contents prajñâ vihâra, volume 6,number 2, july-decmber 2005, 133-135 133 © 2000 by assumption university press cultural snapshots artist: mr. boonpard kangkamano (1966 — ) bachelor of arts (sculpture), chiang mai university, chiang mai, thailand master of arts (sculpture), silpakorn university, bangkok, thailand diploma (sculpture), shinshu university, nagano, japan he is now a lecturer in the college of fine arts at lad krabang in bangkok these works are a commentary on the growing consumerism in thai society. the artist sees this consumerism and materialism becoming so powerful, that it is also feeding upon and destroying indigenous thai culture. taberu consuming (2001, 2002) was originally developed and sculpted in japan, when the artist was studying for his diploma, and later revised in thailand. it suggests that we human beings, live in this world in a manner where we both use the world, but in the process, also destroy it. chopsticks suggest a traditional manner for eating and consuming for the benefit of self and body. their elegance also expresses the paradox more clearly between traditional culture and destructive consumption. 134 prajñâ vihâra taking advantage (2002) was developed after the taberu consuming. the idea is that in this materialistic, consumerist society, people allow others to take advantage of them to satisfy their materialist desires. but here the artist chose the portrait of a woman, implying the condition of poor women, like prostitutes, who are exploited. and this would also include those women who wish to marry foreigners for a better life. even those who reject materialism are taken advantage of because they are in a position which is too weak to fight or escape. thus the face of the portrait has a look of sadness. the manipulation (2002) discusses how thais sometimes use other people’s hands (like foreigner’s hands) and trade-in our own ancient, valuable things because they desire wealth. the khon head indicates something very precious being traded easily and openly. the big ladle also indicates consumption. the hand could be anybody’s hand, but the artist chose a man’s hand because it is unusual for a man to hold a cooking ladle, at least in traditional asian culture, so it creates a feeling of conflict. and a man’s hand also indicates a manipulation which is stronger and more destructive than a soft and weaker hand of a woman. text and photographs are by preeyanuch nhukate, graduate school of philosophy and religon, assumption university of thailand. prajñâ vihâra 135 spirituality and mysticism: a global view book review spirituality and mysticism: a global view. by james a. wiseman. new york: maryknoll, orbis books, 2006. 242pp. globalization is a reality that has profoundly changed our world. john paul ii once stated, "globalization, a priori, is neither good nor bad. it will be what people make of it."1 accordingly, globalization and its consequences will be shaped by human choice and action. the negative side of globalization has cast its shadows through a deteriorating effect on the environment and an alarming persistence of poverty in various nations of the world. it also sets off an era of cultural and religious warfare, not only through the battlefields, but also through the media and economics. yet on the positive side, it can enable us to break down cultural, ethnic, and religious barriers and brings us into increased human understanding and solidarity. to provide guidance for students of spirituality, who live in a society of religious pluralism in this age of globalization, james a. wiseman wrote the book "spirituality and mysticism: a global view" with attention to the global context in which the study of christian spirituality is done. he refers globalization to its positive sense which is "a growing sense of interconnectedness among all peoples and nations on earth, facilitated by rapid means of communication that promote a sharing of ideas and a broadening of intellectual and emotional horizons."2 even though the focus of the book is specifically on christian spirituality, wiseman also wants to "offer examples of how some have done the dialogue with persons of other persuasion."3 as a result he repeatedly presents the pieces of history that show christianity, since the beginning, has had a continuing history of living "in peace with their religiously diverse neighbors."4 this relatively short and readable book has ten chapters. the first chapter is a fine treatment of the various issues concerning the definition of terms, christian spirituality and mysticism. particularly informative is wiseman's presentation of a theological methodology, inspired by lonergan, for interpreting and understanding the subject of spirituality. the second chapter is a sketchy outline of the spirituality of the biblical authors and the different forms of exegesis, which have been foundational in guiding understanding and explaining spiritualities. wiseman's attempt to cover a colossal amount of material in one chapter however seems to be problematic. yet, he shows his genius in employing the biblical story of abraham as a lens through which the history of biblical spirituality is examined. besides, he adopts david tracy's schema dividing biblical interpretation into three paradigms: pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. as a result he appropriately recognizes the contributions of feminist biblical scholars, such as elisabeth schussler fiorenza, and at the same time he sensibly includes the poignant works of elie wiesel in the long tradition of biblical interpretation. in chapters three through seven, wiseman presents a superb synopsis of the history of christian spirituality from the early beginning of christian martyrs, through patristic era, to the medieval age. not only the most important and familiar figures in christian spirituality's history such as clement of alexandria, origen, anthony of egypt, augustine of hippo, gregory of nyssa or thomas aquinas are presented but influential figures in the east like ephraim the syrian, gregory palamas, nicephorus and, most interestingly, important women, such as perpetua, felicity, macrina, syncletica (a desert mother), and frankish woman dhuoda are included as well. writing a short book with so much material to cover, wiseman creatively pairs the historical figures with contemporary ones. thus lutheran spirituality is treated through the writings of both luther and martin dietrich bonhoeffer; ignatian spirituality is discussed through the writings of ignatius of loyola and karl rahner; similarly the book of common prayer is considered with evelyn underhill's works. accordingly history of spirituality of several centuries is greatly compressed; at the same time, wiseman is able to demonstrate a continuing influence of a school of spirituality. in the last three chapters wiseman explores recent christian spiritualities in asia, africa, and the americas. instead of examining an asian spirituality in general, he focuses specifically on indian, japanese, and filipino figures. in consideration of african spirituality, wiseman's focus is thematic: liturgical inculturations, social justice, and the current rise of the independent churches which represents a wide range of christian spirituality at work on africa continent. in the final chapter of the book examining the spiritualities throughout the americas, wiseman focuses on liberation theology through the writings of gustavo gutiérez; on feminist spirituality through the works of sandra schneiders, jacquelyn grant, and ada maría-diaz; on pentecostal through the writings of jonathan edwards'; on contemplative spirituality through those of thomas merton. reading the book, one can't help but agree with peter c. phan that "within the narrow space allotted to his book, he [wiseman] deftly helps us not only to take a penetrating look at the catholic, protestant, anglican, and pentecostal spiritual and mystical traditions but also to extend our horizon to include asia, africa, and the americas."5 unfortunately, the book's greatest strength is also its most conspicuous limitation: so much material and so little space. nonetheless, wiseman sensibly adds to each chapter stimulating discussion questions and helpful bibliographies for the students who wish to go deeper into the subject. at the beginning of the book, wiseman warns that "some readers will lament the absence of one or more of their favorites" because "rather than attempting to say just a bit about a great many persons and movements, i have gone into somewhat greater detail about a few of them."6 given that wiseman "had to be extremely selective," 7 one still wonders if liberation spirituality in latin america would be better demonstrated by a heroic example of the struggles of the many christian martyrs such as archbishop oscar romero. furthermore, those who are aware of the work of the three volumes of asian christian theologies8 will certainly question the choice of shusaku endo, kazoh kitamori, or mary john mananzan over other writers of contextual theologies such as feminist, dalit, minjung, tribal/indigenous, minority resistance theologies which represent the rich tradition of christian spirituality emerged from multi-religious contexts in asia. after all, despite its limitations of perspective on south america and asia, the book is a great accomplishment in informing students of spirituality about the richness and variety of the world's christian spiritualities. it is an innovative atlas of the history of the christian spirituality which is a useful guide to seeing christian spirituality from global perspective. it definitely makes a wonderful contribution to orbis books 's "theology in global perspective" series. reviewed by joseph n. dinh, op assumption university, thailand endnotes 1 john paul ii, "address to the pontifical academy of sciences" (april 27, 2001) no. 2, taken from the vatican web site. 2 james a. wiseman, spirituality and mysticism: a global view (new york: maryknoll, orbis books, 2006), xi. 3 ibid. 19. 4 ibid. 45. 5 peter c. phan, "foreword," in james a. wiseman, spirituality and mysticism: a global view, ix. 6 james a. wiseman, spirituality and mysticism: a global view, xii. 7 ibid. 8 john c. england et al. (eds.), asian christian theologies: a research guide to authors, movements, sources (new york: maryknoll, orbis books, 2004 & 2005). 147-154 islam and ecology cultural corners and asian contexts cristal huang soochow university, taiwan abstract globalization in the way it has often been conceived, is onesided. it is often thought of as the influence of the west upon the rest of the world. but in the very early exchanges – the silk road – this was a two-way relationship. how can we conceive of globalization, not as domination, but as exchange between local cultures? in this paper i propose to investigate idea of the “corners” as a new model of globalization. global or local recently, the term globalization has become an important concept in asia. but we can ask: why do we need such a concept, and how can we interpret the term appropriately? and from these questions, we will somehow get to know more about the necessity of globalization, and if the term has any legitimacy in asia. if globalization means to run societies in asia from a global perspective, then globalization is nothing new. trade and cultural exchange has taken place with the west since the time of the silk road. in globalization today, western societies often influence our human needs and social practices. these are products which are not necessary to own, but in our contemporary globalized world, nobody seems to mind. asia during the time of the silk road also exported culture to the west. if we did transfer goods and ways of living into western life-world before, then why not now? this points to the fact that asia needs to awaken to the possibilities of globalization. it should no longer be content with being passive receiver of culture, but should work harder on the creation of culture. otherwise, our great influence on western culture during the silk road will only be something of interest for tourists. so our next question 32 prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 32-36 © 2000 by assumption university press is how to create and export our culture into the west? the integration of cultural differences in asia how does globalization influence the relationship of cultural differences in asia? now we will try to reflect on the relation between the inescapability of globalization and the possibility of preserving cultural corners under an asian context. our argument is: if we must continue to globalize asian societies in the future centuries, what principles should we should pay attention to if we still want to preserve cultural identities in asia? we identify the necessity of globalization, but we also want to preserve the local as the entrance to the global. and by globalizing locally, we need to interpret texts of every asian social activity according to asian contexts. in asia, there are many different cultural regions. we can consider each region as a corner. the idea of corner is to avoid thinking that our own cultural region is the central part of the world. the historic silk road is now just a tourist spot. yet the current import of technology is really an invisible silk road extending into asia for hundreds years. but is this new road a two-way street? can we use the diversity of asian corners as a strength rather than a weakness? among the many contemporary theories of interpretation, the socalled hermeneutic circle may provide us an important tool. re-defining the meaning of a corner, it is a place that links two margins. a corner is not anymore just a corner, it is the essential part for moving toward differences. in asia, the possibility of facing global totality comes from the corner. when people in asia learn how to identify our cultural phenomenon as a passage between differences, then we will revitalize asian commercial and economic power once again. we may see cities in asia as stops, when people from outside need to do business here, they need to work on our cultural commonness, too. it means that asia works together for asian benefits. for example, we provide local materials, local manpower, but we also negotiate with companies to respect reasonable salaries for these natural sources. by combining both globalization and economic learning, asian people will earn good life-world together. our point is that globalization is not only for external marketing, it means to use global cristal huang 33 standards to earn a decent living. asian people will respect cultural differences. it means that we must also remove some of the blind fantasies of the western social lifeworld. and then people will try to move on to other corners. the principle of facing one’s own self as a corner under the whole context may provide asian studies multiple dimensions of signifying what asia means. by this principle, every cultural region in asia is a corner from which we can go toward different directions. every corner is the beginning of a journey. by detouring from corner to corner, we continue the journey of globalizing asia. here let us use a very concrete example to describe clearly what we mean about the philosophy of corners. the corner has two walls that cross and encounter, by the old way of thinking, we think that asia must keep the dying traditions, but by the philosophy of corner, we go to another direction-but it is not a antior opposite direction neither-it is only a possible direction from this corner. asia can create new traditions with modern validity of social values in present time. then by globalizing the new way of thinking, in many years, they become traditions. to say this in another way: if we cannot keep the old tradition we can continue to create good ways of thinking, and it will develop into a tradition in the future. contemporary french philosopher gilles deleuze uses french term “devenir” on the philosophizing, now let us use this to reflect asian corners. asian corners are both global and local: let us use temporarily the term glocal to describe the situation. global or local? toward a “glocal” society the term global is relevant to worldwide scope or application1. if we use semiological approach to explain what global and glocal mean, we may try the following analysis. first, to saussure, a sign has always two sides: to be spoken, and to be signified. global is a term. but the term glocal does not yet have an official and legal sense and meaning. but it comes from the signifying of the real operation of globalization. there is actually not a globe as a place from which to run business. when a society wants to be globally established, it still needs to start from the base of being local. the way of operating globally involves interpreting this local 34 prajñâ vihâra place as one unit of the whole globe. without the corner, there is no room. when people ignore one corner, immediately the wholeness of the room disappears. under the context of being global, each corner needs to be movable. when we keep to the two sides of one corner, we are local. but when we move in a different direction, then the space is open to the outside. under the contexts of being with others, the space is both: local and global, and we temporarily use glocal to describe the situation. the totality of speaking (le langage) has two major parts: the speech (la parole) and the language system(la langue)2. to saussure, the place of language system exists inside the wholeness of the function of language3. so if a society is global, it means that it maintains every social activity by a global perspective. but here we use the term global from a particular perspective. yet we can be deceived. for example when one japanese bank uses its royal family identity in its advertisements, yet its services are similar to any other foreign bank, then it is only a false use of cultural identity. it is already a global bank. the cultural advertisement is only a means. we should only accept this bank if it is a safe and good bank, we must try to overlook the cultural allusions when we make decisions about whether to choose this bank, or a bank from abroad. we usually conceive of globalization in the form of a globe or spherical suface. the focus of this paper is to analyze whether it is possible to use cultural corners to understand the scope of globalization in asian societies. practically, asian societies need to promote its asian identity first. the principle of our interpretation is to face both sides, and the contexts turn to be clear when we find paths. cultural corners: the entrance to contexts so the philosophy of corner may perhaps provide a new idea for thinking about contexts. the problems of globalization need to be discussed by local people in societies. and if they decide to pursue and promote globalization, they still need to start from local regions. glocal is only an example of a term that we can use to emphasize the relation between global and local. by thinking practically concerning local issues, we move from the global positions. by thinking practically concerning global issues, we also move from the local languages and needs. in asia, our languages and needs provide our true characters. from the glocal perspective, we cristal huang 35 move through cultural corners. the cultural corners are also the entrance to asian contexts. from local corners, we move toward the contexts. and in these contexts, we are asia. endnotes 1 http://www.yourdictionary.com/ahd/g/g0152400.html. 2 ferdinand de saussure, cours de linguistique générale (paris: éditions payot, 1972), pp.23-35. 3 ibid. p.27. 36 prajñâ vihâra 09_(143-152) cultural snapshot rishi_phra siriphong.pmd cultural snapshots: on the rishi artist: phra siriphong kharuphankit prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 143-152 2000 by assumption university pressc 143 phra siriphong was born on 7 july 1956. he was the only child of mr. maen (khord) kharuphan, the operator of an orchard at bang tamru district, and mrs.chaluey (jaemjan), from amphur tayang, petchaburi province. after finishing prathom 4, elementary education, from amnuaywongwittaya school in thonburi, he continued his study at the dance and music college (witthayalai natasin) on 17 may 1967, majoring in thai musical instruments with a thai music minor. after leaving the dance and music college, he trained in the thai art of making khon masks. he has created many khon masks and teacher’s heads (srisa khru). his remarkable achievement and superb craftsmanship was recognized in his being awarded a prize: the master of the arts (sartrmedhee), from professor mom luang pin malakul foundation, in the category of the thai art of khon mask making, on 24 october 2001. phra siriphong was ordained a monk at wat suttharam, bangkok, on 8 june 1986. tissapharano is his ordained name. he was appointed assistant abbot of wat suttharam on 21 june 2005. on 4 september 2006 her royal highness crown princess maha chakri sirindhorn bestowed on him a souvenir medal of “thai cultural heritage conservationist”. the following are excerpts from his book the gurus of the artist. the first passage is from phra siriphong and is a description of the various kinds of rishi [eysei, rsi]. the second section is an explanation of the need for the honoring of the rishi by ranadhamma dharapan which phra siriphong included in his book. the last section are illustrations and photos of srisa khru (teacher’s heads) made by phra siriphong and his assistants. many examples of phra siriphong’s work can be found at: www.monnut.com/en. rishi rishi is translated as a ‘seer’, meaning the possessor of a higher knowledge derived from insight. he can see the past, the present and the future and therefore is called ‘the knower of three periods of time’ [trikalajna]. the rishi had many roles in ancient times: as a knowledgeable person, as a teacher, as a spiritual leader, and as an observer of culture. they are named according 144 prajna vihara-~ to their characteristic behaviors or ways of living, for example: a ‘seer’ [rishi], a ‘yoga practicer’ [yogi], a ‘trance possessor’ [tapasi], ‘a wearer of long hair’ [jatila], ‘a learned person’ [muni], ‘a successor’ [siddhi]. rishis may wear a bark cloth, a dyed cloth, or a white cloth. 1. brahma-rishi means the rishis, who are derived from brahma or rishis who belong to the brahmin caste, the highest caste, and observe more intense ascetic practices than any other rishis. they are asvavasu, astavagra, atri, ouvara, bharadwaja, bhrgu, cayavana, suka, dadhija, damana, devasaraman, gautama, jachali, kasayapa, kathupa, likita, lomasa, mamkanaka, marakandeya, narda, pulassataya, ricika, waisampayana, vasittha, visawamitta, vayasa. 2. deva-rishi are the rishis, who are derived from gods, they are originally born in high status, and come to the human world from heavenly world. they became rishi in order to observe the ascetic practices to achieve the resulting perfections. they include: brahmanaspati, aggani, usnas, buddha, asita, bhurabhula, kasayapadevapitra, tanupravata, lomasa, vasita, and narada. the last three rishis are not only derived from gods, but also because of their intense austerity they raised their status to become brahmarishis. 3. raja-rishi means the rishis who were once kings but renounced their property and became ascetics. they are janaka, rama, lakshna, vishvamitra, and vesantara. 4. maha-rishi means the great rishi. but it can also refer to minor rishis, who practice ascetic lives intensively until they achieve supernatural powers that can even frighten gods and demons. they are known as duravasa, kapila, and agustaya. in the sanskrit literature, there are stories narrating important rishis existing in the human and heavenly worlds. they are as follows: phra siriphong kharuphankit 145 146 prajna vihara-~ phra siriphong kharuphankit 147 148 prajna vihara-~ phra siriphong kharuphankit 149 mask at center right belonged to phra siriphong’s teacher arkom sayakhom. 1. the rishi ‘valamiki’, who is the famous poet, who composed vedic scriptures and the ramayana. 2. the rishi named ‘bharatamuni’, who is the teacher of dance, who wrote the dancing scripture entitled ‘natyasatra’, and recorded the 108 dancing postures of shiva. 3. the narada-rishi, who taught the musical subjects. 4. the rishi who is expert in medicine. 5. the rishis who suppress all evils, they include agustaya, kapila and brhaspati. why we need to honor the rishi? by ranadhamma dharapan translated by veerachart nimanong i am often asked by people, when they see me exhibiting or worshiping an amulet or statue of rishi at my home: why do you exhibit the rishi? why do you worship the rishi? who is the rishi? a rishi [eysei, rsi] is an ascetic, often dwelling in the forest, observing celibacy, renouncing material possessions, and following practices quite similar to buddhist monks. yet it is clear that a rishi is not a monk when considered from his outward appearance. the story of rishi existed long before buddhism. in fact, when the lord buddha was born, a rishi, visited the royal palace and predicted that siddhartha will someday be ordained as a monk and will become the great teacher of the world. after siddhartha grew up, he went to study with two ascetics: a rishi named alara kalamakotta and one named udaka ramaputta. rishi alara taught him to perfect up through the seventh level of trance and the rishi udaka taught him to perfect the eighth level of trance. when he finished his study with the two ascetics, he then knew that it was not the way for which he was searching. why is this so? because, even though while in trance, all images of his worldly relations like his wife and son, together with his worldly possessions disappeared, they immediately reappeared when he emerged out 150 prajna vihara-~ from the trance. he then decided to be ordained, and his ordination for the first time was as a rishi, because the tradition monkhood did not begin until siddhartha became the lord buddha. after his enlightenment, he thought about to whom he should preach his dharma for the first time. suddenly, he thought of his former teachers, alara kalamakotta and udaka ramaputta. but when he went to search for them to preach to them, he discovered that they died to their bodily existence before his arrival. the lord buddha knew with his special insight that since his former teachers were born in the brahma world (a formless plane of existence [arupa-bhrahma] where the span of life is up to 8400 eons) they did not have the bodily instruments to benefit from his preaching concerning the path to nibbana. only human beings can achieve the attainment of nibbana. how to explain the lord buddha’s gratitude toward the rishi? even the buddha, who is the most sublime of the human beings and gods, still gives honor to the rishi. so shouldn’t we ordinary human beings, with our wives and children, and our desire for worldly things, also honor the rishi? the triple gem is the sanctuary and the object of highest worship; this includes the buddha, the dhamma and the sangha. however, the lord buddha never prohibits the worshiping of the teacher, no matter who they are. he always taught that one should be humble to our seniors. this involves: 1. seniority in age: those who are older than us. whether they be our brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, and elderly people. 2. seniority in birth: those who are born higher than us. for instance the king and queen. 3. seniority in virtue: those who have more virtue than us. they are monks and novices, and those who are our benefactors, like our father, mother and teachers. this last category includes rishi. the lord buddha mentions the merits resulting from being humble to these three groups: phra siriphong kharuphankit 151 those who humble themselves to those who are senior will receive four kinds of blessing: long life, beautiful skin, bodily and mental happiness and physical and mental energy.1 the lord buddha never taught that people should pay respect only to the monks. even the supreme patriarch (carern nanavaro), the noble monk from wat thepasirindarawasa, teaches that one should prostrate oneself five times a day: the first prostration is for the lord buddha, the second for the dhamma, the third for sangha, the fourth for our parents, and the fifth for our teachers. he even accepts prostration done for trees, so why not for the rishi, who are nobler than the trees. at the very least we should think of the rishi’s life as the original influence of the lord buddha’s celibate lifestyle, the teaching of the ‘form and formless trances’ [rupajana and arupajana], the teaching of non-violence, the observance of the eight precepts, and the vegetarian diet. the rishi always spreads loving kindness and good-wishes to all living beings. (translated from the book entitled ‘holy’ [saksit], 15 vol. 15, no. 348, 1 july 1997/2540k). endnote 1aphivadanasilissa niccam vutthapacayino cattaro dhamma vatthanti ayuvanno sukham phalam. 152 prajna vihara-~ 1free of religion & religious heritage book review piety and politics: nurcholish madjid and his interpretation of islam in modern indonesia ann kull, lund studies in history of religions volume 21 lund: lund university, 2005 with piety and politics, swedish islamologist ann kull has published the most extensive study on the indonesian intellectual nurcholish madjid (1939-2005) -also known as cak nur -in english so far. this book is based on her doctoral thesis and was ready to go to press a few weeks before this leading neo-modernist muslim thinker's death in august 2005. in this study the author has focused on the later thought of cak nur, and in particular the diffusion and reception of his ideas. the book's first two chapters deal with kull's methodological concerns and situating nurcholish in the context of contemporary indonesia respectively. for her 'secular and empirical' research approach kull is indebted to social scientists like the german sociologist georg stauth and peter beyer, a professor of religious studies at the university of ottawa. from the former she has adopted a research method designed to integrate biography and ethnography, bringing together 'life projects, institutional affiliations and social networks' (16), in order to show how a thinker's ideas are embedded in a discrete social milieu. beyer's distinction between religious performance and religious function provides a framework for analysing cak nur's interpretations of islam and how these are applied to concrete situations. for a coherent presentation of the wide variety of sources that have inspired nurcholish madjid's ideas kull borrows the notion of the 'islamic basket', developed by her supervisor jan hjärpe. she explains: 'the "basket" is applicable to all religions and ideologies, and is said to contain the complete range of histories, activities, practices, beliefs, etc. that comprise an entire tradition. […] "the 'basket' 182 prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 182-187 © 2000 by assumption university press is full. however, and this is important, not everything is on display all the time".' (10). for surveying nurcholish's ideas during the latter part of his career, that is from the early 1980s onwards, kull has mainly relied on his islam agama kemanusiaan: membangung tradisi dan visi baru islam indonesia (1995). in composing the biographical portrait of cak nur, the author has drawn on a number of earlier studies. for nurcholish's career as a student leader in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the work of the malaysian muhammad kamal hassan is of prime importance. notwithstanding the fact that in his assessment hassan tends to side with some of nurcholish's fiercest critics, it was the first major study of his ideas. two other key sources in english are the writings of the australian scholar greg barton, who has published a number of studies on indonesian neo-modernists, and siti fathimah's ma thesis, 'modernism and the contextualization of islamic doctrines: the reform of indonesian islam proposed by nurcholish madjid' (1999), written at canada's mcgill university. kull has also made use of studies on the role of islam in contemporary indonesia by hefner; martin; woodward; saeed, and steenbrink, in which the ideas of cak nur have received ample coverage. for situating nurcholish in the context of present-day indonesian intellectualism, the ph.d. thesis by his close associate budhy munawar-rachman is one of the most important sources. kull considers it to be the most 'comprehensive study of nurcholish's ideas' that has been made so far (22). interestingly, it was written (in indonesian) at the advanced school of philosophy in jakarta, under the supervision of the german-indonesian catholic priest frans magnis suseno, who has been an important interlocutor of nurcholish throughout the years. munawar-rachman later became the manager of paramadina, the ngo and soon also a private university founded by nurcholish madjid and a number of like-minded intellectuals in 1986. an important aspect of cak nur's background is the dual secular and islamic education which informs his intellectual outlook. after completing a public primary school, he pursued an islamic-oriented education at prominent javanese pesantrens in jombang and at gontor. in particular the latter school, with its emphasis on both arabic and english language training, and classical islamic studies alongside secular subjects, played an important part in shaping the young nurcholish. he then purbook review 183 sued a tertiary education at the state institute of islamic studies (iain) syarif hidayatullah in jakarta, studying adab (arabic literature and islamic history) rather than specialising in fiqh (islamic jurisprudence) or kalam (classical theology). after a career in indonesia's association of islamic studies (hmi), nurcholish continued his advanced studies in the united states, where he eventually obtained a doctorate in islamic studies from the university of chicago, with a thesis on ibn taymiyya (1984), written under the supervision of fazlur rahman (1919-1988). kull identifies both fazlur rahman and taqi al-din ibn taymiyya (1263-1328) as the two most important influences shaping cak nur's view of the islamic heritage (102). although nurcholish rarely makes any explicit reference to his mentor, the impact of the methodology and reformist ideas of this pakistani scholar on his thought 'cannot be overestimated' (64). apart from this duo, other sources of inspiration form an eclectic mix, featuring indonesian intellectuals who were often at odds with each other: such as hamka and harun nasution; former ministers of religion mukti ali and munawir sjadzali, but also western scholars such as islamicist marshall hodgson, the theologian harvey cox, and the sociologist of religion robert bellah. following siti fathimah, ann kull also notes the impact of the 'perennial philosophy' promoted by europeanborn sufis such as rené guénon, frithjof schuon and martin lings, of which nurcholish showed himself a great admirer (105). since his days as chairman of the hmi, nurcholish madjid has been no stranger to controversy. although not the focus of attention in this study, two speeches given in 1970 and 1972, in which he championed highly contentious views of the concepts of sekularisasi ('secularisation') and desakralisasi ('desacralisation'), caused furore among indonesia's traditionalist and 'mainstream' modernist muslims alike. cak nur was accused of being a 'secularist', and once hailed as a 'young natsir', he was now disowned by indonesia's grand old man of islamic party politics. nurcholish's idiosyncratic interpretation of the legacy of ibn taymiyya was also greeted with considerable scepticism by fellow scholars. what cannot be denied, however, is that his 'contrapuntal reading' to borrow a term from ebrahim moosa betrays not only an enormous erudition and grasp of both classical islamic theology and the muslim interpretations of greek thought, but it also opens exciting possibilities for using the classical 184 prajñâ vihâra islamic legacy in entirely new ways.1 captioning her chapter on nurcholish's thought with the title 'the ideas of nurcholish madjid: "maintain that which is old and good, and take over that which is new and better"', ann kull has surveyed the key concepts informing cak nur's writings since his two 'paradigmatic speeches' (106) of the early 1970s. in addition to sekularisasi and desakralisasi, more 'standard' islamic notions like takwa ('god-fearing'), fitra (man's 'pure original nature and implicit inclination to holiness and truth' (108)), and ijtihad ('independent' reasoning or interpretation) are also of central importance. in addition, there is nurcholish' reliance on the qur'an and sunnah ('tradition of the prophet') in his writings on the relevance of islam in today's world. in regards to the latter it is important to note that cak nur warns against equating sunnah and hadith (hadis in ann kull's parlay). according to nurcholish the hadith collections focus on muhammad's role as a prophet and leader, while the sunnah also includes his actions as a private person (112-3). all these notions and concepts informed nurcholish madjid's interpretation of the islamic legacy, which has been characterised as 'neomodernist', 'liberal', 'pluralist', and 'inclusivist'. in concreto, such an outlook translated into a concern for humanism, democracy, civil society, and religious tolerance. but on a more personal level a reflection of his interest in muhammad as a private person it has also resulted in a deep interest in spiritualism and sufism, leading ann kull to her ultimate conclusion that nurcholish madjid must be regarded as 'first and foremost a sufi' (276). that contention is also informed by the author's findings concerning the 'strategies for the diffusion of nurcholish's ideas' (chapter 4), which were developed in response to indonesia' socio-religious landscape of the 1990s and early twenty-first century. basing herself on the important work done by australian scholar julia day howell on the 'urban sufism' that has been gaining a foothold among indonesia's emerging and increasingly affluent city-dwelling middle and upper classes (89, 173), kull describes how an organisation like paramadina caters for the need among these new elites to find some deeper purpose to life than achieving social success or the amassment of wealth. most of the data in this chapter, kull collected during extensive visits to the paramadina offices in jakarta and lengthy talks and discussions with its staff and associated intellectuals. book review 185 in the chapter on the reception of nurcholish madjid's ideas, the author has categorised the responses as 'positive' and 'negative commentaries'. many of the latter have been well-known since the 1970s, both from the writings of the critics themselves and the earlier mentioned study made by m.k. hassan. but ann kull has also identified a very interesting new voice, coming from a younger generation of muslims known as 'posttraditionalists' or 'postra' (reflecting indonesians' penchant for coining acronyms). postra emerged in early 2000 among young ngo-activists with an nu background. the view held by these critics is that nurcholish madjid has not gone far enough in his innovations. according to one of the spokespersons of postra, ahmad baso, 'islam has many voices and many truths; it is a hybrid culture that keeps changing. […]. "in my opinion islam cannot be hegemonic against local cultures".' what cak nur is accused of is that he advocated 'a new essentialism […] a universalised and institutionalised brand of islam, a legitimisation for hegemony' (237). postra is an interesting phenomenon to watch. based on information derived from baso, kull notes that among their 'principal sources of information are abdurrahman wahid, muhammad arkoun, the egyptian's hassan hanafi and ali abduh razi, and the moroccan muhammad aljabri; other important sources that were mentioned are jürgen habermas, michel foucault, jacques derrida and christian liberation theology' (237). kull agrees with siti fathimah that some of the above muslim intellectuals' names belong to a 'larger tradition of muslim thinkers and scholars throughout the world' of which cak nur is also part (245). with this we have touched on new type of muslim intellectual, who combines a profound grounding in the study of the islamic tradition with an equally solid familiarity with the western academe's achievements in the human sciences. i agree with ann kull's assessment that for the development of such a new intellectual 'tradition' (a word that sits somewhat uneasy with an innovative trend!) '[g]lobalisation must be regarded a prerequisite' (255). it is important to recognise the fluidity that accompanies such a development. scholars and thinkers like nurcholish madjid use a wide variety of sources and references, moving freely between classical texts and modern scholarly works. but it is also crucial to realise that globalisation has as its antithesis a renewed 'interest in cultural origins and in exploring question of identity'.2 that would explain why nurcholish, with a predomi186 prajñâ vihâra nantly indonesian audience, 'although his sources of inspiration are global, […] conceptualises his ideas in a way that makes them applicable to the indonesian context' (249). the fluidity in nurcholish madjid's use of sources is reflected in some of the 'positive commentaries' which ann kull recorded earlier on in her thesis. here cak nur is characterised as a 'free-thinker' who refused to become institutionalised. in that respect, he is put alongside hasan hanafi, mohammed arkoun, and his critics from postra (hendro prasetyo and ali munhanif, cf. p.226). also azyumardi azra notes that cak nur is 'very hard to pin down to a certain, "absolute' typology' (222), as he attempted to develop an 'islamic civilisation (peradaban islam) that would be both viable in a post-modern milieu and strongly rooted in classical islam tradition' (221). this leads to an interesting, larger question, namely: to what extent can a thinker like nurcholish madjid be considered as belonging to that wider phenomenon of the 'liminal' or 'interstitial' intellectual often referred to in the postcolonial studies literature? this is not a question ann kull attempts to answer, but piety and politics contains ample material for considering such an issue. reviewed by carool kersten carool kersten is a ph.d. research student in the department of the study of religions at the school of oriental and african studies (soas) in london. he is writing a thesis on the thought of mohammed arkoun, hasan hanafi and nurcholish madjid. endnotes 1 cf. ebrahim moosa (2005) ghazali and the poetics of imagination. chapel hill: university of north carolina; idem (2006) 'contrapuntal readings in muslim thought: translations and transitions' jaar 74: 1, 107-18. 2 susan bassnett (2003) translation studies. third edition. london and new york: routledge, p.1. book review 187 contents heritage and the paradox of culture* bambang sugiharto parahyangan catholic university, bandung, indonesia abstract we are accustomed to see culture relative to identity. this has been the strategy of modernity which leads us to see globalization as a crisis. this paper proposes to demonstrate that it is more promising to see a culture as a process of transformation through a creative dialogue with its other. today, global interactions have compelled us to rethink the role of our local cultures, along with the significance of its heritage, in our present life. as never before, culture is now situated in a tug of war between centripetal and centrifugal forces. the centripetal would treat culture as a sanctuary or panacea for the troubled identity, whereas the centrifugal would take culture as a strategy for the transformation of self in new contexts and wider possibilities. while the former oftentimes shows not so much a realistic solution to the problem as a disguised helplessness in facing the global power, the latter seems to promise a more realistic response. how we are to see the problem of cultural heritage will depend on how we conceive culture and tradition today. culture given the inevitability of cultural interaction today and the fact that so many elements of our culture do change substantively, it would be more relevant to see culture as a process, instead of a system or a formal pattern. culture is an historic process of plural influences and exchanges. it is a provisional imaginative picture of the junctions of various streams. what is primary is the flow, not the picture. culture is a dynamic living flow. and as such it has its own internal principle of change. culture consists prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 54-60 54 © 2000 by assumption university press of loosely connected elements that can be ordered and reordered in accordance with changing circumstances, such as when beliefs and values become incompatible with each other, politics is in tension between opposing visions and factions, new meaning subverts the old, and so on and so forth. hence culture has its own indeterminacies, internal strains, conflicts and improvisations. it is a process of requests and counterrequests, of changing one’s responses, and of innovating new expressions. it is also a struggle of power over meaning-giving to important aspects of life, such as problems of gender, private property, human rights, etc. culture is a creative reordering and renewing capacity, processes of transmission and transformation, based on the existing condition and the possible.1 although a culture can be envisaged somehow as a certain whole, it is an internally fissured whole, a whole containing internal differences, including its own alternatives (“otherness”) and conceiving internal contestations. the connection between culture and social community is not necessarily one to one. culture may transgress geopolitical boundaries. in terms of culture, some countries may be overlapping. in history the conflation of culture and social unit was oftentimes political: it served to legitimize the construction of a nation-state. and these days, especially when the survival of a certain community is under the threat of global political power, the need to overemphasize cultural uniqueness arises more strongly. in this respect, when according to samuel huntington what is political is basically cultural or civilizational, it would be better to see it the other way round that, what is cultural is basically political.2 in such context culture plays the role only as a temporary common focus for political engagement, a common reference binding various participants to struggle together for a common cause, not necessarily with common understanding of it. further, culture does not always serve as the principle of social order, since social order can be buttressed by technique of surveillance, systematic use of terror, effective economic system, educational institution or media of communication.3 tradition bambang sugiharto 55 if culture is a creative reordering and renewing capacity, then, the capacity does not come out of the blue. it owes a great deal of its energy and intelligence from the collective past experience, namely, from the so called tradition. tradition is a peculiar rationality, that is, a systematic effort to make the lebenswelt the flows of events or the multiformity of experience intelligible. it is the inner struggle of human effort to give meaning to life experience in particular time and space, which eventually forms particular pattern of inner logic and inner feelings about life. tradition is an essential part of our spiritual biography, the collective unconsciousness that has shaped our inner perception, the tacit knowledge that has secretly helped us go through the changes. it serves as the innersetting, the hidden spiritual alphabet of our dealing with the deep mystery and the paradox of life : the perpetual motion and change. there is no culture without tradition. even modernity has its own tradition. the problem, however, is that modernity is characterized by the primacy of the subject over tradition: personal reflection controls tradition. whereas in the pre-modern condition it is tradition that controls personal reflection. modernity is an ongoing process of transvaluation of any cultural traditions, and of its own. but the subject or self is never a disengaged agent. in heideggerian terms, the self finds itself and is able to define itself only in terms of a life shared with others, as being-together.4 and, following merleau-ponty, the most part of its perception is basically pre-conscious and pre-personal, materialized by a bodily ego which is also preconscious.5 it is precisely this archaic unity between the self and the world that manifests itself in the so called tradition. but it manifests itself not so much in its overt systems and artifacts as in the covert desires, emotion, imagination, evaluation and behavior behind them. as such, tradition is the natural field for all our modern thoughts and explicit perceptions. however, when tradition is put vis-à-vis modernity, and “traditional” means “pre-modern”, then, we can see traditional culture, with its peculiar characters, as a significant antidote to contemporary modern life. in general, the traditional antiques set up for us the context of our history. heritage is some sort of transubstantiation of our past. but when they are exhibited in museums they becomes art objects and, like all masterpieces, are made idols, to be appreciated in contemplation, with disinterestedness and distance. and idols soon are transformed into ideas in discourse. unlike modern art objects, however, traditional artifacts 56 prajñâ vihâra originally do not belong to the realm of spectacle, in the sense that they are meant neither to be appreciated through watching, nor for contemplation of the sublime. they, instead, belong to the realm of event. it is not the object in itself, but rather, the event or the collective happening that counts. in such context, beauty, usefulness, pleasure, reflection and psychophysical effects are all fused.6 therein the significance of an object lies in its physical presence, which presents the unpresentable, the absent, the godhead. the power does not lie in its conceptual meaning or virtuosity, but rather, in its emanation of being, in the collective spiritual-cognitive resonance it incites. it does not mean, it simply is. and to appreciate in the modern world the value of objects can be framed in two main categories: instrumentality and contemplation. instrumental perspective prevailing in modernity has created peculiar fabricated environment filled with mass-produced things, the world of “the they” (das man). the modern perspective of contemplation, on the other hand, has created esoteric art with its high formalism trying to articulate the sublime. the former is characterized by its usefulness and transparency, the latter by its virtuosity and opacity. traditional artifacts can be viewed as an antidote to the insipidity of functional modern industrial environment as well as to the anomic and idiosyncratic world of art. in traditional art maximum utility is continually violated in favor of imagination and sheer caprice, whereas beauty and contemplation are subordinated to usefulness and supernatural power. the energy of its creation is derived from the desire to take delight in every thing we see and touch, a celebration of divinity working in and through banality. it is a fiesta of the object which transforms everyday utensils into a sign of communal participation. this explains the predominant penchant for decoration, while in modernity decoration is almost a crime. the imprint on the object is not personal signature, but rather, a faded scar commemorating the original brotherhood of man, the fact that the object is made by and for human collectivity, where soul searches for other soul and body for other body, in a mutually shared physical life.7 by suppressing local traditions and heritage modernity has impoverished the world, has become an agent of cultural entropy. and as a utopia it has created uniformity without unity, has failed to eradicate rivalry and hatred between peoples and states. great civilization is always bambang sugiharto 57 a rich synthesis of various cultures, an ongoing growth through the elaboration of otherness. global cultural interaction and authenticity global modernization has enhanced cultural interactions which, in turn, have also elicited the instability of culture. in the interaction selfinterrogation and mutual self-criticism take place, in which the participating cultures are put into question. in this way, cultures would weave and reweave their conceptual networks continually. through a process of translation, appropriation, resistance, subversion and compromise, thoughts, emotions, symbols and self–awareness are time and again decomposed and recomposed. it is a process of continuous translation of the other into our own horizon, biography and collective consciousness, and the reverse, our own into the other’s. thereby we are exposed to the possibility of interpreting anew our own cultural tradition as well as our personal narratives, hence a new possibility to give sense to life.8 indeed the logic of negation or the logic of the “new” inherent in modernism would always compel cultural traditions to reformulate and translate their worldviews in terms of new frameworks of meaning, new demands and new opportunities. but the outcome of such process is not necessarily alienating, since in this way the long hidden potentiality and the unknown significance of a culture may also be rendered manifest to their most abundant flowering. neither is it to be perceived simply as leading to the re-integration of the core values of the respective cultures, as once envisaged by samuel huntington. it is, instead, a process of deleuzian deterritorialization of meanings and values, a subtle and unpredictable process of ramification, which in turn might even change the very core value of the culture itself.9 cultural interaction is a process of self-enlargement. vis-à-vis the other, or the thou, we realize ourselves, we realize the imaginative variations of the ego, the playful metamorphosis of the ego.10 it is a process of recognizing the complexity, ambiguity and subtlety of each other’s “world”. what emerges in the interaction is the truth that tells about both. and the truth becomes perceptible only through letting oneself “be told” by the 58 prajñâ vihâra other, being exposed to that otherness. this is an infinite relation. for the condition of the dialogue keeps changing, motivated by different interests, questions and prejudices.11 we are all the potentialities that we have. what we call “human nature” is something we interpret and construct through relationship, by way of metaphors, figures, discourses, organizations and various forms of self-externalization. identity is in fact a transitory product of ongoing critical dialogical exchange with others. history, tradition and heritage of the past are all the data and interpretation that have constituted our way of living, that we have made use of, and that we are exposed to as an alternative among many others. history, tradition and heritage are not always objective representations of the past, but rather, possible interpretations of it, which are to be re-interpreted so as to transform us, to keep us on the move and to enable us to evolve to higher level.12 more than simply a matter of transmission, tradition is a process of transformation. in global cultural interaction what we can expect is the disclosure of possibilities for being and acting that emerge in and by means of playful encounters with the others. it is self-enrichment and greater self-realization as a result of the play of meaning. authenticity, then, is to be conceived as “being in the truth”. we are in the truth when we are true to ourselves, when in the process of self-transformation we are able to incorporate our specific tradition and personal histories, that is, when our narratives are such as to contain a significant amount of ongoing coherence ; when in our rewriting and retelling we are able to preserve and take up the significance of the past with greater subtlety and complexity of narrative. we are authentic also when we are able to overcome the distortions – systematic or otherwisethat constantly menace conversation; when we can maintain the openness of the conversation and keep it going. for it seems that what we most truly are, in our deepest inner self, is a conversation. endnotes * the paper was written for aacp international conference on “asian heritage in a global society”, 18-20 august 2004, bangkok, thailand. 1 cfr. bourdieu, outline of a theory of practice (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1977) p 8. bambang sugiharto 59 2 huntington basically sees political problems of the global world today as merely problems of identity rooted in the differences of civilizations. see samuel p.huntington, the clash of civilizations, remaking the world order (new york: touchstone, 1997) pp 20-21. 3 cfr. j.g. merquior, the veil and the mask: essays on culture and ideology (london: routledge and kegan paul,1979) pp 63-65. 4 see martin heidegger, being and time, trans john macquarrie et al. (new york: harper and row, 1962) pp 61-62. 5 cfr. maurice merleau-ponty, phenomenology of perception, trans. colin smith ( new york: the humanities press, 1962) pp viii-xi. 6 cfr. leon rosenstein, “the aesthetic of the antique” in philip alperson (ed) the philosophy of the visual arts, (new york: oxford university press, 1992) pp 404-405. 7 octavio paz writes beautifully on craftwork, comparing it with modern objects. this part is inspired very much by the article. see octavio paz, “use and contemplation”, ibid. pp 402-408. 8 cfr. gadamer, truth and method, (london: sheed and ward,1975) pp 345-6. 9 in deleuzian perspective meaning and values as inscription of desire and produced by various “desiring machine” are deterritorialized along with the capitalist formation. the deterritorialization happens in such an unprecedented way that the previous social inscriptions is no longer needed. see gilles deleuze and felix guattari, anti-oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia, trans. robert hurley et al (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1986). 10 cfr. paul ricoeur, “hermeneutics and the critique of ideology”, in j.b.thompson (ed), hermeneutics and the human sciences (new york: cambridge university press, 1981) p. 94. 11 see gadamer, “forward to the second german edition of truth and method”, in i.k.baynes et al (ed), after philosophy (massachusets: mit press, 1991) p 347. 12 michel foucault proposes an interesting notion that by way of reinterpreting our history, self can also re-create her/himself. this “aesthetics of existence” is in line with nietzschean notion of self as a “work of art”. see h.dreyfus et al, michel foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (chicago: university of chicago press, 1982). 60 prajñâ vihâra 08_(154-163)art and knowledge in romantic philo art and knowledge in romantic philosophy paolo euron chulalongkorn university, thailand บทคัดย่อ บทความน้ีผู้เขียนนำเสนอโลกทัศน์บางอย่างของความรู้และบทกวีของ ปรัชญาโรแมนติกเยอรมันในยุคเร่ิมแรกจากมุมมองท่ีไม่เป็นระบบ เป้าหมายหลัก ไม่ใช่เพื่อการนำประวัติของปรัชญาโรแมนติกยุคเริ่มแรกมาสร้างใหม่ ผู้เขียน ต้องการช้ีให้เห็นว่าข้อความทางทฤษฎีบางอย่างของนักคิดโรแมนติก ยังคงมีความ ต่อเน่ืองกับความคิดยุคปัจจุบัน ความคิดแนวโรแมนติกบางอย่างเก่ียวกับความเป็น จริงและการสร้างสรรค์ศิลปะเป็นองค์ประกอบท่ีสำคัญของความคิดแบบตะวันตก และเป็นเง่ือนไขหน่ึงของประสบการณ์ประจำวันของเราเก่ียวกับชีวิตและศิลปะแม้ว่า เราจะไม่ได้ตระหนักถึงเร่ืองน้ีก็ตาม ผู้เขียนจะนำเสนอมโนทัศน์สองอย่างเป็น แนวทาง กล่าวคือมโนทัศน์เร่ืองความเป็นจริงและมโนทัศน์เร่ืองการจำลอง abstract in this essay i will present some approaches to knowledge and poetics by the early german romantic philosophers. my main purpose is not a historical reconstruction of early romantic philosophy, but to point out its continuity with present thought. the essay will demonstrate that the romantic ideas concerning reality and artistic creation are still a constitutive part of western thought and a condition of our everyday experience of life and art, even if we are not aware of it. i will use two concepts as a guiding thread: the concept of reality and the concept of imitation. 154 prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 154-163 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ 1 today we live in a world where everything seems relative. in our life everything is determined: everything has a dimension and a duration. everything was made, everything has a purpose and it is connected with other things, that is to say, it is in relation with other things. for instance, we can say a book is on the table because we consider the “book” is not the “table” on which it lies. everything is because it is not something different. in our everyday experience everything seems relative, because everything is related with other distinct things. but in 19th century romantic philosophy we find a peculiar idea of reality, called the “absolute”. in our everyday lives, we consider the distinctness and relativity of things to the point where we have lost the sense for absolute and the meaning of the word. nevertheless we can have glimpse of the original meaning of absolute if we consider such ideas as “god” or the experience of “love”. even today, even in our “relativistic” and materially “conditioned” world, a “relative” or “conditional” love is not worth serious consideration. for the romantic philosophers, the absolute is the central concept of concern. the absolute reality can be considered the infinite [in german: das unendliche], or the un-conditioned [das unbedingte], or simply the absolute [das absolute]. accordingly, the task of philosophy is to explain how we can conceive a finite reality. it is to understand the conditioned reality, and the relative, conditioned things of our everyday life, from the perspective of the absolute. for romantic philosophers the reality of the absolute is not the main problem. the task of philosophy is to explain the existence of finite reality. for us, today, the concept of absolute is not so obvious. the challenge is to attempt to explain it and recover its importance through the romantic philosophers. the absolute is the unconditional reality: what is not conditioned by other things and what is not relative to other things, what is free from capture by any point of view. the word “absolute” derives from the latin adjective: absolutus = ab-solutus = not tied, not bound, i.e. free, not conditioned by anything, without bond, without connection. 155paolo euron in romantic philosophy the absolute is the only reality, it is object and subject at once, it is infinite, without beginning and without end. determined things, finite things of the material world of experience are nothing but parts of the absolute, determinations inside the absolute. the concept of absolute was unknown in classical age: for plato and aristotle perfection is related to measure and limit, whereas the unlimited and the infinite suggest imperfection. “cosmos” is the finite and ordinate universe conceived by plato. it is not until nikolaus cusanus (1400) that we find a philosopher using the word “absolute” to refer to god. god is beyond our possibility of knowledge and god is the first historical experience of absolute. god is something immeasurable, to whom nothing can be compared; he is the absolute; since our knowledge proceeds by comparison, god cannot be object of knowledge. following cusanus, giordano bruno (1548-1600) proposed an infinite universe as effect of god’s (infinite) creative power. we can say that the romantic concept of absolute is derived from spinoza and bruno’s concept of nature as a necessary creation of god. the infinite effect (nature) of an infinite cause (god) is infinite. kant uses the word “conditioned” referring to the world of nature which we can know by means of intellect, whereas we can have experience of the “unconditioned” only by means of our freedom (morality). we can consider the epitaph inscribed on kant’s gravestone. two things fill me with increasing wonder: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. this well-known epitaph, drawn from his writings, recalls the two realms which are the central topics of kant’s philosophy: on one hand knowable nature; on the other hand the infinite reality attested by our freedom and by the moral law. nature and spirit: these are the two correlated realms that the romantic philosophers try to unify. romantic philosophers will think the absolute in the kantian meaning of “unconditioned”: absolute is nature, but nature as a whole, not as an object of understanding or intellect (which understands natural rules), but in its freedom. the whole as absolute cannot be conditioned, it is necessarily free. 156 prajna vihara~ the romantic poet and philosopher novalis wrote: wir suchen berall das unbedingte, und finden immer nur dinge. we look everywhere for the absolute, and we always find only things. novalis, schriften. die werke friedrich von hardenbergs ii [stuttgart, kohlhammer: 1960] p.454. the unconditioned (absolute) cannot be any object of knowledge; in the world we can only find things [german: dinge], but we look for the absolute [das unbedingte], which is not a thing and which cannot be a thing. this fact explains a general romantic attitude: passion, desire and longing for something (which one cannot reach) are more satisfying than the possession of a thing. romantic philosophers do not consider the infinite or absolute as an object of intellectual knowledge or of material possession. romantic philosophers try to think the relationship between finite and infinite in its necessity, they try to catch the unceasing movement of reality between finite (things) and infinite (absolute). the central interest of early romantic philosophers was not the possession of finite (which cannot satisfy us), nor the infinite (which we cannot reach), but the necessary relationship between them (that we experience primarily as a desire and a longing). 2 the idea that art is an imitation of nature has lasted for more than two thousand years. imitation is the easiest and most natural in order to explain the relationship between things of nature and things called “works of art”. karl philipp moritz (1756-1793) wrote the work on creative imitation of beauty [uber die bildende nachahmung des sch nen] in 1788. moritz considers imitation from a new perspective. the artist imitates nature not imitating its creations (objects or natural things), but imitating nature as a creative principle. 157paolo euron .. the moment of creation is more important than the created object, because the act of creation is the creation of a new reality, it does not matter if it is the reality of a work of art instead of the reality of a natural thing. moritz’s concept of “uselessness” [das unn tzliche] characterizes “beauty” as an ontological example of a perfect being. a thing of beauty does not need anything except itself. with the concept “useful” we think of the relationship of a thing, that we consider as a part, with the connection of things [zusammenhang der dinge], which we think as a whole [als ein ganzes]. [...] the whole, considered as a whole, on the contrary, needs no relationship with something else except with itself. moritz, werke [frankfurt, insel: 1981] p.558 the artist’s imitation is an imitation of reality in its very essence, which is a creative essence. the artist should imitate the creative power of nature (natura naturans) rather than the created product of nature (natura naturata). the work of art is an experience of the essence of reality, the creative principle of nature, and not just a copy of existing things. in such a perspective the work of art does not need to appear realistic. it does not need to be justified by a similarity to any natural thing. the work of art is a self-sufficient and “by itself consisting” whole, similar in the origin and in the structure (not in the appearance) to the whole of nature. accordingly, since the work of art is reality, it does not need to imitate it. it is a small representation of the world, but from the philosophical point of view, work of art and world of nature lie on the same ontological level. the great connection of things is the only, true whole; every single whole in it [...] is nothing but a product of imagination. every beautiful whole of the creative artist is nothing but an imprint [abdruck] of the highest beauty in the great whole of nature. moritz, werke [frankfurt, insel: 198] p.558 158 prajna vihara~ we could say that the work of art has not any “transitive” meaning, i.e. it does not mean anything existing in the world, it does not mean anything else and it has not any meaning except itself. art becomes a nonimitative activity, a source of knowledge of reality in its essence. the work of art receives a new ontological status: it is “arbitrary”, it is freed from rules, from the will of representing reality, but this freedom and this “arbitrary” character reveals the essence of reality. the romantic concept of work of art is a self-sufficient whole, similar in the origin and in the structure to the whole of nature. 3 although for us this view of art may seem foreign, and the absolute may seem a distant concept, for the romantics it was the very thing which art expresses. friedrich schlegel (1772-1829), novalis [friedrich von hardenberg] (1772-1801) and friedrich schelling (1775-1854) considered art as the way to know the absolute reality. the work of art has a relational aspect, but it does not present any determinate content; that is, it does not communicate any truth by means of concepts, but presents a relationship between things. it forms a structure or system. the romantics considered this system presented by the work of art as reality in its highest form: the absolute. according to friedrich schlegel it is through the structure of the work of art that we can have an experience of the infinite or absolute. in his dialogue on poetry [gesprach uber die poesie] schlegel takes the old classical mythology as an example. mythology, as work of art, is the way by which the absolute reveals itself in the finite, in history. mythology is a work of art of nature. in its fabric [structure] are really shaped the supreme things, in it everything is relation and metamorphosis; everything receives a form and is transformed. [...] and here i find a great similarity with the great wit of romantic poetry, which shows itself not in individual tricks, but in the construction of the whole. 159paolo euron .. .. [...] all plays of art are nothing but a far imitation of the infinite play of the world, of the eternal and self-creating work of art. f. schlegel, kritische fr.-schlegel-ausgabe ii [schoening, m nchen: 1958] p.318 in the work of art (of which mythology is an example) the real subject of the work is the whole, the totality, whereas the finite determinations (the visible and concrete contents of the work) are nothing but means, devices, artifices or tricks to get this whole. the work of art presents reality in its relational structure: we experience a relationship between things before we meet the things themselves. the work of art presents the world because of its structure and not because of its content. the presentation of a specific content is not the principal aim of the work of art. as we have seen, the work of art cannot be simply considered as an imitation of reality, but it is reality, it presents reality in its structure. it presents reality as “the absolute”. even today in our relativistic world we could say that the work of art offers the experience of a relationship between things rather than the experience of a thing. in the experience of a work of art we do not see simply a new thing, but we can see usual things under a new light and in a new perspective. by means of the work of art we have neither the experience of a real thing nor of a real person, but we can live a new relation with things, facts, persons, since the work of art discloses a new perspective. novalis writes that, “poetry elevates each individual phenomenon through an original association with the rest of the whole”. it does not mean that poetry is an instrument of knowledge. poetry works in this way, connecting the individual with the totality, because poetry is the essence of reality, or better it is reality in its secret essence: poetry is the genuine absolute reality. that is the kernel of my philosophy. the more poetic, the truer. novalis, schriften. die werke friedrich von hardenbergs ii [stuttgart, kohlhammer: 1960] p.647. 160 prajna vihara~ poetry is reality. in other words, poetry is the essence of reality (ratio essendi) and so it is the way to understand reality (ratio cognoscendi). poetry is the most important form of art, since the poetical language shows the essence of reality: in the language [i. e. poetry] happens that words are a world apart. words reflect the unusual game of the relations between things. only through freedom they are members of nature and only in their free movement the soul of the world reveals itself. novalis, schriften. die werke friedrich von hardenbergs ii [stuttgart, kohlhammer: 1960] p.414. poetry tells us the truth, whereas history tells us facts without an essential connection. there is more truth in a fairy-tale than in a chronicle. though characters and events are invented, the sense in which they have been invented is true and natural. novalis, schriften. die werke friedrich von hardenbergs i [stuttgart, kohlhammer: 1960] p.259. the truth of the “invented sense” is the truth of the work of art, the absolute expressed in a finite form. we can now read a fairy-tale composed by novalis himself which presents the mysterious relationship between nature and absolute. it is novalis’s fairy-tale of hyacinth and little rose flower, from the novel disciples of sais. hyacinth is a young man living in a village. he is engaged to little rose flower, a nice girl of the same village. they are happy together, but one day a stranger comes into the village. he is an old man with a long, white beard. he is very wise and well-travelled and he teaches hyacinth some of the secrets of nature. he gives him a book and, since this moment, hyacinth loses his happiness. he has interest neither for little rose flower nor for the rest of his family and community. now he is longing for something that he does not know. actually, he is striving for the secrets of 161paolo euron nature. one day the fairy of the forest burns hyacinth’s book and tells him that he must move on and meet the “veiled maid”. the “veiled maid” is nothing but the goddess isis, an egyptian-greek mythic goddess, the “mother of all things”, the oldest personification of nature. she is veiled because she does not easily surrender her secrets. hyacinth goes searching for the veiled goddess and he forgets little rose flower, his family and his village. after a long quest, and many experiences, he becomes calmer and less eager to know and to grasp immediately the secrets of nature, i.e. the secret of everything. at the end of his quest he finally meets the veiled goddess isis. now he can lift her veil, the veil hiding nature’s secrets. and what does he see under her veil? he finds, after his long searching and wandering, his original love, little rose flower. this story suggests that our quest for the absolute must start from the conditioned. reality is an absolute totality where we are involved with determined things and yet are unaware that these determined things are the absolute. we have to start and to finish in the conditioned, in order to have some intimation of the unconditioned. we realize that we have to undergo a long process to know who we are and to grasp our essence. in other words, we need the finite in order to understand the infinite or the absolute. hyacinth in the beginning cannot be aware that the secret of nature (isis), the absolute, is within the nearest thing, in his beloved little rose flower; he must first look for it far away. he needed to face a long journey and many experiences in order to recognize what is nearest to him. one may consider this a mere fairy-tale, a romantic representation of absolute, and ask what it means for the philosopher? here we can turn back to kant. kant refers to an illustration of the veiled goddess isis on the front page of a handbook of physics written by segner, published in the 18th century. he expresses his approval with this image in a note of the critique of judgement (1790): perhaps it was not ever said something more sublime, or expressed a thought in a more sublime way, as in that inscription on the temple of isis (mother nature): “i am all that what is, and that was and that will be, and no 162 prajna vihara~ mortal has raised my veil”. segner used this idea by means of an ingenious picture put on the cover of its book of physics, in order to fill with awe the student who he was preparing to introduce in this temple, and to dispose his spirit to a solemn attention. kant, the critique of judgement [oxford: clarendon press, 1957] p.176 this suggests that human being (which is nature itself) using the mathematical-scientific method, can follow the steps of nature only so far. he can understand its manifestations, but he cannot know nature itself. knowledge of nature presents precise limits. nature can be measured in its external effects, but it remains an inaccessible secret in presence of which it is often better to be silent. yet the romantic philosophers have in their own aesthetic way, strived to approach this secret and to unveil the goddess isis. paolo euron 163 1free of religion & religious heritage the common good and social hope in africa t. ebijuwa ladoke akintola university of technology, ogbomoso, nigeria abstract there is no doubt that every society tends to operate with what they considered the good life or the common good suitable to their social formation. but, the problem here is that people sometimes disagree as to what they considered good. what this implies for our conception of the common good in africa is that the socio-political structure should be arranged in such a way that stakeholders in the society are guaranteed of fairness in the distribution of opportunities and benefits. for, it is only when stakeholders are duly recognized in the scheme of things, that we can expect their commitment to the common good. the common good is thus a kind of social relationship, which is somehow constituted by the coordination of the personal activities of members of the state. the common good then can thus be conceived as the platform of the existence of any social order. it is a good of all members of the society. on this showing, the common good is not a mere collection of individual interests, and it is not a surrogate for the sum of the different individual goods. this paper will investigate the conflict between individual interest and the common good in african political philosophy. "members of a community are expected to show concern for the wellbeing of one another, to do what they can to advance the common good, and generally to participate in the community life. they have intellectual and ideological as well as emotional attachments to their shared goals and values and, as long as they cherish them, they are ever ready to pursue and defend them" (gyekye, 1997:42) as germane as the notion of the common good might appear in africa today, we find traces of individualist thinkers, insisting on the pursuit prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 75-85 75 © 2000 by assumption university press of their personal autonomy and freedom as that which will increase their opportunity to choose their own good and life plans. this insistence is especially significant within the context of the identity discourse, the discourse of difference peculiar to some in the liberal societies who are denied due participation especially ethnic minorities, gays, disabled and in some cases especially in africa, gender. it is also argued that the pursuit of common good will result in intolerance of other conceptions of the good and the manipulation of the instrument of power to realize the common good. in view of this, individualist argues for the promotion of the common good through the voluntary choices of individual members of the civil society. this appears to me to be wrong headed because the individualist conflates and thus reduce the common good to an artificial combination of individual interests or ideals. but what exactly do we mean by the notion of common good? before this, let us quickly see why the demand for common good is pertinent at this point of our historical life in africa. suffice it to say at this point that hitherto africans enjoyed their communal form of life, which made available a variety of valuable options, where individuals derive their significance from social forms. all those suffered some form of dislocation, which incidentally is no fault of the ordinary citizens of africa. rather, the result of the disruption and /or dislocation of our cultural values are the incursion of negative alien values. these values driven by the negative forces of slavery, colonialism and most painfully the misrule of african political elites, which in concert, created a gap between the state and the citizens. this is to say that the inability of the state to meet the needs and provide the ground for realizing the aspirations of the people is responsible for the distrust of the collective spirit inherent in the hitherto communal form of life. indeed, our persistent set of problems in africa is traceable to this gap between the state and the citizens; our inequalities of wealth and power, ethnic conflicts, economic instability, crime etc. are so obstinate today because of this alienation. what the whole of these represents is that because the state could no longer meet the needs of the people, it has lost the basis for the citizens' loyalty. the result of which is the complete lack of confidence in the state. as adeajayi clearly puts it in the case of the 76 prajñâ vihâra elite: the elite, like the colonial state, which they inherited, has grown apart from the society. increasingly the state and the elite who control the state, have become predators of the society (1999: 16). here then is the reason for the insistence on individual interests in african societies. since the society where individual social hope lies in hitherto communal forms life could no longer provide the lifeline for the survival of the collective spirits; it becomes increasingly difficult to rely on it. consequently, the society becomes an arena of conflict, where social relationships can no longer generate important common goods, interests and values. these feelings of alienation can obviously not command the commitment of people to the common good, as individuals are likely to be concern about what will promote their interests rather than what will frustrate them. the thinking then is that once everybody's interest is promoted in this regard, it will in the long run be in the interest of everybody in the society and thus lead to the common good. but since the pursuit of individual interest(s) can be read to be subjective, and hence prudential contemporary individuals like will kymlicka likens the common good to "the result of the process of combining preferences, all of which are counted equally (consistent with the principles of justice)" (1990: 206). in the same vein, jeremy bentham sees the common good as the "sum of the interests of the several members who compose it" (1948: 126). to adequately understand the individualist account one must take into consideration what kwame gyekye calls the normative or ideological impulse of the notion. (p.45). first, individualists consider themselves as prior to the society. secondly, and as a consequence of the above, individualist sees the good arrived at independently of the society. thus, hart summarized the individualist conception of the common good as "a maximizing and collective account that require the society to maximize the total net sum or balance of happiness of its subjects" (p.182). in the opening paragraph of the politics aristotle avers: our own observation tells us that every society is an association of t. ebijuwa 77 persons formed with a view to some good purpose. i say 'good' because in their actions all men aim at what they think good. clearly, then, as all association aim at some good, that one which is supreme and embraces all others will have also as its aim the supreme good (p.25). there are two goals involved here: the goal of the individual and that of the state. the point one can deduce from this distinction is that the common good, which aristotle calls the supreme good is higher than any good pursued by an individual or a collection of individuals. in affirming this view, plato agrees with aristotle that the purpose for which a state exists goes beyond that of satisfying the interest of individual. for plato: our aim in founding the commonwealth was not to make any one class specially happy, but to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole(p: 110). clearly then aristotle and plato base their views that the state is not designed to protect the interests of individuals, or what they considered the "imperfect" or incomplete nature of man. for them, it is only within the confines of the state that an individual can find social and /or self-fulfillment. a state comes into existence because no single "individual is self-sufficing". he states further that since our needs are numerous and that it is because individuals cannot meet their needs themselves that the state evolved. the existence of this is to enrich the lives of everybody. now, what is beginning to appear is how a state is formed in the direction of order. since man cannot live alone and needs the services of others to make his own life meaningful and fulfilled, everybody is expected to contribute to the overall mix i.e. the whole (here referred to as the state) by the parts (considered as individuals). but since a meaningful life cannot be attained without the union and assistance of others, it is difficult to describe "the part as prior to the whole". in other words, the common good from the above sense should be seen as a goal to which all things flows, the benefit of which returns to each individual. put differently, no human society is considered orderly if what binds them together or what they seek communally is undermined. as thornhill (1967) avers: to say that man is by nature social --is to say that what man achieves, he achieves together with other men, that the goals which he sets himself 78 prajñâ vihâra are goals he pursues in common with other men; that any benefit which he seeks, he seeks as a benefit held in common, a common good. (p.45) the common good is thus a kind of social relationship, which is somehow constituted by the coordination of the personal activities of members of the state. this coordination in the words of eneh and okolo (1998: 51) is itself regulated by the purpose of the common good, which motivates and binds the group together. the common good then can thus be conceived as the platform of the existence of any social order. it is a good of all members of the society. on this showing, the common good is not a mere collection of individual interests, and it is not a surrogate for the sum of the different individual goods. if the contrary, then it may just be contingently common and might, on this basis, may partially be achieved, if even it will be at all. in fact, as kwame gyekye says, the notion of the common good is a notion of that set of goods that is essentially good for human beings (op.cit: 46). for maritain (1966): the common good, is the "good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. it is therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it". (p: 51). let me put this metaphorically in the words of raj mansukhani (2002); the common good as he puts it: --can be described as a vast net, and at each junction where the meshes meet sits a jewel. each jewel reflects the light of all the jewel round it, and all of those jewels reflect others around them. in this way, the whole universe of jewels is ultimately reflected in every single jewel. (p: 191). this analogy of interdependence or interconnectedness clearly represents the commonality of the good that kwame gyekye says can be "universally shared by all human individuals, a good the possession of which is essential for the ordinary or basic functioning of the individual in a human society" (op.cit: 44). this, as said earlier can be said to be linked to the concept of common humanity, and hence cannot be derived from the goods or preferences of particular individuals. no wonder, velasquez et al. say that the catholic religious tradition that has a long history of trying to define and promote the common good, sees the common good as "the t. ebijuwa 79 sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment". arising from the above is the claim that the common good does not 'come out of the blue'. it involves the cooperative effort of everyone. as a result, the common good is a good to which all members of the society must have access, and from which no one can be excluded. it should be understood that to say that "the common good is a good all members of the society must have access", one is referring only to what can be regarded as the basic or essential goods as such, to which everybody must have access. there is no human being that is not desirous of peace, security, respect, freedom etc in any human society. it is such notions embracive of the essential goods that human beings desire, that we can call common good. from the above, it could be argued that since all human beings benefit from the common good, we would be willing to urge that all should cooperate to establish and promote the common good. but this, as some would argue, rests on a mistake, as some people are likely to identify a number of hurdles that would hinder us, from successfully doing so. suppose the argument starts from the notion that the very idea of the common good is inconsistent with a pluralistic society like ours in africa, or suppose, as many postmodernists would argue that the establishment of common good is another form of meta-narrative, which is oppressive in character. from this perspective, we would be pursuing the interests of the many at the expense of the interests of minority groups. this is how this objection is clearly stated by velasquez et al: and even if we agreed upon what we all valued, we would certainly disagree about the relative values things have for us. while all may agree, for example, that an affordable health system, a healthy educational system, and a clean environment are all parts of the common good, some will say that more should be invested in health than in education, while others will favour directing resources to the environment over both health and education. now, such disagreement abounds in many areas of our national lives and "are bound to undercut our ability to evoke a sustained and 80 prajñâ vihâra widespread commitment to the common good" in the words of valasquez et al. in the face of such diversity, efforts to get the commitment of people to support the common good will be herculean. there is another challenge of the common good similar to the above. it is easy to see that whatever the benefits a common good provides will be available to everyone in the society; an exercise that is not restricted to only those who contributed to the pool of the common good. this is what many have referred to as the "free-rider problem". individuals can become free-riders to the extent that they benefit from the common good while refusing to contribute their support to it. now, it is because so many people, especially the elites in many parts of africa, are guilty of this freerider problem that we encounter all manners of crises in africa-be it economic, social, political or what have you. very many elites in africa find it very easy to evade tax. we all know what taxes are used for. very many elites in nigeria, to be specific, find it convenient not to pay their electricity bills. yet, we know that they consume more energy than the poor. the implication of all these for the common good is not far fetched. i want to say here that there is a cacophony of opinions arising from cultural diversity, language, tribe, and religion or even on the mere insistence of one's individualism, depending on the perspective by which we conceive the common good. the idea of the common good is embracive. it does not as the foregoing discussion states, eliminate any stakeholder. the thinking of individualism which many feel will undermine the common good, is a fallout of the general social instability in many facets of our lives necessitated by our colonial experiences and driven by the negative forces of african political elites. or else, how do you explain the quest for individualism, when hitherto the society maintains a social form of life characterized by communalism which made available a variety of valuable options, where individuals derive their significance from social forms. the quest for the promotion of private life or individualism is a creation of the dislocation of the communal form of life in africa that was hitherto highly prized. where then is the hope of africa? how do we bridge the past with the present in an attempt to create a robust path for the future? or simply put, how do we evolve an arena where social relationships can generate important common goals, interests and values? the above questions, either singly or wholly, assume that there is t. ebijuwa 81 a gap in the social relationship in africa, and that this gap needs to be investigated. for, to assume that this is impossible is to deny that there is hope for africa's development. but hope is still possible. how? first, we must develop a system that would overcome the weaknesses of our present value system. there is no doubt that every society tends to operate with what they considered the good life or the common good suitable to their social formation. but, the problem here is that people sometimes disagree as to what they considered good. what this implies for our conception of the common good in africa is that the socio-political structure should be arranged in such a way that stakeholders in the society are guarantee of fairness in the distribution of opportunities and benefits. for, it is only when stakeholders are duly recognized in the scheme of things that we can command their commitment to the common good. for example, how do you command the commitment of women in nigeria, when to a large extent they are displaced in the distribution of opportunities and benefits in the state. they are even marginally represented in the national assembly where decisions that concern daily experiences are formulated and managed. here, decisions sometimes are based on voting. even when some have argued that agreed points on any subject matter can be based on the "force of the better argument" as jürgen habermas points out, evidence has shown than most women in africa do not possess the quality or the character to withstand the "force of better argument" in a dialogic sphere dominated by men. this is so because the cultural constraints of the society has brought to bear on the social structure. let me say here that even if the number of women is increased in the dialogic sphere, it will be only a mere recognition of representation, and not the recognition of the will of the representatives. the latter is paramount. yet, this is culturally undermined. the implication of this for the common good is a sort of social dissension because a group excluded from a share in power is always a group excluded from a share in social and other benefits or advantages in society, the results of which are the well known indecencies of adversarial politics in many parts of africa today. it is for this reason that we suggest a kind of consensualist perspective in social organizations. by this, i mean the recognition of the "voices" of stakeholders in the arrangement of benefits and opportunities in africa. 82 prajñâ vihâra this, for example, is part of the reasons for different ethnic clashes in nigeria, liberia, cô te d’ivoire and many parts of africa. it is equally the reason for the withdrawal of many from the state into their ethnic enclaves for social fulfillment. the reason for this withdrawal is not only because the state is not able to provide for the common good of all, but also because of the frustration of one suffering in the mist of plenty. thus, it is only when all stakeholders are adequately recognized that we can command their commitment to the common good. suffice it to say here that this is only when talks about social stability in africa can be meaningful and common identity forged. from the foregoing, we have said that the hitherto communal form of life enjoyed by africans suffered severe dislocations arising from our colonial experiences and the negative influences thereof on our political elites. we argued that this led to the creation of a gap between the state and the citizens to whom the state owes responsibility. and this is part of the reasons why it is difficult to command the commitment of all stakeholders to the common good. thus, when individualist defines the common good as the "surrogate for the sum of the different individual goods", it is because of the failure of the state to fulfill its obligation to the people. the common good, following maritain, is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons, … their communion in good living" the recognition of which will provide stability, meaningful progress and social hope in africa. references ade-ajayi, j.f. (1999) "development is about people" viewpoint: a critical review of culture and society vol. nos. 1 and 2. aristotle (1952) the politics. london: penguin books ltd. bentham, j. (1948) an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation 1823: oxford: basil blackwell. ebijuwa, t. (2000) "ethnic conflict, social dislocation and the search for a new order in africa" indian journal of politics vol. xxxiv, nos. 3-4, julydec. ebijuwa, t. (2002) "postmodernism and the conflict of values: the challenge of universal morality" filosofia: international journal of philosophy. department of philosophy de la salle university manila philippines vol. t. ebijuwa 83 31 number 2 may. eneh j.o. and okolo c.b. (1998) "the common good and political stability" in m.dukor (ed) philosophy and politics: discourse on values and power in africa. lagos: obaroh and ogbinaka publishers ltd. gyekye, k. (1997) tradition and modernity: philosophical reflections on the african experience. new york, oxford: oxford university press. habermas, j. (1970) "towards a theory of communicative competence" inquiry no. 13. hart, h.l.a.(1985). essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. oxford, clarendon press. kymlicka, w. (1990) contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. oxford: clarendon press. mansukhani r. (2002) "wisdom in a postmodern age" filosofia: international journal of philosophy. department of philosophy, de la salle university,manila,philippines vol. 31 no. 2. maritain, j. (1960) the person and the common good indiana: university of notre dame press, paperback. plato (1973) the republic of plato, (translated with introduction and notes by francis macdonald conford oxford, london, new york, oxford university press. thornhill, j.s.m. (1967) the person and the group. milwaukee. the bruce publishing company. velasquez, m, et al "the common good" file://c:/docume~1/tostne/locals ~1\temp/trimnflo.htm. 84 prajñâ vihâra t. ebijuwa 85 09_the hartshornian way on solving the problem.pmd the hartshornian way: on solving the problem of dualism warayuth sriwarakuel assumption university, thailand º·¤ñ́ âèí çô¸õ¤ô´áººµðçñ¹µก¹ñ鹶ùก¤ãíº§ó´éçâก®¢í§íãôêâµàµôéå ·õèçèò´éçâ กòãกṍ กñ¹µñçàå×íกกåò§ííกä» ¶ö§ááéçèòàîàกå¨ð¾âòâòáêãéò§กòãà»åõèâ¹á»å§ ¤ãñé§ãë­èêóëãñºçô¸õ¤ô´áººµðçñ¹µกâ´âãªéµããกðàªô§çôàòéçô¸õ áµè·çèòµããกð Ẻíãôêâµàµôéå ëã×í·õèàãõâกçèòẺ �íâèò§ã´íâèò§ë¹öè§� กçâñ§¤§ëåí¹âåก µðçñ¹µกáòâ´âµåí´ íâèò§äãกçµòáëòก¤ó¹ö§¶ö§á§èáøá·ò§ é́ò¹­ò³çô·âòµããกð Ẻàîàกåกçâñ§äáèªñ´à¨¹¹ñกã¹กòã¹óáòãªéáกé»ñ­ëò·çô¹ôâá íò¨กåèòçä´éçèò ªòãìåêì îòãì·êìîíãì¹ µèò§ëòก·õèà»ç¹¼ùéáกé»ñ­ëò·çô¹ôâáã¹âåกµðçñ¹µกä é́êóàãç̈ º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ðêò ô̧µçô̧ õ«ö觼ùéà¢õâ¹¢íàãõâกçèò �çô̧ õẺîòãì·êìîíãì¹� ãëéàëç¹çèòà»ç¹ ·ò§à´õâçà·èò¹ñé¹·õè¨ð·óãëé¤çòá¨ãô§·õèµã§กñ¹¢éòáà»ç¹·õèâíáãñºáåð¹óáòãçá กñ¹ä é́à»ç¹¼åêóàãç̈ abstract the western way of thinking has been dominated by the aristotelian law of the excluded middle. even though hegel tried to create a revolution for western thought through his dialectical logic, the aristotelian logic or the either/or logic still haunts the western world. however, hegelian logic is not so clear in terms of epistemology to solve the problem of dualism. it is charles hartshorne who could be said to have successfully solved the problem of dualism in the west. this paper will demonstrate what the author calls “the hartshornian way” and argues that only through this way, truths of the opposites can be recognized and combined together successfully. prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 131-144 131 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ i. introduction dualism has played an important role in the western thought. although we often attribute this problem to descartes who contributed a lot to the duality between mind and body in his epistemic system, the problem of duality, in fact, is as old as other metaphysical problems going back to ancient greek philosophy. as a matter of fact, it is normal for human beings everywhere, no matter from the east or the west, to learn and see things according to contrasts or opposites. contrasts are pervasive in the world around us, or as hartshorne says, “contrast is found not only throughout life but throughout nature as discovered by science”.1 it might be said that the fundamental difference between western and eastern people is that while western mind stops at duality, the eastern mind strives to transcend duality to reach unity. in other words, the western people tend toward the duality of reality whereas the eastern people tend toward the unity of reality. religion has been one of the powerful historical forces shaping our thought. religion influences the way of life of most peoples in the world, even now in this age of science and globalization. some thinkers in the past predicted that there would be no more major religions in the world by the twentieth century, and that science would have replaced them. it is true that many people in the west have turned their backs to religion and become unbelievers since the enlightenment, or as ian barbour puts it, for many centuries in the west, the christian story of creation and salvation provided a cosmic setting in which individual life had significance. it allowed people to come to terms with guilt, finitude, and death. it provided a total way of life, and it encouraged personal transformation and reorientation. since the enlightenment, the christian story has had diminishing effectiveness for many people, partly because it has seemed inconsistent with the understanding of the world in modern science. similar changes have been occurring in other cultures.2 132 prajna vihara ~ _ _ however, we have found that these predictions were wrong. throughout the twentieth century people still respected and followed their religions, especially during and after the first and the second world wars. in the twenty-first century christianity and all other religions are still very much alive, and science has not succeeded in replacing them.3 in fact, it seems that more and more people are believers in religions. this is evidence of how religion is essentially significant to life. religion affects not only the way of life but also the way of thinking. turning to the west, we will find that “the western theological tradition, in all its evident diversity, rests upon a polar or, more precisely, a dyadic foundation. though consistently monotheistic, christian theology is repeatedly inscribed in binary terms. the history of religious thought in the west can be read as a pendular movement between seemingly exclusive and evident opposites”.4 in his book erring: a postmodern a/theology (1984) mark c. taylor lists the following opposites as examples. god world eternity time being becoming rest movement permanence change presence absence one many sacred profane order chaos meaning absurdity lif death infinite finite transcendent immanent identity difference affirmation negation truth error reality illusion certainty uncertainty clarit confusion sanit madness warayuth sriwarakuel 133 light darkness vision blindness invisibl visible spiri body spiritual carnal mind matter good evil innocence guilt purity stain proper improper centered eccentric first second original imitation natural monstrous purposeful purposeless honesty duplicity height depth depth surface interiority exteriority speech writing seriousness play a question may be raised, “why does the western theological tradition rest upon this polar or dyadic foundation?” an answer may be that it is based on a polar foundation because it has been influenced by aristotelian logic. ii. aristotelian logic logic has a long history. logic in the west is more than 2,500 years old. philosophers in western civilization who made contributions to logic include pythagoras, zeno of elea, and plato. however, it was aristotle who made the greatest contribution to logic. in fact, he is considered the father of formal logic. his formal logic is based on three laws: the law of identity, the law of the excluded middle, and the law of non-contradiction. 134 prajna vihara ~ _ _ later philosophers and logicians who made contributions to logic include boole, venn, frege, russell, whitehead, and g?del. but although logic is subject to change and development like other subjects, all western logicians have followed the aristotelian three laws of logic. of course, hartshorne is no exception. among these three laws which one is the most fundamental? i think the most fundamental one is the law of the excluded middle. why so? because we can transform the other two laws into the law of the excluded middle. let us see the following proofs. 1. p g p the law of identity 2. ~p v p 1, material implication, replacement rule 3. p v ~p 2, commutation, replacement rule q.e.d. 1. ~ (p .~p) the law of non-contradiction 2. ~p v ~ ~p 1, de morgan, replacement rule 3. ~p v p 2, double negation, replacement rule 4. p v ~ p 3, commutation, replacement rule q.e.d. the law of the excluded middle leaves no room for an intermediate between opposites or contradictories, or as aristotle puts it, …there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. this is clear, in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are. to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.5 from the above quotation we can deduce that the law of the warayuth sriwarakuel 135 excluded middle has no room or space for “both/and” and “neither/nor”. people who follow this law in their way of thinking are forced to choose only either of the two opposites. we can illustrate this through the following examples. example 1: the chili is either green or red. according to the law of the excluded middle, if the statement “the chili is green” is true, then its opposite or contrastive “the chili is red” must be false. there is no space for “the chili is both green and red” and “the chili is neither green nor red”. in fact, the same chili can be both green and red in its different parts at the same time. it can also be neither green nor red, for example, white or brown at a particular time. it can have different colors at different times. example 2: light is either composed of particles or waves. according to the aristotelian law of the excluded middle, “light is composed of particles” and “light is composed of waves” cannot be true together or false together. if “light is composed of particles” is true, then “light is composed of waves” must be false, and vice versa. in fact, some physicists hold either position. still, others also hold that light is composed of both particles and waves. someday perhaps some physicists may hold that light is composed of neither particles nor waves because all actual entities are subject to change at all times. the above two examples demonstrate that aristotelian logic has its own limits. what i am saying here is not that aristotelian law of the excluded middle is invalid. i am just saying that this law is true only within its own system or context. it is not always true in the absolute sense. people who adopt the aristotelian law of the excluded middle as fundamental in their way of thinking will be trapped in the game of dualism. if they do not recognize its limits, they will and could not be able to transcend dualism. 136 prajna vihara ~ _ _ iii. hegelian logic in the west it was hegel who first recognized the limits of aristotelian logic. thus he proposed dialectical logic instead. for hegel, the whole of reality is a historical process. the dialectic is something that is realized in the actual process of history. in other words, dialectic logic implies that form and content always go together. logic is not just a matter of form separate from content, which is how aristotelian logic is interpreted. hegel says, “…the maxim of identity…everything is identical with itself, a = a: and, negatively, a cannot at the same time be a and not a. this maxim, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of abstract understanding”.6 in order to understand dialectic logic clearly, peter singer summarizes hegel’s basic ideas as follows: 1. reality is a historical process. 2. the way this process changes is dialectical. 3. this dialectical process of change has a specific goal. 4. this goal is a conflict-free society. 5. until that goal is reached we are condemned to remain in one form or another of alienation.7 the dialectic is composed of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. unlike aristotelian logic, the dialectic contends that a and not a can be true together, or as brent puts it, a dialectical process is a process that…we begin by starting our thesis, and about such a statement or thesis we might assume with aristotle’s law of identity that what it says it is, it says it is, that it cannot be both affirmed and denied (non-contradiction), and that it must either be so or not be so (excluded middle). but to make such a claim in the real world of human experience…does not yield knowledge that conforms to such fixed structures. any such initial statement (thesis) will be contradicted (antithesis) and…no such contradiction is itself ever final. as such, hegel’s concept of emerging truth breaks aristotle’s warayuth sriwarakuel 137 law of the excluded middle and claims that in so doing the inadequacy of that law to explain the facts of how the epistemic subject acquires true knowledge. for these syntheses that arise in both the development of the world and in the development of man’s understanding of it, show that neither thesis nor antithesis is finally true, but rather that both are in a certain way true. the ‘middle’ that aristotle wished to ‘exclude’ is seen to be the essential core of reality itself.8 example 1: dialectic thesis: water antithesis: fire synthesis: steam example 2: dialectic thesis: coffee antithesis: tea synthesis: coffee mixed with tea9 from the above two examples we can see that hegelian logic can solve the problem of dualism in the ontological dimension. it obviously tells us about the way things are. ontology deals with mode of existence, non-existence, and actuality. hegelian logic works well with the development of the world and its objects. however, in the epistemological dimension hegelian logic is not that much of a help for developing our understanding of the world and its objects in form of propositions. let us consider the following proposition. tea is different from coffee. according to aristotelian logic, the opposite of the above proposition is “tea is not different from coffee” or “tea is similar to coffee”. and according to the law of the excluded middle, if “tea is different from coffee” is true, then its opposite must be false, and vice versa. on the contrary, according to hegelian logic, “tea is different from coffee” and its opposite can be true together. the question to be raised here is why 138 prajna vihara ~ _ _ hegelian logic seems to be silent on this problem at the epistemological level. iv. hartshornian way it was charles hartshorne who helps us solve the above question. hartshorne was born in kittanning, pennsylvania on june 5, 1897, and died on october 10, 2000. david ray griffin says, “he (hartshorne) was clearly one of the major philosophers of the 20th century”.10 john b. cobb considers hartshorne the einstein of religious thought. after reading his works and understanding his ideas, i absolutely agree with griffin and cobb. hartshorne is most famous as a process philosopher. he wrote more than 20 books and 100 articles in his lifetime. hartshorne was a scholar who made great contributions to the modal proof of the abstract aspect (pole) of god based on the second form of st. anselm’s ontological argument and the concept of the concrete aspect (pole) of god who is dynamic and creative. some may know him as a philosopher who brought philosophical insights to an empirical field through his first book the philosophy and psychology of sensation. some people may even know him as a very distinguished ornithologist through his book born to sing. still others may know him as a devout vegetarian who did not own an automobile, preferring to ride a bicycle, and supporting feminism, abortion rights and higher taxes. in this paper i will try to show another face of hartshorne, namely, a great contributor to logic. for hartshorne, extremism is always wrong. let us consider the following three statements. (a) there is nothing in the world. (b) there is everything in the world. (c) there is something in the world. it is obvious that the first two statements (a) and (b) are wrong because they are extreme. the third statement (c) is correct because some things do exist, and some things do not exist in the world. warayuth sriwarakuel 139 dealing with the nature of god, hartshorne argues that both classical theism and pantheism go wrong because they are extreme. hartshorne considers his position as neo-classical theism or panentheism which is in the middle way between classical theism and pantheism. let us consider the following three statements. (1) god is relative in all aspects.(pantheism) (2) god is relative in some aspect. (panentheism) (3) god is relative in no aspects. (classical theism) the words “all aspects” and “no aspects” imply extremism. thus hartshorne rejects (1) and (3), and he prefers (2). in his own words, hartshorne says, if ‘pantheism’ is a historically and etymologically appropriate term for the view that deity is the all of relative or interdependent items, with nothing wholly independent or in any clear sense nonrelative, then ‘panentheism’ is an appropriate term for the view that deity is in some real aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items. traditional theism or deism makes god solely independent or noninclusive. thus there are logically the three views: (1) god is merely the cosmos, in all aspects inseparable from the sum or system of dependent things or effects; (2) he is both this system and something independent of it; (3) he is not the system, but is in all aspects independent. the second view is panentheism. the first view includes any doctrine which, like spinoza’s, asserts that there is a premise from which all acts are implied conclusions.11 now if we turn to the word “absolute”, we can play the same game as follows: (1) god is absolute in all aspects. (classical theism) 140 prajna vihara ~ _ _ (2) god is absolute in some aspect. (panentheism) (3) god is absolute in no aspects. (pantheism) thus for hartshorne, god is both relative in some aspect and absolute in another aspect. this is the main thesis of panentheism or neoclassical theism which takes a middle way. from this game proposed by hartshorne, we can solve the problem hegelian logic does not answer at the epistemological level. let us now turn to the proposition “tea is different from coffee” and its opposite “tea is not different from coffee” or “tea is similar to coffee”. how can we make the two opposites true together according to dialectical logic? we can make both of them true through the hartshornian way. let us start with the propositions containing the word “different”. (1) tea is different from coffee in all aspects. (2) tea is different from coffee in some aspect. (3) tea is different from coffee in no aspects. from the above three proposition it is obvious that the propositions (1) and (3) are wrong because they are extreme. the proposition (2) is correct. now let us turn to the propositions containing the word “similar”. (1) tea is similar to coffee in all aspects. (2) tea is similar to coffee in some aspect. (3) tea is similar to coffee in no aspects. similarly, the propositions (1) and (3) are obviously wrong while the proposition (2) is true. therefore, with the hartshornian way, we can make hegelian logic clear at the epistemological level as follows: thesis: tea is different from coffee in some aspect. (true) antithesis: tea is similar to coffee in some aspect. (true) synthesis: tea is both different and similar to coffee in warayuth sriwarakuel 141 some aspects. (true) v. conclusion the world today is filled with many conflicts and dualisms. we are tempted to use logic to solve these problems. but to follow aristotelian logic or the western theological tradition without recognizing their limits is not of much help. the hartshornian way may be a more appropriate way to settle disputes, solving conflicts and transcending dualisms of many kinds. the hartshornian way can give space to all the opposites. let us see the serious fight between egalitarian liberalism and multiculturalism as an example. the main thesis of egalitarian liberalism is “everybody is just like us”, while that of multiculturalism is “everybody is just different from us”. for aristotle, the two theses are opposite, and they cannot be both correct according to the law of the excluded middle. however, the hartshornian way can help solve the problem as follows: everybody is just like us in some aspect. (true) everybody is just different from us in some aspect. (true) everybody is both similar and different from us in some aspects. (true) if egalitarian libertarians insist that “everybody is just like us in all aspects” and multiculturalists insist that “everybody is just different from us in all aspects”, then we can see that both groups are wrong. even though hartshorne himself was not aware that his methodology could solve these epistemological problems of aristotelian and hegelian logic, i would like to credit him with this, and call this solution “the hartshornian way”. endnotes 1hartshorne, charles 1971. reality as social process. new york: hafner 142 prajna vihara ~ _ _ publishing company, p. 47. 2barbour, ian g. 1990. religion and science. harpersanfrancisco: an imprint of harpercollins publishers, p. xiii. 3except for those who believe that science and religion are always in conflict. some of these people have chosen to take side with science while others with religion. however, ian barbour divides 4 ways of relating science and religion: conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration. many people including theologians take the last three ways as their alternatives. “those who are of the opinion that science and religion share common admirable purposes, or at least are on speaking terms, affirm that each enterprise possesses a rational-factual and a normative or valuing component. both contribute to a fully satisfying understanding of the world and our place in it. others, however, are of a different opinion. they sharply demarcate the methods and goals of science and religion, assigning special functions to each so as to assure their mutual independence. on the one hand, the challenge is to avoid reducing one enterprise to the other science to religion in the form of natural theology or religion to science as an antiquated approach to explaining natural phenomena. on the other hand, the challenge is to avoid complete compartmentalization by assigning matters of the heart to religion and matters of the head to science where each has nothing to contribute to each other”. see james e. huchingson, 1993. religion and the natural sciences, orlando: holt, rinehart and winston, inc., pp. 4-5. 4taylor, mark c. “erring: a postmodern a/theology” in lawrence e. cahoone 1996. from modernism to postmodernism: an anthology. oxford: blackwell publishers, p.p. 516-7. 5aristotle. “metaphysics” in jonathan barnes, ed., 1984. the complete works of aristotle. princeton: princeton university press, vol. two, p. 1597. 6hegel. “encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences”, translated by w. wallace in jacob loewenberg, ed., 1929. hegel selections. new york: charles scribner’s sons, p. 136. 7see s series of television programs transmitted by the bbc in 1987. see also magee, brian 1987. the great philosophers: an introduction to western philosophy (based on the bbc television series), oxford: oxford university press, p. 205. marx followed and took over all hegel’s basic ideas. the difference is just that for hegel the process of historical development is spiritual whereas for marx this process is purely material. 8brent, allen 1983. philosophy and educational foundations. london: george allen & unwin, p. 174. 9hegelian logic is close to the way of thinking of the eastern peoples because it is inclusive. all forms of the eastern logic are holistic because eastern thought tends to be inclusive whereas western thought tends to be exclusive. at the epistemological dimension the nyaya logic is the logic of integration between induction and deduction. at the ontological dimension the taoist logic is the logic of complementarity while the buddhist logic is the logic of detachment. in order to warayuth sriwarakuel 143 see the difference among these types of logic, we may use “tea and coffee” as examples. if a waiter asks, “tea or coffee?”, then what an answer would be. an aristotelian may say, “tea” or “coffee”, but not both. a hegelian would say, "both tea and coffee in the same cup”. a taoist will say, “both tea and coffee in two different cups”. the answer from a buddhist may vary. it may be “tea”, “coffee”, “both tea and coffee in the same cup”, “both tea and coffee in different cups”, “one tenth of tea and nine tenths of coffee in the same cup”, or even “neither”. 10see the new york times on friday, october 13, 2000, p. c15. 11hartshorne, charles 1976. the divine relativity: a social conception of god. new haven:yale university press, p. 89-90. 144 prajna vihara ~ _ _ contents asian heritage and the future of christianity joseph i. fernando assumption university of thailand abstract this paper explores the significance and profundity of the asian heritage and how christianity finds itself in asia amidst ancient civilizations. some important questions like the following need to be answered: what kind of future will christianity have in asia? how can asia benefit from the christian presence? what would be the distinct contribution of christianity, if any, to asia? asian heritage it is an interesting fact that all the major religions of the world originated in asia – hinduism, buddhism, and jainism in india, confucianism and taoism in china, zoroastrianism in persia, judaism, christianity and islam in west asia and shintoism in japan. one may ask, “why did the world religions originate in asia and not in europe or africa or elsewhere? this is a topic for research. down through the centuries asia has been profoundly religious. the essentially religious heritage of asia manifests itself in the asian way of life. the religions of asia have inspired asian philosophy, literature, architecture, sculpture, music, dance, painting, sociopolitical institutions and so on. asia is the largest continent with a number of regions, each having its own distinct culture inspired largely by the religion of the region. west asia is predominantly islamic, central asia islamic and buddhist, south asia predominantly hindu and islamic, southeast asia largely buddhist, islamic and to some extent christian, east asia buddhist, confucian, taoist and shintoist. asia is not like the christendom of the europe of the bygone days, unified by a single religion. it is a continent of diverse religions and cultures, each unique in its own way. prajñâ vihâra, volume 6,number 2, july-decmber 2005, 90-100 90 © 2000 by assumption university press the indian heritage let me just highlight the indian heritage as space does not permit a detailed look at the other cultural heritages of asia such as buddhist, confucian, islamic and so on. india is not a nation; it is nations. it comprises a multitude of regions, languages, cultures and religions. hinduism too is not a single religion; it is a cluster of religions. the name hindu is derived from the river sindhu and ‘the persians, who found difficulty in pronouncing the initial s, called it hindu… with the muslim invasion the persian name returned in the form of hindustan, and those of its inhabitants who followed the old religions became known as hindus’1 the origin of hinduism in northern india dates back to vedic period (1500 b.c. – 900 b.c.) and in southern india the tamils had their own religion. hinduism was finally shaped into a composite religion due to the intermingling of the aryan and dravidian elements. prior to the aryan and dravidian civilizations, there existed the indus valley civilization dating back to the beginning of the 2nd millennium b.c. hinduism’s contribution to indian civilization is enormous. some writers call india ‘the wonder that was’ (before the muslim invasion). indian civilization is the only living civilization from time immemorial. the other ancient civilizations of egypt, sumeria, greece, rome and so on have become museum pieces. india has made remarkable contribution to philosophy, literature, architecture, sculpture, fine arts, mathematics, astronomy and so on. the syrian astronomer-monk severus sebokht wrote in 662 a.d. as follows: “i shall not now speak of the hindus, … of their subtle discoveries in the science of astronomy – discoveries even more ingenious than those of the greeks and babylonians – of their rational system of mathematics, or of their method of calculation which no words can praise strongly enough – i mean the system of using nine symbols. if these things were known by the people who think that they alone have mastered the sciences because they speak greek they would perhaps be convinced, though a little late in the day, that other folk, not only greeks, but men of a different tongue, know something as well as they.”2 joseph i. fernando 91 india’s influence on southeast and east asia has great historical and cultural significance. a.l. basham acknowledges this as follows: “the whole of south-east asia received its culture from india. early in the 5th century b.c. colonists from western india settled in ceylon, which was finally converted to buddhism in the reign of asoka. by this time a few indian merchants had probably found their way to malaya, sumatra, and other parts of south-east asia. gradually they established permanent settlements, often, no doubt, marrying native women. they were followed by brahmans and buddhist monks, and indian influence gradually leavened the indigenous culture, until, by the 4th century a.d., sanskrit was the official language of the region, and there arose great civilizations, capable of organizing large maritime empires, and of building such wonderful stupa of borobodur in java, or the saivite temples of angkor in cambodia. other cultural influences, from china and the islamic world, were felt in south-east asia, but the primary impetus to civilization came from india. “indian historians, proud of their country’s past, often refer to this region as “greater india”, and speak of indian “colonies”. in its usual modern sense the term “colony” is hardly accurate, however. vijaya, the legendary aryan conqueror of ceylon, is said to have gained the island by the sword, but beyond this we have no real evidence of any permanent indian conquest outside the bounds of india. the indian “colonies” were peaceful ones, and the indianized kings of the region were indigenous chieftains who had learnt what india had to teach them. “northwards indian cultural influences spread through central asia to china. faint and weak contact between china and india was probably made in mauryan times, if not before, but only when, some 2,000 years ago, the han empire began to drive its frontiers towards the caspian did india and china really meet. unlike south-east asia, china did not assimilate indian ideas in every aspect of her culture, but the whole of the far east is in india’s debt for buddhism, which helped to mould the distinctive civilizations of china, korea, japan and tibet.”3 it is said that indian philosophy had its impact on greek philosophy as there was contact between greece and india through brisk trade in the pre-christian era as supported by archaeological evidences. the influence of indian literature and philosophy is noticeable in european literature and 92 prajñâ vihâra philosophy too. “…goethe and many other writers of the early 19th century read all they could of ancient indian literature. we know that goethe borrowed a device of indian dramaturgy for the prologue to “faust,” and who can say that the triumphal final chorus of the second part of that work was not in part inspired by the monism of indian thought as he understood it? from goethe onwards most of the great german philosophers knew something of indian philosophy. schopenhauer, whose influence on literature and psychology has been so considerable, indeed openly admitted his debt, and his outlook was virtually that of buddhism. the monism of fichte and hegel might never have taken the forms they did if it had not been for anquetil-duperron’s translation of the upanishads and the work of other pioneer indologists. in the english-speaking world the strongest indian influence was felt in america, where emerson, thoreau and other new england writers avidly studied much indian religious literature in translation, and exerted immense influence on their contemporaries and successors, notably walt whitman. through carlyle and others the german philosophers in their turn made their mark on england, as did the americans through many late 19th-century writers such as richard jeffries and edward carpenter… the sages who meditated in the jungles of the ganges valley six hundred years or more before christ are still forces in the world… india’s contribution to the world’s cultural stock has already been very large, and it will continue and grow as, in her new freedom, her prestige and influence increases. for this reason if for no other we must take account of her ancient heritage in its successes and its failures, for it is no longer the heritage of india alone, but of all mankind.”4 hinduism has been a way of life. the hindus have been guided by a number of shastras such as the vedas, the dharmashastras like the great epics ramayana and mahabharata, natyashastra regarding dance and music, shilpashastra regarding architecture and sculpture, arthashastra concerning polity and so on. there has been a perpetual yearning for moksha or liberation from the world to union with brahman. the hindu way of life consisted of four stages: 1) brahmacharya (of the student), 2 grahasta (of the householder), 3) vanaprasta (of the hermit) and 4) sanyasa (of the homeless wanderer). the ultimate goal of life is union with brahman. profound religiosity marks the hindu way of life. the german indologist max müller states: “if i were to ask myself from what literature we here in europe, we who have been nurtured almost exclusively joseph i. fernando 93 on the thoughts of greeks and romans, and of one semitic race, the jewish, may draw that corrective which is most wanted in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more universal, in fact more truly human, a life, not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life – again i should point to india”5 friedrich von schlegel testifies similarly: “it cannot be denied that the early indians possessed a knowledge of the true god; all their writings are replete with sentiments and expressions, noble and clear and severely grand, as deeply conceived and reverently expressed as in any human language in which men have spoken of their god… among nations possessing indigenous philosophy and metaphysics together with an innate relish for these pursuits, such as at present characterizes germany, and in olden times was the proud distinction of greece, hindustan holds the first rank in point of time.”6 the british knew they encountered a superior civilization in india which had a humbling effect on them. j. seymour keay, m.p., banker and agent in india, wrote in 1883: “it cannot be too well understood that our position in india has never been in any degree that of civilians bringing civilization to savage races. when we landed in india we found there a hoary civilization, which, during the progress of thousands of years, had fitted itself into the character and adjusted itself to the wants of highly intellectual races. the civilization was not perfunctory, but universal and all-pervading – furnishing the country not only with political systems, but with social and domestic institutions of the most ramified description. the beneficent nature of these institutions as a whole may be judged from their effects on the character of the hindu race. perhaps there are no other people in the world who show so much in their characters the advantageous effect of their own civilization. they are shrewd in business, acute in reasoning, thrifty, religious, sober, charitable, obedient to parents, reverential to old age, amiable, law-abiding, compassionate towards the helpless and patient under suffering.”7 hinduism as an ancient religion has been the bedrock of indian civilization for centuries. what is there in christianity which is not there in hinduism?8 does christianity have anything unique to give to the people of india who, according to the european historian a.l. basham “reached a higher level of kindliness and gentleness in their mutual relationships than 94 prajñâ vihâra any other nation of antiquity?”9 the catholic church officially acknowledges the following about hinduism, “thus, in hinduism men explore the divine mystery and express it both in the limitless riches of myth and the accurately defined insights of philosophy. they seek release from the trials of the present life by ascetical practices, profound meditation and recourse to god in confidence and love.”10 “eastern” christianity in the west many hindus look upon christianity as a western religion introduced in india by the western colonial powers. they are hardly aware of the eastern origin of christianity. in the old testament of the bible we see god singling out abraham, an asian to become the father of a great nation. the christians believe that in jesus christ, an asian jew god became man. we may say god became an asian. mary, the mother of jesus was a simple asian woman regarding whom the catholic church promulgated the dogmas of immaculate conception and assumption based on the tradition of belief and experience of the early christian community. the same mary is also honoured as the queen of heaven. no woman has ever been so lavishly honoured as mary. peter, the first pope and paul the apostle were asians as well. when i say god became an asian in jesus, i do not advocate any nationalism or continentalism. towards the end of their lives the apostles peter and paul were in rome and died there. so historically rome developed as the seat of catholicism. christianity began to spread all over europe civilizing many barbaric tribes over the centuries. eventually europe emerged as a christian civilization. christianity with its origin in the east ended up predominantly as the religion of the west. but, according to tradition st. thomas and st. bartholomew, two of the twelve apostles of jesus christ, brought christianity to india in 1st century a.d. st. thomas landed at maliankara on the southwest coast of india in 52 a.d. he preached the gospel and established the first christian communities in the ancient chera kingdom known today as kerala. tradition holds that he was martyred in mylopore (chennai, southern india) on the east coast in 72 a.d. christianity has been alive in kerala for joseph i. fernando 95 more than 2,000 years. this is a fact unknown to many indians who think christianity was first introduced in india by the europeans. according to another tradition, st. bartholomew, an apostle of christ, preached the gospel in the bombay region and established a christian community. “western” christianity in the east with the discovery of new lands by the maritime powers of europe like spain and portugal, christianity was introduced in many regions of asia by the european missionaries. christianity, an asian religion came back to asia in a european garb. obviously, the asian view of christianity as a european religion is not surprising. christianity, the religion of the white man was associated with the colonial powers of europe who were the ruthless exploiters of the colonies in asia and elsewhere. that is why gandhi said, “i like christ, but not the christians.” the future of christianity it is inappropriate to speak of the true religion. if a religion claims to be the only true religion, it would imply other religions are false. in fact there are no false religions. every religion teaches its followers to be truthful and good. every religion deserves to be respected and appreciated. instead of speaking of the true religion, we may speak of the uniqueness of each religion. every religion has something unique. for example, in christianity there is an overwhelming experience of god grounded in human history. the call of abraham is historical. the incarnation of god in jesus is historical. the death and resurrection of jesus witnessed by his disciples are historical. the founding of the church by jesus with the mission to preach the good news is historical. the experience of a personal god is historical. as levinas says, “nobody can really say i believe – or – i do not believe for that matter – that god exists. the existence of god is not a question of an individual soul uttering logical syllogisms. it cannot be proved. the existence of god, the sein gottes, is sacred history itself, the sacredness of man’s 96 prajñâ vihâra relation to man through which god may pass. god’s existence is the story of his revelation in biblical history.”11 besides historicality, what is unique in christianity is the incarnation and resurrection. no other religion has a claim to incarnation and resurrection. incarnation means god became man in jesus christ. it is not the same as the avatar. there can be a number of avatars, but incarnation as a historical event took place only once and it is final. the resurrection means jesus rose from death on the third day. another important uniqueness of catholic christianity is its belief in the eucharist, the body of christ in which jesus is truly present. another unique feature of catholic christianity is succession to peter and the other apostles. peter was appointed by jesus to look after his church. the pope is the successor to peter and the bishops to the other apostles. the pope and the bishops in the church are guardians of the teachings of christ and protects the purity of the truth handed down to the church by christ through his apostles. this solidarity of the bishops of the world with the pope is something unique to catholic christianity. christianity, thus, can speak of its uniqueness rather than of its claim to the true religion. what can christianity offer to asia which already has a rich and ancient heritage? in retrospect, one can speak of christianity’s impact, for instance, on india. mahatma gandhi, the father of the nation was profoundly influenced by jesus’ sermon on the mount which had its share in inspiring his adoption and advocacy of nonviolence. he had read the works of tolstoy and ruskin too. social reforms such as the abolition of sati (burning the widow in the funeral pyre of her husband), of child marriage, and of the devadasi system (temple prostitution) were influenced by the christian perception of human dignity. the christian missionaries opened their schools to all the children whereas in the traditional educational system of india, not all and only those from the so-called upper castes were permitted to learn. christianity made signal contribution to education and health care through schools, colleges and hospitals. the christian organizations continue to run good schools. many non-christians too run good schools. so what will be the unique contribution of christianity to asia? what will be the future of christianity in asia? archbishop fulton j. sheen once asked mother teresa how she was able to lead so many persons to christ. she replied, “i would ask joseph i. fernando 97 them: ‘do you like to know about jesus?’ they would ask me, ‘who is he? is he like you?’ i would tell them, ‘he is not like me; i am trying to be like him’. they would say, ‘then tell us about jesus’.” this anecdote clearly reveals what the christians are called to do in asia. “preach the gospel always; if necessary, use words,” as st. francis of assisi said to his brethren. it is not the task of christianity to proclaim itself as the true religion. the greatest thing christianity can do is to convince people that god must be given the first place in their lives. people must seek god above all else. seeking god above all else implies obeying his commandments and his holy will at all times. being a seeker of the lord, one is immediately and simultaneously in love with his fellow human beings. reaching out to the brethren, especially the rejected, the persecuted, the abandoned and the marginalized is gospel in action. when the nonchristians see the kind of deeply spiritual, caring and unselfish lives of christians, they will realize what it means to love god. in such a context, jesus as lord and saviour, the church as a community of believers, the sacraments (in the case of catholics) and the hope in resurrection and eternal life will be seen as meaningful and true. without having a profound experience of god, it is impossible to tell others about the love of god. we do not need professional evangelists with a million dollar proselytization program, but we do need men and women who have truly experienced the love of god and share it with their brethren in humility and joy. if much of the evangelical preaching is unfruitful, it is because it lacks the experience of having witnessed to the death and resurrection of jesus in one’s own life. christianity’s dialogue with other religions should not aim only at converting others but for gently sharing with them one’s own profound experience of god in humility and to listen attentively and respectfully to the experiences of others. christianity can contribute to asia if it plays its prophetic role with regard to justice and peace in the context of globalization on the one hand and exploitation, poverty, environmental decay and violation of human rights on the other. christianity is not a strategy. mere organization, planning and management of the church, without a profound experience of the lord and intimacy with him, would be of no avail in sharing his light with others. it is in the holiness of the 98 prajñâ vihâra christians, can one sense the hope of christianity’s contribution to the people of asia and of the world at large. we live in times of great crises everywhere despite enormous advancement in science and technology. many third world nations face economic crisis, others political, spiritual and moral. christianity in the west seems to be declining. the churches are almost empty. a number of catholic seminaries have been converted into hotels. many catholic priests are unemployed as their service is not very much required. people hardly marry in the church. many do not marry at all; they prefer to cohabitate without marriage. the single parent family is another new phenomenon. there are also western adherents of oriental religions and practices. many seem to dislike the church for several reasons. some young people say, “jesus, yes; church, no.” some christian doctrines seem spurious in an age of science and technology. the church in the west faces the task of revitalization of itself. the church can learn from the experience of the asians. the spiritual experience of the christians of the west can fuse with that of the asians. the church can learn from the praxis of nonviolence of gandhi as to how to bring about a nonviolent lifestyle the world over. the westerners can learn the great indian languages of antiquity such as tamil and sanskrit to discover the spiritual riches of india. the tamil bhakti literature of the saivite nayanmars and the vaishanavite alwars is a rich treasure of spirituality. it is no exaggeration to say it has no parallel in the world. one can truly learn from this literature what it means to love god, what it means to be human. this healing, ennobling and enriching literature should be tapped. discovery of asian spirituality can lead one eventually to the rejection of materialism, consumerism, individualism, atheism and agnosticism. thus christianity in asia rooted in the values of asian spirituality can contribute to the regeneration of spirituality the world over. in this sense christianity has a future in relation to the asian heritage. endnotes 1 a.l. basham, the wonder that was india, rupa &co; new delhi, 2001, p.1. 2 ibid, p. vi. joseph i. fernando 99 3 ibid, p. 485. 4 ibid, 486 487. 5 m.k. gandhi, hind swaraj or indian home rule, navajuvan publishing house, ahmedabad, 1998, p. 95. 6 ibid, p. 95. 7 ibid, p. 94. 8 someone asked sadhu sundar singh, a convert to christianity “what is there in christianity which is not already there in hinduism?” and he replied, “jesus christ.” 9 a.l. basham, the wonder that was india, p. 9. 10 austin flannery (ed.), vatican ii, (vol. 1), declaration on the relation of the church to nonchristian religions, liturgical press, collegeville, mn 56321, 1984, p. 739. 11 richard kearney, dialogue with contemporary continental thinkers, manchester press, 1984, p. 54. 100 prajñâ vihâra contents book review a peaceful jihad: negotiating identity and modernity in muslim java ronald lukens-bull new york: palgrave macmillan, 2005 reviewed by raymond scupin lindenwood university ronald lukens-bull’s book a peaceful jihad is one of the most recent ethnographic attempts to understand indonesian islam. the major topic addressed in this ethnography is how the process of modernity has been innovatively and selectively modified by muslims in indonesia (especially east javanese) to reconstruct their own unique forms of islam. in this work, lukens-bull recognizes the early pioneering understandings of indonesian islam by geertz as too limited in representing islam as a thin lacquer spread over the hindu-buddhist cultural fundamentals. geertz had viewed indonesian islam as a struggle between the santri, an urban, modernist strain of islam, versus the rural traditionalist or popular syncretic abangan believers. lukens-bull building on the research of more contemporary anthropologists such as john bowen, robert hefner, suzanne brenner, and his mentor mark woodward has shown that these early geertzian categories were too crude. lukens-bull has added to this anthropological research by focusing on the dynamics of the islamic schools in east java known as pesantren. he did in-depth ethnographic research in the 1990s on how the islamic teachers and leaders within the pesantren were incorporating the political and symbolic-cultural matrix into the curriculum. lukens-bull describes how various symbols of sufism, modernity, and secular elements were drawn into the debates about what ought to be incorporated into the curriculum within the pesantren. he also adds an interesting postmodern reflexive insight into this process by illuminating how a particular sufi leader used him as a westerner as an 136 prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 136-137 © 2000 by assumption university press example to the students of how to purify and dissolve incorrect “christian” teachings from his consciousness. lukens-bull goes beyond the reformist/modernity-traditionalist dynamic within islam to demonstrate how these young students were weaving their understandings of secularism, political economy issues, and so-called “clashes of asian-islamic civilization with the west to construct and drive new forms of non-secularized and spiritualized forms of modernity. he draws on robert bellah and anthony giddens as sociologists as well as anthropologists such as arjun appadurai to discuss these new forms of modernity. in the final chapter, lukens-bull defines the contours of this “peaceful jihad” as represented within the voices of these young students in contrast to the terrorist movements of jemaah islamiyah (ji) or laskar jihad. he suggests that the culturally deep seated sufi tradition as maintained within the pesantren communities of east java provides a basis for constructing an islamic identity that is distinctive from these radical militant forms of islam. lukens-bull ends his discussion of indonesian islam with perspicuous questions that have relevance when thinking about the western political and cultural strategies in respect to muslims. these questions involve whether we in the west can accept forms of pluralism, civil society, democracy, and human rights that have emerged in regions such as indonesia as equivalent to our own understandings of these processes and institutions. or must we project and impose our own western forms of these processes and institutions in areas with much different histories and cultural developments. this book ought to be read by anyone interested in understanding islam beyond sweeping generalities based on the reading of religious texts or the testimony of so-called terrorism experts, or superficial media accounts. in-depth ethnographic understandings of islam like lukensbull’s study help provide a richer and much more detailed comprehensive understanding of the muslim world than most journalistic reportage or armchair speculation from the stacks of a western library. raymond scupin 137 03_ezigbo mmadu an anthropological.pmd ezigbo mmadu: an anthropological investigation into the concept of a good person in igbo worldview chinyere ukpokolo university of ibadan, nigeria º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéµãç¨êíºáâ¹·ñè¹ìàกõèâçกñº �ºø¤¤å·õè́ õ� ã¹âåก·ñè¹ì¢í§ ªòçíôก⺠íõก·ñé§âñ§àëç¹çèò �ºø¤¤å·õè́ õ� ¹ñé¹ ¶ùกêãéò§¢öé¹áò¨òก¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹ ì̧¢í§ á¹øéâì º·¤çòá¹õéâñ§ä é́¹óàê¹íçèò ¤çòá ṍ㹤çòáà¢éòã¨¢í§ªòçíôก⺠¹ñ鹤×í ¨ø´êø´âí´¢í§กòãêãéò§êãã¤ì¢í§¾ãð¼ùéêù§êø´ áåð¤çòá§òá (¢í§กòãêãéò§ êãã¤ì)กçíâùè·õèµñçá¹øéâìã¹°ò¹ð·õèà»ç¹¼ùéกãð·óกòã·ò§èõå¸ããá กòãàºõèâ§àº¹ã´ æ กçµòá·õèëñ¹àë仨òกíø´á¤µô¹õé¤×íกòãå´°ò¹ð¢í§µñçá¹øéâìàí§¨òก¨ø´êù§êø´ ·õèá¹øéâªòµô¶ùก¨ñ´çò§äçé àá×èíà»ç¹àªè¹¹õéêóëãñºªòçíôก⺠¤óçèò �ºø¤¤å·õè´õ� ö̈§à»ç¹กòã ñ̈º©çâáåðêð·éí¹ãëéàëç¹íǿ ᤵôàëåèò¹ñ鹫ö觨óà»ç¹êóëãñº¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹ ì̧ ãðëçèò§กåøèááåðàòâã¹กåøèá é́çâกñ¹àí§ abstract this paper examines the concept of ‘ezigbo mmadu’ (good person) in igbo worldview. the paper argues that ‘ezigbo mmadu’ is constructed in human relationships. it argues that the igbo people’s understanding of ‘mmadu’ as the climax of the supreme being’s creativity and beauty situates the human person as a moral agent. deviating from that ideal is an aberration that reduces the human person from the pinnacle that humankind has been placed. and so, for the igbo ‘ezigbo mmadu’ captures and reflects those ideals necessary for group and inter-group relations. prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 29-44 29 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ introduction every human society has certain general framework of principles, values and norms or precepts with which people are categorized and placed in the moral scheme of things. it is on such templates that individual’s actions and thoughts are judged good or bad, right or wrong. on this moral scale, everyone is placed, differentiating individual from individual, as well as group from group. this categorization is based on what the society perceives as the model of a good person and model for emulation, which in turn shapes the nature and direction of interpersonal relationships. the personalization of the model in this categorization is embedded in what the igbo people refer to as ezigbo mmadu. this paper attempts an anthropological exploration of what constitutes ezigbo mmadu (good person) in igbo worldview with the intention of understanding how this shapes human behaviour and social interaction in traditional igbo society. this is against the background of an exploration of the nature of relationship existing between the individual and the community in igbo traditional society. the resulting questions are: (i) what is the nature of igbo traditional society that provides the context for individuals and groups interactions? (ii) what is the nature of the relationship existing between the individual and the community in igbo sociocultural space (iii)what does the concept of ezigbo mmadu stand for in the people’s construction of human relationships [iv] finally, what are the likely parameters for judging whether a person is ezigbo mmadu (good person) or not? this paper provides answers to the above questions as it interrogates the moral or ethical issues that characterize human relationships in igbo traditional society. a brief comment on igbo people the igbo territory is located in the southeastern part of nigeria. the river niger divided the land into two unequal parts, namely the eastern igbo, which is located in the eastern part of the river niger, and the western igbo, (the smaller portion) located in the western bank of the river niger sharing boundaries with the benin people of the mid-western 30 prajna vihara ~ _ _ nigeria. the word, igbo, as uchendu (1965) noted, is used in three senses, namely the igbo territory, the native speakers of the language, and finally a language group. igbo language belongs to kwa language group of nigercongo family. both forde and jones (1950) and onwuejegwu (1981) have divided the igbo speaking areas of nigeria into sub-cultural groups. while forde and jones identified five sub-cultural groups, onwuejegwu (1981) divided the people into six culture areas. though the igbo people speak one language known as igbo language, there are dialectal variations. however, those who are closer in the language continuum tend to share greater mutual intelligibility. nevertheless, the people share core cultural values such as umunna system, ozo title taking, marriage practices, kolanut hospitality, masquerade institution, white chalk custom, wall paintings and vigorous dancing steps (onwuejegwu, 1981). the people are traditionally farmers and traders, while those in the riverine areas also engage in fishing. staple foods include yam, cassava, and maize; economic trees include palm produce which yielded much foreign currency to the nation before the crude oil boom of the 1970s. the igbo are known for their hard work, resilience and ubiquitous life style. the igbo people believe in the duality of human existence. madu, (1996) summed it up this way: traditional igbo is convinced of the existence of two distinct but similar worlds __ the physical world and the spiritual world. ... whatever exists in the physical world has its counterpart, equally real, in the invisible, spiritual world (madu, 1996: 145 -146). the interaction of these two worlds implies that there is the need for harmonious relationships between the inhabitants of the two worlds. traditionally, the people worship the gods of their ancestors, which include spirits and deities. they also believe in the supreme being whom they referred to as chukwu, (the almighty god) or chineke, meaning 'god the creator’. the earth goddess referred to as ala played important role in the people’s day-to-day living. to the people, the earth goddess is the messenger of the supreme being and she assists him in punishing the wicked and rewarding the just. as the earth is intimately close to chinyere ukpokolo 31 humankind, it is impossible to do anything that she is not aware of. the honour and devotion ascribed to the earth goddess also owes to the fact that she provides humankind with food, herbs for curing sicknesses and diseases, and it is to the earth that human beings must return after death. as the interaction is inescapable, the people believe, one must endeavour to cultivate good relationship with the earth goddess. igbo socio-political organization is based on the family which is predominantly polygamous, the umunna (patrilineage), the village and the village groups. when the igbo talk of the family, they are basically talking of the extended family. the umunna is the basic political unit and the most important one for that matter. the village or the clan is made up of a conglomeration of many umunna. members of an umunna claim the same ancestral lineage up to ten generations, and are headed by an okpara who is the co-ordinator of the affairs of the unit. the largest political unit of the igbo is the obodo, that is, the town which is made up of a group of villages. in pre-colonial times, beyond this, the traditional igbo person owes no allegiance to any other political unit. leadership in traditional igbo society is gerontocratic, that is leadership by the elders. the women groups which are basically the umuada or umuokpu institution (association of patrilineage daughters both married, unmarried, divorced) and the inyom di or anumanu (association of wives) are the two dominant women groups in the traditional society (see ukpokolo, 2004 for a discussion on gender and socio-political organization of igbo traditional society). the age grades are also significant and function as the executive arm of the government. in the pre-colonial period, their duties, among other responsibilities, were to carry out the instructions of the community leaders and execute the decisions arrived at by the general assembly. the individual and the community in traditional igbo society this section explores the nature of the individual and the community, and the relationship that exists between the two in traditional igbo society. we view the individual in this study from the normative point of view, that is, the social and moral conception of a person. it is not that in igbo worldview, the metaphysical conception of personhood is absent. 32 prajna vihara ~ _ _ rather, for the purpose of our study, the normative is more relevant to us as this is located in the social life of the people whose worldview we are reflecting on. we begin first by examining the nature of the community in igbo culture, and then identify the interconnectedness existing between the individual and the community. the igbo conception of community is different from the euroamerican model. in the igbo worldview, the community is perceived solely in terms of its communality. the euro-american model, on the other hand, views community simply as an association aggregate of individual persons who share interests. this is in opposition to african conception of the community. in akan culture, for instance, gyekye notes that the community is “a group of persons linked by interpersonal bonds, biological and/ or non-biological, who consider themselves primarily as members of the group and who have common interests, goals and values (gyekye, 1992: 105). this is also applicable to igbo culture. in addition, to the igbo people, the community goes beyond human beings to include the living dead (or ancestors), the earth goddess, the spirits and deities. afigbo sums it up this way: in traditional social philosophy [of the igbo] the ‘community’ meant the living members, the dead ancestors, and the convocation of the local deities and spirits. these deities and spirits were conceived as closely associated with and interested in the weal and woes of the unit (afigbo, 1972: 34). the members of the community, according to igbo conceptualization, go beyond the physical beings to include the spiritual, the invisible. the igbo people believe that all these participate and make impact in their day-to-day life. the ancestors, for instance, oversee their still-living relatives and guard them in their daily activities. within this holism of tempo-spiritual relationship, the individual is located. nwoga, for instance, observes that, in igbo culture: the individual is a member of the community that sets the goals that have acceptability within the community. it chinyere ukpokolo 33 is the community that sets up reward and punishment systems. to a large extent, the individual in igboland is subsumed within the requirement of the community (nwoga, 1984: 58-59). the individual is, therefore, bound to the values of his community because it is in this community that, as it were, he exists and has his being. anthropologists have observed that the impact of culture in the human person is the major distinguishing factor between a human person and an animal. shared values and meanings integrate the individuals into a community (gyekye, 1992). to participate in the social life of the community demands that the individual shares in the group-mind by imbibing those non-material or metaphysical aspects of the societal ideals inherent in the value system. it is these values, and how the individual live them out in day-to-day activities that constitute the parameter for the individual’s categorization in the socio-cultural schemas. to be integrated, one has to conceive of these values as paramount, and in observing them in daily life one paves way one’s societal acceptability. in this symbiotic relationship between the individual and the community, the action of the individual member can affect positively or negatively on the fortune of the community. little wonder that when an individual commits an nso ala (abomination) like murder, or desecrating a taboo in the traditional pre-colonial society, it was the whole community that suffered the consequences, particularly when such an individual was not exposed by his family, a witness or even the community for necessary punishment or cleansing rituals to appease the gods. as a member of a community, therefore, the overriding interest of every individual within a community was to seek to live a good life within the conditions and standards set by his/her community. to be perceived as living a good life in igbo traditional culture, one is expected to inculcate and abide by the laid down principles of interaction within the community, and acceptable principles of wealth acquisition in the people’s value system. these are the issues that allow for harmonious co-existence. the igbo people also believe that without economic well-being, life is meaningless (nwala, 1985). the non-material or metaphysical aspect of the people worldview is summed up in the tenets of ofo (detarium senegalense stick). ofo represents the people’s moral 34 prajna vihara ~ _ _ philosophy, the symbol of authority, justice and peace. ofo also represents a two-dimensional approach to peace, that is human being to human being, and human beings to the ancestors/spirit beings. whether in relating with one’s spouse, children, friends, neighbours and associates or in the relationship between the leader and the led, the yardstick of moral evaluation is embedded in what ofo stands for. the people often say ‘eji m ofo’ which literally means ‘i’m holding an ofo’ but which symbolizes one’s claim of clear conscience or innocence in the face of accusation or suspicion. of course, ofo’s strengths are derived from the fact that it anchors on the people’s customs and traditions known as omenana (or omenala/ omenani), which literally means the ‘doings of the land’. omenana is an unwritten constitution that guides the people’s day to day activities. the ofo simply re-echoes those principles and values inherent in the people’s omenana. conversely, the tenets of omenana re-echo the doctrines of ofo, which include justice, peace, honesty and the like. indeed, for someone to live in peace with the fellow human beings, he/she must cherish justice and have respect for the right of every individual member of his community in his daily relationships; his right to use land, for instance. this of course, is social justice. okafor (1995), for instance, observes: the notion of right must be examined in the context and light of social justice. it is in fact from the taproot of social justice that individual rights in igbo traditional setting draw nurture and strengths. and social justice demand mutual and reciprocal respect of rights and interests (okafor, 1995: 77). although it is difficult at times to demarcate where individual rights and that of the community extricate in such a traditional setting, there are certain rights that are inalienable, such as right to use land. among the igbo, it is the community that determines the individual’s right. as gyekye rightly noted of akan society of ghana, it is within the context of the community that an individual person can pursue and achieve life goals, and it is this same community that determines what goals and values are pursuable (gyekye, 1992; see also ikuenobe, 2006). for this reason, the chinyere ukpokolo 35 individual igbo person has unequivocal loyalty to his community, not only because his biological relationships and associational life are established within the community, but also and more importantly, the community harbours him and provides moral and psychological security, and above all, the community safeguards all that is precious to the individual citizen, especially land (okigbo as cited in madu, 1996: 148). land provides food, herbs, sustains life and to the people, it also consumes life. it is a symbolic object full of ironies and contradictions. to the igbo, land is animate. it symbolizes life, consumes life, and along the line, takes a religious significance, a goddess. the ala is the messenger of the supreme being who executes judgment and metes out punishment, especially when one contravenes the omenala of the people, which in itself represents the commandments of the earth goddess. the belief in the earth goddess is so pervasive that she is constantly invoked in conversations and speech. for instance, when told to carry out an activity which the addressee believes is wrong, he/she may assert, ‘nso! ana b’ayi ekwekwa naa’, which means, ‘abomination! may our earth goddess forbid’. the people believe that the fear of ala is the beginning of wisdom. in pre-colonial igbo society, religion was so pervasive in the daily life of the people that it was difficult if not impossible to draw a clear cut demarcation between the sacred and the secular. to the people, their religion was their existence and their existence was their religion (madu, 1996), and the earth goddess was a mediating force in this tempo-spiritual interaction. the metaphysical dimension of moral philosophy added ember to the moral character of the traditional igbo person. the spiritual and the physical/social are intertwined in a symbiotic relationship that it was difficult to demarcate and concretely decide where one ends and another begins. in the execution of justice, the people believe that after all said and done, humans in their imperfection cannot adequately execute justice. the supernatural is, therefore, constantly invoked in the negotiation of social justice in human relationships. little wonder, therefore, that the fear of the repercussions that follow evil conduct was enough deterrent for one to desist from wicked conduct. 36 prajna vihara ~ _ _ ezigbo mmadu: a socio-cultural construction in human relationship in this section, we explore the interpretations of the concept of ezigbo mmadu (good person) in igbo worldview, and how the concept is constructed in human relationships. every individual is intertwined in a web of social relationships that further define who and what the individual is. in order to fully appreciate the concept of ezigbo mmadu this concept must be seen in relation to the igbo practice of morality and moral thought, with its implied dimensions of social recognition and responsibility. the concept, ezigbo mmadu can be linguistically analyzed as follows: ezigbo/ezi good, correct, acceptable mmadu humankind, human being, person the word, ezigbo or ‘ezi’ thus, means, ‘that which is correct, good, or acceptable’. in the context of human relationships, ezigbo connotes such traits as sincerity, truthfulness, self respect, good nature, trustworthiness, fidelity, genuineness, fairness, dependableness, loyalty, faithfulness, and integrity. the concept mmadu can further be divided into two parts and analyzed as follows: mma and du or di. mma means ‘beauty’, while du or di means ‘exists’ (otakpor 2006). mmadu (human being/ humankind), the igbo people believe, is the climax or peak of creation. human kind is the summit of beauty and creativity. of all the creatures created by the supreme being, humankind is the zenith. nothing can equate him or surpass him. in humankind, beauty, goodness, comeliness, is exhibited in its entirety. the opposite of ‘ezigbo’ is ‘njo’ or ‘ajo’ which means ‘ugly’, ‘bad’, ‘wicked’, ‘evil’, ‘lack of beauty’, or ‘comeliness’. when ugliness is used to describe an individual in human relationship, it is not the outward appearance that is being emphasized, but the the non-material aspects of the individual. that is character, behaviour, or conduct. the fact that the word mmadu means ‘beauty exists’ implies that the igbo acknowledge that beauty is inherent in the human person. however, the people also recognize that this beauty can be lost. for this reason, when they say ‘ajo mmadu’, ‘bad person’. it means that though this beauty exists it can chinyere ukpokolo 37 be lost through bad conduct. this points to the fact that the beauty in the creature called ‘humankind’ is revocable if not cultivated and nurtured by the individual. to the igbo, human beings are moral agents, and one is, therefore, accountable for one’s conduct. this means that one can lose the beauty that the supreme being/god has bestowed on him or her, hence the need to nurture and protect it. for to lose the beauty is to lose the essence of human existence, and in the context of igbo worldview one becomes a misfit, a deviant in the social world, and may even seize to be a member of the community. depending on the gravity of this ‘unfitness’, one may be excommunicated. hence, when an individual commits an abomination, certain steps will be taken before such a person could be reabsorbed into the different groups that constitute the collectivity. but first, the individual must acknowledge that he has contravened the laws of the land and confess his evil deeds following appropriate procedures, and if accused wrongly, proper procedure must also be followed. in nanka, a local community in southeastern nigeria, a respondent affirmed that in pre-colonial nanka society: for confession to be made, a person has to go to ‘ana oji’ [a local deity in the village] stand bare-footed and swear that he did not commit a particular crime, and that if he did it, may our earth [earth goddess] hold him (pa obuoha, oral interview, august 2005). the implication is that the community has a space for social and spiritual purification/sanctification. according to the respondent, in a situation where the offender was not known despite all efforts to bring him/ her to the open, the ‘nze na ozo’ [titled men] would gather at ‘ana oji’ (a local deity in the village, symbolising holy land) and began to render conditional curses: “he that did this thing [mention is made of the offence committed] let the earth goddess hold him”. the people would respond ‘ofoooooooo’ which means ‘so be it’. ezigbo mmadu is exhibited through responsible conduct. according to mazi udonna, a respondent: in a polygamous family, as a good person, the family 38 prajna vihara ~ _ _ head must be able to coordinate his family, avoid shameful activities, for the sake of the family name. despite rivalries in the polygamous home, he must be seen to be fair in his dealings with the wives and the children, recognize and respect the position of the first wife, for instance (mazi udonna, interview, september, 2009). when the people say, ‘o bughi ezigbo mmadu’ that is, ‘he/she is not a good person’ or o bu ajo mmadu meaning, ‘he/she is a bad person’, such assertion occludes space for the one so referred, and determines his/her life’s chances and access to social resources in that community. to deny the goodness in a person, is saying that such an individual lacks sincerity/truthfulness, self respect, good nature, trustworthiness, fidelity, genuineness, fairness, dependableness, loyalty, faithful, integrity, and reliability. in fact, the humanity in him is lost (otakpor, 2006). the people often say that ajo mmadu bu ajo ofia meaning ‘a bad person is an evil forest’. in igbo cosmology, an evil forest is a place that the corpses of the despicable people of the community were deposited in pre-colonial times. the corpses of those who had committed abomination were thrown into the evil forest. such people were excommunicated when alive and denied a proper burial after death. they were, consequently, separated from normal human social life in this world, and life in the spirit world. in a culture where ceremonious burial was regarded as honourable and a way of ushering the dead into the abode of the ancestors and spirits (the people’s concept of ‘heaven’], to cast someone into the evil forest can be likened to, in the christian parlance, to physically cast one into hell fire to rot with the devil. indeed, in traditional society the bad person was abhorred. concerning truthfulness, for instance, otakpor asserts: the importance of truth per se and truth-telling in human life and its affairs is so compelling that the igbo believe that only those who have a passion for truth can be entrusted with the leadership of the community (otakpor, 2006: 22). as a respondent observed, “in igbo culture, truth is expected chinyere ukpokolo 39 from everyone. even when people are not on good terms, one is expected to speak the truth about the other person. this helps to maintain group harmony (mazi, udonna, interview, august 2008). the people believe that the earth goddess could strike a dishonest person dead or something mysterious could begin to happen to members of his family, depending on the gravity of the offence. the community recognizes and appreciates the good person. it is in the light of this that chiegwe noted that the igbo culture recognizes that: opposing qualities hardly inhere in the same person; a deceitful person, for example, can hardly be fair or dependable; greedy and fraudulent person can hardly be kind and frank. ... it becomes clear, therefore, that the concept of ‘truth’, situated in a broad social context, takes on the attributes of conformity or correspondence to fact or reality as well as the qualities, dispositions and characteristics that are both personal and socially desirable (chiegwe, 2006: 42). in a communitarian society, therefore, to be an ezigbo mmadu one must, necessarily, submit oneself to the thought system and values inherent in such a society for one to be socially healthy. in the context of our analysis on the relationship between the individual and community, a good person is also one who abides by the principles of communal interests and must necessarily exhibit those non-material qualities associated with goodness. such a person stands for common good and when the self-interest conflicts with the common good, the overriding consideration is to promote common good. ezigbo mmadu is that person to whom the members of the community can entrust responsibility knowing fully well that he/she is responsible, honest, trustworthy, and dependable. an ezigbo mmadu does not cheat or defraud people of their belongings and dues. an ezigbo mmadu does not relegate his role as husband, father, wife, mother, daughter, son, brothers and their children, and the in-laws but carries out the social roles and responsibilities as demanded of him/her by the customs and traditions of the people. he recognizes the power of the gods and ancestors and gives them their dues. he 40 prajna vihara ~ _ _ does not pretend that humankind is completely self-sufficient. as the head of the family, an ezigbo mmadu was also the priest of his household. the ezigbo mmadu is sought after whenever the need for third party consultation arises. it could be for the purpose of conflict resolution, peacemaking, or leadership. it could also be for choosing marriage partners, business associates or arranging for the apprenticeship of one’s children. he is epitome of fairness and justice. as a business man he settles his apprentices when the time is due; he does not deprive the poor and the underprivileged of their rights and is courageous enough to stand for that which is right. for one to be ezigbo mmadu he/she must live a socially acceptable life, a life of integrity. a good person must not smear his hands with blood, that is commit murder or be an accomplice. he must, therefore, not be involved with homicide for punishment is from both the living and the ancestors. indeed, to the igbo, the concept of good can only be understood in the context of their social life. issues of moral significance and value are based on communal principle of morality in relationships with others. for this reason, behaviour that militates against those values is frowned upon. consequently, when one embezzles public fund, cheats one’s neighbour, or refuses to settle terms with one’s apprentice, such an individual is an ajo mmadu which is the opposite of ezigbo mmadu. such morally bankrupt individuals were denied leadership positions in the community, which is the people’s universe. for this reason, the individual igbo person was conscious of the fact that his/her conducts were judged by the social and moral character in the people’s thought system, and that his/her conducts in turn had impact on the extent to which the individual could further utilize his or her place in human relationships. conclusion this paper has attempted to interrogate the concept of ezigbo mmadu and situating it in the socio-cultural construction of human relationships among the igbo people of southeastern nigeria. we have noted that the igbo people believe that the human person is a free, rational moral agent and as such, responsible for his actions. thus understood, the human person has the power to choose either to do right or wrong, to be chinyere ukpokolo 41 good or evil, to be selfish or altruistic, to be socially responsible or become a deviant. nevertheless, whichever one the individual chooses assumes symbolic significance either to create or occlude space, determining the individual’s life chances in that community. the igbo, also, as we have noted, see humankind as created to reflect beauty in its entirety. hence, the term mmadu means ‘beauty exists’. the people further recognize that in regard to morality, it is in relationships (both temporal and spiritual) where the issue of good or bad can be significantly evaluated. in the construction of intraand inter-group relationships, those unwritten regulations encoded in the people’s omenana were given due consideration. these are, in traditional igbo society, the principles of law and justice. the judicial principle exists in two parts: human and divine laws. these human laws guard human relationships to promote common interest. okafor, (1995) puts it this way: igbo human laws are social instruments by which diverse and often conflicting interests of the members of the society are regulated in such a way that common interest of the community as a whole is placed above individual interests (okafor, 1995: 64). the divine law re-enforces human laws in the execution and sustenance of social justice in such a manner that where human laws stops the divine law continues. the divine law assists in establishing spiritual harmony between human beings and the spiritual world (okafor, 1995). consequently, both the physical/social and spiritual aspects of human wellbeing are significant in determining the acceptability or otherwise of an individual. a typical traditional igbo person is aware of the implications of dislocating himself from the tempo-spiritual community through the violation of taboos or by involvement in any ‘nso’ behaviour. the two types of law are, therefore, indispensable in fostering justice, fairness, honesty and equity among the members of the community, and in the construction of ezigbo mmadu in tempo-spiritual relationships. 42 prajna vihara ~ _ _ references afigbo, a. e. (1972) the warrant chiefs; indirect rule in eastern nigeria 1891 1929. london: longman. chiegwe, onwuka (2006) ‘eziokwu bun ndu: an essay in sociological interpretation’. in ‘eziokwu bu ndu’: truth is life. uniben studies in philosophy. vol. 1. otakpor, nkeonye (ed.). ibadan: hope publications. pp. 39 48 forde d. and g. i. jones (1950). the ibo and ibibio speaking peoples of south-eastern nigeria. london: international african institute. gyekye, kwame (1992) ‘person and community in akan thought’. in: person and community: ghanian philosophical studies 1. wiredu, kwasi and kwame gyekye (eds.). washington: the council for research in values and philosophy. pp. 101 122. hallen, barry [2000] ‘eniyan: a critical analysis of the yoruba concept of persons. in: the substance of african philosophy. pp. 288 308. ikuenobe, polycarp (2006) philosophical perspectives on communalism and morality in african traditions. new york: lexington books. kirk-greene, anthony h.m. [ ] ‘the concept of the good man in hausa’. in: the substance of african philosophy. c.s. momoh (ed.). auchi: african philosophical projects publications. pp. 246 259. madu, okechukwu raphael (1996) studies in african-american culture: african symbols, proverbs and myths: the hermeneutics of destiny. owerri: assumpta press. njaka, elechukwu nnadibuagha (1974) igbo political culture. evanston: northwestern university press. nwala, t. u. (1985) igbo philosophy. enugu: fourth dimension publishers. okafor, f. u. (1992) igbo philosophy of law. enugu: fourth dimension publishers. onwuejegwu, m. a. (1981) an igbo civilization: nri kingdom & hegemony. london: ethiope publishing corporation. chinyere ukpokolo 43 otakpor, nkeonye (2006) ‘introduction: wisdom teaching in igbo culture. in ‘eziokwu bu ndu’: truth is life. uniben studies in philosophy vol. 1. otakpor, nkeonye (ed.). ibadan: hope publications. pp. 11 26. uchendu, v.c. (1965) the igbo of southeastern nigeria. london: holt rinehalt and winston. ukpokolo, chinyere (2004) ‘gender and socio-political organization of igbo traditional society’. africa: journal of contemporary issues. vol. 2. no 2. pp 190 -203. 44 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 147-154 islam and ecology tourism and heritage in a global society: the philippine experience (some philosophical considerations)1 rolando m. gripaldo de la salle university, manila abstract this article tries to clarify the meaning of several terms such as “global society,” “tourism,” “heritage,” and relate them particularly to the philippine experience. while there are reasons to promote tourism and preserve the national heritage, there are certain obstacles to these that must be overcome. the article further argues that the present filipino generation has accepted the current global culture—described by james fallows as a “damaged culture”—as a source out of which a new understanding of filipino identity is possible. introduction a global society is here assumed to mean a world which is fast becoming borderless in that restrictions to travel from one state to another have become minimal. the association of southeast asian nations (asean) is an example where only a passport, not a visa, is required for entering a geographical national boundary. in the european union (eu) one is “free to move.” s/he can travel, study, and work anywhere in the 25 eu countries,2 if s/he is an eu citizen. “in most of the eu you can travel without carrying a passport and without being stopped for checks at the borders. with very few exceptions, you may buy anything you want anywhere you want and take it all back home with you” (see “the european union at a glance,” 2004). in time, it is highly probable that asean will have a common monetary unit, like eu’s euro, and may possibly discard 74 prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 74-89 © 2000 by assumption university press the requirement of a working permit for employment within the region. if such a thing happens worldwide, then we surely have a genuine global society. the other component of globalization—aside from the usual economic consideration of transnational corporations directly doing business or commercial agreements with local governments and generally bypassing to a large extent national governments, which basically simply set the national economic agenda and laws3 (see omae 1996 and gripaldo 1996-97:75)—is the idea of multicultural ethnicity.4 let me quote some relevant portions of the speech by patricia evangelista5 (2004) in great britain: …this is a borderless world, where no individual6 can claim to be purely from where he is now. my mother is of chinese descent, my father is a quarter spanish, and i call myself a pure filipino—a hybrid of sorts resulting from a combination of cultures. each square mile anywhere in the world is made up of people of different ethnicities, with national identities and individual personalities. because of this, each square mile is already a microcosm of the world. in as much as this blessed spot that is england is the world, so is my neighborhood back home. seen this way, the filipino diaspora, or any sort of dispersal of populations, is not as ominous as so many claim. . . . a borderless world presents a bigger opportunity, yet one that is not so much abandonment but an extension of identity. even as we take, we give back. we are the 40,000 skilled nurses who support the uk’s national health service. we are the quarter-of-a-million seafarers manning most of the world’s commercial ships. we are your software engineers in ireland, your construction workers in the middle east, your doctors and caregivers in north america, and, your musical artists in london’s west end. rolando m. gripaldo 75 the point of evangelista is that a global society consists of not merely foreign tourists and transnational companies coming into a country, but also migrants in search of the good life or for “greener pastures”. some of these migrants become permanent residents or naturalized citizens, adding up to the multicultural ethnicity of the locality. they also transform themselves into tourists during their free time. the thrust of my paper, however, is limited to the linkage between tourism and heritage. tourism and heritage tourism accounts for a significant amount of domestic and international travel. to see different cultures and peoples, to see places and scenic spots, to experience and enjoy one’s leisurely time in a beautiful country or island with beaches and corals and marvelous ocean waves, are some of the reasons for traveling. in one sense, these cultural and natural tourist attractions constitute a country’s national heritage. unesco issued a world heritage list as of july 2004 of some 788 properties, 611 of which are cultural, 154 are natural, and 23 are mixed in 134 states. of the association of southeast asian nations (asean), indonesia has seven, kampuchea one, malaysia two, philippines five, thailand four, and vietnam five. on the world heritage danger list only the philippines in southeast asia is cited with one, that is, the rice terraces of the cordilleras. domestically, however, if one goes by the roster of every country, the list of national heritage sites is relatively long. tourism and heritage are compatible bedfellows, but the philosophical issues are: why should a nation promote tourism and why should it protect and preserve its national heritage? why tourism? tourism is defined as a leisurely trip to a place where one can spend a few disposable hours or days from one’s usual ordinary routine to enjoy culture and natural scenic spots. it is meant to free or unwind one’s 76 prajñâ vihâra mind from the daily round-the-clock habitual boring existence. tourism is different from occasionally going to beer houses or night spots to drink a few bottles of beer or spirits and watch some entertaining shows. it is also different from just going to movies and watching cultural presentations especially in the cultural centers of one’s own country. although these can be components of a tour schedule, tourism connotes going to places not necessarily within one’s locality but somewhere else. tourism oftentimes requires a plan or schedule, no matter how haphazard it may initially be. there are, of course, rare occasions when one decides on the spot to have a travel tour unscheduled. but why should an individual or a nation promote tourism? one reason is that it is good for one’s health, both physical and mental. it relaxes and releases tensions brought about by work or by the workplace such that a brief change of environment seems appropriate to break the monotony. there are agencies that promote health tourism, and in some cases, although many disapproved of it, sex tourism. the disapproval arises because sex tourism is basically exploitative. in the philippines for example, many arrests are made of pedophiles exploiting minors (2003a).7 secondly, it is good for the economic health of the nation. the philippines in asean has one of the lowest tourist arrivals of about 2.3 million while thailand and malaysia are enjoying annually over 10 million tourist visitors (2003b, 2003c, 2003d). translated into financial terms of $500 spent per tourist on the average, the amount runs into billions of dollars, which is good for the national economy. moreover, part of the tourism income can be used to preserve the national heritage. in cambodia, e.g., tourism played a part in the removal of the angkor wat temple from unesco’s “in danger” list since enough tourist money has been generated “to hire local residents to work as guards and to pay them enough to prevent them and others from looting the site and selling artifacts overseas” (“unesco urges countries…,” 2004). there is one other feature in tourism which in the philippines may be called, in one sense, a “reverse tourism.” there are between 7 to 8 million filipino migrant workers distributed throughout the world. they earn money primarily as workers in a foreign land, but secondarily transform themselves into tourists by enjoying and experiencing the cultural and natural rolando m. gripaldo 77 scenic places there. the point is that, as reverse tourists, they remit money to the country of origin that amounts to about $7-$8 billion dollars annually (2003e). and this amount—sent through the banking system—excludes the “padala” system, or the money that a worker sends through another migrant worker who is coming home to be given to his/her family. lastly, tourism is basically educational. to see places and meet different people, to phenomenologically experience the ambience of the place is something which cannot be duplicated by simply watching it in television or reading it in a brochure. why preserve the national heritage? unesco classifies a heritage as cultural, natural, or mixed. cultural heritage “refers to monuments, groups of buildings and properties with historical, aesthetic, archaeological, scientific, ethnological or anthropological value.” natural heritage “refers to outstanding physical, biological and geological formations, habitats of threatened species of animals and plants and areas with scientific, conservation or aesthetic value.” mixed heritage is a combination of both cultural and natural properties. according to unesco, since “1992 significant interactions between people and the natural environment have been recognized as cultural landscapes.” unesco listed 24 mixed properties in 14 countries (see unesco from the internet). upon nomination of a party state, that is, a country which has adhered to the world heritage convention, certain national properties are selected by unesco as a world heritage under certain criteria.8 but why preserve or conserve a national heritage? firstly, a national heritage is a public good. it is owned collectively by the people as a national treasure. it must be preserved because people come and go, the ownership is fluid and passes on from one generation to the next. preservation of a national heritage ensures that the treasure is inherited, so to speak, by the sibling generation. secondly, a national heritage is a source of national pride, which enhances a sense of love of country and strengthens the nationalistic spirit of the people. preservation, as in the first case, sustains the firmness of the people’s patriotic bond. 78 prajñâ vihâra thirdly, especially for cultural and mixed types, a national heritage is an investment that requires human labor. it may or may not generate income, but the point is that the product of such labor may be compensated in terms of the people’s aesthetic appreciation of it. if it is a sight to behold, if it enlivens one’s sense of wonder, then that is its own compensatory reason for being. its preservation helps assure the people on the continuance of this sense of appreciating beauty. lastly, a national heritage can be included in a tourist schedule. as such, it has an income-generating potential. many state ministries or departments of tourism actively promote heritage sites and places, ethnic cultural features, natural beautiful sceneries, etc. because of their economic potential. sustainability of such tourism income necessitates the preservation of a national heritage. obstacles to tourism and heritage if tourism and heritage are sweet bedfellows, why are tourist visitors of countries in a global or globalizing society not uniform in number? in asean, for instance, why are there more tourists in malaysia, thailand, and singapore than the rest of the member countries? why do other countries lag behind. one, the cultural, natural and recreational sites in these countries are less preserved and maintained. two: the sites are less promoted. it is sometimes the case that when a country becomes popular as a tourist destination, the promotion budget of a tourism ministry or department gets bigger, and tourist arrivals continue to increase annually. accredited tourist agencies of a country have linkages with many types of transportation such as airlines, shipping lines, bus companies, car-for-hire outfits, etc. these agencies have also promotional come-ons and add-ons, or additional privileges and benefits such as discounts, a side-trip to a tourist spot not originally listed in the usual tour schedule, an additional free night, etc. three, the country may be isolated such that it is basically uneconomical to visit since tourist preference is to connect by train or bus to other countries. if the viable transportation is only by air, then the tourist rolando m. gripaldo 79 budget must be bigger than usual. england tried to connect itself to mainland europe by train through an underground tunnel (see internet). four, international business meetings, international academic conferences, international political summits, and the like are few. members of these gatherings are generally considered as tourists in that many live in hotels, in university lodgings, in tour cottages, etc. and spend their nights or break days sightseeing the city or locality. some even extend their stay in the country to visit more places and craft stores. in the xxist world congress of philosophy that i attended in istanbul, turkey, many participants skipped the morning or afternoon sessions to take a bus tour around the city or take a boat tour of the bosphorus strait, visit the blue mosque, the sophia hagia, the underground cistern, a night spot to watch some belly dancers perform, or even extend their stay for several days to take a bus tour in asia minor to see the ruins and scenic spots of ancient city-states, including cappadocia and troy. five, the country is visited by natural calamities, the effects of which is longlasting. in the philippines there were the mt. pinatubo eruptions which practically covered several provinces with dust, ashes, and lahar. for many years the area affected was a virtual wasteland and some of the important tourist places desolated, albeit temporarily. an earthquake or a strong typhoon can also do an extensive damage to cultural, natural, and mixed heritage. six, transnational companies who come to a country can destroy potential tourist areas because of the construction of the work-and-factory sites and the pollution of the environment. moreover, it can also threaten the ethnic culture of the locality because of the possibility of urbanization and modernization. seven, local governments may be unmindful of these heritage sites despite the explicit provisions in existing laws to protect and preserve the national heritage. the mayor of cagayan de oro city, for example, in the philippines approved the construction of a “new bridge and road that could destroy the huluga site [open site and caves], an area recognized by the national museum as an important historical and archaeological discovery” (“manifesto…,” 2001). the construction violated republic act 4846, “which renders unlawful the destruction of archaeological or historical sites identified by the national museum” and presidential decree 80 prajñâ vihâra 105, “which makes it unlawful to change the features of existing historical landmarks.” last, a political turmoil exists. we are here talking about political terrorism, an invasion, a civil war, or a country with pockets of rebellion. there are also travel advisories by foreign governments discouraging their respective nationals to visit a particular country, or parts of that country, because of war, terrorist bombings, kidnappings, and the like. the philippines has a pocket muslim rebellion in the south, a series of abu sayyaf kidnap-for-ransom terrorist activities in basilan and a few places in southern philippines, and a communist resistance movement which occasionally attacks or ambushes some military outposts. so the philippines receives such advisories from foreign governments, particularly from the united states, new zealand, and australia. what is to be done? we have seen that the development and sustained maintenance or preservation of the national heritage does not guarantee the increase of tourist arrivals because of various obstacles to be hurdled. nothing can be done in a country at war, not until the bloody rebellion (not just a symbolic coup d’état9), civil war, or invasion is ended. nothing much can also be done immediately in terms of restoration of a national heritage when a natural calamity such as a devastating typhoon and flood, a strong earthquake, a destructive volcanic eruption, a tsunami, etc. destroys it. the process of restoration and redevelopment of the tourist site takes a little longer. but something can still be done in other areas. the first thing that can be done is to minimize or contain the troubled spots to a certain locality as much as possible so that tourism can be encouraged in a vast expanse of peaceful areas. tourist spots, lodging houses, resorts, and the like must have a telecommunication system, including a siren, and a sufficient number of efficient security guards equipped with two-way radios in cases of emergencies or terrorist infiltration. it is advisable that a helicopter from a nearby military or civilian base should be handy. the abu sayyaf, for instance, infiltrated and abducted several tourists from a tourist resort (dos palmas) in the island of palawan in western philippines. they also abducted tourists from a rolando m. gripaldo 81 malaysian island resort, i.e., at sidapan, sabah (see abu sayyaf group 2004). their area of operations goes beyond the boundary of their base of origin (basilan).10 when disturbances are contained, tourism may still grow in peaceful areas. for instance, the philippine muslim resistance movement is basically limited in actual operations to a few provinces in southern mindanao: sultan kudarat and north cotabato of region xii and lanao del sur, maguindanao, basilan, sulu, and tawi-tawi of the autonomous region of muslim mindanao. these are predominantly muslim provinces. foreigners may be prohibited in going to these places. these two regions themselves have many relatively safe provinces like saranggani and south cotabato. together with region ix (zamboanga del sur, zamboanga del norte, zamboanga city, and zamboanga sibugay), it is less risky to go to these places. but regions i-viii (luzon and the visayas provinces), together with regions x, xi, and the caraga region (mindanao provinces) are very safe. foreigners can visit these places (see “political map,” 2004). promotion of tourist places and sites must include an advisory to relatively unsafe places so that foreign tourists will inhibit themselves from going there. it is important for tourist agencies locally and abroad to issue an advisory on places not to visit because of the bad publicity a terrorist abduction, for example, will generate. there is a need to balance “tourism with heritage protection.” the director of ecological sciences of the unesco, n. ishwaran (“unesco urges countries…,” 2004) says that “tourism can be a benefit as well as a threat.” in both china and india, some tourists caused damages to the sites such that it is advisable for local and national officials to monitor the movements of tourists. as ishwaran further notes: “for sites in europe, asia and america, where access is easy, tourism can become a threat unless it is monitored.” in northwestern china, e.g., the centuries-old buddhist art painted in the mogao caves “is under threat from the crowds of visitors” and so management was compelled to “restrict the number of tourists entering the caves.” it is likewise necessary to strictly implement laws governing constructions, as in the case of the huluga site, as these might damage heritage sites. it is perhaps advisable that the state should not only cater to government conferences, but ministries or departments of tourism should 82 prajñâ vihâra also have a linkage with national academic organizations and with a little financial support, at least in terms of advertisement or media coverage, encourage these to sponsor international conferences. in this way, more participants and tourists can come in. in some world conferences i attended, such as the world conference on mulla sadra and issues in contemporary western philosophy, held in tehran in may 1999, and the xxist world congress of philosophy, held in istanbul in august 2003, these had the blessings of their respective governments. some academic organizations may not want a government linkage, but in the philippines, such international conferences do not usually get the national attention as if it were an insignificant event, unless, to my mind, government comes in. it is important to have an advertisement space in newspapers and television in which issues are ventilated and discussed prior to the conference so that many will be interested to attend. it might be useful for some countries to take a deep and profound look into the proposed “open air” or “open sky” policy in order to determine the quantitative merits of such a policy to countries concerned in terms of tourist promotion. finally, laws on air and water or environment pollution for transnational corporations operating in a locality should be strictly implemented to protect the national heritage. it is, i think, advisable for transnational companies to operate in a localized zone such as an export processing zone or a special economic zone or the like. in this way, their production activities are confined to the zones and not scattered anywhere else which could endanger a national heritage. conclusion philippine society has been the result of hundreds of years of colonization. as such there is no national ethnic culture to speak of (although there are still tribal ethnic cultures). it is a hybrid national culture which retains some ethnic cultural traits and adopts many western cultural traits. as every generation adopts more and more of the western traits, it gradually diminishes the ethnic cultural traits. consequently, what was described by james fallows (1987:passim and gripaldo 2000:26-27) as a “damaged culture” is now the accepted culture, out of which the current filipino generation—especially the younger filipino generation—is reshaping its own sense of nationalism. and from the point of view of this generation, it is a progressive culture, western-oriented, and generally optimistic about the future despite current economic and political disturbances. in a manner of speaking, there is no filipino culture that globalization will threaten because its culture now is the culture of globalization. it accepts the fact that as transnational companies come into the country to do business, so are filipinos going outside the country to seek “greener pastures.” as patricia evangelista (2004) says: when i was little, i wanted what many filipino children all over the country wanted. i wanted to be blonde, blue-eyed, and white. i thought—if i just wished hard enough and was good enough, i’d wake up on christmas morning with snow outside my windows and freckles across my nose! more than four centuries under western domination does that to you. i have sixteen cousins. in a couple of years, there will just be five of us left in the philippines, the rest will have gone abroad in search of “greener pastures.” it’s not just an anomaly; it’s a trend: the filipino diaspora. today, about eight million filipinos are scattered around the world.13 there are those who disapprove of filipinos who choose to leave. i used to. maybe this is a natural reaction of someone who was left behind, smiling for family pictures that get emptier with each succeeding year… …i come from a third world country, one that is still trying mightily to get back on its feet after many years of dictatorship. but we shall make it, given more time…. …nationalism isn’t bound by time or place. people from other nations migrate to create new nations, yet still remain essentially who they are…. in a few years, i may take advantage of whatever opportunities come my way. but i will come home. a borderless world doesn’t preclude the idea of a home. i’m a filipino, and i’ll always be 84 prajñâ vihâra one. it isn’t about just geography; it isn’t about boundaries. it’s about giving back to the country that shaped me. and that’s going to be more important to me than seeing snow outside my windows on a bright christmas morning. endnotes 1 slightly revised paper originally delivered during the 6th philosophical conference of the asian association of catholic philosophers held at assumption university, huamak and bang na campuses, bangkok, thailand on 17-20 august 2004. the conference is sponsored by the graduate school of philosophy and religion of assumption university with the theme, “asian heritage in a global society.” 2 there are four candidate countries for eu, in addition to the 25, namely, bulgaria, croatia, romania, and turkey (see “the european union at a glance” 2004). 3 on the other hand, nations are interconnecting for economic survival. toffler (1980) says that the third wave will be the age of regional technopoles or the age of transnationals and regional states. the global role of the nation-state will be secondary and not dominant as in the second wave civilization. this is good in the sense that world conflicts will be minimized because nations will have to go into interdependent linkages to sustain their economies (toffler 1993:289). rolando m. gripaldo 85 they will become post-nations. drucker (1993:141-56) likewise maintains that the nation-state is rapidly becoming obsolete. 4 there are two senses of multicultural ethnicity. one is “inner,” or being a hybrid or having many ethnical biological origins. the other is “outer,” or living in a multicultural environment or living with people belonging to many ethnic groups within a locality. both senses are used in this paper. 5 evangelista, a mass communications student from the university of the philippines, unanimously won the international public speaking contest held by the english speaking union of london against 59 other students from 37 countries. 6 we may interpret the individual as a cultural or ethnic hybrid even as far back as the homo sapiens when they migrated and inter-copulated with each other to bring about an inner ethnicity that, over the centuries, is not originally pure today. 7 the australian center for independent journalism (acij) discusses the philippine child sex industry and the work of father shay cullen, an anti-pedophile campaigner for more than twenty years now (see “acij features sex tourism…”, 1995). 8 unesco mentions 23, but an actual count as of 29 july 2004 yielded 24. the party states have also increased from 134 to 178 as of 1 may 2004. regarding the criteria, there are 6 for cultural properties and 4 for natural properties (see unesco overview). 9 by a “symbolic coup d’état” i mean only an attempt to grab power not seriously but symbolically by occupying a hotel or another building just so plotters can express their dissatisfaction with the government and press for their reformist demands. the philippines has many such cases. the latest occurred on 27 july 2003 when 300 military officers and enlisted soldiers took over the oakwood hotel in makati city and pressed for demands from the government to cleanse the military of corruption. 10 the bullet train service will connect by land from vietnam to kampuchea and thailand, and then possibly to all the other countries of mainland southeast asia. 11 the train chunnel connecting england and france costs “more than $13 billion and took seven years to complete.” the distance between the philippines and vietnam is much longer than the english channel (“channel tunnel…”, n.d.). 12 deputy director general reynaldo velasco (2004) of the philippine national police and also the concurrent executive director of the philippine center of transnational crimes said the center was alerted by “its foreign counterparts such as the interpol on the plans by the terrorists” and is now tightening security on “tourist spots” as possible terrorist “soft targets.” 13 here is a quote from william hyde (2004), the deputy representative of the international organization for migration, regarding filipino migration: 86 prajñâ vihâra …the filipino migratory process is so extraordinary compared to other countries that foreign authorities regularly travel here to learn more about how it all works. they know that this country embraces migration and deals with it as a routine part of life. they know that they can learn a lot looking at what filipinos have already gone through and they are interested to see how the government is managing the process now. references abu sayyaf group (asg). 2004. patterns of global terrorism, 2003. washington, d.c.: united states department of state. http:// library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/asc/htm. accessed: 16 august 2004. acij features sex tourism in the philippines. 1995. http://www. signposts.uts.edu.au/articles/philippines/women/327.html. accessed: 19 july 2004. channel tunnel and eurostar. n.d. http://www.railpass.com/eurail/articles/ chunnel.htm. accessed: 29 july 2004. child prostitutes hit 100,000 mark in rp. 2003a. manila bulletin, 27 october. rolando m. gripaldo 87 convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/ pg.cfm?cid=182. accessed: 29 july 2004. dollar remittances of overseas filipino workers rise 5 percent. 2003d. manila bulletin, 16 november. dot launches special incentive program to attract tourists to philippines exceed 2.2 m arrivals. 2003b. manila bulletin, 26 september. drucker, peter f. 1993. post-capitalist society. new york: harper business. evangelista, patricia. 2004. borderless world does not preclude the idea of home. philippine daily inquirer, 23 may. http://www.inq7.net/nat/2004/may/ 23/nat_11-1.htm. accessed: 27 july 2004. fallows, james. 1987. a damaged culture. atlantic monthly 260. gripaldo, rolando. 1996-97. knowledge, education, and the development of the mind. σοφια 26 (1). __________. 2000. filipino philosophy: traditional approach. part i, section 1. with foreword by george f. mclean, omi. manila: de la salle university press. how we work. n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=34. accessed: 29 july 2004. hyde, william. 2004. ocw 2004: a migration perspective. paper delivered on 5 august 2004 at ariston estrada seminar room, de la salle university, manila. sponsored by the international studies department. maglalang, ferdie j. 2004. angelo de la cruz released. manila bulletin online. http://www.mb.com.ph/main2004072114516.html. accessed: 16 august 2004. mahathir says tourists are flocking to malaysia. 2003c. manila bulletin, 3 october. manifesto of protest to mayor vicente y. emano. 2001. http://www. heritage.sni.ph/huluga/manifesto. accessed: 19 july 2004. ohmae, kenichi. 1996. the end of the nation-state: the rise of regional economies. new york: free press paperbacks. overview. n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid-167. political map. 2004. republic of the philippines. san juan hydn publishing. 88 prajñâ vihâra thailand set to capture 11m tourists and 340-b baht in revenue this year. 2003d. manila bulletin, 15 july. the european union at a glance. n.d. http://europa.eu.int/abc/ index2_en.htm. accessed 29 july 2004. tighter watch on boracay island, other prime tourist spots urged to prevent terrorist attack. 2004. manila bulletin, 12 august. toffler, alvin. 1980. the third wave. new york: bantam books, inc. __________ and heidi. 1993. war and anti-war. new york: warner books, inc. torres, e., m. gonzalez, f. legazpi, and j. espina. 2004. gov’t defies ultimatum, bargains for worker. today, 8 july. http://www.cbscbnnews.com/newsstory. aspx?section=headlines&oid=54786. accessed: 16 august. “unesco urges countries to balance tourism with heritage protection.” 2004. http://sg.news.yahoo.com/040708/1/3lk8f.html. accessed: 19 july 2004. world heritage convention. n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=160. accessed: 29 july 2004. world heritage list (results by country). n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/ pg.cfm?cid=31. accessed: 19 july 2004. world heritage list (mixed properties). n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/ pg.cfm?cid=31& search=&search_by_country=&type=mixed& order=. accessed: 29 july 2004. world heritage in danger list. n.d. http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=86. accessed: 19 july 2004. rolando m. gripaldo 89 article 4-2 53 the relation of european thought to the ‘logos’ and ‘logic’: a possible contribution to cultural world integration? heinrich beck otto-friedrich university, bamberg, germany modern secular culture primarily is the result of world wide extension and influence of european culture. therefore, in order to determine the constructive and destructive power of modern secular culture for shaping a dynamic world peace in encounter with traditional asiatic and african cultures, an analysis of positive and negative characteristics of european culture seems to be necessary. these characteristics are to be comprehended by means of their historical manifestations, especially of the development of european philosophy from antiquity and middle ages to modernity, which we have to look over in the following exposition under this aspect. in the first part, we will try to elaborate the primordial positive disposition and capacity of european spirit. this consists, as i would like to demonstrate, in the development of logos and logic; european culture, from its basic onto-anthropological identity and tendency, is a rational culture. this fundamentally means a particular faculty of an objectifying and distancing consciousness of being, which makes possible a critical understanding and transcending of the past and an active projection and creation of the future. this rational ability gave birth to the sciences,which have to analyze and divide the original unity of experienced reality into its components and partial functions, and it produced modern techniques, which have to synthesize and recompose the parts to new ingenious unities. hence it follows an especial progressivity of european mind and culture. this consciousness confronting and dividing reality further included the evolution of individual rights of the human person, as well as the construction of rational orders of society and economy. in these human values the possible contribution of european culture to world integration is grounded. prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 53-66 53 © 2000 by assumption university press 54 but simultaneously this particular capacity of the logos and of logical structuring of empirical reality seems to have been partially perverted into negative attitudes: in alienation, exploitation and destruction. to point it out will be the intention of the second part of this exposition. here occur historical phenomena like rationalism, empiricism, positivism, which indicate the permanent danger and tendency of european spirit, to fall into a subjectocentric nihilism. it is to be understood as a partial privation and perversion of the originally positive faculty and disposition just mentioned, and signifies a deep crisis of european culture and in its enlargement in modern secular world civilization a threat to mankind’s survival and therefore a strong provocation. the task of overcoming this crisis demands a creative encounter with the asiatic and african cultural traditions which exactly embody those human values which could balance out the one-sidedness of the european access to the reality. i. the representation of the logos as the primordial capacity and destiny of european culture, as a possible contribution to world integration a) looking upon the historical development of european mentality in its philosophical conceptualization, we see the idea of the logos as the leading motive of thinking since the earliest times. in the antiquity, as it seems, the pre-socratic thinker heraclitus1), was the first who called the logos the supreme and inmost principle of reality and the law of all processes and events, combining and determining the differences and contrarieties of being to an all-embracing floating unity, as a palintropos harmonlae, and in pythagoras2) this logos assumed more mathematical-harmonical and psychical features. later on, with socrates3) the logos in the play of questioning dialogues and dialectics was recognized as the methodical principle of finding out the truth; and according to his disciple plato4) all physical reality is transparent to its metaphysical logos, it is to an order of through-shining archetypes or hypostatic ‘ideas’, as the good and the love of truth, beauty, equality, harmony and justice; and at least, aristotle5) put these transcendent principles of sense and cognoscibility into the matter of the 54 prajñâ vihâra 55 world, as the immanent forms of the physical beings and happenings. as to be seen, for the ancient greeks the whole world was ordered homogeneously by harmonical mathematical principles and reigned by the logos, who worked out the chaos to the cosmos. but, because the material substratum to a certain extent resists the logos, he does appear in the visible world only in a limited manner, and order can’t overcome the chaos perfectly. this metaphysical opposition and dualism in the constitution of the world’s being also is the reason for an ultimate failing of all ethical efforts and for a deeply tragical feeling of fate. therefore, human education was understood as the task to elaborate, represent, imitate and actualize the logos and a logos-corresponding order of being: theoretically in the rational consciousness, practically in the ethical will and character, and poetically in the constructing of external culture. this european conception of cosmic logos, embracing all nature and mankind and grounding world order, may be found in a similar way also in other cultures and certainly opens a basical perspective for future world integration. b) in the second period of the historical development of european culture, the so called middle ages, under the influence of jewish and christian revelation the cosmocentric image of being changed to a theocentric one. that means, in the center of being it is not the logic of an anonymous divine energy that works, but the one and omnipotent personal god, who creates the world through the logos, his personal word, by which he calls all things into being. now, the logos is no longer understood as a part of the world, as its immanent forming and structuring force, but as a personal divine reality.according to christian philosophers such as saint augustine5) or thomas aquinas6) god in himself realizes an interpersonal life; his act of being consists in a trinitarian dialog: by intellectual self-penetration god perceives his own infinite essence and expresses and pronounces it in the logos, who therefore is named the coessential ‘son of god’; he perfectly represents him and corresponds to him. the co-acting of self-pronouncing and of responding culminates in the origination and aspiration of the holy spirit, by which both accept each other in perfect love and unity. in this unlimited divine dialog, the world as a limited being in space and time participates.thus god the heinrich beck 55 56 creator occurs as the father both of his consubstantial son, the divine logos, and of all his creation which is pronounced through the same logos in the love of holy spirit; and the world, especially the human person, is invited to integrate itself into the logos and his correspondence to god, that is in his responding and answering son-partnership to god. in this horizon, the evolution and history of the world appears as nothing less than an increasing or decreasing conformity to the reality of the logos, that means: history is the response and responsible answer to the call of the creator, or also its denial. it implies a mystery of christian belief, that in the history of his fatherly partnership with the world, god has sent his son as an incarnated brotherly being with the humankind, and that he was crucified; hence the cross is understood as a sign for the disturbed order of being and for the suffering, as a consequence of the denial against creative divine logos and love, and simultaneously as a permanent offer to reconciliation and freedom. philosophically, thereby two important aspects of the logos have been elaborated: 1) ‘logos’ means personal dialog and creative encounter, and all human being from its absolute divine fundament is disposed and directed to dialog and interpersonality; in this logos-participating similitude to the divine, especially an irreplaceable dignity of every human person is rooted, and this is the fundament of its individual rights and its social and cosmical obligations as dimensions of a dialogical and responsible being. this value, articulated in a peculiar way in the christian middle ages, means an indispensable and contribution for world integration. 2) but logos and all logos-participating order in reality also is violated and is deeply suffering; therefore the aim of history seems to be liberation and freedom through the relation to the logos, by his personal assimilation and subjectification. thus, in the line of logos-accentuated european culture development after the cosmocentric world view of the antiquity and the theocentric of the middle ages, now in a 56 prajñâ vihâra 57 third period, modernity, a more anthropocentric version is initiated. c) since modernity, the cultural and intellectual evolution of the european-occidental world appears as a spiritual movement of liberation; now occidental philosophy understands its fundamental intentions as ‘philosophy of freedom and liberation’. this setting out towards freedom and liberty first announced itself in a new relation to nature and gained form in the modern sciences and technics. in antiquity and the middle ages human reason was considered as the capacity to perceive the logos, the intelligible content of the sensorily given reality and to express it in rational concepts; the logical order of human reason had to correspond to the preceding order immanent in nature. since modernity, however, a new task has been attributed to human reason, the task of taking the empirical reality logically into its potency, of forming it as a disposable material according to man’s subjective intentionswhether according to innate ideas, as in descartes8), or according to apriori forms, as in kant9) , or according to interests of the society, as in positivism or neo-positivism 10). man intended to grasp reality rationally by ‘logical’ concepts, and to dominate it theoretically by science. in this way he could subject it also practically and dispose of it by technics. he confronted himself with nature, opposed it as a ‘determined object’ and imposed himself on it as the ‘determining and free subject’. by means of the ‘objectifying of nature’ the ‘subjectifying’ of man should be mediated; the ‘constitution of nature as a determined object’ served the ‘self-constitution of man as a dominating and free subject’. especially the quantifying character of the modern exact natural sciences can be understood by this tendency of reason to freedom. because, if the concrete qualities of the objects of the sensorial experience lose significance and importance for the abstracting view of the natural sciences, and only the quantitative-mathematical aspects of reality formulatable in general laws are observed, then the human spirit gains distance from concrete nature and makes itself free from it. so, the paradigm of a ‘reduction of quality to quantity’ serves as an instrument for an intellectual taking in possession of reality, as hobbes11) says, and thus for mediating freedom. heinrich beck 57 58 a similar phenomenon to that in the natural sciences, especially in physics, chemistry and biology, can be observed in the modern development of psychology, whose prototype is the so-called psychoanalysis, initiated by freud12). by an objectifying cognition of the unconscious psychic complexes which determine human life, and by dissolving them into their elementary functional components, man intends to subtract himself from their narrowing hindering and so to liberate himself. by means of psycho-analytical dissolution and destruction of opposite and undesired structures and by free psycho-synthetical construction of desired structures man will be the free creator of the psychic structure of his life. in the modern history of the occident an analogous process is equally realizable in the human co-existence, it is in structuring society, in economy and in politics. here was more elaborated the concept of individual rights, of tolerance and solidarity work of a dividing and distancing, but also unifying and ordering logos, perhaps with an accent on distancing and liberating. furthermore, the so called ‘capitalistic liberalism’ is conceivable as an expression of an unlimited aspiration of the individual towards freedom vis-à-vis the whole society; in the subsequent phenomenon of a ‘collectivistic socialism’ there operates a will to liberation of the lower classes or also of the whole humankind from the predominating and repressive higher classes of society. as notable figures, who searched to interpret philosophically and to favorize historically this direction of social development, primarily kant, hegel, and marx are to be mentioned. kant13) proclaimed the free and strongly transcendentally valid self-determination as that state which solely corresponds to the dignity of man as the autonomous subject of morality. hegel14) saw in the liberating and victorious anti-thesis of the third social class, the citizens, to the first and second class, the clerics and the nobles, as manifested in the french revolution, a progress of the ‘spirit of world’ and the ‘logos of being’; this hegelian ‘logos’ with his three dialectical steps of self-realisation, identifies the world-history with the trinitarian structure of the deity in the christian middle ages, and so he understands the social progress to more freedom as a step of an absolute divine logic. marx 15) sawin a dialectical continuation of hegel in the desired victory of the fourth society-class, the proletariat of the 58 prajñâ vihâra 59 physical labourers, in a socialistic world-revolution the last and definitive step towards freedom in the all embracing ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’ of the whole humankind. this progress to an always more unlimited freedom should in reality mediate itself by means of a rational analysis of the historical structures and complexes in their single causal factors with the intention to dominate and manipulate them psychoand sociotechnically, for instance by application of mediums of communication and propaganda, in order thus to create social structures of more humanity. d) to sum up: what is the prevalent feature of europeanoccidental culture and mentality, as it has shown itself in its selfexplication in the course of history? it seems to be an especial relation to logos, logic und rationality. in the first epoch, the more cosmocentrically thinking greek antiquity, the logos seemed included in the cosmos, as its innermost fundamental part and forming principle; and so, as human values were generated: an intellectual sensibility for cosmic order and harmony, and its representation, imitation and continuation both in the theoretical rational consciousness and in the practical, ethical und external culture. in the second period, the more theocentrically oriented christian middle ages, the logos transcended the world and faced it as the word of the all-mighty divine creator, who has even spoken it into his creation up to its personal incarnation in jesus christ; by association with him and participation in him, the possibility was offered to mankind to insist and engage in the world from the basis of its absolute and free divine fundament, and so, new values-dimensions were opened such as free personal partnership on the basis of an unsubstitutable god-representation of human person and responsibility. in the third and ultimate era, modernity, with its anthropocentric turn and orientation, the logos is appropriated from its divine transcendence and in a certain way identified with human rationality and human history. the occidental spirit in modernity conceives itself in evolution and realization in the tendency towards freedom, exceeding and transcending every status that it already has reached and rejecting it again: gaining distance from it theoretically by means of ‘acts of a rational objectification’, and dominating practically by ‘real acts of technics’; so this spirit searches for its progress towards a heinrich beck 59 60 greater freedom in all regions of physical nature and the psychic structure of the individual and the society.it may occur that in the differentiation and cooperation of the geographically and culturally distinct sectors of europe this process is accentuated differently. in the northern part; it is the anglo-saxon culture which also has expanded to north-america, a more abstract logico-analytical theory of science and the search for an economic appropriation of the world prevails and in this sense here we have a progressive culture. in a certain contrast to this, in the southern part, it is the roman culture which also is extended to southand latinamerica, a concrete intuitive and esthetical access to the logos is prevalent, as seen in a typical development of arts and religion -and in this sense here the expressive dimension of culture is accentuated16). situated in the center of europe, germany participates in both regions and therefore seems particularly called to their ideological confrontation and creative conciliation as realized in great german scientists, inventors, artists, philosophers and innovators of religions who have influenced world history. so, the cultural identity of europe, according to the explicating and differentiating character of the logos itself is not a monotonous, but a polyphonic one; it does not express uniformity, but analogy. ii. the crisis of european culture in modernity and overcoming it through world cultural encounter. the peculiar ability of european spirit for logos and logical structure of reality, as described above, which basically means a creative capacity for culture and a positive disposition for integral human being, especially in modern and present times seems to have been partially perverted to a negative state, and so it has thrown all humankind into a deep survival crisis. one can’t deny that domination and freedom, gained by means of science and technics, on the basis of nominalism, rationalism and positivism have led to a removal, alienation and estrangement of the theoretical consciousness from the structures of sense of reality and consequently to a practical attitude of hybris, it is of exploitation, destruction and unlimited manipulation.according to the early modern nominalistic philosopher ockham17), our rational concepts have not to 60 prajñâ vihâra 61 perceive and represent a preceeding sense or immanent logos of being, but to grasp the empirical reality and to bring it under the ordering intention and potency of human subjective consciousness; according to its rationalistic continuation in kant18), the rationally forming intentions were to be understood as expressions of the so called ‘transcendental subject’ or of the whole humankind as such; then positivism19) substituted the strongly universal and transhistorical kantian ‘transcendental subject’ with the multiple concrete human societies and their partial and variable interests, which now were considered to be the ultimate sense-giving instances and authorities. hence nature was no longer comprehended as a subject of its own being and sense, but still more as an object for man, who intends nothing else but only himself as an unlimitedly free subject. nature was regarded as a pure medium and instrument for human selfrealization; it was not apprehended and respected as ‘value of sense in itself’, but merely as ‘value of use and utility for man’. it is in the end an effect of this mentality and attitude that we are nowadays threatened by the danger of a destruction of life through contamination of the air with poisonous emissions, by unintended secondary effects of radioactivity and through certain evolution of gene-technics which escapes human responsibility; and further in the future it cannot be ruled out that there will be a disturbance of the cosmic equilibrium by atomic energy., which is at no time absolutely controllable. a provocation of history becomes manifest, touching the possibility of survival for mankind from its physical basis. a similarly lugubrious view is given by modern evolution in the regions of the psychic, the social and the political. it seems that the relations of the sexes and the generations are falling more and more into neurotic forms and the economic and intercultural activities of the peoples are most heavily disturbed by lacking mutual respect and confidence. where are reason and freedom going to? it is evident, that occidental history of freedom manifests itself not only as a rational movement of opening, representing and confronting reality, but also partially perverts itself in sense-failing estrangement and destruction; confer in this context sartre’s20) conception of freedom as rejection of all obligating claims of the beings, and heidegger’s21) interpretation or the occidental ‘seinsgeschick’ as an ‘eclipse of being’, heinrich beck 61 62 in the line of nietzsche’s22) prophecy of nihilism. the fall into a subjectocentric nihilism attacking the ontical fundament of the human subject and of his freedom is threatening. it is true that recently a new ethics is demanded, for instance in the realms of bio-chemical genetic manipulation and socio-economic activities; but one must ask if here an adequate conception of ‘ethics’ is commonly included: if ‘ethics’ is intended as an attitude of ‘respect for the being because of itself’ and not only another form of ‘technics’, namely a mere technics of survival. so it seems concretely proved under different aspects that the peculiar capacity of european spirit to distance and objectify reality – which is the fundament of free self-determination and projecting the future, and which signifies an originally positive quality has to a great extent become perverted to removal and estrangement from reality; occidental rationality has fallen into a rationalistic attitude, not sufficiently opened and susceptible for the voice of being; occidental logos in its concrete habit means if one might interpret it in a christian perspective a particular participation in the crucified logos. what occidental logos is missing in its actual state of alienation is the corresponding reference, the adequate re-obligation and re-implication to the original sense of being. european culture today seems unilaterally more progressive by looking at the physical matter to dominate it rationally as a mere medium for economic prosperity, than expressive by representing and mediating an intuitively perceived metaphysical sense in spiritual concordance and love; in short: it seems more mental and logical than spiritual. therefore, as the way to a more integral and free humanity, there suggests itself a creative encounter with other cultures, which in their basic onto-anthropological disposition are accentuated more spiritually, that means with cultures of the asiatic orient and of africa. and it seems, that in the ultimate and most recent development of modern european and secular culture in the so called ‘post-modernity’23), under the influence of asiatic and african spiritual impulses, there is opened a new sensibility for the metaphysical expressivity of the physical world, and initiated a cosmic consciousness, transparent to the totality of being. but the first signs of breaking up to a new age of mankind, seem to a great extent to be rather confused, and more distinctness would be required, 62 prajñâ vihâra 63 through a rationality which has regained its intuitive fundament and, on this basis, its metaphysical competence. then there is hope that the abstracting and analyzing rational reflection which dissects reality in its parts would be accompanied and balanced by an emotional devotion which rebinds the separated parts and acknowledges the whole. thus the full and integral act of being in its triadic structure will be realized: in its basic first step, the initial in-sisting and reposing of the being in itself; the second step, the recognizing and opening ex-sistence or outwardsmovement and confrontation; and the third and ultimate step, the respecting and loving inwards-movement and re-in-sistence, by which the being expressively accepts itself and the others and perfects its unity and identity. a creative encounter of modern secular world civilization which mainly originated in europe, and traditional asiatic and african cultures, forced and favorized by the present survival-provocation of being of all humankind, could initiate in the scientific technological civilization a critical self-consciousness: both of the positive human values, elaborated in the history of european culture since antiquity and middle ages as we have described it, and of its own unilateralities, limits and deficits. out of this could arise a practical impulse to actualize and develop the positive qualities and to accept and gradually overcome the negative ones in mutual dialog and completion. motivation and inspiration for change and evolution of habits come from the experience that we can complete one another and so reach our own fuller identity. perhaps the present sufferings of mankind are to be understood as the pains on the way to an essentially new kind of human being, expressing more integration, humanity and freedom. heinrich beck 63 64 endnotes 1concerning the general conception of the logos in greek philosophy cf. m. henze, die lehre vom logos in der griechischen philosophie. repr. of the ed. oldenburg 1872, aalen 1984; w nestle, vom mythos zum logos. die selbstentfaltung des griechischen denkens von homer bis auf die sophistik und sokrates, stuttgart 1942; b.snell, die entdeckung des geistes. studien zur entstehung des europäischen denkens bei den griechen, hamburg 1955; w kelber, die logoslehre, von heraklit bis origenes, stuttgart 1976; m. bartling, der logosbegriff bei heraklit und seine beziehung zur kosmologie, göppingen 1985; especially to heraclitus cf. k. deichgräber, rhythmische elemente im logos des heraklit, wiesbaden 1963; e. kurtz, interpretationen zu den logos-fragmenten heraklits, hildesheim 1971; w h. pleger, der logos der dinge. eine studie zu heraklit, frankf./m.1987. 2cf w burkert, weisheit und wissenschaft. studien zu pythagoras, philolaos und platon, nürnberg, 1962; b.l. van der waerden. die pythagoreer. religiöse bruderschaft und schule der wissenschaft, zürich-münchen 1979; d. j. o’meara, pythagoras revived. mathematics and philosophy in late antiguity, oxford 1989. 3cf h. kuhn, sokrates. versuch über den ursprung der metaphysik, münchen 1948; b. waldenfels, das sokratische fragen. aporie, elenchos, anamnesis, meisenheim 1961. we can also mention here that in platonic dialogues socrates is the person, which demands from his partners “to give the reason”, that means literally: “to give the logos” (logon didonai, as in ‘menon’ 81a or in ‘protagoras’ 336d). socrates himself says that the essential aim of his life is “to follow the logos” (‘kriton’ 46b: penthesthai to logo). 4cf p. friedlander, platon. vol. i-iii, berlin-new york 1964-75; a. graeser, platons ideenlehre. sprache, logik und metaphysik, stuttgart 1975; w d. ross. plato’s theory of ideas, westport (conn.) 1976; see also b. witte, der (eikos logos); in platos ‘timaios’. beitrag zur wissenschaftsmethode und erkenntnistheorie des späten plato. in: archiv für gesch. der philos. 46(1964) 1-16; k. barthlein, der (orthos logos); und das ethische prinzip in den platonischen schriften. ibid. 46 (1964) 129-173. 5cf. j. stallmach. dynamis und energeia. untersuchungen am werk des aristoteles zur problemgeschichte von möglichkeit und wirklichkeit, meisenheim 1959; h seidl, beitrage zu aristoteles’ erkenntnislehre und metaphysik, wurzburgamsterdam 1984; h. schmitz. die ldeenlehre des aristoteles. vol. 1.2, bonn 1985; m furth.. substance, form, psyche. an aristotelian metaphysics, cambridge 1988. 6cf.m. schmaus. die psychologische trinitätslehre des hl. augustinus, münster 1927, repre ibid. 1967: f.m. sladeczek, die selbsterkenntnis als grundlage der philosophie nach dem hl. augustinus. in: scholastik 5 (1930) 329-356; v. warnach. erleuchtung und einsprechung bei aurelius augustinus. in: augustinus magister. vol. 1, paris 1954, p.429-449; r. berlinger. augustins dialogische metaphysik, frankf/m. 1961; j. mader. die logische struktur des personalen 64 prajñâ vihâra 65 denkens. aus der methode der gotteserkenntnis bei aurelius augustinus, wien 1965; o. du roy l’intelligence de la foi en la trinité selon saint augustin, paris 1966. 7cf. a. malet. personne et amour dans la théologie trinitaire de saint thomas, paris 1956; e. bailleux, le personnalisme de saint thomas en theologie trinitaire. in: rev. thomiste 61 (1961) 25-42; h. beck, der akt-charakter des seins. eine spekulative weiterführung der seinslehre thomas v. aquins aus einer anregung durch das dialektische prinzip hegels, 2 fft/m. 2003; k. kremer, die neuplatonische seinslehre und ihre wirkung auf thomas v. aquin, leiden 1966; f inciarte, forma formarun. strukturmomente der thomistischen seinslehre im ruckgriff auf aristoteles, freiburg-münchen 1970. 8cf r. descartes, discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la verité dans les sciences, paris 1986; idem, meditationes de prima philosophia, hamburg 1977; further f. o. rose, die lehre von den eingeborenen ideen bei descartes und locke. ein beitrag zur geschichte des apriori, bern 1901; w schulz, die aufhebung der metaphysik descartes in den konstruktiven systemen der neuzeit. in: schulz, der gott der neuzeitlichen metaphysik, pfullingen 1957, p. 58-87; c. f von weizsäcker, descartes und die neuzeit1iche naturwissenschaft, hamburg 1958; w röd; descartes. die innere genesis des cartesianischen systems, münchen-basel 1964; ch. link, subjektivität und wahrheit. die grundlegung der neuzeitlichen metaphysik durch descartes, stuttgart 1978. 9i. kant, kritik der reinen vernunft, riga 1781, 2nd ed. 1787 (passim); further f. kaulbach, die dialektik von vernunft und natur bei kant. in: wiener jahrb. für philos. 10 (1977) 51-72; w teichner, kants transzendentalphilosophie. grundriâ, freiburg-münchen 1978; k. gloy, das verhaltnis der kritik der reinen vernunft zu den ‘metaphysischen anfangsgründen der naturwissenschaft’, demonstriert am substanzbegriff. in: philosophia naturalis 21 (1984) 32-53; h. schmitz, was wollte kant? bonn 1989. 10cf. h. beck, der wissenschaftstheoretische positivismus. in: beck, natürliche theologie. grundriâ philosophischer gotteserkenntnis, münchensalzburg 1988, p. 244-262; a lot of corresponding publications you can find ibid., p. 382-392. 11cf.. b. gert, hobbes and psychological egoism. in: journ. of the hist. of ideas’ 28 (1967) 503-520; h. fiebig, erkenntnis und technische erzeugung. hobbes operationale philosophie der wissenschaft, meisenheim 1973. 12cf. s.. freud. studienausgabe. vol. i-x, frankfm. 1982 [vol. i: vorlesungen zur einführung in die psychoanalyse; vol. ii: träumdeutung; vol. iii: psychologie des unbewuâten special explications in: h. beck /a. rieber. anthropologie um ethik der sexualität. zur ideologischen auseinandersetzung um korperliche liebe, münchen-salzburg 1982, p. 46-63; see also e. fromm, s. freuds psychoanalyse. gröâe und grenzen, stuttgart 1979. 13cf. i. kant. kritik der praktischen vernunft, riga 1788 (passim); idem. schriften zur geschichtsphilosophie. ed. by m. riedel, stuttgart 1974. heinrich beck 65 66 14cf g. w. hegel. vorlesungen über die philosophie der geschichte, frankf/ m. 1973, espec. p. 491-540; further explications in: m. riedel. forschritt und dialektik in hegels geschichtsphilsophie. in: neue rundschau 80 (1969) 476-491; e. coreth die geschichte als vermittlung bei hegel. in: philosoph. jahrb. 78 (1971) 98-110; o. d. brauer. dialektik der zeit. untersuchungen zu hegels metaphysik der weltgeschichte, stuttgart 1982. 15cf.. k. marx/fr. engels. ausgewählte werke, moskau 1983 [p. 26-28: thesen zu feuerbach; p. 29-63: manifest der kommunistischen parteir; in other respects h. kesting, zur geschichtsphilosophie von karl marx. in: archiv für rechtsund sozialphilos. 43 (1957) 545-554; l. kolakowski, marx anti-utopische utopie. in: merkur 28 (1974) 616-627. 16cf. e. spranger. lebensformen. geisteswissenschaftliche psychologie und ethik der persönlichkeit, münchen-hamburg 1965; s. t alisjabana, values as integrating forces in personality, society and culture, kuala lumpur 2 1986; idem, socio-cultural creativity in the converting and restructuring process of the new emerging world, jakarta 1983. 17cf. w. of ockham, philosophical writings. ed. by ph. boehner, edinburgh 1957; idem, texte zur theorie der erkenntnis und der wissenschaft. ed. by r. imbach, stuttgart 1987. 18see above the footnotes 9 and 13. 19see above the footnote 10. 20cf. e. schadel. sartres dialektik von sein und freiheit. existentialistische absurditätser-fahrung als konsequenz positivistischen wirklichkeitsverständnisses. in: theologie und philosophie 62 (1987) 196-215; h. beck, sartre: nihilistäischer existentäialismus. in: beck, ek-in-sistenz: positionen und transformationen der existenzphilosophie, frankf./m.-bern-new york-paris 1989, p.71-100. 21cf. m heidegger, zur seinsfrage, frankf./m. 1956; idem. nietzsche. i.ii, pfullingen 1961; idem, was ist metaphysik? frankf./m. 12 1981; g. siewerth. das schicksal der metaphysik von thomas zu heidegger, einsiedeln 1959. 22cf. k. löwith. nietzsches philosophie der ewigen wiederkehr des gleichen, stuttgart 1956; e. heftrich. nietzsches philosophie. identität von welt und nichts, frankf./m. 1952; d. arendt. nihilismus. die anfänge von jacobi bis nietzsche, köln 1970; e. fink. nietzsches philosophie, berlinköln-mainz3 1973. 23cf. jf lyotard. grundlagenkrise. in: neue hefte für philos. 26 (1986) 133; r.g. renner. die postmoderne konstellation. theorie, text und kunst im ausgang der moderne, freiburg 1988; w welsch (ed.) , wege aus der moderne. schlüsseltexte der postmoderne-.diskussion, weinheim 1988; idem. unsere postmoderne moderne, ibid.3 1991; j. roberts, postmodernism, politics and art, manchester 1990; g. vattimo. das ende der moderne, stuttgart 1990. 66 prajñâ vihâra 122-dialogue on differing asian dialogue on differing asian spiritualities: filipinos and thais terence j. fay, s.j. st augustine’s seminary, toronto school of theology, university of toronto, canada when i finished writing my recent book, a history of canadian catholics, i discovered few references to asians or asian spirituality and was immediately spurred on to begin working on a sequel about asians in canada.1 thus conceived in my mind was the outline of the new faces of canadian catholics: the asians. there is a need for this volume in canada because since 1970 asians have come in great numbers. asian catholics are filling canadian churches, supplying canadian clergy and seminarians, and exerting strong influence on canadians and canadian parishes. asians come to the canadian church with strong families, accomplished professional skills, and committed faith. asians are suitable candidates for the canadian nation and desirable parishioners for the canadian churches. my projected volume, the new faces of canadian catholics: the asians, demands not only a study of asian canadian catholics, but also a study of their spiritual source, namely, asian spiritualities. an examination of the matrix of asian spirituality, which undergirds the asian canadian religious experience, is now timely. this investigation begins with a pioneering study of asian canadian catholics, and at this time, there is no comparable study attempting such an academic enterprise. my study employs the techniques of narrative analysis2 and traditional historiography. it seeks the foundation of asian canadian spirituality in a deeper understanding of asian spiritualities. this year my research was expanded to asian catholics in the philippines, hong kong, mumbai, and now bangkok. i share with you some of my interviews with filipinos and thais, whom i look upon as analogues for asian spirituality. i would like to divide this study, first, into the personal religious experience of filipino asians, second institutional changes, and third, the responses of thai religionists to these experiences. i am taking filipino 122 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 122-135 catholics to be somewhat typical of asian religionists and will discuss their religious experience in historical context. this means that catholics and their post-vatican ii institutions, such as the federation of the asian bishops conference, local dioceses, and religious orders, while at the same time preserving the core of christian values, are inculturating themselves to the asian environment. as asian catholics, they express themselves in ways they feel suitable for asians, in asian song, language, vestment, and symbol. let me now share with you some of the stories i have heard from asian catholics since my arrival in the philippines in september. professor maria elena samson was born in the philippines and geared for studies from an early age. elena’s grandmother, who cared for her during the week when she was at school, would not let her go outside to play for fear that she would mix with children beneath her station. nor was elena allowed to look out of the window, as this would be a violation of the modesty expected for young women. elena proved to be a good student, did well in the lower schools, and earned a master’s degree in psychology from indiana university and a master’s degree in sociology from the asian social institute in manila. professor samson is currently involved in a doctoral program in applied cosmic anthropology at the asian social institute. she has visited american, australian, asian, and european nations for study, business, and family reasons.33 interview with maria elena c. samson, asian social institute, manila, 13 september 2004. to her daughter and her students, professor samson communicates the values of family solidarity, love for people, involvement in the filipino commonweal, and love for their catholic faith. she finds that family solidarity and the love for their religion burn brightly in the hearts of young filipinos who are sorting out their lives and value systems. in her view, generational conflict arises during the adolescent period when the young are striving to establish their own boundaries. yet she admits that chaperons and group dating can still be the norm for teenage women in the philippines dating the opposite sex. more leeway is given to 25-year olds in serious relationships. marriage for her is best restricted within the categories of similar religion, ethnicity, and class. inter-racial and inter-faith marriages, which do happen, are frowned upon by filipino and asian communities as they are often seen as being unsuccessful.4 terence j. fay, s.j. 123 professor samson is content to continue her work in the philippines, but would accept a call to carry the ideals of asi to other communities. as she has a medical plan connected with her work, she is comfortable with the protection she has. in many ways, like other asians, she also appreciates the faith healers and herbal cures for minor health problems. but most of all, she believes filipinos enjoy the help of support groups – groups of extended family and close friends with whom they feel “simpático.” suicides are minimal in the philippines. but were psychiatric help necessary for herself or her daughter, she would not hesitate to employ its assistance. she believes in utilizing western science and not regressing to antiquated customs. elena samson has no intention of leaving the philippines, but if she were to send a family member to explore another nation for immigration, she would send as her pathfinder the best-educated member of her family. she shares decision making with her daughter, and they encourage each other in their careers.5 for inspiration, professor samson utilizes meditation, reflection, and contemplation but also employs some formula prayers, such as the rosary and novenas. she finds the catholic church leads her to spiritual growth and is her primary source of spiritual nourishment. she finds the church is very supportive in the care of ordinary people and in social justice. the filipinos as a people, she believes, are naturally concerned with the care and well being of others. filipinos are people who love to celebrate with others and incorporate good fellowship and music into their festivals.6 other asian catholics may not always have the same buoyant hopes as filipinos, or their need for communal celebrations. yet like many asians, filipinos are reluctant to accept western psychiatry as an assist to a healthier life. they will seek a guidance counsellor readily, but are slow to go to a psychiatrist. elena samson is a strong woman mentally and physically and has been able to pursue her academic career unimpeded. she is a loyal asian and is content to live the remainder of her life in the philippines, but she would also be open to extend her career to other nations for altruistic reasons. enjoying academic enlightenment, she still remains loyal to the gospel of jesus as found in the catholic church. as director of couples for christ (cfc) and its gawad kalinga program, tony meloto was appointed by the philippine government in 124 prajñâ vihâra december 2004 to “lead the rehabilitation effort” in conjunction with other agencies of the “typhoon affected areas.”7 consultant to rice and the sugar cane workers, tony meloto works to defuse labour strife and bring the different sides toward a peaceful resolution of their dispute. he admits his service as conciliator is not always appreciated and that he has been derisively called “the deodorizer.” yet when he negotiates, he is aware that the wealthy farm owners are able to send their sons and daughters to quality universities, such as ateneo de manila and la salle, while the labourers on their farms receive barely enough for existence.8 tony meloto has been the director of gawad kalinga 777 since 2000, a program which is building 700,000 homes in 7000 regions of the country in 7 years. he states that building houses for the poor is not about houses so much as it is about building community. it is a question of regaining productivity, which is needed for the maintenance of filipino families. there is not enough work in the philippines, and men do not have adequate work to support their family. without work, the male loses his sense of being a son of god having inherent dignity as the provider, protector, and pastor of his family. lacking work for their hands, many of the male population are humiliated when they find themselves irrelevant to their family and society. they become isolated, losing the sense of family and community, and are reduced to the animal level of survival. their animal instincts dominate and turn them into predators for their own survival. building homes, according to tony meloto, is a way to lead men into productive work to regain their humanity and christian dignity. they learn to transform slum shanties into family homes, and their family into a warm and human resource for them.9 tony meloto has been a member of couples for christ since 1985. he worked in the biggest slum in the philippines at bagong silang, to the east of manila from 1995 to 2000. he worked with 2000 youths and their families and tried to understand the relationship of poverty and criminality. from his experience and observations, he learned that husbands, lacking work, are surplused in filipino society. they are deprived of their rightful role as provider, protector, and pastor of their home community. the restoration of filipino manhood became the priority of couples for christ to find ways to assist husbands to be responsible before god and their family.10 terence j. fay, s.j. 125 gawad kalinga 777 co-opts men into house building and organizes them into neighbourhood associations to take leadership in their communities. many men suffered from social alienation, were violent abusers or former prisoners whom couples for christ restored by using their model of productive work, family dialogue, and being concerned first for others before oneself. by drawing these men toward this model, cfc restores them to their dignity as sons of god and providers of their family. builders and tradesmen, who know plumbing, electronics, and carpentry, work with the gk 777 men giving them on-the-job training. professional workers give up saturday golf to help the renewal of their gk 777 brothers by assisting them to be productive. men work to restore men, and the affluent and the poor join together in the genuine communion of building homes for the needy. the spirit of cfc is to create harmony among the needy and to assuage their anger. their overall motto is “less for self, more for others, and enough for all.” they form a partnership with the schools, the needy, and the corporations to regain productivity for the good of all.11 according to tony meloto, the poor pray well because they are in pain most of the time and need god’s help to make it through the day. they pray because they believe in the after life and want to be part of it. they go to mass to get help to hold their marriage together and to continue the self-sacrifice for their spouse and family. in adversity, they pray for the strength to hold onto their family. couples for christ gather the new homeowners into households of 5-7 families who meet periodically to talk of their faith and support their neighbours. as a matter of fact, when the poor have food, they do not eat it all, but take some to those who have less. gawad kalinga 777 is designed to rehabilitate the husband’s dignity and to renew the family by his presence.12 professor john schumacher recognizes that the filipino family, as other asian families, is ambiguous and has both strengths and weaknesses. the family protects is members and makes sure they have jobs. eldest daughters will sacrifice marriage to work and send their younger siblings to school, or to take care of their elders. on the other hand, family ties are strong factors in the graft and corruption which have hurt the philippine economy and made it among the worst in asia. for instance, schumacher warns that “fictive kinship by which sponsors at baptism and marriage 126 prajñâ vihâra are bound by strong ties includes not only the sponsor and god-children but also the sponsors and the parents of the god-children. family ties likewise lead to family dynasties by which high political office in the provinces is occupied by members of the same families over several generations.”13 religion is a great inspiration for filipinos and keeps them in harmony with each other over the long term. republican leaders, such as jose rizal, who were heroes who fought for philippine independence, were more concerned with national political gain than religion exercises. yet before they died, many republicans and freemasons came back to the church to be buried in the catholic cemetery with their family and relatives.14 for some filipinos, devotions and pilgrimages are seeping back because for the young, they seem the right thing to do. while the cursillos are dying out, the charismatic movement is growing in strength. the spanish friars after 1836 had taught a romantic loyalty both to cross and crown. being docile students with good memories, the filipinos continued european religious and civil loyalty throughout the american colonial regime. in recent years, with the death or withdrawal of foreign clergy, filipinos have taken charge of their own religious orders. the young people, observes professor schumacher, increasingly date as they like, and many imitate the american way of doing things and dress according to american fashions. parents have generally given up on the old asian ideal of arranged marriages, and let the young marry when and whom they wish. affluent filipinos accept psychological help, but most filipinos find these services too expensive. families have a balance between the authority of the husband as the head of the family, and the power of his wife as the treasurer of the family goods. this can occasionally lead in poorer families to wife beating by the husband demanding more access to the very limited family funds. prayer groups educate young filipino couples to initiate regular family discussion and share family decisions with family members. in the philippines, the careers of professional women are built upon having the ready services of domestics who keep their family going. filipino domestics who go abroad are educated women who provide financial support for their families and are also greatly appreciated in hong kong, asia, the middle east, europe, and north america.15 ten percent, terence j. fay, s.j. 127 or eight million filipinos, work outside the country and are away from their families. men hire onto ships, and women go to work in others’ homes. religion is important to filipinos both at home and abroad. they form prayer groups to deepen their spirituality and assuage their loneliness. in rural areas, basic ecclesial communities are common, and in the urban areas, marriage encounter and couples for christ are popular. christian life communities and bible study groups are equally important. prayer groups among filipinos at home and abroad are more and more popular and growing in number and size. in the philippines, adult catechism is becoming more popular, and catechists are being theologically trained to undertake full time paid positions to teach after hours in public schools. filipino spirituality is alive and well in the philippines and wherever filipinos settle around the world.16 exposed to various nations of the world through travel, professor randolf david and his family have elected to remain in the philippines where their ethnicity is solidly rooted. philippine ethnicity for the davids stresses close family ties, love of country, personal freedom, and excellence in professional performance. randolf and and his wife karina david during their university years were student activists, whereas their children were not. randolf and karina david are educated and spiritual people but do not go to church for various reasons, whereas the children are educated and spiritual people who go to church. family dialogue and responsibility for actions have always been stressed in the family. through discussion, the family comes to consensual decisions on schools, which children are to travel with them on vacation, or who might live abroad for a time. the children are well educated and trained to be assertive. the eldest son, carlos, earned his doctorate at an american university. the eldest daughter, kara, works in communications and had a child before marriage but did not marry while she raised her child because she did not feel ready for marriage. the second daughter, nadya, designs book covers. the youngest daughter, jovita, passed up an mba degree and a lucrative profession to work as a jesuit volunteer teaching mathematics in palawan island.17 a family consensus takes a positive stand for inter-ethnic and interfaith marriages. it is the family belief that openness is preferable to bigotry. health care plans are modest for family members, and they are composed 128 prajñâ vihâra of the university of the philippines system and the national health system. although the family would welcome psychiatric treatment were it necessary, it is expensive and avoided by most filipinos for reason of cost. the david family believes that the best health care system is their own family.18 randolf david has never needed a pathfinder in his immediate family, but in the family from which he sprung, one of his younger sisters was the pathfinder. she went as a nurse to san diego where she has worked as a senior coronary nurse. she was followed by a second sister who is a medical technologist, and a third sibling who had completed law in the philippines and migrated to the united states to manage a small printing company. randolf david’s youngest brother completed his bachelor’s degree in economics at the university of the philippines and moved to los angeles and works for an air freight company. randolf david’s siblings are all married and active in their american parishes. the couples for christ is a prayer group of choice for one of his american siblings.19 the david family is principled, highly responsible, and committed to spiritual authenticity. professor david is a private person and needs time alone to pray in his own way. he is concerned with the issues of social justice in the philippines and the world. he is a committed filipino nationalist and wants by his presence to improve life in the philippines. one of the constant interests of sociologist john carroll has been the 300,000 people living at payatas, the garbage dump site near manila. many of the people came from the countryside to manila looking for work, and unable to find it, went to the dump to become squatters and work at sorting garbage. having no other place to go, those at payatas marry and settle down in squatters’ shanties and raise a family. they sort the garbage to make money selling glass, paper, metal and plastics for recycling. while the minimum wage in the philippines is 300 pesos a day, they can make perhaps 200 pesos as scavengers. others can make one hundred pesos daily weaving plastic doormats. some of the people are construction workers, security guards, taxi, tricycle, and jeepney drivers. many are people without skills who cannot find work, and others, over 50 years of age, who are too old to do heavy work.20 professor carroll started a feeding program of supplying milk for over 500 “third-degree malnourished infants.” his aim was to give them terence j. fay, s.j. 129 adequate weight to avoid mental deficiencies later in life. the jesuit order and american friends supplied the program money. “the weighing of children and distribution of the powdered milk was handled by celing, a local volunteer and mother of four.” smart and capable, celing proved to be “a paramedic and an all-purpose social worker in the community, assisting in the clinics, getting people into hospitals and watching by them at night, bringing in doctors from the department of health when there is an outbreak of cholera, and being called to intervene in cases of child abuse, rape, and incest in the community.” her own children, inspired by her service to others, became respectively nutritionist, social worker, and instructor in the billings method of fertility care. with the don bosco brothers and sisters, carroll initiated a scholarship program for fifty students to enable them to take vocational courses, while others go on to community college. some children at the city dump have become professional workers, such as juliet who became chief of operations at a fast-food firm, and others who got into plumbing, electro-mechanics, and electronics. transportation back and forth to the city schools is the major cost of this apostolate.21 the religion of the people, according to john carroll, is folk religion. it consists mainly in baptism of infants and the family rosary. on major holidays, the new babies are lined up, baptized, and celebrated. willing parents are offered instruction on the meaning of baptism for the lives of their children. the values that the children learn are respect and support of parents, and beyond their “face-to-face family,” they have “little sense” of the larger community or nation. when filipinos go abroad, interestingly observes carroll, they settle more with language and regional groups than among filipinos as a nation.22 the parents do not find they are able to control their teens any longer. the young people want to go out at night and mix with their peers, and only recently has the community experienced adolescent pregnancies. sometimes there is a marriage following the pregnancy, but often the couple will wait until next year. there has been considerable success with the billings method of fertility care in that over one hundred couples are practising it and having good success. the cost of “the pill” would be inhibiting to the people of payatas. they are not shocked by inter-racial or inter-faith marriages among them, but they would avoid marrying a 130 prajñâ vihâra bumbai, that is an east indian moneylender, many of whom are looked upon as being aggressive and rough. some of the brighter young women living at the dump would hope to be health workers or teachers, and go abroad, but their language skills are limited. some of the men hire onto ships as seamen. health care is fragile for most of the inhabitants. a german doctors’ foundation sponsors a clinic, and two jesuit doctors visit another clinic built by the german augustinian sisters. psychiatric services would not be available except for extreme cases that are taken to the national mental hospital.23 earlier john carroll mentioned that religious practices at payatas were mainly folk religion. for some the church is “a place where one can cry, ask for help in trouble, tell god our sins, ask forgiveness, and come away feeling better.” the churchgoers would believe that “jesus is my friend who understands me and keeps me from committing suicide.” only a small percent of the inhabitants would attend sunday mass or know the responses and songs at mass. the prayer groups which carroll’s associates animate include born-again christians and at least one member of an indigenous sect. they appreciate the bible study and mutual support, which they receive in the group. the catholics would know the basic prayers like our father and hail mary. as a long-term chaplain, carroll would feel that the gift that filipinos have to give the world is their joy of celebration. this is demonstrated in the novena of pre-dawn masses before christmas which draw more people than any other religious occasion of the year and are celebrated as anticipated christmas masses, with many candles and bells, sung gloria, white vestments, christmas carols, and often afterwards, a “noche buena” of ginger tea and hot pastries.24 i would like to point out some institutional bright spots in the filipino and asian spiritual environment which are religiously inspired, such as, the success of microfinancing in south and south east asia in stimulating home industry, basic ecclesial communities in animating social justice ministries, and searsolin working in south east asia to renew agriculture among rural communities. in mumbai, india, sixteen homes for street children were established over the last thirty-five years and 30,000 children have benefited and become productive citizens and some homeowners. many of these programs are employed in countries throughout asia to help low income people and are committed to a better economic, political, and terence j. fay, s.j. 131 religious future for all. the concern that asians show for one another is a manifestation of a number of very powerful spiritualities at work. these signs, we have seen, reveal that the post-modern period is arriving in filipino spirituality. women become autonomous such as elena sampson. self-styled spirituality as that fashioned by randolf david is being lived. secularizing of the university life and catholic piety is proceeding apace. couples for christ direct their own ministries and build homes for the homeless. volunteers following their own conscience take care of the inhabitants of payatas. these self-directed laity have learned to discern the will of god for their communities, and they reveal the spiritualities of asia as less static and more dynamic toward the future. they believe that conflicting interpretations of life will be resolved in the transcendent.25 as part of the dialogue on asian spirituality, i asked the thais present at the talk to assist me draw conclusions appropriate for the asian spirituality. the respondents included representatives of the christian, buddhist, muslim faiths, and those with no particular affiliation. they responded to questions in regard to family customs, religious ideals, religious practices, national loyalties, and ethnic gifts. the respondents shared a traditional vision of family values which included solidarity with and care for the elders. these values they hoped to pass onto their children. some included among their family values that they should live within their means, never borrow, and give generously to those in need. sharing meals together and contributions to the family by one’s work were also considered important. in contrast to these signs indicating that the filipinos were entering into a period of postmodern change, the thais in their responses to the questionnaire revealed a belief in unchanging traditional values which continue to guide their society. religious values which the respondents hoped to passed to their progeny included “the middle path” of insight, honesty, knowledge, contemplation, harmony, temperance, generosity, and enlightenment leading toward nirvana.26 a number of responses referred to “the five precepts” as a suitable code of conduct. the precepts teach disciples to avoid killing, stealing, lying, alcohol, drugs, or sexual misconduct. positively, they asked disciples to think, speak, and do good things. the query on religious practice elicited similar responses.27 for some, going with one’s family to a place 132 prajñâ vihâra of worship weekly was an important exercise, while for others giving alms was more significant. religious people related by their questionnaires that listening to god’s voice in the scriptures, the ten commandments, the five precepts, and prayer is important. fasting, prayer, and almsgiving in asian spirituality continue to be meaningful exercises. national values are part of the asian value system. for example, many thais have a strong loyalty to the royal family and to their country, and the young studying abroad return quickly to thailand after finishing their studies. thais in general do not seek work abroad or settle in foreign countries. as a nation, the thais believe in their special national gifts which include the welcome of visitors with delicious food, human kindness, tolerance, and generosity. love of family and elders, hospitality and peacefulness, religious values and buddhist culture are the thai manifestations of a traditional asian spirituality. dominated by a national commitment to buddhism and in contrast to a more flexible filipino spirituality, thai spirituality looks upon itself as traditional and unchanging. filipino catholic spirituality, in contrast to thais spirituality, shows the manifestations of change in response to the breakup of the modern world. terence j. fay, s.j. 133 endnotes 1 terence j. fay, a history of canadian catholics: gallicanism, romanism, and canadianism (mcgill-queen’s university press, 2002). 2 catherine kohler riessman, narrative analysis. (thousand oaks ca: sage publications, 1993), 1-7; d. jean clandinin and f. michael connelly, narrative inquiry: experience and story in qualitative research (san francisco: josseybass, 2000), 1-10, 54-55; n. k. denzin and y. s. lincoln, eds., collecting and interpreting qualitative materials (thousand oaks ca: sage publications, 1998); juanita johnson-bailey, “dancing between the swords: my foray into constructing narratives” in qualitative research in practice: examples for discussion and analysis, edited by sharan b. merriam and associates (san francisco: jossey-bass, 2002), 323-5; norman k. denzin and yvonna s. lincoln, eds., the landscape of qualitative research: theories and issues (thousand oaks ca: sage, 1998), 80. 4 interview with maria elena c. samson, asian social institute, manila, 13 september 2004. 5 interview with maria elena c. samson, asian social institute, manila, 13 september 2004. 6 interview with maria elena c. samson, asian social institute, manila, 13 september 2004. 7 the philippine star metro, “gawad kalinga leads typhoon rehab effort,” by perseus echeminada, 12 december 2004. 8 interview with antonio p. meloto, executive director of gawad kalinga, couples for christ office, manila, 25 november 2004. 9 interview with antonio p. meloto, executive director of gawad kalinga, couples for christ office, manila, 25 november 2004. 10 interview with antonio p. meloto, executive director of gawad kalinga, couples for christ office, manila, 25 november 2004. 11 interview with antonio p. meloto, executive director of gawad kalinga, couples for christ office, manila, 25 november 2004. 12 interview with antonio p. meloto, executive director of gawad kalinga, couples for christ office, manila, 25 november 2004. 13 interview with john schumacher sj, ateneo de manila university, manila, 19 september 2004. 14 interview with john schumacher sj, ateneo de manila university, manila, 19 september 2004. 15 interview with john schumacher sj, ateneo de manila university, manila, 19 september 2004. 16 interview with john schumacher sj, ateneo de manila university, manila, 19 september 2004. 17 interview with randolf david, university of the philippines, manila, 17 september 2004. 134 prajñâ vihâra 18 interview with randolf david, university of the philippines, manila, 17 september 2004. 19 interview with randolf david, university of the philippines, manila, 17 september 2004. 20 interview with john j. carroll sj, institute for church and social issues, ateneo de manila university, 25 november 2004. 21 john j. carroll sj, philippine daily inquirer, 20 october 2004. 22 interview with john j. carroll sj, institute for church and social issues, ateneo de manila university, 25 november 2004. 23 interview with john j. carroll sj, institute for church and social issues, ateneo de manila university, 25 november 2004. 24 interview with john j. carroll sj, institute for church and social issues, ateneo de manila university, 25 november 2004. 25 stanley grenz, a primer on postmodernism (grand rapids mi: william b. eerdmans, 1996), 165. 26 kenneth w. morgan, the path of buddha: the buddhism interpreted by buddhists (new york: ronald press, 1956), 103-7, 165-6, 372-4; nolan p jacobson, buddhism: the religion of analysis (new york: humanities press, 1965), 38-39. 27 the path of buddha, 108-9, 134, 233, 370, and 390; buddhism, 38-39. terence j. fay, s.j. 135 04 (51-66)_the primacy.pmd 51 the primacy of language in paul ricoeur’s hermeneutics yohanes slamet purwadi gajah mada university, yogyakarta, indonesia abstract this paper intends to explore the philosophical foundation of ricoeur’s hermeneutics on meaning and truth. husserl’s phenomenology and heidegger’s existential phenomenology will be used as point of reference to disentangle the complexity of ricoeur’s hermeneutical project. ricoeur proposes and develops a new hermeneutical method. he places an emphasis on “the primacy of language” as a reference point to grasp self-understanding. ricoeur shifts the focus of phenomenology from “intuition” to “mediation”; from “essence seeking” to “symbol interpretation”. it is equivalent to saying that in formulating his concept on self-understanding, ricoeur historicizes the subject. thus, subject is no longer understood in its essence, but rather, on how it creates itself through language. introduction the history of modern western philosophy, to some extent, can be viewed as a battle of ideas concerning the search for truth. yet there is one point often missing in this kind of philosophical debate: that philosophical activity is entirely linguistic. one may consider an idea “an idea” when it is already articulated into language. thinking is not so much a mental process, or even a rational activity, but a linguistic matter. it is language that enables us to think.1 as an australian semiotician, richard harland, proposes rhetorical question: “how could ideas exist in the mind without words?”2 this is to say that without language, there is no thinking. this linguistic issue gained its popularity in philosophical discourse during the 20th century. this so-called linguistic turn3 marked the emergence of new sensibility and radical shift toward the appreciation of the 52 role of language in philosophical discourse. language is repositioned from an instrumental function to constitutive function. previously it was common to understand language as merely an instrument to reflect reality. the “linguistic turn” shed new light on language. language is regarded now as a constitutive element of reality. the way we understand reality depends on the way we represent it. reality exists as represented through language. that is to say, our relationship with reality is not direct. it is always mediated by language. one prominent theorist who follows this “linguistic turn” project is paul ricoeur.4 however, it is important to note that ricoeur’s approach is quite different from structuralist approach. structuralism formulates linguistic issue with radical anti-phenomenological approach, which considers meaning as independent from subject.5 it claims meaning derives solely from a system of signs. whereas, ricoeur embraces a hermeneutical-phenomenological agenda that serves self-understanding. ricoeur’s interpretation theory sets out from his critique of husserl’s more idealist mode of consciousness, through which he further radicalizes phenomenology to hermeneutics. he criticizes heidegger’s phenomenological ontology, wherein meaning is conceived of as “concealing” itself. taking this lead, ricoeur moves away interpretation to symbolic field.6 indeed, language plays crucial role in ricoeur’s hermeneutics. if hermeneutics is to be defined as a process of interpretation that aims at self-understanding, this process will take place in and through symbolic field, so to speak, through language. before commencing this discussion, a brief explanation about husserl and heidegger’s phenomenological project, particularly which gives insight to ricoeur’s hermeneutic __ will be of much help. ricoeur begins to build his theory from his critique to husserl and heidegger’s phenomenological project. critique to husserl and heidegger’s phenomenology edmund husserl is arguably the key figure in phenomenology tradition. he introduces transcendental phenomenology; a new theory about consciousness and mode of knowledge. husserl’s main purpose is seeking for eidos or the essence of knowledge. to some extent, his very attempt is similar to descartes’s investigation.7 like descartes’, husserl 53 phenomenological project is based upon ‘consciousness’. consciousness is determined as the foundation of knowledge. however, husserl and descartes’s project is somewhat different. both of them differ in how they treat consciousness as prima causa in their philosophical foundation. descartes’ philosophy considers consciousness as introspective, that is, as consciousness that recognizes itself. on the contrary, husserl’s consciousness is “intentional”. this means, consciousness is always consciousness about something. it is always directed toward an object. in this manner, husserl attempts to break down cartesian dichotomy between subject and object and between consciousness and reality. husserl’s phenomenological project might be best summarized under the jargon “back to the thing in itself”.8 phenomenology, then, is an art to understand phenomena as self-manifestation of reality. phenomena are the reality that shows itself in consciousness. for husserl, phenomenology is not only about epistemology, but also ontology. to this degree, kantian dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is collapsed. intentionality of consciousness, in husserl’s view, is the reality as it appears itself in consciousness. there is no reality without consciousness. nevertheless, it does not refer to an idealistic standpoint which views reality as constructed by consciousness. but rather, reality derives “an objective world” and “genuine” knowledge is inherently inseparable from subjective consciousness.9 in phenomenological perspective, ‘truth’ is understood as the reality which shows itself in subjective consciousness; the truth is discovered in “any attempt at relating the conditions of the appearance of things to the structure of human subjectivity”.10 therefore, understanding and authentic experience can only be grasped through intuitive mode, by allowing the phenomenon to show itself in consciousness without any mediation. authenticity appears itself directly and transparent (intuitive) to subject’s consciousness. intuition is kind of pure reflection which operates by directing itself toward an object in order to grasp theoria, or true knowledge. in husserl’s phenomenology, intuitive knowledge is conceived as “a purification of the phenomenological field of consciousness from its spatio-temporal objectivity”.11 consciousness is understood as “self-contained system of being”.12 thought may reveal being directly and in transparent way. based on this assumption, husserl’s phenomenology insists that philosophy is not a concept or interpretation of reality, but more precisely, reality in itself.13 in his second period, husserl proposes another key concept in his phenomenology, namely lebenswelt or life-world. it refers to everyday 54 world which is experienced and comprehended by each individual. it is the horizon where primordial experience of individual and its daily life transpires. it is called ‘primordial’ because this experience has not been redefined by any scientific categories. lebenswelt subscribes to the idea that one’s encounter with the world is prior to any reflection to the world. it constitutes the world we live in and experience with, where there is no clear distinction between subject-object as suggested by science. it is prior to our scientific distinctions of subject and object. thus, scientific-objective understanding is nothing but the interpretation of lebenswelt.14 heidegger’s existential phenomenology existential phenomenology is proposed and developed by heidegger as a critical response to husserlian phenomenology and scientific understanding in general (read: the worldview which tends to objectify and instrumentalize). heidegger’s phenomenology is existential in a way that it is anchored on existence to explain reality, meaning, and truth. heidegger argues that husserlian phenomenology of knowledge and understanding is a-historical and its concept about self is trapped into pure transcendentalism, which he calls “immanent consciousness of truth”.15 husserl urges one to set aside and to bracket or suspend any cultural prejudices, whether it is in the naive or scientific forms. this is necessary in order to gain understanding, or in this case, to be able to grasp the essence of “things in themselves”, which is presumed to be universal and exceeds space and time. heidegger, on the contrary, rejects husserl’s notions concerning the subject and the transcendental. indeed, heidegger does not begin with transcendental subject as does descartes or husserl. his subject is, rather, historical, a kind of subject that inhabits and bound to its daily life. herein lies his difference with his predecessor as well as tutor, husserl. husserl intends to transcend temporality and particularity in order to grasp what he believes as universal essence. in stark contrast to this, heidegger situates temporality and particularity as conditions of existence which enable understanding and truth. thus, understanding is not located outside the world, due to the very fact that subject is always already in the world (being-in-theworld). another interesting contrast, husserl insists on detachment as a key to knowledge and understanding. while, heidegger stresses engagement. knowledge and understanding bases itself upon concern and inter55 est. however, this is not self-interest. interest here is a ‘horizon’ of meaning for an individual. to put it differently, reflection toward the world or reality is prior to and becomes possible due to the fact that we are part of it and have meaningful relationship with the world and reality that we try to represent.16 actually, husserl had considered this but regarded it as a prejudice that has to be suspended. heidegger’s assumption becomes a crucial attack on science that holds objectivistic-positivistic paradigm. the scientific paradigm relies on dualism, such as dualism of subject-object and fact-value. to give an example, in our society date of birth is considered to be the most crucial fact of people’s biography. one’s birth date is recorded in exact manner, which consists of date, month, and year. yet in another society, the question of date of birth might not be considered important. rather than date of birth, perhaps the day of birth is more relevant to them. it may relate, for instance, to the belief of good or bad fortune. this instance shows that fact is oftentimes closely related to value; both are not considered contradictory. it cannot be fully separated from the horizon of meaning, and the differences are not as sharp as considered by the objectivisticpositivistic paradigm. heidegger’s project shares common concern with western philosophy, which investigates the deepest meaning of reality, or as heidegger calls it ‘being”. but the novelty of heidegger’s project, lies in his method. through phenomenology, husserl attempts to provide the new ground of philosophy as a rigorous science. heidegger, instead, goes further by questioning such an ambitious and optimistic project. broadly speaking, both husserl and heidegger agree upon basic principle of phenomenology, which states that reality shows itself. yet husserl starts from intuition, while heidegger starts from existence. if phenomenology is to be defined as an event where the essence discloses itself, husserl claims that the essence discloses itself intuitively when the subject puts aside his disposition. in contrast to that, heidegger argues that the essence will never appear or disclose itself apart from its existence. to put it differently, husserl conceives meaning as transcendental, whereas heidegger assumes it as entirely existential. heidegger elaborates a new method concerning the meaning of being in order to grasp the fundamental ontology of understanding.17 existence is the meaning of being that conceals itself to us.18 understanding the essence of being is impossible unless we analyze the basic existential condition that defines human (or dasein, in heidegger’s term). 56 from heidegger point of view, the basic condition of human is constituted by two primary facts, namely: existence and being-in-the-world.19 through his existential analysis, heidegger insists that human being always anchored in history, bound to its temporality, and always already inhabits a certain cultural milieu. we cannot talk about humans apart from the way they represent themselves and existence, which is mediated by language. one is able to talk about him/her self, and describes his deepest aspiration in so far as it is mediated by language. language constitutes the existence of human being. besides, it determines one’s position in the world and even the way the reality discloses itself as meaningful to an individual. it is, so to speak, through language that being reveals itself to subjectivity. existential analysis is about how to interpret human through language. from this point, self-understanding moves from immediacy to interpretation. understanding human cannot be direct, but rather it has to be interpreted through the manner human existence reveals itself, that is through language. heidegger argues that “life is about interpretation”. the truth, or the disclosure of being through language, is therefore a hermeneutical event. in this way, phenomenology becomes hermeneutical activity because it involves interpretation of the meaning of being. yet, heidegger differentiates the ontological status between being and dasein. being discloses itself within dasein, but it does not suggest that both of them are identical. the position of being is ambiguous though, as disclosure and closure. as heidegger puts it, truth is aletheia. ricoeur and primacy of language following heidegger, ricoeur criticizes the concept of a transcendental-subject in husserl’s phenomenology as the foundation of knowledge and truth. the intentionality of consciousness is moved into a subjective transparency of understanding. therefore, ricoeur concludes that husserl’s phenomenology and intuitive method tends to become a mere idealism.20 and subjectivity and knowledge beome alienated from human existence. this is similar to heidegger’s approach. heidegger proposed an idea of human existence as being-in-the-world.21 through this concept, human being is not located in a position that transcends space and time, but on the contrary, it is viewed as already belong to particular horizon of 57 meaning, a certain time and space. all this, then, implies hermeneutics of “finitude”. ontologically speaking, “finitude” is related to temporal dimension of being. and, one representation of human finitude takes form of historicity. the idea of historicity affects interpretation and meaning as follows: first, subjectivity and meaning is constructed in intersubjective relations. second, dasein or human existence is developed and constructed through language in intersubjective dialogue with ‘others’. in short, being is being for others. third, dasein does not only disclose, but also conceals itself. being constitutes a horizon of meaning that disclose and conceals itself, hence it is to be interpreted in and through language. from the perspective of hermeneutics of finitude, ricoeur’s existential phenomenology reveals “the expanding of subject’s horizon” through interpretation. besides, interpretative horizon which is widely open to the hermeneutic existential-phenomenology, constitutes a new understanding of language as a process of interpretation and meaning construction. hence, language becomes the new field for philosophical investigation and interpretation of being and takes place in symbolic space. in the perspective of hermeneutic existential-phenomenology, meaning relates to the capacity of being in revealing the possibilities: “being discloses itself through existence (dasein) which understands itself through its own possibilities”.22 or, as formulated further by richard kearney: “ricoeur emphasized the primacy of signifying intentionality. this new emphasis leads him to advance a general hermeneutics where phenomenology confronts its own limit __ that is, where the intuition of essences ends and the interpretation of symbols begins.”23 to sum up, human is no longer understood directly and transparently in terms of substance or essence, but through a “round about route” mediated through the symbol. the symbolic constitutes a field wherein humans “create” and reveal themselves. the answer to the very question of “what are we?” and “who we are?” is to be pursued in and through language. taking his cue from husserl’s phenomenology and heidegger’s existential phenomenology, ricoeur advances his hermeneutical project. he concentrates mostly on the relation between existence and hermeneutics which base itself on “interpretation as a mode of being”. for ricoeur, 58 we are what we interpret to be. this idea is crucial indeed as a foundation to interpretation, that is, the project of meaning as “manifestation” and “projection”. if hermeneutics to be simplified as a matter of interpretation, as in phenomenology and existential phenomenology of being, the root and the horizon of existence, or dasein, will become the starting point to move into the most crucial issue in hermeneutics. the interpretation of “meaning” originates from the idea of finitude of human consciousness which is always in constant tension between the past and the future: “as heidegger’s phenomenological ontology clearly showed, consciousness is bound by a relation of belonging to past sedimentations and future projects of meaning...”.24 ricoeur’s hermeneutics of finitude, precisely, elaborates how meaning is contingent in the context of human existence. for him, the most fundamental hermeneutical problem lies in the fact that existence provides a mode of interpretation since, “life is the bearer of meanings so that understanding is made possible through interpretation of life”. or, as the following hermeneutics maxim suggests: “life interprets itself”. this is equivalent to saying that interpretation is a mode of being. it is not one among many instrumental activities, but rather a fundamental activity which constitutes human existence. to comprehend this concept, we have to analyze the relations between ‘subject’ and ‘the world’ and how it influences our mode of understanding, as well as our interpretation. here, world and contingency take the role as horizon of meaning and understanding to the subject. being-in-the-world implies that subject always already sees the world from certain ‘perspective’ and understanding. the world is never being as non-meaning. the term “world” in this context has specific meaning. ricoeur himself formulates “the world” as “the most concrete horizon in our existence”.25 heideggerian concepts of temporality and “practical world of life” are reflected in his statement: “before objectivity, there is the horizon of the world; before the subject of the theory of knowledge, there is operative life”.26 the world initially exists as lebenswelt, as a world of meaning, long before it is objectively defined in scientific term. in this sense, world becomes “the horizon” of all attitudes and understanding. as a critique to objectivism, phenomenology introduces the term “world horizon” to hermeneutics, which is the pre-given world that represents retrospective dimension of interpretation. the referential point of this retrospective dimension of interpretation is ricoeur’s critique to 59 husserl’s transcendental subject. in husserl’s transcendental subject, meaning and truth is conceived of as kind of self-transparence. in this sense, the subject is assumed to have the capability to grasp the appearance of essence of object intuitively with no mediation needed. subjective consciousness constitutes the very foundation of meaning.27 but, the idea of self-transparence and the immediacy of meaning is relativized by ricoeur by embracing husserl’s idea of intersubjectivity. meaning is no longer immanent in subjectivity, but rather situated in intersubjectivity and embedded into lebenswelt. lebenswelt, ricoeur asserts, represents a pre-given world that denotes “the level of experience anterior to the subject-object relation”.28 in contrast to the principle of self-transparency, ricoeur views the process of interpretation and meaning as indirect. it is indirect in a sense that it is mediated through others. meaning originates and develops itself through ‘the others’. the linguistic character of existential-phenomenology shows the intersubjective dimension of understanding to the extent that “we are constructed by language”. it relates to the fact that we construct our world intersubjectively through the preexisting worlds of others. as ricoeur puts it, the world: “... is always-alreadybefore and i come too late to express it”.29 ricoeur goes on to argue that our existence is characterized by historical horizon of language wherein language precedes our subjective consciousness. through language, nature transforms itself into culture, hence a “world of meaning”. it transforms the unknown into the known. culture, or say “the world”, is simply an alternate name for nature (which is articulated and intelligible). thus, language is the most explicit manifestation of historicity and subjectivity. anthropologically speaking, we are indeed a linguistic being. ricoeur remarks: “we belong to language that has been shaped and formed by others before we arrive on the existential scene”.30 this is what constitutes the horizon of hermeneutical activity. besides the historical horizon, language actually has another dimension, namely ‘transcendental’ horizon. the seeking for meaning is encouraged by the human facticity wherein language plays a central role as transcendental medium for interpretation. the concept of “hermeneutics of finitude” will be used to describe the process of meaning construction. “hermeneutics of finitude” implies that the understanding process is not direct. this means, meaning does not originate from subjective consciousness, it instead, derives from “the others”, which is produced through language. this mediation should be considered as social-historical text 60 which is linguistic in nature. as a hermeneutical discourse, this idea shows the crucial transition from pure phenomenology that starts from consciousness to hermeneutics that begins with interpretation of symbols. the aforementioned concepts have several implications. first, the heart of understanding moves from consciousness to language. human’s interpretation and the process of understanding are not based on consciousness, but on language. to interpret humans is not to analyze their consciousness, but to interpret their symbolic expression. the question about self (about what are we and who we are) is to be answered through language. if ortega y. gasset argued that human does not have any essence, but history,31 the very same expression can be applied in ricoeurian hermeneutics; we can say that human does not have an essence, but language. the historicity of human crystallizes itself in language. second, truth is neither transcendental nor universal, it is purely existential. truth is constructed through language, and language mediates between us and reality. truth, however, is not a correspondence between mind and reality, but rather it constitutes our existing. following this assumption, it would be better to understand the truth as an ongoing process of expressing and transforming the self. meaning is not waiting somewhere “out there” to be found; it does not lie outside our articulation in language. indeed, millions of possible meanings can be articulated. thus, truth and meaning __ thanks to the intervention of language __ is the possibility as well as the potentiality of existence.32 interpretation is a creative and transformative event. it “creates itself” in and through language; meaning, we transform ourselves as well during the interpretation process. function of language: re-description in existential-phenomenological hermeneutics’ perspective, linguistic interpretation has its reference in the idea of the world. in the process of interpretation, language works by deciphering the hidden signs of lebenswelt or life-world and human existence. this kind of hermeneutics challenges the semiologist’s view which sees language as a closed system of signs, as believed by ferdinand de saussure.33 more than selfsufficient within its own linguistic structure, in this process of understanding, language operates in dismantling symbolic power, and thereby it elevates existing situation and textual order toward new modes of existence.34 that is to say that, the distinctive function of language is to redescribe reality at the symbolic level. language, “as signifying milieu, 61 must be referred to existence”.35 language has a transcendental ability to create new meanings to the given and present situations, is to re-describe new awareness and experience that, in turn, brings new way of looking at things. language, therefore, brings epistemology to ontology in two senses. on the one hand, language brings interpretation to existence where our consciousness reaches the world, on the other, it discloses possible modes of being-in-the world as well. in this sense, for ricoeur, “to interpret is to understand a double meaning”,36 namely to move beyond existing reality (disclosure of meaning), which is symbolic, but without losing the reference. the heidegerrian idea that ‘being discloses itself’ could not be placed in the immediacy of self-reflection but within and through linguistic mediation.37 the basic nature of language is to say about something. the deeper layers of meaning are then deciphered by language.38 the profound and distinctive function of language to ‘disclose’ reality is actually not weakened by non-immediacy in constructing meaning: “…language itself (in some sense almost intersubjective consensus) offers a more valid claim to constitute the bedrock uncovered by metacritical exploration than ‘methods’ or ‘explanations’ which operate at a higher or more derivative level of abstraction”.39 the intersubjective nature of language discloses ‘true knowledge’.40 also it demonstrates the ‘meta-critical exploration’ aspect of language, which highlights the imaginative and creative power of language which is overlooked in scientific abstraction. through the analyses of metaphor and narrative, ricoeur sees a ‘higher’ derivative level of linguistic capacity; language has ability to bring new possibilities for imagination and vision. in other words, language leads the openness of consciousness to new understandings of human life and the world.41 indeed, metaphor presents a possibility rather than actuality.42 in such a way, metaphor provid ‘imaginative discourse’ which can “open new understanding more directly rather than descriptive and scientific statements”.43 besides, from the phenomenology of imagination, ricoeur reconsiders the living vitality of symbolic power of language. he observes that language articulates meaning not merely as an abstract mimesis of events in reality. meaning is more than a ‘concept’, that is, “meaning is not event to be abstracted”.44 to see the symbolic-interpretive power of language, ricoeur points to ‘poetic language’. metaphoric language works through poetic images. the poetic image contains insights that stimulate the ways 62 of becoming which are different than the ways of existing. the process of becoming in poetic imagination gives a potential for verbal expressions. then, the verbal expressions exercise specific function to provide imaginative ‘catalyst’ for a ‘becoming’, namely becoming of our being in our mind. however, what is distinctive here is that language has also a capacity to correlate “verbal potentiality and non-verbal actuality”,45 words and act. it is parallel with linguistic ability to break the rigid relations between words and the world. in other words, it presents an imperative description that is even beyond the description of ‘seeing as’, beyond what realized as it is. this is because poetic language follows the path of the ‘reverberation’ of the poetic image into the depths of existence”.46 to understand this more clearly we can look to the formulation of richard kearney: “the poetic image thus points to the very ‘depths of existence’ where ‘a new being in language’ is synonymous with ‘a growth in being’ itself. it is because “there is poetical imagination that words dream being”.47 thus, in this sense, it is possible for language to incorporate productive connection between words and our being, imagination and the possibilities of transformation. this linguistic vision of reality opens in us the possibilities to seek new possibilities in our being through the creative process of poetic imagination. it demonstrates that ‘becoming in language’ could also be becoming in the sense of ‘making possible’ in our mind. this shows the capacity of language to express us by making us what it expresses. here “expression creates being”.48 in such dialectical expression, language brings us to the depth of reality along with the growth of our own being. in the process of re-creation by language, “we discover reality itself in the process of being created”.49 so, language serves as a creative instrument to interpret meanings from the texts of life in the process of becoming in existence. as ricoeur puts it: “language in the making celebrates reality in the making”.50 it is in this sense that we can transform the world first as ‘ideality’ under poetic imagination, and then it leads us into the symbolic ‘increase’ of becoming in our being in the world. one of heidegger’s key philosophical concepts was that language is the “house of being”. language is the only way to understand our being and existence. inspired by heidegger, ricoeur believed that the distinctive function of language is to disclose being by re-describing reality in new ways51 as a ‘potentiality-for-being’.52 yet for ricoeur, heidegger’s ideas of ‘state-of-mind’, ‘being-attuned’ and ‘mood’ in subjectivity are not merely ‘subjective’, but rather, considered as ontology,53 63 namely, as a certain way of existing, of becoming. the centrality of language can be seen here in that a becoming in language takes place first in such ontological reflection before becoming in being. consequently, the human world is a creative construction of language. the words become the world. therefore, the function of language can also be explained in aristotelian term: to “present a creative poeiesis (making)”.54 in the perspective of hermeneutics, language provokes the awareness of our being and reality ‘in the making’, and this represents our modes of being. as a result, the re-description of reality by language signalizes a ‘reconstructive power’ of human understanding and action (praxis) in the world as well.55 for ricoeur, linguistics constitutes a key tool for hermeneutics, especially in correlation to textual model of interpretation. the nature of language, therefore, can not be portrayed simply as a 'picture of reality’ as proposed by wittgenstein where the only valid language is the ‘positive language’ representing its objective correspondence with reality.56 conclusion the shift from “consciousness” to “language” marks the shift of phenomenology to hermeneutics. in ricoeur’s hermeneutical stance, language plays a significant part in constructing meaning and self-understanding. through the primacy of language, key issues in modern western philosophy, such as subject and truth, are redefined. by insistence on language, the firm position of transcendental subject with its self-transparency is indeed historicized through language. concrete subject is not the transcendental subject that transcends space and time, but rather, as a historical subject that expresses itself in and through language. and to talk about truth: truth is no longer ‘an equation’ between mind and reality, but rather, it is the process of expressing and transforming the self. endnotes 1richard harland, 2006, superstrukturalisme: pengantar komprehensif kepada semiotika, strukturalisme, dan postrukturalisme (superstructuralism: a comprehensive introduction to semiotics, structuralism and poststructuralism). trans. iwan hendarmawan, yogyakarta: jalasutra, p. 14 2ibid., p. 14 64 3bambang sugiharto, 1996, posmodernisme: tantangan bagi filsafat (posmodernism: a challenge to philosophy). yogyakarta: kanisius, p. 79-80 4paul ricouer was born in valance, france in 1913. during his study in university, the dominant philosophical discourse was phenomenology and existentialism. his hermeneutical theory was elaborated when he positioned as professor of philosophy at the universities in strasbourg, paris, and chicago. besides, he served as director for center of hermeneutics and phenomenology in paris during 1970s to 1980s. see: richard kearney, 2004, on paul ricouer: the owl of minerva, burlington: ashgate, p. 1 and also: clark, s.h., 1980, paul ricouer, london and new york: routledge, p. 2 5structuralism bases itself upon linguistic principles endorsed by ferdinand de saussure. saussure remarks that meaning is not derived from individual, but rather locates on differences existing in the language system, or langue as he calls it. to illustrate language as a system, saussure exemplifies with his well-known chess game analogy. in order to play this game properly, one has to understands its basic rules. take for instance, knight is able to move two squares horizontally and one vertically (or vice versa). we can call it a knight simply because it moves in a different way with other chessman. similarly with language, system of language precedes any actual speech. and meaning is determined by its position in a system. see: richard harland, op.cit., p. 15-17 6richard kearney, op.cit., p: 15-17 7anton baker, 1984, philosophical methods, jakarta: ghalia, p. 108 8andre edgar & peter sedgwick (eds.), 2002, cultural theory: the key concepts, london and new york: routledge, p. 271-273 9theodore de boer, 1978, the development of husserl’s thought, boston: martinus nijhoff, p. 398 10charles e. reagan, 1978, the philosophy of paul ricouer: an anthology of his work, boston: beacon press, p. 76 11dermot moran & timothy mooney. (eds.), 2002, the phenomenology reader, boston: martinus nijhoff, p. 129 12theodore de boer, op.cit., p. 398 13anton baker, op.cit., p. 108 14bambang sugiharto, op.cit., p. 36-37 15martin heidegger, 1996, being and time, albany: state university of new york press, p. 259 16bambang sugiharto, op.cit., p. 71 17john richardson, 1986, existential epistemology: a clarendon press, p: viii 18dermot moran & timothy mooney, op.cit., p. 18 19kees bertens, 1981, filsafat barat dalam abad xx, jakarta: gramedia, p. 150 20richard kearney, op.cit., p. 16 21ibid., p. 16 22ibid., p. 1 23ibid., p. 13 24ibid., p. 16 25paul ricoeur, 1965, history and truth, northwestern university press: evanston, p. 193 65 26don ihde, 1974, the conflict of interpretations: essays in hermeneutics, evanston: northwestern university pess, p. 9 27richard kearney, op.cit., p. 16 28don ihde, op.cit., p. 8 29paul ricoeur, history and truth. op.cit., p. 194 30paul ricoeur, 1981, hermeneutics and the human sciences, cambridge: cambridge university press, p. 145 31quoted with slight modification from ernst cassirer, 1987, human and culture: an essay of human (manusia dan kebudayaan: sebuah esai tentang manusia), jakarta: gramedia, p. 260 32paul rabinow and william sullivan. (eds.), 1979, an interpretative social science: a reader, los angeles: university california press, p. 129 33charles e. reagan, op.cit., p. 87; 102 34richard kearney, op.cit., p. 25 35don ihde, op.cit., p. 16 36anthony c. thiselton., 1992, new horizons in hermeneutics: the theory and practice of transforming biblical reading, michigan: zondervan publishing house p. 347 37don ihde, op.cit., p. 17 38charles e. reagan, op.cit., p. 91-92 39anthony c. thiselton, op.cit., p. 359 40paul ricoeur, history and truth, op.cit., p. 159 42ibid., p. 352 43ibid., p. 352 44charles e. reagan, op.cit., p. 103 45paul ricoeur, 1978, the rule of metaphor: multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language, london: routledge & kegan, p. 215 46ibid., p. 215 47richard kearney, op.cit., p. 53 48paul ricoeur, the rule of metaphor, op.cit., p. 214-215 49richard kearney, op.cit., p. 53 50ibid., p. 53 51charles e. reagan, op.cit., p. 104; 108 52anthony c. thiselton, op.cit., p. 351 53ibid., p. 352 54ibid., p. 352 55ibid., p. 355 56anton bakker, op.cit., p. 123 references baker, anton, 1984, philosophical methods, jakarta: ghalia cassirer, ernst, 1987, human and culture: an essay about human (manusia dan kebudayaan: sebuah esai tentang manusia), 66 jakarta: gramedia clark, s.h., 1980, paul ricouer, london and new york: routledge de boer, theodore, 1978, the development of husserl’s thought, boston: martinus nijhoff edgar, andre & sedgwick, peter (eds.), 2002, cultural theory: the key concepts, london and new york: routledge harland, richard 2006, superstrukturalisme: pengantar komprehensif kepada semiotika, strukturalisme, dan postrukturalisme (superstructuralism: a comprehensive introduction to semiotics, structuralism and poststructuralism). trans.by iwan hendarmawan, yogyakarta: jalasutra heidegger, martin, 1996, being and time, albany: state university of new york press ihde, don, 1974, the conflict of interpretations: essays in hermeneutics, evanston: northwestern university press kearney, richard, 2004, on paul ricouer: the owl of minerva, ashgate publishing company: burlington moran, dermot & money, timothy (eds.), 2002, the phenomenology reader, boston: martinus nijhoff richardson, john, 1986, existential epistemology: a heideggerian critique of the cartesian project, oxford: clarendon press rabinow, paul and sullivan, william (eds.), 1979, an interpretative social science: a reader, los angeles: university california press reagan, charles e., 1978, the philosophy of paul ricoeur: an anthology of his work, boston: beacon press ricoeur, paul, 1981, hermeneutics and the human sciences, cambridge: cambridge university press ____________1965, history and truth, evanston: northwestern university press ____________.1974, the conflict of interpretations: essays in hermeneutics, evanston: northwestern university press ____________ 1978, the rule of metaphor: multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language, london: routledge & kegan sugiharto, bambang, 1996, posmodernisme: tantangan bagi filsafat (posmodernism: a challenge to philosophy), yogyakarta: kanisius thiselton, anthony c., 1992, new horizons in hermeneutics: the theory and practice of transforming biblical reading, michigan: zondervan publishing house 01 (1-19)_buddhism.pmd 1 buddhism and suicide: voluntary death and its philosophy1 kanae kawamoto2 mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university abstract japan, one of the leading industrial countries, has had one of the world’s highest suicide rates for years. this paper in its present form is a shortened version for publication in assumption university’s journal “prajna vihara”. since the limitation of space to 20 pages prevented a more exhaustive treatment of each chapter, this abbreviated version partially summarises chapter 3 of my master’s dissertation, ambiguity of karmic fate and voluntary death: suicide cases in theravada buddhism and japanese society.3 this concise version thus analyses the statistics of suicides followed by references to the unique methods employed and phenomena related to suicide in modern japanese society. in addition, it examines particular acts of voluntary death in japan with reference to their cultural, religious, and philosophical aspects. japan has some unique tendencies in regard to the prevalence of suicide and an ‘aesthetics’ or philosophy of death. hopefully the findings in this paper can contribute practical guidelines which can be applied to the social problems surrounding suicide while promoting the right attitudes towards life not only in japan, but in the whole world. introduction although my master’s thesis primarily resulted out of a consideration of a comprehensive corpus of buddhist discussions and stories on suicide in the pali canon, it is also based on a survey of suicide in japan from medieval to modern times. while many cite economic-related hardships, it is evident that there are some economically developing countries with low suicide rates, especially theravada buddhist countries such as myanmar and thailand, which have preserved a more original form of 2 buddhism than japan. my initial idea was to clarify not only the real factors preventing or triggering suicides, but also to consider the problems surrounding suicide in the teachings of both theravada and japanese buddhism. my initial motive for studying buddhism and suicide derived from an encounter i had in july 2008 when i visited a friend in tokyo before i left japan. he half-laughingly told me something which shocked me: “i lose someone around me through suicide every three months, so my friends are concerned that i might be next”. sadly, many of the japanese around him, myself included, have had similar experiences of loosing someone in this way. with a heavy heart, i then left for myanmar to complete my second bachelor’s degree at the international theravada buddhist missionary university. the particular mortal code associated with suicide has been universally accepted in japan, which has consequently acquired the undesired epithet of ‘suicide nation’. it is an ever-increasing concern in japan where suicide figures are among the highest of industrialised countries. for at least the past decade, almost 30,000 people kill themselves annually, equivalent to nearly one every 15 minutes. other than the traditional suicide methods such as jumping, diving, and going to ‘popular’ suicide spots, a range of new methods have been constantly evolving day by day which draw peoples’ attention, including suicide websites for group-suicide, smoking a coal briquette in a closed car, creating poisonous gas by mixing toilet-bowl cleaner with other solutions, and so forth. the present discussion can be divided into three sections. the first examines worldwide suicide statistics provided by authoritative or governmental reports. the second illustrates the unique methods and the phenomena of suicide in japan generally. the third section analyses the japanese act of suicide from religious, aesthetic, and philosophical viewpoints relating to death. such unique tendencies exhibited by the prevalence of suicide can be regarded as quite similar to the concept of death in nietzsche’s ‘amor fati’ (love for destiny). my conclusion is then drawn from the analysis of the real causal factors of suicide in japan. this issue does not merely arise out of the japanese cultural or traditional background, rather, my findings reveal that these factors are deeply intertwined with societal problems. therefore, it would seem that the government has the primary responsibility to take an initiative for their resolution. the final part of my thesis is concerned with the harmonious relationship between societal support and the development of buddhist un3 derstanding in daily life. popular japanese buddhist groups such as jodo shinshu would probably collaborate with the government in order to improve peoples’ awareness of ‘overcoming’ suffering by ‘embracing’ amida buddha. such a reflection of their own weakness and belief in buddhism can undoubtedly contribute to the development of endurance in times of hardship. worldwide suicide statistics 1. the worldwide suicide rate over the past six decades, the world health organization (who) has compiled a considerable worldwide database on mortality associated with suicide in collaboration with its member states. the estimate for the year 2020 presents an approximate total of 1.53 million people dying as a result of suicide whereby 10-20 times more people attempt suicide worldwide. this rate averages out to one death every 20 seconds and one attempt every 1-2 seconds.4 figure 1 shows the worldwide suicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants based on the who report for the year 2013.5 the leading country is lithuania, where the suicide rate is 34.1%. most of the top 10 countries were formerly communist. it is generally said that long unstable transitions of social systems may greatly afflict citizens in those countries. japan has one of the highest suicide rates in the world, ranked second among the group of eight leading industrialised nations. the rate is two to three times higher than that of the united states and great britain. since suicides in south korea have outnumbered those in japan recently, japan has only now managed to avoid the stigma of having the highest suicide rate of all the developed countries. 2. suicide by gender the global predominance of suicide rates by gender is consistently seen in the predominance of males over females (see figure 2).6 the x-axis indicates the male suicide rate and the y-axis that of females. the ratio to the left of the equal line of the male-female rate shows that the rate of female suicides outnumbers the male, and on the right, it indicates that the male number is higher than the female. seen in figure 2, 4 figure 1: worldwide suicide rates (who 2013) 5 figure 2: male-female suicide rate ratio by country figure 3: suicide rates (per 100,000) by religion 6 male suicides are more frequent than female ones in most countries. the ratio is also fundamentally higher in former soviet and communist countries, distinct from the group including japan, south korea, and sri lanka around the dotted line. the female rate in china is exceptionally high exceeding the male rate. a low male-female ratio is found in other asian countries such as india, hong kong, and singapore as well. given the high female suicide rate in south korea, it would most likely be influenced by the ethos of confucianism still permeating society. 3. suicide and religion figure 3 shows suicide rates in different world religions.7 in muslim countries, remarkably, committing suicide is strictly prohibited. in contrast, the rate of suicide in buddhist countries is distinctly higher than in countries where other religions or even atheism prevail. emile durkheim, the french founder of modern sociology well-known for his study on suicide, examined this phenomenon in relation to both the individual and society: “every society is predisposed to supply a given number of voluntary deaths”.8 according to his theory the collective order of society can be disturbed by sudden transformations such as massive impoverishment or excessive wealth aggravated by industrial, economic or financial crises. durkheim admits to the preventive benefits of religion as regards the suicide rate to a certain extent not because of its prohibition, but because of the strength of communal values. moreover, the re-application of his theory to the correlation between buddhism and the present society has yet to be examined, for the scope of his exploration is limited to christianity and judaism, which he had researched in a range of neighbouring european countries around france in the early twentieth century. in christianity, the act of suicide is generally regarded with disapproval as a sacrilegious act that is contrary to the sacrosanct character of the religious compact between the believers and god. therefore, one needs to examine whether buddhism would similarly exercise an appropriate preventive effect on taking one’s own life. 7 uniqueness in japan’s suicide cases 1. nationwide suicide statistics in japan given the statistics provided by the who, japan is without doubt home to one of the highest suicide rates in the industrialised world, which has been raising both national and global concerns about japan being the 'nation of suicide’. in an effort to analyse the main characteristics of suicide in japan, this section begins by displaying the nationwide statistics. reliable suicide data for japan can be obtained from two governmental sources: vital statistics compiled by the ministry of health, labour and welfare (mhlw) and the other, statistics of suicides recorded by the national police agency (npa). the numerical distinction in data between the two derives from the procedures related to their statistical strategies.9 since the npa has the more recent statistics, i have mainly relied on its data in the following figures. the following four tables show the breakdown of the suicide statistics for japan by different categories. table 1 shows the suicide rate by gender per 100,000 inhabitants for the past five years for both sources comparatively. as mentioned above, the npa has included more recent data up to the year 2012. in respect of the ratio of male-female suicide rate, males consistently outnumber females every year, which is common to the ratios in other countries, too. this gender gap presumably testifies to the more economically responsible role of males as compared to females. the breakdown in regard to age group is shown in table 2. the age group 50-59 has the highest suicide rate every year, followed by similarly high rates in the age groups of 40-49 and of those over 60. according to the statistics in table 3, suicides categorised by occupation groups, table 1: japan’s suicide rates by gender for 5 years per 100,000 inhabitants the npa’s report the mhlw’s report year male female total male female total 2008 36.7 14.4 25.3 35.1 13.5 24.0 2009 37.8 14.3 25.8 36.2 13.2 24.4 2010 35.9 14.4 24.9 34.2 13.2 23.4 2011 33.7 14.8 24.0 ------2012 31.1 13.1 21.8 ------source: annual statistics of suicide, 2012 (the npa), annual vital statistics, 2012 (the mhlw) 8 table 2: suicide rates by age group for 5 years age group year 0-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 over 60 total 2008 2.6 23.3 26.1 30.7 36.0 31.7 25.3 2009 2.4 24.1 26.2 32.1 38.5 31.3 25.8 2010 2.4 23.3 25.1 30.6 36.3 30.3 24.7 2011 2.7 24.3 25.0 29.2 33.7 28.9 24.0 2012 2.6 22.5 21.9 26.1 29.9 26.9 21.8 source: annual statistics of suicide, 2012 (the npa) table 3: suicide by occupation for 5 years year self/family company student jobless uncertain total cemployed employed 2008 3206 8997 972 18279 795 32,249 2009 3202 9195 945 18733 817 32,845 2010 2738 8568 938 18673 783 31,690 2011 2689 8207 1029 18074 652 30,651 2012 2299 7421 971 16651 516 27,858 source: annual statistics of suicide 2012 (the npa) table 4: causes of suicides for 5 years family health economy/ work love school others uncer life affairs tain 2008 3,912 15,153 7,404 2,412 1,115 387 1,538 8,759 12.3% 47.5% 23.2% 7.6% 3.5% 1.2% 4.8% 2009 4,117 15,867 8,377 2,528 1,121 364 1,613 8,411 12.1% 46.7% 24.6% 7.4% 3.3% 1.1% 4.7% 2010 4,497 15,802 7,438 2,590 1,103 371 1,533 8,118 13.5% 47.4% 22.3% 7.8% 3.3% 1.1% 4.6% 2011 4,547 14,621 6,406 2,689 1,138 429 1,621 8,070 14.5% 46.5% 20.4% 8.5% 3.6% 1.4% 5.2% 2012 4,089 13,629 6,219 2,472 1,035 417 1,535 7,243 14.4% 48.0% 18.4% 8.7% 3.6% 1.5% 5.4% source: annual statistics of suicide 2012 (the npa) the unemployed are consistently predominant in number followed by the company-employed in each five year period. table 4 shows overall data of the causes of suicide reported from 2008 to 2012. religious faith does not statistically comprise the main variable in regard to suicide. rather, half of its causes are driven by health problems, with depression emerging as its main cause. 9 based on these factual four tables, most suicides are committed by people who meet background conditions such as being male, middleaged, either unemployed or company-employed, and with health problems. these tendencies also substantiate men’s financial burden in society in accord with an extant patriarchal gender role (the male as primary breadwinner), especially against the background of the steady decline in japan of the life-long employment system. 2. uniqueness of suicides in modern japanese society new travellers to tokyo, especially those travelling by rail, might at first be confused by the frequent delays of trains accompanied a deadpan voice announcing ‘due to a bodily accident the train service is temporarily being halted...’. visitors soon learn the implicit meaning behind the announcement to be a suicide jump so that they grow accustomed to this euphemism for someone jumping in front of a train. it has proved to be a very reliable, though perhaps not the most popular, form of suicide in japan, despite the fact that the perpetrator’s family might be charged a high amount of compensation due to the disruption caused to the railway services. in addition to ‘death by train’, there are some other typical or unique methods that are worth mentioning in the current epidemic of suicides in japan. the advent of the internet has undoubtedly helped in this process especially in the form of the 'suicide website’. the object of the first media attention paid to the suicide website was possibly dr. kiriko in 1998. he was a 27-year-old man whose cartoon alter-ego went by the alias dr. kiriko, a practicioner of euthanasia, he was contacted by police after a woman had been found in a critical condition exhibiting traces of potassium cyanide that he had sold to her. after the woman’s eventual death, kiriko also committed suicide by self-poisoning. he had hosted a message board called “dr.kiriko’s consulting room” to chat with web surfers about suicide, some of whom took orders for the poisonous drug from him. though exactly how he was involved with his ‘clients’ remained a mystery until his sudden death, this case was said to have been the fist to have raised awareness in japan about how the internet was used as a means of assisting suicide.10 while some tens of thousands of websites indeed encourage teen victims of school bullying and struggling job seekers, even others have been provided with opportunities for a less lonely suicide or an ‘internet 10 joint suicide’ since 2002.11 perfect strangers meet like-minded people in suicide-related chat rooms or on websites and then make a ‘suicide pact’ to die together. the majority of the victims are young ranging from teenagers up to those in their 30s. strangers with different motives for seeking an untimely death, meet in a particular place merely to spend their final hours together. in 2005, seven people died from the inhalation of carbon monoxide poisoning from charcoal stoves, having sealed themselves inside two vehicles. police found four and three in each car respectively, including a 14-year-old girl. according to the suicide notes found inside the cars, all seven had made plans to die together in internet chat rooms. likewise, at least 20 people died in 2004 and 55 in 2005 by group suicide through their having made the arrangements on the internet. police estimate, however, that the actual figures may be far higher.12 unlike the internet generation, the typical pattern of suicide among middle-aged men is more often courted by financial adversities. their deaths, described as inseki-jisatsu (so-called ‘responsibility-driven suicide’) are imperceptibly intertwined with the japanese sense of responsibility.13 the pressures due to their responsibilities towards their families have made them choose self-sacrifice in preference to their families having to face financial difficulties. for example, fathers, as the sole breadwinners, may take their lives to gain the insurance money for their surviving family members. otherwise some of them may drive themselves to death in the hope of gaining enough money to cover unpaid loans or debts. in view of the countermeasure adopted by insurance firms to defer the exemption period a few more years, they will patiently wait until the lapse of this period to secure a payout.14 in regard to the particular mindset of the japanese, a comment by jose m. bertolote from the who's department of mental health brings to light the problems concerning suicide being committed out of a sense of failure and its alleged effect of atonement: “in japan, suicide is likely to be part of culture. the immediate cause is due to overwork, joblessness, and bullies, and so forth. suicide, however, is regarded there as an ethical standard to preserve one’s honour and to take responsibility by suicide”.15 this kind of viewpoint has been widely and repeatedly noted by western observers as well. as he suggested, the price of failure in japanese society is too high so that moral judgement permits no personal defensive excuse but rather promotes an indelible longer-term self-admission of guilt. thus, the japanese, required to function under such unendurable normative pressure, may therefore involuntarily tend towards 11 adopting a resolution to kill themselves to demonstrate their atonement rather than to live in disgrace. the economist magazine offered an insightful solution to this japanese inclination: “suicide might be less common if, rather than force people to endure lifelong shame, japanese society began to allow its people second chances”.16 the japanese philosophy of death 1. proverbs in this section, i will analyse the religious influence on the japanese philosophy of death as it might serve as a way to decode the background of the suicide issue in the japanese cultural or religious context. the proverb ‘to die isagi-yoku’ is one of admirable types of death to the japanese, literally meaning “leaving no regrets”, “with a clear conscience”, “like a brave man”, “with no reluctance”, “in full possession of one’s mind”, and so on. it also refers to the metaphor of falling cherry blossoms representing transience and a brave death.17 the japanese are reluctant to meet death lingeringly, but rather sacrifice their lives willingly at any worthy occasion. it is not a form of escapism according to the definition by durkheim’. cherry blossom viewing is undoubtedly one of the most popular spring traditions in japan. the japanese see virtue in the fact that flowers are blown away by the wind within a few weeks, rather than fade and die naturally, analogous to their ideal of transitory beauty. 2. zen and samurai -mindfulness the symbolism of a brave death expressed through the imagery of cherry blossoms was deeply embedded as an ideal attitude particularly among the military classes (samurai) in medieval japan, which was profoundly influenced by zen buddhism. zen was first brought to japan in the thirteenth century, in the kamakura period, when the hojo military class had started governing. daisetsu t. suzuki, a prominent japanese zen scholar, in his book zen and japanese culture, points to the valuable contribution made by zen buddhism in the development of bushido, ‘the way of the warrior’. due to the hojo family’s sincere encouragement, zen was able to flourish and influence the feudal society morally and spiritually up to the eigh12 teenth century, but even thereafter it was seen to have permeated the whole of society and not only the upper classes. whereas zen has never encouraged the samurai’s violent profession in practical ways, it instead promoted mental balance in their daily lives. suzuki highlights that “zen has sustained them in two ways, morally and philosophically”.18 first, from a philosophical perspective, zen juxtaposed the virtue of using one’s intuitive simple mind with that of using one’s intellect and logic. suzuki argues that although zen may thus somewhat neglect the use of logic, it aims at attaining personal and experiential understanding instead: “there is something of the zen method of training, which consists in personally experiencing the truth whatever this may be, and not appealing to intellectual or systemic theorisation”.19 it could be concluded that zen’s emphasis on simplicity and directness is indispensible for the warrior spirit. furthermore, the essence of zen meditation is to achieve mindful concentration on only one single object, which is congenial to their fighting spirit as suzuki explains: to go straightforward in order to crush the enemy is all that is necessary for him. he is therefore not to be encumbered in any possible way, be it physical, emotional, or intellectual. intellectual doubts, if they are at all cherished in the mind of the fighter, are great obstructions to his onward movement, while emotionality and physical possessions are the heaviest encumbrances he may have to suffer if he wants to behave himself most efficiently in his business.20 3. hagakure: readiness for death the second spiritual contribution of zen to the samurai spirit is the training code known as bushido associated with asceticism in swordfighting constituted by the development of unwavering readiness to sacrifice one’s life at any moment. therefore, it requires rigorous mental training of the kind offered by zen emphasising that worldly affairs primarily constitute occasions for one’s inner reflection. a particularly good guideline is given by tsunetomo yamamoto’s utterances, arranged and given the title hagakure, literally meaning either “hidden by the leaves” or “in the shadow of leaves”. yamamoto was a samurai in the early 1700s and later became a buddhist monk after 13 retirement, although he referred to no specific correlation between buddhism and the samurai code.21 it is also valued as ‘the book of samurai’ appreciating that the samurai’s reflection on death is as deep as of that on life in the middle of the mundane world. thus hagakure consistently encourages detachment from life without cherishing any strong cravings and the consideration of life and death as equally valuable. in its opening sentence the book begins with its most popular phrase: “the way of samurai is found in death. when it comes to either/or, there is only the quick choice of death... this is the substance of the way of the samurai”.22 the problem of death is one that everyone has and an even more pressing problem for the samurai engaged in battle. as he needed to maintain a cool head along with consistently excellent swordmanship, the samurais used zen meditation to improve their mindfulness for this purpose. 4. the suicide of yukio mishima the ritual suicide of yukio mishima (1925-1970) is one of the most representative embodiments of the philosophy inspired by hagakure. mishima, the famed japanese writer, was listed as a candidate for the nobel prize in literature three times. he is often compared with jean cocteau from france because of his prolific and versatile talents, not only in writing novels, poems, essays, and traditional kabuki and noh playwriting, but also in his activities as a sportsman and film actor. his last and most supremely monumental act was to commit seppuku (disembowelment) in adherence to the ritual way of the samurai by cutting open his stomach using only a ritual sword and arranging for a kaishakunin (a ceremonial beheader) to subsequently chop off his head. to the samurai, seppuku, whether ordered by someone else or volitional, was in preference to the disgrace and shame of living as a warloser or a captive. the act is an incontestable demonstration of their dignity, honour, and loyalty. mishima ardently espoused bushido and had openly declared that “my only eternal book would be hagakure”23 in his introduction to hagakure. his own views on volitional death were very similar to those of yamamoto: “the problem of death overwhelms us, enduring for eternity unchangeably in either the time of hagakure or in the present time. from such viewpoint, death as stated in 14 hagakure is no special matter. reflection on death every day is as meaningful as the reflection on life every day; it is what hagkure alleges”.24 mishima also differentiated his notion of volitional death from simple suicide: “voluntary death emerges from one’s own volition. the willing suicide does not represent defeat such as a suicide in western ways, but ‘the selectable act’ and ‘free action’”.25 he also added that in this way, “we are able neither to choose our own moment of death, nor to be forced when to die”.26 although his death has yet been a matter of much debate in japan, it is clear at least that both yamamoto and mishima had both challenged the idea that death needs to happen by itself and only be determined by the decree of destiny. 5. the paradoxical prescription of suicide this paradoxical contemplation on life and death still permeates modern japanese society. the kanzen jisatsu manual (the complete manual of suicide) which was first published in 1993, has sold over one million copies. phrased as “the only verbal suicide machine in japan”, by wataru tsurumi, the author, the book is composed of an explicit compendium of ten suicide methods such as overdosing, hanging, jumping, gas poisoning, and so forth.27 tsurumi’s aim was to expose taboo questions in society, though neither explicitly encouraging nor discouraging suicide: “why we must not kill ourselves, why we must continue living, and how to challenge life without being trapped by the never-ending daily grind?”,28 albeit the manual has been blamed for the increasing numbers of young followers inspired by its guided methods. in tokyo, in 1999, the book was found along with two young suicide victims. yukiko nishihara, the founder of a tokyo helpline, is also baffled by the numbers of suicide ‘failures’ who call him in great pain, when they had wrongly followed the book’s instructions.29 after repeated criticism by parents’ and suicide prevention groups, the tokyo metropolitan government and some local authorities designated the manual as yugaitosho (a book harmful to youth), by virtue of which sales were restricted to people over 18 years old. tsurumi complained that he was being made a scapegoat: “no one ever killed themselves just because of my book”.30 in a newspaper interview, he also advised under18-year-olds to read his book more because “they need it more than 15 anyone. it is important that people realise that suicide is not wrong. it is the right of every individual to kill themselves and, no matter what laws you enact, you cannot stop it.”31 the debate between respect for an individual’s rights and the actual restrictions on suicide needs to be further discussed because it seems that the lack of discrimination between life and death paradoxically might indeed lead to a lack of appreciation of the value of life. tsurumi ends the book’s prologue by referring to one of his friends who carries a small capsule of a powerful drug called angel dust said to trigger the immediate desire to kill oneself. he thus lives light-heartedly without a fixed job, saying “i can take the drug and commit suicide whenever i need to”32 hoping his book would “serve like the capsule and relieve a bit of anxiety from the hearts of people who compulsively try so hard in life”.33 6. amor fati and voluntary death maurice pinguet, in his voluminous study voluntary death in japan, refers to a number of suicides that are lucid and determined, or in his words, ‘voluntary deaths’ in which suicidal acts must not be judged on their outcome alone, but each must be understood separately. he seems thereby to have adopted the unique attitude in the japanese tradition, to quote nietzsche, of ‘amor fati’ (love of destiny): “destiny must not only be endured, it must be loved and conquered, for that is the price of serenity __ amor fati”.34 if voluntary death is dedicated to superior faith or to elevated aims, the japanese mindset would be inclined to approve of it charitably. moreover, it is taken as noble altruism far removed from self-centeredness. this manner of the idealisation of martyrdom, however, may be seen to have engendered a society harbouring some fascist features. it has been misused for political aims in japanese history. in world war ii, for example, the notorious kamikaze pilots, who were the young human bullets with only enough fuel for a one-way flight to crush the enemy’s warplanes while praising “glory to the emperor!”, are often blamed as forming part of the tradition of suicidal behaviour cited above. the pilots were allegedly all volunteers. however, one survivor disclosed the pathetic truth that they had been ordered to embrace obligatory death as a justification for the japanese participation in a war not of their own making, by then japanese government. likewise, the defence of the pacific island of iwo jima was also regarded as a form of ‘voluntary death’, thus is also a 16 continuation of this japanese tradition.35 by 1868, the privileges of the samurai were abrogated and the japanese had to endure a miserable defeat in world war ii in 1945. ‘death with honour being more admirable than life in disgrace’ __ this misemployment of the philosophy of death should never again be repeated in our history. the inherent qualities of the samurai tradition, however, have not been completely destroyed. the japanese still pay respect to their virtues of loyalty, devotion, discipline, and sacrifice. once faced with unavoidable defeat, the japanese do not hesitate to face death preferring to sacrifice themselves in conformity with the decrees of destiny without cowardice. voluntary death is thus imperceptibly associated with intentionality. conclusion it is a pity that those japanese in social and economic difficulties continue to engage in religion-inspired voluntary death in order to find a solution to their problems. excuses and self-defence are still considered shameful responses to the normal challenges posed by life. as their judgment of one another’s failures is often extremely severe, their societal and moral values may influence them decisively into a reckless decision to commit suicide. therefore, it would appear that certain traditional forms of a ‘noble death’ influenced by the normative and religious structure are still historically relevant. however, the prevalence of voluntary death and the rising concern posed by suicide in modern japanese society must also be viewed separately. it is worrying that some modern japanese take their own lives by wrongly interpreting the act of suicide as their predetermined right in the face of societal or economical hardship. likewise, the real enemies of suicide would appear to be hidden elsewhere in society unrelated, perhaps, to philosophy or aesthetics. the government, in this light, has, fortunately, adopted comprehensive measures to cope with the problem: in particular, it has adopted a specific goal to achieve the decline in the number of annual suicides by 20% from the 2005 level by 2016. this ratio is to correspond to about 25,000 suicides a year.36 the government’s aim, however, will be difficult to implement without changing its perception of the true causal factors hidden within the mind-set of the japanese. while not wholly or unanimously 17 endnotes 1this paper is based on an oral presentation held at the research seminar of the guna chakra research center, the graduate school of philosophy and religion at assumption university, bangkok, on the 29th january 2014. this presentation was made in the context of the ma program in buddhist studies at mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university and the ma thesis written by the present author entitled buddhism and suicide: ‘the ambiguity of karmic fate and voluntary death: suicide cases in theravada buddhism and japanese society’. 2you can reach kanae kawamoto at metta9072@gmail.com 3the full text of my dissertation is available in the library of mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, ayutthaya, thailand. 4bertolote, jose manoel and alexandra fleishmann, “a global perspective in the epidemiology of suicide”, suicidologi, arg.7. nr.2, (international association for suicide prevention, 2002), p. 6. 5varnik, peeter, “suicide in the world”, international journal of environmental research and public health, 760-771; doi:10.3390/ijerph9030760, 2012, p. 760. 6figure 2 was made based on the figure “worldwide male-female ratio rate” compiled by yutaka honkawa, < http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/2772.html>. 7bertolote, jose manoel and alexandra fleishmann, “a global perspective in the epidemiology of suicide”, p. 8. 8emile durkheim, on suicide (london, penguin classics), 2006, p. 28 tolerant of suicide, they may still be intolerant of the shame of having been seen to have behaved irresponsibly by society because the japanese are very vulnerable to a sense of responsibility and dignity. unwilling to proclaim their faults because making excuses for failure is a shameful act, by the same token, guilt and self-punishment are greeted with much sympathy and admiration. if volitional death is regarded as the only way of redemption for errors and faults, then nothing would be esteemed so highly as the act of killing oneself. in this respect, it would appear that it would benefit society not to be overly critical. as long as the majority of suicides are attributed to societal or economic problems, society’s severe eyes being cast on people’s failures is bound to have repercussions. japanese normative values, in this light, continue to drive people to the verge of suicide, as they are not given any opportunities for constructively engaging with their failures. this causal influence could then act to force them to make a reckless decision on the spur of the moment, accepting as their destiny or fate that they are thereby at least ‘saving face while not admitting their faults’. 18 9according to references on the website of the mhl, their numerical distinctions are (1) the investigation object; the mhlw only compiled the statistics of all japanese inhabitants in japan, while the npa, those of the total population including foreign nationals in japan, (2) the investigated time and location; the mhlw reported suicides based on the victim’s address and on the time of death, different from the report by the npa based on the place and time of death discovered (determined as a suicide, more accurately), (3) the official procedure; the mhlw does not record a suicide unless the cause of death is uncertain either as suicide or homicide or accident and also unless there is any correction by the issuer of the death certificate. in case of the npa, suicide is counted whenever it is identified as a suicide through their investigation. <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/suicide04/16.html#3>. 10matsueda, sei, “do suicide websites really encourage suicide? content analysis of postings to a japanese suicide website”, doctoral program in international and advanced japanese studies, (graduate school of humanities and sciences, university of tsukuba), <https://journal.hass.tsukuba.ac.jp/interfaculty/article/ view/4/6>. 11sakamoto, akira, “the internet and suicide”, science of human development for restructuring the “gap widening society”, (ochanomizu university, 2011), pp. 65-71. 12mccurry, justin, “seven die in online suicide pact in japan”, the guardian, (2 march 2005), <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2005/mar/02/japan. internationalnews>. 13chambers, andrew, “japan: ending the culture of the ‘honourable’ suicide”, the guardian, (3 august 2010), 14ibid.chambers, andrew, “japan: ending the culture of the ‘honourable’ suicide”, the guardian, (3 august 2010), __ you can say ‘ibid’ here 15“report on suicide by resident officers of each country”, the mainichi newspapers, tokyo, (2 october 2004). [in japanese] 16“suicide in japan, death be not proud: a rash of suicides horrifies japan”, the economist. date, page number??? 17ohunuki often referred to this aesthetic symbolism of cherry blossom in her book. ohnuki, emiko, kamikaze, cherry blossoms, and nationalisms: the militarization of aesthetics in japanese history, (chicago: university of chicago press, 2002). page no? 18suzuki, daisetsu t., zen and japanese culture, (princeton: princeton university press, 1970), p. 61. 19suzukiibid, , daisetsu t., zen and japanese culture, p. 18. 20ibid, p. 62. 21yamamoto, tsunetomo, “introduction”, hagakure: the book of samurai, william scott wilson, trans., (tokyo: kodansha international, 1979). 22ibid, p. 23. 23mishima,yukio, introduction to hagakure, (tokyo: shinchosha, 1967), pp. 8-9. 24ibid, p. 28. 25ibid, p. 42. 19 26ibid, p. 91. 27the manual has been blamed for the increasing body count in aokigahara forest as it was described as “the perfect place to die”. prefecture? 28ozawa, harumi, “author of japanese suicide manual has no regrets”, the mail & guardian, (13 july 2006), 29watts, jonathan, “tokyo urged to curb suicide book after spate of deaths”, the guardian, tokyo, (10 december 1999), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 1999/dec/10/jonathanwatts>. 30ibid.. 31watts, jonathan, “tokyo urged to curb suicide book after spate of deaths”. 32tsurumi, wataru, “introduction”, the complete manual of suicide. 33ozawa, harumi, “author of japanese suicide manual has no regrets”. 34pinguet, maurice, voluntary death in japan, rosemary morris, trans., (cambridge: polity press, 1993), p. 231.is t his a book or article? 35fouraker, lawrence, “‘voluntary death’ in japanese history and culture”, 2nd global conference of making sense of: dying and death, brussels, 23 nov 2003, p. 9. 36“suicide rate in decline”, the japan times, (4 feb 2013), <http://www. japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/04/editorials/suicide-rate-in-decline/#.ur vvuyeisso>. article5-1 george francis mclean: a philosopher in the service of humanity hu yeping revised and edited by william sweet the council for research in values and philosophy, usa george francis mclean is a philosopher in the service of humanity. at present he holds the titles of professor emeritus at the school of philosophy of the catholic university of america (cua) in washington, d.c., and director of the centre for culture and values. yet anyone who knows him knows that this says only a small part of who he is. over the years, mclean has been a scholar and a teacher, but most importantly he has worked to democratize philosophy – promoting the research of philosophers coming from many different cultural traditions, and publishing the academic work of teams of scholars from countries and regions around the globe. since 1993, when mclean took early retirement from his teaching position, he has worked full-time promoting global philosophical dialogue and cooperation. he has lectured in dozens and dozens of countries, traveling to places where key philosophical and cultural issues are debated. he has helped to bring together professors from many countries and regions in order to create an opportunity for dialogue, communication, and cooperation, and to assist in building teams who, through their scholarly work, will be able to contribute to answering the vital questions of the day. in addition, each year, mclean invites professors from different countries to come to washington to participate in a 10 week seminar on such philosophical issues as “the relation between cultures,” “freedom and choice in a democracy,” “diversity in unity,” “civil society and social reconstruction,” and “globalization and identity.” but mclean serves philosophy and philosophers in other ways as well. as the general editor of the publication series “cultural heritage and contemporary change,” sponsored by the council for research in values and philosophy (rvp), he helps to bring the work of philosophers prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 1-17 1 © 2000 by assumption university press from the farthest reaches of the planet into the public eye. much of this work is published in edited volumes, the result of regional teams working together on themes of common interest. mclean carefully edits each paper in every volume, as he prepares them for publication. over 100 volumes have been published to date; in addition to marketing through regular channels, they are distributed free of charge to 350 university libraries throughout the world, particularly to institutions in developing countries. the full text of most of these volumes is also made available on the internet (see www.crvp.org). for mclean, the dividends from the dissemination of ideas is of far greater interest than the dividends from sales. george mclean has devoted not only his mind, heart, and hands but his energy, his financial resources, and virtually every waking hour to this philosophical endeavor. for mclean, philosophy is a vocation, and his support for global dialogue stems from a deep sense of faith, hope, and love. there are, mclean believes, many philosophical traditions, cultures, and schools that seek the truth. his metaphor for this is that there are many roads that lead ‘to the holy mountain’. the present volume of essays – and other volumes like it, appearing in several languages and in several countries – are tokens of the respect and deep appreciation for all that george mclean has done for the cause of philosophy and to help philosophers of different cultures, languages, and traditions to come ‘to the mountain.’ i. a strong sense of faith george mclean has a faith that holds that communication and cooperative activity is possible among philosophers from all philosophical traditions – and that it is important to enable those of different traditions to bring their contributions ‘to the table’ and thereby (to use another metaphor) to build bridges among the very different world views. but some may ask how he came to have such a ‘faith’? george francis mclean was born on june 29, 1929 to a scottishirish catholic family. his great-great grand parents on both sides of his family came to the united states from ireland 150 years ago. mclean 2 prajñâ vihâra grew up in lowell, massachusetts, the earliest developed industrial community in the united states. his grandparents were shopkeepers. his father, arthur mclean, served as a lieutenant during the first world war, and afterwards was a clerk at the city post office. his mother, agnes mclean, was a grammar school teacher. george mclean was the second youngest of five children (three boys and two girls). when he was young, he was quiet and timid but, as his sisters say, fond of reading. at the age of 11, at st. margaret church in lowell, where he was baptized, mclean made up his mind to dedicate his life to what he refers to as his “family” – the oblates of mary immaculate, a catholic missionary community founded by eugène de mazenod, a french priest. the oblates’ chief mission is to help the poor, the neglected and the abandoned across the world. after high school, mclean went to newburgh, new york, for study at our lady of hope seminary. in 1949, mclean was sent to rome, for studies at the gregorian university. he remained there for seven years: three years in philosophy and four years in theology. for a young student, it was a mind-opening experience. at the scholasticate where he lived there were over 100 seminarians from many different countries. living together with such a large group of people with varied cultural backgrounds provided him with a special opportunity to learn how to live with others in a harmonious and friendly way. the experience was unique because french was spoken at the residence, latin was used in the classes, and italian was the local language. in 1955, mclean was ordained an oblate priest and, in 1956, he was called back to the united states to pursue a doctorate in philosophy at the catholic university of america (cua) in washington. in 1958, mclean finished his doctorate with a dissertation on paul tillich, and began teaching at cua as well as at the oblate college. tillich (1886–1965) was an influential protestant theologian, who broadened the understanding of religion by defining it as a person’s ‘ultimate concern’ – insisting that everyone has some religious commitment and that the mythic quality of religious narratives play an important role in people’s lives. tillich’s writings provided mclean with an intellectual bridge from the catholic tradition to the broader christian horizon. hu yeping 3 in 1960, mclean was asked by the school of philosophy at cua to organize a summer philosophy workshop; he did this every year until 1968. in the united states – and throughout the world – the 1960s were a period of great change and instability. in africa, anti-colonial movements fought for national independence from foreign domination; in asia, the two major communist powers – the soviet union and china – periodically engaged in hostilities with each other; in europe and north america, people sought equal civil rights and demanded more freedoms. protest marches and demonstrations took place everywhere, and new movements emerged that challenged existing institutions and traditional life styles. as this turmoil and these changes continued, many questions arose. what should people do? what means should they use? could philosophy play an active role in social and cultural change? in order to answer these questions and to help sort out these puzzles, mclean organized the summer workshops thematically, choosing such topics as philosophy and technology, reason and belief, and the value of the study of classical philosophy and ethics. he invited many of the most influential philosophers of the time to lecture in the mornings and opened the discussion to all participants in the afternoons. more than 100 philosophy professors and students, as well as others who were searching for answers, came to washington to attend the workshop each summer. this work gave mclean experience that later enabled him to play significant roles in a number of professional philosophical organizations. because of the success of the workshops, mclean was asked by professor james a. weisheipl, o.p., the president of the american catholic philosophical association (acpa), to be its secretary, a position he held for 15 years (1965-1980). during these years, mclean enhanced the work of the acpa by including in its publications a ‘chronicle’ of philosophical events happening around the world, by organizing membership drives, by establishing a placement service for graduating students seeking employment in philosophy, and by organizing the annual meetings of the acpa and editing and publishing the proceedings. in 1968, mclean went to vienna to attend the world congress of philosophy. there began his involvement with the work of international federation of philosophical societies (fisp). from 1978 to 1988, mclean served on the board of directors of fisp, developing policies 4 prajñâ vihâra for the world congress of philosophy and other philosophical meetings sponsored by fisp. mclean’s contributions to philosophy at the international level increased when, in 1974, professor h.d. lewis of king’s college (london) and president of the international society for metaphysics (ism), appointed mclean secretary of that organization. in the same year, mclean began his service as the secretary of the world union of catholic philosophical societies (wucps) (with professor carlo giacon of italy, the director of the enciclopedia filosofica and the then-president of the world union). mclean held both of these positions from 1974 to 1998. in the following year, in 1975, mclean participated in the founding, and served as the first secretary for, the inter-university committee on research and policy studies (icr) and the joint-committee of catholic learned societies and scholars (cls). one of the first fruits of mclean’s international activity was his initiation of a series of conferences, beginning in 1976, that were sponsored by the international society for metaphysics. these conferences took place in major centers around the world – in shantiniketan (india), new york, jerusalem, bogota (columbia), nairobi, and in other locales – on the themes of the human person, society, and culture. some of the papers presented at these meetings were later published by the council for research in values and philosophy in volumes titled, person and nature, person and society, person and god, and the nature of metaphysical knowledge. following each subsequent major conference of the ism, collections of papers were published; volumes in preparation include: society and unity, society, truth and human rights, society and the good, the metaphysics of culture, metaphysics, culture and symbols, metaphysics, culture and nature, metaphysics, culture and values, and metaphysics, culture and morality. in the early 1970s, mclean began to work with philosophers in latin america, especially in the countries along the andes. a series of colloquia on moral education was held in mexico, colombia, ecuador, venezuela, peru, and brazil. within a few years, mclean had lectured in virtually all the countries of central and south america. then, beginning in 1977, mclean participated in the organization of colloquia, in association with the academies of sciences of several countries of central and eastern europe. the aim of these meetings was to build hu yeping 5 bridges for joint philosophical reflection and to enable exchange with philosophers of western europe. since 1987, a similar series of colloquia with the academies of sciences in beijing and shanghai, and with peking, fudan and other universities in china have been held. a number of corresponding volumes have been published: 25 from central and eastern europe and 20 from china. in 1983, mclean founded the council for research in values and philosophy (rvp) as an extension of the two specialized philosophical organizations – the international society for metaphysics and the world union of catholic philosophical societies. the objective of the council is to break through ideologies in order to engage deep human concerns, to bridge traditions and cultures, and to seek new horizons for social transformation. it aims to mobilize research teams to study the nature, interpretation, and development of cultures; to bring their work to bear on the challenges of contemporary change; to publish and distribute the results of these efforts; and to organize both extended seminars for deeper exploration of these issues and regional conferences for the coordination of this work. starting in the early 1980s, through visits, lectures, and regional conferences, mclean has been involved with the work of philosophers at a number of african universities. his initial trip to africa brought him to some 12 universities. mclean has since made subsequent visits – to dozen universities in 1996 and to several more in 2000 – to a total of 22 universities. as dialogue with the islamic world has become more pressing, mclean has also focused on work with islamic scholars. in addition to organizing conferences in countries where islam is a powerful force, he gave lectures in egypt, mali, senegal, morocco, tunisia, and in asia (e.g., in iran, pakistan, malaysia, and indonesia), including several central asian countries. throughout all this it is mclean’s sense of faith that underlies his work. the initiatives undertaken by the world union and by the ism – and, more recently, the special work of the rvp – are tangible results of the faith that underpins mclean’s efforts. as mclean describes it, the goals of the rvp are to assist scholars in understanding and appreciating 6 prajñâ vihâra their own culture and the values that shape aspirations and motivate actions; to help philosophers to understand other cultures and to develop a positive yet critical appreciation thereof; and to build cooperation among peoples by overcoming tensions and promoting peace and cooperation on a global scale. mclean believes that culture is the foundation of human life, and that it is necessary for spiritual cultivation and social progress. a community develops its distinctive character through its history by formulating its values and virtues, and it is through its patterns of social life that freedom is developed and exercised. by culture, then, mclean means the capacity of the spirit of a people and its ability to act creatively in shaping all dimensions of life – material and spiritual, economic and political, artistic and scientific. it involves a whole life, which is characterized by unity, truth, goodness and beauty. it shares deeply in meanings and values of life of the people. “culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation. this leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.” in all of this, a sense of faith is necessary. the role of philosophy, then, is to help people carry on “the living faith of the dead” and bring their respective cultural heritages forward to face and respond to change. ii. a positive sense of hope the last century witnessed enormous human tragedies and spectacular human achievements: world wars – cold and hot – the holocaust, the confrontations of ideologies, dramatic social changes, the astonishing development of science and technology, and the communications revolution that accompanied it, and so on. these have affected virtually every aspect of everyday life. philosophy understood as the way of searching for universal truth has also undergone change. the cold war split the world into antagonistic camps; for a long time there was no real dialogue, communication, or exchange, but only isolation or confrontation between philosophers of east and west. in some countries, philosophy was employed merely as a tool to serve certain ideologies; in some places it was reduced to a narrow and specialized subject; and for some philosophers, philosophy was merely a pragmatic hu yeping 7 and analytical tool that had nothing to do with the search for the meaning of life. despite these challenges and divisions, mclean’s work has long exhibited a sense of hope, for he recognizes the universality of the search for meaning in all cultures and traditions. this is what has commonly been described as a metaphysical view. mclean insists that metaphysics – and philosophy in general – should not separate themselves from life experience, and that philosophers should actively engage what is going on in the world. once when he was in bogota, columbia, for a conference of the international society for metaphysics, a professor told him that people there were not interested in metaphysics but rather wanted to know the meaning of life. mclean immediately replied that that was exactly what metaphysics was about. mclean, then, is a metaphysician, and his philosophy is based on his christian understanding of the loving relations of the trinity and its extension to the transcendental principles of the true, the good, and the beautiful. he believes that the meaning of life is to look for the true, to act for the good, and to enjoy the beautiful. of course, these are far from uniquely christian values. for example, mclean found in the hindu concepts of sat (existence), cit (consciousness), and ananda (bliss), a corresponding understanding of how particular actions and persons are seen through the one or as the manifestations of brahman and, hence, contribute to living in a way that is truly just, good, and meaningful. in 1999, on the threshold of a new century and a new millennium, mclean published a series of lectures given in lahore, pakistan, entitled ways to god: personal and social at the turn of millennia. in this book, he systematically traces metaphysical being from totemic myth and ritual, to the greek and judeo-christian traditions, to systematic christian philosophy, through to islamic mystical and existential understanding. in persons, peoples and cultures in a global age: metaphysical bases for peace between civilizations (published by the rvp in 2004), mclean goes deeper into being (esse), looking for the metaphysical foundations of person through culture, relation, and gift. mclean’s sense of hope in overcoming division and in promoting exchange can be seen in his efforts to build bridges among philosophers, particularly including those from the ‘east.’ after meeting professor 8 prajñâ vihâra janusz kuczynski of poland, the founder of the journal dialogue and universalism, at the world congress of philosophy held in varna, bulgaria in 1973, mclean was invited to come to warsaw in 1977, in order to explore the possibility of exchange and dialogue with polish philosophers. after a year’s planning, the first meeting was held in munich in 1978 with 8 philosophers from poland and 8 philosophers from west europe and north america – a very rare encounter between philosophers from both the east and west. a second meeting was held the following year in bellagio, italy. during his 1977 visit to poland, mclean also went to krakow to take part in a meeting of polish catholic philosophers organized by then-cardinal karol wojtyla (now pope john paul ii), and spent a week with him in krakow. in 1978, mclean, as the secretary of the world union of catholic philosophical societies, returned to krakow to work with cardinal wojtyla to convoke a meeting of 60 catholic philoso-phers from poland together with an equal number of philosophers from other countries. in 1977, mclean also went to moscow and met professor vadim s. semenov, editor of philosophy, the journal of the institute of philosophy of the russian academy of sciences. this led to contacts with other russian philosophers and, later, to colloquia with philosophers from other academies of sciences – of hungary, bulgaria, czechoslovakia, georgia, and lithuania. in 1978, mclean visited romania. professor ion bansoiu recalls that one day he saw a foreigner who seemed lost, sitting on the curb along the street near the university of bucharest. bansoiu went over and asked the foreigner what was he looking for. the foreigner (mclean) told him that he was looking for the philosophy department of the university. since bansoiu was a philosophy professor at the university, he took him to the department office. thus, cooperation with philosophers in romania began. work with philosophers in central and eastern europe – like the work that mclean (through the rvp and related groups) has supported throughout the world – has gone through three stages: (1) retrospective: retrieving insights from the rich resources of the tradition of the region; (2) prospective: developing concepts concerned with values and rights, hu yeping 9 based on the resources discovered in the first stage; and (3) international: enabling scholars to address the many challenges involved in moving into closer relations with the european union and with the international community in general. this retrospective activity has resulted in the publication of eight volumes of essays, on such issues as the philosophy of the person; solidarity and cultural creativity; tradition and the challenge of czech political culture; language, values and the slovak nation; national identity as an issue of knowledge and morality; and personal freedom and national resurgence. (these volumes were published by the council for research in values and philosophy in cooperation with the paideia publishers in bucharest.) a further 14 volumes have appeared, which discuss such issues as: national, cultural and ethnic identities: harmony beyond conflict; models of identity in post-communist societies; interests and values: the spirit of venture in a time of change; values in islamic culture and the experience of history; values and education in romania today; lithuanian philosophy: persons and ideas; islamic and christian cultures: conflict or dialogue, and so on. the building of relations that mclean has been involved in in central and eastern europe has also been repeated in china. mclean had wished to visit the people’s republic of china from the early 1970s. then, however, the country was in the middle of the cultural revolution and had cut off connection with the outside world. only in the early 1980s, after the chinese government initiated economic reforms and an open-door policy, were there possibilities for chinese to visit other countries and for foreigners to enter. in 1986 in hawaii, mclean met professor tang yijie of peking university, and together they planned meetings which would be held every other year in china. in 1987, a first colloquium with chinese philosophers, on the theme of “man and nature,” was held at the peking university in beijing. in 1988, at the world congress of philosophy held in brighton, england, mclean met professor wang miaoyang of the shanghai academy of social sciences and invited him to another meeting in leuven, belgium, following the world congress. since then, there has been continuous cooperation with the shanghai academy of social sciences. in 1991, while in shanghai, mclean visited fudan university and met professor liu fangtong and 10 prajñâ vihâra other professors. thus began cooperative work with philosophers at fudan university. in 1999, mclean organized a series of small conferences in which he invited 11 chinese philosophers to visit six universities in india, in order to come to know better the hindu roots of chinese buddhism. and, in 2001, mclean invited 7 foreign professors to come to china to participate in twelve colloquia held at universities and academies across china. there, the focus of the discussion was: how can philosophy contribute to the process of social transformation? what role should philosophers play in helping people face the many challenges of the modern and postmodern world? these and subsequent colloquia have involved understanding and examining chinese and discussing ways of responding to contemporary change, particularly concerning: the human person and society; chinese cultural traditions and modernization; the humanization of technology and chinese culture; beyond modernization: chinese roots for global awareness; economic ethics and chinese culture; civil society in a chinese context; and the cultural impact of international relations. to honour his efforts in bringing chinese philosophy into closer contact with the outside world, mclean was made an advisory professor by fudan university, shanghai, in 1994, an advisory researcher by the shanghai academy of social sciences in 1998, and an advisory professor by the jiaotong university, xian, in 2000. the chinese philosophers who know mclean refer to him as a “sage,” a term which signifies the highest respect given to intellectuals in china. iii. an open sense of love kant says that to love is to do good; love also involves an openness to and a respect for others that requires a willingness to listen to others and to hear them on their own terms. love reflects faith and hope. it requires us to look closely at reality – at what is hidden and what is open to all – and to be willing to share both the joys and struggles of life. this unity of love, hope, and faith is characteristic of religion, and mclean believes that the religious lies at the root of all cultures. in fact, as he writes in faith, reason, and philosophy: lectures at the al-azhar, qum, hu yeping 11 tehran, lahore and beijing, “reason in its first and basic philosophical articulations was religious.” philosophy as an intellectual discipline helps us to look at reality from a critical distance, to provide a rational analysis, and to express what we see in conceptual terms. but love for others requires us to read between the lines – to see the shift of human awareness from the vertical to horizontal, from object to subject, from the material to the spiritual, and from the quantitative to the qualitative. this shift provides an opportunity for all peoples and all cultures to pursue self-realization, self-consciousness and self-perfection actively. philosophy, as reason, implies theory, rationality, and abstraction; the love that is reflected in religion draws on lived experience, shows openness, and allows intimacy. the two complement and enhance each other, rather than contradict and weaken one another. mclean loves to use the image from the book of isaiah (27: 13) in the hebrew scriptures, which shows the peoples of the world coming from all directions to converge at the holy mountain. each brings its own special contribution to the whole, shines with its own beauty, and manifests the goodness of the absolute. mclean’s sense of love is evident in his efforts to reach out from his own cultural tradition and professional training. inspired, as we have seen, by the insights of paul tillich, in 1969, during his first sabbatical, he went to the radhakrishnan institute for advanced study in philosophy, at the university of madras, india. there, he studied the hindu classics with t.m.p. mahadevan (1911–1983) and r. balasubramanian. at that time, the research of the institute was especially focused upon the advaita philosophy of sankara. mclean attended classes in the university and was fascinated by the richness of hindu philosophy and religion – a richness which enabled him to understand his own philosophy in a deeper and clearer way. because he loved indian intellectual life so much, mclean returned there for his second sabbatical in 1977, when he spent three months in darjeeling, reading through all the commentaries he had collected on the indian classics. since then, mclean has gone back to india often, to organize colloquia and to give lectures. to honor his contribution to indian philosophical life, the indian council for philosophical research designated him as their annual lecturer for 2004, 12 prajñâ vihâra and invited him to give a set of lectures in six universities across the subcontinent. during his first sabbatical, mclean also spent six months in paris with paul riceour, who gave him the green light to use the facilities and libraries of the universities and to attend whichever classes he was interested in. these experiences in madras and paris led mclean to establish, beginning in 1984, a program that mirrored his own intellectual opportunities – the annual 10-week seminars held at the catholic university in washington. as noted earlier, mclean invites some 10 professors from 10 different countries, provides basic room and board for the participants, and designates them as cua visiting research scholars (which makes it possible for them to use the university libraries in the washington area as well as the library of congress). mclean also encourages seminar participants to attend courses related to their research interests. in order to promote the active involvement of local university faculty, mclean founded the center for the study of culture and values at the catholic university in 2000. mclean’s work in asia has extended beyond india and the mainland of china; he has been a frequent visitor to taiwan where, together with professors tran van doan and vincent shen, he has promoted work on the interface between traditional chinese and christian philosophy. he has participated in conferences in japan (in connection with the work of professors tomonobu imamichi and noriko hashimoto) and in the philippines (with professor manny dy). more recently, mclean has developed contacts with scholars in a number of other countries, such as indonesia and malaysia. mclean believes that islamic philosophy and religion have much to contribute in the development of the present world. in order to understand the dynamic of this, in 1991 and 1992, he went to cairo, egypt, to study islamic philosophy and religion at the institute for oriental studies with professor g. anawati; he also gave lectures at the al-azhar university (the world’s oldest university). in 1998, one of mclean’s students from iran invited him to participate in a conference in tehran on the issue of security and cooperation. in the following year, he went back to tehran to attend the first international conference on mulla sadra, during which time he was hu yeping 13 invited to give a public lecture at mofid university in qom, the holy city for shiite muslims and the major center in iran for training muslim clerics. an iranian scholar (professor musa s. dibadj) said later that mclean was probably the first non-muslim – and the first christian – to give a public lecture in qom. in 2000, mclean spent a month at mofid university, lecturing and helping to organize the international meeting on human rights that was held in tehran the next year. after the former soviet republics in central asia established their independence in 1991, mclean began to work with philosophers from that region as well. in 1994, with the help of professor vadim s. semenov, mclean visited tashkent, uzbekistan, to give a series of lectures at the university of tashkent and to discuss plans for future cooperation with professor said shermukhamedov. later, mclean returned to tashkent to teach at a summer school – which led to his invitation to professor victoriya levinskaya to participate in the annual seminar in washington – and subsequent visits to uzbekistan (in 1999 and 2002) led to the publication of one of the first volumes in english written by uzbek philosophers. mclean has traveled through the other former soviet republics – to turkmenistan (in 1997) where he spent two and half months investigating possibilities of working with philosophers there; to kazakstan (in 1997, 1998, and 2002), to georgia (in 1999 and 2001), to kyrgystan (in 1998 and 2002), and to the ukraine (in 1997, 1999, and 2001) – giving lectures, participating in colloquia, and organizing meetings. in 2003, to honor his contributions to philosophical development in central asia, mclean was awarded an honorary doctorate by the academy of sciences of kazakhstan. if kant is right in saying that to love is to do good, then mclean has shown a love that complements his intellectual commitments to help philosophers throughout the world to engage in their own philosophical work. the author of over a dozen books, and editor of some 70 others, mclean has strong philosophical views. characteristically, however, he lets others speak first – and this reflects the influence of various traditions and cultures on his own work. these influences are many: the thomistic philosophy and catholic tradition in which he was first educated; the work of paul tillich which provided intellectual tools to engage other 14 prajñâ vihâra traditions constructively; the critique of modernity of martin heidegger; the study of the philosophies and religions of india and asia, and, of course, the contacts with philosophers from different regions and cultures. but, most of all, it is hermeneutics – which seeks to uncover what is hidden, yet also requires humility from the enquirer, an openness to the existence of different interpretations of texts, and the recognition that no interpretation is final – that underlies mclean’s approach to his work, his concern to bring scholars into dialogue, and his optimism concerning the future. as we might expect, then, among his recent publications are volumes on hermeneutics, tradition and contemporary change (lectures in chennai/madras, india); hermeneutics, faith, and relations between cultures (lectures in qom, iran); and hermeneutics for a global age (lectures in shanghai and hanoi). here, mclean traces “the nature of hermeneutics and the history of its development from a science to a life process,” argues “how an hermeneutic perspective can enable us better to understand the nature and formation of the religious tradition in which we stand and the role of that tradition in the reading of our sacred texts,” and reflects on “how such an understanding can be transformative in contemporary social life and engage in faithful dialogue with the many cultures and civilizations of the world.” the hermeneutical method, then, provides an intellectual tool to pursue what mclean also knows through his sense of love – that doing philosophy requires listening to others and letting their voices be heard. conclusion to honor george francis mclean for his friendship, for his contributions to scholarship, and for his tireless support of philosophy and philosophers from around the world, his colleagues and friends offer him this token of their appreciation and respect on the occasion of his 75th birthday on june 29, 2004. at the end of any meeting, colloquium, or gathering, mclean asks ‘where do we go from here?’ with his deep sense of faith, hope and love, he has devoted himself for decades to serving society through promoting ideas that may serve to bridge cultures and traditions. hu yeping 15 someone once asked mclean what were his motives for traveling to places where philosophy was considered by many in the west to be less developed, and where the social and intellectual situation was difficult. mclean’s response was that philosophy is not a ‘top down’ activity; it is not something to be done in isolation or by a single individual. it comes from the grassroots, from people’s everyday lives, and from the culture in which they live. each people has its own way of living and searching for the meaning of life. yet it also needs a window to let in new light and new air, and to let its unique character be seen by those outside. in the republic, plato gives us the allegory of the cave. only those who climb out of the cave – painstakingly, passionately, and consistently – will come to see the light, the truth, and the absolute. philosophy, then, is the exercise of freedom. like mclean, dr. martin luther king, jr., the great leader of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, wrote his doctoral dissertation on paul tillich. mclean loves to quote king’s famous speech: i have a dream. let us end this brief introduction with the very last part of that speech. these words capture mclean’s global commitments and his philosophical vision: “with this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to go to jail together, knowing that we will be free one day. this will be the day when all of god’s children will be able to sing with new meaning . . . let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of new york. let freedom ring from the heightening alleghenies of pennsylvania. let freedom ring from the snow-capped rockies of colorado let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of california. but not only that. let freedom ring from the stone mountain of georgia. freedom ring from lookout mountain of tennessee. freedom ring from every hill and molehill of mississippi, from every mountainside, let freedom ring. and when we allow freedom to ring, when we let it ring from every village and hamlet, from every state and city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of god’s children – black men and white 16 prajñâ vihâra men, jews and gentiles, catholics and protestants – will be able to join hands and to sing in the words of the old negro spiritual, “free at last, free at last; thank god almighty, we are free at last.” hu yeping 17 article5-1 self and the west in thai philosophical discourse* suwanna satha-anand chulalongkorn university, thailand historical background thailand was never colonized. this historical “fact,” although not beyond debate, has created a cultural environment wherein antiwestern sentiment does not exist. this does not mean that the thai people do not “fear” the west, if imitation necessarily includes certain elements of fear. it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the complex historical relationship between thailand the west. what is attempted here will be limited to a brief exposition of two major movements of “modernization” in the bangkok period. the first movement was initiated by king rama iv and rama v in the late 19th and early 20th century. this political process was a direct response to western colonialism in southeast asia. the process involved the creation of a national bureaucracy, centralization of political power, nationalization of cultural expressions, introduction of modern railroad and communication system. the second major movement was initiated by field marshall sarit thanarat in the early 1960’s. with money borrowed from the world bank, thailand drew up its first “economic development plan.” these plans, being written every five years, have served as the blueprint of all subsequent government policies. these plants serve as explanation behind the frenzy economic development in the past 30 years. thailand has decided to “industrialize” without establishing a firm basis for agricultural development, which has been the backbone of thai economy since the early bangkok period. this “industry for export” practice has given rise to big city centers, depleted natural forest area from 75% to 28%, and still some scholars think that thailand has been “modernized” without being “developed.”1 *this paper was first delivered at the fourth annual general meeting of the international association for asian philosophy and religion. 138 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 138-154 © 2000 by assumption university press within this second movement of modernization, philosophy as an academic discipline was born, first in the two buddhist universities in the year 1946 and 1947, then in secular thammasat and chulalongkorn in the years 1963 and 1964 respectively.2 although individual courses in philosophy have been offered in the early 1960’s, philosophy department in major universities were not established until in the early 1970’s. the first m.a. thesis in philosophy was completed in 19733. basically it could be argued that the “thai philosophical discourse” is constituted by 420 items or books and text books on philosophy, 350 articles in 65 journals and 144 m.a. and ph.d. theses produced in the past 35 years.4 as it would take an enormous amount of time to “read” all these materials in order to construct a faithful picture of the thai philosophic landscape, what will be attempted here would be limited to the 144 theses carries at least two advantages. first, it should represent the most “vigorous” attempts by thai students to deal with philosophical issues. second, many of those who are teaching philosophy and producing text books in colleges and universities in thailand are the authors of these theses.5 setting boundaries it should be noted that m.a. and ph.d. theses philosophy in thailand are produced under the supervision of a rather limited number of professors. this implies that, in the thai cultural context where the opinions and knowledge of the advisors are held in high esteem, a lot of topics selected and developed into a thesis are heavily influenced by the academic interests of advisors. this implication carries even more weight once one takes into consideration the fact that libraries, even of institutions of higher learning, do not carry extensive collections of materials necessary for an in-depth research. of all 122 m.a. and ph.d. theses in philosophy from chulalonkorn university, 42.6% were completed under two advisors, whose interests are in the field of indian and buddhist philosophy. another 50% were completed under the supervision of 5 more professors whose interests cover the fields of social philosophy, ethics and philosophy of religion.6 in the thesis abstracts of these 122 theses, the term “indian philosophy” is mentioned 33 times in 10 theses, the term “chinese philosophy” is mentioned 15 times in 7 theses, the suwanna satha-anand 139 term “thai” is mentioned 14 times in 4, and the term “western philosophy” or “western world” is mentioned 10 times in 7 theses.7 it is interesting to note here that the term “eastern philosophy” is mentioned only 5 times in 4 theses, and the term “asia” is mentioned only once in one thesis.8 it should be noted here that when the term “eastern philosophy” is used in thailand, it does not include buddhist philosophy. if the frequency of the terms used can serve as indicator, it should perhaps indicate that there is a conscious effort, among one-fourth of the thesis abstracts, to draw a line or a connection between the spatio-cultural domain of the authors and the objects of study. these statistics should immediately bring to mind the fact that the majority of theses produced from chulalongkorn university do not mention any indication of geographic or cultural-intellectual civilization. on the one hand, it seems “natural” that philosophic works, being “universal” should go beyond any national, temporal or cultural boundaries. on the other hand, it is quite evident that the “universal” philosophical discourse is essentially “western.” if this latter point is well-taken, it would mean that the western dominance in the field of philosophy is so complete that people who are doing philosophy are unconscious about it and thus implicitly treat it as a non-issue. another critical point of observation is that this phenomenon corresponds very well with the fact that the question, “is there philosophy in asia?” is never obsolete.9 while the terms “western” and “thai” appear not so frequently in theses produced from chulalongkorn university, those produced from chiengmai university offer an interestingly different picture. among the 22 m.a. theses from chiengmai university in northern thailand, the term “western” is mentioned 17 times in 5 theses, while the term “thai” is mentioned 40 times in 6 theses. this means that about 50% of the chiengmai theses are quite conscious about setting the boundaries between being “thai” and the “west.”10 another interesting point is, the philosophic distance between being “thai” and being “western” is not significantly accompanied by the mention of chinese or indian philosophical system, and there is only one thesis dealing partially with an indian philosophical system, and there is only one thesis dealing with chinese philosophy. in these two theses, there is no mention of the term “indian,” while the term “chinese” is mentioned only once.11 140 prajñâ vihâra judging from these two sets of statistics alone, it might not be unreasonable to say that, once consciously stated, the philosophic distance between being western and being thai, among the chulalongkorn theses, is accompanied by the philosophic proximity of indian and chinese philosophy. whereas an opposite line of reasoning might also be feasible, namely, that, among the majority of the theses which do not mention these national, geographic or cultural terms, the philosophic proximity between being “thai” and being “western” is complete. in this sense, one might conclude that theses from chulalongkorn university aspire to discuss philosophical issues in a “universal” milieu. the orientation is quite different once we look at the theses from chiengmai university. again, judging from statistics alone, it seems that there is a high level of consciousness of being “thai” or attempting to be “thai.” this basic concern is best expressed by ms. naiyany nagvatchara who poses this question in her m.a. thesis on “a study of philosophic thoughts in thai proverbs.” “it should be noted that, unlike countries in the west or in china or in india, there has never been a thai philosopher or a thai philosophical system. most writings by thai sage-scholars are in the forms of literature relating to religious or political institutions. thus, a puzzle arises, whether the thai people have their own philosophy or not. if there is one, what does it look like?”12 giving this kind of expressed concern, it seems that theses from chiengmai university aspire to explore philosophic thinkings of the thai people as represented in a northern thai legal text, a thai classical thinker, a most famous thai poet and central thai proverbs.13 self and the west in thai philosophical discourse one of the major difficulties in setting out to discuss the topic of “self” and the “west,” is, among other things, how to define the two terms and how to justify one’s definitions. a whole list of questions arise. is it possible to have one “self” which represents thainess? is there such a thing as one characteristic which could represent the “west?” are there not many strands of the “west” which are contradictory? what would be suwanna satha-anand 141 the time frame of one’s definitions? in order to side-step all these questions which are beyond the scope of this paper, i propose to approach this task through another mode of understanding the “self” which is philosophically tenable and illuminating for our purpose. professor charles taylor offers an interesting critique of the understanding of the self in the modern world who is a “disengaged first-person-singular self” as evident from the founding figures of the modern epistemological tradition like rené descartes and john locke. he argues, “it means that we easily tend to see the human agent as primarily a subject of representations: representations first, about the world outside; and second, descriptions of ends desired or feared. this subject is a monological one. she or he is in contract with an “outside” world, including other agents, the object she or he and they deal with, his or her own and others’ bodies, but this contact is through the representations she or he has “within.” the subject is first of all an “inner” space, a “mind,” to use the old terminology, or a mechanism capable of processing representations. they may also be causally responsible for some of these representations. but what “i” am, as a being capable of having such representations, the inner space itself, is definable independently of body or other. it is a center of monological consciousness.”14 in place of seeing the self as subject of representations, professor taylor brings our attention to the fact that rather than representations being the primary locus of understanding, they are just “island in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world.” in other words, “our understanding resides first of all in our practices.”15 he offers four paradigmatic cases of “dialogical” acts, which he thinks are illustrative of an embedded and embodied self. he cites sawing, dancing, engaging in conversation and the use of language itself as demonstrating the primacy of this “dialogical self.” he concludes, “much of our understanding of self, society, and world is carried in practices that consist in dialogical action. i would like to argue, in fact, that language itself serves to set up spaces of common action, on a number of levels, intimate and public. this means that our identity is never simply defined in terms of our individual 142 prajñâ vihâra properties. it also places us in some social space. we define ourselves partly in terms of what we come to accept as our appropriate place within dialogical actions.”16 although the locus of discussion of the self here is primarily the “individual,” the analysis offered by professor taylor can be very useful in explicating the “dialogical” relationship between the (thai) self and the west. this relationship exist in a linguistic practice, with the beings of each self giving rise to the other. this method of analysis could sidestep the difficulties imposed by the questions of definitions as discussed earlier. in this dialogical mode of understanding the independent, disembodied, disengaged self is not presupposed, rather one can see the co-arising of interdependent selves, which rhythmically define each other. based on professor taylor’s concept of the “dialogical self” i propose to offer my analysis through three modes of “dialogical” acts. 1. the (thai) self in dialogue with buddhism 2. the (thai) self in dialogue with siamese heritage 3. the (thai buddhist) self in dialogue with the west self in dialogue with buddhism as buddhism has been the de facto national religion of thailand for over 700 years, it is only natural for thai students of philosophy to pay a great deal of effort and emphasis on discussing issues in relation to buddhism. of all theses produced in thailand in the past 22 years, one in three are about or directly related to buddhism.17 the mode of this “dialogical” relationship can essentially be characterized by four areas of concerns. first, there are explicit attempts to argue for the existence of buddhist metaphysic. the first thai m.a. thesis argues that “the lack of attempt by buddhist philosophy to create a metaphysical system has given rise to a new and uniquely buddhist metaphysics of “nonessentialism (anatta-vada).18 along the same line of observation, the author of the first thai ph.d. thesis argues for the necessity of buddhist metaphysic. he argues, “although buddhist metaphysical teachings do not lead to the cessation of sufferings, it does function as a philosophical basis for the practical teachings. if buddhist philosophy should lack metaphysic, buddhist ethico-pragmatic teachings would be without a suwanna satha-anand 143 basis. it would be like a tree without roots.”19 it is interesting to note that although the historical buddha seemed confident in remaining silent on questions of metaphysics, students of philosophy in thailand have made explicit efforts to argue for the existence of buddhist metaphysic. this is perhaps part of an effort to “defend” buddhism from misunderstandings, to “uphold” the uniqueness of the buddhist religion, and to “demonstrate” the completeness of buddhism as a philosophical system. all these attempts are quite evident from many theses.20 second, there are attempts to argue for the superiority of buddhist ethics. take the following as examples. according to the only thesis on buddhism and human rights in thailand, the author concludes, “theravada buddhist philosophy does not need the concept of human rights.”21 another thesis on the buddhist concept of karma offers the following comparison. “the buddhist concept of karma is more comprehensive than the brahmanic version because buddhism offers clear explanations for the present as well as for the future without having to resort to a deity who acts as protector of the law of karma. besides, buddhism offers more confidence than other ethical theories which deal with only the present life. buddhism confirms that results of ethical acts are definitely coming either in this life or the next. moreover, we can also create a new life for ourselves according to that law of karma.”22 third, there are several attempts to correlate buddhism with democracy. according to one thesis, “both buddhism and democracy are based on faith in human reason and intelligence, giving great importance to the individual, utilizing majority votes as the deciding factor and giving complete freedom and liberty to the people.”23 the same author concludes, “buddhism essentially comprises many democratic elements.”24 another thesis on buddhist philosophy of education offers that following findings. “the ideal person according to buddhist philosophy of education is called a “pundit” (a learned person). he is someone with great knowledge of right ways of thinking, speaking and acting. he devotes himself to society and has a democratic attitude.”25 fourth, buddhism offers highly positive contributions to the cause of women. in a pioneering thesis on buddhism and the status of women, the author argues, “this research has shown that buddhism has played an important role in elevating the status of women in many aspects. what 144 prajñâ vihâra buddhism did at that time was the opening of a new era when pioneering work was done to support equality between the sexes which served as a ground for later developments. it could be said that asian people, especially buddhists, have had an awareness of sexual equality for a long time.”26 by implication this thesis is saying that the question of equality between the sexes is not something imported from the “west.” this “fact” in itself could serve as a legitimation for the women movement in thailand. in this first mode of dialogical relationship with buddhism, it can be seen that there are attempts to create a sense of “being in relation to buddhism.” thai buddhism is portrayed in a very positive light both in terms of being the highest philosophic truth as a system of philosophy with its own “non-essentialist” metaphysics. it is also a buddhism with a superior system of ethics with teachings comprehensive enough to guarantee moral efficacy in future lives, as well as offering confidence for practitioners without the need of a supreme deity. this buddhism is also essentially democratic and supportive of equality between the sexes. as buddhism has been part and parcel of being thai, it can be argued that the sense of “self” being created in this dialogical relation to buddhism, is essentially a “thai self” with solid grounding in truth, goodness, democracy and justice between the sexes. in other words, it seems that in the process of upholding buddhism, thai thesis are also uplifting the thai self. self in dialogue with siamese heritage as philosophy as an academic discipline was defined, created, de bated and developed in the “west,” the western world does not have to be burdened with the question, “is there philosophy in europe or america?” however, it seems that the rest of the world where they have their own ways of thinking have to face similar challenges whether their “ways of thinking” would deserve the term “philosophy.” considerable efforts in philosophical debates in many areas of the world, including asia, latin america, and africa have to deal with this question which the west has the luxury of exemption.27 this “burden of proof” is highlighted in the thai context through dialogical interrogation with the suwanna satha-anand 145 siamese heritage. as there has not been any uncontested claim for any one who can represent a thai “philosopher,” those whose consultations are sought are the poets, proverbs and some classical texts. in an interesting study of thai proverbs in the central area, the author finds that “the thai people are not interested in questions of metaphysics. or it can be said that views on metaphysics do not exist in thai proverbs.”28 the thai people seem to accept the “reality” of the empirical world which appears before the senses. their understanding of “truth” is primarily pragmatic.29 if metaphysics is not one of the major concerns, ethics seems to receive much attention. in an attempt to hold dialogue with the thoughts of sunthorn poo who is the most popular thai poet in the bangkok period, the author makes explicit her wish to prove that the ethical thought of sunthorn poo corresponds with a humanist ethics. this is done with the purpose to “use those thoughts as a basis for moral development in thai society. … this study will give us a humanist philosophical ethics which will greatly benefit the thai people and the thai nation.”30 it is interesting to note that this dialogical moment with the siamese heritage indicates a sense of moral decadence within the present thai society, wherein there is a strong need to re-negotiate with the past in order to reform or rebuild the present. in these theses, there seems to be a deep sense of hope in and respect for the past. their study approach indicates less a sense of attempting to “critique” the past than a sense of “attempting to find an answer” from their past. another interesting aspect of this process is the fact that oftentimes there is a felt need to go back even further, namely to back to buddhism. in the thesis on sunthorn poo’s ethical thought, the author concludes, “it is important to note that from our critical study of sunthorn poo’s ethical thought, we find that sunthorn poo deals with certain issues, like political ethics and domestic ethics. however, his thought is neither clearly comprehensive nor systematic. when we apply these ethical principles to the daily lives of the thai people, we should simultaneously rely on buddhist ethics. only then, we will have a more comprehensive ethics.”31 along a similar line of thinking, in another thesis on the political thoughts in the (buddhist) sutta the author makes explicit his wish to 146 prajñâ vihâra “develop understanding in the issues of the state, the ruler, the ruled, political system, political power according to buddhism. this is done with a purpose to create a buddhist political theory to help remedy the political problems in the present day thailand.”32 it is interesting to note that there is an expressed sense of moral and political decadence in thai society when authors of thai theses make attempts to hold dialogue with their own cultural past. in this sense the siamese heritage functions as “filling up station” for the moral and political inadequacy in modern thai life as perceived by the thesis authors. the very fact that they are searching for “moral and political answers in the thai cultural past seems to indicate a sense that the west cannot provide the thai people with this kind of answer. this statement is verified by the fact that none of the 144 theses which deal with non-thai or nonbuddhist themes, discuss the possibility of adopting any “western” philosophico-ethical answers for thai moral or political needs. this does not mean, of course, that we cannot learn from the west, rather that the west does not provide an answer for us. our own national heritage does. (buddhist) self in dialogue with the west among the 144 thai theses, only one brings up the common fate of both the “east” and the “west.” this thesis deals with the issue of religious language. it uses wittgenstein’s theory of language game” to explain the language practice of a radical buddhist reformist group in contemporary thailand. the author argues, “due to rapid advancement in the field of science in the past years, scientific knowledge has become the paradigm of “truth” and “rationality.” within this mode of thinking, the status of religion has degenerated to an all time low level. religionists, both from the east and the west, have tried to explain their religions in terms of scientific knowledge. this is attempted to show that religious teachings are rational and true, thus deserving respect in the same way as scientific knowledge does.”33 it is interesting to note that in the reasoning process of this author, science is not necessarily associated with the west. rather it is science versus religion, east and west. in this way, the distinction line is not drawn between the east and versus the suwanna satha-anand 147 west, but between two paradigms of knowledge, namely, science and religion. however, if one looks at the overall picture, one will see that a clear majority of thai theses, when juxtaposing the east and the west, they oftentimes reflect an opposing tension, a radical difference or sometimes a sense of superiority on part of the east. the following expositions should serve as representative examples. in a comparative study of the notion of self in buddhist philosophy and that of david hume, the author concludes, “the reasons in negating the self in buddhist philosophy and the philosophy of david hume are the same, that is, they both analyze human beings into composite units and find no self. if it is only because of the necessity to use language for communication, misunderstandings arise as to the existence of the self. however, the purposes of the two philosophical systems are different. buddhism negates the existence of the self because it is a method of practice to reach the highest good, that is, for ethical aim; whereas hume negates the existence of the self because of his theory of knowledge.”34 in another thesis, the importance of epistemology is discussed in the following way. “there still are conflicting debates as to the importance of epistemology in western philosophy. not so in buddhist philosophy which holds that epistemology is very important. this is because right knowledge must be able to get rid of avijja (ignorance) which is the root cause of sufferings. the way to gain that right knowledge is within the realm of epistemology.”35 this argument seems to indicate that buddhism has found that ultimate importance of epistemology. as epistemology is the realm wherein the method leading to the cessation of sufferings is embedded. it also seems to imply that buddhism has advanced further than western philosophy because buddhism has found the true and ultimate importance of epistemology. in another thesis on the notion of emptiness in nagarjuna, the author echoes a similar line of reasoning. she argues that nagarjuna, belonging to the eastern tradition, and kant and hegel, belonging to the western tradition, both use “dialectics” in their attempts to reach philosophic truth. but hegel’s dialectics is different from that of nagarjuna in the sense that, for hegel, dialectics is a movement from lower ideas with lower essence to higher ideas with higher essence, thus 148 prajñâ vihâra ultimately reaching highest truth through intuition which is beyond experience. for nagarjuna, dialectics is a critical use of reason to prove the state of emptiness. this state of emptiness will liberate the mind from any theoretic attachment and will reach ultimate liberation.”36 this theme of liberation from attachment is often emphasized in many theses dealing with east and west encounter. in those cases there seems to be an implied sense of superiority on part of buddhism over its western counterpart. take another example in a study of “form” in buddhism. the author concludes that the purpose of western analysis of “form” (substance) is to understand its nature, its true state; whereas in buddhism, a study of “form” is for the purpose of enlightenment, so that a person can liberate himself from the influence of “form.” then life can be lived without any danger of “form”37 the issue of the “purpose” of philosophic endeavors seems to be the locus of difference between buddhism and the west. when a philosophic quest is not conducive to enlightenment, the buddha is not interested in answering. in a thesis on the question of agnosticism, the author argues that buddhism fully believes in the possibility of ultimate knowledge, but the buddha remains silent on metaphysical questions not because those question cannot be answered, rather that, they should not be answered because they are irrelevant to the purpose of enlightenment.38 this line of reasoning is repeated in another thesis on the idea of suffering in schopenhauer. the author concludes that schopenhauer is an extreme pessimist who insists that life is essentially suffering. this is because the inner nature is a will which endlessly struggles to find contentment only to be replaced by new desires. the cessation of this struggle only leads us to boredom. the method which will lead to the cessation of suffering is to be immersed in aesthetic beauty and a sacrifice of worldly desires. however, according to the author, “(schopenhauer’s) method only offers temporary sanctuary, it cannot lead to true liberation.”39 even though this thesis is not a comparative study, at the end of the conclusion, the author still implies that schopenhauer’s way out is short of being the best. the term “buddhism” is not directly mentioned here, but any thai reader would automatically associate that “true liberation” here with buddhism. within that association, again, buddhism reigns supreme over another western thinker. suwanna satha-anand 149 concluding note perhaps one can say that in the process of being exposed to the west in the economic development process, wherein all answers seem to lie in the west, thai students of philosophy carry an uneasy ambivalence about the west. this “uneasy ambivalence” seems to be subtly contested in many thai philosophy theses. given the three dialogical movements outlined above, the following will be an attempt to bring all those observations together into a single framework so that a better sense of the thai self in relation to the west can be developed. first, it seems reasonable to conclude that in order to create a sense of self, the process of dialogical relationship with the west needs to be constituted through buddhism. at this first movement, the thai self does not rely on metaphysical foundation (the buddhist insistence), but it is a self with solid ethical foundation, is supportive of democracy and advocates sexual equality. the main point here is this ideal self does not need to rely on any western philosophic ideology. we only need buddhism.40 second, when there is a felt sense of moral or political decadence in thai society, a re-constitution of the self is needed in dialogical relationship with the siamese heritage. it is interesting to note that when going back to thai poets or thai proverbs, the constituted thai self is not put side by side with the west. the only significant mention of the west in this context is an attempt to claim that sunthorn poo should be honored as one of the important humanist thinkers of the world.41 there is also no claim that this version of self with its own ethico-political envelop can be applicable to the west or any other asian cultures. in short, it might not be illogical to conclude here that the siamese heritage can provide an answer to the re-constitution of a thai self, but this self does not indicate universal application. this limited confidence seems to indicate the boundary or the thai self. third, when there is a direct juxtaposition of thai self with the west, buddhism is again needed. oftentimes this dialogical relationship is characterized by tension, difference (especially in philosophic purposes), and sometimes superiority on part of buddhism. the hidden meaning seems to be that if buddhism is superior to the west (only buddhism 150 prajñâ vihâra offers liberation, philosophic as well as religious?), then the thai self will also be elevated. the fact that there is never an explicit equation or superiorization of the thai self over the west seems to indicate two logical possibilities. first, the thai self can be honorably compared to the west through buddhist references. second, the thai self cannot face up to the west on its own? the conceptualization of the thai self in dialogical relation to the west seems to indicate an uneasy acceptance of the west with a felt need to fight back. this “fighting back” is carried out by bringing in the issue whether the philosophies under discussion will lead to the cessation of sufferings or not. this criterion is in itself a buddhist criterion, and is based on a non distinction between philosophy and religion. suwanna satha-anand 151 endnotes 1see for example, norman jacobs, modernization without development: thailand as an asian case study. new york: praeger publishers, 1971. 2suree suwanpreecha, “status and roles of philosophy in thai education,” thammasat university journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (march e.e. 2524), p.126. although the two buddhist universities first offered courses on “buddhist philosophy” many years before the second modernization movement, i still includes them under the time frame of the 1960’s because it is highly probable that the teachings at that time would not be significantly different from teaching buddhism as a religion. 3see the first m.a. thesis in philosophy produced from chulalongkorn university in cha-earnsri issarangoon na ayudya, “an analytical study of ‘self’ and ‘non-self’ in theravada buddhist philosophy,” chulalongkorn university graduate school, b.e. 2514 (1973) 4see a recently completed research, suwanna satha-anand, “thai philosophical landscape: report on philosophical research in thailand (b.e. 25082538), 225 pp. this research was commissioned by the thai national council, and submitted to the council in july b.e. 2540 (1997). 5it is difficult to obtain complete and accurate data as to what is the percentage of these people who comprise the total number of 200 people who are teaching philosophy in institutes of higher learning in thailand. i have tried to search for this information with the ministry of university affairs. i was informed that the data are classified as “restricted.” 6see suwanna satha-anand, op. cit., p. 18. 7these statistics are enumerated by this author from the 122 thesis abstracts produced from chulalongkorn university graduate school between the years b.e. 2516–2538 (1973–1995) 8ibid. 9see prominent example of this questioning in, frits staal, “is there philosophy in asia?” in general james larson and eliot deutsch (eds.) interpreting across boundaries. princeton: princeton university press, 1998, pp. 203–229. 10the same method of enumeration is used to count the appearance of these two terms among 22 m.a. thesis abstracts from chiengmai university between the years b.e. 2528–2538 (1985–1995) 11ibid. 12ms. naiyana navatchara, “a study of philosophic thoughts in thai proverbs,” m.a. thesis, chiengmai university graduate school, b.e. 2531, abstract page. 13please see ms. nipapan chaimongkol, “the legal philosophy of mangrai customary law,” b.e. 2531; mr. mum manroo, “the political philosophy of tienwan.” b.e. 2534; ms. rienthong somsak, “a study of ethical thoughts in sunthorn poo’s literature, b.e. 2529; and ms. naiyana navatchara, “a study of philosophical 152 prajñâ vihâra thoughts in thai proverbs,” b.e. 2531 respectively. all of these are m.a. theses in philosophy from chiengmai university. 14charles taylor “the dialogical self,” in david r. hiley, james p. bohman, and richard shusteman (eds.) the interpretive turn: philosophy, science, culture. ithaca, new york: cornell university, 1991, p. 307. emphasis added by this author. 15ibid., p. 308 emphasis added by this author. 16ibid., p. 311 emphasis added by this author. 17suwanna satha-anand, op. cit., p. 18 between b.e. 2516–2537, 39 in 122 m.a. and ph.d. theses produced in thailand are about or directly related to buddhist philosophy. 18cha-ernsri issarangoon an ayudhya, “an analytical study of atta and anatta in theravada buddhist philosophy” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2516 (1973), abstract. 19samparn promta, “space and time in theravada buddhist philosophy” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2530 (1987), abstract. 20suwanna satha-anand, op. p. 20. 21boontham poonsab, “morality and human rights in theravada buddhist philosophy” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2533 (1990), abstract. 22preecha kunawut, “buddhist philosophy on karma and the result of karma” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2521 (1978), abstract. 23morakot singhapat, “an analysis of democratic elements in buddhism” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2521 (1978), abstract. 24ibid. 25wichit kertwisit, “theravada buddhist philosophy of education” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2519 (1976). 26parichart nontaganan, “buddhist philosophy on women” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2523 (1980), abstract. 27take the following debates for examples. vincente medina, “the possibility of an indigeneous philosophy: a latin american perspective,” american philosophical quarterly vol. 29, no. 4, october 1992, pp. 373–380. polycarp ikuenobe “the parochial universalist conception of ‘philosophy’ and ‘african philosophy,’” philosophy east and west vol. 47, no.2, april 1997, pp. 189–210. frits staal, “is there philosophy in asia,” in gerald james larson and eliot deutsch (eds.) interpreting across boundaries. princeton, new jersey: princeton university press, 1988, pp. 203–229. these debates are in direct contrast to two recent articles on ways of doing philosophy in north america, wherein the absence of the term “asia” or any other non-european traditions is not conspicuous. please see hilary putnam, “a half century of philosophy, viewed from within,” daedalus vol. 126, no.1, winter 1997, pp 175–208. and alexander nehamas, “trends in recent american philosophy,” daedalus vol. 126, no. 1, winter 1997, pp. 209–223. 28naiyana nagwatchara, “a study of philosophical thoughts in thai proverbs” graduate school chiengmai university, b.e. 2531 (1988), abstract. suwanna satha-anand 153 29chalermkiat pewnuan, “truth in thai mind” journal of thammasat university. vol. 8, no. 3 (january – march 2522), pp. 54–61. (in thai) 30rianthong somsak, “a critical study of sunthorn poo’s ethical thoughts in his literature,” graduate school, chiengmai university, b.e. 2529 (1986), abstract. 31ibid. 32tthana nuanplod, “political thoughts in the sutta pitaka,” graduate school, chiengmai unversity, b.e. 2536 (1993), abstract. it should be noted here that although the buddhist tripitaka technically is not part of the “siamese heritage,” the distinction between the two is not very clear in thai mind. i therefore, include here a thesis about ideas in the sutta under the heading, “siamese heritage.” 33 sunai setbunsarng, “the application of wittgenstein’s language game theory to the explanation of meanings in religious language: a case study of the santi asoka language” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2528 (1985), abstract. 34 siriwan ostanonda, “a comparative study of the notion of self in buddhist philosophy and the philosophy of david hume,” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2523 (1980), abstract. 35 wichit kerdwisit, “theravada buddhist philosophy of education” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2519 (1976), abstract. (emphasis added by this author.) 36 sumalee chimtrakul, “nagarjuna on sunyata” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2519 (1976), abstract. 37 nantaporn vorakul, “a study of “form” in buddhism,” graduate school, chiengmai university, b.e. 2533 (1990), abstract. 38 chutima ounwong, “agnosticism in buddhism,” graduate school, chiengmai university, b.e. 2534 (1991), abstract. 39 porntip chusak, “an analysis of schopenhauer’s idea of suffering,” graduate school, chulalongkorn university, b.e. 2523 (1980), abstract. 40 the thesis by somparn promta who insists that buddhism has its own non-essentialist metaphysics, is establishing this metaphysical foundation without any need to rely on western metaphysical system. 41 rianthong somsak, op. cit. 154 prajñâ vihâra 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 5-12 5 © 2000 by assumption university press his majesty’s philosophy of sufficiency economy: an alternative for the sustainable development of thailand sumet tantivejkul secretary-general, chaipattana foundation abstract the extreme application of capitalism and consumerism has lead to a destruction of natural resources and has corrupted the foundation of the country’s development system. this paper examines the theory of sustainable economy developed by his majesty king bhumipol adulyadej. it stresses the middle path as the overriding principle for appropriate conduct and way of life by the populace at all levels. this applies to conduct and way of life at the level of individual, family and community, while providing a choice of balanced development strategy for the nation so as to develop in line with the forces of globalization, and shielding against inevitable shocks and excesses that may arise. “this sufficiency means to have enough to live on. sufficiency means to lead a reasonably comfortable life, without excess, or overindulgence in luxury, but enough… the word to have enough is sufficient; sufficiency is moderation. if one is moderate in one’s desires, one will have less craving. if one has less craving, one will take less advantage of others. if all nations hold this concept – i don’t mean sufficiency economy – this concept of moderation, without being extreme or insatiable in one’s desire, the world will be a happier place.” his majesty king bhumibol adulyadej 4 december 1998 a decade ago, thai people followed and relied on the western world’s model of economy, aiming specifically for growth and wealth, without considering the solid foundation of the country and without understanding if that model would fit our economic and social system. in retrospect, the money we were spending for the nation was hardly ours, we still had to borrow from others, as well as use foreign technology. this extends even to human resources; we borrowed the skills of foreigners (who ultimately created instability in our system), without thinking of expanding our own intellectual capital. without a solid foundation, the unstable system collapsed. in 1997, the economic crisis hit thailand severely. it started with the flotation of its currency, and brought great negative impacts to the thai society and thai people at large. a large number of people went bankrupt and lost their jobs, their homes and their pride. the crisis made thai people, both in private and public sectors, aware of the vulnerability of the country’s economic foundation and the problems of heavy reliance on foreign investment, technology, and markets. the catastrophe left a scar in thai economic history that is still remembered by most thais today. consumerism not only was the system corrupted, but also the thai’s also developed habits of over consumption, which led them to bankruptcy and the country to crisis. consumerism interrupts the world function by replacing the normal common sense of desire for an adequate supply of life’s necessities with an unnatural ongoing search for unnecessary things. as a result, people tend to hasten the replacement of the old. those who try to push consumerism instill us with the idea that the economy and quality of life would improve if people buy more things and spend excessively. financial resources which should be spent on fundamentals such as nourishment, 6 prajñâ vihâra housing, education, or other public service activities, unfortunately, are spent on products of little value and little social return. consumerism is a cyclical system in which the consumer develops a false sense of need to purchase more products to accommodate previously purchased items, further benefiting the producers’ income. as more things are forced upon consumers, the amount of waste and other undesirable products increases extensively. each year we consume more oil, energy and valuable natural resources that will be most valuable in the future. as a result of this over consumption, we face an oil crisis. even as the oil price continues to rise, a number of thai people are still buying new cars. a lot of them are unable to afford luxury ones, so they pay by installment. like other unnecessary items, they are paying by credit cards. this growing consumption leads to continuing wars for valuable natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, gold and other limited resources; resources which ultimately are not vital for our survival. maybe in the future, people will fight for water or even the air that we breathe! are we depending on others too much? are there any ways out? is it about time that we need to stand on our own feet and become more self-reliant? sufficiency economy: an alternative to the world crisis the heart of “development” has always been the improvement of livelihood of the people in general. however, to improve does not necessary mean to increase gdp or to increase the markets or consumers, it should rather mean the empowerment of sustainable happiness and individuals become self-reliant to raise their quality of life. fortunately, the livelihood of the thai people and strength of the thai nation have been nurtured and developed by his majesty king bhumibol adulyadej. through his caring leadership and his ingenious thinking, his majesty has earned love and profound respect of his people. while laying the foundations for his country’s development strategy, his sumet tantivejkul 7 majesty’s philosophy of “sufficiency economy” lies at the heart of thailand’s development, and it can truly serve as guidance for the country’s economic and social developments. over the past three decades, his majesty has graciously reminded thai people through his royal remarks on many occasions of a step-bystep and balanced approach to development, which is now known as the philosophy of sufficiency economy. the philosophy provides guidance on appropriate conduct through numerous aspects of life. the following is one example of an excerpt from his royal speech in 1974: “economic development must be done step by step. it should begin with the strengthening of our economic foundation, by assuring that the majority of our population has enough to live on… once reasonable progress has been achieved, we should then embark on the next steps, by pursuing more advanced levels of economic development. here, if one focuses only on rapid economic expansion without making sure that such plan is appropriate for our people and the condition of our country, it will inevitably result in various imbalances and eventually end up as failure or crisis as found in other countries.” since the crisis, his majesty has reiterated and expanded on the sufficiency economy concept in his remarks made in december 1997 and the following years. the concept points the way for recovery that will lead to more flexible, balanced and sustainable development, better able to meet the challenges arising from globalization and other worldly changes. definition of the sufficiency economy philosophy “sufficiency economy” is a philosophy bestowed by h.m. king bhumibol adulyadej of thailand that stresses the middle path as the overriding principle for appropriate conduct and way of life by the populace at all levels. this applies to conduct and way of life at the level of individual, family and community, while providing a choice of balanced development 8 prajñâ vihâra strategy for the nation so as to develop in line with the forces of globalization, and shielding against inevitable shocks and excesses that may arise. “sufficiency” means moderation and due consideration in all modes of conduct, together with the need for sufficient protection from internal and external shocks. to achieve this, the application of knowledge with prudence is essential. in particular, great care is needed in the application of theories and technical know-how and methodologies for planning and implementation. at the same time, it is essential to strengthen the moral fiber of the nation, so that everyone, particularly public officials, academics or theoreticians, businessmen and financiers, adheres first and foremost to the principles of honesty and integrity. in addition, a balanced approach combining patience, perseverance, diligence, wisdom and prudence is indispensable to cope appropriately with critical challenges arising from extensive and rapid socioeconomic, environmental, and cultural changes occurring as a result of globalization. therefore, the sufficiency economy philosophy involves the three following principles: 1. rationality: we have to use our own judgment and rationality to choose our own way of conduct, our own path of living without following blindly the irrational globalization trend, such as overly extravagant life style and over consumption. you can choose your own suitable model of living for your own life with your own rational judgment. 2. moderation: judgment is also used for considering our limitations. how much do we have in our savings? can we spend without going bankrupt? we have to learn about our own limitations, capacities and potentialities, such as human capital, financial capital and availability of resources, and start there. only a balanced conduct of living will be in harmony with others. 3. risk management: this stage is to prepare ourselves to accept and face the impacts and other changes which are expected to likely happen in the future, both interior and exterior. we have to create our own savings, national savings, and to become self reliant without always depending on foreign countries. sumet tantivejkul 9 some might think that this philosophy of sufficiency economy is outdated, old fashioned and cannot lead the country to prosperity. the new systems to measure a better living in the past, we normally used “wealth” as a criterion to measure a better living, and gross domestic product or gdp was the most useful figure. this system measures the quantity of products and services that a country produces. at that time, most people believed that crime usually went down when gdp went up and when gdp rose, quality of health and life just simply got better. however in the 1970s, researchers and social policy experts weakened that belief. when subtracted from gdp, the cost of crime, unemployment, malnutrition, environmental deterioration, etc., it was found that for the last 30 years, a better living does not essentially depend on increasing incomes and economic figures. in fact, the number of people suffering from depression in industrialized countries had escalated tenfold in 50 years. the word “wealth” in fact came from the word “well-being”. so “wealth” in its origin does not really mean just economic prosperity, but something much broader than that. now that we believe that gdp is no longer the most useful figure to measure a better living, he human development index or hdi, which was issued annually by the united nations, is an alternative to that. all countries around the world are ranked according to their people’s life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted real income rather than by the nation’s economic figures. another new trend that is now becoming more popular for measuring a better living is the gross domestic happiness (gdh) or gross national happiness (gnh), invented by his majesty king jigme singye wangchuck of bhutan. this country is one example that concerns about what globalization may bring and wants to preserve its unique culture and social values by holding on to a new term, gnh, through his majesty king jigme singye wangchuck’s 1972 declaration: “gross national happiness is more important than gross national product.” this system has been applied since 1972, using “four pillars of happiness” — 10 prajñâ vihâra sustainable economic development, conservation of the environment, promotion of national culture and good governance. benefits and happiness his majesty king bhumibol adulyadej also pays great attention to the well-being and happiness of the thai people. unlike his majesty king jigme singye wangchuck, the thai king did not invent a new system to measure happiness for his nation; instead he created a new term “benefits and happiness”, which he stated in many occasions because he believes that “benefits have to go along with happiness”. benefits without happiness will create an unbalanced approach to well-being. if the life of the individuals is not balanced and they do not care to invite sufficiency into their life, only personal material value will hold significance. when material accumulation reaches its peak, things will just break down and will have to start everything from zero again. economic growth alone normally benefits less people, but balance of income distribution benefits people as a whole. economic development and income distribution must develop together to generate a greater profit for the country at large. the extreme application of capitalism and consumerism leads to total destruction of natural resources and corrupts the foundation of the country’s development system, whereas the sufficiency economy leads towards a more balanced approach to better living. the world is now in chaos. if we do not stop our habits of over consumption, the sustainable state will never happen. the natural resources will be depleted and our descendants will suffer deprivation. i believe that to follow the king’s idea of “benefits and happiness” can create a better living among mankind, and that the philosophy of sufficiency economy can build a solid foundation for the country’s development. if things are carried out on the moral and ethical basis, we can achieve progress with stability. it may take a bit longer, but it will be less risky. and ultimately, we will be able to achieve happiness and sustainable growth. source: undp sumet tantivejkul 11 12 prajñâ vihâra 03_(35-52)the apology an introduction the apology: an introduction to the dynamics of the moral life kevin e. o’reilly faculty of philosophy, milltown institute, dublin บทคัดย่อ บทความนี้ผู้เขียนนำเสนอให้ไตร่ตรองแนวคิดสี่อย่างซึ่งดูเหมือนว่า สนับสนุนแนวทางหลักของศีลธรรมของโสเครติส ดังที่ปรากฏให้เห็นรางๆ ในบริบทของการพิจารณาคดีของเขา: 1) ธรรมชาตินิยมเชิงจริยะ 2) ชีวิตทาง ศีลธรรมในฐานะท่ีตอบสนองต่อเสียงเรียกของพระเจ้า 3) บริบททางสังคมของ ชีวิตทางศีลธรรม 4) บทบาทของการคิดแบบมีวิจารณญาณในชีวิตทางศีลธรรม แนวทางเหล่านี้ได้รับการพัฒนาขึ้นมาในยุคของพวกโสฟิสต์ ซึ่งสนับสนุน ศีลธรรมแบบสัมพัทธนิยมและปฏิเสธมาตรฐานของศีลธรรมแบบสัมบูรณ์นิยม และแนวคิดแบบวิมัตินิยมของพวกเขานำไปสู่ทัศนคติแบบอเทวนิยม ในทางตรง ข้าม โสเครติสตระหนักในความสำคัญของบริบททางสังคมในการเผยแสดงชีวิต ทางศีลธรรม เขามุ่งม่ันในการแสวงหาความดีอย่างไม่ลดละ และในท่ีสุดเขาก็ได้ เปิดรับการกระทำการของภาวะเหนือธรรมชาติในชีวิตของเขา abstract in this article i propose to reflect upon four themes that seemingly underpinned socrates moral enterprise as adumbrated in the context of his trial: (1) ethical naturalism; (2) the moral life as a response to a divine call; (3) the social context of the moral life; and (4) the role of critical thinking in the moral life. this was developed at the time of the sophists who espoused moral relativism, denying any basis for absolute moral standards. and their scepticism led them to adopt an atheistic attitude. socrates, in contrast, recognized the importance of a societal context for the unfoldprajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 35-52 35 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ ing of the moral life. he engaged in a relentless pursuit of the good. and, finally, he was open to the operation of transcendence in his life. while there are various interpretations concerning what constituted the exact moral teaching of socrates,1 there can be little doubt that the apology is a faithful account of his trial for, as hugh tredennick points out, “however much its form owes to plato’s artistry; it would have been stupid to misrepresent the facts which were familiar to a great part of the athenian people”.2 even the most cursory reading of the apology, reveals that socrates believes that moral goodness is the one thing that matters. indeed, the apology typifies socrates’ abiding interest in ethical enquiry, an interest that far outweighs his concern with natural philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, or any other branch of investigation that falls outside of the domain of moral philosophy. if we accept the veracity of the apology’s account of socrates’ mission and trial, we can perhaps argue that the various seminal ideas that are placed before us in it furnish the origins of western moral philosophy. in this article i propose to reflect upon four themes that seemingly underpinned his moral enterprise as adumbrated in the context of his trial: (1) ethical naturalism; (2) the moral life as a response to a divine call; (3) the social context of the moral life; and (4) the role of critical thinking in the moral life. the apology does not, of course, offer a systematic treatment of any of these issues; their status there can be described rather as being somewhat embryonic. it fell to the lot of the subsequent western moral tradition to develop these seminal notions. what the following reflections offer therefore is an attempt to unpack the significance of socrates’ deliberations in the apology with the support both of contemporary scholarship and speculation on the issues broached by socrates. ethical naturalism there are two distinct groups of accusers whom socrates has to confront in his defence: one group comprises his immediate adversaries in court; the other is a more diffuse group and much more difficult to deal 36 prajna vihara~ with. the latter group is made up of the great many people who for many years have propagated false rumours about socrates. he begins his treatment of their accusations by summarizing their substance: “there is a wise man called socrates who has theories about the heavens and has investigated everything below the earth, and can make the weaker argument defeat the stronger”.3 indeed, this misrepresentation had formed the basis of a caricature of him in a play by aristophanes in his play, the clouds, produced in 423.4 in the popular depiction of him socrates went around, as he says, “proclaiming that he is walking on air, and uttering a great deal of other nonsense about things of which i know nothing whatsoever”.5 socrates simply asks those present to tell one another if they have ever heard him discuss such things. in this way they will realize that there is absolutely no foundation to these or to other reports about him. not only are the foregoing accusations false, socrates maintains that he never tried to educate people and to charge a fee. in this way he once again distances himself from the sophists who charged for the “instruction” which they imparted. socrates cites a conversation with callias the son of hipponicus who had paid more in sophists fees than everybody else whom socrates knew put together. this conversation offers us an avenue into one strand of the tradition of ethics which was to develop in western civilization. socrates says to callias: [i]f your sons had been colts or calves, we should have had no difficulty in finding and engaging a trainer to perfect their natural qualities; and this trainer would have been some sort of horse-dealer or agriculturalist. but seeing that they are human beings, whom do you intend to get as their instructor? who is the expert in perfecting the human and social qualities? i assume from the fact of your having sons that you must have considered the question. is there such a person or not?6 the foregoing quotation constitutes in my opinion a rudimentary statement of what contemporary authors call ethical naturalism. this concept is strictly speaking one that belongs to the aristotelian tradition of moral philosophy, but it seems to have been prefigured in socrates. this is 37kevin e. o’reilly only to be expected, for just as plato knew socrates and acted as his mouthpiece, so too aristotle himself was a pupil of plato. although aristotle’s philosophy is opposed to that of plato in many ways, there are some elements of continuity. there are some ideas which he did not reject, but which he rather developed and integrated into his own system. ethical naturalism, i suggest, is one such idea. perhaps it would be useful at this point to explain more fully what exactly ethical naturalism is. as i indicated at the outset, i will do so in the light of contemporary philosophical discourse. after many centuries during which virtue ethics disappeared from the domain of moral theorizing, elizabeth anscombe wrote an important and influential paper, entitled “modern moral philosophy”, which proved to be a catalyst in its revival. a central concept in virtue ethics is that of ethical naturalism. subsequent authors have elucidated this concept and it is my intention to draw upon two of them at this point in order to elucidate and elaborate on socrates’ statement. philippa foot begins her reflections on ethical naturalism with a linguistic consideration. the word “good”, like “small” is an attributive adjective. consequently, although we are free to evaluate and choose things according to almost any criteria we wish, when giving linguistic expression to our evaluation or choice we must choose our words carefully for they determine the criteria of goodness that are appropriate. thus, although i can deem a particular dead cactus to be good because i think that it would constitute a wonderfully decorative addition to my mother’s windowsill, what i cannot do is describe it as being a good cactus because a cactus is a living thing. on this basis foot, following anscombe, argues that this grammatical feature of the word “good” and its related terms do not suddenly undergo a mysterious change when employed in ethical discourse. in fact, as rosalind hurtshouse states: “what goes for “good cactus”, “good knife”, “good rider”, also goes for “good human being” even when we use that phrase in ethics”.7 these authors are in opposition to the fact-value distinction common in analytic philosophy in particular and the corresponding idea that the word “good” is purely descriptive in non-ethical contexts but somehow becomes an evaluative term in ethical ones. the contention is that just as words such as “good”, “well”, “de38 prajna vihara~ fective”, and so on can be used in relation to plants and to non-human animals, so too they can be employed in evaluating the behaviour of members of the human species. foot’s idea is that just as “there is something wrong with a free-riding wolf, who eats but does not take part in the hunt and with a member of the species of dancing bees who finds a source of nectar but does not let other bees know where it is”, so too there is something wrong with a human being who does not possess and practise the virtues of charity and justice.8 she concludes her deliberations as follows: in my view . . . a moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals, and other aspects of their behaviour. nobody would, i think, take it as other than a plain matter of fact that there is something wrong with the hearing of a gull that cannot distinguish the cry of its own chick, as with the sight of an owl that cannot see in the dark. similarly, it is obvious that there are objective, factual evaluations of such things as human sight, hearing, memory, and concentration, based on the life-form of our own species. why, then, does it seem so monstrous a suggestion that the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts about the nature of human beings and the life of our own species? undoubtedly the resistance has something to do with the thought that the goodness of good action has a special relation to choice. but . . . this special relation is not what noncognitivists think it, but rather lies in the fact that moral action is rational action, and in the fact that human beings are creatures with the power to recognize reasons for action and to act on them.9 it is precisely the notion that we can evaluate the goodness or badness of human beings on the basis of the extent which they live up to the demands which issue from the form of the human species that informs socrates’ comment quoted above. he takes colts or calves as an analogy 39kevin e. o’reilly in order to illustrate his point: “[i]f your sons had been colts or calves, we should have had no difficulty in finding and engaging a trainer to perfect their natural qualities; and this trainer would have been some sort of horsedealer or agriculturalist. but seeing that they are human beings, whom do you intend to get as their instructor?” just as we can avail of the services of experts who are able to bring out the best in these animals, that is to say, to perfect their characteristic qualities, can we not also say that there are presumably people who are expert in matters concerning human nature and human conduct. if there are, who are these people? comically, callias thinks that a sophist called evenus of paros is to be numbered among one of these experts, while socrates denies that he possesses any such knowledge! surely a case of turning reality on its head. if there are experts in human nature, presumably they will have reflected at length on human nature and discerned the kinds of things that conduce in general to its flourishing and the kinds of things that undermine its well-being. such experts will no doubt be keenly aware of a fact that will be discussed further on in this article, namely that the flourishing of individuals depends on the flourishing of society __ as well as vice versa. in other words, the notion of ethical naturalism possesses a political significance, a point concerning which socrates is acutely conscious. socrates’ activity: a response to a divine call the question arises in the course of the trial as to how socrates has acquired the reputation that has finally brought him to face charges in the athenian court. he offers this answer: “i have gained this reputation, gentlemen, from nothing more or less than a kind of wisdom”.10 he explains what he means. a friend of his, chaerephon, went to delphi and asked whether there was anyone wiser than socrates. the priestess replied that there was no one. socrates was perplexed by this response, for he did not lay claim to any wisdom, great or small, so he eventually decided to check its truth. he therefore went to examine a person __ a politician, to be more precise __ who had a great reputation for being wise. during the course of the examination it became abundantly clear that the politician only thought he was wise, but was in fact not really so. as a 40 prajna vihara~ result of being exposed, the politician and the many other people present resented socrates’ questioning. this experience led socrates to the following conclusion: well, i am certainly wiser than this man. it is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge to boast of; but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas i am quite conscious of my ignorance. at any rate it seems that i am wiser to this small extent, that i do no think that i know what i do not know.11 in an effort to check the truth of the oracle, socrates went to question someone else with an even greater reputation for wisdom, but the result was the same. indeed, compelled by a sense of religious duty, he interviewed person after person. when he had finished with the politicians, he turned to the poets, dramatists and lyricists, in the belief that he would eventually expose himself as “a comparative ignoramus”.12 finally socrates turned to the skilled craftsmen, but once again he met disappointment. the effect of socrates’ activity was to arouse a huge amount of hostility towards him. moreover, whenever he disproved an interlocutor’s claim to wisdom in a particular subject, everybody assumed that he knew everything about the subject himself, something which definitely was not the case. all that socrates claimed was that in respect of wisdom he was worthless.13 true wisdom in fact belongs to god alone: but the truth of the matter, gentlemen, is pretty certainly this: that real wisdom is the property of god, and this oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value. it seems to me that he is not referring literally to socrates, but has merely taken my name as an example, as if he would say to us, the wisest of you men is he who has realized, like socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless.14 it is clear that socrates’ activity was inspired by some kind of experience of the divine.15 whatever the precise nature of that experi41kevin e. o’reilly ence may have been,16 it compelled him to become obsessed with a search for wisdom. indeed, this search was not something he could choose either to engage in or not to engage in, like one might choose to watch a match on television rather than listen to a cd. rather, this search was a matter of conscience for him; it was imbued with a moral tenor. not to question people would have constituted moral failure on his part. consequently, in spite of the increasing unpopularity which it brought on him, socrates was compelled to continue interviewing people, one after another, and to show up their ignorance. we can see, moreover, that the moral imperative which fuelled socrates’ activity was not of mere human origin. its source was rather divine. we can assert of socrates what eric voegelin states concerning plato, socrates mouthpiece: he “was engaged concretely in an exploration of the human soul, and the true order of the soul turned out to be dependent on philosophy in the strict sense of the love of the divine sophon”.17 further on voegelin, when adumbrating the significance of this experience, posits that “the true order of the soul can become the standard for measuring both human types and types of social order because it represents the truth about human existence on the border of transcendence”. and again, he avers: [n]ot the arbitrary idea of man as a world-immanent being becomes the instrument of social critique but the idea of a man who has found his true measure through finding his true relation to god. the new measure that is found for the critique of society is, indeed, not man himself but man in so far as through the differentiation of his psyche he has become the representative of divine truth.18 it becomes clear that considerations of truth in the realm of human affairs, moral and political, cannot be dissociated from relationship to god. in the experience of socrates as recounted in the apology we witness the beginning of a realization of this fact. here we witness one who has opened his psyche to the truth of god and allowed himself to be measured by it. having been informed by the unseen measure of the divine being he can then become a true living measure of human affairs, as wit42 prajna vihara~ nessed by his questioning of all whom he meets who have pretensions to wisdom: “that is why i still go about seeking and searching in obedience to the divine command, if i think that anyone is wise, whether citizen or stranger; and when i think that any person is not wise, i try to help the cause of god by proving that he is not”.19 to socrates we can apply voegelin’s assessment of plato and aristotle: “the validity of the standards developed by plato and aristotle depends on the conception of a man who can be the measure of society because god is the measure of his soul”.20 various scholars question exact nature of socrates’ experience. they argue that it was merely his way of expressing his deep-seated conviction that his life of philosophising was something laid upon him by his conscience. this may indeed be so, but the point still remains that conscience and experience of the divine are intimately linked. conscience might be compared to a sensorium of transcendence. the documents of vatican ii capture the essence of conscience wonderfully when they describe it as man’s inner sanctuary where he is alone with god. let me quote a little from gaudium et spes (pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world): deep within their consciences men and women discover a law which they have not laid upon themselves and which they must obey. its voice, ever calling them to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells them inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. for they have in their hearts a law inscribed by god. their dignity rests in observing this law, and by it they will be judged. their conscience is people’s most secret core, and their sanctuary. there they are alone with god whose voice echoes in their depths.21 to speak of socrates’ conviction concerning an experience of the divine as being merely a metaphor is inaccurate. socrates was arguably aware that conscience is man’s most secret core where the divine communes with him. indeed the more conscience develops the greater one’s consciousness of the divine presence there. the two realities cannot be 43kevin e. o’reilly separated; or more precisely, when they are severed from one another, the ethical consequences are catastrophic. for socrates the experience of conscience was incessant, touching even the minutia of life: “in the past the prophetic voice to which i have become accustomed has always been my constant companion, opposing me even in quite trivial things if i was going to take the wrong course”.22 it is clear, in the socratic conception, philosophy is not simply about developing the capacity to formulate good arguments and to think critically __ although these capacities are certainly crucially integral to the philosophical enterprise; it is more fundamentally concerned with living a good life. the truly philosophical life is shot through with moral consciousness __ which as we have argued is grounded in an experience of the divine. (indeed, attempts at formulating good arguments and at critical thinking are themselves moral activities, as we shall see presently.) for socrates living the good life obviously entails prompting others to do the same. he compares himself to a gadfly/stinging fly which stimulates a large thoroughbred horse to activity; in the same way he awakens people from their moral slumber. this view of the moral responsibilities of the philosopher are of particular interest in an age such as our own which has suffered a severe dimming of moral consciousness. the philosopher has a duty to enter the realm of public debate in an attempt to stimulate right moral thinking and action in others, taking the risk of having to endure public opprobrium and material poverty as a result as was the lot of socrates. he never let a day pass without discussing goodness and examining both himself and others. he regarded this as “really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living”.23 socrates studiously avoided wrongdoing. proof positive of this contention is the fact that none of those whom he is supposed to have harmed have come forward to accuse him; neither have any of their families. to suffer an injury is better than to commit one, for wrongdoing harms the soul. socrates and the social context of the moral life in beginning his defence against his first group of accusers, 44 prajna vihara~ socrates restates the accusation levelled against him: “socrates is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young, and of believing in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state”.24 socrates now takes up the first part of this charge with gusto and subjects it to keen critical appraisal. our philosopher asks his interlocutor who it is that makes the young good, to which meletus replies, “the laws”.25 this answer does not satisfy socrates. he is interested in knowing who makes the young good. in other words, whose business is it to know the laws and then to communicate this knowledge to the young? meletus responds that that this responsibility in fact falls to the members of the jury, all or them. on questioning, meletus extends the sphere of influence to the spectators present in court and to members of the council and of the assembly. so, as socrates points out, it follows from meletus’ contention that socrates is the only person in athens who exercises a negative influence on young people! at this point the kind of ethical naturalism which we have already noted makes a return: take the case of horses. do you believe that those who improve them make up the whole of mankind, and that there is only one person who has a bad effect on them? or is the truth just the opposite, that the ability to improve belongs to one person or to very few persons, who are horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with horses and make use of them, do them harm? is this not the case, meletus, both with horses and with all other animals? of course it is, whether you and anytus deny it or not”.26 socrates’ point is that the reality is in fact diametrically opposed to what meletus has maintained. just as there are very few people who are skilled in the training of horses, of bringing out the very best in them, because they are intimately acquainted with equine nature and what the best conditions are for the flourishing of this nature, so too there are very few people who have reflected deeply about human nature and, being 45kevin e. o’reilly intimately acquainted with this nature, are capable of cultivating it and bringing it to its optimum fulfilment in individual human beings. consequently, states socrates: “it would be a singular dispensation of fortune for our young people if there is only one person who corrupts them, while all the rest have a beneficial effect”.27 continuing his critique of meletus’ claim, socrates points out that if he spoils the character of someone else he runs the risk of being harmed by him. someone who is bad is no great respecter of personages. now nobody in their right mind would run this risk, so if socrates does spoil the characters of his companions, it must be unintentional. so he either does not have a bad effect on others or this bad effect unintentional. in either case, he should not have been brought before the court. if he did have an unintentionally negative influence on the youth of athens, somebody ought to have taken him aside and enlightened him as to the errors of his activity. this, however, did not happen. implicit in the foregoing argument is a recognition of the social context of the moral life. we are brought up in a society in which moral values or disvalues are transmitted to us all. the society in which we live makes an important contribution to our moral formation. none of us can in fact stand outside of a social context. at least there is one important sense in which we cannot do so. i have been born into a particular family and brought up in a particular way, according to certain values or lack thereof. i have been schooled in the education system of a particular society, perhaps in a school run by a particular part of that society. i am subjected to the values of the press and even more so to those of television. and so on. now each of these sources of influence may be at crosspurposes with one or other, or some or all of the rest. nevertheless, in my own person they have some influence in the formation of my value system, which is unlikely to be completely coherent. (hence the need for constant critical evaluation.) the point is that various societal influences condition my sense of right and wrong. w. jay wood makes this point in the following way: [w]e are not alone in our efforts to become morally and intellectually virtuous persons; our careers as moral and intellectual agents are developed in a community con46 prajna vihara~ text [. . .] family, friends and social institutions such as the church contribute mightily toward shaping the framework within which our development takes place. what goals are worth pursuing, what goals should be subordinated to others, what practices ought to be avoided and which pursued, and what resources are available to assist us in moral and intellectual growth are matters shaped in large measure within families, churches, schools and other social frameworks.28 unfortunately, however, what societal consensus teaches us to be right and wrong may not in particular cases be in accord with objective reality. this kind of teaching was the object of socrates’ own critique. he posits that the best defence against being infected by the mistaken tenets of an official morality is furnished by a life of virtue. after showing up the incoherence of meletus’ charge concerning belief in deities, socrates proclaims: “you are mistaken, my friend, if you think that a man who is worth anything ought to spend his time weighing up the prospects of life and death. he has only one thing to consider in performing any action __ that is, whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, like a good man or a bad one”.29 the rightness or wrongness of an action is never and can never be determined by pragmatic considerations. just because prevailing public opinion says that something is right does not necessarily mean that it is in fact so. as a cursory knowledge of world history teaches us, whole societies can get things badly wrong. upright conscience __ which is a conscience informed by the demands of objective reality and sustained by a life of virtue, and not simply constituted by some kind of subjective feeling __ offers the only way of escape from the barbarity that can ensue. werner jaeger offers a succinct characterization of socrates’ life and mission which accords with our own understanding of the same: “in the apology socrates’ influence and the way he taught his fellow-citizens to approach true aret? are related to “the polis itself”. that stamps his mission as a political one”.30 indeed, what socrates has to say in this dialogue reveals that education in aret? is a political task. in other words it is a task towards which society cannot remain indifferent without undermining its very own well-being. 47kevin e. o’reilly critical thinking and virtue . in the apology we learn that the examined life was important for socrates. he consequently subjected his own beliefs and those of others, moral and otherwise, to constant examination. in this final part of my treatment of the relevance of the apology for an understanding of the moral life, i wish to look at intellectual virtue. we are all familiar with moral virtues such as compassion, selfcontrol, generosity, kindness, gentleness, courage, patience, and so on. these virtues contribute in large measure to the kind of persons we are. but there are also intellectual virtues. this term is a little unfortunate, as it might suggest that they are not also informed by a profound moral dynamic. their moral import cannot in fact be overstated. what are the intellectual virtues? well, they include wisdom, prudence, foresight, studiousness, discernment, truthfulness, and so on. the opposite of intellectual virtues, namely intellectual vices, include the following: dishonesty, uncritical acceptance of others’ opinions, gullibility, folly, and so on. the intellectual virtues are crucial to our functioning as intellectual and moral agents. for our ability to grasp the truth depends on much more than our iq or on the kind of education we receive. more fundamentally, this ability rests on whether or not we have cultivated virtuous habits of the mind. in the words of w. jay wood: “our careers as cognitive agents, as persons concerned to lay hold of the truth and pursue other important intellectual goals, will in large measure succeed or fail as we cultivate our intellectual lives”.31 viewing the intellectual virtues as important to the unfolding of the life of mind formed an integral part of the ancient and medieval traditions of philosophy.32 the intellectual virtues are central to our integrity as human beings: on them depend our ability to grasp truth, as already stated; on them also depends the kind of persons we become: truthful, critical, attentive to detail, aware of nuances, and so on; or dishonest, uncritical, fuzzy, forcing reality into black and white categories, and so on. what distinguishes us from even the highest of the other animals is our rationality. to be good beings of our kind, therefore, that is to say, good human beings, requires that we function well as rational agents. whether or not we do so will have a fundamentally determining effect on the moral vir48 prajna vihara~ tues, for their unfolding and right development depends to a large extent, for adults, on an attitude of critical reflection __ precisely the kind of reflection that socrates was concerned to cultivate. in the apology we witness the intertwining of a cultivation of intellectual virtue and moral virtue, pursuit of truth and pursuit of goodness. socrates adopts a critical stance toward the accepted norms of behaviour and common opinions of his day, norms and opinions based on the sophistical desire for power, pleasure and success. he subjects to close examination the opinions of those who subscribe to life lived in this way. socrates’ approach is dialogical, that is to say, it is based on dialogue with others in a genuine search, at least on his part, for truth __ that truth which pertains to human nature and upon which are predicated the conditions for true human flourishing.33 conclusion in the course of our deliberations concerning the apology we have attempted to unpack some of the philosophical riches virtually contained in socrates’ discussion of his mission. the ethical notions that he highlights cannot in reality be disentangled from each other, a fact to which the overlapping between the various sections of this article bears witness. not only is the moral life itself a dynamic affair, there also obtains a dynamic inter-involvement between its various constitutive parts. thus, for example, there is the question of a correct understanding of human nature and the education of young people based upon this understanding, which education clearly has implications for the wider society. clearly, moreover, a sense of the divine, as manifested through moral consciousness, is an indispensable condition for the unfolding of the moral life __ one of the defining characteristics of human beings and clearly the one with which socrates is obsessed. this unfolding, however, cannot take place without the exercise of critical reason which, in the case of socrates, receives its initial and ongoing stimulus from his experience of the divine. the significance of this exercise of critical reason __ and, by extension, an opening of the human psyche to the transcendent source of moral experience __ for equipping anyone to be a suitable mentor for the young is apparent. their 49kevin e. o’reilly importance for the well-being of society at large follows from this fact. interestingly, it was at a time when athenian society had fallen under the sway of the teaching of the sophists __ in spite of the fact that the sophists had at the same time become unpopular that socrates enunciated his teaching.34 it was arguably the experience of not being able to “find his way around” in this “world” that forced socrates to embark upon his philosophical crusade, a crusade which was inescapably moral in tenor.35 the sophists espoused an individualist doctrine, summed up in protagoras’ famous assertion that man is the measure of things. they espoused moral relativism, denying any basis for absolute moral standards. and their scepticism led them to adopt an atheistic attitude.36 socrates, in contrast, recognized the importance of a societal context for the unfolding of the moral life. he engaged in a relentless pursuit of the good. and, finally, he was open to the operation of transcendence in his life. although i do not wish to make any sweeping generalizations, it cannot be denied that the three characteristics of the sophist movement mentioned here have gained greater prominence once again in the wake of the enlightenment project, particularly in the postmodern era. perhaps this fact alone provides sufficient reason for bringing both the teaching and the existential attitudes of socrates into dialogue with our own age. perhaps the initiation of such dialogue will fall to the lot of those who find difficulty “finding their way around” in contemporary civilization. endnotes 1frederick copleston, s.j., summarizes these interpretations as follows: “the character of the sources at our disposal xenophon’s socratic works (memorabilia and symposium), plato’s dialogues, various statements of aristotle, aristophanes’ clouds make this a difficult problem. for instance, were one to rely on xenophon alone, one would have the impression of a man whose chief interest was to make good men and citizens, but who did not concern himself with problems of logic and metaphysics a popular ethical teacher. if, on the other hand, one were to found one’s conception of socrates on the platonic dialogues taken as a whole, one would receive the impression of a metaphysician of the highest order, a man who did not content himself with questions of daily conduct, but laid the foundations of a transcendental philosophy, distinguished by its doctrine of a metaphysical world of forms. statements of aristotle, on the other hand (if give their natural 50 prajna vihara~ interpretation), give us to understand that while socrates was not uninterested in theory, he did not himself teach the doctrine of subsistent forms or ideas, which is characteristic of platonism” (a history of philosophy, vol. i, greece and rome (burns oates and washbourne, 1944), p.99. 2the last days of socrates (london: penguin, 1988), p.12. 3apol. 18b. hereafter, the edition referred to is the collected dialogues of plato, ed. edith hamilton and huntington cairns (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1961). 4aristophanes represents socrates as a sophist of the worst possible type a quack scientist and a rhetorician with no religion or morals. aristophanes probably meant no harm, for the two men are quite friendly in another of plato’s works, the symposium. the play nevertheless probably did socrates great personal harm. 5apol. 19c. 6apol. 20a-b. 7rosalind hursthouse, on virtue ethics (oxford: oup, 1999), p.195. 8philippa foot, “does moral subjectivism rest on a mistake?”, oxford journal of legal studies 15 (1995): 1-14. 9ibid., p.14. 10apol. 20d. 11apol. 21d. 12apol. 22b. 13this claim constitutes socrates' interpretation of the riddle posed by the delphic oracle. clearly, it could not be lying and yet it obviously could not be taken literally. socrates therefore concludes that the god took advantage of chaerephon’s question to emphasize that human wisdom is not worth anything. as guthrie states: “he simply took socrates as an example and used his name in order to say that the wisest thing a man could do was to be aware of his own unwisdom” (w.k.c. guthrie, a history of greek philosophy, vol. iii, the fifth century enlightenment (cambridge: cup, 1969), p.408). 14apol. 23a-b. 15see, however, gerald m. mara, socrates discursive democracy: logos and ergon in platonic political philosophy (ny: suny, 1997), p.47: “chaerephon must have been motivated to ask the oracle about socrates by what he had seen in socrates’ “pre-delphic” conduct … according to this view, then, socrates’ confrontations with the politicians, the poets, and the handworkers stem less from a dramatic metamorphosis than from a continuing identity”. no doubt mara is correct in maintaining a continuing identity in socrates’ behaviour; nevertheless, i think that one can at the same time posit discontinuity, a discontinuity that has its source in the oracle experience. clearly, the post-delphic socrates is motivated by some kind of experience of the divine in a way that was lacking in the pre-delphic socrates. thus, we can say that the post-delphic socrates is characterized by elements of continuity and discontinuity, sameness and difference. 51kevin e. o’reilly 16see guthrie, a history of greek philosophy, p.404: “the exact nature of the ‘divine sign’ may be left to students of psychology or religious experience. at this distance of time, and on the evidence available, it probably cannot be decided with certainty”. 17eric voegelin, the new science of politics (london: university of chicago press, 1987), p.63. 18ibid., 67-68. 19apol. 23b. 20voegelin, the new science of politics, p.70. 21gs 16. 22apol. 40a. 23apol. 38a. 24apol. 24b. 25apol. 24d. 26apol. 25a-b. 27apol. 25b. 28w. jay wood, epistemology: becoming intellectually virtuous (leicester: apollos, 1998), p.20. 29apol. 28b. 30werner jaeger, paideia: the ideals of greek culture. vol. ii: in search of the divine centre, trans. gilbert highet (oxford: oup, 1986), p.95. 31wood, epistemology, p.16. 32thomas aquinas tells us that while moral virtue “can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, science, and art”, it cannot be without understanding and prudence (summa theologiae i-ii, 58, 4). 33see, for example, wood, epistemology, pp.54-56. 34one must of course avoid falling into a simplistic description of the sophist movement, which was in reality quite complex, and its influence on greek society. a superficial reading of plato might give the impression that the sophists were responsible for corrupting public morality. the reasons for the decline in public morality in fifth-century greece, if such there was, were however probably much more involved than what one might conclude from a simplistic reading of plato. 35the notions of “finding one’s way around” and “world” are drawn from heidegger’s being and time. 36these three traits are not meant to offer an exhaustive depiction of the sophists. they simply provide points of clear contrast with socrates’ teaching and attitudes. 52 prajna vihara~ 03_(35-54) ethical issue of educational technology applied by the uncritical.pmd ethical issues of educational technology applied by the uncritical mass alireza sayadmansour university of tehran, iran º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéกóë¹´¹ôâòá¨ãôâèòêµãì¢í§à·¤â¹âåâõ·ò§กòãèöกéòã¹á§è¢í§ »ãðâ⪹ì·õè¤ãùáåð¹ñกèöกéòä é́ãñºáåðà¾×éí¤é¹ëòçèòâñ§áõá㧠ù̈§ã¨í×è¹ æ áòกóë¹´กòã ãªéà·¤â¹âåâõëã×íäáè ̈ ǿ íèí¹¢í§çô̧ õกòãáåð¾ñ²¹òกòã¢í§กòãê×èíêòãíí¹äå¹ì¢íº ¢èòâกòãèöกéò·ò§äกåã¹»ñ̈ ø̈ºñ¹ä é́ãñºกòãµãç¨êíºâ´â¾ô̈ òã³ò¶ö§กòãà¹é¹ë¹ñกã¹»ãðêô· ô̧ àò¾¢í§à·¤â¹âåâõã¹กòãàãõâ¹กòãêí¹ º·¤çòá¹õéíàô»ãòâ¶ö§åñกé³ð·õèà»ç¹´òºêí§ ¤á¢í§ê×èíà¾×èíกòãê×èíêòãáåðªõéãëéàë繤çòáêó¤ñ­¢í§กòã»ãðàáô¹¼åกòãèöกéòà¾×èíà»ç¹ กòããñº»ãðกñ¹çèò¨ð¹óê×èíãëáè æ áò»ãðâøกµìãªéกçµèíàá×èíáñè¹ã¨çèòáñ¹´õกçèò¢í§à´ôá ·õèãªéíâùè ¸ããáªòµôàกèòáกè¢í§»ñ­ëòàëåèò¹õéä´é¶ùกëâôºâก¢öé¹áò¹óàê¹í´éçâกòã çôà¤ãòðëìàêõ⧾ãèóºè¹¢í§¾çกåñ́ ä´·ì «ö觵èíµéò¹á¹ç» ô̄ºñµô¢í§íøµêòëกããáêô觷í ã¹íñ§กäéàá×èí 200 »õáòáåéç abstract the article defines the ethics of educational technology in terms of its benefits for teacher and student, and whether other motives determine its use. the various drawbacks of current online methods and developments in the distance education field are examined in view of its emphasis on the efficiency of its course delivery technologies. the double-edged nature of all communications media is discussed, and the importance of evaluation studies is suggested to ensure that new media are not adopted unless they represent clear improvement over existing options. the age-old nature of these issues is illustrated by an analysis of the grievances of the luddites, who opposed practices in the british textiles industry 200 years ago. prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 35-54 2000 by assumption university pressc 35 ~ introduction in a recent interview, american teenage star miley cyrus explained why she terminated her online social media account at twitter.com: that’s because you announce everything you are doing...friends on the internet (are) not cool, not safe, not fun and most likely not real...i’m telling kids, “don’t go on the internet. it’s dangerous, not fun, and it wastes your life” ...i (now) have a personal life. (morgan, 2010) social media and networking software are the current technology involving the integration of text, audio and video communication methods that have been available since the 1990s. for example, twitter, the mobile textmessage equivalent of broadcast e-mail, allows the user to send a message to a potentially unlimited number of people at once. a celebrity such as miley cyrus is in a strong position to recognize the security dangers of this practice. unguardedly disclosing one’s location in a twitter message (or ‘tweet’) has caused the actress and her hotel to be surrounded by thousands of fans in minutes; and a teenage role model is an ideal person to warn other teenagers of the stalking and predatory practices that such methods enable. social networking sites provide many useful educational services. twitter has been used as a tool for helping students to organize their homework (chisa, 2008); facebook is used for social and political campaigns (goldfarb, 2009); students scour their cities in scavenger hunts using both of these sites and location-tracking software on laptops, cell-phones, and gps systems (bradshaw, 2010); and the writer’s own university has a social media research group dedicated to defining valid educational uses of the new options. each new medium has a potential “dark side”, however (evans, 2010). bradshaw’s ‘social media treasure hunt’ teaches journalism students how to “hunt” individuals and online and collect information about them. as long as the individuals have given permission to be tracked, the activity is useful and acceptable. yet, the recent australian case of a teenager lured to her death by a ‘friend’ on facebook (dickinson, 2010), demonstrates that the same facilities and skills can be used for other purposes entirely. society in general needs a greater understanding of these risks. any36 prajna vihara~ one can be stalked, blackmailed, bullied, or threatened by other online users, especially when the software facilitates it. the facebook web servers contain personal information about, currently, 400 million users; and one can identify individuals’ tastes and relationships from their facebook profiles even without needing to create an account of one’s own. meanwhile, “location-aware” web sites such as brightkite, foursquare, and loopt make use of users’ cellphones to help “keep up with your friends, meet new people, and discover new places. all while you’re out and about” (brightkite.com, 2010). foursquare similarly allows its users to know exactly where their ‘friends’ are, and to link their account directly to their facebook, twitter and google e-mail (gmail) accounts. this aggregated information makes it possible to check the identities, addresses, and personal information of passersby in the street, and to rob their houses before they get home (yamshon, 2010). software such as anonymizer and mutemail disguise the location of the online searcher, thereby protecting the identity of the innocent and guilty alike; and adding the recognizwr face recognition software to one’s cell phone carries this identification process to a new level, allowing users to point their cell phone cameras at passers-by and to download their personal details without their knowledge (dillow, 2010). one would not easily guess at the intrusive potential of the recognizer software simply by looking at its web site, which not surprisingly stresses the tool’s benefits for legitimate purposes only __ by, for example, students, professionals, and college alumni associations. numerous social networking products strategically identify themselves with credible users in this way: e.g. second life with educational institutions including harvard university and the uk open university; and facebook with thousands of users among the world’s leading broadcasting networks, programs and professionals. meanwhile, second life has been shown to host activities including child pornography (connolly, 2007), prostitution (boyes, 2009), and illegal gambling (raby, 2007) __ problems only partly addressed by the company responsible for its operations (ferret, 2007; linton, 2009; secondlife.com, 2010a). the risks of joining social networking communities are well documented (o’neill, 2010), and web sites such as pleaserobme and quitfacebook are emerging to warn the public about social media risks. these are also attracting increasing attention by agencies including the us electronic privacy information center (epic, 2010; raphael, 2009), and alireza sayadmansour 37 canada’s office of the privacy commissioner (opcc, 2009), which have required facebook to tighten its procedures in order to protect users’ security. facebook’s response has been to make modifications to its services and web site design, while still leaving the responsibility for secure configuration of user accounts to the individual subscribers. in the words of the company’s 26-year-old chief executive, mark zuckerberg (2009): “(we) understand that everyone’s needs are different...the best way for you to find the right settings is to read through all your options and customize them for yourself”. since making this statement, zuckerberg has announced that facebook will soon be adding its own location-tracking software, so that users can know “where a person is and to personalize what’s around them” (schweizer, 2010). presumably, this refers to ways of delivering, for example, local advertising material directly to individuals based on their interests and tastes. if facebook’s new tracking software has the same functions as the ‘location-aware’ services cited earlier, one may also assume that it will subject even more users to the same predatory risks. meanwhile, information is readily available on how to optimize the design of a facebook page for marketing purposes (e.g., socialmediaforum. com, 2010; and socialmarketingforum.net, 2010); and the risks of social software continue to escalate as the cautions of agencies and individuals are ignored by millions of users who have no comprehension of the risks, nor of how to configure their personal software settings so as to avoid them. when technologies are developed and implemented without sufficient concern for their personal consequences, ethical questions arise. double-edged swords all media have the potential for harm as well as good. film and television have carried violent and potentially harmful content throughout their histories. these broadcast media typically direct their messages at types of consumer defined in demographic terms (e.g. the female teenager, or the young professional). today’s online media, however, owing to their added interactivity, are capable of directing their effects at people individually identified by the profiles they have placed online, by the history of their online activities, and by the unique internet protocols (ips) of their computers. thus, the internet has 38 prajna vihara~ created a new era of social risk, with new media recalling boyle’s description (1661) of double-edged swords “as well applicable to the service of falsehood, as of truth”. the warnings about online media risks expressed by observers and government agencies seem plaintive and unavailing in the face of the enthusiastic acceptance of these media by millions of cell phone users and endorsements by countless credible media figures, political leaders, academics and their institutions. how aware are these individuals, one wonders, of the risks attached to the methods they encourage? in the educational world at least, one would assume that the necessary research and evaluation skills are available to ensure that the adoption of new technologies is based on carefully weighed evidence of their merits. the basic question seems a simple one: do the new educational media and methods benefit the teaching process and especially the learner? on the other hand, do they involve side-effects that can detract from educational benefits? in practice, however, the multi-way interactions of media technique, content, and the capabilities of the teacher and learner are difficult to disentangle (salomon, 1993); and reliable and predictive conclusions about cost effectiveness require complex and often impracticable research and evaluation designs (flagg, 1990). as a result, decisions about educational technology implementation are commonly based on other criteria than cost-effectiveness, raising distinct ethical concerns (morningstar, 2004). the ethical problems of technology implementation are particularly acute in distance education (de), which relies entirely on the efficiency of its communication technologies rather than employing them as supplementary to campus-based options. without an adequate technological infrastructure, the goals of de are unattainable and distance educators have a prime responsibility to ensure that appropriate technologies are in place. unfortunately, efforts to validate technological usage in de have been no more successful than in conventional educational media contexts __ a fact lamented by numerous writers; e.g., moore in his discussion (1985) of field’s weakness in relation to disciplined research under controlled conditions; in farrell’s analysis (2001) of the “dysfunctional” development of de technologies; and in mckee’s account (2010) of the field’s 30-year “identity crisis, defined by a developmental deluge of pedagogies and technologies, depending on the favored course delivery methods of the day”. particular issues in online de implementation relate to lack of student alireza sayadmansour 39 access to the technologies selected (samaranayake et al., 2010), and to the concerns of students and teachers in relation to, for example, online learning management systems (lms). hotrum (2005) has suggested that lms methods have caused students to lose “control of their learning process and activities, while the lms vendors/ administrators (and by implication instructors) have increased their control over a fixed style of learning that fails to evolve”. in relation to social media activities, cleal (2009) reports that students who are concerned about the outcomes of their work express frustration at being asked to join in second life ‘virtual world’ activities that they regard as mere play. dissatisfaction and loss of interest of this type have been identified as reasons for the rapid decline and closure of online communities (garber, 2004); and hughes (2010) indicates that the need for evidence of pedagogical validity is as central in the adoption of the new social networking methods as in the case of any previous technology. during the same 2005-10 period, open-source software (oss) and open publishing approaches have evolved with the laudable goal of reducing the commercial domination of the educational content industry. yet these same approaches also involve a loss of quality control, as indicated by analyses of open editing biases in the popular wikipedia information source (sydney morning herald, 2007), and by the repository’s own official self-description, “the free encyclopedia that anyone can edit” (wikipedia.org, 2010). in addition, an increase is evident in student plagiarism based on the ease of online ‘copying and pasting’ (derby, 2008); and a corresponding increase is observed in multiple publications of individual journal articles by academics (errami & garner, 2008). ignoring such practices can seem to condone them. educators have an ethical responsibility to address these unacceptable side-effects of technological usage, using plagiarism checking services (e.g. turnitin.com), and devising firm but fair procedures for dealing with abusers (baggaley & spencer, 2005). the current writer’s most recent uses of the turnitin service have indicated the frequent use of wikipedia and online essay providers as unattributed sources of student work (analyses in progress); and the fact that the writer and his academic professors are noting increasing examples of students breaking university’s conduct codes by hiring “professional academic editors” may indicate that some students are at very least confused as to the ethical standards now expected of them. the ease of online referencing has also had a discomforting impact on 40 prajna vihara~ the current writer’s practices. the reference list of the current article, for example, contains an unusually high proportion of citations (35/73) which would have been impossible before the expansion of online resources. while it is satisfying to be able to illustrate one’s points with such a large amount of upto-date material, it is worrying that so many of the sources increasingly cited are ‘blogs’ by unknown and unaccredited people rather than quality-assured traditional sources. the four-year ‘shake-down’ period whereby submitted articles were reviewed, published in print form, absorbed, and cited in subsequent articles, is a thing of the past. the ethical responsibility of ensuring quality in the world of instant online publication is not simplified by ease of access to this increasing repertoire of un-reviewed information. conflicting motives and priorities the technologies themselves would not be double-edged swords at all if those involved in technology selection did not bring conflicting motives and priorities to the process. these can influence decisions about appropriate technologies in ways detrimental to the teachers’ and learners’ interests. each party in the process has the ethical responsibility of ensuring that decisions about technology selection and implementation protect the institution’s educational objectives, and the teacher’s and student’s efficiency. the stakeholders in question, and examples of their ethical responsibilities, are as follows. 1) personnel who base their careers on encouraging technology innovation. the educational media literature of the last 50 years has chronicled a steady parade of new technologies, in articles by academics and resource staff who welcome the opportunity to suggest that each new medium might possibly replace other options already in place. those who encourage innovative technologies are ethically responsible to provide reasonable evidence that new media represent improvement. when students are required to take part in online virtual-world activities, for example, it is ethically vital for the teacher to inform them in advance of the risks of incautious social media use, and of how to configure their software for personal security. alireza sayadmansour 41 2) hardware and software vendors. salesmen are probably the last people one expects to give impartial and objective accounts of new technologies. in baggaley’s first week (baggaley, 2011) of university employment forty years ago, he asked for a demonstration of a shiny box designed to convert super-8 film into tv images. unfortunately, the university had paid £3,000 for the gadget before discovering that compatible educational film was not being produced for it. one can hardly blame vendors for failing to mention basic information of this type when their livelihoods depend upon it. the ethical responsibility of today’s social media developers to fully explain the security risks of their products, however, is crucial; and the failure of social media vendors to clamp down on illegal activities and security loopholes before subscribers are exposed to them seems ethically indefensible. second life did not put its 2007 curbs in place before a federal investigation required it, by which time the number of active users was already an estimated 90,000 (reuters, 2007); and facebook only created adequately secure facilities after 400 million active users had been exposed to its security loopholes (schweizer, 2010; facebook, 2010a). 3) instructional designers. a tendency to over-complicated visual designs was one of the factors that lead to the marginalization of television as an educational medium in the 1970s. lesser (1974) wrote of the importance of constant evaluation in educational tv production and delivery, and of the leadership of the children’s tv workshop (producer of sesame street) in making evaluation a central part of the process. as a result of its in-house research, the ctw learned to simplify its delivery style to appropriate levels for its preschool audience __ a valuable lesson for all educational media designers. today’s online software also tends to be over-complicated in its facilities and navigation procedures (hotrum et al., 2005); and a recent analysis by elias (2010) indicates that inhouse designers of the popular open-source software moodle tend to use relatively few of the accessibility options available for it. the ethical responsibility of instructional design specialists is to be aware of the accessibility problems that affect the users, and to ensure that the materials overcome them. 42 prajna vihara~ 4) educational researchers and evaluators. the difficulty of isolating the effects of individual media and design features has been mentioned above. in the 1970s and ’80s, this methodological issue was a major focus in the educational media literature, and the predictive value of research and evaluation studies evolved as the technological and psychological variables of the educational delivery process were defined. a notable framework for such studies was provided by the aptitude-treatmentinteraction (ati) concept, which stressed the need to isolate the effects of specific media techniques upon specific types of student (cronbach & snow, 1977. the generation of researchers and evaluators that has since emerged to address the pedagogical value of, for example, online conferencing and social networking methods, has an ethical responsibility to uphold that detailed level of analysis, distinguishing between the broad technologies and the specific techniques of their use, and focusing on the most efficient approaches for specific purposes, rather than merely reporting general student reactions to innovative treatments without giving details of the activities’ content and design. 5) institutional administrators. the tendency of institutional administrators to invest in educational technologies without justifying them via evaluative evidence is illustrated in morningstar’s analysis (2004). at that time, a popular but expensive learning management system, webct, was launching an even more expensive version to which many educational institutions were upgrading. morningstar presented evidence of the cost-ineffectiveness of transferring to the new system, and pointed out that the 1st-year costs of implementing it at a large academic institution would be over usd 600,000, compared with the minimal operational costs of more flexible open-source freeware alternatives. institutional administrators have an ethical responsibility to ensure that the features, licensing fees and running costs of educational hardware and software are compared with those of alternative products each time a new commercial license or license renewal is considered. alireza sayadmansour 43 6) funding agencies. decisions to purchase and explore the value of educational technologies are commonly dictated by financial support from external agencies. when a new educational medium emerges with innovative potential, it is quite likely that a request for funding to investigate it will be more successful than an equally good proposal to explore new uses of an older medium. education using television or radio, for example, is no longer a prime candidate for support by international funding agencies, even though these are the only accessible media for the vast majority of developing country students. after funding an initial investigation of a new medium, agencies commonly regard it as new no longer, and are less interested in supporting studies of its use in new situations. funding agencies have an ethical responsibility to address these accessibility and sustainability issues, and to make reliable interpretations of the evolving techniques for media usage. 7) government policy-makers. ultimately, the technology implementation decisions of many of the above parties depend upon the priorities and concerns of national and regional governments. in countries where sophisticated internet and cell-phone technologies have major commercial potential, their development is naturally encouraged. that these media may have no potential for teachers and students who cannot access them does not necessarily deter policy-makers from encouraging their educational adoption. policymakers have a responsibility to invest in new and promising technologies for society’s benefit; but they also have an ethical responsibility to ensure that traditional media are preserved side-by-side with the emerging media, to provide education and training until the new media have the same penetration and efficiency and can take over the task. when the priorities of any two of these decision-making parties come into conflict, the result can be the adoption of an educational technology that makes little or no improvement on the status quo. if individual motives lead to the selection of a technology, or of ways of using it, that do not benefit the teacher and the learner, they may well be unethical. the conflicting criteria and 44 prajna vihara~ priorities of its decision-making process has led the educational media field to evolve in a hit-and-miss fashion over the years. for the teachers and students who must use the technologies, it can feel at times like “trying to hit a moving target” (mckee, 2010). the situation was described in a classic jibe attributed to the roman writer gaius petronius (though actually by ogburn, 1957): we trained hard ... but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. i was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization. that problems in the adoption of new technological infrastructures are by no means new is illustrated by a notorious event that occurred exactly 200 years ago, in which conflicts of priority between the parties in a workplace disagreement had disastrous consequences. a 200-year problem this year (i.e.2011) marks the bicentenary of the luddite revolt, in which british textiles workers expressed their opposition to changes in the activities and policies of their workplace. these workers have since been vilified as ignorant opponents of technological progress; but latter-day analysts including thompson (1963), pynchon (1984), and thomas (2009) have indicated that the luddites actually held concerns markedly similar to those commonly expressed about technology today, and that they were violently and unjustly obstructed in their efforts to raise their concerns. a direct comparison between the points made by the luddites in 1811 and those commonly expressed about modern educational technology indicates that the central ethical dilemmas have remained basically unchanged. the case has been discussed in relation to educational media practices by baggaley (2011a), and is summarized as follows. the luddites claimed to have a legal right to decommission workplace machinery that was not being used according to their prior agreements with the management (luddite manifesto, 1812); and they smashed or at least disabled their machinery to draw attention to their grievances about workplace practice. yet they were not, as commonly supposed, hostile to the techalireza sayadmansour 45 nology per se, for they had already been using the same machines for two hundred years. their grievance was with non-agreed increases in the sales prices of their products, with new industry practices of “not marking the work according to quality”, and with a resulting loss of artistry in their products as handed down from fathers to sons. in return they were branded as thugs, arrested, in some cases executed, and in many cased deported. the factory managements were more concerned to ally with the evolving commercial interests of the industrial revolution, and the british government sent the strongest possible message that workplace revolt would not be tolerated, by calling in the army to quell it. this historical event illustrates the conflicting interests of those who feel that their responsibility is to encourage innovative technologies; those who design, fund, and create the goods; workplace administrators; and government policy-makers. each of the parties involved in the luddite revolt could no doubt argue that their priorities and decisions were ethically justified, although it seems impossible to justify the british government’s decision to smash the luddite workers with an army of 12,000 troops __ twice as many as were sent to europe to defeat napoleon. today, teachers and students continue to grapple with the problems of adapting to new technologies, and “fast-adopters” (rogers, 2003) still call “slow-” and “non-adopters” luddites! but technologies commonly used in global education (e.g. online) are inaccessible to hundreds of millions of students; thus demands to preserve traditional media techniques are as justified today as in the 19th century. the luddites’ concern for the raising of prices for their goods is echoed in the criticisms of educational institutions today which invest in expensive commercial software when open-source freeware is more flexible and customizable. concern for loss of artistry caused by automated methods is seen in the modern-day criticisms of educational technology as destroying the artistry of the individual teacher and the personal relationship of the teacher and student (noble, 1993; robertson, 1998). possibly the strongest message sent by the luddites over the centuries, addressing each of these concerns, is the need for more efficient quality control in technological adoption. their manifesto gave specific, expert examples of how managements were “not marking the work according to quality”. today, quality assurance and ‘best practices’ in educational media tend to be globally defined without reference to local conditions and cultures; and the justifications for 46 prajna vihara~ them tend to be undisciplined. thus, demands for greater professionalism in technological adoption are as needed today as 200 years ago. the fact that the name luddite, adopted by the concerned workers of 1811, is still used disparagingly owing to shameless political propaganda against them, is the cruelest cut of all. conclusions: the uncritical mass the educational world tends to follow the currents of technological innovation rather than leading them. television and the internet were only adopted as educational tools in the 1970s and ’90s after becoming a part of the social fabric in general; and educational methods using, for example, today’s social media methods are suggested by their popularity in society at large rather than by visions for their educational use. research and quality control relating to the latest online techniques are still in their infancy, as hughes (2010) has indicated, and are post hoc rather than pre-emptive. to anticipate the central ethical issues of today’s educational technology, researchers and evaluators need to give prime consideration to the techniques of media usage, as in educational television’s intensive development period of the 1970s and ’80s. the distinction between technology and technique is far less upheld in the analysis of today’s online methods than in earlier educational media research, possibly because the researchers of today’s online methods have not absorbed the literature of the previous generation, believing it to be pass?. as a result of undisciplined research and evaluation, technologies are liable to be adopted in education once a critical mass of the population has embraced them for their personal purposes; but these users cannot be expected to base their selections on educational criteria. one might describe them as the “uncritical mass” that drives the decisions about uses of innovative technology regardless of the lack of justifying evidence. those who design and promote educational technologies have long failed to see the need for needs assessment and usage research, and have discouraged it via arguments such as “if the romans had to consider how their roads would be used, they would never have built them”; and questionable mottos such as “if we build it, they will come!” the conflicting motives and priorities of the individual parties in the educational technology selection and design process need to be weighed alireza sayadmansour 47 and harmonized by the professional bodies that advise the issue internationally. their guiding criterion in testing these motives should be whether or not the educational interests of the teacher and the student are protected or undermined. ultimately, a fundamental shift is required in the professional attitudes of the educational technology field as a whole, if ethical issues such as these are to be resolved. the risks arising out of the lack of control over current educational media are greater than ever before, owing to the ability they provide to infiltrate the personal data, lives, and identities of individuals. solutions to ethical issues arising in this situation are currently being offered by increased attention to quality assurance and ‘best practices’ in international distance education (baggaley & belawati, 2010, belawati & baggaley, 2010; jung & latchem, 2011). nonetheless, based on his involvement in this field of research, the current writer sees a need for greater attention to ways of ensuring that quality principles leap from the page into action and policy, rather than languishing on the academic shelf. the literature of international education habitually proclaim the advantages of new technologies without admitting that the local infrastructure and skills to use them are inadequate; and many writings about quality assurance amount to little more than empty public relations statements, to the effect that “quality is important, and at university x we are in favor of it!” the abiding message to educational technologists worldwide is that hundreds of millions of would-be students will have no access to the education and vocational training they need unless accessible and appropriate distance-based technologies are devised for them. criticisms of distance education quality are often well justified, though do not ultimately undermine this basic sine qua non. the prospect of expanding the reach and value of global education can keep an educational technologist challenged and involved in the field despite its hurdles, distinguishing the technologies capable of moving the field forward from those which let it down, and focusing on the ethical practices and the potential risks that attend them. educational institutions have a key responsibility to acquaint their teachers and students with the risks associated with novel technologies, especially when students may be pressed into using them for obligatory coursework activities. celebrities such as the teenage star applauded at the beginning of this chapter for closing her twitter account to prevent its abuse have a prime role to play in passing on this message to the public. 48 prajna vihara~ sadly, in the decision-making of that particular celebrity, the “uncritical mass” appears to be triumphing. after closing her twitter account a year ago, miley cyrus has since reopened it, following a fan’s threat to kill a cat if she refused to do so (hollywood gossip, 2009). references anonymizer.com (2010). anonymous web surfing and online anonymity solutions. retrieved from: www.anonymizer.com. baggaley, j. 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(2009). an open letter from facebook founder mark zuckerberg. blog.facebook, 1 december. retrieved from: blog. facebook.com/blog.php?post=190423927130. 54 prajna vihara~ 07 (100-118)_the split in.pmd 100 the split in the western intellectual tradition: the controversy over knowing and what can be known leon miller tallinn university of technology, estonia abstract the western intellectual tradition split over issues concerning the role of reason in revealing the nature of being and the role of knowledge in contributing to integral being. throughout human history this had traditionally been the concern of religion. in spite of a shift away from religion and greater confidence in an empirical approach to ultimate questions, the problem remains. kant attempted to resolve the issue but was unsuccessful. the unresolved controversy subsequently led to the “continental divide” (which became a crisis for western civilization). this article analyzes the issue and points out why complementarity has been successful in reconciling the controversy. introduction throughout much of human history questions regarding epistemology and ontology were answered by religion. this means that at the foundation of every culture there had been no separation between religion (the most cherished beliefs of the culture) and observations of what is best for enhancing the human experience. this is an important point because there have been (and still are) societies where the cultural worldview provides answers to the question of ontology that describe existence in terms of complementarity. cultural worldview, in this sense, has been a means of promoting a greater sense of complementary interaction between humans and nature, and more harmonious social interactions. in light of such examples there is no necessary difference between naturalism, cultural worldviews (religion), and what helps a culture to flourish. this includes cultures that did not become extinct and continue to demonstrate an example of a cultural worldview that promotes holis101 tic well-being. in other words there are cultures that demonstrate a strong sense of the complementarity between humans and nature. they are respected in the international arena, they score high on world happiness inventories, and they base their planning on naturalism and empiricism. although reliance on cherished cultural beliefs for answers on how best to address issues of epistemology and ontology now includes confidence in what is empirically reliable, the quest remains the same: increase the range of beneficial interactions the culture is able to enjoy, produce strong flourishing societies, and improving the score on the happiness inventory. this article argues that achieving these goals is based on gaining reliable knowledge of what is best for enhancing the human experience (epistemology); understanding the true nature of the phenomena that humanity is confronted with (ontology); and what is worth devoting time, energy, and resources to (teleology). one thing that has changed, however, is the fact of global interdependence (meaning that there are some aspects of these concerns that involve global issues thus, are shared by all cultures). in other words, global interdependence means that a viable approach to addressing these issues takes into account the ontological nature of global social existence. in the history of the western intellectual tradition__from the presocratic philosophers to the present__there have been attempts to address and resolve perennial concerns. aristotle was one of the first to use a logical positivist approach which allowed him to move from earlier mythological and metaphysical claims, to insights based upon observation and reason. his approach to issues in virtue ethics and political economy are still relevant for addressing problems today. kant can also be considered as coming close to employing what had been religious concerns for contributing to perpetual peace (that is if one takes into consideration his views on cosmopolitan ethics) (firestone 2006, 142). kant recognized that cartesian dualism was creating problems in human interactions (resulting from the fragmentation of human knowledge) that led to the fragmentary nature of the human experience. he realized that, if unresolved this would undermine the ethical basis for interpersonal and social relations as well as becoming detrimental to interstate relations, to peace, and to collective security. kant proposed a method for eliminating this epistemological problem by suggesting a complementary interplay between the ontological ground of being and human understanding (kant 1996, 39-40). however, unfortunately, he fell short of fully developing this claim by subse102 quently placing his emphasis on reason. without clarifying the complementary connection between “raw existence” and the human experience we are left with a set of problems which are set for us by our rational natures and which is otherwise unsolvable (gardner 2007, 87). if the interplay between the actual nature of things and the human experience cannot be clarified then what is it, actually, that we are forming knowledge about? that is to say, if our conceptualization of reality is not grounded in an actual sensing of reality then our knowledge is actually groundless. for, if conceptuality is confined to the sphere of the conditioned, it leaves us with the incapacity to ground knowledge (gardner 2007, 87). one can see attempts to solve this problem in many fields. we see this in postmodernism, post positivism, critical theory, and pragmatism. we also see it in the sciences quantum physics, neurobiology, and social psychology. in other words what had for millennia been religious concerns (epistemology, ontology, and teleology) still remain a problem __ that is, how to be bette-integrated within the fabric of being and how to have more beneficial outcomes in all human interactions. this article explains the nature of the problem, and the various academic attempts to resolve the problem through philosophy of religion, quantum physics, neurobiology, pragmatism, and social psychology. the pursuit of reliable knowledge concerning the nature of existence the pursuit of reliable knowledge implies an inquiry into how humanity can better integrate itself within the fabric of existence. for socrates such insight was tantamount to self-knowledge. when socrates asked the delphian oracle what is the highest knowledge? the answer came, “know thyself”. the world famous confucian expert tu weiming describes self-knowledge as revealing the essential connection between the self and the life generating force. in essence, self-knowledge means gaining clarity on the nature of existence and the dialectic connection one has with creation. in other words self-knowledge provides clarity into the relationship between the self (one's sense of individuality, subjectivity, or ego) and the total scope of reality (objectivity, intersubjectivity plus, the connection between self, the phenomenal world and absolute being). thus, according to confucianism, “self-knowledge is nothing more 103 than the realization of one’s authentic nature” (wei-ming 1985, 20). aristotle touched on the same theme by describing the sense of self as a “mirror reflection of one’s most significant social relations (the good that one is able to perceive reflects the virtuous character of the perceiver) (aristotle 2004, 179). his philosophy of mind describes the sense of self as potentiality that is actualized by character development then demonstrated in interactions and encounters. in other words aristotle did not think of self-knowledge in terms of a self in distinction from others, but as an interaction between “what is out there” which is mirrored by or reflected by “something that is in here” (aristotle 2002, 24). the signal or sign makes an impression, and the impression shapes a conceptual interpretation. “something ‘out there’ in the environment signals interaction or engagement however, the interpretation is dependent upon the integrity of ‘what is in here’” (miller 2012, 2). the conception of the interaction is the basis of self-consciousness. aristotle’s notion of the self as identifying with rather than in contrast with the surroundings was a critical attempt to reform platonic idealism (plato believed in a higher world of forms that is imperfectly manifest in the physical world. aristotle avoids this dualism by establishing a complementary connection between appearance (legetai kath’ hypokeimenou) and that which is manifest as appearance (en hypokeimenoi estin) (heidegger 1973, 5-10). emile durkheim (considered by many to be the father of sociology) offers a similar explanation of the humannature relationship and human perception. durkheim asserted, in the elementary forms of the religious life, that the perceptual recognition of complementarity initially played a primary role in human self-formation, the social formation of a culture, and initial expressions of the human understanding of an appropriate relationship with the environment (durkheim 1995, 85-102). to fully understand the shift away from complementarity and back to dualism one must understand the influence of rene descartes’ turn to idealism. descartes prioritized mind or consciousness as the seat of the essence of being and superior to material form. this had a tremendous impact on enlightenment thought which began to devalue natural realm. descartes’ philosophy was based upon doubt: doubts about the reliability of the physical, of the sensuous, and of the reliability of natural evidence (derived from the senses). this led to the rejection of observation as a reliable basis for information about reality. if consciousness is independent and autonomous, as descartes suggested, it enjoys the essence by 104 turning in on itself. the most drastic consequence of descartes’ proposed solution to the problems of epistemology and ontology was the resultant dualism reflected in subject-object, mind-body, and nature-human schisms. kant recognized that the problem holding back the realization of the enlightenment ideals was related to the skepticism which descartes attempted to resolve but actually only complicated it. for__as hegel pointed out in on the relationship of skepticism to philosophy, expositions of its different modifications and comparison of the latest form with ancient one__the enlightenment ideals were diminished by this skepticism which had developed in europe (hinchman 1984, 95). skeptics doubt the human ability to gain knowledge of the essence of being and in this respect refuse to accept that reliable knowledge about the ontological ground of being is possible. william james (a pioneer of american psychology) characterized skeptics as plagued with fear which led them to focus on protecting themselves from their fears rather than embracing greater virtues, principles and values (james 1907, 18-26). this is not to say that suspension of belief, withholding judgment, the rejection of dogmatism, and the rejection of dogmatic authority have no merit. a value of open-mindedness is reflected in socrates’ skepticism, open-minded inquiry is the basis of epistemology in pragmatism, and the suspension of bias is the basis of constructivist inquiry. what is called into question and what kant attacked was the hobbesian type skepticism where the other is believed to pose a threat to one’s interest. in the hobbesian sense of self-other dualism, the other has to be either assimilated, dominated, or eliminated. this viewpoint on human interactions was in opposition to kant’s ethic of mutuality (the basis of human rights) and in conflict with his constructivist notion of what enhances human interactions. what kant attempted to do was to take the cognitive capacity that descartes had left isolated from nature, from a holistic sense of self, and from being, and connect it to the ground of being by means of a complementary link that he believed would result in better human interactions and more reliable knowledge. he also implied that the ontological nature of existence can be explained as a complementary interplay between humanity and the essence of being. in this respect it can be argued that kant laid the foundation for an interactional (constructivist) understanding of how knowledge is acquired. such an interplay, he argued, could elevate human judgment to a level of genius (kant 1987, 174). this would be completely consistent 105 with kant’s interactive ethics and interactive notion of what improves human existence. kant’s transcendental psychology__with its assertion that self-knowledge is connected with the transcendental unity of selfconsciousness__offered tremendous potential that would gradually be embraced by those social psychologists who are concerned about integral being and holistic well-being. carl jung, himself, follows this kantian emphasis on complementarity when he provided insight into the connection between the ego and the whole or universal (jung 1963, 70-74). jung recognized in kant the premise that self-knowledge is derived by extending the range of human consciousness by opening normal consciousness to the deeper capacities to enable the intuiting of the universal consciousness. in other words self-knowledge (as referred to by socrates), the true self (in jungian terms), or self-actualization (in maslow’s terms), results from a consciousness awakened by perception of (or perhaps conceptual realization of) the semiotic nature of existence (michel et al 2008, 306). william james concurred by defining self-knowledge as perception of the essential continuity between phenomena (the not-self), the universal (that superimposed on all phenomenon), and self-consciousness (the sense of being a particular superimposed on the universal which is transpersonal). the need for reflection on what holds-back the enlightenment agenda kant failed to fully develop his complementarity theory. for this he was criticized by later thinkers and this set the stage for critical theory. kant’s failure is attributed to the unresolved contradiction between his initial project in critique of pure reason and its contradiction with the ingenious claims he makes about aesthetics and the psychology of perception in critique of judgment. that is, after making his marvelous claims about semiotic perception (a complementary interaction that provided a means by which humanity can be better-integrated with the underlying nature of existence and with each other) he__in the end__claims that the ground of being is unfathomable. this implies that knowledge is groundless and that concepts are cut off from “the thing within itself”. then the question remains: what are we forming concepts about? or why is the human pursuit of knowledge not resulting in outcomes that are mutually satisfying, that generate more mutually beneficial outcomes in 106 relationships, contribute to more sustainable use of resources, and outcomes that help to create less disruptive human interactions? the culmination of the enlightenment did not resolve the problem of skepticism but exasperated it. it merely made the problem more apparent, leading to dialectic materialism’s attempt to revise the conceptual basis of western history (gunther 2001, 317-319). the split __ which eventually was evidenced as a divided europe __was rooted in interpretations of kant (german transcendental idealism). however, dialectic materialism __ the claim that the western intellectual, social, economic, and political system(s) have unresolved contradictions that could result in crisis __ became the doctrine that fueled an ideological warfare that ultimately led to a global bipolar stand-off. thus, the issue of how to carry the enlightenment aims forward by means of the modernity project was also hampered by the impact of skepticism that dominated international relations. these involved the notion of power, the role of knowledge in generating power, the effects of power on human interactions, and its impact on international relations. it emphasized that the use of power-over to protect ones interests and to maximize utility is justified. thus classical skepticism, throughout history has always influenced the position of realism (the belief that values and norms matter less than material capabilities or values matter less than the increase of material capabilities primarily measured in terms of military and economic power). historically realism dominated approaches to human interactions and intercultural relations (miller 2012, 9). the belief__dating back to the pre-socrates philosopher thucydides__was that “imperialism is based on certain traits inherent in human nature, which are believed to be universal. egoistic individuals pursuing wealth and security are seen to be behind all political struggles. thus power politics is ultimately rooted in an egoistic human nature” (freyberg-inan 2004, 26). classical skepticism not only had “doubts regarding the human intellect’s self-sufficiency” but even doubts about humanity’s aptitude toward moral improvement. such doubts have justified attitudes toward international relations theory that are characterized as ‘self-help’, hard power, and power politics (monoson & loriaux 2007, 49-50). modern skepticism is distinct from ancient skepticism because it not only doubts rationalism but also about the nature of the external world. this doubt has had an impact on globalization because it engenders a view that the international arena exists in a state of anarchy. interna107 tional relations theorists argue that those burdened with such skepticism will not accept the constructivist claim that democratic, rational deliberation can be applied to the international arena. without this reconsideration of the traditional approach to international relations there can be no acceptance of the role of culture and values. there were repeated warnings that the dilemma regarding knowing and what could be known could produce dire consequences if continued to be unresolved. this prompted enormous intellectual effort toward understanding the best approach to epistemology and toward understanding how humanity fits best within the fabric of being. however, the full recognition that the split was apparently irreconcilable became evident during the period leading up to the first world war. this period marked a heightened crisis in europe with the average person increasingly realizing the mounting problems in politics, economics, morals and ethics, as well as in science (which would only increase as a result of the onslaught of ww i). thus, it became apparent that the depth of moral skepticism was hampering western civilization’s effort to realize its hope for the enlightenment aims. this has been especially problematic as moral skepticism prompts the conviction that the criteria for interaction is how much it satisfies self-interests. because of the present concern for managing humanity’s earthly existence, the acquisition of and application of knowledge seem to be a major concern (given the meaning, significance and transformative power of science and technology in the human experience). “the devastation of world war one made strikingly evident the fact that the unresolved nature-human dichotomy with its anxiety producing tension (which humanity has attempted to mediate by means of science, reason and technology) had put humanity on a path that culminated in unparalleled destruction” (miller 2012, 7). the issues in dispute are important because they demonstrate various conceptions of the human experience; conceptions of power and how power is employed in human interactions, conceptions of the method, goals and methodology of philosophy and science plus, how knowledge is applied to human interactions (miller 2012, 7). post world war one europhiles had hopes of quieting the worries over these issues by generating some sense of improved cooperation between the people of postworld war one europe but the intellectual split (the crisis in europe) only became more apparent (plunging europe into a nietzschean nihilism__the most extreme form of skepticism) (nietzsche 1967, 2-3). 108 this was evident in the great depression, world war ii and the cold war. resolving the dilemma (a more widely accepted epistemology and ontology) as the last century progressed, scientists and philosophers began to realize that what kant feared (that the fragmentary nature of knowledge would become increasingly evident in the fragmentary nature of the human experience) was beginning to be realized. thus, there was an almost concerted effort to resolve the dilemma of why knowledge did not yield better insight into how to have more mutually beneficial and satisfactory human interactions. niels bohr’s was successful in devising one of the most influential attempts to resolve the dualistic dichotomy between the subjective__what is taken to be self__and the raw nature of existence. bohr’s solution is referred to as the principle of complementarity. his exposition of the principle also emphasized its epistemological value for providing more accurate information regarding what seem to be paradoxical aspects of reality. “however, scholars also acknowledge that it contributes to resolving the problem of the discontinuity between underlying reality and the human ability to conceptualize the ontological nature of existence. it has grown in popularity because it seems to offer a means of addressing dichotomies in other sciences and in philosophy” (kafatos 2011). in addition, it has grown in popularity because it seems to be complementary with the latest theories of biology, neurology, psychology and the philosophy of mind. complementarity allows a more accurate analysis of fundamental reality which even today is designated as being marked by “uncertainty” because from a “bottom up” perspective it seems that it can be reduced to something indiscernible while from a “top down” perspective, it is clearly discernible as enormous complexity. the principle of complementarity offers a reconciliation between what heretofore had seemed to be diametrically opposing descriptions of the fundamental nature of existence. the philosopher john searle believes that the new paradigm provides empirical evidence that, from the “top down” perspective, creation displays a complexity that can be described as a full manifestation of in109 tentionality (a life generating principle that perpetually manifests itself through forms as the universal) (searle 2012, 85-87). thus, complementarity emerged as an epistemological and ontological principle that offered reconciliation to long-standing controversies within and between the world’s wisdom and philosophical traditions. complementarity, became widely accepted as an explanation of the fundamental nature of existence while at the same time resolving disputes between the sciences, between science and philosophy, and between eastern and western intellectual traditions. these seeming contradictions primarily regard epistemology and ontology, the relationship between subject and object, plus the connection between the material objects of reality and creation’s vitalizing life force. however, complementarity also provides insight into the essential connection between underlying reality and the human ability to intuit/conceptualize the ontological nature of existence. a part of its popularity is due to the fact that it has been established as the fundamental paradigm for current views of science and philosophy (searle 2012, 3). above all the principle of complementarity provides insight into self-knowledge (the realization of what socrates claimed is the most worthwhile life pursuit or what the pursuit of knowledge is really all about). self-knowledge, in aristotle’s terms, means knowledge of how to maintain a sense of personal integrity (a holistically well-integrated person that is in appropriate relation with others and with the environment). such a person experiences happiness, well-being, good health, and they avoid misfortune. eastern and western perennial philosophies attest to the fact that self-knowledge does not occur if conception is limited to cognitive constructs because normal mind alone cannot provide a full sense of self. self-knowledge accompanies the recognition that, in addition to perceiving the distinction between particulars (the difference between the self and other things), there are the universals or the way in which life force manifests itself as particular things and connects particular things with the laws of nature (a recognition of the yin-yang interplay between manifest form and the universals which are manifesting). thus, the first prescription for achieving self-knowledge is to employ the principle of complementarity as a means for analyzing the connection between the nature of things and the nature of the self. richard rorty__noted for his contribution to attempts at reconciling the historical split in the western intellectual tradition__stated that 110 the problem of knowing could be eliminated by means of a mediating factor between the observer and the observation. the solution rorty proposes is a strategy based on employing the principle of complementarity. in rorty’s own words, “the kantian picture of concepts and intuitions getting together to produce knowledge is needed to give sense to the idea of theory of knowledge” (rorty 1979, 168). he points out that explanatory theory related to self-knowledge (clarity on the nature of the individual and the relationship of the self to existence) has always run into seeming contradictions that the theory of complementarity has always contributed to resolving (rorty 1979, 41-42). rorty states that the problem of knowing is tied to the “problem of consciousness”. he also acknowledges that the problem of knowing, as it is connected with the problem of self, is a concern that can be traced back to greek philosophical issues where one of the central concerns was the problem of personhood. from its greek origins, rorty argues, the issue is related to the body-mind problem, the ability to sustain relations to the inexistent, intentionality, and the subject-object problem (rorty 1979, 34-36). thus, as philosopher of mind john searle pointed out, the principle of complementarity provides empirical evidence that there is a complementary connection between primordial forces that shaped the biological nature of existence and the individual's biological nature. in other words there is an essential interconnection between the self and the phenomenal world. with added insight from new perspectives on neurobiology, the metaphysical issue of consciousness (mind being something that although ethereal clearly interacts with and effects what is tangible) could also be more adequately analyzed in empirical terms. the principle of complementarity has enormous heuristic value that provides the means for establishing a link between the mental functions of the brain and the forces of nature that gave rise to the factors that evolved into consciousness (semetsky 2012, 56). nobel prize-winning neuroscientist gerald edelman implies that complementarity explains the fundamental connection between nature’s biological principles, humanity’s biological nature and the neural value preferences naturally triggered as human cognitive skills developed. what the principle of complementarity contributes to in this sense is a means for shedding more light on the relationship between matter and that aspect of existence that heretofore was considered indiscernible. it bridges the gap and at the same time reveals the complementary connection between the two aspects of reality 111 (wheatley 2001, 249). in this respect, mind and matter are no longer at odds but exist in a complementary relation. research in complementarity conducted by physicists, biologists, psychologists, and sociologists makes it clear that the concept explains the link between the biological aspects of human behavior, how individuals self-organize, the structuring of culture, and the human relationship to the environment (bernston 2008, 36-37). studies in perceptual psychology and neurobiology reveal that humanity’s inherent perceptual preference for experiencing interactions is complementarity (gibson 1986 127). john searle agrees that organisms__interlaced with elements of nature in a particular way__are predisposed by nature to continuously seek integration (within their particular environmental context) in an attempt to maintain being well-integrated (searle 2012, 86). “as human cognitive skills developed, reliable knowledge was shaped by the human neural network “firing” in patterns aligned with the neural value preference. the value preference favored relating to things in nature in ways that shape environmental interactions into outcomes that are beneficial for individuals and cultures” (miller 2011, 129). the popularity of the principle of complementarity is in part due to the agreement it generates between science, philosophy and religion. the sciences, metaphysics, and religion all agree that complex organisms must maintain some type of integrity. integrity is enhanced when a biological organism adheres to its natural urge to become more fully integrated and in the human situation helps the individual to experience a fuller sense of self. in this sense, being better-integrated within its econiche enables the organism to experience more beneficial interchange. the natural biological inclination can be thought of as an inherent value preference that establishes the inclination for social cooperation and culture. this natural value preference has been expressed by the world’s wisdom traditions as the conviction that the human cognitive capacity__that provides an ability to discern what is best for human well-being and for the human experience in nature__is a natural part of the ontological nature of existence. the most cherished wisdom traditions of the east and the west agree that viewing existence from the perspective of humanity’s inherent value preferences is personally beneficial, mentally beneficial (heightens cognitive abilities), and is socially beneficial. today, in accordance with the admonition of the great wisdom traditions, social psychologists stress 112 that such a perspective is more likely to result in the experience of a more enhanced sense of being. in other words, today there is widespread agreement amongst neurobiologists that the fundamental biological principles of creation (the laws of nature or the universals) have been encoded into the organic elements of nature with the propensity that this can be decoded by humans into an understanding of the teleological significance of existence. from the perspective of the world’s wisdom traditions, the teleological significance of existence is realizing how to enjoy this fuller sense of well-being (miller 2011, 129). gerald edelman implies that the principle of complementarity explains the connection between nature’s fundamental biological principles and the way biological elements evolved into sensations and consciousness. the principle of complementarity provides the conceptual propensity for bridging the gap between contrasting features of reality. according to paul k. feyerabend complementarity can be interpreted, on the one hand, as the intuitive capacity that complements what is needed for theoretical comprehension and, on the other hand, as a heuristic principle guiding empirical research (feyerabend 1981, 221). certainly when a person realizes that his or her existence is dependent on the perpetual dynamic transformation of his or her biological make-up by means of reintegration with the fabric of being then the person also realizes that this is in fact what one clearly continuously perceives as the difference between phenomena and the self (constant interchange). however, although it is clearly apparent that what a person thinks of as the self is in a continuous state of transformation, most people have not developed the perceptual capacity to realize that what is thought of as a separate ego is a constant interaction between the self and the phenomenal world. one would assert that, when looking out at existence he or she merely observes life or reality and its processes and in some respect this is true. take, for example, the perception of a tree in winter. one observes the tree’s form that is indeed barren. now imagine that same tree perceived when full of blossoms in late spring. one is not only observing the form but also the life generating force which is manifesting itself through the tree’s form (perceiving the manifestation of the lifegenerating force makes a big difference). for the japanese a certain aesthetic perspective__yugen 幽玄 an aesthetic perceptual capacity that allows penetrating through the appearance to the essence of being__allows one to see past the superficial to the very nature of things. “yugen is a means whereby one obtains a glimpse of 113 things eternal in the world of constant changes: that is we look into the secrets of reality” (suzuki 2012, 220). in the japanese worldview, to really perceive the essence of a thing (its kami 神) one has to perceive beyond the superficial (as we all know appearances are deceiving) to enable aesthetically detecting yugen. for the japanese this allows the ability to perceive or experience existence in its wholeness rather than in a fragmentary or superficial way (miller 2012, 17-18). the problem hindering the full realization of self-knowledge (even for the well-informed) is the inability to sense the complementary interconnection between the particular and the universal. self-knowledge, in this sense, is the result of the perceptual ability to accurately appraise the semiotic interaction between the universal force that is manifest as appearance and the particular manifestation of this life-generating principle or life force that one takes to be the self. yet, in spite of the clarity of the principle of complementarity as an explanation of the perpetual (yin-yang) interchange between all aspects of nature, the validity can still be hard to accepts, even for experts in the science of mind, because of aspects that seem to reflect an unresolved paradox (peirce 1958, 224-225). enhancing all aspects of human interactions’ the principle of complementarity has been successful in impressing scholars in the sciences, the philosophy of science, the social sciences plus, scholarship in the eastern and western wisdom traditions because it explains the process by which the primordial life-generating force evolved into humanity’s biological nature. in other words, the principle of complementarity seems consistent with the cultural worldview and the sciences of both the east and the west. in this respect, the principle of complementarity explains how the elements of nature exist in constant interchange and not in isolation that makes each part ecologically connected other parts. thus, according to this principle what appears to be not self becomes the basis of how the self is formulated and cognitively realized (the self exists as a continuity of biological elements, forces, and principles). according to gerald edelman the principle of complementarity explains how humanity’s neural value predisposition (that was ordained by nature’s biological forces) evolved into a clear preference for beneficial interactions (interactions occurring between individuals, within cul114 tures, between cultures, and interactions between nature and humanity). edelman implies that complementarity explains the connection between nature’s creative forces, nature’s biological principles, humanity’s biological nature, and value preferences triggered as human cognitive skills evolved (edelman 1992, 118-119). the wisdom traditions of the east and west assert that information encoded into the fabric of existence illustrates a feature of nature that links elements together into a complex unity. thus, information inherent in the nature of things urges the fulfillment of nature’s intention. in the human case, the urges are experienced as the individual’s biological predisposition or value preference(s). self-knowledge, in this sense, results from an accurate appraisal of the semiotic interaction between the information that is fundamental to the biological make-up of the individual and the information encoded into aspects of existence. the encoded information__that is fundamental to the way nature’s biological forces shaped complexity into what we understand to be the self__contained the potential for the self to decode this information (as a means of deciphering nature’s ontology and teleology) (edelman 1992, 19-20). john searle states that this “special feature” of the nature-human relationship highlights the significance of human interactions by giving them intention, value and meaning. in his recent book rationality in action he explains that rational decision-making is a matter of selecting means that enable fulfilling human ends. the ends are a matter of values. we come to the decision-making situation with established value preferences and rationality is a matter of figuring out the means to our ends (searle 2001, 1). humanity’s value preference accounts for what searle calls the cooperative and coordinated character of collective intentionality. searle adds that this value preference is rooted in the biological structure of the human organism thus stems from the ontological nature of "how the world in fact is”. in other words, collective intentionality and cooperative behavior are displays of natural functions (miller 2011, 129). “for the individual there is a value in survival and reproduction, and for a culture there is a value in continuity. but natural function takes place only within a set of prior assignments of value (including purposes, teleology, and other functions)” (searle 1995, 6 & 15). in this sense reliable knowledge provides insight into how to extend a culture’s range of more cooperative or more beneficial interactions (searle 1995, 292). the pioneer of american pragmatism john dewey believed that a 115 cultural worldview represents an accumulation of knowledge of how to manage interactions in ways that promote the flourishing of the culture. human culture developed by expanding the range of beneficial interactions, not only for maintaining individual integrity, but also for maintaining the integrity of all structured units (miller 2011, 141). this means that the worldview of a flourishing culture must be based on expanding its scope of internal and external beneficial interactions. to promote a thriving culture, neural value preference must be shaped into conceptual understandings of how to extend the range of cooperative interactions (miller 2011, 129). what kant set out to achieve with his cosmopolitan ethics __ the effort to fulfill the enlightenment aims by balancing individuality and mutuality __ can be realized by coupling the individual's effort to maximize benefits with the realization that utility results from increasing beneficial interactions (smyth 1994, 53 & 54). because of the fact of interdependence, one’s rational preference should be to follow inherent human value inclination for experiencing enhanced interactions. the principle of complementarity contributes to the ability to perceive and conceptualize the complementary connection between one’s discreteness (one’s own self-interest) and the force of continuity that is superimposed on the interests of the individual. thus, connectedness prompts realization of the value for making life’s unavoidable encounters a means by which the interaction between the ontological nature of existence and one’s unique self is perceived not as self-other dichotomy but as complementarity (the basis of self-knowledge) (miller 2012, 22). the experience awakens a perceptual capacity described by william blake as the ability to see the secrets of the sea in a grain of sand, heaven in a wild flower, and sense eternity within the here and now (blake 2001, 356). references aristotle. de anima. 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(herman, parret. edt.), amsterdam: john benjamins publishing company, 1994. suzuki, daisetz. zen and japanese culture. new york: princeton university press, 2010. wei-ming, tu. confucian thought: selfhood as creative transformation. albany: state university of new york press, 1985. wheatley, jerry. the nature of consciousness: the structure of reality. phoenix, arizona: research scientific press, 2001. 06_(90-108) a sisyphean task the buddhas perseverance.pmd a sisyphean task: the buddha’s perseverance and its application to religious dialogue ramida jupatanakul chulalongkorn university, thailand º·¤ñ́ âèí «ô«õ¿ñêµñçåð¤ãã¹µó¹ò¹¢í§กãõก à»ç¹êñ­åñกé³ì¢í§¤çòáºòกºñè¹¾òกà¾õâã «öè§à»ç¹¤ø³åñกé³ðíâèò§ë¹ö觢í§á¹øéâì·õèáñก¨ðä é́ãñºกòãºñ¹·öก¨´¨óäçéáåðà»ç¹·õèâกâèí§ àªố ªù µòá·õè·ãòºกñ¹·ñèçä» ¤óçèò �àòãðกô̈ ¢í§«ô«õ¿ñê� ëáòâ¶ö§¤çòá¾òกà¾õâã¾âòâòá ·õè̈ ð» ô̄ºñµôàòãกô̈ íâèò§ã´íâèò§ë¹öè§ «öè§ ù́àëá×í¹¨ðäáèáõ·ò§·óä é́êóàãç̈ áåðäáèáõçñ¹¨º êôé¹ é́çâ ¾ãð¾ø·¸à é̈òàí§กç·ã§à»ç¹µñçá·¹¢í§¾åñ§áë觤çòá¾òกà¾õâ㢳ð·õè¾ãðí§¤ì ·ã§¾âòâòáºóà¾ç­à¾õâã¼èò¹·øกãกôãôâòµèò§ æ à¾×èíºããåø¶ö§กòãµãñêãùé ¶ö§ááéçèò àòãกô¨¢í§«ô«õ¿ñêµéí§ãªé¤çòáà¾õâã·ò§กòâàò¾ áµèêô觷õèêó¤ñ­·õèêø´¤×í¾åñ§ã¨ ¶éòàãòêòáòã¶àíòª¹ð㨵¹àí§ä é́ àãò¨ðกéòç¢éòáíø»êã㤵èò§ æ ä é́ äáèçèòíø»êã㤹ñé¹ ¨ðâòกàâç¹à¾õâ§ã´กçµòá º·¤çòá¹õé¨ðµãç¨êíºµñçíâèò§¢í§ºø¤¤åµèò§ æ ·õèáõ ¤ø³åñกé³ð·õè¹èòêããàêãô­àëåèò¹õé abstract sisyphus, a character in greek mythology, symbolizes the power of perseverance, an aspect of human beings often chronicled and revered. the word “sisyphean task”, as it became known, represents the struggle to perform a task that seems to be unattainable or never-ending. the buddha himself also embodied the power of perseverance as he struggled through seemingly endless obstacles on the way to achieve enlightenment. although the “sisyphean task” requires physical effort, the most important requirement involves our mental state. if we can master the mind, then no obstacle, no matter how difficult, can be conquered. this essay examines examples of people who have possessed these traits. prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 90-108 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 90 introduction in the complex and fast-changing world that we are living in today, many actions that we undertake require a tremendous amount of effort and faith. not only are we bound by the circumstances that we choose based on our own wills, we are also being constrained by many factors increasingly beyond our control. destiny also plays a part in providing us opportunities to choose what objectives we wish to pursue in life. it can be said that though we humans are born equal, the chances and tasks that come our way are vastly different for each of us. for some of us, the most important mission in our lives is to perform a task that seems impossible to achieve and endless, but is somehow self-fulfilling and gratifying to our mind and spirit. it is also a common dilemma for human to want to acquire the good things in life without really working for it. in the book entitled “the power of perseverance”, there is a passage stating that whatever we want in life cannot be achieved by just dreaming about it or begging a higher being for it.1 there are no shortcut, magic spells, or any other way to attain our objectives other than putting effort into it. even the buddha taught that success can only be reached through our own perseverance (viriyena dhukkhamaccheti). the buddha himself also experienced the process of perseverance on the way to achieve enlightenment. the path to accomplish our objectives is not smoothly paved, but is filled with rough patches and bumps. those who reach the top are the ones who persevere through hardships, difficulties, and uncontrollable factors, while never giving up or look back. they are also the ones who refuse to be confined by their destinies or whatever limitations they have to encounter. we can select many examples of individuals who spend their lives performing a task that appears to others to be futile and pointless. these individuals are viewed by some as heroes or by others as fools. whatever the opinions of the masses may be, the deeds performed by these individuals will be long remembered by many. the achievements set by them have proved to be inspirations to normal people who are weary of the daily grind without much hope of ever fulfilling their dreams. it is said that what set some of us apart from another is mostly in the mind. motivation comes from deep inside of us, and the best sources of motivation can be provided by a mythological figure. one of the best cases that exemplify this point is the case of sisyphus, ramida jupatanakul 91 who originated in greek mythology. my attempt in this paper is made to demythologize the mythology of sisyphean task through different examples of real stories in this present day world to inculcate the true meaning of the buddhist doctrine of ‘perseverance’ (viriya). my approach in this paper is dialogical hermeneutics, which is a science and art of understanding our own life. the myth of sisyphus __ the origins of the “sisyphean task”: sisyphus was a figure in greek mythology who came to symbolize neverending and unrelenting labor. as a king, sisyphus was known for his cunning and deceitfulness, in his quest for maintaining his dominance in commerce. he was also known for his betrayal of his own kin and even the mighty zeus, the king of all greek gods. by betraying zeus’s secrets and thinking that he could be in the same rank as the gods, sisyphus was punished by zeus and sent to the underworld. but being very clever, he fooled and chained hades, the ruler of the underworld. eventually, another god intervened and sisyphus was again imprisoned. in another story of his cunning, sisyphus devised a way to escape the underworld. he lured his wife into putting his unburied body on public display instead of burying it as a wife is required to do. he then asked and was given the god’s permission to return from the underworld to scold his wife for her infraction. once out in the upper world, sisyphus basked in the happiness of the earth and refused to return to serve his time. the intervention by the god mercury was necessary to forcibly bring sisyphus back, where as a punishment for fooling the gods, he was condemned to push a giant rock up a hill, and upon nearing the top, to helplessly watch the rock roll back down to the bottom again. this task was to be repeated by sisyphus over and over again for eternity. as a representation of the eternal labor of rolling rock uphill, the word “sisyphean task” or “sisyphean challenge” was created. the word depicts a task where the goal is never achieved, yet is repeated to go on and on without end. many interpretations of the word have been made over the years by different scholars and philosophers. from comparing this constant and neverending task to the ongoing rise and fall of the sun and of the waves in the sea to the representation of man’s vain attempt in the pursuit of knowledge, “sisyphean task” became a common reference. 92 prajna vihara-~ the sisyphean task and the power of perseverance of the buddha: setting aside the more negative aspects of the sisyphus myth and his punishment, one aspect of “sisyphus task” that needs to be examined is that it came to represent the positive power of perseverance. the task that sisyphus undertakes everyday and for eternity not only requires physical effort, but also mental strength. it can be said that sisyphus performed his task knowing full well that there was little or no chance of success. yet, he endured the physical hardship by having a positive outlook and inner willpower. the french existentialist and admirer of the absurd, albert camus, said that “one must imagine sisyphus happy” as “the struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart”. for it is a most common trait of man to feel disheartened when having to push himself to perform a task that seems futile and hopeless. it is the inner gratification that drove sisyphus to repeatedly do the same things over and over again. camus also said that “at each of those moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks toward the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his fate. he is stronger than his rock”. based on his idea of the absurd, camus aimed to show a dualism or paradox that exists in the human psyche. for example, we greatly value life and existence, yet we know full well that eventually we will die and all our undertakings will be meaningless. how then can we go on and value a life that has no meaning? though sisyphus’s labor was deemed to be excruciating and pointless, sisyphus still persisted. sisyphus strongly believes that he could win over whatever his fate belies him. he fully committed himself to his inner beliefs and it was this full commitment which provided him with motivation and made him able to continue to push his rock. what do we mean when we say that sisyphus represents the power of perseverance? power can be described as a force that cannot be seen by the naked eyes, but that which can be felt spiritually and radiates potent energy. the power of this energy can be a driving force for a person to perform things that he or she could not normally do. the mental energy translates into physical energy which can help a person perform great feats. perseverance is an ongoing action performed physically, but is driven by the willpower of individual. it can drive a person to overcome all obstacles. it requires patience and the faith and belief in oneself. in the book, the power of perseverance, perseverance is described as being one aspect of the mind, and of being neutral in respect to the objective that the person is trying to achieve. if a person ramida jupatanakul 93 perseveres to do good deeds, this will lead to happiness and success in life. however, if a person perseveres to do bad deeds, this will lead to unhappiness and troubles in life. the power of perseverance can be illustrated in the context of the buddha’s path toward enlightenment. during his long period of deep meditation to achieve enlightenment, prince siddhartha’s mind was free of all distractions, whether these came from outside forces or from within his mind. although the perseverance by siddhartha to achieve enlightenment did not require physical energy as in the myth of sisyphus, it is similar in that it necessitated unrelenting willpower. another commonality is that both siddhartha and sisyphus undertook tasks that were deemed to be almost unattainable and endless. siddhartha did not know from the outset that his mission would be met with success. it was his strong, inner belief that kept him from giving up throughout his ordeal. the perseverance of the buddha can also be interpreted in terms of performing tasks without expectation. he realized that desire and expectation cannot lead to true happiness and peace, for when we do not find what we are searching for we are miserable, and even when we do find the pleasure we seek, it soon fades and we have to look for something new. therefore, just like sisyphus, he came to a conclusion that it is essential that we live in the present moment and concentrate on performing our tasks, though repetitive, to the fullest extent. the real world in the real world, there are many exceptional individuals who emphasize the “sisyphean task and the buddha’s perseverance”, which can be interpreted in many ways, from the struggle to help save the environment to the fight for democracy. for some, it is a labor of love. for others, it involves a responsibility to themselves and to the greater whole. but one thing is common to all practitioners of these principles is that the task before them are seemingly endless, repetitive, and very difficult to succeed. some has spent literally their whole lives dedicating to their causes. tremendous sacrifices had to be made in their personal and family lives. for many, this task means they had to be away from their homelands, friends, and ones they loved. these individuals possess the capacities and inner spirit to undertake and succeed in 94 prajna vihara-~ these special tasks. these individuals are scattered all over the world and have existed in many periods of time. the results of their undertakings not only benefited the doers themselves, but also have affected many people and many generations. with this in mind, it is extremely gratifying to analyze the origin and to understand the motives behind the actions of these special individuals. the labor for the environment: in the srisaket province in the northeast of thailand, a story emerged in 2008 about a man who dedicated his life to planting one tree per day for 20 years to help save the environment. lt. vichai suriyuth planted in his spare time from his work as a policeman, he planted trees in empty spaces along roads, public areas, etc., without being contracted by anyone. he never received any compensation for his labor. his labor was often met with the laughter of local villagers who thought he was crazy. two million trees were the result of over 20 years of perseverance and dedication to the cause that transformed his native district from one of the driest areas in the country, to one that is green and luscious.2 the type of tree vichai planted were mostly palm trees, because palm trees could endure dryness better than other tree types. he used seeds instead of other tree parts to ensure vast distribution. he would start planting trees just before the rainy season began and also during the rainy season in areas that has a lot of open air and moisture. on may 1 of every year, he would start his labor to commemorate the importance of labor day in thailand. he estimated that he planted approximately 100 seeds per day. vichai became famous overnight from a tv commercial for an energy drink that highlighted his tireless and selfless sacrifice. when the commercial first aired, many people thought that he was a fictitious character. but when it became clear he was an actual person, he drew the attention of the thai media. government organizations presented him with rewards. yet vichai life remained the same. he continues to plant trees every day till now. he still uses his trusted motorcycle to go to any area he considers a prime location for growing trees. before and after his regular hours as policemen, he goes out, without fail, to do what he loves. instead of letting his fame “go to his head”, vichai is still a humble person who still lives the same life as before. he has been approached by political party to help promote its cause and ideology, but vichai steadfastly ramida jupatanakul 95 refuses to get involved. his motive for his work is that whatever benefit he receives from his work also benefits his country. he feels that if others take inspiration from him, they would also feel as satisfied about themselves as vichai feels about himself. if the whole country gets involved, thailand will progress. the unity of people into this one common cause will create power for all people. the fight for the animals: jane goodall is the symbol of the continuing and seemingly endless fight for the cause of man’s closest counterpart, chimpanzees. opposed by many primatologists for her unique methods in studying chimpanzees, jane has to continually fight to use her own methods. her love and understanding of the chimpanzees goes beyond any normal boundary. jane strongly feels that human and chimpanzee are related in more ways than just sharing similar genes. the range of feelings and emotions displayed by chimpanzees are similar to humans, as is their need for family and social relationships. her work demonstrated there is no clear line separating human and apes in terms of rationale and behavior. she totally commits her life to the study of the way that chimpanzees live by living among them in tanzania. during her experience, she not only learned their most common behaviors, but also discovered what man had wrongly conceived over the years: that only man can construct and use tools, and that chimpanzees are vegetarians. furthermore, jane dispelled the long-common beliefs that chimpanzees were only peaceful in nature, by seeing through her own eyes how chimpanzees had an aggressive nature and could kill fellow chimpanzees and other animals. this finding showed that human and chimpanzees share a darker side. jane became attached to chimpanzees at an early age when her mother gave her a toy chimpanzee. her mother was her biggest supporter in the fight for the study of chimpanzees, and even accompanied jane to live in tanzania when jane was just starting her work as a chimpanzee researcher. though she was not trained as a primatologist, jane somehow was able to find her way into working with the famous archeologist, louis leakey. through sheer dedication, she was able to impress leakey and was assigned to oversee the project on chimpanzees at the gombe national reserve in tanzania. up until now, it has been 38 years that jane has been doing research in gombe. when jane first arrived in gombe, she was prepared to go into the jungle on her own, in order to explore the natural habitat of the chimpanzees. in 1960, it was very dangerous for a young woman of jane’s age to go into the jungle 96 prajna vihara-~ alone, but jane did not let this obstacle deter her from her work. initially she was discouraged that the chimps would not let her get within 50 yards of them. she could not get any cooperation from her subjects. but through her perseverance she eventually grew very close to the chimps at gombe. they would soon allow her to follow them, as they led the way. they greet her as they do each other, with a touch or a kiss. her sense of patience and trust won them over. more obstacles were about the greet jane and her mother, who accompanied her. they both were inflicted with malaria. for weeks, they were confined in bed with fever and had little energy. it would be a long period before jane could recover from the illness. what jane goodall shows us is that it is not necessary to accept the prior scientific findings that might not be totally accurate. she showed courage and determination in defying the rules and opened our eyes into what are the real facts about our closest animal relative. her method of giving chimpanzees names, instead of using numbers, was not readily accepted by her peers. jane was also criticized by her colleagues and classmates by using descriptive, narrative writing in her observations and calculations. she also demonstrated by showing persistence in getting a ph.d. in ethology from cambridge university in 1965. jane is one of only eight persons in the world who got her ph.d., without ever having received a bachelor degree before. her mentor, louis leakey, suggested that jane get her doctorate degree in order to be more acceptable to the media, which jane needed as a source to help publicize her work. jane reluctantly agreed to spare time from her work in tanzania to obtain the degree. today, jane is still very much involved in her work to study and help save chimpanzees. she continues to promote conservation. jane created the chimpanzee guardian project and has set up several halfway homes for injured or orphaned chimps found in the wild. she advocates the ethical treatment of chimpanzees in research and zoos. she teaches the humane way to study chimps in a lab setting. jane created the roots and shoots program for school children to learn about wild animals and conservation of the environment. since it is imperative that this labor is continued by new generations of dedicated people. the endless fight for democracy: perhaps one of the most recognizable names and faces around the world, aung san suu kyi is a prime ramida jupatanakul 97 example of individuals who tirelessly and voluntarily work for the principle of democracy. her labor has been going on for many years and is still continuing today. without any end in sight, she keeps on fighting for the noblest cause that any country strives for, freedom. what she wishes for is very simple and the freedom she is asking is for freedom for herself and freedom for her people. though burma is basically a very peaceful country with peaceful people, it is being ruled by a military regime that oppresses the rights and freedom of its people. the regime dictates the way that the burmese live and express themselves. she was born into a political heritage. her father was the founder of the modern burmese army and took part in the negotiation of burma’s independence from the united kingdom. her mother was a former burmese ambassador. yet suu kyi was never forced to take on the task of leading her people against the military ruler. her inspiration came from her desire to fight the injustices that has taken over her homeland. during a visit back to burma to visit her ailing mother, from england where she was living with her husband, suu kyi became involved with the pro-democracy movement against the military ruler of burma. she sacrificed her personal life for the cause of her beloved homeland, suu kyi would rarely have the chance to see her husband before he later died in 1999. besides losing precious time with her husband, she was also kept apart from her two children, who still live in the united kingdom. the responsibility and care that suu kyi feels for her people, goes beyond what any of us could possibly imagine. she is as dedicated to her country, as a loving mother would be to her child. the military regime put her under enormous pressure time and again to force her to leave burma. but every time, she showed strong determination and composure to withstand anything that was thrown at her. suu kyi uses nonviolent means to oppose the burmese military regime, as she was influenced by the late mahatma gandhi’s philosophy and also by the peaceful buddhist concepts. she cited the faith she has in dharma to help her remain mentally stable. by meditation, she would remain mindful of what she need to achieve, and not get caught up in all the troubles she was facing. the only way out of the deadlock with the military, to her, would be to negotiate and find a common ground. she would be repeatedly put under house arrest for her refusal to conform to her opposition. though she was falsely accused of instigating rebellion, she never incited her followers to cause 98 prajna vihara-~ any uprising that would lead to any form of violence. over and over again, she would keep her composure and perseverance without showing any sign of fatigue or despair. the latest incident against her in 2009 involved a foreigner entering her compound while she was inside. it caused the military ruler to accuse her of cooperating with the foreigner and resulted in her being placed under house arrest again. in june 2010, suu kyi celebrated her 65 birthday, locked up in her home. international condemnation of this event has been voiced from all around the world.3 world leaders all offer their voices in demanding that the military ruler release her from her confinement. president barrack obama and the u.n. secretary general ban ki-moon have voiced their support for suu kyi. throughout the past 20 years in burma, she has been detained 15 years. she is the only noble peace laureate in the world that has been imprisoned.4 the fight for independence: another well-known example is the fight for the independence of tibet by the dalai lama. in a much similar way to aung san suu kyi, the dalai lama advocates the use of nonviolent means to counter the oppression from a much stronger and more powerful opposition, the chinese government. to most of the world, he is revered as one of the greatest champions of mankind’s precious right to live one’s life according to one’s own values and customs. to tibetans, he is an enlightened being who delays his own spiritual union with the supreme spirit in order to serve humanity. in his fight for tibet, he has lived in exile ever since 1959.5 for over four decades till now, he has traveled all over the world to ask for support of his cause which is to stop the destruction of the tibetan culture by china. he has compared this atrocity to the jewish holocaust of wwii. over 6,000 temples in tibet have been damaged and over one million tibetans have died.6 the struggle to free tibet has been very costly for the dalai lama. it began when he was taken from his family when he was only two years old to train in the buddhist principles and diplomacy. then at 15, he was elevated to head tibet in its fight with china. later on, he was forced to leave his homeland. during his time in exile, his mother and brother passed away. but the pain that was hardest to endure was seeing so many of his people lose their lives in the fight for freedom. in addition, over 40 years of his quest for the independence of tibet has yet still to bear fruit. yet, despite the hardship that he has to face for so many years, the ramida jupatanakul 99 dalai lama has kept up his determination, his positive thinking, his joy for life and his dedication to peace. no matter how difficult the circumstance, people from all over the world will rarely see him react in an angry manner. what you see is the perpetual smile and kindness toward his audience. when asked what his religion is, he replied that compassion is his religion. he preaches that if a person wants to achieve happiness, he must be compassionate. if a person wants others to be happy, he must also be compassionate toward them. he also suggests that our enemies are our best teacher for teaching us how to persevere. another principle that the dalai lama has upheld is to how to compromise and search for common grounds. his latest approach is to give up the fight for tibet’s independence and to support a “middle way approach”, which advocates abandoning the fight for independence in exchange for china giving tibet cultural autonomy. this controversial stance has divided the international tibetan community. many younger tibetans take a more militant approach and are not willing to compromise in their fight for independence. so far, this approach by the dalai lama is yet to be accepted by china. now, at the age of 73 and troubled by poor health, the struggle for the cause of tibet is fast approaching 50 years. but still, the dalai lama refuses to give up the pursuit for what he believes is his responsibility as long as he lives.7 the fight for the poor: poverty is a state of living experienced by millions around the world. the fight to help the poor to improve their life is a noble task, exemplified by the work of muhammad yunus. yunus is a bangladeshi banker and an economist who dedicated his life to the poor. the labor that yunus undertakes is extremely challenging, as poverty and inequality have existed throughout history. to yunus, poverty is the most important factor in creating conflict in this world. the world cannot be peaceful unless poverty is eradicated. though it is an idealistic vision, yunus managed to translate this vision into practical action for the benefit of millions of people, not only in bangladesh, but also in many other countries. his main weapon against poverty is to give out loans to the poor. loans to poor people without any financial security had appeared to be an impossible idea. while he was a professor in economics, yunus started to realize that the ongoing project to help the poor rarely have an effect on the poorest people. he then decided to investigate the truth behind the failure of 100 prajna vihara-~ this project and found out that commercial banks were not keen on lending to the very poor. the only solution was to do the lending himself. therefore, yunus started his own bank called grameen bank. the bank’s main borrowers were from the poorest rank which had no land as collateral. by giving the poor a chance to have a better life without wanting to reap benefits, yunus discovered that the debts were fully repaid up to 98%, the success rate that no commercial bank could boast of. women were the borrowers who put the loans into the most effective usage. therefore, 95% of the loans were given to women. yunus’ project had to face many difficulties and oppositions. yunus and his colleagues had to endure everything from violent radical leftists to the conservative clergy who told women that they would be denied a muslim burial if they borrowed money from the grameen bank. but with much perseverance, yunus sticks to his ideal and was able to pass through these ordeals. as time passed, the small borrowers learned how to save and have the capabilities to obtain more loans to improve their houses, to buy land, and expand businesses. in addition, these loans helped develop the communities through investments in new technologies that helped improve the agricultural and textile sectors. the loan project for the poor that yunus started in bangladesh spread to other parts of the world and now totals over 170 places. even in the u.s., yunus helped started a trust to teach people in the communities how to set up their own loan projects. currently, yunus is working with results, an international grass-roots organization, to ask for help from the countries around the world. muhammad yunus’s contribution to the world has earned him honors around the world. in 2009, president barrack obama of the u.s. presented yunus with a presidential medal of freedom and most honored of all, yunus was given a noble peace prize in 2006.8 he is credited with developing the concepts of microcredit and microfinance. taking the issue close to home, in 2009, yunus opened a research institute in thailand with the main purpose of researching how to help solve the poverty problem in southeast asia. but perhaps the honor dearest to yunus’s heart is his labor for the love of the poor people. his far-reaching vision of giving a chance to people who did not have a fair chance to better themselves in life has made an inroads into many people’s consciousness. though it is a labor that will never cease to end, yunus felt an inner gratification for undertaking it. it also illustrates the concept that the more you give, the more you will receive. the result of his work will be felt for ramida jupatanakul 101 years to come, as small businesses now have a chance to be free from the dominance of multi-national companies. local communities now have a chance to choose to develop their own businesses and meet the needs of the people. the spiritual benefit of the sisyphean task and its relevance to vesak day and to religious dialogue perseverance is an integral part of our virtuousness. although other human qualities such as generosity, moral conduct and patience are parts of being a virtuous man, without perseverance, human beings are considered lazy. it is very easy to fall back and find excuses for not persisting when difficult circumstances come our way. the ability to push through our negative thoughts of not wanting to practice dharma teachings is needed to overcome laziness. dharma is not useful by just knowing the concepts, but you need to practice it continuously even in times when you feel tired and listless. by not practicing dharma, you will be caught in negative thoughts about problems in your life, without accomplishing virtue and benefiting others. by possessing perseverance, we can increase our virtuous qualities without being distracted or obscured. our mind will be calm and peaceful, and not disturbed by our emotions. we keep our mind in the present and care not about the past nor fear the future. we learn to let go of our ego, even though we still converse with ourselves. because the self is the basis of our suffering, by not clinging to it we can make our mind free. letting go of our ego requires wisdom and compassion. because the process of letting go of our ego requires time, we need to persevere in the path that we are in. during the process of trying to focus one’s mind, one will sometimes be distracted or tempted by laziness, however, it is important to keep one’s resolve. if you have perseverance you will achieve enlightenment quickly.9 what is the real meaning of perseverance in spiritual context? it’s the feeling of inner happiness knowing that you are undertaking a virtuous task. this feeling will come upon you when you truly understand and absorb dharma teachings. you will feel motivated and joyful in practicing dharma, because you know the cause of peace and the cause of suffering. excuses will not arise in your mind because you are not being forced into doing it. the compendium of abhidharma says that perseverance is the antidote to laziness, delighting in 102 prajna vihara-~ virtue.10 because laziness is an obstacle to enlightenment, it is necessary to have perseverance to counter the feeling of laziness. the vesak day and buddhist-sisyphean perseverance: the word “sisyphean task” can be illustrated in terms of the perseverance by the buddha during his striving for enlightenment. pertaining to the “visakhabucha day”, the day the buddha was born, enlightened and died, the perseverance of the buddha relates to the hardships he had to undergo to discover the truth about life. as prince siddhartha at the age of 29, he witnessed the cycle of old age, suffering, and death, and came to realize that it affected everyone. but many were ignorant of this cycle of life. so, siddhartha decided to leave all his worldly belongings and comfort behind to search for the real meaning of life. during siddhartha’s path to enlightenment, he took the path of physical perseverance by fasting. it was a common method that other religious practitioners before him had practiced and was considered the most testing spiritual regimen at that time. yet he found that the way of starvation was too extreme and did not bring peacefulness to the mind. physical perseverance was not the answer to why the cycle of life existed and how we could be free from it. therefore, he decided to abandon this practice and went back to eating food normally. after siddhartha started eating again till his body recovered, he undertook the process of mental perseverance. for six years, he meditated until he realized that he was nearing the attaining of full enlightenment. he then walked to a tree that would later become known as the bodhi tree. seating himself under the tree, he vowed not to rise from meditation until he had achieved enlightenment. with this determination he entered the space-like concentration on the dharmakaya.11 as siddhartha sat meditating, devaputra, the chief of all demons, tried to distract his concentration by conjuring up terrifying images. some images were of demons throwing weapons, rocks and mountains at him and some were of demons trying to burn him with fire. but with his unwavering concentration, the weapons and rocks appeared to him as a rain of fragrant flowers and the fire turned into rainbow lights. after seeing that siddhartha could not be frightened or distracted in his meditation, devaputra tried to use images of beautiful women to lure siddhartha out of his concentration. instead of being tempted, siddhartha went into even deeper concentration until he conquered ramida jupatanakul 103 all demons of this world. after passing through the test against the demons, he mediated until dawn and finally achieved full enlightenment. the attainment of enlightenment is considered the second important happening on visakhabucha day. it was comparable to the second birth of siddhartha, for the first birth was to be born as human, but enlightenment was like being reborn. it was a birth that was complete and free from all temptation, demons, sufferings, or even happiness. siddhartha persevered to achieve this state on his own will without being ordered from anyone or willed by any divine being. he did it as a normal human being who persisted in his quest to be free from all suffering. the application to religious dialogue: perhaps one of the most difficult tasks facing anyone is the task of trying to bridge the faiths and beliefs of different people from different backgrounds. the clash of belief of the many religions around the world have led to many conflicts. the example of raimon panikkar: raimon panikkar is a roman catholic priest and a scholar who advocated inter-religious dialogue. he dedicates his life and work to the near-impossible task of trying to building bridges between different religions and cultures. he is well-known for his inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue. he strongly believes that culture cannot be understood unless you have been living in that culture and not until you are seeing the world from the perspective of that culture. what this means is that you must learn to accept all cultures and that everyone is his or her own most complete source of knowledge of oneself. he further advocates that nothing is permanent, no theory or view is the absolute truth. all points of view depend on the context, time, and place. panikkar also has his own view on religions and cultures. his mother was a catholic catalan and his father was a hindu indian. he grew up living a life of two different worlds for many centuries. at one stage, he was living half a year in india, and teaching at a university in california the other half of the year. he proclaims himself a christian, a hindu, a buddhist, and also an atheist, meaning that he accepts all faiths. in his own words, he mentions that “i left (europe) as a christian; found myself a hindu; and i return as a buddhist, without having ceased to be a christian”. his experience of christian-hindu, christian-buddhist and christian-secularist dialogue help form his method for 104 prajna vihara-~ interreligious dialogue and intercultural encounter. for panikkar, inter-faith dialogue helps raise new human and religious consciousness. to be able to do this, you don’t have to abandon your own faith, but you just have to deepen and extend it. he develops his rules for religious encounter, by emphasizing that you should not merely try to defend your own religion, you should be open to the truth of other religions. he further points out that religions must not be limited by past teachings, but must be able to adapt the teachings to the modern world. in regard to cultures, panikkar opposed the notion of one culture’s superiority to another culture, and that the view of one culture can be applied everywhere. panikkar also has his own view on science. even though he received a doctorate degree in science, panikkar views that modern science is based on belief, hypothesis, and principles that don't relate to the experience of the local natives and cultures. modern science, to him, is not based on neutrality and is not truly global. it is mainly based on the use of technology and wants man and the world to change and adapt to the rules of technology. panikkar prefers to learn from the forests, rocks, mountains and rivers. he realizes that mother earth has its own life and soul, and that our own souls and minds are not coincidences but are parts of the reality of this world. analysis and conclusion from the examples of ordinary people to national leaders, the word “sisyphean task” has been used to symbolize the struggle to perform a labor that seems to be unattainable and never-ending. the power of perseverance, as we term it, is the force that is behind the achievements of all these cases. yet, what these cases have shown is that there is no limit to what human can overcome or undertake if he or she is willing to sacrifice and persevere in order to follow dreams or missions in life. the refusal to get frustrated by the circumstances and limitations imposed on them is what set them apart. yet, we should realize that these individuals are not superheroes, but they are normal human beings just like the rest of us. it does not matter whether you are a man or a woman, rich or poor, from whatever background, hope springs eternally for those of us who are inspired to start a project and follow it to its end. to some, the inspiration comes from nothing but a sense of inner gratification to ramida jupatanakul 105 help others without wanting anything in return. to others, the motivational factor is the responsibility to help their own people to be free from religious or political persecution. some individuals performed their feats for the love of the fellow animals on this earth, while some did their jobs to help protect the environment. many share the feeling to create an awareness and sense of justice to fight against inequality of all kinds. the accomplishments that we have analyzed bring fame and recognition to some of these deserving recipients. but for many more, labors of love do not bring any monetary reward, or media coverage. but what these cases did bring is to raise awareness of the cause for the greater good and to instill social-consciousness in all of us. the “sisyphean task” almost always requires sacrificing personal life and even means exile from home. these undertakings require years to be accomplished and most tasks will not be finished in the person’s own lifetime. therefore, it is up to the next generation to carry on the work, all the while realizing that there is no limitation to what we can achieve as long as we possess the power of perseverance. visakhabucha day reminds us of the buddha’s own perseverance in his achievement of enlightenment. though the physical part of being human is important, it is the mental side that is the dominant force. the true test of our body means that we must overcome our mind first. for no matter how difficult a task the body is asked to perform, this task can be accomplished if we have the right mental frame of mind. practicing dharma can help us control our mind and understand the true meaning of life. it keeps us motivated and prevents us from falling into the mode of laziness. perseverance of the mind is therefore an essential part of practicing dharma and countering laziness. the path to enlightenment may seem unattainable to most of us, but peaceful mind and inner joy from being virtuous can surely be reached. endnotes 1íò¹øàò¾áë觤çòáà¾õâã. http://www.dhammajak.net/book/payayam/payayam10.php. (15 september 2010). 2www.sarakadee.com (15 september 2010). 3christopher titmus visionaries: the 20th century’s 100 most important inspirational leaders, pg 235-239. 4aung san suu kyi is the leader of burma’s national league for democracy, 106 prajna vihara-~ her party won a landslide victory in 1990. (king, 2005, p. 8). 5http://www.myhero.com/go/hero.asp?hero=dalilama. (16 september 2010). 6http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2010/06/despite_tensions_tibetans_ rema.html. (16 september 2010). 7he has won the wallenberg award, the albert schweitzer ward, and the nobel peace prize. (king, 2005, p.9) 8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/muhammad_yunus. (17 september 2010). 9www.aboutbuddha.org/english/life-of-buddha-4.htm/. (17 september 2010). 10http://medicinebuddhasangha.org/teachings/perseverance.html. (17 september 2010). 11www.aboutbuddha.org/english/life-of-buddha-4.htm/ (17 september 2010). 12http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt_2/hall.htm. (17 september 2010). references mahachula buddhist university. mahachula tipitaka. bangkok: mahachula press, 1996. dasaporn srikham. wish to be a buddha part i concerning the origin of buddha. bangkok: 2007. samritee buaramual. the myth of religion, cult and mythological belief. bangkok: khomkham, 2007. the power of effort. http://www.dhammajak.net/book/payayam/payayam10.php. (15 september 2010). bernard, evslin. heroes, gods and monsters of the greek myths. new york: four winds press, 2005. king, sallie b. being benevolence: the social ethics of engaged buddhism. honolulu: university of hawaii press, 2005. klemm, david e. hermeneutical inquiry. 2 vols. atlanta: scholars press, 1986. lopez, donald s. (ed.). buddhist hermeneutics. honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1988. olivia, coolidge e. greek myths. new york: houghton mifflin, 1977. payutto, p.a. buddhadhamma: expanded and revised. bruce evans (trans. and ed.), bangkok: buddhadhamma foundation, 1996. titmus, christopher, visionaries: the 20th century’s 100 most important inspirational leaders, p. 235-239. ramida jupatanakul 107 www.aboutbuddha.org/english/life-of-buddha-4.htm/(17 september 2010). www.dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt_2/hall.htmã www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/muhammad_yunus (17 september 2010). www.sarakadee.com (15 september 2010). www.thewip.net/contributors/2010/06/despite_tensions_tibetans_rema.html www.kalyanamitra.org/daily/dhamma (5 october 2010). www.myhero.com/go/hero.asp?hero=dalilama. (16 september 2010). www.thewip.net/contributors/2010/06/despite_tensions_tibetans_rema.html. (16 september 2010). http://medicinebuddhasangha.org/teachings/perseverance.html. (17 september 2010). 108 prajna vihara-~ 122-dialogue on differing asian can life be a criterion of persistence through time? a discussion of some ontological thesis by peter van inwagen carlo conni saint raphael university of milan, italy this work is centered upon some of the principal ontological topics to be found in the major texts by peter van inwagen. almost all his philosophical works fall into about four general areas. 1. the problem of free will, 2. the philosophical theology, 3. the ontology or metaphysics and logic of material beings 4. topics about the philosophy of modality. after some introductive remarks about the ontological general positions assumed by van inwagen, i’ll concentrate myself specifically about his conception of life and identity and the ways of changing and persisting through time of living beings1. 1. peter van inwagen between analytics and continentals in his general analysis concerning analytic contemporary ontology, van inwagen has distinguished two attitudes or two kinds of ontologists called respectively: a-ontologists and b-ontologists. a-ontologists attempt to say what there is in the world, to give a sort of list of all that there is without including anything that does not exist. according to van inwagen the list must of course comprise very general abstract terms like artifacts or material things (tables, statues, houses but also mountains or stones), material beings (living beings and simples, the latter entities without parts and indecomposable) or sets (abstract compositions of the entities listed above). the most representative a-ontologist is, according to van inwagen, w.v.o. quine. a-ontologists as quine are mainly concerned in an attempt to lay out the extension of being. what van inwagen calls b-ontologists try first of all to answer to the question: how are the entities of the world made, or how is the structure of the concrete entities of the world2? prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 27-48 27 © 2000 by assumption university press van inwagen admits not to understand much of what b-ontologists write. their favourite key-terms are tropes, bare particulars, immanent universals, and the entities of the world are generally viewed as bundles of tropes placed in the three spatial dimensions. nowadays, it is not still clear what is a trope. for instance, i can ask myself: how many tropes of white are in my shirt? tropes theorists are for instance peter simons but also leibniz was an ante-litteram friend of tropes3. but it is not even more clear what is an immanent universal. if simons affirms that a chair is composed of a bare particular and assorted tropes, d. m. armstrong4 a realist philosopher respect to universals can dispute this characterization saying that a chair is rather a bundle of immanent universals and their disagreement belongs to b-ontology concerning how the world is but not about what there is. but van inwagen’s disagreement with a-ontologists may be the most radical one. notoriously, the theory of material things presented by van inwagen has seemed to many philosophers a very strange one as the consequence of his denial that there are any of the things that the medievals called “substances existing by art” (tables, houses, etc.) or “substances existing by accident” (sticks, stones, severed limbs, etc.). van inwagen affirms to agree entirely with quine about the nature of what there is in the world as material entities placed in a four-dimensional space, and also about the scientific methods one should use in trying to determine what there is, but he disagrees almost entirely about exactly what there is. van inwagen agrees about the metaontology of quine that he defines as the highest development of what may be called the “thin” conception of being, as to say, that the concept of being is closely allied with the concept of number. to say that there are things or xs is to say that the number of xs is 1 or more and to say nothing more. the methods to investigate the nature of being are, as you know, those of natural sciences and higher order logic that for quine is nothing but set theory in sheep’s clothing, set theory disguised5. the third ontological position or conception of being mentioned by van inwagen is the philosophical continental tradition saying that ontology is the science of being as such. hermeneutics is an exponent of this conception. a practitioner of the science of being as such is engaged neither to lay out the extension of being nor to answer the question how is the world made. the science of being as such is concerned above all with 28 prajñâ vihâra the question of the meaning of terms like “there is”, “being” or “exists”. according to van inwagen the study of the meaning and the nature of being as for instance the heideggerian ontology, is a meta-ontology rather than a genuine ontology. for continental philosophers the being is instead a thick concept and they see the thin conception as a loss of the richness of being. according to van inwagen the mistake of analytic philosophers is to think that material objects and living beings are entities that can be analyzed at the same degrees as concrete particulars or individuals. the consequence of this standpoint is that the different ontological statuses and the different kinds of identity of these entities are missed. the so-called thick conception of being of continental philosophy, is founded, according to van inwagen, on the mistake of transferring what belongs to the “nature” of things to its being. according to van inwagen, to endorse the continental conception of being is to make the mistake of which kant accused descartes, the mistake of treating being as a real predicate. things have a nature and the mistake consists of transferring the properties belonging to the nature of a table or of a human being or of a universal to the being of the table and so on. this is in short the very idiosyncratic position of van inwagen between analytics and continentals. 2. identity and parts in material beings according to van inwagen, the problem of the nature of things and living beings is the problem of their specific identity. do material objects have a specific identity? do artifacts exist and have a specific identity? are artifacts real material objects as they are living beings? can we think that the same principles of identity, the same logical and conceptual strategies and procedures to establish the identity can be applied to material things and living beings ? we know that the metaphysics of material beings has come to be recognized as one of the most difficult parts of philosophy. in the philosophical panorama of the sixties it seemed to most philosophers that there was nothing but material beings and what was puzzling were rather sense-data, thoughts, universals or elementary particles. but the ontological puzzles the material beings raise are undeniable as the famous of the ship carlo conni 29 of theseus or more recent but almost equally famous cat tibbles and his tail tib. let’s summarize the puzzle of the cat tibbles in the following way: let’s sppose that at a certain time t tibbles is a cat normally endowed with a tail while at the time t 1 tibbles comes to lose his tail. we call tib the part of the cat without tail and continue to call tibbles the cat that at t 1 survives after he has lost his tail. in accordance with the matter of the puzzle at t tibbles, the cat all whole, and tib, tibbles less its tail, are perfectly distinguished since they have different forms and weight, while when tibbles at t 1 realy loses the tail in an accident then tibbles and tib become identical: (1) tibbles at t ≠ tib a t (2) tibbles a t 1 = tib a t 1 but if we assume, following an ontology of the common sense in other words the naive ontology of our every day life recognizing the principle of temporal continuity that the cat that has lost the tail would be always the same cat that first we have, we will have then that tibbles will be the same in the two temporal different moments even if tibbles at t is a cat with a tail while at t 1 is a cat without tail. the conclusion in (4) it is the passage that here instead we want to put in discussion since tib in the t instant is only a part, or a potential part of the cat, while to t 1 has become indeed an autonomous whole. in any case, if we admit the four passages then for the logical principle of transitivity of the identity which is easily seen from (2) (3) and (4), then it follows (5): (3) tibbles a t = tibbles a t 1 (4) tib a t = tib a t 1 (5) tibbles at t = tib at t contradicting clearly the premise in (1) where tibbles and tib were separate6. van inwagen underlines that in this puzzle there is a plain violation of the principle of the transitivity of the identity. the conclusion of this paradox is that an object can be identical to one of its parts. it seems natural to describe this puzzling episode in words that appear to entail that the cat become identical with a former proper part of itself, a violation of the modal principle that a thing and another thing cannot become a thing and itself. according to van inwagen, if we admit that: “the northern half of the eiffel tower is a concrete material particular in the same sense as that in which the eiffel tower itself is a concrete material 30 prajñâ vihâra particular”7, otherwise if we believe that the parts of the material beings really exist as the object itself, then we should accept a theory in disagreement with the ontology of common sense. we should deny diachronic identity through time and change. the crucial assumption made in the puzzle is that at t tib really exists in the same sense tibbles exists at t and tib at t 1 . this assumption is supported by a theory well known as mereological essentialism in which everytime an object loses a part we will have a new object with a new identity. the puzzle of tibbles has shown us a source of problems concerning the ontology of material beings. here is a list where, according to van inwagen, every thesis is a possible source of puzzles: any region of space that is wholly filled with solid matter is occupied by material objects that exactly fills it. any material objects whatever have a mereological sum. every material object has all its parts essentially. if an object x is the mereological sum of certain objects, the ys, then the ys have essentially the property of having x as their sum. material objects are extended in time in a way very strongly analogous to the way they are extended in space; objects that are extended in time are composed of temporal parts just as objects that are extended in space are composed of spatial parts. but the very strong metaphysical assumption that we ordinarily make in our common sense ontology is the transitivity of the identity. the fact that me, you and all material beings can persist through time as the same individuals or things. this metaphysical statements would be, according to van inwagen, the source of many paradoxes because their combinations lead to some violation of common sense. the combination of these principles together with the puzzles about material objects as the tibble’s one has led many philosophers to propose very differents identity theories for material beings. many philosophers have decided to quit the comfortable principle also called the standard view of numerical identity suggesting at least other three possibilities: identity must be relativized to kinds. it makes no sense to ask whether the object that is the ship x is identical with the object carlo conni 31 that is the ship y because x may be the same ship as y but not the same aggregate or collection of planks. identity must be relativized to times. x and y may be two objects at a certain time and later become numerically identical as in the case of the cat tibbles. identity can also be conceived as a relation that many things can bear to one thing not individually so to speak but collectively. for example certain trees numbering in the hundreds of thousands are identical with the forest of arden in belgium, the legs and the seat of a chair which are five in number are identical with one thing, the chair. that there are deep metaphysical problems about material objects is evident from the antinomies and paradoxes we have just seen. van inwagen has intended to present a theory about the nature of material beings that takes seriously the apparently paradoxical features of their unity and persistence. all paradoxes involve not only material objects but crucially the parts of those material objects. no such paradoxes can be raised in connection with objects that were not composed of parts, then the metaphysically puzzling features of material beings are connected in an essential way with the problem of constitution of objects by their parts. what is parthood? answering to this question become more and more important for every ontological theory. does the word “part” mean the same thing when we speak of parts of cats, parts of tables, parts of poems, parts of games, parts of events? according to van inwagen, there is one relation called “parthood” whose field includes objects and things like elementary particles which are not clear cases of material objects. but there is another relation called parthood defined on events, another one defined on stories and so on through an indefinitely large class of cases. the analogy between these cases is no doubt, as etymology would suggest, grounded in the idea of “cutting a thing” but cutting in re and cutting in intellectu are two very different things8! 3. the special composition question the very analysis that, so to speak, has made famous and relevant the ontology of van inwagen is called “the special composition question”. 32 prajñâ vihâra the question is the following: “in what circumstances is a thing a proper part of something?” but according to van inwagen this formulation can be misleading because it begins in medias res. it is not helpful to ask: in what circumstances is a plank a part of a ship? but rather: in what circumstances do objects compose or form something? we can try to answer these questions in a similar as way to questions: “when do grains or stones make a heap?”9. and we could answer: when the relevant elements are disposed or configurated as a heap, or as a ship. what is crucial are not the plank or the stones, the apparently parts of the ship or of the heap, but the ship/heap form or structure. we are asking a question about the mutual relations that hold among various objects of the same type in virtue of which they are bound together into a specific kind of whole. but it seems that these relations are established independently from the parts or the kind of the parts. then the stones or the planks are not the very proper parts of the respective wholes. the relevant relations between parts, defining the notion of proper part, are well defined only internally to the entire whole constituted by the material object. we can say that a house is made of bricks but also that the north half and the south half compose the house, and of course there is no inconsistency in saying both that the bricks compose the house and that the two halves compose the house. according to van inwagen we cannot explain the nature and the identity of a whole from its parts, then the question is: “when does unity arise out of plurality?” according to van inwagen, any answer concerning contact, fusion, contiguity between material parts does not offer the right solution to the special composition question. i believe we can rightly interpret van inwagen saying that we cannot move out from parts to wholes without still knowing the identity of the whole, without answering the question: what is that? what is it? we have to know the characteristic or typical relations between its parts. we cannot simply answer the question what are the proper parts of a things as a house without establishing what is a house. are the elementary particles, the molecules, the bricks, the walls and the doors, the genuine parts of a house? no clear answers to these questions can be offered without leading to paradoxical situations. here we have a clear application of the classical principle of quine: no entity without carlo conni 33 identity, in a very closed sense we could say: no parts without the identity of the whole. van inwagen argues that there are at least two extreme answer to the special composition question. the first is the nihilist one, the second universalism. the thesis of nihilism is that: “it is impossible for anyone to admit that something is such that parts or xs compose it because nothing, any entity in the world, is such that the parts or xs compose it”10. nihilist are for instance the physicists who believe physical world consists entirely of quarks, leptons, bosons, etc. the nihilist says that there are no composite material beings, there are only physical simples. a simple is an object whithout proper part belonging to physical matter. the identity of a thing is strictly equal to the mere composition of the simples. nihilism corresponds to a form of very extreme nominalism or mereologism. on the contrary, the thesis of universalism argues that if something exists is such that some xs compose it. according to universalism for every group of xs we have different possible sums (sets) one of those necessarily corresponds to the relevant present object. these sums of the xs exist already before the xs effectively composing these sums, in the sense that we could at least think or have a grasp of these sums. for instance a sentence like: “i exist now” is denied by the nihilist because we have no i or self, but it is not denied by the universalist, while the sentences: “i exist now and i existed one year ago” “i am an organism (in a biological sense) and i have always been an organism”. are denied by the universalist because the same parts cannot compose the same objects simultaneously nor succesively. blocks of matter can set out both the salisbury cathedral or the colosseum. the same set of blocks can bring into existence a model of these two buildings. for the universalist “the sum of those blocks” is merely a definite description that needs no temporal qualification. in this respect it is like the proposition “the set containing just exactly those things”. universalism, according to van inwagen, is not an answer to the special composition question because it is a principle about summation, not composition. according to van 34 prajñâ vihâra inwagen, the universalist denied the existence of an identity through time and also a principle of structural continuity between the slices of time of an individual. j. locke, for instance, was not a universalist. van inwagen defends the thesis that such things as me and you exist and strictly persist through time. in his view human beings provide the clearest examples of material beings that are composed of different parts at different times. 4. the answer to the special composition question. simples and lives what is the answer to the special composition question? when do we have a real case of parthood? what must be done to cause objects or parts to compose something? when do objects compose or form something? if material things are nothing but aggregates of simples and do not dispose of identities they do not have parts. van inwagen believes that the correct answers to these questions are radically different from what most philosophers have supposed. according to van inwagen, we have real composition only in the case of living beings. his answer to the special composition question is the following: <the xs compose y if and only if y is an organism and the activity of the xs constitutes the life of y>. what is an organism like? the material beings we call organisms have parts and the properties of organism are at least to some extent determined by the properties of their parts. the thesis that the properties of organisms are not wholly determined by the properties of their parts is sometimes called holism but van inwagen does not take a very clear position about this point, maybe holism is true may be it isn’t. what it is important is the fact that we have now a principle establishing that the composition is a matter only of living beings: <every physical thing, every material being is either a living organism or a simple>. but then, what are the medium size objects of our every day life? what then distinguishes mere artifacts or aggregates from real material beings? what is the criterion between these two kinds of entities? according to van inwagen, we do not need a criterion because we have just lives and simples. carlo conni 35 what this principle fundamentally means is still not clear because it can means that an entity can be a material being either if it has proper parts or not. a real proper part of something is not a thing simply spatially contained inside another bigger thing but it is an entity whose existence, identity or functionality are determined by the whole to which it belongs. it seems that in van inwagen’s approach, to be a proper part means to be an essential proper part or better to be an intrinsic or pregnant proper part. according to van inwagen, suppose there is something that is neither a simple nor an organism, since it is not a simple it has proper parts. since it is not an organism it has no proper parts, then our supposition would be impossible. so, in which sense an artifact does not have proper parts? the answer of van inwagen is because they do not really exist, they are only a form of rearrangement of the furniture of the world, as to say, a rearrangement of simples. an organism may be thought of as a thing whose intrinsic nature determines how it is to change its parts with the passage of time: “also a simple fits this abstract characterization of what it is to be an organism. its intrinsic nature determines that it is always to be composed of the same parts […] we can say that all physical objects are organism either degenerate or living […] we might in fact think of simples as degenerate organisms”11. a table could not be an organism since if they were tables, they could change their parts purely as the result of the application of external forces. do these assumptions entail that organisms are composed of simples? one might suppose – this is aristotle’s view of the matter – that organisms have no proper parts and that they are composed of absolutely continuous stuff. however, today we know empirically that living organisms are not composed of continuous matter. we could alternatively suppose that organisms have proper parts and that every proper part of an organism is composed of proper parts. for instance a man is composed of cells and the cells in their turn are composed of subcells and so ad infinitum. again, we can again take it as empirically false. what can we say more about the notion of “simple”? van inwagen believes that: “the notion of simple is just a functional not a structural or ontological notion. if current physics is right, then it seems fairly clear that the category “simple” comprises quarks, leptons and gauge 36 prajñâ vihâra bosons. but perhaps current physics is wrong – or at any rate incomplete”12. let us make a very simple example to better clarify in what sense we have to intend the notion of an inclusion of a part into a material being as a living being. take a mountain like the everest. what are the parts that intrinsically belong to the everest? we can remove many blocks of stones without stopping the everest to exist. doing so we can change the shape of everest without losing it. how many blocks of stones we have to remove to lose the everest? as you know well, we do not have a univocal answer to these questions because the identity of the everest is independent from the matter and the shape which effectively compose and characterize it. with the proper name “everest” we refer to a mountain which is exactly localized by well-defined spatial coordinates while the material and individual identity’s criterions for the everest are in any case vague. concerning organisms we can find out the continuity of the structural and formal conditions of identity of an individual determining which kinds of parts must belong to the individual. in the case of artifacts we do not have any constraints to determine which effectively are the proper parts of an artifact. we can easily show as in the case of the heap that grains are not the proper parts of the heap. it is rather the existence of that kind of shape which make us affirm that the heap exists. the mountain and the heap go on existing as a mountain and a heap if and only if they continue to show their tipycal shape that determine their specific identity but not their individual identity. as a matter of fact, from a logical point of view and also from a mere mereological one, we cannot establish which are the true essential parts of the everest or of an individual determined heap. 5. the structure of life as a criterion of persistence in his research van inwagen tries to account in which way an organism is composed by its proper parts in an essential way differently from material things as mere aggregates or rearrangement of simples. van inwagen also assumes a critical standpoint about the problem of identity across world, about the problem of specifying the class of circumstances in which an object that in fact exists would have existed: “none of these carlo conni 37 “problems” in my view is a real problem”13. to do that van inwagen states an ontological principle called life. i think this principle could offer an answer to the question: what is life? but i don’t believe it can really establish why certain parts can be essential proper parts of a living beings. i think a principle like the one i proposed in my precedent paper can instead offer a more complete ontological criterion to account for the existence of essential proper parts, specifically the fact that proper parts should be in existential dependence on one another14. in the van inwagen’s principle we have a characterization of life as a self-maintaining event but not any self-maintaining event is a life because also a flame or a wave are self-maintaining events. life is a selfdirecting event because it is a reasonably well-individuated event. there is a reasonably clear answer to the question whether a life that is observed at one time is the same life as a life that is observed at another time or place. if a life is at present constituted by the activities of simples xs, as it is established in the answer to the special composition question, and years ago was constituted by the activities of the ys, then it seems natural to identify the two events if there is a continuous path in space-time from the earlier to the present space-time location along which the life has propagated itself. a flame is a self-maintaining event satisfying this constraint but does not seem to be nearly so well individuated as a life. for instance we cannot transfer life as we can with the wave, fire or flames. according to van inwagen now that we have somehow grasped what is meant by a life, we can restate the proposed answer to special composition question: in what circumstances are objects proper parts composing something? the xs compose y if and only if the activity of the xs constitutes its life. x is a proper part of y if and only if y is an organism and x is caught up in the life of y. this solution is good even if prima facie it can leave a little unsatisfied. a problem of vagueness seems to emerge from this definition. we know that for the quantistic laws we are not able to state if an atom or an electron, in generally an elementary particle, is or not a proper part of something. it is a vague question. however it is not vague if a certain organ or a small piece of tissue is or not a part of a bigger organism. the vagueness concerning the elementary particle of organisms is a consequence of the intrinsic quantistic vagueness while at the level of proper 38 prajñâ vihâra parts this kind of vagueness is lacking as in the case of the example of the brick where it is easy to establish if the brick belongs to the house or not. i think the argument of van inwagen about the non-existence of material artifacts is not really convincing. i believe it is true that artifacts are not substances but i do not believe van inwagen has offered us a plausible argument for this shareable assumption. in sum, the argument is that objects or artifacts do not have proper parts because they are nothing but aggregates of simples and then simples cannot be proper parts of artifacts. i think that material things in order to have proper parts need an identity that does not depend on their parts or their nature. we can demonstrate this statement by illustrating the fact that: if simples do not constitute the identity of artifacts, then simples cannot constitute the proper parts of living beings because in this case they would not be substances but just aggregates. the proper parts of living beings are then some relevant complex parts of an organism in a way van inwagen has not illustrated yet. i think that the right way to establish what is a proper part of something should start from the specific identity of the whole entity. the right way is top down and not bottom up. it is the nature and the identity of the whole material beings that determines in an essential way what is a true proper part of them. the proper parts of a human being are not the same proper parts (for instance carbon atoms or something like that) of a unicellular living being and that depends on the specific identity of the living being. if we believe that identity plays an important role in order to determine the proper parts of a material being then we can now try to answer the crucial question about when in general do organisms persist through changes in time. it would be nice to have an answer to the special composition question that would at least suggest an answer to the great puzzle concerning their identity across time of material being. does our answer to the special composition question suggest an answer to the question: under what conditions does one and the same organism continue to exist? according to van inwagen, it is doubtful whether any answer to the special composition question can logically commit us to any thesis about the persistence of objects through time. van inwagen believes that locke has already offered an answer which is very close to his own. this carlo conni 39 is locke’s answer: “an animal is a living organized body and consequently the same animal is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body”. this is a passage of the famous section of locke’s essays identity and diversity. however, van inwagen does not agree with locke’s view that a certain person or thinking substance is not essentially a living animal and therefore is not essentially a man. actually, in locke’s view an organism such as an oak tree or a man is at any given moment of time spatially conterminous with an object that is numerically distinct from it: a certain mass of matter, and typically the oak or the man will be conterminous with different masses of matter at different times. each of the successive masses of matter associated for instance with me is a sort of momentary recipient of my life. on the contrary, in van inwagen’s view there does not exist any mass of matter numerically distinct from the living persisting being. van inwagen rejects the thesis that there are lockean masses of matter. the part of locke’s thesis about organism accepted by van inwagen is the following. van inwagen calls this principle life and it tells us when an organism persists. life: <if an organism exists at a certain moment, then it exists whenever and wherever the event that is its life at that moment is occuring. more exactly if the activity of the xs a t 1 constitutes a life and the activity of the ys a t 2 constitutes a life, then the organism that the xs compose a t 1 is the same organism that the ys compose at t 2 if and only if the life constituted by the activity of the xs a t 1 is the life constituted by the the activity of the ys at t 2 >. organisms persist as the same organisms in virtue of life persisting. it is important to underline immediately that in order to apply this principles we should know when the life persists. the life principles do not absolve us of our obligation to say as much as we can about the persistence of lives. i also wonder whether the life could be an intrinsically persisting individuated event or anything else. let us first examine the question of the temporal continuity of lives. if a life is going on a t 1 and is not going on at the later time t 2 , is it possible for it to be going on at the later time t 3 ? can the life of an organism stop and then start again? can a life fall into two parts separated by a temporal pause? 40 prajñâ vihâra suppose that a man’s heart stops beating and then he stops breathing and suppose that a doctor is able to start his heart beating again, can we say that the man who has been recovered is the man who was stricken by the heart attack?. we shall assume that we can. however, it is not completely sure that a man’s life is not going on when his heart is not beating or even when blood is not circulating in his vein. we can imagine a more difficult case. suppose we take a healthy cat and freeze it. suppose we then revive the cat. it seems clear that the revived cat is the cat we started with. but it also seems clear that the cat’s life ceased when it was frozen. there is only one cat in our story. according to van inwagen, if life is suspended, then it is not disrupted, and a life is not disrupted if and only if the atoms, the simples, of which the cat is composed, continue to be bonded to one another by the complicated movements of electrons, photons, etc. if they were not so bonded the frozen cat certainly would dissolve into atomic nuclei. we can now rewrite life in this way: <if the activity of the xs at t 1 constitutes or results from a life, and the activity of the ys at t 2 constitutes or results from life, then the organism that the xs compose at t 1 is the organism that the ys compose at t 2 if and only if the life that the activity of the xs at t 1 constitutes or results from, is the life that the activity of the ys at t 2 constitutes or results from>. life has then important consequences for the persistence of organisms. temporal and material continuity is necessary for the persistence of lives of organisms. but is spatial and material continuity a sufficient condition for the persistence of life? this is a very important point because it concerns the problem of cells division and those of embryonic growth. locke formulated two identity criteria through time, one for the persistence of organisms and one for the persistence of persons. the first one is typically called lockean continuity while the second is the well known principle of the continuity of consciousnees and memory in the same person through time. let us take the classical material continuity. suppose that the activity of the xs constitutes a life at the time t 1 , suppose that a few of the xs cease to be caught up in that life and suppose that those of the xs that have ceased to be caught up on that life are replaced by some ys in such a way that the ys and the remnant of the xs constitute that life. suppose that this process of replacement continues in time until carlo conni 41 all the xs are replaced by the ys. is this life the same life that was constituted by the xs? the lockean answer is: yes it is. however, there are episodes of biological change that raise the question whether a life b which is spatiotemporally continuous with life a, and which is connected with life a by the lockean continuity may or may not be the life of a different organism. cell division and embryonic growth raise questions about the application of the concept of lockean continuity. another sort of case, specifically metamorphosis, suggests that two numerically distinct lives may be continuous with each other in the proper lockean sense. let us first examine cell division. what happens to the life of an amoeba, a life just composed of one cell, during the mitotical process of fission in two cells? we have three possiblities. (1) the first option is that the life of the amoeba divides. an instant before it began to divide, the activity of the xs according to the answer to the special composition question – constituted the life of the amoeba while an instant after the fission the activity of the xs still constitutes a life but now are some ys or zs constituting the life of the two amoebas. we would have a situation where two lives as to say to living beings – would be parts of just one and the same bigger life. this answer would yield the result that every amoeba is a virtual part of a vast scattered living being. this hypothesis is implausible because, according to van inwagen, there must be some sort of causal interaction between the two or more separated parts of the bigger organism. the causal interaction would have to be continuous in time and space but this is not the case. in sum, we would have just one life and just one organism even if completely scattered in space and time. (2) the second option says that the old life of the amoeba is transferred to one of the daughter cells, and the other is somehow provided with a new life. we must have just two organisms not three or four with just one life. according to van inwagen that would be arbitrary and absurd. (3) the old initial life ends. the life of each daughter cell is a new and distinct life. the initial simples, the xs, stop to compose anything and their activity no longer constitutes a life. new simples begin to constitute a life and the preceding simples dissolve. if it is that the right account of the cell division then the beginning of a life is still a real mystery because where do new simples originate from? according to van inwagen, it is tricky to develop the hypothesis demonstrating that the question whether lockean spatio42 prajñâ vihâra material continuity is a sufficient condition for the persistence of a life. we should like to say that the life of the cell has ceased when its chromosomes begin to split. but at least as far as we know there is nothing in the observable facts of cell division to prevent us from saying that the cell’s life ends much later in the mitotic process at any time before the actual material separation of the daughter cells. but if the life of the amoeba ceases at any time before the actual physical separation we have a case of life ending without any apparent break in the lockean spatio-temporal continuity of the process of life. the speculative description of the metaphysics of mitosis by van inwagen entails that in most of the mitotic process there is not one but at least two or three lives consituted by the activity of the simples, and this description entails no break in the continuity of that process. the ontological questions about the continuity of life raised by sexual reproduction are even trickier than the questions raised by cellular fission. what happens, metaphysically speaking, when a sperm unites with an egg? according to van inwagen the sperm enters the egg and then each one ceases to exist – the simples that compose the sperm stop composing the sperm and the simples composing the egg stop composing the egg, then the simples of the sperm and of the egg begin to compose a new material being, a zygote. the new life begins and the old constituents of the precedent organisms sperm and egg are absorbed by it. a new living being now exists generated out of the simples that composed the sperm and the egg. it is sometimes said the a zygote develops into a new individual, that a zygote is the starting point of an individual that tomorrow will be for instance a person. according to van inwagen, this statement cannot be true because the zygote is a new individual from the starting, in latin ab initio, that does not evolve in anything, instead at certain point in time of its life stops existing. it would not be true that you and i were once zygotes. about thirty hours after fertilization the zygote will divide mitotically. if what we have said about the metaphysics of cellular fission is correct then the zygote will cease to exist after the fission. but in this case you and i have never been zygotes. whenever we came into existence it was more than thirty hours after our conception, the normal lifetime of a zygote. carlo conni 43 what happens to a zygote during its fission? there would seem to be three possibilities. we can have the following views of the metaphysics of embryonic development. (1) the zygote a stops existing at t 1. at t 2 neither b nor c nor anything else is a. (2) the zygote a replicates itself and continues to exist as identical to its replica, at t 2 either b or c is still a. (3) the zygote a changes its structure from one-celled to a twocelled organism. at t 2 a is just the mereological sum of b and c. van inwagen favors possibility (1). the case (2) seems arbitrary and incongruent with the leibnizian laws. an entity cannot be identical with two, three or millions of entities. (2) is also inconsistent with the thesis the we were once zygotes because we will be then always zygotes for all our life. (3) is the possibility chosen by those who think we were once zygotes and still are. the advocates of (3) believe that after the fission of a there is no longer any such cell as a. for them a is an individual composed at t 1 by one cell as part, at t 2 by two cells, at t n by n-cells as its proper parts. the advocates of (3) will say that the individual a has billions of cells as its parts. the bad point is the way of thinking and speaking supported from the expression one-cell organism. if there can be a one cell-organism then surely there can be a two-cell organism? but a one cell organism is just a cell, then two-cells are just two cells. according to van inwagen, it does not follow from the fact that the zygote is an organism and hence a real material being that the two-cell embryo that replaces the zygote is a real unique object and not two objects simply connected. why should we believe that there is something, an individual, that b and c compose? the two cells adhere to each other but it seems we have no reason to suppose that the two material objects compose a singular individual thing. according to van inwagen, while the zygote is really a single unified organism no such statement can be made about two cell embryo. the hypothesis of van inwagen is that it seems more plausible to state that we have really two living beings not one. the simples that compose b and the simples that compose c do not jointly compose anything. the crucial question is now: when does a multicellular organism, a singular individual, begin to exist? according to the answer to the special 44 prajñâ vihâra composition question: we have no artifacts but just arrangements of simples, and according to the principle life: an individual life is something composed by the activity of the simples composing it. b an c together seem to be just cells that are arranged “embryonically”. we know that these cells can begin to compose something when their activity begins to constitue a life. but then when is this? when b and c begin to compose and constitute a life? the answer of van inwagen is: i don’t know. certainly not earlier than the organization of cell differentiation and certainly not later than the development of a functioning central nervous system, which in the case of human beings, takes place about twelve days after conception. according to a research in progress by barry smith and berit brogaard, a human being begins to exist at the sixteenth day. according to the argument of the sixteen days the embryo begins at this stage to be transtemporally identical to the future human being and person15. if we look at the discussion below we see no necessity to state that b and c are composing an individual. b and c are also biologicallly and existentially independent from each other. it seems that b and c do not compose a substance because there is not any existential dependence between them. for van inwagen to state the birth of an individual we have to wait for the moment in which the cells begin to enter into a sort of activity constituting a life. the difficulty is to establish exactly when it happens. it seems to me that speaking of existential and biological dependence relations between parts is more appropriate than simply speaking about activity of simples. according to van inwagen, the boundaries of life are vague but in any case it is sure for him that the life of an individual begins later than that of a one-cell life like the one of a zygote. it seems evident that the lockean spatio-material continuity is not a reliable criterion to state the persistence through time of the existence of a material being. neither in the hypothesis that subsists continuity nor in that continuity not verified, the life of a living being would be able indifferently to stop or continue. it seems then that they are the conditions that constitute the structure of life to constitute the principle of persistence of an individual or a material being. we know that the life of an individual can not be transfered to another individual. we cannot imagine mental experiments of biological and physical transfer of a life in another material being. we are not able to dispose criterions of individuation and discrimination of a carlo conni 45 life from that of another individual, distinguished independently from the physical and qualitative aspects of the individual himself. the numerical singleness of a life is not something guaranteed by the numerical and qualitative singleness of an individual living being in flesh and blood but from the maintenance of the life’s structure. there are not many lives in a material being while to times it seems we could distinguish many material individual beings in just an organism. let us take for instance the colonies of lichens. but even if it is the case that individuals do not persist in their individual or specific identity the persistence of life appear to be a sufficient condition to the persistence of an individual because the continuity of life is an event intrinsically independent by the manifold physical and qualitative changes of a material being in which the life is ontologically grounded. as we continue to live we continue to exist as individuals. our life perhaps is begun in a moment not well determined during our embryonic development and probably it will stop in a flash not well specified. whenever my life began, it was already going on when i was born. there is a vagueness that appear insurmountable. although in the course of our existence as individuals, we undergo radical physical and biological transformations it throws into question our continuous identities. however, we would not be able, under no circumstances, to affirm that our biological actual life is another in comparison with our past life. the life seems presuppose as its essential ontological conditions the change across time of its physical conditions of subsistence as a stable emerging structural phenomenon 16. the life of the organism that i am and that emerged from that period of growth and development is my life despite the fact that it is continually constitued by the activity of different simples. in this sense we could say that the event that is our life would have occured under an infinite array of different material circumstances. 6. conclusions the important point to underline is the apparent inadequacy of the lockean principle of continuity. material and spatial continuity does not constitute sufficient criterion to determine if an entity is still through time the same entity or if a life is still the same life. many philosophers today 46 prajñâ vihâra talk of ontological vagueness concerning a high number of predicates. it would be vague the boundaries between life and death. predicates as rich, tall, clever would be vague. but also the qualitative identity of living beings would be vague. what are the right boundaries of the waves? when do the mountains begin? when exactly did napoleon’s decline start? what are the exact space-temporal boundaries of the french revolution? at what age do we stop being children? are these a kind of vagueness concerning intrinsically our language and our conceptual system or is it also a real ontological vagueness 17? van inwagen affirms that if his answer to the special composition question is correct then the relation part-whole is vague. and it will also be the notion of the continuity of identity. in fact there are simples such that it is neither definitely true nor definitely false that the activity of those simples constitutes a life. there will be then events of which it is neither definitely true nor false that those events are lives. we have said that a human embryo in the early stages of its development is a mere virtual object, a mere mass of cells. in the early stages of embryonic development the activity of these cells does not constitute a life. but will there be a moment at which the activity of these cells constitutes a life? must there be an intermediate mathematical point beween these two phases? for this question we will have just a vague answer as to the question at which moment the last glaciation has finished. individual human lives and also artifacts are infected by vagueness at both sides of their existence, at the beginning and at the end. the analytic ontology and mereology studying the boundaries of things seem threatened by these possible conclusions. carlo conni 47 endnotes 1 i will refer in the article to the following texts by peter van inwagen. (a) (1981) the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts, rep. in p. van inwagen (2001 ed.). (b) (1990) material beings, cornell university press, ithaca (ny). (c) (1990b) four-dimensional objects, rep. in van inwagen (2001). temporal parts and identity across time, “the monist”, 3, pp. 437-59. (d) (2001) ontology, identity and modality. essays in metaphysics, cambridge university press, cambridge (ma). (e) (2001 ed.) time and cause. essays presented to richard taylor, reidel, dordrecht. (f) (2002) metaphysics, westview press, boulder. 2 see p. van inwagen (2001: 2). 3 by p. simons see (1994), particulars in particular clothing: three trope theories of substance, “philosophy and phenomenological research”, 54, 3, pp. 553-75, and (2000) identity through time and trope bundles, “topoi”, 19, 14755. 4 see d. m armstrong (1978), nominalism and realism. universals and scientific realism, 2. voll., cambridge university press, cambridge, and (1980), identity through time, rep. in van inwagen (2001 ed.). 5 w. v. o. quine (1969), ontological relativity and other essays, columbia university press, new york and london. 6 on tibble’s puzzle see d. wiggins (1968), on being in the same place at the same time, “the philosophical review”, 77, 90-95. p. simons (1987), parts. a study in ontology, clarendon press, oxford, pp. 117-121. 7 p. van inwagen (1981: 191-192). 8 p. van inwagen (1990: 19). 9 p. van inwagen (1990: 21). 10 p. van inwagen (1990: 72). 11 p. van inwagen (1990: 98). 12 p. van inwagen (1990: 158). 13 p. van inwagen (1990: 161). 14 see c. conni (2004), husserlian pregnant wholes as an ontological criterion for individuals and objects, “prajñâ vihâra. the journal of philosophy and religion”, vol. 4, 2. 15 b. smith & b. broogard (2003), sixteen days, “the journal of medecine and philosophy”, 28. 16 on the topic of emergent structures see my c. conni (2005), identità e strutture emergenti, bompiani, milan, forthcoming. 17 there is today a large debate on vagueness. you could see m. tye (1990), vague objects, “mind”, 99, 535-57. t. williamson (1994), vagueness, routledge, london and new york, and a. varzi (2004) vagueness, “dialectica”, forthcoming. 48 prajñâ vihâra 06_an insight into unvamuno's existentialism.pmd an insight into unamuno’s existentialism and the tragedy of human existence monday lewis igbafen ambrose alli university, nigeria º·¤ñ́ âèí ¤çòá¤ố ¢í§áôàกå à´ íù¹òáùâ¹è (1864-1936) ¹ñก»ãñª­òèµçããé·õè 20 ªòçê໹ ñ́̈ íâùèã¹กåøèá»ãñª­ò íñµ¶ôàòç¹ôâáã¹»ãðçñµô»ãñª­òµðçñ¹µก ¤óçèò �íñµ¶ôàòç¹ôâá� áõ¤ó¨óกñ́ ¤çòáëã×íกòãµõ¤çòá·õèëåòกëåòâáµèกç»ãð¹õ»ãð¹íá กñ¹ä´é¨¹กãð·ñè§íò¨กåèòçä´éกçéò§ æ çèò ëáòâ¶ö§»ãñª­òáëè§กòã´óã§íâùè¢í§ á¹øéâì¹ñè¹àí§ »ãñª­òá¹ç¹õéàกõèâç¢éí§กñºกòãµõ¤çòááåðกòãºããâòâ¶ö§»ñ­ëò àªô§íñµ¶ôàòçðáåð»ñ­ëò¢í§กòã´óã§íâùè¢í§á¹øéâì·õèà»ç¹ãù»¸ããá ·ñè¹ð¢í§ íù¹òáùâ¹è·õèáõµèí¸ããáªòµô·õè§èí¹á§è¹¢í§á¹øéâìáåðกòã´óã§íâùè«öè§กç¤×í »ãðêºกòã³ì·ñé§ëåò⺹âåก¹õé¹ñ鹨ð»ãòก¯ã¹ë¹ñ§ê×í¢í§à¢ò·õèª×èíçèò �¤çòáëáòâ¢í§ªõçôµ·õèãñ¹·´� ã¹ë¹ñ§ê×í ñ́§กåèòçíù¹òáùâ¹èµõ¤çòáçèò á¹øéâì¹ñé¹ »ãðกíº´éçâ¤ùèêø´âµè§ ëã×í¤ùèµã§¢éòá¢í§¤çòáàª×èíáåð¤çòáê§êñâ ¤óí¸ôºòâ ¤çòá¤ố ¢í§íù¹òáùâ¹è áê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò á¹øéâì¤×íë¹èçâ·õè»ãðกíº é́çâêêòãáåð ô̈µëñçã¨áåð¾ø· ô̧»ñ­­ò ́ ñ§¹ñé¹á¹øéâì̈ ö§à»ç¹ë¹èçâ¢í§¤çòáàª×èíáåð¤çòáê§êñâ ·õèáºè§áâกäáèä é́ º·¤çòá¹õéçô¾òกéì¤çòá¤ố ¢í§íù¹òáùâ¹è à¾×èíáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò á¹ç¤ố ñ́§กåèòçṺá¹è¹กñº¤çòá¤ố àã×èí§âèก¹ò¯กããá¢í§á¹øéâìíâèò§äã abstract the thought of miguel de unamuno (1864-1936), a twentieth century spanish philosopher, belongs to the genre of existentialism in the history of western philosophy. the term ‘existentialism’ has diverse but reconcilable definitions or interpretations such that it can be broadly accepted to mean the philosophy of human existence. it is concerned with 72 prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 72-96 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ the interpretation and description of existential issues and problems of human existence that are concrete. unamuno’s views on the contingent nature of man and his existence __ earthly experiences __ are mainly contained in the tragic sense of life. in the book, unamuno construes man as a composite of two oscillating extremes or opposites of faith and doubt. an account of unamuno’s thought shows that “just as man is a concrete matter-and-spirit, heart-and-intellect unit, so is he an indivisible unit of faith and doubt”. this paper is a critical engagement with unamuno’s thought with a view to showing how its grapples with the notion of (human) tragedy. unamuno’s existentialism in general the characterization of philosophic existentialism as that which addresses itself substantially to the “personal” or “concrete” rather than the “impersonal” or “abstract” is true of unamuno’s philosophy to the extent that his primary philosophical interest is the value of the individual person. by this, we mean that unamuno’s philosophical object and subject of inquiry is the man of “flesh and bone”4 and not the abstract man of plato, for example. this is how unamuno describes the object and subject of his philosophical concern: the man of flesh and blood; the one who is born, suffers and above all, who dies; the man who eats and drinks and plays and sleeps and thinks and wills; the man who is seen and is heard; the brother, the real brother.5 this view accounts for why ferrater mora argues that unamuno is not concerned with abstractions but people of flesh and blood, complex and concrete people.6 it is for a reason such as this that unamuno denies the appellation of “a philosopher”, given the traditional belief that philosophers are generally people who are obsessed with abstractions. it is for the reason of excessive indulgence in abstract rationalization that unamuno seeks to dismiss classical philosophies, especially on the strength of having paid little attention to human attitudes that are invariably concrete. monday lewis igbafen 73 according to unamuno, the human person is the subject and supreme object of all philosophy. the reason is that man is the end of all things. in other words, “man is an end, not a means. all civilization addresses itself to man, to each man to each i”.7 as a matter of fact, unamuno’s existentialist philosophy is literally a philosophical inquiry into what constitutes a human person in terms of both his inward attitude and outward action. according to unamuno, in most of the histories of philosophy that i know, philosophic systems are presented to us as if growing out of one another spontaneously, and their authors, the philosophers, appear only as mere pretexts. the biography of the philosophers of the men who philosophized occupies a secondary place. and yet it is precisely this inner biography that explains for us most things.8 by this view, unamuno introduces a radical dimension to existential philosophizing to the extent that he does not only concern himself with concrete human situations and existence (which are the traditional domains of existentialist philosophers) but what lies within man. the inner composition of man which unamuno is so much interested in shall be made clear as we progress in the exposition of his philosophy. at this point, it becomes important to note that a significant philosophical tradition which unamuno’s thought is often contrasted with is rationalism, the philosophical doctrine which views the cognitive power of human person as the most significant aid to him. in a rationalist tradition, “reason” is held supreme as the best attribute of man. this is, for example, exemplified in the philosophy of aristotle which construes man to be a rational animal. to be sure, the thesis which all rationalist philosophers seek to defend is that “man is a natural creation in a natural world of cause and effect: and that with the aid of reason we can master nature, manipulate society, change culture and indeed shape ourselves.9 unamuno’s thought is not only a substantial negation and rebuttal of rationalism but also an affirmation of emotional virtues of man. he argues that, 74 prajna vihara ~ _ _ man is said to be a reasoning animal. i do not know why he has not been defined as an affective or feeling animal. perhaps, that which differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason. more often, i have seen a cat reason then laugh or weep.10 unamuno thus views emotion rather than reason as a distinguishing feature between man and other animals. he says the merely and exclusively rational man, is an aberration and nothing but an aberration.11 closely related to this is unamuno’s idea that philosophizing is not wholly a rational exercise, given the argument that the will or heart is more active in every philosophic exercise. according to him, philosophy is a product of the humanity of each philosopher, and each philosopher is a man of flesh and bone who addresses himself to other man of flesh and bone like himself. and let him do what he will, he philosophizes not with reason only but with the will, with the feelings, with the flesh and with the bones with the whole bone and whole body. it is the man that philosophizes.12 unamuno further argues, philosophical answers to our need of forming a complete world and of life, and as a result of this conception, a feeling which gives birth to an inward attitude and even to outward action. but the fact is that this feeling, instead of being a consequence of this conception is the cause of it. our philosophy __ that is our mode of understanding the world and life __ sprang from our feeling towards life itself. and life like every thing affective has roofs in subconsiousness perhaps in unconsciousness.13 unamuno thus believes that the depths, range and complexities of human existence are such that reason by itself is insufficient to grapple monday lewis igbafen 75 with them. or in the words of bernard e. melcard, “we live more deeply than we can think”.14 these views capture embodied ideas or facts about irrationalism, the existentialist temper which “draws our attention, in a dramatic way, to the fact that human reason is limited”.15 in this context, hegel’s philosophy which makes reason an “utmost stuff of all things” and other related philosophies are regarded as a foil to be destroyed in unamuno’s philosophy. according to unamuno, the doctrine of rationalism which abides solely by reason or objective truth is necessarily materialist. he thus views rationalism and materialism as one and the same, since they both mean nothing else than the doctrine which “denies the immortality of the individual soul, the persistence of personal consciousness after death”.16 for example, unamuno argues that while hegel made famous his aphorism that all the rational is real and the real rational, there are many of us who, unconvinced by hegel, continue to believe the real, the really real is irrational, that reason builds upon irrationalities17 arthur schopenhauer shares a similar irrationalist viewpoint.18 like unamuno, he argues that the “real” or “ultimate reality” is the irrational. upon this philosophical mindset, it is inevitable for unamuno to hold a low opinion for knowledge that does not promote emotional feelings and desires of man. in fact, an account of unamuno’s epistemology shows that he discriminated among a hierarchy of knowledge in favour of spiritual knowledge. by spiritual knowledge, he means knowledge at the service of emotion, passion, faith and that which helps to nurture the belief in immortality. as unamuno poignantly puts it, all knowledge has an ultimate object. knowledge for the sake of knowledge is, say what you will, nothing but a dismal begging of the question. we learn something either for an immediate practical end or in order to complete the rest of our knowledge. even the knowledge that appears to us to be most theoretical __ that is to say of least immediate application to the non-intellectual necessities of life __ answers to a necessity which is less real because it is intellectual to a reason of economy in thinking, to a principle of unity and continuity of consciousness. but just as 76 prajna vihara ~ _ _ a scientific fact has its finality in the rest of knowledge, so the philosophy that we would make our own has also its extrinsic object it refers to our whole destiny, to our attitude in face of life and the universe.19 by this rendering, unamuno is particularly critical of science and knowledge based on reason. he explores a series of argument to protest the usefulness of scientific knowledge. for example, he argues that “science exists only in personal consciousness just as astronomy, mathematics have no other reality than that which they possess as knowledge in the minds of those who study and cultivate them”.20 explicit in unamuno’s rejection of science is the explanation that it cannot satisfy man’s highest or deepest desire for immortality. this is how unamuno puts it, i do not know why some people were scandalized, or pretended to be scandalized, when brunetieòre proclaimed again the bankruptcy of science. for science as a substitute for relation and reason as substitute for faith have always fallen to pieces. science will be able to satisfy and in fact does satisfy, in an increasing measure, our logical or intellectual needs, our desire to know and understand the truth; but science does not satisfy the needs of our heart and our will, and far from satisfying our hunger for immortality, it contradicts it.21 the reason unamuno gives for the inability of science to meet the supreme desire of man is well brought out when he says, any knowledge that cannot or does not prove that the soul is immortal or that the human consciousness shall preserve its indestructibility through the tracts of time to come or cannot or does not prove that individual consciousness can persist after the death of the physical organism upon which it depends should be committed to flames to use the words of hume.22 monday lewis igbafen 77 unamuno’s denigration of science and other related knowledge claims is thus predicated generally on the strength of the argument that they only promote human understanding of reality. yet, to unamuno, “the end of life is living and not understanding”.23 c. robert and k.m higgins argue that unamuno bemoaned the failure of objective science and reason to answer life’s questions and defended a version of subjective truth.24 having explored the poverty of science for not being able to solve the ultimate questions of life, unamuno is faced with the question about what life’s questions are. according to unamuno, life’s questions are issues about man’s ultimate end __ immortality. he argues that science or reason teaches that immortality is highly problematic and absurd. or to be more exact, “reason teaches us nothing in this connection and thus leaves us in a state of perplexity”.25 a further scrutiny of unamuno’s rejection of objective science and reason shows that his epistemology is anchored on a foremost theme of his philosophy, namely, “the longing not to die, the hunger for personal immortality”.26 jose mora views the theme of immortality as the most insistent in unamuno’s thought. the desire for immortality is such a central phenomenon in unamuno’s thought that mora argues that, faced with the question, what is the most important problem for man? unamuno would have declared in all likelihood that it was the question of the soul’s ultimate destiny, that is, whether or not the soul is immortal.27 as we have seen, this view is perfectly or wholly true of unamuno’s philosophy of human existence, given that there is no desire that is as fundamental to man as that of self-preservation and self-perpetuation. unamuno is definite in asserting this supreme desire when he says, eternity, eternity! __ this is the supreme desire! the thirst of eternity is what is called among men, and whosoever loves another wishes to eternalize himself in him. nothing is real that is not eternal.28 in unamuno’s thought the term “eternity” is often interchanged 78 prajna vihara ~ _ _ with immortality since both depict or satisfy man’s instinct of self-perpetuation, that is, “to be forever, to be without ending”.29 unamuno’s ethics is man-centered to the extent that “goodness” is measured according to the extent to which it guarantees the preservation and perpetuation of man on earth. given this, unamuno argues that, … what end is goodness? is it perhaps an end in itself? good is simply that which contributes to the preservation, perpetuation and enrichment of consciousness. goodness addresses itself to man, to the maintenance and perfection of human society which is composed of men. and to what end is this? “so act that your action may be pattern to all men” kant tells us.30 it is clear from the formulation of his ethics that unamuno is emphatic that for the actions of men in human society to be adjudged as good and moral, they must be tailored towards the realization of human perpetuity or immortality. however our brief mention of unamuno’s ethics here is to justify a fundamental conclusion. it is that the theme of immortality is the single thread that ties together other themes in unamuno’s philosophy. unamuno’s use of immortality in this context is ambiguous. it is not so clear whether by the term he means a spiritual phenomenon only. in its most straight forward form, the term “immortality” refers to a belief which expresses that the soul survives the biological death of the body. this form of immortality is expressed by most, if not all religions or religious people like the christians, moslems and hinduists. c. agulanna argues that the belief in immortality is not only held by religious people alone, given that philosophers such as plato, descartes, kant as well as most human cultures including african culture,31 have all held views that can be readily used to justify belief in the immortality of the soul. however, what is common in the various notions of immortality and which is the defining idea of immortality, is the treatment of the soul as a separate entity different from the (physical) concrete man. from his numerous examples, it is clear that unamuno adopts a position regarding the idea of immortality that is quite different from the one which is found, for example, in the tradition of judea-christian monomonday lewis igbafen 79 theism. for example, unamuno argues that, when doubts invade us and cloud our faith in the immortality of the soul, a vigorous and painful impulse is given to the anxiety to perpetuate our name and fame, to grasp at least a shadow of immortality. and hence this tremendous struggle to singularize ourselves, to survive in some way in the memory of others and posterity. it is this struggle, a thousand times more terrible, than the struggle for life that gives its tone, colour and character to our society, in which the medieval faith in the immortal soul is passing way. each one seeks to affirm himself, if only in appearance.32 j. mora succinctly captures such a distinction in the analysis of unamuno’s idea of immortality in the following words, although … he often used the vocabulary of the platonic __ christian tradition, his purpose was not the same. in fact, it is misleading to speak of unamuno’s idea of the soul in any terms that suggest an entity separate or separable from the body. even though we shall be obliged to use this same terminology, as unamuno was the “soul” “immortality” and immortality of the soul __ it must be remembered that the real problem that concerned unamuno was that of the individual human death.33 implied in unamuno’s notion of immortality, therefore, is the fact that it is not exclusively a metaphysical phenomenon. to be sure, unamuno agrees that the term “immortality” embodies more than the immaterial to include all other concrete material things that man does on earth to keep his name or memory in perpetuity, since to keep one’s name in perpetual remembrance is not to die. consequently, unamuno tied his notion of immortality to all worldly endeavours because as he argues, every worldly endeavour is shaped by man’s desire to perpetuate himself. unamuno insists that, 80 prajna vihara ~ _ _ if a man who tells you that he writes, paints, sculptures or sings for his own amusement, gives his work to the public, he lies; he lies if he puts his name to his writing, painting, status or song. he wishes, at the least, to leave behind a shadow of his spirit, some __ thing that may survive him.34 this, again, shows concretely that immortality, as a concept is used by unamuno to describe not only a metaphysical phenomenon but such concrete actions of man which are aimed to perpetuate himself, his memory, his name even after death. it is the same thing as saying that for life to be meaningful, we need to have a sense that we are contributing to something beyond ourselves. or as amalia elguera puts it, if logically pressed, unamuno’s desire for immortality can be considered as a desire to be in history forever.35 this position of unamuno, however, raises the question as to whether man can really live forever by a landmark of material achievements. our scepticism derives from the fact of history that a time will be or come when the so-called (material) achievements will disappear into oblivion. leslie muray has rightly argued in this vein when he said that “contributing to posterity, to future generations, to the on-goingness of history and so on are, however, all insufficient and inadequate; they are all transient, subject to perpetual perishing”.36 unamuno is, perhaps, aware of this, hence he avers that there is no guarantee that man will realize his basic desire for personal survival after death. such scepticism can be found in unamuno’s argument that it may be that “it is extinction that awaits us at death, that this fundamental human desire will be frustrated”.37 by this scepticism, unamuno introduces a veil of uncertainty about man’s ultimate destiny. it is such a theatre of uncertainty that defines the tragic nature of man and his existence. unamuno and the tragic nature of human existence at the heart of unamuno’s philosophical thought is the idea that monday lewis igbafen 81 human existence typifies tragedy. it is his characterization of human existence as tragic that earned unamuno the appellation “the philosopher of tragedy”.38 the germane question that follows from the above is: what does it mean to exist tragically since tragedy has assumed a signification for human existence? the dominant notion of tragedy is one which has defining features of grief, horror and sadness. it is for this reason that some scholars like nietzsche and aristotle have employed the word “tragic” or “tragedy” to depict an extreme human grief, horror, suffering and so on. but, again, as we earlier showed, unamuno is one philosopher who used the word “tragic” or “tragedy” from a different perspective. far from identifying the word with its popular connotation, unamuno uses the word to describe a number of human attributes and experiences that are invariably concrete, for example, the instinct of self-preservation, that of self-perpetuation, the experience of ambiguity, the inextricate mixture of desperation and hope and so on.39 from this clarification, it becomes clear that our initial question, as to what it means to exist tragically, can best be explained within the purview of unamuno’s ontological account of man as an indivisible unit of “faith” and “hope”, “reason” and “feeling”. unamuno implies that the human person is not wholly rational; neither is he purely an irrational being. he is at the same time rational and irrational. in any case, it is the warring coexistence of “reason” and “feeling”, according to unamuno, that defines his true contingent nature. unamuno argues, neither the one nor the other of these positions satisfied us. the one is at variance with our reason, the other with our feeling. these powers can never conclude peace and we must needs live by their war. we must make this war, of war itself, the very condition of our spiritual life.40 from the above clarification of what the nature of man entails, it would appear that a genuine human existence is a composite of ceaseless warring coexistence of opposites, for instance, of “reason” and “faith”. this is the case because in this struggle, neither reason nor faith is less important, given that “the struggle between opposites and each opposite with itself is not the result of logical contradiction but the very core of the tragic dyna82 prajna vihara ~ _ _ mism of life”.41 in this context, it is axiomatic that though “reason” and “faith” are construed as “enemies”, none can maintain itself without the other. by this, unamuno means, that the irrational demands to be rationalized and reason only can operate on the irrational”.42 this suggests that both reason and faith or the opposites are compelled to seek mutual support and association. thus to say that human existence is tragic, according to unamuno’s lexicon, is to hold that existence is “continually torn by the enimity __ which acts through the coexistence of warring provocations: the will to be and the suspicion that one can cease to be, feeling and thought, faith and doubt, certainty and uncertainty, hope and desperation”.43 as highlighted previously, man’s strongest desire, according to unamuno, is the hunger for immortality. it is the desire for immortality that causes each man to “cry out in anguish: i will not die”.44 indeed, unamuno argues that the most profound and shattering of all human experiences is death, including our awareness and anticipation of it. according to him, if we do not live forever nothing has value and everything is absurd. but unamuno does not accept absurdity or meaninglessness of human existence in its entirety, given his hope for immortality. the search for immortality is linked to unamuno’s understanding of god. to be sure, unamuno finds solution to the insolubly linked problems of immortality and meaning of life in the existence of god without which man’s existence is absurd, void and meaningless. according to leslie muray, unamuno finds the solution to the insolubly linked problems of immortality and meaning of life in an image and concept of god that is quite suggestive of panentheism.45 for one, unamuno takes a swipe at the doctrine of pantheism as typified by benedict spinoza’s philosophy because, according to him, it harbors atheistic tendencies. he argues that: if the belief in the immortality of the soul has been unable to find vindication in rational empiricism, neither is it satisfied with pantheism. to say that everything is god, and that when we die we return to god, or more accurately, continue in him, avails our longing nothing; for if this indeed be so, then we were in god before we were born, and if when we die we return to where we were monday lewis igbafen 83 before being born then the human soul, the individual consciousness is perishable.46 he further says, and since we know very well that god, the personal and conscious god of christian monotheism is simply the provider and above all the guarantor of our immortality, pantheism is said, and rightly said to be merely atheism disguised: and in my opinion, undisguised.47 this view clearly puts unamuno on the camp or divide of christian monotheism. however, a cursory look at his concept of god reveals, in a significant way, that unamuno’s idea of god contrasts with the doctrine of christian monotheism. the reason is that unamuno desires god not as creator, judge or redeemer, but only as guarantor of immortality. he thus denies the creative power of god as the creator of heaven and earth and everything thereof. to be sure, he believes that the knowledge of god as creator cannot aid man to understand the world and human existence. in his words, in no way whatever does the idea of god help us to understand better the existence, the essence and the finality of the universe. that theme is a supreme being infinite, absolute and eternal, whose existence is unknown to us, and who has created the universe is no more conceivable than that the material basis of the universe itself, its matter is eternal and infinite and absolute. we do not understand the existence of the world … better by telling ourselves that god created it. it is a begging of the question, or a merely verbal solution, intended to cover up our ignorance. in strict truth, we deduce the existence of the creator from the fact that the things created exists, a process which does not justify rationally his existence.48 this is why even though he is classified among christian existen84 prajna vihara ~ _ _ tialist philosophers; it remains a subject of intense debate whether or not unamuno believes in the christian god. but some scholars like amalia elguera wondered why this should be debated at all since according to him, it may surprise the reader of the tragic sense that the question should arise at all for the book states that god is man’s creation and as such a divinity, even if it were real, could not possibly be christian. moreover, unamuno envisages a deity not only anthropomorphic but hermaphroditic: the notion of replacement of the trinity by a quaternity through the assumption of the virgin mary into the godhead is put forward both in the commentated life of don quixote and the tragic sense.49 a view such as this accounts for why, though classified among christian existentialist philosophers, it remains a subject of intense debate whether or not unamuno believed in the christian god. in any case, this doubt, as we have earlier indicated, issued from unamuno’s unique conception or idea of god. to participate in that debate as to whether or not unamuno believed in the christian god, is beyond the scope of this work. suffice it to say that unamuno situates his understanding of god and the meaning of immortality in the experience of death. he believes that it is the encounter with death that leads us to the quest for immortality and the search for meaning which “culminates in the sense that our lives matter to god, that our experiences in their ambiguity are preserved in the divine memory”50 this is what gives us, according to unamuno, a sense that our lives are worthwhile, significant and meaningful in an ultimate and abiding sense. paradoxically, unamuno argues that there are no absolute guarantees and certainties about such a faith, given that the search for immortality is full of its own paradoxes. put differently, there is a perpetual contradiction in man’s desire for self perpetuation. by this, unamuno means that man hovers in a vague mean between “immortality” and “mortality”, “life” and “death”, “faith” and “doubt”, “being” and “nothingness”. in this dual attitudinal setup, unamuno believes that a complete scepticism in monday lewis igbafen 85 favour of one out of the two extremes would amount to a denial of the essential nature of man. in unamuno’s words, ‘the tragic history of human thought is simply the history of a struggle between reason and life __ reason bent on rationalizing life and forcing it to submit to the inevitable, to morality; life bent on vitalizing reason and forcing it to serve as a support for its own vital desires’.51 j. mora explicitly crystallized this idea of unamuno when he says, when experience and common sense join forces with reason, the conclusion is inescapable: human death is a certainty, and immortality at best an illusion. the denial of immortality or impossibility of proving it is, therefore, the virtual equivalent of the affirmation of death. but as unamuno says the “yes” lives on the “no”. or more accurately man’s life swings between the “yes” and the “no”. this oscillation of judgment does not however, lead us to a sceptical suspension of all judgment; but rather leads us to permanent restlessness. it is another manifestation of the perpetual struggle of opposites which touches off the cosmic “civil war” in the midst of which all things live.52 by this rendering, it is true that unamuno seeks to exalt the virtues of “war” and permanent struggle, given his insistence that there is no possible solution to the conflict that characterize human existence. in other words, unamuno believes that the motif of human existence is “a permanent struggle”. buttressing this point, mary giles argues that in unamuno’s philosophical scheme, a human being is human “insofar as he is conscious of himself as being doomed to physical death and yet, in the anxiety of this awareness, struggling not to die”.53 this is better explained by j. mora when he argues, there is no reconciliation and peace in unamuno’s truly dynamic universe, whether it concludes only the minds of men or also that of god. here war plays the part of the heraclitean “father of all things”. but although heraclitus admitted the existence of a certain cosmic rhythm __ the 86 prajna vihara ~ _ _ rhythmic alternation according to which the universe travels an upward and downway unamuno dissociates existence from any thing that might for so much as an instant diminish its unbending “furring”. what we term “peace” is found only in war. thus unity and identity are both present in unamuno’s universe. but they exist as much as any thing does, within the framework of an unending battle. they struggle to hold their ground and they push forward __ through unsuccessful __ toward ultimate domination.54 it is clear from the foregoing that unamuno’s philosophical thought is suggestive of the fact that a genuine human being is one who knows no peace. man is simply a bundle of tension, since human existence in all ramifications must necessarily be dogged by ceaseless tension of contradictions. in this sense, a human person or existence portrays a battle ground for eternal conflict such that to live as a human being is to live in “agony, in permanent tension between opposed elements within ourselves and particularly between, on one hand, reason’s commands and on the other, the force of those irrational elements within ourselves that are so important for our lives”.55 unamuno is thus inclined to extol the virtues of war. he says war has always been the most effective factor of progress, even more than commerce. according to him, it is through war that the conqueror and conquered learn to know each other and in consequence to love each other56 unamuno employs this same element of war to describe and interpret human existence. so far, what obviously stands out from our analysis of unamuno’s thought is that human existence is devoid of “peace”. consequently, if human existence is characteristically devoid of “peace”, so to speak, a negative interpretation of unamuno’s philosophy as that which views human existence as tragic and meaningless holds. there is, however, a dynamic characteristic feature of unamuno’s existentialist philosophy. it is its dialectical flavour, given its emphasis on opposition, tension and contradiction. this raises the question about the value of dialectics in unamuno’s existentialism. is dialectics in unamuno’s thought the same as that found in philosophies like hegelianism and marxism? examining the dialectical aspect of unamuno’s existentialist thought would further illuminate his idea of human person and existence. monday lewis igbafen 87 dialectics in unamuno’s thought the term “dialectic” which derives from the greek word dialelik means “the art of examining the truth or validity of theory or opinion, especially by question and answer”.57 the lexicographic meaning of dialectic is thus suggestive of the fact that it is a method that places emphasis on disagreement or conflict, given that the art or exchange of opposition (question) and counter-proposition (counter-question) connotes disagreement or contradiction. broadly perceived as a method, therefore, dialectic functions as an argumentative framework through which disagreement, conflict or contradiction may be resolved. in philosophy, the term “dialectic” is significantly traceable to socrates. as a logical method of philosophy, it originated from the socratic method of cross-examination; that is, cross-examining one’s assertion in order to draw out inherent contradictions or falsities within his position. this is clearly demonstrated in plato’s dialogues, where, for example, socrates is reported to have engaged euthyphro in a discussion about the meaning of “piety” thus: euthyphro replies that the pious is that which is loved by the gods. but socrates points out, the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. euthyphro consents that this is the case. therefore, socrates reasons at least one thing exists which certain gods love but other gods hate. again euthyphro consents. socrates concludes that if euthyphro’s definition of piety is true then there must exist at least one thing, which is both pious and impious, which euthyphro admits is absurd.58 this summarizes the socratic dialectical method, which is also known as socratic irony. it is all about leading one to first accept and confess ignorance and then discover the truth by himself. since socrates, however, the term “dialectic” has assumed a wide variety of uses in philosophy. its most technical forms are expressed in the philosophies of immanuel kant, g.w.f. hegel and karl marx (181888 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 1833). for example, kant uses the term to describe “the contradictions and errors in which reason gets entangled when it attempts to operate beyond the limits of possible experience”.59 an examination of hegel’s philosophy shows that his dialectical philosophy is directly a response to the kantian view. he construes dialectic simply as a logical pattern of thought; the overall pattern being thesis, antithesis and synthesis.60 by this, hegel implies that thought (the object of analysis) proceeds by contradiction (thesis/antithesis) and is in turn reconciled by a fusion of the contradictory ideas or opposites (synthesis). marx on his part agrees with hegel on the main features or nature of a dialectical approach to the extent that it is a process by which one element (the thesis) is contradicted by an opposing element (the antithesis) and both dissolving into a form of synthesis; a reconciliation of the thesis and antithesis. the detail examination of kant or marx’s or hegel’s dialectical philosophy is not our main concern here. suffice to note that marx’s dialectic differ from hegel’s ontologically in that marx’s dialectic represents a materialist interpretation of reality while hegel is idealistic and spiritual. in any case, they both express a common temper or tendency that there is a unity or reconciliation to the tension of opposing ideal, conflicts or contradictions within a dynamic dialectical framework. in contrast, there is a significant variation in unamuno’s dialectical thought even though the foregoing understanding of the word also significantly permeates his philosophy. this is so because of unamuno’s loyalty to opposition, contradiction, tension and conflict. in fact, unamuno perceives almost everything mainly from the perspective of tension, opposition and struggle. for example, unamuno argues that a human person or existence is concretely a bundle of contradictions. he further says, some may espy a fundamental contradiction in every thing that i am saying now expressing a longing for unending life, now affirming that this earthly life does not possess the value that is given to it. contradiction? to be sure! the contradiction of my heart that says no! of course there is contradiction. who does not recollect these words of the gospel, “lord i believe, help thou my unbelief?” contradiction! of course! since we only live in and by monday lewis igbafen 89 contradictions, since life is tragedy and the tragedy is perpetual struggle without victory or the hope of victory life is contradiction.60 a significant understanding which derives from this turns on the fact that unamuno appropriates the term “dialectic” as a descriptive category in that dialectic in his lexicon depicts a human theatre of conflictual opposites or attributes in relation to an oscillating warring coexistence, for example, between faith and doubt or, simply say, between thesis and antithesis. but unlike the dynamic dialectical worlds of hegel and marx, there is no reconciliation (synthesis) of opposing elements or ideals in unamuno’s truly dynamic dialectical nature of man and his existence. unamuno rightly underscores this when he says “we have arrived at the bottom of the abyss at the irreconcilable conflict between reason and vital feeling. and having arrived here, i have told you that it is necessary to accept the conflict as such and to live by it”.62 the denial of a synthesis or final harmony thus sets unamuno’s dialectical system significantly apart from the conventional dialectical systems. j mora poignantly expresses the inherent distinction of unamuno’s dialectic when he argues that while conventional dialectical systems attempt to describe and explain the attributes of the cosmos as an impersonal being, unamuno’s dialectic is an entirely personal nature, that is, it is exclusively about human existence and experience. mora further says, all the philosophers who have tried to describe reality as a dialectical process of some sort --nicholas of cusa and giordano bruno no less than hegel have built conceptual systems in which the opposites end in reunification in the bosom of some ultimate and all embracing principle. the war between particulars finds peace in the absolute generality of the essential one, so that the principle of identity overcomes in the end, all contradictions… but in unamuno’s world animated by the principle of perpetual civil war and unending strife, there is no place for any final harmony and still less any identitywhich would be in his opinion, the equivalent of death.63 90 prajna vihara ~ _ _ from the foregoing, we can summarize two important differences between unamuno’s dialectic and traditional dialectical systems. first, unamuno’s dialectic is personal rather than impersonal as in the case of hegel. secondly, underlying unamuno’s dialectical understanding is a principle of irreconcilability in contrast to that of reconciliation or unification in other forms of dialectic. upon this dialectical mindset, it is not surprising that unamuno perceives the authentic human person, human existence or life as one characterized by struggles, contradictions and tension. according to unamuno, the battle goes on forever; reason and faith, doubt and belief, thought and feeling, fact and desire, head and heart are united by an association in war, the only opposition in which they can survive since “each lives on the other” and feeds on the other there being no third party to rejoice in or benefit from the struggle, no absolute unity or supreme harmony to lay peace between the antagonists. the only attainable peace lies in the eye of this powerful hurricane but the eye subsists only because the hurricane moves on.64 by the instrumentality of dialectic, unamuno presents thus a frightening testimony of a human person and existence, such that the human person who ordinarily looks simple, plain and peaceful is interpreted in his philosophy as a most complex entity seething with confusion and contradiction. it can, therefore, be said that the dialectical method functions in unamuno’s philosophy to bring out concretely the tragic nature of a human person and his existence. critique of unamuno’s existentialist thought it is glaring from unamuno’s truly dynamic world that nothing can be taken for certain since he argues that life without uncertainty is plainly unbearable and with absolute certainty there can be no room for faith or hope.65 monday lewis igbafen 91 this implies that in unamuno’s world nothing can be taken for absolute certainty and absolute doubt are both alike forbidden to us. in fact, unamuno perceives a tragic sense in human life arising from the certainty of death and scepticism surrounding man’s immortality. such a view or position about human existence smacks of great tepidity, scepticism, despair and pessimism. it is bad enough not to be sure of oneself. neither is it good to be in a permanent struggle or war. besides, unamuno’s underestimation of reason in the scheme of things is contestable. his philosophy, in this regard, is diametrically opposed to a very common and popular affirmation of reason, and that man should be judged on a high scale of rationality. in this vein, godwin sogolo argues that the conception of man as a rational being connotes a basic quality which all human beings are thought to share in common.66 this portrays “reason” as a superior entity and thus the most important aspect among the (inner) parts of man including emotion, passion, desire and feeling. in view of this, traditional philosophers have tended to warn against the danger of being controlled by one’s passions and desires. for example, plato and the stoics are unanimous and unambiguous on their underestimation of the emotional aspect of man. in his ethics, plato describes the moral man as man whose life is always controlled by reason and is always keeping his passions in check.67 j. omoregbe argues that the stoics went beyond plato in their mistrust of the passion and advocated complete suppression or even complete eradication of the passion.68 similarly, and as we underscored in the preceding chapter, hegel's conception of philosophy is affirmative and rationalist. he argues in support of a rationalist philosophy which is capable of giving a priori knowledge of the ultimate structure of reality.69 baruch spinoza (1632 1677) and rene descartes, are also among a motley of rationalist philosophers who taught that reason was the ultimate source and standard for determining the truth and certainty of human knowledge.70 as we sum up the critical exposition of unamuno’s philosophical thought, it is necessary to raise objections, particularly to the central thesis upon which his philosophy is based: the concept of immortality. first, it is necessary to observe that there is a high level of inconsistency in unamuno’s thought in respect of immortality. though he (unamuno) may see it as part of contradictions that define the “tragic sense of life”, the impression one 92 prajna vihara ~ _ _ gets at the beginning of his philosophical voyage is about a philosopher who has nothing to do with metaphysical disquisitions. his initial emphasis on what is concrete suggests that he is a man of “it-is-what-i-see, touch or hear” that matters. what this implies is that the power of unamuno’s philosophy is weakened by his clinging to religious rationalizations. as he consistently argues, “nothing is real that is not eternal”.71 this is essentially a statement of the absurdity of life without immortality. yet, unamuno’s understanding of immortality, as already underscored, is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. besides, unamuno thinks that his notion of immortality strikes every one with equal interest and appreciation. in this context, scholars and philosophers like david hume, john stuart mill, kai nielsen and clarence darrow would not take unamuno seriously because they all reject the immortality thesis. based on the difficulty involved in proving it, empirically or scientifically, they regard a belief in immortality as a mere wishful thinking. or what sigmund freud would call “a figment of imagination”. for example, darrow argued that ‘there is perhaps no more striking example of the widespread belief in immortality. perhaps evidence can be found to support a positive conviction that immortality is a delusion’.72 on his part, kai nielsen described the belief in immortality as both incoherent and unreasonable. he further says, conceptions of the afterlife are so problematic that it is unreasonable for a philosophical and scientifically sophisticated person living in the … twentieth century to believe in life eternal, to believe that we shall survive the rotting or the burning or the mummification of our present bodies’73 closely related to this is unamuno’s emphasis on the existential self, to the extent that he argues not only for a search for immortality but also the need to fight to keep its existence. francis wyers regards this aspect of unamuno’s thought as “ontological greed”, given the refusal to let go of the self even after death. according to wyers,”why such an emphasis on the self... the largest part of this ontological greed comes from unamuno’s unresolved passion for his own immortality; which he took quite literally as meaning that he would never experience the cold monday lewis igbafen 93 hands of death nor would he be reabsorbed into god but rather that he would forever suffer and celebrate the knowledge of his own existence”.74 the fear that b.e. stone expresses in this regard is that a mixture of ontological greed and the impossibility of being able to imagine the world without us would lead to a great suspicion of life itself.75 afterall, unamuno says, “if we die utterly, wherefore does everything exist? wherefore?”76 finally, it is important to note that a great of suspicion of life itself has been given existential import by unamuno’s mystification of a human person and his existence. from the exposition of his philosophical thought, it is clear that unamuno has a very fearful and dreadful picture of man which culminates in viewing man as a bundle of unending confusion, tension and contradiction. j.f mora says that the only “formal principle” which permeates unamuno’s thought may be stated as follows “to be is to be against one self”77 note and references 1unamuno, m. 1921 the tragic sense of life. london: macmillan. 2this description can be found in gerald brannan’s commentary on the back cover of the tragic sense of life. 3see amalia elguera, “introduction” to the tragic sense of life. 2. 4the phrase “flesh and bone” is used by unamuno to describe a concrete human person in contrast to abstract conception of man; for example, in platonism and hegelianism. 5unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 21. 6mora, j.f. 2003 three spanish philosophers unamuno, ortega and ferrater mora. new york: state university of new york press. 34. 7unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 30 8unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 21 22. 9masolo, d. 1994 african philosophy in search of identity. edinburgh: edinburgh university press ltd. 126. 10unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 22--23. 11unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 111. 12unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 54. 13unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 54. 14muray, l.a. 2003 god, immortality and lived experience in unamuno, see this at http://wwwfind articles.com/p/articules/mi-qa4044/is200310/ai93/9200/pg.2. 94 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 15omoregbe, j. 1991 a simplified history of western philosophy vol. three. lagos: joja educational research and publishers ltd. 42. 16unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 92. 17unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 24-25. 18for detail of arthur schopenhauer’s irrationalism, see michael rosen, op. cit., p. 679. 19unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 33-34. 20unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 47. 21unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 113. 22unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 113. 23unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 124. 24solomon, r.c and higgins, k.m. 1996 history of philosophy. new york: oxford university press. 268. 25mora, j.f. three spanish philosophers. 48. 26unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 52. 27mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 47. 28unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 55. 29unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 55. 30unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 46. 31agulanna, c. 2001 an african perspective on death and the crisis of existence. a ph. d thesis in the department of philosophy, university of ibadan nigeria. 21. 32unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 67. 33mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 47-48. 34unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 66. 35elguera, a. introduction, unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 15. 36muray, l.a. god, immortality and lived experience. 37unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 51. 38among scholars who describe unamuno, m. as “a philosopher of tragedy” is mora, j.f who is sufficiently known for his commentaries on the works of major spanish philosophers. 39mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 34. 40unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 115. 41mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 37. 42unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 120. 43mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 37. 44mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 54. 45muray, l.a. god, immortality and lived experience. 46unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 99-100. 47unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 100. 48unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 164-165. 49unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 16-17. 50muray, l.a. god, immortality and lived experience. monday lewis igbafen 95 51unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 123. 52mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 54. 53giles, m.e. 1992 “miguel de unamuno”. in great thinkers of the western world. mcgreal, ian ed. new york: harper collins publishing. 458. 54mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 44. 55unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 120. 56unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 120. 57watson, o. 1968 (ed) longman modern english dictionary. london: longman group limited. 290. 58for this, visit http: //www factbites com/topics/dialectic. 59immanuel, k. as cited by sayers, s. 1993 review of ian hunt’s analytical and dialectical marxism. aidershot and brook fold vt. avebury. www.kentiac.uk/ secy/philosophy/ss/hunt-pdf. 60omoregbe, j. 1991 a simplified history of western philosophy vol. 2 lagos: joja education research and publishers limited. 132. 61unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 32. 62unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 131-132. 63mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 39. 64mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 40. 65miguel de unamuno, op. cit., p.125. 66sogolo, g. 1993 foundations of african philosophy a definitive analysis of conceptual issues in african thought. ibadan: ibadan university press. 68. 67omoregbe, j. 2004 comparative philosophy: east and west a comparative analysis of asian and western philosophers. lagos: joja press ltd. 39. 68omoregbe, j. comparative philosophy. 39. 69michael rosen, op. cit., p. 677. 70jones, w.t. 1969 a history of western philosophy: the classical mind (new york: harcourt brace and world, inc; see rationalism under glossary. 372. 71unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 55. 72darrow, c. 1973 the myth of immortality a modern introduction to philosophy edwards, p. and pap, a. eds new york: free press. 261-253. 73nielsen, k. 1989 the faces of immortality death and afterlife davis, s.t. ed london: macmillan press ltd. 1. 74wyers, f. as cited by stone, b. e. 1999 god and postmodernity: unamuno and westphal http://members.tripod.com/on soficiphile/unawest.htm. 75stone, b.e. god and post-modernity. 76unamuno, m. the tragic sense. 43. 77mora, j.f. the three spanish philosophers. 39. 96 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 147-154 islam and ecology pros and cons of globalization from asian perspective wook chang yonsei university, seoul, korea abstract i would like to discuss what the asian nations should accept and what they should reject from the western nations. as we all know, the common ultimate end of man is the selfperfection and self-achievement as a rational being, as a person. therefore, the primary task of all nations should be the promotion of the common human values, which transcend all racial, ethnic and cultural differences, in view of that common human end. the ultimate purpose of globalization also cannot be other than the promotion of such common human values. as is known, western culture is founded upon the two pillars of the judeo-christian culture and greco-roman culture. the western nations should retain these original inspirations of their culture and should promote such spiritual values as freedom and human rights, which are of christian inspiration. while it is true that the asian nations have much to learn, and accept, from the western culture in the areas of human and empirical sciences and in technology, they should, however, resist as much as possible the infiltration of the more decadent aspects of present-day western culture, which manifest themselves in the concrete forms of secularism, materialism, utilitarianism, hedonism, neoliberalism, and militarism. concept of globalization we know that many things are rapidly coming together on earth. but we do not always know what comes together, in what ways, and for what reasons. to initiate the search for the what, the how and the why in prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 37-50 37 © 2000 by assumption university press globalization, we can adopt a working definition. for example, we can take the definition given by roland robertson. according to him, “globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”.1 we can start with examining this definition. we notice that it is a nominal definition lacking a concrete content. it contains two components: the compression of the world and the accompanying growing consciousness thereof. the words, “compression” and “intensification” convey the ideas of shrinking, accelerating, fortifying, strengthening, and so forth. one might question if such a subjective moment as “the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” should be included in the definition itself. the insertion of such a subjective element, however, at least brings to light the fact that globalization is not a mechanical process but a historical one. but then, the insertion of consciousness is not sufficient. what is required here is the human subjectivity which would include human voluntary action. i think that globalization as the shrinking of the world itself should be understood both in the objective sense as a historical fact or process and in the subjective sense as a historical human action. the former refers to the aspect of globalization as a factual inexorable historical process. the latter refers to its aspect as a human making as a human endeavor, task and challenge. these two aspects are not contradictory so they do not exclude each other. they are coexistent and inclusive of each other. numerous words have been used by sociologists to characterize globalization and, perhaps, not always with sufficient control or due reflection. i think, however, that the choice of words, is very important because they contribute to the models or concepts of globalization. these models and concepts are not exactly the same thing but they are very akin to one another. globalization has so many facets that it has been a subject of interdisciplinary research. as we know, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, ecologists. social philosophers and others have treated this problem at different times and from different perspectives. a survey of terms and expressions the scholars use not only reveal their general orientations but also their concepts and models of globalization.2 i can divide the terms used into five groups: 1. globalization as unification or 38 prajñâ vihâra compression of the world; 2. globalization as monism; 3. globalization as westernism; 4. globalism as pluralism 5. globalism as humanism. 1. globalization as unification the general terms used to characterize globalization are unification, integration, compression, universalization, etc. they have in common that they understand globalization as a kind of unification. unification expresses simply “coming together” and only implicitly expresses “coming together closely” or “coming closer”. i think that “the compression of the world” is a more exact definition of globalization than “the unification of the world”.3 2. globalism as monism the terms used for characterizing globalization as a monistic process are: totalization, homogenization, uniformity, continuity, convergence, etc. monistic globalization has two main characteristics: 1) in contrast to pluralistic globalization which has a number of centers or no centers at all, it has one center from which globalization originates, or to which its entirety is referred to, or around which it takes place. 2) it seeks homogeneity and uniformity in contrast to heterogeneity and diversity and also continuity and convergence in contrast to discontinuity and divergence. whereas the use of the terms, homogeneity and uniformity, signify monism, the use of the terms, continuity and convergence do not always do so.4 3. globalism as westernism westernism, which is the west-centered globalism, is but a sample of monistic globalism. eurocentrism and occidentalism are synonyms for it.5 4. globalization as pluralism the terms used for characterization of pluralistic globalization include all the terms of. group 1 which convey the general meaning of globalization and some of group 2, except for those words which refer to the idea of centralized globalization. basic terms characterizing this type of globalization are: multiculturalism, interdependency, collaboration, conflicts, resistance, dialogue, flexibility of oneness, relativization of uniqueness, and the word-pairs, universalization particularization, wook chang 39 continuity discontinuity, convergence divergence.6 5. globalization as humanism the terms that are used, or are apt to be used, to designate globalization as humanism are: for example, supra-national, supra-nationstates, supra-cultural, universal, humanity, humanism, humankindness, personalism, human values, human rights, etc. these five understandings of globalization, however, do not necessarily contradict and exclude one another; some of them are closely related and partly overlap one another. these different understandings do not exclusively represent either theoretically pure concepts or observations on the historical process of globalization. they represent mixtures of both; and as such, they contain ambivalences . we now have before us the task of evaluating the five understandings. but we must first justify our right to evaluate them and also must justify the norms we use to evaluate them. i think we can say that philosophers have the right to evaluate any and all things. philosophers consider its object totum et totaliter, that is, as a whole and from all aspects or from the absolute aspect. therefore, we can evaluate them in a way different from sociologists, psychologists, historians or anthropologists. in my opinion, to evaluate something philosophically means to evaluate its meaning according to the very principles of reason or to evaluate its meaning in absolute sense or in ultimate terms which i believe are the same. if we disregard the first understanding, which is a general characterization of globalization, the rest differ from one another fundamentally. the second understanding, namely, globalization as monism and the fourth understanding, that is, globalization as pluralism are contradictory to each other and exclude each other. the third understanding of globalization, namely, as westernism, is a kind of monism so that its evaluation is included in that of monism. therefore, it does not need to be evaluated separately unless monism would be proven to be acceptable. and finally, the fifth understanding, globalization as humanism, differs from all others by way of transcendence with respect to them. multiculturalism and universal humanism 40 prajñâ vihâra 1. multiculturalism it is well to have in mind that globalization can take place on many levels or in many areas of life, such as economic, social, military, religious, cultural, etc., and for each level or area, globalization has a different meaning. accordingly, monism or pluralism also have different meanings for each of them. monism understands global unification as an integration which creates homogeneity and uniformity. integrating unification may or may not have a center. in the former case, monism becomes a centralizing unification. a center presupposes the superiority of one system, nation, or culture, etc. but as long as such a superiority is disputable, this kind of unification will remain problematic. in the case that superiority is not rationally founded, a centralized unification would be disrespectful to the principle of equality. integrating unification without a center also is based on homogeneity and uniformity which it creates. as a unification, globalization demands an integration of some sort but not necessarily integration based on homogenization and uniformization. it is true that integration by way of homogenization and uniformization is, even when it is centralized, of and by itself value-neutral. it can be justified, and it is even necessary or unavoidable in some areas of globalization. we all know that in areas of mass media and communications, trades, defence systems, sciences and ecology, etc., some uniformization, if not homogenization, is always necessary. unrestricted, total homogenization or uniformization is not possible at all. but were it possible, it would not be necessary nor desirable. proponents of this kind of globalization seem to overlook the difficulties involved in this process in face of the existence of many diverse particular cultures and their possible resistance against it. total homogenization and uniformization in all areas of life cannot succeed. this is due to the fact that particular cultures have long traditions. they are firmly rooted. their contents cannot be readily de-naturalized and homogenized within a short period of time. in other words, these cultures do not lend themselves to be easily de-cultured. they can only be synthesized with one another gradually and step by step. as said above, confronted with the danger of wook chang 41 homogenization and uniformization, these cultures will not remain passive recipients but will stage resistance for their survival and, at the same time, they will, for their identity, take measures to invigorate themselves, and accentuate and sharpen their uniqueness and particularity. the meeting of the particular cultures is bound to create not only the process of mutual acceptance, assimilation and peaceful interactions but also that of clashes, conflicts and rivalries. furthermore, totalistic homogenization or uniformization is indeed not necessary. as we know, globalization as integrating and unifying process of the world brings about gradual annihilation of spatio-temporal distances in many areas of our life. and through the spatial immediacy and simultaneity, peoples on earth increasingly participate in the common civilized life. we all know, all peoples on earth share more and more in their daily life common sports and leisure, news and communication media, foods, attires, scientific knowledge, languages, arts, religions, etc. and this is globalization which ordinary people experience in their daily life. but we notice that, in taking part in this process, they do not abandon their own culture entirely nor do they feel the need to do so. but how long can a person of a minority culture sustain to preserve his or her own culture? is it a matter of time that he or she would abandon the indigenous culture entirely? it seems to me that it all depends on what efforts a person makes to preserve his own culture. the question, therefore, is about a person’s persistence, and not sustenance, to preserve his or her own culture. culture in the large sense includes all that man creates for his living the life, including all what he experiences, does and makes for his life. it is something man spontaneously creates by living his life. homogenization and uniformization of cultures mean acts of coactive exertion of external force upon them. in other words, they mean acts of violence against them. they are in fact acts of violence against the very nature of culture as the product of spontaneous creation. they constitute acts of deculturation, acts of denaturation of culture as such. imposition of one uniform, universal culture on all other cultures, that is, centralized homogenization of cultures, would constitute equally an act of violence against the nature of culture as such. basing on the discussion above, i think that the desirable globalization is pluralistic globalization in the form of multiculturalism this 42 prajñâ vihâra type of globalization would bear the following characteristics. 1. there is not one central culture to which all cultures are expected to converge or into which they are expected to be integrated and homogenized. there is not an abstract ideal model of global uniform culture 2. all cultures are, in principle, equal as cultures. they all are expected to remain what they are, keeping their identity and particularity and to grow and flourish 3. all cultures spontaneously meet together, enter into dialogue with one another and exchange values with one another, material and spiritual. 4. diverse cultures should consider other cultures as possible partners of dialogue and of cooperation and not simply as rivals or enemies and thus should not merely strive for hegemony and dominance. in this multicultural globalization, the cultures can enrich themselves externally and simultaneously strengthen themselves and reinforce their uniqueness internally. 2. universal humanism humanism or humanity, human values or human rights however we may express it is something which transcends cultural differences. it is global in the sense that it is universal but it is trans-global in the sense that it is absolute. everyone understands something immediately under humanism but not everyone knows what is right humanism. i think that the right humanism in philosophy is the thomistic personalism. according to aristotle and st. thomas, there is a common ultimate human end of man, namely, the self-perfection and self-fulfillment as a rational being, as a person. humanism cannot mean anything other than the cultivation and promotion of spiritual values which are necessary for attaining that ultimate end. now, what conforms to the human reason conforms to the human nature and also to the ultimate end of man. and the inverse is also true: that which conforms to the human nature and the human ultimate end constitutes what is rational. the respect for humanism is most rational. it transcends the differences of western and eastern rationalities. in my opinion, only western philosophy has the clear notions of rational being wook chang 43 and person and of rationality founded on them. the ultimate end of globalization must correspond to that of man himself, the self-fulfillment. this means that the ultimate end of globalization consists in nothing other than in promoting humanism. present globalization process 1. globalization as a historical process globalization process which goes on today is something which no one can arrest or reverse but only decelerate or modify. globalization, however, is not a natural or a mechanical process but a historical process. and as such it can be considered a human action. man does not only have a share in it; man can have a share in its very making. in order to examine and evaluate the present-day globalization process, characterizing globalization as human action is necessary. but for the latter, i think that some principles of traditional ethics can be very helpful. traditionally, a human act is evaluated as to its volition as well as to the act in itself, intention, circumstance and foreseeable effects, etc. according to these norms, present-day globalization exhibits some serious defects. as to volition: the more powerful nations often conceal their selfserving intentions as they impose globalization on other nations. in that context, the less powerful nations are often led to act without sufficient knowledge and sufficient spontaneity. as to the act in itself: globalization is value-neutral so there is no problem in this respect. as to intention: as has been implied, the more powerful nations seek to expand political, military and economic powers for greater gains. the less powerful nations are forced to struggle to protect their interests and to resist exploitation. as to circumstances: globalization creates conditions for an unfair competition due to the existing political, military and economic inequality. as to foreseeable effects: intensifying demands for globalization on the part of the more powerful nations and increasing resistance on the part of the rest cause severe conflicts. and it is often the case that the former also play the role of arbitrator of conflicts. the important question which remains is: to what extent western nations’ supremacy in the economic, military and political areas can represent a threat to the integrity of minority cultures. 44 prajñâ vihâra 2. essence of western culture what is western culture? western culture is founded on the two pillars of greco-roman culture and judeo-christian culture. as we know, christianity is much indebted to greco-roman culture and civilization for becoming a world religion. but greco-roman culture is in turn also much indebted to christianity for its maturity and perfection as well as for its fundamental tenets and values. those tenets and values may be summed up as the christian message of salvation itself and the freedom and human rights. democracy, science and technology of western nations are also fruits of spiritual commerce of greco-roman culture christianity. western culture, however, betrayed its spiritual vocation. western culture as we know it today has fallen into a kind of decadence. it has become highly secularized, materialistic, utilitarian-positivistic and hedonistic. western nations at times make appeal to christian principles and ideals to camouflage their covert immoral intentions or to justify their misdeeds. except for the freedom and human rights, western nations abandoned much of spiritual values, christian and other, and promote materialism and hedonism in various forms. they promote unilaterally the material well-being of man, generally understood as maximal satisfaction of any and all desires within the limits of positive legality. they also practise the barbaric ethics of power in various forms in economic, military, international-political and cultural areas. 3. intentions of western nations the western understanding of globalization as first and foremost in the economic sense (market globalization) overshadows the more important values of globalization, especially the cultural values. the “free trade” based on western ideology of “new liberalism” is but a means of exploitation of the less developed nations in the name of “fair competition”. freedom and democracy are valuable in the politics of globalization. but western nations at times misuse it as an ideological slogan for justifying domination and exploitation. and in doing so, they often do wook chang 45 not sufficiently render into account the cultural and political traditions of other nations. generally speaking, the superpower, the u.s.a., and other military powers, in their self-deceiving but unfounded self-righteousness, wield their military might as means of domination and exploitation in political, economic spheres and even in cultural sphere as well.7 conclusion: globalization from asian perspective as concluding remarks, i would like to give my opinions on the two problems: what we, as asians, should accept, and not accept in globalization, and what we should preserve within our own cultures. we first of all realize that everything is caught within the process of globalization. everything is either globalizing or is being globalized. perhaps, as asians, we are being globalized more than we are globalizing others. as for the question of what we, asians, should accept and what we should not, we notice that, this question applies both to globalization and westernization because for us they mean practically the same thing. now, it is easy to determine what we should, in principle, accept and what we should not. we should accept what is absolute such as, absolute truths and absolute values. as we know, what is absolute is valid everywhere, at all times and under all circumstances. for that reason, it is universal. it is easy to understand that what is universal is trans-cultural or supra-cultural. it transcends even globalization understood as an intercultural process. we, asian christians, should have no difficulty in accepting some absolute and universal truths and values. in the context of globalization they are, for example, the christian teaching itself, the theological notion of god, the philosophical and anthropological concepts of human personhood and related human rights. these truths aside, i think that we are not obliged to accept much else from westernization and globalization. as for the question of what we, asians, should do about our culture or cultures in globalization, i think that we should not abandon them but persist in keeping them. i think that we should preserve, protect and further develop them. culture is our life as a whole. our life is deeply rooted and embedded in our culture in such a manner that it does not only reflect who we are and what we are, but it is a portion of ourselves. 46 prajñâ vihâra all of us are aware that the elements, such as mass media and communication systems, travels, foods, attires, sports and leisure, etc. globalize our daily life. in so far as these elements are constitutive parts and parcels of culture, one must admit that globalization of them means a partial globalization of culture. and, by the same token, one cannot deny that globalization of these elements, in their own ways and to different degrees, exert influence, if not directly at least indirectly, on our culture or cultures as a whole. but i think that i can consider these elements as external elements of culture. as we know, there are internal elements of culture such as, ethos and social sanction, art and literature, philosophy and religion, and, last but not least, education. the question which awaits our answer is: to what extent globalization of the former affect the latter. my answer is that globalization of the former does not automatically cause that of the latter and how much one influences the other depends on the will, attitude or disposition of the members of the culture and the actions they undertake in face of globalization. globalization is not simply the compression of the world but it includes as its component the consciousness of the world as a whole and actions taken based on that consciousness. globalization is a historical process not only in the sense that it is an irreversible, inexorable process in history but also in the sense that it is a historical process as human voluntary action. i am not in the position to predict how much in the future the flood of western cultural goods will in fact erode away the internal elements or inner layers of asian cultures. but i can still say that it all depends on the attitudes and actions asian nations will take with respect to it. in the course of westernization and globalization, dialogues, interactions, mutual assimilations and fusions take place in diverse areas and on different levels. in the area of religion, however, i think that we should be on guard against any attempts to fuse the tenets and practices of christian religion with those of other religions. as a revealed religion, christian religion is sufficient of and by itself. its doctrines do not need to be implemented or revised with the aid of elements of other religions. apart from christianity, what is absolute and thus universal is the human personhood and related human rights. as we know the core of human personhood consists in self-purposiveness. in other words, the person is an end in himself. the personhood of man has been clearly wook chang 47 established in the christian western tradition, which has not been the case in other cultural traditions. in areas other than religion and philosophical anthropology, some forms of interactions, mutual assimilations and fusions are possible. they are unavoidable, necessary or even desirable depending on the circumstances of particular areas of life. in some areas of life, strict uniformity of regulations and norms are necessary but in other areas it is not and is often impossible. for example, capitalism or democracy can take various forms in different cultures and traditions. whenever a culture borrows or imports something from another culture, the recipient culture should indigenize it, wring it out of itself, re-create it as its own. the final product then, bearing its characteristics and tailored to it, would have stability and permanence. a simple imposition of one element of a culture and tradition on another without taking sufficient account of their differences amounts to an act of unilateral integration and homogenization. such an act would not be meaningful because it would provoke more defiance and resistance than acceptance and cooperation on the part of the recipient culture. finally, it is my opinion that we, asians, should cherish and develop to the utmost the cultural goods which our ancestors handed down to us; and, at the same time, we should practice the wisdom of distinguishing what is useful, meaningful and necessary and what is idle and unnecessary in imitating and importing foreign cultural elements. endnotes 1 roland robertson, “globalization as a problem” in: linda martin alcoff and eduardo mendieta(ed.), identities. race, class, gender and nationality, blackwell publ. co., 2003, p. 284. 2 cf. mike featherston, “localism, globalism and cultural identity”, pp. 343-59; roland robertson, “globalization as a problem”, pp. 284-311, in: linda martin alcoff and eduardo mendieta(ed.), op. cit.. 3 we can place also other words in this group such as: shrinking, blending, fusing, interaction, interdependency, internalization, cosmopolitanism, etc. 4 the words we can also place in this group are: centralization, world unicity, world systemicity, worldism, hegemony, etc. 5 the expressions frequently used in this context are: hegemony, domination, western rationality, the third world, colonization, exploitation, neo48 prajñâ vihâra imperialism, neo-liberalism, etc. 6 many other words appear in the context of pluralistic globalization, such as, for example, power balance, power struggle, rivalry, clashes, coordination, cooperation, internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded, plurality of national responses, boundaries between the self and others, (monoculturalism) multiculturalism, (globalization) deglobalization, indigenization, (wholeness and continuity) uniqueness, (homogenization) heterogenization, (integration or homogenization) fragmentation, localization, (wholeness and continuity) or uniqueness, etc. 7 examples of abuse of military power by the more powerful nations are as follows: 1. one-sided claim on the part of the so-called democratic nations for the right of monopolizing nuclear arms for promoting peace and world order. 2. claim of the right to use military power or to declare war (pre-emptive) without international sanction in the name of self-defence, for combatting terrorism and for world peace, freedom and democracy, etc., discarding any diplomatic measures and solutions (hard power policy instead of soft power policy) 3. monopoly of arms trade of the wook chang 49 more powerful nations, etc. 50 prajñâ vihâra contents freedom of religion and religious heritage1 william sweet st. francis xavier university, canada abstract what is freedom of religion? what is its relation to other values in society? how do we respect religious heritage in democracies particularly in multi-cultural democracies that contain many potentially conflicting values? how far can one express one's religious heritage? in what follows, i want to discuss these issues with a view to determining whether some kind of secularism is the best public policy to pursue in order to respect and promote freedom of religion and one's religious heritage, particularly in contemporary liberal democracies. introduction one of the most basic rights in national constitutions and in international declarations and related documents is freedom of religion. it is a cornerstone of liberal democracies, and it is formally recognised by all the states that are members of the united nations. freedom of religion is a freedom of individuals, but it is also recognised as a freedom of collectivities in the sense that not only individuals but communities have a right to the respect of their religious heritage and traditions. religious freedom was one of the motives for emigration to the 'new world', and calls for it today are part of the democratic reforms taking place in much of the 'old world'. yet freedom of religion has been at the centre of much recent debate; in india, it comes up in discussions concerning restrictions on prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 1-24 1 © 2000 by assumption university press 'conversion'2; in iran, such freedom has been said not to include what some call 'apostasy'; and in the united states, it has been involved in a number of legal cases, such as having christmas trees or depictions of the ten commandments on public property, or having prayer in publiclyfunded schools. this freedom has also been accused of being incompatible with other values with the value of human equality (for those religions where this is allegedly not emphasized or respected), with the value of public security, with the value of government neutrality, and so on. what is freedom of religion? what is its relation to other values in society? how do we respect religious heritage in democracies particularly in multi-cultural democracies that contain many potentially conflicting values? how far can one express one's religious heritage? in what follows, i want to discuss these issues with a view to determining whether some kind of secularism is the best public policy to pursue in order to respect and promote freedom of religion and one's religious heritage, particularly in contemporary liberal democracies. cases cases where we find a tension or apparent conflict between religious heritage or religious freedom and other values are all too common. one case familiar to many is that of the wearing of the islamic hijab or headscarf in western europe. for example, in france, a law banning islamic headscarves in public schools was adopted on march 3, 2004. on that date, the french senate voted 276 to 20 in favor of the law, following a similar vote by the national assembly on february 10 (where it won with a vote of 494 to 36). in germany, the bundesgerichtshof germany's highest court decided in september 2003 that there could be restrictions on the wearing of religious dress for those employed in public service occupations in the länder (states), as long as there were no state laws against it3 and on december 9, 2003, the government of bavaria unveiled a draft law restricting such attire. in belgium, in december 2003, two senators proposed a law prohibiting the wearing of the hijab and other overt religious symbols in state schools. and, on june 29, 2004, the european court of human rights allowed that "banning muslim 2 prajñâ vihâra headscarves in state schools does not violate the freedom of religion and is a valid way to counter islamic fundamentalism4". the arguments against such bans often appeal to the value of one's religious heritage and to freedom of religion. some say that not only does wearing the hijab help to preserve a woman's modesty, but the right to wear the hijab is "part of one's identity" as a muslim and even a religious duty. and they would say that any society that respects individual freedom should not restrict the expression of a person's beliefs and particularly of one's identity. nevertheless, those who defend such bans claim that limiting the wearing of the hijab and thereby restricting the expression of one's religious heritage are consistent with fundamental democratic values, such as equality and security. for example, it is claimed that very few women wear the head scarf voluntarily; that not allowing girls to wear it to school in fact respects the wishes of the majority of parents who are afraid to openly resist the fundamentalist elements in their communities, and that forbidding it serves to protect pupils against fundamentalist influences. others have argued that banning the hijab reflects basic social values such as the principle of state neutrality (or secularism); thus, in belgium, the proposed law states that "[t]he government should remain neutral…in all circumstances and be represented as such…that means no distinctive religious symbols or veils for police officers, judges, clerks or teachers at public schools.'5 in short, while a person has the right to wear a hijab or headscarf in public, it does not mean that she has the right to do so as a public employee, or that her freedom to express her religious heritage is limited if, in applying for, or obtaining a teaching position, she is prohibited from wearing attire that identifies oneself as a member of a religious group. a second kind of case of conflict that may be familiar to some is that between parental rights to preserve the family's religious heritage and children's rights particularly concerning the mental and physical health and education of children. in a recent case in toronto, ontario, canada, the one-month old daughter of jehovah's witness parents required a blood transfusion to treat the girl's potentially life-threatening congestive heart failure.6 the parents claimed the transfusion was unnecessary, but principally objected that, because of their religious beliefs against blood transfusions, the medical personnel should not carry out the procedure. on the other william sweet 3 side, the ontario children's aid society argued that they had an obligation to a "child in need of protection" under the ontario child welfare act and courts in canada subsequently held that "freedom of religion, guaranteed under s. 2(a) of the charter [i.e., the canadian charter of rights and freedoms], does not include the imposition of religious practices which threaten the safety, health or life of the child." the courts determined that, "although the freedom of belief is broad, the freedom to act upon those beliefs is narrower, because it is subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."7 a similar example is that of a 1972 united states supreme court case. the defendants, who were members of the amish faith, refused to send their children, aged 14 and 15, to public school after the children had completed the eighth grade. they claimed that the us constitution's guarantee of freedom of religion "protects a community's right to live in accordance with its tradition and beliefs, even if this limits the individual freedom of children."8 on the other hand, the state argued that the freedom of religion does not extend so far as to deprive children of basic goods, such as education.9 another kind of case focuses on freedoms of speech and of expression of one's religious beliefs, and the prohibition of comments that are deemed to be hurtful to members of certain identifiable groups. a recent example in canada concerned a small advertisement in a local newspaper, the saskatoon star phoenix. on june 30, 1997, mr hugh owens, an evangelical protestant, placed an advertisement in that newspaper that "consisted of a pictograph of two men holding hands superimposed with a circle and slash the symbol of something forbidden and a list of bible verses condemning the practice of homosexuality."10 three gay men filed a complaint with the saskatchewan human rights board, claiming that, as a result of the ad, they "were exposed to hatred, ridicule and their dignity was affronted on the basis of their sexual orientation."11 there are many other cases where one can see potential or actual tensions or conflicts between freedom of religion or professing one's religious heritage and other social values. such conflicts may be even more dramatic in countries where there is an explicit policy of multiculturalism or of pluralism. 4 prajñâ vihâra democratic values many of the countries in the world today express or claim to express 'democratic values.' what are these 'democratic values'? (here, i am simply being descriptive; i am making no judgement about whether these values are essential to democracies, or whether all of these values ought to be present.) perhaps the first, and most fundamental of these values is "human rights." the history of human rights is a lengthy one, and need not be recounted here.12 in general, however, these rights began to come to prominence in eighteenth-century europe, largely as a way of restricting or limiting the arbitrary authority of monarchical regimes. today, such rights are enshrined in national constitutions and bills of rights (e.g., in canada, australia, france, india, and united states), and we see them as well in international documents such as the universal declaration of human rights (udhr), proclaimed by the united nations in 1948. these rights serve as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," and the udhr refers to "the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" (preamble). among the rights enumerated in this declaration are "life, liberty and the security of the person" (art. 3), dignity and the free development of [human] personality (art. 27), peaceful assembly and association (art. 20), and fundamental equality and cultural rights (e.g., to participate in the building of culture). but also present is the right to freedom of religion (art. 18). in many countries, of course, there are other important and fundamental values in addition to human rights (though these values may be in, or be implied by, articles in the udhr). these values include: the rule of law; individual autonomy (i.e., the pursuit of one's good in one's own way); social harmony and stability and, more broadly, peace and security; values of character (such as loyalty, self-control, independence, and the like); the obligation to protect the weak (especially children) and those who are not able to claim their rights; the commitment to truth and to the pursuit of truth (so that one's activities and exercise of one's freedoms william sweet 5 are more than just acting on whim); the commitment to the community in which one lives, grows, works, and participates; one's national, religious, and ethnic heritage; and so on. yet we also find another important value that of diversity or cultural, ethical, religious (and other) plurality. many believe that not only is this diversity a good thing, but that it is related to each person's dignity and autonomy. and thus, in some nations, we find another value a value that has become a key element of public policy. this is multiculturalism. what is 'multiculturalism'? "multiculturalism or cultural pluralism is a policy, ideal, or reality that emphasizes the unique characteristics of different cultures in the world," that holds that "several different cultures (rather than one national culture) can co-exist peacefully and equitably in a single country," and "supports policies of maintaining ethnic identities, values and lifestyles within an overarching framework of common laws and shared institutions."13 (emphases mine). the intent of such a policy is to ensure genuine pluralism not a 'melting pot' (a term that is sometimes used to describe the mixing of cultures and the development of a 'new' culture in the united states). is multiculturalism implied by other democratic values? it is possible that a state may be democratic without being multicultural, though now it is less and less likely. even though equality, autonomy, and the emphasis of diversity over unity may often seem to lead to a thin, legal and purely formal social unity, it is clear that multiculturalism is a value that has a broad recognition, and which has been officially adopted in a number of democratic states. religious heritage and freedom of religion14 appeals for the respect of religious heritage have often drawn on the right to freedom of religion. in his message of september 1, 1980, for example, pope john paul ii wrote of "the freedom of conscience and of religion," and on the celebration of the world day of peace (january 1) in 1991, he wrote "if you want peace, respect the conscience of every person." freedom of religion is a freedom that is recognized (and, presumably, 6 prajñâ vihâra guaranteed) in various declarations, charters and bills of rights, and it is often listed as among the most basic or fundamental of these human rights. thus, in the udhr we read: "everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance" (art. 18). (and this is closely connected with the following article: "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" [article 19].) similarly, in the first amendment to the constitution of the united states we read: "congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech" (emphasis mine). this freedom or right is found in a number of international documents and protocols which expand on the udhr. for example, the united nations declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief (general assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 november 1981) sets out the minimum international standards for the elimination of such discrimination. its description of freedom of religion is virtually identical to that found in the udhr (art. 18). but notice how far it extends! article 1 1. everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. this right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice. 3. freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. william sweet 7 the importance of preserving one's religious heritage is an essential part of this freedom. for example, the un declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities (1992) provides that 'states shall protect the existence and the… religious… identity of minorities within their respective territories' (art. 1). further, it provides that minorities have the 'right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion… freely and without any interference or any form of discrimination' (art. 2, emphasis mine). what does it mean to have such a right to freedom of religion, and to enjoy, profess, and practice it? how does this recognize the value of religious heritage? by such a freedom or right, here, those who have drafted and approved these documents do not mean to refer just to "tolerance" or to "freedom of opinion" for religious freedom is a special kind of freedom that goes beyond freedom of opinion or belief or speech. it is not just a freedom to choose, but more like a freedom to commit oneself, and it presumes that one is seeking the truth how to lead one's life and not adopting a belief for some other purpose (e.g., to avoid military service). thus, freedom of religion is not just freedom of opinion or belief; it is a freedom to act on one's beliefs in shaping one's life. freedom of religion including engaging in and preserving one's religious heritage is a basic right in these documents. it is, perhaps first and foremost, an individual right. it is usually taken to entail that each person has a right to choose his or her own religion and religious tradition, and to practice what one has chosen but also to protect those who do not want to practice religion at all. some would also say that it is a 'collective right' a right of collectivities which involves "the right of the members of any religion to maintain the beliefs, practices and symbols of their religion." such individual and group rights are related. it would seem that the individual's right would be empty if there were not also a corresponding "right of the group as a collective entity"; there could not be an individual freedom of religion unless there were the sets of institutions and practices found in communities. given the focus on religious heritage and the respect for religious freedom in the context of other, basic, values, one must ask how far these rights extend. 8 prajñâ vihâra at first glance, the value of religious heritage and the freedom to participate in it are very great, for both seem to be part and parcel of a basic principle to pursue one's own good in one's own way. thus we see, in the declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief (1981), that, "in accordance with article i of the present declaration" the following freedoms are included: (a) to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes; (b) to establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions; (c) to make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; (d) to write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas; (e) to teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; (f) to solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions; (g) to train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; (h) to observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief; (i) to establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels. nor does this "freedom" ignore the rights of parents in determining and passing on religious heritage to their children: article 5 of this declaration reads: 1. the parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the right to organize the life within the family in accordance with william sweet 9 their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up. 2. every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle. clearly, the extent of freedom of religion, described in these documents, is very broad; each person can pursue "whatever belief of his choice" and "manifest [it] in worship, observance, etc." as john paul ii writes, "it is essential that the right to express one's own religious convictions publicly and in all domains of civil life be ensured if human beings are to live together in peace."15 in short, then, freedom of religion and the supports necessary to maintaining one's religious heritage are guaranteed by international documents as well as by many of the charters and declarations of rights that we find in nation states. nevertheless, such a freedom is not absolute. in the constitutional documents, and in the recent debate, freedom of religion and the respect of one's religious heritage are to be allowed but, many insist, only to the extent that they do not provide "undue hardship" on others in the community and/or can be given "reasonable accommodation." thus, the freedom of religion and respect of religious heritage can be limited in a variety of ways; they are subject to like, and larger, values. in the udhr, freedoms seem to exist only within a context of duties. according to the udhr, article 29, "everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible." (art. 29, section 1). moreover, such freedom and values must respect other values the rights of others. they must not harm the physical or mental health of others (i.e., they are subject to the 'harm principle'), they must respect "public order", and they must respect "the just requirements of morality" which includes 'the natural law.' article 29 continues by stating that 10 prajñâ vihâra in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (art. 29, section 2) similarly, in his message for the xxiv world day of peace (1991) (section 3), john paul ii writes: "to claim that one has a right to act according to conscience, but without at the same time acknowledging the duty to conform one's conscience to the truth and to the law which god himself has written on our hearts, in the end means nothing more than imposing one's limited personal opinion" (emphasis mine). we see such 'limits' stated in a number of international documents. in the united nations declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief (1981) art. 5, section 5, we read: "practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present declaration." in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, section 1, we are reminded that such rights exist, but are "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." indeed, in some national laws 'harmfulness to oneself' is a limitation (where there are restrictions on such religious practices as 'snake-handling'); offensiveness may be as well. nevertheless, despite the recognition of such limitations, it is generally acknowledged that religious freedom should be allowed, at least to the extent that it does not provide "undue hardship" and/or can be given "reasonable accommodation." sources of tension between religious heritage and other values the reasons why religious heritage (including freedom of religion) and other values are in tension in many democracies and particularly democracies that are multiculturalist are, perhaps, obvious. nevertheless, it will be useful to signal just a few of them. william sweet 11 first, it is difficult to determine what counts as a 'religion' and what the heritage is that a believer may wish to appeal to or draw on. the number of 'religions' is increasing exponentially according to a recent news report, there are two new religions in the world each day16 and the specific character of what counts as a religion is far from settled. so how can one non-arbitrarily determine when such a freedom may properly be claimed? second, we must take account of the special status of religion (in light of other values) as well as the special status accorded to 'freedom of religion', in the way described above. for example, in the canadian charter of rights and freedom, section 2, where the most fundamental rights and freedoms are articulated, we see first, "freedom of conscience and religion," and, second, "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication." but the order here is not necessarily a ranking, and it is difficult (if not impossible) to say, in advance, how much weight these freedoms actually have relative to one another and in relation to other values particularly in light of the article in that charter that states that all rights are "subject ... to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." the specific weight of freedom or religion and of these other values is all the more unsettled and unstable both from case to case and overall because any assessment may reflect varying public opinion. nor are laws and constitutions a firm guarantee of the weight of such values particularly since democracies are subject to wide swings in public opinion. third, the above-mentioned limitations on freedom of religion are vague and potentially problematic. we have seen above that one of the 'limits' on this freedom is 'harm to others' (i.e., where the exercise of the religion threatens or harms public order, general welfare, or 'the just requirements of morality'). but what these rights or interests are vary from country to country, and religious groups themselves may understand harm rather differently (for example, when it concerns initiation rites into religious communities17). other limits on religion may be 'harmfulness to oneself' or 'offensiveness,' or the "falsity" of the belief. (while the latter appears infrequently in legal documents in the west, it is clearly involved where apostasy is a violation of national law.18) but can such limits be justified? 12 prajñâ vihâra fourth, there are more and more calls by believers for respect of religious heritage and freedom of religion, and it is increasingly difficult to determine when and how to respond and, if there are conflicts, how to adjudicate among them. in multicultural environments, for example, not only is there a diversity in values, but there are significant differences concerning which values people rank highest and how they are understood. there is also no clear answer to how to respond to 'competing' values (such as the priority of the private over the public; the individualisation of society; the integration of different cultural groups within a larger community; the value of diversity; the value and the possibility of the integration of other values into those of the dominant cultures and traditions; and the value of the policy of tolerance and reasonable accommodation of diversity). related to this is the fact that the expectations of what equality rights involve what one has an equal entitlement to have increased; and that such expectations are not just to toleration, but to support. if so, and if law is to maintain equality among religious groups, how far must it guarantee support? yet another a fifth concern is that there are few, if any, overriding principles in a democratic, and particularly a multicultural, society and less and less of a sense of a common culture or allegiance or common good. indeed, one sometimes detects a fear of any appeal to an overriding common good or overarching principle, and a suspicion of anyone promoting such a good. it may be true that respect for religious heritage and freedom of religion is unproblematic in itself, but that it brings with it other values anti-liberal or anti-democratic values that may disrupt (such as ethnic or tribal nationalism) or may even challenge the most dominant values of a society.19 therefore, some critics question whether, how, and how far respect for religious heritage, and freedom of religion, does or should have a place in multi-cultural and multi-religious democracies. responses william sweet 13 what responses to these tensions are open to us? it seems that there are at least three. first, there is simply staying with the status quo to let courts and parliaments decide (drawing on philosophical discussions, perhaps, but standing independent of them). that is, we continue much as we have been in recent years. yet this option is unsatisfactory. to begin with, such an option is unstable. it seems fairly clear that governments and democratic institutions in general have failed so far in achieving a comfortable balance between respect for religious heritage and religious freedom, on the one hand, and respect for other values, on the other. (this is not to attack these institutions, but simply to remind ourselves of their vulnerability to various pressures.) parliaments and even courts are susceptible to shifts in public opinion or changing ideologies, and sometimes judges 'make law' rather than simply interpret and apply it. (here, we can see something of why a.r. lord saw democracy as tending to intolerance.20) moreover, if we simply continue the status quo, we will likely accept values and priorities that seem to weigh against any clear resolution of conflicts or diminution of tensions. consider, for example, the priority of freedom over responsibility; the emphasis of private goods over the public good; the individualisation of society; and the refusal to address, in many cases, whether, how and to what extent, to integrate or coordinate the various systems of values that we find in modern communities. these will serve only to perpetuate the existing tensions and problems. finally, the status quo leaves unanswered the question of what are the legitimate limits on freedom of religion, and it leaves unanswered whether the limits that we have now (e.g., in law) are in fact legitimate. staying with the status quo is, then, no option. a second option that might be considered to address current conflicts and tensions, is a paternalistic or directive one i.e., that the state provide an overriding principle or direction in how to solve conflicts between freedom of religion and other values. such direction could involve the imposition of a broad common good or even the institution of an established religion. but this solution would clearly not be acceptable to many in a democratic society for they would argue that a hallmark of a liberal democratic society is the right to pursue one's own conception of 14 prajñâ vihâra the good in one's own way (providing it does not harm others), which precludes having or imposing any overriding conception of the good. and even if one could find a dominant conception of the good that people happen to agree on, it is far from clear that it would be one that could last over time. one might revise this view slightly by proposing that the state could argue for or promote a (larger) common good, but not impose it as it does, on a much smaller scale, in promoting healthy lifestyles though this, too, i suggest is impracticable and at best something that can be successful only over a long term. alternately, one might propose that, while there cannot be for reasons of practicality a broad-based common good, states might nevertheless consider imposing limits, beyond those described above, on religious practices and religious expression, to ensure that appeals to religious freedom are authentic and made sincerely. states might insist that, if there is to be freedom of religion, then those making appeals to it must accept corresponding religious (or non-religious) responsibilities. these statements of corresponding responsibilities might come from within the faith traditions themselves, or the state might attempt to define responsibilities to one's (religious and ethnic) heritage or to one's presently existing religious community. (thus, those who wish the benefit of religious exemptions from certain obligations, such as military service, must clearly be practicing members 'in good standing' of their faith.) but the perennial, practical challenge here is, who is competent and who can be trusted to decide fairly what such limits or responsibilities are? attempting to introduce overriding principles or values to help to resolve these competing and conflicting values, then, does not seem to be a promising option either. now, a third option that has been proposed is secularism i.e., an explicit state policy of neutrality with regard to religion. it is an option more or less endorsed by most democratic states, and, interestingly, it is an option that is embraced by some religious groups. i wish to briefly consider some of the ways in which we might understand this view, to see whether it might contain at least the seeds of a viable solution to conflicts between freedom of religion (including respect for religious heritage) and (other) democratic values. william sweet 15 secularism secularism is a vague term, and states which have endorsed a policy of secularism vary widely in how they understand and apply the policy. one standard definition of "secularism" is that it is "indifference to or rejection or exclusion of religion and religious considerations"21; the term is derived from "secular", which means "concerned with affairs of this world, worldly, not sacred, not monastic, not ecclesiastical, temporal, profane, lay, skeptical of religious truth or opposed to religious education, etc."22 the attitude towards religion here is, we should note, ambiguous; secularism is not necessarily opposed to religion. in fact, as noted above, a public policy of secularism has sometimes been embraced by religious believers. how is it, then, that certain religious groups challenge secularism? one explanation for this is that there are different kinds of secularism. there is, to begin with, a 'negative' secularism (such as that which one not only seems to find in the united states, but found in many communist countries in the 20th century), which may be close to john rawls' position on religious tolerance as described in political liberalism. this kind of secularism envisages that, in the state, there is a freedom from religion that is, religion is properly in the private, not the public sphere (because it allegedly is as richard rorty puts it a "conversation stopper").23 to be fair, this freedom from religion can admit of degrees. a 'weak' version such as that of rawls, for example would seem to allow that one can publicly argue for values that may happen to be present in religion (e.g., as based, for example, on natural law), but not as religious values. a 'stronger' version perhaps as was found under communism holds that any action on or out of religious conviction must be justified that it must be on balance, a social good, or at least not harmful. but in no way is religion to be introduced into public discourse. an advantage to either version of 'negative' secularism is that, as far as it is a freedom from religion, it provides a barrier to 'bogus' religious claims to social benefits though of course it is a barrier to all religious claims. but it is likely to be ineffective (for it is not clear that those having religious beliefs could 'privatise' their values; it would simply drive religious beliefs underground), and it puts the state in the position of imposing values, 16 prajñâ vihâra i.e., preferring one group of freedoms over another (traditionally basic) freedom. a second kind of secularism is 'mitigated' secularism. this seems to be the one that we find in some asian countries. freedom of religion and expression of one's religious heritage exist, but restrictions on that freedom are allowed, providing that they do not impose undue hardship on the adherents. in such cases, in addition to the recognition of freedom of religion as a human right, states may also recognize the social value of the transmission of a religious heritage, or that providing opportunities for religious expression and worship is a service for at least some of its citizens. thus, the state guarantees freedoms of religion and religious practice providing that i) they do not violate the rights of others; ii) they do not reasonably risk violating the rights of others; and iii) they do not risk harming the legitimate interests of others. because the state recognizes that providing opportunities for religious expression is a service, it can ensure reasonable accommodation of religion, and can even support religion (e.g., through allowing donations to religious groups to be tax deductible; through subsidizing some of the expenses of religious institutions and organizations; by providing land or space to construct a place of worship, and so on.) nevertheless, freedom of religion can still be compared with, and weighed against, other values (e.g., national or international security, values that deal with equality of women or of alternative lifestyles, etc.). moreover, while the expression of religious belief does not deprive one of the right to some basic social goods (e.g., the equal administration of justice), it does not follow that all will have equal opportunities to enjoy all non-basic social goods (e.g., employment in certain occupations). (for example, if my holy day is wednesday, my employer does not discriminate if he nevertheless expects me to work on that day.) both negative and mitigated secularism allow, justify, and in the case of negative secularism require the state limiting or restricting religious expression and related freedoms. but one may well be concerned about this. for, after all, what are the other rights or interests that the state pays heed to, in imposing limits on religious freedom? are such rights (just) legal rights i.e., the rights that happen to exist on the law books of a given william sweet 17 state? and what exactly is the moral weight of a (mere) legal right? are such rights sufficient to limit what are generally recognized as fundamental rights? and even if we allow that there can be legitimate limits on freedom of religion, based on the legal rights of others, how far do such limits extend? do such 'legal' rights justify the state in determining how adherents of a religious tradition can show their religious commitment, e.g., determining even the size of the religious symbols that may be worn? and can the state be an impartial or neutral party in determining the nature and limits of freedom of religion and the expression of religious heritage? it is, of course, unavoidable that there be some limits on the freedom of religion, and that states (specifically, legislatures and the courts) will properly be called on to determine what these limits are. but this also effectively places the state in the position of being an arbiter of religious belief i.e., of determining which beliefs are fundamental, and which may be expressed or practiced. for this reason, i would argue that the state should be involved in such a practice as rarely as possible. mitigated secularism, like negative secularism, puts the state in the position of making 'religious' decisions i.e., decisions about the value of religious heritage and of certain religious beliefs and practices (e.g., whether some aspects of religion are more central or important than others, or whether they need to be allowed to be expressed). but determining the content of belief is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of authorities of a democratic state. if secularism is to be a solution to the conflicts and tensions that arise between the right to freedom of religion and other democratic values, we need another model of secularism. i would argue that there is another such model what i will call 'positive secularism' though i can provide only a sketch of this view here. positive secularism is a kind of secularism where the state intervenes as little as possible in how freedom of religion, including the expression of religious heritage, is respected in relation to other values, and it would reflect three primary considerations: 1. legislatures and the courts should have as little as possible to do with religion. 2. the state and public institutions in general should (thereby) allow for a reasonable presence and accommodation of religion e.g., 18 prajñâ vihâra that religious believers have access on a par with everyone else to public goods but the state needn't (and shouldn't?) provide positive support. (in other words, since the state normally stands apart from religion, public institutions cannot restrict the presence of religion in the public sphere, but they have no positive obligation to ensure that religion be present.) 3. when there are conflicts between freedom of religion and other values, and when the courts must intervene, the burden of proof should be shared; where there is a proposal to limit freedom of religion, both sides should justify their views, but not just by constitutional appeals to 'freedom of religion' or 'equality rights', but also by referring to other, fundamental values. (in other words, appeals to freedom of religion, or the right to equal treatment or the right to non-discrimination would be, by themselves, insufficient.) there can, then, be restrictions of freedom of religion, but such restrictions would be rare. i would add, however, that this does not mean that the restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion (including religious expression) would be primarily or solely those determined by the state. in fact, i would argue that religious groups should establish limits themselves recognizing that there are other values and other groups with values in the state and that, as far as possible, they should respect other values without obliging the state to intercede or interfere by having to determine the relative weight of religious freedom against other democratic and multiculturalist values. for, once the state is involved, there is the possibility or probability of interference in religious expression and practice. what the specific mechanics of such a secularism will be will, obviously, vary from state to state but the preceding considerations would constitute a minimum that must be respected. such a secularism is compatible with religious, ethnic, and social diversity, though it does not require and in fact may involve abstaining from a policy of multiculturalism. this 'positive' secularism is also compatible with a genuine right to freedom of religion and the free expression of religion without allowing any religious group to claim a particular political right or privilege over minority religions or over those without any (particular) religious faith. william sweet 19 conclusion freedom of religion is a basic human right, and the expression of one's religious freedom is part and parcel of it. not only is this freedom a part of the liberty that is necessary for the development of human personhood, but it is recognized in national and international declarations and bills of rights, constitutions, and the like. yet, in multicultural societies and especially in democratic societies that adopt a policy of multiculturalism the tensions and conflicts between the right to freedom of religion and other values are not negligible. and they show no signs of diminishing. this situation arguably has led or, at the very least, may lead to the violation of rights. it may also constitute a real threat to social unity, and challenge even the thin, formal social unity that such societies have in part because of the emphasis on the equality of different cultural groups. diversity and plurality of religion, ethnicity, culture, and the like, are facts of life in many of the nations of the world, and they reflect values that democratic societies rightly defend. but to respond to problems of tension or conflict by imposing rigid or excessive limits on freedom of religion or the expression of religious heritage or on other fundamental values risks running counter to the foundational principles of modern democratic states. so, when we consider how we can best respect and preserve religious and cultural heritages, and how we can allow the broadest range of religious freedom and limit abuses of it secularism offers a fruitful option. nevertheless, it must be a secularism that does not marginalize freedom of religion or religious expression i.e., it must be what i have called 'positive secularism.' at the practical level, a society that adopts other forms of secularism what i have called 'negative' and 'mitigated' secularism will be the worse for it, for it divides not only societies but believers against themselves. those with religious convictions will try to avoid being involved in these conflicts by withdrawing from the public sphere, leaving their views unheard and their talents underused. moreover, at the theoretical level, 'negative' and 'mitigated' secularism run the risk of establishing themselves as arbiters of religious doctrine and of violating basic rights of its citizens. a 'positive' secularism aims at avoiding these results. it is a secularism that is compatible with the value of diversity and of a multicultural 20 prajñâ vihâra society though we should note that, despite the way in which modern democratic societies have evolved, the recognition of this value of diversity does not logically require multiculturalism. indeed, support for a multicultural society is consistent with working for the direct or indirect recognition of broad cultural values, a common good, or even natural law. it is here that philosophers can make a particular contribution. they can serve to prepare the intellectual and social ground for a policy of positive secularism that includes freedom of religion and the expression of religious heritage, in the short term, but also to defend the necessity of broad cultural values and even a common good in the long term. this task will undoubtedly be an arduous one, particularly as it challenges some of the dominant ideas of our times. but not to take on such a task is to risk abandoning the recognition and respect of one of humanity's most fundamental rights. william sweet 21 endnotes 1 this paper was presented at the conference of the asian association of catholic philosophers on asian heritage in a global society, in co-operation with assumption university, bangkok, thailand, 18-20 august 2004. 2 see "religious freedom legal restrictions on conversions," the hindu, july 8, 2003. http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/op/stories/2003070800080200.htm. 3 "scarf ruling in germany can't cloak ongoing debate," mark landler, new york times, thursday, september 25, 2003, http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/ generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&articleid=111184. 4 gilbert reilhac, "euro rights court backs muslim scarves ban," reuters news service, tues. june 29, 2004, http://www.reuters.co.uk/newspackage article.jhtml?type=topnews&storyid=537910&section=news. 5 deputy prime minister of belgium, m. patrick dawael. see "belgium too planning hijab ban," aljazeera.net, sat. 10 jan. 2004, http://english.aljazeera.net/ nr/exeres/20af07f7-6afe-4d19-bb0f-ad116f02a2f4.htm. 6 b (r.) v. children's aid society of metropolitan toronto [1995] 1 scr 315; for the text of the judgement, see http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/ pub/1995/vol1/html/1995scr1_0315.html. 7 see http://www.educ.sfu.ca/cels/past_art26.html "the provincial court temporarily removed parental authority and made the baby a ward of the children's aid society for the duration of the medical treatment required." the district court, the court of appeal and the supreme court of canada later dismissed the parents' appeals. 8 people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/justicepaptop3.html. see wisconsin v. yoder et al., no. 70-110 supreme court of the united states 406 u.s. 205; 92 s. ct. 1526; 32 l. ed. 2d 15; 1972 u.s. lexis 144 december 8, 1971, argued may 15, 1972, decided. see http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/yoder.html 9 the supreme court upheld the amish claim. 10 "religious persecution in canada," john pacheco, in the catholic legate, on line at http://catholic-legate.com/articles/persecution.html. 11 "homosexual rights trump religious rights provincial rights court rules bible verses regarding homosexuality ruled unpublishable," lsn.ca, june 19, 2001. see http://www.lsn.ca/ldn/2001/june/010619.html. on june 15th, 2001, the saskatchewan human rights board of inquiry fined owens and the saskatoon star phoenix $1,500 for the offense. the decision was appealed to the court of queen's bench. justice j. barclay upheld the ruling on 2002 december 11. 12 a short account may be found in my "theories of rights and political and legal instruments," in philosophical theory and the united nations declaration of human rights, (ed. william sweet), ottawa: university of ottawa press, 2003, pp. 1-14. 13 see canadian multiculturalism act (r.s., 1985, c. 24 (4th supp.) [c-18.7] an act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in canada [1988, c. 31, assented to 21st july, 1988]. 22 prajñâ vihâra 14 in my remarks here i am focusing on the rights already explicitly defined in charters, declarations, protocols, and that like. justification of this right has been discussed by john rawls, will kymlicka, charles taylor, and jürgen habermas. see the recent debate on multiculturalism among john rawls, will kymlicka, charles taylor, and jürgen habermas see, for example, john rawls's political liberalism (new york: columbia university press, 1993), 190-200, on political neutrality, and will kymlicka's criticism in multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (oxford: clarendon press, 1995), chapter 8 (on toleration). see, as well, charles taylor "the politics of recognition," in amy gutmann, ed. multiculturalism [with commentary by k. anthony appiah, jürgen habermas, steven c. rockefeller, michael walzer, and susan wolf (princeton: princeton university press, 1994)], and jürgen habermas, "reconciliation through the public use of reason: remarks on john rawls's political liberalism," the journal of philosophy, vol. 92, no. 3. (1995): 109-131, and habermas's "struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state," in gutmann, multiculturalism, 107-148. 15 message for the xxiv world day of peace (1991), section 1; cf. his message of 1988. 16 "bad moon on the rise," national post, tuesday, july 20, 2004 "nearly 10,000 religions have been identified worldwide. sociologists estimate new ones spring up at the rate of two per day. the majority of governments in canada federal and provincial list upwards of 60 as protected creeds, from christianity, judaism and islam, through buddhism, native spiritualism, sikhism and unitarianuniversalism. even neo-paganism and wicca are protected in most provinces. ontario goes so far as to safeguard "non-deistic bodies of faith" provided the "beliefs and practices" they maintain "are sincerely held and/or observed." http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/comment/story.html? id=b990cbe4-0284-4fbc-a062-7621b49a7961. 17 "section 31(2) [of the constitution and the bill of rights] ensures that the concept of rights of members of communities that associate on the basis of language, culture and religion, cannot be used to shield practices, which offend the bill of rights. these explicit qualifications may be seen as serving a double purpose. [a purpose of this qualification] is to prevent protected associational rights of members of communities from being used to 'privatise' constitutionally offensive group practices and thereby immunise them from external legislative regulation or judicial control…" this was the decision of the court in "christian education sa v minister of education 2000 (10) bclr 1051 (cc)13 at para 24 & 26." see south african human rights commission report into initiation practices at educational institutions and a preliminary report on cultural initiations, october 2001 http://www.sahrc.org.za/final_initiations_report.pdf. 18 anh nga longva (university of bergen), "the apostasy law in the age of universal human rights and citizenship: some legal and political implications," the fourth nordic conference on middle eastern studies: the middle east in globalizing world, oslo, 13-16 august 1998. see http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/ longva.html and the author's account of the case of hussein ali qambar, a shi'a william sweet 23 kuwaiti businessman. 19 see mary searle-chatterjee, "'world religions' and 'ethnic groups': do these paradigms lend themselves to the cause of hindu nationalism": ethnic and racial studies, vol. 23, no. 3 (2000). see peter beyer, "defining religion in cross-national perspective: identity and difference in official conceptions," in a.l. greil and d. bromley, eds., defining religion: investigating the boundaries between sacred and secular. religion and the social order, vol. 10. london: elsevier scientific, 2003. pp. 163-188. 20 see a.r. lord, "the problem of modern democracy", in william sweet and errol e. harris, eds. philosophical lectures and remains of arthur ritchie lord, 3 vols., vol. 1, (lewiston, ny: mellen press, 2005). see also william sweet, "a.r. lord and later british idealist political philosophy," british journal of politics & international relations, vol. 7, no. 1 (2005): 48-66. 21 merriam-webster dictionary. 22 the concise oxford dictionary of current english. 23 richard rorty, "religion as conversation-stopper," common knowle -dge, 3 (1994): 1-6. 24 prajñâ vihâra 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 110-123 110 © 2000 by assumption university press towards understanding the relation between religions and cultures in southeast asia joseph i. fernando assumption university of thailand abstract in the face of modernity and its erosion of traditional values, we need to preserve something of the wisdom of traditional culture. the traditional cultures have taken thousands of years to evolve and are necessary to preserve. they are the carriers of the accumulated wisdom of the people since antiquity. they give man a sense of belonging, acceptance and assurance. they enshrine the values, which define meaning, guide, motivate and lead people to fulfillment. we find cultural traditions still alive in the rural communities of south east asia. it is to these communities that we need to turn to guide us on our road to the future. the significance of religion marx wrote in the introduction to a critique of hegel’s philosophy of right “religion is … the imaginary realization of human being, because human being possesses no true reality. thus the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world whose aroma is religion … religion is the opium of the people. the real happiness of people requires the abolition of religion, which is their illusory happiness”.1 feuerbach argued in his the essence of christianity that ‘the secret of theology is anthropology’. whatever man says about god is an expression in mystified terms of his knowledge about himself. “god is the imaginative projection of man’s species-essence, the totality of his powers and attributes raised to the level of infinity… man’s knowledge of god is an attempt to perceive himself in the mirror of exteriority; man exteriorizes his own essence before he recognizes it in himself, and the opposition between god and man is a ‘mystified’ version of the opposition between the species-being and the individual … man asserts in god what he denies in himself”.2 is religion really the opium of the people? the answer is both yes and no. there is a distinction between religion in principle and religion in practice. religion in practice can be exploitative. in fact, exploitation by religion has been prevalent all over the world. one can think of the exploitative religious practices, for examples, in ancient india and europe. the materialists known as lokayatikas or charvakas in ancient india held that only this world or loka is real. “the materialist theory had a good deal to do with the repudiation of the old religion of custom and magic”.3 the common man was weighed down by the burden of rituals in india in 6th century b.c. orthodox hinduism was excessively ritualistic. many could not afford the cost of the rituals. without the rituals it was almost impossible to establish contact with the deity. religion was in the hands of the priests. priesthood had become almost priest-craft. “the masses of men were addicted to the ceremonies and observances prescribed by those who lived on food provided by the faithful ... the priest who pretended to be the channel of divine power dominated the religion of the country … he pretended to be in the confidence of the gods and addressed the needy: ‘son, make a sacrifice to god and a payment to me, and thy sins will be forgiven thee’. the system of salvation by silver could not answer to the deeper needs of the human heart”4. gautama buddha was aware of this. “the cruel rites with which worship was accompanied shocked the conscience of buddha”.5 he searched for a way to free people from the clutches of ritualism. his departure from orthodox hinduism was a protest against all that was not humane. he was silent on god but emphatic on the practice of morality. his stand could be it is not necessary to be vociferous about god but obligatory to be good and do good. as the christian scripture says, “not everyone who says to me: lord! lord! will enter the kingdom of heaven, but the one who does the will of my father in heaven.”6 is it not the will of the father in heaven people must be good and do good? marx, nietzsche and freud vehemently opposed religion. for marx, religion is part of the superstructure resting on the base of economics. in the feudalistic europe, the serfs would listen to the sermons by priests who exhorted them to obey their feudal masters. their suffering on earth joseph i. fernando 111 was negligible compared to the eternal happiness they would have in heaven after death. they were told “you will get a pie in the sky after you die.” but the serfs were in need of the pie ‘here and now’. no wonder he considered religion as the opium of the people. nietzsche was disgusted with the christianity of his times and declared in his the gay science, “god is dead. god remains dead. and we have killed him” (aphorism 125). for freud, religious beliefs are considered infantile illusions. yet just because religion has been abused by certain so-called religious people and others, it cannot merely be condemned as the opium of the people. religion has been a panacea for the ills of the soul. in a country like india, from time immemorial there has been a longing to become one with the divine. earthly life has been understood as a prelude to eternity. this longing expressed itself in simplicity, austerity, learning, meditation and contemplation. this longing was manifest in philosophy, literature, music, painting, sculpture, dance, architecture and so on the antiquity of which is unparalleled in human history. although secular themes too found their expression in human creation, the predominant theme was, of course, religious. with the advent of christianity, the barbaric tribes of europe found themselves civilized and tamed. the barbarians were the celts, germans, slavs and others ‘the non-italic and non-greek peoples of europe who inherited the greco-roman civilization and formed most of the presentday european nations. like the italic peoples, they were speakers of indo-european dialects.’7 many were called to a life of holiness. towering intellectuals like st.augustine, st.anselm, st.thomas aquinas, st.bonaventure were holy men. the founding of monastic orders by st.benedict, st.dominic, st.francis of assisi, the gothic cathedrals and the cathedral schools which eventually evolved into such great universities as oxford, cambridge, padua, salamanca, the works of artists like michael angelo and leonardo da vinci, literary creations and immortal musical compositions; these were all inspired by religion. in the islamic and buddhist worlds we also find amazing creations which evolved from deep religiosity. religion has been the bedrock of hope for millions of people down through the centuries. it has been the source of purpose and fulfillment in their lives. religion has given them a reason to live and a meaning to their death. it has enabled them to live, to give, to forgive, to serve, to suffer for 112 prajñâ vihâra worthy causes and to work for peace and unity. without religion, the world would be engulfed in spiritual darkness. for millions of people human life would be unthinkable without religion as they are guided by the precepts of their religions. the fact that people take their religions seriously indicates that man is not only a rational, social and political animal but also a religious animal. scores of people have laid down their lives and are ready to do so even today in defense of the values upheld by their religions. religion has a tremendous hold on man. man as a mortal being realizes death puts an end to his earthly existence. all his toil and moil will come to a halt one day. as heidegger puts it, man is a being-towards-death. his life is fleeting, temporary and finite. st.thomas aquinas demonstrates in his summa theologica man has only one end: god.8 his happiness consists only in god, not in wealth, honours, fame, glory, power, bodily good, pleasure, some good of the soul and created good. is it not, then, wise to seek the ultimate reality, which is his final end and source of all happiness? interestingly, asia is the cradle of religions such as hinduism, buddhism, jainism, zoroastrianism, judaism, christianity, islam and so on. it is worth investigating into the relation between religions and cultures especially in southeast asia. the southeast asian context plato aptly remarked that philosophy begins in wonder. man is not only a wonderful being but also a wondering being. he wonders about the things around him, within him and beyond him. this sense of wonder and the curiosity to search for answers to perplexing questions have led him to philosophy and religion. there have been several stages in the development of the religious consciousness of man from animism to monotheism. there is hardly any culture without religion. religion has been a major force propelling great cultural accomplishments. the great epics of ramayana and mahabharata, the angkor wat temple in cambodia and borobodur temple in java are some examples of the impact of religion on literature and architecture respectively a.l. basham writes in his the wonder that was india: “ the whole of south-east asia received most of its culture from india … other joseph i. fernando 113 cultural influences, from china and the islamic world, were felt in southeast asia, but the primary impetus to civilization came from india.”9 traditionally, in mainland southeast asia, burma, laos, thailand, cambodia and vietnam have been buddhist nations. malaysia, indonesia and brunei are predominantly islamic nations. the philippines is the only predominantly christian nation in asia. singapore is truly a cosmopolitan city-state. the religions of southeast asia today are buddhism, islam, christianity, hinduism and sikhism. none of these religions were native to southeast asia. indian buddhist missionaries, hindu priests, merchants and settlers introduced buddhism and hinduism respectively in southeast asia from india. the sufi merchants and masters from india, persia and arabia introduced islam in southeast asia. the filipinos became catholics due to the colonization of the philippines by the spaniards in 16th century and some of them later became baptists due to the american presence in the country. although these religions have contributed much to the cultures of southeast asia, the natives of these lands had their own cultures prior to the advent of these religions. what are the values and practices of these indigenous cultures? were these cultures enriched or hampered by the advent of the new religions? have there been conflicts between the native cultures and the adopted religions? how much of the native culture is preserved? has there been an enculturation of these religions in southeast asia? if some of the native cultural practices were abandoned in the wake of embracing a new religion, can we rediscover their values and preserve them for posterity? this is an urgent task today especially in the context of globalization which allegedly threatens to some extent the existence and continuity of our cultures. the filipinos converted by the spaniards became more like spanish christians, just as those converted by the portuguese in goa, india became like portuguese christians. yet they have also developed their own asian christian identity distinct from their western roots. likewise, to be a muslim in indonesia or malaysia is not to be exactly like a muslim in arabia. a muslim in arabia is a product of arabic culture with its own history, ecology, and traditions. indonesian and malaysian cultures have existed long before the advent of islam in these countries 114 prajñâ vihâra has there been a symbiotic relationship between religions like islam and christianity and the cultures of southeast asia? in this context what come to mind are the pioneering efforts of the italian jesuits matteo ricci in china and robert de nobili in india in 16th and 17th centuries respectively, with regard to enculturation of christianity. ricci and de nobili attempted to present christianity not as a western religion with western trappings but as a universal faith of salvation to people everywhere. they believed the christian faith must incarnate itself in the native cultures of the people. ricci and de nobili were not mere missionaries but visionaries of enculturation. nearly 400 years later, the catholic church for the first time spoke about the need for enculturation and the interrelationship between the gospel and culture in the vatican ii documents.10 in the light of this paradigm of enculturation, what is the impact of religions like christianity and islam on southeast asian cultures? significantly, when a native culture encounters a non-native religion, there may be a mutual impact. for example, christianity had its impact on indian culture. the christian presence in india influenced the abolition of sati (burning the widow in her husband’s pyres), of child marriage, and of devadasi system (temple prostitution). the christian missionaries threw open their schools to all children in a country where some sections of society were traditionally denied education. the sermon on the mount profoundly influenced gandhi in his advocacy of nonviolence. hinduism has had its impact on christianity. the christians learnt from the hindus to appreciate religious tolerance. the hindu belief in divine presence in the natural phenomena – the trees, mountains, rivers and so on – has enabled the christians to understand better divine immanence in the universe besides being aware of the transcendence of god. likewise, has there been a mutual impact of religions and cultures in southeast asia? it may be said that religion is the core of culture. just as culture preserves religion within itself, religion too has to affirm the values of culture in which it is embedded. religion and ethnicities seem to go hand in hand in southeast asia. it appears as if to be a thai, burmese or cambodian is to be a buddhist; to be an indonesian or malay is to be a muslim and to be a filipino is to be a christian. the religion of the majority seems to determine the national character. this is not how southeast asia should be. in fact, religions transcend ethnicities and are universal. the minorities too play significant joseph i. fernando 115 roles in the life of the nation. some microscopic minorities do make enormous contributions to the nations. for example, the christians in asia have been pioneers in the fields of education and health care. people of all religions constitute the rich diversity of the nation. the minorities are not left to the mercy of the majority in democratic polity. democracy is where all the citizens are equal under the law and have equal opportunities. a nation is judged by the character, dynamism and quality of life of its citizens, which include both the majority and the minorities. therefore, to be a thai is more than to be a buddhist; it is also to be a muslim, christian and so on. to be a filipino is also to be a muslim. to be an indonesian or malaysian is also to be a christian, hindu, buddhist and so on. one’s identity as belonging to a particular religious or ethnic community cannot be a threat to another’s identity as belonging to another religious or ethnic community. as autonomous persons, people profess and practice a religion, which they find meaningful. therefore, there is no question of threat to anybody’s identity as long as the citizens recognize the value of peaceful coexistence, mutual appreciation, cooperation and collaboration. threat arises when religious groups become fundamentalist, fascist and have misguided motives and vested interests. in fact, the church or the religious body is the only moral voice of society. holiness is nurtured in a religious environment. more holy men and women are needed today that in any other time in human history. holy persons who are committed to the love of the divine and the human are called upon to bring light, love and healing to the lives of people. in the absence of holiness, spirituality, devotion and service, mere organization and administration of the church or the religious body would be lifeless and meaningless. without holy men and women who are meek, simple, caring and loving, the world would be a hell. truly holy persons transcend the barriers of language, religion, race and ethnicity and reach out to all human beings in loving service. such persons respect the sentiments, freedom and rights of others. for example, truly holy hindus and muslims would not impose on others abstinence from eating beef and pork respectively. similarly, those living in predominantly hindu and muslim areas would voluntarily abstain from eating beef and pork respectively as a mark of respect for and identity with the brethren of other religions. 116 prajñâ vihâra st.paul expresses this concern so well in his letter to the romans (14:15-23): but if you hurt your brother because of a certain food, you are no longer walking according to love…the kingdom of god is not a matter of food and drink; it is justice, peace and joy in the holy spirit… let us look, then, for what strengthens peace and makes us better. do not destroy the work of god because of food… and it may be better not to eat meat or drink wine, or anything else that causes your brother to stumble. keep your own belief before god, and happy are you if you never act against your own belief. instead, whoever eats something in spite of his doubts, is doing wrong, because he does not act according to his belief and whatever we do against our conscience is sinful religion, of course, primarily meets the moral and spiritual needs of man. it guides him to the realization of ultimate reality. this does not mean religion is indifferent to the other aspects of human life – the political, economic, social, cultural, technological and so on. religion sees man in his wholeness. man is not a fragmented being. religion guides the whole man to his final destiny. so, all aspects of human life are the concerns of religion. religion seeks to integrate all these aspects of life into a meaningful whole. whenever human wholeness is threatened by politics, economics, business, technology, and so on, religion has to intervene in an effort to redeem it. moreover, religious bodies have to cooperate with governmental and nongovernmental agencies to promote human welfare. such an alignment presupposes solidarity among religions themselves. like the world parliament of religions, there should be a southeast asian confederation of religions to promote social action. each southeast asian nation should have a federation of religions. all these federations can be formed into larger confederation of religions. such organizations can enhance the effectiveness of each religion in solidarity with others for social action. religions must come out of their isolation and forge a unity for social action. sometimes religions are represented on the occasion of inter-religious prayer service. this is not enough. despite the difference of doctrines among themselves, they have one common goal of serving man. this common goal is sufficient to lead them to form a confederation of joseph i. fernando 117 religions with a view to work for human wholesomeness in the context of modernization, technology and urbanization. modernization, religion and culture in southeast asia i would like to probe into the role of religion and culture with regard to the quality of life in southeast asia in the context of modernization. modernization is a postcolonial phenomenon in asia. after gaining independence from their former colonial powers, the nations of asia with their right to self-determination embarked on the course of modernization. modernization is the fruit of science and technology. it includes industrialization, effective means of transport, communications, medical care, timesaving utilities, liberal education, international trade and so on. modernization was expected to improve the quality of life. but has the quality of life really improved in these nations? what is meant by the quality of life? does the quality of life consist only in economic development? although economic development is certainly a major contribution to the quality of life, there are several other desirable things to improve the quality of life. the quality of life has much to do with what is to be human and what is a good life. does a good life mean only satisfaction of economic needs? no. man has other needs too to fulfill in order to be human. what are they? for man to live a truly human life means primarily to live with dignity. his dignity and worth as a person should be affirmed. this means he should live a decent life. decency requires satisfaction of basic needs such as food, shelter and clothes. decency also implies rights and freedom: right to life, security, livelihood, education, property and so on; freedom of thought, expression, and assembly, freedom of belief and opinion, freedom of mobility, tastes and pursuits. a decent life can be quantitative and qualitative — quantitative in so far as the things people need are measurable; qualitative in so far as people achieve their well-being in terms of relationships, community, freedom and creativity. amartya sen speaks of development not merely as economic but also contributing to the enhancement of the capabilities of people.11 people have many capabilities such as to live a healthy life, to develop their talents, to decide freely what 118 prajñâ vihâra is good for them, to pursue careers of their choice, to interact meaningfully with others, to develop their emotions, to be creative, to participate in activities of the community, to be part of decisionmaking, to work for environmental protection, to promote peace and harmony, and so on. the development of numerous capabilities contributes to the growth of persons and communities. although modernization has accelerated economic growth, it has caused some other problems in the region. there has been an exodus from the rural areas to the cities in search of job opportunities. overpopulation in the cities affects the quality of urban life. congested traffic, pollution, overcrowding, shantytowns, poor sanitation, crime, mafia, and so on are the problems in the cities. the exodus to the cities affects the rural economy too. farming suffers, the environment decays, cottage industries and handicraft shrink and villages wear a forlorn look due to neglect, desertion and lack of resources. both the cities and villages need redemption. they can be saved from further ruin by limiting the exodus from the villages to the cities. one of the most urgent tasks today is rural development. the villages must be developed in such a way that the necessary amenities are available to the villagers so that they do not migrate to the cities in search of them. as far as possible, people must be enabled to live satisfying lives in the developed villages. modernization has its impact on the moral values of the people too. moral values like honesty, integrity and so on tend to suffer a setback in a highly competitive and success-driven society. interpersonal relations are likely to be measured in terms of economics. family as the most fundamental and vital unit of society is threatened by divorce, unfaithfulness, separation and so on. moneymaking activity takes too much of one’s time leaving little time for spending with family, caring for others, performing meaningful religious rituals to maintain cohesion in the family and community. gradually cultural traditions slip out of one’s consciousness within this concrete jungle. in this context, how important it is to understand why gadamer upholds the importance of tradition! asia is traditionally known for the values of simplicity, religiosity, hospitality and joy. the asians have generally preferred a simple life-style which is marked by possession of a few things needed for daily use. consumerism and greed have crept into the asian societies because of joseph i. fernando 119 globalization and aping the west. a difficult task is how to strike a balance between simplicity and modernization. a profound sense of religiosity generates hope, meaning and purpose in the lives of the people of asia. the asians view earthly existence as transitory and seek the ultimate reality according to their religious traditions. but of late, the values of religion have been affected by consumerism, materialism and hedonism. traditional asian hospitality has been transformed into hospitality industry today. hospitality has become a marketable commodity. how hard it is to be hospitable, warm, generous and caring without being paid! joy has been a distinguishing mark of the asian spirit. the asians laugh, joke and are cheerful even if they are poor. they are seldom given to despair, depression and gloom. dominique lapierre’s the city of joy is an ample proof for this.12 how can the erosion of cultural values be stopped? in what ways can culture be preserved and promoted? how is a holistic approach to life possible? searching for answers to these questions is essential because it is part of one’s search for meaning in life. what is the role of religion in contributing to a good life? what are the dynamics of religion in providing meaning to life? in southeast asia, has religion been hijacked by economy or has it adapted itself to the changing times or compromised with modernization? has any religion undertaken a critique of southeast asian society, which it seeks to serve? it is a matter of great concern not to lose one’s consciousness of cultural heritage amidst the flux of modernization. another concern is how religion can interact meaningfully with culture. such an interaction presupposes dialogue among religions themselves. the religions of southeast asia in trying to understand more of each other can foster friendship and solidarity for social action. dialogue requires openness to plurality, diversity and recognition of the other. they need not shy away from dialogue saying dialogue is a western concept and the christians are interested in it with the motive of conversion. dialogue is not for conversion, but to understand the other. all understanding eventually leads to self-understanding. there is a need for committed dialogue among religions. the purpose of religions coming together in dialogue is not to brag about each one’s religion. it is not to say, ‘my religion is the only true religion’, as if others are false. of course, one may be legitimately proud 120 prajñâ vihâra of one’s religious heritage and rightly so. that does not mean one can look down upon other religions. in dialogue, a sincere attempt is made to understand the other’s position. as gadamer says, dialogue is guided by the subject matter and not by the personalities involved in it. it requires openness and respect. as persons seek to understand each other in dialogue, the emphasis is not on the theoretical. dialogue is praxis. it is a commitment and an opening towards grasping the common ground on which all stand. it is a revelation of the shared humanity and the human condition that is inescapably everyone’s lot. religions coming together in dialogue ought to seek the praxis of addressing situations that need to be rectified. buddhism, islam, christianity and other religions of southeast asia need to create a platform for praxis. in a joint venture they can address a number of issues more effectively. that is the way religions become credible in a society where many tend towards materialism, skepticism, individualism and indifference. religion ought to retain its moral voice in relation to the concrete situations in which people find themselves. in the absence of dialogue among religions, the people of southeast asia may not visualize their shared destiny and will lack a sense of direction towards the future. religion needs to do a lot of soul-searching with regard to being a moral force in defining what is to be human. to grasp what is to be human has much to do with overcoming situations people are in: human trafficking, profiteering, racketeering and so on. in fact the call to rediscover the values of religion and culture in southeast asia is linked to the destiny of the people of the region. the perennially relevant question remains: what is to be human? traditional cultures have taken thousands of years to evolve and are worth preserving, since they are the carriers of the accumulated wisdom of the people since antiquity. culture gives man a sense of belonging, acceptance and assurance. culture enshrines the values, which define meaning, guide, motivate and lead people to fulfillment. this does not mean everything in cultural tradition is good. culture needs purification too. superstitious beliefs, for example, are not wholesome. the caste system is an aberration and a blot on indian culture. caste is dehumanizing, divisive, discriminatory, oppressive and fascist. it recognizes the intrinsic dignity and worth of only some and not all persons. it builds walls, not bridges, between people. it is a denial of brotherhood. joseph i. fernando 121 modernization may be a threat to traditional cultures. with the advent of modernization, there is a tension between change and continuity. how much of the traditional culture changes and how much of it continues? how best can modernization and cultures be integrated? does religion have a role in this? religion cannot be a mute witness to the destruction of traditional cultures. people need to be part of traditional cultures. culture, like the hearth and home, is necessary for man, without which he will be a wanderer and dispossessed. the rural communities with their closer ties and bonds of union should be preserved as an antidote to the faceless technological society, which may dehumanize people and threaten the survival of nature. whatever contributes to human wholesomeness, sense of belonging, loveliness, beauty, rustic simplicity and the joy of rooted in the soil must be protected, preserved and fostered. endnotes 1 leszek kolakowski, main currents in marxism, 1. the founders, oxford university press, new york, 1989, pp.128-129. 2 ibid., p.115. 3 s.radhakrishnan, indian philosophy, vol.1. oxford university press, 2000, p.283. 4 ibid., p.356. 5 ibid., p.354. 6 the bible, matthew 7:21. 7 new catholic encyclopedia vol. 2. the catholic university of america, washington, d.c., 1967, p.86. 8 summa theologica, i-ii,q.1-5. 9a.l.basham, the wonder that was india, rupa & co., new delhi,2001, p.485. 10 vatican ii documents, gaudium et spes 53-62. 122 prajñâ vihâra 11 amartya sen, development as freedom, anchor books, new york, 1999. 12 dominique lapierre in his the city of joy narrates his unique experiences in calcutta where he finds the people strikingly joyful although many are poor. joseph i. fernando 123 contents cultural heritage and the problem of identity in the world on globalization process hyondok choe institute of missiology missio, aachen, germany abstract this paper will discuss the tensions between cultural heritage and globalization. it will examine the various responses to the challenges of globalization. and it will promote an idea of an ‘intercultural philosophy’ as a response to the present challenges. the process of globalization globalization is certainly one of the central terms describing the present situation of the world. most of the people would agree with the fact that there is an ongoing, worldwide process of ‘globalization’. but, regarding the analysis of its reasons, the estimation of its consequences and perspectives of judging its results, there are vastly different perspectives. even though the ‘globalization’ itself is not the theme of this paper, i will explain some aspects in relation to our theme. the manifestations of ‘globalization’ became very familiar even in our everyday life. you can enjoy the new trends of cultures (music, movies, fashion, etc.) everywhere in the world where you have the internet access. the announcement of the flight schedule after 6:00 p.m. in the airport in berlin is broadcast from california. (in germany, overtime is expensive). in the dead body of the penguins discovered in the south pole entails poisonous heavy metal, even though there are no factories in that area. in the department stores all over the world you can find the same brands (gucci, christian dior, panasonic, siemens, etc.). prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 61-72 61 © 2000 by assumption university press however, ‘globalization’ in our time does not only refer to the globally spreading culture and commodities or the amazing development of information, communication and transport technology. these are rather the surface manifestations of a process which is much more complex and touching upon every aspect (economic, social, political and cultural) of human life. originally it is based on the internalization process driven by the innate dynamics of the capitalistic economic system. the basic mechanism can be summarized as follows: the ultimate goal of the capitalistic economy lies in the maximization of the profit which produces an intensive competition. it stimulates the technical and technological development in order to reduce the production costs. the enhancement of the productivity results in the continuous increase of the products and the capitalists notice very soon the narrowness of the domestic market. it is very rational for them to seek for other markets in the world. the internalization of the capital is not restricted in the expansion of the market for the surplus products (export). it includes also the direct investment, international division of labor for producing products (for example: row material from indonesia, fabrication in thailand, package in south korea, etc.) and internalization of financial capital (bank, stock market, etc.). the enhancement of the productivity is not necessarily accompanied by the improvement of the material living standards of the common people in the similar proportion. on the contrary it is normally the case that it produces the increasing disparity between the rich and the poor. it is a problem of the relation of the political power how to distribute the produced wealth. social democratic governments in western europe have tried to reduce the disparity through their social democratic policies of redistribution including policies (regarding tax, activities of trade union, social welfare, etc.) state intervention in the economic process which look unfavorable for the capitalists. but, in the present stage of internalization of the economy, the capitalists have possibilities to overcome the state boundaries, it means to escape from the “unfavorable” policies of a national government (for example: moving the production site to other countries where they pay much less taxes and wages). moreover they have even possibilities to put the national government under the decisive pressure. the “exit option” of 62 prajñâ vihâra the financial investors (the possibility to withdraw all the money from the finance market of a country) could mean a bankruptcy of the national economy of that country. it was evidently proven during the asian financial crisis in the second half of the 1990’s. the total amount of wealth on the global level is still growing, but the income of the state is reducing. it influences directly the budget reduction of the social welfare system. the disparity of the rich and poor is increasing immensely. the possibility of a “20:80” society, where just 20% of the population could have a life appropriate for human dignity, is not exaggerated. the word “globalization” suggests a harmonic global world. there has been also intensive propaganda that the globalization would bring out a wonderful world. but, globalization is not harmless, because it is in essence combined with the increasing inequality and the marginalization of the weak people. it subjects everything under the principle of the market, even the culture. the asymmetry of the power in the economic and political field makes influence on the constellation of the cultural power. i am not defining culture on the basis of national boundary. (and i am not suggesting american culture will destroy the cultures of the other countries.) even in the west, the tendency of the reduction of the culture (the “civilization” of the market and the culture of consumption1) is observed. only a culture which is subsumed under the principle of the market could survive. we can buy dimsam and sushi in the supermarket in europe. but, i do not think that it signifies the equal treatment of the western and eastern cultures. it means that dimsam and sushi succeeded in adjusting themselves under the principles of the market. in this sense i am suggesting that the globalization brings out the uniformity of the culture. it is very natural that one extreme calls to the other. in this context we can understand the rise of the fundamentalism and the increasing conflicts between the groups with different cultural background. it is a protest against the compelled ‘uniformity’, which is lacking in ‘equality’. in the area of culture we are confronted with a totalitarian ideology robbing a people of the right to create their own culture in an autonomous way. in this sense the globalization does not encourage the development of the dialogue between cultures; it produces rather the conflict of cultures. hyondok choe 63 “war against terror” as an extreme manifestation of an essential problem of the current globalization process – either “we” or “others (=enemy)” the series of occurrences in the world since september 11, 2001, including the war in afghanistan and iraq as well as threat of war in other regions, is a serious challenge also for philosophy. in accordance with the process of the neo-liberalistic globalization accompanied by the expansion of the single super culture there is a clear tendency in this present world: the world is rules by policies lacking in the concept of “the other” as an equal partner. the friend-enemy-dichotomy is prevailing, where waging war is justified by way of removing “the enemy” – even though they are just a “potential” enemy. for theologians it is an urgent task to develop and spread a philosophy of an intercultural and mutual encounter, a theology of living together. in this context i remember a comment of an american newscaster several days after sept. 11: “good and evil rarely manifest themselves as clearly as they did last tuesday. people who we don’t know massacred people who we do. and they did so with contemptuous glee.” then he broke down and wept.2 allegedly there are two antagonistic groups of people, even though all of them are living in the same “global village”: people whom the usamericans know and people whom they don’t. this dichotomy of “we” and “the others” is related to the dichotomy of “good and evil”. and the problem is that the usa have been at war against “the others”, “the evil”, whom they do not know. the dichotomy of < either “we” or “the others (= enemy)” > entails a very dangerous potential. first of all, it can function as an epistemic basis for justifying violence against “the others” as well as for desensitizing people in terms of the violation of the human rights of “the others”. people tend to think that it is enough to take care of “us”. “the others” or the “enemy” must be defeated. this kind of mentality is opposite to the basic premise of the concept of “human rights” which have to be acknowledged for all human beings, just because they are human beings without any condition. 64 prajñâ vihâra secondly, the perspective of this dichotomy oppresses any criticism against its own society. in the constellation of < either “we” or “the others (= enemy)” >, to whom do the critics belong? it can happen easily that the critics are regarded as “the others”. as a result, they have no place in “our” society. it is justified to deprive them of their human rights and to tyrannize them. the society develops in the anti-democratic direction. the tendency to regard the anti-globalization activists as equivalent to the terrorists3 is an example of this development. thirdly, the dichotomizing mentality creates social atmosphere favorable for militarism. in fear of losing “our” own security it becomes even acceptable to make a war against “the others”. the climate of war is used as an excuse to curtail civil liberties, deny free speech, lay off workers, harass ethnic and religious minorities, cut back on public spending and divert huge amounts of money to the defense industry.4 i remember well the strong civil movement in the 80’s in germany for the protection of data privacy from the state control. at present, however, the german ministry of interior dares to introduce the regulation requiring finger prints on identity cards. democracy takes a step backwards. everyone wishes to eliminate terrorism. however, it is absurd to believe that one can stamp out terrorism with more violence and oppression, since terrorism is only a symptom, not the disease.5 there is a reason and circumstances in which terrorism is nourished. isn’t it natural for the people, who have been defined as “the others”, to resist? in the course of proceeding globalization they have been becoming more and more marginalized. the foundation of their existence has been more and more threatened. globalization and growing fundamentalism are two sides of the same coin.6 the basic problem is the mode of relations. only the recognition of “the other” as an equal subject, and the development a relationship of mutual enrichment, could be the solution.7 to react through warfare only worsens the original problem – this ranges from ‘ignoring’ to a total ‘elimination’ of “the other”. ‘arundhati roy suggests, “the first step is for america to at least acknowledge that it shares the planet with other nations, with other human beings who, even if they are not on tv, have loves and griefs and stories and songs and sorrows and, for heaven’s sake, rights.”8 but the today’s world ‘superpower’ does not yet recognize the ‘equality’ of cultures. the notion of the “axis of the evil” and the hyondok choe 65 manipulation of the public opinions to justify the war against “the evil” show it clearly. the goal of the us policy is not to “live together” but to eliminate “the other”, so that only “we” can live. culturally interpreted, it has the implication of the ‘intolerance of the differences’ forcing ‘uniformity of the culture’. the political and social consequences of this mentality have affected the everyday life of the majority of people in the whole world in a disastrous way. response to a process threatening one’s own identity for the most of asian countries, which were subjected to colonial rule, the globalization process is a second blow, because they are still struggling with the task of de-colonialization and recovery of their oppressed or lost identities. moreover, the innovation of their societies with the values of (self-defined) modernity and the formation of a new identity is also on program. (i’d like to avoid using the term “modernization”, because it is usually understood as ‘westernization’.) the ‘identity’ is not a fixed entity, but always in process. there are various types of reaction: a) a modernist reaction involves the effort to break with tradition and to radically adopt the so called “modern” values. b) efforts to synthesize the modern and the traditional is the second type of the reaction. this often involves modernizing science and technology while preserving traditional culture. c) traditionalists idealize the past and appeal for a return to tradition. they regard “the western” influence as a danger, destroying the ideal and supposed identity of their society. d) fundamentalists go even further and try to “protect” their own identity through aggressive attitudes and actions. in extreme cases they use violence and terror as an instrument. even though each type of these reactions differs from each other, they are more or less under the common paradigm according to which: 66 prajñâ vihâra a) the traditional culture (a) and “western” influence (b) are antagonistic figures being understood as dichotomous contradiction; b) the efforts to innovate or modernize the values and systems of the existing society are often regarded as identical with adoption of the western values (b); c) the traditional culture (a) as well as the “western” influence (b) are conceived as closed entities (essentialistic conception). this essentialistic paradigm has the following decisive shortcomings to understand the present situation and develop an alternative: a) culture is not an abstract entity in itself; it is rather a horizon of human history on which every concrete human being understands and interprets the reality as well as carries out actions in it. neither do human beings understand and interpret reality homogeneously, nor do they act in a unified way.9 culture is rather a place where different interests, views and actions of different individuals or groups are competing, struggling or living together. power struggles and the changing constellation of power belong of course to a culture. we can remember how feminist movement changed the cultures of their societies. culture is never a closed entity, but rather an epistemic unit which entails in reality great internal dynamics and diversities. the essentialistic paradigm does not help us understand the internal dynamics of a culture. b) according to the essentialistic paradigm, it is difficult to explain change within a culture. culture is created by living human beings, and to live means to be in continuous change. so culture too is an identity which is continuously in process. resisting change in a culture results in the mummification of the past, and canceling the dynamic of present life.10 we need to appreciate a more dynamic concept of culture and identity. c) the antagonistic couple of the concepts is rather <tradition vs. innovation>, rather than <one’s own tradition vs. influence from others>. even in one’s own tradition the dynamics of tradition and innovation is in process. also for “western” culture it is the same. there is no undifferentiated tradition in itself. if there is a tradition of the past dominating system, there is also a revolutionary tradition. the undifferentiated “tradition” designating a culture of those who have power was often misused hyondok choe 67 by dictators for ideological manipulation of the mass. south-koreans can remember the propaganda of the “national identity” or “democracy in korean way” under the military dictatorship in the 1970’s. the asianism of lee kwan yew is another example.11 the relationship of tradition and “western” influence regarded as contradictory by the essentialistic paradigm is not really contradictory. d) according to the essentialistic paradigm, the essential difference between asian and european value systems lies in the question, whether a community or an individual, duties or rights stands at the center of human life and all sorts of social system and culture. various values were established as a result of an emancipation movement or revolution against feudal ruling system – the concept of human dignity, human rights, individual person as an autonomous subject, equality of all human beings, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, idea of democracy, tolerance, feminism etc. – are often regarded as “western” per se. asians fighting for democracy or human rights, or especially asian women fighting for gender equality, have been often blamed by the traditionalists for propagating western values and betray their own country and its tradition. dieter senghaas, a well known german sociologist and expert in development discourses, indicates that these values are never european per se. he asks us to recall european history. even until the middle of 18th century, the idea of equality, human dignity and human rights were rejected as strange and absurd. the few thinkers who promoted these ideas were persecuted and their books were prohibited. the theocracy and intolerance which existed at the time of the christian reformation reminds us of the attitudes of the taliban. yet less than 200 years later in northern and western europe, people achieved these rights and established them through various democratic systems. southern european countries achieved these ideals in the 20th century.12 the success in establishing these values is not ‘european’ per se, but the result of the hard struggles of the people for their emancipation. ‘intercultural philosophy’ as a response 68 prajñâ vihâra what would be an appropriate way to respond to the challenge of globalization? is there no alternative to its main tendency of expanding the super culture while it subdues and marginalizes other smaller cultures? wouldn’t it be conceivable to innovate the cultural heritage of asia so that it can initiate a cultural change in the process of globalization for pluralization of human cultures in the world? in order to do it, we need not only a competent strategy of adoption (rezeption) but also we should be able to offer a content which can be universalized. at the same time we have to claim the right to offer it. i think that the “intercultural philosophy” is a viable response. since the end of the 80’s there have been philosophers making efforts to establish a new form of philosophy called “intercultural philosophy”.13 beyond the horizon of the comparative philosophy the new one has to realize the transformation of philosophy as requested by the ‘dialogue of the cultures’. now i will introduce some concepts of intercultural philosophy which can hint its essential characters.14 1. contextuality philosophy is always done within a culture. it implies that there is a material context of human thinking and the interdependence between the culture and philosophical paradigms. this awareness stimulated philosophers to be conscious of their own context and avoid absolutizing or universalizing one’s own paradigm. this awareness contributed, on the one hand, to the critical evaluation of the universality claims of the european or occidental philosophy – “euro-centrism” leading to the discovery of the regional contextuality of european philosophy. on the other hand, a fundament was prepared to reexamine and revaluate the philosophical traditions of other cultural areas which have been called “cosmovision”, “wisdom of life”, “religious consciousness”, “mysticism”, and other ways of thought not traditionally accepted as philosophy by european philosophers.15 2. plurality hyondok choe 69 there are diversity of contexts which bring about a diversity of the form and content of philosophy. the plurality of the cultural practices of philosophy is the source of the differences in its concrete forms, in which the human being is doing philosophy. therefore it is necessary to regionalize (to be aware of the regional character of) the forms of practice and expression of philosophy (seminar, lecture, academic articles, conversation, etc.). 3. reference to praxis philosophy should be contextualized in the sense of being aware of its humus from which it has been growing. the world, within which human beings practice philosophy, influences not only what is thought but also how it is thought. at the same time these activities (practice of philosophy) are a part of the events happening in the world and influence the reality. it implies that philosophy not only knows and explains the world but also forms the reality. 4. universality the proposal of intercultural philosophy to regionalize philosophy does not assume cultural relativism, nor is it postmodern. the necessity of the universality is not abandoned. it is not the same universality which the mono-cultural european philosophy has claimed. the intercultural philosophy substitutes the tension between the universal and the particular with the dialogue between the contextual worlds. the universality is produced during the communication praxis, reciprocal translation and mediation of own world of experiences and references. 5. diverse types of rationality the intercultural philosophy has distrusted the concept of ‘reason’ of traditional european philosophy (cf.: postmodernism). but it does not mean the absolute rejection of ‘reason’ itself but the rejection of its background of mono-cultural formation combined with exclusive claim of validity. the proposal of intercultural philosophy is to examine historically the process of the formation of the valid forms of rationality using an intercultural, open dialogue free from prejudice. the dialogue will uncover the mono-cultural structure of the conceptualizing process and suggest a 70 prajñâ vihâra correction. the diverse ways of practicing philosophy from various cultures of our multicultural world will participate in this process through translation. furthermore, the intercultural philosophy proposes to redefine the status of ‘reason’ by an intercultural and historical reconstruction of its conceptualization process. here it is necessary to explain the understanding of culture presupposed in this notion. culture is not an abstract, isolated entity, but forms itself through the continuous process of interactions between the internal and the external, etc. crossing various sorts of boundaries. every culture knows also the differentiation process as a reflex of internal conflicts – intracultural struggles among various groups based on different constellation of power or different interests (gender, class, ethnic groups,etc.). they are fighting for cultural hegemony in order to establish tradition (including value system) in their cultural world, an authoritative reference point for the order of their world. it means each culture also entails a history of possibilities which were suppressed and cannot be realized. a historical reconstruction of a tradition may discover these oppressed subcultures, reawakening them, and leading to a new integration. redefining the status of ‘reason’ from an historical to an intercultural perspective may allow a transformation of ‘reason’ – a possible liberation of the historical figure of ‘reason’ that was limited by its context within western capitalistic modernity. endnotes 1 theoreticians of cultural globalization criticizes this thesis of ‘uniformity’. according to roland robertson the globalization accompanies always localization. the goods, which can acquire popularity in the world market, are based on the local culture. not only mcdonald, but also dimsam is sold all over the world. however, in terms of the dominance of principles of the market, the thesis of ‘uniformity’ has still its validity. 2 it was quoted by arundhati roy in her article “the algebra of infinite justice” published in: the guardian, sept. 29, 2001. the statement of the u.s. president hyondok choe 71 bush, “either you are with us, or you are against us,” expresses the same sort of mentality. 3 for example: council of the european union, working party on terrorism: presentation of a presidency initiative for the introduction of a standard form for exchanging information on terrorist incidents, brüssels, january 29, 2002(05.02). 4 arundhati roy, a.a.o. 5 ibid. 6 josef estermann, 2001, religion und gewalt – dialektik von globalisierung und fundamentalisierung, manuscript of lecture at rheinisch-westfälische technische hochschule (aachen, germany) in oct. 2001. 7 cf. vincent shen, 2002, from politics of recognition to a politics of mutual enrichment, in: taipei ricci institute data base, http://www.richbase.com (downloaded on aug. 10, 2002). 8 arundhati roy, a.a.o. 9 raúl fornet-betancourt, 2001, einführung, in: raúl fornet-betancourt (hg.), kulturen zwischen tradition und innovation. stehen wir am ende der traditionalen kulturen? dokumentation des iii. internationalen kongresses für interkulturelle philosophie, frankfurt am main:iko-verlag, p. 22. 10 ibid., p. 23. 11 choe, hyondok, 1999, towards a new life in asia: modernity in asian context, in: ctc bulletin, vol. 16, no. 1, ed. by christian conference of asia, p. 93. 12 dieter senghaas, 2004, zum irdischen frieden, frankfurt am main, pp. 283290. 13 the following publications can be regarded as a milestone to signify the beginning of the explicit constitution of an intercultural philosophy: r.a. mall / h. hülsmann, 1989, die drei geburtsorte der philosophie: china, indien, europa, bonn; r.a. mall, 1992, philosophie im vergleich der kulturen. eine einführung in die interkulturelle philosophie, bremen; f. wimmer, 1990, interkulturelle philosophie. geschichte und theorie, wien; h. kimmerle, 1991, philosophie in afrika. annäherungen an einen interkulturellen philosophiebegriff, frankfurt am main. 14 raúl fornet-betancourt, 2002, zur interkulturellen transformation der philosophie in lateinamerika, pp. 13-17. 15 josef estermann, 1997, interkulturelle philosophie und mission. wege zwischen fundamentalismus und globalisierung, in: neue zeitschrift für missionswissenschaft 53-1997/4, p. 288. 72 prajñâ vihâra 1free of religion & religious heritage preserving asian cultural identities in the face of globalization jove jim s. aguas university of santo tomas, manila, philippines abstract this paper tackles the issues of globalization, cultural identity, and safeguarding asian cultural identities in face of globalization. it discusses the phenomenon of globalization and its effect on culture, the notion of culture and the multiplicity of the asian cultural identities. while globalization is more of an economic and technological phenomenon, it has a great effect on culture, especially our asian cultures. we have definitely gained something positive from globalization, but one possible consequence of globalization is the disintegration of our cultural identities. so one important question that this paper will try to address is: how do we preserve our asian cultural identities in the face of the globalization? how do we integrate ourselves, without losing our identities in the bigger global society? i. the nature of globalization the complexity of globalization globalization is a complex phenomenon, a phenomenon that has affected every aspect of our human life. it has changed our modes of living, modified our attitudes, preferences, values and thinking. in the academic and intellectual field, it has been the subject of spirited debates and discussions; scholarly studies have been conducted on its nature and impact in human life and society, in the various disciplines, most especially in economics, politics, philosophy, sociology, and ecology, among others. at the outset, we can say that it is a concept that transcends individual prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 123-150 123 © 2000 by assumption university press disciplines. but despite this attention, globalization is hardly a well defined concept. according to one author, it is "the most slippery, dangerous and important buzzword of the late twentieth century."1 it is slippery because it can have many meanings and be used in many ways. it is dangerous because too often it is used as a powerful and simplistic justification for the endless expansion of unregulated capitalist relations into every part of life in every corner of the globe. it is important because debates about globalization can illuminate a world in which time and space have been so dramatically compressed that distant action in one corner of the globe have rapid and significant repercussions on people and places far away.2 each discipline offers its own views about globalization. for the economist, globalization is essentially the emergence of a global market. for the historian, it is an epoch dominated by global capitalism. for the sociologist, globalization at once underscores the celebration of diversity as well as the convergence of social preferences in matters of lifestyle and social values. for the political scientist, globalization is the gradual erosion of state sovereignty.3 but while all studies of globalization in the different disciplines do advance a rich and nuanced understanding, each discipline merely explains a part of the phenomenon.4 according to martin albrow5 globalization refers to all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single and global society. the changes leading to this global society are long in the making and impact on different locations, countries and individuals in a highly uneven manner. but they have increased in scope and intensity, and recently in an accelerating rate. globalization can be better understood as a set of mutually reinforcing transformations in economics, politics, society and culture, that are taking place more or less simultaneously. it is quite difficult to really point to a single transformation as the essence of globalization. however, we can at least identify certain components of these transformations.6 the changing concept of space and time. in the past, peoples, societies and even cultures are contained within fixed borders and territories. 124 prajñâ vihâra against this background of fixed territories, maps could be drawn showing "states with clear-cut boundaries and nicely demarcated zones of authority and influence."7 however, because of globalization, "culture and societies are being squeezed together and driven towards increased mutual interaction, resulting in the compression of the world."8 as shared forces and exchanges in terms of technological advancement structure our lives, the world is becoming one place and one system. through the advancement of technical knowledge linked to economic changes, we have come to pass from the exploration of the world through horse-drawn coaches and sail and steamships, to the rapidly shrinking distances and vastly accelerating movement of people, goods and equipment, through aircraft and super-freighters. it is now possible "to measure, divide and map the physical and temporal dimensions of the world into universal, standardized and predictable units."9 time and distance have dwindled in significance as forces shaping human actions; both space and time have become freely available to us to manipulate and control. and with human interaction and communication becoming faster, distance is no longer a problem. with the television and satellite communication, we can experience a rush of images from different places almost simultaneously, collapsing the world events into series of images flashed on television screens.10 the compression of time and space facilitated by electronic media has put many of the world's inhabitants on the same stage and brought their lives together, so that even people who do not see and know each other personally can interact meaningfully, especially through the internet. indeed, the world has not only contracted, it has shrunk! increasing cultural interactions. electronic mass communication has propelled the increase in cultural flow around the world in an unprecedented quantities and at great speed and intensity. this increase in "contact between peoples have gradually exposed all humans to the growing flows of cultural meanings and knowledge coming from other sciences."11 social relations have been stretched and networks of interaction and interconnectedness have transcended the boundaries of nation-states.12 through the electronic mass media, even those who lack formal jove jim s. aguas 125 education are able to encounter new ideas and experiences from other cultures. people can obtain full pictures of other lifestyles, especially through the power of visual images conveyed in television and film. people are made conscious of the multicultural world and are given opportunities to participate through different modes in the cultural practices of other people. increasing interconnections and interpenetration. the fastexpanding interconnections and interdependencies bind localities, countries, social movements professional and other groups and individual citizens, into a dense network of transnational exchanges and affiliation.13 these networks of transnational exchanges have crossed territorial borders, breaking the cultural and economic self-sufficiency once experienced by nations and as a result societies have extended toward each other. and as social relations are stretched, there is an increasing interpenetrations of economic and social practices, bringing distant cultures and societies face to face with each other both in the local and global levels.14 the emergence of transnational actors and organizations like the transnational corporations (tncs), international non-governmental organization (ingos), the global social movements (gsms) and diasporas and stateless peoples, have extended and intensified the interconnections across national borders.15 synchronization of all dimensions. all the dimensions of globalizationeconomic, technological, political, social and cultural, appear to be coming together at the same time, each reinforcing and magnifying the impact of the others.16 all dimensions of human advancement are flowing like a common stream, intertwining with one another and integrating into one phenomenon. globalism: the underlying philosophy of globalization the phenomenon of globalization is based on the philosophy of globalism which essentially describes the reality of being interconnected. globalism holds the belief that the world is rapidly integrating in all spheres. it asserts the complex interconnectedness of peoples present and future. 126 prajñâ vihâra this interconnectedness is becoming the dominant character of our political, cultural, economic and natural environments; our economic, political and cultural expectations are headed toward convergence.17 globalism brings all people together toward a collective action to solve common problems. it points to the aspirations for a state of affairs where values are shared by or are pertinent to all the world's more than 5 billion people, their environment, and their role as citizens, consumers or producers with an interest in collective action to solve common problems.18 the simplest dimension of this interconnectedness is communication. today nearly a billion of homes can talk to each other within few seconds. global positioning technologies can track down with precision any position in the surface of the planet.19 however, globalization and globalism in a sense are different. globalization refers to an underlying process, to the series of objective changes anchored on the interconnectedness of people. globalism on the other hand refers to our consciousness of the world as a single space, it refers to a subjective feeling of being part of one world, of one humanity. as a mental frame, globalism has certain major aspects: first, people are now thinking about themselves collectively while identifying with all humanity; the end to one way flows and the growth of multicultural awareness; the empowerment of self-aware social actors; and the broadening of identities. according to the philosophy of globalism, men are now capable of thinking about themselves collectively as one entity. our understanding of humanity is extended beyond our affiliation to people of the same ethnic, national and religious identities. human qualities are now crossing the barriers of caste, class, ethnicity, nationality and religion. furthermore, it asserts that the long era of one sided cultural and political flows is over, nations and culture are more willing to recognize and accept cultural diversity.21 some writers22 have also pointed to the growing number of social actors who are empowered to exercise reflexivity in their daily lives. all humans reflect on the consequences of their own and others' actions and jove jim s. aguas 127 can alter their behavior in response to new information. and as a consequence, social life becomes subject to endless revisions in the face of constantly accumulating knowledge.23 and lastly, the consciousness of human interconnectedness is also changing the way we construct our identities and orient ourselves toward life in the world concern. today, no people nor institutions can avoid contact or knowledge of some cultures. whether people accept or reject or modify the concepts or values which they encounter from other societies and cultures, that will greatly affect their identities and how they look at their own identities. and sociologists assert that the response to this reality is either by selection, adaptation or resistance.24 it is not difficult to realize the extremely intricate interconnectedness of human life across the planet or the oneness of humanity. its awareness and immediate implications are striking. for example, all of us on planet earth share the same environment. our awareness of global warming and its causes make us realize that this shared environment link our present and future. while wars and famine may be far from us, we are certainly affected by the constant and never ending conflicts in the middle east and some parts of asia, we are greatly affected by the famine in some parts of africa, a terrorist act in one part of the globe certainly affects everyone. the 9/11 incident affected not only the americans but the whole world. the ambiguity of globalization globalization is not just a complex phenomenon, its effect on human life has been ambiguous. while it may be easy to understand that it is a complex phenomenon anchored on the interconnectedness of people and while we accept the fact that we are indeed interconnected, the effects of globalization on every aspect of human life has divided our thinking, preferences and prejudices. it has divided the opinions of intellectuals and thinkers in the different disciplines, especially as far as its consequences are concerned. there are those who hail and praise the inevitability of globalization, stressing that this will bring about progress and development, and there are also those who dismiss it as another dominant discourse of the powerful and colonizing nations, another form of colonization, signaling 128 prajñâ vihâra the demise of the weaker societies and cultures. but one thing is certain, whether we like it or not, it is an inevitable and irreversible process. and while those on the right favor the spread of free markets and investment flows, of the increasing interconnections and interdependence of societies and cultures, there are those on the left that support the emergence of a truly global culture based on the value of multiculturalism and genuine democracy. it is in this respect, that we see the ambiguity of the character and consequences of globalization. and such ambiguity is better understood by trying to examine the effects of globalization both through the eyes of those who praise it and those who criticize it. in praise of globalization those who have faith and interest in globalization see it as a process that seeks to eliminate political and geographical distances between peoples. the two key engines of globalization are the revolution in technology and politico-economic liberalization.25 by now, everybody recognizes the potential and the promise of the internet and other forms of electronic mass communication. the world wide web has created a virtual reality that has made time and distance irrelevant. in many ways, the chat rooms of today are the factories and cultural hubs of the future.26 they have virtually eliminated physical, temporal and cultural distances between peoples. globalization is also driven by "the integration of economies, the standardization of politics through the domination of international norms and laws over domestic regulation and liberalization."27 the new environment of liberalization has made it easier, with the help of technologies, to quickly move people, ideas, capital and goods across borders. globalization in that sense is basically the heightened mobility of ideas, peoples, goods and capital across borders.28 for those who favor globalization as a political and economic ideology, it connotes freedom and internationalism, it helps realize the benefits of free trade, like comparative advantage and the division of labor, and it also enhances efficiency and productivity.29 like free trade, globalization has an aura of virtue. and just as "freedom" must be good, the trumpeters of globalization favors internationalism and solidarity between jove jim s. aguas 129 countries, as opposed to nationalism and protectionism, which for them have negative connotations.30 globalization: a new form of colonization while the advocates of globalization welcome its inevitability and expound on its advantages, many consider it as another form of domination of the colonial powers. while its adherents preach the value of the integration of economies and the dissolution of borders among people and societies, this integration and cross-border interaction has taken the form of colonization wherein the stronger discourse and rule are imposed on the weaker ones. anthony giddens takes this position into a more radical view by saying that globalization is another form of americanization, he wrote: to many living outside europe and north america globalization… looks like westernization or, perhaps, americanization, since the us is now the sole superpower, with a dominant economic, cultural and military position in the global order. many of the most visible cultural expressions of globalization are american, coca-cola, mcdonalds… a pessimistic view of globalization would consider it largely an affair of the industrial north, in which the developing societies of the south play little or no active part. it would see it as destroying local cultures, widening world inequalities and worsening the lot of the impoverished.31 indeed the boundary-expanding dynamics of globalization, like liberalization and advancement in technology has threatened the less dominant peoples and cultures. the incursions of globalization have undermined their jobs, their national and ethnic interests, their belief systems and communities. while it anchors itself on the philosophy of globalism, it goes beyond the ideals of globalism, for it does not only stress the interconnectedness of peoples, it pushes for the integration and cooperation of societies and cultures. while integration and cooperation have their own inherent advantages, in the case of globalization they have some negative underpinnings. and any form of integration and cooperation function through the balance of power among the components and participants. and in the case between western and eastern or north and south societies 130 prajñâ vihâra and cultures, there is certainly an imbalance between them. and such imbalance caters to the interest of the dominant western or northern cultures and societies. in the process of globalization the more dominant and powerful societies and cultures will have the tendency and the opportunity to impose themselves upon the less dominant societies and cultures. the process of interconnections and exchanges, in the form of cross-border trades and investment will certainly be economically damaging to the weaker party, or will erode the democratic controls especially in the weaker countries. hence many consider globalization as an attack on the sovereignty of weaker countries and cultures. in itself, it is another form of colonialism.32 we need not look very far, we asians have been the subjects of the colonizing powers in the past. because of our colonial past, we lost our right to self-determination, our freedoms and our wealth. our best lands were seized for colonial tillage. indigenous communities lost their rights to their lands. if we look back in our history we can see that colonizing powers, using superior military might forcibly imposed their rule over our peoples, at great cost to us in terms of human lives and suffering and natural ecology. then they imposed new religions and cultures, which facilitated subjugation by softening our impulse to resist or diluting our desire to free ourselves from colonial clutches.33 the colonizing power then set up a colonial administration and brought with them the practices of plantation agriculture, large-scale logging, large-scale mining, and other powerfully destructive technologies, for maximizing exploitation and profits. these unsustainable practices replaced the sustainable indigenous practices our pre-colonial peoples had relied on for centuries.34 during this post-colonial period, the role of global capitalists expanded, partly due to internal developments in their home countries, and partly as a counter-response to independence movements and economic nationalism. having lost direct control, global capitalists sought and became better at indirect control; military aggression was replaced by culture-aggression and economic control. they have lured other developing societies with such pretexts as: "we bring jobs"; "we bring technology"; "we will lend you money for development" and other catchy slogans.35 jove jim s. aguas 131 the globalization of recent decades in some societies was never a democratic choice of peoples. the process has been business driven by business strategies and tactics for business ends. government decisions and actions have been made often in secret without national debate and discussions of where the entire process is taking the society as a whole. this undemocratic process, carried with a democratic façade, is consistent with the distribution of benefits and cost of globalization, and this has served the interest of the elite.36 ii. on culture and globalization social scientists and anthropologists, including philosophers have offered a number of definitions of human culture, reflecting various schools of thought. edward burnett tylor in primitive culture (1871) provided what is considered a classic definition of culture, according to which it includes all capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.37 it is the "integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief and behavior. it consists of language, ideas, beliefs, customs, taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremonies and other related components.38 at the 1982 mondiacult conference in mexico city as well as in the universal declaration on cultural diversity, united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization (unesco) has tried to reconcile different conceptions of culture by defining it as follows: in its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. it includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.39 it is culture that makes us specifically human, our attitudes, values, ideals and beliefs are influenced by our culture and at the same time it is through culture that we express ourselves. unesco declared: 132 prajñâ vihâra it is culture that gives man the ability to reflect upon himself. it is culture that makes us specifically human, rational beings, endowed with a critical judgement and a sense of moral commitment. it is through culture that we discern values and make choices. it is through culture that man expresses himself, becomes aware of himself, recognizes his incompleteness, questions his own achievements, seeks untiringly for new meanings and creates works through which he transcends his limitations.40 every human society has its own particular culture or socio-cultural system which overlaps with other systems. there are variations among cultures and this is attributable not only to physical habitats and resources, but more importantly, to the range of possibilities inherent in various areas of activities, such as language, rituals and customs and the manufacture and use of tools; and to the degree of social development.41 all cultures form part of the common heritage of mankind. the cultural heritage of a people includes the works of its artists, architects, musicians, writers and scientists and also the work of other artists, which express the people's spirituality, and the body of values which give meaning to life.42 it includes both tangible and intangible works through which the creativity of that people finds expression like languages, rites, beliefs, historic places and monuments, literature, works of art, etc. culture is not an abstraction, it is a living, open totality that evolves through the constant integration of individual and collective choices that are taken in interaction with other similar wholes. it expresses itself in diverse concrete ways like the arts, literatures, religious practices, without being reducible to mere "works". there is no such thing as a closed and finished culture. culture is dynamic, it develops; it grows out of a systematically encouraged reverence for selected customs and habits. the development of culture depends upon human's capacity to learn and adopt new habits and practices and transmit these to succeeding generations. cultures grow and change from constantly changing interactions, either with nature or with other cultures. changes within and among cultures may take place not only by means of ecological and environmental changes, but by diffusion of certain advantageous cultural traits among societies at approximately equivalent stages of their cultural development, by acculturation or the acquisition of a foreign culture by a relatively subject people, or by the evolution of jove jim s. aguas 133 cultural elements over a period of time. cultural identity every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people's traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating its presence in the world.43 unesco declared: cultural identity is a treasure that vitalizes mankind's possibilities of selffulfillment by moving every people and every group to seek nurture in its past, to welcome contributions from outside that are compatible with its own characteristics, and so to continue the process of its own creation.44 hence, the assertion of cultural identity contributes to the liberation of peoples. conversely, any form of domination constitutes a denial or an impairment of that identity.45 many societies, particularly indigenous peoples, view culture as their richest heritage, without which they have no roots, history or soul.46 its value is more than monetary. culture is not just another product like steel, computer parts or any other material merchandise. it cannot be commodified and commercialized, to commodify it is to destroy it. today, many countries, through funding programs, content regulations and other public policies, have encouraged their own artists and other individuals involved in culture to maintain some space for their own intellectual creations and to protect their cultural heritage from commercialization and exploitation. the positive effect of globalization on culture depending on which side one is looking from, globalization can be viewed as having either a positive effect or negative effect on culture. for those who favor globalization, although it has economic roots and political consequences, it also has brought into focus the power of culture in this global environment the power to bind and to divide in a time when the tensions between integration and separation tug at every issue that is relevant to international relations.47 ç 134 prajñâ vihâra according to those who favor globalization, the homogenizing influences of globalization that are most often condemned by the new nationalists and by cultural romanticists are actually positive; globalization promotes integration and the removal not only of cultural barriers but of many of the negative dimensions of culture. therefore, globalization is a vital step toward both a more stable world and better lives for the people in it.48 globalization promotes inter-cultural exchanges, it expands cultures and allows them to introduce and promote themselves in the global stage. through the different cultural exchanges, cultures can benefit from one another. negative effect of globalization on culture on the other hand, there are those who stressed the negative effect of globalization on culture. globalization commodifies culture and reduces it to pure economics and business. global cultural homogenization which is sweeping the world is threatening local cultures. dominated by us and western values and lifestyles, driven by a consumer-based, free-market ideology and carried through the massive us entertainment-industrial complex, the global monoculture has infiltrated every corner of the earth.49 artisans from minorities are complaining that together with each endangered craft are centuries of songs, expressions and lifestyles that are part of an artisan's creative environment. economic globalization has threatened the cultural identities especially of less dominant cultures and the diversity of cultures in the world. globalization is a serious challenge to cultural identity. the world has ceased to be spiritual, it has become commercial. culture has been transformed into a business. the entertainmentindustrial complex, sees culture as a business a very big business that should be fiercely advanced through international trade agreements.50 and for many countries which feel the deadening and harmonizing impacts of economic globalization, protecting cultural diversity has become as important a fight as preserving biodiversity. jove jim s. aguas 135 iii. asian culture asia comprises nearly one-third of the world's land area and about three-fifths of its population the continent includes the two most populous countries, china and india which together account for more than a third of all people. the asians are the most diversified of all people and the cultural diversity of asia is greater than that of any continent. common characteristics despite the diversity in terms of ethnic origins, cultures, religions and languages asians share some common characteristics. asians are deeply spiritual people, they acknowledge their close relationship and affinity with the divine and spiritual being. they are more inclined towards the spiritual rather than the material. life is understood, lived in relation to the spiritual, and human life is evaluated in terms of man's relationship with the divine. the fullness of life is not realized here in this world but in the after life, so, while the world is important, it is more important to direct one's life toward the beyond, toward the after life. asians are deeply religious, every aspect of human life is given or acquires some religious meaning and roots. religion becomes the outward expression of their deep spirituality; it is the manifestation of the asians total surrender and obedience to the divine. these deep spirituality and religiosity are complemented by the asian peoples inwardness, they are inward looking. asians have the common tendency to look into their inner selves, through introspection and meditation. while material possessions are important, the purification of the inner self or the soul, is much more important. and lastly, asians share a great affinity and respect for nature. nature is the source of life and therefore must be preserved. nature is something that should not be controlled or manipulated. asians would rather commune and be one with nature. but although asians share the same values and outlook in life, they differ in expressions, they differ in terms of how they manifest these 136 prajñâ vihâra values and outlook in life. hence there is diversity and multiplicity of cultural expressions, in religious practices and rituals, in languages, in artistic expressions and works, in literatures, in music, and many others. these different expressions give rise to cultural diversity and the multiplicity of cultural identities of asians.51 the cultural diversity of asians is manifested in the diversity of language and religion, in art and literature, in cuisine and music. language and religion asian cultural diversity is first manifested in the asian languages which are divided into eight main language groups namely, turkic, slavic, tungusic, chinese, tibeto-burman, indo-aryan, iranian and mongol. aside from these major language groups, there are more than one hundred small-ethnic-group languages.52 aside from linguistic diversity, asians are also diverse in terms of religion. asia is the birthplace of all major and some minor religions of the world. like all disseminated cultural expressions, asian religions maybe considered geographically in terms of both their places of origin and distribution. in south asia, originated hinduism, jainism and buddhism. hinduism which is the oldest of the religions originating from this region, is a polytheistic and ritualistic system comprising of numerous cults and sects. it remains as the unifying force of indian culture and the social-caste system. jainism and buddhism emerged in reaction to prevailing hindu practices in the 6th and 5th centuries bc, respectively. although jainism never spread significantly beyond two present-day states of northwestern india, its principles of non-violence and asceticism have deeply influenced indian thought. buddhism arose in northeastern india as a universal alternative to hierarchical religion, offering nirvana or eternal bliss to individuals regardless of culture or social status. in the centuries following its foundation, it gave rise to two main divergent schools theravada, which claimed the most ancient traditions and mahayana, which held its teachings to be the fullest account of buddha's message. the monastically oriented theravada predominates today in sri lanka and mainland southeast asia, jove jim s. aguas 137 while the more liberal mahayana with its proliferation of philosophical schools and sects had an immeasurable impact on china, japan and korea. tantrism an esoteric form of buddhism predominates in tibet, nepal, bhutan and mongolia. another religion, sikhism, a monotheistic indian religion which was founded by punjab in the late 15th century ad, has fueled the region's modern demand for independence. southwest asia is the cradle of three great monotheistic religions judaism, christianity and islam. judaism, founded in the eastern mediterranean region some 4,000 years ago posits a covenant relationship with god and mankind. most asian jews are now in israel, although there are other small jewish communities in other areas of the continent and other parts of the world. christianity, which started as a movement within judaism, was founded by jesus christ emphasizing salvation of the soul through the observance of the law and the teachings of christ. in the course of 2,000 years it has become the most widespread of the world's religions, predominating in europe and the european derived cultures. it is practiced by sizeable minorities in many asian countries and by a roman catholic majority in the philippines. islam dominates as the state religion of most southwest asian countries, and has by far the largest number of adherents in asia. from the arabian peninsula where it was founded in the 7th century ad, islam spread through the middle east, into central asia and across the southern part of the continent to indonesia. the majority of asian muslims belong to the orthodox sunnite branch, except in iran and iraq where the majority are the more esoteric shi'ite branch. muslims constitute important minority populations in india and china. among the other religions that developed in southwest asia is zoroastrianism, an ancient religion founded in persia and still survives in iran and india. in east asia, ancient chinese religious and philosophical traditions survive in the form of two main schools, taoism and confucianism, both of which originated in the 5th or 6th century bc. the two schools differ in orientation taoism stressing mystical experience and the individual's harmony with nature and confucianism emphasizing the duty of the individual in society and government. both have profoundly influenced chinese and chinese derived cultures. shinto encompasses the indigenous religious beliefs and practices of the japanese people. its principles linking 138 prajñâ vihâra sacred power, ritual observance and imperial nationhood remain unique to japanese culture, although some of its practices has absorbed the influences of taoism, confucianism and buddhism. iv. preserving asian cultural identities while globalization, as we have shown have certain positive effects on our lives in general, and in particular to culture, we also have to be wary and cautious about its negative effects and implications on our cultures and societies. there is a need to preserve our asian culture which is based on the multiplicity of asian identities. but the big question is, how do we preserve our asian cultural identities in the face of the globalization? how do we integrate ourselves, without losing our identities in the bigger global society? i propose certain guiding principles and counter measures to preserve our cultural identities as we engage and integrate ourselves in the global society. guiding principles these principles serve as framework for our task of coping with globalization and preserving our cultural identities. the ambiguity of the effects of globalization on culture is such that it can on the one hand promote and revive some cultural practices, or on the other hand threaten these cultural practices (either their very existence or their meaning to the people). through aggressive and skillful advertising, brochures and films, it is easy to attract tourists and promote local cultures.53 but tourism, could either have a positive or a negative effect on local cultures. the business of selling and promoting local cultures for economic gain, along with the influx of growing numbers of foreign tourists, could threaten to degrade the very cultural identities which attracted the visitors in the first place. the shared ancient meanings, religious beliefs and established social relations attached to these cultural practices, which enable the people to know who they are and take pride in where they belong, could disintegrate. and these local ethos could be replaced by a socially jove jim s. aguas 139 divisive and materialist ethos. hence exposure to commercial apparatuses may be damaging to local traditional cultures and may lead to further commercialization and cultural exploitation. on the other hand, a tourism that is sensitive to culture may help to preserve the local culture. instead of destroying local cultural meanings and social relationships, some local and international tourists are also sensitive to the cultural meanings of these practices. these types of tourists are proactive, reflexive, sensitive to the local needs and motivated primarily by the search for authentic traditions. cultural security it is in this respect that any cultural exchange should be guided by the principle of cultural security. cultural security is defined here as: "the capacity of a society to conserve its specific character in spite of changing conditions and real or virtual threats: more precisely, it involves the permanence of traditional schemas of language, culture, associations, identity and national or religious practices, allowing for changes that are judged to be acceptable.54 cultural security protects culture from commercialization and exploitation and helps preserve the meaning and values of local cultures in the face in the midst of global cultural exchanges. cultural pluralism we asians are a culturally diverse people, so is the rest of the world. cultural pluralism is a principle that gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. as we recognize the right of each people and cultural community to affirm and preserve its cultural identity and have it respected by others, we must also recognize the equality and dignity of all cultures. no culture should dominate and dictate to the other, no culture should regard the others as inferior to other cultures. no culture can claim that it is the universal culture and therefore must be followed by others. cultural pluralism is the recognition and respect for the different cultures of the world. 140 prajñâ vihâra though cultures are embodied in particular identities that should not hinder the quest for common values, there are common values that are inherent in each culture, values that maybe considered as universal. universality however, is not synonymous with uniformity. each culture is an effort to reach the universal, but no culture can claim that it has a monopoly on it. to some extent, every culture is represented in the others.55 the defining objective of the preservation of cultural identities and cultural pluralism is "the defense of individual and collective freedom to choose while respecting universal values, affirming rights to difference."56 balanced cultural dialogue no culture has ever been isolated and none will ever be so. the cultural identity of a people is renewed and enriched through contact with the traditions and values of others. culture is dialogue, the exchange of ideas and experience and the appreciation of other values and traditions; it withers and dies in isolation.57 but no cultural dialogue or interconnection can succeed when inequalities are too great or when it is controlled by the most powerful. while globalization has facilitated intercultural exchanges it has also created deeply unequal conditions for such exchanges. any meaningful cultural exchange should be based on a balanced cultural dialogue, wherein each culture is respected and treated as equal. the principle of cultural pluralism, we mentioned above involves, defending "the basic conditions for dialogue among cultures that accept each other as equal in dignity and are able to question themselves about their values, practices and adaptation to contemporary global conditions."58 a balanced cultural dialogue denounces domination, control and manipulation of other cultures. it promotes respect and understanding among cultures. in a balanced cultural dialogue, every participant is heard and respected, and it allows cultures to question each other. democratic and social participation social participation is essential to dialogue. participation takes place both within the society, wherein the individuals are the participants and among societies, wherein individual societies comprise the global society. whether within society or among societies, participation should jove jim s. aguas 141 always be democratic. within the society, individuals should be given the opportunity to fully participate in the society especially in matters that affect his person and life. according to the unesco, cultural democracy is based on the broadest possible participation by the individual and society in the creation of cultural goods, in decision-making concerning cultural life and in the dissemination and enjoyment of culture.59 the participation of all individuals in cultural life requires the elimination of inequalities based on social background and status, education, nationality, age, language, sex, religious beliefs, health or the fact of belonging to ethnic, minority or fringe groups.60 applying this reasoning to the international or global level, or the global society, every individual society then within the global society must be given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making especially in those matters that affect its own integrity and dignity and its standing in the global society. participation in international affairs must be based on respect for cultural identity, recognition of the dignity and value of all cultures and societies, national independence and sovereignty, and non-intervention.61 cultural exchanges then must be based on a climate of respect, confidence, dialogue and peace among societies. counter measures what we have presented so far are general principles meant to provide us with a mental framework in our task of preserving our asian cultural identities in the face of globalization. in a more concrete approach we need to institute certain counter measures in order to give these principles some flesh. strong national consciousness nationalism is one national anchor which people can use to preserve their sense of national community, which globalization seeks to eradicate. "without a strong sense of national consciousness, we cannot confront the ideology of globalization."62 with a strong sense of nationalism we can take pride of our own identities and culture, and be critical of the various ideas and prescriptions by other cultures by examining their impact 142 prajñâ vihâra especially the negative ones on the local economic, social, political and cultural realities. because of our colonial past, we asians are often burdened with the baggage of colonial thinking, which to some extent, has been translated into total dependence and uncritical acceptance of colonial ideas and prescriptions. we have to think in terms of our cultures and our identities. we asians have to discover and rediscover the products of the asian minds, we need to build links with each other in a common effort of making our authentic asian voices be heard in the global stage. we have a glorious past and there is certainly no lack of asian genius in every field of human endeavor. all we need is a popularization and appreciation of our diverse cultural identities in our region where they are rooted, and then eventually in the whole world.63 critical awareness while we maintain a strong national consciousness, especially of our particular cultures, we need also to develop a critical awareness of what is going on around us. we cannot confine and lock up ourselves within the borders of our communities and societies, and reject everything that we encounter from the outside. we need to go out and cross borders and engage in dialogue with other cultures and societies. but while we become aware of the many changing facets and aspects of our lives, we need to develop a critical awareness of our ever changing world. not everything that we encounter and see in the other cultures or societies will be to our advantage or benefit. we need to evaluate and question the impact and consequences of those things, concepts and practices that we encounter in other cultures in our lives. while we try to preserve and store our cultural practices for posterity and for linkage with our past, we need to avoid those that can harm our identities and incorporate those things that can enhance our identities without compromising our dignity. appreciation and preservation of cultural heritage our asian cultural heritage expresses our own identities, it expresses our inner spirituality and the body of values that give meaning to jove jim s. aguas 143 our life. and it is usually our cultural heritage that suffers damage or destruction as a result of urbanization, industrialization and commercialization. any form of colonialism, in the past or in the present imposes alien values which could obliterate our links with our past and erase our memory of our noble past. everyday we are bombarded with different works of art, music, dances, and other literatures from other cultures. while we show appreciation and respect to them, we must also give preference to our own asian arts, music, practices and literatures. we asians need to preserve and appreciate our cultural heritage, if there is someone who must appreciate and preserve the asian cultural heritage, it is the asian. preserving our cultural heritage is one way of defending our sovereignty and independence, and affirming our cultural identities. we are recognized as asians through our values, works, arts, beliefs, literature, practices and other forms of self expressions. promote national or ethnic language the use of national language is a way of asserting the unique asian way of thinking and living. language is the expression of culture and the embodiment of national power.64 the first thing that dominant societies impose on the weaker ones to soften their resistance is to impose their own language and render the local language useless in the global stage. national language asserts a distinct identity and clear sense of nationhood, hence its value is not only the past, it is more important in contemporary times. while globalization favors english, our own local languages "are more than adequate for purposes of communication and culture, and can be developed further for highly scientific and technical purposes. as expressions of our unique cultures, our local languages are invaluable for their continued vitality."65 it is necessary to encourage the use of asian languages to communicate knowledge and share ideas and insights, and to develop interpersonal relations. concluding remarks while globalization is understood more as an economic and 144 prajñâ vihâra technological phenomenon, it is undeniable that it has a homogenizing effect on culture. through ideological and technological apparatuses the more dominant discourse can take control of the consciousness of the less dominant peoples and races. and one of the first casualties of this hegemony is culture, and when culture is threatened, the cultural identity of peoples and races are also threatened. we asians have definitely benefited from the advancement of technology and knowledge brought about by globalization, but we also have to be alarmed of the onslaught of the hegemony of globalization against our culture. while we have been subjected to colonization in the past, we cannot allow ourselves to be swept by yet another wave of colonization in the name of globalization. we asians are heirs to a glorious past and heritage, our history is inspired by our gallant ancestors who struggled for independence from the colonizers and preserved our identity and dignity.66 there is a need to preserve our asian culture which is based on the multiplicity of asian identities. we need to assert our asian culture based on the multiplicity of asian identities, this is a significant step in facing globalization and in meeting the other cultures on equal footing. and with the reflowering of asian cultural and intellectual life, we asians can rekindle our sense of dignity and our cultural identities. endnotes 1 david held. ed. a globalizing world? culture, economics, politics. london: routledge & the open university, 2000, p.12, quoting john wiseman in global nation? australia and the politics of globalization, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998. 2 wiseman quoted by held. ibid. 3 muqtedar khan. "teaching globalization." in globalist, august 28, 2003. http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2003/0828teaching.htm. accessed june 30, 2004. 4 khan . khan further adds that globalization must be approached from a multidisciplinary perspective. 5 martin albrow, globalization, knowledge and society: an introduction, 1990. quoted by cohen, robin & kennedy, paul. global sociology. new york: palgrave, 2000, p.24. jove jim s. aguas 145 6 cf. cohen & kennedy pp.24-34. 7 held., p.3. 8 cohen & kennedy., p.24 quoting roland robertson, globalization: social theory and global culture. 9 ibid., p.25. 10 in fact we can go beyond the boundaries of the planet earth and observe the outer space. one can imagine the voyage of the cassini-huygens to the planet saturn which is 1.5 billion kilometers from the earth, yet the voyager can transmit radio signal in 84 minutes. source: time magazine. 11 cohen & kennedy., p.27. 12 held. ibid., p.16. 13 cohen & kennedy p.29. 14 held, p.16. 15 the tncs are the most powerful economic agents of the globalization because of their global power and reach. the tncs account for half of the largest economies in the world. the ingos are autonomous organizations which are not accountable to governments nevertheless act as powerful forces in social world affairs and issues, like poverty, peace, labor, etc. 16 cohen & kennedy., p.33. 17 khan. ibid. 18 james rosenau. "the complexities and contradictions of globalization." current history. vol 96 no. 613. nov 1997. p.361. 19 geoff mulgan. connexity: responsibility, freedom, business and power in the new century. london: vintage, 1998, p.19. 20 cf. cohen & kennedy, pp.35-39. 21 ibid., p.36. 22 anthony giddens (1990), and beck. 23 cohen & kennedy, p.36. 24 cf. cohen & kennedy. p.38. we may select from the global only that which pleases us and then alter it so that it becomes embedded in and accommodating to local conditions and needs (glocalization). our growing knowledge of the global may heighten our awareness of the local and may intensify our feelings of loyalty to it, thus it allows the possibility of participating both in the global and local simultaneously. some religious or ethnic groups may become antipathetic to other cultures and may resist incorporation in the global sphere. 25 khan 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 28cf. ibid. 29 cf. edward herman. the threat of globalization. http://www. globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/hermantk.htm. may 5, 2004. 30 ibid. 31 anthony giddens. "runaway world, the bbc reith lectures," london: 146 prajñâ vihâra bbc radio4, bbc education, 1999, quoted by david held, a globalizing world? culture, economics, politics. london: routledge & the open university. 2000, p.12. 32 roberto verzola. "globalization: the third wave." http://www.corp watch.org/issues/pid.jsp?articleid=1569. may 5, 2004. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. however, our people inspired by the desire to preserve their identity and dignity struggled for independence against this wave of colonization. many of these independence struggles were eventually resolved through successful armed revolutions. 35 verzola. 36 herman. 37 quoted from the encyclopaedia britannica. culture may also be viewed in terms of components patterns, like cultural traits, and in terms of institutional structures and functions, like social organization, economic systems, education, religion and belief, customs and laws. the study of culture may be subdivided into the study of non-urban culture as compared to modern urban culture and the study of tribal societies as compared to modern industrial society. 38 encyclopedia britannica. 39 unesco mexico city declaration on cultural policies, world conference on cultural policies mexico city, 26 july 6 august 1982. http://www. unesco.org/culture/laws/mexico/html_eng/page1.shtml. june 30, 2004. 40 ibid. 41 encyclopedia britannica. 42 unesco mexico conference. 43 ibid. 44 ibid. 45 cf. ibid. 46 maude barlow. "the global monoculture: 'free trade' versus culture and democracy." earth island journal. http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/ cultural/2001/1001mono.htm. may 5, 2004. 47 david rothkopf. "in praise of cultural imperialism? effects of globalization on culture." http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/ globcult. htm. may 5, 2004. 48 cf. ibid. 49 cf. barlow. barlow also added that in china, latin america, the pacific region, south america, africa and the industrialized world, young people want nike sneakers, gap clothes, michael jordan t-shirts, the latest cds, hollywood blockbuster movies, american television and mass-market books. around the world, north american corporate culture is destroying local tradition, knowledge, skills, artisans and values. 50 like the world trade organization (wto), combines giant telecommunications companies, cable companies and the internet, working jove jim s. aguas 147 together in a complex web. 51 the whole of asia represents ethnic types and linguistic systems that have evolved over long periods of time in separated regional homelands, as well as repeated patterns of modification and intermixture. these modifications are brought about either by ecological changes, or by peaceful and militant migration resulting to either diffusion or acculturation. some asian territories have become highly diversified ethnic and linguistic mosaics in which there are mixed and overlapping elements. 52 in the philippines for example, there are 172 listed languages, 169 are living, 3 are extinct. 53 in the philippines one of the tourism thrusts of the government is ecotourism, which try to promote the tourist spots of the country especially in the countryside. 54 tardif, jean. "intercultural dialogues and cultural security." planet agora. http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/2002/09intercultural.htm. may 5, 2004. 55 ibid. 56 ibid. 57 unesco mexico conference. 58 ibid. 59 unesco mexico conference. 60 ibid. 61 ibid. 62 renato constantino, the invisible enemy: globalization and maldevelopment. quezon city: foundation for nationalist studies, 1997. p.117. 63 ibid., p.130. 64 constantino, p.133. 65 constantino, p.133. 66 constantino, p.129. references books alexander, jeffrey & seidman, steven. eds. culture and society: contemporary debates. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1990. beals, alan, spindler, george & spindler, louise. culture in process. new york: holt, rinehart & winston, 1967. bello, walden. the future in the balance: essays on globalization and resistance. quezon city: university of the philippines press, 2001. cohen, robin & kennedy, paul. global sociology. new york: palgrave, 2000. constantino, renato. neocolonial identity and counter consciousness: essays 148 prajñâ vihâra on cultural decolonization. london: merlin press, 1978. constantino, renato. the invisible enemy: globalization and maldevelopment. quezon city: foundation for nationalist studies, 1997. dirks, nicholas, eley, geoff & ortner, sherry. eds., culture, power, history: a reader in contemporary social theory. princeton: princeton university press, 1994. garcia, ed. the filipino quest: a just and lasting peace. quezon city: claretian publication, 1988. held, david. ed. a globalizing world? culture, economics, politics. london: routledge & the open university. 2000. khan, joel. ed., southeast asian identities: culture and the politics of representation in indonesia, malaysia, singapore and thailand. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies, 1998. mulgan, geoff. connexity: responsibility, freedom, business and power in the new century. london: vintage, 1998. perlas, nicanor. shaping globalization: civil society, cultural power and threefolding. quezon city: center for alternative development initiatives (cadi) & network for social threefolding, 2000. vente, rolf & chen, peter. eds. culture and industrialization: an asian dilemma. singapore: mcgraw_hill international book co., 1980. articles: hettne, bjorn. "globalisation, regionalisation and security: the asian experience." european journal of development research. vol 14, no. 1, june 2002. pp.28-46. houghton, james. "globalization: unleashing the power of the people." vital speeches of the day. vol 61 no. 9, february 15, 1995. pp.268-272. keller, william & pauly, louis. "globalization at bay." current history. vol 96 no. 613. nov 1997. pp.370-376. nordhaug, kristen. "globalization and the states: theoretical paradigms." european journal of development research. vol 14, no. 1, june 2002. pp.5-27. rosenau, james. "the complexities and contradictions of globalization." current history. vol 96 no. 613. nov 1997. pp.360-364. internet sources barlow, maude. "the global monoculture: 'free trade' versus culture and democracy." earth island journal. http://www.globalpolicy. org/globaliz/ cultural/2001/1001mono.htm. may 5, 2004. herman, edward. "the threat of globalization." http://www.globalpolicy. org/ globaliz/define/hermantk.htm may 5, 2004. khan, muqtedar. "teaching globalization." in globalist, august 28, 2003. http:// jove jim s. aguas 149 www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2003/0828teaching. htm. accessed june 30 2004. mendoza, rené. "religion and secularization in the philippines and other asian countries." institute for japanese culture and classics, kokugakuin university, http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/cimac/mendoza.html. rothkopf, david. "in praise of cultural imperialism? effects of globalization on culture". http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/globcult.htm. may 5, 2004. tardif, jean. "intercultural dialogues and cultural security" planetagora. http:// www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/cultural/2002/09inter cultural.htm may 5, 2004. verzola, roberto. "globalization: the third wave". http://www. corpwatch. org/ issues/pid.jsp?articleid=1569 may 5, 2004. 150 prajñâ vihâra article5-1 solidarity and the dialogue among civilizations ioan voicu assumption university of thailand 1. foundations we are witnessing planetary convulsions. an imperfect world order is under the risk of being replaced by a more dangerous and unpredictable global disorder. in a recent address at harvard university kofi annan (the united nations (un) secretary-general) stated inter alia that: “we are threatened now by a triple crisis… it challenges us both to live up to our best ideals and our best traditions. what does this crisis consist of? first, a crisis of collective security. second, a crisis of global solidarity. and third, a crisis of cultural division and distrust.”(1) a realistic analysis of the global situation today would conclude that our perplexing world cannot be safe or secure if the divisions within it are not reduced. solidarity is a universal concept and connotes protection and security for all. yet, the world community has not been able to establish a globalization process based on solidarity, which might lead to viable solutions. a strong political impetus for promoting global solidarity is still on the waiting list of priorities. in a diplomatic approach of these issues in the ministerial declaration of the group of 77 adopted in sao paulo on 12 june 2004 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the group it is emphasized: “the main strengths of the group of 77 have been its unity and solidarity, its vision of fair and equitable multilateral relations, the commitment of its member states to the well being of the peoples of the south as well as their commitment to mutually beneficial co-operation.”(2) developing countries are deeply concerned that multilateralism is in a relative crisis. sensitive to this reality, the french minister of foreign affairs, dominique de villepin, advocated in january 2004 the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity as a stimulus for exchange and dialogue, noting, however, that multilateral instruments prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 181-208 181 © 2000 by assumption university press were in something of a crisis and that, therefore, it was important to develop an awareness of solidarity among all nations.(3) these examples illustrate the topicality of a vital question: are there solid foundations for promoting global solidarity during a permanent dialogue of civilizations in universal contextuality? we will try to offer a partial answer based essentially on multilateral diplomacy and international law.why? because international law is a common baseline for globalization, and central to all efforts to build a safer and more prosperous world. justice must be placed at the heart of multilateral diplomacy, because it is the essential foundation for security, prosperity and sustainable development. by definition, diplomacy is the area of peaceful contacts between sovereign states. it may never resort to duress. its action is mainly performed through permanent dialogue. sometimes the dialogue is considered synonymous with negotiations dedicated to overcoming contradictions in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions. arriving at win-win situations is the key to successful negotiations which are both an art and a science. in this field there is a strong recommendation according to which while negotiating, genuine finesse is the truth spoken sometimes with force but always with grace. negotiations are flexible and effective means for the peaceful settlement of disputes among states and for the creation of new international norms. as a fundamental practical requirement, all negotiations must be conducted in good faith. states should adhere to the mutually agreed framework, maintain a constructive atmosphere and refrain from any conduct which might undermine the negotiations and their progress. moreover, they should use their best endeavors to continue to work towards mutually acceptable and just solutions even in the event of an impasse in negotiations. on all continents there is a calling for a new diplomacy that focuses more on the imperatives deriving from the irreversible process of globalization. the practice of diplomacy must adjust to a new and more demanding environment, paying greater attention to the economic, business, cultural and scientific matters. dialogue cannot develop in a vacuum. it is necessary to recognize the value of political, cultural, scientific, academic or other types of links 182 prajñâ vihâra as favoring factors of significant dialogue. ambassadors alone or diplomats in general are not able by themselves to generate great transactions, without the strong support of the interested communities both in the sending and in the receiving states. certainly, diplomats may have an important role as catalysts in obtaining such support, by performing the classical functions of diplomacy: negotiation, information and representation to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all fields of human activity. although diplomacy is the art of flexibility and adaptation, there are certain basic rules that have been tested by time and cannot be changed at the whim of passing leaders and circumstances. diplomacy is not an invention of a particular political system, but is an essential and durable component in overall relations between nations. at the same time, in the present turbulent world diplomacy has a vital contribution to keep alive a flame that forces nations as well as the international community out of indifference to settle global problems facing humankind. how it can be done is a challenging story. the preamble to the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organization (unesco) constitution (november 1945) declares that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. the founders of unesco believed that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice, liberty and peace were indispensable to the dignity of man and constituted a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern. unesco’s founders clearly expressed their conviction that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.(4) diplomacy is an intellectual and political activity which must find strong inspiration in this truth in order to be able to cope successfully with new and unpredictable challenges of the present century. it is axiomatic that education is one of the essential foundations of both a culture of peace and a dialogue among civilizations. it advocates ioan voicu 183 for the respect for universal values common to all civilizations, such as solidarity, tolerance, recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all etc. unesco is actively involved not only in the promotion of all of these values but also deploys energetic efforts to anchor them within educational practices and in an individual’s behavior with a view to promoting peace and dialogue among civilizations. the un charter does not contain specific provisions dedicated to solidarity. however, the un as a whole embodies institutionalized solidarity. it is the most representative institution that can address the interests of all. through this universal, indispensable instrument of human progress, states can serve the supreme value of peace and pursue it in solidarity. by the unga resolution 55/2 of 8 september 2000 the un millennium summit approved by consensus the un millennium declaration. its first section is entitled values and principles. in a separate long paragraph this programmatic document enumerates certain fundamental values considered to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. these include inter alia solidarity and tolerance. on the value of solidarity, the millennium declaration introduces a topical characterization: global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most. at international level, the concept of solidarity has gained some visible prominence. in its most commonly accepted meaning, solidarity expresses itself through assistance given notably in cases of natural or other disasters. beyond this explanation, it should be noted that solidarity has a strong emotional appeal and is amenable to political leadership. it can be used as a mobilizing force for a number of worthwhile causes. young people have a particular capacity to experience and practice solidarity, which expresses the joy of giving and the satisfaction of being human with other humans. the operational message is clear: solidarity must know no race, no hate, no discrimination. in recent documents, the 10 asean members reflected this conception and agreed that their organization should help 184 prajñâ vihâra hasten the development of a regional identity and solidarity, and pointed out that their political cooperation is aimed chiefly at strengthening solidarity, harmonizing views on political and security issues of common concern, coordinating positions and, wherever necessary, possible and desirable, taking common actions. special attention is given by the un to the value of tolerance. the millennium declaration cogently reminds that human beings must respect one another, in all their diversity of belief, culture and language. differences within and between societies should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a precious asset of humanity. a culture of peace and dialogue among all civilizations should be actively promoted.(5) in un conception, tolerance is a keystone of human rights, pluralism and democracy. it stands for openness, dialogue, understanding and respect for others. it is a value that makes peace possible. and without peace, there can be neither progress nor development. tolerance also means that all people should benefit from economic and social opportunities without discrimination. exclusion and marginalization can lead to hostility and fanaticism, and are likely to generate intolerance. the promotion of tolerance is thus an important element of the fight against terrorism. it lies at the heart of the noble objective to create a global community built on the shared values of solidarity, social justice and respect for human rights.(6) 2. lessons of a year it is significant to recall that in 1997 iran stated: “... we muslims should rely on two important factors: one, wisdom and reason, and the other, cohesion and solidarity”(7) . the value of tolerance found its reflection in 1998 in an explanatory memorandum submitted by iran for inscribing an additional item on the agenda of the fifty-third session of the un general assembly to designate the year 2001 as the united nations year of dialogue among civilizations.(8) the memorandum emphasizes that dialogue is the essential element and the key to understanding, which opens the gates to progress and prosperity. it is imperative that the international community shows its determination to promote, encourage and facilitate dialogue and ioan voicu 185 understanding between various cultures and civilizations, thereby promoting peace, tolerance and cooperation. civilizations have enriched each other through constant interaction, while preserving their respective identities. diverse civilizational achievements of mankind crystallize cultural pluralism and creative human diversity. positive and mutually beneficial interaction among civilizations has continued throughout human history despite impediments arising from disputes and wars. the un, as the center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends, should have the central role in the promotion of dialogue among civilizations and cultures. following an encouraging and large debate, the un general assembly proclaimed 2001 as the year of dialogue among civilizations. an important and highly significant part of the process of celebration of this event was the discussion dedicated to it in the plenary of the un general assembly in november 2001. from the many ideas and considerations expressed on that occasion we will focus on those dealing specifically with the close correlation between dialogue and solidarity in universal contextuality, the un being the most legitimate institution embodying universality and the aspirations to global solidarity .we will respect the particularities, vocabulary and nuances of various summarized statements. while inaugurating the debate, kofi annan, stated that if anyone had ever doubted the need for a dialogue among civilizations, the september 11 events made the need for such a dialogue crystal clear. that was why the response of the united nations must be to bring nations, cultures and civilizations ever closer together through dialogue and cooperation. the dialogue among civilizations is a central pillar of the global response to conflict and violence of every kind, particularly when they are based on bigotry and intolerance. such a dialogue is based not on the premise that humanity is all the same, or always in agreement, but rather on appreciation of the fact that it represents a diversity of cultures, and that our beliefs reflect that diversity.(9) the statements dedicated to the event fully illustrate that truth. wolfgang schussel, federal chancellor of austria, said that the tragic event of september 11, 2001 underlined the need to think beyond traditional patterns of diplomacy. faced with an enemy contemptuous of 186 prajñâ vihâra human values and misusing religion to justify the unjustifiable, it was important to think and act beyond the current efforts to bring the terrorists to justice. it was important to build upon those values a world of tolerance and mutual respect which might bring about peace and security and a genuine human rights culture. in order to reach all segments of society, it was important to put the dialogue on a broader base. in particular, one had to aim for the children, the future. they all — boys and girls alike needed to be taught the merits of mutual respect and solidarity. they must be able to grow up with a profound and respectable understanding of diversity. the efforts must go beyond diplomatic circles and expert meetings and reach out to the hearts and minds of people, particularly young people, all over the world. using globalization to create a new awareness of togetherness and closeness among people is a real possibility. one of the great advantages of modern information technology is its ability to bridge geographical divides. but it must also bridge the divides of mentality, culture and religion. the process could start with small but concrete steps, moving bottom up rather than top down. one instrument could be cultural dialogue stimulated by the creation of intercultural networks for religious, economic and ecological exchanges. another tool could be strengthening scientific discourse and organizing forums on perceptions of history.(10) in the opinion of switzerland, coexistence between different cultures, religions and traditions did not happen on its own, but required constant effort and work. now, when the world had become what was often called a global village, it was important to realize that what was true within borders was also true on the international level. standards, values, religions and traditions defined civilizations at the same time creating a collective identity and a sense of belonging to a whole. there is a clear link between the individual and society; hence dialogue among civilizations concerns every human being. however, identity and civilization are not static concepts nor “set in concrete”. societies emerge, re-emerge and change according to current visions of the world. there are more similarities than differences between various civilizations. one of the priorities to achieve a dialogue among civilizations must therefore be the highlighting of all that humanity and civilizations have in common. the concept of the dialogue is too important to remain a mere concept or ioan voicu 187 a pious hope. it is vital to use the momentum and ensure that dialogue becomes a reality on the ground.(11) at non-governmental level, hans küng (switzerland), professor of ecumenical theology and president of the foundation for a global ethic, said that as a scholar, he had for decades striven to promote world peace through dialogue among civilizations and religion. his group proposed a new paradigm of international relations. the world’s religions had rediscovered that their own fundamental ethical teachings supported and deepened some secular ethical values enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights (1948). at the 1993 parliament of world religions at chicago, more than 200 representatives of all world religions had expressed their consensus on a set of shared ethical values, standards and attitudes, as a basis for a global ethic. the basis for such an ethic was first the principle of humanity: every human being must be treated humanely, or more explicitly: what you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others. in light of those principles, the swiss professor called for a culture of solidarity and a just economic order; for a culture of tolerance and a life in truthfulness; and for a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women. the globalization of economy, technology and communication should be supported by a globalization of ethics. while some political analysts had predicted a “clash of civilizations” for the twenty-first century, he shared an alternative vision of hope: the religions and civilizations of the world in a coalition of all people of good will could help to avoid such a clash, provided they realized that there could be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions, no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions, no dialogue among religions without global ethical standards, no survival of our globe without peace and justice and without a new paradigm on international relations based on global ethics.(12) an instructive statement on the issue was made by ambassador john d. negroponte, united states permanent representative to the united nations, on november 9, 2001. quite cogently, he started by reminding the sad fact that the indiscriminate brutality of the september 11 terrorist attacks represented the antithesis of all that people would hope to achieve in a dialogue of civilizations. that was neither dialogue, nor was it civilization. a fundamental question asked by the speaker 188 prajñâ vihâra was: how can we harmonize differing perceptions of the world’s glorious diversity, how can we ensure that the savage impulse to negate the very existence of another people is consigned to humanity’s past? in this respect the american diplomat reminded a sad truth. the greater danger confronting us in the world today is not that we speak in different languages, but that we don’t always listen in any language. the art of hearing one another, the commitment to respond to what one is told, these are the fundamental dynamics of dialogue. and dialogue two-way communication is of supreme importance in attempting to address the vast complexity of civilizations that have evolved over the course of centuries, and, indeed, millennia. for civilization is not static. civilization is alive; it is the basis upon which dialogue with others is possible. our civilizations are our voice and meaning; they are our capacity for harmonious exchange; they are our capacity for mutual understanding.(13) the us message on the issue is realistic. indeed, religion-based and communitarian conflict clouds the dawn of the 21st century. some people might believe they can manipulate national and cultural values as if their actions took place behind a wall, but they delude themselves if they think their deeds are not seen and their words not heard. in the present globalizing world, no civilization, no culture, no religion can live in isolation on our planet. a remarkable fact was the similarity of ideas expressed by the representatives of various cultures. a good example is offered by the statement of ambassador shen guofang, deputy permanent representative of china to the united nations. the speaker reminded first of all that due to the differences in historical background, geographical conditions and cultural traditions, human civilizations have demonstrated much diversity and dissimilarity through their development. the diversity and dissimilarity have in return made their exchanges and blending an inexorable historical trend as well as a necessity for their self-improvement and continued development. in the history of mankind, there have been circumstances where one civilization would repel and attempt to force one set of values upon others. however, such attempts have all ended up in failure because they are against the historical trend of human development. ioan voicu 189 history has demonstrated that there is nothing to be worried about the differences and disputes among civilizations. rather, we should adopt a proper attitude towards them. there are no superior or inferior civilizations in this world. on the contrary, they are equal. the peaceful coexistence and common development of different civilizations can only be achieved through their learning and benefiting from each other on the basis of equality and mutual respect. the chinese diplomat emphasized that the september 11 terrorist attack on the united states was a barbarous destruction of human lives and a serious threat to international peace and security. it has nothing in common with human civilization. fighting terrorism is not a conflict among different races, religions or cultures but a fight between justice and evil, civilization and barbarism.(14) lourdes arzipe, professor at the university of mexico and former assistant director-general for culture at unesco, said the world was one but that many had not yet found their place in it. our nature as human beings made us forever look at the world from a specific place, a specific time. and the horizon of our eyes was always transformed into the boundary of “our world”. in this new millennium could it not be possible to extend that horizon to a sphere with no boundaries, an imagination with no barriers, solidarity with no limits? in his opinion, it could certainly be aspired to, but the more the basic needs of so many people were not met, the more resentment grew, and the more conflicts would erupt into wars.(15) the philippines reminded that the un continued to be the bedrock upon which the dialogue among civilizations should take place. it has the potential to demonstrate how dialogue could bring together, rather than polarize communities. some had noted that since the september 11 attacks the world faced a more uncertain future. that need not necessarily be true. the temptation for exclusionism and mistrust, however, remains strong. that temptation must be resisted, by working vigorously to heal real and perceived differences. the “us” versus “them”syndrome must be eliminated, as must the stereotyping of peoples and cultures. drawing from a pool of different cultures and civilizations, the world community is bound together by the urgent need to address its shared burdens — the deprivation and indignity of poverty, the vast pockets of underdevelopment, the degradation of the environment, the existence of 190 prajñâ vihâra terrorism and conflict and the silent cry of the victims of famine and disease. now is not the time to falter in working constructively through dialogue. the various peoples of the world may hold different beliefs, and traditions, but they remain part of the same global village.(16) in a joint declaration philippines-iran it is emphasized that the two parties commit themselves to initiate the implementation of concrete activities such as conferences, educational exchanges, dissemination of publications and other sources of information, and the strengthening of social, national, and global institutions, with a view towards nurturing a human society that upholds peace, non-violence, solidarity, and development.(17) this commitment is very significant, as the value of solidarity should be assessed in relation with the actual attitude and behavior of those who are, individually and collectively, partners in solidarity. solidarity is, in practical terms, a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good. it cannot be reduced to vague promises of support or feelings of compassion. it has a spiritual dimension which must be deeply rooted in a responsible approach to global issues.(18) 3. global agenda at the end of the general debate, on november 9, 2001 the plenary forum of the united nations adopted by consensus a resolution entitled global agenda for dialogue among civilizations. the draft resolution was sponsored by 108 countries representing all continents, including thailand as an initial co-sponsor. the presentation of the content of the full text of this resolution may prove quite instructive for the item under consideration. indeed, in the preambular part of its resolution 56/6, the general assembly reaffirms the purposes and principles embodied in the un charter, which are, inter alia, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, and to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting ioan voicu 191 and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. for the understanding of the general philosophy of the event celebrated in 2001, the resolution contains a remarkable assertion according to which all civilizations celebrate the unity and diversity of humankind and are enriched and have evolved through dialogue with other civilizations and that, despite obstacles of intolerance and aggression, there has been constructive interaction throughout history among various civilizations. there is also an emphasis that a common humanity unites all civilizations and allows for the celebration of the variegated splendor of the highest attainments of this civilizational diversity, and civilizational achievements constitute the collective heritage of humankind. the operative part of the resolution contains two sections. section a is composed of 9 articles grouped under the title a. objectives, principles and participants. article 1 is a kind of definition and states that “dialogue among civilizations is a process between and within civilizations, founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple perspectives through dialogue.” the notion of civilization refers to a mode of communal existence that expresses a people’s finest qualities and greatest gifts and blessings. consequently, article 2 gives more substance to the definition just reproduced and states that “dialogue among civilizations constitutes a process to attain, inter alia, the following objectives:. promotion of inclusion, equity, equality, justice and tolerance in human interactions;. enhancement of mutual understanding and respect through interaction among civilizations;. mutual enrichment and advancement of knowledge and appreciation of the richness and wisdom found in all civilizations;. identification and promotion of common ground among civilizations in order to address common challenges 192 prajñâ vihâra threatening shared values, universal human rights and achievements of human society in various fields;. promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and enrichment of common understanding of human rights;. development of a better understanding of common ethical standards and universal human values;. enhancement of respect for cultural diversity and cultural heritage.” article 3 is dedicated to the presentation of principles of the dialogue among civilizations. it includes the following:. faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small;. fulfilment in good faith of the obligations under the charter of the united nations and the universal declaration of human rights;. respect for fundamental principles of justice and international law;. recognition of diversified sources of knowledge and cultural diversity as fundamental features of human society and as indispensable and cherished assets for the advancement and material and spiritual welfare of humanity at large;. recognition of the right of members of all civilizations to preserve and develop their cultural heritage within their own societies;. commitment to inclusion, cooperation and the search for understanding as the mechanisms for the promotion of common values;. enhancement of participation by all individuals, peoples and nations in local, national and international decision-making processes. article 4 has a great importance from the operational point of view. it demonstrates that the resolution is really action-oriented.it says: “dialogue among civilizations provides important contributions to progress in the following areas: ioan voicu 193 . promotion of confidence-building at local, national, regional and international levels;. enhancing mutual understanding and knowledge among different social groups, cultures and civilizations in various areas, including culture, religion, education, information, science and technology;. addressing threats to peace and security;. promotion and protection of human rights;. elaboration of common ethical standards. article 5 offers a clear image of the universal contextuality in which the dialogue has to be promoted. it clearly states that participation in dialogue among civilizations shall be global in scope and shall be open to all, including:. people from all civilizations;. scholars, thinkers, intellectuals, writers, scientists, people of arts, culture and media and the youth, who play an instrumental role in initiation and sustainment of dialogue among civilizations;. individuals from civil society and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, as instrumental partners in promoting dialogue among civilizations.” as mentioned earlier, the whole resolution is action-oriented and contains a number of pragmatic recommendations arranged as section b entitled programme of action. the 6 paragraphs of this section are rich by their content and refer inter alia to facilitating and encouraging interaction and exchange among all individuals, including intellectuals, thinkers and artists of various societies and civilizations.(19) in 2005, 191 countries will assess the results of the implementation of this global agenda and programme of action. this very fact will show that dialogue among civilizations should not be just an expedient measure, but a long-term process. the un activities in the field must strengthen the interest of the international community in dialogue among civilizations and give a new impetus for such dialogue. we will consider now some individual approaches to the permanent dialogue among civilizations from different philosophical perspectives. 194 prajñâ vihâra 4. cogent views in a speech delivered in 2003 at the first panel of the prague international conference “europe in the 21st century: a crossroads of civilizations”, the indian thinker pran chopra recalled the fertile interactions between greece and rome, between christian and prechristian europe, between orthodox and catholic churches, between islamic and pre-islamic north africa and the middle east, and between each and all of these forces which have shaped the history of the world. the word culture is used by pran chopra in accordance with the conception of a great interpreter of hinduism, dr. sarvapalli radhakrishnan, who said: “after centuries of existence a little history is born. after centuries of history a little civilization is born. after centuries of civilization a little culture is born.” pran chopra notes there is an apprehension that what ought to be a dialogue among civilizations is not only turning into, or is being turned into a clash between civilizations, but it is threatening to lead us into a crash of all civilizations. wars between countries are becoming wars between peoples, their faiths, their civilizations and societies. these wars are spreading aversion to reconciliation, and because of such aversion all systems of social order, all constructive interactions within and between countries, communities, societies, civilizations are becoming dysfunctional. when the preachers of one faith quote the founding texts of their faith to claim how tolerant, accommodative, peaceable, benign are the institutions of their gods, their churches, their books, they are not able to carry conviction with the followers of another faith because their professions are contradicted by the practices of the practitioners of their faith. the actions of the fanatics in the ranks of all faiths reduce the professions of the preachers to the level of intentional or unintentional lies. competition between the fanatics on the two sides follows, and hopes of peaceful co-existence between faiths vanish in clouds of accusations and counter-accusations. the conclusion formulated by the indian thinker is very cautious. in his opinion, unless we face up to these questions, we will not be able to figure out whether a “clash of civilizations” is going on, or is in the ioan voicu 195 offing, or with what motives, if any, was this theory of a clash propounded and propagated, and how it should be countered by those who are not a party to these motivations.(20) the speech pronounced by dr. abdelouahed belkeziz, secretary general of the oic, at the 31st islamic conference of foreign ministers in istanbul on june 14, 2004 is an authoritative presentation of a collective muslim conception about the dialogue among civilizations, coming from an organization based on solidarity, in conformity with its constitutive act. we will summarize the relevant ideas with due respect for the terminology used by dr. abdelouahed belkeziz. in his view, the islamic world today stands unquestionably at a crossroads where it must embark upon a civilizational self-examination. what is meant by that? dr. abdelouahed belkeziz has in mind a systematic and balanced, rational assessment of its present reality aimed at working an internal reform by transforming the negative facets of that reality, renewing its democratic, political, social, and economic institutions, and strengthening its external relations and interaction with the outside world. it has become abundantly clear that the islamic world cannot remain stuck in a stance of defensive apology for certain positions, nor can it live outside the confines of its own age as a pariah of history. on the contrary, it is duty-bound to be one of the pioneers and shapers of this era by working to command the basic components of autonomous efficiency, competence, and ability to perform on a proactive, competitive basis. that is an effort where hesitancy and procrastination must have no place. the approach proposed by the secretary-genearal of the oic is quite realistic. in his own words, just a quick glance at the political, economic, informational, technological, ideological, or civilizational position of the islamic world is sufficient to fill some with an overwhelming feeling of bitterness. therefore, it is evidently high time for the islamic world to take a decisive position on democracy. to succeed in conquering the tools of modernization so as to keep abreast of modern times does not mean that the islamic world would or should lose its identity and values, nor does reaching these goals imply that it would or should have to follow a reform path fashioned by others 196 prajñâ vihâra or forcibly imposed on it. the islamic world of today is in no way wanting for an ideological interpretation of islam. what islamic countries need is an innovative interpretation, not an imitative interpretation, which is an endeavor requiring an act of selfcriticism. oic is considering with unesco the initiative of convening an international conference for an interactive, inter-civilizational dialogue, which will be a leap beyond the level of theoretical debates on dialogue to a practical, tangible level that highlights common grounds and rapprochement of views.(21) the need for dialogue among civilizations is the topic analyzed by the iranian thinker mohammad mehdi movahedi from a more philosophical perspective. in his opinion muslim thinkers are in favour of solidarity and seem to share a consensus view that a dialogue with the west is absolutely necessary. the need of the hour is that islam should learn from the west and then take part in its achievements as part of a global human enterprise. knowledge should be acquired regardless of its source. a truth is a truth regardless of whether it is discovered by an american, a chinese, a european or an african. this is in line with prophet muhammad’s saying, “seek knowledge even if you have to go to china.”(22) for the french philosopher and sociologist edgar morin, dialogue is only possible between individuals who recognize each other as subjects with the same dignity and the same rights. that is why he is pessimistic about our era, which he describes as being marked by manichaeism and a breakdown in understanding. when we speak of dialogue between civilizations in its ordinary meaning, we think in a simplified way of western civilization, of chinese, islamic, christian, iranian, african and so on. civilizations or cultures do not dialogue. only individuals can engage in dialogue. there are periods, such as ours, in which very little dialogue is possible. edgar morin thinks we are entering a dark period.(23) to prevent entering such a dark period, if we really aspire to an authentic globalization, we should accept that solidarity, as a universal value, is an imperative prerequisite for a globalization with a human face. ioan voicu 197 however, in practical terms, solidarity will remain a distant ideal if the dialectics of unity in diversity are not accepted. the asia-europe meeting (asem) is an original forum of multilateral diplomacy which unifies more than two billion people from different cultures it specifically advocates “unity in diversity” the literal presence of this expression in the carefully negotiated asem documents is very significant. it is common knowledge that the roots of the phrase are to be found in the ancient greek and roman civilization as well as in taoist and buddhist teachings. german philosopher hegel asserted that the diversity of philosophical systems is the progressive evolution of truth. asian and european diplomacy may find inspiration in that topical idea. global and regional cooperation may be efficiently served by a catalytic diplomacy enlightened by values transcending cultural and national differences. during a period of international tension, asem documents have the great merit of inviting us to meditate more profoundly about the cogency of unity in diversity.(24) as many peoples celebrate their independence from tyranny, the whole international community should stand in solidarity against tyranny everywhere. 5. perspectives a dialogue based on solidarity is a mandatory path to the building of a reconciled world, able to look with serenity to its own future. as indicated by the un secretary-general: “a dialogue among civilizations is not only a necessary answer to terrorism it is in many ways its nemesis”(24) and the very presence of the un is a permanent invitation to dialogue. all cultures must bear some relationship to freedom and truth. as strongly emphasized by the holy see, fanaticism and fundamentalism cannot be equated with the search for truth itself. a true dialogue between cultures requires a respect for differences. much too often, both in history and present times, ethnic and religious differences have been used as a justification for brutal conflict, genocide, and persecution. there have also been problems where one religious group has sought to expel members of another religion from a country, often with threats and actual violence. authentic culture cannot be built upon the practice of religious 198 prajñâ vihâra persecution. such a so-called culture stands diametrically opposed to the human person and will eventually lead to the disintegration of society. meaningful dialogue among civilizations cannot take place in the absence of religious freedom. the cultures of the world, with all of their rich diversity of gifts, have much to contribute to the building up of a civilization of love. what is required is a mutual respect for differences among cultures a respect inspired by the desire to uphold the right of all individuals to seek the truth in accord with the dictates of their conscience and in continuity with their cultural heritage. no authentic dialogue can take place if it fails to respect life. there can be no peace or dialogue among civilizations when this fundamental right is not protected. there have been many examples of generosity, dedication, even heroism in the service of life in our time. yet the world is still plagued by a number of attacks on life. when the human dignity of the weakest and most vulnerable members of society is not duly recognized, respected and protected, all civilizations suffer. yet again, despite these terrible practices and the recent crises, mankind must not be discouraged. the very idea of dialogue presupposes our ability to reason and understand, and especially to change and make anew. the holy see has full confidence that a true dialogue among civilizations will serve to benefit all.(25) that assessment is shared to a great extent by unesco. in its view this may well be the time of globalization, but it is also the time of the rediscovery of individual identity. as the discovery of individuality brings the appreciation of uniqueness, globalization also broadens our awareness of dissimilarities. consequently, the two opposing trends, globalization and diversity, are two faces of the current reality. it is important also for a profound understanding of the relation between authenticity and modernity. dialogue may offer a way to look at the un from a different angle: its universality and its inclusiveness of all diversities may be the fertile forum where a global social contract is successfully consummated. it is in this spirit that a lesser-known document, the vilnius declaration (2001) envisages the future.the document was circulated at the un but it is seldom quoted in governmental statements. the probable reason is the predominantly philosophical content of the document. fortunately, it ioan voicu 199 is in harmony with the philosophical foundations identified in the basic un and unesco documents on the matter and therefore deserves to be summarized in this presentation. there is no doubt that civilizations are entities of faith, historical memory, moral imagination and human connection. they contain historically unique and self-asserting cultures, irreplaceable forms of human creativity, and also the intellectual and moral sensibilities of large groups of people. biodiversity and cultural diversity are closely linked and are instrumental for the ability of humankind to adapt, create and invent. a topical warning is formulated: simplistic, monologue-based or otherwise politically convenient notions of civilization should not be applied. contrary to a firm conviction that western civilization was the only civilization nurtured by dialogue-based individualism, liberty and toleration, scholars have stressed the importance of each civilization and the dialogue among them as an inescapable part of the concept of civilization itself. in a practical assessment, civilizations appear as symbolic designs within which people raise core questions concerning their being in the world, and also search for key concepts and frames of meaning to interpret themselves and the world around them. the main conclusions of the vilnius declaration are realistic. no civilization can assume or represent complete humanity. the comparative approach therefore brings us to a proper understanding of the complementarity of civilizations. it powerfully stands against bias, demonization of the other and the sense of superiority over other societies and cultures. the complementarity of civilizations would be unthinkable without the constant interplay and exchange of such faculties of human thought and creativity as science, art and philosophy; nor would it be possible without the ethical and spiritual dimension. a dialogue of multiple, pluralistic and communicating identities would result in a multi-civilizational universe of discourse. no civilization could be demonized, and references to all of them, their intellectual traditions and masterpieces of art would come to the contemporary individual as easily and naturally as references to his or her own civilization. 200 prajñâ vihâra finally, the vilnius declaration contains a pathetic appeal. all governments and civil societies are enjoined, as an integrated part of their cultural policies, to take the initiative to further a dialogue among civilizations in such a way that it can become an instrument of transformation, a yardstick for peace and tolerance and a vehicle for diversity and pluralism, especially in culture, with the ultimate aim of furthering the common good.(26) another document adopted in lichtenstein in 2002 contains a provision reading as follows: “stress the concept of human co-operation based on mutual respect to strengthen civilizational exchange and solidarity between nations within the respect for the cultural specificities and the political and social options of states and peoples in accordance with the principles of international law.”(27) this appeal has a special resonance today. the turkish foreign minister and deputy prime minister abdullah gul said on june 14, 2004: “as the islamic countries, we must take strength from our common heritage which offers a rational and humanistic understanding of the world.” speaking at the 31st session of islamic conference of foreign ministers in istanbul, gul emphasized: “we meet again at a very crucial time. the arab-israeli conflict with the question of palestine at its core is bleeding hopes away. iraq has yet to show a genuine sign towards stability. africa’s problems remain to be solved. terrorism is expanding its scope and intensifying in ferocity. the sense of security is fast diminishing. the continuing political, social and economic deprivation is bringing greater instability. those preaching a clash of civilizations are winning more attentive ears. prejudices, fanaticism and discrimination are everywhere. and, insecurity is now threatening a global economic downturn.”(28) what should be done? a proposal was advanced by abdoulay wade, president of senegal, to organize a world conference for islamic-christian dialogue.(29) senegal is offering to host this event, which has had favorable reactions from religious leaders and heads of state in the g-8 and the muslim world. a meeting of this sort at the highest level, with messages from the world’s ioan voicu 201 most influential leaders, would be an exceptional opportunity for the establishment of a new understanding between the followers of the two major monotheistic religions, whose relations have unfortunately become strained. it is a most topical proposal. favourable conditions exist for establishing a dialogue among civilizations. religions can become an important unifying factor in this dialogue. the great potential of universal humanistic ideals must be recognized by all members of the international community, without any exception. this would contribute to the promotion of peace as a supreme value in the third millennium. the bangkok declaration: global dialogue and dynamic engagement adopted by consensus by unctad x on 19 february 2000 emphasizes that solidarity and a strong sense of moral responsibility must be the guiding light of national and international policy. they are not only ethical imperatives, but also prerequisites for a prosperous, peaceful and secure world based on true partnership.(30) the same message was refreshed on july 16, 2004 at the conclusion of the 15th international aids conference which wound up its week of work in bangkok with ringing calls from un officials for solidarity in the battle against the pandemic. the director-general of the world health organization (who), lee jong-wook, echoed this call for action. “i know that voices have been raised, i know that fingers have been pointed, but it is through our solidarity that we will finally defeat this menace,” he said.(31) these are very topical words. we live now during the international decade for a culture of peace and non-violence for the children of the world, 2001-2010. on november 5, 2001, the un general assembly stated that the objective of the decade is to further strengthen the global movement for a culture of peace (resolution 56/5). it invited states to expand their activities promoting such a culture. proclaiming the decade in 1998 (resolution 53/25 of 10 november), the assembly invited non-governmental organizations, religious bodies and groups, educational institutions, artists and the media to support the decade for the benefit of every child of the world. for that a permanent dialogue is needed. international understanding and consensus do not happen overnight. it takes time to reduce misunderstanding and build trust across the divides caused by 202 prajñâ vihâra cultural diversity, competing interests and different languages. this is a business for marathon runners, not sprinters. literature can be helpful in this regard. in 1971, accepting the nobel prize in literature, pablo neruda said, “i believe that poetry is an action, ephemeral or solemn, in which there enter as equal partners solitude and solidarity, emotion and action, the nearness to oneself, the nearness to mankind and to the secret manifestations of nature.” the message: read the world and recite its hopes and struggles out loud.(32) values must not be underestimated. on september 12, 2001 all members of the united nations unanimously adopted a resolution expressing solidarity with the people and government of the united states of america. such expressions of universal solidarity represent a rare international opportunity. the united states was the object of an unprecedented global outpouring of support and sympathy. in the epic fight against terrorism, solidarity is not an option, but an imperative. as a fundamental democratic value, it is a decisive prerequisite for a prosperous, peaceful and secure world. no power or superpower can make tabula rasa of the duty of solidarity as an imperative prerequisite of the irreversible process of globalization. without solidarity the current and future (improved) world system cannot properly function. the draft of the constitution of the european union which emphasizes in an exemplary way the concepts of mutual solidarity and loyal cooperation may serve as a good source of inspiration for promoting some common fundamental values. building trust and forging solidarity is a vital task. without trust there are no right answers to fundamental questions.(33) solidarity may lead to building alliances capable for making the international community better prepared to face unprecedented challenges. it should be emphasized that at crucial times, global solidarity can only be accomplished on the grounds of firmly entrenched and universally recognized values. solidarity is considered to be the path to peace as well as to development. peace is inconceivable without dialogue capable to diffuse and finally eliminate mutual distrust. the holy see had solid reasons to phrase this truth as opus solidaritatis pax: peace is the fruit of solidarity. in practical terms, solidarity provides a new model of the unity of the humankind beyond the bonds of nature and offers a new moral criterion for interpreting the world.(34) ioan voicu 203 as a general conclusion we may assert that an authentic dialogue among civilizations must be permanent and pro-active to be a success. it needs a generous humanistic framework at the level of the entire earth. indeed, only in universal contextuality, a dialogue among civilizations may be an instrumental process to uphold mutual respect, to promote global understanding and tolerance, and to contribute to building a world of human dignity, genuine solidarity and hope. this might be the only viable survival strategy for our shrinking planet. the call for solidarity must not be considered incantatory or obsolete during the present age of global vulnerability. there is a growing conviction that tomorrow’s world cannot be built on the current patterns. enhancing the value of solidarity today is not clinging to the past; it is working for a better future. 204 prajñâ vihâra endnotes 1commencement address at harvard university entitled three crises and the need for american leadership, in cambridge, massachusetts, on 10 june 2004. the full text of the address of the un secretary-general is available at http://www. un.org/news/ossg/sg/index.shtml visited on july 5, 2004. for the most comprehensive collection of studies on solidarity see kurt bayertz (editor), solidarity, kluwer academic publishers, dordrecht/boston/london, 1999. for a welldocumented study on the crisis of security and related aspects see nicolae ecobescu: a new phase in fighting terrorism, romanian journal of international affairs, vol. viii, no. 1-2, 2002, pp. 170-198. 2 see http://www.g77.org/40/declaration.htm visited on july 5, 2004. see also andrey grachev, the meeting of civilizations: reflections based on the results of the international forum ‘for solidarity against intolerance, for a dialogue between cultures’, unesco, january 1996. 3see the clash of civilizations will not take place. report from paris, culturelink review, no. 42/april 2004, available at http://www.culturelink.org/ review/42/cl42rpt.html. on january 30, 2004, the french minister stated: “today the world demands our attention and commitment. the quest for a new world order, the ongoing construction of europe, and more active solidarity with the developing countries: we must work together on these tasks. persistent crises and new threats bursting upon the scene are a reminder of our common duty to work for the general interest.” see www.iiea.com/keynotes/20040130-villepin.html visited on july 5, 2004. 4the text of the constitution of unesco is available at http://unesdoc. unesco.org/ulis/index.html visited on july 5, 2004. 5the full text of the un millennium declaration is available at www. un.org in various sections containing official documents. the association of tunisian parliamentarians organized on 25-26 september 2002 an international colloquium on dialogue among civilizations and international solidarity. see http://www. afkaronline.org/colloque/english/intro duction.html 6see the text of the message from the un secretary-general kofi annan on the occasion of the international day of tolerance being observed on 16 november. http://www.unescap.org/unis/press/l_44_01.htm 7see the islamic world and modern challenges at http://al-islam.org/ civilsociety/4.htm. for a relevant analysis of this issue see marlene kurz: islam and the world today, in prajna vihara, journal of philosophy and religion, vol. 4, no.1, january—june 2003, pp. 1-14. 8see doc. a/53/233. request for inclusion of item “dialogue among civilizations”. letter dated 5 october 1998 from the representative of the islamic republic of iran at www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-233.htm ioan voicu 205 9see the address of the un secretary-general available at http://www.un. org/news/ossg/sg/index.shtml visited on july 5, 2004. 10the summary of the debates about the dialogue among civilizations is reproduced on the basis of the documentation available at http://www.unis. unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/ga9952.html visited on july 6, 2004. 11see note 10. bucharest hosted on 6-7 june 2000 a seminar on “the dialogue among civilizations.” on that occasion professor virgil candea stated inter alia: “no matter how different, civilizations get closer, get acquainted, they value each other and collaborate through the dialogue they have, which reveals common ideals, forms of life and a common love for truth, for the good and the beautiful.” cf. romanian journal of international affairs, vol. vi, no. 3-4, 2000, p. 284. see also virgil candea: the peace vocation of the great religions, millennium iii, issue no. 8-9, 2002. 12see note 10. the critical remarks about the clash of civilizations refer essentially to samuel p. huntington who wrote in 1993 the second-most-popular article in the history of foreign affairs under the controversial title “the clash of civilizations”. after this article, in 1998. huntington published the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order which is a provocative analysis of the state of world politics. huntington’s thesis is that the post-cold war world is no longer bipolar but “multipolar” and “multicivilizational”. the centers of gravity in this new world order are various “civilizations”, defined on the basis of religious, cultural and linguistic lines: western civilization, latin american, african, islamic, sinic (chinese), hindu, orthodox, buddhist, japanese. huntington argues that this map of civilizations will help us to understand current and future conflicts, which increasingly are “fault-line” conflicts in which states or peoples belonging to different civilizations clash. 13see the full text of the statement in usun press release # 161 (01) november 9, 2001. http://www.un.int/usa/01_161.htm from which we have reproduced the most important paragraphs. 14see http://www.china-un.org/eng/smhwj/2001/t29167.htm a site at which the full text of the chinese statement is available. 15see http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/ga9952.html visited on july 6, 2004. 16see note 15. 17declaration of the philippines-iran bilateral conference on the dialogue among civilizations held in makati city, philippines, from 4 to 6 august 2003 at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2003/aug/makatidec.htm. see also the materials of the international seminar on globalization, a challenge for peace: solidarity or exclusion?, organized in milan, in october 1999, by the international jacques maritain institute. in a recent interview president gloria macapagal-arroyo stated: “we treasure the virtue of solidarity with others. at the core of solidarity are the virtue of justice and the pursuit of peace. moreover, our solidarity is not just with fellow filipinos, no matter what their ideologies. in a shrinking world our 206 prajñâ vihâra solidarity must have a global dimension.” see http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/news story.aspx?section=opinion&oid=54130 visited on july 17, 2004. 18see the materials dedicated to solidarity at www.um.dk/da/service menu/ english/visited on july 9, 2004. the participants of the international conference of peace and accord held in almaty, kazakhstan, on the 13th february 2003, adopted a declaration in which they stressed the importance of the realization of the principles of freedom, equality, solidarity and tolerance proclaimed in the united nations millennium declaration. 19the text of the resolution is available at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/ resguide/r56.htm visited on july 7, 2004. see also crossing the divide: dialogue among civilizations. the report of the “group of eminent persons” for the u.n. dialogue among civilizations, published by school of diplomacy and international relations, seton hall university, 2001. 20see pran chopra, clash, crash or dialogue of civilisations? available at www.wpfdc.com/eng/news visited on july 8, 2004. this presentation has the merit of being focused on practice which is the ultimate criterion of truth. on this aspect asst. prof. dr. warayuth sriwarakuel cogently pointed out: “truth is implausible without both knowledge and praxis. in the pursuit of truth, knowlege without praxis is emptiness, and praxis without knowledge is blindness.” see editorial note, prajna vihara, journal of philosophy and religion, vol. 3, no. 1, january-june 2002, p. v. 21the organization of islamic conference is an association of 56 islamic states promoting muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political affairs. the speech of its secretary-general is available at www.oic-oci.org/ visited on july 10, 2004. see also http://www.oicistanbul2004.org.tr 22see mohammad mehdi movahedi, the significance extent of, and the need for “dialogue among civilizations” available at http://www.dialogue centre. org/magarchive4.html visited on june 20, 2004. see also note 10 supra. 23see philosopher of complexity. interview by sophie boukhari available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ulis/index.htm. philosopher and sociologist edgar morin is presented as one of france’s leading contemporary thinkers. he is also the president of unesco european agency of culture. 24for the statement of the un secretary-general see http://www.un.org/ news/ossg/sg/index.shtml visited on july 5, 2004. 25for the opinions expressed by the holy see on the matter see http:// www.holyseemission.org/26. at unctad xi (sao paulo, brazil, june 13-18, 2004) the holy see stated inter alia: “globalization, a priori, is neither good nor bad. it will be what people make of it. no system is an end in itself, and it is necessary to insist that globalization, like any other system, must be at the service of the human person; it must serve solidarity and the common good.” for the full text of the statement see http://www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=55740 visited on july 17, 2004. ioan voicu 207 26for the full text of the vilnius declaration see www.unesco.org/dialogue 2001/vilnius/vilnius_declaration.htm visited on june 20, 2004. 27communique of liechtenstein (2002) on dialogue among civilizations and cultures: comprehension and mutual understanding, document available at http://www.isesco.org.ma/english/dialogue/lish.html visited on june 12, 2004. 28for the statement by deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the republic of turkey, abdullah gül, at the thirty-first session of the islamic conference of foreign ministers (istanbul, 14 june 2004) see http://www. mfa.gov.tr/ visited on june 20, 2004. 29how the g-8 can make a real difference, international herald tribune, june 10, 2004. 30the text of the unctad x bangkok declaration is available at http:// www.unctad.org/sections/about/docs/bangkokdeclaration_en.pdf 31the full text of the statement of lee jong-wook is available at http:// www.who.int/dg/lee/speeches/2004/hivaids_summitbangkok/en/ visited on july 17, 2004. un secretary general kofi annan made an outspoken attack on a worldwide lack of commitment to fighting aids. in an exclusive interview with the bbc, he said the fight against terrorism was overshadowing the hiv/aids epidemic. at a time when millions of dollars are being put into the fight against international terrorism, where, he asked, is the “international solidarity” on aids. see http://www. newsdotcom.com/viewtopic.asp?forumid=2&id=224 visited on july 17, 2004. 32pablo neruda, the boston globe, tuesday, july 13, 2004. reprinted in international herald tribune, july 14, 2004. 33thomas l. friedman, only human values can repair civilization, the new york times, wednesday, september 11, 2002. 34see http://lilt.ilstu.edu/jguegu/social.htm visited on july 17, 2004. assumption university, bangkok, july 18, 2004. 208 prajñâ vihâra 01_the contractual foundation of justice.pmd the contractual foundation of justice and democracy as an imperative for social development in africa francis offor university of ibadan, nigeria º·¤ñ´âèí º·¤çòá¹õéäáèà¾õâ§áµè¾âòâòáêãéò§กòãàª×èíáâ⧷õè¢ò´àêõâáôä é́ãðëçèò§ êñ­­ò»ãðªò¤áกñºáâ¹·ñè¹ìàã×èí§¤çòáâøµô¸ããáà·èò¹ñé¹ áµèâñ§à¹é¹ãëéàëç¹ ¤çòáêó¤ñ­¢í§á¹ç¤ố ñ́§กåèòç·õèáõµèí»ãðªò ô̧»äµâáåðã¹°ò¹ðà»ç¹à¤ã×èí§á×í ãëéºããåøà»éòëáòâกòã¾ñ²¹òã¹áí¿ãôกò à¾×èíà»ç¹กòãµãç¨êíº¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹¸ì ãðëçèò§êñ­­ò»ãðªò¤ááåð¤çòáâøµô̧ ããá º·¤çòá¹õéâ×¹âñ¹çèòกòã·õèàãò´óà¹ô¹ ªõçôµ»ãð¨óçñ¹íâèò§áõ» ô̄êñá¾ñ¹ ì̧กñº¤¹í×è¹ã¹·øกãð ñ́º¢í§êñ§¤áâèíáä é́ãñºáã§ë¹ø¹¨òก áâ¹·ñè¹ìàã×èí§êñ­­ò»ãðªò¤áäáèçèò¨ðà»ố à¼âëã×íäáèà»ố à¼âáåðกòãáõ» ô̄êñá¾ñ¹ ì̧ ñ́§กåèòç áãกêǿ âèíáëáòâ¶ö§กòãíó¹çâ¤çòáêð´çกãëéกñºáòµã°ò¹·ò§¤çòá âøµô¸ããááåðêè§àêãôá¾ñ²¹òกòãã¹êñ§¤áá¹øéâì ã¹¢³ðà´õâçกñ¹ º·¤çòá¹õé ¹íก¨òกâíáãñºçèò»ãðªò¸ô»äµâà»ç¹à¤ã×èí§á×í·õè´õ·õèêø´êóëãñºกòã¾ñ²¹òáåéç âñ§ä é́ªõéãëéàëç¹çèò»ãðà·èã¹áí¿ãôกòêèç¹áòกâñ§äáèä é́ãñºกòã¾ñ²¹òíâèò§¢¹ò¹ ãë­è·ñé§æ·õè»ก¤ãí§́ éçâãðºíº»ãðªò̧ ô»äµâกçà¾ãòðçèò¼ùé¹óâñ§äáèä́ éâíáãñºçèò»ãðªò̧ ô»äµâã¹ °ò¹ðà»ç¹ãù»áººë¹ö觢í§êñ­­ò»ãðªò¤á¹ñé¹µéí§¹óáò» ô̄ºñµô¤çº¤ùèกñ¹ä»กñº »ñ­ëòàã×èí§¤çòáâøµô̧ ããáíâèò§¨ãô§ ñ̈§ abstract in this paper, an attempt is made not only to establish the inextricable link between the social contract and the notion of justice, but also to emphasize their importance to democracy and as a means of achieving the prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 1-15 1 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ goals of development in africa. in examining the relationship between social contract and justice, the paper asserts that our every day dealing with others at various layers of existence is underpinned by the notion of a contract, whether explicit or implicit and that such dealings are meant primarily to facilitate some measure of justice and to foster development in human society. while accepting democracy as the best means for achieving the goals of development, the paper concludes that the reason most african states have not made giant developmental strides, despite their practice of democracy, is because their leaders are yet to accept democracy as a form of contract that carries with it, serious implications bordering on the question of justice. introduction contractual models have come to inform a vast variety of relations and interaction between persons....[therefore] contemporary...society is in the grip of contractual thinking”1 virginia held the idea of contract is as old as man himself. from the creation story in the holy books of most religions, the view that man’s enjoyment of even his natural rights is dependent upon some form of contract or agreement between him and his creator is very prevalent. in most accounts, the idea of a contract, whether explicit or implicit plays a significant role in our every day dealings with others. fundamental however to all contractual arrangements is the central role occupied by the notion of justice. in fact, it can rightly be asserted that the essence of entering into any form of contract is to facilitate some measure of justice, whether in a social group, a religious organisation, an educational institution, a political association, a business cartel or even the society at large. in this paper, attempt is made not only to establish the central role justice occupies in all contractual arrangements but also to draw the inextricable link between social contract, justice and social development. our argument is that all our dealings with ‘others’ at various layers of existence amount to an attempt to reconcile various interests guided by some presumption of 2 prajna vihara ~ _ _ a contract, whether implicit or explicit, and since development is always the raison d’être of all contractual arrangements, it follows that all our dealings with others not only have contractual underpinnings, such dealings are meant primarily to foster development in human society. while accepting democracy as the best means for achieving the goals of development, the paper concludes that the reason many african states have not made giant developmental strides is because their leaders are yet to accept democracy as a form of contract that carries with it, serious implications bordering on the question of justice, whenever the terms of the contract (represented by the principles of democracy) are not followed to the letter. but, first, let us start with a historical excursion on the relationship between social contract and the notion of justice.l social contract and the idea of justice in the ancient period although the social contract theory is usually associated with modern moral and political theorists like thomas hobbes, john locke and jean-jacques rousseau, philosophers before and after these, also gave elaborate attention to discussing the idea of a social contract. central however to all discussions on social contract is the fundamental position occupied by the notion of justice. in one of the early dialogues of plato called crito,2 socrates used a social contract argument to explain to crito why he must remain in prison and accept the death penalty rather than escape and go into exile in another greek city as crito and some of his friends had planned. in his argument, socrates attempted to explain the reason he had an overwhelming obligation to obey the laws of athens even at the cost of his own life. starting from the premise that his entire way of life and existence has been made possible by the laws of athens, socrates then explains his relationship with the laws of athens as representing some sort of contract between him as a citizen and athens as a state. in fact, the terms of this contract are spelt out in the laws of athens. in some circumstances, a social contract is explicitly consented to by the parties, whereas in some other cases, the consent may be merely implied. in the specific case of socrates, the contract between him and the city of athens is an implied francis offor 3 one, since he had enjoyed all the benefits and facilities provided by the state, and has abided by the laws and accepted the punishments they mete out since his youth, even though he was not one of the original contractors. this forms the framework of socrates understanding of the notion of justice. having implicitly consented to the contract that the laws of athens represent, socrates is therefore under obligation to keep the terms of the contract, even at the expense of losing his own life. this is socrates’ understanding of justice. so, the notion of justice for socrates has its foundation in the idea of a social contract. also, in another of plato’s dialogues, the republic,3 a social contract explanation is presented for the nature of justice. here, justice is said to be the conventional result of the laws and covenants that men make in order to avoid two extremes. the first is to avoid a situation where men are able to commit injustice with impunity and the second is to avoid becoming victims of injustice themselves. men therefore contracted among themselves that in order to avoid the inconveniences of these extremes, it will be in their own best interests to enter into a covenant by enacting laws that will regulate conducts and promote a sense of justice. in another expression from the republic, the concept of justice is explained in terms of three different kinds of interests, virtues and personalities in individuals and the three different kinds of social classes that should reflect these three personalities, interests and virtues. justice here is seen as consisting in each person falling into the class to which he belongs and each class performing those duties for which it is best fitted.4 from the views expressed above in crito and the republic, the notion of justice is intricately tied to the idea of a social contract and justice consists not only in obedience to the state and the laws that sustain it, as explained in crito, but also in the state of a well-regulated soul or a just man who will, among other things, recognize his obligation to the state and fellow humans by performing those duties for which his is best fitted. social contract and the idea of justice in the modern period the idea of social contract received the widest attention in the modern period in the history of philosophy through the writings of thomas 4 prajna vihara ~ _ _ hobbes (1588-1679), john locke (1632-1704) and jean-jacques rousseau (1712-1778). thomas hobbes lived during the most crucial period in england’s history, which is the period of the english civil war. the war was occasioned by the clash between the king and his supporters who preferred the traditional authority of a monarch, and the parliamentarians, who demanded more power for the parliament. hobbes tried to mediate in this conflict through reflection on the origin and nature of political authority as well as the obligation of self-interested individual members of society. hobbes’ reflections are detailed out in his seminal work, leviathan.5 in the leviathan, hobbes started his analysis with an assessment of those universal natural qualities of man as a special kind of animal. man, he explained, is necessarily and exclusively egoistic and self-interested. all men, he argued, pursue only what they perceive to be in their own individually considered best interests they are drawn to that which they desire and are repelled by that to which they are averse. from there, he extended his analysis to a consideration of what it is like for men with distinct natural qualities to live and interact with one another, and then extrapolated the logical consequences of such interaction.6 all of these combined to form his idea of the state of nature; a condition where naturally and exclusively self-interested men jostle for limited resources, and where there is no power to moderate their excesses. given these conditions, hobbes concludes that the state of nature would be unbearably brutal; a state of perpetual and unavoidable war. in fact, he describes it as the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. it is the rather unfortunate consequences arising from this form of co-existence that necessitated the construction of a body polity or state, where such inconveniences are expected to be taken care of. the construction of such body polity or state is done through a social contract. this contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. first, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the state of nature. it is this mutual renouncing of rights that hobbes refers to as ‘covenant’.7 however, if a man merely gives up his right of governing himself, on the promise that others would do likewise, others might just fail to francis offor 5 keep their own part of the agreement. the ‘signing’ of a covenant by men is therefore not enough for achieving the desired goal; for such covenant would still depend on its implementation, on the same self-free, equal and passionate being as we have in the state of nature. there must therefore be a force behind the agreement that makes the pains of breaking it outweigh the pains of keeping it.8 this common force is created in a second contract by the entire people, by conferring all their powers upon one man or assembly of men, to whom they surrender all their basic natural rights to govern themselves. in other words, to ensure their complete escape from the state of nature, they must agree to live together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. prior to the establishment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live together and the contract to embody a sovereign with absolute authority, nothing is immoral or unjust __ anything goes! this means that questions regarding justice or injustice had no place in human existence prior to the contract that created the state or society. in the social contract, says hobbes, lies the foundation and origin of justice; for without the contract, no right can be said to have been transferred and every man still has the right to everything or whatever he so wishes, but once a contract is made, to break it becomes unjust. injustice then means the non-performance of a covenant or contract.9 in other words, it is the performance of one's covenant that gives room for distinguishing between a just and an unjust act. since the sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete out punishments for breaches of the contract, which are worse than not being able to act as one pleases, men have good, albeit self-interested, reason to adjust themselves to the artifice of morality in general, and justice in particular, which are the very essence of the contract. the social contract is seen by hobbes as the most fundamental source of all that is good and just. our choice, according to him, is either to maintain justice by abiding by the terms of the contract, or prescind from our obligations regarding the contract and thereby arrive by abstraction, at another layer of atomic individualism which is rooted in the human passions, where questions of justice and injustice make no meaning. in his two treatises of government,10 john locke also postulates a ‘state of nature’, which is however, neither chaotic nor anarchical. 6 prajna vihara ~ _ _ in the lockean ‘state of nature’, men lived peacefully and own private properties like cattle, sheep and land. locke maintains that men by nature are not wholly selfish, for they sometimes co-operate and work for the good of others, even though sometimes, they also act egoistically. occasionally however, men, he admits, transgress by attempting to kill or steal someone’s property. when this occurs, the injured party has right to punish the transgressor, because in the state of nature, there is no civil authority or government to punish people for transgressions against laws. locke further argues that there would have been no reason for men to covenant to leave the state of nature to form society, except that difficulties arise in applying punishment to the transgressors and ensuring justice. political society therefore came into being when individual men contracted together in the state of nature to give up the executive power to punish those who transgress the laws of nature. people entered into the contract with the sole aim of developing such institutions as necessary for the purpose of punishing transgressors and administering justice in the society. jean-jacques rousseau’s accounts of the moral and political evolution of human beings from a state of nature to modern society are laid out in his essay titled, discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men.11 according to rousseau, the state of nature was a peaceful and quixotic one where people lived solitary, uncomplicated lives. their few needs were easily satisfied by nature because of the abundance of nature and the small size of the population and so, they had less reason for conflict. as time passed by and as population started increasing, humanity started facing certain changes, resulting in discoveries, public values and the invention of private properties. all these led to envy, pride, greed, competition and contempt. in his the social contract,12 rousseau attempted to respond to this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have been produced by these developments. the fundamental question that bothered rousseau concerns how we can live together without succumbing to the force and coercion of others. for rousseau, we can do this by submitting our individual, particular wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement or contract with other free and equal persons. this act, whereby individual persons come together as a people through contract to choose a sovereign is, according to rousseau, “the real founfrancis offor 7 dation of society”.13 fundamental to this version of the social contract is the idea of reciprocated duties: the sovereign is committed to the good of the individuals who constitute it, and each individual is likewise committed to the good of the whole by fulfilling their duties to the sovereign. the individuals' fulfilment of their duties as well as the sovereign’s commitment to the good of the individual amounts to justice in this context. from the views expressed above by the modern theorists, the notion of justice is inextricably tied to that of the social contract. in fact, discussions on the question of justice would not have come up, if men didn’t enter into contract in the first instance. social contract and the idea of justice in the contemporary period the relationship between the social contract and the notion of justice is more forcefully established in john rawls’ version of the social contract theory.14 essentially, john rawls’ theory which is contained in his book, a theory of justice, is a general theory of social justice, which includes not just principles of justice but a very elaborate edifice supporting these principles. rawls takes the subject of his principles of justice to be what he calls “the basic structure of society”,15 whose major function is to distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation among members of society.16 unfortunately, rawls observes that the basic structure of most societies favours some starting places over others in the division of the benefits of social cooperation, thereby resulting in some form of inequalities. for rawls, therefore, the primary problem of justice is to fashion out a set of principles, which would not only provide a way of assigning fundamental rights and duties to the ‘major social institutions’ of society, but would also lay down how the basic structure should distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.17 the question now concerns how such principles of justice that would regulate the basic structure of society would be chosen. this is where rawls makes use of the social contract theory. rawls’ social contract is that of a situation in which people come together to draw up principles to regulate their society. he calls this situation, the ‘original po8 prajna vihara ~ _ _ sition’. central to rawl’s idea of social contract, which marks him out from other contractarians before him, is the notion of the ‘veil of ignorance’. the veil of ignorance is a hypothetical construct used by rawls to show how persons in the original position are denied knowledge of their particular abilities, talents and social positions they would occupy in the society. this not only puts all the contractors on equal moral standing, it ensures that none of them has any advantageous bargaining power over others. rawls’ central argument here is that if people are ignorant of those things that prejudiced them directly or indirectly in their favour, as the situation in the original position allows, they would not endorse a principle that favours one party at the expense of another, since, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, they might find themselves on the losing end of such a principle. rawls proposes two main principles of social justice that should regulate every well-ordered and just society. these principles, according to rawls, are that: (i) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. (ii) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and b. attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.18 the first principle is called the ‘liberty principle’.19 this principle consists of two claims. first is that all members of society are to have the greatest liberty consistent with a similar liberty for others. the second claim of this principle is that this total system of basic liberties is to be as extensive as possible. what rawls means here is that these liberties are inalienable and are to be enjoyed by everyone in the society, in a manner that will not prevent some others in the society from enjoying the same liberties. the second principle is also of two parts. the first part, which states that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged or worst-off group in society, is known as the ‘difference principles’. what this principle demands is that the basic francis offor 9 structure should be arranged in such a way that any inequality, in terms of prospects of obtaining the primary goods, must work to the advantage of those members of society who are worst-off with respect to these primary goods. the second part of the second principle is known as the ‘principle of fair equality of opportunity’.20 the principle states that people with identical skills, abilities and talents enjoy equal opportunities. in this respect, if we have two people ‘x’ and ‘y’ with similar skills and talents and they both desire to attain a position which requires technical training. x comes from a wealthy family and the family of x is willing to sponsor him for his training. but in the case of y, he comes from a poor background, so the family cannot pay for his training. the principle of fair equality of opportunity would require that the society should finance the training of y who comes from a poor background, so that he is not deprived of opportunities available to others with similar skills or talents.21 a just society for rawls, therefore, is one in which the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy the principles of justice enumerated above. in his book, morals by agreement,22 published in 1986, david gauthier outlined his own account of social contract. gauthier agreed with other contractarians that society and morality are founded upon an agreement between exclusively self-interested yet rational persons. but whereas theorists like hobbes and locke insisted that an external enforcement mechanism in the form of a sovereign was necessary to enforce justice, gauthier believed that such external mechanism was not necessary, as rationality alone convinces persons not only to agree to cooperate, but to ensure justice, by sticking to the terms of their agreements. justice for him therefore consists in acting cooperatively and in being consistent with acting cooperatively by sticking to the terms of one’s agreements at all times. 10 prajna vihara ~ _ _ gauthier appealed to the allegory of the prisoner’s dilemma to show that self-interested and rational persons can be consistent with acting cooperatively. this narrative involves two persons who have been brought in separately for questioning by the police, for a crime they are both suspected to have committed. each prisoner is promised a chance of a lesser jail term if he cooperates and gives information on the other prisoner. gauthier reasoned that in order to serve his own interests as much as possible, each prisoner is better off cooperating with the police by confessing, no matter what the other prisoner does. the important lesson from the prisoner’s dilemma is that when one is engaged in interaction such that others’ actions can affect one’s own interests, and vice versa, one does better if one acts cooperatively. acting cooperatively and being consistent with doing this, is gauthier’s idea of justice. our analysis so far tries to draw the nexus between justice and social contract. it tries to establish that the raison d’être behind every contractual arrangement is the establishment of the necessary conditions that can engender development. but such conditions can only be created where justice is given its prime place. this is the reason the analysis of the question of justice is inextricably tied to that of the social contract. although, the question of what constitute justice has remained a significant one and has bothered philosophers right from the time of plato, we can, from our analysis so far, identify different criteria that represent the various positions by philosophers down the ages, on what constitute justice. these criteria range from that of need, desert, and right, to equality. the criterion of need states that justice is done to people when their needs are met. this position is well expressed in karl marx’s the gotha programme,23 where he enunciated that the distribution of the social goods in the communist state would be according to need. this is captured by his famous and much quoted aphorism: “from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs”.24 the criterion of rights states that justice consists in respecting the rights of people in society. advocates of this view include j.s. mill, john locke and robert nozick. whereas j.s. mill contends, for instance, that every claim of justice is a claim of individual right and that an individual is justly treated when his rights are respected,25 robert nozick argues that people have property rights and that it would be morally indefeasible and unjust for such properties to be taken away francis offor 11 through any means. the criterion of desert states that justice is done to a person when he is given what he deserves. finally, the criterion of equality states that justice consists in treating everyone equally. although the view has been expressed that each of the criteria of need, right, desert and equality embodies important aspects of justice, yet, none of them sufficiently explain the meaning of justice. all the criteria cannot be taken together, as this would amount to incorporating into the concept of justice, some other claims not relevant to the determination of what is just at some particular point in time. in view of the variety of circumstances to which matters of justice are applied, however, some have insisted that the criterion relevant to the determination of what is just or unjust should be a function, both of the kind of issue being assessed and of the circumstances in which the assessment is taking place.26 this, we must warn, may make the meaning of justice not only contextual and relative but also situational. our primary interest here, however, is not with these controversies or how they are resolved but with showing how a consideration of any or all of these criteria can help in our determination of issues of justice from time to time. social contract, justice and development in africa so far in this paper, attempt has been made to establish the link between social contract and the notion of justice. from our examination, we can rightly assert that our every day dealing with others at various layers of existence is underpinned by the notion of a contract, whether explicit or implicit and that such dealings are meant primarily to facilitate some measure of justice and to foster development in human society. the aim of social contract therefore is to create the enabling conditions for realising the goals of development, but such conditions can only be created where justice is given its prime place. that there is an indispensable link between justice and the establishment of the type of environment that can engender development is attested to, by the preamble to the international labour organisation’s constitution which states that development is only sustainable where there is “universal and lasting peace” but that these can only be established in an environment where justice is given the prime 12 prajna vihara ~ _ _ place.27 in fact, philosophers, right from the time of plato, have all emphasised the fact that justice is a prerequisite for peace and stability and that peace and stability are indispensable conditions for development. it is true that as individuals, we pursue our different interests at various levels, but by virtue of the fact that we live in societies where we can serve each other’s interests by our actions, it becomes pertinent to regulate at all times our relationship with others, guided by some presupposition of a contract and the notion of justice. this, however, is where leaders of states in africa miss the point and the very reason they fail to deliver the common good and engender development, even with the most effective instrument. from the views of the contractarians examined so far, the existence of government has been justified solely in terms of its ability to secure the common good of all within the state, and most contemporary scholars have argued in favour of democracy as the form of government that can best help secure the common good. this is because, democracy places power in the hands of the people. it holds that all people have something good to offer in the governance of their shared political space and that through their collective efforts and contributions, the common good is better secured, improved and promoted. although a few people end up playing active roles in the day to day running of a democracy, the faith in democracy as a principle of governance is that: sovereignty ultimately lies with the people and is only exercised on their behalf by a few within a body of rules, predetermined and agreed upon by both parties the ruler and the ruled for the benefit of the polity, its affairs, the common good and well-being of its citizens and future generations.28 this means that democracy, by its very principle, is a form of contract, in fact, a contract of a more flagitious tang, with serious implications for both the present and future generations. therefore, it can be said that democracy, if it is to function as a valuable means for enhancing development, must be understood as a form of contract, and should not betray this theoretical basis, as is currently the case in many of the states in africa. the experiments with democracy in many of the states in africa francis offor 13 belie a ‘breach of contract’ and a gross neglect of the issue of justice, resulting in the very many tensions, conflicts, violence and other vices that pose as hindrances on our paths to development. africa can only begin to make giant developmental strides when its leaders accept democracy as a form of contract. this would mean that there would be serious implications whenever the terms of the contract (in matters of justice) are not followed to the letter. the idea of a contract has been and will undoubtedly remain with us for the foreseeable future, but so too is the notion of justice. these are essential concepts that will continue to compel us to always keep the terms of our collective contract, by rethinking as socrates did in crito, the nature of both ourselves, our laws and of our relations with others, as we travail on our democratic journeys. this is the only way we can together create an enabling environment that can engender development in our various societies and in the world at large. endnotes 1virginia held, feminist morality, transforming culture society and politics, chicago: the university of chicago press, 1993. 2see: plato five dialogues, translated by g.m.a. grube, hackett publishing company, 1981. 3plato republic, translated by g.m.a. grube and revised by c.d.c. reeve, hackett publishing company, 1992. 4samuel enoch stumpf, elements of philosophy, an introduction, new york: mcgraw hill, 1993, p.36. 5hobbes leviathan, edited by c.b. macpherson, england: penguin books, 1968. 6francis offor, ‘a philosophical perspective an globalization and the quest for a stable world order’, unpublished ph.d. thesis submitted to the department of philosophy, university of ibadan, nigeria, february, 2005, p.138. 7hobbes leviathan p.192. 8ibid., p.196. 9david gauthier “hobbes” in robert l. arington (ed.), a companion to the philosophers, massachusetts: blackwell, 1999, p.307. 10john locke, two treatises of government, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1963. 11see: jean-jacques rousseau, the basic political writings, trans. donald a cress, hackett publishing company, 1987. 12jean-jacques rousseau, the social contract, harmondsworth: pen14 prajna vihara ~ _ _ guin, 1968. 13mon chek min “social contract theory"http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/soccont.htm. 14john rawls, a. theory of justice, oxford: clarendon press, 1972. 15ibid., p.54. 16dipo irele, introduction to contemporary social and political thinkers, ibadan: new horn, 1993, p.14. 17rawls, a theory of justice, p.2. 18rawls is cited in gardner michael r. “rawls on the maximum rule and distribute justice”, philosophical studies, 27, 1975, pp. 255 256. 19rawls, a theory of justice, p.61. 20dipo irele, op. cit., p.16. 21ibid., p.17. 22david gauthier, morals by agreements, oxford: oxford university press, 1986. 23see: dipo irele, op. cit., p.102. 24ibid. 25see: a.b. ekanola ‘peace and the problems of justice in contemporary society’, unpublished ph.d. thesis, department of philosophy, university of ibadan, nigeria, 2002. 26ibid. 27david a. morse “ilo and the social infrastructure of peace” in haberman (ed.), nobel lecturers: peace, amsterdam: elsevier publishing company, 1972, p.438. 28t. d. oladipo, “apathy and the future of nigeria’s democracy” reflections, vol.6, 2008, p.23. francis offor 15 1free of religion & religious heritage reason, faith, and secularization: jürgen habermas meets joseph cardinal ratzinger gerhold k. becker assumption university abstract the debate between the two leading representatives of critical theory and catholic theology on the moral and (presumably) religious foundations of the secular state that can neither be vindicated nor ignored by secular reason has drawn great attention far across the borders that tend to separate theologians from liberal philosophers. the paper seeks to explore the historical context of the debate and to identify major areas of agreement between the two discussants before it examines some of the more important remaining differences. with the subsequent election of cardinal ratzinger as pope and the programmatic implications of his papal name the debate has taken on a new significance by highlighting the continuous need for dialogue and deeper understanding between the church and all people of good will regardless of intellectual background or ideological affiliations. i. cross-border explorations on monday, 19 january 2004, the catholic academy in munich hosted a debate between two of the most distinguished german intellectuals with international acclaim far beyond their respective disciplines. the debate took place between joseph cardinal ratzinger and professor emeritus jürgen habermas. in many quarters the encounter at first stirred up disbelief and utter surprise. it was thought nearly impossible that two personalities representing positions diametrically opposed to each other would engage in an open-ended debate and could even find a common language for it. for many in germany, ratzinger as one of the most powerful prelates of the roman church and for over two decades the prefect of the congregation of faith, was above all a conservative theologian whose doctrinal views would jeopardize any meaningful dialogue and at best present another dogmatic statement of the roman point of view. habermas’ leftwing friends and followers were taken aback by his willingness to engage in a dialogue with the head of the congregation that directly succeeded the infamous sacred congregation of the universal inquisition established in 1542 by pope paul iii. to fight heretics and to suppress free thought. it is therefore one of the great surprises of this in many ways remarkable encounter that it not only took place at all, but also that friend and foe acknowledged the great sincerity and respect with which the two antagonists debated their issue at the highest intellectual level. and even more significant was that they succeeded in bringing religion and its contribution to modernity again into focus of a debate whose tremendous implications far exceed catholicism and christianity and extend to non-believers and unbelievers alike. both discussants, albeit from different angles, found commonalities in their claim of a role for religion within modern society that let forget, at least for a moment, the remaining differences between them. 1 apparently, the initiative for the debate came from cardinal ratzinger. as a wellinformed observer not only of developments in contemporary theology but also in the whole range of the humanities, he seemed to have followed with great interest what in the meantime has been called habermas’ approximation to religion. in particular, habermas’ surprising intervention in the debate about the implications of biotechnology, particularly in the context of human cloning and wasteful embryo research, had caught the cardinal’s interest. habermas’ small but influential book on the challenge of biological engineering and human cloning was published in 2001 entitled die zukunft der menschlichen natur; the title of the english translation (2002) aptly indicates its major concern: the future of human nature. the book offers an eloquent defense of the right to a unique human identity and explores the limits of human interference with nature. while habermas examines the issue from his own philosophical perspective, in various points his results show a remarkable affinity to the catholic position. beyond its immediate point of departure, the munich debate gains its full significance only if it is placed within the broader context of a renewed interest among european intellectuals in religion and of their search for partners in a dialogue that meets at the high level of intellectual integrity and sincerity the topic deserves. three specific contexts are worth mentioning. 1. the martini-eco debate the opening issue of the italian journal liberal published on 22 march 1995 included the first of a series of letters between the archbishop of milan, carlo maria cardinal martini, and the world-famous linguist and novelist umberto eco (the name of the rose, foucault’s pendulum). altogether eight public letters were exchanged and published in quarterly intervals that ended in march 1996. the letters met with unusual interest among italian intellectuals, which prompted the editors to invite others to participate and to contribute views from their respective professional backgrounds, i. e. from philosophy, journalism, and politics. the title under which the letters were collected and published in 1996 once again indicates the overall topic of the debate: in cosa crede chi non crede? which could be literally translated as: in what does he/she believe who does not believe?1 a german issue appeared in 1999 and was most appropriately prefaced by the former archbishop of vienna, franz cardinal könig, who from 1965 to 1980 headed the vatican secretariat for the nonbelievers. the title of his preface succinctly illustrates the significance he attached to this exchange and to the renewed interest in religion: the question of god knocks again at our doors. although it is here not possible to provide an adequate overview of the various issues the two partners in the dialogue discussed, the last two letters touch on an issue that is directly relevant to the ratzinger-habermas debate as well; it is certainly of fundamental importance to believers and non-believers. while in the first three letters umberto eco takes the initiative and raises issues that range from the meaning and purpose of history, the beginning of human life and its protection, all the way to the role of women in the church, in the last exchange it is the cardinal who puts the question to eco. this question relates to the foundation and authority of ethics in the age of post-modern secularization and is put as follows: “what is the basis of the certainty and necessity for moral action of those who, in order to establish the absolute nature of an ethic, do not intend to appeal to metaphysical principles or transcendental values, or even to universally valid categorical imperatives?” he 2 reformulates it again and asks more specifically: “which reasons can someone adduce for his actions whose moral principles entail the possible sacrifice of his own life but who does not believe in a personal god?”2 martini emphasizes that his goal is not to “upset anyone’s conscience,” but to bring believers and nonbelievers closer in their cooperation towards a more humane world. as one critic remarked, martini frames his words without any sense of judgment or superiority, and it is very obvious that he has a genuine desire to understand secular humanism at its root level. he also expresses his hope that a common ground can be found on which the principle of human dignity could be based that would inspire, motivate, and morally guide the actions of people that may otherwise be separated by secular and religious divisions.3 eco’s response consists partly in exploring what he calls “semantic universals” or “elementary notions that are common to the entire human species and can be expressed in all languages.” from there he develops some kind of evolutionary ethics that has its foundational experience in the encounter with “the other.” he maintains that “the ethical dimension begins when the other appears on the scene” and when it dawns on the individual that nobody “should do to others what he does not wish to be done to him.” in our present context even more significant is eco’s description of what he calls his “lay religiosity,” as this offers a pre-religious yet foundational perspective on life that could be shared by secular and religious communities: “i firmly hold that there are forms of religiosity, and therefore a sense of the holy, of the limit, of questioning and of awaiting, of communion with something that transcends us, even in the absence of faith in a personal and provident divinity.” such a position is not that of an atheist, which for eco is simply the exchange of one form a belief with another (cf. the book’s italian title). or as he puts it: “i do not see how one can not believe in god, and hold that his existence cannot be proved, and then firmly believe in the nonexistence of god, holding that it can be proved.” instead, he regards himself more as an agnostic and this is another parallel to habermas. in allusion to max weber’s famous self-characterization, habermas too has called himself “religiously tone-deaf.” there is even a further similarity that is worth mentioning. the martini-eco exchange is not only respectful and filled with curiosity and even warmth, both authors are also “perfectly matched thinkers, gentlemen scholars with a genuine interest in what the other has to say” (allan b. ruch). i think the same can be said about the exchange between habermas and ratzinger. and a final observation applies to the habermas-ratzinger debate: as harvey cox in his introduction to the english translation of the letters between eco and martini remarked, “reading this book left me wanting more.” 2. more lines of communication and more was forthcoming when in 2002 the well-known italian journal of the leftist political spectrum micromega dedicated a whole issue to the thesis that contemporary philosophy is above all else interested in religion and seeks to engage itself in a dialogue with it. this thesis is then tackled by philosophers of various camps, but also by three theologians. one of them is the archbishop of chieti-vasti, bruno forte, the second the founder of a new monastery (bose, italy) enzo bianchi, and the third is no other than cardinal ratzinger. in the preface, he is introduced by the journal’s editor as the quintessential representative of catholic orthodoxy. ratzinger was apparently amused by the fact that his text would be included in a journal that usually accepts only articles by non-believers and that not long ago had published a harsh critique of the papal encyclical on the relationship between reason and 3 faith, ratio et fides, which is thought to be directly influenced by the cardinal’s views. ratzinger’s own interest in participating in the debate, however, is the prospect that religion can be brought back to the focus of intellectual discussion and that a broad-based discourse could be stimulated on the truth of the christian religion (per stimolare il dibattito sulla veritate della religione cristiana). it is no coincidence then that ever since ratzinger moved to rome as head of the congregation of faith he actively sought to open new avenues of communication with intellectuals inside and outside the church. his other important positions in the vatican, as long-time president of the international theological commission and as head of the papal committee entrusted with the new edition of the catechism of the catholic church (19861992), provided additional incentives for taking up the challenge of modernity and for expounding the christian message in a new language to the catholic faithful, critical theologians, and skeptical intellectuals. in an interview with a german journalist he revealed that he had made it some kind of condition of accepting his appointment as prefect of the congregation of faith and of giving up his beloved munich archdiocese that the pope would allow him to continue his scholarly work even in his new position and to publish as an ordinary theologian. as he confessed, he had secretly hoped that the pope could not consent to this condition. but to his surprise john paul ii. replied that although this request was rather unusual there were precedents and he would have to consult his advisers. when the pope’s response came and was positive, ratzinger had no longer an excuse to decline the pope’s request as he had done already once before when the pope had asked him to come to rome not longer after he had been installed as archbishop of munich. it is a sign of ratzinger’s international acclaim as theologian that in 1992 the academie des sciences morales et politiques at the institut de france, the highest academic institution in secular france besides the académie française, elected him as membre associé étranger. the title of his acceptance speech is highly programmatic as it indicates ratzinger’s desire for dialogue that bridges the fortified borders between the religious and the secular worlds: “the significance of religious and moral values in the pluralist society.”4 the list of books and papers taking up similar issues and reaching far beyond the confines of catholic theology is long and includes at least the following: “liberty, right, and the good: moral principles in democratic societies”, “political visions and praxis of politics” (2002), truth, values, power (1993). faith, truth, tolerance: christianity and world religions (2004). the small volume entitled: values in times of change became an instant bestseller in germany.5 3. the lambertini-voltaire debate: a remarkable historic precedent lastly, when ratzinger was elected pope and took the name benedict xvi. an even more significant historic parallel became available that can shed new light on the habermasratzinger debate. in choosing his papal name, ratzinger wanted his pontificate to be seen in line with his immediate predecessors of the same name and to carry their respective missions forward. benedict xv. (1854-1922) was the pope during world war i who condemned the use of poison gas as inhumane weapon and tried hard to mediate peace between the warring parties. although he failed, he steadfastly continued in his pacifist policy and soon after the war had ended, which he had already at its beginning called “the suicide of europe,” he wrote an encyclical (pacem, dei munus pulcherrimum) pleading for international reconciliation. his moral standing is reflected in the inscription to a monument in his honor that was in 1920 erected in a church courtyard in the turkish city of istanbul. it reads: “the great pope of world tragedy... the benefactor of all people, irrespective of nationality or religion.” 4 the intellectual similarity with benedict xiv (1675-1758), the former cardinal lambertini, is even more striking. prior to his elevation to pope he too was head of the congregation of faith, then still called the inquisition and had actively sought to establish a dialogue with the intellectual representatives of the 18th century, the self-conscious age of reason and enlightenment. as scholar, he was regarded as one of the most erudite men of his time. his excellent knowledge of literature and all sciences brought him into close and friendly contact with many famous authors, and in spite of some criticism he stated that his familiarity with the likes of tasso, dante and ariosto were a necessity for him as they gave energy to his thought and life to his style. in the enlightenment, belief was in rapid retreat and cardinal lambertini thought it was not enough for the church to be merely defensive. as an observer summed up his motives for dialogue, “if the church was to deal with a world in which active christians were in a minority, it needed to convince others of the importance of what it was saying. it could no longer do this by force, but needed to use argument and rationality. ”6 so lambertini corresponded with voltaire, the greatest philosopher of the french enlightenment, and maintained this dialogue when he became pope. as voltaire was not only the greatest philosopher of the french enlightenment but also the feared critic of absolutism and advocate of freedom of thought, particularly in matters of religion, lambertini’s intellectual exchange with him both as head of the inquisition and later as pope is all the more remarkable. against this historical backdrop, ratzinger’s choice of the papal name takes on a new and programmatic significance. ii. the context: religion and modernity in preparation of their munich debate, it had been agreed beforehand that habermas and ratzinger would reflect on the “pre-political moral foundations of the liberal state.”7 at issue was the authority, scope, and possible limit of secular reason as it originated in ancient greek philosophy and established itself as the dominant force of modernity in the west during the enlightenment period. its particular form of rationality, which found its most important expression in modern science and technology as well as in the liberal, democratic, and constitutional state, was not only credited with the mind’s liberation from self-wrought bondage and church tutelage, but was also thought to have no rival and thus to naturally extend its reign to non-western cultures and, finally, throughout the world. thus the triumph of science and technology was the triumph of secular reason. due to the specific interests of the two discussants, this very large issue was narrowed down to the question about the relationship between faith and reason in modern society and the role of religion in the secular state. in its more specific form, the question had first been raised in the late 1960's at the peak of the neo-marxist excitement in germany by a conservative legal philosopher, ernst wilhelm böckenförde, who later became an influential judge on germany’s highest constitutional court. for a moment it had looked as if the marxist utopian vision of a free and equal society exclusively based on rational and “scientific” foundations had come a decisive step closer to realization. and in such a society there would certainly be neither a need nor a place for religion, which would quickly disappear from the secular scene and fade into oblivion. the opponents to views of such heroic simplicity fell on hard times as their voices were drowned in the upheaval of streets protests, “sit-ins,” and “teach-ins” that greatly disrupted university life. while habermas’ neo-marxist leanings could easily be appropriated for the revolutionary cause, ratzinger always steered clear of the 5 theological sympathizers within the church and in his own faculty at tübingen. he became, however, completely disillusioned when he saw himself as a target of anti-religious slogans. he soon gave up his chair of dogmatics and went into some sort of internal emigration at the largely undisturbed and more quiet university in the city of regensburg. böckenförde, however, didn’t mind a fight and caused a huge outcry with his claim that in spite of appearances and neo-marxist wishful thinking the roots of the modern, secular state reached well below its supposed rational foundations. instead it depended on spiritual and moral resources it was unable to justify by its own means and within the perimeter of its own rationality. one of those taking up this challenge was jürgen habermas. it is therefore not without irony that after almost forty years he should again be confronted with the same question but now find himself in some sort of agreement not only with conservative philosophers but even with the most prominent representative of catholicism. 1. the tale of reason the munich debate took place within the larger historical context of the process of secularization that has defined the state-church relationship of modern european society. although this is mainly a socio-cultural but also a political phenomenon of european history, it generated a new, “liberated” form of rationality that found its clearest expression in modern technology and instrumental reason and as such has long extended its overwhelming influence around the globe. some of the cultural tensions the world is facing at present seem to have one of their causes in the conflicting responses to the implications of secularization. while no country rejects completely modern technology, religious (and sometimes also cultural) resistance against the dominating power of secular rationality is on the rise. a brief outline of the process of secularization that is the point of departure for the intellectual exchange between ratzinger and habermas may therefore be necessary so as to bring their debate into sharper profile. the story goes somewhat like this: at the beginning of modernity, the grand medieval synthesis of faith and reason, church and state, collapsed under its own ideological weight and left in the ruins not only three separate christian churches fighting for the superiority of their respective truth-claims but also invigorated reason that would soon leave churches and religion by the wayside. kant has famously illustrated this process in the image of the maid-servant and her mistress. in the past, reason as maid-servant to faith had walked behind her mistress humbly carrying her bridal gown. with the advent of modernity, however, she walked in front of her bearing the torch by whose light alone faith (religion) could set her foot forward without stumbling. yet the story quickly took a new turn even kant had not anticipated or if he did, he kept quiet about it. before long the maid would run off altogether leaving her former mistress in pitch darkness behind. after holding a grudge against her for a while and even turning hostile, finally, reason would forget about her as if she had never existed. then reason would bask in her own light on the assumption that it would shine ever brighter and gradually enlighten the whole world from west to east. in his best-selling book the secular city (1965), harvey cox defined secularization less dramatically as “the liberation of man from religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from other worlds and toward this one.” secularization then is the process of socio-cultural change in which religion loses cognitive and social significance. in its extreme form of secularism the complete abolition of religion is advocated and the 6 transfer of its functions to secular agencies.8 typical of such functionalist theories of religion originating from the philosophies of feuerbach, marx, and nietzsche is their attempt to reduce the basic religious experience to something other than what religious people say it is referring to. thus religion is no longer supposed to relate man to god as in fact there are no such “things” as transcendence, the absolute, or god. consequently, reference to anything that cannot be translated into the language of secular rationality is illusory and the likely product of some complex mechanism of otherwise ”natural” forces that sooner or later will find their rational explanation. depending on the theoretical approach, these forces have variously been identified as economic, psychological, social, or cultural. they were thought to have disguised themselves so cleverly that the naive mind could be misled to take them for something real beyond this world, something that was religious in the full sense of the word. 2. religion within the bounds of reason in habermas’ analysis, the greatest achievement of modernity is the liberal state of equal citizens enjoying the same freedoms, in principle, under the constitutional protection of secular law. this state is the historic result of the religious wars at the dawn of modernity and of the collapse of the authority of comprehensive doctrines of religious or metaphysical provenance. in the functional analysis of religion in his theory of communicative action,9 habermas had argued that whereas in the past religion had provided legitimacy to state authority both in legal and moral terms, in modernity this function has been absorbed into secular reason. thus invalidated religious world views first gave way to metaphysical world views which then evolved into rational discourses at various levels, above all scientific, legal, and moral. the liberal state of equal citizens is based on religiously neutral ground and is required to hold equal distance to churches and religious communities. the conduct of and the participation in its affairs requires a commitment to exclusively public reasons open to all. secular morality is therefore expected to result from the rational consensus about principles of universalistic ethics on the sole basis of the stronger arguments. it is the characteristic of post-metaphysical thought that it has neither the authority of absolute truth previous religious and metaphysical world-views had claimed nor the means to achieving it. instead it proceeds on the premise of “methodological atheism,” which for the secular state translates into religious neutrality. by and large, habermas continues to hold on to this narrative. yet with the ever-accelerating progression of modernity, he seems ready to admit that the story of modernity has been written in too broad strokes and that the time has come for a more detailed inspection and re-examination. with this assessment, ratzinger can concur, albeit for rather different reasons. while he would not accept the role religion has been assigned in the process of modernity, he agrees with habermas’ assessment that “the derailment of modernity” has become a real possibility with frightening implications. if i am not mistaken he then goes even further by claiming that it is not only a real possibility but has already become manifest reality. on this reading, modernity is not simply in crisis, but has veered off its original track and begun to run wild. habermas, however, has taken refuge in the belief that at least some of the problems modernity has presented us with are merely indications of the fact that it has not fully completed its task yet but remains an “unfinished project.” while the project of modernity certainly requires re-examination and adjustment, it has no viable alternative and still holds the promise of being able to cope by secular means with the dark forces of its own making. though habermas, on his premise of methodological atheism, cannot enlist religion in the 7 service of reason, the re-assessment of the historical genealogy of modernity as well as the recognition of the factual re-emergence of religion within the secularized world have sharpened his intellectual sensitivity for religion and prompted him to redefine its role in the liberal state as well as the state’s responsibility towards religion. iii. shared perspectives for any discourse to be meaningful there needs to be some kind of common ground and a minimum of shared convictions. in spite of all their differences, i see three major areas where habermas and ratzinger found some kind of “overlapping consensus” in their debate about the relationship between faith and reason. 1. the challenge of re-emerging religion the first area of agreement relates to the fact that religion is still alive and well even in the secular west. not only does it pose a new challenge to the liberal state, it offers also valuable resources society can hardly ignore. the recognition of the factual survival and even reemergence of religion within secular modernity is taken at the theoretical level as a strong argument for its right of existence. ratzinger’s critical question whether the previously advocated gradual abolition of religion was indeed a necessary condition of humankind’s progress10 has found its answer. not only has religion a right to exist in modernity but it even has a positive role to play in it. habermas concurs and notes that it was the assumption of a common human reason that provides the epistemic base for the justification of a secular state, which no longer depends on religion. the surprising “political revitalization of religion at the heart of western society” requires a review of the epistemic relationship between secular reason and religion. while statistical evidence suggests that the wave of secularization affected all european countries since the end of world war ii and brought forth social modernization, in the united states the comparatively large proportion of devout and politically active christians has remained the same over the last sixty years.11 the re-emergence of religion in a supposedly secular world is a challenge to habermas’ conception of modernity. it prompted him to reconsider modernity’s, which he, following hegel, had seen culminating in self-consciousness, self-determination, and selfrealization. now, habermas pays greater attention to the implications of the judaeo-christian origin of those fundamental ideas for modernity. on habermas’ interpretation, modernity is the result of a process of secularization that liberated the cognitive core of those ideas from church domination and the political powers of religion.12 self-consciousness is founded on the increasing reflexivity that absorbed the substance of rigid cultural traditions into the domain of reason. self-determination is the result of egalitarian and individualist universalism and its vindication in law and morality. self-realization evolves through the internal pressures arising from the demands on the individual to take charge of one’s own fate. in a recent interview habermas summarized his re-interpretation of the driving forces in modernity: “for the normative self-understanding of modernity, christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct legacy of the judaic ethic of justice and the christian ethic of love.” 8 in other words, both “athens” and “jerusalem” have played important roles in western thought and both have contributed to the modern emphasis on individualism, freedom, autonomy, and justice. it is above all the christian legacy that provided the ideological foundations for the human rights discourse. yet, christianity owes it to modernity to take cultural diversity into serious account, and to apply these formal ideals worldwide without coercion. ratzinger, by contrast, can take a more relaxed attitude towards the genealogical aspect of modernity as it seems to confirm new testament theology comparing christian ideas with the yeast that is gradually permeating and transforming the dough into nourishing bread. on this reading, the effects of the christian message are not restricted to the church but extend into secular society, which in turn cannot be fully understood without taking into account its christian heritage. however, the effects of christianity, above all on morality and the human rights discourse, remain necessarily “anonymous” and therefore cannot be a substitute for explicit faith within the ecclesial community of believers. the necessity of explicit faith and, by implication, of continuous evangelization marked the line that already in the 1960s divided ratzinger’s theology of salvation from karl rahner’s theological doctrine of the anonymous christian. while rahner thought a more constructive relationship not only between christianity and modernity but also between christianity and the other religions was possible and could be developed from the theology of creation, ratzinger, together with his theological friend (and later cardinal), hans urs von balthasar, insisted on a clear separation between the christian and all non-christian (religious and secular) realms. it is, however, remarkable that ratzinger and habermas concur in their views of the potential for danger inherent in religion. the fact of the survival of religion and its invigoration in modernity is ambivalent as it may unleash highly destructive forces that threaten civilized society and endanger humanity. both link contemporary examples of the destructive potential of religion to fundamentalist movements and their disregard of reason that leads to an uncompromising rejection of the liberal pluralist state in favor of some form of theocracy. these fundamentalist and reactionary movements threaten to replace the secular world with a counter-modernity of their own making. 2. the challenge of instrumental reason a second area of consensus between habermas and ratzinger can be found in their acknowledgment of the tremendous risks mankind is facing at this historical juncture. both discussants see morally unrestricted “instrumental reason” as one of root-causes of the grave uncertainties that cast long shadows on the achievements of modern science and technology. while for ratzinger those problems are symbolized in the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, habermas, on various occasions, has expressed his concern with regard to social and moral challenges arising from tensions between the progressive forces of modernity and traditional values. one area where this tension is particularly evident is biotechnology. it apparently were as we may recall his recent publications on this subject that caught ratzinger’s attention. the new technologies in the life-sciences and their penetration into all areas of human life have begun to change the parameters that previously defined the realm of nature. they even extend their naturalistic and scientistic interpretations to the human person and to human self-understanding. in particular, genetic intervention at the genomic level raises the fear that the resulting human product would have lost the fundamental freedoms constituent of human personhood.13 similarly, ratzinger fears that the human being is in 9 danger of being turned into a commodity, which would have lost any sense of mystery associated with creation. the temptation will arise to see in such product no more than raw material for social construction that can be discarded if it loses its functional value.14 doubts about the unchecked progress of modernity arise further from the scope and pace of economic globalization and unfettered capitalism. in his acceptance of the prestigious peace-prize of the german publishers association, habermas observed that “the economic language pervades everything and forces all interpersonal relationships into a pattern that orientates everything exclusively on individual preferences. the social bond, however, consisting in reciprocal recognition of free individuals transcends the concepts of contract, rational choice, and the maximization of usefulness.”15 in another context he notes that the previous balance in the division of labor between the integrative mechanism of the marketplace, bureaucracy, and societal solidarity no longer exists and that it has been replaced by an economic imperative that is exclusively focused on economic success of disenfranchised, competing individuals.16 lastly, the far-reaching changes in society’s value structure and ethical outlook pose the risk of the total collapse of moral norms and an increasing erosion of moral consciousness. indications are the gradual disappearance of “sensitivities to social pathologies” and the growing inability to see any meaning in the question about the “good life”, or its opposite: whether life can be wrong and meaningless (verfehltes leben). it is remarkable that habermas should now pay specific attention to the substantive question of a good life as his own ethical theory had avoided it and instead focused on procedural mechanisms for the consensual recognition of formal moral principles. as the changes evolved from within the parameters of secular reason, modernity is not only under threat from outside, i.e. pre-modern religion, but also from inside. and it looks as if it could soon be “derailed” by its own ever accelerating forces of progress and advancement for the sake of advancement. habermas is fully aware that no post-metaphysical philosophy can adequately address these fundamental concerns and provide the answers. philosophy within the confines of modernity has lost the ground upon which authoritative answers were once constructed that were both authentic and consoling. in other words, philosophy is no longer in command of reasons that once distinguished a holistic world-view that at the same time could motivate right actions and meet the existential expectations of individuals for a meaningful life within a meaningful universe. the church-dominated world of faith, which provided normative guidance in all contexts of life has not been able to withstand the challenge of enlightened and critical reason and has collapsed into a plurality of competing “comprehensive doctrines” and moralities. yet secular reason emerging victoriously from the ruins may now have arrived at its own limits or even at a dead end. 3. the challenge of the two cultures habermas and ratzinger agree, thirdly, in their evaluation that contemporary society holds the chance of a new openness on both sides of the divide, secular and religious, for a reassessment of the cognitive roles of the fundamental religious conceptions in secular discourse. habermas’s re-examination of the genealogy of modernity has set a precedent for the positive recognition of non-secular moral and intellectual resources and of their reintegration into modern society. and ratzinger too acknowledges interculturality as an indispensable dimension in any debate on the foundations of humanity.17 the cardinal concedes that the search for true humanity cannot be undertaken exclusively on the premises of christianity, and this is a remarkable statement by the roman 10 official at the helm of congregation of faith. yet he subsequently adds that they cannot be undertaken exclusively on the premises of secular reason either. christianity and the tradition of secular reason represent two distinct cultures both of which have defined the western world but mainly the western world. in spite of their theoretical claim for universality, both traditions have to recognize that other cultures outside their perimeters have factually remained as yet unmoved by their advances. ratzinger refers to the cultures of islam, buddhism, and hinduism as well as tribal cultures of africa, which challenge not only the revelatory claims of christianity but also secular rationality in spite of experiencing within their own respective societies similar tensions as the culture of secular reason. with this interpretation of the tradition of secular reason in terms of culture, the cardinal undercuts habermas’s universality claim for a common secular reason and reduces it to the claim of one particular culture among others. christianity’s new openness for secular reason is therefore defined by a position of strength, not weakness. when both discussants advocate a new readiness to listen to each other in good faith and to learn from each other’s thoughts and intuitions, they in fact advocate different things. for habermas it means that secular reason has to attempt to appropriate pre-conditional constituents of sound rationality that lie outside its purview. the universality claim of secular reason is upheld as it recognizes no rival to its authority. strictly speaking, the tradition of secular reason is not simply one culture among others but rather provides all cultures their rational foundation. habermas therefore had to reject the idea raised by a colleague at a meeting with philosophers in teheran that secular rationality may represent nothing more than one particular system or culture (sonderweg) among other cultures or systems of truth. while habermas thus has to clearly separate the realms of faith and of reason, he accepts that in today’s secular world of cultural pluralism there is a greater need than in the past for reflection on the conditions of peaceful cooperation between citizens of a liberal constitutional state. ratzinger, on the other hand, seems comfortable with the idea of comprehensive pluralism as for him the controversy among the various cultures, including the culture of secular rationality, about the respective claims for universality and truth has not yet been settled. in his perspective of multi-culturalism, the tradition of secular reason represents only one possible approach to truth within human history and this tradition is in need of correction through religion. ratzinger’s more relaxed attitude towards the divide between reason and faith is, of course, grounded in a theology of creation, which derives all good from god, and reason is neither an exception nor a natural opponent to faith. from such perspective, the liberal, democratic state is not the antagonist to the church earlier theology had suggested. instead it is rather the neutral framework within which various “comprehensive doctrines” can find their places. ratzinger therefore argues for a “necessary correlationality of reason and faith, reason and religion so that they both are called to mutual purification and therapy.” both are in demand of each other and must recognize each other in their respective roles. this is particularly necessary as both, religion and reason, can become distorted and defective. ratzinger recognizes the possibility of highly dangerous pathologies of religion, which currently unleash their disastrous potential in religiously inspired terrorism or more exactly in terrorism that claims for itself religious roots and motivations that resonate within the fundamentalist religious spectrum. the catholic doctrine of reason as lumen naturale provides powerful conceptual means for ideological purification and therapy. for ratzinger and in accordance with a long tradition, reason serves in a dual-function as critical assessment of and as constructive advisor 11 to religion, and both functions are grounded in the theology of creation. reason therefore is not only the natural light that shines into human darkness so that even outside the realm of revelation truth can be found. as ratzinger points out, reason is above all “the divine light,” which illuminates religion and which can and must be utilized within religion and for its own purification. in as far as the natural light of reason is at the same time the divine light this presupposes a conception that correlates reason and nature in and through their common origin in god’s creation. this gives ratzinger ground for his claim that in as far as faith and reason are correlative and to the extent that reason itself can go astray it needs faith as its limiting and corrective force. while this position far exceeds what habermas can grant from his own agnostic perspective and on the basis of secular modernity, he not only sees a positive role for religion within modernity but also holds that the secular state needs religion. and that is something really remarkable and merits further exploration. 4. peaceful cooperation both discussants concur that any conflict between cultures must be resolved by means of the better arguments and with respect for other conscientious convictions. on this latter point, habermas has more to say than the cardinal. although in the present context it is not possible to provide his full and detailed argument, a few remarks may at least indicate the direction in which his thought on this subject recently has evolved. firstly, habermas assumes that philosophical reason can play a maieutic role in mediating in the dispute between the conflicting comprehensive doctrines and holistic worldviews. he assigns to philosophy the role of interpreter of the substantive life-plans that unite and separate the christian faithful, the believers in other religions, and the non-believers. philosophy is thought to be able to assist in a discourse whose aim it is to find sufficient commonalities for the establishment of a peaceful society on shared moral ground. while philosophy may draw on its analytical abilities in the service of enlightened reason, it must avoid any attitude of superiority and supposedly greater insight. secondly, taking his point of departure in a critical review of rawls’ concept of “the duty of civility,” habermas holds that it would be neither fair nor necessary to demand of politically engaged religious citizens to suppress their personal religious convictions in favor of exclusively “secular reasons.” such demand would ignore the integral role religion plays in the life of persons of faith. it is therefore a matter of fairness that the liberal, democratic state should not place a greater burden on the shoulders of religious citizens by demanding of them to ignore their religious world views. it is therefore a matter of fairness that both sides ought to be open-minded and sensitive to other people’s world-views. whereas religious citizens may make public contributions in their own religious language provided that they are presented so that secular citizens can grasp their meaning, secular citizens must not close their minds to the possible truth content of such presentations and even enter into dialogues from which religious reasons then might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible arguments.18 i note in passing that this issue presents another context from which the question of the specific status of secular reason could arise and demand further scrutiny. from ratzinger’s perspective one could argue that it was an illusion to simply regard secularization as formal and procedural and in tune with culture-independent reason. if, however, secular rationality too would have to be understood in cultural terms, the principle of procedural neutrality would conflict with the de-facto privilege the secular position holds in the west. in 12 other words, the question of the epistemic status of faith and reason remains unsettled. iv. concordant discord in spite of fundamental differences, it is encouraging to see the two discussants engaged in the honest search for common ground from which resources can be drawn in defense of a shared conception of humanity and human dignity. while habermas continues to hold on to an agnostic position that respects the dividing line between faith and reason and steers clear of any cognitive assessment of religious, or christian truth-claims, he acknowledges that the religious and in particular the christian tradition offers highly important resources for secular citizens and the modern world in general. he displays great sensitivity for fundamental concepts in the christian spiritual tradition whose recovery for secular modernity has become a matter of urgency in the face of the continued erosion of its own moral resources. habermas regards it as one of the major roles of philosophy in modernity to translate religious statements into non-religious propositions, i.e. public reasons that carry relevant validity claims without requiring a metaphysical foundation. while he has long committed himself to this sort of translation, he has now become more sensitive to the question of whether such translation is indeed possible without remainder. put positively, the question is whether religion may have something substantial to say that must remain elusive for secular modernity. although habermas resists post-modern temptations and does not waver in his belief that modernity is the process of liberation from self-wrought immaturity and bondage and not a disastrous development that should be undone, he recognizes that in this process something important was lost and that it is one of the roles of philosophy to seek to salvage as much as possible from the wreckage. the way to do this is to translate substantive religious concepts into the parlance of secular reason. habermas holds out the hope that in this way philosophy can contribute to the re-integration of at least some of the religious resources into modern consciousness, albeit in the form of sensibilities, motives, and ideas that are accessible to public reason. in this task he locates himself in the tradition of hegel whose genealogical approach sought to decode the highly suggestive narratives and enigmatic messages of the great worldreligions so that they could be integrated into the universal history of the mind and the phenomenology of the spirit. habermas not only believes that such an approach is still possible today but also that it is highly necessary. he is convinced that the religious heritage contains insights, intuitions, expressive possibilities, and forms of interpersonal behavior that modernity could neglect only to its own disadvantage and which deserve to be reintroduced into the communicative system of contemporary society. what is required is not so much the whole-sale readmission of those religious insights into the system of communicative reason but their transformation into publicly accessible concepts and motivations. examples of a successful transformation habermas finds in secular concepts such as “positivity,” “alienation,” and “reification” whose religious origins are associated with the narratives about sin, the fall of humankind, and the loss of paradise as well as with the prohibition to form an image of god (bilderverbot). in the light of these secularized religious ideas the triumph of modernity under the sign of capitalism takes on a new look as it is illuminated from the perspective of a religiously motivated longing for meaning that transcends the economic sphere. the critical application of such ideas has removed the veil of normality that had long covered the social conditions of modern life: “kant, hegel, and marx made secular consciousness feel the sting 13 of the religious heritage.”19 while they appropriated religious concepts and ideas for philosophy and utilized them for the progress and liberation of humankind, kierkegaard took the opposite position by criticizing secular reason from the perspective of faith and religious reason. he confronted post-metaphysical thought with the unbridgeable heterogeneity of a faith that rigorously denies the birthright of anthropocentric modernity. thus he pointed to something that from the perspective of secular reason must remain hidden and inaccessible. yet it preserves something that is of the highest importance to secular philosophy: the insight in its own limitations. habermas compares the encounter between philosophy and religion, between knowledge and faith, to the aesthetic experience, which is similarly part of human life, although it is inaccessible to any rationalistic interpretation. philosophy can only circle around (umkreisen) the concept of the transcendent and point to the abyss out of which those utopian energies emerge that motivate our longing for the realization of the “highest good” or the “kingdom of god.” philosophy, however, can successfully translate religious content into its own language only as long as it is conscious of what it is doing: that it is and remains in the service of reason and knowledge and is aware of the unbridgeable gulf that separates it from revelation and faith. habermas is convinced that any attempt to reduce the one to the other or to blur the dividing line will inevitably lead to the collapse of both. but philosophy has a further and perhaps even more crucial role to play with regard to religion and faith. though it would be unreasonable to assume that the cognitive substance and content of religion has been exhausted and did not deserve to be recovered through secular translation, such translation is possible only to a point. habermas is aware that religious content may resist such translation and that not all of its substance can be recovered in secular language. instead of dismissing this remainder as insignificant, as some of his liberal colleagues would advise, habermas is remarkably sensitive to the semantic connotations of religious concepts and to their significance for secular modernity. he acknowledges, for example, that when sin was transformed into guilt, something was lost, and this has to do with the longing for forgiveness that is accompanied by the unsentimental wish that suffering caused to others may be made undone. this is different from any form of secular remembrance of the victims and even from walter benjamin’s belief in its therapeutic power since in the words of adorno the slain are really slain, and nothing can put past injustice right. only religion holds out the hope that past suffering of the just is not in vain and, as kant acknowledged, that the worthiness of happiness arising from moral action may be rewarded with true happiness in a life to come. thus the lost hope in resurrection leaves a tangible emptiness in modern secularization when it is confronted with the irreversibility of past suffering and with the injustice of abusing, denigrating, and murdering the innocent. the magnitude of such suffering exceeds any secular, humanly possible forms of restitution and compensation. while philosophy thus cannot be a substitute of religion and religious worldviews, it has nevertheless a positive role to play. it needs to keep the empty space once occupied by religion empty as a constant reminder of the loss incurred so that hope may still arise. in this assessment habermas comes remarkably close to the iconoclastic theology of the old testament, which anxiously sought to preserve yahweh’s place in the world by keeping it empty. with this interpretation of the relationship between reason and faith the cardinal can fully agree. i conclude with two quotations from an article in which ratzinger looks back on one of his most important early books, introduction to christianity, and writes as follows: 14 “today, after the horrors of the [twentieth-century] totalitarian regimes, the problem of theodicy urgently and mightily demands the attention of us all; this is just one more indication of how little we are capable of defining god, much less fathoming him. after all, god’s answer to job explains nothing, but rather sets boundaries to our mania for judging everything and being able to say the final word on a subject, and reminds us of our limitations. it admonishes us to trust the mystery of god in its incomprehensibility.” and further: “the mystical dimension of the concept of god, which the asian religions bring with them as a challenge to us, must clearly be decisive for our thinking, too, and for our faith. god has become quite concrete in christ, but in this way his mystery has also become still greater. god is always infinitely greater than all our concepts and all our images and names.”20 references: 15 1 roma: atlantide editoriale s.p.a.; engl. transl. belief or nonbelief? umberto eco and cardinal carlo maria martini, new york: arcade publishing, 1999. 2 translated from the german edition: carlo maria martini, umberto eco, woran glaubt wer nicht glaubt?, münchen: dtv, 1999. 3 ibid., p. 80. 4 communio: international catholic review, 21(1992), pp. 500-512. 5 joseph ratzinger: wahrheit, werte, macht. prüfsteine der pluralistischen gesellschaft. freiburg: herder 1993; neuausgabe 1999; glaube, wahrheit, toleranz. 4. aufl., freiburg: herder, 2005; werte in zeiten des umbruchs. freiburg: herder, 2005. 6 harold james, “a pope devoted to a dialogue on values.” financial times, 20april 2005. 7 joseph ratzinger, jürgen habermas, dialektik der säkularisierung: über vernunft und religion. freiburg: herder, 2005, p.13. 8 for a comprehensive analysis of the religious and theological implications: gerhold k. becker, neuzeitliche subjektivität und religiosität. regensburg: pustet, 1982. 9 jürgen habermas, the theory of communicative action. boston, ma: beacon press, 1984/1987. 10 joseph ratzinger, jürgen habermas, dialektik der säkularisierung: über vernunft und religion. freiburg: herder, 2005, p.47. 11 jürgen habermas, “religion in the public square”, paper presented at international conference on philosophy and religion, university of lodz, poland, 2004. a revised version of this paper is: “religion in der öffentlichkeit.” in: jürgen habermas, zwischen naturalismus und religion. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2005, pp. 119-154. a collection of papers on similar topics has been published in english in 2002 by mit press, cambridge, mass. entitled: religion and rationality: essays on reason, god, and modernity. 12 jürgen habermass, “die grenzen zwischen glauben und wissen. zur wirkungsgeschichte und aktuellen bedeutung von kants religionsphilosophie.“ in: jürgen habermas, zwischen naturalismus und religion. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2005, pp. 216-275, 247. 13 jürgen habermas, glauben und wissen. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2001. 14 joseph ratzinger, jürgen habermas, dialektik der säkularisierung: über vernunft und religion. freiburg: herder, 2005, p.47. 15 jürgen habermas, glauben und wissen. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2001 (quoted from the internet version www.dizmuenchen.de a013.167.547v2.03 [2001-08-01]; my translation). 16 jürgen habermas, “die grenzen zwischen glauben und wissen, ” op. cit., p. 247. 17 cf. dialektik der säkularisierung, op. cit., p. 53. 18 jürgen habermas, “religion in der öffentlichkeit.” in: jürgen habermas, zwischen naturalismus und religion. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2005, pp. 119-154. see also his paper in the same volume: “religiöse toleranz als schrittmacher kultureller rechte,” pp. 258-278, particularly pp. 268-271. 19 jürgen habermas, “die grenzen zwischen glauben und wissen, ” op. cit., p. 251. 20 joseph ratzinger, “introduction to christianity: yesterday, today, and tomorrow.” communio: international catholic review 31 (fall 2004), pp. 481-495, p. 492. see also: joseph ratzinger, einführung in das christentum. 6. aufl., münchen: kösel, 2000. 190-note for authors the dialogue between religions and cultures george f. mclean catholic university of america abstract this paper will survey how western philosophy turned almost from its beginning to the objective dimension, which it developed ever more intensively through much of its history; and second, to watch more closely the restoration of the dimension of subjectivity and the way in which this in turn has most recently given new access to the cultures of people. thirdly it will look at the way in which the history of religious awareness both undergirds this history of philosophy, and manifests a parallel dynamic. in this light it will be possible finally to analyze how the relation between religions and cultures can be a key to an harmonious progress of peoples at a global level and in south east asia. objectivity and the history of western philosophy and culture that the religious dimension of life be taken as an absolute point of reference has been foundational for all cultures as far back as we can track. thus in its earliest totemic form, human understanding in terms of the external senses and the corresponding social organization, was structured in relation to some one reality whether animate or inanimate. this one was not itself subject to being used, as were all other things, but rather was treated with the greatest reverence as the key to the meaning of the whole of reality and each of its parts. to dishonor or abuse this one in any way to break a taboo was the ultimate crime and unless corrected was considered to be destructive, not only for the individual but also for the welfare of the whole society.1 prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 34-59 © 2000 by assumption university press 34 with the progress of human consciousness in the development of the imagination as an internal sense, these codes of honor and taboos evolved into mythic forms. these unfolded the inherent sense of the one totem as a key to all reality, into a pattern of gods identified either as nature, or as the parts of nature. their hierarchy culminated in a highest god, or in a community of gods, who consciously directed and judged all of life.2 it was against this background that the history of philosophy in the west began with the development of the ability to think not only in terms of what can be sensed by the external senses (totem) or imaged by the internal sense (myth), but what could be directly or formally known in its own term according to the intellect. this is particularly indicative for our issue of religion and culture, for just as totemic thought was centered in an absolute one, and mythic thought structured in terms of a family of gods, now philosophy proper as opened by thales, and the metaphysics as initiated by parmenides in his poem, was built on a similar insight. it argued rigorously that being would not differ from nonbeing unless it were ultimately one without beginning or change, intelligent and intelligible.3 thus human thought at the totemic mythic and philosophical levels was founded in the one absolute reality. all of life is shaped and inspired according to these norms. this was so much the case that when any vision arose which seemed to threaten this key to social life as with socrates in greece or christianity later in rome it was effectively proposed that they needed to be eliminated for the welfare of the community as a whole. indeed it is first here that western thought took a decisive turn. seeing its own need for norms and orientation it proceeded to make the virtues which socrates sought into stable things like stars in the firmament according to which people could guide their lives. thus plato gave them the ontological status of things, ideas existing at another level or in another world beyond the reach of humans. they were unable to be shaped by human history, and able only to provide stable guidance as norms of the human good. in the great monotheisms of judaism, christianity and islam people were then challenged to live in tune with this principle of unity, truth and goodness. it came indeed to be understood as creator and saviour in intimate interaction with a humankind created in its image, serving as its george f. mclean 35 vice regent, and even in christianity sharing in human and divine nature through the incarnation. subjectivity and the emergence of culture there remained, however, something inconvenient for human pride, as man was increasingly subject to the objectively higher one, which could never be exhaustively understood or manipulated. hence, in the reformation and renaissance which initiated the modern period, an effort was made to reduce the field of vision and focus on objects which could be grasped clearly and distinctly; all else was removed from consideration. not god and infinite truth, but only human reason would be the measure of all. our world became not what man could do with the infinite truth and love of the creator the world of nature inhabited by man but what he could construct in terms which to him would have the clarity and certainty of science. this would be not the living world of nature and human beings, but the artificial world of robots and mechanics, the economic structures of profit and exploitation, and the political world of power and hegemonic suppression. intentionality to read this history negatively, as in the last paragraph, is, however, only part of the truth. it depicts a simple and total collapse of technical reason acting alone and as self sufficient. but is there more to human consciousness and hence to philosophy? if so, to use the analogy of the replacement of a tooth in childhood, it is not so much the old tooth that is falling out which is important, but the strength of the new tooth that is replacing it. a few philosophers did point to this other dimension of human awareness. shortly after descartes, pascal's assertion "le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connâit pas" (the heart has its reasons which reason does not know) remains a significant insight even if it was unheeded at the time. the same was true of vico's prediction that the new reason would give birth to a generation of brutes intellectual brutes, but 36 prajñâ vihâra brutes nonetheless. later, kierkegaard would follow hegel with a similar warning. none of these voices would have strong impact during an era where the human race was intent on "conquering" the world by a supposed omni-sufficient objective scientific reason. but as human problems mounted the adequacy of reason to handle the deepest problems of human dignity and transcendent purpose came under sustained questioning; greater attention was given to additional, in particular subjective, dimensions of human capabilities. one might well ask which came first, the public sense of human challenge or the corresponding philosophical reflection and insight; or were they in fact one -the philosophical insight being the reflective dimension of the human concern? in any case, one finds a striking parallel between social experience and philosophy in this century. from the extreme totalitarian and exploitative repression of the person by fascism and communism in the 1930s there followed the progressive liberation of the person from fascism in world war ii, from colonial exploitation in the 1950s and 60s, from social marginalization as minorities in the 1970s, and from marxism in the 1980s. like a new tooth the emergence of the person has been consistent and persistent. this has had a strikingly parallel development in philosophy. at the beginning of this century it appeared that the rationalist project of stating all in clear and distinct objective terms was close to completion. this was to be achieved in either the empirical terms of the positivist tradition of sense knowledge or in the formal and essentialist terms of the kantian intellectual tradition. whitehead wrote that at the turn of the century, when with bertrand russell he went to the first world congress of philosophy in paris, it seemed that, except for some details of application, the work of physics had been essentially completed. to the contrary, however, the very attempt to finalize scientific knowledge with its most evolved concepts made manifest the radical insufficiency of the objectivist approach and led to renewed appreciation of the important role of subjectivity in knowledge. to be more precise, wittgenstein began by writing his tractatus logico-philosophicus 4 on the lockean supposition that significant knowledge consisted in constructing a mental map corresponding point to point to the external world as perceived by sense experience. in such a project george f. mclean 37 the spiritual element of understanding the grasp of the relations between the points on this mental map and the external world was relegated to the margin as simply "unutterable". later experience in teaching children, however, led wittgenstein to the conclusion that this empirical mental mapping was simply not what was going on in human knowledge. in his blue and brown books5 and his subsequent philosophical investigations 6 wittgenstein shifted human consciousness or intentionality, which previously had been relegated to the periphery, to the very the center of concern. the focus of his philosophy was no longer the positivist, supposedly objective, replication of the external world, but the human construction of language and of worlds of meaning. a similar process was underway on the continent of europe. there edmund husserl's attempt to bracket all elements, in order to isolate pure essences for scientific knowledge, forced attention to human intentionality and to the limitations of a pure essentialism. this opened the way for his understudy, martin heidegger, to rediscover the existential and historical dimensions of reality in his being and time.7 the religious implications of this new sensitivity would be articulated by karl rahner in his work, spirit in the world,8 and by the second vatican council in its constitution, the church in the world.9 for heidegger the meaning of being and of life was unveiled and emerged the two processes were identical in conscious human life (dasein), lived through time and therefore through history. thus human consciousness became the new focus of attention. the uncovering or bringing into light (the etymology of the term "phe-nomen-ology") of the unfolding patterns and interrelations of subjectivity would open a new era of human awareness. epistemology and metaphysics would develop and merge in the very work of tracking the nature and direction of this process. thus, for heidegger's successor, hans-georg gadamer,10 the task becomes uncovering how human persons, emerging as family, neighborhood and people, by exercising their creative freedom weave their cultural tradition. this is not history as a mere compilation of whatever humankind does or makes, but culture as the fabric of the human consciousness and symbols by which a human group unveils being in its time. the result is a dramatic inversion. before all began from above 38 prajñâ vihâra and flowed downward whether in structures of political power or of abstract reasoning. progressing into the new millennium, attention now focuses rather upon developing the exercise of the interior creative freedom of the intentionality of a people in and as civil society as a new and responsible partner with government and business in the continuing effort toward the realization of the common good.11 this is manifest in the shift in the agenda of the united nations from the cold war debates between economic systems and their political powers to the great people's conferences of rio on the environment, in cairo on family, in beijing on women. the agenda is no longer reality as objectively quantifiable and conflicting, but the more difficult and meaningful one of human life as lived consciously with its issues of human dignity, values and cultural interchange. what does this mean for philosophy? the philosopher's index for 1970 had only 32 books or articles on culture. in 1980 the philosopher's index carried 120 listing on the subject. by 1998, however, there were 300 listing on culture and an additional 100 on values, with almost the same number on hermeneutics. soon on gadamer alone there were well over 1000 entries. if marx spoke famously of standing hegel on his head, in our lifetime the same has happened quite literally for the entire field of philosophy; the theme of the 2008 world congress of philosophy: "rethinking philosophy in a global age." the more integral human horizon now situates the objective issues of power and profit in a context of human intentionality or subjectivity. this calls most urgently upon philosophy to develop new ways of thinking and interpreting which can enable people to engage more consciously and freely, more responsibly and broadly, these new dimensions of life emergent as the interchange of cultures and civilizations of a global age. done well this can be an historic step ahead for humanity; done poorly it can produce a new round of human conflict and misery. with this new interior insight into the working of human consciousness it is as if a whole new world opens before us as we become self aware of the free inclinations and decisions by which we open our own horizons and the preferences and commitments by which we shape the terrain of our life and mobilize its forces in its relations and engagements. values george f. mclean 39 the drama of free self-determination, and hence the development of persons and of civil society, is most fundamentally a matter of being as affirmation or a definitive stance against non-being as seen above in the work of parmenides, the first greek metaphysician. this is identically the relation to the good in search of which we live, survive and thrive. the good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent.12 basically, it is what completes life; it is the "per-fect", understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through. hence, once achieved, it is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. this is reflected progressively in the manner in which each level of reality, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has, and resists reduction to non-being or nothing. the most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else; we cannot annihilate it. similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. finally, an animal protects its life -fiercely, if necessary -and seeks out the food needed for its strength. this, in turn, as capable of contributing to an animal's sustenance and perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means. in this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the well-being of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. as these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its achievement. hence, goods are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. in this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others. the moral good is a more narrow field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. this has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to one's own perfection and to that of others and, indeed, to the physical universe and to god as well. hence, many possible patterns 40 prajñâ vihâra of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or mis-ordered. this constitutes the objective basis for what is ethically good or bad. nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost innumerable, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. however broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral a human act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the things involved. in addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization. the term 'value' here is of special note. it was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. this is reflected also in the term 'axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." it requires an objective content -the good must truly "weigh in" and make a real difference; but the term 'value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.13 thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. a people or community is sensitive to, and prizes, a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. by so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors the corporate free choices of that people. this constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. it constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods or values which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. young persons peer out at the world through lenses formed, as it were, by their family and george f. mclean 41 culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history often in its most trying circumstances. like a pair of glasses, values do not create the object; but focus attention upon certain goods rather than upon others. this becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional life described by the scotts, adam ferguson and adam smith, as the heart of civil society. in time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values. through this process a group constitutes its concerns in terms of which it struggles to advance, or at least to endure, mourn its failures, and celebrate its successes. this is a person's or people's world of hopes and fears in terms of which, as plato wrote in the laches, their lives have moral meaning.14 it varies according to the many concerns and the groups which coalesce around them. as these are interlocking and interdependent, a pattern of social goals and concerns develop which guides action. in turn, corresponding capacities for action or virtues are developed. indeed, aristotle takes this up at the very beginning of his ethics. in order to make sense of the practical dimension of our life it is necessary to identify the good or value toward which one directs one's life or which one finds satisfying. this he terms happiness and then proceeds systematically to see which goal can be truly satisfying. his test is not passed by physical goods or honors, but by that which corresponds to, and fulfills, our highest capacity, that is, contemplation of the highest being or divine life.15 virtues martin heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. it consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whom one is concerned. in this process, one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. in relation to these goals, certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning.16 freedom then becomes more than mere 42 prajñâ vihâra spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of determining oneself to act as described above. it shapes -the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes -one's world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. this is the making of the complex social ordering of social groups which constitutes civil society. this process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affectivity or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values. these, in turn, evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. but it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral and social dimension of life. for, in order to live with others, one must be able to know, to choose and finally to realize what is truly conducive to one's good and to that of others. thus, persons and groups must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth, both in itself and in relation to others. this is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person and society good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment, or the contrary. in this, deliberation and voluntary choice are required in order to exercise proper self-awareness and self-governance. by determining to follow this judgment one is able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values and to turn these, instead, into openings for free action in concert with others in order to shape one's community as well as one's physical surroundings. this can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of my actions. by definition, only morally good actions contribute to personal and social fulfillment, that is, to the development and perfection of persons with others in community. it is the function of conscience, as one's moral judgment, to identify this character of moral good in action. hence, moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience. this work of conscience is not a merely theoretical judgment, but the exercise of self-possession and selfdetermination in one's actions. here, reference to moral truth constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which i ought to do. george f. mclean 43 when this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. these are the modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise, along with the coordinated natural dynamisms they require, we are practiced; and with practice comes facility and spontaneity. such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. for this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to, or, as is often said, "amount to". since socrates, the technical term for these especially developed capabilities has been ̀ virtues' or special strengths. but, if the ability to follow one's conscience and, hence, to develop one's set of virtues must be established through the interior dynamism of the person, it must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. this is a basic right of the person--perhaps the basic human and social right--because only thus can one transcend one's conditions and strive for fulfillment. its protection and promotion must be a basic concern of any order which would be democratic and directed to the good of its people. cultural tradition together, these values and virtues of a people set the pattern of social life through which freedom is developed and exercised. this is called a "culture". on the one hand, the term is derived from the latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. cicero and other latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (cultura animi), for just as good land, when left without cultivation, will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained or educated.17 this sense of culture corresponds most closely to the greek term for education (paideia) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the german term "formation" (bildung).18 here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a people and their ability to work as artists, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political toward fulfillment. the result is a whole life, characterized by unity and 44 prajñâ vihâra truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. the capacity for this cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation.19 this leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both. on the other hand, "culture" can be traced to the term civis (citizen, civil society and civilization).20 this reflects the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. by bringing to the person the resources of the tradition, the tradita or past wisdom produced by the human spirit, the community facilitates comprehension. by enriching the mind with examples of values which have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. for g.f. klemm, this more objective sense of culture is composite in character.21 e.b. tyler defined this classically for the social sciences as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society."22 in contrast, clifford geertz focused on the meaning of all this for a people and on how a people's intentional action went about shaping its world. thus to an experimental science in search of laws he contrasts the analysis of culture as an interpretative science in search of meaning.23 what is sought is the import of artifacts and actions, that is, whether "it is, ridicule or challenge, irony or anger, snobbery or pride, that, in their occurrence and through their agency, is getting said."24 this requires attention to "the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs."25 in this light, geertz defines culture rather as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of intended conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life."26 each particular complex whole or culture is specific to a particular people; a person who shares in this is a civis or citizen and belongs to a civilization. for the more restricted greek world in which this term was developed, others (aliens) were those who did not speak the greek tongue; they were "barbaroi", for their speech sounded like mere babel. though at first this meant simply non-greek, its negative manner of expression george f. mclean 45 easily lent itself to, perhaps reflected, and certainly favored, a negative axiological connotation, which soon became the primary meaning of the word ̀ barbarian'. by reverse implication, it attached to the term ̀ civilization' an exclusivist connotation, such that the cultural identity of peoples began to imply not only the pattern of gracious symbols by which one encounters and engages in shared life projects with other persons and peoples, but cultural alienation between peoples. today, as communication increases and more widely differentiated peoples enter into ever greater interaction and mutual dependence, we reap a bitter harvest of this negative connotation. the development of a less exclusivist sense of culture and civilization must be a priority task. the development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time, and hence depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. the culture which is handed on, or tradita, comes to be called a cultural tradition; as such it reflects the cumulative achievement of a people in discovering, mirroring and transmitting the deepest meanings of life. this is tradition in its synchronic sense as a body of wisdom. this sense of tradition is very vivid in premodern and village communities. it would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers, undoubtedly in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. however, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as this is passed on in new ways. attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which socrates sought, but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future. the genesis of tradition in community because tradition has sometimes been interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, it is important to note that a cultural tradition is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community or civil society and enables succeeding generations to realize their life with freedom and creativity. 46 prajñâ vihâra autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. one's consciousness emerges, not with self, but in relation to others. in the womb, the first awareness is that of the heart beat of one's mother. upon birth, one enters a family in whose familiar relations one is at peace and able to grow. it is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine one's capacities for subsequent social relations. there one encounters care and concern for others independently of what they do for us and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand.27 just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. as persons we emerge by birth into a family and neighborhood from which we learn and in harmony with which we thrive. similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. the phenomenologist sees this life in the varied civil society as the new source for wisdom. hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is in life as lived in the family and in the progressively wider social circles of civil society into which one enters. if it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. in fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. in this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and, accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments. but even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too uni-dimensional. while tradition can be described in george f. mclean 47 general and at a distance in terms of feed-back mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one's nation. moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. the result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted. this points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground, and hence, to the bases of the values which humankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize. it is here that one searches for the absolute ground of meaning and value of which iqbal wrote. without that all is ultimately relative to only an interlocking network of consumption, then of dissatisfaction and finally of anomie and ennui.28 the impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the iliad or odyssey. all conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern. tradition, then, is not, as is history, simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. it is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. it contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and progressively passed on generation after generation. the content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, emerges progressively as something upon which personal character and civil society can be built. it constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed 48 prajñâ vihâra and cultivated. hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part, or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears, that our culture provides a model and exemplar. on the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning whereby wisdom is drawn from experience, and the cumulative free acts of commitment which have cultivated our culture and civil society.29 ultimately, tradition bridges from ancient greek philosophy to civil society today. it bears the divine gifts of life, meaning and love, uncovered in the process of facing the challenges of civil life through the ages. it provides both the way back to their origin in the arch? as the personal, free and responsible exercise of existence and even of its divine source, and the way forward to their divine goal, the way, that is, to their alpha and their omega. religion in one sense we have been speaking in horizons that are increasingly restricted to the human: from objective dimensions which in modern terms come to be restricted to sciences totally constructed by, and at the disposition of, humankind, to subjective dimensions which could become reduplicatively self referential in terms of human whims and desires. yet another path is also opened by human subjectivity and it is precisely one which leads to the other term of our search, namely, religion. mohamed iqbal points to this in his reconstruction of the sciences of religion when he distinguishes between religion and the philosophy of his day when awareness of subjectivity was only beginning to emerge. he saw philosophy as more objective, abstract and coldly rational, whereas religion located in the realm of human subjectivity is alive and relational. the aspiration of religion soars higher than that of philosophy. philosophy is an intellectual view of things; and as such, does not care to go beyond a concept which can reduce all the rich variety of experience to a system. it sees reality from a distance as it were. religion seeks a closer contact with reality. the one is theory; the other is living experience, association, intimacy. in order to achieve this intimacy thought must rise george f. mclean 49 higher than itself, and find its fulfillment in an attitude of mind which religion describes as prayer one of the last words on the lips of the prophet of islam.30 metaphysics is displaced by psychology, and religious life develops the ambition to come into direct contact with the ultimate reality. it is here that religioin becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness.31 this does not remove it from rationality, but enables rationality to expand to al-ghazali's savoring of being and truth. similarly parmenides' highly rational exercise of abstract reasoning identified the basis of being as one, eternal and unchanging. for aristotle at the culmination of his metaphysics this was life divine, contemplation on contemplation itself (noesis noesios). yet from so exhalted a position it was unable to know our world of multiple beings with their tragedies and triumphs. all this is reversed when we review these issues with the new sensibility to subjectivity and in ways that bring us directly to culture. for if as we have seen cultures are most radically the values and virtues of a people then we must ask what is the basis of the valuing by a people what is not only their interests or concern but what is their ultimate concern in terms of which all has meaning. this appears in the thought of paul tillich in both the thesis and the antithesis of his dialectic. in the former he speaks of god not only as absolute being but phenomenologically as "ultimate concern". he notes that we are never indifferent to things, merely recording the situation. rather, we judge the situation and react accordingly as it reflects or deviates from what it should be. this fact makes manifest essence or logos in its normative sense. it is the way things should be, the norm of their perfection. our response to essence is the heart of our efforts to protect and promote life; it is in this that we are basically and passionately engaged. hence, by looking into our heart and identifying basic interests and concerns our ultimate concern we discover the most basic reality at this stage of the dialectic. 50 prajñâ vihâra in these terms, tillich expresses the positive side of the dialectical relationship of the essences of finite beings to the divine. he shows how these essences can contain, without exhausting, the power of being, for god remains this power. as exclusively affirmative or positive, these might be said to express only the first elements of creation. they remain, as it were, in a state of dreaming innocence within the divine life from which they must awaken to actualize and realize themselves.32 creation is fulfilled in the self-realization by which limited beings leave the ground of being to "stand upon" it. whatever is to be said of the negative or antithetic phase of the dialectic about this moment of separation, the element of essence is never completely lost, for "if it were lost, mind as well as reality would have been destroyed in the very moment of their coming into existence."33 it is the retention of this positive element of essence that provides the radical foundation for participation by limited beings in the divine and their capacity for pointing to the infinite power of being and depth of reason. as mentioned above, such participation in the divine being and some awareness thereof is an absolute prerequisite for any religion. after the tragic stage of the antithesis, tillich returns to the ultimate concern as experienced in true ecstasy. one receives ultimate power by the presence of the ultimate which breaks through the contradictions of existence where and when it will. it is god who determines the circumstances and the degree in which he will be participated. the effect of this work and its sign is love, for, when the contradictions between beings in the state of existence are overcome so that they are no longer the ultimate horizon, then reunion and social healing, cooperation and creativity become possible. the hindu thought of the bhagavad gita goes deeper than the conflicting egos or selves to appreciate a unity, an absolute self, at the root of all and of which each is a reflection. paul tillich calls the cognitive aspect of ecstasy inspiration. in what concerns the divine, he replaces the word knowledge by awareness, (for it is not concerned with new objects, which would invade reason with a strange body of knowledge that could not be assimilated, and, hence, would destroy its rational structure). rather, that which is opened to man is a new dimension of being, participated in by all, while still retaining its interior transcendence. george f. mclean 51 it matters little that the contemporary situation of skepticism and meaninglessness has removed all possibility of content for this act. what is important is that we have been grasped by that which answers the ultimate question of our very being, our unconditional and ultimate concern. this indeed, is tillich's phenomenological description of god. "only certain is the ultimacy as ultimacy."34 the ultimate concern provides the place at which the faith by which there is belief (fides qua creditur) and the faith that is believed (fides quae creditur) are identified. it is here that the difference between subject and object disappears. the source of our faith is present as both subject and object in a way that is beyond both of them. the absence of this dichotomy is the reason why tillich refuses to speak of knowledge and uses the term 'awareness'. he compares it to the mystic's notion of the knowledge god has of himself, the truth itself of st. augustine.35 it is absolutely certain, but the identity of subject and object means that it is also absolutely personal. consequently, this experience of the ultimate cannot be directly received from others;36 revelation is something which we ourselves must live. ultimate concern in this experience, it is necessary to distinguish the point of immediate awareness from its breadth of content. the point of awareness is expressed in what tillich refers to as the ontological principle: "man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the interaction and separation of both subject and object, both theoretically and practically."37 he has no doubt about the certainty of this point, although non-symbolically he can say only that this is being itself. however, in revelation he has experienced not only its reality but its relation to him.38 he expresses the combination of these in the metaphorical terms of ground and abyss of being, of the power of being, and of ultimate and unconditional concern. generally, this point is experienced in a special situation and in a special form; the ultimate concern is made concrete in some one thing. it may, for instance, be the nation, a god or the god of the bible. this concrete content of our act of belief differs from ultimacy, which as ultimacy is not immediately evident. since this concrete content remains within 52 prajñâ vihâra the subject-object dichotomy, its acceptance as ultimate requires an act of courage and venturing faith. the certainty we have about the breadth of concrete content is then only conditional.39 should time reveal this content to be finite, our faith will still have been an authentic contact with the unconditional itself, only the concrete expression will have been deficient.40 here it is important to keep in mind buber's caution with regard to the thought of max scheler. is it enough to change the object of intention; is indeed the act of intention the same even if the object is different? or is this intention essentially relational; an i-thou rather than an i-it relationship, whose quality is not effected by its object? tillich sees two correlated elements in one's act of faith. one is that of certainty concerning one's own being as related to something ultimate and unconditional. the other is that of risk, of surrendering to a concern which is not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as if it were. the risk arises necessarily in the state of existence where both reason and objects are not only finite, but separated from their ground. this places an element of doubt in faith which is neither of the methodological variety found in the scientist, nor of the transitory type often had by the skeptic. rather, the doubt of faith is existential, an awareness of the lasting element of insecurity. nevertheless, this doubt can be accepted and overcome in spite of itself by an act of courage which affirms the reality of god. faith remains the one state of ultimate concern, but, as such, it subsumes certainty concerning both the unconditional and existential doubt.41 can a system with such uncertainty concerning concrete realities still be called a realism? tillich believes that it can, but only if it is specified as a belief-full or self-transcending realism. in this, the really real the ground and power of everything real is grasped in and through a concrete historical situation. hence, the value of the present moment which has become transparent for its ground is, paradoxically, both all and nothing. in itself, it is not infinite and "the more it is seen in the light of the ultimate power, the more it appears as questionable and void of lasting significance."43 the appearance of self-subsistence gradually melts away. but, by this very fact, the ground and power of the present reality becomes evident. the concrete situation becomes theonomous and the infinite depth and eternal significance of the present is revealed in an ecstatic experience. george f. mclean 53 it would be a mistake, however, to think of this as something other-worldly, strange or uncomfortable. it is ec-static in the sense of going beyond the usual surface observations and calculations of our initial impressions and scientific calculations, but what it reveals is the profundity of our unity with colleagues, neighbors and, indeed, with all humankind. rather, then, than generating a sense of estrangement, its sign is the way in which it enables one to see others as friends and to live comfortably with them. in these global times as ethnic and cultural differences emerge, along with the freedom of each people to be themselves, this work of the spirit which is characteristic of tillich's dialectic comes to be seen in its radical importance for social life. conclusion: dialogue between religion and culture we have now come to the point of relationship between religion and culture and precisely in ecstasy or the point of ghazali and iqbal which was omitted by james. religion then is not another realm of human experience alongside others, but rather the source from which we come, the foundation on which we have, and the goal which we seek through all our values and virtues. some would want to distinguish between beliefs which they would see as related to earlier levels of experience and expressed in the various theologies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, faith which is the deeper level of experience the ultimate concern which is literally inexpressible or unutterable. it is the former which specifies and distinguishes the multiple cultures and the latter in which all human life indeed all reality whatsoever grounded. such a distinction is not without merit in that it takes account of the diversity and multiplicity of cultures and religions. unfortunately, what we distinguish we too often separate and then proceed to conceive one without the other. as a result the concrete or specific beliefs of a people lose their depth of meaning and become only cultural artifacts similar to their dances or songs. in this case they lose their religious significance. these are "religious" as seen by the sociologist or anthropologist. 54 prajñâ vihâra hence, if we can distinguish beliefs from faith we must not separate the two, but understand rather that beliefs are the ways in which faith is lived in time and place. in this relationship it is faith which holds the primary and gives to beliefs their sacred and salvific character. in this light then the term dogma must be rethought. in the modern rationalist context anything based on a faith that went beyond reason was rejected as beyond the realm of assured truth, and hence as blind, arbitrary and willful. in post modern terms with their implicit critique of rationalism it is rather rationalism itself which has come to be seen as willful, blind and arbitrary. what then is the proper relation between the one faith and the multiple "belief systems." properly controlled insight can be garnered from the extensive work done on the system of analogy in the last part of his work participation et causalité which cornelio fabro rightly termed the language of participation. this was developed by plato to express the way in which the many reflected (he used the term "mimesis" or "imaged) the one, that is, the way the many good realities shared in and expressed the absolute idea of the good. each in itself as well as each of its beliefs is sacred and salvific. as elaborated over time the first thing to be said here is that this differs from univocity which is obtained by abstracting from or omitting that which is distinctive, leaving only an identical sameness in nature. abstraction is realized only in and by the mind, but it misses the quintessentially unique character of cultures as products of freedom and hence as intensively unique. analogy of proportionality differs from this in that each is a realization of being according to its own nature or essence: the existence of a : : the existence of b -------------------- ----------------------the essence of a the essence of b in the early 1930s penido, studying this in the context of the emerging totalitarianism, was concerned with the defense of the uniqueness of the individual before the all powerful state. for him analogy cannot be a compromise, a halfway mark between univocity and equivocity and an george f. mclean 55 attenuation of both. rather it is necessary to appreciate that analogy is itself a form of equivocity for there is nothing at all in one being which is also in the other, neither its existence nor its essence. any two beings are each fully unique and hence different or equivocous. but in an analogy of proper proportionality they are differentiated from within, and in this very differentiation lies a certain degree of similarity. this is even more true of the relation between two cultures. as works of creative human freedom they are unique. as ongoing processes of a cultural tradition, being continually adapted and passed on through time, they are in a continually process of differentiation from within. yet there is a certain similarity which consists in each culture being a realization of its own nature from within. the similarity lies in the freedom by which a person, people or culture shapes its identity, passes this on, and lives this at each point in time. precisely then as a matter of creative freedom we come to the paradoxical conclusion that the similarity between cultures lie in the very reality by which they constitute themselves as differentiated and unique. this similarity consists not in their abandoning any part of themselves in negotiation with others, or in the attenuation of the devotion with which their identity is pursued, but rather in their unique committed pursuit in their own terms of the goodness of being. this is the very reality of their identity or culture. for our purposes i would like to suggest that this means not only that the many cultures religions and beliefs receive a truly sacred character from the faith that inspires them, but that each expresses their faith in the absolute or the absolute itself in a unique and wonderful manner. if this be so then the insight of nicholas of cusa takes on new importance for our global times. for in meeting other cultures founded in their religions i encounter not only something holy, like my own religion, but a manifestation of the divine that my own religion (shaped as it has been by its own distinctive beliefs) has not been able to express. religions are sisters which complement each other. each needs, and is needed by, the others as all tend toward the one absolute and absolutely loving source and goal of all. endnotes 56 prajñâ vihâra 1 g.f. mclean, ways to god (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1999), ch. ii, pp. 75-105. 2 ibid., ch. iii, pp. 107-132. 3 g.f. mclean and p. aspell, readings in ancient western philosophy (englewood cliffs, n.j.: prentice hal, 1971), pp. 39-44; g.f. mclean, ways to god (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1999), pp. 171-175. 4 tractatus logico-philosophicus, trans. by c.k. ogden (london: methuen, 1981), completed in 1918, published in 1921. 5 blue and brown books (new york: harper and row, 1958) dictated in 1934-1935. 6 philosophical investigations, trans. by g.e.m. anscombe (oxford: blackwell, 1958), begun in 1936, published in 1953. 7 being and time, trans. by j. macquarrie and e. robinson (new york: harper and row, 1962). 8 karl rahner, spirit in the world, trans. by w. dych (montreal: palm, 1968). 9 “the church in the modern world” (gaudium et spes) in the documents of vatican ii. ed. w. abbott (new york: america press, 1966), pp. 199-309. 10 h.g-. gadamer, truth and method (new york: continuum, 2000). (original german: warheit und methode. tubingen: mohr, 1960.) 11 g.f. mclean, “philosophy and civil society: its nature, its past and its future,” in civil society and social reconstruction, ed. g.f. mclean (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 2001), pp. 7-85. 12 aquinas, on truth, q.1. 13 ivor leclerc, “the metaphysics of the good,” review of metaphysics, 35 (1981), 3-5. 14 laches, 198-201. 15 metaphysics xii, 7. gerald f. stanley, “contemplation as fulfillment of the human person,” in personalist ethics and human subjectivity, vol. ii of ethics at the crossroads, george f. mclean, ed. (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1996), pp. 365-420. 16 j.l. mehta, martin heidegger: the way and the vision (honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1976), pp. 90-91. 17 v. mathieu, “cultura” in enciclopedia filosofica (firenze: sansoni, 1967), ii, 207-210; and raymond williams, “culture and civilization,” encyclopedia of philosophy (new york: macmillan, 1967), ii, 273-276, and culture and society (london: 1958). 18 tonnelat, “kultur” in civilisation, le mot et l’idée (paris: centre international de synthese), ii. george f. mclean 57 19 v. mathieu, “cultura” in enciclopedia filosofica (firenze: sansoni, 1967), ii, 207-210; and raymond williams, “culture and civilization”, encyclopedia of philosophy (new york: macmillan, 1967), ii, 273-276, and culture and society (london, 1958). 20 v. mathieu, “civilta,”enciclopedia filosofica, i, 1437-1439. 21 g.f. klemm, allgemein culturgeschicht der menschheit (leipzig, 18431852). 22 e.b. tylor, primitive culture (london, 1871), vii, p. 7. 23 clifford geertz, the interpretation of cultures (london: hutchinson, 1973), p. 5. 24 ibid., p. 10. 25 ibid., p. 13. 26 ibid., p. 85. 27 john caputo, “a phenomenology of moral sensibility: moral emotion,” in george f. mclean, frederick ellrod, eds., philosophical foundations for moral education and character development: act and agent (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1992), pp. 199-222. 28 gadamer, pp. 277-285. 29 ibid. gadamer emphasized knowledge as the basis of tradition in contrast to those who would see it pejoratively as the result of arbitrary will. it is important to add to knowledge the free acts which, e.g., give birth to a nation and shape the attitudes and values of successive generations. as an example one might cite the continuing impact had by the magna carta through the declaration of independence upon life in north america, or of the declaration of the rights of man in the national life of so many countries. 30 iqbal, reconstruction of religions, ed. m. saeed sheikh (lahore, pakistan: iqbal academy and institute of islamic culture, 1984), p. 143. 31 ibid., pp. 48-49. 32 paul tillich, systematic theology (chicago: university of chicago press, 1951), i , 238, 255. 33 ibid., p. 83; cf. “a reinterpretation of the doctrine of incarnation,” church quarterly review, cxlvii (1949), 141. 34 dynamics of faith, vol. x of world perspectives, ed. ruth nanda anshen (new york: harper & brothers, 1957), 17. 35 ibid., pp. 8-11. 36 “the problem of theological method,” journal of religion, xxvii (1947), 22-23. 37 “the two types of philosophy of religion,” union seminary quarterly review, i (1946), 10. 38 systematic theology, i, p. 109. 39 “the problem of the theological method,” loc. cit., pp. 22-23. 40 dynamics of faith, p. 18. 41 ibid. 58 prajñâ vihâra 42 the protestant era, trans. j.l. adams (chicago: university of chicago press, 1948), p. 18. 43 participation et causalité selon s. thomas d’aquin (louvain, publications universitaires de louvain, 1961). george f. mclean 59 04_mystical strategies.pmd mystical strategies: sufism in the 21st century arthur saniotis university of adelaide, australia º·¤ñ́ âèí åñ·¸ô«ù¿õกóåñ§¶ùก·éò·òâà¾ôèá¢öé¹àã×èíâ æ ¨òก¾åñ§¢í§¹ç¹ôâááå𠢺ç¹กòãµèò§ æ ¢í§íôêåòá àªè¹à ṍâçกñºãù»áºº ñ́é§à ốáµèò§ æ ¢í§กòãáê´§ííก ·ò§èòê¹òáåðêñ§¤á¢í§íôêåòá áåðà¹×èí§¨òกåñ·¸ô«ù¿õ¤èí¹¢éò§¨ðã¨กçéò§ áåðáõ¢ñ¹µô̧ ããáµèíèòê¹òí×è¹ æ ́ ñ§¹ñé¹åñ· ô̧¹õé̈ ö§áõèñกâàò¾êù§ã¹กòã·õè̈ ðกèíãëé àกố ¼åกãð·ºàªô§ºçกµèíçôçñ²¹òกòã·ò§êñ§¤á¢í§êñ§¤ááøêåôááåð·õèäáèãªèáøêåôá ã¹èµçããé·õè 21 ¹õé º·¤çòá¹õé¨ðµãç¨êíº´ùçèòåñ·¸ô«ù¿õ¨ð»ãñºµñçãëéà¢éòกñº êàò¾áç´åéíáãëáè·ò§êñ§¤ááåðºãã´ò¼ùé¹ôâáãªéµããกðàªô§¹ç¹ôâá áåðíôêåòá¹ôâáä é́íâèò§äã ¨óà»ç¹·õè̈ ðµéí§èöกéòàò¾ãçá¢í§åñ· ô̧«ù¿õã¹í ṍµ à¾×èíãëéàกố ǿåâ¾ô¹ô̈ çèòåñ· ô̧«ù¿ṏ ð¢ò¹ãñºèµçããé·õè 21 ¹õéä é́íâèò§äã abstract like other traditional islamic forms of religious and social expression, sufism is becoming increasingly challenged by the forces of modernism and by the islamicist movements. yet, because of its tolerant view of other religious disciplines, there is great potential for sufism to have a positive impact on the social evolution of muslim and non-muslim societies in the 21st century. this paper will investigate how sufism can come to terms with this new social environment and its entourage of modernist and islamicist logics. it involves an overview of sufism’s past to give some insight as to how it can respond to the 21st century. notwithstanding its apparent mystical and quietist import, the role prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 45-50 45 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ of sufism may have an influential impact on the social evolution of muslim and non-muslim societies in the 21st century. like other traditional islamic forms of religious and social expression, sufism is becoming increasingly impinged by the forces of modernism and islamicist movements. although sufism emerged from the political and social backdrop of the umayyad dynasty which had in part strayed from the principles of nascent islam, sufism must now reformulate its position for the 21st century. abdul aziz said views sufism as a humanising response to the emergence of modernist models and their ruthless debunking of traditional forms of religion and value systems. but how will sufism come to terms with this new social environment and its entourage of modernist and islamicist logics? perhaps, an overview of sufism’s past may give some insight as to how it will respond to the 21st century. as islam spread into north africa, asia and europe during the 7th century it began to take on a cosmopolitan feel. islamic scholars and administrators began to incorporate various knowledges from civilisations which they had encountered, inevitably leading to an efflorescence of scientific learning and inquiry __ the age of islamic science had been sparked. generally speaking, early muslims saw their relationship with their nonmuslim hosts as complementing their particular worldview. the saying of the prophet muhammad to “seek knowledge as far as china” prompted this spirit of co-existence and conveyed the “genius of authentic islam” to coin abdul aziz said.1 thus, the formation of muslim societies was informed and contoured by their relationship with older civilisations. the rationale of tolerance was further conveyed by various sufi orders (tariqa) which spread throughout the islamic world from the ninth century onwards. one of the hallmarks of traditional sufism was its ability to adapt to the socio-cultural environments where it found itself in. this process of adaptation was often prompted by sufism’s willingness to incorporate beliefs and practices from other cosmologies. the islamic scholar stoddart claims that early sufi thinkers sometimes borrowed ideas from neo-platonic and other spiritual traditions in order to broaden their doctrinal positions.2 arguably, the indian sufi orders provide the most outstanding example of this syncretic attitude. for example, the chistiyyah order became renowned for its broad range of humanitarian activities and prac46 prajna vihara ~ _ _ tice of religious tolerance, which became an integral ideological bridge between islam and hinduism. there is little doubt that sufi orders such as the chistiyyah adopted a more liberal understanding of hinduism, and emphasised communal harmony between hindus and muslims. khizer even claims that: the sufis, unlike the ‘ulama’ did not keep themselves aloof from indian mainstream. they adopted local idiom and preached the message of love and universal brotherhood.3 on this note, it seems that sufi orders were often more aware of the social conditions of the common people and tended to their spiritual and physical needs than the islamic clerics. evans-pritchard’s classic study of the sanusi order of cyrenaica (1954) not only aroused a generation of studies of north african sufi orders, but emphasised their social and political implications for north african societies. evans-prtichard pointed out that the austere nature of islam in north africa was considered by many lay muslims as too rigid.4 consequently, sufi orders tended to adopt more individualistic and experientialist approaches which found their social expression in present day saints’ cults. a similar scenario is observed in many muslim societies today, reaffirming ziauddin sardar’s view that traditional muslim communities are constantly reinventing and innovating tradition.5 strategies for the future what can sufi interpretations of islam offer muslim and non-muslim societies in the present day and beyond? my guess is a great deal. however, initially what needs to be done is to dispel the notion of sufism as an outdated and irrelevant form of “dervishism”. the fact remains that in many muslim societies such as india, pakistan, the central asian republics, and north africa, sufism continues to play a significant role in shaping and “sustaining communal identity”.6 in these societies a crucial source for the maintenance of islamic cultural knowledge and practice derives arthur saniotis 47 from the belief in sufi saints. to believe in the collective of god’s saints (auliya) and to perform pilgrimage at their shrines are personal forms of piety, which confer spiritual merit to believers. not only are saints’ shrines prominent features in the islamic landscape, but clearly demonstrates the religious sway of sufism for millions of muslims. it is also important to note how saints’ shrines have for centuries been centres for genuine inter-religious harmony. when i was conducting field-work during 1994-5 at the shrine of nizamuddin auliya in delhi, i regularly witnessed muslims, hindus, and sikhs performing pilgrimage there. it was also common practice for hindus to pray in the mosque there and for sufi teachers to have non-muslim disciples. one sufi even compared the saint’s shrine to an open bar where all people were welcome. this kind of communal harmony was all the more astonishing in light of the religious riots between hindus and muslims over the destruction of the barbri mosque in ayodha which had taken place a few years before, as well as the flagrant discrimination of muslims in maharashtra state and elsewhere in india. what this kind of communal model indicates is not only the possibility for muslims to live peacefully with people from other religions, but assists in the development of conflict resolution strategies in those muslim societies experiencing civil turmoil. in one interview, hussein aidid, son of the deceased somali warlord, stated his intention to implement a system of law in somalia based on a sufi model which is in accordance with somalia’s clan based social system. aidid’s remarks in large reflects the “popularist and grass roots”7 backing of sufism by many muslims. given its respect for “native traditions and customs” sufism is strongly placed as a relevant social model for islamic liberalism in the 21st century. as abdul aziz said says: in the new international environment, viable conflict resolution requires an understanding of the beliefs, values, and behaviour of conflicting parties.8 in this vein, sufism has provided and continues to offer a viable political and social rebuff of authoritarian regimes. afghanistan is a case in point. during the soviet invasion of afghanistan sufi orders played a 48 prajna vihara ~ _ _ significant role of resistance, “offering solidarity and stability” to afghans without consideration to their ethnic backgrounds.9 although the sufi orders went underground during the ensuing civil wars, sufi followers had pervaded every section of afghan society. sufi followers are also included in the present interim government.10 the sufi orders in the central asian republics were also highly effective in fostering armed and ideological resistance against tsarist and soviet expansion.11 in the current climate of islamicist resurgence sufi inspired paradigms of inter-ethnic tolerance and liberal humanism (an islamic development) are still a potent social force. given the profound influence of sufism on muslim polity12 it is unreasonable to suggest that sufism is a spent force in the 21st century. it is because sufism draws much of its social and moral power from the grassroots level that makes it a positive model for social change. ironically, it is the emerging global system’s symbiotic paradigm which corresponds with sufism’s integral approach to social relations. here perhaps, sufism may offer a crucial ideological nexus between islam and the west in the 21st century and beyond. endnotes 1said, a. a. 2001. “islam and the west: toward common ground”, in global education association. 2stoddart, w. 1994. sufism: the mystical doctrines and methods of islam, new delhi: taj company. p. 43. 3khizer, m. m. 1991. “sufism and social integration”, sufism and carnival harmony, a. a. engineer. (ed.) jaipur, india: printwell. p. 109. 4evans-pritchard, e. e. 1954. the sanusi of cyrenaica, oxford: clarendon press. p. 1-3. 5sardar, z. 2002. “islam and the west in a transmodern world”, in islam online. june 5th. p. 2. 6tyson, d. 1997. “shrine and pilgrimage in turkmenistan as a means to understand islam among the turkmen”, in central asian monitor on-line supplement. no.1. p. 1. 7ferguson, r. j. 1996. “meeting on the road: cosmopolitan islamic culture and the politics of sufism”, in the centre for east-west cultural and economic studies, research paper no. 4, december. bond university. school of humanities and social sciences. arthur saniotis 49 8said, a. a. 1994. “a sufi response”, in religion and world order symposium. p. 4. 9alexe, d. “afghanistan: sufi brotherhoods reemerge after the fall of the taliban, in radio free europe. february 1st, 2002. p. 1. 10alexe, d.” “afghanistan: sufi brotherhoods reemerge after the fall of the taliban”, in radio free europe. february 1st, 2002. p. 3. 11ferguson, r. j. 1996. “meeting on the road: cosmopolitan islamic culture and the politics of sufism”, in the centre for east-west cultural and economic studies, research paper no. 4, december. bond university. school of humanities and social sciences. 12ferguson, r. j. 1996. “meeting on the road: cosmopolitan islamic culture and the politics of sufism”, in the centre for east-west cultural and economic studies, research paper no. 4, december. bond university. school of humanities and social sciences. 50 prajna vihara ~ _ _ article5-1 human dignity reconsidered tran van doan national taiwan university abstract this paper conjectures a possible reduction of the conflict of contrasting systems of values. here, the confucian social values and the christian religious values are taken as the objectives of our investigation, due to their different and somewhat contrasting outlooks. my choice of christianity and confucianism is, of course, not at random but intentional, simply because they form an integral part of my life-world. i was born in a society of pluralistic belief: i was nourished by confucian values, but raised up in christian tradition and educated with western scientific and humanist knowledge. however, in order not to be fallen into the trap of generality, i will deal more specifically with the concept of human dignity. this work develops further the thesis that any reduction of conflict can be possible if mankind share common values, have common interests and are guided by common aspirations, in a word, if there exist human commonalities. the thesis begins with an examination of the thesis of diversity: our life-world is constituted by different values, interests, and aspirations. that means the rightness (or the error) of any system of values cannot be judged by the yardstick alien to their life-world. hence, any one-sided criticism of (either chinese or christian) values seems to commit the so-called category-mistake. in this context, i would argue along the line of ludwig wittgenstein, r. g. collingwood, martin heidegger, hans-georg gadamer, and others, that human dignity can be understood in the context of their (our) life-world only. that means any claim of a universal human dignity would complicate the matter more than to help to settle down this conflict, since one has to foresee a universal world before hand. however, such a thesis would be of little help to reduce human conflicts. thus, i share the hegelian (and of course, the christian) optimistic belief in the so-called forces of reason (or the force of hope in 74 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 74-99 © 2000 by assumption university press the christian tradition, or the emancipatory interests in habermas), and conjecture a possible sensus communis as the basis for understanding. the work consists of three main parts: the first part studies the confucian understanding of human dignity in its moral system, and the second part reflects on its relevancy to a global society. in the first part, we investigate the process of constitution of human dignity. it is evident that such concept has been conceived, nourished, formed and developed in the life-world of the people at confucius’ time, i.e. the springs-autumn period, cherished and developed further from generation to generation and becomes an integral part of the chinese life-world (and of other lifeworlds influenced by the chinese one). the second part deals exactly with the christian view of human dignity, and with the claim of being universal of the west. in the third part, we are searching for a possible solution to the conflict of the confucian and the christian view of human dignity. our argument is based on the insight that any understanding of human dignity is primarily implicit in our understanding of human nature which is constituted and reconstituted in-and-from our life-worlds. in the second part reflecting on the relevancy of the chinese concept of human dignity, i argue for a possible contribution of the confucian concept of human dignity to the world. the fact that the world is right now becoming a global village which demands for better mutual understanding, reciprocal activity (solidarity) and more communication (in the sense of habermas’ theory of communicative action) would fortify our belief in the possibility of a common understanding of human dignity. human dignity would no longer be the product of a particular culture, but rather a human common aspiration for an ideal world. in this sense, human dignity cannot be cut off from divinity, which, in its original sense, expresses human deepest and insatiable desire for perfection. keywords: christian philosophy, asian philosophy, confucian human dignity, human nature, life-world, human self-perfection, theory of communicative action, confucius, thomas aquinas, wittgenstein, collingwood, heidegger, gadamer, habermas. tran van doan 75 remarking introduction: human rights, human nature and human dignity the issue of human rights has been the main concern of mankind; it constitutes the kernel of all cultural traditions, especially of great religions.1 with jean-jacques rousseau, and then with the success of a series of revolutions, from the american revolution to the french revolution, from the labour revolution to the bolshevik revolution (1917), from the hsin-hai revolution (1911) to the movement of liberation, human rights becomes today the most cherished, most sacred objectives sought by humankind. the irony is, no one can say precisely what human rights mean; no society can offer their exact criteria; and there is no warrant of a certain concept of human dignity acceptable to all human beings. what we are witnessing is a constantly shameful abuse of human rights, an often biased, one-sided and even cynical understanding of human dignity. human rights, human dignity, people power, etc., all are but sheer slogans often perniciously abused to cheat on the people, and to be misused as a tool to grab, to defend and to expand power. ironically, precisely the same ones who most loudly advocate human rights, who fiercely champion human dignity are their worst offenders. they jealously keep these rights to them by denying other people, other religions, other races, other cultures, etc. from these rights.2 to be more precise, the issue of human rights has been taken as a weapon to inflict wound on (or in many case, more brutally, to destroy) those who stubbornly resist the super-powers, the states, and the likes. if peace in the past is pax romana (the roman peace), then today, human rights may be just either jus sovieticum (the soviet justice claimed by stalinists), or jus sinicum (the chinese justice of mao dze-dung) and today, jus americanum (the american justice), or in a broader context, jus occidentalis (the western justice). on the name of human rights, these powerful states, governments, or persons have destroyed the rights of other people, without ever questioning which rights they possess, which are the rights other people have and need. in bottom, to say in the manner of blaise pascal’s sarcastic remark of reason, and anatole france’s mockery at the concept of justice,3 human rights are mistreated as the whores serving everyone: aggressors find in them the best tools to suppress 76 prajñâ vihâra their victims, while, on the other side, the suppressed may abuse them as a no less destructive weapon to wage a merciless battle against their oppressors. the controversy on human rights may be born in human different, even conflicting understanding of human nature, and of course, on human lack of respect for humankind. thus, a reduction of human rights abuse demands first a minimizing misunderstanding of human nature, and then an increasing of respect for human dignity. that means, any discourse on human rights requires a further discourse on human nature, and any discourse on human nature suggests a concern for human dignity. since these issues are well debated i would prefer to tackle on a relatively small aspect of our understanding of human dignity. as an asian born in and nourished by asian cultural heritage, especially by the confucian values, and educated in the western knowledge and christian faith, our own understanding, in the strictest sense, rather reflects my personal modus vivendi, which is inseparable from these two great traditional cultures. from my own living experience (erlebniss), i am fully convinced of a possible fusion of two quite contrasting systems of values. thus, the title “a confucian-christian understanding of human dignity” represents my personal search and answer to the above question. it does not pretend to claim any common understanding among all asians, or even among chinese, as the title of my paper hints. i will concentrate on the confucian values in particular, partly because i am more or less directly nourished by them, and partly due to my lack of a solid knowledge of taoism and buddhism. the paper consists of three main parts: the first part investigates the concept of human dignity expounded in the main doctrines of confucianism, the second part deals with the christian concept of human dignity as seen in the constitution of lumen gentium promulgated by the council vatican ii,4 while the third part would reflect on its relevancy to our asian society in the global age. this part, in a certain sense, is an attempt to incorporate the confucian concept of human dignity into the christian concept of human dignity in a broader and more integral way, to make it universal. in the conclusion, we argue that human dignity should be understood in the context of the process of human participation into the process of self-perfection. tran van doan 77 part 1 a confucian understanding of human dignity confucius was certainly not concerned with typical metaphysical question on human nature and its foundation. he was rather obsessed with practical question of human self-realisation.5 thus, not the question of what is human nature but that of how do we recognise man as a man, and more importantly, of how to make man as man, has been the objectives ardently sought by him. and indeed, in the analects, almost no clearcut definition of human beings, god or human nature was given.6 the master even refused to answer to those who questioned him on matters of deity and evil.7 whenever confucius had to refer to human nature, he would opt for a valuation and not a description. the analects devote 6 paragraphs to deal with human nature,8 but none of them could be regarded as a definition of it in the strictest sense. the reason of why confucius resisted temptation to make any definition of human nature is quite simple: human nature can be known only as long as the actual man is living, i.e. thinking, sensing, and especially acting in a certain circumstance, a certain community. that means, one would understand man as long as one be able to participate into this kind of living,9 or as his followers insisted, to follow the way (tao) of living.10 hence the important issue here is what does confucius mean by human life? to express confucian thought in modern languages, one would say that confucius might have understood human nature in a process of growth in toto (moral, intellectual as well as physical growth). thus to him, any demand for an exact understanding of human nature by birth (or a priori) is superfluous, and even dangerous (as we later witness with mencius and hsun-tze, who had attempted in vain to understand human nature in se as innate goodness or original evil).11 if human nature is understood in its total aspects, then one has to arrive at a conclusion that human dignity reflects this human totality. such a conclusion seems to be a little bit adventurous, if not dangerous, if one has no idea of what confucius meant by human totality. thus, we need to go a step further to pinpoint what we mean by total aspects, and their difference. 78 prajñâ vihâra first, one might argue that human dignity rather reflects the values aspect, since it is this aspect that makes man transcending animals. that means that not all aspects are equally essential. that is true to some extent. confucius himself had made clear of the distinction of human various aspects: the survival and the moral, and he seemed to lay more weight on the latter, when he regarded the noble man (chun-tzu) with noble deeds as the true representative of authentic humanity (existence).12 actually, such an understanding was not false, but only partial correct. confucius never neglected the aspect of survival.13 but he was fully aware of the fact that not all aspects are equally essential, that it would be necessary to classify them in the order of values: the survival and the progress, or in confucius’ own words, the basic needs, the need for security and humanity.14 only when forced to make a final choice, then one would opt for the values of higher order.15 following confucius’ idea, i would like to propose to distinguish human existence into the bare existence and the authentic existence (to borrow the language of soren a. kierkegaard and jean-paul sartre). human bare existence is often understood as material life, while authentic life as spiritual (moral, aesthetic) life. bare existence is possible if basic needs for survival are met, while authentic existence requires values of higher order, the one of progress. that means in order to be human in its full sense, i.e. to be an animal par excellence, a bare existence is insufficient. to be human demands to have an authentic existence that requires a life of values. second, if human existence consists of bare existence (with survival values) and authentic existence (defined by values of higher order), and if as confucius insisted, the last one would be prevalent, then one may argue that human dignity, as the value of higher order, would be more prevalent. as corollary, culture (arts), spiritual values, and moral values are not essential to human bare existence (since man can survive without them), but categorically necessary for human dignity. third, as a logical consequence of such a distinction, human nature (which consists of bare existence and authentic existence) is not equal to human dignity (which refers to the authentic existence). human dignity hence expresses the value of human existence, and certainly not identified with it. human dignity can be possible only if man can find an adequate answer to the question concerning the reason of our own tran van doan 79 existence. confucius made this point very clear in his distinction between the superior man (noble, worthy man) and the inferior man (little means man), as we have pointed out earlier. now we can understand of the reason why confucius set his mind on the practical program of human self-realisation, i.e. on the value of human progress: “let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a son.”16 he was fully conscious of the fact that without human dignity, then all of our attempts of a bare existence would be meaningless: “the duke said, “excellence! indeed when the ruler is not a ruler, the minister not a minister, the father not a father, the son not a son, although i may have all the grain, shall i ever get to eat it?”17 now, the question is whether such view of human dignity could be practical, and whether it could be acceptable to us in the age of globalization? any claim of a definitive answer to these questions is too premature, since it involves our awareness of the diversity of life-worlds, of the gradual (or even sudden) transformation of our own life-world, and certainly of our knowledge of the possible future. furthermore, we are aware of the fact that nobody can remain fully autonomous even if he deliberately chooses to be so, and that no system of values could claim to remain monolithic. we all become global, consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly. if so, then any understanding of human dignity from a single, pure, and monolithic system of values is no longer sufficient. it could become reactionary, dangerous for human progress. as history testifies, the jealous defence of monolithic confucian values of the conservative confucians in the later man-ching had done great damage to confucian humanism, reducing it into a kind of rigid ideology, impeding human progress, and hence offending human dignity. aware of this treacherous ideology, i am inclined towards the view that, a modern confucian understanding of human dignity must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit of authentic existence and with the actual modus vivendi of the chinese (far eastern) people. in other words, the idea of a globalization of confucian moral system seems to be rather adventurous (and even dangerous). in contrast, i argue that a confucian (living in a global age) may further the confucian insistence on human progress (in terms of searching for higher values). and as such, he has to incorporate into the confucian body any system of values that contributes 80 prajñâ vihâra to human progress and renders human values more universal, eternal and perfect. here is the reason of my investigation into the system of christian values, and my search for a kind of fusion of two systems of values, in the sense of a fusion of horizons, once proposed by hansgeorg gadamer (1900-2002).18 part 2 the western understanding of human dignity 2.1. the christian concept of human dignity the concept of human dignity in lumen gentium is based on the metaphysical principles of human nature as imago dei (the image of god),19 and of human community (ecclesia) as a communion of god and humankind: “signum et instrumentum intimae cum deo unionis totiusque generis humani unitatis” (the sign and instrument of an intimate union with god and of a unity of all human beings).20 as creature created in accordance with the image of the creator, human nature is similar to the divine nature. hence, if human dignity means to be worth of being human, then it does mean also to be worth of being divine.21 the point here is, if human nature is made after the divine nature the image of god-then what is the nature of god, and why only human beings (and not all creatures) are created after his image. these questions force us to put our faith in the bracket (to follow phenomenological method) and to venture into the sphere of human understanding. whether we can understand the nature of god, as well as his will by means of rational arguments? let us not return to the whole history of how philosophers dealt with this question, and concentrate on a point, namely, up to our times, no answer (given by whomever) is definitively final. the safest way seems to adopt the kant’s strategy of excluding the sphere of faith from rational discussion. but, such a strategy backfires. as kant himself conceded, it does not help much to our understanding of human beings as such. it rather leads us to a certain agnosticism that excludes all human activities except the knowing activity. thus, i would argue that even though faith is not identified with human capacity (or faculty) of understanding, they are inseparable. in my view, understanding expresses our approach to tran van doan 81 faith. and our understanding may consist of the so-called the rational understanding based either on the common sense, or on rational basis, or on our own personal life, personal feeling, and so on. to put in a straightforward word, the same faith can be expressed in different ways, often rational and consistent, but sometimes contradictory and even irrational. let us return to the question of what is the nature of god, or how do we know that the nature of god is as such? the scholastic tradition would prove by means of an analogia, that man as an image of god, i.e. a part of the absolute god, would bear the same characteristics of the absolute, though in lesser, imperfect and partial degree. st. augustine’s argument of the ray and the source of light (theory of illuminatio) may at best present this neo-platonic theory.22 analogically, one may argue that (in accordance with aristotle), since god is the absolute, the logos, the perfect, then human nature (as a part participating in god) is tending towards the absolute (transcendence), then it is rational, and then it is guided by moral principles. such an a priori argument would give little light on the divine nature, and of course, would hardly produce any proof, strong enough to ascertain the existence of god. it requires before hand a certain faith, which cannot be rationally understood, much less to be proved. the argument of credo qui absurdum seems to be of no value in persuading rationalists. the thomist approach tried to avoid this embarrassing conclusion when it chose the rational path. to aquinas, the idea of god must be proved a posteriori, through a careful examination of the works of god, namely nature. since, he argues, if nature is created by god, it must bear some of his imprint. in other words, one may know the existence of god by knowing nature (in its form, structure, order, and so on). if there is a certain order, if anything happens must have some cause (because nothing can be the cause of itself), if there is a scale of value, etc. then there must exist a certain perfect order, the causa in se, the source of values, etc. in a word, god is precisely the absolute order, the final cause, the value in se, etc.23 here one has to make a short note: aquinas did not demonstrate god in se. he wants to show us the cause for believing in the presence of god. thus, his arguments are not directly based on god in se but on the 82 prajñâ vihâra presence (appearances) of god in the world.24 his arguments (in his socalled five proofs) can be resumed in a sentence: if the world and all beings are created by god, then the world must be reflecting his will, then the world must display his presence. consequently, the order we found in the world reflects the divine order. similarly, human desire for happiness is unlimited. but any happiness may short live, in the sense that it can satisfy us only temporally. and as such, it cannot be the ultimate happiness, which human beings are seeking. the idea of a god emerges here as the ultimate happiness, i.e. as the cause of all kinds of happiness. if one follows the neo-platonians (like plotinus and st. augustine), then the orders in the world are only the rays of light which are coming from the sun. god is the sun i.e. the source of all rays. the ray may be diminished, or disappeared, but not its source. similarly, the order in the world may be imperfect, but not the legislator who made orders. this theory of emanatio (initiated by plotinus) is the backbone of the above mentioned arguments: it points out the existence of a perfect state, a perfect order. god is conceived by as the creator of these orders. thus he must be perfect, absolute. as an image of god, and as the chosen people of god, human beings are called to live up to this divine image. they are called to fulfill the sacred mission assigned by god to them. or more precisely, they are assigned the responsibility to build a regnum dei (the reign of god), or a civitas dei i.e. a perfect society (the city of jerusalem as st. augustine explicitly named) after the model of the world which reveals the nature of god: “the very order, disposition, beauty, change and motion of the world and of all visible things silently proclaim that it could only have been made by god, the ineffably and invisibly great and the ineffably and invisibly beautiful.”25 if god is known by his nature, and if his nature is displayed in the world, then one might say that, the divine nature can be discovered precisely in nature. but such a conclusion seems to be rather spinozian. as most of theologians agree, the world reveals only a part of the divine nature. thus, what we know about god is only a partial knowledge. there is no complete picture of god. and even such partial knowledge is not directly apprehended, but only by means of an analogy (and by means of a pure speculation). in this sense, the nature of man reflects a part of tran van doan 83 the divine nature. first, since god is the creator of man, then man is his product (or his image). but god is by no means identified with man, and man could never become god. as an image, man reflects only a part, incomplete part of god. there man is imperfect. in this sense, the imperfect is a characteristic of man and not of god. thus, any defect, incomplete, insufficient… could not belong to the nature of god. aquinas’ via negativa clearly demonstrates that what god is not. that means, human nature could not be identified with the divine nature, simply because human nature is full of defects. in contrast, the divine nature must be the perfect, good in se, self-sufficient, etc. if we follow aquinas to the letter, then the argument regarding human dignity as worth of being divine seems to be inconsistent. how could a part become the whole, the defect to be transformed into the perfect, the finite to be the infinite? the inability to give a satisfactory answer would persuade us to return to augustinism: man is worthless before god; he can never become god (with an exception of course, of the nietzschean madman who proclaims himself to be god). unwillingly, we have to go back to the starting point and content with it: human dignity means worth of being human. now it is clear that aquinas might have proposed a different view of human dignity, namely, that human nature in se is orienting towards perfection, and human dignity can be seen in human act of following this nature. the act of refusal of this nature leads to what we might label as human indignity. since, as we have seen, aquinas’ proofs of the divine existence point out rather the difference between man and god. thus, human dignity cannot be understood in the sense of worthiness of being divine, because it would tacitly accept an identity of god and man. to follow aquinas’ spirit, we may have to understand human dignity not in the framework of the logical identity, but of the logic of faith: the concept of human dignity is built on our knowledge of humanity and on our faith in god. on the one hand, the knowledge of humanity suggests that man is man simply because he has the capacity to transcend natural world to become better. in this sense, his nature is defined by his progress. the language of faith, on the other hand, would prove that if god is omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, the good in se, etc. then as his image, i.e. as someone most close to god, human nature should be in some way more 84 prajñâ vihâra close to his nature. thus, to become holy means to become better. similarly, human vocation is the call to become perfect. as a finite proceeding towards the infinite, human nature means a dynamic essence (dynamos) possessing the energy (energeia), not at the static stage but proceeding (or developing) towards the perfect (telos). to say in the language of faith, we are called to become perfect. hence, to become perfect is the essence of humanity. 2.2. the western claim as we see, the history of human understanding of god, and of the concept of human dignity in the constitution lumen gentium, and other documents of the vatican ii yields a view of monolithic character: the character of western thinking. the triumph of the west in the fields of sciences, military and economics has consolidated its own character and constituted its own self-consciousness (as hegel had fabricated: the world is the west, and its soul is christianity, its spirit is reason, its form is science and its force is economics. as corollary, the west dogmatically dismissed or arrogantly downgraded the views (values) of other cultures. of course, such monolithic, iconoclast view is no longer shared by even western intellectuals. r. g. collingwood is not the only gentleman who once warned the west: “savages are no more exempt from human folly than civilized men, and are no doubt equally liable to the error of thinking that they, or the person they regard as their superiors, can do what in fact cannot be done. but this error is not the essence of magic. and we should be careful how we attribute it to the people we call savages, who will one day raise up and testify against us.”26 much earlier, the legendary matteo ricci had eloquently testified the greatness of a china, just as great missionaries like de nobili had brilliantly demonstrated the grandeur of indian civilization. a voltaire, a leibniz, a schopenhauer, a legge, a wilhelm, and other great occidental learners, were certainly not the only and the last ones who wholeheartedly echoed the view of these missionaries. since, it is not our scope to argue for the greatness of other non-western cultures; it is sufficient to limit our work in unearthing the source of biases in the world of western philosophers. to avoid any possible and unnecessary misunderstanding, it is important, however, to make a short clarification: my criticism of some tran van doan 85 views of some western philosophers does not mean my objection to western values. quite in contrast, i am fully aware that nobody would be foolish, or too radical to throw away the western values. in fact, there is some truth in the claim of the west: their triumph was possible due to its own character. however, such triumph could not be the backbone of its universal claim, and much less demonstrate its universality as hegel had done in vain in his immortal (but very controversial) phenomenology of spirit.27 thus we have to turn now to the second question of whether such concept could be regarded as universal, or whether it is rather a particular product of the church fathers (and of theologians of the western world, or western educated theologians). the answer to this question is of important significance, because, in our view, biblical understanding advocated first by martin luther, and recently by theologians of, from and for the world outside vatican,28 has been rather the fruit of their world. to borrow hegelian expression, their view reflects the spirit of their age (zeitgeist) and their people (volksgeist). thus, the condemnation of their view by the sacra congregazione della dottrina della fede in the past, and even in recent days,29 may be understood as an objection to (possible) understanding of the message of god of the world outside the vatican, or in a broader sense, outside the western world. as we have seen, the concept of human dignity has been constructed in the womb of the greco-roman culture, guided by the christian spirit, nourished by the thoughts of the church fathers, and developed by modern western philosophy. more concretely, the concept of human dignity defended by the vatican ii may be regarded as a synthetic product of the following traditions: the homeric tradition of regarding the divine world and the human world as homogeneous, the judaic tradition of considering human beings as the image of god (and the israel as his selected people), the christian tradition of believing in christ as the son of god and the son of man, and the western modern idea of equality among all people. the point now is, whether such a synthetic view could represent other traditions, say the chinese tradition, the indian tradition, the african tradition, and others, or, more universally, whether it could include all traditions. since, as we may agree, we would not be able to understand the concept of human dignity if we do not have any idea of the culture in which the idea of human dignity is born; and 86 prajñâ vihâra certainly much less can we perform it, or obey its laws, or apply it in our own life-world, if it is alien to us.30 here i have to repeat once again that i do not deny the effort (and the merit) of our church fathers in searching for such a synthesis. my suspicion is about their claim of a final and complete synthesis that is theirs and theirs only. as an asian, nourished in the womb of chinese culture (and partly buddhist culture),31 my reflection begins with whether the concept of human dignity understood by our church fathers reflects, or represents our asian understanding of human dignity? if it does, then the claim of universal may be justified for asians (of course, not yet for other peoples). if not, then such a claim is still questionable, or at least not definitive. in order to avoid misunderstanding, it is very important to clarify here that my question focuses on the claim of universality of the concept of human dignity and not of that of truth. as i have previously pointed out the distinction between faith and understanding, so i have to accept that the sphere of understanding is not identified with that of truth. the same truth may be understood quite differently, and consequently, interpreted in different ways. let us return to the definition of human dignity: human dignity means to be worth of human beings. no doubt, such definition does add nothing new to our understanding of human dignity, since it is rather of tautological essence. but no doubt, no one would question its correctness either. thus, it would be superfluous to treat such definition in se and waste time for such an answer. one has to venture beyond to pose a series of questions concerning the meaning of worthiness of being human like what we mean by human nature, whether human nature is an image of the divine nature, and why should we live up to this nature. since i am rather concerned with confucian understanding of human dignity, and of whether such an understanding is compatible with the concept of human dignity promulgated and defended by the vatican ii (as we have presented in the second part of this paper), i would like to tackle the problem from two angles: their compatibility and the possibility of a fusion of them. tran van doan 87 part 3 divergence and convergence 3.1. the difference in this section, i will follow thome fang’s and fu pei-jung’s analysis of the concept of life in the analects to some extent, to make clear the divergence between christianity and confucianism in matters of human life, and human dignity. the first difference between the christian view and the confucian view of life lies in its metaphysical foundation: the ursprung of life and its importance. if life, in the christian belief, is created by god, then it is inseparable from the divine life. it is not us but god who determines our life. as consequence, life itself matters little, because it can be given, or taken away by its creator. in this context, it is not life but its ursprung must be human concern. the confucian view of life does not object to this view (confucius’ avoid to tackle this problem does not mean his objection), but it does not regard it as essential to our understanding of life either. it rather concentrates on life itself, and certainly on its process, putting aside its metaphysical ursprung. as a matter of fact, confucians do rather question the metaphysical foundation of life; they would prefer to ponder on practical question of living.32 in the context of process, life is producing life in the way of self-generating.33 thus, it is a matter of urgency to follow the natural way of this process (the tao of i-king, the taoist tao), or to correct human behaviour to follow this tao. the second difference lies in the attitude towards life. to the confucian, a true human being does not contradict, jeopardise, or destroy one’s own life. and it is also true with regard to the life of others. thus, one knows a man worthy of being human only by his conducts which fulfill the aims of human life: preservation, prolong and development of life.34 but life can be preserved, prolonged and developed not by one’s own force alone, since it cannot be separated from the cosmic force which encompasses heavenly force (tien), earthly force (ti) and human force (ren). that means human life generates its own life by the co-operative force of other lives (the cosmic life, human life, etc.). in a single word, life is possible only by means of other lives.35 thus, one may say with confidence that human life is primarily cosmic life and social life. in this 88 prajñâ vihâra context, human nature is known as first cosmic nature and then as social nature. similarly, human essence is firstly cosmic essence and then as social essence. in the christian view, life is given by god, and rooted in god, therefore, man has no right to claim over one’s own life. even human participation in the divine life is not an act of human self-developing, but a special grace bestowed on them by god. evidently, the christian man is rather passive in comparison with the active confucian man. furthermore, as the logical consequence of human self-generation and self-determination, the meaning of human life is determined by one’s own contribution to this social essence. in other words, human nature cannot be understood albeit from social nature, since man reveals oneself through one’s own social acts, or better say, by means of one’s contribution to the growth of humanity.36 here is the reason why confucius reserved most times to the theme of humanity (jen), to the ways of being human (superior man, filial piety, righteousness, etc.).37 these themes are concerned with human acts in a society. better say, they are the practical categories, which any human being as a social being must take. not quite in the same line, christian view is centred on the divine grace and salvation. one cannot, due to human sin, free oneself from the external and internal conditions. thus, only by divine grace or by the intervention of god that man would be liberated. the incarnation of jesus christ and his redemption clearly indicate that man by himself is incapable of determinating his own fate. this dogma also suggests that while the substance of man is divine, his social nature is rather of accident character. the dualist separation of soul from body unmistakably sidelines the needs of human body, which constitute an essential part of human world. of course, this dogma has been slightly changed by the council fathers, when they adopted the view of social nature as a manifestation of divine nature. nevertheless, its substantial part remains intact, namely, human nature is divine, prior to the fall of adam and after the redemption. 3.2. christian view and the confucian view of life. i will not delve into their analysis of the difference between christianity and confucianism in general, which is quite interesting but, nonetheless, irrelevant for our discussion here. thus, for the sake of brevity and for a fruitful discussion, and as a logical consequence of the concept tran van doan 89 of human nature as social essence, one may venture to argue that human dignity must be understood in the following contexts: firstly, since human nature is shaped in the process of living, and since human beings are different by birth,38 then in order to attain this social essence, education is necessary: “by nature men are alike. through practice they have become apart.”39 education is an art of living, in the sense of living in accordance with human nature, social nature and the world nature. secondly, confucius insists on the fact that human nature can be evaluated by social (moral) standards. thus, to him, to obey rules, to respect social orders, to execute duty… contribute to what we may regard as human dignity. thirdly, social standards, laws are not beyond human capacity. they are for human beings and not the reverse.40 thus human dignity can be known through our most noble principles of existence, co-existence, and progress, just as in the more negative forces, which do harm to human existence, and human progress. from these main currents of thought, one easily finds that human nature is regarded not as something inborn, innate but as substantial products in the living process. if this view can represent the so-called eastern view, then it seems to be quite different, if not contrast to the west-christian view of human nature as imago dei, i.e. a pre-planned, pre-determined and unchangeable nature which human beings cannot change by any means. if there were some change, then this would be rather a change for worse, a change that is interpreted as original sin, the sinful decadence of humanity. of course, the difference between chinese culture and christian culture is not only seen in their different view on human nature. this is only one of many controversial points,41 which are sufficient to make doubtful the claim of universal of the west. the above mentioned differences are only a part of a deeper divergence that discourages any claim of a universal view on human nature. despite this seemingly unbridgeable divergence, it seems to me that lumen gentium had let the door open for more reasonable interpretation concerning human nature. it had made a tremendous progress in comparing to the old dogmas promulgated by earlier councils, especially by the council of trent (1545-1563), or declared and enforced 90 prajñâ vihâra by the so-called magisterium. due to the limit of this discussion, i will not repeat here the major contribution of lumen gentium to human understanding and to promote human dignity that i have referred elsewhere.42 i would prefer to conclude my paper with a conjecture of a possible convergence of different views, kind of a fusion of different horizons which gadamer has projected in his now becoming classical work: truth and method.43 conclusion the possibility of a common understanding of human dignity gadamer’s thesis of the fusion of horizons exposed in truth and method and in other works44 can be resumed in following main tenets: first, each tradition (each culture, each historical consciousness, each life) is like a horizon. in gadamer’s own words, horizon expresses or displays the “range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.”45 second, horizon changes with our own move, just as the range of vision is changing with the change of our life, or more exactly, with the change of our life-world. the change usually takes the form of widening (in space), or broadening (in terms of consciousness), and deepening. that means, the more our life-world is extending, the wider is our vision, the deeper is our consciousness, and the richer is our life. that is, the more cultures we encounter, the richer, wider, and deeper is our life-world. third, the widening, broadening and deepening of horizon follows a dialectical path: the next stage (vision) absorbs the actual stage and previous stages, just as the actual present stage includes all previous stages. of course, this kind of synthesis is not a non-reflective mathematical summing up, but a selective one, in the sense of hegel’s aufhebung. as such, human beings always possess a certain horizon, and his (her) horizon is permanently changing in the sense of self-enriching, self-broadening, self-deepening, and the like. the point here is such an expansion of horizon could be possible if and only if one has to move up, i.e. to expand one’s own life by going into other cultures (or life-worlds). tran van doan 91 the more one advances, the more one discovers one’s horizon expanding; the more one is rooted in other life-worlds, the more one is deepening one’s own horizon, and so on. to apply to culture, we can say analogously: the more cultures we learn, the wider is our life-world; the more open we are, the more possibility we may encounter; the deeper we dig in traditions, the deeper is our own historical consciousness. of course, not all human beings are able to expand their horizons, and not all horizon-expansion takes the dialectical course. followers of marx would rightly doubt gadamer’s over-optimistic expectation, by arguing that these horizons (cultures, religions) might have been manufactured (fabricated), falsified or instrumentalised; that we might have been alienated by the same cultures we are born in, etc. if so, then the so-called expansion of horizon is rather a regression back into the “darkness” of pre-enlightenment ages (habermas’ criticism of gadamer). in my view, habermas’ over caution of gadamer’s “uncritical” and “unreserved” attitude in favor of horizon-fusion has served as a good warning. however, in bottom, as habermas himself conceded later (after his debate with gadamer in the later 1970s), that his over-zealous defense of the so-called force of reason (of the enlightenment) does not contradict the hegelian insight that the spirit is in a permanent process toward the absolute, and that its process follows dialectical path.46 if so, then what habermas insisted is nothing new with regard to gadamer’s proposal. only one thing worth to be said is his insistence on reason as the guiding force behind the any act of fusing. following gadamer, and in line with traditione catholica, my reflective conclusion is, in the strictest sense, not a conclusion but, in contrast, an invitation for further reflection on the concept of human dignity. my main thesis is as follows: if human dignity means what is constituting human essence, and if this essence cannot be separated from other essences (the physical, the social, the spiritual, etc.), and if these essences form human nature, then any definition of human dignity in terms of divinity, or pure humanity, or in its material essence alone is perhaps incomplete and, consequently, misleading. just as any definition of human nature in terms of a single essence is rather dogmatic. one has to search for a more encompassing understanding of the concept of human dignity, divinity and humanity. as a corollary of my tentative proposal 92 prajñâ vihâra to understand human nature as social essence which reflects human deep and eternal aspiration for self-perfection by means of mutual, reciprocal and communicative activities i would venture to go a further step by arguing that the concept of human dignity, thanks to the new discovery of archeologists, anthropologists and biologists, has been significantly modified in the last century. similarly, the christian churches have made a revolution in redefining human beings, no longer in terms of immortality but also in terms of our existential worlds. as we have argued elsewhere, the concept of human dignity in lumen gentium (the constitution of the catholic church) is going through a process of self-renovating (aggiornamento), self-enriching, and self-bettering by means of cultural fusions. the recent apostolic exhortation of john-paul ii to the asian bishops conference, ecclesia in asia (the church in asia, 1999), most vividly reflects this wide and deep change: human nature, and consequently, human dignity must be understood in the context of human common concern, common vocation, and common aspiration for perfect life,47 which is implicitly found in almost all cultures. tran van doan 93 endnotes 1it is well known that almost all great religions have devoted most energy and resources to the cause of human rights. one of the greatest achievements of the council vatican ii is the church ’s determination to protect and to promulgate human rights. in fact, the vatican ii had devoted an entire section ix of the council on human rights. see the declaration on religious liberty dignitatis humanae (7 december 1965). recently, the muslims have also devoted more research to the issues of human rights. muffi university in iran, with the strong support of the iran government and the president of iran in person, had organised two international conferences on human rights in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 2aristotle had excluded the slaves just as the romans had denied to the non-romans the right of being human. similarly, the christians had been denied of basic rights by many states and governments. 3pascal’s criticism of cartesian rationalism as useless and uncertain (pensees, 2, 78, p. 361.). similarly, anatole france, a reputed french novelist, once remarked against justice, justice gives to everyone what he (she) deserves, to the riches property, to the poor poverty. 4council vatican ii, constitutio pastoralis de ecclesia in mundo huius temporis – gaudium et spes and lumen gentium in sacrosanctum oecumenicum concilium vaticanum ii, constitutiones, decreta, declarationes (vatican: liberia editrice vaticana, 1966). quotations with abbreviations: gs (gaudium et spes), lg (lumen gentium), dh (dignitatis humanae). for a specific discourse of the concept of human dignity in lumen gentium, see my work: tran van doan, “human dignity in lumen gentium.” paper presented at the international conference on christian philosophy and human dignity, fujen university, taipei, dec. 2002. further, i have objected to the so-called “universal understanding” of human rights. see my: tran van doan, whose rights? deception or illusion of monological thinking.” paper written for the international conference on human rights, muffi university, iran (april, 2001). 5the analects, 6:18: “to know it is not as good as to love it, and to love it is not as good as to take delight in it.” trans. by chan wing-tsit, a source book in chinese philosophy (new jersey: princeton university press, 1963). all english quotations in this paper are from chan wing-tsit. hereafter as chan. note that the followers of confucius like mencius and hsun-tze might have different view in their mind, when they searched for a metaphysical foundation of human nature. according to thaddeus hang, mencius argued for human self-perfection and for heaven mandate as the metaphysical foundation of human nature. starting from a reverse angle (human nature as evil), hsun-tze arrived at the same conclusion, human nature is grounded on the metaphysical principles of tien-tao (the way of heaven), and jen-tao (the way of man). see thaddeus hang, “the metaphysical background of mencius-hsun-tze’ concept of human nature” in chung-kuo ren-hsing lun, op. cit., pp. 68-71. for further discussion on this question, see also li ming-hui, 94 prajñâ vihâra “meng-tze yu kang-te di dz lu lun-li xuye” (autonomous morality of mencius and kant) (taipei, april, 1988), mentioned by thaddeus hang, op. cit., p. 63. 6the analects, 5: 12: “tzu-kung said, we can hear our master? [view] on culture and its manifestation, but we cannot hear his views on human nature and the way of heaven.” 7the analects, 11: 11: “tzu-lu asked about serving the spiritual beings. confucius said, “if we are not yet able to serve man, how can we serve spiritual beings?” 8according to the classification of prof. chan wing-tsit, op. cit., 6 sentences are 5: 12, 6: 17, 6: 19, 16: 9, 17: 2, and 17: 3. 9the analects, 6: 18. 10as seen in the thought of mencius, hsun-tse, wang yang-ming, chu-hsi, etc. 11the debate on human nature between mencius and hsun-tse may obscure the central doctrine of confucius on humanity. actually, even their so-called debate on the metaphysical foundation of human nature did not bear the same characteristic as seen in the debate of western philosophers. by regarding human nature either as originally good in se (mencius) or bad in se (hsun-tse), they did not contend that goodness or badness must be the real and universal foundation of human nature. actually, they wished to solve the enigma of our understanding and our revaluation of the so-called good and bad. 12the analects, 4: 16: “confucius said, “the superior man understands righteousness (i); the inferior man understands profit.” similarly, the analects, 4: 12: “confucius said, “the superior man thinks of virtue; the inferior man thinks of possessions.” 13the analects, 6: 28: “tzu-kung said, “if a ruler extensively confers benefit on the people and can bring salvation to all, what do you think of him? would you call him a man of humanity? confucius said, “why only a man of humanity? he is without doubt a sage. even yao and shun fell short of it.” 14the analects, 12: 7: “tzu-kung asked about government. confucius said, “sufficient food, sufficient armament, and sufficient confidence of the people.” 15the analects, 12: 7: “tzu-kung said, “forced to give up one of these, which would you abandon first?” confucius said, “i would aband on the armament.” tzu-kung said, “forced to give up one of the remaining two, which would you abandon first?” confucius said, “i would abandon food. there have been deaths from time immemorial, but no state exists without the confidence (social essence) of the people.” 16the analects, 12: 7. 17 id. 18hans-georg gadamer, truth and method. english translation by joel weinsheimer and donald g. marshall (london: sheed & ward ) pp. 273 ff. 19col. i, 15; lg i, 2. tran van doan 95 20lg i, 1: “cum autem ecclesia sit in christo veluti sacramentum seu signum et instrumentum intimae cum deo unionis totiusque generis humani unitatis, naturam missionemque suam universalem, praecedentium conciliorum argumento instans, pressius fidelibus suis et mundo universo declarare intendit.” 21this kind of understanding of human dignity is often repeated in almost all documents. in the declaratio de libertate religios (dignitas humanae), one reads: “primum itaque profitetur sacra synodus deum ipsum viam generi humano notam fecisse per quam, ipsi serviendo, homines in christo salvi et beati fieri possint.” (de iure personae…, dh 1); “homines vero cuncti tenentur veritatem, praesertim in iis quae deum eiusque ecclesiam respiciunt, quaerere eamque cognitam amplecti ac servare.” (dh 1). of course, human dignity can be known in terms of reason, morals, responsibility… also: “secundum dignitatem suam homines cuncti, quia personae sunt, ratione scilicet et libera voluntate praediti ideoque personali responsibilitate aucti, sua ipsorum natura impelluntur necnon morali tenentur obligatione ad veritatem quaerendam, illam imprimis quae religionem spectat.” in gaudium et spes, parts on “de homine ad imaginem dei, de hominis constitutione…”. 22 st augustine takes a theme (soliloquia 1, 8, 15) that was found in plato’s comparison of the idea of the good with the sun, according to which the idea of the good irradiating the subordinate intelligible objects or ideas. plato, republic, 514518. summa theologica, ia, 2, 3, 10.1, 13, etc. 23summa theologica, ia, 2, 3; 10. 1, 13, etc. 24 karl rahner, the widely acknowledged as one of the greatest theologians of the 20th century, has brilliantly expounded this thomistic idea in his now becoming classics gott in welt (innsbruck: tyrolia, 1943) and hoerer des wortes (muenchen 1947). 25 st. augustine, soliloquia, 3, 11, 26. 26 r. g. collingwood, the principles of art (london: oxford university press, 1958), pp. 67-68; see also peter winch, understanding a primitive society (london, 1967), p. 14. 27 g. f. hegel, phenomenology of spirit (1807). english translation of a.v. miller (oxford: oxford university press, 1977). 28 johannes b. metz, zur theologie der welt (1968), eng. trans. (et) by william glen-doepel, theology of the world (new york: herder and herder, 1969); juergen moltmann, k irche in der kraft des geistes (1975), et by margaret kohl, the church in the power of the spirit (san francisco: harper & row, 1977); r. munos, la iglesia en el pueblo (lima, 1983); aloysius pieris, an asian theology of liberation (maryknoll: orbis, 1988); lee jung-young, ed. an emerging theology in world perspective: commentary on korean minjung theology (mystic, conn.: twenty-third, 1988); r. s. sugirtharajah, ed., voices from the margin: interpreting the bible in the third world (maryknoll: orbis, 1991); leonardo boff and virgilio elizondo, ed., theologies of the third world: convergences and differences 96 prajñâ vihâra (edinburgh: t. & t. clark, 1988); song choan seng, third-eye theology: theology in formation in asian settings (maryknoll: orbis, 1982), and others. 29see the polemic declaration dominus iesus issued by joseph card. ratzinger, prefect of the sacred congregation for the doctrine of faith in 2000. in this declaration, asian philosophy, as long as it is understood as the opposite to the western rational thinking, is considered as incompatible with faith. though, as archbishop giuseppe bertone, the then secretary general of the congregation insisted, the declaration is consulted and accepted by asian bishops, its language seems to be a little bit inappropriate. how can asian philosophy, a very complex web of different thinking, be simplified and reduced into some rude ideas as seen in dominus iesus (2000)? 30the seemingly violent and arbitrary request from the occident (the usa in particular) that the world must follow its order (and values) is a case in point showing how impracticable is the belief in universal values, or unified science. the discordance about the meaning of human rights between the east and the west, the west and the muslims, etc. could not be settled down by means of violence, or as in the case of habermas, by the rational standards invented by rationalists. so long the west hegemony (and rationalism) still imposes their own order, criteria and values on other cultures, then not only misunderstandings but, more tragically, violent reaction would be unavoidable. see george f. mclean, hermeneutics for the global ages, introduction. (manuscript). the human tragedy does not arise from the break down of the babel tower but from the idea and the claim of human absolute power. the disorder after the tragedy of babel tower is the necessary consequence of such a claim. see my “the search for the pentecostal spirit” in the acts of the fourth international conference of the asian association of catholic philosophers: humanity in the 21st century: towards a new vision (seoul: the catholic university of korea, 2000), pp. 213-228. 31actually, no one can doubt that chinese culture (as we conceive today) and other cultures influenced by chinese culture) is far from purity. it is rather a continuing synthesis of different currents of thought like confucianism, buddhism, taoism, christianity and, particularly, the folklore culture. see tang yi-chieh, confucianism, buddhism, taoism, christianity and chinese culture (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1989). 32 the analects, 12: 5: “ssu ma niu worrying, said, “all people have brothers but i have none.” tzu-hisa said, “i have heard (from confucius) this saying: “life and death are the decree of heaven (ming); wealth and honor depend on heaven. if a superior man is reverential without fail, and is respectful in dealing with others and follows the rules of propriety, then all within the four seas (the world) are brothers. what does the superior man to have worry about having no brothers?” see also thome h. fang, chinese philosophy: its spirit and its development (taipei: linking, 1985), pp. 71-72. 33this idea was original in the chinese mind, as seen in their cosmological view. to say after taoism, and i-king, in thome fang’s words, the universe is the unified field of all existence, permeated with the spiritual meaning and value of life. tran van doan 97 thus, human life, like the cosmic life, creates and procreates continuously. in a word, life is perpetual creativity. see thome h. fang, the chinese view of life, pp. 27-52. 34see my other article: tran van doan, “confucianism: survival or revival” in korean studies – its cross-cultural perspective (seoul: the academy of korean studies, 1990), pp. 197-222; chinese text in chung-hwa wen-hwa qwo-chuy he wei-lai (taipei, peking, shanghai, 1991), pp. 243-255. 35the predominant importance of the concept of jen in the confucian body of learning is the most evident showing this idea. in the analects alone, there are at least 27 passages referring to jen. but more important, almost the whole content of the analects, the doctrine of the means and the great learning and the mencius, is concerning with jen. 36the analects, 4: 2: “the man of humanity is naturally at ease with humanity. the man of wisdom cultivates humanity for its advantage”; 4: 3: “confucius said, “only the man of humanity knows how to love people and hate people”; 4: 4: “confucius said, “if you set your mind on humanity, you will be free from evil.” 37in fact, the analects is full with passages or quotations on humanism (6: 20; 10: 12; 11: 11; 12: 22; 15: 28; 18: 6); on humanity (jen) (1: 2, 3, 6; 3: 3; 4: 2-6; 6: 20, 21, 28; 7: 6, 29; 8: 7; 12: 1, 2, 22; 13: 19, 27; 14: 30; 15: 8, 32, 35; 17: 6, 8; 19: 6); on rectification of names (12: 11, 17; 13: 3, 6); on superior man (abundant passages), etc. see chan, p. 18. 38the analects, 6: 19: “to those who are above average, one may talk of higher things, but may not do so to those who are below average.” 39the analects, 17: 2. note that similar idea also found in the taoist tradition. taoists like lao-tse and chuang-tse do not regard the business of searching for an exact definition of human nature as important as we may think. in tao te king, we find three chapters dealing with humanity and righteousness (chaps. 18, 19, 38), but none of a definition. lao-tse describes human nature in a genetic process of birth and death: “when the great tao declines, the doctrines of humanity and righteousness arose.” since i am not familiar with buddhism, i would not venture in this unknown area. just a point to be said, since buddhism has been incorporated into chinese culture, it is certainly no longer purely indian. it reflects a part of the chinese view of human nature. as seen in the fa-tsang and hua-yen school, only through moral exercise, practice that one can free oneself from the karma. such a doctrine leads logically to the view that human nature is shaped by human own acts of moral purification. 40the analects, 13:18. 41see fu pei-jung, “chinese thought and christianity”, in collectanea theologica (fujen university, 1978), pp. 215 ff. in this article prof. fu presents as much as 10 different doctrines between christianity and chinese culture, such as the controversy on the original sin, the absolute god, the concept of transcendence, the absolute difference between god and human beings, the salvation through christ, etc.; also in a. b. chang, dann sind himmel und mensch in einheit. bausteine 98 prajñâ vihâra chinesischer theologie (freiburg, 1984), pp. 70-74. such ideas are developed further by fu in his more comprehensive monograph: communication between confucianism and christianity (taipei: ye-chang pub. house, 1988). i have developed further the ideas of chang and fu in my study: tran van doan, “ueberlegungen zu einer asiatischen theologie” in zeitschrift fuer missionswissenschaft und religionswissenchaft (75 jubilaeumsausgabe, muenster, 1985), pp. 172-79; and tran van doan, toward a viet-theology (washington, d.c.: vietnam university press, 2002). 42cf. tran van doan, “human dignity in lumen gentium.” paper presented at the international conference on christian philosophy and human dignity (fujen university, december 2002). this paper will be published in a special volume edited by george f. mclean (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 2003). 43hans-georg gadamer, truth and method, op. cit., pp. 306-7, 374-5. 44for a more detailed discussion of gadamer’s concept of horizons-fusion, see richard bernstein, beyond objectivism and relativism (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 1985), part on gadamer. see also my work: tran van doan, “pluralistic culture versus cultural pluralism.” paper presented at the xxth world congress of philosophy, istanbul, august 2003. 45truth and method, p. 302. 46juergen habermas, der philosophische diskurs der moderne: zwoelf vorlesungen (frankfurt a. m.: suhrkamp, 1985). eng. translation by frederick lawrence: the philosophical discourse of modernity – twelve lectures (boston: beacon press, 1987). 47cf. john-paul ii, ecclesia in asia. english translation in the origins 29/ 23 (18 november 1999), pp. 358-384. ecclesia in asia (the church in asia) is an apostolic exhortation of pope john-paul ii addressing to the catholics in asia during the synod of asian bishops in new delhi (india) (6 november 1999). for comments, see peter phan, composed and edited, the asian synod: text and commentaries (maryknoll, new york: orbis book, 2002). tran van doan 99 article 4-2 110 theological perspectives on religious experience francis cais, std saengtham college, thailand in a. d. 627 the monk paulinus visited king edwin in northern england to persuade him to accept christianity. he hesitated and decided to summon his advisers. at the meeting one of them stood up and said: “your majesty, when you sit at table with your lords and vassals, in the winter when the fire burns warm and bright on the hearth and the storm is howling out side, bringing the snow and the rain, it happens allof a sudden that a little bird flies into the hall. it comes in at one door and flies out through the other. for the few moments that it is inside the hall, it does not feel the cold, but as soon as it leaves your sight, it returns to the dark of winter. it seems to me that the life of human being is much the same. we do not know what went before and we do not know what follows. if the new doctrine can speak to us surely of these things, it is well for us to follow it.” they found the answer they sought in the message of jesus.1 philosophy and religion every generation and every person must ask questions about the meaning of existence. it is natural for a person to question the meaning of life. the growing child puts question after question. for the moment, it seems satisfied with the answers given it. but the grown person still keeps on asking questions until he/she comes to the deepest questions that he/she can ask of him/herself: the question which is always greater than any answer a person can find of himself or herself: who am i? what is human being? what is this creature that comes into the brightness and warmth of the human day, hurrying on his way from the mystery of his origin to the mystery of his end? what is the meaning of life? what is the point of this world? the question can be posed in various terms but it remains the same question. at the beginning of the third millennium it is still the same enigma which man is always asked to solve, not a game which one can stand aside from, but the question of each man’s happiness 110 prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 110-137 © 2000 by assumption university press 111 and of his aim in life. it is the question whether life itself has a goal. or is the question academic, something to occupy a leisure hour, more a reverie than a serious challenge? both philosophy and religion began with a person’s or a people’s quest for answers to ultimate realities: the source of life, the why of life, the how of life, and the whither of life. this quest for ultimate meanings in life, led eventually to a god-experience and the knowledge that there is an ultimate reality in a sacred cosmos which is integrally related with the human cosmos and which is somehow the source and cause of all that is and all that happens in the human cosmos. whether this ultimate reality is to be found within creation or outside of creation, it is experienced as the power behind the fragile structures of everyday life and understood to be the ground and source of all life. as such, this ultimate reality is understood to be perfect, unlimited and all-powerful. together with this experience of god is the awareness that human wellbeing requires that one should establish a relationship with the god so experienced. since god is the ground and source of all life and the power behind all that happens in the world, any relationship with god includes a relationship with the world that belongs to god. every experience of god comes to a particular people in a particular time and place. using the power of imagination, and what is known in their own cultural worldview, (namely, values, attitudes, images, language and artifacts) they create an ordered system or framework of symbols (words, institutions, artifacts, actions) that express what the community understands about god and the proper way to relate with god, and with the world that belongs to god. this symbol system can be said to represent a religion’s ideological system. “a religion, as a cumulative tradition, is made up of the expressions of faith of people in the past. it can include scriptures and theology, ethical teachings and prayers, architecture, music, and art, and patterns of teaching and preaching. religion, in this sense, gives forms and patterns for the shaping of the faith of present and future persons. religions are the cumulative traditions that we inherit in all of their varieties of forms. religious faith, on the other hand, is the personal appropriation of a relationship to god through and by means of a religious tradition.”2 in time this system of symbols is thematized and encoded in rituals, codes of behavior and francis cais 111 112 intellectual representations such as scriptures, creeds, and doctrines. these religious texts are then institutionalized; that is, officially established as the orthodox (straight, right, true) expression of a people’s religious ideology. as the religion moves forward in time and geography, its scholars and pastors will continually reflect on ways to explain the meaning of the original god-experience to the present generation of believers. this becomes a religion’s theology, which is handed on in the tradition.3 christian theology the english word “theology” is a composite of two greek words: theos and logia. theos translates as divinity or god; it refers to the universal idea of god as the absolute reality or absolute other, or absolute transcendent being and not to any particular god. logos means word; logia has the meaning of saying words about something. so, “theology” means to say words about god and all things in the light of god. if one will speak about something, that is, “say words” about it, this implies that there has been some thinking, reflecting, understanding that is orderly, rational and logical within a culture’s understanding of rational and logical talk. therefore, the word “theology” carries the deeper meaning of “reasoned-talk about god.” christian theology is the product of a critical dialogue between two poles: the pole of the judeo-christian tradition and the pole of presentday experiences. the word “tradition” comes from the latin word traditio that means “the action of handing over” or “the action of handing down information, beliefs, customs, by word of mouth, example, or signs (words, artifacts, gestures, and rituals).” “tradition” in the theological context, therefore, means handing over or handing on to others what our ancestors have said about god and all things in the light of this god. for christians, their ancestors in faith are those who belonged to the jewish and christian religions, those who believed and lived the judeo-christian understanding of god. they attain their “religious” identity only in and through a tradition. and, they express their relationships with god in the context of a religious tradition. a study of theology calls christians to know, understand, and be able to critique the tradition of their ancestors in religion so as to have a clearer understanding of their religious identity 112 prajñâ vihâra 113 in the present day. but the contents of their tradition were written in other times and by other peoples. so, before they can know and understand the meaning of the content of the tradition, they need to examine the particular historical, social, and cultural context within which it was written. if we push this subject a little further, christians are led to ask: “where did our ancestors get their knowledge of god; where did they get this tradition that they handed on to us?” the answer to this question is: a founding god-experience which is re-interpreted and re-interpreted through the ages as the religion spreads in time and place. christianity’s founding god-experience at the heart of religion is a people’s experience of and response to someone or something perceived to be the ultimate reality who/which is wholly other than human reality. this ultimate reality has been called by an infinite number of names. in the judeo-christian tradition, the ultimate reality is called “yahweh, god” in the old testament; “abba, father” in the new testament; and “triune god or trinity” in christianity. moreover, the social, cultural and political context within which god is experienced will determine the way the experience is interpreted. this, in turn, determines the way theology is done. christianity’s founding god-experience is the whole life of the human and historical person, jesus of nazareth: his ministry, passion, death and resurrection. in other words, it is in and through the whole of jesus that christians experience god, know god, know about god, and know how to live in relation with the whole world because of their relation with god. when the early disciples reflected on their experiences with jesus, they realized that with him and because of him, they received the life-giving power of yahweh. this power of life was available for all, but especially for those who were the outcasts in jewish society; for those who had been cut off from the religious life of the jewish people because they had some kind of “unforgivable” sin. jesus reached out to these people, forgave their sins, and created a community of disciples commissioned to do as he had done: forgive one another, love those who hate you, wash each other’s feet. in such a life was life. living his words and following his example, within a community of disciples, they francis cais 113 114 were more alive. this knowledge was then interpreted primarily, but not only, from the perspective of the old testament understanding of god. yahweh is a god who creates; a god who has the will and capacity to call forth and sustain life. god created the world and all that is in it, and continues to create a life-world of order, vitality, and fruitfulness that makes life possible and that, in the end, is judged by god to be ‘very good’. god’s creating activity is most dramatically visible in his creation of a people, the people of israel. “i am the lord, your holy one, the creator of israel, your king.” (is 43:15) yahweh intends not only to create a world, but to create a certain kind of world, a world characterized by justice, righteousness and steadfast love, that is aimed at giving life to the needy: the stranger, the widow and the orphan. yahweh’s power of life is a power of generous life for all, no matter their position in society. but, yahweh’s power of life is especially generous to the needy. yahweh’s power of life overthrows the power of chaos: a society whose sociopolitical structures rob the weak of a chance for life. thus, god’s gift of the power of life has a strong ethical dimension. the vocation of israel is to be the community that testifies, by life and word, that the generosity of god is more powerful than the ideology of greed, which diminishes creation and makes human life yet more desperate. the life-giving activities of jesus were the same as the life-giving activities of yahweh in the history of israel. the ethical teachings of jesus were the same as those given by yahweh to israel. and, when followed, the results were the same. since god alone is the source of this life, the life-energy (spirit) at work in jesus and which flowed from jesus to others, must be from god. therefore, god must be present and actively at work in and through the person of jesus of nazareth. at the death of jesus, people would say “truly this man was god’s son” (mt. 27:54; mk 15:39). at pentecost, the small community of disciples experienced themselves receiving the spirit (life-energy) of jesus and now knew themselves able to preach in word and action, the same life-giving “good news” that jesus preached. the resurrection was a sign that god had forgiven them of their sin of crucifying his son and now they were to preach a life-giving message of forgiveness and reconciliation. a careful study of the new testament makes it clear that the early church’s understanding of jesus was definitely theological, god114 prajñâ vihâra 115 centered. the events in the history of the people of israel told the jewish people what god was “like.” now the events in the life of jesus told the same story about god. thus, from their knowledge of god in the old testament, they concluded that it was one and the same god who was acting in and through jesus. yahweh, god is the “abba, father” of jesus. and, jesus is the “anointed” of yahweh, the christ of yahweh. john’s gospel, for instance, recognizes this by having jesus say “the son can do nothing by himself; he does only what he sees the father doing; what the father does, the son does, too.” (jn 5:19) more general is the insight shared by all the traditions that the empowerment of jesus to function as prophet and healer comes from god’s own healing and life-giving spirit. the mystery of god’s creative spirit pervades the whole history of god’s loving self-gift. jesus’ ministry takes its meaning from this broader context of god’s activity in the whole of creation and history. while there was a unique and normative inspiriting of jesus, the mission of god’s spirit is not limited to jesus alone. jesus’ own existing and identity as the risen christ involves a relatedness to all other humans; he is the first-born of the “new creation.” in and through his risen life, he is related to all human persons and he shares with them that spirit by which he lives. while the manifestation of god’s creative spirit working in jesus was very limited during jesus’ earthly lifetime by the bounds of space and time, that limitation no longer held after jesus’ death. for the christian, jesus of nazareth, the christ of god, is the way and the means to god because god “speaks” in and through jesus and by sharing in the spirit of jesus, we are able to “speak” to god. jesus is the “word” god speaks to us and jesus is the “word” we speak to god. revelation and faith christians recognize that this knowledge lies beyond the normal reach of human inquiry. it is a revelation, i.e. a free manifestation by god, the initial action by which god emerges from his hiddenness, calls man, and invites him to a covenant-existence. the concept of revelation is of constitutive importance for the whole christian life. vatican council ii states that “it pleased god, in his goodness and wisdom, to reveal himself and to make known the mystery of his will (cf. eph 1:9). his will francis cais 115 116 was that men should have access to the father, through christ, the word made flesh, in the holy spirit, and thus become sharers in the divine nature (cf. eph 2:18; 2 pt 1:4).”4 god, who ‘dwells in unapproachable light’ (1 tm 6:16), wants to communicate his own divine life to the human persons he freely created, in order to adopt them as his sons and daughters in his only-begotten son. by revealing himself god wishes to make them capable of responding to him, and of knowing him and of loving him far beyond their own natural capacity. the act of faith, which is a person’s positive response to revelation, is a personal adherence of one’s whole being to god who reveals himself. it involves an assent of the intellect and will to the self-revelation god has made through his deeds and words. “to believe” has thus a twofold reference: to the person and to the truth; to the truth, by trust in the person who bears witness to it. faith is a gift from god. in order to believe a person needs the interior help of the holy spirit. but it is no less true that believing is an authentically human act, conscious and free. “trusting in god and cleaving to the truths he has revealed is contrary neither to human freedom nor to human reason. even in human relations it is not contrary to our dignity to believe what other persons tell us about themselves and their intentions, or to trust their promises (for example, when a man and a woman marry) to share a communion of life with one another. if this is so, still less is it contrary to our dignity to yield by faith the full submission of intellect and will to god who reveals, and to share in an interior communion with him.”5 faith is the knowledge born of god’s love flooding our hearts. pascal remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know. here by reason bernard lonergan would understand the compound of the activities on the first three levels of cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging. by the heart’s reasons, then, lonergan would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values. the two aspects of such responses are: the absolute aspect, that is a recognition of value, and the relative aspect, that is a preference of one value over another. finally, by the heart he would understand the subject on the existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love. “the meaning, then, of pascal’s remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, 116 prajñâ vihâra 117 understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love.”6 the rational basis of faith it is a postulate of christian faith that one called by god is always likewise called to love others and share his faith with them. faith is meant for all, because “god wants everyone to be saved and reach full knowledge of the truth” (1 tm 2:4). the love that is required by faith and that belongs to its innermost nature does not exclude the other’s need for truth. if it did, it would refuse to respond to his most urgent need. the faith that reaches out to the other reaches out of necessity to his questioning as well, to his need for truth; it enters into this need, shares in it, for it is only by sharing in the question that word becomes answer. the rationality of faith develops of necessity from the love that is intrinsic to it: the love that comes from faith must be a prudent love that is not content with providing the other with bread but also teaches him to see. a love that gives less or that is unwilling on principle to extend itself to the other’s need for truth fails to attain a genuinely human level and is consequently not love in the full sense of the word. but when love gives the ability to see, as it is so beautifully portrayed in the story of the healing of the man born blind (jn 9), faith is not just a blind gesture, an empty confidence, an adherence to a secret doctrine or the like. on the contrary, it wants to open people’s eyes, to open their eyes to truth. faith, as the new testament understands it, is more than a fundamental trust; it is my yes to a content that compels my belief. the existence of this content is a structural constituent of christian faith, because he whom christians believe is not just any human person but the logos, the word of god, in whom is contained the meaning of the world its truth. for the christian, however, the learned person is not the one who knows and can do the most, but the one who has become most human. one can neither become nor be that without letting oneself be touched by him who is the ground and measure of human being and of all being. that is why a very simple person who bears within himself a sense of values and, thus, a sensitivity toward others, toward what is right and francis cais 117 118 beautiful and true, is immeasurably more learned than the most experienced technocrat with his computer brain. augustine experienced this in the case of his mother monica: while he, with his friends, all of whom came from the academic world, struggled helplessly with the basic problems of humanity, he was struck again and again by the interior certainty of this simple woman. with astonishment and emotion, he wrote of her: “she stands at the pinnacle of philosophy.”7 “faith seeks understanding”8: it is intrinsic to faith that a believer desires to know better the one in whom he has put his faith, and to understand better what he has revealed; a more penetrating knowledge will in turn call forth a greater faith, increasingly set afire by love. in the words of st. augustine, “i believe, in order to understand; and i understand, the better to believe.”9 theology has been well defined as “faith seeking understanding”. the theologian cannot be content to analyze and present abstract concepts of revelation in isolation from the rest of reality. he must confront revelation in the concrete shape and circumstances in which it comes to the human person, and reflect on its relationship to the totality of what one knows, or thinks to know. beside the knowledge coming from revelation as expressed by the judeochristian tradition, the other dialogue partner in the theological process is the knowledge gained from critical reflection on present-day experiences. this knowledge is called “experiential knowledge” to distinguish it from knowledge we get from learning what others have said about a subject. faith and experience faith, accordingly, is the knowledge born of god’s love flooding our hearts. being in love with god, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. all love is self-surrender, but being in love with god is being in love without qualifications. as lonergan puts it, “to be in love is to be in love with someone. to be in love without qualifications or conditions or reservations or limits is to be in love with someone transcendent. when someone transcendent is my beloved, he is in my heart, real to me from within me. when that love is the fulfilment of my 118 prajñâ vihâra 119 unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence through intelligence and truth and responsibility, the one that fulfils that thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth and goodness. since he chooses to come to me by a gift of love for him, he himself must be love. since loving him is my transcending myself, it is also the denial of the self to be transcended. since loving him means loving attention to him, it is prayer, meditation, contemplation. since love of him is fruitful, it overflows into love of all those that he loves or might love. finally, from an experience of love focused on mystery there wells forth a longing for knowledge, while love itself is a longing for union; so for the lover of the unknown beloved the concept of bliss is knowledge of him and union with him, however they may be achieved.”10 the question of experience and faith has acquired more and more urgency in the theological dialogue of recent years; a number of studies have touched upon it and produced important insights, but many problems have, of necessity, been left unsolved. the purpose of this paper is not to offer something new or even to give a more or less comprehensive survey of the discussion to date but simply to clarify some of the basic concepts that suggest themselves. above all, it will not attempt a clear definition of what has still not been satisfactorily explained namely, the concept of “experience” itself, which gadamer has numbered among “those concepts that have yet to be elucidated.”11 experience is the encounter by a conscious human subject of any reality in a way that leads the subject to respond to that reality and to critically appropriate that encounter as an event in his or her personal history. understood in this way, an experience entails at least three elements: encounter with a reality, response to that reality and appropriation of that encounter into one’s personal history. religious experience then may be described broadly as any depth experience, which brings the subject into an immediate contact or a relationship with the sustaining ground of life, i.e. with god. the desire for god is written in the human heart, because man is created by god and for god; and god never ceases to draw man to himself. only in god will he find the truth and happiness he never stops searching for. vatican council ii states: “the dignity of man rests above all on the fact that he is called to communion with god. this invitation to converse with god is addressed francis cais 119 120 to man as soon as he comes into being. for, if man exists it is because god created him through love, and through love continues to hold him in existence. he cannot live fully according to truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and entrusts himself to his creator”12 although a person can forget god or reject him, god never ceases to call every person to seek him, so as to find life and happiness. but this search for god demands of the human person every effort of intellect, a sound will, ‘an upright heart’, as well as the witness of others who teach him to seek god. st. augustine, reflecting on his experience, prayed: “you are great, o lord, and greatly to be praised: great is your power and your wisdom is without measure. and man, so small a part our creation, wants to praise you: this man, though clothed with mortality and bearing the evidence of sin and the proof that you withstand the proud. despite everything, man, though but a small part of your creation, wants to praise you. you yourself encourage him to delight in your praise, for you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you”13 i should like to present and expound upon four basic themes in which are expressed the main aspects of the relationship between experience and faith.14 1. experience as the basis of all knowledge we begin with an aristotelian axiom that thomas aquinas reduced to the formula: “there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses” sensory perception is the indispensable gateway to all knowledge as such. this basic concept of the doctrine of cognition was so significant for thomas that he applied only to the realm of cognition the basic anthropological formula that defines human being as a spirit contained in a body in such a way that the two are inseparably intertwined. his formula “the soul is the form of the body” regards body and soul as so fused that together they form but one existential entity. if this is so if, on the one hand, it pertains to the nature of the human spirit to be able to exist only as the form of the body, and if, on the other hand, it pertains to the nature of human corporality to be the expression of spirit then it follows that the way of human cognition always requires the combination of corporal instrument and spiritual appropriation. of necessity, then, all human knowledge must have a sensory structure; it 120 prajñâ vihâra 121 must have its beginning in experience, in the perception of the senses. thomas extended this view (which was shocking from the point of view of the then reigning augustinian-platonic tradition) to the knowledge of god as well. in fact, he had no choice but to do so. for if it is correct to say that in a human person spirit exists only as incarnate, then this epistemological theory cannot be limited to a particular realm of thought: it is valid for every kind of human knowledge. thus it was clear to thomas that we cannot know god except through the senses and that even our way of thinking about god is dependent on, and mediated by, sense perception. what we have discovered first from a philosophical view of mankind is confirmed when we examine the pedagogical method of holy scripture and especially of jesus himself. jesus taught consistently in the form of parables and the parable was obviously not, in this case, just a pedagogical trick that could be eliminated without loss. in his farewell words, jesus states explicitly that the parable is the way in which knowledge of the faith is to be realized in this world (jn 16:25); in the synoptics, too, the parable appears as the structure by which access is to be had to the mystery of the kingdom of god (mk 4:10-11). if we look more closely, we see that the parable has a twofold structure: the content of faith is made transparent in the reality of the senses, and this knowledge of the faith has, in its turn, a reciprocal effect on the world of the senses, making it comprehensible as a movement that transcends itself. there is no question here of a grafting onto a content that is in itself neutral with respect to god of a religious application that, in the last analysis, is alien to the earthly content and remains exterior to it; rather, there appears in the parable precisely that which is essential to sensory reality itself. the parable does not approach our experience of the world from without; on the contrary, it is the parable that gives this experience its proper depth and reveals what is hidden in things themselves. reality is self-transcendence, and when human being is led to transcend it, he not only comprehends god but, for the first time, also understands reality and enables himself and creation to be what they were meant to be. only because creation is parable can it become the word of parable. that is why the material of daily living can always lead francis cais 121 122 beyond itself; that is why a history can take place in it that both transcends it and is profoundly conformable to it. 2. limits of experience whatever is discovered to exist, god always transcends it, “god is always greater.” in other words, precisely when we are most aware of the potentiality of the sensory world for revealing god, we must, at the same time, hold fast to the knowledge that god alone is divine; that he can be seen only when i do not stand still, but regard experience as a road and set out upon it. r. brague offers the following trenchant formulation of this concept: “god alone is divine. anyone who makes the experience of god his final goal is interested only in his own psychology. left to itself, experience is satisfied with too little.”15 the answer that comes from faith brings about a permanent widening of his inquiry. the reality of god is greater than all our experiences, even our experience of god. that is why faith cannot be transmitted simply as a matter of supply and demand, and why it cannot be satisfied with what human being is content to ask. so limited, it would no longer be able to let its own radiance shine forth but would constrict human being and dull his sensibilities. for human being asks too little of his own accord and even that little he does not ask rightly. from this perspective, we can now broaden and deepen our earlier insights. faith starts with experience, but it cannot be limited by any experience that happens to present itself. on the contrary, faith gives rise to a whole dynamics of new experiences. the always greater god can be known only in the transcendence of the always “more”, in the constant revision of our experiences. thus faith and experience form the continuum of a road that must go farther and farther. only by keeping step with the always new transcendence of faith can we come at last to the true “experience of faith”. 3. stages of experience having considered the relationship between faith and experience, we are ready now to examine and differentiate more precisely the various stages in the concept of experience itself. experience is a multidimensional concept. throughout this section, i adhere closely to the 122 prajñâ vihâra 123 ideas presented by jean mouroux, which were adopted and developed further by w. beinert.16 3.1. mouroux calls the first stage empirical experience. empirical experience is the immediate and uncritical perception by the senses that is common to all of us. we see the sun rise; we see it set. we see a train pass. we see colors; and so forth. this manner of experience is, certainly, the beginning of all knowledge, but it is always superficial and inexact. and therein lies its danger. because of its immediate certainty, it can be an obstacle to deeper knowledge; because of the superficial empiricism of what it seems to have perceived without ambiguity, it leads to falsity if the impression is accepted as final and definitive. there is no need to confine these observations to the region of faith alone, for the insight into the possibility and the necessity of criticizing “empirical experience” is the starting point of the natural sciences. in fact, the natural sciences came into existence precisely because human being had learned to criticize and exceed the impressions received by his senses. the dispute that centered round galileo was, in part, also a dispute about the meaning and limitation of sensory experience, about the relationship between perception and understanding. the real substance of the dispute was actually something quite different from what we usually imagine it to have been. galileo’s opponents were aristotelian empiricists, whereas galileo himself was a platonist who, therefore, put more emphasis on understanding than on sensory experience. as empiricists, his aristotelian opponents defended sensory perception, which clearly saw the sun rise and set and, therefore, encircle the earth. in his thesis, galileo rejected what everyone can see. the same is true of the laws of gravity, which never actually occur in reality as galileo formulated them, but are a mathematical abstraction and, for that reason, also contrary to our immediate experience. modern natural science is built on the rejection of pure empiricism, on the superiority of thinking over seeing. in his fundamental exposition of the theory of evolution, jacques monod has offered a most stimulating proof that modern natural science is ultimately platonism, that it is based on the superiority of thought over experience, of the ideal over the empirical, and that it has its source in the fundamental notion that reality is composed of intellectual structures and can, francis cais 123 124 consequently, be known more exactly by thought than by mere perception.17 hence this notion is valid not only in the realm of faith; we can quite generally say that, while “empirical experience” is the necessary starting point of all human knowledge, it becomes false if it does not let itself be criticized in terms of knowledge already acquired, and if it does not open the door to new experiences. 3.2. with this we come to the second stage of experience, which jean mouroux calls “experimental”, as opposed to empirical experience. we can safely say that this second stage, to which belong all the modern natural sciences, is based on the juxtaposition of the aristotelian axiom: “there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses” and the platonic corrective: “there is nothing in the senses without the prior action of the intellect”. the senses experience nothing if no question has been raised, if there is no preceding command from the intellect without which sensory experience cannot take place. experimentation is possible only if natural science has elaborated an intellectual presupposition in terms of which it controls nature and on the basis of which it can bring about new experiences. in other words, it is only when the intellect sheds light on sensory experience that this sensory experience has any value as knowledge and that experiences thus become possible. the progress of modern science is produced by a history of experiences that is made possible by the repeated critical interaction and reciprocal prolongation of these experiences and by the inner bond of the whole. the question that raised the possibility of constructing, let us say, a computer could not even have been asked in the beginning, but became possible only in the continuum of an experiential history of experiences newly generated by thought. up to this point, the structure of the experience of faith is completely analogous to that of the natural sciences; both have their source in the dynamic link between intellect and senses from which there is constructed a path to deeper knowledge. but we must point, here, also to a crucial difference. in a scientific experiment, the object of experience is not free. the experiment depends, rather, on the fact that nature is controlled (which is why heidegger labeled the technique ge-stell: a “set-up”). r. brague expresses it this way: “because we have removed from it everything that might be a freedom (vagueness, 124 prajñâ vihâra 125 contingency, etc.), it can become the object of science.”18 it is, of course, also possible to experiment with a person. one attempts to control the person in terms of what is tangible, of what does not depend on his freedom. we know from the modern human sciences how much we can actually learn about human being in this way. it is, in fact, possible to learn so much that it is easy to imagine there is nothing more to be learned; that one has “controlled” the whole person by this “set-up”. “however, what is personal” in human being cannot be controlled in this way, but “reveals itself voluntarily through speech”.19 3.3. we have arrived now at the third type of experience, which mouroux calls “experiential” and beinert translates as “existential” experience.20 it is an experience that accepts the intellectual principle we have discussed above but, at the same time, permits the freedom which is its own specific characteristic. it has its source in the already described bond between intellectual assimilation and a constantly renewed influx of experience. moreover, it gives free play to the experience itself and lets itself be led “where it would rather not go” (cf. jn 21: 18). the decisive factor is not control but letting oneself be controlled. an integral part of this latter process is acceptance of the experience of non-experience, which is the only way one can reach a higher level. let us quote hans urs von balthasar on this subject: “it can be said with certainty that there is no christian experience that is not the fruit of the overcoming of one’s own self-will or, at least, the determination to overcome it. and with this self-will we must include also all our willful efforts to evoke religious experiences on the basis of our own initiative and by our own methods and techniques.”21 “it is only when we renounce all partial experiences that the wholeness of being will be bestowed upon us. god requires unselfish vessels into which to pour his own essential unselfishness.”22 this last point is essential. to say that god is trinitarian means, in fact, to confess that he is self-transcendence, “unselfishness”, and, consequently, that he can be known only in what reflects his own nature. from this there follows an important conclusion: the being-led to a religious experience, which must start in the place where human being finds himself, can yield no fruit if it is not, from the beginning, directed to the acquisition of a readiness for renunciation. the moral training that, in a francis cais 125 126 certain sense, belongs to the natural sciences, as does the asceticism of transcenence, becomes more radical here because of the meeting of the two freedoms. in any event, it is inseparable from training in the acquisition of religious knowledge. from this perspective, we can understand why the fathers of the church regarded the basic formulation of religious knowledge as such this teaching from the sermon on the mount: “happy are the pure in heart: they shall see god” (mt 5:8). here it is a question of “seeing”. the possibility of “seeing” god, that is, of knowing him at all, de-pends on one’s purity of heart, which means a comprehensive process in which human being becomes transparent, in which he does not remain locked in upon himself, in which he learns to give himself and, in doing so, becomes able to see. from the perspective of christian faith, we might say that religious experience in its most exalted christian form bears the mark of the cross. it embraces the basic model of human existence, the transcendence of self. the cross redeems, it enables us to see. and now we discover that the structure of which we are speaking is not just structure; it reveals content as well. 4. christian experience after this general analysis of experience, i propose, by way of conclusion, to present the specific nature of christian experience. christian experience begins in the ordinary course of communal experience, but it relies, for its future course, on the extent and richness of the experiences already accumulated throughout history by the world of faith. we are made capable of this transcendence of the place where we find ourselves and of the things we would ask of our own accord, because we see before us the transcendence that has already occurred in the world of faith, which, as it were, lets itself be contemplated there and invites our participation. the community of believers, the church is the place of accumulated experience, and encourages participation in the experience she has to offer. we might say, in fact, that the church, as a place of experience, is, in a threefold way, the source of new personal experience: 4.1. the communal life of faith and liturgical worship in the church offers what might be called experiential support. in mutual faith, in praying, celebrating, rejoicing, suffering and living together, the church 126 prajñâ vihâra 127 becomes a “community” and thus a genuine living space for human being where faith can be experienced as a force that sustains him or her, both in his daily routine and in the crises of his existence. 4.2. one who truly believes, who lets himself or herself be matured by faith, begins to become a light for others; he becomes a source of support to whom others can turn for help. it is quite normal in the early stages of faith for one who has not yet mastered the logic of faith to say to oneself: this or that person is better informed and has more experience than i; if he believes, then there must be something in this faith, and i want to believe as he does. it is at first, as it were, a kind of borrowed faith in which one does not yet comprehend the content of what one believes, but has confidence in a convincing living embodiment of it, and thus opens the way to one’s own growth. it is at first a secondhand faith, which is, at the same time, an access to faith “at firsthand”, to a personal encounter with the lord. for all that, we shall always experience faith to some extent “at second hand”, for it is our human destiny to need one another, even where there is question of ultimate realities. 4.3. a higher form of this daily phenomenon that is one of the essential functions of the church may be found in the person of the saint. the saints, as the living personifications of a faith actually experienced and tested, of a transcendence actually experienced and confirmed, are themselves, we might say, places into which one can enter, in which faith as experience has been, as it were, stored, anthropologically seasoned and brought near to our own lives. in the last analysis, it is by the gradually ripening and deepening participation in these experiences that there grows in us that experience which is called in the psalms and in the new testament “the tasting of god” (ps 34:8; 1 pet 2:3; heb 6:4). here one rests in reality itself; one no longer believes “at secondhand”. certainly, we must say with bernard of clairvaux and the great mystical teachers of all times that such an experience can be but a “brief moment.” in this life, it can be no more than an initial foretaste that must not become an end in itself. for, if it did, faith would become self-satisfaction instead of self-transcendence, and would thus betray its own nature. such moments are governed by the law that governed the experiences of the apostles on mt. tabor: they are not places where we can linger but are intended to encourage and strengthen us to go out, with the word of jesus, into the francis cais 127 128 routine of daily living, and to know that the radiance of the divine nearness is always present wherever anyone goes in the strength of that word. we can thus identify four stages23 or levels of religious experience from a christian point of view: 1. the experience of creation and history offers itself to human being not only in the range of possibilities that are open to him for transcending the superficial, but also as a road leading him or her to a meeting with the ground of being. our experience of the high and low points of human life constitutes most of what leads us to seek out, or to persevere in, a religious way of life. were it not for joy and hope, pain and distress and the fear of death, mingled as they are in our daily lives, we might well not bother to find a religion to guide us in a confusing world. secular human experience thus prompts us to turn to religion for insight and illumination and for final redemption. we expect our faith to make sense of our experience. whether we think of our experience of one another, or our experience of nature, or our experience of the events of history, or our experience of such internal states as love, desire, pain, anxiety in all of these we are engaged in a commerce with being, and so with the source of being, god, mediated through our experience. by reflecting on our secular experience, either directly or with the help of novels, poetry, drama, film, the visual arts, and the like, or again through conversation with other people, we come to discern more fully the reality that is offering itself to us in our personal depths. and this reality, just because it is reality, must inevitably say something about god who is “creator of all things, visible and invisible”. 2. the experience of conversion is the experience of the selfrevealing god made possible by faith. revelation has the structure of experience. jesus christ surely experienced his own relationships, one of essential sonship, with the father, and through that experience came to an understanding of his own person and destiny. the apostles of jesus christ experienced their lord and master, living, teaching, dying, and rising again, and through that experience came to see what his role in human history was, and what theirs should be on the model of his. in conversion, the life, death, and resurrection of christ are experienced as 128 prajñâ vihâra 129 throwing light on my life. the son of god’s involvement in this world is used to interpret my own life and death, triumphs and failures, moral achievements, collapses, and recoveries from moral collapses. here the christian gospel intersects with my ordinary human experience. whenever and whatever we read of christ in the gospels, we are also reading our own self-portrait, for christ is what we are called to become. “god became man” as one early christian writer put it, “so that man might become god”. christ is not simply, nor primarily, a model of good behavior we must imitate. he is the source of our life and the sense for it. 3. the experience of the christian community and of christian individuals, in which the ways of transcending creation and history are opened to human being, that is, in which the first type of experience is made ready, intensified and cast in a christian mold. we cannot live as human beings unless we can find some kind of unity and meaning in our lives. to find meaning in our lives we have to question, criticize, systematize and theorize about our experience. the church must answer this deep human need by evolving hypotheses and theories to show the coherence not only of its teaching, but the coherence of its teaching with life as we experience it. a church which concentrates simply on the coherence of its own teaching without relating it to everyday experience is behaving like the paranoid. a church isolated from our human experience can only survive as long as it can succeed in forbidding its adherents to ask questions and think for themselves. a mark of true christianity is its vigor and its search for meaning in every aspect of life. 4. from a combination of the above-mentioned types, there develops, then, a very personal experience with god in christ and, finally, the genuinely supernatural experience that we have just described as mystical experience. the characteristic of adulthood is a growing awareness of inner consciousness, of the complexity of feeling and emotion within us, revealed to us through our activity, our encounters and relationships with others, our work, what we read, hear and see, and of the inner activity which results from this, our hopes and despairs, sadness and joy, fears and expectations, certainties and doubts. as we become more conscious of this inner world, we are coming closer to ourselves and to god. this inner world is unique to each one of us, incommunicable and mysterious even to ourselves in its complexity. francis cais 129 130 although we cannot understand this hidden world, we know that it holds the key to our happiness and to our personality, and that the way we perceive, think, and therefore act, has its explanation in this inner world. religion explains this phenomenon to us and shows us that this is the most important stage in our journey towards god, whom we are invited to meet in this hidden, and often very frightening, recesses of our minds and memories. we will experience god as the one whose ways are not our ways and whose thoughts are not our thoughts, the god of surprises, who is now encountered rather than thought about, who communicates himself through these mysterious inner experiences rather than through the articulate phrases of set prayers, who is now being experienced from within rather than being presented from without, who is loved and lived rather than theorized about. training in prayer will foster this inner awareness, because it is in these inner experiences that we encounter the god of surprises, whose spirit is at work in our spirit in a manner unique to each individual. a biblical example24 following the insightful comments of ratzinger, i should like to exemplify what has been said by means of a biblical text the account of jesus’ meeting with the samaritan woman at jacob’s well in the gospel of john (jn 4:4-30): (jesus) had to pass through samaria. so he came to a town of samaria called sychar, near the plot of land that jacob had given to his son joseph. jacob’s well was there. jesus, tired from his journey, sat down there at the well. it was about noon. a woman of samaria came to draw water. jesus said to her, “give me a drink.” his disciples had gone into the town to buy food. the samaritan woman said to him, “how can you, a jew, ask me, a samaritan woman, for a drink?” (for jews use nothing in common with samaritans.) jesus answered and said to her, “if you knew the gift of god and who is saying to you, ‘give me a drink,’ you would have asked him and he would have given you living water.” (the woman) said to him, “sir, you do not even have a bucket and the cistern is deep; where then can you get this 130 prajñâ vihâra 131 living water? are you greater than our father jacob, who gave us this cistern and drank from it himself with his children and his flocks?” jesus answered and said to her, “everyone who drinks this water will be thirsty again; but whoever drinks the water i shall give will never thirst; the water i shall give will become in him a spring of water welling up to eternal life.” the woman said to him, “sir, give me this water, so that i may not be thirsty or have to keep coming here to draw water.” jesus said to her, “go call your husband and come back.” the woman answered and said to him, “i do not have a husband.” jesus answered her, “you are right in saying, ‘i do not have a husband.’ for you have had five husbands, and the one you have now is not your husband. what you have said is true.” the woman said to him, “sir, i can see that you are a prophet. our ancestors worshiped on this mountain; but you people say that the place to worship is in jerusalem.” jesus said to her, “believe me, woman, the hour is coming when you will worship the father neither on this mountain nor in jerusalem. you people worship what you do not understand; we worship what we understand, because salvation is from the jews. but the hour is coming, and is now here, when true worshipers will worship the father in spirit and truth; and indeed the father seeks such people to worship him. god is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.” the woman said to him, “i know that the messiah is coming, the one called the anointed; when he comes, he will tell us everything.” jesus said to her, “i am he, the one who is speaking with you.” at that moment his disciples returned, and were amazed that he was talking with a woman, but still no one said, “what are you looking for?” or “why are you talking with her?” the woman left her water jar and went into the town and said to the people, “come see a man who told me everything i have done. could he possibly be the messiah?” they went out of the town and came to him. francis cais 131 132 this pericope seems to me to be a beautiful and concrete illustration of what we have just been saying. it opens with the meeting of jesus and the samaritan woman in the context of a normal, human, everyday experience the experience of thirst, which is surely one of a person’s most primordial experiences. in the course of the conversation, the subject shifts to that thirst that is a thirst for life, and the point is made that one must drink again and again, must come again and again to the source. in this way, the woman is made aware of what in actuality she, like every human being, has always known but to which she has not always adverted: that she thirsts for life itself and that all the assuaging that she seeks and finds cannot slake this living, elemental thirst. the superficial “empirical” experience has been transcended. but what has been revealed is still of this world. it is succeeded, therefore, by one of those conversations on two levels that are so characteristic of john’s technique of recording dialogue, the johannine “misunder-standing”, as it is called by the exegetes. from the fact that jesus and the samaritan woman, though they use the same words, have in mind two very different levels of meaning and, separated thus by the ambiguity of human speech, are speaking at cross-purposes, there is manifested the lasting incommensurability of faith and human experience however extensive that experience may be. for the woman understands by “water” that of which the fairy tales speak: the elixir of life by virtue of which a person will not die and his thirst for life will be entirely satisfied. she remains in the sphere of bios, of the empirical life that is familiar to her, whereas jesus wants to reveal to her the true life, the zoe. in the next stage, the woman’s full attention has been attracted to the subject of a thirst for life. she no longer asks for something, for water or for any other single thing, but for life, for herself. this explains the apparently totally unmotivated interpolation by jesus: “go and call your husband!” it is both intentional and necessary, for her life as a whole, with all its thirst, is the true subject here. as a result, there comes to light the real dilemma, the deep-seated waywardness, of her existence: she is brought face to face with herself. in general, we can reduce what is happening to the formula: one must know oneself as one really is, if one is to know god. the real medium, the primordial experience of all experiences, is that a person himself is the place in which and through 132 prajñâ vihâra 133 which he experiences god. admittedly, the circle could also be closed in the opposite direction: it could be said that it is only by first knowing god that one can properly know oneself. as we have said, the woman must come first to the knowledge of herself, to the acknowledgment of herself. for what she makes now is a kind of confession: a confession in which, at last, she reveals herself unsparingly. thus a new transition has occurred to preserve our earlier terminology, a transition from empirical and experimental to “experiential” experience, to “existential experience”. the woman stands face to face with herself. it is no longer a question now of something but of the depths of the “i” itself and, consequently, of the radical poverty that is a person’s i-myself, the place where this i is ultimately revealed behind the superficiality of the something. from this perspective, we might regard the conversation between jesus and the samaritan woman as the prototype of teaching. it must lead from the something to the i. beyond every something it must ensure the involvement of the person, of this particular person. it must produce self-knowledge and selfacknowledgment so that the indigence and need of a person’s being will be evident. the samaritan woman has achieved this radical confrontation with her own self. in the moment in which this occurs the question of all questions arises always and of necessity: the question about oneself becomes a question about god. it is only apparently without motivation but in reality inevitable that the woman should ask now: how do things stand with regard to adoration, that is, with regard to god and my relationship to him? the question about foundation and goal makes itself heard. only at this point does the offering of jesus’ true gift become possible. for, the “gift of god” is god himself, god precisely as gift that is, the holy spirit. at the beginning of the conversation, there seemed no likelihood that this woman, with her obviously superficial way of life, would have any interest in the holy spirit. but once she was led to the depths of her own being, the question arose that must always arise if one is to ask the question that burns in one’s soul. now the woman is aware of the real thirst by which she is driven. hence she can at last learn what it is for which this thirst thirsts. francis cais 133 134 it is the purpose and meaning of all religious teaching to lead to this thirst. for one who knows neither that there is a holy spirit nor that one can thirst for him, it cannot begin otherwise than with sensory perception. teaching must lead to self-knowledge, to the exposing of the i, so that it lets the masks fall and moves out of the realm of something into that of being. its goal is conversion, that conversion of a person that results in his standing face to face with himself. conversion is identical with self-knowledge, and self-knowledge is the nucleus of all knowledge. conversion is the way in which human being finds himself and thus knows the question of all questions: how can i worship god? it is the question about his salvation. in the new testament the word that is invariably used for conversion is “metanoia”, which also means a “change of heart”, i.e. a change in the way of seeing things, of judging and living realty; in brief, a “trans-evaluation”, a word created by nietzsche to express the change of paradigm. conclusion all this discussion on religious experience was intended to show that seeking god’s presence in our world and in our lives involves theological reflection, the artful discipline of putting our experience into conversation with the heritage of our religious tradition. in this conversation we can be surprised and transformed by new angles of vision on our experience and acquire a deepened understanding and appreciation of our tradition. in this conversation we can find ourselves called to act in new, courageous, and compassionate ways. we are all called to transformation. i conclude with a true story, told by robert fulghum about a seminar he once attended in greece. on the last day of the conference, the discussion leader walked over to the bright light of an opened window and looked out. then he asked if there were any questions. fulghum laughingly asked him what the meaning of life was. everyone laughed and stirred to leave. however, the leader held up his hand to ask for silence and then responded “i will answer your question”. he took his wallet out of his pocket and removed a small round mirror about the size of a ten baht coin. 134 prajñâ vihâra 135 then he explained: “when i was a small child during world war ii, we were very poor and we lived in a remote village. one day on the road, i found the broken pieces of a mirror. a german motorcycle had been wrecked in that place. i tried to find all the pieces and put them together, but it was not possible, so i kept the largest piece: this one. and by scratching it on a stone, i made it round. i began to play with it as a toy and became fascinated by the fact that i could reflect light into dark places where the sun could never shine. it became a game for me to get light into the most inaccessible place that i could find. i kept the mirror, and as i grew up, i would take it out at idle moments and continue the challenge of the game. as i became a man, i grew to understand that this was not just a child’s game, but a metaphor of what i could do with my life. i came to understand that i am not the light or the source of light. but light be it truth or understanding or knowledge is there, and it will only shine in many dark places if i reflect it. i am a fragment of a mirror whose whole design and shape i do not know. nevertheless, with what i have, i can reflect light into the dark place of this world into the dark places of human hearts and change some things in some people. perhaps others seeing it happen will do likewise. this is what i am about. this is the meaning of my life.” may also our lives find meaning in reflecting the light of our religious experiences into our society and in sharing with other people the knowledge we acquire from these same experiences. francis cais 135 136 endnotes 1cf. a new catechism: catholic faith for adults (new york, 1967), p.3. 2james fowler, “stages in faith consciousness”, new directions for child development (1991:52), p.31. 3for the first part of this paper i am indebted to loretta harriman, m.m., “foundations for theology: establishing perspectives for understanding the nature of theology,” the east asian pastoral review, 36 (1999): 3. 4vatican ii, dei verbum, no. 2. 5catechism of the catholic church, (london: geoffrey chapman, 1994), p.38. 6bernard lonergan, method in theology (london 1972), p. 115. 7st. augustine, de ordine, i, 11, 32 in pl 32:994. 8st. anselm, proslogion: proemium in pl 153 225a 9st. augustine, sermo 43, 7, 9 in pl 38: 257-258. 10lonergan, method in theology, p. 109. 11hans georg gadamer, wahrheit und methode (tuebingen, 1965), p. 329. 12vatican ii, gaudium et spes, no. 19. 13st. augustine, confessiones 1,1,1 in pl 32:659-661. 14for this part of the paper i am indebted to joseph ratzinger, principles of catholic theology (san francisco, 1987), pp. 343-355. 15r. brague, “was heisst christliche erfahrung?” in ikz 5 (1976): 481482; quoted by ratzinger, principles of catholic theology, pp. 346. 16jean mouroux, the christian experience: an introduction to a theology (london, 1955). w. beinert, “die erfahrbarkeit der glaubenswirklichkeit”, in mysterium der gnade (regensburg:, 1975), 134-45, quoted by ratzinger, principles of catholic theology, pp. 346. 17j. monod, zufali und notwendigkeit: philosophische fragen der modernen biologie (munich, 1973), esp. 127ff. and 139. 18brague, p. 492. 19ibid. 20beinert, p. 137. 21hans urs von balthasar, “gotteserfahrung biblisch und patristisch”, in ikz 5 (1976): 497509; quotation is on 500. 22ibid., p. 508. 23for this section i am also indebted to aidan nichols, the shape of catholic theology, (collegeville, indiana: the liturgical press, 1991), p. 238-245. 24see ratzinger, principles of catholic theology, pp. 353-355. 136 prajñâ vihâra 137 bibliography catechism of the catholic church. london: geoffrey chapman, 1994. de mesa jose and lode l. wostyn. doing theology: basic realities and processes. quezon city, philippines: claretian publications, 1990. flannery, austin, ed. vatican council ii: conciliar and postconciliar documents. collegeville, indiana: the liturgical press, 1992. gelpi, donald l., the gracing of human experience: rethinking the relationship between nature and grace. collegeville, minnesota: the liturgical press, 2001. harriman, loretta, m.m., “foundations for theology: establishing perspectives for understanding the nature of theology,” the east asian pastoral review, 36 (1999). killen, patricia o’connell and john de beer. the art of theological reflection. new york: crossroad, 1994. lonergan, bernard. method in theology. london: darton, longman &todd, 1972. mouroux, jean. the christian experience: an introduction to a theology. london: sheed and ward, 1955. nichols, aidan. the shape of catholic theology. collegeville, minnesota: the liturgical press, 1991. o’collins, gerald. fundamental theology. new york: paulist press, 1981. ratzinger, joseph. principles of catholic theology: building stones for a fundamental theology. san francisco: ignatius press, 1987. schillebeeckx, edward. christ: the christian experience in the modern world. london: scm press, 1980. schillebeeckx, edward. christ: the experience of jesus as lord. new york: crossroad, 1983. francis cais 137 147-154 islam and ecology angelo de la cruz and the politics of victims rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract ibana’s paper proposes an articulation of the noble aspirations of traditional cultures against the horizon of the monolithic grids of western globalization. the case of mr. angelo de la cruz, the truck driver whose life was saved by the philippine government by withdrawing its troops from iraq has shown that the intrusive powers of the global geopolitics can be thwarted by local cultures as long as the latter can justify their values within the broader context of the community of human persons. the withdrawal by the weaker party from the game of power can succeed only to the extent that such a withdrawal is premised on the affirmation of higher values. introduction on july 20, 2004, angelo de la cruz, a filipino truck driver was freed by his iraqi captors in exchange for the philippine government’s withdrawal of its humanitarian contingent from iraq. the whole nation expressed its relief and thanksgiving by hosting a festival in his hometown. the events celebrated traditional filipino values such as our zest for life, personalism, intimate family life, and religiosity. our western allies, such as australia and the united states, however, ridiculed us and bewailed our lack of courage and commitment to keep our promises to the so-called “coalition of the willing.” the u.s. ambassador, at one point, quipped that we should not mistake our friends from our enemies (pdi). 136 prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 136-146 © 2000 by assumption university press the conflict between the decision of the philippine president and our western allies reveal the inherent tension between the local values of traditional societies like the philippines and the liberal presuppositions of modern countries like the usa and australia. this paper will show that the possible resolution of these conflicts lies in the recognition of the “right to be different” by other nations and by an appreciation of how the distinctive differences among nations can contribute to the infinite wealth of our shared moral universe. zest for life the festive mood that greeted angelo dela cruz upon his arrival in manila confirmed our zest for life. as survivors of typhoons, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and other natural calamities, we mark every event that celebrates life with feasts: the birth of children, baptisms, birthdays, graduation ceremonies, awards of recognition, weddings, arrival and departure of friends and relatives from or to other countries, funerals, wedding anniversaries, death anniversaries, feast day of saints, etc… our department of tourism even advertised ourselves as an archipelago of festivals because one can conceivably attend a feast somewhere in the islands at any day of the year. these feasts are celebrated with the best food that our homes can offer. it was estimated that three hundred thousand pesos (php 300,000 or us$ 5,390) were spent for the banquet held in honor of mr. dela cruz alone. the honoree actually could not have been able to afford to pay for these celebrations; but his neighbors, friends, patrons and politicians felt that they were socially obliged to sponsor and pay for the festivities. the extravagance that stands out in sharp contrast to our surroundings accentuates how our festivals celebrate our triumphs over the adversities that hound our everyday lives. it is no wonder that we exude with our happiest expressions when we greet our guests, friends, and relatives with our deepest wish for ourselves: mabuhay! (to live! or viva!) such celebrations also pervade our political culture. our national and local elections, even our rituals of protest, are all festive. the colorful flyers that decorate our homes and the gigantic effigies that walk our streets rainier a. ibana 137 during festivals are all recreated during political rallies and protest marches. we share our food, water and other resources during these political events. even the entertainment industry joins the fray to the extent that movie actors become indistinguishable from politicians. if the troops from iraq were not withdrawn and mr. dela cruz was sacrificed in the altar of the “coalition of the willing,” his coffin would have been paraded from the airport to his hometown with thousands of sympathizers and supporters that chant the ouster of mrs. arroyo along with effigies that depict american imperialism. this would have paved the way for the galvanization of the political forces that have been aligned against mrs. arroyo during the recently contested national elections and they would have created enough chaos to change the national leadership. the american military would have to intervene to defend mrs. arroyo against her own people. our collective memory of funeral marches, such as that of ninoy aquino’s and flor contemplacion’s, are dreadful reminders of protest-actions, led by the dead, against those who happen to stand in positions of power. personalism the withdrawal of our troops from iraq can be justified on high moral grounds had it not been for the political pragmatism of our president in not invoking the ire of the united states and its western allies. contractual obligations, such as the “coalition of the willing,” are valid only for as long as these contracts do not violate the rights and dignity of the contracting parties. laws are made for humans, and not the other way round since humans were the ones who legislated these agreements in the first place. when the very existence of human beings are being threatened by the laws that they have promulgated, then these laws have become irrelevant and oppressive and therefore can no longer be considered just. nations may call upon individuals to sacrifice their lives in case of wars. but such wars must be justified in the first place. in the case of the western invasion of iraq, the justification of finding weapons of mass destruction has come to naught and mr. saddam whom the west detests has been captured already from his foxhole by the time that we were 138 prajñâ vihâra asked to withdraw from iraq. the only reason why our troops were kept there was to adhere to the foreign policy of other countries. our personalism is known all over the world. our medical practitioners, singers, and entertainers are in demand for overseas work because of our propensity to extend our services from the mere performance of our institutional duties towards a more personal interest in the living conditions of our clients. this is done to the extent that other clients find us nosy and intrusive of their personal affairs. we ask questions pertaining to their love lives, the state of their emotions, their relationship with prominent people, their home addresses, birthdays, civil status, number of children, etc… personalism also pervades our political culture. the majority of our people vote for candidates not on the basis of platforms and ideas but on the basis of how they were personally treated in the past: whether they visited and ate in their homes, whether they were sincere when they shook their hands, whether they spoke the same language and acted like they do. in one documentary film on our political culture, one informant said that she will vote for a presidential candidate not because he will provide them with jobs and food, but because he recognized her as a fellow human being. “nililingon niya kami.” “he looks back to us.” they were referring to a candidate who did not even finish a college education and his main claim to fame is being a former movie actor.1 family values the first request made by mr. dela cruz upon his arrival in manila was to allow him more private time with his family.2 it was for the sake of his family that he ventured into iraq in the first place. even his captors learned about his family life through the television footages that were covered by filipino media practitioners whose first instinct was to go to his home in order to cover the news of his captivity.3 lacking in social security and services that are usually provided by modern governments and economies, filipinos rely on the support system accorded to them by their extended families. success is not evaluated in terms of individual efforts and achievements but as a product of fortune and luck to be shared with family members. educational rainier a. ibana 139 certificates, ribbons and trophies are displayed prominently in middle class living rooms in order to take pride in the achievements of its members. our political culture has been rightly described as an “anarchy of families.” political dynasties are evident in the example of mrs. arroyo who is herself a daughter of a former president of the republic. the wife and son of mr. estrada, her chief political opponent, were both recently elected to the senate. other congressmen seem to have inherited the congressional seats of their parents. that they were actually elected into office by the population shows that this form of aristocracy is not only promoted by the candidates themselves but is also embraced by the electorate. philippine aristocracy seems to be legitimized by electoral processes. the sympathy accorded to mr. dela cruz’s family during their time of need has galvanized our political opposition against the “coalition of the willing.” (even the underground communist party of the philippines and its leftist organizations expressed their support for the government’s withdrawal from iraq and the preservation of the life of mr. dela cruz.) agreements with foreign countries have become irrelevant and relegated to the back burner for the sake of the dela cruz’s family, whose name, by the way, is the same as the filipino symbol for every man personified by juan dela cruz. religiosity saints were petitioned and candles were lit for the sake of mr. de la cruz’s release. upon his arrival, the president of the republic brought him to the shrine of our lady of rosales in pangasinan whose intercession she had sought to secure his release. church bells toiled upon angelo’s arrival in his hometown and the police chaplain referred to him as the “angel of the cross.” our piety serves as our depository of hope against the harsh realities of life. this hope allows the poor among us to brave foreign lands, sleep soundly under the shadow of mountains of garbage, build homes on stilts along river banks, hang on to jeepneys as they speed along ravines and highways, and gamble their last centavo in the hope of turning the tides of 140 prajñâ vihâra fortune in their favor. we take big risks because we believe that since we are now at the bottom of the heap, there is no other way for us to go except to get out of our misery. we have nothing to lose because we already have nothing but our being. we say “bahala na” (come what may) as we go on with our lives. bahala na has its etymological roots in bathala, our word for the most supreme being. after doing everything that is humanly possible to advance our plight, we leave everything to bathala for him to determine our fate. our attitude of “bahala na” is the dynamo that empowers us to move on with our lives instead of wallowing in hopelessness. the cost of alienation from america and the western world as a consequence of our withdrawal from iraq is a small price to pay for the thousands of overseas contract workers who have risked their lives, in the spirit of bahala na, in the middle east. in fact, many more overseas contract workers are still lining up in order to work there even after our withdrawal from iraq. they are willing to risk their lives rather than die of hunger in our own land. the expectations raised by the spectre of globalization as magnified by the mass media are not of much help to quench the thirst of our people for the possibilities of a better life for themselves and their families. our overseas contract workers have been hailed as our new national heroes for keeping our economy afloat in spite of the fluctuations of the global and local markets. the politics of victims a new york times editorial was quoted by the philippine press for its astute observation that “president arroyo’s surrender shows the perils of assembling a coalition of weak allies eager to please washington but lacking much conviction in the american cause.”4 this remark was dismissed by mrs. arroyo’s spokesperson by simply proclaiming “we don’t read the new york times here,” emphasizing the role of local politics in the decision to withdraw our troops from iraq. this nyt editorial, however, poses a serious warning to western nations that the inequities of the global economic and political systems could actually imperil their hegemonic agenda. the practices of liberal rainier a. ibana 141 democracy, nevertheless, unsoundly presuppose symmetry among sovereign and powerful nations. in situations of grave political and economic inequalities, however, the only recourse of weaker countries is their access to the inner resources of their cultural heritage. max scheler has long observed that asians practice a different kind of politics than their western counter parts. he referred to this as the politics of the hunted or the victim, as opposed to the politics of the hunter or the victor. in this kind of politics, the hunted lures the hunter into his lair in order to trap the latter to a more familiar terrain and thus win the battle in its own terms. the united states lost the war the moment they landed in iraq. they thought that the power of their guns and the might of their technologies could subdue a whole nation by invading its territory. they, however, were trapped by their own naïveté and it is now too late for them to realize the consequences of their folly. they are now being plucked and assassinated, one by one, in a foreign terrain, with their enemies taking advantage of their familiarity with the environment, fighting battles in their own turf. the americans did find saddam holed inside a pit; but they had to sacrifice many american lives and there are many more militant iraqis who continue to assert their sovereignty by means of assassinations and other guerilla tactics against us soldiers. a similar strategy was deployed against napoleon by the russians when they gave up moscow after the french grand army who began the invasion with over 600,000 men, retreated during the dreaded winter of 1812 with fewer than 10,000 men plodding home to france in defeat. the french forces were decimated, not by the weaker armory of russian soldiers, but by the invincible powers of nature herself. we must not forget that the iraqis were under russian military tutelage before the american invasion. the vietnamese who were likewise trained by the russians have employed the same tactics against the americans, but the latter, unfortunately, never learned the lessons of their own history. max scheler tells us that shiva, the indian deity, escaped the world snake by submitting his body to the strangling forces of his nemesis and thus escaped as gracefully as a woman taking off her gloves. in a similar fashion, taoists remind us that formlessness is the more advantageous 142 prajñâ vihâra position in a confrontation. the first party who reveals its form will show its weaknesses and thus expose its vulnerability. for westerners, such astute tactics are unethical, dishonest, and treacherous. their notion of modern politics is hinged on the presupposition that human beings and, by extrapolation, all nations, fight their battles on equal terms. this western enlightenment ideal, however, fails to recognize not only the variety and differences of peoples’ cultures, but the obviously disadvantaged starting points of human political and economic development of many nations and the cultural element that determines their politics and economics. bamboo politics it has been said that filipinos survive by dancing like the bamboo, bowing according to the strength of the winds but remaining standing at the end, unlike the other proud trees that have been uprooted by the storm. one of our myths of origin even narrates how our ancestors emerged out of a bamboo pole when the first male and female tricked a mythical bird to peck a bamboo node in order to bring us to existence. our bamboo dance, which warns of broken ankles if we don’t follow its rhythms, reminds us that we must abide by the laws of nature, never going against her contours if we wish to keep our composure in the midst of danger. located at the fringes of the geopolitics of australia and america, we are a small nation whose survival instincts affirm the values of life. we greet our visitors with mabuhay! (long live!) as we receive them at our airports with leis of flowers and kisses. we provide our guests with the best bed, food, and entertainment facilities even at the expense of our convenience. we hold our families close to our hearts and we hope in god with all our might. our sense of justice is therefore grounded on the depths of our relationships and not on the modern egalitarian notion of equal rights that can be claimed by anyone regardless of who she or he may happen to be. thus, we are more forgiving of the remarks inflicted on us by the americans in comparison with the australians whom we are barely getting to know more recently on our beaches and entertainment centers. the australian ambassador was actually called in by our department of foreign affairs rainier a. ibana 143 as a result of unsolicited remarks made by their ministers.5 we still look up to america with a sense of debt of gratitude for our shared experiences during the second world war. our president therefore confidently declared that “no president can weaken philippine american friendship” because of our shared history. as a weak nation, we are beholden to those who have aided us during our times of need. we have always looked up to america as the land where our relatives have made a better life for themselves. american movies and fast foods have invaded our cultural horizons, just like any developing country in this age of globalization. but globalization has also allowed us to send our overseas workers to the middle east. it is for the sake of these workers that we have withdrawn our troops and saved the life of one of them, signifying our concern and dedication for these new national heroes who brave foreign lands in order to uplift the lives of their families at home. our relationships with other nations, therefore, have now become pluralistic in comparison with our previous alliance with the americans and the western world. we used to pride ourselves on our hispanic heritage, having been a colony of spain for 300 years. with the american annexation, we became uncle sam’s “little brown brother” in asia. but with the ascendancy of the east asian economies, we suddenly became aware of our oriental heritage and rediscovered our chinese and japanese affinities. the recent deployment of our workers in arab countries has further broadened our horizon to include our muslim brothers in the south whom we have relegated to the margins since the coming of the spanish galleons. this expansion of our awareness of our historical contexts demands from us that we think for ourselves, in the same manner that the modern enlightenment thinkers of the west have demanded of their people to dare to think (sapere aude!). unlike the empty formalist forms of thought discovered by modernity, however, our modes of thinking will inevitably arise from the historical and geographical contexts that determine the cultural matrix of our everyday lives. in contradistinction to kant’s “critique of pure reason,” we are impure thinkers who must come to terms with our cultural baggage in order to offer our distinctive contribution to the wealth of values in the moral universe. 144 prajñâ vihâra by articulating the noble aspirations of traditional values against the horizon of the monolithic grids of western globalization, our local cultures can gain moral ascendancy by distinguishing itself from the leveling logic of economic of globalization. the case of angelo dela cruz has shown that the intrusive powers of global geopolitics can be thwarted by local cultures for as long as the latter can justify its values within the broader context of the community of human persons. the withdrawal by the weaker party from the game of political power can succeed only to the extent that such a withdrawal is premised on an affirmation of higher values. endnotes 1 ditsi carolino, “riles: life on the tracks” (a documentary film). 2 pdi july 24, 2004, p. a9. 3 pdi august 1, 2004, p. a21. 4 pdi july 21, 2004, p. a5. 5 jerome aning, “fuming at australia but not at america” philippine daily inquirer (july 30, 2004), p. a!. rainier a. ibana 145 01_(1-15)on islam and evolutionary theory on islam and evolutionary theory samsul ma’arif mujiharto gadjah mada university, indonesia บทคัดย่อ บทความนี้มีจุดมุ่งหมายเพื่อสำรวจทัศนะของนักชีววิทยามุสลิมชาว อินโดนีเซียเก่ียวกับทฤษฎีวิวัฒนาการ โดยอาศัยมโนทัศน์แห่ง “ความเป็นเหตุผล” และ “พันธกิจทางศาสนา” ของสเตนมาร์ค นอกจากน้ันยังต้องการแสดงให้เห็นว่า แง่มุมทั้งสองนั้นเชื่อมโยงกันอย่างไร และว่าความเป็นเหตุผลมีความหมายต่อ พันธกิจทางศาสนาอย่างไร บทความน้ีเร่ิมต้นด้วยข้อสังเกตท่ัวไปในประวัติศาสตร์ เก่ียวกับการพบกันระหว่างทฤษฎีวิวัฒนาการกับศาสนาอิสลาม และสำรวจมุมมอง ต่างๆ ของนักชีววิทยามุสลิมชาวอินโดนีเซียที่มีต่อทฤษฎีวิวัฒนาการ มีการ สัมภาษณ์นักชีววิทยามุสลิม ๓ คน จาก ๓ มหาวิทยาลัยในประเทศอินโดนีเซีย เพื่อที่จะทราบถึงชนิดของความเป็นเหตุผลที่พวกเขาเหล่านั้นนำมาใช้และเพื่อ ท่ีจะทราบว่า ความเป็นเหตุผลมีอิทธิพลต่อพันธกิจทางศาสนาของพวกเขาอย่างไร ข้อค้นพบในบทความน้ีช้ีให้เห็นว่า (๑) คำตอบท่ีคลุมเครือต่อเร่ืองวิวัฒนาการใน สังคมมุสลิมเป็นเพราะคัมภีร์อัลกุรอานไม่ได้ระบุให้เด่นชัดเกี่ยวกับเรื่องราว การสร้างมนุษย์คู่แรก และ (๒) ดังน้ัน จึงมีผลทำให้คำตอบของบรรดานักชีววิทยา มุสลิมชาวอินโดนีเซียท่ีมีต่อทฤษฎีวิวัฒนาการน้ันพลอยไม่ชัดเจนไปด้วย abstract the paper aims to explore indonesian muslim biologists’ views on the evolutionary theory. employing stenmark’s concepts of “rationality” and “religious commitment”, this study wishes to show how these two aspects are interconnected, and how a certain rationality primarily constitutes a certain religious commitment. the research involves both library and field research. the library research is to get a general overview on the prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 1-15 1 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ relation of evolution and islam (and muslim) in the past. while a small scale, in-depth, and qualitative field research project is intended to portray the views of muslim biologists in indonesia on the theory. interviews that include three muslim biologists from three universities in indonesia are also conducted to explore what kind of rationality they have and how this rationality influences their religious commitments. the findings report that: 1). the ambiguous responses to evolution in muslim society are because koran does not explicitly deal with the first-human creation story. 2). the various responses of indonesian muslim biologists to the theory along with their variety of understandings of the rationality and its relation to the religious commitment is also due to this ambiguity. evolution at the “crossroads” evolution theory, (heretofore abbreviated with et) has had great impact not only on the natural sciences but also disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and philosophy. in the field of religion, it has also created great controversy as it came to question the role and existence of god. since the publication of the origin of species, some have taken the position that there is no real conflict between the creation story in genesis and the theory that all life forms including humans evolved gradually. yet others have considered evolutionary theory a challenge to religion and a “godless philosophy”, based on the principles of regularity and predictability that in some extents opposed the great role of god in creation. in muslim world, especially among modern muslim thinkers, an argument from design is extremely popular. yet there have been approaches that minimize the challenge of evolution to islam. in the early 20th century muhammad iqbal, in his reconstruction of religious thoughts in islam, concluded that god is a “skilled worker” in the sense that he actively engages in a dynamic, sustainable, and unfinished creation. consequently, gradual evolution is a sign of god’s creativity and god’s partnership in the creation. iqbal, however, disagrees with darwin due to his materialistic interpretation of evolution. indeed, he continues his argument; the koran uses the words ‘bashar’ or ‘insan’, not ‘adam’ to reserve for a man with special capacity. so, it is clearly mentioned that the word ‘adam’ 2 prajna vihara~ is used more as a concept than the name of a concrete individual human1. the issue seems to hinge on how we understand the idea of scientific fact? scientific understanding seeks support in facts and theories that can explain the process on first-human creation in a coherent manner. the evolution theory, in this context, is both a fact and a theory. it is an incontrovertible fact that organisms have changed, or evolved, during the history of life on earth. in this sense, the theory of evolution could never be religiously neutral. it may or may not contain declarations concerning the divine, but it cannot avoid making implications concerning that domain. this “hidden-metaphysical-philosophy” implicit in modern science brings the idea of theory into the issue of the relationship of science and religion. thus, though science and religion occupy different domains and speak to different issues, it is the role of theory that shows itself as the major problem in both. science and religion, like other human endeavors, are spaces in which we create our stories about the world that are not necessarily coherent but fulfill different and equally important functions for human life. if the creation stories were taken literally, as logos2, people would lose the depth and the power of mythos to answer the abstractexistential questions3. both logos and mythos participate __ and, sometimes compete4 __ to encompass creation5. this is why we could say that the issue of creation is at the crossroads between science and religion. the evolution in muslim world and its ambiguities along with my research i found at least three models of arguments responding to the theory. interestingly, some muslim scholars often use the same model of argument but they ambiguously come to a different conclusion. noted at least there are two things that cause this ambiguity. firstly, it is because the koran is not a “book of science” or a “book of philosophy” that deals in detail about the creation story of the first human being. the koran only says that human beings are made of certain things and there is no further explanation of “how” the creation was actually done6. this “mystery of how” consequently opens up the variety of interpretations. secondly, there are different levels of understanding of evolution among the thinkers of evolution that even become more complicated samsul ma’arif mujiharto 3 by their different political, social and cultural viewpoints. these two causes significantly contribute in shifting the models of argument, they are: philosophical-metaphysical, literal, and literal-scientific arguments. 1. philosophical-metaphysical argument this model refers to the so-called metaphysics in philosophy that talks more about what is behind “physics”. as this model uses a philosophical approach it accordingly does not deal directly with the substantial issues of et, which depends upon empirical data. this model is usually based on sufistic thought that is generally evolutionary in terms of exposing the evolutionary stages in the human soul, which progress from the lower to higher level through certain spiritual trainings. of course, this sufistic evolutionary view does not “match” directly with darwinian evolution because it focuses more on the spiritual world. however i still put on the board, as some metaphysical views are congruous with epistemological views. the first figure in this group is abu bakr muhammad ibn ’arabi (1165-1240). in his ’uqlatu al-ustawfiz he stated that there were many adams before adam7 and the creation is not always based on the creatio ex nihilo principle8. god showed me, when i was asleep, that i was circumambulating the ka’ba with some people whose faces i don’t recognize. these people recited two verses of poetry, one of which stayed in my mind and the other. “we have been circumambulating, like you circumambulate, for many a year, in this holy house, all us together, collectively”, the other verse escaped me, and i wondered about that. then one of them addressed me and gave me his name, which i did not know. he said: “i am one of your ancestors”. so i asked him: “how long is it since you died?” he said: “about 40,000 years ago”. so i said: “but adam didn’t live that long ago”, to which he replied: “which adam are you talking about? the one nearest to 4 prajna vihara~ you or another one?” then i remembered the hadith of the prophet that god (allah) has created 100.000 adams, and i said to myself: perhaps this ancestor who says that i am related to him is one of them (i.e. one of adams)”. history is ignorant of this (the different adams) just as it is ignorant of the fact that the world is undoubtedly originated. the world cannot have the position of the ancient: that would mean the negotiation of priority, for it is acted-upon by god who has given it existence out of nothing9. he also presupposed the concept of the “perfect human” that differs from the “animal human” which is characterized by brutality. all people through certain spiritual exercise have equal chance to be a perfect human, but of those who fail to achieve that level would be considered equal to “animal human”. meanwhile, to achieve the level of “perfect man”, a person is obligated to worship the lord and follow all religious teachings and glorify him and do everything in order to develop an intimate connection with him10. the second major figure of this group is jalaluddin rumi who stated that evolution is the act of god that progresses the human being from “animality” to “humanity”. in his masnawi-ye ma’nawi as quoted by t.o. shanavas he said: “he came first to the inorganic realm and from there stepped over the vegetable kingdom. living long as a plant, he has no memory of his struggles in the organic realm. similarly rising from the plant to animal life he forgets his plant life, retaining only an attraction for it which he feels especially in the spring, ignorant of the secret and cause of his attraction like the infant at the breast who knows not why he is attracted to the mother… then the creator draws him from animality to humanity. so he went from realm to realm until he became rational, wise and strong. as he has forgotten his former types of reason (every stage being governed by a particular type of reason) so he shall pass beyond his present reason. when he gets rid of this coveted intellect, he shall see a thousand samsul ma’arif mujiharto 5 other types of reason”. “i died from the inorganic realm and became a plant; then i died from plant life and became a man, so why should i be afraid of anything less through another death? in the next step i shall die from humanity to develop wings like angels. then again i shall sacrifice my angelic self and become that which cannot enter imagination. then i become non-existent when the divine organ strikes the note. “we are return unto him””. he also points out that creation is like a journey that a human needs to experience from the “physical existence” to “metaphysical existence” phase and eventually they would return to god as the main source of creation. god is an extraordinary charm that attracts all beings to approach him11. meanwhile, using the same model of argument, afghani rejected the theory. for example, as cited by aly remtulla, he wrote: “it would be possible that after centuries of the passage a mosquito could become an elephant, an elephant could become a mosquito”12. this statement is easily understood but does not match with darwinian evolution due to its simplistic use of the term “changing”, and not “evolving”. afghani, by stressing the impossibility of self-existence of the universe, wants to emphasize that god is the only creator of the universe13. in his al-radd ala al-dhahriyyin (against materialism) afghani also criticizes the materialist philosophy that reduce humans to animality14. consequently, evolution theory is so in line with this materialistic philosophy that should be rejected. the next figure is sayyed hosein nasr who criticizes et because by means of historicism, utopianism and secular ideas, the evolutionists seek to replace immortality with transitory existence. et in this case could be a potential aspect that alienate humans from nature because: “the theory of evolution did not provide an organic view for the physical sciences but provided a way of reducing the higher to lower, a magical formula to apply everywhere in order to explain things without recourse to 6 prajna vihara~ any higher principle causes. it also went hand in hand with a prevalent historicism which is a parody of the christian philosophy of history, but which nevertheless could only take place in the christian world where the truth itself had become incarnated in time and history”15. metaphysically speaking, species in the view of nasr does not consist of matter only and it is impossible to physically and gradually grow. the metaphysical views could not accept the possibility of physical evolvement from the simpler (lower) to the more complex (higher) one16. the only possible evolvement is before matter (the soft life). through secularization, the evolution theory is cut off from its metaphysical basis17. 2. literal argument this model develops interpretations based “only” on a literal reading of the verses of the koran. literalism definitely closes the possibility of interpretations based on anything outside of the koran. fazlur rahman18, for example, successfully compiled the creation verses and systematized them as follows: “he (god), created adam from clay, which created an extract, sulala (cement reproduction). when inserted into the womb it cements the creative process. however, human beings are differentiated from other creatures, because god breathed his spirits into humans”. in addition, syahin in his adam qishah abi al-khaliqah baina al-usthurah of al-haqiqah, uses the same model to unveil the mystery of the first human creation and surrounding issues. the compilation contains verse-by-verse literal interpretations. employing this model syahin remains committed to a so-called “safe position”, because he does not confront the tensions between the koran and evolution. in his view, shad: 71-85 is the first verse to explicitly deal with the creation story19. the story is as follows: 1) god informed to the angels that he would create basyar. 2) god created basyar and commands the angels and devils to worship basyar. responding to the command, the angels obey but the devils do not because they consider themselves superior to basyar, as basyar are made of mere dust while they made of fire. in unveiling the mystery of adam, sahim clarifies three terms that samsul ma’arif mujiharto 7 are widely misunderstood: basyar, insan, dan adam. basyar is originally taken from ba-sya-ra that refers to certain creature made of dust20. the word basyar has four meanings; empirically seeable creature (al-dhahir 'alaa kulli al-kaainaat), creature in general (al-makhluq bi ithlaaq), non-special creature (al-makhluq ghoiru mutamayyiz), and special creature (al-makhluq mutamayyiz)21. of those meanings the first is the most substantive one. interestingly, syahin acknowledges the “perfecting process” (thariq al-istikmal) to open the possibility of the evolutionary process22. initially, basyar could not see, listen and even understand but then basyar gradually found the signing language and finally oral and written language that implies their capacity improvement in seeing, listening and even understanding. the second word; insan (khalaqa al-insan) is mentioned in 35 verses23. unfortunately, syahin does not completely define insan. we could, however differentiate insan from basyar from his comparative explanation. basyar refers to all two-footed creatures able to stand upright and insan refers to a basyar who possesses knowledge and obedience to god24. thus, adam is the first insan and is also known as “the father of insan” (abu al-insan), not “the father of basyar” (abu al-basyar). consequently, all insans are basyars but not all basyars are insans. 3. literal-scientific argument compared to the previous two models of arguments, this argument is often the clearest because it is contextually more related to darwin’s theory of evolution. for those who reject et, they emphasize the weaknesses of et and interpret the koran as being superior. meanwhile, those who accept et try to reconcile scientific facts with the koran. to explain the two views within this model i review harun yahya and t.o. shanavas; the former represent the opponents of et, while the later represents the supporters of et. harun yahya is widely known as part of the anti-evolution group that has a strong political influence in turkey. politicians wanting to remove the teaching of evolution in schools support him25. he comes to his arguments by trying to show some seemingly scientific weaknesses of et on one hand, and appealing to the greatness of allah’s power in human 8 prajna vihara~ creation on the other. furthermore, yahya tries to demonstrate that the theory is ideologically biased in materialism. yahya rejects the theory in regard to at least three issues: firstly, the excessive claims of evolutionary scientists who seemingly can observe events that occurred millions of years ago is completely imaginary26. secondly, listening to darwinian claims about macroevolution, for yahya, is similar to listening to a fable about a frog that can change into an elf27. thirdly, the evidence used by evolutionists themselves in some ways turns against the theory and confirms the weakness of evolution. the second figure is t.o. shanavas, who was born in india in 1970 and immigrated to the united states. i consider shanavas to be the few thinkers who does not begin by merely attempting to relate islam to evolution. as a result he does not find contradictions between islam and evolution. shanavas first clarifies the term khalaqa; “to bring into existence a thing according to a certain measure, or proportion, so as to make it to the equal of another thing that is not pre-existing”28. this definition is based not on modern arabic, but on the classical arabic language in accordance with the language used at the time of the prophet. linguistically the word khalaqa implies the diversity of living creatures that are not created simultaneously, but through several stages. shanavas concludes that adam and eve are the “perfect people” chiseled from the first hominid creatures. the division among muslims, again, reflects the strong ambiguity in responding to evolution. this ambiguity suggests that the divisions regarding evolution among muslims are not a matter of argumentation alone but involves multiple interpretations of the koran and various levels of understanding concerning evolutionary theory. indonesian muslim biologists on the evolution theory: between scientism and religiosity these explanations and arguments concerning evolutionary theory do not necessarily have a direct influence on muslim biologists as evolutionary theory is so central in the biological sciences29. so, looking closely at the experiences of individual muslim-biologists30 in indonesia is a nesamsul ma’arif mujiharto 9 cessity due to at least two reasons. the first is to come up with how islam and evolution are reconciled by the individual. meanwhile, the second is to emphasize the competition between the two “structures” [islam and evolution] and which one is dominant depends on the understanding of rationality, religious commitment and how they are connected. 1. evolution and islam in response to the evolution, the indonesian muslim biologists (imb) 1, imb 2 and imb 3 have different understandings concerning rationality. they operate from different epistemological principles (standards of rationality), and have different ideas concerning the scope of rationality. these differences shape their different standpoints. imb 1 and imb 2, for example, believe that rationalities operate in separate domains. the rationality of science is supported by empirical evidence, while the rationality of religion is based on a faith that requires total acceptance __ as a manifestation of “submission” to god. concerning this point, imb 1 and imb 2 have similar standpoints. in many instances imb 2 stressed that his belief in “god as creator” does not imply the refusal of the theory of evolution. however, imb 2 agrees that the theological axiom “god as the creator” is not (always) correctly used to answer scientific questions that are merely empirical. in this case he receives the authority of “the verses of nature” to more clearly explain such propositions. for him, “the verses of nature” parallel the koran, or in other words, kauniyyah verses [verses of nature] have the same validity with qauliyyah verses [koranic verses]. the clear-cut distinction between the two verses does not only imply the incompleteness of the architecture of the arguments, but also potentially opens up a space free from epistemological claims that tend to be oppressive. actually, oppressive claims contradict the spirit of islam that appreciates freedom of thought rather than blind submission to a certain authority. however imb 1 disagrees with the acceptance of what are called the “verses of nature”. radical reduction of “the verses of nature” to modern science leaves a mysterious hole in both epistemological and axiological issues because modern science is not always compatible with islam. islam 10 prajna vihara~ receives intuition as one of possible sources of knowledge, while modern science affirms only the claims of empirical validity. islam emphasizes the singularity of “telos”, while modern science does not. based on such questions, imb 3 is reluctant to enter the debate over evolution and islam. it is more convenient for him if the two are not mutually “connected”. he only uses empirical rationality when he stands as a biologist before a biology class and adheres to religious doctrine when he is acting as a muslim. there is an effort not to interconnect religious and scientific rationality. but an ambiguity at the same time increasingly arises because islam does not break down the story of creation. if he holds religious doctrine, then his religion should provide him a space for the freedom of thinking, shouldn’t it? imb 3 seems to admit that the doctrine of creation is illogical without explicitly rejecting it. interestingly, in spite of having the same religious commitment, when religious commitment is connected with the rationality of science (evolution), the muslim biologists were still not necessarily in agreement. instead, each has a different strategy to respond to evolution. their different understandings of rationality, the implementation of rationality, the boundaries of rationality and its interaction with the religious commitment create this ambiguity. this leads to further questions concerning differences in the construction of rationality? does the rationality of science contrast with religious commitment? if not, how to understand the relationship? this clarification is useful to see the deeper social dimension of their understandings. the relation between rationality and religious commitment is also determined by the four standard measurements of rationality above. imb 1 sees no difference between rationality and religious commitment. this is what stenmark called the “monist model” because it must be guided by religious commitment. commitment is the top religious orientation of life. if there are things that are contrary to religious commitment, they should be rejected. moreover, related to the creation of reality, “... this problem can not be answered by pure science and considers god does not exist”, said imb 1. this is the problem of creation, and creation is too sacred to be examined only by science. as a biologist, this view is in contrast to most mainstream biologists who are less involved in the religious debate about evolution. samsul ma’arif mujiharto 11 based on the arguments above, imb 1 believes that the evolution model will never completely displace religion because it does not assume the omnipotence of god. yet he is not worried about being charged with blending religion and science, because of his contention that creation cannot be explained by mere science. creation will always include theological presuppositions about the existence and role of god, while science does not leave space for these kinds of presuppositions. as a muslim biologist, imb 1 places his religious commitment over everything, which ultimately means that when faced with contradictions with the rationality of science, the religious commitment must always win out. only in this way can a muslim become an ulil albab: a muslim who always remembers allah and thinks that everything is only because of him. during standing or sitting, a muslim always so remembers god in order that he does not lose the uluhiyah (godliness) dimension to his life. even though being in agreement on the importance of religious commitment, imb 3 believes that religious commitment has an additional value for scientific rationality. they are not always opposed but often experience “contact”. a respect for rationality may be an extension of religious commitment. or roughly speaking, rationality, can to some extent, help religious commitment become stronger and more understandable. imb 2 believes in a critical thinking that enables him to navigate clearly between religion and science. the “one moment” creation story, he said, was fully based on the story of creation in the old testament, which was then adapted to the story of creation in islam. he also supports the idea of steady creation, and reasons that since the koran did not explicitly explain creation, it follows, therefore, that people with the ability to reason should seek to discover the creation process and evolution is a theory that pursues this end. exploration of science cannot be considered as a neglect of religious commitment. religious commitment will be more “reasonable” when science is involved in providing explanations of the doctrine. moreover, imb 2 believes that the kauniyyah verses parallel the qauliyyah verses, and the kauniyyah verses can be clearly understood in the light of scientific findings. meanwhile, imb 3 prefers the “secure” way by not confronting rationality and religious commitment (the independence model). he places 12 prajna vihara~ rationality and religious commitment in two separate domains as he maintains that evolution theory is independent from the account of creation in islamic narratives. they are for that reason difficult to unite. these approaches can be summarized in the following table: rationality commitment relationship religious religious commitment is more important than rationality. the exploration of rationality of science can be a manifestation of religious commitment. no connection between the two imb 1 imb 2 imb 3 the rationality of science separates from religion. science is supported by empirical evidence and religion by faith. the rationality of science separates from religion. science is supported by empirical evidence and religion by faith. the rationality of science separates from religion. science is supported by empirical evidence and religion by faith. influenced by external factors (environment). influenced by external factors (environment). influenced by external factors (environment). conclusion from its earliest interactions, muslim scholars have shown an ambiguous response to evolution, primarily because the koran itself does not deal explicitly with the creation story. this is reflected to this day in the ambiguous responses found among indonesian muslim biologists and their varying understandings of rationality and its relation to the religious commitment. samsul ma’arif mujiharto 13 endnotes 1iqbal, iqbal, sir muhammad, 1951, the reconstruction of religious thought in islam, lahore, pakistan, shaikh muhammad ashraf bookseller and publisher, p.83. 2it is provided by modern science. 3it is provided by religion and belief system. 4the competition is mainly because of two apposing ideas of the story of creation. on the one hand, the koran states that human beings are god’s most honorable creatures, but on the other hand, human beings are unfriendly full of weakness. these two ideas often “expand” each other. stenmark introduces what he calls religious and scientific expansionism. c.f. stenmark, 2004, how to relate science and religion a multidimensional model, amerika serikat, wm. b. eerdmans publishing co. p.5-6 and 183-208. 5foerst, anne, 2002, “the stories we tell: the mythos-logos dialectic as new method for the dialogue between religion and science”, dalam terence j. kelly s.j. & hillary d. regan [ed.], god. life, intelligence and the universe, australia, australian theological forum (atf) press, p.23, 26. 6primanda, andya, 2007, evolusi dan islam, a paper presented at “the evolution controversy: who is fighting with whom about what?” workshop held by yogyakarta society for science and religion (myia) in cooperation with center for religious and cross-cultural studies (crcs) gadjah mada university, 16 june 2007, not published, p.7. 7adam is the first messenger that also claimed as the first human. 8little, john t., 1987, “al-insan al-kamil: the perfect man”, in the muslim world a quarterly journal of islamic study and of christian interpretation among muslims, vol. 77, no. 1, (january, 1987), p.47. 9hirtenstein, stephen, 1994, “lunar view, air-glow blue ibn ’arabi conversations with the prophet adam”, appearing in journal of the muhyiddin ibn ’arabi society, vol. 16, 1994, p.53. 10chittick, william c., 1994, imaginal worlds ibn al-’arabi and the problem of religious diversity, albany, amerika serikat, state university of new york press, p.35-36. 11kartanegara, mulyadhi, 2003, menyibak tirai kejahilan: pengantar epistemologi islam, bandung, mizan media utama, p.14. 12remtulla, aly, 1993, “the reaction of muslim arab scholars to the darwinian revolution”, appearing in muslim education quarterly, vol. 10, no. 4, (1993), p.59. 13mohamed, aishah, 2001, “a critique of jamal al-din al-afghani’s reformist ideas and its importance in the development of islamic thought in the twentieth century”, in the islamic quarterly, vol. 45, london, islamic cultural centre, p.54. 14mohamed, aishah, 2001, ibid, p.55. 14 prajna vihara~ 15nasr, seyyed hossein, 1986, man and nature the spiritual crisis of modern man, malaysia edition, london, inggris, george allen & unwin ltd, p.74. 16nasr, seyyed hossein, 1996, “evolusi: sebuah kemustahilan metafisika”, in osman bakar [ed.], evolusi ruhani kritik perenialis atas teori darwin, translated by eva y. nukman, bandung, mizan, p.62. 17bakar, osman, 1996, “sifat dan tingkatan kritik teori evolusi”, in osman bakar [ed.], evolusi ruhani kritik perenialis atas teori darwin, bandung, indonesia, mizan, p.163. 18fazlur rahman, 1994, major themes of the qur’an, minneapolis, usa, bibliotheca islamica, p.17. 19syahin, abdus-shobur, no year, abi adam qishah al-khaliqah baina al-usthurah wa al-haqiqah, muniroh, maktabah syabbab, p.58-59. 20syahin, p.74. 21syahin, p.70. 22syahin, p.116. 23syahin, p.79-83. 24syahin, p.97-98, 109. 25koening, danielle, 2006, “anti-evolutionism among muslim students”, in isim review, vol. 18/auntumn, p.1286. 26yahya, harun, 2006, the historical lie of stone age, istanbul turkey, global publishing. (pdf version appearing at www.harunyahya.com), p.17. 27yahya, 1999, the error of evolution of species, istanbul, turkey, global publishing. (pdf version appearing at www.harunyahya.com), p.157. 28shanavas, t.o., 2005, creation and/or evolution an islamic perspective, philadelphia, usa, xlibris, p.150. 29dobzhansky, theodosius, no year, dalam biologi, tidak ada yang dapat dipahami kecuali dengan penerangan evolusi, translated from “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” appearing at the american biology teacher, march 1973 (35: 125-129), translated by: andya primanda, not published, p.4. 30these three are: imb 1, imb 2, imb 3. samsul ma’arif mujiharto 15 contents individual and community: toward a new ‘brave new world’1 kyung hee lee yonsei university, seoul, korea abstract any consideration of western culture includes an examination of western modern thought. contemporary western thought is based upon not only scientific thought but also on an individualistic thought which renders the civil liberties of democratic society possible. however this highly developed science and technology, and the extreme claims of individual freedom have deteriorated into fetishism and selfishness and have become objects of severe criticism. today, a regional or state selfishness occasionally conflicts with the entire human community so that some eastern philosophers attempt to search for a solutions in the ancient eastern thought which emphasizes relation and holism. but there have also been negative cases of totalitarianism, and the suppression of the freedom of the individual as is the case of korea. thus i would like to investigate the original meaning of individualism in western modern thought and then find out how to harmonize western ideas with eastern ideas. finally, i shall try to find a way of harmonizing individual and community for the coming global society, the new ‘brave new world’. prologue human beings, in the west or in the east, are confronted with a problem which is, perhaps, the most important and fundamental problem from the standpoint of history. ever since human beings appeared on earth, they have tested their own civilizations, from the smallest region to more extended areas, and they have finally formed two main streams, which are the eastern and the western civilizations. each has developed their prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 101-114 101 © 2000 by assumption university press respective civilizations to the utmost. in their struggle for survival, each civilization had to take up challenges from other civilizations and to find their own forms of life and thought. whenever the scope of life was expanded, be it by conquest or conciliation, peoples had to consider what would be the most advantageous terms for their survival in these new situations. thus civilizations, diverged in such a fashion, gradually establishing the various different civilizations we recognize today in the east and the west. and today, these remaining civilizations have reached their final barriers. today, the partition wall between the two, the east and the west, is breaking down, positively or negatively, and compulsorily or voluntarily. at last human beings have come to be faced with the possibility of a single final civilization. hence globalization2 is a pressing subject for all mankind. what makes us very conscious of the inevitability of globalization is the infinite mutual communication based upon the high information technology (it), of which the internet is representative. however, the problem rises as to what sort of globalization this is. if we cannot solve this problem successfully, we can’t take a rosy view of the future and we are put in the position of oedipus, who put his fate at risk in order to solve the question of the sphinx. that is to say, although globalization is inevitable, it is not yet definitively established as to whether this process is barbarous and violent or positive and desirable. especially in asia the globalization becomes a grave issue because its influence has been negative as well as passive from 20th century on. no one doubts that the present process of globalization has the west as its central axis. in face of such undesirable globalization under the sole leadership of the west, an anti-globalization movement is growing. today, we, asians, stand at an important crossroads. it is a matter of fact that asians have not been very successful in preserving their tradition in so far as they were unable to resist the infiltration of the western culture into their own culture from the beginning of the 20th century. asians have at times even considered western culture and civilization as more reasonable and advanced than their own. and today, even westerners criticize their own thoughts and attitudes. according to this reflective and critical current of the times, people even commit the error of embellishing and idealizing eastern value as an alternative to western one. i am of the opinion that now is the time neither to follow blindly, nor to criticize too 102 prajñâ vihâra harshly these cultures but to evaluate them. we have to find out what makes values desirable by investigating the various modes of thought upon which cultures are based. i think that this is the task of philosophers. any consideration of western culture, also requires an examination of western modern thought. contemporary western thought is based upon not only scientific thought but also on an individualistic thought which renders the civil liberties of democratic society possible. however this highly developed science and technology, and the excessive claims of individual freedom have deteriorated into fetishism and selfishness and have become objects of severe criticism. today, a regional or state selfishness occasionally conflicts with the entire human community so that some eastern philosophers attempt to search for a solution in the ancient eastern thought which emphasizes relation and holism. but there have also been negative cases of totalitarianism, and the suppression of the freedom of the individual as is the case of korea. thus i would like to investigate the original meaning of individualism in western modern thought and then find out how to harmonize western ideas with eastern ideas. finally, i shall try to find a way of harmonizing individual and community for the coming global society, a new ‘brave new world’.3 the modern western individual “what, then, is the postmodern?” lyotard asks. “undoubtedly part of the modern. a work can [now] only be modern if it is first postmodern. postmodernism . . . is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.”4 it’s been a long time since ‘transcendence of the modernism’ became the topic for contemporary cultural discussion. though, as lyotard says, we have to understand the movement better known as ‘postmodernism’ in terms of a prolongation of modernism. so postmodernism plays the role of criticizing and reconsidering the viewpoints of western modernism. however, the more serious problem at issue for some non-western societies such as in korea is the fact that they, koreans and the eastern peoples, are faced with postmodernity before they actually understand the essence of modernity. hence it would be too hasty to talk about postmodernism under the kyung hee lee 103 circumstances where modernism is still unripe. therefore, we have to, first of all, find out what the core of modernity is. one of the most controversial terms in postmodernism is subjectivity. we may call the ‘end of philosophy’ the ‘end of subjectivity’. and subjectivity is the subjectivity of the individual. “. . .the postmodern conception of subjectivity can be distinguished by its opposition to the cartesian notion of the subject : a strongly bounded agent of rational selflegislation conceived in traditional epistemology (from descartes to kant) as the counterpart to the object. despite diverse and sometimes oppositional formulations, postmodernist and poststructualist critics share an impulse to “deconstruct” the humanist subject as the intending source of knowledge and meaning. such accounts redefine the human self as an entity constructed by, and not simply reflected in a culture’s social discourses, linguistic structures, and signifying practices.”5 thus the subjectivity criticized by the postmodernists is traced to descartes in western modern age. erich fromm holds that the idea of the individual endowed with subjectivity has its birth at the beginning of the modern age. “european and american history since the end of the middle ages is the history of the full emergence of the individual.”6 moreover it is this individual’s subjectivity that became the most important foundation of western thought ever since then down to contemporary times. the subjective individual is rated the origin, the foundation and the master of thought, judgment and activity. the western modern individual is the being who will lay down a rule and a principle for him/herself starting from his or her own reason and will, not willing to accept god’s regulations and laws. many things unprecedented in history, such as the modern natural law and regal humanism came into being. and it goes without saying that these positive elements now form the basis of most contemporary societies. we can show the meanings of the subjectivity and the freedom of the individual through the theory of social contract of modern thinkers, such as hobbes, locke and rousseau. the french revolution and the american revolution, basing upon that theory, formulated the foundation of modern european and american thoughts. and we can conclude that the realization of the free democracies founded on human rights, freedom and equality is really the purpose of modern enlightenment. furthermore, enlightenment can be actualized only when the freedom of the individual 104 prajñâ vihâra endowed with autonomous reason is secured. foucault asks : “how did “man” come to know himself? what is (was) enlightenment? how in fact did the modern european turn himself and every human or animal he came across in his adventures, his conquests, into a knowable species and individualobject and subject of knowledge?7 now i shall turn to examine first descartes’s individual, which the postmodernists criticized as being the ‘metaphysics of subjectivity. descartes’ cogito it was descartes who inaugurated a new type of human being, that is the ‘individual’. descartes substituted the question ‘what am i?’ for the ancient aristotelian question of ‘what is man?’. furthermore he defined the ‘i’ as a thinking thing.8 descartes did not rely upon established usages and old standard authorities but upon the individual innate ability of reason to achieve true and certain knowledge. it is ‘the natural light’ or ‘the light of reason’ that substantiates descartes’ individual. and everything known by that natural light does not come under the body or the composite of the body and mind but under the mind alone. moreover, the mind consists of the intellect and the will. the question is how the natural light bears on the intellect and the will. when we hold fast to the views that the natural light is merely the cognitive power through a narrow distinction between the passive intellect and the active will, we will place the meaning of the modern individual under restriction. we can say that the criterion of truth is the clearness and the distinctness. when we perceive certain and objective knowledge, it means that our perception is transparently certain. but the knowledge of its being true can be produced only when the will assents to that. now we can maintain that the natural light is closely connected with the act of will. when the intellect perceives a certain proposition clearly and distinctly, the will comes to feel that it cannot but maintain that the proposition is true. it is at that time, descartes says, that the natural light shines on. we can find that the subjective and autonomous will and the necessary and objective world can be compatible in descartes’ individual, placed at the zenith of the modernity. the free will and the clear and distinct truth can kyung hee lee 105 coexist under the natural light. descartes’ individual is not a narcissistic subject. the criticism of individualism thus freed from fetters of established power and the larger community, the individual and its growing power has led to the current crisis in the west. the problem is that the stronger we make the individual as an absolute being, the more the individual’s life becomes isolated and impoverished. erich fromm described this state of things as ‘escape from freedom’ and indicated the dark side of this situation. he writes, “though giving the individual a new feeling of independence, at the same time made him feel alone and isolated, filled him with doubt and anxiety, and drove him into new submission and into a compulsive and irrational activity.”9. the worst of it is that when the individualism resulting from the maximization of individual transmutes into the shallow selfishness, this selfishness should encroach on the civil mutual confidence which is the foundation of community. the selfishness means that though sacrificing the public good and disregarding other people, the individual is only willing to pursue his/ her personal interest. moreover this selfishness mistakes liberalism as ‘making the individual’s right absolute.’ taylor maintains that the individual isolated from societies is not the true individual. this is the sense in which one cannot be a self on one’s own. i am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of selfunderstanding and, of course, these classes may overlap. a self exists only within what i call ‘webs of interlocution’. it is this original situation which gives its sense to our concept of ‘identity’, offering an answer to the question of who i am through a definition of someone’s identity thus usually involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual matters but also some reference to a defining community.10 106 prajñâ vihâra macintyre also denounces the dark side of individualism and insists on a communitarian ethics. he recollects the eudaimonic (aristotelian) conception of the virtues. “this was a conception that equated the good with a full and unimpeded exercise of whatever activities conduced to our all-round wellbeing as citizens, thinkers, artists, soldiers, politicians, or creatures whose happiness is at every point bound up with our role as members of a flourishing cultural community. it also included a certain narrative elements, that is, a capacity to view our own life-projects as contributing to a story whose meaning and significance derived from its enactment within that same context of communally sanctioned purposes, values, and beliefs. but again we have lived on, as macintyre argues, into an epoch of splintered value-spheres which set up a false dichotomy between what is good for us as private individuals in quest of personal fulfillment and what is good for “society” (or the public interest) conceived as imposing a stern moral check upon our “lower, self-seeking, unregenerate instincts and desires.”11 however it is in the societies like america, blessed with individual freedom, from which communitarian ethics emerged. that is to say, it was not until the individualism planted its roots deeply in each society that the modern individual’s limit was revealed and the criticism of the individualism became possible. and it is to be noted that the true knowledge and realization of the individual through the new interpretation of subjectivity has equipped the european to develop the postmodernist view. they have learned the meaning of the individual through years of experience. we can take levinas’s theory of ‘responsibility’ of the subject as an example. “levinas’s focus (in otherwise than being) shifts the description of the genesis and structure of subjectivity. he uncovers a dimension of the subjectivity that precedes and undoes the arché or origin of all beings. this dimension is responsibility. he asserts that the subject’s responsibility for what the other goes to the extreme point of substitution for the other.”12 now he does not insist on the narrow meaning of subjectivity but on the broad sense of subjectivity implying communitarian thought. and his affirmation is established on the society and the history that the individual’s right and freedom was ripe for theorizing. now how do things stand now in non-western societies, for kyung hee lee 107 example in korea. especially in korea, there has been a movement towards the opposite direction of the west, that is, from the communitarian thought to the individualistic view. broadly speaking, they become conscious of their own individualistic value and have begun to discard old communitarian habits. judging by the present situation, it would be still premature to talk about the negative meaning of individualism in korea. in other words, we find it difficult to consider postmodernism in a situation where modernism is not yet ripe. furthermore there still remains a more fundamental matter in the method of understanding others in the west, in addition to the above oriental ideas. eastern communitarian thought the korean people, as is generally known, opened the 20th century in a state of colonization and were involved in the korean war at the midtwentieth century. the time-honored traditions crumbled radically and many koreans fell into utter confusion of ideas. agricultural society was the traditional basis of economic activity and confucian values its ideology. communitarian thought rather than individualism controlled korean thinking. in the late 19th century, the picture of koreans as they appeared to the western, foreign, missionaries is a positive proof of that state of affairs. that’s just what the europeans have to study with care in asia. the europe is not willing to find out the true origin of her lost power in religion. our new legal system is not only atheistic but also disrespectful. hence the europeans think of themselves only and the result comes to no good. on the contrary in chosun (korea), the purpose of the regal system is to keep the family and it goes well on the whole. it is a matter of course that there are frequent occasions when the individual should be sacrificed within that society. but however hard i may think, isn’t it that this situation is less tragic than the disorder caused by egoism.13 108 prajñâ vihâra thus we can find that koreans of those days still maintained the traditional way of thinking, as foreigners saw it. as we see it, the community came before the individual in korea. as a matter of fact it was not to be supposed that, under all circumstances, the individual and the community were two entirely different things. one missionary, daveluy, understood that the korean’s mind of community and their mutual aid in the korean customs and social life of the 19th century was superior to the european’s. he wrote that this led him to an intense hatred and abomination against his own modern selfish egoism.14 it is a case example that shows the positive aspect of the communitarian thought in korean traditional society. this western foreigner regarded this communitarian thought highly because he had already experienced the harmful influence of individualism. this communitarian mind is quite different from the monadic individual having a metaphysical independence, as described by leibniz.15 contrary to this positive viewpoint of the communitarian thought, the missionary insisted that if koreans wanted to make the korean civilization possible, they should enlarge the scope of the individual’s freedom. here the missionary continues to emphasize the western values that placed the individual as the basic unit of all social activities and the subject of rights, and insists on its appropriateness for korean civilization. this is entirely different from the traditional korean communitarian thinking that regarded as the subject the social relational network itself, and considered the family or the regional community as a unit.16 the thing which tightens the union of the community is ‘ ’( , jeong) in korean. if we are to speak about ‘ ’, it signifies the deep emotions of relationship among the members of the community. as the korean saying runs, namely “the hateful , the lovely ”, the ‘ ’ can be taken in either a good or a bad sense. as a matter of fact, we can say that communitarian thought was a desirable way of thinking in the traditional agricultural societies. but there was a rapid industrial conversion of the past agricultural society to the present westernized industrial society not only in the economic system but also in the political and the social system in korea. here lies the point. there was a remarkable difference between the national characters before and after the switchover. koreans had not autonomously directed the reorganization of its economic order. it was still directed by external powers. as a result, we can discover some unfavorable side of effects kyung hee lee 109 where koreans have been pressured into a certain kind of democracy, as well as an economic order of a liberal capitalistic nation. thus the traditional communitarian thought in korea should have gradually accomodated the new ideas befitting the changed circumstances. however, while the prototypal communitarian thought remained intact, only the social environment changed with rapidity. koreans have yet to find an equilibrium between such thought and the actual facts. in the long run, because koreans could not adjust effectively to this sudden change, they are nowadays in an awkward situation. beginning in the late 19th century when western ideas were planted in this country, the traditional communitarian thought excluding the individual have clashed with western individualism. with the lack of such balance and integration, korean communitarian ideas have been transformed into such liabilities as cronyism and mass-selfishness. since hobbes, described the state of nature as “all against all”, western thinkers have learned through years of bitter experience that they could establish a sound community only through the perfection of self, only when they overcome the selfishness of the individual. hence it is absolutely necessary for koreans to learn this lesson from their western experience which was the bright side of modernism. and fortunately, it is a good thing that koreans of today can also avert the harmful side of modern individualism through the teachings of the postmodern ideas. the postmodernist criticism of subjectivity is a valuable lesson to koreans. in korea, foreign invasion was not the only difficulty. the reason why korean people suffered a totalitarian history is not because, as erich fromm would say, they voluntarily embraced the totalitarianism to escape from freedom, but because there has been a history where it was difficult for the individual to mature (such as the partition of korea). nevertheless many people are of the same opinion that the korean communitarian thought has been the driving force of the present development of economy shortly after the calamity of the korean war. but, as was said earlier, the communitarian ideas changed into the exclusive ideas, such as cronyism and mass-selfishness. and now the conflict between selfish groups and communities is a serious issue. therefore, as of today, we need to investigate the true meaning of the individual. in other words, koreans have to inquire into the various values of the western modern individual, such as, the subjectivity, freedom, equality, and rationality of 110 prajñâ vihâra the individual, in order to make up for the weak points in the current communitarian thought. it goes without saying that the complementary measures do not merely mean a simple comparison or mixture between western culture and eastern culture. moreover, each country, including korea, should develop her own methods in a fashion unique to herself from an independent standpoint. epilogue: is the east the other? the reason why we, koreans and eastern people, cannot readily accept the theory of otherness is that there is too much uncertainty concerning the role of alterity, which the postmodernists use in criticizing the western modernity. that is to say, besides the matter of the objective description of western individualistic thought and eastern communitarian thought, the subtle matter indwells both in modernity and the postmodernity. we can discover one of the matters in an example of so-called neocolonialism. gayatri chakravorty spivak criticized the idea of benevolence suggestively and persistently. benevolence is a category of bourgeois culture and morality rooted in modern humanist enlightenment philosophy. postmodern critiques of power and subject have approached benevolence in terms of the epistemological and moral-ideological production of a hegemonic humanist subject rather than a natural human disposition. for spivak, western humanist benevolence is an essential, constitutive part of the system and problematic of neo-colonial hegemony. rather than representing or helping the subaltern, benevolent discourse performs the hegemony of the neo-colonial subject and constitutes his/her world as naturally superior. this blocks the possibility of talking with the subaltern. benevolent humanism is not simply a legitimating ideology in the service of economic interests inscribed elsewhere. the international monetary fund’s and world bank’s aid and development programs are instances of benevolence as forms of extraction of economic value. as these are essential to the system of neo-colonial exploitation, so called, the benevolent subjectivity and morality are inevitably politico-economic inscriptions.17 these new postmodern critical movements expressed in spivak, homi bhabha, and said shed light on alterity or otherness from the standpoint of kyung hee lee 111 the third world18, and not from western point of view. however, this postcolonial project took advantage of certain trends in the western thought. alhough the postcolonialists maintain the otherness of ‘the subaltern’ and the margin through the postmodern body of theory, they are little removed from western dualism of center and the other. according to this framework, the orient is forever the other, and the object of charity for the occident. are the eastern people the others? this viewpoint shows that the situation continues to be unchanged. that is to say, the situation is that the western powers regarded asia as the barbarous object to be enlightened, when they advanced into asia. therefore, first of all, korean people should break away from the western biases of modernism or postmodernism. also, it is important that the korean people produce their own body of theory befitting an advanced society and on a more realistic basis. koreans should dismiss the ideas that they have used as models – both western and eastern and search for what is needed now. there is no doubt that this thought should have both regional characteristics and the universal characteristics at the same time. these preceding remarks are merely preliminary considerations for entering the coming global world a new ‘brave new world’ endnotes 1 *this work was supported by the korea research foundation grant (krf-2003-074-am0009). 2 “the term “globalization” emerged from management and business literature in the 1970’s to describe new strategies for worldwide production and distribution, entering the social sciences through geography and sociology, and the humanities through anthropology and cultural studies. analytically, the term has been used in two ways. first, it functions as a response to earlier theories of capitalism, such as the world systems theory of immanuel wallerstein and the world historical perspective of fernand braudel. globlization scholars ask whether there is anything new about the current era of global capitalism, answering that question by directing attention away from mechanics or totalizing theories of capital and history, and toward the contingent metaphysics of movement entailed in global systems of production and consumption. instead, emphasis is placed upon forms of identity construction and power, and incompleteness and indeterminacy. second, it functions as a response to triumphalist narratives globalization put forth in business literature and by theorists of the “end of history” 112 prajñâ vihâra of the “end of geography” who view three events as completing the modern project of bringing the peoples of the world under the benevolent mantle of one rational system: the global reach of capitalism, the demise of the socialists bloc, and the creation of new information technology. critics respond to these narratives by challenging their tropes of dominance, totality, and penetration, and by directing attention to the problematic iconography in corporate rhetoric that recognizes globalization as the new idiom of power. as an alternative, such scholars present images of the globe in order to call attention to global civil societies emerging in tandem with or in response to global capitalism, highlighting hybridity, hyperreality, and paradoxical identity formations co-occurring with postmodernity.” victor e. taylor and charles e. winquist ed., encyclopedia of postmodernism, london: routledge, 2001. p. 381-382. 3 c.f. huxley, brave new world and shakespeare, “how beauteous mankind is! o brave new world” (the tempest, vi,182) 4 lyotard, jean-franç ois, “answering the question: what is postmodernism?” inthe postmodern condition: a report on knowledge. minneapolis: minnesota university press, 1982. 5 victor. e. taylor etc., ibid. p.133. 6 fromm, erich, escape from freedom, london: routledge & kegan paul, 1960. 7 victor e. taylor, etc., ibid. p. 133. 8 descartes, rené, at: oeuvres de descartes, publiées par adam charles & tannery paul, paris: vrin, 1974. vii 25: csm: the philosophical writings of descartes i, ii, cottingham j., stoothoff r., murdoch d. trans, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1984. ii 17. 9 erich fromm, ibid. ch. 3. / “. . . for the realization of individuality in the sense just mentioned, while at the same time people have lost those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. it then becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction. powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom.” ibid. ch. 2. 10 taylor, charles, sources of the self: the making of the modern identity, cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press, 1989. p. 36. 11 payne, michael, ed., a dictionary of cultural and critical theory, oxford : blackwell, 2001, p. 112-113. 12 taylor e. victor, ed., ibid. p. 218. 13 antoine daveluy, notes pour l’introduction a l’histoire de la coree, p. 62. requotation from 19 p. 93. 14 p.84-85. 15 leibniz, robert latta, trans., the monadology and other philosophical writings, london: oxford university press, 1951. p. 217-218. 16 , p. 160-161. kyung hee lee 113 17 taylor e. victor, ibid. 32-33. 18 instead of the term, robert young uses the term‘tricontinentalism’. 114 prajñâ vihâra 147-154 islam and ecology chinese thought and the birth of postmodern culture: the western man’s early encounter with china alfredo p. co university of santo tomas, the catholic university of the philippines abstract the understanding of another culture leads to both respect for that culture, and a new understanding of one’s own culture. before eastern thought became popular in the west, there were already westerners who explored the east and brought back stories about it; scholars and missionaries who began to patiently translate eastern writings into western languages. these early western explorers discovered a new world of understanding which would gradually ignite the european imagination and transform its understanding of itself. this paper wishes to chart the very earliest western encounters with the thought of china. discovering the culture of china china was a far-away land to the west, unknown and mysterious. it was a land-source of the great merchandise that inflamed the great courts of egypt and rome, the producer of silk that became a sartorial favorite of the great monarchs, and a manufacturer of exquisite porcelain wares that adorned the houses of the western nobles. the silk-road trade provided the most important signpost to discovering the supplier of these goods. intrigued by the tales they heard from these merchants and traders, and by the subsequent threat of the conquest of genghis khan, european men were gradually drawn to the mysterious land called cathay. we shall trace the important development by tracing some of the landmark encounters that led to the discovery of eastern philosophy and gradually fueled the interest and imagination of the west. if the medieval age was prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 1-10 1 © 2000 by assumption university press marked by the western man’s (italian) encounter with the greek culture through the arabs, the discovery of the chinese and indian civilizations was again fueled by venetian (italian again) travelers. john de plano carpini one of the earliest recorded accounts of the discovery of china by a western man took place in 1245 when the roman pontiff sent the 65-year-old italian franciscan monk john de plano carpini on a mission to the mongolian (yuan) court in china to persuade the khan to cease his attack against the christian nations. suffering terrible hardships on the way, carpini, ignorant of the chinese language, arrived in the yuan court, where he stayed for barely three months. upon his return, he made an astonishing report to the pontiff in rome. carpini told the pope that the chinese had both the old and new testaments. he also claimed that the chinese worshipped one god, had many saints, and love the christians. to wit: the men of kytay (cathay as china was then known) are pagan, having a special kind of writing by themselves, and (as it is reported) the scriptures of the old and new testament. they have also recorded in histories the lives of their forefathers, and they have hermits, and certain houses made after the manner of our churches, which in those days they greatly resorted unto. they say that they have diverse saints also, and they worship one god. they adore and reverence christ jesus our lord, and believe the article of eternal life, but are not baptized. they do also honorably esteem and revere our scriptures. they love christians, and bestow much alms, and are a very courteous and gentle people. they have no beards, and they agree partly with the mongols in the disposition of their countenance, there are no better artificers in the whole world. their country is exceedingly rich, in corn, wine, gold, silk, and other commodities.1 2 prajñâ vihâra subsequent encounters with china will reveal that father carpini made a very superficial understanding of china and the impression he gave to the pope failed to capture the reality of the vast country. one thing was certain, the image he gave raised curiosity in the christian corridors of power. jacob d’ancona the next important encounter with china by a western man is a recently unearthed manuscript of a jewish-venetian merchant named jacob d’ancona who claimed to have arrived at the southern coastal metropolis of china called zaitun, the “city of light” in 1270. jacob d’ancona described china with vivid, and often dramatic prose, always rich in humanity and insights. jacobs documented account forms great historical significance in that he discovered a great flourishing civilization with vast trade and commerce never before seen in any european center. d’ancona described the adventures of medieval traders, and the chinese society and manners through the eyes of european man of learning. the jewish italian traveler jacob provides also an unparalleled account of life in the thriving mercantile economy of zaitun, amidst vigorous manufacture and lavish consumption that defines a well-developed culture and civilization. the southern chinese metropolis of zaitun was to him, a great “city of light”, a “city of measureless trade” peopled by many “learned men”, where there is “law and freedom” and with vibrant trade and commerce.2 marco polo the third and the most dramatic and picturesque account of the western man’s early encounter with china however came with marco polo, a venetian merchant who arrived in the yuan (mongolian) court in 1275. he wrote the most celebrated travelers tale entitled, the description of the world, which described china’s yuan court at the height of its greatness, when it was unrivaled in its cultural attainment, splendor, sophistication, and power. alfredo p. co 3 when one sets out from the city of ciangan he goes riding three days journeys through very beautiful country where there are found many dwellings and cities and many villages of great importance and of great wealth and of great activity, where they live by trade and crafts. they are idolaters and are subject to the rule of the great khan. they have money of notes. they have abundance of all victuals for man’s body...one finds the very most noble and magnificent cities for its excellence, importance, and beauty is called quinsai, which means to say in french the city of heaven...for it is the greatest city which may be found in the world, where so many pleasures may be found that one fancies himself to be in paradise....quinsai is so large that in circuit it is the common belief a hundred miles round....there are squares where they hold market, which on account of the vast multitudes which meet in them are necessarily very large and spacious. and it is placed in this way, that it has on one side a lake of fresh water which is very clear, and on the other there is an enormous river which, entering by many great and small canals which run in every part of the city, both takes away all impurities and then enters the said lake, and from that runs to the ocean. and this makes the air very wholesome….and the streets and canals are wide and great so that boats are able to travel there conveniently and carts to carry things necessary for the inhabitants.3 this travel story of marco polo, together with the things he brought back to europe that includes gun-powder, used by the chinese for festivities, (which was to be transformed into use for weapons when they returned to china several years later), the noodle (that was transformed into many pasta preparations), aside from the fabulous goods of silk, porcelain, lacquer-wares, ivory and jade carvings, and many exotic other goods. all these ignited the fertile imaginations of the europeans that paved the way to the european adventure and colonization of the east few centuries later. 4 prajñâ vihâra 16th and 17th centuries religious missions in china the account of the early travelers and merchants enflamed the western man’s imagination and drove him to explore and colonize the east. side by side with the military conquest were the religious missions that were instrumental in making the east known to the west. they were the ones mostly responsible for translating the eastern manuscripts to the western languages. the most consistent and systematic attempt by the west to understand the chinese culture and civilization came only in the 16th and 17th centuries. it must honestly be said that the early missionaries who were evidently more interested in the spiritual and intellectual life-world of the chinese than either the merchants or the politicians made the painful work of getting to know china. for the missionaries, understanding a civilization was a prerequisite to conversion. they were facing a formidable work that they had not experienced in the other, still undeveloped, places like most of southeast asia, africa and arabia. matteo ricci’s early attempt at dialogue a jesuit missionary, matteo ricci (1552-1611),4 was assigned superior of the first christian mission in china. ricci came face to face with an enormous culture before him: confucianism, a philosophy that was synonymous with chinese culture and mores, not to mention its being a spiritual guide. at the center of china’s civil and religious life are the confucian rites and its philosophical concepts of ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (rite and propriety)), zhi (wisdom), xiao ching (filial piety, central to ancestor worship), chi (spirit) and many more.5 facing the european missionaries was the question of how to introduce christianity to a well-developed culture like china. the mission was unlike the philippines, for example, where the natives did not have yet a developed written language, nor a written cultural history, and thus no philosophy and literature, no political institution, and neither established religion nor great temples. if the mission in the philippines was a matter of teaching the natives the latin script, baptizing them, teaching them christian alfredo p. co 5 religion, giving them names and surnames, introducing them to the food, the culture and the finer arts of europe all that was not the case for the missionaries in china. matteo ricci tried to approach china by showing to the chinese that there were similarities in their way of thinking and their worship with that of christianity. a philosophical position that points to the existence of natural theology. but christianity came with revelation. for what man can naturally reach by reason has to come to its fullest only in the revealed text. in effect, what matteo ricci wanted to do, so as to convert the confucian chinese, was to confucianize christianity. niccolo longobardi recoils matteo ricci was, however succeeded by niccolo longobardi (1565-1655)6 who opposed ricci’s accommodation approach to confucianism. longobardi’s position was that the revelation of god was given only to those who were spiritually prepared and baptized. thus, there could be no accommodation with the chinese whose object of worship could not be equated with the christian god. this resulted in one of the most exciting controversies of the christian mission in china that lasted several centuries. but, as everyone knows, a controversy comes only with the excitement of both proponents and opponents creating great debates. those who defended ricci and those who defended longobardi succeeded in animating the western world. they both gained many followers. those who sided with ricci argued that there is such thing as natural theology found in all cultures. it was impossible for a great civilization like china not to have discovered the divine presence by the light of reason, for this was just a matter of trying to find its conceptual equivalence through a dialogical comparison with the christian god. those who followed longobardi were, however, the conservatives. they taught that god had revealed himself only to those who were baptized, and only the followers of the christian faith could attain heaven. the great debate illumed some of the most interesting issues about christian faith and evangelization. the debate was to echo the great divide on the question of evangelization that went all the way to the twentieth century, when pope john xxiii called for the second vatican council. 6 prajñâ vihâra initial translation of chinese classics the controversy caused by the early chinese mission triggered the western philosophers to probe into the religious controversies. they started to ask, what is the chinese concept of truth? what is the chinese concept of god? what is the chinese concept of good and evil? what is the chinese concept of human nature? what is chinese cosmology? in short, what is the chinese weltanschauung? to understand the real chinese worldview, the western scholars had to unmask the mystery of the chinese civilization, first by knowing the unknown language, and then by translating its great literary and philosophical heritage. the europeans knew that the civilization and culture of china was hidden deeply in the literature and philosophy of its people, and, since they did not understand chinese, the first task was to learn chinese and then translate the most important works. what could be a better work to start with than the famous she shu7 or the four books consisting of lun yu (the analects of confucius), meng zi (the book of mencius), da xue (the great learning) and zhong yung (the doctrine of the mean)? a partial translation of these works came to print. other missionaries and colonizers, who could not translate, wrote their own impressions and memoirs. these chinese documents, in spite of the many inaccuracies that came with the initial translations, animated the intellectual life-world of the 17th-and-18th-century europe.8 one can easily see that there is still so much work to do in this regard, for what the early scholars found were only the confucian teachings as interpreted by the 12th century confucian scholar chu shi, and chu shi; we have to be cautioned, is just one of the several interpreters of confucianism. development of western sinophilism in the west the newfound ideas from china prompted the flourishing of the work on and about china. some of the earliest works written about china are: “de confucio ejusque doctrina tractatus”9 (a treatise on confucius and his doctrine) in 1623, a work that was translated into spanish in 1676 and then into french in 1701; “de bello tartarico in sinis historia”10 in 1654; “china monumentis qua sacris qua profanes”11 in alfredo p. co 7 1667; « tratados historicos, politicos, eticos y religiosos de la monarchia de china »12 in 1674; “confucius sinarum philosophus”13 in 1687, which contains a partial translation of the four books; and « description de l’empire de la chine »14 in 1735. the novelty of chinese thought triggered some important reactions from the western philosophical circle. initial engagements were found in the writings of voltaire, baron de montesquieu, jean-jacques rousseau, david hume and goldsmith. description de l’empire de la chine produced reactions from these political thinkers who wrote to underscore the excellence of the chinese system of government, bureaucracy and administration, as well as the chinese excellence in education, the civil service examination system, the tax system, the grain storage system and also the quality of the confucian ethical system on which the chinese civilization and culture were based. the philosophes of the 18th century cited the confucian chinese empire, sometimes extolling china to highlight the decadent situation at home.15 but there was so much more to know about china other than what the scholars had already found out about the confucian teachings. they had not yet discovered the works of lao zi and zhuang zi. the political thoughts of shang yang and han fei zi and many others that would preoccupy many western scholars for many years to come. it now becomes obvious that there was a great intellectual revolution happening in europe that came side-by-side with their colonization of the east. the translations that followed the discovery of the cultures and thoughts of china shattered the western hegemony. the europeans were now looking at two enormously distinct civilizations, which were different from their judeo-christian and greco-roman roots. if the renaissance brought europe back to greco-roman and judeo-christian origins, thereby paving the way for the triumphalistic modern age, the european encounter with china and india brought about the emergence of a new intellectual, post-colonial mindset. endnotes 1 cf. raymond beazley, the texts and versions of john de plano carpini and william de rubruquis. (london: cambridge university press.1903). 8 prajñâ vihâra 2 jacob d’ancona the city of light. david selborne tran. (london: little, brown and co., 1997). 3 cf. a.c. moule and paul pelliot, trans marco polo: the description of the world. (london: routledge and kegan paul ltd., 1938). 4 cf. ricci-trigault, expédition chrétienne en la chine. (paris: 1654). 5 matteo ricci’s approach to the chinese mission in china was marked by what impact the chinese civilization had on him. he found natural piety in the chinese and he wanted to capitalize the innate piety as vehicle to christianize the chinese. he was of the assumption that it would be easier if he were to use the homegrown religious conception to translate the christian ideas to the chinese. many of these “semi” religious ideals seem to him to be very close to christian tenets. 6 niccolo longobardi succeeded matteo ricci and took a completely confrontational approach to the evangelization in china. alfredo p. co 9 7 the writings of philip couplet contains partial translations by the jesuit missionaries on the she su or the four books, which comprises the analects, the book of mencius, the great learning and the doctrine of the mean. 8 it was chu xii who insisted in including the three other books with the analects of confucius to give them equal importance, making their views as official interpretation of confucius. i take such classification as arbitrary and insist, that confucianism is not complete without the inclusion of the book of xun zi. 9 niccolo longobardi, “de confucio ejusque doctrina tractatus.” (a treatise on confucius and his doctrine). c. 1623. 10martin martini, “de bello tartarico in sinis historia.” c. 1654. 11 athanasius kircher, “china monumentis qua sacris qua profanes ». amsterdam: 1667. 12 domingo fernandez navarette, tratadoz historicos, politicos, eticos y religiosos de la monarchia de china ». rome: 1674. 13 philip couplet, « confucius sinarum philosophus ». paris: 1687. 14 jean baptiste du halde, « description de l’empire de la chine ». paris: 1735. 15 the discourses of the période de lumière were greatly reflective of the secular political ideals in chinese philosophy. 10 prajñâ vihâra article 4-2 1 marx and technology joseph i. fernando assumption university of thailand karl marx had spent more than three decades (1849-1883) in england, the land of the industrial revolution. steeped in philosophy and political economy, marx became more and more aware of the exploitative nature of capitalism. he was committed to the discovery of an alternative to capitalism which would be in keeping with the worth and dignity of human persons. marx’s attention was drawn to technology as technology in the hands of capitalists led to greater exploitation of workers. marx was certainly a pioneer in the philosophy of technology. his painstaking analysis of the relation between the machinery and the worker and a host of other revelations concerning the use of machinery in the capitalist system are impressive. this article is an attempt to understand marx’s philosophy of technology. 1. the development of machinery marx begins his analysis of machinery and modern industry1 by quoting john stuart mill who says in his principles of political economy: “it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day’s toil of any human being.”2 that is not the aim of the capitalist application of machinery. machinery is intended to cheapen commodities by lengthening that portion of the working day, which the labourer gives, without an equivalent, to the capitalist. it is a means for producing surplus value. in manufacture or cottage-industry, the revolution in the mode of production begins with the labour power, whereas in modern industry it begins with the instruments of labour. marx’s first enquiry is, what is the difference between a machine and the tools of handicraft? some call a tool a simple machine, and a machine a complex tool. they do not see an essential difference between the two and give the name of machine to the lever, the screw, the wedge and so on. in fact, every machine is a combination of these simple powers. for marx, from the economic standpoint this explanation is worthless because it lacks the historical element. another explanation of the difference between tool prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 1-17 © 2000 by assumption university press 2 and machine is that man is the motive power of a tool and in the case of a machine the motive power is something different from man; such as an animal, water, wind and so on. according to this explanation, a plough drawn by oxen would be a machine, while a circular loom, which worked by a single labourer, weaved 96,000 picks per minute (at the time of marx in england) would be a mere tool. this loom, though worked by hand, would be a machine if worked by steam. marx goes on to say that fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts: the motor mechanism, the transforming mechanism, and finally the tool or working machine. the motor mechanism puts the whole in motion. it either generates its own motive power like the steam engine or it receives its impulse from some already existing natural force like the windmill from wind. the transmitting mechanism, composed of fly-wheels, shafting, pullies, gears and so on regulates the motion, changes its form where necessary and divides and distributes it among the working machines. the motor mechanism and the transmitting mechanism put the working machines in motion. the working machines as such is that part of the machinery with which the industrial revolution of the 18th century began. we find the working machine proper under altered forms, the tools used by the handicraftsman or manufacturing worker. instead of being human implements, they are mechanical implements. the entire machine is either only an altered mechanical edition of the old handicraft tool, as for example, the power-loom or the working parts fitted in the frame of the machine are old acquaintances like saws in sawing machine and knives in a chopping machine. the machine, which is the starting point of the industrial revolution, supersedes the worker, who handles a single tool, by a mechanism operating with a number of similar tools, and set in motion by a single motive power. 2. the effects of machinery on the labourer a. appropriation of supplementary labour-power by capital the machinery does not require muscular power. it becomes a means of employing labourers of slight muscular strength and those with incomplete bodily development, but whose limbs are supple. the labour of women and children is the first thing needed by capitalists who use 2 prajñâ vihâra 3 machinery. machinery, the mighty substitute for labour and labourers became a means for increasing the number of wage labourers by enrolling every member of the worker’s family without distinction of age or sex. compulsory work for the capitalist robbed children of their play and the worker of his free labour at home within moderate limits for the support of the family. “the value of labour-power was determined, not only by the labour-time necessary to maintain the individual adult labourer, but also by that necessary to maintain his family. machinery, by throwing every member of that family on to the labour market, spreads the value of the man’s labour-power over his whole family. it thus depreciates his labour-power. to purchase the labour power of a family of four workers may, perhaps, cost more than it formerly did to purchase the labour power of the head of the family, but in return four days labour takes the place of one, and their price falls in proportion to the excess of the surplus-labour of four over the surplus-labour of one. in order that the family may live, four people must now, not only labour, but expend surplus-labour for the capitalist. thus we see, that machinery, while augmenting the human material that forms the principle object of capital’s exploiting power, at the same time raises the degree of exploitation.”3 machinery also changes completely the contract between the labourer and the capitalists, which formally fixes their mutual relations. taking the exchange of commodities as basis, marx’s first assumption was that capitalist and labourer meet as free persons, as independent owners of commodities, one with money and means of production, the other labour-power. but now the capitalist buys children and youth under age. previously, the worker sold his own labour-power as a free agent. now he sells his wife and children; he has become a slave-dealer. the capitalist’s greed for exploitation is the cause of employment of children. in spite of legislation in great britain children sold to act as live chimneysweeping machines exceeded 2000 when marx was in england. children and women faced physical deterioration as machinery subjected them to the exploitation of the capital. the mortality rate of the children of the workers was enormous during the first few years of their life. the cause of the death-rates was principally due to the employment of the mothers away from their homes, and to the neglect and maltreatment consequent on her absence. there arose natural joseph i. fernando 3 4 estrangement between mother and children, as a consequence intentional starving and poisoning of the children. the revolution in the mode of cultivation had led to the introduction of the industrial system. immorality was on the rise as women were away from their home; children were left pining at home. marx says that the moral degradation caused by the capitalistic exploitation of women and children has been thoroughly depicted by f. engels in his lage der arbeitenden klasse england. by the excessive addition of women and children to the ranks of the workers, machinery at last breaks down the resistance which male operatives in the manufacturing period continued to oppose to the despotism of capital. b. prolongation of the working day if machinery increases the productiveness of labour i.e. shortens the working-time required in the productiveness of a commodity, it becomes in the hands of capital the most powerful means for lengthening the working day beyond human endurance. in the form of machinery, the tools of labour become automatic, moving and working independent of the worker. the automaton, as capital in the person of the capitalist is endowed with intelligence and will. it is animated by the longing to reduce to a minimum the resistance offered by man. this resistance is lessened by the apparent lightness of machine work, and by the more docile character of the women and children employed on it. the productiveness of machinery is inversely proportional to the value transferred by it to the product. the longer the life of the machine, the greater is the quantity of the products over which the value transmitted by the machine is spread, and less is the portion of that value added to each single commodity the active lifetime of a machine is dependent on the length of the workingday or on the duration of the labour process multiplied by the number of days for which the process is carried on. in the lengthening the working day the exploitation of double the number of workers demands, not only a doubling of the constant capital which is invested in machinery and buildings, but also of that which is invested in raw material. the lengthening of the working day allows production on a large scale without any change in the amount of capital invested in machinery and buildings. there is not only an increase in surplus value, but the outlay to obtain it diminishes. this takes place with every lengthening of the working day. on the one hand, the 4 prajñâ vihâra 5 development of the factory system fixed a constantly increasing portion of the capital in a form in which its value is capable of continual selfexpansion. on the other hand, it loses both use-value and exchange-value whenever it loses contact with living labour. marx quotes a cotton magnate in support of his view: “when a labourer lays down his spade, he renders useless, for that period, a capital worth eighteen pence. when one of our people leaves the mill, he renders useless a capital that has cost £100,000.”4 thus the increased use of machinery makes a constant increase in lengthening the working day desirable. machinery produces relative surplus value not only by directly depreciating the labourpower, and by indirectly cheapening the same through cheapening the goods that enter into its reproduction; but also by converting the labour employed by the owner of that machinery into a labour of a higher degree and greater efficacy, by raising the social value of the article produced above its individual value. this enables the capitalist to replace the value of a day’s labour power by a smaller portion of the value of a day’s product. when the use of machinery is a monopoly, the profits are exceptional, and the capitalist, by prolonging the working day increases the magnitude of profit. a remarkable phenomenon in the history of modern industry is that machinery sweeps away every moral and natural restriction on the length of the working day. “hence, too the economic paradox that the most powerful instrument for shortening labour-time, becomes the most unfailing means for placing every moment of the labourer’s time and that of his family, at the disposal of the capitalist for the purpose of expanding the value of his capital.”5 c. intensification of labour in production as the use of machinery spreads and the number of workers habituated to machinery rises, the rapidity and the intensity of labour increase as a natural consequence. so lengthening of the working day went hand in hand with increasing intensity of factory labour. where labour was repeated day after day with unvarying uniformity and lengthening of the working day became compatible with a lower degree of intensity. the shortening of the working day increased the degree of intensity of labour. when the workers revolted against the lengthening of the working day the english parliament was compelled to shorten the working day. consequently the capitalist lost the production of surplus joseph i. fernando 5 6 value he was used to getting by the prolongation of the working day. but the capitalist engaged himself in the production of relative surplus value by hastening on the further improvement of machinery. at the same time there was a change in the nature of relative surplus value. generally, the mode of producing relative surplus value consists in raising the productive power of the worker, in order to enable him to produce more in a given time with the same expenditure of labour, “labour time continues to transmit as before the same value to the total product, but this unchanged amount of exchange value of each single commodity sinks. otherwise however, so soon as the compulsory shortening of the hours of labours takes place.”6 thus great impetus is given to the development of productive power and to economy in the means of production. this imposes on the workers increased expenditure of labour in a given time, heightens tension of labour power and condensation of labour to a degree that is attainable within the limits of the shortened working day. the condensation of a greater mass of labour into a given period is really greater quantity of labour. in addition to measure of extension, labour now acquires a measure of its intensity. “the denser hour of the ten hours working day contains more labour, i.e. expended labour power than the porous hour of the twelve hours’ working day.”7 marx is interested in the question: how is the labour intensified? the first effect of shortening the working day is due to the law that the efficiency of labour power is inversely proportionate to the duration of its expenditure. what is lost by shortening the duration is gained by the increasing tension of labour power. the mere shortening of the working day increases to a great degree the regularity, uniformity, order, continuity and energy of labour. the shortening of the hours of labour creates the subjective conditions for the condensation of labour by enabling the worker to exert more strength in a given time. with the shortening of the working day, machinery becomes in the hands of capital the objective means, systematically employed for squeezing out more labour in a given time. this is done in two ways, by increasing the speed of the machinery and by giving the workers more machinery to tend. the shortening of the hours of labour called forth such an intensification of the labour as is injurious to the health of the worker and to his capacity for work. 6 prajñâ vihâra 7 3. the factory the body of the factory is machinery organized into a system. machinery by annexing the labour of women and children augments the number of human beings who form the material for capitalistic exploitation. it confiscates the whole of the worker’s disposable time by immoderate extension of the hours of labour and its progress, which allows for enormous increase of production in shorter periods, serves as a means of systematically getting more work done in a shorter time, of exploiting labour power more intensely. in the automatic factory, the collective labourer or social body of labour appears as the dominant subject, and the mechanical automaton as the object. in reality, the automaton itself is the subject, and the workers are merely conscious organs, coordinate with the unconscious organs of the automaton and together with them, subordinated to the central moving power. the central machine from which the motion comes can be described not only as an automaton, but as an autocrat. along with the tool, the skill of the worker in handling it passes to the machine. in the factory, there is a tendency to reduce to one and the same level every kind of work that has to be done by the minders of the machines. though the old system of division of labour is thrown overboard by machinery, it is remoulded and established in a more hideous form of capital as a means of exploiting labour power. the life-long specialty of handling one and the same tool, now becomes the life-long specialty of serving one and the same machine. “machinery is put to a wrong use, with the object of transforming the workman from his very childhood, into a part of a detail machine. in this way, not only are the expenses of his reproduction considerably lessened, but at the same time his helpless dependence upon the capitalist, is rendered complete. in handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes use of a tool; in the factory, the machine makes use of him. there the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow. in manufacture the workmen are parts of a living mechanism. in the factory we have a lifeless mechanism independent of the workmen who become its mere living appendage. the miserable routine of endless drudgery and toil in which the same mechanical process is gone through over and over again, is like the labour joseph i. fernando 7 8 of sisyphus. the burden of labour, like the rock, keeps ever falling back on the worn-out labourer.”8 factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost. it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and snatches away every bit of freedom on bodily and intellectual activity. the lightening of labour becomes a sort of torture since the machine does not free the labourer from work, but deprives the work of all interest. it is no more the worker who employs the instruments of labour, but the instruments of labour employ the worker. “the separation of the intellectual powers of production from the manual labour and the conversion of those powers into the might of capital over labour is finally completed by modern industry erected on the foundation of machinery. the special skills of each individual insignificant factory operative vanishes as an infinitesimal quantity before the science, the gigantic physical forces, and the mass of labour that are embodied in the factory mechanism and, together with that mechanism, constitute the power of the master.”9 the material conditions under which factory labour is carried on are detrimental to the workers. all the sense organs are injured in an equal degree by the artificial rise in the temperature, by the dust-laden atmosphere, by the deafening noise. there is danger to life and limb among the thickly crowded machinery. marx accuses the factory system in the hands of the capitalist of robbery: “economy of the social means of production, matured and forced as in a hothouse by the factory system, is turned in the hands of capital, into systematic robbery of what is necessary for the life of the workman while he is at work, robbery of space, light, air and of protection to his person against the dangerous and unwholesome accompaniments of the productive process, not to mention the robbery of appliances for the comfort of the workman.”10 4. the conflict between worker and machine the conflict between the capitalist and the wage labourer goes back to the very origin of capital. with the introduction of machinery the worker fought against the instrument of labour itself, the material enbodiment of capital. he revolted against this particular form of the means of production, as it is the material basis of the capitalist mode of production. it took very long for the workers to learn to distinguish 8 prajñâ vihâra 9 between machinery and its employment by capital, and to fight not against the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used. when the instrument of labour takes the form of a machine, it becomes a competitor to the worker. the self-expansion of capital through machinery is directly proportional to the number of the worker whose means of livelihood are destroyed by that machinery. the entire system of capitalistic production is based on the fact that the worker sells his labour-power as a commodity. division of labour specializes this labour power by reducing it to skill in handling a particular tool. as soon as the handling of this tool becomes the work of a machine, the exchange value along with the use-value of the worker’s labour power disappear making the worker unsaleable. that section of the working-class rendered superfluous by machinery floods the labour market and reduces the price of labour power below its value. “when the machinery seizes on an industry by degrees, it produces chronic misery among the operatives who compete with it. where the transition is rapid, the effect is acute and felt by great masses. history discloses no tragedy more horrible than the gradual extinction of the english hand-loom weavers, an extinction that was spread over several decades, and finally sealed in 1838. many of them died of starvation, many with families vegetated for a long time on 2½ d. a day. on the other hand the english cotton machinery produced an acute effect in india. the governor general reported in 1834-35: ‘the misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of commerce. the bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of india.’”11 machinery is continually introduced in new fields of production. so the character of independence and estrangement, which the capitalist mode of production as a whole gives to the instruments of labour and to the product as against the worker, is destroyed by the means of machinery into an antagonism. thus, with the advent of machinery the worker for the first time violently revolts against the instrument of labour. the instrument of labour strikes down the worker. this direct antagonism between the machinery and the worker comes out most strongly, whenever newly introduced machinery competes with handicrafts or manufacturers. but even in modern industry the constant improvement of machinery and the development of the automatic system has analogous effect. joseph i. fernando 9 10 machinery not only acts as a competitor who gets the better of the worker, but always makes him superfluous. it is also a power antagonistic to him, and as such capital makes use of it. it is the most powerful weapon for repressing strikes and revolts of the workers against the autocracy of capital. the steam engine was from the very first an antagonist of human power; it enabled the capitalist to turn a deaf ear to the growing claims of the workers who threatened the nascent factory system with a crisis. marx quotes nasmyth, the inventor of the steam hammer who gave the following evidence before the trades union commission, with regard to the improvements made by him in machinery and introduced in consequence of the widespread long strikes of the engineers in 1851: “the characteristic feature of our modern mechanical improvements is the introduction of self-acting tool machinery. what every mechanical worker has now to do, and what every boy can do, is not to work himself but to superintend the beautiful labour of the machine, the whole class of workmen that depend exclusively on their skill, is now done away. formerly, i employed four boys to every machine. thanks to these new mechanical combinations i have reduced the number of grown-up men from 1500 to 750. the result was a considerable increase in my profits.”12 5. lack of compensation for the workers displaced by machinery marx observes that bourgeois political economists like james mill, john stuart mill and others insist that all machinery that displaces workers, necessarily and at the same time, sets free an amount of capital sufficient to employ the same displaced workers. marx argues to the contrary as follows: “suppose a capitalist to employ 100 workmen, at 30 a year each, in a carpet factory. the variable capital annually laid out amounts, therefore to £3,000. suppose, also, that he discharges 50 of his workmen, and employs the remaining 50 with machinery that costs him £1,500. to simplify matters, we take no account of building, coal, &c. further suppose that the raw material annually consumed costs £3,000 both before and after the change. is any capital set free by this metamorphosis? before the change, the total sum of £6,000 consisted half of constant, and half of variable capital. after the change it consists of £4,500 constant (£3,000 raw material and £1,500 machinery) and 10 prajñâ vihâra 11 £1,500 variable capital. the variable capital instead of being one half, is only one quarter, of the total capital. instead of being set free, a part of the capital is here locked up in such a way as to cease to be exchanged against labour power: variable has been changed into constant capital. other things remaining unchanged, the capital of £6,000, can in future employ no more than 50 men. with each improvement in the machinery, it will employ fewer.”13 he makes it clear that it is not machinery as such, but machinery in the service of capital is to blame for displacing the workers. “it is an undoubted fact machinery as such, is not responsible for setting free the workmen from the means of subsistence… machinery, considered alone, shortens the hours of labour, but, when in the service of capital lengthens them; … in itself it lightens labour, but when employed by capital, heightens the intensity of labour; … in itself it is a victory of man over the force of nature, but in the hands of capital, makes man the slave of those forces; … in itself it increases the wealth of the producers but in the hands of capital, makes them paupers.”14 for the bourgeois economist any employment of machinery, except by capital, is an impossibility. with him, exploitation of the worker by the machine is identical with exploitation of the machine by the worker. 6. the impact of modern industry on manufacture, handicraft and domestic industry a. removal of cooperation based on handicraft and on the division of labour machinery does away with cooperation based on handicrafts and with manufacturer based on the division of handicraft labour. “an example of the first sort is the mowing machine; it replaces cooperation between mowers. a striking example of the second kind is the needlemaking machine. according to adam smith, 10 men, in his day, made in cooperation, over 48,000 needles a day. on the other hand a single needlemachine makes 145,000 needles in a working day of 11 hours. one woman or one girl superintends four such machines, and so produces near upon 600,000 needles in a day, and upwards of 3,000,000 in a week.”15 joseph i. fernando 11 12 b. adverse impact of the factory on manufacture and domestic industries the development of the factory system changes the character of production in all the other branches of industry. the principle of the factory system is of analyzing the process of production into its constituent phases, and of problem solving by application of mechanics, chemistry and other sciences. this principle of the factory becomes the determining principle everywhere. machinery finds its way into the manufacturing industries. the organization of the manufacturing industries based on the old division of labour is destroyed and constant changes are made. unlike in the manufacturing period, the division of labour is based on the cheap labour of women, children and unskilled labours. cheap labour is found not only in the factories, but also in domestic industry which is converted into an outside department of the factory. marx laments that the exploitation of cheap labour process is carried out flagrantly in modern manufacture than in the factory. it is because the technical foundation of the factory system which is the substitution of machines for muscular power, and the light character of the labour are absent in manufacture. moreover women and children are exposed to poisonous and injurious substances. 7. modern industry and agriculture marx draws our attention to the changes in agriculture affected by modern industry. agricultural machines replace labourers. modern industry in the field of agriculture annihilate the peasant, the bulwark of the old society and replaces him by the wage labourer. as a result, the desire for social changes, and the class antagonisms are brought to the same level in the villages as in the towns. the old-fashioned methods of agriculture are replaced by scientific ones. capitalist production completely destroys the bond of union, which held together agriculture and manufacture. in agriculture as in manufacture, the transformation of production under the control of capital means destruction of the producers. the instrument of labour becomes the means of enslaving, exploiting and impoverishing the labourer. the social organization of labour process is turned into an organized mode of crushing the worker’s individual vitality and freedom. the dispersion of the rural labourers 12 prajñâ vihâra 13 over large areas breaks their power of resistance while concentration increases that of the urban operatives. all progress in capitalist agriculture not only robs the labourer, but robs the soil as well. all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress toward ruining the lasting sources of that fertility. “the more a country starts its development on the foundations of modern industry, like the united states, for example, the more rapid is this process of destruction. capitalist production develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth — the soil and the labourer.”16 to sum up, in marx’s perception, the following are the effects of machinery on the labourer: appropriation of supplementary labour-power, prolongation of the working-day, intensification of labour, the inhuman conditions in the factory, the conflict between the worker and the machine, lack of compensation for the workers displaced by machinery, removal of cooperation based on handicraft and on the division of labour, adverse impact of the factory on manufacture and domestic industries and finally the negative impact of modern industry on agriculture especially robbing the soil of its fertility. marx’s critique of technology is a part of his critique of capitalism. the key to his critique of capitalism is his theory of surplus value that explains how capital grows by consuming living labour. labour-power produces surplus value. the exploitation of the surplus value is the basis of capitalism. labour power is provided by living human beings who have their own needs and aspiration. capitalism separates labour and the satisfaction of human aspiration. for marx, labour is the most essential characteristic of human life. labour is physical commerce with nature. it is in labour man creates himself and nature which is the object of his activity. marx depicts how alienation and dehumanization takes place in capitalism. alienation means the subjugation of man by his own works. alienation is the process in which man deprives himself of what he really is, of his own humanity. the worker’s own labour and its products become alien to him. labour is treated as commodity, which means the worker himself has become a commodity. he is forced to sell himself at the market price. paradoxically, the more wealth the worker produces, the poorer he gets. it is not only the product of the labour that is alienated from the joseph i. fernando 13 14 worker, but labour itself is alienated as it is not a means of selfdetermination but of dehumanization. he works for the sake of keeping himself and his family alive. labour is no more a specifically human activity through which he realizes his essence as a human being, but a means to satisfy his biological needs. he is alienated from other human beings as well and social existence is impossible. the commodification of the worker means that he is turned into a thing, deprived of a free and human existence. the capitalist is reduced to an abstract money-power. marx writes in his economic and philosophical manuscript “my power is as great as the power of money. the attributes and essential strength of money are those of myself, its owner. it is not my own personality, which decides what i am and what i can afford. i may be ugly, but i can buy the prettiest woman alive; consequently i am not ugly, since money destroys the repellent power of ugliness. i may be lame, but with money i can have a coach and six; therefore i am not lame. i may be bad, dishonest, ruthless and narrowminded, but money ensures respect for itself and the possessor. money is the supreme good, and a man who has it must be good also.”17 alienation of labour paralyses man’s personal life, species life and community life. capitalism, which breeds alienation, is interested exclusively in surplus value. “capital cares nothing for the length of the life of labour-power. all that concerns it is simply and solely the maximum of labour-power that can be rendered fluent in a working day. it attains this end by shortening the extent of the labourer’s life, as a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility.”18 being forced to sell his labour-power the worker hardly has time to develop himself as a human being. he faces the tragic reality of technology, which is at the service of the capitalist. “the fulfillment of humanity is not, in marx’s view, a matter of attaining some final imagined perfection, but of freeing man forever from conditions that hamper his growth and make him the slave of his own works.”19 marx envisioned the cessation of alienation in socialism. “the working class has conquered nature; now it must conquer man” (marx in the people’s paper, 18 march 1854.)20 to conquer man is to create conditions wherein men control their labour forces and the results of their actions cannot turn against them. socialism does not mean essentially 14 prajñâ vihâra 15 abolition of material poverty or the luxurious consumption of the bourgeoisie, but the abolition of alienation by doing away with the division of labour. the liberation of humanity does not mean simply the satisfaction of material needs but achieving a full and multifaceted life for all. marx stood for the abolition of the division of labour, which not only crippled human beings physically and spiritually but also condemned them to a lifeless monotony and one-sidedness. the cardinal task of socialism is to enable everyone to develop their abilities to the fullest in the social context. for marx, the essential difference between capitalism and socialism is that in the former human beings are degraded into things and in the latter they recover their subjectivity. in the capitalist division of labour one is forced to do a particular activity from which there is hardly an escape. one is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a critic and must remain so for the sake of livelihood. whereas in the socialist society none has a particular sphere of activity and one can specialize in what one wishes. as marx would say, it is possible for one to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, to fish in the afternoon, to rear cattle in the evening, to criticize after supper without becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. this sounds utopian. we do not find such a thing happening in socialist countries. on the one hand, the credit goes to marx, a pioneer, for undertaking a study of the relationship between capitalism and technology and of the dehumanizing effects of capitalist technology. his analysis exposes the inhuman nature of capitalist technology. we are drawn to appreciate marx’s concern for fellow human beings, especially the working class whose labour-power was bought by the capitalist to increase the surplus value toward accumulation of wealth. on the other hand, we may ask ourselves how valid would be marx’s expectation that in the socialist societies dehumanization of labour created by capitalism would cease to exist. there is hardly any evidence that the socialist societies have solved the problems of alienation of labour. with state ownership of the means of production, planning has been introduced. so the workers are no longer at the mercy of the capitalist bosses. they may enjoy job security, health care, education and other social benefits. but other thing like organization of labour process, technical division of labour, rigid joseph i. fernando 15 16 control of management and so on are like in capitalist countries. in other words, the basic causes of alienation, division of labour and wage-labour exist in socialist countries. marx was optimistic that technology would cease to be a means of alienation in a socialist society. but this dream of marx remains still utopian as we know from socialist experiments. humankind is yet to learn how to handle technology responsibly. humankind is yet to learn how to share the resources of the world equitably. humankind is yet to learn what it means to be human. 16 prajñâ vihâra 17 endnotes 1karl marx, capital, vol. i, progress publishers, moscow, 1986, chapter xv. 2marx writes in the footnote: “mill should have said ‘of any human being not fed by other people’s labour,’ for, without doubt, machinery has greatly increased the number of well-to-do idlers.” 3capital, vol. i, p. 373. 4ibid., p 379. 5ibid., p. 382. 6ibid., p. 384. 7ibid., p. 387. 8ibid., p. 389. 9ibid., p. 398. 10ibid., pp. 398-399. 11ibid., p. 406. 12ibid., pp. 401-402. 13ibid., p. 411. 14ibid., pp. 413-414. 15ibid., p. 415-416. 16bastian wielenga, introduction to marxism, centre for social action, new delhi, 1977, pp. 77-78. 17quoted from leszek kolakowski, main currents of marxism, vol. i, oxford university press, 1978, p. 139. 18capital, vol. i, p. 253. 19leszek kolakowski, main currents of marxism, vol. i, p. 265 20ibid., p. 284. joseph i. fernando 17 article5-1 interreligious dialogue: old liquor in standard new bottles parichart suwanbubbha mahidol university, thailand introduction when confronted with the idea of interreligious dialogue, members of most of the world’s religions might well argue that there is nothing new to such discussions; they have, historically, long been a part of each religious tradition. many of the world’s religions, that is, have an extended experience with interreligious dialogue, although they may not have developed the principles and the rationale for dialogue to the degree that those principles and that rationale are now understood. it can be said that contemporary interreligious dialogue has its “official” origins in the christian missionary attempts to develop relations with and achieve an understanding of other religions, as seen especially at the world missionary conference that met in edinburgh in 1910.1 while that conference is particularly noteworthy because it promoted the ecumenical movement as a way to improve relations between christian denominations, it also gave attention to the inescapable involvement of christian missionaries with people of other faiths. the following world missionary conference, which met in jerusalem in 1928, affirmed the “value” of other religions and called on the adherents of the various religions to join together in addressing the problem of secularism, which the jerusalem conference saw as an attempt to solve world problems without any reliance on religion.2 religious dialogue, broadly speaking, has taken two different forms. on the one hand, it has involved people of different religions in “interreligious dialogue.” dialogue, on the other hand, has also occurred *this paper was first delivered at a conference entitled “visions for religious studies in the next century” in bangkok. prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 155-166 155 © 2000 by assumption university press between people who belong to different sects or denominations within the same larger religious tradition such as, for example, between catholic and protestant christians or between theravada and mahayana buddhists. this second form of religious dialogue is termed “intrareligious dialogue.” one important issue that must be considered is the extent to which these various discussions between people of faith provide us today with a creative, effective methodology for university religious studies programs. a second issue that “traditional” interfaith dialogue raises, and one we must consider here, is that of the very definition of interreligious dialogue itself. what is interreligious dialogue? we usually understand, initially, that interreligious dialogue amounts to discussions about religion that take place between people from two faith traditions for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of each other. this definition is partly correct, but it is incomplete because it fails to encompass all that is involved in interreligious dialogue. when the members of two different faith traditions engage in a comparison of points of the similarities and differences between them, for example, we normally term such discussions as “comparative religion” even though they also fit the general definition of “interreligious dialogue” as well. comparative religious studies, however, is not interreligious dialogue in the sense we are using the term in this paper. comparative studies attempt to use the instruments of the scientific method to objectively study religious data without any preconceptions, emotional input, or traditional religious perspectives involved. the unavoidable problem facing the students of comparative religion, we might add, is whether or not they can avoid prejudice when they make comparisons between the ideas and beliefs of another religion with their own faith. interreligious dialogue, in contrast to comparative religious studies, involves the expression of emotions and feelings as well as the personal religious beliefs of individuals. the tools for this type of dialogue are subjective, which is to say that interreligious dialogue involves each side in revealing and sharing their feelings concerning firmly held and deeply cherished beliefs. such dialogue is good, and it has great value 156 prajñâ vihâra for those engaged in it because it provides each dialogue partner with an opportunity for learning.3 interreligious dialogue of this personal nature cannot avoid discussing differences in beliefs, and it is not necessary that it ends with an agreement of opinions. it presents both partners, rather, with an opportunity to learn each other’s beliefs and, in the process, to unlearn misapprehensions that one or both sides previously held.4 interreligious dialogue also offers those involved in dialogue with the possibility to change their own point of view concerning the actual faith of their partner in dialogue, thus gaining for themselves and that partner a clearer shared understanding. this is what we seek in every interreligious encounter, namely the opportunity to correct our own misunderstandings regarding the faith of those with whom we dialogue. in spite of the fact that interreligious dialogue is based on an initial willingness to accept religious differences, it is always possible that the dialogue process will cause tension and conflict to arise between those involved in the process. the possibility of friction underscores the importance of learning how to engage in the dialogue process creatively and peacefully in the face of the difference in religious perspectives that both partners in dialogue bring to the process. dialogue requires, in short, that those engaged in dialogue be sensitive to each other and behave towards each other in a positive manner. they must also avoid the “don’ts” of interreligious dialogue described below. the do nots of interreligious dialogue participants in interreligious dialogue must particularly avoid the following negative patterns of behavior: 1. dialogue must not be a matter of superficially accepting disagreement and differences in order to avoid dissension, in what we might term “lazy tolerance.”5 interreligious dialogue, that is, does not support the concept of relativism, the idea that everything and everything is acceptable. 2. dialogue must not be a confrontation as if those engaged in dialogue are enemies, and it must not involve argumentation for the sake of winning. parichart suwanbubbha 157 3. dialogue must not involve an “imperialistic” or prejudicial judgment on the dialogue partner that is made before dialogue even begins.6 one must not enter into dialogue, that is, with a either a false sense of pride or of humility. those involved in dialogue must also avoid belittling or extolling their own beliefs, nor should they judge the beliefs of their partner in dialogue before learning about the partner by listening to how they explain their faith. individuals sometimes enter into dialogue with hidden feelings of absolutism, which is the idea that his or her own truth is the most correct, complete, and best truth. such persons intend to rely on that “truth” to judge their dialogue partner, which means in the end that they approach that partner prejudicially. 4. dialogue must not be merely the exchange of religious data or be nothing more than superficial discussions between the adherents of two religions. 5. dialogue must not be driven by hidden agendas, for example as an opportunity for proselyization7 or tricking people in order to gain additional adherents. if changes in belief do take place, they should occur naturally as a part of the dialogue process itself. it is possible for one dialogue partner, for example, to learn about, understand, and come to prefer the beliefs of the other partner, but such a change must not be the basic purpose of dialogue. it is not the purpose of dialogue to be a tool for gaining adherents for one’s own religion. 6. dialogue must not use a “mixing bowl” method,8 meaning that it should not merely takes good points from the various religions and blend them into one’s own religion. this approach causes a syncretistic mixing of teachings, or so much combining takes place that a new religion entirely different from one’s original beliefs is the result. instead of being a “creative” approach to dialogue, approaches of this sort have a negative impact on dialogue because each person who engages in dialogue must be a faithful representive of their tradition and a witness to the beliefs of that tradition. people who do not clearly declare themselves a believer in a particular religious tradition will not be able to explain to their dialogue partners what it is that inspires them in their own religion, why they see it as being good, and what they find in it that is personally meaningful in their lives. this is true even if they have closely studied the belief system of another particular religion. it is 158 prajñâ vihâra difficult for them to represent the faith of that religion and enter into a dialogue with other religious perspectives because they lack the value judgments that arise out of the unique religious experience of the faith that they are supposed to represent. the necessity of dialogue in the age of globalization the definition of interreligious dialogue with which this article began helps us to understand that dialogue has nothing in common with either absolutism or relativism. it does have a great deal in common, however, with a religiously pluralistic type of religious faith.9 such a faith accepts the fact that there are many religions in the world, that there is more than one religious belief system, and that each of those religions has its own way of solving human problems based on its own religious logic. the ultimate goals of the various religious faiths, according to this pluralistic mode of thinking, may or may not be the same. ultimate reality, that is, may be the same for the various religions, for example, faith in one god; or, it might be something entirely different.10 the important point is that religious pluralism is willing to accept diversity. the british religious scholar, john hick, points out that the world’s religions differ in three distinct ways. first, they differ according to their adherent’s experience of the “divine,” which for some religions such as christianity and islam is personal while for others it is non-personal, such as the belief in nippan (nirvana) for buddhists and the way for taoism. second, the various religions differ in their religious doctrine and philosophies and are particularly conditioned by the various ways their teachings have developed historically and culturally. finally, since each religion expresses its faith in ultimate reality differently each religion also has a particular set of commandments, ways of behaving, and rituals that respond to its particular expressions of faith.11 at this point, we can agree that the world’s various religions have differences and a distinct identity each within themselves. we can also agree that interreligious dialogue affirms the plurality of beliefs, which means that it accepts diversity, differences, and the fact that there are many religions in the world. the willingness to accept different religious beliefs and practices also reflects the nature of globalization parichart suwanbubbha 159 since one aspect of globalization itself is the willingness to accept cultural and religious variety. it is not possible for us to mandate that everyone should have the same culture or believe the same things, and we have to accept the reality of differences based on that diversity of cultures and religious beliefs. modern communications and transportation brings that diversity of culture and beliefs into close proximity one with another. they now have close relations with each other in the “global village.” at the same time, however, the nature of globalization also enhances personal identity, local culture, and the uniqueness of local life as well. the same holds true for interreligious dialogue. the dialogue process is a process of accepting the reality that the spiritual values held by the faithful of the various religions and are not encompassed in a single category. that process demonstrates, at the same time, a willingness to accept the differences between religions and the particular religious identity of each religion. yet, it is also possible to bring understanding, cooperation, and unity out of those differences, which we might term “unity amid diversity.” it might be said that interreligious dialogue is thus an appropriate method for religious learning, whether it be dialogue between individuals of different faiths or between groups of individuals within the same faith. the problem is how to best establish an appropriate framework in dialogue, one that allows for differing ideas, that encourages people to both speak and listen, and that is a practice which leads to the highest possible levels of understanding and peace. the starting point of interreligious dialogue it was stated at the beginning of this paper that interreligious dialogue should avoid certain dangerous points. it, for example, should avoid using the standards of belief and praxis of one group to judge the beliefs and actions of others. such an approach we can only label as “imperialistic.” judgmentalism of this sort takes place because those making the judgments are sure that the truth referred to in their own beliefs is the highest and most perfect truth. it is absolute truth. partners in dialogue, however, must have a broad mind, one that gives others the opportunity to speak and is willing to listen to the expression of beliefs that differ from their own. dialogue partners, at the same time, must 160 prajñâ vihâra have their own place to stand and be truly representives of the faith they hold. these two aspects of dialogue, that one must be open to the other and yet representive of one’s own faith, seem to contradict each other. but it is very important for those who would engage in dialogue to understand from the beginning that each dialogue encounter is not the final word in deciding that the beliefs of people of other faiths are mistaken, inferior, or defective. it is true that each participant in dialogue will try to explain the truth of her or his faith and explain why that truth is important, greatly influences their own life, and should be important or even necessary to the life of the dialogue partner as well. these arguments serve to confirm the faithful stance of the person presenting them and confirm that they are a representative of the faith they hold. at the same time, however, this does not mean that those engaged in dialogue will judge others before they give them an opportunity to explain their beliefs and show how those beliefs differ from their own perspective. those who say, “i have the final, most complete answer, and those who have revealed my truth to me expect me to use their revealed truth to judge your truth”12 do not give their dialogue partners a chance explain their own faith. they, instead, decide in advance that their dialogue partner’s faith is not as complete or perfect as their own faith, which is taken to be the most correct form of religious beliefs. opinions of this sort create endless dissenssion and are detrimental to interfaith understanding. those engaged in dialogue, moreover, must have the courage and insight to treat critically in a straighforward fashion the beliefs and practices of their own religion, which means that they must be honestly self-critical.13 the process of examining one’s own religion critically in order to correct particular practices will make that religion even more firm and stable. this advice concerning the need for critical self-awareness in dialogue does not conflict with the need for a person to preserve the unique identity of his or her own religion. forthright criticism of one’s own religion, furthermore, may take the form of new interpretations of religious teaching or encourage a new perspective on religious beliefs and practices that may well be more appropriate to a person’s contemporary situation. it is certain, however, that such new perspectives must not be in conflict with the important doctrines found in the scriptures parichart suwanbubbha 161 of one’s own religion. when a person taking part in dialogue has no prejudice against her or his own faith and also has no predisposition to favor it, dialogue can proceed in an honest and sincere fashion.14 it will lead, furthermore, to trust that those engaged in the process will dialogue with each other sincerely to the end that something creative will take place. creating trust of this nature is important because an important obstacle to interreligious dialogue occurs when there is the fear that if one speaks honestly one party or the other will use what they learn from dialogue in order to increase the number of their adherents. if interreligious dialogue begins with trust and sincerety, it will successfully attain the goals it has set out for itself. another important point to remember is that from the beginning of an interreligious dialogue encounter both sides should in fact want to dialogue with each other.15 if that is not the case, dialogue will amount only to one side interviewing the other, or it will entail only an ordinary exchange of religious information. those engaged in dialogue, furthermore, should always being talking with each other at the same level, meaning that if the subject of dialogue is doctrinal beliefs each partner must discuss doctrinal beliefs found in their scriptures. if, again, the subject of dialogue is popular beliefs and practices, the dialogue partners should not introduce abstract or technical theological material into the discussions. the point here is to prevent misunderstandings_ misunderstandings that will waste time in arguments that are aimed at different situations or concerns entirely. from what has been said above, it can be seen that interreligious dialogue can take place with individuals of any level from academics who specialize in interreligious dialogue to local people who are not experts in their religion’s scriptures but still practice their religion faithfully according to their understanding of it. local people, too, can share their beliefs so that others will know and understand that set of beliefs. various forms of interreligious dialogue16 the various forms of interreligious dialogue include: 1. dialogue at the level of scriptural beliefs (dialogue of study) 162 prajñâ vihâra 2. dialogue that emphasizes religious experience and practice (dialogue of prayer) 3. dialogue for life, which empahsizes solving problems (dialogue of life) the first form of interreligious dialogue, dialogue of study, usually is conducted by scholars who want to know and understand, officially, the beliefs of the dialogue partner. such dialogue encounters, for example, will refer to each religion’s scriptures. the purpose of this form of dialogue is to increase wisdom through understanding, which may lead to cooperation in practice as well. the second form of interreligious dialogue, dialogue of prayer, is dialogue by experimental actions. it begins with a sympathetic imagination that conducts experiments based on the implications that particular sets of beliefs have for religious praxis. for example, individuals engaged in dialogue with muslims might take john dune’s “passing over”17 and practice fasting with their muslim friends in order to understand the importance of how muslims gain a strong faith based on faithful religious practice. they would do this (without any thought of changing their religious affiliation) to understand how their muslim friends are able to fast, hold certain doctrines, and have the motivations that enable them to fast as they do. when a person engaged in dialogue tries this method of imagination and then experiments with the actual religious practice of another faith until he or she understands the ultimate truth underlying that practice, the person is then able to “pass back” into the practice of her or his own religion. this method is dialogue by imagination and by shared religious practice and may lead to a better understanding of the religious experience and highest religious truth or ultimate end of the dialogue partner’s religion. the last type of interreligous dialogue, dialogue of life, is a form that emphasizes solving problems that every person of whatever religious persuasion faces. many people around the world, for example, face problems related to environmental pollution and human rights. these problems are challenging and require immediate attention. if members of the various religions enter into a dialogue that examines the conditions, causes, and possible solutions of these problems in light of the teachings of their own religion and if they cooperate in solving these common parichart suwanbubbha 163 problems, interreligious dialogue will achieve its goal. it will lead, that is, to mutual understanding and cooperation between religions. it will facilitate the bringing of different teachings together to help humanity as much as possible. the first type of interreligious dialogue, dialogue of study, may seem to be merely a form that is conducted by academics dwelling in their ivory towers and involves only ideas without praxis. it is still, however, an important form of dialogue. the second and third forms, which do involve praxis, unavoidably depend on the knowledge and understanding gained from the dialogue of study, which provides them with a foundation for their praxis. is dialogue necessary & appropriate for thai society? interreligious dialogue is necessary for thai society because thailand is under the influence of globalization and has been influenced by the fact of global unity. thai society, which has its roots in buddhism, is not going to be able to separate itself from thais who are of other faiths than buddhism. it is necessary, therefore, for it to develop a religious perspective and practice appropriate to its relationship with people of other faiths. certain historical factors, furthermore, also give cause to the need for interreligious dialogue. some groups in thai society may have deeply rooted doubts about dialogue because of the way in which some other religions have tried to spread their religions in thailand. there are segments of thai society that are still fearful and uncertain when it comes to “dialogue between religions” with other religions. this is especially true of other religions that have been accused of having hidden purposes in wanting to learn about and understand thai religion and society. such feelings as these in thai society should be an indication of the need for honest interreligious dialogue between buddhism and other religions. they indicate the need for opportunities to discuss doubts and to understand each other’s methodologies in order to do away with doubts and in order to gain a correct understanding of other religions. moreover, many groups and people claim that thai society and religion has its own unique identity, one that preserves an underlying unity and is not characterized by being divided into many sects and 164 prajñâ vihâra denominations. thailand does not, therefore, need an ecumenical movement as do some other religions. thailand, furthermore, more or less has religious freedom and is religiously peaceful to a degree. there is, these groups and people claim, thus no need for interreligious dialogue, especially because they fear that the consequences of dialogue will be more negative than positive because dialogue might expose doubts and fears that are best left uncovered. in spite of such thoughts, thai society should consider again its understanding of the usefulness of conducting interreligious dialogue. an event that took place in b.e. 2538 [c.e. 1995] gives clear indication of this need to reconsider the value of interreligious dialogue. in that year, a religious organization attempted to hold a seminar involving buddhists and members of another religion from india. the seminar, however, was cancelled because of the suspicious behavior of the international organization that sponsored it. there was a fear that it might be trying to use thailand as a stage for creating interreligious dissension for its own advantage. the problems concerning the intentions of the seminar’s organizers is not a subject we need discuss here, but the important point that i want to point out here concerns an interview on the matter given by one highly placed thai official. that official stated, “no one organizes interreligious dialogue seminars; they are a danger that can create dissession.”18 this statement reflects a failure to understand the true purpose of interreligious dialogue. it also reflects a widely spread suspicion or even fear in thailand concerning the fallout that can follow from interreligious dialogue. this example points to the pressing need for an understanding of the principles, purposes, values, ways, and perspective regarding dialogue and interfaith relations that should be widely disseminated among students and the general public. the danger is that interfaith misunderstanding, suspicion, and mistrust might lead to a general unrest in society. conclusion each encounter in interreligious dialogue, in sum, is not necessarily an end in itself, and we cannot expect that each encounter will be completely successful. this is because of the complexity of the interreligious dialogue process itself and because of self-centered human parichart suwanbubbha 165 nature, which causes people to look at dialogue as a process difficult to bring about successfully. it should be, however, a challenge for religious scholars and those with a broad mind to accept the reality of religious “variety and differences.” they should be able to use the epistemological methods of interreligious dialogue and reap the benefits of those uses, which will enable them to solve the problems of interfaith dissension. the unofficial methods of dialogue of the past are worthy of study to the end that a proper official theory and praxis of dialogue can be obtained, a theory and praxis that reminds us of the old, long familiar “liquor” that is now placed in a “standardized” bottle for the common benefit of religious people of all faiths. 166 prajñâ vihâra 01_(1-10) sculpting words in ice how buddhist and christian.pmd sculpting words in ice: how buddhist and christian stylistiques en-act mundane failure and ultimate hope* robert magliola national taiwan university, (retired) º·¤ñ́ âèí ë¹ñ§ê×í¤óêí¹·ñé§¢í§¾ø·¸èòê¹òáåð¤ãôêµìèòê¹ò áñก¨ð·óกòãã×éíêãéò§êô觷õè �à»ç¹à¾õâ§� âåกõâçôêñâ à¾×èí¼ùéèöกéò¨ðä é́êòáò㶾ñ²¹òµ¹àí§ãëéºããåø¶ö§ ¤çòáêø¢·õèá·é̈ ãô§ä é́ ë¹ñ§ê×í·õè·ã§¤ø³¤èòàëåèò¹õéºò§àåèá¨ðêí¹ é́çâçô̧ õกòãẺã×éíêãéò§â´âãªéà·¤¹ô¤·ò§çãã³กããáà»ç¹á¹ç·ò§ ¢¹ºµèò§ æ ¢í§ë¹ñ§ê×íàëåèò¹õé ¨ðáê´§ãëéàëç¹åñกé³ð»ãòก¯áºº«×èí æ áåð¤çòáëáòâ·õè«èí¹íâùèàòâãµé¢¹ºµèò§ æ àëåèò¹ñ鹨ðáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò¤çòáàª×èíáñè¹ (㹤óêí¹¢í§¾ãð¾ø·¸à é̈òêóëãñºªòç¾ø·¸ áåð㹤óêñ­­ò¢í§¾ãð¤ãôêµìêóëãñºªòç¤ãôêµì) ̈ ðàกố ¢öé¹ä é́íâèò§äã 㹺·กçõ·õè âôè§ãë­èàã×èí§ �á·è¹ºùªò� (¢í§ ¨íãì̈ àîíãìàºôãìµ 1593-1633) åñกé³ð»ãòก¯áºº í§¤ìãçá¢í§ �á·è¹ºùªò� ¹ñé¹ä é́ὧêñ­­ò³¢í§กòãáµกêåòâ·õèá·é̈ ãô§¢í§áñ¹äçé́ éçâ áåðêñ­­ò³àëåèò¹õéªõéä»·õè¤çòáëáòâ·õè«èí¹íâùè «öè§à»ç¹¤çòáëçñ§¢í§¤ãô굪¹ ¨òก¼å§ò¹íñ¹âôè§ãë­è shobo-genzo ¢í§ dogen zenji (1200-1253) à·¤¹ô¤µèò§ æ ·õè à»ç¹áººá¼¹ä é́¢âõé¢âóí§¤ìãçáàªô§¢¹ºáåðíñµåñกé³ì·õèµòâµñç à¾×èíáê´§ãëéàë繶ö§ �¸ããáªòµô·õèá·é̈ ãô§� ¢í§¤çòáà»ç¹¨ãô§ êóëãñº·èò¹ dogen áåéç ¤çòáà»ç¹¨ãô§¤×í �กòãà»åõèâ¹á»å§íâèò§µèíà¹×èí§� abstract both buddhist and christian teaching-texts often deconstruct the “merely” mundane so that the learner can advance towards beatitude. a precious few of these texts teach by miming such a deconstruction via subtle -prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 1-10 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ literary techniques: the textual surfaces or conventions act-out the role of naï ve appearance, and the subtexts that subvert them act-out how confident trust (in the buddha’s teachings, for the buddhists; in christ’s divine promises, for the christians) can find fulfillment. in the great poem “the altar” (by george herbert, 1593-1633), the holistic appearance of the altar bears hidden signals of its own real brokenness, and these signals point to the sub-text that is the christian’s hope. in the great shobo-genzo of dogen zenji (12001253), formal techniques scramble conventional holisms and fixed identities in order to act-out the “true nature” of reality-reality, for dogen, is at once “continuous flux” (and “absolute density”). both buddhism and christianity affirm “hope” in the sense of confident trust: buddhists trust in the reliability of the dharma (teaching) and christians trust in christ and the divine promises. through most of their histories, both religions have stressed the impermanence of the merely-mundane world, and encouraged detachment therefrom. in short, the buddhists and the christians, for most of their history, have set their sights more or less squarely on the supra-mundane. the conventional world is continuously melting, like ice. the ongoing “now” of our sculpting, the intention and action constituting our “now”, are what liberate or obstruct us (this is not to gainsay, of course, that buddhists and christians attune their “now-moments” according to very different scales). during the last decades of the 20th century, the public spiritualities of the so-called “technologically-advanced” nations underwent a very perceptible shift. mahayana buddhists, for example, tended, more and more, to interpret the buddha-nature, etc., in such wise as to celebrate the plenitude of worldly life; and christians tended more and more to interpret the “reign of grace”, etc., so as to celebrate the fruits of a consumerist society. now, in the first years of the 21st century, years shaken by new wars and imminent economic collapse, the timbre of spirituality in these same countries is changing again, and__it is to be hoped__changing back to the ultimacies that public religious discourse never should have thus marginalized. a key teaching of buddhism, after all, is that one must deconstruct the merely mundane in order to access ultimate truth__be that truth the nibbana of the theravadist or the wisdom/compassion of the mahayanist. and a key teach2 prajna vihara~ ing of christianity, after all, is that one must take up the cross, forsake the world of “flesh” (sensualism, etc.) and deny all selfishness, in order to gain supernatural life. moreover, i am very convinced that even in “prosperous” times, every human being__at least in private life__is sooner or later brought up short by some devastating heartbreak, some radical impasse. at this moment of personal aporia, religious ultimacy turns out to be the only hope-ful solution. for academics in the pertaining specialties, the themes of buddhist anicca/anitya (“impermanence”, “transience”) and christian memento mori and sic transit are long over-saturated. instead, i treat here a much less studied topic, namely, stylistic language-uses whereby buddhist and christian texts have traditionally acted-out (in the sense of performed or “en-acted”) the impermanence of that-which-appears. most interesting are those texts that deconstruct themselves__simultaneously laying bare their impermanence and exposing enough of their ultimacy so that hope, so that confident trust, can shine. my own published work for many years has involved the intersection of french post-structuralist thought, especially derridean thought, and traditional religious thought (be it buddhist or christian).1 the postmodern recognition that texts are bodies and that the textual body performs by way of its more formal components, is very serviceable for my argument in this paper: buddhism and christianity both have several textual traditions which inscribe bodies that somehow are in-the-process-of-melting, indeed, that ingeniously self-deconstruct.2 given the constraints of time/space, i limit myself to two examples: the well-known poem “the altar” by the great english poet-ecclesiastic george herbert (1593-1633), and passages from the shobo-genzo, the master-work of the great dogen zenji (1200-1253), founder of soto zen. examining the format of herbert’s poem in the original edition, i point out the disguised subtext, the “holes” which puncture the surface-text and lead to the revelation hidden in the non-intact body. in passages from the shobo-genzo, i indicate formal techniques that cut-up and scramble the intact body in order to open up truth. [please forgive that, though competent in several languages, i am unable to read dogen’s original japanese: i make confident assertions about the shobo-genzo only because i reference, herein, very respected secondary sources.] --robert magliola 3 george herbert’s poem “the altar” is what is called in the british tradition a “shaped-poem”__that is, the poem’s formatting is carefully designed to resemble its subject-matter. in a very visual way, the altar as a tangible “body” is placed on display in front of us. the very first edition of the temple, the posthumous collection of herbert’s poetry in which his “the altar” appears, formats the poem specifically as herbert had intended. (it is ironic that subsequent editions frequently ignored the original formatting by “regularizing” the spaces between words, and centering the title.) the poem is shaped like an altar, with flat altar stone resting upon a table-cap supported by a narrower column and the latter’s wide two-leveled base, as herewith: the altar. a broken altar, lord, thy servant reares, made of a heart, and cemented with teares: whose parts are as thy hand did frame; no workmans tool hath touch’d the same. a heart alone is such a stone, as nothing but thy pow’r doth cut. wherefore each part of my hard heart meets in this frame, to praise thy name; that, if i chance to hold my peace, these stones to praise thee may not cease, o let thy blessed sacrifice be mine, and sanctifie this altar to be thine.3 here my connection to the early-phase derrida can come into play, because derridean thought maintains that the holistic “surface” or “face” of a “body” functions to conceal the real cause of the body. deconstruction uncovers this hidden cause, and the “trail” to it is marked by some defect, some faille (“fault”) that the (apparently) intact surface disguises or “cosmeticizes” so the body appears “whole”. in short, bodies__no matter what the kind--are not really wholes: they are broken, and the disguised break in the surface 4 prajna vihara~ marks the trail. what is more (less), the real cause of the body is itself somehow “there” but “not there”, what derrida calls a trace, “trace”. (isn’t “there/ not-there” also like ice at the very moment/point of sculpting?) the shape of herbert’s original poem achieves its intact altar-like form by a ruse__sometimes the spaces between words are necessarily irregular,-many are too wide, and some of even these are irregularly wider than others. the spatial irregularities (the failles, here) are right before our eyes, yawning like holes or gaps in the text, but most readers don’t note them (or, noting them, take them for granted). the conventional altar-shape is the disguise: it is designed to make the altar-body “appear” intact. herbert, of course, has carefully contrived his poetic text so the discerning eye can detect the clues and uncover mere appearances. the poem identifies the “broken altar” [fully capitalized thus in the text] with the speaker’s “heart”, which is “cemented with teares” [note the spelling of “teares” generates two homographs__“teares” (eye-droplets), “teares” (rips, ruptures)]. the altar of the heart is “cut” (by god, circumcision of the heart) so it can properly “praise” his name. the last couplet identifies christ’s “sacrifice” [the slaying of the lamb of god] and the heart-altar of the speaker. the gaps in the text are the cuts, wounds, in the speaker’s heart-altar leading to the sacrificed christ whose salvific cuts and wounds are the cause,--the real cause whereby the christian body-system works. and the christ in and on the “altar” is there/not there, that is, revealed in the eucharistic act but concealed by the appearances of bread and wine. finally, upon a re-reading of the poem, one realizes that even the de-centering, at the top, of the poem’s title, “the altar.”,__as in the text’s original printed form-signals herbert’s agenda. “centering” is a characteristic of holism, as is “symmetry”, a traditional virtue of the “perfect appearance” of a body. this poem’s is, instead, from the very outset, skewed. dogen zenji’s shobo-genzo4 (the true dharma-eye treasury) brings to japanese buddhism a version of zen emphasizing the radical equivalency of all things: reality is an emptiness that is absolutely dense and empty at the same time. for dogen, detachment does not mean a turning away from “objects” but rather, a passing through the “great death” so that the very distinctions between subject and object, self and other, spirit and body, are “cast off”. his famous shikantaza or “single-minded sitting” involves not the “bracketing-off” of experiential chunks of life: instead, “single-minded sitting” is the full engagement of “body-mind” (konshin). what “melt away” are the robert magliola 5 false constructions of merely mundane knowing. in terms of language, what is relevant is that dogen navigates textual bodies as an equivalent of how he navigates all things. all things are in continuous flux so he momentarily alights where the ad hoc interests of enlightenment are best served.5 likewise, the textual body (of buddhist convention, the canon, the tradition), rightly understood, is in continuous flux, so the shobo-genzo text incorporates and then scrambles these conventions, re-assembling semantic and formal units according to what may best serve the needs of the disciple(s) at the time. indeed, dogen often insists on the reliability of these situational teachings, and the very wording “true dharma-eye treasury” proclaims them utterly worthy of confident trust. what dogen aims to show is that any single dharma (understood to mean a “particularity” transcending “all forms of dualism”6) is a “total exertion” that is at once every other dharma and also unique. kim maintains that what distinguishes dogen’s teaching from the “mutual identity and mutual penetration” of the huayan school is that dogen’s is far more dynamic, so a dharma is said to leap out of itself, leap into itself, crash and smash into other dharmas, etc.7 the wisdom-eye sees everything continually melting and reconstituting in a kaleidoscopic play. dogen’s version of “the ongoing now” is perhaps best explained in the shobo-genzo’s treatment of “existence being” (uji): “because continuity is a characteristic of time, time past and present cannot pile up”. and because time cannot pile up, everything is “coming and going” and everything is “eternal now”.8 one of dogen’s favorite deconstructive devices is the dismantling of a canonical “fixed phrase” by scrambling, repeatedly, its traditional word-order, and thus its semantic emphases. a good example is his re-orderings of the famous phrase soku-shin-ze-butsu, “mind itself [or “mind here/now”] is buddha” (in vol. i, chapter 6, of the shobo-genzo9). chodo cross, the translator, in his introduction to chapter 6, explains: “mind here and now is buddha” must be understood not from the standpoint of the intellect but from the standard of practice. in other words, the principle does not mean belief in something spiritual called “mind” but it affirms the time “now” and the place “here” as reality itself. this time and place must also be absolute and right, and so we call this the “truth” or “buddha”.10 6 prajna vihara~ the four words “mind itself is buddha” can be arranged in twenty four combinations, from which dogen selects five: “mind itself is buddha” emphasizes “buddha”, the particularity of buddha-awareness. “itself mind buddha is” emphasizes itself, the particularity of hereness/nowness. “itself buddha is mind” emphasizes mental particularity. “mind itself buddha is” emphasizes existential particularity. “is buddha itself mind” emphasizes that each particularity is at once in all the others.11 among dogen’s many deconstructive devices, the other one i shall treat here is the subtextual subversion of traditional surface meaning. hee-jin kim supplies us with three good examples,12 kuge (“sky flowers”),13 mitsugo (“secret talk”),14 and nyo (“likeness/thusness”).15 ku means “sky” and ge means “flowers”, so kuge in traditional usage is taken to represent “[mere] flowers in the sky”, that is, illusory experiences. however, ku can also mean “emptiness” (or “space”, as in the rendering of nishijima/cross), and it is this positive meaning of ku that dogen raises to the surface. in dogen’s deconstructive reading, every particularity__whether said to be “real” or “illusory”-is a unique “flower of emptiness”, a reality. mitsu means “secret, hidden” and “go” means “talk”, so the phrase mitsugo is traditionally taken to mean mystical communication, a kind of “talk” that is intuitive, like “two things touching” without the use of intellect or the senses. dogen reconfigures these meanings so as to eliminate all hiatus whatsoever “between self and other, between thought and reality, between the symbol and the symbolized”.16 nyo is ordinarily taken to represent similarity, but dogen explains “‘being like’ does not express resemblance; being like is concrete existence”.17 when d ō gen writes nyo nyo, he is declaring that likeness is really thusness (see fn. 6 of nishijima/cross, vol. iii, chapter 42, p. 9). again, dogen is teaching the absolute density of each particularity, so each particularity is absolutely unique and absolutely the same as all other particularities. keeping in mind that lines at the point of crossing do not share com-robert magliola 7 mon ground (since lines have no width), we can celebrate how the texts of herbert and dogen intersect. for herbert’s, resurrection is hatched18 in dying: in moment-to-moment “dissolution” of selfishness, and final “dissolution of the body” as we know it. for dogen’s, the realization of “true nature” is hatched in dying: in dying to the essentialist ego and to its fabrications--phantasms of “fixed views” and essentialist “self and other”. “what is hope? what can we hope for? is there any hope for hope at all? these are the questions we struggle with today. for dogen’s part, he quietly calls for authentic practice.”19 --hee-jin kim “... for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected it in hope.” --the new testament, romans 8:20 “turn [your] afflictions into buddhist bodhi, just as ice melts into water.” --master hsuan hua, city of 10,000 buddhas, talmage, california 8 prajna vihara~ endnotes *this paper was given as an oral presentation at the bi-annual conference of the european network of buddhist-christian studies, liverpool hope university, liverpool, u.k., july 1, 2011. the conference’s theme in 2011 was “hope: a form of delusion? buddhist and christian perspectives”. 1for example, derrida on the mend (purdue up, 1984; 1986; 2000); on deconstructing life-worlds: buddhism, christianity, culture (scholars p. of american academy of religion, 1997; oxford up, 2000), pp. 133-202; “differential theology and womankind: on isaiah 66:13”, in p. berry and a. wernick, eds., shadow of spirit: postmodernism and religion (routledge, 1992), pp. 211-225; “two models of trinity__french post__structuralist versus the historical-critical: argued in the form of a dialogue”, in o. blanchette et al., eds., philosophical challenges and opportunities of globalization, cultural heritage and contemporary change: series 1, vol. 19.2 (wash--robert magliola 9 ington, d.c.: council for research in values and philosophy[crvp], 2001), pp. 401-425; “after-word” [my book-chapter at end, commenting on the collected papers], in jin y. park, ed., buddhisms and deconstructions (rowman & littlefield, 2006), pp. 235-270; “hongzhou chan buddhism, and derrida late and early: justice, ethics, and karma”, in youru wang, ed., deconstruction and the ethical in asian thought (routledge, 2007), pp. 175-191; and many articles in journals, both in the west and, in chinese translation, in asia. 2jacques derrida’s thought-motifs are widely known, but his stylistique, how he manipulates language-use (especially in his native french) so his texts deconstruct themselves, is largely ignored though he insisted__given the assumptions of deconstruction itself--on its primary importance. for a long description of his stylistique, with many examples and their intriguing if fortuitous (or inevitable?) intersections with buddhist themes, especially “impermanence”, see my “derridean gaming and buddhist utpada /bha?ga (rising/falling): how a philosophical style can devoid substantive field”, in the online international journal for field-being, vol. 1, part 2, article 1 (august 2001); accessible online at the international institute for field-being website: http:/ /www.iifb.org/site > journal > vol. 1, no. 1 (2001) > part ii > v1p2-no1 magliola 1179608191360. 3the original version of “the altar”, as it appears in the 1633 edition of the temple. see it online at http://www.ccel/org/h/herbert/temple/altar.html, via the christian classics ethereal library. 4the english version of the shobo-genzo used here is: master dogen’s ‘shobogenzo’, gudo wafu nishijima and chodo cross, trans., vols. i-iv (windbell pubs., 19961999): citations are to the on-line digitalized text of the same, http://www.numatacenter. com (bdk english tripitaka series reprint edition), accessed via https://www. bdkamerica.org. 5dogen’s buddhist way is here very much like the “non-abiding” (wu-chu) of the great chinese scholar chi-tsang/jizang ( 549-643 c.e.); see r. magliola, “nagarjuna and chi-tsang on the value of ‘this world’”, journal of chinese philosophy (u. of hawaii; blackwell, u.k.), vol. 31, no. 4 (dec. 2004), pp. 505-516. 6see hee-jin kim, “‘the reason of words and letters’: dogen and koan language”, in william r. lafleur, ed., dogen studies (honolulu: u. of hawaii p., 1985), p.59. 7ibid. 8from dogen’s shobo-genzo, vol. i, chapter 11, “existence time” (uji). here i am using the online translation at http://www.thezensite.com/zenteachings/ dogen_teachings/uji.htm. compare master dogen’s ‘shobo-genzo’, nishijima and cross, vol. i, chapter 11. 9shobo-genzo, bdk english tripitaka series rpt. ed., vol. i-dbet pdf version (2009), chapter 6, pp. 65-73. 10chapter 6, p. 65. 11see chapter 6, p. 68, and associated editorial endnotes 14, 16, 19, 22-27, p. 72. 12in kim, “‘the reason of words and letters’”, pp. 66, 67. 13in the chapter of the same name, shobo-genzo, bdk english tripitaka series, vol. iii, chapter 43, “kuge”, pp. 13-28. 14in the chapter of the same name, shobo-genzo, bdk english tripitaka series, vol. iii, chapter 51, “mitsugo”, pp. 129-137. 15in the chapter entitled tsuki (“moon”), shobo-genzo, bdk english tripitaka series, vol. iii, chapter 42, pp. 3-11. 16see kim, “‘the reason of words and letters’”, p. 66. 17shobo-genzo, bdk english tripitaka series, vol. iii, chapter 42, p. 4. 18in this context, the primary lexical meaning of “to hatch” is of course “to produce from an egg”, that is__taken figuratively__”to produce new life” (the egg is a symbol of fertility and progeny in chinese and japanese culture, for example, and of “resurrection” in christianity). we should keep in mind, however, that one of the operative subtexts here is the meaning of “to hatch” as “to crisscross with lines” (from f. hacher, “to chop up”, “to cross-hatch”). hache and hacher are two of the often used words in derrida’s off/talmudic word-play, since in french they can imply both duress and erasure. derrida’s “to mark with the x”, to put “under erasure” (sous rature), reminds his readers that the word or idea at hand is “marked” by the difference between what it declares and what it cannot say. for us at the end of this paper the crisscross can remind us that in both buddhism and christianity, not words but only experience can truly know real liberation. 19see website: http://www.worldtrade.com/religion/buddhism/buddogenr.htm. 20from the website: http://www.cttbusa.org/founder2/teaching_west.htm. 10 prajna vihara~ 1free of religion & religious heritage a comparative study on the ethics of john dewey and thomas aquinas tjeng, eui-chai, sogang university, seoul abstract dewey rejects any idea of a universal good or a supreme good in his ethics. the reason is that the good is realized only in the individual situation. thus only the individual good is real and has adverbial meaning. the idea of relatively universal good is just an idea, generalized from the individual good through the intellectual action. the idea of universal good is recognized as an instrument in solving the individual condition. because a new situation is occurring at all times, the real good is determined in the continuing conduct of an individual situation. good, thus, is determined in the continuing growth and not in the fixed condition. thomas aquinas explains good and evil in terms of human nature. the human nature as an image of god [imago dei] is not changed ontologically but changed at the phenomenal dimension of self-realization in time and space, that is, environment. therefore in the theory of ethics of thomas aquinas, natural law [lex naturalis], the highest (supreme) good, ultimately guide human ethics. i wish to use aquinas to point out the weak points of dewey’s ethics. i will also appeal to the universal elements of confucianism and buddhism. introduction: the reason that i chose this title is twofold: on the one hand, present-day korea has been experiencing continuous political confusion, being claimed by the leaders of both the ruling party and the opposition party, arguing that they would lay out the policies based on a kind of pragmatism. however, i am worried whether they really know what pragmatism is, and that their actions will lead to an aggravation of the problems rather than to their solution. on the other hand, the increased development of the natural sciences, technology and commercialism, allows a kind of pragmatism to permeate 1 every aspect of life. therefore, i would like to attempt to compare and investigate john dewey's pragmatic theory of ethics, with st. thomas's theory of ethics in order to provide some criticism. because of the huge amount written on dewey's ethics, i would like to focus upon the question of good and evil. in addition i will introduce some consideration of confucianism and buddhism as well. dewey’s ethics dewey makes many statements about the good. his theory of good is positioned at the very core of his ethics. here i wish to investigate his theory of moral good by focusing on his later works, reconstruction in philosophy (1920), human nature and conduct (1922) and ethics (1932), and attempt to summarize his theory of the good. 1) dewey, in the reconstruction in philosophy1, explains briefly his reconstruction in moral conceptions (moral reconstructionism). here, dewey attempts to refute the universal approach to truth and morality, discussing instead the particular moral good. he believes that truth and morality occurs only in concrete and individual situations, and that all moral categories depend upon these individual situations. therefore, dewey denies the supreme good as the ultimate criterion or source of morality, because morality or good occurs only in special or individual situations. according to dewey, the idea of morality or good might have initially originated from customs. with the development of social life, however, customs came into collision with each other in many areas. the greeks thus attempted to define morality based on rationality rather than upon customs. in the west, at least, ethical theories have thus approached moral problems through the idea of an ultimate purpose, ultimate good, and ultimate principle. this “ultimate” is expressed in a variety of ways: god's will, a ruler's will, or the sum of all pleasure. however, dewey holds that this ultimate end is a production of feudalism and should be changed in accordance with the changes within social systems and the development of natural science. as natural science deals with the concrete, special, and individual situations, so the definition of good and evil should be examined only in the concrete and individual situation. therefore, an individual good rather than a universal good or supreme good should be 1 john dewey, reconstruction in philosophy, new york, henry holt and co., 1920, c. ⅶ. 2 considered, because man lives a concrete and individual life in an individual situation rather than universal life in a universal situation. good is performed in the action of the concrete moral subject under the individual situation. ultimate end or supreme good is completely a product of human reason. therefore, the supreme good as a moral criterion should be expelled from ethics. instead, the individual and concrete situation should be introduced as the basis of moral criteria. the determination of the good should be restricted to the action of the moral subject, that is, of an individual under a given situation. the good is done as the solution of an individual situation which is never clear and certain. the action towards a solution of a particular situation is always individual and special, concrete and personal, and unique. therefore, the judgement of an action should be individual, resulting in the solution of an individual situation. the good therefore has an adverbial character. for instance, when you ask for justice, it means you ask that someone acts justly in a concrete situation. as truth is considered as an adverb of justly in the solution of an uncertain situation, so good is regarded as an adverb rather than adjective in a moral situation.2 good in dewey, with the change and progress of an individual situation, should be concrete, individual, changeable and promotional. moral situations include conflicting elements: that is, conflicting desires and, conflicting purposes and goods. therefore, the correct action in a given situation, is not clear or self-evident in itself. thus a judgement is needed to choose among one of several situation-solving propositions. in this very sense, the action of an intellect is required. those who are in this situation, therefore, should consider the uprightness and real good [verum bonum] of an action. the standard for the right action and real good is: the thing which contributes to human advantage examined collectively. the action is justified by the result which follows, that is, the good is only determined when the initial idea is examined relative to the result. the initial idea is only a hypothesis until verified. so the standard of good in this 2 john dewey, ibid., pp.161-167. "action is always specific, concrete, individualized, unique. and consequently judgement as to acts to be performed must be similarly specific. to say that man seeks health or justice is only to say that he seeks to live healthily or justly. these things like truth, are adverbial. they are modifies of action in special cases"(p.167). 3 case, is determined when the anticipated moral result, in the solution to the situation, is consistent with the moral result which follows.3 dewey refuses to draw a distinction between the intrinsic good, which is worthy in itself, and the instrumental good, which is of value only as an instrument for the intrinsic good.4 the distinction between the intrinsic good and extrinsic good is based upon a fixed value, or on an absolute good that dewey rejects. again, according to dewey, this is because the good is confined to an individual and particular situation. therefore, the distinction between intrinsic value and instrumental value can not be made. the good is just one, and is the supreme good in a particular situation. the instrumental good, which was recognized before as a less er level of good, is now the same level of good as the ideal and intrinsic good.5 dewey also rejects the distinction between moral good and physical or natural good. it is because physical good also has a moral value when contributed to a human being. the natural sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, and so on, become moral when they contribute to the elimination of agonies and disasters. also natural science is examined from the viewpoint of social relations, that is, contributing to human well-being. in other words, it contributes to the benefit of human life.6 in summary, dewey considers the good as an action directed towards solving a problem within a particular situation, through the reflection of the intellect. thus the universal moral and the supreme good are rejected but the individual good is admitted. the final resolution of a 3 ibid., pp.163-164 4 ibid., pp.171 5 ibid., pp.175-176. 6 ibid., p.173. "when physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, contribute to the detection of concrete human woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and receiving the human estate, they became moral; they become part of the apparatus of moral inquiry or science. the latter then loses its peculiar flavor of didactic and pedantic; its ultra moralistic hortatory tone. it loses its thinness and shrillness as well as its vagueness. it gains agencies that are efficacious. but the gain is not confined to the side of moral science. natural science loses its divorce from humanity; it becomes itself humanistic in quality. it is something to be pursued not in a technical and specialized way for what is called truth for its own sake, but with the sense of its social bearing, its intellectual indispensableness. it is technical only in the sense that it provides the technique of social and moral engineering." 4 situation is not possible because a new problematic situation is occurring all the time. this solution, thus, is a continuing process. this is what we need to consider next.7 2) dewey, in human nature and conduct8, examines the moral good on the basis of action. moral action is a continual process but not a fixed achievement. that is, the moral good is determined when the action grows into the meaning. the growth or expansion in this meaning occurs in the observation of the outcome and condition of a conduct.9 the good determined by the continuing conduct means performing the current action for an indeterminate situation. therefore, good is determined in the organized process with growth. the present time includes various impulses and habits. it is something continuing, which includes memory, observation, foreseeing and so on. moreover, the present time is a moral momentum and has the power which allows man to progress. dewey thus examines the good in terms of progress and development of action. the good, that is, is determined in the action developed from the indeterminate to the determinate situation. human life includes various entangled elements and ambiguities. development or progress is achieved when something moves from a lesser condition to a better condition. it is achieved in the process of the improvement of the situation, although it never reaches a final condition. moral good, in the ethics of dewey, refers to the action that is progressing towards a determinate and organic growth situation, from an indeterminate or confused situation of moral conduct. dewey considers this conduct from the sufficiency of impulse and habit, and from the continuity. dewey thus rejects the ideological moral good of plato, aristotle, and spinoza. it is 7 ibid., p.177. "…the process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing. not health has an end fixed once and for all, but the need improvement in health…a continual process…is the end and good. the end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. it is the active process of transforming the existent situation. not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living. honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth and learning, are not goods to be possessed as they would be if they expressed ends to be attained. they are directions of change in the quality of experience. growth itself is the only moral 'end'." 8 john dewey, human nature and conduct, pp.278-332. 9 ibid., p.280 "when we observe that morality is at home wherever considerations of the worse and better are involved, we are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of conditions and outcome of conduct." 5 because they just claim the transcendental moral meaning to which experience is subordinate, not considering the morality within the limits of experience. dewey also rejects the utilitarian theory of good. while he appreciates utilitarianism’s concern with the good relative to earthly meaning, he criticizes that utilitarianism’s consideration of the good as something separated from the present, or something ideal to be acquired, rather than something to be accomplished by present conduct. dewey also rejects the good of epicureanism. while he appreciates how epicureanism examines the good from the present, and not from an uncertain future, nevertheless, it does not consider good in relation to the total category of a particular conduct. dewey investigates the good in the sufficiency of desire or impulse in connection with social environment. 10 dewey here questions how we think about others. according to him, the other self is worth as much as my own.11 the good is determined in the growth of meaning of an activity. an activity has moral meaning in the degree in which it has variety and intimacy in relation to social environment.12 in short, the good in dewey is determined in continuing conduct. this conduct is to improve a situation or to solve a problem. it is determined in the harmonious fulfillment of impulse and desire in the improvement of a continuous and problematic situation. dewey here mentions evil. evil is not determined in itself. one good is chosen whereas others rejected among the competing good presented in the given problematic situation. rejected good is regarded as evil within the situation.13 10 ibid., p.288-291. 11 ibid., p.293. "selfishness for selfishness, one is as good as another: our own is worth as much as another's …. it shows that good is the same in quality wherever it is found, whether in some other self or in one's own." 12 ibid. "an activity has meaning in the degree in which it establishes and acknowledges variety and intimacy of connections." 13 ibid., p.278. "in deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil. until it is rejected, it is a competing good. after rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation." 6 3) dewey examines good in its relation to desire, and to thought. he considers it in its relation to an object to be attained and an idea of an object. 14 this is the pursuit of a real good [verum bonum]. dewey thinks that all good should also include an element of enjoyment. otherwise it does not induce human conduct and remains neutral. yet, all pleasure is not a good.15 we cannot consider some pleasures good, if the enjoyment is separated from the environmental condition, or not considered in harmonious relation with the conditions. in other words, some pleasure s are not good if they are not considered from a problematic situation. the harmonious solution of the problematic situation is done through reflection or thought. through the reflection of the intellect, pleasure or sufficiency is considered within a larger context of conduct and character. dewey names such pleasure happiness. this happiness is determined in the harmony of various desires and tendencies. in other words, this happiness is achieved through the harmony of self through the reflection of the intellect in an environment or even an adverse situation. good is determined in this happiness.16 evil, on the other hand, can be said to be determined in direct pleasure and the pleasure separated from the social relations. dewey, in this way, examines the real good in social relations. it is because a human being is social, and because the morality of a man is also social in essence. an individual is born in a certain social environment in which he acts and is shaped intellectually and morally. an individual also acts on his environment.17 material for reflection and choice comes from social 14 john dewey & h. tufts, ethics, pp.204-205. "in its relation to desire, it requires a theory of the good; the good is that which satisfies want, craving, which fulfills or makes complete the need which stirs to action. in its relation to thought, or as an idea of an object to be attained, it imposes upon those about to act the necessity for rational insight, or moral wisdom." 15 ibid., p.210. "it is true that there is nothing to us which does not include an element of enjoyment and nothing bad which does not contain an element of the disagreeable and repulsive. otherwise the act of object is merely indifferent. it is passed by. but the statement that all good has enjoyment as an ingredient is not equivalent to the statement that all pleasure is a good." 16 ibid., pp.210-215 17 ibid., p.350. 7 environment and system.18 the social environment is here considered from a material perspective.19 an idea of good is formed in relation to social elements. it is when the sufficiency of desire is considered in the improvement of the social situation.20 4) dewey also acknowledges the collision between individual and social happiness. social or common happiness often requires the sacrifice of an individual happiness. thus the question of why one should sacrifice one's individual happiness for the common good, or other's happiness is raised. dewey, rejecting all the objective elements or law of duty, attempts to approach it from the consciousness of happiness. he maintains that one who chooses social happiness rather than individual happiness feels happiness although social happiness has less density than the sufficiency of individual desire. dewey attempts to provide some rational motive in choosing social happiness at the cost of individual happiness. for him, social happiness evaluated and chosen by the agent as the noblest value, and the value which cannot be compared with any other happiness. this is his only reason why one should sacrifice one's individual happiness for the social happiness.21 it seems that dewey here has a critical weakness in his ethical theory. it is because his ethics does not admit the objectivity of duty in itself [qua talis]. in fact, the sense of sufficiency, from the viewpoint of completion of social happiness, is not enough for sacrificing the sufficiency of stronger tendency and passion of egoism. in fact, individual happiness, which is direct, has higher and deeper density than social happiness. furthermore, social or communal happiness requires the biggest sacrifice of an individual in some cases. for instance, it can even require the sacrifice or death of an individual life. for this sacrifice, some reason or principle of more fundamental duty is required than some sense of social happiness self-imposed at the cost of individual happiness. one needs the objective imposition of external duty. in fact, nobody imposes his or her own duty, duty is characterized by being externally imposed. yet, we do have 18 ibid., p.351. 19 ibid., p.347. "the analysis of the previous part(par.ⅱ) may be called formal, since it deals with basic conceptions of morals, such as good, right, duty, approbation, standard, virtue, etc. now we shall consider the content or material of these ideas which is provided by contemporary organization of life." 20 ibid., pp.352-354 . 21 ibid., p.272 8 the consciousness of duty or conscience – where we experience the externally imposed duty from the inside that is, conscience which tells us to act for communal good at the cost of one's individual good. now, i will try to summarize briefly the theory of good in dewey's ethics. the universal good or the supreme good is not admitted in dewey's ethics. the reason is that the good is realized only in the individual situation. thus only the individual good is real and has adverbial meaning. the idea of relatively universal good is just an idea, generalized from the individual good through intellectual action. the idea of universal good is recognized as an instrument for solving the individual situations. thus the good is achieved through continuing action. that is, because a new situation is occurring at all times, the real good is determined in the continuing conduct of an individual within an individual situation. it is realized in the sufficiency of individual desire in solving and improving the individual situation, done in the viewpoint of social relations. in other words, dewey's moral real good [verum bonum] is realized in filling up the individual desire from the viewpoint of improving the life of human beings. thus, dewey's theory of good follows utilitarianism, which, in a way, he further developed. 2. on human nature and the changeability of morality human nature in dewey's theory is considered from the three perspectives: namely impulse, habit, and intellectual action. human nature is changeable. thus morals, which are totally determined by the interaction between human nature and circumstances, is also changeable. this change is accomplished by intellectual action. dewey thinks that the impulse can be changed into any form depending on how it is used. this is especially the case in his earlier writings.22 impulse and instinct, although they have relative permanency and confirmed character toward their proper objectives, are not eternally fixed, and can be changed into whatever forms by the interaction with circumstances. impulse and instinct possess the impulsive power of life. in this sense, dewey's theory is in line with the "elan vital" of bergson. dewey examines impulse in the guidance of intellectual action. impulse should be liberated from the shackles of the habit, system, custom, etc. these things have a tendency to freeze the 22 cf. john dewey, human nature and conduct, p.93. 9 state which it already possesses, and one needs to escape from the shackles of things when they are not proper in solving the new situations. furthermore, the power of impulse should be fully used in reconstructing the habit and systems in order to advance to a better situation. liberation of impulse should be done in order to allow adaptability and to give new life to habit, to allow it to be a proper instrument for solving a new situation. impulse keeps changing in the interaction with the situation. the present impulse and instinct have been acquired through human life including the evolutionary process over a long period of time. the habit, system, or custom constructed by impulse is always changing and adapting into new situations. the change of human habit, system, and custom is carried out by the guidance of intellectual action. human instinct changes in this way and so do morals. it is because dewey's morals take place in the interaction with impulse, habit, system, and circumstances by the light of intellectual action. morals thus should be changed in accordance with the change of impulse and system. morals also should be reconstructed by the reorganization of custom and system. therefore, fixed morals or some permanent and unchangeable commandments of morals are excluded in dewey's ethics.23 on the standard of good and evil of dewey and thomism. we saw how in dewey’s philosophy, the good is individual in essence, not universal. he therefore does not accept a supreme good which is real and a standard for individual good. the supreme good is purely an outcome of reason. individual good grows lively with a man's life because the situation of the life of a human being grows. so, in dewey's ethics, there is no internal and essential distinction between good and evil. this is because the good acquired through an experience in one situation could become an evil in other situation. that is, when the good can not solve other problematic situation, it can become an evil and the reverse is also possible. all the ethical elements in dewey's ethics are changeable. st. thomas does not think that a constituent essence or standard of good and evil is an interaction between environment and actor. the reason is that the essence of good and evil, even 23 ibid., p.103. "consequently rigid moral codes that attempt to lay down definite injunctions and prohibitions for every occasion in life turn out in fact loose and slack. stretch ten commandments or any other number as far as you will by ingenious exegesis, yet acts unprovided for by them will occur." 10 though the environment or the interaction is changed, always remains as it is. for instance, the adoration to god, a filial heart to parents, sense of respect to grown-ups, love for one's country, friendship, justice, etc. are always good, that is, what is good, and the opposite concepts are defined as bad, that is, an evil. therefore, the interaction between the environment and the subject does not specify in itself the good and the evil of a moral act, but changes it accidentally [accidentaliter] or secondarily. the essential distinction between good and evil is intrinsic and permanent. this is proved through experience and history. the reason that human beings in the present globalized society are able to live together, notwithstanding their different environments and historical backgrounds, is that they have basically commonality and universality of morals. dewey's ethics connotes some contradiction in itself in that it rejects metaphysics as a foundation of ethics and emphasizes only scientific experimental value as well as empirical value. according to dewey, the material foundation of good and evil is the sufficiency of a desire. this sufficiency becomes formally good or evil according to the solution of a problematic situation and the improvement of earthly life. therefore dewey examines the standard of good and evil phenomenologically and subjectively [phoenomenice et subjective]. st thomas, unlike dewey, considers the standard of good and evil from the deeper root, that is, objectively and ontologically [objective et ontologice]. he examines good in the object in being itself. all being is good inasmuch as they are being and something to be desired. evil consists in deficiency of fullness to be existed [malum autem consistit in carentia vel defectu perfectionis debitae]. st thomas refers to it as follows: “every action inasmuch as it has something real (aliquid de esse) about it has something good about it; and that inasmuch as it fails to have the full reality a human act should possess then it falls short of goodness, and so is referred to as bad.”24 being includes some fullness of esse. this fullness is desirable, leading to a desire of the subject. this metaphysical point of view is something strange to dewey. from this ontological reason of being, man's free will [velle liberum humanaum] is aroused. man's choice of free will, in the ontological question of good and evil, is a decisive element of composing good and evil. 24 s. thomas, s. th., ⅰa ⅱae, q.18, a.l. "omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate: inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala." 11 both theories agree to this, but the theories of free will are fundamentally differentiated from each other. here, we need to examine more deeply the fundamental elements of ethics in sufficiency of desire and happiness. both theories, of course, have in common in that all the sufficiency of desire cannot be good. however, a question can be raised concerning how some sufficiency or happiness is something good, whereas some other sufficiency or happiness is something bad, that is, evil. in other words, we need a solid standard to define moral good and evil. according to dewey, the standard of moral good and evil consists in the solution of a problematic situation through human conduct. st thomas, however, examines good and evil in the objective of human conduct. the reason is that, as the natural things are specified by the form [forma] so is human conduct morally specified by the proper or rational objective. it is also related to the final end of human life. thus, st thomas states as follows: "the basic goodness of a moral act is provided by the befitting objective on which it is set"25 also, a human act is specified according to the end or purpose of human life. man is a contingent being [ens contingens], which belongs to an other being. therefore, as long as the being is belonged to, it has its end in an other being. human act is morally specified by this end. st thomas thus goes on to say: "human act, as well as other things the goodness of which depends on something else, hold a manner of good which is relative to the end on which they depend besides the strain of good which is considered in themselves".26 st thomas also considers that the end and objective specify human moral act formally [fomaliter] and materially [materiliter]. thus he maintains that "the specific character of a human act is assessed as to its form by the end intended and as to its matter by the objective of the external deed."27 25 s. thomas, ibid., a.2. "prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obicto convenienti." 26 ibid., a.4. "actiones autem humanae, et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio, habent rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent." 27 ibid., a.6. "actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum objectum exterioris actus." 12 the objective, however, is considered the closest end.28 those which are moral receive the classification from its end. the end classifies human act.29 an act is done by the end [actio fit propter finem]. the end, as the standard of good and evil, is rationally examined by human nature. ultimately, this end is considered in the ultimate end of human life. this ultimate end is related to the original being of all existence, that is, being itself or creator. this metaphysical moral standard of good and evil is not only just theoretically but corresponds with the daily moral life, that is, empirical or experimental characteristics of good and evil. it is because the metaphysical foundation is unchangeable and universal for all the people. in fact, morals are concretely revealed in time and space, yet include the elements that are common to human beings beyond time and space. this shows well that morals are deeply rooted in human nature. human beings thus live in diverse situations, but with the same humanity and morality. from this point of view we can explain properly the unchangeability and universality of morals as the first principle of morals. in fact, thomas holds the unchangeability of moral principles. human nature is a composite of soul and body, the image of god, and of natural law which is the self-expression of human nature and is based on the eternal law. but such essentially unchangeable moral principles also are accidentally changeable in their realization in time and space.30 the unchangeability of moral principles in the world religions now i would like to present here the unchangeability of the moral principles of christianity, confucianism and buddhism as follows: christianity 1. i, the lord, am your god. you shall not have other gods besides me. 4. honor your father and your mother. 5. you shall not kill. 6. you shall not commit adultery. 7. you shall not steal. 28 ibid., a.2., comment. 3; a.7. 29 ibid., a.6. 30 cf. s. thomas, s. th. ⅰ. 75, 4, c; ⅰ-ⅱ, 34, 4-5 13 8. you shall not bear false witness against your neighbor etc. confucianism confucianism considers that 5 human relations(五倫) are an unchangeable principle of morals. mencius says 'between father and son there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate function; between old and young, a proper order, and between friends, fidelity'.(孟子, mencius, ‘滕 ’文公上) (prof. jung, in jae 鄭仁在explains the relation between husband and wife in his own way: he says 'between husband and wife there should be (moral) discrimination from other man and woman = husband should discriminate his wife from other woman and wife should discriminate her husband from other man.') 荀子says '体常而盡変' that is 'substance is constant(unchangeable) but everything is changeable'(荀 子, hsunzi, 天論). it is exactly the same meaning as that of thomas aquinas. buddhism the 5 and 10 commandments of buddhism which are unchangeable: against murder (殺生), thief (偸盜), adultery (邪淫), falsehood (妄語), drinking (飮酒), a wrong view (邪見), calumny (毁謗), fraud (欺誑), self-praise and pulling down of others or humiliation of others ( 毁 他自讚 他 ), stinginess (慳 吝) etc. thus the moral principles and the human nature of christianity, confucianism and buddhism are unchangeable. it is quite an interesting point of view that christianity and oriental religious have unchangeable moral principles and human nature ontologically with the changeability of them phenomenologically. these 3 religious' moral viewpoints are fundamentally contrary to dewey's. challenging dewey through thomism dewey, who attempts to reconstruct ethics positively, does not correctly discuss the negative elements, namely evil. in fact, a great deal of evils are found in human life and numerous difficulties, agonies, and disasters. according to dewey's theory, there is no essential way to distinguish between good and evil, and so a fixed distinction does not exist. the difference is just gradual and is only stems from both the interaction of situation and the difference between 14 solutions. evil is nothing more than the rejected good in a certain confirmed situation. therefore, evil can be transformed into good. in other words, when it can change the situation and work out effectively for solving the problematic situation, the evil becomes good and vice versa, namely good is turned into evil. this theory is easily refuted by the internal experience of our consciousness. the reason is that we experience and recognize that the moral evil, in itself, never becomes good. for example, the murder of an innocent person, impiety to one's parents, betrayal of one's fatherland and friend and so on must be evil at all times wherever they occur and whether the situation is changed. the consistent moral experience like this is not explained properly in dewey's ethics. the reason is that his ethics is not based on sound metaphysics, namely human nature. st thomas explains the matter of evil in the internal reason metaphysics. that is, he approaches it from the reason of human nature and rationality. he also, from this point of view, accounts for the internal difference of good and evil. this theory of gap is consistent with both our internal experience and daily life. for this thomas considers it as follows: in human acts, good and evil are examined from the relation to the reasonable, namely grasping the reasonable. it is because man's good is to live according to reason and his evil to live outside of reason. the good, thus, is keeping with its form, and evil is out of keeping with its form. thus the difference between good and evil in the objective is compared in itself in the relation to reason. that is, good and evil are judged to be reasonable or unreasonable according to the objectives of man in keeping with the reason.31 31 . thomas, s. th. ⅰ-ⅱ, q.18, a.5. "in actibus autem humanis bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem: quia…bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse malum autem quod est praeter rationem. unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei praeter ordinem suae formae. patet ergo quod differentia boni et mali circa objectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem: scilicet secundum quod objectum est ei conveniens vel non conveniens." 15 1free of religion & religious heritage from apprehension to prehension: exploring a different experience for philosophical speculation tomas g. rosario, jr. ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract both aristotle and st. thomas are acknowledged to have firmly established, at least in a general way, the close link between our experience of the material world and the metaphysical articulation of the said sphere of reality. their philosophies are recognized to have provided the rational confirmation of the beliefs and convictions of ordinary men who rely mainly on their experiences for their understanding of what is real. on this premise it is plausible to esteem the two as philosophers of the common man. and yet, like all thinkers who generate and nourish philosophical inquiry through reliance on experience, both aristotle and aquinas confined experience to conscious experience or what whitehead has called 'sense-perception'. whitehead considered this traditional view on the starting point of philosophical analysis as erroneous although he clarified that "the mistake was natural for mediaeval and greek philosophers: for they had not modern physics before them as a plain warning." whitehead therefore initiates an inquiry into the radically new conception of experience. this entirely new view of experience is called by whitehead "prehension", which is the theme of this paper. as we shall see, it appears to be the implicit thesis of whitehead that the only way to access the so called 'ultimately primitive experience' is not by means of traditional sense apprehension but only through a non-cognitive act of appropriation. 86 prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 86-108 © 2000 by assumption university press introduction philosophers would hardly question the general conviction that philosophical thinking is not only stimulated but is also continuously nourished by experience. in this regard, we may refer to the pertinent teaching of aristotle in view of his major influence as a metaphysical thinker on other great philosophers. when he declared what today has become a popular philosophical tenet namely that, "all men by nature desire to know,"1 one could not fail to notice that aristotle initially referred to sense knowledge which is common to both man and animals.2 yet he was obviously concerned to show that, although both man and animals do have sense experience by which they respectively have knowledge of things as individuals,3 only man could attain universal knowledge and understanding by means of art and reasoning. nonetheless, aristotle was unequivocal in affirming that "…science and art come to men through experience…"4 but still, even if both science and art provide knowledge and understanding in a manner that is superior to sense experience, aristotle maintained that it is philosophical knowledge that constitutes the highest science or wisdom insofar as it deals with the first causes and most universal principles.5 in his treatise on human knowledge, thomas aquinas referred to the abovementioned teaching of aristotle clearly noting that for the philosopher "…the beginning of our knowledge is from the senses."6 furthermore, we gather from the following text of 84, 7, which is considered as the key passage in st.thomas's theory of knowledge, an a fortiori affirmation of the indispensable role of sense experience not only in the acquisition of knowledge but also in actual understanding.7 in other words, without sense experience not only is it impossible to gain knowledge of material things in this world but it is also not possible to actually use the said acquired knowledge.8 for this reason, st.thomas noted that actual understanding by the human intellect would be impeded if there is an injury or illness to the bodily organs that are used by sense faculties like sight, hearing, imagination, memory, and the like.9 hence, in man's temporal life, the human intellect could not know anything unless there is sense experience.10 we relied on the teachings of aristotle and st.thomas regarding the key role of experience in philosophical thinking insofar as both are tomas g. rosario, jr. 87 acknowledged to have firmly established, at least in a general way, the close link between our experience of the material world and the metaphysical articulation of the said sphere of reality. their philosophies are recognized to have provided the rational confirmation of the beliefs and convictions of ordinary men who rely mainly on their experiences for their understanding of what is real. on this premise it is plausible to esteem the two as philosophers of the common man. and yet, like all thinkers who generate and nourish philosophical inquiry through reliance on experience, both aristotle and aquinas confined experience to conscious experience or what whitehead has called 'sense-perception'.11 whitehead considered this traditional view on the starting point of philosophical analysis as erroneous although he clarified that "the mistake was natural for mediaeval and greek philosophers: for they had not modern physics before them as a plain warning."12 the above brief discussion of the common understanding of experience as a conscious phenomenon at its origin, and the initial critical reaction of whitehead against such view provide the background entry for our inquiry into the radically new conception of experience by process philosophers, in particular, by whitehead. this entirely new view of experience by process thinkers entails what whitehead also called a 'special activity' called "prehension" which is the very theme of the inquiry in this paper. as we shall see, it appears to be the implicit thesis of whitehead that the only way to access the so called 'ultimately primitive experience' is not by means of traditional sense apprehension but only through a noncognitive act of appropriation. from apprehension to prehension what is probably the central notion of whitehead's process metaphysics or what he himself called his own version of a "philosophy of organism"13 is the very difficult notion of "prehension."14 as we shall uncover, all the surface meanings and the nuances of prehension will point to the principal thesis of whitehead's social metaphysics namely, that the capacity for prehension of actual entities is indicative of their dependence on one another, or, of their social existence. first of all, whitehead clarified 88 prajñâ vihâra his usage of this term: "i will use the word prehension for uncognitive apprehension: by this i mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive."15 further clarification is provided in another work when he said that "this term is devoid of suggestion either of consciousness or of representative perception."16 these clarifications unquestionably show that whitehead has given up on the traditional or common usage of the terms, "apprehension" and "perception" in their essentially cognitive or conscious character.17 we could, then, refer to apprehension or perception when we speak of prehension on condition that we do not link it with conscious knowledge. it is also significant to the understanding of the notion of prehension that we now point out the fact that whitehead's introduction of this radical notion constitutes also his rejection of berkeley's subjective idealism18 synoptically defined by his philosophical slogan, esse est percipi aut percipere. if one is familiar with his epistemological theory, one could recall that in reducing the reality of things to their being perceived by the mind, berkeley absolutized the existence of the mind. whitehead, however, found this key teaching of berkeley to be metaphysically problematic and proposed instead a view that represents a realist epistemology.19 in this connection, he deemed the following obscure passage from 'francis bacon's natural history' to embody a theory of realism that he favored and, at the same time, is supportive of his scientific reading of the realities in nature: "it is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception…"20 this text must clearly refer, at least, to all inanimate bodies since they have no sense faculties and so they are incapable of cognitive perception. but to say that they are capable of 'perception' even if they have no senses is to affirm a 'noncognitive perception,' which will be explored by whitehead into a theory of prehension. primitive, non-conscious experience it is probably one of the radical insights of whitehead's metaphysics of prehension that there could be experience without consciousness.21 in asserting that "…an actual entity may, or may not be conscious of some tomas g. rosario, jr. 89 part of its experience,"22 we encounter a radically different understanding of experience. first of all, it necessarily implies that whitehead has conceived of experience as having a wider meaning than the notion of consciousness. just as we are familiar with the common notion of conscious experience, or, what phenomenologists call 'intentional experience', there is a "…primitive form of physical experience…"23 that "…does not necessarily involve consciousness."24 although it is a long-established tradition that philosophers do not dissociate consciousness with knowledge, whitehead did not adhere to this tradition in his construction of his own metaphysical doctrine of experience.25 he did not see consciousness as having a necessary role but only an additional value in the subject-object interplay in experience.26 but, in providing us a distinction between conscious experience and primitive physical experience in process and reality, whitehead has not explicitated in definite terms what constitutes experience in itself such that consciousness is not essential to it.27 he has practically hidden the meaning of experience by using a term peculiar to physics and described physical experience as similar to a "vector feeling."28 we have to look for clarification elsewhere. first of all, whitehead pointed out in his work, symbolism that "the word 'experience' is one of the most deceitful in philosophy"29 obviously convinced that this notion must be carefully examined since its wider and much richer meaning has long been overlooked. if we turn to his adventure of ideas, we find some of his less technical reflections on the fundamental meaning of experience. at the outset, he expressed his agreement with modern thinkers like descartes, locke, and hume that the subject-object relation is the fundamental structure of experience.30 but he rejected their position that the knower-known cognitive structure is the prototype of this subject-object relation.31 this means that, for him, what is truly primordial when we speak of experience is not cognitive in character but something "emotional."32 but again we should not be misled into thinking that whitehead was speaking of human emotion. we need to go back at this point of our inquiry to process and reality for needed textual support. whitehead noted here that "the primitive form of physical experience is emotional---blind emotion---received as felt elsewhere in another occasion…"33 in other words, he was convinced that we could refer to a non-conscious 'emotional experience', an experience so primitive and so 90 prajñâ vihâra elementary that it is universal to all entities of the natural world. this 'primitive form of physical experience' is referred to in his theory of feelings, as a "simple physical feeling." and he described this 'simple physical feeling' as "…the most primitive type of an act of perception, devoid of consciousness."34 it appears, then, that whitehead is calling our attention to a widely unrecognized---perhaps, because it does not enter human consciousness---yet the most fundamental, and so, the most universal of all levels and types of experiences namely, a simple physical feeling which is the most primitive type of physical experience. let us briefly turn to a pertinent passage in his other work, religion in the making, since it helps clarify not only his rejection of the common view of modern philosophers that experience has a fundamentally cognitive structure but also why the theory of prehension must be necessarily linked with a more fundamental experience that whitehead believed has been ignored by most philosophers: the phrase 'immediate experience' can have either of two meanings, according as it refers to the physical or to the mental occasion. it may mean a complete concretion of physical relationships in the unity of a blind perceptivity. in this sense 'immediate experience' means an ultimate physical fact. but in a secondary, and more usual, sense it means the consciousness of physical experience. such consciousness is a mental occasion. it has the character of being an analysis of physical experience by synthesis with the concepts involved in the mentality. such analysis is incomplete, because it is dependent on the limitations of the concepts. ….the most complete concrete fact is dipolar, physical and mental.35 in downgrading the common notion of 'immediate experience' i.e. as 'consciousness of physical experience' to a secondary meaning, whitehead has, in effect, sought to abandon what is generally considered as the starting point of philosophical inquiry. 'immediate experience' in this sense could be equated with our sense perception of the objects around us. most epistemological doctrines consider sense perception as the beginning of knowledge or as the initial illustration of the knower-known structure. but since, for whitehead, consciousness is a mental occasion' and it entails the use of concepts, we may plausibly conclude that this experience is more abstract rather than concrete. now, if philosophy is tomas g. rosario, jr. 91 supposed to deal with what is most concretely real, this could only be the 'ultimate physical fact' or an occasion of experience whose concrete reality, as we shall see, does not depend on consciousness or on the mind. now, the effort however of whitehead in process and reality to illustrate this most primitive and most fundamental type of experience, or what he called in this book, a 'simple physical feeling', remains technical and could not stimulate in us concrete images of ordinary events in our daily experience.36 when whitehead, for instance, has given the abstract illustration of an actual entity a 'physically feeling' other actual entities like x, y, and z, which also ' 'feel' each other respectively, we have to greatly struggle, just like his more dedicated and more erudite scholars, if we wish to understand this in terms of common experience, or, to see how these elementary and primary entities have a nexus or have a relation to one another, or, how they undergo the process of integration into a unified whole. we should, then, try to look for pertinent or related teachings of whitehead in his less technical work, adventure of ideas. in the same section where he dwelt on the subject-object structure of experience, whitehead provided us with what appeared to be the essential or general meaning of experience when he spoke of it in the following manner: the process of experiencing is constituted by the reception of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process into the complex fact which is that process itself. these antecedent entities, thus received as factors into the process of experiencing, are termed 'objects' for that experiential occasion…. thus the process of experiencing is constituted by the reception of objects into the unity of that complex occasion which is the process itself. the process creates itself, but it does not create the objects which it receives as factors in its own nature.37 if whitehead has enunciated here the essential meaning of experience, it is evident that the notion of consciousness is not a major factor in his conception of experience. he highlighted, at least, in the above text, the key role of object in the whole process of experiencing. an isolated reading of this passage might give one the impression of a passive notion of experience in view of the unequivocal reference to it as a process of 'reception of entities' or of the object. before we continue in drawing out 92 prajñâ vihâra the nuances of this passage in relation to the primitive notion of experience, it is good to turn to an earlier passage where whitehead disabused our minds concerning this impression on the passivity of the process of experience. according to him, the subject-object structure of experience could have been expressed in terms of "…recipient and provoker, where the fact provoked is an affective tone about the status of the provoker in the provoked experience."38 in this relationship, the object plays the role of the provoker while the subject or what is referred to in the above text as the complex occasion of the process of experience itself is the recipient. what he found unfortunate, however, in this different illustration of the subject-object structure of experience is that "…the word 'recipient' suggests a passivity which is erroneous."39 this categorical clarification by whitehead should make us realize that he had not thought of the process of experience in a purely passive manner. yet in viewing the 'process of experiencing' as constituted by the 'reception of entities' or 'objects,' it seems to me that the simplification of the subject-object structure of experience in terms of provoker-recipient relation would have been satisfactory for whitehead if not for the clear connotation of passivity in the use of the term 'recipient.' in other words, the provoker-recipient relation would have met his radical view of noncognitive experience, which could not be expressed properly by the knower-known relation because of its parochial meaning. nonetheless what is noteworthy, if we go back now to the long passage, in his description of the process of experiencing is the unequivocal affirmation of the notion of receptivity. it might be the case that this notion is used in describing the primitive sense of experience in order to point out the major role played by the object as one of the key elements of and as 'received' in the complex process of experience. we can notice at the end of the text that he asserted without equivocation that the objects received are not 'created' by the process itself although the process 'creates' itself. it is obviously crucial to whitehead's conception of experience that the object, which subsequently forms part of the process of experience, has its own being prior to and independent of the new event of experience. it is for this reason, i believe, that he insisted on the antecedent character of the object if it is to be considered as a component of the process of experience. it is at least clear in the adventure of ideas that whitehead has tomas g. rosario, jr. 93 introduced the highly complex notion of prehension in connection with his critical discussion of the traditional philosophical conception of experience in terms of the subject-object framework. in his rejection of the knowerknown model by which experience in its widest sense could be articulated, he deemed it most appropriate to employ a new conceptual tool namely, the notion of prehension. it is also crucial to our understanding of the notion of prehension that whitehead did not link it, in particular, to human experience ordinarily considered as conscious and cognitive. and, since prehension is not essentially related with conscious experience, much less with knowledge, it must be the most universal activity affecting at least every reality in nature; it must be the most universal event. furthermore, this new notion also constitutes his rejection of berkeley's subjective idealism and of his de-emphasis of the role of the mind in defining the reality of natural entities. the occasional effort of whitehead to render his very complex teaching on the notion of prehension less difficult in his adventure of ideas and in science and the modern world should not deceive us and lead us into the pitfall of oversimplification of his conception of the said notion. if he has spoken of 'prehensions in nature' as 'events in nature,'40 or, that the term 'event' could be used instead of the term 'prehension' this does not mean that prehension and event are thoroughly synonymous. this is not to deny, however, that the highly technical notion of prehension could, in a general sense, be considered as referring to events insofar as both partake of the dynamic idea of process. we could add the observation that the reality of event as a concrete process and the reality of the process of prehension are hardly distinguishable so much so that one might confuse the two and view them as identical. in fact, hartshorne, who is the leading scholar in the promotion of whitehead's thought, has taken effort to simplify the esoteric teachings of the latter by speaking more of events and concrete experiences rather than of prehensions and of actual entities. yet, the total reality of a particular event is still analyzable into more elementary functions, and prehension, as the creative and unifying activity of this event, is one of its elementary functions.41 we may initially point out that whitehead, as we have already seen, uses the term 'prehension' to signify a non-cognitive activity of perception or apprehension. if we return now to process and reality he spoke here of prehension as a particular 94 prajñâ vihâra "…process of appropriation of a particular element…"42 as an activity of appropriating or grasping, prehension necessarily implies that which is grasped or appropriated. that which is appropriated or grasped is referred to in process and reality as the 'actual entities or the ultimate elements of the universe',43 or, as 'prehensive event' in science and the modern world.44 but this distinction between the act of appropriating and that which is appropriated is relevant since it leads us back to the crucial background of our current discussion of the theory of prehension namely, the subject-object structure of experience. the process of prehension entails, then, the subject-object model in the clarification of experience. components of prehension in fact, whitehead categorically referred to this subject-object relation in his exposition of the notion of prehension in both process and reality and adventure of ideas. in chapter 2 of part i of process and reality where he begun to clarify the difficult notions that he regularly employed in explaining his philosophy of organism, he analyzed the notion of prehension into three aspects: (a) the 'subject' which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is prehended;  the 'subjective form' which is how that subject prehends that datum.45 however, whitehead did not provide any elaboration for this text in the same location where it was cited. we have to go back to adventure of ideas where the notion of prehension is introduced as a 'formal explanation' of experience in accordance with the subject-object relational structure. here, the subject of prehension, which is none other than the actual entity, is illustrated as an occasion of experience, or, we may say, a particular concrete event.46 and he clearly noted that prehension as an activity is just one of the details or elements constitutive of the whole tomas g. rosario, jr. 95 occasion of experience. this is an obvious indication that prehension as an activity or as a process of appropriating is distinct from the actual entity, or, occasion of experience that serves as its subject. yet, in this connection, whitehead made the interesting insight that the subject is active rather than passive and its active trait is disclosed in its special activity of prehension. but it is already clear to us that an occasion of experience or a particular momentary event is the subject of prehension and, since we could view nature as a manifold of events, dynamic occasions, and developments then we could view nature as the macrocosmic subject of prehensions, "…necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension."47 faithful to his conviction that the subject-object relation is the only appropriate articulation of experience, whitehead spoke of the object of prehension or the datum of prehension as the second factor to be considered in his conception of prehension. if the subject of prehension is said to be active insofar as it has the special activity of appropriating the object, on the other hand, the object is deemed as the 'provoker' or stimulus of the said special activity of prehension. for this reason, whitehead considered the subject and object as correlatives48 and that, in fact, their progressive union is made possible by the very activity of prehension, which we shall discuss later. but let us presently dwell on what appears to me as whitehead's realist argument against the subjective idealism of berkeley. in giving prominence to the role played by the object in the process of prehension, whitehead stated his opposition to the fundamental teaching of berkeley that the reality of natural things is completely determined by their being perceived by the mind. it is now relevant to recall the text cited above concerning the 'process of experiencing'. in describing this process as the reception of objects into the subject or the occasion of experience, it is, i think, the intention of whitehead to declare his realist position without any taint of equivocation that natural entities have a reality of their own, which is not established by their relation to the subject, whether or not this subject is the complex occasion of experience or the perceiving mind of berkeley. and to stress that the object, or, the datum of prehension has a reality that is not generated by the process of prehension, he prescribed the parameters of 'antecedence' and 'givenness' so that something could be considered as an object of prehension. in other words, if the object or datum of prehension is both antecedent to 96 prajñâ vihâra and is something 'given' to the occasion of experience, then, these are indications that it is a real element in the process but whose reality is not derived from the process itself. the third factor in the process of prehension namely, the subjective form refers to how the subject prehends the object or the datum of prehension, could be the most crucial factor in the meaning of prehension in connection with our future goal of doing research on whitehead's conception of god's consequent nature. but, for the present moment, we need to understand what role this third factor really plays in the process of prehension. in process and reality we learn "that there are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc."49 with this wide heterogeneity of these various examples, we seem to be confronted again with another very complex notion, which is, in fact, a constitutive factor in the already very difficult notion of prehension. but these diverse types of subjective form confirm the universality of the phenomenon of the prehensive process. there are diverse types of subjective forms because there are diverse subjects of prehension ranging from the inanimate, non-living entities to the organic realities, up to the level of consciously prehending entities. and we should not forget that whitehead employed the notion of prehension to clarify experience in the widest sense of the term, especially in its non-cognitive, non-conscious nature. we may initially conclude, then, that there is a subjective form respectively appropriate to a lower entity and to a higher entity.50 the observations whitehead raised in the adventure of ideas might help minimize the difficulty of articulating the notion of 'subjective form'. he taught here that "subjective form is the character assumed by the subject by reason of some prehended datum."51 this point could be clarified by an example he provided in connection with the role of subjective form on the continuity of an experience. he gave us the case of a man who is continuously angry due to a hurtful incident in his life. let us assume that the immediately past occasion of this man is s (let us specify it as "speaking before a big group of businessmen"), which "positively prehends" or "feels" datum l (let us specify datum l as "sudden loss of microphone voice because someone deliberately lowered the volume control"), and eliciting subjective form i (let us specify it as "becoming indignant due to the tomas g. rosario, jr. 97 deliberate disruption of his speech"). the immediately subsequent occasion, let us call it a (we may describe this new condition of the human individual we are talking about as "angrily reprimanding the technician in the audiovisual control room"), now prehends or feels s, the previous occasion "…with the same subjective form of anger."52 this subjective form, i.e. anger might persist even in the succeeding occasions of experience (e.g. occasions t, r, u, v, w, etc.) of this man. the above illustration of the role of subjective form and, certainly, even of the prehensive process itself, teaches us at least two things. first, the subjective form is an indication of the manner the subject is changed53 upon its prehension of an object or a datum, and this object is normally another occasion of experience or an actual entity. in this sense when whitehead spoke of the 'subjective form as the character that the prehending subject assumes' upon its appropriation of an object, it is a clear statement that the prehending subject is transformed or re-shaped in a certain manner or in another manner. we shall return to this point later. second, the subjective form also reflects ---and this is the main theme illustrated by the above-mentioned example ---the continuous actuality of a certain mode of change in the complex occasion of experience. there is no question that the example of human anger easily illustrates what whitehead meant by subjective form 'as the primary ground for the continuity of nature' for the obvious reason that continuous anger is a very common human experience. hence, if something actual could be said to be relatively lasting or enduring in man, whitehead attributed it to the subjective form of the various occasions of experience or events in the life of the said human individual. common experience teaches us that anger, as an instance of subjective form, is an emotion that is ordinarily though not exclusively linked with consciousness.54 in the above example, the continuing anger of the speaker is sustained by his consciousness of the datum that elicited his anger. it is certainly not to be denied that both emotion and consciousness are two types of subjective form, which are ordinarily associated with occasions of human experience. in our momentary concrete states, we are calm or angry, happy or sad; we are also generally aware in particular moments of activities. but if whitehead has told us in process and reality that "…the subjective form of a simple physical feeling does not involve 98 prajñâ vihâra consciousness…"55 we are reminded initially of the focus of his inquiry namely, that there is a primordial experience which is non-conscious and non-cognitive and is appropriately articulated by the notion of prehension. it seems plausible then to assume that just as he is more concerned with non-conscious perception so whitehead was equally focused on subjective forms that have nothing to do with consciousness. 'primitive feeling' as prehensive activity further reading of the teachings of whitehead on the notion of prehension, together with the foregoing analyses induces us to make the further major observation that the above-mentioned notion serves as his argument for his disinterest in the traditional epistemological theory of abstraction. according to him, the conventionalized abstractions prevalent in epistemological theory are very far from the concrete facts of experience. the word 'feeling' has the merit of preserving the double significance of subjective form and of the apprehension of an object. it avoids the disjecta membra provided by abstraction.56 let us first point out that whitehead adopted the term "feeling" according to the meaning developed by f. h. bradley namely, as the irreducible underlying activity of experience itself.57 he was convinced that bradley's theory of feeling is the fitting explanation of our apprehension of the most concrete and integrated wholeness of immediate experience. he adopted also but reinterpreted bradley's notion of "inclusive whole," which the latter thinker considered as presupposed by relation rather than as a manifestation of relation. in his reinterpretation, whitehead deemed this "inclusive whole," as actually referring to the actual connectedness, or better, intrinsic relation, of individual or atomic58 occasions of experience. there is no doubt that whitehead has greatly admired bradley for his great insight on the key role of feeling in the non-cognitive apprehension of experience. since feeling is non-cognitive and non-abstractive, it preserves the unity and richness of an occasion of experience. to feel an occasion of experience is to grasp it as an inclusive whole such that the tomas g. rosario, jr. 99 subject, the datum or object of prehension, and the subjective form are intact in their complex but integrated unity. on the other hand, the process of abstraction, since it is essentially analytical and reductive, breaks up the rich unity of concrete experience. the constitutive elements of concrete experience are separated in view of the misplaced belief that the essential must be discovered and isolated because it is the core of reality. in this task, the mind has the principal role. we may recall that whitehead criticized berkeley's subjective idealism i.e. a doctrine that reduces the reality of natural things to the perception of a unifying mind. he recommended instead the following: "for berkeley's mind, i substitute a process of prehensive unification."59 this very unusual view of whitehead is tantamount to a blanket indictment of all epistemological theories as failed attempts to clarify experience. all theories of knowledge are myopic insofar as all of them confine experience to human experience and, as a consequence, essentially relate experience to a cognitive faculty especially to intellectual faculties. perhaps it is inevitable for philosophers to "overintellectualize"60 their exposition of experience since, by definition, they seek knowledge.61 whitehead belittled, however, the role of knowledge in the reality and structure of experience by treating it as an additional but non-essential factor in a given occasion of experience.62 going back to his adoption of bradley's doctrine of feeling, whitehead has sometimes used it interchangeably with the term "prehension."63 yet we may recall that it is also true that he sometimes loosely uses the term 'prehension' by equating it with event.64 now, we find the specific definition of feeling as 'positive prehension' in both process and reality65 and adventure of ideas.66 in the former work, feeling as positive prehension is distinguished from "negative prehension," which signifies that a datum has no definite contribution to make in the "concrescence" or 'real internal constitution' of a subject of prehension.67 if negative prehension indicates the exclusion of an object of prehension, positive prehension, or, feeling refers to the definite positive contribution of an object of prehension in the concrescence or self-transformation of an occasion of experience. it also follows from this that the datum or object of prehension becomes preserved as an integral part of the creative development or expansion of the reality of the prehending occasion of experience.68 100 prajñâ vihâra the above discussion of prehension in terms of 'feeling' could help minimize the difficulty of clarifying the very fundamental yet truly esoteric thesis of whitehead that there is a primitive experience which precedes the familiar conscious experience associated with traditional philosophical inquiry. this 'feeling' is equally primitive insofar as it is also unaccompanied by any form of vital consciosness or by any sense consciousness. the actual entity as the subject of this feeling is said to 'feel' or to prehend in the sense that it appropriates "…some elements in the universe to be components in the real internal constitution of its subject."69 we might as well say then that prehension viewed as an activity of feeling is none other than the appropriation or 'active receptivity' of influencing events, whether small or very small in size, by the actual entity that prehends or 'feels'. but the 'feeling' itself is a constitutive element in the concrescence or novel integration of the actual entity undergoing change.70 feeling as prehensive activity would be easy to understand if it were to be associated with whitehead's own example of the feeling of anger used above to illustrate the meaning of subjective form which is one of the components of prehension. however, the feeling of anger though a clear illustration of the subjective form of prehension does not exemplify what whitehead referred to as primitive, non-conscious feelings. if this primitive experience of feeling, which whitehead referred to as a 'simple physical feeling' and as 'the most primitive type of perception', is the most common event of prehension in the universe we are then confronted with a phenomenon so widespread yet unnoticed and, perhaps, of no serious interest to most philosophers. this is so because, as whitehead himself acknowledged, philosophers normally deal on the sort of experience that is at least accessible to our knowing faculties. while the feeling of anger is consciously experienced by man, this primitive type of feeling is 'felt' by an atomic reality called actual entity. prehension as a primitive feeling is obviously an experience so atomic in size that we do not notice them71 as they occur in our surroundings and even in us. whitehead himself recognized that we could never differentiate one simple physical feeling with another physical feeling as they occur because of their atomic size. in our daily lives alone, there is an innumerable succession of unnoticed events or occurrences actually affecting us. these atomic, unnoticed influences are probably mostly tomas g. rosario, jr. 101 physical and are coming from the equally innumerable elements of nature, but they may also be psychological which may be caused either by natural phenomena or by our interaction with our fellowmen. it should be beyond debate that our bodies have so much more of this so-called 'primitive experiences' by means of 'simple physical feeling' than of influences captured by sense perception or by sense consciousness. if these atomic influences, which are 'primitively felt' by our bodies, would turn out to be beneficial or harmful to us it is the teaching of our ordinary experiences that it is at the later and large stages of their build up or development72 in our bodies that we realize or we become aware of any of these atomic influences or prehensions. for instance, the physical, physiological, psychological, and even intellectual growths of any human individual are due to innumerable external and internal influences which are also imperceptibly felt neither by the individual concerned nor even by the people with whom he regularly interacts. it is usually at later stages of growth that we notice the obvious change in the physical transformation of an individual. what this inquiry tries to demonstrate is the reality of an area of experience which whitehead has discovered to be located outside sense perception, or, prior to conscious experience. because of this location, it is inaccessible to sense apprehension or, to sense experience. whitehead theorized that in this area of 'primitive experience' what takes place is not apprehension but 'prehension', a new notion with which most philosophers and even the celebrated ones are unfamiliar. yet, our inquiry has shown that although this is a very complex notion it is not completely alien to the teachings and testimonies of our ordinary experience. this we tried to exemplify, in fact, in the immediately preceding paragraph. if this very complex notion has any value for further philosophical research, whitehead himself has trail-blazed its relevance by applying this notion to the metaphysics of divine nature. in other words, he has developed a metaphysical doctrine of divine prehension especially in the last section of his major work, process and reality. and his followers, notably charles hartshorne, have vigorously explored and reinterpreted the richness of this notion for the benefit both of the philosophical articulation and theological exegesis of god-belief. 102 prajñâ vihâra tomas g. rosario, jr. 103 endnotes 1 "metaphysics," richard mc keon, the basic works of aristotle (new york: random house, 1941), i, 1. 980a. 2 ibid., i, 1. 980a25-980b. 3 ibid., i, 1. 981a15. 4 ibid., i, 1. 981a5. 5 ibid., i, 1. 981b25-30; i, 2. 982a5-982b10. 6 summa theologiae, i, 84, 6. henceforth to be cited as st. 7 "…impossibile est nostrum intellectum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata." ibid., i, 84, 7. 8 "unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum." loc.cit.. 104 prajñâ vihâra 9 "videmus enim quod, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis; et similiter impeditu actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis; impeditur homo ab intelligendi in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praeaccepit." loc. cit.. 10 "…impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. loc.cit. 11 whitehead actually accused john locke of fundamental misconception for the latter's failure to see that there is an experience more primitive than sense-perception. but he also attributed the same misconception to thinkers he referred to as 'medieval and greek philosophers'. he could have named aristotle and aquinas. see alfred north whitehead, process and reality (new york: harper & row publishers, 1960) part ii, chapter 4, section 2, p.173. 12 loc.cit.. 13 ibid., "preface," pp. v-vi. see victor lowe, "whitehead's metaphysical system," process philosophy and christian thought. edited by delwin brown, ralph james, jr., and gene reeves (new york: the bobbs-merrill co., inc. 1971), p.3. 14 whitehead acknowledged that the use of the term "prehension" is awkward. see alfred north whitehead, "science and the modern world," alfred north whitehead, an anthology. selected by f.s.c. northrop and mason w. gross (new york: the macmillan co., 1961), p. 429. hereafter to be cited as "science and the modern world." despite the esoteric trait of the whiteheadian notion of prehension, hartshorne considered it as "…one of the greatest intellectual discoveries ever made." "hartshorne: response to paul weiss," charles hartshorne, existence and actuality, conversations with charles hartshorne. edited by john b. cobb, jr. and franklin i. gamwell (chicago:the university of chicago press, 1984), p.124. 15 ibid., p.426. 16 alfred north whitehead, adventure of ideas (new york: the new american library, 1933), p.235. 17 according to him, "the word perceive is, in our common usage, shot through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension. so is the word apprehension, even with the adjective cognitive omitted." "science and the modern world, " pp.425-26. 18 see "science and the modern world, " pp.426-28. 19 ibid., p.425. 20 cited in "science and the modern world," p.425. 21 we may recall a text we have already cited elsewhere but is currently relevant: "…consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness." process and reality, ii, i, 6; p.83. 22 loc.cit. 23 process and reality, ii, vii, 3; p.246. 24 loc.cit. 25 according to him, "…the notion of consciousness …in my doctrine is not a necessary accompaniment." adventure of ideas, p.235. 26 ibid., p.179. 27 in his study of whitehead's metaphysics, lowe thinks that "…consciousness is no basic category for him, because it is so far from being essential to every drop of experience in the cosmos, that it is not even present in every human experience." victor lowe, "whitehead's metaphysical system," process philosophy and christian thought, p.6. 28 process and reality, ii, vii, 3; p.247. 29 alfred north whitehead, symbolism, its meaning and effect (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1958), p.16. 30 see adventure of ideas, p.177. 31 loc.cit. 32 against the conviction of the said modern thinkers, he held the view that "the basis of experience is emotional." ibid., p.178. 33 process and reality, ii, vii, 3; p.246. 34 ibid., iii, ii, 1; p.361. 35 alfred north whitehead, "religion in the making," alfred north whitehead, an anthology, pp.511-512. 36 it would have been very helpful to our understanding of his position if whitehead had given an example which is close to ordinary experience concerning this 'simple physical feeling'. if one considers a related example he has given in process and reality in the section focused on the theory of feelings one may note the difficulty of illustrating this theory: our perceptual feelings feel particular existents; that is to say, a physical feeling, belonging to the percipient, feels the nexus between two other actualities, a and b. it feels feelings of a which feel b, and feels feelings of b which feel a. it integrates these feeling, so as to unify their identity of elements. these identical elements form the factor defining the nexus between a and b, a nexus also retaining the particular diversity of a and bin its uniting force. ibid., iii, i, 9; p.351. see a longer but still abstract exemplification in iii, i, 6; pp.345-46. the elaboration by william a. christian, highly regarded for his interpretation of whitehead's metaphysical thinking, is hardly helpful since, like whitehead, his illustration was equally abstract i.e. in terms of feelings a and b, and datum x. see william a. christian, an interpretation of whitehead's metaphysics (new haven: yale university press, 1959), pp.130-38. 37 adventure of ideas, pp.180-181. 38 ibid., p.178. 39 loc.cit. hartshorne should have critically noted that whitehead failed to see that just as there is 'bad' passivity, there is also 'good' passivity. tomas g. rosario, jr. 105 40 in his effort to make the notion of prehension intelligible to his readers, whitehead was willing to say that "the realities of nature are the prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in nature." whitehead, "science and the modern world," p. 429. bold underscoring is mine. 41 see adventure of ideas, p.178. 42 "each process of appropriation of a particular element is termed a prehension." process and reality, iii, i, 1; p.335. 43 loc.cit. 44 see "science and the modern world," p.426. 45 process and reality, i, ii, 2; p.35. in his adventure of ideas, whitehead acknowledged his indebtedness to f. h. bradley (author of essays on truth and reality, and on our knowledge of immediate experience) for the threefold factors which are constitutive of the prehensive process: in accordance with this doctrine of bradley's, i analyze a feeling (or prehension) into the 'datum,' which is bradley's 'object for me,' into the 'subjective form,' which is bradley's 'living emotion,' and into the 'subject,' which is bradley's 'me.' adventure of ideas, p.232. 46 see adventure of ideas, p.178. 47 "science and the modern world," p.428. 48 whitehead explained the subject-object structure of the process of prehension in the following manner: thus subject and object are relative terms. an occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object; and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity within a subject. such a mode of activity is termed a 'prehension'. adventure of ideas, p.178. 49 process and reality, i, ii, 2; p.35. 50 certain passages refer to this distinction of grades or levels of entities and the corresponding subjective form in their prehensive activities: for the subjective form of a simple physical feeling does not involve consciousness… process and reality, iii, ii, 1; p.362. it is evident that adversion and aversion…only have importance in the case of high-grade organisms. they constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, though in themselves they do not amount to consciousness. ibid., iii, iii, 4; p.388. the subjective form will only involve consciousness when the 'affirmation-negation' contrast has entered into it. ibid., iii, iv, 3; p.399. 51 adventures of ideas, p.233. 52 ibid., p.185. 53 this interpretation is supported, i think, by the following text in process and reality: but the subjective form is the immediate novelty; it is how that subject is feeling that objective datum. there is no tearing this subjective form 106 prajñâ vihâra from the novelty of this concrescence. iii, i, 10; p.354. concrescence. iii, i, 10; p.354. 54 see adventure of ideas, p.186. 55 process and reality, iii, ii, 1; p.362. 56 adventure of ideas, p.234. 57 whitehead made the following reference to bradley on the notion of feeling: bradley uses the term feeling to express the primary activity at the basis of experience. it is experience itself in its origin and with the minimum of analysis. the analysis of feeling can never disclose anything lying beyond the essence of the occasion of experience. ibid., p.232. 58 "as used here the words 'individual' and 'atom' have the same meaning…" adventure of ideas, p.179. 59 "science and the modern world," p.426. 60 whitehead attributed the error of berkeley partly to the "…overintellectualism of philosophers…" ibid., p.423. 61 see adventure of ideas, p.179. 62 this is whitehead's view of the role of knowledge in experience: all knowledge is conscious discrimination of objects experienced. but this conscious discrimination, which is knowledge, is nothing more than an additional factor in the subjective form of the interplay of subject with object. loc.cit. 63 for instance, in the later part of his exposition of the main teachings of bradley regarding the notion of feeling, to which he agreed in general, whitehead clearly identified the notion of feeling with the notion of prehension: "in accordance with this doctrine of bradley's, i analyze a feeling [or prehension] into the ‘datum,’ which is bradley’s ‘object before me,’" loc.cit. 64 we may cite the passage describing the exact equation of the terms prehension and event: "but the word event just means one of these spatio-temporal unities. accordingly, it may be used instead of the term 'prehension' as meaning the thing prehended." "science and the modern world," p.429. 65 process and reality, i, ii, 2; p.35. cf. ii, i, 1; pp.65-66. 66 adventure of ideas, p.235. 67 see process and reality, i, ii, 2; p.35; also ii, i, 1; p.66. 68 see adventure of ideas, p.235. 69 process and reality, iii, i, 10, p.353. 70 "a feeling is a component in the concrescence of a novel actual entity." process and reality, iii, i, 10, p.355. 71 according, in fact, to whitehead, "…perhaps we never consciously discriminate one simple physical feeling in isolation. but all our physical relationships are made up of such simple physical feelings, as their atomic bricks." process and reality, iii, ii, 1, p.362. tomas g. rosario, jr. 107 72 whitehead's view resonates with our ordinary experience when he said that "…the subjective form of a simple physical feeling does not involve consciousness, unless acquired in subsequent phases of integration." loc.cit.. in the same location, he also said that "consciousness originates in the higher phases of integration and illuminates those phases with the greater clarity and distinctness." loc.cit. references primary sources richard mc keon, 1941."metaphysics," the basic works of aristotle. new york: random house. st.thomas aquinas. 1963. summa theologiae. translated by blackfriars. new york: mc-graw hill book co. whitehead alfred north, 1933. adventure of ideas. new york: the new american library. ___________________, 1960. process and reality. new york: harper & row publishers. ___________________, 1961. "science and the modern world," alfred north whitehead, an anthology. selected by f.s.c. northrop and mason w. gross. new york: the macmillan co. ___________________, 1961."science and the modern world," alfred north whitehead, an anthology. selected by f.s.c. northrop and mason w. gross. new york: the macmillan co. ___________________, 1958. symbolism, its meaning and effect cambridge: cambridge university press. secondary sources christian, william a., 1959. an interpretation of whitehead's metaphysics. new haven: yale university press. john b. cobb, jr. and franklin i. gamwell, editors, 1984. charles hartshorne, existence and actuality, conversations with charles hartshorne. chicago: the university of chicago press. lowe, victor, 1971."whitehead's metaphysical system," process philosophy and christian thought. edited by delwin brown, ralph james, jr., and gene reeves (new york: the bobbs-merrill co., inc. 108 prajñâ vihâra 07_(109-122) social sciences and peace studies.pmd social sciences and peace studies mohammad abdus sabur º·¤ñ́ âèí ºèíâ¤ãñ駷õèêñ¹µôèöกéòáñก¨ðáí§¢éòá­ò³ëâñè§àëç¹¢í§êñ§¤áèòêµãìã¹ é́ò¹ ·õèàกõèâç¢éí§กñº¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹ ì̧·ò§êñ§¤á ¤çòá¢ñ́ áâé§àกố ¢öé¹¾ãéíáกñº¤çòááµกáâก ã¹àã×èí§¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹¸ì¢í§á¹øéâì«öè§êñ¹µôèöกéò¾âòâòá¨ðáกéä¢ êô觹õéàí§·õè·óãëé áõ¤çòáà»ç¹ä»ä é́·õèêñ§¤áèòêµãìáåðêñ¹µôèöกéò¨ðàêãôáêãéò§¤ø³¤èòãëéáกèกñ¹áåðกñ¹ ã¹á¹ç·ò§·õèáõµèí¤çòá¢ñ́ áâé§áåðêñ¹µôàò¾ º·¤çòá¹õéáºè§ííกà»ç¹êí§àò¤ é́çâกñ¹ àò¤áãกà»ç¹กòãíàô»ãòâçôªòêñ§¤áèòêµãìáåð·äé®õ·ò§êñ§¤á·õèàå×íกêããáò àò¤·õèêí§à»ç¹กòã·º·ç¹»ãðçñµô¢í§¤çòá¢ñ´áâé§áåðêñ¹µôèöกéò º·¤çòá¹õé âñ§ä é́èöกéò¤ø³ù»กòã¢í§¼ùéºøกàºôกêòá·èò¹ íñ¹ä é́áกè johann galtung, adam curle áåð john paul lederach ·õèáõµèí¤çòá¢ñ´áâé§áåðêñ¹µôèöกéò áåð¼å§ò¹¢í§êòá·èò¹ ¹õéä´éáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò êñ§¤áèòêµãìáåðêñ¹µôèöกéòµèò§àêãôáêãéò§àก×éíë¹ø¹¤ø³¤èò ¢í§กñ¹áåðกñ¹íâèò§äã abstract peace studies often ignore the insights of the social sciences concerning social relationships. yet conflict emerges with a break in human relations which peace studies tries to mend. that creates a possibility for social science and peace studies to mutually enrich one another in their approach to conflict and peace. this paper is divided into two parts. part i discusses social science and selected social theories. part ii reviews the history of peace and conflict studies. the paper then goes on to discuss the contributions of three pioneers namely johann galtung, adam curle and john paul lederach in peace and conflict studies; and how their work demonstrates the enriching reciprocity of social science and peace studies. prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 109-122 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 109 social science as a discipline is much older than peace studies. it possesses vast deposits of resources from which peace studies can draw upon and develop further. the main task of social science is to study social relations. peace studies as a discipline emerged only in mid fifties after the second world war. the purpose of peace studies is to mend relationships so peace may prevail. this creates a possibility for social science and peace studies to mutually enriching engagement in the areas of common concern such as conflict and peace. conflict exists at micro and macro levels and affects people worldwide. these common concerns lead to social actions. so the challenge is how both disciplines could contribute towards a process of peace building. this paper will be divided into two parts. in part i, i shall discuss social science and selected social theories. part ii of this paper includes the history of peace and conflict studies. then i shall illustrate contributions of three pioneers namely johann galtung, adam curle and john paul lederach in peace and conflict studies; and mutually enriching reciprocity of social science and peace studies. part i: social science and social theories social scientists conduct a deep investigation of the sources and dynamics of the problems that exist in the society. they develop theories they believe most relevant to address those problems. society is not static, it changes, and therefore social theories vary. some of them remain relevant and applicable longer than others. but it is important for peace builders to understand works of social scientists as a building block. here i shall first discuss the main points of the founders of social sciences and then move to selected theories for the interest of this paper. among the founders of the social sciences, durkheim’s consensus theory is based on the idea that our thoughts are inherited not invented. we learn through socialization and follow the social norms and order which leads to social solidarity. in pre-modern traditional societies, there was more homogeneity and the division of labor was simple. so the solidarity was achieved automatically. this is called mechanical solidarity. but in the modern society, division of labor is more complex. in this environment individualism and 110 prajna vihara-~ competition are obvious and the threat of disintegration becomes real. that makes it harder to achieve solidarity. durkheim argues that in modern society human beings are required to be interdependent in order to survive. this is what he called organic solidarity. solidarity enhances prospects for stability and peace. the second major point of durkheim is functionalism. he compares society with a living organism having various functional organs. in a society organs are structures such as cultural rules, belief and practices. members of the society follow them and that gradually become institutionalized with political, educational and religious functions which leads to harmonious society. society functions through a system which is called “social system”. if system does not function then society becomes static. but in the present day of increasingly secular modern society, traditional ceremonial practices of religion remain but less powerful, whereas civil religion (bellah) is on the rise. that means without being part of a hierarchical religious structures citizens still can possess and demonstrate religiousness. at the same time society tends to become more conservative. a criticism of functionalism is that it does not explain adequately the process of social change. it over-emphasizes socialization and equates organism with human behavior but less on power structure that widen gaps between rich and poor and produces and reproduces conflict in a society. to address this shortcoming, there developed alternative theories of society. marxism believes that the fulfillment and freedom of individuals are linked to the progress of society and development of alternative social structures. in other words, it requires abolition of exploitative structures which support and sustain class-based capitalist mode of production. because it exploits, dehumanizes and deprives the working class people from exploring their full potentials, the key to this process is the control of means of production by the dominant class. according to marxist sociologists, the sustenance of this economic-based system is supported by non-economic structures such as ideas, belief and philosophies which they call superstructure. towards the change process of this exploitative capitalist system, marxism emphasizes consciousness raising, organizing of working class and subordinate class and developing a political struggle. this objective is to replace old system and establish a system appropriate to new non-exploitative economic system. mohammad abdus sabur 111 the critiques of this brand of marxist ideas call it economic determinism. marxists of twentieth century argue that this is a misreading of marxism. marx did not mean that the social life of human beings is solely determined by economic factors. for example, according to gramsci, the control of ideas allows the domination by the capitalist. the reason he suggested is that the capitalist maintains control not only by employing force and economic coercion but by the manufacture of consensus where the working class are made to feel that their wellbeing is closely tied to the prosperity of capitalist and bourgeoisie. this is what prevented revolt, and allowed the capitalist to maintain their power. therefore there is a need for the working class to develop their own counter culture which would, on the one hand, eliminate the notion that the bourgeoisie values dominate the society, and on the other hand, unite both the intellectual and the working class for the same cause. each class goes beyond its narrow economic interest in order to exert intellectual and moral leadership and build alliances with other social forces. we can see why critical theory calls attention to the instruments of ideological domination. from the above discussion, we can see that both functionalism and marxism have their own ways of analyzing modern society and how social change takes place. the third founder is max weber. he developed social action theory. this theory refutes durkheim’s and marx’s analyses. weber believes that exchange takes place in the society because of people’s desired goals, their own perception and ways of making choices. they assess the situation of existing structure and take action. weber sees reason behind the existing structures. he does not attach importance to class inequality as a central question but the values and market power which generates opportunities. with intellectual capacity an individual utilizes the opportunity rationally. that is the basis from which modern capitalism develops. weber also attaches importance to advantage and disadvantage of different religious traditions. he compared between buddhist tradition which is seen as withdrawal from concerns of day-to-day life and strives for nirvana whereas protestant ethic and spirit of capitalism encourages effective engagement and hard work. for example calvinism and their practices of savings contributed to their economic strength and development. from above discussion, we can see three main streams of thinkers and their works impacted upon many social scientists in 20th century. the second and third generation social scientists continued their work. among 112 prajna vihara-~ them frankfurt school contributed to critical theory and other group worked on weberian social action theorists. the frankfurt school under the leadership of horkheimer, adorno and marcuse, took up the challenge put forward by marx that the philosophers have hitherto interpreted the world --the point however is to change it. that is why they emphasized a shift away from philosophical abstraction to make philosophy more useful for social change. so, critical theory is rooted in change. it analyses the present to embark on the future. in other words, it examines differences and contradictions within modernity and sees to it that theorizing is developed with attention to its position as a part of history. being conscious of criticism that philosophy is equally distant from social action and empirical enquiry, the frankfurt school evolved four dimensions: (a) to have perception or an image of a society is not enough but there is a need to see distinctions of components within, (b) it is not merely what we see on the surface, underlying causes and conditions are also important, (c) not only application of social theory rather critical examination of theory itself is important. it helps to understand the limitations of theory as marx did through an analysis of political economy. this is how theories can develop from one stage of society to another and (d) in order to achieve unity between theory and practice, critical engagement is an integral part of the process by which the gained knowledge enriches theory. in absence of critical engagement and reflection, dogmatism arises. frankfurt theorists drew this conclusion from observing the rise of stalinism. in that case, the integration of the working-class in the system __ instead of functioning as a vehicle for liberation __ became a tool of totalitarianism. habermas in many ways carries influences from both marx and weber. based on marx’s concepts of base and superstructure, he divides social existence into the social realm which is influenced by structure and the life world, and is considered as the space for meaningful action. through weber’s works, habermas sees the importance of modernity in promoting rationalization, as a motivation for two types of rational actions: (a) achieving efficiency in human life and (b) determining value in terms of right and wrong. that means when in the society the first person interacts with the second person, it is taken for granted that the person is communicating correct and right thing. so, when the second person communicates, the first person would expect the same. it is an effort of two persons, two communities, two parties mohammad abdus sabur 113 coming together to arrive at a consensus. from the perspective of ethnomethodology this is unique gift of human kind. this enables human beings to engage in collaborative projects and enterprise. habermas also recognizes the ability of human beings to undertake communicative action across cultures. this is necessary in order to identify common grounds, common causes, and common needs. based on these, communities are able to achieve consensus for their actions. this gives hope that parties across political divides can come together as long as they are in dialogue with one another. on the question of dialogue and effective communication, the sociologist anthony giddens introduces structuration theory. he believes that structures can constrain at the same time determine behavior. structures can facilitate effective communication, but at the same time, can also impose limitations. giddens calls this the duality of structure. but with the course of time, the context itself get regenerated and transformed. therefore, it can be said that there is a dialectic relations between structure and actions. but it is also a fact that society is changing, new factors and conditions both from outside and inside of a particular society pose new challenges and risks. this affects everyone. therefore, it has to be an ongoing process of actions __ reflections __ actions, in order for us to be effective in responding to new challenges. i have discussed works of selected social scientists and their contributions in understanding social dynamics and social relations. social and human relations are directly linked to peace. in part ii, i shall discuss peace and conflict studies and its contribution. part ii: history of peace and conflict studies, the contribution of social sciences in peace studies and mutually enriching reciprocity in this section i shall discuss history and development of peace and conflict studies. then i shall examine the integration and contribution of social sciences in peace studies and reciprocity. i shall discuss works of johann galtung, adam curle and john paul lederach with an inbuilt critique of con114 prajna vihara-~ flict resolution field and increasingly experience-based relevance of conflict transformation. then i shall explore future challenges of peace studies. peace and conflict studies as an academic program initially was conceived under international relations as a sub-discipline. peace studies focused on understanding structural issues and underlying causes of conflict. conflict studies concentrated on implication and impact of conflict resolution theory. both were based on the platform of enlightenment peace and created awareness that peace is necessary. in the course of time this sub-discipline has helped develop a ray of hope that inter-state peace is possible as the united nations charter expressed strong commitment for peace to be achieved through diplomacy and international relations. international relations have been influenced by the theories of various philosophers. these have alternately supported both war and peace. aristotle prescribed to make war that we live in peace (2008). for erasmus, war has to be avoided at all cost because it serves only the interests of the powerful and leads to crime and brutality. locke, being advocate for modern liberalism, emphasized on social contract between the rulers and subjects in favor of protection of lives and liberty. bentham further added that there is a need to develop institutions through which international imperialism can be resisted. immanuel kant promoted the idea of cosmopolitanism anticipating international rules of conflict resolution executed through international mechanisms __ such as today’s united nations. at that time, given the interstate nature of conflict and experiences of intensity of destructions and sufferings of the people, conflict resolution was a more obvious immediate response than peace studies as an academic discipline. conflict studies and conflict resolution now i shall discuss contributions of pioneers of conflict studies and the field of conflict resolution. among the pioneers, the center for research on conflict resolution at the university of michigan in 1950s, founded by kenneth and elise boulding, emphasized humanistic psychology. the international peace research center, established in norway in 1959 was founded by johann galtung. he made significant contributions in terms of research and evolving models of conflict resolution. here i shall highlight johann galtung’s works. mohammad abdus sabur 115 johann galtung developed a conflict resolution model known as the abc-triangle. attitude refers to emotions and cognitions are interpreted as highest level of hatred to frozen level of apathy. behavior ranges from extreme violence to apathy. apathy is considered more dangerous than hatred and violence. therefore for peace makers, it is a task to channel apathy into a creative work and engagement. contradiction is the root of conflict. due to incompatible goals of conflicting parties one may determine to eliminate the other. in conflict all three factors are present. besides the abc-triangle, galtung’s theoretical and conceptual works include models of ways that conflicts emerge between people, communities and states. he also describes structural violence, seeing it as a system that produces poverty, and institutionalizes racism and discrimination. he distinguishes between negative peace, which suggests an absence of violence, and positive peace, which involves new and supportive relationships towards peace. galtung’s transcend actions advocate non-violence, creativity and empathy, which help conflicting parties to move beyond their respective positions and create new possibilities for achieving goals. this is sharp contrast to coercive and competitive diplomacy. johann galtung has been engaged in research, conflict resolution work and teaching work. his conflict resolution work has received recognition from the united nation’s agencies and other international institutes. there has been research and documentation concerning the advantages and limitations of international relations and the role of the united nations for conflict resolution. the un has succeeded in halting war and reaching peace agreement mostly at interstate level as a short-term goal. when conflict resolution fails then as a next step conflict management effort is undertaken mainly to control damage by sending peace-keeping forces. between 1988-1998, 35 un peace-keeping operations were conducted (tamara duffey 2001) with little or no substantial impact. the conflict resolution school considers that conflict is bad therefore there is a need to end conflict. conflict management acknowledges that a conflict cannot be solved within a short time so they attempt to control damage. but both efforts have failed to address the root causes of the conflict. so the revival of the conflict occurs. the un mission for peacekeeping has been criticized for not being able to fulfill its objective of restoring peace. bosnia, rwanda and somalia are few examples of these failures. 116 prajna vihara-~ critics argue that the conflict resolution groups have become complacent and lost relevance. bernard mayer (2000) as an insider who has worked in this field many years claims that conflict resolution as a discipline is facing crisis. professionals in this field are neither involved in major conflicts of our time such as the middle east, iraq, afghanistan and korea, nor engaged in environmental social policies. conflict resolution organizations mostly come from a middle class orientation from the west which is often an impediment to reaching out to marginalized people and communities in order to establish dialogue with them on an equal basis. the identity and independence of this field is increasingly under attack. relevance and impact of third party mediators has been limited and their objectivity is questioned. they are unable to engage those people who are bearing the brunt of conflict and wars. after this critical review of conflict resolution i would like to discuss peace studies towards conflict transformation. peace studies and conflict transformation peace studies as an academic program was launched at the university of bradford in 1973, chaired by adam curle. adam’s curle’s concept of peace was initially concerned with fulfilling human needs and liberating human potentials. with time, his concepts became more concerned with human relations and spiritual values. in 1960’s and 1970’s he was involved in track two or citizen’s diplomacy in the nigerian civil war and the india-pakistan conflict. but in 1990s he shifted to peace making from below and assisted local people of osijek in their initiative for peace during the balkan conflict. adam curle’s defined peace and conflict as a set of peaceful and unpeaceful relationships. he believed that if friendship is based on sufficiently strong understanding, then it is possible to overcome differences. from individual to social level its interpretation would be active organizations and movements, their planned and effective cooperation and intelligent and creative efforts would resolve conflict. for adam peacemaking means effecting changes in relationships, which would ultimately lead to meaningful cooperation and development in fulfilling human needs. he further added that our main fault is our failure to recognize that the roots of conflict are largely in our minds. therefore, one has to have desire to ‘seek within’ the human spirit. this realization helped adam curle remain associated with religious society, and mohammad abdus sabur 117 led him towards spiritual and mystical explorations. this process of selfeducation and training help peacemakers to become unbiased mediators and facilitators. adam emphasized that mediators (from the very name) remain in the middle and take no sides. mediators are placed at the center of conflict and are deeply involved. they possess ability to establish communication with conflicting parties which is needed to be followed by skillful negotiation. both tolerance and determination enable a process to reach an agreement for sustained relationships for nurturing peace. this is a value-based effort blended with knowledge and humanistic psychology. john paul lederach has been appreciative of adam curle’s ideas and his critique of the conflict resolution model of johann galtung. within that conflict resolution model he sees a danger of manipulation, co-optation and a misunderstanding of conflict. like adam curle, lederach emphasizes right relationship and a social structure which is committed to human rights. respect for human life and nonviolence, are his emphasis. lederach believed peace is embedded in justice and he does not agree with concepts such as negative and positive peace. his main thesis is that there is a need to think critically at a much deeper level concerning both the content and process of conflict resolution. lederach prefers the concept of conflict transformation instead of conflict resolution. the transformation approach employs a process by which parties in conflict see their role in a deeper understanding of the nature and root causes of conflict. this process is an analytical and conceptual tool to enable community members to assume responsibility and be engaged in the process of long term change. outside facilitators have a role to encourage and facilitate the self-empowerment of the community from within. in this approach the people themselves can employ their cultural resources and wisdom towards achieving self-sustaining harmony and peace. in contrast to the field of conflict resolution, the school of conflict transformation believes that conflict is a natural phenomenon. according to lederach, conflict can neither be controlled nor eliminated. but it can be transformed and human relationships can be mended. this concept may sound prescriptive depending on how one applies it. conflict cannot always be transformed in a constructive way. that is where reciprocity of social science and peace studies could play critical role. 118 prajna vihara-~ integration and reciprocity of social sciences and peace studies lederach attaches importance of the body of knowledge of social sciences and its contribution to understand society, social relations, and resources available within, which enriches the approach of conflict transformation. through the elicitive process, local, relevant and effective symbols, terms and language can be utilized as resources. this helps mobilize participation and find most desirable outcomes. in this process conflict transformation, reconstruction, rebuilding tasks can be accomplished and the process can be owned and directed by people themselves. the nature, scale and dynamism of conflict have been shifting from interstate to intrastate. such as conflict between ethnic, religious and cultural communities within a state, between people and promoter of development projects, transnational corporations, aid agencies and so on. edward azar termed them as protracted conflict. azar’s protracted social conflict theory refers to violent struggle of community groups in search of recognition, political participation and economic development. denial and deprivation of such rights and needs lead to conflict. around the common issues the struggling communities develop their own identity and negotiate with the state power. failure on the part of the state and the government to recognize and address those issues create conditions for identity groups to engage in prolonged violent conflict. therefore it is the responsibility of the government to enter into dialogue and initiate program development process genuinely owned by the people. this is one of the examples how conflict can be transformed to an opportunity for peace and development. this process requires enquiry and research at a deeper level in order to understand the underlying causes, not only at surface level. generally, sociologists and anthropologist have been doing such research for a long time to understand human behavior and the social relations but not necessarily directly in connection with the concerns for peace. that has resulted in minimum or no contribution to the development of peace studies. it is increasingly being recognized that there is a need and opportunity for both disciplines to reflect, exchange and engage in identifying common ground and enrich each other. considering the fact that society continues to evolve and change, actors and dynamics also change, and therefore, theoretically informed empirical research is needed on a continuing basis. on the other hand, peace studies can play a role in sensitizing social sciences to mohammad abdus sabur 119 be proactive and practical in responding to conflict studies of various natures. lederach has been appreciative of paulo freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed and has documented the conscientization process among peasants and workers to achieve in-depth understanding about social and political contradictions. it leads to empowerment of the oppressed to take action towards ending oppression. lederach also talked about elicitive approach and a participatory process by which participants draw local knowledge and wisdom. in contrast prescriptive process is used for direct transfer of knowledge. it limits learner’s creativity but provide space for cross-fertilization of ideas between learner and teachers or trainers. therefore, lederach prefers combination of both. to add further inputs from social science in peace studies, jean piaget’s constructive epistemology can be useful which refers to a process by which human beings generate knowledge and meaning through interaction between experiences and ideas and that leads to reform and change. taking the lead from constructivism, seymour papert’s theory of constructionism argues for reconstruction rather than the simple transmission of knowledge because learning can be more effective when a tangible object is created in the present world. lederach from a practitioner’s perspective cites moore (1986) and emphasizes a multi-disciplinary perspective. he stresses the necessity of combining social knowledge and theoretical approaches in order to provide a role for knowledge in the change process. it is relevant in the sense that peacebuilding is a continuous process. lederach’s contribution has been very significant in peace studies. at the same time it can be said that peace studies so far has not addressed the issue of caring the state of mind such as anger, anxiety, agony, grief and remorse as observed by adam curle. healthy state of mind can get rid of mental roots of conflict and nurture healthy human relationship, which is peace. conclusion the speed of change which adam curle illustrated in his book another way, is real and will continue for many years to come. it will create a more complex world where conflict will take multi-dimensional shapes and dynamics. this means the students of peace studies ought to keep their minds 120 prajna vihara-~ and hearts open to study these new social phenomena. in this way both social sciences and peace studies can play mutually enriching role. the development of both social sciences and peace studies, so far have been predominantly embedded in the western concepts and their theoretical base. therefore, it remains a major challenge for scholars of young generations from the rest of the world to bring cultural, religious and spiritualbased value perspective for peace building. the right balance between (a) academic excellence and practical engagement (b) between paying attention and investment of energy to deal with macro conflicts with widespread devastating impact, for example, worldwide war against terrorism, climate change and responding to protracted conflict within the nation state and affected communities remain as a major challenge. through from conflict transformation perspective, it is very clear that peace building is a continuing process and nothing is definitive, but it does not mean that the engaged communities, actors and facilitators should not make efforts and aim at tangible changes and results. in this change process moral dimension, prudence dependent virtues as well as prudence as a memory of future are of great importance to address the mental roots of the conflict and nurture sustainable human and social relationship for peace. references john. pips, introducing social theory, p11, p17, p33, p41, p51, p71, p169, 173, policy press, uk, 2003. bellah n robert, beyond belief: civil religion in america, essays on religion in a post traditionalist world, berkeley: university press, 1991. calhoun. craig, josef. karaganis, hand book of social theory, critical theory, pp180-181, sage publication ltd. india, 2003. williams. raymond, marxism and literature, pp110-111, oxford university press, 1997. ramsbotham. tom. woodhouse, hugh miall, conflict resolution, the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts, pp39. policy press, uk. 2011. duffey. tamara, cultural issues in contemporary peacekeeping, internamohammad abdus sabur 121 tional peacekeeping journal, vol.7, issue 1, published by frank cass, 2000. mayer s. bernard, beyond neutrality, confronting the crisis in conflict resolution, jossy-bass, ca 94103-1741, 2004. woodhouse. tom, adam curle: radical peacemaker and pioneer of peace studies. http” journal of conflcitology.uoc.edu, 2010. curle. adam, another way, positive response to contemporary violence, john carpenter publishing, oxford oxi 4ph, 1995. lederach. p. john, the little book of conflict transformation, pp4-5, p15, pp29-31,good books, pansalvania, 2003. lederach. p. john, preparing for peace, conflict transformation across cultures, p8, pp74-77, syracuse university press,1996. comte-sponville, a small treaties on the great virtues: the use of philosophy in everyday life, metropolitan book, 2001. 122 prajna vihara-~ 04_(53-67)creation of a creation myth creation of a creation myth: steps towards a promethean age kenneth dobson payap university, chiang mai, thailand arthur saniotis the university of adelaide, australia บทคัดย่อ บทบาทของตำนานในบริบทของศาสนานั้นเป็นที่สนใจในเชิง ทฤษฎีเป็นอย่างมาก การตีความตำนานท้ังในเชิงจิตวิทยาและมานุษยวิทยามักจะ เห็นว่าศาสนาคือวิธีปฏิบัติการ (modus operandi) ของพฤติกรรมด้านวัฒนธรรม ในขณะที่การตีความเหล่านี้อาจก่อให้เกิดญาณหยั่งเห็น ในเวลาเดียวกันมันก็ เป็นการทวนปัญหาเกี่ยวกับบทบาทของตำนานที่จะเป็นตัวชี้นำสังคมอนาคต บทความ น้ีเสนอความเห็นว่าถึงเวลาแล้วท่ีต้องสร้างตำนานใหม่ข้ึนมาเพ่ือรับมือ กับปัญหาและความท้าทายต่างๆ ท่ีใหญ่โตระดับโลกท่ีมนุษยชาติกำลังเผชิญอยู่ ขณะนี้ ตำนานที่เกิดจากความกล้าหาญและความคิดริเริ่มนี้จะใช้มโนคติจาก บรรดาศาสนาต่างๆ ท่ีมีพ้ืนฐานมาจากประเพณีด้ังเดิม แต่ว่า (ตำนาน) จะเป็น อิสระจากมโนคติ เหล่าน้ัน abstract the role of myth in the context of religion has had considerable theoretical attention. both psychological and anthropological interpretations of myth have tended to view religion as a modus operandi of cultural behaviours. while such interpretations may be insightful it begs the question as to the role of myth for guiding future societies. this paper will pose the idea that a new myth is needed in order to tackle the major global challenges which humanity is facing. this promethean myth will use prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 53-67 53 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ ideas from traditionally based religions but will not be dependent on them. the rise and fall of western myth it may come as a surprise to hear the question asked in this postmodern age whether it is possible to wonder whether a new creation myth could be created. these are hard times for authentic myths, it seems. the old myths are being exploited as entertainment. but before that they have been transmogrified into archaisms and demystified. let’s see if we can reconstruct the millennia-long mythic life cycle. first, there is a re-eruption of chaos, a pervasive spiritual cataclysm that the old myths cannot comprehend. so a new set of myths emerge (and that is the aspect of the process we need to consider). it is the nature of these new myths to show how the chaos that the older forces or deities was not subordinating was re-ordered by the new heroes and divinities. the older realm was relegated to some primordial region, safely put away, for the time being. later this will be recalled as the primitive era. for the mediterranean world the stories of zeus and the olympian deities was the evocation of the sacred. these were the myths of the greeks and the romans. as mircea eliade has demonstrated it is not necessary to find exact parallels between the old myths of io and the titans with zeus and athena. “because the sacred’s essence lies only in the mythical age, only in the sacred’s first appearance, any later +appearance is actually the first appearance; by recounting or re-enacting mythical events, myths and rituals ‘reactualize’ those events (eliade 1961:68-69). then the second generation of gods and heroes begin to fade and lose their edge of awesome mystery. the narratives about them refer to a dim and distant past. their power to coalesce human endeavor is at its zenith at this point, however, calling up sumptuous works of art, monumental architecture and liturgical spectacles. these works and the faith that inspires them is layered now. there is an application implied, an inference to configurations of secular authority. at the same time the mythological aspects are becoming brittle and are the more stoutly defended. toward the end there arises a generation (hundreds of years long) 54 prajna vihara~ of sophists: philosophers, skeptics, analysts, scholars, and explorers who search for still another layer of truth as the crest of the civilization passes, the monuments become archaic, and the liturgies anachronistic. by this time the myths are becoming nothing more than tales told to amuse, or curiosities that can augment some renaissance. meanwhile, one of three things has happened: either chaos has re-erupted that needs to be dealt with mythically, or civilization has evolved or moved to enfold some additional mythic narrative, or some event has caused one mythic narrative to replace another. this latter is more often presumed than may actually be the case. let’s review this scenario more slowly. there has been no shortage of chaos in human history. but human beings, being as adaptable as anything living except viruses, cockroaches and rats, have endured most of those chaotic epochs without suffering an immediate “pervasive spiritual cataclysm”. mythic ages, like geologic ones, are prolonged and slow. the fall of a civilization is not necessarily the end of a mythic age, nor is a mythic deposit co-terminal with a religion. often, it seems, in retrospect, the nature of the chaos that precipitated the new mythos was too remote to be remembered distinctly. all that is left of the chaos, in fact, is the mythic evidence of its submersion. it is unclear what it was, for example, that led to the victory of the family of zeus over the primordial giants like voracious cronus at the same time that marduk was subordinating tiamat, the primordial mother. all we know is that now the giants reside in tartarus, far from us. the stories of zeus and his kin expressed the optimism of the new era and the confidence in the essential connectedness of the diverse and sometimes conflicted aspects of life lived on little islands, peninsulas, mountainsides and valleys. despite the perpetual change and turmoil, this was not re-emergence of the primordial chaos that had been overcome. the present violence, disruption and discontinuity was part of a whole that was analogous to a clan whose various members did not always conform to the directions laid down by their superiors, the agreements they had made, or even to their own basic characters and best interests. they were given to emotional outbursts, jealousies and whims. village life is like that, even though it should be otherwise. but when the time came that this capricious picture did not satisfy, 55kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis when a new era of nations emerged with alliances and empires at stake, a new story cycle was needed, a new set of imaginative connections had to be evoked. homer served it up. his heroes bridged the gap that had yawned between present reality and mythic reality. the heroes of greece and troy claimed divine ancestry, homer carefully explained, and the divinities intervened in the battles as though they were a re-enactment of cosmic ones. nearly a millennium after troy fell, alexander again assumed the mantle of divine hero, heir of heracles (hercules) and of achilles, descendant of the aeacidae, and therefore from zeus (diodorus siculus, 17.1.5; plutarch, alexander, 2.1-2). but alexander’s destiny was greater than that of his mediterranean tribal ancestors, divine though they might be. alexander rode the mighty horse bucephalus to conquer the heirs of osiris of egypt and ahura mazda of persia. so the greek mythos with greek cultural artifacts and art spread east to the center of aryan culture and south to the center of egyptian culture. but, hellenized though they were, the core narratives of those regions were not replaced. it can be argued, i think, that no religion which insists on utterly replacing the mythos of a region can become dominant in that place without first decimating the people there. alexander, it is said, took another track. while he was in persia he donned the gossamer robes of the persian king of kings and adopted darius’s own mother as his third mother (counting ada of caria as his second), much to the disgust of a faction of his army (plutarch, alexander, 45). he made no war on other people’s culture. as a result, a greek tone entered persian culture, the first known statues of the lord buddha wore greek countenances, and alexandria became the home of a hellenic line of pharaohs. meanwhile, pyrrho of ellis, born only 4 years before alexander, was the founder of the skeptic-stoic line of philosophy. the thing they were most maddeningly skeptical about was zeus and his unruly clan. it was pythagoras and socrates who had first proposed intellectual alternatives to the rote recitation of mythic memories that camouflaged the spiritual vacuum that was emerging (durant 2005:9). the myths had lost their power, but the religion, note, was more glistening than ever. the philosophers might hold forth in the stoa (covered walkways where the philosophers conversed with their students) around the agora (market area), but athena reigned unchallenged above it all in the splendid parthenon on the 56 prajna vihara~ hilltop. when rome succeeded athens and sparta it was not a new mythos that was needed. the old one held no threats, as had the older phoenician fertility gods baal hammon and later tanit of the carthaginians. what was needed for the new age of empire was not a new pantheon but a new set of heroes. virgil served it up, along with ovid’s justification of change as the very character, after all, of the gods. by this time what was left of the belief in jupiter and his dysfunctional, metamorphosed and metamorphosizing children, was merely belief in the belief in them. it was augustus who was to be believed in, and the gods were to help sustain that and to grace it with the aura of authentic divinity, the glint of religious respectability. thanks to peter heather’s “new history” of the fall of the roman empire (2005), a more realistic picture of the transition from the roman to the gothic era has relieved us of the traditional interpretation that christianity completely replaced paganism, or specifically that the truth came in to wipe out heathen superstition on the coat-tails of constantine’s victory at the milvian bridge on october 28, 312 a.d. heather insists that the christian church did not replace the imperial liturgical and architectural structure, but claimed it. as far as the roman imperial apparatus was concerned perhaps the change the church brought was just a coat of varnish; it was certainly no more than a new veneer that was laid on the accoutrements of empire after constantine. …christianity…and empire rapidly reached an ideological rapprochement. roman imperialism had claimed, since the time of augustus, that the presiding divinities had destined rome to conquer and civilize the world. the gods had supported the empire in a mission to bring the whole of humankind to the best achievable state, and had intervened directly to choose and inspire roman emperors. after constantine’s public adoption of christianity, the long-standing claims about the relation of the state to the deity were quickly, and surprisingly easily, reworked. the presiding divinity was recast as the christian god, and the highest possible state for humankind was declared 57kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis to be christian conversion and salvation. literary education and the focus on self-government were shifted for a while to the back burner, but by no means thrown out. and that was the sum total of the adjustment required. the claim that the empire was god’s vehicle, enacting his will in the world, changed little: only the nomenclature was different. likewise, while emperors could no longer be deified, their divine status was retained in christianroman propaganda’s portrayal of god as hand-picking individual emperors to rule with him, and partly in his place, over the human sphere of his cosmos. thus the emperor and everything about him, from his bedchamber to his treasury, could continue to be styled as ‘sacred’ (heather 2005:123). on the other hand, just as certainly, christian faith and practice were very, very much impacted and changed and the remnants of the religious cults of zeus and athena disappeared and after a short while were hardly missed. the empire changed the church far more than the church changed the empire. the roman empire was validated on the core belief that the roman people were divinely chartered to dominate the barbarians. that belief has adhered to christianity right through the era of european colonialism. the acceptance of christianity as the roman state religion simply renamed the divine authenticators. heather painstakingly recounts the steps by which “roman” changed from referring to citizens of a single city to mean a type of culture and land-ownership. it was in defense of the landlord class that the empire needed its military legions. and it was the loss of the infrastructure to support the empire and its armies in the fifth century that ended the political dominance of the western roman emperor, while the eastern roman empire, now called byzantine, continued for another thousand years, according to gibbon, until the fall of constantinople/byzantium in 1453. in short, insofar as the mediterranean world is concerned, the mythic era that began with zeus did not end. it migrated and evolved. its antecedents linger influentially and recur again and again. when europe underwent another seismic spiritual shift at the time of the renaissance58 prajna vihara~ reformation-enlightenment, it was none other than paintings of zeus and his family that appeared after a millennium to hang beside the virgin mary and the newborn infant or next to the grieving mother of the passionate newly-dead jesus. but when the divinities of an evolving mythos re-emerge they may not be the same. the “cult” of isis in roman times would have been as unrecognizable to the egyptians in the time of rameses ii as the 20th century art deco egyptian motifs would have been to tutankhamen who inspired them. the christos pantokrator who presided awesomely over the imperial cathedral and was celebrated in clouds of incense would have been unrecognizable by the apostle paul who introduced the christ narrative to that part of the world. some things are changed. furthermore, some things are lost, some new eras ignore emphases that a previous era valued. more than the names are changed. themes are lost. essences are submerged. one thing that the mediterranean mythos lost was a creation myth. some objection can be expected as we suggest that western culture, by which we mean the heirs to the mediterranean mythos, does not any longer have a creation myth. take it, for the moment, at least as a debatable point that both the jupiter and jehovah narratives have a lot to say precisely about the suppression of their predecessor mythic heritages. what else are the culture wars of joshua, samuel, elijah and elisha about if not the suppression of creation-sensitive fertility cults of baal-astarteisis-proserpine? we can perhaps yield the point that the cultural heritage still retains these mythic strata, if we can agree that they are layered over and are virtually, practically inaccessible. what passes for a creation myth in christianity is barely a stopgap. the narratives in genesis 1 and 2 talk of creation in passing on to the real point. syntactically, the opening phrase of genesis 1, verse 1 is subordinate and better translated, “when, in the beginning, god created the heavens and the earth, the earth was formless and void….” the meat of the text is not about creation, much less the process of creation, but about the creator and the creator’s authority to dictate terms for living comfortably in a state of paradise with an amicable relationship to the creator. the narrative wastes no more words on creation. it’s over and done with quickly. the story cycle of the jewish and christian bible is 59kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis concerned with society, not cosmology. what’s important is “now what?” the job of the theologian is to expound on the “now what” by extrapolating from the rest of the long narrative applications to present circumstances by using a hermeneutic that has achieved a consensus in a particular community (the church, or part of it). the job of the philosopher is to try to stand outside the community and assess the relevance of both the narrative and the theological exposition using a more universal set of principles. what, then, are we to do when we have arrived at a time of environmental and ecological crisis? in myriad ways humankind has brought survival to the tipping point. we do not need to explain these ways and the dangers they present. it is enough to name some of them: nuclear holocaust, population explosion, global warming, species eradication, viral proliferation, and environmental degradation. as far as we know, the solutions, if there are any, are in human hands. at the same time it will take a monumental shift of human will to seize upon those solutions, or even to sense the crisis. one proposal now being considered is to create or revive a creation myth. thomas berry calls it a “new story”. but is such a project feasible? the ‘new story’: sacred earth and the promethean myth the new creation myth proposed by thomas berry and brian swimme (1992), centres on cosmogenesis as the centerpiece of religion. they rightly argue that anthropocentric ideals contained and propounded by the wisdom traditions have led humanity to a path of destruction. this argument was propounded by the islamic scholar seyyed hossein nasr who suggests that human disenfranchisement from nature began during the european renaissance and the concomitant rise of humanism which deemed humans as the centre of the world. during this time, a split began between the human and non-human worlds in which the latter was increasingly de-sacralised. according to nasr (1968), during the medieval period nature was still perceived as sacred. however, from the 17th century onwards the rise of mercantilism and capitalism, as well as mechanistic science, recalibrated human ideas of nature. the new schemata now 60 prajna vihara~ saw nature as something material and bereft of spirit, waiting to be exploited for human purposes. the copernican revolution which began in the 16th century reached its zenith and final acceptance in newton’s seminal work, philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica (1687). here, the universe is systematically stripped of its sacred meaning and supplanted by a materialistic and mechanistic paradigm. orbs and planets follow mathematical principles that have been designed by the human mind. the trajectories of the spheres are no longer the abode of celestial beings but an infinite vacuum governed by centripetal forces and infinitesimal calculus. arguably, this radical discontinuity between religion and science reached its height during 19th century philosophy commandeered by darwin’s work on the origin of the species (1859). this work stated that humankind was not exclusive as expounded by the abrahamic religions, but was informed by natural selection as all other species. it recently took molecular biology to conclude that all life on earth originates from one primordial ancestor, making all species kindred. in this new mythos, humans share 98.5% of dna with chimpanzees and 70% of dna with the humble slug. modern science tells us that there is no pinnacle in evolution nor teleology (ridley 2000:24). nor does it seem that any species is given special favour in nature’s design. 99.9% of species that have existed on earth are now extinct; a sobering thought. species it seems have an expiry date as do periods on earth. for example, the permian-triassic, triassic-jurassic and late cretaceous extinction events transformed the planet. it seems that mass extinctions are part of nature’s tool kit for revolutionary change. like prometheus who gave fire to humans, natural selection has endowed planet earth with illimitable creativity. berry’s and swimme’s new myth privileges organic processes as the domain of human spirituality. their myth is elegant. starting from the big bang which saw the formation of energy changing into sub-atomic particles, then atoms, then primordial stellar galaxies, life begins on earth approximately 10 billion years after the big bang. the first life forms are single cell animals called eukaryotes which can live in the inhospitable environment of early earth. after aeons of time prokaryotes with nuclei come into existence. however, for over 2 billion years, all life on earth is 61kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis microscopic and denizens of seas. for some mysterious reason, a plethora of multi-cellular life evolves approximately 700 million years ago. this event is called the ‘cambrian explosion’ and it has been unparalleled. during this period, the 31 phyla or ‘body types’ evolve over a stupendously short period of geological time. after this period, multicellular life festoons the oceans and forays on the earth’s surface. myriads of ecosystems evolve, testifying to nature’s creativity. but here is a mystery. although, evolution is like a ‘blind watchmaker’ there seems to be some kind of hidden purpose which is seen in the increasing complexity of life forms. for example, the advent of multicellular life begins the formation of archaic central nervous systems in invertebrates and vertebrates. these nervous systems eventually cluster to form primitive brains. over time, brains become increasingly more sophisticated and are capable of problem solving and predator detection. brain complexity continues through the long ages of reptiles and mammals to a point in time only a few million years ago in africa where various species of apes starting from ardipithecus ramidus (circa 4.5 million years ago) and australopithecus aferensis (3.5 million years ago) begin the line of homo; the human lineage. these creatures are the first known hominins to have been selected for bi-pedal locomotion and clever brains. although there is much which we will never know about these creatures, it has been speculated that they must have had a behavioural repertoire that spurred the rise of the self reflexive mind in later hominins. according to evolutionary theory, each successive hominin from australopithecus, homo habilis, homo erectus, homo heidelbergensis, homo neandertalinensis and homo sapiens sapiens are cognitively more sophisticated than previous hominins, an idea which is highly disputable. in any case, all these creatures seem to share self reflexive awareness, the hallmark of homo. for berry and swimme, the universe can now ponder upon itself through the human mind. such selfawareness, has among other things, allowed humankind to tinker with its own evolution. we have seemingly outgrown the gods. advances in molecular biology, nanotechnology, information technology and recombitant dna are steering the human species into a promethean age. in greek mythology the titan prometheus was punished for provoking the olympians. with the gift of fire prometheus provided a means for humans to challenge the gods, and ultimately rejecting them. fire, in 62 prajna vihara~ this instance may stand as a metaphor of the human imagination. unlike the other elements fire needs to be created and that takes imagination and insight. however, fire must also be harnessed otherwise it can destroy instead of profit. for the ancient greeks human intellect needed to be tempered by moderation (souphrosene) if it was to benefit others. for this reason, on top of the entrance of the apollonian oracle at delphi was written gnosis auton (know thyself). to this end, the greeks invented an array of myths which instructed future generations about the sin of hubris and inevitable fall from grace. if the promethean myth is to inform future humans we must resolve our own foibles and trespasses with which we have plagued planet earth. first, we must recognize the origins of human biology in the context of the ‘new story’. second, we need to create a rapprochement with the non-human world. like other mythic genre that foreground human dependency on the animal kingdom, the promethean myth will have to reconnect with other species. this will need a transformation from a humancentered language to an earth-centered language (swimme and berry 1992: 258). here swimme and berry are instructive. beyond any formal spoken or written human language are the languages of the multitude of beings, each of which has its own language given to it generally, in the world of the living, by genetic coding. yet each individual being has extensive creativity in the use of the language. humans are becoming much more sensitive to the nonhuman languages of the surrounding world (1992:258). the new promethean myth should be informed by both the world’s indigenous and wisdom traditions which foster an inter-dependent worldview. for example, the islamic notion of tawhid (divine unity) informed islamic science to view the universe as a unity and humankind as a microcosm whose interiority reflected the glory of creation. the muslim mystic philosopher mohyuddin ibn arabi viewed the universe as a kaleidoscope of infinite potentiality reflecting the divine attributes (sifat). similarly, in his summa theologica (1265-1274), thomas aquinas expounded platonic and aristotelian inspired natural theology which placed an onus 63kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis on sensory experience of the life world. in his essay on the christian concept of perichoresis buxton discusses this term in relation to interconnectedness and holism (2004:109). the classical meaning of perichoresis describes the divine nature as “dynamic relationality”. here buxton uses moltmann’s synthesis of the “creation-community” __ a community encompassing the web of terrestrial life (buxton 2004:110). the creation-community is the primordial family, intimately connected to each other through dna; such interconnectedness is referred to as the primal reality (buxton 2004:110). in buddhist thought, the mutually interpenetrating diversity of forms and expressions are recognised by the term pratityasamutpada (the-together-rising-up-of-things) (brown 1994:125). a conjoining idea of pratityasamutpada is the theory of tathagatagarbha (unborn, pure, permanent undying reality) (brown1994:128). the theory of tathagatagarbha includes the identification of the buddha with the cosmic body (dharmakaya). this cosmic body is perfect self awareness, integral and universal essence (dhatu) (brown 1994:128). the promethean myth will therefore not be totally adverse to traditional religion but adhere to the ecological principles apparent in the wisdom traditions. we are at the terminal phase of the cenozoic era and entering into the ecozoic era which will foster a rapprochement with the non-human world. the mechanistic and materialistic worldviews of modernity will be devalued in the ecozoic era. this is the hope for swimme and berry. for swimme and berry “the universe is a collection of subjects rather than a collection of objects” (1992:243). this is a far cry from heidegger’s ‘night world’ in which humankind’s technocratic regimes have de-mystified the universe. because the earth is an integral world, it cannot survive if it is fragmented (swimme & berry 1992:243). the message behind our biological discoveries in recent decades is that life is a unity. for this reason the earth must be primary. the promethean age, will therefore, make inroads to understanding life on earth, its complex interactions and evolutionary stages. present knowledge of planetary life forms is small, fewer than 10%, with fewer than 1% which have been studied (wilson 2006:116). in 2002 alone, 6,288 new species of bacteria were discovered (wilson 2006:118). earth’s present biodiversity is probably the highest in its long history. in other words it has taken 3.9 billion years for the earth to achieve this level of biodiversity. present 64 prajna vihara~ extinction rates of flora and fauna are so high that some commentators have called it the sixth mass extinction event. the last mass extinction event happened at the end of the cretaceous period approximately 65 million years ago. according to the well-known biologist paul ehrlich, humans are probably causing the extinction of nearly 10,000 species a year (swimme & berry 1992:247). the loss of biodiversity is immense with unknown implications for the future. since variation is the engine of natural selection the analogy of this level of biodiversity loss is like walking through a library only to find whole shelves of books missing everywhere. for ehrlich what is needed in extant humans is the ability to think and plan ahead for several generations. he coins this ability as having “long twitch muscles” (ehrlich 2000). incumbent with having long twitch muscles will be having a spiritual appreciation of the earth. the philosopher david abram (1997) considers a recalibration of human sensory perceptions in order to ‘presence’ the non-human world. as saniotis (1997) explains: here, the senses become increasingly attuned to the animal and organic landscapes, to the “encompassing cosmos”. both berry and abram argue for a new kind of poietic embodiment emulating the mytho-experiential understandings of creation that are found in shamanic societies. abram also believes that present human language is partly responsible for human exploitation of nature. western based languages, he says, have led to an objectification of the non-human world. these languages have also tended to de-mystify the universe which in indigenous languages retains the magical element of the cosmos. for example, the english language possesses many metaphors dealing with quantification, as well, as privileging the primacy of vision. this is the aristotelian legacy. it was aristotle who professed that vision was superior to all other senses. from descartes onwards, vision has been viewed as the most verifiable of the senses. stoller (1989) notes that such a vision-orientated world handicaps our ability to fully engage with cultures which may privilege other senses. in genesis, the construction of the tower of babel leads god to separate human beings through various languages. the lesson of 65kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis babel is also a return to the primordial language of the senses. the promethean myth will need to retrieve our previous engagement with the senses in order to respond appropriately to global problems. gregory bateson is informative here. bateson, like martin buber, points out that “i-thou” relationships are possible between humans and ecosystems. nature is always sacred for bateson. his theoretical development of mind as alluding to the informational and cybernetic processes inherent in nature enabled a possibility for humans to ecologically relate with the nonhuman world (charlton 2008:162). his notion of systems as comprising sub-systems fits into his model of a dynamic and interactive nature. this view is of the living world as a unity, “a single interrelated mental system” closely “related to the idea of divinity” (charlton 2008:164). bateson’s epistemology posited the individual mind as being immanent, of which it is a part of a sub-system of a larger mind (bateson 2002). this larger mind is the totality of all ecological and social systems, immanent and self corrective, identifying with all life and extending towards the cosmos (charlton 2008:164-165). references abram, david. 1997. the ecology of magic. spell of the sensuous: perception and language in a more-than-human world. new york: vintage books. http://www.primitivism.com/ecologymagic.htm. bateson, gregory. 2002. mind and nature: a necessary unity. cresskill, new jersey: hampton press, inc. brown, brian. 1994. toward a buddhist ecological cosmology. in: mary evelyn tucker & john a. grim eds. worldviews & ecology. new york: orbis books. pp.123-137. charlton, noel g. understanding bateson: mind, beauty, and the sacred earth. albany: state university of new york press. diodorus siculus, 17.1.5. retrieved january 17, 2011 from history-ofmacedonia.com/wordpress/2006/10/18/greek-ancestry-ofalexander-the-great/. durant, will. 2005. the story of philosophy. new york: simon & 66 prajna vihara~ schuster. ehrlich, paul. r. 2000. human natures: genes, cultures, and the human project. washington d.c. & covelo, california: island press. eliade, mircea. 1961. the sacred and the profane: the nature of religion. translated by willard trask, new york: harper torchbooks. heather, peter. 2005. the fall of the roman empire: a new history. london: pan books. nasr, seyyed hossein. 1968. the encounter of man and nature: the spiritual crisis of modern man. london: allen & unwin. plutarch, alexander. retrieved from history-of-macedonia.com/ wordpress/ 2006/10/18/greek-ancestry-of-alexander-the-great. ridley, scott. 2000. genome: the autobiography of a species in 23 chapters. new york: perennial. saniotis, a. 2007. reinventing nature: thomas berry’s “new story” as universal communitas prajna vihara: the journal of philosophy and religion. 2007 january-june 7 (1). stoller, paul. 1989. the taste of ethnographic things: the senses in anthropology. pennsylvania: university of pennsylvania press. swimme, brian. berry, thomas. 1992. the universe story: from the primordial faring forth to the ecozoic age. new york: harper one. wilson, e.o. 2006. creation: an appeal to save life on earth. new york & london: w.w. norton & company. 67kenneth dobson and arthur saniotis 122-dialogue on differing asian narrative criticism and a study of setting in the temiya jataka me me khine assumption university, thailand narrative criticism can be termed as critical hermeneutics in the sense that it interprets the text in the light of human existence. although narrative criticism originated from the biblical studies, it seems to me that it is appropriate for the study of any kinds of religious literature. this presentation is an attempt to apply narrative criticism to the study of buddhist literature. 1. what is narrative criticism? narrative criticism is said to have developed within the field of biblical studies without an exact counterpart in secular world. if classified by secular critics, it might be viewed as a subspecies of a new rhetorical criticism or as a variety of the reader-response movement. rhetorical criticism attempts to find the effect of a text by studying the way the work is created. reader-response theory emphasizes on finding meaning in the consciousness of the one who reads the text. biblical scholars, however, think of narrative criticism as an independent, parallel movement in its own right. (powell, 1990, p. 19) according to powell, (1990, p. 23) narratives have two aspects: story and discourse. story refers to the content of the narrative, i.e., what it is about. a story consists of such elements as events, characters, and settings, and the interactions of these elements comprise what we call plot. discourse refers to the rhetoric of the narrative, how the story is told. stories concerning the same basic events, characters, and settings can be told in ways that produce different narratives. according to flood, (1999, p. 120) narrative “as story” has a meaningful chronological sequence expressed through the genres of oral tradition, written text, conversation or personal narrative and music (songs and operas). prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 49-65 49 © 2000 by assumption university press the elements of narrative include the five ws that one might expect in the first paragraph of a news story: who (characters), where and when (settings), what and why (plot), to the extent that story and discourse can be separately analyzed. these three are elements of story. the fourth narrative element is the rhetoric, i.e., the how of the story-as-discoursed. rhetoric refers to how the implied author persuades the implied readers to follow the story. because narrative criticism (like literary criticism in general) asks “how does the text mean?”, it takes a keen interest in rhetoric. (anderson & moore, 1998, p.33) narrative theory involves the study of language and semiotics. it attempts to explain religion and generate new knowledge, culture, history, time, text, space (context), everything is interactive at one time. it is thus a comprehensive approach. it encourages cross-fertilization between different aspects of psychology, sociology, semiotics, and philosophy of language through narrative studies. narrative approach helps us i. learn, tell, and live stories (in multiple ways) ii. understand how reading of text is repeated to generations (from both insider /outsider points of view) iii. follow rational discourse. one narrative passes many contexts. for example the adam and eve story as understood by jews, christians and muslims. iv. see overlapping of narratives (cross each other). for example, biblical mark, matthew, luke narrated the same event but was described in different ways. that is why they are called synoptic gospels. according to paul ricoeur there are three dimensions of narrative approach. (flood, 1999, p. 127) i. narrative realism: which maintains that culture and history enact a live narrative pattern. narrative realism claims that narrative structures exist in the human world itself and not just in the stories people tell about in the world. human lives are already formed into stories before historians or biographers attempt to tell these stories. true stories are found, not constructed. (fay, 1996, p. 179) 50 prajñâ vihâra ii. narrative constructionism: that narrative is told or imposed upon culture and history. it claims that historians impose narrative structures on a formless flow of events. (fay, 1996, p. 190) iii. narrativism: that both lived and told narratives are true. it tries to be such a view, one that steers a middle course between narrative realism and narrative constructivism, hoping to capture what is worthwhile both. (fay, 1996, p. 194) 1.2. how would you conduct narrative criticism? there are three schools of narrative theology, the chicago school, the yale school and the california school. both the chicago and the yale schools employ text-centered approach with the former having broader philosophical and cultural perspectives and the latter strictly focusing on the biblical materials alone. the yale school sees the narratives of the bible as “story like”, representing the familiar world or real people. it does not consider biblical stories as narratives in the universal and anthropological sense. instead it takes the stories as spiritually important, forming part of the stricter historical sense and as forming part and parcel of the scripture. the california school concentrates more on biography as a way of illuminating theology. the focus is on theological convictions which are rooted in the texture of a life; i.e., we discover a person’s convictions by discovering his or her story. concepts such as grace and courage have meaning only when seen in the context of a biography. this approach recognizes that religious beliefs are living convictions which give shape to actual lives and actual communities. in this way, we open ourselves to the possibility that the only relevant critical examination of religious beliefs may be one which begins by attending to lived lives. theology must be at least biography. (striver, 1996, pp. 134-162) among the three schools of narrative theology i would prefer to adapt the chicago school and the california school in my narrative criticism. the chicago school of narrative theology has a wider perspective of not denying any methods such as historical criticism, literary criticism, form criticism, source criticism and redaction criticism. instead it tries to synthesize all methods and comes up with an approach which is more me me khine 51 empirical (which has the text its foundation) and more reflective (because it does not stop at looking at the language) and more applicable to our lives. i believe that the chicago school of narrative study, especially that of ricoeur has a clear foundation and methodology for our analysis of any scriptures. at the first step, i can start my study of the scripture from semiotic level with the words, which can be metaphors. at the second phase, i.e.at the semantics level, the analysis will continue with the sentences that as a whole constitute the text, studying the different genres of narratives. at the final stage, i will choose the most appropriate meaning for our lives then to my life. the california school of narrative theology will guide me what to focus on while analyzing the temiya jâtaka. in one sense the tamiya jâtaka is one of the biographies of the bodhisatta (the future buddha) in his cultivation of perfections. by studying the convictions of bodhisatta, i will understand the ideal practice of a true buddhist. paul ricoeur, in his article “towards a narrative theology: its necessity, its resources, its difficulties” (ricoeur, 1995, pp. 236-248), explains that we need narrative theology because the methods used before failed to serve their purposes. before 1940, the time of romantic criticism, secular critics paid a great deal of attention to establishing the identity, circumstances, and intentions of a work’s historical author. any interpretation of a work by one of these masters would be expected to take into account the circumstances of the writing: the life and personality of the author at this point in his career, and perhaps the condition of english society at the time. it put a lot of emphasis on background information of a work of art. literary critics today prefer to speak of an implied author, who is reconstructed by the reader from the narrative. when a person reads a story, he or she will inevitably form some impression about that story’s author. the story itself conveys a sense of the author’s values and world view. the goal of such a definition, however, is not to arrive at a partial understanding of what the real author might have been like, but to elucidate the perspective from which the narrative must be interpreted. the implied author’s point of view can be determined without considering anything extrinsic to the narrative. thus literary critics may speak of the intentions of the implied author without violating the basic principle that narratives should be interpreted on their own terms. when hermeneutical preference 52 prajñâ vihâra is given to a work’s implied author over its real, historical author, the narrative is allowed to speak for itself. the interpretive key no longer lies in background information, but within the text itself. identification of the implied author provides all that is needed in order to comprehend the literary meaning and impact of the narrative; thus it is possible to understand works that are anonymous. all narratives have an implied author, even if the real author is unknown. even stories that have no real author – such as tales that have developed over a period of time by being passed down from generation to generation – can be studied according to the standards of narrative criticism. this is true because, regardless of the process through which a narrative comes into being, it will have a single implied author, which can be identified and described. (powell, 1990, p.6) since the age of the enlightenment, we are losing our ability to tell stories and listen to stories. we destroy the genuine sense of tradition and authority. we dominate, exploit and manipulate the natural environment of humankind and consequently human being themselves. these in turns make us forget the past sufferings of humankind, and causes us to lose our capacity for story telling. therefore a rebirth of narrative is necessary for the rebirth of narrative in general and to give meaning to the biblical narrative in particular. in modernity, life has been partitioned into discrete segments and actions are not perceived to be within the context of larger wholes or parts of wider narratives. the modern self as a consequence does not have such a unified sense of identity because it does not have the unity of a narrative linking ‘birth to life to death’. but even the modern self cannot be wholly stripped of narrative identity, for in the temporal nature of life, narrative is generated inevitably from the process of birth and death. even at the mundane level, statements can only be understood through a narrative. (flood, 1999, p.129) narrative is essential for establishing a moral identity for the self within communities, such as the family, city, neighborhood, or tribe, who is bound by their restrictions. narrative is central to the development of both a sense of personal identity as well as historical or traditional identity and it is through narrative that ethics is linked to the unity or coherence of a particular life. (flood, 1999, p. 129) me me khine 53 paul ricoeur believes that theology should be rebuilt on a narrative basis. he affirms that: i. theology discourse can expand the horizon of meaning not clearly mentioned in the narratives and symbols in the jewish and christian traditions. ii. stories can be understood through a person’s individual and communal histories and stories. iii. a narrative theology takes into account the long period of history of several millennia. according to paul ricoeur, (1995, pp. 236-248) the main resources of narrative theology are in the achievements in the field of narratology. these resources exist in the art of emplotment; in the understanding caused by the configurational act of emplotment, in the role of tradition, and in the “meaning” of narrative. firstly, in the art of emplotment, narratology inquires all the literary devices used by narrators. this is to draw an intelligible story from a variety of events or reciprocally, to take the events into a story. emplotment brings together the diverse features such as circumstances, agents, interactions, ends, means and unintended results. time and poetic composition of story are important in this area. temporality connects the two types of time: the pure time itself and the story incidents. configurational act of narrating gathers all the incidents of the story and creates a temporal whole by mediating between time as passage and time as duration. secondly, narratology inquires the understanding caused by configurational act of emplotment. narrative intelligibility is more concerned with practical wisdom or moral judgement than with theoretical reason. thirdly, narratology investigates the role of tradition in the transmission, reception and interpretation of received stories. traditionality is complex because it relies on the flexible dialectics between innovation and sedimentation. sedimentation makes things stabilized whereas innovation encourages experimentation and new paradigms. fourthly, narratology inquires the “meaning” of a narrative. such meaning is not confined to the so-called inside of the text. it occurs at the intersection between the world of the text and the world of the readers. 54 prajñâ vihâra only when reader’s experience has been transfigured by the plot, then the meaning is actualized. for literary criticism the world of action is the ‘inside’ of the text. language establishes it as a self-containing” entities. the major problem a hermeneutics of poetic text exists in the three-fold mediation of referentiality (humankind and the world), of communicability (human being and human being), and of self understanding (human being and her or himself). in order to have a better understanding of narrative criticism we should also have some ideas of interpreting the text we read. there are many ways of reading a text. according to m. h. abrams (quoted in powell, 1990, p. 11) there are four basic types of literary criticism and all of the various schools may be understood as representing one or more of these four types. i. expressive types of criticism are author-centered and tend to evaluate a work in terms of the sincerity and adequacy with which it expresses the views and temperament of its writer. ii. pragmatic types of criticism are reader-centered and view the work as something that is constructed in order to achieve a particular effect on its audience; the work is evaluated according to its success in achieving that aim. iii. objective types of criticism are text-centered, viewing the literary product as a self-sufficient world in itself. the work must be analyzed according to intrinsic criteria, such as the interrelationship of its component elements. iv. mimetic types of criticism view the literary work as a reflection of the outer world or of human life and evaluate it in terms of the truth or accuracy of its representation. ( powell, 1990, p.11) 2. the jâtaka stories in general the jâtaka stories are stories of the previous existences of gotama buddha, while he was as yet but a bodhisatta. a jâtaka is an extensive work in verses containing five hundred and forty-seven stories of previous existences as recounted by the buddha. jâtaka tales offer abundant material for religious education. central motifs in the biographies of the buddha me me khine 55 elucidate moral principles, values, and ethics, and certain well-known jâtaka tales serve a didactic purpose in teaching younger generations about the tradition. jâtaka are salient across buddhist communities and the themes they recount readily resonate with other aspects of religious knowledge and practices. as such, recounting certain jâtaka stories in public sermons or even representing them in paintings can serve as commentary on current social and political issues. stories about the buddha’s former lives are also a form of entertainment. in burma, for example, these stories have traditionally been the subject of popular theatrical performances that continue through the night. (encyclopedia of buddhism, vol. 1, 2004, p. 46) 2.1. the temiya jâtaka (synopsis) the temiya jâtaka is jâtaka no. 538 (in cowell’s collection) which depicts the story the buddha-to-be in which he fulfills his perfection of resolute determination, adhitthana. the temiya jâtaka or the mugapakkha jâtaka is a story about a former life of the buddha, which has been extremely popular. in this bizarre story, the future buddha was born as a king’s long awaited heir apparent. when he is a month old he is taken to sit on the lap of his doting father while he is on his judgment seat sentencing criminals to violent punishments, including death. there is no suggestion that these sentences are improper: the king is only doing his duty. as a future buddha is in full possession of his faculties from birth, the baby prince understands what is going on. it reminds him that in his former life that he too was a king and found it his duty to pronounce death sentences, and that as a consequence he had to undergo torment in hell for eighty thousand years. determined to escape a repetition of that fate, he decides to pretend he is a cretinous deaf-mute, as the only way of avoiding the succession. he does not look like a defective child, so his father employs the most extravagant stratagems to make him react. his resolve remains such that no amount of pain or temptation to pleasure can provoke him into a response. finally, when he has grown up, his father gives up and decides to have him destroyed; he orders a man to take him to the cemetery, kill him and bury him. while the man is digging the grave, the future buddha speaks (for the first time in his life) and preaches to him. 56 prajñâ vihâra the man then calls the future buddha’s parents and he preaches to them. the whole city comes out to hear him. all are converted and settle down to lead a religious life there in the wilderness. the state is abandoned; the only people left in the city are the drunks. (gombrich, 1988, p. 70) 2.2. buddhist hermeneutics and the jâtaka stories buddhist philosophy cannot be said of lacking hermeneutics. lord buddha himself in the catuhpratisaranasutra, provided rules of the interpretation of his teaching as: to rely on the teaching, not the teacher, to rely on the meaning, not the letter, to rely on the definitive meaning (nitartha), not the interpretable meaning (neyartha) and to rely on wisdom (jnana), not on [ordinary] conscious (vijnava). (,lopez, 1992, p. 3). thus the four rules of textual interpretation will be (1) the dharma is the refuge and not the person; (2) the spirit is the refuge and not the letter; (3) the sutra of precise meaning is the refuge and not the sutra of provisional meaning; (4) (direct) knowledge is the refuge and not the (discursive) consciousness. thus the buddhist truths threefold wisdom, or prajna arise from listening (srutamayi), reflecting (cintamayi) or meditation (bhavanamayi). (ibid, p. 23) then, how should we see jataka stories in the light of buddhist hermeneutics? firstly, we must accept that jâtakas are tales and thus it would be difficult to take them as reality. however, many scholars were of the opinion that the jâtakas such as we have them give a picture of indian life in the days of buddha, that is, in the sixth and fifth century b.c. or at least at the time of the redaction of the canon in the third century b.c. since then, however, it has become the almost general opinion of scholars that only the jâtaka-gathas can claim canonical authority, and be regarded as documents of the third, or even the fifth century b.c, while the jâtaka commentary, as we have it, can claim no higher antiquity than the fifth or sixth century a.d., though in its prose parts also it contains old traditions which in many cases may go back to the same early period as the gathas. (quoted in winternitz, 1928, p. 2) then, we should take the jâtakas as tales of “moral” teachings where myths are included for decorative purpose. here the second rule of textual interpretation of buddhist hermeneutics that “the spirit is the me me khine 57 refuge not the letter” should be applied. we need to see the core or the real message embedded in these stories. we must bear in mind, as pointed out by reynolds, that “mythically constructed biography of the buddha, has from the very beginning, played a fundamental role in the structure and dynamics of theravada religion.” (in schober, 1997, 19) myths in jâtakas are to elaborate the doctrines, just as myths without doctrines will be meaningless. 3. narrative understanding of setting mark allan powell (1990, p.69) likens the basic elements of a story, namely: events, characters and setting, to the grammatical components of english sentence structure. events correspond roughly to verbs, for in them the story’s action is expressed. characters are like nouns, for they perform these actions, or, perhaps, they describe the characters involved in the action. and settings are the adverbs of literary structure, they designate when, where, and how the action occurs. 3.1. spatial setting according to elizabeth struthers malbon (quoted in powell, 1990, p. 76) there are three types of spatial settings: i. geopolitical settings (e.g. regions, cities, towns) ii. topographical settings (e.g. physical feature of the earth such as the mountains, the hills, the rivers, etc.) and iii. architectural settings (e.g. houses, synagogues). 3.2. temporal setting paul ricoeur distinguishes between mortal time and monumental time. mortal time is the time in which the characters of a story live out their lives, just as people do in the real world. mortal time is measured by calendars, watches, clocks, and sundials. monumental time, on the other hand, refers to the broad sweep of time that includes but also transcends history. it cannot be measured either by people in the real world or by 58 prajñâ vihâra characters in a story. nevertheless, people have some sense of what they think it is like. 3.3. social settings social settings concern social circumstances. these include the political institutions, class structures, economic systems, social customs, and general cultural context assumed to be operative in the work. (powell, 1990, p. 74) identification of social settings is especially important in ancient literature, because so much of the context is not immediately accessible to the understanding of real readers today. in secular literary criticism, scholars recognize that literature is not comprehensible without some understanding of other cultural phenomena assumed by the text. in such works, the normally asked questions are what is the social environment portrayed in the work – the manners, mores, customs, rituals, codes of conduct of a society?; what does the author seem to think about them?; and how do they affect the characters? (griffith, 1982, p.55) 4. setting in the temiya jâtaka the setting of temiya helps to realize the fulfillment of perfection, the importance of renunciation, and the value of ascetic life. the following discussion will attempt to describe the places, time, and social circumstances within which events transpire in the temiya jâtaka. the interest will be in the metaphorical and connotative value that such settings receive within the narrative. it is hoped that the following analysis will bring a better understanding and appreciation of the jâtaka story and finally grasp its theological value. 4.1. soteriological setting in the temiya jâtaka geopolitically, the story of temiya is set in the palace of benares, of jambudipa. for topographical settings, the world is divided into the world of the thirty-three gods, the world of the higher gods and the world of men, the world of the brahma, the six heavens of the gods and various me me khine 59 hells. architectural settings include palace scene and forest scene. in the palace scene, the throne, the chamber, the sumptuous bed under a white umbrella, the royal pomp, etc are mentioned. in the forest scene, emphasis is on the forest-wild alone, a hut of leaves and a grove of trees. what important message do these spatial settings bring to us, the readers? to me, the most important spatial setting is the contrast between the descriptions of the palace (the place for kingship) and that of the forest. the palace scene is always a reminder for the prince to be aware of hells (the place for punishment of wrongdoing). on the other hand, the forest (the place for asceticism) is depicted as the right place for attaining renunciation, which will be the only escape from hell. various tests on the prince to make him respond, speak or show signs were always carried out in the palace. the palace itself symbolizes the ground for suffering, all kinds of woes, although it is outwardly very pleasant, grand and has all the physical comfort. in contrast, a hermitage, a hut of leaves, with the requisite articles for an ascetic, furnished with an apartment for the night and another for the day, a tank, a pit and fruit-trees is a blissful place which meets bare necessity is the ideal place for temiya who attempts to escape from hell. a bed of leaves is pleasant for him because “he does not mourn over the past, does not weep for the future but must meet the present as it comes. mourning about the hopeless past or some uncertain future need, dries a young man’s vigor up as when you cut a fresh green reed.” the great being announcement of his homelessness at the request of his father, the king of kasi to come back to his proper home: “by parents i was left forlorn, by city and by town, … i have no home my own…here in this forest-wild alone, … is also a description of the ideal condition of an ascetic life. 4.2. temporal setting in the temiya jâtaka the story of temiya told by the lord buddha starts with “once upon a time”. so it may be assumed that it is ahistorical. however, most of the birth stories start with once upon a time and ends with thus who is who in the story. so we must assume that temporal setting is important in 60 prajñâ vihâra the understanding of the narrative. in this story the importance of time is the emphasis it pays on the contrast between twenty years of reign in benares and eighty thousand years of suffering in hell. the fact that ruling a kingdom for twenty years is equivalent to eighty thousand years of suffering in the ussada hell denotes the gravity of being a king. the concept of monumental time in the temiya is shown through cycles of life. first the king rules a kingdom for twenty years, then suffers in hell for eighty thousand years. after that he enjoys a long life in the world of gods and then comes back to the human world as a king and will head again to hell. soteriologically, these rebirths throw lights to the buddhist understanding of samsara. at the last moment of the story, all the residents of seven kingdoms enjoyed the ascetic lives in the forest and at the end of their lives become destined for the world of brahma. here the temporal setting reinforces the buddhist teaching of escaping samsara and the way to do so is by renouncing the worldly life. temiya’s hearing of the wheel of chariot striking against the threshold, “my desire has attained its end” denotes the right time: “your sixteen years’ labor has reached its end”. this is the actualization of the beginning of an ascetic life, which will lead the prince to the ending of life, a satisfactory end. as for mortal time, the temporal settings in temiya are distinctive. chronological time is measured annually; each year a different test is given since he is a baby prince until he comes of age. when the queen is claiming the boon the king has granted her at the birth of the prince in order to save her son, the mortal time starts with life-time, then is reduced to seven years to seven months… to seven days. the king at long last agrees to honor seven-day of reign to his son as the last test, if the prince responds to grandeur of kingship, he will enjoy it for his life time, if not it is only seven days to receive the praise or blame. in my opinion, there is an important connotative meaning in the time frame “seven days” because most buddhist believe that only seven days after death, a being will eventually obtain a next life. one might think that youth is a time of enjoying life, but in temiya, this is not the case. according to the temiya jâtaka, youth or young age is the best time for renunciation: “the ascetic’s life best suits the young, thus counsel all the wise.” me me khine 61 old age and death is constantly wearing out human life is described: “the world is smitten by death, and surrounded by old age, the (days and) nights pass by unfailingly; … just as a full river runs on, never turning back, so the life of men runs on, never turning back. just as a full river might carry away trees growing on its banks, so beings are carried away by old age and death.” (collins, 1998, p. 432). 4.3. social setting in thetemiya jâtaka the prominent social setting that carries theological value is that of tests of determination of the bodhisatta (the great being). the prince temiya, for fear of samsara, pretends to be deaf, dumb, and cripple, bearing all tests of physical tortures. yet, he is happy to be tortured than to suffer in hell. the tests administered to him show the social customs and cultural practices of the time of the story. here, in my opinion, the social setting of the story is not as much important as that of the soteriological teaching. in essence, the bhohisatta’s tolerance and determination for nonactions for sixteen years depict his cultivation of perfections. the political setting for temiya story starts with a kingdom, which is facing a lack of heir apparent. this problem is solved by the act of truth of the virtuous chief queen. however, another crisis arises when the baby prince hears the harsh punishment of his father, the king, to his subjects, the four thieves. the crisis continues for sixteen years. the scene here denotes the notion that kingship is bad, it is the cause of hell, and there is no escape from samsara. the conflict between the fear of sin and the inheritance of the throne from his father, which everyone should have desired is the climax of the story. the conflict is resolved by the prince’s winning over not only the hearts of his parents but also the residents of seven kingdoms. some scholars believe that the emphasis on observing silence in temiya’s political culture is to oppose the kingship (or government in modern time). the idea stems from the fact that the avoidance of wrongdoing (adhamma-cariya) is in fact the righteous thing, dhamma. 62 prajñâ vihâra the political setting of temiya ends with the scene of a righteous king, the king who keeps his promise, who gives chances to his citizens. at the end of the story, we see a three-league-long hermitage built by sakkha and occupied by the citizens who are leading an ascetic life being taken care by the great being. this is followed by three kingdoms abandoned, with their houses open, the elephants and horses left to roam wild in the woods, and the money in the treasuries scattered about. these settings emphasize the difference between the worldly and the soteriological. temiya jâtaka envisions an ideal world populated with the residents who have rigorously practiced the eight ecstatic meditations, and at the end of their lives were destined for the world of brahma. this is to affirm that the ascetic life is more desirable than a life of worldly pleasure. 5. conclusion in the temiya jâtaka, the narrative of the fulfillment of the perfection of determination (adithana) weaves its way through particularly social settings of physical tortures and ideal world and the ascetic values of renunciation, the refusal to enjoy worldly life and the difficulties of renunciation. it also shows that real human goods must, ultimately, be abandoned in the ascetic search for ultimate felicity. my study here is like the first sketch in a painting of literary appreciation and theological understanding. of course, the picture will become more vivid, colorful and meaningful when subtler strokes of brushes are added on. the analysis of characters, events and points of view will do so. however, the analysis limits itself to setting. to sum up, the temiya jâtaka successfully mingles ascetic values and soteriological motifs in an ideal image of a bodhisatta (the great being). perfection and asceticism are the two elements of an ideal life for the buddhists. the story can clearly convey this message. when i first read the temiya jâtaka both in my native language and english, i find the story somewhat boring. the language is to some extent archaic, the story is simple and i have heard it so many times in my young age. however, when i read it again and again to analyze it, my understanding of the story has increased as i discover the underlying serious message of the story. narrative criticism has helped me to reach a better me me khine 63 understanding of the story. as general reader and as a buddhist i can enjoy the inner meaning of the text. it also helps me to look into the outside meaning, the history of the time this story was told. what is most striking is that it makes me see the moral values embedded in a story of buddhist scripture. 64 prajñâ vihâra references a. primary sources cowell, professor e. b. (translated by e.b. cowell and w. h. d. rouse) (1995). the jâtaka or stories of the buddha’s former births. the pali text society. oxford. horner, i. b. (1974) ten jâtaka stories (a pali reader). mahamakut rajavidyalaya press. bangkok. u ah ba tha, min pu sayadaw. (2000). pondawson zat kyi se bwe. (ten jataka stories with illustrations.) vol. i. khin cho tun sapay. yangon. (in burmese language) b. books anderson, janice capel & moore, stephen d. (ed). (1998). mark and method: new approaches in biblical studies. fortress press. usa. collins, steven. (1998). nirvana and other buddhist felicities: utopias of the pali imaginaire. cambridge. uk. fay, brian. (1996). contemporary philosophy of social science. blackwell publishers. uk. flood, gavin. (1999). beyond phenomenology: rethinking the study of religion. cassell. london and new york. gombrich, richard f. (1988). theravada buddhism: a social history from ancient benares to modern columbo. routledge. london. griffith.jr., kelly (1982) . writing essays about literature. a guide & style sheet (2nd edition). harcourt brace jovanovich, publishes, usa lopez, jr., donald s. (ed.). (1992). buddhist hermeneutics. university of hawaii press. usa. ricoeur, paul (translated by kathleen mclaughlin and david pellauer.) (1983). time and narrative volume 1. the university of chicago press. usa. ____________ (translated by kathleen mclaughlin and david pellauer). (1985). time and narrative volume ii. the university of chicago press. usa. ____________ (translated by david pellauer, ed. by mar i. wallace) (1995). figuring the sacred: religion, narrative, and imagination. fortress press. usa. striver, dan r. (1996). the philosophy of religious language: sign, symbol, and story. blackwell. uk. u ko lay. (1990). guide to tipitaka. sri satguru publication. india. winternitz, m. (1928). jâtaka gathas and jâtaka commentary. the indian history quarterly. (vol. iv march, 1928 no.1). me me khine 65 07_alienation and the problem of loyalty in africa.pmd alienation and the problem of loyalty in africa dipo irele university of ibadan, nigeria º·¤ñ́ âèí »ñ­ëòàã×èí§¤çòᨧãñกàñก ṍáõ¤çòáêó¤ñ­íâèò§âôè§ã¹กòã·ó¤çòáà¢éò㨠àกõèâçกñºçôกäµôกòã³ì¢í§กòãà»ç¹»ãðà·èãñ°ã¹áí¿ãôกòàòâëåñ§âø¤íò³ò¹ô¤á º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ðµãç¨êíºàëµø¼åçèò·óäá¼ù餹 ö̈§áõ¤çòá¼ùก¾ñ¹กñºª¹à¼èò¢í§µ¹àí§ á·¹·õè̈ ð¼ùก¾ñ¹กñºãñ°ªòµô µí¹áãกº·¤çòá¨ðçôà¤ãòðëìàã×èí§¤çòᨧãñกàñก ṍ¢í§ ¼ù餹 áåð ǿ̈ íèí¹¢í§ãñ°·õè̈ ð ö́§ ù́́ ¾åàá×í§¢í§µ¹àí§ µí¹·õèêí§¨ðà»ç¹กòã¹ó àíò·äé®õáµôàíก©ñ¹·ì¢í§ãíçìåêìáòãªé à¾×èíáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò ëåñกกòãµèò§ æ êòáòã¶à»ç¹·õèâíáãñºกñ¹ä é́à¾×èíêãéò§¾×é¹°ò¹¢í§èõå¸ããá·ò§êñ§¤á abstract the problem of loyalty is important for understanding the crisis of the nation-state in postcolonial africa. this paper examines the reason why people are attached to their ethnic units rather than the nation-state. in the first part it analyzes loyalty and the weakness of the state in attracting it. the second part it uses rawls’ theory of overlapping consensus to show how certain principles can be agreed upon which would form the basis of social morality. since independence many african countries have been bedeviled with the problem of the loyalty of their citizens. the problem of loyalty has been ascribed to the primordial attachment which people have for their ethnic units which has precluded them to have loyalty to the nationstate.1 in fact weaving together the heterogeneous ethnic groups in africa has become a critical problem in most african states.1 in this paper, i shall prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 97-112 97 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ dwell on the reason why the people are attached to their ethnic unit rather than the nation-state. in the first part i shall analyze loyalty and then go on to proffer reasons why the citizens of most of african countries have not willingly given their loyalty to the nation. in the second part, i argue that there is the need to have an agreement or consensus on certain basic principles. i utilize rawls’ theory of overlapping consensus to sketch how an agreement could be reached embodying certain principles which would form the basis of social morality. in a stimulating paper, oldenquist argues that loyalty is different from fanaticism.2 he contends that loyalty is not a bias or bigotry. he goes on to argue that loyalty exhibits certain characteristic features which are different from bias and bigotry.3 although loyalty can degenerate into fanaticism or bigotry, it does not necessarily have the features of fanaticism because loyalty to one’s country is predicated on rational assessment of one’s country. he claims that in the case of fanatical loyalty to one’s country this “is usually dependent on ignorance” and “can be rationally faulted”.4 this kind of loyalty depends on emotional and ideological appeals. oldenquist contends further that our loyalty to a country depends on certain benefits and protections that the country provides for its citizens.5 in other words, our loyalty to a country is predicated on certain basic needs the country can provide for its citizens. oldenquist further argues that there is a relationship between loyalty and shared moral values. according to him, loyalty presupposes shared values which the citizens have as background norms. in any society, these shared values define the common good and adjudicate among competing claims of different groups.6 these shared values are also important because, according to oldenquist, they define the moral community. oldenquist further claims that these shared values or, what he calls at times, “social morality”, must have the feature of universalization. the basic tenet of universalization is that moral language is reasonable. when we say that something is good, for example, we must have in mind some features of that thing in virtues of which we hold it to be good. furthermore, our judgment must be universalizable. that is, whatever our reason may be for holding that ‘x’ is good, it must be such that we would agree that anything else like ‘x’ with respect to that reason would also be good. if i say that my child is good, i must have a reason for saying so, 98 prajna vihara ~ _ _ and if this is the case, any child that has the same characteristics as my child would also be a good child. in other words, i am committed to the view that any child that exhibits that same characteristics as my child ought to be a good child. the interpretation i have given above of universalization might not have caught the essence of this metaethical theory properly. but we can get the crux of the tenet of universalization by adapting hare’s suggestion for our purpose.7 someone might claim that the assertion, “all children with blonde hair ought to be protected” is universalizable if and only if there is a type of action o such that (i) the person believes that “all children with blonde hair ought to be protected” is for the type o, (ii) the person accepts the general principle the actions of type o are obligatory, (iii) this general principle can be formulated without using proper names or personal names or personal pronouns. this can be formulated thus: u: you ought to do o = if there is action o and a falls within action o and a ought to be done. or it could be put thus, taking over nagel’s conception of objective reasons: (p(x) (px) ought to do x) where the property must contain an occurrence of the variable p which is bound only by the universal quantification which governs the entire formula.8 the person who made this assertion if she were to be consistent would agree that she is also duty bound to abide by the principle. she cannot require others to abide by this principle while she excuses herself from this requirement. thus the universalization theory yields something like the golden rule. however, another person might adopt a principle that is different. she might claim that everyone has a similar non-universalisable obligation to protect her own child which is more fundamental than protecting other people’s children. this case is similar to the more familiar case of egoism or fanaticism. an egoist would claim that she ought to perform an act if and only if it would maximize her benefits. this can be put starkly in this schema: e: an act is morally right if and only if it maximizes my benefits. dipo irele 99 thus the egoist does not perform an act to benefit others however similar other people would be to her because it is not a matter of similarities. like its twin sister, egoism issues in absurdity: it cannot be consistently held. oldenquist has pointed out that normative judgments based on egoism and those based on loyalty at times, share the same uneliminable egocentric characteristics or, put differently, individualistic hedonism.9 they are based on self-dependent normative judgements.10 if i say i love my country, i am claiming that there is a putative loyalty to my country. but if i replace my country with a characterizing expression which is peculiar to me only, i have an egoistic ideal, not loyalty. as oldenquist says, “what i am committed to is a kind of thing, not some particular things”.11 in other words, there are no certain features which others could share with me. but if i am willing to replace my country with any characteristic expression which others share with me, i have a genuine loyalty and not an ideal; my normative judgment is not individualistic. as i have pointed out above, an egoist does not recognize similarities, hence he cannot replicate himself. this, according to oldenquist, is what separates his position from that of shared social morality. he is inclined towards an entity only by means of a singular term.12 but he cannot replicate the singular term. he cannot say he values this more than that because there will be no intelligible ground for him to decide which of them he favours. he will favour himself and then the confusion that attends his “favouring ‘this’ or ‘that’ sets in”.13 this equally characterizes, at times, a person with a banal form of loyalty because his loyalty is self-dependent. he cannot employ any general feature in characterizing his loyalty, it must be ‘my group’, and this becomes meaningful to him alone; hence he lives in a solipsistic world.14 loyalty, according to oldenquist, is an object of noninstrumental value in virtue of having certain characteristic features which appeal to all people. in general, people care about the object of their loyalty and they acknowledge obligations towards it, which they would not feel towards any object which they do not have loyalty to. loyalty, as earlier pointed out, towards an object could be shared by a number of people unlike object of pure self-interest. in this regard, we talk about “our country”, and not just ‘my country’.15 what distinguishes this from pure egoism is 100 prajna vihara ~ _ _ that there is a shared value or social value.16 i shall return to this issue of shared value later. the foregoing, i trust, would have given something of the flavour of oldenquist’s position on loyalty even though i have had to give only the barest sketch of it and sacrifice much of the more detailed analysis. what emerges from the discussion is that there must be a shared value or social morality before we can have loyalty towards a nation. the overwhelming consensus on loyalty in africa is that the nation-states in africa have not been able to secure the loyalty of their citizens. rather their loyalty has been to their ethnic groups and this has led to political instability in most african countries.17 this ethnic loyalty or primordial sentiment, it is claimed, started with colonialism and the colonialists played this up in order to pursue their strategy of divide and rule.18 the nation-states that emerged after colonialism have not been able to weld these disparate ethnic groups together into a cohesive nation. further the elites in these states in africa after colonialism have also played the issue of ethnicity up in order to have access to power.19 in other words, they have manipulated the issue of ethnicity in order to protect their vested interest. as i pointed out above, some scholars believe that the integration of these ethnic groups into nation-states in africa and the loyalty of the citizens to these states have become difficult to achieve. they believe that national integration and loyalty could be achieved only in a homogenous society. in other words, a state with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds would find it impossible to achieve national integration and have the loyalty of its citizens. this conception of a nation seems to me to be in line with friedrich herder’s conception of it. this older romantic belief is that before we can have a nation the people must have the same language and share the same common ethnic origin.20 i wish to state that this herderian conception of a nation seems to me inadequate. a nation, according to benedict anderson, is imagined; it is a fiction.21 so, except perhaps for a face-to-face community, there cannot be a nation which completely satisfies herder’s definition. this definition of nation is therefore not complete because it describes only homogeneous communities. one may ask, cannot heterogeneous communities constitute a nation? i think we can supplement our conception of a nation by stipulating that dipo irele 101 multiple ethnic groups can constitute a nation if they are brought together on the basis of mutual consent based on certain principles or shared values. i shall return to this later. i need to add that the existence in a nation of much cultural and linguistic diversity has been an historical fact. cultural and linguistic heterogeneity has been far more common to political units than homogeneity. indeed heterogeneity has been a factor favoring political, social, economic and cultural development. the existence of diversity in a nation should not be a problem. the reason militating against loyalty and national integration in africa has to be sought elsewhere. what has emerged from the above consideration is that a nation may be made up of an aggregate of persons not belonging to the same linguistic and cultural groups but they should be held together by mutual consent and agreement. most african countries with different groups were legislated into existence by the colonial powers in different african countries. the constitution imposed on the people, for example in nigeria, from the colonial period to the present one did not enjoy widespread acceptance among the different ethnic groups. this points to the fact that there was no prior agreement on certain fundamental issues which could have reflected in the constitution. this has been the reason why the citizens have been alienated from the state and their loyalty has been to their ethnic groups. in a perceptive paper, “colonialism and the two publics in africa: a theoretical statement”, professor peter ekeh explains the dynamics that have militated against loyalty in africa.22 ekeh contends that there are two public realms in african social and political universe. he characterizes one of the realms as primordial and the other civic. he claims that the primordial is the “communal” or “sectional” and this is identified with “the primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities….”23 he goes on to say that “the primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperative as the private realm”.24 on the other hand, the civil realm “is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private and in the primordial public”.25 there is a sense of belonging to the primordial, while the civil realm lacks this sense of belonging. he claims further that the civic public derives from the colonial administration and “has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial africa”.26 according to him, it is grounded in civil structures: the military, the civil 102 prajna vihara ~ _ _ service, the police etc. ekeh points out that the individual is linked morally with the primordial realm: “he sees his duties as moral obligations to benefit and sustain a primordial public of which he is a member”.27 the individual does not think he has to benefit from the primordial realm. ekeh says that the concept of citizenship in europe in which rights and duties of the citizens are structured does not operate in the african context in terms of the civic realm. in this realm, there is no duty corresponding to right hence the individual does not have any sense of obligation or duty to the civic realm. indeed, the attitude to the civic realm is measured in material terms. as he puts it, “while the individual seeks to gain from the civic public, there is no moral urge on him to give back to the civic public in return for his benefits”.28 in other words, there is no corresponding duty to the right which the citizens get from the civic public. there is no moral urge in the citizens to give back to the state. in short, the civic public is amoral. in fact, there is the urge to exploit the civic public for the benefit of his/her primordial group since there is no sense of belonging. ekeh has put it graphically: “the individual seizes largess from the civic public in order to benefit the primordial public”.29 ekeh then goes on to point out the negative effects this has had on the political process in africa __ corruption and lack of loyalty to the wider political unit. ekeh believes that the civic public needs social morality. it should be pointed out again that ekeh's analysis is highly illuminating and it brings out one important point which has been mentioned earlier. this is that loyalty depends on social values or social morality which must be the guiding principle in the nation. besides, the citizens' basic needs have to be catered for. i shall come back to this issue presently but before that i wish to point out that ekeh’s position does not square with certain facts with the present reality of african politics. it is not the case that individuals seize largess from the civic public and benefit their primordial groups. the truth of the case is that individuals seize from the civic public without benefiting their ethnic groups. as previously pointed out, the ruling elite in africa use the primordial sentiment when it suits them to protect their vested interest. the various strifes in many african countries had ethnic colouration. the civil war in nigeria was as a result of this. the recent conflict in kenya after the elections has ethnic colouration. the ivorian, rwandan, dipo irele 103 liberian, sierra leonean conflicts and to some extent the conflicts in somalia and darfur were and are ethnically motivated. ekeh’s analysis of citizenship has to be deepened by bringing it up to date to accommodate the existing reality in africa. the discourse on citizenship has had a long history,30 but it is in recent times that the discourse has become more important due to certain events in the world: the democratization experiment in eastern europe, parts of africa and latin america; the rise of vicious ethnic and national conflicts, especially in africa. these events have thrown up challenges to the discourse of citizenship and various views have been expressed.31 in the specific case of africa, the multi-ethnic nature of many african states has made the theme of citizenship an urgent one in recent years. the ethnic groups conceive each other as the other and there is what could be termed the politics of difference in these african states. in what follows i will discuss the concept of citizenship within this context. i need to point out that the discourse of citizenship has to be reconfigured to accommodate the situation in african multi-ethnic states. the problem of citizenship could be traced to colonialism. although the idea of citizenship in the colonial period in most multi-ethnic african countries was grounded on the liberal idea of individual rights. colonialism promoted the politics of difference through its policy of divide and rule. this brought about tension in the post __ colonial african states since politics was rooted on ethnic lines. the predominant ethnic groups marginalized the smaller ones and this led to agitations for group rights rather than individual rights. this demand for group rights has brought into the fore another dimension to the discourse of citizenship. the discourse of citizenship in its liberal variant gives priority to the individual rights: the individual has rights which are sacrosanct, and which the state cannot infringe upon. from the earlier social contractualists __ though rousseau might be an exception __ to rawls and the british sociologist marshall, to some extent, the emphasis has always been on the rights of the individual as a citizen of a political community.32 despite the merit of marshall’s work in extending the rights __ civic and political __ to include social rights the focus of his work on citizenship is still the individual rights.33 the liberal conception of citizenship rights has to be reconfigured 104 prajna vihara ~ _ _ in such a way that social institutions have to be refashioned that allow or accommodate the distinctiveness of each ethnic group. in this way of conceptualizing citizenship rights, these rights are not only bestowed on individuals as found in the liberal perspective but on ethnic groups as well in the state. these rights which would be conferred on ethnic groups would be a recognition of the diversity or the plural nature of the state, and will lead to an inclusive politics. this could be termed a fourth citizenship right __ that is, extending the marshallian three scheme rights of civil, political and social rights. i shall still come to this issue when i discuss rawls’s overlapping consensus.34 let me quickly traverse the terrain we have covered so far. the analysis of loyalty has shown that loyalty has to depend on certain social values or social morality which defines certain principles which guide the conduct of the citizens. it is in this connection that i have pointed out that a nation which has these principles which are universalisable would have the loyalty of its citizens. the most tragic dilemma of our time is how we can bring about or fashion certain principles and norms, social values (or social morality) which are binding on all citizens. colonialism succeeded in utterly destroying the traditional social values (or consensus) without succeeding in laying new foundation of any new social value or social morality, which is why in most african countries it has been difficult to have loyalty of the citizens. furthermore, the citizens in most african countries see the state in a praetorian fashion. hence they are alienated from the government. the state does not seem to care for them and thus they see it as a hostile force. in other words, they do not derive any benefits from the state. they see the state as an aggressive and oppressive one hence they are alienated from it and seek the solace of their ethnic groups. since the basic functions of the state which are protection and security of its citizens have been eroded, and ethnically based militias have taken over and the territorial state has become “a universe of negativity”. in some african states, the state has collapsed. thus, the difficulty in eliciting the loyalty of the people lies in the alienating nature of the social system. so let me turn now to the concept of alienation. there are many definitions of alienation which, as lukes has pointed out, “have achieved considerably and widespread contemporary dipo irele 105 currency”.35 but it was through the work of marx that alienation became fixed in contemporary consciousness.36 alienation, for marx, occurs when the products and creations __ all those things that are extensions of man’s personality which should serve to enrich him __ are controlled by external forces. they acquire an independent life of their own and they dominate him. in its consummate form (i.e. in capitalist society), alienation takes place in four ways: 1. man is alienated from his own products 2. man is alienated from other men through the competitive nature of the economic system which is based on private property 3. man is alienated from nature, a thing that should have enriched his creative power 4. man is alienated from society, which expresses a collective power that oppresses him. we can extend the concept of alienation to cover the phenomenon of loyalty. let us say provisionally that someone is alienated from an object (a) (a country) when, given his situation, he would normally have expected to show a sense of loyalty towards a (the country) but in fact does not. he will normally be expected to show a sense of loyalty to that object (a) (a country); that is if he lives within a defined geographical boundary. but if he is alienated he does not view the country as his own, and as a result does not care much about what happens to it. anything that one is loyal to he can also be alienated from. if i come to view an object as mine i feel ashamed about it if it deteriorates, and hence i can be alienated from it. i have this feeling because i have created a link between myself and the object which i see as being worthy of my loyalty. on the other hand absence of any feeling toward an object which one should, in a normal situation, have a feeling for could also be a sign of alienation. there are some casual conditions that normally create loyalty and lead us to expect it, and of alienation as undesirable state of affair which exists when these conditions are not present. when do we expect loyalty, or, what are the conditions that foster loyalty in a nation? it is difficult to 106 prajna vihara ~ _ _ answer the question in a neat manner, but it is easy to say when people could be alienated and hence not loyal to their nation. in these later regard, i'll say that loyalty does not occur in a vacuum. people would expect a government to be responsive to their minimal needs before their loyalty could be won. furthermore, people would wish to see that they participate in the decision process which affects their lives, that is not seeing the government in a praetorian fashion, to repeat this phrase again. the elites in most african countries have turned the state into their fiefdom and have pauperized their citizens.37 moreover i pointed out earlier that there are no social values (or social morality) which would be a guiding principle in african social system. the constitutions of most african countries that should embody social values have in fact been fashioned in such a way that they do not possess any such thing. there is, therefore, the need to evolve new guiding principles which define the rights and duties of the citizens as well as the various groups within the social system. these principles would have to be by mutual consent of various interest groups as well as ethnic groups and would be the basic principles which would animate the public interest and promote the public good rather than the interest of a few elites.38 there should be a consensus on these principles __ indeed they have to consist of what i would call overlapping consensus, to borrow rawls’s phrase.39 rawls in his book, political liberalism, develops the idea of overlapping consensus which is an extension of his seminal work, a theory of justice.40 i want to utilize his view of overlapping consensus to see how we can have an agreement on some basic principles which will bring about a sense of belonging of all the various groups and individuals in the polity. i need to say that rawls’s theory is specifically addressed to liberal democratic societies but i believe that his theory has relevance to african situation since most african states are also evolving or trying to adopt a proper democratic system in africa. roughly speaking, rawls’s account of overlapping consensus centers on how agreement could be achieved in a society with divergent views. an overlapping consensus is an agreement on central political, social and economic issues by individuals and groups who subscribe to conflicting comprehensive moral, religious, economic, social and political views. dipo irele 107 rawls says that a comprehensive view, like many moral or religious views, contains direct answers to difficult and controversial questions, such as what is of value in human life?, and what is the nature of the good society?41 again rawls says a comprehensive view “covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought”.42 rawls believes that in an appropriate setting (original position) proponents of divergent comprehensive views would accept a common set of political precepts, although they would be approached in different ways. this, according to him, is possible if there are intuitive ideas that appeal to the different proponents of these comprehensive views. in order to have an overlapping consensus, rawls believes, there should be a shared principle of toleration. through the adoption of the principle of toleration different views can be harmonized and an overlapping consensus reached among the proponents of different views. rawls argues that the overlapping consensus must be acceptable to the members of the society. he claims that members of the society striving to achieve an overlapping consensus must be ready to revise their views on some controversial issues since they will adhere to the principle of toleration and strain of commitment. this is supported by the principle of reflective equilibrium discussed in a theory of justice. rawls claims that dialogue is socratic in nature. he argues that our views are justified by being shown to fit into an integrated web of beliefs and principles. through reflective equilibrium, participants in a dialogue try to achieve consistency between their principles and specific cases to which the principles apply. to achieve equilibrium they must revise their principles if they do not fit into particular web of beliefs of which they are certain. they shuttle back and forth until there is an equilibrium among the various principles. though the overall focus of rawls’s theory is individual’s rights, these individuals would share the virtue of cooperation that would allow them to have a bond between themselves. there will be social unity and they will share the same conception of justice through the overlapping consensus that has been reached. this summary omits many details of rawls account but should be adequate for our purposes though there are objections which could be 108 prajna vihara ~ _ _ pressed against rawls which i cannot go into here since they are beyond the scope of this paper.43 if the different ethnic groups and other divergent groups could adopt this socratic method then an agreement could emerge and consensus reached over principles which would lay down the social values of the state. the rights and duties of the citizens would be defined. additionally, the duty of the state would be defined vis-?-vis its citizens and its various ethnic groups. in this way the state would no longer be seen as a hostile force by the people and the tendency to look to one’s ethnic group for protection would disappear. further, the domination or hegemony of one ethnic group over others would disappear and the fierce contest for state power between the different ethnic groups would also be eliminated since there would be an equality of opportunity and equitable sharing of rewards and burdens in the society among the different groups either ethnic or individual groups. in short, the agreement would embody social values (or social morality), and these would be the guiding principles in the society. the alienating social system that makes loyalty to the state a mirage would be replaced with a humane system that caters for the citizens. let me conclude by noting that the solution proffered here is a magical panacea or single solution which can solve all problems pertaining to ethnic conflicts in africa. neither will it bring about utopian harmony amongst the different ethnic groups but it is considered simply as a way of negotiating and dealing with ethnic differences and conflicts in a constructive manner.44 endnotes 1bruce berman, dickson eyoh & w. kymlicka (eds). see the text ethnicity and democracy in africa (oxford: james currey; athens: ohio university press, 2004) for the papers on this issue; see also tunde zackwilliams, “african leadership, nationstate and the weberian project”, the constitution, vol. 8, no. 1, march 2008; patrick chabal and jean pascal daloz, africa works: disorder as political instrument. (oxford: james currey; bloomington, in: indiana university press, 1999, pp. 17-30; michael bratton and nicholas van walle, democratic experiments in africa; regime transition in comparative perspective. (cambridge; cambridge university press, 1977). 2a. oldenquist, “loyalties’ journal of philosophy”, vol. lxxxix, no 4, dipo irele 109 april 1982, pp. 173-193. i have also gained a lot from the work of s. keller, the limits of loyalty (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007); see also m. c. nussbaum, patriotism and cosmopolitanism in j. cohen (ed.) for love of country (boston: beacon press, (1966). 3oldenquist, op. cit, p.178: for this point see also m. billig, banal nationalism. london: sage, 1994; see also craig calhoun, nationalism (buckingham: open university press, 2002. 4oldenquist, p.177, see also s. keller, op. cit. 5oldenquist, p.184. 6ibid, p. 178. 7r. m. hare, “universalizability”, proceedings on the aristotelian society, pp. 295-312. see also his books, the language of morals, (oxford: oup, 1964); freedom and reason (oxford: oup, 1965). 8t. nagel, the possibility of altruism (oxford: oup, 1974). 9a. oldenquist, op. cit, p. 175. 10ibid. 11ibid. 12ibid. 13ibid. 14ibid. 15ibid. 16ibid, p.176. 17for this view see, p. ekeh, “citizenship and political conflict” in j. okpaku (ed), dilemma of nationhood (n. y.: nok press,). 1974. 18for this line of position, see o. nnoli, ethnic politics in nigeria (enugu: fourth dimension, 1980); see also tunde zack williams, op. cit. 19p. c. rosenblatt, “origins and effects of group ethnocentrism and nationalism”, journal of conflict resolution, vol. 8, no. 2, 1964. cf also calhoun, op. cit. 20for a lucid elaboration of herder’s position, see j. plamenatz, “two types of nationalism” in nationalism, e. kamenka (ed) (london: e. arnold, 1976), pp. 2447; cf also calhoun op. cit. see also john hutchinson & anthony d. smith, ethnicity (oxford: oxford university press, 1996). 21i am inclined towards anderson’s position that any nation is an imagined community. for this position, see b. anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, rev. ed. (london: verso, 1991). 22p. ekeh, “colonialism and the two publics in africa: a theoretical statement”, comparative studies in society and history vol. 117, no. 1, 1975. 23ibid, p.92. 24ibid. 25ibid. 26ibid. 27ibid, p. 106. 110 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 28ibid, p. 107. 29ibid, p. 110. 30for an historical trajectory of the concept of citizenship, see, j.g.a. pocock, “the ideal of citizenship since classical times”. queens quarterly no.1, 1999; see also gerard delanty, citizenship in a global age: society, culture, politics (buckingham & philadelphia: open university press, 2000); see also said adejumobi, “identity, citizenship and conflict” in w.a fawole and charles ukeje, the crisis of the state and regionalism in west africa: identity, citizenship and conflict (dakar: codestria, 2005). 31there are liberal, communitarian and radical views on the concept of citizenship. for an analysis of these various views, see g. delanty, op. cit.; see also macedo’s text, liberal virtues: citizenship, virtue and community in liberal constitutionalism (oxford: clarendon, 1990) for a perceptive view on the issue of citizenship. 32see, j. rawls, a theory of justice (cambridge, mass.: belknap, 1971), pars. 1, 68; political liberalism (n. y.: columbia university press, 1993) ; t. h. marshall, citizenship and social class and other essays (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1950). 33for a survey and evaluation of his work, see j.m. barbalet, citizenship: rights, struggle and class inequality (milton kaynes: open university press, 1988). 34i have relied and appropriated some of the ideas from will kymlicka’s text, multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (oxford: oxford university press, 1995); for a similar position, see partha chatterjee, “religious minorities and the secular state: reflections on an indian impasse” public culture. vol. 8, no. 1.1995. 35s. lukes, “alienation and anomie” in philosophy, politics and society in p. laslett and w. g. runciman (oxford: blackwell press,1975). 36k. marx, early writings (london: penguin, 1978). 37for the failure of leadership in most african countries, see, chinua achebe, the trouble with nigeria (london: heinemann, 1993); see also these texts which give vivid accounts of how the elites have behaved in most african countries, jean -fran?ois bayart, the state in africa: the politics of the belly (london: longman, 1993); b. ayittey, africa betrayed (n. y.: st. martins press, 1992); jean-fran?ois bayart, stephen ellis, and beatrice hibou, the criminalization of the state in africa (london: zed books ltd, 2006), see especially chapter 5; see also some papers in africa now s. ellis (ed) (oxford: james curry ltd, 1997). i need to add here that there is massive corruption perpetuated by the elites in most african countries; for this see p. bond, looting africa: the economics of exploitation (london: zed books ltd, 2006), chapter 5. cf. also tunde zack-williams. op.cit. 38i am quite conscious of the ambiguity of the concept of public interest. for an interesting analysis of the concept see, brian barry, political argument (n. dipo irele 111 y,: humanities press, 1965). 39for an elaboration of this idea, see john rawls, political liberalism (n. y.: columbia press , 1996), pp. 133-168; for a position along the same line, see david gauthier, morals by agreement (oxford: clarendon press, 1986); see also brian barry, justice as impartiality, (oxford: clarendon press, 1995): john rawls (oxford: oup, pp. 60-77. 40j rawls, a theory of justice (cambridge, mass; harvard university press, 1971). 41j. rawls, political liberalism, p.134. 42ibid. p. 152. 43i cannot go into the various objections here but for some objections see brian barry’s text; op. cit. rawls’s version of original position has been improved upon by t. m. scalon. for scalonian text, see, “contractualism and utilitarianism”, in a. sen. and b. williams (eds), utilitarianism and beyond (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1982). and also the cambridge companion to rawls in s. freeman (eds), (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2003). for a critique of rawls from a radical perspective in recent times see suman gupta, the theory and reality of democracy (london & n. y.: continuum, 2006). *i wish to thank prof. abiola irele of harvard university, u.s.a for his comments and suggestions which have improved the paper and members of the premiere circle __ group of scholars and writers at the university of ibadan, nigeria __ for their comments on the paper when it was presented at the group’s seminar. 44for another position that could help in solving ethnic strife in africa see the text of kwasi wiredu, “democracy and consensus” in cultural universals and particulars: an african perspective (bloomington, in: indiana university press, 1996). 112 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 05 (67-84)_on schiller.pmd 67 on schiller’s aesthetic and social elevation of moral perception gerald moshammer mahidol university international college, thailand abstract many contemporary philosophical theories of morality operate according to crude logical examples. for instance: ‘setting a cat on fire is wrong’. schille’s robbed man scenarios from his kallias letters tell a subtler tale. in this paper, i claim that with the notion of moral beauty, schiller substantially transcends contemporary philosophical approaches to moral perception by (i) leading the eye to the ‘how’, rather than only to the ‘what’ of an action, (ii) loosening the fixation on the immoral, yet becoming aware of the graceful among the ostensibly dutiful and (iii) realizing that the possibility of moral perception is ultimately interlocked with graceful expressions in social interactions. i to the concert of contemporary ethics, theories of direct moral perception contribute a genuine philosophical tune in claiming that one could have direct sensory access to objective values without explicit deliberation or inference (audi 2013, mcgrath 2004, wright 2008). through a critical reading of schiller’s moral writings, in this paper i shall question, redirect and enlarge the framework within which such theories are situated. particularly, i choose a reexamination of schiller’s notions of ‘beautiful action’ and grace that can be positioned between kant’s rational ethical formalism and aristotle’s emphasis on practical wisdom. schiller’s moral writings try to solve the paradox of freedom in nature. establishing ‘moral beauty’ as the highest form of character, and calling for ‘gentility’ as beauty in social relations (kallias, 174), schiller’s exposition offers an alternative to both kantian rationalism and humean emotivism, one that speaks in the spirit of the enlightenment without becoming ‘sense-less’. 68 in letters upon the aesthetic education of man, schiller formulates a programmatic synthesis of reason and affection in response to the failures of the french revolution. however, schiller is by no means an anti-rationalist. in his third letter, one can read that “man is not better treated by nature in his first start than her other works are; so long as he is unable to act for himself as an independent intelligence, she acts for him” (aem, 37). in order to accommodate the notion of freedom, schiller’s holistic anthropology subsequently binds moral sensation to graceful acting. the claim for a natural bond between feeling and expression, as it is also stipulated in contemporary emotion research (see for an overview dunn et al. 2006 and lindquist et al. 2012) ultimately pushes the discussion of moral perception to a socio-political plane, which contemporary moral philosophy tends to disregard. ii schiller’s ethical interpretation of beauty as freedom’s appearance is derived from kantian thought and reminiscent of aristotle’s differentiation between the enkrates, i.e. those who are capable of temperate actions but feel counter-pressure, and the genuinely virtuous capable of ‘phronesis’, i.e. practical wisdom (nevii.1, 1145a18-19). while schiller’s moral philosophy overlaps with kantian thought in its adherence to a rational conception of duty (see beiser 2005, especially chapter 5), schiller’s inclusive conception of aesthetic existence differs from kant and his rigid reduction of morality and human life’s essence to dutiful acting. comparing schiller’s and kant’s moral philosophy, beiser writes that “kant subordinates humanity to morality whereas schiller subordinates morality to humanity” (beiser 2005, 186). schiller’s moral promotion of ‘play’ also deviates from aristotle’s appraisal of knowledge and rational endeavor as the highest good (nei.5, 1095b17-1096a5). what schiller’s moral philosophy does share with aristotle’s virtue ethics, and what distinguishes its tone from kantian thinking, is the explicit acknowledgment of sensibility as an integral part of human morality. on first glance, schiller appears to demand simple harmony between moral principles and inclination that is also promoted in contemporary ethical discussions. for instance, departing from julia driver’s virtue ethical treatment of huckleberry finn (driver 2001), michelle ciurria (2012) discusses three possible ethical constellations with regard 69 to huck helping jim escape from slavery. one expresses what i wish to call a ‘justice-cum-virtue’ equilibrium: when huck helps jim on both ‘deontic maxims’ (ciurria 2012, 246) and his friendship to him. the others constitute the remaining two possibilities in ciurria’s framework. the ‘real’ fictional huck believes that slavery is justified yet helps freeing jim as a friend, illustrating a subjective ‘justice-versus-virtue’ conflict. a second huck doppelganger is supposed to help jim based on rational criteria, however, without personal inclination, which comes close to the kantian ideal of rational duty. in order to demonstrate that schiller’s aesthetic sublimation of kantian ethics adds subtle nuances to the analysis of the complex interplay between duty, virtue and emotion, i shall first refer to schiller’s five cases about a traveler in need for help, a mini-parable of moral sensation that overlaps with, and enriches, ciurria’s possible-world fiction of ‘huck-intentions’. i am going to deconstruct three of schiller’s five scenarios from his kallias letters whose differences seem particularly instructive for a metaethical review of moral sensation (i will not quote the remaining two cases, yet briefly refer to them in my discussion). iii schiller introduces a robbed man who got thrown onto the street. having been stripped of his clothes, he is freezing. five travelers pass by. the first case plays out as follows: “i suffer with you”, says the moved traveler, “and i will gladly give you what i have. i only request that you do not ask for any of my services, since your appearance revolts me. here come some people, give them this purse and they will help you”. __ “that is well meant”, said the wounded man, “but one must also be able to see the suffering if duty to humanity...requires it. reaching for your purse is not worth half as much as doing a little violence to your tender senses. (kallias, 157) schiller’s first traveler appears a pure sensual being whose actions are motivated by his natural state. two divergent moments of the 70 short scene are paradigmatic. “i suffer with you”, he says and shows empathy that schiller calls subsequently “kind-hearted out of affect”. yet the traveler does not want to help the robbed man personally since the latter’s appearance revolts him. hence, affection and empathy become blurred. in terms of modern psychology, the first traveler in schiller’s example exhibits emotional ambivalence. this is not uncommon. based on historical, conceptual and scientific evidence, colombetti (2005) questions, for instance, whether valence could actually be properly grasped in terms of bipolarity, i.e. by qualifying emotions exclusively as either positive or negative. however, what schiller seems to have in mind with his first traveler is a conflict of two unrestrained diverse emotions, compassion and aesthetic repulsion respectively. one does not encounter a single emotion with ambivalent valence in this case, such as in a love-hate relationship. a proper understanding of schiller’s seemingly trivial example becomes further problematic once one acknowledges that in contemporary emotion research it is disputed whether emotions could, on natural grounds, be individualized. notably, against the ‘locationist’ view, constructivists argue that emotion categories signify concepts, rather than natural kinds, similar to color distinctions. constructivism supports the (nominalistic) stance that talk of emotions is a mere reflection of how human beings interpret and conceptualize emotional core affects, i.e. bodily sensations of environment’s motivational salience (see lindquist et al., 125). colombetti recalls that the term ‘valences’ is actually a rough translation of the german ‘aufforderungscharaktere’ (‘invitation-characters’) as it is used in the work of kurt lewin (colombetti 2005, 104-5). given this connotation, one can build an interesting connection between emotion valence and jeremy j. gibson’s ecological concept of ‘affordance’, i.e. the perceptual evaluation of what an environment offers an organism (gibson 1979). i believe that the interpretation of perception as the result of the interplay between (external) affordance and (internal) ‘ability’ (see greeno 1994) provides the most plausible psychological explanation of how a direct grasp of values could be understood. particularly, the notion of affordance highlights ‘dialectic’ interaction of an organism with its environment that appears crucial for the analysis of value formation in sensation. this, i posit, forms the conceptual framework within which one should decipher schiller’s scenarios. schiller’s first traveler, for instance, is feeling disgust when he encounters the robbed man, as the latter’s appearance affords such a re71 action. a contemporary view would stress that without certain neurobiological ‘modules’, particularly insula and amygdala, it would be impossible to generate disgust. yet such a naturalistic approach cannot get rid of the fact that perceptions and sensations have intentional content or at least generate from an objective causal source. for an alternative organism that is equally equipped with insula, amygdala and other relevant neural conditions, disgust vis-a-vis a robbed man could be out of question, unless human appearance is treated as a matter of beauty, style and decency. a guide dog, for instance, is supposed to be naturally democratic in her response to the outward appearance of a blind person she should assist. in short: beliefs and inclinations are interwoven. it is this holistic theme that makes schiller’s robbed man parable a valuable case study of moral philosophy. that human culture plays variations on ‘raw’ emotions qua body states can also be demonstrated with the second moment in the first traveler’s ambivalent reaction, empathy and compassion. indeed, investigations into the contribution of shared neural networks in third-person perception of pain suggest that especially male subjects make distinctions between inand out-group members in their empathy reactions. further, moral perception, in terms of pain empathy, appears to present a suffering fellow human being first and foremost as an inor out-group member (see singer and steinbeis 2009). thus, while empathy happens to be an immediate reaction to seeing someone in pain, the association of a suffering individual with either an inor out-group position defines whether empathy augments to compassion, or rather turns into a feeling of revenge. the important detail in this is that inor out-group classifications, for instance in the evaluation of individuals who either support one’s favorite or rival soccer team in the case of the aforementioned study, determine the course of moral perception. that empathy, as the picking up of the other’s pain sensation, would not be felt in isolation, but rather as compassion or revenge, shows that from a phenomenological point of view, there exists no isolated moral sense that in its entireness could be pre-rationally located. the subtlety with which schiller presents the indicated holistic picture of moral perception can be demonstrated with schiller’s fourth scenario. here, two former enemies of the robbed man still offer help, but without forgiveness for what the latter has done to them. their motivation is simply that the robbed man appears ‘wretched’, i.e. it is situational. although the robbed man should be ‘out-grouped’ from the perspective 72 of his enemies, momentary moral (or aesthetic?) affordance seems here to overcome a more general and permanent cognitive disqualification. subsequently, schiller seems to suggest a model of moral perception where the interplay between ‘hic et nunc’ affordances and beliefs principally yields open moral results, i.e. gives room to freedom. modern theories of direct moral perception suggest that ethical values are directly accessible, and can be ‘seen’ independent from what one believes. however, what one morally perceives is here meant to be distinct even from ‘secondary’ qualities such as colors and shapes, and moral values are supposed to supervene on, or have to be somehow ‘naturally’ inferred from relevant base qualities (see audi 2013 for such a position). in light of schiller’s robbed men scenarios, such a position appears questionable as it (i) neglects belief/desire holism, (ii) involves in the philosophically rather hopeless task of saving moral perception from overlapping with intuition and emotion and (iii) posits moral naturalism without a clear conception of objective moral properties. on the contrary, gibson’s dialectic notion of affordance, which schiller’s robbed man scenarios ‘prematurely’ exemplify, opens categorical gateways to moral sensation that help escape the aforementioned difficulties. according to gibson, “an affordance [...] points two ways, to the environment and to the observer [...] this is only to reemphasize that exteroception is accompanied by proprioception__that to perceive the world is to co-perceive oneself. this is wholly inconsistent with dualism in any form, either mindmatter dualism or mind-body dualism. the awareness of the world and of one’s complementary relations to the world are not separable”. (gibson 1979, 129) gibson neutralizes here ontological implications of perception and i would like to suggest that within a framework of moral affordances one could philosophically address morality without plunging into the enduring meta-ethical confrontations between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. a proper ‘functional’ analysis of direct moral perception in terms of valence import that leads to inclinations and desires in reaction to the environment, rests basically on the one important differentiation, between moral disposition and ability respectively. dispositions materialize necessarily within an appropriate environment, which only becomes suggestive as to certain abilities. it appears perfectly sound to state that autistic people are unable to both ‘see emotions of others and show empathy. yet such a formulation does not mean that ability automatically materializes under particular circumstances. being unable to do something is a subjective 73 restriction, while being able to do something is only an opportunity. in this sense, schiller’s first traveler is picking up moral affordances of the robbed man based on his sensory abilities. whether the situation presents ‘real’ values or rather initiates moral sensations, however, is a question that becomes mute in light of anti-dualistic thinking. further, in accordance with belief/desire holism, his ability to sense moral affordance is not independent from the traveler’s cognitive states. considered a scam, he hardly would get in conflict with aesthetic repulsion and be pressed to offer a solution to the situation schiller describes. gibson’s claim that proprioception is a constitutive component of ‘reality’ is particularly striking in relation to moral sensation when one considers current research into the mirror neuron system (see shapiro 2009) or, with similar implications, shared neural networks underpinning empathy as discussed above. from the perspective of moral affordances, schiller’s robbed man scenarios exhibit an early intuitive recognition of themes that contemporary social neuroscience imports into the examination of moral behavior. schiller’s proximity to kant’s ethics, however, crucially transcends the neuroscience of moral sensation by asking one of the most important philosophical questions of post-newtonian philosophy: how the notion of human freedom should be understood. iv the third traveler stands silently as the wounded man repeats the story of his misfortune. after the story has been told the man stands there contemplatively and battling with himself. “it will be difficult for me”, he says at last, “to separate myself from my coat, which is the only protection for my sick body, and to leave you my horse since my powers are at an end. but duty commands that i serve you. (kallias, 157-58) schiller’s third traveler exhibits outright moral rationality. in order to put this feature into a broader context, let me briefly return to the first scenario. here, the traveler’s moral nature produces an immediate conflict in response to the new situation. what is particularly noteworthy in schiller’s first robbed man scenario is its call for a “little violence to one’s tender senses”, which indicates a particular tension between aes74 thetic and moral sensation. in the original german, the critical adjective is “weichlich”, which could be rephrased as ‘overly soft’ and actually carries a more negative connotation, alluding to passivity, than the “tender” in the quoted translation of schiller’s letters. i believe that schiller alludes here to a point that is more systematically defined in kant’s framework of judgment types, particularly concerning its comparison and differentiation of the pleasant and the good. kant says that: the pleasant and the good have both a reference to the faculty of desire; and they bring with them the former a satisfaction pathologically conditioned (by impulses, stimuli) the latter a pure practical satisfaction, which is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented connexion of the subject with the existence of the object. (coj, para. 5) in kant’s framework, there is no place for ethically justifying sensation. if elevated to free imagination, and in emancipation from ‘pathological’ impulses and stimuli, perception becomes aesthetic and thus loses interest in the existence of what is perceived. according to kant, disinterestedness is a necessary condition of judgments of taste. ethical judgments, however, need to be both free and interested in the existence of their object, and thus can only generate from (formal) reason, which schiller’s third traveler exemplifies. indeed, the traveler’s hesitant yet dutiful action is in accordance with kant’s rational conception of ethics, yet not virtuous in aristotle’s sense. felt counter-pressure (“it will be difficult for me...”) is for both schiller and aristotle morally suboptimal. schiller calls the third traveler’s action “purely moral”, yet against “the interests of the senses”, which curiously stands in contrast to the demand for “a little violence to one’s tender senses” in schiller’s first case. schiller alludes in these cases to an important difference in how moral reasoning and moral sensation can interplay. both the first and third traveler exhibits pathological inclinations that are the result of natural conditions. the third traveler, however, is able to silence his immediate motivation through considerations of duty, while the first can only rationalize and adapt to, yet not overcome his ambivalent emotions. he thus ends up with offering the robbed man his purse. the fifth traveler, finally, exhibits moral sensation without conflict. 75 as soon as the wanderer sees him, he lays down his load. “i see”, he says of his own accord, “that you are wounded and tired. the next village is far and you will bleed to death ere you arrive there. climb onto my back and i will take you there”.__“but what will become of your load which you leave here on the open road”.__“that i don’t know, and it concerns me little”, says the carrier. “i do know, however, that you need help and that i am obliged to give it to you. (kallias, 158) duty and desire coincide here, forming the ideal of a virtuous ‘beautiful’ action. schiller’s second scenario has still remained unmentioned. exemplifying an economic model of care, here a traveler asks for compensation, which the robbed man rejects for a lack of “readiness to help”. in a final assessment of all five variations of his robbed man case, schiller says that all five wanted to help [...] one of them acted out of purest moral purpose. but only the fifth acted without solicitation, without considering the action, and disregarding the cost to himself. only the fifth...’fulfilled his duty with the ease of someone acting out of mere instinct’. __ thus, a moral action would be a beautiful action only if it appears as an immediate [...] outcome of nature. in a word: a free action is a beautiful action, if the autonomy of the mind and autonomy of appearance coincide. (kallias, 159) in line with the quoted passage, one can define virtues as the expression of ‘mindful nature’. unlike the first, the fifth traveler demonstrates character rather than spontaneous emotion and undirected empathy. further, in contrast to the third, his senses are in harmony with kantian duty. hence, schiller’s fifth case illustrates what i called above ‘justicecum-virtue’. the idea of beautiful acting must assume plasticity with regard to human nature’s endowment that allows for motivational approximation to laws of reason, a point it shares with aristotle’s virtue ethics. neither judgments of sense, i.e. pure instinctive reactions, nor economic trade-offs qualify as ethical justifications. however, it is important to notice that schiller’s illustrates an ideal harmony between the autonomy of the mind and the autonomy of nature’s appearance. obviously, for the ‘kantian’ schiller nature is fully determined by physical laws. only man;s 76 superior subjective faculties, reason and imagination, can generate the impression that nature is free and beautiful. injected into morality, where human nature is the ‘material’, this can only mean that beautiful acting must present nature in free form, i.e. as self-determined. a semiotic mediation between moral sensation and graceful expression in schiller’s aestheticized moral philosophy differentiates it from both aristotle’s virtue ethics and rational accounts of moral reasoning. further, by making the robbed man the subject, rather than the object of moral perception, schiller turns the table on contemporary approaches to moral sensation. v in order to capture schiller’s implicit view on moral perception, his moral philosophy’s overall signature requires some attention. for a comparison, let me highlight that aristotle’s virtue ethics demands emotional fine-tuning that only experience and moral practice can teach. formal rationality is thus considered insufficient as source for the understanding of morality. schiller equally emphasizes the indispensability of man’s natural conditions in moral formation, but he is nowhere as adamant as aristotle in pointing at particularizing emotions. schiller’s program, on the contrary, is characterized by the search for the ultimate harmony between natural diversity and rational unity. schiller writes that education will always appear deficient when the moral feeling can only be maintained with the sacrifice of what is natural; and a political administration will always be very imperfect when it is only able to bring about unity by suppressing variety. (aem, 40-1) distancing himself from the enlightenment’s rational monotony, and, like aristotle, subscribing to a ‘holistic’ anthropology, schiller famously aims at solving this perpetual moral conflict between reason and inclination in human nature through a generous notion of ‘play’. he states that when we welcome with effusion some one who deserves our contempt, we feel painfully that nature is constrained. when we have a hostile feeling against a person who com77 mands our esteem, we feel painfully the constraint of reason. but if this person inspires us with interest, and also wins our esteem, the constraint of feeling vanishes together with the constraint of reason, and we begin to love him, that is to say, to play, to take recreation, at once with our inclination and our esteem. (aem, 75) schiller’s ‘playful’ synthesis of ethics and aesthetics could be viewed as overly romantic and idealistic. further, when schiller urges to “put morality in the place of manners” (aem, 81), his notion of moral beauty seems to associate with the aristocratic etiquette in the 18th century that the then emerging european bourgeoisie has been adopting. when schiller uses the english dance of his time as an allegory for a free society, an aristocratic connotation of his notions of grace and gentility is hard to deny, for instance, when one reads that “the spectator in the gallery sees countless movements which cross each other colourfully and change their direction wilfully but never collide” (kallias, 174, italics are original). yet while one could indeed decipher schiller’s moral philosophy as mere intellectual poesy, or deconstruct some of its paragraphs as an elitist promotion of moral etiquette and mannerism, there exists probably no genuine ethical theory that juxtaposes so eloquently the ‘what’ of acting with its ‘how’. indeed, in formulating his notion of moral beauty, schiller is much more dialectic than both aristotle and kant. freedom, schiller writes, stands above both the necessities of reason and nature: “but the will of man is perfectly free between inclination and duty, and no physical necessity ought to enter as a sharer in this magisterial personality”. (aem, 40). schiller advocates neither kantian freedom from nature, nor unrestrained emotion, but rather a concept of personality that symbolizes unrestrained free play between duty and inclination vis-a-vis a loved person. the notions of love and play explain here deeds that appear right as much as they are desired. both ‘false empathy’ and ‘reason’s rigidity’, as one could phrase it, disappear in beautiful acting. in order to make sense of this condition, however, one has to further address schiller’s semiotic view on movement as a necessary constituent of human action. in his seminal letters upon the aesthetic education of man, schiller elaborates through the notion of play the paradigmatic synthesis of reason and sensation as the ultimate foundation of moral education. in 78 his slightly earlier theoretical reflections in on grace and dignity and his kallias letters, one can additionally find passages that also offer crucial semiotic substructure. in the former of these two 1793 writings, schiller contemplates on what could be called ‘physiognomy of sentient expression’, while the latter, in sequences that follow the robbed-man-parable from which i quoted above, particularly discusses the notion of technique as a ‘negative’, yet necessary condition of nature’s free appearance. these subtexts direct our attention to semiotic transformations of nature that indicate a moral dimension. herein lies, as i shall demonstrate in the final considerations of this paper, schiller’s genuine contribution to the analysis of moral perception and its role in moral philosophy. schiller’s notion of grace is supposed to transcend the mere beautiful of the aesthetic realm. beauty already associates the two separate worlds of necessities, reason and nature, thus leading the way to freedom and autonomy in appearance. grace, however, as an attribute of human acting that can be perceived, elevates beauty to the expression of moral character. schiller defends the concepts of personality and individuality against kant by arguing that only through the moral sentient condition (in german, “empfindung”), both rational duty and human nature can be done justice (see especially gd, 206-7). schiller speaks of grace as the symbol for “inclination to duty”, whereby grace is beauty that stems from the moral sentient condition. representation of beauty, however, is according to schiller “technique in freedom” (kallias, 162). thus, grace must also involve technique, i.e. formal artfulness. it is not easy to decipher schiller’s multi-faceted discussion at this intersection between on grace and dignity and his kallias letters, yet a close look reveals an underpinning core notion of movement. for instance, schiller exemplifies the appearance of freedom with the trope of overcoming the general and alien force of gravity: “we perceive everything to be beautiful [...] in which mass is completely dominated by form (in the animal and plant kingdom) and by living forces (in the autonomy of the organic)” (kallias, 164). the primacy of beauty in movement also shines through in examples where schiller does not address literal movement, such as in the case of a bird in flight or a horse’s light motion. prototypical for ‘static movement’ is here schiller’s reference to a curved line, as opposed to one with abrupt changes in direction (kallias, 173). thus, schiller seems to base moral beauty on movement even where a genuine temporal param79 eter drops out. contemporary neuroscience strikingly supports schiller’s reflection at this point (see freedberg and gallese, 2007). however, schiller demands more from beauty than ‘motion empathy’. beauty only emerges when nature appears as “following its own will” (kallias, 170). this temporal component carries over into schiller’s definition of grace: grace can be found only in movement, for a modification which takes place in the soul can only be manifested in the sensuous world as movement. but this does not prevent features fixed and in repose also from possessing grace. there immobility is, in its origin, movement which, from being frequently repeated, at length becomes habitual, leaving durable traces. (gd, 188) note that schiller characterizes the human condition through act potentials. actions are willful manifestations in time, whose modality can give expression to the synthesis of reason and sensibility, the active and the passive, the voluntary and involuntary, and thus accommodate one’s personality: when i extend the arm to seize an object, i execute, in truth, an intention, and the movement i make is determined in general by the end that i have in view; but in what way does my arm approach the object? how far do the other parts of my body follow this impulsion? what will be the degree of slowness or of the rapidity of the movement? what amount of force shall i employ? this is a calculation of which my will, at the instant, takes no account, and in consequence there is a something left to the discretion of nature. (gd, 190-1) schiller’s emphasis on the physiognomy of an action can be put in the context of modern sociology, goffman’s work on symbolic interaction (see goffman 1959 & 2005) and, particularly, bourdieu’s notion of habitus and social distinction (bourdieu 1977). yet, as aforementioned, while a critical deconstruction of schiller’s moral philosophy could find its demand for grace and gentility discriminatory and elitist, one has to read schiller’s appraisal of kantian duty, i.e. rational freedom, against 80 such an account. note that in schiller’s example, as discussed in this article’s initial section, the first traveler’s reaction to the robbed man’s misery is deemed inappropriate because of the traveler’s affection preventing him from accepting the required “little violence to his tender senses”. schiller’s allegory of freedom in animals’ movements should exemplify that, while the necessities of nature, i.e. gravity, can factually not be overcome, they still can ‘disappear’ in the expression and perception of motion. similarly, grace is for schiller the ethical disposition to display emancipation from nature, rather than a mere matter of distinct and distinguishing social habitus. schiller addresses here, besides movement, particularly facial mimicry and physiognomy that “speak”. he states: i call speaking...every physical phenomenon which accompanies and expresses a certain state of the soul; thus, in this acceptation, all the sympathetic movements are speaking, including those which accompany the simple affections of the animal sensibility. [...] to take the word in a more restricted sense, the configuration of man alone is speaking, and it is itself so only in those of the phenomena that accompany and express the state of its moral sensibility. (gd, 194-5) schiller’s contemporary kleist, in his philosophical dialogue on the marionette theater, counters schiller’s conception of grace. only blind nature (or god), says the main protagonist in kleist’s literary conversation, are capable of pure grace, which the naturally balanced movements of marionettes symbolize. consciousness, on the contrary, imports reflection, and thus hesitation, to human performance and expression. kleist claims that “we can see the degree to which contemplation becomes darker and weaker in the organic world, so that the grace that is there emerges all the more shining and triumphant” (kleist and neumiller 1972, 26). kleist overlooks that marionettes would neither perceive grace nor form its notion. schiller insists on sensation as an anthropological necessity that secures subjectivity, i.e. personal identity, through one’s actions. unformed natural expressions are ‘dumb’. they can display individuality, but never constitute personality (gd, 196-7). on the contrary, grace symbolizes the ideal harmony between moral duty and movements 81 that, as constituents of actions, stems from acquired sensual conditions schiller adapts kant’s dualistic metaphysics in its distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom. in schiller’s thinking, technique mediates between these separate worlds by bringing freedom into appearance. technique imports the impression of autonomous rules and regularities into the sensual realm that otherwise would be perceived under the influence of heteronomous physical forces. yet according to schiller, one reaches artfulness only when technique promotes freedom, i.e. autonomy in appearance. such aesthetic transformation of the physical realm happens when one perceives beauty in nature, in artworks and, finally, on a moral plane, in human acting. in the latter case, the beautiful generates from a subjective sensual disposition that enables the necessary metamorphosis, from passive nature to the active embodiment of morality in grace. vi schiller’s secondary notion of technique turns moral perception ultimately into a subject of social critique. only through cooperative techniques graceful behavior and its perception can ‘playfully’ develop and personality be put in a position where choice between inclination and duty is free. in terms of philosophical anthropology, schiller’s conception of grace reminds us of the constitutive, ‘transcendental’, conditions of human interaction, and could be read as an ‘embodied’ supplement to discourse ethics (see habermas 1991). schiller’s example of the english dance as a symbolic expression of individual freedom in group-action illustrates a ‘social score’ that allows for free play and ‘beautiful’ acting in accordance with duty. in this point, schiller’s thinking is actually closer related to gadamer’s ontological analysis of ‘play’ in truth and method (1975) than to, say, marcuse’s neo-freudian and subjectivistic re-interpretation of schiller’s ideal of aestheticized ethos (marcuse 1955). although gadamer explicitly seeks distance from kant’s and schiller’s subjective interpretation of ‘play’ (gadamer 1975, 102), his definition of play as “transformation into structure” (110) resembles the crucial ‘objective’ component in aesthetic practice that schiller also alludes to when he makes ‘technique’ a condition for freedom in appearance. certainly, gadamer’s emphasis on pure appearance of what is played, in contrast to the intentional states of the 82 players, overlaps partially with the impersonal characteristic of kleist’s marionettes. this becomes particularly obvious when gadamer points at impersonal expressions such as “the play of light” or “the play of the waves” (104). yet the ontological autonomy of play as structure also defines human play that is interwoven with intentionality: the playing field on which the game is played is, as it were, set by the nature of the game itself and is defined far more by the structure that determines the movement of the game from within than by what is comes up against [...] it seems to me characteristic of human play that it plays something. that means that the structure of movement to which it submits has a definite quality which the player ‘chooses’. (gadamer 1975, 144) the example of (physical) queuing might help demonstrate a categorical connection between gadamer’s ontological analysis of play and schiller’s notion of grace and gentility, that, if interpreted as social practices, no framework of moral perception should overlook. queuing can be seen as a miniature social system that is essentially linked to the social construction of time (see mann 1969). in light of my discussion hitherto, it is a kind of ‘play’ that can be performed gracefully, similar to the english dance schiller uses as an example. grace would definitely call for subtle dispositions in relation to movements in public space when one joins a group that is waiting for something. whether one grants exceptions, how someone who jumps the queue is addressed, or which temporary adjustments in the line-up are deemed acceptable when a newcomer sees a friend who is already waiting in line, are all issues that contribute to the overall functioning of this particular social subsystem. there are definitely different cultural forms of (mis)handling queuing, and there is certain room for personal interpretation of the playfield, yet common graceful behavior and interaction would certainly demonstrate a kind of ‘objective’ social ethos that echoes gadamer’s aesthetic ontology of play. what is now particularly interesting is that ‘graceful queuing’ rests also on material conditions. if a group grows into a critical mass, or the available public space is too small for a decent line, for instance, the game cannot be played gracefully, independent from the players’ ethos. the structural objectivity of play and social practices, i.e. human (inter)action, contradicts only on the surface with schiller’s demand for 83 genuine personal sensation and motivation. rather, the structural autonomy of play appears necessary in order to establish technique and regularity in what schiller calls ‘beautiful acting’. while for schiller grace reflects the “portion of the intentional movements to which the intention of the subject is unknown” (schiller gd, 190), gadamer specifies that this unintentional element needs an objective counterpart in order to be comprehensive: “the real subject of the game [...] is not the player but instead the game itself. what holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself” (gadamer 1975, 106). gadamer acknowledges the “seriousness” (106) of playing as the enjoyment in framed decision-making and risk taking. schiller, however, adds an explicit requirement of authenticity that, one could conclude, must naturally occur when someone is “drawn into play”. for schiller, as already underscored with reference to kleist’s marionettes, artful techniques without genuine sensation must remain a parody of grace: it is true that a man, by dint of art and of study, can at last arrive at this result, to subdue to his will even the concomitant movements; and, like a clever juggler, to shape according to his pleasure such or such a physiognomy upon the mirror from which his soul is reflected through mimic action. but then, with such a man all is dissembling, and art entirely absorbs nature. the true grace, on the contrary, ought always to be pure nature, that is to say, involuntary (or at least appear to be so), to be graceful. the subject even ought not to appear to know that it possesses grace. (gd, 192) moral affordances of a particular situation create potentially ambiguous and continuously orderable proprioception whose valence and strength are crucial in deciding whether one acts in accordance, or against applicable moral principles. an annihilation of cognitive dissonance in this interplay, i.e. grace, is not only a matter of whether an agent has been able to reshape her natural moral dispositions. further, she has to become confident that her action’s recipient would actually perceive her spontaneous conciliation of inclination and reason as graceful. such a framework of mutual understanding through acting and perceiving must be embedded in common social practices. without the structure of ‘social play’, like in schiller’s paradigmatic example of the english dance, nei84 ther the expression nor the perception of grace would be possible. subsequently, grace correlates with socially constituted moral abilities, i.e. the creation and perception of movements and expressions in social space that are dignified and morally beautiful. in this view, direct moral perception is not merely concerned with the epistemic detection of virtue or vice, but with both the sensation and the creation of moral beauty, freedom and love, which only can be achieved when moral dispositions are brought into harmony with moral and fact related beliefs. schiller’s moral writings serve here as a reminder that ethics must not overlook that without adequate social platforms that facilitate a common moral ‘semiotics’, this process can hardly be initiated and cultivated. vii i have argued that schiller’s moral philosophy promotes both the naturalizing and ‘politicizing’ of moral perception. its notion of grace suggests an expansion, if not redirection of the philosophical analysis of direct moral perception as it is presented in contemporary moral philosophy. particularly, schiller implicitly abandons both the subject-object and acting-perceiving dichotomy and is thus is line with certain theoretical implications of contemporary psychology and social cognitive neuroscience. further, my deconstruction of schiller’s moral philosophy could be summarized in the ontological claim that the social and the moral world essentially coincide, since both generate from our actions and perceptions. schiller’s secondary notions of movement and technique stipulate that the physiognomy and expression of actions are essential not only for how they are morally perceived, but also for the determination of what encompasses the moral world, which current theories of moral perception tend to overlook. bibliography aem friedrich schiller (1884) “letters on the aesthetical education of man”. in aesthetical and philosophical essays. boston: 33-125. gd friedrich schiller (1884) “on grace and dignity”. in aesthetical and philosophical essays. boston: 175-210. kallias friedrich schiller (2003) “kallias or concerning beauty: letters 85 to gottfried koerner 1793”. in classic and romantic german aesthetics. ed. j. m. bernstein. cambridge: 145-83. ne aristotle. nicomachean ethics. ed. h. rackham. perseus digital library. coj immanuel kant. 1914. critique of judgement. transl. j. h. bernard (2nd ed., revised). london. audi, r. (2013) moral perception. princeton. beiser, f. c (2005) schiller as philosopher: a re-examination. oxford. bourdieu, p (1977) outline of a theory of practice. cambridge. ciurria, m. (2012) “critical thinking in moral argumentation contexts: a virtue ethical approach”. informal logic 32(2): 245-246. colombetti, g (2005) “appraising valence”. journal of consciousness studies 12(8): 103-26. driver, j. (2001) uneasy virtue. cambridge. dunn, b. d., dalgleish, t and lawrence, a. d. (2006) “the somatic marker hypothesis: a critical evaluation”. neuroscience & biobehavioral reviews 30: 239-271. freedberg, d. and gallese, v. (2007) “motion, emotion and empathy in esthetic experience”. trends in cognitive science 11(5): 197-203. gadamer, h. g. (1975) truth and method. london/new york. gibson, j. j. (1979) the ecological approach to visual perception. boston. goffman, e. (1959) the presentation of self in everyday life. new york. goffman, e. (2005) interaction ritual: essays on face-to-face behavior. new brunswick, new, 18 jersey greeno, j. g. (1994) “gibson’s affordances”. psychological review 101(2): 336-42. habermas, j. (1991) moral consciousness and communicative action. cambridge. kleist, h. v. and neumiller, t. g. (1972) “on the marionette theatre”. the drama review 16(3): 22-26. lindquist, k. a. et al. (2012) “the brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review”. behavioral and brain sciences 35(3): 121-143. mann, l. (1969) “queue culture: the waiting line as a social system”. american journal of sociology 75(3): 340354. marcuse, h. (1955) eros and civilization: a philosophical inquiry into freud. boston mcgrath, s. 2004. “moral knowledge by perception”. philosophical 86 perspectives 18(1): 209-28. shapiro, l. (2009) “making sense of mirror neurons”. synthese 167(3): 439-456. singer, t. and steinbeis, n. (2009) “differential roles of fairnessand compassion-based motivations for cooperation, defection, and punishment”. annals of the new york academy of sciences 1167: 41-50. wright, j. l. (2008) “the role of moral perception in mature moral agency”. in moral perception. ed. j. wisnewski. cambridge: 124. 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 13-33 13 © 2000 by assumption university press moral leadership: exploring the foundations of good governance gerhold k. becker visiting professor, assumption university of thailand abstract his majesty king bhumibol adulyadej, is not only a formidable leader who has taken the well-being of his country to this heart but that he is also a moral leader of extraordinary stature. as he exemplifies the most characteristic qualities of moral leadership, he continues to provide moral guidance and vision for all his subjects, most importantly for those in positions of power in government, the judiciary, the military, and administration, extending all the way to leaders in business, education, and society at large. this paper will take inspiration from his majesty to meditate on the meaning of moral leadership in general. searching for shining examples of moral leadership the people of thailand have not to go far. they are most fortunate to have in their midst a most admirable leader who has lived by his moral convictions all his life and through many turbulent phases of politics. beyond all divisions that may otherwise exist the people of thailand are united in their view that their beloved king, his majesty king bhumipol adulyadej, is not only a formidable leader who has taken the well-being of his country to this heart but that he is also a moral leader of extraordinary stature. as he exemplifies the most characteristic qualities of moral leadership, he continues to provide moral guidance and vision for all his subjects, most importantly for those in positions of power in government, the judiciary, the military, and administration, extending all the way to leaders in business, education, and society at large. it is therefore my great pleasure and honour to contribute to this special edition of the journal in celebration of his majesty’s 60th anniversary of his accession to the throne. exploring some of the more pressing issues of moral leadership with regard to business and economics, i have been greatly inspired by the monumental life and work of his majesty. i. power, self-interest, and the moral imperative arguably, niccolo machiavelli’s book the prince is one of the most astute leadership manuals that even today offer valuable insights into the mechanism of power and the psychology of power-hungry leaders. its main thesis is encapsulated in the following observation: “one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved...for love is held by a chain of obligation that, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment that never fails” (machiavelli, 1999). the thesis reveals not only the mechanism and the psychology of power, but also and more importantly the ethical issue that comes with power and thus with leadership. i will argue that leadership in the world of today can no longer be based on (military) might, fear, or terror but must have a strong moral foundation. leadership therefore must be both: leadership whose power and authority has moral legitimacy by extending beyond individual selfishness, and leadership for which ethics has not merely instrumental, but intrinsic value. the moral dimension gives leadership its authenticity and transforms leaders from power-wielding individuals into persons respected for their commitment to the greater good of the whole society. they represent values that are not confined to the secrecy of boardrooms and centers of power but are universally recognized as the fundamental building blocs of a life worth living. as machiavelli’s book title suggests, throughout most of history leadership was mainly restricted to political and military leaders who held the fate of their subjects in their hands and presided over the flourishing or misery of their states. today, leadership has proliferated into many fields and leaders now can be found in various areas of society. while politicians and government leaders are still the most visible representatives of 14 prajñâ vihâra leadership, the enormous financial assets held by multinational corporations, which in some cases far exceed the reserves of individual countries, suggests the power of business leaders may already rival that of heads of state. business leaders with powers to lay off workers, close factories or move them overseas, dismiss employees, and develop strategies that may affect the future of thousands of people depending on them have become increasingly instrumental in the well-being or decline of whole nations. in a variety of countries, most notably in the united states of america, the influence of business leaders even extends well beyond their own enterprises and into the heart of government. through donations to political parties and a whole range of lobbying activities they seek to tip political decisions in their favour. this suggests a new focus on leadership in business is needed and that, above all, it must be on its moral implications. there can be no doubt that the social sciences together with a whole range of business studies on management and human resources have tremendously contributed to a better understanding of the mechanisms of leadership. yet while these studies usually include some considerations about ethics, their main focus is on the strategic value of ethics for greater (economic) efficiency. frequently, ethics seems to be considered merely as bait for otherwise ethically ignorant or unconcerned leaders in their quest for personal success and profit. there is nothing wrong with regarding ethics as an asset and longterm investment provided it is not the only answer to the question: “why should i be moral?” if the only motivating answer were, “because ethics pays,” ethics would in fact be “instrumentalized” (jürgen habermas) and reduced to a function of success; any “intrinsic, “categorical”, or “absolute” value it may also have would be denied. yet, as former bosch ceo hans merkle once put it, there are certain things an honest person simply doesn’t do period. obviously, the coincidence of ethics and success on the one hand and reasons for behaving ethically on the other are two quite different concerns. to argue that ethics will “enhance the bottom line” offers little more than “an easy, prudentially acceptable, attractive, and enticing reason for business to be ethical” (cohen 1999). it ignores, however, the fact that everyone stands under the moral obligation, including business leaders. the ethical imperative demands that one does first what is good and right gerhold k. becker 15 and just and looks for personal gain later. there is a long tradition in philosophy arguing that ethics is never a means only but also the end as it defines what we call the good life. as immanuel kant has pointed out: even “moral philosophy is not properly the doctrine of how we are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to become worthy of happiness” (kant, 1788). therefore a good life in the emphatic sense of the term will include more than just profit and financial gain.1 the idea of moral leadership in business rests on two important assumptions: that business does not operate in an amoral space and that business decisions are not exclusively determined by economic factors of the market. the almost exclusive focus in leadership handbooks on the techniques and psychologies of leadership seems to suggest that their authors take as their premise the classic economic view. on this premise, economics is the realm of pure and autonomous business transactions that are – and must remain – external to ethics. the economy evolves with some kind of necessity in accordance with the laws of its own rationality and stands outside the realm of ethics and morality, since economic behaviour is thought to be separate and distinct from other types of behaviour. consequently, the primary criteria of business performance are economic efficiency and growth, and the primary goal and motivating force for business organizations is nothing but profit. (mckie, 1975). this view has been most famously summed up in the late milton friedman’s statement (in his capitalism and freedom, 1962) according to which the sole purpose of business is to make “as much money as possible.” in anthropological perspective, such strict separation of business from ethics draws on the psychology of self-interest: the strongest of the various human drives is the drive for individual gain and benefit in the interest of pure survival and the avoidance of costs. the genealogical lineage of this view is long but the philosophically most ambitious such conception derives from hobbes, who explained leadership as the necessary implication of social and political institutions in the service of the rational pursuit of self-interest. in the meantime, hobbes’ materialistic and a-historical anthropology has lost much ground. human agents are no longer seen as exclusively self-interested and ethics is not simply a means to achieve political or economic ends. consequently, the belief that ethics has no role to play in business or business decisions is now regarded as a myth: “the 16 prajñâ vihâra myth of amoral business.” companies, particularly multinationals, may frequently “forget” about ethics, but they depend on it nevertheless. although they are in business for making money, they rely on extant and well-functioning ethically informed social systems. as richard degeorge points out, “the myth [of amoral business] obscures the fact that people do apply ethical criteria” in judging business and that business leaders in general do not behave less ethical than the average citizen (degeorge, 1993). what is missing in the classic view is the perspective in which we see ourselves not only as role-bearers and functionaries of economic systems but also as social beings with a shared history of beliefs about “the good life.” as social beings, we can only expect to further our selfinterest when we recognize the needs of others. the necessary rules for effective cooperation among individual players are not only the result of rational behaviour and communal prudence but also of an interest in “the good” that can be shared. while self-interest may be the major drive in humans, it is certainly not the only one. throughout history human beings have built societies and instituted moral and legal frameworks that mediate individual selfinterest with the good of society as a whole. the difference between human society and a gang of bandits is that the latter is exclusively defined by individual and collective self-interest whereas the former is, in addition, defined by a comprehensive vision of the good. if ethics is not external to society but one of its main constituents, and if business is one of the most significant social institutions, then business cannot operate in an amoral space. in spite of all their historical variety, societal systems have internalized moral values without which they could not exist. in as far as the economy forms an integral and most important part of society it is also shaped by and implicitly draws on the moral vision of society as a whole. business, for example, is based on and presupposes trust, honesty, responsibility, and larger frameworks of fair play. business leaders and managers are not only relying on society’s functioning moral system in their daily interactions but are also themselves citizens with moral obligations. as “institution citizens” (nielsen, 1983) they must strife to integrate moral sensitivity with business competence and must not sacrifice moral judgment and practical reason for prudential considerations and the most profitable strategies. gerhold k. becker 17 instead, their moral goals must include balancing the needs of the individual and the community and defending society’s fundamental values (gardner, 1990). furthermore, moral leadership assumes that business is not exclusively determined by economic and societal forces that leave no space for moral decision-making. if it is true that the economic system as well as its key players depend and thus benefit from the common ethos they have not and cannot generate on their own, this reveals another important truth. contrary to popular perception, the autonomy of the economic system is not absolute and its rules do not have the status of immutable laws of nature. instead, it is the product of human culture whose further development can be directed in accordance with human needs and the moral vision of the good society. as the swiss business ethicist arthur rich has argued, in spite of economic rationality and the autonomy of the economic sphere business leaders retain sufficient space for responsible acting even within the parameters of the economic imperative and its constraining objectivity. although business leaders as everyone else have to work within economic and societal frameworks, these systems are not determinants that would leave no space for human freedom and decision-making. on the contrary, rich maintains that both the economic and the ethical are interrelated dimensions of human agency. “that which is not economically rational cannot really be humanly just; and that which contradicts human justice cannot really be economically rational” (rich, 2006). therefore, people need to reflect critically on their actions and assume responsibility before the court of humanity if they do not want to become slaves of their own creations. leadership and in particular moral leadership would be meaningless and indeed impossible, if economy and markets were exclusively determined by their own rationality. on this premise, even adam smith’s belief in the “invisible hand” is either one more myth, or rather the benign illusion by which we seek to protect ourselves from the otherwise disturbing truth about the utter insignificance of human acting and decision-making. or it is the somewhat reluctant acknowledgment that economic rationality can only be “trusted” and expected to work towards the greater good of all when it is based on a shared moral vision of functioning social relationships. 18 prajñâ vihâra ii. the moral legitimacy of leadership business leadership is characterized by asymmetrical powerauthority relationships in hierarchical organizations. it can be exercised by “coercion (the possession of, and threat to use, the means of inflicting pain), reward (the possession of, and the promise to bestow, pleasure) and legitimate authority (warrant to speak for the group).” business leaders have the power to “fire or demote, they can pay bonuses and promote, and the organizational chart backs up their right to command the obedience of their subordinates” (newton, 1987). while its authority derives from legal and contractual stipulations between employer and employee, its moral legitimacy must be justified independently of considerations about legality and economic efficiency. as leader and follower, manager and subordinate are not only functional actors of the corporate system but above all autonomous human persons, the moral legitimacy of authority and power is fundamentally grounded in the free and informed consent of persons and in the respect of their dignity. leadership certainly requires subordination and obedience, yet employees are not only means for greater profit, but persons whose rights must not be compromised and their dignity not violated (becker, 2001). moral leadership then integrates respect for human dignity and the recognition of fundamental human rights into business excellence and the competence to pursue economic efficiency. despite its somewhat high-sounding tone, grounding moral leadership in a strong conception of human dignity is not without teeth. it specifically challenges business practices sanctioned or tolerated by business leaders where violations of human dignity have come to be regarded as an unavoidable consequence of competitive market economy. placing the principle of human dignity firmly on the agenda of business leadership implies not only a genuine “concern for the safety and welfare of all individuals with which the corporation deals,” but also regarding subordinates “as independent persons, capable of making their own decisions” (newton, 1987). dignity-based moral leadership will not tolerate immoral orders or requests and not expect slavish obedience at gerhold k. becker 19 the expense of constructive and critical loyalty. it will promote a participatory leadership style that seeks as much consensus as possible. it regards colleagues as members of a team and actively seeks their opinion. it engages them in the process of decision-making instead of merely asking them to follow and execute orders. thus the moral legitimacy of leadership authority and power derives from the respect for fundamental rights grounded in the dignity of the human person. in particular, they include the right to physical and psychological inviolability, the right to privacy (data protection), and the right to fairness and protection against discrimination. this latter right extends from fair work conditions to fair pay. in this regard, business leaders need also to be sensitive in their sphere of influence and authority to issues of what johan galtung has called “structural violence” (galtung, 1969). company structures may be too rigid and stifle individual development or prevent employees from realizing their potential. as ethical rules are usually applied to individuals and not to companies, it has been argued that corporate cultures could generate “dehumanizing” effects on individuals. in her book value shift (2003) harvard business ethicist lynn sharp paine recalls how she once met a business man on a plane who told her frankly that his job was to be “a liar”: after his company had been bought by a large global enterprise his first truthful report as regional manager was received with such hostile response “that he never again dared to tell the truth.” since then he regularly fabricated reports for headquarters. while it is easy to blame this manager, the company leadership failed even more in its humiliating and dehumanizing treatment of its employees, which clearly shows its destructive potential and self-defeating consequences. klaus leisinger has proposed to domesticate corporate institutions with inherent potential for structural violence (instead of domesticating critical employees) by turning them into “open systems,” which are in continuous communication and interaction with their social environment. this would enable them to self-critically evaluate their own structures and to safeguard what he has called the “directed autonomy” of employees (leisinger, 1995). this implies providing the conditions for individual development and empowerment and working towards “a participatory leadership style” that subjects itself “to the control process 20 prajñâ vihâra of a pluralistic company-internal ‘public’.” good companies are not so much interested in people who are easy to manage because they are obedient, diligent, honest, punctual, and reliable, or – in the worst case – simply report what the boss likes to hear. instead they need employees who “distinguish themselves through primary critical virtues.” besides the traditional cardinal virtues of justice, courage, moderation and prudence leisinger argues that they include “basic attitudes associated with the concepts of civil courage, ability to cope with conflict, tolerance and the capacity for constructive disobedience.” iii. the organizational dimension of moral leadership the best qualities of moral leadership are useless unless they are embedded in a supportive company structure. that is to say, moral leadership not only interacts with internal environments, corporate cultures, and hierarchical structures, it also influences their development. while leaders may be the most visible representatives of an enterprise, companies, particularly corporations, are themselves moral agents with their own sets of values and objectives. ceos come and go, while companies are usually there for the long term. corporations are moral persons on equal footing with natural persons with all the privileges, rights, and duties moral persons normally have (werhane, 1985). while company leaders represent their companies most visibly, they must, above all, assure themselves of the moral grounding of their companies’ values and objectives. former johnson & johnson ceo ralph s. larsen once summed up his company’s famous ‘credo’ as follows: “in essence, it says that our first responsibility is to our customers, to give them high-quality products at fair prices. our second responsibility is to our employees, to treat them with dignity and respect and pay them fairly. our third responsibility is to the communities in which we operate, to be good corporate citizens and protect the environment. and then, it says that our final responsibility is to our shareholders, to give them a fair return. in the final analysis, the credo is built on the notion that if you do a good job in fulfilling the first three responsibilities, then the shareholder will come out all right. [the credo] implicitly tells us what’s important: honesty and gerhold k. becker 21 integrity, respect for others, fairness, and straight-dealing. those are the ethical values on which we operate all over the world” (2002). apparently, the interplay between leader and company is not exclusively defined by economic parameters but also opens up the moral space of leadership. in sorting out company values and formulating rules and policies leaders must therefore institute effective ethics checks and take measures to further develop established company policies in line with ethical standards. internally, the company-wide mechanisms to bring moral leadership to bear include codes of ethics, mission or core value statements, ethical training programs and reporting channels for ethical grievance (ethics office). as morality and the law do not necessarily match, and business does not operate in an ethics-free zone either, the need for the pro-active commitment to moral norms and values derives in part also from pragmatic considerations. while the law may only define the very bottom line of socially acceptable behaviour, unethical practices encouraged or condoned by business leaders, almost inevitably, will lead to calls by the general public for the extension of the law so as to assure compliance with society’s moral standards. business leaders are, however, well aware of the undesirability of ever expanding legislation as this ultimately would restrict the space for decision-making by countless legal regulations, which would stifle business activity. it would also put business at a considerable disadvantage with regard to companies operating under more liberal legal regimes elsewhere. moral leadership, in contrast, will be sensitive to society’s expectations and voluntarily adopt standards of good practice that take the justified interests of others into account. a recent example is the eu’s decision not to intervene, for the time being, in the financial markets by mandating regulations for the clearing and settlement sector. it expects, however, the industry to voluntarily adopt a code that would not only ensure greater competition through greater transparency in pricing but also more overall efficiency. leaders must pay close attention to the avoidance and clarification of value ambiguities and value rankings within their organizations. it has been argued that many ethics violations by mid-level managers signal in 22 prajñâ vihâra fact conflicts of loyalty resulting from their leaders’ inconclusive, ambiguous, or outright misleading value statements and personal behaviour. morally committed leaders therefore will take measure to assure the development of moral sensibility and morally sound judgment in their subordinates and throughout the company. they will see to it that the moral point of view becomes an integral part of company performance and strategy. besides their role within the company, moral business leaders will also recognize their responsibility within the larger business community. through business organizations, chambers of commerce, and board memberships, their influence usually extends far beyond their own company and into society. business leaders are in close contact with government, accompany government officials on visits to foreign countries and participate in negotiations on regional and international trade agreements (wto, gatt, gats, trips)2. in all those activities, moral leaders will tie the strategic interests of their companies, and of their country to standards of common morality. they will recognize the fundamental importance of issues of human rights, global justice, and environmental sustainability. they will refrain from merely paying lip service to moral commitments and instead will go the extra mile by searching for ways to translate their moral vision into tangible results in their own business enterprises. they will support initiatives that seek to apply the moral point of view to all areas of business activities and, in particular, shun all unethical practices. transparency international, the global reporting initiative, and the global compact may come to mind. a related project is the business leaders initiative on human rights (blihr). since its start in 2003, the initiative has attempted to break down some of the barriers and uncertainties that have kept many responsible companies from realizing their role in supporting universal human rights. as the corporate response to human rights, it is blihr’s ambition to “find practical ways of applying the aspirations of the universal declarations of human rights within a business context and to inspire other businesses to do likewise.” the initiative starts from the assumption that no company competing with integrity can justify “collateral human rights damage” in its endeavours to achieve its profit targets. gerhold k. becker 23 iv. moral competence, character, and virtues “in the final analysis, it is individuals who will determine the ethical quality of business conduct. personal integrity and commitment to high moral values begin in the family, are nurtured in schools and universities and mature on the job. the individual working in a business must be regularly reminded from the top of the need for integrity, which includes adherence to stated principles and codes but which also requires a standard of conduct beyond printed guidelines” (the institute of business ethics, 1988). if moral leadership is to be more than merely a technique for economic efficiency, leaders must believe in its intrinsic value and strife for moral character. they will neither merely instrumentalize ethics for personal success, nor mistake it as a substitute for “business literacy.” as konosuke matsushita, the founder and president of matsushita electric industrial, illustrates, moral leaders must be able to look “up to the stars” and at the same time stand with both feet on the earth. if they expect people to take their leadership seriously, they must inspire them not only by reward and precept, but primarily by example and by visibly living the values others are to follow. moral leadership therefore requires moral common sense, a clear value commitment, and moral character. it combines business expertise with the determination to bring the moral point of view to bear on all business decisions. its authority derives as much from moral authenticity as from business acumen. in surveying the various individual requirements of moral leadership, we must remember the simple truth that its authority has to be grounded in astute business competence and not only in the powers that come with the top position. at the minimum, this implies what business consultant warren bennis has called ‘business literacy’ (bennis, 1989). it includes job-specific knowledge and expertise, combined with high analytical intelligence and the ability to perceive, interpret, and create reality. usually, successful business leaders possess the knowledge, skills, abilities, personal characteristics, and other person-based factors that help distinguish between outstanding and average performance (pritchard, 1999).thus leaders are smart, articulate, strong-willed, and clear in their thinking, with 24 prajñâ vihâra a broad perspective on business and good judgment about important business decisions. they will have good interpersonal and communication skills and be excellent communicators who integrate expressive and communicative talents with argumentative competence without aggressiveness. it is only on those conditions that they can expect to influence and encourage subordinates to higher performance levels. in the global economy of multicultural interactions business leaders need also to be “globally literate.” they must be able and confident to see, think, act, and mobilize in culturally mindful ways. global literacy then is “the sum of the attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, skills, and behaviours needed for success in today’s multicultural, global economy” (rosen and digh, 2001). on the assumption that economic mechanisms do not fully determine decisions and that there is space for responsible and free agency, effective leadership requires broad vision and creativity. moral common sense identifies the bottom line of moral leadership and includes the moral minimum of acceptable business practice ranging from avoiding harm from others and respecting their rights to fairness and the intention to help those in need. regardless of how cleverly carried out, there is not much cultural insight needed to know that stealing company money or confidential information, plundering pension funds, accepting bribes, tolerating or authorizing false accounting practices, ignoring product safety standards, risking employees’ lives through unhealthy work conditions are universally condemned as shameful. moral leadership begins beyond this threshold. it commits executives to look for ways how they can contribute to minimizing unavoidable harms and to improve the living conditions of the worst off while increasing company value. personal value commitment: moral leaders are aware of the tie between the core values of their company and their personal value commitment. in adopting the moral point of view in all their actions, they develop moral character and become role models for their subordinates. this insight is shared by moralists as far apart as aristotle and confucius. confucius made it the cornerstone of his political philosophy and summed it up as follows: “when a prince’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without issuing orders. if his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.” (lunyu, gerhold k. becker 25 xiii, vi) and again: “a ruler who governs his state by virtue is like the north pole star, which remains in its place while all the other stars revolve around it” (lunyu, ii, i). for aristotle virtue is the integration of the moral point of view into all dimensions of life. moral leadership therefore unfolds in a variety of specific moral qualities. most important among them are honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, and justice and fairness. consequently, “managers who lack integrity place themselves and their organizations at risk. when they transgress norms of integrity, they risk losing the trust, loyalty, and commitment of employees, suppliers and customers. the best preventative is for organizations to define the moral standards expected of everyone and to develop programs that reinforce these standards” (zauderer, 1992). honesty and integrity imply a commitment to openness, truthfulness and transparency. to be honest is to be not deceitful, but frank and open. honesty is primarily a relational value rooted in an experience of sharing with others and communicating with them truthfully. for a business leader to be a person of integrity implies not to be corrupt, not to promise what one cannot deliver, not to misrepresent or to evade accountability, and not to suppress obligations. “honesty is absolutely essential to leadership. after all, if we are willing to follow someone, whether it be into battle or into the boardroom, we first want to assure ourselves that the person is worthy of our trust. we want to know that he or she is being truthful, ethical, and principled. we want to be fully confident in the integrity of our leaders” (kouzes and posner, 1993). trust: moral leaders are leaders who are trusted because they have proven to be worthy of trust – by colleagues, subordinates, clients, and customers. trust establishes an atmosphere of shared understanding, even feeling, and is a precondition of any alliance and mutual understanding. a moral leader is someone who succeeds in establishing and sustaining a framework of trust. trust is a reciprocal relation, one that binds people together in their mutual interests. “whereas leaders may be said to earn the trust of their followers, it is the followers who have the capacity to give that trust. trust thus becomes a part of the dynamics of the relationship between those who would be leaders and their followers” (solomon, 1998). only leaders able to foster relationships that create respect for all parties 26 prajñâ vihâra will earn the trust they deserve. business leaders who are insensitive to society’s value expectations or deliberately ignore them, will not be trusted. in the absence of trust, companies will increasingly be faced with calls for expanding legal controls that will institute costly checks and balances. moral courage: courage in general involves the capacity to cope with difficulties and dangers, and not to be intimidated by them or unduly fearful. moral courage is the capacity to do what one judges is ethically called for in spite of one’s instinctive reaction to the perceived dangers and difficulties in which such an action will result. moral courage means refusing to do what is unethical (e.g. paying or accepting bribes even in countries where corruption is “endemic” and laws either non-existent or not enforced) and instead promoting the ethical way even in times of recession and other obstacles. corruption is certainly the most obvious opportunity to prove moral leadership and to face it with moral courage. corruption is ubiquitous and affects all countries. it causes huge losses to individuals and societies and causes real harm. justice and fairness: moral leaders must have a clear sense of and a commitment to justice and fairness. justice concerns the fact that “each person matters and matters equally, each person is entitled to equal consideration” (will kymlicka). in business environments, justice demands of leaders the distribution of benefits and burdens in accordance with moral principles. they must be personally concerned about the fairness of salaries, bonuses, and wages they pay to the people in their companies. truly moral leaders will not shy away from applying standards of justice and fairness to their own remuneration. a reality check, however, confirms that in this regard most top salary packages are a matter of greed rather than morality and only a handful of business leaders may feel embarrassed by their overgenerous salaries. examples of business people falling short of fairness and integrity are not difficult to find; frequently, the disastrous consequences of their moral failures cause serious damage to their companies, hurt shareholders and investors, and ruin employees. it may be unrealistic to expect that top executives follow max de pree’s example. in the 1980s, de pree, ceo of office furniture manufacturer herman miller, decided after consultation with his friend peter drucker to limit the ceo’s salary to 20 times the amount made by gerhold k. becker 27 an average factory worker (murphy and enderle, 1995). in 2005, a typical fortune 500 ceo’s salary was on average 262 times that of his workers on the production line, and a number of top managers even made more than 400 times that amount. although the fairness of compensation levels is a complicated matter with no easy answers, it is a clear implication of moral leadership in business that it should transcend the levels of greed and selfishness. authenticity: authentic leaders are “those who are committed to a purpose or a mission; people who live by their values every day and who know the true north of their moral compass.” “without a moral compass, any leader can wind up like the executives who are facing possible prison sentences today because they lacked a sense of right and wrong.” authentic leaders lead “with their heart, not just with their heads, and have compassion for the people they serve. they do so with the discipline and commitment to get great results, not just for their shareholders but for all their stakeholders, their customers, their employees, and their shareholders – as well as for the communities they serve. this sounds old fashioned and yet is almost revolutionary” (george, 2003). authentic leaders therefore need moral courage, the capacity to do what one judges is ethically called for and not to give in to difficulties that may result. moral courage means refusing to do what is unethical, for instance paying or accepting bribes even in countries where corruption is ‘endemic’ and laws either non-existent or not enforced. v. moral leadership counts in conclusion, if we accept that business does not operate in an ethics-free zone and that business leaders are not only functionaries of economic efficiency but persons with moral obligations that define our common humanity, then moral leadership is not optional but imperative. it is beyond the simplistic dichotomy of being either an asset or a liability. instead it is an indispensable constitutive factor of what can count as business excellence within the parameters of the “good society.” much has been said in leadership studies about its strategic business value, and there are many reasons to believe that, indeed, ethics pays and 28 prajñâ vihâra that good ethics is good business. reporting the results of a survey of business leaders, the business roundtable of new york called the belief that ethics and profit contradict each other “a myth”. “that myth is thoroughly debunked by the attitudes and actions of top managers in the companies that contributed to this report. there is deep conviction that a good reputation for fair and honest business is a prime corporate asset that all employees should nurture with the greatest care.” basic to effective leadership “is the insight that corporate ethics is a strategic key to survival and profitability in this era of fierce competitiveness in a global economy.” various studies have confirmed the positive effect of trust, helpfulness, and fairness for increasing work-group creativity. yet there are cases where moral leaders had to quit because their companies floundered, and there are managers who thrive on unethical practices. the majority, however, seems to follow the opportunist’s path. they are ethical as long as it pays but have little qualms to trade ethics for more tangible profit. nevertheless, we need remind ourselves that ethics is not a luxury we could do without. business leaders, too, feel its pinch, and underneath their sometimes ruthless images many experience that nagging suspicion that all their success may fall short of their own ultimate standard. leadership consultant peter koestenbaum recalls one of those moments when a business leader comes across his true self: “i am the top executive in a very large organization and i live with a deep conflict. there is a fundamental ‘bad’ in business, a pervasive cancer. business lives in a cutthroat, ruthless, dishonest atmosphere. you do what it takes and care nothing about morality. you are not true to your word. in the end, you cheat, deceive, and lie. eventually, even the most determined among us must contract this disease. this presents me with a fundamental dilemma: can you win being ‘good’? i do not want to take on the characteristics that disturb me in some of my colleagues” (koestenbaum, 2002). obviously, the moral imperative cannot be ignored indefinitely. there is a moral self in each of us, which proves that ethics defines our very humanity. the motivation for moral leadership may start from strategic considerations about the many personal advantages that come with an ethical reputation in a society where ethics plays an increasing role in many gerhold k. becker 29 areas. it may also be motivated by the potential for profit and success for the company, at least in the long term. yet ethics has not only instrumental but intrinsic value. ethics is its own reward. it turns our world into a liveable habitat for all humans where together we can enjoy the fruits of our labour. moral leadership must therefore go beyond strategic calculations and express the conviction that, in spite of all the crooks around us, ultimately, ethics is without alternative; ethics counts (sharp paine, 2003) – in business as elsewhere. business excellence and excellent leadership performance without ethics are contradictions in terms. excellent business leaders are able to look their subordinates in the eyes without blushing, and they can bear their true selves without being ashamed every time they look at the mirror. moral leaders would not have to shy away from the “reciprocity test” of the universally recognized golden rule: “how would i feel if they did that to me?” it may be true that in the ruthless world of business as we know it such moral vision stands little chance. there is a long tradition in western philosophy that has even doubted that ethics can be taught, and this may well apply to courses in leadership ethics and managerial ethics training programs, if moral awareness and sensitivity had first to be created from scratch. the question, “why should i be moral?” will remain without answer as long as we do not know it already. it is either redundant or wrongly footed as it suggests a world without ethics as a viable alternative. yet human society anywhere in the world is already impregnated with moral values and norms without which humanity could not have survived until now. the truly amoral person, therefore, is either parasitic on society’s extant and functioning ethical systems, or he or she is mentally disturbed and deserves our compassion. the value of moral leadership training courses then lies in their potential for making leaders aware of their moral sense, strengthening their moral sensitivity, and furthering their competence for sound moral judgment. leaders need to be conscious of their power to harm or to benefit individuals and society alike, they need to include ethics in their standards of performance evaluation and the assessment of the consequences their decisions are likely to have. that is to say, they need 30 prajñâ vihâra to personally endorse in their practice the insight that ethics counts and that it is without alternative. in a world without ethics and the respect it demands of each of us for no other reason but that we are human beings – fragile and vulnerable, but with a dignity beyond all price – in such a world even profit and success would have lost their meaning. i would like to conclude with a quotation from jürgen habermas, which i fully endorse and to which i have nothing to add: “without the emotions roused by moral sentiments like obligation and guilt, reproach and forgiveness, without the liberating effect of moral respect, without the happiness felt through solidarity and without the depressing effect of moral failure, without the ‘friendliness’ of a civilized way of dealing with conflict and opposition we would feel, or so we think today, that the universe inhabited by human beings was unbearable. life in a moral void (…) would not be worth living. this judgment simply expresses the ‘impulse’ to prefer an existence of human dignity to the coldness of a form of life without moral considerations” (habermas, 2001). endnotes 1 in the kantian tradition, ultimately, it is not happiness that counts in morality but being worthy of it: “do that through which you become worthy to be happy” (kant, 1787). 2 world trade organization (wto), general agreement on tariffs and trade (gatt), general agreement on trade in services (gats), trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (trips). references becker, gerhold k. (2001), “in search of humanity: human dignity as a basic moral attitude.” in: matti häyry and tujia takala, ed., the future of value inquiry. amsterdam: rodopi, pp. 53-65. bennis, warren (1989), on becoming a leader. reading, mass.: addison-wesley. gerhold k. becker 31 cohen, stephen (1999), “good ethics is good business – revisited.” ethics and society, vol. 5. connerly, mary l. and paul b. pedersen. leadership in a diverse and multicultural environment. thousand oaks: sage publ., 2005 de george, richard t. (1993), competing with integrity in international business. new york: oxford university press. galtung, johan (1969), “violence, peace and peace research.” the journal of peace research 6, 2, pp. 167-91. george, bill (2003), authentic leadership: rediscovering the secrets to creating lasting value. san francisco: jossey-bass. habermas, jürgen (2001), die zukunft der menschlichen natur. auf dem weg zu einer liberalen eugenik? frankfurt: suhrkamp. kant, immanuel (1787), kritik der reinen vernunft, 2nd. ed., berlin: de gruyter, 1968. kant, immanuel (1788), kritik der praktischen vernunft. berlin: de gruyter, 1968. koestenbaum, peter (2002), leadership: the inner side of greatness. san francisco: jossey-bass. kouzes, james m. and barry z. posner (1993), credibility: how leaders gain and lose it, why people demand it. san francisco: jossey-bass publishers. larsen, ralph (2002), “leadership in a values-based organization.” the sears lectureship in business ethics. waltham: bentley college, pp.9-23. leisinger, klaus m. (1995), “corporate ethics and international business.” in: whose values? some asian and cross-cultural perspectives, ed. sally stewart and gabriel donleavy, hong kong: hong kong university press, pp. 165-210. machiavelli, niccolo (1999), the prince (1516), london: penguin. mckie, james w. (1975), “changing views.” in: social responsibility and the business predicament, ed james w. mckie, washington, dc: the brookings institutions, pp. 17-40. murphy, patrick e. and georges enderle (1995), “a managerial ethical leadership: examples do matter.” business ethics quarterly, 5,1, pp. 117-128. newton, lisa (1987), “moral leadership in business: the role of structure.” business and professional ethics journal, 5, pp. 74-90. nielsen, r. p. (1983), “arendt’s action philosophy and the manager as eichmann, richard iii, faust, or institution citizen.” california management review, 26, pp. 191-201. pritchard, k. h. (1999), introduction to competencies (white paper, society for human resource management: http://www.shrm.org rich, arthur (2006), business and economic ethics. the ethics of economic systems, leuven: peeters publishers. rosen, robert and patricia digh (2001), “developing globally literate leaders.” training and development, 55, 5, pp. 70-81. 32 prajñâ vihâra sharp paine, lynn (2003), value shift: why companies must merge social and financial imperatives to achieve superior performance. new york: mcgraw-hill. solomon, robert c. (1998), “ethical leadership, emotions, and trust: beyond ‘charisma’.” in: ethics: the heart of leadership. joanne b. ciulla, ed., westport, conn: quorum books. werhane, patricia h. (1985), persons, rights, and corporations. englewood cliffs, n.j.: prentice-hall. zauderer, donald g. (1992), “integrity: an essential executive quality.” business forum, pp. 12-16. gerhold k. becker 33 02_when spirit and intellect know no gender.pmd when spirit and intellect know no gender boundaries: women and the rise of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya in the ottoman empire during the nineteenth century sean foley middle tennessee state university, usa º·¤ñ´âèí ¤ò ṏ́ ò ºô¹·ì âù«ù¿ ¤×íë¹öè§ã¹ºãã´òêµãõ·õèáõíô· ô̧¾åáòก·õèêǿ ¢í§«õàãõâ áåð¨ñกãçãã´ôííµâµáñ¹ à¸íà¤â´ó㧵óáë¹è§¼ùé¹ó¢í§ naqshbandiyyakhalidiyya «öè§à»ç¹êò¢òë¹ö觢í§åñ· ô̧«ù¿õ·õè ત ¤òåố êòáõ¢í§à¸íกèíµñ駢öé¹áò àãôèá¨òกàã×èí§¢í§à¸íà»ç¹µñçíâèò§ º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ðµãç¨êíºçèòºãã´ò¼ùé¹ó¢í§åñ· ô̧ «ù¿õáõ·ñè¹ðµèíêµãõáåðê¶ò¹àò¾·ò§êñ§¤á¢í§¾çกà¸ííâèò§äã áåð·õèêǿ áåéç §ò¹»ãðàà·¹õé̈ ðªèçâàãòãëéà¢éò㨠ṍ¢ö鹶ö§¾ñ²¹òกòã¢í§êñ§¤ááøêåôá㹪èç§çôกäµô¢í§ »ãðçñµôèòêµãìµðçñ¹ííกกåò§êáñâãëáè abstract khadija bint yusuf was one of the most powerful women in syria and the wider ottoman empire. she also headed a branch of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya__the sufi order founded by her husband, shaykh khalid. beginning with her example, this paper examines how the leading sufi figures viewed women and their place in society. ultimately, this type of work will help us better understand the development of muslim societies during a critical period in the modern history of the middle east. 16 prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 16-28 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ introduction in 1891 khadija bint yusuf died in damascus at the age of 110. although she is unknown today, khadija was one of the most powerful women in syria and the wider ottoman empire. she not only formed close bonds with leading politicians, but she also headed a branch of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya__the sufi order founded by her husband, shaykh khalid. he was a charismatic kurdish religious leader and wali (or saint) from northern iraq, who won a wide range of followers in the 1820s in the ottoman empire and then the rest of the muslim world. shortly before his death in 1827, khalid entrusted khadija with administrative and financial responsibilities, and her role in ottoman politics and in the sufi order grew afterwards. seven decades later, khadija’a power was so great that the ottoman sultan at the time, sultan abdulhamid ii, made certain that her dying request to rebuild khalid’s grave in damascus was fulfilled. by analyzing the writings of shaykh khalid and his followers, court records and the firman decree, my paper today will illustrate the role of women in the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya throughout the nineteenth century. while women are absent from the scholarship on the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya,1 they nonetheless played a role in khalid’s career and in the growth of the order. they served as teachers, administrators, financiers, and even political leaders. i will argue that the prominence of these women should come as no surprise, since there is nothing intrinsic to shaykh khalid’s teachings or devotional practices that preclude women from participating in the order or in political life generally. i will also focus on how khadija and other women assumed control over khalid’s properties after his death, won exemptions from military services and financial privileges for khalid’s family, and forged ties with ottoman elites, including female members of the ottoman royal family. significantly, my approach to women in the naqshbandiyyakhalidiyya is consistent with the ideas of itzchak weismann, a leading scholar of sufism. he observes in the preface to naqshbandiyya: activism and orthodoxy in a worldwide sufi tradition that “naqshbandi authors tend to focus on the ‘great men’ of their brotherhood and to depict them as they ought to have been rather than they sean foley 17 actually were”.2 to address these biases, he argues that scholars must read naqshbandi writings critically and crosscheck them “where possible against independent sources”.3 my paper reflects my research in syrian and turkish archives over the last eight years-archives that contain a wealth of “independent sources” about the naqshbandiyya. from these archives we will see that a tradition of “great women” emerges from the naqshbandiyya along with the tradition of “great men”. i hope this paper will begin a process of reframing how scholars look at sufi orders during the nineteenth century. although there is growing scholarship on the role of women in sufism generally,4 there remains little work on sufism and women in the nineteenth century and how leading sufi figures viewed women and their place in society.5 ultimately, this type of work will help us better understand the development of muslim societies during a critical period in the modern history of the middle east. women and the rise of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya in kurdistan born in 1776 in a small village in the ottoman-iranian frontier district of shahrazur in what is today northeast iraq, shaykh khalid began his career in 1810, when he journeyed to india and joined the naqshbandiyya-mujaddidiyya tariqa. a year later, khalid returned to kurdistan. there he founded a suborder of the naqshbandiyyamujaddidiyya that bore his name: the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya. but differences with local religious and political leaders as well as international tensions prevented him from settling anywhere permanently until he came to damascus in 1823. he died there four years later, reportedly a victim of plague. after his death, the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya grew into a vast socio-religious network, which would go on to play a key role in muslim societies from algeria to southeast asia. women were integral to shaykh khalid’s success, beginning with the socio-cultural milieu in which the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya first arose: the jaf tribal regions in northern iraq, turkey and iran. in particular, the jaf tribes differed from arabs and even turks in their attitudes toward women, particularly during shaykh khalid’s lifetime. the british traveler, 18 prajna vihara ~ _ _ james rich noted in the 1810s that women in the jaf tribe lacked “the slightest pretension to a veil, nor had they even a handkerchief round the lower part of the face like arab women”.6 they did not even attempt to “hide themselves” from foreigners, and there “were as many women as men present” in jaf camps.7 in rich’s mind, the behavior of jaf women epitomized the wide freedoms enjoyed by women in a kurdish society in which women “mixed freely” with men in public and were “treated as equals by their husbands.”8 the freedom of kurdish women was so striking that rich also states that the condition of kurdish women was “far better” than that of their turkish, arab or iranian counterparts and that kurdish women in particular derided and despised “the slavish subjection of the turkish women”.9 equally striking is rich’s discussion of the central role of women in regional diplomacy, in the life of elite kurdish families in the 1810s and 1820s, and in the important role of keighan, believed to be an english female knight, in the foundational story of the baban family, the ruling family of khalid’s hometown, sulamaniyya.10 how accurate were rich’s observations of jaf behavior and the roles of kurdish women in the baban and other families? while research on kurdish women in the nineteenth century remains limited, martin van bruinessen’s work on matriarchy in kurdish societies suggests that kurdish populations in the ottoman lands __ both muslims and non-muslims __ accepted female political and military figures in the nineteenth century. he cites the female kurdish chieftain who fought for the ottomans in the crimean war and the tale of zambilfifrosh in which a queen falls in love with a prince who had foresworn luxury for the life of a wandering dervish. even more importantly, van bruinessen discusses adela khanum, the wife of the ruler of shahrazur, shaykh khalid’s and the jaf's home region; adela khanum was a descendant of the ruling ardalan family, who frequently intermarried with jaf rulers. she was shahrazur’s ruler in all but name from the turn of the twentieth century until 1924 __ even presiding over the province’s court. although adela khanum governed several decades after rich visited kurdistan, her success lends some credibility to rich’s portrayal of kurdish women, particularly that of elite women.11 within this context, women were critical to forming community bridges among various tribes for shaykh khalid and penetrating the local political elite. though there is scant biographical information on these sean foley 19 women in the hagiographies and official histories, khalid’s correspondence, rich’s observations and official ottoman government records give us a wider view. from khalid’s correspondence and ottoman records, we know that at least one of khalid’s wives had brothers and other relatives in aramayn (hawraman), a mountainous region on the ottomaniranian frontier northeast of shahrazur.12 in another one of his letters, shaykh khalid mentions that he had recently visited his mother (presumably his mother’s grave) in this region. finally, there are several letters written by khalid during his time in kurdistan addressed to a certain “walidat al-majida”, a term that could have applied to his mother or an older woman whom khalid especially respected. whoever walidat almajida turns out to have been, there is little question that older, motherlike women and their relatives were an important factor in shaykh khalid’s life in kurdistan. baghdad and damascus after the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya spread from kurdistan southward to baghdad between 1810 and 1820, khalid found a new group of male and female supporters. the enormous crowds that gathered at the baghdadi mosque that became known as khalid’s zawiya (the “tekke khalidiyya”) represented all ages, classes, and ethnicities. men and women affiliated themselves with the tariqa and visited the zawiya regularly. numerous wealthy baghdadis endowed orchards and properties to support khalid’s work. the ottoman governor of baghdad, dawud pasha, gave khalid a cash grant of 30,000 gold pieces, an enormous sum at the time, and provided funds to expand khalid’s zawiya.14 nonetheless, the largest contributor to the naqshbandiyya-khaldiyya was a woman, khadija katun; this fact suggests the great influence that women carried in baghdad’s elite at the time.15 as dina le gall notes in a culture of sufism: naqshbandis in the ottoman world, katun’s generosity was consistent with what other muslim women in the ottoman empire had done for centuries, where they often served as “benefactors for naqshbandiyya institutions”.16 the role of women in the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya continued 20 prajna vihara ~ _ _ to grow following khalid’s exile from iraq and decision to settle in damascus in 1823. among the prominent damascene women to join the order was halima al-kayyali al-khalidi. she was the wife of one of shaykh khalid’s closest syrian followers, ’abdullah bin mustafa al-khani, and the daughter of a prominent shaykh in damascus’ salihiyya neighborhood.17 in a letter penned in syria announcing the death of his son in urfa, turkey18 khalid requested that his disciple in baghdad, ’abd al-ghafur, inform his male and female followers that he had been able to come to terms with the sudden loss.19 when husan efendi died while shaykh khalid was in sulaymaniyya, khalid told ’abd al-ghafur that he had sent um ’abd al-hakim to express the condolences of his family and to console husan’s wife and daughter. he also asked um ‘abd al-hakim, whom he referred to reverentially as “shaqiqa al-shaqiqa” (sister of the sister), to tell husan’s family that he no longer saw them “as he did before” __ a potential indication that shaykh khalid would be closer to them in the future and look after their interests.20 as you can see, women were integral to the growth of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya. a flexible approach to women by the time of shaykh khalid’s untimely death in 1827, he had enough trust in khadija that he designated her alone in his wasiyya (or will) to oversee his properties in syria and to distribute charitable resources to the poor. the fact that shaykh khalid trusted a woman with such an important assignment along with the fact of the prominence of his female followers in damascus suggests the strength of women in the order. moreover, there is nothing intrinsic in shaykh khalid’s core teachings, in the beliefs of his followers, or the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya’s devotional practices that precludes women from participating in the social movement or in political life generally. equally importantly, there were other women who played important roles in the dissemination of sufi orders and muslim social movements generally in the nineteenth century: teachers, leaders, and even soldiers.21 that said, khalid was not a modern feminist, and there are instances in which he appears to have explicitly limited women’s access to sean foley 21 the tariqa, its followers, and places of worship. in this sense, women may not have been “equal” to men in the order’s hierarchy. shaykh khalid had female disciples throughout the ottoman empire and married the daughter of a prominent syrian family, but he forbade his disciples in istanbul after 1823 to marry turkish women or to allow young women to enter the official naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya lodge in istanbul; the point of this was to prevent them from forming independent alliances with turkish elites.22 equally important, naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya sources also record that khalid, while on his deathbed in 1827, barred women outside of his family from entering his family’s house in damascus. the only exception to this was the young women who had been required to remain in the house until they gave birth and who were now nursing children. in addition, he warned his followers not to start relationships with women under the pretext of teaching as well as to cease seeking guidance from his wives in the teachings of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya.23 how does one explain shaykh khalid’s approach to women? khalid often displayed flexibility in both his personal behavior and his approach to his followers. he could suspend basic teachings if changing circumstances dictated that he needed to do so. for instance, khalid’s instructions to his followers in istanbul in 1823 reflected his fear that one of them would build alliances with the ottoman elite and usurp khalid’s position as the leader of the order-just as his old disciple in the city, ’abd al-wahhab al-susi, had done before he was expelled from the order. similarly, khalid’s instructions to his followers in damascus in 1827 regarding women generally and his kurdish wives in particular may have been meant to prepare them for a new conservative social and political order in the city after his death. it is worth remembering rich’s observation that the position and freedoms afforded kurdish women in the nineteenth century was substantially better than those enjoyed by their arab and turkish sisters. women and the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya after 1827 as flexible as shaykh khalid’s teachings may have been, it is worthy of note that his followers either ignored or chose to forget these 22 prajna vihara ~ _ _ final instructions regarding women. after a brief exile in kurdistan in the late 1820s, khalid’s followers returned to the city and resumed administering his damascene house, land and network of pious endowments. rather than limiting their public role, khadija and other women played an even larger role, closely linking themselves to shaykh khalid’s legacy. through egyptian diplomatic documents, we know that khadija forged close ties with the egyptian government during the egyptian occupation of syria in the 1830s and won a state pension.24 in the years after the restoration of ottoman sovereignty in syria in 1840, khadija forged even closer ties with ottoman officials, including senior female members of the ottoman royal family’s properties. she also won generous state funds for the upkeep of shaykh khalid’s tomb-appealing directly to highest levels in the ottoman government. when khadija died in 1891, sultan abdulhamid ii requested that a poem be composed eulogizing his decision to uphold her request to rebuild khalid’s tomb.25 other women also played key roles in the naqshbandiyyakhalidiyya in damascus and beyond in the nineteenth century. one of khalid’s daughters, fatima, became a leading teacher of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya in damascus. she was very well schooled in islamic sciences, had her own followers, and married the scion of a leading damascene religious family, muhammad bin muhammad al-khani. she spoke four languages fluently: arabic, farsi, kurdish, and turkish. by comparison, her father, shaykh khalid, only knew arabic, farsi, and kurdish. he never learned turkish.26 another woman who played a role in the naqshbandiyyakhalidiyya was ’aftab bint ’abdullah, the daughter of one of khalid’s followers from baghdad. in 1854 she publicly challenged khadija’s decision to sell the contents of shaykh khalid’s personal library, bringing suit against her in damascus’s shari’a court. according to court records khadija argued through her representative that the books had been the property of her recently deceased son and she therefore had the right to sell them. ’aftab countered through her representative that khalid had written a family waqf (or pious endowment) on the flyleaf of a dictionary that mandated that the library remain intact. the chief judge, ’ali rida, sided with ’aftab and prohibited khadija and any other of khalid’s relatives from obstructing her access to the library. in a subsequent ruling, sean foley 23 rida certified the family waqf as official and mandated khadija to look after the administration of the pious endowment. khalid’s personal library remained intact and served the people of damascus well into the mid twentieth century.27 if one reviews the 1854 court case, khadija’s motives are pretty clear: she wanted the money that she would get from selling the books in khalid’s library. but ’aftab’s motives are not nearly as clear. bringing suit in court would have meant expending considerable time and resources fighting over the fate of a collection of books she did not own and could never expect to control. she must have had a very good reason to want the library to remain as it was. while personal animosities may have played a role in motivating ’aftab to sue khadija, there is another (and more likely) explanation: education. khalid’s library contained nearly 900 book manuscripts in arabic and persian on subjects as diverse as quranic exegesis, law, islamic mysticism, history, philology, arabic syntax, grammar, logic, philosophy, and arithmetic. the library also contained multiple copies of key islamic texts. in the period before the establishment of the zahiriyya library, such a vast collection of books, which multiple individuals could access at one time, was a valuable resource to students of the islamic sciences. in short, ’aftab sued khadija to make certain that she-like previous generations of men and women in the tariqa-could benefit from khalid’s library.28 conclusion nearly a hundred and fifty years after ’aftab went to court to save khalid’s library, men and women continue to be drawn to his followers in syria and in many other parts of the world. just as there is a silsila, or formal chain of spiritual descent, from shaykh khalid to his leading contemporary male disciples, there is also a silsila of female shaykhs that dates back to the nineteenth century. hundreds of girls and young women are trained annually in the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya tariqa in damascus and develop their own followings. other women have joined the tariqa and been initiated in communities administered by female followers in cyprus. today women are an inescapable part of any of the tariqa 24 prajna vihara ~ _ _ anywhere in the world.29 though they are often forgotten by scholars and laymen alike today, women made critical contributions to the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya and provide us important insights into the role of women in the middle east and in damascus during the nineteenth century. through a critical reading of naqshbandi writing and by referencing independent sources, i have sought to restore these women to their rightful place in the history of the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya and give a new insight into the rise of modern islamic movements. my conclusion (and source materials) reminds us of the wisdom of the leading syrian historian of the ottoman period, abdul karim rafeq. he argues that “no study of pre-industrial arab society and the changes it underwent…may be adequate, or in fact possible, without consulting [syria’s] rich law-court registers”.30 indeed, we would never know about khadija and other women in the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya without the registers. given the spiritual and intellectual limitations of the time __ and the way in which biography was conceived __ it would not have been possible for khalid’s hagiographers to have included material dealing with the powerful women present in the shaykh’s retinue. but spirit and intellect know no gender boundaries, and you may be sure that the women of khalid’s time made their presence felt. khadija is a particularly telling example of how much genuine power a woman of that time could attain. endnotes 1examples of the literature on the naqshbandiyya and shaykh khalid in western languages include the following texts: butrus abu-manneh, “the naqshbandiyya-mujaddidiyya in the ottoman lands in the early 19th century”, die welt des islams 22 (1985), 1-36; butrus abu-manneh, “khawla and rabita in the khalidi suborder”, in naqshbandis cheminements et situation actuelle d’un ordre mystique musulman: historical developments and present situation of a muslim mystical order: actes de la table ronde de sevres: proceedings of the sevres round table 2-4 mai/2-4 may 1985, ed. marc goborieau, alexandre popovic and thierry zarcone (istanbul and paris: editions isis, 1990), 281-294; hamid algar, “the naqshbandi order: a preliminary survey of its history and significance”, studia islamica 44 (1976): 124-152; albert hourani, “shaykh khalid and the sean foley 25 naqshbandi order”, in islamic philosophy and the classical tradition: essays presented by his friends and pupils to richard walzer, ed. m. stern, albert hourani and vivian brown, (columbia, sc: university of south carolina press, 1972), 89-104; albert hourani, “sufism and modern islam: mawlana khalid and the naqshbandi order”, in the emergence of the modern middle east (berkeley and los angeles: university of california press, 1981), 75-89; and albert hourani, “ottoman reform and the politics of notables”, in beginnings of modernization in the middle east: the nineteenth century, ed. william r. polk and richard l. chambers (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1966), 41-68; and itzchak weismann, taste of modernity: sufism, salafiyya, and arabism in late ottoman damascus (leiden: brill, 2001). there is also an extensive literature in arabic and farsi: ’abbas al-’azzawi, “khulafa mawlana khalid”, majallat al-majma’al-’ilmi al-kurdi (baghdad) 2 (1974), 182-222; nizar abaza, al-shaykh khalid al-naqshbandi al’alim al-mujaddid: ha-yatuhu wa-ahamm mu’allafatihi (dimashq: dar al-fikr, 1994); dr. irfan gunduz, osmanlilar’da devlet-tekke munasebetleri (istanbul: yaylacik matbassi, 1984); hawlkat al-hakim, “ab’ad zuhur al-tariqa al-naqshbandiyya fi kurdistan fi awail al-qarn al-tasi’ ’ashar”, studia kurdica 1 (1984): 55-67; abdrrahman memis, halidi bagdadi ve anadoluda halidilik (istanbul: kitabevi, 2000); mahindokht mu’tamadi, maulana khalid naqshband (teheran: pazhang publishing, 1990); and muhammad sharif al-sawwaf, mawlana al-shaykh khalid alnaqshbandi. (dimashq: bayt al-hikma, 2000). 2itzchak weismann, naqshbandiyya: activism and orthodoxy in a worldwide sufi tradition (new york: routledge, 2007), xiv. 3ibid. 4recent examples include camille adams helminiski, women of sufism: a hidden treasure (boston and london: shambhala, 2003) and rkia cornell, trans. and edit., early sufi women a bilingual critical edition of as-sulami’s dhikr anniswa al-muta ’abbitdat as-sufiyyat (louisville, ky: fons vitae, 1999). 5an exception is burney abbas, the female voice in sufi ritual: devotional practices in pakistan and india (austin, tx: university of texas press, 2002). 6claudius james rich, narrative of a residence in koordistan, and on the site of ancient nineveh with a journal of a voyage down the tigris to baghdad and an account of a visit to shirauz and persepolis (london: j. duncan, 1836), narrative, vol. i,181. 7ibid., 284. 8ibid., 283-285. 9ibid., 285. 10ibid., 291-301. rich notes that the baban family believed that keighan was an english warrior and had bested the finest turkish knights until she lost to the male founder of the baban dynasty, fakih ahmad. the ottoman sultan then rewarded fakih with territories in kurdistan and sanctioned his marriage to the female english knight. 26 prajna vihara ~ _ _ ’ .. .. < < < < < < < 11for more on this issue, see martin van bruinessen, “matriarchy in kurdistan?: women rulers in kurdish history”, the international journal of kurdish studies 6 (1) (fall, 1993): 25-39. 12shaykh khalid built a substantial following in this region and there are still important families con-nected to the naqshbandiyya-khalidiyya there today. for more on shaykh khalid’s influence on the ha-wraman, see ferhad shakely, “the naqshbandi sheikhs of hawraman and the heritage of khaliddiyyamujaddidiyya in kurdistan”, in naqshbandis in western and central asia, ed. elisabeth ozdalga (istanbul: svenska forskningsinstitutet istanbul, 1999), 92-100. 13for more on walidat al-majida, see shaykh khalid, maktubat khalid baghdadi (istanbul university library rectory, ay 728, folios 1-192, n.d.), folios 107a, 111a-112b, 148a-b, 150b, 165b, 166a, and 181b. 14yusuf ‘izzy al-din, dawud basha wa-nihayat al-mamalik fi al-’iraq (baghdad: matba’at alsha’b, 1976), 49. 15’abd al-ghani ibrahim al-durubi, al-baghdadiyun: akhbaruhum wamajalisuhum: kitab yabhath ’an majalis baghdad. edited by usamah nasir alnaqshabandi. al-tab`ah 2. (baghdad: dar al-shu’un al-thaqafiya al-’ammah afaq ’arabiya, 2001), 149 and 288-89. durubi provides a lengthy list of the lands endowed to provide for the upkeep of the zawiya and its accompanying buildings. 16dina le gall, a culture of sufism: naqshbandis in the ottoman world, 1450-1700 (binghamton: state university of new york press, 2005), 60. 17muti’ al-hafiz and nizar abaza, ’ulama dimashq wa-a’yanuha fi alqarn al-thalith ’ashar al-hijri (bayrut: dar al-fikr al-mu’asir; dimashq: dar al-fikr, 1991), 433 and dr. ‘ala’ al-din al-khani, al-usra al-khaniyya al-dimashqiyya (dimashq: dar al-fikr, 1986), 29. 18urfa is a town in south-central turkey near the turkish-syrian border. it was an important stopping point on the land route between iraq and syria. 19as’ad al-sahib, bughyat al-wajid fi maktubat mawlana khalid. (dimashq: matba’at al-taraqqi, 1334/1915-16), 219. 20ibid., 206-207. 21sahib, bughyat al-wajid, 259-265. a good example is nana asma’u. for more on her life, see beverly b. mack and jean boyd, one women’s jihad (blomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 2000). 22sahib, bughyat al-wajid, 121. 23khalid, maktubat khalid baghdadi, folios 44b-45a and sahib, bughyat al-wajid, 259-264. 24imad ra’uf, al-iraq fi watha’iq muhammad ali (baghdad: bayt al-hikma, 1999), 68 (#46 and #211). 25basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, sadaret mektubi kalemi, nezaret ve devair, 66/70, document date 12 safer 1269 (november 25, 1852); basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, sadaret mektubi kalemi, nezaret ve devair, 128/37, document date 28 rebi’ulahir 1271; (january 18, 1851); basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, sadaret mektubi kalemi, nezaret ve devair, 348/50, document date 29 ramazan 1277 (april 10, 1861); sean foley 27 .. < < <<< << < < < <<<< basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, sadaret mektubi kalemi, meclis-i vala, 127/47, document date 29 sevval 1277 (may 10, 1861); basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, yildiz perakende, umumi, 18/53, document date 25 agustos 1306/20 muharrem 1308 (september 5, 1890); basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, yildiz perakende, umumi, 19/51, document date 28 tesrin-i evvel 1306/26 rebi’ulevvel 1308 (october 26, 1890); basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, yildiz perakende, basbakanlik or baskanlik, 19/91, document date 4 tesrin-i sani 1306 (november 4, 1888); basbakanlik osmanli arsivi, yildiz perakende, umumi, 22/111, document date tarih ve imza: 25 agustos 1307 asim (august 25, 1890); and mufid yuksel, mevlana haltd-i sehrezori hazretleri’nin ailesine ait basbakanlik osmanli arsivlerinde bulunan belgeler, word document and e-mail, fatih, istanbul, july, 2004 (collection of documents from the basbakanlik in istanbul turkey), documents, documents 2-3, 5-10, and 14. i express my sincere appreciation to mufid yuksel for providing me access to these documents. 26makama shar’iyya li-dimashq, vol. 1151, pp. 153, 180-182, case dated 20 jumada i 1310 (december 10, 1892) and al-hafiz and abaza, ’ulama dimashq, 681. 27for more on the library and a copy of the specific court case, see frederick de jong and jan just witkam. “the library of al-sayk kalid al-sahrazuri alnaqshbandi: a facsimile of the inventory of his library (ms damascus, maktabat al-asad, no. 259)”, manuscripts of the middle east 2 (1987), 68-73. 28ibid. 29annabelle bottcher, “islamic teaching among sunni women in syria”, in everyday life in the muslim middle east, ed. donna lee bowen and evelyn a. early, 292-296, 2nd ed. (bloomington: indiana university press, 2002). 30abdul-karim rafeq, “the law-court registers and their importance for a socio-economic and urban study of ottoman syria”, in l’espace social de la ville arabe, ed. dominique chevallier (paris: g.p. maisonneuve et larose, 1979), 58. 28 prajna vihara ~ _ _ .. .. . .... . .. < .< < < < < < <<<< < < 02 (20-36)_philosophy.pmd 20 philosophy and healing: restoring an ancient alliance1 edward j. alam notre dame university-louaize, lebanon abstract we normally do not consider the close proximity of philosophy and medicine. yet many early philosophers were physicians and drew close parallels between philosophy and healing. this paper will investigate the value of this analogy, specifically with regard to the insights of science in contrast to the appreciation of human design. it will also consider the importance of memory. to re-member implies an intelligent and willed striving for courage and hope in the face of the supreme mystery, namely, death. it leads to the realization that the philosopher’s meditation upon death reflects upon the value of life. a few months ago a well known orthopedic surgeon in beirut told me i needed a back operation. i had a seriously herniated disc putting pressure on my sciatic nerve, causing numbness and pain in my leg and toes, making it difficult to even walk normally. i decided immediately to get a second opinion, only to be told by another orthopedic that indeed an operation was necessary. totally disconcerted by the bad news, as it meant, among other things, a cancelation of philosophy seminars in india, poland, and the ukraine, which i had long prepared for, i told my wife i wanted yet a third opinion, but she consistently reminded me that both doctors had impeccable international reputations, and that we had seen “with our own eyes” how the disc was protruding out into the spine. it was true. each doctor had patiently examined the mri’s with us and pointed out to us exactly what was wrong. but i was still resisting an operation because the pain was slowly going away, and the numbness was subsiding, even though i was still in pretty bad shape. when i had finally resigned myself to what i thought was the inevitable, i met by mere chance a neurologist, to whom i hurriedly explained my case, rather inappropriately, i might add, as the social circumstances of our chance 21 meeting was not the place for a medical consultation. in spite of this, he gave me his card and told me to make an appointment. i promptly handed him the mri’s when i met him in his office, expecting the worse. after a few moments of examining the pictures he said “ok, let’s have the real examination now”. surprised, i blurted out, “but what did you see?” he said, “well, i just saw some electronic images, but now i want to examine you; i don’t treat images, i treat persons”. it then occurred to me that the previous doctors had been much more interested in the images of me than in me. while leaving his office, i felt triumphant. no surgery. no more medicine. no more tests, just some more rest, some common sense caution, some physical therapy, and eventually some swimming and light stretching. i had to miss the trip to india, but the philosophy seminars in poland and the ukraine, the themes of which just happened to be on the identity of the human person, were back on the table. with renewed vigor i continued my work on the subject of personal identity, armed with a new insight into some of the challenges our ever so technological age presents__challenges that have everything to do with the subject i am privileged to speak to you about today, and which my title, philosophy and healing: restoring an ancient alliance, tries to capture. this brief personal overture is by no means meant to reject technology or specialization in modern medicine or in any other branch of knowledge for that matter, to do so of course would be to unwisely ignore a plethora of advantageous achievements that form the very fabric of improved modern society and culture. but i must say that, as someone who teaches philosophy, and as someone who hopes to become a real philosopher someday, i do read with great sympathy people like dr. patricia benner, who argue convincingly that due to the primacy of instrumental reason, which “surrounds technology in a certain prestige and aura. . . the technological approach in medicine has often sidelined the kind of care involved in treating the patient as a whole person with a life story, and not as the locus of a technological problem”.2 i am also in sympathy with someone like andrew taylor still, the father of osteopathy, who emphasized in the 19th century the importance of seeing deep and real connections between the mental, physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions of human beings, something that is today captured somewhat by the concept “holistic health” which, i assume, is now widely accepted by medical professionals worldwide. although still was somewhat revolutionary in his day, a long view of the history of medicine reveals that in some ways he was actually re22 covering a vision of medicine that was really quite ancient, one, that is, wherein many medical doctors were also philosophers. if we take even a superficial glance at the history of philosophy, in fact, we see that some of the most prominent philosophers were also medical doctors. beginning with hippocrates himself, who was known simply as the wise man, and whom aristotle referred to as the “great hippocrates” a rare compliment coming from aristotle, continuing with galen, moses maimonides, ibn sina, and many more, one could almost say that to be a doctor in the ancient and medieval world in both east and west meant also to be a philosopher. the famous stoic philosopher and great roman emperor, marcus aurelius, carefully chose a certain galen as his court physician not only because of galen’s superior medical knowledge, but because of his wisdom, exemplified in his well known treatise titled that the best doctor is also a philosopher__something a philosopher of the caliber of marcus aurelius__could certainly appreciate. galen argues in this 2nd century treatise that if the major impetus in becoming a medical doctor is anything other than the complete devotion to the art of healing the patient, then another profession should be chosen. when it comes to making money, galen is even more stoical than his stoical emperor since he argues that not only is the doctor not to be motivated by financial profit, but must learn to despise it. for galen, in fact, healing is an art, having much in common with music and poetry. the famous medieval jewish philosopher/physician, too, moses maimonides, in his celebrated medical oath, which echoed the major tenets of the hippocratic oath itself, spoke about the medical profession as a divine calling, a vocation, a love of wisdom. and ibn sina, perhaps the greatest islamic philosopher ever, who had considerable influence on thomas aquinas, one of the greatest christian philosophers ever, saw his own life as a philosopher and physician as profoundly and naturally complementary: one was all about the soul or the mind, the other was all about the body, but both, more than anything else, had to do with the love of healing, the loving desire to heal the whole human person__a desire that had everything to do with knowing what it meant to be human, and with philia-sophia loving wisdom, in other words, with being a philosopher. now although we can speak about the healing of the soil or the oceans or the planet, all these uses of the term are only analogous uses; they are all derived from and even presuppose and require a more fundamental healing, namely, a healing of the human person. but a great deal is assumed here. first and foremost, an assumption concerning the very 23 existence and nature of such a thing as the human person, and secondly, the assumption that something has gone wrong with it. questions concerning human nature, personhood, and the meaning of healing a wounded humanity have traditionally been reserved for the domains of philosophy, psychology, and theology, but with the advent of the biological revolution in 1953,3 biology has gotten in on the discussion as well. this is especially true of questions concerning human nature and personhood in so far as they relate to queries into the complex processes of the brain; such queries have developed into what some are calling a new science of mind. aided by remarkable accomplishments in molecular biology, this new science of mind or biology of the brain attempts to unite philosophy, psychology, and psychoanalysis in novel ways when it comes to questions concerning human nature and personal identity-leading to controversial positions such as the one suggesting that it is “each person’s brain [that] creates the consciousness of a unique self and the sense of free will”.4 and so whereas still’s ideas at the end of the 19th century regarding the need to see how the physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual dimensions of the human person are all connected might enjoy widespread support today, under the modern heading of “holistic health” the very meanings of the physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual have undergone and are still undergoing radical changes that make it difficult to put forward a clear account of what constitutes personal human identity or to describe accurately what is meant by human nature. it seems to me that if any talk about the connection between healing the human person and loving wisdom, that is, philosophy, is to make any sense, we must try to better understand these changes. to do this, it seems proper to begin with the physical, seemingly the least complicated among the four, and to point out that with the influential work of the 17th century french philosopher and mathematician, rene descartes, matter and the physical were reduced to mere extension and set in dualistic opposition to mind. this conception of the material or the physical had significant influence on the thought of important physicists and was partly responsible for the emergence of ‘classical’ newtonian physics, wherein the movements of matter were thought to be completely predictable and stable given a conception of time and space as absolute. for centuries, classical newtonian mechanics held sway until a new conception of matter began to develop in the 20th century. at a public lecture in greece some four decades ago, the great physicist werner heisenberg gave voice to what this new conception of matter was when he stated: 24 if i endeavor today to take up some of the old problems concerning the structure of matter and the concept of natural law, it is because the development of atomic physics in our own day has radically altered our whole outlook on nature and the structure of matter. it is perhaps not an improper exaggeration to maintain that some of the old problems have quite recently found a clear and final solution. so it is permissible today to speak about this new and perhaps conclusive answer to questions that were formulated here [in greece by philosophers] thousands of years ago.5 the radical alteration of outlook, of course, is a reference to the way twentieth century physics overcame the “classical” newtonian view of matter as constant and predictable. more specifically, heisenberg’s investigations into what takes place when elementary particles collide at adequately high levels of energy led him to assert that eventually all particles are either destroyed, leaving behind just radiation, or are converted into other particles. from this observation, he concluded that there must be an underlying substratum that potentially provides for all of the different forms of matter, but which does not have any of its properties. in a particularly precise formulation of this, wherein we are able to see exactly what he meant when he stated that “it is permissible today to speak about this new and perhaps conclusive answer to questions that were formulated here [in greece by philosophers] thousands of years ago”, he explains: we can say that all particles are made of the same fundamental substance, which can be designated energy or matter; or we can put things as follows: the basic substance “energy” becomes matter by assuming the form of an elementary particle.6 what is remarkable about this to me is that we find one of the twentieth century’s most important physicists answering a fundamental question about matter in terms so strikingly close to those of aristotle’s that it sounds like aristotle himself. moreover, the work of scientists such as michael faraday and philip anderson have shown analogously that because matter is neither a conductor nor an insulator, it only stands 25 to reason that it is supple enough to potentially become both, again, a very aristotelian sounding description of matter as a kind of potency with infinite flexibility and unlimited suppleness. for a long time now my hunch has been that just as the new physics has to some extent vindicated aristotle’s doctrine of matter, modern molecular biology will eventually vindicate his doctrine of form and soul. what i mean is that if it were not for the new physics, we would never have had the breakthroughs in molecular biology that we have had. and if the new physics really does vindicate aristotle’s doctrine of matter, then the breakthroughs in molecular biology, which are essentially dependent upon the new physics, must also be somehow related to aristotle’s doctrine of matter. i thus concluded some years ago now that since aristotle’s doctrine of matter necessarily presupposes and includes his doctrine of form and soul or mind, then both modern twentieth century physics and modern molecular biology, which depends upon it, also accepts, to some degree, perhaps unwittingly, aristotle’s doctrine of form and soul or mind. i will not attempt to lay out the entire argument here,7 as it is long and arduous and presupposes a mastery of aristotle’s linguistic apparatus, but i do want at least to suggest that aristotle’s treatise on the soul is not at all outdated by new developments in biology, and that the new biology may in some ways come to vindicate some of aristotle’s penetrating insights. this traditional philosophical account of the soul, in fact, complements what still had to say about the second component of what it means to be human, namely, the mental, and which now i would like to say something about. this seems especially important today given the advent of the new science of mind or biology of the brain, which, as mentioned, has recently been attempting, due to the dramatic and exciting achievements in molecular biology, to unite philosophy, psychology, and psychoanalysis in novel ways, particularly when it comes to questions concerning human nature and personal identity__and has generated a number of controversial positions regarding the origin of mind__positions related in particular to the complex phenomenon of memory. if we are to say something meaningful about the healing of the human person, in other words, we should seek to address the question of the nature of mental reality in the light of what is, perhaps, one of the greatest mysteries of all, namely, the mystery of what it means to be human. as early as the end of the 5th century bce, in fact, hippocrates states in a treatise titled on ancient medicine “that the only source for precise knowledge on the [nature of 26 man] is medicine”, but then he goes on to tell us that to acquire such knowledge the doctor “must embrace medicine itself correctly in its totality” which is to say “in that historia [history] or investigation that consists in knowing what man is, the causes of his formation, and all the rest, with precision”.8 it has probably become evident by now that i will not speak to you this afternoon about ethics, at least not directly. nor, then, will i address directly the complex subjects of bioethics and medical ethics, which is what one might expect from my title; after all, what else would a philosopher addressing medical professionals and doctors speak about? i have avoided these subjects not only because i am not a competent bioethicist, but because a lot of what goes on in bioethics and medical ethics today is misleading in that it misses what philosophy has traditionally understood by ethics as a branch of philosophy organically joined to the other major branches of philosophy: aesthetics, anthropology, metaphysics, and epistemology. my impression is that, today, the rich and ancient branch of philosophy known as ethics has been trivialized, often times with the best of intentions, by lawyers, judges, medical professionals, doctors, journalists, economists, and professionals in advertising and marketing.9 even the few competent bioethicists who really know ethics in this fuller sense as an integral branch of philosophy, and who also know biology deeply, must face the ever-growing challenge from the legal arena, which dictates the agenda and development of bioethics in ways that tend to be legalistic and reductionist. by focusing directly on the mystery of what man is, to quote hippocrates, or of what it means to be human, that is to say, on philosophical anthropology, rather than on ethics, which because of these present day trends, tends to digress into various kinds of moralizing, i hope to provide a wiser, that is, a more philosophical account of this mystery__one that sees aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics as all integral and important elements of this search. i shall seek to do this, as i’ve indicated, in the context of what leading experts are saying about the new science of mind or biology of the brain as it relates to exploring the mystery of consciousness, memory, personal identity, and free will. one such leading expert is eric kandel, winner of the 2000 nobel prize in physiology or medicine, who in his book, in search of memory, reveals that, like many of the great doctors of old, his deepest interests are philosophical. fascinated by the phenomenon of memory, as the title of his book indicates, he dwells upon how essential memory is not only 27 for “enabling us to solve the problems we confront in everyday life”, but for the very continuity of individual identity. at one point he states, “[w]e are who we are because of what we learn and what we remember”.10 as a physician, his interest in the new science of mind is undoubtedly motivated by his hope to discover better treatments for memory loss and posttraumatic stress disorder, both of which we now know contribute to psychiatric disorders such as depression and schizophrenia, but the ultimate impetus in his research has to do with, in his own words, “penetrating the mystery of consciousness, including the ultimate mystery: how each person’s brain creates the consciousness of a unique self and the sense of free will”.11 with this, kandel reveals both his deep philosophical interests and his philosophical assumptions__assumptions which seem to be gaining ground in elite circles and which, in my judgment, need to be questioned at a fundamental level. for so much is at stake here in terms of what it means to be human that will in turn determine what human healing is really all about. there is no doubt, then, that kandel is both philosopher and physician, and seems to have become a kind of model for many elite and cutting edge physicians to emulate. his desire to merge philosophy, psychology, and psychoanalysis with the biology of the brain is certainly a step in the right direction with respect to both holistic learning and holistic healing and, in this, his approach to both education and the human being is commensurate with the approach of the great ancient and medieval doctor/philosophers of old, who pursued knowledge in an integrated, interdisciplinary, and non-fragmented way. thanks to kandel’s discoveries, and the many related scientific breakthroughs of the late 19th and 20th centuries in, for instance, magnetism and electricity, the various theories (often times competing) of evolution, early genetics, the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics (mentioned above), molecular biology and biochemistry, the thermodynamics of non-linear open systems far from equilibrium, astrophysics and others, the reductionism of 17th century mechanism has finally been overcome.12 we have come a long way from the cartesian reduction of matter to mere extension; the multi-layered variety and complexity of natural phenomena revealed by these developments in science is staggering, but what is even more impressive is that in the midst of this remarkably diverse and nearly unfathomable vision of nature, there are still those rare geniuses like kandel who strive for unity and integration in knowledge and resist the almost inevitable fragmentation and departmentalization accompanying intense specialization. 28 in spite of all this, however, kandel’s efforts to develop this new science of mind by merging philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis with what he consistently calls the biology of the brain rather than a biology of the brain, may also be moving towards a reductionism, albeit different than the mechanistic reductionism that the late 19th and 20th century discoveries in science overcame. but reductionism, if in fact this is where he is going, in whatever form is reductionism and therefore is always misleading. just as the cartesian mechanical philosophy tried to reduce all the other sciences, including philosophy, to a particular mathematical method, kandel, too, reveals certain reductionist tendencies, but in terms of a biology of the brain, a biology which he insists on calling the biology of the brain, as if there were only one biological approach, and which he uses synonymously with the phrase the new science of mind, or biology of mind insisting in both cases on not using the definite article to qualify mind. we should not, he says, refer to the new science of the mind, or to the new biology of the mind, but to the new science of mind or the new biology of mind. these are not pedantic hair splitting particularities, but reveal what the elite in this field hold and teach concerning the very meanings of the terms mind and brain. to their great credit, and against descartes’ mind/body dualism, they hold, as aristotle did, that the human mind and the human brain are inseparable, but in stressing the unity, they tend to lose sight of the subtle distinction, or better yet to explain the subtle distinction in ways that tend to reduce mind to brain. explaining the first of five principles upon which the new science of mind is based, a science which kandel believes will be as important to the 21st century as the biology of the gene was to the 20th, he states, . . . mind and brain are inseparable. the brain is a complex biological organ of great computational capability that constructs our thoughts and emotions, and controls our actions. the brain is responsible not only for relatively simple motor behaviors, such as running and eating, but also for the complex acts that we consider quintessentially human, such as thinking, speaking, and creating works of art. looked at from this perspective, mind is a set of operations carried out by the brain, much as walking is a set of operations carried out by the legs, except dramatically more complex.13 29 the analogy is an interesting one per se: the legs are to walking as the brain is to the mind. at one level, i can imagine any one of our ancient or medieval philosopher/doctors agreeing with it, but to turn the analogy into a principle, and the very first one at that, is problematic on a number of fronts-not the least of which is the way it is then taught dogmatically at elite institutions as a fundamental tenet of the new science of mind, a premise of sorts which ultimately leads to the conclusion that the new science or biology of mind, using the power of molecular biology, promises to explain the remaining mysteries of life including how the brain “creates the consciousness of a unique self and the sense of free will”. and this, to be sure, our pre-cartesian, medieval and ancient doctor/ philosophers would certainly not agree with, and, whatever it is worth, nor would i. cognizant of just how reductionist this sounds, those in the field are quick to point out, as kandel does, in a defensive mode, that for “biologists working on the brain, mind loses none of its power or beauty when experimental methods are applied to human behavior”. these same biologists, among whom he is one of the most prominent of course, he goes on to say, “do not fear that mind will be trivialized by a reductionist analysis, which delineates the component parts and activities of the brain. on the contrary”, he argues, “most scientists believe that biological analysis is likely to increase our respect for the power and complexity of the mind”.14 i suspect he is right here, but be this as it may, what he avoids really explaining and defending, which is typical of those in the field, is actually what matters most, namely, the thesis that the human mind, consciousness, memory, creative thinking, and spirituality all “originate” in a physical organ. this is simply assumed to be the case based on the novel and incredible ability to identify how each mental function in the brain (from simple reflexes to complex creative acts) is “carried out by specialized neural circuits in different regions of the brain”,15 and, moreover, based on the fact that we now know that “these circuits are made up of the same elementary signaling units, the nerve cells”, and that the “the neural circuits use specific molecules to generate signals within and between [these] nerve cells”. admittedly, these are extraordinary accomplishments, but i do not see how such remarkable achievements prove in any way that the “brain creates the consciousness of a unique self and the sense of free will”. they only indicate just how intricate the complex functions of the brain are to the phenomena of consciousness, memory, creative thinking, free will, and spirituality. in other words, what the astonishing success of 30 the biology of the brain has shown is just how inseparable the human mind (or human soul, to use the traditional word) and the human brain really are. but this insight is as old as aristotle himself, who in developing the thought of his master, plato, argued strongly against any mind/ body or spirit/matter dualism and provided a sophisticated account of the differences without, however, compromising their fundamental unity. thomas aquinas, in fact, one of the most famous medieval aristotelian philosophers goes so far as to say that the human mind or soul is not even what it is without the physical body. this aristotelian account dominated the western intellectual tradition right up until the time that descartes rejected it and introduced a matter/mind, body/soul dualism, which, as i’ve mentioned a few times now, was finally overcome by the scientific discoveries of the late 19th and 20th centuries, discoveries, which, like heisenberg’s theory of uncertainty, vindicated to some extent aristotle’s rich and supple account of matter as potency. we are still waiting, however, for the biological revolution to vindicate his account of form or soul which cannot be separated from his account of matter; the two are mutually dependent and intertwined and are not intelligible unless taken together. for this reason, i think the biological revolution, which itself cannot be understood, and would not have occurred, without the prior revolution in physics, will also lead to some kind of vindication of aristotle’s account of substantial form and soul. this vindication may very well come from the new interpretations that some molecular biologists are putting forth with respect to what the new science identifies as its fifth and final principle, namely, the fact that “specific signaling molecules have been conserved__retained as it were__through millions of years of evolution. . .[some of which] can be found today in our most distant and primitive evolutionary relatives: single-celled organisms such as bacteria and yeast and simple multicellular organisms such as worms, flies, and snails [that] use the same molecules to organize their maneuvering through their environment [which] we use to govern our daily lives and adjust to our environment”.18 from this amazing discovery, proponents of the new science then conclude “that the human mind evolved from molecules used by our lowly ancestors and that the extraordinary conservation of the molecular mechanisms that regulate life’s various processes also applies to our mental life”.19 to argue, however, from the astounding discovery regarding the similarity of signaling molecules in all living organisms (from the simplest to the most complex) to the conclusion that the human mind therefore evolved from molecules used by our own lowly 31 ancestors, and that the extraordinary conservation of the molecular mechanisms that regulate life’s various processes also applies to our mental life, is problematic on a number of different levels: first, a strict identification is made here between mind and brain without any discussion of why in the long tradition of science and philosophy, many good thinkers have always made a clear distinction between the two, without however dualistically separating them. second, to say that the human mind evolved from molecules used by our lowly ancestors ignores what other molecular biologists are saying about these so-called “lowly ancestors”, namely, that those closest to us may not have been so lowly after all. i refer here to the developments that took place about a quarter of a century ago, when john gribbin and jeremy cherfas challenged traditional paleontological theory by suggesting in their book, the monkey puzzle (1982), that the common ancestor we share with the gorilla and the chimpanzee had distinctly human characteristics. they also suggested that the paleontologists had been off by about fifteen million years in terms of when this common ancestor lived, putting the date around five, rather than around twenty, million years ago. in 1997, fifteen years after the publication of the monkey puzzle, simon easteal of the australian national university declared that in using the latest procedures in molecular biology, he and his colleagues had interpreted the dna evidence in such a way as to confirm what gribbin and cherfas had already suggested, that is, that apes are descended from man, not man from the apes. superficial commentary hurriedly pitted the biologists against the paleontologists, suggesting that the latter’s work had become irrelevant overnight. more informed investigations, of course, point out the obvious error in such claims by underscoring the fact that without paleontology, the so-called molecular clock20 is useless. it is not my concern to analyze how this molecular clock works; it is enough to say that the ticks in this clock can only be counted once a reasonably accurate date for the split between any two species has already been provided, and such a split cannot be determined without the fossil evidence of the paleontologists. the real breakthrough came in 1967 when berkeley’s vincent sarich and allan wilson, building upon the work of george nuttal and paul ehrlich, eminent biologists of the late nineteenth century, and especially upon the work of morris goodman in the late 1950’s, began to count the ticks of the molecular clock beginning with the split between old world monkeys and apes, which the fossil evidence had reasonably situated at about thirty million years ago.21 simply speaking, the count32 ing had to do with comparing monkey proteins with ape proteins. when the counting was over, sarich and wilson claimed that gorillas, chimps, and humans, all shared a common ancestor as recently as about five million years ago. the 1980 specification of the entire dna sequence for the virus phix 174, which led to the completion of the first map of the entire human genome some twenty years later, seems to have vindicated the findings of sarich and wilson, as well as improved upon the accuracy of the date of the existence of the common ancestor that humans, chimps and gorillas all have in common, putting it between 3.6 and 4 million years ago. the new date stunned the scientific world because according to reliable fossil evidence, our ancestors may have learned to walk upright well before this date. in the light of this new evidence, gribbin and cherfas felt confident in their hypothesis that the common ancestor was probably more human like than ape like,22 and went searching for further evidence. where this search will ultimately lead is hard to say, but the point i'm trying to drive home here is that although evolutionary theory is virtually impossible to deny, the variations on the evolutionary theme are diverse, complex, and nowhere near being agreed upon by the scientific community. therefore, to speak about evolution as if it were one thing, the details of which are unambiguous and well known facts, is to go way beyond the available evidence. even the stunning genetic fact that chimps and humans and gorillas are genetically as close (or closer in the case of chimps and humans) as the goat is to the sheep or the zebra is to the horse,23 98.4% to be exact, needs to be qualified. that is to say, some scientists are quick to remind us that although we were able to specify the entire dna sequence for the virus phix 174, which in turn led to the completion of the first map of the entire human genome about a decade ago, it is still the case that the functions of about 97% of the human genome is still waiting to be identified and remains largely undetermined; to call this genetic material “junk” dna, they tell us, simply because we have not been able to identify its function, is misleading. scientists like w. w. gibb’s argue in fact that we may still find some gems among the so-called junk.24 none of this of course is meant to call into question the importance of the biological revolutions in 1953, 1980, and 2000; it is meant, rather, to challenge the position which uncritically reduces mind or soul to brain based on the premise that these biological revolutions of the 20th century are essentially the natural outcome of the very first biological 33 revolution in modernity, that is to say, the revolution spawned by charles darwin's work in the 19th century. we tend to forget that what was so revolutionary about the 1859 publication of darwin’s the origin of species was not the idea of evolution per se, an idea which we find among the ancient ionian philosophers,25 but an idea that concerned the very purpose of biology itself. before darwin, the purpose of biology by and large had been understood as an attempt to explain design in nature, but darwin “proposed. . . that evolution’s driving force [was] not a conscious, intelligent, or divine purpose, but a “blind” process of natural selection, a completely mechanistic sorting process of random trial and error based on hereditary variations”.26 in many ways, of course, this idea was completely predictable given the influential epistemological assumptions of the 17th century mechanical philosophy, and it is perfectly commensurate with such a philosophy. but for some strange reason, many of the very scientists who otherwise welcome the overthrow of this mechanical philosophy in say, the new physics, continue to hold on to a variation of this mechanistic view when it comes to the new science of mind. kandel, in fact, draws a clear straight line from darwin to modern biology right up to the new biology of the brain and suggests that just as modern biology, following darwin’s “blind” process assumption, “ask[ed] us to believe that living beings, in all their beauty and infinite variety, are merely the products of ever new combinations of nucleotide bases, the building blocks of dna’s genetic code”,27 so eventually will the new biology, following this same darwinian assumption, ask us to believe that “consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells”.28 i have no doubt that kandel is right, what i call into question, rather, is whether or not any of these explanations are complete, or ever will be complete, without taking up the question of what it is that accounts for the ultimate unity of the human organism. naturally, this quandary surrounding the question of unity is recognized as the crux of the issue by many proponents of the new science, including kandel, and to his great credit, he seeks such unity in the mystery of memory; this is why so much of his brilliant research on the brain focuses on memory. but the problem is that investigations into memory, whether taken up by the neuroscientist, the philosopher, or the psychologist, will not provide any kind of unity when it comes to questions of personal identity, human nature, or what is meant by healing this nature unless one overcomes the mechanistic, “blind” process assumption and 34 admits that purpose and design are at the heart of what memory itself is: “[i]n fact, design seems to be a common thread that runs through the whole of nature. time and again, in cases that have been catalogued since the dawn of biology, nature reveals that (1) its inhabitants are remarkably suited to fit their environment and (2) the various parts and systems that constitute organisms are remarkably suited to work in concert with one another”.29 and when it comes to the phenomenon of memory, to deny design would be to deny memory itself; even the etymology of the word itself reveals that to re-member or to re-group or to re-gather is necessarily concerned with achieving unity for the purpose of survival, but not the kind of survival that implies “chance mutations, driven blindly by the engine of natural selection”,30 but the kind that implies an intelligent and willed striving for courage and hope in the face of the supreme mystery, namely, death. with this, we have come to the utmost meaning of all we have been considering: philosophy, healing, what it means to be human. it was for a good reason that plato said "all philosophy is but a meditation on death”. the great philosopher/doctors of old emphasized that it was this, above all, that set human beings apart from the higher animals, and i suppose we would have to add today, above super-computers. a meditation upon death brought the lover of wisdom, the philosopher, to the see that although death could only be postponed, and not overcome, life was still worth living. to heal the patient meant, above all, to help the patient realize this timeless truth, and the memory of this truth was said to live on in the really genuine healers. the physicians who were able to preserve this truth and hand it on to their patients, were the ones considered to be philosophers, lovers of wisdom. it seems fitting then, to bring this very modest meditation on an enormous topic to a close with a quote from a sixth century philosopher by the name of boethius, who towards the end of his life, as he was facing his own death, penned the following words to describe his own ultimate healing: the clouds of my grief finally dissolved and i drank in the light with my thoughts recollected i turned to examine the face of my physician. i turned my eyes and fixed my gaze upon her, and i saw that it was my nurse in whose house i had been cared for since my youth__the house of philosophy. 35 endnotes 1this key note address was given at the 12th annual chicago trauma symposium/www.chicagotraumasymposium.com on august 5th, 2010 2see charles taylor’s the ethics of authenticity (cambridge: harvard university press, 1991) 6. 3i refer here to the discovery of the structure of a part of the human cell called deoxyribonucleic acid, better known as dna, by francis crick and james watson. it was revolutionary in that it provided “an intellectual framework for understanding how information from the genes controls the functioning of the cell. that discovery led to a basic understanding of how genes are regulated, how they give rise to the proteins that determine the functions of cells, and how development turns genes and proteins on and off to determine the body plan of an organism”. see eric r. kandel’s in search of memory: the emergence of a new science of mind (new york: w. w. norton and company, 2006) xi. 4kandel, in search of memory, 11. 5werner heisenberg, “natural law and the structure of matter, in across frontiers (new york: harper and row, 1974) 104. 6ibid., 115. (my emphasis in italics) 7for the full argument see my “soul matters: apes, anthropology, and aristotle” in transdisciplinarity in science and religion ed. eric weislogel (bucharest: curtea veche publishing house, 2009) 197-234. also available on-line at www.metanexus.net under “conferences, 2008”. 8see pierre hadot’s the veil of isis: an essay on the history of the idea of nature (london: the belknap press of harvard university press, 2006) 19. in some ways, i have taken this quote out of context because part of what hippocrates is resisting here is the influence of certain kinds of philosophy upon medicine. however, i do maintain that the thrust of what i am trying to argue here is warranted. 9see bioethics in central europe ed. vasil gluchman (slovakia: filozoficka fakulta pu v presove, 2009). the title is somewhat misleading, as many of these conference proceedings are not limited to analyzing the situation of bioethics only in central europe, but have a global perspective. 10in search of memory, 10. 11ibid., 11. 12see richard khuri’s “values and science: a philosophical examination of values suggested by recent developments within the sciences”__a presentation given at an international conference in venice, 2010. soon to be published by. . . 13in search of memory, xii. 14ibid., 9. 15ibid., xii. 16ibid. 17for a full treatment of what exactly is meant by “substantial form” in the modern context of the biological revolution, see my soul matters: apes, anthropology, and aristotle” in transdisciplinarity in science and religion ed. eric weislogel (bucharest: curtea veche publishing house, 2009) 197-234. also available on-line 36 at www.metanexus.net under “conferences, 2008”. 18in search of memory, xiii. 19ibid. 20“credit for the concept of a molecular clock is given to emile zuckerkandal and double nobel prize winner linus pauling. they are supposed to have been the first to realize that because mutations are random events dna should accumulate them at a relatively steady rate”. see john gribbin’s and jeremy cherfas’ the first chimpanzee: in search of human origins (new york: barnes & noble, 2001) 114. 21ibid., 23, 114, 125, 129. 22ibid., 1-3. 23ibid., 1. 24see w. w. gibb’s “the unseen genome: gems among the junk” in scientific american, (2003) 289 (5): 46-53. 25anaximander, the student of a certain thales who is known as the father of philosophy in the west, composed a long poem on nature wherein he suggests that plants and animals evolved from mud and that humans evolved from fish. 26this is how kandel puts it: see in search of memory, 8. 27ibid., 8 28ibid., 9 29see thomas b. fowler’s and daniel kuebler’s the evolution controversy (grand rapids: baker academic, 2007) 237. 30ibid. 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 124-140 124 © 2000 by assumption university press contemporary indian approaches to epistemology with special reference to b. k. matilal k. srinivas pondicherry university, india abstract epistemology is one of the oldest branches of philosophy that is basically concerned with the scope and aim of knowledge, the means of knowledge, and the justification of knowledge. there are instances in the western tradition where philosophy is reduced to mere epistemology. but there are also systems or schools of thought that balance epistemology with metaphysics. for my present study i have chosen one of the most distinguished contemporary indian philosophers, b.k. matilal. i propose to discuss how he understands this balance. i epistemology is one of the oldest branches of philosophy that is basically concerned with the scope and aim of knowledge, the means of knowledge, and the justification of knowledge. there are instances in the western tradition where philosophy is reduced to epistemology. for example, the continental rationalists and the classical british empiricists found nothing more enterprising than epistemology in their respective doctrines. we find a similar case with metaphysics. for example, in the philosophies of hegel and heidegger the focus on metaphysics is conspicuous. but there are also systems or schools of thought that have a balanced view as regards the nature of epistemology and metaphysics for they believe that these two traditional branches of philosophy are not independent from each other, rather they are interdependent. therefore, they cannot afford to ignore each other. among the many examples of this approach, are the classic approaches of kant in the western tradition, and indian philosophical systems in general. of course, in the philosophy of nyaya the epistemological and logical concerns dominate all other aspects of philosophy. this does not mean that nyaya did not subscribe to any metaphysical standpoint. as an allied system of vaisesika, nyaya admitted its metaphysics. now we have, at least, two distinctive approaches to epistemology. they are: (1) epistemology per se is independent of any other branch of knowledge, (2) epistemology cannot be separated from metaphysics. the western epistemologists in general subscribe to the former view, and their indian counterparts to the latter. for my present study i have chosen one of the most distinguished contemporary indian philosophers, late professor b.k. matilal (hereafter bkm). i propose to discuss his approach to epistemology in general. in his book on perception: an essay in classical indian theories of knowledge, bkm writes that: “ the dispute that lasted in a little over twelve centuries between the nyaya and the buddhist over the nature of perception, the critique and criteria of knowledge, and the status of the external world is undoubtedly an important chapter in the history of global philosophy.”1 just as we come across realism, phenomenalism, and representationalism in the western epistemology, we also come across these doctrines in indian philosophical systems, especially in nyaya and buddhism. therefore, for any western reader, as rightly pointed by bkm, this would be a familiar area. another interesting point is that some modern indian philosophers have produced illuminating expositions and reformulations of some of the speculative metaphysical doctrines with a view to highlight the traditional style of philosophizing in india. this is a laudable effort on the part of those who have undertaken this exercise of making the philosophical theories of india more prominent and appealing. yet, the modern indian philosophers, who are under the influence of analytical tradition of the west, may not find these doctrines all that illuminating. the reason that is attributed to this state of affairs by bkm is that these writings are opaque and blurred. i do not quite agree with bkm’s stand on this issue. of course bkm held that most of these metaphysical theories were discussed out of context. consequently, these most k. srinivas 125 sophisticated theories were conveniently ignored as inessential.2 i personally feel that the western epistemologists have to reconcile with the fact that these theories are not understood by the modern western philosophers, not because they are opaque and blurred, but because their method of analysis cannot penetrate into the structural depths of the classical indian philosophical theories. i would say that the method of analysis advocated by the modern western epistemologists is found wanting in many respects. to put it in the language of wittgenstein, the rules of the game played by the classical indian philosophers are totally different from those of the game played by the modern western philosophers. it is opined by bkm that pramana method, to use indian terminology, is invariably linked up with the prameyas. to quote bkm in this context: “ the metaphysical doctrines of classical india developed in the background of intense intellectual activity in philosophy. hence they are imbedded in the philosophical style that was current at that time, and this was subtly oriented by epistemological concerns and orchestrated by the logical theories of classical india.”3 bkm is right when he held that the establishment of any metaphysical theory is dependent on certain epistemological considerations (pramanadhina prameya-sthitih). to put it in the modern terminology, our epistemological and logical concerns precede our metaphysical and ontological ones, for the latter can be approached only with the help of the former. ii in order to drive his point home, bkm highlighted the importance of pramana epistemology and its logical significance in determining our metaphysical/ontological4 commitments or priorities. he assumes that all of us, when we are in a pre-philosophical state, believe that there is a world external to us, and existing independent of us. this is a position taken by realists in general. however, it is not all that easy to philosophically prove or disprove this commonplace belief. for centuries together philosophers have advocated theories after theories either to establish or to falsify this commonplace belief. the existence of pre-philosophical, pre-reflective, and pre-critical certainties is always doubted by philosophers. the commonplace belief that there is a material or physical 126 prajñâ vihâra world independent of our awareness of it is questioned by philosophers by advancing a counter thesis that the so called external reality or world is only mind-dependent and it can be vindicated by rational means. the skeptics on the other hand viewed it in a different way. according to them, it is not possible to arrive at any definite position as regards the status of material or physical world. all that philosophers could do is to advance the theories of various sorts, which often conflict with each other, to explain their position as regards the status of the material or physical world. therefore, these theories are highly presumptuous. they are only poor substitutes for truth. this being the case, suggest bkm, “if the cloths do not fit we may either decide to remain naked or buy new ones that may fit better. the skeptics may prefer the pristine purity of nakedness, but others choose the latter.”5 it is generally held that when our beliefs are proven to be true they acquire the status of knowledge. on of the aims of philosophy as an activity, is to define the characteristics of knowledge, and to set forth certain criteria for obtaining knowledge in the sense in which its characteristics are defined. in this sense, claims, bkm, the purpose of epistemology or pramana-sastra in indian tradition is not in any way different from that of the western tradition. epistemology, which is basically concerned with theory of knowledge, investigates and evaluates the evidence, our methods of reasoning, and the criteria upon which our knowledge claims are dependent.6 apart from that, the common point shared by both indian and western philosophical traditions is, as aptly put forth by bkm, their concern for truth or reality, which is also known as divinity. therefore, the quest for knowledge in both traditions has given rise to a number of interesting results. according to bkm, pramana is that which leads to a knowledge-episode called prama as its end. interestingly, evaluation of our evidence to knowledge is invariably linked up with the question of the sources of knowledge. out of these sources, one very important source recognized by empiricist tradition in the west is sense-experience, which provides us with immediate knowledge. accordingly, it is held that the real base for our theoretical and objective knowledge lies in observation of aspects of reality. in its weak form it is held that all our knowledge must start with sense-experience and its validation is always subject to some form of observational data. k. srinivas 127 some pramana theorists in india have advocated their weaker version of the empirical tradition of the west. one of the advocates of such a position is uddyotakara. according to him: “we emphasize perception, for all pramanas (in some way or other) preceded by (sensory) perception.”7 the result of such a position is that conception without perception is empty. the counter thesis of this claim is that perception without conception is blind. but bkm claims that this counter thesis too is incompatible with empiricist doctrine, for it advocates the view that pre-conceptual or nonconceptual perception is blind and unrevealing. however, such a nonconceptual experience is possible as advocated by the indian epistemologists in the form of nirvikaplaka pratyaksa. but such a possibility does not deter the pramana theorists from advocating their theory. in fact, such a perception maintains the ontological neutrality regarding the status of concepts. further bkm maintains that the most important aspect of such a philosophic position is ‘experience’. both our factual knowledge and knowledge of existence are necessarily justified on the basis of experience. if this were so, we need to define the expression ‘experience’ in clear terms. both the western and the indian epistemologists are not very clear about this expression. bkm feels that the most suitable sanskrit expression for the expression ‘experience’ is pratiti or anubhava. like in the indian tradition, the western tradition too the expression ‘experience’ is used as an ultimate court of appeal for any knowledge claim. however, this argument does not stand the critical scrutiny for obvious reasons. the most immediate, non-conceptual experience is barren because it does not have any explanatory content within it. consequently, nothing can be put forward in the form of a legitimate statement.8 iii bkm analyzes the various theories of perception of classical indian type in the context of pramana epistemology. for this purpose first he highlights the salient features of pramana doctrine that inevitably resulted in a form of skepticism. one of the chief traits of skepticism is that it always questioned the very possibility of our knowledge of the external 128 prajñâ vihâra world. thus it remained a constant shadow of epistemology both in indian and western traditions. in a way, it has driven the subject of experience to think how the world ‘appears’ to the subject. thus it paved the way for a distinction between an experience and its interpretation, between a crude sensory data and logical construction out of them. bkm agues that empiricists claim sensory experience provides us with the ‘building blocks’ of knowledge. if what is called knowledge is constructed out of these ‘building blocks’, then the very edifice of our knowledge represents mere appearance, but not the reality. such a treatment of knowledge made skeptic to contest the legitimacy of empiricist claim to the knowledge of the external world, for it is not established. even the causal theory of perceptual experience is no better for it makes the subject of experience speculate about the true nature of the external world which is never given in perceptual experience. according to bkm, both the western epistemologists and the pramana theorists are trapped in the same boat when they try to look for, with a sense of hesitation, some subjective element in support of our objective knowledge. now it is left for the epistemologists of both traditions to bridge the gap between subjective and objective elements to substantiate our knowledge claims. pramana theorists in general hold the view that no knowledge is possible independently of some perceptual basis or other. even the scriptural knowledge is not exempted from this condition. they hold the view that direct experience of such people like the buddha or the jaina resulted in scriptural knowledge. it is believed by naiyayikas that the vedas are spoken by god. hence, their validity is as sure as the validity of the statements made by a reliable and trustworthy person. although mimamsa does not support this claim, the vedanta joins the camp of pramana theorists in this regard. when bkm speaks of empiricism, he uses this expression with utmost caution. he does not use it as a movement that opposed the continental rationalism of the west. following the flag of w. v. quine, bkm holds that an empiricist doctrine is one that insists on the observational basis of our knowledge. however, there may be some do believe in the existence of mind-independent universals or realities. such a claim to mindindependent realities does not really bar them from being empiricists. the sixth century ad philosopher bhartrhari held that all of us possess certain k. srinivas 129 amount of innate disposition to articulate concepts in speech. this is an acquired disposition, maintains bkm, for it is derived from (in a metaphysical sense) the residual (memory) traces of the experiences of every individual in countless previous births (purvahita samskara). this view of bhartrhari can be compared with that of plato. according to the latter, learning in a way is a process of recollection of that knowledge possessed by an individual before birth. the buddhists claim that universals are mere convenient myths. like a vehicle they are dispensable once the goal is achieved. on the contrary, nyaya holds that some natural universals are objectively real and perceivable for they have instantiations that are perceptible. the point that bkm wants to drive home here is that although there are doctrinal differences among the various schools of indian tradition, yet majority of the schools can be brought under the camp of pramana theorists. iv skeptical arguments against accepted doctrines are found both in the western and the indian traditions of epistemology. the pramana theorists in general have their own arguments against the skeptics’ claim that knowledge is a remote possibility. according to nyaya epistemology, perhaps one of the earliest arguments against the challenges of skepticism, we can know what is out there with the help of pramana. therefore, the object of knowledge (prameya) is definitely known. before the emergence of full-fledged philosophical systems in india, there were ancient skeptics like sanjaya and others (between 600 to 100 bc) who directed their skepticism against the possibility knowledge pertaining to moral, religious, and eschatological matters. sanjaya questioned the veracity of the statements made about these matters. according to bkm, the following questions never found any satisfactory answers. therefore, they remained unexplained. they are as follows:9 1. does anything survive death? 2. is the world finite? 3. is there a soul different from body? 130 prajñâ vihâra 4. does he who acts ‘enjoy’, i.e., get reward and punishment? 5. what is right and what is wrong? the skepticism about the truth-claims of the above mentioned questions gradually paved the way for the skepticism about the truth claims of the very possibility of knowledge. it is in fact in the writings of nagarjuna (2nd century ad), the great madhyamika buddhist, one can come across a systematic and skeptical challenge to a theory of knowledge. later on it was the skeptics like jayarasi (8th century ad) and sriharsa (11th century ad) questioned the claims to knowledge. there were also the skeptics in the form of monistic metaphysicians who were critical of pramana method. thus there was a constant debate between the advocates of pramana theory and the skeptics. the skeptical dialecticians of india followed a ‘radical’ method to expose the knowledge-claims of the epistemologists. they contested that the very concept of knowledge and its foundations are either paradoxical or circular. bkm defends the indian skeptics like nagarjuna, sanjaya, jayarasi, and sriharsa for they have not indulged in the construction of any metaphysical system. although it is true of sanjaya and jayarasi, it is not the case with nagarjuna and sriharsa. bkm admits that it is arguable whether nagarjuna and jayarasi have subscribed to any metaphysical position at all. perhaps, the skepticism advocated by them is only a complementary to their soteriological goal in the sense that it serves as a ladder to climb up, and then to be discarded. the aim of these two skeptics is to show the limitations of pure reason in sorting out the knowledge claims of one sort or other. in the process of resolving the rival knowledge claims pure reason would lose itself in the quicksand of contradictions. in fact it is held in the lankavatara-sutra: “the own nature of things cannot be ascertained by the analytical exercise of intellect (buddhi). therefore, they (the things) are shown to be ineffable and ‘without own nature.”10 this statement suggests that reason cannot discover the real nature of things. in a way, it is a reminder to the rationalists of traditions that reason cannot penetrate into the very nature of things. bkm believes that philosophical empiricism is ingrained in some form of skepticism. the very problem of uncertainty regarding the claims to knowledge necessitated epistemologists of both traditions to look for k. srinivas 131 secure foundations of knowledge that rest on direct evidence (experience). the pramana theorists subscribed to only a weaker form of empiricism. according to them, sense-experience is only a starting point of knowledge. the reason is that most of them advocated other sources of knowledge apart from sense-experience. on the contrary, the skeptics held that there is an inherent contradiction between the data offered by experience and reason. such a contradiction always leads to skepticism but not to any legitimate theory of knowledge. for instance, nagarjuna put forth the following argument to justify his claim that there is no possibility of obtaining knowledge. the paraphernalia that we use to measure or obtain knowledge is itself in need of justification. if this point is conceded then the question of arriving at knowledge of any kind is a remote possibility for this process ends up in an infinite regress argument. thus nagrajuna’s argument remains a great impediment to pramana theorists for knowledge in any form is an impossible proposition. if this argument is not conceded then our choice of selecting a particular standard of measurement is completely arbitrary and not really appealing to reason. a cartesian follower might say that one can choose a standard of measurement that is highly indubitable and self-evidently true. but the skeptics like nagajuna would object to this proposal for the search for an indubitable criterion necessarily involves subjective element into the whole process. this may not be acceptable to those epistemologists who insist on some objective standards of criteria. in order to defend their position, the pramana theorists, in spite of their different ontological commitments, would agree that whatever exists can be known. further, they argue that whatever is known is existent. consequently, it is effable in the sense that it is expressible or nameable in language. of course, there are some pramana theorists who hold the view that knowability is not a sufficient condition for affability. this is not treated as a major impediment. according to bhartrhari, human consciousness always reveals the objects (knowables) with the help of words for it is ever vibrating. in the absence of such a mechanism, the revelatory character of human awareness is destroyed. perception or awareness of any sort would be meaningless in the absence of wordmediated act of consciousness. nyaya does not subscribe to this view for it admits perception or awareness without effability. this is due to the fact that there are objects or knowables that are only known or revealed to 132 prajñâ vihâra human consciousness, but may not be expressible through the medium of language. to use wittgenstein’s terminology, they can be called “mystical”. according to bkm, the thesis of ‘ineffability’ may be viewed from different standpoints. according to one interpretation, what is grasped by the senses (perceptual experience) cannot be put into words or language, for language is a social affair and it can only communicate those aspects of reality that are inter-subjectively accessible. since perceptual experiences are unique to each subject, the content of such experiences cannot be communicated. bkm holds that such a view can be, with minor modifications, attributed to the buddhist doctrines advocated by dinnaga and dharmakirti. both these philosophers have subscribed to what is called phenomenalism, and logical atomism in modern terminology. just as russell held that there must be logically proper names in any ideal language, although one cannot give an example for it, dinnaga too held that the pure particular or pure sense-datum cannot be, in principle, communicated. thus it remains ineffable (anirdesya).11 the other interpretation is holistic in its nature. accordingly, it regards the reality as a single indivisible whole, which is undifferentiated. since the whole cannot be grasped in its fullness, language reduces it into parts resulting in the proliferation of concepts. consequently, all our concepts enter into some contradiction or other. as long as language operates with the help of concepts, it fails to picture reality. v another interesting feature that we come across in the empiricist tradition of the west is the cleavage made between a priori (non-empirical) and a posteriori (empirical)forms of knowledge. the former is the knowledge obtained independent of experience and the latter is necessarily dependent upon sense-experience. such a distinction is not found in the indian epistemological tradition. this may be treated, according to bkm, as a lacuna in the pramana theory advocated by the indian epistemologists. for the sake of convenience, bkm classifies knowledge into nonempirical and empirical forms. the scriptural knowledge or the knowledge of dharma can be characterized as non-empirical knowledge for it cannot be derived through any empirical means such as perception or inference. here the expression ‘dharma’ is used in its loose sense to cover religious, social k. srinivas 133 and ethical duties of individuals. and we cannot obtain knowledge of these matters empirically. this is the reason why the skeptics like sanjaya did not entertain any questions regarding these matters for knowledge about these matters is impossible. what bkm wants to stress here is that the scriptures impart non-empirical or trans-empirical knowledge. pramana theorists recognized this form of knowledge for the tradition defines scripture as the “ means (in fact, “knowledge-how”) that can be known by neither perception nor inference is what they come to know through scriptures. and this constitutes the scripture-hood of the scriptures.”12 what is unique and significant about the scriptural knowledge is that it is highly infallible. it is held by the great vaidika philosophers like bhartrhari and samkara that the knowledge obtained by empirical means such as perception and inference may be fallible at times. bkm calls it a kind of fundamentalism for our knowledge derived from the authority of scriptures remains infallible because there is no empirical means that can ever falsify it. to record the statement of samkara in this context: “the truth (knowledge-hood) of the vedic statements is self-established independently of anything else. it is like the sun which reveals itself while revealing colours.”13 thus scriptural knowledge is self-validating. another important argument advanced by pramana theorists in general is that scriptures being apocryphal there is no human agency involved in their creation. they are the creations of the divine (apauruseya). if a statement is false, its falsity can be traced back to the shortcomings of those who propounded it. but in the absence of an author it is treated valid. this amounts to a dogma. however, bkm puts forward the following considerations to avoid the charge of dogmatism. the mahabharata and manusmrti held that the truth of dharma is beyond human comprehension. however it can be obtained by the means such as scripture, the verdict of the saints and seers, and one’s own conscience or moral intuition. it is on the notion of intuition or pratibha that bhartrhari has something to say. he clearly demarcated intuition from perception and inference.14 intuition occurs to us like a flash. it is altogether a different type of experience. intuition occurs in all sentient beings in a spontaneous manner. such a form of knowledge, according to bhartrhari, is far more reliable than any other form of knowledge for it is direct and immediate. but bkm argues that although it is not clear from bhartrhari’s 134 prajñâ vihâra interpretation of intuitive knowledge whether it can be treated as nonempirical or empirical, it is a clear case of non-empirical form of knowledge. further bkm alleges that naiyayikas, the most prominent pramana theorists, find it difficult to accommodate it in their classification of empirical forms of knowledge. the scriptural knowledge as viewed by bhartrhari, is the highest form of intuitive knowledge. contrary to the view advocated by bhartrhari, naiyayikas argued that scriptural knowledge must have some empirical base. they ridiculed the view that the scriptural texts have no author. just as the veracity of any statement is dependent on the trustworthiness of its author or speaker, the veracity of the scriptural statements must also be dependent on the infallibility of their author. therefore, according to naiyayikas, the author of the scriptural statements must be person with perfect knowledge, and he is none other than god. bkm maintains that the notion of ‘trustworthy person’ can be saved from its sectarian colour and theistic overtone once we accept the buddha and the jaina as trustworthy (apta) persons. the truth of dharma is known through their intuitive insight that is non-empirical in its character. our religious and moral prescriptions are based on the knowledge of scriptures and the knowledge of dharma. coming to the empirical foundations of our knowledge, pramana theorists hold that all our cognitive knowledge has empirical base. in this context, bkm cautions us that unlike in the western tradition there is no dichotomy made between facts and values i order to understand the basis of our secular, religious, and moral beliefs. in a nutshell, the following are the features of pramana-prameya doctrine advocated by the indian epistemologists.15 1. there are valid means or sources of knowledge on the basis of which we make assertions about what exists, and what is true. 2. there are entities called knowables (prameya), and each knowable is cognizable. they constitute the world or reality. each knowable entity can be grasped or apprehended by our knowledge-episodes. 3. there is no distinction between means of knowing and its justification. the means themselves justify what is known. 4. pramana theorists are in agreement with the view that like the sensation of pain, knowledge episode is an event. k. srinivas 135 5. all knowledge-episodes are cognitive episodes, but not all cognitive episodes are knowledge episodes, for some cognitive episodes may not yield truth. every pramana, maintains bkm, is both evidential and causal in its nature. it is evidential for it provides ample justification for the cognitive episode. it is causal for it is responsible for any cognitive episode. therefore it is treated as an ‘instrument’ (karana) and most effective causal factor (sadhakatama) of the knowledge-episode in question. a pramana is that which measures. what is to be measured is called prameya. in this sense, pramana leads us to such cognitive episodes by means of which we can understand the nature of reality unerringly. however, reminds bkm, the skeptical challenge to pramana theorists does not end there. both an empiricist and a pramana theorist have to spell out clearly the status and the nature of entities that they experience, and believe to be there. the pre-philosophical or pre-analytical belief in the existence of external world independent of perceiver’s consciousness has to be justified. the skeptic argues that how can a pramana theorist rationally justify his claim that there is an external world independent of perceiver’s mind. what are those indubitable data that serve as the foundation of his knowledge-claim? if the data obtained from his most immediate experience serves as indubitable foundation of his knowledge–claim, then the very nature of that data is under investigation. it is held by the skeptic that the data obtained from one’s immediate experience are always subjective, for they are not accessible to others. how can anyone use these subjective data to construct a system of objective knowledge? as rightly pointed by bkm, there are two alternatives left for a pramana theorist to explain away his position. according to the first alternative, he must admit that the objects are exactly the same as those that we experience in our pre-philosophical and pre-reflective mood. thus the world is constituted by middle-sized, measurable, material objects. the second alternative is that he must construct objects out of the data obtained from his immediate experience to give a philosophical justification to his knowledge-claim. these two alternatives led to an age-old controversy between realists and phenomenalists and immaterialists. for instance, bkm characterizes the nyaya realism and the buddhist 136 prajñâ vihâra phenomenalism in the following manner.16 the following are the features of nyaya realism. 1. what we directly perceive in our sense-experience is the external reality that exists independent of the perceiving subject. 2. all the physical objects, wholes, bodies, and their properties can be seen and touched. we see and touch wholes and substrata because they possess parts and properties, but not because we are able to see and touch these wholes and parts. but in the case of smell, taste, and hear, we do not smell the flower but the fragrance of the flower, we do not taste sugar, but its sweetness, we do not hear the train, but only its whistle. 3. the whole is a distinct entity created by arranging the parts, yet it is not the sum total of its parts. it is over and above the parts. similarly, a substratum is distinct from its properties it instantiates. in other words, properties subsist in substratum. 4. either perceiving or seeing is regarded as knowing in the direct sense. there is no secure or basic foundation other than perceiving or seeing which is indubitable or certain. 5. although knowledge is not always verbalized, it is verbalizable. 6. perceptual illusions can be analyzed without bringing in the notion of sense-datum or sense-impression as an intermediary between the perceiver and the external world. 7. knowledge in its ordinary sense is neither self-revealing nor self-validating. in other words, it is not necessary that every cognitive event must be noticed or perceived. there is always a possibility that some cognitive events may occur and pass away unnoticed and unperceived. in order to communicate the occurrence of a cognitive event in any form of language it must be inwardly perceived by the subject in question. this inward experience is called (anuvyavasaya). one’s experience of pain and pleasure come under this category. in contrast to nyaya realism, the buddhist phenomenalism can be characterized in the following manner: 1. what we directly aware of in our perception is only a sensible quality, and it is doubtful whether such a quality exists independent of its k. srinivas 137 instantiation. also, it is doubted whether an instantiation exist independent of our sensation of it. 2. what we call material objects, physical objects, and wholes are only perceived only in a secondary or metaphorical sense for we do not have direct access to anything other than their sensible qualities which are directly given in perception. in other words, we infer the existence of material objects, physical objects, and wholes from their sensible qualities. 3. the so-called material or physical objects are nothing but constructions out of sensory phenomena. a whole is not independent of its parts taken together. the wholes have only nominal existence (samvrtisat). they are objects of either unconscious inference or desiredominated construction. as regards unconscious inference, which is a form of vikalpa, it has mere psychological certainty, but not the required logical certainty. therefore, such inferential awareness cannot be equated with knowledge proper. 4. in its most immediate sense, sensing is identified with knowing. hence, sensing is the foundation of knowledge. it is indubitable and incorrigible. 5. such knowledge is not verbalizable, for it is completely free from conception. there is no scope for verbalization without concepts. 6. the entity perceived in perceptual illusion is not distinct from the cognition itself. what is given in sense-illusion is an integral part of the sensation itself. 7. knowledge is always self-revealing. every cognitive event would be noticed. in other words, no cognitive event can pass away unnoticed. like pleasure and pain every cognitive event is self-cognized. the above cited world-views share the view that the basic elements of our experience are observable or perceptible individuals. but the nature of these individuals is treated differently in both world-views. according to the realist view of nyaya-vaisesika, the observable individuals are physical and the observable phenomena are always explained in terms of the physical. contrary to this view, the buddhist phenomenalists hold that there is nothing beyond phenomenal, therefore, everything is reduced to observable phenomena. in spite of these differences, there is another common point shared by both. they view that an ontological system must be properly grounded in epistemology in the sense that what 138 prajñâ vihâra is epistemologically prior must be the staring point of their respective ontologies. for a realist what is epistemologically prior is physical entities with properties. on the contrary, a phenomenalist considers what is directly apprehended in one’s sense-experience, namely, the phenomenal qualities, become their epistemological priorities. to conclude: the contemporary indian approaches to epistemology in many respects resemble the approaches of the western epistemologists. in fact, it is one’s own ontological priority that paves the way for a suitable or convenient epistemological doctrine. it is through the latter that the former gets substantiated or vindicated. the perennial philosophical problems, whether epistemological or metaphysical/ontological, are common to both the indian and the western philosophical systems. the controversy between the realists and phenomenalists as regards the nature of observables in the west is akin to the controversy between the nyaya realists and the buddhist phenonamlists in the classical indian tradition. bkm consistently highlighted the point that the controversies and issues that dominated the modern western epistemology are very much found in classical indian epistemology too. the western epistemologists cannot ignore the contributions made by the classical indian philosophers to the traditional theory of knowledge. in the indian context, epistemology cannot be segregated from metaphysics/ontology. it is through epistemology that every school of thought justifies its metaphysical presuppositions. in other words, our epistemological concerns are basically rooted in our commitment to a certain type of metaphysics/ontology. since metaphysical/ontological commitments vary from school to school, there are bound to be differences in their epistemological priorities too. this naturally results in the proliferation of ‘isms’. one cannot deny this fact. endnotes 1 b.k. matilal, perception: an essay on classical indian theories of knowledge (oxford: clarendon press, 1986), p.1. 2 ibid.,p.8. 3 ibid. 4 normally it is held that metaphysics deals with the nature of highest reality, which may be transcendental. those who are averse to using this expression, k. srinivas 139 especially those who claim to be ant-metaphysicians in the west like marxists, the modern empiricists(logical positivists), preferred the term ontology to metaphysics to deal with the ultimate nature of reality, which is not transcendental. but, there are philosophers who interchangeably use these expressions to deal with the ultimate constituents of reality. 5 ibid., p.21. 6 ibid.,p.22. 7 ibid. 8 ibid.,p.23. 9 ibid.p.27. 10 lankavatara-sutra, ch.ii, verse.173; ch.x, verse 167. 11 b.k.matilal, perception, p.30. 12 ibid.,p.32. 13 ibid.,p.35. 14 ibid.,p.33. 15 ibid.,pp.35-6. 16 ibid.,pp.5-6. 140 prajñâ vihâra contents prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 73-89 73 © 2000 by assumption university press the philosophical problem of democracy in east asia kim eunjoong yonsei university, korea abstract this paper will investigate the possibilities of democracy in east asia. it will examine the conditions behind the genesis of democracy in ancient greece. and will relate this to the emergence of reason and the hypothetic deductive system. it will then contrast the growth of western rationality with eastern traditions of logic in order to determine how appropriate western styles of democracy are to the asian situation. introduction 1. in asia in 1994, there was a dispute over “asian values” between mr. kim dae-jung, chief director of asia-pacific peace foundation at that time and lee kuan yew, ex-prime minister of singapore. in the issue of march and april 1994 of foreign affairs, lee kuan yew insisted, “western democracy and human rights can’t be applied to east asia whose culture is different from that of the west because culture is fate. “he evaluated the political and economic system of east asia affirmative, emphasizing the hypocrisy of the western view of value and the limitation of the western system. this insistence of lee kuan yew’s has become the origin of the promoters of “asian values.” 2 however, kim dae-jung publicly refuted lee kuan yew’s insistence through writing for the issue of november and december 1994 of foreign affairs. kim dae-jung insisted, “lee kuan yew’s wrong insistence is to justify denial of democracy.” he added, “the traditional thoughts of the east contain the ideology of democracy like mencius’ idea of popular sovereignty and innaecheon thought (“man is the heaven”) of donghak which are 2,000 years ahead of john locke who prepared the ground for modern democracy of the west. the biggest barrier of asian democracy is authoritative leaders’ resistance, not cultural traditions.” 3. this dispute was ignited again in seoul in 1999 by lee kuan yew’s visit to seoul at the end of october 1999. lee kuan yew, through an annual meeting of fki international advisory, and kim dae-jung, president of korea, through forum of democratic leaders in the asiapacific, stated their insistences and refuted each other. kim dae-jung criticized, “lee kuan yew’s theory of efficient national management is to rationalize dictatorial government.” and he was convinced that western democracy would be possible in asia too. 4. can western democracy be realized in asia? do the traditional thoughts of the east contain the logic and ideology of western democracy? it is not appearance of democracy, but contents and form of it that we should pay attention to. for this, we need to investigate: the social background of greece where western democracy was born; the process that democracy was settled after polis was made in greece; the thought through reason and logic that appeared in the process that democracy was settled; and its difference from asian values. from monarchia to politics 1. the true character of civilization of mycenae and creta in ancient greece is monarchism. the kings in the age of monarchism (monarchia) had to carry out three functions; (1) as general who commands subordinates; (2) as priest who communicates with the gods through a religious ceremony; and (3) as judge who finally judges whether a criminal is guilty or not at a court. 2. around 1,200 b. c., monarchism of mycenae and creta fell with invasion of dorians living in the north, and for about 400 years since then, greece was in a state of confusion, the reason for which being the lack of any political system to replace monarchism. the position that finally replaced the sovereign, called basileus, was basileia as noble, the head of dorians. it meant a shift from monarchism to aristocracy, which meant that power, which was formerly concentrated on one person, became distributed to several people. 74 prajñâ vihâra 3. basileia lost its military authority as soon as a military commander, called polemarchos, appeared, and further, lost its sovereignty as soon as the system of archon (administrative minister) appeared. as basileia’s military and administrative authorities were distributed to administrative ministers, the kings lost their three functions. their absolute authority, which could control disagreements among confronting groups or conflicts among basically different social classes, disappeared. the greek democracy was created as the result of concern over how to solve these conflicts and how to decide upon the standards for the solutions. however, it is not true that democracy came right from conflicts. it was changes in the form of battles and in the method of raising horses supplied for the battles that led to democracy. 4. nobles showed their remarkable capacity in the classical handto-hand fights whose victory and defeat was decided by horseback combat between the heads. at that time when there were always wars, the fighting power was regarded as the top arête so brave nobles took possession of power, lands and wealth in return. however, the noble knights could not defend for themselves and accordingly, hoplites—heavily armed infantry unit consisting of rich farmers—appeared and a new type of battle appeared too. the advent of a new type of battle—heavily armed organized infantry action—brought fundamental revolution in the social system.1 5. changes also occurred with the raising horses. horse tanks belonged to the kingdom in the times of mycenae. at that time, the king securing the army owned various military machines too, which meant revelation of power and authority at that time. however, basileia who were inferior to the king in terms of power and authority couldn’t have tanks. the nobles entrusted ownership and breeding of horses to rich citizens. therefore, in addition to the right to own horses, citizens gained the rights to master combat techniques, to own lands, and to participate in politics. 6. the phenomenon that many ordinary people, not a small number of nobles, became the subject playing an important role in a battle started to have influence on the social structure. relatively, the value of groups of people, that is, ordinary people (infantrymen), rather than a noble (general), became greater and this trend played a decisive role in changing the social structure. that is, people composing demos became a kim eunjoong 75 unit of phalange and at this time, polis started to appear, which fell in the relationship of homologie with the phalange. like polis, an army was made with interchangeable unities, and a person as citizen unit (demos) was acknowledged to be equal to a person in a military unit (laos). consequently, the soldiers (laos) who played an important role in a battle were able to claim, even after a battle, a reward as demos as much as the values they showed in a battle. demos strongly requested sharing of war trophies and occupied lands, and the right to equally participate in decision making for the matters of the land where they lived, and of their community. 7. heavily armed infantrymen (hoplites) should have necessary equipment at their expense, which made farmer-infantrymen insist on the right for their own allotment.2 they requested to organize citizens’ general assembly and insisted upon what they deserved through a speech at the assembly. this request for political and social equality collapsed aristocratism and further, made a way toward polis isonomique that all the citizens could have the same right. consequently, politics appeared for the first time in the human history. 8. from two viewpoints, greek democracy is regarded as the most ideal political system in the history of human politics. first, citizens reflected their opinions to the national affairs through a special unity of polis. second, in order to maintain order in the unity, individuals observed the laws according to their own judgment, regardless of that the laws were made through their agreement or by their ancestors.3 polis in greece that was changed to public society from common society consisted of heterogeneous factors, and in order to maintain polis, the members of polis required a powerful system that could unify heterogeneity into homogeneity.4 9. polis gave homogeneity to people belonging to the same space by setting the national border between itself and its neighboring polis. however, the homogeneity was very weak. polis that was composed of various groups was too heterogeneous a group for its members to feel complete homogeneity in it so it needed more powerful strength that could group them under homogeneity. 10. in polis, a zone having common interest (which was opposite to private interest) and a practical and public zone (which was opposite to secret process) started to come to light. the punchy insistence on openness 76 prajñâ vihâra drove them to the public’s sight. polis guided behaviors, knowledge and procedures (exclusive special rights of arche and gene) to gradual occupation by groups. 11. polis took the leading part in converting otherness into homogeneity, and living in polis trained citizens to follow the laws and justice (dike) that were commonly accepted by several people transcending relativity, not doxa. it gave them an opportunity to think from another level. therefore, the greeks ought to have an ability of differentiating objects according to type. it means to separate the same from the different, and to group the same into one or the different into one.5 that is, it means to classify objects according to type. based on this ability, the greeks could differentiate private things (individual and physis) from public (nation and nomos). the appearance of speech and competition 1. polis allowed even the poorest people to participate in the common people’s assembly. speech was used as the means for participants in the polis, regardless of their social class (noble or common people). it was the great political tool within the polis, a method to give a command to others, and also the means of control. they thought that the technique of politics was management of language, and believed that discussion was the best means to organize a public system and to efficiently operate the system.6 speech was a live discussion, argument and dispute, not strict order made in a religious event or the king’s final judgment. under this circumstance, the greeks developed a remarkable ability of speech and dispute. 2. politics started to become eloquent competition and dispute. the stage for the dispute was agora, a public plaza.7 it was the place for meeting, not only the market. citizens having horses competed for horse breeding in army. those who mastered the technology of competition competed at agora through language. those who competed for horse started to compete through language. those who competed through language and eloquence become the same class. competition could be made among those who were in the same position. kim eunjoong 77 3. the precondition for speech was audience. audience was judge who decided victory and defeat of dispute or speech made between two parties. only the audience could guarantee victory of one against the other. it was the matter of who would decide dike. those who were in the control position hierarchically, had decided it before, but now audience started to decide it. that is, citizens themselves developed the standards for judging truth and falsity, or reasonableness and unreasonableness. 4. command and obedience in polis were no longer an order any longer that couldn’t be reversed, but horizontal tension that could be reversed anytime.8 this was founded on the precondition that citizens had a reasonable ability to persuade or to be persuaded through free mutual contacts.9 5. eloquence, dispute, and discussion became formalized as debate which was opposite to demonstration. therefore, there was close relation and mutual combination between politics and logos. the technique of politics became management of logos. logos had accepted itself, its rules, and the sense of its efficiency through political functions. historically, rhetoric and sophistic techniques that were performed in assembly or court defined the rule of proof, together with the technique of persuasion. it made a way for aristotle’s research. aristotle stipulated logic over the matters that could be verified or theoretically understood, which were opposite to superficial and plausible logic.10 6. the greeks became winners in a dispute by capturing a universal. for example, once what i say is proved to be more universal and the more the audience agrees with it, then i can become a winner in the dispute. socrates and plato systematized dialectic, but the dispute that the greeks had in agora was the starting of dialectic. citizens took a strategy to appeal to audience to become a winner, which meant catching logos through logos. 7. there are two types of universals that show themselves in competition. one shows itself while a competitor’s privacy is sublated and the other shows itself while a competitor’s privacy is controlled. greece pursued the former.11 in greek thinking, the way of proving myself comes from something transcendental. the greek philosophy starts from the idea of who i am and what drives me here. in the process that greek thinking goes toward abstraction, we should pay attention to how it was changed 78 prajñâ vihâra to universalism. this is clarified through logic or pure mathematics. that is, logic and pure mathematics of greece that are organized in the hypothetic deductive system are the products of this politics and society. 8. it means the process of reasonable thought to capture logos through logos. the concept of equality became the origin of greek democracy, but it couldn’t make greek democracy settled. greek democracy handled affairs happening in polis as public matters (to demosion), not as private matters (to idion), through public decision making like discussions and agreement among citizens.12 as plato explained, a human was individually inferior to animals, but he/she could surpass animals by building up polis and having political techniques (politike techne).13 9. the instinct of simple expression (telling one’s experience) was shifted to a new level of study that asks the nature of an object under a proposition, “what is x?” it was the culture of several public activities taken by citizens in athens in the plaza of agora. the greek people believed that discussion was the best device for constructing of public system and operating it efficiently.14 10. a speech for the general public at agora where several opinions contradict causes a peculiar problem that can’t be found in tales among individuals. it requires another work proving that one’s opinion is best and making the attendants agree with the proof. however, to get consent from the participants is just all so the proof is just agreement based on an individual’s doxa, not strict proof. 11. their relativism that put its standard for judgment on doxa succeeded to give relative value to numerous individual doxas, but failed in finding the absolute truth that could be universally applied to all people. and further, it reached at skepticism that denied the concept of truth. philosophy in the times of athens that started from the fundamental reflection on intelligent environment intended to propose academic foundations for universality of human knowledge, not satisfied with physis.15 the creation of hypothetic deductive system 1. it was the hypothetic deductive system that the greeks invented to settle public things. it was regulated as the absolute truth, to which kim eunjoong 79 everything in the world belonged. it was logos to carry out the hypothetic deductive system.16 in mathematics and formal logic, the hypothetic deductive system according to logos centralism appeared obviously. 2. construction of the deductive system was the foundation for all the scientific ideologies including formal logic, which was originated from the trust that all the existences could come into a certain principle. and the principle was thought as the shape that could be understood only by reason in the european traditions since the time of the ancient greeks.17 in this aspect, logic was the real science. it was only mathematics, besides philosophy, that could be understood by reason only and that handled objects beyond sense. the shapes in geometry are not incomplete sensual shapes drawn on paper. 3. pure mathematics means mathematics that is deductively systematized through strict dispute based on a small number of groups of axioms, regardless of calculating techniques to be applied to actual living. the pattern of pure mathematics that was materialized in euclid’s stoicheia has become the frame of the western intelligence history as the symbol of logos. advent of utilitarian demonstrative mathematic that was made in greece first was an epoch-making accident. it was an important indication showing fundamental difference in the culture between the east and the west, and it was the reason why the western scientific civilization was not created in the east. 4. greek mathematics has a characteristic all the theorems necessarily accompany proof. in euclid’s stoicheia, a sentence, “this should have been proved. “ is attached to the end of the proof of each proposition, which tells that proof in mathematics was an indispensable property. the process of proof that is related with a square in meno is a good example to suggest how a theorem was proved in the early days of the greek mathematics.18 it was a technique that citizens in polis were required to have in agora. 5. what we should pay attention to is that at the time of explaining euclid geometry with the deductive system, ultra-mathematical investigation was being made which reflected on geometric thought itself and intended to clarify the logical structure of it. in general, in order to organize science with the deductive system, reflection on the thought over science is indispensable. therefore, construction of the deductive system means 80 prajñâ vihâra perfect unification of scientific thought and reflection on the scientific thought itself. this logical structure of the scientific world is a cultural phenomenon available in europe only.19 6. dialogue (dialogos) of plato is a technique that two people investigate truth through (dia) language (logos). his dialogue becomes possible when two people dynamically continuously pursue truths according to the instinct of eros while guiding each other to the state of having nous from the state of having no nous. it suggests a direction of philosophical investigation, but it doesn’t correctly specify its methods. categoriae of aristotle practically suggests concrete methodologies of science, a step ahead of plato’s dialogue. that is, it talks about the standards that a man needs to define and understand a certain object at the level of nous; it talks about how substance and properties of a certain object (which are found based on the standard of category) should be combined without any error; and his logic talks about the types or methods of right thinking. 7. based on the concept that had logical homogeneity as a meaning indicating a certain existence, on the definition that classified the concept into specific difference and proximate genus, on the category (the highest generic concept containing all the generic concepts that were used for classification of an object) and on the judgment over a certain object or phenomenon in the type of the subject concept and the objective concept combined, logic reasoned a new conclusion from the already known major and minor propositions, and verified whether the reasoning was appropriately made or not. it could make a science by making judgment (universal statement about species) possible, not by simple expression of an object in daily conversations. 8. the human instinct for expression (desire for stating one’s feelings and opinions) was sublimated into the spirit of love for aletheia in the athenian philosophy (having a meaning to clarify justness of interpretation and reasoning in language and proposition) through the stage of love for aletheia in terms of the natural philosophy (which intends to find unhidden appearance of an object toward the subject). this spirit of philosophy or science that came from public activities in polis provided profound insights into the general matters of politics, society and ethics, which deepened politics more. 9. it is true that european logic had been created by europeans kim eunjoong 81 since the time of the greeks, but in consideration of that its nature is the product of human’s universal reason, it can be applied to cultures other than those in europe. however, on the other hand, in some aspects, western logic is a culture of europe’s own, therefore, it is closely related with the ideological tradition of europe. formal logic or collectivism and the waiting opposite as a partner 1. in the documents of mathematics available in the ancient civilized society, except for greece, and in the chinese traditional society, there is no theorem made through strict logical deduction from the basic proposition, and whatever theorem there is, it just explains simple solution. the lack of established forms for general theorem means that the concepts of definition, postulate, axiom, deduction, theorem, and demonstration were not settled yet. 2. east asia doesn’t belong to the top world or the tradition of the greek polis. the language and thinking system of east asia doesn’t possess the method of greek substantialization. for example, the language system of the west which is represented by alphabets indicates the logic of one-sided decision which requires the subject to coincide with the predicate, whilst in the korean language, the subject, an object, and a complement, except for the predicate, are not fixed or settled in a sentence, and the predicate is always pushed to the end of a sentence. in chinese, a copula that shows the relationship between the subject and the predicate is not used at all. this linguistic difference suggests that the western thinking system (represented in greece) is different from that of the korean peninsula in east asia. that is, it means that the experience of both parties are different and further, their views of the world are different. 3. the western logic has made deductive logic while moving to the city order from the order of moira and gods. on the other hand, the oriental logic has made collectivism (requiring the waiting opposite as a partner)20 while moving to city from fate.21 the ancient greek philosophers adopted universalism (using an individual or a special in creating the city order), while the advanced philosophers adopted collectivism that requires the waiting opposite as a partner of individuals (or parts). 82 prajñâ vihâra 4. in greece, the orator had to persuade the general public to follow them. therefore, under this environment, logic was regarded very important, which was natural. in china, there was this tendency in the age of civil wars, but the object for it was not the general public, but feudal lords, logical school or intellectuals belonging to the school. this tendency faded after the advent of the powerful “han” dynasty. 5. in logic, it is very important to clarify a concept, which is called definition. therefore, it is natural that confucius mentioned zhengming (to define the names) first. just as socrates intended to get correct knowledge of definition, confucius took the first step into logic. however, in ancient china, zheng-ming had never been applied to pure intellectual interest. 6. with no doubt, confucius’ thought is rational thought based on human’s intelligence, denying conventional traditional thought like incantation or superstition. the basic attitude of confucianism is the thought of zheng-ming, the thought of zie-ming (to know the names), and selfconsciousness of limitation of intelligence. the intellectual action of zhengming was regarded important as the means of solving social and political matters. it was not important in itself. zheng-ming is an attempt to reconstruct politics and morality intellectually. here, intelligence is superior and it is the position of intellectual practice. the pivotal key of this intellectualism is zheng-ming. however, zheng-ming of confucianism is short of intellectual investigation. zheng-ming of confucius is ideologically different from socrates who pursued definition. 7. as for socrates, to get correct knowledge through definition was to practice right morality, but when he pursued knowledge, he thought from the intellectual position and made a decision. therefore, as a stage to reach a definition, he needed dialogue, which was developed to dialectic. dialogue is a process of investigating the discussed thoughts or concepts, and of excluding any contradiction that may be found in it. through this intellectual work, a correct definition can be obtained. that is why socrates’ theory of definition contains a possibility for aristotle’s logic. 8. confucius’ zheng-ming was to practice right morality. however, upward reasoning is not found in confucius. therefore, to become fatherly doesn’t consist of generic concept and specific difference, but it is a collection of several cases of becoming fatherly. it is often found kim eunjoong 83 in the analects of confucius. for example, confucius showed several explanations of humanity, which all are cases of humanity.22 his way of answer is not to catch the universal concept of humanity. accordingly, formal logic that requires deductive reasoning is not found in confucius. what the leader of china was required to have was to evaluate whether a case is humane or not. 9. in response to the question, “can the virtue be taught?”, socrates asks in the meno, “what is the virtue?” in in euthrophro, he asks what is piety (that which makes all the pious things pious, and is not individual cases of piety). in this aspect, confucius, who takes an example of humanity to the question what humanity is, is clearly different from socrates. that is the difference whether there is deductive logic or not. the reason for this difference is that greece thinks the definition of a universal concept can be recognized, while china suggests it impossible to recognize universal concepts or universals. it involves the fact that the hypothetic deduction system is impossible.23 10. deduction is not only found in confucius, but also in other philosophers of china. in gongsunlong’s saying “a white horse is not a horse,” a white horse is not subordinate to the universal concept of horse.24 as for him, a white horse is a white horse that is not included in horse. in a certain aspect, logic or the concept of mathexis has peculiarity of the european culture so strictly speaking, it is difficult to call both the western logic and the oriental logic. 11. knowledge of numbers or shapes is a universal phenomenon that can be seen in any place at any time through the history of human culture, but mathematics or logic as the science differentiated from collection of knowledge of numbers or shapes is an historical event that can be seen only in europe. construction of the deductive system can’t be seen in the culture and traditions of the east centering on china. 12. in the civilization of the ancient orient before the greek times or in the chinese culture, highly advanced mathematical knowledge had been formed earlier, but the deductive and democratic system, pure mathematics, had not been settled, which means that these cultures had no deduction (which was born within the same process which western democracy was rooted) and that there was no process of the western democracy. 84 prajñâ vihâra 13. the history of greece went through the process: extinction of monarchism; advent of social conditions that made the class of citizens grow up; advent of the citizen class; activation of speech and dispute; transfer to public order from private interest; creation of universal concept; and set-up of formal logic or deduction. in this process, they made universal concepts and acted upon these universal concepts. it is logos centralism that was melted in this process. the greek reason was not results of human negotiations toward things but results of human relations toward human. it had developed through the skill that a man superintended another, not the skill that applied it to the world.25 conclusion 1. formal logic is the power that made western democracy possible.26 it means to create formal logic in their livings, not to learn formal logic. creation of formal logic was possibly made by training of rational thought, and formal logic was subordinate to the proposition of the created hypothetic deductive system, which made western democracy possible. 2. in the tradition of the east asian cultures, there were no speech, dispute, transfer to public order, creation of universal concepts, and advent of deduction. there was no major proposition that could be found through dialectic discussion and accordingly, there was no rational object to obey. this is the fate of the east asian culture. in consideration of the fact that democracy is not form, but process and contents in it, democracy in east asia that appeared in the 20th century had form, but did not have process and contents. 3. as kim dae-jung insisted, mencius insisted popular sovereignty and donghak insisted innaecheon (human is equal to heaven). however, popular sovereignty emphasizes politics for people to the leader, but it doesn’t insist establishing deductive order through training the public to have rational thought. further, popular sovereignty is not established by demos’ free will, which is same as the innaecheon thought of donghak. the hypothetic deductive system is not found in innaecheon. both mencius’ popular sovereignty and donghak’s innaecheon mean to realize humanism. kim eunjoong 85 in this aspect, the ideology of the east is humanism, but it is not identical with western democracy. superficially, the ideology of east asia is surely democratic, but it is also far from democracy from a concrete viewpoint. 4. the oriental philosophers tried to teach what politicians should do rather than to emphasize deductive order coming from demos who were trained logos. politicians were required to govern according to the collectivistic spirit. in china, the kings were responsible for the order of nature and the universe, not only for good politics for people. society and nature become one, and the kings were in the center of it. this understanding had been continued until the monarchy was abolished in 1911, but it is not true that china after 1911 turned to western democracy. korea built up a provisional government based on democracy in 1919, but it was democracy in terms of form only. it was not democracy in terms of its contents or process. korea went through historical accidents like independence in 1945, april 19 revolution in 1960 and citizens’ strife in 1987, but it was just the same as the class of citizens that appeared in the early days of the greek times. 5. the fact that east asia’s values are not identical with western democracy doesn’t mean that the east asia’s values lead to inferior political systems or anti-humanism. in this aspect, kim dae-jung didn’t correctly understand the values of east asia. on the other hand, lee kuan yew correctly understood it. it is not to emphasize that asia should stick to asian values. in order to change the fate of the asian culture to western democracy, corresponding social changes, advent of rational thought, and the hypothetic deductive logic system should be preceded or accompanied. european democracy is not cultural fate in east asia. endnotes 1 the change in the battle type—from lightly armed hand-to-hand fight to heavily armed infantry action—made a stress laid on a group of normal soldiers who moved forward in the same steps with shields just like one person moved. that is, many soldiers following the given command through self-control (sophrosyne) in the clear mental state became to play a more important role rather than generals showing more abilities than humans‘ in the hypnotic state (lyssa). alike, an individual’s value was shown only through dynamic functions performed in the relationship with the whole group, not through the individual itself. 2 socrates participated in the war as hoplites. 86 prajñâ vihâra 3 the basic interests of greek poleis were freedom and autonomy. the freedom implied the freedom from the domination of other poleis. the autonomy implied the establishment of law. l. de blois & r. j. van der spek, an introduction to the ancient world, 1997, p. 91. 4 however, democratic political system was not common to every polis. a few poleis were governed by the kings. 5 politikos, 282b7-8., sophist, 243b5. 6 j. -p. vernant, the origins of greek thought, 1982, p. 49. 7 agora meant: (1) citizens’ assembly (boule, ekklesia) in which speech was made or the place where citizens’ assembly was held (political meaning); (2) speech at plaza (general philosophical meaning); (3) court (legal meaning); and (4) act of buying and selling daily necessities (economic meaning). these meanings of agora have corresponding verbs and the verbs such as ‘have a speech at citizens ‘assembly’, ‘speak at plaza or court’, etc. were philosophically important. that is, it is quite different from daily conversations to have speech in front of the general public at citizens‘ assembly, plaza or court. it is to express one‘s opinion in language having a certain form (it has a certain form so it will not be changed any more) that one tells one;s doxa to others. the fact that more than two people have conversations means that one tells one‘s opinion, one listens to what one says, and one recognizes what one says through what others say (different from one’s idea). 8 j. -p. vernant, ibid., p. 60. 9 g. h. sabine, a history of political theory, 1986, vol. 1, p. 60. 10 j. -p. vernant, ibid., 1982, p. 50. 11 the greek words, ho men and ho de, symbolically show that a certain man has this view and another has that view over the same situation. it made an affirmative contribution to development and settlement of democracy in greece. at this time, greeks found something to group ho men and ho de into one. 12 in greece, the best person was the best citizen. cf. g. l. dickinson, the greek view of life, 1957, p. 80. this means the equality or identity of the polis and citizen, universal and individual. 13 protagoras, 322a-323c. 14 g. h. sabine, ibid., p. 59. 15 against the natural philosophy that emphasized only theorein without reflection on from what level an object got to appear, and against sophists who intended to find truth from doxa, plato and aristotle insisted that an object was made from three dimensions like sense, doxa and nous. these two philosophers intended to overcome skepticism by proposing a possible foundation for truth with universality, and they insisted that we should find truth in the real facts (pragma) through dialogs (dialogos) and logic (organon), not through eloquence or rhetoric. 16 they maintained logos centralism, derivatives of which are existing as eidos, substance, existing as ousia, time existing as a dot of the present time and a kim eunjoong 87 moment, consciousness, subjectivity, common existing of self and others, and mutual subjectivity of self toward directional phenomenon. 17 e. kapp, greek foundations of traditional logic, 1967, pp.6-8. 18 meno, 82b~85e. 19 the culture of logical construction of the scientific system also signifies the logical construction of life world. the logical means here the formal logic. 20 it is a theory that the opposite things help each other and become an adjustment body. however according to greek logic, opposite things mean personal argument (doxa). so the confucius’ logic of the waiting opposite as a partner never reach the major premise, public idea or truth. 21 d. park, ‘urban philosophers, on what do they depend?’(not published) 22 the man who is not humane cannot endure adversity. / only the humane person can love person and hate person. / the man who loves humanity is perfect.(analects of confucius, ch. liein), the humane person works difficult things ahead others. / the humane person gives a person credit for good thing.(analects of confucius, ch. ongya) 23 in greek thought, the universal can be known by the human reason. however in chinese thinking, the heaven cannot be known by human. this is the fundamental difference between europe and east asia. 24 gongsunlong, gongsunlongtzu. 25 j.-p. vernant, ibid., p.132. 26 the important thing here is not the democracy itself but the method of the democratic thinking that is rational and deductive, searching for the universal. bibliography l.de blois & r. j. van der spek, an introduction to the ancient world, 1997. f.m.conford, from religion to philosophy, 1957. confucius, analects of confucius. g.l.dickinson, the greek view of life, 1957. gongsunlong, gongsunlongtzu. e.kapp, greek foundations of traditional logic, 1967 88 prajñâ vihâra kim eunjoong 89 e.neumann, the origins & history of consciousness, 1954. platoni’s opera, euthyphro, meno, politikos, protagoras, sophist, 1972. g.h.sabine, a history of political theory, 1986. e. b.tylor, primitive culture, 1920. j.p.vernant, the origins of greek thought, 1982. article 4-2 67 husserlian pregnant wholes as an ontological criterion for individuals and objects* carlo conni saint raphael university of milan, italy 1. introduction the first part of this work intends to give a general survey of some theories current in the fields of ontology and mereology dealing with the well-known problem of whole-parts relations. some hints about the philosophical consequences of these positions concerning the problem of identity will be given. in the conclusive part of the article i will focus on a specific identity criterion defining the cartesian notion of substance in order to distinguish in ontological-formal terms individuals from objects. more specifically, it seems that the differents notions of pregnant whole of husserl’s “third logical investigation” can single out the formal parthood structure of certain kinds of entities, typically living beings, from that of material artifacts or objects. it is well-known that the topic of whole-parts relations is today at the centre of a lively debate about relationships between metaphysics, ontology and many applied disciplines such as medical-biological sciences, cognitive sciences, but also geography, environmental sciences or software engineering. my research aims at developing some important issues of the “third logical investigation” named “on the theory of wholes and their parts”, in view of presenting a double type articulated theory of strong integrated wholes called, respectively, unitary pregnant wholes and emergent or supervenient pregnant wholes. the former typically exemplified by living beings or individuals, the latter by complexes of individual properties called by the australian philosopher *the author based his paper on the lecture delivered to the graduate school of philosophy and religion at assumption university of thailand on 24 september 2003. many thanks to those present and to asst. prof. sriwarakuel for arranging my visit. prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 67-92 67 © 2000 by assumption university press 68 keith campbell <abstract or dependent particulars>1, as opposed to <concrete particulars> also known in the tradition as substances or individuals. abstract particulars of campbell are very close to williams’s <tropes> and husserl’s <individual moments>, but many centuries before leibniz and aristotle called them <individual accidents or individual properties>. donald williams (1953) espoused his view in the pioneering “the elements of being” where substances are bundles of tropes related by a relation of compresence. campbell following williams wrote: “an ordinary object, a concrete particular, is a total group of compresent tropes or abstract particulars”.2 i will not accept the bundle theory because the relation of compresence is too weak in order to explain how from a fusion of tropes we can move to concrete particulars as objects or living beings. individual properties seem to be too insubstantial to give rise to substantial individuals by bundling, that remain as peter simons assumes a mere collection and not an individual.3 in my view, bundles of tropes not single tropes are emergent or supervenient pregnant wholes made up by the husserlian relation of ontological foundation binding unitarily every trope. they can be melodies, the laughing of the mona lisa, expressive and affective aspects of anatomical parts as faces, attributes of objects shape as the pug-nose of theaetetus in the famous dialogue of plato, or as in an example of peter simons, the way ingrid bergman asks sam to play “as time goes by” in casablanca, and so on.4 unitary pregnant wholes and the emergent wholes plausibly, living beings and complexes of tropes are radically distincts form each other and from material artifacts medium-sized dry goods as in the words of j. l. austin, the inanimate things called by husserl narrow wholes. 2. extensional approaches to whole-parts relations my view also differs from the formal theory of whole known as classical exstensional mereology which is usually presented in two logical guises: “the calculus of individuals” of h. leonard and n. goodman and the mereology of lesniewski.5 usually in extensional mereologies no formal ontological differences have been carried out up to now between individuals and objects. these theories are subject to two major criticisms. 68 prajñâ vihâra 69 the first is that it asserts the existence of certain individuals called mereological sums for whose existence we have no evidence outside the theory itself. the second and more fundamental criticism is that they do not fit most of the objects around us. also in the spirit of analytic philosophy, objects and individuals have always been conceived like spatiotemporal entities with the same conditions of identity in a strict sense and across time. for frege and quine individuals and objects both can be in the same way the value of a logical variable in a predicate calculus. peter strawson applies the term individual to refer to all the conceivable spatiotemporal entities even if he recognises that the terms individual and object are linguistic expressions that cannot be synonymous.6 recently, some theories have been proposed to favor the encounter between topological disciplines of space and mereological theories like those mentioned before. roberto casati & achille varzi in their two books published by mit press, “holes and other superficialities”, 1994, and “parts and places”, 1999, have reformulated many mereological principles in terms of topological principles that lie behind spatial representations. casati & varzi apply these principles to things conceived as specific space regions clearly determined by bona fide boundaries constituted by surfaces or lines. mereo-topological approaches together with purely logic-analytical conception of entities cannot in any case formally distinguish between individuals and objects and also between wholes like living beings and complexes or bundles of tropes. the topological attitude does not also offer a well outlined position on the problem of identity, as to say that this problem is still open to different solutions. on the contrary, in extensional mereology the identity of things is given by the strict algebric sum of their actual proper parts. in classical extensional mereology things are pure aggregates of parts. the crucial notion of identity of extensional mereology is the claim that entities with the same parts are identical. this is a thesis developed by analogy with the extensionality of sets, whereby sets with the same members are not only identical but also possible. but in spite of the theory of sets, the notion of identity that we find in mereology is not abstract or ideal identity as the identity between two numbers or the one of qualitative-material similarity between two things, but it is rather the carlo conni 69 70 notion of the thisness of a thing as numerical sameness that is at play. the notion of identity of mereology is not so far from that of tropes theories. we can trace the philosophical origins of identity notion of the mereological approach to the philosophy of leibniz, more precisely in his super-essentialism where the identity of a thing is given by all its individual intrinsic non relational properties. this situation is exactly formulated in his principle of the identity of indiscernibles. if the thesis of mereological essentialism is accepted then two prima facie big problems need to be accounted for. (1) the first is that certain things like living beings have clearly different parts at different times, they are mereologically variable or in flux. we easily see how an entity with different parts or properties at different times cannot be identical with the sum of its parts at any time, for then it would be different from itself across time. (2) the second problem is that some entities in the world would have had some parts other than those they actually have, and still be the same entities. in other words, they are not modally rigid in their parts. if we accept exstensional mereology then no objects could have had parts other than those they actually have. this claim is called mereological essentialism and it is usually associated with chisholm.7 it must be clear that in every essentialist approach and accordingly to exstensional merelogy, an individual in two different times because of natural changes in the compositional structure of his parts, could not be considered the same individual. for instance, if at a certain time t 1 the individual a is composed of the sum of the parts <a + b + c + d + e>, and at the time t 2 the individual a 1, temporally continuous with a, is composed of the parts <a + b + c + d>, we say that the individual designated by the term a 1 cannot be the same as the individual designated by a. mereologically they cannot be identical because they have different parts, and we have then to exclude a relation of identity through time. 2.1 modal approaches the modal approaches try to avoid the many problems of strong essentialist theories by using a form of weaker essentialism. for example, this table could have been painted with another colour and it seems plausible to think that it would be the same table. in the same way, a person could have undertaken different careers or experiences and still 70 prajñâ vihâra 71 be identified as the same individual. however, the crucial problem with modal approaches is that they do not offer a well defined criterion to establish when an individual is still the same individual. how far can we push ourselves in imagining possible worlds populated by individuals with counterfactual properties? modal theories are not able to determine what are the essential properties that an entity could not lose without becoming another entity with a different individual identity or a specific identity. we find here the express acknowledgement that the problem of identity through time is one to which we cannot offer really satisfying solutions, as in these claims by saul kripke, which do not seem to encourage to solve identity problems: “in reality adequate conditions, necessary and sufficient, for the identity that is not a matter of principle are in any case rare. to tell the truth, mathematics is the only case that i know in which such conditions are even given in a possible world. i don’t know conditions of this kind for the identity of material objects in time, or for people. everybody knows what kind of problem we are dealing with. but let’s drop the subject”.8 in modal approaches the identity across time of an individual must satisfy the more general conditions expressed by the properties of his genus or species. the general attitude of modal theories about identity seem to be trapped in what we could call the vicious analytical circle in as much as they continually refer to the species of the individual to define what an individual is permanently across time at the level of its individual identity. to achieve this they usually use a form of mereological essentialism less restrictive than of extensional mereology to make up for the lack of theory of individual identity. they start off with a definition of the individual coinciding with the definition of his natural species or natural kind establishing his general existential conditions, then they deduce that his individual identity may persist across time and change if and only if it continues to satisfy the defining conditions of the species to which it belongs, if it continues to exist as an exemplification of its species. but what seems to be defined in reality is nothig but certain conceptual notions in use in the linguistic community, or rather, certain scientific notions that are applied to kinds of individual but that cannot describe the infinitely richer and more complex individual reality. it seems implausible to think that individual identity could be established simply carlo conni 71 72 by the fact that an individual was born by the sexual union of a couple of individuals as in the kripke’s theory. we are clearly dealing here with conditions that have some value for the specific identity of an individual but not for his individual identity. as soon as the individual identity of a human being is presented as the same as having a head, a heart, a dna, etc., it seems necessary then that the loss of one of these parts invariably provokes the loss of the individual identity. following an old mental experiment by hilary putnam we can think instead that an individual could preserve his individual identity constituted by his physical external features, his character, personality, memories or abilities, and at the same time this individual may radically change his specific identity constituted by his organic internal structure into an artificial one. what we usually intend in a lockean sense as individual or personal identity memories and personality, would be maintained even if the specific identity of a human being would be modified into another one. the paradoxical situation is that meanwhile extensional mereology shows a too strong theory of the individual identity and, at the same time, it lacks a theory about conditions for the specific identity, for the modal theories the situation is exactly the opposite, where with solely a theory concerning specific conditions they try to construct a theory for individual identity across time. the unsolved questions are in what way does an individual remain related to the peculiar characteristics of his individuality? what exactly are individual identity and specfic identity, and what from an ontological standpoint differentiates them from any other identity of a material artifact like an object? the second objection to modal theories concerns the fact that it is unclear how to establish what properties could objectively be different from those in existence. in the modal approach there are no limits for up to what point we can imagine counterfactuals situations compatible with the enduring individual identity. this is because a too broad use of counterfactual situations prevents us from reaching a positive definition of the individual identity. this difficulty in the modal approach is determined by the fact that it cannot answer positively to the question on what is individual identity. at the heart of these theories it is possible to think that napoleon would continue to be napoleon even if he had won the battle of waterloo or if he had had a different face, body or another 72 prajñâ vihâra 73 personality. this attitude clearly seems to lack an ontological theory of the parthood structure of an individual as a whole conceivable independently of its material origins. 2.2 alternative approaches in the contemporary ontological debate we also have theories as van inwagen’s (his main essays are “the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts”, 1981, and “material beings”, 1991) that do not recognize ontological object’s status to material artifacts as tables or houses. van inwagen believes that material artifacts are only a way to rearrange the furniture of the earth without adding to it. from this point of view objects are virtual objects having virtual parts bound to each other by a manifold set of physical forces. there are therefore no tables no chairs and there are no other artifacts. artisans do not create, not at least in the sense causing things to exist. they rearrange objects in space and make binding relations to begin to hold or to cease between portion of matter as in the case of the sculptor who chips away at a block of marble. an example of van inwagen’s is the following: “imagine a desert and imagine that a regiment of the foreign legion arrives at a certain location with orders to secure the local caravan. the first thing the legionnaires do is build a fort. they have brought bulldozers and they push the sand about with these machines up to building an aggregate of sand. have they brought anything a fort say into existence? the reply of van inwagen is that they have not brought even one object into existence, therefore, the fort is in this sense a virtual object”.9 however, van inwagen’s hypothesis seems to be too strong a solution to the problem of the nature of objects and does not offer new elements to understand the relationships between the parts of an object and the object as a whole. from this point of view, a classical dilemma or puzzle like the one of theseus’ boat seems to find an apparent solution. theseus’ mythical boat, that each year took young people to the island of crete to be sacrificed to the minotaur, was protected by the athenians as they from time to time removed any damaged or old pieces and replaced them with new parts. let’s suppose that things went on as thomas hobbes told, that is, the damaged planks were being removed and collected to be carlo conni 73 74 reassembled in the original way. if we imagine that theseus’ boat have had every plank substituted, the boat so reconstructed with the old original planks would appear very similar to the boat at the start of the story. which is theseus’ real boat? the one that plank by plank was put together and renovated or the one composed only from the old planks taken off the original boat? the principle of identity based on spatial temporal continuity suggests that theseus’ boat is the first the one that was renovated plank by plank but the material and qualitative identity principle suggests that theseus’ boat is the second. how do we decide? van inwagen’s solution is that there are no boats and hence there is no puzzle about the identity of the boats. all that happens in the story is that the planks are rearranged, brought into contact and separated. but at no time two or more of these planks compose anything, and no plank is ever an essential part of anything. according to the ontological standpoint of van inwagen the puzzle of theseus’ boat seems to disappear as soon as we stop to think of the objects as endowed with an intrinsic individual and specific identity. in other words, a table or a boat are not essentially a table or a boat. they do not possess a specific ontological structure in the sense that material artifacts do not properly have parts or essential parts. only living beings have truly undetached parts, more precisely, according to van inwagen: “i think that the cells of living beings are made of […] are unitary things having an entelechy; in this respect they are like men, women, and dog of which they are parts”.10 as we will see later this position is incompatible with any coherent mereological counting policy. van inwagen is willing to have men, women and dogs along with their cells and that violates whatever non-redundancy ontological constraint. i share van inwagen’s denial in ascribing an essential identity to material artifacts but not for his peculiar reasons. the motivation of this denial should be found, in my view, in the failing by the objects to satisfy a specific structure of relationships of dependence between their undetached parts that i will call structure of unitary foundation determined by mutual relations of existential dependence. an array of condition that seems satisfied at least by leaving beings. i think van inwagen’s proposal does not actually fit in an ontological analysis concerning the parthood of wholes but rather a larger 74 prajñâ vihâra 75 metaphysical view of the nature of reality in the search for a reply to the famous question of quine: what is there in the world? without saying anything about how we have to count the entities of the world. the answer of van inwagen is there are nothing but aggregates of atoms but he has to add immediately that some of these atoms, as in the case of cells or living beings, are not just merely modalities to rearrange preexistent matter by physical and chemical forces. we are still far from an ontological theory able to describe in formal terms the intrinsic difference between artifacts and living beings. however, if along the line of analytical thought (e.g. frege-quine-strawson) we find only spato-temporal entities called indistinct individuals, with van inwagen we have another approach which overcomes those presupposed ontological distinctions between inanimate things and animate ones. i believe that too much prominence has been given to the metaphysical question about what there is in the world solely from a logical standpoint. i think the former quinean metaphysical question has brought us to an unwarranted and widespread equivalence between objects and individuals driven by the search for a most economic solutions quite often of a reductionist type, deflectionist or eliminativist in the spirit of the notorious ockham’s razor: “entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem”. now, i would like to come to the problem of counting policies. to the problem of how many entities we actually have to count as elements in an inventory of the world. for instance, the strictest case of counting policy is the atomistic one: <never count an entity that has parts>. (av) x is included in an inventory of the world iff x is mereologically atomic, i.e. has no proper parts. of course this presupposes that the domain be fixed by an atomistic mereology and that we are actually able to verify that a certain entity does not have any part. we may choose among various ways of drawing up an inventory of the world, we can decide to include only the parts or we can decide to include only the wholes. but once we have chosen there is no room for double counting. this is called minimalist view from casati & varzi 12. this view says in short that a very admissible carlo conni 75 76 way of drawing up an inventory of the world must satisfy a nonredundancy constraint. (nrc) if x properly overlaps y and y is included in the inventory then x is not itself to be included. this avoids double counting. for instance michelangelo’s statue of david or the form of that piece of marble overlaps the block of marble and its parts then we have to count only one thing, more plausibly david as michelangelo’s statue. the (nrc) is an ontological stance that recently has been challenged by a relevant philosopher of both analytical and phenomenological provenance, l. r. baker in her “persons and bodies”, 2000. she proposes that michelangelo’s david and the block of marble constituting the statue, would be two distinct entities because they differ at least in their modal properties. baker’s account has a great interest, although it seems more plausible to think that to carry out ontological distinctions between entities in terms of modal properties is not sufficient to support this proposition. i think this problem about the possibility of an ontological subsistence of coincident or superposed things, as the relation between an object’s shape and its matter might well be solved by appealing to the husserlian notion of ontological foundation instead of baker’s account, which distinguishes among different kinds of pregnant wholes, a few of which are complexes of properties ontologically founded upon wholes. we can see a few passages of baker’s essay: “the nature and identity of many of the things that populate the world of everyday life are not always or even usually, determined by what they are made of […] our experience of things going out of existence leads to the conclusion that a statue is not identical to a piece of marble, nor is a stone wall identical to the stones that make it up, nor are persons identical to their body. but if a statue is not identical to a piece of marble, nor a person to a body, what is the relation between statue and piece or between person and body? this query motivates development of the idea of constitution-without-identity […] constitution is a contingent relation between individuals things. the relata of the constitution relation are not properties, so constitution 76 prajñâ vihâra 77 must be distinguished sharply from supervenience”.11 >> (baker, 2000: 24-33) according to baker, rightly i think, to understand a thing whose identity is not determined by the identity of its parts we need to look beyond mereology. the relation of constitution is ubiquitous and, in baker’s view, is the relation that is obtained, for instance, between an octagonal piece of metal and a stop sign, between strands of dna molecules and genes or between pieces of paper and dollar bills. it is a relation of unity that is intermediate between identity and separate existence. however, the idea of such an intermediate position strikes many philosophers as incoherent. here are some more passages of baker: “if david and the piece of marble were identical than by a version of leibniz’s law there would be no property borne by the piece of marble but not borne by david and no properties borne by david but not borne by the piece of marble […] but we know that the piece of marble could have existed in a world without art. by contrast, david could not exist without being a statue. so, david has a property the property of being a statue wherever it exists that the piece of marble lacks […] if x constitutes y at a certain place and time, then there is a unified individual at that place at that time, and the identity of that individual is determined by y. the identity of the constituting thing is submerged in the identity of what it constitutes”.12 david and the piece of marble differ in their modal properties and hence are not identical. baker clearly admits that david overlaps the piece of marble when she said <that the constituting thing is submerged...>. what happens is that baker’s account escapes not only from the application of the non redundancy constraint (nrc) but also from a metodological more general principle that we have called the minimalist view. the (mv) says that: (mv) x is included in an inventory of a world iff x does not overlap (at the time when the inventory is drawn up) any distinct y that is itself included in the inventory. in my opinion, also a strong criticism of extensional mereology cannot avoid meeting some very general mereological principles as the carlo conni 77 78 mv. i think we have to regard the (mv) as a postulate: any inventory of the world must satisfy (mv). the mereology concerned with the problem of the counting policies has been called countermereology. a way of implementing one particular instance of the minimalist view is the one that is obtained by including in an inventory of the world only things completely demarcated by bona fide boundaries. a bona fide boundary is a real physical discontinuity in the world between two distinct entities, as a river between two lands, the surface of an object or the epidermis of a human being. a fiat or unreal boundary is for instance the border between france and italy or thailand and myanmar. the (mv) and (nrc) playing a central role in what we might call the normal view: (nv) x is included in an inventory of the world iff it is strongly self-connected in at least two possible ways, (1) x is constituted with bona fide boundaries, (2) x is strongly self-connected relative to some condition φ. we says that x is self-connected, i. e. in one piece, iff any two regions that make up x are connected to each other.13 according to the condition (1) of the (nv) we count as entities of the world only things bordered by bona fide boundaries. for instance, if the right parts and the left parts of the top surface of a table seem delimited by fiat boundaries then we should count only one thing, the top of the table. however, the various pieces of the table, its tops, its legs etc. are actually pretty visible. we can state then they are real undetached not potential parts of the whole either from a purely mereological point of view or from husserlian wholes conception. accordingly, these parts are solely potential wholes, potential unities, that could become real wholes just in case they could be made independent and detached from the table. in that case, the parts qua detached parts become in spatial terms independent wholes provided that they have bona fide boundaries. if the condition (1) of (nv), the condition of having bona fide boundaries is respected then the (nv) is statisfied. 78 prajñâ vihâra 79 3. the role of the relations of dependence i think the way in which casati & varzi have exposed the (nv) states at least for me that the two conditions must be mutually exclusives and then we have two possible ways to satisfy the (nv). this clearly means that the (nv) could admit two ontological kinds of entities. the second condition of (nv) admits the central role of identity conditions in an inventory of the world but depending on the kind of unity between the parts of an entity. an example of unity satisfying the second condition of the (nv) is the following case. we easily see how a table is endowed with a functional identity that it is non constituted by, in the sense that it doesn’t contain immediately, any real material part of the table. the table’s functional identity is a kind of unity ontologically founded on a determined spatial and functional arrangement of some material parts. nevertheless, the functional identity does not contain these material parts, on which it is founded, as proper parts of the functional identity. in this sense, the table’s functional identity can endure over time and over any alteration or change of the constituent parts of the table. we count one thing a table until its functional identity is respected. we also see how the material parts of the table are completely independent from each other in terms of their existential conditions. every part of the table exists independently from the other parts. this means that the table really exists only as the table’s functional identity but not as a table-material-object. in this last case we have an extrinsic aggregate. then we can conclude that the table as a material artifact is not essentially a table but only an aggregate of matter while a functional identity is esssentially a table’s functional identity. we will see that also living beings are essentially what they are but not as functional entities. from the standpoint of baker’s theory there are two distinct entities: the object with a table-shape that submerges a second object constituted by a piece of matter. in van inwagen’s theory the table is a virtual object, just matter arranged in a certain way. i’m deeply persuaded that the husserlian notion of unitary ontological foundation can better describe lots of important phenomena concerning the constitution of unities. let’s think for instance of a colour that to exist it must be founded on a spatial surface but without containing carlo conni 79 80 that surface as its part. in the same way the table’s functional identity does not actually contain the material parts of the table. it’s worth noticing in the case of the table’s functional identity the condition (2) of (nv) has been satisfied. yet it seems also clear that here we have an ontological dependence between the table’s functional identity and the formal arrangement of the spatial parts composing the table. we can see how these spatial or material parts of the table are completely independent for each other in terms of their existential conditions. every part of the table exists independently from the other parts. this means from an ontological point of view that the table really exists only as the table’s functional identity but not as a table-material-objects. the functional identity of the table ontologically depends on some determined φ condition but the existence of the table or the existence of its material parts does not depend on each other in any sense. we have here an extrinsic aggregate. we have seen before that topological unity can only be one of the various kinds of unity or ontological glue that can be appealed to in singling out a whole. homogeneity, causal unity, functional unity, teleological unity are all quite relevant. there are of course many other senses in which we may speak of individual integrity besides the sense of topological connectednees. this was a central intuition of aristotle. for aristotle spatial continuity was only one kind of ontological glue with rigidity, uniformity and qualitative similarity (metaphysics, delta, 6, 1016a). and the same intuition is to be found in husserl’s third logical investigation which may be regarded as the first thorough formulation of a theory of parts and wholes based on the notion of ontological dependence. to perform a criterion to distinguish individuals and objects on purely ontological basis we need some specific ontological instruments. this criterion lies on the possibility to determine the nature of a few relations of dependence between the parts of a whole and the whole but not in terms of spatial connectednees. before introducing the criterion it can be useful to see how in the extensional approach the problem of existential dependence relations between parts has never had relevance. we have seen that real entities are simply spatial aggregates of some type of matter, and spatial connectedness is the only ontological glue. on this mereo-topological account the fundamental primitive is not 80 prajñâ vihâra 81 parthood but connection and all the mereological notions are introduced via the following part definition: (pd) x is a part of y if and only if everything that is connected to x is also connected to y. in one direction this principle is obvious: the leg is part of the table only if everything is connected to the leg is connected to the table. if we interpret it as an overlap of parts then (pd) is certainly viable. it expresses a basic mereological fact: one thing is part of another just in case whatever overlaps the first overlaps the second. on this basis and barring for the moment the complications arising from intensional factors such as time, modalities and counterfactuals, let us review some mereo-topological principles in the order of increasing strength and consequence. most theories agree on some common ground, treating parthood as a reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive relation. in a formal way we have the following representation of parthood axioms: (pa) (reflexivity) pxx everything is a part of himself (antisymmetry) pxy ∧ pyx → x = y two distinct things cannot be part of each other if x is a part of y and y is a part of x then x = y (transitivity) pxy ∧ pyz → pxz if x is a part of y and y a part of z then x is a part of z any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing we also add the principle of proper part: ppxy = df pxy ∧ ¬ pyx x is a proper part of y iff x is a part of y and y is not a part of x. carlo conni 81 82 the crucial point is that this axiomatisation needs to be completed by an approach in terms of relations of ontological dependence. in particular, rescher (1955)14 and several other authors do not recognise the validity of the transitivity relation, the case in (c). in military usage, for example, a person can be part of small units which are parts of larger ones, but people are never part of large units. a part of a cell is not said to be a part of the organ of which that cell is a part. casati & varzi minimize on these counterexamples but we can see as transitivity is a general principle which is meant to apply to parts only spatially broadly understood. a soldier is directly part of a battalion but the soldier does not report to the head of the battalion. likewise, a handle is a functional part of a door, the door is a functional part of the house and yet the handle is not a functional part of the house. these examples involve a departure from the broader notion of parthood that mereo-topology is meant to capture. to understand the manifold parthood phenomena we have to recur to the husserlian ontological foundation or existential dependence. husserl pointed out two types of ontological glue between parts and wholes. a narrow whole as a material artifact is one in which a number of entities are bound together into a unity by means of which husserl calls unifying moments, in other terms, spatio-temporal relations of contiguity or something like that. while in a unitary pregnant whole the parts are bound by existential or ontological relations of foundation and dependence. we have to thank the seminal work of the manchester triad k. mulligan, b. smith and p. simons on the notion of ontological dependence, if inquiries on this topic have received a deeper development in the 80’s. the new bible of an ontology not merely exstensional is the text of p. simons, “parts”, 1987. another very important work is the study on the “third logical investigation, “parts and moments. studies in logic and formal ontology”, edited by b. smith and k. mulligan, 1982. my inquiring into dependence relations between parts and wholes starts from these studies also to point out some of their intrinsic limits, above all the fact that they have not shown the ontological potentialities of the husserlian notion of unitary foundation in its two variants. 82 prajñâ vihâra 83 the key notion we have to work is then that of ontological dependence. we have many types of dependence relations but only some of them can play a central role in explaining the structure of an individual. the concept of dependence is a form of connection between entities that may be variously filled out. to try to find a common thread running through various notions of dependence we may appeal to the following list of definitions by p. simons: 1. person a is financially dependent on person b iff a cannot be solvent unless b is solvent (financial dependence). 2. skill a is dependent on skill b iff a cannot be mastered unless b is mastered (practical dependence). 3. judgement a <the roses are red> is dependent on the representation or idea b of the roses iff a cannot occur to a person c unless b occurs in that person (brentanian psychological dependence). 4. person a is dependent on drug b iff a cannot survive unless doses of b are regularly dispensed (physiological dependence). 5. an organic part a of a living being c is dependent on an organic part b of c iff a does not exercise its functions without the function of b (biological dependence). 6. a living being a is dependent on a set b of internal biological conditions or on a set c of outside environmental conditions iff a does not exist unless b and c exist (existential dependence). 7. clause a of a contract is dependent on clasue b iff a cannot apply unless b applies (legal dependence). 8. proposition p is dependent on proposition q iff p cannot be true unless q is true (one form of logical or semantic dependence). 9. accident or property a (e.g. this whiteness) is dependent on object b (e.g. a piece of paper) iff a cannot exist unless b exists (ontological dependence or de re dependence).15 this list could obviously be much longer. 4. the ontological core of the third logical investigation here are the basic definitions of ontological foundation also called existential or ontological dependence. the usserlian definition of carlo conni 83 84 ontological foundation stated in the third logical investigation is the following: (hdof) “a content of the species α is founded on a content of the species β iff an α cannot exist, for its essence (that is by law, on the basis of its specific nature), without the existence of a content of the species β (iii lu, § 21)”.16 we can easily see how husserl insists on defining the relation of foundation making appeal to the specific nature, to the specific identity of the contents embraced in the relation. the definition most simply affirms that an α is founded on a β iff it cannot exist without a β. the classical example of husserl is that of the colours that cannot exist without a bearer as the surface of an object. we have then a formal definition of the existential dependence relation in terms of parthood. this is a reading that has been shown to be true of husserlian definition of ontological foundation. the relation of foundation is a specific parthood pattern: (edd) a f b → (¬ (b < a) ∧ (a < b)) we read the definition as: if a is founded (or a is existentially dependent) on b then b is not a part of a but a is a proper part of b. it is by means of the existential dependence relation that husserl defines the notion of unitary ontological foundation. it is the unitary fondation that can be the relevant candidate to satisfy the phi-condition of the (nv) and to capture a large number of phenomena that we cannot explain in terms of pure topological relations. the relevant class of suitable candidates to satisfy the φ condition will be those of living beings or more generally the class of substances here represented by pregnant wholes. to husserl, the pregnant concept of a whole goes beyond the one of an arbitrary mereological aggregate endowed with bona fide boundaries and calls for an account in terms of the two concepts of unitary ontological foundation. the husserlian general definition of unitary ontological foundation is the following: 84 prajñâ vihâra 85 (hduof) “we understand by a pregnant whole a range of contents which are all covered by a single and unitary foundation without the help of further contents. the contents of such a range are called its parts. by talking of the unitarity of the foundation we imply that every content is foundationally dependent, directly or indirectly, with every content. this can happen in such a way that all those contents are founded on each other, directly or indirectly, without any external recourse” (iii lu: § 21). the definition affirms that a unitary pregnant whole is a strongly connected network of parts whose existence depends on the existence of the other parts. all the relations between the parts are relations of existential dependence in a strong sense of existence like coming into existence, survival or enduring. in my doctoral dissertation i have argued that in the § 21 of the third logical investigation it is actually defined another complementary definition of unitary foundation. it is the following that i call unitary emergent foundation: (hduef) “…this can happen in such a way that all those contents are founded on each other, directly or indirectly, without any external recourse; or inversely they all together found a new content, still without any external recourse. in this last case this new unitary content will be constituted by part-contents which will be founded on part-groups of the whole presupposed system of contents” (iii lu: § 21), the italics are by husserl himself. an emergent property is such a property that emerges from a whole of more basic properties or constituents. emergent properties are exclusively properties of a whole. husserl adds this important specification: “we note immediately that differences of this type determine essential distinctions between wholes. in the first cases the parts are in foundational relations […] in the others the parts are external to one another and determine real forms of connections. when we talk about connections we have to intend a narrow sense of whole where certain contents are independent of each other” (iii lu: § 21). carlo conni 85 86 it would take too long for me to enter into the details of the husserl definition of emergent unitary foundation but it is important to notice how these passages of husserl are essential to understand the innovative strength of his ontology. the narrow wholes that husserl mentions are clearly material artifacts, pure extensive contents unified by real forms of connections, while pregnant wholes can only be living beings or, still hypothetically functional forms or perhaps, complex digital systems, where the existence of any software part depends on the existence of other parts. i think that the two definitions disclose two distinct types of pregnant wholes that we have called unitary pregnant wholes and emergent or supervenient pregnant wholes. now, what are the new contents described in the husserlian definition of (hduef)? i think this definition could refer to complexes of individual properties or complexes of tropes but also, in a very interesting way, to objects’s shape or spatial configurations of parts as this passage of husserl seems to suggest: “certain independent contents each from the other, (in which a whole can be divided into its pieces or fractions) found new contents as “forms of connection between them”” (iii lu, § 21). if the property of an object’s shape, for instance the property to be round or square, is an emergent property then we could explain why we can say of many forms that they are nearly round or nearly square without actually being round or square. this is because the geometrical character of a form is never contained in its singular parts or in a particular set of its parts but only in the more comprehensive whole constituted by all the single spatial and geometrical aspects of the shape. 5. the notion of substance my hypothesis about ontological differences between individuals and objects and the nature of specific identity are then the following. full-fledged livings beings are unitary pregnant wholes because every organic part of these beings is, directly or indirectly, in a relation of existential dependence on the other parts of the whole. all parts depend on each other and the whole is not a simply sum of its parts. the network of existential dependences implemented in living beings is a recognizable pattern representing their specific identity. every kind of living being 86 prajñâ vihâra 87 detains his specific pattern of unitary foundation made up by a specific network of all his parts in relations of existential dependence. we define in the following way the notion of specific identity of an individual: (sid) an entity is an individual in an essential way iff it shows a specific identity. an entity holds a specific identity iff it is a unitary pregnant whole resulting from a unitary ontological foundation. specific identity (si) is a case of (hduof). by means of (hduof) we obtain a systemic definition of the specific identity of an individual in terms of the complexity of its structure. an entity is an individual if and only if all of its parts are one another in relations of existential dependence. this means that the living organic structure of individuals is such that we have a continuous interdependence, either functional or existential, between their parts. we easily see how an object cannot in any sense satisfy this ontological pattern. an object, in as much as it is a narrow whole, constituted by relations of spatial connection like contiguity between its parts cannot show a specific identity. i believe that the husserlian definition of unitary foundation (hduof) together with his notion of pregnant whole can offer us a fundamental tool to explain in formal terms the cartesian notion of substance. an entity is a substance if it matches the definition of unitary pregnant whole. r. descartes in his principles of philosophy defined the notion of substance in this way: (cds) <lorsque nous concevons la substance nous concevons seulement une chose qui existe en telle façon qu’elle n’a besoin que de soi-même pour exister> (i. 51). <by substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence> (eng. trans. j. cottingham, 1985) the notion of substance has been traditionally identified with concrete particulars, however, so doing the necessary condition of ontological independence has been reinterpreted in such a way as spatial separate existence of an entity from all the others. it is evident that concrete carlo conni 87 88 particulars are not ontologically independent all things are in some way existentially dependent entities but at least some of them are spatially separated from others by bona fide boundaries. as the cartesian definition stands, it should be clear that no entity could plausibly satisfy it. there are actuallly no absolutely independent entities, only god could plausibly being ontologically independent or perhaps the prime immovable motor of aristotle that turns all the celestial spheres. in any case, we woudn’t have ordinary candidates for this notion. husserlian definition of unitary foundation can offer the right solution in the spirit of cartesian definition. until we think about individuals in topological or mereological terms as aggregates of parts, we’ll have no solution because the existence of these type of entities depend upon their proper parts, but the parts of an object cannot actually depend on the whole object itself. the existence of the table depends on the existence of its proper parts and this is a trivial truth but these parts are existentially completely independent from one another and also from the table itself as a whole. the relations of dependence inside material artifacts are therefore only in one direction, from the object to its parts. we have now to prove that an individual, differently from an object, does not properly depend on its proper parts in only one direction, and this is not a difficult task to achieve. if it is true that the existence or the functionality of every organic part of a living being depends on some other functional parts it is also true that all single parts of a living being cannot exist without the whole individual itself. to better understand this point we can think of the embryo that comes into existence almost complete with his essential parts. if the existence of the whole depends on its part, at the same time the single parts could not come into existence without the integral whole. my organic parts never could come into existence without the whole of my body that i am. we can now state that if the existence of a whole depends on its proper parts and in turn the existence of the proper parts depends on the whole, then this type of whole is a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other things for its existence. the whole depends on itself. the ontological independence of the substance is not a matter of absolutely existential independence but it is determined by an interdependent structural network of mutual relations of dependence between the whole 88 prajñâ vihâra 89 and its parts. at the § 10 husserl wrote: “establish the concept of dependence it is sufficient to affirm that an object can be dependent (in terms of its essential determinations) only inside a more comprehensive whole” (iii lu, § 10). in this sense the relavant ontological relations of dependence are inside a whole. the existential dependence of the part upon the whole is then essential in understanding the notion of substance. we can have the following definition of substance: (sd) if an entity has a specific identity it is a substance. a substance is a whole constituted by means of a unitary ontological foundation if: (a) the existence of every part depends on the existence of the other parts, (b) the existence of the whole depends on its parts, (c) the existence of all single parts of the whole depend on the existence of the whole itself. in a pure topological conception of entities we cannot understand the essential dependence of the parts on the whole to which they belong. and we could not satisfy the (2) condition of the (nv). i think this is the deep ontological intent of husserl’s work when he introduces the notion of ontological foundation as the genuine ontological glue between parts of pregnant wholes. within this ontological frame we have for example a new way to look at the puzzle of theseus’ boat. the boat exists only as a whole with certain specific properties. its existence depends obviously on its parts but the existence of the planks of the boat never depends on the other parts nor on the whole itself. the boat then is not a substance, it doesn’t have a specific identity. at any time theseus’ boat has proper parts constituted by its planks but no intrinsic relation of dependence between these parts and the boat subsists, and then any replacement of planks is admissible. temporal continuity is then plausibly the right identity criterion for the boat. i think with the husserlian notion of unitary ontological foundation we have seen not only a useful tool to formally distinguish between individuals and objects but also a very meaningful way of describing one of the essential aspects of the phenomenon of life: his intrinsic systemic interdependence of his properties. i believe that the ontological view i have developed from husserlian ontology can fruitfully carlo conni 89 90 meet the science of complex systems also now called the science of life. on this point, i’d like to quote a few passages of f. capra that clearly illustrate the relevance of the relations between wholes and parts for the understanding of living systems: “the essential properties of an organism, or living system, are properties of the whole, which none of the parts have. these properties are destroyed when the system is dissected, either physically or theoretically, into isolated elements. although we can discern individual parts in any system, these parts are not isolated and the nature of the whole is always different from the mere sum of its parts […] system sciences show that living systems cannot be understood by analysis. the properties of the parts are not intrinsic properties but can be understood only within the context of the larger whole”.17 now i’d like to sketch very briefly a notion of individual identity as an instantiation of an emergent pregnant whole. we cannot deepen the wide phenomenon of individual identity for which i advance an articulated theory in terms of emergent properties. here is my definition of individual identity: (iid) individual identity is the set of properties of an individual that are constituted by means of (hduef). the real properties of an individual identity must be properties of the whole individual. emergent properties can fit this requirement because in the spirit of husserlian definition they have to emerge from the whole individual. as to say, from the whole relevant set of more basic properties belonging to the proper parts of the individual. emergent properties are then essential properties because the whole individual cannot persist as the same individual without these properties. emergent properties show a typical character to the effect that they do not contain the parts on which they are unitary ontologically founded. in this way, they can persist across time in the case of an individual changing or losing a few of its parts. the organic and anatomic parts upon which emergent properties are founded are not constitutive parts of the emergent properties. i quote an example. if the typical way in which john expresses his sadness is an affective expression on his face, founded on some anatomic and physical 90 prajñâ vihâra 91 parts of john’s face, then the parts of this affective expression of sadness are not the parts of his face, and vice versa. in this way, probably, we could think that mental contents are unitarily ontologically founded on neurophysiological states but without containing the parts and properties of these states as proper parts of the mental contents itself. the parts of a neurophysiological state cannot play any explicative role with regard to a mental content. why don’t we think then that the thought is a property founded in some psycho-physical state and in this sense it points out to us the existence of a situation where the thought can play the role of a part, but not the contrary, the more basic states are not parts of the thought as in (edd)? probably the relations of ontological foundation best deeply represent the spirit of the cartesian’s dualism of the cogito ergo sum, where if i think certainly my thinking is a part of a more comprehensive whole constituted by my bodily existence, but the existence in itself is not an evidence of thinking. if this is true then the thought and its conceptual content is not a proper part of anything but rather an emergent property of a whole, more specifically, an improper part as well as all the other emergent properties. we can formulate the following definition of improper part: (ipd) x is an improper part of y iff x is euf on y and ¬ (x < y) ∧ (y < x) the mental and conceptual contents are not something personal that exclusively belong to us but rather something that can be objectively shared in a community of persons just because of its emergent character. carlo conni 91 92 endnotes 1campbell k. (1990), abstract particulars, blackwell, oxford. 2ibid., p. 21. 3simons p. (1994), “particulars in particular clothing: three trope theories of substance”, philosophy and phenomenological research, 3, p. 558. 4ibid., p. 556. 5see leonard h. s., goodman n. (1940), “the calculus of individuals and its uses”, journal of symbolic logic, 5, 45-55. see also goodman n. (1956), a world of individuals, in j. m. bochensky, a. church, n. goodman, the problem of universals. a symposium, university of notre dame press, notre dame, pp. 13-31. 6strawson p. f. (1959), individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics, methuen, london. 7chisholm r. m. (1973), “parts as essential to their wholes”, in review of metaphysics, 26, pp. 581-603. 8kripke s. (1980), naming and necessity, blackwell, oxford, p. 45. 9van inwagen p. (1990), material beings, cornell university press, ithaca (ny), p. 124. 10van inwagen p. (1981), “the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts”, pacific philosophical quarterly, 62, p. 133. 11baker l. r. (2000), persons and bodies. a constitution view, cambridge university press, cambridge (ma), pp. 24-33. 12ibid., p. 33. 13casati r., varzi a. (1999), parts and places: the structure of spatial representation, mit press, cambridge (ma), p. 112. 14rescher n. (1955), “axioms for part relation”, philosophical studies, 6, pp. 8-11. 15simons p. (1987), parts: a study in ontology, clarendon press, oxford, p. 293. 16husserl e. (1900-1901), logische untersuchungen, i edit., halle; (1913), ii edit., m. niemeyer, halle. 17capra f. (1996), the web of life, anchor books doubleday, new york, pp. 29-30. 92 prajñâ vihâra article5-1 the use of history1 william sweet2 st. francis xavier university, canada the use or value of history today has been questioned by many. but it is not an issue that we should feel free to ignore. our values, our perspectives, and our very identities are reflections of our cultures; we know that we are not merely biological beings. yet neither are we just cultural beings – we are historical beings. our value as human beings cannot be understood without also considering our histories. it is this latter insight that is one of the guiding principles of the work of george mclean. research on values, on metaphysics, on religion – and, arguably, in every sphere – needs to take account of individuals as beings with a distinctive history. whether mclean is participating in a conference in bangkok, leading a seminar in washington, dc, or reading a paper in nairobi, he recognises that the hermeneutical task requires looking at the human person as a being coming from a particular place at a particular time. if history has no use, then what can be said about the nature and value of the human person? history is not just an academic interest; it is important to life – and it is particularly significant at a time when the conventions and norms of religion and science no longer hold firm. people want to know who they are and where they come from, and so they turn to history – to family or local history, to genealogies and chronicles, but also to stories and accounts of historical figures, of nations and civilisations, and even histories of the world. but here, too, little appears settled, for we have institutional histories, ‘people’s histories,’ academic histories – and we are told that all histories are ideological, each promising to tell things ‘as they were’ and yet frequently leaving out more than they include. so the underlying assumptions involved in the writing of history concern not only scholars, but anyone struck by the uncertainty that exists at the beginning of the 21st century. 18 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 18-41 © 2000 by assumption university press i if we look at history – academic history – as it is engaged in today, we see that many historians find themselves confronted with challenges concerning the presuppositions of history. so, while some may go no further than to admit that there is a distinction between history as ‘event’ or a series of events, and history as a discipline, historians and historiographers (and philosophers as well) raise the issue of what history is – whether it is a science, a social science, an art, a “corpus of ascertained facts” (carr, 1961, p. 6), a social practice (that inevitably reflects ideologies and models of gender), or a ‘conceptual structure’ that makes no claim to be ‘about’ people or events. some historians and philosophers go further, raising such questions as whether there are any facts or only judgements – whether one can ever know the past and, if so, how one could attain it. others raise the points that, even if the past can be known, one cannot conclude anything from this knowledge – and that historical understanding or explanation is not even possible. as historians (and philosophers) today consider and reconsider questions central to what history is and what it is about, the answers they give certainly divide them. but it seems that the source of this division does not lie in the interpretation of data, but in how one answers the more basic questions of the possibility and status of historical knowledge. in current debates, then, what one takes history to be, what it is to do history, and so on, are influenced by what is generally called ‘historicism.’ ‘historicism’ is an ambiguous – or at least vague – term. it appears in the movement called the ‘new historicism’ that has been influential in literary and cultural studies (cf. michaels, 1987; greenblatt, 1988; veeser, 1989). the term has also been used in (what is for an anglo-american audience) a somewhat idiosyncratic sense by karl popper, where it is equated with a kind of grand narrative determinism – that, “through studying the history of society, we can detect patterns and recurrences which will enable us to predict the future” (popper, 1957) – which, to popper, not only denies human freedom but suggests that there may be some way in which to engage in ‘social engineering’ to create the perfect society. and the term refers as well to a movement rooted in 19thcentury german scholarship in religion, philosophy, and history, william sweet 19 concerned with the basic questions of how knowledge – and particularly judgements of value about what is ‘known’ – are possible when we recognise that the conditions under which we know are in flux, that human knowledge is limited, and that what we know has an essentially subjective character which seems to preclude absolute objectivity and the possibility of making definitive judgements (cf. iggers, 1995; megill, 1997; hoover, 1992). historicism in its most widespread and popular sense today is close to this third description. it holds that “human phenomena cannot be understood in isolation from their historical development and from their significance to the particular historical period in which they existed” (martin, 1991, p. 103) – that “the nature of any phenomenon can only be adequately comprehended by considering its place within a process of historical development” (gardiner, 1995) – and it emphasises the particularity (and possibly incommensurability) of past events compared with present events. because of this, it is often equated with a kind of historical relativism. historicists reject the claim that there can be “a purely ahistorical perspective on human affairs” (kemerling, 2003) and hold that there can be no understanding events or the actions of agents as events or actions of a certain type; events have meaning and significance only within a particular context. everything is subject to “interpretation.” historicists also suggest that, at best, the only legitimate judgements (i.e., value judgements) we can make about these events are those we could have made at the time ( – so that, by extension, we have relativism). historicism, then, challenges not only the possibility of historical understanding, but the giving of ‘historical explanations,’ and it would also appear to challenge the possibility of history itself as being anything other than “something spun out of the human brain” (carr, 1961, p. 30). historicism has become entrenched within our intellectual culture; at least, one finds a widespread acceptance of many of its underlying principles. some scholars have become so convinced of the relativity of claims of knowledge and meaning, that they are reluctant to claim that we can say anything true about the past. indeed, they question whether ‘truth’ is a proper historical concern. this has contributed to the development of a post-modern approach to history and to a philosophy of history which rejects any attempt to present the past “as it really was” 20 prajñâ vihâra (ranke in carr, 1961, p. 5), any claim that there are any principles or rules or models of history, and any attempt to see history as a science – particularly an explanatory science. this approach is also resolutely antifoundationalist. the postmodern ‘solution’ or response, then, has been to focus on issues other than knowledge, objectivity, and meaning, and to see history as a construct – as a narrative that does not have a particular logic or character to it (ricoeur, 1983-85) – and not to be concerned with seeking to explain events (cf. the essays in a new philosophy of history, ankersmit and kelner, eds., 1995). some have chosen to discuss the character of historical writing as literature, or in relation to gender or politics or ideology (smith, 1998). others, having similar views, have become more open to seeing even historical ‘fiction’ as a source of knowledge and understanding. there are, of course, those who resist this. there seems to be something wrong in just giving up on history, or saying that it has no use. some scholars have suggested that the post-modern turn, exemplified by its fundamental historicism, “is self destructive and can lead to solipsism” (hoover, 1992, p. 355). others have tried to argue that reality exercises a constraint on theory, and that the objections of the post-modern sceptic just are not borne out (cf. telling the truth about history, in appleby, hunt, and jacob, 1994). some argue that, no matter how persuasive – or how difficult to refute – it is, this post-modern approach to history is “methodologically irrelevant” to historians, so that “hardly anyone... acts as if he or she” believes it in practice (martin, 1995, p. 327). still others acknowledge the legitimacy of the issues raised by historicism about the “historical sensitivity” of knowledge claims or the relativity of knowledge, but seek to avoid post-modern or relativistic conclusions (whatever this might mean); this is a strategy suggested by hilary putnam’s 1981 reason, truth, and history and also acknowledged, at least in part, by e. h. carr (1961). there are those who return to such philosophers as r.g. collingwood, whose recognition of the contextual character of knowledge nevertheless claims to allow room for genuine historical understanding. and there are other responses besides. nevertheless, historicism presents us with a number of challenges. is history passé – a ‘thing of the past’? why should anyone seek to william sweet 21 understand history? can we ever speak of objectivity in history? to see better the present debates in history, and to help in answering or responding to these three challenges, it may be useful to review briefly how matters got to where they are today. after all, the present debates about history and historicism, like all events, are ‘historical’; they are products of what has come before. ii history – by which i mean the activity or discipline of history – is old. the “father of history” in the west is commonly held to be herodotus (c 490-425 bce), and it is perhaps no surprise that he is also sometimes referred to as the “father of lies.” it was his history, written at the time of the peloponnesian war that sought to do more than chronicle or relate a series of events; its aim was to interpret events, explain them, and draw a lesson from them. but a key moment in the discussion of history occurred more than 2,000 years later, in the late 19thand early 20thcenturies. following on 18thcentury models of history reflected in the work of scholars like edward gibbon and william robertson, the 19thand early 20thcentury was still a period of detailed, comprehensive historical accounts, and included attempts to describe the course of events, not just in a nation or an empire, but in the world as a whole. in the anglo-american world, for example, robert labberton (1812-1898), edward augustus freeman (1823-1892), thomas keightley (1789-1872), and h. g. wells (18661946; see wells, 1920) continued to provide grand historical accounts. (on the continent, oswald spengler (1880-1936) may be included as well [see spengler, 1939].) here we see instances of historians writing works that were not mere chronicles, and which explicitly sought to interpret events, to put them into a ‘meaningful’ order, and to suggest some kind of direction in them. a model of such endeavours – and perhaps the greatest project in history in the 20th century – was that of arnold toynbee (1889-1975). in his magisterial twelve volume a study of history (1934-61), toynbee produced a comparative study of 26 civilizations, analyzing their development, and discerning not only a pattern, but a “lesson.” focussing on civilisations rather than nations or 22 prajñâ vihâra empires, toynbee allowed that there can be a development in history – that history is not cyclical – but neither is it necessarily a straight line of progress from the past to the future. yet the 19thand early 20thcenturies were, in many respects, also a watershed in the writing of history. from the mid-19th century, an increasing number of scholars – particularly philosophers – argued that undertaking large, narrative histories was highly problematic. the stirrings of this concern, first found in the historical and literary criticism of biblical texts in the early to mid-19th century (e.g., in friedrich schleiermacher [1768-1834]), and inspired by the work of j.g. herder and g.w.f. hegel, came to have an influence in dealing not just with texts, but with any talk about events in a historical past. these ‘stirrings’ did not influence just 19th-century german thought; it had an impact far beyond its borders. critical reflection on history was undertaken by many of the leading anglo-american philosophers and, while this interest may not have been pervasive, it was acute. f. h. bradley (1846-1924) raised a number of fundamental questions in his presuppositions of critical history (1874). influenced by the german biblical scholarship and criticism, bradley argued that (historical) testimony does not stand as a fact on its own, but must be evaluated from the perspective of the historian. history, then, must be “critical” – it cannot pretend just to be a “copy” of what happened in the past. the historian must select, and must also be aware of the presuppositions of the approach she or he brings to historical enquiry. for bradley, the historian’s judgement is the basis of history; “the historian ... is the real criterion” (bradley, 1968, p. 78). bradley does not deny that there are facts; he simply rejects the view that these facts exist independently of the historian and are there for scholars just to collect. while bradley’s position is not (narrowly) historicist, it recognises the inseparability of (value) judgement from event and the importance of understanding historical events within their contexts. bradley’s view, r.g. collingwood later wrote, was a “copernican revolution in the theory of historical knowledge” (collingwood, 1946, p. 240). bradley’s colleague, bernard bosanquet (1848-1923) has seemed to many to take an even more cautious and sceptical view of history. when confronted with “mechanistic” accounts of history or william sweet 23 accounts that emphasized the fundamental role of “great individuals,” bosanquet was struck by their “fragmentary” and dead quality. he was suspicious of any history qua narrative or qua chronicle of the contingent events of the past which proposed to give a “total explanation” – and of the historian who sought to provide an explanation of “the minds and natures of great men as if he was god’s spy” (bosanquet, 1912, p. 79). such history was a “fragmentary diorama of finite life processes unrolling themselves in time,” consisting of “mere conjectures,” and “incapable of any considerable degree of being or trueness” (bosanquet, 1912, pp. 7879). and thus bosanquet wrote what some take to be a remark dismissive of the whole practice of history – that history was “the doubtful story of successive events” (bosanquet, 1912, p. 79). bosanquet did not, however, mean to reject the value of history, or imply that history could not be done, or say that there is no point in studying history, or hold that history is merely “one damn thing after another.”3 (he was, for example, the author of a history of aesthetic (1892) and, like many ‘speculative philosophers’ of the period, had been schooled in the greek and roman classics and had a deep appreciation of history and tradition.) bosanquet’s objection was, however, that history – when it is understood simply as a series of contingent events in a narrative – ignores the general; it is not a concrete universal. and so bosanquet proposes that, rather than concern ourselves with this kind of history, we should turn to art and religion, both of which bring together the particular and the general. thus, bosanquet could write a history of aesthetic – of the development of aesthetic consciousness in and through particular works of art – but not be interested in a history of art. we see this “critical” approach to history in r.g. collingwood (1889–1943) as well. influenced by benedetto croce (1866-1953) and by the idealism of his teachers in oxford, collingwood is best known for his the idea of history (posthumously published in 1946). here, collingwood develops some of the insights of the idealist tradition by arguing that “all history is the history of thought ... and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind” (collingwood, 1946, p. 215). an experienced archaeologist and a distinguished historian of roman britain (see collingwood, 1926, 1923, 1930, 1936), but a philosopher by inclination, training, and profession, 24 prajñâ vihâra collingwood had the experience to reflect seriously on history. he argued for a closer relation between history and philosophy than was generally held, and insisted that philosophy must understand itself as a historical discipline – that philosophy’s task was to articulate the “absolute presuppositions” characteristic of an age or way of thinking, and that the truth and falsity of philosophical claims must be understood in their context. yet collingwood believed in the possibility of historical knowledge and historical explanation through the method of re-enactment. (i.e., a “re-thinking” of the historical actor’s thoughts). collingwood focused on the historical figure as an agent – on what he or she thinks – rather than on just what the person does. explanation, then, requires understanding – and hence the appropriateness of re-enactment. collingwood has been called a historicist (strauss, 1952; mink, 19874). perhaps rightly so – though if it is, it must be in a sense that is consistent with collingwood’s rejection of relativism and subjectivism. indeed, whether bradley, bosanquet, or collingwood actually held strongly historicist views, in the sense in which the term is used today, is doubtful. for while they raise some problems in giving historical explanations, they do not deny that this is possible, nor do they claim that there can be no history or historical truth. one of the key features of these three thinkers, then, was that they identified some central problems in the practice of history. and so, by the mid-20th century, the study of history was much more critical, and there were serious questions about the nature of that activity itself – and indeed, of what it was to do history. iii this ‘moment’ in the philosophical reflection on history described above – though i am speaking here of a ‘moment’ that lasted some 50 years was a ‘watershed’. and it evoked two radically different responses in the understanding of history in the anglo-american world. the first was a move to formal or critical philosophy of history; this can be said to begin in the middle of the 20th century, about the time of the death of collingwood in 1943. in a 1952 essay, “some neglected philosophic problems regarding history,” maurice mandelbaum william sweet 25 presented what was becoming clear to many who engaged in, or thought about, history, and that was that how one ‘did’ history was rooted in an issue in the philosophy of history – that there was a distinction between “formal” and “material” approaches to the field. “formal” philosophy of history dealt with “a philosophical concern with the problem of historical knowledge” and attempted “to interpret the historical process itself” (mandelbaum 1952, p. 317); “material” philosophy of history sought to provide “some ‘meaning’ within the whole of man’s historical experience” (mandelbaum 1952, p. 318). much the same distinction was made, at the same time, by w.h. walsh – between critical and speculative philosophies of history – the former dealing with such questions as “the nature and validity of historical knowledge” and the latter being “attempts to give an over-all, ‘metaphysical,’ interpretation of the course of events” (see oakeshott, 1952). speculative philosophy of history, then, was that which hailed back to augustine, and through bossuet to vico, to hegel and marx, on to spengler and toynbee and up to karl löwith and niebuhr5. here, one found accounts that professed to discern a pattern within history, to find a principle that serves as an axiom of interpretation and explanation, and therefore to give a meaning to the historical process. formal or critical philosophy of history, however, did not have such ambitions. it focused on the assumptions underlying history – for example, about the nature and objectivity of historical knowledge. other questions included whether we can establish causal relations among events and, if so, whether they have a general character. broadly, formal philosophy of history was concerned with epistemological and logical problems. because of this focus on the analysis of the fundamental concepts of historical practice, most philosophers of history in the 20thcentury anglo-american tradition can be seen as formal philosophers of history. it is an approach that one sees reflected early, in herbert butterfield (1931), in e.h. carr (1961), and in other historians. and there were attempts by philosophers to ensure that history could be a truth-bearing discipline: by karl popper and c.g. hempel – who insisted that unless history provided causal explanations involving “covering laws,” it had no title to call itself a science (hempel, 1966, 1963, and 26 prajñâ vihâra 1942; popper, 1949) – and by those like william dray who insisted that explanations with ‘law governing’ rules or general statements were possible in history, even if these rules did not have a necessary character (dray, 1957). formal philosophy of history was widely accepted, no doubt, because of the awareness of problems with the selection process used by historians in gathering data and the adequacy of any resulting knowledge – but also because of suspicion of speculative philosophies together with (or perhaps because of) the anti-metaphysical and antisystematic tendencies of mid-20th century philosophy.6 whether one can make a rigid distinction between speculative and formal philosophy – whether each does not implicitly lead the philosopher to questions characteristic of the other – is a fair concern. nevertheless, by the mid-1960s, anglo-american historiography and philosophy of history was almost exclusively formal, and the dominant questions were the formal (epistemological) questions of explanation, of objectivity, and of whether history can be a science. but there was a second response to the late 19thand early 20thcentury discussion of history, that went beyond many of the mid-twentieth century “epistemological” questions of explanation and objectivity. some found many of the concerns of philosophers and historians simply question begging – for they presumed that there can be explanation and objectivity when such things are simply not possible. such challenges were – and are – pressed by those who, explicitly or implicitly, adopt the ‘principles’ of postmodernism. the term ‘postmodern’ is, like many terms to describe intellectual movements, vague (see sweet, 1997) – but in general one can say that it is rooted in the conviction of the legitimacy of historicism and, by extension, of the inappropriateness or impossibility of claims of objectivity and truth.7 drawing on hegel, martin heidegger, michel foucault, jean baudrillard, roland barthes, and jean-françois lyotard, postmodern historians insist that both “upper case” history and “lower case” history have collapsed. (the former is “a way of looking at the past in terms which assigned to contingent events and situations an objective significance by identifying their place and function within a general progressive schema of historical development usually construed as appropriately progressive” [jenkins, 1997, p. 5], the latter is “the study william sweet 27 of the past ‘for its own sake’” [jenkins, 1997, p. 6]). thus, speculative and formal philosophy of history are both rejected.8 many see the postmoderns as taking the late 19thcentury theory of ‘critical history’ to its logical conclusion – that, by recognizing the role of the historian in history, we must also challenge many of the pretensions to truth and objectivity of history itself. and so, inspired explicitly or implicitly by the historicism of the 19thand early 20thcentury german and anglo-american philosophers, postmoderns asked: is there room for the concept of truth in history? is it proper to attempt to judge (morally) the motives and actions of agents in the distant past? or is all this ruled out of court, given the questionable status of historical knowledge? today, then, while some scholars may still hope that there is a ‘meaning’ to history, few would claim that reason, observation, or experience shows that there is and, like pluralistic postmodern philosophers, many have come to accept the possibility that there is no such meaning at all. some have gone so far as to suggest that, because historical objectivity is impossible – there always being bias in the posing of questions and in the selection of data – history should become more focussed on advocacy (zinn, 1970). of course, while postmodernism is influential – largely because of the persuasiveness of some features of historicism – it is not without its critics (e.g., brunzl, 1997; evans, 1997; cf fox-genovese, 1999). and so it would be presumptuous to hold that postmodernism expresses the consensus of historians or philosophers of history, and a mistake to think that contemporary philosophy of history has entirely left behind the debates and controversies of the preceding generation. nevertheless, in the scholarly literature today, a large – perhaps an inordinately large – amount of time is spent discussing the various post-modern criticisms (and there are many) of history, historiography, and the philosophy of history. and thus the three challenges of historicism raised earlier need to be addressed. but i would suggest that the preceding ‘history’ of how we arrived at where we are may provide us with some responses to these challenges. 28 prajñâ vihâra iv as we have seen, postmodern historicists press the points made by those like bradley, bosanquet, and collingwood concerning the place of the historian in history, the pretensions of a value-free historical science, and the alleged independence of historical knowledge. but do these points in fact lead us to, or oblige us to hold, the conclusions of the postmodern historicist? consider the first question raised earlier, in section i: is history a thing of the past? when we ask such questions as ‘what is it to have knowledge of the past?’ or ‘what are the conditions for the possession of historical knowledge?’ it may seem that we cannot avoid ending up in some kind of subjectivity – for how (as bradley noted) can history be done without reference to the standpoint or the context of the historian? but does this – as some postmodern critics maintain – eliminate the possibility of the study of history as a study of what has happened in the past? as students of r.g. collingwood remind us that “the possession of a point of view by the historian should not be confused with bias”9, and we can acknowledge the inevitability of having a perspective without being committed to arbitrariness or relativism. after all, it is obvious that any historical account is given from a point of view, and that this point of view may not have been available to the historical agents. but this does not entail that there is incommensurability in the accounts or bias. historians can or do know what their presuppositions are, are normally open to debating and criticizing them, and seek to avoid unreflective bias. historians recognize that their histories are always written from a perspective representative of their time, and yet seek to organise or present them in a way that allows them to engage the past in a ‘critical’ and self-critical way. in other words, a “critical history” (to use bradley’s term) recognises the inseparability of context from historical knowledge while, at the same time, avoids the potentially relativistic consequences of postmodern historicism. yet – a postmodern might claim – even if we can have historical knowledge, history is nevertheless just a “thing of the past”, that neither bears on contemporary discussion, nor can be subject to any kind of (contemporary) normative assessment. substantive critical commentary on the actions or the motives of past historical agents is not possible; (as william sweet 29 quentin skinner10 seems to hold) we are prohibited from making such (putatively anachronistic) attributions and limited to merely formal commentary.11 collingwood, however, would allow we can reasonably know what past historical agents held “on their own terms”; this is, in part, what is undertaken when we engage in re-enactment. and because we focus here on historical agents as agents – decision makers – we can hold them responsible for their views (as collingwood does in the new leviathan). thus, we can appropriately make substantive critical comments (as distinct from simply formal remarks) about a past historical agent’s blindness or lack of blindness on an issue – at the very least, provided that there are reasons to believe that that person could have had his or her position challenged by others who lived at that time.12 this is not to ignore that collingwood’s re-enactment theory is not without its difficulties, and later scholars, such as william dray, have tried to develop collingwood’s insights in a way that avoids these problems. nevertheless, it is clear that collingwood did not see the role of the historian in doing history as providing any reason to doubt that there is something called the past, or that we can have access to the past – and there is certainly no logical connexion between collingwood’s claims and the postmodern ‘conclusions’ putatively drawn from them. but even if history is not just a thing of the past, what – if anything – are we to do with history? why seek to understand history? even if we grant that we can know the past, are not past events also unique – the results of events that, strictly, can never take place again? and doesn’t it follow that history is, therefore, of little help to us? i think that there are two responses to this, implicit in the accounts of bradley, bosanquet, and collingwood. the first is that we seek to understand history because it is required in order to make sense of the present. the postmodern challenge to historical knowledge and understanding – based on the concern that our location in the present and in a ‘different’ place always impedes any genuine knowledge – is misplaced, for neither the present nor one’s aims for the future can be known unless they are already understood in the context of the past. indeed, ignorance of the past severely inhibits action in the present.13 for collingwood, for example, we must know the past in our own lives in order to know our own ‘presuppositions’, and these serve as guides for 30 prajñâ vihâra action and our own personal development.14 again, it is by a study of the past that we can have a “trained eye for the situation in which one acts”15 – and thereby can bring about progress. second, not only do we need to have some understanding of the past to make sense of our own present (i.e., to ‘make ourselves’), but we need to know the past so that we can be aware of the present in a broader sense. collingwood would point out that a re-enactment by the historian of the thinking of the historical actors allows us to understand it as a process that is historical and relative, and yet does not require explanation of the past in terms of principles or laws. thus we do not need a casual theory to explain why an agent acted or chose as he or she did, or a lawlike account of history. and so, even if we accept the putative uniqueness of historical events, there can still be an understanding of the past. still, some postmodern critics argue that such ‘knowledge’ of the past can never be genuine because it can never succeed in being objective; it is ‘just’ a perspective. (it is ironic that a principal argument for this, presupposes the correspondence theory of truth which postmoderns generally reject.) these postmodern critics would add that historical explanation involves historical understanding – and understanding is a process that is historically relative and value laden. but there can be no objectivity – not in history or in any social science or even science. and it is precisely its claim to objectivity that makes conventional or traditional history suspect. many post-modern historians would consider that a “narrative” is sufficient to provide all we need (and all we can have) qua explanation. nevertheless, bradley and collingwood (who saw himself as completing bradley’s ‘copernican revolution’16) – both figures whose work lies at the origin of this historicist critique – would insist that objectivity can still be achieved. indeed, they would argue that objectivity can be achieved not in spite of, but because of, the fact that historians write from a point of view. by re-enacting the thought of agents, collingwood says one is attempting an objective picture – by taking into account all the relevant details that one can, being ready to adjust or to correct error, and so on.17 it is true, of course, with the writings of different historians we have before us a multiplicity of perspectives. but, first, historians would standardly allow that these perspectives and william sweet 31 presuppositions are open to discussion and critique – and that, to do so, they admit that there is enough that is shared to allow for the possibility of the engagement of, and a reconciliation between, differing views. and, second, to the extent that this diversity remains, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the result is less, rather than more knowledge. consider a marxist and a feminist account of an historical event. each would draw attention to details the other might not. but by having both to hand, we may have a better understanding than only one – even a ‘best’ one on its own – might provide. while the multiplicity of different accounts does not cumulatively provide a general principle or law, i) what counts as good research is the same, ii) one recognises and overcomes certain problems in the selection of data and in the selection process, and the result is that iii) one may have a better understanding of the event even if not a better explanation of the event. if none of this were the case, why take feminist or marxist criticism seriously? in short, there is no good reason to assume that objectivity entails that exactly or only one correct perspective does or can describe best how events took place. such an “interperspectivism” among historians, taking its inspiration from collingwood, would thereby allow one to claim that one’s knowledge is objective. this does not mean that historical truth is absolute and unchanging, but that it meets a standard, appropriate to the object of study, where ‘the past’ and the historian’s self awareness of doing history and his or her judgement lead to understanding the event. as a result, if we adopt a broadly collingwoodian conception of re-enactment – which contains elements of narrative we may have both a better understanding of the agency of historical actors, and a basis for objective knowledge of the past.18 in short, we can take some of the basic claims of postmodern historicism, and see that, if we look at their roots, this origin not only does not entail postmodernism, but may provide for a more robust account of history as objective. while taking seriously the three challenges of historicism enumerated at the beginning of this paper, we can allow that historical explanations are not value free, and yet objective; we can still claim that we can have knowledge and understanding of the past; and we can hold that understanding the past is an activity that is done not just for its own sake, but because it bears on our capacities to understand ourselves 32 prajñâ vihâra and the world around us, and to respond thoughtfully to what may happen in the future. v the preceding remarks present some reasons for holding that there is a use for history today. ‘doing’ history today cannot ignore the arguments of postmodern critics and of all those who would argue that the ‘subjectivity’ of the discipline of history makes it impossible to carry out. it requires reassessing or rethinking what it means to have historical understanding, and what it is that historians do. nevertheless, in this paper i have suggested that, if we return to the work of some of the key figures in anglo-american philosophy of history, we can see that a postmodern, historicist critique of the ‘use’ of history need not succeed. i have argued, first, that history is not just a thing of the past. this does not mean that history is just a series of events that the historian merely identifies and puts into some externally determined right order. it requires a critical effort on the part of the historian as well as an act of interpretation. but neither does this mean that there is nothing in ‘the past’ that we must respond to. second, i have argued that the issues of historicism and historical understanding have to be carefully and fully assessed. as paradoxical as the notion of knowledge of what does not exist – i.e., the past – may be, it is obviously necessary both for our social practices and for our ability to understand the present; this suggests that the subjectivist or post-modern may simply be posing a set of pseudo problems. this is not to deny that the questions have force, but perhaps the issue of the nature of the past is just like the issue of the nature of time – a puzzle about which augustine remarked, “if no one asks me, i know what it is. if i wish to explain it to him who asks me, i do not know” (augustine, 1993, bk. 11, ch. 14, sect. 17). third, i have argued that there is no sufficient reason to abandon the search for objectivity. rather than rule out objectivity tout court, it seems plausible to hold that there are different ways in which we might understand objectivity – with some ways more likely to be fruitful than william sweet 33 others. here, we need to explore the notion of standpoint or perspective, what it entails, and whether (and how) it is consistent with objectivity and the possibility of making judgements about the past. and finally, i have suggested that, in returning to, and reassessing, the work of figures such as bradley, bosanquet, and collingwood who were central in the critical understanding of history we may be able to resist the temptations of historicism. despite the many difficulties that critics note, we may still have confidence that history is possible, that there can be some kind of historical understanding, and that we can learn lessons from – and make criticisms of – history. there is a use for history. 34 prajñâ vihâra endnotes 1an earlier version of this essay was presented at the institut for pædagogisk filosofi danmarks paedagogiske universitet, kobenhavn, denmark, on march 25, 2004. as well, i draw on material that will appear in the introduction to my book the philosophy of history: a re-examination (aldershot: ashgate publishers, 2004). 2professor and chair in the department of philosophy, and director of the centre for philosophy, theology and cultural traditions, at st. francis xavier university, in nova scotia, canada. secretary general, world union of catholic philosophical societies and member of the steering committee of the fédération internationale des sociétés de philosophie. 3despite bosanquet’s view of history, he is not an ally of the post moderns, and would not hold that since we can’t know the past itself, there is nothing to know and, in consequence, history is simply explained away. 4see, especially, the essays “collingwood’s historicism: a dialectic of process,” and “collingwood’s dialectic of history,” pp. 223-45 and 246-85. 5löwith, 1949; see also jaspers, 1953. 6outside of the anglo-american world are figures like wilhelm dilthey (18331911) and raymond aron (1905-1983). despite dealing in his later works (e.g., introduction to the human sciences, 1883) with the question of whether there can be a “foundation of the human sciences” – a question which bears indirectly on the possibility of a philosophy of history – dilthey also addressed the issue of historical understanding, and thus can properly be regarded as a critical philosopher (see dilthey, 1962). similarly, aron (1961) provides a powerful critique of positivism, but also proposes the use, in history, of an imaginative reconstruction that is more than empathy.) 7historicism was not, at first, particularly influential on historians or historiographers; neither was it immediately adopted in philosophical circles. thus, karl marx provided a purely objectivist and materialist philosophy of history which was notwithstanding later works by benedetto croce (storia come pensiero e come azione, 1938; engl. tr. 1941), reinhold niebuhr (the nature and destiny of man, 1939), and oswald spengler (der untergang des abendlandes, 1918; engl. tr. 1939) the last profoundly influential philosophy of history. 8keith jenkins and hayden white (1973) have had a significant influence here. 9see james connelly, ‘is history a thing of the past?’, in sweet (2004), pp. 27-42, at p. 39. 10see skinner (1969). 11see catherine wilson, “postformalist criticism in the history of philosophy”, in sweet (2004), 43-62. 12ibid. 13see franz schreiner and mostafa faghfoury, “temporal priority and a better world”, in sweet (2004), 119-127. here, they argue for a similar point, drawing on the work of wilhelm dilthey. william sweet 35 14lionel rubinoff, “history, philosophy and historiography: philosophy and the critique of historical thinking”, in sweet (2004): 163–196, at p. 191; cf. collingwood 1946, pp. 226; 230. 15ibid., p. 175. 16ibid., p. 174. 17ibid., p. 179. 18see for example, karsten steuber, “agency and the objectivity of historical narratives”, in sweet (2004), 197-222. 36 prajñâ vihâra bibliography ankersmit, f.r. and kelner, hans, ed. (1995), a new philosophy of history, chicago: university of chicago press. appleby, joyce; lynn hunt; margaret jacob (1994), telling the truth about history, new york: norton. aron, raymond (1961), introduction to the philosophy of history: an essay on the limits of historical objectivity [introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire: essai sur les limites de l’objectivité historique, 1938], trans. george j. irwin, london: weidenfeld and nicholson. augustine (1998), the city of god against the pagans [de civitate dei], ed. trans. r.w. dyson, cambridge: cambridge university press. bosanquet, bernard (1912), the principle of individuality and value, london: macmillan. bosanquet, bernard (1892), a history of aesthetic, london: swan sonnenschein, 1892. 2d ed., 1904; reprinted in the collected works of bernard bosanquet, 20 volumes, ed. with introductions, notes, and annotations by william sweet, bristol, uk: thoemmes press, 1999. vol 4. bossuet, jacques-bénigne (1976), discourse on universal history [discours sur l’histoire universelle à monseigneur le dauphin. pour expliquer la suite de la religion, & les changements des empires], ed. orest ranum, trans. elborg forster, chicago: university of chicago press. bradley, f. h. 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(1920), the outline of history: being a plain history of life and mankind, by h. g. wells; written with the advice and editorial help of mr. ernest barker, sir h. h. johnston, sir e. ray lankester, and professor gilbert murray, and illustrated by j. f. horrabin, new york: the macmillan company. white, hayden (1973), metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth century europe, baltimore: the john hopkins university press. zinn, howard (1970), the politics of history, boston; beacon press. 40 prajñâ vihâra 1free of religion & religious heritage the construction of collective identity of muslims in america after september 11, 2001 suchart setthamalinee payap university, thailand abstract in this paper i attempt to analyze the construction of collective identity of muslims in america since september 11th to answer two questions. how have the american muslim movements emerged and developed after september 11? how do they construct their identities as muslims in america? i will demonstrate the dynamic and linkages between the framing and constructing of collective identity of muslims in america at three levels: public discourse; persuasive communication; and negotiations and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action. i will show how, for the overwhelming majority of muslims in the america, the internet and friday sermons have become the major channels for constructing their collective identity, politics, and movements. introduction the issue “collective identity” seems to have intrigued many scholars studying muslims in several countries. (bringa, 1995; jacobson, 1998; humphrey, 1998; and mcgown, 1999). yet, none of them focuses on the collective identity of american muslims. the issue has now become especially important after the tragic event of september 11. in this paper i attempt to analyze the construction of collective identity of muslims in america since september 11th to answer two questions. how have the american muslim movements emerged and developed after september 11? how do they construct their identities as muslims in america? 44 prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 44-61 © 2000 by assumption university press i would argue that after the september 11th attacks, the collective identity of muslims in america has formed through public discourse, persuasive communication, and negotiations in the politicization of everyday life. not only did muslims severely condemn the terrorists, but they also created their boundaries within peace discourse: reinterpreting the meaning of “islam” and the concept of “jihad” through various kinds of media. finally, the political consciousness of muslim identity as an umma-muslim community-has been raised through the internet and friday sermons, particularly with regard to the policies toward the conflicts between israel and palestine. methodology there are several national islamic organizations operating in north america today. each islamic organization has its own unique history, and their relevance to the lives of muslim in america is great. they distribute information on islam to politicians; organize prayer times; advocate on behalf of muslim concerns; educate muslim and non-muslims about islam; and publish books, pamphlets, and magazines that guide the faithful in their daily lives. i rely on two key sources of data. first, websites of three islamic organizations: the islamic society of north america (isna)1; the islamic circle of north america (icna)2; and council on american-islamic relations (cair)3. my second data source consists of khutbahs or friday sermons which are distributed weekly at the muslim association of hawai’i. according to islamic teaching, friday is the most prominent and the most virtuous of the days. friday prayer is obligatory upon every muslim, except women, children, the sick, and travelers. a person who does not believe in the obligatory status of the friday prayer falls outside the pale of islam, and one who abandons it due to negligence and careless, without a genuine reason, becomes a sinner. the sermon will be delivered before the friday prayer. the sermon in fact is meant to induce muslims to offer devotions and worship to allah, thus, when the preacher comes forward to deliver the sermon, then it is required for all muslims not to engage in conversation. suchart setthamalinee 45 (islahi, 2000a; 2000b). i chose these three organizations because they are the three most distinctive national islamic organizations in the united states, and i also attend and observe the friday sermon regularly at the muslim association of hawai’i. the website of these organizations and the friday sermons are now becoming the public sphere of muslim communities and play an important role in framing american muslims’ identities post-september 11th. the khutbah is an important “weekly dose” of islam, and in fact for many it is the only islamic contact they have in the entire week. the main purposes of the khutbah is to remind people of their islamic duties and to teach them about their religion. who are the muslims in america? according to the u.s. department of state (2001), islam is one of the fastestgrowing religions in the united states. by the year 2010, america’s muslim population is expected to surpass the jewish population, making islam the country’s second-largest faith after christianity. (webb, 1995; power, 1998; esposito, 2002; nimer, 2002) while there are no official population figures of religious affiliation in the united states, and the estimates of the number of american muslims vary from four to twelve million, it is safe to say that there are at least four to six million. according to the survey by zogby international (2000), approximately a third of american muslims live in the east coast (39%), 27% in the central/ great lakes region, 21% live in the south, and 13% in the west. the same survey indicated that the ethnic origins of american muslims are as follow: 32% south asia, 26% middle east (arab), 20% african american, 14% other, 7% african, and 1% not sure of ethnicity. muslims were present in america before the nineteenth century4. the explorers, traders, and settlers who visited the new world from the time of columbus include muslims. in addition, between 14 percent and 20 percent of african slaves brought to america between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries were muslims, although they were forced to convert to christianity. other muslims, particularly indians and arabs, 46 prajñâ vihâra who were not slaves also immigrated during this period and were able to maintain their spiritual, cultural, and social identity. the numbers of muslims in america increased in the late nineteenth century with the arrival of significant numbers of immigrants from the arab world (syria, lebanon, and jordan). then, after world war ii, significant numbers of immigrants from palestine, who had lost their homes after the creation of israel in 1948, and elites from the middle east and south asia, who sought either education or professional advancement, came to america. african-american muslims originated with the nation of islam in 19305. about two-thirds of the muslims in america today are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. like many other immigrants of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds, muslims have been challenged to define their place in american and european society. they struggle with the relationship of faith to national identity, intermarriage, gender relations, worship, and education. many struggle with the english language, as well as their desire to hold on to their native or homeland cultures, and many face religious and ethnic discrimination in the workplace and society. living as a minority in a dominant culture that is often ignorant about islam, many muslims experience a sense of marginalization, alienation, and powerlessness. some muslims are further marked as “different” by their manner of dress, and they are sometimes singled out for harassment. this has increasingly been the case since september 116. despite the fear and stress that muslims suffered in the wake of the attacks, many islamic organizations and leaders have worked actively to overcome the prejudice which come from either inside or outside muslim communities. collective identity of muslims in america “identity” remains one of the most urgent as well as hotly disputed topics in sociology and cultural studies. for nearly two decades, it has been a central focus of debate for psychoanalytic, poststructuralist, and cultural materialist criticism in areas ranging from postcolonial and ethnic studies to feminism and queer theory. (moya, 2000; cerutti, 2001). one of the most crucial elements in the history and development suchart setthamalinee 47 of a social group is the maintenance of its identity. the identity question is central to the muslim presence in the united states. american muslims are experiencing both exhilaration at the opportunity to increase their numbers and develop their institutions and frustration and dismay as they continue to experience prejudice, intimidation, discrimination, misunderstanding, and even hatred. (haddad, 1991). it is increasingly important, therefore, to take a fresh look at some of the ways in which they have constructed their collective identity and establishing an islamic community in the united states especially after the september 11 attacks. bert klandermans (1992) develops the concept of social construction of meaning in action situations. he refers to the processes of interpreting, defining, and consciousness raising that occurs among participants who interact during episodes of collective action. for klandermans, an important aspect of the social construction is the construction of an injustice frame: situations are defined as unjust and grievances are transformed into demands. he proposes three levels of meaning construction: 1) the level of public discourse, at which collective identity is formed and transformed; 2) the level of persuasive communication conducted by movement organizations, their opponents, and countermovement organizations; or 3) the level of consciousness raising during episodes of collective action. alberto melucci (1995) defines collective identity as a process of “constructing” an action system. for melucci, collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action take place. verta taylor and nancy whittier (1992; 1995) have conceptualized collective identity as consisting of three interrelated processes : the construction of group boundaries that establish differences between a challenging group and dominant group; consciousness consists of the interpretive frameworks that emerge out of a challenging group’s struggle to define and realize its interests; and the negotiation or politicization of everyday life encompasses the symbols and everyday 48 prajñâ vihâra actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination. to many muslims, the september 11th attacks also represented a major challenge in their struggle for acceptance as a community with a distinct religious identity. in that regard, muslims in america have witnessed the good, the bad, and the ugly. ‘islam’ and ‘muslims’ now became a major topic of public discourse in america. the question is: how they create their boundaries, position themselves, or take actions in response to this public discourse? to this extent, klandermans, melucci and taylor and whittier’s works provide a good framework for understanding the process of the construction of muslim identity in america. public discourse on the collective identity of muslims in america bert klandermans (1992) suggests that media discourse has become a crucial element in this evolutionary process. there is no doubt that whoever the terrorists were who attacked the world trade center and the pentagon building on september 11, the attacks put all muslims in a state of shock. all media attempted to relate the attacks to islamic fundamentalism. as a muslim, i still remember my triple suffering i experienced while watching the horrific events unfold on television. i first suffered at seeing the deaths of the innocent people in the world trade center who did not even have the opportunity to know why. second, i suffered when i witnessed the television coverage of muslim women in palestine celebrating the attacks7. third, i was stunned when i opened my internet and found the hateful words directed at muslims. i experienced all three events at the same time, and like many others around the country, i felt my heart sink, my throat tighten and my eyes fill with tears. along with major media organizations, mainline protestants and catholics as well as members from the black, latino, asian, and jewish communities have favored a position that distinguished between extremists and mainstream muslims. on the other hand, some christian conservatives and pro-israel zealots have actively sought to drive a wedge between suchart setthamalinee 49 muslims and the nation. members of these groups revived the defunct ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and have actively worked for the exclusion of muslims from public forums, while continuing to argue for anti-muslim public policies. these are just a few examples of why muslims were disheartened by the vitriol from the far right wing and anti-muslim elements. at an annual gathering of the southern baptist convention (sbc) in june 2002 in st. louis, the rev. jerry vines, pastor of first baptist church of jacksonville and a former sbc vice president, told sbc conventioneers that the prophet mohammad was a “demon-possessed pedophile.” televangelist pat robertson, speaking on his christian broadcasting network’s ‘700 club’ program in february 20028, described a veritable infestation of america with violent, subversive muslims. he chose to blast president george w. bush’s position on islam as well. he said “i have taken issue with our esteemed president in regard to his stand in saying islam is a peaceful religion…it’s just not. and the qur’an makes it very clear, if you see an infidel, you are to kill him.” repeatedly, evangelist franklin graham, son of the renowned reverend billy graham, called the islamic religion “wicked, violent and not of the same god.” he also said “i don’t believe this is a wonderful, peaceful religion…when you read the qur’an and you read the verses from the qur’an, it instructs the killing of the infidel, for those that are non-muslim.” to protect their collective identity, various muslim groups and scholars responded to those public discourses. (cair, 2002). muslims exposed the distortion of the qur’an, which permits defensive struggles but calls for peace when aggression ends. on the issue of a muslim’s friendship with people of other faiths, muslims reminded the public by distributing news release that a number of verses support cordial relations with anyone who does not attack their faith. these include “ o ye who believe! take not for friends and protectors those who take your religion for a mockery or sport…” (qur’an, 5: 57); “god only forbids you to make friendship with those who fought you on an account of your faith and drove you out of your homes and backed up others in your expulsion.” (qur’an, 60:9). 50 prajñâ vihâra media promotion of tolerance it is important to note the stark contrast between the anti-muslim tone of several conservative media personalities and other reporters who took a more balanced approach in their coverage of september 11. among the commentators who engaged in muslim bashing were sean hannity and bill o’reilly of fox news, rich lowry of the national review, dr. laura schlesinger, rush limbaugh, cal thomas, and allen keys. however, several media outlets have made an effort to draw a clear distinction between islam and terrorism. they have also been vigilant on the issue of civil liberties. here is an example: * oprah winfrey show, october 5, 2001 the one-hour, widely watched nbc program gave a crash course on islam that was generally balanced. it introduced the main beliefs of islam and featured an american muslim couple practicing their faith and going about their daily lives in chicago. most of the american public professed generally a negative impression of muslims and arabs in america shortly after the attacks. however, muslims in america sympathized with some balancing views in the media. the most extensive post september 11th poll on americans’ view on islam, jointly sponsored by the abc television network and the belief net religion news website, was conducted on january 6, 2002. the poll revealed that the percentage of americans with a favorable view of islam had dropped slightly, while the percentage with an unfavorable view of islam had also dropped. (cair, 2002). americans lend hands to their muslim neighbors there were several instances of americans from various faith communities coming to the aid of muslims in the wake of the violent post 9/11 backlash. jennifer schock, 31, a web designer from fairfax, virginia, sprang into action upon learning that some american muslim women started leaving their head scarves at home out of fear for their safety. schock and other non-muslim women around the usa began donning scarves suchart setthamalinee 51 themselves as a sign of solidarity with their muslim sisters. through the internet9, they established a global network called scarves for solidarity to support the right of muslim women to choose their headwear without fearing retaliation. muslim community centers reported many spontaneous acts of kindness from members of the public. within a week after the attacks, islamic centers in san diego received bouquets of flower and cards of support and sympathy from members of other faith groups—specially after reports of muslim women being afraid to leave home. one measure of this support is surveys targeting muslim community members. in an august 2002 cair survey, about 80 percent of 945 respondents said they have experienced kindness or support from friends or colleagues of other faiths. (in contrast, 57 percent said they have experienced anti-muslim bias or discrimination). according to taylor and whittier (1992; 1995), boundaries mark the social territories of group relations by highlighting differences between activists and the web of others in the contested social world. i find that muslims in america use public discourse as constructing their boundary of asserting “who we are.” boundary markers are, therefore, central to the formation of collective identity of muslims in america because they 52 prajñâ vihâra promote a heightened awareness of a group’s commonalities and frame interaction between members of the in-group members and the out-group members. persuasive communication the social construction of protest proceeds in the context of mobilization and counter mobilization campaigns, as different actors in social conflict try to persuade individual citizens to take their side. according to bert klandermans (1997: 89), unlike public discourse and the process through which collective identities are formed and transformed, the construction of meaning at this level involves deliberate attempts to influence beliefs. movement organizations, opponents, and countermovement organizations alike try to convince the individual that they are right. organizers are “social reconstructionists,” they construct an alternative view of social reality. within hours of the first plane hitting the world trade center on september 11, american muslim organizations issued a joint statement condemning the terrorist attacks, including the islamic society of north america (isna), islamic circle of north america (icna), and muslim american society (msa). the statement read in part: american muslims utterly condemn what are vicious and cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. we join with all americans in calling for the swift apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators. no political cause could ever be assisted by such immoral acts. (cair, 2002). council on american-islamic relations (cair) sponsored a fullpage advertisement in the washington post on september 16, 2001, condemning the attacks and expressing gratitude to the rescue workers and condolences to the families of the victims. islamic organizations and leaders then reached out to other faith communities to condemn terrorism in solidarity with one another, together with other major christian groups such as the national conference of catholic bishops. the statements from notable scholars making clear the distinction between islam and terrorism flow out via the internet. sheikh yusuf alqaradawi, one of the most respected leaders of sunni islam, denounced the attacks against civilians and encouraged muslims to donate blood to the victims of the attack. he issued a statement saying that “our hearts bleed for the attacks that have targeted the world trade center, as well as other institutions in the united states despite our strong positions to the american biased policy towards israel on the military, political, and economic fronts. islam is the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem, and considers the attack against innocent human beings a great sin.”10 this is backed by the qur’an verse which reads: who so ever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth , it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, and who so ever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.’ suchart setthamalinee 53 (qur’an, 5: 32). after september 11 attacks, islamic leaders of every organization promptly reconstruct the meaning of “islam” to distinguish themselves from terrorists. they actively readdress the “peace discourse” in islam as a distinctive concept of muslim identity. we can find statements and articles about “peace discourse” on the internet and also the friday sermons. for examples, hakim quansafi, president of the muslim association of hawai’i, preaches at the friday sermon, and news release at the website that “islam is a continuation of all the morals of all the religions. it is a religion of the prophet abraham and all the prophets, which means submission to god. islam means peace. we the muslims in hawai’i condemn in the strongest possible terms what are apparently vicious and cowardly acts of terrorism against innocent civilians. we offer our condolences and prayers to the victims and their families for this horrific tragedy.”11 maulana wahidulddin khan, a distinctive muslim scholar, states in an islamic website that “islam is a religion which teaches non-violence. according to the qu’ran, god does not love ‘fasad’ or violence or terrorism. on the other hand, non-violence should never be confused with inaction or passivity. non-violence is an action in the full sense of the word. rather it is more forceful an action than that of violence. it is the fact that non-violent activism is more powerful and effective than violent activism.”12 all websites reconstruct the concept of “jihad” which is always misunderstood in the public discourse. they try to argue that “jihad” is one of the most misunderstood and abused aspects of islam. there are some muslims who exploit and misuse this concept for their own political objectives. there are many non-muslims who misunderstand it or use it to discredit islam and muslims.13 the arabic term “jihad” usually translates into european languages as “holy war,” more on the basis of its juridical usage in islam than on its much more universal meaning in the qur’an and hadith, which is derived from the root ‘john’ whose primary meaning is to strive or to exert oneself. jihad means serious and sincere struggle on the personal as well as the social level. it refers to struggles to do good and to remove injustice, 54 prajñâ vihâra oppression and evil from society. this struggle should be spiritual as well as social, economic and political. the events of september 11 were followed by a surge of public interest in islam and muslims. ordinary people wanted to know what muslims thought of the attacks; others began wondering about the intentions of muslims in their midst. muslims in america quickly realized that the best way to allay fear, prevent further damage to america’s well being, and preserve the society’s unity was to reach out to their neighbors to an unprecedented degree. the american muslims outreach to the rest of the country has been noteworthy for its unusual degree of openness, observed the los angeles times on september 30, 2001. mosques opened their doors, muslims conducted educational programs and islamic organizations and centers launched media and advertising campaigns to communicate with their fellow americans. according to melucci (1995), collective identity is a process referring to a network of active relationships between actors, who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions. during this process, we have seen the model of leadership, communicative channels, and technologies of communication which constitute parts of this network of relationship between muslims and non-muslims in america. negotiations and consciousness-raising during episodes of collective action bert klandermans (1992: 93) suggests that once individuals become involved in an episode of collective action their view of the world may change dramatically. they acquire new collective identities as participants in collective action. these new identities, however, do not necessarily represent a disjunction with the past, since they evolve from beliefs an individual already shared with the collective. observing the friday sermons and e-mail released to muslims in america, i find that muslims’ consciousness has been raised during the episode of collective actions. not only do they criticize the terrorists attacks, but also criticize american companies supporting israeli government in killing palestinian suchart setthamalinee 55 people. sheikh yusuf al-qaradawi, again, issued a decree during his khutbah that consuming goods from american companies is forbidden for muslims because those companies support israel through the u.s. government. on delivering a friday sermon, hakim quansafi, the president of hawaii muslim association, addressed muslims in hawai’i that according to cia report, muslims are the heaviest smokers of the world, and each year cigarettes contribute $400 million dollars in taxes which in turn goes to support israeli militarism. so, muslims who smoke are supporting israel to kill innocent people in palestine14. and on march 2002, the association also conducted a peace rally for palestinian peoples in front of the state capital of hawai’i. moreover, ‘american muslims for global peace and justice’ delivered an article, “global action alert #1 boycott starbucks: you might save a life in palestine,” to all american muslim organizations15. the message states that: for american muslim point of view, despite the current onslaught undertaken by israel against the palestinian people, starbucks ceo howard schultz is fueling an already tense situation by using inflamed language to “legitimize” israel’s actions. american muslims for global peace and justice (global peace) calls on all muslims and all people of conscience to boycott the starbucks coffee company regarding starbucks also plans on opening several shops in israel, which amounts to the funding of the israeli occupation of the palestinian people in much the same way that u.s. tax dollars sent to israel help fund the armory used to kill and besiege palestinians. the website called on muslims to take action world wide to refuse to support starbucks’ stance by not buying their products. tell schultz and his company that you will not support such insightful remarks at a time when people are being killed on a daily basis as a result of the ongoing aggression by the israeli army. starbucks has over 3,000 stores worldwide, so we are calling on muslims to take up this boycott in every city, in every neighborhood where starbucks operates. we ask that 56 prajñâ vihâra this action alert be translated into other languages and distributed in countries worldwide. stop drinking starbucks coffee, and make sure you tell them why you have stopped. according to taylor and whittier’s (1992; 1995) concept of negotiation or politicization of everyday life, the action alert in refusing to support starbucks on muslims’ websites, or the calling on friday sermon to stop smoking are a type of negotiation central to the construction of politicized collective identity of muslims in america. it calls attention to self-transformation which aims primarily at the individual level, and renegotiates the meaning of “muslim” as an antagonist to the dominant power. conclusion in this paper i have attempted to illustrate the social construction of muslim identities in america in the aftermath of september 11. according to the data from the websites of a few national islamic organizations in america and friday sermons, we have seen the dynamic and linkages between the framing and constructing of collective identity of muslims in america at three levels: public discourse; persuasive communication; and negotiations and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action. in the public discourse, for the most part, american media coverage of muslims and events in the muslim world concentrates on the sensational. greg noakes (1998), in “muslim and the american press” maintains that the media propensity for the ‘sensational,’ the explosive of headline events, acts of violence, a religious extremism capture the headlines at the expense of the faith and practice of vast majority of muslims. undoubtedly, the failures or limitations of american media reporting on islam and muslims have an impact on the sensibilities and sensitivities of muslim in america, especially in the aftermath of september 11 attacks. this level is important as a starting point for constructing collective action among muslims in america. to this extent, we have seen the persuasive communication level. all muslim organizations in america redefine the meaning of ‘islam” and suchart setthamalinee 57 “jihad” to “peace discourse,” to distinguish themselves from the terrorists and open their communities to the public. finally, the consciousness of muslim’s umma (unity) has been raised, and takes peaceful action against american companies which support israel in killing palestinians, and finally, these organizations have gradually become a part of anti-war movement in america. to muslims in america, the september 11 attacks represented a major challenge in their struggle for acceptance as a community with a distinct religious identity. interestingly, the friday sermon and the internet have hence become a dominant force both in terms of how they represent themselves and how the ‘other’ is represented to them. and how do other aspects of identity influence the term of religious discourse on the internet? there are also those who argue that the internet has had a moderating effect on islamist discourse. sa’ud al-faqih, for example, believes that internet website, chat-rooms, and discussion forums devoted the debate concerning islam and politics serve to encourage greater tolerance. he believes that in these new arenas, one sees a greater convergence in the center of islamists’ political spectrum and a weakening of the extremes. (mandaville, peter, 2001). thus for the overwhelming majority of muslims in america, the internet and friday sermons are major channels for constructing their collective identity, politics, and movements within islam. 58 prajñâ vihâra endnotes 1 isna is the most well-known muslim organization. it acts as an umbrella group for many local mosques and associations. 2 icna is an offshoot of isna founded by immigrants from the indian subcontinent. it has chapters in many major cities and engages in charity work and missionary efforts. 3 cair muslim public affairs organization that work to confront discrimination, influence politics, and educate people about islam. 4 see a collection of essays and research findings on the emerging muslim communities in the united states of america in sulayman nyang (1999). 5 initially it differed significantly from mainstream islam in its doctrines of black militancy and separatism and its theology. since the mid-1970s, under the leadership of warith deen muhammad the bulk of the nation of islam has been integrated into mainstream islam. see black american muslims movements in edward curtis iv, 2002, eric lincoln, 1994, lewis baldwin and amiri al-hadid, 2002, and yahiya emerick (2002). 6 the report on one year after 9-11by cair insists that the 9-11 attacks were followed by a dramatic rise in anti-muslim hate crimes. cair received 1,717 reports of harassment, violence and other discriminatory acts in the first six months. 7 i knew later that the picture was another event during the gulf war on 1992. 8 website: http://www.cbn.com. 9 website: http://www.interfaithpeace.org. 10 website: http://www.iio.org/. 11 http://www.iio.org/, september 12, 2001. 12 http://saif_w.tripod.com. 13 http://www.isna.net/; http://www.icna.org/; http://www.cair-net.org; and http://www.iio.org/. 14 friday sermon at the islamic center of hawai’i, 25 january 2002. 15 http://www.globalpeaceandjustice.org. suchart setthamalinee 59 references bringa, tone. 1995. being muslim the bosnian way: identity and community in a central bosnian village. new jersey: princeton university press. cerutti, furio. 2001. “political identity and conflict: a comparison of definitions.” in identities and conflicts: the mediterranean. cerutti, furio and r. rainier (eds.). great britain: algrave publishers, pp.9-25. esposito, john. 2002. what everyone needs to know about islam. new york: oxford university press. haddad, yvonne. 1991. “introduction: the muslims of america.” in haddad, yvonne (ed). the muslims of america. oxford: oxford university press. pp.3-10. jacobson, jessica. 1998. islam in transition: religion and identity among british pakistani youth. london and new york: routledge. klandermans, bert. 1992. “the social construction of protest and multiorganizational fields.” in morris, aldon and carol mueller (eds.). frontiers in social movement theory. new haven ct: yale university press, pp.77-103. humphrey, michael. 1998. islam multiculturalism and transnationalism: from the lebanese diaspora. new york: st martin’s press and toronto. canada: university of toronto press. islahi, muhammad. 2000a. etiquette of life in islam. new delhi: markazi maktaba islami publishers. . 2000b. everyday fiqh. new delhi: markaba zikra. mcgown, rima. 1999. muslims in the diaspora: the somali communities of london. melucci, alberto. 1995. “the process of collective identity.” in hank johston and bert klandermans (eds). social movements and culture: social movements, protest &contention. minneapolis: university of minnesota press, pp.41-63. moya, paula. 2000. “introduction: reclaiming identity.” in moya paula and michael hames-garcia (eds.). reclaiming identity: realistic theory and the predicament of postmodernism. berkeley, c.a.: university of california press, pp.1-28. nyang, sulayman. 1999. islam in the united states of america. united states of america: abc international group, inc.. nimer, mohamed. 2002. “muslims in american public life.” in yvonne haddad. muslim in the west: from sojourners to citizens. new york: oxford university press, pp.169-186. noakes, greg. 1998. “muslims and the american press.” in haddad, yvonne and esposito, john. muslims on the americanization path?. florida: scholars press. power, carla. 1998. “the new islam.” newsweek, march 16, p.34. taylor, verta, and nancy whittier. 1995. “analytical approach to social movement culture: the culture of the women’s movement.” in hank johston and 60 prajñâ vihâra bert klandermans (eds). social movements and culture: social movements, protest & contention. minneapolis: university of minnesota press, pp.163-187. . 1992. “collective identity in social movement communities: lesbian feminist mobilization.” in morris, aldon and carol mueller (eds.). frontiers in social movement theory. new haven ct: yale university press, pp.104-129. u.s. department of state. 2001. islam in the united states: official state department fact sheet. http://www.state.gov/. webb, gisela. 1995. “expressions of islam in america.” in timothy miller. america’s alternative religions. albany: state university of new york press. zogby international. 2001. american muslim poll. november-december 2001. websites the islamic society of north america (isna), http://www.isna.net. the islamic circle of north america (icna), http://www.icna.org. council on american-islamic relations (cair), http://www.cair-net.org. the muslim association of hawaii, http://www.iio.org. suchart setthamalinee 61 147-154 islam and ecology book review islam and ecology: a bestowed trust richard foltz, frederick m. denny and azizan bahruddin (eds.) religions of the world and ecology series. harvard university press, isbn 094545406, 2003, pp. xliii + 584, glossary, biblio, index. carool kersten the themes of this hefty tome, consisting of twenty-three essays, preceded by prefaces and introductions, are closely connected with the may 1998 conference on islam and ecology, which was held in the framework of a series of gatherings on the stance of the world’s religious traditions towards today’s environmental crisis, hosted by the center for the study of world religions at harvard university between 1996 and 1998. the editors of this volume must be credited with giving the contributors opportunity to present the most up-to-date essays, which must have been quite a strain on the editing process of an ambitious project like this. the various contributions have been arranged in five sections on broad themes related to ecology and relevant environmental issues. the first three essays are orientational and reflective pieces, providing a setting and capturing a mood that help place the elaborations in other articles into a proper context. the book appropriately starts with a meditation on the qur’an by ibrahim özdemir, introducing a number of crucial notions for a holistic way of thinking. terms like mizan (balance), khalifa (viceregency or stewardship), and the concept of nature as muslim (submissive) are keys to understanding the islamic attitude towards creation. the author also makes the important ontological correlation between nature and qur’an as ‘signs of god’. özdemir’s is followed by two mystically-inspired essays on rumi and on the concept of fitra. while l. clarke’s exposé on the masnawi’s imagery of nature as a living organism opens up the poetic vistas of sufism, saadia khawar khan chishti explains how fitra, the innate realization of prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 147-150 147 © 2000 by assumption university press true religiosity, has shaped islam’s outlook on world and man. this theme is picked up again in said and funk’s later article on ‘peace in islam,’ a contribution suffused with the ‘unity-of-being’ (wahdat al-wujud) idea, inspired by the thought of ibn al-arabi (1165-1240). the next part – ‘the challenge of (re)interpretation – contains some of the most thoughtful essays of the entire book. s. nomanul haq’s survey of islam’s normative sources pursues the philosophical angle of özdemir’s opening essay. apart from the daring stand of taking the qur’an as a ‘stimulus to religious imagination’ that ‘cannot claim epistemological finality’ (p. 125), some of his observations can be cross-referenced to other articles in the book, such as the qur’anic image of all living creatures being communities in their own right (said & funk, llewellyn), the hadith literature on the use of resources (llewellyn), and the parable of the ikhwan al-safa (said & funk, foltz). a very important contribution is othman llewellyn’s lengthy exploration of the possibility for an islamic environmental law. a nature conservationist who pairs a rich experience in implementing environmental protection programs with sound knowledge of islamic law, his essay is probably the most practical exercise in searching for islamic solutions to acute global problems. in particular his elaboration on the instruments provided by islamic law of property pertaining to land and water resources is extremely instructive. taking the current world order as a given, llewellyn’s approach towards change is very pragmatic. that cannot be said of two essays found in the third section, where environment is linked to social justice. although fazlun khalid and yasin dutton are correct in establishing a correlation between the emergence of a monetary economy and our present-day ecological predicament, their rightly-felt moral indignation of its usurious excesses is taken to utopian conclusions, such as a plea for a re-introduction of gold and silver-based currencies, which does not take into consideration the order of magnitude of the global economy. moreover, they also fail to take notice of the deep involvement of states claiming to be the guardians of islamic heritage, such as saudi arabia; a point that mawil izzi dien, one of the first explorers of islam and ecology, does raise in his contribution to this book. instead of only focusing on the detrimental effects of the dominance of western economic and political models, some other writers are more 148 prajñâ vihâra introspective and even openly critical of islamic tradition itself. seyyed hossein nasr, whose pioneering work on environmental issues dates back to the 1950s, accuses muslims of ‘sleep-walking’ through the ecological crisis. very few religious scholars pay close attention to the issue, while the interest of jurists – and islamic revivalists — is virtually non-existent. however, both sufi and philosophical texts provide excellent starting points for an islamic teaching on ecology. nasr’s essay is at the same time a plea for the preservation of traditionalist knowledge and the introduction of political reforms that can lure muslims away from their obsession with the thoughtless emulation of western models of scientism. in a similar vein are the contributions by richard foltz and kaveh afrasiabi. they attribute the apparent lack of interest in ecology to islam’s ‘anthropocentrism’ — a charge denied by khalid. as a result muslim tradition has approached man’s relationship to nature from the angle of social justice, which in this context means ensuring equal access to natural resources. although this is in itself also a worthy cause, it is nevertheless another exploitative attitude and contradictory to the holism advocated by foltz and afrasiabi. while foltz is cautiously appreciative of iran’s practical achievements in managing environmental issues, in alfrasiabi’s article the earlier criticism leveled by haq, nasr and foltz reaches its crescendo. ‘toward an islamic ecotheology’ is a bold critique full of postmodernist arguments against dualism and utilitarianism. it does not shy away from taking on big names like qutb, rahman, izutsu and nasr himself. alfrasiabi wants to combine controversial subviews from within islam with nonmuslim advances in human knowledge. the fourth section reports on concrete activism toward a sustainable society. safei-eldin a. hamed revisits the instruments of land use, but argues that more far-reaching – and indeed extremely difficult — institutional reform, which takes cultural specifics into account, is needed. his contribution is followed by case studies on family planning in iran and egypt; islamic aspects of malaysia’s development doctrine; and a study of the aga khan development network. mohammad siddiq’s ‘an ecological journey in muslim bengal’ seems somewhat out of place in this section. it might have fitted better in the closing part of the book, which returns to poetic harmony, revolving around the metaphor of the garden. richard folt 149 this last section opens with an essay by architecture professor petruccioli, in which a dialectic concept of landscape is linked to islamic urbanism, bringing back once again the gnostic notion of nature as a divine sign. the author also explains that the islamic view of ecology is not — like that of many ‘fundamentalist’ western ecologists — preoccupied with preserving pristine, virgin nature. he illustrates this with a historic example from algeria and an interpretative ‘recodification’ of the landscape of the kashmir valley. james westcoat then contemplates the correspondence between the qur’anic imagery of paradise and the mughal gardens of lahore, linking it with the significance of paradise symbolism to muslim environmental design. to close this impressive study of islamic ecology the editors have selected farzaneh milani’s excursus into the ecofeminism of the contemporary poetess forugh farrokhzad (1935-1967). although perhaps of no direct interest to medievalists themselves, this book contains so many references to the classical muslim heritage that it will certainly help raise the non-specialist reader’s awareness of islam’s contributions to mankind’s knowledge and spirituality in relation to ecology, and will consequently lead to more appreciation for the work done by the students of medieval islam. carool kersten, formerly with payap university in chiang mai, now conducts research at the school of oriental and african studies (soas) in london. 150 prajñâ vihâra 04_(55-75) albert camus on christian meta.pmd albert camus on christian metaphysics and neoplatonism j. larson waseda university, japan º·¤ñ́ âèí àãò¨ð¾ºกñº¢éííéò§¾×é¹°ò¹¢í§»ãñª­òèõå¸ããááåð¨ãôâèòêµãìàªô§á¹øéâì ¹ôâá¢í§ íñåáºãµì กòáùêì ä é̈́ òก§ò¹çô·âò¹ô¾¹ ì̧¢í§à¢òàกõèâçกñº íàô»ãñª­òẺ¤ãôêµì áåðåñ· ô̧à¾åâµãëáè êóëãñº �diplom̂e d’eètudes� ã¹»õ 1936 ·õè»ãðà·èáíå ṏàãõâ º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ðµãç¨êíº¤çòá¤ố àëç¹¢í§กòáùêìàกõèâçกñº â¾åµõ¹øê ííกñêµô¹ à¾åò ṏíøê áåð¤çòá¤ố Ẻ»ñ̈ à¨กçôçã³ì¹ôâá áåðà¹é¹ë¹ñกä»ã¹»ãðà ḉ¹¢í§¤ãôêµì «öè§กòáùêì âñ§¤§ê׺àêòð¤é¹ëò㹺·¤çòá é́ò¹»ãñª­òáåð§ò¹à¢õâ¹ é́ò¹çãã³กããá¢í§à¢ò abstract albert camus’ moral philosophy and his search for a humanistic ethics find their basic premises in the academic dissertation that he wrote on christian metaphysics and neoplatonism for the diplôme d’ eètudes in algeria in 1936. this paper examines camus’ ideas on plotinus, augustine, pelagius, and gnostic thought and focuses on the christian themes that he continued to explore in his philosophical essays and his literary works. camus states in the beginning of his dissertation that its primary aim was to distinguish the two basic lines of thought of early christianity and later greek philosophy (mainly neoplatonism), as two paradigmatic and deeply influential modes in which human beings deal with their finitude, their embeddedness in nature, and their ideas about their relationship with god. camus also sought to show how these two powerful onto-theological traditions came together through gnosticism and neoplatonism to form the theo55prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 55-75 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ logical and philosophical ideas, as well as the problems, that christianity would create for western civilization. by tracing the development of philosophical and religious thought during the period when christianity and the greek world first came into contact, camus examines the differences in worldviews between two deeply influential intellectual currents and the values inherent in both of them. and throughout his life he would continue to compare and contrast mediterranean and european values and their different philosophical perspectives. the mediterranean origins of all the key philosophers, especially in the case of augustine, from camus’ own homeland, was extremely significant for him. in augustine and his masterful synthesis of the greek and christian speculative thought, camus attempted to show a unification of theology and philosophy, which created the historical and philosophical conditions upon which western civilization would be built, and which would come into crisis in the modern age, particularly in the horrors of the 20th century. it can also be argued that early christian metaphysics and late hellenistic philosophy left a positive trace in camus’ thinking and writing, if only because of the grand visions and poetic force of these writings. early christianity and the greeks according to the young camus, in its early stages christianity was not a philosophy but a faith or “a gamut of inspirations” that operated on a very different plane than that of the greek world.1 in hellenism, by contrast, man had the primary responsibility for determining his destiny and explaining the universe and his relationship with the gods and nature.2 in this world knowledge was the highest good and its attainment made the wise man an equal of god. the good was simply defined in terms of knowledge and viewed as a superior form of it. in turn, all human finitude was interpreted as a lack of knowledge, and ignorance and incomplete knowledge was seen as the real reason for human limitations and what caused them to err. it was those limits that defined the human condition and man’s tragic fate. most significantly, camus highlights the fact that nature was the background that defined the way that the greeks viewed the world. it was a cyclical world; a world that operated on an aes56 prajna vihara~ thetic plane where the concept of beauty, structure, and order were held in the highest esteem (as were virtues); where the body was closely connected to nature; and man’s purpose was to accept and celebrate this connection.3 nature and evil christianity, on the other hand, saw nature not as something that humans must find a place in, and learn to perfect in themselves, but as something that they must escape from. from the christian belief that nature is matter and that matter is evil, the logical conclusion is drawn, as camus shows, that this world is clothed in a darkness of sin and suffering.4 christians saw it as a world of punishment and wretchedness where humans seek some form of salvation to release them from the bondage of misery and woe. in this view, the function of sin is to make humans conscious of their pride, wretchedness, and imperfection.5 in short, nature and the world is a lightless morass of evil that humans are thrown into and where, more specifically, the flesh of the body is a symbol of death and evil. camus devotes a large section of his dissertation to the beliefs and teachings of some of the gnostics, where he shows that they all shared an obsession with the problem of evil. he writes that “the importance of evil can be gleaned from the writings of even the least known gnostic. the same is true of all gnostic sects.”6 this manichean dichotomy of good and evil in the world created a structure of thought and division into absolutes that separated god and humans and made their unity an impossible task. it also placed a hierarchical value in the relationship of god, humans, and nature. finally, it directed human perceptions not only toward the abstract and toward an object that would do more than anything else to give meaning or identity to human existence through an idea of absolute unity.7 the crucial moment came when the greek mode of thinking, i.e., the relationship between the realm of god and the human realm, based on a cyclical and ordered view of nature and a faith in the power of reason, became more specific as it came into contact with a judeo-christian world that was based on the concept of a transcendent and all-powerful god, and the attendant concepts of faith, revelation, and teleology. this union was later shaped and influenced by the gnostics and neoplatonism, and camus delineates four j. larson 57 stages in this evolution: the gospel, gnosis, neoplatonism, and augustinian thought. the first major theme around which this synthesis of greek and judeo-christian speculation revolved is the problem of death.8 death and the incarnation while the gnostics may have been obsessed with evil, camus writes that early christians were obsessed with the idea of imminent death. this was connected with the second coming (or parousia) of christ, as well as the belief in the end of the world.9 two essential states of mind emerged from this: pessimism and hope, the first referring to the tragic plane of death attached to this world and the second referring to the hope and faith in god and the desire to be transported beyond this world and beyond the realm of nature. one had to choose between this world and god, from the sensible world to that of an intangible world not marked or bounded by perceptible limits, but an infinite expanse made even more distant by the apparent gap between this world and the other. this distance was so vast that no one could hope to bridge it, and since man was unable to reach god, only despair was open to him. despite man’s wretchedness and his pleas for salvation, the immeasurable distance remained filled with an unresponsive silence.10 there is no need to insist on the great significance of this kind of analysis in view of camus’ later writing, both philosophical and literary. it is clear that in the early christian writers camus found a duality of pessimism and hope, a dialectic of necessary despair and illusory hope counterbalanced by the opposite dialectic of necessary hope and fruitless despair. articulated in highly speculative, theological and philosophical arguments, this dialectic provided a fundamental mode of approaching the world that would be the hallmark of his later philosophy of the absurd and his very specific brand of “existentialism.” with the incarnation, which camus calls the “privileged theme” and the center of christian thought, the gap was bridged and the two realms were finally connected.11 in camus’ words: “man being unable to rejoin god, god comes down to man,”12 which is a reverse of the process of plotinus’ soul’s ascent up the ladder to the one. in the figure of christ, god’s will is seen operating, and camus cites paul’s comment that the sole purpose of this will 58 prajna vihara~ was to save mankind. this act of will is seen as god’s second revelation. after the first revelation in the creation, the second revelation is redemption. by doing so, however, god comes into the material world through the word made flesh. here judeo-christian thought provides its own solution to the mystery of the link between god, nature, and man. through the incarnation, god is no longer an abstraction or numenon: he becomes in a sense finite. by taking on flesh through christ, god becomes earthly reality, forever uniting himself with human thought, whilst at the same time, making this relationship more problematic. for in connecting human thought with a more finite and personified god through the body of christ, the seeds of the “death of god” are already sown, which under nietzsche and other existential thinkers would explicitly develop many centuries later.13 the word became flesh; god became man; and christ’s purpose was to take on the burden of our sins. as such, the person of christ functioned in the same way as the ancient greek scapegoat which purified the people and the city from its evils and then was driven out and killed in the form of a blood sacrifice.14 in camus’ words: the only way to save us was to come to us, to take our sins from us by a miracle of grace, namely jesus, of our race, of our blood, who acts on our behalf and has taken our place. dying with him and in him, man has paid for his sins, and the incarnation is at the same time the redemption.15 nothing, camus writes, is as specifically christian as this idea of the incarnation in the person of jesus christ in determining and developing the thinking and the ideas that will come to be known as christianity. from this one central tenet the evolution of its theology and philosophy develops through the dialectic that it will create through years of opposing thoughts and heresies and the works of the apologists, eventually pushing it toward the structure of orthodoxy or dogma that will result in the construction of an institution of power and influence.16 camus’ emphasis on the body, on sensual experience as a locus where the world is revealed in its truth and the absurd is vanquished, is somehow the heir to this highly ambiguous christian teaching of god made flesh. early christian speculation thus created the conditions for the emergence of instituj. larson 59 tions that modernity and postmodernity would strive to dismantle, but also captured, in theological and metaphysical garments, the sacred value of sensuous experience and bodily interaction with the world. in a sense, one might say that camus’ work attempts to write a dechristianized version of the theories of the incarnation and the redemption. philosophy, knowledge, and faith against the greek ideas of knowledge and truth, as in principle attainable through philosophical speculation, stood the christian ideas that knowledge is faith and that man sinned or did evil not out of a lack of knowledge or ignorance, but by the very nature of existing.17 only faith was necessary for salvation. indeed, the importance of evil or sin is probably even more decisive between these two systems than those of the incarnation or redemption, because it is sin and guilt that made the incarnation and redemption necessary.18 the rational knowledge of the greeks and the religious faith of the christians were two competing epistemologies that not only had to do with the limits of knowledge, but also the limits of the human will and the idea of sin, as the early heresies illustrate. for example, camus quotes clement as saying that “greek philosophy is merely a produce of human intelligence: it does not teach the truth”, and camus relates that the opinions of the christians in alexandria was that “faith is sufficient for man and all else is literature.”19 the opposition of reason and faith or greek philosophy and christianity reached its climax in works of pagan philosophers like celsus and porphyry, who criticized the beliefs of christianity and whose intellectual revolt was met with a forceful response from the early church by origen in his against celsus, and to a lesser degree by macarius magnes in his apocriticus. as r. joseph hoffman has shown: the criticism of christianity for its lack of a coherent philosophical system--a criticism which cannot easily be separated from the sociomoral attacks on the sort of people who found the new religion appealing-becomes a fixture of pagan polemical writing from the mid-second century onward. 60 prajna vihara~ celsus himself, in a famous passage, alleges that most christians ‘do not want to give or receive a reason for what they believe’ but rather win converts by telling them “not to ask questions but to have faith”.20 it is primarily the opposition between these ideas of philosophical logic and faith that neoplatonism sought to reconcile. in any case, this is how camus viewed neoplatonism, and the reason why it was significant to him early on. for him, neoplatonism was “a constant effort to reconcile contradictory ideas with the help of a principle of participation, a principle which has a place solely in a logic divorced from space and time”.21 these contrasting ideas of intellect and faith created a dialectic from plotinus to saint augustine, or as camus calls it a “dialogue between heart and reason”, where he says the truths of this dialectic could only be expressed in images. these images used by plotinus and others served to “mould the intelligibles into a shape that can be grasped by the senses, to restore to intuition what belonged to reason”.22 in other words, plotinus served as a mediator by joining the intellect with artistic images that could be understood on the sensible level of parables. this explains camus’ comment that these two systems of thought met “on the plane of philosophy”.23 heart and reason and religious and philosophical thinking were brought together to create new frames of reference that helped to solve the problems that were raised by applying logic and doctrinal questions to a system of faith. neoplatonism used the rational structures of greek philosophy to construct the fundamental premises as well as the dialectic that created the basic truths of christianity, and nowhere was this seen more clearly than in the writing of saint augustine, who borrowed many of his ideas from plato, plotinus, and porphyry. saint augustine camus wrote of augustine that his philosophy assimilated “all the uncertainties and vicissitudes of christian thought”.24 while augustine was a follower of manichaeism, (which camus calls a mere continuation of gnosticism, primarily because of its focus on evil and death), it was the writings of j. larson 61 saint ambrose and the neoplatonists that led to his conversion, as augustine relates in his confessions.25 camus claims that the problem of evil obsessed augustine, and while he was “greek” in his need for rational coherence, augustine was plagued with anxieties. it is this conflict between the mind and emotions that led him away from manichaeism in search of other forms of truth as he wrestled with the carnal and the spiritual.26 camus writes that “it seemed to him above all that the solution was not to be found in knowledge, that the resolution of his doubts and of his distaste for the flesh did not lie in intellectual escape but in the total acknowledgement of his depravity and wretchedness”.27 in his search for faith and truth, augustine ended up transforming neoplatonism into christianity.28 according to camus, the greatest contribution of plotinus to augustine’s thinking was the “doctrine of the word as mediator” and “a solution to the problem of evil”, while the most important ideas that augustine sought in neoplatonism were christ, the incarnation, and the trinity.29 it is on this basis that augustine sought to unite greek and christian thought. if we list the themes that occupied most of augustine’s writing, we see once again how camus’ early encounter with christian metaphysics provided him with a language to articulate his core beliefs and experiences. the basic augustinian themes were: happiness, evil, sin, grace, freedom, and human will.30 the neoplatonists taught that evil was a privation, not a reality in itself and while augustine agreed, according to camus, he stated that there were two kinds of evil: natural and moral evil.31 while natural evil results from the human condition or the wretched state and the tragedy of man’s “fall” into nature and matter, moral evil was sin as a direct result of the human will. sin came from our being given free will by god, but this was tainted by the ill use we make of it.32 camus adds that “we have fallen so far that the proper exercise of free will is invariably to be traced to god alone”, which reinforces the idea that we, or our soul, have fallen so far into matter and darkness that humans, basically, only have the will to sin.33 in that state, humans have forfeited their free will and are in bondage, slaves to evil and matter, which explains their wretchedness. once again, it is extremely tempting to see in such speculation an anticipation of camus’ own anxieties, and to make the point that camus will provide a dechristianized, secular version in his novels and plays of this deep feeling of “falling” and of man’s unhappy state. 62 prajna vihara~ unlike the greek idea of virtue, augustine believed that virtue without god is useless and beyond human capacity. god bestows grace, and on that basis virtue can be achieved. this is opposed to plotinus’ idea in the enneads that the soul turns toward virtue and that an ascent to the good is achievable by contemplation and self-reflection.34 with augustine, morality and values find their primary source in god rather than humans. as camus remarks, this makes the virtues of the pagans useless, since for the christian these virtues can become faults and even sins, such as pride. it is not the pagan idea of virtues seen as a good or a form of excellence through which the powers of human life and human potentials can be extolled, as in plato and aristotle, but the idea that man’s first duty is not to himself, but to god. for the christian it is faith, not virtue, that is the beginning of grace. believing in god is the first step in submitting to that grace.35 in speaking of augustine’s ideas of god and freedom, camus then remarks that: the grace of god is, in this context, totally arbitrary: man should simply put his trust in god. how then can one speak of man’s freedom? precisely because our sole freedom is the freedom to do wrong. saint augustine’s final avowal on this question, vital for the christian, is one of ignorance. god’s will remains intact.36 this question of god’s will and human freedom is most clearly seen in the plague in the sermon of father paneloux where he made it clear that “this plague came from god, for the punishment of their sins”,37 and that “since it was god’s will, we, too, should will it”.38 augustine and pelagius for camus, pelagius’ substantial discussion of free will, choice, and sin was highly instrumental in shaping augustine’s philosophy.39 pelagius, like the later existentialists, believed that man was created free; that he is able to choose between doing good or evil; and that this free will is a freedom or emancipation from god.40 of course the logical conclusion that one could j. larson 63 make from this statement would be that if a) humans can choose, b) they can avoid sin, and therefore, c) humans can be free from sin. this logical conclusion would render the christian idea of original sin meaningless and would negate the need for grace, salvation, and ultimately the incarnation. this is the reason behind the pelagian heresy and augustine’s opposition to it. pelagius’ argument was that adam was born mortal; his sin and the fall were not our mistake; and therefore, his bad example should not condemn other humans. for pelagius, grace was not something that could be given because creation itself was already a grace.41 for the young camus, these theological disputes hide important truths about man’s freedom, god, and the reality of free will. he mentions the council of carthage (29 april 418 a.d.), where the teachings of pelagius were attacked by the church: “in general, this teaching puts its trust in man and scorns explanations which refer to the will of god. it is also an act of faith in the nature and independence of man”. and camus adds: “this thesis then, was above all a declaration of man’s independence of god and a denial of that persistent need of the creator that is at the basis of the christian religion”.42 what camus could find in these old debates was already the kind of philosophical point made by later materialists and, of course, 20th century existentialists. needless to say, questioning the “need for a creator” would also become one of his main intellectual endeavors. augustine countered pelagius’ teaching by saying that adam was immortal; that he originally had the ability not to sin; that he already had a form of grace; and that he was free. this all changed, however, when adam destroyed this happy state in eden by committing the original sin.43 our corrupt nature stems from this and since our human nature is corrupted, without baptism and god’s grace, we are damned. in essence, as a result of this we have no freedom not to sin. humans are incapable of not sinning and we have no choice in this. we carry the original sin of adam, and subsequently, are destined for hell and damnation unless we turn to god for salvation. predestination is our fate and our only choice of history, since moral values exist a priori, and what limited freedom and actions we may have only exist within this linear movement of time.44 with this idea of predestination and of man’s fate, salvation and grace become even more important, and camus says that we depend on this idea of grace for three things: 1) “to protect us from our fallen nature”, 2) “to believe 64 prajna vihara~ in the truths of the supernatural order”, and 3) “to enable us to act in accordance with these truths”.45 we do have the freedom to reject or accept these graces, but as he puts it, our freedom is defined by this context and the concept of god, and freedom exists only within this context. what is most fascinating about his rendering of augustine’s rejoinders to the pelagian heresy is that, despite the fact that the latter already articulates the basic tenets of the existentialist position, augustine continues to represent a positive reference and influence for him. it is as though the philosophical power and rhetorical mastery of his demonstrations contained some truth, beyond the untenability of the dogmas he defends. the relevance of the augustinian idea of man’s “fall” needs to be rescued, as it were, from its theological clothes and rewritten in the prose of the modern novel. meursault and the penitent jean-baptiste clamence of the fall could be seen as later, secularized incarnations of augustinian man. the trinity and the incarnation in the last part of his dissertation, camus focuses on augustine’s idea of the word made flesh and the concept of the trinity. whereas in plotinus “the pure soul dwells with the intelligibles” in the realm of intelligible forms, and he stresses the gap or the distance that exists between the one and the intellect,46 for augustine the ideas (plato’s ideal forms) are like the first forms, which are eternal and unchangeable (and therefore true or absolutes). these ideas represent god or at the very least the divine presence in them.47 augustine thus places the emphasis on god, from which all things emanate, unlike plotinus, who focuses on the soul and the separation that exists between the three hypostases. augustine’s focus on god is represented most clearly in the trinity of god, man, and spirit, which rather than a hierarchy, forms a unity, where each part contains the others. by doing so, augustine defines and closes the distance that separates these ideas or realms in plotinus.48 camus remarks that the word in augustine is, however, not the intellect of neoplatonism and of plotinus. for augustine the word was made flesh in the incarnation of christ, in what amounts to god taking on human form in the miracle of the incarnation.49 through the word becoming flesh, humans would now be able to participate in god on earth, not as something j. larson 65 that occurs only after death through the soul’s conversion and its return to a lost homeland. christianity bridged the gap and the distance of silence that had characterized man’s relationship to god, thereby confirming that this separation was finally closed. as a result, one could say that faith and reason were also brought closer together, creating boundaries of thought that allowed the necessary elements for the beginning of christian dogma.50 it is important to follow camus’ patient reconstruction of these dogmas, as it shows the extent to which he sought to salvage the figure of augustine for his role in bringing together the best of christian and greek metaphysics through the synthesis of the philosophical frameworks of plato, plotinus, and the gnostics, and through his understanding of the incarnation and the trinity. in camus’ words: saint augustine ends where plotinus’ conversion culminates. they both pursue the same conclusion, but while their paths sometimes overlap, they are different nonetheless. augustine asserts at every step that philosophy is not enough. the sole intelligent reason is that which is enlightened by faith.51 again, camus’ paradoxical attraction to the father of the church is incontrovertibly represented here. what could easily appear as a dogmatic rejection of man’s true position in the world (free but finite) is interpreted by camus in explicitly positive terms. later on, just as for augustine, philosophy won’t “be enough” for camus either. he will replace the trust in faith with a faith in sensual experience, engagement, and creation. however, he will always retain from augustine the gesture of distrusting an overly rationalistic approach in dealing with the finitude of human existence. augustine’s main contribution to christianity was thus to “make greek reason more supple and to fuse it with the christian edifice, but in a sphere in which it can do no harm”,52 by contrast, the role of neoplatonism was to “support this softening of reason, to lure socratic logic to religious speculations and so to transmit this tool, already fashioned, to the fathers of the christian church”.53 camus quotes augustine as saying, “if you cannot understand, believe so that you may understand. faith comes first, understanding follows. therefore do not seek to understand, but believe so that you may understand”.54 reason must 66 prajna vihara~ be humble and pliant and in a subordinate position to faith, and camus writes that faith in augustine consists of two things: 1) the belief in supernatural truths, and 2) “man’s humble abandonment to the grace of god”.55 knowledge does not begin with reason, but with faith. the role of dogma is to give knowledge and certainty to that faith; critical reasoning is not important, but rather humility and submission. according to camus, the word or logos that was brought into christianity from neoplatonism was not just intellect, but god, and therefore intellect is no longer just an effusion or emanation as in plotinus, but a creation of god.56 the word, dogma, and truth become joined into a logos, and god can now communicate with his creation. camus concludes his dissertation by remarking that some speak of a hellenization of early christianity and agrees that, as regards morality, this is a correct statement. however, as has just been shown, this is not the final truth of the matter. more significantly, camus felt that christian morality cannot be taught, because it is an “interior ascesis which serves to ratify a faith”.57 again we find here camus’ paradoxical attraction to a form of moral teaching that escapes the strictures of rationalism and goes beyond all of his disagreements about content. rather than a hellenization of christianity then, we should speak, he says approvingly, of the christianization of a decadent hellenism.58 according to camus, nietzsche’s thesis was that greece was a culture of “pessimism, insensible and tragic”, while christianity was a renaissance compared to “socratism and its serenity”.59 christian man replaced the greek one. despite camus’ sympathy for the greek spirit, however, he finds himself attracted to the christian translation of greek speculation as carried out in most exemplary fashion by augustine. in the final paragraph, camus says that by the time of augustine’s death, christianity had become a philosophy and that it was “sufficiently armed” to resist attacks against its basic tenets.60 by this time the basic foundations of christian thought had been constructed through the merging of christian theology and greek philosophy; through the suppression of the main heresies; and through the establishment of its basic themes and doctrines.61 the last sentence of his dissertation reads: for many years now it has remained the only hope and the only real shield against the misfortune of the western world. in this way christianity won its catholicity.62 j. larson 67 this statement is highly significant in the context of camus’ philosophical thought. for at first glance the treatment in camus’ later writing of such themes as the death of god; the place of man in the world; his relationship to nature; the importance of the body; the belief in immortality; the problems of evil, sin, and suffering; the need for salvation; the powers of reason and knowledge; the nostalgia for faith; the limits of free will, freedom, and human happiness-appears as if it stands in sharp contrast and stark opposition to the christianity that he presented in his dissertation. however, it should also, hopefully, be clear by now that the dissertation and the academic engagement with christian metaphysics helped camus gain invaluable insights into the continuing depth and magnitude of these early ideas, as they had engaged the minds of the early philosophers and theologians. what is most important is that camus used these neoplatonist and christian themes to illuminate the travails of the 20th century and to show how these fundamental themes were still crucially relevant to the problems of human morality and moral philosophy. as camus develops his thinking on the absurd, nihilism, the human condition, and the dangers and necessity of revolt, what appears is a philosophy that reflects a continuous dialogue questioning, yet constantly finding inspiration from, the basic premises and early formations of christian thought and natural law. in his dissertation, camus learned the full significance of these notions despite his rejection of the dogmas. camus’ materialist and “pagan” viewpoints, and his “greek” affinities, led him to emphasize the concrete realities of human morality, ethics, happiness, justice, and social existence, where man is placed at the center of importance rather than the absolutes and ideologies of religious and political systems. however, camus’ man is also, in some ways, a “detranscendentalized” version of the fallen augustinian man. the literary works and the philosophical essays of camus that follow his dissertation all reflect the christian influences outlined in this work. these early christian ways of perceiving and identifying the problems of human existence were translated into the main problems that would shape his own philosophical thought, i.e., the realities of human existence, man’s need for religious certainties and political absolutes, and the problems of moral and political action. when one examines camus’ opposition to the christian worldview and its philosophy, we are better able to understand the influences that shaped 68 prajna vihara~ his religious and political thinking; his moral philosophy; where this dialogue with christianity led him in his search for meaning and value; and his vision of the tragic nature of human existence. j. larson teaches philosophy at waseda unversity and lectures at sophia university in tokyo, japan. he can be contacted at: jlarson@gol.com. endnotes 1 joseph , albert camus: philosopher and litté rateur (new york: st. martin’s press, 1992) 93. 2ibid., 94. 3ibid., 94-95. in camus’ opinion: “in the realm of nature, moreover, the greeks also believed in a cyclical world, eternal and necessary, which could not be reconciled with creation ex nihilo and therefore with an end of the world” 94. furthermore, “for a christian who separates reason from beauty, the true from the beautiful, reason becomes merely the arbiter in questions of logic. and there can be conflicts between faith and reason. a greek finds these encounters less acute, for beauty, which is, at the same time, order and sensibility, harmonious arrangement and object of desire, remains an intelligible landscape: ...” 126. camus writes in notebooks 1942-1951: “historicity leaves unexplained the phenomenon of beauty; in other words, relations with the world (sentiment of nature) and with persons as individuals (love)” (136), and “greece introduced the notion of order and harmony into morals, as she did into aesthetics” 122. 4ibid., 96. camus discusses marcion’s gnostic view that there are two divinities: “one, the superior divinity, is lord of the invisible world. the other, his subaltern, is the god of this world” 115. christ, as camus reconstructs the gnostic view, “is nothing less than the envoy sent by the supreme god to do battle with the wicked god, the creator of the world, and to free man from his domination. jesus accomplishes a revolutionary mission here below. if he redeems our sins it is because he combats, in them, the work of the cruel god. emancipator and redeemer, he is the author of a sort of metaphysical coup d’ é lat” 115. camus says that as a result, marcion proposes a morality based on an ascetic life and sexual abstinence to combat this material world and that “the goods of this world should be scorned out of hatred of the creator: marcion’s ideal is to allow him least scope for his power” 116. the subject of matter, evil, and the corporeal body can be seen in the orphic belief that “the body is the tomb of the soul”. and paul would later write in romans 8:8: “those who are in the flesh cannot please god”. 5as camus writes: “in sin man become conscious of his wretchedness and pride”. he quotes from paul’s epistle to the romans: “i do not understand my own actions: for i do not the good i want, but the evil i do not want is what i do. now if i do j. larson 69 what i do not want, it is no longer i who do it, but the sin which dwells within me” 100. 6ibid., 114. while most definitions of gnosticism place it in the historical periods of pre-christianity and the early christian era, scholars disagree as to its origins and even the term itself. for a good discussion of gnosticism, see karen l. king’s what is gnosticism? (cambridge: harvard university press, 2003). see pages 111-124 of camus’ dissertation for his discussion of gnosticism 7a brief historical reminder might be useful here. manichaeism was founded by the persian mani (216-c. 275 a.d.) and like zoroastrianism, it held as its central belief a metaphysical dualism according to which the world consists of a battle between good and evil or light and darkness. the division of the world or universe into this dialectical contrast of good and evil influenced many religious and philosophical schools, especially the pythagoreans and the early christians. in this worldview, the subject/object relationship between humans and god also helps to define human nature and the human condition. god becomes the mirror of human actions leading to the idea that god sees all. 8camus writes: “...the gospel, gnosis, neoplatonism, augustinian thought. we shall study these four stages of an evolution that is common to greece and rome, in their historical order and in the relationship that they maintain with the movement of thought in which they are inscribed” 97. all these stages will also becomes powerful themes in camus’ work. 9ibid., 99. camus relates that at the end of the fourth century, the proconsular bishop of africa, julius quintus hilarianus, wrote that the world would end in 101 years (99). the idea of the parousia or the second coming of christ in early christianity and the teachings of paul emphasized the apocalyptic vision or belief that “time was short”; that the end of the world was imminent; and only those who had faith in christ would be saved. 10camus remarks that “the distance between man and god is so great that no one can hope to bridge it” 102. this gap between god and humans and the despair that results from the silence that arises between them is a theme shared by many poets and writers at the time of camus, most famously represented, for instance, in samuel beckett’s play waiting for godot. 11ibid., 98. camus calls the incarnation “...the point where the divine and the flesh meet in the person of jesus christ: the extraordinary adventure of a god taking upon himself man’s sin and misery, humility and humiliations being presented as so many symbols of redemption”. 12ibid., 102. 13ibid., 102. unlike the idea of an abstract force like daimon, kami, orenda, or spirit that exists as a field of power rather than a personified figure, the christian god became finite and took on human form through christ, and therefore become nonnegatable and a “being” that came to be tied to mankind. see samuel beckett’s reference of being tied to godot in act i of waiting for godot. 14for a thorough discussion of the idea of the scapegoat and christ as the sacrificial lamb of god, see ren é girard’s the scapegoat (baltimore: johns hopkins 70 prajna vihara~ university press, 1986). of the crowd who condemns christ in front of pilate, girard comments: “yet the crowd wins out; nothing is more important than this victory, nothing more significant for the revelation of the mechanism that selects a victim” 106-107. 15op. cit., 102. 16ibid., 103. two important early pagan writings against christianity were celsus’ on the true doctrine, which was countered by origen in his contra celsum, and porphyry’s against the christians, which was countered by several christian writers, including st. augustine. for an analysis and discussion of these two works, see r. joseph hoffman’s celsus on the true doctrine (oxford: oxford university press, 1987) and his porphyry’s against the christians: the literary remains (new york: prometheus books, 1994). after the early evolution of christianity and the merging of philosophy and theology, the next development would be joining these two with political power under constantine. 17this whole problem of knowledge and truth is one that pits the two realms of the philosophical and the religious and the belief that only the gods are omniscient. according to alcmaeon, “gods possess clear knowledge of matters invisible”. early greek philosophy (london: penguin books, 2001) 36. as heraclitus said, “for human ways have no insights, divine ways have”. 67. 18while religion and the belief in god allow for the possibility of absolution and redemption, in a world without god the problem of guilt and absolution become intractable. this is the subject that dostoevsky struggled with in crime and punishment and the brothers karamazov, and that camus focused on in the fall. for existential man and the philosophy of existentialism where god is absent, the question of how man gets rid of his guilt and the judgment of others has no solution. 19op. cit., 107. 20see r. joseph hoffman’s celsus: on the true doctrine 27. 21op. cit.,139. 22ibid., 139. this idea reflects pascal’s comment that “the heart has a reason that the reason knows not of”. pascal is mentioned at the beginning (100) and at the end of camus’ dissertation 152. 23ibid., 139. 24ibid., 142. 25ibid., 142. in his confessions (london: penguin, 1961), augustine relates that he was an adherent of the manicheans for nine years but that his encounter with faustus and his apparent shortcomings led to a disenchantment. in book v, augustine talks about “the keen interest which i had had in manichean doctrines was checked by this experience, and my confidence in the other teachers of the sect was further diminished when i saw that faustus, of whom they spoke so much, was obviously unable to settle the numerous problems which troubled me” 99. he then goes on to explain the influence of ambrose and his eventual preference for catholic teaching (116). 26ibid., 142. camus’ notebooks are filled with passages reminiscent of augustine’s struggle with the carnal and the spiritual and the need for chastity in notebook 1935-1951, he writes: “it is legitimate to glory in the diversity and quantity of j. larson 71 experience __ and especially in the life of the senses and the surrender to passionate impulses __ only if one is completely disinterested in the object of one’s desires. there is also the leap into material things-and many men who glory in the senses do so only because they are slaves to them. here, too, they embrace the vulture which is eating them away. hence the absolute necessity to have gone through the experience of chastity, for example, and to have been ruthless with oneself. before any deliberately thought-out enterprise aimed at glorifying the world of immediate experience, a moment’s asceticism in everything” 162. 27ibid., 142. 28ibid., 142. 29ibid., 143. celsus accuses the christians of worshipping a man rather than a god (the heresy of arianism), which precludes them from being called monotheists (116). hoffman makes the statement in the notes that “such attacks as these stand behind later philosophical defenses of the unity of the godhead, and issue finally in the credal definitions of the fourth century” (note 197) 142. by “unity of the godhead”, hoffman is referring to the concept of the trinity, which was codified at the council of nicaea in 325 a.d. camus discusses the conflict over christ’s divinity between arius and athanasius and the role of the neoplatonists in solving this problem: “the nicene creed (325 a.d.) states the principle of consubstantiality and opposes the begotten christ to the created jesus of arius...” 140. 30ibid., 143. olivier todd in albert camus: a life. (new york: carroll & graf, 1997), relates the following story in his biography, which is particularly telling: when a dominican priest told camus that he had not found grace, camus replied: “i am your augustine before his conversion. i am debating the problem of evil and i'm not getting past it” 230. 31ibid., 144. 32ibid., 144. 33ibid., 144. camus quotes augustine for whom “man’s sole possession is deceit and sin” 100. 34see the section on virtues in plotinus’ the enneads (london: penguin, 1991) on pages 15-23, and the section on conversion on pages 338-229. 35ibid., 144. this contrast between christian faith and greek virtues, between an absolute god and the importance of human character runs through the notebooks and shapes camus’ moral reflections. for instance, camus makes the statement in carnets iii that “character is not virtue which we have: it is acquired” 15. human character and action are bounded by vices and virtues and their extremes. this is reflected in camus’ comments in notebooks 1935-1951: “an extreme virtue that consists in killing one’s passions. a deeper virtue that consists in balancing them” 187; “there are some temptations which are so strong that they must be virtues” 134; and in notebooks 1942-1951 “all great virtues have an absurd aspect” 27. 36ibid., 144-145. compare this idea to pascal’s wager and kierkegaard’s leap of faith on putting your faith in god. this idea is also connected to predestination and the teleological belief in history as god’s design or will, which is a major tenet in divine 72 prajna vihara~ natural law theory. we will return to this in the concluding chapter. 37camus, the plague 83. it is interesting to note that in the novel, father paneloux is conducting research on st. augustine and the african church. see page 78. 38camus 184. 39op. cit., 145. according to the online catholic encyclopedia, pelagius “denied the primitive state in paradise and original sin..., insisted on the naturalness of concupiscence and the death of the body, and ascribed the actual existence and universality of sin to the bad example which adam set by his first sin. as all of his ideas were chiefly rooted in the old, pagan philosophy, especially in the popular system of the stoics, rather than in christianity, he regarded the moral strength of man’s will (liberum arbitrium), when steeled by asceticism, as sufficient in itself to desire and attain the loftiest ideal of virtue” 2. the article also discusses pelagius’ friendship with caelestius; caelestius’ six theses, which were deemed heretical and reflected the main ideas of pelagianism; augustine’s response; and the attempts by the church to counter pelagius’ teachings, which culminated in the council of carthage in 418 a.d. (5) see www.newadvent/org/cathen/11604.html 40ibid., 145. 41ibid., 145. 42ibid., 145. 43ibid., 146. the logic here is that human reason, while given by god, is imperfect and that it can be used incorrectly, resulting in both sin and the need for faith. 44ibid., 146. the debates about predestination between dr. rieux and father paneloux constitute one of the main themes in the plague. 45ibid., 146. 46ibid., 147. 47ibid., 147. 48 the notion of the trinity and christ’s divinity were defined and codified at the council of nicaea (325 a.d.), presided over by constantine, and at the second, third, and fourth councils held at constantinople (381 a.d.), ephesus (431 a.d.), and chalcedon (451 a.d.). the first three councils also dealt with the heresies of arius, macedonius, and pelagius. for an account of these councils, see the catholic encyclopedia online at (www.newadvent.org/cathen). 49op. cit., 148. 50in contrast to the emanations of the hypostases outlined in plotinus, which were understood as manifestations of light and the soul descending into matter, logos or the word of god in christianity was transmitted first through the law of moses and then took on flesh in the incarnation of christ. this fundamental difference in the conception of “manifestation” was at the heart of the philosophical and theological disputes between the pagan philosophers and the early christians. these debates directly informed the dogmas of the trinity and the divinity of christ. it is important to keep this historical-philosophical background in view given the importance of both these elements in camus’ writing and thinking. in rediscovering these old debates, camus saw at play gigantic struggles, waged simultaneously in thought and politics, j. larson 73 over the exact definition of the tragic paradigm. for the section on the three hypostases, see plotinus’ the enneads on pages 347-360. 51op. cit., 149. 52ibid., 149-150. 53ibid., 149. 54ibid., 149. 55ibid., 149. 56ibid., 151. 57 ibid., 151. while camus may make the statement that christian morality cannot be taught, it is quite clear that the church and governments have tried to do just that, and in many ways, the fate of meursault in the outsider reflects the consequences when someone refuses to accept that morality. 58ibid., 126. 59ibid., 152. see this other amazing passage in the birth of tragedy (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1999), which speaks directly to camus’ nietzschean interpretation of the differences between neoplatonism to christian metaphysics: “if one can still speak of ‘greek serenity’, then only as the cheerfulness of slaves who know no graver responsibility, no higher ambition, nothing in the past or future of higher value than the present. this appearance of ‘greek cheerfulness’ was what so outraged profound and fierce natures in the first four centuries of christianity. it seemed to them that his womanish flight from all that was grave and frightening, this cowardly contentment with comfortable pleasure, was not simply despicable, but was the true anti-christian attitude of mind” 56-7. in his introduction to nietzsche’s work, raymond geuss comments that the key point for nietzsche was affirmation, and “since both schopenhauer and christianity agree that this world is not to be affirmed, they are really instances of the same kind of weakness, and the difference in their metaphysical views (that the christian thinks the underlying reality of the world, god, is to be affirmed while schopenhauer thinks this underlying reality, the will, is to be negated) is irrelevant” (xxvii). such opposition between nietzschean affirmation and christian negation of the world finds its way most famously in the last chapter of camus’ the outsider in the confrontation between the priest and meursault. 60ibid., 152. hoffman argues that “the moral critiques of christianity antedate the philosophical assaults of writers like celsus for an obvious reason: the christianity of the first century had yet to develop an assailable system of belief or fixed canon of writings from which such beliefs could be deduced. it is only as doctrine begins to supplant apocalyptic enthusiasm and the practices associated with it that the focus of pagan writers shifts from what christians do to what they teach...” celsus 24. 61with the emperor constantine, this theology and philosophy would be united with political power, giving christianity military, legal, and spiritual authority. 62ibid., 152. 74 prajna vihara~ references augustine, saint, confessions. london: penguin, 1961. barmes, jonathan, early greek philosophy. london: penguin, 1987. camus, albert. carnets iii: mars 1951-december 1959. paris: gallimard, 1989. camus, albert. notebooks: 1935-1951. new york: marlowe, 1963. camus, albert. notebooks: 1942-1951. new york: harcourt brace, 1965. camus, albert. the plague. london: penguin, 1948. girard, reneè. the scapegoat. baltimore: johns hopkins university press, 1986. hoffman, r. joseph, celsus on the true doctrine: a discourse against the christians. new york: oxford university press, 1987. hoffman, r. joseph. porphyry’s against the christians: the literary remains. new york: prometheus, 1994. king, karen l. what is gnosticism? cambridge: harvard university press, 2003. macbride, joseph, albert camus: philosopher and litterateur. new york: st. martin’s press, 1992. nietzsche, friedrich, the birth of tragedy. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1999. “pelagius”, catholic encyclopedia. http://newadvent/org/cathen/11604.html. plotinus, the enneads. london: penguin, 1991. todd, olivier, albert camus: a life. new york: carroll & graf, 1997. j. larson 75 ' contents the ideals, pluralistic culture and social progress tran van doan national taiwan university, taiwan abstract this paper will contend that social progress should always be determined by noble goals and ideals (truth, goodness, beauty, holiness). that means, social progress is achieved first by human search for these noble ideals, and then by human continuous effort to realize them in a concrete form, to cultivate them and make them flourish. a society makes real progress only when it is trying to take "a step forward" closer to the ideals of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness. traditional values are conceived of, first, as the ideals of a society, and after a long history of being tested by their life-worlds, "passed on" (traditio) to the next generations. traditional values are the real testaments of social progress. we argue further that, since traditional values represent the ideals of a certain society, and since we are always orienting towards these ideals, then a step closer to traditional values means social progress also. precisely in this context that we may say that progress means both "a step forward" and "a step backward." progress and social progress progress, in its etymological sense of "progredire," is understood as "a step forward."1 the question now is, can a simple step forward make progress? surely not! one may make many steps forward but if they lead nowhere, then they are either futile, or regressive. therefore, the question is not a step forward, but "forward to what?" it is, then, the goal that determines progress. and, of course, a step forward of negative character, like destruction, sickness, death, and the like, can be hardly hailed as progress. prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-december 2005, 25-42 25 © 2000 by assumption university press in this context, progress made in technology could not be esteemed as progress if it leads to human self termination, even if it would be undisputedly an invention or a discovery. the "technical breakthrough" of mass murder is not progress but social regress. we know, nazi scientists and scientists working in the service of the war machine, the inventors of mass-destructive weapons (gas-chambers, rockets, etc.), the "fathers" of atomic bombs, did not contribute anything to social progress, since their goal is, in contrast, the destruction of a certain society, a certain race. despite their claim of being the "defenders of peace by means of violence," they have indirectly participated into the hideous unpardonable extinction of million of innocents. how can they cleanse their hands tainted with the blood of their victims? their claimed progress, if there is any, then is "a step forward" to the destruction of humanity. scientists would contribute nothing to social progress, if the purpose of their scientific invention (or discovery) is either fully alien or hostile to human life. in contrast, only the invention (of technique or the new idea) serving mankind, warranting world peace, reducing human sufferings, prolonging human life, and bettering society would be hailed as real contribution to social progress. from the above considerations, progress should only be understood as both a step away from terror and destruction, and a step towards the noble goals of safe-guarding, developing human life and human happiness. progress makes sense only if it satisfies this double function. now the point we want to argue further is, a step forward closer to noble goals is in a way, a step backward, since these noble goals are not the property of the future. they are "immanent" to human life, and thus are timeless. and they are certainly not identified with our ordinary goals of being better, smarter, richer, happier, and the likes. as a step backward, the constant striving forward to noble goals truth (veritas), goodness (bonitas), beauty (pulchritudo) and holiness (sanctitas)2 would be the real factors deciding progress, since the first aspect of progress, i.e. "go away from" or a step forward far from the evil (malum) is actually a necessary condition to progress. and, interestingly, precisely this factor was and still is the dynamic force behind human construction of different sets (or systems) of values. are not asian values (chinese, indian, vietnamese, korean, japanese, indonesian, thai, philippines, malaysian, etc.) the products of this permanent construction 26 prajñâ vihâra of means and purposes for these ultimate ends (noble ideals)? are not the western values based on them as well? are not the african values and the human values in general judged by the yardstick of the truth, the good, the beauty and the holy? in this context, my paper argues that social progress should always be determined by noble goals (truth, goodness, beauty, holiness) which are ardently desired, zealously searched for, and constantly applied into our society.3 that means, social progress is made first by human invention of these noble ideals, and then by the continuous effort to realize them in a concrete form, to cultivate them and make them flourish. a society makes real progress only when it is trying to take "a step forward" closer to the ideals of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness. as the forms, which are already tested and accepted by a certain society, traditional values are conceived of, first, as the ideals of a society, or of a certain nation, or more universally, of human kind. then, after a long history of being tested by their life-worlds, these ideals take the forms of values, which are "passed on" (traditio) to the next generations. as such, traditional values do not exist a priori (since they are not innate), but are worked out, tested, used and reused by generations of people. in a word, as both the witness and the soul of history, traditional values are the real testaments of social progress. and since traditional values represent the ideals of a certain society, and since we are always orienting towards these ideals, then a step closer to traditional values also means social progress. precisely, in this context, we may say that progress means both "a step forward" and "a step backward." the dialectic of progress: a step forward and a step backward progress, as we have mentioned, is often characterized in spatial terms by its "advance", or in ordinary language, "a step forward." "forward" means "going farther" than the hic, i.e. the present position. "forward" means also "later" in terms of temporality: going further than the nunc, i.e. the present time (moment). "looking forward" bears at the same time a temporal and spatial dimension. but, as we will see, the "temporal forward," often understood as the future, does not clearly point to progress, because tran van doan 27 our existence is limited by our own insurmountable end. to go farther than the present (the hic) means also to approach our own end, i.e. death. hegel's analysis of human dasein, just as heidegger's analysis of temporality (temporalitaet) both point to the tragic destiny of human existence: existence is limited by the death. there is no more paradoxical and tragic than the reality of human existence: it is defined by the nonexistence.4 man is born in order to die. this is a truth which no one denies but nobody would happily accept. such a bleak future is, of course, not the goal that human beings are seeking. our burning desire for a bright future, i.e. an unlimited future, and our "march forward" toward it means also our effort to prolong our end. progress in biological sciences would be measured by human effort to prolong our own end. therefore, progress now means a step forward closer to longevity the ideal sought by all of us; it is a cardinal virtue for chinese, i.e. closer to the unlimited, the absolute, i.e. an aeternitas, or, in religious expression, to a "never ended now time" (infinitus hic et nunc).5 hegel's attempt to overcome this fateful end with his search for the absolute, the infinite i.e. the absolute geist must therefore be understood as a progressive approach.6 similarly to the dialectic of life, a step forward closer to the good means also a step far from the evil, a step closer to the beauty a step far from the ugly, and a step closer to the holy a step far from the unholy. as we will argue in the next section, the search for noble ideals of truth (veritas), goodness (bonitas), the beauty (pulchritudo) and the holy (sanctitas) has always been the most urgent task. it takes a double and dialectical course, the first is the via negativa while the second the via positiva. the first demands us to take a step far from the evil, the untruth, the ugly and the unholy while the second one a step closer to the truth, the beauty, the good and the holy. consequently, human construction of values must be guided by these two approaches. however, in bottom, they must be based on the second ones, namely on the ideals of truth, goodness, beauty and holiness. in this sense, it is clear that noble ideals serve both as our ultimate goals and the metaphysical foundation of all values so far. the paradox of progress as a step forward 28 prajñâ vihâra there is no doubt that, the future is always prior to and posterior from our present moment. in different expression, our future existence will come later than our present existence; tomorrow comes after today, and so on. however, there is no warrant for the ideal that what comes later would be any closer to our ideals, and consequently, would constitute progress. our future achievements constitutes "progress" only in comparison with the achievements of our present existence, just as our claimed progress is verified by the present success in comparing with that of the past. that means it is the "what" and not the temporal dimension that counts here. hence, future understood as a "temporal forward" would lose its sense if it is restricted to the mere measure of time. let us begin first with the ordinary understanding of progress as "a step forward," and a step forward as the future. if progress is defined by its temporal advance, then this "advance logic" determines progress. such a logic forces us to bite into the premise of "no advance, no progress." it is usual to find the belief that the progress of human history is striving forward to a certain future. such tacit understanding of progress leads us to a conclusion that the future must be the real objective of human search. it is human ultimate end. of course, such a conclusion is fully consistent with the advance logic. the point we have mentioned above is, it is not the temporal dimension but the content of our existence, i.e. the "what" that counts; and consequently, our question is whether the advance logic would be appropriate for any understanding of progress at all. as we see, progress or regress is measured by the different quality or quantity between the content of the present moment and that of the future. the difference of quality or quantity of the content would be the sole criteria determining progress or regress. and this is tacitly accepted by mankind as reflected in the motto of altius, fortius et longius once laid down by the romans in the olympic games: the better or the best are those who are stronger, who spring higher and jump farther. that is, those who achieve better results in terms of quantity and quality are the ones who progress. in this sense, the advance logic based on temporal dimension would yield no meaning, since future is a vague concept, lacking of any concrete content. and as such, it is "unreal" even if it is "true" in theory. the future can at best point to an unknown, not yet happening event, not yet existing tran van doan 29 life and not yet coming world. that means, the content of the future is void so long we still do not reach it. as a consequence, one encounters a very dubious and paradoxical reality, best expressed by samuel beckett in his waiting for godot: future life is certainly coming (true in advance logic), but it never exists for us. we are uncertain of our future life despite its unquestionable reality. sticking to the advance logic, protagonists of the view of progress as an advance toward future brush aside this paradox. and to convince themselves of its "truth", they must "imagine", and "design" a future which they force themselves to believe in it. to them, this future must advance farther than the present in terms of quantity and quality. charles darwin is certainly not the sole defender of this view, though he is unquestionably the best one. now, the question is, what they "regard" as "real" and "true" is rather a product of our imagination and our, perhaps, arbitrary design. if future does not yet exist, and if the real is what already existed, then such an imagination remains a pure product of phantasma. could we judge progress or regress by comparing the existing to the non-existing? that means, by taking the future as the goal of progress, and by conceiving of "a step forward" closer to the future as the sign of progress, one is obliged to either accept the non existence as our ultimate goal. as such, we are either facing the bleak prospects of "abyss" (heidegger), "nihilism" (nietzsche), or "absurdity" (sartre), or we must embrace a certain utopia (the sort of a terrestrial paradise, or the total triumph of the proletariat) as the ultimate goal of history.7 the fact that, we can never arrive at it, simply because future is unreal (even if it is true), and its content is void. future is a true idea, but a void concept. this dilemma forces us to renounce the thesis of progress in terms of advance logic: such progress seems to reflect the portrait of nietzsche's madman, or the visions of despair painted by such modern western artists as renoir and van gogh. this consideration forces us to go a step further in arguing that not the logic of temporal advance, i.e. not the future but the ideals and our effort to realize them that decides progress or regress. by rejecting the thesis of temporal advance as progress, and by arguing that the real content, i.e. the "what" of the present cannot be measured or compared by the yardstick of (the contents of) the future, here we conjecture that a step forward closer to the ideals is the real sign of progress. that means, not 30 prajñâ vihâra any step forward means progress, but only "a step forward" closer to a certain goal of ideal character may be taken as the sign of progress. in the case of evolution and transformation, one may apply the same argument pro and contra: not evolution in se is the sign of progress, but an evolution to a certain higher (in quality), better goal that may be called progress. a blind evolution as a kind of natural law, can hardly be praised as progress at al. progress as a step towards the ideal goals this thesis demands a further investigation into human goals, as well as in the qualitative difference among human goals. we will argue further that, although progress can be judged by the degree of success, i.e. by the closeness to the goal, social progress is possible only if the goal set by us is noble in character. let us return to the darwinian view. if the goal of human race is simply a continuous self-transformation, and if the course of self-transformation is natural then any claim of progress seems to be meaningless. we know, such a goal is implanted in all living beings, and is not set by us; and because we have nothing to do with it. or better say, we are fully impotent in dealing with it. can we praise the fact of a baby being born, growing up, getting old, and finally dying as human progress? by any generous standard can one hardly take this natural fact as progress. growing old confirms human course determined by natural law, but growing old is not our goal, just as death is certainly not our goal, even if it is fully natural, marking the end of life. hence, one can say, simple natural transformation or evolution is not the goal of human life, and much less of human society. consequently, if future is marked (or better, predicted) by what we are transforming to, then such a future is rather a repetition of time, and our life is only a repetition of the same, thought in different forms. more tragically, would we be willing to accept death as a sign of "progress"? one may say, we are conscious of our fateful end, but we object to the idea of death as human ultimate goal. death is the concluding moment of life, but it is not our goal. similarly, future is not our goal, even if we are passively moving forward to future. one might argue against us tran van doan 31 by appealing to the darwinian logic of evolution (and transformation), and freud's analysis of unconsciousness. in this case, natural instinct is always oriented towards a certain goal, either conscious or unconscious. in the case of suffering and dying, then one may say, ironically, that any step closer to them is natural, and as such they can be legitimately considered as human "goal." the goal conceived by the defenders of this view is certainly not different from the goal implicit in nature. nature is blind, but like a bat in the darkness. so, they would conclude, any step forward towards this goal can be regarded as "progress." of course, such an argument is absurd. closer to death is not progress but regress. even if death is deliberately chosen as the goal, then this goal is certainly not ideal. suicide reveals only a state of hopelessness and not the reverse, i.e. hope. hope is not the symptom of illness but the expression of a better life, better work, better chance, etc. in other words, hope reflects an ideal. death is regarded as an evil. so conversely we can therefore call progress a certain recovery from illness, an escape from death. we see this when a biologist makes progress in discovering a bacteria or viruses to aid in the prevention or cure of disease, or when politicians makes progress in reducing the death rate of their people. if progress is understood as a step forward closer to our ideals and to a certain future, then the point here is, is the ideal set by us lying in the future, or already immanent in our society, or in our own existence. i would opt for the second view, arguing that our noble goals are neither a priori existing nor a posteriori lying in the future. they are immanent in our existence and our society. immanent here is understood in the sense that they were constructed by human beings in a long process, and remained inseparable from our own existence, even if we are unconscious of them. they were constructed not to satisfy our present moment, but for a lasting history, i.e. for a long lasting existence. as such, our ideals are not to be found only in the distant future, but also in the past and in the presence. our future life-world means not a life after the present moment, but an encompassing and multi-dimensional life. consequently, searching for the ideals needs not to look forward to the future, but perhaps, better, to be found in our own life-worlds, the ones in the past and the present. german idealists like georg f. hegel and friedrich wilhelm schelling have discovered this truth long ago. nostalgic of the homeric 32 prajñâ vihâra spirit and the renaissance vitality, they have taken forschritt (literally, a step forward) as the logic of the world (and nature). to them, forschritt carries a double function: striving forward and receding back to the most substantial values. history in their eyes must obey the law of progress, i.e. has to walk towards the end required by reason. as such, forschritt here does not means a step forward to the future in the darwinian sense, but a step for-and-backward, in the sense of a step closer to the "end," i.e. the absolute, i.e. human ultimate goal. actually, hegel still conceived of the absolute as what homer dreamed, as what plato searched, and as what the protagonists of the renaissance attempted to revive: ultimate harmony as the goal (the end) of history. this ultimate end is immanent in history, but it is not placed at the end of history, i.e. in a future, or in the final day of judgement. it poses itself as the beginning and the end. to use messianic language, it is the alpha and the omega of human destiny. walter benjamin, a writer famous for his kabbalistic melancholy and mysticism, has blended messianic flavour with his repugnant surrendering to the (heideggerian) "abyss." he "foresaw" the ultimate end of history immanent in our now-time (jetztzeit).8 he thus took the stand against an optimistic marx who, still clinging to a certain kind of messianism, predicted its forthcoming in the form of a proletariat society. understood in this sense, progress reveals the right course of history. whenever history approaches the final end, then it has made a certain progress. and in this logic, history is conceived of by hegel as history only due to its quality of progress, and progress can be judged only in its forschritt towards the ultimate goal of history. phenomenology of spirit (1807) wants to demonstrate such logic. in this logic, the world history is a dialectical accumulation of periods (zeitsgeist) and a dialectical synthesis of the diversity of people minds and habits (volksgeist) in accordance with the logic of reason of which its essence is progress. in other words, if spirit is the universal form of history, and if reason is its law that forces all phenomena to orient, or to go toward this universal form, then a step further, close to this universal is called forschritt, i.e. progress.9 it is not our concern about hegel's identification of spirit with the reason itself, but rather with his understanding of progress as its "characteristic." we may have here two quite contradictory views: the one contra and the other pro hegel. the contra argument goes to the direct tran van doan 33 consequence of hegel's logic: if progress is the characteristic of reason and if reason is absolute then progress means a step close to absolute. however, if absolute is unreachable, or simply a void concept (as embraced by nihilists and marxists), then progress means ironically (or paradoxically) a step either to nowhere, or a step to nihilism, i.e. self-destruction (as seen in the prediction of marx about the doom day of capitalism). in this logic, progress remains either an impracticable utopia or a dangerous illusion. not only the pessimist existentialists like albert camus and jean-paul sartre but also post-modernists would heartily welcome this nietzschean prophecy; not only writers like samuel beckett, franz kafka but also some historians would enthusiastically embrace it as the unavoidable consequence of hegelian logic in the reverse. oswald spengler was certainly neither the first nor the last historian,10 just as david bell and francis fukuyama were surely not the single voices in the "desert." these voices are repeated in a polyphonic post-modern chorus loudly sung by people like derrida and lyotard.11 the second view pro hegel begins where hegel left: progress means a step closer to the absolute, but absolute here reflects rather an ideal which is reachable only in its temporality and historicity. that means, ideal is a concept that appears in history and makes history. since history is proceeding to the absolute, ideal reveals a part of the absolute indeed. progress in this sense means the process of realization of the ideal in history, as loewith describes: "as a spirit which continuously surrenders and recollects, it is per se historical, even though the dialectic of becoming does not proceed in a straight line toward infinity, but rather goes in a circle, so that the end is the consummation of the beginning."12 the ideals and traditional values so far, we have pointed out the close relationship between social progress and the noble goals, i.e. human ideals. this part goes a step further to identify human noble goals with human values, and to show that traditional values were constructed so to attain human noble goals. as we have argued above, progress means "a step forward" far from destructive force, and a "step forward" closer to the noble goals, i.e. our ideals. actually, these two steps are the two sides of the same coin. 34 prajñâ vihâra they bear the imprint of the same essence. to live longer means to keep a distance farther from death, just as to live better means to reduce misery, and so on. in this sense, to be closer to the ideals is tantamount to be far from the undesired reality. hence, one may adopt two different tactics for the same goal. the first approach is to change the unfavourable conditions, to dismiss the obstacles, or to reduce the factors which may hinder, endanger or destroy our life; while the second one would be a positive approach, to discover and take the means which help us to attain these noble goals. progress could be seen from these two aspects, or judged by the success of these two different approaches. now, keeping us far from the factors (conditions, milieu) which may endanger us, and reaching to the ideals which benefit us make sense only if one knows exactly what these ideals are. in a word, noble ideals are what one conceives of as the best goals serving as principle guiding our life, and as the same time, on which one constructs methods to attain them.13 in the manner of giambattista vico who, in his now becoming classic la scienzia nuova, rightly elevates sex (marriage), death (funeral) and religion to the rank of the "trinity" of the social sciences,14 we can also categorically claim that truth, goodness, beauty and holiness have been, still are and will always be the most noble goals human beings are seeking. they become the "quattronity" of human life. these most noble and highest ideals are not lying in the future; they are not a product of the past either. more importantly, they are not the products of a particular people, or a particular nation. they are neither single-handedly constructed nor invented by a genius, nor are they randomly or arbitrarily imposed by some one on us. great philosophers did not invent them, but attempt to defend them, and to work out various methods in order to attain them. so, socrates did not invent truth, just as plato did not discover beauty. similarly, buddha did not create goodness, and certainly confucius had not worked out the ideal world based on moral tenets. we know, the reason of socrates' attack against the sophists is certainly not a vulgar vanity showing his superiority over them, but his defence of (the ideal of) truth. he considered truth as a noble goal not because it may produce the best effect, but simply because of its eternal and universal rightness. simply speaking, truth is identified with justice. kant has brilliantly defended the socrates' position when he repeatedly tran van doan 35 argued for its eternal rightness: even if all men are lying, that does not change the eternal truth, and consequently, the command of "you should not lie" must be always valid.15 to socrates, kant and philosophers like them, truth is the most desired goal. it is the ideal and remains ideal even if no one can attain it. similarly, aristotle and almost all great philosophers have found in the goodness (happiness) the ideal. various moral systems have been based on goodness, and still on it. of course, all of them are fully aware of the fact that there is no clear-cut definition of happiness, just as there is hardly a complete set, or a perfect system of truth, holiness and beauty. this seemingly paradox is found in the essence of human beings: their ideals are remaining human and surpassing human limit at the same time. that means, even if the ideals are constructed by human beings, they transcend the limit of human experiences. here is what we mean by saying that the ideals are constructed by generations of human kind, but are lying immanently and transcendentally in us. more interestingly, they existed already in the future as the goals we are striving for. since the purpose of this paper is to prove the dialectical relation between progress and traditional values, i will not go into details the process of construction of ideals, and be content to say that without these noble ideals, our system of values would not be stable, and since these ideals are internal, the values based on them are always valid. as such, one may find in traditional values the ones based on these ideals. they are eternally valid. here is the reason and the values of our inquiry into traditional values. here is also the raison d'etre of the council for research in values and philosophy and of our gathering here. before moving to the next section discussing the relationship between progress, the ideals and traditional values, i would reiterate our thesis, namely, progress is achieved only when we are approaching the noble purposes truth, goodness, beauty and holiness. these ideals serve as both the foundation and the goals of our activities. these ideals serve also as the conditions and criteria of any system of values, if values are understood as those which satisfy human most basic needs, most intimate aspiration; as those which fulfill our expected or planned future; and in a word, as those which give life, fulfill our life and make our life flourishing. 36 prajñâ vihâra progress as a step forward to ideals and backward to traditional values traditional values, as we understand, may consist of two sets of values, the one based on the ideals, and the other on temporal needs and deeds. in the first set of values based on the ideals, one finds similar characteristics between the ideals and traditional values: they all are essential (necessary) and long lasting (universal). they serve as foundation of all values. without them, the idea of values would become as vague as confused. hence, they are necessary. since the ideals were not a product fabricated by a certain age, they are eternal, and since they were certainly neither a property of the greek nor a possession of the chinese or the hindu, they must be the common property of human beings. furthermore, since they are neither the products of a creatio ex nihilo nor that of pure experiences, they must be transcendentally known (or recognized) by us in the course of life. based on the ideals, and sharing the same essences, the first set of traditional values is not the product of a certain period, a certain history or a certain group. and, to be sure, they are not the property of a certain genre, or a certain culture as "cultural imperialists" would claim. to be more concrete, traditional values, say of chinese, like benevolence (jen), fidelity (chung), filial piety (hsiao), rightness (yi), etc… are, of course, based on the ideals of goodness and truthfulness (sincerity).16 traditional values (virtues) like happiness, justice, etc. laid down by aristotle are no doubt founded on the ideals of goodness and truth, and perhaps, even on the ideals of beauty and holiness. of course, we may recite a horde of values (virtues) which, by any means, we cannot deny as groundless. the second set of values may be constructed to suit the temporal tastes, to solve temporal needs, to satisfy the sudden emerging desires, needs and so on.17 the values of democracy, autocracy, or monarchy in politics are, doubtless, not traditional values based on the ideals of truth or absolute goodness and rightness. they are nonetheless guided by some ideals of lesser values (in the sense that these values are not universal and necessary) like the ones of temporal and spatial urgency (stability, power tran van doan 37 and the likes). since they are of rather temporal and regional characters, plato once rightfully argued that each of these lesser ideals would generate values only in a certain conditions; they may endanger human life (or society) if they step over their own limit. similar to the greek society, each society, each people would construct many sets of minor values depending on their temporal, spatial and racial ideals, and depending on their taste. the ideal beauty for black people would be for example someone with black skin, while the reverse is true for white people. the ideal food for a chinese, in most case, is chinese food, while it could not be the case of, say, an indian or an african. these ideals could be changed or transformed once their social conditions, knowledge about them, and other factors are diminished, expanded or deformed. in a globalized world, many of them, especially of minor groups or races, are simply wiped out and replaced by others of stronger or bigger groups. the conquering of (american) fast food chains and beverage in every corner of the globe, just as the triumph of western luxurious goods in the world is certainly not an isolated case. the slow and quiet death of many dialects of african tribes, just as the silence explosion of new (sometimes bad) tastes among young people everywhere are the most eloquent and tragic examples showing that the ideals of minor values cannot resist the change. however, one cannot, and has no right to claim that english (especially american english) is the new ideal language, or that the american cnn news channel is the best, and so on. the fact that they are "globalized" does not prove their universal and necessary characters, since they can never become our noble ideals. in contrast, we can make progress without cnn and fast foods, just as we may acquire knowledge without american language and universities. in some case, it could be the reverse that is true.18 to identify coca cola, macdonald's, kentucky fried chicken with american culture displays not only a na?ve and superficial understanding of americans; it is a malicious insult to them. americans, just as chinese, japanese, and others may have some kind of commercial culture, but they are not their essence. their merit (values) is found in their strength, their strong will which are nourished by their ideals. the essence of american culture must be found in their ideals (respect for human rights, equality among human races, belief in god) which abraham lincoln brilliantly represented and defended. similarly, the essence of chinese (and vietnamese, koreans, japanese) is 38 prajñâ vihâra the ideals of harmony, benevolence, righteousness, etc., while that of the thai people would be human peace and tranquillity. of course, we can find similar essences in the culture of the philippines, malaysia and indonesia. there is no doubt that, we would contribute to a real social progress if we first possess these ideals. a strong sense of selfconsciousness, a firm belief in our own faith, a self-confident in our own values, etc. have always been, and still are the ones for excellence.19 as seen in our above analysis, then traditional values are belonging to two set of values: the ones of a priori characteristics and the other of a posteriori characteristics. the first are constituted in our consciousness, and become what we may call "good conscience" (liang-chih in chinese), or "good will" (kant), or "divine will," while the latter are constructed by us in accordance with social and temporal conditions. they form what we may call "morals" (in the sense of customs), social values, national values, political values, and the like. it is important to make this distinction, since we have by no means to take all traditional values for granted, and put them on the same rank. when we insist on the essential relation between traditional values and progress, we have in mind the traditional values of noble ideals, and not those of lesser values, namely, those of the second set of values which are restricted by temporal and spatial as well as social conditions. only the highest ideals would be at the same time the dynamic forces and the goals which attract us and force us to march forward, to search for the means to attain them. precisely by these real factors that social progress is understood as a step forward closer to the ideals; and precisely because of their transcendental characteristics that social progress must also be a step backward closer to them. tran van doan 39 endnotes 1 note that progress is different from development. by development, i understand as a growth of quantitative character, while progress as step closer to perfection. in the encyclical sollicitudo rei socialis, sect. 4, john-paul ii makes clear that sviluppo (development) surpasses a simple crescita (growth). actually, the term sviluppo used by the pope bears the same meaning of progress that i am discussing. 2 aristotle himself had elaborated a great deal of ideals like eudemonia (happiness, blessedness, prosperity), logos (kata ton orthon logon, nicomachean ethics, 1138b25), phronesis, dike (justice, 1155a), episteme, etc. 3 it is interesting to note that the empirical researches on the structure of development (jean piaget) and moral development (lawrence kohlberg) both point to the fact that human development (progress) is dictated (or guided) by noble values. an inter-disciplinary research of a group of scholars in taiwan (targti group) reach the same finding that the values among taiwanese (chinese) is oriented by most basic values and supreme values. see louis gutheinz, ed., quality of life in the bioregion of taiwan (taipei: faculty of theology, fujen university, 1994). 4 martin heidegger, was ist metaphysik ? (frankfurt a. m.: klostermann, 19 57); jean-paul sartre, l’etre et le néant (paris: gallimard, 1947). 5 the theme once explored by plotinus, st. augustinus, meister eckhardt and most recently by walter benjamin and emmanuel levinas. see emmanuel levinas, totalité et infini. essai sur l’exériorité (1961). 6 see the interpretation of alexandre kojève in his introduction to the lecture of hegel’s phenomenology of spirit (english translation, 1971). it is wellknown that contemporary philosophers, the prophets of the earlier existentialism, like jean-paul sartre, jacques derrida, maurice merleau-ponty have been heavily influenced by kojève’s lecture. 7 the works of daniel bell, the end of history (new york, 1976), and francis fukuyama, the end of history and the last man (new york: free, 1992) may best depict the tragedy of an immanent “end of history.” 8 walter benjamin, the origin of the german tragic drama. translated by john osborne (london: new left books, 1973). the concepts of aura and jetztzeit were also developed by benjamin in other works like illumination (new york: schocken books, 1969) and charles beaudelaire: a lyric poet in the era of high capitalism (london: new left books, 1973). 9 george f. hegel, phaenomenologie des geistes (1807). karl loewith observes brilliantly hegel’s view of history as a constant progress towards the absolute spirit as follows: “this pathway of the eternally present spirit through the previous nature of history is not a detour to be avoided, but the only practicable way to the consummation of knowledge. the absolute or spirit, not only has its external history, as a man has clothing, but is, in its deepest nature, as a movement 40 prajñâ vihâra of self-development, an entity which exists only by becoming.” see karl loewith, from hegel to nietzsche the revolution in nineteenth-century thought (canada: holt, rinehart and winston, 1964), p. 32. 10 oswald spengler, der untergang des abendlandes (hamburg, 1972). 11 see jean-françois lyotard, la condition postmoderne un rapport du savoir (paris, 1978); english translation of g. bennington and b. massumi, the postmodern condition: a report on knowledge (minneapolis, 1984). 12 loewith, op. cit., p. 32. 13 note that in the homeric tradition, the ideals are almost understood as virtues. arete in its most original sense means “excellence,” “the best.” aretai are regarded as the virtues in the homeric times (such as courage, physical strength, goodness, and the likes). see alasdair macintyre, after virtues (notre dame: university of notre dame press, 1984), sec. ed., p. 141 ff. similarly in the confucian tradition, the ideal man is a chun-dzu (gentleman, noble man, moral man), i.e. the one who possesses virtues like benevolence, loyalty, filial piety, etc. 14 giambattista vico, la scienzia nuova. english translation: the new sciences, 332-333. in this work, vico demands for a new understanding of science grounded on the three most basic factors (forces), i.e. marriage, funeral and religious rites. 15 actually, kant in his grundlegung der metaphysik der moral (1785) had conceived of the ideals as something of a priori and absolute character. he conjectured that it is the good will, i.e. a will of unconditional and absolute good, the necessary condition of every case or form of goodness. it is in this context that kant apportioned happiness, truth, etc. to the good will (which is tantamount to the summum bonum of medieval philosophers). 16 see tran van doan, “the dialectic of tradition and modernity” in philosophical review, no. (also: tran van doan, “what can be called tradition?” in george f. mclean, ed. (washington, d.c.: crvp, 2002), and tu wei-ming, modern spirit and confucian tradition (hsian-dai ching-shen yu ru-chia chwantung) (taipei: linking, 1995). 17 actually aristotle had constructed his ethical principles in accordance with the greek tastes. his attempt to construct an ethics that can be demonstrated in the geometrical way is certainly motivated by the greek’s aesthetic cultivation of harmony and proportionality. his conception of goodness in terms of not deficient, not bad, not excessive is clearly the result of the greek view of beauty. we know, in the homeric tradition of heroes, honour is also a taste. and as such, it was declared to be an arete (virtue). similarly, following plato, even political ideals, in aristotle’s view, must conform to these tastes. in the books seven and eight of politea, his ideal of a state is neither too large nor too small, and the number of citizens must not exceed. only an ideal taste can provide to its citizens a leisured life, an enjoyable luxury: thus, the main aim of the city is not a “mere wealth,” but a pleasurable life: “importing her needs and exporting her surplus.” politeia, 1325 b 33 1326 b 24. tran van doan 41 18 the report of hongkong bureau of education in 1999 has issued a warning to responsible educators and politicians about the deterioration of hongkong students and residents on many subjects, especially in language and morals. it is stated that hongkong students are “so good” in language so they speak english “like” chinese and chinese “like” english, that is, they are speaking the so-called “chinglish,” a corrupted english mixed with a bad chinese. 19 the success of the first and second generations of asians in the united states is a strong case in point to back this view. the most successful asians (nobel laureates, the millionaires, etc.) in the united states, etc. are those who are mastering their own natal (mother) languages and fluent in english, fully conscious of their values, and nourished by their ideals. recent study on the third generation of asian immigrants (2000) has revealed a not very bright prospect: they are less successful, less motivated and lacking of moral values. furthermore, they are unable to express their own thought in their mother tongue. many of them feel “alienated” from their own american society. 42 prajñâ vihâra 06_(87-137)ethics as optics of the divine ethics as optics of the divine1 ryan c. urbano university of san carlos, philippines บทคัดย่อ บทความน้ีพูดถึงปรัชญาจริยศาสตร์แห่งความรับผิดชอบของเลวีนัส โดย หลักๆ แล้วจะเก่ียวข้องกับงานสองช้ินของเขาคือ “totality and infinity” และ “otherwise than being” ซ่ึงถือว่าเป็นงานช้ินเอกของเลวีนัส เลวีนัสได้พัฒนา ปรัชญาจริยศาสตร์ขึ้นใหม่โดยให้ความสำคัญกับความรับผิดชอบต่อผู้อื่น (มากกว่า)โดยมิได้ละท้ิง อัตตา หรือ “ตัวฉัน” ให้เป็นเหย่ือคุกคามของสุญนิยม ใน ทรรศนะของเลวีนัสน้ัน อัตตา หรือ “ตัวฉัน” ซ่ึงมีความเป็นผู้รับ ถูกกำหนดโดย ความรับผิดชอบท่ีมีต่อผู้อ่ืนอย่างไร้ขีดจำกัด ตัวฉันตกอยู่ภายใต้ผู้อ่ืน ไม่ว่าจะโดย นัยตามตัวอักษรหรือโดยนัยเชิงสัญลักษณ์ และทรรศนะน้ีเองท่ีทำให้เลวีนัสเช่ือ ว่า “จริยศาสตร์ คือ การมองของพระเจ้า/ส่ิงศักด์ิสิทธ์ิ” สำหรับเลวีนัสแล้วปัญหา เร่ืองภาวะเหนือธรรมชาติและปัญหาเก่ียวกับพระเจ้า และปัญหาท่ีว่าอัตวิสัยลด ทอนลงเป็นสารัตถะไม่ได้ ลดทอนลงเป็นภาวะท่ีกระจายอยู่ในทุกแห่งท่ีจำเป็น ก็ไม่ได้น้ันต้องไปด้วยกันเสมอ abstract this paper discusses levinas’s philosophy of ethical responsibility. the discussion mainly relies on totality and infinity and otherwise than being, two works levinasian scholars unanimously consider as his masterpieces. levinas develops a novel philosophical project which gives priority to the ethical philosophy of the other without abandoning the notion of the subject to the imminent threats of nihilism. the subject for levinas is one whose passivity and receptivity is such that it is constituted by its infinite responsibility to the other. the subject is literally and figuraprajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 87-137 87 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ tively subjected to the other. this allows for his contention that “ethics is an optics of the divine”. according to levinas, the problem of transcendence and of god and the problem of subjectivity irreducible to essence, irreducible to essential immanence, go together. levinas’s philosophy is dominated by and preoccupied with a single vision. this vision is the self’s inescapable responsibility for the other. the other is levinas’s term for the human other.2 in many of his writings, he calls the other as the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the poor, and the neighbor, terms which levinas lifted from the bible to stress the urgency of the self's ethical obligation towards another human being, and to acknowledge the non-greek (hebraic religion) sources of his philosophical enterprise. in some instances, the other is also described as absolute alterity, infinite, transcendent, invisible, and enigma. the other consumed levinas’s life just as heidegger was captivated and enthralled by the thought of being. levinas says: “there is something more important than my life. and that is the life of the other. that is unreasonable. man is an unreasonable being”.3 indeed, man’s ineluctable obligation to his fellow man precedes deliberation and so “unreasonable”. before one can ignore or accept the responsibility, the other has already made an ethical appeal and has pierced one’s sensibility. for levinas, ethics and not ontology is prima philosophia. he subordinates ontology to ethics because the former effects a relation that reduces the other to the comprehension of the thinking ego, stripping the other of its singularity or distinctly human qualities. levinas maintains that genuine religion rests on and cannot be conceived apart from the self’s responsibility for the other. he is very emphatic on this claim and asserts: “there can be no ‘knowledge’ of god separated from the relationship with men. the other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with god. he does not play the role of a mediator”.4 ethics for levinas is inseparable from religion so that unless the latter works within the matrix of ethical relationships, it fails to be authentic. a religion grounded solely in abstruse dogmas and excessive rituals have no meaning whatsoever in levinas’s perception because this disre88 prajna vihara~ gards the justice due to the other. without ethics, religion becomes an empty discourse and a meaningless ritual. this paper discusses levinas’s philosophy of ethical responsibility. the discussion mainly relies on totality and infinity and otherwise than being, two works levinasian scholars unanimously consider as his masterpieces. adriaan peperzak and richard cohen hold the opinion that the former work stresses the transcendence of the other (ethical alterity) while the latter makes the responsible subject (ethical subjectivity) its central topic.5 both levinasian scholars agree however that though the two works differ in emphasis, they still deal with the same concern and that is the ethical relation of the same to the other. this distinction made by peperzak and cohen only reveals levinas’s novel project of giving priority to the ethical philosophy of the other without abandoning the notion of the subject to the imminent threats of nihilism. levinas defends a notion of subjectivity that runs contrary to structuralism and post-structuralism, according to which, the subject is constituted and is eventually dissolved by such external forces as language, myths and ideologies.6 in his “preface” to totality and infinity, levinas says that his book is a “defense of subjectivity” “founded in the idea of infinity”.7 he refuses to accept the postmodern notion of the “death of the subject” because this averts one’s ethical obligation to the other.8 he likewise disapproves of the notion of a modern autonomous subject because it bypasses alterity and obscures radical difference. as will be shown later in this article, the subject for levinas is one whose passivity and receptivity is such that it is constituted by its infinite responsibility to the other. the subject is literally and figuratively subjected to the other. the discussion of the main concepts and themes in the abovementioned works will be followed by an account of the connection between levinas’s ethics and religion, explaining the reason why for levinas “ethics is an optics of the divine”. according to levinas, “the problem of transcendence and of god and the problem of subjectivity irreducible to essence, irreducible to essential immanence, go together”.9 this link between ethics and religion will be made in the last section of this article. 89ryan c. urbano being without beings: the “there is” the self, prior to its existence as a subject or existent and as one which has identity and determination, lays faceless and unknown in the there is (il y a). it is immersed in and engulfed by the there is. “what we call the i is itself submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalized, stifled by it”.10 in the nocturnal chaos of the there is, the self lacks identity and is therefore indeterminate. it slowly acquires determination in its effort to realize itself by escaping the there is through assimilation, possession, consumption, absorption of things other than itself. it stabilizes and defines itself through these self-interested activities. the self “desire[s] to get out of itself, to rid itself of itself, to ‘save’ itself from the narrow confines of its material self-relationship, to disburden itself of itself”.11 but in its effort to give form to its existence, the self is still haunted and threatened by the there is. it still hears the rumblings of its previous anonymous existence in spite of its labors to leave it. the there is is levinas’s term for anonymous existence, the form of which is the impersonal verb as in “it rains, or it is warm”.12 it refers to a state that, where all things are to disappear including the self, it still exists and “remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging to no one, universal, returning in the midst of the negation which put it aside, and in all the powers to which that negation may be multiplied”.13 the there is is “being in general”, pure undifferentiated being.14 unlike heidegger where being is understood as a donation (es gibt) to which dasein must hearken in order to be authentic, levinas’s there is is a milieu out of which the self emerges and acquires identity as a self. while for heidegger being encompasses everything there is in the sense that it confers meaning and worth to existence, levinas’s there is refers to a meaningless existence that enwraps the ego and from which the ego must evade. it is “existence without existents”, being without beings and “content without form”. it is an anonymous, impersonal existence before the hypostasis of the individuated human subject. there is no consciousness to experience this anonymous existence and yet it is not to be equated with pure nothingness as if it is a substance that has been annihilated. one cannot approached the there is cognitively since one is immersed, steeped and bathed in it. philip lawton says, “in approaching the question of the there is, then, 90 prajna vihara~ levinas attempts to describe, or at least indicate, in language a deduced experience that precedes language, precedes deduction, and precedes experience”.15 if there is an appropriate description to the there is where it could be experienced analogically, it would be the silence and stillness of the night. levinas, in alluding to the metaphor of the night to describe the there is, explains: in the night, where we are riven to it, we are not dealing with anything. but this nothing is not that of pure nothingness. there is no longer this or that; there is not ‘something’. but this universal absence is in its turn a presence, and we do not grasp it through a thought. it is immediately there. there is no discourse. nothing responds to us but this silence.16 this silence which the there is murmurs levinas depicts as something frightening, a “mute, absolutely indeterminate menace”.17 the horror which the there is engenders is due, not to the fact that things are covered by darkness and so obscures vision, but to the fact that “nothing approaches, nothing comes, nothing threatens”.18 as the “dark background of existence”, the there is is also a monotonous presence, insomnia, impersonal vigilance which strip consciousness of its subjectivity.19 in totality and infinity, levinas names the there is as the element and he describes it as a state which is neither being, nothing nor becoming. the element is “wind, earth, sea, sky, air”. it makes the inner or interior life possible. the ego is within element but it does not possess it. the ego feels the breeze of the wind, stands on earth, swims in the sea, is encompassed by the sky and breathes air but it does not use the element in the same way it fashions or creates things out of pre-existing materials. levinas simply depicts the ego’s relation to the element as “bathing”. the ego is enveloped by the element and it is immersed in it.20 the element is one-dimensional; it has no width and length but only depth.21 as depth it is “inextinguishable consummation”, an uninterrupted, indeterminate, nocturnal space.22 the element is formless, indeterminate, without beginning and without end. this explains why for levinas 91ryan c. urbano the element is impervious and refractory to thought because it is without qualitative determination and it is not an object which one can approach and determine by circling around it. the importance of there is in levinas’s philosophy is that, for levinas, consciousness and individual existence are a hypostasis. consciousness arises out of this anonymous general existence or being. it is from the there is that the self builds a home and secure possessions through its labors. in doing so, the ego begins to form its own identity. the there is is the medium and the milieu where things for enjoyment are situated. it is the “common fund or terrain” which cannot be possessed by any self.23 it envelops and contains things but which in itself is not contained and enveloped. from and within the elemental, the self lives, appropriates and possesses things. the emergence of the self from the there is serves as levinas’s strategy for escaping heidegger’s notion of being. if levinas is to move beyond being in order to affirm the other, he has to find a concept that does not preclude him from achieving his purpose. and he finds this in his notion of the there is. davis says that the there is “plays a vital strategic role in levinas’s escape from what he calls the ‘climate of heideggerian philosophy, since it forms the basis of his attempt to cast off the tyranny of being”.24 the there is also provides a context in which there is a real encounter between the self and the other.25 as was already pointed out in heidegger’s ontology, dasein is solitary whose primary relationship is with being and not with others. the existence of others in heidegger’s philosophy is presumed as part of dasein’s being-in-the-world. dasein’s being in the world is also its being-with-others. another importance of the notion of the there is is that, through it, levinas is able to come up with the idea that the ego, in its effort to achieve self-sufficiency, is always menaced by this anonymous existence because of the uncertainty it brings to the ego’s future. also, through the there is, the self is separated from the infinite and so renders the ego atheistic.26 the ego is a-theistic in the literal sense of the word. it is not-god, not the infinite. 92 prajna vihara~ from anonymous being to being: the separated ego or self this section elaborates levinas’s notion of an ego which is master of itself and of the world that it inhabits. it explains further levinas’s concept of the same whose concrete expression is the ego and its totalizing activities. levinas calls the world of the ego as interiority, inner self and psychism. from the there is emerges the ego whose essence is to persist in its own being. for levinas, relatively agreeing with spinoza, all beings are driven by their essence to strive to become themselves. every being is attached to and lives for itself. each is innately egoistic and inclines towards narcissism. in totality and infinity, levinas takes time to describe the egoistic character of the self, which he describes as enjoyment, nourishment and love of life. enjoyment is for levinas the primordial existence. the ego, as was already discussed in the preceding section, is like the there is in which it is immersed. it is faceless, anonymous and without an identity. but it slowly and gradually arises from its anonymity by engulfing objects in there is in order to establish itself as separate ego. levinas describes this process of assimilating and taking possession of things in the there is as “living from”. the ego, being corporeal and endowed with sensibility, lives from “‘good soup’, air, light, spectacles, work, ideas sleep, etc”.27 it is concerned with the worldly necessities of life. things from the sensible material world are “swallowed, used, enjoyed, integrated in knowledge or practice” in order for the ego to endure in its being.28 hence, living from establishes the ego’s identity. the ego absorbs the other in order to constitute and maintain itself as the same. it retains itself as the same as it changes by appropriating things to itself.29 levinas regards life in its elementary form as happiness and enjoyment. suffering is possible because life is happiness in the first place. it “presupposes a self whose natural tendency is to enjoy the world”.30 he says: the life that is life from something is happiness. life is affectivity and sentiment; to live is to enjoy life. to despair of life makes sense only because originally life is happi93ryan c. urbano ness. suffering is a failing of happiness; it is not correct to say that happiness is the absence of suffering. happiness is made up not of an absence of needs, whose tyranny and imposed character one denounces, but of satisfaction of all needs. . . . happiness is accomplishment; it exists in a soul satisfied and not in a soul that has extirpated its needs, a castrated soul.31 moreover, though the ego realizes that it lives in a strange world where things are either subservient or indisposed to it, still it does not find these things radically opposed to its existence. the world is still pleasant and a source of enjoyment to the ego. as davis explains: “the strangeness of the world is its charm, a cause of happiness. jouissance names the process by which the subject makes itself at home in an environment where otherness is not a threat to be overcome, but a pleasure to be experienced”.32 levinas explains this point crisply: the primordial relation of man with the material world is not negativity, but enjoyment and agreeableness [agr?ment] of life. it is uniquely with reference to this agreeableness-unsurpassable within interiority-that the world can appear hostile, to be negated and to be conquered. if the insecurity of the world that is fully agreed to in enjoyment troubles enjoyment, the insecurity cannot suppress the fundamental agreeableness of life.33 for levinas, the world is fully available to the ego for its nourishment. it gives the ego a way of gratifying itself. the world as other is transformed into the same and this for levinas is “the essence of enjoyment”.34 as enjoyment, the self is at home in the world. it enjoys its economic life. the world, which the self inhabits, is a world where it finds enjoyment and not merely derives its sustenance. enjoyment is spontaneous and it has no other goal except enjoyment itself. life is not the naked will to be, an ontological sorge for this. life’s relation with the very conditions of its life 94 prajna vihara~ becomes the nourishment and content of that life. life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in the sun. distinct from my substance but constituting it, these contents make up the worth [prix] of my life. when reduced to pure and naked existence, like the existence of the shades ulysses visits in hades, life dissolves into a shadow. life is an existence that does not precede essence. its essence makes up its worth [prix]; and here value [valeur] constitutes being. the reality of life is already on the level of happiness, and in this sense beyond ontology. happiness is not an accident of being, since being is risked for happiness.35 the ego absorbs and consumes the things in the world. it “lives from” the world. things are consumed and absorbed not for any utilitarian purpose like survival and the satisfaction of a need but for the sake of enjoyment. “to enjoy without utility, in pure loss, gratuitously, without referring to anything else, in pure expenditure__this is the human”.36 the essence of existence is enjoyment. this kind of life manifests not only the physicality or concreteness of the ego but also its self-centeredness, which for levinas is a kind of innocence. this is an unconscious egoism devoid of any malice. wyschogrod explains this poignantly: in acknowledging man as need levinas is maintaining dialectically that from the point of view of a developed ethical consciousness man is hopelessly guilty, but from the point of view of natural man he remains innocent. natural man thus behaves no differently from fallen man, but natural man simply has not experienced the conditions that make his behavior be nonethical behavior. he has not yet encountered the upsurge of the other.37 what the ego incorporates in enjoyment is not the other but the other. the former puts up a stand before the transcendental ego and re95ryan c. urbano fuses to be included in the world the ego constructs for itself. the latter is absorbed into the same and is the “source of jouissance’ or enjoyment. the same, as it assimilates the other, “confirms totality” while the resistance of the other “reveals infinity”.38 levinas emphatically makes a distinction between the other and the other. the other metaphysically desired is not “other” like the bread i eat, the land which i dwell, the landscape i contemplate, like, sometimes, myself for myself, this “i”, that “other”. i can “feed” on these realities and to a very extent satisfy myself, as though i had simply been lacking them. their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor. the metaphysical desire tends toward something else, toward the absolutely other.39 the ego finds enjoyment in the world because, as a bodily living entity, it has sensibility. sensibility is the ego’s way of first engaging with the world of things. it is the ego’s mode of enjoyment. sensibility is even enjoyment itself.40 the ego, as sensibility, has needs which it must satisfy. it has affectivity and sensation which renders it to encounter and enjoy the contents of life. levinas makes a careful distinction between need and desire. need is natural while desire is spiritual. the former, he says, can be satisfied by something finite that the ego lacks, while the latter is insatiable because it intends the infinite. as corporeal, the ego seeks satisfaction for its needs by appropriating the world to itself while remaining within itself.41 “it would coincide with the consciousness of what has been lost; it would be essentially nostalgia, a longing for return”.42 need converts the “other into the same by labor”.43 desire, on the other hand, moves towards that which cannot complete it. it desires the good, which as desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.44 it is the desire for the “alterity of the other and of the most-high”.45 desire is nourished by its hunger. it wrenches the ego from its self-sufficient existence and directs it to the beyond__the other.46 thus, it is the other’s egression that answers the deepest desire, which propels the ego to goodness. levinas however argues that a need resides 96 prajna vihara~ in desire. need is the primary movement of the same and as such it surmounts, suspends and obliterates the alterity of the world.47 “the human being thrives on his needs; he is happy for his needs”.48 while this is true for the primordial natural life, the ethical life is animated by desire for the other which as infinite awakens this very desire in the self. need and self-gratification is what characterizes the natural self while desire and responsibility for the other is what constitutes the subjectivity of the ethical self. the desire for the other however is not possible if need, which is a natural inclination, is suppressed. as levinas writes, “having recognized its needs as material needs, as capable of being satisfied, the i can henceforth turn to what it does not lack. it distinguishes the material from the spiritual, open to desire”.49 in other words, the self cannot open its arms to embrace the other unless it has satisfied its biological and material needs. it must be noted however that levinas’s notion of the ego as “living from” the world is in stark contrast to heidegger’s dasein as “being-in-the-world”. living from nature does not denote that the ego consciously confronts the world and utilizes it for its own needs. it does not also mean that things from which the ego lives from are a “means of life”.50 it likewise does not mean that the ego is saddled by anxiety as a consequence of its awareness of its own death. rather, living from nature is the ego’s primordial immersion in the there is prior to making nature an object of representation and praxis. it is the ego’s experience of nature at the level of sensibility before this experience is brought to the level of conscious intentionality. levinas says: “the sensibility we are describing starting with enjoyment of the element does not belong to the order of thought but to that of sentiment, that is, the affectivity wherein the egoism of the i pulsates”.51 or in the words of peperzak, “ego is concerned and takes care of itself before it becomes conscious of itself”.52 sensibility does not constitute the world as representation but it constitutes “the very contentment of existence”.53 here, levinas is rejecting husserl’s notion of a transcendental ego whose contact with the world is first and foremost an “objectifying relation” “mediated through representation”.54 the objectifying vision of the ego through representation precludes the appearance of the other as a genuinely other to the self. but 97ryan c. urbano in the level of sensibility, the presence of the other is strongly felt and he is regarded with esteem and warm affection.55 peperzak makes an interesting remark on the significance of sensibility. he explains that “the importance of levinas’s description of sensibility lies in its overcoming the old dualism of body and spirit. in enjoying the world, i am a body that feels itself as an affected and affective, corporeal and sensitive i, not as a disincarnate, invisible, or ethereal consciousness”.56 though sensibility, like representation, is reflexive and incorporates the other to itself, levinas thinks that the ethical encounter between the self and the other is principally in the sensible level of experience before it is raised to consciousness. the poverty of the other wounds and painfully affects the ego at the level of sensibility rather than cognition. for levinas, the ego does not rise above the world as it seems in husserl’s transcendental ego. it has a body which assigns it to inhabit the world. through the body, the ego labors in order to satisfy its needs. the body, having needs, is the ego’s way of overcoming the alterity of what the ego lives from. “for a body that labors everything is not already accomplished, already done; thus to be a body is to have time in the midst of the facts, to be me though living in the other”.57 levinas thinks that when the ego first relates with alterity, it does so not on the cognitive level but in the immediacy of bodily contact and experience. the body for levinas is indigent and naked, and as such it derives nourishment from the world it inhabits. the body however is not an instrument that the ego uses in order to satisfy its needs. it is not like other things because it is the ego incarnating itself in the world. the ego as a body is already concretely involved in the world before it affirms and represents the world.58 the ego as “living from” exhibits its dependence on the things in the world. although as enjoyment, the ego, like a leibnizian windowless monad, has acquired independence and mastery of the world, it also relies on the world in the sense that its enjoyment is conditioned by it. the ego can only enjoy what is made available to it by the world. while it is true for example that in the enjoyment of food, sunlight, fresh air, shelter, etc., the ego becomes nourished, warm and healthy, and thus gains independence and self-sufficiency, it is also determined by the world in the sense that its identity is constituted by it. levinas calls this “mastery in this dependence”.59 hence, the ego is a master and a slave of what it lives 98 prajna vihara~ from.60 it was explained above that the ego needs to fill its lack or emptiness by appropriating things in the there is. it finds enjoyment in doing such activity. in spite of the ego’s happiness and enjoyment, it is still disturbed, haunted by the rumbling and horror of the there is. according to peperzak, “sensibility is an incurable unrest dependent on the contingencies of a future that remains uncertain. after moments of happiness, in which we feel no care, the menaces of the world come back”.61 as one which has sensibility, the ego still finds its happiness insecure. though the ego finds enjoyment in the elemental, yet its happiness lies in assimilating what is other than itself and never of itself. levinas calls this “an enchainment to self, the very enchainment of identification”.62 enjoyment, although it manifests the freedom and independence of the ego, is still an insufficiency, an independence based on dependence.63 the ego is menaced by the insecurity and anxiety posed by the there is. and so it takes a slice or piece from the elemental in order to build its own home and accumulate possessions through labor.64 “labor” for levinas “recoups the lag between the element and the sensation”.65 it “can surmount the indigence with which not need, but the uncertainty of the future affects being”.66 the ego, confronted by the uncertainty of the future, withdraws in a dwelling in order to find security and stability. this is what levinas calls inhabitation and economy.67 this is the economy of existence where things are ingested to the “establishment and maintenance of a house or home”.68 hence, “the ‘law’ (nomos) of ego’s ‘home’ (oikos) rules the universe”.69 for the ego to escape the horror of existence it must acquire mastery through possession, recollection and representation of the things in the world by extending its domain in and dominion over them. “possession masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future of the element-its independence, its being”.70 consciousness arises as a consequence of planning and annexing things, which actually refers to the ego’s economic activities, in order to find security in the future and allay disquietude.71 the indeterminacy of the there is from which the ego arises causes the ego to think and reflect about its own being. “the indetermination of the future alone brings insecurity to need, indigence: the perfidious elemental gives itself while escaping”.72 “hence the subject contemplating a world presupposes the event of dwelling, the withdrawal from the ele99ryan c. urbano ments (that is, from immediate enjoyment, already uneasy about the morrow), recollection in the intimacy of the home”.73 without a home, the ego has no orientation and is drowned in the there is.74 from the above discussion regarding the notion of the self as enjoyment, levinas is moving beyond husserl in terms of prioritizing sensibility over representation. while husserl emphasizes the intentional character of consciousness that founds subjectivity, levinas rules this out saying that consciousness “is not the ultimate legitimation of subjectivity” and subordinates this to the intentional character of sensibility, which translates to responsibility for the other.75 this prepares him for his phenomenology of the other, the existence of whom is encountered in sensibility. in his otherwise than being, levinas reinterprets and extends further this notion of sensibility to a point where it is now understood as contact with the other’s skin and proximity. there is now a deepening of the meaning from a notion of sensibility which allows the self to appropriate in the immediacy of the sensuous elements such as light, air, water, food, etc. to a notion where the self is now construed as sensitivity to the needs of the other. in other words, sensibility in totality and infinity is understood within the context of interiority and enjoyment while in otherwise than being, sensibility is construed as the self’s openness, embodied exposure, disposal, subjection, vulnerability, passivity and susceptibility towards alterity. the former notion of sensibility prepares for the latter notion since a self which does not enjoy and does not experience pain and suffering cannot be ethical or become responsible for the other. as levinas says, “only a being who eats can be for the other”.76 a being who knows and experiences misery is vulnerable to the miseries of others. levinas’s discussion of the interiority of the self presages the approach of the other from a dimension of height. the self, while enraptured by its delight of the world, cannot avoid the presence of the other. though the self is solitary and independent, it is suddenly confronted by the comportment of the other who challenges his autonomous existence. levinas’s phenomenology of the self as interiority and economy is part of his strategy to leave the climate of heidegger’s thinking of being. levinas says: “to be i is to exist in such a way as to be already beyond being, in happiness”.77 levinas maintains that no real ethical relationship is possible if the 100 prajna vihara~ ego and the other are not separate. “separation . . . . is solitude, and enjoyment__happiness or unhappiness__is isolation itself”.78 “egoism, en joyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension of interiority__the articulations of separation__are necessary for the idea of infinity, the relation with the other which opens forth from the separated and finite being”.79 levinas’s phenomenology of the self as enjoyment, as interiority, is necessary in order to punctuate the independence of the ego from any form of totalization. unlike hegel’s philosophy where the self is a moment of and subsumed under an absolute self, which to levinas’s judgment is simply a neuter term that neutralizes alterity, the self as interiority is sovereign and master of his own dwelling. only through the self’s independence can levinas establish the ethical relation between the self and the other without constituting a totality. for levinas, the egoism of the ego is important for the possibility of ethical metaphysics. egoism should rather be viewed as separation of desire and the desired so as to maintain the claim that the desired does not fulfill desire but deepens it. in levinas’s mind, desire provokes the ego to the elusive other. egoism, however, must not also be construed as an opposition to the other or else this opposition assumes a neutral standpoint which would form a “totality encompassing the same and the other”.80 levinas describes the egoism of the ego as “an incomparable unicity; it is outside of the community of genus and form, and does not find any rest in itself either, unquiet, not coinciding with itself”.81 hence, man is a unicity which recoils from being or essence. subjectivity and the face of the other: responsibility to-and-forthe-other this section gives an account of the notion of the other who appears, confronts and challenges the egoism of the self-same. the self, in its encounter with the other, becomes cognizant of the infinity of the other. as infinite, the other lies beyond the range of the self’s synthesizing gaze. levinas asked: “but how can the same, produced as egoism, enter into a relationship with an other without immediately divesting it of its alterity?”82 it was seen in the previous section that the ego is naturally egoistic, with101ryan c. urbano drawing and seeking refuge into a home it constructs in order to shelter itself from the dubious future and anonymous being. if this is so, then how is responsibility for the other induced in the self as basically solitary, egoist, blind and “entirely deaf to the other?”83 how can a monadic ego truly encounter another person?84 here, levinas proffers an ethical subject who is neither master, virile, sovereign nor autonomous but one who is a dedicated and generous servant to his fellow human being. he defends a selfless and affective subject who, by being faced by the other, is summoned to sacrifice and give up his comfort and even his life for the sake of the other. his notion of a subject whose identity is formed by obsessive responsibility for the other supplants the hegemonic subject reduced to consciousness by western philosophy. “the reduction of subjectivity to consciousness”, levinas observes, “dominates philosophical thought, which since hegel has been trying to overcome the duality of being and thought, by identifying, under different figures, substance and subject”.85 ethics as critique of the freedom and hegemony of the self. the ego’s self-absorption, its being at home and solitary in the world, is interrupted and opened up by the presence and approach of the other. levinas succinctly puts it this way: “the presence of the other is equivalent to this calling into question of my joyous possession of the world”.86 he names as ethics this state of affair where the other thwarts the self’s enjoyment and freedom.87 he construes ethics not merely as a theoretical and norm-giving discipline. he does not also understand it as a theory based on “rationalist self-legislation and freedom (deontology), the calculation of happiness (utilitarianism), or the cultivation of virtues (virtue ethics)”.88 likewise, he does not think that ethics must be founded on “altruistic will, instinct of ‘natural benevolence’ or love” because this would imply that they are attributes inherent in the subject and this runs contrary to the self's egoistic nature.89 for levinas, the subjectivity of the self is shaped by and within the matrix of the ethical relation. hence, ethics is more of a “face to face” meeting between the self and other, where the latter, as an almost overwhelming presence (which levinas calls ‘the other in the same’), stands as a critique of the “liberty, spontaneity and cognitive enterprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to itself”.90 as a critique, ethics always keeps vigil of the possible threat posed by totalizing philosophical systems and the ways of life these systems en102 prajna vihara~ gender. it will see to it that the relation between the self and the other is not subsumed under a unifying and mediating principle which issues from and still prioritizes the sovereign ego. levinasian ethics also stresses the urgency and compelling responsibility that the self must immediately assume as a result of its passivity for the other. this ethical exigency is enkindled by the other’s proximity to the self. levinas criticizes previous ethical theories because they are preoccupied with matters concerning the validity and the justification of moral standards. these theories seem to overlook the necessity of responding immediately to the ethical demand exhibited by the other. more importantly, these ethical theories hinge on human reason or freedom which, according to levinas, tends to lapse into or even encourage egoism and eventually violence. moreover, levinas’s ethics sheds light on the problem raised by some ethicists since hume that the ought (moral obligation) cannot be derived from the is (fact). viewed from within levinas’s ethics, this problem does not yet exist since it dwells on the plane of consciousness. ethics for levinas is prior to theoretical philosophy. it is “the immediate experience of another’s emergence” which “contains the root of all possible ethics as well as the source from which all insights of theoretical philosophy should start”.91 the presence of the other, according to levinas, makes the ego feel guilty and ashamed. but this culpability, as will be shown later in this section, does not necessarily obliterate the ego, for such effacing would constitute violence. for levinas, the other is the unexpected visitor or stranger who shakes and disturbs “the being at home with oneself”.92 the epiphany of the other makes the ego ask whether in his happy existence, in his “being-in-the-world” or “place in the sun”, he is not depriving the other of his own rightful place in the world whom he has “already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world”.93 unlike other beings, the other defies representation in thought and thus cannot be assimilated into the ego’s world (as in husserl’s transcendental constitution). the other rather awakens the self to its real authentic existence-a life anchored in the ethical relation referred to by levinas as metaphysical desire. the revelation of the other poses a challenge to the ego’s monadic existence and its power to engulf things outside of its own milieu. the other represents an excess to thought, a transcendence and a “good beyond being”. it is not a phenomenon falling within the noesis-noematic 103ryan c. urbano phenomenological schema but an enigma, an entity that surprises and addresses the self that wallows in its complacent existence in the world.94 he signifies an unreachable height that commands and demands infinite and unconditional responsibility. levinas says that the presence of the other is the ego’s source of meaning, liberating it from its previously egoistic existence. in an interview, levinas enunciates the following: “my ethical relation of love for the other stems from the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of sameness”.95 this is because the other is the heart of the same, the very psyche of the soul of the self.96 the very structure of the self is its responsibility for the other. the self is “one-for the other”. if the other is the heart of the self, the self is the lung and support of the other. exposure. the ego finds its life weighed down by the there is unless it answers the ethical claim of the other. it suffers from “ennui, that is, from enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological way of identity”, failing to open its home and offer it to the other.97 the self, in its effort “to be” (or as conatus essendi), will become restless if it keeps on “equalizing difference” or otherness to itself.98 this uneasiness or anguish however is due neither to the self's preoccupation with itself nor to its “existential ‘being-for-death’”, but due to its exposure and proximity to the other which levinas describes as “the anguish of contraction and breakup”.99 levinas explains: this contraction is not an impossibility to forget oneself, to detach oneself from oneself, in the concern for oneself. it is a recurrence to oneself out of an irrecusable exigency of the other, a duty overflowing my being, a duty becoming a debt and an extreme passivity prior to the tranquility, still quite relative, in the inertia and materiality of things at rest. it is a restlessness and patience that support prior to action and passion. here what is due goes beyond having, but makes giving possible. this recurrence is incarnation. in it the body which makes giving possible makes one other without alienating.100 104 prajna vihara~ for levinas, hypostasis__the emergence of the self from anonymous being__is exposure to the other.101 and this exposure so strikes the self that it returns and contracts to itself, feeling the weight of responsibility inflamed by the other. exposure is the “risky uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability”.102 the recurrence of the self is not a process of self-conscious activity where consciousness reaches out to external objects and returns to itself fully aware of its own being.103 this is hegel’s philosophical project. rather, this recurrence is an assignation where the self’s responsibility for the other is unique and irreplaceable. the intentional nature of the self to grasp what is other than itself is deflected by the human other (or what levinas calls the ‘inversion of intentionality’)104 and goes to affect the very core of the self and prompts him to acknowledge and respect that which it cannot be integrated into its being. levinas makes use of a variety of terms to describe this condition where the other affects the nucleus of the self. he says that the self is hostage, disturbed, interrupted, traumatized, beleaguered, persecuted, deposed, besieged, assailed, expelled, stripped, dislodged, attached, exposed, denuded, defeated, extradited, deported and subjugated.105 all these can be summed up in a central theme in his second major work (otherwise than being): namely, substitution. in otherwise than being, levinas now sets up the precedence of the notion of a subject being affected in its passivity and susceptibility by the other over the notion of a subject in totality and infinity as first and foremost sensuous and jouissance. the subject in the earlier work seeks to escape from the there is in order to constitute itself as a subject that enjoys its immersion in the world. but in the second major work, it is alterity or the other that makes the ego recoil to itself in order to assume responsibility not only for itself but for the entire universe.106 the ego is made to bear the weight of the world upon its shoulder like atlas in greek mythology. this is then the origin of his infinite responsibility to the other. as will be explained in the paragraphs that will follow, the self is singled out, the reason of which it knows not, to put himself in the place of the other (substitution) and to act as the very breath of his life. the face of the other. levinas argues that the other discloses himself as a face. the face is the “way in which the other presents himself, 105ryan c. urbano exceeding the idea of the other in me”.107 “the face approaches with a glance, a word, a gesture or a movement of the whole body. it addresses, expresses an appeal to, and makes demands of the self”.108 the other, which reveals himself as a face, touches the self to the very core of its being. the look of the other pierces the heart of the self so that the self cannot evade the other’s call for help, generosity and sacrifice. this look is the look of the poor, the orphan and the widow that begs for mercy and compassion. the presence of the other that strikes the very being of the self levinas would call passivity, affectivity, vulnerability, persecution and trauma. some of these themes would be elaborated later in this section. the self encounters the face in sensible experience but it also transcends that experience.109 the face of the other is not a phenomenon that can be turned into an object of representation. it is not the physical face that one sees because it is beyond perception and cognition. the other as the face is not exposed to the thematizing gaze of the self but approaches the self from outside its horizon. the other appears not according to the self’s initiative or illumination but according to its own light.110 “the relation with the face is not an object-cognition. the transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this world into which it enters, the exiling [depaysement] of a being, his condition of being stranger, destitute, or proletarian”.111 thus, as someone who appears outside of the self's vision, world, home and horizon, the status of the other is then “absolute”. he is not limited or confined by the self’s synthesizing knowledge because he absolves from it. he continually slips away from the self's intellectual grasp. and as such, he is homeless, a total stranger who deserves to be taken care of. the other is also not just a mere exteriority which lies outside of the self; the other “approaches me not from outside but from above”.112 for this reason, the other is not wholly in the ego’s site but he is transcendent.113 although the face is opaque to physical and intellectual vision, it is nevertheless the living presence and expression of the other who continually unmakes and eludes the thematization of the same. “the face is a living presence; it is expression. the life of expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as theme, is thereby dissimulated”.114 precisely as expression, the face defies the power of the self to contain the other in its thought, for the other “is incessantly and infinitely 106 prajna vihara~ withdrawing and surpassing its revelations”.115 the face reveals, and so the self wants to make it present in its consciousness. and yet the more the self attempts to represent it, the more it withdraws. this impossibility of catching up manifests the infinity and radical alterity of the other. the face of the other evinces indigence and defenselessness and so it begs and summons the self to deeds of kindness and generosity. and because the face expresses misery and helplessness, the face of the other commands the self to respond by doing something to relieve the other of his suffering. paradoxically, this command makes the other lord and master in his frailty. “the other qua other is situated in a dimension of height and of abasement__glorious abasement; he has the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, and, at the same time of the master called to invest and justify my freedom”.116 as levinas describes: this gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate only because it demands, deprived of everything because entitled to everything, and which one recognizes in giving (as one “puts the things in question in giving”)__this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face. the nakedness of the face is destituteness. to recognize the other is to recognize a hunger. to recognize the other is to give. but it is to give to the master, to the lord, to whom one approaches as “you” in a dimension of height.117 for levinas, the epiphany of the other evokes a command: “you shall not commit murder”.118 it is the first ethical injunction as soon as the self encounters the other. levinas claims that the ego cannot assimilate, absorb and comprehend the other in the same way it negates the nonhuman other.119 the ego can only negate the non-human other partially; otherwise, it cannot enjoy what it assimilates completely.120 the ego cannot totally absorb the nonhuman other. it partially preserves and neutralizes the otherness of the nonhuman other in order to absorb it. in the case of the human other, it is the only being that the ego can kill because it resists total annihilation or negation.121 though by reducing the other to the same, the other may be murdered and the command defied, but before this horrible act can be done, the other already orders the prohibi107ryan c. urbano tion of murder. murder, to levinas’s mind, is the self’s refusal to recognize and respect the radical alterity of the other. it is the utter disregard of the other’s paralyzing power over the self’s power to annihilate. as levinas explains: to kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. murder exercises a power over what escapes power. . . . i can wish to kill only an existent which is absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely and therefore does not oppose them but paralyses the very power of power. the other is the sole being i can wish to kill.122 the very reason why the other cannot be contained or integrated into the same is that only the other is the being whom the same wants to kill. the same cannot murder a being which easily succumbs to its wishes. but the other, as infinitely transcendent and infinitely foreign and one whom the same wishes to kill, cannot be annihilated by the murderous power of the self because it exceeds its powers infinitely.123 the other opposes and disarms the ego of his freedom, power and imperialism. as naked and destitute, the other poses a defiant stand against the ego’s sovereignty not with violent force but by its frailty. levinas describes it as a “resistance of what has no resistance__the ethical resistance”.124 it is a force of infinite transcendence “stronger than murder” and “convinces even ‘the people who do not wish to listen’”.125 to oppose power with power is to subscribe either to the hobbessian state of nature wherein man is at war with other men, the hegelian dialectics of master and slave relation where there is a struggle for recognition, or the sartrean notion of being-for-itself which culminates in absolute power, freedom and reason. in these three philosophies, the other is viewed as a threat to the ego’s existence. when seen within the levinasian ethical project, these three philosophies is “ethically dangerous” because it reduces the primordial ethical relation to that of struggle and war instead of welcome and peace.126 in totality and infinity, levinas says: “the whole of this work aims to show a relation with the other not only cutting across the logic of contradiction, where the other of a is the non-a, the negation 108 prajna vihara~ of a, but also across dialectical logic [hegel], where the same dialectically participates in and is reconciled with the other in the unity of the system”.127 furthermore, the other’s resistance is not only nonviolent but it also calls the ego to responsibility and invests it with freedom. it does not limit the freedom of the self because his freedom has not yet emerged. instead it promotes his freedom by arousing its goodness.128 as levinas says, the “absolutely other__the other__does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it”.129 election and passivity. levinas contends that the self’s responsibility to and for the other is already established prior to the self’s existence. the responsibility is already assigned before the self is born. the responsibility for the other does not only precede one’s birth but also one’s freedom and commitment. this is so because freedom “already presupposes a theoretical consciousness, as a possibility to assume, before or after the event, a taking up that goes beyond the susceptiveness of passivity”.130 for levinas, responsibility is placed on one’s shoulder from an immemorial past, “a past more ancient than every origin, a pre-original and anarchical past” and “a past more ancient than any present, a past which was never present”.131 this responsibility from an anarchical past is already assigned to the self in creation. the self is already created as an ethical being and its subjectivity is precisely this responsibility for the other. levinas says: “the miracle of creation lies in creating a moral being”.132 the subject was not created and then was given freedom in order to decide whether it should assume responsibility for the other or not. rather, its very subjectivity is its subjection to the other. being a creature, the self is “more passive than the passivity of matter” in the sense that it bears responsibility for the other from nothingness “before hearing the order”.133 passivity implies the vulnerability of the self to the other to the point of being accused, traumatized and persecuted. this means then that the self is not the cause and origin of responsibility. moreover, passivity also connotes that the self has “nothing at its disposal that would enable it to not yield to the provocation” and appeal of the other.134 the self is already singled out prior to its encounter with and even what is legally due to the other.135 peperzak has this to say about levinas’s passivity of the subject: 109ryan c. urbano this passivity without choice can only be thought of as patience and pain or suffering, for otherwise__as enjoyer__i would myself still be the focus and neither handed over nor dedicated to the other. my suffering must even be__at least partially__meaningless. for were i able to grasp its meaning, i would be able to integrate it into my consciousness in the form of some piece of knowledge.136 passivity implies accusation. the obligation imposed by the other on the self makes the self guilty. it is as if the self owes the other a debt without really incurring it. but this debt actually has its roots in the self's dependence on the other. since the other defines the subjectivity of the self as a “being-uniquely-responsible for the other”, it then follows that the self is indebted to the other.137 “my relation to the other”, james richard mensch poignantly describes, “individualizes me”.138 moreover, the responsibility of the self to the other increases to the measure in which the self fulfills this obligation. the self cannot really pay off the burden of its guilt. more is demanded of him than what he can accomplish. this is an accusation which the self does not deserve. this unearned accusation levinas calls persecution. the self is persecuted against his will. he is one who lives for the other and has no complete possession of his own life. all these can be summed up as substitution. in substitution, the self is totally responsible for the other, not only for the other’s misery but also for his crimes-even for the outrage that the other initiates against the suffering subject.139 levinas describes the passivity of the self to the other as maternity. “maternity in the complete being “for the other” which characterizes it . . . is the ultimate sense of this vulnerability”.140 this best describes the way the self bears and serves the other. like a mother, the self carries the other without thought of reward or reciprocity. it is purely giving, nourishing and sacrificing. the self nurtures the other in the same way that a mother selflessly takes care of her child. according to levinas, the other is ‘the first one on the scene’ and he orders the self even before the self recognizes him.141 prior to the self's awareness of the other, responsibility for the other is already firmly insti110 prajna vihara~ tuted as if the self is obsessed, persecuted, wounded, and accused by the other. the other already provokes and inflicts the self with responsibility before the self can respond either by acceptance or refusal. the self is singled out to serve the other and he is irreplaceable in his obligation to the other. it cannot renounce its irreplaceable responsibility because to do so would mean giving up its own being.142 its own being, it must be noted, is a result of its responsiveness to alterity. he is exposed and vulnerable to the other’s call for help. in a very touching expression, levinas says: in the exposure to wounds and outrages, in the feeling proper to responsibility, the oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without being able to resign, and thus incarnated in order to offer itself, to suffer and to give. it is thus one and unique, in passivity from the start, having nothing at its disposal that would enable it to not yield to the provocation. it is one, reduced to itself and as it were contracted, expelled into itself outside of being. the exile or refuge in itself is without conditions and support, far from the abundant covers and excuses which the essence exhibited in the said offers. in responsibility as one assigned or elected from the outside, assigned as irreplaceable, the subject is accused in its skin, too tight for its skin.143 this responsibility placed on the shoulder of the self before its birth is what levinas calls “unjustifiable election”. the self is chosen to take care of the other, the reason of which is oblivious to the self, except that the self’s “election is in the subjection.144 election refers to the self’s unforeseeable and singular or unique obligation to the other.145 it is the ‘good’, levinas says, that elects the self to serve the other. the good cannot become present or enter into a representation. the present is a beginning in my freedom, whereas the good is not presented to freedom; it has chosen me before i have chosen it. no one is good vol111ryan c. urbano untarily. we can see the formal structure of nonfreedom in a subjectivity which does not have time to choose the good and thus is penetrated with its rays unbeknownst to itself. but subjectivity sees this freedom redeemed, exceptionally, by the goodness of the good. the exception is unique. and if no one is good voluntarily, no one is enslaved to the good.146 for levinas, election is not a privilege but “the fundamental characteristic of the human person as morally responsible. responsibility . . . is a principle of individuation”.147 it is not the heideggerian anxiety over one’s death that singularizes the self but its assumption of responsibility instigated by the face of the other. being already chosen to be responsible for the other before one’s birth signifies not prestige but responsibility. the self must take up this challenge that gives worth and dignity to his being. subjectivity and substitution. for levinas, the subjectivity of the subject is its subjection to the other. the self is one-for-the other, built and structured to respond to another human being. this is what is precisely meant by the self's radical passivity to the other. once the other appears on the scene, the self is immediately responsible and no one can take his place. right there and then, the self is summoned to responsibility even to the point of substituting for the other. levinas writes: “i can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me. such is my inalienable identity of subject”.148 the self's irreplaceable substitution for the other, its being accused by the other is what, according to levinas, makes the self unique.149 this excessive responsibility of the self for the other, however, does not negate the identity of the self. it is not “a flight into the void, but a movement into fullness” which establishes the subjectivity, identity and unicity of the self.150 as levinas explains: it is, however, not an alienation, because the other in the same is my substitution of the other through responsibility, for which i am summoned as someone irreplaceable. i exist through the other and for the other, but without this being alienation: i am inspired.151 112 prajna vihara~ subjectivity for levinas is not primarily consciousness. the “appearance of being is not the ultimate legitimization of subjectivity”.152 as jeffrey kosky says, “the subject is not, finally, reducible to the field or the event wherein beings are deployed in their being.153 levinas remarks, “consciousness, knowing of the self by the self [savoir de soi par soi], is not all there is to the notion of subjectivity. it already rests on a ‘subjected’ condition” which is “the very sub-jection of the subject . . . obsessed with responsibility for the oppressed”.154 levinas rejects descartes’ central claim “i think, therefore i am” and replaces it with an accusative statement “here i am”.155 the latter expression signifies an unconditional offering of oneself to another. this means that the self as sensibility already encounters and is already affected by the other at the level of sensibility before the other becomes an object of consciousness.156 as critchley says, “the ethical relation takes place at the level of sensibility, not at the level of consciousness. the levinasian ethical subject is a sensible subject, not a conscious subject”.157 in fact, subjectivity is the other in the same. “the other in the same determinative of subjectivity is the restlessness of the same disturbed by the other”.158 furthermore, this subjectivity is a condition of being hostage to the other.159 the self as hostage does not only mean that the self must answer the call and satisfy the hunger of the other but it also implies that the self is responsible for the behavior and misdeeds of the other, including those acts that persecute other persons including the self.160 according to michele saracino, the term hostage is a powerful image for jews and christians alike, for one cannot help but think of the moments in which abraham’s son, isaac, and god’s son, jesus, are held hostage for others. importantly, these situations are not ones of simple exchange. it is . . . sacrifice . . . beyond a symmetrical substitution or equal trade.161 to be hostage to the other is a deposition that draws the self out of its home to meet and welcome the other even to the point of offering his comfort and life.162 the real meaning of subjectivity is subjection to the other.163 subjectivity is synonymous to responsibility. such responsibility is non-reciprocal or assymetrical. the self cannot demand from the 113ryan c. urbano other the same responsibility he gives to him. as such, responsibility is disinterested and non-transferable. no one can take the place of the self’s responsibility for the other.164 the subject, before it can form an image of the other, is already affected and shocked by the other’s presence. the outward movement of its consciousness in order to apprehend and possess the exterior is reverted by the other. before the ego can exercise its sovereign will, it is already persecuted by the other.165 for levinas, “the other individuates me in the responsibility i have for him”.166 this varies from heidegger’s notion of subjectivity because it is death that individuates dasein. the self’s responsibility for the other does not happen by chance; rather, it is placed in the subject and takes the form of an accusation. levinas says, “i have not done anything and i have always been under accusation__persecuted”.167 the self does not know the reason why, except that from the very beginning he is already de-posed from his home as a subject. “it is a withdrawal in-oneself which is an exile in oneself, without a foundation in anything else, a non-condition. the withdrawal excludes all spontaneity, and is thus always already effected, already past”.168 for levinas, the form that the subject’s subjection to the other assumes is that of sensibility or sentience. this sensibility is a vulnerability and passivity towards the other. sensibility is proximity to the other and it is the foundation of intentionality.169 hence, for levinas the self is an embodied subject capable of being affected and vulnerable to the needs and sufferings of the other. as critchley describes: “the ethical subject is an embodied being of flesh and blood, a being that is capable of hunger, who eats and who enjoys eating”.170 for levinas, responsibility is concrete. the self is incarnated so that it can support the material needs of the other. the self in hypostasis builds a home in order to welcome and play host to the stranger who knocks at the door. as levinas explains, sensibility has meaning only as a “taking care of the other’s need”, of his misfortunes and his faults, that is, as a giving. but giving has meaning only as a tearing from oneself despite oneself, and not only without me. and to be torn from oneself despite oneself has meaning only as a being torn 114 prajna vihara~ from complacency in oneself characteristic of enjoyment, snatching the bread from one’s mouth. only a subject that eats can be for-the-other, or can signify.171 the intimate relation between the self and other is what levinas calls proximity. levinas describes proximity in the following way: proximity is thus anarchically a relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ideality. . . . the relationship of proximity cannot be reduced to any modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, nor to the simple “representation” of a neighbor; it is already an assignation, an extremely urgent assignation__an obligation, anachronously prior to any commitment. . . . this formula expresses a way of being affected without the source of affection becoming a theme of representation. we have called this relationship irreducible to consciousness obsession.172 in other words, proximity, although it puts into contact the self and the other, does not reduce the contact into a union where the independence or separation of both is annihilated. it is a difference which is “non-indifference”.173 this explains why levinas calls the other as the stranger because he is outside of the ego’s intentional grasp and a neighbor because he touches the very sensibility of the self. one’s responsibility for the other, according to levinas, is not motivated by a debt the former owes to the latter. such a motivation manifests the ego’s need to persist in his being. the motivation is not intrinsic but extrinsic to the self although the other as the infinite is already in the finite self.174 what the other does is that it awakens the self to its responsibility. but this awakening is “produced concretely in the form of an irresistible call to responsibility”.175 this concrete responsibility means “to give, to-be-for-another, despite oneself, but in interrupting the foroneself, is to take the bread out of one’s mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one’s own fasting”.176 as already noted above, levinas says that the infinite is already 115ryan c. urbano contained in a thought that exceeds and cannot contain it. the prefix “in” of infinite both signifies that the infinite is inside the finite self as well as outside of it.177 how is this possible? the infinite is already in the finite because, as already explained, somebody from an immemorial past placed it there. the self is already made responsible to other prior to its creation or birth. the infinite is at the same time outside of the finite self because the self is not the reason or the cause of the infinite other’s existence. the infinite other is in fact the reason for the finite self's being. it must be remembered that the subjectivity of the subject is its subjection to the other. it is the other that constitutes the very subjectivity of the self, a subjectivity that is “a passivity more passive than all passivity”. thus, the self is passive and vulnerable to the disturbance of the other. this passivity and vulnerability, however, is not tranquility because it is a passivity and vulnerability of a hostage.178 the self’s responsibility to the other, just like desire, is infinite and insatiable. it is infinite because the more the ego responds to the other, the more the responsibility deepens. as levinas says, “the debt increases in the measures that it is paid”.179 levinas quotes dostoyevsky in the brothers karamazov to stress this point: “each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and for everything, and i more than the others”.180 for levinas the relation between the self and the other is not reciprocal but asymmetrical. the self’s responsibilities to the other is not equal to the responsibilities of the other to the same. to construe the relation as reciprocal would place both in the same category or genus which implies a totality. reciprocity is equality and this makes both sides of the equation identical. such identity is not ethical but ontological. the asymmetrical relation between the self and the other is due to the self's irreplaceable substitution (or unicity) for the other. the self can substitute for the other but no one can substitute him in his responsibility for the other. the self alone bears this responsibility upon himself and cannot place this burden on others. the self's responsibility is unique and nontransferable. for this reason, levinas argued that responsibility is excessive, infinite and irreplaceable. as such, the responsible self cannot demand the same amount of responsibility from the other. to do so, levinas says, “would be to preach human sacrifice” and it is “criminal”.181 one’s responsibility cannot be universalized (as in kant) otherwise the respon116 prajna vihara~ sible self would just be something abstract and not a concrete one. the responsible subject is “me”, unique and particularly elected to respond the approach of the other. the other’s destitution makes the self question its own existence as regards his contribution to the other’s misery even if the self is not directly and consciously involved. this shows how powerful the other is despite his weakness. in the face of the other, the self’s freedom is questioned and he is summoned to surrender it in order to preserve it. but this relinquishment of freedom is not in line with hobbes’ (and, to a certain extent, hegel’s) conception where individual freedom is subordinated to the state. such a renunciation is self-serving because one gives up one’s liberty in order to have peace and consequently preserve one’s being. as peperzak explains: the incentive to peace remains selfish-striving toward a secure life in mutual exchange with other humans. the self-interested repression of violence secures rational coherence and association. reason and politics fight every possible anarchy.182 levinas thinks that this notion of freedom subordinated to the ideals of the state is bound to create trouble and violence because it is not grounded on a selfless or disinterested ethical relation. for him, freedom is given up not to the abstract goals of the state but to the other who is concrete. in this sense, the freedom of the self is not dissolved into a blind acquiescence to an anonymous power as in heidegger, which is still a vestige of ontology. language and proximity. the ethical relation between the self and the other is not a perceptual or visual encounter. instead, it is a linguistic event.182 the other who discloses himself as the face levinas designates as “primordial expression” or language whose first word is “you shall not commit murder”.184 the face is not something that the self sees but someone to whom it speaks. this close encounter and contact between the self and the other through language, levinas names proximity. proximity is the pre-original approach of the other that establishes non-cognitive and non-spatial intimacy of the self with the other. it is 117ryan c. urbano non-cognitive because the ethical encounter takes place at the level of sense and affective experience. it is also non-spatial because it preserves the distance between the two. otherwise, this relation is reduced into a unity or synthesis which constitutes a totality. the face as expression or language is a signification that signifies an ethical command. his presence speaks the language of an ethical appeal, of prayer or supplication.185 the other beseeches the self to recognize and respect him. this in turn instigates the self to express the language of greeting, a “hello” which signifies a blessing and availability.186 the self is beckoned to offer himself and say “here i am”. through language, the other opens and offers himself to the self. the other who approaches communicates to the self and this touches the self’s sensibility. in language, the self finds that it cannot assimilate the other in its world. the self discovers through language that he does not inhabit the world alone and that there are others who also share this world with him. language is the place where different worlds come together. hence, it becomes the birthplace as well as the matrix of the ethical relation. for levinas, language “announces the ethical inviolability of the other”.187 its essence is hospitality and goodness.188 as an ethical event, language welcomes the other. the following lines from totality and infinity best capture this notion of language as ethical and therefore communal: language is universal because it is the very passage from the individual to the general, because it offers things which are mine to the other. to speak is to make the world common, to create commonplaces. language does not refer to the generality of concepts, but lays the foundations for a possession in common. it abolishes the inalienable property of enjoyment. the world in discourse is no longer what is in separation, in the being at home with oneself where everything is given to me; it is what i give: the communicable, the thought, the universal.189 when levinas claims that the face is language and speech, the kind of language he refers to is the primordial expression he calls saying. this is non-thematizing and non-violent language prior to conceptualization 118 ~prajna vihara~ and philosophizing. conceptual and discursive language levinas calls the said. it is the language that dominates western philosophy. hence, language “as saying is an ethical openness to the other; as that which is said__reduced to a fixed identity or synchronized presence__it is an ontological closure to the other”.190 in language, the one who is usually given attention is the subject who speaks and the content of his words, the said. the other, the person spoken to, takes secondary importance. moreover, “in the realm of the said, the speaker assigns meanings to objects and ideas”.191 this is a process which identifies, names, or labels things. levinas challenges this view of language by reversing it so as to emphasize the other. for him language does not only disclose being or represent things, but it also solicits concern.192 “the activity of speaking robs the subject of its central position; it is the depositing of a subject without refuge. the speaking subject is no longer by and for itself; it is for the other”.193 levinas insists that the said should be referred back to the saying; otherwise the self would overlook its “essential exposure to the other without which there would be neither utterance nor meaning”.194 he says: antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it [saying] is the proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of signification.195 for levinas, the saying is what conditions the possibility of the said.196 it is saying which exposes the self “to the other as a speaker or receiver of discourse”.197 it is the site where contact with the other takes place because it “uncovers the one that speaks, not as an object disclosed by theory, but in the sense that one discloses oneself by neglecting one’s defenses, leaving a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to insults and wounding”.198 moreover, saying does not only expose the self to the other but it also assigns the former to the latter. saying is an assignation, an encounter, where the self is separated from its inwardness and is exposed towards the other. thus, the self is de-posed or de-situated from its interiority because “the saying tears the ego from its lair”.199 119ryan c. urbano the said, on the other hand, thematizes saying. it is the verbalization of being, which is the realm of ontology.200 the said, according to levinas, betrays saying because it transforms the ethical contact of the self with the other into a theme or object of knowledge.201 once the ethical relation becomes an object of thought, the other is no longer treated as absolute alterity and this denies the justice and respect due to him. for levinas, the said could not exhaust the meaning of saying. saying always overflows the said. and yet, levinas argues, it is only through the said that one can have access to and express saying.202 thus the said is indispensable since without it there would be no philosophy.203 also, without the said, no society, justice, judgment or moral norms would be possible.204 the saying and the said occur at different temporal levels. the realm of the saying is diachronic time where the self encounters the other prior to its synchronizing and thematizing vision. diachronic time is the realm of transcendence and infinity. it is time outside of husserlian phenomenology where the past is gathered into the simultaneity of the present by retention (or memory) and the future by protention (or hope). most importantly, it is also the time where the self as passivity and sensibility is opened to the ethical supplication demanded by the face of the other. happening in a different temporal plane, is the realm of the said. this realm is synchronic time where the other is represented as a theme in the mind of the ego. here, the other loses its singularity or uniqueness because it is reduced into a general concept. synchronic time is the realm of totality and immanence. it is the time of being where beings or entities become manifest and where they are gathered together by a synthetic vision (of retention or protention) that reduces them to concepts and themes or a said. the importance of the distinction levinas makes between saying and the said could be seen in the issue that derrida raises in his essay violence and metaphysics205 against levinas’s reliance on ontological language to propound an ethical metaphysics.206 derrida points to the contradiction implicit in levinas’s thought because in describing the other as infinite, for example, levinas makes use of inherited philosophical language.207 simmons succinctly explains it this way: 120 prajna vihara~ levinas who desires to replace ontology with ethics, relies, at least in totality and infinity, on terms which are permeated with ontological connotations such as ‘being’, ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘in-finite’. in other words, levinas cannot transcend the philosophical tradition because he is using its language.208 this language does violence to the other because it assimilates alterity into the ego. “since language is thematizing, violent, and appropriative, our first encounter with the other will be thematizing, violent and appropriative. thus, the first relationship is not ethical”.209 in other words, levinas cannot escape the very language he attempts to overcome. if the other is unthematizable and oblivious to thought, then philosophical language is impossible. but levinas answers that the original approach of the other is a saying which, when stated in propositions (said), betrays the ethical encounter. the ethical encounter happens in a diachronic time where the self strongly feels the weight of the other’s ethical plea. although the said is indispensable because it is necessary for order, law and justice, the saying must be preserved because it is the heart of ethical relations. there should be a constant unsaying or deconstruction of the said in order to allow the saying to “circulate as residue or interruption within the said” and avoid the complete reduction of the otherwise than being to ontological language.210 this movement from the said to the saying, which should be the task of ethics as first philosophy, point to a beginning where the subject, prior to the birth of his consciousness as well as his freedom, is exposed to the other, capable of being affected by and therefore respond to the other’s ethical appeal.211 as levinas would say: “saying is to be responsible for others”.212 the heideggerian play of unconcealment and concealment is a dialectic that still belongs to ontology (or being) and hence, of synchronic time. in order to break away from this dialectics of perpetual uncovering of the unsaid from the said, levinas redirects philosophical questioning from repeatable time to an immemorial time of the saying where the said is constantly examined and re-examined so as to bear witness to the infinite and transcendence. skepticism. at this point it is significant to introduce the role skep121ryan c. urbano ticism plays in the philosophy of levinas. skepticism, according to levinas, is philosophy’s “legitimate child”.213 the history of western philosophy has shown that skepticism periodically recurs and this, according to levinas, indicates that philosophy cannot exhaust the truth about everything. levinas says: philosophy is not separable from skepticism, which follows it like a shadow it drives off by refuting it again at once on its footsteps. does not the last word belong to philosophy? yes, in a certain sense, since for western philosophy the saying is exhausted in this said. but skepticism in fact makes a difference, and puts an interval between saying and the said. skepticism is refutable but it returns.214 indeed, skepticism cannot escape its contradictory assertion but it performs an important role by constantly reminding philosophy of its ethical origin and task which is to continually unsay what has been said. it redirects philosophy to a transcendent (diachronic) time where alterity and infinity is otherwise than being. as levinas says: “skepticism, which traverses the rationality or logic of knowledge, is a refusal to synchronize the implicit affirmation contained in saying and the negation which this affirmation states in the said”.215 the skeptic’s claim that truth is not possible is refuted at the level of logic and rationality because the assertion implies that it is not possible that truth is not possible. but it is precisely this sphere of thought which skepticism attacks and this spares skepticism from the refutation. the contradictory remarks of skepticism are only contradictory in the realm of the logical said but not so in the skeptical saying.216 the periodic recurrence of skepticism in the history of western thought, according to levinas, would just be “pure nonsense” if its critique of the said is to be refuted under the auspices of logical thought since skepticism inhabits in and judges from the realm of the saying.217 the approach of the other as saying cannot be totally congealed in a said for the other continually recedes from synchrony and thematization. levinas is not saying that the skeptic’s claim is true. what he 122 prajna vihara~ means, according to peperzak, is that the ‘truth’ that attempts to pronounce itself in skepticism is rather the necessity…of recalling (deèdire) the said, and of replacing it by a new saying (redire) that is just as little a final saying as the previous one was. the enigma of transcendence, which can never become evident, does not come into its own by synoptic expositions in which time stands still but only by continual attempts through new speeches to rectify the unavoidable contradictions of speaking.218 the third party. for levinas, the ethical or face to face relation is not merely a private or exclusive affair between the self and the other.219 the face as expression and as language opens up to the rest of humanity which levinas calls the third party.220 the third party is the neighbor of the self’s neighbor and represents every person. he is the neighbor of every other. the third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow. . . . the other stands in a relationship with the third party, for whom i cannot entirely answer, even if i alone answer, before any question, for my neighbor. the other and the third party, my neighbors, contemporaries of one another, put distance between me and the other and the third party. . . . it [third party] is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: what do i have to do with justice? a question of consciousness. justice is necessary, that is, comparison, co-existence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in the intentionality and intellect, the intelligibility of a system and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as before a court of justice.221 123ryan c. urbano the emergence of the third party which is revealed in the face of the other disturbs the intimacy and asymmetrical relationship between the self and the other. this is so because the third party demands for justice. the neighbor and the third party simultaneously call to and demand for responsibility from the other. it is the third party which prompts the self to weigh, evaluate, compare, calculate and think which for him needs most his attention and service. the arrival of the third party is the inception of justice, symmetry, philosophy and law. it is the third party that divides the attention of the self. if there were only the self and the neighbor, then there would have been no problem, for in this situation the self has undivided attention for the other. but the surfacing of the third party limits the self’s unbounded care for the other and poses problems as regards priority as well as the nature of relationship between the other and the third party. because of the third, the self now becomes a judge for he must compare, calculate, correct, order and treat others as equals. this now necessitates the rational organization of society and the creation of laws in order to carry out justice. the entry of the third legitimizes the state, politics and philosophy. it corrects the asymmetry in the relation of the self and the other. it also upholds the welfare of the self because his responsibility is no longer solely for others but also for himself since he is also a neighbor to others.222 to be sure . . . my responsibility for all can and has to manifest itself also in limiting itself. the ego can, in the name of this unlimited responsibility, be called upon to concern itself also with itself. the fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought, consciousness, justice and philosophy.223 conclusion: ethics as beyond nature or ontology and towards god this final section will discuss the movement of the ethical relation between the same and the other towards transcendence. levinas names 124 prajna vihara~ this ethical bond religion.224 religion presupposes an ethics that points in the direction of god. it is an ethical proximity that manifests god’s presence. in this proximity, god leaves only a trace which cannot be traced at all since it redirects the self to his responsibility to the other. “divinity”, william paul simmons writes, “is experienced through the trace”.225 levinas asserts that “the dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face”.226 he says that “the other is not the incarnation of god, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which god is revealed”.227 god therefore is revealed in the human face as the good beyond being and yet the human face is not god’s embodiment. “the alterity of the face ‘points’ to god’s transcendence, but without being its incarnation, symbol, or self-expression”.228 god instead leaves a trace in the face of the other person whose face summons the self to responsibility. what levinas is saying is that ethics provides an opening towards the divine because the other “resembles god” and he is “closer to god than i”.229 ethics, in the words of cohen as he interprets levinas, is the “authentic entry” to god.230 it leads to a vision of god because “responsibility”, as kosky elucidates, “would be the image of god in man”.231 but this vision is “without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation of intentionality of wholly different type”.232 this “relation of intentionality of a wholly different type” is not the husserlian noesis-noematic correlation, but the intentionality of desire inflamed by the ethical appeal of the other. for levinas, god is only accessible through responsibility for the other. god as infinite is refractory to human thought. he cannot become an object of conscious representation. as levinas remarks: “there is witness . . . only of the infinite. the infinite does not appear to him that bears witness to it. on the contrary, the witness belongs to the glory of the infinite. it is by the voice of the witness that the glory of the infinite is glorified”.233 for levinas, the self who is addressed by the other through his ethical appeal bears witness to divine transcendence. the self’s responsibility to the other is the living testimony of god’s presence. as wyschogrod says, “the one who, in self-giving, says to the other, ‘here i am’, placing the self at another’s disposal, bears witness to the infinite.234 levinas employs the word illeity or he-ness to name this incom125ryan c. urbano prehensible god. god is designated as this third person demonstrative pronoun in order to preserve his transcendence as well as to show respect to him. illeity “designates something present but at a distance, such as ‘that great man over there’ or anything to which one refers with respect”.235 for levinas then, images or concepts of god arrived at through intellectual vision or proof would be artificial since they reduce god’s transcendence to immanence. god’s withdrawal from the clutches of man’s intellectual grasp is instead god’s way of redirecting man’s gaze to the other. as levinas explains: “a god invisible means not only a god unimaginable, but a god accessible in justice. ethics is the spiritual optics. the other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with god”.236 in saying that ethics enables the self to bear testimony to the presence of god through its infinite responsibility to the other, levinas does not imply “that religion is reducible to ethical intersubjectivity . . . but rather that intersubjectivity is raised to religion, that is to say, raised above its own ontological possibilities”.237 this means that god is neither identical with the ethical relation, nor is he the being or the foundation of this relation. ethics is rather a spiritual optics, an optics of the divine. it makes visible the invisible, reveals the infinite in the finite and manifests transcendence without incarnation. though the ethical is the space through which god reveals, the face of the other does not function as a mediator between the self and god. god remains transcendent and wholly other. he is other than and outside of being. to construe god as someone who dwells in the other is an infringement of his illeity. for levinas, ethics is not only first philosophy. he also considers it as “first theology”.238 theology, according to michael purcell, “is both ethical in content and ethical in origin”.239 the realm of the ethical face to face is the condition that makes theology receptive to revelation. discourse about god and his revelation, purcell says, “can have no other point of departure than in the subject who is capable of asking the question about god, or the subject for whom god can become a possible question”.240 morever, “the question of god cannot be asked without raising the prior question of the one who is able to ask the question of god. theology begins as theological anthropology; and to reflect on the human person is already to be involved in an ethical enterprise.241 126 prajna vihara~ levinas has already pointed out that human subjectivity is responsibility and deference to the other. it is a subjectivity constituted not by a satisfaction of a natural need but by a metaphysical or spiritual desire. man’s basic structure is not merely a conatus, a perseverance in being but an inescapable love for the other. levinas says: “the metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything that can complete it. it is like goodness__the desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it”.242 this metaphysical desire is an eschatology which is a “relationship with a surplus always exterior to the totality”.243 wyschogrod explains the transition from the natural life to the religious life in levinas thought in this way: once need is established phenomenologically as belonging to natural man, levinas has prepared the ground for homo religiosus, who remains man as need but who cannot fulfill his need in natural existence. it is the need for transcendence that characterizes fully human ethical existence. this transcendence . . . is founded in the experience of other persons.244 for levinas, the true life “is not a conatus but disinterestedness and adieu”.245 it is a life of selfless giving to others motivated by a desire for god. levinas asserts that his ethical philosophy is not purely of this world in the sense that it seeks to transcend the natural tendency of the ego to persevere in its being. “ethics is, therefore, against nature because it forbids the murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first”. for levinas ethics is rooted neither in being nor in being but in a platonic “good beyond being”. as he nicely puts it: the ethical situation is a human situation, beyond human nature, in which the idea of god comes to mind (gott fallt mir ein). in this respect, we could say that god is the other who turns our nature inside out, who calls our ontological will-to-be in question. this ethical call of conscience occurs, no doubt, in other religious systems besides the judeo-christian, but it remains an essentially 127ryan c. urbano .. religious vocation. god does indeed go against nature, for he is not of this world. god is other than being.247 from these eloquent words, levinas seems to imply that ethics points to man’s fundamental relation to god as evidenced by his desire that is inflamed by the other. man’s inescapable primordial ethical relation with the other, this “obsession of responsibility is, in a sense, the “latent birth” of religion”.248 subjectivity as desire is intentionality. it seeks transcendence and it takes the form of responsibility for the infinite other. this structure of subjectivity as transcendence points to the religious orientation of human existence. levinas puts it succinctly in the following words: “the impossibility of escaping god lies in the depths of myself as a self, as an absolute passivity.249 endnotes 1the title of this article is a phrase borrowed from emmanuel levinas. see his difficult freedom: essays on judaism, trans. sean hand (baltimore, maryland: the johns hopkins university press, 1990), 159. there is a similar expression in his totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority, trans. alphonso lingis (pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1969), 78. levinas says: “ethics is the spiritual optics”. 2with levinas’s approval, lingis translates the french word autrui as the “personal other, the you” while autre as simply “other”. see footnote of page 24 in totality and infinity. 3emmanuel levinas, “the paradox of morality”, “translated by a. benjamin and t. wright in r. bernasconi and d. woods, editors, the provocation of levinas (london: routledge, 1988 [1976]), 172. quoted in peter atterton, “emmanuel levinas”, in postmodernism: the key figures, edited by hans bertens and joseph natoli (oxford: blackwell, 2002), 235. 4levinas, totality and infinity, 78-79. 5adriaan peperzak, to the other: an introduction to the philosophy of emmanuel levinas (west lafayette, indiana: purdue university press, 1993), 212 & 217; richard a. cohen, “foreword” to emmanuel levinas, otherwise than being or beyond essence, translated by alphonso lingis (the hague: martinus nijjhoff, 1981; pittsburgh, pennsylvania: duquesne university press, 1998), xii. see also cohen’s “introduction” to emmanuel levinas, humanism of the other, trans. nidra poller (urbana and chicago: university of illinois press, 2003), xxvi-xxvii. 6colin davis, levinas: an introduction (notre dame, indiana: university of notre dame press, 1996), 2. see also emmanuel levinas and richard kearney, 128 prajna vihara~ “dialogue with emmanuel levinas”, in richard a. cohen, editor, face to face with levinas (albany, new york: state university of new york press, 1986), 27. 7levinas, totality and infinity, 26. 8levinas, otherwise than being, 127. 9levinas, otherwise than being, 17. 10emmanuel levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, in the levinas reader, trans. sean hand (oxford: blackwell, 1989)31. 11richard a. cohen, elevations: the height of the good in rosenzweig and levinas (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1994), 139. 12levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 30. 13levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 31 14levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 30. 15philip n. lawton, jr., “levinas’ notion of the ‘there is’’”, philosophy today 29 (spring 1976): 69. 16levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 30. 17levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 31. 18levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 31. 19levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 31. 20levinas, totality and infinity, 131-132. 21levinas, totality and infinity, 131. 22levinas, “there is: existence without existents”, 31. 23levinas, totality and infinity, 131. 24davis, levinas: an introduction, 23. 25davis, levinas: an introduction, 23. see also edith wyschogrod, emmanuel levinas: the problem of ethical metaphysics, second edition (new york: fordham university press, 2000), 68. 26levinas, totality and infinity, 132. 27levinas, totality and infinity, 110. 28peperzak, to the other, 150. 29levinas, totality and infinity, 36. 30peter atterton and matthew calarco, on levinas, (belmont, california: thomson wadsworth, 2005),61. 31levinas, totality and infinity, 115. wyschogrod avers that levinas provides a novel insight on life in its basic form as enjoyment which runs contrary to the existentialist view of man who in his existence is stricken by anxiety, boredom, nausea, loneliness and absurdity. she enunciates: “levinas posits a self at home with itself, satiable and happy. suffering is understood against the background of prior satiety and is experienced as destruction of satiety. levinas introduces into contemporary existential analyses of primordial affective states a radically new understanding of being-in-the-world, a view that upholds human satisfaction within the framework of ontological plenitude”. wyschogrod, emmanuel levinas: the problem of ethical metaphysics, 61. 32davis, levinas: an introduction, 43. 129ryan c. urbano 33levinas, totality and infinity, 149-150. 34levinas, totality and infinity, 111. 35levinas, totality and infinity, 112. 36levinas, totality and infinity, 133. 37wyschogrod, emmanuel levinas: the problem of ethical metaphysics, 62-63. peperzak endorses the same judgment on the innocence of the ego as enjoyment. he says: “the hedonism and utilitarianism of the ‘economy’ is not an evil, but rather the constitution of a provisional world which waits for and ‘desires’ a more properly human meaning”. peperzak, beyond: the philosophy of emmanuel levinas, 122. 38davis, levinas; an introduction, 43. 39levinas, totality and infinity, 33. 40levinas, totality and infinity, 135-136. 41emmanuel levinas, “the trace of the other”, trans. alphonso lingis, in deconstruction in context, ed. mark taylor (chicago: university of chicago press, 1986), 350. cited in william paul simmons, an-archy and justice: an introduction to emmanuel levinas’s political thought (lanham, maryland: lexington books, 2003), 37. 42levinas, totality and infinity, 33. 43levinas, totality and infinity, 117. 44levinas, totality and infinity, 34. 45levinas, totality and infinity, 34. 46simons, an-archy and justice, 37. 47levinas, totality and infinity, 116-117. 48levinas, totality and infinity, 114. 49levinas, totality and infinity, 117. 50levinas, totality and infinity, 110. 51levinas, totality and infinity, 135. 52peperzak, to the other, 150. 53levinas, totality and infinity, 135. 54simon critchley, “introduction”, in simon critchley and robert bernasconi, eds., the cambridge companion to levinas (cambridge, united kingdom: cambridge university press, 2002), 20. 55this is now the theme of levinas’s second major work otherwise than being or beyond essence. in this work levinas reinterprets sensibility as proximity and sensitivity to the other. see critchley, "introduction," in the cambridge companion to levinas, 21. 56peperzak, to the other, 156. 57levinas, totality and infinity, 117. 58levinas, totality and infinity, 127. 59levinas, totality and infinity, 114. 60wyschogrod, emmanuel levinas: the problem of ethical metaphysics, 65. 130 ~prajna vihara~ 61peperzak, to the other, 156. 62levinas, “time and the other”, in the levinas reader, 38. 63levinas, totality and infinity, 143-144. 64levinas, totality and infinity, 156-157. 65levinas, totality and infinity, 141. 66levinas, totality and infinity, 146. 67levinas, totality and infinity, 110. 68peperzak, beyond, 9. 69peperzak, beyond, 9. see also his to the other, 24. 70levinas, totality and infinity, 158. 71levinas, totality and infinity, 153. 72levinas, totality and infinity, 141. 73levinas, totality and infinity, 153. 74peperzak, to the other, 23. 75levinas, otherwise than being, 183. 76levinas, otherwise than being, 74. 77levinas, totality and infinity, 120. 78levinas, totality and infinity, 117. 79levinas, totality and infinity, 148. 80levinas, totality and infinity, 38. 81levinas, otherwise than being, 8. see also totality and infinity, 118. 82levinas, totality and infinity, 38. 83levinas, totality and infinity, 134. 84edmund husserl poses quite the same question in one of his writings. he asked: “how can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the name ‘experience of something other’ precisely something other__something that excludes the constituted from the concrete make-up of the sense-constituting ‘imyself’ which i ascribe to this something other as alter ego?” husserl, cartesian meditations: an introduction to phenomenology, translated by dorion cairns (the hague: martinus nijhoff, 1960), 94. the difference between husserl and levinas as regards the problem of the self and the other is quite obvious. levinas views the problem as an ethical one whereas husserl looks at it from the perspective of epistemology. levinas thinks that husserl’s way of looking at the problem (and all those philosophers who consider the problem as primarily epistemological) jeopardizes ethics in that one does not need to prove first that the other exists before one can be responsible for him. in other words, one does not ask oneself if the person who needs his immediate help exists or not before he extends his assistance. this demeanor, levinas would perhaps think, is preposterous. 85levinas, otherwise than being, 103. 86levinas, totality and infinity, 75-76. 87levinas, totality and infinity, 43. 88betina bergo, “emmanuel levinas” the stanford enclopedia of philosophy (fall 2008 edition), edward n. zalta, editor; available from http:// 131ryan c. urbano plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/levinas/. 89levinas, otherwise than being, 111-112. see also davis, levinas: an introduction, 80. 90levinas, otherwise than being, 111; critchley, “introduction”, in the cambridge companion to levinas, 15. see also simon critchley, the ethics of deconstruction: derrida and levinas, second edition (george square, edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1999), 5. 91peperzak, to the other, 22. 92levinas, totality and infinity, 39. 93levinas, “ethics as first philosophy”, in the levinas reader, 82; 85. levinas, alluding to heidegger, asks “if the da of my dasein is not already the usurpation of somebody else’s place”. levinas, “ethics as first philosophy”, in the levinas reader, 85. 94see emmanuel levinas, “enigma and phenomenon”, in emmanuel levinas: basic philosophical writings, ed. adriaan peperzak, simon critchley, and robert bernasconi (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 1996), 65-77. 95levinas and kearney, “dialogue with emmanuel levinas”, in face to face with levinas, 24. 96levinas, otherwise than being, 109. 97levinas, otherwise than being, 124. 98levinas, otherwise than being, 107. 99levinas, otherwise than being, 108. 100levinas, otherwise than being, 109. 101levinas, otherwise than being, 106. see also emmanuel levinas, entre nous: on thinking-of-the-other, trans. michael b. smith and barbara harshav (new york: columbia university press, 1998), 202. 102levinas, otherwise than being, 48. 103levinas, otherwise than being, 146. 104see levinas, otherwise than being, 47. 105andrius valeviχius, from the other to the totally other: the religious philosophy of emmanuel levinas (new york: peter lang, 1988), 2-3. 106levinas, otherwise than being, 116. 107levinas, totality and infinity, 50. 108virginia l. jayme, “emmanuel levinas’ philosophy of responsible subjectivity”, philippiniana sacra 26 (may-august 1990): 245. 109levinas, totality and infinity, 198. see also roland paul blum, “emmanuel levinas’ theory of commitment”, philosophy and phenomenological research xliv (december 1983): 152. 110levinas, totality and infinity, 65-66. 111levinas, totality and infinity, 75. 112levinas, totality and infinity, 171. 113levinas, totality and infinity, 39. 132 prajna vihara~ 114levinas, totality and infinity, 66. 115jayme, “emmanuel levinas' philosophy of responsible subjectivity”, 252. 116levinas, totality and infinity, 251. 117levinas, totality and infinity, 75. 118levinas, totality and infinity, 199, 201, 230, 251, 297, 302, 303. 119levinas, totality and infinity, 194. 120levinas, totality and infinity, 198. 121levinas, totality and infinity, 198. see also jeffrey kosky, levinas and the philosophy of religion (bloomington, indiana: indiana university press, 2001), 22. 122levinas, totality and infinity, 198. 123levinas, totality and infinity, 194. 124levinas, totality and infinity, 198. 125levinas, totality and infinity, 199, 201. here levinas quotes plato’s republic 327 b. 126david couzens hoy, critical resistance: from poststructuralism to post-critique (cambridge, massachusetts: the mit press, 2004), 155. 127levinas, totality and infinity, 150. 128levinas, totality and infinity, 200, 203. 129levinas, totality and infinity, 197. 130levinas, otherwise than being, 136. 132levinas, totality and infinity, 89. 133levinas, otherwise than being, 113. 134levinas, otherwise than being, 105. 135atterton and calarco explains: “an unargued assumption of many modern moral philosophers is that the other only has the right to demand what is his or legal due, and that anything he or she receives beyond that is purely optional and a matter of private philanthropy on the part of the benefactor. it has to be said time and time again that levinas is opposed to that way of conceiving ethics”. on levinas, 70-71. 136peperzak, to the other, 221. 137james richard mensch, postfoundational phenomenology: husserlian reflections on presence and embodiment (university park, pennsylvania: the pennsylvania university press, 2001), 208. 138mensch, postfoundational phenomenology, 207. 139see levinas, otherwise than being, 108-113. 140levinas, otherwise than being, 108. 141levinas, otherwise than being, 87. 142mensch, postfoundational phenomenology, 208. 143levinas, otherwise than being, 105-106. 144levinas, otherwise than being, 127. 145levinas, otherwise than being, 145. 133ryan c. urbano 146levinas, otherwise than being, 11. 147levinas, entre nous, 108. 148emmanuel levinas, ethics and infinity: conversations with philippe nemo, trans. r. cohen (pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1985),101. 149levinas. otherwise than being, 139. 150levinas, otherwise than being, 108. 151levinas, otherwise than being, 114. 152levinas, otherwise than being, 183. 153kosky, levinas and the philosophy of religion, 83. 154levinas, otherwise than being, 102, 55. 155levinas, otherwise than being, 145-146, 149, 152, 185. here levinas reechoes abraham’s reply to god in the book of genesis (genesis 22:1) when god commanded abraham to sacrifice his son isaac. “here i am” (in hebrew ‘hineni’ and levinas translation in french is ‘voici’) is the self's unconditional obedience to the call of the other. 156levinas, otherwise than being, 101. 157critchley, “introduction”, to the cambridge companion to levinas, 20-21. 158levinas, otherwise than being, 25. 159levinas, otherwise than being, 127. 160levinas, otherwise than being, 117-118. 161michele saracino, on being human: a conversation with levinas and lonergan (milwaukee: marquette university press, 2003), 96. 162levinas, otherwise than being, 127. 163levinas, ethics and infinity, 98. 164levinas, ethics and infinity, 100-101. 165levinas, otherwise than being, 101-102. 166levinas, god, death and time, trans. bettina bergo (stanford: stanford university press, 2000), 12. 167levinas, otherwise than being, 114. 168levinas, otherwise than being, 107. 169critchley, “introduction”, in the cambridge companion to levinas, 21. 170critchley, “introduction”, in the cambridge companion to levinas, 21. 171levinas, otherwise than being, 74. 172levinas, otherwise than being, 100-101. 173levinas, otherwise than being, 139, 166. 174levinas, totality and infinity, 48-52. 175levinas, god, death and time, 23. 176levinas, otherwise than being, 56. 177emmanuel levinas, of god who comes to mind, translated by bettina bergo (stanford, california: stanford university press, 1998), 63. 134 prajna vihara~ 178levinas, god, death and time, 23. 179levinas, otherwise than being, 12. 180levinas, of god who comes to mind, 72. 181levinas, otherwise than being, 113, 126. 182peperzak, to the other, 217. cf. roger burggraeve, the wisdom of love in the service of love: emmanuel levinas on justice, peace and human rights, trans. jeffrey bloechl (milwaukee: marquette university press, 2002), 77-83. 183critchley, “introduction”, to the cambridge companion to levinas, 12. 184levinas, totality and infinity, 199. 185levinas, otherwise than being, 5. 186levinas, otherwise than being, 92. 187levinas, totality and infinity, 195. 188levinas, totality and infinity, 174. 189levinas, totality and infinity, 76. 190levinas and kearney, “dialogue with emmanuel levinas”, in face to face with levinas, 29. 191simons, an-archy and justice, 51. 192hoy, critical resistance, 158. 193peperzak, to the other, 221. 194davis, levinas: an introduction, 75. 195levinas, otherwise than being, 5. 196levinas, otherwise than being, 48. 197davis, levinas: an introduction, 75. 198davis, levinas: an introduction, 45, 49. 199simons, an-archy and justice, 51. 200levinas, otherwise than being, 42-43. 201levinas, otherwise than being, 7. 202levinas, otherwise than being, 37-38, 45-48. 203levinas, otherwise than being, 85. 204davis, levinas: an introduction, 79. 205see jacques derrida, “violence and metaphysics: an essay on the thought of emmanuel levinas”, in writing and difference, trans. alan bass (chicago: university of chicago press, 1978), 79-153. 206this is the opinion of jacques rolland, see parcours de l’autrement: lecture d’emannuel levinas (paris: presses universitaires de france, 2000), as cited in michael b. smith, toward the outside: concepts and themes in emmanuel levinas (pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 2005),148. but michael b. smith holds a different opinion. he says “it would be both unnecessary and unlikely for levinas to have shaped his future work on derrida’s critique”. he is inclined to believe “that levinas’s thought already contained, for such an astute reader as derrida, the exigencies that were to be worked out until later, but so clearly inscribed in potentia that derrida’s essay was able to decipher some of them”. smith, 135ryan c. urbano toward the outside, 149, 148. 207levinas is already aware of this weakness in his philosophy, particularly in totality and infinity. in his 1962 essay transcendence and height, levinas writes: “one could reproach it for using classical rationalist terminology and for mixing it up and dressing it up with empirical givens”. levinas, “transcendence and height”, basic philosophical writings, 22. 208simmons, an-archy and justice, 5. 209simmons, an-archy and justice, 5. 210critchley, “introduction”, in the cambridge companion to levinas, 18. 211davis, levinas: an introduction, 77. 212levinas, otherwise than being, 47. 213levinas, otherwise than being, 7, 183. 214levinas, otherwise than being, 168. 215levinas, otherwise than being, 167. 216levinas, otherwise than being, 168. 217levinas, otherwise than being, 171. 219levinas, totality and infinity, 212. 220levinas, totality and infinity, 213. 221levinas, otherwise than being, 157. 222see levinas, otherwise than being, 158-161. 223levinas, otherwise than being, 128. 224levinas, totality and infinity, 40. 225simmons, an-archy and justice, 54. 226levinas, totality and infinity, 78. 227levinas, totality and infinity, 79. 228burggraeve, the wisdom of love in the service of love, 117. 229levinas, totality and infinity, 293; emmanuel levinas, “philosophy and the idea of the infinite” in peperzak, to the other, 112. 230cohen, elevations: the height of the good in rosenzweig and levinas, 188. 231kosky, levinas and the philosophy of religion, n. 10, 211. 232levinas, totality and infinity, 23. 233levinas, otherwise than being, 146. 234wyschogrod, emmanuel levinas: the problem of ethical metaphysics, xvii. 235smith, toward the outside, 89. for smith, god is in the third person because levinas wants “an important distinction to be made between the relation to god and the dialogical relation to the other person”. levinas intends to depart from martin buber’s implied reciprocity in the “i-thou” dialogical relation. as smith explains: “the dialogical relationship brings with it elements that make it inadequate structure for transcendence because of the reciprocity and eventual play of gratitude and psychological interplay to which both parties of the dialogue are 136 prajna vihara~ open. the otherness of the other person is preserved and his or her stature as “greater than myself safeguarded only if the face of the other is ‘in the trace’ of illeity. ‘the illeity of the third person is the condition of irreversibility’”. smith, toward the outside, 89. 236levinas, totality and infinity, 78. 237cohen, cohen, elevations: the height of the good in rosenzweig and levinas, 187. 238see emmanuel levinas, is it righteous to be? interviews with emmanuel levinas, edited by jill robbins (stanford, california: stanford university, 2001), 182. 239michael purcell, levinas and theology (cambridge, united kingdom: cambridge university press, 2006), 2. 240purcell, levinas and theology, 47. purcell, however, does not here imply “that the subject is the absolute origin of theology. rather, it means that the starting point for theological reflection on god takes its point of departure in the here of human subjectivity”. purcell, levinas and theology, 47. 241purcell, levinas and theology, 2. 242levinas, totality and infinity, 34. 243levinas, totality and infinity, 22. 244wyschogrod, emmanuel levinas: the problem of ethical metaphysics, 62. 245levinas, god, death and time, 15. 246levinas and kearney, “dialogue with emmanuel levinas”, in face to face with levinas, 24. 247levinas and kearney, “dialogue with emmanuel levinas”, in face to face with levinas, 25. 248hent de vries, “levinas” in a companion to continental philosophy, edited by simon critchley and william s. schroeder (oxford, united kingdom: blackwell, 1998), 246. 249levinas, otherwise than being, 129. 137ryan c. urbano 147-154 islam and ecology is filipino thought medieval? preliminary work in writing the history of philosophy in the philippines jovino g. miroy ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract the philippines is an asian nation which has a long and complex relationship with the west. and so its philosophy and cultural heritage shares this same complexity. what is filipino philosophy? in what sense can it be said to be medieval or modern? the first major part of this preliminary work discusses the meaning of medieval philosophy, modern philosophy, and philosophy itself. the second part gives a philosophical understanding of the works of abstract artist nena saguil in order to describe how visual artists can be a source of philosophical thought in a non-traditionally philosophical culture, and to describe the course modernity has already taken in other humanistic disciplines. when i had an opportunity to meet prof. john maraldo, a student of rahner who had become an expert in japanese and chinese philosophy, i asked him if i could write a paper comparing nishitani and filipino philosophy. he asked me a question that i had not been able to answer up to now: “what would be the sources of filipino philosophy?” the incident turned out to be very significant because it made me realize that what seemed very obvious was virtually unknown to me. at that time the paper would have meant comparing ferriols’s pambungad sa metapisika1 to nishitani’s religion and nothingness2. maraldo, however, was asking the more fundamental question of sources (mga bukal) of our philosophy, i.e., where our philosophy comes from. he might have been asking for specific texts and authors, but he could also have been asking for the history of our philosophy. in the ateneo de manila philosophy department, the usual suspects are french and prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 51-73 51 © 2000 by assumption university press german thinkers, such as gabriel marcel, paul ricoeur, emmanuel levinas, michel foucault, martin heidegger, max scheler, hans-georg gadamer, jürgen habermas, as well as thomas aquinas and thomists like norris clark. nevertheless, maraldo’s question made me ask other questions: 1) what can a culture that is not traditionally philosophical take as sources of philosophy? can poets and artists be other sources for what we can consider its own brand of philosophizing (pamimilosipiya)? on the other hand, a decade ago, david keck and jose m. cruz s. j. held a round-table discussion on medieval influences in philippine culture3 where i proposed to study the scholastic philosophy that was current in philosophical education since the time of the spaniards and continued into the american and post-war eras. in the meantime, acquiescing to institutional demands, i decided to work on medieval philosophy for my doctorate. in 2002, i completed my text on nicholas of cusa’s metaphysics and political philosophy under prof. jos decorte, who suddenly died from a vehicular accident. through fellow medievalists, i discovered books by the medievalist jorge garcia who has also written on latin american philosophy.4 this led me to ask how we can write the history of philosophy in the philippines. this task imposed itself upon me as a kind of a moral duty, especially since when one skims through encyclopedias of philosophy,5 one will see entries on asian philosophy that would have no mention of anything on the philippines. although many would see the importance of writing the history of our intellectual culture, few would agree with the use of the rubric of the middle ages in analyzing our thought. aren’t we putting the horse before the carriage, i.e., deciding a particular direction in performing the task we have just set out to do? indeed, this author consciously chooses to use the rubric of the european middle ages to understand the development of philosophy in our country. why? firstly, he hopes that eventually historical evidence can be presented that the spaniards did bring in medieval thinkers and used them in their evangelizing work. the fact that these missionaries were augustinians, franciscans, and dominicans (as well as jesuits)6 already present prima facie evidence that the importation of medieval ideas in our country was not marginal in the way the colonizers dealt with and reconstituted the existing culture. such introduction, however, could already have begun when the muslims came here. is it possible that the 52 prajñâ vihâra muslim religious leaders brought with them the arabic learning that have been developed by thinkers such as avicenna and averroes? finally, to ask our question implicitly asks another question, that is, is filipino thought modern? in fact, we undertake this inquiry to know whether we are still in the threshold of modernity and, more importantly, how we can enter into it definitely. methodologies the question we pose presents some serious methodological problems. one can treat it as a historical problem: if we surmise that our thought is medieval, are we reducing it to the philosophy brought by the spaniards and the americans? this leads to the basic problem of when we started doing philosophy. i already mentioned that perhaps it began earlier when islam spread to the philippines. it is also possible that the chinese and hindu settlers also brought their own philosophies albeit not systematically. could this explain why we have an ethical as well as gnostic side to our thinking? we would also wish to know when the spaniards began teaching western philosophy here. this is a problem that can be answered through the manuals and text books still kept in the archives of religious orders, and also through the literature and art done during these times.7 the propaganda movement and the birth of the ilustrado probably mark a different phase of philosophy in the philippines. this is most likely the earliest moment our thought tried to enter into modernity. was this a movement offset by the american occupation when they continued teaching philosophy through the scholastic manuals? did the professors in state universities try to continue the modernization efforts initiated by the ilustrados by introducing anglo-saxon philosophy? in the ateneo, the break from scholasticism started with the introduction of phenomenology and existentialism. how did this staunchly catholic university try to move away from “traditional philosophy,” especially after vatican ii and during the martial law years? how come it preferred the french thinkers over marx and nietzsche? another method we can use is that of the history of philosophy and ideas. we now have to take into account the place of the history of philosophy itself in the philosophical culture. how we look at the history jovino g. miroy 53 of philosophy certainly reflects our own philosophy and how we will write our own history of philosophy. a simpler question would be how current filipino philosophers use the history of philosophy? in other words, how do they lend authority to what they are saying, by referring to thomas or augustine? or to kant or hegel? or to foucault or habermas? do filipino philosophers present the history of philosophy in their own terms and purposes? what would be the consequence if we relied on the anglo-saxon synthesis of philosophical history? shouldn’t we in fact look at the more continental european tradition? certainly, the spaniards, who consider some of its 18th century jesuit philosophers greater than descartes, would present the history of philosophy differently.8 we can also use the method of philosophy itself. does our philosophy begin with metaphysics in the same way most medieval thinkers did. do we in fact begin with ethics or philosophy of nature? can we, however, trace our streak of anti-intellectualism to a form of franciscanism that favored asceticism over the intellectualism of the jesuits? perhaps one would say that true filipino philosophy is the one unsullied by western philosophers. at this point what becomes clear is our true question, that is, what is philosophy? jan aertsen says, however, that philosophy is defined by its own practitioners. philosophy in the course of history, as well as colonization, liberation, dictatorship, and peaceful revolutions have been defined by those who do it. it bears a selfunderstanding independent of what other philosophies in other times and cultures have done.9 the first major part of this preliminary work discusses the meaning of medieval philosophy, modern philosophy, and philosophy itself. the second part gives a philosophical understanding of the works of abstract artist nena saguil in order to a) describe how visual artists can be a source of philosophical thought in a non-traditionally philosophical culture and b) to describe the course modernity has already taken in other humanistic disciplines. medieval philosophy 54 prajñâ vihâra roque ferriols translates ancient greek philosophy as “sinaunang pilosopiyang griyego.”10 should we translate medieval as “gitnang panahon” and modern as “makabago?” our word for modern, in fact, influences the way we look at the traditional. is it justified to call it “makaluma?”11 how we answer our question for this paper depends on how we define medieval and modern. bertrand russell, in fact, did not think that there was philosophy independent of theology in the middle ages. on the other hand, what medieval philosophy is has recently been an object of reflection among medievalists, proving that the question is a hotly debated topic. jan aertsen provides us with a summary of the dispute. he begins with pierre hadot, who is actually a greek philosophy scholar.12 hadot maintains that for the ancients philosophia had, first and foremost, an existential dimension: “it was not so much a system of thought but a “way of life, a spiritual exercise preparatory to wisdom.” carlos steel, however, uses hadot’s thesis in order to argue that medieval philosophy is “an impossible project.”13 if philosophy is search for happiness, and if happiness can only be found in theology or in the christian religion, then islamic philosophy and greek philosophy is impossible, that is not capable of reaching its goal. in his adherence to hadot, steel wishes to criticize alain de libera’s approach to medieval philosophy, and rejects the thesis “that masters in the faculty of arts represent the true “essence” of medieval philosophy.”14 he also points out the fact that thomas aquinas radically rejected the idea of a philosophical way to happiness. steel’s contention is significant because it questions the reduction of medieval philosophy to the gilsonian idea of “christian philosophy.” aertsen points out that in the middle ages, the expression “christian philosophy” stood for the monastic life. for gilson, however, this notion is the authentic medieval philosophy whose uniqueness cannot be understood apart from its relationship to christianity.15 this means that medieval philosophy is the twin sister of theology or what is called sacra doctrina. hadot disagrees with gilson’s reduction of philosophy in the middle ages to christian philosophy because he thinks that christian ideas, such as the incarnation and the trinity, transformed ancient philosophy. such a view is mistaken insofar as it misses the continuity between ancient and medieval and forgets the existential aspect of medieval philosophy. it has also given jovino g. miroy 55 the false impression that philosophy in the middle ages serves only the purposes of theology. aertsen thinks that through hadot’s thesis, one can say that there is philosophy independent of theology even in the middle ages. he also shows that steel’s thesis presupposes that “the conception of philosophy as promising salvation were normative.”16 in other words, the medieval thinkers did rule that a system has to lead to salvation in order for it to be counted as philosophy. aertsen’s article, in fact, shows that the middle ages developed a self-critical philosophy that set down limits to the reason itself: “it was a possible project because medieval philosophy was a critical philosophy, reflecting on the human condition of knowledge.”17 this is not the place to take sides on this issue; but through this summary of the debate, we see that none of the historians think that medieval philosophy is scholasticism nor is it simply christian philosophy. from here, however, we can ask very crucial questions: a) can we say our philosophy is medieval because it is scholastic and christian, b) can we assume that although we have outgrown scholasticism we have ceased to refer to the medieval world view, c) to what extent have filipino philosophers used medieval or scholastic or christian sources, d) and how have they used these sources in their own brand of philosophizing? modern philosophy since it is not very clear what medieval philosophy is, should we then take the negative route, and ask whether our philosophy is modern. aertsen’s article is a good example of why the question of the medieval necessarily brings one to the question of the modern, for he himself has a short discussion on what modern philosophy is. he says: “this ideal of ancient philosophy nearly disappeared in the modern age, and today, especially in the university milieu, philosophy is usually conceived of as a purely theoretical manner.”18 this point of view states that modern philosophers have lost the wholeness of life, especially the unity between the practical and theoretical. after philosophy became a servant of theology, it eventually exercised autonomy and later dominated it. this became the mark of modernity. different from aertsen, we view modernity not 56 prajñâ vihâra necessarily as a step down in the ladder, nor do we think that the task of the philosophy is simply to return to traditional wisdom. one can only live in the age he is born in, and his task is to bring his age to other and higher possibilities. for the purposes of this paper we refer to louis dupré’s article “the modern idea of culture: its opposition to its classical and christian roots.”19 dupré, an ex-jesuit who started as a marx scholar and became an astute historian of philosophy, philosopher of religion and culture, and a cusanus scholar, thinks that modernity is characterized by the turn from nature to culture, the turn to subjectivity, and the loss of transcendence. giving the examples of hesiod and lucretius, dupré explains that the opposition between nature and culture is an ancient problem. the greeks symbolized each by the mythical figures. hercules stands for the success nature accords to those who diligently obey her laws; while prometheus stands for the depths one will fall if he revolts against nature and tries to steal the treasures of the gods. dupré thinks that traditional man did not try to dominate nature, but conformed to its workings, while modern culture sought independence from nature and eventually controlled it. modernity no longer thinks that there is an intrinsic rationality, an order manifested in the eternal dance of the spheres. on the other hand, it thinks that rationality means the quantification of nature: “instead it (nature) has become what we entrap and control as a calculable, predictable force.”20 at this point, culture has come to mean the refusal to accept nature as given. human craftsmanship changed from techne to technological control and ownership of nature. the radical turn of modernity is thus from nature to subjectivity; we begin to look at reality no longer from the point of view of what is objectively out there and that which we can discover (pagtuklas), and recognise what is out there is what is constituted by us (itinatakda). the example par excellence is rené descartes, who thought that the primary idea (clair et distinct) is his own existence. for him, what is true is his own being that becomes clear in the very act of doubting. descartes says also that if the object of knowledge is outside that which is clear and distinct, it can only be known through the subject’s categories. modernity has stipulated that the self is a self-constituting subject, and that reality is jovino g. miroy 57 not what is out there but what one thinks. popular psychology summarizes this view when it advices that a situation is not decided by what has happened but how one looks at it. dupré, however, thinks that the idea of a constitutive subjectivity turned against man himself. “what began as a radical subjectification of the real ended by reducing the subject itself to the mere function of constituting objectivity in the theoretical and the practical order.” he gives the example of marx who eventually placed man as a part of the product of productivity itself. marx has placed the absolute priority onto praxis, where in man constitutes both himself and his world.21 when man turns to himself as self-constituting subject, his selfassertion resulted into a loss of transcendence. dupré does not only describe the nietzschean death of god, but the loss of man’s capacity to go beyond immanence. the assertion of the self through his systems and technology has actually obscured man’s very self. the categories he created have absorbed him, for now he is an organism that evolved like any other. now he is living an immanentist existence, wherein god is simply part of the other choices in life. the divine no longer occupies as special place in reality, but is simply another aspect of reality, just like sports and entertainment. obviously dupré’s view of how modernity changed human culture is not completely accurate. he has, for example, not explained how modernity contributed in the development of politics and society. i warn my students in my philosophy of religion class that the opposition between the traditional and the modern is not identical to the opposition between good and evil. would it, however, be fair to say that our philosophy is not modern because it is imbued with religious and metaphysical concerns? certainly, modernity has led to the loss of transcendence in most parts of the world, especially in the developed countries. we can ask whether we can be christian and modern? once a priest from south africa and i talked about the lack of christian identity in the katholieke universiteit in leuven. but then we realized how radically privileged we were, sitting in cafeteria just like ordinary belgians, and having full rights as their citizens. belgian society is such that if there are hierarchies, these hierarchies are neither rigid nor exclusive. can one not say that since their society is more humane that it is more christian than a church-going society? 58 prajñâ vihâra what is (filipino) philosophy? at the root of our question, however, is what philosophy is and whether there is such a thing as filipino philosophy. in this regard, the rubric of medieval philosophy is truly helpful. for aertsen, in explaining the definition of medieval philosophy, says that “what philosophy is and of what it is capable are to be determined by philosophy itself.” philosophy has its own self-understanding. for most philosophers, the definition of philosophy is moot and academic; once you have done, it is very clear to you when you’re doing it. as ferriols drummed into our young heads before, “philosophy is easier to do than to define.”22 is there filipino philosophy? is our philosophy similar to existential and practical philosophy of ancient greece and rome and of the european middle ages. is our philosophy that which cannot be separated from religion? is philosophia that which the spaniards used in order to do away with the existing beliefs and ethical systems? we can continue to debate and write on these questions, but it is certain that philosophy in the philippines has its own self-understanding, which when he has done it, one knows what it is. modernity, art and philosophy: the case of nena saguil perhaps, however, the sources of filipino philosophy are not only found in commonly accepted texts but also in art and literature. 23 what is surprising is that most of our early modernists are artists and writers. one prime example is alejandro abadilla, who is not coincidentally a philosophy major from ust.24 in this last part of our paper, however, we shall talk about the modernity of the woman painter nena saguil. our discussion will show how a filipino has already traversed the path from the traditional to the modern.25 saguil embodies the myth of the filipino intellectual who has to leave his country to find enlightenment (ilustrisimo). most filipinos who study abroad eventually end up losing their first naiveté, especially with regard to their religion. some recover it, leaving their agnostic stage and jovino g. miroy 59 become more enlightened believers. on the other hand, saguil who would never be a balik-bayan, converted from catholicism to the church of jehovah’s witnesses. eric (emmanuel) torres characterizes her art as a transition from the material to the spiritual.26 even so, her art is not reducible to this, for it is not marked by a single conversion but a continuous evolution. unlike picasso, who has varied periods, saguil’s art reveals a search for personal clarity and the appropriate artistic style for such clarity. what is significant, however, is that her search for the divine did not make her less of a modernist. the modernity and abstraction is not simply a moda, but a conviction or a way of seeing the world. where does her personal modernity begin?27 first, her modernity is in longing for freedom, which she finds in “flight” (1962). indeed, she had to leave her house in manila and go abroad to find liberation, and yet once she found the locus of her freedom, i.e. paris, saguil would never leave it. in the process, she became the “first woman to pioneer in nonfigurative, purely abstract, art.”28 saguil took abstraction as the medium of this freedom. this viewer, however, thinks too that she was using her painting to depict her life-story. one does not associate her art to the ideas nor events, but a kind of autobiography or confession. the impulse of the viewer is to attach the frame to her life.29 then, her abstractness takes a more definition and focus. she began drawing the tunnel, which cannot be dissociated from a road or a train trip and thus from journey.30 the works about tunnels bring to mind not only the paris metro system, but also the trains system and numerous tunnels that burrow through the european mountain ranges. the tunnel works impart the incessant comings and goings referring to progress and movement. nevertheless, the full meaning of the tunnel actually becomes unambiguous through the inscape paintings.31 her inscapes should be studied in relation to landscape painting itself, not only of saguil’s but the whole of philippine art.32 landscape also refers to the land both as political as well as an economic issue.33 to the mind of the author, the landscape meant prison, the limits of artistic possibilities in her own country. for this reason, when she found freedom abroad, she depicted the core of the land: the tunnel. saguil, however, could also have depicted another symbol 60 prajñâ vihâra nena saguil, “the island” 1970 oil on canvas mounted on wood (tondo) 110 cm. (diameter). collection ateneo art gallery. gift of benjamin saguil jr. courtesy of ramon e.s. lerma, curator jovino g. miroy 61 of progress, namely, the skyscraper. one can say that this did not interest her at all because none of the works in the exhibition showed the usual fascination for the monuments in paris. even more fascinating is that her early parisian works were on the subject matter of the night.34 yet, even the painting “paris by night” (1956) does not really bear any indication that it could not be anywhere else.35 in this regard, her painting of “the lamppost” (1956) is significant. having gone to paris in the 1950’s, she would have reached the time when those lampposts ran on gas, and would have witnessed their electrification. up to now, the modernization of cities begins with improvement on street lighting. saguil demonstrates her genius by painting, rather than just its light, the alluring form of the post and its place in the frenzied city. compare this to the depiction of the lamp in an earlier painting which gave off neither light nor life.36 if one goes back to the inscape paintings, one notices playfulness in the drawings that is also found in pop art. yet the series is a true exemplar of how a person would draw his own mind. how are we to understand the word inscape? in terms of art, it stands in contradistinction to landscape. is inscape about the self or is it about the mind? saguil’s abstraction, although it is also about freedom, differs greatly from expressionism. for her abstraction used a very specific figurative language: the circle, the semi-circle, the line. the colors are very distinct too. the composition is stunning too, there is not one stroke of pen, especially in the triptych series, that needs to be changed. in this sense, she continues the task of the landscape artist, who portrays the external order of the physical world. in her case, however, the ordering is internal, while the movement is upward and expansive, reminiscent of a cathedral. saguil’s modernity, then, would not conform to the one dupré described. most christian thinkers have deplored modern art, especially abstract art. dupré’s essay on modernity reveals the same bias. if we look at the works of saguil, however, there is not the same violation of humanity dupré talks about.37 in her works, the self is completely herself, and yet she does not get lost in her own categories or even in her own expression. furthermore, saguil includes the viewer in the conversation that goes on between the artist and her self as well as her self. just like in rothko, abstraction in these works is truly spiritual.38 indeed her choice 62 prajñâ vihâra to make inscapes rather than landscapes distances her from the romantic artists who wish to experience their inhibited self in nature. instead, her modernity is an individuation through the experience of the religious, where the self is truly herself within the interior order. the religious evolution continued until she found illumination.39 regardless of the possible reference to rimbaud, no one can deny the reference to augustinianism in this regard.40 it was also during this time that she converted to being a jehovah’s witness. can one say that illumination is the discovery of the one god through his own the gift of knowledge? we notice that sometimes saguil depicts illumination in black and white, and sometimes in bursts of colors. the colors of the illumination paintings have come very far from the colors of the manila period. the later ones are pristine, and are truly light, both in the sense of being luminescent as well as not being ponderous. the final turn is the turn to space.41 in at least one later work there is centering as well as simplification. the centering, however, might deceive us into thinking that the painting is about the forms, but rather it is about space. it talks about how figures make one see the space, which is not the subject matter in all the other paintings. most of her work manifest the same horror for emptiness (or love of fullness) found in most filipino art. again one can be deceived, for emptiness is in the numerous circles. for saguil, space is not exterior but interior. even so, in the late works, she has converted from the over preoccupation for the interior space to space itself. she did not want also the freedom of individuality, but wanted also to be in all. is the philosopher over reading the works of saguil? is he too steeped in the medieval world to see that saguil is not? but the more he looks at triptych i (1977)42 the more sure he is that the inspiration is the cathedral. did not nena live near the notre dame? but the notre dame no longer meant for her the center of french catholicism. it meant only what is truly essential—the spiritual. the little girl who lived in front of the sta. cruz church has now become the apostle of abstraction rather than representation, of the mind rather than of the land, of illumination rather than knowledge, of space rather than form and color. the triptych drawings encapsulate how she no longer sees the incarnated and suffering god, but instead the pure lightness and being of god, i. e., he who is. jovino g. miroy 63 she has become modern, but in being modern she also embodied what is essential in her communal self, that is god and religion. saguil’s modernity is not a discovery of a self constituting subject, but of a transcendent light or the all-encompassing space. contrary to dupré ’s assertion, her modernity does not exhibit dehumanization or a romantic return to nature where the self communes more intimately with itself. instead, they speak of illumination, wherein the mind understands through the efficiency of divine light itself. in saguil, however, this ethereal light appears only at night. for her, god does not rise in the morning but in twilight.43 conclusion this paper gave a very preliminary discussion of the question “is filipino thought medieval?” primarily using the method of philosophy, it clarified the questions involved in answering the question, namely, the definition of medieval, modern, and philosophy. at the same time, it discussed the relevance of the question, especially to the writing of the history of philosophy in the philippines. finally, it discussed the work of nena saguil to illustrate how a filipino thinker has gone over modernity. this also shows that thought transcends philosophy and that philosophy is present in other areas like art. nonetheless, the main message of this paper has been that philosophy is not defined from the outside. filipino philosophy is decided by its own practitioners. at the same time, it can assume a broad definition that can include the philosophy discernible in art, architecture, and literature. addendum: the first synod of manila the sinodo de manila refers to the junta convoked by the first philippine bishop, domingo de salazar in 1581 and which ended in 1586.44 the documents pertaining to the synod are three: a] document 1: archivo de la universidad de santo tomas (manila), seccion de becerros, tomo 14 suma de una junta que hizo a manera de concilio el año 1582, para dar asiento a las cosas tocantes al aumento de la fe, y justificacion de las conquistas hechas ; y que en adelante se hicieren por los españoles. b] document 2: árchivum romanum societatis iesu (roma), seccion 64 prajñâ vihâra philippinarum, volumen 12, folios 268-289v junta i congregacion hecha en la ciudad de manila para aviso de los confesores y remedio de algunos casos de abusos de las islas filipinas. 1582. c] complementary document: agi, audiencia de filipinas , 84 tondo 17, de octubre de 1581 « la junta y resolucion que el obispo tomo sobre la execucion de la cedula de los sclavos ».45 how can we prove that these texts can be sources of philosophy? can one use synodal texts for philosophy at all? historians who have studied the text would be first to say that the synod’s “theological conclusions were not drawn up on the basis of abstract principles excogitated by theologians enclosed in their cloisters.”46 although they are clear that those present were theologians and not philosophers, this does not mean that those present in the synods and those who drew up the documents did not use philosophy at all. by pointing out that the theological conclusions were not drawn from abstract but “concrete” principles, the historian seems to be saying that there were practical considerations involved in the resolutions of the synod. these precepts, however, have to be taken as examples of communal truth for they were reached through discussions and not individual cogitation. these texts belong to the conciliar tradition, which historians of political philosophy have long studied as adumbrations of constitutionalism. they resemble the conciliarist writings (e.g. nicholas of cusa’s de concordantia catholica) insofar as they use theology and metaphysics to justify political claims.47 the texts can be used as sources of philosophy for two main reasons: a) there is enough historical evidence linking its protagonists with philosophers like francisco de vitoria and bartolome de las casas. b) corollary, through the work of scholars like cary nederman, one can use these texts as examples of medieval toleration.48 francisco de vitoria and natural law lucio gutierrez states: “the synod faithfully follows the teaching of the spanish theologian francisco de victoria” (1485-1546)49 he rightly makes this claim because vitoria was part of the dispute over the legitimacy of the colonization of the americas, “to which vitoria alludes at the jovino g. miroy 65 beginning of on the american indians, began in 1513 when king ferdinand called a commission (junta) of theologians and civil and canon lawyers to discuss the matter.”50 it was vitoria who said that legitimacy of sovereignty can only be derived from natural law.51 failing to meet the requirements of natural law, spanish colonial presence, however, could only be justified through laws of nations (ius gentium) which made room for natural partnership and communication between nations, ius peregrinandi, and ius predicandi,52 and just war.53 john schumacher states that according to the texts of the synod: “the king of spain had no natural law title to sovereignty over the philippines, supporting the earlier opinion of fr. martin de rada that no part of the philippines had come under spanish rule by any just war.”54 for this reason schumacher explains the legitimacy of spanish colonial rule through what he calls supernatural sovereignty.55 the spanish could only stay in the philippines on the following conditions: 1) that they had commission to preach the gospel; 2) that colonial presence did not give the right to take away all authority from the pre-hispanic native rulers; and 3) that it meant the role of supervision to the extent necessary that the gospel be effectively preached.56 for schumacher the relevance of the texts of the synod goes beyond demonstrating to us the thought prevalent in manila in the latter part of the 16th century; instead, it is an enduring testament to the need for the church to ponder on the principles of justice.57 it is also interesting that because he wanted to draw up guidelines for the 1979 synod of manila, he uses a vatican ii term to describe the synod’s underlying political philosophy; namely, subsidiarity: “the governor…should put in the larger and more stable towns indio judges, elected by the indios themselves, who should take care of general justice and good order, and settle ordinary disputes.”58 the synod thought that those who would proximately rule filipinos should be filipinos themselves, for spanish sovereignty was legitimate only to the extent that it permitted the spread of the catholic faith.59 de las casas and toleration there is also evidence of the possible link of the texts to bartolome de las casas (1484-1566). gutierrez quotes salazar himself who said: “i 66 prajñâ vihâra was reared in the doctrine of the bishop of chiapas [las casa].”60 cary nederman takes de las casas as an example of late medieval form of toleration.61 distinguished from vitoria for not being a theologian who disputed over the americans in the safety of the university of salamanca, “bartolome de las casas, had observed the process of conquest at first hand and could draw on empirical as well as philosophical evidence to refute justifications of spanish imperialism.”62 nederman considers him a philosopher of toleration because he thought that conversion could not be humanly effected through coercion: “to employ coercion is inhumane because it fails to take into account that humanity is defined by possession of certain inborn, but imperfectly realized, potentialities, it is uncivilized because it mistakes occidental cultural development for a singular process that no other people is capable of recapitulating, except perhaps at sword’s point.”63 thus, if non-christians cannot be forced to be baptized into the catholic church, the authorities in the americas have to forbear the nonchristian rites and beliefs until the natives themselves voluntarily embrace the imported religion.64 such toleration is the locus of dialogue, which the missionary has to practice in order to remain true to himself as a christian. according to schumacher, the texts of synod indicate their adherence to de las casas’ principle of toleration: “what is more significant, however, is some of the reasons given, which show an underlying respect for the filipinos and their personal dignity which contrasts not only with that of the generality of the conquistadores but with that which even the clergy would express in later times.”65 one indication that perhaps the synod upheld the principles of toleration is the ruling on the language to be used for evangelization: “the momentous decision it took in this matter was that the filipinos were to be evangelized in their own languages, which the missionaries should set themselves to learn, if they had not done so already.”66 it must be emphasized that this decision of the synod differs from the directive given in 1555 for america. it also differs from the effort to superimpose spanish in the whole of iberia itself. schumacher explains that not only was this a practical and effective evangelical strategy, but it also demonstrates that the synod thought that “filipino society, the “republica de indios,” as it was called, had a right to existence of its own, and that spanish rule was only justified to the extent that it created conditions necessary for preaching of the gospel.”67 to a large extent this directive jovino g. miroy 67 to missionaries to preach in the native languages changed the entire course of spanish presence in the philippines. although significant in the preservation and development of the native languages, the decision not to teach spanish also set the philippines behind spain and the other colonies, thus becoming an issue in the egalitarian efforts of the propaganda movement. language figures prominently too in the colonization process of the united states which decided to teach english to the filipinos. in one sense the synod of manila is a logical consequence of what has been going on in spain since the 15th century. the place of the texts of the synod of 1581 in writing the history of philosophy in the philippines is large, not primarily because it used scholastic thought but because it is political philosophy. this is evident not only in what historians have called its agenda of justice but more especially in its links to vitoria and de las casas. gracia pegs the starting point of hispanic philosophy to the time spanish philosophers began thinking about the territories in america.68 the texts of the synod prove that this is true in the philippines as well. if we accept this as a starting point of western philosophy in the philippines then it means that a) filipino thought might be more interested in practical philosophy than in speculative and metaphysical philosophy, and b) that the spanish culture that came here had roots in the middle ages. hopefully, this medievalism is not static but dynamically looks forward to modernity. the texts of the synod are significant only insofar as they can be a source for reflection on democratic thought.69 the synod it must be remembered was not an extraordinary event in the process of colonization for it came after two previous juntas: the junta of burgos called by king ferdinand in 1513 and the ecclesiastical junta of mexico in 1546. there is mention in the historical studies of many juntas (civil and ecclesiastical) that were held in the philippines. to what extent did the experience of the juntas lead to the formation and development of democratic thought among ordinary citizens as well as the founding of the katipunan? it is significant that our word huntahan, which means telling stories, comes from the word spanish junta. the texts of the synod of manila tell us that our obsession for telling stories in the streets is indeed an avenue towards democracy. endnotes 68 prajñâ vihâra 1 roque ferriols, pambungad sa metapisika (quezon city: office of research and publication, 2002). 2 keiji nishitani, religion and nothingness (berkeley: university of california press, 1982). 3 david keck, “influences of the european middle ages in the philippines,” philippine studies vol. 44 1996: 447-464. 4 jorge gracia, hispanic/latino identity a philosophical perspective (mass: blackwell malden, 2000). 5 cf. routledge encyclopedia of philosophy (london: routledge, 1990). 6 one can argue that, as a counter-reformation foundation, the jesuits order preserved and developed the medieval fund of knowledge in the face of the spain’s position in the world order. the relationship of this powerful order of priests to the middle ages should be a relevant subject to explore. 7 cf. addendum on the first synod of manila. 8 cf. gracia, hispanic/latino identity, 86: “suarez’s disputationes metaphysicae, for example, was printed in more than 17 editions outside the iberian peninsula between 1597 and 1636, whereas descartes’s meditations appeared only jovino g. miroy 69 nine times between 1641 and 1700. yes descartes is considered a major figure in the history of philosophy, whereas suarez is hardly known.” the spanish tradition also looks at the pensador as being different from a philosopher. how spanish philosopher also traversed the road from tradition to modernity might also be helpful for our purposes. 9 jan aertsen, “is there a medieval philosophy?,” international philosophical quarterly vol. 34 1999: 397. cf also adreas speer, “qu-est-ce que la philosophie au moyen âge? bilan philosophique du dixième congrès international de philosophie médiévale tenu à erfurt du 25 au 30 août 1997” recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 65 1 (1998): 133-146. 10 roque ferriols, sinaunang pilosopiyang griyego (quezon city: office of research and publication). 11 we are immediately within a political discourse here, for these two terms can also be retranslated into english as conservative and progressive. sinauna sometimes considered not tribal, but spanish. sometimes it is considered the superstitious versus the enlightened faith of products of catholic schools. 12 pierre hadot, qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (paris: gallimard, 1995). 13 carlos steel, “medieval philosophy: an impossible project? thomas aquinas and the averroistic ideal of happiness” in was ist philosophie im mittelalter? (miscellanea mediaevalia 260, ed. a. aertsen and andreas speer 9berlin: degruyter, 1998): 152-74. 14 alain de libera, la philosophie médiévale, 2nd ed. (paris: puf, 1992). 15 etienne gilson, l’esprit de la philosophie médiévale (paris: vrin, 1969). 16 aertsen, is there a medieval philosophy, 397. 17 ibid., 399. 18 aertsen, is there a medieval philosophy, 386. 19 louis dupré , “the modern idea of culture: its opposition to its classical and christian origins,” in modernity and religion ed. ralph mcinerny (notre dame: university of notre dame press, 1994): 1-18. 20 dupré, modern idea of culture, 5. 21 dupré, modern idea of culture, 11. 22 roque ferriols, magpakatao: ilang babasahing pilosopiko (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 1999). 23 karsten harris, the meaning of modern art (evanston: northwestern university press, 1968). 24 alejandro abadilla, ako ang daigdig (manila; silangan publication house, 1955). 25 the addendum would show that some texts can be found as sources of philosophy in the philippines. its culture, however, is still largely non-discursive in nature; for this reason, it tries to bring out the philosophy found in the arts. cf. peter murphy, civic justice: from greek antiquity to the modern world (amherst new york: humanity book, 2001). for additional literature cf. josef chytry, “fair play,” history and theory 43 (feburary 2004), 83-106; 70 prajñâ vihâra 26 emmanuel torres, nena saguil: landscape and inscapes from the material world to the spiritual (quezon city: ateneo art gallery, 2003). 27 although a modernist even before she went to france, saguil only fully developed her own true form of modernism there. 28 torres, nena saguil, 7. 29 this is also paralleled by the fictitious information she gives in her interviews, almost saying that her art alone contains her biography. 30 the green tunnel (1964); the tunnel (1964), book jacket covers (front and back) for nena saguil by ernst fraenkel and waldeman george (paris: edition de beaune, 1969 (1964). 31 landscape of the mind i (1969), landscapes of the mind ii and iii (1973). 32 landscape 1949. 33 ann bermingham, landscape and ideology the english rustic tradition 1740-1860 (los angeles: university of california press, 1986). 34 night i and ii, 1962. 35 one can also note that in her manila years there is an obvious sense of imitation, that is, she would imitate the style of the european modernists. while her later styles bore the mark of other painters less obviously, art critics hesitate to put her in any clear movement in art, even the ones current in paris while she was alive. she became an individual, reflected in her being a recluse. 36 vanity (1948). 37 dupré, idea of modern culture, 11. 38 richard sennet, the conscience of the eye (new york: alfred a. knopf, 1990). 39 illumination i (cloud, sun, sea, and marine creature) (1974), illumination ii (1977), evening illumination (1983), illumination iii (yellow sky, purple landscape) (1985). 40 norman kretzmann, the cambridge companion to augustine (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2001). 41 l’espace sur rouge ver gris, noir et blanc (1989-90), scriptures on the wall (1990). 42 triptych ii and iii (1977, 1983). 43 crépuscule de dieu (1972), the black sun (1977). 44 domingo de salazar, sinodo de manila de 1582 estudio introductorio, glosa y transcripcion de los textos sinodales por josé luis porras camuñez (madrid: centro de estudios historicos del consejo superior de investigaciones cientificas, 1988). 45 « actas del primer sinodo de manila (1582-1586),” philippiniana sacra (1969): 426-27; h. de la costa, s. j., the jesuits in the philippines 1581-1768 (cambridge: harvard university press, 1961); john schumacher, “the manila synodal tradition: a brief history,” philippine studies 27 (1979): 285-348; lucio gutierrez, the archdiocese of manila 1565-1999 (manila: the roman catholic archbishop of manila, 1999). jovino g. miroy 71 46 schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 305; de la costa, jesuits in the philippines, 23; gutierrez 42-43; 47 for literature on this cf. bibliography of jovino miroy, tracing nicholas of cusa’s early development the relationship between the de concordantia catholica and de docta ignorantia (kuleuven, 2002). 48 de la costa mentions thomas once, cf. jesuits in the philippines, 34. 49 lucio gutierrez, archdiocese of manila, 44. 50 francisco de vitoria, political writings ed. anthony pagden (cambridge: cambride university press, 1991), xxiii. the careful study of vitoria’s relationship with the conciliarists is in order. it is also relevant to state that there are a number of notable conciliarists among the spaniards, for example, johannes de segovia. 51 vitoria, political writings, xxiv. 52 the right to go out to other parts of the world peacefully, schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 296ff. 53 vitoria, political writings, xxviff. 54 schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 293. 55 on the distinction between the two sovereignties, cf. ibid., 296ff. another distinction he uses is: sovereignty by natural law and hypothetical sovereignty ibid., 294. 56 schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 294. in addition, the king of spain had right of sovereignty only because the native rulers did not rule according to natural law. this was the reason why the synod was called because the way spanish rulers were behaving proved that themselves did not adhere to natural law, cf. also. de la costa, jesuits in the philippines, 28. thus, the task of providing legitimation had the other effect of justifying and perpetuating their rule. 57 schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 297. 58 suma, 455-56. 59 schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 302. 60 cf. letter of domingo salazar to philip ii, manila, june 18, 1583, archivo general de las indias (seville, spain), patronato 25, ramo 8. 61 “in surveying the writings of las casas, one is struck by their constant and heavy dependence on the multiple conventional “languages” of philosophy, politics, and law in currency during the latin middle ages” cary nederman, worlds of difference european discourses of toleration c. 1100c. 1550 (university park: pennsylvania university press, 2000), 101. 62nederman, worlds of difference, 100. 63 ibid., 102. 64 ibid., 111. 65 schumacher, manila synodal tradition, 300. 66 ibid., 309. 67 ibid. 68 gracia, hispanic/latino identity, 76-86. 69 cf. de la costa, jesuits in the philippines, 25: “they presented a cedula or decree, which they had obtained from philip ii, forbidding the colonists to retain 72 prajñâ vihâra natives as slaves under any pretext whatever. this prohibition had been issued often enough before, even since pope paul iii made his famous declaration that liberty and property were of the number of those inalienable rights with which, as the signers of the american declaration of independence finely said some two centuries later, all men are endowed by their creator.” jovino g. miroy 73 122-dialogue on differing asian augustine and descartes on the divine light: a comparison to plato hu yeping the catholic university of america, washington, d.c. augustine and descartes are two great figures in the history of western philosophy, each having made his own major contribution in the field. in view of this aurelius augustine (354–430, a.d.) can be considered the father of christian philosophy, whereas rené descartes (1596–1650, a.d.) is called the father of the modern western philosophy. studies of the philosophy of these figures are particularly abundant. however, inspired by the book descartes and augustine1 by professor stephen menn, in this paper i would like to reexamine augustine’s confessions2 and descartes’ meditations on the first philosophy.3 we will ask why, after so many years, they promise to open new pathways between philosophers and theologians; what the two figures have in common in their search for truth, wisdom, and goodness, or the “divine light”; and where they differ in terms of its understanding and implementation. to help make this comparison i would like to employ as point of reference the commonplace of plato’s theory of the divided line and his allegory of the cave. this will make it possible to analyze the processes of inner self development as the path to truth for augustine and to knowledge for descartes, to appreciate their convergence upon the divine light, and to see what significance and meanings we can draw today from their distinctive insights for the troubled relation of faith and reason in our times. this then is a study in four parts: part i, “plato,” treats the passages in the republic on the theory of forms, the divided line and the allegory of the cave; parts ii and iii are on augustine and descartes respectively and examine the inner development of their work as it encounters the divine source of the light of the mind; and part iv compares the two great philosophers with plato’s allegory of the cave to see what they achieved, and they can contribute by their search, and what more needs to be done. prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 1-21 1 © 2000 by assumption university press part i. plato plato (427–347 b.c.) is the father of western philosophy; indeed whitehead once said that the rest of western philosophy was but footnotes on plato. plato’s writings in the form of dialogues are endlessly rich and profound resources for lovers of wisdom to explore, to contemplate and so to find new meanings. his republic is certainly one of the most significant of his great dialogues; its simile of the divided line and allegory of the cave are among its high points. plato divided reality into two levels of reality, one lower and the other higher: the objects on the lower level are physical, while on the higher level they are “forms”. forms are transcendent, eternal, intelligible, and archetypal, whereas physical things are spatio-temporal, changing, changeable and sensible. the forms are more perfect and real than physical things, whereas physical objects only imitate and participate in the forms. for instance, a ball is round, a watch is round, a well is round, etc.; there is also an ideal or a form of roundness in my mind. but which of these is the more real? plato believes that all physical roundness can be changed or is changing, but the idea of the roundness in my mind is permanent and changeless. this idea or form of roundness is imprinted in my mind. the next time i see something which has similar shape, i can compare the shape with the form in my mind and identify the physical thing as round. this is plato’s theory of forms. in the republic at the end of book vi, plato describes a line divided into two unequal sections, each having two unequal subdivisions. the four parts correspond to image (eikasia), belief (pistis), thought (dianoia) and understanding (noesis). what does this mean? through socrates plato argues that there are two kinds of reality: visible and intelligible. the first two subsections, image (eikasia) and belief (dianoia), belong to the visible world, which consists of images as shadows, reflections in water and physical objects, and their originals such as animals, plants, and material things. “as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this proportion: as the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to the thing that it is like?” the last two subsections, thought (dianoia) and understanding (noesis), belong to the intelligible world in which the soul uses images to reason from hypotheses not up to first principles, but down 2 prajñâ vihâra to a conclusion on the part of thought. the mind cannot go beyond its hypotheses and has to use images. however, in the last subsection the soul makes its way up to the first principle, proceeding through forms alone, moving from form to form and ending in forms. (see republic,4 book vi 508d-510b) here the subsections of divided line symbolize different levels of knowledge, truth and forms (goodness). knowledge and truth are beautiful, but not goodness itself, whereas the form is the highest good which is the source of all things. like the sun as regards sight, sight is not the sun, but receives the light from the sun; the sun is not sight, but the cause of sight and is seen by sight. in order to make the divided line more graphic and more understandable, plato uses the famous allegory of the cave to illustrate why the last section is so significant and best of all. plato invites us to imagine human beings chained in an underground cave and able to see only the images or shadows on the wall in front of them. there was fire at the mouth of the cave which cast the images or shadows. those in chains were limited to the images or shadows on the wall all their lives and believed these to be the truth or real things. this is equivalent to the visible realm corresponding to the first section of plato’s divided line which he called image (eikasia). others, freed from their chains, were able to look toward the physical objects which gave the shape or outline of the shadows and believed what they saw to be the real or true. plato called this belief (pistis) which was still on the sensible level. some managed to climb to the mouth of the cave and conceptualize what they had seen through their rational assumptions and reasoning power; this stage plato called thought (dianoia). eventually some struggled out the cave and reached the fire or source of the light. here they attained the level of understanding (noesis) and were able to experience reality beyond that encountered in the cave. beyond shadows, physical things and hypothetical reasoning, it is unchangeable, immeasurable, immutable and eternal. it is the truth and the form (goodness), the light which is the source of all things. arriving there the soul sees things ten thousand times better and enjoys the brilliant light of goodness itself. it is precisely this light, this truth and this goodness which augustine and descartes, each in their own unique or distinctive ways, discovered hu yeping 3 to be essential. we shall now proceed to explore how they made this discovery and what it can suggest for the human quest in our days. part ii. augustine brief history though there are many descriptions of the life and thought of augustine, we shall review briefly his personal history in order to situate the points of personal development relevant to our concerns. augustine was born in 354 ad in the town of thagaste in north africa. his father, patricius, who owned some property and was a small official, was not christian; his mother, monica, was a devout catholic. augustine learned rhetoric, literature, natural science, music, etc. and later taught rhetoric in thagaste, carthage, rome and milan. during his years in carthage, he became a manichean, a religion derived from many sources which claimed that it could lead to salvation. the key to its metaphysics was that there were two powers in reality, one good and the other evil. during his years in rome and milan, augustine gradually gave up this old faith and in 386 began to read some neo-platonic texts and converted to catholic. after his baptism, augustine gave up his teaching of rhetoric and concentrated on church work and biblical writings. in late 388 he returned to africa. in 391 he went to hippo, where he was ordained as priest and later became bishop of hippo till his death. augustine wrote many important works, among which his confessions is considered one of the great works of western literature. he composed this masterpiece during his first three years as bishop of hippo. this work, in the style of a prose-poem, has thirteen books with 278 chapters, directly addressed to “my god and my lord”. it covers many issues to philosophy, theology, religion, psychology, social theory, etc., but distinctively has a threefold confession: “a confession of sins, a confession of faith, and a confession of praise.”5 the first 1-9 books are about his past personal growth from infancy to his conversion. the last four books are precisely on the concerns of his converted mind in relation to memory, time and eternity, form and matter, and creation. 4 prajñâ vihâra “our heart is restless until it rests in you” the confessions is not only about wisdom which augustine desired and tried to embrace, but also about the truth which was the original source of his being. this he approached “by calling upon” and “by believing in” god through the interior development of his inner world. “if wisdom were found, to abandon all the empty hopes and all the lying follies of my vain desires.” (confessions vi, 11) “in truth, when i call upon him, i call him into myself.” (confessions i, 1) he examined his sinful infancy, evil-doing youth and the struggles of his early adulthood, but noted that throughout “i wished to mediate upon my god, but i did not know how to think of him except as a vast corporeal mass, for i thought that anything not a body was nothing whatsoever. this was the greatest and almost the sole cause of my inevitable error.” (confessions v, 10) indeed before his conversion, he was always bothered by the question of evil; he said that in his early life he enjoyed doing things sinful not out of some need, but for the wrong-doing itself. he tried different ways in order to find the answer. augustine believed that even an infant is not without sin. as a boy, he wanted to win and to show himself “not out of a desire for better things, but out of love for play.” (confessions i, 10) though his devout mother wanted him to be baptized his baptism was delayed. “for i, so small a boy and yet so great a sinner.” (confessions i, 12) he was fond of play, committed thefts, told lies and was full of greediness because “i did not see the whirlpool of filth into which i was cast away from before your eyes.” (confessions i, 19) at his early youth, he “burned to get my fill of hellish things” because of “the corruption of my soul.” (confessions ii, 1) though his mother warned him, he was blinded without seeing that her warnings “were your warnings, and i knew it not.” (confessions ii, 3) he enjoyed the association with others who committed crimes with him. in telling the famous story of stealing fruit augustine said the stealing was not out of need, but rather for the enjoyment of the actual theft. “i should be evil without purpose and that there should be no cause for my evil but evil itself. foul was the evil, and i loved it.” (confessions ii, 4) hu yeping 5 in his later youth, he said “my soul did not grow healthy” and there “was hunger within me from a lack of that inner food.” (confessions iii, 1) he was bothered by such questions as “whence is evil?” “is god confined within a corporeal form?” and “does he have hair and nails?” (confessions iii, 7) in searching for answers he first became a manichean, but later argued that the manichean view of all in material, corporeal and hence quantitative terms prevented him from knowing and loving god. “i did not know how to love you, for i knew only how to think upon gleaming corporeal things.” (confessions iv, 2) thus, he considered god to be part of the world and as a corporeal thing; he did not see that god is a spirit and “your spiritual works are above those corporeal things, bright and heavenly.” (confessions iii, 6) by reference to plato’s divided line we see that augustine was looking for an answer for his questions on evil and god in the visible subsection. he wished to conceive things whether bodily or spiritual in the same way “that seven and three make ten,” because he “did not know how to conceive except in a corporeal way.” (confessions vi, 4) he did not know that the true interior justice was not according to custom, but by the righteous law of god, and that “my body lives by my soul, and my soul lives by you.” (confessions x, 20) he loved all the bodily things and physical pleasures and looked for answers from without rather than within. such an earthly way of thinking forced him to think of god as something corporeal and measurable, having existence in space and place. he had no clear ideas about himself. like those chained in the cave he believed that shadows and physical objects were the true knowledge of the form and within that realm tried to think of something higher and beyond. he was, as it were, wandering in the cave, studying shadows on the wall and sensible things in order to conceive god. he thought of both god and evil in a measurable corporeal way and could not separate the two because in his sensible vision the infinite good, god who is everywhere, must overlap or interpenetrate evil. yet he could not be satisfied with this manichean answer and remained puzzled by the problem of evil: how to explain that god was almighty, all good and infinite, and yet recognize and resolve the problem of evil. there must be something else which transcends visible thinking. as menn points out, “augustine says that the principal reason why he had fallen into error was his inability to conceive of anything except 6 prajñâ vihâra bodies extended in space. wishing to conceive of god in the most appropriate way, he could only imagine him as an infinite body interpenetrating all other bodies.”6 reading cicero’s hortensius “changed my affections. it turned my prayers to you, lord, and caused me to have different purposes and desires.” (confessions iii, 4) during his years in rome and milan as a teacher of rhetoric, he never stopped searching for a better understanding of his questions; unsatisfied with the manichean doctrine, he looked for a new answer. in milan he met saint ambrose who had great impact on him. “i heard him, indeed, every sunday as he was rightly handling the word of truth before the people.” (confessions vi, 3) however, “not yet”: augustine was still uncertain and still searching. in the meantime he received some neo-platonist texts which liberated him from manichean notion of reality and directed his mind within to discover that his mind was measured by something higher and more perfect than what is corruptible, and that the eternal truth and the universal good were above the changing world. neo-platonist spirituality and interiority and its corresponding internal freedom from the external world drew augustine closer to the christian scriptures. neo-platonism pulled him out, as it were, from the visible and the corporeal to the third level of the divided line. he began to turn inward to his inner self to look for an answer. augustine was influenced by the thought of two neo-platonists: plotinus (204/5–270 ad) and porphyry (c.233–309 ad). plotinus developed a metaphysics founded in a dichotomy between the intelligible and the sensible. the former was real, unchanging and non-spatial, whereas the later was unreal, changeable and spatial. further he developed a hierarchy of three existents: the one, the intellect, and the soul. ‘the one’ or ‘the good’ was the ultimate cause of everything. it could not be grasped by sensible things and thought, but was connected to externals through ‘the intellect,’ which was the platonic form. ‘the intellect’ acted through the cosmic soul, which produced sensible objects and gave life to the bodily organisms. the soul, the lowest intelligible cause, was directly in contact with sensible objects. plotinus was a dualist about body and soul. human beings belonged to the sensible world through their physical life, but their soul was rooted in the divine intelligibility and contemplation hu yeping 7 and philosophy could help the soul return to its divine root. plotinus believed that the cosmic realm was a chain of forms and matter and that non-being was the cause of evil. evil was no more than a defect of being and goodness. the weakness in the soul made humans misuse their free choice and tend to material things, which was the cause of evil. porphyry was a student of plotinus and edited plotinus’ teachings with his own insights. he was also responsible for the renewal of aristotle’s philosophical thought. he possessed very broad learning from philosophy to literary criticism, from history to religion. porphyry held that reason exercised by a pure mind could lead to the true essence of things, the one god. intellectual activity detached the soul from passions and confusions, and concentrated its activity on the real things: the soul could be purged if it was away from body. he promoted abstinence such as being vegetarian, avoiding sexual activity and being devoted to the contemplation of being. god contained all things, but was contained by nothing. degrees of being were also degrees of goodness. the soul was in the median position: it could descend to evil or ascend to goodness. by ascetic acts and retrospective contemplation, the soul could achieve its true fulfillment. the neo-platonist views of evil and its immaterialism had strong impact on augustine. it liberated him from the manichean understanding of god and taught him that the soul had inherent power of self-knowledge, which could be achieved by putting aside the sensible and physical objects. thus the soul could be led to the divine light and to truth itself. by entering into himself to seek out “who i am?” augustine no longer desired honor, wealth and vanity, but looked for incorporeal truth as instructed by “the books of platonists.” he was by now certain that “you exist, that you are infinite, . . . that you are truly he who is always the same, . . . that all other things are from you . . . of these truths i was most certain, but i was too weak to find my joy in you.” (confessions vii, 20) “i knew what a thing of evil i was, but i did not know the good that i would be after but a little while.” (confessions viii, 8) but when he “enters into his own innermost parts,” he is not considering how much room his body or his soul may take up, but only his own thoughts. this reflection on himself leads him to recognize that some of his thoughts are in accordance with truth 8 prajñâ vihâra or wisdom, and that some of them run contrary to truth. he therefore recognizes that there must be some such thing as truth, which sets the standard for whether he is thinking rightly or not.7 augustine begins by intuiting his own soul, and then this first intuition somehow allows him to come to an intuition of god. augustine says that this procedure led him to a knowledge of god very different from the conjectures he had previously formed, and that with this knowledge of god he could understand whence evil arose.8 because of the influence of the neo-platonism augustine began to think of himself, his soul and god in a non-corporeal way and to conceptualize what they were and how they related to each other. but in plato’s imagery he was still inside the cave or in the third level of the divided line – thought (dianoia). he tried with his own measurable power of intellect to reason out the immeasurable and non-quantifiable god; but he was close to the fourth level and its true understanding of the divine light. thus, his inner struggle was fought “much more bitterly than ever before,” (confessions viii, 11) he confessed that it was his love of old trifles that delayed him from drawing closer to the highest good. this debate within his heart was only a fight of himself against himself, because people wished to be “light not in the lord but in themselves.” the heart was still restless because it did not know that “the true light enlightens every man that comes into this world.”9 in his confessions augustine described in detail his struggle and his encounter with the divine light, with god, face to face. when he started reading scriptures he was at first not as enthused as he later became. “my swelling pride turned away from its humble style, and my sharp gaze did not penetrate into its inner meaning.” (confessions iii, 5) with a newly intense desire, he reread the scriptures and “i saw those pure writings as having one single aspect, and i learned to exult with joy . . . whatever truths i had read in those other works i here found to be uttered along with the praise of your grace.” (confessions vii, 21) “for your teaching is true, and besides you there is no other teacher of the truth.” (confessions v, 6) he turned to himself again and again to look for the inner light in his hu yeping 9 soul and found that “i” am only a man and ‘i am not he, but he has made me!’ in particular he found that his mind was measured by truth which enabled him to know and hold to those first principles by which all areas of truth could be explored. augustine recognized that beyond corporeal objects, changing and measurable things, there was something higher and truer, something unchangeable and unmeasurable which measured all. this transcended the physical and visible world (plato’s first and second levels) where he had searched. looking within he found that as measuring of the mind it must be beyond the mind (plato’s third level). where could he find that unchangeable and unmeasurable measure of all? here, i would like to recall a story from one of the upanishads. uddalaka, the father, repeatedly asked his son, svetaketu, through what could he see; the son answered by the sun; but if there was no sun, then by the moon; if however there were no moon, then by lamp light; finally if there were no lamp light – the son was silent. then the father taught him: you could see through your heart and your inner soul. augustine did precisely the same. “i entered into my inmost being” and saw “an unchanging light” above his soul and his mind. “it was not this common light, plain to all flesh, nor a greater light, as it were, of the same kind, as though that light would shine many, many times more bright, and by its great power fill the whole universe.” (confessions vii, 10) in 386 in the garden of his house in milan, augustine made the final decision “in the shifting tides of my indecision” to surrender himself to “my light, my wealth, my salvation, my lord god.” (confessions ix, 1) it was an unconditional surrendering to “put you on the lord jesus christ.” as he recalled later in his confessions it was a child’s voice calling out “take up and read. take up and read” that led him to pick up the gospel and read the passage which came before his eyes: “go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me.”10 immediately the dark shadow of doubt in his heart fell away. in 387 he was baptized a few days before his mother’s death. from then on augustine’s heart and soul rested in the city of god where he found wisdom, truth and beauty, and above all the divine light. 10 prajñâ vihâra part iii. descartes it would be too simple to say that descartes made the same search as did augustine. however, there are real similarities. both were looking for the divine light which transcends sensible things, and even indubitable thought. in his major work, mediations on first philosophy, descartes established the mind as an immaterial substance and god as an infinite and non-deceiving existence. brief history descartes was born in 1596 in touraine, france. his father was a provincial government official and landholder; his mother died when he was one year old. he studied at the collège royal de la flèche, run by the jesuit order, where he received a well-grounded education in the aristotelian-scholastic tradition, the study of languages and literature, as well as natural science. he left la flèche and later went to the university of poitiers, after which he traveled broadly across europe learning, as he put it, from the book of the world. during his travels, he met isaac beeckman to whom he promised to write down his method. after this meeting descartes had a series of three dreams which he took as divine approval of his project to found a new science which would bring mathematical clarity to all branches of knowledge. he continued to travel extensively throughout europe, and subsequently returned to paris, where he joined the intellectual elites of the time. among them were some augustinian theologians whose views on god and the will were more attractive to descartes. he was closely associated with marin mersenne who later became a central figure in the new philosophy and science in europe and descartes’ paris correspondent. at a gathering at the home of the papal nuncio in paris, in responding to an alchemical lecture descartes illustrated the methodic principles on which his new philosophy would be based. this caught the attention of cardinal de bérulle who urged descartes to develop his philosophy. as a result in 1628, descartes went into relative seclusion in holland where he wrote his major scientific and philosophical works. he hu yeping 11 concentrated finally on his mediations on metaphysics or first philosophy which he conceived as providing the foundation for the new science. for this he came to be called the father of modern western philosophy. except for a few short trips to paris, descartes remained in holland until 1649, when he was asked by the queen christina of sweden to come to stockholm. there he fell ill and died in february 1650. descartes’ earlier writings concerned method, both in his rules for the direction of the mind and his discourse on method for conducting one’s reason well and for seeking the truth in the sciences. the latter he exemplified by works in optics, geometry and meteorology. in his later writings descartes concentrated on how the method was grounded in metaphysically based truths, the cogito argument and the proof for the existence of god and the spirituality of the soul. in 1640 descartes completed his work on meditations on first philosophy but did not publish it till 1641 in latin. he dedicated this work to the faculty of sacred theology of the sorbonne and wrote synopses to introduce its six meditations. “cogito ergo sum” descartes was educated in traditional scholasticism which attempted to combine christian doctrine with aristotelian philosophy. at la flèche he studied logic, physics, cosmology, metaphysics, morals, theology, etc. after he left school, descartes rejected aristotelian philosophy which was based on sensory experience and the physical world. “i will attack straightaway those principles which supported everything i once believed.”11 however, he always held that there was a systematic coherence in knowledge and a methodological structure which one needed to follow. descartes began by attempting ambitiously in his rules for the direction of the mind to develop a method of proceeding solely by clear and distinct ideas in order to achieve mathematical certitude for all areas of knowledge. menn notes that descartes achieved great success in the mathematics section of his project. however, when he sought mathematical clarity regarding the physical order, he failed to work out a coherent set of rules based solely on pure mathematics. mathematics opened many 12 prajñâ vihâra possibilities, but in order to know which of these applied there was need for clear and distinct knowledge of the nature and structures of the physical powers of observation. but as this could not be had without a priori certification of his method he found himself in a vicious circle from which there was no escape. something more than mathematics was needed; he needed to know the extent of the capabilities of the human mind, “what human knowledge is, and how far it extends.”12 he needed knowledge especially of the foundations of knowledge which could not be doubted. as a result he never completed his rules, which was published only posthumously. instead it was at this time that he left paris and settled in holland to focus on these deeper more foundational problems and developed his works on method and metaphysics. in order to build a solid and indubitable foundation for all the sciences descartes began with a universal doubt, but how to start such a universal doubt? in part ii of the discourse on method, descartes established four scientific and methodological principles. the first was “never to accept anything as true” until it was so clear and distinct “that i had no occasion to call it in doubt”; the second was to divide the problem into as many pieces as possible in order to analyze them; the third was to synthesize the parts or put them in “an orderly fashion” in order to reconnect them clearly and distinctly; and fourth was to review them thoroughly and completely in order not to leave out anything.13 where could he start his universal doubt? in the first mediation descartes chiefly discussed those things “that can be called into doubt”, those sensible objects which were direct and immediate to us. descartes believed that the senses were deceptive, that the images of things in our mind were false, and that stories or fables, oratory and poetry, languages or books, theology and philosophy, and even medicine and mathematics were not trustworthy. hence we could not tell what was true; was it what we saw with our eyes if our dreams could be equally vivid? in order to make sure that all was clear and distinct, it was necessary to examine all these disciplines, so that we could know “their true worth and to guard against being deceived by them.”14 he suggested that people should learn not to believe “too firmly” anything given by examples and custom because they prevented us from reaching true knowledge. “thus i little by little freed myself from many hu yeping 13 errors that can darken our natural light and render us less able to listen to reason.”15 he pulled out all the old foundations, began again from what could not be doubted, and proceeded exclusively by clear and distinct ideas in order to avoid reasoning falsely. once there was nothing more that could be doubted and at the same time a new foundation was needed to start with, where could he begin? descartes started from the “i” as a thinking thing. “while i wanted thus to think that everything was false, necessarily this truth – i think, therefore i am – was so firm and so assured . . . i judged that i could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy i was seeking.”16 even though “i” was deceived, as long as “i” was thinking then “i” was something. “i am, i exist” was true in my mind whenever “i” conceived it. “i” was a thing to doubt, understand, will, affirm, deny, refuse, imagine and sense.17 in the second meditation descartes used the example of wax to assert that only the human mind or the intellect alone perceived the extended, flexible and mutable wax — not seeing, touching or imagining. descartes developed his cogito argument: ‘i am thinking, i exist’ or ‘ego cogito, sum’ to establish the self as the starting point of his search for his new philosophy and to certify the self as a thinking substance distinct from the body. however, he asked, how i knew that my thinking was not deceiving me? he wanted to see whether these reasons were powerful enough. he said “all i have in mind is that i am driven by a spontaneous impulse to believe this, and that some light of nature is showing me that it is true.”18 this “light” was not ordinary light, for he had already prescinded from or placed under doubt the physical “light” by which he perceived sensible things. what then is this light? here augustine may be helpful. as mentioned above, augustine confessed that he was caught by corporeal things, and conceived the senses, the soul and god in the first to third levels of the divided line. that is, he always sought to use a measurable instrument to try to sort out unmeasurable things, or to use ordinary light to see the divine light; hence he could not solve the problem of evil. descartes, however, was concerned with how to avoid error in knowing truth, how to build an adequate fundation for all knowledge, and where to locate the foundation. it was just at this point that descartes too recognized that the project of his rules was unrealizeable in its original terms and that some further foundation was needed. 14 prajñâ vihâra menn argues that after descartes met cardinal de bérulle who “made it an obligation of conscience for him” to work out his philosophy for the benefit of humankind rather than only for mathematics, descartes went to holland and worked on nothing but metaphysics. “from this time on descartes always regards metaphysics, not mathematics or psychology, as the basis of his science.”19 and it was also possible that cardinal de berulle suggested to descartes to study augustine as a model. “about this time descartes turned to augustine’s central metaphysical ideas,”20 that is, to augustine’s understanding of god and the soul. the “ascent from the soul to god gives the core of augustine’s method or making god intelligible to us.” this is also the core of descartes’ third meditation. menn continues his argument that descartes was drawn to augustine’s approach precisely by the way his frustration with the project of the rules showed him the need for a “standard for the truth of the soul’s thoughts that would be independent of any prior understanding of bodies.”21 hence like augustine, even after the first two meditations where descartes first began by doubting his senses, then his own thinking and finally even a god who might deceive him if imagined as an “evil genius,” he still asked such questions as where he could find that “light” which would never deceive him what metaphysical foundations and absolute sources were there for his undoubtable “thinking thing”; and whether there was a god who was immutable, infinite, unmeasureable in perfection and the source of all things. “i clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than there is in a finite one. thus the perception of the infinite is somehow prior in me to the perception of the finite, that is, my perception of god is prior to my perception of myself.”22 here descartes says something similar to plotinus. as mentioned in the above section on augustine, plotinus established a hierarchy of one, intellect and soul, among which the soul was the lowest and connected with sensible things through the cosmic world. descartes claimed “i have been so constituted as a kind of middle ground between god and nothingness, or between the supreme being and non-being.”23 in order to be certain that god was the only source for the tangible things, the only truth for the illusive images and the only standard for all sciences, descartes turned to discovering or uncovering the existence of god by noting that the idea in him about the existence of god was the most true, the most hu yeping 15 clear and distinct. this could not be found from the senses or corporeal objects. rather, he took up augustine’s approach of withdrawing into himself, the thinking thing, to “distinctively conceive god by conceiving him as the immutable standard for our mutable mind, and in proving the existence of god as the cause of this conception in our mind.”24 if we followed this divine standard and did not turn away from it, we could not go wrong. here it is no longer the earlier inference of the descartes’ method iv “cogito ergo sum,” but the direct intention that doubting is thinking, that thinking is being, and that being is at root god: cogito, sum, deus est, as would note ferdinand alquié. in meditation iii descartes employs causal theory to prove the existence of god. he grouped thought in “certain classes” and argued that something could not come from nothing, but only from what possessed equivalent reality. the ideas of corporeal things were contained in “i” formally as “i” was a thinking thing, and eminently as “i’ was a substance. “the very nature of an idea is such that of itself it needs no formal reality other than what it borrows from my thought, of which it is a mode.”25 but the objective reality of the idea of the infinite and all perfect was so great that “i” alone could not be the cause of that idea formally and eminently; there must be something else outside of “i,” which was the cause of that idea. i could not cause the idea of god which was infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and powerful, and creates everything that exists. since “i” am a finite substance, “i” could not conceive something infinite because “there is more reality in an infinite substance than there is in a finite one”.26 arguing from a cosmological point of view, descartes asks from what source “i” derive my existence: from myself, my parents, or other things which contained less perfection than god. if from myself, “i” would have all the perfections “i” needed. since “i” am nothing but a thinking thing “if such a power is in me, then i would certainly be aware of it. but i observe that there is no such power; and from this very fact i know most clearly that i depend upon some being other than myself.”27 my parents gave “me” my body, but they did not generate my thoughts or ideas or myself as a thinking thing. it is also impossible that the less perfect things created me as “i” had the idea of god in my mind and “nothing more perfect than god, or even as perfect as god, can be thought or imagined.”28 16 prajñâ vihâra in meditation v descartes argues from an ontological point of view that since pure and abstract mathematics was most certain, it could also be applied to proving the existence of god. “god’s nature that he always exists is something i understand no less clearly and distinctly than is the case when i demonstrate in regard to some figure and number . . .”29 the existence of god is one of his perfections. “i” as an imperfect and finite being am not free to think of god without existence, “a supremely perfect being without a supreme perfection, as i am to imagine a horse with or without wings.”30 further the existence and essence of god were inseparable, just like a mountain and a valley which were inseparable from each other and like a triangle which contained three angles. by nature if “i” perceived something clearly and distinctly, it could not but be true. “i” perceive clearly and distinctly that there was a god not as a deceiver, and that everything else depended on him. then “i” concluded that my perception was necessarily true. “and thus i see plainly that the certainty and truth of every science depends exclusively upon the knowledge of the true god.”31 in sum, descartes found the divine source which could assure his “cogito ergo sum” and never deceive him, but rather give him faculties of reasoning, perceiving, judging, etc., upon which he depended entirely. like augustine, descartes also started from the senses (the visible level of the divided line) and advanced to the “thinking thing” (the third level) till he found the divine light (the fourth level), which not only created him but also gave him the intellectual idea of god, as “the mark of craftsman impressed upon his work.”32 afterthought from the above analysis of augustine and descartes we learn that both go back to their inner self to search for the light, both believe that there is something higher and greater than their soul and mind, both attribute that highest to god, the infinite and eternal creator of all things, and both find the divine source for augustine’s restless heart and descartes thinking thing. augustine was primarily concerned with the question of evil whereas descartes emphasizes the problem of avoiding erroneous knowledge. one hu yeping 17 is looking for religious freedom, the other for the liberation of human reasoning. both start from senses and move to the inner self till, in terms of plato’s allegory, they both escape the cave and arrive at the fourth level where they see the truth or the divine light. by this both were enlightened with a real sense of truth and knowledge (or understanding) beyond the senses, imagination and intellect (reasoning). this ability of understanding is somehow given and embedded in the human mind. thus, augustine finds a path to religious liberation, where descartes proceeds to apply human rationality empowered by the divine light. one rests in the kingdom of god to praise the eternal and infinite; the other uses the divine light to enlighten the human mind and assure the scientific exploration of the world. the way taken by augustine directs his restless heart to the kingdom of god, where he sees the real things with real knowledge, real truth and real beauty. thereafter he continues to reside there under the brilliant sun to contemplate and praise god in a saintly manner. in some contrast, when descartes meditates upon his self he too locates it in the divine light, but he does not stay there. rather he returns to the third level in order to apply his thought and reasoning now certified by the divine light. he resides there to live his “cogito” and “sum” as an undoubted “thinking thing”. augustine and descartes have done what they could with their own understanding of truth, wisdom and the divinity in their own circumstances. each has developed his own way to reach the highest good and to bring to humanity their own brilliant contributions. menn argues that descartes used augustine’s interior approach to god to resolve his difficulties and based science on this conception of god as reflected in his meditations. the core of augustine’s approach for making god intelligible to man by ascent from the soul to god was also the core of descartes’ meditations, especially his third meditation. menn’s reading of descartes provides a new angle to look at the father of modern western philosophy and opens a new approach to the study of his works. in this light we see that something significant had been omitted in the cartesian reading of descartes and that we need to go back to reexamine the texts and bring them forward for today. it is not that descartes’ project of a universal mathesis did not continue, but that it continued not against religious vision but as based thereupon. this is most important for 18 prajñâ vihâra the contemporary concern to work out a more adequate relation, of science to religion, of reason to faith or to reasoning in faith. over a millennium has passed since augustine, and more than 400 years have gone by since descartes. through the examination of the history of modern philosophy, we learn that the thought of modernity, based on descartes’ own thinking, contributed greatly to human development and human history, especially to its scientific achievements. however, there has been also a negative impact expressed by the terms “rationalism” and “iron cage” (weber). this might be due to the error of reading descartes exclusively rather than inclusively; to selectivity rather than openness in relating man and god, thereby setting reason against religion; and to our narrowly rationalistic rather than hermeneutic understanding of the project of the father of modern philosophy i would like to end this paper by pointing to the remainder of plato’s allegory of the cave. the continuation of his account notes something of special importance. some had struggled out of the darkness of the cave and its restrictively visible and measurable understanding of truth to reach the divine light and the goodness, or the real understanding of truth. but they were obliged to return to the cave in order to bring back the light, the truth and the goodness to the ones who still lived in the darkness and believed exclusively in sensible things. this the enlightened ones did at the risk of their life. plato argues that this is because they “are better and more completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both types of life.” because “you have seen the truth about fine, just and good things, you will know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image.” 33 it is indeed good to enjoy the sun and the divine light; it is good to strengthen human knowledge and intellect. but the most needed thing is for those who are thus enlightened to contribute to their fellow beings, to go back to the cave whence they came in order to bring light to the darkness, to educate the enslaved, and to enlighten the ignorant hearts. that is real education, real enlightenment, and the better way to be. hu yeping 19 endnotes 1 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998). earlier he published a summary of his views on descartes and augustine as “the problem of the third meditation,” american catholic philosophical quarterly, vol. lxvii, no. 4. 2 translated, with an introduction and notes, by john k. ryan (new york: image book doubleday, 1960). 3 translated by donald a. cress, fourth edition (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1998). 4 plato, republic, trans. g.m.a. grube and revised by c.d.c. reeve (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, inc., 1992), book vi, 509e510b. 5 ryan, introduction, p. 29. 6 “the problem of the third meditation,” american catholic philosophical quarterly, vol. lxvii, no. 4, p. 545. 7 ibid., p. 545. 8 ibid., p. 544. 9 john 1:9. 10 matt, 19:21. 11 rené descartes, discourse on method and meditations on first philosophy, trans. donald a. cress (indianapolis, indian: hackett publishing company, 1998), p. 60. 12 menn, p. 540. 13 descartes, p. 11. 14 ibid., p. 4. 15 ibid., p. 6. 16 ibid., p. 18. 17 ibid., p. 66. 18 ibid., p. 72. 19 menn, p. 543. 20 ibid., p. 543. 21 ibid., p. 548. 22 descartes, p. 76. 23 ibid., p. 82. 24 menn, p. 550. 25 descartes, p. 74. 26 ibid., p. 76. 27 ibid., p. 79. 28 ibid., p. 78. 29 ibid., p. 89. 30 ibid., p. 89. 31 ibid., p. 93. 32 ibid., p. 80. 33 plato, 520c. 20 prajñâ vihâra references augustine, confessions, trans. with an introduction and notes, by john k. ryan (new york: image book doubleday, 1960). descartes, meditations on the first philosophy, trans, by donald a. cress, fourth edition (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1998). descartes, discourse on method and meditations on first philosophy, trans. donald a. cress (indianapolis, indian: hackett publishing company, 1998). balz, albert g.a., descartes and the modern mind (hamden, conn.: archon books, 1967, c1952). chadwick, henry, augustine: a very short introduction (oxford : oxford university press, 2001). evans, g.r., augustine on evil (cambridge; new york: cambridge university press, 1982). lowry, walker, augustine, a secular consideration (s.l.: w. lowry, c1982). menn, stephen, descartes and augustine(cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998). menn, stephen, “the problem of the third meditation,” american catholic philosophical quarterly, vol. lxvii, no. 4, plato, republic, trans. g.m.a. grube and revised by c.d.c. reeve (indianapolis/ cambridge: hackett publishing company, inc., 1992). schouls, peter a., descartes and the enlightenment (kingston, ont.: mcgill-queen’s university press, 1989). wilson, margaret dauler, descartes (london; boston: routledge & k. paul, 1978). hu yeping 21 article5-1 christian attitudes toward other religions: the challenge of commitment and openness paul f. knitter xavier university, usa synopsis: this essay outlines both the necessity and the difficulty that christians face in working out a theology of religions that will sustain an authentic dialogue with other religions. the necessity for such a dialogical theology is grounded on the need for all religions to move from “an age of monologue” to “an age of dialogue.” the complexity has to do with the requirement of all dialogue: to be both truly committed to one’s own religion and at the same time truly open to other religions. the author then outlines the four models in christian theology for understanding other religions and shows how all of them, in one way or another, do not sufficiently foster both commitment and openness. the models are: 1) replacement (christianity is the only true religion, meant to replace all others.) 2) fulfillment (other religions are valuable but meant to be fulfilled in christianity.) 3) mutuality (no one religion is superior over all others; all are called to learn from each other.) 4) acceptance (all religions are so different that they really cannot be compared; each will make absolute claims.) so the task of developing an adequate christian theology of religions remains as a challenge to all christians; such a theology must be worked out through dialogue with other christians and with followers of other religions. over the past decades, for many christians (i’m talking especially about western christianity), there has been a slow but marked shift in the way christians view the “them” in the title of this chapter. especially in mainline churches, pastors are noting a change in the attitudes of their prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 167-180 167 © 2000 by assumption university press congregations toward persons of other religions: the “alien others,” we might say, are becoming the “neighborly others.” i. a shift from alien to neighbor throughout most of church history, the “religious others” have been for christians “the alien others.” those who walked hindu, buddhist, confucian, taoist, even jewish, and especially islamic, paths were generally felt to be strangers, often enemies, or competitors. they were aliens – feared, perhaps hated, always dangerous or suspicious. if there was any more positive christian relationship with them, it was one of trying to convert them, for on their own paths, they were moving away from god, toward eternal damnation. so to help them, one had to convert them. especially since the second half of the past century, such attitudes, both pastorally and theologically, have been changing. the theological shift occurred explicitly in the second vatican council of the catholic church (1962-65), but that was perhaps more an effect than a cause of what was already going on within the christian communities.1 gradually, more and more christians felt the need to get along with, respect, learn about, maybe even learn from hindus and buddhists and muslims. what may have been the scowl christians saw on the face of the religious other was turning to a smile. the question christians began to feel was not “how do we get them into heaven?” but “how do we talk with them?” many factors contributed to this shift. primarily, the world has become smaller. not only do ideas move around more quickly and more clearly, so do people. we live in an age of greater, smoother communication, information, migration. what has been happening religiously within our world and communities was captured way back in the 60s by wilfred cantwell smith, a pioneer of interfaith exploration, when he observed that now we no longer just read about hindus or muslims, but “we drink coffee with them personally as well.” they live down the street, work in the same office, play with (maybe even marry!) our kids.2 furthermore, centuries of missionary labors may have planted the christian church on all the continents of the world, but these labors 168 prajñâ vihâra have not changed the basic contours of the religious map of the world. some theologians, therefore, are drawing the tentative but unsettling conclusion that the many religions of the world are not “a matter of fact” but a “matter of principle.” they just don’t happen to be there — as the result of the vagaries or aberrations of history; they’re intended to be there – intended by the one god of history. in some way, the religions are playing a role in what christians call the history of salvation.3 god seems to love diversity, not only among plants and animals and peoples, but also among religions. if this is so, christians have to figure out what is the role of these other religions. that’s a theological question. it’s a question that can be answered not only by consulting the bible but also through knowing more about these religions. and one of the best ways to understand them is by talking with their followers. dialogue becomes a theological requirement. from the age of monologue to the age of dialogue the necessity of interreligious dialogue becomes all the more pressing when we consider, and feel overwhelmed by, the state of our world. what i am trying to get at is best expressed in the well-known announcement of hans küng: there will be no peace among nations unless there is peace among religions. and there will be no peace among religions unless there is greater, more effective dialogue among them.4 what küng is urging goes beyond tolerance between the religions. certainly, there can be doubt that the religious communities need to tolerate each other – that is, respect each other, let each other be. but tolerance, as urgent as it is, is not enough. religious people also have to talk with each other – and talk with each other in a way that will lead not only to greater understanding and respect, but also to cooperation. küng is calling for an interreligious dialogue that will facilitate not only interreligious tolerance but interreligious action – not only the ability to live together but the ability to work together in order to change this world. for christians, as well as for other religious believers, dialogue is becoming an ethical imperative. humanity today faces a broad, menacing array of ethical problems that threaten us all – and that therefore can be resolved only through the collaboration of all nations and cultures. paul f. knitter 169 i’m talking about the violence of material poverty, the violence of economic injustice, the violence of some people taking advantage of other people on the basis of race or of gender, and especially the violence that touches everyone everywhere – the depletion and destruction of the lifesustaining ability of the eco-system. and looming over (or under) this list is the violence and warfare and terrorism that is justified and fortified in the name of religions the analysis and resolution of such lifethreatening ethical challenges cannot come piecemeal, from any one nation or culture; rather, they require shared concern and shared action among all peoples based on some kind of shared ethical values. thus, the growing discussion about the need for a global ethic – fundamental, shared values, principles, commitments that have to be elaborated by all peoples and cultures in order to be acted on by all peoples and cultures. such a global ethic, if it is to be realized at all, will be the work of politicians, economists, political scientists, philosophers, grassroots organizations. but also, many are claiming, it must involve the work and contribution of religious communities. for great numbers of the world’s population, the values that will ground a global ethic and the energy and resolve to actually live by it will come from their religious faith and traditions. so the religions of the world must make their contribution to the common ethical challenges facing humanity; and they must do so individually by looking into the treasures of their own tradition and collectively through dialogue and cooperation with other traditions. so, though the phrasing may sound somewhat grandiose, we can say that christians, as well as all religious persons, are today being called to move from an age of monologue to an age of dialogue. the “age of monologue” describes most of the religious history of humankind – the centuries when for the most part religions were born in their own cultural neighborhood and felt they could do perfectly well in staying there and talking only among themselves. good fences made for good neighbors; when those fences weren’t well maintained or well observed, problems resulted, even warfare. this age of monologue is, as i have suggested, starting to crumble, or at least be questioned, by many religious people and their leaders. yes, religious fundamentalism is growing among various traditions; and a synonym for fundamentalist might well be 170 prajñâ vihâra “monologuer.” but it is precisely this growth of fundamentalism, and the excesses of intolerance and violence it can lead to, that is becoming one of the strongest voices in the call for dialogue. so whether it is because of the dangers of a fundamentalist exploitation of religion, or because our religious neighbors are moving closer to our neighborhood and we’re getting to know, even like, them, or because the kinds of problems facing our broader city or world require the cooperation of all the neighborhoods – for a variety of reasons christians, with other believers, feel that the new millennium needs to be the threshold of a new age of dialogue. in an age of dialogue, one must be religious interreligiously. – and that brings us to the real challenge of interreligious dialogue. the challenge of dialogue: commitment and openness real interreligious dialogue isn’t easy. and it can be dangerous. if we understand dialogue to be more than just chit-chat in which we talk mainly to be nice to each other, and more than just an exchange of information so that we can understand each other better – if dialogue is going to be a real conversation in which we both talk and listen, in which we both speak our mind and open our mind, in which we both try to persuade the other of the truth and value of what we believe and at the same time are ready to be so persuaded by what our partner holds to be true and valuable – then dialogue is going to make both difficult and risky demands. dialogue is a complex movement of “both-and” – both speaking and listening, both teaching and learning, both clarity and questioning, both firmness and suppleness. all these duets can be summarized in the polarity of commitment and openness. in a genuine religious dialogue (really, in any conversation where people speak out of different viewpoints) one has to be firm in what one believes, persuaded that what has been true and good for oneself might be the same for others; this enables one to have something to contribute to the dialogue. and yet, if the conversation is going to be two ways, if there are going to be “equal rights” for all the participants in the dialogue, then one has also to be open to listening to paul f. knitter 171 and possibly learning from the commitments of the dialogue partner. and “learning from” can mean changing one’s mind and admitting mistakes. for christians, this means that we have to be fully committed to christ and his gospel and at the same time genuinely open to what god may be trying to tell us through other religions. but for most christians, this is something new, maybe something bewildering or threatening. just how does one balance such commitment to christ and openness to others? is it even possible? wouldn’t it be something like asking a married person to be committed to one’s spouse and at the same time open to other potential spouses? for christians in the dialogue, openness to other religions might lead them to lessen or even lose their own allegiance to jesus and the gospel. just because something is difficult or dangerous doesn’t mean that it does not remain necessary. and for many – a growing number it seems – dialogue with persons of other faiths, despite the complexities and risks, remains an ethical imperative. one might even say that one of the most urgent and daunting challenges (certainly not the only one) facing christians as they step into the new millennium is how to carry on a dialogue with other religions that will, first of all, help all religions to work together in, as küng puts it, “global responsibility” for the ethical challenges facing humankind; but it will also be a dialogue that enables christians to better understand themselves and their own convictions in the light of so many other thriving religious faiths. such a dialogue will require the complex balancing of commitment and openness. can christians do it? right now, it seems to me, we christians don’t have the equipment to manage such a balancing of commitment and openness in an authentic religious dialogue. that is, we don’t have the theological tools. we are in a situation familiar throughout church history where our practice (or the need for practice) has outstripped our theory.5 (that’s really the way christian understanding or theology grows – by trying to accompany, help, or catch up with christian living.) we don’t have the theological clarity and guidance for carrying out an interreligious dialogue that would balance commitment and openness. in the words of jacques dupuis, one of the most knowledgeable and careful christian theologians of religions, such a dialogue-sustaining theology will require a “qualitative shift” in 172 prajñâ vihâra the way christians understand other religions.6 that shift has not yet happened. so a christian theology of religions that is informed by and can support a christian dialogue with religions is “a work in progress.” — a brief, hasty review of contemporary theologies of religions will, i think, indicate progress made and still needed. ii. current theologies of religions don’t meet the challenge of commitment and openness classifying is always risky. fitting things into neat categories often means stuffing them (or leaving any misfits on the floor). still, in an effort to bring some order into the array of current christian attitudes toward other religions, let me offer a line-up of categories or models that, i think, cover most of the theological terrain. most christian theologians writing about other religions may move between these models, but each of them, i venture to say, spends more time in one than in the others.7 i’ll try to give a thumbnail sketch of each and then comment on how well it balances the commitment and openness needed for dialogue. the replacement model for christians who follow this model, the best way to relate to persons of other religious paths is to share the good news of jesus with them and hope that this will bring them into the community of jesusfollowers. this attitude is found especially among the fundamentalist and evangelical churches, though much of its theology was laid out, powerfully and prophetically, by karl barth. for these christians there are certain beliefs, given in god’s revelation through jesus, that are simply non-negotiable. among these are the announcement to all the world that god has given hope and the possibility of well-being (salvation) through the life, death, and resurrection of jesus the christ. here and no where else. as stated so clearly in i tim. 2: 4-5, god certainly does not discriminate in god’s love and “desires everyone to be saved”; but this god offers this saving love “through the one mediator between god and humankind, christ jesus.” this means that in other religions we may paul f. knitter 173 find many worthwhile, even necessary, questions as to how humans can get their act together; but the real, effective, and only answer is given in the message and the person of jesus. while christians will always love persons of other religions and try to talk with them, they will show their love by attempting to replace their previous religious beliefs and practices with baptism into christian life and practice. clearly, this model meets all the requirements of the commitment necessary for dialogue. but it evidently lags in openness. how can one be open to possibly learning from others when one already has the fullness of god’s truth? how can one really cooperate with other religions in trying to solve the ethical, global issues of the day when one is convinced that the one and only solution has already been given in jesus? admittedly, christians who hold to this replacement model see no need for dialogue and feel no uneasiness in announcing to buddhists or muslims that without embracing jesus they cannot be saved.8 – but for those followers of jesus who feel the imperative of dialogue, this model, though it offers a good example of commitment, doesn’t work. the fulfillment model this model came into clear focus, especially for catholics but also for protestants, when the second vatican council tried to lay the theological groundwork for a more positive attitude toward, and therefore a real dialogue with, members of other religions. for the first time, in formal, official statements of a christian church, christians publicly recognized that there is much that is “true and holy,” in other religions, that they contain “precious things both religious and human…elements of truth and grace,” that god is revealing, perhaps saving, through them, and that therefore christians are “exhorted…prudently and lovingly…to dialogue and collaborate” with these religions.9 what, as it were, burst onto the christian world in vatican ii has to a great extent been endorsed and developed and become a consensus among many members and theologians of the so-called mainline churches –that the god revealed by jesus cannot be confined to the christian churches. but what, for this model, is the ultimate purpose of dialogue? the answer is determined by the same non-negotiable belief that guides 174 prajñâ vihâra the replacement model – jesus as the one and only savior. though representatives of this fulfillment model allow the effects of jesus’ death and resurrection to actually work outside the church, within and through other religions (cosmically or anonymously), they insist that it is only in jesus that god’s gift of saving love is actually offered or constituted, and therefore only in jesus is god’s truth fully, finally, unsurpassably revealed. the final end of dialogue, therefore, must be fulfillment. in jesus and in his church, all the truth and value and beauty of other religions are to find their completion. as the second vatican council put it: “whatever goodness or truth is found among them [the religions], it is considered by the church as a preparation for the gospel.”10 with this model, how do commitment and openness balance out? like the replacement model, this attitude weighs in heavily with commitment; at the same time, it provides possibilities of greater openness by strongly affirming the active presence of god in other religions. but is this openness sufficient to sustain a conversation in which both sides are really able not only to speak but to learn? if the value of buddha is actually made possible by jesus, if we christians have the full and final word of god, if therefore whatever truth might be found in hinduism has to be already given in christian revelation – how much can christians really learn in the dialogue? how much can be added to what is already “full and final”? the mutuality model spokespersons for this model try to make up for the deficiencies of openness that they find in the other models. for them, what is nonnegotiable is still open to new interpretations. and so they press their case that the witness of the new testament and christian tradition can, in this age of pressing dialogue, be so understood that christians can proclaim jesus to be truly savior of the world (that’s the non-negotiable), but not the only savior of the world. in other words, the saving role of jesus remains universal – that is, meant for all peoples not just for christians; but this role is not exhaustive of what god is up to in the world. therefore, just as christians must continue to announce that jesus and his message are necessary for humanity to understand and live what paul f. knitter 175 god intends for creation, so might other religious figures or revelations be equally necessary. (they say might, for it is only through dialogue that they can find out.) this is not to say that therefore there are no differences between the religions, or that they are all essentially saying the same thing, or that every religious belief is equally valid or effective in revealing god’s truth. the differences between the religions are real; they’re often stark; and they matter. differences constitute the stuff of dialogue.11 clearly, there is greater openness in this model. but has it just tipped the scales in the opposite direction? openness seems to outweigh commitment. if many religious figures can have universally relevant and equally valid messages, then doesn’t jesus end up as “one of the boys,” one of many saviors? is this really consistent with all the new testament language that attributes to jesus a specialness not found elsewhere? is it consistent with the belief, in the new testament and throughout christian history, that jesus was “son of god” in a way that differs from how we are all sons and daughters of god? and if god is saving in many ways, why should i choose one way over another? why be a christian rather than a buddhist? one can also ask advocates of the mutuality model whether they are as open to other religions as they think they are. if we really hold something to be true, if that truth colors our whole life, won’t it also color what we see in other religions? won’t we always be viewing and understanding and evaluating the other religious person from the perspective of our own commitments? we will judge something to be true and good in another religion because it reflects or relates to our own truth and good. if it doesn’t we’ll judge it to be false or evil. how open is that, really? the acceptance model this model seeks to recognize and live with the complexity, even the well-neigh impossibility, of neatly balancing commitment and openness. influenced by what is called postmodern consciousness (that’s why this model is also termed a “post-liberal” perspective), its proponents accept the reality that we are all living in our own cultural worlds, that 172 prajñâ vihâra the world we live in, like a pair of glasses, affects how we look at everything else, and that the many cultural-religious worlds that make up humanity are very, very different. in fact, they’re so different that you really can’t “measure” one from the perspective of the other; each world or religion is incommensurable with the others.12 some advocates of this model suggest that each religion has its own goal, or ultimate end, different from the others. the religions are seeking, not salvation, but salvations, each, as it were, going its own way to its own final destination, both in this world and in the next13 this means, more clearly and practically, that we all have our non-negotiables; we all have our absolutes or full and final truths, and you really can’t judge one in the light of another. to try to do so will lead either to distorting the other so that it will fit yours, or reducing yours so it will make room for the other. so this model calls upon christians, and all religious persons, to simply accept the other religions. let them be. be good neighbors to each other, but stay in your own backyard. yes, talk to each other as much as you can, but let it be over your backyard fences. and if there is going to be any kind of a dialogue in which the partners search for deeper truth or a solution to common problems, know that it will really be a conversation in which each participant, for the most part, will be making an “apology” for, or promoting, their own truth. dialogue is, and should be, a kind of holy competition, in which everyone lays out their own non-negotiable truths as clearly and courteously as possible, in the hope that the deeper or higher truth will prevail.14 it seems that this acceptance model does achieve a neat balance of commitment and openness, recognizing that all religions make their own absolute or non-negotiable truth claims and urging them all to respect each other for doing that. but, one may ask, does this understanding of religious pluralism, even when it urges dialogue as apologetics, go anywhere? it appears that the religions are actually confined to their own backyards. each is securely committed to its own truth. but maybe too securely. does this model really allow for any kind of real challenge to religious truth from the outside? also, while each religion is open to and accepts the differences and the absolute claims of other religions, does this acceptance really end up as tolerance rather than as a dialogue in which both sides are ready not only to defend but to criticize their own paul f. knitter 177 positions? can religions really search for truth and cooperation together when they are going in different directions, toward different “salvations”? so where do we go from here? it seems that none of these models, by themselves, does the job of aiding christians to achieve the convergence of commitment and openness necessary to respond to the imperative of dialogue. as i said, the theology of religions and dialogue is a work in progress. christian theologians, from whatever “model,” need to keep talking with each other. and if they can do so using these two “hermeneutical flashlights” – searching for a theology of religions that would facilitate both commitment to christ and openness to others – they can, i trust, achieve a theology that will make for a more satisfying christian spirituality, a more effective dialogue with others, and a greater healing for our world. 178 prajñâ vihâra endnotes 1see “declaration on the relationship of the church to non-christian religions.” 2the faith of other men (new york: harper & row, 1962), p. 11. 3edward schillebeeckx, the church: the human story of god (new york: crossroad, 1990), pp. 163, 167; jacques dupuis, toward a christian theology of religious pluralism (maryknoll: orbis books, 1997), p. 11. 4hans küng, global responsibility: in search of a new world ethic (new york: crossroad, 1991), p. xv. 5i have tried to lay out this creative tension between practice and theory, especially for roman catholics, in: “catholics and other religions: bridging the gap between dialogue and theology.” louvain studies 24 (1999) 319-354. 6jacques dupuis, “christianity and other religions: from confronta-tion to encounter,” the tablet, october, 2001, 1484-85 (see also, op.cit., 1520-21, 200102. 7i’ve tried to describe these models in a broader and balanced manner in introducing theology of religions (maryknoll: orbis books, 2002). 8well, not all of them. recently, evangelical theologians have been laboring to devise theological theories that would enable “pagans” who have not heard of jesus to actually be saved – through special revelations at the moment of death or post-mortem, or through god’s “middle knowledge,” or “by exception” in anticipation of jesus’ death. there have even been some evangelical thinkers who would allow for god, in the divine “wider mercy,” to actually act and save through other traditions; such views would probably blend into the next model. see clark pinnock, a wideness in god’s mercy (grand rapids: zondervan, 1992). 9“declaration on the relationship of the church to non-christian religions.”, # 2, “the decree on the church’s missionary activity,” # 9; “pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world,” # 92. 10“dogmatic constitution on the church,” # 16. for representatives of this fulfillment model, see jacque dupuis, toward a christian theology (note 3). gavin d’costa, the meeting of religions and the trinity (maryknoll: orbis books, 2000). pope john paul ii, redemptoris missio. 11representatives of this mutuality model can be found in the myth of christian uniqueness: toward a pluralistic theology of religions, john hick and paul f. knitter, eds. (maryknoll: orbis books, 1986) 12spokespersons for this acceptance model would include george lindbeck, the nature of doctrine: religion and theology in a postliberal age (philadelphia: westminster press, 1984); joseph a. dinoia, the diversity of religions (washington, d.c.: the catholic university press of america, 1992). 13s.mark heim, salvations: truth and difference in religions (maryknoll: orbis books, 1995); id. the depth of riches: a trinitarian theology of religious ends (grand rapids: eerdmans, 2001). paul f. knitter 179 180 prajñâ vihâra 14paul griffith, an apology for apologetics: a study in the logic of interreligious dialogue (maryknoll: orbis books, 1991). see also william placher, an unapologetic theology: a christian voice in a pluralistic conversation (louisville: westminster/john knox press, 1989). 1free of religion & religious heritage diplomacy for a safer world ioan voicu assumption university of thailand abstract new dramatic challenges to diplomacy emerge from coping with man-made and natural disasters. this paper will focus primarily upon the tsunami in south east asia and the response of various states and world organizations. it will demonstrate the central role of diplomacy in dealing with natural disasters in general. within the calendar of the irreversible process of globalization, the end of 2004 and the years 2005 2006 have revealed critical challenges that impose a greater commitment to humanity in terms of solidarity and political will. the period 2004-2006 has witnessed in southeast asia a historical show of solidarity in response to the apocalyptic tsunami of december 26, 2004. that colossal catastrophe was the result of the greatest earthquake in 40 years, measuring 9.0 on the richter scale, with its epicenter at 150 kilometers off the west coast of northern sumatra in indonesia and more than 500 kilometers from the west coast of thailand. despite the distance, the giant waves struck with an unimaginable power and left behind destruction of biblical proportions. the tsunami was one of the most devastating natural disasters in modern times. millions of people have been affected in 12 countries. on may 27, 2006 a new devastating earthquake on the indonesian island of java killed over 5,700 persons, hurt over 20,000 and left about 200,000 people homeless. in a more general context, it should be recalled that from 1980 to 2005, over 7,000 natural disasters worldwide have taken the lives of nearly 2 million people and produced economic losses of over $1 trillion.1 animated by generosity, many states and ordinary citizens from all continents offered a helping hand to ease the suffering caused by these prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 151-176 151 © 2000 by assumption university press unprecedented calamities. bilateral and multilateral diplomacy have had a high visibility in this ongoing humanitarian process. there are encouraging signs that this trend will continue; that countries and peoples will not limit themselves in expressing compassion for victims, but will continue to demonstrate an authentic, proactive solidarity. the international development agencies most involved in the recovery effort stated that the toughest difficulties still lie ahead, including the complex issues of where to re-establish housing, how to quickly restore livelihoods, and what to prioritize after the immediate relief phase is over.2 while recovery efforts continue to meet the needs of victims, in particular on the indonesian island of java, there are many reasons to ponder and reflect on the mission of diplomacy directly or indirectly involved in a tremendous collective endeavor of contributing to the establishment of a safer world during the present era of global vulnerability. is this not to ask the impossible? 1. fundamental functions it is hard to imagine real success in world affairs, including fighting the consequences of natural disasters, without a responsive diplomacy, as it is the first line of defense for all nations.3 diplomacy is defined by sir harold nicolson, in a classical work, as "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist. "in a more limited definition, the same author considers that diplomacy is "the ordered conduct of relations between one group of human beings and another group alien to themselves."4 diplomacy designates also the use of tact in dealing with people. in this sense, it is a skill which is critically important in the very conduct of diplomacy. in addition, beyond any technical definitions, we should not ignore that in fact "diplomacy is essentially a human activity whose quality depends on the quality of the people engaged in it."5 there is no doubt about the existing consensus that diplomacy is a fundamental means for developing international relations. diplomacy helps in bringing people closer together, thus contributing to harmony and peace 152 prajñâ vihâra between nations, cultures, religions and individuals. understanding between peoples and the promotion of ethical values at universal level are at the root of sustainable solidarity, as promoted by diplomacy. at present, this humanistic philosophy is under a complex test. although it relies first of all on negotiation, diplomacy includes other essential functions like representation and information. it involves official representatives and diplomats as well as non-governmental organizations (ngos). it encompasses not only conflict management but also cooperation, at bilateral and multilateral levels, including international institutions and conferences dealing with natural disasters. the most important legal document of universal scope on diplomacy is the vienna convention on diplomatic relations (1961) which in its 2nd article stipulates that "the establishment of diplomatic relations between states, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent." for the present study, article 3 of the vienna convention has a particular relevance, as it deals with the functions of a diplomatic mission which consist, inter alia, in: (a) representing the sending state in the receiving state; (b) protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; (c) negotiating with the government of the receiving state; (d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state; (e) promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.6 new dramatic challenges to diplomacy emerge from coping with man-made and natural disasters, as all human situations are complex. a recent example is instructive. the new holy father benedict xvi received (on june 16, 2005) the letters of credence of seven ambassadors to the holy see. on that occasion he said: "our world is faced with many challenges. our heart cannot be in peace when we see our brothers suffer for lack of food, work, housing or other fundamental goods…" "to help our needy brothers and sisters", underlined benedict xvi, "we have to face the first of these challenges: that of solidarity between generations, solidarity between countries and between continents, for a more equitable sharing among all men of the riches of the planet. it is one of the basic ioan voicu 153 services that men of good will must give to mankind."7 normal or traditional diplomacy is conducted by both permanent and occasional representatives via bilateral and multilateral channels. accredited ambassadors and their staff carry out the daily business of bilateral diplomacy by pursuing their primary mandate of maintaining good relations between their home and host countries. the diplomat's second task is to gain support from the host country for policy positions important to the home state. when diplomats turn to the objective of developing common positions on issues of shared concern, negotiation is the first modality by which this is accomplished. in practice, negotiation is a complex process of combining and harmonizing divergent positions in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions.8 if diplomacy in its dynamics is the peaceful instrument of solving one's problems in conjunction with other states, it is also the means of helping other states resolve their difficulties and conflicts. increasingly, diplomacy has to deal with the construction of cooperative agreements to settle complicated issues, either currently pressing or prospectively impending. multilateral diplomacy uses negotiation to identify common responses to a variety of problems within the united nations (un) system, other international institutions and regional organizations. quite frequently, beyond any ambiguity, diplomacy has been used to find and coordinate pragmatic responses to specific problems common to large numbers of states. to do that multilateral negotiations are first of all needed, which differ on substance from bilateral diplomatic processes. the basic task of multilateral negotiation is to manage the extraordinary complexity of international life, so that multiple parties, multiple issues and multiple roles become amenable to generally acceptable decisions reflected in a final consensus. the humanitarian sector illustrates the fact that official diplomats are now sharing their efforts with a new category of actors. in the post cold-war era, international humanitarian officials have increasingly found themselves engaged in negotiations with state and non-state entities with whom they may have few common interests, values and objectives. despite this lack of commonality, many humanitarian actors have been propelled into negotiations by virtue of the mandate of their organizations, which is to deliver emergency assistance and protection to those in need. whether 154 prajñâ vihâra it is called humanitarian or disaster diplomacy or something else, the terminology is not essential, as a new form of more adaptable statecraft is clearly needed in order to develop rapid and effective humanitarian activities in today's world. beyond any minimalist views, the evolution of international relations illustrates the expanding practice of the so-called "track 2" diplomacy by non-governmental organizations and actors. it reveals the role of domestic politics in controlling diplomatic negotiations and the orientation of diplomacy towards populations rather than governments. yet, the two tracks of diplomacy have gradually come to terms with each other. official or governmental diplomacy finds that unofficial efforts can be truly helpful in providing the context and framework for official actions or entering situations where official interference could be viewed as intrusive. but unofficial practitioners recognize themselves that governmental auspices and contributions are always necessary to negotiate and conclude binding agreements, as valid instruments for promoting cooperation in various fields. diplomacy proves to have an important vertical dimension, by co-relating the actions of interstate negotiators to the client groups to which they are responsible and on which they depend for implementing the agreements they conclude. the need to take public opinion and the positions of ngos into account in the conduct of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy increases significantly. this trend is well visible and has been positively anticipated. authoritative writers believe that diplomacy is condemned to failure if it remains limited to merely state-to-state relations. it should be extended to all "relations between one group of human beings and another alien to themselves," as nicholson predicted many years ago.9 with such a broad and modern understanding of diplomacy, nobody can underestimate the role of all categories of people who contribute to enlargement and diversification of international cooperation: diasporas, students on research and exchange visits, tourists, consumers on shopping jaunts, business-people working with transnational companies, journalists and artists. while this elucidates and adds new meanings to the traditional notion of diplomacy, it also enriches the very environment in which diplomats have to operate.10 ioan voicu 155 2. coping with an apocalyptic disaster speaking on may 1, 2005, to the people attending his first sunday audience, the new holy father benedict xvi underlined that solidarity, justice and peace should be "the pillars on which to build the unity of the human family".11 these pillars must be fortified by diplomacy. on december 26, 2004 all of diplomacy's functions entered a new and critical test as a result of the worst natural disaster of the 21st century which urgently demanded a much more articulated diplomacy in action. thousands of people died in natural disasters as far apart as new orleans and kashmir in 2005 and java in may 2006. in these circumstances there seems to be an emergent need for new conceptual fundamentals for expanding cooperation in disaster reduction, prevention and recovery. this is by all standards a very difficult process, as diplomacy is still operating many times with old or outdated methods of action, while trying to solve far more complex and far more demanding scenarios. therefore, some writers assert skeptically that as long as we keep toying with some antiquated notions of diplomacy and humanitarianism we will continue to miss the real mark. significant changes are needed in training and educating diplomats. in this respect, among the necessary kinds of knowledge for the education of the future, recommended by the french philosopher edgar morin (1999), the following are enumerated: teach the world identity. teach knowledge at a worldwide level. teach the history of the planetary era. teach solidarity between all the parts of the world. teach understanding, in all its meanings, between human beings. and teach what misunderstanding is. it is a crucial basis for peace education. teach also the ethics of humanity, preparing citizens of the world.12 that leads to mutual understanding. as pointed out by professor warayuth sriwarakuel "understanding presupposes knowledge". in the humanitarian field, no positive action can be undertaken without an adequate understanding of the needs based on the knowledge of the situation on the spot. however, "genuine or authentic understanding can be acquired only at the spiritual level. there is no way to reach authentic understanding except through praxis with compassion, loving kindness and agape".13 this is obviously valid in the field of 156 prajñâ vihâra humanitarian diplomacy. diplomats all over the world were on alert in december 2004 after the terrible tsunami which affected 12 countries. in an article entitled in a symbolic way "tsunami diplomacy" released in washington on january 8, 2005, cbs news reporter charles wolfson wrote that since december 26, 2004, people around the world have been watching pictures of the total devastation brought on by the tsunami. while there was immediate concern for survivors and an effort to rescue and track down the missing, government officials in far flung capitals from washington to canberra, tokyo to new delhi started to focus their attention on mounting the massive relief effort everyone knew would be required. president george w. bush publicly expressed his and his nation's condolences on december 29, 2004, and announced the establishment of the so-called core group of nations the u.s., australia, japan and india, with canada and the netherlands added later to spearhead relief efforts. these countries having significant military assets in or near the disaster zone, "it was crucial they get to the right places and not duplicate their efforts", said under secretary of state for political affairs, marc grossman. from the diplomatic point of view, the functioning of this core group was very interesting and instructive. beginning on the evening of december 29, 2004, senior officials representing each country in the core group held a daily conference call to discuss the initial relief effort. the us state department's 24 hour operations center placed a telephone conference call, allowing each senior diplomat on the call to tell the others what his or her country had done and planned to do in the next 24 hours. state department spokesman adam ereli called this "an interesting new kind of diplomacy…it was an intensive and immediate effort, multilateral coordination and disaster relief, at a senior level, that in some ways was virtual diplomacy." this collective effort was not considered as necessarily breaking new diplomatic ground so much as taking advantage of technologies such as teleconferencing and e-mail. at technical level, in order to help move the daily call forward, each country would also send around one e-mail per day per country with updates since the last call. the e-mails were lists of where each country's military forces in the region were and what they ioan voicu 157 were doing. the first couple of nights, the calls were all about helicopters, who had them, where they were and how long would it take to get them where they were needed. finally, after a productive activity, the core group took itself out of business, turning over the medium and long-term relief effort to the un at a meeting in jakarta. however, it was recognized that by the actionoriented process necessitated by the enormity of this disaster, the core group was able to stimulate international relief efforts with more urgency and at a faster pace than would have been possible otherwise. what conclusion could be formulated on the basis of this original experiment? cbs news reporter charles wolfson was categorical in his reply. this interesting and promising experiment does not mean that the planners and promoters of grand diplomatic conferences need to start looking for other work. but it should be acknowledged that there are situations, like the tsunami of 2004, where time is of the essence and quick decision-making can save lives. judging from this case the teleconferencing/e-mail model made correct use of valuable tools and worked well, preparing also the ground for future events. once the un took over, one of its first moves was to schedule an international donors conference to aid victims of the tsunami in geneva.14 a special note is appropriate about the un diplomatic initiative of appointing former us president bill clinton as un special envoy for tsunami recovery. on april 13, 2005, the day his appointment was announced by the un secretary-general kofi annan, former president clinton said: "…the world community did a terrific job in responding to this unprecedented disaster in the immediate aftermath: the governments, the international agencies, the non-governmental organizations..."15 on may 17, 2005 bill clinton met with leading humanitarian agencies based in the united kingdom for talks on how to speed up delivery of aid to the hardest-hit survivors of the tsunami tragedy. bill clinton and top officials from the disasters emergency committee (dec), "an umbrella group of 13 relief agencies ", met in london to discuss how plans are being drawn up to boost spending as the long-term impacts and local challenges of the devastating indian ocean earthquake and tsunami become clearer." it is imperative that local communities participate in the decision-making process and that the needs of families, and especially 158 prajñâ vihâra children, are at the heart of the recovery agenda," bill clinton said during the meeting. in accordance with a transcript of the press briefing, in banda aceh, indonesia, dated may 30, 2005, bill clinton further explained his mandate: "i'm going to be on the job for at least two years and my primary goal, besides making sure that all the donors give the money that they're supposed to give to the affected countries, is to help solve problems and provide a forum for good ideas".16 indeed, good ideas are in great demand. the scale of the destruction and loss caused by the tsunami was a dramatic reminder of the fragility of humankind and of the duty to promote respect for nature as a fundamental value of international relations. klaus toepfer, the executive director of unep, said: "the tsunami in the indian ocean taught the world some hard, shocking but important lessons which we ignore at our peril. we learnt in graphic and horrific detail that the ecosystems are not a luxury. they are life savers capable of defending our homes, our loved ones and our livelihoods from some of nature's more aggressive acts." "it is, therefore vital that during the reconstruction of shattered coastlines and settlements, the environment is taken into account along with the economic and social factors," he added.17 from the perspective of diplomacy there are, indeed, important lessons to be derived from this terrible catastrophe. as all countries and citizens can be affected by natural disasters, international, regional and national organizations have an imperative duty to enhance their coordinated efforts to minimize casualties. it has become clear that risk reduction depends considerably upon effective communication and information sharing by all states. therefore, the interaction between all competent scientific institutions and national and local authorities must be strengthened. diplomacy helps in giving tangibility to the legitimate expectation that planetary awareness is possible. the un general assembly, the most representative diplomatic forum, was sensitive to this vital requirement in the aftermath of the tragedy. it adopted by consensus, on january 19, 2005, a resolution initiated by asean countries which had the merit of conveying topical recommendations on behalf of 191 member states. the resolution encouraged regional cooperation and urged donor countries and international organizations as well as other relevant institutions to ioan voicu 159 provide financial and technical assistance to countries affected by the tsunami. there is an indisputable need for the international community to maintain its focus beyond the emergency relief, in order to sustain the political will to support the medium and long-term rehabilitation, reconstruction and risk reduction efforts led by the governments of the affected countries at all levels. in that context, the largest un diplomatic forum emphasized the need for the establishment of a regional early warning system, particularly for tsunamis, in the indian ocean and southeast asian regions.18 this is a capital necessity in light of the most pressing question: are countries really prepared for future natural disasters, irrespective of their probability? there is no definitive answer to this vital question. implausible implications cannot be taken into account. however, there seems to be consensus on two crucial requirements: promotion of solidarity and active regional and global cooperation. yet, a most pragmatic question is how to achieve permanent, proactive solidarity and collaboration at a global level in order to reduce as much as possible the tragic consequences of current and future natural disasters? thailand made significant contributions to finding valid answers to these questions by its active involvement in the implementation of decisions to establish regional mechanisms for disaster prevention and mitigation, as well as in giving tangibility to the recommendations made by 168 countries at the world conference on disaster reduction (january 18-22, 2005, kobe, japan). these recommendations are meant to increase the international profile of disaster-risk-reduction and to strengthen local and national capacities to more effectively address natural catastrophes. the kobe conference adopted a declaration stipulating that a culture of disaster prevention and resilience must be fostered at all levels and recognized the relationship between disaster reduction, sustainable development and poverty alleviation.19 in a similar spirit, the ministerial declaration on regional cooperation on tsunami early warning arrangements, released at the end of the phuket ministerial conference (28-29 january, 2005), attended by 43 countries and 16 international organizations, recognized the asian disaster preparedness centre (adpc) as a focal point for a multi-node 160 prajñâ vihâra tsunami early warning arrangement in the region, working together with relevant national and regional organizations.20 that postulates further diplomatic negotiations. the whole project shall be developed within the relevant un international strategy coordinated by the intergovernmental oceanographic organization (ioc) under the un educational, scientific and cultural organization (unesco). as emphasized by thailand, an early warning arrangement cannot be based on hardware and technology alone. a holistic approach is necessary, integrating awareness building, education and training, of experts and of ordinary citizens, into the system.21 the phuket conference welcomed the establishment of a voluntary trust fund to be administered by the un economic and social commission for asia and the pacific (escap). 3. is diplomacy prepared for the future? interesting ideas have been formulated on that question at academic level. in a study entitled "tsunami diplomacy: will 26 december, 2004 bring peace to the affected countries" its author, ilan kelman, examined whether or not disasters induce international cooperation amongst enemy countries. the 26 december 2004 tsunami impacted some countries with internal or external conflicts, thereby providing an opportunity to explore how the same event affects different countries in different disaster diplomacy contexts. indonesian tsunami diplomacy was used as a case study for further discussion, in terms of both american-indonesian relations and the conflict in aceh. additional work is suggested in the tsunami's aftermath in order to better understand the disaster diplomacy outcomes which are feasible and why they rarely yield positive, lasting results.22 at non-governmental level diplomatic reactions were immediate and quite eloquent. ambassador richard c. holbrooke, chairman of the board of trustees of asia society, at a special meeting organized in new york and washington d.c. (via videoconference), on january 13, 2005, recognized in a realistic way that: "the reconstruction phase is going to be critical so we intend to be an ongoing effort to keep attention focused on ioan voicu 161 this after it leaves the front pages of the newspapers. press attention will recede just as the waters of the indian ocean receded." at the same meeting jan egeland, un under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, asserted that the tsunami crisis represented a "moment of truth for us as humanity, for international compassion and solidarity and also for the united nations. the donor nations are now 60 to 65. it is the biggest international aid effort and it is the widest ever…there is an unprecedented global response."23 at the regional non-governmental level, a significant event was the asia-pacific business forum 2005, held from 13-15 may 2005 at the un conference centre in bangkok, with over 300 participants from more than 20 countries. the forum included a special roundtable session entitled "coping with economic effects of regional natural disasters." among the special guests at the forum was erskine bowles, un deputy special envoy for tsunami recovery. "the corporate sector's response to the tsunami was unprecedented in its scale and generosity…if that spirit of solidarity can be intertwined with the spirit of entrepreneurship necessary for economic growth, the result could be truly revolutionary", he emphasized.24 at regional governmental level, especially encouraging was the escap high-level panel on tsunami recovery on may 16, 2005, whose collective deliberations represented a common road map towards the medium-to long-term post-tsunami recovery. discussions focused on three major areas: recovery plans, the status of financial pledges and commitments and progress on the early warning system. key challenges and ways forward to post-tsunami recovery were identified and outlined. the high-level panel was attended by ministers from tsunami affected countries, including thailand, india, indonesia, the maldives, malaysia and sri lanka and examined emerging issues in regional cooperation in natural disaster reduction. "we must promote community-based disaster risk management. we aim to link rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts to risk management for sustainable economic growth," said kim hak-su, executive secretary of unescap.25 from the financial point of view initial estimates by assessment teams, as revealed by escap, place the costs of reconstruction for 162 prajñâ vihâra indonesia at up to $5 billion and for sri lanka at $3.5 bn. including india, the maldives and thailand, the total reconstruction costs, over the next three to five years are expected to be between $9.8 bn and $12.5 bn. $6.7 bn has already been pledged by the international community for tsunami relief, by donor countries, private individuals and corporations. but of the $6.7 billion pledged, only about $2.5 bn has been recorded as committed or paid up.26 additional diplomatic efforts are needed for financial pledges to be honored, and for recovery assistance to be delivered rapidly and effectively. adequate coordination and prompt information sharing are crucial components. the high-level panel mentioned above has already exchanged available information on national recovery plans and post tsunami reconstruction projects which must ensure that the long-term recovery of the devastated areas be carried out in a way that will break past cycles of poverty. all these activities will serve as a strong boost to the ongoing recovery process, including work on the multi-hazard and multi-nodal early warning system. to that end, an appeal was launched to both traditional and non-traditional donors to enhance their funding support to escap and the regional institutions. the theme topic for the 62nd escap session, which took place in indonesia in april 2006, was: "enhancing regional cooperation in infrastructure development, including that related to disaster management". the escap secretariat expressed its commitment to the production of a cutting-edge analysis and innovative recommendations on the subject.27 in another related sector, the international strategy for disaster reduction (isdr) secretariat started a new collaboration with the asiapacific broadcasting union (abu), a professional association of 102 radio and television broadcasters in the asia-pacific region. the purpose of this new collaboration is to develop new radio and television products to better educate and prepare people against natural hazards in asia-pacific countries. isdr considers media an essential partner to enhance public safety. the media is the best channel to prepare communities for disasters. it can help educate people on the need to reduce risk by regularly informing on the hazards and social vulnerabilities that may lead to disasters. media ioan voicu 163 also plays an important role in convincing governments and citizens to invest in disaster reduction. education and preparedness are the key to reduce the number of people affected by natural hazards. if people know what to do, they can save their own life. broadcasters have a responsibility to educate people and raise their awareness of the dangers of natural disasters. as publicly announced, thailand established a national disaster warning centre (ndwc), linking radio, television and cell phone networks. the first tsunami evacuation exercise was successfully held in phuket. around 2,000 people took part, including members of the diplomatic corps. certainly, to be truly effective, a tsunami early warning system must be comprehensive in scope and cover the whole region, including the indian ocean and south china sea.28 all these diplomatic events reconfirmed the fact that the un has an unrivalled experience and a unique capacity in all fields of cooperation. consequently, energetic efforts must continue under un auspices. with its universal membership, its comprehensive consensus mandate, with a range of activities covering both the normative and the operational components and an institutional presence that is at the same time global, regional and country-based, the un can be at the very center of this impressive collective endeavor dedicated to human security. the un initiatives can be cemented by global solidarity. therefore, all developed countries are being urged never to lose sight of the pressure of the socalled silent tsunamis: poverty, hunger, inadequate access to clean water, elementary sanitation and health care. disaster diplomacy might realize its genuine potential in the future only if it is founded on universal values, including, first of all, solidarity. the truth of this value was cogently summarized in various un documents stating that solidarity and a strong sense of moral responsibility must be the guiding light of national and international policy. they are not only ethical imperatives, but also prerequisites for a prosperous, peaceful and secure world based on true partnership. beyond negotiable uncertainties, diplomacy alone cannot make the world a safer place tomorrow or next week. yet, with genuine political will diplomacy can contribute in the long run to translating the ideal of achieving human security into reality. 164 prajñâ vihâra in this context, the 14th annual asia leadership forum entitled the new leadership imperative, which took place on 13-14 june, 2005 in bangkok, brought instructive ideas for the topic under consideration. the forum attracted an elite gathering of over 400 business leaders and policy makers, including diplomats, from around the world and across the region, bringing them together in a unique, interactive environment that fostered discussion and debate on the economic, political and social issues impacting economic growth in asia. one of the debated topics was effective risk management: insights from the asian tsunami crisis. a number of speakers pointed out that the global economy is now operating in a new world of risk and volatility. the various economic crises, security and terrorism concerns, the collapse of some corporations, have all brought home this fact. and risk is not just about financial factors, but also about securing the people and assets of a corporation. recognizing and managing these is a very important part of any business. people should draw lessons and insights from what was called the asian tsunami crisis. while the initial shock has worn off and the emphasis is on rebuilding efforts, the ways in which the fallout can be better managed by governments, business and individuals had to be carefully examined. speakers called for taking effective measures to face the tsunami calamity in the region. credibility in diplomacy comes with visibility which is dependent on effectiveness. the latter can be judged as such when political commitments are translated into concrete actions at all levels, be they national, regional or international.29 to work toward that end for stronger cooperation in disaster prevention and relief, china hosted the asian conference on disaster reduction in beijing on september 27-29, 2005. its mandate was to identify priority fields for action for the next ten years and push for fresh regional initiatives in specific areas.30 4. finding the right road the tsunami disaster and other calamities in 20052006 have shown that the international community had insufficient capacity to immediately support people in widespread disaster situations. diplomats ioan voicu 165 have reason to be self-critical in their analysis of how crisis management capacity is organized in dramatic circumstances. in this context, in a speech made on january 16, 2005, laila freivalds, minister for foreign affairs of sweden, remarked: "none of us will forget the warmth and compassion, the generosity and solidarity, shown to the victims and the countries affected. it is this that gives us hope and strength to face the future. we must look ahead."31 in the same speech it was recalled that as the next major disaster will probably not be caused by a tsunami, but by something completely different, it is absolutely necessary to improve national capacity for crisis preparedness. moreover, there is also a need to develop the european union (eu) cooperation in the area as a natural part of solidarity within the eu. some unanswered questions are not limited to the eu, but seem to be valid also for the asia-pacific area. how do natural disasters affect security policies? how to improve the instruments for managing crises and disasters? how can traditional security policy instruments be used to alleviate suffering in natural disasters? and how can traditional disaster relief indirectly help in promoting international peace and security, while traditional, international threats have declined? what makes countries and citizens vulnerable are threats that know no borders. conflicts far off can indirectly affect security in quite different areas. the terrorist attacks in bali, madrid and new york, developments in the middle east and the peace efforts in afghanistan and iraq show that we are influenced and affected in new ways. the tsunami disaster in asia shows similar effects despite dissimilarities with regard to causes, actions taken and legal systems. diseases and epidemics can quickly spread over increasingly larger areas. a holistic approach to security and development is needed. if reconstruction efforts after the disaster fail, security will also be affected. there is a need for a whole range of instruments, structures and expertise, globally, regionally, nationally and indeed, locally.32 the development of humanity cannot be conceived without a stable and prosperous asia-pacific area. if there is an emerging consensus to admit that asia and the pacific are holders of the key for a secure future, national and regional institutions meant to help shape it have a crucial role to play. in this respect, escap is called upon to help its 62 members and associate members to develop a robust multilateral cooperation beneficial 166 prajñâ vihâra to all and to prove that regionalism is a real driving force. it should be reminded that escap is the only regional commission in the world reuniting all five permanent members of the un security council. the area covered by escap is home for the greatest demographic power (china), the biggest democracy (india), the largest muslim country (indonesia) and an unspecifiable number of nuclear powers. it includes countries belonging geographically to both europe and asia, like russia and turkey. the region is vibrant and is growing fast. diversity is a prominent feature of the region. an incredible mosaic, asia is home to most large nations with a population greater than 100 million. christianity, islam, buddhism, hinduism and brahmanism are an integral part of asian and world spirituality. it offers convincing evidence that all cultures can and must co-exist in harmony. they are able to cast away any prejudice, discrimination or clashes and promote permanent dialogue. despite the apocalyptic tsunami of december 26, 2004 and other disasters, escap economies had in 2004 a growth rate of 7.2 per cent, the highest since 2000. the impressive performances of asia and the pacific offer to this gigantic area the position of a dynamic economic leader. yet, this obvious progress is still fragile. the area is far from being a model. eight of the world's 10 most polluted cities are in asia. abject poverty, wide income gaps, underdevelopment's negative social consequences provide a fertile ground for transnational organized crime, including drug, arms and human trafficking. floods, droughts and cyclones are frequent and dangerous. some small island states are under a growing vulnerability affecting their very viability and existence.33 escap, as the main mechanism of multilateral cooperation in the area, has already made a great contribution to the asia-pacific economic development and social progress. more remains to be done. as emphasized by dr. kantathi suphamongkhon, minister of foreign affairs of thailand, south-south cooperation should also be strengthened, including the fields of intra-regional trade and investment. an important role belongs to various regional and sub-regional cooperation frameworks to promote and deepen political, social and economic cooperation, acting as dynamic bridge-builders.34 the asian development bank, the mekong river commission, the asia pacific economic cooperation, the asean regional forum, ioan voicu 167 asean plus china, japan and the rok dialogue, the shanghai cooperation organization, the south asian association for regional cooperation and the pacific islands forum, as well as the asia cooperation dialogue are providing useful platforms to enhance mutual trust and promote common prosperity. a visible readiness for using in a more articulated and better coordinated way all the possibilities for cooperation would be a clear evidence of the ability of the region to withstand effectively the irreversible process of globalization. from this perspective, escap is called upon to assist with renewed vigor the region to achieve its infrastructure goals with a three-track strategy of promoting technical cooperation in finance, trade and investment; forging greater cooperation among sub-regional groupings to achieve integration and creating a knowledge management center to share experiences of financing for development. moreover, it should encourage the establishment of a regional network of research institutions and universities in the escap region in order to promote education, technical skills development and technology transfer through the exchange of programs, students and academics.35 animated and guided by the fundamental principles and values proclaimed by the un, including a full and proactive solidarity, asianpacific peoples have solid reasons for moderate optimism about their collective capacity to successfully face the formidable challenges of a world living under global vulnerability and to give tangibility to their vital aspirations for peace, progress and prosperity. the practical value of solidarity can be really assessed only in action. both governmental and non-governmental institutions are expected to bring more convincing contributions in their respective sectors of competence. multilateral diplomacy may provide useful assessments and recommendations and may facilitate win-win negotiations leading to more attractive, competitive and profitable cooperation. its practical value should not be obscured. the un secretary-general kofi annan in his address to a meeting on "the business contribution to the millennium development goals" in paris, on june 14, 2005, said: "if the goals are met by the target year of 2015, the world will be a very different place. five hundred million people will be lifted out of extreme poverty. more than 300 million people will no 168 prajñâ vihâra longer suffer from hunger. thirty million children will be saved from dying of preventable illness. one hundred fifteen million children will be enjoying primary education, instead of labouring in factories and fields. two million mothers will have been spared death from childbirth complications. aids will no longer be spreading, but at last beginning to retreat. africa, the continent most afflicted and most neglected, will be given a new chance, building on the important progress of recent years. far from utopian, such goals are achievable."36 in september 2005, world leaders gathered for a summit at the un in new york, the largest such meeting in diplomatic history. according to ambassador jan eliasson, president of the 60th session of the un general assembly, the main task of the practitioners of multilateral diplomacy is to accept, and live up to, the triple challenges of development, security and human rights. the three are intertwined and affect and reinforce each other. un is not a panacea or a universal cure. it reflects the collective political will of the member states and their interest in strengthening the multilateral system. ambassador eliasson invited all states to let them be inspired by former un secretary general dag hammarskjold's words in his book "markings" containing a number of philosophical and pragmatic reflections on the need for visions and a long-term perspective: "never look down to test the ground before taking your next step: only he who keeps his eye fixed on the far horizon will find his right road".37 the commemoration in 2005 of the un's sixtieth anniversary provided a new opportunity to take stock of both tremendous difficulties and modest progress and to look with equanimity and increased responsibility towards the future. all states were expected to generously pool their resources to work closer together with a view to adapting the un to the needs of our times and to preparing it to better face current and future challenges. however, the crucial task of revitalizing the un is a mission nearly impossible if it is not guided by the fundamental values proclaimed in the un millennium declaration. these are: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. these values are crucial. they should inspire and guide both the bilateral and multilateral diplomacy of the future. otherwise people will be inclined to believe that ioan voicu 169 mark twain was right when he wrote for humoristic purposes that "the principle of give and take is the principle of diplomacy give one and take ten."38 the tsunami disaster appears to have inspired unprecedented feelings of global solidarity and generosity. as an imperative prerequisite of globalization, solidarity should permanently manifest itself pro-actively, not just as a simple feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of distant or near people. as a universal value, solidarity is a strong and persevering determination for commitment to the common good at global level and is expected to be operational with those who are directly and critically affected by a catastrophe and who suffer from difficult or unjust circumstances and structures. it should become immediately visible and tangible to those who need economic, political or just psychological support in alleviating their suffering. contrary to the conventional interpretation of international life, the face of the diplomacy of the future will be quite different from today. new skills will be developed and new methods found. but beneath it all, tomorrow's diplomat must have the same basic aptitudes that he or she has always needed: knowledge, understanding, sophistication, enthusiasm, and a taste for hard work under trying circumstances. and within the new world of cyber-diplomacy, there is no doubt that diplomacy will not only succeed, but will expand its reach.39 to that end it is necessary to adapt the traditional methods of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to a world where intergovernmental patterns of relationships account for only part of the policy-making environment. the skills of diplomacy should be mobilized in fashioning an effective multilateralism to successfully cope with problems that no one actor, governmental or non-governmental, has the capacity to manage.40 by the document entitled 2005 world summit outcome the heads of state and government, who gathered at un headquarters in new york from 14 to 16 september 2005, committed themselves to taking further action through practical international cooperation, inter alia to work expeditiously towards the establishment of a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards with regional nodes, building on existing national and regional capacity such as the indian ocean tsunami warning and mitigation system. they also committed themselves to fully 170 prajñâ vihâra implement the hyogo declaration and the hyogo framework for action 2005-2015 adopted at the world conference on disaster reduction, in particular those commitments related to assistance for developing countries that are prone to natural disasters and disaster stricken states in the transition phase towards sustainable physical, social and economic recovery, for risk-reduction activities in post-disaster recovery and for rehabilitation processes.41 the ministers of the non-aligned countries welcomed on may 30, 2006 the establishment of the un central emergency response fund (cerf) and stressed the need to maintain the follow-up, oversight and review by the un general assembly of the activities undertaken by the cerf to ensure its functioning according to the agreed principles contained in the relevant un resolutions, in particular general assembly resolution 46/182. the ministers expressed concern over the human suffering and economic impact caused by the recent series of natural disasters throughout the world. they encouraged the international community, national authorities and non-governmental organizations, to promote closer cooperation to respond to natural disasters by strengthening emergency preparedness and disaster management measures, such as regional disaster early warning systems, as well as exchange of information.42 in fact, both the un and the non-aligned movement are pleading for a more catalytic diplomacy able to contribute in a more visible and convincing way to creating a safer and fairer world, an authentic ethos of humankind, where every human being lives in dignity, with real hope of a prosperous future. "the future of coming generations depends on the way we address contemporary problems", stated haya rashed al khalifa of bahrain , president of the sixty-first session of the un general assembly, which is scheduled to begin on 12 september, 2006. "we should work towards preserving humanitarianism and ensuring that our planet is a safer and more suitable place to live in", she said, thus emphasizing a fundamental objective of multilateral diplomacy.43 the magnitude and consequences of devastating natural disasters have more and more a global human resonance. affected people can not rely only on their rescue and recuperative capacity. therefore, diplomacy can contribute to the recognition of solidarity as the guiding light of national ioan voicu 171 and international policy which must be treated as a universal value. the duty of solidarity is an imperative prerequisite of globalization during the present era of planetary perplexities, discontinuities and vulnerabilities. diplomacy may succeed in promoting a holistic and multi-hazard approach to natural calamities, placing disaster risk reduction at the centre of regional and global political agendas. this is an urgent and permanent task, as disasters do not recognize borders and calendars. multilateral diplomacy may help in intensifying the momentum generated in the humanitarian field by recent tragedies and ensure that risk reduction assumes a higher priority on all agendas in order to make the world a safer place.44 development and education models have to be revised so that reducing and managing risk becomes central to sustainable development.45 building safe societies remains a capital objective for all human activities among which diplomacy must have a more prominent role. endnotes 1 a detailed assessment of the tsunami disaster was made by the highlevel expert group on technical options for disaster management systems: tsunamis and others, which met on june 22-24, 2005, at the un conference centre in bangkok. see for details http://www.unescap.org/ visited on june 26, 2005. for the assessment of the earthquake on java see the bbc report at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5026680.stm, visited on may 29, 2006. general data about natural disasters were released by the un world meteorological organization (wmo) at the symposium on multi-hazard early warning systems for integrated disaster risk management, in may 2006. see http://newsblaze.com/ visited on may 29, 2006. 2 for a comprehensive and updated summary of the relief and recovery activities for tsunami victims see http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2005/ iha1062.doc.htm visited on june 25, 2005. 3 one of the most comprehensive academic sources on this topic is diplomacy, three volume set, edited by christer jonsson, university of lund, sweden, and richard langhorne, rutgers university, newark, new york: sage publications, 2004, 1264 p. 4 the quotation is from diplomacy, third edition, oxford university press, 1963, as reproduced at www.diplomat21.com/diplomacy/diplomacy.htm. 5 the quotation was used by former us secretary of state george schultz 172 prajñâ vihâra in a speech delivered at the virtual diplomacy conference, united states institute of peace, april 1997, available at www.diplomat21.com/diplomacy/diplomacy.htm. 6 for the full text of vienna convention see www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/ diplomat.htm visited on june 12, 2005. see also g.r berridge and alan james, a dictionary of diplomacy, second edition, london, palgrave macmillan: 2003, 296 p. 7all statements of the holy father are available at http://212.77.1.245/ news_services/press/vis/dinamiche/b0_en.htm. 8 for a professional presentation of these aspects see fred charles ikle, how nations negotiate, new york, harper & row: 1964, pp.1-255. 9 see note 4 supra. 10 this section is inspired in particular by the excellent study dimensions of diplomacy by i. william zartman from johns hopkins university. the text is available at www.sais-jhu.edu/pubaffairs/publications/saisphere/winter03/ zartman.html. 11 the statement of the holy father is available at http://212.77.1.245/ news_services/press/vis/dinamiche/b0_en.htm visited on june 19, 2005. 12 for the conception of edgar morin about teaching see www. knowledgeboard.com/ cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=114218&d=pnd. 13 see warayuth sriwarakuel,"rationality and understanding others" prajna vihara, journal of philosophy and religion, vol.5, no.1, january june 2004, pp.134-135. 14 the full report of charles wolfson is available at www.election. cbsnews.com/stories/ 2005/01/08/opinion/diplomatic/main665626.shtml, visited on june 12, 2005. 15 the statement of bill clinton is summarized at http://www.un.org/apps/ sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=714, visited on june 15, 2005. 16 the statements are available at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/ 053005-nr-sp-cf-tsu-ts-wjc-on-tsunami-recovery-in-indonesia.htm, visited on june 15, 2005. 17 the full text of the statement is available at http://www.un.org/apps/ news/story.asp?newsid=14643&cr=tsunami&cr1=visited on june 15, 2005. 18 the resolution adopted by the un general assembly is entitled strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the aftermath of the indian ocean tsunami disaster and is available at http:// www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r59.htm. 19 all documents of the kobe conference are available at http://www. un.org/apps/news/infocusrel.asp?infocusid=102&body=tsunami&body1=, visited on june 10, 2005. 20 the declaration of the ministerial conference in phuket was initially obtained by the present author from the participants. now the document is available at www.ioc.unesco.org/indotsunami/phuket_jan05.htm. 21 the position expressed by thailand at the phuket conference is reflected ioan voicu 173 in the documents available at http://www.mfa.go.th/web/1.php. 22 the abstract of the study is available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/sro/ srosro/2005-21-1.html. 23 the proceedings of the asia society are available at www.asiasociety. org/ and were consulted on june 14, 2005. 24 all documents about escap meetings can be consulted at http://www. unescap.org/unis/sub_unis/press_releases.asp. 25 the essential documentation of the 61st session of escap is available at http://www.unescap.org. the most recent escap resolution on the matter is jakarta declaration on enhancing regional cooperation in infrastructure development, including that related to disaster management, adopted by consensus on april 12, 2006. 26 statistics on the tsunami were released during the 61st session of escap and are available in particular in the statements made by kim hak-su, executive secretary of escap, at http://www.unescap.org. 27further documentation about the meeting can be consulted at http:// www.unescap.org. 28 see statement by dr. kantathi suphamongkhon, minister of foreign affairs of thailand, special envoy of the prime minister of thailand at the private sector summit on post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction on may 12, 2005, washington, dc , available at http://www.mfa.go.th/web/1.ph. 29 the 14th annual asia leadership forum took place on june 13-14, 2005 in bangkok. the proceedings are available at http://www.dnmstrategies.com/ 2005_calendar.html. 30 for the preparation and the content of the conference see the relevant proposal at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjsxw/t195894.htm visited on june 20, 2005. 31 the speech of laila freivalds, minister for foreign affairs of sweden, is available in full version at www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5189/a/37222. 32 see note 31 supra for the source of information. 33 all data and relevant information are available in the documentation of the 61st session of escap at http://www.unescap.org consulted in june, 2005. for updates on the 62nd session see doc.e/escap/l.164 of april 12, 2006. 34 see statement by dr. kantathi suphamongkhon, minister of foreign affairs of thailand, at the 61st session of escap on may 16, 2005, available at http://www.mfa.go.th/web/1.ph. 35 see the escap shanghai declaration (2004) at www.worldenable.net/ bmf2004/doc_shanghaideclaration.htm. 36 for the full text of kofi annan's statement see http://www.un.org/news/ ossg/sg/pages/statements.html, visited on june 20, 2005. 37 the full version of ambassador eliasson's statement is available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3103/a/46337 visited on june 17, 2005. 38 the quotation from mark twain is available at http://www.bellaonline. 174 prajñâ vihâra com/articles/art4859.asp, visited on june 24, 2005. 39 see henry e. catto, jr., "the end of diplomacy", article available at http://hiboard.hitel.net/down/jangkeun/netdiplomacy.htm. 40 these reflections are inspired by an article by brian hocking, professor of international relations at coventry university, u.k., entitled "diplomacy: new agendas and changing strategie", available at http://hiboard.hitel.net/down/ jangkeun/netdiplomacy.htm. 41 see doc.a/res/60/1of 24 october 2005 containing 2005 world summit outcome, published in abac journal, vol.25, no.3, 2005, pp.65-66. 42 see par. 209-210 of the final document of the ministerial meeting of the non-aligned countries, adopted on may 30, 2006 in putrajaya, malaysia. the full version of the document is available at http://www.e-nam.org.my/namcob/ files/outcome/mmcob_finaldocument_.pdf. visited on june 5, 2006. 43 see the press-release containing the summary of the statement made by haya rashed al khalifa of bahrain, as president-elect of the sixty-first session of the un general assembly, which is scheduled to begin on 12 september, 2006, at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2006/ga10478.doc.htm, visited on june 10, 2006. 44 see world conference on disaster reduction, 18-22 january 2005, kobe hyogo, japan, proceedings of the conference, united nations, geneva, 2005, p.5. the un general assembly adopted, on december 22, 2005, without a vote, a resolution relating to the international strategy for disaster reduction. that resolution called for a more effective integration of disaster-risk reduction into sustainable development policies, planning and programming; for the development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to hazards; and for the incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery programs. see http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2005/ga10441.doc.htm, visited on june 14, 2006. 45 op.cit. supra, p.124.this is a conclusion which was shared by many participants in the regional workshop "education for natural disaster preparedness in asia-pacific in the context of education for sustainable development (esd)", held at unesco bangkok on june 1st, 2006, attended also by the author of the present article. ioan voicu 175 176 prajñâ vihâra 1free of religion & religious heritage reinventing nature: thomas berry's "new story" as universal communitas arthur saniotis christian university of thailand abstract this paper will provide an overview of how nature has been constructed as 'other', and discuss ways of challenging this worldview via thomas berry's notion of the "new story". elaborating on victor turner's concept of communitas, i will propose that the "new story" is an assertion to a universal communitas. the issue of ecological degradation has been given ample scholarly attention. prompted by rachel carson's controversial book silent spring (1962), the environment became a centerpiece of necessitating concern due to the profligate character of modernity.1 drawing upon carson's thesis, future ecologists developed various theories of nature. many works endorsed a transition from an anthropocentric worldview to an ecocentric worldview. developing from indigenous cosmologies, the famous ecologist arne naess eschewed anthropocentric paradigms in developing his ecophilosophical model. naess's model initiated a link for co-operating with nature with social justice, peace and non-violence. naess was one of the first theorists to suggest that ecological degradation was tied to the failure of social systems in ensuring citizens civil rights and social equality. in naess's view, the 'othering' of nature is symptomatic of societies that have lost their way. humanity lauds itself over its mastery of nature. human fixation for treating nature as 'other' is prompted by a need for ontological security. unable to admit our mortality and fragile existence humans efface nature in order to retrieve a sense of existential mastery. however, our dominance prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 109-122 109 © 2000 by assumption university press is driven by distorted myths and commercial realities. our cruelty must be absolute. animals are tormented in order to fulfill market quotas, lands are denuded of their forests and animals are genetically modified for human consumption. in the words of mary jenkins, "the treatment of animals to scientifically increase production for humans becomes more and more grotesque."2 jenkins continues stating that, "scientific experimentation, vivisection, and the control of individuals and non-human species by humans can be seen as a warring process against those whom we have come to call the "other"3 the implicit assumption here is in maintaining a mystique of human suzerainty in order to counteract our loss of control through age and death. human addiction to "a deep cultural pathology"4 diminishes any possibility for a rapprochement with nature. consequently, human fear has effected nature's withdrawal from our lifeworlds. as thomas berry has stated, our assault on the earth has emasculated our experiential being. in our denial of nature we abjure the ties which are the source of our archetypal myths. the question remains, how far will human hubris inform our relationship with the earth? our need for an "empathetic response" must outweigh "inhuman callousness.".5 jenkins further notes that, "humans separate themselves from the animism of the earth and the feelings of the non-human of the world in a myopic quest for human progress."6 human rejection of nature as evinced by predatorial forms of capitalism and globalisation serve to reaffirm nihilism. more importantly, such models give an illusion of the primacy of homo economicus. this is unfortunate since our most significant secular and religious rituals and stories are somehow tied to nature. the humble non-human retinue of the christmas nativity scene, the buddha receiving enlightenment under a bodhi tree, or the 'night journey' of the prophet muhammad upon the buraq attest to the innate correspondence between the human and non-human worlds. for eliade (1963) our most sacred rituals move us because they restore our place in the cosmos; they allow us to participate in the universe.7 the 'othering' of nature: historic processes constructions of nature as other came during the socratic period 110 prajñâ vihâra (circa 5th century b.c.e.). unlike the pre-socratic greek philosophers (circa 6th century b.c.e.) (i.e. thales, anaximander, anaximenes, heraclitus) who were among the first thinkers in natural science, the socratic philosophers (socrates, plato, aristotle, sophist schools) veered towards humanism. this transition is mainly attributed to the seminal greek philosopher socrates (470-399 b.c.e.). according to legend, it was socrates who said that there is nothing to be learned from trees, and encouraged investigation into human nature. socrates legacy was continued by aristotle (384-322 b.c.e.). although aristotle made substantial inquiries into the natural world, he believed that human beings were superior to non-humans. this was based on his belief that human beings were rational animals. spencer claims that "aristotle denies the power of thought to animals, maintaining that they are capable only of sensation and appetite, and that they need the rule of humankind in order to survive."8 such a view is in concord with aristotle's idea of the inequality of beings where "subordination is right because it corresponds to the way things have been made."9 thereafter, with the exception of the atomist philosophers,10 greek philosophy was anthropocentric with little exploration into the non-human universe. in contrast, the european medieval world consigned the universe to a sacred order from which humanity derived. the concept of a sacred universe, created and maintained by a prime mover (god), informed medieval cosmology. in this worldview (as prescribed by the abrahamic scriptures), humanity was designated the role of vice regent; its purpose was to protect and preserve nature. western religious iconography of the medieval period attested to the relationship between humankind and the cosmos. 'man' was viewed as 'microcosmos', a theomorphic being composed of matter (earth) and spirit (pneuma). humans embodied an "organistic unity".11 the preservation of nature was crucial, particularly in islam as the former was a means for contemplating god's natural order. for the 'people of the book' (abrahamic religions) nature was revelatory, a living testament of divine design, composed of myriads of signs. nasr explains that the aim of medieval science was to contemplate the unity of the cosmos as a way of understanding divine unity.12 the advent of the european renaissance (1450-1550) fostered a arthur saniotis 111 paradigmatic shift. renaissance science separated nature from the sacred, giving rise to a human centered universe.13 human allegiance to god was increasingly supplanted by humanist self interest.14 the ecologically orientated space-time model of the medieval world was displaced by a linear scheme which adumbrated human living patterns according to economic imperatives. the change in worldview was confirmed by various european thinkers. among those the french philosopher rené descartes' materialistic philosophy had a profound impact on western science descartes ascribed to the aristotelian concept of an atomistic universe a mechanistic cosmos stripped of its sacred substance. moreover, his mind/body model reaffirmed the intellectual and moral supremacy of humans while constructing nonhumans as soul-less machines. here, aristotle's concept of the 'great chain of being' was employed in which "nature made plants for the use of animals, and animals were made for the sake of humans (politics 1:88)."15 the assigning of animals to automata, bereft of feeling and emotion, resulted in their brutalization by humans from the 17th century onwards. by this time, scientists indulged in animal vivisection while the latter were still alive. scientists believed that animals felt no pain. accordingly, the historian lynn white writes how progress in european agricultural technology changed "peasant and farmer attitudes towards nature" in which "man and nature are two things, and man is master".18 another characteristic of the scientific worldview was a concern with taxonomy "with the aim of manipulation and predictability."19 for example, in his famous work the birth of the clinic (1975) michel foucault avers that physicians increasing use of vivisection from the 16th century onwards not only revolutionised medical techniques but reinforced the notion of the 'body as machine.' this new medical 'gaze' advanced medical specialisation and its cavalcade of specialists. "it presented [the practical knowledges of medicine] as the restitution of an eternal truth."19 bodily disease was no longer viewed as a mystery but arising from pathological causes which could be carefully observed, defined and categorized by the new empirical discourse. along with the advent of a mechanistic worldview arose the discovery of the 'new world' by western europeans. colonialism spread 112 prajñâ vihâra western values to the conquered peoples of the 'orient.' europeans justified their conquest of the orient on the pretext that they were a civilizing force. consequently, the colonized were viewed as being "biologically inferior" and "culturally backward". edward said notes that the colonial powers essentialised the non-west as irrational, carnal, and inimical.20 in this schemata, oriental peoples were considered to be closer to nature. thus, the 'othering' of nature was similarly employed to define the oriental. nowhere is the imagery of othering better exemplified than in orientalist art of the 19th century. orientalist art invariably portrayed the oriental male as effeminate "yet dangerous" while the oriental female was typically exotic and "eager to be dominated."21 the concurrent popularity in social darwinism (circa mid 19th to early 20th centuries) subscribed indigenous peoples as 'irrational primitives' who were incapable of acquiring civilisational status. like nature, indigenous peoples were to be controlled under the prescriptive of justified force. the estrangement between the human and non-human other has been referred by martin heidegger as a "night world" and max weber as "disenchantment of the world". for heidegger modernity is consigned to instrumentalism whereby things are viewed technologically. hence, things are no longer revealed as themselves but rather as resources for human ends. according to this scheme, old growth forests become chipboard, serene valleys become tourist resorts, and wildlife are turned to media attractions.22 modernity is characterised by a matrix of technological relations which has disconnected human beings from the earth and hurling them into "existential homelessness."23 similarly, weber postulates that the social organising principles of modern human beings are "disenchanted and denuded" and "inwardly genuine plasticity."24 disenchantment also describes the belief that the universe has become de-mystified and no longer perceived with awe, but succumbing to human calculations.25 thomas berry: the "new story" the catholic theologian, thomas berry has over several decades developed a new theology which he has termed the "new story". the arthur saniotis 113 new story expresses the need for a "mythic consciousness"26 in humans which will ordain a rapprochement between the human and non-human worlds. berry observes that western science and religion have colluded in a global pathology which has vehicled "the radical discontinuity" between the western religious traditions and nature. according to berry et al (kinsley 1995;27 angyal 2003), western religious traditions have also been primarily focussed on "spiritual redemption" and "seriously deficient" in foregrounding the "natural world" as "our primary revelatory experience". at this point berry argues that science must be balanced with a "poetic and spiritual appreciation of the earth" towards a scientific logos.28 berry's views are synonymous with the eco-philosopher david abram when he calls for a phenomenology of perception whereby the human 'presences' the non-human world. here, the senses become increasingly attuned to the animal and organic landscapes, to the "encompassing cosmos".29 both berry and abram argue for a new kind of poietic embodiment emulating the mytho-experiential understandings of creation that are found in shamanic societies. however, berry is not calling for modern societies to return to a pre-industrial age, but rather a reinvention in the way in which humans idealize and participate with the earth. concurrent with the new story is viewing the earth as the ground of our biological and spiritual being. in berry's dream of the earth (1990) he observes the human need, "to go into the earth, as the source whence we came, and ask for its guidance, for the earth carries the psychic structure as well as the physical form of every living being upon the planet".30 as humans are terrestrial creatures, our spirituality is earth bound, "human and earth are totally implicated each in the other."31 such a worldview entails a transformation in regarding the earth from an object to a "primary subject"32 "endowed with a spiritual mode of being."33 in this view, science becomes a key mode of interpreting the evolution of the universe and life on earth. the story of cosmogenesis begins with the primordial explosion of the big bang which is the origin of space/time, the creation of atoms and the first "galactic formations",34 the beginning of our solar system and primeval earth, the advent of proterozoic creatures, the evolution of complex life forms, and the formation of human 114 prajñâ vihâra consciousness. as swimme points out, defining "life" in a moral and spiritual sense only undermines "biological life".35 importantly, berry's new vision purports the centrality of a "time developmental universe" in which cosmic processes "reveal themselves in an ongoing creativity."36 berry's vision is laced with metaphors of an "interconnected universe", where star matter is the progenitor of future worlds, and where "life is a principle inherent in the primordial structures of the universe."37 humanity is central to berry's vision, as being the consciousness of the universe, a species created for celebration, for in human awareness the universe exalts itself.38 berry refers to the chinese pictograph "hsin", in explaining the human relationship with the universe.39 hsin denotes the human as the "heart of heaven and earth". in berry's words: "here we have a remarkable feeling for the absolute dimensions of the human, the total integration of reality in the human, the total integration of the human within the reality of things." new story as universal communitas at this point, i would like to introduce victor turner's concept of communitas in order to unpack some of berry's views. central to turner's theory of religion is the phase during religious rituals which he calls liminality. liminality is characterised as an ambiguous state in which ritual participants are "betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial."40 this phase is also characterised by what turner refers to as communitas which denotes a feeling of unity, comradeship, egalitarianism, empathy, and comity between individuals. in other words, communitas suggests a temporary dissolution of social structures which privilege social distinctions between people. for example, turner asserts that religious pilgrims often experience a state of 'flow', 'impregnated by unity ... purified from divisiveness and plurality' (turner and turner 1978:255).41 turner cites that communitas is not restricted to rituals but also encompasses various kinds of ideological movements or transcendental states of awareness where an individual experiences a feeling of unity between human or non-human others. this corresponds with martin arthur saniotis 115 buber's "i-thou" where humans are aware of the human or non-human other "as having a unity of being."42 the state of a 'universal communitas' is expressed in barbara meyerhoff's study of the huichol indians during their sacred journey to wirrikuta in the south-west united states of america. during one of their rituals the huichol attain a transcendental state synonymous with eliade's illud tempus where they unite with the gods and the cosmos.43 universal communitas pervades berry's cosmology. in berry's language existence is constituted by interdependent systems, or what he refers to as "allurement" where the cosmos is held together atomically, magnetically and chemically (p.7).44 allurement is the primal dynamism, the blueprint of cosmogenesis. this key principle which "awakens the communities of atoms, galaxies" stars and ecosystems is the same force that creates human nations, communities and families.45 allurement in the human species is characterised by self reflexion or conscious awareness through which the universe discloses itself and is apperceived in our sensibilities. cognate with the ancient notion of humanity as microcosm, abram claims that "we are organs of this world, flesh of its flesh, and that the world is perceiving itself through us."46 however, for berry human consciousness is the integument which "binds us to the world and to one another",47 constantly striving towards disclosing the universe. furthermore, one way in which the universe organises itself is through myths (p.8).48 according to brian swimme myths inform and direct human consciousness. the realm of the myth is a cavalcade of creativity. meta-narratives are epic myths which are universal to human societies. the epic of the divinisation of the cosmos is kernel to the human species. with the exponentialise rise of technology the epic of the divinisation of the cosmos has engendered new organising principles. for instance, the advent of the internet and global communication networks have catapulted human consciousness. for the first time in human history human consciousness has been able to venture into space via space rockets and satellites. in the latter, human consciousness has been transformed into a "noosphere" enveloping the earth in an infinitesimal communication matrix. here, the symbiosis of silicone based cyber machines and biologically based consciousness are extending ontological boundaries. in ibn arabi's thought, the predominating technologies of our time are 116 prajñâ vihâra none other than the "self disclosure of being" in its desire to be known.49 reinventing the human: new ways of universal communitas a feature of thomas berry's new story is his call for a global transformation in human belief systems which surmounts to "reinventing the human" (p.19).50 reinvention primarily comes via accommodating the human species into the earth community in a non-intrusionist manner.51 secondly, reinvention of the human species must be done in a "time developmental" context which accounts for the cosmological dimension of human evolution. human evolution should not simply be viewed as a biological phenomenon, but also as an emergent process of transformations which navigate cultural and spiritual modes of human existence.52 the key here is "to be able to identify the microphase of our human being with the macrophase mode of our universe being is the quintessence of what needs to be achieved."53 berry discusses the need for empirical observation as an invaluable resource in our establishing a "viable mode of living".54 such a mode incorporates an understanding of human evolution as the sacred journey of the universe towards self awareness.55 furthermore, the universal journey is a creative process. in human terms the universe's creative potentialities are manifested by the human penchant for mythmaking. whereas beneficial myths lead towards existential and social development, destructive myths lead towards "enhancement" i.e. cultural narcissism and "cultural pathology"56 berry's notion of the sacred journey corresponds with martin heidegger's concept of being "released toward". to be released toward something is to consign one's attention towards it in a caring way.57 "to be released" towards an indoor plant is to appreciate its beauty for what it is, rather than passing it unnoticed in one's daily life. to be released to the earth is to be attentive of its contours, lines and sinews, its unfolding and concealing. thus, in heideggerian terms our sacred journey is 'world gathering', "an arena within which" "attending to a thing can illuminate a world" and for disclosing its significance.58 james reminds us that to "gather world" is not simply a "frame of mind" but a set of habitual bodily practices.59 arthur saniotis 117 from an environmental level, negative bodily comportments may include neglecting to switch lights off, leaving rubbish on the ground rather than putting it in a bin, or overuse of private transport. releasement also intimates a sensuous disposition with the natural world. drawing upon abram, he views releasement as a "returning to the senses". as he observes: "if we ignore or devalue sensory experience, we lose our primary source of alignment with the larger ecology, imperilling both ourselves and the earth in process" (p.1).60 for example, abram states that our experiencing the rising and setting of the sun is caught between our frames of mind which indicate to us that the earth is really moving, and our animal senses which experience the sun as rising from the earth every morning and vanishing into the earth every evening.61 when we awake our sensory perceptions we experience each entity as a horizon disclosing its secrets. when we privilege our sensuous awareness of the natural world we are drawn in a dynamic communitas, the intertwining of our bodies with the "flesh of the world".62 in this vision of via positiva, human language as an aspect of human embodiment needs to be reinvented. the metaphors we commonly associate to nature expose our anthropocentric views. with few exceptions, metaphors alluding to animals are often used to describe a litany of uncouth behaviours, and ensure our separation from the non-human world. our observance with 'metaphors of quantity' is indicative of our present dilemma. grossman citing wendell berry states: "when language is detached from its origins in communal experience, it becomes 'arbitrary and impersonal'" (p.5).63 metaphors of quantity have become the measuring stick of social systems, which ensure the "system of inequalities".64 "in a world of extreme inequities, growth and the language of growth has become a smokescreen" for unchecked human practices.65 grossman's call for the expunging of metaphors of quantity66 mirrors abram's view that human beings need to retrieve the sensuous quality of languages.67 according to abram, language connects us to the world, "touching and penetrating" the sentient landscape. words which originate from the body's inner domain meld with the body of the world. language 'presences' our being in the world in ways which modern human beings have forgotten. the need to return language to the senses will ensure that our being in the world re-enchants our connectedness 118 prajñâ vihâra with the sacred universe. endnotes 1 carson, rachel. (1962) silent spring. boston: houghton mifflin co. 2 jenkins, mary. (1997) "the dystopian world of blade runner: an ecofeminist perspective," trumpeter. pp.6. http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/ v14.4/jenkins.html. 3 ibid., p.5. 4 tucker, mary, e. 'thomas berry and the new story: an introduction to the work of thomas berry,' bucknell university. lewisburg, pa. p.2. http:// ecoethics.net/pos/tucker.html#3. 6 ibid., p.5. 7 eliade, mircea. (1963) patterns in comparative religion. rosemary sheed (trans.) cleveland: the world publishing company. 8 spencer, colin. (1995) extract from the heretics feast: a history of vegetarianism: london: university of new england. www.ivu.org/history/ greece_rome/aristotle.html. in his politica aristotle says that "it is the best for all tame animals to be ruled by human beings." politica, ed. loeb classical library, 1254 b 10-14, cited in "greek philosophy on the inferiority of women". http:// www.womenpriests.org/traditio/infe_gre.asp. 9 ibid. 10 the atomist philosophers (leucippus (early fifth century b.c.e) and democritus (circa 460 b.c.e.) viewed nature as being composed of indivisible units (atoma). www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/greece/presoc.htm. 11 wei-ming, t. (1979) humanity and self cultivation: essays in confucian thought, berkeley: asian humanities press. pp.159. 12 nasr, seyyed hossein. (1968) "introduction", science and civilization in islam, new york: new american library. 13 hope marjorie and james young. (1994) "islam and ecology", crosscurrent. summer vol. 44. issue 2. pp.3. 14 ibid. 15 rodman, john. (1995) "four forms of ecological consciousness reconsidered," deep ecology for the 21st century, boston: shambhala press. pp. 159-160. 16 as rachels notes" "if animals are conceived of as intelligent, sensitive beings, these ways of treationg them might seem monstrous. so humans have reason to resist thinking of them as intelligent or sensitive". rachels, james. (1990) created from animals: the moral implications of darwinism, new york: oxford (university press. pp.129. 17 antolick, matthew. (2002) deep ecology and heidegerrian arthur saniotis 119 phenomenology, m.a. thesis. department of philosophy., university of south florida. august. pp.56. 18 hope & young. op. cit. pp.6. 19 foucault, michel. (1975). the birth of the clinic: an archeology of medical perception, (a. m. sheridan smith, trans.) new york: vintage books. pp.57. 20 said, edward (1979) orientalism, new york: vintage. 21 orientalism. http://www.english.emory.edu/bahri/orientalism.html. 22 james, simon, p. (2002) "heidegger and the role of the body in environmental values." trumpeter. pp.1. 23 ibid., p.1-3. 24 weber, max. (1946) from max weber: essays in sociology. translated and edited by h. h. gerth and c. wright mills. new york: oxford university press. pp.148. 25 ibid., p.139. 26 angyal, andrew, j. (2003) "thomas barry's spirituality and the great work", the ecozoic reader, 3, (3): 35-44. web version p.1-6. http://www.ratical.org/ many_worlds/great work.html. 27 kinsley, david. (1995) ecology and religion: ecological spirituality in cross-cultural perspective. englewood cliffs, nj: prentice-hall. pp.173. 28 angyal, op cit., p.2. 29 abram, david. (1997). "the ecology of magic"...chapter excerpt from spell of the sensuous: perception and language in a more-than-human world. (1997), new york: vintage books. http://www.primitivism.com/ecology-magic.htm. 30 berry, thomas. (1988) the dream of the earth. san francisco: sierra club books. pp.195. 31 32 arngyal, op cit., p.35. 33 berry, thomas. (1990) "earth spirituality", riverdale papers. vol. v. new york: the riverdale center for religious studies, n. d.). pp.1. 34 berry, james. (1993) "the universe story, as told by brian swimme and thomas berry," trumpeter. http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/content/v10.2/ berry.html. 35 swimme, brian. (2003) "a scientist responds to thomas berry's cosmology," the ecozoic reader. vol. 3. no. 4. pp.23. 36 ibid., p.26. 37 ibid., p.27. 38 ibid., p.28. 39 berry, thomas. (1990) "the spirituality of the earth," in charles birch, william eaken & jay b. mcdaniel (eds.) liberating life: contemporary approaches in ecological theology. pp.151-158. html version: http://www.radical.org/ many_worlds/spiritofearth.html. 120 prajñâ vihâra 40 turner, victor. (1969) the ritual process: structure and anti-structure. chicago: aldine. pp.95. 41 turner, victor. (1978) encounter with freud: the making of a comparative symbologist. in g. and l. spindler (eds.), the making of psychological anthropology. berkeley: university of california press. pp.558-83. 42 martin buber. (1958) i and thou, translated by ronald gregor smith. new york: charles scribner's sons. pp.26; scott, alex. (2002) http:// www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/buber.html. 43 meyerhoff, barbara. (1976) peyote hunt: the sacred journey of the huichol indians. new york: cornell university press. 44 swimme, brian. (1997) "the universe is a green dragon: reading the meaning in the cosmic story." in context: a quarterly of humane sustainable culture. pp. 1-14. http://www.context.org/iclib/1c12/swimme.htm. 45 ibid., p.8. 46 abram, david. op cit., p.68. 47 gill, j. h. (1991) merleau-ponty and metaphor, new jersey: humanities press. pp.71. 48 swimme, brian (1998) "science as wisdom: the new story as a way forward". brian swimme interviewed by lauren de boer. issue 26, summer. web version october 1998. pp. 1-9. http://www.earthlight.or/ignterview26.html. 49 "ibn 'arabi and modern thought. extract for chapter 3: ibn 'arabi and the era." http://www.ibn-arabi.com/modernextract.htm. the medieval sufi philosopher moiuddin ibn ' arabi purported his famous concept of the "unity of being" (wahdat-ul-wujud), in which existence is an expression of divine unity (tawheed), which discloses itself in infinite ways. the guiding thought of ibn 'arabi is contained in the sacred prophetic tradition which states: "i was a hidden treasure and i wanted to known, so i created the world, so that all things could live in me, and i could live in all things." 50 berry, thomas (2003) "reinventing the human." the ecozoic reader. winter. vol. 3, no. 1. pp.19-23. 51 ibid., p.20. 52 ibid., p.21. 53 ibid. 54 ibid. 55 ibid. 56 ibid., p.22. 57 james. op. cit., p.2. 58 ibid. 59 ibid., p.3. 60 abram, david. (2001) "returning to the senses." wild earth magazine. november-december. pp.1-5. http:/www.aislingmagazine.com/aislingmagazine/articles/tam31/davidabram.htm 61 ibid. p.1. arthur saniotis 121 62 ibid. p.2. the concept of "flesh of the world" is borrowed from the philosopher maurice merleau-ponty. (merleau-ponty cited in gill op. cit., p.71). 63 grossman, richard. (1999) "uprooting "growth" as metaphor: 20th century reflections for the 21st." blueprint for social justice. volume liii, nos. 4&5. december. pp.1-18. 64 ibid., p.3. 65 ibid. 66 ibid., p.5. 67 saniotis, arthur. (2002) "enchanted landscapes: sensuous awareness as mystical practice among north indian sufis". unpublished doctorate. school of social sciences. the university of adelaide. p.19. 122 prajñâ vihâra 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 141-156 141 © 2000 by assumption university press love in the age of high technology: how are metta and karuna still possible?* soraj hongladarom chulalongkorn university, thailand abstract the tremendous advances in science and technology today need not deter us in promoting and sustaining love. this may seem surprising to some, at least because such advances have resulted in pessimism concerning the survival of love. on the contrary, not only is love possible, but it has become more necessary in today’s world. the paper will focus on the kind of love that buddhism pays particular attention to, namely metta (skrt. maitri) and karuna. the two terms are generally translated as ‘loving-kindness’ and ‘compassion’ respectively. it is the teleological character of buddhist thought that makes metta and karuna possible in today’s world. i. introduction the fact that today’s world is so thoroughly pervaded by technology scarcely needs comment. by ‘technology’ here i do not mean merely the kind of technology that has existed since there were human civilizations, such as the plough or the water mill. the technology that concerns me in this paper is much more powerful, and has the potential to transform not only our ways of living and conceptualizing the world, but they have the potential power to transform the constitution of our very being. one is well aware now that the first steps toward cloning of full human beings are now a reality. genetic manipulation of living organisms is growing rapidly, prompting concerns over the use of such technology in ways that exacerbate existing inequalities and perhaps create irreversible changes to the environment. on the other hand, information technology is poised to transform human beings and societies just as dramatically. the internet, many believe, has the potential to transform the ways people think and what they believe. some have even gone so far as saying that it is an instrument of ‘colonizing consciousness’.1 people all over the world are communicating with cellular phones and computers, but it seems that the more cellular phones and computer networks are used in communication, the more isolated people become from one another. these two major strands of contemporary technology are also merging together,2 thus making each strand much more powerful than it can be alone. on top of this, the manipulation of matter has progressed to such a level that the individual molecules themselves being arranged and rearranged according to the manipulator’s desires. the implications of this nanotechnology could well be very serious. in this paper i would like to reflect upon these phenomena in order to find tentative answers to the question: how love is possible at all in such an age? i believe this question has become all the more pertinent because biotechnology, information technology and nanotechnology, each in its own way but in a structurally rather similar manner, have the power to transform human society and relationships in such a way that love could become extinct altogether. this is so because, as the technologies advance, there is a real possibility that traditional ways of living and ways of relating to one another will be severely threatened, and this of course includes love. i have to mention at the outset that ‘love’ in this paper does not mean merely erotic love or romantic relationships. while the subject of romantic love’s relation with technology is interesting and itself deserves a treatment in a series of papers, what i feel to be a more urgent topic is love in the broader sense of agape, or, as spinoza says, amor intellectualis dei, or metta and karuna in the theravada buddhist tradition. that is, i would like to focus on love as an unconditional devotional attitude toward the supreme being (in the theistic religions) or unconditional well wishing of other sentient beings (in the case of buddhism). while there are important similarities and differences among agape, amor intellectualis dei, metta and karuna, i will focus on the latter two in this paper. these two pali terms are translated as ‘loving-kindness’ and ‘compassion’ respectively. i will mention only briefly how the buddhist and the western concepts are similar or different from each other, and concentrate the bulk of the paper 142 prajñâ vihâra on the question how i feel metta and karuna seem to be threatened in this age of high technology and what we can do about it. in the next section i will discuss some key texts surrounding these two terms. then, in section iii, i present my tentative answer to the question in the title. the idea is that metta and karuna must be possible— that much can be taken for granted, and the more important question is how. and key to an answer to that lies in the role of mental and character development, which plays a crucial role in buddhist ethics. another key is the emphasis on the teleological nature of theravada buddhist thought, where everything is geared toward attainment of nibbana. in the age of high technology, metta and karuna are possible through education, practice and transformation of the consciousness of the people. this implies also that the kind of technological enterprise being conducted currently mostly in the west but is spreading fast elsewhere needs to be reconsidered. then section iv concludes the paper. ii. metta and karuna according to the theravada tradition, metta and karuna are two of the four ‘abodes of the brahma’ (brahmavihara’s) that characterize the mental attitude of one who practices the path of purification leading ultimately to nibbana. the other two are mudita and upekkha. metta means ‘wish for all beings to become happy’; karuna means ‘wish for all beings to cease from suffering’; mudita is ‘to feel happy when the others are happy, and finally upekkha is the feeling of equanimity or nonattachment toward worldly happenings. these are important attitudes to cultivate for those who would like to enter the path toward liberation. that love (or loving-kindness) and compassion are very important in buddhism is underscored by richard gombrich, according to whom it was out of these two sentiments that buddhism itself first originated.3 furthermore, the karaniya-metta sutta, a popular paritta chant in the khuddaka-patha, has the following to say about the benefits of metta: he who is skilled in good, and who wishes to attain that state of soraj hongladarom 143 peace [i.e., nibbana] should act thus: he should be able, upright, perfectly upright, of pleasant speech, gentle and humble, contented, easy to support, unbusy, with sense controlled, discreet, modest, not greedily attached to families. he should not commit any slight wrong on account of which other wise men might censure him. ‘may all beings be happy and secure, may they be happy-minded! whatever living beings there are—feeble or strong, long, stout or medium, short, small or large, seen or unseen, those dwelling far or near, those who are born or those who await rebirth—may all beings, without exception, be happy-minded! let none deceive another nor despise any person whatever in any place; in anger or ill-will let them not wish any suffering to each other. just as a mother would protect her child at the risk of her own life, even so, let him cultivate a boundless heart toward all beings. let his thoughts of boundless loving kindness pervade the whole world: above, below and across, without obstruction, without any hatred, without any enmity. whether he stands, walks, sits or lies down, as long as he is awake, he should develop this mindfulness. this, they say, is divine abiding here. not falling into wrong views, virtuous and endowed with insight, he gives up attachment for sense-desires. he will surely not come again to any womb.4 in buddhadhamma, which is arguably thailand’s most outstanding contribution to buddhist scholarship in modern times, venerable payutto has the following to say about metta, which is reminiscent of the western conception of eros and agape: metta is a well known topic of dharma. however, there may be some problems understanding it. the usual translation of ‘metta’ is love, having good wishes toward others, wishing others to be happy and to find only good and beneficial things. this translation sounds easy enough to understand. but problems arise when one confuses this meaning with love that is metta and love that is unwholesome. love that is unwholesome is often referred to as ‘sineha,’ which means love or infatuation only to certain individuals.... this kind of love only results in the mind becoming narrowed down and clouded, or heated and excited. on the contrary, metta is pure love that one has toward one’s earthly friends and sentient beings, who are all friends that suffer together under the samsara.... this results in the mind becoming wide open and clarified.5 this wide open and clarified characteristic of the mind, which is cultivated through practicing metta and actually the other three elements of the brahmavihara’s is key toward the realization of nibbana later on. payutto places much emphasis on metta, which is directed at all beings 144 prajñâ vihâra without exception, as opposed to the particular nature of sineha, or love informed by egoistic desire, which is only directed at particular individuals or objects. the key here is the role of the ego. since cultivating metta is among the first steps toward the realization of the truth that the ego is only a construction and is not there substantially in reality, whereas cultivating sineha brings about the exact opposite, the two are thus natural opposing members of each other, and one should remind oneself how the two are thus opposed so that one remains steadfast and becomes clear what metta actually is. the key in all this is that the practice of brahmavihara’s serves to rid oneself of the defilements that block the path toward nibbana. with the attitudes of loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, one purifies the mind, with the result that not only does the individual self become purified, but the world will become literally a better place. the canonical texts may present the brahmavihara’s as techniques for stilling the mind, thus helping an individual to practice it gain insights that lead to his or her own attainment. however, that is not to say that buddhism pays attention only to individual well being and not to the well being of the society as a whole. on the contrary, the emphasis is on the development of mental character in such a way that the mind is thoroughly pervaded by these four attitudes, and it is easy to imagine that most of the ills in the world, at least all ills that are caused by malevolence or harmful intentions, will be eliminated if everybody has a loving-kindness and compassionate attitude toward one another. it is true that each individual needs to practice the brahmavihara’s for his or her own individual benefit—that is a basic tenet of theravada buddhism, but that does not mean that social concern should altogether be neglected. the idea is that changes at the social level come from the volition and intention at the individual level. in terms of individual ethics, then, what is ‘right’ is constituted by an individual’s practice, that leads to the dissolution of the wrongful views connected with the ego, and which leads finally to attainment of nibbana. one can cultivate that kind of practice through the practice of the brahmavihara’s. in terms of social philosophy then, a ‘right social practice’ is constituted by the ability of individuals in that society to practice and develop their inner capacities so that they can attain nibbana in the end. soraj hongladarom 145 thus sue hamilton is correct when she writes that “love, or compassion, is inseparable from the efficacy of one’s action.”6 accepting personal responsibility, in her view, involves that one needs to help oneself, and acts of love and compassion should always include the aim of helping one to be able to help oneself.7 such practice and development does not limit themselves only to individual practice of meditation, but also include social action such as charity work and, i may add, destruction of unjust social structure. in short, love as metta and karuna (and also mudita and upekkha) is not only an instrument for individual benefits alone, but through that individual benefit one gains a kind of society and community that best exemplifies the ideals of justice and benevolence, an ideal society or community. there is also a tendency among some scholars to pronounce a distinction between ‘kammic’ and ‘nibbanic’ buddhism. according to melford spiro8 and winston king,9 ‘kammic’ buddhism is associated with the lay followers and involve such things as making merits in order to attain better next lives. the emphasis is on performing action in order to reap the rewards in the future. on the other hand, ‘nibbanic’ buddhism focuses exclusively on the cessation of suffering and involves practices such as meditation and intellectual studies of the canonical texts. this brand of buddhism is found more in the monasteries than in the lay households. furthermore, spiro and king view this latter to be the correct practice of buddhism. however, according to harvey aronson10 such a distinction is mistaken.11 one can bring about nibbana also through the development of what is understood as ‘kammic’ buddhism. through the ‘kammic’ practice of developing the four brahmavihara’s, the theravada text also states that one is equally able to attain nibbana. through the meditation on lovingkindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, one thereby gains admission to the high heaven, the abode of brahma. that is, by itself, within the realm of kammic buddhism. however, aronson states that there are many references in the texts that show that this practice of lovingkindness and so on enables one to gain a penetrating insight into the nature of all beings, which brings about attainment of nibbana.12 this is relevant in our case because if metta and karuna, are efficacious in bringing about the supreme goal of buddhism, then they, 146 prajñâ vihâra together with the other two elements of the brahmavihara’s, are endorsed at the highest level of buddhism itself. in fact the so-called ‘kammic’ and ‘nibbanic’ buddhisms are not really separable from each other. one starts one’s practice toward the ultimate goal of nibbana through the development of one’s own physical, vocal and mental characters. one continually refines one’s bodily action, speech and mental thoughts, until one finally achieves the ultimate goal. these practices of following the brahmavihara’s inevitably bring about positive karmic results—this much is in accordance with spiro’s ‘kammic’ buddhism. however, the texts are unequivocal in guaranteeing that this type of practice leads one quite directly to the ultimate goal, which is the domain of ‘nibbanic’ buddhism. and since the practice of the brahmavihara’s are inseparable from right social action in order to found right social structuring, then it can be quite plausibly argued that, contrary to popular belief, social concern is built into the highest teaching of buddhism itself. iii. how are metta and karuna possible in a technological society? on st. valentine’s day this year, it was reported that as many as 17 million “i love you” messages were sent in thailand through the short message service systems on mobile phones. many altruistic activities are organized through the use of information technology, and many websites have sprung up focusing on disseminating the buddhist teachings, with the explicit aim of fostering loving-kindness and compassion. these examples seem to show that metta and karuna are alive and well with technology, as the latter is used to serve the purpose of propagating the former. furthermore, they also seem to support the position of technological neutralism or instrumentalism, where technology is perceived to be a neutral force lacking its own ethical and evaluative character. the influx of information technology apparently, according to the above examples, did not obviate the thai people’s strong attachment to metta and karuna. on the contrary, novel ways to utilize the technology are being devised, apparently to follow the key buddhist teaching of engendering lovingkindness and compassion. the saying is that it is not the technology that is the culprit, but the people who use it—”guns do not kill people, people soraj hongladarom 147 do,” so the saying goes. however, this idea is deeply problematic because technology allows for possibilities which hitherto have not been there before, and it is these possibilities that open up ways of performing action that could have been prevented or could not have been conceived before if there had not been the technology in the first place. in the case of guns, many actual killings could have been prevented only through keeping guns out of people’s hands. in the case of information technology, instrumentalism seems to be saying that all the ills that are accorded to the technology, such as the proliferation of pornographic material and its perceived threat toward the minds of children and youths, are rooted in the volition of those who propagate the websites, and the technology itself is not responsible. on the other hand, attempts to promote the use of information technology, such as the attempts of the thai government to connect each and every village in the country through communication networks, seem to be based more on the belief that it is the technology itself that is efficacious in bringing about desired changes in these villages. to the thai government, the problem of rural development appears to be simple: give the villagers computers, software and infrastructure, then development will happen. i have presented my opinion in another paper that this is far from being the case.13 the policy makers responsible for the thai government’s approach appear to be under the spell of technological determinism, the belief that the path of technologization is an inevitable one. and what is more startling is that this belies the belief that there is only one such path that societies in the third world need to take in order to ‘catch up’ with the west.14 it seems to me, however, that both technological neutralism and determinism are in the wrong, and perhaps they are but two opposing sides of the same coin. thus i am in a broad agreement with charles ess, who argues essentially the same thing.15 both neutralism and determinism seem to be based on the presupposition that technology and its surrounding contexts are distinct. for neutralism or instrumentalism, technology is perceived as a neutral force. in this case it is clear that the two are perceived to be entirely distinct from each other. on the other hand, the idea of determinism, that technology is an autonomous force which cannot be channelled or controlled, also presupposes that technology can stand aloof from its contextual domain. many works in science and technology studies, 148 prajñâ vihâra however, have contradicted this assumption of distinctness of technology from its social, cultural and historical contexts.16 the details are too numerous to list here. nonetheless, the main idea is not too difficult to grasp. technology, and i emphasize here the ‘high’ technology of our contemporary era, cannot be conceived apart from its socio-historical context. what i mean that technologies such as nanotechnology or biotechnology are part and parcel of our contemporary, late capitalist, early twenty-first century societies, so much so that it is not conceivable to imagine another possible society, where these kinds of technology flourish in a very different social and cultural environment. this is so because all technologies arise from human needs and wants. information technology, for example, first arose out of the need for the military to find a machine that could perform calculations powerful enough to crack the secret codes of the enemy. the internet, furthermore, also has its origin in the military, as is well known. we can conceive of a different kind of social environment where there is no need for the military to devise such a scheme, or where there is no need for the military to innovate at all. an example would be the case of ming china, where the major policy was mainly to withdraw oneself and to build protective shells as a response to external threats, the ming emperors ordered the great wall to be built, which still stands today, and they ordered their chinese subjects to stay away from the coast in order to avoid the threats of japanese pirates. there are of course many factors involved, but it seems clear at any rate that if technologies are humans’ answers to the challenges that they face, then in the environments where the threats are different, then the technologies can be entirely different. we can even imagine life on an alien planet as having developing a completely different technology based upon the particulars of its alien environments and cultures. of course it can also be imagined that in a different environment, a similar kind of technology can well emerge that resembles what we have today. the fact that technologies such as nanotechnology could not have arisen in 15th century ming china does not entail that no such technology can ever take place in another, different environment. it seems plausible, so the argument goes, that technologies can converge. different environments can produce same kinds of technology. suppose in a different planet something like the internet. let’s call it ‘shaman-net’ was not born soraj hongladarom 149 with the military, but was invented as a tool for priests and shamans to store and categorize information and to allow them to communicate with their peers. then it can be easily imagined further how that technology could be much similar to what we have today. but this argument looks really too simple. what does it actually take for priests and shamans in that context to communicate with their peers and to categorize and store information? what kind of equipment is used? what kind of attitude toward the network that the priests have which presumably do not resemble our own (remember that the internet was once associated with the ‘tech culture’ and libertarianism here.) to what kind of society and culture do the priests and shamans belong? if the example provides more details then in order to make the shaman-net more like our own, the kind of social and cultural environment perhaps needs to be more like our own too. this serves to show how technology is inextricably linked up with socio-historical contexts. but if this is so, then the presupposition of both neutralism and determinism does not seem to hold, with the result that both positions are not actually tenable.17 technology is not a neutral power, depending solely on human volition and motivation; but neither is it an autonomous force capable of its own internal movement and logic. information technology, for example, is only capable of transforming belief and consciousness because certain socio-cultural contexts do obtain. without those contexts, there would be no such power of transformation. among the buddhist arahants, who have already attained nibbana and are totally free from kilesas or defilements, information technology has no power over them at all. furthermore, in a kind of social condition where the people are educated well enough to become immune to these negative influences, the power does not take hold either, as can be seen when many cultures find creative and novel ways of using the internet to serve their own agenda, which are internal to their own values and goals. on the other hand, new kind of technology often produces a series of changes in the socio-cultural contexts where it is introduced. today it seems every teenager in thailand is toting a mobile phone. it is a very fashionable item. changes, some of which are rather profound, are taking place each minute, and it seems undeniable that these changes are caused by the introduction of the technology. however, this does not mean that the path of development of a society can be totally determined by 150 prajñâ vihâra technology. as societies are changing as a result of introduction of various types of technology, it remains within the power of the individuals or in the collective judgment and decision of the society as a whole to put the forces of technology under control. since technology is inseparable from context, the two do influence each other. humans control technology through volition, and societies are in turned influenced by technology through the latter’s being an important part in the logic of capitalism and world order, as well as its internal characteristics. what is pertinent in our case here is that, in this very own context of early twenty-first century earth, how are metta and karuna possible? if technology is inextricably bound up with socio-cultural contexts, then metta and karuna, in short, are not possible without changes in these contexts, or at least without some corresponding conditions being possible in the contexts themselves. the trick is to find what features in the contexts should be responsible for them to be viable. since metta and karuna, wish for other beings to be happy and to cease from suffering, are fundamental to human relationships and their care toward one another, they are thus possible to the extent that the contemporary technological society does foster that kind of caring relationships. that fostering would not be possible if the structure, the way society is constituted, did not allow that to happen. in a kind of technological society where inequalities are ingrained, where there is exploitation of the poor by the rich and powerful, marginalized is rampant. and where the technology is only used to benefit those who are in power, this widens the gap even further. the growing concern over the digital divide issue, both between groups of nations, and within nation states themselves, clearly attests to this problem. without concerned effort and concrete measures of all those involved, it appears that love as metta and karuna would be doomed. though the political and economic structure of society is vitally important in bringing about love and caring relationships, according to the buddhist thought it is not sufficient. what more is needed is the kind of mental and character development which fosters loving-kindness and caring attitudes that will make metta and karuna lasting concrete realities. in it under the culture of wisdom,18 ven. payutto writes that the typical buddhist attitude toward such things as information technology is that the latter should not be allowed to take hold of the awareness and imagination soraj hongladarom 151 of the people in such a way that they lose sight of what really matters to them, namely their attempt to get rid of dukkha and attain nibbana, or at least starting to practice in the right direction in order that suffering is eliminated in the end. payutto also stresses that education and character development should play a central role in any attempt to harness the power of technology to benefit humankind to the fullest: all this means that, if used in the wrong way, technology is poisonous. in the west they are paying a lot of attention on violence, which is very harmful indeed, as well as advertising, which is a kind of baiting for those who are gullible. our thai society is also facing the same problems, including indulgence in the power and material benefits of technology, dependence on it, and indolence. in short, if people do not know how to use the technology, then there are problems, including deterioration of physical and mental health and worsening relations among the people in the world, such as competition and lack of warmth in the family.... as for the intellect, the flood of information has no benefits. it only increases delusion (moha). we need to find a solution for all this. .... i would like to emphasize that what is needed in coping with information is education.... we need to develop people so as they are above technology. no matter how far the technology has progressed, people need to be developed to be above it. do not let people become slaves of the technology. if technology is above people, then there are dangers. but if people are above technology then there is a way out to safety, because people would then be able to protect their freedom.19 the idea is that technology needs to remain under control of people who are wise enough to see through it and who remain free despite its powers. this emphasis on character development needs not conflict with the influx and diffusion of high technology, as we have seen. since neither technological instrumentalism and determinism is tenable, social context and technology in fact determine one another in a dynamic relationship. this means that character development should be part of society’s response to the influx of high technology, and the two can go along with each other. moreover, since the influx of technology means that at least some characteristics of the social environment will change to a certain degree, what we also need is then a kind of technology that allows for loving152 prajñâ vihâra kindness and compassion to be possible. hence, the kind of technology that is predicated upon exploitation of the poor and on widening the gap between the richer and poorer nations of the world would not contribute to promoting metta and karuna. these technologies include those pushed forward by multinational corporations that focus exclusively on their own profits rather than on contributing to bridging the gap. microsoft’s practice of effectively monopolizing operating system software, which lies at the core of almost all the machines embodying the information technology we have today, and monsanto’s technology of producing seeds that prevent farmers from replanting them after harvest would be two clear examples of the technologies that worsen the existing inequalities. they are, in short, examples of technologies that lack metta and karuna. iv. conclusion perhaps we can start imagining what it would be like for high technology to incorporate metta and karuna by imagining first what kind of socio-cultural environment it would be like for the technology to coexist with or even to be supportive of the two. it has often been said, in buddhist thailand and elsewhere, that to attain the arahant or nibbanic ideal is a very difficult task that few could achieve, thus it seems a utopian dream to imagine that such a society that realizes the ideal could ever be achieved in reality. however, to think in such a way is to follow the lines of those who propound that nibbana is a remote and almost impossible goal, and the task of human beings should focus more on performing ethical conduct and on collecting merits for the next lives, without having to bother to think about the ultimate goal. this kind of attitude goes against the very core of buddhism itself. for without the realizable and imminent nibbana there is no real impetus toward the dissolution of the ego which is necessary for conducts to be genuinely ethical and to be efficacious to bringing about a kind of society in which the ideals are concrete reality. since nibbana is imminent, a kind of society envisioned here is not a fantastic dream. and the buddha has shown clearly how that is to be achieved. the first steps involve cultivating metta, karuna and the other soraj hongladarom 153 brahmavihara’s. needless to say, here the role of education and character development is crucial. endnotes * research for this paper has been made possible in part by a grant from the thailand research fund, under grant no. brg4680020. the author wishes to thank prof. vichai boonsaeng for his generous support. 1 see peter hershock, reinventing the wheel: a buddhist response to the information age (albany: suny press). 2 cf. susantha goonatilake, merged evolution. 3 richard gombrich, how buddhism began (london, 1996). 4 khuddaka-patha, transl. with its commentary, bhikkhu nanamoli, minor readings and illustrator (london: pali text society), verse 8-9, quoted in peter harvey, an introduction to buddhism: teachings, history and practices (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1990), pp. 209-210. 5 prayuth payutto, buddhadhamma (bangkok: mahachulalongkornrajavidhyalai, 1986), p. 507. 6 sue hamilton, early buddhism: a new approach (richmond, surrey: curzon press, 2000), p. 213. 7 sue hamilton, early buddhism, p. 507. 8 melford spiro, buddhism and society: a great tradition and its burmese vicissitudes (new york: harper paperbacks, 1972. 9 winston king, in the hope of nibbana: theravada buddhist ethics (lasalle: open court, 1964). 10 harvey b. aronson, “the relationship of the karmic to the nirvanic in theravada buddhism”, journal of religious ethics 7.1(1979): 28-36. 11 see also harvey b. aronson, love and sympathy in theravada buddhism (delhi: motilal banarsidass), 1980. 12 harvey b. aronson, “the relationship of the karmic to the nirvanic in theravada buddhism,” p. 34. 13 soraj hongladarom, “cultural politics of the digital divide,” paper presented at the third international convention of asia scholars, singapore, 19 to 22 august, 2004. 14 a. gershenkron, economic backwardness in historical perspective (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1962). see also steve fuller, science (buckingham: open university press, 1997). 15 charles ess, “cultures in collision: philosophical lessons from computer-mediated communication,” in james h. moor and terrell ward bynum eds., cyberphilosophy: the intersection of computing and philosophy. malden, ma: blackwell publishing, 2002, pp. 219-242. 154 prajñâ vihâra 16 see, for example, sandra harding, is science multicultural?: postcolonialisms, feminisms, and epistemologies (bloomington, in: indiana university press, 1998); steve fuller, science, (buckingham: open university press, 1997). 17 charles ess, “cultures in collision: philosophical lessons from computer-mediated communication,” pp. 222-227. 18 prayuth payutto, it and the culture of wisdom (bangkok: buddhadhamma foundation, 1997 [in thai]). 19 prayuth payutto, it under the culture of wisdom, pp. 47-50. references aronson, harvey b. “the relationship of the karmic to the nirvanic in theravada buddhism”, journal of religious ethics 7.1(1979): 28-36. aronson, harvey b. love and sympathy in theravada buddhism. delhi: motilal banarsidass, 1980. ess, charles. “cultures in collision: philosophical lessons from computer-mediated communication.” in james h. moor and terrell ward bynum eds., cyberphilosophy: the intersection of computing and philosophy. malden, ma: blackwell publishing, 2002, pp. 219-242. fuller, steve. science. buckingham: open university press, 1997. gershenkron, a. economic backwardness in historical perspective. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1962. gethin, rupert. the foundations of buddhism. oxford, 1998. gombrich, richard. how buddhism began: the conditioned genesis of the early tteachings. london: athlone press, 1996. goonatilake, susantha. merged evolution: long term implications of biotechnology and information technology. gordon and breach, 1999. hamilton, sue. early buddhism: a new approach. richmond, surrey: curzon press, 2000. harding, sandra. is science multicultural?: postcolonialisms, feminisms, and epistemologies. bloomington, in: indiana university press, 1998. harvey, peter. an introduction to buddhism: teachings, history and practices. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1990. hershock, peter d. reinventing the wheel: a buddhist response to the information age. albany: state university of new york press, 1999. hongladarom, soraj. “cultural politics of the digital divide.” paper presented at the third international convention of asia scholars, singapore, august 19-22, 2003. king, winston. in the hope of nibbana: theravada buddhist ethics. lasalle: open court, 1964. soraj hongladarom 155 payutto, prayuth. buddhadhamma. bangkok: mahachulalongkornrajavidhyalai, 1986 [in thai]. payutto, prayuth. it under the culture of wisdom. bangkok: buddhadhamma foundation, 1997 [in thai]. spiro, melford. buddhism and society: a great tradition and its burmese vicissitudes. new york: harper paperbacks, 1972. 156prajñâ vihâra 02_(16-34)architecture as a sign architecture as a sign of objective reality: temporalizing space in husserl’s lectures on time jariya nualnirun university of the thai chamber of commerce, thailand บทคัดย่อ บทความนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อวิเคราะห์คำบรรยายของฮุสเซิร์ลใน หนังสือที่ชื่อว่า “ปรากฏการณ์วิทยาแห่งสำนึกเรื่องกาลเวลา” ซึ่งได้รับการตี พิมพ์ในปี ค.ศ. 1928 งานชิ้นนี้อธิบายแนวคิดของเขาในเรื่องการทำพื้นที่ให้มี ความหมายของกาลเวลาได้กระจ่างชัด ฮุสเซิร์ลยืนยันว่า โดยกระบวนการดังกล่าว ประสบการณ์อันมีชีวิตชีวาจะถูกรับรู้ได้เสมือนหนึ่งเป็นภาพตัวแทนของ ความจริงท่ีทุกคนเข้าใจได้ตรงกัน หน่ึงร้อยปีท่ีผ่านมา นักปรากฏการณ์วิทยาได้นำ แนวคิดเร่ืองกาลเวลาของฮุสเซิร์ลไปประยุกต์ใช้กับการประเมินคุณค่างานศิลปะโดย ตัดสินกันท่ีความสามารถในการถ่ายทอดสัจธรรม ในด้านสถาปัตยกรรม ทฤษฎี การรับรู้แบบปรากฏการณ์วิทยาเป็นท่ีรู้จักกันดีในฐานะท่ีให้แนวทางออกแบบอาคารให้มี ความหมายของการต้ังหลักปักถ่ินฐาน ถึงกระน้ันผลงานของฮุสเซิร์ลช้ินน้ีก็ยังถูก ท้าทายอยู่เสมอ โดยเฉพาะอย่างย่ิงสมมติฐานเร่ืองความถูกต้องแม่นยำของกาล เวลาท่ีแต่ละคนรับรู้ได้ตรงกันโดยไม่ต้องอาศัยอุปกรณ์ใดๆ ความจริงเชิงภววิสัย จะได้รับการสร้างขึ้นภายในจิตสำนึกผ่านตัวงานสถาปัตยกรรมได้อย่างไร บทความน้ีพยายามท่ีจะตอบคำถามดังกล่าว abstract husserl, in his work the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, developed ideas concerning a process of object formation called temporalizing space. he affirmed that by such a process, lived experience can be perceived as a sign of objective reality. throughout the late century, phenomenologists have applied husserl’s notion of internal 16 prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 16-34 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ time to justify the work of art in relation to truth. this can be extended to the architectural field, where the phenomenological theory of perception has been related to the idea of building and dwelling. even as husserl’s work has been frequently challenged, his approach to time consciousness is still valuable in approaching the question of how objective reality be constituted through a piece of architecture. i. the temporality of architecture the past was left behind by thee, the future state has not yet come. but who with vision clear can see. the present which is here and now… the buddha’s sayings1 it is often the case with ancient buildings that they risk irrelevance in the current age. some are considered to be representative of a particular time and its particular standards for judging what is beautiful about a building. yet they are often ignored by the local people, as is the case with the ruins of old cities in the centre of new ones. for many westerners, “ruins have a richly layered aesthetic”2, yet this is not the case for every community in the world. they are confronted by the more practical problem of how a current population can coexist with historical ruins. some propose the expulsion of the local population out of the sites of ancient ruins so that material forms of shape, color, solid and void are conveniently preserved. others believe that while architectural beauty is residual, living beings should take priority. it is believed that people are key in maintaining the temporality of these ancient buildings. this leads to an important question in the philosophy of architecture concerning both ancient and modern buildings: what is the real meaning latent in a faade? in phenomenological aesthetics, founded by edmund husserl (1859-1938), a thing is considered beautiful depending on the subject’s sense of lived experience.3 in the case of a spatial object, husserl asserted that its position in space seen by our visual field is not sufficient, for instance “the appearance of a house is not beside or over the house, one 17jariya nualnirun meter from it, etc”.4 in addition, it needs a place in time for a lived experience to happen and so its significance can be perceived by everyone. this temporality of a spatial object is considered as an entity to enable us to see more clearly what objective reality is. for example, a house, not a faade, can show itself in its place without distorting its real meaning from anything else. as a result of becoming a temporal object, even a plane surface of space can be considered beautiful. however, this time cannot be measured by chronometers or clocks, since it refers to an internal time determined by peoples’ themselves. this time-consciousness thus is essential to the appearance of something beautiful and can be extended to understanding the beauty of a piece of architecture or a landscape. husserl remarked: …a temporal object may be beautiful, pleasant, useful, etc., and may be all this in a determinate time. but the beauty, pleasantness, and so on, has no place in nature and in time. these qualities are not what appears in presentation and presentification.5 this article aims at analyzing husserl’s lectures on time6, the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness (1928) in order to clarify his thought about the temporalizing of space to affirm the possibility of emerging meaningful place as a sign of objective reality. throughout the in a historically significant area of bangkok, behind the mahakan fort is an old community that will be demolished. http://www.muangboranjournal. com/ modules.php?name=sections&op=viewarticle&artid=51 18 prajna vihara~ last century, phenomenologists, such as martin heidegger (1889-1976) and maurice merleau ponty (1908-61), have applied husserl’s notion of internal time to understand the work of art in relation to “truth”. thereafter a major enquiry of the phenomenologist is “how is truth disclosed aesthetically?”7 in the architectural field, the phenomenological theory of perception has been known through a work of christian noberg-schulz (1926-2000) as a fundamental idea of dwelling building.8 in addition to the artistic sphere, husserl’s lectures on time are admired as a major influence on continental philosophy.9 even so, this work has been frequently challenged, in particular his presumption of the accuracy of subjective time and his providing complicated methodology to guard against error.10 anyway, there is no independent objective reality, it is subjectively constructed through temporality. so it can ultimately be said that phenomenological aesthetics deals with illusion. so the question then arises: how objective reality can be constituted through a piece of architecture? this paper tries to respond to this question. the first part of this article, will introduce the problem of the temporality of architecture. it will then address time, space and lived experience in husserlian phenomenology and proceed to examine his ideas concerning the temporalizing of space as making possible the emergence of a beautiful thing. it will then discuss the relationship between architecture and objective reality. finally, it will evaluate husserl’s theory about temporalizing space. the old marketplace of samchuk, suphan buri province, picked up a unesco asia-pacific award of merit 2009. http://saisampan.net/index. php?topic=27774.0. 19jariya nualnirun ii. time, space and lived experience in husserlian phenomenology professionally, husserl was trained in mathematics. basically, mathematics is a process of deduction that tries to analyze the facts of nature and conjure up latent truth. the truth is independent from changes in human thought or feeling. it is evident that husserl provides such an objective viewpoint into the sphere of philosophy so as to explicate the logical structure of perception from the so-called lived experience. it was earlier known in terms of a content of an object a being one and the same thing. the object shows itself as a presentation, that is, as the object we perceive. even if we close our eyes or we are moving away, we are still aware of the fact that what we have perceived is identically the same thing. this is elaborated in his work, logical investigations (1900-01): whether i look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, i always see this book. it is always one and the same thing, and that not merely in some purely physical sense, but according to the sense of the perception.11 what led husserl to establish his own theory of perception was his reaction towards the empiricists’ theory of perception, which was a major school of thought in the late nineteenth century. he was critical of empirical psychology based on three issues. first, was the tendency of empirical sciences to define an object in terms of its existence in definite space and time. such psychological theories of perception assert that an external object is fully independent from the subject. second, is the belief that this independent subject perceives the sensory content of an object, that is, perception is a result of the penetration of the objects raw materials into the subject’s sense data. lastly, is the empirical assertion that in regard to objective reality, subjectivity is not a concern. unfashionably, husserl attempted to remedy these problems with the idea of lived experience. but, he could not entirely capitulate to the standpoint of franz brentano (1838-1917) who described lived experience as if it is something enduring, remaining present in a definite space and time in consciousness. yet, husserl was also opposed to the idealists who hold that reality 20 prajna vihara~ was fundamentally mental in nature. this was due to his limiting lived experience to the realm of perception. in particular, perceptual experience subsists in different phases of time. husserl emphasized that his task is to make lived experience completely intelligible.12 so he dedicated himself to studying lived experience of space and time for more than a decade, giving lectures on time from 1904-10 and lectures on space in 1907, although he claimed that he focused on space before his researches on time. he considered both integral to the movement of lived experience, yet he emphasized the special quality of lived experience of time. hence his lectures on space seem incomplete, while he seems to more fully accomplish his task of explicating lived experience in his lectures on time. in order to understand the evolution of husserl’s thought about time, space and lived experience, i shall divide his achievement into two parts. first, i will summarize his lectures on space and next his lectures on time. thing and space: lectures of 1907, although not considered as one of husserl’s most distinguished works, nevertheless reflects the development of his thoughts on inter-correlation between time and space. in this work, he attempted to examine lived experience as it is spatially sensed. he explained how lived experience is constituted through visual and tactile organs. in particular, the perception of a spatial thing was given not only in the form of threefold physical space, but it was also given through the dimension of movement, the so-called kinaesthetic sensation. this sense was understood as the consciousness of actual and potential action, of the “‘i move myself’ and ‘i can move’”.13 he affirmed that although this kinaesthesia depended on sensory organs, it had a different sensation because it was psychic lived experience constituted by the subject. this moment of lived experience was considered as an essential condition for performing any meaningful special activity in the world of things, as he argued: “…by the constitution of the one time in which the temporality of the thing resides”.14 it seems to me that husserl’s attempt to search for an authentic experience by investigating a spatial thing was not a complete failure, because he, at least, discloses its trace. husserl’s lectures on time were published in 1928 as the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, and became a well-known work. here, he attempted to carry out his phenomenological task by 21jariya nualnirun analyzing the lived experience of time which was identified as pure subjectivity. initially, time was defined by way of negation: “not the time of the world of experience but the immanent time of the flow of consciousness”.15 despite having character of movement, this subjective time was not a single line consisting of an orderly series static points of past, present and future. it could repeatedly change its position in its mode of appearance under different subjective conditions. husserl looked carefully into timeconsciousness so as to discover what conditions causes its movement to occur. in so doing, he provided mathematical methods such as the law of transitivity16 and the law of modification17 on the assumption that each mathematical property is a sign of an object appearing in the flow of time. in other words, it is a temporal object. indeed, husserl explains that subjective time consists of before and after where each is perceived as a temporal object. this lived experience of time involved memory and expectation appearing as the actually now. also, although time-consciousness was subjective, it could be perceived as objective: “temporal objectivity __ therefore, individual objectivity in general”.18 this is husserl’s assumption that the lived experience of time is the origin of objective reality. for instance, insofar as we are conscious of a tonal process as it were, by no means of sense, we are conscious of what a tone exhibits as a just then or not yet come. consequently, we can perceive a tone appearing as one and the same thing at the same time, not for someone, but for everyone. to sum up, husserl’s theory of perception aims to explain the the flowing of time 22 prajna vihara~ inseparable binding together of subjectivity and objectivity. it is a fact that the former is investigated with great care since it is a foundation of the latter. as a mathematician, he provides an objective point of view to verify the systematic property of subjectivity exemplified by analyzing lived experience. husserl’s business in elucidating lived experience of time and space has been succeeded in his lectures on time. he discloses that even if time and space were constituted under the subjective conditions, they were intelligible without providing physical measurement. husserl implies lived experience in the sense of recognition as we live through it.19 this is the presence of the living present throughout the ceaseless flow of time. lived experience of time is defined as perceiving the same thing appearing as such at the same time. by this definition, husserl can overcome empirical standpoint of view about space and time. time-consciousness is a source of objective reality in which everyone can apprehend without any physical tool. as a sign of this pure lived experience, a temporal object is what appears in memory and expectation; although it changes its position in the mode of appearance, it shows itself as now continuously. thus, the temporality of a thing is a result of constituting lived experience of time; it is possible through a process which is so-called the temporalizing of space. iii. temporalizing space in husserl’s lectures on time the task of a phenomenological aesthetic is to provide an analysis of the constitution of time and space by going back to what is “truly absolute subjectivity”.20 if a space that makes us aware that our awareness is itself continuous21, that space is temporalized. temporalizing space here is a process of perceiving space becoming a temporal object. to clarify this issue, three questions are discussed here. one is “what is temporalizing space?” “how is it performed?” and “what is its outcome?” temporalizing space leading to a beautiful thing in husserl’s lectures on time, the “temporal object” is a key term for understanding time-consciousness. defined differently than an ordinary object, a temporal object appears itself as present and is in the form of continuity. it refers to the occurrence of any spatial thing having two 23jariya nualnirun related qualities of time: duration and temporal flow. in this way, revealing itself in the passage of time, a piece of architecture can be recognized as the representative of a true knowledge appearing itself as such at the same time. it is notable that a thing which we consider beautiful, which occupies space, can be considered temporal, while beauty cannot. this means that as a value, beauty has no position in time. it hence lacks the capacity of transition. since husserl’s aesthetic judgment is based on the criteria of being a temporal object. that is to say, if a spatial thing appears itself as now and yet transcends itself in the continuous flow of time, then it is beautiful. such a self-transcendence is a result of its having something to say to others. a beautiful thing can, therefore, communicate messages living in its background to perceivers, as husserl said: “everything in perception has its background…the foreground is nothing without the background; the appearing side is nothing without the non-appearing”.22 a spatial thing is beautiful when it can tell the truth. as a viewer, if we are conscious of messages in a work of art, we are conscious of time. time is necessary to the experience of works of art of all kinds.23 indeed, both philosophers and artists have common questions concerning how life should be lived.24 while philosophers recognize that the understanding of time is essential for arriving at such answers, nevertheless they encounter difficulties in understanding the flowing of time itself, as recognized by saint augustine (345-430) in book xi of his confessions.25 as shown, the purpose of phenomenological aesthetics is to analyze tacit knowledge which cannot be seen at the first sight. what follows is art which serves as a primary means for conveying cognition rather than expressiveness. husserlian phenomenology might agree with aesthetic cognitivism28 that knowledge makes a spatial thing art. nonetheless, an artwork’s success is not judged by an efficacy of providing knowledge in practice. furthermore, the admiration of technical skill, or even the mood resulting from contemplation, is just the artwork’s incidental benefits. since, a work of art should be evaluated by providing a true knowledge in the terms of understanding, interpretation and imagination about “the reallife” to the viewers. as far as such true knowledge settles down, empirical sciences go forward firmly. this is husserl’s epistemological standpoint 24 prajna vihara~ that subjectivity is a foundation of objectivity. temporalizing space, therefore, is provided to be a phenomenological approach to evaluate a beautiful thing through its being a representative of objective reality. directed glance of attention toward the appearing thing temporalizing space is initially possible through a directed attention toward a spatial thing. in other words, it is so-called intentionality29 presenting itself in the form of this intentional act. husserl described the outcome of temporalizing space according to two aspects: the external and internal object. an external object is the external appearance initially constituted. for example, in the visual field, if we draw a lot of attention toward the appearance of a movable thing, then we are conscious of it actually now. this directed glance does not just see something, but it is the perception that makes sense for us, as husserl said: if we perceive a flight of birds, a squadron of cavalry at a gallop, and the like, we find the described distinction in the underlying basis of sensation…precisely by this means, the objective itself appears,… the appearing event always has the identical, absolute temporal value …in the living source point of now there also wells up ever fresh primal being…accordingly, the appearance of sinking back, of withdrawing, arises.30 in the case of an internal object, it is temporal in memory. it has its own living extension existing in the retentional phase of consciousness. the directed glance can carry this remaining present which is an immanent character of the elapsed temporal object with it forever, thereby transcending from past to now-point of time. that is, it is the appearance of two aspects of one and the same thing: immanence and transcendence, flowing in the stream of time-consciousness. in addition to moving along attention, some internal objects have a chance to be fresh again. husserl described that in retention, there are two forms of memory: the one is the memory which can be easily recollected and reproduced and the other is the memory which disappears from remembrance like it is nearly expired. the former is in subsisting 25jariya nualnirun lived experience, while the latter is neutral in spite of having temporality. nonetheless, the latter can be refreshed by intentionality to temporalizing that object again. for example, when some memories seem to vanish without their living extension, husserl described that it is a result of our moving out of the point of temporal duration, although in fact its temporality is unmoved. and whenever we are conscious of that memory, this means that intentionality works to give the clarity to lived experience of our memory, as given now and movement to that expired temporal object, as husserl said: “to my consciousness points of temporal duration recede, as points of stationary object in space recede when i “go away from the object”. the object retains its place…its temporal point is unmoved….”31 this recollection reflects to an importance of the subject as an entirely intentional actor. besides, if we regard the directed glance of attention toward the appearing thing, we can make vanished memory clearer. husserl advised to search for the clue of memory which was obscured like being covered with a veil. as a result of paying attention, the actual lived experience will continually emerge, as husserl said: “the ‘clear’ (in the first sense) appears as seen through a veil-unclear now and then, that is more or less unclear, and so forth. they belong to the actual lived experience of the presentification”.32 temporality in a beautiful thing undoubtedly, time-consciousness aims at providing a standard for evaluation of the appearing thing, as husserl said “an authentic experience…provides the standard for evaluation of all forms of experience”.33 generally, a standard identifies an invariant thing; whether we are aware of it or not, it constantly exists. also, our frame of reference has no capacity of distorting reality to follow our needs. it’s not only real for us, but for everyone. this objective reality, hence, extends to the logical capacity of an individual to judge what is true or false. this temporality should therefore also extend to the work of architecture. however, in husserl’s point of view, this objective reality could not be seen directly in the work of art. if objective reality is perceived indirectly through temporalizing space, the beautiful thing is a sign of ob26 prajna vihara~ jective reality as smoke is a sign of fire. the trace of objective reality exists in the temporal ordering consisting of present, past and future. as in husserl’s lectures on time, there is an attempt to seek these clues in spite of the fact that they move ceaselessly (since time manifests itself in every place, as well as saturating human experiences, activities and cognitions). so the temporal object which culminates in an identical unity signifies an objective reality. definitely, a beautiful thing can be a tool of searching for the truth on condition that time is absolutely perceived. let us consider trace of time in a beautiful thing. there are three concomitant appearances: the presence of the living present, the presence of temporal flow and the presence of identical unity. the presence of the living present temporalizing space produces the presence of the living present as a foreground of its appearance. in so doing, our visual field is displaced with regard to spatiality united to temporality. a directed glance of attention toward…this piece of paper, and, in particular, toward a corner of the paper which is especially prominent. this distinction on the ‘subjective side’. the attending itself in its various step, is something entirely other than what is specifically noted and not noted in the object…with regard to the object, now this, now that is objective in a particular way, and that what is now specially favored was already there.34 it is notable that such awareness is the lived experience of the here and now. this is a result of our perceptual apprehension in discriminating differences in temporal ordering. what is now is precisely perceived. in other words, such directed attention brings about the awareness of an item as occurring in a certain order, although it is running off the now point of time, as remarked by husserl: “‘past’ and ‘now’ exclude each other. something past and something now can indeed be identically the same but only because it has endured between the past and now”35 similar to temporal object which has not yet come, it also appeared as present through a directed glance of attention toward an ob27jariya nualnirun ject. for example, when we have a precisely determined plan and intuitively imagine what is planned as future reality. so this temporal object of expectation is not represented in fantasy, but it is also perceived as actually now, as husserl remarked: …expectation finds its fulfillment in a perception. it pertains to the essence of the expected that it is an aboutto-be-perceived. in view of this, it is evident that if what is expected makes its appearance, i.e., becomes something present, the expectational situation itself has gone by.36 the presence of temporal flow this is the consciousness of a particular item in the ordering as the now, the just then, or the not yet. husserl’s evidence is that we are able to draw the elapsed temporal objects into the now as a primal impression from retentional consciousness. the directed glance of attention toward an object leads to the movement of perception. just as the elapsed temporal object, the expected one is intended to be now in the course of lived experience. this presence of temporal flow is a necessary condition for the occurrence of a primal impression; if a primal impression occurs, then the consciousness of temporal flow must have been presented. in other words, if one were aware of a memory, then one could be aware of the flow of time-consciousness. therefore, there are two kinds of temporal object; an immanent and a transcendent one which bind together in the stream of time-consciousness. specifically, the transcendence is an essential quality which is considered as background leading to the presence of the living present. in other words, if one were aware of an immanent object, one must be aware of a transcendent object which is its movement. this transcendent quality is continued in the constitution of the temporality of the enduring thing itself with its now, before and after. similarly, a spatial thing having its potentiality of changing orientation brings about the living now. this temporalizing space, thus, is an essential process of the emergence of the architectural building in the moment of lived experience. 28 prajna vihara~ the presence of identical unity it is precisely the business of phenomenology to grasp objective reality and to make it completely reasonable. the final consequence of temporalizing space is to clarify it in the terms of identical unity. its presence is not merely possible for the individual, but for all sentient beings. it is defined in terms of the assumption that everyone is conscious of the same thing, appearing as such, at the same time. further, it is the perception of unity of space and time. undoubtedly, husserl provided the presence of identical unity to affirm that the subject causes objective reality to occur. because a true item of knowledge can be considered as the unity of various perspectives of everyone toward an event in which they perceive and agree on its being the one and the same thing. this is an original meaning of objectivity which has been neglected by empirical sciences throughout the century. scientists entirely separated objectivity from subjectivity, while husserl wants to reunite the two. husserl also provided a tightly unified space and time to identify what objective reality exactly meant. human experiences, events, innovations and the like emerge in space and endures in time. in addition to saturating time and space, identical unity carry some messages which manifest themselves at the present. if scientists can find the truth through apprehending natural law of all physical things, then husserl can find it through apprehending natural law of consciousness which is lawfully psychological act of all human beings. his investigating the trace of time is reliable. in so doing, messages hiding behind the material foreground are allowed to exhibit themselves. then, the presence of identical unity is true and needs no proof. thus, husserl concluded that not all physical things can be objective reality, unless they have been temporalized. in brief, a beautiful thing is able to be the standard for measuring human experience and cognition. this becoming one and the same of spatiality and temporality can constitute some significant places in relation to physical world. in particular, temporalizing space brings about apprehension of the correct meaning of objectivity. as a result of these three concomitant appearances, a beautiful thing can not only immanently exist in our memory, but also transfer its message outside of the barriers of time and place. husserl’s originality in investigating trace of time, thus, is a paradigm for revealing of what people’s really thinking by no means of 29jariya nualnirun physical tools. i have argued that husserl’s directed glance of attention toward the appearing thing leads to absolute perception. in addition to perceiving surfaces of a physical object in the terms of shape, color and so on, we can be aware of it as a temporal object which has a deep meaning concerning subjective conscious life. that is to say, husserl’s directed glance of attention toward the appearing thing is a major device for seeking and apprehending a real meaning of the same thing in which either memories of past or expectancies of future events appeared as the flow of the living present. tripitaka kept by nhong khu lu community, ubonratchathani province. samray church, the first protestant community in thailand. http://www.manager.co.th/daily/viewnews. aspx?newsid=9470000065116 30 prajna vihara~ iv. evaluation of husserl’s thought about temporalizing space why do we need objective reality? it is to know ourselves as a being living together inseparably with others. indeed, it is a major aim of phenomenology, as introduced by merleau-ponty, “we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression…rationality is not a problem”.37 bangkokian way of life in river condominium. http://www. aanda.co.th/ ap_list001.html when we turn to architecture, we can appreciate the validity of husserl’s observations about temporalizing space. it enables us to look at a piece of architecture from the perspective of temporality. some structures express their age and are still attractive and livable. some contemporary styles of tower buildings are designed to send messages of cheerful vitality and anticipate a future to come. this temporalizing space can also allow us to address a major issue of architecture, that is, how do people inhabit their places. how does architecture influence the way we live, how they consider their future and their surrounding community. for instance, it allows us to consider the phenomenon of the many communities old wooden houses and buildings placed haphazardly within the newer urban city. according to phenomenological aesthetics, a beautiful place does not depend on drawing or positing something into a surface, or considering dwellings as we would mere furniture. rather, it shows that architecture should be designed to bring out people’s memories and expectations into being. such moments of lived experience should be designed into a piece of architecture as much as possible so that these meaningful 31jariya nualnirun places can lead to meaningful mutual understanding of the world. as shown, by husserl’s process of temporalizing space, everyone can be conscious of the same thing, appearing as such, at the same time. consequently, the communal lived experience of time is the key to allowing the beautiful thing to occur. v. conclusion the temporality of architecture is the interchange between spacetime in consciousness that allows the able to reside in a worldly place. its process, temporalizing space, creates an awareness in us of a beautiful thing which goes beyond mere faade, but shows the temporal object as an essential quality. this means that an item of architecture must have a place in time, determined by the people themselves, in order for it to become a sign of objective reality. husserl’s aesthetic judgment has been frequently challenged, in particular his presumption of the presence of the now. yet, from examining his lectures on the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, i feel that husserl succeeded in demonstrating the importance of the actually temporal now, before and after in the continuous stream of time-consciousness. in the end he found the necessary condition for the presence of objective reality, that is, the awareness of temporal flow. therefore, this approach provides rich possibilities for the understanding of architecture. endnotes 1this buddha’s saying aims to teach that everything is impermanent. a fuller description of the buddha’s thought on time-consciousness is found in i.b. horner, trans., the collecton of the middle length sayings (majjhima-nikay_ volume ii (london: luzac & company ltd., 1957), p.97-107. 2donald crawford, “nature and art”, in aesthetics: a reader in philosophy of arts, ed. david goldblatt and lee b. brown (new jersey: prentice hall, 1997), pp.214 3lived experience is “erlebnis” in german term expressed for supporting husserl’s phenomenology. this term refers to a particular type of experience which lives itself as intention. see emmanuel levinas, “intentionality and sensation”, in ~32 prajna vihara~ edmund husserl: critical assessments of leading philosophers, volume i, ed. rudolf barne, donn welton and gina zavota (london and new york: routledge press, 2995), pp.265. 4edmund husserl, the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, trans, james s. churchill (bloomington: indiana university press, 1964), p.24. 5ibid., p.126. 6husserl’s lectures on time were given during 1904-10. later, martin heidegger had collected and published in 1928. 7andrew cutrofello, continental philosophy, (new york: routledge press, 2005), p.30. 8see christian norberg-schulz, genius loci: towards a phenomenology of architecture, (london: academy editions, 1980), p.6. 9originally, the term “continental” is referred to contemporary or recent philosophical happening on the european continent. today, it is applied to philosophers who see themselves as continuing the continental “tradition”. its methodology is the investigation for gaining objective reality through human speech and artistic work in which scientific method is not adequate to evaluate it. see andrew cutrofello, continental philosophy, p.1-2. 10prominent critiques toward husserl’s the phenomenological of internal time-consciousness can be seen in jacques derrida, speech and phenomena and other essays on husserl’s theory of signs, trans. david allison (evanston il: northwestern university, 1973), p.9 and see john b. brough, “the emergence of an absolute consciousness in husserl’s early writings on time-consciousness”, in husserl: expositions and appraisals, ed. frederick a. elliston and peter mccormick (london: university of notre dame press, 1977), pp. 93. 11dan zahavi, “internationality and the representative theory of perception”, man and world, 27(1994): 37-47, quotation from p.39. 12“…indeed, as soon as we even make the attempt to undertake an analysis of pure subjective time-consciousness-the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time”. see edmund husserl, the phenomenology of internal timeconsciousness, p.22. 13see jitendra nath mohanty, “the development of husserl’s thought”, in the cambridge companion to husserl, ed. bary smith and david w. smith (new york: cambridge university press, 1995), p.58. 14edmund husserl, thing and space: lectures of 1907, trans. and ed. richard rojcewicz (dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1997), p.69. 15edmund husserl, the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, p.23. 16law of transitivity, namely, the law that if a is earlier than b then b is later than a is used to identify what is likeness and difference of elapsed temporal objects into a continuity of memory, as mentioned by husserl: “that there is transitivity, that to everytime belongs an earlier and a later”. see edmund husserl, the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, p.29. 33jariya nualnirun 17law of modification is used to explain why a temporal object that sinks into the past, as the one and the same thing, has a fixed position in the flow of timeconsciousness. this law is an essential device for examining a temporal object through every dimensions of a memory. for example, (a---b)---(a---b)’---(a---b)’’ ….is the sign for a temporal flow consists of infinite series of modified memory of “b follows a”. see ibid., 103. 18ibid., p.21-22. 19phenomenology online, “erlebnis”, glossary, http://www.phenomeno logyonline.com/glossary/glossary.html. 20see andrew cutrofello, continental philosophy, p.45. 21see barry dainton, stream of consciousness-unity and continuity in conscious experience, (london and new york: routledge, 2000), p.100. 22edmund husserl, the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, p.78. 23see john b. brough, “plastic time: time and the visual arts”, in the many faces of time, ed. john b. brough (dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 2000), pp.226. 24the relationship between philosophy and architecture is found in edward winters. aesthetics & architecture, (london: continuum international publishing group, 2007), p.9. 25“we surely know what we mean when we speak of it…if i want to explain it to an inquirer, i do not know” see saint augustine of hippo, confessions, trans. henry chadwick (oxford : oxford university press, 1991), p.54. 26john b. brough, the many faces of time, pp.238. 27an overview of frank lloyd wright’s applying phenomenology to architecture is found in christian norberg-schulz, genius loci: towards a phenomenology of architecture, p.192-194. 28aesthetic cognitivism is defined as art’s capacity to provide knowledge. see katherine thomson-jones, “inseparable insight: reconcilling cognitivism and formalism”, the journal of aesthetics and art criticism, 63 (2005): 375-384.. 29generally, intentionality is defined as directedness. a discussion of husserl’s concept of intentionality can be found in aron gurwitsch, “husserl’s theory of the intentionality of consciousness”, in husserl intentionality and cognitive science, ed. hubert l. dreyfus (cambridge: the mit press, 1982), pp.65. 30edmund husserl, the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, p.94. 31ibid., p.45. 32ibid., p.72. 33ibid., p.28. 34ibid., p.180 35ibid., p.57. 36ibid., p.80. 37maurice merleau-ponty. phenomenology of perception, trans. colin smith (london: routledge & kegan paul, 1981, p.vii-xxi. 34 prajna vihara~ contents prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-decmber 2005, 115-132 115 © 2000 by assumption university press conflicting values: a tribute to max weber francis pangfei lai assumption university of thailand abstract this paper examines the wisdom of max weber in the light of the theme: ‘asian heritage in a global society.’ in particular, the paper addresses the wisdom of an uncritical embrace of western values, particularly that of capitalism and that of the blind adoption of westernized democratic concepts, by the cultures of asia. it looks at the conflicting social values between the eastern and the western ways of life and questions how humankind should react in the light of such conflicts. additionally, this paper takes a long and hard look into the conflicting values in the commercial world. it aims to show the inadequacy of the present definition of ‘market value’ as advocated by present day property professionals as the definition fails to take into consideration of the value of any property for the ‘public good’. the conflict that arises between the value for the benefit of the public and that for the benefit of a commercially interested individual or group is highlighted. it proposes another version of that definition of ‘market value’ that incorporates the concept of value for the common good of the public. social actions before we enter into discussions on the topic of conflicting values, it is relevant to look into weber’s concept of social actions. to weber, there are four types of social actions, namely: zweckrational, wertrational, affective action, and traditional action. in many ways, the type of social action that a person takes governs the value that s/he places in the property or asset or issue that s/he is examining or considering. it is therefore of primary importance for us to come to grips with these four types of social actions at the very beginning. zweckrational refers to those social actions that are rationally chosen with the means to attain a particular goal very much in mind. such actions have also been referred to as ‘technocratic thinking’ and the action of an engineer in the construction of a bridge to cross a river is an example of zweckrational thinking. wertrational refers to those social actions that are value oriented characterized by striving for a goal that is not at all rational in itself but is pursued by rational means. an example of wertrational action is of an individual who seeks salvation by following the teachings of a prophet. an affective action is one that is based entirely on the emotional state of the person rather than on the rational weighting of the pros and the cons. a traditional action is a social action that follows tradition or custom or habit without so much as reflecting on the purpose or on the meaning of that action. people engage in this type of action almost without thinking because the action is always done by society. weber’s main purpose of identifying these four types of social actions is to demonstrate to us in his writings that the modern world, with its globalized setting and heavily influenced by the westernized thoughts, comprises mainly of people who are taking social actions more for reason of goal-oriented rationality (that is zweckrational) rather than for reason of value (wertrational); of emotion (affective action); or of tradition (traditional action). rationalization, bureaucracy, authority and oligarchy: weber is thus concerned with the rationalization process of society, which is the practical application of knowledge to achieve one’s desired end. this can of course lead to efficiency, to the proper coordination of activities that can result in the control over both the physical and the social environment. rationalization is a product of “scientific specialization and technical differentiation” that seems to be a characteristic of the western 116 prajñâ vihâra culture.1 rationalization is the guiding principle behind bureaucracy and the increasing division of labor. it has led to the unprecedented increase in both the production and distribution of goods and services. it is also associated with secularization, depersonalization, and oppressive routine. increasingly, human behavior is guided by observation, experiment and reason (zweckrational) to master the natural and social environment so as to achieve an end which is deemed desirable.2 as mentioned earlier,3 freund has defined ‘rationalization’ as “the organization of life through a division and coordination of activities on the basis of exact study of men’s relations with each other, with their tools and their environment, for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and productivity.” weber’s general theory of rationalization refers to the increasing human activities in mastering the natural and social environments, which in turn, brings about changes in social structure with the result that we have now a set of changed human characteristics through changing values, changing philosophies, and changing beliefs. such superstructural norms and values as individualism, efficiency, self-discipline, materialism, and calculability (all of which are included in weber’s concept of zweckrational) have been encouraged by the bureaucratization process. bureaucracy and rationalization are now rapidly replacing all other forms of organization. they are becoming strangleholds on all sectors of western society. it is horrifying to think that the world may one day be filled with nothing but human cogs in a mechanized society with little men clinging to their little jobs and striving toward bigger ones, acting in the best interest of our present administrative systems. this overall passion for bureaucracy is enough to drive one to despair. it is as if through politics we are deliberately conditioned to become men who need ‘order’ and nothing but order, and we then become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this order wavers, and helpless if it is taken away that the world should know no men but these: it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and the great question is, therefore, not how we can promote and hasten it, but what can we do to oppose this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life. francis pangfei lai 117 rationalization is the most general element of weber’s theory. he identified rationalization with an increasing division of labor, bureaucracy and mechanization.4 he associates it with depersonalization, oppressive routine, rising secularism, as well as being destructive of individual freedom. the focus on rationalization leads weber into thinking about the operation and expansion of large organizations, both in the public and private sectors of societies. to weber, bureaucracy can be considered to be a particular case of rationalization, as it is applied to human organization. bureaucratic coordination of human activities is the distinctive mark of modern social structures. weber tracks down the main characteristics of an ideal-type bureaucracy as an organization with a hierarchy of authority divided into efficient specialized-labor departments, totally impersonal, conducting its affairs under a rigid written code of conduct and all promotions within the organization being based on focused achievements. according to weber, bureaucracies are goal-oriented organizations designed according to rational principles in order to efficiently attain their goals. offices are ranked in a hierarchical order, with information flowing up the chain of command, directives flowing down. operations of the organizations are characterized by impersonal rules that explicitly state duties, responsibilities, standardized procedures and conduct of office holders. offices are highly specialized. appointments to these offices are made according to specialized qualifications rather than ascribed criteria. all of these ideal characteristics have one goal, to promote the efficient attainment of the organization’s goals.5 the bureaucratic coordination of the action of large numbers of people has become the dominant structural feature of modern societies. it is only through this organizational device that large-scale planning and coordination, both for the modern state and the modern economy, can become possible. the consequences of the growth in the power and scope of these organizations is the key in the understanding of our world. where there is organization, there must be authority so that the organization can be directed towards its goals. to weber, there are three types of authority: traditional; charismatic; and rational-legal based. it is the third type of authority – the rational-legal based type that bureaucratic organizations of our modern societies have adopted. this type of authority is anchored in impersonal rules that have been legally defined and it parallels 118 prajñâ vihâra the growth of zweckrational social actions. traditional authority is based on the belief in the sanctity of tradition while charismatic authority rests on the appeal of a leader who claims allegiance because of the force of his/ her extraordinary personality. weber notes that although the major advantage of a bureaucratically-run organization is the efficiency in which it is attaining its goals, the organization is unwieldy when dealing with individual cases. the impersonality, so important in attaining efficiency of the organization, is thus dehumanizing. but the concern over bureaucracy’s threat to the members of a particular organization has served to overshadow its effects on the larger society. weber is very concerned about the impact that rationalization and bureaucratization have on our socio-cultural systems. by its very nature bureaucracy generates an enormous degree of unregulated and often unperceived social power. because of bureaucracy’s superiority over other forms of organization, they have proliferated and now dominate modern societies. those who control these organizations, weber warns, control the quality of our life, and they are largely selfappointed leaders. what is worse is the fact that such self-appointed leaders in the name of efficiency within the bureaucratic organization can set double standards – one for themselves and their associates and one for the rest within the members of their societies. such double standards, especially in commercial dealings can lead in turn to conflicting values within an organization. bureaucracy thus tends to result in oligarchy, or rule by the few officials at the top of the organization. in a society dominated by large formal organizations, there is a danger that social, political and economic power will become concentrated in the hands of the few who hold high positions in the most influential of these organizations. robert michels,6 a socialist who followed closely the thoughts of weber, was disturbed to find that the socialist parties of europe, despite their democratic ideology and provisions for mass participation, seemed to be dominated by their leaders, just as the traditional conservative parties. he came to the conclusion that the problem lay in the very nature of organizations. he formulated the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which read: “who says organization, says oligarchy.” francis pangfei lai 119 according to this “iron law”, democracy and large scale organization are not compatible. any large organization, michels pointed out, is faced with problems of coordination that can be solved only by creating a bureaucracy. a bureaucracy, by design, is hierarchically organized to achieve efficiency, that is to say that many decisions that have to be made every day cannot be made by large numbers of people in an efficient manner. the effective functioning of an organization therefore requires the concentration of much power in the hands of only a few people. the organizational characteristics that promote oligarchy are reinforced by certain characteristics of both leaders and members of the organizations. people achieve leadership positions precisely because they have unusual political skill; they are adept at getting their way and persuading others of the correctness of their views. once they hold high offices, their power and prestige are further increased. leaders have access and control over information and facilities that are not available to the rank-and-file. they control the information that flows down the channels of communication. leaders are also strongly motivated to persuade the organization of the rightness of their views, and they use all of their skills, power and authority to do so. by design of the organization, the members within the rank and file of an organization are less informed than their ‘superiors’. from birth, we are taught to obey those in positions of authority and therefore, the rank and file members tend to look to the leaders for policy directives and are generally prepared to allow leaders to exercise their judgment on most matters. the stage is now set for the very presence of conflicting values. capitalism and the protestant ethics: we have to make one last point before we launch into the presence of ‘conflicting values’ in our society. this concerns that of protestant ethics. weber is concerned with the meaning that people give to their actions. he comes to the conclusion that social actions of modern society are shifting from traditional to rational actions. he questions the cause of this shift and in the process of trying to understand this, weber studies the religious and economic systems of many civilizations. weber comes to 120 prajñâ vihâra believe that the rationalization of action can only be realized when traditional ways of life are abandoned.7 because of this shift, modern people may have a difficult time realizing the hold of tradition over pre-industrial societies. weber’s task is then to uncover the forces in the west that have caused people to abandon their traditional religious value orientation that have encouraged them to develop a desire for acquiring goods and wealth. after a careful study, weber raises the hypothesis that it is the protestant ethics that breaks the traditional hold of people and encourages them to apply themselves rationally in their work. he finds that calvinism has developed a set of beliefs around the concept of predestination. it is the belief of followers of calvin that one cannot do good works or perform acts of faith to ensure a place in heaven. one is either within the elect or one is outside those people elected. but, wealth has developed to be a sign in which one is deemed to be ‘elected’. this then provides the encouragement for everyone to strive to be rich and powerful by applying rigid disciplines to oneself in the single-minded goal of acquiring wealth.8 weber has studied non-western cultures and he finds that several of these pre-industrial societies have had the technological infrastructure and other necessary preconditions to begin the process of capitalism and economic expansion. but here, capitalism failed to emerge.9 to weber, the only force missing there were the positive sanctions to abandon traditional ways. “by such a comparative analysis of causal sequences, weber tried to find not only the necessary but the sufficient conditions of capitalism.”10 while weber does not believe that the protestant ethic was the only cause of the rise of capitalism, he believes it to be a powerful force in fostering its emergence. asian values in the onslaught of globalization: with the settings laid, we can now proceed to talk about asian values in the context of globalization. we shall begin by looking at the asian values, both social and commercial, prior to the arrival of any western influence into an asian society. francis pangfei lai 121 perhaps mainland china is a good place to start as an example of the pre-west cultural values. for many years of ancient china, the entire societal systems was based upon an hierarchical grouping of ‘scholars’, ‘farmers’, ‘workers’ and ‘retailers’ in which case the commercial element of society was placed at the very bottom of the social scale. this is chiefly because of the innate distrust of business people as they went about their businesses ever ready to make an extra tael of gold by dishonest means. the military came under the group of workers and the main purpose of military presence in the society is the protection of the interests of scholars and farmers essentially. imperial examinations were held, perhaps once every five years, to select people for both the administrative service (which includes the officers of the courts and the local magistrates) and the military service (for the protection of the interests of the emperor down to the law and order of a provincial community). scholars of the day studied both chinese classics and chinese philosophy. to the chinese, philosophy and religion are imbedded into their daily lives as living actions of ethics and they are not separate topics to be observed, examined and criticized. “the basic aim of chinese philosophy has not been primarily that of understanding the world, but that of making people great. … being great has a double aspect in chinese thoughts. first of all, it involves inner greatness, which is a magnitude if spirit reflected in the peace and contentment of the individual in his or her completeness. second, it involves outer greatness, which is manifested in the ability to live well practically, dignifying the social context of one’s ordinary day-to-day existence. this ideal is called ‘sageliness within and kingliness without.’ “11 in china, even to this day, philosophy has been the chief concern of every educated person. in ancient china, if a man were educated at all, the first education he received was in philosophy as young children recited the four books comprising the confucian analects, the book of mencius, the great learning, and the doctrine of the mean. the first reading text was the three characters classic and the very first statement therein was “the nature of man is originally good,” the very fundamental ideas of mencius’ philosophy. contrary to common belief in the west, confucianism is no more a religion as platonism or aristotelianism. the four books mentioned 122 prajñâ vihâra above may have been called collectively as the chinese bible but they are not books on creation, or on heaven and hell. in the chinese sense, therefore, the terms philosophy and religion are both ambiguous. philosophy and religion form part and parcel of life itself, of living out one’s life that calls for considerateness of the wishes of others. returning to koller,12 both inner and outer greatness are basic to all three forms of chinese philosophy – confucianism, taoism and neoconfucian. lao tzu says that unless one knows and lives according to the inner laws of the universe, which he calls the ‘invariables’, one can end up in disaster. for confucius, the most basic thing is the cultivation of one’s humanness and to regulate all our activities in accordance with this developed humanness. because of the importance of both inner and outer greatness, chinese people always give the greatest importance to the consideration for people in general. the human world is considered primary importance and the world of things, secondary. emphasis on human greatness naturally leads to the emphasis on ethics and the spiritual life. the spirit, rather than the body, becomes the more important aspect of human. this spirit must be nourished and cultivated in order that it can develop according to its capacities. if we measure the social actions of the ancient chinese with the yardstick of max weber, then, we find that the actions were essentially of the cultural value type (wertrational); of the emotional type (affective action); and the traditional type (traditional action). the actions were very far removed from the goal-oriented type (zweckrational). there is no desire here to elaborate on every asian cultural system. suffice it to say that, in the asian context, the chinese example given above shows one typical aspect of life. the common denominator is the fact that social actions in the asian context are generally less of the goaloriented type. they are more of the other three types of cultural value, of emotional and of traditional and the failure to comprehend this fact can lead to grave misgivings and misunderstandings between the people from the asian cultures and heritage and those from the western cultures. this paper attempts to illustrate such misgivings and misunderstandings in the form of known conflicting values. francis pangfei lai 123 asian cultural values rest in the belief in historicity. they emphasize on the rank and the station of a person in a society and on looking into the past as a guide for future conduct. the west has criticized these aspects as feudalistic such that they prevent true egalitarianism from taking place. it has been said by many in the west that in the present day of fast moving age of information technology that produces obsolescence in months rather than in years, can we afford to constantly look back into our past before we move forward into our future. this paper advocates that it is wiser for us to take an asian approach to life. egalitarianism and the western style of democracy that advocates one man one vote system cannot be working for the benefit of the entire society when there are poverty and illiteracy amongst the population. singapore and malaysia are shining examples where the western democratic system has been tampered with the eastern influence under the name of ‘guided democracy’ and both countries have progressed to the envy of many westernized nations. societal values: those of us who practiced the art and science of property valuation or property appraisal are familiar with the concept of market value in determining the commercial value of a property or fixed asset. the ivsc13 has defined the term market value as: “the estimated amount for which a property should exchange on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion.” a careful study of the definition will disclose that there can never be any property that has ever been transacted at market value as defined. the first requirement for ‘market value’ is that of a ‘willing buyer’ and ‘willing seller’. most transactions occur with one party being unwilling to 124 prajñâ vihâra enter into a transaction or rather being pushed into acting by some external forces, most likely because of economic downturns or other personal mishaps. the next requirement for ‘market value’ is ‘an arm’s length transaction’. most transactions may look as if it is totally unrelated but in actual practice there may well be some connections between the two transacting parties, however remotely. the last requirements of ‘market value’ are the hardest to comply. for the two parties to act ‘knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion’, full disclosure is required, especially of the vendor such that the purchaser can act with full knowledge of the property. in the structured bureaucratic world as described by weber, genuine disclosures may not be in the interest of some controlling groups and thus property transactions are rarely transacted under these last requirements. more often than not, the purchasers are entering into transactions that they are totally unaware of the implications until after the sale and purchase agreements have been signed and sealed. property valuation as a profession becomes important only in the global setting and is influenced by the western concept of ‘highest and best use’ of land usage the most efficient use of a plot of land commercially, with complete disregard both to those people who will be living on earth in the future and to the environment. weber’s has argued that the westernized social setting that emphasizes the essentials of goal-oriented and rationally related social actions that emphasize detached efficiency, especially for the benefits of the very few, can one day destroy a nation. our point is this: there is a gap that exists between the ‘market value’ of a property as defined and the ‘value’ of the same property for the common good to the society at large, that is to say, for the overall interest of the entire community. perhaps, more explanation here is warranted. take the value of the houses around a public park as an example. without the presence of the public park, built by public expenditure, the commercial values of those houses might be much lower than those of the present. if the ruling bureaucratic government is not an enlightened group in matters concerning town planning, environmental issues and the preservation of the present for the benefits of the future, there would not be any public park built. the houses around the park have therefore two sets of conflicting values – one the commercial value and the other the value from the wider perspective of the ‘benefits’ to society. francis pangfei lai 125 to put this concept in a nutshell, the two conflicting values would only meet as one under the following limiting conditions: condition # 1: the general public is one that is well educated to such an extent that the man-in-the-street can wisely elect into power a group of dedicated and educated representatives who are able to view matters from a totally different and wider perspective than that of a commercial viewpoint. condition # 2: the bureaucracy of government comprised of wisely elected people who cares for the interests of the communities at large. condition # 3: the values are not distorted due to the presence of interested parties in the bureaucracy of government. condition # 4: social actions may have to be modified away from weber’s zweckrational type towards the wertrational, or the affective, or the traditional types. what does all this boils down to in the context of asian heritage and asian culture? we need to take a look at the political and social fabrics of communities within the asian context. here we have the localized villages – the moo bans of thailand or the kampongs of malaysia or the ancestral villages of ancient china. the village elders make most of the decisions concerning the well-being of the villagers, usually in consultation with one another. the ‘common good’ of the community is decided by these people. they will send their representatives to the wider society within which they live and in their turn the committee of this wider society will decide the ‘common good’ of the society. in this form of setting, professional valuers as we know them in today’s society, would have to argue their valuation viewpoints with the elders and would need to modify their property values to incorporate the wishes of the community at large. herman daly and john cobb jr.14 have written a book on the subject of for the common good: redirecting the economy towards community, the environment, and the sustainable future that is most relevant for the present time. the main goal of the book is to deconstruct neoclassical economic theory and set forth a more holistic model that more fully accounts for the individual, the community, and the natural world. 126 prajñâ vihâra in the first half of the book, daly and cobb discuss the implicit assumptions and theoretical fallacies governing contemporary economic scholarship; in the second half, they discuss numerous policy changes toward their economic goal of a society based on community and ecological balance. the book also includes an appendix where they construct an “index of sustainable economic welfare” intended to supplant gross national product as a measure of economic well-being. a lot of the ideas of weber’s have been incorporated in the book. suffice it to say as of now that conflicting values are here to stay. it is up to us to recognize their existence and to ponder over the need for the inclusion of societal values into our commercial decisions, especially in regard to the development for the future of humankind. we now understand, for instance, that the contemporary economical theory holds a crude, mechanistic worldview of economics as an autonomous individual driven purely by the self-interest and that society is just an aggregate of such individuals. this view tends to equate gains in society as a whole with the increases in goods and services acquired by its individual members, but it says nothing about the changes in the quality of the relationships that constitute that society. daly and cobb15 advocate the departure from radical individualism to the notion of a “person-in-community”. their main argument concerns the need for realigning government and social structures toward smaller social and economic units. this is not at all dissimilar to the asian context of the village community. they argue that it now becomes difficult, if not impossible, for governments to perform their essential non-market functions when economic power is centralized at the global level, while political power is decentralized to national and local levels. for the system to function in the interest of community, economic and political power must be in balance at any given system level. to daly and cobb, the emerging global society must develop democratically controlled institutions at all levels: international, national, and local. it also needs to create a decentralizing context for economic activities that returns institutional control to people, roots economic interests in local soil, and reestablishes some sense of human community. all this points again to the need for us to backpedal a little to the asian culture and values, where the family and the immediate community have the final say in most domestic activities. this francis pangfei lai 127 is a move away from bureaucratic authority, away from secularism and back to family and religious traditions forming the key to inculcate social values in the young. in order to achieve the goal of decentralization of political power and the breaking up of the large bureaucratic authority that can be so harmful to the common good as explained by weber, we need to start a program of the following four activities to be undertaken immediately to lead to an overall policy shift: #1. there ought to be a significant university reform away from the stress of business studies as the prime target of a community. we need to produce more community-minded thinkers and community-minded doers, not sharp-witted commercial wizards out to make a quick baht at every opportunity with complete disregard to ethics; #2. we ought to go back to our roots and to nurture our community-building venues. in the case of urban centers like bangkok, there ought to be programs in place to re-build a sense of belonging to localized communities. #3. there ought to be a dedicated public awareness program to bring home the message that we should be acting socially to bridge the gap of conflicting values – both social values and commercial values. this entails the need to change our way of measuring economic success by devices other than the purely monetary values of the gross national product (gnp). #4. we ought to convince the people in our communities to return to the older practices of life where religious traditions prevailed. secularism, which is so much associated with the globalized trends of today, should be discouraged as contrary to the common good of society. concluding options: we have traced the works of max weber to understand the reasons why present-day globalized setting, with its entourage of rationalization, bureaucracy, authority, oligarchy, western-styled democracy and capitalism may not be for the common good of humankind. 128 prajñâ vihâra we have briefly mentioned that, whilst it may be true that the ancient asian cultures and beliefs, if totally re-adopted, cannot lead us to be an efficient, effective work and goal-oriental organization, there are merits in some of these ancient ways of work attitude. we have taken a look at the western definition of ‘market value’ in the case of property valuation and appraisal and we raised the argument that such a definition can only bring about a heightened tension between two conflicting values – that for the commercial world and that for the more enlightened ‘common good’ of the entire population. we have raised the issue of ‘conflicting values’ and we have proposed that a solution can possibly be found in the works of daly and cobb jr. in their research. many scholars have dwelt on the need for environmental assessments in property development and in town planning issues but such ideas have not been able to be translated in simply ordinary terms for the general public to comprehend. there can only then be three concluding options: one is to take no action at all in the belief that god who cares about us will have his solutions for humankind; the second is to continue to take in the wisdom from the globalized western world and pursue a continued track of zweckrational social actions, where the organizations within our society are goal-oriented and successmotivated with the current gnp as the chief measure of economic success; the third and last option is to decide now for a change to blend in the asian heritage and culture with the better of the globalized setting and to give in to more social actions that are wertrational, affective and traditional. the choice is ours to make. finally, we are recommending the property consultancy fraternity that the term ‘market value’ for a property should be re-phrase to include the consideration for the common good of humankind in the following draft format: “market value is the best estimate of the value of a property as at the date of valuation after due consideration has been given to the following three key issues: francis pangfei lai 129 #1. market value is an estimate of value of a possible transaction of the property between a seller and an unrelated buyer, the two parties being totally unrelated in every sense of the word, that is to say, without any commercial interest in each other’s business; #2. market value of a property should reflect the fact that the two parties to the possible transaction mentioned above are fully aware of all the data concerning the property, including those data known to the seller but not apparent to the buyer; #3. market value of a property should additionally reflect the overall contribution of that property to the common good of the immediate surrounding community and to the society at large.” endnotes 1 freund (1968). 2 elwell, (1999). 3 see page 2 of this paper. 4 gerth and mills (1946). 5 aron (1970). 6 michels (1915). 7 coser (1977). 8 gerth and mills, (1946). 9 gerth and mills, (1946), p. 61. 10 gerth and mills, (1946), p. 61. 11 koller, john m, (1985), second, edition, p. 245 – 246. 12 koller, john m. (1985), chapter 16, pp. 245 – 249. 13 ivsc stands for the international valuation standards committee, a body comprised of property valuers that sets up standards for the valuation of capital assets of publicly listed companies and works conjunctionally with the committee for international accounting standards. 14 daly, herman & cobb, john jr. (1989). 15 daly, herman & cobb, john jr. (1989). 130 prajñâ vihâra references aron, raymond (1970). main currents in sociological thought ii. new york: anchor books. coser, lewis a. (1977). masters of sociological thought: ideas in historical and social context, second edition. new york: harcourt brace jovanovich. daly, herman and cobb, john jr. (1989). for the common good: redirecting the economy toward community, the environment and a sustainable future. boston: beacon press. elwell, frank w. (1999). industrializing america: understanding contemporary society through classical sociological analysis. west port, connecticut: praeger. freund, julien (1968). the sociology of max weber. new york: vintage books. gerth, hans and c. wright mills (translators and editors). (1946 [1958]) from max weber: essays in sociology. new york: galaxy books. kloppenberg, james t. (1998). the virtues of liberalism. oxford: oxford university press. koller, john m. (1985). second edition. oriental philosophies. new york: charles scribner’s sons. michels, robert (1915). political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. translated by eden paul and cedar paul. new york: the free press. rics (2000). international valuation standards (2000). united kingdom: london, royal institution of chartered surveyors. stocker, michael (1989). plural and conflicting values. oxford: oxford university press. francis pangfei lai 131 132 prajñâ vihâra 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 60-86 60 © 2000 by assumption university press formality and representational relativism: a critical philosophical investigation into knowledge representation as one transformation of western philosophy gerald moshammer assumption university of thailand abstract this paper provides a philosophical discussion of knowledge representation [kr], which has become an influential interdisciplinary and technology friendly research field through artificial intelligence and computer science. while kr appears an increasingly fashionable and subsequently blurred term, it originally emerged out of genuine meta-theoretical considerations. subsequently, the reconstruction of kr's formal, structural and functional foundations should call for further philosophical evaluation of kr's interdisciplinary and practical potential. the focus is put on kr's logical and semiotical roots, both methodologically and historically, whose exposure prove necessary for a proper understanding and possible criticism of kr's [technological] applicability. the stipulation of analytical symbol theory is new in this context, but nevertheless necessary, as only a more principal semiotic focus may allow an appropriate evaluation of symbolic intelligence, which has to be considered kr's essence. introduction knowledge representation [kr] appears a genuine interdisciplinary research field with strong philosophical roots. its openness for practical applications [such as hotel reservation systems and library databases, cf. sowa (2000), 513ff.] results from a methodological link to software engineering: an agenda to focus on the representation of knowledge from the perspective of technological implementation. "computation supports the applications that distinguish knowledge representation from pure philosophy" [sowa (2000), preface xii]. another related technical term, "cognitive modeling"1 [also called "knowledge engineering"], sharpens this characteristic. "the disposition, which separates the cognitive modeler from experimental psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers, is the belief that the best way to understand something is to try to build it. the goal of cognitive modeling is to understand the human mind to such a degree of precision that one could design a computer program that did the same thing. as a result, cognitive modelers tend to be computer scientists as well, and are generally well accepted into a larger computer science field of artificial intelligence, whose members share many of the same methods, if not the same values" [gordon (2004), 1]. an underlying connection of philosophy with computer science has thus become epistemologically crucial through artificial intelligence [ai], cognitive science and cybernetics.2 moor (2002) gives an extensive coverage of "the intersection of philosophy and computing" entitled "cyberphilosophy". and there are even contemporary philosophers who are active participants in the modeling side of this new bond. its most virulent philosophical manifestation can be found in pollock (1995) with claims of the "first ai system capable of performing reasoning that philosophers would regard as epistemically sophisticated", called oscar [pollock (1995), preface xii]. the program of transforming philosophy of science into "computational philosophy" in thagard (1993a) is another indicator for the aforementioned philosophical heresy. but kr does not just apply logical tools and computer languages; furthermore it colonizes the old philosophical branch of ontology. independent from specific platforms or implementation issues, computer oriented kr attempts here to work on a traditionally philosophical task 3 [cf. simons (2004)]: the portrayal of the world's basic entities, their systematic specification and interrelation in terms of a commonsense metaphysics 4, i.e. from the perspective of how people think and talk about the world. additionally, it should not be overlooked that kr is also concerned with the understandgerald moshammer 61 ing of reasoning as a creative discovery process, especially with the emergence of new scientific hypotheses, explanations and theories. generally, research into kr comes along with the discovery of knowledge acquisition techniques [cf. gaines/shaw (1995), sowa (2000), 452-59]. the investigation into different forms of inference and categorization concentrates hereby on non-deductive procedures, which leads to a thematic overlapping with those philosophical streams that have criticized the narrow views of logical positivism dominant in the first half of the 20th century. in particular, since, as already mentioned, kr seeks distance to philosophy via software implementation, its systematic preconsiderations tend to be methodologically closer related with more stringent philosophical theories. semiotics is the most obvious candidate here, and it should be underlined in due course of this article that especially nelson goodman's philosophy and theory of symbols [cf. goodman (1976)], although hardly discussed in details by kr theorists, offers philosophical analysis and implicit criticism of fundamental kr issues. this is insofar remarkable as one main concern of goodman's theory is aesthetics and furthermore an interdisciplinary approach to education5, which indicates the interdisciplinary relevance of the methodological principles involved. a framework for the discussion kr functions mainly as metatheory and methodological foundation of a naturalistic and furthermore technological program with the outlook to answer traditionally philosophical questions of mind and knowledge by means of experimental research within the methodological scope of natural sciences.6 apparently, we face a kind of "naturalistic epistemology" here. but such a label provides more distortion than orientation. obviously, the key concept of [mental] representation distinguishes the research programs under discussion fundamentally from any kind of behaviorism. furthermore, also the explanatory principles of evolutionary epistemology are considered insufficient and inappropriate [cf. thagard (1993a), 101ff.]. but foremost, the central category of representation is philosophically disturbing. philosophers such as richard rorty7 have radically questioned a naive concept of representation, seeing in it a major 62 prajñâ vihâra paradigm which has mislead hundreds of years of philosophy; and it should be noted that the so-called "linguistic turn" is meant to be explicitly included here, although language oriented philosophy itself had intended to criticize and limit traditional philosophy from a radical methodological point of view, namely the ontological analysis of language. while logico-linguistic philosophy had often launched a rigorous anti-psychologism, nowadays, decades after cognition has become a multiand interdisciplinary research field, the philosophical situation seems fuzzy insofar as the now so-coined "cognitive turn" [cf. roy (2000)] allows again a speech of mental requisites, stored in the newly furnished mind's inner theater. linguistics was the forerunner of this renaissance. "the basic idea is that knowledge of language involves a system of rules and representations, of mental computation, linked to the motor and perceptual apparatus; and that much of this system is fixed and invariant, just as the essential form and organization of the human body is fixed and invariant, determined by our biological endowment" [chomsky/putnam (1987), para. 13]. the paradigm of computation merges so with the concept of representation to a technological picture of the mind, whose nature is supposed to provide the operating system for information processing. the following figure should allow a first orientation. symbolic software technological hardware biological software? knowledge / rationality / intellegence / intentionality representation / reconstruction modeling / implementation function realization medium task figure 1 gerald moshammer 63 reductionism and realization the technological analogy of the "mind as the software of the brain" [block (1995)] is indeed one of the philosophically most controversial issues related to cognitive science. it is especially remarkable as it implies once more a radical program of reductionism, employing the computer analogy to suggest a [biological] hardware performing and materializing every aspect of mentality. the digital age rejuvenates so an old materialistic position by asking the central question involved in terms of equivalence: the man as machine and the machine as man? and as it always has been the case with reductionist explanations, philosophers seek reasons to let the reductionist's attempt appear principally impossible. note that reductionists naturally have to say first what they attempt to reduce. regarding cognitive science and ai it is exactly this heuristic characterization of mental features and abilities where philosophical argumentation against reductionism can gain ground. for example, putnam (1975), block (1978) and searle (1984), have outlined now famous principal doubts that the cognitive modelers understand the key words in the discussion intentionality, meaning and reference properly. jean michel roy summarizes one of the crucial problems as follows. "accordingly, i tend to believe that one of the most important challenges facing the naturalization of intentionalism is not to do without the notion of representation, but to elaborate a non symbolic notion of mental representation" [roy (2000), section 4 para. 3]. we face here the "symbol grounding problem" [harnad (1990)] which opens a path to so-called "non-symbolic ai" with the emphasis on a more biologically oriented robotics. contemporary research into "reinforcement learning" [cf. sutton/barto (1998)] and "intelligence without reason" [brooks (1991)] takes a methodological approach which tries to get in distance to the sole influence of traditional neumannian computer theory and its mathematical and logical models. this pre-logical and anticomputational "bottom up" method is significant as it transposes aspects of originally philosophical criticism of positivism and logocentrism, 64 prajñâ vihâra paradigmatically outlined by philosophers such as heidegger, bergson and merleau-ponty, into an ai research issue. furthermore, such a reevaluation of ai with a focus on embodied machines and biological organisms enlightens the cartesian dualistic nature of traditional ai which has appeared to replace descartes' res cogitans simply by a mechanized manipulation of tokens. but still, since intentionality is aboutness, the concept of representation cannot be easily abandoned. the question regarding symbolic ai and cognitive science is then rather if and how their methodology can overcome the linguistic and semiotic turn. indeed, a large portion of thoughts in traditional symbolic ai has to be considered a genuine logical, semiotic and methodological program [often then called "knowledge representation"] and the cognitive turn of symbolic ai does not substantially revolutionize the linguistic or semiotic turn at all, although cognitive science makes different theoretical claims [cf. roy (2000)]. figure 1 differentiates a symbolic, technological and biological level of mental manifestation. ned block (1995) outlines a hierarchy of such explanatory levels based on a criterion of generality and questions the possibility of an ultimate bottom. "this point is so simple, fundamental, and widely applicable, that it deserves a name; let's call it the reductionist cruncher. just as the syntactic objects on paper can be described in molecular terms, for example as structures of carbon molecules, so the syntactic objects in our heads can be described in terms of the viewpoint of chemistry and physics. but a physico-chemical account of the syntactic objects in our head will be more general than the syntactic account in just the same way that the syntactic account is more general than the content account" [block (1995), section 3.3 para. 6]. the main task for the reductionist is to show that a higher level can be framed in terms of lower levels. but again, what are the criteria of success here? how do we first specify the potential of a higher level and then upon what criteria can we judge that a lower level mirrors that potential? of course, every level has to be framed in symbols, mostly verbally and mathematically, and will need interpretation in order to become a theory. note that physical laws appear idealized in mathematical funcgerald moshammer 65 tions. we do need "bridge laws" [cf. field (1980), 7-16] to relate constants to "real" things and to interpret variables, but it is the mathematical part that deals flexibly with quantities. lower levels of explanation appear more general in a sense that basic entities are introduced in order to explain a wider range of phenomena in terms of them by means of functional interdependence. lower levels systematize and integrate therefore to a higher degree; interrelating sciences depends on the possibility of ontological unity. but there lie some interesting structural discrepancies in explanatory hierarchies. cases of non-isomorphism between terminologies at different levels have become a highly rated issue since putman delivered his famous thought experiment of twin earths [cf. putnam (1975)] which tried to challenge cognitive functionalism exactly through higher level differentiation at the content level, designed to be per definition inexpressible in terms of functionally understood mental states.8 nowadays, manymany mappings [cf. endicott (1998)] and multi-realizibility [see shapiro (2000) for a critical discussion] mark key issues in the debate and show the dominance of structural thinking when it comes to methodological heurism, analysis and criticism in the aforementioned debates.9 excursion: semiotic channels if we look at figure 1 we find an example of knowledge representation. it offers not more than an unsystematic oversimplifying chart [which does not make it inappropriate for a first orientation] by using a simple representation modus which can be found in various types of media, especially academic textbooks, and a reader [or better viewer!] with a certain theoretical background might easily be able to understand aspects of its intention, to possibly criticize its general approach, to identify its shortcomings and eventual failures, but also to discover theoretically problematic relations and new tasks of inquiry. given the background knowledge required, it will usually lead to a rather intuitive process of interpretation. and even if some reading instructions were added [e.g. as to the arrows and lines between certain categories, or regarding the different category frames], they would themselves be determined just to such an extent as they can be related to a certain representation type and inso66 prajñâ vihâra far as they appear selected from a certain set of representational devices. for example, we might identify the last thought itself as a variation of spinoza's "omnis determinatio ex negativo" respectively the structuralists' methodological principal of opposition, which could lead to certain paths of evaluation and criticism not immediately available to someone without background knowledge. although kr does usually not deal with typologies of such general methodological principles, it is principally its stance to make background knowledge explicit for certain areas [stimulated exactly by the aforementioned goal of computational implementation] and to establish a meta-theory of logical constellations and symbolic devices. the methodological core point is here the examination of tools for detailed reconstruction, systematization and step-by-step reasoning for a representation of certain fields of knowledge, designed to possibly overcome or clarify any "jumping" intuition. if we analyze figure 1 as an example of symbolization, we recognize its use of different dash styles to outline some differences in categories and relations among them is purely random. indeed, the relevant differences could be marked in many other ways [e. g. by means of colours] or we could easily just exchange dash styles without any loss of expression. there might be some psychological considerations governing such choices, but the basic semiotic task of differentiating does not depend on any material here. now consider the following drawing as an attempt to sketch the anthropological difference between chinese and western medicine: gerald moshammer 67 figure 2 apparently, the way of making the difference is relevant here: the dynamic lines shall symbolize energetic flow and the dotted lines fragmentation. remember that linguists consider language to be arbitrary. syntactically there is no difference between "syntax" and "syntax" and, from a semantically extensional view point we can refer to the same things with the english adjective "beautiful" as we do with the german "schön". in contrary, drawings like those in figure 2 depend essentially on their appearance. while their resizing or colouring would not spoil the message, a change of line style definitely would. goodman (1976) has elaborated an analytical symbolic theory employing an integrated technical terminology for the analysis and description of such symbolic facts. he applies the method of abstraction to formulate syntactical and semantic criteria based on the logical concepts of equivalence and relation. specific combinations of these criteria result in the general distinction between notational, verbal and pictorial symbolic systems [cf. goodman (1976), 127-173]. figure 3 illustrates the main idea of the aforementioned differentiation regarding symbolic systems and, moreover, gives a simple example of how a switch between semiotic channels, as i call it here, can be understood. denotation flow fragmentation exemplification any person 68 prajñâ vihâra figure 3 in goodman's terminology [cf. goodman (1976), 3-95 and 12757 for details], the representations exemplify "flow" and "fragmentation", while they both denote a person. unlike the different marks "a" and "a", which belong to the same character regardless their font style, the two marks in figure 3 make two different characters if they belong to certain pictorial scheme. it has to be emphasized, that no intrinsic property lets them function in that way. we could incorporate the same marks in a verbal scheme and thus make them syntactically equivalent. we just need to "see" them as members of the same equivalence class collecting marks like "person", "person" etc. although such a mix of pictorial and phonological alphabets would be rather impractical, the following sentences could be syntactically equivalent in a non-standard scheme: [1] every struggles for life. [2] every struggles for life. [3] every person struggles for life. the second marks [as all others taking same positions in the aforementioned sentences] are fully interexchangable, since, if they function relative to a verbal syntactical scheme, they belong to one and the same character. the graphologist is apparently going the same path we have described in the opposite direction. he takes the handwriting of a person as a scheme whose pictorial properties are supposed to exemplify certain personal characteristics. generally, a swift of [or oscillation between] semiotic channels constitutes a basic procedure in the arts and seems to be a radical move of symbolic intelligence, leading to possible epistemological innovation, transgression or even subversion. this is insofar remarkable in this context as research fields surrounding ai seem to be solely task oriented and tend to overlook even in their definitions of intelligence any kind of symbolic freedom, most generally, interpretative flexibility at the level of symbolic channels themselves. gerald moshammer 69 abstraction and functionalism the differentiation between notational, verbal and pictorial syntactic schemes can be seen as a further reaching consequence of the wellknown use/mention distinction. and the philosophically most striking manifestation of this distinction has been in arithmetic. as there seems to be an obvious difference between numerals and numbers, e.g. "2" and 2, the almost unavoidable question is: what are these numbers? or more specific: what kind of entities are they? frege radically opposed the psychologism of his time and located numbers in a "third realm" of [abstract] entities [cf. frege (1884)]. according to frege, numbers can neither be psychological entities like ideas nor the (physical) numerals themselves. numbers and their properties [e.g. the property of the cardinal number one to remain identical when multiplied by itself] should be understood both transpsychological and transsemiotic. their objectivity is so supposed to be predetermined. this kind of mathematical platonism has been widely attacked in the 20th century by nominalists [cf. field (1980), gosselin (1990) and burgess/rosen (1997)]. a comparison of abstract entities like numerals with terms referring to material objects, such as "house", enlightens the obvious difference. for instance, houses are not just fundamentally distinct from the term "house" but from "house-idea" as well, since as simple as it is we can perceive them. material objects are open to ostensive definition, abstract ones are not. of course, this is not more than common sense ontology; still, it is this difference which constitutes one aspect underlying endless philosophical comments about the ontological status of abstract entities. but in the kaleidoscope of 20th century philosophy we can recognize certain attempts to overcome such ontological foundation problems by replacing them with more functional and constructive approaches. indeed, functionalism has been a key word in cognitive science as well, designed to replace strict physicalism. "functionalism has three distinct sources. first, putnam and fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind. second, smart's "topic neutral" analyses led armstrong and lewis to a functionalist analysis of mental concepts. third, wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by sellars and later harman" [bock (1996), para. 2]. 70 prajñâ vihâra in a broader philosophical context, ernst cassirer's differentiation between substance and function [cassirer (1994)] has to be added to this list. remembered should be especially the german philosopher and mathematician paul lorenzen who developed a "constructive" approach to mathematics which explains arithmetic in an operative way of building a numeral system and furthermore, explains basic logic operations in the form of dialogues where the two sides hold, challenge and defend certain assumptions [cf. lorenzen (1974a), (1974b) and (1987)]. the foundation problem ontological or axiomatic is here supposed to be replaced by the questions how numbers and logical operators are introduced, learned and become elements of certain operational procedures. functionalism and operationalism explain equivalence as the potential of symbols to play an identical role and to allow specific moves whereas the tokens' intrinsic properties have no relevance and ontological considerations no priority. logic and computation: the formal paradigm the recovery of a now naturalistic psychologism and rationalism in computational terms makes it worth to focus on the logical roots of computation, since logic has widely been considered to provide a genuine example for a normative discipline, which causes a certain theoretical tension. at this point, philosophy has to be recalled once more as methodologically a priori and self-reflexive [or, in the significant and specific sense of kant, as transcendental]. this so described status of philosophy happens namely to be purified in the vienna circle's radical and rigorous attempts to reduce philosophy to logical syntax and of wittgenstein's conclusive program to cut back the area of "philosophy" to logical space and its possibilities in his tractatus [wittgenstein (1961)]. such purification has its price: philosophy now turns into a logico-linguistic theory of syntactical architecture. the a priori conception of philosophy only survives in the normative determination of the combinatorial power of certain logical and axiomatic frameworks, i.e., the clear distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical expressions, and the classification of the former gerald moshammer 71 along the lines of metalogical concepts like analyticity, tautology, contradiction, etc. kant's synthetic judgments a priori, the last genuine rationalistic heritage in modern epistemology, had vanished. but much more is involved here: since there are different frameworks possible, "a priori" appears to be comprehensive solely relative to a systematic language. wittgenstein and carnap found in the new logic of frege and russell a powerful prototype, but already carnap had to emphasize a transethical logical tolerance: "in logic there are no morals"10. and wittgenstein impressively refused the ultimo ratio of his own tractatus by turning his attention to an unlimited space of ordinary language games [cf. wittgenstein (1956)]. also tarski, who contributed extensively to the theory of deductive systems, sees logic as a matter of choice, foremost of the concept of inference itself [tarski (1956), 409]11. nowadays, in times where there are much more logical systems than members in a comprehensive set of axioms, logic appears to be merely a flexible instrument and tool, sometimes even as fruitfully fuzzy. thus, the originally narrow and most general field of formal logic enforces now a choice [cf. lewis (1923)], depending on the logician's goal oriented decision. with this signature it possibly becomes preferable to speak of norms, rules and axioms and leave the a priori to the historian of philosophy. the old debates about a final justification of a definite starting point seem fruitless. but it should be kept in mind that quine's famous attack of the analytic-synthetic distinction [quine (1951)] was meant to abandon any conception of a "prima philosophia" but not construction and definition as necessary scientific tools. it is definitional transgression that performs the crucial step here. if we give up any a priori knowledge innate, by intuition or through any necessary reasoning how should we start a systematic construction of a certain framework? or better: which kind of criteria could justify the initial step? for example, ontological constructivism takes pure deductive logic as its role model and examines tools for a construction of different ontological systems. the first chapter of goodman's seminal work "the structure of appearance" gets immediately involved with the question of how the accuracy [not adequacy!] of definitions could be tested and in an elaborated argument goodman shows that solely a structural criteria12 can provide necessary and sufficient conditions recalling implicitly the vienna circle's discussions about "structural properties" [cf. carnap 72 prajñâ vihâra (1967a), para. 11-15, schlick (1986), 190ff. and critically waismann (1976), chapter xii and xiii]. together with its relatives, "syntax" and "structure", "formality" gets so the touch of (ontological) neutrality. concerning carnap's "the logical structure of the world", which applies the modern logic of relations to the construction of an ontological system, michael friedman emphasizes the search for "a peculiarly philosophical vantage point that is neutral with respect to all traditional metaphysical disputes" [friedman (1987), 525]. the so emerged ontological neutrality becomes even more obvious with nelson goodman's further step in "the structure of appearance" [goodman (1977)], where different ways of ontological constructions are investigated. quine's methodological emphasis of a "semantic ascent", outlined in the last paragraph of his famous word and object [quine (1960)], cannot be overlooked here. especially quine's references to carnap are interesting, as quine builds his semantic ascent on the distinction between the formal and material mode of sentence construction. the main idea, similar to the switch from an objectto a metalanguage, the turn into the mode of speech about instead in a language, allows, through the medium of quotation, to get rid of ontological burden. it might be unknown, what entity "mile" refers to, but it is safe to state "'a mile' is true of the distance between the house and the main road", to expand quine's example. obviously, such a way out becomes especially urgent if we accept a theory of ontological commitment. "the more formality, the less ontological debate", seems to be the philosophical slogan. for the philosopher there is no vantage point outside the conceptual scheme, says quine. but it is remarkable that semantic ascent should provide mediation between conceptual schemes. "the strategy is one of ascending to a common part of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes, the better to discuss the disparate foundations. no wonder it helps for philosophy" [quine (1960), 272]. it is this potential of mediation respectively clarification concerning different languages and theories13, which seems to make the step to the formal mode philosophically relevant. quine's methodological strategy has been criticized [cf. willas (1983)], and indeed, the methodologigerald moshammer 73 cal emphasis of different linguistic levels seems at least misleading, as it suggests a higher level of also higher ontological "security". but linguistic clarification has no expressible starting point or halt. what remains is a position of semantic clarification as structural adaptation, to which i will come back at the end of this section. the formal paradigm has had an enormous influence to western thought in many areas [cf. agazzi (1994)], but it has been the field of logic where "formality" found its purest expression. after the foundation crisis of mathematics at the beginning of the 20th century the answer to striking logical questions has been pushed back to a distinctive metalevel, which is concerned about the completeness, consistency and decidability of logical systems. this happened pretty early: gödel's famous incompleteness proof [gödel (1931)] came out just three decades after russell confronted frege's ambitious project of transforming arithmetic into logic with devastating antinomies [cf. russell (1902)], and subsequently also russell's and whitehead's ingenious superstructure, principia mathematica [russell/ whitehead (1925)], lost its universal explicitness: since then, david hilbert's ideal of a pure formalistic foundation of mathematics has had to be considered principally impossible. but gödel's proof does not just awake us from the dream of comprehensive universal axiomatic systems; it furthermore exemplifies a procedure how to perform such a devastating proof. and since gödel turned metamathematical proofs into algorithmic calculation, they could play a role model for the theory of computing, i.e., in mechanical procedures performing "intelligent" tasks. the famous turing machine, more an analogy than a machine actually, was the first famous computational output of the metalogical input. logic as a formal system has so become the paradigm for intelligence and cognitive technology. expanded to a panformalism and pancomputationalism, this reads like the following: "if any formal system can be explicitly mechanized as a turing machine, so can any actual machine nervous system, natural language, or mind in so far these are determinate structures. number objects and formal languages [and their interpreters and interpretations] only reach stable specification within fully mechanized procedures…this suggests that the rest of our world and natural languages ….require understanding of the analogous sorts" [leiber (1991), 57-8]. 74 prajñâ vihâra as far as formal systems determine rule governed actions the formation and transformation of expression on the base of a stock of symbols they allow technological implementation. unsurprisingly, gödel's metalogical results have been debated extensively within ai and cognitive science; they methodologically originate but also principally limit the computer analogy of the mind, giving again a certain support especially to the concept of intuition [cf. sullins (1997)]. mathematics appears a sophisticated exploration of structural possibilities which, regardless of its boundless inventions [or findings?], builds upon the basic operations of differentiation, abstraction and identification. as such, formal thinking is universally involved in any kind of intellectual activity. of course, the mind is supposed to do more than moving tokens. interpretation [inclusive translation], reference and intentionality are philosophical key issues. naturally, the question "what is meaning?" cannot be answered formally. like other sorts of general "what-questions", it might not be possible to answer it at all. interestingly enough, specific semantic clarification is formal. in a large part of analytical philosophy, from the analysis of ostensive definition14 and its status to investigations into necessary and sufficient conditions for term definition, from the analysis of quotation, translation and interpretation to holistic theories of meaning, the core explications have always come along formal and structural lines. especially comparative examples given for the inscrutability of reference, conceptual relativity and ontological indeterminism appear to be understandable just in case that they can generate functional mappings. note that wittgenstein's famous and highly controversial private language argument [cf. wittgenstein (1978), sections 244-71] heads into a direction where any reference to an individual inner sphere is absorbed by the force of public language, whose rules and grammar are supposed to solely determine the "meaning" of even psychological and mental predicates. formal sciences create semiotic possibilities and variability of expression, but not [empirical] knowledge. experience results in a selection of certain semantic vehicles and their evaluation as "true" and "right". without an understanding and interpretation of the symbols we use, if lacking the external source of experience, such a selection process would be boundless. still, articulation and communication of knowledge, its interpretation, gerald moshammer 75 criticism and evaluation in two or more minds' communication depend on structural characteristics which could be paraphrased solely within formal semantics.15 indeed, it is important to realize that formal semantics builds a structure which can itself be seen as purely syntactic and does therefore not provide any intentionality respectively identification of entities.16 in other words, the so-called interpretation of symbols, by means of a specific function that assigns values, results simply in new logical relations between these symbols. the interpretation of such relations as being semantic is a supposition not intrinsic to formal semantics. "formal semantics" appears an oxymoron and exemplifies so the ambivalent status of formal thought in meta-theorizing especially if we evaluate such a panformalism as the strongest ground of mediation between different linguistic and semiotic expressions [foremost in terms of declarative speech]. as formal sciences define more and more methods and strategies of reasoning, the pressure of choice, and therefore of responsibility, has grown. generally, if we understand how we are doing something, we can also do it differently. and that is the philosophically crucial point here. as machines should learn how to think, humans might ask: how should we [they] think?17 the progress of disciplines like kr makes this question virulent at the methodological level. and regardless of our final stance, we should be committed to know what our possibilities are. maybe that is a formal requirement for culture, for which scientific communities play a role model: not to be necessarily differentiated but to be differentiating to the highest possible degree. postscript: non-deductive kr tools detailed and instrumental examination of rational tasks and the exploration of possible modes of their reconstruction make kr a genuine research program. somehow untouched by principal and skeptical philosophical debates, there is a commitment to a more step-by-step experimental program which simply tries to go as far a possible in the analysis and [technological] mimicry of human capacities. in a certain sense kr can be understood to prolong the old tradition of a search for a proper "ars inveniendi", reflecting in many aspects the philosophical disputes con76 prajñâ vihâra cerning the status of an "ars demonstrandi" and a theory of categories paradigmatically outlined by aristotle and kant. but the influence of advanced logic and mathematics as well as computer technology combined with a new methodological tolerance certainly makes an enormous difference in theory building nowadays. in the context of this article the following characteristics of this development have to be underlined. . the paradigm of deduction as the purest form of inference, still dominant in the first half of the 20th century, has not just been supplemented by intensive research into a theory of induction and probability, but furthermore a third concept, abduction18, has drawn attention to theorists [cf. wirth (1998)].. the field of deductive logic itself has opened up a wide area of very heterogeneous formal systems, designed as logical tools with different sets of axioms and enriched with operators to allow for an analysis and [re-]construction of genuinely extralogical areas of human speech and thought.. non-monotonic formalisms, defeasible and prima facie reasoning have been addressed to give a more realistic picture of actual human rationality, allowing furthermore the speech of degrees of justification [cf. pollock (1995)].. soft computing has become the key word for an approach in software design and controlling which allows tolerance for imprecision and uncertainty. the main techniques are here fuzzy logic, rough set theory, artificial neural networks and probabilistic reasoning.. a re-discovery and development of conceptual logic has taken place after modern predicate logic since frege had focused primarily on sentences and functions. categorization19, concept maps and conceptual hierarchies have become the subject of intensive investigation and appear often linked with methods in computer science such as frames, databases, ontologies and conceptual modeling tools [cf. thagard (1993), 13-33, sowa (2000), 51-205 and 408-452].. non-verbal symbolic systems, from diagrams to artistic notation, have been investigated in analytical and logical terms, gerald moshammer 77 showing their epistemological value and relevance [cf. goodman (1976)].20 someone may miss ethics in this list. it well could be included if we agree with an often forgotten implication of the vienna circle's scientific program. referring to one of its members, elisabeth nemeth gives the following paraphrase of what science and its methodologies could teach us beyond science: "at this point we see more clearly why frank believed that science…might even strengthen the belief in the validity of values. it can be experienced and habitualized as a form of social practice which enables us to reformulate not only theoretical but also moral claims in a changing world. and we can see what philosophy of science could contribute to the public vision of what the pluridimensional cultural project is all about. it could intervene in the public discourse by demonstrating that the capacity for integrating new experiences into any social practice is determined at least by three factors: first by the willingness of the acting people to analyze the logical framework of their claims and to define the meaning of concepts by their "observable consequences"; second by the constructive power which is needed for the creation of a new, an enriched language, capable of describing "a new stock of facts"; third by the preparedness of people to "relativise" their own standpoint in order to contribute to the enrichment of our experience" [nemeth (2003), last para.]. endnotes * doctoral degree in philosophy from the university of vienna. master degree in both philosophy [university of vienna] and piano pedagogy [vienna university of music and performing arts]. 1 object modeling languages such as uml, z and alloy are, for instance, technologically motivated conceptual modeling tools whose expressive features and differences are also philosophically relevant [cf. jackson (1999) for an illustrative introduction]. 2 kr has become a fashionable and fancy term which has lost power to describe any clearly defined and specifiable subject matter. while it happens to be applied in various academic disciplines, the discussion about its philosophical foundation has broadened to such an extent that it covers almost everything that has been a philosophical key issue. paradigmatic publications such as sowa (2000), 78 prajñâ vihâra thagard (1993a) and pollock (1995) seem to result from ambitions almost comparable to traditional systematic philosophy and in clear distinction from spot analysis as it had been the favor of many 20th century analytical philosophers. at the other hand, "knowledge representation" is widely used in concrete scientific research and plays so a dominant role in reflections on research methodology as the representation modus naturally effects data interpretation. for example, vamos (1995) discusses in a comparative article the so-called pattern method as to completely heterogeneous research fields: early brain development dysfunction, a sociological-legal project and a study of economic patterns. moreover, management theories are highly concerned with knowledge creation, representation and transfer (cf. boland 2001). this article concentrates solely on more logical, philosophical and semiotic aspects. 3 the large-scale cyc project is the most outstanding example for the described ontological orientation in computer science [cf. http:// www.opencyc.org]. 4 strawson (1959) famously outlined a "descriptive metaphysics" [in opposition to a "revisionary metaphysics"] in a kantian tradition which can be seen sharing some principal assumptions with domain and database oriented ontologies. especially the opposition to logically and scientifically more sophisticated world views, accommodating neither common sense nor user friendly applications, let the aforementioned approaches appear related. still, ontologies designed for information technology differ from strawson's project fundamentally by their degree of systematization and specification. 5nelson goodman is well-known for his philosophical work, which is in larger parts abstract and technically demanding, while it is often overlooked that he founded the so-called project zero in 1967 as a harvard university graduate school of education research associate. this project has been continued until today with the "mission to understand and enhance learning, thinking, and creativity in the arts, as well as humanistic and scientific disciplines, at the individual and institutional levels" [cf. http://www.pz.harvard.edu]. 6the replacement of philosophical cosmology by [extraterrestrial] physics gives us an impressive example for such a transformation of a "philosophical" branch. but regarding this case we can question, if e.g. the pre-socratics really did philosophy at all and not merely protoscience instead. aristotle definitely was a universal scientist and an outstanding philosopher too, just to mention one example. on the other hand, also many great scientists have made paradigmatic philosophical contributions, notably in modern times, when philosophy was already an isolated academic discipline. thus, however we write intellectual history, an understanding of philosophy as science in a primitive stage and therefore as something that has to grow up in order to become a real science seems rather illfounded. philosophical reasoning about new paradigms in science has often reflected back to the self-definition of philosophy. and philosophy questions even the most fundamental suppositions of extremely advanced sciences, as e.g. in gerald moshammer 79 case of modern physics the ontological status of the whole mathematical apparatus employed, expressively numbers, classes and functions. the fact of being an integrated part of empirical or applied sciences should therefore not mislead an evaluation of modern research fields like kr. 7for a comprehensive overview of rorty's standpoint see his two retrospective essays in rorty (1992), 361-374. 8the observation of how his argument works is of interest independently from the question if we consider putnam's "externalism" a comprehensive philosophical standpoint. 9this is not new in philosophy influenced by logic and mathematics. carnap spoke of a "spielraum" [combinatorial space] regarding the truth value distribution in sentential logic, and combinatorial logical possibilities always emerge when we reflect on cognitive principals and reconstruct them in a structured way. indeed, combinatorial thinking and epistemological innovation are linked; in this context, especially leibniz' treatment of an "ars inveniendi" within a broad "mathesis universalis" has to be recalled. for a radical structural ontology see dipert (1997). 10for a better understanding, here is the full passage: "in logic there are no morals. everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language as he wishes." [carnap (1937), 52] 11for a differentiated discussion of logical tolerance see restall (2002), who refers to tarski and especially carnap to distinguish his own specific pluralism concerning the concept of logical consequence. 12a very interesting concrete manifestation of a methodological isomorphism similar to goodman's structural and ontologically neutral criterion of definition can be found in churchland (1998), 11f. 13it has to be remembered, that it was the "linguistic turn" which had led to the marketplace of semantics for a discussion of ontological issues. and in the pretty secure corner of extensionality the only issue to worry about is reference. since this spot is mainly occupied by physicalists, materialists and/or nominalists, the theoretical challenges are easily identified: besides terms that supposingly refer to abstract entities those with null-extension, especially fictious ones, appear puzzling. over the last hundred years many strategies to deal with these theoretical difficulties have been applied. paradigmatically, the main forerunners are here frege's contexuality principle [cf. frege (1884)] and russell's famous theory of descriptions [russell (1905)] using existential quantification to incorporate extensionally empty expressions into [false] sentences, while the relation of identity allows to safe singularity in definite cases. the problem of direct reference disappears as we solely have to determine truth values of whole sentences. of course there is still the questions how to deal with verification, how to determine single propositions. after the logical positivists' attempt to root all our [scientific] knowledge in pure protocol language had failed, holism has gone one step further and raised the problem of reference and verification to the level of whole different theories and languages. and once we reach this top level, the question is how the 80 prajñâ vihâra speech about different conceptual schemes is comprehensive at all. davidson rejects the idea of conceptual pluralism. he writes: "…we must say much the same thing about differences in conceptual scheme as we say about differences in belief: we improve the clarity and bit of declarations of difference, whether of scheme or opinion, by enlarging the basis of shared [translatable] language or of shared opinion. indeed, no clear line between the cases can be made out" [davidson (1973-74), 20]. davidson's "shared language or opinion" seems again just comprehensive if we understand such a common pool as formal congruence, a kind of isomorphism at the end. 14ostensive definition constitutes a philosophical challenge to any kind of pure structuralism. indeed, many philosophers have emphasized its semiotic character and necessary mediation. already hegel gave in his famous "phenomenology of spirit" (1977) a lucid examination of "sense certainty". in the 20th century it was wittgenstein who gave ostensive definition a linguistic turn in the opening passages of the so-called blue book [cf. wittgenstein (1974)]. 15if somebody let's call him mr. hook labels a whale "fish", you could say his general terms "fish" and "mammal" differ in meaning from the standard usage in biology. but how could the difference be clarified and determined? is mr. hook applying the simple universal sentence "every animal of a certain shape and living in water is a fish" and still believes in a fundamental difference between fishes and mammals as to reproduction? is he aware that whales have mammary glands with which they nourish their young? if so, why it this not reason enough for him to classify a whale as a mammal? how would mr. hook classify dolphins? normally it would not be difficult to find out wherein the difference between mr. hook's and the biologist's categorization lies. but the only path of investigation is the path of formal semantics, i.e. the identification to which entities a term is supposed to apply by testing how it is related to other terms considered relevant. the clarification process involves usually just a small part of concepts. for example, it might not refer to the fact that mammals and fishes show differences in the neuronal connectivity pattern of the olfactory bulb. a biologist might try to clarify mr. hook's understanding just by pointing out that whales breathe air, are warmblooded, breast-feed their young and have some hair, all characteristics typical for mammals in standard biology. the closure and scope of conceptual [or belief] clarification and mutual adaptation in a dialogue of two or more minds depend finally on rather pragmatic reasons. but during the process of mutual understanding and clarification, regardless the actual point when we feel satisfied with the result, there is not more to do than exploring the relationships a term yields to others. 16as far as formal semantics is logical, the following characteristic of logic has to be kept in mind "logic does not deal with specific men or animals; it can apply to individuals if they are members of a class, but it can actually mention them only as members, not as individuals. we cannot say in logic , 'reynard killed a lamb' meaning by 'reynard' an individual known by personal acquaintance, we gerald moshammer 81 can only say [ x] : x is named reynard and x killed a lamb. but this tells us only that at least one member of a class is named reynard, and has killed a lamb. it still leaves us with 'at least one' not with 'this one'. the fact, that this fox killed a lamb, that this is reynard, goes beyond the sphere of logic; it requires sense-experience, to furnish a specific individual to which one may point", langer (1967), 113. even if we added an identity clause here to secure singularity [[y]: if y is named reynard and y killed a lamb then y = x] we still could just express "one and just one" and not "this one". 17the area of formal ontology is a good example for the elaboration of choices. a metatheory has been established that creates a comprehensive typology of various ontological constructions and principals [cf. armstrong (1989) for an introduction]. the different formal ways of interpreting the relation between particulars and universals show in a paradigmatic way that at the level of common sense and ordinary language an ontological theory hardly can be finalized. 18the concept of "abduction" was introduced by charles sanders peirce and it is remarkable that philosophers in the german-world find in it a link to thoughts related to german idealism. for example, the austrian philosopher kurt walter zeidler compares in this respect peirce with hegel [cf. zeidler (1990)]. 19categorization plays a central role in nelson goodman's theory of symbols and epistemology, a theme which interestingly began with his famous "new riddle of induction" [cf. goodman (1983)]. 20although there might be principal limits to the program of a naturalization and technological implementation of "human" intelligence and intentionality, a comprehensive reconstruction of how different intelligent tasks could be understood has definitely epistemological value and offers furthermore a useful repertoire of analyzing, organizing and creating knowledge. moreover, achievements in kr could notably contribute helpful tools to enhance didactics and communication. bibliography [1] agazzi, e. 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(1991), philosophie und semiotik, vienna, 153166). retrieved may 16, 2006 from http://phaidon.philo.at/asp/puh.htm. 86 prajñâ vihâra article 4-2 138 meditation today: science and shortcuts thomas valone integrity research institute, washington, usa abstract a daily practice for millions of people around the world, akin to prayer, meditation is now welcome in many professional areas such as psychoneuroimmunology that have proven its efficacy. medical doctors like d.s. khalsa, say that meditation produces “optimal cognitive function” and have found that it is positively rejuvenating for the brain and physiologically harmonizing for the body. this article is an outgrowth of presentations to audiences at the u.s. patent and trademark office and the u.s. psychotronics association.* it provides an introduction to the practice of meditation for westerners, with some science and shortcuts. introduction the subject of meditation applies to the mind. there is a wealth of research and developments that have a direct bearing on the effect of the mind over the body. dr. carl simonton, author of how to meditate wheels of life – a. judith *videotapes of this lecture to the uspa are available from the uspa. and getting well again, notes that a breakthrough was made in this area when nature magazine published the finding that white blood cells have “neuroreceptors” on their surfaces. thus, the physical connection between the mind and the immune system had been finally established. from the simplest example of pain control, which i have experienced, to the most extraordinary superhuman feats, it is concentration, visualization, and a meditative calm that 138 prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 138-165 © 2000 by assumption university press 139 achieves the results. recently in the dentist chair, joyce the dental assistant said to me after a drilling without anesthetic, “i don’t know how you do it. i’ve watched you and you are so calm. some guys try to be macho and tense up. do you study something to do that?” i said, “yes, yoga and meditation practice.” when i was a teenager learning about meditation practices through indra devi’s book yoga for americans (prentice-hall), i saw a martial arts expert drill a hole into a solid brick with his finger. i was able to talk with him afterwards and examine the brick as well. this was one of many feats which stuck in my mind as being physically difficult to explain. years later at the us. psychotronics association’s “spoonbending” parties with jack houck, one of which i hosted as well in my hometown, i witnessed more than one person bending the bowl of a tablespoon with their thumb as they held it in one hand. if i had not supplied the silverware myself in one case, i would have had some doubts. in one case, i sat right next to a young woman as she showed me how she did it (make the suggestion and then wait for the softening effect). it still was amazing to me since i couldn’t do it even with two hands and trying to cheat with a flat surface to push against! everyone has heard of desperate mothers lifting an automobile off of their child in an emergency. i have saved newspaper clippings of such events. all of the above examples show the extraordinary power of the mind over physical circumstances. (an article on this subject by jack houck is featured in the forthcoming anthology, energetic processes: the interconnection between matter, energy, and consciousness by moscow et al., xlibris press.) 1925 poster history in this century, it wasn’t until “for the first time in india’s history a swami was officially received by the president” that meditation became popular with americans. the event was when swami yogananda, the founder of self-realization fellowship, met president calvin coolidge at the white house, as reviewed on the front page of the washington herald (jan. thomas valone 139 140 25, 1927). that popularity was also evident when yogananda subsequently filled carnegie hall to capacity, as well as many other lecture halls across the nation. other meditation teachers also came before and after him: swami vivekananda, meher baba, and of course, maharishi mahesh yogi who gave a new resurgence to meditation with a “transcendental” flair and attracted the beatles back in the 1960’s. today, transcendental meditation (or “tm”) is probably the most familiar type of meditation known to westerners, though buddhist meditation is also very popular. without meditation, zen archers would miss their target. without meditation, qigong masters could not perform superhuman feats. without meditation, christian mystics would never have become saints. without years of transcendental meditation, bestselling authors, deepak chopra, m.d. and john gray, ph.d. would never have become famous. eastern philosophy and yoga, offer a viewpoint that the mind is more fundamental than matter. demonstrating the power of meditation in consciously accomplishing such abilities has been shown by the menninger foundation. studies of tibetan monks increasing their body temperature through the practice of “tumo” or the indian journal of medical research articles (v. 49, 1, jan. 1961, p.82) of yogis buried underground for extended periods of time are good examples. the article about the underground burial shows the electrocardiogram (ekg) records as the yogi’s heart voluntarily stops and then, 30 days later, starts up an hour before the crypt is opened. they are fascinating accounts, very convincing and motivating to me. more recently, a modern yogi, sri chinmoy, has also amazed many researchers. many people know of his music and involvement with sports figures. sri chinmoy also leads peace meditations at the united nations, u.s. congress, and at the british parliment on a regular basis. however, not many may know of his extraordinary accomplishments in weight lifting. in two separate witnessed and photographed events, with specially prepared equipment, sri chinmoy has lifted 2000 pounds and 7000 pounds dead weight respectively. he is not a muscle-bound person either. so how did he do it? through meditation, one can convince the brain, or more scientifically, program our “biocomputer” to believe something is possible, with practice. the motivational speaker anthony robbins, author of unlimited 140 prajñâ vihâra 141 power, tells us that it’s only our beliefs that are holding us back and changing them is a technique that can be learned. robbins is known for curing addictions in one session and training sharpshooters for the military, both by changing their belief systems. qigong today, more and more eastern techniques are emerging which have an ancient history to them such as “qigong” (chi-gong). it is related to the more well-known practice of tai chi and teaches one how to move the life energy “chi” or “prana” through the body. recently, a medical doctor from mainland china named dr. yan xin has trained and healed thousands of people throughout the world with qigong methods (“the secrets and benefits of qigong” audiotape from amber leaf press). in 1991, when president bush sr. met dr. yan xin, he called him “a contemporary sage”. very important is the “relaxed and quiescent” state to the practice that dr. xin speaks of. a nervous or restless mind is not compatible with qigong. this is also true of “pranayama” (movement of prana) which we will try later on. what can we expect from meditation? research psychologist, dr. lawrence leshan, who i met years ago, says in his book, how to meditate (bantam books): “central to the response to meditation is the lowered rate of metabolism, the lowered rate of using oxygen and producing carbon dioxide. that these decreases are due to a lowered metabolic rate rather than to a slower or shallower breathing is shown by the fact that both decrease equally and the ratio between them remains the same. this would not be true if it were due to alterations in respiration. there is also typically, in meditation, a slowing of the heartbeat...the lactate concentration of the blood decreases sharply during mediation, nearly four times as fast as it does in people resting quietly...the skin’s electrical resistance increases sometimes as much as four hundred percent.” thomas valone 141 142 an increase in cortical response measured after tm practice thus, meditators show a profound lack of tension and anxiety, accompanied by an increase of slow alpha waves of the brain. meditation can be scientifically described as a means for the brain to electrically resonate. as proven by eeg recordings, the practice bathes the brain in the harmonic frequencies most conducive to homeostasis (alpha and theta), that becomes pleasurable the longer you meditate. compared to the usual “electrically noisy” waking state of the brain, meditation increases the “signal-to-noise” ratio as well. one study that i reviewed, performed by scientists from maharishi international university, showed the strong alpha and theta waves of the brain dominating the neuronal eeg patterns in a “waterfall” frequency plot over time. this study of the resonant modes of the brain drew the analogy of a laser cavity tuned to one major frequency. as one stills the random, restless thoughts, meditation convinces the practitioner that he/she can be fully conscious and even blissful, without thinking thoughts. we then start to learn the profound truth taught by yogis that “we are not the mind”. meditation increases the awareness of the self that is apart from the ego. sometimes referred to as “self-actualization,” self-realization has also been taught by many great philosophers like hegel, bradley, and green as the “realization of the true self.” it’s a gradual process of 142 prajñâ vihâra 143 connectedness that makes one feel more centered and a necessary part of the universe. meditation tends to remarkably “expand consciousness”which can be accelerated with visualization exercises. the expansion of consciousness is difficult to describe in western terms but the experience is breathtaking when it happens to the meditator. here “teaching by analogy” works best for the uninitiated—swami sri yukteswar once said, “the little fishes of ideas make quite a stir in shallow minds. the whales of inspiration make hardly a ruffle in oceanic minds.” this gives you an idea of how less perturbed one becomes when patience improves and calmness is a daily learned habit. another benefit is that one’s intuition improves, which was amazing to me since my intuition was practically dead as a twenty-year old. i thought only women had the gift of intuition. ideas which are accurate but seem to come from nowhere start occurring with more regularity as one perseveres with daily meditation practice. meditation had other important benefits in my life too, such as relieving nervousness and even a tendency to stutter, as i turned twenty-one. purification by fasting back in 1972, on the evening in which i learned the tm technique, i skipped dinner for the first time, to which my mother was astonished. however, though she was impressed, my mom said she didn’t like meditation because it “stalls the brain.” then, after going through a difficult time, i attended my first 10-day yoga retreat by yogi amrit desai at ursinus college in 1975, fasted for three days on watermelon, and ate mostly live vegetarian food for the rest of the retreat. near the end, some of us saw several clouds line up in the sky in a formation i later found to resemble the tun hexagram from the i ching, which is entitled “retreat.” along with the pranayama breathing exercises, this purifying yoga experience convinced me that consciousness can be favorably and profoundly changed without drugs. within a year, i applied for the meditation lessons through self-realization fellowship and even gave a lecture on meditation at a local high school biology class. fasting on fruit juice, for example, is something that i now do every monday, and recommend it as a purifying method for the body and brain. books on thomas valone 143 144 fasting (such as fasting, the super diet by shirley ross) describe how the body dumps toxins during a fast. my thinking and meditations become clearer during and after fasting, even if it is only done for one day. why do we meditate? “we meditate to find, to recover, to come back to something of ourselves we once dimly and unknowingly had and have lost without knowing what it was or where or when we lost it” says dr. leshan. referring to meditation, a scientist at a conference once told him, “it’s like coming home.” this, in a nutshell, summarizes the essence of this mysterious fourth state of consciousness (waking, dreaming, and sleeping being the other three). dr. leshan also states, “essentially, meditation seems to produce a physiological state of deep relaxation coupled with a wakeful and highly alert mental state...quite opposite from the state brought about by anxiety or anger.” however, meditation is not an excuse to sleep while sitting up! when done properly, meditation provides deeper rest than deep sleep, according to research done at maharishi international university. meditation produces subtle rewards that increase over time and oftensurprising insight in just a few minutes of practice. it creates a balance between your inner world and your outer world. it also contributes to greater self-acceptance and therefore, greater self-esteem when you begin to carry what the yogis call a “portable paradise” within you. meditation helps us to live more consciously as well since our sensitivity and receptivity increases. lastly, meditation contributes to the inner feeling of positive personal growth being created day after day, as if we are continually evolving each time we meditate. the bubble diagram of tm, from the book the science of being and the art of living by maharishi mahesh yogi, shows one tracing the thought of a mantra (a repeated word or sound) back to its source deep below the normal level of consciousness. this diagram helps us westerners understand why, when all of our restless thoughts are on the surface of 144 prajñâ vihâra 145 our consciousness, that the diving below the surface will create for us a new, deeper, more profound experience. ancient meditation and prayer the man, myth and magic encyclopedia (marshall cavendish, bpc pub.) says that meditation was “once regarded almost exclusively as a preoccupation of mystics, saints and hermits.” it goes on to say that the ancient chinese practiced a taoist form of meditation, trying to reduce all striving for a goal. in the islamic mystical tradition, sufis sit in solitude repeating the name of allah without ceasing. buddhist meditators will often use a mandala, an elaborate symmetrical, circular design representing the cosmos, to focus their attention. jewish followers of the kabbalah meditate on the treelike “sefiroth” or the chariot “merkabah” to carry their consciousness upwards. southern med. journal, v. 81, no. 7, july, 1988, p. 826 – one of the best single-blind studies on prayer ever conducted, according to dr. larry dossey – 7/01. meditation has also been a practice of christian contemplatives and mystics as well including st. francis and st. ignatius of loyola. for example, st. teresa of avila is well known for her four stage “water wheel” analogy (the way of perfection, doubleday). at first it is a lot of work for the aspirant to pump the water of devotion to feed the garden of the soul. however, by the four stage, the water flows freely and unaided. in fact, prayer, contemplation and meditation are very closely related, as the cardiologist dr. larry dossey has pointed out in his books, such as prayer is good medicine. dr. dossey has also proven, through many articles now published in medical journals, that prayer can effect healing thomas valone 145 146 changes even in unsuspecting patients, most often in the range of 40% to 50% efficacy, which he points out is a huge percentage of patients, signifying a major effect beyond chance. (dr. dossey was the keynote speaker at the uspa conference in 2001, so i was also able to meet him personally. i highly recommend the videotape of his lecture to everyone.) many spiritual leaders of various religions go even further by teaching that anything is possible through prayer. what better state of mind for an effective prayer, clear of mental “noise and static,” than just after meditation? in yogananda’s book, how you can talk with god, it says, “we should speak to the divine spirit with confidence and with a feeling of closeness, as to a father or a mother. our relationship with god should be one of unconditional love.” god’s response, he states, can be felt during meditation “as peace, as love, or as joy.” meditation is referred to in the biblical sayings, “be still and know that i am god,” “if thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be filled with light,” and “the kingdom of god is within you.” these sayings have great significance that can be explored during deep meditation. for me, the striving for stillness, even of the breath, and the concentration aspect of one-pointedness, within the depths of meditation, have been two very important insights, which have created memorable breakthroughs for me in meditation. in the buddhist tradition, the emptying of the mind is the key concept for meditation. often a mandala or “yantra” is used to focus the mind to an interiorized state. in a time article on buddhism (10/13/97), the magazine says that enlightenment is regarded as the “awakening to the true nature of reality” but also, “a little below nirvana.” in the hindu tradition, the state of samadhi is very similar to nirvana, but enlightenment is definitely regarded as the highest goal. to reach this goal, the ancient eight-fold path of patanjali’s yoga sutras is the accepted roadmap for the path of yoga taught in the schools of raja yoga, kundalini yoga, kriya yoga, etc. the science of yoga by taimni (theosophical press), is one of the best translations, with excellent commentary. patanjali’s eight stages are: 1) self-restraint (yama), 2) observance (niyama), 146 prajñâ vihâra 147 3) posture (asana), 4) control of breath (pranayama), 5) withdrawal from sense perception (pratyahara), 6) concentration (dharana), 7) meditation (dhyana), 8) super-consciousness (samadhi). it can be said that the connection between meditation and religion is obvious. in a recent survey, respondents who used meditative prayer were twice as likely to feel a “strong relationship with god” than if they stuck to the usual petitionary style of prayer. when we reflect that the word “religion” comes from the latin word “religio,” meaning “to link back,” it reminds us of dr. leshan’s statements about “coming home,” in regards to meditation. thus, meditation is inherently compatible with any religion, though it is often taught and practiced without any religious connotation. the practice of meditation is effective, even if regarded simply as a technique. many people just meditate for what dr. herbert benson called the “relaxation response” in his book with the same title. the main reasons professionals have for prescribing meditation for their patients are: for stress reduction as well as improving health and mental clarity. breathing exercise does anyone believe that we can change your consciousness and induce a relaxation response in less than 5 minutes? let’s try a simple breathing exercise that will induce a meditative state. sit with spine straight, preferably away from the back of the chair with the eyes closed: oxygenating relaxation exercise to quiet the breath 1) inhale slowly for the count of 10, 2) hold for a count of 10, 3) then, slowly exhale for a count of 10. 4) repeat a few times. thomas valone 147 148 doing this pranayama exercise before meditating will: (a) quickly interrupt the internal dialogue, (b) improve the depth of meditation, and (c) produce better and more satisfying results in a shorter period of time. the power of affirmation another area of great help to meditators is the science of affirmation. affirmations are really like guided meditations and a good introduction to the mental interiorization necessary for meditation. they work in conjunction with your goals. furthermore, they have been shown to program your subconscious “biocomputer” with new habits and produce healthful results. another less well known result are the beneficial synchronistic events from affirmation practice, such as the first insight in the book, the celestine prophecy, by james redfield (warner books). as mentioned earlier, the effect of the concentrated conscious mind over objective reality usually surpasses normal expectations. affirmation practice is the key to creating major changes in one’s life. what we strongly believe usually becomes true for us, whether good or bad. therefore, be careful, as anthony robbins warns, of negative affirmations said during periods of anger or fear. instead, i suggest creating new, beneficial beliefs slightly beyond your comfort zone, repeat them mentally and see what positive things will happen. using the directions from his wonderful pocketbook, scientific healing affirmations, yogananda instructs us to: “free the mind from restlessness and worries. choose your affirmation and repeat all of it, first loudly, then softly and more slowly, until your voice becomes a whisper. then gradually affirm it mentally only...until you feel that you have attained a deep, unbroken concentration—not unconsciousness, but a profound continuity of uninterrupted thought.” 148 prajñâ vihâra 149 once background mental repetition in a rhythmic fashion is achieved, the affirmation takes on a life of its own and we notice that it sort of “echos” in the mind as it keeps repeating. then, days or weeks later, we find a change has taken place in our lives, which is beneficial and sometimes surprising. this is how the yogis change physical reality. try one of these examples from the book, “there is a hidden strength within me to overcome all obstacles and temptations”, “i am a prince of peace, sitting on the throne of poise directing my kingdom of activity” or “i will purify my mind with the thought that god is guiding my every activity.” read it out loud a few times until it is memorized and then repeat mentally. other affirmations that i use often are: “i will go forth in perfect faith in the power of omnipresent good to bring me what i need at the time i need it” or my favorite, “i am ever-protected by omnipresent goodness.” it is recommended that you memorize a few of them, like these that yogananda says he has “spiritualized,” to have a fully equipped arsenal with you at all times to use as needed. thoughts are things. concentrated affirmation practice will prove it for you. mantra meditation meditating “about” something is essentially contemplation, which patanjali’s yoga sutras define as “dhyana,” where the concentration is narrowed and focused to discern the foundational essence of the object of meditation. to quote evelyn underhill from her 500page treatise called mysticism (oneworld pub.), written in 1911, “the modern american schools of mental healing and new thought recommend concentration upon a carefully selected word as the startingpoint of efficacious meditation.” examples that are popular today include the words, “one,” “aum,” “the lord is my shepherd,” or a direct command like “relax.” one can also ask a single identity question, as paul brunton says in discover yourself, (samuel weiser pub.): “who is it that is trying to make the mind still? then you must wait reverently. the answer will be heralded by an intuition, a gentle sense, and something very thomas valone 149 150 indeterminate. you cannot force it. you must pay the keenest attention and yield yourself up to it. that is the higher meditation, when you let the interior world reveal itself to you.” this carefully chosen line of questioning, from my experience, can create a consciousness breakthrough when used as a point of concentration with earnest sincerity. to summarize, follow these simple steps for your meditation practice: 1) sit upright with the eyes closed, relaxing the body and calming the mind, while putting aside all outward thoughts, giving this time exclusively to meditation. you may start with a prayer if you are so inclined to help elevate your consciousness and spiritualize the experience. 2) do the breathing exercise from the previous section, thus gaining control over the breath. 3) pick a single word or phrase (mantra) which has meaning for you. in a similar fashion as affirmation practice, repeat the mantra in your mind, returning to the mantra when you get distracted. 4) you may also simply watch the breath, gently bringing the mind back to your single purpose, as you continue to relax and let go of every thought except one. 150 prajñâ vihâra 151 practice on a regular basis, for 10-15 minutes (dr. simonton suggests to start with once-a-week, then twice-a-week, then finally daily.) most meditators find daily practice well worth the effort. suggestion: it is important while the habit is being formed, you practice regularly, with an empty stomach, even if only for five minutes, rather than skip the agreed-to routine because of some “emergency.” modern meditation popular magazines like the washingtonian, self, time, spa, and let’s live, have all had articles on meditation and yoga, with experts like dr. andrew wyle suggesting that inducing a state in which you are relaxed and emotionally comforted can have substantial health benefits. insurance benefits are also available if you are a veteran or working at ibm or gm. the veterans administration, ibm, and gm all pay for part of transcendental meditation training under the category of “stress management.” regarding a modern approach to meditation, dr. khalsa, medical physician and author of the recently published book (and audiobook), brain longevity (warner books), says that, “occasionally my patients will add various elements of their brain longevity programs one at a time, and will delay their participation in meditation. sometimes they put off meditation for a week or two, because it seems exotic to them, particularly if they are older patients who have never meditated. but when they do finally begin to meditate, they invariably report to me that the meditation ‘took them to a new level.’ meditation is really that powerful.” he talks about how great athletes use meditation to achieve their repeatable performances. he boasts about taking over 90% of his students through a medical course that had a 50% national pass rate by training them in meditation first. dr. khalsa presents the following medical benefits from meditation in his book, brain longevity: thomas valone 151 152 some suggestions in the beginning of meditation practice, the most important task you can accomplish, which may take all of your will power and determination, is to sit still, in silence, for at least 10 minutes each day. if you can promise yourself or someone else, that you will keep such a commitment to create a beneficial habit, this time will become your resource. a yoga magazine once stated, “the more trouble you have allocating twenty minutes a day for meditation, the more desperately you probably need it.” having your own “meditation room” in the house is a great reinforcement for the importance of this practice. i am also happy to see that bwi airport now has a meditation room. going to a weekly meditation group, such as an employee sponsored meditation group (like the pentagon has maintained for over twenty years), can become an oasis of peacefulness and restoration in an otherwise hectic week. at first, the subconscious mind tends to use the time to “dump” on you. all of your worries, troubles, desires, etc. will at first plague many or most of your meditations. a lot of people get discouraged at this point if day after day it seems that they are not really meditating. however, that is a trap created by the ego. instead, this experience of “clearing” the mind of “garbage thoughts,” as meditators call them, is very therapeutic. it makes way for the clear thoughts to come and the “space between thoughts” which becomes blissful. by the way, “bliss” is the eastern phrase for the very subtle joy that wells up from deep within everyone who becomes proficient at meditation. it is so peaceful, transforming and expansive that meditators sometimes call it “transcending” because it really is like a new level of consciousness. meditation causes a decrease in meditation causes an increase in oxygen consumption healthspan blood lactate lifespan heart rate hearing blood pressure vision respiration rate youthfulness cortisol production vitality 152 prajñâ vihâra 153 often it lasts for a while after meditation period is over. more so, it is directly proportional, from my experience, to the length and depth of meditation. in other words, if you meditate for an hour or so but not very deeply, another “deeper” meditation may be more refreshing and have lasting effects, though it is shorter. i have experienced transforming and memorable changes in longer meditations that in some cases have become milestones for me in my spiritual evolution. i’ve had three-hour meditations at home where the last hour is the most exciting and uplifting. the inspirations that come make it all worthwhile and memorable, especially when combined with prayer. st. teresa of avila, for example, called meditation the “prayer of quiet” for good reason (the interior castle, doubleday). i’ve also participated in 6 and 8-hour meditations with our dc meditation center in college park, maryland. to reassure those who can’t imagine such a long time “doing nothing,” the first thing one invariably finds is that the time passes quickly for an experienced meditator without a lot of mental noise. it is the mental distractions that create the awareness of time. meditators benefit from longer meditations, especially if they mentally prepare for the experience by “cleaning house” first. in deep meditations, one will detach from the consciousness of the body. it starts to happen slowly as time goes on, starting from the lower part of the body and moving upwards, until it seems that only the spine and brain are present in your field of awareness. that is when the mental space of meditation begins to expand and “lighten.” mentally retreating to the spine and brain helps this process. often referred to in yoga as “kundalini,” the upraising of spinal energy and consciousness is central to the universal phenomena of meditation. in fact, gopi krishna, author of the biological basis of religion and genius, and also dr. lee sanella, author of kundalini: psychosis or transcendence? both believe that the kundalini process is biologically inherent in all human beings. sometimes the mental expansion it induces happen spontaneously, as in the case with gopi krishna, following years of daily meditation. what a kundalini awakening or the state of samadhi may feel like can be imagined by mentally visualizing an expanding bubble of consciousness from the room to the building, city, country, world, solar system, galaxy, and finally letting go to infinity to mentally touch the thomas valone 153 154 universe. this is also a good visualization to use at the start of meditation. another similarly fulfilling visualization taught the pocket book, metaphysical meditations, is to increase the feeling of joy as a growing bubble, expanding it to infinite size whenever we find ourselves feeling happy. centers of consciousness as you meditate, it is important to remember to “look up,” even while your eyes are closed. the frontal lobe of the brain is a mystery to scientists today and yet provides our advanced insights and our sense of inspiration if activated properly. by looking downward, one will start to feel sleepy, even while sitting up. another finding is that the concept of “higher consciousness” is a physical phenomenon as well. what we focus upon with concentration, we often can bring into being. therefore, by concentrating upwards with our eyes closed during meditation, we can awaken the frontal lobe and what the eastern mystics call “the spiritual eye” (ajna center), the tunnel of light, as well as the highest “crown chakra” center of consciousness, (sahasrara) at the top of the head. (recall that many paintings of saints show a “halo” around the top of the head because the crown chakra has opened in that saint.) the practice of looking upward with the eyes closed also tends to draw the consciousness upwards, which can easily be physically perceived during meditation. other chakras, as indicated in time (4/23/01) include the throat center (vishuddha) of powerful speech, the heart center 154 prajñâ vihâra 155 (anahata) where the feeling of love is the strongest, the lumbar center (manipura) which is also called the power center of “chi” for martial arts, the sacral center (svadhistana) of sex energy, and the root chakra (muladhara) of survival at the perineum (most books simply say “the bottom of the spine”). i discovered my muladhara chakra on june 15, 1977 quite unexpectedly while coincidentally in chicago at the 2nd international congress on meditation and related therapies. i stuck my head out of a window from the 15th story of the ymca to look down to the street. try it sometime, from any tall building or bridge, looking down suddenly to the ground. the overwhelming, fearful surge of selfpreservation radiating from the perineum is unforgettable. otherwise, the muladhara center is mostly dormant in civilized, daily life. for those interested in an interdisciplinary understanding of the nature of the chakras, dr. caroline myss in anatomy of the spirit, has proven a strong correlation exists between the 7 chakras, the 7 sacraments, and the 7 rungs of the sefirot. not many people may know that the reality of the chakras of the body as centers of consciousness, has been shown by a ucla professor, dr. valerie hunt, who, during ten years of research, recorded electrode signal from the major body chakras during various states of consciousness. an example is shown here from wheels of light (simon & schuster) by aura reader, rosalyn bruyere, who worked closely with dr. hunt for all of those years. during her lectures, dr. hunt showed that new distinctive violet chakra signal and its spectrum – dr. hunt credit: wheels of light—bruyere violet chakra signal and its spectrum – dr. hunt c re di t: w he el s of l ig ht — b ru ye re thomas valone 155 156 frequency spectra are measurable from these centers, apart from the emg and eeg frequency ranges, correlating to predominant colors of the “aura.” she is currently working on an advanced biofeedback machine based upon her findings. (dr. hunt’s lectures on videotape are available from the uspa where she spoke two years in a row.) dr. hunt’s work is the first to prove that aura “colors” are objective, measurable states of consciousness, distinctly identifiable. her work has profound implications for alternative health and wellness research. it will bring this esoteric subject of chakras and auras into the mainstream medical community, in the same way that acupuncture became accepted in the west, after research proved its worth. regarding the higher centers of consciousness normally activated during meditation, one indication that they are opening is the internal experience of light. inexperienced meditators may laugh but remember that the pineal gland, esoterically connected to the crown chakra, responds to light though deep in the brain. this mystery of it being “optically activated” has been related to the reception of direct sunlight on the eyes. esoterically, what i have found, especially during longer meditations, lasting a few hours, is that it appears to the meditator that someone has “turned on the ceiling light” in the room. this may be a result of meditation directly stimulating the pineal gland. other times, various deep colors will be seen on the internal mental screen. most often, simply a white, opal glow will be perceived as one relaxes into a deep meditation. however, in the beginning, the tendency is to think about it, which drives away the phenomenon. visualizing a white vertical tube for the spine, lit up like a fluorescent bulb, has helped me focus on “retreating to the spine and brain”, which is a powerful but advanced technique. yogananda suggests that whenever you see a quiet pond without waves, stop and meditate nearby with eyes partly open, concentrating on quieting the mind to make it as calm as the pond. merging and expanding one’s awareness of light, peace, love, or joy, is certainly the best course to take, while consciously feeling gratitude in one’s heart. then we can understand why the ancient bhagavad gita from india, says that meditation induces “radiance of character.” 156 prajñâ vihâra 157 electronic meditation some people believe that learning meditation is not necessary since there are many machines, many of which are patented, that put the brain in a state of meditation. examples are james gall’s “method and system for altering consciousness” patent #5,123,899, also robert monroe’s patent 5,356,368 of almost the same title, and tye rubins’ “brain wave synchronizer” patent #5,409,445. these were referred to as “electronic drugs” about ten years ago when they became very popular. i have tried a few of them, especially the ones with blinking lights in front of the eyes and low frequency tones for the ears. though your brain may be driven to produce theta waves, your awareness can actually fight the experience since it may seem unexpected and often intrusive. they may work for some people but they don’t allow the deep awareness to emerge from within which takes practice and bodily relaxation as well. electronic drugs also can produce a dependency and a limit to the depth and scope of the experience. therefore, i don’t recommend them as a shortcut. hatha yoga and pranayama a more natural approach to relaxation and flexibility is hatha yoga. often a state of mind can only be optimized if the body is free from tension, pain and distraction. yoga asanas or hatha yoga, offered at many fitness centers, can be very beneficial for toning and stretching the ligaments, muscles, and spine. yoga teaches that maintaining a flexible spine ensures the flow of kundalini energy upwards during meditation. furthermore, doing a pranayama exercise (moving prana energy with the breath and concentrated visualization) such as the fire breath, khapalabhakta breathing, or even the gentle kriya yoga technique, helps clear the spinal “blockages” which keep our attention at the lower chakras. the kriya technique, for example, also enables the meditator to feel the spinal currents of energy and use them beneficially to enhance the meditation experience. even the beginner’s hong sau technique is also a powerful pranayama capable of quieting the breath and focusing the thomas valone 157 158 attention at the highest spiritual centers. hatha yoga and pranayama are additional techniques that help prepare the body and mind for meditation. a quick shortcut here is an example of a consciousness changing breathing exercise or pranayama which i discovered that helps in times of drowsiness, especially while driving or working long hours is the following. it is also very similar to one of the kundalini exercises taught in the book by dr. khalsa. it will give you in a few seconds the feeling of what a longer meditation will feel like: 1) inhale, hold the breath, and look up; 2) keep holding the breath as you concentrate at the point between the eyebrows; 3) exhale only after a minimum of 10 seconds. it only takes 10-15 seconds or so to feel the tingling sensation in the middle of the forehead and the mental change which will invariably awaken even a sleepy driver or a drowsy office worker. holding the breath has been proven to cause the brain’s blood vessels to expand in compensation. this immediately improves brain circulation and alertness. practicing this each day may also directly improve mental faculties. conclusion meditation today is proven to be physiologically transforming and recommended by doctors. to review, we touched on the practice of mantra meditation, where it is recommended to stick with one mantra you choose for at least a month or more before trying another one. we also practiced a powerful breathing exercise that helps awaken brain cells through oxygen therapy. the discussion of kundalini and the chakras, vital to the advanced yogi, gave a basis for the deeper benefits that can be achieved through regular meditation. also helpful in transforming the conscious mind is the astounding changes a person can experience through the correct practice of affirmation, implanted in the subconscious or superconscious, without any extraordinary effort. thus, as you progress in affirmation and meditation practice, you may rightly expect some or all of the following: 158 prajñâ vihâra 159 credit: living arts, www.gaiam.com thomas valone 159 . an increasing peacefulness during meditation.. a conscious inner experience of calmness in meditation metamorphosing into increasing bliss.. a deepening of one’s understanding, and finding answers to one’s questions through the calm intuitive state of inner perception.. an increasing mental and physical efficiency in one’s daily life.. love for meditation and the desire to hold onto the peace and joy of the meditative state in preference to attraction to anything in the world.. an expanding consciousness of loving all with the unconditional love that one feels toward his own dearest loved ones.. actual contact with god, and worshipping him as ever-new bliss felt in meditation and in his omnipresent manifestations within and beyond all creation. -yogananda (self-realization magazine, spring, 1992) you may choose to take meditation lessons locally from a yoga center or through more than one correspondence courses offering meditation instructions. dr. carl g. jung, founder of analytical psychology, said that yoga and meditation promise “undreamed-of possibilities.” this is also the title of a free introductory booklet available from self-realization fellowship, (3880 san rafael ave., los angeles, ca 90065) describing excellent and inexpensive meditation lessons, including the kriya and hong sau techniques. meditate to improve alertness, mindfulness, general health and well-being, while enhancing one’s spiritual practice, whatever that may be…or as yogananda says, “why not unite all your smaller lights, letting 160 160 prajñâ vihâra them shine forth in one splendid effulgence to illumine the bodily house in which you dwell?” 122-dialogue on differing asian some comments on a modal ontological argument brian garrett australian national university, australia an ontological argument for god’s existence is any argument which attempts to prove the existence of god by reason alone. its only resources are concepts (especially the concept of god) and logical inferences involving those concepts. in contrast, other kinds of argument for god’s existence, such as the cosmological or telelogical arguments, rest on contingently true premises concerning, e.g., the existence of the physical universe or the complexity of organisms within it. these arguments do not purport to prove the existence of god by reason alone. one version of the ontological argument is the modal ontological argument. it is called ‘modal’ because it makes essential use of modal notions such as possibility and necessity. these notions are anyway integral to understanding god: it is traditionally held that god is a being who exists necessarily, and not merely contingently. (in possible worlds talk, a necessary being is one who exists in every possible world; a contingent being is one who exists in some but not all possible worlds.) here is the simplest version of a modal ontological argument, with one premise and one conclusion: (1) it is possible that a necessary being exist1; so (2) a necessary being exists. the argument is valid (at least in standard modal logics such as s5): if there is a possible world containing a necessary being (i.e., a being who exists in every possible world), such a being exists in this world, and thus actually exists. hence, if the argument is to be faulted, the fault must lie with premise (1). note that this is an ontological argument: a necessary being is claimed to exist because, and only because, it is possible that a necessary 22 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 22-26 © 2000 by assumption university press being exist. premise (1) is not an empirical, contingent premise: if true, it is conceptually or necessarily true. i there have been three main types of objection to this argument: (a) the idea of a ‘necessary being’ is incoherent; (b) we have no reason to accept (1) in preference to its opposite; (c) the argument is ripe for parody, so cannot be sound. none of these objections strike me as compelling. in which case, unless there are other objections, we should accept our little argument. ii (a) according to the first line of objection, ‘necessary’ can be predicated only of sentences or propositions, not of objects. we cannot meaningfully talk of necessary beings, or of contingent ones. russell advocated this view.2 however, developments in logic and semantics since russell have allowed us to make good sense of de re modal claims (that is, claims of the form ‘x is necessarily f’ or ‘x is possibly f’).3 and we seem to have little difficulty understanding the claim that numbers necessarily exist. if these remarks fail to convince, it’s worth pointing out that many philosophers are willing to acknowledge the coherence of talk of necessary objects, yet refuse to accept any ontological argument for god’s existence. such philosophers can be considered the target audience of this note. iii (b) surely, it might be said, whatever modal intuitions support (1) equally support: (1-) it is possible that a necessary being not exist; from which we could conclude: (2-) a necessary being does not exist. since (2) contradicts (2-), and since (1-) is no less plausible than (1), we should have no confidence in our original argument. brian garrett 23 comment it is perhaps not obvious how we are to understand (1-). if it is to imply (2-), it must be read as: (1-*) it is possible that no necessary beings exist4. why prefer (1) to (1-*)? premise (1) is supposed to be a conceptual truth, true simply in virtue of the generosity and abundance of the possible. what kind of general principle would generate (1)? a natural suggestion might be: (a) for any coherent or non-contradictory concept f, it is possible that there are fs (i.e., there is a possible world containing fs). from (a), assuming that the concept of a necessary being is coherent, (1) follows. i do not say that (a) is inescapable, but it is plausible. what analogous general principle would deliver (1-*)? presumably: (b) for any coherent or non-contradictory concept f, it is possible that there are no fs (i.e., there is a possible world containing no fs). yet (b) is not a plausible principle: the concept the even prime number is coherent, yet, assuming that numbers exist necessarily, there is no possible world which fails to contain that number (which is the number 2). hence there is an asymmetry which favours our premise: it’s not true that that we have just as much reason to believe (1-*) as to believe (1).5 24 prajñâ vihâra iv (c) ever since gaunilo objected to anselm, ontological arguments have been subjected to parody ripostes. these are arguments of the same form as ontological arguments, yet with obviously absurd conclusions. we are invited to draw the conclusion that the ontological arguments they parody cannot be cogent either. thus: (3) it is possible that a necessary island exist; so (4) a necessary island exists. (4) is absurd: our world plainly does not contain an island which exists necessarily. all earthly islands are contingent beings. since this argument exactly mimics our ontological argument, that argument must be hopeless. comments (i) we can observe that this objection is hardly complete: at best it tells us that our argument is wrong; it does not tell us where it goes wrong. but there is a more fundamental point. (ii) it is not just that earthly islands are contingent beings. islands are not the kind of being that could be necessary. they have a beginning and an end; they are part of the causal swim; they can be destroyed and created. in short, they depend for their existence on contingencies. hence we can, quite justifiably, deny premise (3). the concept of a necessary island is not coherent, and hence principle (a) cannot be used to support (3)6 v i conclude that our ontological argument has not been refuted: therefore, we may reasonably believe that a necessary being exists simply because it is possible for such a being to exist. brian garrett 25 endnotes 1 in possible worlds talk: there is a possible world containing a necessary being. 2 for example, in a debate with f. copleston. (see ‘must god exist?’ in philosophy in the open (ed.) g. vesey (open university press, 1978), pp. 114 – 121.) russell objected to talk of necessary beings on the grounds that all necessity is analytic and that existence is not a predicate. however, the first claim is false (many now accept non-analytic necessities such as ‘water is h 2 o’ and ‘tully is cicero’), and the second irrelevant (our argument makes no assumption about the logical form of ‘x exists necessarily’.) 3 see, e.g., saul kripke, naming and necessity (blackwell, oxford, 1980). 4 that is: there is a possible world containing no necessary beings. 5 this point seems to have escaped some commentators. see, e.g., j. l. mackie, the miracle of theism (oup, 1981) pp. 55 – 64. 6 this shows that it is not always an easy matter to determine whether a concept is coherent. it takes varying degrees of reflection to realise that (e.g.,) married bachelor, necessary island, and largest prime number, are incoherent concepts. 26 prajñâ vihâra 05_the tacit dimension in knowledge management.pmd the tacit dimension in knowledge management: the implications of the epistemology of michael polanyi mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, jakarta º·¤ñ́ âèí ¹ñกàèãé°èòêµãìêñ§¤áíâèò§ »õàµíãì ́ ãñ¤àกéíãì áåð áíåçô¹ ·í¿¿ìàåèíãì ä é́·óãëéàãòê¹ã¨¤çòáêó¤ñ­¢í§¤çòáãùéã¹°ò¹ð·õèà»ç¹·ãñ¾âòกã é́ò¹กòãºãôëòãáåð íó¹ò¨ íâèò§äãกçµòáàã×èí§¹õéกç¹óä»êùè¤ó¶òá·õèçèò·óíâèò§äã ö̈§¨ð·óãëé¤çòáãùé¹ñé¹ áõ¤çòáêãéò§êãã¤ì ëã×íกåèòçíõก¹ñâë¹öè§กç¤×í¨ðêòáò㶼åôµกòãêãéò§êãã¤ì â´âíòèñâ¤çòáãùé¢öé¹áò㹺ãôéñ·ä é́íâèò§äã º·¤çòá¹õéáø觷õè̈ ð¹óàê¹íกòãçôà¤ãòðëì àªô§»ãñª­òàกõèâçกñºáôµôàªô§êãéò§êãã¤ì¢í§¤çòáãùé¢í§á¹øéâì µòá¤çòá¤ô´¢í§ äáàกôéå â¾åò¹âõ ¼ùéàê¹íá¹ç¤ô´·õèçèò ¤çòáãùé·ñé§ëá´¢í§á¹øéâìµñé§íâù躹 í§¤ì»ãðกíºêè繺ø¤¤åëã×íäáèà»ô´à¼âªñ´à¨¹ º·¤çòá¹õéàê¹íá¹ðçèò ø̧ãกô̈ áôãªèกô̈ กããá·õèà»ç¹กåò§ æ ëã×íà»ç¹»ã¹ñâ กòã¨ð·óãëȩ́ øãกô̈ êãéò§êãã¤ì àãò¨ðµéí§ ñ́̈ กòããëȩ́ øãกô̈ à»ç¹กô̈ กããá é́ò¹êñ§¤á·õèáõ¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹ ì̧กñºçñ²¹¸ããá »ãðླõ ̈ òกá§èáøá¢í§กòããùéâ´â¹ñââð ̧ øãกô̈ กç¤×íçô¶õ·ò§¢í§กòã´óã§íâùè¢í§àãò ã¹กòã·ó ̧ øãกô̈ àãòâñ§¤§´óã§íâùèã¹çñ²¹¸ããá»ãðླõ¢í§àãòàêáí abstract socio-economists such as peter drucker and alvin toffler have called our attention to the importance of knowledge as a management resource and as power. this issue, however, raises question of how knowledge can be creative, or better, how knowledge creation can be produced in a company? this article is intended to provide a philosophical analysis of the creative dimension of human knowledge. following the prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 51-71 51 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ thought of michael polanyi who proposes the thesis that all knowledge is based on personal or tacit elements, this article suggests the idea that business is not a neutral and objective activity. to be creative, it must be arranged as a social activity that has a relationship to cultural tradition. from the perspective of tacit knowing, business is our way of being. we still always dwell in our cultural tradition in doing business. 1. introduction michael polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing has been considered at large in many areas: science, economics, and business. for people who dwell in these areas, personal knowledge (1958) and the tacit dimension (1966) are not only philosophical books but also the alternative sources to understand science, human knowledge in general, and organizational knowledge creation. especially his explanation of creative dimension of human knowledge can be helpful to understand the capability of a company as a whole to create new knowledge, to disseminate it throughout the organization, and to embody it in products, services, and systems. this tone of its relevance in the organizational knowledge creation has been introduced for the first time by ikujiro nonaka and hirotaka tekeuchi in their book entitled the knowledge-creating company in 1995.1 the book is a scientific report of their research on the success of japanese companies in the 1970s and 1980s. started with the assumption that knowledge creation is the source of the highest-quality power and the key to powershift as a translation of western idiom “knowledge as power” __ nonaka and takeuchi reach the conclusion that the great success of japanese companies in the 1970s and 1980s depends on how the management staffs and the workers dwell into the vision of company, their commitment to company's problem, and their immersion into the company’s tradition. all these are tacit dimension in knowledge creation.2 in the course of this study the tacit dimension is not just a fact in human knowledge and knowledge management but also has its function in the creative process in knowledge management. regarding this contribution, scholars in organizational knowledge creation try to understand the secret of tacit knowing with which the philosophers are concerned. this 52 prajna vihara paper aims to introduce the meaning of tacit knowing and then tries to examine its relevance for organizational knowledge creation. for this purpose, this paper will divide this topic into two stages. at the first stage the paper will take a look at the question how michael polanyi explains his theory of tacit knowing and at the second stage it will try to find out its implications in the knowledge creation in business. 2. michael polanyi, a philosopher michael polanyi was born on march 11, 1891 in the talented and intellectual family of mihaly pollacsek and cecilia wohl, in budapest, hungary. his father was born between 1825 and 1830 in a small jewish settlement in the hungarian mountains and, after participating in a hungarian revolt against the habsburgs in 1848, he escaped to switzerland where he studied engineering.3 the mother was an anarchist russian countess, who had also fled to switzerland in the aftermath of a bomb plot (for which she had built the bomb in the chemistry laboratory of the czar’s school for daughters of the nobility). michael polanyi had three brothers and one sister. the eldest brother was otto, who in the 1920s became a major industrialist in italy, where he changed his name to otto pol. otto was known as a marxist and a financial backer of the socialist newspaper avanti, of which mussolini was the editor. the next brother in age was adolph who had emigrated to brazil, where he found an interracial society in which whites, blacks, and indians would meld into a new civilization __ modern yet tribal, free yet not individualist. after otto and adolph came michael’s sister, mousie or laura, who around 1900, at the age of nineteen became a leader in the hungarian folk movement. the sister had an artistic side (bartok and dohnanyi) as well as a political and social vision of a life centered in the communal village. mousie polanyi was the editor of a magazine for this movement and through this organ helped to define and direct it. between laura and michael in age came karl who was the first president of the galilei circle at the university of budapest4 and eventually became a professor of history of economics at bennington and columbia university in 1946. after world war i, he edited the austrian mikhael dua 53 economist in vienna and lived in poverty while giving most of his income to the relief of hungarian refugees. karl is now best known for his study of the social and cultural effects of the rise of capitalist market economies through his book the great transformation, which had been drafted in 1940 and was published in new york in 1944 and in london in 1945.5 karl is known because of his criticism of the extensive application of the market system and its law of supply and demand of goods and capital. one of his central arguments is that if this system is applied to land and labor, then the result is that people come to be considered as commodities with a purely economic value. for karl, the market system violently distorts our views of man and of society. and to counteract this dehumanizing tendency, karl advocates redistribution of wealth and reciprocity of commitments and obligation according to social and political rather than economic norms. if karl, like otto and laura, defined himself as a socialist, michael was looking for an alternative style of life, which he later calls in the personal knowledge, ‘the responsible person’.6 at first he was concerned with the problem of society and social processes. he tries to find his own way between a bourgeois capitalism that rejects the intervention of community in the individual life and a marxist socialism that denies the individual freedom and the claim to be an independent person. opposing the rationalism of the traditional ‘liberal’ and anti-human collectivism of the socialist and marxist, he builds up his own concept of man and social processes under the formulation: “the freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act as he must”.7 with this position of a responsible person, he defends in his writings the political and social implications of science with a genuine intelligence and thereby opens a clearer path for the life of reason and justice. to look for a solution to the problems that existed in his and his father’s generations, he holds that only in co-operation with others in the development of understanding and in responsible action can the full development of human personhood take place.8 this difference between the socialism of his siblings and his own responsible personalism which sought justice and freedom, resulted in tensions within the family. one of these is that the relation between michael and karl became very cool.9 at first, the brothers were brought up with 54 prajna vihara the same world view. both were members of the galilei circle and in this circle both brothers shared the same ideas: they were free in spirit and anti-materialist. by the end of the 1920s, both had moved from freethinking atheism to tolstoyan christianity based on the view that individual self-completion could be the impetus for social change. here, at this period, however, the brothers began to diverge. while karl took a definite step beyond individualist ethics towards the societal one, and tried to imbue sociology with moral imperatives, influenced by kant’s categorical imperatives and by christianity, michael seemed to keep insisting upon the anti-materialist world view and shifted towards a theoretical philosophy in which the theory of knowledge dominated the theory of society. from here on, the brothers took divergent directions. karl became a socialist or more precisely a social democrat, while michael, with his deep understanding of the personal and social dimension of man, from the beginning of his career as scientist and philosopher, engaged in a criticism of marxism. the year 1935 marked the critical stage in the relationship when michael criticised ussr economic policy in his essay, “ussr economics fundamental data, system and spirit” which he wrote when we was in the manchester school of economics and social studies.10 karl accused michael of not understanding social and economic problems and contended that the working-class must be a starting point in russia for the sake of socialism.11 thus, from their former common ground of tolstoyan religiosity, karl had moved towards a community-oriented christian sociology which led him to celebrate the russian experiment as the sole embodiment of socialism, while michael rejected it and went on to construct a social theory based upon a theory of knowledge and of free society. accordingly, for michael fascism was not a genuine monster in the twentieth century, but only a consequence of marxism. but the cool relationship in the family did not last forever. in the end, karl knew that michael was right. the hungarian revolution in 1956 was the moment. karl began to criticise russian power politics; and the emphasis he placed on moral considerations as a motive for the hungarian revolution brought the brothers closer. whereas karl held that the hungarian revolution was of great significance because it had torn hungary from its feudal hangovers, michael set the events in the context of his mikhael dua 55 theory of knowledge and anti-totalitarian social theory, in which he reasserted the need for “spiritual beliefs” in truth, in fairness and decency, in beauty, in solidarity, and in justice.12 on this ground, michael, more than karl, maintained that science, arts, religion, and jurisprudence, while being fields of independent thought, are yet allied to each other. if the independence of one is taken away, then the freedom of others likewise will be ended. considering this position harry prosch points out: “the ultimate (result) of polanyi’s (michael’s) efforts was to reinforce our traditional beliefs in truth, justice, mercy and fellowship…for the continued existence of a free society…. this will lend an ontological basis for man’s grasp of his own dignity and high calling in the universe”.13 through his emphasis on spiritual beliefs, michael moved away from the socialist spirit of his own family and began to move toward the examination of the responsible person in a free society. 3. polanyi and gestalt psychology polanyi offered his life to inquire human knowledge in which he published science, faith and society (1946), personal knowledge (1958) and the tacit dimension (1966). his approach in those books was a fresh one. having rejected the positivistic notion of knowledge he looks for a true epistemology which would constitute a totally new philosophical beginning: tacit knowing. while his opponents, the positivists, have a long time been attempting to derive the wholes from parts, in a very explicit way, by identifying the parts and describing their mutual relation, polanyi turns to a position that says we know more the whole reality although we cannot specify it. he explains that any attempt to specify the particulars of the whole remains incomplete. in one way, there is always a residue of particulars left unspecified; and in another way, even when particulars can be identified, isolation of the particulars can change their appearance. polanyi, then, says that knowing is a process of comprehending: a grasping of disjoined parts into a comprehensive whole.14 the mutual relationship between particulars can be grasped only by a sustained effort of imagination. in any event this position has been developed by gestalt psy56 prajna vihara chologists who had amassed in their attempts to show that we see objects by supplying forms or patterns in terms of which the various bits and pieces in our perceptual field tend to fall into meaningful place. it seems to be clear from some of their experiments that we do not perceive objects by inferring them from their given parts, nor by a process of induction. polanyi’s references to gestalt psychology occurred for the first time in his article in 1941: “the growth of thought in society”,15 when he was still struggling with the freedom of science and drew upon the ideas of gestalt to argue for decentralized control. he contends that there is more than one form of order besides a predetermined one given by centralized scientific planning. from the work of wolfgang kohler,16 polanyi shows that there can be an order of the highest complexity spontaneously achieved by internal mutual adjustment. his interest in gestalt psychology’s findings in relation to creative intellectual endeavor becomes the foundation of his major new insight. besides gestalt psychology’s importance in the context of the freedom of science, polanyi also saw its importance in his discussion of knowledge generation. this can be found for the first time in his book science, faith and society, when polanyi concentrates on the problem of scientific discovery. he acknowledges that his reflection on the role of scientific intuition in the process of scientific discovery is “akin to the recognition of shapes as analyzed by gestalt psychology”.17 the gestalt psychology assumed that the perception of shapes is caused by the spontaneous reorganization of the physical traces made by sense __ impressions inside our sense-organs. the capacity of scientists to guess the presence of shapes as tokens of reality does not essentially differ from the capacity of our ordinary perception to establish the reality of things around us. in personal knowledge polanyi says that the finding of gestalt psychology was his first clue to his concept of tacit knowing. he clarifies: “scientists have run away from the philosophic implications of gestalt; i want to countenance them uncompromisingly”.18 the importance of gestalt psychology for polanyi, therefore, lies in its thesis that “we may know a physiognomy by integrating our awareness of its particulars without being able to identify these particulars”.19 for polanyi, gestalt psychology was response against the atomic sensationalist theories of the nineteenth century which contended that senmikhael dua 57 .. sory experience is the basis of all human knowing. in this controversy with atomic sensationalism, the gestalt theoreticians promoted a thesis that derives from its name: the gestalt, the whole. in the formulation of kurt koffka they seemed to say: “the word gestalt has the meaning of a concrete individual and characteristic entity, existing as something detached and having a shape or form as one of its attributes. a gestalt, therefore, is a product of organization, [and] organization the process that leads to a gestalt”.20 in the process of organization what happens to a part of the whole is determined by intrinsic laws inherent in this whole. all particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly constitute. polanyi knows that gestalt psychology tends to treat perception and knowledge as a more or less passive affair and therefore failed to see perception as a construction, in which we create a tacit integration of sensations and feelings into a perceived object. “such an interpretation”, polanyi says, “leaves no place for any intentional effort which prompts our perception to explore and assess in the quest of knowledge the clues offered to our senses”.21 despite this critical defect polanyi acknowledges that his theory of knowledge uses some proofs from gestalt psychology. he says that gestalt psychology has pushed him to build a kind of phenomenology of knowledge. in this standpoint polanyi formulates his ambiguous attitude toward gestalt psychology. he writes, “yet my evaluation of this material is so different from that of gestalt theory, that i shall prefer not to refer here to this theory, even though i shall continue to draw on its domain and pursue some arguments on lines closely parallel to that of its teachings”.22 with this attitude polanyi promotes his own view on the nature of knowledge using some data from gestalt psychology. 4. the subsidiary awareness and the focal awareness in the preface to his major book personal knowledge polanyi writes his epistemological position: i regard knowing as an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires skill. skilful know58 prajna vihara ing and doing is performed by subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to shaping of a skilful achievement, whether practical or theoretical. we may then be said to become subsidiarily aware of these particulars within our focal awareness of the coherent entity that we achieve.23 according to this epistemological encapsulation, the foundation of knowing lies in the distinction between focal awareness and subsidiary awareness. focal awareness is an awareness of an object as our focus of attention, while subsidiary awareness is an awareness of an object as a clue to another. his departure point of this thesis is the observation of the relation of a set of particulars to a comprehensive entity in several kinds of knowing, namely, the understanding of physiognomy, the performance of skills, and the mastery of tools and probes. in all these cases, polanyi finds that we can be aware of something in two mutually exclusive ways. “we can”, he says, “be aware of particulars uncomprehendingly, i.e., in themselves, or understandingly, in their participation in a comprehensive entity”.24 in the first case we focus our attention on the isolated particulars and then are aware of the particulars focally. but in the second, our attention is directed beyond them to the entity to which they contribute; we notice them subsidiarily in terms of their participation in the whole. focal awareness and subsidiary awareness, therefore, are definitely not two degrees of attention but two kinds of attention given to the same particulars. the critical factor distinguishing the two types of knowledge, however, lies not only in the content but primarily in the logical function of the subsidiary elements. the subsidiary elements function as clues to enable the knower to form a consistent perceptual or conceptual image of an object being considered. therefore, to clarify what he means by subsidiary awareness and focal awareness polanyi gives more attention to the evidences that are the results of the organization of sensory clues. in this case polanyi attempts to clarify that to see object is the result of learning a skill, of learning how to attain a meaningful (but non-explicit) integration of sensory clues. to explain this polanyi follows an exposition of the fact which had mikhael dua 59 been demonstrated by gestalt psychology, namely, what happens “when i move my hand before my eyes”.25 so far as immediate givens are concerned, i should only see my hand constantly changing its color, its size, and its shape. but instead it appears that i informally “take into account a host of rapidly changing clues, some in the field of vision, some in my eye muscles and some deeper still in my body, as in the labyrinth of the inner ear”,26 and so what i really perceive turns out to be a coherence among these thousand varied and changing clues in the form of a single unchanging object moving about, and therefore tacitly understood, in my perception, as being seen from continually different angles and distances and under variable illuminations. but it is apparent that this coherence could have been accomplished only tacitly, since i could not have been explicitly aware at the moment of some of the clues that apparently have entered into my coherent perception, those provided by my eye muscles, labyrinth organ, etc. through this example polanyi makes clear two points concerning the distinction of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness. in one point he says that one does not need to be consciously aware of all the clues he integrates into a perception. with respect to this point polanyi holds that the physiologists have long ago established that the way we see an object is determined by our awareness of certain efforts inside our body, some efforts that we cannot feel in themselves. they proved that “we are aware of these things going on inside our body in terms of the position, size, shape, and motion of an object to which we are attending”.27 in the second point, polanyi adds, it is also apparent that there must exist a perceptual action enabling me to pick out “objects” from my visual field and to retain them as integrated wholes even when their sense quality changes. i perceive them to be entities in motion retaining their integrity as objects, instead of perceiving them to be changing their character as objects. given such a mechanism to start with, i could then learn the skill of using it in more and more adequate ways as time went on. with this analysis of the distinction of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness we can conclude that knowledge is an activity which would be better described as a process of knowing. it is tacit because all the clues and particulars which are at work in our visual perception and the use of tools and probes are unspecifiable. it is an experience that we 60 prajna vihara have of our bodies and of our mental act as our own. but it is also a consciousness of the intentional terms projected as externally distanced whole, forms, objects, skills and more generally meanings, when forms, objects, skills, and meanings are the object of our focal awareness. knowing, therefore, involves the objective pole upon which subjective operation may be said to focus, but it also necessarily involves a non-focal substratum experience and performance. it contains “components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were parts of our body”.28 no knowledge, therefore, is wholly focal. 5. the subsidiaries the remarkable thing of polanyi’s theory of knowledge is that the appearance of a thing at the centre of our knowing depends on clues to which i am not directly attending. in the case of perception, there must be certain sensory clues essential to what i am seeing, of which i am not focally aware. the question arises as to what is the subsidiary? how can it operate in our knowledge? categorically, the non-focal clues or better the subsidiary clues must be of two kinds:29 (1) there are those clues which polanyi called subliminal: those events in my body, such as eye-muscles movements, movements inside my labyrinth organ, and neural traces in my cortex that i cannot ever directly perceive as part of my visual field when they are functioning in an act of perception. but (2) there are also clues that i do see, but only from the corner of my eyes. these clues he called "marginal clues." i can observe directly these clues if i choose, but it is obvious i do not attend to them directly when i am viewing an object focally. i merely attend from them to a focal object. thus my awareness of both kinds of these clues must only be subsidiary to my focal awareness of an object. the marginal clues can also be broken down into two kinds. besides what we see “at the corner of our eye:”, there is another type of clues which also functions marginally in perception, that is, the way we have been used to seeing in the past. perception is contextual and historically conditioned and what we see is often a function of what we have mikhael dua 61 learned to see. it is a habituation. polanyi in this case explains that if we irresistibly see a room as having a normal shape that is because of another act of tacit knowing involving a subsidiary awareness at the back of our mind of a great many normal rooms that we have seen in the past.30 so, not only what is at the corner of our eyes, but also what is at the back of our mind that functions as a background in perception. the weight of these memories at the back of our mind functions as a marginal clue, as part of a background upon which we see the objects. this background, in polanyi’s thought, is so important for the perception of objects because it, like a landscape, includes an infinite range of particulars to which we are paying no special attention, but nevertheless makes it possible to see, for example, a cow strolling in a field. polanyi seems to mean that since the background fills up the field of our vision, it strikes us perceptually as unlimited in its extent, i.e., as infinite. and because what fills up our field of vision cannot be seen to be moving against a further background, it has to appear to us to be at absolute rest. with this concept polanyi appears to be holding that the conceptions and general notions we have formed on the basis of the past experience enter only tacitly and as further specifications of what already has become our perceptual background by the operation of our visual mechanisms. the humean notion that our past experiences automatically condition us to feel certain expectations for the future must therefore be in error from polanyi’s point of view. from what polanyi says, it would seem to mean that our cognitive expectations, or what dewey called our “funded experience” are not effective in determining the background in perception when our visual mechanisms provide us with a background that contradicts this funded experience, our knowledge.31 harry prosch also informs that “as for our tendency to integrate some of our sensory fields into stable objects in the first place __ objects that retain their integrity while moving against a stationary background polanyi rejects references to ‘equilibrations’ in our nervous systems, or to any other sort of automatic nervous mechanisms”.32 it seems to him, polanyi holds rather that this tendency to integrate some of our sensory field into stable objects comes from our “craving to find strands of permanence in the tumult of changing appearances”, which “is the supreme organon for bringing our experiences under intellectual control”.33 we should 62 prajna vihara note here that for polanyi, an intention to bring “our experiences under intellectual control” begins to operate already in basic perception, so that even the basic mechanisms of visual perception are held by him to be teleologically oriented toward the attainment of an intended intellectual coherence. physiological mechanisms themselves are therefore thought by him to be structured to function toward the goal of attaining meaning, although functioning only mechanically toward such a goal, not deliberately. thus, they sometimes present us with illusions, i.e., are in error. yet, in spite of the mechanical operation of basic perceptual mechanisms, polanyi holds that our perceptions are not heteronomously caused. rather, he maintains, “we are performing one single mental act in jointly seeing an object against its background”. such a mental act has a focus in terms of which the background functions in a subsidiary way, and so “we are aware of the background only in terms of the object’s appearance __ e.g., of its being in motion”.34 he holds that both focal awareness and subsidiary awareness exist functionally related in a single, purposive act of mental awareness. but since we cannot discover in our consciousness all the subsidiary clues that we integrate into a perceived object (we admittedly are unable to infer the object explicitly from all our consciously known sense data), polanyi’s contention is that a perception as a single mental act must rest upon a reiterated supposition that some physiological events in our body that we can never take note of focally by means of introspection are nevertheless elements used by us in a subsidiary way in structuring an integrated object of focal perception and are not simply causes of such integration. in other words, he holds that subsidiary awareness may function at all levels of consciousness from the subliminal to the fully conscious __ that some “functions inside our body at levels completely inaccessible to experience by the subject” are elements of which we take account in the total economy of our awareness.35 we truly do, therefore, “know more than we can tell”.36 with the clarification of the nature and the status of the subsidiaries polanyi, then, says that the act of knowing involves an intentional change of being: the pouring of ourselves into the subsidiary awareness of particulars which function as the elements of the observed comprehensive whole. polanyi calls his theory of knowledge tacit knowing or the tacit dimension because the grounds of all knowing are subsidiary, or tacit commikhael dua 63 ponents, items or particulars. tacit knowing, then, although an intentional act, is one in which we are only in subsidiary fashion. 6. tacit knowledge: its role in business polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing reached its highest development in 1966, when he published the tacit dimension. in this publication, polanyi defends his position that science is an art of knowing that is developed according to the principle of spontaneous coordination of independent initiatives under the criterion of plausibility, scientific values and originality.37 both the criteria of plausibility and of scientific value tend to enforce conformity, while the value attached to originality encourages dissent among scientists. all these criteria are tacit dimensions. thirty years later ikujiro nonaka and hirotaka takeuchi applied this theory in business. the resulting book is entitled the knowledgecreating company. the book is not so much one of philosophical reflection, but a management book that focuses on the problem of knowledge creation in japanese companies. as suggested in the title of the book, nonaka and takeuchi were attempting to show that the success of japanese companies is due to knowledge creation. following peter drucker, alvin toffler, james brian quinn and robert reich, nonaka and takeuchi agree that “the economic and producing power of a modern corporation lies more in its intellectual and service capabilities than in its hard assets, such as land, plant, and equipment”.38 knowledge creation, then, becomes the new competitive resource in business. but the questions arise as to what kind of knowledge the japanese opt to create? which knowledge is more preferable? how could this kind of knowledge be developed? it takes for granted in management that a good organization is one which has the capability to process explicit knowledge. nonaka and takeuchi describe this kind of knowledge as formal and systematic, can be expressed in words and numbers, and can be easily communicated and shared in the form of hard data, scientific formulae, and codified procedures. this concept, however, is very different from implicit knowledge as understood by japanese companies. this kind of knowledge is prima64 prajna vihara rily tacit, something not easily visible and expressible, includes subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches and is deeply rooted in an individual's action and experience, as well as in the ideals, values, or emotions he or she embraces.39 in polanyi’s perspective this kind of knowledge consists of two kinds of subsidiaries. the first is the technical dimension, which encompasses the kind of informal and hard-to-pin-down skills or crafts captured in the term knowing how. like a master of craftsman, the japanese managers develop a wealth of expertise at his fingertips after years of experience. this kind of knowledge is hard to be articulated in words. the second is the cognitive dimension. it consists of schemata, mental models, beliefs, and perceptions so ingrained that we take them for granted. this aspect of tacit knowledge reflects our image of reality and our vision of the future. though they cannot be articulated, these implicit models shape the way we perceive the world around us. this aspect of tacit knowledge contains also our knowledge of the history of a company and the way how this company looks for solutions in facing its problem. according to nonaka and takeuchi, this vision of knowledge has its roots in the japanese intellectual tradition influenced by buddhism and confucianism. according to these traditions, the japanese perception is oriented toward objects in nature that are subtle, but, at the same time, visual and concrete. knowledge does not mean to grasp the objects, but includes the way of being to participate in the way of other being. it means knowledge includes wisdom that is the way of being to discover the reality. if western philosophy is dominated by cartesian dualism between subject and object, mind and body, or mind and matter, the japanese intellectual tradition is concerned with the idea of oneness of humanity and nature,40 oneness of body and mind,41 and oneness of self and other.42 in the context of such a tradition, it can be thought that almost all of the highly visionary knowledge of the top president of a japanese company consists of subjective insight, intuitions, and hunches. this kind of knowledge cannot be easily processed in a mechanical way (like a computer creating a database). one should dwell in it and have a feeling to what they have in mind. like a child who learns things with his body, not only by his mind, to understand the implicit knowledge of the top president one should delve into history, into the way the company is organized, and even into the mikhael dua 65 speech that is spoken in the ceremonial events of company. with this concept in mind, nonaka and takeuchi anticipate that in business it is not the thing that we have knowledge of, but how we create knowledge: “once the importance of tacit knowledge is realized, then one begins to think about innovation in a whole new way”.43 they explain that in business, knowledge is not just about putting together diverse bits of data and information. it is a highly individual process of personal and organizational self-renewal. in polanyi words, the task of management is searching the way to discovery or innovation.44 in such pursuit “we are guided by sensing the presence of a hidden reality toward which our clues are pointing; and the discovery which terminates and satisfies this pursuit is still sustained by the same vision”.45 the essence of innovation is to recreate the world according to a particular vision. this means to create the company and everyone in it in an ongoing process of personal and organizational self-renewal.46 to have an insight that is highly personal is of little value to the company unless the individual can convert it into explicit knowledge, thus allowing it to be shared with others in the company. nonaka and takeuchi tell us that japanese companies are especially good at realizing this transition from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. they take honda as a case. before 1975 honda produced sedan which has a large and long body. the prototype of this product is honda civic and honda accord. in 1978, hiro watanabe, the top management at honda, inaugurated the development of a new-concept car with the slogan, ‘let’s gamble’ which received a positive response from the young engineers and designers (the average age was 27). mr. watanabe only had a vision that the revolutionary car should be called ‘tall boy’ with ‘man-maximum, machine minimum’ principle. the mission might sound vague, but in fact it provided the team with an extremely clear sense of direction. the result was called “honda city”. from this example nonaka and tekeuchi explain that the tacit knowledge is not a solitary fact. it can be understood because it can be made explicit in three ways.47 first, it can be expressed in figurative or metaphorical language. a metaphor such as “automobile evolution” “manmaximum, machine-minimum”, “tall boy” is a distinctive method perception. it is a way for individuals grounded in different contexts and with 66 prajna vihara different experiences to understand something intuitively through the use of imagination and symbols, both metaphor and analogy. through metaphors, people put together what they know but cannot yet say. as such, metaphor is highly effective if fostering direct commitment to the creative process in the early stages of knowledge creation. second, it can be disseminated into team work. the story of honda city suggests how new knowledge always starts with an individual __ mr. hiroo watanabe in this case __ and how an individual’s personal knowledge is transformed into organizational knowledge valuable to the company as a whole. in this case the organization cannot create knowledge on its own without the initiative of the individual and the interaction that takes place within the group. knowledge can be amplified at the group level through dialogue, discussion, experience sharing, and observation. third, although it can be expressed, implicit knowledge is born in the midst of ambiguity and redundancy. the story of the honda city suggests how certain organizational conditions can enhance the knowledgecreation process. it may sound paradoxical, but the confusion created within the product development team by the ambiguity of the mission handed down by honda’s top management provided an extremely clear sense of direction to the team. ambiguity can prove useful at times not only as a source of a new sense of direction, but also as a source of alternate meanings and a fresh way of thinking about things. it also invites redundancy. to western managers, redundancy has connotation of unnecessary duplication and waste. yet, in case of honda city, redundancy is important because it encourages frequent dialogue and communication. this helps create a common cognitive ground among employees and thus facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge. 7. closing remarks “knowledge is an important factor in economic phenomena”. this is one of the basic thoughts of neoclassical economics and has been taken for granted by many contemporary scholars such as marshall, hayek and schumpeter. but what is important here is the way knowledge is treated. mikhael dua 67 this depends upon the emphasis we put on knowledge, the type of knowledge to which attention is paid, and the ways we acquire and utilize it. what needs to be recognized is the fact that not all knowledge is explicit. the greater part of knowledge is still implicit and can only be expressed in figurative ways. looking at the way it is produced and communicated; two things concerning tacit knowing can be deduced in these closing remarks. first, tacit knowing is social-psychological fact, in a sense that it is based on personal or national experiences of things. human beings acquire knowledge by actively creating and organizing their experiences. being different from traditional epistemology that derives knowledge from the separation of the subject and object of perception, we contend that human beings create knowledge by involving themselves with objects. polanyi calls this process ‘indwelling’. two, tacit knowing is an ontological fact, in a sense that tacit knowing presents different worldviews: the individual world and the organizational world. tacit knowing suggests that at first stage knowledge is created only by individuals. an organization cannot create knowledge without individuals. the organization supports creative individuals or provides contexts for them to create knowledge. organizational knowledge creation, therefore, should be understood as a process that organizationally amplifies the knowledge created by individuals and crystallizes it as part of the knowledge network of organization. this process takes place within an expanding community of interaction, which crosses inter-organizational level and boundaries. my knowledge, then, means my world, because only through my knowledge do i dwell in my world. with this perspective, i can say that a company is not only a neutral organization, but a knowledge-sharing organization. it is not determined by its goal, but by its basis, which is the process of sharing-knowledge of those who dwell in a common tradition. endnotes 1ikujiro nonaka and hirotaka takeuchi, the knowledge-creating company, how japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation (new york: 68 prajna vihara oxford university press 1995). 2ibid., p. 8. 3peter drucker, adventures of a bystander (new york: harper and row, 1978), pp. 127-138. citation is taken from eugene webb, philosophers of consciousness (seattle: university of washington press, 1988), pp. 26-30. 4the galilei circle, formed in 1908, was made up of progressive students. michael was also one of the founders and members of this circle. ilona duczynsk, karl’s wife, has described its motif in these terms: “let it be free in spirit, let it keep away from party politics, let it be dedicated and decent. let it appeal to the students who live in poverty in their thousands. let it be a movement aiming to learn and to teach”. its mission: “to mobilise against clericalism, corruption, against the privileged, against bureaucracy against the morass ever-present and pervasive in this semi-feudal country”. harry w. pearson (ed.), the livelihood of man: karl polanyi (london: academic press, 1977), p. xi. 5ibid., pp. xi-xii. 6personal knowledge, p. 309. 7ibid. 8michael polanyi, the study of man (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1959), p. 60. 9endre j. nagy, “after brotherhood’s golden age: karl and michael polanyi” in humanity, society, and commitment, edited by kenneth mcrobbie (london: black rose books, 1994), pp. 88-109. 10michael polanyi, “ussr economics __ fundamental data, system, and spirit”, the manchester school of economic and studies, 6 (november 1935), pp. 67-89. this essay was published also as the third essay in the contempt of freedom, 1940. 11ibid., p. 99. 12knowing and being, p. 34. 13harry prosch, michael polanyi: a critical exposition (albany: state of university of new york press 1986), p. 197. 14knowing and being, pp. 123-124 and the study of man, p. 28. 15michael polanyi, “the growth of thought in society”, economica 8 (november 1941), p. 432. 16polanyi refers to wolfgang kohler, the mentality of apes (london: kegan paul, trench, trubner & co., ltd., 1925). 17science, faith and society, p. 33. 18personal knowledge, p. vii. 19the tacit dimension, p. 6. 20kurt koffka, the principles of gestalt psychology (london: routledge, 1999), p. 682. 21personal knowledge, pp. 97-98. 22personal knowledge, p. 55. mikhael dua 69 .. 23ibid., p. vi. 24knowing and being, p. 128. 25knowing and being, p. 139. 26ibid. 27the tacit dimension, p. 13. 28the tacit dimension, p. x. 29knowing and being, pp. 139-140. 30ibid., p. 140. 31harry prosch, michael polanyi, a critical exposition, op. cit., p. 60. harry prosch is one of polanyi’s assisstant who becomes co-writer of the book meaning. 32ibid. 33knowing and being, p. 114, personal knowledge, pp. 18, 73, 103-104, 132-133. 34knowing and being, pp. 111-112. 35michael polanyi, “logic and psychology”, the american psychology 23 (january 1968), p. 31. 36the tacit dimension, p. 4. 37knowing and being, pp. 49-55. 38ikujiro nonaka and hirotaka tekeuchi, the knowledge-creating company, op. cit., p. 7. 39ibid., p. 8. 40examples of this trait include: the sympathy to nature depicted in the man-yohshu, the notion of change and transition described in the famous tale of genji, delicate sentiment conveyed by the kokin-wakashu. yujiro nakamura, a contemporary japanese philosopher called this style as emotional naturalism. 41in the meiji era (1868-1912), kitaro nishida built up a philosophy that focuses on the fact of human-being-in-the-world as originally having the character of action. in this mode of act, there is separation between body and mind, subject and object. 42it assumes that the japanese view is collective and organic. while western philosophy promotes the realization of the individual self as the goal of life, the japanese ideal of life is to exist among others harmoniously as a collective self. 43ibid., p. 10. 44knowing and being, p. 118. 45the tacit dimension, p. 23-24. 46ikujiro nonaka and hirotaka takeuchi, the knowledge creating company, op. cit., p. 10. 47ibid., p. 13-15. 70 prajna vihara references drucker, peter. adventures of a bystander. new york: harper and row, 1978). ikujiro nonaka and hirotaka takeuchi, the knowledge-creating company. new york: oxford university press, 1995. kurt koffka, the principles of gestalt psychology, london: routledge, 1999. nagy, endre j. “after brotherhood’s golden age: karl and michael polanyi” in humanity, society, and commitment, edited by kenneth mcrobbie. london: black rose books, 1994. pearson, harry w. (ed.). the livelihood of man: karl polanyi. london: academic press, 1977. polanyi, michael. “the growth of thought in society”, economica 8 (november 1941), pp. 41-52. polanyi, michael. knowing and being, chicago: the chicago university press, 1968. polanyi, michael. personal knowledge. london: routledge and paul kegan, 1958. polanyi, michael. the study of man. london: phoenix books, 1963. polanyi, michael. the tacit dimension. new york: doubleday, 1966. polanyi, michael. “ussr economics fundamental data, system, and spirit”, the manchester school of economic and studies, 6 (november 1935): pp. 67-89. prosch, harry. michael polanyi: a critical exposition. albany: state of university of new york press, 1986. webb, eugene. philosophers of consciousness. seattle: university of washington press, 1988. mikhael dua 71 1free of religion & religious heritage morality and social order in contemporary africa olatunji a. oyeshile university of ibadan, nigeria abstract we cannot evade the fact that africa is in dire need of sustainable development. yet as the minutes of the twenty-first century tick away, we seem to be still far from the desirable development results. many reasons account for this: bad leadership; ethnic conflict; political crisis; corruption; dearth of scientific and technological development; religious crisis and many more. all these reasons are interconnected. how? we cannot talk about sustainable development without a desirable social order. then how do we achieve the desirable social order that will serve as the necessary condition for development in africa? this work provides an answer by examining the role of morality in achieving the desired level of social order in africa. it is our contention that if we internalize certain precepts of morality, some which are universal and some which are culturally based, then it would be easier to provide solutions to our problem in africa. the state and those in leadership position have the task of providing an environment conducive to the application of moral values that will engender social order, and which can serve as the basis for sustainable development in africa. and since morality strives at human wellbeing which presupposes the well-being of the moral agent and the others in society, then the proper appreciation of moral values and their application within the context of the larger society will be a valuable avenue for achieving social order. the problem of social order in contemporary africa 62 prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 62-74 © 2000 by assumption university press any rational individual will prefer a society in which there is order as against a society in which there is disorder. this is because it is in a state of social order that an individual can carry out his projects and realize his goals, goals which provide the necessary condition for the attainment of the happy life which aristotle refers to as the highest good, the summum bonum1. africans are not exception in this regard. although no human society is perfectly insulated against social disorder in its various manifestations, due to certain peculiar traits of human nature, which hobbes refers to as 'instincts of self-preservation', our experience in africa depicts a continually retrogressing society where most moral values, necessary for the sustenance of the modern state, have been bastardized and compromised due to a plethora of reasons. a cursory but critical look at our african society shows that the social order necessary for the anchoring of development is lacking. this can be seen when we look at various areas of human endeavor. our use of social order in this context must be properly defined. social order can be taken to mean: first, the arrangement or state of things in the society; second, the proper functioning of societal institutions; and third, political stability. it is in the second and third perspectives that we are emphasizing in this work. in a broad sense, the concept 'social order' is used to refer to the harmonious functioning of different facets of a society such as the political, economic, religious and scientific and technological institutions. it is through the harmonious functioning of these different institutions that there can be development in any human society.2 what are some of the underlying factors that have contributed to the social crisis in africa, which is mired in civil wars, poverty, disease, illiteracy, child labour, corruption, political ineptitude and economic disintegration and disorientation?. the economic, political and religious spheres easily come to mind. vices such as corruption, bad leadership, election rigging, fraud in public offices, inequitable distribution of national resources and so forth have been the albatross around the neck of african development. on leadership, kalu focusing attention on nigeria, the most populous country in africa, notes: the central problem in nigeria has been the lack of public leadership olatunji a. oyeshile 63 nurtured by the core values of an indigenous elite across the national landscape political, civil society, cultural, religious, educational and in many instances, family. the absence of public leadership is directly related to the absence of national dialogue on what nigerian identity should be about and how the different nationalities that were brought together by colonialism should live together productively.3 it is instructive to note that various african statesmen and scholars have described the scenario painted above in various ways, even though most african statesmen are also guilty and responsible for the state of africa's decadence. robert mugabe, in his daily times lecture (jan. 1991) has this to say: africa is now home to the world's largest number of least developed countries. the continent further boasts of the largest refugee population in the world. furthermore, it is a theatre of endless conflicts, civil strife and gross human right abuses. whereas standards of living in other continents have risen over time, in africa, present standards of living are not better than they were two decades ago. high unemployment, inflation, civil strife, poverty, refugee crisis, desertification, disease, malnutrition the list is endless appear to be the only legacy the continent is capable of passing from one generation to the other.4 much as insightful as mugabe was on the african predicament, he himself seemed to have fallen in the same abuses about a decade later due to the violation of human rights and various repressions against the opposition in his country. the democratic space in zimbabwe seems to recede on daily basis. some scholars have even seen the problem mainly from the lack of moral basis of the leaders to govern the people. for instance, oladipo5 claims that lack of legitimacy of government in post-colonial african states has made the government rely solely on force and manipulation or deceit to secure the support and loyalty of the people, which ought not to have been the case. with this scenario, the people are denied the opportunity of freely participating in the determination of the events that affect their lives. the foregoing line of thought is aptly complimented by udo etuk6 when he suggests that there is an urgent need in africa today to restructure or reform our institutions in such a manner that makes the harmonization 64 prajñâ vihâra of interests in the various african societies possible. according to etuk: what is required for africa to develop is more than the acquisition and application of scientific knowledge. development has an ethical component which africans could neglect at their own peril.7 perhaps what is meant to be emphasized by etuk is that sustainable development should not be thought as a mere catch-up through scientific and technological advancement, but more fundamentally, that development should be predicated on human values. although we can still make an allusion to the problem of ethnicity and class stratification as major causes of underdevelopment and social crisis in africa, the underlying factor seems to be the loss of our ethical identity in africa. the notion of moral values in any human society, social interaction would not only be difficult but impossible if the people do not have a sense of right and wrong. this sense of right and wrong is important if the individual is to have the good life. in striving towards his own welfare or self-interest, the individual is also aware that the welfare of others is as important as his and therefore must act in such a way that will ensure not only his own well-being but the well-being of the society in which he finds himself. human beings cannot just accept the natural world as it is, they need to compliment it with an idea of their own self importance and self preservation, hence the need for morality. russell put this in a comical manner when he writes: the great world as far as we know it from the philosophy of nature, is neither good nor bad, and is not concerned to make us happy or unhappy. all such philosophies spring from self-importance and best corrected by little astronomy.8 while we may not join issue with russell concerning the role of astronomy in correcting such philosophies of good and bad, happy and olatunji a. oyeshile 65 unhappy lives, it is true that due to our instinct of self-preservation, space must be given to self-importance since it is when we regard ourselves as such that the goal of self-preservation can be attained. the circularity of our argument notwithstanding, mankind cannot gloss over good and bad conduct as well as happy and unhappy life without putting their own existence in jeopardy. hence, the need for morality in any human society. since we live together, a sense of right and wrong, good and bad are germane for the sustenance of society. an action is thus moral if the consequences, either positive or negative, will affect the well-being of others even though actions that threaten the self or agent are also considered immoral. it then bears pointing out following pettman that: morals are social products, held out of habit and self-interest to be sure, but motivated also by emphatic urges like love, and a sense of what is right and due. human beings learn to prefer particular ways of relating to each other and standards by which to assess their relationships and to endorse or censure what appear to be sociable or anti-social acts, as part of the general educative process whereby they assimilate expectations of how the world is meant to be.9 from our extensive reference to pettman, we easily discern that morality is born out of the needs of society, to protect interest of members through emphatic urges like love and honesty. in arriving at this situation, education also plays a vital role in the transmission of moral values from one individual to the other and from generations to generations. the ultimate aim would be human survival which depends, not the least, on reciprocal obligations which are situated in certain communitarian values which make this goal possible. so what we call morality itself is embedded in the whole idea of community. moral values then encompass those ingredients that would make a moral situation achievable. they would include such values that would not only make self-preservation possible, but also such values that would ensure the preservation of others by enlightened self-interest on the part of various individuals. they include honesty, avoidance of greed, avoidance of lie, trust, keeping of promises when we are not presented with a dilemma, altruism, that is, placing others first, love and obedience. although the list is inexhaustible and may vary from culture to culture, the importance of this nexus of values lie 66 prajñâ vihâra in the fact that they help in ensuring human well-being. although moral values may vary from culture to culture, there is a sense in which we can talk about the universality of morality. the primary consideration for this is the rationality of man. in this regard, when we say that man is a rational being, we are implying, according to sogolo, that there are certain things shared in common by mankind, and if these traits such as love, self-reflection, honesty, sympathy and so forth, are absent in any human group, there will be doubt as to whether that group is human at all.10 the thrust of our argument concerning the universality of morality is that moral value the world over, in spite of variations in norms or mores impose similar restrictions on individuals in all societies. in other words, the goals of morality are primarily the same. these goals are the ultimate values of life and they are ends in themselves. for example, such goals include human happiness, human survival, human well-being, order and harmonious society. furthermore, since moral issues arise when people's interests and well-being conflict (for example in the case of theft, rape or murder) such conflict could only be resolved by maintaining an impartial point of view in these matters. accordingly, when we are not partial, we act normally the way judges, referees and umpires are supposed to act.11 an impartial person who does not favour the interest and well-being of the person or group over the interest and well-being of another person or group on the basis of considerations that are irrelevant to the issue at hand would be preferred in any society. the universality of morality, therefore, presupposes primarily that all human societies have a sense of right and wrong which guides their everyday existence and interaction with one another and not that all societies share the same moral norms even though one cannot rule out the possibility of some moral norms which cut across cultures. moral values and contemporary african society our use of the phrase "contemporary african society", while not implying that there is a uniformity among various african societies olatunji a. oyeshile 67 concerning their approach and reaction to the issues of knowledge, religion, socio-political organization and reality as a whole, is appropriate here in the sense of the universality of moral values and for the fact that most african societies are deeply enmeshed in similar moral disequilibrium that has made purposeful leadership, good governance and development daunting tasks. let us note also that social, communal and ethical values are intertwined in such a way that one cannot talk about one without the other. this simply underscores the fact that moral values have social origins. bewaji poignantly describes social basis of morality thus: it is the social milieu in which competition for the scarce resources of the environment takes place. but it is not only the resources of the environmental that are scarce. the human resources of love, patronage, recognition, compassion, companionship, etc are also scarce and require deliberate efforts in both their generation and equitable distribution. here lies the crux of the moral responsibility of society to its members and to itself. and this fact is represented in numerous ideas in african thought.12 the extensive passage from bewaji has a lot of implications for contemporary africa in the sense that we in africa are not only experiencing the dearth of material resources needed for development, we also lack the moral resources to manage the little resources we have due to what olusegun oladipo has described as "moral dislocation".13 the present situation is sharply in contrast to what prevailed in traditional african societies in which brotherly concepts such as ubuntu flourished. for emphasis sake, let us take a look at the traditional yoruba moral universe. traditional yoruba society achieved considerable social-political order due to its strict adherence to certain ideals of life based on ethical values shaded with religious overtones. these social ethical values include emphasis on character (iwa), opposition to selfishness (imortaeninikan), tolerance (ifarada/amumora), condemnation of wickedness (iwabuburu), truthfulness and rectitude (otito/ododo/otito inu), condemnation of stealing (ole), opposition to hypocrisy (agabagebe), and covenant keeping (mimule). other social values include sharing, mutual aid, support, co-operation, religious tolerance, interdependence, solidarity, reciprocal obligation, and selflessness.14 in the yoruba moral universe therefore communal well-being was the main focus of an individual's action. little surprise then that mbiti asserts: 68 prajñâ vihâra "i am because we are; and since we are, therefore i am". while this statement is not to be seen as depriving the african of his or her personhood and individuality, it underscores the point that there was a deep link between the individual and the community in traditional african societies. the yoruba individual acts with an unconscious notion of communal interest.15 it goes without saying that communal interest is lacking in the contemporary relationship between the society and the individual. let us note that in traditional yoruba moral universe, individuals strive to have iwa (pleasant character) acceptable to the community, thereby striving to reach the target of an omoluwabi (a well-behaved and morally upright person). one then cannot go too far in linking morality with social order. it is true that social order exists to provide the multifarious needs of man which are necessary for a fulfilled happy life conducive to development. it is also true that social order is a condition in which society is organized to effectively provide for the needs of man. granted that this is the case, how do we in africa ensure the desired social order? this is where morality comes in. interestingly, morality leads to the sustenance of social order and social order can enhance not only the internalization of morality, it can also enhance its application. to provide answer to our myriad of questions, we must consider what has made a sustainable moral order difficult in africa. let us note again that this moral order is predicated on certain values described variously as communal, social and human values. according to sogolo, human values can be taken to be essentially natural and universal simply because human nature itself is universal. he puts human values thus: human values are intrinsically designed to fulfill man's goal of individual and collective survival. therefore, the human tendencies to pursue virtue such as peace, care, justice, truthfulness etc are naturally embraced to ensure the well-being and survival of human kind.16 the question again is this: what has made the internalization or application of moral or human values difficult in africa? the answer can strictly be situated within our socio-political and economic sphere. the state of moral values in africa has been exposed to unfavourable economic olatunji a. oyeshile 69 pressure, political competition with its attendant vices such as corruption, violence, ethnic cleansing, injustice in the allocation of natural resources. it would take an angel to be moral in a situation in which survival in the political sphere is not guaranteed and in which the political space devoted to justice, freedom and equality continues to recede on daily basis. in many of the african nations, especially nigeria, survival for the ordinary person is becoming extremely difficult. it is an unending competition in the face of deprivation, scarcity and frustration. individuals then yield easily to the darwinian imperative of 'survival of the fittest'. in any situation where this maxim operates, the "moral precepts" in such a society would not be ones that encourage the desired level of social order that can aid, promote and sustain development. the economic policies of most african states are predicated on the capitalist economic ethos, which our leaders, for lack of critical temperament and vision, 'accept hook, line and sinker' without considering the peculiarities of development economies which require certain government assistance in terms of the essential welfare facilities. such concepts as deregulation, market forces, liberalization, privatization and commercialization are forced on the people when they are not sufficiently prepared for such challenges. and the results are obvious increased poverty, increased dread, immorality, lack of empathy and loss of solidarity which is expected to be fostered by a society. on this abrogation of the role of the state in nigeria, sogolo opines thus: given the prevalence of poverty, increased tensions, violent and related social disorder, nigeria is in need of moral rearmament. traditional african societies thrived on a system of collective values which was severely disorganized by colonialism and its attendant value system essentially defined by extreme individualism and cut-throat competition that are inherent parts of capitalism.17 this crisis is not one that can be solved either by social legislation or military coercion, according to sogolo, but the solution is to be sought through: the evolution of an equitable system of distributive justice and the 70 prajñâ vihâra installation of a social order that guarantees the full expression of all the values endowed in us by virtue of our humanity.18 we can then see that morality, in the form of the desired form of moral relationship exhibited through moral values, involves not only the internalization of moral values but the existence of a strong and viable social basis on which these moral values can be nurtured. added to our list of the encumbrances to the attainment of moral ideals in contemporary africa is the problem of urbanization which has led to overpopulation in cities, thereby making individuals to be less concerned about common welfare in their bid to survive in an increasingly unsympathetic urban environment. furthermore, globalization has brought its own problems. while we are not oblivious to the fact that globalization is a necessary phase of human evolution, which is not bad in itself, we in africa have made fetish of the globalization trend, thereby to the detriment of certain humanistic african cultural values. on daily basis our youths are fed with violent films, sexual profligacy, language acculturation to the detriment of indigenous language that can promote authenticity and growth. the loss of salient aspects of african languages through globalization has also led to the loss of the cultural values of the people that promote such values as integrity, hard work, honesty, solidarity and so forth. what can we then do to reverse this trend? moral values as the basis for social order we cannot forget socrates so soon, for according to him, "the unexamined life is not worth living". granted this we must re-examine our moral pedigrees from the individual and state perspectives if we are to ensure the desired level of social order that will promote development in africa. morality presupposes human well-being both at the societal and individual levels. if this is the case, moral values are not ends in themselves as such, but tools which should be tailored towards arriving at our goals let us make a disclaimer at this juncture. it is not that africans do not understand what it means to be moral and what moral values are all about. it is rather that, that in spite of their knowledge of morality, the state of olatunji a. oyeshile 71 things is not as desirable as it ought to be. the non-application and noninternalization of these moral values have been due largely to the inaction of the states in africa that have foisted undue political and economic pressures on the individuals, who then have no choice but to resort to unethical means of attaining livelihood and survival. furthermore, we cannot overlook the role of the government and state in promoting social order which will make the proper application of moral values possible. government must derive its legitimacy through the people, as opposed to the current situation, where government derives power through the military coups, kangaroo elections and one party dictatorships, that have become the trademarks of most african states. this is buttressed by the fact that leadership successions through democratic process have become so difficult that most african leaders are replaced in office through coup d'etats or sudden deaths. in a similar vein, government economic policies should coup d’ états allow the unfettered development of the weakest individual in society. this seems to be the major pre-occupation of rawls in his a theory of justice, where he argued that the state has the obligation to protect the interest and welfare of the less well-off in society.19 the essence of the foregoing is that since we cannot reverse the movement of capitalism in most african states, with some of its perceived threat to economic dependent ones, government can continue to foster such measures that will make it possible for the ordinary citizens to enjoy the benefits of life. multinational corporations who are seen as the agents of development in this epoch of globalization and privatization should do more in their host communities to alleviate the sufferings of the people. it is when government and multinational corporations embark on such positive gestures that life can become meaningful and moral for majority of the populace. finally, the solution to our moral problem and social order would then require readjustments in our attitude towards wealth, democratic values such as justice and freedom, and governance and the necessary educational orientation, which is not predicated on the fetish of material development which governments in africa tend to encourage. rather, it should be based more fundamentally on educational orientation, both at formal and informal levels, that develops human mind to strive for excellence, integrity, justice and happy life based on reciprocal obligation, not only among individuals 72 prajñâ vihâra but also between the state and its citizens. this, we think, is our major challenge in africa in the twenty-first century. olatunji a. oyeshile 73 endnotes 1 see, r. mckeon (ed.), introduction to aristotle (new york: the modern library, 1947). 2 olatunji a. oyeshile, "communal values, cultural identity and the challenge of development in contemporary africa", journal of social, political and economic studies, vol. 29, no. 3, (fall 2004), p.295. 3 kelechi a. kalu, "echoes of instability: implications for state, society and democratic consolidation in nigeria", the constitution, vol. 5, no. 1 (march 2005), p.3. 4 robert mugabe, "africa in the new world order: europe 1992 and beyond", a daily times (nigeria) special lecture delivered on jan. 9, 1991, and published in daily times (jan. 10, 1991), p.22. 5 olusegun oladipo, "introduction" in o. oladipo (ed.), remaking africa: challenges of the twenty-first century (ibadan: hope publications, 1998), pp.8 12. 6 udo etuk, 'ethical conditions of development in twenty-first century africa" in o. oladipo (ed.) remaking africa: challenges of the twenty-first century (ibadan: hope publications, 1998), pp.276-291. 7 olusegun oladipo, "introduction", p.12. 8 bertrand russell, "what i believe" in the basic writings of bertrand russell (london: george allen and unwin, 1961), p.371. 9 r. pettman, 'moral claims in world politics", in r. pettman (ed.), moral claims in world affairs, (london: croom helm, 1979), p.19. 10 g.s. sogolo, foundations of african philosophy: a definitive analysis of conceptual issues in african thought (ibadan: ibadan university press, 1993) p.15. 11 e. barcalow, moral philosophy: theory and issues (california: wadsworth pub. com, 1994), p.15. 12 john a.i. bewaji, "ethics and morality in yoruba culture" in kwasi wiredu (ed.), a companion to african philosophy (uk & usa: blackwell publishing ltd., 2004), p.397. 13 see olusegun oladipo (ed.) remaking africa. 14 olatunji a. oyeshile, "traditional yoruba social-ethical values and governance in modern africa", philosophia africana: analysis of philosophy and issues in africa and the black diaspora, vol. 6, no. 2 (august 2003) p.83. 15 ibid., pp.83-84. 16 godwin sogolo, 'philosophy, human values and social order', a keynote address presented at the 30th anniversary celebration of the department of philosophy at the university of ibadan, ibadan, (16th sept. 2004), p.3. 17 ibid., p.17. 18 ibid. 19 see john rawls, a theory of justice (london: oxford university press, 1971). 74 prajñâ vihâra article5-1 philosophy and culture in book one of plato’s republic charles freeland mahidol university international college, thailand according to the twentieth century german philosopher hansgeorg gadamer, a philosophical text always arises as a response to a question; so, an important principle to keep in mind when interpreting a philosophical text is to read it in light of the question to which that text is a response. for plato’s republic, for example, the questions posed are questions of justice and of the nature of virtue, or the overall ‘best-ness’ of an individual. thus, the questions “what is justice?” and “how can justice be brought about in the soul of the individual and in the city?” are asked in different ways and in different forms in many of plato’s dialogues. it would seem that a good way to bring these questions better into focus would be to see them in the light of their cultural context. this would involve special difficulties, no doubt, for ancient greek culture is many ways so distant from that of the modern europe it inspired. but seeing plato’s concern for justice and especially for education in justice in the light of its cultural context seems not only useful but also crucial for a proper understanding of his text. in discussing the cultural context for ancient greek philosophy, we do not intend to show a material or historical cause for philosophy. culture is not a cause and philosophy is not a mere effect. there is no cause-effect relation between culture and philosophy. culture and philosophy are not separate from one another, with culture on one side and philosophy on the other. philosophy was within culture. conversely, greek culture was philosophical. indeed, it would be difficult to isolate the philosophical tendencies in greek culture, as they were seemingly everywhere, woven into the fabric of daily life as into their literature, their arts, their political systems and outlooks and into their ethical views. a classical philosophical text, a platonic-socratic dialogue, for example, is situated within a cultural framework or world, which, for the classical greeks, was divided into the public and private domains. (on “world”, cf. heidegger’s being and time, i, iii, p. 61, 100 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 100-118 © 2000 by assumption university press translation by joan stambaugh) it would benefit anyone trying to interpret such a philosophical text, therefore, to know something about the cultural world from which it speaks. we shall attempt such a reading of plato’s republic, book one, especially the conversations first between socrates and cephalus, then between socrates and the sophist thrasymachus. but first, allow us to make some introductory comments. i. not only for the beauty of their arts, ancient greeks have been equally admired for their enquiring, restlessly inventive spirit. they are credited with practically inventing the western european notions of humanism and democracy. they are credited with honoring and respecting the human individual – so long as that individual was male and a citizen of a polis (a city-state) — in a way no other ancient culture appears to have done. they enjoyed freedom of speech and their religion, being neither monotheistic nor orthodox, allowed for considerable freedom of worship. science, philosophy, free inquiry, the visual and performing arts, all thereby flourished. little wonder, then, that the greeks have been the object of much fascination and study on the part of later philosophers and historians, or that their influence has been seen as extending far beyond their own time and historical situation. one tendency in interpreting greek philosophy and culture has been to look behind the shining achievements and seek their source in a social-psychological perspective. for such modern scholars as jacob burckhardt, for example, writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, greek culture and philosophy was inherently pessimistic in that the greeks saw the human situation not in terms of religious salvation or of an after-life, but in terms of the “absoluteness of the here-and-now”. the greeks were thus among the first to understand “what it is to be a human in the modern sense”, which is “to live in the present without hope for the future”, as beyond both hope and morality. in a strikingly modern way, they wrestled with the necessity of human beings to confront themselves and to affirm themselves in their own radical finitude, in their own being towards death, from which there is no escape. (the greeks and greek civilization, translated by sheila stern and edited by oswyn charles freeland 101 murray, st. martins press, 1998, the editors introduction, p xxxix). thus, the greek love of beauty, harmony, law, and order, was only a mask by which they looked into the death, horror and chaos that is in the midst of all human life. if such is the case, this speaks volumes for not only the cultural but also the philosophical outlook of the ancient greeks. one could then see the harmony and balance of their arts as a beautiful illusions trembling over an abyss of death and nothingness. but this deeply pessimistic outlook can also be seen as optimistic, if one follows friedrich nietzsche’s interpretation of ancient greek philosophy and culture. what is the background to this and what is meant by ‘optimism’? greek optimism lay in its will to know, and so to master the world around them. for the philosopher nietzsche, this optimism was expressed most pointedly in its socratic philosophy. “philosophy” was, after all, a word evidently first used by plato and meant the “love of wisdom”, where to be wise was to know the principle of all things, especially one’s ‘self’. because of our finitude, the darkness of the flesh and of the powers of our desires, plato, for one, was not so optimistic about the chances of human beings every becoming truly wise, so there was an emphasis on the search for wisdom, and on the quest and the questioning process, the desire for knowledge, in short, rather than the actual results. so, for the greeks, this philosophical attitude meant looking at the world with wonder. perhaps this attitude was already detectable in their mythology, which aristotle described as being “full of wonder”, but it was especially philosophy that said to actually begin in wonder. to wonder about the world is first to be aware of one’s ignorance and therefore to desire knowledge. plato’s symposium shows how human beings are possessed by an erotic desire for knowledge, a desire, a true eros, which carries the human soul to ever-higher domains of truth and beauty. everywhere, then, as they looked upon particular things and human actions in the world and admired their beauty, the greek philosopher and scientist sought their concept, the universal dimension for all things. by seeking the universal concepts for all things and for all human actions, they could then master those things and those actions. hence, not only science but also ethical life was brought under a powerful will to knowledge. virtue, in the socratic view, thus became identified with knowledge, and implied mastery of life and human excellence 102 prajñâ vihâra achieved through attaining both theoretical and practical modes of knowledge. these classical lines of inquiry helped open the paths that would later be followed by modern ethics, politics, science, logic, and mathematics. the greeks thus demonstrated a powerful desire for knowledge, a ‘will to knowledge’ and an optimism that greatly impressed such later thinkers as friedrich nietzsche, for example, in the second half of the nineteenth century. he saw both greek classical, tragic culture and its philosophy as essentially ‘optimistic’, in the senses just described. but for him, the word “optimism” also has ironic, even negative connotations. this points out the ambiguity in nietzsche’s reading of ancient greek culture. in his twilight of the idols, for example, he wrote a section entitled “the problem of socrates” in which he describes the socratic optimism as the reverse side of a deeper decadence. with socrates, the rabble rises to the top of society. socratic philosophy expressed, nietzsche thought, a deep contempt for life. “life is no good”, socrates might have thought. perhaps this came about as a result of his having penetrated into the finitude of life, into the death and impermanence that characterizes all things human. but in his earlier book, the birth of tragedy, section 18, nietzsche wrote that greek culture was “alexandrian” (“apollonian” as opposed to “dionysian”) and “socratic”. as such, it was characterized by an over-bounding desire to know whereby to know was to conquer as alexander the great had conquered the whole known world. it was also to be thus under the spell of a beautiful illusion: namely, the “cheerfulness of (the) theoretical man” blindly possessed by an insatiable desire to know and by the “delusion of being able thereby to heal the wound of existence.” and this, nietzsche thought, still characterized the situation of modern europe in the late nineteenth century. it, too, is a culture energized by a will to know, and in knowing, possessing, and above all, mastering. but whether pessimistic or optimistic, classical greek culture and philosophy both began to look at the world with a new wonder and to question the relations and possibilities of human existence in ways unheard of before them. this has been called their “enlightenment” (a cultural period dating from, roughly, the middle 6th to the fourth centuries), and the philosopher, in the form of socratic man, was an essential part of it. charles freeland 103 but the relations between the philosopher, especially in the person of socrates, and the athenian polis, were not always so harmonious and accommodating. excessive (hubristic) in his desire (eros) for beauty and knowledge and somewhat aristocratic or oligarchic in his political inclinations, he quickly found himself at odds with athenian society. he asked too many questions and the results of his inquiries were rarely satisfactory. he was thought arrogant in his dealings with other people, especially with the athenian court, and appeared to meddle in the business of others when he questioned them about the kinds and quality of lives they were living. his attitudes about the gods and goddesses were controversial. he was seen communing with strange spirit deities. he asked about things in a way that was outside of accepted religious and ritual frameworks and that was implicitly critical of those frameworks. although he appears in his last days as arguing in support of the democratic laws of athens, addressing them as though democratic laws were the philosopher’s virtual parents, he was long suspected as being an ally of a kind of spartan oligarchy and an enemy of athenian democracy. he claimed (see plato’s the apology of socrates) that his work, his questioning and questionable work as a philosopher, was a continuation of the work of the gods and that he had been stationed in athens like a soldier on a mission from god. little wonder, then, that people thought him odd, bad mannered, and potentially dangerous. little wonder, too, that the athenian youth found him so irresistible. alciabiades, for example, the brilliant, corrupt, and traitorous athenian general, blamed for the athenian military disaster at syracuse in 415413 b.c., was particularly smitten, if one can believe what he says about socrates in the symposium. all of this came to a head in the trial of socrates that was finally conducted in the year 399 b.c., after the end of the peloponnesian war. here, the philosopher was charged with impiety and with corrupting the youth. these may have been cover charges, perhaps, because to an amnesty following the end of the war with sparta, crimes alleged to have been committed during the war years could not be brought to trial. so, these charges were drafted instead of the ones the enemies of socrates would have liked: namely, that socrates was an enemy of athenian democracy and that his philosophical practice was undermining its constitution and its institutions. especially because 104 prajñâ vihâra socrates had so closely defined philosophy in terms of education (paideia) in justice and in the good, and because his educational programs were so critical of the given mythological, religious, contexts, and because he had thereby become identified with another potentially dangerous lot, the sophists, he thus became the target for a conservative backlash in athens which had no doubt been brewing for some decades before 399 b.c.. so, in aristophanes’ comic play, the clouds, for example, produced in the spring of 423 b.c., socrates is shown swinging from a basket suspended from a high wire as he attempts ludicrously to study the clouds as meteorological phenomena rather than as divinities. caricatured in the play as the strange director of a kind of “school for sophists”, a man unkempt and contemptuous of social conventions, socrates was also shown teaching the young how make weaker arguments seem stronger and, when not doing that, pursuing his nonsensical and materialistic questions and theories about the natural world (“that there is no zeus and that the sun is a stone”, and “how many flea-feet can a flea jump?”), and finally, and most dangerously, he taught the young how to question the authority of their parents and even to physically beat them if necessary. that there were no hard feelings on socrates’ part because of the rough treatment he received in this parody of sophistic teachings is shown in an anecdote repeated in charles rowan beye’s ancient greek literature and society (cornell university press, 1987, p. 104). beye relates how socrates was in the audience at the performance of the play and that he even stood up to show the audience how well the mask worn by the actor resembled his own real face. but, socrates also claimed in his 399 b.c. defense speech before the athenian court that this play had contributed to a prejudice against him and that this prejudice was, indeed, the background to the present charges he was then facing, especially those of impiety and corrupting the youth. but, whether true or not, this does pose the question of the wider cultural and political setting for socratic philosophy and the consequences and impact that philosophy had within athenian classical society. what was this ‘enlightenment’ that the sophists and philosophers offered to their students? the word ‘enlightenment’ refers in a general way to the retreat or withdrawal of an essentially religious or mythological outlook on the world and its gradual transformation into a more charles freeland 105 recognizably philosophical and scientific outlook. in terms outside of religion or myth, in a discourse that both borrowed from and transformed the prevailing religious frameworks, the greek philosophers, tragedians, and scientists had begun to question human existence in all its relations with earth and sky, gods and men. during the greek enlightenment of fifth-century, athens was thus the stage for an explosion of experiments and invention in poetry and tragic drama, art, philosophy, and science. many philosophers shared the perception of human existence as deeply divided between the desires of the flesh and those of the spirit. they saw human nature as defined and determined by its essential and radical finitude, that is to say, by death and all else that divides human existence and keeps it from becoming divine. deep human spiritual yearnings for knowledge, immortality, beauty, harmony, and power are evidence of a definitively human desire to transcend the limits of the human condition. certainly, one finds similar expressions of this in other cultures. there was, indeed, an important tradition of wisdom in ancient china and india, and in some ways their reflections on ethics and politics parallel those of the greeks (one thinks, for example of the parallels between the greek kaloskagathos, the beautiful and good gentleman, and the notion of the “superior man” or the “man of wisdom” found in the writings of confucius or mencius, or of the ways in which ancient chinese philosophy posed the essential questions of good self government, or ethics, and the relations of ethics and politics, for another). but this should not cover over the uniqueness of either the greek or the asian examples. the word “philosophy”, especially in its platonistic and socratic usages, is, after all, a greek word, and, as such, it is deeply rooted in a distinctly greek outlook on life and the world. thus, the ‘enlightenment’ promised by socrates required the faceto-face encounter of living conversation. this is how enlightenment was to be achieved. not by private meditation, but in the public conversations among fellow citizens. socrates thus adopted the dialogue form in which he questions both himself and others especially about ethics and about the best way for a human being to live. in the course of his conversations, socrates must confront the forces of religious myths, and of sophistry. both cephalus and thrasymachus, from book one of plato’s republic can be seen as representing these outlooks. in his conversations with 106 prajñâ vihâra them, socrates was seeking a kind of enlightenment whereby one would live a better life in this life and in this world. and this meant a living life devoted in part to the overcoming of ignorance, especially self-ignorance. he called it “the examined life”. realized through dialogue, socratic ‘enlightenment’ was, thus, a kind of purging or purification of the soul of socrates’ interlocutor of all the false opinions it held. this would allow the soul to then receive proper instruction in the truth. so, book one of the republic, for example, shows how, in order to bring the concept of true justice into view, it is necessary first to confront the forces of ritual and myth and, above all, sophistry, which stand in the way. socratic enlightenment would thus amount to a turning of the human soul toward the good and towards true justice. standing in the way of this are not only the sophists, but also the many religious myths that formed the backbone of classical greek education, (see book two for a thorough discussion of the negative influence of homeric and hesiodic myths on education). these would be the enemies of this paideic turning of the soul, for they would only reinforce selfishness and fear at the expense of true knowledge. we would like now to show the importance of these two cultural contexts – that of the religious and mythic-ritual culture and that of the competing sophistic movement — for the platonic and socratic ethical and political philosophy as found in plato’s republic, and to discuss why they had to be confronted by the philosopher. ii. first, however, some general questions: what was philosophy for the ancient greeks and what cultural factors nourished its emergence in greece from the archaic through the classical periods (the 6th to the 4th centuries)? philosophy, in its greek manifestations, has become associated with a feeling of wonder and a desire for knowledge. it posed the question of being, of ultimate reality, and of human existence, a question posed in such a way that it appeared to owe nothing to the context of religious experience. unlike religious myth, the first philosophers did not identify the origins and sources from which existence springs with the gods. “what charles freeland 107 directs the cosmos,” heraclitus said, “is both willing and unwilling to be called zeus.” as the young nietzsche observed, the greeks sought to formulate the essential being of existence not in terms of a god or goddess but in terms of an element, ‘water’, in the case of thales, ‘fire’ for heraclitus, ‘air’ for anaxagoras, and so on. where to know meant to know the ultimate principles and sources of all things, this knowledge sought not a divinity, but a material element, something more akin to the ancient words of night, of earth and chaos than to the anthropomorphic deities of greek mythology. this was certainly a change in perspective, and part of a more generalized greek ‘enlightenment’. but the philosophers were also looking, somewhat in the manner of the mythological outlook, for a way to express the seeming unity and rationality of existence. the idea that “all things are somehow one” was an idea with a receptive ear in both the poet and the philosopher. for the philosopher, however, this unity, this “logos” as heraclitus would call it, was rational rather than religious or mythical. access to it was through thought, through questioning, through intellectual insight and conversation with others and in the face of others rather than through religious ritual. thus, the philosopher could well seem to a more conservative audience to be somehow at odds with religious conventions and to be perhaps a danger to a society in which social and political legitimacy often had mythic and religious foundations. a conservative backlash against the enlightenment in general and against the philosopher was evident, as we have already seen, in greek tragedy and comedy. moreover, because of the way he questions, because, one could presume, of the power of his rhetoric and his skill in argumentation, socrates was also taken to be a sophist, not a philosopher, then, but someone intent only on false persuasions and on rhetorical virtuosity. this would be a dangerous confusion, in socrates’ eyes, of true philosophy and sophistry, for the latter does not teach truth. we shall return to this shortly. in his apology socrates denied that he is a sophist on the grounds that he had nothing to teach and that he was poor and had never earned money for his work. but beyond those rather superficial issues, there was socrates’ more important concern that philosophical education in the virtues, in justice, for example, was being taken as a kind of skillful 108 prajñâ vihâra game that one plays for one’s own benefit. to this socrates replied that his one and only concern was for truth and for turning the souls of the young toward the good. thus, turning the tables on his judges, socrates repeats how his philosophical activity, his questioning of the poets, politicians, and the artisans, was an important way of continuing the work of the gods insofar as it sought the true grounds for the possibility of human happiness and well-being, (eudaimonia, as this is called in greek), and to oppose him thereby could itself be taken as a form of disrespect for the gods. an arrogant, heedless claim, no doubt, one that even he may not have taken all that seriously, but one that nonetheless earned him the cruel enmity of the state. so, in answer to the question of the chief role and concern of philosophy, socrates would have said that it is a true preparation for death in the sense that it is a mode of taking care of one’s soul, taking care of the immortal dimension of every human individual. this was his path of ‘enlightenment’, which does not mean just the pursuit of theoretical wisdom, no matter how lofty the latter may seem, but the pursuit of a better human life in this world. for this, philosophy was above all education in the virtues, especially justice, the unity of all the virtues and the sole ground for human happiness. philosophy’s chief concern was thus for education in justice and in the other virtues. it was the path that should be followed by all who seek the good and by all who seek thereby to realize the ultimate possibilities of human existence. and insofar as philosophy was education in justice and in the good, it was necessary for it to confront the forces of myth and ritual, on one hand, and sophistic rhetoric on the other. let us now focus on these issues as they develop in book one of plato’s republic. in the republic, set perhaps in the year of 421 b.c. during the peloponnesian war and during one of the lulls in that war, the peace of nicias, these issues are again strongly evident. socrates is much younger in this dialogue, yet in the images and allegories he presents in the course of his night-long conversation with the young glaucon and adeimantus, brothers of plato, on the question of justice, he seems to already know the fortune that is to befall him in the year 399 b.c. he recognizes already that the wisdom seeker will be at odds with conventional society and common opinion and that there will be dangers, charles freeland 109 especially when the philosopher seeks to educate others and lead them out of the cave of human political life and onto the true paths of the just life. he shares these visions with his young interlocutors, emphasizing the risks of the philosophical life as well as its divine-like pleasures. but first, socrates must show his young interlocutors how both the mythic view and the sophistic views of justice are mistaken, and how they have misconceived both the rewards and burdens of the just life. there are readings of plato’s republic for which the whole dialogue is set in a mythical context. not only does the dialogue open with socrates and his friends on the way to see a certain spectacular thracian festival featuring horsemen bearing torches, but also the dialogue can itself perhaps be interpreted as presenting the mythic journey of the soul as it seeks the higher, transcendent realms of knowledge and existence. the dialogue’s visions and allegories show a journey of the soul, one taken perhaps after death, as the soul ascends the ladder of true being and knowing. no doubt plato placed the human soul and the care, as he called it for the human soul, at the center of his concerns, for the soul, he held, was the immortal dimension of human existence. so there should be no surprise in seeing this theme as central to the republic. but, in book one of the republic, where an old man, socrates’ host for the evening, is shown preparing himself for ritual sacrifices at the altar of the gods, the question of the proper care for the human soul is raised in connection with the question of justice. as the dialogue opens, cephalus, who is described as aged and as rich, is concerned about what will happen to his soul after his death. he is concerned about whether or not he has lived a just life. old age has its benefits, he tells the younger socrates, specifically in the ways it frees the human soul from being a prisoner to physical, sexual lusts. but it also brings trepidations aroused by the terrors and tales told in the myths about what happens to the souls of the unjust. greek poetry and myth were replete with stories about how the unjust are tortured after death and how the gods reward the just. what should one do in order to be favorably remembered by the gods? is it enough to perform ritual ceremonies and to attempt as though in a business arrangement to purchase the good will of the gods, as though one’s true character counts 110 prajñâ vihâra for little and one’s purchasing power counts for everything? should one only be concerned for the just life when one is old and presumably too old to learn about justice and the living of a just life? isn’t it too late then, when one’s life is over, to worry about whether or not one has lived justly? for socrates, a poor and younger man, it would seem cephalus’ concerns would suggest that he, socrates, could neither be just nor in the position to raise the important concerns of justice. so, when cephalus defines justice as making sure paying what one owes and as telling the truth, all but the latter component in this definition would seem to leave socrates out, for he was poor and by all accounts, cared nothing for money. no doubt cephalus represents a prevailing strain of conservative thought and action in classical greek culture. whether or not the greeks believed in their myths, they certainly placed stock in the idea that how one lived might influence the kind of torments or rewards one might receive in the next life. there was widespread belief in the idea that the soul survived the death of the body. belief in rebirth or reincarnation was widespread, even among philosophers, plato included. but cephalus seems only concerned about the next life, whereas socrates’ idea seems to be that one must first get this life right and that if that is the case, one need not worry about the next life. indeed, socrates only speaks of the next life in mythic terms. what comes after death cannot be a subject of knowledge. there is only myth. but, for socrates, one must live one’s life as though one’s actions and the choices one made counted for something. no harm can come to the good man, he is fond of saying, and education in justice can bring about a condition of the human soul in which one can live best both in this life and in the next. by the time one is old, it is too late for sacrifices, and little can be done finally to assuage the lingering suspicions that one has not lived one’s life in the best manner possible. justice and the just life, where these are defined in terms of virtues and of human excellence of living, cannot thus be brought about merely through proper business dealings. they require thought, and they require critical thinking about what one is doing and what the principles for one’s action really are and whether they are good principles and how those principles have indeed guided one’s actions. cephalus has never taken these dimensions into account because, for him, justice is a simple charles freeland 111 matter of lighting the incense at the altars and of purchasing one’s peace of mind through the exercise of religious ritual. how one has lived, what one was in the course of human life can be altered or arranged through the proper ministry of ritual. of course, should one be unburdened of any fears for the next life or for the mythic vengeance of the gods, there are no longer any reasons remaining to be just. then, there is only this life, and one should then pursue it with all the gusto one can muster. one can then let one’s full appetites and lusts rule one’s actions. socrates dialogues with cephalus because no doubt he in some way represents the conventional elements of greek religious culture. so, socrates, the philosopher, felt obligated in the name of truth to interrogate and to critically examine the claims of myths and ritual practices to be guides for human action. should one ground one’s life on or base one’s life on fear? fear of what may befall one in the next life? for this is what the poets taught. in any event, the real issue for socrates is to elaborate a definition of justice that owes nothing to the rewards or fine consequences that may come from justice. glaucon and adeimantus rightly demand an account of justice in which justice is perceived as desirable in itself and not for its rewards. this is the challenge socrates must face and it is one that is first and most forcefully presented in the person and in the arguments of a sophist named thrasymachus. who were the sophists and what were their goals? according to jean-pierre vernant, especially three major cultural transformations contributed to the emergence of philosophy. first, discussed above, was the transformation of religious and mythic culture. secondly, there were the economic and technical transformations that brought about not only the use of money as a medium of exchange but in the opening of new markets and foreign exchanges and relations. this brought new ideas and perspectives that enriched the philosophical culture of ancient greece. but thirdly there was the sophistic movement and the use of persuasion as playing an important role in greek political life. as there was no king or monarch to dictate the course of political life in greece or to proclaim by decree what the laws of the land would be, persuasion and skills in persuasion became more important in deciding the types and nature of 112 prajñâ vihâra law to be obeyed by all citizens. in greek democratic society each and every citizen, no matter how modest their station in life, stood a chance of becoming head of state, or occupying some other strategic role in greek political society. thus, the sophists were traveling teachers who taught skills in rhetoric to young men desiring political success. for socrates, the sophists were especially dangerous in that they taught the powers of persuasion over those of truth. to speak the truth (parrhesia) in political contexts was something of a political right in ancient athenian culture. yet, the sophists had turned this into the teaching of rhetoric, (speeches made especially to the assembly and to the law courts), the art of the powers of persuasion, but did so at the expense of truth. nietzsche showed how rhetoric belongs to a culture that still lives in the grip of mythic images. such a culture, he said, has not yet developed a sense of historical fact. its people want to be persuaded, seduced, by images and conventions rather than be instructed in the truth. (see his “description of ancient rhetoric”, texts from a lecture course given in 1872-73) thus, there are links between the mythic culture of cephalus and the sophistic culture of thrasymachus. the sophists practiced and taught the art of persuasion rather than truth telling. this is an important issue for socrates. his defense speech before the athenian court and the jury of 501 begins by telling the court that meletus has been so persuasive in his opening remarks to the court that even he, socrates has almost forgotten who he is. socrates’ accusers have been very persuasive, yet they did not tell the truth about who he, socrates, is. so, socrates says that it shall be his mission that day before his fellow athenian citizens and before the judges and his accusers alike to tell the truth, to present himself to the court as he is in truth. the risk, of course, is that truth is not persuasive. so, from the beginning of his defense speech, his apology, socrates points out a distinction, (which, one could suppose, he considered unfortunate), that truth telling, especially in cases such as this in which one has been a target of slanderous accusations, was not often persuasive. the distinction is also implied in the phaedrus (247d), where socrates proclaims, “the truth is my subject.” odd as it may seem, book one of the republic shows the ideal of telling the truth about justice as something actually shared by both socrates and the sophist, thrasymachus. the sophist here, too, intends charles freeland 113 to tell the truth about justice. he will ‘give the show away’, so to speak, about successful tyrants and reveal the tricks and delusions by which tyrant, like the perfect puppeteer he must be, works the strings of the sheep-like people he governs. the sophist will show how justice, for the many, amounts to no more than legal conventionalism, or, obedience to the law, and which they, the ruled and the governed, foolishly take to be to their advantage, especially insofar as they are, like sheep, herd animals and find their safety and security in obedience. but, thrasymachus continues, the law is not to their advantage but to the advantage of the ruler, the ruthless and cunning tyrant who has an eye out for one thing only, his own self-interest, which, thrasymachus allows, he understands perfectly. thus, the tyrant might seem to have perfect self-knowledge and to have, therefore, perfect self-master and self-possession. but as socrates will show, the tyrant is defined and guided by his appetites, especially the irrational desire to always get more or to get the better of everyone, his likes as well as his opposites. so, he is always at war with himself and with others. the tyrant, thrasymachus says, legislates the law, changes the constitution, and in doing so, slants and distorts the law so that it benefits him by feeding his interests. those who obey the law, meanwhile, really end up benefiting not themselves, but the tyrant. naïve, well-intended obedience to law, obedience to slanted and unjust laws, is by far the most economical and efficient way for the tyrant to maintain his grip on absolute power. no police force is needed in such a system to keep people in line. they are happy to obey, innocent as they are of the true nature of justice and its apparent opposite, injustice. this is where the sophist’s craft comes in. it shall be the sophist’s job to teach the skill of persuasion to others, potential tyrants, so that they might employ it to create false images of themselves as just and lawful men so that they can appear to be just before the public and so be better able privately to practice perfect injustice. justice then becomes a mirror game, a sucker’s game, and a technique in the most insidious sense of the word. against this, socrates would like to uphold a vision of justice as stronger, more unified, and more successful, therefore, than injustice. but socrates must first show the inconsistencies in thrasymachus’s ‘truthful’ account of justice. where thrasymachus attempts to tell the 114 prajñâ vihâra truth about justice, whereby justice is not a benefit to the just but only to the unjust, and where he further admits that this will work only if the just and obedient ones do not see justice for what it is but for what it is not, socrates must show that this cannot be the case, and that thrasymachus is mistaken. ironically, socrates shows that the only way for the unjust man to succeed in his dealings is for him to be just rather than unjust. justice here implies not obedience to the law but cooperation and harmony with others, the way musicians play together to create beautiful music. thrasymachus’s contention that the unjust man will always try to get the better of everyone, just and unjust alike, is quickly shown by socrates to be self-defeating. the unjust man can only succeed if he at some point agrees to cooperate with others. he will need allies and this will require justice. even thieves do not steal from one another, for if they do, they will be defeated. so, socrates suspects that thrasymachus is, beneath his sophistic appearances, a true lover of knowledge, and socrates would like to bring this out and enlist thrasymachus as an ally in the struggle to find true justice and to provide an account of true justice that will also be persuasive in that it will indeed turn the souls of the hearers of the conversation and the discourse on justice toward the good. thus, it will contribute to the education of the guardians. their education will be effective and complete only when it is education in true justice. thus, their education will bring about and maintain a stable condition (hexis) of justice in their souls that will shield them from all evil. again, the distinction between telling the truth and speaking in a way that persuades but does not tell the truth is strongly pertinent. by the tentative and unsatisfactory conclusion of the dialogue with thrasymachus in book one, socrates has roughly sketched a conception of justice in which justice is more than merely a skill whereby one pursues one’s self interests and always seeks one’s own advantage over others. if justice is such a skill, it will, like many skills, be stricken by the ambiguity of being fully capable of doing either great good or great harm, as is medicine, for example. so, justice, too, would be a kind of pharmakon, the kind of thing that can equally kill or cure. this is especially the case where justice, as a deceitful technique practiced by the tyrant, is linked charles freeland 115 to the technique of rhetoric and where the tyrant uses persuasive rhetoric to succeed in his attempts to get his own advantage over others. but for socrates, on the other hand, justice must be seen not as a skill, something instrumental, calculating, and linked to rhetoric, but as a virtue, an excellence of soul and practical action, and, therefore, a component essential to the well being of both the individual and the political community (polis). because it is a virtue, justice shall benefit the just, for it is a life (bios) guided by intelligence and harmony rather than by the always restless chaos of the appetites. justice becomes, then, a paramount virtue unifying the private and public domains by practically eliminating the distinction between the private and the public. the private was always a threat, in socrates’ view, for the ‘private’ meant the home, women, private lives and private interests. such environments only nourish self-interests by turning the individual away from the public toward his own private life (bios). through his truthful and hopefully persuasive speech, (logos), socrates hopes to secure a life, (bios), linked to the social and to the community rather than to the private sphere. but in this new logos on justice, the bios socrates seeks is one in which one’s self interests, far from being set aside, are cultivated such that they become isomorphic with the interests of the whole political community. justice pays. that shall be shown in the long account that follows book one to be the truth of justice, insofar as a human being can know it and give expression (in true accounts, or true opinions) to it. throughout, though, one should not miss this connection socrates is making between truth and persuasion, for what is at issue in these discussions is the link between logos and bios, between the principles that one adopts and the life one lives. this is what everyone must seek and question for themselves, especially when they meet socrates. whether politician, poet, or artisan, one must give an account of oneself, one must tell the truth about oneself and the kind of life one is living. (see also plato’s laches, 187e –188e) so, the debate with the sophists and socrates’ concern for the difference between telling the truth and merely being persuasive is a crucial one insofar as ethics and politics are concerned. for socrates, justice itself, both an ethical and a political virtue, is largely a matter of human life (bios) being guided by right principles (logos) and rational desires, such that to flourish as both an 116 prajñâ vihâra individual and as a member of the political community depends upon it.* iii. socrates’ questions concerning the best life for the individual and for the political community resonated throughout greek classical culture. in this concluding section, we would like to set forth a sketch of some of the background cultural questions and tensions that should be taken into account for a better understanding of yet another important question one finds in plato’s republic, a question as relevant today as it was in classical times, namely, the question of the relation between the individual and the state, the private and the public domains. first, what was an “individual” in classical greek culture? again, classical greece is often identified with or defined by “humanism”. by and large, humanism here refers the ways in which greeks put the human dimension at the center of their concerns. as was quoted above, “man is the measure of all things.” sculptures of gods and goddesses were anthropomorphic – the greek individual written large, in bronze letters, and so made monumental. the bronze sculptures of zeus found in the sea, or the so-called riace warriors, are all heroic visions of the greek individual. he is shown athletic, free standing, proud, independent, and capable, as the weapons he brandishes testify. earlier sculptures, the famous kritian boy (c. 480 b.c.), for example, show at an even earlier date many of the same features. gods or men? it would be difficult to say. there were, and not only in plato and aristotle, but more generally in greek culture, descriptions of the kaloikagathoi, the beautiful, good, noble and ‘just’ individuals. they were those who had realized in their lifetimes a kind of special worth (time) that was so important for athenian culture. time social worth, or reputation was wholly in the eye of the beholder, so it was an important form of the social marking of identity. as such, the individual as kalloskagathos was, literally, the beautiful *my discussion of the relations between bios and logos is indebted to m. foucault’s “discourse and truth” unpublished transcript of a seminar given at u.c. berkeley in 1983.) charles freeland 117 man, the virtuous man who could lead others and lead himself as well. he was the one of special time, one whose life had become a work of art, a thing of beauty to be much admired, especially in the poems and myths, the memories, in short, that would be told about him and his time long after his death. so, the conception of the kalloskagathos is linked to the greek awareness of human finitude and of the more general greek conviction that such life at best is but a wretched shadow of life lived in the here and now. the man is beautiful and so the subject of legend and memory; so, in the language and the words of the mythos, he will live on, or at least the statue dedicated in his memory will serve to prompt the recall of what he, too, once was. again, a link between bios and logos, where, in this instance, it is immortal life that is promised for the kalloskagathos insofar as he shall live on in the collective memory of the community. perhaps this is the worth, the time that becomes the stuff of legends, that socrates is implicitly holding out to the young glaucon and adeimantus an implicit promise that, not despite the intrinsic worth of justice, the just life will also bring about a condition of such time and such remembered beauty for them, as well. moreover, there is a related notion that may help us to understand the nature and purposes of the platonic-socratic dialogue technique, and that is the cultural and political fact that, insofar as one was a male and an athenian citizen, one primarily lived one’s life in the face-to-face encounter with others, and that to be recognized by others was all important, and that self-knowledge, a classical and humanistic ideal, was possible only through others, especially in the ‘face-to-face’, let us say, of the living conversation, the word, the logos shared with others, in the eyes and ears of the other. aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the nicomachaean ethics is quite clear on this point: self-knowledge is possible only through or by way of friendships with others. so, in the socratic dialogue, wherein one must give an account of oneself, there is also an ongoing search for self-knowledge. but, what was this ‘self’ that was, or that could be known? according to vernant (the greeks, translated by charles lambert and teresa levendar fagan, chicago, 1995, p. 19), the individual in classical greek society was not the same as the individual in modern european society. the greek individual was not a bearer of universal 118 prajñâ vihâra rights. there were no “human rights” in humanistic classical athens. moreover, the classical or archaic (pre-classical period from late seventh to the early 5th centuries b.c.) individual was not a “person” in the sense of having a secret, singular inner life that would lie at the foundations of the originality and the possibility of anyone saying “me”. as the discussion of time has shown, everything seemed most importantly on the surface of appearances. there being no real inner life, the athenian individual was essentially social and community directed. having no concept of the private person, the greeks used the word idiotes, “idiot”, in modern english, to describe the person withdrawn from his ‘true self’ which was public man. (see ancient greek literature and society, by charles rowan beye, cornell university press, 1987, p. 104) but, and this will lead us to our next important point, there was in the democratic regimes of athenian political history, despite all these communal and polis related tendencies, considerable emphasis placed on the private domain. so, vernant, in his discussion of this, quotes thucydides, (2.37.2-3) where he points out the freedom and privacy enjoyed by athenians: “…. far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes….” but, in connection with time, there is an important, socially restraining dimension: how one appeared to others in the sight of others was an important part of the calculation of time. knowledge, idea, (eidos), are all sight words, or directly imply the in-sight of intelligence, and self-knowledge was realizable only in sight of others, in the face-to-face encounter with others. so, the greek individual was first and above all, a citizen, and the passage of the young man into fullfledged citizenship and adulthood were important transitions in life. for the philosophers, the individual was, most importantly, a public and political kind of animal. (aristotle). thus, the lead issue for socrates concerning his debate with the sophists and with the poets and myth-tellers is how such logoi affect the bios of the individuals who hear them. plato’s overt concern for this, expressed in the context of a discussion of the dangers of democracy in book eight of the republic (557a-c), is precisely that free speech, (parrhesia), something encouraged in democratic regimes, would be coupled with not only the freedom of each and all to tell the truth but charles freeland 119 with the freedom of each and all to their own choice of life. democratic tendencies with regards to logos would have disastrous consequences for both the bios of the individual and for the greater polis. (“….and isn’t the (democratic) city full of freedom and free speech? and isn’t there license in it to do whatever one wants?.…and where there’s license, it’s plain that each man would organize his life privately just as it pleased him….” republic 557a-c). in other words, for plato, the chief danger of speeches, and the freedom to speak and to tell the truth, is that it might lead to everyone choosing a free and private life, that it would thus bring harm to social cohesion. (see also foucault, op. cited, p. 54.) how to persuade the citizens of a democratic regime of the dangers of democracy in which the freedoms promised are illusory and self destructive, and because of their emphasis on the private at the expense of the public domains, and how democracies then become the breeding grounds and hatcheries for the tyrannical souls that will grow to become the eager pupils of sophists such as thrasymachus. thus, plato’s great, almost mythic dialogue on the just life must be seen as written from within the cultural, historical and political context of an athenian world that was dynamic rather than static, and that was endlessly involved in an ongoing and frequently violent debate about the virtues of democracy versus oligarchy and tyranny. plato’s questions thus seem as essential to ancient culture as to our own, and in addressing his concerns in this way, we have shown how plato’s texts still speak to us today, wherever there are societies in which human beings ask about the ways and possibilities of true human happiness and justice. for these seem, the leading questions in plato’s republic, the question of the examined life, the question and the quest that seeks a true account of justice that will succeed in persuading and so turning the human soul toward the good; an account of justice that will show it to be the intellectual, conceptual principle of ethical life and, as such, the practical cause of excellence in the action for both the individual and the community. in the platonic-socratic conception of the just man, justice will be more than merely obeying the law. it will be that virtuous life that binds the individual to the community of his fellow citizens whereby both individual and community alike will attain to a kind of health, harmony and well being of soul that is the best possible for a human 120 prajñâ vihâra being, given the radical finitude of the human situation. it is only in this that one can find from within the radical finitude of the human situation a true opening to infinite life, not only in that other men will remember the beauty of one’s life, but that one will also be remembered by the gods. charles freeland 121 references foucault, michel, fearless speech. edited by joseph pearson. los angeles: semiotext (e): 2001. gadamer, hans-georg, the idea of the good in platonic-aristotelian philosophy. translated by p. christopher smith. new haven and london: yale, 1986. nietzsche, friedrich, on rhethoric and language (1872-3). edited and translated by sander l. gliman, carole blair and david j. parent, new york and oxford: oxford, 1989. plato, republic. translated by g.h.a. grube. indianapolis: hackett publishing co., 1974. _______, phaedrus. translated by alexander nehamas and paul woodruff, indianapolis: hackett, 1955. vernant, jean-pierre, mythe et pensée chez les grecs. paris: editions la découverte, 1985. 122 prajñâ vihâra 08_(123-142) teachers head_john t.pmd teacher’s heads john t. giordano graduate school of philosophy and religion assumption university of thailand º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéä´éê׺êòç¾ô¸õกòãäëçé¤ãùã¹»ãðà·èä·âáåðกñá¾ùªò «ö觵èò§กç âกâèí§ãëéàกõâãµô �¤ãù� áåðâñ§ä é́ê׺êòç件ö§µé¹กóà¹ố ¢í§¾ô̧ õกòã¹õéã¹íô¹à ṍâ ·ñé§âñ§ µãç¨êíº§ò¹à¢õâ¹µèò§ æ ·õèàª×èíáââ§กñº¹ò¯âèòêµãì º·¤çòá¹õéáê´§ãëéàë繶ö§á¹ç »¯ôºñµô´ñé§à´ôá¢í§¤çòáãùéã¹àªô§¾ô¸õกããááåð´óà¹ô¹ä»íâèò§µèíà¹×èí§กñº»ãðླõ íõก·ñé§âñ§à»ãõâºà·õâºãëéàë繶ö§¤çòááµกµèò§¨òก¤çòáà¢éò㨤çòáãùé¢í§µðçñ¹µกêáñâ ãëáè áåð¤çòáà¢éò㨤çòáãùéãèçáêáñâ·õèáí§çèò ¤çòáãùéà»ç¹áµèà¾õâ§êòãê¹à·èáåð¢éíáùå áµèà¾õâ§à·èò¹ñé¹ abstract this paper investigates the wai khru ceremony in thailand and cambodia which gives honor to the “teacher”. it traces this ceremony from its origins in india and the writings connected to the natya sastra. it shows the traditional practice of knowledge as ritualistic and continuous with one’s tradition. it contrasts this to the modern western and contemporary understanding of knowledge as information and data. introduction let me begin by acknowledging that i am already un-grounded. and while i am a professor, i have periods of doubt concerning just what it is i profess. while my mind flutters from object to object, idea to idea, and theory to theory, it seems that there is still some density i am barely aware of. the prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 123-142 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 123 124 prajna vihara-~ mask of phra pharot rishi which once belonged to arkom sayakhom john t. giordano 125 mask representing arkom sayakhom by his student phra siriphong kharuphankit movement and gravity of my thoughts as they connect with my body, my moods, my life. my encounter with dusty books in libraries, with the unblinking computer screen, with people i meet, with events, and finally with those who taught me. is there some thin capillary of movement which provides some continuity to my thoughts? some mechanical reflex which informs their habitual repetition and reflexes? surely a biological explanation would address such issues although in the process of its materialist explanation, would extinguish the life of thoughts like a flame. but if my thoughts seem to be detached from my situation perhaps it is due to their gaze merely being directed outward. but for the sake of this paper, let us turn our gaze back to the living generation of thought. the teacher academics in south east asian universities often discuss the difficulties in developing a critical spirit among their students. students tend to be passive and reluctant to challenge their teachers or the topics presented. and certainly this is a problem. yet it is rooted in something far deeper and begging our consideration. that is, the traditional and ritualistic approach to knowledge and the teacher-student relationship still operative in south east asia. there is a curious tradition in thailand. a great teacher of a particular type of wisdom or art will seek the ideal student to pass on their knowledge. if the teacher cannot find the appropriate student, he or she will allow their knowledge to die with them and disappear into obscurity. that is, the transmission of knowledge is taken very seriously. knowledge is something with sacred overtones. one must be a pure receptacle to preserve it and one must find the proper receptacle to pass it on. there is a deep responsibility to the very act of teaching and being a student. this is rooted partly in the ancient indian traditions for honoring one’s teacher such as the guru puja, the guru dakshana, and the upanayana. the ceremony of the sacred thread [upavita]. in fact, most ceremonies involving the teacher / student relationship are symbolized by various types of threads. these represent binding, protection, control and connection. the student teacher relationship can be also be demonstrated within 126 prajna vihara-~ the stories of the seven rishis [eysei] [rsis]. in some of these stories, a student after studying many years prepares to depart after his years as an apprentice and asks his teacher what gift they can offer in exchange. the teacher replies that the student’s service has been gift enough. but the student insists, whereupon the teacher sets an impossible task, which the student miraculously fulfills. these stories illustrate the power of this organic continuity of knowledge. although the discipline of the teacher and student is extremely important, yet knowledge itself is something that possesses a weight that transcends the roles of those who transmit it. when one considers the debt and responsibility, it is almost impossible to repay, one can only participate in its flow. and yet there is a need to repay and acknowledge. and this is nowhere so evident as in the wai khru [tway kru] rituals found in thailand and cambodia. the wai khru is a ceremony that is conducted before a dramatic performance, or as an initiation to the study of an art. it is designed to honor the spirits invoked in the performance or art, the chain of teachers who have passed on this knowledge, and finally the gods who created these artistic forms. the form of the wai khru is based upon the ancient indian text of drama, the natya sastra. this work is a manual and codification of all the dance moves and expressions of drama [natya]. it also provides the rationale and rituals for honoring the gods and teachers. in the first book, the great teacher or rishi __ bharat muni (bharata) __ is asked by his disciples to explain the origins of the natya sastra. ‘long, long, very long ago’, said bharata, ‘people of this world of pain and pleasure, goaded by greed and avarice, and jealousy and anger, took to uncivilized (lit.: gramya = vulgar) ways of life. it (the world) was then inhabited by gods, demons, yaksa-s, raksasa-s, naga-s and gandharva-s. various lords were ruling. it was the gods among them who, led by mahendra, approached god brahma and requested him (thus): please give us something which would not only teach us but be pleasing both to eyes and ears [the term kridaniyaka means a ‘toy’]. (true) the vedas are there but (some like) the sudras are prohibited from listening to (learning from) them. john t. giordano 127 why not create for us a fifth veda which would be accessible to all the varna-s (castes)?’ (rangacharya, p. 1) brahma had difficulty expressing this knowledge in a form accessible to the people, so he asked the hermit bharat muni to record the information in a more accessible form. he was chosen because of his intelligence, his analytical skill, his moral courage, and his bodily control. that is, he was chosen for being the proper receptacle and medium for this knowledge. so the natya was created to communicate a kind of wisdom [veda] and make it accessible to ordinary people. so brahma teaches the dance forms created by shiva and passes them to bharat muni who records them. bharat muni then stages the dramas with the aid of his 100 sons. the 100 sons are sometimes taken to represent the variety of people and character types used in drama. the first staging of a drama by bharat muni was a failure. it was a depiction of the famous story of the “churning of the ocean of milk”, which depicts the victory of the gods against the demons [asuras]. offended by this, the first performance was disrupted by the demons until indra intervened. this resulted in the seeking of the services of the architect visnawakarm who constructed a special stage for the drama. before the next performance, brahma calls a meeting of all the gods and demons and explains the purpose of drama. in one version he placates the demons by explaining: “you are as much the creator of us as of the gods. so, you should not have done it” (n, p. 4) brahma continues: if that is all, then there is no need for you to feel angry or aggrieved. i have created the natyaveda to show good and bad actions and feelings of both the gods and yourselves. it is the representation of (the ways of) the entire three worlds and not only of the gods or of yourselves. (rangacharya, p. 4) so before the performance the deities, the teachers and even the stage itself is worshiped. the worship of the stage is considered as a sacrifice. gods and demons are then invited to be spectators. and the performance itself is not propaganda, but an accurate depiction of the ways of the world. it is a space which allows a certain kind of truth to appear. brahma explains that this 128 prajna vihara-~ expression of the various emotions [bhava] of the ways of the world brings knowledge and wisdom to people engaged in all the various pursuits. in the thai wai khru ceremony, the wai khru begins by invoking the triple gem of buddhism. it then involves with the use of music, addressing the deities and inviting their presence. first the lower deities are called and requested to invite the higher deities. finally when all deities and spirits are assembled, the conductor of the ceremony is inhabited by the spirit of phra pharot rishi (bharat muni). he performs the dance and he bestows blessings on the spectators and initiates. the teacher as rishi is a manifestation of shiva who represents world knowledge (this is also the case in the tengger ritual in east java). deborah wong, in her excellent study of music in the wai khru ritual, provides the explanation of thongchai phothayarom concerning the spirit possession of the officiant in the wai khru ritual. it’s not like the teacher just enters you __ no! you invite him to come and bestow himself on you, invite him to come into you and make you a deity, invite him to come and imprint himself upon you as a deity __ invite him to come and be an officiant through you. at that time, you are the deity. but if you’re going to invite him down into you, you have to use special knowledge [withayaa kaun], which involves receiving magical verses [khaathaa] and the right to use them. you don’t just walk out and he suddenly comes into you. being in the ceremony means that you sit and invite him to enter you. you invite him to come into you. there are those who believe that you are him. (wong, p. 11) so this encapsulates the process of transmission in a very succinct way. the teacher of a certain wisdom is a receptacle for it, he is possessed by it. one also has to demonstrate the right to transmit this wisdom and to receive it. this shows a certain lineage of authority, and lineage of knowledge. this is also demonstrated in the belief that the spirits of the deities, of the teachers inhabit the masks, inhabit the performers, and inhabit the performance. cambodia of course also possesses this tway kru or sampeah kru john t. giordano 129 ceremony [pithi sampeah kru lokhon krop]. this involves similar sacrifices and rites to the thai ceremony. it even involves an eye opening ceremony for the masks (similar to the boek phra net). this can also be found in the khmer lakhon khol performance. the officiating rup becomes a channel for the spirit of the teachers or kru. while the rup do not take part in the dancing, they can control or disrupt the dance if it departs from the wishes of the spirit kru. the rup were not performers in lakhon khol in the sense of being trained in the dance movements. nonetheless, if a kru was unhappy with any aspect of the performance, he could possess the rup, who __ following a general pattern __ would speak, dance, enter into a trance state, and then collapse, always in the same manner. the performance could be totally disrupted if the wishes of the kru were not fulfilled. consequently the role of rup was central to the lakhon khol performance and its ritual effectiveness. (cravath, p. 593) in this case we see the kru or eysei directing this from the spirit world, insuring their accuracy. we also see adaptation of older forms to new religions. the wai khru in thailand is often framed by buddhism. the katha which is recited to invoke the very powerful deity phra phirap [rap], a form of bhairava shiva, is mollified by the invocation of the triple gem. the famous mask-maker and buddhist monk __ phra siriphong kharuphankit __ explains it as follows: the first katha begins with the word “buddha”, ... it asks for the presence of phra phirap. the second begins with the word “dhamma” and the third with “sangha”. these three names constitute the triple gem of buddhism. this invocation of the triple gem is not to worship phra phirap, because phra phirap is a deity of brahmanism. but it is included because the person who composed the katha is a buddhist who believes in the triple gem. when we observe the history of phra phirap we find he is a bhairava form of phra isuan [shiva], he is a deity of war and death, and he is the deity 130 prajna vihara-~ who can cure sickness. his form is that of an asura. it is the tendency of human beings to guard against powers that bring calamity and danger, powers which are hidden and beyond their imagination. for this reason the person who composed the katha of phra phirap initiates each katha with the worship of the triple gem, in order to bring purity and calmness of heart, and to mollify phra phirap’s violent power. (siriphong kharuphankit. phra phirap.) this same process can also be seen in the tracing of lineages of authority in javanese islam. in her study of the music in the wai khru ceremony, deborah wong discusses what is distinct about the thai conception of knowledge. based upon her conversations with a buddhist monk, she shows a distinction between the more common conception of ruu, wichaa (a knowledge that comes from study) and panyaa. the latter can be divided into three types. sutamayapanna comes from listening to others, reading, and asking questions. it comes from outside yourself and thus constitutes worldly wisdom. cintamayapanna, which comes from thinking, also comes from outside, but you make decisions yourself, based on what you have read and heard. bhavanamayapanna, however, comes from inside and arises from practice __ in other words from meditation and contemplation. (p. 78) notice the categories on panyaa emphasize the receptivity toward something outside, and the developing control of what is inside. to use the language of the thread, it represents both a connection and a binding. wong then goes on to explain what characterizes thai epistemology in general. even closer to the heart of thai epistemology are its many verbs detailing the passage or transmission of knowledge from a knower to other people. their sheer number suggests that a high value is placed on the knowledge that flows from learned john t. giordano 131 people. expressed in its simplest form, teacher hai, “give”, their knowledge to student. they are also said to phoei phrae, “propagate, spread out”, their knowledge; phoei means “to reveal, make known, uncover, expose, open”, implying the revelation of contained knowledge. teachers prasit prasaat, “confer, transmit, bestow”, their fund of knowledge on their students; the pleasing alliteration of this compound word as well as its component meanings (prasit, “success”; prasaat, “to confer, to take pleasure in giving”) make it common in writings about teachers and students. teachers also thaai thaut, “transmit, hand down (as to the next generation)”, their knowledge; thaai means to let something flow or to transfer something from one thing to another, and thaut means to cast, lay down, or (a vivid image) for a plant to send forth roots. put together, the compound word strongly conveys a sense of knowledge as a physical substance that can be sent out from the holder. (p. 79) i think we are not in danger in emphasizing these organic metaphors with regard to traditional knowledge. in general, the rituals around the wai khru demonstrate the idea that culture, even as it changes and evolves, is something rooted in the authority of the past. it is something that must be traced back even as it moves forward. that knowledge is something rooted in life. the information age we can, perhaps at some considerable risk, jump ahead and consider the way information works from our technical and secular age. the more organic and continuous process that we have been discussing is seemingly under threat from the “global” situation. zygmunt bauman has dealt with the shift in our understanding of culture with reference to the present age. in his book, does ethics have a chance in a world of consumers?, he points towards a more original concept of culture: 132 prajna vihara-~ the term “culture” was conceived within the semantic family of concepts that included terms like “cultivation”, “husbandry”, “breeding”. “grooming” __ all denoting improvement, prevention of impairment, arresting deterioration. (bauman, p. 195) in his work, culture in a liquid modern world, he further connects this concept with the enlightenment project of refinement, and bildung. according to its original concept, ‘culture’ was to be an agent for change rather than for preservation of the status quo; or more precisely, it was to be a navigation tool to steer social evolution towards a universal human condition. (p. 6) this was in the service of the building of society. it involved the creation “of a nation, a state, and a nation-state __ at the same time entrusting that tool to the hands of the educated class”. (p. 8) and this process is also intertwined with the process of globalization. he goes on to say: the prospect of colonization of farflung dominions proved a powerful stimulus to culture’s enlightenment idea and gave the proselytizing mission an altogether new, potentially worldwide dimension. (p. 9) bauman condemns pierre bourdieu’s definition of culture in his work distinction. this corruption of the idea of culture is contemporaneous with the twilight of the enlightenment ideal, the shift from solid to what he calls “liquid modernity”. in short, ‘culture’ was transformed from a stimulant into a tranquilizer; from the arsenal of a modern revolution into a repository of conservation products. ... bourdieu’s report did not escape the timing of minerva’s proverbial owl, that goddess of all knowledge: bourdieu was observing a landscape illuminated by the setting sun, which momentarily sharpened contours which were soon to dissolve in the approaching john t. giordano 133 twilight. he therefore captured culture at its homeostatic stage: culture at the service of the status quo, of the monotonous reproduction of society and maintenance of system equilibrium, just before the inevitable and fast approaching loss of its position. that loss of position was the result of a number of processes constituting the transformation of modernity from its ‘solid’ to its ‘liquid’ phase. (pp. 10-11) culture shifted from the responsibility of an enlightened elite to the responsibility of the individual. and yet these individuals are seduced by the “managers” of culture. “culture” appeared in the vocabulary less than a hundred years after another crucial modern concept __ that of “managing”, which, according to the oxford english dictionary, meant “to cause (persons, animals, etc.) to submit to one’s control”, “to operate upon”, “to succeed in accomplishing” __ and more than one hundred years earlier than another, synthesizing sense of “management”: “to contrive to get along or pull through”. to manage, in a nutshell, meant to get things done in a way in which they would not move on their own; to redirect events according to one’s design and will. to put it in a yet another way: to manage (to get control over the flow of events) came to mean to manipulate probabilities __ to make certain conduct (openings or responses) of “persons, animals, etc.”, more likely to take place than it would otherwise be, while making some other kinds of conduct less likely or utterly unlikely to happen. in the last account, to manage means to limit the freedom of the managed. (bauman, pp. 195-196) adorno had already pointed to this phenomenon in what he called the “culture industry”. the culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above... culture, in the true sense, did not simply 134 prajna vihara-~ accommodate itself to human beings; but it always simultaneously raised a protest against the petrified relations under which they lived, thereby honoring them. in so far as culture becomes wholly assimilated to and integrated in those petrified relations, human beings are once more debased. (adorno, “the culture industry reconsidered”) notice here the metaphors concerning control or integration from above. bauman raises some important issues. what is most important for us are the contradictions in his argument. on one hand “culture” in its more authentic sense is “identified with europeanization, whatever that may have meant” (p. 53). and as such is related to a process of expansion and domination. if this process has expired, if culture has become static (following bourdieu’s definitions), then this is just the twilight of a particular interpretation of culture. the momentum of the western enlightenment and its more oppressive aspects have achieved their high tide and are now retreating, countered by the flow of other cultural traditions. the static nature of multiculturalism may be a problem for bauman or for the west, but perhaps not so much a problem for the rest of the world. outside the west, the decline of the enlightenment project and its myths of development, refinement, and progress, open up new avenues of expression, new understanding of politics and democracy, new understandings of the place of technology separated from its more dominating aspects. people hold on to their cultural traditions while simultaneously operating within the fluid and fragmentary global situation. bauman’s thinking cannot go beyond his crude oppositions of solid and liquid modernity. but outside of the west, people pass freely between solid tradition and liquid media technologies. they embrace the contradictions. they are simultaneously rooted and uprooted. we can in fact return to the permeable conception of the individual we observed in the wai khru ceremony. there the individual is connected to their teacher, their students, their culture, even if they function according to imported modalities of information and media culture. the insights by adorno and bauman, although now limited in their explanatory power, do make us aware that there are various kinds of control. john t. giordano 135 there are the distant mechanisms of control related to politics, economics, intellectual property and marketing. and there are the local forms of elite control that rely on the organic continuity of knowledge we have been highlighting. we see that knowledge in the information age is often fragmented into discrete units which are manipulated from afar. the source of local elite control is effaced. there is a loss of the organic concept of connection to tradition. this is captured well by the concept of the “meme”. the meme is a term coined by richard dawkins in his work the selfish gene, to consider the transmission of knowledge in a manner inspired by the mechanisms of genetics. this concept has naturally become ubiquitous in the information age. so what is a “meme”? it seems appropriate for once to quote from wikipedia: dawkins used the term to refer to any cultural entity that an observer might consider a replicator. he hypothesized that one could view many cultural entities as replicators, and pointed to melodies, fashions and learned skills as examples. memes generally replicate through exposure to humans, who have evolved as efficient copiers of information and behaviour. because humans do not always copy memes perfectly, and because they may refine, combine or otherwise modify them with other memes to create new memes, they can change over time. dawkins likened the process by which memes survive and change through the evolution of culture to the natural selection of genes in biological evolution. (http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/meme) with the emergence of google, bing and other search engines on the web, information is organized based upon popular use. it is this utility aspect of knowledge that continues to be amplified by the technologies behind information, economics, and politics. and notice here that control and freedom go hand in hand, and is submitted to a process of natural selection. but just as in biology where the introduction of foreign species creates disruptions in the local ecosystem, a kind of knowledge based upon units of information, which are in free compe136 prajna vihara-~ tition, is disruptive of local knowledge and favors the producers and managers of knowledge. we can see this disruptive aspect of knowledge in a more positive light in the writings of the german writer walter benjamin. in his essays he distinguished between the role of the storyteller and the information one finds in a newspaper. the newspaper is presented in such a way that its information can be instantly forgotten. but he also speaks of the possibilities of this “debasement of the word” in a 1934 text the newspaper. i quote this short piece in its entirety. in our writing, opposites that in happier ages fertilized one another have become insoluble antinomies. thus, science and belles lettres, criticism and literary production, culture and politics, fall apart in disorder and lose all connection with one another. the scene of this literary confusion is the newspaper; its content, “subject matter” that denies itself any other form of organization than that imposed on it by the reader’s impatience. for impatience is the state of mind of the newspaper reader. and this impatience is not just that of the politician expecting information, or of the speculator looking for a stock tip; behind it smolders the impatience of people who are excluded and who think they have the right to see their own interests expressed. the fact that nothing binds the reader more tightly to his paper than this all-consuming impatience, his longing for daily nourishment, has long been exploited by publishers, who are constantly inaugurating new columns to address the reader’s questions, opinions, and protests. hand in hand, therefore, with the indiscriminate assimilation of facts goes the equally indiscriminate assimilation of readers, who are instantly elevated to collaborators. here, however, a dialectical moment lies concealed: the decline of writing in this press turns out to be the formula for its restoration in a different one. for since writing gains in breadth what it loses in depth, the conventional distinction between author and public that the press has maintained (although it is tending to loosen it through routine) is disappearing in a socially desirable way. john t. giordano 137 the reader is at all time ready to become a writer __ that is, a describer or even a prescriber. as an expert __ not perhaps in a disciple, but perhaps in a post that he holds __ he gains access to authorship. work itself has its turn to speak. and its representation in words becomes a part of the ability that is needed for its exercise. literary competence is no longer founded on specialized training but is now based on polytechnical education, and thus becomes public property. it is, in a word, the literalization of the conditions of living that masters the otherwise insoluble antinomies. and it is at the scene of the limitless debasement of the word __ the newspaper, in short __ that its salvation is being prepared. (benjamin, pp. 741-742) now benjamin, when he speaks of the “restoration of writing” and the “mastering of antinomies” means this in what bauman would align with solid modernity. that is, a modernist sense that sees salvation in the ability of living labor to express itself through social mechanisms. and like adorno and bauman it seems to be a slightly flawed approach in terms of its desire to master antinomies, but it does help us in understanding the character of the information age. on one hand, the information age is challenging to traditional aspects of writing and its “depth”, but on the other, it has positive aspects in that it transforms the reader into a producer. it develops their critical power. and it collapses oppressive elite structures arbitrarily based on class or rank __ let us say: illegitimate forms of authority (which can also be seen in the buddha’s critique of brahmanism). the individual at their computer interacting with information through cyberspace is far from the ritualistic aspects of knowledge we see in the wai khru ceremony. so we can see the power of the information age and its possibilities for a kind of critical thought that can complement traditional knowledge, but we also see its uprootedness and destructiveness as well. likewise traditional thought is powerful in its abilities to provide us a sense of place and responsibility to the past, or to direct ourselves towards something greater than our individual desires, but it can also weaken our ability to see our problems with a critical spirit and allow for the suppleness of the intellect necessary to deal 138 prajna vihara-~ with the increasingly fast pace of change. it is the ambivalence of both of these types of knowledge that lead us to consider a solution in a phenomenon common to south east asia. this solution is already present within its tradition. it has often been called syncreticism but might more accurately be called eclecticism. repositioning in southeast asia, not only are there layers of animism, brahmanism, vaishnavism, shaivism, mahayana and therawada buddhism, islam and christianity, and today there are additional layers of western capitalist, secular and scientific cosmologies. this would be a kind of syncretism, or eclecticism, which would involve a passage between traditional rituals, myths and symbols, and the imported images and information, and yet tolerate the lack of a common logic. this is also evident in the wai khru ceremony where all gods, angels, demons and mortals are invited to gather peacefully to watch the staging of a drama. as well as in the practice of couching this brahmanist ceremony within the triple gem of buddhism which protects the participants from the powerful forces they awaken. this tolerance of contradiction allows a special dynamic to religious experience outside of the west. it allows non-western cultures to preserve traditions and beliefs in the onslaught of the imported rationalities of globalization. these gaps, imperfections and tensions prevent one logic from cannibalizing another. the practices and rituals connected to knowledge and the teacher student relationship, the belief in powers and spirits, still very much alive, are considered irrational from global rational utilitarian perspectives (this also includes most philosophical and theological perspectives). yet these practices represent a kind of pre-reflective intimacy with the earth and the sacred not present within capitalism and the more dominant western systems of thought. we can here see that this eclecticism is different than the kind discussed by lyotard in the postmodern condition. there eclecticism was linked to a failure of the autonomous function of art. it represented a fragmentation, a paradoxology, a paralogy, which is understandable only within the framework of the static nature of the end of western modernism, or bauman’s conception john t. giordano 139 of a static multiculturalism. we might also here dispense with the post-structuaralist idea of the subject as a screen, animated through objects of desire. the subject which begins to emerge into focus here is rather a complex series of threads which link us to various responsibilities, various authorities. each thread requires its own logic, and its own rituals. it cannot be conceived of as a fragmentary surface because there was never a surface unity, and therefore nothing to fragment. more like a switchboard, but not in baudrilliard’s vapid post-modern sense. these threads both connect and bind. they act as symbolic transmission lines and also act as a symbolism of control. as in the upanaya: it symbolizes submission to sensory discipline, to what is called ‘vratabandha’ or voluntary acceptance of a life which may ensure and lead to learning good conduct, robustness and sagacity. (upanayana, p. 115) ganesh (phrapikanet), who is considered the patron god of the arts, also holds a lasso which symbolizes this control as well. the buddhist monk and artist phra siriphong tissapharano points out that he gives out magical amulets he creates, not merely for the purpose of the magic. to receive an amulet is also to dedicate oneself to a community, and it is also to assume the responsibility to live one’s life correctly. just as bharat muni was chosen by the gods for his wisdom and his character, so everyone dedicated to the arts in their sacred form must strive to be of good character. it is a kind of effacement of one’s own ego which allows oneself to be a receptacle for the wisdom of the past. it is in this way that wisdom is passed, and also what allows wisdom to reflect back upon its source. it is this ability for special kinds of knowledge to embed themselves within the swirl and confusion of contemporary information that provides some kind of hope for the future. we can be implanted with both the wisdom of the past and also develop a critical spirit. these two functions of knowledge can be held in a fragile eclectic constellation. and me? i have a responsibility to acknowledge my debts. i am indebted to my mentor at duquesne university, wilhelm wurzer, and his entrancing impres140 prajna vihara-~ sionistic lectures which gave me a feel for where thinking can go and how philosophy can be done. to my professor andre schuwer who showed me the importance of a sense of passion and sincerity to thinking; the ability to roll an idea in one’s head for days and to savor an idea. and to my professor tom rockmore who taught me the sense of rigor and seriousness needed to be a scholar. and also a sense of tolerance, that no matter how often one disagrees, one can have deep respect for another thinker. i have a responsibility to acknowledge how their ideas have affected me, however unconsciously, even if i often spend my time resisting them. i have a responsibility to phra ajarn siriphong tissapharano who kindly taught me about the making of hua khon masks, the wai khru ceremony, and the responsibility of all who are apprenticed in some way to the traditional thai arts. and i must acknowledge my students who seem, for unknown reasons, to appeal to my perceived authority. i have the responsibility to respond to them as their former professor. i must always carefully explain my own ideas and help them to develop their own, and help them even to break free from my influence. i am grateful to my colleague and former student, phatsara phongpit who accompanied me in my study of the wai khru. and i am especially grateful to my student preciosa regina de joya for her efforts to keep me honest and on the right path as a teacher and her encouragement __ through email __ to more carefully rework this essay for publication. our passing ships with their communications back and forth, their occasional shots over each other bows, often ignore the deep water we are moving on. mere information merely serves those who manipulate it from afar. the up-rootedness is potentially destructive. yet seeds of connection can always be found, even carried by the flows of capitalism and the contemporary media. these seeds can allow for the re-growth of organic structures of wisdom and connection in such a way to mollify the more destructive aspects of the information age. i think that what i am doing is gesturing toward something which is unfolding in time. to suggest how these tensions will play themselves out seems far beyond me. but i think that the task of the philosopher __ especially in the context of south east asia __ is to act as an arbiter between the onward momentum of john t. giordano 141 142 prajna vihara-~ our globally innervated culture, and the wisdom of local culture. not through the synthetic violence of grand philosophical theories, not through the passive resignation or abstract resistance of postmodernism and deconstruction, but through the cautious switching back and forth between an eclectic series of conflicting rationalities, myths, and cosmologies. bibliography bauman, zygmunt. culture in a liquid modern world. polity press: cambridge, 2011. bauman, zygmunt. does ethics have a chance in a world of consumers? cambridge: harvard university press, 2008. benjamin, walter, selected writings. vol. 2. cambridge: belknap press, 1999. cravath, paul russell. earth in flower: an historical and descriptive study of the classical dance drama of cambodia. umi dissertation information service. 1985. rangacharya, adya. the natyasastra. new delhi: munshiram manoharlal, 2007. wong, deborah. sounding the center: history and aesthetics in thai buddhist performance. chicago: university of chicago press, 2001. the beautiful hua khon and writings of phra siriphong kharuphankit can be accessed at http:www.monnut.com/en. 147-154 islam and ecology matteo ricci and global civilization andrea bonazzi sapientia university, osaka, japan abstract this essay will examine the contributions of the jesuit missionary matteo ricci. his evaluation of confucian ethics and the related religious thought of the ancient chinese tradition is not the result of a work of mere “intellectual meditation”, but the obvious outcome of an authentic christian experience, which enabled him to receive all that was positive in the culture that he met. there is in ricci the clear knowledge that the christian faith gives a vision of the human experience and of history that does not go against human cultures, but assumes all of them in a real encounter between all the peoples. the christian faith, in fact, generates a total vision of the truth, in which science, culture and politics are not separated, but unified in a weltanschauung (vision of the world). in this way the encounter and the dialogue that ricci established with the chinese culture turned out effective, in as much as compromises were not attempted, nor convictions were abandoned. neither did he pursue the road of syncretism, but it is in true dialogue that an encounter was attempted, a dialogue that is also a new interpretation and a new assumption of the essential elements present in the ancient chinese religious tradition and in the original confucian thought. an understanding of ricci’s approach can serve as an example of authentic intercultural dialogue. introduction the dialogue and the encounter with chinese culture that the jesuit father matteo ricci established more than four hundred years ago, today constitute an example of extraordinary significance for those looking forward prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 1, january-june 2005, 11-31 11 © 2000 by assumption university press to a pacific and constructive relationship between the civilizations of the european west and that of the east. the extremely precious contribution that this missionary gave to the knowledge of the chinese civilization and culture in the western world, as documented in his autobiographic writings, represents an amazing anticipation of that intercultural dialogue of which today a lot is spoken about. however the work accomplished by ricci in china cannot be understood in its full meaning if we forget that what he was trying to do was something primarily apostolic in nature, namely evangelization. the deep knowledge that ricci gained from the study of the chinese classics and from the friendly relationship he enjoyed during the time of his permanence in china with the class of the literati, did not have any other aim outside that of introducing christianity in this immense continent. that is why reviewing ricci’s contribution, without thinking of the reason that basically inspired him, would be too partial and incapable of explaining the fervor that animated his entire life. moreover, the analysis of the work of evangelization completed in china by father ricci gives new light also to the history of catholic missions in the modern age. his “method of adaptation”, his being “chinese with the chinese”,1 his attempts towards incarnation inside chinese culture in order to find the points from which proclaiming the gospel, all of this came centuries before the vatican council ii declared that “in order that they may be able to bear more fruitful witness to christ, let them be joined to those men by esteem and love; let them acknowledge themselves to be members of the group of men among whom they live; let them share in cultural and social life by the various undertakings and enterprises of human living; let them be familiar with their national and religious traditions; let them gladly and reverently lay bare the seeds of the word which lie hidden among their fellows.” (ad gentes, n.11). ricci’s evaluation of confucian ethics and the related religious thought in the ancient chinese tradition is not the result of a work of mere “intellectual meditation”, but the obvious outcome of an authentic christian experience, which enabled him to receive all that was positive in the culture that he met. there is in ricci the clear knowledge that the christian faith gives a vision of the human experience and of history that does not go 12 prajñâ vihâra against human cultures, but assumes all of them in a real encounter between all the peoples. the christian faith, in fact, generates a total vision of the truth, in which science, culture and politics are not separated, but unified in a weltanschauung (vision of the world). in this way the encounter and the dialogue that ricci established with the chinese culture turned out effective, in as much as compromises were not attempted, nor convictions were abandoned. neither did he pursue the road of syncretism, but it is in true dialogue that an encounter was attempted, a dialogue that is also a new interpretation and a new assumption of the essential elements present in the ancient chinese religious tradition and in the original confucian thought.2 ricci’s missionary method 1. the abandonment of the buddhist dress at their arrival in china the fathers ruggeri and ricci dressed like buddhist monks and justified their coming from far away citing “the reputation of the good government of china” and the desire “to build one small house and one small church”.3 after the return of ruggeri to europe, in 1595, taking the opportunity from the opening of a residence in nanjang, capital of the jiangzi, ricci decided to renounce publicly the buddhist dress and joined the revered class of the confucian literati.4 if at first ricci thought “to conform to the dress and to the condition of the buddhist monks, because he was convinced that in doing so he would be seen for what he truly was, that is a ‘religion man’”, later on “realized that the religious conception and the atmosphere in which he lived was remarkably different from that of the west: the monks, in fact, lived at the margin of society; their places of worship were usually built outside the cities. ricci, with his companions, decided then to carry their religious witness at the very heart of society, and in order to do this, adopted the style of life of the men of letters, and engaged like them in the social life andrea bonazzi 13 of the community. by doing this he meant to show that his religious faith did not imply an escape from, but an engagement in the world, contributing to the improvement of the social life until it would open itself to the redemption of christ and the life of grace in the church”.5 ricci writes about realizing the effectiveness of the newly adopted method, when introducing himself as a man of letters so that he could make more friends with the people working inside the bureaucracy and the court which at the beginning had not considered him because of the little esteem they had towards those who dressed like buddhist monks.6 after this period, ricci renews also his approach: instead of saying mass and preaching in public, he dedicates his time “to private conversations, trying to earn the confidence and the consideration of the listeners, even at the cost of taking care more of scientific curiosities and of literary arguments than direct proclamation of the gospel”.7 in a letter of 14 august 1599 to father costa, after having described china as a different culture, because the people were given more to the letters than to war and were mistrustful towards the aliens, ricci concludes saying that “this is why the wisest thing we can do is to take to this enterprise little by little and the best result we can expect seems to be earning credit with this people, take away every suspicion and enter in conversation with them”.8 this attitude of prudent and diplomatic gradualism adopted by ricci vis-à-vis the men of letters resulted slowly in a change from the inside and without any external imposition, of his counterparts. this is what characterizes the apostolic method of ricci and what earned him the esteem of the men of letters, and also the conversion of some of them. 2. knowledge of the chinese language however the decisive factor, at the base of ricci’s method of adaptation, was the learning of the chinese language. that knowledge made possible holding arguments of philosophical, religious and scientific character and to write some literary works that would eventually be part of the best chinese literary production. “for this i recommend to all the fathers who are here ricci wrote to maselli in 1605 – to dedicate themselves to the study of chinese literature, as to something on which 14 prajñâ vihâra depends in large part the conversion of china”. “it was a fundamental necessity to know the language”, since as ricci will write in the letter to his brother anton maria on 24 august 1608 “who does not use it is reputed a barbarian and cannot bear any fruit”. similarly in the letter to father pasio of 1609, ricci asks for “good missioners and all learned” because “nobody so far does not attend more than mediocrely to the letters of china, since to know ours without knowing theirs is not of much utility; and your reverence will very well see how much this point imports at the beginning of this mission. i for me estimate this more than having made ten thousand christians, for being this the condition for the universal conversion of the all kingdom”.9 in this quotation, we can see the innovation that ricci brought to the method of traditional evangelization. in fact, he changed the traditional emphasis on quantification (how to obtain the greater number of baptisms) – to that of entering in a living culture in order to take advantage of all that would allow a deep understanding of the proclamation of the gospel. what ricci perceived as the priority was the necessity of “inculturation”, entering in the middle of the living social and cultural issues of a people. in the letter to father acquaviva of the 22 august 1608 he asks the superior general not to judge “of the fruit that is made here only from the number of christians”, but to consider the “great foundation that is being laid here in preparation for a great aim”; and asks him to send “here men of good talent and men of letters, able to build better things than the foundations”.10 3. science at the service of faith deeply knowledgeable in geography, cartography, astronomy and geometry learned during the years of its cultural formation at the roman college ricci understood the value of these sciences in order to earn some credibility with the chinese people, still unaware of the real geographic borders of the world, the astronomical discoveries of galileo and euclidean geometry. ricci himself testifies that, having shown as insufficient the explanation of natural phenomena made by the monks, “it happened that many, having learned our sciences of mathematics, laughed at the law and doctrine of the idols, saying that who spoke many errors about the natural andrea bonazzi 15 things and about this life, should not be credited when talking about supernatural things and the other world”. ricci moreover understood that the vision of the world of the chinese of those times was encompassing: morality, religion, science, theology and the philosophical instructions of the chinese men of letters of the end of the ming dynasty constituted an organic and unified all. it seemed to ricci that this cultural characteristic of the chinese civilization would eventually have facilitated the transmission and the understanding of the total and organic vision of the world possessed by christianity which the chinese called tianxue (instruction from heaven). science therefore was totally at the service of faith, did not pursue other aim than the one of spreading the gospel. and ricci was always aware that the better means “in order to prepare china to give credit to the things of our holy faith” was the instruction of western sciences. although ricci has contributed to the introduction of western sciences to the chinese, he was and remained primarily a missionary as we can see also from his works and his correspondence. the contribution that he gave to scientific knowledge, the satisfactions and the successes that he gained from this did not change his attitude as a missionary and his purpose of proceeding to the one all important task of evangelization.11 4. the valorization of reason faithful to the aristotelico-thomistic tradition, ricci from the beginning intended to put himself on the standpoint of pure reason. the predilection in china “for letters, the sciences and opinions founded in reason he will write to father pasio in 1609 will render easier to persuade the principals of the kingdom about the things of our faith, confirmed with so much evidence from reason”. this was also the reason that made ricci give prominence in his catechism12 to those truths that could be understood with the natural light of reason. in the demonstration of the existence of god he makes use of the classic arguments of thomistic philosophy (cr, pp. 495-515). in order to give a reasonable foundation to the possibility of an ultramundane existence, he makes reference to the suffering during our life, the constant dissatisfaction of human beings and to their thirst for happiness and fullness that are unattainable during life in this world (cr, pp. 534-540). with the same method he proceeds criticizing monist 16 prajñâ vihâra pantheism (cr, pp. 557-590), metempsychosis and the fear to kill animals: all parts of the buddhist conception of the time (cr, pp. 591-614), in order to put on a rational footing the idea of the existence of a paradise and a hell (cr, pp. 615-647), of the goodness of human nature (cr, pp. 647-674), of the incarnation of god in jesus christ (cr, pp. 695-699). in this way ricci remains faithful to his option of an anthropological approach to the revealed mystery: before approaching the fullness of revelation, he strives to show the reasonableness of his arguments in the order of the natural reflection. from this method, inaugurated by ricci, we can understand his attempt to lead gradually the chinese people to conversion, beginning with the truths that could be grasped with the intellect in order then to pass to the revealed enunciation of the truth. speaking about its catechism, ricci reports that “it is not about all the mysteries of our holy faith, which are to be taught only to catechumens and christians, but about some of the main ones, especially those that in some way can be proved with natural reason and can be understood with the help of the same natural light (“istesso lume naturale”); so that it could be of service to christians and gentiles and to others in remote places, where we cannot soon arrive, opening with this the way to the other mysteries which depend on faith and the revealed science. that is to say: there is a lord and creator of the universe and of all the things that he continuously keeps in existence; the soul of man is immortal, and he is rewarded by god for his good and bad deeds in the other life; the transmigration of souls in bodies of other human beings or animals is false, a doctrine that many follow here, with other similar things. and all of this proved not only with many reasons and arguments taken from our sacred doctors, but also with many authorities from their ancient books, which the father had noticed when reading them; and that gave great authority and credit to this work” (fr, ii, n. 709, pp. 292-295). ricci, with this method of evangelization, builds a bridge between scholastic philosophy and confucianism.13 in other words, in order to find acceptance in the confucian tradition, ricci did not choose – as did other religions present in that period in china the way of mediation or syncretism, but opted for the valorization of all the elements that could be amenable to the christian conception, elements which he did not fail to notice in the ancient chinese tradition, as in confucianism. in this way he gave rise to an effective encounter, keeping andrea bonazzi 17 the truth of the respective positions, without having to vilify or in some way to attenuate the original meaning of the proclamation of salvation. 5. the return to the ancient chinese classics in his meticulous study of the ancient chinese classics ricci did not fail to find an original concept of god, monotheistic in nature and without any implication of pantheistic and polytheistic character, as was the case in other primitive religions. in the pages of his “history of the introduction of christianity in china” and in many letters, ricci anticipates some of the results later confirmed by modern sinology. in the valorization of this pure and original concept of god, that to ricci appeared deeply connatural to the chinese mentality, ours took the occasion for introducing the christian doctrine not in a way stranger to the feelings of the chinese, but deeply immersed and participating of the best tradition. in the letter to the general father acquaviva of 4 november 1595, ricci will declare his aim as wanting “to prove the things of our holy faith by their books”. for this reason “in these past years i had myself taught by good masters not only about the ‘tetrabilio’ [the four books], but also all the six doctrines, and i noticed many passages in many of them that confirm the things of our faith, such as the uniqueness of god, immortality of the soul, the glory of the blessed, etc. and when i speak with these men of letters, i am used to ask what is their doctrine, and through it i prove what i want to prove to them”. (tv, 207) this apostolic method, inaugurated by ricci in china, pursued therefore two objectives deeply related to each other: on one side the attempt of an adaptation to the cultural and religious atmosphere of china, and from the other the revaluation of all that could be interpreted in the light of the christian concepts and that could serve for evangelization. for this purpose, the terms of supreme lord (shangdi) and heaven (tian) to which the ancient chinese had attributed the character of uniqueness, personality, omnipotence, creator of all the things and all the men came to the profit of ours which did not hesitate to use them in the translation of the gospel and christian prayers. in this way ricci appeared to the eyes of the chinese people not like a bearer of one new doctrine, of a new dominion, but as one who indicated the urgency of a return to the ancient 18 prajñâ vihâra chinese classics and their sound tradition. however, his attempt to offer an interpretation of the chinese classics has not always been seen in a benevolent light.14 we should not forget, however, that ricci has always been aware of operating an interpretation of the chinese classic thought, consisting of taking advantage of those passages which for their obscurity allowed for different readings.15 other jesuits, at least those who were nearer to ricci, admit that they never tried “to assimilate heaven and the monarch of the high of the chinese with the god of the bible”, as gernet says, but they have always taken from the chinese tradition those terms that more approached the christian conception, in order to enrich their sense. they have never, moreover, spoken about “equation”, but about proximity of sense, that allowed the use of the traditional term for the opening to a new sense. it turns out therefore false to say that ricci expected to find inside the tradition of ancient china some form of christian thought, as is wrong also to accuse him of syncretism. what he discovers in the ancient traditions concepts near to christian ideas, he uses them in order to introduce his audience and readers to the truth of the christian faith; and when he finds something that seems incompatible with the christian faith, he does not hesitate to condemn it. in ricci the attempt to manipulate the chinese truth or to impose to it a prejudicial interpretation, as has been said by some, is completely absent. in the attempt to recover and to value the ancient chinese religion, giving to this a christian meaning, ricci realizes a true “inculturation”, in so much as the essential elements of the christian proclamation are not made to come from outside like something stranger, but they are made to derive from the chinese cultural tradition itself. in this way he anticipates by some centuries the pastoral orientation proposed by the vatican council ii and based on a great esteem and respect for the moral and religious ideas of every culture. 6. the interpretation and the recovery of the ancient confucian tradition this same attitude, of deep respect towards chinese culture and religion, is manifest in ricci also in his handling of confucianism. from the study that he undertakes of the confucian texts (the four books), he is led to the belief that no element was present in confucianism that could make andrea bonazzi 19 one think of it as one religion. for this reason ricci in its “history of the introduction of christianity in china” and the numerous correspondence that he had with its confreres and relatives, many times reiterates that the cult rendered to confucius had nothing to do with the worship of a divinity or the adoration of a god. it is true that the men of letters were, usually twice a month, going to the shrine of confucius in order to show respect and gratitude with prostrations, ignitions of candles, offering of animals, food, incense and other things. still, they did that without reciting any prayer or asking for some grace.16 the attitude of the chinese people was therefore expression of the gratitude that it nourished towards those who with their own life and teaching represented a model of virtuous life. the aim of confucianism says ricci “is the peace and quiet of the kingdom and good governance of things particular; for which it gives much good advice, all in compliance with natural reason and the catholic truth. they make a great deal of the five relationships that they call common to all mankind: that is of father and son, of husband and wife, master and vassal, older and younger brother, companion and companion; thinking that the other foreign kingdoms do not value them so much (...). their books have a lot to say about the second precept of charity, that is doing onto others what we want the others do to us. and they very much emphasize obedience of children to their father and mother, and loyalty of vassals to their subjects and superiors. and therefore they neither command nor prohibit anything of what we are to believe of the things of the other life, and many of them follow, besides the others two sects, from which we can come to the conclusion that more than a complete law it is a sort of academy, established for the good government of the ‘republica’[sic]. and therefore they can very much be part of this academy and be also christians, given that in essence it does not contain anything against the catholic faith, neither the catholic faith prevents them in anything, indeed it helps very much to build the quiet and the peace of the ‘republica’, as their books require”.17 in spite of this sincere admiration of confucianism, ricci’s attitude towards this doctrine was never an unconditional support, but a critical and active one, as in the case of the things left in doubt by confucius, which he always tried to interpret to the benefit of his mission.18 moreover, ricci made a clear distinction between the ancient confucian doctrine, as 20 prajñâ vihâra it is derived from the reading of the four books, and which represents the classic thought of the master, and the version of confucianism of his time which tended to conciliate it with taoism and to fight the interference of buddhism. for this reason in his catechism he made the rationalistic and syncretistic version of neo-confucianism the object of a strong criticism, in the conviction that such interpretation had not been assumed warily and in a systematic way by the confucian men of letters, but had come in to place without the clear knowledge of the connected consequences as one might expect. it was for this reason that ricci strived so much in order to recover the principles of the ancient confucian tradition.19 some critical appraisals of ricci’s attitude towards confucianism ricci’s attitude towards confucianism, together with his missionary method, in some studies of the last century, have received various critical appraisals. his work has often been accused of syncretism, a “devout conciliator of different beliefs”.20 h. boehmer has accused “ricci’s pedagogical method” of creating “a christian-chinese religious mixture”.21 kristofer schipper denounces ricci and the jesuits for entering “in the sphere of officialdom”, for putting themselves “under the protection of the government” and for having credited to the outside, therefore among us, the official ideology and the image of confucius as the “sinarum philosophus”, minimizing the religious aspect of the cult sponsored by the state”. moreover he charges ricci with having conferred “to confucianism the image of a doctrine or wisdom of the supreme being to which nothing, in the end, was lacking except the revelation of the gospel”.22 other authors, like bavaj and natali, consider ricci’s attitude towards confucianism as “a purely tactical means for action”, as nothing more than an “instrumental” strategy for evangelization.23 jacques gernet thinks of the contribution given by the jesuits to the knowledge of european sciences as simply a work of seduction, made in order “to draw advantage, in religion and moral matters, from seeming analogies between chinese and christian traditions” (p. 9). he charges ricci of wanting “to appear like a philosopher among the philosophers of china” without “revealing himself for what he was, a religious come to preach the true god to the pagans” (p.21). ricci’s decision to distinguish in the proclamation of the gospel andrea bonazzi 21 between truths of reason and truths of faith is considered a mere simulation of the real intentions and of the ideas the missionaries wanted to impose (cf. pp 64-65), while the prudent approach towards chinese civilization is considered an instrumental act on the part of who “is careful not to reveal his true intentions, limiting himself to discuss, to cite the classics, trying to confer them a meaning favorable to his own theses” (p. 23). ricci and the jesuit missionaries, finally, are accused of wanting “to weaken the chinese traditions”, to have transformed them “from the inside” and to have tolerated, also for purely tactical reasons, ancestor worship, knowing that it would have been “too risky to criticize frontally the most venerable traditions of china”, as would have been “imprudent to create too many enemies at one time” (p. 59). to my opinion these critical observations are all born from a prejudicial and too partial reading of ricci’s work of evangelization, in which the point of view of faith not only turns out completely absent, but it seems also that all of the explicit affirmations made by ricci and the jesuit missionaries must stay at all costs out of the discussion. in fact, all these interpretations fail to give any reason for the missionary approach put into effect by ricci. it is not for machiavellian tactics or duplicity that ricci and the jesuits discovered progressively the method of their work in china, but for respect towards those to which they addressed themselves and towards the message they had come to convey. after all christ himself, during his life on earth, used, in revealing himself, a “pedagogy”, surely not theorized but lived in the concrete relationship with his disciples.24 moreover, the adaptation to the customs of china, learning the language and the closing of public worship must be read from inside the perspective of a new assumption of chinese culture in the christian event. “the mission writes john paul ii in “redemptor hominis” is never a destruction, but a new assumption of values and a new construction” (n. 21). for this reason the work accomplished by ricci in china cannot be characterized as a “cunning form of captatio benevolentiae, bent on capturing pagans and increasing proselytism”, but it must be interpreted as “a wide opening towards the civilization and the human values that the company had inherited from the humanism [of the renaissance]”, in the conviction “that human history was a continuum endowed with progress and that in the pagan there were to be found 22 prajñâ vihâra germs of the truth which the explicit proclamation of the gospel brings to fruition”.25 ricci was not satisfied with preaching the message of salvation to purely passive listeners, as it was usual in the missionary method of that age. he operated, instead, a true change in the classic missionary attitude. before preaching he took care himself to listen and to understand in what kind of land the gospel would have been planted. the knowledge of the language, adaptation to the habits of the new civilization, the study of the classics and of all religions of that period were all gradual steps in order to find those natural elements that could allow him to introduce the evangelical message in a way not stranger to the chinese lifestyle. in confucian thought, in particular, ricci valued the notion of human nature contained in the thought of the master and that the classics considered as naturally good. in this way he began his teaching starting from the traditional ethics, in the conviction that this could serve as a base for the explanation of christian morality. this was also the reason that lead ricci to inaugurate his literary production with the famous “treaty on friendship” (jaoyoulun),26 which, before being a theoretical elaboration on a universal phenomenon in the moral field, constituted for ours an experience of life and one the most important. we know how ricci was able to make many friends for his affability, for his outgoing and lovable character with his ability to listen to everybody. in this way he developed an apostolic method based on human relations in which the starting point is human nature and the human being in its concrete situation. with his missionary work, ricci has to offer a true philosophy and theology of the human condition, because it is only through a better understanding of the human condition that revelation can be understood.27 in forging this intercultural relationship, ricci did not omit as he is accused by some to transmit the nucleus of the catholic doctrine, that is the proclamation of the passion and death of jesus christ on the cross. pasquale d’elia has discovered a document in chinese containing a complete summary of the catholic doctrine, which was destined to the chinese men of letters who went to visit the father in the first years in zhaoqing.28 this chinese writ is very important in order to demonstrate how ricci and his companions, from the beginning of their apostolate, had never forgotten to introduce to the chinese men of letters the catholic doctrine in its entirety. the text, composed in 1585, after explaining the andrea bonazzi 23 attributes of god and the necessity of acknowledging his presence in order to receive eternal happiness (paradise) and to escape total perdition (hell), proceeds to tell the story of adam and eve and of original sin. given the human condition of sin, god has sent his son jesus, “a european word that in chinese means universal savior of the world”. in spite of his good works he was crucified, died and resurrected the third day. appeared to his disciples and ordered them to go all over the world in order to spread the announcement of salvation that god in jesus christ had donated to all mankind. after the main text follows an appendix called “explanation of the remission of sins of the past [by means] of the holy water”, in which all those who wish are invited to get baptized in order “to enter the religion of the lord of heaven”. it should not be forgotten moreover that, at the end of 1583 a translation in chinese of the decalogue, had already appeared. in the letter to the father general of 30 november 1584, ricci claims to have sent copy of the chinese catechism written by ruggeri together with “the commandments, the paternoster and the hail mary, also in chinese” (tv, 51). a translation of the creed already existed before 24 november 1585 (cf. tv, 71). the inculturation process from what has been said, it is clear that for ricci evangelization was never a second step, something that could be done later. ricci followed the way of “incarnation”, putting into effect a real process of “inculturation”, not theorized, but lived in the concrete. “inculturation”, in fact, is that process through which the christian message becomes part of a particular culture, incarnates itself inside a cultural community, arriving until the roots, so as to produce in this culture original forms of thought, action and expression. it is not to be confused with tactics or propaganda. it excludes any attempt to manipulate a culture and it does not produce conformist cultural copies. inculturation, moreover, cannot be reduced to a “temporary adaptation”, based on the outer aspects of a culture, like language, ceremonies, dresses and the way of living. it contains in itself, as an important stage, the adaptation, but it has to do first of all with the incarnation of the evangelic message in a concrete cultural atmosphere, in such way 24 prajñâ vihâra that the christian experience is not only expressed in the elements of that culture, but becomes also a force that inspires from the inside this same culture.29 “it was thanks to such work of inculturation said john paul ii in the speech made in rome in 1984, at the end of the international convention of studies on ricci that father matteo ricci could succeed, with the aid of his chinese collaborators, in achieving something that seemed impossible: to elaborate that is, the chinese terminology for theology and catholic liturgy and to create therefore the conditions needed to make christ known and to incarnate his evangelic message and the church in the context of the chinese culture”. mission and cultures the failure to understand the real meaning of “incarnation” and “inculturation” has led in modern times to several misunderstandings and to a strongly critical attitude towards missionary work. many anthropologists, in fact, have accused christian missions of being carriers of a religious conception of a specific culture, the western one, which paternalistically has tried to impose itself to other cultures.30 if it is true that every culture is valuable and therefore as such must be respected and safeguarded, there is nothing wrong with the fact that between different cultures can happen a contact and a dialogue. we cannot ignore the fact that mental categories and the religious and cultural sensibility are not outside time, given once and for all, closed to the mutations that happen for endogenous evolution or for the impact of other cultures. as there is no such thing as a culture good for all, superior to every other culture, so it is an illusion to think of cultures as isolated, perfectly separated from each other, “chemically pure”. cultures without external influences do not exist; every culture, just like any person, is called to be open and to communicate.31 on the other hand, there cannot be true evangelization except through the particularity of one specific culture, of one specific person or circumstance. the faith needs a body in which to manifest itself; it is not simply words, but a living experience and as such it cannot exist without incarnating itself (taking flesh) in a determined cultural atmosphere. the christian message, in fact, becomes part in the evolutionary process of a andrea bonazzi 25 culture as a dynamic element and with the aid of grace leads it to a higher level. however, christianity, although incarnated within a particular culture, must not be equated with or made to serve only one particular culture, it should keep its autonomy and independence vis-à-vis any cultural expression.32 as a matter of fact, there should not exist a culture that, a priori, is irreconcilable with christianity. it is this specific sense of the word “inculturation” that ricci has inaugurated, founded on a deep sense of respect for chinese culture; always ready for dialogue, but also intransigent in avoiding dangerous compromises. in its work ricci does not fall in the trap of considering the historical forms of the culture he met in a static way; in the study that he undertakes of the chinese culture he also finds signs of decline and crisis, cultural elements that betray the original intentions and others able to express the true traditional sense. for this reason his interpretation of chinese culture constitutes a recovery and a reproposition of those original elements belonging to that primitive revelation of which also china is an instance and through which we have evidence of the universal reasonableness of christianity, of the “pretension” that supports it and that it differentiates it from other religious and cultural perspectives elaborated by mankind in the course of history.33 in this line of thought the adaptation ricci realized, is one direct consequence of his living the christian message and we can say that it was this faith experience that “has conquered” china, not the merely practical adaptations, necessary as they might have been. ricci and the “rites controversy” the apology by pope john paul ii for the past errors of the catholic church in its relations with china, and his appeal to beijing to renew ties between the vatican and the people’s republic of china,34 has come at a time in which the pope is playing a crucial role in the campaign to build an understanding between different civilizations, as the only alternative to conflict. he chose to make this historic call in the name of father matteo ricci. the pope describes father ricci as “a precious connecting link between west and east, between european renaissance culture and chinese culture, and between the ancient and magnificent chinese civilization and the world of europe.” 26 prajñâ vihâra as i shall very briefly report here, ricci’s role was not limited to his own lifetime; rather, his ideas have been at the center of every subsequent effort to build a true alliance between the people of europe and those of asia, based on the principle of reason. as lyndon larouche said in his address to the italian institute for asia in rome,35 an effort to build a world alliance among sovereign nations can never succeed if it is based on the mutual acceptance of each other’s opinions, but only through a dialogue based upon a fundamental agreement on an idea—an idea of man distinguished from the beasts through the cognitive power of reason. ricci lived by this principle, which flourished in china until a hundred years after ricci’s death. some factions in the european church questioned his ideas in what is known as the “chinese rites controversy”, and that is why pope john paul ii felt it necessary to extend an apology in regard to certain “theological disputes.”36 it is most interesting that this particular pope, who profoundly understands the importance of his personal mission in the current crisis of civilization, reaches back to ricci as the universal figure representing the dialogue of cultures so necessary today. personally i draw these lessons from the vicissitudes of the rites controversy: power struggle is always a factor to be reckoned with in intercultural relations, even (sad to say) inside the church. so we need the “spirit of discernment” in order to be able to make a distinction between real problems and all forms of narcissism. this long dispute is nothing more than the tip of the iceberg, it just highlights the distance, not only geographical, but above all psychological that still persists nowadays between europe and asia. what we need to bridge this gap are men and women who, emulating ricci, would dedicate their life to mutual understanding. besides power struggles, the other big enemy of intercultural dialogue is, in my view, superficiality. as can be seen many times during the dispute, decisions based on insufficient or superficial knowledge become the seed of conflict. above all we should beware of stereotypes, “politically correct” ideologies and downright prejudice. andrea bonazzi 27 endnote 1 cf. 1 cor 9:22. 2 “quod non est assumptum, non est sanatum” (cf. st. gregory nazianzen, ep. 101 ad cledon.). franco di giorgio, comprendere e convertire. il dialogo di padre matteo ricci con le religioni cinesi, edizioni istra, milano 1986. 3 m. ricci, storia dell’introduzione del cristianesimo in cina, in “fonti ricciane”, edite da p.m. d’elia, roma 1942-1949, vol. i, n. 234, pp. 180-183. from now on “fr”. 4 p. tacchi venturi, “le lettere dalla cina” in opere storiche del p. matteo ricci, macerata 1913, vol. ii, p. 200. from now on shortened “tv”. 5 giovanni paolo ii, padre ricci stabilì tra la chiesa e la cultura cinese un ponte che appare ancora solido e sicuro, “l’osservatore romano”, cxxii, n. 250, 27.10.1982. see also the speech in manila, 18 february 1981. 6 cfr. fr, i, nn. 187, 340, pp. 125-126, 282; fr, ii, n. 637, pp. 187-188. 7 c. portatadino, cristianesimo e culture nell’estremo oriente, in “communio”, iii, 1974, n. 15, p.32. 8 tv, 247. 9 tv 257, 376. see also the letter ricci wrote to his father the 10 may 1605 in tv, 270-271. 10 tv, 367-368. «il frutto che facciamo si può comparare et anteporre con altre missioni, che al parere fanno cose meravigliose; percioché il tempo in che stiamo nella cina non è anco di raccolta, anzi né di seminare, ma di aprire i boschi fieri e combattere con le fiere e serpi velenose che qua dentro stanno. altri verranno 28 prajñâ vihâra con la gratia del signore che scriveranno le conversioni e fervori de’ christiani; ma sappi che fu necessario prima fare questo che noi facciamo, e ci hanno da dare a noi la maggior parte del merito, se però faremo questo che facciamo con la carità che dobbiamo» (letter to fr. gerolamo costa , 14 agosto 1599, tv, 246). 11 fr, ii, n. 540, p. 55. in a letter to the father general (8 march 1608), ricci asks for books of mathematics and astrology to be sent, because «through our sciences there is much to be gained by christianity» (tv, 343). see also: r.p. henribernard, le père matthieu ricci et la société chinoise de son temps (1552-1610), tianjin 1937, vol. i, pp. 329-332. 12 “tianzhu shiyi”(1603). “the true meaning of the lord of heaven” (chinese-english), taipei, 1985. for a french translation see: “lettres édifiantes et curieuses concernant l’asie, l’afrique et l’amérique », edited by m.l. aime-martin. in italian: “scelta di lettere edificanti scritte dalle missioni straniere”, milano 1825, pp. 495-702, “ragionamenti di un letterato cinese e di un dottore europeo”(from now on “cr”). 13 cfr. c. portatadino, op. cit., p. 34. see also j. sedes, “a bridge between east and west: father matteo ricci, his time, his life, and his method of cultural accommodation” in acts of the international symposium on chinese-western cultural interchange in commemoration of the 400th anniversary of the arrival of matteo ricci in china, taipei-taiwan, september 1983, p. 591. 14 see for instance, j. gernet, chine et christianisme, action et réaction, paris, 1982. cina e cristianesimo, casale monferrato 1984, p. 33. 15 cfr. fr, ii, n. 709, p. 296. 16 cfr. fr, i, nn. 178, 55, pp. 118-119, 40; p. corradini, confucio e il confucianesimo, fossano (cuneo) 1973, p. 79. 17 fr, i, nn. 180-181, p. 120. cf. the letter to father general of the 4 november 1595 in tv, 203. see also r.p. henri-bernard, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 110-112. 18 cfr. fr, ii, n. 556, p. 74; cr, pp. 519-527; tv, 387 19 cfr. fr, ii, n. 556, p. 74; cr, pp. 519-527; tv, 387. 20 as the cenotaph written by prof. isidoro del lungo the 11 may 1919 on the occasion of the iii centenary of the death would have it. this cenotaph is to be found in the corridor of macerata university. 21 h. boehmer, die jesuitem. eine historische skizze, leipzig 1907, p. 107 22 k. schipper, il corpo taoista, roma 1983, pp. 25-26. 23 a. bavaj, “padre matteo ricci e il suo metodo di apostolato” in sviluppi delle celebrazioni marchigiane: uomini insigni del maceratese, macerata 1936, p. 6; g. natali, il secondo confucio, estratto dalla “rivista politica e letteraria”, settembre 1900, p. 21. 24 cf. l. giussani, all’origine della pretesa cristiana, milano 1987, pp. 88109 25 m. marcocchi, colonialismo, cristianesimo e culture extraeuropee, milano 1981, p. 37. 26 yen yong lien s., “traité de l’amitié par li ma t’eou d’europe»,recherches de science religieuse, 72/1 (1984), pp. 59-70. andrea bonazzi 29 27 cf. l. giussani, il senso religioso, milano 1970, pp. 13-52. 28 p.m. d’elia, il domma cattolico integralmente presentato da matteo ricci ai letterati della cina, “la civiltà cattolica”, ii, 1935, pp. 35-53. see also fr, ii, n. 709, pp. 297-298. 29 cf. j. scheuer, l’inculturation, “lumen vitae”, xxxix, bruxelles 1984, n. 3, pp. 251-259; g. chantraine, evangelizzazione e inculturazione, “il nuovo areopago”, iv, 1984, n. 4, pp. 23-34. 30 “not only does there appear a strange inability to understand christianity or missions adequately from within – as one rightly tries to do in regard to foreign religions – on its own merit as it were, but also, in regard to missions particularly, a propensity to evaluate it first and foremost according to its faults (which are indeed many) and to misunderstand it as to its intentions and role. current hearsay is often used as a sufficient basis for judgment” (h. kraemer, world cultures and world religions. the coming dialogue, philadelphia, 1960, p. 84) 31 “behind this condemnatory or unsympathetic attitude is hidden not only a deep misunderstanding of the gospel, but also a curiously inhibited view of the western invasion. the arguments one meets everywhere, in able writers and in the mouths of western businessmen and civil servants, runs as follows ‘why do missions disturb and penetrate into these eastern structures and religions, introducing an alien element? they have no right to do so.’ the simple answer is first that the whole western invasion, cultural, economic and political, represented in civil servants, business men, teachers etc. perpetrates the same thing by disturbing as an alien element the eastern structures of culture and religion. yet these agents of the great disturbance do not dream of applying the demand to quit, which they direct towards missions, to themselves. (…) this whole kind of reasoning is at bottom rather childish, because logically speaking it excludes all spiritual free trade, which is the life-blood of true cultural life. at the same time it betrays the modern fallacy of the west: that is, treating religion as an isolated sector of human life.” (h. kraemer, op. cit., pp. 82-83). cf. s. bocchini, il missionario di fronte alle culture, “mondo e missione”, 1979, nn. 13-14, pp. 387-409. see also f. di giorgio, il vangelo in cinese, in “litterae communionis”, a ix, luglio/agosto 1982, n. 7/8, pp. 38-42. 32 “evangelii nuntiandi”, n. 20. 33 cf. l. giussani, all’origine della pretesa cristiana, cit., pp. 17-49. 34 see “message of his holiness pope john paul ii for the fourth centenary of the arrival in beijing of the great missionary and scientist matteo ricci” (message to the participants in the international conference commemorating the fourth centenary of the arrival in beijing of father matteo ricci, 24 october 2001). text available on http://www.vatican.va or www.zenit.org. 35 http://larouchein2004.org/pages/speeches/2001/011016dialogueof cultures.htm 36 about the controversy see: the church in the age of absolutism and enlightenment / by wolfgang müller ... [et al.]; translated by günther j. holst. — new york: crossroad, 1989, — (history of the church / edited by hubert jedin and john dolan; v. 6) translation of: die kirche im zeitalter des absolutismus und der 30 prajñâ vihâra aufklärung. andrea bonazzi 31 05_(68-86)disability from philosophica disability from philosophical perspective pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin mahidol university, thailand บทคัดย่อ "พิการ" เป็นคำท่ีสามารถเป็นอุปสรรคแก่ความเข้าใจได้ เน่ืองจากภาพ ลวงจากความท่ีเป็นคำสามัญท่ัวไป อันท่ีจริงคำน้ีนับเป็นทางบรรจบของปรัชญา และการปฏิบัติเน่ืองจากสามารถเข้าใจความหมายได้หลากหลาย ข้ึนอยู่กับกรอบ แนวคิดทางปรัชญาท่ีขัดแย้งและมีนัยเชิงนโยบายอันแตกต่างกัน ในบรรดากรอบ แนวคิดเหล่าน้ี ท่ีทรงอิทธิพลได้แก่รูปแบบเชิงการแพทย์และรูปแบบเชิงสังคม แม้ว่ารูปแบบเชิงสังคมจะเป็นปฏิปักษ์กับรูปแบบเชิงการแพทย์ แต่ก็มีฐานคติแบบ เดส์การ์ตเช่นเดียวกัน จึงนำสู่การกดข่ีคนพิการไม่น้อยไปกว่ากัน ประเด็นน้ีถูก เปิดโปงในงานด้านการร้ือโครงสร้างของนักวิชาการสายหลังสมัยใหม่/หลังโครง สร้างในทุพลภาพศึกษา ดังน้ัน จึงได้นำเสนอกรอบแนวคิดของฟูโกสำหรับการ ปลดปล่อยผู้พิการ โดยมิให้มีการกดข่ีเป็นผลตามมาด้วยน้ัน เพ่ือให้ง่ายแก่การ พิจารณา จึงนำเสนอผลการวิจัยผ่านกรณีศึกษาของ เธเรซา ชาน สตรีผู้มีความพิการ ซ้ำซ้อนท่ีได้รับการบอกเล่าในภาพยนตร์ท่ีได้รับรางวัลเร่ือง “be with me” abstract “disability” is a term that can be very disabling to our comprehension because of its illusory commonness. embedded in conflicting philosophical frameworks with different policy implications, it is such an intersection of the philosophical and the practical. most influential among these frameworks are the medical model and the social model of disability. despite its declared animosity toward the former, the latter shares its cartesian presuppositions and therefore leads to no less oppression of the disabled. this is exposed in the work of deconstruction by later postmodern/ 68 prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 68-86 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ poststructuralist scholars in disability studies. to liberate the disabled without oppressive side effects, a foucauldian framework is thus offered as an alternative. the case study of “theresa chan”, a multiple-disabled woman as portrayed in the award-winning film, “be with me”, is herein used to facilitate the presentation of the research results. 1. introduction although it seems simple, the term, “disabled” is a complicated concept whose meaning varies from one philosophical framework to another. and the adoption of one framework over the others has great implications on social policies. in this research report, the two widely adopted frameworks are subject to critical analysis, and an alternative framework developed within the foucauldian tenet is considered. the case study of “theresa chan”, a multiple-disabled woman as portrayed in the awardwinning film, “be with me”, is herein used to provide a common ground for the analysis. 2. theresa chan the winner of five international awards, the film “be with me” was inspired by the autobiography of theresa chan’. becoming deaf at 12 and blind at 14 years old, the multiple-disabled lady was in her 60’s at the time of the film production. she was able to communicate through word-by-word pronunciation but unable to hear her own voice. she was once in love, but cancer took her fianceè away. despite all these tragedies, she was a perfect human being fully living her life. she devoted herself teaching disabled students and depended on her own strong self when she travelled, cooked, exercised and wrote her autobiography. apart from chan, the film features three inter-woven story lines. in “meant to be”, a story is told of an old man incapable of facing the truth that his wife had departed. although a shopkeeper, he was a talented cook. his estranged son, a social worker taking care of chan, eventually introduced the old man to her, who cured his distress of departure with 69pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin her autobiography and gentle touch. in another story, “so in love”, two teenage girls, jackie and sam, developed a romantic intimacy keeping contact by mean of texting through the internet and cell phones. the love, serious and passionate for jackie, was considered by sam to be experimentation. upon finding a new boyfriend, sam left. “finding love”, is a story of secret love, told about fatty koh, a security guard in a big office building who fell in love with a lady executive. she was confident, beautiful and stylish, which was quite contrary to the timid, coward security guard haunted by childhood memories of family violence. each day, koh was obsessed with only three kinds of activities: eat, watch the lady, and plan a confession of love. he finally decided to give the lady a love letter. yet, he was killed on the way when someone dropped on him. that person from the sky was the heartbroken jackie, who had committed suicide by jumping off a building. the social worker came in and took care of the surviving girl. it was probable that he would be a bridge for jackie to meet with chan, the life inspirer. why is it said above that chan is a “perfect” human being? the film communicates this idea through pictures of activities. chan did everything that other characters did; but not everything that chan did was done by each one of the characters. the old man cooked and read; fatty koh ate and wrote a letter; jackie and sam went to school, wrote and sent texts through the internet and cell phones, and enjoyed leisure. chan did all these: she cooked and ate, wrote and sent, went to school, and enjoyed leisure. there was but one trait that she didn’t share. that was found in the case of koh stricken with the memory of his abusing parents. chan was different for she was not haunted by the tragic past. it is evident that koh was the only character who never touched love no matter whether it was from his parents, colleagues, the office lady, or even chan. an objection may be raised that koh was not different since he suffered from a tragic past just like the others. a closer consideration shows that his tragic past was not due to a broken heart but to ‘injustice’, which can be related to chan, for whom the multiple disabilities and the departure of the loved one can be described as ‘unjust’ fates. another remarkable feature was that koh solely was a ‘taker’, which was portrayed through the scenes of his eating and also through that in which he was unable to be a ‘giver’, i.e. 70 prajna vihara~ when in an elevator and incapable even to move himself to help a boy being abused by his father. koh’s obsession with the past injustice and inability to be a giver are what prevents him from becoming a perfect human being. there is one thing that chan did while all others didn’t __ chan gave. all other characters desired to ‘take’ from someone whereas chan, who suffered most, gave love to everyone. in the end before meeting with chan, the old shopkeeper cooked for chan upon the request of his son, the social worker; and he cooked to his best even though chan was not yet ‘somebody’ to him. just then, the old man became what chan was the one who gave without discrimination. finally, he met and received love from chan, the universal love that inspired, comforted, and gave life a meaning. more than this, one activity that all characters evidently shared throughout the film was the travel, which reminded us of samasara. it seems, on the path of life, only those can find the true happiness who are self-emancipated from injustice, in quest of love, and offering love. 3. “impairment” or “disability” the story of theresa chan provides an excellent means to understand disability from a philosophical perspective. people can be surprised if someone says it is more appropriate to say that chan is ‘impaired’ rather than ‘disabled’. why? that is because of the assumption that impairment and disability are one and the same. endorsement and refutation of this assumption is a key to grasping the debate on the definition of disability. those who agree with such identification are thinking within the philosophical framework of medical model. in thailand, they usually are healthcare personnel, social workers, policy makers, and people in general. as a result, it can be deemed as the mainstream understanding of disability. those who find the above assumption disagreeable support the social model of disability. they usually are scholars in the field of disability studies and advocates of the rights of people with disabilities. the social model has not yet been mainstream __ not only in thailand, where it was recently introduced, but also in the west, especially the usa, where the disability rights advocates declared the victory of the 71pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin social model in 1990 when the americans with disabilities act (ada) was enacted. the reason is that progress in bio-medical science and technology (e.g. cloning, genetic selection, advanced prosthetics, etc.) carries with it the presupposition that disabilities are physical, including the implication of discrimination against disability and the determination to eliminate them. impairment is a kind of bodily defects, formal and/or functional. disability is an inability to perform daily, social and occupational activities as normal people do. according to the medical model, the disability is a natural consequence of the impairment. therefore, for people with impairments, disabilities are inevitable, and this holds true in every social context. however, michael oliver, who first introduced the philosophical framework of the social model, challenged this idea by arguing that disablement doesn’t result from physical impairments, but from social arrangements. that is, people with impairments are ‘dis-abled’ by social institutions. therefore, the disablement is the result of social oppression. in other word, people with impairments are not dis-abled in the just society. the term, ‘oppression’, is used because, according to the social model, the society does not pay attention to the needs of impaired people and draws the resources that should be allocated to meet these needs to benefit the majority of people who do not suffer from impairments. the new definition of disability inaugurated by oliver is welcomed even by normal people because it draws attention to the fact that all of us can somehow be dis-abled when the social arrangements are not suitable. different situations testify to this insight e.g. tourists who cannot understand language on street signs, young boys who cannot use relatively too high a urinal, children who cannot reach a public telephone, pregnant women and elderly people who cannot climb up stairs. the social model can free disabled people from various, especially emotional, impacts from the medical model, within which the goal is to change them to be like normal people. the latter model is embedded in the cartesian dualistic framework, which separates mind from body. the human self is identified with the mind that should be under the control of reason. the body, in which the mind resides, is just one among other physical objects in the world and thus subject to the external control, the 72 prajna vihara~ natural laws. according to this framework, the mind should be in control of the body the way science controls the natural world. as for people with impairments, their mind seems to fail to control their body. many succumb to grief over their own fate, fail in rehabilitation, and give up their efforts. these are signs that they do not meet the standard of what it is to be a human being. the other side of the same coin is the appreciation given to those impaired persons who never grieve over their own fate, succeed in their rehabilitation, and never give up despite failures. both derision and admiration confirms the cartesian framework, which even leads the impaired people to blame and punish themselves. the advocates of the social model consider it to be unjust the expectation to change the impaired people so that they have the characteristics of the ‘human beings’ as defined by the cartesian framework. many kinds of impairments defy rehabilitation, which means that many impaired people are cursed to always fail. according to the social model, instead of the impaired people themselves, the spotlight should be on the society. indeed, people with impairments are not ‘the losers’ but ‘the oppressed’. the shift of perspective greatly restores impaired people’s selfesteem and encourages them to fight against the oppression. eventually, the social model becomes highly influential among disability rights advocates and scholars in the disability studies. 4. “impairment” in “disability” however, deconstruction by the later postmodern/poststructuralist scholars in the disability studies discloses that, in fact, the social model supports the medical model. therefore, this makes it not a surprise the above example from the usa, in which the admiration for the successful campaign for the ada is side by side with the dismay caused by the scientific and technological progress. the attempt of those working on the basis of the social model to turn the dis-abled into the able __ so that they are just like the normal __ is the clear sign that, in the social model, the same goal as found in the medical model is present __ to change impaired persons to be like normal persons. this is to use ‘the normal person’ as ‘the norm’, which can be termed, ‘normalization’. moreover, the carte73pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin sian idea of ‘mind over matter’ is also present. a difference is that, as for the social model, ‘matter’ is understood as the physical environment and social arrangements, rather than the body as it is the case in the medical model. consequences from the medical and the social models are therefore similar. in the context of new and ‘enabling’ infrastructure acquired through campaigns based on the social model, any disabled people who fail in rehabilitation are subject to emotional pressure and humiliation, and labeled as ‘losers’ and ‘burdens’ by their kind, normal people who ‘pay the tax’, and the state who provides the welfare system, which leads to similar experience they undergo in the framework of medical model i.e. self-blame and self-punishment. moreover, the social model lends support to the medical model in another dimension through its implicit reiteration of the idea that the impairment cannot be separated from the disablement. even though the social model’s definition of disability helps people to realize that dis-ability is common experience, none at all call them ‘people with disabilities’ those normal people who are dis-abled by the infrastructure. this is an indirect confirmation that the term, ‘disabled’, is specifically for the impaired people. therefore, both the medical and the social models do not only highlight the presence of impairment, but also insist that they belong to the natural, not social, realm. postmodern/post-structuralist scholars in the disabilities studies, especially those influenced by michel foucault, question the idea of ‘mind over matter’ and that of impairment as belonging to the realm of nature. they argue that the mind is actually constituted by an external condition i.e. discourse that constructs reality and deploys both the material (e.g. the body, objects, spaces) and the mental (e.g. self-identity) in such a way that they are in agreement with the constructed reality. the important point is that ‘normality’ as a discursive construct provides a criterion for constructing ‘abnormality’, which includes ‘impairment’. the discursive power drives the process of normalization with the effort to turn the abnormal into the normal. therefore, the true oppression stems from ‘the good will’ to help impaired people to be normal or close to normality no matter whether it is understood in terms of ‘normal body’ (in the medical model) or of ‘normal way of life’ (in the social model). 74 prajna vihara~ why is the normalization considered to be a form, or even the origin of all forms, of oppression? in the west, it is disclosed that the model of normal human being is the white, heterosexual, and able-bodied male. based on this model of normality, abnormality is constructed. of course, those who fall into this category are homosexuals, non-whites, women, and impaired persons. this provides a justification for subjecting them to the process of normalization. however, since they will never fit the normal model, the process continues forever. therefore, it is not unreasonable to deem oppressive the constant effort to change people into something they can never be. power has both repressive and productive dimensions. for the discursive power to operate, targeting mechanisms are needed. they are based on categorization which individualizes people. each individualized person is given an identity, the intersection of categories to which she belongs. identity is therefore nothing more than the categories that define an individual. there is no self over and above these categories. therefore, according to foucault, the individual as the discursive product can be understood as the ‘subject’, who is not only ‘subject to’ the discursive power, but also has ‘subjectivity’ defined by that power. in addition, normalization is not only exercised from without but also from within; the external and the internal are both constructed by and subject to the same totalizing discourses. in self-surveillance, individuals observe and discipline themselves as if they were in a panopticon, a kind of prison proposed by jeremy bentham. foucault offered it as the model for understanding self-surveillance. in the panopticon, illuminated prison cells form a ring around a central tower of guards that is kept out of light. since they can never be sure whether the guards are around in the tower and since they are well aware of their own visibility, the prisoners have to always behave as if they are being watched. eventually, they become the guards to themselves. from this, it can be seen that individuals unknowingly are representatives of power despite their sense of self-agency. more than that, apart from themselves, they act as the agent of power to control, or normalize, others. the true horror of oppression is therefore not in its repressive violence, but in the subjectification and agency of power. for instance, when women’s beauty is defined with thinness, it is the women who play 75pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin the active roles in observing and ‘disciplining’ themselves (e.g. through diet, exercise, weight-losing pills) in order to meet the beauty criterion. likewise, among different mechanisms, including social work and rehabilitation that produce and maintain the understanding that impaired people are the disabled, one can find those mobilized by disability rights advocates and people with impairments. the foucauldian framework enables one to see that the ‘good will’ of the social model is not different from that of the medical model in that it too supports oppression. the philosophical framework of the social model implicitly maintains that impairment belongs to the natural realm. at the same time, it approves the bio-medical scientific categorization of body and impairments, the knowledge of which is necessary for implementation of welfare policies. moreover, as the social model advocates launch campaigns to urge the government to provide different welfare systems to support people with impairments, they encourage development of more meticulous and detailed systems of categorization that are needed for individualizing impaired people in the process to select ‘appropriate’ welfare recipients. and the acquired supportive systems put pressure on impaired people with the expectation that they succeed in living a normal life. however, if it is true as foucault pointed out that reality is discursively constructed so that human self does not even exist, it seems none can deal with the oppressive power. a question that follows is how the oppressed can be emancipated. 5. neither “impaired” nor “disabled” the above foucauldian ideas belong to the earlier period, which rest on the two poles of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ (i.e. categorization). these cannot be separated and thus are referred to as ‘power/knowledge’. as for the later period, foucault introduced another pole, ‘self’, whose existence seems to be denied by his earlier thought. the later foucault studied about the ancient greeks and found that people then focused on stylizing their self to make it beautiful like a work of art. in this process, they took care of the self through self-reflection based on the norms defined by power/knowledge, and through self-formation based 76 prajna vihara~ on that reflection. therefore, foucault sees that, before power and knowledge can create the subject, they must interact with the self. usually, the self is passive letting power/knowledge to mold the subject. as shown in the above example, women let power/knowledge to construct their subjectivity and consequently try in every way to keep thin. processes in the society that lead to these women’s subjectivity and contribute to their weight-keeping efforts are called, ‘technologies of power’, which include ridicule of ‘fat’ women, skinny models on magazine covers, weight-control clinics, etc. however, the greek lesson shows that the self can have an active role. although it still relies on power/knowledge and technologies of power, it transforms them into ‘technologies of the self’. the starting point, according to foucault, is the criticality known as ‘limit attitude’, which is to be in quest of the limits of our being, doing, or thinking. in other words, it is to search for possibilities of not being, doing, or thinking as we are. when the limit is discovered, one can start to form one’s self in a way different from that within the limit constructed by discourse. the product of the quest is an understanding about the kind of subject formed by the discourse through the technologies of power. this understanding includes the rationality that legitimizes the discourse. the understanding is vital because, if lacking, the emancipatory activities will instead become oppressive. for instance, in their resistance to sexual oppression, if women does not take into account the rationality that provides the basis for the oppressive practice and struggle against it by way of doing everything opposite to those prescribed by society, they eventually lend support to what they are against. some women wear revealing clothes or are sexually liberal to rebel against the social prescriptions. unknowingly, these support the rationality for women’s subjugation because they are raised as evidence to confirm that women lack conscience and self-control on the one hand, and that they are sex objects on the other hand. the resisted discourse is thus strengthened, rather than challenged. the critical attitude, which initiates self-formation through technologies of the self, needs to be maintained. it is analogous to an artist who has to keep critically assessing her own work while in the creative process. therefore, foucault called this constant care of the self, ‘aesthetics of existence’. his concept of ethics plays an important role in this 77pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin resistance through self-formation. according to foucault, ‘morality’ prescribes the sort of subject that discourse aims to mold while ‘ethics’ is how a person relates to morality. ethics is therefore the way to negotiate with morality. foucault saw that the former was the practice of the ancient greeks while the latter belonged to the modern period. even though prescriptions of conduct existed in the time of greeks, the focus was on individuals’ styles, interpretations of these prescriptions. individuals during that time were therefore free to a certain extent in their decision of how to relate to the norms. ethics is thus a resource for the ‘ethics of existence’, affirmation of freedom through self-formation. however, in the modern time, the focus shifted from individuals’ styles to the prescriptions themselves, which deprived individuals of interpretive liberty. the social norms thus demanded, with punitive threats, strict observance. a return to the greek way was urged in order to change from the passive attitude of subjectification to the active attitude of self-formation. according to foucault, the ethical practices comprise the following four elements. 1. ontology or ethical substance: it constitutes an ethical concern. for example, as for the ancient greeks, their concern was ‘aphrodisiac’, the practices of sexuality; as for christians, their concern was the spirit; as for people with impairments, their concern is the body. 2. deontology or mode of subjection: this is how one relates to the ethical substance. for instance, the ancient greek individuals’ care of the substance was voluntary. as for the christians and the impaired people, the relation to the ethical substances is in the form of obligation. 3. ascetics or elaboration of ethical work: ascetic are those activities and methods utilized to become the subject as desired. the ancient greeks’ ascetics is stylization e.g. through gymnastics. christian ascetic practice is self-discipline e.g. by way of self-confession. likewise, the impaired people elaborate their ethical work through self-discipline e.g. rehabilitation. 4. telos: it is the goal of subjectification, the kind of subject to create. the ancient greeks aimed at self-mastery; the christians’ goal was to become without sins; the impaired people want to be normal or able. 78 prajna vihara~ based on understanding of the exiting ontology and telos, resistance is carried on with voluntary deontology. the ascetics is thereby separated from the ‘telos’ and attached to a new one. therefore, a person can benefit from the technologies for ascetic practice by subjecting them to the new telos. in case of people with impairments, they need to resist by abandoning the telos to be like normal people while using the available technologies (e.g. medicine, rehabilitation, social welfare, ngo’s, etc.) to serve a new telos. then, they can attain freedom or autonomy. autonomy is usually understood as absolute freedom. however, the above does not lead to such freedom. the resistant are still bound to their contexts. actually, the quest for autonomy is possible in the contexts whose possibilities are structured by power, especially its technologies. this is not to say that the achieved autonomy is not true because, according to foucault, autonomy is intertwined with heteronomy. this was clear in time of the ancient greeks when a method to take care of the self was to seek a teacher. through earlier dependency on teachers, students were later able to depend on themselves. even though the resistance as freedom seems to be personal, it implies relationship with others. the separation of telos from ascetics is a challenge to the discourse that unifies them. thereby, both the categorization and the rationality are disturbed. in addition, the resistance to the discursive power is a fight against normalization, which reaches everyone. at the same time, foucault encouraged friendship as the mode of relating to others which, because of its requirement to accept others as they are, presupposes differences between the parties and prevents one from being an agent of normalizing power. this kind of relationship therefore allows others to form their selves. however, this is not easy. because power is to make others do what one wants and people inevitably wants others to do as they want, it is impossible to be free of power. foucault consequently proposed a principle of minimal domination. he also defined friendship as a ‘way of life’, which can be shared among people with differences. in other words, ‘a way of life’ is characterized by its not being institutionalized, which means that it does not have norms that can easily lead to normalization. as is shown above, the social model leads to new forms of oppression because it fell victim to the institutionalization. the ‘way of life’ is in agreement with 79pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin the process of self-formation, the aesthetics of existence carried out throughout life. an escape from the totalizing discourse, self-creation is not easy because the telos and ascetics are not easy to identify; the rationality underlying the discourse is not easy to analyze. and, even though the rationality is recognized, it is not easy to overcome because our understanding of reality is conditioned by it. these do not only lead to a failure of resistance but also transform the resistance into an ally. moreover, even when the legitimizing rationality is disclosed, it is not possible to imagine a resistance as a collective movement (e.g. by the impaired people) since this will eventually lead to institutionalization that starts another cycle of normalization. a good example is the authors’ direct experience when this research was presented in a conference. a debate started among the audiences about terms that should be used to address people with impairments. their common goal was to find a term that did not imply the normal/abnormal distinction for fear that, if otherwise, it might lead to discriminations. from the foucauldian perspective, since the new term functions to remind people of the normal/abnormal distinction and thereby maintain the foundation of discrimination, such goal should be relinquished. however, if so, people who still need to talk about people with impairments have to use the terms that are widely used in the society and functioning in the normalization process. therefore, from this example, it can be seen that the totalizing discourse can deploy both the new and the old terms to support itself. consequently, although according to the above arguments, the foucauldian framework is superior to those of the medical and the social model in the effort to understand the nature of impairment and disability, its application is not clear and is still a topic of debates among scholars who adopted the later foucault’s ideas in the fields of disabilities studies, women’s studies, education, organization theory, sociology of sport, etc. one of the difficulties stems from the attempts to discover resistance methods for use in the collective level. the generalized solutions are open to discursive deployment as shown in the above example. moreover, foucault himself seemed to suggest that one should avoid acting as a representative for a collectivity for it may lead to a normalizing attitude. there80 prajna vihara~ fore, the best way to apply the foucauldian framework is by way of case studies to understand individuality. yet, it should be careful not to utilize the study results as models for other cases in such a way that normalization follows. the case studies should give inspiration to individuals in their self-formation. while it is not clear, in an individual’s care for their self, what should be chosen as a new telos and how the technologies should be diverted to serve self-formation, it is clear how we individuals should treat others. we should let them be. thus, impaired people should not be subject to rehabilitating processes so that they show as much as possible appearances and abilities akin to those of normal people. in other word, to let them live with the kind of bodies they have is a form of friendship. for instance, instead of inconvenient artificial legs, an impaired person should be allowed to use a roller board or even move on the ground with hands if that suits the person’s desire. people should not impose their opinion that, since such choices look demeaning, the person should walk on legs like normal people. although it seems easy to open space for people to choose their telos and transform the technologies of power into technologies of the self, one complication that one should bear in mind is that this should be based on understanding of the legitimizing rationality. 5. theresa chan and michel foucault theresa chan’s story is best understood within the foucauldian framework. from the foucauldian perspective of ethical practices, chan’s ethical substance seems to be love rather than the body as prescribed by the discourse of disabilities. to serve her telos of non-discriminate giving, chan made use of the available technologies e.g. braille, typewriter, education, residence and occupation provided by social welfares. superficially, she seemed to be one among those disabled people who subject themselves to normalization through these technologies. however, a closer consideration shows that, despite her perfect abilities to live like a normal person, she went beyond that by applying these abilities to serve others. she wrote the inspiring autobiography, taught students with disabilities, gave warm comfort to suffering persons. to sum up, her ascetics is to help 81pagorn singsuriya and wipada aungsumalin people. why the foucauldian framework? it seems the medical and the social models suffice for understanding chan. can we say that chan achieved the goal of the medical model i.e. had an appearance and physical functioning enjoyed by normal people? it is not so. although, looking like other elderly ladies, she did not have a problem with her appearance, the functioning of her eyes and ears could never be restored. yet, from the rehabilitative perspective derived from the medical model, she was considered to achieve the goal never to surrender to physical limitations. however, this is not sufficient to understand chan’s story. since the medical model focuses on the body and its functioning, it aims at a personal victory over her own body. in addition, there was a scene in which chan was swimming and a lady beside the pool could not hold her laughter. this too highlights the failure of the medical model whose goal is to fit people into the model of ideal human being i.e. the ‘normal’ person. even though chan was able to perform normal people’s activities, her impairments __ the mark of abnormality __ were still present. the laughter lends support to the idea held by the social model that the society oppresses people with disabilities and therefore highlights the motive to struggle against the social prejudices and achieve facilities that give abilities to the presently dis-abled people. pushing for reforms of infrastructure and social welfares for people with disabilities, the social model emphasizes a victory over the society. the film portrayed chan as the one who enjoyed this kind of victory while the roles of medical technology and physical therapy were not present. however, it is undeniable that, no matter how many facilities are won, the laughter remains if the sole aim is for the impaired people to become like normal people. may be, the social model implicitly enjoys such laughter because it helps maintain the rationale for campaigning. moreover, since the social model focuses on abilities, it can be said that people with impairments can be superior to normal people if the former has better abilities. this kind of superiority was not portrayed in the film at all. chan performed ordinary activities i.e. ate, cooked, read, wrote, cleaned her place, travelled, etc. more than that, chan lacked the attitude required by the social model. unlike fatty koh, chan was never obsessed with injustice. this was reiterated in the above scene in which chan was 82 ~prajna vihara~ totally untouched by the laughter. knowing that people in general felt that disabilities were pathetic, chan wrote the autobiography of the life with multiple disabilities to inspire readers. this shows that, while chan depends on others, she depends on herself. while the society defined her with impairments, she utilized that definition to serve her telos. this was in contrast to other characters who, despite their apparent autonomy, depended on others so much that they could not live their life when the people that they were attached to left them. chan did everything the other characters did but not with the same goal. her autonomy provides the reason for adopting the foucauldian framework to understand her story. on the other hand, it is now evident that the case of theresa chan can facilitate an understanding of the foucauldian framework. 6. acknowledgements this research was under the project, “religions and people with disabilities”, directed by rachasuda college, mahidol university and funded by health systems research institute (hsri) in collaboration with thai health promotion foundation (thpf) and sirindhorn national medical rehabilitation centre (snmrc). deep 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(2001). sociological imperialism and the profession of medicine revisited: where are we now? sociology of health and illness 23(2), pp.135-158. 86 prajna vihara~ 05_(76-89) wisdom traditions nature and inherent human values.pmd wisdom traditions, nature and inherent human values leon miller tallinn university of technology, estonia “to see the world in a grain of sand and heaven in a wild flower, to hold infinity in the palm of your hand and eternity in an hour.” (william blake, auguries of innocence) º·¤ñ́ âèí èòê¹òâø¤áãกàãôèá¹ñé¹àãõâกกñ¹çèò �¸ããá»ãðླõ»ãõªò­ò³� «öè§à»ç¹ªèç§กèí¹ ·õèá¹øéâì̈ ðãùé́ õãùéªñèç àòçðàº×éí§µé¹·õèá¹øéâìกåáกå×¹กñº¸ããáªòµô¹õéµéí§à¼ªô­กñºกòã á·ãก᫧¢í§èòê¹òã¹âø¤ãëáè íñ¹áõ¼å·óãëé¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹ ì̧¢í§á¹øéâìáåð¸ããáªòµô à»åõèâ¹ä»ã¹çô¶õ·ò§·õèá¹øéâì¤ãíº§ó¸ããáªòµô çô·âòèòêµãìáåð»ãñª­òµèò§กçâö́ ¶×í á¹ç·ò§¢í§µ¹ã¹กòã·õè̈ ðèöกéòàççô·âò¢í§กòã´óã§íâùèâ´âáõèù¹âìกåò§íâùè·õèกòããñºãùé ¢í§á¹øéâìáåðáñก¨ðåðàåâกòãºùã³òกòãกñº¸ããáªòµô º·¤çòá¹õé¾âòâòááí§âéí¹ กåñºä»·õè �¸ããá»ãðླõ»ãõªò­ò³� à¾×èíáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò �¸ããá»ãðླõ»ãõªò­ò³� áõêèç¹·óãëéá¹øéâìáõºùã³òกòã·õèåéóåöกกñº¸ããáªòµôä é́íâèò§äã «ö觨óà»ç¹µèí¤çòáà¨ãô­ §íก§òá¢í§á¹øéâì º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ðáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò ­ò³ëâñè§àëç¹àëåèò¹õé̈ ðêñ§à¤ãòðëì กñºçô·âòèòêµãì »ãñª­ò áåðèòê¹òêáñâãëáèä é́íâèò§äã abstract early religions have often been called “wisdom traditions” and represent a stage of human existence that was prior to knowledge of good and evil. this initial harmonious state in nature was disrupted by more modern religions, resulting in a more dominating relationship with nature. science and philosophy has further pursued their own investigations into the ontological nature of existence, centered on human perception and often ignoring our prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 76-89 2000 by assumption university pressc -~76 integration with nature. this paper attempts to look back to the earlier “wisdom traditions” to show how they can contribute to a deeper integration with nature which is essential to human flourishing. it will show how these insights can be synthesized with the insights from modern science, philosophy and religion. introduction western and eastern wisdom traditions assert that humanity was ordained, by the primordial forces shaping existence, to be well-integrated within the environment. western religious traditions describe this as a stage prior to the knowledge of good and evil, thus prior to judgments based on preconceptions (suggesting that human cognition was a factor in the initial period of existence). science and philosophy investigated the validity of such claims by pursuing empirical (rational) evidence concerning the nature of existence and how perception influences the human understanding of the nature of existence. the resulting evidence led scholars to conclude that perception is the basis of how we experience the phenomenal world. by understanding the role of perception in shaping the human experience of the phenomenal world we gain insight into how to sustain a focus on nature’s beneficial opportunities and avoid what is harmful to human well-being. as a result of such an inquiry we can better understand how to reduce the nature-human dualistic split. the world’s wisdom traditions assert that it is possible for humans to enjoy the feeling of being well-integrated with the environment and they prescribed how to maintain a perceptual focus on what is essential for human flourishing. such a perspective has long been prescribed by the world’s wisdom traditions as the key to human flourishing. the world’s wisdom traditions have asserted that this is a preferable perspective from which to view and experience existence. they also state that the subsequent alteration of this preferable perspective is unfortunate and should be rectified. by synthesizing insights from ancient wisdom, modern science, philosophy and religion we gain a better understanding of how humanity could enjoy a better-integrated experience with the environment. humanity’s understanding of the nature of existence is primarily based on perception. humanity has held a perspective on existence where nature leon miller 77 and human culture exist in dichotomy. but this perspective of nature has not always been the view through which humanity perceived and experienced the environment and is not the only view through which the nature-human relationship is based. it is possible and preferable to have a perspective that allows taking advantage of nature’s signaled opportunities for flourishing while diminishing what would threaten human well-being. being able to take advantage of this improved nature-human relationship is a matter of understanding how perception shapes the human perspective on ontology, thus shaping the human experience of existence. the first segment of this article describes why the human biological system has an inherent value preference for perceiving existence in a way that provides better nature-human compatibility. i offer a biological explanation to support the claim that humanity’s natural drive to be well-integrated within the environment is characteristic of how humanity’s biological nature is constituted. the second section of the article describes the possibility of enhancing the perception of the nature-human relationship. the enhanced perspective on the nature-human relationship (a perceptual focus on nature’s life enhancing opportunities) would contribute to human flourishing and aids humanity in enjoying more of what we value. the final section describes the significance that our natural value preference for cooperative interaction has for human culture, the progression of civilization and for improving the nature-culture relationship. a flourishing culture is built on increasing the range of internal and external beneficial interchanges. the world’s wisdom traditions have continued to proclaim that the highest level of being can be actualized when humanity holds such a perspective on existence and when this perspective shapes the practices of individuals. such a perspective takes us beyond a sense of dualistic contention into improved connections with the things we need to flourish. this is followed by a conclusion summarizing the arguments made in the article. the conclusion reemphasizes ontology and teleology (the natural preference for beings that are well-integrated with as many other aspects of existence as possible). humanity’s inherent value preference aristotle believed that all things (especially all organic things) exist 78 prajna vihara-~ with the ontological necessity of maintaining integrity without which they will begin to deteriorate (this includes both individuals and societies). aristotle’s naturalism prompted him to claim that knowledge is intended to increase our understanding of the teleological significance of natural processes plus to enhance our participation in natural processes.1 on the basis of this claim one could argue that realizing one’s full potential (entelechy) for happiness, flourishing and well-being is based on understanding the teleological significance of human interactions (intersubjective and with nature). because concern for the self is tied to a concern for having beneficial interactions with the environment-the only source of nourishment and growthgood (or that which benefits humanity) would be that which enables humanity to achieve its telos. bad (or that which harms) are those things which interfere with humans achieving telos or that which diminishes the quality of those things on which the human biological organism is dependent for existence. in other words intentionality is evident as a feature of nature’s telos. however, the value nature’s telos has for enriching human existence is dependent on humanity learning to shape encounters into beneficial and life enhancing outcomes. thus experiencing eudaimonia requires developing a character trait that as human beings (given the human biological and neurobiological nature) is needed to flourish-to do and fare well in this world in which we inevitably find ourselves-not just in the particular culture or society we happen to find ourselves in.2 in this respect the understanding of ethics needs to be expanded to include a particular new trait that would specify the importance interactions have to achieving human telos. humanity’s telos is preordained by the primordial biological forces that shaped patterns of natural interchange into complex structures of beneficial exchange (the very basis of life for the human organism and for human society is the ability to form structures of cooperative interchange). the fact that human behavior is directed at (or is about) veridical interaction with the natural order means that the ontological reason for human interactions is the natural human predisposition for seeking appropriate reintegration with the natural order. the elements of humanity’s biological nature demand nature-human reciprocal integration. the world’s earliest wisdom traditions all spoke about humanity’s initial, naturally ordained inclination for being well-integrated within the environment. the belief was that humanity’s initial immersion in nature was characterleon miller 79 istic of the way humanity’s biological nature is constituted. thus, the earliest conceptualization of the nature-human experience reflected a prescription for experiencing at-one-ment with the natural order. we are demanded by the urges of human nature to interact with the environment. the necessity of human interaction affirms that the nature of the human experience is enhanced when properly integrated with other elements in existence.3 in support of this claim the world wisdom traditions (eastern and western) have asserted that it is possible to have a well-integrated connection with nature (that is not only a source of nourishment and growth but also the basis of a heightened sense of well-being and harmony). recent research in cognitive science sheds light on the connection between humanity’s inherent biological impulses and perception thus on the significance of perception in the human experience of nature. studies in perceptual psychology and neurobiology reveal that the human inherent perceptual preference for viewing and experiencing nature-human interactions is complementarity.4 the theory of complementarity is rooted in gestalt theories of perception and was originally used to explain the figure-background dynamics involved in human perception. that is to say, in accordance with vygotsky’s social formation of the mind, that cognition serves the attempt to shape internal and external stimulus into complimentarity”.5 cognition prefers to achieve a complementary interaction between the perceiver and the perceived. modern research in complementarity, conducted by physicists, biologists, psychologists and sociologists agree that it explains the link between the biological aspects of human behavior, how individuals self-organize, the structuring of culture and the human relationship to the environment.6 in other words “the whole body (including the human cognitive abilities) is a biological self-organizing system that interacts with the environment in a way that shapes out of environmental possibilities a unique eco-niche that best complements its organism. nobel prize-winning neuroscientist gerald edelman implies that complementarity explains the fundamental connection between nature’s biological principles and the value preferences naturally triggered as human cognitive skills developed. the human neurological system (an extension of the human biological system) prompts a neurological value preference that reinforces behavior that promises an undisturbed enjoyment of nature’s beneficial opportunities.7 the struggle for survival in an unpredictable environment pre80 prajna vihara-~ disposes neural value preference. the preference is in favor of values, proven by natural selection, that contribute to shaping fortuitous encounters into an experience of life sustaining outcomes. he claims that humans are “hard wired”, with a neurobiological, value predisposition that developed with the intent to “reinvent” internal-external ecological equilibrium. many of the world’s wisdom traditions have always asserted that achieving the natural value preference for life-enhancing interactions with nature sparks regeneration, benefits health, increases human vitality and heightens mental abilities. eastern and western science would add that the complexity of the human organism is a composite of natural elements in cooperative interchange. these natural elements-reorganized into the form of a complex structure-still require reintegration with the environment (sparked by the biological nature of the organism) in the form of beneficial interchange with the environment. “this is because our complex structures are generated by conjunctive unions which depends on effectively integrating with others”.8 both myth and science agree that the human inherent value preference has been shaped into conceptions of what will satisfy natural biological drives. what has been ordained by existence was shaped into the earliest and most cherished cultural concepts of humanity. enhancing the perception of the nature-human relationship the drive for complementarity or for continuous reintegration-evident in the biological make-up of both nature and humans-can be thought of as the tie that binds all of existence into integral relatedness. science, philosophy and religion all agree that the integrity of complex organisms is enhanced by fulfilling the inherent urge for better nature-human compatibility and in the human situation helps the individual to experience a fuller sense of self. cooperative interchange can be thought of as a natural biological value preference that establishes the inclination for social cooperation and culture. this natural value preference has been expressed by the world’s wisdom traditions as the conviction that harmonious interaction is consistent with what was ontologically ordained to be best for human well-being and for the human experience in nature. leon miller 81 eastern and western perennial philosophy claim that viewing and experiencing existence from the perspective of humanity’s inherent value preference is personally beneficial, mentally beneficial (heightens cognitive abilities), and is socially beneficial. such a realization is more likely to result in the experience of elevated being. perennial philosophy has claimed that the fundamental biological principles of creation have encoded the organic elements of nature with intention that can be decoded by humans into an understanding of the teleological significance of existence. from the perspective of the most respected wisdom traditions of both the east and the west the teleological significance of existence is realizing how to enjoy the sense of elevated being. as human cognitive skills developed reliable knowledge was shaped by the human neural network firing in patterns aligned with the neural value preference. the value preference favored relating to things in nature in ways that shape environmental interactions into outcomes that are beneficial for individuals and cultures. such knowledge was key to human survival and the effort to organize flourishing cultures. in other words the thriving of humanity and culture was dependent on realizing that in spite of nature’s threats culture could produce accumulated knowledge of how to recognize nature’s signaled opportunities for growth and how to effectively manage the disturbances that would threaten the flourishing of the culture. many of the world’s wisdom traditions have asserted that achieving the natural value preference for lifeenhancing interactions with nature sparks regeneration, benefits health, increases human vitality and increases the feeling of holistic well-being. knowledge is considered reliable if it helps the individual to maintain organic integrity while interacting successfully with other aspects of the environment that are needed for flourishing. as a result of such cooperative interaction the fullest sense of self is actualized. it is such knowledge that is a preferable basis for the cultural belief systems regulating human interactions. the emergence of culture is indeed based on the recognition that structures of cooperative interactions work best for helping humanity face environmental challenges. charles sanders peirce asserted that knowledge of what extends units of cooperative interactions thus increasing life enhancement is discerned by accurately appraising the true nature of environmental signs. peirce claimed that patterns of natural interchange are evidence of biological elements intentionally participating in efforts to cooperatively form structures of beneficial exchange (the very basis of life for the human organism 82 prajna vihara-~ and for human society is the ability to form structures of cooperative interchange). flourishing depends on being able to recognize and participate in these opportunities for cooperative interchange. peirce would add that the recognition of ambiguity in nature is not due to environmental conditions alone as perception is contingent on the perspective of the experiencer. peirce argues that reliable knowledge reduces the disturbance of nature’s ambiguity by increasing the probability of anticipation becoming experience. peirce claimed that nature primarily acts on the basis of repeated patterns. these repeated patterns (that we call the laws of nature) he referred to as the principle of agape. peirce goes on to explain that there are always some spontaneous, unexpected disruptions that are characteristic of this dynamic creative force.9 because of such possible disruptions humans sensed that the opportunities in the environment were surrounded by possible interferences to the effort to gain satisfaction. this resulted in humans developing acute sensitivity to the ambiguity in the nature-human relationship. peirce realized that nature is filled with opportunities for nourishment, growth and regeneration. nature is also abundant with encounters best avoided. this can result in the impression that the dreadful aspects of the environment are juxtaposed to the individual, intentionality and culture. peirce however thought that attempts to avoid the distressing disturbances in nature are more successful as a result of accurately appraising nature’s signals, by acting on the basis of accurate knowledge and by extending the range of cooperative interchange. peirce believed that individuals act on the basis of knowledge that is believed to be reliable for effectively managing encounters with the environment. knowledge proven effective for managing these encounters is considered to be epistemologically reliable knowledge. peirce considered knowledge as reliable when it accurately describes how to enjoy nature’s life enhancing possibilities. according to peirce nature is abundant with signs that can be interpreted to understand how to enrich the human experience. thus he held that reliable knowledge guides the individual to perceive possibilities that nature provides for being internally and externally well-integrated. leon miller 83 the human inherent value preference for integral being the world’s wisdom traditions claim that the fundamental biological principles of creation have encoded within each and every human cell an intention that can be decoded by humans as an inherent value preference for extending the range of beneficial interchanges and interactions. from the perspective of the world’s wisdom traditions nature has ontologically structured the human organism so that it has a natural value preference for experiencing more beneficial interactions (intersubjectively, socially, and with the environment). i argue that all complex organisms sense this encoded ontological intention as a natural urge to be even better integrated and to experience enhanced cooperative interactions. in this respect prudence demands considering that the world’s wisdom traditions are right to admonish reconciling this breach between humans and nature in order to enjoy a more elevated human experience. the world’s traditional belief systems lay the foundation for the experience of integrity by promoting being in harmony with the primordial forces of existence as the means of being in harmony with the self. they prescribe integrity as a means of aligning human values and human actions with what has been intended by the natural forces of existence. the elements of one’s own physical make-up demand interaction with other elements in existence. we are aware that doing this successfully brings benefit. wisdom traditions advocate acts of integrity in order to promote the beneficial reintegration of elements necessary for growth and regeneration. this is the key to the experience of health and wholeness. we know that ineffectiveness in this regard can bring threat or harm. the threat is maximized to the extent that humanity fails in an attempt to be properly integrated with the other elements in the environment. the nature of phenomenal existence-a composite of the elements of nature constantly in interchange in the effort to experience reintegration-makes evident the fact that the world is not made up of atomistic entities juxtaposed to each other. in other words, in accordance with aristotelian teleology, as biological organisms human survival, growth, nourishment and well-being are dependent on shaping necessary interactions into harmonious interchange. because of the fact of interdependence the purpose, goal or function of hu84 prajna vihara-~ man activity is enhancing interactions. thus, to improve the quality of human existence we must learn to view the parts in such a way that we perceive them as holistically integrated, thus the particular quality of the total increases in life-enhancing value.10 such a perspective on the nature of existence takes us beyond a sense of dualistic contention into improved relationships. it takes us beyond a subject-object split into cooperative union. humanity’s value preference accounts for what john searle (philosopher of mind) calls the cooperative and coordinated character of collective intentionality. searle adds that this value preference is rooted in the biological structure of the human organism thus stems from the ontological nature of “how the world in fact is”. in other words collective intentionality and cooperative behavior are displays of natural functions. “for the individual there is a value in survival and reproduction, and for a culture there is a value in continuity. but natural function takes place only within a set of prior assignments of value (including purposes, teleology, and other functions)”.11 it is in this respect that neuropsychologists assert that there is an inherent drive for growth and increased complexity imprinted into organic organisms by nature’s underlying biological principles. one way to appreciate what this entails is to survey a few representative types of organism-environment couplings, starting with single-cell organisms and moving up by degrees to more complex animals. “in every case we can observe the same adaptive process of interactive coordination between a specific organism and recurring characteristics of its environment”.12 thus it can be argued that it is an inherent human neurological (cognitive) urge that prompted shaping human cooperative interactions into culture. humanity has learned that culture, as an extended network of complex cooperative structures, supports thriving in spite of the challenges the culture is confronted with. humanity’s fundamental cognitive experience began with a learned response to environmental stimulus. these cognitive abilities have been a special capacity that has played an important role in formulating our response to the challenge of unpredictable encounters. this ability, if not a special gift of nature, certainly was developed to help us have a better experience with nature as well as with each other. john dewey believed that a cultural worldview represents an accumulation of knowledge of how to manage interactions in ways that promote the flourishing of the culture. human culture was spurred on by the realization leon miller 85 that beneficial interaction is not only basic to maintaining individual integrity it is essential for the integrity of all structured units. this means that the worldview of a flourishing culture must be based on expanding its scope of internal and external cooperative interactions. in other words, to promote a thriving culture neural value preferences must be shaped into conceptual understandings of how to extend the range of cooperative interactions. dewey understood that there is a certain contingency that human culture faces in relationship to nature that creates precarious nature-culture interactions. dewey claimed that the ability to survive in the natural system depends upon an ability to foresee possible dangerous consequences. the ability to enjoy that system depends upon the perceptual ability to foresee nature’s opportunities for satisfaction and fulfillment.13 dewey recognized that because humans, like all animals, adapt to the environment in ways that effect the environment; “any disequilibrium of an organism in its environment, encompasses both organism and environment”.14 conclusion one of the old maxims that motivated much of our behavior toward nature (and other aspects in existence) was “only the strong survive!” the strong would flourish and the weak would diminish. this led many people to presume that the weak would be dominated by the strong. i believe that we are now beginning to conceive of the possibility of acting on the basis of a new maxim: existence prefers those who create the least disturbance to other elements in existence as possible. existence prefers those who are well-integrated with as many other aspects of the environment as possible. the preference of the forces of existence is to restrict or eliminate beings based on the extent to which they damage other aspects of existence. we are all aware of the fact that existence can and certainly has at times eliminated those beings not appropriately integrated with the environment. recent research in neurobiology affirms that humanity has been hard wired by a natural biological principle urging harmonious, cooperative interactions as a selective value preference. we have come to value the nature of harmonious interchange because our sense of self, as we prefer to be, is dependent on increased cooperative interactions. as admonished by the world’s 86 prajna vihara-~ wisdom traditions by adhering to the human value preference we can achieve a desired state. the advantages of achieving this desired state prompts religion, philosophy and science to promote cooperative interactions. in other words, there is a human value preference “for achieving unity as a self, to have a unique center and to find common ground and relation or unity with others. in other words, human beings strive for unique individuality or fulfillment of capacities with a unique angle of vision and, at the same time, to improve the quality of their associations and to establish new common ground in friendship and communication”.15 writers in such diverse fields as social psychology, neurobiology, philosophy and religion have all found that the endeavor to enhance the human experience is contingent on addressing the existential and ontological conditions of humanity. in other words, scholars concerned about the social psychological condition of humanity also demonstrate a concern about the ontological nature of being. this has prompted many scholars __ in their effort to help humanity experience greater well-being __ to address human nature and the value preferences that motivate human behavior. results from the body of research on the underlying motivation behind human behavior has led social scientists to claim that humanity has basic needs for relatedness and also has the need to feel well-integrated within particular social and environmental contexts. society, according to this social psychological view, has the responsibility of structuring itself to satisfy the human need for experiencing well-being in terms of being well-integrated. endnotes 1falcon, andrea. (2005) aristotle and the science of nature: unity without uniformity. cambridge, uk, cambridge university press, 16. 2hursthouse, rosalind. (2002) virtues and reasons: philippa foot and moral theory: essays in honour of philippa foot. (hursthouse, rosalind. lawrence, gavin. & quinn, warren. edts). oxford, oxford university press, 68. 3dewey, john. (1922) nature and conduct. new york, henry hold and company, 10. 4gibson, james j. (1986) the ecological approach to visual perception. (new jersey: lawrence erlbaum, 127. 5portugali, juval. (1996) the construction of cognitive maps. netherlands, kluwer academic publishers, 39-40. leon miller 87 6berntson, gary. & cacioppo, john. (2008) a contemporary perspective on multilevel analyses and social neuroscience. interdisciplinary research, 36-37. 7edelman, gerald. (1992) bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind. n.y.: basic books, 102. 8dewey, john. (1929) experience and nature. london, george allen & unwin, ltd, 15. 9peirce, charles s. (1893) evolutionary love. the monist, vol. 3, 6:303. 10peirce, charles, s. (1974) ethical and esthetical goodness. collected papers of charles sanders peirce (edited by hartshorne and weiss). cambridge, harvard university press, 84. 11searle, john. (1995) the construction of social reality. new york, the free press, 6 & 15. 12johnson, mark. & rohrer, tim. (2007) we are live creatures: embodiment, american pragmatism, and the cognitive organism. body, language and mind, volume 1: embodiment. (ziemke, tom. zlatev, jordan. & frank, roslyn. eds.). new york, mouton de gruyter publishers, 24. 13scheckler, rebecca klein. (2000) weaving feminism, pragmatism, and distance education. doctoral dissertation in philosophy. published by the education dept. of the virginia polytechnic institute and state university, 35. 14dewey, john. (1929) experience and nature. london, george allen & unwin, ltd., 253. 15ziniewicz, gordon, l. (2006) essays on the philosophy of john dewey. adventures in philosophy, 4. bibliography berntson, gary. & cacioppo, john. (2008) a contemporary perspective on multilevel analyses and social neuroscience. interdisciplinary research. dewey, john. (1929) experience and nature. london, george allen & unwin, ltd. dewey, john. (1922) nature and conduct. new york, henry hold and company, 10. edelman, gerald. (1992) bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind. n.y., basic books. falcon, andrea. (2005) aristotle and the science of nature: unity without uniformity. cambridge, uk, cambridge university press. gibson, james j. (1986) the ecological approach to visual perception. (new jersey: lawrence erlbaum. 88 prajna vihara-~ hursthouse, rosalind. (2002) virtues and reasons: philippa foot and moral theory: essays in honour of philippa foot. (hursthouse, rosalind. lawrence, gavin. & quinn, warren. edts). oxford, oxford university press. johnson, mark. & rohrer, tim. (2007) we are live creatures: embodiment, american pragmatism, and the cognitive organism. body, language and mind, volume 1: embodiment. (ziemke, tom. zlatev, jordan. & frank, roslyn. eds.). new york, mouton de gruyter publishers. peirce, charles, s. (1974) ethical and esthetical goodness. collected papers of charles sanders peirce (edited by hartshorne and weiss). cambridge, harvard university press. peirce, charles s. (1893) evolutionary love. the monist, vol. 3. portugali, juval. (1996) the construction of cognitive maps. netherlands, kluwer academic publishers. searle, john. (1995) the construction of social reality. new york, the free press, 6 & 15. scheckler, rebecca klein. (2000) weaving feminism, pragmatism, and distance education. doctoral dissertation in philosophy. published by the education dept. of the virginia polytechnic institute and state university. leon miller 89 06 (85-99)_dragons.pmd 85 dragons: myth and the cosmic powers kenneth dobson payap university, thailand arthur saniotis the university of adelaide, australia abstract this essay investigates the significance of dragon mythology in early civilizations. three mythical dragons are be considered, zhulong, apep and makara. these examples show that the symbol of the dragon represents a triune principle of generativity, vitality and knowledge. introduction in the beginning there was chaos. most of the earliest mythologies that can be reconstructed make such a claim. later came the age of gods which accompanied high civilization. however between the age of chaos and the age of gods, is the age of dragons. the symbolism of the dragon during this period is the subject of this short treatise. dragons are dual beings on the threshold between the world and the netherworld, between the primordial and the generational. to illustrate this, three mythical dragons will be considered, zhulong, apep and makara, although dragons are found in every culture, including aboriginal australian folklore and meso-american mythology. a key to understanding the universal spread of dragons is to see how they embody the triune principle of generativity, vitality and knowledge, which the vedas synthesize as kundalini, a type of awareness that can be aroused by yoga. scholars from plato to jung have believed that dragons function as connectors between necessary knowledge and the awesomely mysterious. zhulong michael carr has analyzed over a hundred terms for dragons in 86 chinese literature. of these, several clearly have cosmological references. ten that are associated with water and weather include: . shenlong the “god dragon” or “spirit dragon”; a thunder god that controls the weather.. dilong, “earth dragon”; controller of rivers and seas; first mentioned in the 7th century ce.. yinglong, “responding dragon”; winged dragon associated with rains and floods. this dragon helped king yu to control the mythic great deluge; from literature of the 3rd to 2nd century bce.. jiaolong, “crocodile dragon”; leader of all aquatic animals; first mentioned in the 1st century bce in literature common among the coastal people and the tan.. paulong, “coiled dragon”; lake dragon that has not ascended to heaven. it was first written about in terms of a dragon design used at the time, the 3rd century bce.. feilong, “flying dragon”; a winged dragon that rides on clouds and mists. the term was used to refer to a man of great character in literature from the 5th to 3rd centuries bce.. longwang, “dragon kings”; divine rulers of the four seas.. zhulong, “torch dragon” who created night and day by opening and closing its eyes and created the seasonal winds by breathing. zhulong is one of the most prominent of chinese dragons, and demonstrably one of the most ancient in the world. it is also one of the most useful to illustrate the evolution of religious ideology. in classic chinese literature zhulong is a personification of a set of natural occurrences, the creation of night and day and the seasonal winds, which were monsoonal. the deity of mount bell is named torch shade. when this deity’s eyes look out there is daylight, and when he shuts his eyes there is night. when he blows it is winter, and when he calls out it is summer. he neither drinks, nor 87 eats, nor breathes. if this god does breathe, there are gales. his body is a thousand leagues long. torch shade is east of the country of nolegcalf. he has a human face and a snake’s body, and he is scarlet in colour. the god lives on the lower slopes of mount bell. [shanhaijing] most of what can be said with confidence about zhulong can be traced back to this recapitulation of the classic of the mountains and the seas from the 3rd century bce, “the classic of regions beyond the seas: the north”, section 8. carr quotes kwang-chih chang that according to the eastern zhou “transformation thesis” natural elements transform out of body parts of mythical creatures. scholars of mythology are familiar with the concept that mythological creatures were used to explain the origin of phenomena. this concept has come under scrutiny recently, but it was evident in shanhaijing. however, the appellation of “torch shade” or “torch dragon” came from a source that did not mention zhulong by name. dongfangshuo, daoist advisor to the emperor wu of han (156-87 bce), describes a qinglong “azure dragon” with a zhu “torch”. “i made a journey to the north pole and came to a mountain planted with fire, which neither the sun nor the moon ever illuminates, but which is lighted to its uttermost bounds by a blue dragon by means of a torch which it holds in its jaws.” [dongfangshuo] obviously, zhulong predates the dragons of the classical era in which it was being written about. first, the “torch dragon” is described as being essentially a serpent in form, rather than being a composite creature. second, the dragon is associated with aspects of nature that precede human presence. its “functions” have to do with essentials, things which in jewish scripture are called separation of light and darkness, and the movement of ruach (breath) over the waters. in other words, the very beginning of things, insofar as people of the earliest millennia bce could conceptualize how things began. there were “dragons” in the chinese consciousness of things as far back as the neolithic era. dragon images have been found in excavations of xinglongwa culture from the inner mongolia-liaoning border area dating back to 6200-5400 bce. at that time the dragon was appar88 ently thought of as a predecessor of the pig. the carvings found show a pig-like image with a snake-like rear end curved around in a circle. pig bones have been found in xinglongwa gravesites, indicating that pigs held a special or sacred status. although, there is no further evidence to indicate how the “pig dragon” (as anthropologists have named this type of figurine) functioned in the narratives of the people or in their venerations, it can be confidently said that there were dragons in archaic china, insofar as dragons were composites of animals including a reptile and were venerated. [see: “pig dragons” and “hongshan culture”]. apep apep is named in classical egyptian lore from the 8th dynasty onward (a short dynasty of less than twenty years ending in 2160 bce). significantly, he is the deification of darkness and chaos, called izft. therefore, apep or apophis is the opponent of light and ma’at, order/truth [see: “apep”]. every day apep tried to swallow the sun. inasmuch as the sun was the very principle of life, the voracious appetite of the demonic beast was a threat to be taken with utmost seriousness. apep was pictured by the egyptians of the later dynasties as a snake and sometimes a dragon, but even before he was named there was mention of this nemesis of the sun god going back many centuries. probably the earliest representation was on a c-ware bowl now in cairo from the time of naqada i (ca. 4000 bce). after the mythic shift at the beginning of the agricultural era, the god set began to be considered as the embodiment of evil and took over all the characteristics of apep. apep’s identity was eventually entirely subsumed by that of set. anthropologists have evidence that two important cultic entities existed in neolithic egypt: worship of the sun and cults of snakes, particularly cobras. again, since this was a time before writing, there is no hard evidence about how these cultic practices were carried out, or how they were supported by narratives. it is in looking back on those dim and distant times that mention of apep and his role are recorded. the oldest stories say that he lurked just below the horizon either trying to devour the sun on his way back into the sky or as the sun was just going down for his nightly journey through duat, the underworld. 89 however, in the later coffin texts of the vii to x dynasties, aphophis is encountered in the seventh of the twelve phases of night. during the sixth hour of the night in the passage through the underworld ra begins to be regenerated. he is encircled by the protective mehen serpent. with that protection, with the magical assistance of isis, and with the help of set, ra prevails in his battle with aphophis and the journey into the new day accelerates. before ra, the sun god was always female. during those earliest eras she was identified as a number of deities: wadjet, sekhmet, hathor, nut, bast, bat and menhit. it was during that earliest era that the realm of the primordial waters and the chaos beyond were presided over by the mighty snake apep. makara in the vedas varuna is the god of sky, water and the celestial ocean. the crocodile makara is his mount. makara is a sanskrit word meaning “sea dragon” or “water monster” [monier-williams, p. 771]. in sculpture makara is depicted as sometimes a crocodile, sometimes a hybrid being with a fish head and elephant’s snout [see: reliefs in wat suthat, bangkok]. but the form and character of makara are more complicated than that. in south east asia, there is often the presence of makara at the stairways leading up into the vihara (main assembly halls) of buddhist temples. on each side of the stairway is likely to be makara, a longtailed, scaly being with an open mouth from which a many-headed naga is emerging. sometimes the naga emerges from a reptilian head (sheshanaag) and sometimes from an elephantine head (makara), indicating they are the same as far as their role is concerned. the naga is a reptile variously represented in buddhist iconography as having one head and sheath like a cobra, or a 9-headed being that is more clearly dragonesque. the naga is featured in the buddhist canonical legends of the life of the lord buddha as the creature who protected gautama as he was in his enlightenment trance. when mara, the source of evil finally mounted a full-fledged assault by inducing the demons to attack, mae toranee (mother earth) wrung out her recently washed hair to create a flood. the inundation delayed the attack so that the divine forces could counter-attack. to protect the buddha and save the dharma the naga 90 coiled under the entranced enlightened one to raise him above the water level, and shielded him with his hood from the torrential rains from above. the figure of a naga is also found in hindu sculptures shielding vishnu in exactly the same way [see: statue in parsurameshwar temple, bhubaneshwar, orissa, india]. the simplest explanation of the relationship of makara to the naga of the legend is that buddhism emerged from hinduism (although buddha emerged as a teacher to counter brahmanic control over access to basic truth, very much as jesus apparently did in opposition to those who claimed control over access to esoteric knowledge in his time). the naga was a liminal being, on the threshold between the entirely mythic or spiritual and the physical/natural world. prior to the naga, then, was makara, who was a servant to various beings in the hindu anthropomorphic pantheon. one thing is indicated: before makara was a vehicle or “mount” for the sea god, varuna, makara was something else, more primordial but definitely related to cosmic water and primordial seas. in that era makara had a complex identification with both creative forces and destructive ones. probably the key to understanding makara’s role, is to recall makara’s relationship to another vedic image, sheshanaag (king of the nagas), who was also an avatar of narayana, the first being or supreme god [srimad bhagavatam 5.25.1]. unlike the greeks and babylonians, the hindus did not conceive of the precursors as having been conquered or demoted when the next era/generation came along. but the predecessors were more obscure and primordial. the vedas tell of sheshanaag (ananta shesha or simply as shesha) as being a couch (rather than a mount or vehicle) for vishnu afloat on the cosmic ocean. sheshanaag has either five or thousands of heads, sometimes crowned. when sheshanaag uncoils time moves forward and creation begins but when she/he coils back the universe ceases to exist. what we have available is what has been written and represented in art. in this way we know of makara who was both a mount or vehicle for the gods, but also a precursor, a being from a previous era. makara / sheshanaag in its role as the first being and creator of the universe derives from the pre-vedic era, but as described in the vedas to be consistent with a more distinct narrative. 91 dragon/serpent mythological symbolism in human cultures first, it can be seen that a prior era is reflected in the development of the dragon concept in all three faith traditions mentioned above. today dragons are largely fictional, subjects in literature, sometimes even domesticated. prior to this, dragons were subdued, vanquished by heroes on their quests for something which the dragons were guarding or simply defeated as an obstacle on a journey [see “jason and the golden fleece” in this regard]. at that time, when stories were being told about heroes from an earlier era dispatching monsters, the mythic stories and legends were being interpreted philosophically, indeed cosmologically. plato, for one, had this to say about ouroboros, in timaeus, 33: the living being had no need of eyes because there was nothing outside of him to be seen; nor of ears because there was nothing to be heard; and there was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed; nor would there have been any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went from him or came into him: for there was nothing beside him. of design he created thus; his own waste providing his own food, and all that he did or suffered taking place in and by himself. for the creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against any one, the creator did not think it necessary to bestow upon him hands: nor had he any need of feet, nor of the whole apparatus of walking; but the movement suited to his spherical form which was designed by him, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence; and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. all the other six motions were taken away from him, and he was made not to partake of their deviations. and as this circular movement required no feet, the universe was created without legs and without feet. [plato] 92 earlier still, dragons were players in mythic dramas during the time that the classic narratives of the gods were forming the narrative context for vast religious constructs. but before there were writings about dragons there were depictions of dragons. they were called dragons by those writing later. it is unsure what they were called by the people of pre-historic and neolithic cultures, but then they were represented as distinctly “other”. it is not so much what they were, but what they were not, that was apparently being expressed in the carvings and engravings of these hybrid beings composed of diverse parts. these parts consisted of what had been feared and venerated as having to do with cosmic functions. later as fearsome dragons began to be rendered friendly or at least useful, suggests that nature was no longer dreaded to the extent it was for our neolithic ancestors. but it still remains in the collective unconscious, as carl jung described it. in fact, the primordial snake coiled in recurring circles was an important archetype for jung (1964). he thought the archetype related to a number of human issues, including birth, death, rebirth, immortality, life, water and cosmic fluid. like plato, jung referred to ouroboros, the cosmic snake that encircles everything, eats its tail to nourish itself eternally, and thereby is the generative principle, symbolized by the phallic tail inserted into its mouth, thereby initiating eternal regeneration. ouroboros was conceptualized as the prime mandala. jung explained that the mandala is a “psychological expression of the personality and the self”. jung’s study of his patients’ abilities to reproduce mandalas they had never seen was a breakthrough to his discovery of the “collective unconscious”. if there is to be a similar breakthrough for us into a new cosmological consciousness, it may come from such symbolism. humankind seems to have wandered away from its connection with the cosmos, progressively anthropomorphizing that which is really inexplicably profound. the ourobouros leitmotif is implicit in many cosmologies containing dragon/serpent beings. interestingly, dragon/serpent beings are invariably associated with cosmic circularity and creative vitality. circularity implies constant movement; this movement of energy within nature is expressed in australian aboriginal dances which mimic the dreaming ancestors. this is exemplified by the pan symbol of australian aboriginal myths __ the rainbow serpent. among north queensland aboriginal cultures, the rainbow serpent is referred to as yaminda, and reveals itself in 93 the rainbow. as the rainbow, yaminda’s body connects heaven and earth, and embodies the circular nature of life cycles. among the yanyuwa, their dances express the interconnectedness between earth and air, and between motion and power (bird rose 2005). to dance, therefore, is to embody the generative and iterative patterns of existence, like the rainbow serpent. this cyclic movement of nature is also implicit in kung san cosmology, expressed as g/aoan __ a being constituting the circular processes and patterns of life (keeney 2005:78). the triune principle as in other dragon/serpent mythopoeia found throughout the world, zhulong, apep and makara embody the triune principle of generativity/vitality/knowledge. for the ancient greeks this triune principle is characterized by the myth of the garden of the hesperides, having been created by the goddess hera. the garden comprised either a single tree or grove which grew golden apples which gave immortality to the eater. however, coiled around the tree was the hundred headed dragon, ladon (greek: λαδωνος). ladon never slept and kept constant vigil. consistent with the ladonic myth is the widely known genesis myth of the garden of eden, which contains a sacred tree whose fruit imparts knowledge of good and evil to the eater. what kind of knowledge is referred to here? knowledge of duality. eden may represent in eliade’s term a state of illud tempus, an eternal realm of unity and non-differentiation (eliade 1959). the serpent guides the primordial human couple to eat the forbidden fruit, and by doing so, duality (a necessary condition) is created in the world (leach 1969). with duality reproduction and death also become possible (leach 1969). among vedic cultures, the generativity/vitality/knowledge principle reached a sophisticated synthesis in the belief of kundalini __ a primeval energy/ power (shakti) contained at the base of the spine, characterized by a coiled serpent. in hinduism, kundalini is usually awakened via intense and protracted meditation practices. once awakened, kundalini rises up the spinal column (sushumna), rousing the seven energy centres (chakram) (each chakra is associated with psycho-physical energies and inclinations). having reached the sahasrara (the crown chakra depicted as a thousand petalled lotus), transcendental knowledge of non-duality is attained (bandyopadhyay 1987:78-79; bose and haldar 1992: krishna 94 1992). in hindu tantra sahasrara is known as the “ultimate ground of being”, constituting a transcendental erotic union between purusha (divine being) and prakriti (material universe) (bandyopadhyay 1987:76). serpent symbolism and uniomystica was also evident in some dionysian rituals in which a golden snake was used by initiates during their mystical marriage with the divine (campbell 1991:184). in contrast, yahweh had commended moses to make an image of a fiery serpent snake (called the nehushtan by generations of hebrews), in order to heal those individuals who had been bitten by ‘fiery serpents’ in retribution for their sins against yahweh (campbell 1976:153). it may be suggested that dragon/serpent mythopoeia personify mysterium tremendumthe power to fascinate and to be in awe (otto 1958). here, the awesome majesty of indo-chinese the dragon/serpent is linked to cosmic time as in the case of makara. as noted earlier, makara shares a correspondence with the pan-hindu sheshanaag __ the cosmic serpent who also acts as savior to the universe. campbell (1991) contends that the dragon represents the antilogies of human experience, between human corporeality and the desire to transcend the body’s confines. furthermore, in native american traditions, the serpent represents the bounded human condition whereas the eagle represents spiritual flight; when serpent and eagle merge they become a winged dragon (campbell 1991). an important aspect of dragon/serpent mythopoeia is their association with the chthonic powers. in many cultures, the chthonic powers are linked to the wilderness, caves and the underworld __ places which exist at the edge of human civilization. it is not surprising in many traditional cultures male initiates must leave the security of their village and go into the wilderness, a journey fraught with various dangers. however, it is at the social margins where the vital powers are most prominent. as jackson (1998:46), states: “vitality always exists beyond. at the edge”. the association between the chthonic powers and the winged serpent is exemplified quetzalcoatl, a principal deity of meso-american cultures. like the rainbow serpent of the australian aboriginal people, for the aztecs, quetzalcoatl was connected to regeneration, fecundity, and the bringer of human civilization. in order to recreate humankind, quetzalcoatl must venture into mictlan (the aztec underworld) and is assisted by the fertility goddess cihuacoatl. the latter deity mixes bones with the blood of quetzalcoatl to form human beings (miller and taube 1993). 95 an interesting theme connected with the serpent/chthonic interplay is the hallucinogenic brew called ayahuascaused among amerindian cultures and brazillian neo-religious cults. ayahuasca is made from two plants: banisteriopsiscaapi and psychotriaviridis (shannon 2003:3). ayahuasca has been used for centuries by amerindian shamans as a way of entering the supernatural realms. once ingested the brew has a profound psychoactive effect. it is common for participants to have visions of various animals, especially snakes and jaguars (shanon 2002). harner (1973) reports aayahuasca vision taken by chaves (1958:134), who studied the siona of colombia: when the drinker of yage’ is a novice, he sees serpents, tigers, and other nonsense. these snakes represent the vines of the yage; at times many snakes are seen in one bunch and one cannot escape from them. for this reason, he who conquers yage also conquers nature and all the dangers which attack men. snakes also appear in ayahuasca accounts among the desana of eastern columbia (koch-grunberg 1909; reichel-dolmatoff 1971) and the iquito of north-eastern peru (tessman 1930). according to harner (1973): conibo-shipibo indians of the ucayali river region in eastern fern commonly see giant anacondas, poisonous snakes, and jaguars, and, less frequently, other animals. the novice shaman, taking the drink, believes he acquires giant snakes which are to be his personal demons to be used in defending himself against other shamans in supernatural battles. statements from quijos shamans undergoing ayahuasca induced visions view themselves as having the power to journey to and from the underworld and to be able to bewitch others oberem (1958:80). among these quijos shamans snakes and jaguars are also most commonly reported in their visions (harner 1973). the correspondence between the vital quality of the underworld and the mythic dragon/serpent hero is emulated in the vedic myth where the creator god brahma asks sheshanaag to journey to patala (the seven 96 divisions of the netherworld) (werner 1997:37) in order to stabilize the earth. sheshanaag uses his hood to support the earth. in this way, the netherworld becomes the home of sheshanaag. unsurprisingly, some of the mythological inhabitants of patala are nagas. similarly, apep lived in the underworld and was the causer of earthquakes, storms and evil. apep, like sheshanaag also presided over the primordial waters and chaos, was associated with the primordial. apep was believed to devour human souls within the underworld (pinch 1994:35). his significance lay in his interminable battle with ra representing order. according to pinch (1994:35), apep was viewed by egyptians as a giant crocodile who lurked under the waters of the nile, ready to devour unsuspecting river-goers. here, the connection between apep and nile crocodiles which are often massive, is a relevant image of the indeterminacy of life. consequently, both egyptian priests and lay people created many spells, charms, amulets and other prophylactics in order to protect themselves against apep (pinch 1994:87). alternately, apep was also associated with the maternal umbilical cord (an allusion to a snake) which necessitated its cutting with a special knife after childbirth (pinch 1994:153). apep’s association with childbirth may be suggestive of high mortality rates of neonates, an endemic feature of classical civilizations. the rubric of this practice may derive from the story of the god horus who defeated snakes sent against him during his youth (pinch 1994:27). the possible greek variation of this myth is when the demi-god heracles choked the two serpents sent by the goddess hera to kill him and his twin brother iphicles when only neonates. in any case, egyptians snakes were sometimes regarded as embodiments of the restive dead and of the forces of chaos (pinch 1994:137). in contrast to apep, but similar to sheshanaag and makara, the chinese dragon is considered as the embodiment of yang __ power and fullness, associated with rain and thunder and celestial clouds. the chinese dragon’s association with water is not coincidental since many parts of ancient china had considerable river systems and lakes, ideal for agriculture and fishing. the chinese dragon was symbolized by water, in contrast to the tiger which is associated with mountains. (devisser 1913:41). entering china, indian buddhism created a distinction between good and evil dragons, the latter dwelling in mountains while the good dragons were linked to water. this distinction was influenced by the indian naga myths, where nanda, the naga king was called nant’o by the chinese, and was chief of the eight dragon kings (roberts 2010:34) 97 comparable with other dragon/serpent mythologies, chinese myths tell of dragons having been born in caves, such as the yellow and blue dragons (both derivatives of gold). the correspondence between the dragon and gold probably became the basis of chinese alchemy (roberts 2010:38). conclusion the mythic themes underlying dragon/serpent symbolism found in many cultures provide a vehicle for understanding mythopoeic imagination. from an anthropological point of view dragon/serpent myths point to the core themes of life, death, regeneration, power, and the need for existential retrieval. moreover, the universality of the dragon/serpent symbolism points to both jung’s and campbell’s notion of archetypes which are ubiquitous to the human unconscious (jung 1964; campbell 2002). for levi-strauss (1962), mythology reveals the dichotomous nature of the human mind. hence, in dragon/serpent symbolism we often find various oppositional categories; life/death; human-world/underworld; power/crisis; death/regeneration. beyond the structural attributions of dragon/serpent symbolism, is revealed the kaleidoscopic nature of human mythopoesis. while the dragon/serpent is often associated with power/ energy, as typified in nature, its ultimate source of energy/power points to a mystery (campbell 1991), hence, the oft repeated dragon/serpent association with chthonic world (an allusion to the eternal void), the origin of existence and source of the inner realms of power. references “apep” on en.wikipedia.org/wiki/apep. see also: cotterell, a & r. storm. 2004. the encyclopedia of world mythology. london: lorenz books. p. 265. carr, m. 1990. “classical dragon names”. linguistics of the tibeto-burman area, 13.2.87-189. dongfangshuo, 2nd c. bce. in groot, jjm de, 1910. the religious system of china, 6. e.j. brill. plato. timaeus, 33. translated by benjamin jowett.downloaded from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ouroboros, january 7, 2013. 98 shanhaijing, 3rd c. bce. classic of the mountains and seas. translated by anne birrell, 2000.the classic of mountains and seas.penguin. bandyopadhyay, pranab. 1987. the goddess of tantra. calcutta: punthipustak. bird rose, deborah. 2005. pattern, connection, desire: in honour of gregory bateson. australian humanities review june 35. http://www. australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/issue-june-2005/rose.html bose, d.n., and hiralalhaldar. 1992. tantras: their philosophy and occult secrets. delhi, india: eastern book linkers. campbell, joseph. 1976. creative mythology: the masks of god. new york: penguin books. campbell, joseph. 1991. the masks of god: occidental mythology. new york: penguin books. campbell, joseph. 1991. the power of myth. new york: first anchor books. campbell, joseph. 2002. flight of the wild gander: explorations in the mythological dimension. novato, california: new world library. devisser, m.m. 1913. the dragon in china and japan. amsterdam johannes muller. eliade, mircea. 1959. the sacred and the profane: the nature of religion. new york: harcourt, brace & world. harner, michael j. 1973. common themes in south american indian yag? experiences. in hallucinogens and shamanism, ed. michael j. harner, pp. 155-175. oxford: oxford university press. “hongshan culture” on en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hongshan_culture. jackson, michael. 1998. minicaethnographica: intersubjectivity and the anthropological project. london: the university of chicago press. jung, carl. g. 1964. man and symbols. london: aldous books. keeney, brian. 2005. circular epistemology and the bushman shamans: a kalahari challenge to the hegemony of narrative. cybernetics and human knowing 12(1-2):75-89. koch-grunberg, theodor. 1917. vomroroimaturn orinoco. band 1. berlin. krishna, gopi. 1992. kundalini: path to higher consciousness. new delhi bombay: orient paperbooks. leach, edmund. 1969. genesis as myth and other essays. london: jonathan cape. levi-strauss, claude. 1962. la pensee sauvage. paris: plon. 99 miller, mary & karl taube. 1993. the gods and symbols of mexico and the maya. new york &london: thames & hudson. monier-williams, m. 2005. a sanskrit-english dictionary. motilal banirsidaas pub. oberem, ude. 1958. espiritus y brujos en las riberas del napo. humanitas, boletinecuatoriano de antropologia 1: 76-83. quito. otto, rudolf. 1958. the idea of the holy. translated by j.w. harvey. new york: oxford. “pig dragons” on en.wikipedia.org/wiki/pig_dragon. pinch, geraldine. 1994. magic in ancient egypt. avon: british museum press. roberts, jeremy. 2010. chinese mythology: a to z. 2nd edition. new york: chelsea house. santesson, c. g., and henry wassen. 1936. some observations on south american arrow-poisons and narcotics (a rejoinder to professor rafael karsten). ethnological studies 3: 330-58. shanon, benny. 2002. ayahuasca visualizations: a structural typology. journal of consciousness studies 9(2): 3-30. tessmann, gunter. 1930. die indianer nordost-perus. hamburg: friederichsen, de gruyter and co. werner, karel. 1997. a popular dictionary of hinduism. richmond, surrey: curzon press. 02_(11-34) ethics instruction during the period of thai educational.pmd ethics instruction during the period of thai educational reform kanchana singhsa ph.d. candidate katholieke universiteit leuven, belgium º·¤ñ́ âèí âø¤¢í§กòã» ô̄ãù»กòãèöกéòà»ç¹ªèç§àçåò·õèêó¤ñ­ªèç§ë¹öè§¢í§ »ãðçñµôèòêµãì ä·â (êâòá) ã¹กòãกéòçà¢éòêùèกòãà»ç¹»ãðà·è·õè·ñ¹êáñâ กòãçò§á¼¹áåðกòã´óà¹ô¹ กò㻯ôãù»กòãèöกéòã¹âø¤¹õéáê´§ãëéàë繶ö§çôêñâ·ñè¹ìáåðกòãáí§กòã³ìäกå¢í§ ¼ùé»ก¤ãí§»ãðà·è º·¤çòá¹õéกåèòç¶ö§çô¸õกòãêó¤ñ­ 5 ãù»áºº·õèãªéã¹กòãêí¹ ¨ãôâ¸ããáã¹âã§àãõâ¹»ãð¶áèöกéò¢í§ä·âã¹âø¤¢í§กòã» ô̄ãù»กòãèöกéò㹪è移õ ¤.è. 1871-1970 çô¸õกòãêí¹¨ãôâ¸ããá´ñ§กåèòçä´éãñºกòãçôà¤ãòðëìã¹°ò¹ð·õèçôªò ¨ãôâ¸ããá¶ùก ñ́̈ åó ñ́ºãëéáõº·ºò·êó¤ñ­µèíกòã¾ñ²¹òâ´âãçá¢í§»ãðà·è กòãèöกéò ã¹ãð ñ́º»ãð¶áèöกéò¶×íçèòà»ç¹¾×é¹°ò¹¢í§í¹ò¤µ·ò§กòãèöกéòã¹กòãàêãôáêãéò§¾åñ§ ¢í§»ãðªòª¹ ´ñ§¹ñé¹กòãçôà¤ãòðëìãòâåðàíõâ´¢í§çô¸õกòãêí¹¨ãôâ¸ããá¨ö§áõ¤çòá êó¤ñ­µèíกòã·õè̈ ð·óãëéàกố ¤çòáà¢éò㨶ö§กòã¾ñ²¹òกòãèöกéòâ´âãçá¢í§»ãðà·è abstract the educational reform period is one of the most significant eras in thai [siamese] history and its modernization. this era witnessed the farsighted planning and implementation of educational reforms by the thai rulers. this text discusses the key methods of classroom education used in ethics instructions in thai primary schools during the educational reform period (1871-1970). it analyses five key methods of delivering lessons on this subject, which has played an important role in the overall development of thailand in the century. this importance is due to the fact that primary school education formed foundation of the future educational empowerment of the citizens. thus, a detailed analysis of those methods is significant for understanding the overall educational development of the nation. 11prajna vihara, volume 12, number 2 july-december 2011, 11-34 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ introduction prior to the late 19th century, education in siam was conducted exclusively by the religious, much as in europe during the middle ages. buddhist monasteries were the main centres of learning in thailand or siam. boys were sent to live with and learn from monks so that they would become good men and conduits for the transmission of buddhist values to society, while girls generally remained at home and taught to perform household chores. similar to the medieval situation in western countries, monks had functioned as custodians of knowledge and traditional wisdom, and were the agents of the nurturing of literacy. they were considered to possess the expertise necessary for the administering of formal education.(depaepe m, 2000; 361)1 it was their duty __ both sacred and professional __ to inculcate religious and secular knowledge in their learners. it was therefore inevitable that monastic methods of buddhism would still exert a strong influence on the methods used by lay teachers in thailand after an era of educational modernization began in 1871. it was king chulalongkorn (or king rama v, 1853-1910) who initiated these reforms based upon admiration he and his father king mongkut had for western advancements in civilization. king chulalongkorn observed these advancements first-hand on his visits to colonial governments in singapore, java and india during the years 1870-1872 and later to europe in 1897. his reforms were not only directed towards education but to politics, law, the judicial system, the military, transportation, the postal service, finance, literature and journalism. these reforms were also designed to resist the immanent threats of colonization. with this process of reform, schooling began to be carried out in the western style even though schools were still located in buddhist monasteries. ethics was included as a subject in the primary curriculum, and its content increasingly incorporated __ alongside traditional buddhist teachings __ values borrowed from western secular culture. this article offers a historical analysis of the variety of teaching methods in thai primary schools from period of educational reform or modernisation (1871-1970). it focuses on the role played by buddhist monks and lay teachers who carried out the ethics instruction in monasteries and primary schools in this period. 12 prajna vihara-~ building the future through the classroom one cannot fully understand the project of siamese educational reform without appreciating the link between the reform policy itself and the methods employed in ethics instruction in the classroom. this discussion will therefore offer interpretations of the relationship between the contents of the curriculum and the methods adopted to deliver those contents. the governments that pursued the expansion of education and the reform of the curriculum also endorsed specific teaching methods. the reformers hoped that a modernised education system would gradually re-shape siam into a state that could hold its own against the industrial and military might of the colonial western powers. in the service of this aim, the siamese peasant was to be re-moulded into a citizen fit for a modern state: literate, technically skilled, and ambitious for his own economic betterment. as part and parcel of this transformation, he was to be made conscious of his duties as a citizen, and this required his moral education. primary schools were to be the spearhead of siam’s response to the western threat. (sayamanont, r., 1964; 878-880).2 before we proceed further, we must pose a key question: what does the concept of a method of classroom education refer to? we must not take it for granted that the meaning of this is known to everyone. we shall base our understanding on the opinions of a few authors. ‘by the phrase “method of classroom education” we mean any deliberate and systematic procedure that teachers use in schools to pass on to their pupils the information, concepts, skills, values, etc. that form the content of the subject curriculum they are employed to teach’. as eze, iwunna, and wittayadamrong define it, the concept of a classroom educational method refers to the special procedure which teachers employ in the delivery of teaching and learning in schools. (eze a e, 1998; 35)3 the procedure involves a step by step approach in the handling and delivery of lessons. this process demands careful preparation of lessons by teachers. (iwunna p, 2009; 184)4 it also requires that a number of educational activities which support the relevance of the teaching method being used should be employed, in order to facilitate pupils’ understanding of the lessons being delivered.5 it follows, in view of the professional nature of teaching, that teachers must be properly prepared and equipped with the skills, knowledge and tools which enhance kanchana singhsa 13 education in the classroom. glauert claims that the choice of method is considered a crucial element in the educational development of children in view of the need to impact their ability to understand lessons effectively, to the extent that their senses of reasoning and comprehension are empowered. by this approach, learners are assisted to organise their knowledge systematically and be able to apply it in their subsequent life and work (glauert e, 2009; 423).6 akahara maintains the opinion that the concept of classroom method of education refers to those professional practices which teachers employ in the delivery of different lessons in schools. this author adds that these methodical approaches enable both teachers and pupils to get a better grip of the core lessons being taught. following the adoption of different techniques in the teaching of lessons, learners’ abilities to develop mental and creative images of the core contents of lessons are strengthened. ability to create personal understanding of lessons is ensured too, while teachers are challenged to make adequate preparations prior to the delivery of specific classroom lessons. (akahara)7 the emphasis on professionalism we find in these writers supports the thai policy of reforming teaching and learning methods. the decision to employ appropriate teaching methods strongly suggests that there were obvious governmental objectives behind the choice of such professional approaches, most especially in the areas of impacting learners’ overall intellectual, moral, and physical knowledge. (sudaprasert k, 1973; 14)8 the need to consolidate the status of siam as a modern state, capable of meeting its political, scientific, economic and skilled labour needs in the comity of world nations, was a factor in these developments. it involved the need to shape both the intellectual and moral character of learners. siamese educational reform was therefore an investment in future generations, in whose hands the building of a modern nation state would lie. methods of classroom education the activities of teaching and learning in schools required ample preparation on the part of teachers, who were the key players in all classroom activities. (akahara)9 this suggests that the successful handling of these core 14 prajna vihara-~ educational activities necessarily entails the use of the appropriate teaching aids which contributed to children’s understanding of lessons, to the extent that they were able to apply them, whether as workers or citizens in adult life. (thai national archives, 1908)10 having said that, we shall now, discuss the different methods of classroom education or methods of teaching employed in siamese/thai primary schools during the first hundred years of educational reform (1871-1970). the methods commonly employed in the teaching of ethics lessons in primary schools can be organized under five headings: the “telling method” which involves story telling, the “revision or recitation method” which involves the rote learning of religious formula, the “lecture method”, the “showing method”, and the “exercising method”. although there still were other significant methods used in that period, visual aids and fieldtrips. these methods were not required in government promulgations of primary curricula, but they were also used in ethics instruction in primary classroom during the reform period. the telling method as the name suggests, the telling method seems similar to the lecture method. this is based on the understanding that teachers constituted the primary role in educational activity. by this activity, teachers conducted the activities of teaching and learning verbally, in the telling or narrative format. the choice of the topic was usually in ethics instruction and were mainly about buddha’s life, his disciples, and ethical stories about buddhism. in thailand, it took the form of jataka stories. (the former lives of the buddha). with the teacher at the centre of action and the mouthpiece of educational knowledge, the activities of teaching and learning were a one-way street, with learners remaining quite passive. they were required simply to attend patiently to the lessons and stories of the teacher. kitthavorn informs us that in the pre-reform period, temples doubled as schools and learning centres for all people. (kitthavorn, p., 1981; 6-8)11 those who wished to learn how to read and write, lived in the temples and were instructed by monks. beginning with the reform period in 1871, teaching was elevated to the level of a career, and restricted to trained professionals. this policy was quite different from pre-reform years, when monks served as kanchana singhsa 15 teachers, and when there was no clear distinction between religious and secular education. (sudaprasert k., 1973).12 each monk had a senior preceptor (pra uppatcha) who officiated at his ordination ceremony and who was assigned the responsibility of teaching and taking care of the newly ordained monk after his ordination, a practice that continues in some areas even until today. the preceptor monk normally taught his disciples one-to-one. as the majority of the buddhist texts used in this process were originally written in pali, the preceptor taught his disciples by means of a sentence-by-sentence translation from pali into thai. as a follow-up, the disciple carefully rehearsed the learnt sentences or phrases, while the teacher controlled his accuracy, step by step. (buddhist preceptor, 2010)13 these views are echoed by anumanratchathon, who tells us that during that period, each boy who was individually taught by a monk learnt a story on an ethical theme, and was expected to memorize and repeat it at the next learning session, after which the monk proceeded to the next story. thus, the one-to-one telling method of instruction was used not only among monks themselves, but also during the instruction of seminarians, and temple boys (phraya anumanratchathon, 1986).14 this is illustrated by the picture which 16 prajna vihara-~ traditional thai education. kanchana singhsa 17 shows the interaction between a preceptor monk and his pupil. (traditional of siam education)15 but what educational lessons did the monks ‘tell’? it was quite simple. they told and elaborated what they themselves had learnt and knew from religious texts, most especially those concerned with stories of the buddha’s life and his teachings, as well as buddhist ethics. as simon de la loubeòre, the french ambassador who travelled with jesuit missionaries to siam in the 17th century during the reign of king narai, had observed and recorded, it became fashionable for siamese parents to send their children to live with, and learn from, relatives or famous monks whom they knew. (bhikkhu prayudh payutto, interview)16 while studying at the temple, the boys did not eat temple food, but rather depended on their parents’ offerings. the preceptors taught their students to read and write, the principles of buddhist morality (dhamma), and stories of the life of buddha. (de la loubeòre, s., 1700)17 seminarians (those boys who aspired to become monks themselves) wore habits like those of the monks. under the guidance of their monk teachers, they lived, studied, meditated and performed puja __ that is, ritual worship of the triple gem (the buddha, his dhamma or teaching, and his sangha or community of enlightened disciples). the telling method seems to have been the most basic and common method used by the preceptors. from the inception of the reform period in 1871, this method was adopted in siamese primary school classrooms all over the country though the teacher-student ratio changed from one-to-one to one teacher to a group of pupils. from the viewpoint of modern theories of learning, an obvious drawback of the telling method was the passive role of the learner. it offered little or no opportunity for the development of creative or critical skills. (iwunna, p., 2009; 190).18 on the other hand, it gave teachers more control over their classes. the understanding was that once the teacher took his stand to tell his stories to the class, children desisted from all acts of distraction and noise making, and focused on the lesson. this practice, however, widened the gap between teachers and pupils, who perceived their class teachers as superhuman similar to the traditional view of monks, who have been held in high esteem in buddhist countries. this method may be considered as an out of date method in teaching, however, this doesn’t mean that this method should be given up in the primary classroom. telling method can be a very useful method for ethics instruction, if the stories used are interesting or the teachers/tellers are skilful in telling. look at jesus’ teaching, he often taught his disciples by telling stories and parables such as “the prodigal son” (luke 15:11-32), “the good neighbor” (luke 10),19 etc. those stories were easy to remember so that the disciples could re-tell or apply in their life. in my own experiences, story telling method is a powerful method in catechesis or teaching especially for a big group of audiences. recitation method the recitation method formed another major method of education available to teachers in thai schools. following this method, teachers were able to make individual assessments of their pupils prior to the commencement of any new lessons. authors claim that the recitation method was intended “to get the metal turning”, (i.e. to ‘warm up’ the learner’s mental faculties) and to make a systematic connection between previous learning and the new lesson. our sources claim that this was also known as ‘recapitulation’ or ‘consolidation of knowledge’. (depaepe, et al., 2000; 143).20 it was known 18 prajna vihara-~ as a method of ‘lesson connection’ (tor nhang sue) or ‘rote learning religious formula’ in the thai educational system. according to iwunna, the ‘questioning and highlighting techniques’ formed the core method in catholic mission schools in nigeria. explaining further, he maintains that the questioning method gave teachers the access to open the minds of their class pupils to the core contents of the previous lesson, while the highlighting method represented an attempt to repeat the major topics of the same subject taught in the previous lesson. (iwunna., 2009; 194).21 this leads depaepe et al to conclude that this approach promptly captures children’s attention. (depaepe, et al., 2000; p. 74).22 at this point, we should note that school textbooks were commonly used by siamese teachers when revising lessons on ethics in classes. textbooks formed the key educational aid. naturally, such books were usually buddhist religious texts, schoolbooks, and ancient books of educational relevance. however, the contents of lessons and subject of discussion influenced the choice of books used. it became a matter of professional ethics for teachers to ensure that learners followed the core elements of the lessons. at the end of each lesson, children were expected to disperse to different corners of the school environment where they practiced their recitation in preparation for repeating it at the commencement of the next lesson. this explains the fact that the activity of recitation was highly significant, especially as opportunities were given to each and every student to recite the previous lesson before their teachers or monk teachers. this receives the support of depaepe, debaere, and van rompaey, who add that the practice demanded that pupils stood before their teachers and in front of their classmates and recited specific lessons.23 for coe, this was simply a game of word reproduction. (coe, c., 2005; 141)24 this recitation method of education formed a major method of teaching and learner-assessment in siamese schools during the pre-reform era, as well as the schools modernisation period. beyond the four walls of formal school institutions, monasteries and seminaries applied the same methods in the course of training their pupils. to that end, teacher monks asked each of their pupils to recite the previous lessons while they listened with critical attention. if a pupil could not recite it properly, the monk would repeat the lessons to him. but after three times, if that pupil still could not remember clearly, he could be punished. kanchana singhsa 19 “in the evening, the disciple had to pick some flowers to offer to the monk teacher as a mark of respect (this was called dokmai tor nhang sue: ‘flowers to continue studying’). the student, on accomplishing the revision by recitation, would then progress to the next level, during which the monk narrated the next lesson, after which students were sent away to continue their individual recitation practices at different corners of the school compound or monastery”. (phraya anumanratchathon, 1986; 140-1)25 it then becomes quite understandable that the thai educational system has continued to witness the application of the revision method of classroom education over the years, up to the present time. this is not to deny that the method has been practiced alongside other methods of classroom education in schools and other educational institutions. the big difference was that in the new primary schools (unlike in the temples of the pre-reform era), learners who could not perform well in the recitation of the previous lessons were still given the opportunity to continue with the next lesson. it encouraged students to repeat frequently their lessons, most especially the core contents of previous topics learnt. it created a forum for better, effective, and individual recitation exercises, and discouraged the attitude of mere comprehension of educational elements contained in lessons. however, it must be appreciated that caution necessarily needs to be employed in its excessive use and unprofessional overuse. (hyman, r. t., 1970; 164-6)26 lecture method authors have classified this method as “the traditional method of teaching, wherein the lecturer transmits information in an autocratic fashion to passive student listeners. in the pure form, students have no opportunity to ask questions or offer comments during the lecture”.27 according to this source, this method is considered most helpful when new topics or detailed information need to be presented. this is because it permits a large group of students to receive succinct information quickly in a highly structured manner. it is further argued that the strength of this method is in its ability to present directly a great deal of information, or to reveal facts and prior knowledge and experi20 prajna vihara-~ ences. it adds that this method could be viewed as safer, easier, and more reliable. another source argues that this method is the one most frequently used in institutions of higher education throughout the world, and concludes that this technique is still favoured in view of its ability to provide understanding to learners at this level. (large classes)28 even so, the method is still criticized. for instance, hyman strongly claims that “people have nowadays got a strange opinion that everything should be taught by lectures. now, i cannot see that lectures can do so much good as reading the books from which the lectures are taken”. (hyman., 1970; 12735).29 this leaves us with the impression that, for effective results, this method must be complemented by other educational methods. while this method remained the general trend in the era of siamese educational reform, siamese teachers, through the course of their training and re-training, acquired the skills of applying other relevant teaching methods in the delivery of class lessons. however the lecture method still remained significant in the educational system of siam, most especially in the teaching of ethics instruction lessons. for instance, this was given prominence in the regulations for basic education of 1892 (kodpikad moolsaman) which indicated that “in teaching dhamma, the teacher usually asks students to recite the virtues of buddha and perform puja (ritual worship of the triple gem) before or after the class”. it adds that explanations should be freely given to students and other learners, while teachers must be the learners’ role models of good conduct. (depaepe, et al., 2000; 172)30 thus, it seems possible that one key method by which teachers taught the primary school curricula on ethics or morality was by asking pupils to recite worship of the triple gem in class. meanwhile, the teachers also found time to explain the meaning of dhamma to them. teacher monks had taught ethics instruction to students in primary classrooms during the pre-reform period. in doing this, they had also followed the national curricula, most especially in the areas of adopting a formal timetable, books and teaching methods, and examination techniques. however, the lecture method is not very different from the telling method that was in use in the temples. the major difference lay in its adoption of a more formal and structured approach in the delivery of lessons. it was also adapted to accommodate larger student groups. this became paramount in view of the need to accommodate the growing numbers of learners being enrolled in schools as a result of the government’s kanchana singhsa 21 desire to expand primary education during the reform period. (ministry of education, bangkok,1970; 63-6)31 teachers were encouraged to employ all possible teaching techniques which accommodated this core objective of expansion. (thai national archives, 1908)32 as the country’s program of educational reformation progressed, a notable development was that trained lay people gradually took over from the monks the task of teaching. the role played for centuries by monks as custodians of literacy and culture gradually died away. at the same time, a greater variety of novel teaching methods came to be employed in classrooms by the new professional teachers. in the minds of the education planners, this was necessary in view of the growing role that schooling had to play in the development of the country. to that end, the lecture method was recognised as one of the key methods needed for the teaching and learning of ethics or buddhist virtue in primary school classrooms. jandang (1993) strongly supports this position with his claim that the lecture method was the major method commonly used by most teachers of ethics and buddhism in primary schools. (jandang, a., 1993)33 showing method the showing method (also known as the illustration method) was another classroom method of education followed in siamese primary schools during the era of school reform. in this method, teachers provided opportunities for using nonverbal educational techniques in the delivery of lessons. some sources say that this method was useful as a means of bringing concision and clarity to the topic being taught. the method reduced the risk of the learners misunderstanding crucial aspects of the lessons. (iwunna. 2009; 192-3).34 by means of various graphic and illustrative materials, such as photographs, paintings, diagrams, wall maps, etc., learners were provided with images that clarified the content of what was being taught in class. udoh maintains that through participation and observation, learners were effectively guided through the core content of lessons. (udoh, g. h., 1966; 58-62)35 it helped them to distinguish fact from fiction, and to appreciate core class lessons on the strength of their connectedness to knowledge empowerment. it also strengthened children’s abilities to make connections between lessons learnt at school and their daily lives outside the classroom. 22 prajna vihara-~ kanchana singhsa 23 thai traditional/religious book which was made of pulp and palm leaves. laska and goldstein add that in some educational contexts, files, slideshows, practical scientific experiments, and field trips were part and parcel of the showing method. (laska & goldstein, 1973; 6-7)36 we might add that images of the buddha, religious paintings, and other religious graphic material were used in ethics instruction during the educational reform period. in addition, field trips to monasteries, seminaries, and other religious establishments formed part of the method. in this way, temples became crucial educational resources. such trips helped shape children’s educational and religious development, and their appreciation of the relevance of ethics in their personal lives, and in the overall social development of siam. this demonstrates the fact that the showing method, which embraced elements of learning by experience and forms of personal contact with educational and religious objects, was employed in a variety of ways. the fact that the stories of buddha and his teachings were written on temples’ walls and samud koi (traditional books made of wood pulp and palm leaves), and illustrated in other paintings, underlines the importance of this method of education in schools. it was a powerful tool for the understanding of the core virtues of buddhism, around which ethics instruction revolved. anumanrajathon strongly supports this opinion with the claim that every year during the mahachart ceremony (commemorating a popular legend about a previous life of the buddha as a generous prince), temples were decorated as locations in the forest setting of the mahachart story. thirteen cloth posters, each depicting one of the thirteen sections of the story of the mahachart, were hung on the walls of the hall to help learners imagine the events of the story more vividly, and thereby absorb its ethical message more effectively. anumanrajathon sees this as equivalent to the field trips which learners engage in today, and as comparable with the illustrative images of the ‘way of the cross’ displayed in catholic schools. (phraya anumanratchathon, 1986; 225)37 let us then conclude this discussion with the opinion of kuporipan (2009, august), who claims that “when i was in primary school, which was run by buddhist monks in my hometown, all the students gathered together every friday after school time to perform ritual worship [of the triple gems], and attend the monk’s sermon for an hour or two. sometimes, we were brought to the temple that the school was attached to, to join in a ceremony on religious days, or simply to see the temple, buddha’s statues, and appreciate the stories of the buddha depicted on the wall. the pictures of the buddha’s life had been used by some teachers in the classroom for ethics instruction in the buddhist context”. this underlines the fact that there are always several roads to any particular destination. it suggests that classroom activities alone have never been quite enough. practical and illustrative educational activities outside the four walls of classrooms also matter, and advance learners’ educational empowerment. the exercise method we have come to the last method of classroom education followed in siamese primary schools during the educational reform period. that is the imitating or exercise method, also known as the activity method. this was not so much a single method as a diverse set of methods loosely bound together by the concept of exercises or ‘activities’. the set was a mixture of traditional 24 prajna vihara-~ practices with elements imported from the west. it included such things as ritual worship, sports, quasi-military drills, scouting activities, recitation exercises, and homework assignments. (laska & goldstein., 1973; 80)38 in the minds of the government’s educational reformers, the connection between these seemingly disparate activities was that students were required to do or produce something. in that sense, they could all be counted as examples of an ‘activity’ or ‘exercise’ method, in contrast to the other methods (such as the ‘telling’, ‘lecture’, or ‘showing’ methods) in which the learners were essentially passive, or at least receptive to the teacher’s input. obviously, some of the exercises, drills, or activities in the above list were concerned with moulding behaviour and character, rather than imparting knowledge or understanding. however, the moulding of character was itself a key aim of the reformed siamese educational system, and from that point of view these drills, sports, etc. were unequivocally regarded as educational methods. knowledge and understanding were simply other means to that same, larger, end. we might compare this to the emphasis on team sports as a character-forming activity in the british public school system of the colonial era. indeed, the british model may have inspired the inclusion of sports in the ‘exercise method’. it might seem odd that ‘recitation’ puts in a repeat appearance here as part of the ‘exercise’ method. however, this is a consequence of the fact that the repertoire of teaching methods was not formulated at a single time as a logically consistent scheme. rather, the repertoire grew organically over time. the ‘recitation’ method, as such, was carried over from the time-honoured monastic tradition, where it was the necessary complement of the ‘telling’ method. the activity method, on the other hand, was mainly a modern addition to this tradition __ one that arose from the transfer of education from the monasteries to the new primary schools. however, as recitation was clearly an ‘activity’ rather than a passive absorption of learning, it made sense to count it again under the new heading. in the context of ethics instruction, ritual worship was an especially important item in the diverse range of activities encompassed in the ‘exercise method’. ritual worship was directed to the triple gem (the buddha, his dhamma or teaching, and his sangha or community of enlightened disciples). through such worship, teachers imparted to their students the ethical principles and virtues. it imbued learners with attitudes of humility, simplicity, obekanchana singhsa 25 dience, love, and commitment to duties. van vliet remarks that “everyone in the temple, leader, monks, seminarians, and temple boys, learns how to read and worship together in the morning and evening”. (vliet, j. v., 1692; 76)39 this was underlined in the 1892 (kodpikad 2435) primary school curriculum, which recommended that in the teaching of ethics, “the dhamma is to be recited, translated and worshipped”. (bhikkhu prayudh payutto)40 this was again highlighted in the 1911 primary school curriculum, which supported the employment of several practical activities of ‘learning by doing’ in the educational empowerment of learners. the activities of worship, moral discussion, and scouting became paramount in the handling of ethics instructions in schools. to that end, it was indicated that “the success of ethics instruction was dependent on practising, not [only] knowing”. (thai national archives, 1911)41 thus, a succession of siamese educational curricula approved the inclusion of ethical and practical activities in primary schools’ curricula, under the umbrella of the ‘exercise method’. this policy program was driven by, among other things, the need to influence the educational and moral development of siamese citizens, in anticipation of their future roles in the development of the country. the understanding was that, with the aid of practical educational activities, children’s core values could be shaped decisively for the rest of their lives. modern technology and the 20th century thai classroom the approach of the 20th century and the birth of the computer age in the last quarter of the twentieth century that opened the door to the modernization of the traditional methods of classroom education in the 19th and 20th centuries discussed in this text, were followed in schools and educational institutions in thailand and other technology-driven countries of the world, most especially those in the southeastern parts of the asian continent. driven by this era of technological breakthrough, scientific and technology-based educational programs which enhanced the quality of teaching and learning in schools were developed. scientific and computer-based educational programs which modernized the traditional teaching methods were introduced into classrooms. 26 prajna vihara-~ supported by these technological programs of school education, teachers and pupils found the activities of teaching and learning interesting and motivating. in line with this development, it is not out of place that schools and educational institutions in china, indonesia, singapore, taiwan, thailand, hong kong, india, japan, malaysia, south korea, etc., recorded huge benefits from this technological awareness, and consequently tailored their programs of education along the lines of the science and technology. in the methods of delivering classroom lessons, therefore, no stones were left unturned as information and communication technology was adapted to the classroom. thus, modern technology has developed computers, audio visual facilities, television sets, computer projectors, microphones, listening devices, video cassettes, radios, tape recorders, and calculators which enhanced the quality of classroom education provided in thai schools. as it were, the introduction of these technologies brought about the desired modernity and heightened literacy in the educational institutions in thailand and several of its asian neighbours. (office of the national education commission, 115-6)42 for instance, our field trip to a few primary schools in bangkok provided crucial support to this claim, which i like to illustrate by using the audio visual screen as a typical example. with the introduction of audio visual aids, learners’ visual and auditory senses were stimulated simultaneously. it allowed for a greater efficiency of communcation, and boosted the quality of the presentation. as students senses were directed to the screen, the teacher needed to talk less, allowing the students also time to contribute, or play other roles in the course of the lesson. as an aid in the teaching of ethics in schools, audio visual displays assist teachers apply the exercising or imitating method more professionally, most especially in the mastery of the buddhist prayer rituals in schools.43 as a technological aid, it impacted children’s practical knowledge of the core contents of lessons, most especially in the areas of story-telling, listening, pronunciation, reading, etc. it impacted the quality of their listenership, and developed their abilities to play leadership roles within the class and within the larger thai society. thus, instead of allowing themselves to be driven by the contents of the educational lessons being delivered, modern technology provides them the opportunities of participating more actively in their classroom activities. the effect is that this development made wider impacts in the kanchana singhsa 27 literacy development of young learners, and eliminated elements of stress and boredom in class activities.44 again, using this audio visual facility as an aid in the activity method of classroom education in the teaching of mathematics, children are practically led through the core methods of calculation. with the aid of the graphic displays of human images doing specific forms of calculation, children are motivated to apply similar practical methods in their own calculation tasks. and using an aid in the teaching of sports, the graphic displays provide learners with firsthand practical guides which direct their sporting activities. tactically then, learners feel motivated to follow the exact examples provided by the screen images displayed in the class during the day’s lessons. (office of the national education commission, 34-5)45 with these few illustrations, no one is left in any doubt about the relevance and educational role which technological devices such as video cassettes, television sets, audio visual machines, tape recorders, microphones, radios, and modern science equipments made in the handling of lessons in primary schools in thailand. with these modern educational aids, teachers are being assisted in the application of their professional skills and ability in handling their class lessons. the larger effect is that teachers are able to impact the learning dispositions of learners, as well as elicit their understanding abilities with less difficulty. (unesco, 1992)46 supported with the appropriate technological educational aids, children pay rapt attention to class activities. class lessons become more interactive, more lively, and lead to a multi-dimensional activity between teachers and pupils. to that end, learners are encouraged to develop critical and individual minds while lessons are presented. pupils become more independent, more inquisitive, open-minded, and more creative. above all, the use of modern technological devices enhances the quality of teachers’ outputs during the lessons, most importantly when microphones are used in delivering lessons in larger classes. (office of the national education commission, 1999; 156)47 again, it is important to appreciate the relevance of computers as core classroom aids in the 20th century thai school education. computers enhance children’s abilities to become part and parcel of their own education, as well as enable them to develop individual and critical knowledge of class lessons. computers motivate children’s inspiration to learn more deeply. sitting in front of computers, children are motivated to develop the attitude of 28 prajna vihara-~ self-competence, scientific awareness, entrepreneurship, and desire for more knowledge. computer designed educational programs offer learners the abilities to develop individual approaches to specific problems and class tasks. they help children to pay closer attention to the educational lessons which they consider relevant to their lives and future careers, as well as enable them to pick out what is valuable from the great variety of materials presented for learning. (depaepe, et al., 2000; 149).48 it could then be said that the introduction of scientific and technologybased teaching aids into thai classrooms brought numerous positive innovations in the traditional methods of classroom education associated with the pre-reform periods. these educational aids enhance teachers’ abilities to handle their class lessons more competently and precisely, without boring learners with their inefficiencies and lack of preparations for specific lessons. the adaptation of modern technological devices into classroom education made teaching and learning attractive to both teachers and learners. they encourage learners to develop the attitude of self confidence, as well as assist teachers consolidating their professional roles as the number one managers of classroom education. to cap it all, the birth of the 20th century technology-based educational aid has enhanced the quality of education of children, and improve their practical skills. most importantly, the introduction of modern technological devices in thai primary schools has shifted the emphasis from book-learning to a more practical educational training, more relevant to the individual learner’s future career needs. conclusion it is a common understanding that routine brings boredom and mental stagnation. conversely, many proverbs (‘a change is as good as a rest’; ‘variety is the spice of life’; etc.) remind us that variations in routine can revitalise our interest and experience. the implications for education are obvious: classroom activities would become boring and even oppressive if only a single method of instruction was used. thus, to sustain effective learning over time, there is a need for frequent changes of instructional methods. in order to recharge the mental batteries of learners, teachers have to apply a variety of strategically relevant and novel approaches. this common insight seems to kanchana singhsa 29 have encouraged the governmental reformers of siamese education to prescribe the use of these new teaching methods. we have surveyed the range of teaching methods approved for use in siamese primary schools during the period of educational reform __ ‘telling’, ‘recitation’, ‘lecture’, ‘showing’ and ‘exercise’. this study has been an attempt to give some historical background and insight into the major methods of empowering learners through knowledge and ethics instruction considered essential for the citizens of a modern state. the choice of particular methods of lessons delivery was influenced by the nature and scope of the subject being taught. endnotes 1depaepe, m. (2000). demythologizing the educational past. an endless task in history of education. in r. lowe (ed.), history of education: major themes, 1: debates in the history of education, (356-370), london: routledge, p. 361. 2sayamanont, r. (1964). major piboonsongkhram’s government policy of 16th march, 1942. 878-880. 3eze, a. e. (1998). primary school teaching methods. in a. b. c. ugwu & a. omalle (eds.), introduction to primary education studies, (35), enugu: fred-ogah publishers, p. 35. 4iwunna, p. (2009). the impact of the christian missionary education. p. 184. 5wittayadamrong ratthana strongly accepted this opinion. she added that once pupils were aided with the right teaching methods in the delivery of lessons, they had bright chances of understanding clearly the core lessons presented to them. according to her, pupils simply needed a clear ray of educational light from their teachers, and would be able to follow effectively. 6glauert, e. (2009). research in early childhood science education: issues for early childhood curriculum design and implications for primary science education. in h. g. r. lauterbach, b. marquardt-mau (ed.), lernen und kindliche entwicklung. elementarbildung und sachunterricht, (42-43), bad heilbrunn: julius klinkhardt, pp. 42-3. 7akahara. (n.d.). nursery education in nigeria. 8sudaprasert, k. (june 1973). primary education in thailand. bulletin of the unesco regional office for education in asia, 14. 9akahara. (n.d.). nursery education in nigeria. 10thai national archives. (1908/b.e. 2452). primary curriculum 1909 (ror. sor. 128). curriculum. bangkok: dhammakarn ministry. 11kitthavorn, p. (1981). sangha’s role in thai education in the reign of king 30 prajna vihara-~ kanchana singhsa 31 rama v. bangkok: chulalongkorn university, pp. 6-8. 12sudaprasert, k. (1973). primary education in thailand. 13buddhist preceptor. (2010, january). retrieved october 8th, 2010, from http: //dict.longdo.com/search/priest%20%20officiates%at20an%20ordination%20 ceremony. 14phraya anumanratchathon. (1986/b.e.2529a). tradition of education. thai traditions by sathienkoses. (2nd ed.). bangkok: khurusapha. 15traditional of siam education between buddhist monk and disciple. the monk uses buddhist texts written on palm leaves as the core teaching aid. (demonstrated by m. phun pitsamai ditsakul) photo by robert lens around 1907/b.e. 2450. 16bhikkhu prayudh payutto, a famous monk in education, strongly agreed with this opinion during our interviews on 18th july, 2010. it is his opinion that thailand still needs the services and religious roles of its monks in order to witness real growth in the 21st century. 17de la loubeòre, s. (1700). description du royaume de siam 1687-1688. paris: chez henry & la veuve de theodore boom. 18iwunna, p. (2009). the impact of the christian missionary education. p. 190. 19christian’s bible: new testament. 20depaepe, et al. (2000). order in progress. p. 143. 21iwunna. (2009). the impact of the christian missionary education. p. 194. 22depaepe, et al. (2000). order in progress. p. 74. 23depaepe, debaere & rompaey. (1992). missionary education in the belgian congo. pp. 270-1. 24coe, c. (2005). youth, nationalism, and the transformation of knowledge. dilemma of culture in african schools. chicago: the university of chicago press, p. 141. 25phraya anumanratchathon. (1986). tradition of education, phraya anumanratchathon. (1986). tradition of education. pp. 140-1. 26hyman, r. t. (1970). introduction: recitation as interaction. ways of teaching. philadelphia, new york, toronto: rutgers university, pp. 136-64; suwankul, l. (1975/ b.e.2518). development of primary and secondary curriculum in thailand. administration of education, chulalongkorn university, bangkok, pp. 164-6. 27jones, a. s., bagford, l. w. & wallen, e. a. (1979). strategies for teaching. metuchen, n.j., & london: the scarecrow press, p. 92. 28large classes: a teaching guide: lecturing. (2008). the centre for teaching excellence. retrieved october 4th 2010, from http://www.cte.umd.edu/library.teaching largeclass/guide/ch5.html. 29hyman. (1970). introduction: recitation as interaction, hyman. (1970). introduction: recitation as interaction. pp. 127-35. 30depaepe, et al. (2000). order in progress, p. 172; and wyatt, d. k. (1994). studies in thai history, op. cit. 31ministry of education, bangkok. (1970). education in thailand, pp. 63-6. 32thai national archives. (1908). primary curriculum 1909. 33jandang, a. (1993). an organization of the elementary school curriculum b.e. 2521/1978 (revised edition) regarding the buddhism for prathom suska one 32 prajna vihara-~ and two in elementary schools under the jurisdiction of the office of the national primary education commission, education region two. [unpublished master thesis], chulalongkorn university, bangkok. 34iwunna. (2009). the impact of the christian missionary education. pp. 192-3. 35udoh, g. h. (1966). an elementary school geography for eastern nigeria, book i. lagos: macmillan & co. (nigeria) ltd., pp. 75-82. 36laska & goldstein. (1973). traditional teaching method laska & goldstein. (1973). traditional teaching methods. pp. 6-7. 37phraya anumanratchathon. (1986). tradition of education, pp. 15-8; iwunna. (2009). school textbooks as tools, p. 225. 38laska & goldstein. (1973). op. cit., p. 80. 39vliet, j. v. (1692). beschrijving van het konikrijk siam (the short history of the kings of siam). (l. andaya, trans.). bangkok, p. 76. 40bhikkhu prayudh payutto was strongly in favour of this opinion, and added that thai citizens still need the light of moral education and buddhist doctrines in order to emerge as a developed nation of the 21st century. 41thai national archives. (1911). common curriculum ror sor 130 (b.e.2454). curriculum. bangkok: dhammakarn (education) ministry; and ministry of education. (1913). the royal curriculum. 42office of the national education commission & office of the prime minister. (1999). education in thailand, pp.115-6. 43our field work took us to the following primary schools: assumption college, bangkok; st. gabriel’s school, bangkok; & st. joseph’s school, bangkok. 44office of the national education commission, office of the prime minister, ministry of education & ministry of university affairs. (2000). education in thailand. bangkok: office of the national education commission, pp. 34-5; depaepe, m. & simon, f. (2003). open-air schools in belgium. a marginal phenomenon in educational history reflecting larger social and historical processes. in a. m. chatelet, d. lerch & j. n. luc (eds.), l’eècole de plein air. une expeèrience peèdagogique et architecturale dan l’europe du xxe siecle / open-air schools. an educational and architectural venture in twentieth century europe, (80-95), paris: editions recherches. 45office of the national education commission & office of the prime minister. (1999). education in thailand. bangkok: office of the national education commission, p. 116. 46unesco principal regional office for asia and the pacific. (1992). education for affective development. a guidebook on programmes and practices. bangkok: unesco. 47office of the national education commission & office of the prime minister. (1999). education in thailand. p. 156. 48depaepe, et al. (2000). order in progress. p. 149. kanchana singhsa 33 references anumanratchathon, p. (1986). tradition of mahachat ceremony. bangkok: kurusapa press. depaepe, m. (2000). demythologizing the educational past. an endless task in history of education. in: r. lowe (ed.). history of education: major themes, 1: debates in the history of education (356-370). london: routledge falmer. depaepe, m., & simon, f. (2003). open-air schools in belgium. a marginal phenomenon in educational history reflecting larger social and historical processes. in chatelet, a. m., lerch, d. & luc, j. n. (eds.), l’eècole de plein air. une expeèrience peèdagogique et architecturale dans l’europe du xxe siecle / open-air schools. an educational and architectural venture in twentieth century europe (pp. 8095). paris: editions recherches. eze, a.e. (1998). primary school teaching methods. in: a.b.c. ugwu & a. omalle (eds.). introduction to primary education studies (35-45). enugu: fred-ogah publishers. glauert, e. (2009). research in early childhood science education: issues for early childhood curriculum design and implications for primary science education. in r. lauterbach, h. g., b. marquardt-mau (ed.), lernen und kindliche entwicklung. elementarbildung und sachunterricht (pp. 42-43). bad heilbrunn: julius klinkhardt. hyman, r. t. (1970). introduction: recitation as interaction. philadelphia, new york, toronto: rutgers university. iwunna, p. (2009a). the impact of the christian missionary education on the educational development of nigeria. a case study of the primary school educational activities of the catholic mission in igboland (1925-1970). unpublished a doctoral dissertation, katholieke universiteit, leuven. iwunna, p. (2009b). school textbooks as tools of evangelization in catholic mission schools in igboland, nigeria (1925-1960). an analysis of key images. in: a. van gorp & m. depaepe (eds.). auf der suche nach der wahren art von textbuchern. beitrage zur historischen und systematischen schulbuchforschung (81-97). bad heilbrunn: julius klinkhardt. jandang, a. (1993). an organization of the elementary school curriculum b.e. 34 prajna vihara-~ 2521/1978 (revised edition) regarding the buddhism for prathom suska one and two in elementary schools under the jurisdiction of the office of the national primary education commission, education region two. unpublished master thesis, chulalongkorn university, bangkok. jones, a. s., bagford, l. w., & wallen, e. a. (1979). strategies for teaching. metuchen, n.j., & london: the scarecrow press. kitthavorn, p. (1981). sangha’s role in thai education in the reign of king rama v. bangkok: chulalongkorn university.sayamanont, r. (1964). major piboonsongkhram’s government policy of 16th march,1942. 878-880. ministry of education. (1970). introduction of curriculum. bangkok: academic department, ministry of education. office of the national education commission, & office of the prime minister. (1999). education in thailand. bangkok: office of the national education commission. sudaprasert, k. (1973). primary education in thailand. bulletin of the unesco regional offer for education in asia, 14. thai national archives. (1908/b.e.2452). primary curriculum 1909 (ror. sor. 128). bangkok: dhammakarn ministry. thai national archives. (1911). common curriculum ror sor 130 (b.e. 2454). bangkok: dhammakarn (education) ministry. udoh, g. h. (1966). an elementary school geography for eastern nigeria, book i. lagos: macmillan & co. (nigeria) ltd.verstraete, p. (2009). savage solitude: the problematisation of disability at the turn of the eighteenth century. paedagogica historica, 45(3), 271. unicef. (1993, june). children and women in south africa: a situation analysis. johannesburg: the united nations children’s fund.vliet, j. v. (1692). beschrijving van het konikrijk siam (the short history of the kings of siam) (l. andaya, trans.). bangkok. verstraete, p. (2009). savage solitude: the problematisation of disability at the turn of the eighteenth century. paedagogica historica, 45(3), 271. vliet, j. v. (1692). beschrijving van het konikrijk siam (the short history of the kings of siam) (l. andaya, trans.). bangkok. contents prajñâ vihâra, volume 6, number 2, july-december 2005, 43-53 43 © 2000 by assumption university press philosophy as mediation between religious traditions, insights from jürgen habermas manuel b. dy, jr. ateneo de manila university, the philippines abstract the task of this paper is to show how philosophy can mediate in the conflict of religious traditions, using the insights of jürgen habermas in his acceptance speech on the occasion of the award of the karl jaspers prize of the town and university of heidelberg on 26 september 1994, “the conflict of beliefs, karl jaspers on the clash of cultures.” habermas may not have addressed the problem directly, but his insights provide meaningful hints in the conduct of inter-faith dialogues of religious communities. one of the negative impacts of globalization is the homogenization of cultures, sometimes referred to as “mcdonalization” or “cocalization,” that has resulted in the dismantling of social diversity and pluralism of cultures. the standardization of life styles by the domination of a centralized culture identified with the west undermines a culture’s self-reliance and identity and attacks the traditional religious values that hold the community together. religion occupies a central position in one’s culture, for in spite of the cultural transformations brought about by greater mobility and the mass media, it is still religion that gives a distinct identity to a culture. but while globalization has given rise to multi-religious cities, has increased the knowledge of each other’s religious traditions and the levels of interaction between peoples of different religious traditions, “the same global processes that draw communities together have also been experienced as a threat to the specificity and identity of religious communities.”1 consequently, there is a new resurgence of religious traditions, reasserting themselves in groups, “polarizing peoples, creating enemy images, and using religious identity as one of the powerful forces to mobilize faith communities against each other.”2 the many religious conflicts in many parts of the world (the middle east, sudan, nigeria, sri lanka, india, the former yugoslavia, northern ireland, and the philippines) attest to this resurgence, the extreme form of which is fundamentalism. thus arises the urgent need for inter-religious dialogue not only between individual representatives of different religions but also between communities themselves.3 a re-emergence of religion into public life and discourse is necessarily happening today. the problematic there is something unique and at the same time universal in religious traditions. the uniqueness comes from the inner cohesive vision of reality peculiar to the place of origin or to the prophetic figure who taught and gathered disciples, from the specificity in the expression of this vision as “enveloped in the philosophical, cultural, linguistic and geo-political realities of the place of its origin,” eventually finding articulation as systems of beliefs, rituals, and culture.4 the universality, on the other hand, is explicit or implicit in the validity claims of the faith-experience of each religious tradition, that these are for all people, and therefore the message must be spread to the four corners of the earth. “universality of religious traditions can also be argued on the basis that most of them emphasize common human values like love, compassion, justice and peace, even though diversities would emerge if one were to interpret these concepts in concrete situations.”5 thus christianity proclaims that jesus is the son of god while islam considers jesus as only a prophet, and buddhism teaches the path to nirvana, which is not god but perhaps godhead. and yet all three religions preach the values of love and justice. habermas states the problem in this way: “can those who belong to different cultures meet on a common basis of understanding, and where might this universal, all embracing commonality be found?”6 in the words of karl jaspers, which habermas quotes in the opening of his lecture, today we are in search of the basis on which human beings from all the various religious traditions could encounter each other in a 44 prajñâ vihâra meaningful way across the entire world, ready to re-appropriate, purify and transform their own historical traditions, but not to abandon them. such common ground for the (plurality of) faiths could only be clarity of thought, truthfulness and a shared basic knowledge. only these (three elements) would permit that boundless communication in which the wellsprings of faith could draw each other closer, by virtue of their essential commitment.7 karl jaspers’ answer before discussing karl jaspers’ response to the problem of the conflict of beliefs, habermas outlines the different current philosophical answers that can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. universalism of the western tradition that emphasizes the unity of reason innate in every human being and criticizes the religious truths using the current standards of science or philosophy. 2. relativism “which assumes that all strong traditions have their own incommensurable criteria of the true and the false, criteria which are internal to them.”8 both 1 and 2 do away with the problem of intercultural understanding. 3. contextualism, also skeptical of universal human reason, holds that unconditional validity claims “are so deeply immersed in the context of a specific tradition that the criteria of truth and falsehood are inseparably woven with a concrete understanding of self and world.”9 alasdair macintyre and richard rorty fall in this conception of philosophy even as they want to avoid the paradoxical standpoint of relativism that has to exempt its own statement from the context-dependency of other statements. 4. philosophical hermeneutics, against the assimilationist model, uses the dialogical model of understanding but with a relational symmetry of the dialogical situation. “through the exchange of first-and-second person perspectives…they are able to effect a rapprochement between the divergent horizons of their linguistic pre-understanding. thus hermeneutics wrests the universalistic potential of a linguistically embodied manuel b. dy, jr. 45 reason from the conditions of successful communication as such, and encourages us in the quest for intercultural understanding.”10 but here in philosophical hermeneutics, habermas asks, towards what is the quest for intercultural understanding? towards a substantive agreement or simply a modest “mutual respect for the sincerely attested power of opposed traditions?’11 the answer will depend on how we view the process of enlightenment occurring in the modern period, on how we understand the triple relation of philosophy: 1. to its own history, whether as a continuum, leveling out the transition from tradition to modernity, by construction as in hegel, or deconstruction as in heidegger, or as a break between tradition and modernity, criticizing metaphysics and transferring inherited from problems to the realm of belief, 2. to the biblical tradition, in one of the three ways: a) in service of religion, b) independent of religion, or c) as superior cognitively to religion; and 3. to other religions, where “western philosophy was very rarely sympathetic or even generous. in this respect jaspers represents an interesting exception.”12 in the first place, jaspers considered buddha, confucius and jesus as great philosophers. for him, “they broke the spell of mythical thought with their words and deeds, and triggered the process of disenchantment which has continued right up until the modern period.”13 the process of disenchantment continues in the enlightenment by freeing us from the dogmatism of faith based on inherited authority and communicated in ciphers. postmetaphysical thinking in prohibiting images treats the metaphysical and religious doctrines “as so many encodings of fundamental experiences which are inaccessible to conceptual explanation.”14 but this philosophical translation of symbolic meanings runs the risk of forfeiting the enciphered truth-contents of the religious tradition, while the modern sciences reduce the lifeworld simply to the domain of what is objectively knowable and technically controllable. the result is that ciphers are no 46 prajñâ vihâra longer taken seriously and understood as the language of transcendence, “so that they no longer illuminate the space of existence.”15 the task of philosophy then for jaspers is to “disclose and preserve the truth-content concealed in the semantic potentials of traditions shattered by enlightenment.”16 “by contrast with the sciences, philosophy moves in the space of essential—in other words: existential-experiences, a space occupied and structured by faith. but, in contrast to tradition, it retrieves these experiences with the argumentative tools of postmetaphysical thinking.”17 philosophy must restrict itself to being a philosophy of existence without resorting to a belief in revelation, as in the case of kierkegaard. as a philosophy of existence, it must have an ethics after metaphysics, without the support of comprehensive interpretation of the world. “fundamental philosophical knowledge establishes the conceptual framework for a possible ethical-existential self-understanding.”18 yet, this self-understanding is not achievable without a clear understanding of ‘transcendence,’ “jaspers’ name for that which always sustains and encompasses us.”19 habermas equates jaspers’ ‘transcendence’ with his own notion of the ‘linguistically structured life-world.” and rightly so, because jaspers, in contrast to heidegger, emphasizes the intersubjective character of authentic self-becoming: “being a self and being in communication are inseparable.”20 this communication is not a clinical discussion with a therapist but an ethical-existential conversation, where participants engage in a friendly argumentation of competing life projects. “in our encounter with the existence of others we get clearer about the faith from which our own existence draws its strength. thus existential communication takes the form of a struggle of beliefs. what is disputed is how to read the ciphers of these beliefs, and how to release their semantic potential through the right conduct of life.”21 fundamental philosophical knowledge takes the form of a substantive ethic: the sincerity of selfconscious conduct of life is the ethical criterion to assess the existential viability of a form of belief. and “to understand each other through ciphers implies a form of communication in contact with the transcendent.”22 thus the participants in the communicative dispute are guided by the “hope for unanimity,” “a form of agreement which is not to be found at the level of prepositional content but at the way in which these contents are made manifest in one’s conduct of life.23 manuel b. dy, jr. 47 in the end jaspers takes this fundamental philosophical knowledge as ‘faith,’ ‘philosophic faith.’ habermas interprets this as coming from the perspective of a specific tradition, that of the reformation. and as such, “it can only appear in plural forms, and can no more claim universal validity than the metaphysical religious doctrines whose truth content it seeks to save…[it] remains dependent on communication between human beings, who are obliged to talk to each other, but not necessarily to pray with each other.”24 ibid., p. 40. habermas’s critique of jaspers habermas finds difficulty in jaspers’ conception of philosophic faith because of the interpretative role philosophy must also take on. “for if fundamental philosophical knowledge is distinguished from the comprehensive doctrines of the tradition only by virtue of its undogmatic posture, then it lacks the impartiality which is needed if it is to establish the rational basis on which contrary faiths can enter into fruitful communication with each other.”25 jaspers confuses the two tasks he himself assigns to philosophy: as an ethical project, his philosophy “is an advertisement for one form of faith amongst others,” and as an analysis for the conditions of a successful communication between essentially competing faiths, “its arguments must be directed towards an agreement concerning the rules of the game.”26 habermas finds a similarity of this tension in the ‘political liberalism’ of john rawls, where philosophy plays a double role: as a metaphysical doctrine, it raises strong context-dependent truth claims that cannot be universalized in view of other competing worldviews, and as theory of justice, it hopes for an acceptance that may be “based on a fortunate convergence of non-public reasons,” and waits “to find out whether its proposal is sufficiently neutral to find access to all the competing world views.”27 unlike jaspers, however, rawls extends the scope of reason to the conditions of a just political life and not just to a mutual acknowledgement of divergent conceptions of a fulfilled life. for habermas, “intercultural understanding must be considered from both angles—from the angle of the good, as well as from that of justice,”28 or what he would term in another context as the “ethical” and the “moral” respectively. the 48 prajñâ vihâra moral use of practical reason inquires into what is equally good for everyone, while the ethical into what is respectively good for me or for us. the moral pertains to the questions of justice or what all could will, whereas the ethical can be rationally clarified only in the context of a specific lifehistory or a particular form of life.29 for habermas, if we interpret jaspers’ philosophical faith as an expectation “that, after the enlightenment, strong traditions will abandon their dogmatic claims to truth and that, instructed by insight into the fundamental situation of human beings, they will transform themselves into versions of philosophical faith,” this will mean the death of religions.30 even as the enlightened philosopher sees the members of other religions as members of different communities of interpretation, each united around its own conception of the good life (ethical), the religious person would insists on the redemptive significance and binding character of prophetically disclosed truths that are essential to his life.31 habermas’s conception of philosophy in criticizing jaspers, habermas comes up with his own response to the problem: “only an impartial fundamental knowledge could foster the desired communication between different forms of belief.”32 here, philosophy as fundamental knowledge takes the task of disclosing to religious and metaphysical worldviews their own inherent reflexivity. philosophy “elucidates the difference between religion before and after the enlightenment. it teaches other traditions about that distancing step away from themselves which reason requires them to take as soon as they become aware that they share the same universe of validity-claims with other faiths.”33 but even before such communication can take place, certain preconditions must already be agreed upon: first, parties must renounce the use of violent imposition of their convictions (militaristic, governmental or terroristic). second, they must recognize each other as partners with equal rights and third, be willing to learn from each other. these preconditions, an overcoming of fundamentalistic self-understanding, “imply not only the reflexive tempering of dogmatic truth-claims, in other words a manuel b. dy, jr. 49 cognitive self-limitation, but also the transition to a different stage of moral consciousness.”34 in this stage of moral consciousness, jaspers’ ‘will to communication’ is driven by the moral insight “that intercultural understanding can only succeed under conditions of symmetrically conceded freedoms, a reciprocal willingness to view things from the perspective of the other.”35 given such preconditions, can communicative reason expect unanimity beyond jaspers’ meaning of mutual respect for each other’s authentic form of life? for habermas, one should not expect a consensus in controversial existential questions, in questions of ethical selfunderstanding. “the pluralism of world views means that comprehensive doctrines, whether across the globe or within the same political community, come into conflict concerning the truth of their declarations, the rightness of their commandments, and the credibility of their promises.”36 reflexivity does not mean an abandonment of essential truth-claims, or a reinterpretation of truth-claims as context-dependent claims to authenticity.37 in another context, habermas speaks of this reflexivity as the ‘modernization of faith,’ since in our societies today, religious doctrine has “to accommodate itself to the unavoidable competition with other forms of faith, and other claims to truth.”38 only through self-criticism can a religious tradition “stabilize the inclusive attitude that it assumes within a universe of discourse delimited by secular knowledge and shared with other religions.”39 again, “this decentered background consciousness of the relativity of one’s standpoint certainly does not lead to the relativization of articles of faith themselves.”40 from the point of view of the religious tradition, the modernization of faith is necessary for the preservation and transmission of tradition. religious tradition must be rationally justified for it to be re-legitimized. “the tradition of modernity is the critique of tradition for the sake of tradition.”41 this modernization of faith has important political consequences: the community of the faithful must refrain from the use of violence, especially state-sponsored violence, in promoting its religious belief. it is “an important cognitive presupposition for the achievement of religious tolerance and the construction of a neutral state power.”42 50 prajñâ vihâra needless to say, this reflexivity must also be applied to the west with its ‘unholy trinity of colonialism, christianity and eurocentrism.”43 “thus the west, molded by the judaeo-christian tradition, must reflect on one of its greatest cultural achievements: the capacity for decentering one’s own perspectives, self-reflection, and a self-critical distancing of one’s own traditions. the west must abstain from any non-discursive means, must be only one voice among many, in the hermeneutical conversation between cultures.”44 conclusion what then is the mediating role of philosophy in the conflict of religious traditions? it is the task as philosophy of reflection in the sense of reflexion. it is to engage in argumentative discourse, a more specialized form of communication, where validity claims previously implicit in religious symbolic language is made expressly thematized and reinserted back into the everyday praxis constituted in the lifeworld.45 philosophy “seeks to re-express what it learns from religion in a discourse that is independent of revealed truth….the ambition of philosophy’s ‘translation program’ is, if you like, to rescue the profane significance of interpersonal and existential experiences that have so far only been adequately articulated in religious language. in contemporary terms, i would like to think of responses to extreme situations of helplessness, loss of self, or the threat of annihilation, which leads us speechless.’46 does this mean that philosophy as the modernization of faith or the linguistification of the sacred will replace religion? not quite, “for indispensable potentials for meaning are preserved in religious language, potentials that philosophy has not yet fully exhausted, has not yet translated into the language of the public, that is of presumptively generally convincing reasons.47 religious traditions, especially monotheistic traditions, “have at their disposal a language whose semantic potential is not yet exhausted, that shows itself to be superior in its power to disclose the world and to form identity, in its capability for renewal, its differentiation, and its range.”48 and for “as long as religious language bears with itself inspiring, indeed, unrelinquishable semantic contents which elude (for the moment?) the manuel b. dy, jr. 51 expressive power of a philosophical language and still await translation into a discourse that gives reasons for its positions, philosophy, even in its postmetaphysical form, will neither be able to replace nor to repress religion.”49 philosophy and religion need each other, for “in habermas’s view, religion without philosophy is speechless, philosophy without religion is contentless; both remain irreducible as long as we must face our anthropological vulnerability without consolation, without ultimate guarantees.”50 philosophy enables the religious traditions in inter-religious dialogues to stand in their own individualities, and it is only in their own stubborn but rationalized individuality that religious traditions can make a positive contribution to a world culture of globalization. endnotes 1 s. wesley ariarajah, “religious diversity and interfaith relations in a global age,” quest, vol. 2, number 2, november 2003, p. 11. 2 ibid., p. 12. 3 ibid., pp. 12-13. 4 s. wesley ariarajah, op. cit., p. 3. 6 jürgen habermas, op. cit., p. 33. 7 karl jaspers, der philosophische glaube angesichts der offenbarung (munich: piper, 1984), p. 7. quoted by jürgen harbermas, op cit., p. 30. 8 jürgen habermas, op. cit., p. 33. 9 ibid., pp. 33-34. 10 ibid., p. 34. 11 ibid., p. 35 12 ibid., p. 36. 13 ibid., p. 32. 14 ibid., p. 37. 15 ibid., p. 37. 16 ibid., p. 37. 17 ibid., p. 37. 18 ibid., p. 38 19 ibid., p. 38. 20 ibid., p. 38. 21 ibid., p. 39. 22 ibid., p. 39. 23 ibid., p. 32. 25 ibid., p. 40. 52 prajñâ vihâra 26 ibid., p. 40. 27 ibid., pp. 40-41. 28 ibid., p. 41. 29 jürgen habermas, “transcendence from within, transcendence in this world,” in don s. browning and francis schussler fiorenza (eds.), habermas, modernity, and public theology (new york: crossroad publishing company, 1992), p. 243. 30 jürgen habermas, “the conflict of beliefs,” pp. 41-42. 31 ibid., p. 42. 32 ibid., p. 42. 33 ibid., p. 42. 34 ibid., p. 43. 35 ibid., pp. 43-44. 36 ibid., p. 42. 37 ibid., p. 43. 38 jürgen habermas, “a conversation about god and the world, interview with eduardo mendieta,” religion and rationality, essays on reason, god, and modernity (cambridge, the mit press, 2002), p. 150. 39 ibid., p. 150. 40 ibid., p. 150. 41 eduardo mendieta, “introduction” to jurgen habermas, religion and rationality, p. 17. 42 jürgen habermas, religion and rationality, p. 151. 43 ibid., p. 152. 44 ibid., p. 154. 45 jürgen habermas, “transcendence from with, transcendence in this world,” p. 240. 46 jürgen habermas, religion and rationality, p. 164. 47 ibid., p. 162. 48 jürgen habermas, “transcendence from within, transcendence from this world,” p. 220. 49 ibid., p. 237. 50 eduardo mendieta, op. cit., p. 28. manuel b. dy, jr. 53 08_critical reson and faith the cotnribution.pmd critical reason and faith: the contribution of ricoeur’s hermeneutics j.haryatmoko, s.j. sanata dharma university, indonesia º·¤ñ¤âèí âø¤»ñ¨¨øºñ¹¢í§çò·กããáëåñ§¹çâø¤áñก¨ðàกõèâç¢éí§กñºกòãçô¾òกéì กòãก´¢õèã¹ãù»áººµèò§ æ «öè§íò¨¨ð»ãòก¯ã¹ãù»áºº¢í§íàôàã×èí§àåèò ãòก°ò¹ ¢í§¤çòá¤ố áåð¤çòáàª×èíã¹ãù»áººµèò§ æ ¢í§¤çòá¨ãô§·õèµòâµñç äáèâ×́ ëâøè¹ áµèçò·กããáµòá¨òãõµ·ò§èòê¹ò «ö觾âòâòá·õè̈ ðà¢éòã¨èãñ·¸òáåðàëµø¼åáåð ¾ö觾ò¤çòá¨ãô§íñ¹â´´à´è¹à¾õâ§ë¹öè§à´õâç íò¨¹óä»êùèกòãกåèòçëòçèòà»ç¹åñ·¸ô »ãðกòèôµ¹ôâáä´é »ñ­ëò¨ö§íâùè·õèçèò ¤çòá¤ô´·ò§èòê¹ò¹ñé¹¾ãéíáëã×íäáè·õè¨ð à»ô´กçéò§ãëéกñºá¹ç¤ô´ëåñ§¹çâø¤ «öè§áõá¹çâ¹éáã¹àªô§à»ãõâºà·õ⺠áõ¤çòá â×´ëâøè¹áåðâíáãñº ¾ëøàò¾¢í§¤çòáëáòâ º·¤çòá¹õé¨ðãªéèòêµãìáëè§ กòãµõ¤çòáàªô§çô¾òกéì¢í§ãôàกíãìáòªèçâà¾×èíáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèòçò·กããá·ò§ èòê¹òµòá á¹ç¨òãõµ¹ñé¹êòáò㶻ãñºãëéà¢éòกñºâø¤ëåñ§¹çâø¤ä é́ abstract the current age of postmodernist discourse involves a critique of various forms of oppression. these can take the form of grand narratives, foundations, and the belief in various forms of inflexible truth. but the traditional religious discourse __ with its attempts to understand faith and reason and its reliance on unique singular truths __ can easily lead to charges of dogmatism. so the question is whether religion thought is sufficiently well-equipped for opening itself to postmodern thought which tends to be analogous, flexible and tolerant of a plurality of meanings. this paper will enlist the aid of ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics to show how traditional religious discourse can adapt to the postmodern age. prajna vihara, volume 12, number 1, january-june, 2011, 113-130 113 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ one of the great challenges today is how to respond to the tendency toward skepticism and relativism that dominates these changing times. such tendencies are engendered by the fact that we have left behind a stable social and cultural order and enter now into circumstances of profound uncertainty. the idea of progress, which has relied on the sciences and technology has been called into question. rationality once seen as emancipatory has failed to deliver its promise. modern man has become more and more dependent and impulsive. postmodernism sees contemporary culture as ephemeral and individualistic, marked by the instability of rationality, and the collapse of the great ideologies (g. lipovetsky, 2004:69) and grand narratives. are our religions also vulnerable to the criticisms of postmodern thoughts whose ambition is to deconstruct all kinds of domination, including the methods and rationality of religious doctrine? the effort to understand the relation between faith and reason could be suspected as being an effort to create a grand narrative. such a project would have an ambition to lay the ultimate foundation of religious belief drawn from reason. this would then lead to the claim of universality leading it into the trap of dogmatism and of the principles of petition. so the question is whether religion thought is sufficiently well-equipped for opening itself to postmodern thought which tends to be analogous, flexible and tolerant of a plurality of meanings. the postmodern trend is willing to depart from the exigency of absolute reason to seek the foundation of truth. this course of thought constitutes a real challenge to religion whose claims tend to converge on some form of unique truth. in the postmodern era, all conflicts should be solved through discussions and negotiations. therefore, one must elaborate on a way to consensus and solidarity. the consensus must be factual, contextual and impermanent. it must not be a form of rational consensus which prevails universally following the illusions and myth of modernism. critical hermeneutics is considered as one of the postmodern approaches. critical hermeneutics and faith a more proper approach will make a stand for a critical rational114 prajna vihara ~ _ _ ity in the form of critical hermeneutics which adopts the argument that a thesis is never definitive, but should be criticized, revised and improved. there are two assumptions behind this approach: the first assumption is that a text contains a plurality of meanings; the second assumption is that a text can become autonomously detached from its initial production (i.e., distanciation of the author’s intention, the initial context, and the origin of destination). paul ricoeur’s hermeneutics is the most convenient tool for us to use to analyze the relation between faith and reason. faith must be understood as “the integral response of the human being to god who reveals himself as savior. faith accepts the messages, promises and commandments of god”. (r.latourelle, 1995:309). faith emphasizes two aspects: aspects of trust and assent to the message. faith is not an alien phenomenon, it concerns us personally. it must be rooted in ourselves or produced by our powers. at the same time, it has its origin in god himself. therefore, in the person as subject and in its structures (mind, psychology, all human capacities) are found the conditions required for the possibility of faith. its process is not a capitulation of spirit, but a sovereign exercise in which human beings make the thinking of god their own (ibid., 310). reason requires that if persons are to give their assent, they must have reasons for believing (fides quaerens intellectum). reasons alone confront us with only the power of our own mind as latourelle writes: “the signs and his rational knowledge of them, give man control not of the intrinsic credibility of the divine word but of his own knowledge of the duty to believe and of his own free decision to believe…” (ibid., 312). every message is a sign. thus, when we deal with a message we need a tool of analysis which enables us to understand its content. in so doing, we better understand ourselves. sign, symbol and text are the mediation to a better self-comprehension. therefore, if faith is well rooted in one’s culture, it has a solid base in which critical reason enlightens experience and are not alien to human beings’ origin structures. as a tool of analysis, the role of critical hermeneutics is in line with the four tasks of the critical reason which are, firstly, to dismantle the relation of power by which a text is misused to disguise the legitimization of power; secondly, to enable marginalized voices to articulate and be heard; thirdly, to bring about a knowledge which is critical toward the complicity of relation between power-knowledge-truth; and fourthly, to create favorj.haryatmoko, s.j. 115 able conditions to form a new subjectivity whose traits are marked by openness and tolerance. the project of history, intended to mobilize our society attracts in fact only a few adherents. our society is no longer obsessed with its future. it is neither a question of absence of insight nor of vision, but it is proof that consumerism focuses on the now-life. the meaning of time is dominated by the changing and ephemeral situations. the optimism of the progress of history is replaced by the horizon of a shorter time. today we face the social era where hic et nunc (the here and now) are considered pivotal. how can religions embody faith in an era of uncertainty? in this era, our society is no longer fooled by the grand narrative (hegel-marxism, socialism, evolutionism, universalism, patriarchal ideology), but is increasingly determined by life here and now. all these grand narratives, which have promised to bring humanity to a better future, failed in fulfilling their promise. finally, the critical discourses manage to unmask the stratagem of the principle of universality. behind this doctrine is a disguised strategy and desire for power. the claim of the value-free and disinterestedness of knowledge is precisely what makes us suspect the so-called scientific discourses of disguising the will to power. the deconstruction of the relation of knowledge-power-truth leads us to call into question the claim of scientific objectivity (m. foucault), behind which is the dissimulated interest in the legitimization of power. in brief, postmodernism enables us to deconstruct all kinds of unjust dominations, including the most disguised and symbolic ones. one of postmodernism’s contributions lies in the structural reorganization of the course of the social and cultural life in the advanced democratic society (g.lipovetsky, 2004:70). the sophistication of mass communication facilitates exchange among nations so that they enrich one another in the social, economic and cultural domains. but this sophisticated mass media has a two-edged sword. besides its meaningful side, it has an ambiguous influence due to the fact that it pushes people to con116 prajna vihara ~ _ _ sume more and more. the contemporary main episteme or structure of significance of life is focused on economy (money). homo oeconomicus is a fanatical adherent to individualism motivated by his/her own interests in all aspects of life (economy, education, politics, sex). how can such individualistic mode of life’s influence leave a religious aspiration remained intact? two main religious values which consist of altruism and disciplinary norms are called into question. the resistance against the authoritarian and disciplinary norms pushes our society to enter the process of the centralization of the role of the individual glorifying hedonism. the principles and norms which rule social life are emptied of their transcendent dimension. therefore, religion must face the society’s fierce resistance whenever it intervenes too much in the public space. the logic of market prevails more and more over social and religious norms. hedonistic culture exalting selffulfillment and the immediate satisfaction of desires is in ascendancy. it incites people to consume more in order to satisfy the urgency of pleasure. the term “urgency” is the keyword in understanding our contemporary culture in its relation to time. the speed of communication in combination with the logic of financial market forms an arbitrary instance to real time. all things must be met immediately with responses. the culture of urgency prevails in all domains. the slowness of response to professional requests constitutes a threat to the development or even the survival of an institution. urgency rules over the time schedule. therefore, the rhythm of time requires high-speed activities and immediate professional responses. the culture of urgency puts in danger a profound discernment because people find it difficult to distinguish between what is essential and what is merely an accessory. the high-speed rhythm of activities has a perilous impact on people’s search for meaning. it empties the question of the meaning of life. people have no time to put distance between themselves and their activities. it is almost impossible to question or to give meaning to these activities, much less to enter into a critical consideration. the response of religions would determine the relevance of their role in this contemporary society. j.haryatmoko, s.j. 117 hermeneutics: bridging faith and reason hermeneutics will be a very helpful method to enable us to understand the complexity of the relation between faith and reason. hermeneutics is not primarily considered a tool to interpret or rediscover the intention of the author of a text. it is not a question of a reproduction of the author’s message inserted into the text, but it must be looked at in ricoeur's perspective, that is, as an effort to search for the dynamic of the text aimed by the structures of the work (1986). the ultimate objective is to find the capacity of self-projection in the text to bring about a new world which represents the core message. using hermeneutics as a method of clarifying the relation between faith and reason, referring to p.ricoeur, implies accepting three assumptions (1995:35). the first assumption is that a religious faith may be identified through its language as a kind of discourse. whatever may be the nature of the religious experience, it must be articulated in a language. the second assumption is that this discourse must be understandable and communicable, that it be meaningful at least for the community of faith that uses it. furthermore, it needs to be communicable for the sake of communication with others outside of the faith community. the third assumption is that reason under the banner of philosophy is implied in this inquiry because this kind of discourse does not merely claim to be meaningful, but also to be true. according to ricoeur, philosophy is confronted by a mode of discourse that displays claims both to meaningfulness and to fulfillment such that new dimensions of reality and truth are disclosed (1995:36). the role of hermeneutics is ineluctable in bridging the hiatus between faith and reason. however, it depends on the capacity to explain that an understanding is never an immediate knowledge. in other words, there is no self-transparency. “there is no immediate understanding of oneself” (c.oliviera 1990:29). thus, understanding needs mediation. philosophy has no ambition to be a total mediation, as if reflection were identical to intuition. therefore, understanding does not consist of the encounter between “being” and “knowing”. there is a distance between the subject reflecting and herself/himself. this distance is bridged by the mediation of sign, symbol and text (ricoeur, 1986). the mediation through sign indicates that the initial condition of 118 prajna vihara ~ _ _ human experiences is language: perception and desire have to be expressed in words; and beauty needs to be described in a communicable way. mediation through symbolism means that all expressions could have equivocal meanings in relation to the designation of the elements of cosmos (fire, water, wind); the appellation of dimensions (height, depth); and the terming of aspects (clarity, obscurity). finally, text is all discourse fixed by writing. according to ricoeur, discourse must be distinguished from language. there are four conditions for something to be considered a discourse: firstly, there is a subject who affirms; secondly, there is a content of the proposition which describes a world that will be represented; thirdly, a discourse is supposed to have an audience to whom it is addressed; and fourthly, there is an aspect of temporality or the context of proposition. the mediation through sign and symbol is extended and modified by the mediation through text, but this extension implies that it uproots the text from its initial production of discourse. consequently, a distanciation linked to the initial production of discourse is created: a work of discourse becomes an autonomous object at a distance from the authorial intention, from its initial situation, and from its primitive audience (ricoeur, 1995:38). that is why a discourse as a work of art is open to an infinite range of interpretations. the hermeneutic category of “distanciation through writing” in combination with the “objectivation through structures” (ricoeur, 1986:126) represents the conditions of interpretation in order to enable a text to give meaning. both categories make up an objective pole of self-comprehension, whereas the hermeneutic category of “self-comprehension” draws an inspiration from the “world of the text”. these last two categories form the subjective pole of comprehension. these four hermeneutic categories reflect a concern which does not content itself with hermeneutics as a method (epistemology), but through this epistemology, the existence dimension of the interpreter (ontology) will be disclosed. from this point of view, the task of hermeneutics consists in expliciting the meaning of all types of imaginable being. from the phenomenological perspective, vision requires the display of the invisible that is not given in the actual experience, but manifests in the form of horizon, which is the cradle where vision is born. there is no vision crej.haryatmoko, s.j. 119 ated exterior to the interpretation. having a vision means penetrating something promising, even if it is still dissimulated. it means that an incisive interpretation will enable us to gain insightful understanding of a text so that it inspires us with creative ideas. objectivation through structural analysis is a logical tool for explaining the relations, combinations, contradictions and comparisons of the elements forming the text in order to display its values or richness. the meaning will be discovered through analysis of the relations that are interdependent so that language becomes a system of signs. this third hermeneutics category is not limited only to structural analysis, but is also extended to all forms of explanation of the text. this category includes all scientific explanations which are contributed by psychology, history, sociology, anthropology, archeology, etc. the reason for this is that, in the dialectic of explanation and understanding, those sciences serve as an instrument for the objectivation of text by means of explaining the logical relations of the text. thus, their contribution is emphasized on the epistemological side. this approach represents the stepping-stone to reach a better self-comprehension (ontological dimension). the dialectical relation between explanation and understanding in the dynamic of comprehension of the text is considered to be completion of each other. a text has an immanent structures whis is able to be explained by structural analysis or other scientific analysis. at the same time, the text has references to extra-linguistic. ricoeur calls this reference to the exterior of linguistics the world of the text which stems from neither psychological intentions nor the breath of god, but from the mediation of the structures of the text. it means that god’s revelation manifests itself in the contrasts and convergence of different types of discourse such as narration, poem, oracle, metaphor, and exhortation which are forged in the text of the holy scripture. the determining passage between objectivation through structural analysis and “self-comprehension” is the disclosure of the world of text. this phase is pivotal because it forms and transforms the reader or interpreter. in the bible, this disclosure is called “good news”, or “kingdom of god” (p.ricoeur, 1986). all of these epithets represent the objectivity of the new existence projected by the text. this new world does not stem from the author’s intention, but it is disclosed through the structures 120 prajna vihara ~ _ _ of the text. the narrative style orientates us to the signification that god is the main actor of the history of man’s salvation. the prophetic style expresses either a god who is threatening or presaging but at the same time he is giving a promise in spite of the prominent destruction. both examples are forms of the bible’s proposal of the world. the capacity of the text for disclosing a revelation derives from the contrasts and convergences of all forms of discourse analyzed together so that hermeneutics leads to the world proposed by the text. this world of the text will make sense only if the reader or interpreter appropriates it. this “appropriation” or “self-comprehension” marks the fusion between the world proposed by the text and the concrete world of the reader. gadamer used the term “fusion of horizons” to refer to the encounter between the two worlds that are more than mere worlds. it is called “fusion” because it is impossible for the reader to expropriate the world of the text exhaustively and, at the same time, to leave totally the actual world where he lives. the result is that the reader does not leave the world intact and he does not refuse the world proposed by the text. the world of the reader undergoes a real transformation allowing the reader to transform and understand himself/herself better. distanciation: criticism of ideology and deconstruction in the process of appropriation, the distanciation from her-/himself is required in order to avoid a distorted meaning and as a fair effort to prevent the arbitrariness of interpretation. contrary to the literal meaning of the word, distanciation is far from the notion of alienation; it suggests a creative resolution due to its merit of enriching and purifying self-comprehension. the distanciation consists in the form of criticism of ideology, deconstruction and analogy of the game. the criticism of religion launched by marx, nietzsche and freud has a lucid significance for a more purified understanding of faith. it is constructed exterior to the hermeneutic process. it grows as criticism of ideology exercising the criticism of the pre-comprehensions and of the illusions of religion. a religious conviction runs the risk of transforming itself into an illusion if it is uprooted from the reality of life, as it is then j.haryatmoko, s.j. 121 analogous with wishful thinking taken for reality. linguistically, such wishful thinking is not impossible because language is not only a tool of communication or means of representation. language as speech-act (performative utterance) is used as an instrument of action or power. on the other hand, the social praxis is discursive in the sense that it is organized discursively by values and representations of human needs. therefore, it is logical that language could construct reality behind which is exalted the adagio of the idealistic philosophy that “the real is rational, the rational is real”. such a conviction or faith needs to be confronted with a critical approach. that is why the thoughts of nietzsche, marx and freud as philosophy of suspicion will be apt to help to dismantle unjust relations of power and the surreptitious manipulations. michel foucault affirmed that religious discourse runs a risk of being embedded deep in the relation of power-knowledge-truth (1976). for a better hermeneutic understanding that focuses on the text, these criticisms are taken as an acknowledgement of the ideological assault which could be destructive, but they can be transformed into a tool of auto-criticism that enables the purification of faith. so, the response to those criticisms is not an apology, but an effort to domesticate or digest the wild assaults, which could be harmful, for a better self-comprehension. this mechanism is a promising exercise because it could pedagogically bring about an attitude of religious maturity that allows our faith to grow up and, at the same time become tough because it could disorientate those who have a limited understanding of faith. in such a mechanism, the adherents of religion could fall into a trap of spiritual aridity if the intellectual exercise empties the spirituality of her/his lived experiences from the horizon of faith. the criticism of ideology defending secular humanism launches a challenge to religions regarding whether they are able to offer their specificity in the domain of morality. does religion enrich ethics? the answer is that religion must not be understood in terms of enriching ethics; religion specifies ethical acts because it defends in ethics the uniqueness of individual (h.cohen, 1990). religion places ethics in a concrete community with its organization, tradition, rites, institutions, theology and members. in religious ethics, the beauty tends often to be marginalized or 122 prajna vihara ~ _ _ disregarded in favor of a focus on the question of goodness and truth. the question of aesthetics is not totally ignored, but religion warns not to confuse aesthetical taste with religious awareness. the latter can endure the concrete individual’s sufferings, whereas aesthetics deals with some styles that have nothing to do with suffering. art only knows bad or beautiful faces in their material expressions. in aesthetics, religion manifests itself through its capacity for inciting a specific feeling irreducible to a mere aesthetic feeling because it can transform into empathy, mercy or forgiveness. this religious feeling is immediately connected with the idea of god. it represents an expression of the expectation of liberation or salvation. religious feeling and the promise of salvation find their articulation in prayer. prayer discloses its meaning when it expresses that expectation of liberation. consequently, the convergence between aesthetics and religion lies in prayer and specifically in mysticism that is desirous of participating in the infiniteness of the transcendent. a problem arises because concrete religion tends to mark the law of separation which founds the relation between god and man. its followers will unconsciously unify this separation when they commit unscrupulous violence on behalf of god. from the humanist ethical point of view, such violence which is motivated by the transcendent reason is totally unacceptable, while religion is still tempted to give a compromise by founding the act of violence on the holy scripture as symbolical and ideological legitimization. accordingly, such a transcendent motivation could not be taken for the specificity of the religious ethics; otherwise it will be contemptuous of humanity and incurs indignation. in order to mark the specificity of religious ethics, religion needs to deal with unique experience of the ethical subject that is recognition of sinfulness, contrary to the secular humanist ethics that insists on freedom and responsibility. this insistence defines the human as being self-confident and tending to be arrogant. the vision of religious ethics enables one to recognize her/his weakness as a human being. hence, the value of religion lies in community insofar as salvation that does not in the power of the individual but in the power of god which is revealed in his promise. this promise is a guarantee that her/his freedom and her/his respect for human dignity can not be separated from that process of god’s liberation. god’s promise lays a strong foundation for the religious disciples to act j.haryatmoko, s.j. 123 conforming to moral virtues. that promise will only make sense if it is guaranteed through institutions and laws that are able to organize one’s responsibility by imposing sanction. therefore, authentic religion is required to be able to translate god’s promise into a system of action. this system of action must be guaranteed by collectivity because it runs a prominent risk of slipping into pretense of being in a legitimate position to confiscate so-called “god’s will”. thus, a path of humility must be taken as contra-measure in which we recognize our weakness. according to h.arendt (1958), one of man’s weaknesses lies in the fact that man’s action is irreversible. when we make an error in typing on computer, the mistake can easily be erased without leaving any trace. but when we hurt someone, this victim will not be left intact. he/she is not protected from an injury that could last a long time. forgiveness helps the perpetrator to resume a new life. to some extent, forgiveness is an act of forgetting someone’s mistake or of overcoming feeling resentful toward perpetrator’s for an offense. forgiveness transcends the rationality of action based on the logic of reciprocity. rather forgiveness bases on the logic of generosity. for this reason, religion represents a community where forgiveness becomes a source of life renewal. only religion integrates forgiveness as a mechanism of community renewal guaranteed by collectivity. that collectivity finds its unity by referring to the same transcendent whose main nature is full of mercy. only forgiveness can break the vicious cycle of evil and dissuade the ruse of reason from being tempted to manipulate the sacred. in order to prevent manipulation of the sacred in favor of different vested interests, deconstruction as a tool of analysis will play a critical role in the process of interpretation. deconstruction is another facet of distanciation. it is, in ricoeur’s point of view, understood as an effort to dismantle the reader’s interests and the interpreter’s either conscious or unconscious motivations in front of the text. the assumption behind this measure is that all human rational acts are intentional. consequently, according to the general theory of action, an agent will be pushed by motivations or interests to achieve a goal. the goal determines the choice of means. the means can appear in various forms; they can even be dissimulated behind the sacred. hence, deconstruction serves to sound the reader out so that all of her/his interested motivations could be disclosed or unmasked. 124 prajna vihara ~ _ _ such a measure is analogous with husserl’s eèpocheè which puts the reader’s interpretation into brackets, and suspends the immediate seizure of the text so that an authentic comprehension can be acquired. by deconstruction, the conflict or tension between different religions may be confined within the interested interpretations of all of the protagonists. the conflict of interests (economy or politics) disguised in a polemic of theological understandings is a significant sign indicating the lack of legitimization. in principle, the relation of power is asymmetric in the sense that there is often a deficit of trust that undermines the authority (politics or religion). the authority requires more than the trust that could be given by the subordinates. to fill a gap in this relation, the authority misuses religion as a system of legitimization. what is interpreted and legitimized by religion is no other pretext than the relation of power because all kinds of power seek always for legitimization. for this reason, deconstruction plays an important role in dismantling all vested interests. the analogy of the game: the creative dimension of distanciation if the criticism of ideology and deconstruction are the negative faces of distanciation, the analogy of the game is the positive and creative side of distanciation. a game allows people to find out the new possibilities that are imprisoned by rigid, formal and serious thought. it helps people to discover in themselves the possibilities to change the fact that they are restrained by a vision that is merely moral. thus, a game brings about an atmosphere that makes initiatives and creativities grow because through the game, the subject is set free from social norms, social hierarchy and everyday seriousness. in an atmosphere of freedom, the essential phenomenon manifests itself; that is the process to give birth to creativities. ricoeur affirms that it is primarily in the imagination and not in the will that “a new being” is born. the capacity to be seized by new possibilities precedes the capacity for choosing and deciding. the imagination represents the dimension of the subject responding poetically to the text because it creates newness. accordingly, the primary destination of the text is imagination. to the imagij.haryatmoko, s.j. 125 nation, the text has conversation by suggesting new possibilities, and through imagination the text murmurs the delightful ideas holding the images, which will set the subject free. a subject enjoys freedom if she/he is open to new possibilities and not constrained by the boundaries of doctrine, religion, race or other factors of social segregation. she/he transcends the social determination. such freedom is not always within reach for all people. some religious doctrines inculcate in the mind of their followers not to be in communication with the followers of other religions. such an exclusive doctrine would see the other as a threat. exclusion is an indicator of being uprooted from the human reality. even if those doctrines are well-founded scripturally an objection arises from the human ethics criterion. “according to the general ethics standard, a religion would be true and authentic as far as it expresses human dignity. it does not eliminate nor destroy humanity, but preserves and promotes humanity” (h.kung, 1991:244). the analogy of the game finds its relevance to the plural society in creating opportunities for informal encounters among religions in the occasion of different events such as sport, theatre, music, camping, festivities, etc. these informal encounters help break the ice between people of different religions who are not well acquainted with each other. such an encounter will allow people to eliminate the prejudices embedded deep in their respective minds. when this phase of encounter is attained, a rich dialogue of theology has the chance to be launched and organized. all these efforts are to avoid a conflictual relationship among religions and to build a deeper understanding. the conflicts among the followers of different religions end in violence from a lack of religious tolerance. even if the cause of conflict did not primarily consist of religious issues, the atmosphere of hatred between muslims and christians (the case in indonesia) did exist, though a lot of the members of both groups still have a good relationship and mutual cooperation. the fundamental problem lies in the difficulty of accepting the difference of the other. the existential question is how muslims or christians can pay respect to and accept another religion, while at the same time be convinced of the authenticity of the truth of their own religion. the acceptance of plurality comes from an attitude of humility .. 126 prajna vihara ~ _ _ acknowledging the limits of human capacity to seize the perfection of god. the different religious traditions show precisely god’s perfection: “god is too rich and unlimited so that a religious tradition, which is of course limited, will not exhaustively be able to dip into the perfection and the fullness of god” (e.schillebeeckx 1992:225). the fullness of god will be better expressed through the plurality of religions than by only one religion. behind this statement, a dimension of ethics appears as a common ground to pay respect to human dignity. an encounter with “the other” represents the moral moment because the other induces me to responsibility. “l’eèpiphanie du visage (the appearance of the face) becomes precisely the expression of the unlimitedness of the other which reminds me of my obligation and judges me” (levinas,1971:215). so, levinas declared lucidly that “a relation does not neutralize the other, but preserves the other. the other is not the object which is part of us nor becomes similar to us, but the other withdraws himself to his mystery” (1982:59). the presence of the other allows me to affirm my uniqueness in which the meaning of life makes sense. so the presence of the other does not threaten me, but invokes me to take on a higher task and a human vocation calling me to take responsibility. the other does not limit my freedom. by invoking my responsibility, the other legitimizes my freedom. the philosophical rationality of cultural and religious plurality answers to the basic need of identity. this basic need will not be satisfied unless it is translated into a concrete policy that defines clearly the principles of social praxis accommodating cultural plurality. the main concern consists of creating the public space allowing the cultural interaction and a more human communication through which a consensus will be attained. the public space gets its significance from facilitating different cultures to share in a strong position thanks to their dignity and self-confidence. are all these approaches not to be taken as a trap of relativism? how, then, to define the mission of each religion if proselytism incurs indignation? luc ferry, a french political philosopher, suggests an interesting reflection on the vocation of every human being. the main vocation of the religion’s followers is a concrete-universality (l.ferry, 1998:246). we find the analogy of this concrete-universality in works of art. a successful piece of art is a concrete object which is universally appreciated. this j.haryatmoko, s.j. 127 concrete-universality is defined as the reconciliation between the particular and the universal. one’s life which is sourrounded by his/her community represents a collective life still a particular life, but it has significance for the whole of humanity. religions are called to live a similar vocation in the sense of the invitation to be like an art-work. the vocation to be a work of art means participating in the life of society contributing a significant meaning to the whole society. a life as a work of art means opening the access to the universal precisely through the authentification of the particular. this authentification is a form of freedom which manages to detach itself from particularism. world figures such as mahatma gandhi, muhammad iqbal, and mother theresa are works of art representing the concrete-universality. these figures are considered universal because they were accepted and appreciated by all groups of religions, and concrete because their lives were rooted in the particularity of their own religions. they contributed to the development of humanity due to their religious education and they grew up in their own religious environment. j. haryatmoko sj is lecturer in philosophy at the sanata dharma university, yogyakarta, indonesia. references arendt, hannah, 1958: the human condition, second edition, chicago: the ucp. baudrillard, jean, 1970: la societeè de consommation, paris: folio/essais chryssides, george d., can new faiths be reasonable?, in: rethinking new religious movements, editor m.a.fuss, rome, 1998, pp.11-27. cohen, herman, 1990. la religion dans les limites de la philosophie, paris: cerf. ferry, luc, & comte-sponville, andre 1998: la sagesse des modernes, paris: laffont. foucault, michel, 1976: histoire de la sexualiteè i. la volonteè du savoir, paris: gallimard. 128 prajna vihara ~ _ _ hammond, david, interpreting faith and reason: denys turner and bernard lonergan in conversation, horizon 35/2 (2008): 191202. jayme, virginia l., emmanuel levinas’ philosophy of responsible subjectivity, in: philippiniana sacra, vol.xxvi, no.77 (1991), pp.227-262. jeanrond, w. g., & rike jennifer l., 1991. radical pluralism and truth, new york: crossroad. knitter, paul, 1995: one earth many religions. multifaith dialogue and global responsibility, orbis books. kung, hans, 1991: dialogability and steadfastness: on two complementary virtues, editor werner g. jeanrond and jennifer l. rike (new york: crossroad, 1991. latourelle, reneè, 1995: dictionary of fundamental theology, new york: crossroad. levinas, emmanuel,1971. totaliteè et infini. essai sur l’exteèrioriteè. la haye: m. nijhoff. levinas, emmanuel, 1982. ethique et infini, paris: fayard. lipovetsky, gilles, 2004: les temps hypermodernes, paris: grasset quilab, oliver d., welcoming the stranger: levinas’ ethical philosophy of responsibility, in: diwa 20 (november 1995), pp.97116. ricoeur, paul, 1986: du texte a l’action. essais d’hermeèneutique ii, paris: esprit-seuil. ricoeur, paul, 1991: soi-meme comme un autre, paris: seuil. ricoeur, paul, 1995: figuring the sacred. religion, narrative, and imagination, minneapolis: augsburg fortress. schillebeeckx, edward, 1992: l’histoire des hommes, reècit de dieu, paris: cerf. schmitz, kenneth l., faith and reason: then and now, in communio 26 fall 1999, international catholic review, pp.595-608. sennett, richard, 2006: the culture of the new capitalism, new haven: yale up. sutor, bernhard, 1991: politische ethik, paderborn: ferdinand schoningh. thayse, jean luc, fe èconditeè et eèvasion chez levinas, in: revue j.haryatmoko, s.j. 129 .. .. < ‘ philosophique de louvain, 1998 (096:000), pp. 624-659. tugendhat, ernst, 1998: confeèrences sur l’eèthique, paris: puf. walsh, david, 1999, reflections on faith and reason, washington d.c.: georgetown university press. westphal, merold, levinas and the immediacy of the face, in: faith and philosophy, vol.10, no. 4 october 1993, pp. 486-501. 130 prajna vihara ~ _ _ 10(134-138)note for authors what can gregory bateson’s ‘ecology of mind’ teach us about the human genome? arthur saniotis the university of adelaide, australia abstract the human genome represents a major scientific achievement which will influence human societies in the 21st century and beyond. in this article i argue that the use of gregory bateson’s ‘ecology of mind’ is a relevant theoretical concept for unpacking our understanding of the human genome. bateson’s cybernetic model proffers new ways of constructing the human genome which takes into account human biological and cultural evolution. in bateson’s ecology of mind, genes embody unities which are apparent in biological and social systems. knowledge of such unities demands a certain kind of human gnosis – ways of knowing which avoid cartesian constructions of knowledge, but rather encourage critical understanding. the discovery of the human genome has been a scientific leap forward and will have an indelible influence on the life sciences. francis collins, the person who was in charge of the human genome project, stated that such a scientific endeavour happened only once in history, thereby placing it among other key human inventions — fire, agriculture, the wheel, the printing press, and cybernetics (kaku 1998, 140).1 i also concur that the human genome project is cognate to an evolutionary leap forward which will transform scientific knowledge of the human body and mind. the completion of the human genome project will probably have a greater impact than the discovery of mendeleev’s elemental chart or einstein’ theory of relativity since it will directly affect human lives (kaku 1998, 141).2 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 23-37 23 © 2000 by assumption university press while progress into the understanding of genetic processes in the human body and the possible treatment of genetic diseases is now possible, scientific discourses on the human genome need to be unpacked. this is an essential epistemological exercise which beckons our scrutiny. the inherent philosophical and bioethical issues arising from the human genome has been given considerable theoretical attention. for instance, iftime (2004, 410) endorses the “reiteration of the precautionary principle” in the use of gene therapies due to their use of “potentially toxic biochemicals.” additionally, a new theory of the transgene proposes that there are “more danger signals that alert the organism resulting in the failure of gene therapy attempts” (iftime 2004, 411). one of the problems in understanding the human genome is due to our current scientific infancy in this area. kaku (1997, 144) maintains that while the period up until 2020 will be characterised by a biomolecular revolution culminating in “personalised dna sequencing,” the period from 2020 to 2050 will determine “the inter-relations of genes.” the scientific gains during this period will much slower, albeit, more crucial to understanding the complexities of the web of life (kaku 1998,144). implicit to kaku’s thesis is the need for greater theoretical understanding of the underlying processes of the human genome which demand new paradigms of knowledge. kaku adds that although science has deciphered some of the fundamental principles of dna molecules, this does not mean that we have mastered its mysteries (1998,10). as kaku notes, “we are now making the transition from amateur chess players to grand masters, from observers to choreographers of nature” (1998, 10). in this article i will propose that gregory bateson’s notion of ‘ecology of mind’ provides a poignant bioethical tool for understanding the bioethical dynamics of the human genome. bateson’s ecology of mind proffers a philosophical breakthrough to the ways in which human beings develop and interpret the world around them and how it is constituted as mind. ecology of mind and ways of knowing bateson’s works on cybernetics have influenced the social, cogni24 prajñâ vihâra tive and molecular sciences. as an anthropologist and cybernetician bateson was concerned by two epistemological issues: firstly, how biological and social systems organise themselves; secondly, how knowledge of these systems is extrapolated and understood. bateson’s interdisciplinary approach, albeit, not unique, is iconoclastic and insightful. kernel to his epistemology was his theory called ‘ecology of mind.’ ecology of mind defines mind as the aggregate of components of a system. the components of a system are characterised by mutuality, cyclicity, and relational symmetry. mind incorporates mental, living, and social systems (bateson 2000). following from bateson, bale (2006a) contends that the organisational symmetry embodied in living systems is evident in mental processes (bateson 2000). the components of a given system constitute whole mind systems and are “also recognised as minds, or sub-minds” (bale 2006b). bateson argues that the process of mind is both immanent and emergent “in the interaction of differentiated “parts” “ (2002, 87). bateson states: “if you want to understand mental process, look at biological evolution and conversely if you want to understand biological evolution, go look at mental process”(manghi 2002, xi). he expresses this idea in the following famous passage: the individual mind is immanent but not only in the body. it is immanent also in pathways and messages outside the body; and there is a larger mind of which the individual mind is only a subsystem. this larger mind is comparable to god and is perhaps what some people mean by “god,” but it is still immanent in the total interconnected social system and planetary ecology (1970). bateson refers to the interconnected patterns of mind as metapatterns – “a pattern of patterns” which connect universal life forms in a cosmic matrix akin to the myth of indra’s net. in this hindu myth, mind is represented as a cosmic net which is connected by an infinite number of translucent gems that reflect each other, symbolising unity in plurality. according to bateson, ideas need to be understood from an ecological perspective. such a perspective provides a heuristic model for explaining how ideas interact and why certain ideas achieve ascendancy while others vanish. bateson’s ecology of mind radically challenges the reader to view nature and mind from a wider perspective, eschewed from “our obsolete habits of mind” (manghi 2002, xii). bateson’s epistemoarthur saniotis 25 logical probings led him to re-evaluate human gnosis, the way in which knowledge is constituted and synthesised via human sensory and cognitive processes. his method was, also, an ethical understanding of the processes emergent in mind. for this, he directs the reader to eschew from the scientific cartesian model, which is “inadequate when applied to describing and explaining the multivariable processes of human and biological interaction” (bale 2006a). similarly, macy criticises the paucity of cognitive approaches towards knowledge which increase ‘anomie’ (durkheim found in giddens 1972), ‘disenchantment’ (weber 1946, 146), and “spiritual and psychic dislocation” (bale 2006b). macy states: either we live in a clockwork universe, wholly predetermined by initial conditions, with no scope for genuine novelty, or the cosmos is a blind and purposeless play of atoms, and determinable only statistically, by the laws of chance(1978, 58). furthermore, scientific methodology privileges the ‘objective’ while attempting to avoid “subjective input”, resulting in an understanding of external properties. what this does is hinder “self knowledge”“a way of knowing” which foregrounds reflexive knowledge (clark 2001). the ecological mind is self reflexive, a central component of creative thought (bateson 2002, 172). the idea of self reflexive thought whereby the subjectivity of the observer is also included in the epistemological exercise is central to anthropology. for bateson, the processes of knowing point towards the relationship between the knower and known. bateson asks, “what, then, are the rules for self-knowledge?” (2002, 127). this is a significant question in relation to the human genome. knowledge of the human genome has been under close scrutiny by geneticists, each vying to unlock the secrets of human genes. recent discoveries of the human genome indicate that there are surprisingly fewer human genes than first anticipated by various scientists. at first, the number of genes in the human body was calculated to be 100,000. present estimates have diminished the number of “protein-coding genes” to 21,000 (gerstein & zheng 200, 32). in addition, only 300 genes are believed to be uniquely human (thacker 2001). theorists such as thacker point out that this is only surprising if the metaphor of 26 prajñâ vihâra quantity is used to measure the human genome. in other words, more genes suggests a more complex organism. “the assumption here is that “more is better” (thacker 2001). the redundancy of dna is, again, surprising if there is a belief that human genes have a “unique function” (thacker 2001). apparently, such a belief fits within the ambit of american individualism and innovativeness. as thacker (2001) indicates: repetition here is taken to be synonymous with redundancy and a lack of novelty, while the icons of american subjectivity individuality, originality, novelty are assumed to reside in the very bodies of subjects, down to their biomolecules. the implications of this kind of discourse are bioethically tenuous since it leads to the commodification of genetic material as is evident in human patenting industry. perhaps, a more interesting point is that the discovery of the human genome reaffirms the unity of life on earth, an issue which is embedded in bateson’s ecological epistemology. “one and the same kind of living filaments has been the cause of all organic life,” erasmus darwin tells us (ridley 2000, 22). craig venter, one of the chief scientists on the american human genome project concluded that, “really, we are just identical twins” (clark 2001).3 this simple truth has vast implications for both science and religion. organic life is exemplified by an elaborate matrix of interdependent systems, each enveloping the other, thus forming a steady communicative symbiosis of a “hierarchical order” (bale 2006a). if mutuality is synonymous with the creational exercise then bateson’s call for a new way of approaching this dynamic warrants attention. as i have pointed out, the discovery of the human genome has been equated by metaphors of quantity which are integral to modern consumerism.4 bateson’s ecology of mind quashes these quantifiable metaphors and draws our foci to the mutual processes that are immanent in biological and social systems (heims 1991). another important point is the way in which the human genome has been constructed as a kind of revelatory text – “a book of promises” (doyle 1997,63). this is problematic. bateson a la foucault claims that the rhetoric of control is inherent to scientific discourses. such discourses arthur saniotis 27 promise ways of knowing beyond the ken of ordinary perception. take for instance, foucault’s notion of the ‘medical gaze’ which legitimises medical ways of knowing. the medical gaze is synonymous to what foucault refers to as a “regime of truth” which valorises certain techniques and discourses while suppressing alternate discourses (dawber 2004; rabinow 1984, 74). the technological oeuvre of the medical gaze penetrates beneath the body’s surface and surveys the visceral domain where the underlying causes of disease and molecular processes await to be discovered (foucault 1973). the body, in this sense, is a predictable machine that renders itself freely to scientific inquiry. thus, the medical gaze has perpetrated the myth of itself as a doyen of hidden truth. however, the problem with this kind of reading is to view the body as a kind of text – a cryptic language awaiting to be disclosed. as taylor avers, “the linguisticality of the body might harbour an unknowability that can never be overcome” (1993, 221). in his textual criticism of the genetic text mcgann observes that “textuality is a social condition” and therefore, indeterminate (1991, 16). “instability is an essential feature of the text in the process” (mcgann 1991, 94).5 in other words there is no correct text, but rather multiple texts which reflect “sociohistorical conditions” (mcgann 1991, 9). moreover, the notion of genetic fixedness ignores the fact that genetic variation is a dynamic process that is constantly evolving. genetic variation is the norm rather than the exception. thus, the genetic code in each human being is unique, exhibiting its own genetic mutations and variations, along with the 19,000 identified pseudo-genes (vestiges of old genetic code associated with defunct routines) (wilson 2002, 27; gerstein & zheng 2006, 31). in the case of pseudo-genes, these are linked to “changes in an organism’s environment ad circumstances” (gerstein & zheng 2006, 35), and freely accumulate mutations which would be precarious to normal genes (gerstein & zheng 2006, 34). for ridley, the variability of human genes goes against the scientific tendency “to exaggerate stability, to believe in equilibrium” (2000, 146). thus, in the final analysis, arguments that posit a correct genetic script are ultimately teleological: they imply a kind of evolutionary “final intention” that recalls the concept of authorial final intention 28 prajñâ vihâra that has so troubled modern textual scholars (wilson 2002, 27). lessons in evolutionary learning the noted anthropologist mary douglas formulated an approach towards knowledge in terms of purity and pollution. the key point of her model is how human beings subscribe human knowledge and behaviours into socially prescribed categories. any phenomena which abrogates or blurs these categories is regarded as polluting and is socially proscribed (douglas 1969). using douglas’ framework it is evident how present kinds of scientific knowledge making seemingly encourage maintenance of compartmentalisation and rigid adherence to ‘traditional’ forms of learning (montuori 1993). bateson argued that habituated ways of thinking were ecologically threatening since it led human beings to becoming de-sensitized to their environments, and allowing dangerous and rigid ideological trends to remain unchallenged. bateson considered habituation as being akin to “internal coherence” (2000, 173) – a process which remained uncorrected by “internal rigor or external reality” (2000, 208). the process of correction, for bateson was a creative exercise, an evolutionary way of learning which foregrounded “co-operative group interaction” (montuori 1993).6 the process of correction is also an ethical response to systems of knowledge that dissuade critical learning and perpetuate competition. an example of internal coherence is the cultural emphasis on dominator learning patterns. dominator learning patterns create circumstances where “continuous conflict is generated,” thereby discouraging conflict resolution strategies (montuori 1993). in this “fear based system”, mistakes are viewed as ambiguous and need to be avoided as they create for ontological insecurity (montuori 1993). such conditions inhibit critical learning and maintain the status quo. dominator learning patterns, are thus, bound to repeat mistakes due to a lack of corrective mechanisms (montuori 1993). consider the domination principle underlying scientists’ and journalists’ ideas of genes. genes are said “to control,” “to program,” and “to determine” proteins (wilson 2002, 29). to continue further, journalists have often used anxiety tropes when reporting on the implications of faulty genes in causing a litany of congenital problems. arthur saniotis 29 awry genes are said to lurk in the genetic corridors awaiting favourable internal and environmental conditions to become ‘switched on.’ these ‘rebel’ genes are constructed as subverting the processes of internal equilibrium much in the same way in which cancer cells overwhelm non-cancer cells. for example, the journalist emma ross of the associated press quoted: “genes can promote or cause disease when they don’t work properly. some illnesses linked to genes gone bad include cancer, arthritis, diabetes, high blood pressure, alzheimer’s and multiple sclerosis” (ross 1999). in the scientific journal beyond discovery (2003), it notes how genes “are responsible for an estimated 3,000-4,000 hereditary diseases.” genetic flaws increase a person’s risk of being struck by one or more disorders. armand marie leroi’s article in the new york times (march 14, 2005) points out that certain drugs may not work on some ethnic or racial groups due to genetic differences. leroi’s article leads us towards ambiguity by claiming that modern genetics has been unable to explain why humans show such a high degree of physiological variation throughout the globe. on this theme, the nation’s (march 10 2006) arthit khwankhom reinforces public fear of genetic profiling by stating that, “the public does not yet appreciate that by giving a few drops of blood they could pass on numerous secrets about themselves to anyone in the world.” such journalistic projections only augment public anxiety and mitigate the processes of critical learning. this is precisely where bateson’s idea of evolutionary learning is integral in, firstly, recognising the habituated processes of thought and, secondly, in acknowledging that there are alternative ways of thinking beyond socially dominated patterns (graham 1994). elaborating from bateson, david russell (1994) identifies the use of narrative as a vital pedagogical tool in learning. whereas science privileges precision and observation, narrative emphasises intuitive and aesthetic modes of analysis (russell 1994). according to russell narrative follows holistic principles in that it integrates experience and explanation. stories, are thus, ways of deriving meaning and for unfolding human experience. quoting russell (1993): “through the continuous integration of narrative into the experience-explanation-experience relationship, the discussion of ethics becomes an inevitable ingredient of the learning process.” david polkinghorne poignantly expresses the significance of stories for social 30 prajñâ vihâra ecology. “through the action of emplotment, the narrative form constitutes human reality into wholes, manifests human values, and bestows meaning on life” (polkinghorne 1988, 159). in bateson’s social ecology stories are a means of connectedness between humans and between the human and non-human world. in short, stories embody unities, connecting a and b. stories are a living, experiential fabric fusing biological and mental systems. as bateson suggests, “rather, if the world be connected, if i am at all fundamentally right in what i am saying, then thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds, whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones” (bateson 2002, 12). bateson was only interested in producing a pedagogy which was bioethically sound, and that meant going back and ‘reinventing the wheel.’ in this way, storytelling pathed the way towards an ecological pedagogy. with regard to the human genome, how can narratives sway us to thinking in alternate ways? current scientific narratives of the human genome are preoccupied with the universality of dna and their life determining qualities (fell & russell 1994a). however, as fell and russell contend, to describe dna as a generative life principle “obscures their role, rather than clarifying it” (1994a). no dna can itself be regarded as creatrix since life is constitutive of the interrelations between “organisms and their environments” (doyle 1997, 128). if we concur with fell and russell’s analogy that dna is cognate with a country’s constitution which proffers a stable government, but, does not rule society (fell & russell 1994a), then we can surmise that genes are a metaphor of life, not life itself. as doyle poetically asserts: “beyond the functions and differences of organisms, there is a secret” (1997, 12).7 in this way, the wise teacher can instruct his/her students that genes are an emergent power of a deep unity that is hidden in the body. from here, a series of narratives can be developed in explaining the principles of knowing how to know. bateson was peculiarly gifted in using stories for elucidating his ideas. in his famous story of the crab given to some schoolboys, bateson explains how the principles of mind are evident in the crab’s morphology (2002, 9). one may theorise here that the symmetry and repetition found in the crab’s leg find their homologue in the rhythmic repetition of information within dna sequences. this is at the heart of bateson’s idea of metapatterns – arthur saniotis 31 “patterns which connect” (bateson 2002, 10). the story of the human genome beckons us to discover nature’s metapatterns via the mergence of intellect with intuition. in the words of jonas salk, “knowing about living systems suggests a way of thinking about some of the burning issues of our time for which we seek solutions” (salk 1975, cited in fell & russell 1994b). salk had reworked herbert spencer’s saying “survival of the fittest” to “survival of the wisest”. he concluded that by viewing nature as a metaphor to define the processes which inform humanity, we can attain the limits of our knowledge of the world (salk 1975). “in this way, man’s imagination and intellect play vital roles in his survival and evolution” (salk 1975, cited in fell & russell 1997). our intellectual systems which have led to a plethora of scientific discoveries have fallen short in unlocking the “mysteries of animal behaviour” and how biological systems co-operate (fell & russell 1994b). irina pollard’s article on the behaviourome project (mind mapping) reminds us that co-operation is even operative at the molecular level. genes and memes co-evolve and impel the evolution of ideas (pollard 2004, 90). these ideas are integrated into various organisational hierarchies that are infixed in the organic (pollard 2004, 90). pollard explains how dog sperm from several competing male dogs end up co-operating once impregnated in the female. once the litter is delivered one can observe how the puppies originated from different fathers, evidence of sperm symbiosis (macer 2004, 20-21). in other words, competition between the male dogs to impregnate the female dog played only a small part, while co-operation played a greater part. the moral of this example exemplifies bateson’s ecology of mind in that nature cannot survive without cooperation and mutuality. endnotes 1 the “new goals for the u.s. human genome project 1998-2003,” proclaimed the discovery of the human genome to be “the single most important project in biology and the biomedical sciences—one that will permanently change biology and medicine. 2 alternately, the eminent biologist paul ehrlich explains that the human genome is 32 prajñâ vihâra over rated since “information from the human environment is more extensive than that of the human genome” (2000, 126). 3 sagan states that “this shared genetic language is one line of evidence that all the organisms on earth are descended from a single ancestor (1977, 23). 4 grossman indicates how western socio-intellectual regimes have encouraged the language of growth. consequently, this has led to the embedding of quantity in our everyday discourses, as well as, quantifiable modes of analysis which ignore the role of human meaning to knowledge (grossman 1999). 5 ridley goes so far as to claim that the human genome does not exist and “is founded upon a fallacy (2000, 145). 6 this process of correction, i would argue, represents an evolutionary advancement in homo sapiens which has enabled the neo-cortex to increase over the last one million years. at the same time, sagan as does langar (1942) state that the ritualistic and hierarchical nature of homo sapiens is influenced by the r-complex (hind brain) of the human brain, which plays an important role in aggression, ritualistic behaviour and maintenance of social hierarchies (sagan 1977, 60-61). if this is the case, then bateson’s idea of habituation may be due to the human leaning towards the r-complex. hypothetically, the lack of internal rigor as specified by bateson may actually be an evolutionary trait in human beings which is contoured by cultural evolution. for example, jackson (1998) states that kernel to the formation of the human self is a need to maintain ontological security through the creation and maintenance of ritualised forms. therefore, the maintenance of ritualism and social hierarchies achieves a sense of existential retrieval amidst a world of random, chance and fate – a world beyond our control. 7 “life withdraws into the enigma of a force inaccessible in its essence, apprehendable only in the efforts it makes here and there to manifest and maintain itself” (foucault 1971, 273). references bale lawrence s. 2006a. “gregory bateson, cybernetics and the social/ behavioral sciences.” (accessed on july 27 2006, at http:// www.narberthpa.com/bale/lsbale_dop/cybernet.htm) — 2006b. gregory bateson’stheory of mind: practical applications to pedagogy (accessed on july 27 2006, at http:// 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(accessed on august 2 2006, at http:// www.pnc.com.au/~lfell/thinks.html) sagan, carl. 1977. the dragons of eden: speculations on the evolution of human intelligence. new york: random house. salk, jonas. 1975. so like an angel: biology and the nature of man. devon, united kingdom: david & charles. taylor, mark, c. 1993. nots. chicago: university of chicago press. 36 prajñâ vihâra thacker, eugene. 2001. “the human genome race considered as a highspeed data dump.” (accessed on august 1 2006, at http:// www.nettime.org/listsarchives/nettime-l-0102/msg00193. html) weber, max. 1946. from max weber: essays in sociology. h. h. gerth & c. wright mills trans. and eds. new york: oxford university press. p. 148. wilson james. c. 2002. “(re)writing the genetic body-text: disability, textuality, and the human genome project.” cultural critique 50: 23-39. arthur saniotis 37 05_the paradox the paradox of happiness in western economics: a buddhist perspective soontaraporn techapalokul** mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, thailand abstract the pursuit of happiness always involves a paradox. this article begins by examining the concept of happiness and the paradox of happiness in western economics and shows how the paradox of happiness is never overcome. the paper then examines the buddhist idea of happiness. in buddhism, happiness is explained with regard to how it arises in the human mind. in buddhism to avoid the paradox of happiness and its attendant suffering is to change our views and attitude about happiness and about the pursuit of happiness. 1. introduction happiness, has been a central philosophical theme since the time of socrates, plato, and aristotle. happiness has always involved suffering in its pursuit. as long as we are attached to its pursuit, we will never achieve it. in buddhism this is known as the paradox of happiness, and this insight goes against the thought of many modern economists, philosophers, and thinkers. pursuing it means that we have already made it impossible because to get happiness does not work that way. to pursue is to desire or crave. the right thought taught by the awakened one of buddhism is a ‘letting go’ of desire or craving. whether we ‘try’ to suppress desire or just pursue desire, we remain bound to desire and suffering. but, in the state of mindfulness (or attentive awareness), we begin to see happiness or our happy feelings as it is actually taking place and vanishing. then, we can let go of the cause of our suffering (dukkha)__by seeing how it actually is__this frees the mind to attain happiness. _____________________________ **ph.d. candidate, mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, bangkok, thailand, 2013 (2556). prajna vihara, volume16, number 1, january-june 2015, 79-93 79 2000 by assumption university press c ˜ that view in economics concerning happiness is complex. the pursuit of happiness in association with economics seems to directly contradict the essence of the buddhist teachings. many people in the developed world seem to think that they can only become happy if they fulfill their desires. their lives involve the pusuit of money. easterlin (1974) finds that happiness in advanced countries such as usa, uk, or japan is not confined to economic affluence. but, a recent study reveals that the paradox of happiness refers to ‘two different empirical data’-in the short term, richer people are on average happier than poorer ones, but in long term, a society does not become happier as it became richer. the question is what is the reason for this paradox? the answer is complex and there is no single explanation. this article investigates how far the western economics and buddhism can explain the paradox of happiness regarding those ‘two different empirical data’. then, i develop a buddhist perspective on the paradox of happiness. 2. a western understanding of happiness in the western world, there are assorted concepts which characterize ‘happiness’. some concepts are not related to each other (e.g., eudaimonia, ataraxia, beatitodo, and utility); some are reduced or derived from one another (e.g., welfare or well-being is derived from choices or preference-satisfaction, and preference-satisfaction is relied on utility, and utility is hinged on pleasure and pain); but all concepts are various forms of an entity called ‘happiness’. in short, the idea of happiness can be traced back to the ancient greeks in the 4th century b.c., ranging from socrates, plato, and aristotle through hume1 and smith down to marx (1875), bentham (1789), j.s. mill (1863), and kahneman (1997). eudaimonia, a greek word for ‘happiness’ (or ‘flourishing’) where ‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’ is centred, is first discussed by socrates (c. 469399 b.c.) in the euthydemus (eu iii.278e-282e) where he contends that humans want to be happy. later, aristotle (c. 384-322 b.c.), in his theory of eudaimonia, written in 350 b.c., describes eudaimonia as the life of virtuous activities that takes pleasure in their own virtues (ne x.7/2847). up to the hellenistic era (4th-1st centuries b.c.), happiness is viewed as ataraxia (tranquility); but in the medieval era (5th-15th centuries), happiness conception is shifted to be beatitudo or the perfect happiness__it is 80 prajna vihara ̃ heavenly happiness which would be granted by god in heaven afterlife; then happiness is gold pursuing concerning the mercantilism (16th-17th century); since 18th-19th centuries, happiness is perceived as public happiness (18th-19th centuries)__including the ideas of ‘wealth of the nations’ of the classical economics, ‘benevolence’ of the socialist utopian such as rousseau (1782), or turgot (1727-1781 c.e.) who suggested the idea that the laws must contribute to public happiness and the government should endeavour to allow thriving of individual freedom rather than “to always immolate the happiness of the private individuals”;2 and the communism of marx (1875: 10); up to the late 18th century, happiness is utility and welfare; and preference-well-being of the new welfare economics (20th to present). for our contemporary, happiness is the ‘conspicuous consumption’ or being an ‘icon’. besides, there are no morals involving in it (utility), and it cannot be the directive rule of human conduct. although the western economics concept of happiness borrows from powerful approaches related to psychology and individual utility to understand social well-being, it conflates happiness with desire. it is related to each individual’s pursuit, and not for the society as a whole. as a result, happiness from the western perspective holds “no possible definition”, or it is presumably an indefinable concept according to philosophers such as hobbes (le i.11.1), kant (1785: 12, 27), and hegel (1830: 396). later the summum bonum, is what bentham (1789), james mill, and j.s. mill hoped to settle via the power of the principle of utility or quantitative hedonism __ the general acceptance of utilitarianism (mill, 1863: 113-9). 3. the paradox of happiness this concept can be traced back to the 19th-century philosophy as the “paradox of hedonism” or the “pleasure paradox”. j.s. mill (1989: 117) was the first to point out that to interpret happiness as the goal of life is paradoxical, as he says, “but i now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end”. sidgwick (1874: 24) continues to develop this paradox of happiness, by saying, “it is true of some pleasures of the merely animal life, as well as of the satisfactions of a good conscience, that they can be obtained only if they are not directly sought”. he means that pleasure cannot be acquired directly; it can soontaraporn techapalokul 81 only be acquired indirectly. it is not until much later that the idea is developed further. easterlin began studying the empirical data on the national happiness and raised the paradox of happiness in his 1974 article. the paradox becomes known as easterlin’s paradox and has been used as a starting-point of a new study called the economics of happiness. 3.1 paradox of happiness: a western economic view a ‘paradox’ means a phenomenon or idea that is opposite to common sense, hypothesis, expectation, belief of general people, or the truth. by the paradox of happiness, it means “the decrease in happiness in a rising (or advancing) economy”. in this article, however, it refers only to the happiness-income paradox. 3.1.1 empirical evidence the early empirical studies which contributed to this paradoxical claim and which gained wide acceptance in the recent economics of happiness are easterlin (1974); scitovsky (1976); and smith (1979). unfortunately, their works have remained unknown to mainstream economists for years. today, the paradox of happiness is described by two facts (layard et al., 2012: 60-6). fact 1: happiness and income have positive relationship with each other in short run, (figure 1). fact 2: there is a figure 1: happiness-income cross-sectional relationship in the u.s.1972-2004 source: layard et al., 2007 (revised january 2008), p. 11. (cited from the us general social survey 1972-2004) 82 prajna vihara ̃ happiness-income paradox in long run (figure 2). the easterlin paradox refers to fact 2__the time-series evidence shows ‘no relation between income and happiness’ which means “getting richer does not make a nation (an individual) happier in the long-run”. most economists and researchers accept ‘fact 1’ as ‘correct’ for income always emerges as a factor explaining the variation in life satisfaction (happiness) within a country. but, ‘fact 2’ is controversial and much debated. 3.1.2 the western explanation of the paradox of happiness the explanations of this paradox are many. but in this paper two basic economic theories will be applied: the ldmui and rih. the law of diminishing marginal utility of income (ldmui) represents societies that are affluent and where individuals can satiate their material needs, by purchasing what they want. but as the society becomes wealthier, any additional income they have can buy less and less happiness (layard et al. 2008; oswald 2012) since economic growth cannot increase happiness beyond a certain level once basic needs are fulfilled. in other words, when a country has satisfied its material needs and with plenty kinds of products and services, there is a law of diminishing returns. figure 2: happiness and real income per capita in the us, 1973-2004 source and notes: clark et al., 2008, p. 96. happiness is the average reply to the following question: “taken all together, how would you say things are these days? would you say that you are…?” the responses are coded as (3) very happy, (2) pretty happy, and (1) not too happy. happiness data are drawn from the general social survey. soontaraporn techapalokul 83 the relative income hypothesis (rih) refers to the tendency of people to compare their income or consumption to others. duesenberry (1949) examines and tests consumption behavior based on a hypothesis that “people usually compare themselves to others; so their consumption functions are influenced by the difference between their level of income and the others”. today, people’s reported level of happiness in advanced countries such as the united states rests on their own income (absolute income) and also how their income compares to their peers (relative income). the latter has more influence in determining their happiness. also, as income continues to grow, it could promote an ongoing consumption race__‘keeping up with the joneses’3 (layard 2010, clark & senik 2010). this causes the level of income and consumption to increase greatly, while average (or total) happiness does not. furthermore, a recent research by princeton university researchers reveals that people also compare their income to some level of reference. in this study it was about $75,000 a year (luscombe, 2010). the lower the person’s annual income was below this reference, the unhappier the person felt, because it made them feel weighed down by the problems they already have. but, at $75,000, this effect disappeared because they care for relative income. however, no matter how much people make above $75,000, it didn’t make them happier, although they felt their life was going well. this means that when each person gains wealth above a certain point the overall level of happiness stays the same. 3.2 a buddhist economic view happiness, from a buddhist standpoint, is a feeling (sukha vedanâ). also, happiness is conditioned arising between the mind-andbody (nâma-rûpa) through the do (dependent origination) cycle. so, happiness in this perspective is transient (anicca), stressful (dukkha), and not-self (anattâ). although it embraces a variety of meanings, types, and grades, it can be given one definition: “a sensory-derived feeling that arises in regard to the five sensual elements: forms or material shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches (m ii 66)”. besides, there are three theoretical doctrines (theories or types) of happiness in buddhism: sensual happiness (kâma-sukha), happiness of meditative absorption (jhâna-sukha), and supreme happiness (nibbâna-sukha). sensual happiness creates for its seekers (and societies) more dangers than benefits and lessens economic and social co-operation. however, it is not rejected 84 prajna vihara ̃ in the buddhist context, if and only if it produces right-life pursuits in keeping with the three practical doctrines of happiness __ that is, the tenbases of meritorious action (dasa-puññakiriyâ-vatthu), the noble eightfold path (ariya-atthangika-magga), and the four foundations of mindfulness (catu-satipatthâna), which support one another to bring real happiness. i propose buddhism as an alternative explanation to the western approach to the paradox of happiness. the paradox of sukha (happiness) in a buddhist standpoint conveys key insights, truths, and itself contains small paradoxes. the issue has also enlarged our understanding about the complexity of happiness, by which i mean sensual (ordinary) happiness (kâma-sukha). 3.2.1 meaning of the paradox of happiness following the buddhist perspective, i define the paradox of happiness as “the situation that the pursuit of happiness is always impossible or incompatible with its attainment for a person without right-view (seeing the thing as it really is)”. 3.2.2 the buddhist explanation of the paradox of happiness the two alternative theories that pertain to the paradox of happiness are applied here: the pmb and the ldo. the principle of nâma-rûpa or the mind-and-body (pmb) invokes an image of men and societies that are obsessed with pursuing happiness and become entrapped in endless routines of getting more and spending more due to unlimited want and not seeing the true nature of happiness: impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self, leading them to unhappiness. the pmb actually carries four small paradoxes which are axioms of life (or of the world) (m ii 261-2). the four are: 1) the world [life] is unstable, it is swept away (upanîyati loko addhuvo). 2) the world [life] has no shelter, no guard; (atâno loko anabhissaro); 3) the world [life] has nothing of its own, one must go leaving everything (assako loko, sabbam pahâya gamanîyam); 4) the world [life] is insatiate, incomplete, and the slave of craving (ûno loko atitto taahâdâso). soontaraporn techapalokul 85 axioms 1, 2, and 3 can be summarized through three words: anicca, dukkha, and anattâ. the axiom 4 reveals that human beings are born of craving (tanhâ). their desires or wants are unlimited. thus, happiness (or utility in the western economic sense) which arises from a life that is unstable, has no protector, and has nothing of its own, has to hold the ‘same truths’ and it is also made up of ‘desires’. this results in the marginal utility of income (mui) to be positive, ú>0. in other words, the fact 1 agrees with the buddhist pmb. in long run, the pursuit of happiness nearly equals the pursuit of money (or wealth), where its intensity is due to the extent of ignorance (avijjâ). when people become richer (not just americans as shown in figure 1 and 2), they do not merely pursue a comfortable life, but pursue conspicuous consumption (e.g., new houses, new more cars, digital tv, new dresses, etc.). so, rather than building wealth to increase freedom and a peace of mind as many rich householders, particularly, in the buddha’s time did, “they go from having one ford to having three lexuses, and nobody is happier”. (easterlin, cited in oswald & blanchflower 2011: 4). this brings about the paradox, involving the decline of happiness. thus, the fact 2 is in agreement with the buddhist pmb. the law of (momentary) dependent origination (ldo)4 illuminates the condition of people who live in societies that are preoccupied with money as a measure of well-being; they do not see the nature of happiness as connected to dependent origination, always ceasing, ultimately empty, and always leading to unhappiness. the gist of do (paticcasamuppâda) can be clarified by a chain of 12 links without a beginning or an end.5 venerable ajahn chah subhaddo (1918-1992) has given a fine analogy of ‘falling from a tree’ in his dhamma talk, on january 17, 1969 (b.e. 2512): it’s in a flash, you’ve fallen all the way from the top of the tree and hit the ground, and you have no idea how many branches you passed on the way down. when the mind experiences a mind-object and is attracted to it, all of a sudden you find yourself experiencing a good mood without being aware of the causes and conditions which led up to it ... in reality, there are no signs telling you that now it’s ignorance, now it’s volitional formations, then it’s consciousness, now it’s mind-and-body, and so on... the buddha analyzed one moment of consciousness… ev86 prajna vihara ̃ erything happens so fast you don’t have time to reckon how far you’ve fallen and where you are at any given moment. what you know is that you’ve hit the ground with a thud, and it hurts! (subhaddo 1969: 335). in the mahânidâna sutta, the buddha shows that happiness derived from the six-sense bases are contextual or causally conditioned in which ignorance (avijjâ), or craving (tanhâ), is involved (d ii 50-70). this spiritual problem (craving or greed), where its related ideas such as self-interest, unlimited want, demand, choices, or desire, are now accepted as ‘natural’. yet, it is hard to deny that the mainstream economic philosophy not only requires but promotes greed through competition, resulting in the more pursuit, the richer and the happier. thus, fact 1 is correct, it agrees to the ldo. in the same sutta, the buddha explains that craving also conditions seeking or pursuing. the process of do operates externally at the macro-level, manifesting the social and economic ills (d ii 55-8). several teachings such as the aggañña sutta (d iii 77-94), cakkavattisîhanâda sutta (d iii 59-76), vâsettha sutta (m ii 379-85), and mahâdukkhakkhanda sutta (m i 110-9), __ explain the implications of ignorance or craving as resulting in social and economic problems, especially poverty and inequality of distribution of wealth in a society. to the buddha, “poverty is a woeful thing for a worldly wanton. it is miserable because it leads to borrowing, mounting debts, and ever-increasing suffering (a iii 249-50)”. this implies that the pursuit of happiness (without wisdom of self-limitation), in long run, cannot lead people to the greatest happiness, but only to societal suffering and ecological catastrophe. this is, indeed, the paradox of happiness. in sum, ordinary people desire to possess, desire to be, desire not to possess, desire not to be, all of which only serve to produce dissatisfaction or suffering (dukkha); suffering which is not always obvious, but concealed. the momentary do implies that the paradox of happiness always happens inside our minds, but hidden in our feeling__that is in our mind, “whatever happiness and pleasure arises dependent on the body,… feelings…on consciousness__this is the satisfaction in them. whatever there is of impermanence, changeability, pain, and confusion on account thereof-this is the misery and unsatisfactoriness inherent in the body and the mind (s iii 24-5)”. the ldo also indicates four conclusions about happiness: 1) it soontaraporn techapalokul 87 is an impermanent and conditioned occurrence, 2) it flows and changes with no-self or me-and-mine found in the mind, 3) it always ends its revolution with dukkha, and 4) it is paradoxical at every moment of mind but we cannot see it as it really is due to our ignorance or craving. to escape the paradox of happiness is only through following the correct practice or virtuous conduct (along the noble eightfold path). when one knows and sees the truth of happiness (which is impermanent and paradoxical); ignorance-based clinging vanishes; desires have no means of arising; and suffering ceases. now is the time to awaken together, set a common ground of understanding happiness as a complex conception and the paradox of happiness with a moral language, as well as often nourish our minds with peace. only thus can happiness be truly achieved. abbreviations 1. pali texts and translations: a = anguttara-nikâya, for example, a iii 249-50. = anguttara-nikâya, vol. 3, pp. 249-50. of hare, e.m. (tr.). anguttara-nikâya: the gradual sayings. vol. 3 (the book of the fives and sixes). (no. 20). oxford: pts, 1995. d = dîgha-nikâya, for example, d ii 55-8 = dîgha-nikâya, vol. 2, pp. 55-8. of rhys davids, t.w. and c.a.f. (trs.). dîgha-nikâya: dialogues of the buddha. 4th ed. (no. 8). oxford: pali text society, 1995. m = majjhima-nikâya, for example, m ii 261-2 = majjhima-nikâya, vol. 2, pp. 261-2. of horner, i.b. (tr.). majjhima-nikâya: the middle length sayings. (no. 11). oxford: pali text society, 1994. s = samyutta-nikâya, for example, s iii 24-5 = samyutta-nikâya, vol. 3 (khandhâ vagga), pp.24-5. of woodward, f.l. (tr.). samyutta-nikâya: book of kindred sayings. (no. 15). oxford: pts, 1995. 88 prajna vihara ̃ 2. ancient books: eu = euthydemus (by plato), for example, eu iii.278e = euthydemus. vol. 3, sec. 278e, of plato in twelve volumes. tr. by w.r.m. lamb. cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1967. [online]. available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+ euthyd.+271a [30 august 2011]. le = leviathan (by hobbes), for example, le i.11.1 = hobbes, thomas. leviathan. part. 1, chapter 11, paragraph 1. of ebook@adelaide. south australia: the university of adelaide, (1651) 2007. [online]. available at http: //ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/ [25 february 2012]. ne = nicomachean ethics (by aristotle), for example, ne x.7/284-7 = nicomachean ethics, book 10, chapter 7, pp.284-7. tr. by terence irwin. indianapolis, in: hackett publishing co., 1985. do dependent origination (paticcasamuppâda) endnotes 1david hume, the skeptic and empiricist, is a scottish philosopher known for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. he introduced the term 'utility' into the moral vocabulary, and his theory was the immediate forerunner to the classic utilitarian view of j. bentham and j.s. mill. 2“turgot, anne robert jacques" paris, 1727 paris, 1781, [online], available at http://www.memo.fr/en/article.aspx?id=per_mod_168 [26 january 2012]. 3‘keeping with the joneses’, an idiom and one of the tenets of consumerism, refers to people living beyond their means and trying to keep up with their better-off neighbours. 4owing to the sammohavinodanî, the commentary on the vibhaga, presents do in two ways: 1) in terms of kamma (volitional activities) that takes place in the ‘cycle of births and deaths’ (samsâra) of the men or in a three-lifetime basis (the past, present, and future)__an orthodox explanation called as the suttanta-bhâjanîyanaya; and 2) in terms of events happening in everyday life within a moment of mind, an alternative explanation called as the abhidhamma-bhâjanîyanaya.4 this article applies do of the latter explanation, although the former more common pa?iccasamupp?da because of its more complete documentation. 5the 12 links are, namely, 1) avijjâ: ignorance, 2) sankhârâ: volitional formations, 3) viññâa: consciousness, 4) nâma-rûpa: mind-and-body, 5) salâyatana: soontaraporn techapalokul 89 six sense-bases, 6) phassa: contact, 7) vedanâ: feeling, 8) taahâ: craving, 9) upâdâna: clinging, attachment, 10) bhava: becoming, 11) jâti: birth, and 12) jarâ-marana: aging-and-death.(d ii 50-1). the cycle of do may begin with other steps; it does not necessarily start from the first. besides, all the mental states (contact, feeling, etc.) are coexistent. they arise in one conscious moment; there is no reason for the sequence (nârada: 83). bibliography 1. primary sources: texts and translations hare, e.m. 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[online]. available at http://alien.dowling.edu/ ~cperring/epicurustomenoeceus.html [24 march 2012]. soontaraporn techapalokul 93 10(134-138)note for authors moral thinking in traditional african society: a reconstructive interpretation christopher agulanna university of ibadan, nigeria abstract a debate concerning the nature of moral thinking in traditional societies has long dominated the scholarship of ethical thinkers and social anthropologists alike. western scholars and intellectuals had justified colonialism as a “civilizing mission” meant to rescue african “savages” whose only mode of regulating conduct was through religion and magical sanctions. according to these scholars, in traditional cultures, there are no behavioural patterns, which can be properly referred to, as ‘moral’. the argument here is that behavioural patterns of the purely secular kind, which exist in more complex societies, were completely absent in traditional african societies, such that relationships between individuals in society only had a religious undertone. introduction what was the nature of moral thinking in the traditional african society before the europeans arrived on the shores of the black continent in the 15th century? was there anything resembling a moral order or an ethical system in traditional africa similar to what existed in europe, asia or the americas, at that period in the history of the world? or was it the case, as thomas hobbes and other imperial scholars were wont to argue, that africa had “no art, letters or social organization, but instead, only fear and violent death”?1 the german philosopher, friedrich hegel (1770-1831), was even more poignant than hobbes in his devalorization of african culture. like most european scholars of the colonial era, hegel wrote in prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 67-81 67 © 2000 by assumption university press support of “a physiological lobotomy of the african negro” (to use a phrase we have appropriated from frantz fanon) 2 by positing the following argument: africa is an ahistoric continent even though it has a geographical location. the people live in a condition of mindlessness barbering without laws and morality.3 hegel and hobbes were not alone in the vilification or denigration of the black race. most european scholars, dating back to the period of slave trade, have had some slide thing or the other to say about the negroid race. renowned thinkers such as j. j. rousseau, david hume and immanuel kant all had uncomplimentary things to say about the black person. it is either the black man has a “subcritical” or “prelogical” mentality; or as rudyard kipling would argue, he is “half devil and half child,” and needs the anodyne of brutality or physical violence to make him truly human! 4 even the great karl marx, the illimitable revolutionist and bitter enemy of bourgeois capitalism, when it came to the issue of european domination of non-european territories, knuckled under the racial weight. while acknowledging the monstrosity of european rule over colonized peoples, marx was however tepid and tendentious in his assessment of the colonial situation. in his view, the brutality and violence meted out to subjugated people could be exculpated on the grounds that it made possible a “fundamental revolution in the social state” of such people.5 but the logic of this argument is obverted by the very fact that it is a non-sequitur. it is like saying that the white settlers in zimbabwe and south africa were justified in dispossessing the black majority of their farm lands because it helped expose the natives to modern methods of farming! or that hitler was right in eliminating millions of jews because it helped liberate the jews from the haughtiness of racial superiority or exclusivism! to argue that way is to be engaged in bad logic or mere intellectual shenaniganism. bigotry, hatred as well as racial prejudice are age-old problems that devalue our world and make light all human achievements. in particular, the peculiar problem known as negrophobia (i.e., the dislike for negroes) has remained the black man’s burden all through the ages. and 68 prajñâ vihâra though it is now a clichéd issue to keep harping on the old argument that colonialism is responsible for the woes of the african continent, it is however a big surprise to discover that by some twist of logic, those same imperial scholars who provided the intellectual justification for colonial domination are usually the ones celebrated as intellectual gurus in african intellectual circles! the issues adumbrated above have been of a general nature. however, the paper has a specific focus, which is to examine the claim by european anthropologists and colonial historians that africa lacked an ethical (or, moral) system before its contact with western civilization! the crucial issue in this discourse is to consider whether or not this claim is true; and whether there are historical or ethnological evidence to back up such a claim. we shall also consider whether this opinion put forward by the colonial historians is not in fact a harebrained assertion by some armchair scholars who lacked the basic knowledge of how traditional cultures operated. but before we get into the discussion proper, we need to make a few general remarks on the meaning of morality and some other related concepts. morality and cognate concepts moral thinking is concerned with the issue of good conduct among those who make up the human community. it is also concerned with the creation of a humane social environment without which those who live in society would hardly realize their goals and aspirations in life. it is for this reason that people are constantly exhorted to lead morally emulous lives because, as the argument goes, it is in living virtuously that human beings can give meaning to their social life and existence. with particular reference to traditional african life, it was the opinion that a life of rectitude helps build up society and guaranteed the individual a good place in the preternatural or chthonic world. the logic of the belief in the existence of an extra-terrestrial world notwithstanding, the important issue that bears relevance to the present discussion is that the human community can only function properly if it is built on a good moral foundation. but then, what exactly do we have in mind when we talk about morals? and in relation christopher agulanna 69 to african life, what was the nature of moral thinking among traditional africans in the pre-european african world? these are some of the issues we shall address here. but first, we need to make the following explanation. in philosophy, the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are often taken to be identical, and have as their cognate the word ‘morality’. etymologically, ‘moral’ is derived from the latin word mores, meaning that which concerns character, behaviour, or actions, considered or judged as being good or evil, right or wrong, etc. broadly construed, however, morals refer to the models and standards of conduct people adhere to. as a concept, it reflects the actual behaviour of members of big or small social groups as well as what the members of these groups allow or prohibit themselves to do. morals, says kwasi wiredu, “covers ethical rules proper as well as customs and taboos.”6 in other words, morals taken as a whole bear on the morality of a social community. it entails human principles of right and wrong, and deals with how people treat themselves in order to promote mutual welfare, progress, creativity and meaning in a striving for what is right over what is wrong, and what is good over what is bad. in our day-to-day interactions as human beings, we expect people to conduct themselves in a morally good way. similarly, we also expect a person to do that which is ethically propitious or good while avoiding that which is evil. when, for instance, we judge the actions and characters of people to be right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc., we have an idea of the best way we think they can live. while we may define moral behaviour as behaviour in accordance with the recommended patterns of a community, the morality of a community on the other hand consists of those ways of behaviour which each member of the community is taught, bidden and encouraged to adopt by other members. having made the foregoing remarks, in the discussion that follows in the paper, we shall dwell in particular, on the nature of moral or ethical thinking in the traditional african society, that is, the african society before christianity, islam or european colonization. but before proceeding in the discussion proper, it is important to clarify the sense in which we are employing the term “society” in this essay. in the present context, we are using the word, “society” as a collective noun to represent the different cultural groups that make up the african continent. in saying this, how70 prajñâ vihâra ever, we are aware that certain differences may exist in cultural emphasis of the diverse groups that make up the african world. the other side of the argument is to state that there are certain elements of culture, known as cultural constants, or what john bowker identifies as the “recurring elements in human behaviour,” which arise from the fact that human beings are all conceived and born in, broadly speaking, the same way.7 it is these cultural constants or elements that establish the universal brotherhood and kinship among all races. however, if as the argument goes, human beings are the same or similar in certain respects, from whence came the problem of racial hate and prejudice among people? the answer to the question is simply, bigotry and blind ignorance! what is shown by the above is that the theory of cultural autarky among the different african groups is neither supported by experience nor historical evidence. this is perhaps what j. a. omoyajowo tries to explain when he says that, “man everywhere is man;” and that the tribal societies that flourished in primeval times were “relatively undifferentiated and homogenous” in outlook.8 if this statement is accepted as a truism, it therefore follows that we can confidently make some generalization about the nature of african culture and belief system. hence, in our discussion of moral thinking in the primeval african world, we shall feel free to adopt any given african culture of our choice to fecundate and to represent how in traditional africa as a whole, the people grappled with moral matters. our choice of a cultural guide in this regard will be the igbo culture. but this choice is not informed by a supposed superiority of igbo culture over other african cultures but for mere convenience, and because the author is familiar with the igbo culture itself and the language with which it is conveyed. put differently, traditional igbo ethical thinking will merely be an example or gauge for traditional african cultures as a whole. moral thinking in traditional african society africa is distinguished by its close-knit society. traditions, customs and rules for regulating conduct and interpersonal relationships are varied and diverse. as with other societies of the world, in africa, the rules are not always obeyed nor expectations all the time fulfilled. as a result, some christopher agulanna 71 sanctions are usually put in place to prevent social disorder and anarchy. in every african community, an elaborate system of guides and sanctions exist. these range from legal sanctions, social customs to moral rules. it is often said that moral and ethical considerations in traditional african societies are communitarian in nature, meaning that it is in submitting his or herself to the will of the community that the individual finds social security and peace. j.o. awolalu argues, for example, that the basic moral values of which the elders are the guardians have to be maintained. according to awolalu, it is the responsibility of the elders to see that all the social norms and ethics relating to the well-being of the community are maintained. the argument here is that the elders “are aware that they owe their positions to the author of these moral values and to the ancestors who are ever present and ever watching to see that a high moral standard is maintained.”9 based on this idea of communitarianism, some scholars have argued that african traditional value systems lacked, in several respects, the characteristic feature of a true moral system. according to these scholars, moral institutions in pre-literate societies were mere devices through which men sought to establish a flourishing society. they were at best studied in functional terms, with the individual’s moral behaviour adjusted to meet society’s need and expectations. among early anthropologists the view was commonly held that in traditional cultures there were no such behavioural patterns which can be properly referred to as ‘moral’. the claim here is that behavioural patterns of the purely secular kind which exist in more complex societies are completely absent from traditional societies, such that the relationship between individuals and, the individual and all forms of social interactions were seen in religious perspectives only. to justify the foregoing assertions two types of arguments are usually proffered. the first is the claim that a truly moral system must be universalizable, and since african traditional codes of conduct discriminate between insiders and outsiders, they are said to have restricted applicability. the second argument claims that a truly moral system is typically characterized by critical reflections, with reason as a crucial tool for differentiating between right and wrong. traditional african value systems, it is argued, are not only dogmatic but have as their sources of reference authority of one kind or another.10 a number of early social anthropologists and social scientists had 72 prajñâ vihâra also argued that life in traditional african societies was full of a superabundance of the emotional as against the rational. the worldview of such societies, we are told, “is dominated by images which have their origins almost solely in man’s uncharted sensations and are coloured more by mystical awe than by the confidence of reason.”11 long ago, lucien levybruhl held that the ‘primitives’ or the so-called savages had a prelogical mentality, that their mind is incapable of rational, critical effort. levybruhl compares the western and the so-called savage mind and argues that the latter is: not constrained above all else, as ours is, to avoid contradictions. the same logical exigencies are not in its case always present. what to our eyes is impossible or absurd, it sometimes will admit without seeing any difficulty.12 many western scholars and social anthropologists are wont to argue that moral conduct in traditional african societies is bound by the sanctions of dogma, religion and authority. one such scholar, e.w. smith depicts african morality as ‘taboo morality’. the african, he argues, is taught to revere custom and resent change. smith lists three types of sanctions, which according to him, explain african customs and behavioural patterns. these include religious, traditional and magical sanctions. the magical sanction, smith says, is the oldest and strongest of the three, and exercises the greatest influence on african behavioural patterns.13 the opinions above need reviewing, as there may not be scientific evidence to support them. with particular reference to levy-bruhl, we need not bother refuting what he has to say since his were the views of an armchair scholar which lacked any scientific or empirical support. with smith, however, we have to concede that in africa, customs are highly revered and even cherished. but this is also true of every human society anywhere in the worldbe it europe, america or asia. in other words, it is not only in africa that culture is hallowed or cherished. what is true about africa in this regard is also true of every other society in the world. but the other opinion which has it that africans resent change is the one that is rather bizarre and awry. the truth of the matter is that africans, more than any other group or race, have proved to be highly receptive to christopher agulanna 73 change and new ideas. a few examples would help to lend weight to what we have said here. africans have not only accepted christianity and islam which are foreign religions but even to the point of killing one another in a bid to win adherents to their faiths. nigeria is a good example where religious violence and mayhem is a normal and common occurrence! and almost all the religious wars fought in the country are between devotees to islam and christianity. africans have embraced western education, democracy, and technology; they have even adopted foreign modes of dressing and mannerisms. these can hardly be said to be the characteristics of a people who are so enamored with their custom that they resent change. by ‘traditional sanctions’ what the writers have in mind is that when questioned regarding why he acts the way he does the african would reply that his parents acted that way and bade him to act likewise. m.j. mcveigh avers, for example, that “by the mere fact that they are passed on from generation to generation, customs tend to be hallowed by time. they may have at one time rested on religious sanctions, but these have been lost or forgotten; so that today the only answer given to the question is that this is the way it has always been.”14 the argument that african value codes have a restricted applicability needs some qualifications. all moral thinkers agree that moral codes or what are commonly known as the fundamental principles of the moral law admit of exceptions. we could take as an example, the moral principle, “thou shall not kill.” ordinarily, the killing of a human being is prohibited (under normal circumstances); but since circumstances are not always normal, situations may arise where the killing of a human being becomes morally justified. this could be in a situation of self-defense (when the only way to save one’s life from an unjust aggressor is to kill him), in a situation of war, or as an act of capital punishment, etc. these are all cases of restrictability in the application of the moral principle which prohibits the killing of a human being. however, they are not peculiar to africa but to all human societies as a whole. admittedly though, a kind of discrimination exists between the way an insider is treated and the way an outsider is treated in the so-called traditional societies. but this fact (if it is a fact) is not peculiar to african societies but is universal to all human cultures and societies. for example, the european colonial authorities discriminated between their fellow eu74 prajñâ vihâra ropeans and the citizens of the subjugated territories. in the same way, the fugitive occupationists in australia and new england (now america) discriminated between those of their own stock and the original owners of these territories. therefore, the argument that african value systems lack the characteristic feature of a true moral system simply because they are said to discriminate between insiders and outsiders is non sequitur. besides, the argument is untoward and lacks merit. the truth of the matter is that morality is a universal feature of all human societies; and to be moral presupposes rationality. by simple or elementary logic or parity of reasoning, since africans are rational beings, it follows as a matter of logic, that their traditional value systems had a moral status. to allude to a point we have made already, morality entails human principles of right and wrong. it deals with how humans treat themselves in order to promote mutual welfare and self-fulfillment in society. keith davis captures this point in a picturesque manner when he argues to the effect that morality: is reflected in the conscience of humankind confirmed by the experience of people in all ages. it has to do with the consequences of our acts to ourselves and to others. it recognizes that life has an overall purpose and accepts the inner integrity of each individual.15 moral thinking among the traditional igbo the igbo form one of the three major ethnic nationalities in nigeria. the other two are the yoruba and the hausa-fulani. the igbo had many of its able-bodied youths exported to europe and the americas through the trans saharan trade in slaves. through british colonialism, the people also had an early contact with christianity and western education. however, our reference to igbo past here is merely incidental and perfunctory, as this is not meant to be a treatise on igbo history or colonial experience. the igbo experience with colonialism is well documented in the literature that it needs no repeating in the present essay. our choice of the igbo culture here is, as we said earlier, to serve as an example or metaphor for our discussion on the nature of moral thinking in the tradichristopher agulanna 75 tional african society. a debate concerning the nature of moral thinking in traditional societies has long dominated the scholarship of ethical thinkers and social anthropologists alike. and as we have indicated above, there are moral thinkers who deny that traditional societies had value systems that could truly be characterized as ‘moral’. but as we have also pointed out already, this type of argument is vitiated by the fact that morality is a universal feature of all human societies. besides, the argument itself cannot be sustained by evidence or by any rational proof. among the traditional igbo, for example, the level of moral thinking was very high. the igbo language contains a variety of words to express approval and disapproval, good and bad, pleasant and unpleasant, and so on. all embody moral connotations. take, for instance, the words, ‘aru’ (pollution) and ‘nma’ (good); to commit ‘aru’ (ime aru, in the igbo language) is to do that which is evil while to do ‘nma’( ime nma, also in igbo) is to conduct oneself in a morally worthy manner. a person is described as ‘onye aru-rala’, literally ‘one who pollutes or abominates the land’, if his or her ethical conduct is contrary to ethically approved behaviour. ‘ajo mmadu’ is a phrase used to describe a bad man (or woman), where the ‘ajo’ means bad, i.e., the opposite of good. furthermore, when a thing or an act is spoken of in terms of ‘iru-ala’ (desecration of the land), ‘ime-aru’ or ‘ime nso-ala’ (doing that which is abominable or acting in pollution of the earth), all these are seen as morally bad actions. among the igbo, ‘ala’ (that is, the land or earth) is believed to possess some form of divine sanctity or sacrality such that one can either please or offend the preternatural forces that indwell it. the close link the igbo have to their land is largely due to the belief that it is the abode of the departed ancestors. similarly, the fertility of the soil, the progress of human life as well as the health of the animals is only assured as long as the earth is not desecrated and the ancestors are duly honoured. the igbo word ‘nma’, as we have said earlier, conveys the idea of goodness or the idea of acting in an ethically appropriate way. in all things, the igbo expect that individuals will act and conduct themselves in morally good ways while avoiding that which is evil and obnoxious. in this way, social harmony is ensured. the good life for the igbo is known as ‘ezi-ndu’ (i.e., the virtuous life), the life of rectitude and approbation. but 76 prajñâ vihâra the question may be asked, what is it that makes some actions good and others bad? put differently, what is the standard of judgment among the traditional igbo? c.c. okorocha answers that traditional igbo moral code is based on the concept of ‘omenala’ or social custom. ‘omenala’ derives from three igbo words, namely, ‘ome’ (that which obtains); ‘na’ (in); ‘ala’ (land or society). in the words of okorocha, “the moral code of iboland commonly spoken of as ‘omenala’ defines the various aspects of behaviour and social activities that are approved while at the same time indicating those aspects that are prohibited.”16 generally, in africa, the norm of right or wrong is said to be social custom. as with most other societies of the world, in africa, the good is usually that which receives the community’s approval while the bad is that which the community prohibits or frowns at. while the good actions build up society, the bad ones tear it down. one is social, the other anti-social. with the igbo in particular, ‘omenala’ or social custom is the means by which society enforces conformity to its rules. ‘omenala’ then, is the means by which “the social ethos is measured, and the values of the society... controlled from one generation to another and the processes of socialization through which the education of the young ones are facilitated.”17 traditional igbo morality, like those of other african societies, was communalistic in nature. in communalistic societies, virtue and goodness are often seen as a means of realizing the social harmony of the group. they function to promote order, peace and the feeling of camaraderie among the individuals who make up society. yet some writers claim that such group-related morality detracts from the ‘essential’ nature of morality. group-related morality, we are told, removes from the moral life the joy of its inner motivation which, it is argued, results from choice, personal decision and responsibility. this is the type of argument, which paul roubiczek makes in his book, ethical values in the age of science. in the book, roubiczek argues that “to subordinate the good to another purpose, such as usefulness for society, falsifies its nature and thus falsifies morality.”18 however, there is no good reason to suppose that roubiczek’s opinion is necessarily correct. for as gerhart piers and m.b. singer have suggested, there is no scientifically demonstrable reason why in grouprelated morality, “heavily influenced by the community’s rigorous enforcechristopher agulanna 77 ment mechanism including shame and taunting improvised songs, members of such group could not develop inner remorse or guilt.”19 some elements in traditional igbo cultural practice could be a helpful illustration in this regard. they will also help lend support to opinion expressed above by piers and singer. it was (and still is) the practice among the igbo that when a man and a woman were caught in any uncomely relationship like adultery, they were made to go round the village half naked, with children singing taunting songs on their heels. if any member of the community committed a heinous crime or sacrilege, he was made to suffer public shame or dishonour. such taunting songs, like the ones by the children, apart from bringing the offenders to public opprobrium, were also meant to deter others from committing the same type of offence in the future. such immoral acts as adultery and incest were described as ‘nso ala’ (i.e., pollutions against ‘ala’, the earth goddess). ‘ala’, the goddess of the land and custodian of igbo morality, imposed numerous laws and taboos which were meant to guide conduct between the individual and his neighbours, the individual and the forces of nature and, the individual and ‘ala’ itself. in the words of a.e. afigbo: the transgression of any of these rules known as ‘omenala’ (conduct sanctioned by ‘ala’) was promptly punished. in this way ‘omenala’ came to mean the highest law. it was distinguished from, and superior to ‘iwu’ which is any enactment made by man, the transgression of which would not involve offence to ‘ala’ and the ancestors, and did not imply moral lapse. ‘ala’ was the guardian of igbo morality.20 in concluding the discussion in this paper, what remains to be said is that contrary to the trite opinion that traditional africa lacked a moral system, africans are social beings like other peoples of the world; and as social beings, africans are not only rational but are also imbued with a sense of rectitude and propriety. to backtrack on a point made earlier in the paper, morality is basically concerned with society and with the relations between men and their fellow men. it is also concerned with general rules governing relations between men and the rules of society they ought to adopt. and as thomas hobbes himself would later argue, “the prov78 prajñâ vihâra ince of morality is limited to those qualities of mankind that concern their living in peace and unity.”21 in other words, no society can subsist or continue to flourish without a solid ethical or moral foundation. societies that encourage good ethical conduct are the ones that have the capacity to survive whereas the ones that encourage moral laxity or rapaciousness are likely to founder, as was the case with ancient sparta. as we bring this discussion to a culmination, there are two final remarks that should be made, and which bear a close relevance to what we have said in the paper already. one is that good moral conduct redounds or conduces to the good of society as a whole. the other is that among africans in particular, apart from the healthy social role which morality promotes, the pursuance of moral rectitude is also seen as a precondition for attaining a beneficent place in the ancestral mode of being. generally, africans regard the ancestors as organic members of the community of the living and as links between the living and the preternatural forces that inhabit the unseen world. the ancestors wield tremendous power over the living. among the igbo, for example, they are seen as the custodians of the social norms of the community, through whom “the moral code is passed on to the living members of their lineage.”22 perhaps this explains why africans set much by on people living virtuously in the society. similarly, africans believe in the transiliency of the human existent from the mundane to the divine essence. and sure enough, the belief in an after life of some sort, and the hope of attaining to the enviable status of a departed ancestor could be for people an incentive to live morally worthy lives in the community. the important thing here is not the logic of the belief in an afterlife or of the existence of ancestral beings that inhabit the after world but the fact that such beliefs served as an aid for traditional africans to live morally worthy lives in the human community. endnotes 1 noxious or denigrating ideas such as the one here were employed by imperial scholars to justify and support colonial rule or the subjugation of foreign territories by european colonizers. for example, thomas hobbes, the famous english philosopher of the 17th century, described africa as “a timeless place,” where the people lived in primitive barbarism and the fear of violent death. for more on this, christopher agulanna 79 see s. b. oluwole’s paper titled “african philosophy in yoruba language,” excerpted in new african (london), october 2006, no. 455, pp. 1011. 2 frantz fanon, “racism and culture,” in e. c. eze (ed.), african philosophy: an anthology (oxford: blackwell publishers ltd., 1998), p. 305. 3 i am indebted to professor s. b. oluwole for this quotation from hegel. for more on how the colonial scholars depicted the african world during the colonial era, see s. b. oluwole, op. cit., p. 10. 4 t. s eliot, a choice of kipling’s verse (new york: anchor books, 1962), p.143. 5 karl marx, “british rule in india,” in karl marx and f. engels, on colonialism (new york: international publishers, 1972), p. 41. 6 kwasi wiredu, “death and the afterlife in african culture,” in kwasi wiredu and kwame gyekye, person and community: ghanaian philosophical studies, i, cultural and contemporary change, series ii (washington, d. c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1992), p. 143. 7 john bowker, the meaning of death (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991), p. 18. 8 j. a. omoyajowo, “the concept of man in africa,” in orita: ibadan journal of religious studies, vol. ix/1(june 1975), p. 37. 69. 9 j.o. awolalu, “the african traditional view of man,” in orita: ibadan journal of religious studies, vol. 1/2, december 1972, p. 133. 10 for a criticism of this type of argument, see g. s. sogolo, foundations of african philosophy (ibadan: ibadan university press, 1993), pp. 120-125. 11 cf., i. okpewho, “myth and rationality,” in ibadan journal of humanistic studies, no. 1, april 1984, p. 28. 12 l. levy-bruhl (1931), la mentalité primitive. quoted by s. lukes, in rationality, edited by b.r. wilson (oxford: blackwell, 1970). 13 this classificatory scheme done by smith is not supported by history or ethnographical evidence. besides, the classification is misleading and unscientific. there is nothing to suggest that african behavioural patterns are simply classifiable into the traditional, the religious or even the magical mode as smith suggests. smith and other writers like him downplay the fact that in traditional africa there were also behavioural patterns of the ethical or moral type. 14 m.j. mcveigh, god in africa (massachusetts: claude stark inc., 1974), p. 85. 15 keith davis, human behaviour at work (new delhi: tata mcgraw hill publishing co., ltd., 1982), p. 13. 16 cf., c.c. okorocha, the meaning of religious conversion in africa (brookfield, u.s.a.: avebury, 1987), pp. 101-102 and, e. ilogu, christianity and ibo culture (leiden, netherlands: e. j. brill, 1974), p. 124. 17 ibid. 18 paul roubiczek, ethical values in the age of science (cambridge: the university press, 1969), p. 57. 19 g. piers and m.b. singer, shame and guilt: a psycho-analytic and cultural study (new york: w.h. norton and co., 1971), p. 99. 80 prajñâ vihâra 20 a.e. afigbo, “prolegomena to the study of the cultural history of igbo-speaking peoples of nigeria,” in f.c. ogbalu and e.n. emenanjo (ed.), igbo language and culture (ibadan: o.u.p., 1975), pp. 42-43. 21 for this quotation by thomas hobbes, see g.h. sabine, a history of political philosophy (london: union books, 1969), p. 428. 22 j. c. u. aguwa, “patterns of religious influence in igbo traditional politics,” in u. d. anyanwu and j. c. u. aguwa(ed.), the igbo and the tradition of politics(enugu: fourth dimension publishing co. ltd., 1993), p. 92. christopher agulanna 81 11(158-162)note for authors ethics and spirituality in indian thought s. r. bhatt university of delhi, india abstract in response to problems of globalization, we are faced with the need for an ethics which does not feed into the problems of materialism and egocentrism. the indian tradition provides a possible solution, especially the tradition of spiritualistic organicism. through its spiritualistic metaphysical premises one can work out an organicismic ethics; it would be an ethical system which can provide the norms to regulate human conduct in relation to other human beings, their social organizations, other living beings and the natural environment. humankind is at present facing a crisis which is manifold and multidimensional. on the one hand, there are the marvels of science and technology that are bewitching and bewildering; on the other, there are the erosion of values, moral degeneration, and deprivations leading to tensions, strife and sufferings. the human mind is faced with a dilemma as to how to respond to the present turmoil. undoubtedly, there is tremendous material progress, but it has been unable to usher in peace and prosperity at the physical, mental and spiritual levels. some people do have enormous levels of material and mental comfort but yet they do not recognize its evanescence. the crux of the situation is that the present-day distracted humanity is suffering from exhaustion of spirit and languishing in the narrow and rigid confinements of ego-centricism, parochialism and disastrous materialistic consumerism. so long as one is entangled in the labyrinth of materialism one does not feel the pinch of it. but the moment one 16 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 16-24 © 2000 by assumption university press gets out of it, one is exhausted and lost. it is a paradoxical feeling of both having and not-having, liking and disliking, seeking and shunning. as we are marching ahead in 21st century, humanity still is engrossed in a bewildering situation. the future course of humankind is condemned to face a choice: one road leads to friendship, peace, and prosperity and the other to strife, suffering, war and destruction. at every juncture of life there is a demand to exercise an option, whether it is the life of an individual or of a nation or of the world at large. the choice is posed to the human race which has the capacity to reason and also the freedom to abide by its dictates. whatever be the decision, the choice is ours and the consequences are also for us to bear. we are the agents of war or peace, peril or perfection. we are rational free agents and it is our free will to adhere to reason and prosper or to give a go-by to reason and perish. time and again the wise and sane people all over the world have reminded us of this fact, and so long as human nature remains as it is, there will always be a need to be so reminded. in this context it is useful to present the indian perspective in its positive form. as late professor charles moore, the former director of east-west center of hawaii university in the preface to his book the indian mind has opined, it is possible to get newer intuitions and fresh insights from the indian thought if only we care to do so. the indian approach to life and reality can be characterized as ‘spiritualistic organicism’ which stands for harmonizing the multiple in the unitary. it regards the multiplicity of all existences as originating from, sustained by and embedded in one ultimate spiritual principle. one of the most significant implications of the organicismic view of reality is the acceptance that the cosmos, rather the cosmic process, is a totality of interdependent and interrelated occurrences and things. it is a highly complex and intricate but planned and purposive networking of events and not a mechanistic arrangement of preexistent entities. every existence, living or non-living, has a dependent origination out of a causal complex characterized by mutuality and openness, inter-relatedness and reciprocity. each one has a specific nature, place, role and function in the cosmic setup as determined in the scheme of the universe. the cosmos is a vast and subtle inter-netting of multiple interpenetrating and coexisting existences which bhatt 17 are in a constant flux. it has physical, mental and spiritual dimensions. there is determinism at the physical level but freedom and spontaneity at the spiritual level. the mental realm is partly determined and partly free. the human being is an organic unity of psycho-physical processes animated by spiritual element. it is thus a complex of body, mind and spirit. with these spiritualistic metaphysical premises one can work out an organicismic ethics. this would be an ethical system which purports to provide the norms to regulate human conduct in relation to other human beings, their social organizations, other living beings and the natural environment. this is because all are dynamically interrelated and interdependent and functioning of one affects the rest. however, the human being is at the center stage of ethical considerations as it is the most evolved being having freedom and spontaneity, creativity and manipulating capacity. it has the prerogative to exercise free will and thus feels responsible for one’s conduct. freedom necessitates norm-prescription and this implies norm-adherence as well as norm-violation. human life in the worldly state is incomplete and imperfect and points beyond itself. it has a goal to achieve, a purpose to fulfill, and an end to realize. it is establishment of a society of individuals wherein the sorrows and sufferings of the world may cease to exist. this is the longing intensely cherished by every human being. the release of human beings from the travails and travesties of worldly life is not effectuated by mere wish, nor is it an idle or ideal apprehension through abstract speculation. it is a realization through properly planned, executed and accomplished endeavor. it requires rigorous discipline of knowledge, will and conduct and the fruits of conduct in mutual sharing, mutual cooperation and collective enterprise. it demands harmonious organization and skillful management of end, means and modalities. it implies just and distributive sharing of the fruits without selfish considerations which is possible only through equanimity of mind and feeling of self-sameness. this can be achieved by selfcontrol and self-sacrifice. but this is not self-abnegation. it is self-fulfillment through corporate living and partaking, by mutual caring and sharing. 18 prajñâ vihâra a spiritual approach to ethics is not rights-based but duty-oriented. it involves performance of one’s obligations as per one’s station in the total cosmic setup without any attachment to consequences. in order that one can perform one’s duties properly, faithfully, efficiently and disinterestedly one must know one’s nature and capabilities as also what is to be performed, how to be performed, when to be performed, why to be performed etc. an unwavering skillful performance depends upon rightness of action and firmness of will. in indian culture, philosophy and religion, view and way of life, theory and practice, knowledge and conduct are not divorced and segregated. they are named as darsana which is not mere reflection upon the nature of reality but also a quest for and a realization of values. basically it is a discipline for realization of ‘perfection’ (moksa sastra) which stands for fullest efflorescence of the inherent potentialities of all existences. there is a definite purpose in life and reality if we care to know and a definite goal to achieve if we have a will to do so. our existence is not meaningless. it has a value and significance. but we must first of all know what we are, what is the nature and purpose of life, what we should be in our life and how we can be so etc. the aim of human existence should be spiritual perfection through material progress. but material progress is only a means and not an end. the end is self-realization which is achieved through the removal of karmic matter and liberation from samsara. this is the ultimate teaching of all schools of philosophical thought in india. in indian philosophy great emphasis is laid on proper knowledge. knowledge is the only and surest way to material progress and spiritual perfection. it, therefore, emphasizes that we must draw a clear distinction between truth and falsity. falsity entangles us in the vicissitudes of worldly life. it is bewitching and bewildering and it springs from ignorance. in order to have right knowledge right attitude or right mental make-up is necessary. this is a prerequisite for a proper view and way of life. this is authentic existence. opposed to this is falsity with which we generally suffer. falsity does not serve any genuine purpose and hence it must be discarded. for an aspirant of perfection only right type of knowledge is helpful. this is the main theme of the teachings of all the schools. knowlbhatt 19 edge always leads to good conduct. the value and purpose of knowledge is not theoretical but necessarily practical. conduct without knowledge is blind and knowledge without conduct is lame. the two are complementary to each other. without right conduct deliverance from worldly miseries and from trials and tribulations is impossible and without complete deliverance from these no permanent happiness can be achieved. right attitude, right knowledge and right conduct are the three jewels of life which every human being must wear. but this wearing is not decoration but actual practice and concrete realization. however this is not easy to achieve. it requires austerity and rigorous discipline, a rigorous control of body, will and mind. knowledge pertains to the real. the real is multifaceted and multidimensional. it has infinite properties and relations and therefore it can be approached in infinite ways. this is perspectivalism at the levels of reality, thought and language. as there are many aspects of reality there can be multiple approaches to reality. each one is true in itself but it is only partially true. it is true from a particular perspective. from another perspective it may not be true. we may have a total or holistic perspective also. this type of understanding leads to mutual complementarities, mutual cooperation, mutual trust and co-existence and above all to nonviolence (ahimsa) which is the highest truth and highest virtue in indian ethics. perspectival approach to reality alone can lead to non-violence and coexistence and this in turn can guarantee peace, progress, prosperity and perfection in the world. organicism, with its corollary of perspectivalism, provides for democracy in ideas and in living. it inculcates the spirit of peaceful coexistence, tolerance and mutual support. this alone can ensure universal peace, solidarity and harmony. it is a unique contribution of indian spirituality. it is not very easy to understand it and to practice it. but with proper education and firm determination this can be achieved and if this can be achieved the world will be an ideal place to live in and to realize spiritual perfection. another significant implication of organicism is practice of vegetarianism and environmental protection which are the dire needs of the day. every thing in the world is interrelated and interdependent. every 20 prajñâ vihâra thing has its unique existence and value. so nothing should be destroyed by the human being for his selfish ends. the indian ethics not only regulates human conduct in relation to one’s own self and in relation to other human beings but also goes a step further to bring in human conduct in relation to all living beings and natural environment. every existence has intrinsic worth and it must be given due respect. in case there happens some misconduct due to ignorance or negligence or even willfully there is a provision for forgiveness and repentance, and rectification. the indian ethical tradition advocates self-sameness in all existence in spite of their inherent differences. it thus has the unique feature of synthesizing quantitative and qualitative monism and pluralism, monadic uniqueness and modal dependence. in fact organicism is the cardinal tenet of indian thought and it is impregnated with immense possibilities of drawing out newer and newer implications and corollaries for cosmic wellbeing. but this should not be mere intellectual exercise. it must involve programmatic action at the corporate level on a cosmic scale. this may not be easy but not impossible. the indian thinkers have put forth the concept of ‘dharma’. it is another unique contribution which is highly valuable in the spheres of thought and action. it provides a strong base for relativism, perspectivalism and situationalism which are needed for pluralistic worldly life. it helps in avoiding the pitfalls of absolutism, dogmatism, obscurantism, ego-centricity and narrowness of all types. the concept of dharma stands for the unique and distinct nature of each entity, its place, function and value in the scheme of reality and also the principle which has to regulate its behavior and interrelationship. thus dharma has both constitutive and regulative aspects. the pursuit of excellence, striving for betterment, and attainment of quality of life have been perennial human concerns and aspirations. all human endeavors in diverse fields of culture and civilization have been directed towards realization of this goal. freedom from imperfection and consequent suffering has been the main motivating factor for all cognitive enterprises and technological advancements. though every human indibhatt 21 vidual cherishes and strives for this and posits it as the ideal of life, its realization requires planned corporate efforts. it can not be a single individual enterprise. a single individual may work out a plan but its execution has to be corporate. moreover, quality of life concerns the individual as well as the cosmos since the two are interrelated and interdependent and constitute an organic whole. this apart, one can not attempt to realize a good quality of life keeping in view an isolated individual, society, nation or region. it has to be a global vision and a universal realization without any prejudice to any one section of the universe. every one has to participate and partake in this venture which is a collective enterprise. every one should be able to contribute by manifestation of one’s capabilities through a dynamic discovery of one’s potentials being assisted in this process by the society and natural surroundings. quality of life is the summum bonum and globalization is its essential corollary. its realization therefore requires propagation and profession of global ethics. the principle of universalizability of ethical norms and their adherence without exception stem from this very consideration. but globalization is not to be understood in materialistic terms only in the sense of liberalization of trade and commerce. basically it is a spiritual ideal. it is inculcation of the attitude of seeing self-sameness everywhere leading to global unity. it is realization of the fundamental unity of the entire cosmos. it is a mode of co-existence with a spirit of mutual support, mutual sacrifice, mutual caring and sharing. it is an enlightened conduct like that of a bodhisattva or a jivanmukta who is constantly engaged in universal well-being, who is happy in the happiness of others and feels miserable in the miseries of others, who always thinks of good of others and acts for their welfare. the moral codes prescribed in all the cultural and religious traditions of the world aim at cultivation of this mindset of universal affinity and self-sameness. globalization is a viewpoint and a course of action, a policy instrument and a world-wide movement for a new world order based on enlightened principles of conduct aiming at enhancement of ‘quality of life’ not just of human beings but of the entire cosmos. this calls for newer formulation of global ethical norms which may regulate the entire 22 prajñâ vihâra gamut of human conduct in relation with one human being and another and also between human beings and the rest of the cosmos of animate beings and inanimate things. this is the precursor of the emergence of a global society in which the entire world can be experienced as one single family. this is possible through the realization of self-sameness and cultivation of the spirit of sacrifice. but this necessitates a trans-valuation of values, a paradigm shift in values, a changed mind-set, and an enlarged vision of cosmo-centricity, an enlightened view and way of life by a proper training of body and mind by illuminating knowledge and liberating wisdom. it calls for a total transformation of matter and mind and realization of spiritual oneness. it is widening of the self as totality, from ‘i’ to ‘we’, from oneself to total self, from individual to cosmic. here there should be no deprivation and exploitation, no sorrows and sufferings which remain unmitigated, no injustice and discrimination unabated. the cosmos is full of splendors and can provide sustenance to all its inhabitants in a just, fair and equitable manner. but this is possible only through the postulation of a new value schema and a new ethics which cares for all and tends all. this has been the cherished desire of the enlightened mind. it is not a utopian dream but an ideal realizable in actual practice through proper education. this has been the message of all great religious traditions of india and this has also been shared by all great thinkers of the world. references bhatt, s. r. studies in ramanuja vedanta. heritage publishers, 1975, new delhi. ________. knowledge, value and education. gian publishing house, 1986, new delhi. ________. vedic wisdom, cultural inheritance and contemporary life. sundeep prakashan, 2004, new delhi. bhatt 23 03 (37-50)_an agenda.pmd 37 an agenda for just and sustainable development at the end of life as we know it agustin martin g. rodriguez ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract this essay discusses the impact that population has had upon the earth. it shows how the growth of population had been made possible by advances in technology and the food industry that have been directed by unmindful economic and developmental considerations. in order to reverse the destructive tendencies of our age we need to consider ideas of systems of development and human flourishing which are more mindful of our place in nature. a time for coming to mindfulness once while listening to the bbc’s “one planet”, i heard the host mike williams ambush-interview a woman in charge of the un copenhagen global warming meeting. he asked how the meeting was going when, clearly, things were not going well. despite the growing clarity regarding the seriousness of the situation, the world’s leaders could still not agree on a framework for global greenhouse reduction. the official was trying to give things a positive spin by saying that certain important agreements were still being reached. and in her effort to remain positive while knowing how dire the situation was, she said something extremely accurate and insightful. she said that this is one of the most significant periods in the history of our species because it is the first time that we must consciously decide how we should live and how we must proceed in building our civilizations. and i thought to myself, she must be speaking with a prophet’s tongue, because this is the most precise definition of the task of our age. this is the age when we must come to mindfullness. this is the era when humanity must take stock of how we have come to realize our being in the world with others, and it is the age of reckoning when we have to accept the fact that we have become a force of destruction and violence. it is the era of repentance when we can 38 realize what we have become and resolve to simply change our lives. since the emergence of the human person in the world, we have made a great impact on the planet. early on, we caused the extinction of various mega fauna.1 from the beginning, human beings seem to unconsciously and inadvertently find ways to realize their being in the world in a way that changes the environment and somehow causes the undoing of other beings in our shared world.2 we are an invasive species. and this is not just true of our contemporary ways of being which undoubtedly alters the very structures of the ecosystem. it goes back to our first appearance on the scene as tool users and hunter-gatherers. even at that stage, we already affected the world around us. we set out creating patterns of provision gathering, production, and consumption that ensured that we would be the most successful species to live in the shared biosphere. but our survival tactics affected the planet so pervasively that we altered our biosphere. this influence over our environment has amplified over the years and it has become so irrevocable that scientists are seriously considering declaring the holocene period over for the coming of the anthropocene__the geological age when “humans are not just spreading over the planet, but are changing the way it works”.3 overpopulation has changed the face of the world and this is the root of the impact we are having on this planet.4 an unmindful flourishing there are just so many of us that scientists actually believe that the planet cannot sustain us. yet there was no conscious decision on our part to become so populous and overtake most of the world’s habitable environments leading to the extinction of thousands of species. the main reason why there are so many of us is because, until recently, maybe even up to the last century, human life was fragile, and we needed to reproduce to ensure that there were enough people to continue the hunting and gathering or farming and even manufacturing.5 also, with more children and larger kinship networks, people had enough social capital to support them in times of disaster and uncertainty. another reason our species reproduce so prolifically is that it leads to more genetic variety leading to a better chance at survival.6 instinctively, we built up the bodily and cultural apparatus to encourage reproduction. as we developed in our capacity to populate, we also grew in our 39 capacity to survive. lower mother and infant mortality, greater child survival, and longer lives led to the steady rise of human populations which led further to our encroaching into various habitats, our over consumption of various fauna and flora, and our changing the landscape to make it more habitable to us but inhospitable to other species. our invasion of other habitats and destruction of other ways of being in the world was almost unconscious on our part. we were just adapting the best strategy to survive. today, we have pushed this destructiveness to a dangerous level. more than ever, we have affected the shape of the very earth and the hospitability of every biosphere to its inhabitants.7 again this was accomplished unmindfully. what i mean by this is we have made choices that have affected the survival of others without considering whether we are acting fairly or unfairly, justly or destructively toward them. we have been bad neighbors without being aware of it. but this situation is changing. today, we are realizing that we may have already surpassed the carrying capacity of the earth as early as 1999.8 and having come to this awareness, there is an opportunity that we can mindfully decide on the best way to move forward as a species. but are we taking the opportunity to rethinking our patterns of procreation with mindfulness? we got to this point without thinking. and we seem to be proceeding without much more thought. the history of the emergence of the modern food factory system is even more illustrative of how we have come to realize our destructive self realization without conscious decision. in recent history we have had an abundance of food. but before this there was a boom and bust cycle of abundance and famine.9 the reason for the change is due to the accidental discovery, in the 1950’s, that antibiotics could produce larger livestock. this realization made it easy to increase meat production to industrial levels because additives in feed could lead to shorter maturation periods, larger, meatier livestock, and the elimination of pasturing since quick growing animals fed with vitamins, antibiotics and amino acids could grow in sheds.10 but the result is a food factory system that is today causing much environmental destruction. it is concerned with profits and not health, promoting consumption and not nutrition, and is intent on expanding its reach to every culture and every geographical region. it is a system that is being proven to be unsustainable but is also proving to be unstoppable. and we got here through a series of unknowing decisions. three million years ago, our australopithecus ancestors were fruit 40 eating gatherer who occasionally scavenged meat. by 3 million to 4.2 million bc, the climate became drier, which led to the primeval forests being replaced by forest and grasslands. this was the impetus that led to meat as the core of our diet. this was because of the difficulty in filling the caloric requirements with fruit and vegetables. more and more we were driven to scavenge meat.11 when homo erectus evolved, meat consumption rose to 65% of their caloric intake because they could hunt with weapons. meat was a good addition to their diet because it meant more calories for less effort.12 with meat, they could migrate to europe. they could also evolve larger brains because they needed less of a gut for plant digestion and the body could focus on building brain matter. eventually, two thirds of homo erectus’ diet was meat based. by 11,000 years ago climate warming drew megafauna to habitats that were farther away from our ancestors and humans had to look to smaller, faster game as a source of food. the difficulties of hunting this game and the change of climate by 10,000 bc led to the “involuntary” development of farming which provided a more stable food supply.13 by then, corn and rice were staple food, and by 6,000bc livestock were kept for hide and milk. farming was prevalent in most areas with the exception of australia by 5,000 bc. farming meant harder work, greater risks, and likely crop failure, but because of the steady food it provided it allowed for population growth from 5 million in 10,000 bc to 20 million in 5,000bc. from this point on, human beings experienced a cycle of population growth and decline based on food production.14 when food production increased with better techniques or new technology, the population grew. eventually the population caught up and food production reached its limit so population declined. for most of human history, food production kept us alive but barely so. the key to human survival was then to look for ways to increase the productivity of all available acreage. thus, people were driven to discover better farming and food processing techniques which consequently raised output. when farmers could feed more people with less land, people started to live in more densely populated cities. surplus was produced which led to food security and trade. cities concentrated populations for better commerce, production, and specialization. this also meant the birth of a system of trade that would lead to greater inequality because it allowed certain members of society to accumulate surplus while leaving others in want. with the development of the city and the market for produce, farmers focused production on the market. they sold and produced what the 41 market demanded and sold produce where it was priced highest. much of production was concerned with supplying this new system of trade and profit accumulation.15 here, without a decision that looked beyond personal survival, farmers’ shifted their concerns to boosting output and cutting cost. grain production doubled and meat consumption skyrocketed. eventually more calories were being produced and populations grew,16 but inevitably supply couldn’t expand because there was no new acreage available to plant the grain that was necessary to produce the greater meat demanded. by the 1400’s there was a disastrous failure of production which led to famines and shortages in europe and asia, and populations dropped. there were also periods like the 1700’s when low nutrition led to significant mental retardation and stunted growth among the populace. from 1600-1860, production gains were not enough to keep off starvation such that life expectancy of peasants was 20.17 what saved western humanity was the discovery of free trade with distant lands but more particularly the fertile acreage of america coupled with the advancements in food preservation and transportation.18 this led to the development of the american food production machinery. the us became the main grain and meat producer of the world. the government ensured that by investing in research on techniques for greater productivity and on better infrastructure and subsidies to increase productivity. the quest for efficiency led to specialization and the factory method.19 this made farmers dependent on a cost effective system of uniform, rationalized food production that involved raising grain fed livestock. raising this livestock meant greater dependence on a complex support chain that produced more pounds per square foot but worked only using carbon producing transportation and manufacturing processes. this way, the us which has 5% of the world's population produced 1/6 of meat and half of corn for the world. today, this machinery has taken over the world's food production system.20 unfortunately, the machinery does not serve the farmer. because of the quest for lower prices which can only be achieved in productions of scale, small farmers are being driven out of business. since the only viable enterprises are the big factory farms, a few large enterprises have actually taken over all aspects of food production, processing, distribution, and marketing. ultimately, the factory specialization and unification of food production processes led to consolidation of power, such that large food conglomerates dictate what is produced and for how much, 42 and inequality, such that small farmers are being deprived of opportunities to profitably produce.21 today, we produce food in a way that is not healthy for us. our food production processes are causing great poverty and hunger for communities that have thrived in traditional forms of life, that is causing the extinction of thousands of species a year, and is making the world inhospitable to life. who decided this way of our realizing ourselves? no one group of persons. we came to this way of being because of small decisions for profit, for convenience, for mistaken notions of human flourishing, and, early on, for survival and development. and now, we are paying the cost for this unmindfulness. fortunately, ours is also the generation that is becoming more mindful of the problems that we are causing and of our destructive way of being. consequently, we are the generation that can and must decide to consciously persevere in our destructive ways or to reinvent our way of being in the world. repentance and development the question is this, how do we arrive at this state of mindfulness? mindfulness begins with the realization that our concretization of self has been perverse and that we should find a way to become more creative in our human becoming. this of course is easier said than done. for how does one genuinely come to a realization of one’s brokenness when more often than not we chose this broken way of being as the most reasonable response to the world that calls us to presence? in the end, repentance seems almost impossible unless, as the philosopher max scheler says, we see ourselves from the eyes of god himself. after all, we can only truly understand how broken we are when we see ourselves with the eyes of the perfect love that called us forth to being.22 but, how many of us can arrive at such an enlightenment? if mystics are to be believed, it is an act of grace that showers us with this awakening. we cannot ourselves invoke it. so how does that work for a species in need of repentance? of course, in faith, we can believe that god can with a single thought bring us all to such an awareness. however, this reflection is focused on the question of how human collectives can, of their own capacities and wills, come to realize the need to repent. it seems that we are hard-pressed to come to a mindfulness of our broken realization of self when our very conceptions of development and human flourishing are determined by an aggressive dominant rationality 43 that has set the standards for civilization, development, and progress. what do i mean by this? let's think about what characterizes a developed country. in a developed nation people have higher incomes, they consume more manufactured goods, their productivity is high, they live longer because they have advanced healthcare, they are generally more highly educated in western ways, and they live with most modern conveniences. this is in contrast to what characterizes an underdeveloped country which is best described by paul hoffman: it is a country characterized by poverty, with beggars in the cities, and villagers eking out a bare subsistence in the rural area. it is a country lacking in factories of its own, usually with inadequate supplies of power and light. it usually has insufficient roads and railroads, insufficient government services, poor communications. it has few hospitals, and few institutions of higher learning. most of its people cannot read or write. in spite of the generally prevailing poverty of the people, it may have isolated islands of wealth, with a few persons living in luxury. its banking system is poor; small loans have to be obtained through money lenders who are often little better than extortionists. another striking characteristic of an underdeveloped country is that its exports to other countries usually consist almost entirely of raw materials, ores or fruits of some staple product with possible a small admixture of luxury handicrafts. often the extraction of cultivation of these raw materials exports in the hands of foreign companies.23 the simple fact is that most people who are somehow part of the mainstream, global economic and cultural system want to belong to the developed nations because their lives will have escaped the conditions outlined above, plus they will live longer and more comfortably with less unnecessary death and suffering, stagnation and boredom. however, these benefits are not always seen as an advancement given what they cost us. what does such a state of development demands from us? it demands, for one thing, greater individualism and less solidarity with a community__one has to rely on one's efforts and one’s capacities in order to realize individual goals. in a modern, developed economy, one must 44 not rely on community and communitarian systems because they hinder efficiency. what should characterize our relationships are contractual engagements with one another. for one's survival, one must engage government agencies and private sector systems that will insure one against life's contingencies with the least disruption of one’s own agenda and without forcing one to build communal relationships of reciprocity. relationships with persons in developed cultures are defined by their utilitarian value. most things are commodified including our relationship to nature and fellow persons, as well as our own creativity and other spirituality. thus, things are valued only in relation to productivity, consumption, investment, profit, and growth. everything has value only when it can be bought and sold, transformed into something that can be sold, consumed, traded, and be a source of profit and gain. modern forms of development demand a kind of relationship with reality that is often violent and reductive. mainstream economy demands that we place the ego and its demands at the center of a consuming totality. to succeed in establishing ourselves in this totality we must see the world as the material to manufacture our needs, and we also see other persons as resources we use to maximize our gains. nature is reduced to pure machinery and resource base__a standing reserve.24 fellow humans are human resources and factors of production. the violence of our economies is rooted in our inability to see anything other than as a standing reserve for our own needs and nourishment. we are trained not to see anything beyond our own agenda and we cannot relate to the other as other but always as something that can and must be reduced to the same. to allow such a system to grow we must engage the world in the mode of encroachment or appropriation. whether they are open about it or not, we appropriate other people, communities, etc. to become part of an expanding system that needs to keep expanding in order to survive. just as europe survived with the appropriation of the fertile lands of the native americans and the us survived and developed with its appropriation of former colonies, our world economy survives and develops by reducing the world’s peoples and cultures to consumers and markets. after all of this is said, what is development? of course the idea of development can be traced to so many modes of civilization and so many periods of human history, but contemporary conceptions of development are certainly rooted in western modernity. one does not necessarily have a sense of development if one’s sense of time is cyclical or follows the rhythms of nature, for instance. nature does not develop: it 45 flourishes, it become abundant, it changes but it does not develop. it does not move toward an end that becomes greater and better, it creates variety and flourishes with what works. but western humanity discovered the possibility of decoupling one’s fortunes from the rhythms and movements of nature. western man was able to define nature as a mechanism that he could tinker with and readjust according to human drives for survival and flourishing. when western man realized that he could impose his needs upon the earth, that he could reshape his relationship to his environment according to his will, this afforded him the possibility of also recreating his self__from persons seeking the will of god, or realizing his essential self defined by the cosmos__to defining himself according to his understanding of who he is. and this realization set forth the restless movement of self-discovery and recreation, of the exploration of the possibilities being that were bounded only by what we knew and what we could do. armed with the new science, we pushed ourselves to know more and realize other possibilities. our will to power was armed with knowledge and technologies that could impose the human will upon the earth and others. this will coupled with mercantile ambitions led to colonization and eventually found its zenith in industrial production and the imposition of the western market economy. overall, the broad business of the expansion of european capitalism to encompass large areas of the globe can be understood in terms of the expansion of one form-of l-life at the expense of other long established local forms-oflife. as the european capitalist system became ever more global in its reach the structures of the economic, social, and political system drew in and reordered a series of extant forms-of-life. in this invasive process, the indigenous patterns of economic, social, political and cultural life were radically remade. the expansion of capitalism absorbed forms-of-life and recast them in system-friendly forms.25 the first movements toward global development involved the creation and expansion of the western market system, which was always at the expense of other cultures. they determined what kind of life was worth living and shaped the world economy to help them realize that. they determined what culture was most worth cultivating and who was savage and civilized. this created a global underclass of underdeveloped 46 nations. after the world wars that weakened the european empires, this underclass of nations suddenly found themselves liberated from the determinations of the rich, developed nations. all of a sudden, there they were, independent and poor and needing to become developed like the former colonizers. although there was the opportunity here to develop ourselves mindfully, with a greater awareness of the danger of the western market systems, being victims of its violence, we nonetheless bought into this conception of development and human flourishing. with the birth of newly independent nations, development theory emerged because exploited nations needed to catch up with the colonial master choosing to participate in the game that caused their impoverishment in the first place. colonization was an opportunity for breaking free and yet resulted in the deeper enslavement of the marginalized. an important opportunity for repentance was lost here. development theory became an apologetics for the existing industrial market systems. up until now, development studies mainly espouses theories about how underdeveloped countries can become like developed countries. it basically analyses how nations can transform themselves from being suppliers of raw materials and cheap labor to becoming manufacturers, producers, and creators of cutting edge products that the markets will consume. the basic question seems to be, “how do these backward nations evolve into creative producers of high-tech products and commodities that the market will be willing to pay for?” in these theories of development, no one questions the assumption that development is desirable in this form. no one is asking if these theories of development are sustainable, or if it can lead to global citizens who are creative and whole. this form of development may actually be inimical to the cultures of the majority of the world's people, and it may not be possible to have this form of development with equity. thus, we have to question present models of development before we reach a point when destructive collective self-realization becomes irreversible. but how can we even begin to question the very frame of our daily living? like our ancestors, we make little decisions on a daily basis which are focused on our present and middle term survival. we are framed by this conception of development and the way of self-realization it demands. on a daily basis, it is the default lens by which we make choices. and so, how do we repent our destructive self-realizations when these are determined by aggressive, imposed rationalities? decisions about the directions we are to take as a people and 47 even as a species cannot be made my individuals who tend only to react uncritically to the daily demands of living. we cannot leave it to people to shift to renewable and clean energy in time before the end of oil and the temperature rise sets in. we cannot rely on the individual efforts of profitoriented corporations to shift to more sustainable means of livestockraising. neither can we rely on well-off private citizens to buy more expensive but more sustainably and justly produced food. individuals will mostly decide according to their own survival issues according to the already dominant rationality. thus, we need guiding bodies and structures that can direct individual actions toward building a just and sustainable future. we need institutions of mindfulness to guide our self-realization in this period of repentance. we need systems of governance to guide our collective self-realization toward a fruitful way of becoming. of course this statement is not made without an awareness of its danger. after all, our systems of governance__state, corporate, and civil society__have supported the very modes of development that have led us to perdition. more often than not, systems of governance exist to support and further the dominant rationality. as we have developed our destructive processes of development, our governance systems have been defined by the rationalities that were born from and frame them. other rationalities with other conceptions of development or flourishing, some which are actually more sustainable and creative, have naturally been marginalized by the governance systems that continue to impose and develop the existing development systems. we know our governance systems to facilitate the imposition of dominant rationalities which in our time tend to aggressively impose their conceptions of human life on all other rationalities or rationalities of the other. however, these systems of governance themselves are what we need to repent our destructive selfrealization. ultimately, we need our systems of governance to guide our efforts at building a shared conception of and will for the common good that is creative and sustainable. building governance systems, be they that of the state, the corporation, civil society, or the family, is the only way we can build together a conception of the good that will awaken us to the need for repentance and rebirth. but this is only possible if our systems of governance are inherently just and discursive. this is almost impossible to imagine, of course, given how order is maintained by governance systems usually through the marginalization of the other. however, governance institutions can choose to institute participatory and dialogical systems that will allow for the enrichment of dominant ratio48 nalities. instead of maintaining systems that impose aggressive and imposing conceptions of development and human flourishing, government systems can be set up so that they are the very site of ordered and systemic processes of discourse. this is especially necessary, and of course even more difficult, for the state which has the sole authority and power to determine the enforceable norms and structures of communal living. given that the state can impose on all its citizens norms of acceptable engagement, it is necessary that these norms are determined not only by a powerful and aggressive dominant class but that these norms represent the shared conception of the good as determined by all its citizens. if the state creates fair systems of discourse between rationalities of its citizens, it will be possible for the other, mostly marginalized, rationalities to engage each other in a way that creates a shared dominant rationality enriched by all rationalities in a polis. if governance systems can genuinely facilitate discourse between its citizens from their various rationalities, it will allow all its citizens with their potentially legitimate conceptions of the good, to challenge the dominant rationality and its narrow conception of development and human flourishing. short of direct revelation, this is the only way we can come to genuine repentance. in the fair and just discourse of governance, we open our fixated dominant rationality to other ways of being. only then can we genuinely reflect upon the genuine fruitfulness and creativity of our self-realization. in a creative engagement with other rationalities, the brokenness or wholeness of our rationalities can be revealed to us. and once revealed we can begin to seek other possibilities and realize better possibilities of our coming to be whole in the world with others. this process is arduous because the good is always in play and we are in play with it. as governed communities we struggle to fix that play with our norms and laws, our systems and ways of life, but of course, genuine human flourishing, as well as the flourishing of our fellow beings in the world, demands that we keep the play in its creative motion even as we build shared structures and ways of shared becoming in the world. that is the creative tension of social becoming. we are in a constant state of constructing and deconstructing, binding and unbinding, defining, redefining and undefining our engagement with the world. we are, in short, in a state of constant repentance and rebirth. this constant play can only be facilitated by the just discourse between rationalities that shape our shared world. for all rationalities, while striving to form a shared domi49 nant rationality, must always remain in play with their others. this is a process of enrichment where the hardening of the rationality of the other is put in play by the play of discourse. the role of the state is to facilitate, even regulate, this discourse so that it is fair and just. and its other role is to make sure that this fair and just discourse comes to the best collective and formal realizations of our collective conception of and will for the good for now. after all, every shared conception of the good is a for now concretization of the most reasonable and acceptable understanding of the good given the play of the discoursing rationalities and what is known. in this way, the state can genuinely guide our collective self realization especially in this time of crisis when we cannot wait for people to face collective disaster to decide a better way to be. that is always how it has always been for us. we create a shared system of becoming, we end up spoiling the nest, causing the extinction of our main source of food, or face an unforeseen disaster, and then we are forced to decide another way of being. that is probably what will happen now. we will foul the nest, we will run out of essential resources like petroleum, water, and topsoil and we will be forced to live more reasonably. however, because of our sheer reach and influence, because of the impact of our power and population, when our way of living causes things to go bad, it may mean the end not just of life as we know it, but most forms of life. even without the catastrophic effect of our living, we are already causing the end of life for many species. morally, it is our responsibility to put our foot down and say enough. we must change our lives! we change our lives more profoundly on an individual basis, of course. but individuals can change more effectively if there are systems that support this change. these institutions can be established by good governments that truly represent our collective understanding of the goodan understanding that genuinely opens to the good because it is born of the fair play of the discoursing multi-verse of rationalities. 50 endnotes 1sean markey, “humans caused australia’s ice age extinctions, tooth study says”, national geographic news, january 24, 2007, (http://news.nationalgeographic. com/news/2007/01/070124-iceage-fossils_2.html.) and e.o. wilson, paul r. ehrlich, stuart pimm, peter raven, gordon orians, jared diamond, harold mooney, daniel simberloff, david wilcove, and james carlton, “insights: human activities cause of current extinction crisis”, environment news service, 19 may 2005, (http:// www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2005/2005-05-19-insltr.asp.) 2jeffrey sachs, common wealth: economics for a crowded planet, (new york: penguin books, 2009), 58. 3”the anthropocene: a man-made world”, http://www.economist.com/node/ 18741749. accessed 9 april 2012. 4walter dodds, humanity’s footprint, (new york: columbia university press, 2008), 32. 5sachs, common wealth, 185. 6dodds, humanity’s footprint, 118. 7ibid., 36. 8ibid., 33. 9much of this section is a summary of “chapter 1: starving for progress”, of paul roberts’ the end of food (boston: mariner books, 2009) which gives a concise understanding of how and why the global food factory system emerged. 10roberts, end of food, 3. 11ibid., 5. 12ibid. 13ibid., 9. 14ibid., 10. 15ibid., 11-13. 16ibid., 13. 17ibid., 14. 18ibid., 17. 19ibid., 23. 20ibid., 25. 21ibid., 27. 22max scheler, “repentance and rebirth”, on the eternal in man, (new york: harper and brothers publishers, 1960), 119-120. 23paul g. hoffman, ‘one hundred countries-one and one quarter billion people”, (washington, dc: committee for international economic growth, 1960) p. 14. 24martin heidegger, “discourse on thinking”, new york: harper and row, publishers, 1966), 50. 25pw preston, development theory: an introduction, (oxford: blackwell publishers, ltd., 1996), 139. 10(134-138)note for authors states and refugees: reflections on the karen refugees from burma and their camps in thailand luis s. david ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract this essay presents the history of the karen refuge situation on the burmese border with thailand. it goes on to discuss the implications of unhcr constituted refugee presences for the sovereignty of states such as burma and thailand. and finally, it asks from a philosophical perspective, the question: what is a refugee? in the late nineteenth century the british invaded burma from india, took it as a colony, and partitioned it according to priorities tied in straightforward fashion to the twin goals of security and profit. in burma’s south-central area, which was inhabited by a large, mostly ethnic burmese population, they governed directly. whereas in burma’s borderlands, they left to the minority peoples to run. as much as the initial lack of attention to the minority people’s affairs paid by the british might have stirred in them the expectation of right to self-determination, that quickly turned to disappointment in face of british policy partitioning burma in such a manner as to spread them out across five distinct political regions. their political dismemberment made it difficult for them to run their own affairs, let alone take part as a group in the broader business of the nation. what is more, it engendered an uneven pattern of development that has continued well into our time.1 burma gained its independence from britain in the aftermath of the second world war. what proved to be far more elusive was hammering down internal peace and stability. with great reluctance, the borderland peoples joined the federation of burma, although on the under116 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 116-128 © 2000 by assumption university press standing that the federation would respect their autonomy, and that, if following a wait period of ten years they felt their interests would be better served by striking out on their own, they would be at liberty to leave the federation. such agreements notwithstanding, the country soon descended into civil war. following the assassination of aung san, the principal figure of burmese independence (father of aung san suu kyi), a number of christian karens were murdered by the burmese buddhist majority, which sparked a karen revolt. before long, other borderland communities, such as the mon, karenni, shan, kachin, naga, arakenese, and the communists, were fighting the government as well. with a mandate from the government to deal with the multiple rebellions, general ne win not only squared off with them through many a fierce battle, but also, quite shrewdly, husbanded the growth of the government’s armed forces, collectively known as the tatmadaw. this gained for general ne win the tatmadaw’s loyalty, so much so that, in 1962, when he staged a successful coup against burma’s civilian government, and took over the government of his country, he had the tatmadaw’s full backing. but instead of husbanding the country’s development on the original idea of a federation that might have enabled its heterogeneous peoples to coexist peaceably in a single state, general ne win and his small band of hand-picked associates (and successors), instituted a program of ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic assimilation — “burmanization” as they called it — which they sustained well into the 1990s.2 among “burmanization’s” unstated assumptions was that the minority peoples were “backward,” that by impeding access to the mineral and other resources found in the lands they occupied they were placing obstacles to national development, that their belligerence posed a subversive danger to the nation’s frontiers — the solution to all of which was their “assimilation.” predictably, the pursuit of “burmanization” provoked even deeper conflict and additional secessionist demands, under the impact of which the country’s economy, fragile to begin with, deteriorated to the point of near collapse, earning for burma (myanmar, as it is officially called), the dubious distinction of being a country that not only is among the world’s poorest, but one racked as well by endless violence. to finance their hostilities, which never seem to end, the government and its rebel opponents trade in resources found in the regions effectively under their control. luis s. david 117 what “burmanization” has also brought to the minority peoples situated in remote areas, especially to those who, quite the reverse of submitting, as non-ethnic burmese, to second class citizenship, work very hard to retain an understanding and a practice of their respective cultures, is persistently brutal treatment from the burmese army, which despises them even as it remains unable to defeat them. they are subjected to recurrent patterns of beatings, torture, sexual abuse, compulsory labor, and forced relocations. the forced relocations occur at the point where large swathes of the territories occupied by the minority peoples are designated “fire-free” zones by the tatmadaw, which then issues expulsion orders from these zones, amidst stern warnings that whose who insist on remaining in their homes would be shot on sight. the minority communities that have been forced out of their homes by means of such scare tactics, known as the “four cuts,” are then crowded into completely fenced in and militarily supervised “strategic hamlets” — virtual concentration camps. in the course of over 40 years, thousands of communities have been in this fashion either destroyed or removed. in cities, the “four cuts” — euphemistically termed, “urban development” — involve the dismemberment of ethnic minority communities by means of their forcible relocation to “resettlement towns,” as they are called. out of the political chaos spawned by such tactics as “the four cuts,” and the social discontent produced by a devastated economy, a democracy movement mobilized, involving a broad array of students, workers, and buddhist monks. this widespread social unrest came to a boil in 1988, in the form of a series of fierce demonstrations, the cumulative effect of which plunged burma’s center into even greater upheaval. when normal crowd control tactics deployed by the police to suppress the increasingly violent demonstrations proved to be of little avail, the military junta, that had styled itself, the state law and order council (slorc), directly assumed, in september of that same year, the governance of the country, ostensibly to save the country from the effects of widespread anarchy and to prevent the disintegration of the burmese union. it is that continuing military rule that, to this day, burma’s citizens have to contend with, even as grassroots support for the democracy movement remains strong, and notwithstanding the tatmadaw generals protestations pertaining to the strictly interim nature of their state law and or118 prajñâ vihâra der council/state peace and development council (slorc-spdc). central to the apologetics of the slorc-spdc is its claim that conditions of “law and order” need to be established throughout the country (by none other than itself, of course) before power can be handed over to a new civilian administration in a democratic system that, ominously, they insist needs to be compatible with burma’s “culture and traditions” to qualify it for their imprimatur. in the meantime, the tatmadaw senior officers have lost no time in refashioning the political landscape to cement their grip on power. to justify their intervention upon, and administration of, the politics of the nation, they operate a lexicon of socio-political obligation — to national security, to national defense, to national unity — unabashedly claiming credit for holding the nation together. that they may actually have begun to believe in the veracity of their own rhetoric accounts in part for the ruthlessness with which they wage their campaigns against political dissidents in the cities, and against armed opposition groups wherever in the countryside a ceasefire has yet to be achieved. nowhere else than in its war against the karen does the ruthless violence of the slorc-spdc’s pursuit of its policies, come through. many karens, under pressure from the “four cuts” operations described above, have been forced out of their home villages by the tatmadaw. instead of proceeding to the heavily guarded settlements, since they fear the forced labor the tatmadaw is expected to exact from them, and the wholesale looting of their food and other supplies (already meager to begin with), and the extrajudicial killings they could at any point be subjected to in the course of the tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency activities against the karen national union (knu), the karens’ armed resistance group — one of the last remaining armed ethnic minority opposition groups still fighting the slorc-spdc, many instead hide in the forests that are lush along the burma-thailand border. conditions in the forests, however, which are poor, make it virtually impossible for the karens, comprised mostly of farmers accustomed to growing small plots of rice on a semi-subsistence level, to do any farming there. besides, the forest areas they occupy have been classified by the tatmadaw as “black areas,” that is, as places that harbor insurgents, and so they have to contend with the additional fear of being mistaken for insurgents who must be shot on sight. from the standpoint of the burmese military, all karens, even those not active members luis s. david 119 of the knu, are suspected of at least providing the rebels with one or another form of support. they must, therefore, be routinely killed, if found hiding in the forests, if demonstratively remiss or slack in their performance as porters to the tatmadaw, if suspected of being sympathetic to the knu. tragically, it is karen civilians, not karen insurgents, who are the principal victims in the armed conflict between the slorc-spdc and the knu. as one karen plaintively refugee put it, “even though we are civilians, the military treats us like their enemy.”3 the burmese army’s war on the karen has driven hundreds of thousands of them into the mountains along the thai border, with some 400,000 of them actually fleeing across the border into thailand, where they inhabit camps in two principal clusters: one in the north outside of mae sot, with the camp known as mae la being the largest, the other in the south, in the area of ratchaburi. each camp is under the control of a different division of the thai army. in 1998, the government of thailand invited the united nations high commission for refugees (unhcr) to administer the camps as co-partner. it arranged as well for a consortium of charities to provide the refugees with basic necessities, such as food, blankets, and mosquito nets, and brought in the doctors without borders (msf) to attend to the refugees’ most basic medical needs. to facilitate its regulation of refugee movements in and out of the camps, the unhcr, in particular, has pushed for, and organized, a program of mass registration for the refugees. prior to the unhcr’s registration of refugees, karen refugees in the aforementioned camps routinely returned to myanmar to farm their plots of land. upon registration with the unhcr, they mostly found that they would no longer be able to do so. or else they used to be able to sneak in and out, say, of camp mae la, to find informal employment with thai farmers in the town of mae sot (that the karens constitute an inexpensive labor pool, is one of the principal reasons they are tolerated on thai soil); but since their registration they can do so only with much difficulty. previously, thai authorities had turned a blind eye on karen rebels reentering burma and crossing over back to thailand in such a manner as to avoid pursuit by burmese government forces; they no longer may do so easily. what is more, thailand has displayed an eagerness to repatriate the karens to burma, and to shutter down the refugee camps. more re120 prajñâ vihâra cently arrived refugees are therefore not permitted to build the previously standard bamboo houses on stilts, or any other semi-permanent facilities, but are provided instead with plastic sheeting to create a makeshift tent upon a framework of bamboo poles over a tarp or on a bamboo platform. the outcome is an open structure that alternately exposes its occupants to cold breezes and to extreme heat (especially when the sun beats down on the plastic sheeting). no furniture is provided as the refugees are expected to sleep on mats, and to sit on the floor or in makeshift hammocks. these structures are crowded closely together, with only trenches separating them. there is, for their occupants, little privacy. the question i wish to pose at this juncture is: what are the implications, for the sovereignty of states such as burma and thailand, of unhcrconstituted refugee presences.4 or put more simply: what is a refugee? according to the un convention relating to the status of refugees, a refugee is: [a]ny person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or unwilling to return to it.5 because the refugee is “outside of the country of his former habitual residence,” asserts sadako ogata, the 8th u.n. high commissioner for refugees, he or she ipso facto is subject to “displacement or uprootedness.” but that, she reasons, is because the material conditions of the refugee constitute “an aberration of the normal, in which the state accepts responsibility for its own citizens.” the unhcr, therefore, must work to bring about “a return to the status ante.”6 mrs. ogata’s view echoes, of course, the 1986 u.n. general assembly resolution underscoring the twin obligation of governments to account for those actions of theirs that force their own nationals to seek sanctuary in other countries, and “to create the conditions which will allow refugees to return to their homelands.” short of the return of luis s. david 121 refugees to their homeland, there is only a preponderance of what jacques vernant calls the curse of “instability” afflicting those who, because their homeland is nowhere, have no access to the legal guarantees that every state accords to its own nationals.7 they are forced by circumstance to earn their daily bread in places to which no one had invited them, but which they cannot depart at will.8 one-time refugee, hannah arendt, writes, “once they leave their homeland, they remain homeless. once they leave their state, they become stateless. once they have been deprived of their human rights, they are rightless, the scum of the earth.”9 in other words, individuals and groups that do not come under the authority or protection of a given state are nomads without an identity. in a world in which global citizenship is tied to citizenship in one or another sovereign state, refugees are an unconscionable anomaly. they are unrecognizable under customary international law; they lack the travel documents that would enable them to move freely between countries; they have no embassies to represent them when they do; they have no government from which they can demand security protection. allow me to quote at length the introduction to a 1993 unhcr study on refugee protection entitled, note on international protection: the international response to the plight of refugees – culminating in a virtually universal consensus that people forced by violence or persecution to flee their countries should receive international protection – is one of the most remarkable humanitarian achievements of this century. building on foundations laid by the first high commissioner for refugees, fridtjof nansen, beginning in 1921, the international community has progressively developed the structure and practice of international protection, elaborating and consolidating a system of legal principles and norms and, most importantly, providing asylum to millions of refugees. the international legal framework for the protection of refugees now has the explicit support of 121 state parties to the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees, its 1967 protocol, or both. many of these states are also parties to the 1969 oau [organization of african unity] convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in africa, or adhere to the 1984 cartagena declaration on refugees. the vast majority of states 122 prajñâ vihâra confronted with refugee situations observe the fundamental principles of refugee protection in granting asylum to persons in need of protection. having entrusted to the high commissioner, under the auspices of the united nations, the task of ensuring the international protection of refugees, states regularly extend to the office the cooperation and support that are essential to the discharge of its functions. the human solidarity thus manifested by governments is inspired and reinforced by that of the people they represent. despite the economic and social problems involved, action to protect and assist refugees still enjoys widespread popular support throughout the world, support that is also expressed through vigorous and effective action by non-governmental organizations working alongside unhcr in every region of the world. the international community’s responses to the problems of refugees must at the same time be viewed against the somber background of armed conflict and human rights abuses which force people to flee in ever-increasing numbers. refugee flows are a symptom of failure to prevent, respond to or resolve crises at home, and the presence of well over eighteen million refugees in the world today is an indication of social disruption and personal tragedy on a massive scale. international protection as provided by countries of asylum in cooperation with the unhcr is an effort to compensate for the protection that refugees should have received in their own countries, and its objective is not fulfilled until refugees once again enjoy protection as full-fledged members of a national community. (un general assembly, 1993: 2.1-2.3) embroidered into the substance of such refugee discourse is the idea that in our world, such as it is, the sovereign state possesses a centrality and distinctive coherence that presupposes fixed and stable borders, inviolate territorial spaces, and a defensible center. everything, including the figure of the karen refugee from burma sitting in a unhcradministered camp in thailand, is positioned in and around the state. there is no “outside” to the state. yet, were we to scratch beneath the surface of the facile assumption that the karen refugee takes as his or her point of reference an always already existing state called burma (or myanmar), that in its state-liness embodies his or her will and desires, we might perhaps see how the state is awarded its centrality, and how its borders and boundaries are constituted. luis s. david 123 the sovereign state, you see, is not simply an entity “out there,” an always already given status ante, but is the convergent effect of protean, multiple, historically contingent activities that relentlessly establish and inhabit its presumed realities as the sovereign state. the state, in other words, is not a self-sufficient, pure, and objective presence, but is, rather, the always provisional coalescence of multiple cohabiting fields and struggles, practices, relations, and domains of reference, constituting what michel foucault has termed a “polyhedron of intelligibilities.”10 as much as the most central of these practices revolve around the claim that the sovereign state is the artifice of the territorially-bound community of citizens presumed already to be in place who have constituted it to be their agent of protection and representation, the fact of the matter is, this community of citizens never simply exists in itself; it is never simply organic in its self-manifestation but must tirelessly and repeatedly produce itself in and around everyday practices of governance. it must already be working tirelessly to effect and to privilege, by means of problematizations effected in various fields of activity, a statist imagination of the world. viewed this way, the modern international refugee regime is not a matter of the powers of already historically fixed states meeting already manifest dangers and difficulties. the powers of states across borders need actively to be produced, at those moments, precisely, at which intergovernmental problems receive elaboration, and states receive recognition as the proper agents for solving them. governmental and inter-governmental conduct in face of perceived (manufactured) practical difficulties induces a whole set of effects “in the real,” effects that “crystallize into institutions … inform individual behavior, and … act as grids for perception and evaluation of things.”11 these include, among other things, nationality laws, formal extradition laws and treaties, resolutions on asylum and the expulsion of aliens, laws identifying and regulating the various manifestations of alien-ness, foreignness, refugee-ness. refugee discourse presents the refugee as an object of statist problematization, that is, of intervention and regimentation by the state, upon the borders precisely between states, so as to enable those borders to become powerful points of reference with respect to the presumed realities of a territorially bound citizenry and an operational statehood. take the seemingly small yet portentous matter of the unhcr 124 prajñâ vihâra identity certificate. the first and most important thing that could be said about it is that it is not a passport. it does not guarantee efficient passage across territorial borders. its avowed objective is to afford the refugee to whom it is issued some degree of freedom of movement within his or her host state, some measure of protection approximating that enjoyed by its nationals. from a genealogical perspective, however, the identity certificate for refugees functions to satisfy objectives other than simply humanitarianism ones. the state is a continuing project that plays itself out by generating official documents that combine complex underlying cultural significations with classificatory practices. from the cartographer’s maps to presentations of columns and graphs in daily reports, the state creates and recreates a vision, or visions, of its own existence. the unhcr identity certificate’s emergence as an official document underscores the position of the territorial state as an agent of governance. by inscribing the refugee upon the intergovernmental field of conduct and policy, the identity certificate “normalizes” the refugee in statist terms. as one among an array of practices that gives temporal and spatial shape to the contingent powers and identities of the modern territorial state, it provides the refugee with much needed assistance, at the same time that it subjects the otherwise dangerous nomad to a tighter control. it negatively positions the refugee, vis-à-vis the citizen-subject, as someone who, because he or she lacks the citizen’s ties to the state, must assume, as the only practically viable salvation open to him or her, his or her reintegration into the system, but on the very terms that the system itself sets. what, in the practical order, are those terms? the refugee is somehow incorporated into the discourse of national life, but only to be distanced, in both legal practice and in the popular imagination, from most of the possibilities contained in that life. however much the refugee might be bannered to be an object of compassion or pity, he or she is, in the final analysis, simply unwanted, insofar as he or she represents, no differently than the plagues of old, a disruption in the conditions of normality in life. as an aberrance of the citizen-subject, the refugee is in no position to participate in, or contribute to, the forces and structures of everyday citizenly affairs. paradoxically, the activities organized, the institutions established, in the name of the refugee, affirm and secure the sovereign state’s technologies of governance; they allow the sovereign state to stay in the luis s. david 125 business of governance.12 this accounts in part for why, notwithstanding a given state’s breach of its contractual duty to represent and protect its domestic community, notwithstanding its predatory actions against a part of its own people exceeding the bounds of legitimate violence (e.g. burma’s actions against the karen), unless such a state fails or disintegrates on its own (e.g. the former yugoslavia), it is not usually the entity that is called aberrant, but those of its citizens who, upon fleeing it, officially become known as refugees. as much as the state might violate the compact, still, it is the state, always already empowered to speak and to be heard. the refugee’s condition comes down, then, to his or her voicelessness, to his or her lack of agency, as the unhcr documents quoted above so vigorously assert. to have “work,” “home,” decisions to take, the refugee must return “home,” that is, he must have his territorial ties reestablished with the community of citizens represented and protected by the state. without such ties to the state, the refugee stands outside, is at a loss. so while in a true sense the problem of refugees, as in the case of the burmese karens in thailand, is directly the consequence of the actions of an illiberal and autocratic government, to tyranny, to intolerant nationalisms, to the violence of dictatorial regimes, and to the abuse of fundamental human rights, placing the figure of the refugee, and refugee discourse itself, squarely within the institution of state sovereignty, enables the international community to avoid having to address the root causes of the refugee situation (admittedly a tricky business since doing something about it would inevitably involve facilitating some type of political change within that country), and to focus instead upon its enforcement of international borders in face of the throngs of moving people worldwide to whom, suddenly, the rules of the world around them, the rules of the state system, have ceased to apply. the world of states must ensure that their proliferative presence does not create a “beyond” or an “outside” to the otherwise presumably all-encompassing hierarchy of citizen/nation/state. this explains the unhcr’s insistence on the refugees’ “need of the state.” statecraft, in face of massive displacements, must seek to “rearticulate” the sovereign state into the shifting sociopolitical terrain, although especially upon the displaced people who, by virtue of their sheer numbers, constitute a powerful transversal, deterritorializing force. it must reinscribe the sovereign territorial state into the very events of displacement in order to convert 126 prajñâ vihâra them into a useful fund, technique, force, knowledge in a sea of changes. in another sense, however, refugee knows better. they fall back on their ability to make new homes out of any place. against all kinds of conditions of adversity, they move on with the task of creating homes wherever and whenever they can. what the maps cut up, refugee stories cut across. even when they submit to the “system,” they negotiate new openings within the politico-administrative and cultural spaces of their host community, causing their activities to become intensely deterritorializing. but that is another story. endnotes 1 martin smith, burma: insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (london: zed books, 1989). 2. ibid. 3 “myanmar: the kayin (karen) state militarization and human rights,” amnesty international (june, 1999). 4 an unparalleled source of sound perspectives on the matter is the book by nevzat soguk: states and strangers: refugees and displacements of statecraft (u.s.a.: university of minnesota press, 1999). 5 united nations, human rights: a compilation of international instruments (new york: center for human rights in geneva, 1988), p. 296. 6 soguk, p. 32. 7 jacques vernant, the refugee in the post-war world (new haven: yale university press, 1953), pp. 13-14. 8 jacques vernant, the refugee in the post-war world (new haven: yale university press, 1953), pp. 13-14. 9 the origins of totalitarianism, p. 267. 10 michel foucault, “why the prison?” in the foucault effect: studies in governmentality, graham burchell et al eds. (london: harvester wheatsheaf, 1981), p. 77. 11 ibid. 12 all this is consistent, of course, with the constitution and mapping of particular forms of otherness, or marginalized subjectivity, in the field of work, criminality, and health, to assure the construction of the “average citizen,” a figure central to the ongoing project of the state. just as vagrants, beggars, etc. are constituted too represent forms of otherness and marginality that will buttress the fields of normality, so also refugees and immigrants, and now, the global terrorist, are added to this list of otherness to serve the same function. luis s. david 127 article 4-2 93 simone weil: a sense of god ranilo b. hermida ateneo de manila university, philippines there is a reality outside of the world, that is to say, outside space and time, outside man’s mental universe, outside any sphere of whatsoever that is accessible to human faculties. corresponding to this reality, at the center of the human heart, is the longing for an absolute good, a longing which is always there and is never appeased by any object in this world. simone weil 1909-1943 prologue there is one thread of thought which a serious reader of simone weil cannot possibly miss from the variegated tapestry of her thinking. and that is her sense of god that is almost naturally embedded therein. she unfailingly elevates her every insight to a level that is at once metaphysical or theological. indeed, weil, considers all human concerns always “situated in the context of our relation to god.”1 she excludes nothing for she believes that even those practices not readily recognized as religious contribute to our spiritual development and prepare us for loving god.2 it may strike as baffling therefore that weil, who is likened to some of the greatest of the early fathers of the church,3 makes this confession in her spiritual biography: i may say that never at any moment in my life have i ‘sought for god.’ for this reason, which is probably too subjective, i do not like this expression and it strikes me as false. as soon as i reached adolescence, i saw the problem of god as a problem the data of prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 93-109 93 © 2000 by assumption university press 94 which could not be obtained here below, and i decided that the only way of being sure not to reach a wrong solution, which seemed to me the greatest possible evil, was to leave it alone. so i left it alone. i neither affirmed nor denied anything. it seemed to me useless to solve the problem, for i thought that, being in this world, our business was to adopt the best attitude with regard to the problems of this world, and that such an attitude did not depend upon the solution of the problem of god.4 to anyone who has a studied familiarity with weil, however, this paradox is immediately recognizable as a distinctive character of her work, thought, and to her very life. her penchant for integrating apparently contradictory elements constitutes her unique approach. as christopher frost and rebecca bell-metereau pointed out: … while the mainstream of western thought may be concerned with consistency, in considerable contrast simone weil, long before postmodernist and deconstructionist ideas became current, was concerned with recognizing the absence of consistency in life, the continual presence of reversals and contradictions, and the unavoidable existence of these even within ‘solutions’ to problems of the human condition.5 that is not to say of course that all we encounter in the works of weil are diverse and heterogeneous ideas. while, admittedly, weil expressed herself in short essays, in thoughts randomly jotted in notebooks, and in reflections recorded in personal journals, there is, nonetheless, a clearly identifiable coherence that unites her positions on a range of subjects close to her heart. the purpose of this paper is to draw from three of her writings the two main leitmotifs of what is undoubtedly one of her most defining viewpoints, namely, her sense of god. how central to her thinking this is may be inferred from her unwavering conviction that reality is only transcendent. weil therefore contends that a true reading of reality can only be done from the perspective of the divine. 94 prajñâ vihâra 95 in what may be considered another irony of her colorful life, weil did not come upon her sense of god by way of her family influence. it could not have been so, for, as a matter of fact, she was born into and grew up in an agnostic jewish family. weil herself professed no religion and did not practice any. neither did she discover this sense of god from her readings of mystical works for which she claimed she never felt an attraction. as she wrote: “i had never read any mystical works because i had never felt any call to read them.” [wfg, 69] indeed, as john hellman distinctly put it, “she did not hit upon christian scriptures and then make sense of the world through a prism formed by them.”6 we may perhaps trace the crystallization of such approach to her much beloved mentor, emile chartier better known by his pseudonym alain, who taught her that “only those who believe think” and that “attention is religious, or it is not attention.”7 weil herself would undergo certain very personal experiences that would confirm her sense of god and dissuade her from the indifference, which she nurtured in her youth, to the question of god. in a moment of conversion, she had to concede: “in my arguments about the insolubility of the problem of god i had never foreseen the possibility of that, of a real contact, person to person, here below, between a human being and god.” [wfg, ibid.] it was this sense of god that served as her inspiration and provided the meaningful link among the many aspects of her personality and her several involvements – “her ascetic intellectualism, her love for mathematics, her concern for the poor and oppressed, her innovatively focused politics, and her unusually empathetic sensitivity.”8 weil embraced this sense of god to the very end of her life and imbibed it more and more deeply. thus, in her “last thoughts,” written a year and three months before her death, she was able to write about her sense of god with absolute confidence and in an extremely personal way: i do not need any hope or any promise in order to believe that god is rich in mercy. i know this wealth of his with the certainty of experience; i have touched it. what i know of it through actual contact is so far beyond my capacity of understanding and gratitude that even the promise of future bliss could add nothing to it for me… [wfg, 88] ranilo b. hermida 95 96 decreation to bear a sense of god, for weil, is to go beyond a mere religious perception of reality. it is more than an intellectual stance but must spill instead onto the very conduct of life, onto a way of life that renounces the sense of self. and nowhere is this sense of god more pronounced than in her notion of decreation. through the creative act god, according to weil, relinquished his exclusive hold on being in order to allow something other than himself to exist: “there exists a ‘deifugal’ force. otherwise all will be god.”9 creation is an act of divine surrender of his omnipotence. weil therefore reckons it “not an act of self-expansion but of restraint and renunciation.” [wfg, 145] sylvie courtine-denamy has a beautiful way of explaining this view of weil regarding the creative act of god: so that the world might exist… god had to withdraw into himself, leaving an empty space (tehiru). creation is contradiction, self-limitation, abdication… hence the creation by no means involves, for god, an extension of his being, the production of something beyond himself; rather, by withdrawing, god enables a part of being to be “other than god.”10 creation, in other words, is truly and totally a gratuitous act on the part of god. man cannot possibly fathom the reason behind his act; he can only at best attribute to it the purest of motives. creation for weil is an epiphany of a divine-being-in-love; the whole universe being not a stage to showcase divine power as much as an arena for a loving god to limit himself. weil does not deny the omnipotence of god; she fully understands that only with such magnitude of power can god call being forth ex nihilo. she asserts, however, that the exertion of his power is only one face of god manifested in creation. the other face, which is even more compelling, is his desertion of power. and it is this second face that weil underlines in her sense of god. creation is god wielding and then forsaking his power. more than anything, therefore, creation is an act of 96 prajñâ vihâra 97 sacrifice on the part of god; not an occasion for his growth but an outgrowth of his love and desire to give himself to creatures. in his absolute perfection, god cannot grow further, he can only grow out of himself and even that cannot be for his good. miklos vetö states it this way: “it is not the power of god that spills over into creation, but his love, and this overflow is a veritable diminution.”11 weil herself writes: “creation is an act of love and it is perpetual. at each moment our existence is god’s love for us.” [gag, 28] the emphasis on the divine largesse, rather than on omnipotence, allows weil to set forth her doctrine of decreation. since creation involves a voluntary abdication done in love, a genuine sacrifice therefore on the part of god, man, in turn, propelled by a parallel love, can only replicate in a reverse way this abdication of god. this is the meaning of decreation. vetö calls it “the self-annihilating vocation of human beings.”12 decreation is the human participation in the creative action of god in the world; it is the complementary human response to god: “we participate in the creation of the world by decreating ourselves.” [gag, 29] through the act of decreation, man, accordingly, renounces his apparent existence, affirms his oneness with god and thereby enters into the fullness of being. so, just as god renounced his exclusive ontological right, man must also be willing to commit an act of self-renunciation. weil upholds this as the supreme religious act – “to make something created pass into the uncreated.” [gag, 28] the creative act, moreover, is not a calculated move on the part of god to gain profit for himself. there is no contrivance in creation because, as weil insists, god “renounces being everything.” [gag, 29] for this reason, decreation, which is a reciprocal answer to creation, cannot but be total. self-renunciation is to be done regardless of outcome; in other words, the willingness to empty the self must likewise be a willingness to be filled by remaining in a state of waiting. there is no quid pro quo transaction in creation and there can be none as well in decreation. weil restricts the idea of creation to autonomous beings. this has an important repercussion: from this position follows her view that only free beings are subject to the ontological requirement of decreation. things that are not endowed with freedom are already always in perfect ranilo b. hermida 97 98 unity with the creator by the presence in them and their complete obedience to necessity. it is really only the case of human beings in whom lies the possibility of breaking away from god. they can declare independence and install their ego, the self, at the center of this separate existence. the bond between god and creature is ruptured by this defiant act. the decreative imperative, by which men participate in the work of divinity and thus perfect creation, is frustrated. we find then at the inmost core of weil’s doctrine of decreation this supreme paradox: our existence is made up only of his waiting for our acceptance not to exist… we should renounce being something. that is our only good. [gag, 28-29] decreation is annihilation of existence within the self and consent to non-existence. it is the one act by which human beings can ironically affirm the authenticity of their autonomy; indeed, weil maintains that “there is absolutely no other free act which it is given us to accomplish – only the destruction of the ‘i.’” [gag, 23] the destruction of existence within oneself consists in selfeffacement, that is, the renunciation of the sense of self or “the power to think of everything in the first person.”13 this entails the extinction of the desire to be the center of reference whereby everything else is supposed to be contributory and subservient to the wishes and wants of the self; otherwise, this extremely vicious sense of the self shall terminate in the negation of the others. unless this “diabolical center in the human being”14 is demolished man will not be able to recover a clear perception of reality and embrace the existence of others. vetö amplifies this point: the recognition and acceptance of the right of others to exist in the same way as we ourselves exist must be preceded by knowledge of the fact that they are and of the fact of what they are. objective knowledge of an external reality is possible only insofar as one sets oneself aside, that is, insofar as one is reduced to nothingness. this means – at least in the case of pure 98 prajñâ vihâra 99 intelligence without relation to supernatural love – abandonment, the suspension of perspective.15 weil is definitely resigned, and fully, to this act of detachment from the self: god gave me being in order that i should give it back to him. it is like one of those traps whereby the characters are tested in fairy stories and tales of initiation. if i accept this gift it is bad and fatal; its virtue becomes apparent through my refusal of it. god allows me to exist outside himself. it is for me to refuse this authorization. [gag, 35] weil forthwith reminds us that this work of decreation cannot be a purely human endeavor. she writes: “we only possess what we renounce; what we do not renounce escapes us. in this sense, we cannot possess anything whatever unless it passes through god.” [gag, 29] and in another passage she continues: “everything without exception which is of value in me comes from somewhere other than myself, not as a gift but as a loan which must be constantly renewed.” [gag, 27] this signifies that in the decreated state man does not celebrate an accomplishment but rather encounters all the more plainly his finitude. the triumph over the sense of the self only exposes man to his nothingness, to the realization that one counts for nothing, as a human being and even more so as a creature. weil entreats us to openly embrace and interiorize deeply this truth, which is the very definition of our ontological status: once we have understood we are nothing, the object of our efforts is to become nothing. it is for this that we suffer with resignation, it is for this that we act, it is for this that we pray. [gag, 30] the repudiation of the sense of the self, moreover, readily opens up an awareness of others as they are and not merely as a function of the self. the self must be diminished in favor of the existence of others. this sense of the other now becomes the mark of a truly decreated person. the supreme expression of decreation, in other words, is the ranilo b. hermida 99 100 acknowledgment of coexistence after the example of god who through the creative act renounced himself in order to allow the existence of something else. through his own decreative act man gains a sense of god, indeed, he identifies himself with god. malheur no one can read weil with attention without being seized by this unusually forceful insight: it is human misery and not pleasure which contains the secret of the divine wisdom. all pleasure-seeking is the search for an artificial paradise, an intoxication, an enlargement. but it gives us nothing except the experience that it is vain. only the contemplation of our limitations and our misery puts us on a higher plane. [gag, 84] weil acknowledges the reality of misery or affliction, malheur, as an integral part of the human experience. she asserts, moreover, that it is more in this experience of affliction that the real truth about our existence is to be sought: “to be aware of this in the depth of one’s soul is to experience non-being. it is the state of extreme and total humiliation which is also the condition for passing over into truth.”16 no more manifestly than in affliction are we made aware of the fragility of our existence. susan taubes puts it this way: “the uprootedness, the nakedness, and the hopelessness of man today reveal him in his ultimate essence.”17 it is really in this encounter with affliction, weil says, that the self comes to a full awakening into the true nature of his existence: i may lose at any moment, through the play of circumstances over which i have no control, anything whatsoever that i possess, including those things which are so intimately mine that i consider them as being myself. there is nothing that i might not lose. it could happen at any moment that what i 100 prajñâ vihâra 101 am might be abolished and replaced by anything whatsoever of the filthiest and most contemptible sort. this is the stark truth about being human, to be nothing, and of being in the world, to be an exile from paradise. [gag, 72] it is important at this point to have a clear understanding of what weil means by affliction. she maintains that it is inseparably associated with, but quite different from, physical suffering. unlike corporal pain, which is temporary, affliction is permanent; it takes possession of the soul and leaves therein its permanent trace. it is “an uprooting of life, a more or less attenuated equivalent of death, made irresistibly present to the soul by the attack or immediate apprehension of physical pain.” [wfg, 118] she further qualifies that it is not real affliction unless the uprooting affects all aspects of life: physical and psychological as well as social. this last element, the social debasement, is the essential factor: “there is not really affliction unless there is social degradation or the fear of it in some form or another.” [wfg, 119] affliction tears the fabric of social relations so that the afflicted man no longer counts for anything. weil paints a grim picture below of the extensive damage that it inflicts: … affliction is essentially a destruction of personality, a lapse into anonymity… in affliction, that misfortune itself becomes a man’s whole existence and in every other respect he loses all significance in everybody’s eyes including his own. there is something in him that would like to exist, but it is continually pushed back into nothingness, like a drowning man whose head is pushed under the water. he may be a pauper, a refugee, a negro, an invalid, an ex-convict, or anything of the kind; in any case, whether he is an object of ill usage or of charity he will in either case be treated as a cipher, as one item among many others in the statistics of a certain type of affliction. so both good and bad treatment will have the same effect of compelling him to remain anonymous.18 ranilo b. hermida 101 102 as a result, the afflicted man bears the brunt of the contempt and disgust that others fling toward one who is a social outcast while, within himself, he feels scorn, disgust, self-hatred, and the sense of guilt and defilement, the severity of which is inversely proportional to his innocence. affliction thus “degrades whomever it touches and can evoke only the revulsion of those who behold it.”19 the effect of affliction upon a person is so devastating that anyone who is unprepared to bear it can be destroyed almost beyond any hope for redemption. even the person, who may be ready to suffer affliction, soon finds out that he is bereft of the inner wherewithal to overcome it. it perturbs weil therefore “that god should have given affliction the power to seize the very souls of the innocent and to take possession of them as their sovereign lord.” [wfg, 119-20] affliction is so absurd that weil shudders at how it makes god “appear to be absent for a time, more absent than a dead man, more absent than light in the utter darkness of a cell.” [wfg, 120] and even worse, as if the blows were not yet enough, it is at this lowest point that the most pernicious effect of affliction sets in, the final test of the self, the ultimate temptation to turn away from and to stop to love god. when this happens, the absence of god becomes final and the self drowns in unsalvageable perdition. weil regrets that this is usually the case; and, frankly, she admits: “often, one could weep tears of blood to think how many unfortunates are crushed by affliction without knowing how to make use of it.” [gtg, 102] and she mourns some more over the fate of its victims: … as for those who have been struck by one of those blows that leave a being struggling on the ground like a half-crushed worm, they have no words to express what is happening to them. among the people they meet, those who have never had contact with affliction in its true sense can have no idea of what it is, even though they may have suffered a great deal… and as for those who have themselves been mutilated by affliction, they are in no state to help anyone at all, and they are almost incapable of even wishing to do so. [wfg, 120] 102 prajñâ vihâra 103 and so the afflicted man asks and demands an answer, his voice as loud and plaintive as the cry that reverberated throughout the whole universe from the cross. weil spells out this question: this question is: why? why are things as they are? the afflicted man naïvely seeks an answer, from men, from things, from god, even if he disbelieves in him, from anything or everything. why is it necessary precisely that he should have nothing to eat, or be worn out with fatigue and brutal treatment, or be about to be executed, or be ill, or be in prison? if one explained to him the causes which have produced his present situation, and this is in any case seldom possible because of the complex interaction of circumstances, it will not seem to him to be an answer. for his question ‘why?’ does not mean ‘by what cause?’ but ‘for what purpose?’ [gtg, 100] there is no answer, alas, that is forthcoming, ever, because as weil explains it, “the world is necessity and not purpose;” [gtg, 101] hence, if we are looking for a reason then we should not seek it in this world. there is a reason, she assures us, but it resides outside our universe. eric springsted and diogenes allen describe this outward trajectory of our quest for purpose in these words: we are thus driven in our demand for finality to a reality that is not this cosmos of necessity. if everything added to harmony in this world, we would never look beyond this world for light. if everything added up in this world, the world’s lack of purpose for affliction would not function to lever us beyond the world. that is, to raise us to a supernatural level.20 it turns out therefore that affliction possesses a redemptive character. in a confounding paradox, the absence of god is also the mode of his presence which corresponds to affliction. when affliction is genuine, when it leads to the complete dissolution of the self, when the self disappears from the center, then god can fill the vacated space and assume his rightful place in the human soul. for as weil maintains: ranilo b. hermida 103 104 “god can love in us only this consent to withdraw in order to make way for him, just as he himself, our creator, withdrew in order that we might come into being.” [gag, 35] this brings us full circle around the enigma of affliction: the very experience of the absence of god is at the same time the locus for discovering his love in its fullest meaning. indeed, as weil concludes, “the contemplation of human misery wrenches us in the direction of god.” [gag, 70] affliction becomes a gateway of the soul to god. there lurks the constant danger, however, of affliction remaining a useless and no more than a degrading experience. this is the case when affliction is just a purely external destruction of the soul without its consent and cooperation. this consent is to be distinguished though from deliberate choice or an active seeking of affliction. weil warns against this because it is tantamount to tempting god: “it is wrong to desire affliction; it is against nature, and it is a perversion; and moreover it is the essence of affliction that it is suffered unwillingly.” [gtg, 88] to inflict violence upon the self is also not the affliction that is “the marvel of divine technique…(the) simple and ingenious device which introduces into the soul of a finite creature the immensity of force, blind, brutal, and cold.” [wfg, 135] to consent is to acquiesce to the fact that one is subject to the blind necessity that envelops the infinity of space and time and which in given circumstances can be concentrated upon the self and totally dissolve it. weil observes that there is nothing in the self that is not exposed to the possibility of affliction: our flesh is fragile; it can be pierced or torn or crushed, or one of its internal mechanisms can be permanently deranged, by any piece of matter in motion. our soul is vulnerable, being subject to fits of depression without cause and pitifully dependent upon all sorts of objects, inanimate and animate, which are themselves fragile and capricious. our social personality, upon which our sense of existence almost depends, is always and entirely exposed to every hazard. these three parts of us are linked with the very center of our being in such a way that it bleeds for any wound of the slightest consequence which they suffer. [gtg, 96] 104 prajñâ vihâra 105 it is only in our illusions we can imagine that some part of our being is exempt or must be spared from affliction. this being so, we must love affliction, which is the natural corollary of necessity in our only universe. we have to recognize affliction not as evil but rather as good, the good that attends to our ontological status. weil enjoins us to respond to our createdness with our love for it and she gives us her reason: it is our function in this world to consent to the existence of the universe. god is not satisfied with finding his creation good; he wants it also to find itself good. that is the purpose of the souls which are attached to minute fragments of this world; and it is the purpose of affliction to provide the occasion for judging that god’s creation is good. because, so long as the play of circumstances around us leaves our being almost intact, or only half impaired, we more or less believe that the world is created and controlled by ourselves. it is affliction that reveals, suddenly and to our very great surprise, that we are totally mistaken. [gtg, 97] to consent to affliction, therefore, is to consent to the will of god for affliction is inflicted by god. what brings it about is necessity or the complete obedience of matter. and man is also matter. weil underscores this point: “man can never escape from obedience to god. a creature cannot but obey.” [wfg, 129] this fact should not be disregarded or forgotten, otherwise, as weil cautions: “if i thought that god sent me suffering by an act of his will and for my good, i should think that i was something, and i should miss the chief use of suffering which is to teach me that i am nothing.” [gag, 101] affliction is his instrument to reveal to us the wretchedness of our natural attachments. weil therefore admonishes us to accept affliction in this welcoming attitude: “each time that we have some pain to go through, we can say to ourselves quite truly that it is the universe, the order, and beauty of the world and the obedience of creation to god that are entering our body.” [wfg, 131-132] then we can rightly appreciate it as in fact a gift and thereby learn “to bless with tenderest gratitude” the love that is its source. the imperative for man is to resist, and never to yield, to the temptation to cease to love and, instead, to hold on but “to go on loving in the emptiness, or at least to go on wanting to love, though it may only be with an infinitesimal part of the self.” [wfg, 121] this is the decreative ranilo b. hermida 105 106 demand and beatitude that accompany the experience of affliction. weil expounds this as follows: he whose soul remains ever toward god though the nail pierces it finds himself nailed to the very center of the universe. it is the true center; it is not in the middle; it is beyond space and time; it is god... in this marvelous dimension, the soul, without leaving the place and the instant where the body to which it is united is situated, can cross the totality of space and time and come into the very essence of god. [wfg, 135-136] this crossing of the infinite gulf that separates man from god can only be the work of god. god comes down to draw man to himself. the love that propels man back to god is divine love. it is “the love of god for god” that passes through the soul of man for “god alone is capable of loving god.” [wfg, 133] what man can and must do is to “diminish those things in us that impede the flow of the divine stream.”21 epilogue much had been made of the fact that weil refused baptism, the only obstacle that stood in the way of her official admission to the church. she surely had her reasons for remaining an outsider all her life, not the least of which is christianity itself, which she scored for being catholic only “by right but not in fact.” [wfg, 10] be that as it may, her candid admission of where her religious proclivities lay is noticeably clear. she wrote: … i never hesitated in my choice of attitude; i always adopted the christian attitude as the only possible one. i might say that i was born, i grew up, and i always remained within the christian inspiration. while the very name of god had no part in my thoughts, with regard to the problems of this world and this life i shared the christian conception in an explicit and rigorous manner, with the most specific notions it involves. [wfg, 6263] 106 prajñâ vihâra 107 most philosophers of religion commonly agree that to be religious is not so much a matter of assenting to a series of doctrines as cleaving to a form of life. if that were so, then it can be argued that weil is one of the most religious personages who ever walked the face of this earth. to be religious, for weil, means to have a sense of god, which she understood to be more than just a hermeneutics of human existence from a metaphysics of transcendence or the perspective of the divine. to be religious it to verily incarnate uninhibited obedience to god who is not so much the omnipotent source of all being or the infinite reality who transcends all conceivable boundaries, but the god who is absent, who emptied himself into the world and transformed his substance in the blind necessity of that world, who died in the inconsolable pits of affliction.22 this is what she conveyed in her doctrine of decreation and her reconstruction of malheur, both of which translate to a full scale struggle on our part for nothing is more difficult in our existence than to stare at our mortality and accept our fundamental misfortune which is that we are nothing because we are not god. nothing indeed is more difficult than to have a sense of god, that is, to follow unhesitatingly the god who asks us to love him with an exclusivity that entails renouncing all attachments to life, the god whose example invites that “even if we could be like god it would be better to be mud which obeys god.” [gag, 35] ranilo b. hermida 107 108 endnotes 1miklos vetö, the religious metaphysics of simone weil, trans. joan dargan (new york: state university of new york press, 1994), 4. 2diogenes allen. three outsiders: pascal, kierkegaard, simone weil (cambridge: cowley publications, 1983), 99. 3george a. panichas, ed., the simone weil reader (new york: david mckay, 1977), xviii. 4simone weil, waiting for god, trans. emma craufurd (new york: capricorn books, 1951), 62. [henceforth all references to this work will be abbreviated wfg and added at the end of the text.] 5christopher frost and rebecca bell-metereau, simone weil on politics, religion and society. london: sage publications, 1998. 6john hellman, simone weil: an introduction to her thought (ontario: wilfrid laurier university press, 1982), 83. 7sylvie courtine-denamy, three women in dark times: edith stein, hannah arendt, simone weil, trans. g. m. goshgarian (london: cornell university press, 2000), 34. 8hellman, ibid. 9simone weil, gravity and grace, trans. emma craufurd (london: routledge and kegan paul, 1952), 28. [henceforth all references to this work will be abbreviated gag and added at the end of the text.] 10courtine-denamy, 213. 11vetö, 12. 12ibid., 11. 13courtine-denamy. 214. 14vetö, 21 15ibid., 30. 16panichas, 332. 17susan a. taubes, “the absent god,” the journal of religion, 35, 1 (january 1955), 7. 18simone weil, gateway to god, ed. david raper et al. (glasgow: fontana books, 1974), 94. [henceforth all references to this work will be abbreviated gtg and added at the end of the text. 19taubes, 8. 20eric springsted and diogenes allen, spirit, nature and community: issues in the thought of simone weil (new york: state university of new york press, 1994), 102-103. 21john m. dunaway, simone weil (new york: twayne publishers, 1984), 40. 22taubes, 13. 108 prajñâ vihâra 109 bibliography primary sources weil, simone. gateway to god. edited by david raper et al. glasgow: fontana books, 1974. ________. gravity and grace. translated by emma craufurd. london: routledge and kegan paul, 1952. ________. waiting for god. translated by emma craufurd. new york: capricorn books, 1959. secondary sources allen, diogenes. three outsiders: pascal, kierkegaard, simone weil. cambridge: cowley publications, 1983. ________. “simone weil on suffering and ‘reading.’ communio, x (fall 1984): 297-304. coles, robert. simone weil: a modern pilgrimage. massachusetts: addison-wesley publishing company, inc., 1987. courtine-denamy, sylvie. three women in dark times: edith stein, hannah arendt, simone weil. translated by g. m. goshgarian. london: cornell university press, 2000. dunaway, john m. simone weil. new york: twayne publishers, 1984. frost, christopher and rebecca bell-metereau. simone weil on politics, religion and society. london: sage publications, 1998. hellman, john. simone weil: an introduction to her thought. ontario: wilfrid laurier university press, 1982. panichas, george a., ed. the simone weil reader. new york: david mckay company, inc., 1977. paulsell, william o. tough minds, tender hearts: six prophets of social justice. new jersey: paulist press, 1990. rees, richard. simone weil: a sketch for a portrait. carbondale: southern illinois university press, 1966. springsted, eric and diogenes allen. spirit, nature and community: issues in the thought of simone weil. new york: state university of new york press, 1994. taubes, susan a. “the absent god.” the journal of religion, 35, 1 (january 1955): 6-16. vetö, miklos. the religious metaphysics of simone weil. translated by joan dargan. new york: state university of new york press, 1994. winch, peter. simone weil: “the just balance.” cambridge: cambridge university press, 1989. wolfteich, claire. “attention or destruction: simone weil and the paradox of the eucharist.” the journal of religion, 81, 3 (july 2001): 359-376. ranilo b. hermida 109 122-dialogue on differing asian dialogue beyond diversity: a buberian postscript reynaldo a. reyes university of santo tomas, philippines is global dialogue possible? is global dialogue or dialogue among diverse civilizations possible? if so, how? if dialogue is premised on common points as starting points, what are those starting points? how can they have common starting points when precisely their diverse cultures clearly spelled out as religions, philosophical and political systems as ideologies__would not allow them? on the other hand, dialogue among civilizations is necessary. it is an urgency, if not settled on the table of peace, shall result in a global wasteland of unrest and doom. to date, millions of children die of hunger and thirst, women desecrated and abused, basic human rights are moral claims alone of the few. there is a global necessity for dialogue; but is it possible?1 how? this paper suggests that global dialogue; dialogue among diverse civilizations is a mode of interhuman relations__hence genuine dialogue is possible amidst diversity and adversity. but which philosophy can make this possible? many philosophers have talked dialogue; but it was martin buber who, in my mind and the minds of others, has this tremendous influence on the philosophical consideration of dialogue as an interhuman relation. hence, this paper opted to offer buber’s concept on dialogue. how can an interhuman dialogue be possible? what is it in the first place? the term ‘dialogue’ can be taken as a noun and as a verb. as a noun, ‘dialogue’ can be taken in four senses: it may refer to 1) the words spoken by characters in a book, a film or a play or a section of a work that contains spoken words2; or 2) a formal discussion or negotiation prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 97-121 97 © 2000 by assumption university press especially between opposing sides in a political or international context; or 3) a talk of any kind between two or more people (formal); and 4) a work of literature in the form of a conversation.3 as a verb, dialogue means, “to take part in a conversation, discussion or negotiation.” prof. ioan voicu, in his lecture4, takes dialogue in its second sense, to mean a formal discussion or negotiation between opposite sides in a political or international context__particularly among diverse civilizations. but then dialogue in the second sense, implies dialogue in the third sense to mean “a talk of any kind between two or more people.” now we call dialogue in the third sense as interhuman relation__a man to man. and i argue that the second sense of dialogue is reducible to the third sense as interhuman. therefore, the possibility of genuine dialogue among civilizations is reducible at least philosophically to the possibility of interhuman relations a special mode of dialogue. so it is in this sense, that i understand the philosophical foundation of permanent dialogue among civilizations__as an interhuman dialogue. it is in this sense i speak of martin buber’s dialogue. martin buber on dialogue dialogue in its various modes simply resolves into its simplest form. it is the form that must pass through the myopic and hyperopic lens of a thinking being called a philosopher. however, it is not the platonic form so detached from the physical reality but it is the form so close to the marrow of human existence and existent; it is the form that passed through the lens of an existentialist philosopher, called mordecai martin buber. mind you, i am not an existentialist whose innocent slogan: “existence precedes essence” which grounds its metaphysical root to subjectivity like buber. rather my existential metaphysical root is grounded both on the firm ground of empiricism’s tenet on the infallibility of the senses and the intelligible certainty of rationalism. my existentialism is the midway between rationalism and empiricism, which refuses to affirm what rationalism and empiricism deny; but agree with what they affirm. empiricism is correct affirming the validity and infallibility of the senses; but wrong denying any valid knowledge beyond the senses. rationalism is correct by affirming the objectivity of our ideas, but wrong denying the reliability of the senses. 98 prajñâ vihâra my existentialism is in between, i affirm what they both affirm, but deny what they deny. however, buber’s existentialism affirms what rationalism denies but then denies what rationalism affirms: for existentialism truth is not objectivity, it is human subjectivity. i shall not discuss in detail martin buber’s life. it suffices to say that buber was an austrian jew, a zionist. he knew his literature, history of art, philosophy and even economics well. he knew ernst mach, wilhelm wundt and carl stumpf. he was well versed in nietzsche, kant, and kierkegaard. martin buber was an editor, an activist against terrorism and arms race and nuclear weapons, a mediator between the arabs and his fellow jews__rolled in one. however, his contribution to philosophy and the world is his philosophy on dialogue; but still for some, it is his being rather than his teaching, which is the dialogue itself. murphy summarizes his influence: martin buber was the foremost jewish thinker of our time and one of the world’s most influential philosophers. he was a theological bridge-builder long before ecumenism achieved its present popularity. he served as a kind of patron saint for such towering christian intellectuals as paul tillich, reinhold niebuhr, jacques maritain and gabriel marcel.5 what caused such tremendous influence on such great thinkers? the reason is buber lived his philosophy__that of dialogue. i know of no one with life as rich with intellectual adventures or so strongly responded to their challenges as martin buber. his greatest contribution was himself, his very being. there was magic in his personality, richness in his soul. his sheer presence was joy.6 i resist the temptation to discuss so many things about buber such as the influence of nietzsche, kant, kierkegaard and heidegger on him and in turn buber’s influence on the rest. let me instead talk about his concept of dialogue as a possibility for a global mode of dialogue. hence, this lecture merely intends to introduce a philosopher whose passion is reynaldo a. reyes 99 dialogue__and if he were alive today would speak at international conferences like dialogue among civilizations. the character of buberian thought it is dialogic: man is a being in relation; because “all real living is meeting.” if for aristotle and others, man is a rational animal, for buber man is a ‘subject in relation.’ buber is a qualified monist not dualist in his view of man. he sees not the dichotomy of rationality and animality. man is man__the whole package as an individual person. as an individual person, each man is unique. man is not rational alone nor body alone but a totality of both__a subject with potentialities waiting to be actualized. but, then at the same time, man is aware of other unique subjects. i am a subject, he is a subject__we are both unique__hence we are beings in relation. hence, man aware of the existence of other subjects immediately perceives that human existence is between man and man. this is called intersubjectivity__the “in between.”7 to be aware of a man is to perceive his wholeness as a person determined by the spirit; it means to perceive the dynamic center which stamps his every utterance, action and attitude with the recognizable sign of uniqueness.8 man, the moment he was born enters into relation with the world9; and he expressed with primary words his primary attitudes as a subject. these primary words are combined words, not to be taken separately. if separately taken they become meaningless. unlike most words, these primary combined words do not signify a thing or object__but only relations. they are: the i-it the i-thou 100 prajñâ vihâra subject-object relation characterizes the i-it relation. man as the subject relates with things including other men as objects of his experience as individuals to love and control. buber calls this ‘objectification.’ it is an attitude of one extreme, in this case, the subject who takes possession of the object and controls it__in this case the world. to man, this world reveals itself to him as an object of his knowledge and desire; and sometimes his fancy. “it is his object and will remain to be as long as he wishes it to be. he can take it and it lets itself be taken, but then it does not give itself to him. he can hold on to it for life and will sustain him, but then he cannot meet others in it.”10 in the realm of knowledge, the “i-it” is called science; and “it includes mundane acts such as mass consumption, industrial production, and societal organization. the world of technical mechanization and scientific objectification and control results from the i-it way of apprehending reality.”11 the ‘i-it’ is good in itself. in fact without an ‘it’ man cannot live.12 science would not be possible without it. objectivity is necessary. the world would be miserable if sciences are not objective. problems crop out only in its abuse; when objectivity misses the individual human existence. when e = mc2 a scientific theory is translated into a reality a bomb that exploded killing millions of people, when people for the sake of exactitude is known not through their names but through their control numbers or id nos. “i am mr. 12345” my cell no. is 678910", when we look at another as a mathematical figure, statistics, as a doctor, as a lawyer, as anything__when respect is commanded by what degrees we achieved__ not the face behind such degree, then it is an “i-it” relation. worst of it all, when a mother looks at her child as an object, a burden, and another mouth to feed, then the mother child relation is reduced to an i-it relation. it is the worst form of i-it__because it is between a mother and her childthe noblest human relation known to man.13 on the other hand, ‘subject-subject’ relation characterizes i-thou relation; because it has no “thing” as its object,14 but only a subject. existentialists call this inter-subjectivity: ‘when the other comes to meet me and i, him.’ here the subject is not an individual but a ‘thou’__a person. an ‘it’ is that which we meet in time and space at the mercy of causality.15 it is something we think, we will and feel. the i-thou has no object to begin with but another subject, a thou to whom the “i” stands in reynaldo a. reyes 101 relation. this is the relation that happens in time, situated in space and determined by causality. but, this ‘stepping into i-thou relation’ is not grounded on space and time as i-it__but transcends it.16 in the i-it relation, the “i” enters not with his whole being; he reserves some to himself just like the i-it mother mentioned above. on the other hand, the i-thou relation transcends time-space-causality but muses on merely being human. it is this relation where a man meets another; in this meeting there is no anticipation, no lust, no right and wrong, no philosophical systems__but only a mutual sharing of selves. and this juxtaposition of persons is called dialogue, the “in between”. it is an “in between” because it is there where minds, wills, and everything human__meet. it is neither i alone, nor thou alone. it is i-thou. it is only in this relation that a man realizes his authentic human existence. it is here where each man unmasks himself off layers upon layers of diversity, prejudices that cover us from the other. it is a sort of excavation. once fully excavated__it is here that one can speak of the face__a true human meeting. “only man with man provides a full image” (bmm). hence, man, as being in relation, is fully realized in dialogue. it is only in dialogue man becomes himself and transcends himself. “it is in virtue of its dialogical character that human life touches upon absoluteness and acquires an absolute meaning that overpasses its own conditioned nature.”17 hence this dialogic relation is the matrix of man’s finite infinity. if man cannot live without the ‘it’, then the man who lives with ‘it’ alone is not a man.18 it is only in dialogue that man can reaffirm his uniqueness and completeness. it is in genuine dialogue when while ‘meeting others, one holds on to one’s ground. “between you and ‘it’ there is mutual giving: you say thou to it and give yourself to it, it says thou to you and gives itself to you. you cannot make yourself understood with others concerning it, you are alone with it. but it teaches you to meet others and to hold your ground when you meet them. through the graciousness of its coming and the solemn sadness of its going it leads you away to the thou in which the parallel lines of relations meet. it does not help to sustain you in life, it only helps you glimpse eternity.”19 102 prajñâ vihâra hence, buberian dialogue is a protest against dehumanization, depersonalization and objectification of man. buberian dialogue is an affirmation of ‘we’ community for buber, the i-thou relation, which is an interhuman relation necessarily implies another interhuman relation, this time its social dimension: the “we” relation. the “we” is merely the plurality of i-thou. but human community a “we” community is possible only and only if, there is an ithou relation when “…men are capable of truly saying thou to one another can truly say ‘we’ with one another.” 20 “what corresponds to the essential thou on the level of self-being, in relation to a host of men, i call the essential we…a community of several independent persons, who have reached a self and self responsibility, the community resting on the basis of this self and self responsibility, and being made possible by them.”21 the “we” relation may be temporary, maybe borne out of urgency, maybe represented by diversity in culture__but then just like the i-thou relation it must be sincere, trusting, must reflect genuine communion wherein participants take off their cultural masks which tend to isolate and estrange them from the rest__to reveal that same face of the other. in the “we” community, the global community__authentic dialogue happens. nations settle global concerns: respect for human rights, balance of powers, protection of nature__for the good of all. since man is dialogic wherein he realizes his authentic human existence, then i-thou relation and in fact, human existence is repugnant to individualism and totalitarianism. individualism is too narrow to open self to the other; hence no dialogue is possible for an individual who lives in isolation. when one is full of oneself, it overflows with oneself and it drowns the other. it is merely an ‘i-i’ relation. totalitarianism on the other hand, is too broad that the individual becomes an anonymous face in the sea of masked faces. the sea of ‘masked faces’ is the faceless “we.” in either case, individualism and totalitarianism are an ‘i-it’ relation. the “i” looks at the ‘other man’ as object to control, with whom the ‘i’ converses reynaldo a. reyes 103 with insincerity, without care, without mutuality and intensity, in other words without dialogue. on the other hand, in buberian dialogue, the individual face is affirmed and confirmed together with the other face. it is religious: but, this i-thou relation is not limited to man and man. it is not merely dialogic__it is also triadic. for buber, dialogue is possible between ‘man and man’__because of the dialogue between ‘man and god.’ hence, atheists for that matter cannot have an authentic human existence in the mind of buber. indeed, an atheist can converse with another man; he can even sympathize with another__but this is not dialogue. there is no meeting, no “in between” possible without an authentic relation with god as the ground of any genuine dialogue. hence, the “dialogic man” for buber is the “religious man”. this is understandable because buber is a religious existentialist who believes that god the eternal thou is the source of the i and thou__of the dialogue itself. hence man is essentially oriented to god as the eternal thou. is dialogue with god possible for buber? dialogue with god is possible because god initiated the dialogue with man, firstly, through creation; then, secondly through revelation. in creating man and things around him, god set the dialogue. he initiated it. creation itself is a constant dialogue with man. when a scientist discovers a law of nature and expresses it in fine, clear and almost exact formula__then the scientist merely translates into human terms the divine words through his creation. god speaks through creation and scientists merely serve as interpreters translating into human terms the beauty of creation. when god said: “it was good”__from that time man has to see for himself why god said it. buber said:” god made no tool for himself, he needs none, he created for himself a partner in the dialogue of time…in this dialogue, god speaks to every man through the life which he gives him again and again. therefore man can only answer god 104 prajñâ vihâra with the whole of his life…the way in which he lives this given life.”22 in revelation, god speaks clearly his mind and heart__what he wants. for buber the biblical history of israel is a living dialogue between god and man. god has been “talkative” as if it were in the scriptures. he initiated the first divine dialogue in the garden of eden wherein god conversed with adam about the forbidden fruit. god’s last dialogue with adam was his promise. then god’s calling of abraham and his divine promise again. later, god almost in detail even designed the ark of the covenant__betraying that feminine quality of his. but then this dialogic relation to god is not that of dogmatic formula, which buber disdains. it is more of trust, not the mindless recitation of religious formula__but it is more of total commitment of one’s being and one’s life to the eternal thou. it is similar to that commandment: love god with all your mind and heart” but this time it is more on trusting god completely; because dialogue is premised on trust. and god proved through creation that he could be trusted since human life entirely depends on him for its being and subsistence. for buber, god needs man; and god attains only his authentic divine personhood when he meets man in that dialogue. scandalized? why create man if god does not need man? of course this ‘divine need’ is not a need for what one lacks in one’s being (god is all perfect) but it is more of a “need” to share what one has. a teacher “needs” his students (not necessarily for the honorarium) not only because a teacher is not said to be a ‘teacher’ without a pupil or disciple__but mainly because the teacher needs to share what he knows__the truth that fascinates him, the good that delights him and the error and evil that disappoint him. in other words, dialogue in a way is based on needs. in turn, meeting god, man receives divinity. through this dialogue god’s presence fills up the meaningless of human existence. here, the buberian ‘being’ is better than the ‘heideggerian being’; because, the latter with its ‘deontotheologic’23 character fails to reach the redeeming grace of the genuine dialogue. through this redeeming dialogue, man opens reynaldo a. reyes 105 his mind and heart to another man__a stranger now assumes a familiar face; an enemy becomes a brother, a sinner is entrusted to his care as a greater responsibility__as a person who is in need more of love. genuine responsibility i.e. the ability to dialogue is to respond to what happens to another. it is existential: but what is the philosophical grounding of buber’s i-thou? answer: human existence. actual human existence; precisely that individual human existence who thinks, wills and feels at this moment__not that abstract and cold human existence of the rationalists. for buber, man is a concrete and unrepeatable subject. the unique man is not an object to be manipulated__man is a thou not an it. since man is a thou, then he is a person who deserves respect. the abstract man is non-existent, cannot have a living dialogue with another abstract man. god though not sensible is not abstract. he is concrete. it is absurd how can a not so concrete god create a real concrete world? god must be supremely concrete, but this does not mean that god has to be a body to be concrete. our mind or intellect is concrete yet it is not a body. shall we speak about our soul? our will? our thoughts? they are so real that to deny them is to affirm them in fact. it is in this way that we understand that human concreteness is different from divine concreteness. yet there is something common between them when they dialogue, it begins in time, space and causality. the meeting must be in time, space and causality but the completion of the meeting, the genuine dialogue happens beyond such limitations__one becomes responsible for the other. “responsibility is readiness to respond in the dialogue with god which takes place in the lived moment of existence.” this dialogue with god need not be in any institution with sets of norms and dogmas to follow. this dialogue with god, for buber, need not be in a religion; it may be so__but not necessarily. what is essential is that meaningful dialogue with a deity (god) or someone in place of any deity (as in the case of buddhism); because only with this rare ‘dialogue’ with a divinity, that an interhuman relation becomes possible. 106 prajñâ vihâra the buberian ‘truth’ is ‘dialogue’; hence ‘truth’ is ‘situational’ contrary to scholastic definition of truth, ‘truth’ for buber__is not the ‘conformity between the intellect and the thing’; but rather it is the ‘confirmation of one’s responsibility to the other’. there is truth when there is genuine responsibility__wherein one is able to answer, a readiness to respond to the other who is willing to dialogue with self. truth is not a statement whose subject and predicate must conform; but truth for buber is the responsible conformity between the two subjects, the participants in a dialogue. this is situational. the characteristics of buberian dialogue: based on the above, how do we characterize buberian dialogue? dialogue is an interhuman relation. it is a special kind of relation because it is between two human subjects. interhuman relation is different from merely social relations wherein man finds himself in a group just like this group in this colloquium. as philosophers or teachers we sit together__ one feels a sort of belonging__if not boredom. we may smile at one another when the lecture seems faulty or we may all feel the same grumbling stomach after some more hours. sympathy or similarity of situations does not entail necessarily an interhuman or inter-subjective relation. at most it is merely social or merely instinctive. the interhuman relation goes beyond all these__it is a personal confrontation. “there is genuine dialogue__no matter whether spoken or silent where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between him and them.”24 dialogue is not monologue. monologue monopolizes the meeting. it is a disguised dialogue. the “i” talks to the other as an “it” who can listen but cannot confront or at least __we prevent to confront us. reynaldo a. reyes 107 monologue is actually turning away from the other. dialogue, on the other hand, “…whether spoken or silent __where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between him and them.”25 dialogue is turning towards the other, not only physically but our being: “ if you look at someone and addressed him, you turn to him, of course with the body but also in the requisite of the soul, in that you direct your attention to him.”26 dialogue is ‘being’, not ‘seeming.’ being and seeming refer to the attitude of the participants to enter into a dialogue: “seeming”. one seems to dialogue but does not really. this is “seeming” dialogue. here the participant is not ready to have a genuine dialogue__he merely wants to make an impression on another whom he considers as an it__to possess, control or manipulate. doing so, the participant skillfully projects a masked image of self and deceives the other. this is clearly a threat to genuine dialogue because it destroys an honest relation; here the “i” refuses to enter a dialogue with another and cannot address the other as “thou” but as an “it.” “to yield to seeming is man’s essential cowardice, to resist it is his essential courage.”27 the “seeming” man fails to achieve an authentic human existence. here there is no genuine dialogue, but only a seeming one. “being”. one courageously unmasks self to enter into a genuine dialogue. here, no pretenses, only spontaneity without rudeness or ill manner. the man of “dialogue” is honest with his intentions; he is not present to impress or deceive anyone__he is too mature to wear any mask to hide his true face. he may have his own agenda but he sincerely lays down those on the table of dialogue__and looks to the other for approval or otherwise and says: “this is what i have in my mind, what do you think?” the man of “being” is ready for a genuine dialogue and usually does it well. 108 prajñâ vihâra dialogue is confirmation, awareness and personal presence of the ‘thou.’ dialogue is awareness.28 the man of “being” does not only present himself as he is to the other as unique individual but he likewise is aware of the uniqueness of the other. it is not to look at the other as an object of contemplation and observation, __but as a person who “steps out to meet and confront me, whom i can attempt to make present to myself just in this way and not otherwise his wholeness, unity and uniqueness and with his dynamic center.29 this is awareness. the other may oppose me, but we both accept each other as partners with whom we struggle. we oppose each other’s predicament but we affirm each other as persons. i am aware of the other as the thou. dialogue is personal presence. the awareness of the other__ brings in something more__the other becomes personally present to the “i”. this personal presence is to “imagine” concretely what the other person thinks, wills, desires, feels and even perceives. this would not be possible if one wears a mask and hides himself to the other. personal presence is “being” presence not “seeming presence. buber says:” i prefer the name ‘imagining the real’ for in its essential being this gift is not looking at the other, but a bold swinging__demanding the most intensive stirring of one’s being__into the life of the other.”30 personal presence is possible only when one maintains one’s ground and yet meeting the other’s own ground__intensely. dialogue is confirmation. hence there must be an acceptance, a confirmation of the “other” as bearer of his own ideas, ideology and convictions. those convictions maybe opposed to the other but it is the sincerity of the other that makes him a partner the person that he is. buber says: …each should regard his partner as the very one he is. i become aware of him, aware that he is different from myself, in the definite, unique way which is peculiar to him, and i accept whom i thus see, so that in full earnestness, i can reynaldo a. reyes 109 direct what i say to him as the person he is.”31 this is confirmation an essential requirement for a genuine dialogue__as human meeting. confirmation done, the other the man of “being” becomes a partner. buber says:” but if i thus give to the other who confronts me his legitimate standing as a man with whom i am ready to enter into dialogue, then i must trust him and suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his partner.”32 dialogue is not an imposition but an unfolding: genuine dialogue is opposed to imposition. imposition for buber means the “i” forces himself to the other__his ideas, his desires. the intention is not to dialogue but to dictate__wherein one lays down his cards on the table and the other must take them. but rather, genuine dialogue happens with the unfolding wherein the “i” helps the other unmask and unwrap his potentialities.33 each person is in the process of becoming; and this is the beauty of dialogue. each person becomes better through dialogue__as buber says: “by existential communication between someone that is actual being and someone that is in the process of becoming… “ this unfolding cannot be by imposing because it destroys the uniqueness of the other. “for the proper existence of the interhuman it is necessary that the semblance not intervene to spoil the relation of personal being to personal being. it is further necessary,that each one means and makes present the other in his personal being. that neither should wish to impose himself on the other.”34 dialogue is not a speech. sometimes dialogue uses speech; but not always because dialogue is more than a speech. it is more than a speech because a speech may conceal our thoughts.35 one can have a dialogue without words. one is speechless because there are no words available for the moment, what we feel and think. in a dialogue no sound is necessary, not even a gesture. “human dialogue, therefore, although it has its distinctive life in sign, that is in sound and gestures, can exist without the sign, but 110 prajñâ vihâra admittedly not in an objectively comprehensible form. …but, in its highest moments, dialogue reaches out beyond these boundaries. it is completed outside contents, even the most personal which are or can be communicated.”36 and for buber, the life of dialogue may dispense with speech and communication, but it has as its minimum constitution one thing, ‘mutuality of inner action’.37 one may talk too much, but not necessarily in dialogue; and yet one may speak less yet is in dialogue. in fact, a dialogue can be a silent prayer, a picture and a whistle.38 dialogue is not monologue. monologue is disguised dialogue as said above. monologue is ‘speechifying’__when one merely speaks and does not listen. but rather dialogue happens when the participants unmasked themselves into “being” not “seeming”__when both are “aware” of the uniqueness of each other__but nonetheless both are “personally present” to each other and finally “confirm” each other as a partner. dialogue is not love. it is true, love may motivate the dialogue and accompany it in its completion__but it is not love. however, love without dialogue is self love__opposed to dialogue. dialogue is connatural to man. man enters into dialogue the time he was born. yet the sound he uttered was not an intelligible sound that everyone can spell out and follow grammatical syntax. it was a simple cry. everyone present especially the mother was happy hearing the baby cry. everyone present understood what the baby meant…without words, but only a cry. the first dialogue the baby had was a simple cry…not in thai, not in filipino, not in english__cry has no nationality__it is a universal language. we all understand the cry of millions of children all over the world_some more minutes or hours before they die of hunger. silence is essential to dialogue. dialogue is ‘the response of one’s whole being to the otherness of the other; that otherness is comprehended only when one opens himself to the other in the present and responds to his need even though he is not aware that he is addressing the other.’ this is clear to the noblest form of inter-human relation: a mother and her child. is there anything more awesomely intimate than the dialogue between the mother and her child? yet their words are merely utterances. reynaldo a. reyes 111 those are utterances of trust, which beget a sense of security. it is the babe, in fact, who gives security to the mother_not so much the reverse. it is more of the security that one is needed; not so much the one who apparently is in need for a moment. the cry of the newborn babe gives its mother security. but, is there anything more intelligible, anything more tragic than the silent cry of an aborted baby? now, it is not hard to realize that nowadays, the cry of the newborn babe is more of a cry of gratitude for having been spared of the abortive forceps. many times the most difficult question is answered by silence. more often than not, silence is the answer itself. in fact, the gap between words, we call ‘pause’ is the ‘magical force’ behind thoughts. in writing, the ‘em’ dash “__” gives force to the sentence we want emphasized. most intimate moments happen in silence, in whispers. there is eloquence in silence. it is not so much on what you say and hear but more on what is left unspoken to celebrate union of being at that magic moment. dialogue is union of “being”__ not unity of sentences following a grammatical rule; dialogue is union of “beings” an ‘i-thou’, which follows the rules of being human. why all these? it is because dialogue is “turning towards one another”. participants in a dialogue may have opposite views. but in a dialogue, despite diverse views, participants turn to one another to share the uniqueness of their grounds. it is this turning towards one another what buber speaks of the “in between” as the narrow ridge. dialogue is an agent of change: when one thinks and speaks what he thinks, something happens__he actualized himself. it was not merely the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the act of speaking; but it is more of giving birth to thoughts. in dialogue, ideas are born. ideas are conceived first painstakingly, and then they are born. this way, we understand why thinkers are called ‘fathers’ of sciences. to give birth to humans is motherhood; but to give birth to ideas is fatherhood. but, among these two modes of generations, ‘intellectual fatherhood’ is more difficult and painful. if a woman labors for several months to give birth, a thinker labors in years, and years__then probably would even give birth to a monstrous idea. now, in dialogue, when one 112 prajñâ vihâra listens to a person’s ideas, intently and sincerely__there is another change that happens__the “being” of the other, dwells in another man’s mind and grows there; then hopefully sinks into his heart__to finally give birth to another idea. in dialogue the “unfolding” comes to be. it is in this way that philosophers, and thinkers in general are said to be movers of history__through dialogue, ideas pass from one generation to the other moving people along the way. children are always reminded, “never to talk to strangers.” that is a prudent advice to children. but the trouble with that advice is that the child carries that advice till he is old enough to be a parent himself. we never talk to strangers. what’s wrong with strangers? our friends were once ‘strangers’. maybe we should rather qualify it saying: “we should not talk to strange looking people” or never talk to people who estrange themselves.” in a genuine dialogue, something wonderful happens. we thought we knew our friend. until one day, you had this magic moment we call dialogue__wherein amidst silence impoverished with words, your outlook about your friend changed. dialogue indeed is the “oxygen of change.”39 teachers are said to be agents of change__because they are agents of dialogue. educators, worthy of their salt, are educators of character. we, teachers, are simply unaware of the influence we have on our students. we do not realize when our influence begins and where it ends. surely, when teaching becomes a dialogue__when we look at our students’ faces intently in a dialogue, that’s the time, teaching begins; and we teachers have no idea when and where it ends. many times, when boredom creeps in after years of teaching_and i want to treat teaching lightly, i use to go to a pond. there i throw some pebbles on the still pond. once the pebble disturbs the quiet water, i watch the ripples. layer after layer, the ripples form__until they are not visible. afterwards, i enter the classroom with renewed strength. that’s our life as teachers. we cast ideas to the still minds of our students to create ripples__but ripples are created only when their minds, like ours, are still and thus ready for a dialogue. reynaldo a. reyes 113 conclusion: are the above concepts and characteristics of buberian dialogue, applicable to global dialogue? can those principles answer the two questions posed at the beginning? or are these theories, just like any philosophical posture, unrealistic? the first question: ‘is global dialogue, among diverse civilizations possible?’ this question is theoretical. the second question: is it a matter of fact that there ‘were’ and ‘are’ genuine dialogues among civilizations? this question is a question of fact. the answer to the first question: yes. it is possible, because inter-human dialogue is possible; and in fact, it is possible because it is essential to man as man. but, global dialogue among civilizations is a mode of interhuman dialogue. dialogue among civilizations is an intercultural dialogue, a global one. yet, global it may be, intercultural it may be__in its very core it is interhuman__a ‘man and man’ dialogue an ‘i and thou’ dialogue. ergo, global dialogue among civilizations is possible; and in fact, essential. the answer to the second question: but is it a matter-of-fact that diverse cultures and civilizations have a genuine dialogue? before answering this matter-of-fact issue, let us first theoretically apply the characteristics of buberian dialogue to global dialogue. first. when delegates of each nation sit together to discuss a global issue or concern__they first sit there at first with the mask of their culture. this is “seeming”. the diversity of civilizations is the uniqueness of each nation. everyone is “aware” of this uniqueness. as the dialogue goes on, slowly they unmask themselves__and face each other as a man facing another. this is called “being”. each delegate listens while maintaining one’s ground__intends to meet the other’s ground. this is “personal presence”. acceptance 114 prajñâ vihâra follows which is called “confirmation”. this time they look at the same direction_they see that what concerns their country initially concerns the rest of humanity. there is diversity precisely because there is commonality. once outer layers, as cultural layers which separate nations and civilizations, are removed and scraped through ‘unfolding’, there is one ultimate layer left common to all men__their humanity. humanity shares the same needs, aspirations and happiness, better known as ‘we’ community. second. with this face of humanity, unmasked off-layers-ofdiversity, each delegate comes face-to-face with the other delegates this time with similarity rather than diversity. diversity comes to be because there is similarity first. we speak different languages, you say. that’s a language barrier. but, rather language is meant to serve as a bridge rather than a barrier. language serves as the bridge among cultures. we use words to express our ideas. but, though words have nationality yet ideas they convey__have none. language is merely geographical__but ideas are beyond bounds of geography__where man and man can meet and dialogue. third. yet, each delegate preserves his own cultural uniqueness, since he represents his own nation or country with its own culture. but, it is uniqueness which is capable not only to express its uniqueness but responsible to listen to the rest; it is uniqueness that is ‘aware’ of and ‘confirms’ the unique presence of the other delegates. it is a cultural uniqueness, which instead of excluding other civilizations, in fact confirms the same__without losing its own ground. there is a cultural meeting here, not cultural antagonism. fourth. it is true. we have diverse religions. but among buddhists, muslims, christians, jews__something is common: they manifest the same ‘act-of-religiosity to give gratitude to the ultimate reality to render an act of justice to the supreme being or an ‘enlightened one’__ the very essence of religion. reynaldo a. reyes 115 to the second question then: “as a matter of fact, are there or were there genuine dialogues, as described above, among diverse civilizations?” the answer is yes. there ‘were’ and ‘are’ genuine dialogues as evidenced by the following united nations general assembly resolutions: . “human rights and cultural diversity.” a/res/58/167. “human rights and administration ofjustice.”a/res/58/183.. “incompatibility between democracy and racism.” a/res/ 58/159.. “rights of the child.” a/res/58/157. “protection of human rights and fundamental freedom while countering terrorism.” a/res/58/187. “universal realization of the right of people to selfdetermination.” a/res/58/161.. “international covenants on human rights.” a/res/58/165.. “promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all.” a/res/58/192.. “the right to food.” a/res/58/186. “human rights and terrorism.” a/res/58/174. “human rights and unilateral coercive measures.” a/res/171.. “non-selectivity, impartiality and objectivity.” a/res/58/168.. “globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights.” a/res/58/193. “science and technology for development.” a/res/58/200. “necessity of ending the economic covenant and financial embargo imposed by the united states of america against cuba.” (a/ res/58/7. “torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment.” a/res/58/104.. “implementation of the united nations convention to combat desertification in those countries suffering serious drought/or desertification particularly in africa.” a/res/58/242. there were heated debates in the process of and in the making of the un resolutions as shown through the video by the previous lecturer. 116 prajñâ vihâra but then each delegate, taking the uniqueness of his own ground and culture, gradually unmasked and unfolded himself. until finally, a resolution is drafted and passed. each resolution speaks of the agreement, that which favors humanity as a whole. not convinced? let us listen to a un delegate speaking about dialogue among civilizations: the greater danger confronting us in the world today is not that we speak in different language; but we don’t always listen in any language. the art of hearing one another, the commitment to respond to what one is told; these are the fundamental dynamics of dialogue. and dialogue__two way communication__is of supreme importance in attempting to address the vast complexity of civilization that have evolved over the course of centuries… civilization is alive, it is the basis upon which dialogue with others is possible…our civilizations are our voice and meaning; they are capacity to mutual understanding.40 it sounds familiar; it sounds buberian. reynaldo a. reyes 117 endnotes 1 it is sad that some universities removed or at least attempt to remove from their curricula, ‘philosophy course’ in the name of industrial and technological progress, as if philosophy is unproductive and an obstacle to progress. ‘progress’ to mean production and industrialization__or getting the humanity of man. 2 there are three modes of possibility: physical, moral and metaphysical or mathematical possibility... the physical possibility, as in the case of physical events, phenomena and physical behavior of things, entirely depends on the physical laws for its actuality until god intervenes. moral possibility depends on the human will for its actuality; while metaphysical or mathematical possibility entirely depends on the metaphysical and mathematical nature of the thing that even god cannot intervene nor deny. in the case of inter-human relation we speak of moral possibility. 3 like the dialogue of lovers, like romeo and juliet. 4 prof. voicu delivered this lecture on june 23, 2004 at assumption university, bangkok. 5 people dialogue for various reasons: and because of these various reasons many of them entitled their finest works as “dialogue.”some dialogue to express their philosophical ideas (philosophical dialogue). plato wrote the dialogue a conversation between two or more people. his dialogues are actually discourses that are primarily concerned with the presentation, criticism and conflict of philosophical ideas. he wrote several dialogues: the apology, cratylus, crito, enthypho, gorgias, the laws, meno, parmenides, phaedo, protagoras, the republic, the sophist, the symposium, theatus, timaeus. hume’s “dialogue concerning natural religion” others, dialogue for religious reasons (religious dialogue). catherine of siena (1347-1380) wrote dialogue which stresses love of neighbors. also a scientific dialogue like that of: galileo (1632) wrote his first scientific masterpiece: “the dialogue concerning the two chief world systems” comparing the ptolemaic-aristotelian and the copernican system__proving that the latter is true or more reasonable. others dialogue to forget human suffering, as a comfort (a dialogue of comfort). st. thomas more wrote his finest english work “a dialogue of comfort against tribulation” while he was in prison. others to defend what they believe (apologetic dialogue). justin the martyr (100?-165?) the first defender of the christians against non-christians wrote the “dialogue with trypho”…an account of his conversion. 6 daniel murphy. buber’s philosophy of education. great britain: billing and sons ltd. 1988, p.40. likewise, martin buber was instrumental to the heideggerian radical metaphysics. as richard may commented: “in view of his [heidegger] engagement with a number of non-western topoi or key-words) it is not improbable that heidegger, with his penchant for poetic expression, received early on, long before being and time, inspiring and significant stimulation from reading the appealing and delightful zhuangzi of martin buber (1910), along with 118 prajñâ vihâra other works…” may, richard. heidegger’s hidden sources: east asian influences on his work. trans. graham parkes. london & new york: routledge. see page 43. 7 ibid. 8 “between’ is not an auxiliary construction but the real place and bearer of what happens between men, it has received no specific attention because, in distinction from the individual soul and its context, it does not exhibit a smooth continuity, but is ever and again reconstituted in accordance with men’s meeting with another.” bmm, 204.s 9 kom, 80. 10 “to man the world is twofold, in accordance with his t wofold attitude. the attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words, which he speaks. the primary words are not isolated words but combined words. the one primary word is the combination i-thou, the other primary word is the combination i-it; wherein without a change in the primary word, one of the words he or she can replace it. hence, the i of man is also twofold. for the i of the primary word i-thou is a different i from that of the primary word iit.” (i-thou) 11 buber, martin. i and thou. [henceforth, ‘i and thou ’]trans. maurice friedman. new york: charles scribners. 1958, page 32. 12 aguas, jove jim. notes on buber. 13 i and thou, 34. 14 mother teresa once commented: “if a mother can kill her own child, i see no reason why we cannot kill one another.” 15 as object to be known, willed, desired, controlled. subject that which/ who reacts or acts upon something/someone. 16 “the world of it set in the context of time and space.” i and thou, 33. 17 “the thou appears in space but in the exclusive situation of what is over against it, where everything else can be only the background out of which it emerges, not its boundary and measured limit. it also appears in time but that of the event, which fulfilled itself ‘it is not lived as part of a continuous and organized sequence, but is lived in a ‘duration’ whose purely intensive dimension is definable only in terms of itself’. buber contended that the world of the thou appears simultaneously as acting and as being acted upon and not linked to a chain of causes: ‘only the world of it can be arranged in order: only things can be coordinated in time and space, but the thou knows no system of coordination.’” aguas notes on buber. “the world of thou is not set in the context of either of these [time,space,causality]” i and thou, 33. 18 buber, martin. between man and man. [henceforth ‘bmm’] trans. ronald gregor smith. glasgow: collins sons & co. 1979, page167. 19 i and thou, 34. 20 i and thou, 33. 21 bmm, 176. reynaldo a. reyes 119 22 introductory essay of maurice friedman. buber, martin. the knowledge of man a philosophy of the interhuman..[henceforth,’kom’] ed. maurice friedman. trans. maurice friedman & ronald gregor smith. new york: harper and row. 1965, page 27. 23 buber, martin. israel and the world, the two foci of the jewish soul. 24 deontotheologic means ontology freed of theological color as opposed to scholastic ontology. 25 bmm,19. 26 ibid. 27 kom, 76. 28 ibid, 78. 29 buber speaks of three modes of perceiving man: 1) as an observer wherein man intently fixes his mind on the traits, gestures and expressions of the other; 2). as an onlooker wherein one pays attention not to the traits, gestures and expressions of the other but in an objective way; 3) awareness wherein one is conscious of the other as someone who “says something to me” and instantly that person enters my being. 30 kom, 81. 31 ibid. 32 kom,79 33 ibid,80 34 “dialogue is a prerequisite at the face-to-face level for any helping relationship.” edgar h. schein (1928 -u.s. educator and author.process consultation revisited: building the helping relationship. 35 kom, 82. 36 the true use of speech is not so much to express our wants as to conceal them. oliver goldsmith (1730 – 1774) irish-born british novelist, playwright, and poet. essays, “the use of language”. 37 bmm, 4. 38 bmm, 8. 39 “you know you didn’t have to act with me, steve. you don’t have to say anything and you don’t have to do anything. not a thing. oh, maybe just a whistle. you know how to whistle, don’t you, steve? you just put your lips together and blow”. lauren bacall (1924-) u.s. stage actress from the motion picture: “to have and have not.” 40 jim maclachan u.s. business consultant. 41 mr. negroponte (usa delegate) a/56/pv.43. 120 prajñâ vihâra reynaldo a. reyes 121 references buber, martin. 1902-1965. believing humanism: my testament. trans. maurice friedman. new york: simon and schuster. ______________. 1979. between man and man. trans. ronald gregor smith. glasgow: collins sons & co. ______________. 1958. i and thou. trans. maurice friedman. new york: charles scribners. ______________. 1965. the knowledge of man. a philosophy of the interhuman. ed. maurice friedman. trans. maurice friedman & ronald gregor smith. new york: harper and row. 1free of religion & religious heritage prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 1, january-june, 2006, 177-180 177 © 2000 by assumption university press cultural snapshots a portrait of a child social victims vara chaiyanitaya was born in 1967 in suphanburi, thailand and is now a teacher at the college of fine arts in lad krabang, bangkok. he graduated a bachelor of fine arts (prints) in 1992 and later a master of fine arts (prints) in 2002 both from silpakorn university. he has had many group and solo exhibitions in thailand and abroad. his prints have won more than a dozen of awards from asian and european countries. in thai society's attempt to adapt itself to the modern world, many social problems are emerging which are highly visible in the news media. we are continuously confronted with images of violent crimes. among these crimes, child labour, sexual abuse to children, violence against children and child trafficking are very common. one concern is how victims are portrayed. the news media sensationalizes the news for the sake of business competition. the more sensational the portrayal, the more interesting and deeper the treatment of the issue seems to be. however, the effect of this is that the innocent victims are being abused just as much by the media as the actual crimes themselves. 178 prajñâ vihâra in the series of "social victims", the artist wishes to portray the pain and violence against children caused by contemporary society. he executes his artworks in a manner which reflects the presentation of the news media. the portraits of children in his prints are similar in pose (the half-length portrait) to that of photographs of victims generally taken by government offices, newspapers and the like. nonetheless, the artworks also allows a transcendence from the dark sensationalism to another level which allows the viewers to understand the problems without penetrating into the privacy of the innocent victims. the artist wishes to foster love, understanding and peace in society through the powerful black-and-white compositions and the multilayered tones of his artworks. cultural snpshots 179 for nearly two decades, the artist has focused his attention on the theme of innocent victims in societies most confronted by the harsh realities of life and world. his art specializes in the techniques of etching and aquatint which allows him to play with detail, strong contrasts of light and shadow, and complex layers of thai script and linear patterns juxtaposed over the human portrait. his signature is the way he accentuates the fixed, penetrating eyes of the subjects which is in contrast to the other more realistic details of the human figure. this is to emphasize the fact that the eyes of children who have been the victims of violence, changes forever. an array of paranoia, aggressiveness and fear now begin to find their expression. in some works, their mouth is also overwritten with words which obscure their own voice and accentuate the fact that the victimized children are too innocent to call for justice. 180 prajñâ vihâra cultural snpshots 181 text by preevanuch nhukate graduate school of philosophy and religion, assumption university of thailand 09_(164-183)paulricoeur's reflexive philosophy paul ricoeur’s reflexive philosophy: tying the filipino self to the family ruby s. suazo university of san carlos, philippines บทคัดย่อ บทความนี้ต้องการอาศัยการวิเคราะห์เชิงวิจารณญาณ ทำการอธิบาย ให้ชัดเจนถึงข้อเท็จจริงเกี่ยวกับการดำรงอยู่เองของอัตตสภาวะ ส่วนที่เป็น จิตสภาวะของข้อเท็จจริงน้ีคือรูปแบบการเข้าใจตนเองท่ีสูงส่ง บทความน้ีประยุกต์ วิธีมองปัญหาเร่ืองอัตวิสัยของริเกอร์เพ่ือทำความกระจ่างเร่ืองอัตลักษณ์ของชาว ฟิลิปปินส์ โดยเฉพาะอย่างย่ิงความพยายามของริเกอร์ท่ีจะจดจารึกอัตตาเสียใหม่ “ภายใต้สิ่งที่เป็นปัญหาของการกระทำในฐานะที่เป็นสนามของศักยภาพ” ใน ทำนองเดียวกัน การที่ผู้วิจัยมุ่งแสวงหาอัตลักษณ์ของชาวฟิลิปปินส์ก็เป็นการ คาดหวังถึงชัยชนะของความหมายเหนือการไร้ความหมาย ซ่ึงในท่ีสุดแล้วจะนำ ชาวฟิลิปปินส์ไปสู่การแสวงหาตัวตนท่ีแท้ซ่ึงสะท้อนออกมาภายใต้การพยายาม ท่ีจะสร้างชาติ ในขณะท่ีริเกอร์พยายามจะอธิบายข้อเท็จจริงเก่ียวกับความมีอยู่ของ อัตตาโดยอาศัยการใช้ส่ือกลางหลายชนิด (สัญลักษณ์และตำรา) ผู้วิจัยก็พยายาม สร้างความชัดเจนเก่ียวกับอัตลักษณ์ของชาวฟิลิปปินส์ โดยอาศัยการมีความหมาย (นัยสำคัญ) ของครอบครัว abstract this essay wishes to clarify, through reflective analysis, the fact of the subject’s own existence. this consciousness of this fact is a form of heightened self-understanding. it applies ricoeur’s approach to the problem of subjectivity to the clarification of the filipino identity. particularly his attempt to re-inscribe the subject “within the problematic of action as 164 prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 164-183 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ a field of potentialities”. in the same fashion, the researcher’s quest for filipino identity anticipates the triumph of sense over non-sense that will ultimately lead the filipino towards his quest for genuine selfhood as reflected in the conscious effort towards nation building. while ricoeur endeavors to explain the fact of the subject’s existence by way of its several mediations (symbolic and textual), the researcher, on the other hand, attempts the clarification of the filipino identity by way of the significance of the family. i. introduction some consider the issue regarding the filipino identity a thing of the past. they feel that researchers have already exhausted this subject matter. nevertheless, i am compelled to re-visit this issue in light of the fact that philippines has not yet reached its desired goal __ an integrated development where every filipino at least enjoys the minimum requirements for a decent life. concerning this problem of development, several approaches have been implemented, but they have not yet borne fruit. foremost of them is the moral recovery program. right after the edsa i revolution, licuanan, for example, points out that the government embarked on a moral recovery program for the reason that “[s]elf-interest and disregard for the common good rears its ugly head. we are confronted with our lack of discipline and rigor, our colonial mentality, and our emphasis on porma (form). despite our great display of people’s power, now we are passive once more, expecting our leaders to take all responsibility for solving our many problems”.1 the government embarked on this program because of the following needs: the need for economic recovery, the need to reestablish democratic institutions, and the need to achieve the goals of peace and genuine social justice. former pres. gloria macapagal __ arroyo also formed the presidential commission on values formation because of “the existence of the filipino’s strong desire to see the establishment and institutionalization of just and moral governance and the imperative to have a continuing and intensified drive against graft and corruption, patronage politics, apathy, passivity, mendicancy, factionalism and lack of patrioruby s. suazo 165 tism”.2 this exercise suggests that filipinos believe that the cause of our present troubles have to do with values, specifically cultural values. this has remained the main thrust of the values education curriculum which is “a response to a general feeling on the need for social transformation after the february 1986 people power revolution”.3 this thrust is spelled out even more clearly in the goals of the values education program: “to provide and promote values education at all three levels of the educational system for the development of the human person committed to the building of a just and humane society and an independent and democratic nation”.4 there are several frameworks to look upon these different values. to name a few, there is the widely disseminated the decs values education framework of minda c. sutaria et al., the filipino value system framework of serafin talisayon and the philippine-value system framework of tomas andres. if filipino identity is based upon what we value most, then the question arises as to which among our values we hold the dearest __ to which of these values we can truly identify ourselves. the moment this value is identified, it is to become “a rallying point for unity, self-discipline, and love and pride in one’s country”.5 here i have found the approaches of paul ricoeur helpful. one of the routes that ricoeur follows in understanding the self is through jean nabert’s “reflexive philosophy”. accordingly, reflexive philosophy which concerns the possibility of self-understanding takes at reflexion as the “act of turning back upon itself by which a subject grasps, in a moment of intellectual clarity and moral responsibility, the unifying principle of the operations among which it is dispersed and forgets itself as subject”.6 grasping the self in a moment of intellectual clarity and moral responsibility can be expanded to include an entire people. ii. what reflexive philosophy is ricoeur explains that “the idea of reflexion carries with it the desire for absolute transparence, a perfect coincidence of the self with itself, which would make consciousness of self indubitable knowledge….”7 however; this desire for absolute transparency is not intuitively possible. it is 166 prajna vihara~ only disclosed “through the mirror of the objects and acts, the symbols and signs”.8 consequently, reflection becomes interpretation. ricoeur explains further that all interpretation aims at overcoming the distance between the past cultural epoch to which the text belongs and the interpreter himself. to overcome this distance, the interpreter appropriates the meaning of the text to himself. he makes familiar a foreign text by making it his own. in so doing, there is a conscious effort on the part of the interpreter to arrive at a complete understanding of oneself. this, however, is only possible through his understanding of the other. thus, hermeneutics is surmised as .self-understanding by means of understanding others”.9 self-understanding by means of understanding others signifies reflection, which must not be qualified as a blind intuition. for reflection not to be a blind intuition, it must be mediated by the expressions in which life objectifies itself. ricoeur explained that, reflection is nothing other than the appropriation of our act of existing by means of a critique applied to the works and the acts which are the signs of this act of existing. thus, reflection is a critique. . . in the sense that the cogito can be recovered only by the detour of a decipherment of the documents of its life. reflection is the appropriation of our effort to exist and of our desire to be by means of the works which testify to this effort and this desire.10 ricoeur understands that .the increase in subjectivity... goes hand in hand with an increase in reflection and meaning. subjectivity is granted us in and through the great variety of experiences that have shaped a cultural heritage”.11 the aim of reflexive philosophy is .to appropriate in praxis an originary dynamism which grounds human existence and with which the conscious, practical self does not coincide”.12 through reflection, the subject recaptures itself through the expressions of life that objectify it. nevertheless, ricoeur recognizes the risk of the subject’s misinterpretation due to the setting in of false consciousness. this is why he also emphasizes that reflection is .the task of equating my concrete experience with the affirmation: i am. (ricoeur 1974). this does not, however, dampen his spirit for he is positive that this is the very reason why herme167ruby s. suazo neutics becomes relevant. hermeneutics exists due to misinterpretations. reflexive philosophy becomes pertinent to ricoeur’s project because it is neither direct nor immediate. in fact, reflection needs to be doubly indirect for the reasons that “existence is evinced only in documents of life [and that] because consciousness is first of all false consciousness, and it is always necessary to rise by means of a corrective critique from misunderstanding to understanding”.13 nabert’s ethical philosophy seeks to recapture the primordial source of human existence, a quest made indirectly possible through the interpretation of the signs in which the “desire-to-be” is inscribed. this view implies that there is at least a direct relationship between the understanding of the signs of the “desire-to-be” and self-understanding. henceforth, self-understanding passes through the signs in which the self inscribes itself. ricoeur believes that there exists a relationship that is frequently disregarded, the relationship between the act of existence and the signs through which this act is represented. for ricoeur, the sign that mediates the subject and its experience is inscribed in language. language in turn is also inscribed in the text. ricoeur employs the theory of the text14 because he finds it a good guide for showing that “the act of subjectivity is not so much what initiates understanding as what terminates it. [moreover, he takes] this terminal act [as] characteris[ing] appropriation”. to reiterate what has been said above, the rejoining of subjectivity is not the one that supports the meaning of the text. it only responds to the matter of the text as proposed meanings unfold in front of the text. the ultimate aim in reading a text remains the understanding of what it means to the reader. to understand the text is to interpret it. and, by interpretation, this means “the concrete outcome of conjunction and renewal”.16 conjunction and renewal are necessary elements for the reason that to read is “to conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of the text. [furthermore,] this conjunction of discourses reveals… an original capacity for renewal which is its open character”.17 thus, “an interpretation is not authentic unless it culminates in some form of appropriation (aneignung), if by that term we understand the process by which one makes one’s own (eigen) what was initially other or alien (fremd)”.18 as ricoeur expounds: 168 prajna vihara~ by ‘appropriation’, i understand this: that the interpretation of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself. this culmination of the understanding of a text in self-understanding is characteristic of the kind of reflective philosophy which… i have called ‘concrete reflection’.19 nonetheless, appropriation implies “a moment of dispossession of the egoistic and narcissistic ego”.20 it is “the… making-one’s-own, of the ground of one’s existence, the home of the subject”.21 thus, the moment of appropriation marks the appearance of the subjectivity of the reader. iii. ricouer’s reflexive philosophy and the filipino self in connection with this, i apply ricoeur’s approach to the problem of the self to the seeking of the value whereby the filipino self is very much attached. a parallelism emerges between ricoeur’s project of understanding the meaning of the self and my project of appropriating a meaning of the filipino self. inasmuch as ricoeur mentions that the self in self-reflection can only be glimpsed through the mirror of the objects and acts, the symbols and signs wherein they are disclosed, i share in the position that culture which is “the totality of a people’s enduring shared patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting in response to their life-needs”22 is made visible through symbols. the filipino self needs to be fully understood by closely studying the pervasive symbolism of the filipino self: its cultural values. nevertheless, there are many values that are very dear to the filipinos; the dearest of them all is the family. thus, the attempt to understand the filipino self is to be done by way of the filipino’s orientation of the family. ricoeur’s re-appropriation of the meaning of the self developed in the course of his studies of the philosophers of the subject is not for the sake of adding into the voluminous studies about the subject. his project 169ruby s. suazo is postured to re-inscribe the subject “within the problematic of action as a field of potentialities”.23 in other words, his desire to understand the meaning of the subject is consciously directed towards the postulation of the meaningfulness of the existence of the subject. although there is no possible way of verifying this, “the desire for meaning, the hope for the ultimate triumph of sense over nonsense in our lives, the triumph of reconciliation… is not delusory”.24 similarly, the pursuit to understand the filipino self foresees a similar result. henceforth, the filipino self should be known because it is expected to become an impetus to act; it serves as “a rallying point for unity, self-discipline, and love and pride in one’s country”.25 further, de quiros points out the significance of identity saying: [w]hat’s the big deal about identity? well, look at countries like thailand, singapore and malaysia, and look at us. with nations as with individuals, you have no sense of self, you will never know, and do, what you want. you will only know, and follow, what others tell you to.26 the importance of knowing one’s self depends on the ability of the person to appropriate his decision upon his own. the assumption is that the moment the filipino understands who he is, he can extend such knowledge to the societal level and eventually create a wave of true national sentiment. arguably, knowing the filipino self can lead to a sense of meaning and an understanding of his reason for being. consequently, this can give the filipino a sense of direction. presently, since the filipino has not yet found a locus of control, he is unable to give direction to his endeavors. inasmuch as the filipino has been shaped by diverse influences, both eastern and western, with their opposing tendencies, he becomes confused. seeing the best and the worst of both worlds is supposedly advantageous to the filipino. but ignorance about his reason for being makes him incapable of threshing out the good influences from the bad influences, something that can lead his nation to the desired stability and integrated development. inasmuch as the way to know a nation’s identity is by its values as roces puts it __ the filipino self must discover itself in its values.27 in 170 prajna vihara~ the research of talisayon, he found out that the core or central clusters of the filipino value system revolve around seven values, with family/kinship orientation as the core value.28 agoncillo echoes that among the many values, the filipino is known for close family ties.29 jocano also recognizes the importance that the filipinos give to the family30 as it gives higher premium to its interest than to the interest of the community.31 he believes that “the family is basic to the life of filipinos. it is the center of their universe. much of what they do, what they think, and what they idealize, among others, are first learned within the narrow confines of the family before these are enriched, modified, or frustrated by other institutions in the larger community”.32 curiously, the significance of this value is overwhelming because the state has strongly recognized the primacy of the family in philippine society as enshrined in the philippine civil code and the philippine constitution of 1986.33 the family is discerned “as a defense against a hostile world and a unit where one can turn to in case [a family member] has a serious problem”.34 however, this seems to counter the idea of thinking nationally for this tends to make a filipino act parochially. family orientation is indeed very crucial to the filipino. historically, covar points out that during the formative period of the philippine history, the filipino was concerned with the ginhawa (inner comfort) of the tao (person) and the well-being of the sakop (ward). as the filipino progressed in the period of struggle and national consolidation, the concern now turned to civilizing of the ‘natives’, first as spanish mesticillos, and then as little brown americans who eventually became the ilustrados. while the filipino during this period did begin to think about national interest and general welfare, this was undermined by the colonizers who exploited the filipino’s family-centeredness by pitting one family against another family, one region against another region.35 as we now enter the 21st century, social scientists and communicators usually ask, “what happened to the society and culture during the formative period? were they wiped out during the period of struggle and national consolidation? is there anything left in the indigenous culture and society which we could rally around the period of cultural solidarity?”36 he then declares, “our answers to these questions shall help guide us in our quest for values beyond 1998”.37 171ruby s. suazo ramirez believes there are still things left in the indigenous culture and society that subsist in the period of cultural solidarity. the traces of the formative period pervades in what ramirez calls as the suppressed culture that operates vis-aò-vis the dominant culture imposed by the colonizers. it might be thought of that the operating values during the formative period are insignificant for they are now relegated to the collective unconscious of the people. however, ramirez elucidates that they are not insignificant for they have “become the soil in which any external item from other cultures may be grafted to assume its own unique growth and evolution”.38 this hidden dimension, she explains further, “is sometimes more powerful than the external elements of a culture [for it] lives in the minds and hearts of people”.39 during the period of struggle and national consolidation, the people’s operating values of the formative period were pushed aside. by the use of whip, people were forced to adopt the value system of the colonizers without positively understanding the impact of the modern practices of modernization. they adopted the practices of the colonizers out of fear, practices which were not completely assimilated and grafted to the indigenous soul of the people.40 in the words of mccoy, although spain and the united states tried to forge a strong bureaucratic apparatus based upon their own laws and social practice, they could not induce compliance through shared myth or other forms of social sanction because the modern philippine state did not evolve organically from filipino society. they derived their authority from the implied coercion of colonial rule.41 consequently, filipinos became very religious and devout christians, but the sharing of material goods with others, most especially to the needy, was quite difficult for them. also, nowadays, with free enterprise, people earn more money but it is not necessarily equated with hard work. people realize that if one is clever enough, one can get money through gambling, scheming (like in graft and corruption) or some illegal way.42 the simultaneous demands of these two incongruous systems on the filipino create conflict situations which satisfy neither value system fully. thus, in the supposed period of cultural solidarity, there is really no solidarity that happens for the reason that the operating values in the formative period (the traditional value system) and those of the period of struggle and national consolidation (the dominant value system) are con172 prajna vihara~ tinually in conflict in this period of supposed solidarity. no matter how passionately the filipino strives for national solidarity, the interests of the family interfere with the interests of the nation, which might be the reason why the filipino has the difficulty of achieving a true sense of nationalism. for this reason, to reconsider the family orientation as a core filipino value is an imperative. this proposal reflects bago’s perception that integrated development in the philippines will only be achieved if the cultural values of the filipino be re-aligned according to the intentions of the filipinos as a nation. based on the analysis of various authors, family orientation as a value is seen as a hindrance to the desired development of the filipino when it interferes with the workings of institutions with supposedly universalistic value assumptions. the pervasiveness of this family orientation can be witnessed in the constitution of political dynasties, nepotism, family corporations and profit-making educational family corporations and even religious organizations who are also not immune from the encroachment of family interests. corruption is likewise a disease traceable to the desire of the filipino to secure his own family. the aforementioned instances are known hindrances to national development. in like manner, the aforementioned instances are under the hands of the philippine elite. inasmuch as an elite is defined as those who have or may have the power to influence the thinking of the citizenry, send charges through the body politic and civil society, alter the power configuration of the nation, and in some instances be able to seize power at the top43, then the initiative of concretely redirecting the nation falls to their hands. however, historically speaking, the elite segment of the society had been derailing the desire of the filipino citizenry for a developed and prosperous nation for all. let us take for example, jose rizal sets up la liga filipina in manila on july 3, 1892 with the aim of inculcating moral and political principles among the population in order to attain a greater unity.44 moreover, on july 7, 1892, bonifacio establishes the katipunan (brotherhood) with the aim of uniting all filipinos in terms of a single ideology. he enables the masses to rally behind his katipunan (brotherhood) because of his vision to bring back the kasaganaan (bountifulness) and the kaginhawaan (prosperity) that the pre-spanish philippines enjoyed.46 this was the central mantra of his article published in the one and ruby s. suazo 173 only issue of kalayaan (freedom), the official publication of the katipunan, which they attributed the rapid growth of its membership.47 the cry for kalayaan (freedom), also becomes the driving force for filipinos to persist in fighting against the spanish regime. however, when the revolution was won, the expected national consolidation of the filipino spirit did not materialize because of the illustrado and the principalia’s jockeying for power and opportunities just to assure the economic security of their own families. this demoralized the organization from the top down to the rank and file and eventually resulted in the rift between the illustrado and the masses.48 during this period, although the spirit of nationalism is very pregnant and vibrant, abueva maintains that “historically, some heroes and leaders have been inspiring models of a socially concerned and nationalistic leadership, but many leaders have also used their power and authority for their own benefit and for perpetuating their power and dominance in society. the latter reinforce the common tendency of citizens to be selfishly individualistic and family-oriented”.49 likewise, agoncillo, as cited by mccoy, accuses the educated illustrados of manila’s nineteenth-century elites for betraying the revolution of 1898 and collaborating thereafter with american colonialism.50 in the period of cultural solidarity, the filipinos were already granted their independence and there was no more inherent fear of the colonizers. but at this time, they regressed to the ideological enculturation of the formative period: which emphasized the economic well-being of the sakop or ward, instead of increasing the emphasis on national interest and general welfare. the one that has been relegated to the unconscious has now resurfaced. the family, although seen as the focal point of the philippines’ underdevelopment, is also seen to be the facilitator of genuine national development. taking the cue from camilo osias, reflecting on one of the filipino languages, the ilocano language, he realizes that an all-inclusive consciousness is imbedded in the psyche of the filipino waiting to be roused up. his analysis of the four personal pronouns, first person under the nominative case of the ilocano language comes out with four levels that can be made as indicators of the development, attitude, and outlook of the filipino. going into the four major stages in the process of broaden174 prajna vihara~ ing his concept, the filipino may graduate from what he calls as the siac (i) stage to the data (you) stage then to the dacami (we __ exclusive) stage, and ultimately, to the datayo (we __ all inclusive) stage. his vision is for a filipino to move out of the siac stage and grow into the datayo stage and not become stuck in the dacami stage.51 this inner transformation must be done in the context of the family. the family as a microcosm of the society can serve as the jumping-off point for the re-consideration of the family as a core value. the success of this endeavor is seen to be decisive when the transformation is spearheaded by the elite forces of the society. only when the elite forces of the philippine society lead the philippines accordingly, that is, when there is consistency between their words and deeds, will the philippines achieve its perennial dream of a developed nation. even confucius, although he sees a parallel between running a family and running a state, does not isolate the family from the state. in fact, he admonishes that “people not only loved their own parents and children, but loved the parents and children of others as well…. all men shared their social responsibilities, and all women had their social responsibilities and respective roles. natural resources were fully used to benefit all, and were not appropriated for selfish ends. people wanted to contribute their strength and ability to society for public gain”.52 in the same end, pope john paul ii preaches that “by means of his work man commits himself, not only for his own sake but also for others and with others. each person collaborates in the work of others and for their good. man works in order to provide for the needs of his family, his community, his nation, and ultimately all humanity”.53 ultimately, even with the many regressive tendencies of family orientation as a core value, it still possesses several praiseworthy and noteworthy characteristics such as the promotion of “sobriety, education, skills, diligence, devotion to the group rather than individual interests, unconditional respect for hierarchy and emphasis on non-confrontational approaches towards human relations”.54 ruby s. suazo 175 iv. conclusion as a conclusion, we might say that the transformation of the idea family into a national family depends on the positive contribution and leadership of the elite. it is the elite forces of the society who have the power to act as a force to lead us towards a developed and prosperous philippines. so far, since colonization, instead of fostering cultural solidarity, they regressed to the securing of the well-being of the sakop. and this clannish and baranganic perspective of the family orientation became an impediment to all the governmental institutions with supposedly universalistic application. but in the present time, the elite must feel secure enough to recognize the existence of the under-privileged other. the said material prosperity should propel them to act on the ethical intention “as aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others, in just institutions”. endnotes 1patricia b. licuanan, “a moral recovery program: building a people __ building a nation”, in values in philippine culture and education: philippine philosophical studies i, ed. manny dy, jr. (manila: ateneo de manila university press) & the council for research in values and philosophy, http://www.crvp.or 2gloria macapagal __ arroyo, executive order no. 314: creating the presidential commission on values formation (manila: malacanang, april 30, 2004), http://www.ops.gov.ph/records/eo_no314.htm (accessed november 5, 2006). 3adelaida bago, curriculum development: the philippine experience (manila: de la salle university press, 2001), 132. 4bago, 132. 5emmanuel mangubat, “basic considerations for attaining a truly filipino national identity”, philippine journal of education, 60 (december 1981), 297a. 6paul ricoeur, p. “on interpretation” from text to action: essays in hermeneutics, ii. trans. k. blamey and j. b. thompson (illinois: northwestern university press, 1991), 12. 7ricoeur, “on interpretation”, 12-13. 8john b. thompson, “editor’s introduction” in paul ricoeur, hermeneutics and the human sciences: essays on language, action, and interpretation, ed., trans, and intro. john b. thompson (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1981), 17-18. 176 prajna vihara~ ~ 9paul ricoeur, “existence and hermeneutics” in the conflict of interpretations: essays in hermeneutics, ed. don ihde (evanston: northwestern university press, 1974) 16-17. 10ricoeur, “existence and hermeneutics”, 17-18. 11see. john van den hengel, the home of meaning: the hermeneutics of the subject of paul ricoeur (washington, d.c.: university press of america, 1982), 15. 12van den hengel, 15-16. 13ricoeur, “existence and hermeneutics”, 18. 14morrison comments that “a theory of texts is important in ricoeur’s hermeneutic as it offers the interpreter space for the application of critical tools. true appropriation of a text’s meaning is a reflexive action realized at the intersection of ontological naivet? and critical distanciation”. bradley t. morrison, a phenomenology of marital dynamics and pastoral care (1992), http://www.xcelco.on.ca/ ~btmorrison/ricoeur/ricoeur&systems.html (accessed july 7, 2006). 15paul ricoeur, “phenomenology and hermeneutics” in hermeneutics and the human sciences, 113. 16ricoeur, “what is a text? explanation and understanding” in hermeneutics and the human sciences, 158. 17ricoeur, “what is a text?”, 158. 18ricoeur, “metaphor and the central problem of hermeneutics” in hermeneutics and the human sciences, 178. see also, ricoeur, “phenomenology and hermeneutics”, 113; ricoeur, “what is a text?”, 159; “appropriation” in hermeneutics and the human sciences, 185. 19ricoeur, “what is a text?”, 158. 20paul ricoeur, interpretation theory: discourse and surplus of meaning (texas: the texas university press, 1976), 94. 21van den hengel, 194. 22mina ramirez, “the dominant and popular cultural systems in the philippines”, reflections on culture (manila: asian social institute, 1991), 14. 23kathleen blamey, “from the ego to the self: a philosophical itinerary”, the philosophy of paul ricoeur, ed. lewis edwin hahn (illinois: open court, 1995), 597. 24g.b. madison, “ricoeur and the hermeneutics of the subject”. the philosophy of paul ricoeur. ed. lewis edwin hahn (illinois: open court, 1995), 89. 25emmanuel, 297a. 26conrado de quiros, “a question of identity” [article online]; available from http://www.inq7.net/opi/2002/mar/20/opi_csdequiros-1.htm; accessed september 3, 2003. 27alejandro r. roces, “a nation is known by its values” in lourdes r. quisumbing and felice p. sta. maria, peace and tolerance: values education through history (pasay city: unesco national commission of the philippines, 1996), 122-124. ruby s. suazo 177 28serafin d. talisayon, “values in our quest for freedom (1896-1898) and their application for future development” in lourdes r. quisumbing and felice p. sta. maria, peace and tolerance: values education through history (pasay city: unesco national commission of the philippines, 1996), 105. this is a result of talisayon’s compilation and review of almost a hundred academic journals and opinion articles about filipino values, orientations or attitudes, and idiosyncrasies. he was able to discern commonalities and consensus among various authors, and reduce them into a set of identifiable value clusters with some internal consistency or coherence. 29teodoro a. agoncillo, history of the filipino people, 8th edition (quezon city: garotech publishing, 1990), 6-7. 30stella go says that the filipino’s stress on the importance of the family can be attested by the voluminous existing literature studying the filipino family. the research for development department of the development academy of the philippines even compiled in one volume bibliographies together with a directory of agencies and individuals involved in studying or working with the family. stella p. go, the filipino family in the eighties (manila: social development research center, de la salle university, 1993), 2-4. 31f. landa jocano, filipino value system: a cultural definition (manila: punlad research house, inc., 1997), 9. 32f. landa jocano, filipino social organization: traditional kinship and family organization (manila: punlad research house,1998), 11. 33alfred mccoy, “‘an anarchy of families’: the historiography of state and family in the philippines” in an anarchy of families: state and family in the philippines, ed. by alfred w. mccoy (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 1994), 7. 34isabel s. panopio and realidad santico rolda, society and culture: introduction to sociology and anthropology (quezon city: jmc press, inc., 2000), 79. cf. jaime bulatao, split-level christianity (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 1966), 26. 35prospero r. covar, “unburdening philippine society of colonialism” in lourdes r. quisumbing and felice p. sta. maria, peace and tolerance: values education through history (pasay city: unesco national commission of the philippines, 1996), 171. 36covar, “unburdening philippine society of colonialism”, 174. jocano shares the same perspective with covar and ramirez as to the filipino’s retaining his old values. jocano reveals that in the midst of the rapidly changing environment, “the old rural patterns are retrieved and used to handle the pressure of adaptation to the changing environment. this keeps the traditional institutions, values, and sentiments alive. thus, if one removes the outer trappings of modernity… one discovers that underneath the veneer, the filipinos are still traditional in their institutional values and community outlook, even if they are in grey flannel suits”. jocano, filipino socialorganization: traditional kinship and family 178 prajna vihara~ organization (manila: punlad research house, 1998), 3. 37covar, “unburdening philippine society of colonialism”, 174. 38mina ramirez, “toward a revolution of mindsets: a critique of the present socio-cultural system” in reflections on culture (manila: asian social institute, 1991), 4. 39ramirez, “toward a revolution of mindsets”, 4. 40the researcher considers this as a palpable possibility considering the general reverence that the filipinos extend to these colonizers without extending the same sentiment to the chinese, the indians, and the arabs. 41mccoy, 11. cf. o.d. corpuz, bureaucracy in the philippines (manila: institute of public administration, university of the philippines, 1957), 128-213. 42ramirez, “toward a revolution of mindsets” in reflections on culture, 5. see also, ramirez, “the dominant and popular cultural systems in the philippines” in reflections on culture, 19. 43teodoro c. benigno, “the philippines’ elites”, in here’s the score, the philippine star (july 20, 2001). based on his opinion as to the meaning of elite, benigno enumerates six types of them in the philippines: the filipino politicians, the filipino businessmen, the clergy, the military, the media, and the left. 44cesar adib majul, the political and constitutional ideas of the philippine revolution, reprint edition (quezon city: university of the philippines press, 1996), 3. 45majul, 4. 46ileto cites the annotation of rizal to morga’s sucesos de las islas filipinas that pointed out the flourishing indigenous civilization in the archipelago even before the arrival of the spaniards. reynaldo cleme�a ileto, pasyon and revolution: popular movements in the philippines, 1840-1910 (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 1979), 83. 47ileto cited pio valenzuela, one of the organizers of the katipunan, saying that “hundreds of people nightly joined the katipunan” after the distribution of the kalayaan. ileto intimated that “bonifacio himself was surprised at the rapid growth of the society. from the time he had founded it in 1892 to the appearance of kalayaan in january 1896, it had only some three hundred members. but from the middle of march to the outbreak of hostilities against spain in august 1896, its membership rose sharply to 30,000”. valenzuela, ileto said, “attributes the sharp rise in membership to the ‘effect of the periodical on the people’”. ileto, pasyon and revolution, 82. cf. “the memoirs of pio valenzuela” (original in tagalog), in minutes of the katipunan (manila: national heroes commission, 1964); teodoro agoncillo (1956), the revolt of the masses (quezon city: university of the philippines). 48bonifacio irks the leading citizens because they believe that if he is to progress, the existing boundaries and hierarchies in the province would be threatened. mabini, as cabinet president of the malolos government, was subjected to harassment because he was born to very poor parents. ileto, pasyon and revolution, 111 & 117. ruby s. suazo 179 49jose v. abueva, “some indicators and explanations of the weakness of filipino nationalism” in filipino nationalism: various meanings, constant and changing goals, continuing relevance, ed. jose v. abueva (quezon city: university of the philippines press, 1999), 814. 50mccoy, 2. cf. teodoro a. agoncillo, malolos: the crisis of the republic (quezon city: university of the philippines press, 1960), 644-45. see also renato constantino, the philippines: a past revisited (quezon city: tala publishing services, 1975), 232. 51camilo osias, “the tayo concept” in the filipino way of life: the pluralized philosophy (boston: ginn and company, 1940), 3-4. 52alfredo p. co, philosophy of ancient china, reprint edition (manila: ust publishing house, 2002), 116. 53pope john paul ii, laborem exercens, n.10 in rev. robert a. sirico and rev. maciej zieba, o.p., eds. the social agenda: a collection of magisterial texts (vatican city: pontifical council for justice and peace, libreria editrice vaticana, 2000), 87; [book online]; available from www.thesocialagenda.org/pdfs/english.pdf; accessed april 10, 2006, 112. 54alejo jose g. sison, “business and culture in the philippines: a story of gradual progress” (instituto empresa y humanismo, universidad de navarra), [article on-line]; available from http://www.unav.es/empresayhumanismo/2activ/ seminario/miembros/sison/ii26/; 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(1982). the home of meaning: the hermeneutics of the subject of paul ricoeur. washington, d.c.: university press of america. ruby s. suazo 183 � article 4-2 18 peer to peer: from technology to politics to a new civilisation? michel bauwens mbauwens@skynet.be, http://users.skynet.be/michel.bauwens a specter is haunting the world: the specter of peer to peer. the existing economic system is trying to co-opt it, but it is also a harbinger of a new type of human relationship, and may in the end be incompatible with informational capitalism. i. technology 1. peer to peer as technological paradigm business and technology watchers would have a hard time of avoiding it, as peer to peer is everywhere these days. peer to peer is first of all a new technological paradigm for the organisation of the information and communication infrastructure that is the very basis of our postindustrial economy. the internet itself, as network of networks, is an expression of this paradigm. as ‘end to end’ or ‘point to point’ network, it has replaced both the earlier hierarchical mainframe form, but also the client-server form, which posited a central server with associated dependent computers, associated in a network. instead, in a peer to peer network, intelligence is distributed everywhere. every node is capable of receiving and sending data. the first discussion note below explains why this peer to peer mode makes eminent sense in terms of efficiency, as compared to the older models. it should be noted that, just as networks, peer to peer can come into many hybrid forms, in which various forms of hierarchy can still be embedded (as with the internet, where all networks aren’t equal). but the very reason i’m using peer to peer is of course the promise of true equality, something that is not so clear when one uses the more generic term of ‘network’. this first section deals with the expressions of peer to peer in the field of technology. distributed computing is now considered to be the next step for the worldwide computing infrastructure, in the form of grid computing, 18 prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 1, july-december, 2003, 18-52 © 2000 by assumption university press 19 which allows every computer to use its spare cycles to contribute to the functioning of the whole, thereby obviating the need for servers altogether. the telecommunication infrastructure itself is in the process of being converted to the internet protocol and the time is not all too far away where even voice will transit over such p2p networks. in the recent weeks, telecom experts have been able to read about developments such as mesh networks or ad hoc networks, described in the economist: the mesh-networking approach, which is being pursued by several firms, does this in a particularly clever way. first, the neighbourhood is “seeded” by the installation of a “neighbourhood access point” (nap)—a radio base-station connected to the internet via a highspeed connection. homes and offices within range of this nap install antennas of their own, enabling them to access the internet at high speed. then comes the clever part. each of those homes and offices can also act as a relay for other homes and offices beyond the range of the original nap. as the mesh grows, each node communicates only with its neighbours, which pass internet traffic back and forth from the nap. it is thus possible to cover a large area quickly and cheaply.” (http://www.economist.com/printedition/displaystory.cfm? story_id=1176136) moreover, there is the worldwide development of wireless lan networks, by corporations on the one hand, but also by citizens installing such networks themselves, at very low cost. here’s a description of what is happening in hawaii, where a peer to peer wireless network is covering more than 300 square miles: now people all over the island are tapping into wiecking’s wireless links, surfing the web at speeds as much as 100 times greater than standard modems permit. high school teachers use the network to leapfrog a plodding state effort to wire schools. wildlife regulators use it to track poachers. and it’s all free. wiecking has built his network through a coalition of educators, researchers, and nonprofit organizations; with the right equipment and passwords, anyone who wants to tap in can do so, at no charge.” (http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,38492,00.html) michel bauwens 19 20 a recent article in fortune magazine uncovered yet another aspect of the coming peer to peer age in technology, by pointing out that the current ‘central server based’ methods for interactive tv are woefully inadequate to match supply and demand: “essentially, file-served television describes an internet for video content. anyone—from movie company to homeowner—could store video on his own hard disk and make it available for a price. movie and television companies would have tons of hard disks with huge capacities, since they can afford to store everything they produce. cable operators and satellite companies might have some hard disks to store the most popular content, since they can charge a premium for such stuff. and homeowners might have hard disks (possibly in the form of pvrs) that can be used as temporary storage for content that takes time to get or that they only want to rent—or permanent storage for what they’ve bought.” (http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml& doc_id=208364 ) in general one could say that the main attractivity of peer to peer is that it will seamlessly marry the world of the internet and the world of pc’s. originally, ordinary pc users who wanted to post content or services needed access to a server, which created inequality in access, but with true peer to peer file sharing technologies, any pc user is enabled to do this. 2. peer to peer as distribution mechanism the last story points to yet another aspect of peer to peer: its incredible force as distribution mechanism. indeed, the users of personal video recorders such as tivo are already using file sharing methods that allow them to exchange programs via the internet. but this is of course dwarfed by what is currently happening in the music world. again the advantage here should be obvious, as in this mode of distribution, no centralizing force can play a role of command and control, and every node can have access to the totality of the distributed information. the latest estimates say that: “worldwide annual downloads, according to estimates from places like webnoize, would indicate that the number of downloads — if you assume there are 10 songs on a cd – is something like five times the total number of cds 20 prajñâ vihâra 21 sold in the u.s. in a year, and one-and-a-half times the worldwide sales.” (http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/06/13/liebowitz/index.html). the original file sharing systems, such as napster, audiogalaxy, and kazaa, still used centralservers or directories which could be tracked down and identified, and thus attacked in court, as indeed happened, thereby destroying these systems one by one. but today, the new wave of p2p systems avoid such central servers altogether. the most popular current system, an expression of the free software community, i.e. gnutella, had over 10 million users in mid-2002, and as they are indeed distributed and untraceable, have been immune to legal challenge. 3. peer to peer as production method p2p is not just the form of technology itself, but increasingly, it is a ‘process of production’, a way of organising the way that immaterial products are produced (and distributed and ‘consumed’). the first expression of this was the free software movement launched by richard stallman. expressed in the production of software such as gnu and its kernel linux, tens of thousands of programmers are cooperative producing the most valuable knowledge capital of the day, i.e. software. they are doing this in small groups that are seamlessly coordinated in the greater worldwide project, in true peer groups that have no traditional hierarchy. eric raymond’s seminal essay/book “the cathedral and the bazaar,” has explained in detail why such a mode of production is superior to its commercial variants. richard stallman’s free software movement is furthermore quite radical in its values and aims, and has developed legal devices such as copyleft and the general public license, which uses commercial law itself to prohibit any commercial and private usage of the software. “free software” is a matter of liberty, not price. to understand the concept, you should think of “free” as in “free speech,” not as in “free beer.” free software is a matter of the users’ freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software. more precisely, it refers to four kinds of freedom, for the users of the software:. the freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0). michel bauwens 21 22 . the freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1). access to the source code is a precondition for this.. the freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbour (freedom 2).. the freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). access to the source code is a precondition for this.” (2) less radical, and perhaps more widespread because of this, is the open source movement launched by the above-mentioned eric raymond, which stipulates that the code has to be open for consultation and usage, but where there are restrictive rules and the property remains corporate. together, even in a situation where the software world is dominated by the microsoft monopoly, these two types of software have taken the world by storm. the dominant server of the internet (apache) is open source, but more and more governments and businesses are using it as well, including in mission-critical commercial applications. most experts would agree that this software is in fact more efficient than its commercial counterparts. what is lacking today is the spread of userfriendly interfaces, though the first open source interfaces are coming into existence. please also remember that peer to peer is in fact the extension of the methodology of the sciences, which have been based since 300 years on ‘peer review’. scientific progress is indeed beholden to the fact that scientists are accountable, in terms of the scientific validity of their work, to their peers, and not to their funders or bureaucratic managers. and the early founders of the free software movement where scientists from mit, who exported their methodology from knowledge exchange to the production of software. in fact, mit has published data showing that since a lot of research has been privatised in the u.s., the pace of innovation has in fact slowed down. or simply compare the fact of how netscape evolved when it was using open source methods and was supported by the whole internet community, as compared to the almost static evolution of internet explorer, now that it is the property of microsoft. 22 prajñâ vihâra 23 the methodologies initiated by the free software and open source movements are rapidly expanding into other fields, witness the movements such as the royalty-free music movement, the open hardware project (and the simputer project in india), opentv and many much more of these type of cooperative initiatives. i would like to offer an important historical analogy here. when the labour movement arose as an expression of the new industrial working class, it invented a whole list of new social practices, such as mutual aid societies, unions, and new ideologies. today, when the class of knowledge workers is socially dominant in the west, is it a wonder that they also create new and innovative practices that exemplify their values of cooperative intellectual work? 4. peer to peer in manufacturing? we would in fact dare to go one step further and argue that peer to peer will probably become the dominant paradigm, not just in the production of immaterial goods such as software and music, but increasingly in the world of manufacturing as well. two recent examples should illustrate it. lego mindstorms is a new form of electronic lego, which is not only produced by lego, but where thousands of users are themselves creating new building blocks and software for it. the same happened with the aibo, the artificial dog produced by sony, which users started to hack, first opposed by sony, but later with the agreement of the company. this makes a lot of sense, as indeed, it allows companies to externalise r&d costs and involve the community of consumers in the development of the product. this process is becoming generalised. of course, work has always been cooperative (though also hierarchically organised), but in this case, what is remarkable is that the frontier between the inside and the outside is disappearing. this is in fact a general process of the internet age, where the industry is moving away from mass production to one production or ‘mass customisation’, but this is only possible when consumers become part and parcel of the real production process. if that is the case, then that of course gives rise to contradictions between the hierarchical control of the enterprise, vs. the desires of the community of usersproducers. this is the same tension as between free software, a pure peer to peer michel bauwens 23 24 conception, and the more liberal interpretation of open source, which can be used by established companies to extend their development, but still under their overall control and within the profit logic. 5. some preliminary considerations one has of course to ask oneself, why is this emergence happening, and i believe that the answer is clear. the complexity of the post-industrial age makes centralised command and control approaches, based on the centralised control, inoperable. today, intelligence is indeed ‘everywhere’ and the organisation of technology and work has to acknowledge that. and more and more, we are indeed forced to conclude that peer to peer is indeed a more productive technology and way of organising production than its hierarchical, commodity-based predecessors. this is of course most clear in the music industry, where the fluidity of music distribution via p2p is an order of magnitude greater, and at marginal cost, than the commoditybased physical distribution of cd’s. this situation leads to an interesting and first historical analogy: when capitalist methods of production emerged, the feudal system, the guilds and the craftsmen at first tried to oppose and stop them (up to the physical liquidation of machines by the luddites in the uk), but they largely failed. it is not difficult to see a comparison with the struggle of the riaa (recording industry association of america) against napster: they may have won legally, but the phenomenon is continuing to spread. in general, we can interpret many of the current conflicts as pitting against each other the old way of production, commoditybased production and its legal infrastructure of copyright, and the new technological and social practices undermining these existing processes. in the short term, the forces of the old try to increase their hold and faced with subverting influences, strengthen the legal and the repressive apparatus. but in the long term the question is: can they hold back these more productive processes? in the second part, we see how the peer to peer paradigm of technological organisation, is paralleled by similar forms of organisation in human society, which are of course enabled by the technological 24 prajñâ vihâra 25 substrate we have just been discussing. indeed, it would be quite difficult to sustain a worldwide networked political movement, or the free software movement for that matter, without the enablement that the technology is providing. ii. social organisation and culture 1. peer to peer in politics our description of free software and open source has already described an important shift, from technology to a new and soon dominant form of social organisation. if we open our eyes, we can see the emergence of p2p as the new way of organising and conducting politics. the alterglobalisation movement is emblematic for these developments. they are indeed organised as a network of networks they intensively use the internet for information and mobilisation and mobile (including collective email) for direction on the ground their issues and concerns are global from the start they purposely choose global venues and heavily mediated world events to publicize their opposition and proposals. here is a quote by immanuel wallerstein, ‘world system’ theorist and historian, on the historic importance of porto alegre and its network approach to political struggle: “sept. 11 seems to have slowed down the movement only momentarily. secondly, the coalition has demonstrated that the new antisystemic strategy is feasible. what is this new strategy? to understand this clearly, one must remember what was the old strategy. the world’s left in its multiple forms communist parties, social-democratic parties, national liberation movements had argued for at least a hundred years (circa 1870-1970) that the only feasible strategy involved two key elements creating a centralized organizational structure, and making the prime objective that of arriving at state power in one way or another. the movements promised that, once in state power, they could then change the world. this strategy seemed to be very successful, in the sense that, by the 1960s, one or another of these three kinds of movements had managed to arrive at state power in most countries of the world. however, they michel bauwens 25 26 manifestly had not been able to transform the world. this is what the world revolution of 1968 was about the failure of the old left to transform the world. it led to 30 years of debate and experimentation about alternatives to the state-oriented strategy that seemed now to have been a failure. porto alegre is the enactment of the alternative. there is no centralized structure. quite the contrary. porto alegre is a loose coalition of transnational, national, and local movements, with multiple priorities, who are united primarily in their opposition to the neoliberal world order. and these movements, for the most part, are not seeking state power, or if they are, they do not regard it as more than one tactic among others, and not the most important.” (source: http://fbc.bingham ton.edu/commentr.htm) this analysis is confirmed by michael hardt, co-author of empire, the already classic analysis of globalisation that is very influential in the more radical streams of the anti-globalisation movement:”the traditional parties and centralized organizations have spokespeople who represent them and conduct their battles, but no one speaks for a network. how do you argue with a network? the movements organized within them do exert their power, but they do not proceed through oppositions. one of the basic characteristics of the network form is that no two nodes face each other in contradiction; rather, they are always triangulated by a third, and then a fourth, and then by an indefinite number of others in the web. this is one of the characteristics of the seattle events that we have had the most trouble understanding: groups which we thought in objective contradiction to one another—environmentalists and trade unions, church groups and anarchists—were suddenly able to work together, in the context of the network of the multitude. the movements, to take a slightly different perspective, function something like a public sphere, in the sense that they can allow full expression of differences within the common context of open exchange. but that does not mean that networks are passive. they displace contradictions and operate instead a kind of alchemy, or rather a sea change, the flow of the movements transforming the traditional fixed positions; networks imposing their force through a kind of irresistible undertow.” (http://www.newleftreview.net/nlr24806.shtml) 26 prajñâ vihâra 27 here is also a description by miguel benasayag of the type of new organisational forms exemplified in argentina: “les gens étaient dans la rue partout, mais il faut savoir quand même qu’il y a une spontanéité «travaillée», pour dire ce concept là. une spontanéité travaillée, cela ne veut pas dire qu’il y avait des groupes qui dirigeaient ou qui orchestraient ça, bien au contraire. quand arrivaient des gens avec des bannières ou des drapeaux de groupes politiques, ils étaient très mal reçus à chaque coin de rue. mais en revanche, une spontanéité «travaillée» en ce sens que l’argentine est «lézardée» par des organisations de base, des organisations de quartier, de troc... c.a.: lézardée, c’est un maillage? m.b.: oui, c’est ça, il y a un maillage très serré des organisations qui ont créé beaucoup de lien social. il y a des gens qui coupent les routes et qui font des assemblées permanentes pendant un mois, deux mois, des piqueteros. il y a des gens qui occupent des terres...donc cette insurrection générale qui émerge en quelques minutes dans tout le pays, effectivement elle émerge et elle cristallise des trucs qui étaient déjà là. donc c’est une spontanéité travaillée; c’est à dire que quand même il y a une conscience pratique, une conscience corporisée dans des organizations vraiment de base. c’est une rencontre du ras-le-bol, de l’indignation, de la colère populaire, une rencontre avec les organisations de base qui sont déjà sur le terrain. j’étais en argentine quelques jours avant l’insurrection. et il y avait partout des coupures de routes, des mini insurrections. et ce qui s’est passé, c’est qu’il y a eu vraiment comme on dirait un saut qualitatif: les gens en quantité sortent dans la rue et y rencontrent les gens qui étaient déjà dans la rue depuis très longtemps en train de faire des choses. et cela cristallise et permet de faire quelque chose d’irréversible. »(http://oclibertaire.free.fr/ca117-f.html) what is significant is that the argentinean demonstrators seemed to reject the whole political class, not just the established parties but also the left-wing radicals who wanted to speak for them and ‘centralise their struggles’, clearly opting for various forms of self-organisation! so here, the often decried anti-politics have a whole different context, not as a sign of apathy, but as a sign of rejection of hierarchical forms. also related is the extraordinary rapid resurgence in argentine of barter systems, based michel bauwens 27 28 on the local exchange trading systems, which in a very short time succeeded in mobilising hundreds of thousands of argentinians. some prospectivists, like the french thierry gaudin, have spoken of the need for such p2p survival networks, only means to survive the storms generated by the speculative financial economy. a report from the canadian security intelligence service has paid particular attention to the innovative organising methods of the alterglobalisation protesters, and to their use of technology: internet before and after the event and cell phones during the events. it concludes that with these innovations, established police powers have great difficulty to cope: “cell phones constitute a basic means of communication and control, allowing protest organizers to employ the concepts of mobility and reserves and to move groups from place to place as needed. the mobility of demonstrators makes it difficult for law enforcement and security personnel to attempt to offset their opponents through the presence of overwhelming numbers. it is now necessary for security to be equally mobile, capable of readily deploying reserves, monitoring the communications of protesters, and, whenever possible, anticipating the intentions of the demonstrators.” another example of p2p functioning is the network of independent journalists indymedia, which refuse to nominate ‘spokespeople’, and thus have been described in similar way: every node of the network is equally representative. of course, these networked forms of organising are not the sole preserve of the left, just as the forms of industrial organisation where avidly used by the nazis, who ideologically wanted to revert to an earlier age, witness the intensive way that the al qaeda forces have used networked technologies, networked forms of organisation etc.. as i have described in an earlier french-language issue on that particular subject. (unpublished, available from mbauwens@skynet.be). here’s an example of p2p organising at the extreme right, amongst the fastest growing radical religion today, the odinists: “today, the number of white racist activists, aryan revolutionaries, is far greater than you would know by simply looking at traditional organizations. revolutionaries today do not become members of an organization. they won’t participate in a demonstration or a rally or give out their 28 prajñâ vihâra 29 identity to a group that keeps their name on file, because they know that all these organizations are heavily monitored. since the late 1990s, there has been a general shift away from these groups on the far right. this has also helped odinism thrive. odinists took the leaderless resistance concept of [leading white supremacist ideologue] louis beam and worked on it, fleshed it out. they found a strategic position between the upper level of known leaders and propagandists, and an underground of activists who do not affiliate as members, but engage instead in decentralized networking and small cells. they do not shave their heads like traditional skinheads or openly display swastikas.” (http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/goframe.pl?refname=/intelligence project/ip-4q9.html) this last development allows a smooth transition to the next, perhaps unexpected description of peer to peer as a new emerging concept in the field of spirituality. 2. peer to peer in spirituality let us start with a revealing quote, from june campbell, a female practitioner of tibetan buddhism, who has been the ‘secret consort’ (lover) of the well-known tulku kali rinpoche, as she describes in the very interesting testimonial book, ‘traveler in space’. it shows the tension between what are perhaps valuable psycho-technologies, which can bring new forms of human awareness, but also how they are embedded in hierarchical, even feudal, forms of organisation: “tricycle: how did misogyny help male monastic practice? campbell: in the very popular text of milarepa’s life storywhich all lay people and monastics read—there are many expressions of ambivalence about women: how women are polluting, how they are an obstacle to practice, that at best women can serve others and at worst they are a nuisance. at the same time, women are transcendentalized into goddesses, dakinis, female aspects of being that men must associate with in order to reach enlightenment. on the one hand, the monastic boys were cut off from women, from maternal care, from physical contact, from a daily life in which women played nurturing and essential roles, and this whole secular way of life was michel bauwens 29 30 devalued in favor of a male-only society. and yet these boys grew into practitioners who needed women, either in symbolic form or real women as consorts, to fulfil their quest. so even misogyny, which was extensive in the monasteries, was used as a way of helping these young men in their practice. in order for patriarchy to survive, women had to be subjugated.” (http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/ int2002-02-08.htm) to make a long story short: june campbell describes in her book how the tibetan system puts woman in submissive positions, and because it does not honor their place in the spiritual system, and does not recognise the sexual needs of the male lama’s, it obliges women to enter into secret, hypocritical, and subordinate sexual relationships. but this is just one example of what happened on a massive scale in the late sixties, seventies and eighties. there was a massive spiritual hunger in the west (the demand), a supply in the east, but which was embedded in hierarchical and feudal relationships. if at least in their own countries these spiritual leaders where beholden to the controlling influence of tradition and convention, this was not the case in the west, and many devotees willingly gave up their critical and independent thinking only to be exploited by a whole series of ‘scumbag guru’s’ (david lane’s neural surfer website had a whole site on them, with extensive documentation of their misdeeds). thus in the nineties arose a critical counter-movement, expressed in books such as “the guru papers” by the kramers, and in a critique of the hierarchical assumptions of eastern spiritualities. as a result, there has been the emergence of a great number of circles, which are based on peer to peer relationships, where a number of spiritual searchers, which consider themselves to be equals, collectively experiment and confront their experiences. this has been elaborated into a methodology by john heron in his book “cooperative inquiry” and also in the important new book by jorge n. ferrer, revisioning transpersonal theory: a participatory vision of human spirituality. (suny, 2001.) “ferrer argues that spirituality must be emancipated from experientialism and perennialism. for ferrer, the best way to do this is via his concept of a “participatory turn”; that is, to not limit spirituality as merely a personal, subjective experience, but to include 30 prajñâ vihâra 31 interaction with others and the world at large. finally, ferrer posits that spirituality should not be universalized. that is, one should not strive to find the common thread that can link pluralism and universalism relationally. instead, there should be emphasis on plurality and a dialectic between universalism and pluralism.” (http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/watch/ferrer/index.cfm/xid, 76105/ yid,55463210) 3. global knowledge exchange and new cooperative social practices on the internet “left-leaning intellectuals have long worried about the way in which our public space shopping malls, city centres, urban parks, etc. have become increasingly private. other liberals, like writer mickey kaus, have emphasised the dangers to civic life of pervasive economic inequality. but the web has provided small answers to both these conundrums. as our public life has shrunk in reality, it has expanded exponentially online. acting as a critical counter-ballast to market culture, the web has made interactions between random, equal citizens, far more possible than ever before.” (http://www.andrewsullivan.com/text/hitsarticle.html?9,culture) the internet is a real revolution in human affairs. isn’t it indeed amazing that millions of people are freely producing and exchanging information and knowledge on the web? we are not talking of the thousands of companies that are doing it out of marketing viewpoints, but on the amazing emergence of this new form of intellectual cooperation that we are witnessing on such a massive scale. there have of course been various explanations for this. wellknown has been the essay on cybercommunism by richard barbrook, which explains the phenomena as a ‘gift economy’, while most business or economy oriented analysts have stressed the notion of an attention economy, which basically states that in a context of abundance, which characterises the information environment that is the internet, the only way to gain influence, is to gather the attention, in fact the only scarce good in a networked environment, and that this requires the giving out of knowledge and expertise. thus, shumpei kumon, the president of the michel bauwens 31 32 global communications institute in tokyo, has introduced the notion of the wisdom game. in short, he explains the changing nature of the rules used to distribute power in a society. in tribal and agricultural societies and feudal societies, whose nature was tributary (the social surplus was extracted by the permanent threat of force), social power depended on military strength, which allowed the dominant to extract a tribute. with capitalism, it was wealth itself that became the vehicle of power. rome was rich because it was strong, but america is strong because it is rich. but in the information society we have a twist: paramount becomes the role of ‘influence’. first of all, influence through the mass media (where of course private ownership plays a role in who can afford these type of massive investments), and it can be said that the vietnam war was not lost by the u.s. due to inferior military force, but because it lost the propaganda wars. but of course, increasingly this influence will be wielded through the internet, and an often-cited early example of this was the use of the medium by the zapatistas. in a knowledge-based economy, he says, there are emergent powers that are based on influence and brain power. again, this struggle for influence (or reputation) can only be a result of giving out information. there are thus strong incentives to share. in his own words: “the new social game that begins to prevail in the era of informatization is the game of wisdom, in which the goal is to acquire and exercise wisdom or intellectual influence by disseminating and sharing information and knowledge. some people call this the game of “reputation.” this contrasts with old games of wealth and prestige.” (4) david ronfeldt and john arquila, have also stressed the changing nature of power dynamics. in the print age, where information is still a scarce physical good, power is based on the control of those information streams, and it gives rise to the bureaucratic form of organisation. in a networked environment, characterised by overabundant streams of information, which are potentially accessible to everybody, power is the result of access and participation in the network itself, and it gives rise to a ‘cyberocracy’. ronfeldt and arquila have developed the notion of a new kind of politics, noopolitics, based on these ‘immaterial’ struggles for the hearts 32 prajñâ vihâra 33 and minds. a probably similar interpretation, which i have yet to read as i write this essay, is alexander barden’s “netocracy”. but one author goes in fact much further than this, stephan merten of oekonux.de, a site that wants to promote the free software paradigm as the example for other social practices, and eventually, as the central paradigm of a new type of society. he, in my opinion, correctly argues that the internet is not an exchange economy at all, because in fact, each produces according to his capabilities and desires, and each takes according to his needs, which is the very definition of communism by karl marx. he also notes that the original gift economy was also a form of oppression, because these gifts created obligations for those who received them, something that is not the case on the internet. two important aspects of these new social practices on the internet, which involve millions of users, and not just the thousands of programmers active around free software, is that the process is cooperative, and free. dutch academic kim veltman introduced the important and increasing role of cooperation as basic to the unfolding of civilisational forms: “major advances in civilization typically entail a change in medium, which increases greatly the scope of what can be shared. havelock noted that the shift from oral to written culture entailed a dramatic increase in the amount of knowledge shared and led to a reorganization of knowledge. mcluhan and giesecke explored what happened when gutenberg introduced print culture in europe. the development of printing went hand in hand with the rise of early modern science. in the sixteenth century, the rise of vernacular printing helped spread new knowledge. from the mid-seventeenth century onwards this again increased as learned correspondence became the basis for a new category of learned journals (journal des savants, journal of the royal society, göttinger gelehrten anzeiger etc.), whence expressions such as the “world of letters. the advent of internet marks a radical increase in this trend towards sharing. “(http://erste.oekonuxkonferenz.de/dokumentation/texte/veltman. html) a similar assessment of the evolution of cooperation, by scientist and evolutionary psychologist john stewart, who actively states that michel bauwens 33 34 cooperation is an evolutionary factor and that the next step for humanity should logically be a cooperative planetary organism: evolution’s arrow also argues that evolution itself has evolved. evolution has progressively improved the ability of evolutionary mechanisms to discover the best adaptations. and it has discovered new and better mechanisms. the book looks at the evolution of pre-genetic, genetic, cultural, and supra-individual evolutionary mechanisms. and it shows that the genetic mechanism is not entirely blind and random. evolution’s arrow goes on to use an understanding of the direction of evolution and of the mechanisms that drive it to identify the next great steps in the evolution of life on earth the steps that humanity must take if we are to continue to be successful in evolutionary terms. it shows how we must change our societies to increase their scale and evolvability, and how we must change ourselves psychologically to become self-evolving organisms organisms that are able to adapt in whatever ways are necessary for future evolutionary success, unfettered by their biological or social past. two critical steps will be the emergence of a highly evolvable, unified and cooperative planetary organisation that is able to adapt as a coherent whole, and the emergence of evolutionary warriors individuals who are conscious of the direction of evolution, and who use their evolutionary consciousness to promote and enhance the evolutionary success of humanity.” (at http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/papers/ reviewcomplexity.pdf ) if cooperation is part of evolution’s arrow and of the unfolding of the civilisational process, cannot the same can be said about the notion of free availability of goods and services? this has been explained in a underestimated book by a french philosopher, jean-louis sagotduvauroux, who wrote the book, “pour la gratuite”. the author stresses that many spheres of life are not dominated by state or capital, that these are all based on free and equal exchange, and that the extension of these spheres is synonymous with civilisation-building. here’s a quote: le rapport gratuit est quand même très différent du rapport marchand, même si le rapport marchand aboutit toujours à un rapport non marchand, à l’usage: quand vous achetez un abricot, il n’est qu’une pure marchandise au moment où vous hésitez entre lui, la pêche ou la 34 prajñâ vihâra 35 grappe de raisins, mais une fois que vous l’avez acheté et que vous le mangez, c’est votre capacité à apprécier son goût qui entre en jeu. la gratuité, c’est un saut de civilisation. a un moment donné, notre problème n’est plus de savoir si, oui ou non, notre enfant va aller à l’école, mais bien comment on va définir le rôle de l’éducation, assurer la réussite scolaire de chacun… les interrogations gagnent en qualité, en ambition, elles créent du lien social. la société a montré qu’elle savait étendre le champ de la gratuité à des domaines qui n’étaient pas donnés au départ, qui n’étaient pas donnés par la nature, par exemple avec l’école publique ou la sécurité sociale. dès lors, il m’a semblé que faire reculer la frontière, identifier les lieux où on peut repousser la limite de ce qui est dominé par le marché et libérer des espaces du rapport marchand, c’était une possibilité très importante, très concrète, très immédiate. cela ne renvoie pas à des lendemains ou des surlendemains qui chantent; ça peut se faire tout de suite et permettre ainsi d’expérimenter déjà une autre forme de rapport aux personnes et aux choses. la gratuité, rappelons-le, un bien vaut avant tout par son usage et n’a qu’accidentellement une valeur d’échange. «(http://www.peripheries.net/g-sagot1.htm ) 4. a new culture of work and being pekka himanen has examined another cultural aspect of peer to peer, based on his analysis of the work culture of the free software and hacker communities, in his book about “the hacker ethic”. in this book, he compares the protestant work ethic defined by max weber in his classic “the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism”, with the new mentality of hackers. a quote from the blurb: “nearly a century ago, max weber articulated the animating spirit of the industrial age, the protestant ethic. now, pekka himanen together with linus torvalds and manuel castells articulates how hackers* represent a new, opposing ethos for the information age. underlying hackers’ technical creations such as the internet and the personal computer, which have become symbols of our time are the hacker values that produced them and that challenge us all. these values promoted passionate and freely rhythmed work; the belief that individuals can create great things by joining forces in michel bauwens 35 36 imaginative ways; and the need to maintain our existing ethical ideals, such as privacy and equality, in our new, increasingly technologized society. this same aspect is discussed in a discussion note below by kris roose, who distinguishes the ‘secondary culture’, described originally by max weber, where one works, many times unpleasantly, to make a living and buy oneselves pleasures, and the tertiary culture, where the work itself becomes an expression of oneself (the ‘self-unfolding’ process described by stephan merten of oekonux, see below) and a source of direct pleasure. richard barbrook and other writers of a manifesto for ‘digital artisans’ had already described some of the elements of this culture as well: 4. we will shape the new information technologies in our own interests. although they were originally developed to reinforce hierarchical power, the full potential of the net and computing can only be realised through our autonomous and creative labour. we will transform the machines of domination into the technologies of liberation. 9. for those of us who want to be truly creative in hypermedia and computing, the only practical solution is to become digital artisans. the rapid spread of personal computing and now the net are the technological expressions of this desire for autonomous work. escaping from the petty controls of the shopfloor and the office, we can rediscover the individual independence enjoyed by craftspeople during protoindustrialism. we rejoice in the privilege of becoming digital artisans. 10. we create virtual artefacts for money and for fun. we work both in the money-commodity economy and in the gift economy of the net. when we take a contract, we are happy to earn enough to pay for our necessities and luxuries through our labours as digital artisans. at the same time, we also enjoy exercising our abilities for our own amusement and for the wider community. whether working for money or for fun, we always take pride in our craft skills. we take pleasure in pushing the cultural and technical limits as far forward as possible. we are the pioneers of the modern.” (http://www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk/hrc/theory/digitalartisans/t.1.1.1) but hackers are not in fact the only one’s exemplifying those values of working for passion, based on self-unfolding of one’s creativity 36 prajñâ vihâra 37 and desires, and in the context of peer-based relationships. a whole new generation of youngsters have shown to be ready for such social practices, as shown in a book like “the industrialisation of bohemia” and exemplified for a short number of years in the dynamism of the internet start-ups, before they were destroyed by the shorttermism of their venture capital backers. we are in fact talking about new ways of feeling and being! in our previous paragraph of peer to peer-based forms of political organising, we quoted miguel benasayag, who is the philosopher who is going furthest in identifying a new cultural substrata that makes p2p practices possible. (he has of course been influenced by the paradigmatic work of what we could call the ‘founding p2p philosophers’, gilles deleuze and felix guattari, whose first chapter of their classic “milles plateaux” is dedicated to a description of the ‘rhizome’, a complete peerbased network...) “c’est pourquoi nous pensons que toute lutte contre le capitalisme qui se prétend globale et totalisante reste piégée dans la structure même du capitalisme qui est, justement, la globalité. la résistance doit partir de et développer les multiplicités, mais en aucun cas selon une direction ou une structure qui globalise, qui centralise les luttes. un réseau de résistance qui respecte la multiplicité est un cercle qui possède, paradoxalement, son centre dans toutes les parties. nous pouvons rapprocher cela de la définition du rhizome de gilles deleuze : «dans un rhizome on entre par n’importe quel côté, chaque point se connecte avec n’importe quel autre, il est composé de directions mobiles, sans dehors ni fin, seulement un milieu, par où il croît et déborde, sans jamais relever d’une unité ou en dériver ; sans sujet ni objet.» “la nouvelle radicalité, ou le contre-pouvoir, ce sont bien sûr des associations, des sigles comme attac, comme act up, comme le dal. mais ce sont surtout et avant tout une subjectivité et des modes de vie différents. il y a des jeunes qui vivent dans des squats et c’est une minorité de jeunes -, mais il y a plein de jeunes qui pratiquent des solidarités dans leurs vies, qu n’ordonnent pas du tout leur vie en fonction de l’argent. cela, c’est la nouvelle radicalité, c’est cette émergence d’une sociabilité nouvelle qui, tantôt, a des modes d’organisation plus ou moins classiques, tantôt non. je pense qu’en michel bauwens 37 38 france, ça s’est développé très fortement. le niveau d’engagement existentiel des gens est énorme. » (http://www.peripheries.net/g-bensg.htm) this is clearly a description of a new existential positioning, a radical refusal of power-based relationships and a clear departure from the old oppositional politics, where the protesters where using the same authoritarian principles in their midst, than those of the forces they were denouncing. here are some further quotes, which highlight the new ‘radical subjectivities’ “contrairement aux militants classiques, je pense que les choses qui existent ont une raison d’être, aussi moches soient elles...”rien n’existe par accident et tout à coup, nous, malins comme nous sommes, nous nous disons qu’il n’y a vraiment qu’à décider de changer. les militants n’aiment pas cette difficulté; ils aiment se fâcher avec le monde et attendre ce qui va le changer.” “c’est toujours très surprenant: la plupart des gens ont un tas d’informations sur leurs vies, mais “savoir”, ça veut dire, en termes philosophiques, “connaître par les causes”, et donc pouvoir modifier le cours des choses.” “oui, l’anti-utilitarisme est fondamental. parce que la vie ne sert à rien. parce qu’aimer ne sert à rien, parce que rien ne sert à rien.” “on voit bien cette militance un peu feignante qui se définit “contre”: on est gentil parce qu’on est contre. non! ça ne suffit pas d’être contre les méchants pour être gentil. après tout, staline était contre hitler!” (http://www.peripheries.net/g-bensg.htm) iii. new zones of conflicts, new alternatives 1. peer to peer in a hierarchical world: conflict within individuals new subjectivities are arising, that desire self-unfolding of their creativity and peer-based working relationships. new cooperative production and distribution methods and p2p organisation forms are arising, often based on the free exchange of knowledge. but is the world ready for it? here is a quote that expresses what happens when a new p2p soul enters an existing organisation, giving voice to the dehumanising aspects of current forms of social organisation: “whether it is in response to us sensing that a new possibility exists for us on the horizons of our current ways of being, or whether it is to do with us sensing an 38 prajñâ vihâra 39 increasing lack, is difficult to say. but, which ever it is, there is no doubt that there is an increasing recognition that the administrative and organization systems, within which we have long tried to relate ourselves to each other and our surroundings, are crippling us. something is amiss. they have no place in them for us, for our humanness. while the information revolution bursts out around us, there is an emerging sense that those moments in which we are most truly alive and able to express our own unique creative reactions to the others and othernesses around us (and they to us), are being eliminated. in an over-populated world, there seems to be fewer and fewer people to talk to and less and less time in which to do it.” (http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds/) in fact, the current form of enterprises are of course still thoroughly hierarchic and authoritarian despite the many changes to networked and team-based forms of work, which stand in tension with the hierarchical format. this was described in the 1988 classic by robert jackall, “moral mazes”, in fact an in-depth anthropological study of the modern enterprise format: “when managers describe their work to an outsider, they almost always first say: ‘i work for [bill james]’ or ‘i report to [harry mills].’ and only then proceed to describe their actual work functions . . . the key interlocking mechanism of [modern corporate culture] is its reporting system. each manager . . . formulates his commitments to his boss; this boss takes these commitments and those of his other subordinates, and in turn makes a commitment to his boss . . . this ‘management-by-objective’ system, as it is usually called, creates a chain of commitments from the ceo down to the lowliest product manager or account executive. in practice, it also shapes a patrimonial authority arrangement that is crucial to defining both the immediate experiences and the long-run career chances of individual managers. in this world, a subordinate owes fealty principally to his immediate boss. “moral mazes goes on to describe how bosses use ambiguity with their subordinates (and other moreor-less unconscious subterfuges) in order to preserve the power to claim credit and deflect blame, which tends to perpetuate the personalization of authority. unlike a straight, max weber style bureaucracy, which is procedure-bound and rule-driven, a michel bauwens 39 40 patrimonial bureaucracy is a set of hierarchical fiefdoms defined by personal power and patronage.” here david isen’s describes the crucial shortcoming of the present system: “when there is good news, credit flows up — so the boss, personifying the organization, looks good to superiors. then credit flows up again. when there is bad news, it is the boss’s prerogative to push blame onto subordinates to keep it from escalating. bad news that can’t be contained threatens a boss’s position; if bad news rises up, blame will come down. this is why they shoot messengers. so it’s easier to ignore bad news. thus, jackall’s chemical company studiously ignored a $6 million maintenance item until it exploded (literally) into a $150 million problem. “to make a decision ahead of [its] time risks political catastrophe,” said one manager, justifying the deferred maintenance. then, once the mess had been made, “the decision [to clean up] made itself,” said another relieved manager.” (http://isen.com/archives/990601.html) or here is french sociologist philippe zafirian who describes a more general unease with the current system. “depuis plusieurs années, les enquêtes nationales ne cessent de nous indiquer une nette dégradation des conditions de travail, telle que les salariés la vivent et la déclarent. les enquêtes sociologique de terrain le confirment: c’est à un phénomène de vaste ampleur que nous avons affaire. les individus au travail souffrent et ils l’expriment. on pourrait certes débattre des moteurs internes de cette souffrance: tous les chercheurs ne sont pas d’accord sur ce point. mais il me semble qu’une réalité s’impose, par son évidence et son importance : les salariés plient sous la pression, elle les écrase. la pression n’est pas simple contrainte. toute personne se développe en permanence, dans sa vie personnelle, dans un réseau de contraintes. les indicateurs de cette pression, nous les connaissons bien : débit, rendement, délais clients, challenges, pression des résultats à atteindre, précarité de la situation, organisation de la concurrence entre salariés, salaire individuel variable… on y relève à la fois la reprise de vieilles recettes tayloriennes, mais aussi quelque chose de nouveau, de plus insidieux: la pression sur la subjectivité même de l’individu au travail, une force qui s’exerce sur son esprit, qui l’opprime de l’intérieur de lui-même, 40 prajñâ vihâra 41 qui l’aliène. mais il existe une autre facette de la situation actuelle: la montée de la révolte. celle-ci transparaît beaucoup moins dans les statistiques; elle s’extériorise moins en termes de conflits ouverts. toutefois, pour un sociologue qui mène en permanence des enquêtes de terrain, le fait est peu contestable. on peut pressentir l’explosion d’une révolte d’une portée équivalente à celle qui a secoué la france à la fin des années 60, début des années 70, lors des grandes insurrections des o.s (red: ‘ouvriers specialises’)., quelles que soit les formes d’extériorisation qu’elle prendra. la révolte n’est pas simple réaction à la pression. elle a des causes plus profondes. elle renvoie d’abord à une evolution profonde, irréversible, de la libre individualité dans une société moderne. elle touche enfin à ce phénomène important: à force de devoir se confronter à des performances, à des indicateurs de gestion, à une responsabilité quant au service rendu à l’usager ou au client, les salariés ont développé une intelligence des questions de stratégie d’entreprise. ils jugent, et d’une certaine manière comprennent les politiques de leurs directions, voire en situent les contradictions et insuffisances. mais il leur est d’autant plus insupportable d’être traités comme de purs exécutants, des machines sans âme et sans pensée propre, d’être en permanence mis devant le fait accompli. je pense que notre époque connaît un véritable renversement: bien des salariés de base deviennent plus intelligents que leurs directions et que les actionnaires, au sens d’une pensée plus riche, plus complexe, plus subtile, plus compréhensive, plus profondément innovante.» the citation from zafirian also points out the opposite problem from the one we introduced at the beginning of this section, and is thus not only about the pain of p2p souls entering old-style procedurial or patrimonial hierarchies, but also the opposite, the pain of the more traditional sectors of the population faced with the new demands of a hypercompetitive enterprise. these changes have been described in the already classic “le nouvel esprit du capitalisme” by luc boltanski and ève chiapello and show how a system has moved from a use of bodies to the demand for the engagement of the ‘whole ‘being’ of the new knowledge workers, an internalising of the priorities of the enterprise. but at the very moment that, since the eighties, the priorities of companies michel bauwens 41 42 have shrunk to the generation of only profits for the shareholders, this creates a tension with the value systems of the individuals. the new forms of peer to peer based work will of course have to accommodate the many different wishes and needs of various sectors of workers, and honor their differences. worth exploring are the different systems that indeed honour the different value systems, as pioneered by clare graves, the different schools of spiral dynamics, temenos from ray harris, and other integrative systems. 2. collective conflicts and the new enclosures two dominant spheres (we will not discuss the surviving precapitalist forms of social organisation) presently co-exist. the dominant sphere of commodity-based capitalism, and the new sphere of cooperative exchange. as they are driven by different logics, it is clear that this is an emerging and important conflict zone. the central problem is that most of the existing peer to peer emergence is based on the surplus created by the present economic system, and that many forms of peer to peer live from the wealth created by this system, being unable to sustain themselves independently. i am personally not convinced yet that peer to peer can sustain itself economically, and so are many of its proponents. this is the reason why many peer to peer oriented theorists point to the need of a ‘generalised citizen wage’, which would replace all existing transfers (unemployment, etc.) and allow for a generalisation of peer to peer activities, based on the surplus generated by the money economy. so, how will these different spheres indeed co-exist? there are in fact three hypotheses of their co-existence, conflict, or dominance: 1) will the cooperative sphere swallow the competitive sphere (thesis of stephan merten); 2) will they co-exist (richard barbrook, eric raymond) 3) will the competitive sphere completely eat the cooperative sphere. the latter is the thesis of jeremy rifkin’s age of access which is an attempt to describe the ways in which the economy is trying to swallow the cognitive and cultural spheres. 42 prajñâ vihâra 43 2.1 extending the cooperative sphere and replacing informational capitalism since peer to peer is functioning so well in the sphere of producing software, the pre-eminent form of social capital, and since our whole economy is becoming dominated by ‘immaterial processes’, what could be expected is that practices arising out of this new cooperative sphere would ‘infect’ the total economy. this thesis is the most radically expressed by stephan merten of oekonux, who calls for a gpl society, where the principles behind the general public license would gradually be extended to the whole society. here’s an extensive quote: as i tried to explain free software is not based on exchange so neither is a gpl society. how a gpl society may look like concretely can’t be determined fully today. however, at present there are many developments, which already point in that direction.. one development is the increasing obsolescence of human labor. the more production is done by machines the less human labor is needed in the production process. if freed from the chains of capitalism this development would mean freedom from more and more necessities, making room for more processes of self-unfolding be it productive processes like free software or nonproductive ones like many hobbies. so contrary to capitalism, in which increasing automation always destroys the work places for people and thus their means to live, in a gpl society maximum automation would be an important aim of the whole society.. in every society based on exchange which includes the former soviet bloc making money is the dominant aim. because a gpl society would not be based on exchange, there would be no need for money anymore. instead of the abstract goal of maximizing profit, the human oriented goal of fulfilling the needs of individuals as well as of mankind as a whole would be the focus of all activities.. the increased communication possibilities of the internet will become even more important than today. an ever-increasing part of production and development will take place on the internet or will be based on it. the b2b (business to business) concept, which is about improving the information flow between businesses producing commodities, shows us that the integration of production in the field michel bauwens 4.3 44 of information has just started. on the other hand the already visible phenomenon of people interested in a particular area finding each other on the internet will become central for the development of selfunfolding groups.. the difference between consumers and producers will vanish more and more. already today the user can configure complex commodities like cars or furniture to some degree, which makes virtually each product an individual one, fully customized to the needs of the consumer. this increasing configurability of products is a result of the always increasing flexibility of the production machines. if this is combined with good software you could initiate the production of highly customized material goods allowing a maximum of selfunfolding from your web browser up to the point of delivery.. machines will become even more flexible. new type of machines available for some years now fabbers are already more universal in some areas than modern industrial robots, not to mention stupid machines like a punch. the flexibility of the machines is a result of the fact that material production is increasingly based on information. at the same time the increasing flexibility of the machines gives the users more room for creativity and thus for self-unfolding.. in a gpl society there is no more reason for a competition beyond the type of competition we see in sports. instead various kinds of fruitful cooperation will take place. you can see that today not only in free software but also (partly) in science and for instance in cooking recipes: imagine your daily meal if cooking recipes would be proprietary and available only after paying a license fee instead of being the result of a world-wide cooperation of cooks. “the same type of ideas have been developed in great detail by michael albert and other proponents of ‘participatory economics’: “the underlying values parecon seeks to implement are equity, solidarity, diversity, and participatory self management. the main institutions to attain these ends are council democracy, balanced job complexes, remuneration according to effort and sacrifice, and participatory planning.” (http://www.parecon.org) the key question is of course, how do we get from a to b? 44 prajñâ vihâra 45 if it is true that the current form of informational capitalism is already creating enough surpluses to sustain such cooperative practices, it is also clear that most of them are not making money by themselves. currently, p2p programmers are often academics, students, or have other sources of income. thus, the current weaknesses of the model are that: 1) the hacker themselves are a varied bunch of individuals, with many different political positions, their only common point is their preference for the free flow of information and knowledge 2) peer to peer in the technological sense is the domain of technology-savvy hackers who have the same ‘absorptive capacity’ to collaborate on software projects; it is and remains a technological elite. nevertheless, the partisans of this approach are convinced that the nature of work in informational capitalism is already such that the ‘cooperative work’ of the knowledge workers is already expropriated, and that this situation can be reversed. this issue is effectively addressed by a group of social and economic thinkers, such as yann moulier boutang of the magazine multitudes, and other partisans of the universal social wage. they are strongly associated with the thinkers around tony negri, himself an offshoot of the autonomous marxism movement in italy, and with participants such as maurizio lazzarato, who just wrote a new book on the french philosopher gabriel tarde (title: “puissances de l’invention: la psychologie economique de gabriel tarde contre l’economie politique”), one of the pioneering thinkers of the immaterial economy, writing at the end of the nineteenth century!! “the modes of production and communication of knowledge lead us beyond the economy. we are beyond the necessity of socialising intellectual forces through exchange, division of labour, money or exclusive property. this does not mean that the relations of power between social forces are neutralised in fact, they show up as fertile matings or fatal shocks beyond the market and the exchange of wealth. this means that unavowed ethical nature of economic forces resurfaces powerfully as a single mode of “economic regulation” at the very moment in which economic production is subordinated to intellectual production.” (http://www.moneynations.ch/topics/euroland/text/ lazzarato.htm; http:/ /www.emery.archive.mcmail.com/public_html/immaterial/lazzarat.html) michel bauwens 45 46 in terms of strategies or tactics, these new schools of militancy no longer advocate revolution (or reform) but a diagonal approach. negri himself often refers to the roman empire and the rise of a counter-empire in its midst. when the christian movement arose, they were totally incomprehensible to the roman establishment, and themselves did not fight the empire (‘give unto caesar, etc..’), but instead, created a countersociety. when the empire disbanded, they were simply ready and the sole counterforce to survive intact. thus these new politics advocate a ‘diagonal’ and ‘hic et nunc’ approach of creating alternatives. ‘résister c’est créer’. 2.2 resisting informational capitalism of course, not everybody believes in this optimistic scenario. for many others, it is simply a matter of resisting the encroachment of the private sphere and to defend these new commons. a good spokesman for this strategy seems to be jeremy rifkin. according to rifkin and others, the extensive method of capitalist expansion, based on the geographical extension of its influence, as in colonialism or imperialism, is indeed over, and we are entering an intensive epoch, where the system is going deeper inwards, incorporating and transforming culture as a commodity. rifkin describes attempts such as leasing and other forms of paid access, and seems to describe the need for a defensive strategy, exemplified by the ‘exception culturelle’ in france, or movements such as slow food. his mantra is: defend the sphere of intimacy against the sphere of efficiency. but one thing is clear, traditional commodity-based and industrial capitalism does not know yet how to fruitfully incorporate the new sphere, although it will continuously try, but so far, as illustrated by the dotcom collapse, it has failed, says john perry barlow, himself a libertarian, and if i’m not mistaken, at one time a member of the republican party: “the whole dot-com thing was an effort to use 19th and 20th century concepts of economy in an environment where they didn’t exist, and the internet essentially shrugged them off. this was an assault by an alien force that was repelled by the natural forces of the internet.” (john perry barlow) (http://news.com.com/2008-1082-843349.html) 46 prajñâ vihâra 47 another example may be lawrence lessig, author of the war of ideas. he situates the field of struggle in the following ways: 1) the very architecture of the internet. as it originally embodied the peer to peer values of its founders, it is precisely this end to end architecture that has to be preserved in order to protect the integrity of its common infrastructure 2) the freedom of speech and association of the internet could be endangered by the encroachment of private interests, who start to monopolise portals and media sites, and can use copyright to silence many voices. thus, it is very important to defend the existence of the new digital commons that is the internet, against any attempts to privatise or disband it. 2.3 integration in informational capitalism of course, this is still a very likely scenario, as the system has shown its extraordinary capacity to integrate any challenges to its hegemony. this is the process that is best described by jeremy rifkin’s age of access, and that would entail a transformation of commoditybased capitalism towards a system based on ‘access’ to digital resources, and dominated by subscriptions, leasing systems, and the like. but if they eventually succeed and this cultural sphere is indeed taken over completely, the consequences would be quite negative, says rifkin, and with him jordan pollack: we will never own anything anymore, we will always be dependent on all kinds of licensing. “it seems to me that what we’re seeing in the software area, and this is the scary part for human society, is the beginning of a kind of dispossession. people are talking about this as dispossession that only comes from piracy, like napster and gnutella where the rights of artists are being violated by people sharing their work. but there’s another kind of dispossession, which is the inability to actually buy a product. the idea is here: you couldn’t buy this piece of software, you could only licence it on a day by day, month by month, year by year basis; as this idea spreads from software to music, films, books, human civilization based on property fundamentally changes.” (http://www.edge.org/documents/day/day_pollack.html) michel bauwens 47 48 this position is echoed by libertarian john perry barlow, cofounder of the electronic frontier foundation: “: i’m spending an enormous amount of my time stopping content industries from taking over the world—literally. i feel like we’re in a condition where private totalitarianism is not out of the question because of the increasingly thickening matrix of channels of communication owned by the same companies that own content, that own web properties, that own traditional media. in essence, they’re in a position to own the human mind itself. the possibility of getting a dissident voice through their channels is increasingly scarce, and the use of copyright as a means of suppressing freedom of expression is becoming more and more fashionable. you’ve got these interlocking systems of technology and law, where merely quoting something from a copyrighted piece is enough to bring down the system on you.” (http://news.com.com/2008-1082-843349.html) of course, this situation can also be described positively, in the sense that the hierarchical based forms of industrial capitalism, are being supplemented and partially replaced by the more humane peer to peer relationships. this is the position expressed by eric raymond, who advocates the use of open source software by the business community, and even by richard barbrook, who in his essay on cybercommunism stresses the co-existence and cooperation of the profit-driven system on the one hand, with the gift economy on the other hand and integrates it in his tenth paragraph of the manifesto for digital artisans, cited above. 2.4 digital commons (section to be developped: struggles around the new enclosures and the ‘digital commons’) 48 prajñâ vihâra 49 bibliography p2p technology peer to peer: sharing over the internet. bo leuf. addison wesley professional; isbn: 0201767325 p2p society the future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. by lawrence lessig. random house, 2001. jonathan rauch, kindly inquisitors and david brin, the transparent society each of these books contain compelling arguments for allowing decentralized social processes to regulate dangerous knowledge. in rauch’s book, he outlines the dangers of attempting to outlaw speech about ideas that are considered unacceptable, and in brin’s, he outlines the dangers of trying to limit the use of information gathering tools to a narrow class of acceptable users. in each case, they conclude that adversarial processes will limit the damage, and maximize the value. they deserve to be widely read and discussed. (note from david reed) webliography p2p technology the advantages of a p2p computing architecture explained by intel url = http://www.intel.com/ebusiness/products/peertopeer/ar010102.htm the p2p identity scheme unveiled by the liberty alliance (nokia, sun) against the passport scheme of microsoft url = http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99992550 mit papers on open source, perhaps the best collection, with many papers crossing over from technology to social, business, and organisational characteristics url = http://opensource.mit.edu/online_papers.php p2p business how proprietary software and open source work together url = http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3416—283153-0,00.html p2p organisation co-creating personal and professional knowledge through peer support and peer appraisal in nursing. thesis submitted by janet c.e. quinlan for the degree of phd of the university of bath, 1996 url = http://www.bath.ac.uk/carpp/jquinlan/titlepage.htm michel bauwens 49 50 p2p spirituality participation, organization, and mind: toward a participatory worldview david skrbina. carpp thesis 2001. url = http://www.bath.ac.uk/carpp/davidskrbina/summarycontents.htm cooperative inquiry is a pioneering methodology for peer-based spiritual experimenting, developed by john heron, now in new zealand url = http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/~jnheron/page2.html p2p society a defense of the open spectrum idea: airwaves are not physical property url = http://www.reed.com/openspectrum/ discussion notes 1. why p2p is a stronger model, both technologically and organisationally, than the hierarchical pyramidal modes – a contribution by kris roose definition each form of organization implies two information streams: from observation point towards decision point, and from decision point to execution point. observation and execution most often coincide, and anyway are much closer -in informational distanceto each other, than each of them to the central decision point. in an hierarchic organization model the first stream goes bottom-up, the second stream topdown. by gathering information at the top, only there we find a complete view of reality and decisions can be made more easily. in a peer-to-peer organization information freely flows from point to point. at each point a global view can be attained. the decisions can be made in global discussion, without the need of a central node. other considerations 1. on decision making one can discern three way of decision making, three ways of problem solving: (1) selection, (2) compromise and (3) integration. in selection, one alternative is selected out against the others, considered as “wrong” or “impossible”. in compromise a rapprochement is made between the alternatives, basically for psychologcial reasons: each contributor has the feeling that, although not completely, his views were at least partially taken into account, and nobody is the winner. in integration every detail of the contributions is taken into account, and all apparently unreconcilable were transformed (reformulated, retroduced to their essence) as to enable a peaceful and constructive combination of all elements. every contributor feels happy and motivated —at least if he agrees to redefine some of his contributions—, and the result has a much higher probability for success than if just one of the options had been chosen. although hierarchical organization doesn’t exclude integration in se, 50 prajñâ vihâra 51 the distance between information source and decision level is so big, that view transformations and secondary motivations (hidden agendas) can be added to the decision making process. as the concerned themselves only participate very poorly in the decision process, the decisions can be taken without complying with the “bottom”. e.g. every war is started against the will of the large majority of the concerned. in p2p the conclusion is more likely an integration, because everybody has the same possibility of participation in the decision making, and can protest when his contribution is not (enough) taken into account. 2. the intermediary agents / brokers as well goods as informations very often are not produced or available where they are needed. this distance allows a host of intermediary agents to settle them in a profitable situation. by creating a lack they create a control situation, and often take enormous) profit without adding value to the products. factors that enable lack creation include material and psychological distances, classified information (e.g. address lists), “licences”, etc. it can easily be calculated that the most important part of the price includes profits of brokers, taxes, etc. builiding a hierarchy also is a kind of parasitism. p2p is a way to reduce this phenomenon to the minimum. 3. the capacitating technology these high forms of communication are only possible with a technological substrate. sociocultural progress in general always implies material substrates. this is often forgotten in politics. noospheric conditions are only possible with the kind of technology internet procured us. 4. progress by hypes sociocultural evolution often makes progress by hypes. all of a sudden, a clear defined concept appears, and divulges at the velocity of light. everybody gets the meaning at once, and those concepts are quickly integrated into the existing social culture. so was, e.g., the notion of “participation” in the 1968 student revolts.”human resources” is another example, as were “evaluation”, “functional evaluations” (‘functioneringsgesprek’). “p2p” seems to be such a good sounding concept. 2. peer to peer needs to be complemented by integration technologies and integrative attitudes – a contribution by kris roose another application is the integrative communication style in an optimal relation. this style, described —in dutch— on http://psy.cc/9510.html , is not only a communication technique, but rather a series of fundamental attitudes towards each other. these attitudes are trained during the communication training. in fact, by disussing human relations and cooperative creativity, we leave the field of p2p. although p2p is an essential paradigm for human interaction and organization, more profound considerations on the integration process should be useful here — or at the begin of the text. these integration philosophy stems from two starting-points: michel bauwens 51 52 1. factual integration (the integration of needs and desires). a dynamic system only can reach equilibrium when the needs of the participating elements are maximally fulfilled. the nonfulfillment of any needs creates a source of disequilibrium that will challenge the structure as long as needs stay unfulfilled. integration is an advantage, not only for each element as such, but for the group as a whole. the whole cosmic evolution can be seen as one long journey towards global integration. the basic law, that in fact underpins all forms of moral and ethics, is: “each action must aim at a maximal integration of the needs of all concerned”. 2. conceptual integration (the integration of ideas). the probability that a diverging idea holds some useful information and intuition is indefinitely higher than the probability that a diverging idea is completely wrong. hence, to make decisions by choice is always erroneous, even if supported by wisdom or a majority. the probability that a thesis is right (“true”, although i prefer “plausible”) increases with the number of divergent contributions that are integrated. 3. the wisdom game – a contribution by kris roose in my own work, i distinguish between secondary and tertiary culture and it seems clear that the concept of the wisdom game is typical of a tertiary culture. in a secondary culture, there is a non-integration (or just a low integration) between earning and feeling happiness. one has to do things, often not captivating in themselves, to earn money, and then we can use this money to purchase agreeable things. on the other hand, the internet offers immediate reward (creativity, proudness, the kick of interacting with great systems). this explains perhaps why so many people -from hobbyists to hackersare prepared to work hours and hours on the net without any financial reward: just for the fun of it. but in the meanwhile they create a thesaurus of information, knowledge advancement and artworks. their game starts growing horribly real. furthermore, if “influence” is defined as the global effect of non-hierarchical interactions, it is a good measure for synergetic processes. i think that information (facts, knowledge, psychologcial skills) was also paramount in hierarchical organization. the strength of the managers is a function of their informational superiority. one can try to increase this superiority, but also to decrease the information and the feeling of a global view in the lower regions of the organization: top secret, control of media, limited education, prohibition of meetings, “divide et impera”, etc. 52 prajñâ vihâra article 4-2 161 book review class, culture and space: the construction and shaping of communal space in south thailand alexander horstmann, new brunswick (u.s.a.) and london (u.k.): transactions publishers. 2002. raymond scupin lindenwood university, u.s.a. compared with other regions of thailand, south thailand has been a somewhat neglected center of research for many decades. thomas fraser's classic ethnographic study of the fishing village known as rusembilan and louis golomb's work on ethnicity in the region, supplemented by some political science investigations by ladd thomas, astri suhrke and others, were conducted in the 1960s and 70s. in the 1980s muslim scholars in thailand including surin pitsuwan, arong suthasasna, hasan madmarn, and chaiwat satha-anand contributed major studies that placed the malay muslims of south thailand in their political, religious and cultural contexts. thai anthropologist chavivun prachuabmoh developed models for understanding gender and ethnicity among malay muslims, while uthai dulyasakem focused on educational institutions in the region. studies lagged on south thailand, however, in comparison with those on central, north, and northeast thailand. fortunately a new internationally-based group of scholars have been engaged in revitalizing the importance of south thailand in cultural, political, ethnic, and religious studies. a singaporean anthropologist, saroja dorairajoo, who under the direction of stanley tambiah at harvard, completed a ph.d. dissertation of an ethnographic study of a fishing village in the coastal province of patani is one of the new cohorts to initiate research in south thailand. dr. dorairajoo organized a wellattended international conference in patani in 2002 that highlighted the importance of this region for thailand. at this conference ryoko nishii a japanese scholar presented her ethnographic research on the coexistence of buddhist and muslim rituals in a village in the south. many prajñâ vihâra, volume 4, number 2, july-december, 2003, 161-164 161 © 2000 by assumption university press 162 other thai and non-thai scholars were in attendance who presented their research from the region. the first book in english that has emerged from this newly flourishing scholarship in southern thailand is an illuminating ethnography by the german scholar alexander horstmann who demonstrates that ethnic and religious identity in southern thailand is primordial/circumstantial, national/transnational, and is local, parochial, and territorialized as well as nonlocal, cosmopolitan, and deterritorialized in various social, political, and cultural contexts in what he designates as "communal space." earlier studies from the 1970s and 80s demonstrated that primordial identity politics were the basis of irredentist movements in the 1970s and 1980s. the pattani united liberation organization and other separatist and islamic movements were active during the 1970s and 1980s, which reinforced primordial tendencies linking muslims with the grandeur of sixteenth century pattani, the center of islam in that region of southeast asia. horstmann's recent analysis of the social and cultural space of middle class muslims and buddhists illustrates the highly variegated spectrum of ethnicity and identity construction in this fluid border region of thailand. his focus on the middle class in this border region reflects the approach of the postcolonial theorist and anthropologist arjun appadurai in describing an ethnoscape that conjoins the elements of mass media and transmigration. horstmann describes southern thailand as an ethnoscape that produces conditions of postmodern identity constructions as well as primordial religious and ethnic tendencies. following fourteen months of field work horstmann focused on a number of individual family case studies among the malay muslim, thai buddhist, and chinese populations of south thailand. he finds that despite the development of cosmopolitanism among the middle class populations in this ethnoscape that combines international media and transmigration, the everyday interaction among these populations still tends to reinforce narratives of "us" versus "them." horstmann notes that while the postcolonial school has "underlined the hegemonic and dominant location of national culture with regard to minority cultures," his case study of local level politics understands thai-ness as an important site of social struggle." he indicates that the top-down nation-state constructions of thai nationality have been losing force in south thai162 prajñâ vihâra 163 land. the educated middle class among the buddhist and muslim populations have been influenced by transnational religious developments. the middle class thai buddhists have been inspired by the universalistic buddhist reformism espoused by the famed buddhadhasa bhikkhu, whereas the muslims are integrating the revivalist conceptions into their local discourse as it emanates from the media in the middle east and southeast centers of islam. these middle class cosmopolitans in the southern thailand communities channel these global trends into local discourses. aside from the muslims and buddhists, horstmann also focuses on the chinese in these communities. in his collection of narratives, he finds that the chinese immigrants often maintain a form of dual identity selectively choosing between a chinese and sino-thai identity in their relationships with others. as the chinese travel and meet with other chinese from malaysia and other southern towns in thailand, a multinational chinese community has developed that focuses on ritual festivals, business and other communal activities. horstmann found that new forms of global islam have reinforced older ethnic and religious affiliations that centered on ancient pattani as a center of islamic thought and culture. during the 1990s the muslim minority community became more active in national affairs in thailand. wahda (unity), a muslim political group organized and supported muslim candidates for local and national offices. in some respects, the relationship between saudi arabia and the islamic discourse of that region has been influencing the local variants of islam. religious leaders who have studied in saudi arabia have introduced these forms of discourse into southern thailand. on the other hand, more modernist and moderate global forms of islam have been perpetuated by some local university cosmopolitans who have studied in egypt and the united states. traditional imams are losing ground to the more literalist and shariahoriented forms of islam emanating from the middle east. these networks of muslim religious leaders and their networks compete for influence in the ethnoscape of southern thailand. however, horstmann notes that the middle class malay muslims are becoming increasingly bilingual as a result of the penetration of a thai educational curriculum in the region. many of the malay students draw on the thai media along with the islamic media to develop multiple identities. these media conraymond scupin 163 164 sumers access national television news, internet sources, cable, local and international print media, local and transnational radio programming, satellite and video resources to re-imagine new forms of identities in the cultural space, which are sites for the continuous flow of images and ideologies in southern thailand. these new re-imaginings of identity have also been a feature of thai buddhist culture and politics in southern thailand. horstmann describes how middle class cosmopolitans based in songkla and ligor focus on the global reformist teachings of bhudhadhasa to accentuate their identity. these teachings provide the basis of local and translocal networks for the buddhist in the region. bhuddhadhasa's reformist theravada buddhist formulations emphasize the moral relationships between the individual and the community. he has revitalized interpretations of nibbana as a spiritual tradition that can be attained within this life rather than a future life. this has had a strong appeal among the cosmopolitan middle class buddhists. the teachings are also anti-consumer and anti-western in their overall orientation. this parallels the islamic reformist forms of moral discourse within the muslim communities. in both forms of moral discourse, thailand is viewed as a society invaded with capitalist consumerism and excessive forms of individuality fomented by western culture. horstmann records the narratives invoked to romanticize the home (baan) and local foods, local wisdom and culture that are juxtaposed with global forms of consumption and behavior. despite these re-imaginings and hybridization of identity among the chinese, muslims, and buddhists in southern thailand, horstmann acknowledges that both circumstantial and primordial aspects of ethnicity and religion are maintained. identity politics draw essentialized conceptions into focus among these populations. the old forms of stereotypes of buddhists, muslims, and chinese tend to persist among these communities. whether these new forms of identities will continue to become reconstructed and evolve in variant directions will be the basis for future research in this fascinating ethnoscape identified by horstmann. he, along with the new international group of scholars focusing on south thailand will undoubtedly enable us to understand the importance of this region in southeast asia. we look forward to these developments. 164 prajñâ vihâra 02_(20-50) forgetting2 forgetting and forgiving: a nietzschean perspective jean emily p. tan ateneo de manila university, philippines beautiful that war, and all its deeds of carnage, must in time be utterly lost; that the hands of the sisters death and night, incessantly softly wash again, and ever again, this soil’d world: ... for my enemy is dead__a man divine as myself is dead; i look where he lies, white-faced and still, in the coffin__i draw near; i bend down, and touch lightly with my lips the white face in the coffin. walt whitman, reconciliation what is the relation between forgiveness and forgetting? while it is true that one cannot be said to have forgiven another an offense simply because one has forgotten the offense __ if only because it is necessary that one know the offense for which one is granting forgiveness nevertheless, common ways of speaking attest to an intuition that there is an important relation between forgiveness and forgetting. for instance, one might respond to a friend’s apology by saying, “forget about it”, or simply, “it is forgotten”. it may be argued that in such instances, the alternative or accompanying expression “there is nothing to forgive”, should perhaps be taken quite literally since the offense in question may be too minor, thus rendering these expressions at best merely incidental and certainly non-paradigmatic cases of forgiveness. nevertheless, no matter how trivial the offense might be, it is clear that in such exchanges the disavowal of the need for forgiveness is not to be taken literally. there is indeed something to forgive and be forgiven for; in the injunction to the offending party to “forget about it” (speaking of a forgetting that has yet to occur and a deed that is still to be forgotten) and in the injured party’s claim that “there is nothing to forgive” (attesting to a forgiving that need no longer occur since it already has), forgetting serves 20 prajna vihara, volume16, number 1, january-june 2015, 20-50 2000 by assumption university press c ˜ as the token of forgiveness. forgiving and forgetting are not identical concepts, but in the expressions mentioned above, forgetting functions as a metonymic substitute for forgiveness. there must be an intrinsic relation that would account for this associative connection between these two concepts. if one were to say, “i forgive you, but i cannot forget what you have done to me”, then it would be tantamount to an admission that one has not yet succeeded in forgiving the other. such a statement would even cast doubt upon the truthfulness of the claim that one wishes to forgive but is unable to. in this case, memory serves as a token of a continuing resentment and of an absence or failure of complete forgiveness. in sarah kofman’s “shoah”, a poem of lamentation, the refusal to forgive the nazis arises directly out of the refusal to forget the injustice suffered by its victims __ both dead and living __ who continue to suffer the memory of the holocaust in different ways. for kofman, to forgive the holocaust is tantamount to nullifying the crime, to denying that an irrevocable crime had been committed and thus, in a sense, to accomplish the crime of “turn[ing] the jewish people to nothing”; whereas to refuse to forgive is to bear witness to the wrong that the victims suffered. to forget the crime is to double the injury by betraying its victims. forgiving, in this account, is a betrayal of memory: because the “final solution”, the vernichtung, is the diabolical will wanting what happened not to have happened das geschehene ungeschehen zu machen it is wanting to turn the jewish people to nothing. without preserving anything. without remainder. without aufhebung. it is wanting to make the jews’ existence null, to make them un-happened, to gather up the jews, one by one, to nullify them up to the last one. … we will not pardon [faire grace] the nazis for this crime, render it null, make it un-happened, nullify it in forgiveness and forgetting. we will not listen to faurisson: he does not deny the existence of the gas chambersjean emily p. tan 21 he repeats, accomplishes the nazi deed. he negates the event; turns it into nothing, nullifies the crime, pardons [grâcie] hitler: das geschehene ungeschehen ist! so that those who died at auschwitz may not be the last of the jews that their memory may not be murdered let us not forget this event!1 it is in view of the demand to respect the claims of memory and the victim’s radical freedom to grant or withhold forgiveness2 that derrida insists on the aporia of forgiveness, namely, that “forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable”.3 in order to avoid normalizing the horrors of evil and compromising the pure and gratuitous character of forgiveness, derrida resists all attempts to neutralize the aporia of forgiveness by subsuming it to teleological explanations: i shall risk this proposition: each time forgiveness is at the service of a finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time that it aims to re-establish a normality (social, national, political, psychological) by a work of mourning, by some therapy or ecology of memory, then the ‘forgiveness’ is not pure __ nor is its concept. forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, normalising. it should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality.4 that forgiveness “should remain exceptional and extraordinary”, in other words, that one should not forgive too easily or forget too quickly, that society is not within its rights to enjoin the victim to forgive those who have wronged him in the name of national reconciliation__this uncompromising refusal to have the “ordinary course of historical temporality” appropriate what injustice has placed ‘out of joint’ is but the proper response to a traumatological understanding of fault. it is a recognition of the world-destroying, meaning-shattering essence of trauma inflicted by that which is experienced by the victim as unforgivable, as well as an acknowledgement of the human propensity to simply ignore the incom22 prajna vihara ̃ prehensible and take refuge in the habitual and the “normal” in order to save oneself the trouble of accounting for the unaccountably real.5 forgetting seems to present itself as an escape from the aporia of forgiveness. as a part of “some therapy or ecology of memory”, forgetting is understood here as an easy solution to the suffering sustained by memory. this is perhaps why in the following passage, although derrida acknowledges the role of memory in forgiving, he quite forcibly and unequivocally rejects the identification of forgiveness with forgetting: there is no forgiveness without memory, surely, but neither is there any forgiveness that can be reduced to an act of memory. and forgiving does not amount to forgetting, especially not.6 in his book forgiveness,7 charles griswold also insists on disengaging forgiving from its identification with forgetting. although in contrast to derrida, griswold does not make the unforgivable the paradoxical condition of the possibility of forgiveness, nevertheless, in the interest of preserving the ethical significance of forgiveness,8 griswold insists that forgiveness cannot simply be the “forgetting” of resentment: … if x stops resenting y, it does not follow that x has forgiven y; amnesia, for example, is not the same thing as forgiveness. so forgiveness cannot simply be forswearing resentment, even though it does require at least the moderating of resentment. we recognize a different phenomenon, namely that of letting go of resentment for moral reasons, as well as of revenge, without forgetting the wrong that was done, and even in some cases (re)accepting the offender as a friend. this is what we are calling forgiveness.9 what does ‘letting go of resentment for moral reasons’ mean? it means that forgiveness is understood as a reckoning with fault __ it has to do with questions of justice (whether the offender has shown himself desiring and thus, to that extent, deserving of forgiveness), of the rightness of one’s anger and resentment (whether the resentment is proportional to the offence as well as to the offender’s efforts at contrition, reparation, and reform) and of the victim’s moral character (what sort of jean emily p. tan 23 person does forgiving or resenting make one), as well as of the possibility of re-establishing a community with the offender. both derrida and griswold insist on the necessity of remembrance in forgiveness. forgiveness demands that the one who suffers not forget but rather be able to remember without rancour. but can we have it both ways? can we have both memory and forgiving? or is forgetting in some way necessary for forgiving? and if it is indeed in some form necessary, what would this form consist in? how are we to understand the forgetting that is associated with and functions as a metonymic substitute to forgiving? although derrida and griswold are right to say that forgiveness is not merely forgetting, i would argue that forgetting is not antithetical to forgiveness or even merely an incidental effect of it, but is intrinsically related with forgiving as one of its necessary conditions because forgiveness is inextricably linked with the reality and memory of suffering. forgiveness is more than an intellectual judgment granted to someone who has offended one. it is a decision that strongly implicates the order of the affects, having to do with feeling anger, grief, humiliation, resentment, and with the desire to retaliate and avenge oneself. to be able to remember a wrong without despising the offender requires that one has become or remains strong enough to endure the memory of past pain without being engulfed by despair and without suffering the memory as a torment of humiliation. in what follows, i will argue that although forgiveness is intersubjective, it also has a subjective aspect. it presupposes a certain quality of relatedness to the self that constitutes the capacity to forgive. it is in the context of this self-relation that i wish to locate forgetting as it relates to forgiveness. in particular, forgetting belongs to the aspect of pathos in this self-relation. the ambiguous nature of forgetting as being halfway between activity and passivity, between agency and receptivity, comes to light in nietzsche’s notion of active forgetting. if forgetting is both an activity (a doing) and a receptivity (a way of being affected), and if as such it constitutes an element of forgiving, then forgiveness, too, is implicated by the double nature of forgetting. forgiveness is an act that one does, a judgment __ or the non-judgment? __ that one grants the other from the depths of one’s being; but at the same time, forgiveness is also something that comes to the forgiver, a relational disposition of the sufferer’s being that cannot be summoned to oneself to pronounce to another by sheer force of the will. 24 prajna vihara ̃ although on one hand, it can be said that one can forget because one has forgiven, on the other hand, could we not say that one forgives only to the extent that one can forget? to think that forgetting is merely an after-effect of forgiving is to misconstrue the relation between forgiveness and forgetting due to the presupposition that forgiving is a pure act of the will and forgetting, merely a passive amnesia. by complicating our understanding of forgiving and forgetting as both act and passion, we gain a better appreciation not only of the fragility of forgiveness but also of the unexpected strength afforded us by our forgetting. forgiveness and power hannah arendt posits a connection between forgiveness and power. according to arendt, forgiveness preserves the power of humans to act by preserving the power to begin new actions. given the fact that the plurality of agency naturally gives rise to inevitable and unanticipated transgressions, without forgiveness, human beings would be tied to the unforeseen and unavoidable consequences of their actions. but trespassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly. only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new.10 this “constant mutual release from what they do” is at the same time a “constant willingness to change their minds and start again”. arendt situates forgiveness in the context of the web of relations formed by actions. within this perspective, arendt asserts that trespassing “needs forgiving” without making a distinction between the trespasser’s need to be forgiven or the need of the trespassed to forgive. presumably, the “constant willingness to change … minds and start again” includes both each person’s willingness (or need?) to change his mind about himself as well as about the other __ on the side of the transgressor, this would consist in repenting, and in the case of the transgressed, in forgiving and jean emily p. tan 25 letting go of his resentment. as a result of this changing of minds, the mirroring burdens of guilt and resentment are lifted and the relation between persons is maintained, making it possible for both agents to “start again” and “begin something anew”. presumably, since agents are mutually implicated and implicating in the web of actions and their unintended effects, no agent is ever entirely blameless or unharmed. likewise, insofar a” no one in this regard is radically evil. in this context of the mutuality of agency and transgression, one’s willingness to forgive can also be seen as a confession of one’s own need for forgiveness, just as one’s appeal for forgiveness also functions as a promise to __ in turn __ forgive. arendt’s succeeding comments about the limits of forgiveness and human power show that there is a reciprocal relation between power and forgiveness: not only does forgiveness preserve the power to act, but it also presupposes that this power exists, that one somehow remains able to either forgive or punish. where this power is destroyed, there __ where radical evil has occurred __ forgiveness, as well as punishment (the other, more manifest mark of power), is no longer possible. the line would have been crossed between trespass (hamartia) and offense (skandala),11 between what is forgivable (and punishable) and what is unforgivable and hence can only be subject to divine __ no longer human __ judgment: the alternative to forgiveness, but by no means its opposite, is punishment, and both have in common that they attempt to put an end to something that without interference could go on endlessly. it is therefore quite significant, a structural element in the realm of human affairs, that men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish and they are unable to punish what turned out to be unforgivable. this is the true hallmark of those offenses which, since kant, we call ‘radical evil’ and about whose nature so little is known, even to us who have been exposed to one of their rare outbursts in the public scene. all we know is that we can neither punish nor forgive such offenses and that they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically destroy wherever they make their appearance. here, where the deed itself dispossesses us 26 prajna vihara ̃ of all power, we can indeed only repeat with jesus: ‘it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea’.12 the difficulty of course is that it cannot be decided in advance what is forgivable and what is unforgivable. the problem arises not only from the fact that, as arendt admits, “so little is known” of what is socalled radical evil (we could say that our understanding is also rendered powerless by such deeds), but from the paradox that it is forgiveness itself which, in the act of forgiving, retroactively determines the forgivable as such. moreover, as derrida insists, against arendt's schematic differentiation between the realm of the forgivable and the unforgivable, it is the unforgivable that we experience as calling for forgiveness. as derrida points out, it is that deed which one cannot excuse or understand, and not merely the wrong that the agent had “done unknowingly” that one recognizes as having to be forgiven. it is the unforgivable that tests the human power to forgive. i bring up derrida not in order to settle the question of the possibility or impossibility of forgiveness, but merely to point out the centrality of the idea of power in the question of forgiveness. in light of the idea that injustice dispossesses humans of power __ the power to act and the power to punish or forgive __ we can read derrida's insistence on conceptualizing forgiveness at the limit of the unforgivable as underscoring the idea that the unforgivable is a test of the human, all too human power to forgive.13 to say that we cannot decide beforehand what is forgivable and what is unforgivable apart from the struggle to forgive what appears to us as unforgivable is to say that there is no way to determine in an abstract and general way the limit of our power to act, to forgive, and to begin anew. nietzsche on power and forgetting guided by arendt’s analysis of action and forgiveness, we have come to understand injustice (both in the sense of forgivable transgressions and unforgivable crimes) as a dispossession of power, in particular, the power to begin anew. without the exercise of the power to punish or forgive, human beings remain indefinitely lodged in a course of mutual resentment and retaliation, unable to move beyond past bitterness onto new paths. implicit in the power to initiate new actions is the power to forget __ the power to counter the tendency to repeat the past in the unremitting recollection of traumatic suffering. jean emily p. tan 27 but what would it mean to speak of forgetting as a power? isn’t forgetting another form of dispossession? is it not in fact a suffering of a loss of memory and hence to some extent a loss of self? it is to nietzsche that i now turn for a conception of forgetting in terms of power and with a view to its creative possibilities. in the second essay of on the genealogy of morals, nietzsche distinguishes an active forgetfulness from a “mere vis inertiae”14 that is to say, a merely passive wearing away or effacement of memory due to an inertness, a kind of impassivity that is unable to retain impressions as memory.15 in contrast to this, nietzsche conceives of active forgetting as a “positive faculty of repression” necessary for keeping “psychic order” since “our organism is an oligarchy”: to close the doors and windows of consciousness for a time; to remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our underworld of utility organs working with and against one another; a little quietness, a little tabula rasa of the consciousness, to make room for new things, above all for the nobler functions and functionaries, for regulation, foresight, premeditation (for our organism is an oligarchy) __ that is the purpose of active forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a preserver of psychic order, repose and etiquette: so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness. the man in whom this apparatus of repression is damaged and ceases to function properly may be compared (and more than merely compared) with a dyspeptic __ he cannot “have done” with anything.16 nietzsche’s active forgetfulness is a difficult notion to grasp because it designates something halfway between action and passion, between agency and receptivity. it is an act that belongs to the individual, indeed as a sign of its good health, but an act which consciousness itself does not possess, but upon which the possibility of consciousness rests. for nietzsche, the “tabula rasa of the consciousness” is possible only because time and again one “close[s] the doors and windows of consciousness”, choosing to “remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our underworld of utility organs working with and against one another”. it is interesting to note that consciousness buys itself the peace 28 prajna vihara ̃ and quiet necessary for its functioning not by comprehending or mediating, certainly not by being constantly aware of the “noise and struggle of our utility organs” but simply by disregarding these. consciousness needs some un-consciousness for it to be. “no happiness, …no hope, no pride”, nietzsche writes, “without forgetfulness”. and since without forgetfulness, one “cannot ‘have done’ with anything”, might we not add, “no forgiveness”? ressentiment comes about when unable either to retaliate or to forget, one who has suffered harm from another “cannot ‘have done’ with anything”,17 and is lodged in a state, which nietzsche acerbically likens __ more than likens __ to dyspepsia, in which “this apparatus of repression is damaged or ceases to function properly”. the metaphor of dyspepsia suggests a connection between memory and ressentiment, which is not to say that the two always coincide. not all memory is resentful remembering, although some kind of memory is necessarily characteristic of ressentiment. in the second essay, nietzsche offers a nuanced account of the relation between memory and forgetting within the context of a genealogy of the sovereign individual. in gm ii 1, active forgetting is presented as a natural tendency, in fact a vital need, that the human animal had to counter to some extent and even suspend in some cases by breeding in itself the “opposing faculty” of memory, in order for him to give birth to the sovereign individual by becoming “calculable, regular, necessary”.18 now this animal which needs to be forgetful, in which forgetting represents a force, a form of robust health, has bred in itself an opposing faculty, a memory, with the aid of which forgetfulness is abrogated in certain casesnamely in those cases where promises are made. this involves no mere passive inability to rid oneself of an impression, no mere indigestion through a once-pledged word with which one cannot “have done”, but an active desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something desired once, a real memory of the will: so that between the original “i will”, “i shall do this” and the actual discharge of the will, its act, a world of strange new things, circumstances, even acts of will may be interposed without breaking this long chain of will.19 jean emily p. tan 29 how is this active memory to have been bred in man? nietzsche speculates that this opposing will to remember, to extend one’s will into the future, to remain the same, could not have been easily attained and had to have been “burned in” by painful means: one can well believe that the answers and methods for solving this primeval problem [i.e., memory] were not precisely gentle; perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. ‘if something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory’__this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth.20 thus, nietzsche posits a direct causal relation between pain and memory. but how could pain as a purely passive experience of subjectivity possibly give rise to the human being’s sovereignty? how can suffering give rise to self-rule? wouldn’t pain itself have to be taken in hand, somehow tamed and overcome, in order for it to make way for the creative “i will”? although nietzsche asserts that “only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”, we should also observe that a remembered pain is in some way a different pain; it is somehow a duller pain, which is to say, to a certain extent, a forgotten pain. it seems that a dose of forgetting is necessary for remembrance. might we not say that the nietzschean revaluation of values is in a sense a grand, historical deployment of the active faculty of repression? in taking pride and pleasure in his own power, freedom, and self-mastery, doesn’t man temper through his forgetting the remembrance of the pain which was the price of his self-mastery? in other words, in order for suffering to give birth to the sovereign individual __ to conscience, to the “privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate”21 __ instead of merely leading to ressentiment and the bad conscience, man not only had to cultivate memory but also the active forgetting which would enable him to master suffering instead of succumbing to servitude to pain. what is at stake in the question whether a person has an unimpaired capacity to forget actively or whether he is of a type that is constitutionally unable to have done away with anything is the quality of one’s relation to pain. does one have an active or a reactive relation to suffer30 prajna vihara ̃ ing? nietzsche shows that ressentiment is a reactive pathos __ it proceeds from weakness rather than being an expression and affirmation of one’s own strength. unable to overcome his suffering by forgetting it or by avenging himself upon his enemy, the resentful person impotently deals with the suffering by enshrining it, and taking his satisfaction in identifying himself with it, and even finding his justification in it. nietzsche’s account of ressentiment is undergirded by an understanding of memory and forgetting in which each of these concepts is doubled by the distinction between their active and passive (reactive) form. nietzsche’s treatment of memory and forgetting may be schematized in the following way: forgetting (-) a1 passive wearing away of memory (inability to remember, inability to extend one’s willing) (-) b1 passive inability to forget (dyspepsia) memory a (+) active forgetting (repression) the sovereign individual b (+) active memory (memory of the will, the will extending its desire) b1 is compatible with the reactive pathos of ressentiment. in ressentiment, the inability to avenge oneself leads to the inability to forget and be done with the injury suffered. as to a1, apart from contrasting it to active forgetfulness, nietzsche does not say much about passive forgetting22 (forgetting as a mere vis inertiae). nevertheless, we could extrapolate that just as active forgetting (a) and dyspepsia (b1) are antithetical to each other, so active memory (b) would also be opposed to a merely passive forgetting (a1) __ a “forgetting” that may be more precisely considered as an inability to remember, an jean emily p. tan 31 inertia against memory. sovereignty would be impossible to attain for such a subject who is unable to remember, someone for whom even pain fails to be a teacher. such a person would be unable to remain one in himself; for such a person, the absence of ressentiment would be a mark not of strength, power, and well-being, but merely of an absence of an integral, and well-ordered self. it is in the positive and necessary tension between active forgetting (a) and active memory (b) that nietzsche locates the struggle of the individual to attain sovereignty. active memory is the temporal extension of one’s will. it is at its core the will to will the same, to will oneself as the same, as one will. but while this will for stasis has to run counter not merely to the passive tendency to forget but also __ and possibly with greater difficulty __ to active forgetfulness, it nevertheless requires the capacity to forget. active forgetting has to clear a space within the cacophony and struggles of the internal world, for there to be room for memory to descend and take root. to remember is to select. for every yes to which memory tenaciously clings, there had to have been a multitude of denials that forgetfulness had to discharge: experiences, feelings, desires, pains, pleasures which in the mysterious depths of our internal world, the self chooses not to will continuously for and as part of itself. and when memory threatens to buckle under the weight of its own remembering __ or, to use nietzsche’s metaphor, when memories sit undigested in the pit of one’s stomach __ memory needs forgetting to overcome itself. memory allows man to will himself, to will the same will through time, but self-overcoming, the capacity to will something new or, more precisely, to renew the very willing of oneself, cannot be had without the activity of self-forgetting. what does nietzsche teach us about forgetting? first, forgetting understood as active forgetting is properly conceived as an active pathos. it is a pathos in the sense that it belongs to the realm of the instinctive, unconscious drives rather than in the sphere of conscious willing. however, it is not for this reason merely passive. this active forgetting is creative; it is indispensable to the revaluation of values and the creation of new ones. it is a primal expression of an individual’s wellbeing to be able to push back, to set aside, to reject what it does not wish to internalize, and to be able to clear a space for a new movement, a new formation, a new ordering of values, rather than indiscriminately succumbing to the oppressive burden of old injuries and to the inertia of 32 prajna vihara ̃ past formations and encrusted ways of being. forgetting is an activity, a negative act of creation in the way that the expulsion of breath is no less an essential part of breathing than inhaling. secondly, for nietzsche, forgetting (whether active or reactive) occurs within the context of comparative exercises of power. this means that forgetting __ and especially active forgetting __ is to be understood agonistically in at least two levels: first, as has been noted, there is the struggle between memory and forgetting. secondly, the painful struggle of memory and forgetting finds its impetus and expression in the interpersonal level, specifically, nietzsche suggests, in the sphere of contractual relations: it was here [i.e., in the sphere of contractual relationships] that promises were made; it was here that a memory had to be made for those who promised; it is here, one suspects, that we shall find a great deal of severity, cruelty, and pain. to inspire trust in his promise to repay, to provide a guarantee of the seriousness and sanctity of his promise, to impress repayment as a duty, an obligation upon his own conscience, the debtor made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he would substitute something else that he ‘possessed’, something he had control over; for example, his body, his wife, his freedom, or even his life […]. above all, however, the creditor could inflict every kind of indignity and torture upon the body of the debtor […].23 keeping in mind the distinction between active memory and a mere inability to forget, it is crucial to note that for nietzsche, promisemaking is not the effect of memory __ one promises not simply because one cannot help but remember one’s obligations. on the contrary, memory __ active memory __ is created as an exigency of promise-making. it is in order to prove oneself worthy of the esteem of others, to prove that one’s word is worth its weight in gold, so to speak, that one creates memory, this active faculty of extended will. just as memory is conceived by nietzsche from an agonistic perspective of individuals “calculating power against power”,24 forgetting likewise begs for an agonistic interpretation in the interpersonal plane. this agonistic interpretation of forgetting is not immediately apparent in jean emily p. tan 33 gm ii because the notion of “active forgetfulness”, is overtaken by memory and promise-making in the interest of giving a genealogy of the sovereign individual. if “forgetting” seems to drop out of consideration, it is simply because it is replaced by the discharge of obligation, either in the form of repayment or punishment. both memory and forgetting are framed within human beings’ exercise of their power against one another and upon themselves, in which they make claims upon one another and assert their own worthiness to make these claims. in gm ii, which is devoted to the genealogy of the bad conscience, guilt is placed within a constellation of ideas which include indebtedness, punishment, justice, and __ at the limit of justice __ mercy. before the birth of the bad conscience, using “the criteria of prehistory”,25 that is to say, before the birth of the human genius for self-torment, guilt in the sense of “personal obligation”26 is conceived in connection with indebtedness. “personal obligation” is experienced as measuring up to others. to harm another is to incur a debt, which one ought to pay back by accepting punishment from one’s creditor. according to nietzsche, for this primitive sort of morality, “everything has its price; all things can be paid for”: … it was rather out of the most rudimentary form of personal legal rights that the budding sense of exchange, contract, guilt, right, obligation, settlement, first transferred itself to the coarsest and most elementary social complexes […], together with the custom of comparing, measuring, and calculating power against power. the eye was now focused on this perspective; and with that blunt consistency characteristic of the thinking of primitive mankind, which is hard to set in motion but then proceeds inexorably in the same direction, one forthwith arrived at the great generalization, ‘everything has its price; all things can be paid for” __the oldest and naïvest moral canon of justice, the beginning of all ‘good-naturedness’ all ‘fairness’, all ‘good will’, all ‘objectivity’ on earth. justice on this elementary level is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an ‘understanding’ by means of a settlement __and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves.27 34 prajna vihara ̃ if nietzsche locates the origin of morality in the sphere of indebtedness, it is not because he reduces the morality of human interaction to economic transactions. the point is not to presuppose the existence of an economic perspective of commensurable values upon which justice is grounded, but rather, to show that the concept of exchange and relative valuation is the outcome of the interaction of a multiplicity of powers. the dictum ‘everything has its price; all things can be paid for’ does not speak of an abstract and universal system of valuation, but is a concrete assertion of each one’s comparable power. to submit oneself to punishment is to assert one’s nobility in being able to pay one’s debts. it is also a recognition of the nobility of one’s victim, who now exercises his right to demand compensation for his pain through the pleasure of inflicting pain upon one. punishment is seen as a discharging of a debt. what has been punished can now be forgotten. from the creditor’s perspective, punishing his enemy allows him to forget the offense. likewise, having been punished, the offender is freed from his obligation, he is now free to forget. through the exercise of his power in punishing the offender, the offended party is able to discharge the burden of suffering as well as the burden of hatred. on the other hand, to remember another’s offense binds oneself to the weight of past injury as well as to the offender. to remember an offense one has suffered is to maintain one’s claim to the other’s suffering __ even if it were only the suffering of humbling oneself in apologizing to another whom one has offended. likewise, an offender who recognizes his debt but has not atoned for it continues to be enslaved by his obligation. from the perspectives of both debtor and creditor, punishment can therefore be seen as a discharging of the burden of memory. and what of forgiveness? punishment and retaliation are not the only means by which the discharge of suffering and indebtedness may be effected. in gm ii, 10, nietzsche speaks of mercy (gnade) as the selfovercoming of justice (gerechtigkeit). this transition from justice (that discharges the offense by exacting payment for it through punishment) to mercy (that grants pardon to the offender) is mediated by a growth in the power of the community, towards which the individual recognizes a relation of indebtedness: still retaining the criteria of prehistory (this prehistory is jean emily p. tan 35 in any case present in all ages or may always appear): the community, too, stands to its members in that same vital basic relation, that of the creditor to his debtors. one lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of a communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the ‘man without peace’, is exposed […] since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injuries and hostile acts.28 with the growth in society’s power, the harm that the individual can do is no longer as threatening or as destructive as it once was. the transgressions of the individual can now be more easily isolated and contained, and so punishments of these transgressions become less violent, less harsh. society now regulates the violence of punishments inflicted upon the offender. in so doing, society is able to prevent the escalation of violence that an unending cycle of retaliation would bring about: as its power increases, a community ceases to take the individual’s transgressions so seriously, because they can no longer be considered as dangerous and destructive to the whole as they were formerly: the malefactor is no longer ‘set beyond the pale of peace’ and thrust out; universal anger may not be vented upon him as unrestrainedly as before-on the contrary, the whole from now on carefully defends the malefactor against this anger, especially that of those he has directly harmed, and takes him under its protection. a compromise with the anger of those directly injured by the criminal; an effort to localize the affair and to prevent it from causing any further, let alone a general disturbance; attempts to discover equivalents and to settle the whole matter (compositio); above all, the increasingly definite will to treat every crime as in some sense dischargeable, and thus at least to a certain extent to isolate the criminal and his deed from one another __ these traits become more and more clearly visible as the penal law evolves. as the power and self36 prajna vihara ̃ confidence of a community increase, the penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or imperiling of the former brings with it a restoration of the harsher forms of the latter. the ‘creditor’ always becomes more humane to the extent that he has grown richer; finally, how much injury he can endure without suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth. it is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it-letting those who harm it go unpunished. ‘what are my parasites to me?’ it might say. ‘may they live and prosper: i am strong enough for that!’ “the justice which began with, ‘everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged’, ends by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as every good thing on earth, by overcoming itself. this self-overcoming of justice: one knows the beautiful name it has given itself__mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man, or better yet, his__beyond the law.29 is it possible to apply this to the individual? is it only the community that is able to consolidate its power and become strong enough to mediate through its laws and institutions the settling of offenses in a way that moderates __ and even, in some cases __ do away with the violence of punishment? can there only be forgiveness in the juridical sense of granting pardon and suspending punishment? what of personal forgiveness which strictly speaking can be granted not by the state but only by the victim of the crime __ i.e., the one whom the transgressor “has directly harmed”? without denying the difference between juridical pardon and personal forgiveness, one can nevertheless find similarities between nietzsche’s account of mercy in gm ii and his depiction of zarathustra’s attitude towards his enemies in thus spoke zarathustra, in which no reference is made to societal and institutional mediation: one day zarathustra had fallen asleep under a fig tree, for it was hot, and had put his arms over his face. and an jean emily p. tan 37 adder came and bit him in the neck, so that zarathustra cried out in pain. when he had taken his arm from his face, he looked at the snake, and it recognized the eyes of zarathustra, writhed awkwardly, and wanted to get away. “oh no”, said zarathustra, “as yet you have not accepted my thanks. you waked me in time, my way is still long”. “your way is short”, the adder said sadly; “my poison kills”. zarathustra smiled. “when has a dragon ever died of the poison of a snake?” he said. “but take back your poison. you are not rich enough to give it to me”. then the adder fell around his neck a second time and licked his wound.30 mercy as an overcoming of justice: beyond an economic conception of forgiveness zarathustra’s gesture of thanking his enemy and the advice he subsequently gives to his followers to “prove that he [your enemy] did you some good”,31 which echoes this passage in gm ii 10 __ “what are my parasites to me? ... may they live and prosper: i am strong enough for that!”32 __ might strike us as rather uncaring and might seem contrary to the spirit of forgiveness. but one could give another interpretation to this nietzschean indifference, this combative sort of generosity towards one’s enemy: could we not say that in this sublime indifference, or perhaps more precisely, this paradoxical gratitude towards one’s enemy, one is releasing the other from indebtedness to oneself so radically that one does not wish the other to be indebted (once more) to his forgiver for having been forgiven? is it perhaps in order to prevent his forgiveness from becoming a snare that would put the adder in zarathustra’s debt, that zarathustra thanks the adder for its bite? this encounter between zarathustra and the adder does not merely suspend retaliation but turns the very notion of a fair exchange of pain for pain on its head. that mercy __ if we are to give this name to zarathustra’s attitude towards the adder __ is the self-overcoming of justice implies that mercy consists in more than the suspension of retaliation, but rather is of a higher kind of power than the power to punish. we come short of understanding what it means for mercy to overcome justice so long as we see pardon and punishment as purely equivalent alternatives. nowhere is the asymmetry between punishment and 38 prajna vihara ̃ pardon more evident than in cases when, having avenged oneself upon one’s enemy or knowing that the transgression one had suffered has been punished, the victim is nevertheless unable to find satisfaction in having been avenged. arendt’s conviction that we can only forgive what we can punish, and that likewise, we can only punish what is in principle forgivable seems to imply a complete reversibility between the two. but is it not possible that something remains after punishment, something that punishment is unable to do away with, and that this __ as derrida argues __ is what in fact, strictly speaking, calls for forgiveness? so what does it mean for mercy to overcome justice? let us begin with the obvious point that in forgiving one’s enemy, the one who pardons foregoes his right to the other’s suffering as compensation for one’s own. but what is it that gives one the right to punish the other? is it merely the fact of having suffered? it has to be grounded in something positive __ in the nobility of the person, that stands over and above his suffering, because to ground punishment in suffering alone would make the desire for punishment a purely reactive sentiment, and one which nietzsche rightly compares to the hermit’s deep well from which there is no getting out.33 it is of punishment as a purely reactive pathos that nietzsche says: the spirit of revenge, my friends, has so far been the subject of man’s best reflection; and where there was suffering, one always wanted punishment too. for “punishment” is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it creates a good conscience for itself.34 punishment that is grounded purely on suffering leaves no room for self-overcoming. if there is to be an overcoming of vengeance in mercy, it will have to be in the name of something that surpasses the victim’s suffering and humiliation. for nietzsche, mercy is an act of self-overcoming and, as such, an act of the sovereign individual. it is accompanied by the self-awareness of one’s sublime freedom. nietzsche speaks of this sovereignty not in terms of an abstract freedom that abolishes all conditions set upon it, but concretely, in terms of strength and the exercise of power upon oneself. in the overcoming of justice by mercy, nietzsche does not speak of releasing the other from the bonds of guilt (for remorse is understood by nietzsche to be an acjean emily p. tan 39 count that one has to settle with oneself), but rather, of releasing the other from an obligation. pardoning, the act of mercy, is for nietzsche the victim’s attestation to the fact that he no longer feels the need to make the other suffer. one’s joy or peace of mind no longer rests on making the enemy suffer. and mercy here, the freedom of mercy (and the mercy that frees), is possible only as an overflowing, an abundance of strength. one simply cannot give the adder back his poison unless one were strong enough not to have succumbed to it. because nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt traces it back upon the paradigm of exchange and indebtedness, it is easy to miss the point that nietzsche’s ironic depiction of forgiveness in fact throws a critical eye upon a certain economic conception of forgiveness that masks a hidden cruelty. to offend and be offended. it is much more agreeable to offend and later ask forgiveness than to be offended and grant forgiveness. the one who does the former demonstrates his power and then his goodness. the other, if he does not want to be thought inhuman, must forgive; because of this coercion, pleasure in the other’s humiliation is slight.35 casting his laughing and knowing eye upon our moral valuations, nietzsche, in this aphorism from human, all too human, speaks of the pleasure of forgiveness in the abasement of the one who asks for forgiveness. what we like to think of as an unselfish act, even a sublime one, is shown to produce a yield of petty pleasure. and should we wish to excuse this pleasure for being merely a slight one, nietzsche reminds us that this fact is due not to the “nobility” of the forgiver’s intentions, but is an effect of the fact that he feels coerced to forgive __ he must forgive “if he does not want to be thought inhuman”. one can almost feel the stirring of ressentiment in this human being who, having been offended, is unable to exercise his power in retaliation, but is forced to forgive the other who was cunning enough to demonstrate first his power before his humanity (i.e., his “goodness”). if we are to find something approaching forgiveness that is freely given rather than one granted merely in resentful obedience to societal expectations, it is not in this passage __ where the word ‘forgiveness’ is explicitly mentioned __ but to zarathustra that we have to turn. 40 prajna vihara ̃ the genealogical narrative of justice overcoming itself in mercy in the second essay parallels the transition of the lion to the child in the allegory of the three metamorphoses in thus spoke zarathustra. in this passage, nietzsche explicitly links forgetting with innocence: but say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do? why must the preying lion still become a child? the child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred ‘yes’. for the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred ‘yes’ is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.36 nietzsche here makes the figure of the child embody innocence and forgetting. both characterize the child insofar as the child symbolizes the creation of new values: “to create new values-that even the lion cannot do;…”37 the child is the figure of the new beginning. it is the last figure in the movement of the spirit’s self-overcoming, a movement, which (1) begins with an affirmation of the importance of asceticism and selfdenial (exemplified by the camel, which bears what is most difficult) in self-overcoming, (2) progresses towards the overthrowing of received imperatives (symbolized by the lion preying upon established values), and (3) culminates in the child’s sacred yes to “the game of creation”. while it is true that in the third moment, “the spirit now wills his own will”, it is important to note the paradoxical nature of this willing. this willing one’s own will is not to be understood as the will of absolute self-possession, because forgetting __ which is a form of dispossession __ is at the heart of the child's creative affirmation. forgetting and innocence are a janus-faced pair, each passing onto the other. the backward-facing forgetting makes the future-oriented innocence possible. indeed, we could even say that forgetting is itself the innocence, which blesses and says its sacred yes to the past, which it thus liberates. in being paired with forgetting, innocence is shown to be a temporal concept, signifying the creative will's reconciliation with time. the temporal structure of innocence is a paradoxical one: the child who, through his “sacred ‘yes’”, “wills his own will” is able to do so by willing backwards __ that is to say, in accepting what has happened; in so doing, he is able to liberate himself from the melancholy jean emily p. tan 41 which imprisons him in the past. according to the following passage from “on redemption”, the will to punish is still expressive of the “imprisoned will” who, unable to undo a past suffered, seeks to unleash his no, his nihilating will upon the future: willing liberates; what means does the will devise for himself to get rid of his melancholy and to mock his dungeon? alas, every prisoner becomes a fool; and the imprisoned will redeems himself foolishly. that time does not run backwards, that is his wrath; ‘that which was’ is the name of the stone he cannot move. and so he moves stones out of wrath and displeasure, and he wreaks revenge on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does. thus the will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards. this, indeed this alone, is what revenge is: the will’s ill will against time and its ‘it was’.38 both innocence and mercy overcome the will to punish. supposing that in mercy, in the granting of pardon, one indeed overcomes the spirit of revenge __ that is to say, supposing that mercy is genuine and not merely a curtailment of aggression out of ressentiment __ could we not say then that mercy is the external face of innocence? innocence, the figure of self-overcoming as it relates to oneself and to time, when turned outwards to the other upon whom one had wanted to avenge oneself, becomes mercy. nietzsche does not use the word ‘forgiveness’ here, and yet, it is not insignificant that he speaks of reconciliation, even if this reconciliation is still a hoped for future: i led you away from these fables when i taught you, ‘the will is a creator’. all ‘it was is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident-until the creative will says to it, ‘but thus i willed it’. until the creative will says to it, ‘but thus i will it; thus shall i will it’. ‘but has the will yet spoken thus? and when will that happen? has the will yet become his own redeemer and joy-bringer? has he unlearned the spirit of revenge and all gnashing of teeth? and who taught him reconcilia42 prajna vihara ̃ tion with time and something higher than any reconciliation? for that will which is the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation; but how shall this be brought about? who could teach him also to will backwards?39 while it is true that nietzsche is not speaking here of reconciliation with one’s enemy or between persons who have wronged each other, this reconciliation with the past __ for which nietzsche has given the name “innocence and forgetting” __ is at the very least not incompatible with the idea of reconciliation with the other. moreover, insofar as the overcoming of resentment is a necessary condition of forgiveness, one can make a stronger claim that this reconciliation with time is a necessary subjective element of intersubjective forgiveness. forgiveness in nietzsche? an agonistic conception of forgiveness is there a concept of forgiveness in nietzsche? it is difficult to answer the question unequivocally (and i shall not attempt to do so here) given the fact that, first, nietzsche is critical of remorse, which is usually taken to be a precondition for the seeking of (and hence, to some extent, the granting of) forgiveness. i shall only point out here that nietzsche’s critique of remorse in the will to power40 has to be read alongside the critique of the bad conscience. nietzsche rejects remorse, literally the bite of conscience, for the nihilism betrayed by therapeutic practices of continually dwelling upon __ even relishing __ painful remembering, practices which do not in fact bring peace or well-being, but merely cultivates remorse. nietzsche’s point is not that one should not feel sorry for one’s fault, but that remorse is not only a useless but an ignoble passion. it is dishonest because while rejecting one’s deed __ rather than standing by it __ one nevertheless continues to identify oneself with this deed and justifies one’s moral worth in one’s act of self-loathing. if one is sorry for one’s deed, rather than wallowing in remorse, one should apologize to the person one had harmed, make amends, offer restitution, present oneself to one’s victim for his judgment or mercy. let us recall that for nietzsche it is ignoble not to pay one’s debt.41 if nietzsche hardly ever speaks of forgiveness, it is perhaps because for nietzsche, the word seems to be entangled with the christian notion of ‘turning the other cheek’. when he does speak of forgiveness in human, all too human,42 it is to unmask the supposed altruism of the jean emily p. tan 43 one who forgives. in the following passage from zarathustra, nietzsche counters such a notion of pardoning one’s enemy with an agonistic conception of kindness towards one’s enemy: but if you have an enemy, do not requite him evil with good, for that would put him to shame. rather prove that he did you some good. and rather be angry than put to shame. and if you are cursed, i do not like it that you want to bless. rather join a little in the cursing. and if have been done a great wrong, then quickly add five little ones: a gruesome sight is a person singlemindedly obsessed by a wrong. did you already know this? a wrong shared is half right. and he who is able to bear it should take all the wrong upon himself. a little revenge is more human than no revenge. and if punishment is not also a right and an honor for the transgressor, then i do not like your punishment either.43 in this idea that it is more noble to share a little in the guilt that is to say, to retaliate a bit __ nietzsche is offering us an agonistic alternative to the usual notion of forgiveness. “a little revenge” rather than none at all is a form of kindness to the other because it is an acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the other. to resist the other, to assert one’s power (in giving back the other his poison) __ rather than clinging to one’s grievance and being “single-mindedly obsessed by a wrong” __ is to recognize and accept the other as an equal and as a worthy opponent. this does not mean that in nietzsche, there is room only for agon and none for forgiveness. however, nietzsche would insist that only a person strong enough for a little revenge __ only one who does not find himself steeped in the adder’s poison __ can lay down his arms. this is why nietzsche ends “on the adder’s bite” with zarathustra cautioning his followers against offending a hermit __ for only he who can repay can forget: finally, my brothers, beware of doing wrong to any hermit. how could a hermit forget? how could he repay? 44 prajna vihara ̃ like a deep well is a hermit. it is easy to throw in a stone; but if the stone sank to the bottom, tell me, who would get it out again? beware of insulting the hermit. but if you have done so __ well, then kill him too. thus spoke zarathustra.44 nietzsche tells us is that forgiveness can only be granted from a position of strength. if forgiveness is not to be something merely forced upon a person __ “obliged” by good manners to forgive __ it has to be an expression of one’s power. this becomes clear if we recall that forgiveness overcomes the reactive pathos of ressentiment. the point here is not to pass judgment on not forgiving. a person who is unable to forgive or refuses to forgive another is not necessarily motivated by ressentiment. the point is not to say that a person who finds himself in this position ought to overcome his resentment and forgive the other. (the question of whether a particular act or person is deserving of forgiveness is not being addressed here.) on the contrary, forgiveness being beyond justice, beyond the demands of duty, there cannot be a categorical imperative to forgive. the point being made here is that if one does forgive another, it was __ at least, in part __ because one was able to do so. one has become (and has to have become) strong enough, powerful enough, rich enough not to have been stuck in the deep well of the hermit, who is unable to do anything but take in insults without being able to either shrug it off or retaliate. to be able to forgive, one has to be strong enough to overcome being immobilized by the sheer passivity of the reactive pathos of resentment. when memory threatens to trap one in the obsessive remembrance of past suffering and in the oppressive weight of resentment, one needs forgetfulness to overcome oneself; one has to be powerful enough for an active forgetting that blesses the past that it lets go. forgiveness and forgetting so is there forgiveness in nietzsche? there is respect, an agonistic kind of reverence; there is justice; there is mercy; there is innocence and forgetting. whether or not one would agree that these constitute forgiveness, there is, in any case, a surpassing of the contractual relationship demanding the equivalence of pain for pain in the self-overcoming of vengeance in pardon, in the self-overcoming of justice in mercy. if we say that forgiveness surpasses the logic of exchange, it does jean emily p. tan 45 so in the name of something in us that is incommensurable, something that attests to each person’s sovereignty and irreducible value.45 suppose that having done something devastating to another person, i feel regret for having done so; when i ask for forgiveness, what is it i am asking for? a nietzschean answer would go beyond the concern for the lifting of the burden of guilt. in asking to be forgiven, in placing myself at my victim’s mercy, i would be (1) recognizing my victim's sovereignty, and in so doing would be restoring to my victim what in my transgression i had unjustly taken from him; and in the same stroke, i would be (2) asking to be restored to myself in my sovereignty as one who pays one’s debt, as one who acts justly. when i ask for the other’s forgiveness, i am appealing to my victim as my sovereign. i am appealing to something in my victim that i have not destroyed, something that has survived the humiliation i had caused him to suffer. if forgiveness is at all possible, it is by virtue of something that has escaped violation. and if at the extreme limits of crime, of what we might call radical evil, forgiveness is at all still possible __ beyond the forgivable, as derrida would say __ wouldn’t it have to be by virtue of something absolutely inviolable? (perhaps then, beyond merely human powers of forgiving and forgetting __ and beyond a nietzschean approach __ the appeal for forgiveness would have to be addressed to one to whom the psalmist says, “wash me, and i shall be whiter than snow”.46) sovereignty is understood in nietzschean fashion in terms of a superabundance of power. and this superabundance expresses itself in the power to forget. in a sense, this echoes hegel’s conception of the monarch’s power to pardon criminals: the sovereignty of the monarch is the source of the right to pardon criminals, for only the sovereign is entitled to actualize the power of the spirit to undo what has been done and to nullify crime by forgiving and forgetting.47 but nietzsche is not hegel, and if we recall that for nietzsche, the human struggle to be a sovereign individual requires the harnessing both of the power of active memory as well as active forgetting, then we would have to say that the nietzschean conception of sovereignty is one that, paradoxically, rests on the power to forget. the proud awareness of one’s freedom that nietzsche calls sovereignty is not grounded on abso46 prajna vihara ̃ lute self-possession, but on a feeling of health and well-being, which partly rests on the power to forget. forgetting, in turn, stands halfway between action and passion. in nietzsche’s dynamic understanding of forgetting, it requires an expenditure of energy to repress, to push impressions and impulses aside in order to make room for the tabula rasa of the now, of present happiness and future hope. let us recall that this act of repression is not an expression of conscious agency; it is rather that which creates a clearing for consciousness. forgetting understood dynamically means the coincidence of power and sheer passivity. it is an activity that covers itself in oblivion __ forgetting forgets itself. nothing shows this more clearly than the impossibility of consciously commanding oneself to forget something. forgetting is the self-relation at the heart of forgiveness.48 although forgiveness is related to the other, it presupposes a relationship with the self. the struggle against resentment, the struggle to forgive is a question posed by the other, but is posed to the sovereign self __ or the possibility of this sovereignty. if i ask for your forgiveness, i must await your answer, wait upon the possibility of your being able and ready to forgive me. and this readiness to forgive, this subjective precondition of forgiveness, is what i mean by the active forgetting that is constitutive of forgiveness. while it may be true that the act of forgiving has a therapeutic power, it is also true that forgiving itself presupposes that some healing, some recovery of power has already occurred in the victim. one comes to be able to forgive once __ and only because __ one has become strong enough to forget.49 when the pain no longer touches one and so one can, like zarathustra, look at the adder and give him back his poison, and can even be grateful, when one can say, ‘i would not have chosen to suffer in your hands, but now that i have gone through it, this injustice has become part of my life, and i can accept it __ it has not killed me __ and i can, despite your ill-will, despite your crime __ love my life’, then one can say: ‘i can forgive you. i am strong enough to forgive you’. since forgiveness is essentially a relation to another, forgetting, which merely speaks of one’s self-relation with regard to one's suffering is not yet forgiveness. what i have sought to do in this essay is not to collapse the distinction between forgiveness and forgetting, but to think about forgetting as a necessary component of forgiveness. that nietzsche seems to have more to say about forgetting than forgiving does not mean that it is not possible to construct a nietzschean account of forgiveness. jean emily p. tan 47 what it does imply is that (1) a nietzschean account of forgiveness would be one that emphasizes forgetting __ understood as an expression of the will to power __ as the subjective aspect of forgiveness. this reading also suggests that (2) there is an other side to the nietzschean will to power, namely, that the will to power is not to be confused with the notion of the autonomous will. forgetting and forgiving __ if we are willing to grant nietzsche a conception of this __ attest to a willing that is beyond the will. forgetting is a condition that both affirms the possibility of forgiveness and sets its concrete limitation. in emphasizing the fact that forgetting and memory are not fully governed by the will, we come face to face with the limits of forgiveness. that forgetting is at the heart of forgiveness means that although forgiveness is an act of the will, that it is something that one freely grants the other from the depths of one’s being, nevertheless, because at its depths, one does not entirely possess the core of oneself, forgiveness is in another sense not something that one does, but is something that comes to one, like grace. forgiveness happens not only to the one who is forgiven but also to the one who forgives. we might even say that it is something we suffer. one can only forgive another once one’s worth is felt to have survived and even strengthened by the humiliation and injury one had suffered. genuine forgiveness cannot be separated from the blessing of one’s life. in zarathustra’s third metamorphosis beyond the lion to the child, the yes to life as reconciliation with the past invites us to affirm that we are as much in our forgetting as we are in our memories. endnotes 1sarah kofman, “shoah (or dis-grace), trans. georgia albert, in selected writings, eds. thomas albrecht with georgia albert and elizabeth rottenberg (stanford, calif.: stanford university press, 2007), 245-46. 2for an illuminating discussion of derrida’s insistence upon the aporetic conception of forgiveness, see richard j. bernstein, “derrida: the aporia of forgiveness?” constellations 13 (2006): 394-406, and agnes heller, “preliminary adieu for jacques derrida”, graduate faculty philosophy journal 26(2005): 191, quoted in bernstein, 399. 3jacques derrida, on cosmopolitanism and forgiveness, trans. mark dooley and michael hughes (london and new york: routledge, 2001), 32. 4ibid., 31-32, boldface mine. 48 prajna vihara ̃ 5for a discussion of forgiveness from the perspective of trauma, see jerome a. miller, “the trauma of evil and the traumatological conception of forgiveness”, continental philosophy review 42(2009): 401-419. 6jacques derrida, the work of mourning, eds. pascale-anne brault and michael naas (chicago and london: university of chicago press, 2001), 185, emphasis mine. 7charles l. griswold, forgiveness: a philosophical exploration (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007). 8see this passage, for instance: “these points are offered not primarily as therapeutic but as ethical ones. […] the ethical benefits of forgiveness have nothing in common with the benefits of the ‘closure’ about which we hear so much, at least insofar as that comes to something like forgetting, or to putting it away so that the issue is no longer felt as a live one. closure has no necessary connection with the moral and spiritual gravity of forgiveness, and indeed is perfectly compatible with a decision not to seek (or grant) forgiveness. one could achieve closure by managing a way not to feel guilt, for example”. (griswold, 70.) like derrida, griswold rejects the reduction of forgiveness to its therapeutic effects. 9ibid., 40. 10hannah arendt, the human condition (chicago: university of chicago press, 1958), 240. 11arendt, human condition, 240, n. 80. 12ibid., 241, italics mine. 13this idea of the limit of human power carries within it a further ambiguity: not only do we not know how far this human, all too human power of forgiveness can go; we also cannot tell when human power passes onto divine power to which it appeals and in which it entrusts itself. 14friedrich nietzsche, on the genealogy of morals, trans. walter kaufmann and r.j. hollingdale (new york: random house, 1967), ii, 1, p. 57. henceforth cited in the text as gm followed by section numbers and page numbers. 15sarah kofman’s chapter on “the forgetting of metaphor”, in nietzsche and metaphor, trans. duncan large (stanford, calif.: stanford university press, 1993), 23-58, develops nietzsche’s distinction between these two notions of forgetting in her elaboration of nietzsche’s conception of metaphorical activity. 16gm ii, 1, pp. 57-58, boldface mine. 17ibid., 58. 18ibid. 19ibid. 20gm ii,3, p. 61. 21gm ii, 2, p. 60. 22however, this notion of forgetting can be found in the english psychologists’ account __ rejected by nietzsche __ of the origin of good and evil in gm i, 1-3. 23gm ii, 5, p. 64. 24gm ii, 8, p. 70. 25gm ii, 9, p. 71. 26gm ii, 8, p. 70. 27ibid., pp. 70-71. jean emily p. tan 49 28gm ii, 9, p. 71. 29gm ii, 10, pp. 72-73. 30friedrich nietzsche, thus spoke zarathustra, “on the adder's bite”, trans. walter kaufmann (new york: penguin, 1966), 68. thus spoke zarathustra is henceforth to be cited as z followed by section title and page number. 31ibid. 32gm ii, 10, p. 72. 33z, “on the adder’s bite”, 69. 34z, “on redemption”, 139-40. 35friedrich nietzsche, human, all too human ?348, trans. marion faber with stephen lehmann (lincoln, nebr.: university of nebraska press, 1986), 184. 36z, “on the three metamorphoses”, 27. 38z, “on redemption”, 139-40. 39ibid., 141. 40friedrich nietzsche, the will to power, “against remorse”, trans. walter kaufmann and r.j. hollingdale (new york: vintage, 1967), 136-37. 41i offer this interpretation of nietzsche’s rejection of remorse as an alternative possibility to william desmond’s in “it is nothing’__wording the release of forgiveness”, proceedings of the american catholic philosophical association 82 (2009): 5-9. 42hh “the adder’s bite”, 68, italics mine. 43z, “the adder’s bite”, 68, italics mine. 44ibid., 69. 45see christian lotz’s reading of derrida’s account of forgiveness as being beyond the order of exchange in “the events of morality and forgiveness: from kant to derrida”, research in phenomenology 36 (2006): 255-73. 46psalm 51:7. 47g.w.f. hegel, principles of the philosophy of right, ed. allen w. wood, trans. h.b. nisbet (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991), ?282, p. 325. 48i am speaking here from the perspective of the one called upon to forgive. the question of self-forgiveness is not addressed here, but i would suggest that forgiveness, being an essentially intersubjective concept, cannot be applied without qualification to self-forgiveness. at the very least, it has to be agreed that self-forgiveness cannot be the paradigmatic case of forgiveness. nevertheless, forgetting is an essential aspect of a healthy self-relation even from the standpoint of the one asking for forgiveness. for nietzsche, forgiveness by the other cannot release one from the bonds of guilt as long as one is bent on tormenting oneself with the fault. 49always remembering that we mean active forgetting: forgetting in the sense of active discharge of affect. 50 prajna vihara ̃ 11(158-162)note for authors plural values, value construction, and social solidarity in africa temisan ebijuwa ladoke akintola university of technology, ogbomoso, nigeria abstract within the emerging new world order boundaries which otherwise serve to delineate local narratives and values are beginning to collapse. what happens in one place cannot be isolated from global concerns. it is difficult for societies to completely rely on themselves for survival and social solidarity. as a direct consequence, developed economies are pressuring weaker economies to further open their boundaries. this presupposes a challenge – a meta-narrative of some sort. it is the contention of this paper that although values may vary from context to context and with time, such variations do not preclude the existence of cross–cultural assessment that defines human progress and global solidarity. introduction i have for quite sometime been attracted to the issues of universal morality as a platform upon which the transcultural legitimation of knowledge claims is possible. but this seems to suffer some setback because of the insistence of some deconstructionists on the dislocation of metanaratives or what lyotard calls the illegitimate scheme for legitimizing knowledge claims, insisting that recognition of universal values fails to respect diversity of language games in terms of historical truths and ethnical accountability. this seems to belie the point of universalist. the unfolding events in 54 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 54-68 © 2000 by assumption university press the emerging new world order suggest to a large extent that boundaries which otherwise serve as the locus of values priorities in diverse societies and forms are beginning to collapse, responding to the ever changing pressure of international trends, which suggest that what happens in one place cannot be isolated from global concerns. the above appears a response to two isolated but related issues: first, recall that the competitive world which human beings live today has made it difficult for societies to completely rely on themselves for the supply of the basic ingredients of survival and social solidarity. secondly, and as a direct consequence of the above, the influence which developed economies bring to bear on the weaker societies so to say, is enough to pressurize them to open up boundaries with the assumption that it will positively lead them out of the woods. (ebijuwa, 2004). this presupposes a challenge – a metanarative of some sort. deconstructionist, on the other hand sees this as oppressive and destructive to norms and values of local narratives. no doubt local narratives gain support from the claim that societies are not constituted in the same way. but this platitude alone is insufficient to answer the basic question of survival inherent in many developing societies today. (ebijuwa, 2002). this goes to say that the claims that local values are context dependent, for example, democracy, does not lose touch with the fact that, although democracy may respond to historical and cultural circumstances, it does not lose track of its basic tenets, such as freedom, justice, fairness etc which gives democracy its universal appeal. “and this is the reason when anybody’s right is violated, it can be subjected to the scrutiny of world opinion (like the gruesome murder of ken saro wiwa and nine other ogoni human rights activists by general sanni abacha former military leader of nigeria) when that treatment violates widely recognize standards – the furtherance of which has come to be conceived as an overriding obligation upon everybody within and across societies” (ebijuwa, 200:58). the argument here then is that, although values may vary from context to context and with time, such variations do not preclude the existence of cross – cultural assessment which defines human progress and global solidarity. before we go into this, let us look at the platform upon which the arguments of the proponent of local narratives are constructed. ebijuwa 55 platform for local narratives the trust of the claim of the proponents of local narratives derives from our quest in contemporary african to reflect on the africa project and thus embark on the search for a platform that would best account for the needs and challenges of africa in a more satisfactory manner. this quest is associated with those held by some scholars in the social sciences in terms of the ways social structures influence value judgments. values judgments, some believe, are determined by the traditions, customs, and folkways of each society, which are not necessarily shared by every society. as sumner puts it, what is right, is determined by the folkways of each society (sumner, 190:446). if we add to this fact of cultural variation the issue of how an individual’s values reflect those of his own social group and time, we may then begin to question the universal validity of moral claims. this is based on the claim that our moral attitudes and judgments leant on our social environment. even our deepest convictions about justice and the rights of man are originally nothing but the internalized views of our societies. this reasoning is the source of the problems we find in africa and many parts of the world today. for, many are wont to use the facts of the variation as a basis to affirm the superiority of one culture to another. the result of this ethnocentric attitude in many cases is as d.h. munro (1967:114) says, an intolerable excess of interference. this no doubt will not only lead to the disruption of viable moral ideals in other culture, it will in additional lead to the destruction of the mechanism for the promotion and preservation of those moral ideas and ideals. this ethnocentric attitude may be, as j.j. kupperman points out, a combination of two factors: “absolutism in ethics” (that is, the belief that something may be right or wrong independently of what any culture or individual happens to believe), and the belief that in fact one’s own culture has arrived at the correct answers to existential problems. (1970:74). the sense in the concern for tolerance is not difficult to see here. narrativists urge us not to speak of practices or beliefs as absolutely right or wrong, but rather to speak of them as right or wrong, relative to a culture or social context. presumably, then, instead of worrying about 56 prajñâ vihâra whether certain customs are really right or wrong; we should say they are right or wrong relative to a given people or culture. what follows from this is the assumption that moral values cannot be interculturally evaluated. benedict puts this view clearly in her descriptions of three cultures with great sympathy and perceptiveness. she sees then as equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself from the raw materials of existence (1946:278). each is selected among human potentialities. some potentialities she says can be realized at great cost but if any society wishes to pay that cost for its chosen and congenial traits, certain moral values will evolve with this pattern, however bad it may be. this cannot be assessed by any external standard. benedict’s position raises as otunbanjo observes, two related issues. first, it challenges the claim that there is a universal, independent, ethical standard in terms of which one can evaluate moral values in other societies. it proposes that the assessment and explanation of any moral judgment should be done within the framework of the society or culture to which it applies (1979:149 – 162). the implication is that the moral norms of any society are the standard. the claim then, as l.m. himnam puts it is that: the standard against which criticism is possible are internal to the ways of life itself and are distinctive from those which are found in other ways of life; with the consequences that there are no common standards against which two different ways of life may be compared to the advantage of one of them (1983:341). the assumption here is that moral ideas, principles and actions are tied to other presuppositions in a society, which we can understand after we have laid bare the systems of knowledge, values and symbols that structure the mind of the people. in this way, each community becomes an autonomous arbiter of its meaningfulness and justification. this presupposes, gratuitously though, that sets of such absolute presuppositions are equal in number to existing cultures or societies. this assumption poses a threat to the existence of universal morality. in fact, it rules out completely the existence and operation of those normative patterns of behaviour which constitute shared human practices, ebijuwa 57 customs and institutions. it is the implications of, and the challenge posed by, universal morality that will be our concern now. before this, let us look at the ground for the appeal of the quest for local narratives. appeal of local narratives one of the reasons for the appeal of local narratives can be traced to the role played by social and cultural factors in the development of moral ideas. the issue here concerns the view that each culture is dominated by control mechanism, the existence of which evolves a unique set of regulatory ideas that shapes the individual into a unique kind of human being. by this we mean that each culture is seen as a set of symbolic devices for the control of human behavior and for giving the individual a set of definitions of himself and of others. through these devices the value systems of each society gradually take shape. in the course of the development of these values, the inhabitant of each society organize their experience into a coherent whole. the point here is not only to show that the diversity of values are result of social experience of different cultures, but also that these value are what characterize the identity of cultures. this conscious effort of differentiation along the line of social experiences is usually used to confer an inestimable value upon cultures and to justify their claim to a separate existence. what this suggests is the view that, where different societies are conditioned by their ways of viewing themselves and interpreting their place in history and nature, it is inappropriate to judge the beliefs and practices of one form of life with the standard of another. an example of this is provided by benedict concerning the moral standards of the zuni and those of the dobu islanders.1 among the zuni, we are told, the value system is based on the pursuance of peace and orderliness. aggressive behavior is not only discouraged but morally disapproved and cooperation, as one would find in most other systems, is morally approved. this picture is in contrast with the moral values of the dobu islanders where aggression, promotion of ill –will, strife, suspicion, fear and hatred between one another, are morally judged differently. according to benedict, 58 prajñâ vihâra all existence appears to him (the dobuan) as a cut-throat struggle in which deadly antagonists are pitted against each other in a contest for each of the goods of life. suspicion and cruelty are his trusted weapons …he gives no mercy, and he asks for none (op.cit 124) here, we must be careful not to assume from this that there is a state of complete anarchy among the dobuans. on the contrary, the treachery and hostilities which are allowed and honored within the group are surprisingly controlled and directed by law and custom. what this indicates is that it is the way of life of the dobuans which explain their cultural identity in terms of which they characterize their lives in ethical terms. this cannot be used as the yardstick to appraise the lives of say, for example, the zunis, whose social experiences are completely different from that of the doubans. this view is what most relativists usually use to support their claims, namely, that the imposition of external values will not only amount to intolerance and dogmatism, it is also, as earlier remarked by munro, what has provided relativism with much ethical appeal. problems of the quest for local narratives but in spite of its appeal, the quest for local values has some problems some of which are discussed below. the first one concerns the claim peculiar to proponent of local narratives that the moral ideals and judgments of each society originate from its customs, folkways, traditions etc. it is true that in our everyday conversation we use the word morals to cover matters that may be brought under customs, folkways, traditions, etc. so, in discussing the morals of a given group of people, we usually refer to such things as the rules of marriage, sex conduct, their manner of organizing mutual aid, and their system of reward and punishment. things of this kind will certainly reveal a lot about their values, but the point is that not all these values would be moral values.2 there is a significant difference between customary values and moral values properly so called. whereas, one cannot contemplate moral values without a renewed sense of universal obligation, values arising from customs may not involve this ebijuwa 59 sense of universal obligation. here, wiredu gives an example: an akan living in akan land is expected, as a matter of course, to observe, for example akan rule of greeting. it goes without saying that other people living in other lands need not feel any such obligation. on the other hand, whether you are a ghanaian or an american or a chinese or of any other nationality, race or culture, truth-telling is an indefeasible obligation upon you (1995:35) the point here is to say that, while it is possible to envisage a society without the rule of greeting elders, it is impossible to have a society that is devoid of the moral rule of truth telling. on this consideration, truth – telling would be binding on everybody. for if truth –telling were not binding, and everybody could tell lies without hindrance, no one would trust any one’s word and social life to use wiredu’s phrase would become intolerably hobbesian. this is the source of the mistake of some relativists. they tend to conflate the rules of customs with the rules of morality. so, when relativist says that morality is relative what they may mean is simply that the obligatoriness of custom is relative. strictly speaking, however, the obligatoriness of moral rules is unconditional. this unconditional nature stems from the fact that moral rules unlike customs are not conditioned responses to environmental stimuli; comprising the results of training and of rewards and punishment in a given society as we can see from the case of greeting in akan society. although, many customs are structured to achieve the well being of societies, and we may supposes that some do actually succeed in this. but this is not a moral fact. the reason is that, there are plenty of rooms for variation in the efficiency of customs. a custom that is good in one society may be considered bad in another society. or it may be good in a given society at a particular time without being so in another time and circumstances. this susceptibility to being overtaken by changing time, place and circumstance is part of what distinguishes custom from morality. yet, because there is, as already remarked, a broad concept of morality within which custom has been assumed to be a part, it is easy for people, on the basis of observation of the great variety of customs among the different 60 prajñâ vihâra cultures of the world, to conclude that morality is relative in the sense that moral rightness consists in being approved by a given culture. another problem implicit in the assumption of relativists is associated with their appeal for tolerance. as we can see from the preceding discussion on the relativist’s point about moral beliefs is that their existence depends on certain other beliefs of a society which provide the framework within which human experiences is interpreted in its social and cultural setting. as a result of this, and in particular, because moral beliefs perform certain roles in the lives of the people, relativists claim that they must be respected. in other words, whatever the nature of any moral practice, for example, the killing of twins as was once practiced in calabar (nigeria), it should be tolerated. the question then is, if moral beliefs are to be understood in terms of the role they play in the lives of the people and on that basis is tolerated; does it mean that such beliefs are free from critical appraisals? hedenius, for example, noted that “the fact that for some reasons it is necessary to tolerate a practice p, must regard p as morally right” (1981:131). many practices may be tolerated though we regard them as morally wrong. this indicates that tolerance does not just entail the existence of a wide range of beliefs and values, and the freedom of individuals and groups to fully express their diverse beliefs, practices and life – stance, it also presuppose the possibility of change (kurtz:1995:16). by this we mean that moral beliefs are not static. the dynamism of moral beliefs is borne out of the fact that, when such beliefs are in conflict with other beliefs, which as ross says, stand better, the test of a true moral reflection (ross:1963:10), they are “bound” to obey the forces of change. here, a moral conviction that stands the test of a true moral reflection will be that the existence of which is not only suitable to contemporary social life, but also whose beliefs and practices leads to the promotion of human essence. this, therefore, explains the diversity of values and how such values that is not in line with the “test of a true moral reflection can be appraised. now, the question of the “distance” of a people’s moral conviction from the promotion of human essence might pose a problem here; relativists are likely to argue that such judgments are personal expressions of speakers. but this cannot lead us to how moral values can be adequately assessed. ebijuwa 61 the assessment of moral values here imply that one unprejudicially see his own conception of values as that whose limitations can be reviewed when compared with others in terms of their adequacy in realizing their goals. in other words, what tolerance requires is not that we endorse all moral beliefs or conceptions of values however repugnant they may be, but that we see our conception of values as being open to revision. this is to show that the diversity of cultural beliefs and practices does not preclude the possibility of cross cultural evaluation of moral values. the issue here is that, even if we grant that there is an unlimited variety of mores occasioned by the diversity of values, there may nevertheless be reasons for preferring some to others. for example, it is possible to say on the score of happiness and satisfactory human relationships that some “experiment in living”, to use macbeth phrase, are more successful than others (1970:103). on this consideration, it is possible for some features of a society to be criticized and changed without necessarily bringing down the “whole structure”. we acknowledge the influence of anthropological and historical findings on the position of ethical relativism. there is now a greater understanding of the impact of such findings on the moral beliefs of peoples in different societies. however, it is important to note the need for shared moral convictions if human society is to be stable. as dorothy emmet remarks, “there are ways of carrying a certain amount of instability and of resolving conflicts besides that of re-asserting beliefs in a single existing set of beliefs” (1970:103). this partly depends on people being able to question some features of their norms. there are situations where people are unwilling to conform to what is traditional, that is, unwilling to change what has been regarded as the given in their society. but this is not to undermine the fact that morality, like culture, is not static. it is something that changes from time to time inconsonance with the dynamics of human struggles. here, relativists may concede that values and judgments do change but most of them insist, however, that the criteria in terms of which they are assessed should not be external to the forms of life of which they are a part. this view is equally problematic. the reason is that, even if moral beliefs, practices and judgments, are to be located in their context, this does not mean that morality must remain so for the society to survive. 62 prajñâ vihâra murdock for example, rejects the relativist’s claim that cultural elements can only be understood in the context of the culture to which they belong (1965:146). such claim, murdock says, is destructive to comparative studies. secondly, murdock rejects the view of herskovits that given the equal validity and dignity of all culture, no evaluation of norms should be made across cultural boundaries. he rejects this because everywhere he sees people changing their moral ideas, especially ideas that are no longer existentially beneficial. people relinquish cannibalism and head hunting with little resistance when colonial governments demonstrate the material advantages of peace. such evidence indicates that different cultural adjustments to similar needs are by no means of equivalent utility or practical worth. some must manifestly be superior to others in at least a pragmatic sense if they are always chosen in preference to the latter when both alternatives are available (murdock: 1965:147-148). here, murdock places choice at the heart of social change and developments, believing that context-dependent value judgment do not create room for change. relativism, therefore, on this view, is part of what murdock calls the “conservatism which hope to arrest social change” (hanson, 1978:43). however, the above claim by murdock cannot be taken to mean a general assertion of the superiority of some values over others; we must, rather, take this claim to mean that there are certain values in some societies that satisfy basic human wants and needs, such as human survival and the provision of conducive atmosphere for social cooperation, better than others. this view, however, is only partially correct. for, there is more to social values than the satisfaction of basic human wants and needs. what one can infer from the above discussion is that murdock seems to be particularly interested in questions that concern the relative ability of different societies to satisfy human wants or needs. now, if question of this nature were the only ones faced in societies, then murdock would have a telling argument against relativism. but there is more to know about societal values beyond their ability to satisfy people’s wants and needs. ebijuwa 63 one can ask about their logical structure; the way they presuppose, imply or contradict each other in a complex cultural system. here, relativism is the only appropriate approach, for our concern is with the intrinsic meaning of cultural values. the meaning here represent what the people in a given culture do in fact think, believe and aspire to. “their ideology is forged in specific socio-historical circumstances and takes specific forms”. and this can be grasped by looking at cultures in their own terms, in their logical relations with each other. but this is the source of the problem. cultures are not so perfectly integrated to warrant such holism. our point about relativism thus far does not contain any claim that a people’s culture is impervious to the outside world. in fact, as lawuyi argues, to say that values are context –dependent, is to create the illusion that we know everything about man and his environment from the knowledge of ourselves (1992:47). this is because cultures do overlap and societies with different cultures do interact with and influence one another. on this consideration, we cannot legitimately talk of any form of moral evaluation that is peculiar to a society. this is to say that the localization of ideas cannot be the final word in any cultural authority. this is because sometimes what happens in one society may affect or restrict the activities of people in other societies – in which case we cannot only say that cultures are local and separate, but that given the fact of the inter – locking relationships of cultures, we cannot but be concerned with the activities of people of other culture. let us now examine the reason for the appeal of ethical relativism. relativists reject any attempt at placing moral values on an evolutionary scale in terms of criteria of values developed outside a society. they argue that since cultures differ in the way they interpret their experiences and because they operate with different assumptions about morality, a people’s moral system can only be understood by unveiling those assumptions which guide their interpretation of experience. and since different interpretations suggest the reality of different cultural identities, no society can claim to have the final word on the meaning of morality. it is important to note here that, relativism has some merits. it is a fact, for instance, that the interpretation of human experience vary from one place to another. and that even within a society interpretation may vary with time. now, if interpretation of experiences vary in these ways 64 prajñâ vihâra then it should be correct to say that no way of interpreting human experiences should be regarded as the given. however, the trouble with the above view is not with the contention that social experiences vary. it is with the mistaken assumption that the diversity of these experiences and their attendant variation of values are sufficient to establish ethical relativism. this is because it is possible for one to accept the facts of cultural variation and deny ethical relativism without contradicting himself. w.t. stace, for example, argues as follows while rejecting the analysis presented by benedict: ruth benedict tells us that the dobu islanders disagree with (the) advice of jesus christ about loving your neighbour…she seems to conclude that treachery and ill-will are, for the dobu islanders, good. my contention is that the dobu islanders are simply mistaken… people are often mistaken about what will be good for the health of their bodies. that is why we have moralists. the dobu islanders need someone to correct their …moral mistake (1950:211-212). this is to say no matter how profound or great the differences in the moral beliefs or our social experience may be, it is possible to hold that some of these beliefs are true and others false. the fact that societies differ about what is right and what is wrong, does not mean that one society cannot have better reasons than another for holding to its views. the question is how do we know which reason is better than the other? here, we believe that a society’s reasons are the results of a value system that have as its priority the satisfaction of the needs of its people and the promotion of human socio-economic cooperation (ebijuwa, 2003). this being the case, it will be “counter-productive” for relativists to use the facts of the diversity of social experiences which expresses their cultural self-identity to say that their value systems cannot be evaluated by criteria of values alien to their social environment. in this sense, the appraisal of a foreign cultural activity will involve what has been called “cultural cross – breeding” (oladipo, 1996:81). by this we mean that we take the good aspect of a given cultural value and blend it with the good ones of another society’s cultural values, for example, the technologically oriented way of life, which are essentially beneficial to mankind (ibid). however, the recebijuwa 65 ognition and adoption of the beneficial aspect of another cultures value should not in any way be taken as the imposition of superior values. after all, no society lives in isolation. and so cannot lead to intolerance and dogmatism as some relativists are wont to believe. this being the case, it will not be difficult to see that the existence of different social experiences and their associated value systems does not eliminate the possibility of cross – cultural assessment of values (ebijuwa, 2006). in fact, edmund burke is right when he observes that a state without the means of some change is without the means of its own conservation. conclusion thus far, we have argued that moral values cannot be completely relativised. and also that the evidence from anthropological findings reveal that value judgments are context – dependent. however, we have also seen that the facts of this diversity of values cannot as protagoras and postmodernists thinkers have argued establish ethical relativism. for, it is possible, as stated earlier, for a society to have a belief in a particular value system and for that belief to be false. this being the case, then universal morality is possible. endnotes 1 the zuni indians can be found in the pueblos of new mexico and the dobus on an island north of the eastern end of new guinea. for further characterization of this groups of people – see r. benedict. 2 i owe the distinction between customs and moral values to kwasi wiredu, see his (1995) “custom and morality: a comparative analysis of some african and western conceptions of morals” in his conceptual decolonization in africa philosophy ibadan: hope publications, p.35. references benedict, r. (1946) patterns of culture london: routledge and kegan 66 prajñâ vihâra paul. ebijuwa, t. (1996) “social relativism and human right in africa” africa quarterly journal of indian council of cultural relations vol. 36 n0.2. ebijuwa, t. (2002) “postmodernism and conflict of values: the challenge of universal morality” filosofia vol. 31.n0.2. ebijuwa, t. (2003) “cultural identity and the future of africa” identity, culture and politics: an afro-asian dialogue vol. 4, n0.2. ebijuwa, t. (2004) “towards universal values” indian council of philosophical research vol. xxi n0. 1 january – march. ebijuwa, t. (2006) “the common good and social hope in africa” prajna vihara: journal of philosophy and religion vol. 7 n0. 1. emmet, d. (1970) rules roles and relations london: macmillan and co., ltd. hanson, f.a. (1978) meaning in culture london and boston: routledge and kegan paul. himnan, l.m. (1983) can a form of life be wrong? philosophy vol. 58 n0. 225. kupperman, j.j. (1970) ethical knowledge london: george allen and unwin kurtz, p. (1995/96) “the limits of tolerance” free inquiry international: secular humanist magazine winter vol. 16 n0. 2. lawuyi, o.b. (1992) “towards an anthropological agenda in africa” in social relativism and beyond. the european journal of development research vol. 4, n0.1., macbeth. a., (1970) experiment in living london: macmillan and co. ltd. murdock, g.p. (1965) “the common denominators of culture” in linton’s r., man in the world of crisis new york: columbia university press. munro, d.h. (1967) empiricisn and ethics london: cambridge university press. oladipo, o. (1996) philosophy and the african experiences in the contributions of kwasi wiredu ibadan: hope publications. otubanjo, f. (1979) wittgenstanianism and magico-religions beliefs theoria to theory vol. 13, n0.2. ross, w.d., (1963) the right and the good oxford: clarendon press. sharrock w.w. and anderson, r.j. (1985) criticizing forms of life? philosophy vol. 60, n0. 233. stace, w.t. (1950) “science and faith” in j.e. burchard (ed) mid – ebijuwa 67 century: social implication of scientific progress new york: john wiley and sons inc. snmner w.g. (1960) folkways: a study of the sociological important of usages, manners, customs, mores and morals. new american library of world literature inc. taylor, p.w. (1975) principles of ethics belmont, california: dickson publishing company inc. wiredu, k. (1995) “custom and morality: a comparative analysis of some african and western conceptions of morals” in k. wiredu, conceptual decolonization in african philosophy ibadan: hope publications. 68 prajñâ vihâra 11(180-184)_note for authors book review vital nourishment: departing from happiness françois jullien translated by arthur goldhammer new york: zone books, 2007 it is very easy to consider something called cultural difference or alterity intellectually. but how are these so-called differences imprinted? are they as real as a geographic structure, like a mountain range, or a river? are they something akin to a physical or biological difference? how do we understand this cartography of ideas, particularly today, when the globe is enervated by fiber optic cables, satellites, and instant information? the journal you are now reading is situated within this dilemma. it is a journal in english which is devoted to the publication of articles in philosophy and religion from many different cultural perspectives. its writers are spread around the world, speaking from many real cultural landscapes, asserting various forms of cultural difference, yet they speak to one another. there is both a play of differences and commonalities. the characterization of eastern thought by the west has a long history. the philosophers leibniz and hegel stand out, as does the jesuit writer matteo ricci, and the novelist victor segalen. this trend focuses upon what is different, or other, about eastern thought from the perspective of the western mind. françois jullien is a part of this tradition. françois jullien is professor at the université paris vii-denis diderot and director at the institut de la pensée contemporaine. he is the author of many books, many of which have been translated into english. these include: detour and access: strategies of meaning in china and greece, the propensity of things: toward a history of efficacy in china, and in praise of blandness: proceeding from chinese thought and aesthetics. this is a review of his latest book to be translated into english: vital nourishment: departing from happiness. in this work jullien 174 prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 174-179 © 2000 by assumption university press looks at the chinese understanding of life. he draws primarily from the work of the third and fourth century b.c.e. chinese thinker zhuanghi [chuang tsu]. what jullien attempts here is a critique of western ideas of transcendence, through the use of the chinese approach to life. he states the goals of this investigation early on. it also provides us with an opportunity to use the parallel between chinese thought and the history of our rationality to recover and rethink precisely those aspects of our most fundamental experience the experience of life that modern western science has covered up and obscured with its characteristic procedures… (p.26) to return to this more authentic understanding of life, he focuses on the idea of “nourishment” or “nutrition”. … nutrition is not progress toward something; it is renewal. the transformation that it brings about has no other purpose than to reactivate something (forsaking the problematic of sense to which the west is so attached: because life in itself makes no sense, as we know)… i put myself in a position to “modify-incite” and therefore to reconnect continually with life (in myself), rather than allow it to cling and adhere to some investment, some representation, or some affect, as caring about things inclines us to do and subsequently to stagnate and wither. (p.27) life has no transcendent meaning or goal outside of itself. in place of the western tendency to seek un-earthly redemption, chinese thought renews itself through a kind of immanent process. the nourishment we are tracking is not a supplement; rather, it consists in ridding ourselves of all “supplements” who only lead us “to force life.” “to feed our life celestially” is to free life from everything that weighs us down be it knowledge acquired, agreements made, virtues adopted, or successes won and to restore it to its sole injunction immanence. (p.42) certainly, this seems to be not merely a theme drawn from ancient chinese thought, but from contemporary western thought. this elevation of the concept of immanence, is a theme promoted by deleuze and others. we might ask if jullien’s reading of chinese thought is pure, or if he book review 175 is distorting it through the coordinates of the western critique of western thought? in other words: chinese otherness in the service of deconstruction. further evidence of this can be seen near the end of the book. the task of philosophy today is, i believe, above all to reconsider its insistence on meaning, which has driven it to this point, and to ponder “existence” as a replacement for the quest for truth. to that end, it needs to draw on the cultural choices of other civilizations in order to challenge its own anthropological presuppositions more radically. it can use these other civilizations to reflect on itself. (p.160) now this approach which emphasizes otherness has come under criticism by another french sinologist jeanfrançois billeter, who in his various works has attempted to try to understand the commonalities of chinese and western art and philosophy. for instance in his work translated into english as the chinese art of writing, he carefully draws connections between chinese calligraphy and modern western trends in art. as jullien’s fame has continued to grow, billeter recently responded with an essay entitled “contre françois jullien,” (which can be accessed at: http://www.afec-en-ligne.org/img/pdf/9-1billeter.pdf.). here billeter takes jullien to task for his exoticism. henry zhao wrote an article about this debate in the new left review entitled “contesting confucius” (also available at: http:// www.newleftreview.org/?view=2664, accessed on oct., 2008). here he gives an account of billeter’s distinction between “comparatists” and “purists.” i wish to quote this at length as it gives the reader a fine summary of the divisions within the east / west philosophy debate. according to billeter, in the early decades of the twentieth century the modern chinese intelligentsia of the may fourth generation split into four factions over their attitude to traditional chinese thought. radical iconoclasts (like chen duxiu, founder of the communist party) reject it completely; critical intellectuals (like gu jigang, the liberal-sceptic historian) question its ‘sacred’ source; comparatists (like feng youlan, author of the first history of chinese philosophy) try to compare it to western philosophy; purists (like qian mu, a confucianist educator) insist that it is simply incomparable, as well as incommunicable to the west. the four factions 176 prajñâ vihâra can actually be divided into two camps: the critics and the apologists. among the latter, both the comparatists and the purists, though differing in approach, arrive at the same conclusion: chinese superiority. jullien, according to billeter, is a typical comparatist and, like his chinese counterparts, unfailingly concludes that chinese philosophy far surpasses all other varieties. both critics and apologists have successors among younger generations of scholars in modern china, and the confrontation, instead of petering out over the years, has become even more heated, especially after china’s economic take-off. billeter cites the examples of two younger scholars. mou zhongjian is today’s purist; writing in archaic chinese in his 2005 essay, ‘the grand chinese way’, he declares that western civilization has passed its peak, culturally as well as economically, and the twenty-first century will be china’s. li dongjun, at nankai university, represents the new iconoclasts. in her 2004 book, the canonization of confucius and the confucianist revolution, she argues that confucianism as a system of representation still has a tenacious grip on the chinese mentality and, despite the demise of the empire a century ago, still leads its subjects to fulfil a ‘duty of abnegation in favour of totality’. (new left review, 44, march-april 2007) henry zhao points out that billeter also sees important political implications in this debate. billeter calls for the demythification of china as a ‘fundamental other’. the necessity to understand its philosophy as an imperial ideology is a political one: ‘not in order to reduce the role it has played in history, but to determine the approach we want to take to it’. this becomes all the more urgent because, although ‘in the past the europeans and the chinese lived apart, this ancient separation is no more. today we are facing the same historical moment, and should act together and understand each other.’ the myth of the other now deters mutual understanding between china and the west. this is the ultimate insult to jullien, whose purported aim has always been to bring about this understanding. billeter puts it bluntly: ‘those who endorse a critical reflection on the past in fact subscribe to political liberty and democracy, while the comparatists accommodate more readily to the state of power’. (new left review, 44, marchapril 2007) zhao echoes billeter’s concerns. speaking about the ‘fever’ among the chinese people in embracing their traditional philosophy, zhao concludes: book review 177 since the authorities are sitting on the fence, the ‘fever’ has been, until now, a more or less spontaneous movement among the masses and intellectuals, stoked by a newly found national pride among the populace, but only half-heartedly encouraged by the government. in chengdu, the city where i have resettled, people gather in tea-houses on sunday mornings to hear lectures on traditional philosophy, though i doubt they would want to hear ideological admonitions. but the ‘fever’ itself is, beyond doubt, ideological in its agenda, an attempt to fill the vacuum of values in modern-day china. spurred by china’s increased economic strength, the ‘fever’ will develop rapidly. this is why the issues billeter raises are of such importance. philosophical speculation on otherness, once pushed to an extreme, risks becoming dangerously attractive. diversity can be encouraged without rendering difference into something unrecognizable, unreachable. when otherness is made into myth, it may serve neither those inside it nor those outside. this fiery debate among french-speaking sinologists is, we may hope, only the prelude to a fuller discussion on the price of keeping the other as the other. (new left review, 44, marchapril 2007) if we focus on the contrast between jullien and billeter in its starkest form, is it perhaps possible to say that both are absolutely right, but that the absoluteness of their rightness ultimately undermines the force of their argument? is it perhaps both too simple and too great a task to walk around the border of china and draw a boundary in the sand, and perhaps too reckless to consider ultimate accessibility? we might add still other voices to this debate. li zehou, in his work the path to beauty: a study in chinese aesthetics, is very careful to show that chinese thought is not a monolithic whole, but has a complex history caught within the tensions between confucianism, daoism, and buddhism. zhang longxi, in his work the tao and the logos, appreciates the complexity of differences but also stresses the ability of hermeneutic understanding to bridge them. regardless of these academic discussions concerning difference and alterity, there remain certain realities that are unfolding on the ground. there are real divisions, which are animated by underlying mythologies, cosmologies, and tendencies that have their own blind momentum. and yet, regardless of these conflicting mythologies, there remains communication, and interaction. and what is most fascinating today is that events 178 prajñâ vihâra happen across divisions and tensions, that these differences are not disappearing, that they are present even within individuals, and that this shows that people are able to function in multiple registers. so it might be better to ask what this phenomenon means. how are real cultural differences, woven together into the technological, financial, economic, educational and religious tapestries, imprinted onto the landscape? the most valuable thing we can learn from writers like jullien, whether we are inclined to follow him or not, are the coordinates by which we can all begin entering into this important problem. reviewed by j. t. giordano book review 179 06_(94-101) cultural snap cultural snapshots: duriyathep (the devas of music) artist: phra siriphong kharuphankit phra siriphong was born on 7 july 1956. he was the only child of mr. maen (khord) kharuphan, the operator of an orchard at bang tamru district, and mrs.chaluey (jaemjan), from amphur tayang, petchaburi province. after finishing prathom 4, elementary education, from amnuaywongwittaya school in thonburi, he continued his study at the dance and music college (witthayalai natasin) on 17 may 1967, starting from the first year of low level class. he left school on 1 march 1976 when he was still in the first year of high level class. his formal academic qualification is thus third year class of middle level, majoring in thai musical instruments with a thai music minor. after leaving the dance and music college, he trained in the thai art of making khon masks. he has created many khon masks and teacher’s heads (srisa khru). his remarkable achievement and superb craftsmanship was recognized in his being awarded a prize: the master of the arts (sartrmedhee), from professor mom luang pin malakul foundation, in the category of the thai art of khon mask making, on 24 october 2001. phra siriphong was ordained a monk at wat suttharam, tambol bang lampoolang, khlongsarn district, bangkok, on 8 june 1986. tissapharano is his ordained name. he passed his first level dharma study at wat prayoonwongsawad dharma school, and middle-level at wat anongkharam dharma school. he was appointed assistant abbot of wat suttharam on 21 june 2005. on 4 september 2006 her royal highness crown princes maha chakri sirindhorn bestowed on him a souvenir medal of “thai cultural heritage conservationist”. the following text and illustrations is from a booklet entitled “bhuchakhruduriyathep”. it exhibits his various masks and drawings and explains the various deities worshiped by musicians. more of his work can be seen at his website at: www.monnut.com/ en 94 prajna vihara, volume16, number 1, january-june 2015, 94-100 2000 by assumption university pressc -˜ i bow in honor of the three devas: you phra visawakarm, who is the potent one who creates many things under the heavens, and you phra panjasinghkorn, who in your hands holds a pin to play your enchanting music, and you phra parakhonthap, who is the ancient teacher. this is the royal command to invoke appearance of the three devas __ phra visawakarm, phra panjasinghkhorn, and phra parakhonthap __ in the wai khru for the teacher of art and music (duriyasin). phra visawakarm phra visawakarm has many names, such as phra visanukarm, phra vetsukarm, phra phetchalukarm, but the people in ancient times who believed in black magic called him phra rishi phetchalukarm. phra visawakarm is considered the great deva of engineering. he is directly under the command of phra in (indra). and he also is the great engineer of phra phrom (brahma). in this form his name is phra sivaphrom. although in indian mythology he is an engineer in a more restricted sense, the original thai term for engineer is nai chang, which means someone who is a handyman and can make anything. so in this phra visawakarm phra rishi phetchalukarm (visawakarm) phra siriphong kharuphankit 95 capacity, he is responsible for the creation and physical design of many beautiful things, including musical instruments. this is why thai musicians consider him to be one of the devas of music. in india there are many versions of his story. one source says that phra visawakarm is born from the blessing of phra isuan (shiva), and was given as a gift to phra in as his personal engineer. but in the puranas, he is the son of phra phat (“the one to gives light”). he is one of eight vasuthep servants of phra in. it does not appear in these stories that phra visawakarm has a wife, but he does have one daughter whose name is sanya. later she became a wife of phra suriyathep (phra atit). the indian texts point out that phra visawakarm has three eyes, white skin, a crown, and dress of the color gold. but in thai, he has green skin and wears a head sash. in one of his forms he holds the tail of a peacock. but in the form of an engineer (nai chang) he is depicted as holding in his right hand an early form of a plane for shaving wood, called a pung, which is shaped like a hoe, and in the left hand a plumb bob called a luk ding. nowadays all schools of engineering worship the image of phra visawakarm. and the instruments he holds varies accordphra rishi phetchalukarm (visawakarm) phra visawakarm 96 prajna vihara ̃ ing the school. i know from khun taluang wisansulapakam that he also has a female form who is a teacher of sewing. her name appears in the divine command of the wai khru chang. i honor you nang nilabanphot, whose name is in the ancient texts. you are the one to call forth all wealth and precious things. phra panjasinghkorn “i would like to worship and respect the great deva who has the knowledge of the pin, who lives in the level of karma. his name is panjasinghkorn. he taught many disciples who have recorded the texts for singing which celebrate our land.” according to the song above, whose name is wai khru mahori, the reason that thai musicians respect phra panjasinghkorn is because he is considered the divine teacher of music. phra panjasinghkorn (or phra panjasinghkorn phra siriphong kharuphankit 97 phra panjasinghkatheppabut) is a kantapthevada, which means a thevada (angel) who is born of a fragrant tree. he is actually half human and half deva. he lives in antarik, which is the region between earth and sky. his role is to play music, sing and dance for all the deities and devas. in the buddhist texts, it is pointed out that phra panjasinghkorn was very intelligent. he liked to make many merits for society: building roads, digging ponds, and constructing salas. he died when still young. afterwards he was born as a deva at the level of chattuckmaharajika. in this form he is depicted with gold skin. as a result of his divinity he has no need to eat and is always full. he possesses many resources. he always carries a lute shaped musical instrument called a pin (or vina in indian music). he has long hair which is parted in five sections and wears a crown with five peaks. he is also the model of the tonsure ceremony. among royalty, thai children before they have their hair cut in the tonsure ceremony, will divide the juk into five strands (common people will divide the juk into three strands). phra panjasinghkorn phra panjasinghkorn 98 prajna vihara ̃ phra parakhonthap his real name is narot. there are many stories concerning him in the brahman and buddhist literature. the meaning of the name phra parakhonthap is “the highest of the rishi”, or “the king of the rishi”. so phra narot receives the highest respect __ more than all the other rishis. he was the one to first invent the pin. in refererence to his role in music, some call him thepkorntam or korntamrat (meaning an angel or person who is great in music). in addition to playing music, he was considered a specialist in many other areas including: singing, astrology, law, and medical science. in black magic, they call him phra rishi narod. in the ancient indian scripture, he was called phrom rishi mahaphrachabodhi. some believe that phra narot is the son of phra manu. but some texts point out that phra narot was born from the forehead of phra phrom. this is why he sometimes has the name “son of phra phrom”. but the vishnu puranas point out that phra narot is the son of pakot sayathep bidon. phra siriphong kharuphankit 99 phra parakhonthap he has many other names. for example phra bisuna, which has the meaning of a “journalist”, some call him phra kri kalka, the meaning is one who incites arguments and fighting. some call him phra kapak or “monkey face”. phra narot has also a female form. her name is nang nartee. she is the wife of phram san nayasi, an avatar of phra narai (vishnu). she had sixty children. according to one story, phra parakhonthap transformed himself to be a great bird and perched in a large fig tree near a river. his weight caused the figs to fall into the river, and the bobbing figs created a kind of music, which inspired him to create a musical instrument. phra parakhonthap has many roles. in the form of phra pisuna he causes many events to happen among the devas. king rama vi points out that phra narot is a trikasan, or a person who knows the three dimensions of time: past, present and future. his omniscient abilities are the result of his ascetic practice. he knows many charms. he is credited with composing a sacred treatise on law whose name is nartiyathamasat. he is also the one to tell the story of the ramayana to phra rishi valmiki, who then recorded the sacred treatise of the ramayana when commanded by phra phrom. 100 prajna vihara ̃ phra parakhonthapphra parakhonthap the piphat musician and natasin dancer revere phra parakhonthap (narot). they believe that he is the one who controls the musical rhythms, and who conducts the playing of instruments and dancing. thus he is associated with the tapone drum. this drum has the function of controlling (natap) the rhythm of the piphat ensemble. that is why the tapone is the symbol of phra parakhonthap, and is why it is also greatly revered. in the piphat ensemble, the tapone placed in a position higher than all the other musical instruments. before the playing begins a bowl of offerings are made to the khru tapone. when the piphat ensemble plays for the wai khru, they will cover the tapone, and the stand that supports it, with a white cloth. the person who conducts the wai khru ceremony should honor the khru tapone first. they then fill up a conch shell with pure water which is used to wash the tapone whereupon the water becomes sacred. then this water is used to bless the other instruments, and then bless the participants in the ceremony. while it is believed that phra parakhonthap is the phrom rishi mahaphrachabodhi, most prefer to honor phra parakhontap as represented by the tapone. he is honored with a white cloth and offerings which do not include any animal flesh. this includes flowers, incense, candles and other fragrant things. the offerings before playing music should also include money, consisting of six and twelve baht offerings. when the playing of the piphat ensemble is finished, there is a beating of the tapone, whereupon the performance is formally closed. then all the offerings are brought in a bowl to make merit to the khru arjan: both the divine teachers and the human teachers who have passed away. phra siriphong kharuphankit 101 10(134-138)note for authors book review slavloj žižek. on belief (thinking in action series, routledge, 2001) much of late twentieth century western philosophy is driven by a certain anxiety concerning the project of the enlightenment. this can be seen beginning with the famous work of horkheimer and adorno and extending through french poststructuralism, and postmodern thought. this anxiety is related to what is perceived as the oppressiveness of instrumental rationality, of the hegemonic system, the violence of representation and reification, and the domination by the principle of capitalist exchange. in each case it is human history which is the subject of domination, and each writer creates formulas for the emancipation, salvation, or redemption of human history. this touches of course on the mythical and theological basis which lies beneath much secular western philosophy. slowly this basis is becoming conscious as evidenced by more recent writings. we can see this in derrida’s spectres on marx, where he touches upon the “messianic”, to ernesto laclau’s emancipations, where he tries to secularize theological ideas of salvation. slavloj žižek here retreads this same ground with an eye toward this age of virtual reality, media culture and the late capitalist flow of desires. žižek’s approach has always been grounded in a mixture of marxism, german idealism and lacanian psychoanalysis. he is very similar to the french philosopher jean baudrillard who writes in the same cheeky, provocative style. he is immensely popular in the west and has written on a wide range of topics from schelling to film studies. i have chosen this work – on belief – because of its relevance to the theme of this journal, and because it addresses theological issues of interest to readers outside of the west. žižek begins by introducing his formula of salvation/redemption which will guide his reflections on contemporary culture. he advances a model which he finds in both lenin and what he calls “authentic fundamentalism.” it aims neither at nostalgically reenacting the “good old revolutionary times,” nor at the opportunistic-pragmatic adjustment of the old program prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 129-134 129 © 2000 by assumption university press to “new conditions,” but at repeating, in the present world-wide conditions, the leninist gesture of initiating a political project that would undermine the totality of the global liberal-capitalist world order, and, furthermore, a project that would unabashedly assert itself as acting on behalf of truth, as intervening in the present global situation from the standpoint of repressed truth. ((p. 4-5) here žižek sees no redemptive potential in “multiculturalism”, third way politics, or a politics of negotiation and compromise, approaches which continue in his mind, to repress truth. on the other hand, the leninist like the fundamentalist “is not afraid to pass the act, to assume all the consequences, unpleasant as they may be, of realizing his political project.” true redemption, in other words, is thwarted the ideologies we prop up the present oppressive symbolic order. in the first chapter, he compares the adaptation of humanity to the digital world of late capitalism to a kind of gnosticism. rather than maintain our connection to the earth, it adapts to the alienation of the contemporary age by practicing a kind of detachment. žižek connects this with the popularity of buddhism in the west. it enables you to fully participate in the frantic pace of the capitalist game while sustaining the perception that you are not really in it, that you are well aware how worthless this spectacle is – what really matters to you is the peace of the inner self to which you know you can always withdraw. (p. 15) those who wish to preserve otherness are similar to the inauthentic fundamentalists who express hatred of the other. they wish the other to remain the other, or see in the other a kind of redemption. using the example of tibet, he stresses that the western traveler who ventures out into the east to find enlightenment, does not find enlightenment in the external other, but in themselves. while the liberal thinker wishes to preserve otherness, this is not where redemption is to be found. it is to be found in the individual unconscious. this brings him to lacan who he returns to in almost all of his writings. it is in lacan that the deficiencies of both marx and freudian psychoanalysis are overcome. to simplify, lacan’s theory of the unconscious is seen as a solution because the contradictions of history emerge within 130 prajñâ vihâra the unconscious as gaps and imperfections. just as adorno emphasized the inability of the subject to fully dominate objective reality, or the “priority of the objective”. žižek, following lacan, will stress that the seat of this objective reality which resists appropriation is within the unconscious. lacan, on the contrary, elaborates the concept of what adorno deployed as dialectical paradoxes: the concept of the “barred” subject who exists only though its own impossibility; the concept of the real as the inherent, not external limitation of reality. (p. 89) the subject is inherently flawed. but the consciousness of this imperfection allows for the subject’s redemption, its reconciliation with the real. this is what he also sees in christianity. this divine self-abandonment, this impenetrability of god to himself, thus signals god’s fundamental imperfection. and it is only within this horizon that the properly christian love can emerge, a love beyond mercy... in contrast to the pagan celebration of the divine (or human) perfection, the ultimate secret of the christian love is, perhaps, the loving attachment of the other’s imperfection. it is this lack in/of the other that opens up the space for the “good news” brought by christianity. (p. 146147) and so belief is the decision to embrace the real which appears in the present symbolic order as an imperfection. it is the act of faith which is decisive and redeeming here. here he quotes the later writings of schelling. the deed once accomplished, sinks immediately into the unfathomable depth, thereby acquiring its lasting character. it is the same with the will which, one posited at the beginning and led into the outside, immediately has to sink into the unconscious. this is the only way the beginning, the beginning that does not cease to be one, the truly eternal beginning, is possible. (p. 147) if the beginning is consciously retrieved, it is not the beginning. it is what žižek calls a “passive decision,” a letting oneself be chosen in the act of one’s decision. one can see what žižek wants here: the redemption of the real hidden in the unconscious, a true revolution which usurps the logic of late book review 131 capitalism which obscures the real, and a break from the ethical categories which postpone this revolution. here he aligns lenin and kierkegaard’s “religious suspension of the ethical.” (p. 149) the ethics of negotiation is always a failure. true redemption involves the suspension of the ethical, through an act or decision of belief. yet this analysis, while being perceptive concerning the failure of liberalism to curb the excesses of capitalism, also brings one extremely close to the proto-neoconservative carl schmitt. it is schmitt who sees each religious faith as being mutually exclusive. and it is schmitt’s political theology which sees the necessity for one faith to clash violently with another. it provides the theoretical framework and justification for the clash of civilizations and those who profit from it. this strange convergence with political theology is especially disturbing in the east, which has traditionally taken a more tolerant attitude to the diversity of religious beliefs and metaphysical approaches. this sheds light on the limitations of the western idea of salvation and links it to the particularly western intellectual struggle for “ultimate truth.” but we also need to take issue with žižek’s crude understanding of buddhism and what he calls paganism. the buddhism he describes as taking root in the west bears no resemblance to buddhism in the east. what he seems to be describing is a kind of sophism which is taking root in western culture which ‘spiritualizes’ itself by an appeal to writers like sun tzu, or new age popularizers of eastern spirituality. to assert the superiority of the christian idea of sacrifice is also suspect. in his psychoanalytic interpretation of so-called pagan sacrifice, he sees sacrifice according to the exchange principle, ”i offer to the other something precious to me in order to get back from the other something even more vital to me.” a higher form which expects nothing in return, nevertheless operates with the purpose to “ascertain that there is some other out there who is able to reply (or not) to our sacrificial entreaties.” the highest form, following lacan, is an attempt to fill the lack present in the other. this is why he considers “empty sacrifice to be the christian gesture par excellence.” (p. 69) christ would be the imaginary real compared to the “real real” (i might add, that this is how adorno understood the function of the work of art.) yet this is to misunderstand sacrifice outside of the judeo-christian 132 prajñâ vihâra tradition. a better interpretation might be that so-called pagan cultures recognize that the center of gravity is not in the culture or the individual, but in something which comes prior to themselves. they recognize themselves as being a part of a larger body. sacrifice then is not an appeasing, an attempt to fill a lack, or the attempt to maintain the existence of a god. on the contrary, it would be a return of excess. it would be a return of accumulated jouissance. in this sense, lacan is seen as the particularly western or individualist thinker, whose theory falters outside of its own rarified environment. which brings us to a very important point: the subject in the east and in africa is a part of a community with traditional ties to the land and to the past. they possess their own temporalities and spacialities based upon their own mythologies. very often they possess an eclectic multiplicity of religious beliefs. when they participate in the temporalities and spacialities of global capitalism, it is only a partial participation. the non-western subject is divided, they exist in multiple worlds. this division cannot be approached through lacan or žižek. it cannot be the basis for the discovery of the real since the real is not located in the gaps of the unconscious. the real is itself partially preserved in the older traditional practices. the gaps preserve the real from contamination by materialism, individualism and consumerism. outside of the framework of western thought, the desire to preserve otherness is not a kind of fetishizing as žižek would contend. it is the simple respect for a diversity of culture and religion which has always been present outside of the west. we can allow writers like žižek and baudrilliard their anxieties and indulgences, and perhaps learn important lessons from them. yet what we see in them is often the prismatic reflections of someone locked in their closed hermetic worlds searching for a way out. reviewed by j.t.giordano book review 133 m. ma’ruf 117 117 book review delayed democracy: how press freedom collapsed in the gambia by alagi yorro jallow author house: bloomington, 2013 isbn: 978-1-4918-0662-3 (sc), 978-1-4918-0660-9 (hc), 978-1-4918-0661-6 (e) this book is written by the gambian journalist and human rights campaigner alagi yorro jallow. it is dedicated to the memory of all those who have died and/or suffered in the struggle for freedom and democracy in the african continent. and, in accordance with such a heart-felt dedication, delayed democracy duly examines the critical role played by the muzzling and manipulation of the media in the development of autocratic rule in gambia, the smallest state of africa. professor jallow currently lectures at assumption university of thailand, after having lived for a while in the united states. previously he was the managing editor and co-proprietor of the gambian newspaper “the independent”. for his activity as editor and journalist, he has won many prizes, and international recognition. his newspaper, “the independent”, has now been banned by the government. for a while, in 1999, he also served as a correspondent for the bbc. he understands freedom of expression as being more than a mere theoretical assumption, it is also a practical undertaking at the service of the community, and a life commitment. accordingly, he has always been ready to uncompromisingly stand up for his professional integrity as a journalist, and for the fundamental principles of human freedom and dignity. because of his support for these noble ideals, he was targeted for death by supporters of the government. in december 2004, these supporters assassinated another editor of the independent, and destroyed 118 prajñā vihāra in an arson attack the office of the newspaper. all this, together with the circumstances leading to this brutal escalation, is well documented in delayed democracy. the events examined by jallow may eerily be seen by many as unveiling the new face of a rising more general, widespread and multiform authoritarianism. it could be argued that this writer is dealing with an example of a relatively new type of autocratic or partially autocratic rule, which pays some lip service to a notion of democracy. academics have variously defined this type of political system as “guided”, “managed”, “partial” or “semi-democracy”. thus, delayed democracy examines the unfolding of its defining feature, i.e. the muzzling of critical voices. the gambia (or simply gambia) is a tiny country of about 2 million inhabitants, predominantly poor, 90% muslim (mostly sunni), located in west africa, along the gambia river, and surrounded on all sides other than the sea by the larger senegal. col. jammeh has governed since a military coup in 1994. at the beginning of december 2015 he declared that the country is now governed by sharia law, thus effectively becoming an islamic state, even though assuring that the rights of religious minorities will continue to be maintained. this deliration is supposed to shed away the historical legacy of the area as an outpost of the slave trade, and as a british colony. this declaration with all its implications, which are difficult to reconcile with the values of liberal democracy, may be seen as the culmination of the process described in jallow’s book. jallow’s book provides ample historical and theoretical background in order to help the reader understand the events leading to the current situation. however, it does much more than that. it is about how press freedom collapsed in the gambia, and an accomplished case study of the mechanisms by which military power has managed to consolidate its rule over a small but significant west-african country. it shows how they were able to claim – with some credibility – to have legally and rightfully acquired the explicit consent of the majority of the local population. these manipulated elections gave the ruling party, the patriotic front, 72% of the votes. for his part, jallow undertakes to make clear all the mechanisms, book review 119 and their theoretical underpinnings, that made the ruler’s manipulations such an apparent success. therefore, by successfully disclosing, the large numbers of skeletons (not only figuratively) in the closet of the powers that be, this book directly and indirectly provides the discerning readers with many helpful, more general and practical suggestions about how to arrange an alternative political system, with more genuine democratic credentials. this points to the necessity of connecting liberalism and democracy, if political legitimacy is to be not vulnerable to manipulation, but dedicated to effectively improving the human rights of the people in africa, as well as in other parts of the world. in regard to this, the book boldly argues that the role of the free press, independent journalists, and more generally freedom of speech, are essential for creating a durable political system based on authentic liberal and democratic values. more specifically, the right to challenge conventional wisdom is a necessary tool not only in order to avoid economic stagnation and ensure intellectual progress, but also in order to expose and propose remedies to all sorts of human rights abuses, corruption, and other wrongs. having made clear the importance of the free media in order to ensure transparency and accountability, nevertheless, prof jallow also points out that this critical role must be played out carefully, taking into account the existing sensitivities. jallow’s examination is the anatomy of a tragic involution or reversal of democracy. how an autocracy has been able to successfully undermine, and all but entirely curtail the role and importance that independent journalists and mass-media are supposed to have in the maintenance and development of a free and vibrant civil society. he argues that there must be a synergy and a reciprocal underpinning between democratic rule and governance on the one side and a free and vibrant civil society in which the media together with other forces play a fundamental role on the other side. that such a regression has taken place in gambia is even more dramatic as we are reminded in the book that gambia once had one of the freest and most resilient presses of the african continent. so, in order to explain how this regressive process took place, jallow carefully 120 prajñā vihāra and with deep sorrow, analyzes how the 1994 post-coup government applied its own version of antonio gramsci’s theory of the acquisition of political hegemony. jammeh’s policies, constitute a brutal, manipulative and reactionary hijacking of the original forward-looking, popular and authentically democraticintentions of gramsci’s both tactical and strategic recommendations for achieving progressive (or revolutionary) social change. allegedly, according to the italian political philosopher, progressive(or revolutionary) social change should be the result of making one particular ideology (in gramsci’s case marxism) become dominant. this means that the hegemony acquired by marxist ideology should lead to a positive change within civil society, since the oppressed will increasingly acquire a consciousness of their own individual and collective rights. that is to say, it is true that gramsci pointed out that coercion is always important, and the capacity to exercise it defines the state as a political institution. moreover, he saw that the role of the ability to use agencies of socialization, especially the press, to foster values and beliefs in the population is absolutely crucial to gain legitimacy. however in gramsci’s time this hegemony, state power and legitimacy were to be sought after by the masses only in order to free majorities from reactionary regimes, driven by privileged minorities. in other words, gramsci had highlighted the importance of acquiring ideological domination within civil society in order to develop the consciousness and liberate the oppressed majority of the population of italy (and beyond) from the forerunners of fascism, and then from fascism itself. however, delayed democracy tells us that freeing the oppressed is obviously not what jammeh has done (except by occasionally paying some lip service to the idea, when expedient to himself and his cronies). and this should not be surprising. paradoxically, and also as it frequently happens ironically, the principlethat the press can be used to advance ideological aims has often been applied, including lately in gambia, in order to make people compliant with the existing political order. this obviously runs against the original intention of gramsci who had formulated his theory of book review 121 hegemony in order to change the existing social and political order, and thus liberate the people from political oppression and economic exploitation. it follows from what i have said so far that jallow’s writing highlights how the regime of president jammeh has very successfully applied from its inception to power, up to the present, a version of gramsci’s theory of hegemony which though turns it upside down, thereby changing it completely for the worst. ideological hegemony was pursued and then achieved by the supporters of the present gambian regime through a media campaign against corruption. jammeh first used the pretext of the need to fight corruption, as a reason for overthrowing the democratic government of then president dawda jawara. jawara had ruled the country since independence from britain in 1965 up to 1994. during his time in power, gambia maintained its cherished tradition of freedom of expression. moreover, because jawara was a man of relatively humble origins who managed to become president, he made himself an avatar of the progress of the lower caste people. quite cunningly, jammeh in order to acquire ideological hegemony, first tolerated, and even wooed the press in order to highlight the shortcomings of the previous supposedly more corrupt government. he thus consolidated his power over civil society, and arguably gained legitimacy in the eyes of the majority. once this consolidation was achieved and legitimacy secured, he has clamped down on the free media, and its policy has been to dominate, intimidate and punish any dissent or opposition. supposedly, in this way, the continuation of political and ideological hegemony can be indefinitely maintained. this book also indicates some possible ways out of gambia’s human rights and democracy predicaments or “delays”. in jallow’s view, the internal civil society consciousness brought about by new social medias such as facebook, twitter, and other networking sites, combined with the external pressure from international public opinion and human rights organizations offers the best hope for the necessary political change in gambia, and elsewhere. perhaps, here, i may add my own suggestion that gramsci is still of value, but with some revisions more in tune with 122 prajñā vihāra liberal democratic principles. all in all, jallow’s writing clearly points out to the reader the role and importance of a free, independent press, as well as more generally free media, in order to clarify issues, and to propose solutions to the most intractable problems affecting the african continent, and many other areas of the world. these problems include: widespread corruption; weak or non-existent nation states; poverty; overlapping tribal rivalries; gaps between urban elites and the rest of the population; persistent illiteracy in some areas; draughts, natural and man-made disasters and epidemics; still incomplete infrastructures; cults of seniority and lack of competition; foreign interference and exploitation; lack of reliable and time honored mechanisms for transferring institutional power, and for ensuring alternationof different governments, thus providing peaceful avenues, through free and fair competitive politics, for different interests and identities to express themselves the fundamental lesson to be inferred by reading delayed democracy,is that only the civic, intellectual resources of a free and vibrant civil society can ultimately tackle the obstacles to good governance in africa, and beyond. top down approaches without corresponding bottom up synergies from civil society will not work. therefore, civil society must be underpinned, nurtured and advanced by the exercise of freedom of speech and expression (particularly, though not exclusively, embodied by the so called 4th power the media). time and again, it has proven to be the most fruitful way to determine the path or alternative ways by which to address obstacles to good governance and developmental issues. autocratic, military and elitist rule more often than not constitute part of the problem rather than of the solution. this is because by claiming to maintain an apparent superficial peace of sorts, in the long run autocracies, mostly in the guise of bringing about one sided, top down, manipulative, only apparent reconciliations, in fact increase grievances, thus aggravating conditions later leading to heightened civil strife, and in the worst case scenario even civil war. solutions to problems, as delayed democracy points out, require the honest work of brave and engaged journalists like book review 123 jallow, but also of social scientists, philosophers, teachers, the various experts, etc., and not the least also of ordinary citizens. reviewed by: giuseppe mario saccone assumption university of thailand phramaha panya kham ai and poonpilas asavisanu 99 learning-centered leadership for buddhist monastic education in thailand phramaha panya kham ai and poonpilas asavisanu assumption university, thailand abstract monastic education is the oldest form of education available to common people in thailand. it continues to this day in the education of monks and in the practice of temporary ordination. this report is based upon research done for assumption university of thailand and explores the possibilities for the improvement of monastic education. it analyzes the learning-centered leadership capabilities of the thai sangha educators and it provides suggestions for improving the educational standards and evaluation in monastic education. introduction the history of monastic education in thailand is a rich one and dates back several centuries. traditionally it was one of the few opportunities for common citizens to educate their male children. secular schools were mostly reserved for children of royalty, and operated within the gates of palaces. common people sent their sons to become ‘temple boys’, to prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 99-106 © 2000 by assumption university press 100 prajñā vihāra receive instruction in reading and writing in thai and to learn humility and piety by serving and taking care of their ‘masters’ in the monasteries. they usually spent a few years in the sasana, studying and leaving after an appropriate amount of time had been spent on their studies. hence, the tradition of temporary ordination into the monkhood became a part of thai culture that is still evident today. although there are 31,071 monasteries in thailand, only a small percentage of these maintain schools. (mcdaniel, j.t., 2008). most monastic students in thailand today study in pariyatidhamma secondary schools that teach paliseuksa (pali language, liturgy, and texts); dhammaseuksa (ethics, general buddhist history and teachings); and samanaseuksa (common or secular subjects). currently monastic education at the university level is available in thailand through buddhist universities such as mahachulalongkon and mahamakut, which require students to pass at least the third pali level (pra yoke 3) in order to be admitted. these buddhist universities, which were established by king rama v, were initiated so that both laymen and monks could study religious and modern subjects together to gain an education. some students upon pursuing their studies, become monastic scholars who return to their residential temples while others serve as teachers. these monastic scholars were thus supposed to be familiar with both the traditional monastic education of the temple and the formal education received in the university. this report is based upon a study that has as its aim the improvement of monastic education by focusing on the learning-centered leadership capabilities of the thai sangha educators in order to improve educational standards and evaluation in monastic education. the study’s conceptual framework is based on the eight dimensions of learning-centered leadership proposed by murphy, eliot, goldring, and porter (2006) and the desired thai sangha’s (monks’) characteristics that will lead to a learning-centered leadership model for thai sangha education. phramaha panya kham ai and poonpilas asavisanu 101 background monastic education for the sangha in thailand is known as phra pariyattidhamma. it is a systematic institutionalized curriculum of teaching and learning divided into two forms: the study of the dhamma and the study of pali. this system of monastic education is usually limited to monks and novices because it is focused on the study of buddhist scriptural text recorded in pali language. administration and management of phra pariyattidhamma schools is under the responsibility of the sangha education council which consists of the supreme patriarch (sangharaja); president of the board of pali education (mae kong pali); president of the board of dhamma education (mae kong tham); president of the university council of the mahachulalongkorn buddhist university; president of the university council of the mahamakut buddhist university; and other senior monks appointed by the supreme patriarch. the sangha education council is responsible for controlling and supporting monastic education for monks. approval of educational projects for buddhist monks and curriculum development can be made only through the sangha educational council. at most of the phra pariyattidhamma schools, the administration is the sole authority of the abbot, who is the head of the sangha within the individual monasteries. the schools usually select a learned monk as the head teacher to oversee the program. in the past, buddhist monastic education served two purposes: to educate and produce qualified buddhist monks and novices to serve in buddhist affairs; and as a path for upward mobility for the less fortunate. these purposes continue to modern times, especially for people living in rural areas of the country. nonetheless, according to nimanong (2003), several inherent problems plague the monastic education system at the university level resulting in educational inequality and inconsistency in teaching and learning. these problems include, but are not limited to: lack of clear educational policy and planning; insufficient governmental and sangha support; and lack of integrative curricular design. in thailand, even though some curricular reforms have been introduced in monastic 102 prajñā vihāra education in the past, specifically those that combined secular subjects with traditional monastic curriculum, conservative members of the sangha have resisted change as the contents of the curriculum were very different from the general education that monasteries had provided and seen as western influenced. the lack of consensus among monastic scholars on the definition of the objectives of monastic education has also contributed to problems with its reform (dhammasami, 2007). consequently, as it is still considered an important avenue for education, it follows that traditions of monastic education should be viewed through the lens of modern educational theories and practices in order to improve the educational experience for all those involved. assessment according to the eight dimensions of leadership within educational science, a popular measure for educational leadership is the eight dimensions of leadership developed by murphy, et.al (2006). this model is divided into eight categories: (1) vision for learning, (2) instructional programs, (3) curriculum programs, (4) assessment programs, (5) communities of learning, (6) resource acquisition and use, (7) organizational culture, and (8) social advocacy. monastic education, if viewed through this structure, could benefit from these educational reforms. vision for learning. in terms of vision, phra pariyattidhamma school leaders need to devote effort into the implementation, articulation, and development of learning that is shared and supported by the community of the sangha. school leaders are obliged to create a better school by facilitating the creative thinking that will contribute to the creation of a vision for school improvement. this also needs to reflect the standards of teaching and learning, personal and organizational performance at the appropriate level while also prioritizing the desirable goals that contribute to improvement. school administrators should articulate this vision through personal modeling and communicating with other staff in and around the school. phramaha panya kham ai and poonpilas asavisanu 103 instructional programs. phra pariyattidhamma school leaders must be constantly involved and invested in the instructional program. they need to demonstrate the model of the importance of teaching by implementing courses or programs of instruction. leaders need to pay attention to teaching by observing classrooms, encouraging critical thinking, and involving teachers with regard to instructional methods. leaders in phra pariyattidhamma schools need to make sure that students are well versed in their subjects and also encouraging more opportunities for input from the students. sufficient opportunities for teacher development and regular counseling for underprivileged teachers is also necessary. instructional programs should also be closely monitored by learning-centered leaders and aligned with the overall learning standards and objectives. curriculum programs. the phra pariyattidhamma school administrators need to be thoroughly knowledgeable about and deeply involved in the curriculum. the current curriculum in phra pariyattidhamma schools should be revised to make sure that it meets the needs of the students in the current world environment. school leaders need to be committed in order to ensure a high quality and rigorous curriculum while also maintaining the standards set up by the board of the pali and nakthamma study council. individual attention to students and the ensuring of access to learning is also needed. a commitment to the monitoring and evaluation for the effectiveness of the schools’ curriculum is also needed. assessment programs. the phra pariyattidhamma school leaders should strictly implement assessment procedures. the use of a variety of data collection strategies and monitoring, both formal and informal are recommended. assessment needs to be carried out to ensure that students meet both local and national standards for examination. assessment needs to be age and level appropriate and well organized. communities of learning. the creation of learning organizations should be a priority of phra pariyattidhamma school leaders as this fosters 104 prajñā vihāra a learning environment that can generate learning in the school. they should be able to nurture the growth of communities of professional practice and vigorous promoters of professional development, while also shaping the school in order to meet the principles of the community.the school should also form a board of the academy for phra pariyattidhamma schools that is able to oversee the teaching and learning of the school to ensure constant adherence to standards. infrastructures such as proper residence housing, libraries, and first-aid facilities should be made available for all teachers and students alike. the phra pariyattidhamma schools must constantly be engaging in their own growth, being a model for lifelong commitment to learning and a motivator for their staff to follow. resource acquisition and use. phra pariyattidhamma schools need to focus deployment of the resources to support the missions of the school. school leaders must be aware that dimensions of work that occupy center stage in the school’s administration-management, organization, and finance are no longer ends in themselves. yet, it rather assumes an importance to the extent that they strengthen the quality of the instructional and curricular program and enhances student learning. in the meantime, the phra pariyattidhamma school leaders must make sure that the overall functions of the school are being properly overseen by the board of the school. teachers should undergo annual training to ensure that they are well-prepared for their jobs. organizational culture. phra pariyattidhamma school leaders must be reminded that leadership is the key factor in explaining the presence of organization culture. therefore, the school leaders must be committed to the creation of an environment for high performance school expectations including that of staff, students, and all other stakeholders. they need to create a clear school academic standard that brings about high expectations for all. in this manner, leaders must take a significant role in holding teachers and students accountable for learning. school leaders must be able to integrate internal and external accountability systems phramaha panya kham ai and poonpilas asavisanu 105 by holding their staff accountable for building strategies that align teaching and learning with broader achievement goals and targets set by policy. the leaders of phra pariyattidhamma schools must recognize the importance of internal goal enforcement as well as strategies within their schools. all the monks and novices entering the community of the sangha should be required to take phra pariyattidhamma education. in order to enhance their education, phra pariyattidhamma schools should seek special permission from temples where student monks are residing to relax some temple rules so that students may have sufficient time for their education. social advocacy. in terms of social services, the phra pariyattidhamma schools should be more proactive in engaging with the community. the school must revise its approach to society to meet modern society and the outside world’s needs. students of phra pariyattidhamma schools should also be encouraged to participate and voice their opinions regarding the school. the school also needs to look after the welfare of the teachers, especially lay teachers, to make sure that they are compensated for their teaching and that compensation meets current living standards. conclusion monastic education, although it may have certain particular traditional characteristics, should have as its aims, the enhancement of education for its students. viewing monastic education through the lens of modern educational institution, therefore, is necessary to ensure student learning and standardization of school objectives. management of monastic schools or phra pariyattidhamma schools need to be in alignment with government educational policy and other national standards in order to ensure that it meets the needs of students of the 21st century. even though the characteristics of the students may be atypical, in that they are monks or novices, modern-world issues, problems, questions are still relevant to these students as their training and education in the buddhist religion 106 prajñā vihāra will enable them to understand, model, and disseminate proper buddhist philosophy in alignment with the needs of the modern world. although a monastic school, phra pariyattidhamma schools can be considered educational institutions that can benefit from leadership with learner-centered skills and outlook for the 21st century. the phra pariyattidhamma school leaders have a similar obligation to administer their schools for the benefit of the students, faculty, and other stakeholders. realizing, accepting, and facilitating the necessity for learning-centered leadership is a major step towards meeting educational objectives. references dhammasami, v.k. (2007). idealism and pragmatism: a dilemma in the current monastic education systems of burma and thailand. in i. harris (ed.), buddhism, power and political order (pp.10-25). new york, ny: routledge. mcdaniel, j.t. (2008). monastic education. thai digital monastery. retrieved from http://tdm.ucr.edu/monastery/life_education.html murphy, j., elliott, s. n., goldring, e., & porter, a. c. (2006). learningcentered leadership: a conceptual foundation. learning sciences institute, vanderbilt university (nj1). nimanong, v. (2003). the educational inequality of buddhist monks and novices in thailand. journal of the national research council of thailand. 3 (1), 160-186. 11(180-184)_note for authors the conflict between the ideal and the real in the context of globalization k. srinivas department of philosophy, school of humanities pondicherry university, pondicherry, india abstract one of the consequences of globalization appears to be a radical shift in our traditional value systems. our identities as human beings are no longer defined by our religions or cultures, but are generalized as a global identity. this new global identity emphasizes the material self-sufficiency of individuals. the dignity of the ‘human being’ is reduced to the level of a ‘consumer’, and our values are redefined in accordance with the requirements of global community. increasingly, it is scientific realism that guides our value system. this robs human beings of their moral freedom, and the possibility of a meaningful and purposeful life. in this paper an attempt is made to show how scientific realism can be balanced with a recovered philosophical idealism in order to prevent the continued deterioration in the quality of human life. introduction what is popularly known as globalization is the byproduct of our technological age, which in turn is the offshoot of our scientific rationality. the pervasive phenomenon called globalization has had its impact on all aspects of social life of individuals. as a consequence of this impact, there appears to be a radical shift in our traditional value systems in general. this is conspicuous in the life-style led by the individuals in the modern societies. such a life-style necessitates us to redefine our value systems to suit our new world-view which is directly or indirectly regulated by gloprajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 117-128 117 © 2000 by assumption university press balization. there are two ways of approaching human being. one way is to approach him through the culture in which he or she is brought up. such a view of human being becomes culture specific and strengthens the doctrine of cultural relativism. broadly speaking, it is the culture that provides man with any social identity. the identity, either physical or social, of any individual reveals his or her accidental features. to say that ‘i am brown complexioned’ or ‘i am an indian’ is to define one’s accidental attributes. they are the external marks of individual's identity. the other way of approaching human being is to see him beyond any culture. in other words, one has to look at man as man. this is how the essential nature of human being is realized. what is problematic here is to define this essential nature of human being for it is always defined in terms of something else. as wittgenstein suggested we should not ask for the definition of it, rather, we must look for it. we will come to this issue in due course. apart from these two approaches, the third approach is to look at human being within the global culture which attaches a distinctive identity to the human individuals. under this new identity there is a danger of individuals losing their respective cultural identities for all the cultural identities get subsumed under the universal or global identity. but this universal or global identity should not be confused with the spiritual identity advocated by the various religions of the world. the spiritual identity certainly strengthens the human values and the quality of human life for it rests on the basic premise that the human nature is essentially the same everywhere. on the contrary, the global or universal identity of the individuals under the sway of globalization only strengthens the material self-sufficiency of individuals. the natural consequence of such an identity is that the expression ‘human being’ is replaced by the expression ‘consumer’. or the expressions ‘human being’ and ‘consumer’ are used as synonyms. a human being becomes essentially a consumer in the context of globalization. in the process, the scientific realism reigns supreme in the form of technological development and the philosophical idealism which stands for human ideals or values gets completely neglected. or our values are redefined in accordance with the requirements of global community. normally it is our value system (ideals) that guides our scientific activity. what is good for human and social well-being alone is pursued by the sciences. but in a technologically advanced global society it is the science that guides our value sys118 prajñâ vihâra tem. in other words, science is no more under the control of human beings, but rather, we are under the control of science. this is the paradox. if science exercises its authority on human conduct then human beings are treated as the ultimate subjects of modern science and technology. we should not invite such a situation. first of all, the polarization between the ideal (ought) and the real (is) results in the lopsided development of human personality as well as human societies. the conflict between the ideal and the real ultimately emerges as a conflict between philosophical idealism and scientific realism. secondly, the domination of scientific realism over philosophical idealism robs human beings of their moral freedom and meaningful and purposeful life. every living organism lives and dies but without realizing the meaning and purpose of its life. in this context i would like to recall the distinction made by sartre between ‘being-in-itself’ and ‘being-for-itself’. what sartre intends to show here is that human individuals have greater dignity than stones, tables, and other living creatures. what gives humans the grater dignity over other existents is their subjective life. being-in-itself is to possess unconscious existence. on the contrary, being-for-itself represents the conscious life led by the humans. similarly, while discussing the nature of pleasure mill criticizes bentham for he failed to distinguish quantitative pleasure from a qualitative one. it is in this context mill holds that it is better to be socrates dissatisfied rather than a fool satisfied. in this paper an attempt is made to show how the mesmerizing effect of scientific realism would promote globalization which ultimately dehumanizes the basic human character. unless and until a balanced approach towards philosophical idealism and scientific realism is adopted there is going to be deterioration in the quality of human life. philosophical idealism the expression ‘idealism’ is basically construed in two senses. in one sense it is understood that every system of philosophy sets forth certain ideals to be realized for the well being of individual and society. in this sense, every system of philosophy is idealistic in its character. even marxism is not an exception to this characterization. in another sense, idealism represents an ontological position wherein ideas are treated as primary k. srinivas 119 and matter secondary or derivative. those systems of philosophy that oppose this view claim themselves to be anti-idealist. but philosophical idealism in the present context must be understood in the sense that philosophy as a discipline aims at certain ideals to be realized. the ancient greeks held that philosophy is born out of man’s sense of wonder and inquisitiveness expressed in questions “what are things really like?” and “how can we explain the process of change in things?” as stumpf puts it: “what prompted these questions was the gradual recognition that things are not exactly what they seem to be, that “appearance” often differs from “reality”.”1 in our day-to-day life we are often carried away by the appearances without probing into the very reality of these appearances. philosophers have advanced diverse explanations with regard to the distinction between appearance and reality. for instance, the classical and modern empiricists in the west, and the ancient indian materialists like carvaka could not see anything beyond sense-experience. hence, they identified all that is perceived (appearance) with reality. similarly, pragmatists explained the reality of anything and everything in terms of its utility and function. there are many different conceptions of reality. i do not propose to go into the details at this juncture. here we are not talking about the reality which scientists and likeminded philosophers explained in terms of material or physical phenomenon. traditionally, philosophy is viewed as a reflective and evaluative enterprise. it reflects on the essential meaning and purpose of life and its subordinate activities and the terms under which these activities are carried on. as ingram views it: the essential means the most basic, the most necessary, and/or the most universal features of some activity or thing. it is what defines something in its innermost identity, relating it to things that are like it and distinguishing from the things that are not. although this defining activity is similar to that of social and political scientist’s penchant for constructions classifications, it involves considerably more than the mere description of reality; it prescribes a norm or ideal to which the activity or the thing being defined must conform in order for it to be truly what it is. therefore, the definitions sought by philosophers have a critical edge.2 what is most important to notice in the above passage is that the reality of any activity or thing is assessed on the basis of a norm or an ideal 120 prajñâ vihâra to which it has to conform. this is the reason why the ancient greeks time and again emphasized the need to distinguish between wisdom and knowledge. it is through philosophical wisdom norms or ideals are arrived at. knowledge is always knowledge of appearances. a natural scientist arrives at knowledge of a given phenomenon by means of observation and experimentation. philosophy, on the contrary, is fundamentally conceived as the ‘love of wisdom’. even in the indian tradition philosophers are characterized as the seekers of truth. a philosopher is one who digs out the truth which exists beneath the appearances. also, the indian philosophers are a step ahead of the ancient greeks in holding the view that philosophers should not remain as mere lovers of wisdom, but must also lead the life of wisdom. it is the philosophical wisdom that reveals the ideal character of anything or activity. it is true that even science makes a distinction between appearance and reality. but this distinction is confined to the analysis of facts of existence. even for a scientist what is real is true. there is no dispute about this. but philosophical idealism, on the contrary, proposes that to be real is to be ideal and vice-versa. this means a philosopher puts forward only those ideals which can be realized for otherwise ideals remain utopian. similarly what is real must be in conformity with the ideal projected. therefore, one needs to distinguish between a real which is empirically real from a real which is ideally real. the latter is arrived at by means of philosophical reflection and evaluation. to arrive at the ideals which can be realized in a meaningful and purposeful life is the job of a philosopher. the following illustration may help us in understanding it in a better way. the concept of ‘human being’ is explained in terms of cut and dried matter possessing certain number of chromosomes by a physiologist. if one does not possess the required number of chromosomes then that entity is not classified under the class ‘human being’. a bat may appear to be a bird but in reality it is a mammal for a zoologist. this is decided on the characteristics possessed by the animal in question. a philosopher cannot come into picture here for his reflection and evaluation are of no use to judge whether a particular animal is a bird or mammal. for a philosopher a human being is one who possesses humanity. but how would one interpret this concept. if humanity is treated as an essential ingredient of human beings then the attributes which make up this huk. srinivas 121 manity such as rationality, ensoulment, consciousness of self, and possession of meaningful world are subjected to critical reflection and evaluation by philosophers. but all these attributes acknowledge the normative or ideal status of humanity. if humanity is viewed in any of the above mentioned ways then humanity consists of potentials that ought to be realized. the ideal fulfillment of potentials depends upon human agency. it may be realized or may not be. there is also another possibility. it is to make philosophy confine itself to the ideals which can be realized. what is to be realized must be made possible by the scientific rationality. as in the case of aristotle's four-fold theory of causation in which formal cause is the ideal or the blueprint. this blueprint becomes a reality when it is realized as a final cause. similarly, philosophical idealism provides us with a blueprint of the life-world with some ideals to be realized. before we construct a massive structure we go for a blueprint of it. it is the builder who has to bring this structure into reality. it is the job of a scientist to arrive at the world-view that conforms to the ideal blueprint of a philosopher. therefore, it is the ideal that precedes the real. we must be a bit cautious here when we talk about the reality. we are not talking about the natural world (natural reality) which is the given world. we are concerned with that world or reality which is transformed into a life-world by the intervention of human agency. scientific realism scientific realism, on the contrary, has its own role to play in shaping the life-world of the individuals. all the changes that are brought about by modern science and technology for leading a comfortable life-style by the humans are received with mixed reaction. to quote the remark of ziman in this context: “science has become a major part of the stock of our minds; it products are the furniture of our surroundings.”3 in the context of globalization science and technology become two important determining aspects of the quality of life led by the individuals in any society. therefore, the progress of these two indicators of qualitative life becomes a matter of pride for any society. technology as an applied form of science has become the basic means of production in modern economy. it goes 122 prajñâ vihâra without saying that mass production leads to mass consumption. as ravetz puts it: “the technocratic view of science is that of a basic factor of production, needing ever-increasing supplies of highly-trained ‘scientific manpower’. this view of science is descendant, in a simplified and vulgarized form, of a tradition extending from francis bacon down through karl marx.”4 bacon defined knowledge in terms of power and marx equated philosophy with political economy according to which the major advances in science and technology boost the needs of production. the boost in production is linked up with the better economic stability of any society and the comfortable living of the individuals in any industrialized society. but this technocratic view of science is dangerously one-sided for it converts science into an ideology. also, there is a danger of scientism percolating into every form of human life by dislodging moral rationality from its sphere. here the expression of ideology is nothing but false consciousness which is often oppressive. one of the worst consequences of the monopoly of science and technology over any society is that science assumes to be an independent and self-contained factor in deciding the life-style of the individuals. globalization, being the offshoot of industrialization, initially aims at catering to the specific needs of consumers on the basis of contract. once this requirement is taken care of the excess stock of commodities produced under this contract are dumped on the developing and the underdeveloped countries. thus, globalization gradually spreads its tentacles by converting the developing and underdeveloped nations into its dumping ground of its rejected products elsewhere. the survival of globalization is invariably dependent upon the industrialized science. as nash views it, industrialized science and science-based industry are closely related to each other. one cannot make any neat bifurcation between these two. in the case of industrialized science, it is primarily the needs of the industry that are to be taken care of by the science. on the contrary, science-based industry tries to augment its production by making use of the techniques of modern science.5 in other words, globalization encourages only those forms of science and technology that promote false needs at the cost of the genuine needs of individuals living in a society. its ultimate aim is profit making at any cost. first of all individuals themselves must have philosophical wisdom to make a distinction between genuine and false needs. k. srinivas 123 the genuine policy makers must keep this distinction in mind before recommending a particular course of action. partly the burden rests on the community of individuals to guide our science and technology to meet the ideals of life. just as food, clothing and shelter are accepted as the basic needs of human life, freedom, happiness, and justices are accepted as the true ideals of human life. unfortunately modern science and technology are oriented towards augmenting our commercial and military capabilities. the big business establishments in the world today found it more profitable to venture into the commercialization of military needs which range from ordinary military uniforms to sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. now it is the turn of the military technology to dominate all other forms of technology. as citizens of human community how horrific it would be to see science as a new leviathan. it is a dangerous body of knowledge which is esoteric, inhuman and increasingly dominant.6 this form of science and technology is not guided by any ideals but by power and domination. it is true that scientific temper has to be cultivated to oppose superstition and dogma, but not to oppose values. every scientist as a humanist must also realize his social responsibility as a scientist. the inventor of electricity should not think that he would not be harmed by it if he accidentally comes into contact with a live wire just because he invented it. a scientist as a citizen of human community must not become a victim of his own discoveries and inventions any more than the fellow citizens. if science is pampered to destroy the human values then it becomes fully authoritarian in style, giving the young or old no opportunity to develop their powers of criticism and judgment. “the increasing power of natural science thus threatens the destruction of humane understanding among educated people as the humane studies are increasingly deprived of prestige, of time in university teaching programmes, and of resources of research. as a result, our thinking about ourselves and the world around us becomes grossly materialistic and quantitative; the higher sensibilities and values are crushed beneath the machine.”7 one must realize that the fundamental differences among humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences are more of degree than of kind. each discipline has its own role to play in the life-world of individuals. when it is a question of decision making between two available alterna124 prajñâ vihâra tives, it is philosophical wisdom that comes to one’s rescue but not the knowledge of any particular science. reflective thinking and evaluation are the two fountains of philosophical wisdom. possessing scientific knowledge is different from how to make use of what is possessed. one must realize that science does not survive “by manpower units alone; and without some ideal to replace that of the pursuit of truth it could soon degenerate. moreover, to the extent that science becomes organized around the service of commercial and military industry, it will be subjected to the criticism of being dirty work.”8 there is a reason for calling modern science a dirty work for it is solely responsible in creating problems of environment or bio-sphere slowly people are coming to realize how modern science in the form of industrialized science has become more and more hazardous. consequently the social and ethical problems become the deepest problems to understand the adverse impact of industrialized science of present day. there is no wonder when one says that science has lost its pristine purity. here in this context we must make a distinction between professional ethic and general ethic. a scientist may follow all the prescriptions of a professional ethic to keep his discipline hale and hearty. but general ethic is more interested in keeping the whole society hale and hearty. for philosophical idealism it is the latter which is important. concluding remarks the above discussion brings out the defects of both philosophical idealism and scientific realism if they are pursued independent of each other. the failure of philosophical idealism is witnessed when the philosophers like plato, marx and gandhi failed in their attempts to cerate ideal societies of their respective periods. plato’s ‘ideal state’, marx’s ‘communist society’, and gandhi’s ‘rama rajya’ turned out to be mere utopian ideals for they were never realized in the history of mankind; and it is doubtful whether there would be any scope for the realization of them in future. here our contention is not to undermine their dream projects for the welfare of mankind, but the question is: how realistic are they? therefore, philosophical idealism can no more nurture such ideals which remain k. srinivas 125 as museum pieces or reified ideals. an ideal is something which translated into a concrete reality. similarly, scientific realism cannot boast about its achievements in the form of technological advancement for it is going to be detrimental to the furtherance of human race on the globe if the present day science and technology are not properly guided by philosophical idealism. scientific realism would be like a ship without a captain in the absence of philosophical idealism. it is set adrift in the waters without any direction. we have already noticed the dangerous consequences of pursuing modern science and technology without any moral base. the ethical basis of science has its source in philosophical idealism. but in modern society, as consumers, we have already become slaves to scientific realism. before the situation worsens we must come to our senses to revolt against excesses of modern science which is a tool or weapon in the hands of big industrialists to suppress human dignity. human dignity consists in the freedom that one enjoys. loss of freedom results in loss of creativity. science ultimately becomes a walking stick for us without which we cannot move a few feet. this was anticipated by michael polanyi, the wellknown physical chemist, karl popper, a well-known philosopher of science, and robert k. merton, a well-known sociologist. polanyi held that science progresses in a disciplined way without causing any danger to human welfare only when it is undertaken by the free and dedicated men. in other words, free and dedicated men need not be scientists by themselves, but as principal observers they orient it towards human welfare.9 karl popper viewed science as an embodiment of intellectual honesty which is realized through the principle and practice of criticism.10 and merton held that the ethos of science stands for the realization of highest standards of civilized human behaviour.11 all of them anticipated dangers to science. according to polanyi, the deterioration of science starts when bureaucracy, power and control determine the direction of science. for popper it is the intellectual dishonesty and non admittance of any criticism that lead to its downfall. merton viewed that the inherent conflict between the norms of cooperative scientific endeavour and those of lay society and state will contribute to its negative impact. some eminent marxist theoreticians like j.d. bernal believed that science is primarily concerned with the society and social development. therefore, a scientist has an obligation towards the welfare of the society. this is being done by the science 126 prajñâ vihâra without losing its integrity and freedom.12 if science is not to degenerate, it requires both philosophical wisdom and highest ethical commitment. majority of the scientists today indulge in ‘mission-oriented’ research. they do not have freedom to work on their own as they have fixed targets. the moral dilemma is whether an individual scientist pursues his scientific research for his own immediate benefits by turning his back to the sufferings of humanity or would he pursue his scientific research with strong social conscience and faith in human values. the present day scientific research prefers the former rather than the latter. especially in the context of globalization this dilemma between the ideal and the real persists. in our normal course of life it is the ideal which guides our real course of action. but it is unfortunate that the real is projecting what should be the ideal in the form of false needs. in other words, we are virtually allowing scientific realism to dominate our philosophical idealism. endnotes 1samuel enoch stumpf, socrates to sartre: a history of philosophy, new york, mcgraw hill book company, 191982, p.3. 2david ingram, critical theory and philosophy, new york, paragon house, 1990, pp. xx-xxi. 3j.m. ziman, public knowledge: an essay concerning the social dimensions of science, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1984, p.1. 4j.r. ravetz, scientific knowledge and its social problems, harmondsworth, penguin books, 1973, p.21. 5l.k.nash, the nature of the natural sciences, boston, little brown & co,1966, p.113. 6j.r. ravetz, scientific knowledge and its social problems, p.24. 7ibid., p.25. 8ibid., p.29. 9michael polanyi, the logic of liberty, london, routledge and kegan paul,1951, p.51. 10karl popper, conjectures and refutations, london, routledge and kegan paul,19630, chap.1. 11r.k. merton, science, theory and social structure, glencoe, the free press, 1957, 537-61. k. srinivas 127 12for details see, j. d. bernal, the social functions of science, london, routledge and kegan paul, 1939. 128 prajñâ vihâra a report on emotional education for young children: a leadership framework for change for thai catholic educators rev. bro. dr. phiranant numkanisorn abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide a leadership framework for thai catholic educators. this study has been developed on the basis of significant concern for the church as it faces contemporary challenges in the form of subjectivism, moral relativism and nihilism. the church needs to respond to these contemporary challenges in a manner that is relevant and effective. the church calls for catholic educators to develop and implement new content, new capabilities, and new educative models as an integral part of contemporary catholic education. the proposed framework comprises four components: relevant types of leadership, vision, values congruence, and school culture. all four said components are complementary and integrated; they 'work together' to develop and maintain catholic schools as authentic educational communities. introduction the catholic church is acutely aware of the challenges facing catholic education in the contemporary world. in her address to the seminaries and educational institutes, she asserts: we have a crisis of values which, in highly developed societies in particular, assumes the form, often exalted by the media, of subjectivism, moral relativism and nihilism. the extreme pluralism pervading contemporary society leads to behaviour patterns which are at times so opposed to one another as to undermine any idea of community identity. rapid structural changes, profound technical innovations, and the globalization of the economy, affect human life more and more throughout the world. (the catholic school on the threshold of the third millenium, article 1.) in this period of a crisis of values, the church calls us, catholic educators to not only understand these phenomena but also to effectively respond to the needs of society with a sense of great urgency and great responsibility. she further states: the catholic church has continued to share responsibility for the social and cultural development of the different communities and peoples to which it belongs, participating in their joys and hopes, their sufferings and difficulties, their efforts to achieve genuine human and communitarian progress. (the catholic school on the threshold of the third millenium, article 5.) the church calls catholic educators to earnestly be committed to, and genuinely carry-out, our duties as catholic educators; the basis of such genuine commitment is a strong motivation to model the life of christ as the great teacher. the church asserts: the project of the catholic school is convincing only if carried out by people who are deeply motivated, because they witness to a living encounter with christ, in whom alone the 1 mystery of man truly becomes clear. these persons, therefore, acknowledge a personal and communal adherence with the lord, assumed as the basis and constant reference of interpersonal relationship and mutual co-operation between educator and student. (educating together in the catholic school, article 4.) the church implies that we, as catholic educators, need to pay due attention to the widening scope of our educational functions. our educational services need to become more sophisticated and specialised in order to effectively respond to the said new challenges in the contemporary world. a new leadership framework is in vital need in order to develop and maintain relevant and authentic catholic education; a framework that will comprise new content materials, new capabilities, and new educational models that reflect the distinctive characteristics of a catholic educational community vis-a-vis school. catholic schools must be based on catholic educational foundations that reflect an operational structure that is a genuine instrument of the church. the catholic school must be a place of effective and dynamic teaching and learning, and a place of authentic and specific pastoral ministry. the paper will now discuss the perceived notions of leadership that are relevant to the changes in schools and how to exercise our leadership in invocation of the church. the paper will also discuss some key elements that contribute to the issue of school 'change'. the paper has an ultimate objective of presenting to the reader a conceptual framework for those catholic educators who desire transforming their educational organisations into places of 'real' learning; places of teaching and learning in which our young people can grow and develop efficaciously in a catholic pastoral environment. scopes of examination many authors have examined leadership practices that foster sustainable change in education. leithwood, jantzi & steinbach (1999) proposed the transformational model of leadership. their model could be likened to an ‘umbrella’ model comprising many separate components of educational leadership. these included mission/vision, school culture, and valuing human resources examined within the light of a catholic education mission. the transformational model, proposed by leithwood, jantzi & steinbach, will be used as the basis for a conceptual framework to organise the insight of others on the question of educational leadership in a catholic context. in order for a school to change a change process needs to be internalised by key stakeholders in the school organisation. the process necessarily involves the creation of a culture of change. for dynamic change to take place, a leadership framework needs to exist which places significant focus on the importance of the vision of the leader, values congruence, and culture transformation. the writer of this paper proposes that the transformational model represents a deliberate and harmonious orchestration of the various components of a particular leadership framework model aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of school change. leadership leithwood, jantzi & steinbach (1999) devoted considerable attention to clarifying the concept of leadership, referring to the works of yukl (1994), and noted that most conceptions of leadership discussed the significance of ‘influence’ to some degree. diversion from clearly defined models or concepts can be attributed to the individual leader, along with her/his rationale, purpose and intended goals of such influence. transformational leadership is that which “...facilitates a redefinition of a people’s 2 mission and vision, a renewal of their commitment and the restructuring of their systems for goal accomplishment. it is a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents. hence, transformational leadership must be grounded in moral foundations (leithwood, as cited in cashin et al., 2000,p.1). the transformational model of leadership described by these authors assumes that the central focus of leadership ought to be the commitments and capacities of organizational members. power is attributed by organizational members to whomever is able to inspire their commitments to collective aspirations and the desire for personal and collective mastery of the capacities needed to accomplish such aspirations (leithwood et al., 1999,p.9). hopkins (2001) indicates that the chosen model of leadership should reflect and respect the culture of the organization, which includes the various individuals within and their interactions, while striving to alter existing beliefs and attitudes. this notion, postulated by hopkins, recognizes that change in education is more likely to occur when a ‘grassroots’ approach is embraced. leithwood et al., (1999) have identified seven dimensions of transformational leadership: building school vision; establishing school goals; providing intellectual stimulation; offering individualized support; modelling best practices and important organizational values; demonstrating high performance expectations; creating a productive school culture; and developing structures to foster participation in school decision-making (leithwood, 1994 as cited in leithwood et al., 1999). in order to effectively apply the concept of transformational leadership in catholic schools we, as educational leaders, must believe in the power of rationale, purpose and intended educational goals integral to the teachings of the church. we therefore must assimilate our particular school educational goals with the core value that underpins catholic education. the core value that underpins catholic education is to evangelize; to approach men and women, wherever they are, and to prepare them to receive the blessed gift of salvation. to effectuate our leadership we will exercise our leadership with inspiration, commitment and aspiration. through our practices, we aim at altering the existing beliefs and values of our teachers in congruence with ecclesial values and encourage teachers to genuinely participate in school decision-making processes. our vision transformational leadership is intentionally aimed at influencing the behaviours, attitudes and inter-personal interactions of individuals within an organization. leithwood et al. (1999), in changing leadership for changing times, provides an authentic example of transformational leadership that describes the application of such a practice and the importance of the vision that underpins such a practice. creating a formal vision statement cannot be the first step; it must be considered a serious and purposeful process. a process that follows a great deal of collaborative discussion, planning and preparation, for the prospect of school change. rather than a ‘canned’ statement, to be rattled-off without appropriate internalization, a truly catholic school vision must reflect the needs of the society intertwined with the core values of catholic educational values and pedagogical foundations. the catholic school is to be a place of teaching and learning for the human person and of human persons. the person of each individual human being, in his or her material needs, is at the heart of christ’s teaching: this is why the promotion of the human person is the goal of the catholic school. (the catholic school on the threshold of the third millenium, article 9) in order to form a comprehensive and authentic vision statement for a catholic school we require 3 teachers, and other relevant stakeholders in the school to commit to dedicated, purposeful, deliberation. it is certainly not an objective – determining a comprehensive and authentic vision statement – that can be completed in one or two staff meetings. the process for determining and maintaining such a vision is dynamic and needs to be abundantly evident in the day-to-day operation of the school throughout the various activities that form part of its daily operation. decision-making, and problem resolutions, will be inextricably connected to the vision that underpins the very life of the school – a real and evidenced vision. if the vision is not clearly articulated, and authentically evident, as the fundamental operational reality of the school, the process of commencing the formulation of a school vision statement becomes futile and, indeed, may result in the development of personal and professional insecurities amongst members of the school community leading to cynical and resentful attitudes and behaviours. it is through the deliberate, consistent and carefully planned and purposeful effort of school leaders that the process of setting operational directions for the school become possible, manageable and joyful. values system congruence in order to materialize our catholic school vision a deep understanding of the concept of ‘values’ is needed. according to rokeach (1973:5) a value is “…an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct, or end-state of existence, is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence…” values are an integral component of organisational culture according to rokeach. “…values are the most distinctive property of defining characteristics of institutions…” (1979:51). we learn that values form the very core of personality, and values influence the choices that people make during the course of participating in everyday activities and work-based activities. posner & schmidt (1992) postulate that it is individual, and collective, values systems that underpin the manner by which people choose to devote a certain amount of time and energy to particular activities of daily living and professional pursuits. values assume even more importance in the case of transformational leaders, since transformational leadership results in changing particular needs and values of both leaders and subordinates. burns (1978) postulated that transformational leadership is based on the role of conscious purpose; conscious purpose drawn from values. transformational leadership involves the uncovering of contradictions among values and between values and practice, and the realigning of values held by teachers the alignment of the values of teachers, values that conform to and complement the desired values of the catholic school, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the role of values in organisations. meglino & ravlin (1998) outline the importance of values systems in the culture of an organisation reminding the reader that values in organisations serve a similar purpose to their function in society at large. schein (1985) explains that values allow internal and external adaptation. shared values enable efficient interactions within the workplace and assist in establishing internal integration of practice, while, externally, the values that contribute to an organisation’s culture can affect its external survival. it is interesting to note that it is possible for an organisation to have strong internal integration, however, externally, the organisation fails to thrive. it is therefore imperative that values that are internally and externally appropriate be adopted and developed. values congruence affects employees in a range of occupations. in the nursing profession tzeng, ketefian & redman (2002) found that employee (health care profession) satisfaction and patient satisfaction were related. in the contemporary business world, meglino,ravlin & adkins (1989) observed a similar relationship between employee workplace satisfaction and commitment to workplace duties. in the teaching profession/vocation, joffres & haughey (2001) observed that 4 values incongruence appeared to increase the teacher’s feelings of alienation, undetermined collaboration, reduced efficacy and commitment to duties, all of which have a detrimental impact on student outcomes. thus, we, as leaders in catholic school communities should take the time to gain a sound understanding of, and develop, values congruence in our educational communities. we need to develop purposeful processes that enable such ‘congruence’ for the benefit of our students, faculty of teachers and the broader community in which our schools are located. teachers need to develop a sense of ‘servant leadership’ and be satisfied with the tasks that they are assigned by those in more senior positions of responsibility at the school. as educational leaders we need to unashamedly strive to achieve demonstrable educational goals that we claim to aspire to. school culture the last component of the proposed catholic school transformation process, discussed in this paper, is the school culture. according to leithwood et.al. (1999:83) a school culture includes the “… norms, beliefs, values and assumptions shared by members of the school…” a pervading school culture has the potential to make or break efforts aimed at restructuring a schools values systems and corresponding modus operandi (way of doing things). the concept of school culture remains elusive in many respects as it is frequently discussed in subjective terms and with particular biases being put forward at a given point in time. while a positive school culture could be said to be conducive to school restructuring effort, it may actually be ignored (to some extent) – as a significant impact by significant school stakeholders. it could, conversely, be argued (with some degree of confidence) that a negative school culture is frequently evident in schools that are struggling to implement reform processes. the dominant, pervading, school culture depends on the nature of its leader; the extent to which the school leader supports – individually and collectively – the personal and intellectual development of the members of the school community. the leader of a school must model the values and professional practices that have been identified as critical shared values of the school community. the ability of the school leader to effectively and consistently model shared values and professional practices of the school community are a particularly important feature of school decision-making and problem-solving strategies that are part of how the school operates. leithwood et.al (1999) discusses the professional growth of all members of a school community in terms of the adoption and evidencing of ‘key values’ and professional practices. a school culture is, therefore, a combining, synthesizing of a broad range of interactions of different individuals within a particular setting vis-à-vis educational community. leithwood et.al. (1999) provides a complete list of behaviours designed to strengthen the school culture. these behaviours include, but are not limited to,clarifying and publicly communicating the vision of the school as well as using slogans and rituals to express cultural values. bohlman & deal (2002:104) reinforce leithwood’s observations when stating that “…celebration and ceremony are anecdotes to boredom, cynicism and burnout. they bring groups together, strengthen bonds, and build spirit and faith…” in order to conduct school rituals, ceremonies, and other events in a rewarding way, leithwood et.al (1999:164) suggests further that they should be designed for symbolic purposes, asserting that “…these events may be viewed by teachers as not only nonauthentic but as a trivialization of both school improvement goals and teachers professional commitment to working toward these goals…” we, as transformational leadership educators in contemporary catholic schools, need to consider ‘change’ as a constant, balanced by the understanding that some modifications of more global initiatives may be necessary to accommodate present needs. however, change management needs to be implemented and developed guided through the spirit-filled wisdom of the shared values of a catholic school mission. we must be willing to permit adequate time for devoted efforts aimed at 5 strengthening catholic school culture; the culture that transitions our catholic educational communities to be a place of ecclesial experience, which is moulded in the christian community. the type of culture we strive to develop must be in profound relations of communion nourished by a living, real, relationship with christ and with the church. this ‘living relationship’ is what makes the catholic school environment an authentic ecclesial experience. through the practice of transformational leadership, we, as catholic school educators in privileged and blessed positions of appointed leadership, must be keen to develop authentic, relevant and meaningful ceremonies and rituals that reflect our shared values in our catholic schools. the ceremonies and rituals that are developed must, indeed, be considered integral features of the ‘whole manner’ by which shared values of a christian community are reflected in the day-to-day operation and management of the school. the success of school transformation is ultimately dependant on the authenticity of the leadership of the school and how the leadership of the school demonstrates such authenticity in the development of school policies, procedures and practices. conclusion catholic schools face new challenges in the contemporary world. the crisis of values is a significant issue for catholic educational leaders to face and deal with in a manner that is well positioned in the word. the contemporary crisis of values is manifest in heightened levels of subjectivism, relativism and nihilism. catholic educational leaders need to pay due attention to the widening scope of education taking place in our local, regional and national communities. our educational services need to become more sophisticated and specialised, and based on the educational positions of those with the spirit indwelling. in order to effectively and efficiently respond to the said new challenges, for catholic education in the contemporary world, a new educational framework is called for to obtain new contents, new capabilities and new educational models which must be well-founded on the nature and distinctive characteristics of a catholic educational community. transformational leadership is a desirable style for school leaders that are involved in efforts aimed at improving the awareness levels of teachers on the importance of how values underpin the modus operandi of an authentic catholic educational community. teachers need to be ‘educated’, through a transformational leadership style, to individually and collectively value organizational goals and educational strategies that aim to produce truly catholic educational objectives. transformational leaders are not just ‘managers; transformational leaders have the knowledge, skills and personal attributes to produce organizational innovation and substantial organizational change. transformational leaders are a necessary ingredient in bringing about, in collaborative partnership with others, significant changes to the culture of educational communities by introducing, in a prudent and purposeful manner, new belief systems and goals. these changes take place when the transformational leader has the capacity to change how members of the educational community perceive, and act upon, their roles; roles as collaborative educators in a catholic educational community. the success of our leadership is therefore rooted in the authenticity of our leadership and the way how the organisational policies, practices and procedures are clearly and purposefully articulated. references bohlman, l. g., & deal, t. e. (2002). reframing the path to school leadership: a guide for teachers and principals. thousand oaks, ca: corwin press. burns,j.m.(1978),leadership,harper and row,new york. 6 joffres, c. & haughey, m. (2001). “elementary teachers’ commitment declines: antecedents, processes and outcomes”. the qualitative report, 6(1). retrieved july 29, 2007 from http://www.nova.edu/sss/qr6-1/joffres.html. leithwood, k. (2002). “organizational conditions to support teaching and learning”. in w. hawley (ed.). the keys to effective schools. (2002, pp.97-110). california: corwin. leithwood, k., begley, p., & cousins, b. (1992). developing expert leadership for future schools. london: falmer leithwood, k. a., jantzi, d., & steinbach, r. (1999). changing leadership for changing times. philadelphia: open university press. leithwood, k. a., aitken, r., & jantzi, d. (2001). making schools smarter: a system for monitoring school and district progress. california: corwin press. meglino, b. m. & ravlin, e. c. (1998). “individual values in organisations: concepts, controversies, and research”. journal of management, 24(3), 351-389. meglino, b. m., ravlin, e. c. & adkins, c. l. (1989). “a work values approach to corporate culture: a field test of the value congruence process and its relationship to individual outcomes”. journal of applied psychology, 74, 424-432. posner, b.z.(1992) “person-organization values congruence: no support for individual differences as a moderating influence”, human relations,vol.45 no.4,pp.351-361. posner, b.z.and schmidt,w.h.(1992) “values and the american manager: an update updated”, california management review, vol. 34 no.3, pp.80-94. rokeach, m. (1973). the nature of human values. new york: free press. rokeach, m. (1979). “from individual to institutional values: with special reference to the values of science”. in m. rokeach (ed.), understanding human values (pp. 47-70). new york: free press. the sacred congregation for catholic education: the catholic school (1977). the sacred congregation for catholic education: the catholic school on the threshold of the third millennium (1997). the sacred congregation for catholic education: educating together in catholic schools (2007). tzeng, h. m., ketefian, s. & redman, r. w. (2002). “relationship of nurses’ assessment of organisational culture, job satisfaction, and patient satisfaction with nursing care. international journal of nursing studies, 39, 79-84. 7 spirituality and mysticism: a global view the dialectic between the private and the public: the philosophy of descartes’ discourse on the method 1 taro mochizuki osaka university, japan abstract descartes, in his discourse on method, constructs an implicit dialectic between logos, ethos, and pathos. this dialectic is finally resolved in the direction of logos or reason by descartes’ decision to publish his work and appeal to the public. it is only through the reflection in the public mirror that the opinions of a philosopher can be judged authentic, and it is in this sense that descartes needs the public. this signals a rejection of traditional religious authority and a trust in the public’s “totally pure natural reason.” introduction if we wish to consider descartes’ philosophy as a system of knowledge produced by a philosopher, we should read his meditations on first philosophy and the principles of philosophy. we will get from them a coherent understanding of so-called cartesian philosophy. however, if by ‘philosophy’ we mean the attitude of a philosopher regarding the public world and the situation in which he actually lives, nothing is better to read than descartes’ discourse on the method. it is from this point of view that i am going to approach descartes and his philosophy. let us start with a brief overview. the discourse serves as a preface to three essays on physics and mathematics, namely dioptrics, meteorology and geometry, and it consists of six parts. part one provides a history or a biography of the author; part two treats the method; part three discusses his morals; part four presents metaphysics; part five introduces readers to new physics, and finally, part six gives an appeal to the public. a philological study showed that the texts of these six parts, which constitute the discourse as published in 1637, were written in different periods from 1635 to 1636. according to gilbert gadoffre, part one and part six were written before the other parts.2 this fact seems to explain why descartes wrote discourse on the method; he wrote it for the purpose of explaining to the public how he, as a philosopher, felt he should react when authorities unfairly censored scientific publication. in other words, what descartes wrote in part one and part six reveals part of his hidden polit1 ical philosophy, although he never revealed his political philosophy completely or in a systematic way.3 in this paper, i am going to discuss descartes’ attitude toward the public world, analysing mainly the text of part six of the discourse. 1. rhetorical structure of discourse on the method, part six a dialectical construction can clearly be seen from the beginning of part six. the argument of this part is rhetorically structured in the sense that it involves the following triptych: logos, pathos and ethos, which are the essential three constitutive elements of rhetoric. the argument of this part appeals not only to a reader’s logos, but also to the pathos and ethos. accordingly, threefold rhetorical relationships can be observed in the very first paragraph of this part: one between logos and ethos, another between logos and pathos, and finally one between ethos and pathos. let me begin by quoting from the first paragraph of part six: [1] but it has now been three years since i had arrived at the end of the treatise that contains all these things, and since i was beginning to review it in order to put it into the hands of a publisher, when i learned that some persons, to whom i defer and whose authority over my actions can hardly be less than that of my own reason over my thoughts, had disapproved of an opinion in physics, published a little earlier by someone else, concerning which i want to say not that i were of the same opinion, but that i had noticed nothing in it, before their censure, that i could imagine to be prejudicial either to the religion or to the state, nor, as a consequence, anything that would have prevented me from writing it, if reason had persuaded me of it, and that this made me fear that there might, all the same, be found among my opinions some one in which i had been mistaken, notwithstanding the great care that i have always taken not to accept into my beliefs any new ones for which i did not have very certain demonstrations, and not to write anything at all that could turn to the disadvantage of anyone. this has been sufficient to oblige me to change the resolution that i had had to publish my opinions. for, although the reasons for which i had earlier made the resolution were very strong, my inclination, which has always made me hate the business of writing books, made me immediately find enough other reasons to excuse myself from doing so. and these reasons, both on the one side and on the other side, are such that not only do i have some interest in stating them here, but also perhaps the public has some interest in knowing them. (part six, discourse on the method, p.84)4 the above discusses the troublesome circumstances surrounding descartes’ treatise on physics. descartes had almost finished writing the text, which was to have been published under the title of the world (le monde) in 1633. he refrained from publishing it because of the galileo affair, in which galileo galilei came into conflict with catholic authorities because of his support for copernican astronomy. the quoted paragraph is the introduction to descartes’ apology for his final de2 cision that he would try again to publicise his theses of natural philosophy. this part covers all the reasons as to why he had originally refrained from publishing the world, why he changed his opinion, and why he finally decided to publish some of his theses with the discourse. in the above paragraph, we see that descartes’ resolution ‘to publish his opinions’ conflicts with the decision of the catholic authorities (logos vs. ethos); that his desire (‘the great care’) for rational thinking conflicts with his ‘fear’ of being mistaken (logos vs. pathos); and that the authorities’ decision eventually supported his inclination ‘which [had] always made [him] hate the business of writing books’, and ‘made [him] immediately find enough other reasons to excuse [him]self from doing so’ (ethos vs. pathos). these three-fold conflicting relations between logos and ethos, between logos and pathos, and between ethos and pathos, make a complex which will determine the dialectic in part six that we are going to review shortly. at the oppositional stage, it seems that ethos and pathos win over logos, ethos going together with pathos. we will see, however, that logos finally wins over ethos and pathos at the synthetic stage. 2. three key moments of the dialectical construction of the discourse, part six 3 let us do a quick overview of part six. the text can be divided into three: first, from para 2 to the end of para 3; and then from para 4 to the end of the para 7, and finally from para 8 to the end of para 12. each division corresponds to the three key moments of the dialectical development of descartes’ argument in part six. the three key moments are (1) appearing in the public, (2) withdrawal back into the private, and (3) authentication of the self. 2.1 appearing in public descartes wrote in the beginning of para 2 in part six: [2] i have never made much of the things that came from my mind, and, so long as i have gathered no other fruits from the method of which i make use except that i have satisfied myself concerning some difficulties that pertain to the speculative sciences, or else that i have tried to regulate my morals by means of the reasons that the method taught me, i have not at all believed myself to be obliged to write anything thereof. (p.85) withdrawal from a world of appearances into the private domain where a philosopher enjoys the life of the mind is the first and necessary condition of speculation, as hannah arendt explains in her final work the life of the mind.5 and, that is why descartes ‘made the resolution to study within [himself]’ and he also made the resolution ‘to employ all the powers of [his] mind in choosing the paths that [he] should follow, [in which he] succeeded much’,6 he reports, and it was lucky for him, as he describes as follows, ‘in the crowd of a great, very active people, and of one more concerned with its own affairs than curious about those of others, in the most frequented towns, to live as solitary and retired as in the most remote deserts.’7 what compelled and prompted descartes to write and try to publish the world in 1633? he explains in the following passages of para 2 in part six: [2] but, as soon as i had acquired some general notions concerning physics, and, beginning to test them in various particular difficulties, i had noticed whereto they can lead, and how much they differ from the principles that one has used up until the present, i believed that i could not keep them secret without sinning gravely against the law that obliges us to procure, as much as it is within us, the common good of all men. for these notions have shown me that it is possible to arrive at knowledge that be very useful for life, and that, in place of that speculative philosophy that one teaches in the schools, one can find a practical philosophy, by means of which, knowing the force and the actions of fire, of water, of air, of the stars, of the heavens and of all the other bodies in our environment just as distinctly as we know the various crafts of our artisans, we might be able, in the same fashion, to employ them for all the purposes to which they are appropriate, and thus to render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature. (p.87) here we see the resurgence of the public (‘the common good of all men’). 4 if withdrawal from the world of appearances is the first and necessary condition of philosophical thinking, thinking would be nothing without making itself manifest in the world of appearances where people share a common sense and good. we are a being-of-the-world, and being-of-the-world presupposes the existence of others who are the recipients of appearances. the recipients of appearances are not singular, but plural. they enjoy the products of the speculation of philosophers. and this is true not only in the practical sense, but also in the ontological sense; although transcendence presupposes immanence, the latter does not function except through the former. in other words, identity cannot exist without difference. why would a reasonable philosopher publish his work? descartes gives us two reasons: the first is ‘the brevity of life’; the second, ‘the lack of observations’.8 the brevity of a philosopher’s life prevents sciences from making progress. hence, the outcomes of scientific research should proceed from generation to generation without interruption, in order that sciences progress continuously. therefore, descartes says: [3] i judged that there was hardly any better remedy against these two obstacles than to communicate faithfully to the public all the little that i had found, and to urge the good minds to try to advance further by contributing, each according to his inclination and his ability, to the observations that it would be necessary to make, and also by communicating to the public all the things that they might learn, in order that, the successors beginning where the predecessors had left off, and thus combining the lives and the labors of many, we all together were to go much further than each one individually could know how to do. (pp.87–89) and also he adds: [3] i noticed, moreover, regarding observations, that, the further advanced in knowledge one is, the more necessary they are. (p.89) his arguments are so persuasive that it is unlikely that we will ever find any ‘other reasons’ to cause descartes to change his opinion about publishing his work. 2.2 withdrawal back into the private but, soon after that, descartes says: [4] but i have had, since that time, other reasons that have caused me to change my opinion, and to think that i really ought to continue to write about all the things that i would judge of some importance, [but that] i ought not to in any way to consent thereto that these writings were to be published during my lifetime, so that neither the opposition and controversies to which they would perhaps be subjected, nor even the reputation such as they could acquire 5 for me, were to give me any occasion for losing the time that i have planned to employ in instructing myself. (p.91) this is the moment of withdrawal. he withdraws into himself, saying that the opposition he anticipates from others, as well as the controversies that the publication of his work will introduce, which he shall inevitably be involved in, are awful enough for him to want to avoid publication, even though he promises to himself that he will continue to write. so, he temporarily decided not to publicise his work. oppositions might be useful, descartes concedes, as much in providing better understanding as in providing more discoveries. but, he argues that ‘[he has] almost never found a critic of [his] opinions who were not to seem to [him] either less rigorous or less fair than [him]self’, and that ‘[he has] also never observed that by means of the disputations that are practiced in the schools one had discovered any truth of which one had previously been ignorant’.9 communication of thoughts is useful to no one, because no one can do better than oneself in applying one’s thoughts to actual practice. descartes says, ‘if there is anyone who be capable of doing this, it must be rather myself than someone else, [...] because one could not conceive of a thing and make it one’s own so well when one learns it from someone else as when one discovers it oneself.’ misunderstanding has happened so often, says descartes, when communicating his thoughts even to those ‘persons with very good minds, and persons who, while [he] was speaking with them about them, seemed to understand them very distinctly, nevertheless, when they have repeated them, [he has] noticed that they have almost always changed them in such a way that [he] could no longer acknowledge them as [his]’.10 observations with the assistance of others could help a philosopher to make more progress in research and science. one man’s mind does not suffice to make all the observations necessary to advance research. artisans might help a philosopher make the instruments needed for observations. ‘volunteers, who, out of curiosity or desire to learn, might perhaps offer themselves to help him.’ but, descartes says, ‘if there were among them some that were to serve me, again, they could not be worth the time that i would have to employ to select [those observations which are really helpful]’.11 hence, descartes decided ‘not at all to divulge the treatise that [he] had in [his] hands, and [...] made a resolution not to let be seen, during [his] lifetime’.12 descartes himself admits that ‘to be useful to no one is, strictly speaking, to be worth nothing’, but, if it is true that, ‘if there is any task in the world that could not be accomplished so well by anyone else as by the same one who has begun it, it is the one on which [he] is working’,13 his withdrawal into solitude would have been the necessary conclusion. 6 2.3 authentication of the self the third moment is authentication of the self. how can a philosopher be authentic to himself? retreat to solitude did not satisfy descartes’ desire to be authentic. he went beyond the opposition between the public and the private. descartes says that he has two reasons to have finally decided to publish three essays on natural philosophy: [8] but since then there have been yet again two other reasons that have obliged me to place here certain particular essays and to render to the public some account of my actions and of my plans. (p.101) the first reason can be summed up, in a word, as self-concern. descartes was so self-concerned that he could neither put up with ‘doing [him]self an injustice’, nor leave himself in quietude, without making an apology for having refrained from publicising his thesis. he says: [8] i have also never tried to hide my actions like crimes, nor have i taken many precautions to remain unknown; as much because i would have believed that i would be doing myself an injustice, as because that would have given me a certain kind of disquiet, which would, again, have been contrary to the perfect tranquility of mind that i am seeking. (p.101) he also adds; [8] and, because, having always been thus indifferent in regard to the concern of being known or not being known, i have not been able to prevent myself from acquiring some sort of reputation, i have thought that i ought to do my best in order at least to prevent myself from having a bad one. (ibid.) he could not stand gaining a bad reputation. he just wanted to do himself justice as well as be treated as deserved. and the second reason, says descartes: [8] seeing every day more and more the delay that the plan that i have to instruct myself is suffering because of an infinity of observations of which i have need and which it is impossible that i might make without the help of others, although i do not flatter myself so much as to hope that the public would take a great part in my interests, still, i also do not want to fail myself so much as to give those who will survive me cause someday to reproach me to the effect that i could have left them many things much better than i had done if i had not so much neglected to make them understand how they could contribute to my plans. (ibid.) it is the question of so-called accountability that descartes poses here. 7 notice the fact that for both reasons he writes not because he wants the public to have any interest in his work, but because he does not want to give any reason to posterity to blame him for a lack of accountability. is he selfish? yes, because he no longer cares for others. to benefit others no longer matters here. what matters here most is the authentication of the self. let us think of it in the following way. what is authenticity for a philosopher? in terms of the attitude of a philosopher, authenticity implies consistency between thinking and acting; in other words, consistency between being subjectively engaged in his own thinking and appearing objectively as such, as he is. it is true that a philosopher can think without expressing his thoughts to the public. keeping silent on what he thinks can also be a right. however, to keep silent already means to act in a certain way. is it an authentic attitude for a philosopher to think and to act differently –– according to different principles? good sense or reason has authority over descartes’ thoughts, as we have seen in para 1, while the catholic church exercises authority over his actions. thus, good sense or reason should be the principle guiding a philosopher’s thinking while any public power could be the principle guiding a philosopher’s actions, if we admit a philosopher’s attitudes splits into two different principles. descartes goes beyond the opposition between such different principles of good sense or reason and the authorities. 3. rhetorical structure and dialectic now, i will go back to the rhetorical structure that i explained earlier and discuss its relation to the dialectical construction of the discourse, part six. first, in terms of logos vs. ethos, logos seemingly yielded to ethos in the first stage. seemingly, i say, because although it is true that descartes once renounced publishing the world in 1633 to withdraw into his private sanctum, he eventually decided to publish his opinions because of those ‘two other reasons’ that we have just seen. second, in terms of pathos vs. ethos, ethos supported pathos at the first stage. as descartes admitted, the authorities’ disapproval of galileo’s opinion made him fearful. third, in terms of logos vs. pathos, he wrote that ‘although the reasons for which [he] had earlier made the resolution were very strong, [his] inclination, which has always made [him] hate the business of writing books, made [him] immediately find enough other reasons to excuse 8 [him]self from doing so’, his feeling of fear as well as inclination won against his former resolution. pathos won against logos in the first stage. to sum up, logos seemingly yielded to ethos, pathos eventually won against logos, and then ethos assisted pathos at the first stage of simple opposition between each opposing term. dialectic moves on, however. at the stage of synthesis, that is, after the key moment of authentication of the self, logos surmounts the challenge of ethos and pathos. for both reasons of self-concern and accountability, descartes finally decides to publicise his theses. however, remember that logos, which was primarily assigned on the side of the public at the moment of appearing in the public, has been shifted there from the private since the moment of withdrawal, remaining so even at the moment of authentication. although logos wins over ethos and pathos in the end, it is not because descartes’ reason persuades him to benefit the public, but because he wants to be authentic to himself as a philosopher. notwithstanding this fact, however, he needs the public. why? at the last moment, descartes tries to appeal to the public, in order to let the public ‘judge [his] opinions’, whether his opinions are right or wrong. to conclude, it is only through the reflection in the public mirror that the opinions of a philosopher can be judged authentic, and it is in this sense that descartes needs the public. conclusion authentication of the self is achieved when the rule of the authorities is replaced with descartes’ own morals, drawn from the method explained in part three. part three is the most recent entry in descartes’ discourse. now i quote from part three a passage regarding the first rule of this philosopher’s so-called morals for provision. [2] beginning from then on to count my opinions as nothing, because i wanted to submit them all to examination, i was assured that i could not do better than to follow those of the most sensible. and, although there may perhaps be people among the persians or the chinese just as sensible as among ourselves, it seemed to me that the most useful thing was to regulate myself in accordance with whom i would have to live; and that, in order to know which their opinions truly were, i ought to take note rather of that which they practiced than of that which they said. (p.41) so descartes submitted his opinions to the french public, who were supposed to be so sensible as to be endowed with good sense or reason. that is why he wrote in part six as follows: 9 [11] and, if i am writing in french, which is the language of my country, rather than in latin, which is the language of my teachers, it is because i am hoping that those who make use only of their totally pure natural reason will better judge my opinions than those who believe only in the ancient books. (p.105) thus, descartes rejected the rule of the catholic authorities over scientific activities, and replaced it with his own morals drawn from the method. he did so in order to reflect himself on the mirror of the french public who were able to judge a philosopher’s opinions, ‘mak[ing] use only of their totally pure natural reason’ that was supposed to be equally, ‘the best distributed thing in the world.’14 10 1endnotes this paper was originally presented as my special lecture at the graduate school of philosophy and religion, assumption university, bangkok, on the 17th december 2008. 2 gilbert gadoffre, sur la chronologie du discours de la méthode, revue d’histoire de la philosophie et d’histoire de la civilisation, lille, march 1943. 3 on this subject, see pierre guenancia, descartes et l’ordre politique, presses universitaires de france, paris, 1983. 4 i quote from the following edition: rené descartes, discours de la méthode/discourse on the method, a bilingual edition with an interpretive essay, edited, translated, and introduced by george heffernan, university of notre dame press, notre dame, 1994. the number between parentheses [n] indicates that i quote the passage(s) from para-n. 5 cf. hannah arendt, the life of the mind, one-volume edition. a harvest book, harcourt brace & company, san diego-new york-london, 1971. part 1, chapters 7 and 9. cf. p.47 & p.75. 6 discourse on the method, part one, para 15. p.25. 7 op.cit., part three, para 7. p.49. 8 discourse on the method, part six, para 2. p.87. 9 discourse on the method, part six, para 5. p.95. 10 op.cit., part six, para 5, p.95.. 11 op.cit., part six, para 7. p.99. 12 op.cit., part six, para 8, pp.99-101. 13 discourse on the method, part six, para 7, p.99. 14 discourse on the method, part one, para 1, p.15. article5-1 three challenges for global religion in the 21 st century: peer to peer, integralism, transhumanism* michel bauwens the strategy team, belguim introduction in this essay, i want to address three themes, powerful combination of ideas and social practices that will challenge both traditional and new religions as they struggle to maintain or establish themselves in the new century. the first topic is the emergence of the peer to peer phenomenon and its deepening influence on many different fields of human endeavour, including religion and spirituality. in short, peer to peer is not only the emerging and fundamental form of the technological and productive infrastructure of our networked age, but also a new mode of production, a new form of social and political organisation, and finally, a new form of subjective experiencing of the world, a psychological and cultural phenomenon. peer to peer is concerned with seeing and organising the world not in a strict hierarchical or centralised system, but as a ‘network of networks’ of equal participants, i.e. a reformulation and old aspiration of humankind, but not less real for that, as we hope to demonstrate. we will content that peer to peer is emerging as a new competitive civilisational format, on a par with the current domination of commoditybased capitalism, and its underlying philosophy of the war of each against all. we will specifically discuss the emergence of peer to peer as a spiritual phenomenon as well. the second topic we want to address is integralism, a form of philosophical understanding that aims to integrate the findings of all religions and philosophies in an integrative viewpoint excluding none. *this article was first delivered at a conference entitled “religion and globalisation” at payap university, thailand. prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 41-17 41 © 2000 by assumption university press what integralism does in essence, is to place the development of religion and spirituality in an evolutionary context, and to draw a common structural core to be found amongst the various spiritual worldviews. and finally, we want to address the challenge of technological transhumanism, a very powerful alternative to transcendentally oriented religions, that acts as the subconscious context of the speeding of the technological quest and its eventual final realisation as a “god project” on this planet, currently expressed in the fields of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence. ken wilber, an author which we will discuss in the second chapter has developed a useful heuristic tool which he calls “all quadrants, all levels” (aqal). it basically says that any phenomena can be described in the context of two polarities: one polarity is between agency and communion, i.e. its individual existence and its always being part of a system, and the other polarity is the interior-exterior polarity. in other words, every phenomenon has always a body in time and space, but always also an interior life, i.e. aspirations, motivations, desires, and instincts, which cannot be measured in space-time, but are nevertheless real. this gives us a system of four quadrants: 1) the interior-individual quadrant, the realm of the subjective life and individual feelings 2) the exterior-individual quadrant, the field of the single object and its behaviour in time and space; 3) the interior-collective, the inter-subjective field which covers collective worldviews, including general culture, philosophy and religious worldviews; and 4) the exterior-collective, the interobjective field, which covers systems: systems of objects, such as the political, social, economic, and other systems. in each quadrant one can then uncover an evolutionary line of development, which envelops systems of evermore encompassing complexity, and of course, interestingly, we can correlate the findings across the quadrants. (lest we would fall in a trap of an ideology of progress, these lines should of course be based on a scientific consensus concerning the data of the past, not as a way to predict any future developments.). let me be nevertheless clear that evolution does not necessarily mean progress, but a kind of process towards more complexity of organization and integration. this is the interpretative scheme we will use to explain the 42 prajñâ vihâra emergence of peer to peer, but we personally always amend the wilberian scheme by putting technology in the individual-exterior quadrant, for the reason that technology can be very usefully seen as an externalisation of the human body, with different levels of technological development representing different externalisations. you do not necessarily need to remember this scheme, but it is the heuristic method i have been using for tracking spiritual phenomena and is thus ‘active’ as an epistemological background. i. challenge one: peer to peer i.1. peer to peer as the newly emerging civilisational format our contention is that “peer to peer” is first of all the primary form of the technological and productive infrastructure of the current phase of cognitive capitalism, but at the same time there are grave doubts that the current system can actually use p2p to its full potential, hence, it may also be a pointer to a new phase of our civilisation with adapted formats of collective organisation, cultural worldviews, and subjective realities. that at least is our contention. we use to notion of cognitive capitalism to distinguish it from the earlier phases of merchant capitalism, based on the use of slave labour and serfdom in a still feudal context, and the phase of industrial capitalism, based on the use of free forms of mass labour, a form that is, at least in the west, declining, and making place for a new logic based on immaterial labour and ‘immaterial production’. indeed, in the current phase of our political economy, where the production of material goods is increasingly automated and dependent on immaterial factors, and where immaterial production is itself becoming a dominant factor (in its two expression of symbolic production by knowledge workers and service provision by ‘affective’ workers), peer to peer is already the primary format of our infrastructure. first of all there is of course the well-known internet, which is no longer organised as a centralised or pyramidal network as earlier computer infrastructures were (as were the mainframe and client-server configurations), but as an ever-changing configuration of a network of networks. this is not only michel bauwens 43 true for the network as a whole, but also for the format of technological organisation within the enterprise, where the client-server format is being abandoned in favor of a webification of the infrastructure. very near on the horizon is the large-scale implementation of the concept of grid computing, which is an even more radical implementation of the peer to peer concept, where every computer of the network can be used for any application according to availibility. and within enterprises, while the process of webification continues apace despite the dotcom technology bubble, the next stage appears to be the implementation of hypernets, which differ from the classic internet in that not only core applications are webified, but also the peripheral applications with workers on the field, who now have increasingly have access to networked devices that are no longer personal computers but a wide array of all kinds of ‘peripheral devices’. in the telecom industry, which was the author’s former area of expertise, centralised models of telephone distribution are increasingly being replaced by networked models, and of course there is the well-known explosion of p2p-based wireless transmission mode (wifi), very popular with civic movements for the independence it affords from private telecom infrastructure. let me remind readers that in western countries only about a quarter of the population is estimated to be involved in material production, and that this percentage is diminishing by about half a percent every year. and that the primary working and communication tool of the knowledge workers are networked computers based on peer to peer based models. (as a reminder, p2p as technology means that all participating computers and networks are considered interchangeable parts of the overall network, which no longer has an identifiable center or hierarchic structure, though there are variations amongst network depending on the radicality of the p2 peer implementation; it also means that ‘intelligence is located everywhere in the periphery and available to all participants of the network, without any ‘bottlenecks of control’) very important in terms of public consciousness is of course that peer to peer has become the dominant form of music distribution (i.e. more music downloaded than actually bought via cd’s), and that this distribution uses peer to peer models of cooperatively united personal computers, connected worldwide into a single system of exchange. and 44 prajñâ vihâra also very important is the increasing speed of implementation of ‘open source’ linux system, which brings us to our second manifestation of peer to peer, not just as a format of technological infrastructure, but as a true mode of production. indeed, today thousands of programmers are cooperatively working on establishing computer systems, mostly software but now also ‘open hardware’, that are in many cases becoming more productive than commercially produced counterparts, as was recently confirmed in a cover story of business week. free software, developed originally by richard stallman, says that all source code is common property and cannot be used for private gain (this is insured by the legal innovation that is the general public license). thus programmers worldwide are cooperating building on the common knowledge base produced by all their predecessors. open source, originally proposed and developed by eric raymond, is a more liberal version of free software, which does not prohibit commercial use, but insures that the source code remains open to collective inspection. obviously, the latter is more open to involvement by the business world. one of the most successful applications of open source collaboration is the linux operating system, which is making fast headway not only in governments worldwide, because of its marginal pricing as compared to software licences from private vendors, but is now very quickly making inroads in the business roads as well, while consumer applications such as staroffice and openoffice insure that it will also be increasingly used as the interface for individual users. the majority of experts and users agree that most open source applications are more productive and bugfree than its commercial counterparts. though the progress has been slow, it has been inexorable so far, and is speeding up to a significant degree, with for example michael dell, chairman of the largest computer firm, declaring that in two or three years, he expects one third of the computers that he sells, to be operating on linux rather than microsoft. however, what is important here is to understand that free software is not just a form of technology, but a true ‘third mode of production’, i.e. a way of producing things, right now mostly software, but with a huge potential for generalised industrial applications. indeed today, even in industrial production, the marketing and production phases michel bauwens 45 are dependent on the crucial design phase, which is wholly taking place using networked computers, and where the peer to peer method could be introduced without major problems. in the car industry for example, production is almost wholly outsourced using standardized parts, with the so-called car companies in fact essentially design and branding/ marketing companies. this extension of p2p production modalities is actually being advocated by the german-based oekonux group, which advocates a gpl society, based on extending the general public licence to other sectors of social life and production, and which counts several industrial engineers amongst its sympathizers and supporters. until now, the industrial world has known two modes of production, the free enterprise system on the one hand, and the centralised and authoritarian planning mode proposed by the now failed eastern bloc states. but here we have a cooperative mode, that is neither authoritarian, nor based on the motivation of gain, and that is a hugely significant development. a quick glance to history would be sufficient to show that specific technological modes of production and their associated ‘political economies’ are long-term but nevertheless transitory ways of organising the world and its production, as the succession of the system of antiquity with the feudal and then the capitalist mode of production show. nevertheless, the capitalist mode is sometimes presented as eternal by market fundamentalists with the good reason that the collectivist approach did not succeed as a viable alternative, and that it is human nature to be only motivated by greed. however, this argument is significantly weakened by the existence of an alternative which functions differently based on the non-hierarchical cooperation of thousands of peers worldwide, who are producing better quality material. it is significant to see how the present system is reacting to that challenge: essentially by criminalising the new ways of software and music distribution. thus the reaction is quite similar to the reactions of the feudal guilds when faced with the emerging capitalist mode, which was to try to outlaw it. however, when a system starts thwarting innovation and more productive applications than its own, it is a definite sign of a loss of legitimacy. but let us continue our description of the peer to peer phenomenon: it is obvious that the success of such a new mode of 46 prajñâ vihâra production is based on new cultural practices, new ways of working with each other. this is best described in the book ‘the hacker ethic’ by pekka himmanen, an update and dialogue with an earlier classic by max weber. as you will remember weber, in his the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism’ had explained how the new mentalities expressed by the protestant reformation, and especially calvinism, were instrumental in creating better conditions for the development of industrial capitalism. in the current phase of cognitive capitalism, these practices, which the author calls the friday-isation of sunday’, are actually being exarcebated, and in fact, the ethics of organization and productivity (called the sphere of efficiency in a similar book by jeremy rifkin, entitled the age of access) are now not only being carried out to their extremes in the business world, but even being translated to the private world (called the sphere of intimacy by rifkin). exploitation of the body and the natural world, is being complemented by the exploitation of the human psyche and mind, in a similar unsustainable fashion. but the interesting second part of himmanen’s book outlines an emerging counter-movement, that was first seen in the communities of passionate programmers (the original definition of hackers, before the term got distorted in common parlance to mean authors of computer mischief). he notes that in the way they organize their workday, their ways of working and learning, are completely different from weber’s model, in fact many times opposed to them. the new model is a form of ‘passionate play’, interspersed with large periods of non-productive life, based on egalitarian cooperation. this point is very important because what we see here is that the objective phenomena of technological infrastructure and modes of production, are being translated into subjective experiencing and intersubjective modes of cooperation. peer to peer is therefore also an emerging cultural format. equally significant are the new methods of political experiencing and organizing. the only growing and innovative worldwide political movement is the alterglobalisation movement, organized as a network of networks on a global scale, intensively using networked forms of organization and technology, and capable of mobilizing hundreds of thousands of activists and sympathizers on a moment’s notice. many of its spokespersons insist that their movement no longer fits in a model of representation, but that everybody represents themselves and their evermichel bauwens 47 changing configuration of political interests and engagement. this is echoed in new radical political theories, such as those of toni negri in empire, miguel benasayag in les contre-pouvoirs, and john holloway in revolution without power. there is a lot more to say about this, and i have, in another essay, developed three transition scenarios to a more fully p2p organized and inspired world. one, defended by richard barbrook, says that peer to peer and capitalism will co-exist peacefully, just as feudalism tolerated the communist forms of the catholic church and its monasteries, and that producers will go back and forth between the two spheres. the second scenario is more negative, and is developed as a warning by jeremy rifkin: the new forms of cognitive capitalism are eating away in the cultural and intimate spheres, turning not only everything that we hold dear into commodities, but dispossessing people of any ownership of immaterial production, basing everything on forms of leasing and licensing which could be called informational feudalism1. faced with this, defensive strategies are on order, such as the french ‘exception culturelle’ (just recently enshrined in the draft of the new european constitution!). and then there is a more optimistic scenario, best defended by the new french review called multitudes. the argument is here that cognitive capitalism is hugely dependent on such cooperative intellectual work (called the general intellect) but at the same time cannot by itself create the conditions to nurture it. thus at one point it will be forced to accept the universal social wage, which will create the conditions not only to make cognitive capitalism stable and growing and end the current era of continued systemic crisis, but at the same time creates a cooperative sphere that goes beyond it, letting that sphere grow as well, until such utopian times as the latter will dominate the former. this is not the proper venue to go into details of political economy, and these ideas are further developed in another essay that is solely devoted to the peer to peer phenomenon. before discussing the impact of peer to peer on spirituality proper, i hope to have convinced the reader that p2p is not just a transient technological phenomenon, but a kind of key format which can increasingly be found in diverse areas of human cultural life, in the objective organizational forms, and in individual and collective cultural expressions. just as we can see in the past that past civilizations have 48 prajñâ vihâra been based on a dominant form of human relationships (authoritarian in the pre-capitalist forms, commodity fetishism and utilitarianism in capitalism), just so we can envisage i belief a form of civilization for which it is the peer to peer format that is its central and most basic form of human relating and producing. that these various aspects of p2p appear concurrently in the four quadrants described in the beginning has been instrumental in strengthening my primary intuition that p2p was a fundamental civilizational process. i.2. spiritual implications and expressions of p2p religion can be seen in two different ways. at the core of the religious traditions are the numinous experiences or revelations of its founders, which can be said to be encounters with an absolute beyond time and space, thus outside history, outside the objective world of social and cultural forms, outside the subjective experience of the ego, and eternally equal to itself. (in fact, this very contention will be criticized in the next section on integralism, but it is a useful distinction in this context). nevertheless, when these experiences have to be related, the inescapable fact is that it has to be translated in the cultural medium of language, which is the other basic aspect of religion, its concrete embodiment in concrete time and place. indeed, when a religion is institutionalized in a organizational form and becomes part of the societal structure, it will take on all the garments of the time and space in which it has been born, and of course slowly adapt itself to changing cultural and societal conditions. hence religion in the objective world is not a static affair, but subjects to the same type of evolution as the others realms of human affairs. taken this context into account, it can be said that most traditional religions that we know were forged in eras dominated by some form of what we generally called feudalism (or broadly similar social forms of the premodern era). and even though these world religions have gone through several hundred years of capitalism, there still have major characteristics of that era. the ‘us vs. them’ theologies that are a form of tribalism, not universalism; the relationships of authority and obedience, instead of democratic participation; the patriarchal attitudes towards michel bauwens 49 women and their place in the religious structures, instead of gender equality. we could go on with such a listing of characteristics showing that most traditional religions are still premodern in many of their aspects. obviously this creates a tension both with the modern ‘democratic-capitalist’ valuesystem, and with the post-modern ‘networked-informational-nonrepresentational’ value systems. it is to be expected that more recently created religions, such as for example the protestant reformation, or the new religious movements of the contemporary era, are much more influenced by the more recent socialcultural formats, analogous of the conception of max weber discussed above. who can deny that a very large part of the new age-based spiritual movements and experiencers, basically operate in a market-mode, where spiritual experiences are ‘bought’ in a marketplace, and where spiritual teachers make a living using market(ing)-based techniques? most of the times we will be able to see the different social and civilisational formats as different sedimental layers. see for example thai buddhism, which i recently encountered after staying in the chiang mai area it has very strong elements of animism and spirit worship; as far as i understand it has a feudal authority structure, the system of merit functions as a spiritual credit card with huge financial streams involved, the financial accounting of this is opaque, and most often, a few monks control huge income, while others have no means of even taking care of their basic health problems, etc.. pre-feudal, feudal, capitalist and postmodern forms coexist. sometimes this co-existence is well integrated and forms a positive combination, at other times the situation is simply intolerable to (post)modern minds. two recent examples. june campbell in travellers in space recounts her experiences as a secret consort of a very-well known tibetan ‘rimpoche’. as she tells her story, and starts talking to other women in her adopted tradition. it turns out that most if not all tibetan teachers have such consorts, not practicing any tantric techniques, but available for the physical needs that they cannot openly express. while perfectly understandable, it is easy to see how this system is demeaning to women, who have to hide the truth and are forced in submissive relationships. another example of tensions between the premodern and (post)modern is the phenomena of scumbag gurus which were so prevalent in the 50 prajñâ vihâra seventies and eighties, before the publication of the seminal guru papers by the kramers. abuses of power, the extraction of money for private enjoyment, and abusive forms of sex were rife, and so were the victims, gullible westerners in search for spiritual solace but without any solid spiritual culture themselves. the gurus came from largely feudal environments, were used to relationships of obedience, but in the west they retained the latter, but married it with the freedom in mores, without the limits provided by the checks and balances of tradition and convention. so the general point i want to make is that every form of religion is subject to betterment, if it would adapt the great democratic and humanist principles first originating in the european enlightenment. for a contemporary individual it seems to be a requirement that the traditions need to adapt themselves to basic requirements such as human rights, and i would argue, an adapted ‘scientific’ approach to the building of spiritual knowledge. this is where peer to peer, as the most recent of civilisational formats with its own set of requirements, comes into the picture as well. in theoretical terms, ken wilber had formulated the hypothesis that the esoteric core of religions, these aspects based on the transmission of real numinous experiences and active psychotechnologies rather than convention and the need for a social and political control of the masses, were very similar in their operation to the workings of science. there is an injunction, ‘do this, in order to experience that’ in order to generate the subjective experiencing, there are concrete ‘objective’ methodologies that can validate the process. finally, everything is also intersubjectively validated by the community of advanced practicioners. but one can question whether this is really the case in the ‘real world’ of religion. even in a broadly nondual tradition such as tibetan buddhism, there are in fact numerous different sects, which differ with one another in their interpretation, and again, the very authority structure is thoroughly feudal, making sure that those in authority can validate or invalidate the experiences of others of a lesser status. furthermore, postmodern epistemological challenges would question whether there is such an eternally validated and objective spiritual truth (we will return to that in our section on integralism). more and more, we are witnessing a huge cultural change, at michel bauwens 51 least in the western countries, the birth of a kind of third culture, that differs both from the believers in premodern traditional religions, and from the modernist rejection of anything spiritual and religious. these ‘postmodern’ or ‘transmodern’ cultural creatives (according to the research of sociologist of paul ray), constitute about one third of the western population, are the only section growing in numbers, compared to the declining numbers of premoderns, and the static number of moderns. they are open to the spiritual search and in search of concrete experiences and psychotechnologies to validate their belief in human betterment, but they want a spirituality that reflects their modern values, postmodern epistemological sophistication, and needs for democracy and human rights, including gender equality. with the reference to the postmodern i essentially mean the increasing conviction that truth is not to be found in one place, in one tradition, but is something that is collectively build confronting various perspectives, and that this can only come from personal experience and maturation, not belief or generational transmission. often, they do not seem to find it in the traditional religions, and many of them are already out of the traditions in which they were born and raised, if they were raised in one at all, as at least in europe, numerous people can be said to have grown up in atheistic and humanistic households, and sometimes in overtly anti-religious environments without access to the traditions. they have many times a typical postmodern attitude of mixing various elements in the making of a kind of personal religion. in many cases, they did try to find answers in their own ‘western’ traditions, but found them wanting, esteeming them unable to face the current slate of civilizational and ecological crises, let alone being of assistance in their personal hunger for a meaningful existence in these in many ways dislocated postmodern times. of course, there is a lot to be criticized in that milieu and social environment as well, as it is there that the various modern religious phenomena, and the new age marketplace, have originated. but it is in this context that the need for a peer to peer conception of spirituality has originated, and is already emerging as a concrete practice. a first expression of this feeling and new cultural understanding of religion has come from john heron, who wrote sacred science and 52 prajñâ vihâra pioneered a form of collective research called cooperative inquiry. in his experience-based system, no spiritual truths are taking for granted, but the various spiritual questions are explored, using the variety of psychotechnologies from different traditions. needless to say that all the participants in these types of inquiry are considered to be equals, and everyone’s experience is taking into account. another milestone has been the work of jorge ferrer, who wrote “revisioning transpersonal psychology: a participatory vision of human spirituality”. both authors are also criticizing the integrative work of ken wilber, which may be considered the most sophisticated current integrator and defender of the idea of a common truth and structure in the various religions. ferrer says that unlike this traditional notion of the transcendent unity of religions, which uses the metaphor of various paths leading to the same mountaintop, one has to use the metaphor of the many beaches on the ocean of the divine. the difference is subtle but fundamental. indeed, for jorge ferrer we are co-creating the universe, and co-creating our spiritual experiences, therefore there is not one mountaintop, but a vast ocean of possible experiences, some of which have yet to be written as future experience has yet to be created and take place. with this kind of conception, we totally abandon the conception of an absolute truth, but we enter an era of the collective creation of spiritual realities, through personal experience and intersubjective dialogue. a dialogue of equals, hence this is a true expression of the peer to peer sensibility, and following the logic of the first section of my essay, the expression in the spiritual world of this new civilisational format. apart from these theoretical developments, there has been a concomitant growth in this type of spiritual groups. of course, this peer to peer format is not the privilege of the socially progressive, but can also be used by other forces. hence, peer to peer formats of organization have been used by al qaeda (which is also a feudal structure of obedience, and a well-organised corporation) and by what is reportedly the fastest growing religion in the us: i.e. extreme right wing odinism which has adopted the peer to peer strategy of ‘leaderless resistance’. in conclusion: peer to peer is already an objectively emerging format for social organizing and subjective feeling/knowing, which also finds its expression in the world of spirituality and religion. but is also a michel bauwens 53 new requirement for existing religious movements: a series of normative rules that their practices are adapted to the current democratic and postdemocratic (with this we mean non-represential formats of participation) demand level of postmodern humanity. those movements that will not adapt, will limit their memberships to premodern ‘conventionals’, those that do adapt will be able to attract cultural creatives and the like. but more likely, we will see the continuing emergence of peer to peer based spiritual groups, unaffiliated with any tradition. however, we will see how these, by itself very radical requirements of nonrepresentational democracy in the spiritual sphere, are to be paired and toned down by a second set of requirements that result from an ‘integralist’ understanding of sprituality, which we discuss in the next session, and which demand a respectful and integrative attitude towards each sedimented layer of social-spiritual practice. ii. challenge two: integralism ii.1. conservative interpretations of the ‘perennial philosophy’ the author of this essay does not have sufficient theological background to state exactly when the idea of the transcendent unity of religions arose, but it seems to be a truly modern conception. before, exclusionary convictions that one’s own religious group had privileged access to an objective absolute truth was the dominant conception. hence the history of religion is not only a beautiful story of the civilisational aspects of religion, but also one of forced conversion, physical elimination of non-believers, civil wars with heretical groups of one’s own tradition, etc… faced with this divisive reality, one can either desire to go on a path of dialogue, i.e. recognizing the differences but trying to go beyond them, or one can try to find common elements of truth, and become an adherent of the unity of religions. today still, religion is often one of the basic divisive issues leading to civil strife with a concrete danger of a globalised struggle between civilizations based on different religious convictions, as described by samuel huntington. one of its first broader expressions of objective unity was with the german idealist movement, which defended the idea that the life of 54 prajñâ vihâra spirit was objectifying itself through human history, on a global and universal scale, as most beautifully expressed by hegel. from that moment on, the idea was more and more distributed amongst many spiritual seekers, though in my opinion the conventional majority of believers would rather intuitively support the concept of a simple dialogue of religions. in this conception, radical differences remain, but they are relegated to the private sphere, while the public sphere operates according to the rules of civil society and religious tolerance. religions continue to compete to save souls according to the true religion, but the way the competition is now organized, protects civil peace. however, even as the mainstream modern culture got secularized and became materialistic in its philosophical conceptions, the idea of the transcendent unity of religions was being expressed by smaller philosophical and religious movements. most vocal proponents of this thesis were conservative ‘traditionalists’ such as rene guenon, julius evola, fritjof schuon, ananda coomaraswamy, and contemporary writers such as seyed hossein nasr and huston smith. most of these authors hold the conviction that common religions should be divided into a culturally dependent outer exoteric side, which mainly functions as a system of social control, and a inner core of esoteric teachings based on access to the same absolute truth. following the invention of the nondual tradition, seen by most of these authors as the highest expression of spiritual truth, it is said that these truths is outside time and space, but it does inform the various exoteric religions and most believers who desire this would have access to it. at the same time, these authors differ in the assessment of the actual religions closeness to this core truth, most of them agreeing that it is only faintly present still in catholicism, more so in orthodoxy, almost totally absent from protestantism, and much more part and parcel of the eastern religions. most of these authors are also strict “devolutionists”, i.e. they reject modernity, the enlightenment, the ideologies of social liberation and their attendant for them ‘catastrophic’ revolutions. on the contrary they reject theories of evolution, if not on the physical plane, then on the spiritual plane, and see the unfolding of history as a constant regression from a high period where tradition was still upheld. even the more democratic and progressive amongst them, such as huston smith, who basically accept modernity, would hold that michel bauwens 55 since the truth comes from access to the formless, it is not impacted by the changing world of form. these group of thinkers are best suited to be called ‘perennialists’, as they are proponents of an eternally fixed form of spiritual liberation or enlightenment. they are indeed the conservative wing concerning conceptions of the ‘transcendent unity of religions’. it should also be said that these theories are in fact based on metaphysical preconceptions, hence ‘unprovable’, and that they therefore generally fall short of postmodern epistemological requirements, which would demand a ‘post-metaphysical’ spirituality (as first described jurgen habermas and discussed by ken wilber in an essay on the author forum of the shambhala.org site). in terms of an analysis of the types of millenialist movements (definitions from david landes), it would seem that the former set of theories also belong to the subset of ‘catastrophic millenialism’, since they all expect that, before a new cycle of cosmic history is to begin, this cycle will be totally destroyed first. ii.2. progressive interpretations of spiritual evolution: the integralists what then are integralists? they basically share the same conviction of a transcendent unity of religion, but accept evolution, not only on the physical plane, but also in the world of spiritual experience and maturation, and this not only on an individual level, but on the collective level of spiritual groups and even civilizations. in fact, they see progress on all levels of cosmological and human history, despite its many setbacks, pathologies and regressions, though they insist that the evolution on the social and spiritual plane is not deterministic, but dependent on human agency. again here, we should note that the german idealists were probably the first to give expression to such conceptions that the world was actually spiritually evolving, though they were talking about an objective spirit. but then came two spiritual giants, one western, one eastern, who gave voice to a totally new spiritual conception that informed their spiritual practice. in the west, we have of course the jesuit paleontologist teilhard de chardin, who tried to marry evolution with his catholic theology. basically, he saw the creation of the geosphere 56 prajñâ vihâra consisting of dead matter, the birth of a biosphere based on life, and the subsequent creation of a noosphere based on the cultural evolution of mankind. this evolution is not the result of any divine intervention, but based on the inherent logic of the principles active in the phenomenological world. the evolution is towards ever more complexity and integration and the human world, rather than participating in the laws of entropy and disintegration, is on the contrary an element of extropy, of increased integration and structure in the world, not only in the cultural world of his own making, but through his physical and technological interventions, in the physical cosmos as well. as matter and life evolve, so does the moral sphere, were through love and solidarity, mankind is increasingly integrated, until the moment it becomes a kind of collective entity which recreates or merges with the godhead. for the first time, an explicitely religious person accepts the world and its evolution, as a prime part of the divine plan for perfection, rather than as the source of evil and distraction. very similar in its logic is the work of sri aurobindo, who combined hinduism with a thorough immersion in western philosophy and science, and in particularly evolutionary theories and developed a similar sets of conception where the world of spirit is not static, but participates in the positive evolution of the cosmos. with this conception, we arrive at a concept of evolutionary enlightenment (a concept recently formulated by ken wilber in dialogue with andrew cohen in the magazine ‘what is enlightenment’, issue 21, on the ‘future of religion’, sie wie.org). in contrast with traditional hinduism, and especially original buddhism, rather than seeing an eternally fixed enlightenment that can be obtained by a detachment from the world of samsara, this new conception requires an active participation in the world. but just as important the very form of enlightenment also changes, since from the nondual perspective of aurobindo, the physical world is just as real as the world of the formless, and both influence each other. in buddhism, we see an evolution that is described by david loy as the ‘three turns of the wheel’. the first was when the buddha showed how to liberate oneself through detachment from desire and the world, the second came with nagarjuna, and the subsequent reforms, where the boddhisatva vow stated that rather than reach nirvana on an individual basis, compassionate masters would return until every living being was michel bauwens 57 liberated. and the turning of the third wheel occurs when the realization sets in that in order to achieve this, one has to actively participate in the creation of a better world where such a process would be possible. but in any case, the world is no longer just seen as samsaric, but as a very part of the divine itself, equally evolving towards perfection, though in need of the conscious intervention of man to do so. indeed, if in feudal societies the social order was seen as given and divinely ordained, this is no longer the case with the advent of modernity, where the social order is clearly seen as a human construct, and hence ‘(post)modernized’ spiritualities have to integrate this new set of ethical demands for a more just society. amongst the important secular authors who have taken up this line of thinking are the swiss cultural historian jean gebser, inventor of the concept of the integral mode of consciousness. gebser has written a remarkable overview of cultural evolution, called the ever-present origin. his main thesis is that the self is a structure that evolves, giving rise to very distinct mentalities that determine the structure of society. he distinguishes the archaic, that state close to the animal kingdom of which little can be known; he describes the magical mode of consciousness, active in tribal societies, where every object is animated; he describes the mythological mode of consciousness, which dominates agricultural societies; and he describes the emergence of what he calls the mental-rational, born in greece but dominant in the industrial world. he argues that for each phase, there is a period of positive integration, and a subsequent period where, when objective conditions are changing so that it is no longer operative in a positive way, this same mentality becomes pathological, pointing to the need for its replacement. often, it will be the new religious forms that are the agency of such a needed ‘consciousness upgrade’. but most original in his work is the description of the birth of a new form of integral consciousness born at the beginning of last century, amongst the most advanced minds in art, culture, science, technology, etc.. and his book is a most impressive elucidation of the change of culture that took place then, with numerous examples showing an amazingly wide erudition. the integral consciousness differs from all the previous one in the important aspect in that it is the first mode to be inclusive rather than exclusive. indeed, all the previous modes were repressive 58 prajñâ vihâra towards the mode that preceded it. each mentality considers the previous mode as essentially negative and demonic. and indeed, who needs to be reminded of the atrocities of the monotheistic religions in combating paganism, and of the anti-religious and anti-traditional attitude of modernism, with its ambition for a tabula rasa. integralism is different: here, individuals start for the first time to recognize that their self is constituted from these different layers, and that each has a particularly useful function in specific contexts. hence integral consciousness abandons the destructive attitude of modernism towards tradition, but instead strives for transparency, learning individuals and collectives to recognize such modes of operation, but also crucially, when their use is inappropriate and pathological. in purely psychological terms, this work has been elaborated by clare graves and popularized by the system of spiral dynamics. integralism is also essentially multior a-perspectival. unlike modernity, characterized by the invention of perspective, a fixed individual looking at a knowable objective world, integral transmodernity sees, following the work of the great masters of doubt, that such an individual has a personal unconscious (jung, freud), a social unconscious (marx) and is part of various webs of language (derrida), power (foucault) etc.. so that he is always part of systems that preclude such objectivity. the world is rather constituted by contrasting various perspectives, and thus, essentially a dialogical construct. the aim of the integral person is to be able to see such differing perspectives, while being unattached to a particular one, so as to see and create the richest world possible. but jean gebser has a glaring weakness, he did not know, or did not write about, any specific spiritual perspective. and his definition and description of the integral mode of consciousness lacks any recognition of any trans-mental or trans-rational state that may disclose further aspects of reality. and this is wherein lies the fundamental importance of the work of ken wilber. ken wilber burst into fame when he already wrote an impressive integrative masterpiece at the age of 23, “the spectrum of consciousness”, for which he was already called an “einstein of consciousness” by various icons of the transpersonal psychology movement. in this book, he offered an integrative description of the michel bauwens 59 development of the ego, using the items of consensus from among at least thirteen psychological schools. but he did not stop there. based on an amazing amount of reading into all the world’s major traditions, and their sacred texts and reports on meditative/contemplative practices and achievements, he posited that all the major religions shared a very similar story of post-ego development, with psychic, subtle, causal, and nondual stages or modes of spiritual consciousness. this thesis was defended with not only very sound theoretical underpinnings but with a mountain of citations, constituting irrefutable proofs of commonality, from the major traditions east and west. thus for the very first time in history, we had a development framework, not only based on the scientific achievements of western psychological science, but also on the major spiritual achievements of the east, with evidence not just from one tradition, but from all, including data from the western christian contemplative traditions, which were shown to be similar in their pronouncements. that at least was the claim of wilber and his defenders, and i must admit that for about fifteen years, i was a staunch supporter of such a claim. suddenly, the claim to a transcendent unity of religion was no longer based on a speculative understanding and ideological position, but based on scientific data from psychology and the rational study of religion. no mean feat for a 23-year old. wilber did not stop there. if his first book was based on the development and transcendence of an individual self (further elaborated in “the atman project” and more recently in “integral pscychology”), his fourth book made clear the sociological and political implications of his claim, because in “up from eden” he fleshes out a second thesis, namely that sociogenesis follows psychogenesis. following gebser, the book is an outline of the evolution of the world and the succession of civilizations, but he goes one step further in predictive power or ambition. he concludes that societies are indeed dominated by successive mentalities or value-systems, the industrial world now largely by mental-rational consciousness, moving towards integral conceptions in its culturally leading minorities, but that the evolution of society will in all likelihood broadly follow the evolution shown by the modes of consciousness of the spiritual elites (though he stresses the nondeterministic nature of this hypothesis). and wilber usefully updates gebser, making the schemes more realistic, by distinguishing between 60 prajñâ vihâra the average mode of consciousness, responsible for society as a whole and its governing elites (the temporal powers), and the mode of consciousness of its most advanced practitioner, which acts as a ‘strange attractor’. (see the distance between christ and the actual practice of the churches, or the distance between a buddha and the actual practices of popular and institutional buddhism). also important is that ken wilber, like gebser, but with more fleshing out, claims that secular humanism and postmodernism, are equally spiritual, respectively echoing mentalrational and integral modes even though sometimes in their pathological aspects, thereby arguing that they are more able to deal with complexity, and more apt to integration, than the magical, mythological, and mythicalrational modes typical of the mainstream believers and power elites who hold sway over organized religion. but these modes are equally less sophisticated and encompassing of the full spectrum of human and societal possibility, than the modes of consciousness and functioning of saints and sages in the psychic, subtle, causal, and nondual modes. since writing these two fundamental books early in his career, wilber has continued to write further integrations, notable in his major work sex, ecology and spirituality, in a brief history of everything, and in, a theory of everything, which for the first time fleshes out an active program of social and political intervention based on his theorising. in these latter books, he also developed the four-quadrant heuristic scheme that i discussed above, which has the advantages that it is not deterministic, since quadrants influence each other, but not ‘determine’ the other, rather it is a case of recognizing correlations and the inner logic behind them. the integration of the inner-outer polarity avoids any physicalist or materialist reductionism, and points to the need to always take into account i, and ‘we’ perspectives, next to the objective ‘it’ perspective. the agency-communion polarity avoids any individualistic or essentialist traps, as everything has always to be considered in its various systemic applications. ii.3. possible criticisms of integralism as the integral movement has gathered strength and become more visible, it has also generated more and more criticism. it is clear that postmodern consciousness would have a hard time, michel bauwens 61 with a conception of development that is hierarchical, consisting of successive integrations that are each ‘higher’ or ‘more encompassing’ than the other. despite wilber’s emphatic denials, is this not another ‘grand narrative’ based on a discredited ‘ideology of progress’? and does he not give more credence and superiority to western rationality and postmodernity rather than to the magical and mythological experience in the eastern popular religions? (to which he would reply: “yes, i do, but i also point out that these western modes, which are universal anyway, are less developed and encompassing than the wisdom modes of these eastern religions, as western christianity has, for particular historical reasons that i have explained, made these attainments impossible within the framework of the churches, despite the occasional exceptions such as master eckhardt etc..”). despite his structural correlations, does wilber not make short shrift of the differences between religions? contrast wilber’s approach with that of professor libbrecht in belgium, who, as a master of comparative religions, describes how each religion brings a unique perspective, that is of use to each individual who would make the effort to look beyond its tradition. it is precisely because they are not the same that they are interesting, and any structural similarities are actually superficial compared to their profound differences. thus, even though we can admit to fundamental differences, these are not necessarily to be seen as antagonistic, but rather as complementary. is wilber’s theorizing not itself an expression of an outmoded form of consciousness, showing a need for unity where none actually exists, and he would be better off accepting diversity and playing with it, in true postmodern fashion. peer to peer theorists such as john heron and jorge ferrer, are also anti-wilberians, and point out that his system is deterministic, and does not allow for autopoesis and co-creation of spiritual realities. it is not because some sages have attained certain particular experiences in the past, that the future will necessarily bring the same. and wilber’s fails to see how the past expressions of religion and spirituality are fundamentally determined by the prevalent and exploitative social structures of their time and can in no way be a full guide to the present. present and future spiritual experiences will have to be informed by the cultural and social relationships of today and tomorrow, with the latter 62 prajñâ vihâra being beyond prediction. they also claim that he is biased towards the nondual tradition, and that in any case, his integration only includes the ‘state religions’ (i.e. not taking fully into account the pre-historical religions). in concrete spiritual experiencing they say, there is no such thing as the seemingly orderly progression of stages that wilber describes. other criticisms are more political. many note that his whole system is, despite the four quadrants, biased towards the experience of the self, and only marginally takes into account the collective aspects of religion. socially engaged buddhists rarely appreciate wilber for example, and find books like ‘one taste’, which describe wilber’s personal spiritual experiences, a distasteful expression of a narcissistic personality, not to mention the negative reactions to his novel ‘boomeritis’. he is also taken to task for failing to clearly condemn ‘scumbag gurus’ that he has supported in the past, such as the notorious da free john, that wilber himself touted as the most advanced expression of spiritual consciousness to date, but who has been accused of numerous abuses by ex-followers. in the last few years, wilber has more or less merged his concerns with those of don beck, a disciple of psychologist clare graves, who has popularized and simplified the latter’s system in the form of ‘value-systems’ that succeed each other. but don beck is a defender of george bush and ken wilber a staunch advocate of tony blair, which he sees as the epitome of an integral politician, despite the latter’s iraqi adventure and dubious use of evidence, which lost him the confidence of his own electorate. these kind of concrete political choices are not immune from criticism in the real world of strife, and can be seen as clearly taken sides, perhaps on the wrong side of the fence. the kind of political integration that wilber is after, often looks quintessentially american, as a kind of synthesis of liberal democrats and culturally progressive republicans, and thus in fact, very limited. what in any case is in my mind clearly lacking in wilber is an integral ‘critical’ theory, which would also integrate critical analysis of the current society and its dominant socio-economic forms, and thus not reduce everything to the ‘limited stage of consciousness’ of the players. wilber himself has on occasion called for precisely such ‘critical integral theory’, but it has not been forthcoming. instead, the movement seemed to have split between a mainstream now closely allied with the ideas of spiral michel bauwens 63 dynamics of don beck, and a series of ‘left-wing’ integralists which have found a home in such collaborative environments as the postconpol (postconventional politics) mailing list, with writers and researchers such as ray harris, greg wilpert, and others. are these just matters of errors of judgments in areas that wilber cannot expect to master all by himself? or is there something wrong with his basic political orientation. since wilber’s discovery and endorsement of spiral dynamics, wilber has focused his critical work on what he calls boomerities, a pathological form of postmodernism, which he sees as dominant in american academia. and increasingly, his work has been focused on combating this spiritual disease, implying that it is the major drawback to the emergence of a healthy integral consciousness, aligning himself with the neoconservative ideology of don beck. using his own colour-coding of value-memes from the interpretative system of spiral dynamics, the debate is framed as follows: “is the key problem facing the world not the ‘mean orange meme’ of unbridled neoliberalism, i.e. the pathology of the ‘modern’ mental-rational form of consciousness, or rather the ‘mean green meme’, i.e. the narcissism of postmodern theorisers, i.e. the pathology associated with the postmodern form of consciousness”? but here indeed one can question whether the world is really dominated by postmodern academics, rather than by a political and economic system run by greed and lust for power, expressions of rather earlier modes of consciousness. wilber’s political functioning in fact proceed from this fundamental interpretation of what mode of consciousness is responsible for the actual state of the world, and by pinpointing the mentality of the boomers as the key impediment, he echoes the culture wars being waged against postmodernity by the neoconservatives, who have a very similar culprit in their struggle against what they call ‘political correctness’. echoing the ‘battle of colour epithets’ which is a regular feature of sd and ‘integralism’ inspired political debates, beck’s former colleague and co-founder of spiral dynamics, calls the former a ‘blue republican’, harking back to an even earlier mode of ‘value-memes’, associated with the fundamentalist religion informing many in the bush team. to add a personal criticism as well, evolving out of my own 64 prajñâ vihâra concern for the emergence of peer to peer as new civilizational format and form of spiritual practice. wilber himself hardly talks about it, if he ever did, and his vision of the human being seems to me largely dominated by the view that they are those that ‘get it’, because they have gone ‘beyond ego’, thereby acquiring the spiritual authority to have a discourse with their peer group, and those that don’t ‘get it’. the question would seem to be: is a mental-rational consciousness, whether or not in its integral form, not already sufficient to have a rational and solidarity-based discourse that could formulate answers to contemporary world problems, or do we need more spiritual development by larger groups of people (wilber himself estimates the current percentage of the population able to reason ‘integrally’ at two percent at the most, so the higher transpersonal stages are hardly present)? and is spiritual development by itself the answer, at least formulated in the sense of having stable access to the socalled higher stages of consciousness. in the context of the many scandals and turpitudes involving spiritual masters and their followers, i would strongly question such a view. if ‘spiritual masters’ have indeed mastered domains of consciousness unbeknownst to the most of us, it does not at all follow that they have equally developed their moral sense and capacity of action on behalf of others (i.e. positive social intervention), as well as a knowledge of the contemporary phenomenological world and its huge complexities. contrarywise, many people and activists, at many different stages of consciousness, have developed such capacities. also, after many years of personal seeking and experience, i would also like to question the negative conceptions of the ego that are pervasive in wilberian literature, especially in the context of the current emphasis in wilber’s writings on the purported narcissism of the boomer generation. i believe that there are ‘progressive’ spiritual traditions that focus on the possibilities of betterment for all, with little specific stress on ego-death and the evils of the ego, that see spiritual evolution as essentially continuous, and other ‘negative’ traditions, culminating in the dualist traditions associated with gnosticism and manicheism, but present in all traditions, of a ‘war’ against the ego, and that are essentially ‘discontinous’. in my view, an emphasis of the latter has often a distinct correlate of hatred of the self and the world, and is not necessarily conducive to spiritual development, especially in the sense of higher moral michel bauwens 65 capabilities for selfless action. wilberian writings increasingly fit the discontinuous scheme. does a p2p conception, insisting on a common spiritual authority of a brother/sisterhood of seekers, not a healthier conception? finally, let me contrast the peer to peer set of ideas and the wilberian form of integralism. the problem with the first, if we would want to extent it from a simple anthropological description of existing tendencies to a normative program and solution for the current civilisational crises, is that it indeed has to cope with, has to integrate, the very strong ‘hierarchical’ realities that dominate the human race up to the present. will the emergence of a fully peer to peer civilization not founder on the essentially dominating/dominated nature of human relationships? or, in other words, will the pelagian optimism that p2p exhibits, not again be defeated by the augustinian ‘original sin’, the conviction and reality that mankind is essentially evil? but wilber has an opposite and equally serious problem. the worldview is essentially hierarchical, posits forms of consciousness that are superior and more encompassing than others. how to square this with the democratic equality of all citizens? with the postmodern distaste for authority? and, with the aspirations for truly peer-based relations which is growing every day in the new generations. this is a weakness of wilberian discourse so far, a lack of capability of framing their otherwise interesting and valid ideas in a format that does not fly in the face of current sensibilities. what is the import all this for the issue of globalisation of religion? my own take is that wilber is an enormously stimulating integrator, but that indeed, the system occludes true diversity. hence, while it is enormously useful to look at structural and developmental similarities between the worlds’ major religions, it is equally useful to look at them in their unique differences, and to focus on the unique existential positioning that they are based on. so in my opinion, the future of religion is dialogic and cross-experiential. unlike before, we now live in an age, where the fullness of that diversity is visible and open to experiencing and verification, so that each individual can enrich his human potential and discover ‘the other’ in the process. the result of such intermingling will not be a new world religion (see the relative failure of the bahai religion, as the last such attempt, as it has remained peripheral on a world 66 prajñâ vihâra scale), but a worldwide process of dialogue. what we need then is some kind of ‘contributive theology’, which takes building blocks from each religion, so that each individual can enrich his edifice of understanding and meaning. but wilber has been enormously useful in pointing out some structural similarities in the experiences of the mystics and contemplatives, and in pointing out which psycho-technologies have been used to attain and experience them. this has taken religion out of the realm of sole belief and convention, and into the realm of personal and collective verification on a world scale. in a modern world, which rejected spirituality and religion, because it rejected any belief based on simple authority, wilber has infused the world with the necessary idea that the experiences are real, and that, in my opinion is a most important and stunning achievement, which will eventually make a true science of religion possible. this work has in fact already begun, with for example michael murphy’s the future of the body, and the later summary for the general reader, god and the evolving universe, which document more than a century and a half of research. these books are a clear indication of the birth of an explicit spiritual transhumanism, a practice for developing other potentialities and concretely enhancing our capacities for understanding and love, that goes beyond any specific religion, but extracts their psycho-technologies and achievements for the whole of humanity. these moral, ethical and physical capabilities existed before, but they are now for the first time extracted from their magical and mythological shells, and made available for cross-comparison. at a time where neoliberalism is reducing the human to a simple utility to be used in the productive process, this is a vital development. it is also vital to balance the dangers of the third challenge, i.e. technological transhumanism, which we will discuss in the third section. iii. challenge three: technological transhumanism peer to peer is a challenge and a solution to globalised religion in that it offers a tool to introduce into religious practice the requirements of radical democracy, and cleanse it of the exploitative residue of the past. integralism is a challenge and a solution in that it offers a way to michel bauwens 67 position oneself towards a globalised reality where every religion is now available and interacting worldwide. but the third challenge is one that is perhaps the most important of all, because it concerns the very future of humanity. indeed, technological transhumanism clearly poses the challenge of the end of man, or of an emergence of a destructive technocalypse on a cosmic scale. let us remember the three grand technological programs of the current age. three technologies that can effectively be called transhuman, because they radically extend the natural and cultural limits of mankind: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, nanotechnology. the first one concerns the noosphere, and the life of the mind: artificial intelligence is a program that reduces human knowledge and operative power to its informational digital format of bits and bytes, in order to operate universal machines that will one day be able to reproduce themselves. in religious terms it expresses the dream of the golem, the building of an artificial human that can undertake any tasks. with technological dreams like the uploading (adding add-on’s to our brains) or downloading (downloading our consciousness in machines) of consciousness, and the dream and realities of the cyborg (mixed human/ artificial beings), the question on the horizon is: will human minds become obsolete. the second concerns the biosphere, life itself and our very genetic constitution. biotechnology reduces our genetic life program to its informational underpinning through the manipulation of dna. through the human genome project, artificial reproduction technologies, the creation of chimeras (new combined species that never existed before), and biotechnology generally, mankind is repositioning itself to obtain power for a second genesis, solely operated by humans. jeremy rifkin adds that we can either choose that hard path, characteristic of an antagonistic and utilitarian attitude towards nature, or a “soft path”, which seeks to understand existing evolution, in order to better integrate ourselves within that process. the question on the horizon here is: are our bodies obsolete? since biotechnology and especially cognitive neuroscience also gains increasing power to chemically manipulate our minds, it also poses again the first question. the third technology concerns the geosphere, the world of matter. 68 prajñâ vihâra nanotechnology reduces matter to its informational underpinnings in the molecular and atomic structure, thereby realizing the dream of unlimited control and transformation of the material world. through nanotechnology we can envision a time where any kind of matter can be transformed into any other. merging the three technologies described here, we can envision smart and self-reproductive nanomachines. the three technologies taken together, paint a picture of almost total power and control over the natural world, which includes our own biology and intelligence. in fact, some say, such as kurzweil, moravec, et al., that we are in the very process of creating a superior life-form, which will transcend our own limits. this technocalyptic program that mankind has embarked upon, has a series of serious spiritual implications. the first concerns our very identity as human beings in the current natural world, where we can change both terms of the equation at an unprecedented level. how far do we want to go in these transformations? the second concerns the control of our own destiny. of course, we have always been subject to natural systems, including our own biology, and its determinations, and to a social system out of control, but here we step into a wholly other level of lack of control of our own self-created technological systems, with possible devastating dehumanizing effects, which are in fact already clearly visible today. as mcluhan had already pointed out, each technology is an externalization of the body and its powers, creating a much stronger collective human being, but weaker individuals, where technology actually functions as a handicap, because it destroys our own natural capacities. (for example, the automobile inhibits our capacity to walk). but we also create technologies that are based on very limited aspects of ourselves. we created machines based on the mechanical nature of our limbs, and then the industrial system (which is actually an expression of our digestive system), forces us to adapt ourselves to the purely mechanical nature of this machinery. we create computers based on the logical workings of our nervous system, then the system forces us to adapt to the highly abstract and logical nature of these computers, which furthermore operate in nanoseconds, creating inhumane stress through the speed-inducing culture that it forces upon us. thus, we have to be very thoughtful about the nature of the technologies that we are creating, michel bauwens 69 making sure that they actually exhibit as much of our deeper spiritual and human natures that they possibly can. our communication technologies are in many ways anti-meditative, creating a culture of constant reactivity. there are thus many, many pitfalls to be faced. more importantly, we have to gain an understanding that we are in fact undertaking a spiritual quest. our quest and yearning for technology is deeply spiritual but in a special sense. my hypothesis, which i formulated in the documentary ‘technocalyps’, is the following: somewhere in the sixteenth century, the cultural elites in the west, stopped believing in the possibilities of spiritual transhumanism, which carried the same type of dreams of superhuman powers, witness the yoga siddhis in hinduism (where it is very easy to associate a particular siddhi or power with an actually existing technology, as has been demonstrated by richard thompson), the taoist alchemy of immortality, or the western traditions of a body of light, particularly the imagery of alchemy, and the belief and desire for a fully physical reincarnation of soul and body so central to the christian tradition, along with the miracles associated with the saints. the reasons for this process of abandoning the explicitely religious worldviews and sensibility have been widely discussed, amongst others in the fundamental book by marchel gauchet, “le desenchantement du monde” which explains how the specificities of christianity itself were responsible for the process of secularization. it may also be connected with the particular dualistic conception of man vs. god in the christian tradition, where it was specifically ruled out and prohibited, that a human being could be god like or christ like and where the church developed a particularly harsh policy of repression towards higher functionings, see its relentless struggle against the surviving pagan medicine women under the guise of the witchhunts for example. official christianity has historically lacked esoteric traditions such as sufism within islam, or the kabbalah within judaism, which could be the vehicle of access for such different functioning of the human bodymind. but whatever the reason, the cultural elites did indeed stop believing in spiritual transhumanism. the result is well known: the west became a thoroughly materialistic (in the philosophical and scientific sense) and secular civilization. but the urge to transcendence is not a marginal but a crucial aspect of human existence, 70 prajñâ vihâra and hence, it can be argued, and i would strongly suggest that it is so, that the transcendent urge did not disappear, but instead went underground. the dreams and aspirations formerly expressed in religious and spiritual terms, became unconscious, and therefore started to express themselves in secular terms. hence our quest for technology and its associated dreams of cosmic power, immortality and perpetual well-being, are thoroughly spiritual in nature, although we could speak of a repressed and therefore distorted form of spirituality, since most technologists would be unaware of this. but scratch beyond the surface of any founder of the above technologies, as david noble has done in his ‘religion of technology’, and you will find explicitely spiritual, and often explicitly religious dreams of a perfect world. this is the case for erik drexler, founder of nanotechnology, who explicitly dreamed of immortality in the suppressed chapter of his first book engines of creation, of marvin minsky, instructed specifically into the mythology of the golem on his bar mitzvah, and the specific spiritual ambitions of the founders of the space program and biotech. (these aspects are documented in detail not only by noble, but also in a 3-part tv documentary that the author of this essay co-produced with frank theys, entitled technocalyps: the metaphysics of technology and the end of man, the third part being explicitely devoted to spiritual and religious interpretations of this technological eschatology). associated readings to document this hypothesis are cybergrace by jennifer cobb, technonosis by erik davis, the pearly gates of cyberspace, by margaret wertheim. the latter is a history of the conceptions of space since the middle ages, starting with dante, and up to the contemporary emergence of cyberspace. wertheim shows how the changing conceptions on space reflect deep-seated worldviews on the self and the universe. her history summarises the move from the medieval dualistic conception of space, with room for a physicalist earth and a spiritualised heaven (and thus with room for body and soul), to the homogenized monist concept of just one physicalist space in the universe (and literally with no longer room for the soul and the divine). the current re-emergence of a nonphysicalist cyberspace is thus indicative to her, of a coming revival of a spiritual conception of the human being. please also note the spiritual nature of the universally networked michel bauwens 71 machine that we are building. if we extrapolate to the far future, as frank tipler has done in the physics of immortality, we can see a machine that is omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent, not without accident three of the traditional characteristics of the godhead (excluding omnibenevolence, though some extropians argue that such a powerful god-machine ‘must’ be benevolent, if it is to survive the different civilisational stages of its growth, as described in the cosmic future history of micheo kaku). in teilhardian-like but materialist fashion, tipler foresees that humanity will one day leave the earth, driven by its own survival in escaping the eventual destruction of the solar system, and will bring life and intelligence to the rest of the universe, creating a cosmic supercomputer of awesome power in the process. this vision is not exceptional but shared in one form or another by many other technological visionaries such as ray kurzweil (the age of spiritual machines), hans moravec (children of the mind), max more of the extropy institute, and many more. in terms of millennialism, and as comparison with our judgment of the conservative perennialists above, these visions seem to be secular visions of transformative millennialism, answering to the same human need for hope, but carrying the same dangers asscociated with unchecked utopianism. according to many commentators, including myself, they often function as real ‘crypto-religions’, to their followers, despite their own, often visceral, dislike of anything religious or spiritual. it is sometimes hard to know how far humanity will be able to go in the realization of these technological dreams, but at the very least we have to acknowledge that the technological machine is accelerating its development. technological transhumanism, the desire to create a paradise on earth rather than in heaven, seems equally fundamental to our human nature. hence, i do not believe it will be eradicated. but if we look at it in an integrative fashion, we can see how a renewed and informed practice of spiritual transhumanism, can be beneficial in balancing the former quest. indeed, spiritual practices remind us that our higher potential for love and transformation are also available through inner practices. spiritual practices have explicit warnings about spiritual materialism, the propensity for seekers to want to ‘have’ experiences, and to hold on to them. in the world of the sufi’s: heaven is the hell of the saints. spiritual transhumanism also has highly evolved ethical systems and reminds us 72 prajñâ vihâra that if we ever want to control our machines, we need an upgrade of our own wetware, i.e. our own moral capacities. we also have to constantly remind ourselves of our capacity for selfdetermination, and we have to radically disbelieve fixed scenarios for the future. technological transhumanists and the forces supporting them in this for-profit economic system, often want to convince us that we have no choice. but we have. if technology is inevitable, it can take many forms, many of which are more respectful of nature and of our fellow human beings, and of our own nature, than the technologies being proposed. we have to start, not only in terms of externalizing, to think about technologies, about the powers of our bodies, and our nervous systems, but also to think about their higher ethical potential. least of all we have to remind ourselves that our social and political systems are also technologies, and that they should also be influenced by the conscious agency of all, rather than solely of exploitative elites. thus again, what we need is an informed dialogue between the two competing perspectives of technological and spiritual transhumanism: both are part of our human yearning for transcendence, and both have their pathologies. a conscious dialogue, an openness to the offerings of both coupled with an openness to the ‘shadows’ of both, would be hugely beneficial to mankind, and possibly, one of the essential features of our salvation from technologically induced destruction. let me remind you of the triple meaning of the apocalypse, and hence of the technocalypse: it is an unveiling of the hidden truth, it is the destruction of a dysfunctional world, but it is also the creation of a better world for all, not only in the physical world where our bodies live, but in the noospheric world where our souls communicate, allowing for a communion with the common spirit which sustains all and everything. that is the greatest challenge of them all, to create a humane world where this is truly possible and infused with love. and this is simply impossible without the further development of wisdom, the enduring legacy of spiritual transhumanism, though we may indeed hypothesise the adaptation of its existing forms to that of a peer to peer civilization. michel bauwens 73 after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi invoking kairos: reflections on islam and christianity in the new world arthur saniotis university of adelaide, australia abstract the totalitarian ideology was pivoted on the hubris ridden ‘right to rule’ as a pretext for creating a new world order. their social and political agendas actualised the greek concept of kairos  a divinely ordained or opportune time to act. in the contemporary period, the notion of the new world order has been linked to the perceived threat which globalisation poses for human rights and the environment. my use of kairos in this essay is informed by the metaphysics of the andalusian sufi master, muhyiddin ibn arabi (1165-1240 ce), which asserts the constant self-disclosure of divine consciousness within human history, culture and nature (coates 2002:82-83). it is the sociological implications of ibn arabi’s ontology that gives us an invaluable insight for examining kairos in relation to the dialogic with islam and christianity, and its implications on world peace. “ until germany has exploded the entanglement of such medusa-like beliefs ...it cannot hope for a future. ...instead, all the light that language and reason still afford should be focused upon that ‘primal experience' from whose barren gloom this mysticism of the death of the world crawls forth on its thousand unsightly conceptual feet. walter benjamin theories of german fascism walter benjamin was writing the above prologue in response to the miasmic spread of fascism throughout europe and asia in the first half of the twentieth century. like other concerned thinkers of the time, benjamin was appalled by the supplanting of civilised values for totalitarian worldviews which seemingly reaffirmed nietzsche’s adage  “the death of god”. the preponderant fervour and ramifications of totalitarian regimes on the human species was cataclysmic. the kernel of totalitarian ideology as personified by hitler, 1 mussolini, franco, tojo, et al was pivoted on the hubris ridden ‘right to rule’ as a pretext for creating a new world order. their social and political agendas actualised the greek concept of kairos  a divinely ordained or opportune time to act. in the contemporary period, the notion of the new world order has been linked to the perceived threat which globalisation poses for human rights and the environment. my use of kairos in this essay is informed by the metaphysics of the andalusian sufi master, muhyiddin ibn arabi (1165-1240 ce), which asserts the constant self-disclosure of divine consciousness within human history, culture and nature (coates 2002:82-83). it is the sociological implications of ibn arabi’s ontology that gives us an invaluable insight for examining kairos in relation to the dialogic with islam and christianity, and its implications on world peace. emergence of the contemporary metaphysic it was the greek philosopher, heraclitus (540-480 bce) who posed the idea of existence as being in perpetual flux (polemos). like the great vedic and taoist sages, heraclitus also advocated an understanding into the nature of logos, which defined the underlying connectedness between all things and events. similarly, the sufi master ibn arabi in his influential metaphysic on the unity of being (wahdat–ul-wujud) further expanded on the heraclitian flux by stating that the divine in its desire to manifest itself in creation, discloses itself on microcosmic and macrocosmic levels. at the macrocosmic level, the divine constantly reveals and conceals itself within the historic world process. for ibn arabi, each era, epoch, day and moment reaffirms the limitless creative potential of divine selfdisclosure (coates 2002:83). as coates notes, “god appears in the era, and he appears as the era” (coates 2002:83)1 ibn arabi’s understanding of time is significant since “each era contains the possibility of its own zenith and aspiration”(coates 2002:87). in this way, each moment contains the kernel of kairos – each moment becomes a means for apprehending the divine in world events. nothing remains static; the world in its entirety ... transforms itself kaleidoscopically from moment to moment, and yet all these movements of self-development are the 'ascending' movements of the things toward the absolute-one, precisely because they are the 'descending' self-expression of the absolute-one (smith 2004). 2 let’s now take aspects of ibn arabi’s metaphysic and apply it to islam/christian relations in the 21st century, and outline a few possible trajectories which this may take. using heidegger’s terminology, the world has never embodied such a degree of ‘thrownness’ (geworfenheit), in the way diverse cultural and religious groups have been brought together by globalisation. while the past saw intermittent ideological and material exchanges between muslims and christians, such exchanges in the contemporary period are vital for creating global peace. comprising between them over a third of the world’s population, islam and christianity are poised in informing humankind through the global crisis. the american scholar abdul aziz said argues that the scale and extent of the global crisis demands new forms of “creative imagination and reason” (said: 2004). here he goes on to postulate the idea of educating people in becoming global citizens, willing to replace nationalistic and cultural ties for more mutually affirming and universal ones (said 2004:1). the global citizen recognises the importance of all religious and cultural traditions and emphasises human dignity. the kernel of said’s discourse mirrors martin buber’s thesis of the i-thou relationship (buber 1972), which is characterised by reciprocity, cooperation, openness and “rediscovery of the boundary between self and other” (carrol & bowman 2000:230). it is because the abrahamic religions assert that god is knowable that privileges the fostering of the knowledge of him. certainly, the sufi tradition of islam posits the way of knowledge as an act of divine realisation as noted in the hadith qudsi, “i was a hidden treasure and i wanted to be known so i created the world.” what such writers as abul aziz said, martin buber, and john dewey prescribe is the nurturing of authentic connections between global citizens as way of reaffirming our common humanity. although violence and division has historically been promulgated by doctrinal religion, religion still bequeaths the promise of conferring a profound sense of humanity and universal wisdom. on this note, friedrich schleiermacher writes: “religion is no kind of slavery, no kind of captivity…the beginning of faith” (van de meyer 2001:89). here, i concur with van de meyer who divides religion according to its good and bad aspects. for him, good religion nurtures universal compassion, knowledge and respect, while bad religion promotes bigotry, obscurantism, and intolerance (van de meyer 2001:92). the fact that the teachings of islam and christianity foreground universal principles and values, suitably positions them to develop a new kind of synthesis based on what prince elhassan bin talal of jordan calls an “ethics of human solidarity” and interfaith as well as 3 intrafaith outreach” (2003:6). certainly, from quranic viewpoint, cultural diversity and its various religious expressions are part of the divine plan. o mankind! we created you from a single pair(pair) of a male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). verily the most honoured of you in the sight of allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you (qur’an 49:13). cultural diversity, then, is both a way of finding human solidarity between communities of humans, as well as, as mediating divine creative disclosure within the human lifeworld. in this way, the quranic injunction of inter-cultural harmony intimates the realisation of oikoumene – the earth as god’s household. it is precisely this kind of shared human project which is presently being rediscovered between muslims and christians throughout the world. we find this kind of interfaith collaboration in bosnia, kosovo and lebanon after the ravages of civil war. according to rose marie berger (1999), bosnia provides a poignant “spiritual laboratory”, for testing “peaceful co-existence of religions”, which christian moe refers to as the “bosnian paradigm” (2003). nowhere is the bosnian paradigm more aptly portrayed than in efforts by the franciscan father mijo dzolan and dr. katica nikolic who are endeavouring to construct the house of peace – a centre for spiritual and psychological healing for all bosnians. the forerunner of the house of peace was in 1992 at rama, where father dzolan had appealed to muslims, serbs and croats to return to the valley. bosnians from the three religions often prayed together at the basement of the franciscan monastery during intense shelling and massacres in the surrounding countryside (berger 1999:3). the appeal of the bosnian paradigm as a workable blueprint of reconciliation between muslims and christians is that its moral vision transcends the boundaries of the balkans and supports the need towards global peace-building. re-enchanting the oikoumene max weber’s gloomy thesis on secularism referred to as the “disenchanted world”  a world characterised by a bureaucratic and soulless rationality, is a journey into social armageddon and the consequences of global hubris. if unchecked, weber’s disenchanted world paradigm poses a potential threat to islamic and christian teachings and values. for 4 weber and the french sociologist emile durkheim, a symptom of the disenchanted world is the amelioration of cultural traditions resulting in mass social alienation and anomie. using weber’s logic, modernism’s triumvirate, of the global market science and technology, have sought to de-mystify the universe. where for thousands of years, nature had been treated as a primordial source of the sacred reality for humankind, has under modernism’s guise been reduced to a quantifiable object and as an expression of human dominance of the world. for the perenialist, sayyed hossein nasr, modernism’s malaise is historically situated in 17 th century europe when knowledge of the natural world was separated from theology, ushering in the cartesian paradigm and its dependency on positivism (nasr 1968). the fruits of this cartesian model have been both insidious and cataclysmic. from a human rights perspective cartesianism has divided human societies according to rational and non-rational (irrational) categories. as rationality became the gauge for measuring human knowledge and progress in the west, it assiduously judged non-western cultures as being non-rational. edward said’s concept of ‘orientalism’ is the historic realisation of this logic which informed european understandings of ‘oriental’ peoples (said 1978). the contagion of orientalism tacitly informs western understandings of the non-west; from the perpetual debt cycle which plagues the third world, to refugees being denied asylum by affluent nations on the pretext of national security. moreover, core features of secularism foster the cartesian paradigm via the deployment of numerous distinctions which mock the conception of modern civil society as based on justice and equity. like the doomed sisyphus whose prankish excesses evoked the olympians’ wrath, modernity has contravened the two sacred dictums of greek lore — “know thyself” (gnosis auton) and “nothing in excess”(sophrousene). the failure of moderation has unleashed the terror of excess — excess in violence, in consumption, and the sybaritic worship of the individual. as john carrol notes, “in a culture of excess the serious is denied” (2002:23). in this scenario, religion, the ancient bastion of cultural and mystical lore is increasingly becoming relegated to faddism and the whimsical. the global human crisis demands “the necessity of a new paradigm”, as proposed by peter young (1999), which contours our understanding of the world into “one absolute and allinclusive reality” in which humankind has a central role to play. this must start with disprivileging the excesses of cartesianism from informing western and non-western societies, and restoring a view of the natural world as oikoumene – a sacred cosmos. this is nothing 5 less than re-enchanting the world by this i mean a way of living the natural and human lifeworlds with communitas. communitas means to be liberated from human limitations and outmoded models of thinking and acting which convey “a false conjecture of reality” according to ibn arabi. (young 1999:5). presently, this new global communitas is being disclosed by inter-religious dialogue and cooperation, between muslims and christians, “locally rooted and globally connected” (boehle 2002:3). it is because as ibn arabi claims that truth can “take on any form it wishes since a single essence gives rise to all the multiplicity of forms” (young 1999:5), that makes globalisation an opportune and effective vehicle for addressing global peace-building. the multiplicity of globalisation allows for new kinds of synergies between various religious and non-religious organisations to co-operate. unesco’s world movement for inter-faith peace building between muslims and christians is pioneering this kind of synergy. “only by joining forces, by creating synergies, by sharing new insights and traditional wisdom”(boehle 2002:8), of islam and christianity can a spiritual ‘commons’ between these two great religions protect and preserve the oikoumene. according to islam, the world has been created to be god’s place of worship. therefore, it is incumbent on every believer to reprobate injustice and violence which threaten all human and non-human communities. ibn arabi’s metaphysic on the multitudinous nature of existence, consigns us to our true relationship with history, as a continual unfolding of divine self-disclosure, while at the same time an affirmation of the immutable mercy (rahma) of the divine fons et origo of creation. for ibn arabi, the notion of separate existence is both an illusion and the enemy of humankind, conveyed in nationalistic and fundamentalist ideologies. however, it is peace that is humankind’s primordial birthright, a legacy that is being painstakingly unveiled through innumerable global events and beings, all converging towards the realisation of kairos, where each moment contains the divine desire to be known. references benjamin walter 1999 “theories of german fascism”, selected writings: vol ii., trans. rodney livingstone new york: harvard university press. p. 320-21. berger rose marie 1999. ‘a laboratory of reconciliation’, sojourners magazine. november/december. 6 http://www.sojo.net/magazine/index.cfm/action/sojourners/issue/soj9911/article/991121.html 8/24/02 boehle joseph 2002. inter-religious cooperation and global change from a clash of civilisations to a dialogue of civilisations. paper presented at the annual conference of the academic council in theunited nations system (acuns). revised and published in pacifica review, volume 14, number 3, october. buber martin 1972 between man and man new york: macmillan. carrol pamela s, bowman, cynthia a 2000. ‘leaping fire: texts and technology’ contemporary issues in technology and teacher education. (online serial), 1 (2), 229-235. coates peter 2002. ibn arabi and modern thought: the history of making metaphysics seriously united kingdom: anqa productions. carrol john 2002. terror: a meditation on the meaning of september 11 melbourne: scribe publications. hrh prince el-hassan bin talal of the hashemite kingdom of jordan 2003 ‘a new world order without ideologies’, presidential address. 4 february zurich switzerland. http://ecumene.org/hassan0203.htm moe christian 2003 ‘a ‘bosnian paradigm’ for religious tolerance?’ the local as a sacred model for global society, university of oslo easr 3rd conference bergen 9 may http://folk.uio.no/chrismoe/papers/bosnian-paradigm.draft.rtf. nasr seyyed hossein 1968 the encounter of man and nature: the spiritual crisis of modern man london: allen & unwin. said abdul aziz 2004 ‘educating for global citizenship’ paper given at the principles of the abrahamic faiths: traditions that advance education, sponsored by creative associated intratrend and the caux rand table. february 12. said edward w 1978 orientalism london: routledge & kegan paul. smith tony 2004 correspondences between the sufi ideas of ibn arabi and physics. file:///phi2pi/users/tony/documents/sufiphysics.html (4 of 13) [23/3/2004 4:31:03 pm van de meyer robert 2001 islam and the west: a new political and religious order post september 11 hampshire uk. john hunt publishing ltd. young peter 1999 ‘ibn ‘arabi: towards a universal point of view’ delivered at the mias symposium http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/pyoung.html 7 http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/2002sesaps.html http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/#ibnarabi http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/#ideas http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/islam.html http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/#correspondences http://folk.uio.no/chrismoe/papers/bosnian-paradigm.draft.rtf 1 according to the hadith, “god is called time”. humanity is also warned, “revile not the era for i (god) am the era” see coates (2002:83). after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi amartya sen’s ‘capability approach’ and democracy in the philippines christopher ryan maboloc ateneo de davao university, philippines abstract this essay applies amartya sen’s capability approach to the way democracy is practiced in the philippines by filipinos. the author has reached the conclusion that negative freedom does not secure for people their well-being. thus, even after the removal of the dictator ferdinand marcos, the philippines still remains poor. in this essay, the author argues that filipinos should empower themselves morally in terms of their positive freedoms or capability, and the church can be at the frontlines of this initiative, in order to achieve national development. re-examining the case of philippine democracy the rice crisis in the philippines in 2008, which reached a point where it was necessary for the church to distribute rice in order to reach out to the poorest of the population, is reflective of how the country has failed in delivering meaningful change to the lives of filipinos. daily, people line up to buy subsidized rice from the government. the government has argued that the spiraling cost of rice is a global problem and is beyond its control. this should not be the case for filipinos, i believe. i think it was a result of wrong economic policies. food security is essential to any developing nation. agriculture, however, has been neglected by the administration of gloria macapagal-arroyo. many poor filipinos, which constitute 30% or 28 million people of the country’s total population, even until today, experience starvation. 1 can civil society do something to change this phenomenon? is there a way to enhance the lives of people beyond the notion of protest? it is necessary, i believe, to study the economics of welfare and its political implications. i will begin with the problem of starvation. starvation, says 1998 nobel laureate for economics amartya sen, “is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat”, not the fact of “there being not enough food to eat”1. people go hungry because their entitlement to food is not secured. it is possible that a country’s food supply problem is a result of wrong political decisions, for instance, the inadequacy of mechanisms to rid a country’s food security program from corruption. but this brings us to a bigger issue – poverty. sen says that poverty is not the case of people’s “lack of income”, but rather, is “a matter of capabilities deprivation”2. income and other social primary goods are only suggestive of what people have or do not have – not of who they really are or of what they are capable of doing. income for sen, therefore, should not be suggestive of the kind of life a person is to live. the philippine government has been using the money from its overseas contract workers to keep the economy afloat. but in terms of human costs and the cruel choices people have to make, the government remains inutile and morally guilty of making filipinos abroad as “mere means to an end”. economic justice, in this sense, entails a new challenge for the church. it is without doubt that social justice, which is the battle-cry of the catholic church in the philippines, unarguably, should favor the poor, women, and the vulnerable, or to use john rawls, the “worst off”, for whom, rawls writes in a theory of justice, the mechanisms of the basic structure must respond to. this requires, undoubtedly, an understanding of the causes of social inequality. democracy, in theory, is meant for the realization of the good life, not only in terms 2 of a higher “standard of living”, but also in terms of the quality of that life, however scarce economic resources may be. the church has been training lay people and has mobilized communities to empower them. but such has not been enough because poverty still thrives in the philippines, especially in mindanao. i therefore propose sen’s approach to take a further step in enabling the church to play a bigger role in human development. in this regard, the capability approach, a framework developed by sen, is a good theoretical starting point in understanding the filipino experience of democracy and how the church can be a meaningful factor in changing the philippine economic landscape. a new tool: amartya sen’s capability approach let me describe sen’s theory. sen says that primary social goods, which he explains are “general purpose means that help anyone to promote his or her ends”3, cannot be an adequate informational basis for evaluating well-being. he asserts that human capability or the extent of people’s freedom has a direct role, the most important indeed, in the achievement of well-being. his basic argument is anchored on the idea that freedom has a foundational importance4 and he proposes the paradigm-shifting distinction between equality in terms of “primary social goods” and equality in terms of “capabilities”. for sen, evaluations regarding equality “should not solely be based on people’s command of resources, sense of happiness or desire fulfillment, but should include features of the way people actually live”5, because “equal benefits to people with unequal needs will not produce equal well-being”6. in addressing the problem of poverty, philippine economic managers look at how economic growth alleviates the lowness of income of the poor, and thus, statistics based on 3 aggregate national income are utilized to measure the “trickle down” effect of economic expansion. this cascading effect to the poor assumes that such will improve the poor’s “standard of living”. des gasper explains that this process, known as the “economics of welfare”, follows from the fact that “economic production creates wealth which is distributed as income. income is used for consumption which results to personal utility on the part of the earner. in economic terms, utility is judged as economic well-being”7. this means that economic well-being is construed as the product of income generated from higher production inputs in the economy. higher input to the process means more labor is needed, thus resulting to employment. people earn their income from this, enabling them to consume commodities, thereby satisfying personal utility. tragically, the arroyo administration does this by giving the poor billions of cash subsidies – to no effect. recently, in the city of davao, its mayor and a local priest argued as to the moral propriety of using the local parishes as distribution centers of food for the poor. the mayor argued that it is not political. rather, by using the parishes, his food for the poor program is insulated from politics. a local priest thinks it is not the case. people are in a dilemma. but a basic point could be lost – people are starving. let me return to sen’s discussion. welfare economics views poverty in a narrow way. this concept of poverty, proceeding from what is theoretically called economism, is ill-equipped as basis for knowing “why people are deprived of their well-being”. it does not tell the extent or the kind of deprivation that people suffer, whether it is so grave or unimaginable, say for instance in the case of children who scavenge in the city of manila or davao, a result of the informal garbage economy one usually finds in the third world. sen argues that the real extent of deprivation, as a matter of fact, may be underestimated if we concentrate only on the size of 4 incomes8. there are many factors to consider, including one’s social and political freedoms, and civil society, notably the church, has been at the frontlines battling poverty through mechanisms which help the realization of social justice in the philippines. but more needs to be understood if the church and civil society as a whole are to become real contributors to human development. sen argues that equality in the amount of income people earn or the social primary goods they possess is not a real guarantee to well-being achievement since there are difficulties that a person (i.e., a pregnant woman, a child, or a person with a physical handicap), may have to hurdle owing to his or her specific condition. a person with a physical handicap may have to overcome disadvantages in living comfortably that another at the same age need not have, even when both of them exactly are allocated the same amount of primary goods. the reason for the above is the correlation between functionings and capabilities. the former refers to “what a person actually does”, whereas the latter means “the ability to achieve certain things”9. functionings correspond to “an individual’s physical state of being”, for instance, whether he or she has enough food to eat; “a mental state of being”, say whether she enjoys herself doing creative work which she finds fulfilling, or “a social state of being”, like whether for instance he or she is free to do certain things like taking part in social gatherings10. functionings, therefore, are “the various things a person may choose to attain in his or her life and thereby value doing”11. functionings imply the different aspects of living conditions of people and thus, in a huge way, these tell us about the kind of life people live. the concept of capability intends to “reflect the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another”12, thus it 5 implies the capacity to achieve real opportunities for well-being. simply put, it means one’s “freedom to be”. in other words, capability concerns what makes a person realize what he can do or to put it basically, the freedom to achieve the kind of life one wants to live and impliedly, the freedom to avoid the kind of life one does not want to be in. to illustrate the above, sen gives the example of “a destitute who is starving due to famine and an affluent person who chooses to fast”13. although both individuals are deprived of the “the functioning of being well-nourished, the freedom they possess is crucially distinct”14. the destitute clearly lacks the capability or positive freedom to achieve nourishment whereas the affluent has that option; he has the resources to buy food but refuses to do so in order to dramatize his protest. the basic idea here is for civil society to consider the role of positive freedom in enhancing the lives of the poor. protests are important in securing the common good, but they are no guarantee to well-being achievement. an explanation is needed. the idea of negative freedom, as opposed to the notion of capability, corresponds to what can be considered as non-intrusion rights or the freedom from abuse or coercion. for instance, a fisherman in any coastal town of the philippine archipelago can feel secure and contented in his simple home, with no threat of violence from anyone. it can be said that in this case, his negative freedom may not have been violated. yet, it can also be argued that his negative freedom has no value to him. why? poor, and sick, it can be said that he has a life that he does not really want. given his condition, he is not really free. he needs more, i.e. education, a decent home, job security and others. these are things which one’s positive freedom can only provide. from the point of view of the poor, the church has played an 6 important role in realizing certain aspects of their negative freedoms, i.e. freedom from human rights abuse and coercion. but, it is equally important right now for the church to take on new frontiers. it is now time for church leaders to see how human well-being is advanced not merely through negative rights. in the archdiocese of davao, the ignatian institute of religious education has been serving the local church by educating lay persons. its donors, through the effort of its director fr. william malley, s.j., provide lay persons who work in basic ecclesiastical communities in davao city scholarships in the study of theology and pastoral ministry. such is a kind of positive empowerment, an empowerment that is absent from the perspective of some expensive elitist religious schools. the example of the fisherman above, however, should not be taken as something that undermines the value of negative freedom. we can say that negative freedom is also very important in securing and protecting our democratic rights which may be violated in the absence of such freedom. our negative freedom is also of great value if seen from the context of society as a whole since without it, regimes can become abusive. while positive freedom enhances the individual’s ability to be the person she desires herself to be, our negative rights protect us from the excesses and manipulative tendencies of other people. it is in this area where the church in the philippines has been active in promoting and protecting its infant democracy. the toppling of ferdinand marcos, of course, remains its prime example. it is without argument that ensuring the elementary capabilities of people as a matter of public policy is to secure the very basis for their well-being. if the government commits itself to each child born in basilan, the poorest province in the philippines, seeing to it that each child is well7 nourished, gets provisions for health care, enjoys good education and is also given the chance to participate in the affairs of governance later in life, then there is no reason for these children to become bandits or rebels someday. but in the absence of the above, it can be said, human life is hopelessly diminished. in places where insurgency thrives, the philippines as a country do not lack heroes. priests and lay workers and members of civil society have sacrificed their lives. however, it is equally important to empower people themselves to change the course of their destiny. this will entail a huge effort for people to value, for instance, their right of suffrage in order to change their kind of leaders. basilan remains poor not only because it is impoverished economically but more so because people lack the freedom to be real contributors to social change. thus, the power of democracy to effect change in the well-being of filipinos depends on what they do to their lives. if democracy is to become a key to national development, then people should be an integral part to its vital existence. from a global perspective, as a counter-argument to this, one can cite the benevolent dictatorship of singapore’s lee kuan yew or china’s rise. in response, jeffrey sachs notes that china’s economy awoke after it opened its markets to the world15. sen also points out that there is little evidence that it is the authoritarian style of lee kuan yew that has made singapore a prosperous state16. if any, sen points to “helpful policies” which includes “open competition, provision for education and high literacy rates, the use of capital markets, and incentives for investments”17, factors which can make a country globally competitive. these things should be studied seriously and must be taken advantage of by civil society if it is to adapt itself to the demands of the 21st century. 8 positive and negative democracy in the philippines from the foregoing, democracy can be theoretically construed and empirically practiced as “positive” or “negative”. the emphasis on people’s positive capabilities, for instance, “the role of freedom concerning the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements”18, can be seen as instrumental to national development. the above includes economic opportunities, education, health, transparency in government, and protective security in terms of safety nets (i.e., farm subsidies during food or economic crises), as the things that are necessary to make democracy work. these rights can be considered as “positive entitlements” which empower people, and as such, they contribute to human well-being in the same manner as one’s positive freedom does to one’s life. in arguing for people’s democratic rights, sen emphasizes the argument that no famine has ever occurred under a democratic regime. the reason for this is that any famine is unthinkable if the government provides enough provisions to farmers in terms of farm inputs. a government that is in solidarity with its people can immediately address any need for food basically because transparency in the disbursement of funds and the participation of farmers in the planning process will help ensure food stability. the case of the 700 million peso fertilizer scam is a classic case on how arroyo has ruined philippine democracy. here, the crucial point is that filipinos owe to each other the moral and political duty to articulate our concerns and press the government for immediate, effective and efficient action. this requires, however, the “capability” to “speak out”, and the “positive empowerment” to argue for one’s rights in public. sen notes that, “the people have to be seen, in this perspective, as being actively involved – 9 given the opportunity – in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs”19. positive democracy means people are real contributors to human well-being and not “passive recipients” of dole-outs and grants. for example, famines, sen argues, are not natural calamities but human disasters, and he theorizes that “famines are policy failures”20, and not a real shortage of food. the same holds true for the country’s rice crisis. neglect of agriculture is simply a failure of governance. where government fails in a poor country, the people have no where to go but the church. where the political apparatus of governance is non-functioning, the church has to lead, not only in terms of giving people a voice, but more importantly, by teaching people become “fishermen” – active in the pursuit of their well-being and not mere by-standers waiting for their government to do something. as an example of how an active and knowledgeable populace would transform society, it can be said that transparency laws, from the point of view of positive democracy, are useless if people are not knowledgeable of the mechanisms which ensure transparent government transactions. any government can easily abuse its people if people are bereft of the tools or knowledge which will secure for them their welfare. the only way forward for the philippines, right now, is a moral revolution that proceeds from well-meaning men and women. there is no other way except through the kind effort of good religious people whom most filipinos respect. it is no secret that a hungry man, for example, will simply say that he has no time to think about corruption in government. it can also be said that “anti-corruption drives” and the “right of suffrage” are only seen by the poor in a negative way as means of protecting one’s negative freedom, and not as positive opportunities to really empower oneself in public. this has to 10 change. positive democracy, it should be noted, entails the active participation of people, of “people power” in a very positive way because it results to real change in the way people act in the public sphere. for sen, “the achievement of democracy depends not only on the rules and procedures of democratic processes but also on the way certain opportunities are used by citizens”21. it is now time for the church to lead this new revolution for positive democracy. basically, it can also be argued that the importance of democracy lies in the fact that it secures and protects the political freedoms of people. negative freedom implies freedom from oppression. simply put, it is the “right to protest”. we can explain this by pointing out that democracy makes, or at least puts “pressure” on government leaders, to be responsive to the needs of the people because the people hold them accountable. the church has been at the forefront of an anti-corruption drive. however, much needs to be done, most especially from the grassroots level. for instance, the weakness of philippine democracy is something that i see in the inconsistent image of a corrupt politician who endorses an anti-corruption book. protests can effect some change in the public lives of people, but unless people become real contributors to their well-being, change is but a dream, “difficult” and “impossible”. for example, libraries are almost non-existent in many public schools. this should not mean that a student mustn’t read books. for a student to really learn, he or she has to find these books somewhere. it will not be enough to wait for the results of mass actions denouncing the government’s neglect of education. a student needs to realize that the life he or she has to live is something that is “fully” and “truly” his or her own responsibility. opportunities don’t just come. these are things that we create. 11 in conclusion, my analysis is that responsible citizens, guided by their “duty of civility”, will work to ensure that development becomes the priority of their national and local leaders. the streets can be the battle ground for such. but beyond such and in a very positive way, the academe, research institutions, basic ecclesiastical communities, and private corporations can contribute to advance the welfare of people more than the parliamentary of the streets. the catholic church-led edsa people power of 1986 is a classic case for negative democracy. after two decades, it has become apparent that the event has not translated to a “highly industrialized” philippines, president corazon aquino’s goal while in office. of course, negative democracy makes people vigilant even in intense economic situations. people value their political freedoms. but people can also resign to the fact that their kind of government is perpetually corrupt. negative democracy does not necessarily empower them to seek real well-being, and thus, negative democracy may not place a country on the map to human development. the church has to take on new frontiers. people should realize, as mahbub ul haq suggested, that they are the “real wealth of the nation”. this means that development is not the mere “by-product” but is in itself the reflection of the “kind of people” a country has. of course, we deserve a better government. but on the other hand, to demand such from our leaders, right now, may not be enough. notes 12 1 amartya sen, poverty and famines, oxford: oxford university press, 1981: 1. 2 ibid., 22 3 sen, development as freedom, oxford: oxford university press, 1999: 72. 4 sabina alkire, valuing freedoms, oxford: oxford university press, 2002: 6. 5 charles gore, irreducibly social goods and the informational basis of sen’s capability approach, journal of international development 9 (2)1997: 236. 6 des gasper, the ethics of development, edinburg: edinburg university press, 2004: 107. 7 gasper, development as freedom: moving economics beyond commodities, journal of international development 12 (7) 2000: 283. 8 sen, inequality re-examined, oxford: oxford university press, 1992: 113. 9 gasper, is sen’s approach an adequate basis for considering human development?, review of political economy, 14 (4) 2002: 454. 10 gore, irreducibly social goods, 237. 11 sen, development as freedom, 75. 12 ibid., 74. 13 ibid., 75. 14 ingrid robeyns, sen’s capability approach re-examined, discussion paper, center for economic studies, university of louvain, 2000: 6 15 jeffrey sachs, the end of poverty, london: penguin, 2005. 16 sen, development as freedom, 148 17 ibid., 150 18 ibid., 37 19 ibid., 53 20 sen, poverty and famines, 78 21 sen, development as freedom, 155 spirituality and mysticism: a global view justice in paul ricoeur’s philosophy pagorn singsuriya mahidol university, thailand abstract according to paul ricoeur, the question “what is the just?” is interrelated with the question “why be just?” which is in turn connected to “who am i?” ricoeur elaborates his conception of justice on the basis of his “little ethics,” which is founded on his conception of narrative identity. according to him, justice is basically rooted in the dialectic tension between alterity and identity, which constitutes the self. his analysis of selfhood, from the most elementary level in semantic analysis onwards, shows that features of justice are reflected in the ontological-existential structure. it can be said that these features as a whole are characteristic of human existence, which is prone to perversion by evil. his analysis of the narrative provide the framework for a further analysis of the just in political, juridical and criminological fields. background in thailand, the study of justice or its counterpart, i.e. engagement against domination, largely draws upon the liberalist-socialist debate in the analytic tradition on the one hand, and upon michael foucault, the prophet of extremity of continental philosophy, on the other. this research fills in the gap with the study of justice according to paul ricoeur, one of the contemporary philosopher giants, who confesses the obsession in mediating polemics. according to ricoeur, the just finds its locus at the intersection of the horizontal and the vertical axes, i.e., consecutively, the dialogical constitution of the self and the hierarchical constitution of the moral qualifier predicates. the orthogonal figure is rooted in his philosophical anthropology that dialectically fabricates subjectivity with the themes of identity-alterity, and sameness-selfhood. since the just is at the heart of the crisscrossing that constitutes the self, its relation to the latter is inextricable. questions thus arise as to how justice pervades the self and how the themes figure in the orthogonal axes and how these throw light on the understanding about justice. this documentary research is a study of paul ricoeur's conception of justice in the context of his philosophical anthropology by mainly drawing on his oneself as another (study 1-9) and the just. this research provides some complement to the body of literature employed in sociopolitical philosophy, especially on the issue of justice, which is now dominated by the liberalist and the foucauldian trends. an alternative perspective is thus available together with the conceptual framework that is applicable beyond the political to the judicial and even criminological fields. the results of the research focus upon the conceptual mapping of ricoeur’s concept of the just onto that of the self, whose ontological-existential structure is eventually and fully explicated with the concept of narrative identity. in the dialectical context of identity-alterity and sameness-selfhood, it will be seen how justice permeates our being and how the nature of our being throws light on that of the just. self and justice to demonstrate how the senses of the polysemic term, justice, permeates our being, it is best to examine ricoeur’s most elementary level of analyses of person, in his dialogue with the analytic tradition, undertaken to lay a foundation for the concept of narrative identity. meanwhile, it is also shown how the theme of identity and alterity runs through all these analyses. semantic and pragmatic analyses of person the concept of person, as individual, is analyzed in semantic and pragmatic frameworks. primarily concentrating on reference in space and time, the semantic framework inevitably treats the person as a referent, which implies in grammatical terms that the person is here understood as the third person. in the most fundamental level, the third person is just one among other entities that are likewise the objects of reference. ostensibly designated by virtue of mere distinction against all others as background, these entities become individuals whose identity is thoroughly defined by alterity. the person is consequently not recognized as such, but as an individual among others. the individualization makes it possible for anyone to make reference to an entity as a subject, which is a precondition for its description i.e. predication of the subject or, in other words, attribution of its properties. the nature of the particular referent is further delineated beyond mere alterity by the categories of properties attributable to specific kinds of entities. following p. f. strawsons, ricoeur distinguishes properties into sets that are applicable to things and persons. however, a duality exists in case of the latter, which does not only consist of a ‘soul’ but also a body. thus said, it follows that the individualized entities are further defined as things (or bodies) and/or persons. some features of justice, i.e. reciprocity and equality, are present in this analytical level. that is, entities are reciprocally defined by their mutual distinction. the predicates, moreover, are meaningful since they are part of language, whose rules are held in common. the predication also presupposes equality because different referents, if belonging to the same categories, are described with properties drawn from the common sets. this equality is made more evident when it is taken into account the personal description that is an element contributing to the personal singularity, and yet is operated with common resource of predicates. to join ricoeur’s fruitful employment of the polysemy, i would also like to add that some trace of another sense of justice, lawfulness, can be observed when it is seen that people need to conform to the rule of language if they are to have successful communication. thus, we may now conclude that the semantic analysis of person as a particular prefigures the permeation of justice in the ontological-existential structure. despite the insight into the ontological-existential nature, the semantic examination proves to be inadequate for the obvious reason that the person is more than an object of reference. unlike the semantic framework, the pragmatic perspective rooted in the conversational context implicates the person not as the third, but as the first and second person who takes turn with his/her interlocutor designating him/herself, designating and being designated by his/her dialogical partner. with speech act theory, the pragmatic analysis seems to fulfill the conditions of personhood, which require agency. however, rather than the actor him/herself, the speech act is far more a matter of the act itself understood with reference not to the intention, but to the public rules, without which the author of discourse cannot even convey his intention through particular acts by utterance. after performed, in addition, the speech act becomes a publicly identifiable event reflecting itself rather than its actor. since the act keeps relapsing into the event, the actor needs to make a continual effort of self-presence. ricoeur calls this effort an act of the author anchoring him/herself to the linguistic event, which is in turn the result of the author’s anchoring the language system to his/her concrete context. the features of justice can likewise be traced in this level of analysis. the universality of the language system, including the rules governing speech acts, implies equality among the speakers of that language who are, ceteris paribus, entitled to the same linguistic resource. not only does the language itself presupposes mutuality, the speech act that is actualized in the dialogical context, in which interlocutors take turn addressing and being addressed, also has as its precondition reciprocity, which foreshadows the characterization of the subject as the one who acts and suffers (i.e. is acted upon) on the ethical plane. the mark of ‘lawfulness’ also figures in the need to conform to the existing rules so as to perform speech acts. moreover, apart from the actualization of general language system in a particular discourse, the theme of identity and alterity is properly present in the act of anchoring, in which the author of discourse so acts as to mark as his own the alienating linguistic event that is produced by him/herself. no less is the theme observed in the interlocutors reciprocally defined as subjects in the dialogue. therefore, the question of self-identity, ‘who am i?’ is partially answered, both in the semantic and the pragmatic levels, with this dialectics of identity and alterity-in other words, the dialogical constitution. indeed, after the semantic and the pragmatic analyses of person as particular and before the explication of narrative identity, ricoeur is engaged in semantic and pragmatic analyses of action. although, for lack of space, the latter is not given consideration in this section, the analyses of person above suffice to demonstrate how inextricable the just is from our being. narrative identity and little ethics more of ricoeur’s genius in his play with words to disclose philosophical insights allows us to pick up where the former section has just left off. in his explication of selfidentity, the first of the opposing identity-alterity poles has its senses delineated with the latin terms, ‘idem’ and ‘ipse.’ the former means sameness, especially in the sense of identicalness through time, whereas the latter signifies selfhood understood mainly in the sense of self-constancy. it seems that the latter entails the former, and no need therefore exists that both are distinguished. ricoeur asserts that it is so believed since both overlap in the usual case. character-whose continuation through time marks sameness and whose qualities define the self-is just where they coincide. however, a case is there to demonstrate that selfhood exists without sameness. promising is such exemplar, in which a person persists with his/her given words in the face of changes, external and internal, objective and subjective. this is evident since many do things despite themselves simply to keep their promises. although self-identity comprises idem and ipse, paramount is the latter, whose role will be seen later in the narrative identity. with double signification, the second of the opposing poles is not different. the senses of the alterity are mapped out in the contexts of relationship with others. to explicate this, it is worth returning to the pragmatic analysis. in the dialogical context, the obvious other is the interlocutor, who is equivalent to the peer in the more extended context of interpersonal relationship, friendship. beyond the face-to-face circumstance, the other of another kind is referred to by the interlocutors in the same conversational setting as the third person that is analogous to ‘anyone’ in the institutional context. these senses are, of course, partial as the alterity may also signify something impersonal such as language, history, social institutions, or even the wholly other, as p. s. anderson (1994) suggests. however, what binds these instances together is that people have them ‘in common.’ by this time, it is easy to see how the personal identity is related to the other in yet another way. that is, the alterity is the condition for the formation of subjectivity. for example, self-constancy disclosed in the act of promise keeping is not possible without the other to make a promise to. and, without language, the act of promising itself cannot be done either. ricoeur devises the notion of narrative identity to capture and mediate all these facets of the human self. through narrative, life events-diverse and at times discordant-are rearranged and unified under a particular goal so as to create identicalness through time on the basis of self-constancy. this is how narrative plays its role in the formation of self-identity. moreover, the narrative identity draws on the alterity in its different senses. firstly, it is in response to the others that we maintain the self-constancy, preserve the commitment to the goal, or attest with action to the self formulated through narrative. in addition, the narration consists of a goal of life that can be loosely identified with ‘the good life,’ and a life plan that comprises practices, which together form the dynamics of the self that manages to adjust and maintain concord between them, and allows a coherence of narrative identity. goals, plots and practices, elements of the project of existence, are not private but appropriated from the common resources such as history, life stories, and constitutive rules of practice. like justice whose senses imply the mean, the narrative identity strikes the balance between idem and ipse on the one hand, and the specified and the unspecified other on the other hand. indeed, the narrative identity can be said to provide the model for the just. in other words, the conception of the just is the extension of this model across ricoeur’s meta-ethical articulation called ‘little ethics.’ the little ethics consists of three moments i.e. the good, the right, and the wise. the evaluation with the predicates, ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ is present in the selection of a goal that orients the life project, the narrative identity. the first teleological moment of aiming for the good life is therefore part of the self-identity formation-to be more precise, part of our self. without such thing as ‘the good life’ for everyone, each person needs to conceive it for him/herself, not in vacuum, but with the notions of the good defined by different social or institutional criteria. the good thus extends beyond the personal to the institutional sphere and so is equally available to all in the construction of their life project. the extension is beyond that as the realization of the good life is possible in the interpersonal context of solicitude and in the just institutions, which is why ricoeur redefines ‘the good life’ as the one ‘with and for others in the just institution.’ the second moment of the right, or the obligatory, enters the scene because the selected goal embedded in the life plan is carried out in the setting of interpersonal or social interaction where the power exercised in the effort towards the achievement leaves the others therein prone to domination and violation in various forms. since the norms that dictate the right and wrong are so universalized as to be applicable to all, the implementation of these abstract rules can be too rigid to accommodate the very ground of morality, the good life. the third moment of wisdom, phronesis or practical reason, becomes necessary at this point to mediate the good and the right. all the three vertically aligned thus form the hierarchical constitution of moral predicates, which completes the orthogonality together with the horizontal axis thoroughly explicated in the conception of narrative identity. politics, judiciary and justice ricoeur’s elaboration of the just is based on the framework defined by the concepts of narrative identity and little ethics. the just in its different aspects, political and judicial, is delineated in relation to this framework. ricoeur prefers ‘the just’ to ‘justice’ because his focus is not on institutions, but on the substantivized form of the quality predicated of action, person, or institution. one of his prominent approaches to justice is his adoption as the starting point the cry, “unfair!” it can be heard in the interpersonal and the institutional contexts when particular persons receive less or take more than their due. apart from this question of equality, the remark of injustice may also arise in connection with the hierarchy of predicates. the question is not whether people have equal shares of social goods, but whether this or that is a social good or whether this or that should be allocated. it is not whether the laws are equally enforced, but whether such a strict and equal enforcement is appropriate or even whether the inevitable enforcement leaves something to remedy. it is not whether a policy or laws are from the legitimate processes and not whether the processes themselves are legitimate, but whether the rationales behind the processes are justified, especially from the perspective of the will to live together. agents in charge of responding to these questions are either political or judicial, whose nature is explicated on the basis of the above exposition. narrative identity and politics the narrative identity comprises a goal, a life plan, and practices. although the goal is the horizon that gives meaning to our life, it is not crystal clear and flickering, which requires that a life plan to interpret and clarify it be designed on the basis of different practices, such as profession, family life and leisure, with their constitutive rules. in the process of achieving the goal, the person needs to design and re-design the life plan either in relation to the goal through the reinterpreting process or in relation to the practices through the process in which practices are included and excluded on the basis of their suitability for the interpreted goal, their realizability and their contribution to the achievement. this is the dynamics, in which the person attests to his/her goal by anchoring this ‘ideal life’ to his/her real life. the goal can be generally described with the term, ‘good life,’ implemented within the normative framework that prevents violation. the implementation process as a whole can be characterized as the exercise of the practical wisdom. as said above, the effort to strike the balance within oneself and in relation to living with others has in it some trace of the meaning of justice. with this as the model, it can be portrayed what the state is and what it is doing to remain just. the state, the city or the polis, is where the realization of good life is made possible. the state’s ultimate goal is the will to live together i.e. to have the good life with and for others in the just institutions. not only does it legitimize political power, this will also provide a background against which social or institutional arrangements are designed, especially through politics, to allocate benefits and burdens in the way considered to be just. the distributive structures are analogous to the life plan in that they are the result of the interpretation of the ideal (in this case, of how people should live together) and in the process of being adjusted in their implementation in order to achieve the ideal while accommodating to the reality that ever comprises conflicts due to disagreements about what is just, what should be included as social goods; and what social goods are to be structurally allocated and how. in the effort to become the just state where citizens achieve their good life, the dynamics of political activities that go back and forth between the ideal and the real is governed by sociopolitical norms and requires exercises of practical wisdom to reinterpret the goal, apply and adjust the norms, develop and improve structural arrangements, manage conflicts on the basis of the will to live together, etc. therefore, it can be said that justice characterizes both the end and the means of the state. practices and spheres of justice a consideration on practices, an element in the narrative identity, will throw further light on the nature of political justice. the practices are different from the object of analysis for action theorists in the analytic tradition, the elementary actions such as hand raising and finger flicking. teleologically defined, the practices cover sets of actions recognized as they are by virtue of the constitutive rules embedded in the practical contexts. for instance, different moves are understood as part of chess playing, not because of their own characteristics, but of the meanings conferred upon them by the rules of chess under the defined ‘telos’ of winning the game, which in turn figures in the larger practice of leisure. similar actions are thus differently understood in different practical contexts. ball handling, for example, is how players should do in the game of rugby; on the contrary, it is how players should avoid in soccer. apart from their goals, the practices give normative standards that are used, not only in directing, but also in evaluating how well actions under their umbrella are performed. social goods, the target of structural allocation, are similar to the actions subordinate to the practices since they too are defined by constitutive rules in different ‘spheres of justice,’ the concept that ricoeur adopts from michael walzer. with their own internal logic of justification, the spheres are irreducibly multiple. examples are commerce, education, family, and politics. the point is that the plurality must be recognized so that each sphere is not dominated by some of the others. in this age of consumerism, we have obvious instances of the interference by the commercial sphere into the others such as ‘marketable programs’ in education, and ‘merits packages’ in religion. the intrusion of justifying logic is deemed to be ‘symbolic violence’ for it acts upon and distorts the meaning of the good in the dominated sphere. therefore, the cry, ‘unfair!’, can also be heard when justifying logic from one sphere is dominating the logic in other spheres. it is the politics that is responsible for keeping these spheres differentiated. however, since the politics is not only one among these spheres but also includes their notions of the good in its task of distributing benefits and burdens, this task of differentiation gives rise to what ricoeur calls, ‘political paradox.’ we cannot go deeper into its details here but this contributes to a further understanding of justice in connection to the exercise of political power i.e. the politics’ responsibility in preserving the just distance among spheres of the good while imposing limits on itself, the kind of responsibility that clearly requires practical wisdom. the judge and dialogical constitution the figure of dialogical constitution with triangular link between the first, the second and the third persons can also be applied to elaborate the concept of justice in the judicial field. embedded in the civil society, the judicial process is essentially to transform physical into verbal violence thanks for its provision for conflicting parties to be engaged in confrontation by arguments instead of force. in other words, it is to prevent what ricoeur calls, "simulation of justice," in which a party filled with indignation seeks justice for himself/herself by means of revenge. even though the cry, "unfair!" is important not only for the understanding about but also the pursuit of justice, it can lead to injustice when left unchecked. that is because the inflicted party may then employs a violent means and thereby makes the other party give more than his or her due. the conflicting parties are equivalent to the interlocutors, the first and the second persons in a conversational situation who have interpersonal contact while the judge occupies the place of the third person. however, it is complicated here. although sharing the sense of 'neutrality,' the judge is not just 'anyone,' the faceless other, in the institutional context, but analogous to that context itself. one characteristic of the institution, e.g. linguistic, is its provision of resource equally available for all. with authority drawn in the final analysis from the will to live together, the judge is to make sure this equality in different institutions is obtained. in maintaining the 'equality,' the judge not only has an obligation to ensure the deserved distribution of the good necessary in the quest for good life, but also restore reciprocity between conflicting parties by first giving them equal opportunity to speak for themselves. by doing so, the judge establishes a just distance between the two parties. the permission for each to speak for him/herself signifies the term, 'due' (in 'to give each his/her due') on yet a deeper plane. that is, it is to confirm the recognition of them as the subject in the sense defined with narrative identity, the expressed power to choose and realize one's goal, share with and respond to the other, and attest to one's self-in other words, as the human. the victim's status as the subject is reinstated when his or her voice, which was ignored in the time of violation, is now heard by all, including the criminal. such status of the criminal is also recognized especially as the author of action, the basis of self-esteem and self-respect. whenever the criminal so recognizes him/herself, the capability for self-esteem and self-respect is thereby restored. and this should comprise the ultimate correctional goal. conclusion and recommendations it is clear from the above that, according to ricoeur, the form of the just can be superimposed on the ontological-existential structure, i.e. narrative identity. therefore, we can say, to the question, “why be just?”, it can be replied, “because we are just.” from this, a question follows, “if so, why can we be unjust?” the answer is, “we are perverted by evil.” as a result, the just is always prone to the unjust. this lays bare ricoeur’s theological presuppositions, e.g. about the creation and the fall, although he wants to keep them apart from his philosophy. it is thus recommended that a further study be conducted to inquire into the significance of the concept of evil in ricoeur’s conception of justice. ricoeur’s philosophy of justice interrelated with his philosophical anthropology is too comprehensive, profound and complicated to capture in a single paper or research. a bunch of analytical details, applicative elaborations and significant implications is inevitably left out. however, it is believed that, in this paper, a general orientation, or a map, is given as to how ricoeur’s ontological-existential framework should be adopted in the approach to his analysis of the just and its instantiated forms, political and juridical. references abel, o. and porée, j. 2007. le vocabulaire de paul ricoeur. paris: ellipses. anderson, p. s. 1994. “agnosticism and attestation: an aporia concerning the other in ricoeur's oneself as another.” journal of religion 74, pp. 65-76. mongin, o. 1998. paul ricoeur. paris: edition du seuil. reagan, c. e. 1996. philosophical essay: personal identity. paul ricoeur: his life and his work. chicago: university of chicago press, pp. 73-99. ricoeur, p. 1992. oneself as another. kathleen blamey (trans.). chicago: university of chicago press. ---------. 2000. the just. david pellauer (trans.). chicago: university of chicago press. ---------. 2005. le juste, la justice et son echec. paris: l'herne. venema, h.i. 2002. “oneself as another; another as oneself.” literature & theology, 16 (4): 410-426. wall, j. 2001. “the economy of the gift: paul ricoeur’s significance for theological ethics.” journal of religious ethics 29 (2): 235-260. ---------. 2003. “phronesis, poetics, and moral creativity.” ethical theory and moral practice: 317-341. ---------. 2002. “moral meaning: beyond the good and the right.” in john wall, william schweiker and w. david hall. (eds.). paul ricoeur and contemporary moral thought. london: routledge, pp. 47-63. 10(134-138)note for authors the history and mystery of diogenes laertius paul swift bryant university, usa abstract “the history and mystery of diogenes laertius” examines the peculiar status of the lives of the eminent philosophers. as literature, philosophy, and history, the lives is a unique text, since it furnishes us with the only surviving attempt to construct an encyclopedia of philosophy from the ancient western world. this essay examines some of the influence this text has had on the history of philosophy, especially nietzsche’s interpretation of philosophy. there are parts of the lives which are widely regarded as accurate by specialists in philosophy (such as the letter to menoeceus by epicurus), but there are also parts of the text which are historically unreliable and inaccurate. diogenes veers from history into fiction at times and this essay addresses some of the difficulties involved in determining precisely where these transitions occur. even when using the best scholarly methods, it is not always possible to know which parts of the lives are trustworthy: thus there is a mystery, a legend which diogenes preserves at the dawn of western philosophy. the lives of the eminent philosophers by diogenes laertius survives from antiquity as the oldest attempt to offer a comprehensive history of western philosophy.1 little is known about who diogenes laertius actually was, but he preserved details of the lives and doctrines of philosophers from the 7th century bce through the third century ce. diogenes considers several accounts of philosophy as originating in egypt, india, and persia, but makes a point of insisting that philosophy begins with the greeks.2 all quests for the origins of western philosophy in the ancient world must deal with this surprisingly neglected text, the peculiar odyssey 38 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 38-50 © 2000 by assumption university press of diogenes’ lives. when i was giving a paper in new york city some years ago at a philosophy conference, a friend of mine referred to the lives as the national enquirer of the ancient world. some of this vast collection of philosophy, poetry, anecdotes, and humor from the lives is indeed unreliable as an historical source for philosophers from antiquity and bears a superficial resemblance to a supermarket tabloid.3 however, some of the lives is widely accepted as authentic and the text often provides us with the best we have to go on from the earliest ionian and italian philosophers. all modern accounts of plato’s life are virtually identical to the history which diogenes laertius preserves.4 however, not everything that diogenes writes about plato is accepted as truth, or even likely for that matter. i am especially interested in trying to figure out where diogenes laertius lapses from history into fiction, a real problem that persists at the dawn of philosophy in the old west. where and when may we safely assume that diogenes is offering history, rather than reports of rumors and heresay?5 where does his collection veer from history into fiction? although diogenes gets some details wrong from primary texts which still survive, he also gets many details correct, and there still is a kind of rigor in how he has assembled and edited the contents of the lives.6 diogenes laertius furnishes us with the only virtual encyclopedia of philosophy which has survived from the ancient world, even though figures such as seneca, lucretius, and cicero are not mentioned. it is a unique text in the history of philosophy and here i hope to open discussion about several ambiguities and problems which diogenes laertius presents. i will address a few of things he writes about plato and his influence on nietzsche, but a few comments are in order about the peculiar status and role this work occupies in western philosophy. it is virtually certain that diogenes laertius assembled the lives from multiple sourcebooks, as well as from primary texts from the history of philosophy and literature.7 he is neither consistent nor reliable in some of his reports, since some of the details he cites obviously contain errors.8 some of the errors found in diogenes laertius were probably introduced by copyists in the precarious transmission of the text from antiquity, but some errors are undoubtedly due to the compiler, diogenes himself. among paul swift 39 other errors, he repeats himself at times, contradicts himself, and attributes the same anecdotes to different philosophers. nonetheless, diogenes does purport to be trying to deliver an accurate account of the histories passed down to him, taking painstaking details about titles of philosophical works, philosophic doctrines, causes of philosophers’ deaths, and other details. in 1929, long claimed that none of the surviving oldest versions of diogenes laertius went back prior to the 12th century. long claims that there were four versions of the lives from the 12th or 13th century still in existence at that time, and there was very likely a common predecessor text from which these versions were derived from the ninth century. he points out that a latin opening was added to the lives by a monk sometime before 1432. diogenes laertius’ text arrives in the modern world via a precarious lineage of copyists. the surviving collection from diogenes laertius provides a history of about nine centuries, offering a chapter for each of the 82 different philosophers on whom he focuses. it is virtually certain that a substantial portion of book vii has been lost. thus the lives of the eminent philosophers at one time was larger than it is now, as there are indices which have survived, indicating that there were at least twenty other additional chapters devoted to stoic philosophers which have been irretrievably lost. someone once compared diogenes laertius to an enormous jigsaw puzzle with many missing pieces—and the missing pieces of this enormous puzzle are replaced with pieces from dozens of other puzzles—a nightmare for anyone who tries to make the mix of shapes fit together seamlessly. such an analogy still does not do justice to the difficulty of making historical sense of diogenes laertius, since there are special problems involved with some of the sources which he incorporates: to what degree are the primary texts he uses reliable? some of his compilation clearly seems to be reliable, since he quotes primary texts at times of works that still survive, such as plato’s, and he also preserves the letter to menoeceus from epicurus which is accepted as authentic today by virtually all historians of ancient philosophy. however, he also passes down letters which are widely regarded as forgeries, such as pherecydes to thales 1.121. yet diogenes laertius still suggests that he is trying to preserve a “straight” account of the details concerning the history of philosophy throughout most of the lives. none40 prajñâ vihâra theless, his work may poetically embellish some elements from the history of philosophy at times and i believe that this is part of the reason why neither philosophers nor historians pay much attention to this text today. diogenes laertius attempts to eulogize the philosophers at times. at various junctures in the text he conveys the idea that philosophy betokens a special type of greatness. he wants to tell an interesting story about philosophy, one that invites the listener to imagine what the great philosophers were like as persons within circumstances in real life. sometimes story-tellers play with the facts, and the degree to which this happens within the lives still remains a mystery. i suspect that part of the reason that less attention is paid to diogenes laertius today than was the case in prior centuries has to do with the way philosophy is done today. in some quarters, interest in the history of philosophy is viewed as far removed from the cutting edge of philosophy. a former colleague of mine remarked that the history of philosophy really starts with hume, suggesting that philosophy before hume is something like witchcraft. if not witchcraft, pre-humean philosophers could still be conceived as quaintly obsolete for the philosophers of the 21st century. after all, what can medieval or ancient thinkers offer for the quest of rigor in contemporary philosophy of science? little or nothing—but is that what philosophy is all about? alternatively, some philosophers who are sympathetic to currents in post-modernist thinking run the risk of making philosophy overly literary—to conceive the discourse of the sciences as one competing narrative or story about the world. it is just not intellectually defensible to have groundless deep skepticism about the real progress the sciences have made in the last few centuries for predicting how events unfold. in the last few centuries there has been an increasing importance for philosophers to be well informed about developments in the sciences. if philosophy is a quest to understand what the nature of reality is, it is imperative to recognize that human beings really do know more today than they did in prior epochs. some contemporary philosophers recognize this and infer that there is no pressing need to sort out the problems of ancient philosophy. however, prior generations of philosophers seem to be more receptive to such questions, as virtually every major philosopher of the modern epoch (between gassendi and nietzsche) had an acquaintance paul swift 41 with diogenes laertius.9 how much time is a professional philosopher willing to devote to digging through the history of ancient philosophy, when technologies constantly emerge which produce and make new types of knowledge possible? one could argue that the value of assimilating developments in new sciences is inversely proportionate to the need to immerse oneself in the ancient histories of philosophy. what value does the history of philosophy have for understanding the present world? the answer to this question depends in part on what one intends to get out of philosophy. diogenes laertius is a story-teller and he depicts the details of the lives of the philosophers (not just their philosophic doctrines or positions and lists of books), as well as details about tyrants, cryptic ramblings, and poetry. he seems to have an interest in relating bizarre and unusual details, since such details often make for good stories. many of his anecdotes are intended not only to inform, but to entertain. he does not want to bore anyone who is curious about philosophy, so he relates funny anecdotes at times, often to display a type of wit which philosophers exercised. the degree to which he takes poetic license to tell the history of philosophers renders his text mysterious at times: is it history or fiction? i suspect he offers a creative synthesis at times. many of details which diogenes relates are frequently regarded as philosophically trivial. he is not only interested in the doctrines various philosophers put forward, but spends considerable effort relating the personal characteristics of philosophers, such as how they dressed, what they liked to eat, how they exercised, their favorite pastimes, whether they drank alcohol, and what they said about or did for friendship, marriage, and sex. his text is hard to characterize, since parts of it are profound, goofy, and even pornographic. he actually quotes songs by some of the earliest thinkers (chilon, pittacus, bias, cleobulus), some of which he claimed were still sung during his own time. i am especially interested in the early connection of the eminent philosophers to music, and i believe this dimension also captured nietzsche’s attention. the idea of a music-playing socrates was important for nietzsche’s birth of tragedy: is it possible today for philosophers to use music as a medium to help spread their ideas? diogenes laertius was especially important for friedrich nietzsche, 42 prajñâ vihâra as one of nietzsche’s dissertation projects was under ritschl—one which investigated the sources of diogenes laertius. nietzsche’s earliest published articles appeared in ritschl’s journal, rheinische museum. diogenes laertius is the figure who marks nietzsche’s transition from purely philological interests into the realm of philosophy.10 in nietzsche’s personal library there are still two copies of the lives of the eminent philosophers that survive today. for the most part they are free from marginalia, but the chapter on democritus in one of nietzsche’s editions has little marks under virtually every word.11 diogenes laertius clearly exerts a significant influence on nietzsche’s philosophic reflection, as nietzsche employs the stories of socrates directing euripides’ plays (dl ii 18) as the basis for his central thesis of the birth of tragedy. nietzsche exploits these rumors to suggest that tragedy dies when socrates (the hypertheoretical moralist) hijacks the poetic imagination by making tragedy subservient to dialectical interests—making art subservient to morality. one of the rumors involving plato and burning texts in diogenes is that socrates takes plato in as a student only after plato tosses his tragic writings into the fire. it is worth noticing that diogenes attributes the same anecdote to metrocles, “come hither firegod” (dl vi 95), later in the text. it is likely that the sheer amount of sources which diogenes tried to coordinate led to organizational difficulties where he accidentally repeated himself at times. some of the repetition and inconsistency can be explained by the way in which diogenes must have worked, since he assembled large quantities of papyrus scrolls from different authors and different collections from the history of philosophy and literature. the sheer amount of sources from which he seems to draw must have been nearly unmanageable, or at least very difficult to organize for his compilation. mejer argues that prior generations of scholars who have suggested that diogenes is dishonest lack sufficient evidence to draw such a conclusion. mejer is probably correct to suggest that diogenes did not understand everything he read—but mejer also maintains that diogenes attempts to pass the histories of philosophy down as he has received them. he thus holds that diognenes is honest and not willfully deceptive. even if there are many parts of the lives which are unreliable, mejer argues that we ought to assume that diogenes was basically honest. paul swift 43 diogenes laertius must have had some training in philosophy, and some have argued that he was an epicurean philosopher. the disproportionate length of text devoted to epicurus and his defense of epicureanism may support this point, but he also expresses a deep respect for both plato and the stoics. diogenes clearly is important as a sourcebook for epicurean philosophy. sorting out the parts of diogenes which are reliable seems to be impossible at times, since some of the early histories which he passes on can not be verified by comparing them to other existing sources. precisely what to make of his chapters on socrates and plato proves to be most difficult. at one point he conveys the idea that he is writing the lives for a young woman who is a platonist and he seems particularly interested in clarifying the historical details about plato. diogenes points out that plato puts words into the mouth of socrates, attributing doctrines to socrates which socrates never held.12 in terms of making sense of the evolution of plato’s writings, such a view is quite consonant with contemporary views, i.e., the early platonic dialogues are more socratic, whereas the middle and later dialogues are frequently viewed as advancing plato’s poetic license. how much does plato make up about socrates? diogenes reports varying accounts of the life of socrates which apparently derive from authors other than plato or xenophon. diogenes offers multiple accounts of the fine that socrates proposes in his defense. diogenes lists 25 drachmae, but then claims that eubulides says he offered 100 (dl ii 41-2). at the minimum it seems safe to acknowledge that plato’s figure of 30 minas in the apology does not square with every account of socrates’ life which diogenes was reading. however, there are roughly seven centuries between socrates death and the likely time when diogenes was writing, so at first glance it seems to make the most sense to assume that plato is giving the more reliable account of the apology. however, to what degree are we entitled to assume this? how much is trustworthy from diogenes? he writes that “euphorion and panaetius relate that the beginning of the republic was found several times revised and rewritten, and the republic itself aristoxenus declares to have been nearly all of it included in the controversies of protagoras” (dl 3.37). there was ample opportunity for forgeries to infiltrate the histories 44 prajñâ vihâra of philosophy in the centuries lying between plato and diogenes laertius, and virtually all philologists believe that diogenes passes some of them off as if they were authentic at times. many philologists believe that this is the case with respect to the claim that plato copied most of the republic from earlier authors. however, diogenes also points out ten different dialogues that were falsely attributed to plato (dl 3.62), so it really seems like diogenes laertius is trying to be careful in preserving the correct titles and doctrines of plato’s work. it seems like diogenes has a will to objectivity and fact checking. which details are reliable from this early treasure mine of philosophy at times is impossible to determine. i would like to mention in closing that it seems very unlikely that diogenes is simply fabricating the history of philosophy, and the copies of the last wills of plato, aristotle, theophrastus, strato, lyco, and epicurus which he preserves reflect a value structure in his composition. diogenes is interested in the details of the lives and deaths of philosophers, and tries to communicate something about who they were as real persons, rather than merely relaying the titles of their works and philosophic positions. this orientation almost certainly influenced nietzsche’s early desire to construct psychological character types in his analysis of the personalities of the greek philosophers. conclusion any attempts to reconstruct the earliest history of western philosophy invariably consult details found in diogenes laertius, but at times it is difficult if not impossible to figure out which parts of the text are reliable. by comparing diogenes to primary texts which still survive, as well as consulting other authors who comment on the history of philosophy such as aristotle, clement of alexandria, cicero, eusebius, pliny, plutarch, porphyry, seneca, stobeus, and others, we may provisionally piece together a view of what the earliest history of western philosophy was like. diogenes laertius may not be entirely satisfying as history, philosophy, or literature, but the lives is still valuable as a peculiar window into the ancient world. the lives of the eminent philosophers by diogenes laertius is a paul swift 45 very peculiar text, like none other in the history of western philosophy. the huge amount of resources in which he finds himself entangled must have been unmanageable at times and contributed to some of the errors he records. however, i want to suggest, like mejer, that for the most part diogenes is probably honest and attempts to preserve the history of western philosophy as it has been passed down to him. moreover, there is a sense of a critical rigor which he exercises, since he does not appear to record just any random details from the history of philosophy. his identification of discrepancies within the tradition as it has been passed down to him, along with his attempt to identify forgeries and remove them from the lists of the genuine works of earlier philosophers indicates that he wants to preserve and contribute to the history of western philosophy. the problem, however, still remains that even when we use all of the best scholarly methods, at times it is still impossible to identify if and when diogenes lapses into fiction. thus his collage of details of the eminent philosophers still offer us a genuine mystery, for no one knows whether some of his stories are true or false, a legend at the dawn of western philosophy.13 endnotes 1 diogenes laertius comes after sextus empiricus (sextus empiricus is mentioned in the chapter on timon, ix 116), but the dates of sextus are also uncertain. dl probably lived in the early 3rd century, so there were quite a few centuries between the time he assembled his compilation and the active periods of the earliest greek philosophers. 2 diogenes laertius claims that the human race also begins with the greeks (!) and the very name “philosophy” refuses to be translated into foreign speech (dl i.4). 3 long points out that “richard hope has counted 1,186 explicit references to 365 books by about 250 authors, as well as more than 350 anonymous references.” introduction to the lives of the eminent philosophers. loeb, harvard university press: cambridge. xix. 4 plato almost never writes about himself, except a brief mention of himself in the apology and phaedo. in the seventh letter, plato does relate details of his travel to sicily and his interaction with dionysus ii, but some scholars regard this letter as inauthentic. 5 sometimes it is easy to recognize that what he is writing cannot possibly be true: he relates accounts of epimenides’ life as if he is giving a straight history, but he claims that epimenides took a 57 year nap (i.109)! later in the same chapter 46 prajñâ vihâra (1.112) he points out that some authors maintain that epimenides simply went into solitude during his absence. at times the constellation of rumors contradict each other, but do any of them correspond to the historical biographies? diogenes laertius tries to rule out forgeries at times: in the same chapter he writes, “there is extant a letter of his to solon the law-giver, containing a scheme of government which minos drew up for the cretans. but demetrius of magnesia, in his work on poets and writers of the same name, endeavors to discredit the letter on the ground that it is late and not written in the cretan dialect but in attic, and new attic too. however, i have found another letter by him which runs as follows: (here diogenes quotes the long letter by epimenides). 6 a type of rigor is evidenced by diogenes laertius when he calls attention to various discrepancies in the histories of philosophy with which he was working. consider his comments about anaxagoras: “of the trial of anaxagoras different accounts are given. sotion in his succession of the philosophers says that he was indicted by cleon on a charge of impiety, because he declared the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal & that his pupil pericles defended him, and he was fined five talents and banished. satyrus in his lives says that the prosecutor was thucydides, the opponent of pericles, and the charge was treasonable correspondence with persia as well as impiety & the sentence of death was passed on anaxagoras by default…hermippus in his lives says that he was confined in prison pending his execution…(and) that pericles came forward and asked the people…to release him. so he was released; but he could not brook the indignity he had suffered and committed suicide (dl ii 12-13). also consider diogenes’ survey of the varying accounts of ariston’s books by panaetius and sosicrates (vii 163) and the account of whether empedocles actually leapt into the fire (viii 70-1). these sections provide examples of a type of critical rigor that is present in diogenes. 7 the reliability of diogenes laertius’ sources is important for assessing diogenes himself, since he uses comic poets as authorities (!) for his philosophic lineages at times. if one were to imagine that 99.999 percent of all written philosophy were destroyed today and a thousand years in the future the only accounts of the history of philosophy would come from the open court series, future people would be forced to use such texts in the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. however, utilizing philosophy and the simpsons, philosophy and the sopranos, and the rest of their series to understand the history of philosophy through the 21st century would be very unsatisfying for professional philosophers, since the open court series is intended to open philosophy to a wider audience that otherwise would not care about philosophy. interesting constructions would emerge, but if they were based essentially on a corpus that had to convey philosophy in general through references to pop culture and sensationalism, there still would be something obviously missing in terms of critical rigor and reliability for professional philosophers. such an analogy still does not capture the difficult complexity of making sense of diogenes’ lives, but does propaul swift 47 vide a sense of what could happen if one were forced to reconstruct the history of philosophy based primarily upon a corpus assembled from “pop philosophy” for dilettante audiences. 8 consider diogenes’ story about anaxagoras commenting about the tomb of mausoleum (dl ii.11), which was a structure created at least 78 years after anaxagoras’s death by mausolus’s widow. such a story can not possibly be true. 9 gassendi published his notes to book x in 1649 on epicurus, the only book of the lives devoted entirely to one thinker. see spinoza’s letter on plato’s plot to incinerate democritus’s texts, a theme that also reverberates through friedrich lange and nietzsche, a legend preserved in diogenes laertius. each of these thinkers addresses this story about plato which comes from the lives of the eminent philosophers: “aristoxenus in his historical notes affirms that plato wished to burn all the writings of democritus that he could collect, but that amyclas and clinias the pythagoreans prevented him, saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for already the books were widely circulated. and there is clear evidence for this is the fact that plato, who mentions almost all the early philosophers, never once alludes to democritus, not even where it would be necessary to controvert him, obviously because he knew that he would have to match himself against the prince of all philosophers, for whom timon has this meed of praise, ‘such is the wise democritus, the guardian of discourse, keenwitted disputant, among the best i ever read’” (dl ix 40). 10 in the nineteenth century multiple philologists proposed the thesis that diogenes copied primarily from one text, rather than assembling from the vast collection of the titles to which he refers. nietzsche advanced this thesis at one time, arguing that diogenes laetius had primarily copied from diocles. 11 check out my becoming nietzsche (lexington books, 2005) for more on nietzsche’s connection to democritus and how it overlaps with nietzsche’s analysis of kant’s critique of judgment. 12 see dl 2.45: “but plato, after mentioning anaxagoras and certain other physicists in the apology, treats for his own part themes which socrates disowned, although he puts everything into the mouth of socrates.” also, dl 3.35: “they say that, on hearing plato read the lysis, socrates exclaimed, ‘by heracles, what a number of lies this young man is telling about me!’ for he has included in the dialogue much that socrates never said.” virtually all modern historians of philosophy believe that the lysis is written about twenty years after socrates’ death, so the report that socrates actually heard plato read the lysis is almost certainly false. references diogenes laertius. lives of the eminent philosophers, translated by r.d. hicks. cambridge: harvard university press, 1995 48 prajñâ vihâra hope, richard. the book of diogenes laertius. new york: 1930. lange, friedrich. geschichte des materialismus und kritik seiner bedeutung in der gegenwart. iserlohn, germany: von j. baedeker, 1866. ———. the history of materialism, translated by ernest thomas. boston: houghton, osgood & co., 1880. mejer, jorgen. diogenes laertius and his hellenistic background. wiesbaden: steiner, 1978. nietzsche, friedrich. brief-wechsel. new york: walter de gruyter, 1975. ———. frühe schriften. stuttgart: beck verlag, 1994. ———. gesammelte werke. munich: musarion verlag, 1922. ———. kritische studienausgabe. new york: de gruyter, 1988. ———. werke. leipzig: kröner verlag, 1912. plato. apology. ————. phaedrus and letters vii and viii, translated by walter hamilton. new york: penguin, 1973. ————. phaedo, translated by grube. indiana: hackett, 1977. porter, james. nietzsche and the philology of the future. stanford: stanford university press, 2000. swift, paul. becoming nietzsche: early reflections on democritus, schopenhauer, and kant. maryland: lexington books, 2005. paul swift 49 11(180-184)_note for authors buddhism and metaphysics: a comparison of chinese and western philosophy he xirong shanghai academy of social sciences, china abstract under the influence of western philosophy, there arose the question of whether buddhism can be considered a philosophy. in trying to address a similar problem in the field of chinese philosophy, some scholars have turned the comparison of the texts of chinese and western philosophy for appreciating the different ways of doing philosophy. if we use this same approach in observing buddhism, it turns out that, as a kind of metaphysics, indian buddhism shares many aspects with chinese philosophy, in terms of origin, its ideas concerning transcendence and practice. this approach also helps to account for the spread of buddhism in china and the absorption of buddhism into chinese philosophy. understanding this process is important for the development of buddhism in the future and the renewing of the notion of philosophy as well. introduction is there a metaphysics in buddhism? is buddhism a kind of philosophy or only a religion? there is still no general agreement concerning these questions. a recent example is a dialogue between jean-françois revel, a french contemporary thinker and an academician, and his son, matthieu richard, who converted to buddhism. their book concludes that: prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 71-85 71 © 2000 by assumption university press people debate endlessly whether buddhism is a religion or a philosophy but the problem has never been settled. in the west, philosophy is a simple branch of knowledge like mathematics or botany. the philosopher is a ‘teacher’, a professor, who teaches a certain theory in his course, but once he returns to his home, he is just like a notary or a dentist, the theory he taught has not affected his behavior or his life one bit. but teachers in the east are spiritual teachers who live according to the theory they taught. and there are groups of students around these teachers who wish to follow in their footsteps. the eastern teacher’s theory is not a merely an intelligent curiosity but it must pass his own practice and only then can it be valuable.1 again as we know, in ancient history there is a process by which buddhism, chinese philosophy and chinese culture melted together. in ancient times there were no doubts about whether buddhism is a philosophy or not, in fact buddhism has become an important part of constitutions in chinese philosophy. however in the modern age, whether buddhism is a philosophy or not has been a debatable focus in academic circles. master tai xu, a famous rabbi in modern china, said: “… people usually didn’t think it was necessary to research whether buddhism is a philosophy or a non-philosophy. but since there have been some people who want to investigate occult things, or want to search for intelligent light from secret and vague minds, or want to look for the riddle of the cosmos, the question of whether buddhist doctrines is philosophy hence was put forward. now the debates are going on in the academic circles, and each keeps its own theory to estimate buddhism. such as ouyang jingwu, a famous monk at home in modern china, took buddhism as nonreligious and non-philosophy; zhang taiyan, a famous philosopher and a monk at home in modern china, then said buddhism is a philosophy; liang shuming, a famous professor in beijing university, also had the same idea with zhang taiyan. who was ever right was the problem.”2 in a conference i attended in india at the end of 1999 on buddhism, some indian scholars also debated whether buddhism is a philosophy. most admitted that buddhism is a kind of philosophy, however, the problem remained whether there are metaphysical aspects to this philosophy. some who affirm there are certain metaphysical aspects in bud72 prajñâ vihâra dhism have different views whether this metaphysics in buddhism is like western metaphysics. the source of this problem is because of the introduction of western culture. under the influence of western philosophy, consciously or unconsciously people took the ideas and framework of western philosophy to contrast to indian philosophy. this happened as well in china. with the introduction of the western notion of philosophy the question of the legitimacy of “chinese philosophy” arose. to make this problem clear, first we need to know what is metaphysics, since metaphysics is the core measure of what can be considered philosophy. what is metaphysics? 1. metaphysics is the core of philosophy. in the west, it comes from a book written by aristotle named metaphysics, meaning after physics. according to aristotle, while physics studies the movements of entities which we can apprehend, metaphysics then studies things beyond our senses such as the distinction between matter and form, actual and potential, being itself, as well as supernatural things such as absolute beings, the first mover etc. because the main object metaphysics studied is the most basic thing so it is “the first philosophy”. thus meditations on first philosophy written by descartes was also named meditations on metaphysics. aristotle once divided mankind’s knowledge into three parts, using the analogy of a tree: the first part, which is the most basal part, is the roots, metaphysics. it is the foundation of all knowledge. the second part is physics, which is like the tree trunk. and the third part are the remaining natural sciences which are analogous to the tree branches. so we can say that metaphysics is the core of western philosophy which had held a dominant status for more than two thousand years. though it was “finished” with hegel, it has declined rapidly since then. but its profound influence is still in effect. throughout the 20th century western philosophy fought with metaphysics, but it seems that this war has never been settled because metaphysics is much more than merely a historical movement, it is also an actuality; it deeply influences our mode of thinking and he xirong 73 has cultural implications as well as implications for everyday human life. 2. metaphysics pursues universal knowledge. aristotle considered that philosophy should be “the superlative degree of universal knowledge”. he said “erudite character must belong to the persons who have the highest universal knowledge; if a thing can not be known, it is not universal. and that the most universal is the most difficult to know since this knowledge is the farthest from the senses.”3 metaphysics is the result of pursuing this universal knowledge. 3. metaphysics transcends the empirical. following from the above, since metaphysics pursues universal knowledge, then this knowledge is surely not empirical. kant said, “first, as concerns the sources of metaphysical knowledge, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. it must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, namely, knowledge lying beyond experience. it can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. it is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason.”4 namely, the study of metaphysics does not deal with changing things as does physics or natural sciences, but it has to do with something immovable and unchanging, and beyond empirical experiences. 4. are there other types of metaphysics? we have described traditional western metaphysics but one can ask if there can be other types of metaphysics. in china, when we think of metaphysics, we will naturally think of dao (tao) since we translated metaphysics from the appended remarks of the book of changes, which was written more than two thousand ago. this remark states: “what exists before physical form is called dao, what exists after physical form is called qi (a concrete thing).”5 the meaning is that, dao is the same as metaphysics which has no forms and is impalpable; qi (concrete thing) has its form and is apprehendable. namely, the dao is metaphysics. the doctrine of dao is rich and 74 prajñâ vihâra deep, which is prominent no matter whether in the aspect of loving wisdom or in the aspect of inclusion. the treatise of the dao is the quintessence of chinese learning, as well as main basis for chinese philosophy as a philosophy. so, pursuing the state of beyond form was the emphases of chinese traditional philosophy. it emphasized the method through which the human being makes contact with outside things. it’s an uplifted route for moving from qi (the concrete) to what has no physical form or dao. it described human being’s transcendental activities and pursuits. the significance of this transcendental pursuits is that people expect to get the experience of gaining dao on this uplifted route. the history of chinese philosophy is the history of the living pursuit of the dao. so, chinese philosophy is not only a theory but also a practice. theory is to describe, to inspect, and to guide practice. the aim of philosophy does not rest only on knowledge of the exhibiting natural processes of the world, but take oneself into it, and to awaken to the fact that oneself is exhibited from nature. in ancient chinese philosophy, there were discussions about human nature and relationship between nature and man. to achieve dao would be to return to an original experience where nature and man were united as one, so wisdom is also cultivation, where people adjust their state of existence so as to achieve wisdom. the core of confucian doctrine was “benevolence”, it also stressed pursuing dao in the social life. we can gather from various descriptions, that to achieve the socalled dao is to reach a self-conscious existent state. sages are those who attained this state of dao from each different living realm. one of the main characteristics of the western metaphysics is transcendence; the transcending of the empirical. though there is no word “transcendence” in the chinese philosophical texts, we can say when people pursue dao, he (she) needs to change his (her) own living state, which is truly a process of transcendence. what chinese traditional philosophy emphasized was the activities of transcendence, while the objects of transcendence were the focus of western philosophy. it seems that these two kinds of transcendence are unrelated to each other, but in fact they are internal and external expressions of the same thing. this exploration shows a common concern for chinese and western philosophy. western traditional metaphysics is the theory of the structures that transcend time he xirong 75 and space as well as experience. as a kind of theory, it transcends the sensitive realm and is accessible to conceptual thought alone. chinese “metaphysics” (exists before physical form) was also transcendence, but this transcendence refers to the human being's own state, namely human experience as a process that allows transformation of oneself from the state in contact with qi (the concrete) to dao (the ideal state). in a word, while western metaphysics limits itself to the properties of theories and learning, the “metaphysics” (exists before physical form) in chinese philosophy was directed to transforming oneself to correspond with the dao, which was not limited by thought but needed to be experienced by personal practice. therefore we can not say that chinese “metaphysics” is not metaphysics or not philosophy. paying attention to practice and experience also is a characteristic of buddhist metaphysics and philosophy. there is no metaphysics in its western form in buddhism 1. buddhism denies a so-called first cause of creation. the original doctrine of buddhism pointed out that all things in the world are produced by predestined relationships (karma); it would not be in existence if the karma and the conditions were not present. therefore, buddha took the theory of arising from conditional causation to explain how the cosmos and mankind’s birth and death are continuously recurrent. he didn’t believe that there is a creator who creates the world and is sovereign. the buddha had told his disciples not to debate on various issues of metaphysics; he also claimed that “people should not speak concerning the things that could not be known.” “the idea of the creator is only a supposition which can’t be proved by logic, so we should pay no attention to it.”6 buddha was the first person who advanced the ideas of the four dogmas (suffering, aggregation, extinction, way) and the twelve nidanas (ignorance, action, consciousness, name and form, the six sense organs, feeling, desire, grasping, have, birth, old and death). then he found out the cause of suffering consists in people’s ignorance concerning the impermanence of all things and that they have no individual independent existence. only by understanding this can one be released. this means 76 prajñâ vihâra that one should search for the truth concerning life, merely in life, and not outside of it. in addtion to this search for the truth in life, buddhism still claims to search from one’s inner mind. yoga is an example. the method of yoga involves special practices, for instance, to sit upright like the statue of buddha and concentrate on the navel and nose. yet actually, the philosophy of yoga extends beyond these methods. it claims to train the intellect properly in order to reach a higher conscious level. “the whole preachings of the buddha did not give any authority to religion, or to god, or the authority of another world. he required people to search for the truth from within ones own mind.”7 2. the philosophy of buddhism is not transcendental but empirical. even the theory of “sunya” is not emptiness or nothingness, in fact it is on the contrary for nothingness. it is “widespread possibility” including cosmos, the whole existence, movement and conciousness. if the ultimate foundation were not sunya, all explicit manifestations would not be produced. so it said in the sutras that because of sunya, everything can exist. namely, sunya itself has all possibities and these may be interdependent. it is to say that sunya is a transcendent material world on the one hand, because it trascends all concepts about existence and nonexistence, appearance and termination, movement and immobility, unity and multiplicity etc., and on the other hand, the realized sunya is not through analysis of thought, but by people’s practice since sunya exists in all things. “metaphysics developed in the philosophy of buddhism, however the method it took was on psychological comprehension as a basis.”8 “it (buddhism) emphasizes that ethics relation has its affirmative values in our limited world. therefore we should stand by the ethical and good life in our living world and in relationship of mankind. we can and should apply our reason, knowledge and experience to this living phenomenal world. as for infinity (or whatever name it might be called in future), it transcends the land of the living, and our reason, knowledge and experience cannot be applied.”9 3. buddhism identified concrete problems and solved these problems with concrete methods. buddha taught his disciples in accorhe xirong 77 dance with their aptitude and conditions. he was a teacher who strove for practical efficiency, and he was full of mercy and wisdom. he answered questions for the purpose of helping the questioners to follow the wise and conscious road. according to the buddha, there are four approaches to answering questions: 1) when questions are more direct, obvious, and avoided metaphysics, these questions must be replied to simply and directly, such as: what is the cause of suffering? 2) some questions must be solved in analytical way, for example, whether buddhism is mentalism or materialism. 3) there are other questions that must be replied to by the way of a rhetorical question. 4) there are some questions that must be responded to by silence, for example, when someone asks buddha about the questions concerning metaphysics. the metaphysical relation between buddhist philosophy and chinese philosophy because both buddhism and chinese philosophy belong to oriental wisdom, they have similarities, so when buddhism was introduced into china it was easily accommodated by chinese philosophy. liang qichao, a famous thinker in modern china, said that buddhism is different from western christianity in that it has two sides: philosophy and religion. knowing dao (or buddha) is by consciousness, and the method of entering dao is by wisdom, the way of cultivating oneself according to oneself. he said that early chinese philosophy was concerned more with human life and matters of country, but rarely reflected upon the principles concerning everything on heaven and earth.10 there was not so much consciousness of religion in chinese thought. therefore, buddhist doctrine was readily accepted by the chinese because it provided theories (a philosophy and a metaphysics), to complement chinese reflection on lived experience. the “metaphysics” (exists before physical form) in chinese philosophy is the path through which people achieve wisdom, and is a process through which people transcend visible things. only by transcending visible things, can people understand the process by which things change, 78 prajñâ vihâra and can unite oneself with things in their unity. here chinese philosophy pays more attention to the situation of oneself. it’s interesting that not only chinese confucianism and daoism understood the dao as the highest aim, but buddhism, as a foreign culture, after it entered into china, also took the concept of dao. for example, one sees the translation of “nirvana” as “dao”, “bodhimanda” as “dao chang” (the place of becoming buddha), “buddhist” as “dao shi” (the person of dao), etc. some themes in buddhism were harmonious with chinese philosophy, but its argumentations were stricter and more exquisite. yet it could still be absorbed by chinese philosophy. 1. the buddhist theory concerning conditional causation was in accordance with the traditional chinese theories about relationship. buddhism claimed that “all things are living from conditional causation”. “all things” means material phenomenon and spirit phenomenon in the experimental world. it is what we call thought and existence, more generally, it means all opposite and relative categories. “conditional causation” pointed to the conditions or factors outside and inside of opposing categories. their existences depend on their opposite. otherwise, it disappears with another.11 sakyamuni realized the objective laws of all things lived and died, and knew the inevitable process of all things from producing to perishing. among the things, they are mutual connection, mutual as conditions, mutual dependence, mutual as cause and effect. this theory was similar to chinese traditional theory about relative network which stressed on “the substance and usage are from one source, and apparent and dim are without interval”; “there is a yang in a yin, and there is a yin in a yang”. (yin and yang, in chinese philosophy, medicine, etc., yin, the feminine or negative principle in nature; yang, the masculine or positive principle in nature.) it meant that in this experimental world, every thing, no matter what its physical or spiritual essence, are all limited in a relative network of relationships. its production, existence, change, and death can never escape this relative network. 2. the object of buddhist devotion is not an external god but various bodhisattvas reflecting mankind itself, which blended he xirong 79 with the attitude of self-reflection in traditional chinese thought. buddhism stresses a mind independent of externals, pure thought, capable of enlightenment from within. sakyamuni said “all buddhist lords of the world come out all from the world not from heaven” (ekottaraagama). it means that the buddha is the wisdom or omniscience in the world but not in the heaven. there are deities, god, brahma, souls and their emissaries in the heaven. buddha is a man, not a god. therefore, buddhism stresses wisdom or omniscience in the world. by this token, buddhist transcendence was similar to chinese traditional philosophy. someone once said that buddhist doctrine was anti-life. but in fact, the buddhist doctrine about releasing oneself from the bonds of birth-and-deaths (nirvana) is not so much a perishing of life, but a purification and transformation from one’s contaminated life (of desire, or sexual passion), towards a life of correct knowledge and no defect. the chinese traditional view as well, especially confucianism, paid attention to the self, and the wholeness process beginning from oneself and extending back to oneself. looking at the world, the chinese were not devoted to purely objective insights and didn’t think that the world exists out from oneself or opposite to oneself. on the contrary, one maintains an attitude that harmonizes things with oneself. daoism also took this attitude. so it held that the universe and i exist together, and all things and i are one. therefore, chinese philosophy emphasized self-examination and inner-transcendence, in order to become a sage and a worthy person. the buddhist theory of becoming buddha and chinese theory of becoming-sage are similar. 3. the view of impermanence in buddhism was similar to chinese view of change. impermanence means that all things are subject to birth, existence, change, and death, never resting for a moment. namely, all things are restricted by the conditions of space and time and are in a state of flux. birth and death, beginning and end are continuous. chinese philosophy also stressed the significance of change, it regarded change as an inborn precondition of the cosmos. since the book of changes first stated, “the great characteristic of heaven and earth is to produce”, “birth and rebirth is what is meant by change”,12 chinese philosophy has always stressed universal becoming and daily renewal. “birth 80 prajñâ vihâra and rebirth” means “change” to produce, “change” is contrasted to permanence. it is just like the chinese idiom that expresses “get rid of the stale and brings forth the fresh”. so buddhist view of impermanence has some inner relation to chinese traditional philosophy although their argumentative method and aims are different. 4. the buddhist view of the meditation on the mean (madhyamapratipad) was similar to chinese view of the doctrine of mean. the purpose of meditation on the mean was for understanding universal reality. nagarjuna advanced a philosophy on immateriality (empty; sunya), but this immateriality was not empty, void, or non-existent. in fact, nagarjuna was not only to reject the view of permanence but also to reject the view of nihilism. he therefore put forward a new perspective that moved away from debate on affirmation and negation, being and non-being etc. he called it “meditation on the mean.” the dialectical factors of this theory were introduced to chinese thought. although the chinese people never directly heard the contents of buddhist teaching, they nevertheless identified with this approach which abandoned all extremes. in traditional chinese philosophy, whether lao tze’s dialectics or the confucian way of the mean, all placed stress on the unbiased and the non-extreme. what the chinese absorbed from buddhism involved a deeper philosophic and theoretical search than mere religious belief. therefore in china, there was no serious dispute between hinayana and mahayana. hinayana and mahayana were introduced into china at almost same time. the chinese were more able to appreciate mahayana buddhism, because it stressed the person’s consciousness on the one hand, and advocated a deliverance of all beings on the other. the buddha spirit that releases oneself in order to save humankind has some similarity to ideas concerning the meaning of life and the social experience in chinese philosophy. 5. moreover, the buddhist views concerning negativity were echoed in the philosophy of lao zi and zhuang zi in china. the meaning of negativity was an object of reflection in ancient india. the upanishads emphasized the unity of brahman and atman (ego), visible he xirong 81 with invisible, knower and unknowable. but brahman and atman here were understood as permanent, unchangeable, and real things. buddhism inherited some of the ancient indian wisdom of the upanishads and the vedas. but buddhism didn’t accept the view concerning atman as a reality, on the contrary, it claimed anatman (no ego). namely, there is no permanent individuality, all things are impermanent, which became one of the fundamentals of buddhist thought. these buddhist views negated being, existence and reality. it is nagarjuna who developed the meaning of these views and established the theory of sunya (emptiness). in ancient china there was the theory about the dao (tao), lao zi said in dao-de ching “the dao that can be told of is not the eternal dao; the name that can be named is not the eternal name. the nameless is the origin of heaven and earth; the name is the mother of all things.”13 he also said, “all things in the word come from being, all being comes from non-being.”14 obviously, in lao zi’s view, the dao, as the fundamental principle, cannot be named, and can not be known, yet it includes everything, and is in everything simultaneously. furthermore, zhuang zi developed lao zi’s theory to its extreme. he said, “there was a beginning. there was a time before that beginning. and there was a time before the time which was before that beginning. there was being. there was nonbeing. there was a time before that non-being. and there was a time before the time that was before that non-being. suddenly there is being and there is non-being, but i don’t know what of being and non-being is really being or really non-being. i have just said something. but i don’t know if what i have said really says something or says nothing.”15 here, zhuang zi expressed a view which it asks us to negate completely in order to attain the ultimate end and true realization. and this ultimate end transcended completely such concepts as beginning and end, existence and non-existence, being and non-being, etc. in zhuang zi’s view, both being and non-being are from the dao and they are two aspects of dao which can not be named. he put forward “free and unfettered” as an ideal life on he basis of the dao. lao zi and zhuang zi’s philosophy of “non-being” was formally similar to the buddhist philosophy of sunya (emptiness), and for this reason buddhist philosophy found a bosom friend in taoist theory at the very beginning and this opened a door for buddhism to enter into china. 82 prajñâ vihâra according to the definition of kant, metaphysics is the field that transcends experience. and it is the philosophical universal principle that expresses with logical concept in abstract speculation.16 but buddhism even in the deepest state, namely in nirvana, involves experience. however it’s not everyone that can experience such states. only by cultivating oneself strictly can one have a possibility to attain it. the cultivation is a transcendent process from daily state to nirvana state. but it does not transcend out of the experience, the result of transcendence is still experience. and one can only experience it personally but can’t communicate it. so we can say that from this meaning that the highest state the buddhist attains is still a kind of experience. and so we can distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: the western type which transcends outward, even out of experience; and the buddhist type which directs one to inside, towards the pure ego that is a basis of all knowledge. if we strictly follow kant’s definition for metaphysics, then buddhism is neither a metaphysics nor a philosophy. however, if we admit that transcendence in buddhism is also metaphysics and it accords with people’s transcendent spiritual requirements, then kant’s definition for metaphysics should be reconsidered. namely, metaphysics should involve a people’s transcendent activities, and that the direction and type of transcendence can vary. we claim the latter viewpoint, and consider that there is a philosophy, moreover a profound philosophy in buddhism. it has a significant metaphysics although it involves religious practice. but buddhism is not a religion of mere blind reverence, and it never excludes and condemns other doctrines. buddhist philosophy is a kind of wisdom, a philosophy with tolerance as a center. equally, chinese “dao” is an abstract philosophical concept of the highest kind, but dao cannot be considered independently from experience. the “dao and qi are not to be thought apart from each other”, “li (reason) is in qi (matter)”, such directives as “get meaning but forget the images”, show the manner in which for chinese metaphysics, transcendence is experienced in actual society. since there were some similarities in the way transcendence was experienced in indian buddhist philosophy and chinese philosophy, these traditions became easily combined when buddhism entered into ancient china. he xirong 83 western philosophy has deeply influenced the western people’s manners and influenced the development of social life. oriental philosophy has deeply influenced the oriental people’s manners of living as well. western traditional philosophy treated philosophy as a knowledge; its aim was to lead people from the phenomenal world toward an abstract “essential” world. in contemporary west, many scholars have rebelled against the western philosophical tradition. one example is heidegger who condemned traditional philosophy as metaphysics. so he gave up on philosophy and pursued “thinking”. this emphasis on “thinking” gave voice to a new view of philosophy, which is that persons should be released from the abstract essential world and draw them back to an actual living world. buddhism and traditional chinese philosophy also provide a life style that would lead people to transcend the limitations of knowledge and return to a perfection in the world. owing to the fact that many western philosophers have found some disadvantages in western metaphysics and philosophy, surely we oriental philosophers should not strive to adapt to it anymore, but should find the riches of our own tradition and to develop our own philosophy in the contemporary era. endnotes 1le moin et le philosophe, by jean-françois revel and matthieu richard, chinese version, p.113, people publishing house in jiangsu, 2000. 2“whether buddhism is philosophy”, collection of speech by tai xu, buddhism press, 1932. 3aristotle, metaphysics, 982 a9-24, translated by w. d. ross. 4kant, prolegomena to any future metaphysics, a revised translation with an introduction by lewis white beck, by prentice hall, inc. 1977. new jersey, p.13. 5a source book in chinese philosophy, p.267, translated and compiled by wing-tsit chan, by princeton university press, 1973 fourth printing. 6the discovery of india, by jawaharlal nehru, 1951; chinese version, the world knowledge press, 1956, p.208. 7id. p.151. 8id. p.211. 9id. p.213. 10liang qichao, on the general situation of academic thought changes in china, yin bin shi collected works, collection of essays no.7. 11samyuktagama, vol.12. 12the book of changes, appended remarks pt.2. 84 prajñâ vihâra 13dao de jing, chapter 1. 14id. chapter 40. 15“the equality of things”, in zhuang zi, chapter 2. 16kant said “as concerns the sources of metaphysical knowledge, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical”. kant, prolegomena to any future metaphysics, a revised translation with an introduction by lewis white beck, by prentice hall, inc. 1977. new jersey, p.13. references jean-françois revel and matthieu richard. le moin et le philosophe, chinese version, people publishing house in jiangsu, 2000. jawaharlal nehru. the discovery of india, chinese version. the world knowledge press, 1956. ran huayun. from indian buddhism to chinese buddism, the company of dong da, taiwan, china, 1995. kanayalal m. talrelja. philosophy of vedas. royal industrial estate, wadala, bombay, 1982. he xirong 85 article5-1 rationality and understanding others warayuth sriwarakuel assumption university of thailand among contemporary social scientists there are two central questions that have been frequently raised. first, is social inquiry scientific or philosophical? second, is understanding others possible? in attempting to answer the first question, some may say that all kinds of social inquiry are scientific because they are empirical and can be measured by scientific methods or empirical approaches. others may say that social inquiry is philosophical in kind because it deals with human beings and cannot escape from normative approaches. still, others may say that it is both scientific and philosophical in the sense that it can be described in terms of both causal theories and intentionality. still, others may say that social inquiry is neither scientific nor philosophical in the sense that it does not deal with “theoretical rationality.” they may argue that it is phronetic in the sense that it deals with “practical rationality.” however, this first question is not the main concern of this paper. in this paper i will inquire into the second question together with the concept of rationality. i. what rationality means “rationality” seems to be one of the most confusing philosophical concepts. it can mean different things to different people. in order not to get lost, we may study it through the long history of its usage, especially from great philosophers. we may date this back to aristotle who first made a distinction between theoria (theoretical rationality) and phronesis (practical rationality). kant followed this distinction and developed more in his critique of pure reason and critique of practical reason. aristotle, kant, descartes, and other great philosophers considered reason as something “given” to human beings only, not to other kinds of animals. however, even though reason is believed “given” and considered central to the conception of human being, everybody must have resolution and courage to use it in order to reach maturity. kant defines the meaning of prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 123-137 123 © 2000 by assumption university press the enlightenment with the horatian motto, sapere aude, “think for yourself.” as he puts it, enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. this immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. the motto of enlightenment is therefore: sapere aude! have courage to use your own understanding!1 richard rorty (1992) explores various meanings of rationality. first, rationality can mean capability of self-adjustment. rationality of this kind belongs to both man and animal. second, rationality may mean tolerance which is a moral virtue or qualification which can be acquired through practice. rationality of this kind is an ability to live among differences without prejudices. third, rationality may mean special faculty given to man only. rationality of this kind is believed immortal, namely, it remains to exist even though a man dies.2 harold brown (1990) also makes a general survey of various concepts and models of rationality from classical to what he calls “the new model.”3 however, in this paper i will investigate two meanings of rationality: rationality as a potentiality and as a virtue. first, rationality may be considered as a given potentiality to establish certain goals and choose appropriate means to reach them. in this sense, i will follow the model as proposed by davidson and rescher. a rational action is one that stands in a certain relation to the agent’s beliefs and desires, that is, their reasons for acting.4 for instance, if person x has a desire to bring about goal b, and believes that action a is the most effective means to goal b, then the person acts rationally if he/she brings about action a for those reasons. to make it clear, we may illustrate this by the following schema. 1. x has goal b. x acts rationally if 2. x believes that action a leads to goal b effectively. 3. x does action a. 124 prajñâ vihâra according to this model, we can see that rationality is related to beliefs, desires and individual actions. second, rationality may be considered as a moral virtue, namely an aristotelian golden mean between the two extremes, namely scepticism and credulity. an agent will be considered as a person of rationality if and only if, after his or her profound reflection through praxis, it is neither too hard nor too easy for him or her to believe or deny things in question. rationality in this sense i follow the lord buddha in his kalamasutta5 and anthony kenny who paraphrases aristotle’s concept of moral virtue.6 like all other moral virtues as proposed by aristotle, rationality in this sense can be acquired only through practice. like courage, we never call a person courageous if he or she never conducts brave deeds. in summary, the difference between rationality as a potentiality and as a moral virtue is that rationality as a potentiality is “given” or “innate” whereas rationality as a virtue is “acquired” or “learned.” ii. what understanding is understanding is one of the key concepts in human and social sciences. dilthey obviously makes a distinction between natural sciences and human sciences7 (geisteswissenschaften). he well recognizes that kant did a good job on providing a critique of pure reason to demonstrate how natural sciences are possible. thus dilthey aims at providing a critique of historical reason to show how human sciences are possible. in other words, while kant develops epistemology as the foundation of natural sciences, dilthey develops hermeneutics as the foundation of human sciences. epistemology deals with explanation, but hermeneutics deals with understanding. what is understanding? in order to understand understanding, we may compare human sciences with natural ones. natural sciences, on the one hand, try to explain natural events. natural scientists use causal laws and theories in their explanations. thus one main task of natural scientists is to discover scientific laws as hempel put it, to explain the phenomena of the physical world is one of the primary objectives of the natural sciences. indeed, almost all of the scientific investigations… were aimed not at ascertaining warayuth sriwarakuel 125 some particular fact but at achieving some explanatory insight… explanatory accounts of this kind will be called explanations by deductive subsumptions under general laws, or deductivenomological explanations. the laws invoked in a scientific explanation will also be called covering laws for the explanandum phenemenon, and the explanatory arguments will be said to subsume the explanandum under those laws.8 once scientific laws are discovered, they will be used to explain natural happenings. to understand or explain natural events, we do not need to know their history. hempel’s d-n schema is demonstrated as a model of scientific explanation. it may be shown as follows: c 1 , c 2 … c k antecedents (causes) l 1 , l 2 … l r laws ________________ e consequents (effects) since scientific explanations are based on laws, we may say that natural sciences are based on nomologicalism. human sciences, on the other hand, try to understand human actions in their inquiry. it may be asked, “what are human actions?” “are they different from natural events?” “if so, how are they different?” to give answers to these questions, we should turn our interests to our own actions first. when we have a retreat, we usually ask ourselves with these questions: “who are we?” “where are we from?” “where are we now?” “are we satisfied with our present position?” “what have we done?” “what should we do next?” “what are our goals?” “what is our ultimate goal?” and so on. no matter whoever we are, these questions will inevitably lead us to ends and means. let’s say for example, x is a businessman who has a retreat every quarter. his strategy is somewhat under a cycle of “plan, do, check and improve,” and this cycle deals inevitably with ends, means and established time. we can say that x’s actions are always purposive and intentional. x understands his actions in terms of ends and means 126 prajñâ vihâra through time. a question that can be raised here is: are x’s actions natural movements? surely, we will say yes to this question. x’s actions as natural events ,like other natural happenings, may be explained by causal laws or theories which transcend all different cultures and civilizations. but human actions are not only natural events but also intentional happenings. as natural events human actions can be explained by causal laws or theories from kinetic and potential energy to gravity, so in this sense they are based on nomologicalism. as intentional happenings they must be explained in terms of ends and means through history and time; therefore, they are based on historicism. suppose we see two boys standing thirty meters ahead. we see one boy handing a five-dollar note to another. in terms of nomologicalism, we can explain their movements by causal laws, but deductive-nomological explanations are not sufficient for us to understand their behavior. we do not know whether the boy pays his debt or lends his money or gives his money to another for free or something else. we can understand their behavior only through historicism. hence dilthey is right when he wrote, “no doubt the human studies have the advantage over the physical sciences because their subject is not merely an appearance given to the senses, a mere reflection in the mind of some outer reality, but inner reality directly experienced in all its complexity.”9 iii. the possibility of understanding others it is obvious that one never asks whether understanding oneself is possible. we do not doubt or ask ourselves about the possibility of self-consciousness because we can reach this “inner reality” directly. we are the only ones who actually have our own consciousness or mental states. nobody else can ever reach, steal or take away our mental states. as fay put it, “mental phenomena are invisible; they take place ‘inside’ where no one else can go. philosophers have described all of this by saying that each person has privileged access to his or her own mental states and processes.10 we can understand our own deeds with regard to our desires and beliefs. we know our own reasons directly why we do such and such deeds. thus a question to be raised here is not about selfunderstanding but about the possibility of understanding others.(1) is understanding others possible? all sceptics will say no to this question, warayuth sriwarakuel 127 and, therefore, they do not need to answer the next question: (2) how is understanding others possible? but for those who say yes to question (1), they need to give an answer to question (2). it is true that all of our sense experiences and mental states are private or personal. all sensations and feelings belong to the consciousness of each particular person. however, since we are by nature social animals, we need to understand and communicate with others. often we do want to share what we see or feel with others, and often want others to share what they feel or see with us. in other words, as social animals, we want to understand others , and we want others to understand us. how can we share our private mental states with others? in other words, how can we communicate our inner feelings with them? to communicate our private feelings and sensations with others we need to have intersubjective media such as concepts, models, signs, symbols, metaphors, and the like. it is obvious that people who belong to the same community that shares a “language game” under the same “form of life” can understand and communicate with one another through the concepts and models used in their community. as we all know, sometimes misunderstandings can happen, but they can be usually solved. thus it is easy to say yes to question (1) if “others” mean members of the same community. to answer question (2) is also not so difficult if “others” mean people in the same culture or civilization. as human beings or to use heidegger’s term dasein , we are always “thrown” into some certain form of life on earth. we have been formed by socio-cultural beliefs, norms and practices through our own traditions. if x, for instance, was born a thai, he would know what “wai” means, and he would know how to “wai” different people in different ways. thus it is not difficult for x as a thai to understand the behaviors of the thai people in general. it seems difficult, if not impossible, for us to understand and communicate with others or those who live in cultures or civilizations different from our own. the only way to understand others who live in different cultures or civilizations seems to be what quine and davidson called “radical translation” or “radical interpretation.” how is it possible? 128 prajñâ vihâra iv. how is understanding others in different cultures possible? in his book inquiries into truth and interpretation davidson argues that there are no such things as incommensurable human cultures. when we confront the task of translating the language, hitherto unknown, of another culture, we should proceed according to the principle of charity which asserts that: 1. most of the doings and sayings of the people whose language is being translated are rational. 2. most of the beliefs of those people are consistent and true by our standards. 3. their beliefs and desires are largely similar to ours. since human actions express beliefs and desires, to determine the meaning of an act we must determine the relevant beliefs and desires behind it. how can this be done? davidson asserts that only by assuming that other people in different cultures and civilizations are rational like us in the sense that their beliefs and desires are connected in the ways we connect them, and only by assuming that most of their beliefs are true by our own standards. davidson wrote, the methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes agreement should not be conceived as resting on a charitable assumption about human intelligence that might turn out to be false. if we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behavior of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count the creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.11 davidson’s assumptions seem to endorse the thesis of provincialism which holds that “everyone is just like us.” the provincialist thesis is opposite to that of multiculturalism which holds that “everyone is just different from us.” relativists adopt the multiculturalist thesis and deny the provincialist one. thus they will disagree with davidson’s assumptions. cultural relativism typically holds that “(1) norms of rationality differ across cultures; that (2) judgments of the rationality of a given action are relative to the governing norms of the local particular culture; such that (3) two people, depending on their cultural locations, warayuth sriwarakuel 129 might disagree about the rationality of the same action, one judging it to be rational and the other irrational, and both judgments would be equally correct.”12 we can use two main models to support the assumptions of cultural relativism: (1) wittgenstein’s model of language games and forms of life and (2) kuhn’s model of incommensurability. according to the later wittgenstein’s work, we may summarize that: (1) all language games which belong to certain forms of life have a logic of their own; that (2) each form of life has its own criteria and sets its own norms of intelligibility and rationality; and that (3) words have their meaning only in the contexts of these different language games. thus if wittgenstein’s assumptions are correct, namely, if other cultures do have very different cultural norms and criteria, we have to try to understand them in their own terms. according to wittgenstein, it is nonsensical for us to try to impose our categories and criteria on other different cultures.13 it is ridiculous if we try to use basketball rules to judge soccer, and vice versa. therefore, we should keep basketball rules to judge basketball matches, and soccer rules for soccer games. there are no such things as neutral rules which are applicable to all different games. davidson goes too far when he asserts that most beliefs of the people in different cultures are consistent and true by our own standards. in fact, our own standards must be used in our own contexts only. there is no such medicine that can cure all kinds of diseases. this is what kuhn calls “incommensurability.” we may paraphrase kuhn that one culture and another are incommensurate because they are completely non-translatable into one another. however, this also goes too far.14 in fact, davidson’s assumptions are not all wrong. it will be all right if he asserts that most of the beliefs of the people in different cultures are consistent and true in their own contexts.15 i agree with him that radical translation or interpretation is possible only if we assume that other people in different cultures are rational like us in the sense that their beliefs and desires are connected in the way we connect them. if all people are not rational in this sense, how can we understand and communicate with them? all people know how to set certain goals and choose proper means to achieve them. all people are given a potentiality to do so since they were born. however, even though all human beings are similar in this aspect, they are different in another. any extreme ideas 130 prajñâ vihâra seem to be improper and misleading. let us consider the theses of provincialism and multiculturalism as mentioned above. both theses are false because they are extreme. to correct these extremes, we should say, “everyone is like us in some aspect and different from us in another.” if we are alike in some aspect and different in another, then our cultures will also be alike in some aspect and different in another. the similar aspect is translatable, so it is commensurable. only the different aspect is non-translatable and, therefore, incommensurable. thus we need to understand others in their own terms only in those non-translatable domains. v. beyond natural and human sciences: from rationality to agape according to all scientific positivists, on the one hand, including all schools of materialists and behaviorists, human actions and other natural events are not different in kind. if all natural events can be explained by causal laws and theories, then human actions, in principle, also can be explained by causal laws and theories. thus the main task of all scientists is just try to discover those laws. if we are lucky in discovering them, then we will be able to predict human actions as we do with other natural events. according to human and social scientists, on the other hand, human actions and other natural events are different in degree, if not also in kind. even though we are lucky in discovering causal laws, they are not sufficient to make us understand human actions. since human actions are considered as both natural events and intentional happenings, we need something more for understanding others. surely, we need causal laws to explain human actions as natural movements, but we also need hermeneutical historicism to understand human actions as intentional activities. in other words, according to the human/social scientists, we need deductive-nomological explanations for the physical aspect of human actions, and, simultaneously, we also need hermeneutics for the mental/psychological aspect of human actions. if we can explain the physical aspect and understand the mental aspect of human actions, then there is nothing more for understanding others. warayuth sriwarakuel 131 are natural and human sciences sufficient for understanding others? my answer to this question is no. it is not wrong for the positivists and the human/social scientists to search for causal laws and theories of interpretation. it is their duties to do so, and they should be highly encouraged and supported. but they are mistaken if they think that their missions are sufficient for understanding others. comte and the positivists are wrong to equate (western) modern science with rationality. in fact, rationality belongs to all humankind in the sense that it is a potentiality given to everyone. moreover, every culture and civilization has its own science which can be validly and soundly justified by its own norms and criteria only. thus rationality and science are not completely identical. rationality includes science, but not vice versa. metaphorically speaking, science is to rationality as metaphysics is to philosophy. do human beings have only the physical and mental dimensions? no, there is still another dimension, namely, the spiritual dimension. this dimension of man cannot be reached by natural and human sciences. it is beyond both nomologicalism and historicism. in other words, it is beyond rationality at the intellectual/cognitive level. it can be reached only through religion and art, namely, through truth and beauty. feyerabend wrote, …subjective events…are beyond the reach of the most sophisticated physical or biological theory. however, they are not beyond the reach of artists, painters, poets, writers of plays. now love, disappointment, desire play a large role in the lives of people. they also play a role in the process of scientific research…hence, if you really want to understand the sciences and not merely write dry and abstract fairytales about them –and remember, by ‘understanding the sciences’ i mean both the context of discovery and the context of justification-then you have to turn to the arts and the humanities, i.e. you have to abandon these artificial classifications most philosophies and ‘rational accounts’ are full of.16 one of the main problems of the positivists and the human/social scientists in understanding others is probably because they ignore the meaning of understanding as sympathy and empathy on account of its subjectivity. for them, if anything is subjective, it is not scientific or 132 prajñâ vihâra rational. this is their big mistake. in fact, in the world of knowledge, no one can throw away their subjectivity from their epistemological framework. that is the reason why hawking once said, “things are as they are because we are.” as a matter of fact, subjective events play a large role in our lives as feyerabend put it above. comte and the positivists are also mistaken when assuming that the spiritual / religious dimension is the lowest stage of human epistemic development. eastern people in general usually do consider an “enlightened” person17 as the one who is truly in the highest position. metaphorically speaking, those who are not enlightened are at the bottom or somewhere between the top and the bottom of the mountain, but those who are enlightened are at the top. thus the enlightened people can transcend all the barriers and limitations. to use nietzsche’s phrase, they are “beyond good and evil.” there is a story about two monks. one day two of them walked by a river. they met a girl crying by the river bank because she could not swim across the river. one of the monk carried her across the river. the other monk complained about this activity because it is against a discipline: a monk should never touch any woman. he kept on complaining until they reached their temple. the monk who carried the girl, after he had kept silence all the way back to the temple, finally said, “i laid her down quite a long time ago. why have you been still carrying her?” from the story, who should be considered as the enlightened one? enlightened people have no sin in their minds, so they can transcend everything with their loving kindness and compassion. they are beyond “good and evil,” “right and wrong,” “disciplined and undisciplined,” “rational and irrational,” etc. they could do as jesus christ said, “the shabbath day is for man, not man for the shabbath day.” we can observe in our daily lives that all kinds of love, no matter they are eros, philia or agape, always help us transcend all the differences. for example, if someone falls in love with a woman, his love will transcend all her differences in race, color, nationality, religion and all her historical background. his love can transcend everything in the sense that nothing can prevent it. it is borderless and limitless. similarly, if we love our friends, no matter whom they are and where they are from, we will certainly transcend all the differences. and for those who have heavenly warayuth sriwarakuel 133 love or agape, they can love even their enemies and be ready to help them like the good samaritan and jesus christ himself. in summary, understanding others in terms of causal laws and theories of interpretation is not sufficient because it is still under the game of rationality and irrationality. to transcend this game and arrive at authentic understanding we have no way except through loving kindness, compassion and agape. vi. conclusion understanding presupposes knowledge. we usually understand and love those whom we know. knowledge is a necessary condition for love and understanding. that is the reason why we need to support the natural and the human/social scientists in their diverse missions. then what is knowledge? knowledge can mean different things. first, knowledge may mean “being able to identify.” second, it may mean “being able to describe and explain.” third, it may mean “having the same experience as.”18 knowledge from natural sciences and human/ social sciences can and do reach only “knowledge” as “being able to identify” and as “being able to describe and explain.” it cannot come up to “knowledge” as “having the same experience as” because “knowledge” in the third sense can be arrived at only through practice. the scientists usually ignore the third sense of knowledge because they think that it is not relevant to their missions as fay put it “…we understand others not when we become them…, but only when we are able to translate what they are experiencing or doing into terms which render them intelligible. when freud wished to understand the nightmares of the rat man, it was not necessary that freud have these nightmares himself…to know someone else or even ourselves requires not the ability to psychologically unite with them or ourselves at an earlier time but the ability to interpret the meaning of the various states, relations, and processes which comprise their or our lives.”19 it is true that it was not necessary for freud to have the nightmares himself in order to understand the nightmares of the rat man if he was simply satisfied with his “intellectual” understanding. but if freud wants to reach “authentic” understanding, it is necessary for him to have such nightmares. if the lord buddha had never 134 prajñâ vihâra experienced suffering before, how could he have had authentic understanding of the sufferings of other people and other creatures in the cycle of life? to have “authentic” understanding is different from to have “intellectual” understanding. moreover, to have “authentic” understanding is always something “more” than to have “intellectual” understanding. that is the reason why buddhadasa bhikkhu once said, “there is no salvation inside a university” because following the way and talking about following the way are different things. understanding others through causal laws is understanding at the physical level whereas understanding others through human sciences is understanding at the socio-psychological level. but both kinds of understanding are just necessary conditions, not sufficient for authentic understanding. then how can we reach authentic understanding? genuine or authentic understanding can be acquired only at the spiritual level. there is no way to reach authentic understanding at the spiritual level except through praxis with compassion, loving kindness and agape. thus if rationality is considered as a moral virtue, our rationality will come to the peak, namely wisdom and enlightenment, only through practice at the spiritual level. warayuth sriwarakuel 135 endnotes 1immanuel kant, “an answer to the question: what is enlighten-ment?” in lawrence e. cahoone, from modernism to postmodernism: an anthology, oxford: blackwell publishers ltd, 1996, p. 51. 2see richard rorty, “a pragmatist view of rationality and cultural difference” in philosophy east & west, vol. 42, no. 4, oct. 1992, pp. 581-96. 3see harold i. brown, rationality, london: routledge, 1990. 4 see nicholas rescher, rationality, oxford: clarendon press, 1988. 5the lord buddha gave advice on how to investigate a doctrine in his kalamasutta. (1) be not led by report. (2) be not led by tradition. (3) be not led by hearsay. (4) be not led by the authority of texts. (5) be not led by mere logic. (6) be not led by inference. (7) be not led by considering appearances. (8) be not led by the agreement with a considered and approved theory. (9) be not led by seeming possibilities. (10) be not led by the idea, “this is our teacher.” the buddha suggested us to adopt or deny things in question only after our deep reflection on them through practice. see phra dhammapitaka (p.a. payutto), dictionary of buddhism, bangkok: mahachulalongkorn-rajavidhayalaya university press, 2000. 6see anthony kenny, what is faith?: essays in the philosophy of religion, oxford: oxford university press, 1992. 7for dilthey, human sciences include both humanities and social sciences. 8carl g. hempel, philosophy of natural science, englewood cliffs: prentice-hall, inc., 1966, pp. 47-51. 9wilhelm dilthey, “the development of hermeneutics” in david e. klemm, hermeneutical inquiry, atlanta: scholars press, 1986, p. 93. 10brian fay, contemporary philosophy of social science, oxford: blackwell publishers, 1996, p. 10. 11donald davidson, inquiries into truth and interpretation, oxford: clarendon press, 1985, p. 137. 12lawrence h. simon, “rationality and cultural relativism,” in edward craig, ed., routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, london and new york: routledge, 1998, p. 82. 13see l. wittgenstein, remarks on frazer’s golden bough, ed. rush rhees, trans. a.c. miles and rush rhees, atlantic heights: humanities press, 1979. 14i do not think that all new and old paradigms are incommensurate because they are completely different. in fact, there would be always, more or less, some similarities and differences of the old and the new paradigms. the model of incommensurability works well only with the different parts, but it does not do so with the similar ones. 15according to fideism, (1) all judgments are relative to a particular culture or particular form of life; (2) concepts and models cannot be exported beyond the boundaries of the particular form of life in which they function and have meaning; (3) the norms of rationality of a particular culture can be judged rational only from 136 prajñâ vihâra within that particular culture; and (4) if other cultures do have very different norms and practices, we have to attempt to understand them in their own terms. see lawrence h. simon, op. cit., and see dan r. stiver, the philosophy of religious language, oxford: blackwell publishers, 1996, pp. 69-72. 16paul k. feyerabend, three dialogues on knowledge, oxford: basil blackwell, 1991, p. 148. 17what i mean by “an enlightened person” is one who achieves satori. it is different from the sense used by kant. 18brian fay wrote, “‘know’ might mean ‘be able to identify’ (as in ‘i know that they are members of parliament’); alternately, ‘know’ might mean ‘be able to describe and explain’ (as in ‘i know why italian governments are so unstable’); or ‘know’ might mean ‘to have the same experience as’ (as in ‘i know what it’s like to give birth to a child, as i too am a mother.’).” see brian fay, op. cit., p. 12-13. 19brian fay, ibid., p. 25. warayuth sriwarakuel 137 spirituality and mysticism: a global view sacred commodities john t. giordano assumption university, thailand abstract this presentation will examine the circulation of sacred images as commodities. in urban areas in southeast asia, the trade in images of buddhist, brahmanist and animist deities in the form of amulets is very popular, as is the trade in these sacred images in the tourist trade. the traditional manner of approaching this phenomenon is to impose traditional academic theories of capitalist exchange, commodity fetishism or spiritual decay. but this approach condemns the negative aspects of this phenomenon without appreciating its more authentic aspects. this paper wishes to show how the religious “eclecticism” found in southeast asia, is also present in the trade of sacred commodities. the paradoxes present in the commodification of sacred images also provide them with a renewed possibility to contribute to types of cultural redemption. amulets and souvenirs along the streets of bangkok, within the eddies of the flow of traffic and people, lying on tables or on mats on the sidewalks, examined carefully by traders and collectors with magnifying lenses, are a vast assortment of sacred amulets and images for sale. in thai they are known as khrueang rang khaung khlang [khmer, ban towng], literally, an object with magical powers. the most sacred would include the buddha, and the images of famous arahant monks. such sacred (saksit) buddhist images would be called phra khrueang rang. amulets also encompass the pantheon of indian and tantric buddhist deities such as phrapikanet [ganesh], phra narai [vishnu], phra isuan [shiva], phra phirap [bhairava shiva], phra phrom [brahma], and hevajra. they include ceremonial knives or phallus icons (palad khik). or they represent famous mythical characters and creatures from the ramakien and the jataka stories such as, bharata [phra phrot muni], hanuman, rahu, chuchok, and khrut [garuda] singh [lion], and yak [a guardian form of yaksa]. this trade is extremely popular and is subject of many magazines and videos which report stories documenting the miraculous powers of particular amulets to protect its wearers from danger, bring them great fortune, or influence others. new amulets are produced, sanctified by monks, marketed and sold to finance the construction of wats, schools and universities. they are also produced to commemorate events concerning the royal family. they are portable sacred images traded and circulated within the profane landscape of the city. this brings up some important questions. what happens to the sacred aspects of a culture when it becomes commodified and traded in the marketplace? how should one speak today about this trade in sacred images? one of the precursors of this type of amulet, votive tablets, were originally created to preserve the teachings of the buddha. they can be traced back to the early buddhism of india. but they became particularly common in south east asia beginning with the mon and angkor period. they were designed for buddhist pilgrims and were often inscribed on the back with a buddhist verse in pali or sanskrit. the thai scholar, ml pattaratorn chirapravati, explains the role of the following common inscription: the conditions which arise from a cause, of these the tathagatha has stated the cause, also the way of suppressing these same: this is the teaching of the great ascetic. this concise statement of the essence of the buddha’s teaching was immensely popular. early sacred writings such as the mahavagga claim that it was the ye dhamma that secured the buddha’s disciples, sariputta and moggallana, later venerated among the sangha as second only to the buddha. that this simple formula convinced the buddha’s two leading followers must have given it a modicum of magic, a quality that was also accorded to the tablets themselves and much later became the only virtue preserved in amulets. a role for the stanza in proselytizing the teachings of the buddha is also hard to ignore on such conveniently portable objects. coedes speculates that the producers of such vast numbers of votive tablets, hidden in stupa and caves, might also have been thinking of a future time when, as sakyamuni is said to have predicted, buddhism would have disappeared from the earth. then the images on the tablets, along with this brief verse stating the quintessence of its doctrine, upon discovery, might lead to a rejuvenation of dharma. (chirapravati, p. 17) there is also a canonical basis (kalingabodhi jataka) for the use of sacred images (ceitiya) as reminders of the buddha’s teachings. stanley tambiah discusses the etymology which suggests the power of images to promote dhamma: the pali word ceitiya (cedi in thai) comes from the sanskrit root ci, “to heap up,” “to arrange in order,” and in this sense is aptly applied to a stupa as a monument. but it also connotes cit, “to fix the mind upon something,” “to remind,” “to instruct,” and in this sense is similar to the english word “monument” (from the latin monere, “to advise,” i.e., to remind). (tambiah, p. 201) these tablets brought back from a pilgrimage to a buddhist shrine, would be the original souvenirs; they would be reminders of a sacred experience, which would be codified within them. they function not only as a reminder, but also as an icon of power. this power is related to the fiery energy which the statue of the buddha possesses (in pali – teja, in thai – rit det). this would also be a living power as can be seen in the ceremonies for the “opening of the eyes” of a new buddha statue (boek phra net), which curiously seem to be mirrored by ceremonies for the "opening of the eyes" of a newborn baby. the amulet is also an icon or idol. jean-pierre vernant describes the function of primitive idols: the function of this kind of sacra consists in certifying and transmitting the powers the divinity accords as a privilege to its elect rather than in making a divine “form” known to the public. the symbol does not represent the god, abstractly conceived in and for itself. it does not attempt to instruct anyone about its nature. it expresses divine power insofar as it is handled and used by certain individuals as an instrument of social prestige, a means of getting a hold on and of acting on others. (v, p. 156) there are various early magical idols in thailand and cambodia such as the mummified still-born child or luk grauk [khmer – kon krok]. such an idol and its power is adopted, just as one would adopt a living baby, and has to care for just like a human baby. it is always protected by a yuan diagram with a figure of nang kwak. another example would be the small wooden idol called a kwai danu [khmer – krok bai khleak]. this is the image of a buffalo made of materials collected in a graveyard during a full moon. living energy is breathed into this idol, which then possesses a protective power for hunters venturing out into the forest. these more primitive examples – which are still in use point to the powers that modern amulets are considered to possess. and they point to how the amulet is treated as an object. most amulets are connected to a certain temple, and were blessed in a certain ceremony. the material can be metal or a kind of terra cotta which is often mixed with sacred substances such as the ash from a sacred book or the hair or bone of a powerful arahant monk. such a sacred image would act as both an icon and an idol. it would possess both a sacred code and a living power. spiritual decay but while there is a healthy trade in amulets and a belief in their powers, these beliefs are increasingly cautioned against. the famous contemporary thai monk buddhadasa bhikkhu warns in his book handbook for mankind: there are beliefs in spirit and celestial beings, in sacred trees and all manner of magical objects. this sort of thing is completely irrational … many people professing to be buddhists cling to these beliefs … and this even includes some who call themselves bhikkhus, disciples of the buddha… if we practice any aspect of dhamma unaware of its original purpose, unconscious of the rationale of it, the result is bound to be the foolish, naïve assumption that it is something magical. (buddhadasa bhikkhu. handbook for mankind. bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, p. 61-62) this condemnation of the fixation upon objects or symbols, present in rational, comparative and even mystical approaches to religious belief, certainly has an important role. especially today, we want to create manners of religious thought which transcend religious divisions. yet in this movement beyond the ritual, the concrete belief, and the icon, we often lose an appreciation of an important living power. the trade in amulets is not only condemned by religious figures like buddhadasa, but also by sociologists, anthropologists and philosophers. stanley tambiah has done very careful studies on the lives of the forest monks (arahants) and what he calls the “cult of amulets” which is connected to their powers. at the end of his work he attempts to understand this within a sociological framework. the possession and circulation of amulets in thailand represents still another semiotic code. the ascetic saint of the forest distributes his charisma as a donation inspired by compassion and loving-kindness (metta). he himself does not expect a return from his gift to the worldlings at large. the amulet is indexically or metonymically related to the ascetic monk and represent a materialization of his virtue, achieved by means of a rite of transfer. amulets are made in plenty and distributed to many, for the saint’s metta is inexhaustible and does not diminish by sharing, provided he continues to cleave to his ascetic and meditative life and to experience the bliss of tranquil joy and detachment. but of course we know that, in the thai instance, amulets are comparable on the basis of the differential charisma of the saints and ascetics; though donated to the public at large, they in practice become scarce and assume a commercial value. they become, at a second less obvious round of social relations, private and hidden possessions of laymen who expect to use the amulets’ potency to manipulate, overpower, seduce, and control their fellow men and women in an ongoing drama of social transactions. this there is a two-level discourse – the charisma of the saint, who in transcending the world is able to shower upon it his virtue, and the gratification of desires on the part of the laymen, for whom prosperity and fortune approach the logic of a zero-sum game. (tambiah, p. 342) according to tambiah, the circulation of amulets becomes a mark of status among the ruling elite. it also represents a kind of spiritual decay of the original function of the sacred image through capitalist exchange and commodity fetishism. this echoes the idea that the sacred always involves the separation of the sacred object from the normal system of exchange. as giorgio agamben writes: religio is not what unites men and gods but what ensures they remain distinct. it is not disbelief and indifference toward the divine, therefore, that stand in opposition to religion, but “negligence,” that is, a behavior that is free and “distracted” (that is to say, released form the religio of norms) before things and their use, before forms of separation and their meaning. to profane means to open the possibility of a special form of negligence, which ignores separation or, rather, puts it to a particular use. (agamben, p. 75) i do not wish to challenge this thesis, but if we can accept the operation of amulets as a kind of “two-level” discourse, perhaps we should recognize that the phenomenon of the circulation of amulets contains contradictions which provide resistances to traditional philosophical or sociological theories, as well as capitalist exchange itself. in fact, connected to the use and belief in amulets is a widespread ritualistic gift-giving, which goes beyond social reciprocity, and is ultimately connected to kamma. we can now accept that the reduction of sacred images to commodities is an accepted fact. this is the reality of our global capitalist system, at least in this period of our human history. but while there is a process of spiritual decay, or a fading of aura, yet at the same time, there is stored up within these sacred commodities, a memory, or a power. if the flow of capital is a reality, then the hidden power of objects is equally a competing reality. the philosophical approaches to our contemporary situation often rely upon the same singular planes of explanation they wish to challenge. such approaches wish to break free of system, identity, restricted economies, reification, commodification, and representation. they wish to escape into pure alterity, difference, utopia or the promise of future redemption. yet like buddhadasa they lose sight of the very powers of the concrete object which may provide the redemption which they desperately crave. we can perhaps begin again and show how sacred commodities have certain “powers”, either to fall into the dangers of exploitation, or to transcend these traits and act as talismans of healing. imperfections caught within the flow of capital, reproduced and counterfeited, beautified into kitsch, the amulet or souvenir is also an imperfect sacred icon. in ananda coomeraswamy’s development of the rasa theory of art, there is an emphasis on the surrender of subjectivity and upon the competence of the viewer of the work of art. ultimately the work appears not as an expression of the artist, but a passage to the sacred. not merely an object, but a symbol. yet coomeraswamy recognizes another process. that whereby we reconstruct the icon as something worthy of veneration. tolerance of an imperfect work of art may arise in two ways: the one uncritical, powerfully swayed by the sympathetic, and too easily satisfied with a very inadequate correspondence between content and form, the other creative, very little swayed by considerations of charm, and able by force of true imagination to complete the correspondence of content and form which is not achieved or not preserved in the original. uncritical tolerance is content with prettiness or edification, and recoils from beauty that is ‘difficult’: creative tolerance is indifferent to prettiness or edification, and is able from a mere suggestion, such as an awkward ‘primitive’ or a broken fragment, to create or recreate a perfect experience. (coomeraswamy, p. 34) coomeraswamy is somewhat of a purist we might ask if the two types of tolerance are that distant. the critique of reproduced art of amulets or the kitsch art of souvenirs would also be a criticism of uncritical tolerance. yet there does seem to be a process whereby the circulations of these simple images can draw one to older, more incomplete, and more authentic types of images. one develops the eye of an archeologist. there must be something that threads its way back to the authentic artifact. the power of the ritualistic use and trade in amulets and souvenirs maintains an invisible connection a wisdom which links culture with nature. the traditional sociological critique of magic and exchange, often reduce these phenomena to mere social relationships, such as the prevalent discourse concerning "the gift". yet this seems to involve a kind of western tendency to recoil from the power of the object itself. the anthropologist marshall sahlins in his essay “the sadness of sweetness” speaks of the character of western cosmology: dare one claim that the determination of nature as pure materiality – absent gods, incarnate spirits, or any such nonhuman persons – is a unique western invention? true, worldly things could represent or be signs of god, but they are not god. nor is this differentiation of “natural” from “supernatural” the same as the natureculture distinctions widely practiced around the world. it is the further argument that nature is only res extensa, made of nothing, lacking subjectivity. the idea, moreover, becomes the ontological counterpart of an equally singular epistemology, insofar as knowledge of nature cannot be achieved by communication and the other ways subjects understand subjects. (sahlins, p. 564) this would suggest that the situation of our increasingly globalizing world is the overlapping of competing cosmologies. the western cosmologies of exchange become the latest layer added to the multi-layered eclecticism found in non-western cultures. so we need to begin again. we need to respect a certain power inherent in objects without being tempted at first to reduce it to any single philosophical, psychological or sociological plane of explanation. 7-eleven, jatukarm ramathep recently thailand experienced a phenomenal popularity of an amulet called the jatukarm ramathep. this amulet has its origin in the southern thai city of nakorn si thammarat. it relates back to the story of king jantarapanu who ruled in this city in the buddhist year 18. the spirit of this king instructed a police captain named khun pan known for his magical powers to install a new city pillar. a city pillar [sow mueang] is established for the purpose of marking the spiritual center of the city. it is established at a special auspicious time and place. this information is often encoded in the form of an astrological chart at the top of the pillar. around the pillar are stationed guardian deities. usually there are four, but in this case, two of the deities jatukarm and ramathep (and possibly king jantarapanu himself) become synthesized into the deity of the pillar, and the guardian deities are replaced by images of the demon rahu. the story is quite complex. and it would seem that the complexity of the story feeds into its mystery and popularity. its popularity, which lasted for about two years, is also considered to have been enhanced by the anxieties connected to the violence in southern thailand. but regardless of the details, what seems most significant is the form of the amulet. it is a circular amulet that represents the cross-section of the city pillar itself. it contains the deity in the center, around which is the astrological chart, and bordered by the guardian rahus. hence in a more dramatic way than most amulets it shows itself as a sacred object, connected to a specific place, a specific time, and a specific ritual. in a sense, it is a portable sacred place, carried by the wearers as they navigate the profane chaos of the modern city. and yet at the same time it is a commodity. at every 7-eleven convenience store in bangkok (of which there are an alarming number) one could buy a version of the amulet. there were also brochures explaining the amulet and how to order them through visa or mastercard. this would involve the movement of sacred objects through the digitized calculations of financial transactions and systems of supply chain management. in this case, we are now dealing with two city pillars. a sacred and traditional pillar, and a pillar which represents the financial center of the city which coordinates the flow of capital. so we can speak of a dance of objects, passing from hand to hand, guided by invisible forces of the sacred, by the invisible forces of commerce. a dance between two poles, each a center of gravity, around which these objects will be attracted into a kind of complex orbit. objects whose motion is propelled by human hands and abstract capital, by fortune and by calculation, and by a motion that involves random collisions and confrontations. and this external circulation between these poles is also an internal circulation of objects within the imagination. again, two (or more) poles, competing centers of gravity, around which our ideas and representations circulate. this also shows how the mythologies which inhabit our imaginations communicate with the landscape. and the object itself would be ambivalent. it would be enervated by the exchange principle and the sacred which places it beyond exchange. it would not be a simple fetish, but a complex locus of competing forces. here we should be careful to distinguish the sacred commodity from the branded object which has had its ‘sacredness’ fabricated through marketing. this is not to say that the amulet itself is not fabricated, or that there are many amulets made to capitalize on the desire for sacred objects. but the process used in sacrilizing an amulet is always connected to traditions, rites, and practices which are organic, that is, rooted in the culture and its natural environment. the desire is for connection and not for the appearance of connection. eclecticism in southeast asia, not only are there layers of animism, brahmanism, mahayana and therawada buddhism, islam and christianity, but today there are additional layers of western capitalist, secular and scientific cosmologies. to appreciate the mythical topology of the landscape and the imagination is to appreciate a kind of eclecticism, which would embrace traditional rituals, myths and symbols, and yet, tolerate the lack of a common logic. as art historian aby warburg points out, people are essentially schizophrenics. they possess contradictions in their beliefs and practices, and even their cosmologies. this then should extend even to the scholar investigating these phenomena. with the permeation of capitalist cosmologies into cultures, we encounter a curious mixture of traditional cosmologies. it is not a matter of simple displacement or change. often it is a curious mixture of competing cosmologies and mythologies of space and time. these competing mythologies are anchored in the landscape in the form of poles: a city pillar, a temple, a bank, a television station. and simultaneously they are anchored within the imagination of each individual. all of these realities overlap within each individual. yet while they overlap, they do not connect. but these gaps and tensions prevent one logic from cannibalizing another. the belief in powers and spirits, still alive at street level, are irrational from most philosophical and sociological perspectives. yet they represent a kind of pre-reflective intimacy with the earth not present within capitalism and the encroaching western systems of thought. so perhaps the imperfections involved in the commodification and circulation of sacred images, also preserve a possibility of a kind of redemption. contemporary western philosophy follows a messianic theology. it tends to be oriented towards a future redemption or emancipation from what it considers to be an imprisonment by the commodifications and reifications of contemporary capitalist culture. this idea of redemption operates from the very models of linear history which it strives to escape. yet, outside of the west, we can still see, deep within the object, shadowy instructions of a process of redemption not oriented towards a pure future, but one which repeats itself within the flow of life itself. a redemption within the flow of life. less a spiritual vision, and more an anchoring occurring below the field of vision. the twentieth century german philosopher walter benjamin also recognized the tension between the “now” of the object and its stored-up past. he calls this the “dialectical image.” the interpreter of the object, commodity or image places it within tensions which will crack open its outer shell to release its stored up histories. in the dialectical image, what has been within a particular epoch is always, simultaneously, "what has been from time immemorial." as such, however, it is manifest, on each occasion only to a quite specific epoch namely, the one in which humanity, rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular dream image as such. it is at this moment that the historian takes up, with regard to that image, the task of dream interpretation. (benjamin, p. 464) we can follow benjamin up to a point, particularly with regard to his recognition of the history stored in images. but we do not want to lose the richness and wisdom of these hidden narratives. we do not want to reduce them to mere dreams or forms of history. to break open these objects to release their powers, would in a way, be the dissipation of their powers within the much larger landscape of historical explanation. benjamin thought that this was a mechanism to promote messianic redemption; a redemption involving the entire trajectory of human history. perhaps such a process is very attractive to academics like ourselves, who want to break open every vessel to see what is inside, or wish to consider history in its totality. yet we need to recognize that the so-called fetishized shell of the object also protects what is inside; it is the shell of a seed which will blossom, at a particular time and place, when the conditions are favorable. immanuel kant was prescient concerning our present plight. he claims that fine art gains its power insofar as it imitates the “creative power of nature,” and not as a mere imitation of archetypes or models. yet he envisages a coming crisis: it is not likely that peoples of any future age will make [artistic] models dispensable, for these peoples will be ever more remote from nature. ultimately, since they will have no enduring examples of nature, they will hardly be able to form a concept of the happy combination of the law-governed constraint coming from highest culture with the force and rightness of a free nature that feels its own value. (kant, p. 232) so for us, the wisdom hidden in objects can be considered as models of a connection or orientation. we can see this demonstrated in the khmer votive tablet depicting the mahayana buddhist trinity common to the angkor period. chirapravati provides a description: the buddha is seated in vajrasana with his hands in dhyanamudra. the buddha is sheltered by the naga, generally depicted with five or seven hoods. the naga head in the centre is shown in full frontal view while the others are shown in profile. the buddha wears a crown. the standard khmer representation of the seated buddha sheltered by naga hoods… lokesvara has four arms but prajnaparamita has two… lokesvara is holding an attribute in each hand: a rosary in the top right, a book in the top left, a lotus in the lower right, and a vase in the lower left – each with a symbolic meaning. prajnaparamita is holding a lotus and a book. the depiction of lokesvara (bodhisattva of compassion) and prajnaparamita (goddess of knowledge) exemplifies the notion of buddhahood. while avalokitesvara symbolizes the notions of compassion and fatherhood, prajnaparamita represents knowledge and motherhood. this representation of the duality between compassion and knowledge is comparable to the tantric concepts of upaya (the male principle, indicating skillful means) and prajna (the female principle, indicating knowledge). in tantrism, the union of male and female counterparts is a symbol of transcendence. (ml pattaratorn chirapravati, p. 44) here we find a union of upaya and prajna. skillful means (which in this interpretation, i would like to link to a pre-reflective ritualistic devotion to amulets) can be separated from wisdom within the current circulation of images within capitalist exchange. yet each image is symbolically imprinted with the prajna which is often forgotten. that is, the upaya or ritual can keep alive an open-ended connection with prajna. this is reflected in the way the meaning of word symbol is sometimes illustrated by the image of a broken plate. the contours of the break the contours of the imprinted forms call us to a possibility of connection, balance, enlightenment – a “rejuvenation of dhamma”. sacred commodities can act as pointers within the swirling exchange of commodities. they act not as radical agents of messianic redemption, but as minor placings and anchorings within the swirling confusion of commodification and the onward-moving process of life. references with book prices agamben, georgio. profanations. trans. jeff fort. cambridge: zone books, 2007 (price; 918 baht) benjamin, walter. the arcades project. cambridge: belknap press, 1999. (price: $16.47) buddhadasa bhikkhu. handbook for mankind. bangkok: supanit press, 1989. (checked out from assumption library, price unknown) ml pattaratorn chirapravati. votive tablets in thailand: origin, styles and uses. kuala lumpur: oxford university press, 1997. (price: $26.07) kant, immanuel. critique of judgment. amherst: prometheus books, 2000. (price: $18.95) coomeraswamy, ananda. the dance of siva. new york: dover, 1985 (bought in manila for 500 pesos) sahlins, marshall. culture in practice: selected essays. new york: zone books, 2000. (price: $23.94) tambiah, stanley. the buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1984. (checked out from assumption library, price unkown) vernant, jean-pierre. mortals and immortals. princeton: princeton university press, 1991. (price: $32.95) tavivat puntarigvivat 91 christianity from a thai buddhist perspective tavivat puntarigvivat mahidol university, thailand abstract this paper is an attempt of a thai buddhist to explore the history of christianity, and understand christianity a theistic religion-which many consider to be completely different from an ‘atheist’ religion like buddhism. in order to comprehend christianity from a buddhist perspective, an understanding of the symbolism is needed. in this way we can appreciate the commonalities of the two religions and open a space for inter-religious dialogue. the catholic church: papacy and politics one way of considering christianity is through its history. christianity, like the other great religions, has a long history and has passed through many reforms, interpretations and divisions into different sects. one of the most prominent characteristics of christianity, especially during the middle ages, was the institution of the church. christian churches had taken their administrative pattern from the secular government of the roman empire. the popes in rome, at one time, were the center of faith for all christians in europe, and has been the center for the catholic churches even in the present time. prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 91-98 © 2000 by assumption university press 92 prajñā vihāra the christian church has only gradually emerged since the end of the first century. at first, a simple organization was formed with a bishop as the supreme head, who was the supervisor of the services in the church. below the bishop, there were ministers, priests and other faithful. thus the hierarchy of the church was established into a religious institution. christianity gained its recognition as a legal religion and a state religion in the reign of emperor constantine the great. the conversion of emperor constantine marked a crucial moment in the history of christianity. emperor constantine took the bishop of rome, sylvester i, as his theological advisor and regarded the bishop of rome’s position as the orthodox one. the alliance of the emperor and the bishop of rome contributed to the rise of power of the roman bishop in the spiritual sector, and later on also in the political sector. christianity became the legal religion and the state religion of the empire for several other reasons. the first was that christianity adopted the form of its institutional church directly from the structure of the roman government. since the roman empire was united under one emperor, the christian church as the roman formal religion became united under one supreme bishop as well. there was a long struggle which led to the bishop of rome gaining the supreme power. but gradually, the bishop of rome-the capital of the roman empire-was recognized as the supreme bishop over the other bishops within the empire. another reason for the bishop of rome gaining power over christian churches in the roman empire was the claim that the church of rome was directly founded by both paul and peter. support for this was a passage in matthew 16 that held that peter was the first bishop of rome. because of this biblical support, rome came to be widely accepted among christians as the authority in the roman empire. as the bishop of rome gained the spiritual authority within the empire, he became known by his present name the pope. one other aspect contributed to the power of the bishop of rome. the dispute in the second century over the dating of the easter celebration was controversial; the debate on the issue continued for several centuries. tavivat puntarigvivat 93 finally the church of rome gained victory concerning this issue, and thus gained the supreme power of interpretation of any christian traditions. when the capital of the roman empire was shifted from rome to byzantium or constantinople in 330 a.d., the pope in rome lost direct access to the emperor, but gained something else which was much more important. being far from the secular central power of the emperors, the popes at rome enjoyed more independent authority of their administration both in spirituality and in politics, and began to exercise their greater powers in almost every aspect. in 1059, pope nicholas ii issued a decree which made the election of the pope handled by the cardinals. the emperor at byzantium would only be notified after the election. after the death of pope nicholas ii, the cardinals elected the new pope, alexander ii, as prescribed by the decree. the emperor, henry iv, being discontented by the challenge of power from the popes at rome, appointed a rival pope. there was a struggle of power between the emperor and the popes on this issue, but finally the popes won and gained freedom for their absolute spiritual authority. two more important popes should be mentioned here: pope gregory vii (1073-1085) and pope innocent iii (1198-1216). pope gregory vii was the one who determined to purify the corruption of the church and its clergymen. he also sought to reunite the western and eastern churches, but unsuccessfully. pope innocent iii was another great pope who tried to match papal theory with papal action, authority and practice; christianity was almost reunited under him. in short, the authority of the popes in the medieval ages was supreme. the reformation era took place in europe around the period of 1500-1650 a.d. martin luther (1483-1546) was the first person who started the movement by challenging the authority of the pope at rome as the “true representative” of the teachings of jesus or of the words of god. while the pope and the churches appealed to the tradition, luther and his new movement appealed to the scripture as the basis of the authority of christianity. 94 prajñā vihāra since the pope at rome and the civil authority during that time were allied, luther challenged not only the authority of the pope but also the authority of the civil government. luther was condemned by both the pope and the civil administration. when he was condemned as a heretic, he simultaneously became an outlaw in the eyes of the imperial forces. luther had to hide himself for a certain period of time during which he translated the bible into the german language, making it accessible to the common people. during this time the printing press was invented. luther’s writings were printed and distributed; these gained him a widespread recognition. the emphasis of luther and the later protestants on scripture was a great impetus for the expansion of literacy and book-publishing. on the other hand, the expansion of literacy and book-publishing supported the reformation movement with the emphasis on the authority of scripture. in 1521, luther publicly denounced the popes and the councils. this event marked a crucial moment in the history of christianity. it split christianity into two main sects, i.e., catholic and protestant. luther’s emphasis on scripture brought a new difficulty into christianity: whose interpretation of the bible was the correct and authoritative one. it seemed that there was no easy answer to this question. in 1526 the german peasants revolted against the oppression of the noble overlords. luther took the side of the nobility and condemned the rebellious peasants. by doing that, luther gained support from the nobility and lost his popularity among the peasants and their leaders. from the peasant point of view, luther lacked consistency in his reading of scripture. this event brought up the question of whose authority of the interpretation of the bible should be recognized. another example of the difficulty of biblical interpretation was when luther and zwingli, another prominent reformer from zurich, switzerland, disagreed over the meaning of holy communion. while luther took the holy communion literally, zwingli interpreted it in a symbolic way. for zwingli, the bread and wine was not the real flesh and blood of jesus, but just the symbol which reminded people to strictly tavivat puntarigvivat 95 follow his doctrine. the disagreement between luther and zwingli created the probability that honest people reading the same words might come to significantly different beliefs as a result of different ways of interpretation. now each individual person was in a sense, alone before god, since no absolute confidence could be placed in an authoritative church nor in an authoritative interpretation of scripture. in the later years of the reformation era, the renaissance movement arose in emerging universities. philosophical and scientific thinking were developing in europe. many great thinkers-including descartes, hume, locke, leibniz, etc.-proclaimed that rationality was the capacity of human beings to find the truths of nature, of society, and of religion. all religious knowledge was subjected to the critiques of logic and reason. challenged by philosophical and scientific critiques, christianity placed an emphasis on experience rather than reason. two developments were important: pietism and the philosophy of immanuel kant (17291804). in the pietistic movement, house meetings were instituted so that people could pray together, read the bible and exchange their experience. the pietistic movement appealed to the will and emotion of people. the philosophy of kant tells us how limited human knowledge is. human beings only know that which is located in time and space. human beings simply are not equipped to know such things as the existence of god. by showing the limits of reason and knowledge, kant had made room for faith. after the renaissance, christianity has expanded to america, africa, asia, and many other parts of the world, and become one of the world’s great religions. symbolism many would suggest that a good way of classifying the great religions of the world would be to consider them either as theistic or atheistic religions. christianity would belong to the first group, while religions like buddhism would belong to the second group. 96 prajñā vihāra but in my opinion, the understanding of reality was expressed in different ways in different cultures and different times. in one time and one culture, it was expressed in religious language, in another time, in scientific language. most religious understandings of the world are symbolic. by approaching things symbolically, we can appreciate commonalities and open room for dialogue. the story of jesus is a good example of symbolic language. jesus was born from the womb of mary, the virgin. the story of the virgin birth could be interpreted in many ways. but one way of interpreting this is that christ, as the symbol of the life of the human being, came directly from god, the creator of all things. life, as a gift from god, is pure by its own nature. it is god who gives bodily life to all human beings through their parents. but our spirits come directly from god. the story of the last supper of jesus and his disciples one day before he died on the cross, which later on has become one of the most important ceremonies in christianity, it involves eating and drinking the bread and the wine, symbolizing the body and blood of christ. this can also be interpreted in many ways. one liberal way of interpreting this is that the flesh and blood represents the teachings and the spirit of jesus. one must internalize the teachings of jesus to be a true christian. the story of the resurrection of jesus is also another good example of the symbolic language in religion. one way of interpreting is that the death and resurrection of jesus is a symbol of the death of impurity and the birth of purity of life in human being. the human being needs to die to his or her life of bodily desires before he or she could be reborn into a new and spiritually pure life. in order to enter the kingdom of god, human beings need a resurrection so that they die to the worldly life and are born anew in the spiritual life. the story of jesus is extraordinary when it is compared to other of world’s great teachers. jesus was probably the only prophet who sacrificed his life to save people and establish his teachings into the world. tavivat puntarigvivat 97 the conception of the trinity in christianity, i.e., god, the son of god and the holy spirit, could also be interpreted in a symbolic way. god, as the primary source of nature and as the great law of nature, creates everything including sentient and non-sentient beings. jesus, the son of god, was the person who found the great law of nature and spoke to the people in terms of theistic language. the holy spirit could be interpreted as the essence of human nature to be found by a human being when he has true faith and wisdom through the teachings of jesus. bibliography ehrman, bart d. 2013. did jesus exist?: the historical argument for jesus of nazareth. new york: harper one. hinnells, john r. 2010. the penguin handbook of the world’s living religions. london: penguin book. johnson, paul. 1976. a history of christianity. new york: a touchstone book. published by simon and schuster. kennedy, robert e. 2007. zen spirit, christian spirit: the place of zen in christian life. new york: continuum. knitter, paul f. 2015. without buddha, i could not be a christian. london: a oneworld book. lohfink, gerhard. 2015. jesus of nazareth: what he wanted, who he was. translated by linda m. maloney. collegeville, minnesota: liturgical press. standford, peter. 2015. catholicism: a complete introduction. new york: quercus. ward, keith. 2013. christianity: a beginner ’s guide. london: a oneworld book. wilson, neil and nancy ryken taylor. 2015. the a to z guide to bible signs and symbols: understanding their meaning and significance. michigan: baker books. 98 prajñā vihāra after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi 1 does apriority involve necessity? siraprapa chavanayarn chulalongkorn university, thailand abstract much has been discussed concerning apriority and its relation to the concept of necessity. many philosophers have conventionally supposed that a proposition is known a priori only if it is necessarily true. according to kant, for instance, the first philosopher who systematically discussed apriority, “necessity” is one of the criteria of a priori knowledge. kant (1958) maintains that all a priori knowledge is necessarily true. thus, from this conventional thought, many philosophers claim that apriority involves necessity, and rejecting the concept of necessity unavoidably affects the status of apriority. that is, if all a priori propositions need to be necessarily true, and we can prove that there is no necessarily true proposition, we are forced to conclude that there are no a priori propositions. however, this paper aims to propose that apriority does not involve necessity since all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. the paper has been separated into three parts. firstly, i will discuss the problem of necessity and its effect on the status of apriority. secondly, i will argue that apriority does not involve necessity by considering the two following questions: (a) is there a necessary a posteriori proposition? and (b) is there a contingent a priori proposition? thirdly, i will scrutinize the possible objections and try to defend my argument which will involve some further considerations about a priori justification. 2 i in this section, i would like to discuss the problem of necessity and its effect on the status of apriority. i will investigate the approach of philosophers for whom apriority involves necessity, which leads them to assert that refuting the concept of necessity is a good ground for refuting the possibility of apriority. w. v. quine’s argument against the concept of necessity (1951) is widely taken to imply a refutation of the concept of apriority. for quine, our beliefs are linked to one another in a vast network, which he called the “web of beliefs.” in this web of beliefs, some beliefs are nearer to the edge and some are nearer to the center. perceptual beliefs are nearer to the edge in that they are linked very much to experience and comparatively little to other beliefs. these beliefs are fairly easy to change if they are given new evidence. other beliefs are nearer to the center in that they are linked very much to other beliefs and only very indirectly, through long chains of other beliefs, to perception. logical truths, for example, are simply beliefs that lie at or close to the center. the beliefs at the edge of the web are more open to change than the beliefs in the center. an unexpected observation can prompt us to make a great variety of possible changes to the web. according to quine, no statement is immune to revision. since no statement is immune to revision, and a priori knowledge is by kant’s definition necessarily true, then it seems to follow that although quine does not explicitly reject a priori knowledge, his arguments imply a repudiation of it. hilary putnam (1976) and phillip kitcher (1983) are the examples of philosophers who take quine’s argument as a challenge to the concept of apriority. however, in the next section, i will maintain that refuting the concept of necessity is not a good ground for refuting a priori knowledge since apriority does not involve necessity. 3 ii in this section, i would like to argue that apriority does not involve necessity since there are contingent a priori propositions. my objective in this section is to debate two important questions: (a) is there a necessary a posteriori proposition? and (b) is there a contingent a priori proposition? are there necessary a posteriori propositions? recent interest concerning necessary a posteriori propositions is due mostly to the influence of kripke whose argument claims that the concept of apriority and necessity are different and are not interchangeable. in this section, i will try to answer the question (a) and ultimately sum up that the examples of necessary a posteriori proposition can be surmised. in order to demonstrate this, i will first discuss kripke’s examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. then, i will discuss the status of laws of nature, which are commonly believed in being examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. my aim in this section is to conclude that the typical examples of necessary a posteriori proposition can be surmised. in explaining why apriority is not equivalent to necessity, kripke (1980) introduces the example of goldbach’s conjecture as a case in which the equivalence between them may collapse. presumably, since so far there has been no proof or disproof of the conjecture, there is no a priori knowledge of it. as a result, here we have a case of a proposition which is either necessarily true or false, but is not a priori in any meaningful sense. the examples which kripke uses to prove the existence of the necessary a posteriori propositions are the propositions which show empirical identity such as “hesperus is phosphorus,” and the propositions about the essence of things such as “gold is the element with atomic number 79”. kripke explicates that when “hesperus” (which is the planet venus 4 in the evening) and “phosphorus” (which is the planet venus in the morning) are used as names, they refer in all possible worlds to the planet venus. as a consequence, names are rigid designators; expressions that designate the same things with respect to every world in which those things exist, and which designate nothing in all the other possible worlds in which those things do not exist. then, regarding to the propositions about the essence of things, kripke claims that “material origins” are the essence of things. according to his thought, it is impossible for anything to be made from any substance but the one of which it actually made. he declares that “how could a person originating from different parents, from an entirely different sperm and egg, be this very woman?” thus, from his account of essentialism, he confirms that the propositions which demonstrate the essence of things are necessarily true propositions. moreover, kripke supposes that we require experience to know the essence of things. for example, “gold is the element with the atomic number 79,” we can know gold’s essence from our experience and we also do not say “gold” of such a thing which has all appearances we initially use to identify gold but does not have the element with the atomic number 79. according to kripke, the propositions regarding essence are necessary a posteriori propositions. therefore, “apriority” and “necessity” are not the equivalent concepts which can be interchanged everywhere without changing their meanings. however, i maintain that kripke’s examples of necessary a posteriori proposition are confronted with two important problems. firstly, if i do not only accept name as referring to expressions, but also accept name as descriptive expressions (for instance, “phosphorus” does not only refer to the planet venus, but also has a descriptive meaning such as “the planet which we can see in the morning,” and “hesperus” does not only refer to the planet venus, but also has a descriptive meaning such as “the planet which we can see in the evening,”) then how can we confirm that phosphorus is hesperus? that is, after considering two terms’ descriptive meaning, 5 “phosphorus” is different from “hesperus.” therefore, it seems that, if we accept name in this way, besides name as referring to expressions, kripke’s example of necessary a posteriori proposition is suddenly problematic. it may be objected that kripke actually disagrees with the idea of names as being descriptive expressions since the descriptive meaning causes us not to think about the other possible situations of the name. that is, if we accept name as descriptive meaning, a proposition which contains name and its description is analytic, and its truth value is tautology which cannot be false. but kripke maintains that such propositions are only contingently true, which therefore can be false. therefore, according to kripke, name is an expression which only purports to designate particular individuals. nevertheless, i do not think that a proposition which contains name and its description is tautology. that is, we can give some descriptive meaning to a name. but later we find that the descriptive meaning is wrong and then change the description to the new one. a proposition which contains names and their descriptions is evidently not a tautology. thus, i am not in agreement with kripke in rejecting names as being descriptive expressions, and when we use names as descriptive expressions, we cannot accept the proposition which presents empirical identity as the examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. secondly, there are many philosophers who contest kripke’s proposition of essence. michael della rocca (2002), for example, notices that kripke’s essentialism is self-defeating since his essentialism primarily assumes the necessity of identity. contrarily, identity also assumes essentialism. so, kripke’s argument is circular and should be discarded. likewise, in my opinion, kripke’s essentialism presupposes some a priori basic idea which precedes the judgment that we cannot clearly confirm that essential propositions are necessary a posteriori propositions. “the table is not made from ice”, for instance, is a necessary a posteriori proposition if and only if we assume that “any objects cannot be made from other materials 6 which are not its material origin” (the assumption is the core idea of origin essentialism). then, when we consider whether this assumption is an a priori or a posteriori proposition, we can see that the proposition cannot be a posteriori since it speaks of all objects in general but we cannot experience all objects in order to conclude the above assumption. however, in reply, someone may suggest that the assumption is a posteriori and is true because of inductive reasoning. nevertheless, it can be asked again whether a justification of inductive reasoning is a priori or a posteriori. but, the justification of inductive reasoning cannot be a posteriori justification since the argument will be circular. that is, when we answer the question "why the past can explain the future?" with the answer that "in the past, we could explain the future using the inductive reasoning," such an answer is highly problematic since it uses the conclusion within its premise. on the other hand, when the justification of inductive reasoning is a priori, it seems to follow that the propositions concerning essence are possible if and only if some a priori proposition is primarily assumed to be true. therefore, we cannot claim that the propositions concerning essence are necessary a posteriori propositions. then, let us now consider the laws of nature, which seem to be necessary a posteriori propositions. many thinkers claim that the laws of nature are a posteriori propositions. law necessitarianism, for instance, claims that everything that happens is necessitated. that is, what happens in the world is determined or necessitated by the essence of things or by general laws, so necessity and possibility are the objective notions. the important point is we justify most laws of nature by experience. thus, most laws of nature seem to be necessary a posteriori propositions. however, i will finally suggest that the laws of nature are not the examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. they are just “scientific hypotheses” which are fallible. 7 the laws of nature are usually defined as uniformities or regularities that hold throughout the universe, at all places and all times. nathan salmon (1992) maintains that the characteristics of the laws of nature are as follows: the laws of nature are universal statements which refer to all things in the domain of what the law says. the laws of nature are true statements. the laws of nature have to sustain counterfactual inferences. the above three characterizations lead me to wonder about the justification of laws. the laws of nature can be the regularities that hold throughout the universe at all places and all times if and only if we can justify laws of nature. and most of the laws are justified by inductive reasoning. so, if we justify inductive reasoning, we can justify most of the laws of nature. however, as i have already pointed out, the justification of inductive reasoning is still problematic. then, the laws of nature as the regularities that hold throughout the universe at all places and all times cause one to question how they can really be possible. that is, what we examine from our experience is in limited time. we cannot observe anything in all places and all times. furthermore, human beings, as living beings, which have their own limitations, cannot see both what is too small and what is too big for them. thus, we can never be certain of the truth of any scientific laws and we cannot identify the regularities which human being observes as the “laws” of nature. however, what i argue does not imply that there is nothing which functions as an explainer of the phenomena. from my own perspective, all laws of nature are just “scientific hypotheses” which can be defeated when there are other hypotheses that can better explain the phenomenon. therefore, i do not agree on insisting the laws of nature are examples of necessary a posteriori propositions. 8 in conclusion, i cannot prove that there is a necessary a posteriori proposition since the typical examples of the proposition are suspect. it denotes that i give a negative answer to question (a). however, i cannot conclude whether apriority involves necessity only from considering question (a) for there is question (b) which if i can positively answer, i can strongly prove that apriority does not involve necessity. are there contingent a priori propositions? in order to verify that there is a contingent a priori proposition, i will scrutinize kripke’s examples of contingent a priori propositions and his contention that his examples prove the existence of the contingent a priori propositions. moreover, in this section, i will discuss about the unique feature of the typical examples of a priori propositions, such as geometry, arithmetic and logic, which is one of the reasons that make many thinkers believe that apriority involves necessity. eventually, i will argue that if the propositions in geometry, arithmetic and logic are the examples of a priori proposition, they are contingently true. in maintaining that there are contingent a priori propositions, kripke (1971) describes that propositions which contain the terms that fix the reference of the terms are the contingent a priori propositions. for instance, “stick s is one meter long at t0”. in order to know that stick s is one meter long at t0, we have to use “stick s” to fix or refer to one meter long. kripke claims that we have a priori knowledge that stick s is one meter long. nevertheless, “stick s is one meter long” is not necessarily true, but contingently true, for “stick s” may not be one meter long as a result of heating or cooling. kripke states that there is a difference between “one meter” and “stick s’s length at t0”, that is “one meter” is a rigid designator which designates a certain length in all possible worlds but “stick s’s length at t0” is not a rigid designator since stick s’s length can be changed because of heating or cooling. “stick s 9 is one meter long at t0,” then, is not necessarily true. therefore, kripke maintains that there are contingent a priori propositions. however, keith donnellan (1997) claims that kripke’s examples of contingent a priori proposition are just an uninteresting kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. according to donnellan, supposing that leverrier introduces the name “neptune” to rigidly designate the cause of such-and-such perturbations, saying, “neptune is the cause of such-and such perturbations.” the sentence he utters expresses a truth. and perhaps leverrier knows that the sentence he utters expresses a truth. but, for donnellan, leverrier does not know the truth that the sentence expresses. donnellan provides an example of his thought by supposing that, today we rigidly baptize as ‘newman’ the first person that will be born in the xxiind century. now we have no idea of who this person will be, although we assume that there will be one. but suppose that one hundred years from now we meet this person, who was in fact baptized ‘john’ by his parents. in this case, as donnellan argues, it seems quite strange to tell him ‘i knew one hundred years ago that you would be the first person born in the xxiind century, and that your name would be “newman”’. the reason why this is so strange is, according to donnellan, that we have never had, before his birth, real knowledge (besides trivial metalinguistic knowledge) corresponding to ‘newman is the first person born in the xxiind century’. it is donnellan’s contention that someone who knows only the reference-fixing definition does not understand the term in the statement nor sentence containing it. according to donnellan, to comprehend the name, one must know of some object that is the reference of the name, when such knowledge of an object requires a causal connection with it. thus, kripke’s examples of contingent a priori proposition are just a trivial and uninteresting kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. donnellan’s critique of kripke’s contingent a priori propositions has had a great impact on discussions about the contingent a priori propositions. nevertheless, i do not agree 10 with donnellan’s analysis. it seems that donnellan’s example is an example which tries to persuade us to see that contingent a priori propositions were just a trivial and uninteresting kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. that is, it is a naming of what will happen in the future, and when the future comes, the discovery that the thing is not named as previously intended. but i maintain that there exist contingent a priori propositions which are not just a trivial and uninteresting kind of meta-linguistic knowledge. the example i wish to give is the case of tropical cyclone naming. presently, most tropical cyclones are given a name using one of several lists of tropical cyclone names. tropical cyclones north of the equator between the international dateline and 100°e are named from the lists, once they reach tropical storm status. each of the 14 nations or territories which are members of the escap/wmo typhoon committee submit 10 names in their languages, which are used in alphabetical order. each year, the names of particularly destructive storms (if there are any) are "retired" and new names are chosen to take their place. we can see that the proposition concerning the tropical cyclone naming is in the form of “name is definite description”. a tropical cyclone is named with the new name after the last retired name. for example, jebi is a tropical cyclone after cimeron. the advantage of this naming process is to allow for easier communication. we can universally refer to a tropical cyclone without giving any definite description, such as “the tropical cyclone which heavily damaged the south of vietnam in 2005”. it is significant that the propositions from tropical cyclone naming, such as jebi is a tropical cyclone after cimeron, are the contingent a priori propositions. they are contingently true since their truth comes from the naming process of escap/wmo typhoon committee, and there can have been other possible worlds where the naming process could have been different. and they are a priori propositions since they are nonexperientially justified. we can see that tropical cyclone naming differs from donnellan’s newman in two respects. first of all, tropical cyclone naming is naming what will happen in a future which is 11 “universally recognized”. but donnellan’s newman is a naming to refer to someone who satisfies a definite description, which is not universally recognized. secondly, as a result of the first difference, when the tropical cyclone occurs, it will be named with the name that is previously planned. but, according to donnellan’s newman, someone who is the first person born in the xxiind century might not be named “newman” which was previously intended, but might be baptized “john” by his parents. the important point of tropical cyclone naming reveals that the contingent a priori propositions exist. furthermore, the contingent a priori propositions are not just trivial and uninteresting kinds of meta-linguistic knowledge as donnellan claims. they are a useful kind of knowledge that allows us to communicate more conveniently. after considering kripke’s examples of contingent a priori proposition, now i will turn my attention to a unique feature of the typical examples of a priori propositions (in geometry, arithmetic and logic) which causes many thinkers to suppose that apriority involves necessity. i will attempt to reply to the question “are the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic (as the propositions which are typically believed to be examples of a priori proposition) necessarily true?” and suggest that if the propositions in geometry, arithmetic and logic are a priori propositions, they are not necessarily true1. according to the history of philosophy, apriority and necessity are closely related. all the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic, which are typically believed in being a priori proposition, seem to have a unique feature that a posteriori proposition does not have. that is, for example, 2 plus 2 is always equal 4, if p and q is true then p is always true. on the other hand, a posteriori knowledge seems to be fallible. thus, the feature of infallibility is one of the reasons many thinkers believe that apriority involves necessity. however, there are two reasons why i maintain that the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic are not necessarily true: 12 (1) there exist mathematical propositions which are recognized to be true but cannot be proved to be true such as goldbach’s conjecture. as kripke argues in naming and necessity (1980), goldbach’s conjecture causes us to finalize that a priority and necessity truth cannot be interchanged everywhere without changing their truth value of the propositions. (2) there are many mathematical, geometrical and logical propositions which can be both empirically and rationally defeasible. for instance, the propositions in euclidian geometry, which are believed to be necessarily true, can be questioned and contested by non-euclidian geometries. in the same way, logic, which seems to be necessarily true, can be questioned as well. this logic assumes that that there are only two truth-values: either true or false. but there are logics which claim that there are more than two truth-values such as fuzzy logic. fuzzy logic describes that there exist truth values which are between completely true and completely false since what happens in our world is not totally certain. moreover, there are the paradoxes in mathematics, such as russell’s paradox in set theory2. these have suggested that all a priori propositions can be both empirically and rationally defeasible, so they are not necessarily true propositions. it may be noted, however, that the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic have a crucial feature which cannot be neglected. that is, their theorems are logical consequences of the rules, such as the definitions and the postulates, in the system. since the theorems are the logical consequences of what are previously accepted, it seems that we can prove all the theorems in the system if we know the propositions which are previously accepted. however, i suggest that the above proposal can be totally disputed by gödel’s incompleteness’s theorems, which claim that a formal system cannot be both complete and 13 consistent at the same time. that is, in any consistent formalization of mathematics, one can construct a statement that can be neither proved nor disproved within that system. and also, no consistent system can be used to prove its own consistency. in a complete mathematical system, there is at least one proposition which cannot be proved within the system, or there is at least one proposition which is conceded without proving. when there is at least a proposition which cannot be proved in the system, it means that there is at least one proposition we cannot know whether it is a priori justified or not. thus, we cannot declare that all of mathematics, geometry and logic are a priori justified. nevertheless, it can be said that, most of the propositions in mathematics, geometry and logic seem to have some forms of necessity, which i call “conditional necessity”. conditionally necessary propositions are propositions whose necessity depends on some prior conditions. for example, the theorems in mathematics are necessarily true depending on the postulates, axioms and definitions which are formerly accepted. if the conditions are true, then their consequences are always logically true. however, the conditional necessity is not the same as “necessity” we discussed here. thus, it cannot be a reason for concluding that apriority involves necessity. to summarize, the propositions in mathematics, geometry, and logic (as the knowledge which are typically believed in being the example of a priori proposition) are not necessarily true. that is, they can be both empirically and rationally defeasible. hence, if the propositions in mathematics geometry and logic are a priori propositions, they are not necessarily true. so far we have seen that the typical examples of necessary a posteriori proposition are suspect, however, there are contingent a priori propositions. the existence of such propositions maintains that all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. therefore, apriority does not involve necessity. 14 iii in this section, i wish to consider two objections to my argument. the first objection is concerning the meaning of apriority and the meaning of necessity. it seems that my meaning regarding "a priori knowledge" and "necessary truth" in this article is different from what traditional philosophers such as kant mean. therefore, it can be doubted whether my argument can actually reject the traditional arguments. the second objection is regarding the typical idea of a priori knowledge. that is, we have become accustomed to the idea that a priori knowledge is knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience, but, if a priori propositions are propositions whose justification does not depend on experience, why is it that experience can defeat a priori propositions? first of all, it may be charged that my definition regarding the concept of necessity in this article is different from what traditional philosophers mean, especially kant, thus, it can be claimed that my argument cannot reject the tradition argument, and i cannot sum up that all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. according to kant, all a priori knowledge is necessarily true. furthermore, his “reality” is not the same as the other thinkers’ reality. for kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the distinct realms of phenomena and noumena. phenomena are the appearances, which constitute the world as we experience it; noumena are the (presumed) things-in-themselves, which constitute reality. kant describes that noumena are unknowable, indescribable realities that, in some way, lie "behind" observed phenomena. human beings cannot, according to kant, know things-in-themselves; we can only know things as we experience them. thus, it seems that my argument (which is based on kripke’s concept, which does not distinguish between noumena and phenomena, and defines necessity by the concept of possible worlds) apparently conflicts with kant’s 15 account. that is, what i mean by “necessity” is not the same as what traditional philosophers mean, so i cannot really deny kant’s argument. nevertheless, even as my argument is based upon a meaning that is different from kant, it is still viable, for i claim that kant’s meaning of necessity is greatly problematic. according to kant, human beings cannot know things-in-themselves; we can only know things as we experience them. thus, kant’s meaning of necessity is not the necessity of things-in-themselves, but of things as appear to us. however, when kant’s necessity is the necessity of things as they appear to us, it can be possible that what appears to us is relative depending on different persons, different times and different places. for instance, if we compare newton’s worldview and einstein’s worldview, we can see that both worldviews are different and rely on different geometrical systems. the general acceptance of newton’s theory led kant to accept euclidian geometry as necessarily true. but it would then follow that the general acceptance of einstein’s theory that riemann geometry is necessarily true. nevertheless, the theorems in the two geometrical systems cannot be both necessarily true for they will conflict each other. at this point, kant’s concept of necessity is self-defeating. although my definitions differ from kant’s, it can be said that this is a viable approach in trying to solve the problems which are raised after kant’s argument about a priori knowledge. then, one may also be tempted to question that if a priori proposition is a proposition whose justification does not depend on experience, how experience can defeat a priori proposition?3 according to this objection, i maintain that if the characterization of a priori justification is changed to be positive, the above question cannot be asked. that is, the general character of a priori justification is deficient in some respect, and the only remedy for the deficiency is to embrace the positive characterization of a priori justification which characterizes it in terms of the sources on which it does depend, and abandon the negative 16 characterization of a priori justification which characterizes a priori knowledge in terms of the sources on which it does not depend. the structure of negative and positive characterization is as follows: negative characterization: s’ belief that p is justified a priori if and only if s’s justification for the belief that p does not depend on experience. positive characterization: s’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if s’s justification for the belief that p depends on some nonexperiential source. (or s’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if s’s belief that p is justified by x) then, as a result of the feature of a priori proposition which is both empirically and rationally defeasible, i suggest that, to cohere with what i said earlier about apriority and necessity, a priori justification has to be positively characterized, namely, s’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if s’s justification for the belief that p depends on some nonexperiential source. this solution does not cause us to question why experience can defeat a priori proposition, whereas a priori proposition is a proposition whose justification does not depend on experience. that is, when we consider a posteriori proposition which generally means a proposition whose justification “depends on” experience, the proposition does not imply that it “cannot be both experientially and nonexperientially defeated”. then, in the same way, if a priori proposition means the proposition whose justification “depends on” some nonexperiential source, the proposition does not imply that it cannot be both experientially and nonexperientially defeated as well. so far i have concluded that our customary ideas concerning a priori knowledge is not accurate. that is, a priori knowledge is not the knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience, but is the knowledge whose justification depends on some nonexperiential source. this positive characterization of a priori justification can competently 17 deal with the second objection which questions why a priori proposition can be experientially defeated, whereas a priori proposition is a proposition whose justification does not depend on experience. iv from what has been said so far it follows that there exists contingent a priori propositions. the existence of such propositions supports that apriority does not involve necessity. moreover, as a priori propositions are both empirically and rationally defeasible, a priori justification has to be positively characterized in terms of the sources on which it does depend, namely, s’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if s’s justification is that p depends on some nonexperiential source. as i concluded in the last two sections, apriority does not involve necessity. therefore, the crucial implication is that refuting the concept of necessity is not a good ground for refuting apriority. that is, whether or not we reject the concept of necessity, it does not have any effect on the status of apriority. 1 the reason why i have to conclude in the form of “if … then” is mathematics, geometry and logic can be considered in two ways. firstly, we can say of mathematics, geometry and logic as a system whose propositions correspond to the things in our actual world. thus, the propositions in the system are experientially justified. secondly, we can say of mathematics, geometry and logic as a system whose propositions do not relate to the things in our actual world. without confirming that the propositions in the system can reflect the things in our actual world, such proposition depends on some non-experiential source. since mathematics, geometry and logic can be considered in two ways, if i sum up that all propositions in geometry, arithmetic and logic are not necessary a priori propositions, it will be objected that we can say of mathematics, geometry and logic as a system whose propositions correspond to the things in our actual world. to avoid such an objection, therefore, i conclude my argument in the form of “if ... then” which do not actually confirm that all propositions in geometry, arithmetic and logic are contingent “a priori” propositions. 2 furthermore, the paradoxes which are not in mathematics can also cause us to question why all of a priori propositions are necessarily true, such as the sorites paradox. 3 the objection may be a result of kant’s argument which claims that a priori knowledge is knowledge entirely independent of experience. when kant states that a priori knowledge is knowledge “entirely independent of experience”, it seems that experience cannot both justify and defeat any a priori knowledge. references casullo, albert. a priori justification. oxford: oxford university press, 2003. donnellan, k. “the contingent a priori and rigid designators.” midwest studies in philosophy ii 2 (1977): 12-27. kant, immanuel. critique of pure reason. translated by norman kemp smith. new york: st.martin's press, 1958. philip kitcher, the nature of mathematical knowledge. new york: oxford university press, 1983. putnam, hilary. “’two dogmas’ revisited” in gilbert ryle, (ed.), contemporary aspects of philosophy. stocksfield: oriel press (1976): 202-13. kripke, s. naming and necessity. oxford: blackwell, 1980. quine, w. v. two dogmas of empiricism. in from a logical point of view. cambridge: harvard university press, 1951. rocca, m. d. essentialism versus essentialism. in gendler, t. s. and hawthorne, j. (eds.), imagination, conceivabilty, possibility. oxford university press, university press (2002): 223-252. salmon, m. introduction to the philosophy of science : a text. nj: prentice hall, 1992. a report on emotional education for young children: educating the king: the art of governance in early arab literature syrine snoussi université de nice abstract this paper questions the early arab literary tradition of the education of kings by initially defining the notion of education in this type of literature. the conflict between power and education is then presented in terms of the opposition between the educator and the king. the architectural model that structures the conception of educating and ruling is then described, before presenting the royal virtues and functions that exemplify the ideal king. it ends with a note on the role of religion in this genre of giving advice to the royalty. introduction since plato's republic at least, we are familiar with the idea that kings should have a special education, distinct from the one of the common people. in the republic, rulers were selected according to their nature and their aptitude towards learning of some specific sciences and arts. the education of the future ruler consists in a process of selection according to a general program of education. this kind of conception of the education of the king was exemplified by the arab philosopher al-farabi (deceased around 950 a.c), in the achievement of happiness. but while philosophy seems to offer a unified and systematic discourse on the king’s education, literature in a larger sense presents what seems to be a prior and more practical version of this education. in fact, the idea of educating the king seems to be as old as the idea of the empire as illustrated in literature even before the emergence of philosophy as a specific and scientific discourse. scholars have even distinguished a specific european literary genre called “fürtenspiegel” or “mirror for princes”. the question of the practice of power is developed in this gendre. the mirrors display models of representation about the king, often crystallized in literature in some topos. these forms, quite prefabricated, reflect the history of thought and have ancient origins. it has examples in ancient egypt or mesopotamia and the ancient hebrew tradition 1 . it then developed in the ancient greek and roman worlds and medieval latin mirrors are quite well known. but this tradition can also be found in persian and arab literatures where it is developed and modified until the last arabic mirror for princes in the xixth century. but, more precisely, in the literature of giving advice to kings, education is not expressly mentioned, and it doesn’t seem to be, at first sight, as the proper place to discuss the education of kings. indeed, in philosophy, like in plato’s laws, the education of the king is based on contemplation and science. but the literary genre stresses the practices of governance, as in the case of the cyropedia of xenophon, or in a discourse to an unlearned prince by plutarch in the grecoroman world. in the arab 2 world this literature appeared even before the emergence of any arabic philosophical writings. the first arabic book seems to be the letters of aristotle to alexander 3 , an arab rewriting of a hellenistic correspondence that initiated the tradition of the arab arts of governance. this literature provided the first and only conception of power or governance in the arab world. these books try to respond to this question of the means of becoming a good ruler and, in this literature, information about the education of the king may be found. but it is questionable whether these literary discourses reflect the real situation of education during the initial stages of the development of islam.. perhaps they contribute more to the establishment of a model, working in a performative way. these interrogations seek to understand the stakes of the topic of the mirrors for princes, and responds to the broader question of the efficiency of ancient arab literature in terms of its capacity to educate the king. one of the difficulties we meet in the analysis of this tradition is the profusion of clichés, topos, and repetitions of anecdotes from one book to another. they certainly give some historical information, but melted with myths, and fantasies. the repetition of some models through time seems to be more relevant if we consider it as the reflection of what the power in a large sense wants to show to the entourage of the king and to the king himself; but not necessarily what it is really in fact. it cannot simply be considered as historical proof. it also contributes to an understanding of the system of values that were developed or needs to be developed during a specific reign. this literary genre does not seem to establish a program of teaching, such as a specification of what should be learned as science and in what age lessons are to be taught in order to produce a good ruler. in the arab tradition, the education of the king is revealed between the lines; not in the sense of school education, but in the ancient sense of learning, and within the context of an ancient sense of philosophy. culture as education the education of the king is not specifically conceptualized in these writings, but merely implied by the problematic of educating the king. for us, education is the methodic action that an adult exercises on a child or a young adult to develop his physical, intellectual or moral aptitudes. by extension, it can designate the formation of the spirit in order to gain self-control, autonomy, and a sense of values or of duty. in the same way, it means training to make someone adapt to his social function or context. if we expect from the reading of the mirrors for princes a sort of knowledge about education in the first two senses mentioned above, we won’t find it. but, if we understand education as a kind of self-transformation for a specific function or context, then the arabic mirrors for princes are the perfect field for such an investigation. there are no indications of a kind of program of education in this literary genre. sometimes, in one mirror, we can find mention of the sort of arts and sciences that the children of the king should be trained for. but this is not about the actual king. indeed the reader of these texts is supposed to be, in most cases, the actual king himself and not necessarily a child. so here we must understand education as a synonym for cultural formation, a process of socialization through which the sum of cultural products of one society is transmitted to its members by means of social imitation and practical education. culture certainly expresses itself differently among the various levels of society: some things that are relevant among the lower levels are not necessarily valuable at the higher level. the culture of the kings is not the one of the people. that is why training the king for his level of society is a duty of the court. beyond a mere process of learning confirmed by tests, the education of kings, as revealed in the mirror for princes, is more of an adaptation towards a specific culture. in the arabic tradition, the metaphor of the mirror is not so developed; but the literary genre has a specific name: al-adaab as-sultaniyya and this is related to the notion of education, revealing the link between culture and education. but the word “adab,” in its singular form, designates a code of behavior and practices, which indicates that this is about the whole knowledge that is required to behave in society or in a particular group. employed alone, this word includes the knowledge of language, poetry, proverbs, and anecdotes that constitute an elegant conversation. from this general sense, a more specific one is derived, which designates the learned prose literature from the viiith century to the xixth centuries. in the first sense, it could be translated as culture, and to some extent it can represent the antique greek paideia 4 , or education. in the expression al-adaab al-sultaniyya, which is plural, however, the prose literature deals with the different kinds of knowledge and behavior that are required from the ruler. it is an application of the first sense of the meaning of education as enculturation with a specific group: those who share the power; in literature, it delineates a specific group of texts, but also consequently identifies the readers and subsequently specifies the purpose. in these texts, the discourse is intimately linked with a way of life, the life of the king. knowing is intended to be immediately related to living. it is remarkable that the verbal scheme “a-d-b” is related to the activity of feeding, giving a feast, and also signifies having a culture, being learned, and ways of punishing. all these activities -feeding, attaining to a certain social class, having authority -require social rules. the concept of “adab” is always related to the activity of domestic management, community, sociability. it indicates a direction, in its original meaning of an oriented movement. there is a semantic link between direction, learning, and ruling. al adaab al-sultaniyya are not only what a sovereign should know but they are also reflective of how he should rule, because real knowledge seems to reside in the art of ruling. politic is the royal art: it is not only the art of kingship but also the art of the arts. education in these books is not only an ethical problem but it is firstly a political problem. the notion of education in these books works as a mirror and we shall try to present how this mirror works. first of all, the education given in the mirrors for princes can be described as parenetical, which means that it exhorts the ruler to virtue. it is a kind of moral education specific to kings. educating and advising presenting a program of education to the king is difficult because of the tension between power and education. the educator must be invested with a minimum of power in order to convince his student about the benefit and the necessity of learning the knowledge he is trying to teach. this authority is the fruit of the recognition of his peers, or by his employer. but when the student is the employer, his knowledge alone is not enough to give him authority. when the most powerful is the one who must be taught, the tension between power and knowledge becomes very sensitive. we have seen that the conception of education in the arabic tradition of mirrors for princes must be understood within the large context of culture. the notion of education, therefore, must be interrogated in terms of the tools by which the culture of the king is transmitted. these books are the books of advices. advising someone, especially a king, to do something, however, does not imply that the advisee will do it. the problem of advising the king has always had to face this difficulty of educating the most powerful. if we accept that education is not necessarily related to obedience, we must recognize that educating the king cannot be anything else but advising and advisement always has to deal with the problem of power. there seems to be only two ways to advise the king: subordinate the counsel to the power, and consequently making it less inefficient or make the counsel more powerful than the king. the art of governance has always made its way between the tensions of these two options. in kalila and dimna 5 , by ibn al-muqaffa’ for example, the lion, as personification of the ruler, is the most powerful in the forest. but, his strength does not make him safe from the ruses of those who are more clever than he is. in the main story of kalila and dimna, one of the advisors of the king is trying to take advantage from a secret fear of the king to obtain a more powerful position than someone who is more qualified. the struggle for power is permanent, and this struggle often occurs between the ruler and his advisors. arabic medieval history is full of these conflicts. the most renowned and the most quoted conflict in ancient and modern times is the conflict between haroun ar-rashid and his barmakid vizirs 6 . in this power struggle, the ones who have the intelligence of tricks pretend to be the advisors of the sovereign. ibn al-muqaffa’ himself, as many of the writers of mirrors for princes, was a secretary of two governors of irak 7 . strength is understood as the power which permits the sovereign to take the throne. but strength is not enough for the king, he must be aware of all the tricks that could be used against him. one of the functions of the mirrors for princes is to try to present other models of power aside from brutal strength. these texts are the first attempts to rationalize the use of power. the hidden spring of the education of kings, just like machiavelli’s prince, lies in how the muslim prince must first of all learn about maintaining his power. the ruler’s need to keep himself in power was considered to be an absolute necessity 8 . the art of governance must therefore include the notion of power. advising was not only teaching about virtue but it was also addressing some of the very practical problems of ruling. many counsels were not exhortations about doing that which is absolutely good, but about goodness, for the sake of the king. this includes the well-being of the people, and also the preservation of power. teaching tricks were a very big part of this education. for example, one of the first mirrors, kalila and dimna begins with a preface from a transmitter that puts the stress on the figure of alexander the great, considered as a model of the good ruler. it tells the story of one trick used by the great conqueror to overcome poros, the king of india. alexander supposedly sent fake riders made of copper filled with sulfur and naphta. when the riders were near the adverse army, alexander set fire on them so the elephants of the army of poros were burnt and they ran away. this trick introduced the tradition of advising the king. tricks were not only used against enemies but also inside the empire. the thematic of being secretive takes an important place in these advices. ibn al-muqaffa‘ advised the king, for the first time in the arab writing, to have secret agents. the educational problem in the art of governance must therefore ask how counseling can be educative, if counseling implies teaching the use of tricks. understand the virtue of the king within the context of teaching the use of tricks must be taken into consideration. the struggle against pure strength and the arbitrary use of power have consequences on the discourse of the art of governance itself. the problem of training the powerful leads to a kind of codification of this literary genre. power is often expressed in metaphors that are reproduced as clichés. the frequently used metaphor, for example, is the one that compares the power and ruling with sailing a ship in a tempest, or the ruler as a sailor. the steersman doesn’t rule men, but he steers a ship, the entity that holds the travelers. he has to avoid the reefs, be prepared for the storms, and know how to find his way out of trouble at any time. this metaphor always appears in a context that describes the dangers that threaten the sovereign. there are inner dangers, like riots, and outside dangers, such as storms, pirates. the prince must defend the city from these perils. this metaphor indicates that the representation of governance has less to do with ruling the souls of citizens in order to lead them for salvation in the hereafter, than with the very political duty to maintain security for the city. the power is also often compared to a fire that burns anyone who approaches it too close. these metaphors of the power are ancient; they already figured in the greek tradition, even in plato’s opera. they stress on the military definition of power. they warn about the dangers that surround those who are close to power. these symbolic expressions of the power, however, are also less dangerous for the one who employs them than to his immediate critics. many recommendations figure in the adaab al-sultaniyya regarding the right way to address the king and the usual advice is to express it symbolically. the advisor should appeal to the imaginative faculty of the ruler. in the fable of the lion and the beef in kalila and dimna, dimna, who wants to be a counselor of the king, employs the metaphor of the painter to describe the activity of the advisor when guiding the desire of the king towards goodness. the painter draws on the walls images as if they are going to step out of the wall, although they are not. but if the counselor should show prudence, he is also the one who will advise the king to act the same. prudence requires the king to take advices from different persons, but not to consult every one at the same time. he must also take his consultations secret, and finally he must act only according to his personal reason, after thinking and balancing every advice, as ibn al-muqaffa‘ recommends in risala fil-sahaba 9 . all the decisions that he makes must be his: for the king's reason only, may lead the king's way. but even though the king makes decisions on his own, the simple fact that consulting and taking advice is now part of ruling, can be considered as an attempt to limit the arbitrary use of power. although it seems to reinforce the king's power, this regulation of the consultation which requires the art of understanding, hiding, and deliberation, reveals a resistance to arbitrary use of power. the art of governance constitute broad discourses that make use of these strategies of consultation. correcting and succeeding mirrors for princes are often directly addressed to a prince. they describe the ideal prince: his behavior, and his place in the world. the european world uses this metaphor of the mirror to designate the kind of book that deals with the education, in a large sense, of the king. the metaphor of mirroring was apparently initiated by seneca in the de clementia. this metaphor operates in two directions: first, the mirror is a model and secondly, provides a reflection. it is a model, in the sense that it invites the ruler to contemplate what is in the mirror. it gives a reflection, when it invites the king to be a model for the people he rules, while the mirror gives him the opportunity to remain himself. it is a characteristic of such treatises on education to give models to the king and, through this, to offer himself as a model to the people, or at least to invite the king to behave like this model. the arab fürtenspiegels were straightaway structured by this scheme. that is why it is possible to maintain the catoptric metaphor even for texts that do not use it. for example, one persian furtenspiegel, 'ahd ardashir 10 , translated in arabic in the 8 th century, insists on the importance of the example and links it with the succession from the same to the same. the narrator of this text is supposed to be ardashir ibn babak, the founder of the persian sassanid dynasty. he addressed his sons and successors, in a paragraph that justifies all his writings: you shall know that you will face what i have faced, and that the matters that will happen to you after my death will bring you what they brought me (…) we have seen the fair king, blessed with happiness, helped by god, favored, victorious, (…) and the salvation of the kingship would not succeed to their reign, unless after his death someone resembled him [on the throne] 11 . this makes us notice that knowing the history of the past kings is a relevant part of the knowledge of the prince. ardashir, alexander and pharaoh were some of the models used in these books. moreover, history is conceived as a tribunal of the reign. to mention great quasi-mythical kings, like ardashir in some later mirrors, functions as an admonition to behave like them. but it is also an indirect invitation to do the best in order to have the same great renown 12 . history was conceived as the collection of great actions and it constituted a persuasive argument for appropriate behavior. this conception of history integrates the ancient tradition of the lives of the famous within the tradition of the fürtenspiegel. the notion of sira is the perfect translation in arabic of the ancient life. it signifies the biography. it was the principal material of the mirrors and an efficient discourse that was an institution of the culture of the king. it provides the king with the basic elements for a culture of ruling. by defining the qualities of the king, it offers a theoretical knowledge and gives examples of the practices of power. the function of this kind of writing as model to the subjects is clearly indicated in the same text : you shall know that every king has a court of faithful followers and that each one in this suite has its own suite one (...etc.). and when the king sets up his suite in a convenient manner, everyone will set up its own in a same way, so that all the subjects will find welfare. knowing the history of past times not only leads to the imitation of the great actions of the past in the present time but also allows the reproduction of the imitation in the present space by the imitation of the place of the prince in the whole society. every level should imitate the preeminent level. this can be related to some neo-platonic influences. in a preface of kalila and dimna, there is a clear evocation of the divine effluence of the king's intellect on his subjects 13 , which has a neoplatonic tone. intellect is what reinforces the [power] of the king on his kingdom. indeed the people and the crowds are only good by the emanation of the flame of the justice that flows from the intellect because it is the consolidation of the nation. this theoretical explanation of the function of such a model devoted to the king explains also the development of a specific literary genre. the mirrors for princes were evidently addressed to kings; but they were not the only ones who read them. they were mostly written by secretaries and ministers who used them to give advice to kings, and so they were a part of the practice and the education of these secretaries too. they must have been a part of the knowledge of the udaba or learned people of the elite. they were also a part of the culture of the court. imitation is the tool that permits the extension of ruling from the governance of the self to the governance of the others. it is based on the intellect but more precisely on the faculty of imagination, which allows the use of symbolism. to get the imitation efficient, the model must have a great power of representation and it must be distinguished as a model. the stress is put on the distinction between the domain of the king and the arena of the people. two concepts are working for that: the “sociological” concepts of ‘amma and khassa. this distinction appears in the first mirrors for princes. the khassa, which has the original meaning of “what is particular, private” designates the king's familiars: his family, his courtiers and almost everyone who works close to him as an employee, like the secretaries and the ministers and even the servants and cooks who can stay in his presence. some of them have a better rank than others but this is not the central distinction. the khassa is a privileged circle that deals with the king’s life, and because his life is related to his ruling, it is the people of the khassa who deal with the state’s affairs. that explains how it is possible for the life of the king to emanate on the life of the majority which is designated by the word ‘amma. “‘amma” means “what is common”, or “what is public”. the word designates the people, the masses. the distinction between khassa and ‘amma separates the field of the art of governance, that requires privacy and the use of tricks and secret, from the field that requires laws and public management. the management of the khassa is to be imitated in the ‘amma. the constitution and the management of the first circle requires attention, because this circle is also the circle of the most powerful people. it is also the place where an opponent can hide. but it also requires attention because it is the model of a microcosm in which the rest of the state reflects. that is why encouraging the king to be a model to the subjects must also be understood as a way of fighting against the excesses of the power. there is conflict between the two parts of the society and the conflict is solved in the discourses of the mirrors for princes by the insistence on the function of the exemplary model that the king should play by reproducing the models that are presented to him in the tradition of the art of governance. royal functions and royal virtues the mirrors for princes define the virtues of the kings. the model is not only illustrated by great figures of the past times, but also by the moral virtues of the ruler. in the first art of governance known in arabic, the letters from aristotle to alexander, one letter insists on the royal virtues 14 . the two major virtues are courage and justice. all the others species of virtues are mentioned but are not detailed because the more important virtues that are related to ruling are courage and justice. but physical and military strength are also considered virtuous. we should understand the meaning of virtue in these treatises in its ancient sense of excellence. the king must be the most powerful. it is not only a matter of fact but it is also what characterizes the good king. two qualities complete the portrait of a good ruler: being loved and admired. these two qualities work as a counterbalance to the great strength of the king, so his power couldn’t be without any limit. its limit lies in the opinion of his people, of the ‘amma. these qualities are typical of the ancient greek meaning of quality, which is relative to a social background. what is good is valued not by itself but in relation to the valuation of the social group. the quality of being loved and admired is indicative of the historical fact of desiring to have a great reputation after the king’s death. moral behavior is conditioned to the tribunal of history and courage seams to be the principal virtue that engenders strength and justice, the other principal virtue that leads to being loved and admired. the same text describes the function of the ruler. the necessity of a ruler is related to the apparition of peace. where there is war, there is no need for a ruler, but when peace comes, the interests of the people are neglected. a ruler is required to set up legislation and education. the argument, in this text, probably written at the end of viii th century, is clearly influenced by the greek conception of governance. it also reveals that setting up legislation was indeed a major issue in the first period of islamic governance, when the hellenic conception of governance was taken as a model. this presentation of the function of the ruler, initiates the arab literary tradition of the mirror for princes, and justifies the need for an art of governance. function of religion in the first mirrors. before ending this presentation of the conception of the education of the king in the arabic mirrors for princes, we must make a remark about the place of religion in this culture. the tradition of mirror for princes appeared prior to the establishment of the collection of the words of the prophet. it is one of the closest scriptural traditions to the so-called golden age of policy in islam world. we cannot deny that the muslim’s first conquests depended on a theocratic conception of power. here there is the influence of the ancient oriental religions and of the persian political tradition, especially the sassanid one. ahd ardashir represents that ancient tradition: sovereignty and religion are twins, one of them cannot exist without the other, because religion is the foundation of sovereignty and the sovereign is the guard of religion. this is a persian ancient text and the religion here is the zoroastrian, and yet the text is very often quoted in the arabic literature. it betrays a certain exploitation of religion. religion could be the refuge for oppressed people of low status. they could therefore contest the power. so the sovereign has a duty to control religion. nevertheless, he still remains out of the religious sphere. the duty of controlling and ruling does not coincide with the duty of religious edification or with an eschatological conception of governance. ibn al-muqaffa’s risala fil-sahaba, deepens the distinction between the two spheres of government in depth. in the §17, he gives a list of the sovereign prerogatives. he is the one who decides to go to war and return from military operation. he commands the collection and distribution of public funds, and the appointment and dismissal of officials. he provides judgement by reason for all that is not written in the book or in the law tradition. he struggles with the enemies and uses tricks against them. he orders the collecting and distributing the specific taxes provided for the muslims only. the theocratic conception of governance is not the last word of this expression of policies. even ibn al-muqaffa’ gives advice to the caliph al-mansur in order to settle the divergent practices of the judges and to constitute a code of law. conclusion the early arab tradition of the fürtenspiegel presents more than a program of education for the kings. it shows a culture of governance that reveals a tension between the knowledge it bears and the one that wields power. its main issue, as an imperial literature, is to define power not only based on strength. this can explain why practical reason and tricks are valued in these writings. however the problem of strength also structures the tradition of the mirrors for princes itself in its rhetoric. it affects its semantics but also its content. the function of mirrors, as examples, is to teach the king; but the way it works makes history the motor of a process of justification and activation of the art of governance. the adaab al-sultaniyya can be described by the metaphor of the mirror even if they do not thematise the catoptric metaphor. these books of advice for kings were not only presenting a model of the good king to be reproduced by the actual king, they also apply the structure of the mirror to articulate a theory of governance that pervades every level of society. endnotes 1 cf. p. hadot, « fürtenspiegel », in reallexicon für antike and christentum, t. viii, 1972, col. 555-632. 2 by arab world, we mean the cultural area in which the arabic language is used. 3 there is still no critical edition of this correspondence. mario grignaschi has produced two important articles on it: « le roman épistolaire classique conservé dans la version arabe de sâlim abû-l-‘ala’ », le muséon, revue d’études orientales, lxxx, louvain, 1967, p. 211 – 264 ; and « les rasa’il aristatalisa ila-l-iskandar de salim abu-l-‘ala’ et l’activité culturelle à l’époque omeyyade », in bulletin d’etudes orientales, tome xix, années 1965-1966, damas, 1967, p. 7 – 83. 4 it is in this sense that werner jaeger employed paideia to describe the ideals of the greek man. cf. w. jaeger, paideia, oxford university press, 1986. 5 kalila and dimna, until recently, was considered by scholars as the very first arabic mirror for princes. ibn almuqaffa’ lived in the viiith century. there are many editions of kalila and dimna in arabic. one of the best, even though not perfect, is the one edited by taha hussain and abd al-wahab azzam, dar al-ma‘arif, cairo, 1982. 6 harun ar-rashid was caliph from 786 to his death in 809. he and his minister ja‘far al-barmaki are the heroes of many stories of the thousand and one nights. 7 see article “ibn al-muqaffa”, encyclopaedia of islam, vol iv, edited by b. lewis, v.l. ménage, ch. pellat and j. schacht, assisted by c. dumont, e. van donzel and g.r. hawting, brill. 8 see for example, ibn al-muqaffa‘, risala fil-sahaba, ed. ch. pellat, paris, maisonneuve et larose, 1976. 9 cf. ibn al-muqaffa‘, risala fil-sahaba, ed. ch. pellat, paris, maisonneuve et larose, 1976. 10 cf. ahd aradashir, [testimony of ardashir], ed. m. grignaschi, in « quelques spécimens de la littérature sassanide conservés dans les bibliothèques d’istanbul », in journal asiatique, 1966. 11 all the quotations have been translated from the arabic by myself. 12 there is a clear mention of it in the first arabic mirror for princes, the letters from aristotle to alexander, specifically in one letter, the siyasat al-mudun, or lettre sur la politique envers les cités, [letters on the policy towards the city] edited by bielawasky and plezner, wroclaw-warszawa-krakow, 1970. 13 kalila and dimna, “introduction to the book, by ali ibn al-shah al-farisi”. 14 cf. siyasat al-mudun, or lettre sur la politique envers les cités, [letters on the policy towards the city] edited by bielawasky and plezner, wroclaw-warszawa-krakow, 1970 11(180-184)_note for authors a new age in the history of philosophy: the world dialogue between philosophical traditions enrique dussel uam-iz., méxico abstract this paper argues the following points: 1. it is necessary to affirm that all of humanity has always sought to address certain “core universal problems” that are present in all cultures. 2. the rational responses to these “core problems” first acquire the shape of mythical narratives. 3. the formulation of categorical philosophical discourses is a subsequent development in human rationality, which does not however negate all mythical narratives. these discourses arose in all the great urban neolithic cultures (even if only in initial form). 4. modern european philosophy confused its economic, political and cultural domination, and the resulting crises in other philosophical traditions, with a eurocentric universality claim, which must be questioned. 5. in any case there are formal universal aspects in which all regional philosophies can coincide, and which respond to the “core problems” at an abstract level. 6. all of this impels entry into a new age of inter-philosophical dialogue, respectful of differences and open to learning from the useful discoveries of other traditions. 7. a new philosophical project must be developed that is capable of going beyond eurocentric philosophical modernity, by shaping a global trans-modern pluriverse, drawing upon the “discarded” (by the modernity) own resources of peripheral, subaltern, postcolonial philosophies. in this paper i will explore a theme that i believe should occupy us prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 1-22 1 © 2000 by assumption university press for a significant portion of the 21st century: our recognition and acceptance of the meaning, value, and history of all regional philosophical traditions on the planet (european, north american, chinese, indian, arab, african, latin american, etc.). this will be the first time in the history of philosophy that these diverse traditions will be open to an authentic and symmetrical dialogue-a dialogue that will enable us to understand many aspects unknown to us, aspects that may be better developed in some traditions than in others. this dialogue will play a key role in unlocking the contents of the daily life of humanity in other cultures, thanks to the enormous machinery of mass media that makes it possible for us to receive news instantaneously of cultures about which we lack first hand knowledge, and will also imply an ethical positioning grounded in the equal recognition of all philosophical communities with equal rights of argumentation. this will make it possible for us to transcend the eurocentrism of modernity, so prevalent today, which impedes creativity and often obscures the great discoveries achieved by other traditions. 1. universal core problems when i refer to “universal core problems,” i mean those fundamental questions (of an ontological character) that homo sapiens posed upon attaining a certain level of maturity. once their level of cerebral development allowed for consciousness, self-consciousness, linguistic, ethical and social development (that is, responsibility for their own acts), human beings confronted the totality of the real in order to manage things in such a way as to achieve the reproduction and development of human life in community. human bewilderment in the face of the possible causes of natural phenomena was further compounded by the unpredictability of their own impulses and behaviors, leading to questions regarding “core problems” such as: what are real things in their totality and how do they behave? such questions encompass phenomena ranging from the astronomical to the simple falling of a stone or the artificial production of fire. they also encompass the mystery of their own human subjectivity, the ego, interiority, spontaneity, as well as the nature of freedom and the cre2 prajñâ vihâra ation of the social and ethical world. in the end, they arrive at the question of how we interpret the ultimate foundation of everything that is real, and the universe itself? which in turn leads to the classic ontological question: “why being and not nothingness?” these basic “core problems” have inevitably been faced by all human communities since the remotest period of the paleolithic age; they are among the many possible variations of the universal “whys,” and are present in every culture and tradition. the content and the way of responding to these “core problems” unleashes, impels, and disperses diverse trajectories of rational narratives, if by rationality we understand simply that reasons have been provided in support of assertions, and that these assertions are intended to interpret or explain phenomena that have “appeared” at the initial level of each of these “core problems.” 2. the rational development of mythical narratives throughout all of its stages of development, humanity has always and inevitably given linguistic expression to rational responses (understood here to mean those that are proffered with some kind of underlying foundation, regardless of its specific character, at least until it is refuted) to core problems such as those described above. this has occurred as the result of a process involving the “production of myths” (mytho-poiésis). the production of myths was the first rational form of interpretation or explanation of reality (of the world, subjectivity, the ethical practical horizon, and the ultimate reference of reality that is described symbolically). from this perspective myths are symbolic narratives that are not irrational and that do not refer exclusively to singular phenomena. they are symbolic enunciations, and therefore have a “double meaning” that can only be fully elucidated through a hermeneutical process that uncovers the layers of reasoning behind them. it is in this sense that they are rational, and that they must be grasped in terms of the extent to which their content has a universal significance, given their reference to circumstances that are susceptible to repetition, and constructed upon the basis of concepts (cerebral categorizations or cerebral maps that involve millions of neurons and imply the convergence in meaning of multiple and singular empirical phenomena that human beings must confront). enrique dussel 3 numerous myths are organized according to their relationship to the core problems that i have just highlighted, and have been preserved in the collective memory of communities throughout the world. this was first done through oral tradition, and in written form since 3000 b.c., when they begin to be collected, remembered, and interpreted by communities of sages who had a sense of admiration in the face of reality, in the spirit of aristotle’s affirmation2: “but he who finds no explanation (in what he sees, and turns instead to admiration) […] thereby recognizes his ignorance. this is why he who loves myth (philómythos) is akin to he who loves wisdom (philósophos)”. this is how mythical “traditions” emerge to provide peoples throughout the world with rational explanations related to the questions that have always been most pressing for humanity, and which i have defined here as “core problems”. these include peoples as poor and as “simple” in their material culture as the tupinamba indigenous people of brazil, who according to claude lévi-strauss’ studies, carried out the responsibilities inherent in their daily lives in ways embedded in the complex web of meaning provided by their vast number of myths. according to paul ricoeur, each culture has an “ethical and mythical core”3, or “vision of the world” (weltanschauung) that provides a framework of interpretation and ethical guidance for the most significant moments in human existence. on the other hand, certain cultures (such as those of china, india, mesopotamia, egypt, the aztec or mexica, the arabs, the hellenic world, rome, russia, etc.,) as a result of their political, economic, and military hegemony, were able to consolidate geopolitical dominance. these processes endowed them a degree of universality that included the imposition of their mythical structures over those of subaltern cultures. such patterns of cultural domination are evident throughout multiple periods of historical development. as a result of these cultural clashes, certain myths will endure in subsequent stages (even in the age of categorical philosophical discourses and of the science of modernity itself, up to the present). myths will never completely disappear as long as some of them continue to make sense, as ernst bloch argues persuasively in his work the principle of hope.4 3. the new rational development of discourses with philosophi4 prajñâ vihâra cal categories we have become accustomed, in the context of explanations of the transition from mythos to lógos, to understand this process as a leap from the irrational to the rational, from the concretely empirical to the universal, and from the realm of the senses to the realm of concepts. this is false. they are both rational. each of the narratives at issues has a certain degree of rationality, but their specific character varies. there is a progression in terms of degrees of univocal precision, semantic clarity, simplicity, and in the conclusive force with which their foundations have been laid. but there are also losses in multiplicity of meaning when symbols displaced, but which can be hermeneutically rediscovered in diverse moments and places (as is characteristic of mythical rational narratives). for example the promethean or adamic5 myths continue to have ethical meaning today. thus univocal rational discourse as expressed in philosophical categories that are capable of defining conceptual content without recourse to symbols (as in a myth) gains in precision but loses in terms of its resonance of meaning. all of this nonetheless implies an important civilizational advance, which opens up the possibility of abstraction in modes of analysis. here, the separation of the semantic content of the phenomenon being observed -the description and precise explanation of empirical realityenables the observer’s management to be more efficient in the reproduction and development of human life in community. in this context, wisdom can order the diverse responses to the core problems that have been enumerated, and becomes the content of a differentiated social “role” focused upon the clarification, exposition, and development of said wisdom. from the perspective of the sociology of philosophy, communities of philosophers form groups differentiated from those of priests, artists, political actors, etc. the members of these communities of sages take on a ritualized form constituting “schools of life” with a strictly disciplinary character (from the aztecs calmécac to the athenian academy or the sages communities of the city of memphis in the egypt of the third millennium b.c.), and came to be known as the socalled “lovers of wisdom” (philo-sóphoi) among the greeks. but from a historical perspective the “lovers of myths” were also, strictly speaking, enrique dussel 5 “lovers of wisdom,” and this is why those who will later be described as philosophers should be described more aptly as philo-logists, if lógos is understood to mean a rational discourse that employs philosophical categories and no longer has recourse to mythical symbolic narrative, or only exceptionally and as an example of how philosophical hermeneutics holds sway. this process of leaving behind the purest form of mythical rational expression and stripping away its symbolic content gradually emerged in all of the great urban cultures of the neolithic. this process gives certain terms or words a univocal, definable meaning with conceptual content that is the fruit of methodical analytical elaboration and is capable of moving from the whole to the parts as it fixes its specific meaning. key examples of narratives employing philosophical categories began to emerge in india (subsequent to the upanishads), in china (from the book of changes or i ching), in persia, mesopotamia, egypt (in texts such as those described as the “philosophy of memphis”), in the eastern mediterranean between the phoenicians and the greeks, in mesoamerica (the maya and aztecs or mexican), in the andean region the amautas among the aymaras and the quechuas, who gave life to incan civilization, etc. among the aztecs, quetzal-coatl was the symbolic expression of a dual ancestral deity (“quetzal” referring to the green and red feathers of a beautiful tropical bird as a symbol for divinity, and “coatl” referring to a twin or brother, the “duality”). this is what the tlamatinime (“those who know things,” and whom bernardino de sahagún called “philosophers”6) described as ometeotl (from the roots in the náhuatl language omé, which means two, and teotl, which refers to divinity), leaving the symbol aside. this denomination highlighted the “dual origin” of the universe (instead of the unitary origin characteristic of to én, or the one in plato or plotinus, for example). this indicates the beginning of the transition from symbolic rationality to the rationality of philosophical conceptual categorization among the aztecs, as reflected in the historical figure of the poet and philosopher-king nezahúalcoyotl (1402-1472). some authors such as raúl fornet-betancourt in latin america7 concede that philosophy was practiced in amerindia (before the european invasion in 1492) or in pre-colonial africa, without much elaboration of what he understands to be philosophy. paulin hountondji’s sharp cri6 prajñâ vihâra tique of the concept of ethnophilosophy, derived from placide tempel’s book bantu philosophy9, highlights the need to better define what we mean by philosophy in such contexts, in order among other things to distinguish it from myth. nonetheless when we carefully read the first sentences of the tao te-king (or dao de jing) by the legendary lao-tze: “the tao that can be spoken of is not the constant tao; the name that can be named is not the constant name; the nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth,”10 we find ourselves confronted with a text that employs philosophical categories distant from those of a purely mythical narrative. it is also impossible today to ignore the argumentative density and rationality characteristic of the philosophy of k’ung fu-tsu (confucius) (551-479 b.c.),11 and the levels of philosophical development evident in mo-tzu (479-380 b.c.),12 whose continuous, even excessive patterns of argumentation criticized the social and moral implications of confucianism, affirming a universalism with grave political implications, and which was skeptical of rituals and unduly elaborate organizations or “schools.” his contributions are one of the pillars of chinese philosophy that predated the great confucian synthesis of meng tzu (mencius) (390-305 b.c.).13 this philosophy spans some 2,500 years, with classics each century, and even during the period of european modernity thinkers such as wang yang-ming (1472-1529), who develops the neo-confucian tradition that extends all the way up to the present, influencing mao tse-tung and playing a role in the emergence of contemporary capitalism in china and singapore equivalent to that of calvinism in europe. there was also huang tsung-hsi (1610-1695) a great renovator of political philosophy. in the same way the philosophies of the indian subcontinent are organized in terms of the philosophical expression14 of the core problems. we read in chandogya upanishad: “in the beginning, my dear, this world was just being (sat), one only, without a second. some people, no doubt, say: in the beginning, verily, this world was just nonbeing (asat), one only, without a second; from that nonbeing being was produced. but how, indeed, my dear, could it be so? said he. how could being be produced from nonbeing? on the contrary, my dear, in the beginning this world was being alone.”15 enrique dussel 7 is it not a philosophical discourse? in hinduism the concept of brahman refers to the totality of the universe (as does that of pacha in quechua among the incas of peru); atman refers to subjectivity, karma to human action, and moksha to the relationship between atman and brahman. it is with these “core” concepts as points of departure that a discourse undertaken by means of philosophical categories begins to be constructed in the fifth century b.c. it is then with sankara (788-820 a.d.) that the philosophy of the subcontinent achieves a classical level, which it has continued to develop up to the present. buddhist philosophy, meanwhile, beginning with siddhartha gautama (563-483 b.c.), rejects the concepts of brahman and atman, given its assumption that the totality of the universe is an eternal process unfolding in an interconnected manner (patitya samatpada). this even more clearly negates the mythical traditions (such as those of the vedas), contributing instead to the construction of a strictly rational narrative, which is not, as in all philosophies, utterly exempt from mythological moments, such as ensomátosis, referring to the successive “re-incorporations of souls.” meanwhile, jainism, whose first exponent was vardhamana mahvira (599-527 b.c.), ontologically defends the tattvartha sutra (“no violence, no possession, no determination”) from the perspective of a universal vitalism, which has great relevance to the ecological crisis we face today. all of this clearly implies that philosophy was not born solely or originally in greece, nor can it be taken as the prototype of philosophical discourse. this error arises from taking greek philosophy as the definition of philosophy itself, rather than discover a clear criteria of demarcation between mythical and philosophical categorical discourse. this confuses the part with the whole: a specific case does not capture the universal sweep of the definition needed. this does not deny greek philosophy its historical place among these philosophies, or its continuity with the philosophies of the roman empire, which in turn opened a cultural horizon towards the so-called latin-germanic european middle ages. these will culminate in the european philosophy that laid the foundations for the 8 prajñâ vihâra modernity produced by the european invasion of the american continent, and the emergence of colonialism and capitalism. the industrial revolution at the end of the 18th century (only two centuries ago) will make europe the central dominating civilization in the world-system, up to the beginning of the 21st century. this domination has obscured and distorted our understanding of history (due to the combined effects of what i have described as hellenocentrism and eurocentrism), and impeded the global perspective necessary to grasp an authentic history of philosophy. as a latin american i am convinced that the future development of world philosophy will be jeopardized if we do not clarify these issues by means of a contemporary dialogue between non-western philosophical traditions and those of europe and north america. in this context, e. husserl’s reflection set forth below, and repeated in general by m. heidegger and throughout europe and north america, seems so naïve: “thus philosophy […] is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation, begun with the first breakthrough of philosophy into mankind […] the image of the dawn characterizes greek philosophy in its beginning stage, the first elucidation through the first cognitive conception of what is as universe (des seienden als universum) […]”.16 in latin america, david sobrevilla essentially supports the same approach: “i believe that there is a general consensus that the philosophical activity of humanity first emerged in greece and not in the east. in this regard hegel and heidegger appear to be correct, instead of jaspers, who argues for the existence of three great philosophical traditions: those of china, india, and greece.”17 the philosophy of the east would be philosophy understood in a broad sense, and that of greece according to much narrower criteria. there is a confusion between the origins of european philosophy, which may in part lie in greece, and the origins of world philosophy, which has diverse origins, almost as many as there are fundamental traditions of philosophy. in addition it is assumed that this process was linear, following a enrique dussel 9 sequence “from greek philosophy to medieval latin philosophy and from there to their modern european expressions.” but the true historical trajectory was much more complex. greek philosophy was cultivated subsequently and principally by byzantine civilization, and arab philosophy in turn was the inheritor of byzantine philosophy, and in particular its aristotelian tradition. this required the creation of an arabic philosophical language in the strictest sense.18 latin aristotelian philosophy in paris in thirteenth century, for example, has its origin in greek texts and their arabic commentaries (translated in toledo, in spain, by arab specialists), and these greek texts were utilized and commentated by the “arab western philosophers” (in the caliphate of cordoba, in spain), continuing the “eastern” tradition with origins in cairo, bagdad, or samarkand. this produced a greek legacy profoundly reconstructed from a semitic perspective (such as that of arab civilization), and then passed on to latins and germanics in europe. it is ’ibn rushd (averroes) who marks the origin of the european philosophical renaissance in the thirteenth century. all of the world’s great cultures have created philosophies as well, with varying styles and characteristics of development, but all have produced (some only initially and others with great depth and precision) conceptual structural categories that must be recognized as philosophical. philosophical discourse does not destroy myth, although it does negate those who lose the capacity to resist the empirical argumentation inherent in such discourse. for example the myths of tlacaelel among the aztecs, which justified human sacrifice and provided good reasons for it19, completely collapsed once their impossibility was demonstrated, as well as their lack of practical feasibility. in fact, mythical elements may contaminate even the discourses of great philosophers. for example, immanuel kant argues in favor of the “immortality of the soul” in the “pure practical reason dialectics” of his critique of practical reason, as a way of resolving the question of the “supreme good” (since the soul would receive after death the happiness it had earned in its earthly life). but these concepts of the “soul” and of “immortality” demonstrate the persistence of mythical elements of indian origin in the greek thought-elements that came to permeate all of the 10 prajñâ vihâra roman, medieval christian, and modern european world. the supposedly philosophical proofs provided are in these cases tautological and not rationally demonstrative upon the basis of empirical facts. this illustrates the unrecognized (and in this case inappropriate) presence of mythical elements in the best philosophies. we might also describe them as examples of unintentional underlying ideologies. on the other hand, the “adamic myth” of the hebrew semitic tradition, which shows that human freedom is the origin of “evil,” and not a deity, as in the mesopotamian myth of gilgamesh, is a mythical narrative that can still be interpreted anew in the present, and which resists the rationality of the age of logos.20 the same can be said of the epic narrative of the slaves led by moses who freed themselves from egypt-narratives recovered by ernst bloch in his previously cited work. 4. the domination of modern european philosophy and its universality claim beginning in 1492 europe conquers the atlantic, which becomes the new geopolitical center of hegemony in the world, replacing the mediterranean and extending its sweep all the way to the “arab sea” (indian ocean) and the “china sea” (the pacific). this becomes the basis of new colonial empires (almost exclusively centered on the american continent between the 15th and 17th centuries), which in turn make it possible for a capitalist civilization to develop. it is in this context that medieval latingermanic philosophy becomes the core of modern european philosophy, in a manner inextricably intertwined with its political and economic hegemonical claim. i believe that the specific philosophical origin of this process is bartolomé de las casas’s philosophical critique of the new colonial domination in the caribbean region in 1514, long before that of descartes’s discourse on method, written in amsterdam in 1637. european philosophy was until then singular and regional in character, but could now reposition itself in terms of a claim to take on the trappings of philosophy itself. it is valid to characterize the domination of european philosophy as hegemonic because it imposed its sway on the philosophical communities that had been colonized or reduced to its periphery. it is this economic, military and political hegemony that makes it possible for enrique dussel 11 modern european philosophy to develop in a unique manner, unlike any other in the world during the same historical period. my emphasis here, then, is on exploring possible explanations for this development and its supposedly universality claim. modern colonial expansion through the opening of the atlantic by portugal to the west of africa, and then towards the indian ocean (which leapt over the “wall” surrounding the ottoman empire), and by spain towards the caribbean and the american continent, laid siege to the islamic world from the end of the 1500’s, paralyzing its civilizational and thus, too, its philosophical development. classic arab philosophy was not able to survive the crisis in the caliphate of baghdad and declined definitively thereafter. the presence of the mongol empire similarly destroyed the possibility of new developments in buddhist and vedanta philosophies during the sixteenth century. china, meanwhile, began to feel the weight of having failed to complete the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, just as great britain21 began to experience it fully; by the end of the same century china had already ceased to produce new hegemonic philosophy. in latin america the process of the spanish conquest destroyed all of the most outstanding intellectual and cultural resources of the great amerindian cultures; subsequently the spanish and portuguese colonies of the baroque period were never able to surpass the achievements of the scholastics of the sixteenth century renaissance. the dominating centrality of northern europe as a military, economic, political, and cultural power laid the foundation for the development of its philosophy from the end of the middle ages, from the fifteenth century of nicolas de cusa (1401-1464) and the italian renaissance, with its origins in the presence and influence of the byzantines expelled by the ottomans of constantinople in 1453. this made it possible for its own philosophy to develop and, in the face of the crisis of the other great regional philosophies, elevate its philosophical particularity to a universality claim. modern european philosophy was therefore positioned in such a way as to appear to be the universal philosophy-both in its own eyes and in those of the intellectual communities of the colonial world that lay prostrate at its feet, and philosophically paralyzed. it was situated geo12 prajñâ vihâra graphically, economically, and culturally in the center, able to manipulate the knowledge and information wrested from all of the peripheral cultures within its grasp. these cultures were connected to the center along a link running between the colonial south and the european metropolitan north, but disconnected from each other, without any south-south relations or alliances possible as yet. these relation will evolve during the age of european modernity, cultivating an increasing disdain for their own identities and contributions, which includes forgetting their traditions and confusing the high levels of development produced by the industrial revolution in europe with the supposedly universal truths in its discourse both its content and its methods. this is what makes it possible for hegel to write: “universal history goes from east to west. europe is absolutely the end of universal history.”22 “the mediterranean sea is the axis of universal history.”23 similarly, certain european mythic narratives will be confused with the supposedly universal content of purely european philosophical rationality. hegel is also the one who wrote that “the germanic spirit is the spirit of the new world [modernity], whose end is the realization of the absolute truth.”24 he fails to note, however, that said “spirit” is regional (european christian and not taoist, vedanta, buddhist or arab), nor is it global, nor does its content reflect the problems characteristic of other cultures. for these reasons, it does not constitute a universal philosophical discourse, but instead reflects the characteristics of a mythic and provincial narrative. what does it mean in terms of a strictly universal philosophical rationality to speak of the “spirit of christianity”? why not then speak of the ‘spirit of taoism” or of buddhism or confucianism? that “spirit” is completely valid as a component of a mythic narrative with meaning for those who live within the horizons of a regional culture (such as europe), but not to attribute to it a rational philosophical content with an empirically based universal validity, as modern european philosophy still claims for itself. philosophical eurocentrism is, then, in essence this univerenrique dussel 13 sality claim of a particular philosophy, many aspects of which may still be absorbed by other traditions. we can assume that all cultures have ethnocentrist tendencies, but modern european culture was the first whose ethnocentrism became globalized, with its original regional horizon extended to coincide with that of the emergent world-system itself, as proposed by immanuel wallerstein.25 but this universality claim falls of its own weight when philosophers of other philosophical and cultural traditions become conscious of their own philosophical history and its grounded implications. 5. philosophical universality and cultural particularity none of what i have argued thus far negates that it is possible for philosophical discourse to take into account the fundamental “core problems” and attempt to develop responses with universal validity, as contributions that can be discussed by other cultures, since they would involve problems that are ultimately human and thus universal in character. k. o. apel’s26 effort to define the universal conditions of validity necessary for a “argumentative discourse” makes it plain that there must be symmetrical possibilities for each of the participants to engage in the process; otherwise, the conclusions of the discussion will not be valid because participants have not participated under equal conditions. this is an ethicalepistemological formal principle (without any content based in any particular material value judgment of any culture), that can be assessed critically by other cultures. similarly, the fact that there are historical-material and economic conditions grounded in the affirmation and development of human life, which are universally necessary for human existence (since we are subjects in living bodies as suggested by karl marx), appears to be valid for all cultures. the formal abstract universality of certain statements or principles, which can be shaped differently at the material level of each culture, does not negate that they can be “bridges” which can make it possible for there to be dialogue and debate between different philosophical 14 prajñâ vihâra traditions. this meta-philosophy is a product of all humanity, even if it emerges initially in the context of a specific culture, or in some specific tradition or historical period, which might have been able to make greater progress on this issue than others, but from which all the other traditions could learn from within the bounds of their own historical assumptions. for example, in the tenth century a.d. in baghdad, mathematics advanced significantly, immediately contributing to a leap in the development of arab-aristotelian philosophy and proving useful to other traditions as well. an absolutely post-conventional philosophy is impossible (implying no relationship to any concrete culture), but all philosophies, located inevitably in some specific cultural context, are nonetheless capable of engaging in dialogue with others through the prism of shared “core problems” and categorical discourses of a philosophical character, which are universal to the extent that they are human. 6. the new age of dialogue between philosophical traditions it has been asserted for too long that this universal function is fulfilled by modern european philosophy. this insistence has obscured many great discoveries made by other philosophical traditions. this is why the great task that lies before us at the beginning of the 21th century is the initiation of an inter-philosophical dialogue. first, we must start with a dialogue between north and south, because we will be reminded of the continuing presence of colonialism and its legacies, still with us after five hundred years. this is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that includes economic and political structures and expressions, as well as cultural and philosophical ones. the philosophical communities of the post-colonial world (with their distinct problems and responses) are still not generally accepted, recognized, nor engaged by their counterparts in metropolitan hegemonic communities. second (and no less important) is the need to undertake and deepen permanent south-south dialogue, in order to define the agenda of the most urgent philosophical problems in africa, asia, latin america, eastern europe, etc., and discuss them together philosophically. the rules for such a dialogue must be patiently developed. we must lay the pedagogical foundations by educating future generations in multiple philosophical traditions. for example, in the first seenrique dussel 15 mester in the history of philosophy in our universities at the undergraduate level, we should begin with the study of the “first great philosophers of humanity”-the thinkers who developed the original categories of philosophical thinking in egypt (africa), mesopotamia (including the prophets of israel), in greece, india, china, meso-america, or the incas. in the second semester we should continue with study of the “great ontologies,” including taoism, confucianism, hinduism, buddhism, the greeks (such as plato, aristotle, and up to plotinus), the romans, etc. a third course should explore later stages of philosophical development in china (beginning with the founding of the han empire), later examples of buddhist and indian philosophy, byzantine christian philosophy, arab philosophy, the medieval european philosophy, and so on. this is how a new generation can begin to think philosophically from within a global mindset. the same approach should be reflected in the courses specializing in ethics, politics, ontology, anthropology, and even logic (shouldn’t we have some notion of buddhist logic as well?). furthermore, we must ask ourselves if other philosophical traditions (beyond those of europe and north america) have wrestled with questions ignored by our own traditions, even though those traditions might have explored them in different ways, with varying emphases. the differences might provide new perspectives on the particular conditions of the geopolitical environment where they were engaged. there must not be only dialogue between east (an ambiguous concept deconstructed by edward saïd) and west (equally ambiguous)27, but also with the world periphery, because africa, latin america, and other regions are until now excluded. we also need a complete reformulation of the history of philosophy in order to be prepared for such a dialogue. world philosophy, the pioneering work by the sociologist randall collins28, points to key aspects that must be taken into account. his comparative analysis crosses the geography (space) and history (time) of the great chinese, indian, arab, european, north american, and african philosophers, which he categorizes in generations and in terms of their relative importance, although glaring omissions include his failures to devote a single line to five hundred years of latin american philosophy, and to the nascent philosophies of the urban cultures prior to the conquest. despite these weak16 prajñâ vihâra nesses, he provides rich information for further interpretation and gives the philosopher pause, since the author is a sociologist who provides a great deal of material for philosophical thinking. 7. inter-philosophical dialogue towards a trans-modern pluriverse after a long crisis resulting from the impact of modern european culture and philosophy, the philosophies of other regions are beginning to recover a sense of their own histories buried beneath the hurricane of modernity. take the example of a contemporary arab philosopher, mahomed abed yabri, at the university of fez in morocco, a prestigious university renowned for over a thousand years, and city which in the thirteenth century had more than 300,000 inhabitants, and where moses maimonides, among others, went to study and teach. at a first stage, in a. yabri’s two works, the critique of arab reason29 and the arab philosophical legacy: alfarabi, avicenna, avempace, averroes, abenjaldun,30 he begins with an evaluative assessment of the philosophy of his arab cultural tradition. along the way, a) he rejects the tradition of interpretation prevalent in this historical period (that of the salafís or fundamentalists), a reaction against modernity that lacks a creative reconstruction of the philosophical past; b) he rejects of “marxist safism,” which forgets its own tradition; and c) he rejects with equal force the liberal eurocentric tradition that does not accept the existence of a contemporary “arab philosophy.” instead the author employs his linguistic skills in arabic as a native speaker and undertakes original research in the philosophical traditions of the great thinkers of the “eastern” schools (of egypt, baghdad, and towards the east, under the influence of avicenna) and of the “western” schools (of the caliphate of cordoba, including the berber regions of fez) that pivot around the contributions of ’ibn rushd. at a second stage in his exploration, a.yabri undertakes a critique of his own philosophical tradition by employing the resources of arab philosophy itself, but also drawing from some of the achievements of modern hermeneutics (which he studied in paris). this combination makes it possible for him to discover new historical elements in his own enrique dussel 17 tradition, for instance, that the arab “eastern” tradition had to contend with persian gnostic thinking as a principal rival. thus the mu’ltazilíes created the first arab philosophy: by opposing persia and at the same time drawing upon greco-byzantine philosophy in order to justify the legitimacy of the caliphate. subsequently al-farabi and ’ibn sina (avicenna), employing neo-platonic categories, will produce a philosophical-mystical tradition of illumination. while andalusian-maghrebi “western” philosophy, inspired by the scientific empiricism and strictly aristotelian thought (with the characteristic slogan: “abandon the argument based on authority and go back to the sources” as urged by the almohade ’ibn túmert) will produce the great arab philosopher ’ibn rushd, a true philosophical enlightenment (aufklärung), which will be the origin of the latingermanic philosophy in 13th century, which was at the same time the foundational moment of the modern european philosophy. ’ibn rushd perfectly defines what inter-philosophical dialogue should consist of: “undoubtedly we should build upon and take from the contributions resulting from the research of all who have preceded us (the greeks, the christians), as sources of assistance in our process of rational study [...] given that this is so, and since the ancient philosophers already studied with great diligence the rules of reasoning (logic, method), it will be appropriate for us to dedicate our labors to the study of the works of these ancient philosophers, and if everything we find in them is reasonable, we can accept it, and if not, those things that are not reasonable can serve as a warning and a basis for precaution.”31 at a third stage, that of new creation based upon one’s own tradition and nourished by dialogue with other cultures, we should not allow ourselves to be blinded by the apparent splendor of a modern european philosophy that has laid the groundwork for exploring its own problems, but not for exploring the problems particular to the arab world: “how can arab philosophy assimilate the experience of liberalism before the arab world has experienced that stage, or without having done so?”32 one more theme must be addressed at fourth final stage. the dialogue that can enrich each philosophical tradition must be carried out 18 prajñâ vihâra by critical and creative philosophers in each tradition, and not by those who simply repeat the philosophical theses that are the traditional echoes of consensus. an essential element of such a critical stance is for philosophers to assume the responsibility for addressing the ethical and political problems associated with the poverty, domination, and exclusion of large sectors of the population, especially in the global south (in africa, asia, or latin america). a critical philosophical dialogue presupposes critical philosophers, in the sense of the “critical theory”, which we in latin america refer to our reality as philosophy of liberation european modernity has impacted cultures throughout the world through colonialism (except for china, japan, and a few others, who were spared direct european rule). it exploited their resources, extracted information from their cultures, and discarded that which it could not absorb. when i speak of trans-modernity, i am referring to a global project that seeks to transcend european or north american modernity. it is a project that is not post-modern, since post-modernity is a still-incomplete critique of modernity by european and north america. instead, transmodernity is a task that is, in my case, expressed philosophically, whose point of departure is that which has been discarded, devalued, and judged use-less among global cultures, including colonized or peripheral philosophies. this project involves the development of the potential of those cultures and philosophies that have been ignored, upon the basis of their own resources, in constructive dialogue with european and north american modernity. it is in this way that arab philosophy, for example, could incorporate the hermeneutics of european philosophy, develop and apply them in order to discover new interpretations of the korán that would make possible a new, much-needed arab political philosophy, or arab feminism. it will be the fruit of the arab philosophical tradition, updated through inter-philosophical dialogue (not only with europe, but equally with latin america, india, china, etc.), oriented towards a pluriversal future global philosophy. this project is necessarily trans-modern, and thus also trans-capitalist. for a long time, perhaps for centuries, the many diverse philosophical traditions will each continue to follow their own paths, but nonetheless a global analogical project of a trans-modern pluriverse (other than universal, and not post-modern) appears on the horizon. now, “other phienrique dussel 19 losophies” are possible, because “another world is possible” -as is proclaimed by the zapatista liberation movement in chiapas, mexico. endnotes 1paper presented in the xxii world congress of philosophy (seoul, korea) (august 2, 2008), in the iii plenary session on “rethinking history of philosophy and comparative philosophy”. 2metaphysics i, 2; 982b 17-18. 3“civilisation universelle et cultures nationales”, en histoire et vérité, seuil, paris, 1964, pp.274-288. 4ernst bloch, das prinzip hoffnung, suhrkamp, frankfurt, 1959, vol. 1-3. 5see paul ricoeur, la symbolique du mal, aubier, paris, 1963. 6see my book the invention of the americas, continuum, new york, 1995, 7.1. the tlamatini. 7r. fornet-betancourt, crítica intercultural de la filosofía latinoamericana actual, trotta, madrid, 2004. 8p. hountondji, sur la philosophie africaine. critique de l’ethnophilosophie, maspero, paris, 1977. 9p. tempel, la philosophie bantue, présence africaine, paris, 1949. see miguel león-portilla, filosofía nahuatl, unam, méxico, 1979. 10sources of chinese tradition from earliest times to 1600, columbia university press, new york, 1999, vol. 1, pp.79. 11see confucius analects, trans. by edward slingerland, hackett publishing company, indianápolis, 2003. 12see sources of chinese tradition from earliest times to 1600, vol. 1, pp.66 ff. 13ibid., pp.114 ff. see randall collins, the sociology of philosophies. a global theory of intellectual change, the belknap press of harvard university press, cambridge (mass), 2000, pp.137 ff., and 272 ff. 14see sources of indian tradition from the beginning to 1800, columbia university press, new york, vol. 1. also r. collins, op. cit., pp.177 ff. on japan, ibid., pp.322 ff. 156. 12-14 (sources of indian tradition, vol. 1, p.37). 16philosophy as mankind’s self-reflection; the self-realization of reason, in the crisis of european sciences, northwestern university press, evanston, 1970, pp.338-339 (the 73 of die krisis der europäischen wissenschaften, nijhoff, haag, 1962, husserliana vi, p.273 ). it is the same text of the crisis of european sciences, 8, pp.21 ff. (german original, pp.18 ff.). for example, the so call “pythagoras theorem” was formulated by the assyrian 1000 b.c. (see g. semerano, la favola dell’indoeuropeo, bruno mondadori, milano, 2005). 20 prajñâ vihâra 17d. sobrevilla, repensando la tradición de nuestra américa, banco central de reserva del perú, lima, 1999, p.74. 18see for example the lexique de la langue philosophique d’ibn sina (avicenne), edited by a.-m. goichon, desclée de brouwer, paris, 1938. the 792 different terms analyzed by the editor in 496 large format pages, provide us with an idea of the “precise terminology” of arab falasafa (philosophy). the final entry is: “792. yaqini: certain, known with certitude, relative to a certain knowledge […]”, and thereafter follow 15 lines of explanation with the arabic expressions, in arabic script, at the right hand margin. 19see the subject on bartolomé de las casas and the human sacrifices in my book política de la liberación. una historia mundial y crítica [politics of liberation. a worldly and critical history], trotta, madrid, 2007, pp.203 ff. 20see la symbolique du mal (supra) by paul ricoeur. 21k. pommeranz, the great divergence. china, europe and the making of the modern world economy, princeton university press, princeton, 2000. 22hegel, die vernunft in der geschichte, zweiter entwurf (1830), c, c; in sämtliche werke, ed. j. hoffmeister, f. meiner, hamburg, 1955, p.243. english version lectures on the philosophy of world history, introduction: reason in history, cambridge university press, cambridge, 1975, p.197. 23ibid., p.210; english, p.171. 24hegel, vorlesung über die philosophie der geschichte, in werke, suhrkamp, frankfurt, 1970, vol. 12, p.413; the philosophy of history, colonial press, new york, 1900, p.341. 25i. wallerstein, the modern world-system, academic press, new york, 1980-1989, vol. 1-3. 26k.-o. apel, die transformation der philosophie, surhkamp, frankfurt, 1973, vol. 1-2. 27and what does the west consist of? is it only western europe, and in that case where does russia fit, which was certainly a part of the culture of the ancient eastern byzantine empire? is its origin in greece? but this too is problematic because for greece the rest of europe was as barbarous as other regions were to the north of macedonia. 28see the book of r. collins quoted supra. 29icaria-antrazyt, barcelona, 2001. 30trotta, madrid, 2001. 31a. yabri, crítica de la razón árabe, pp.157-158. 32ibid., p.159. enrique dussel 21 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december,, 2006, 87-109 87 © 2000 by assumption university press garuda indonesia, registered trademark* john t. giordano assumption university of thailand ____________________ * this essay was originally presented in bandung, indonesia in july 2006. statue of vishnu (narai) standing on garuda, bangkok abstract this essay examines the restrictions imposed on the use of images. it contrasts forms of transmission of images with contemporary transmission. it begins by focusing on the traditional image of the garuda or krut, and its function as a royal and state symbol in south east asia. it then moves on to examine the philosophy of intellectual property and the manner in which private factions claim a new forms of sovereignty through the restrictions associated with information and images. it finally examines the fragility of corporate sovereignty and the phenomena of intellectual piracy. i have been called here, through electronic mail, through electronic cables, their metallic life encased by rubberized skin, snaking their way towards portals, computer screens, optic nerves blossoming into mechanical eyes … with organic eyes steadily staring in response. i have come from the sky, like a brahman, carried by garuda indonesia, registered trademark,… … riding in the cabin of the plane, encased in layers of aluminum, plastic, and fabric covered seats, surrounded by the noise of compressed air and the mechanical whine of the engines… … while far below, the gulf of thailand, the hazy land and water are faintly visible through the clouds, and i am always astonished, how such distance can be covered in such a short time, how something so weighty like the earth, can appear so distant and ephemeral, its density lost in the milky haze… … and yet, the plane lands, and again, here it is, solid land, the falling of rain, the flowing of water, the kinetic chaos of the landscape. this also reflects a dichotomy which i struggle with in my personal life. i stand caught between the expectations of my profession to profess some kind of knowledge, and the blind rhythms and impulses of my everday life … between the desire for some perspective and insight, 88 prajñâ vihâra and my embeddedness in the environment in which i move … between the frozen timelessness of a piece of writing, and the flow of time burning me away like a fuse. and the ideas and images which cross my own mind swim within the same pool as those which move through the city-scapes. some are ancient and sacred, and some are new, and copyrighted, registered, and regulated by international law. but what are these things that pass through me? what loyalties and debt do i owe them? what rituals of sacrifice? what are the restrictions connected to ideas, names, and images? what are the difference between traditional images and their transmission and contemporary images? and how does one think these ideas and images, speak about them – as a philosopher? and this subject is haunted by time. it involves a reckless and accelerating push into a future and a reaching back into the past. the philosopher often feels he or she has succeeded in something when they point to a problem, a balance, a moderation, a resistance, and yet, these sandcastles seem to be swiftly washed away again by the momentum of contemporary global culture. if i am divided and at odds with myself, it makes sense that such a project will be eclectic in nature. what is to be understood, is not something unified like a single idea or a conclusion, but a series of struggles and tensions which constantly undermine a certain sense but create certain relations which hold together into a theme. i will use the title – garuda indonesia, registered trademark to organize my reflections. not according to the sense of the words, but the spaces between them. so allow me again to take flight… garuda chinese : jinchi niao hindi: garud japanese: karunra javanese: garudha john t. giordano 89 khmer: khrut lao: kut, khut myanmar: galon thai: krut tibetan: gnam-mkha’-lding (from kam, garrett. ramayana in the arts of asia. p. 14) garuda is the divine bird-man who is the vehicle [vahana] of vishnu. one version of the story begins with two sisters. kadru desired many offspring and so laid a thousand eggs which quickly hatched into nagas or snake deities. her sister vinata desired only a few offspring and so laid only two eggs. the eggs took so long to hatch that vinata became impatient and opened one egg in curiosity. the boy in the egg was only half-developed. he had an upper body but as yet no lower body. he became the sun-god anruna, who put a curse upon his mother for her impatience. for 500 years, she would be the slave of her sister kadru whereupon she would be freed by her son. and so, vinata waited another 500 years before the second egg hatched and this became garuda. garuda now desires to buy his mother’s freedom. to accomplish this he must enter a whirling wheel of blades, defeat the gods – including the great warrior god indra guarding the amrita or soma (the liquor of immortality), and carry it back to his naga cousins. roberto calasso has an elegant way of telling the end of the story… the snakes had arranged themselves in a circle to await garuda’s return. they saw him coming like a black star, a point expanding on the horizon, until his beak laid down a delicate plant, damp with sap, upon the darbha grass. “this is the soma, snakes. this is my mother’s ransom. i deliver it to you. but before you drink of this celestial liquid, i would advise a purificatory bath.” in disciplined devotion, the snakes slithered off toward the river. for a moment, the only moment of tranquility the earth would ever know, the soma was left, alone, on the grass. a second later indra’s rapacious hand had swooped from the heavens, and already it was done. gleaming with water, aware of the gravity of the moment, the snakes could be seen returning through the tall grass. they found nothing but a place where the grass had been bent slightly. hurriedly they licked at the darbha grass where garuda had laid the soma. from that moment on the snakes have had forked tongues. (calasso, roberto. ka. p. 16) 90 prajñâ vihâra portrait of king erlanga, as vishnu on garuda. c. 1043 a.d. photo from the art of southeast asia, philip rawson john t. giordano 91 the struggle between the forces represented by sun and moon, bird and snake, are almost universal. garuda would then be connected with the sun and with the cosmic order. the more numerous nagas, would represent less differentiated and fluid forces of nature, with the moon and with the feminine. coomeraswamy, in his essay “rape of a nagi,” explains it as follows: the primordial serpent or dragon – really the godhead, as distinguished from the proceeding god – is described as “omniform”, or “protean,” in accordance with the exemplarist doctrine of the first principle as being of a single form that is the form of very different things. there is accordingly something more than a simple position of the solar-angelic and lunar-titanic powers of light and darkness. beyond the concept of an alternate procession and recession, beyond the contrast of exterior and interior operations, there lies the “supreme identity” (tad ekam) of both divine natures, of mortal love and deathless death, … as well known texts express it, “i and my father are one,” “the serpents are the suns”; now soma was vrtra”; agni is outwardly the household altar fire, and inwardly the chthonic serpent. because of the temporal form of our understanding, we think and speak of the one as proceeding from the other, and of an eventful division of “the light from the darkness” (genesis), or of heaven from earth (vedas, passim); and thus regarding the supernal sun, eternal avatar, or messiah, as having most effectively cast off all adherent potentiality and as wholly in act, it is inferred by analogy that it lies within the competence of every separated creature to effect in the same way a riddance of evil, “just as the serpent sheds its skin.” (coomeraswamy, selected papers, p. 334) just as the solar principle emerges from the lunar principle, the consumption of the naga by the garuda is a return to unity. we see then, in what sense a death at the hands of god is also a felicity and consummation most to be desired. if the eagle, noster deus consumens, really devours the nagi … this is not merely a consumption, but also an assimilation and incorporation; if the act of solar violence is a rape, it is also a “rapture” and a “transport” in both possible senses of both words. (coomeraswamy, p. 336) the garuda imposes order and justice. in one story, he demonstrates his role in killing a giant tortoise and elephant who are fighting, while simultaneously rescuing twelve brahman sages who are clutching the branch of a tree. he is also the principle of creativity. in some stories 92 prajñâ vihâra he is praised as the devotional hymn to the sun itself. in calasso’s account, brhaspati, chief priest to the gods, says to indra… “garuda is not made of feathers but of meters. you cannot hurt a meter. garuda is gayatri and tristubh and jagati. garuda is the hymn. the hymn that cannot be scratched.” (calasso, roberto. ka. p. 14) finally because of his strength and loyalty, the garuda is asked by great god vishnu to be his vehicle. garuda becomes the servant of supreme power and sovereignty. traditional transmission the transmission of early symbols, artistic images, myths, religions and languages, was through the early indian traders. they passed on to the early cultures of south east asia, not only religion but also the pali and sanskrit languages, which opened up a new world for these cultures. and yet each culture accepts this cultural gift, absorbs it into itself, and makes it their own. by whatever name we choose to call the phenomenon of the arrival and absorption of indian culture, it becomes so much more comprehensible if we see it not in terms of sudden and dramatic discontinuities but as a gradual and creative interaction between indonesia’s own beliefs, institutions and preferences on the one hand and the exciting opportunities offered by indian experience on the other. there was no clash of civilizations, with one overwhelming the other. in fact, there was considerable similarity between the manner in which ‘sanskritic’ ideas spread in the indian subcontinent itself over the centuries, merging into rather than displacing the vast variety of local cultures, and the way this process extended across the seas to southeast asia. (saran, malini and vinod c. khanna. the ramayana in indonesia. delhi: ravi dayal publisher, 2004. p. 29) as these stories pass throughout south east asia, from the mahabharata, the vishnu-purana, the ramayana, and the jataka stories, they adapt to local situations. the garuda becomes the servant of a variety of sovereign authorities. john t. giordano 93 indonesia here in java, the garuda follows the religion of vaishnavism and becomes the servant of the javanese kings. he becomes the symbol of royal sovereignty. but wisnuite [vaishavite] elements, never exclusive, came up still stronger in the east-javanese period, after the 10th century. mighty kings were all presented as incarnations of wisnu [vishnu]. in the poem arjuna wiwaha, erlangga the first great king of east java, was connected to arjuna, a wisnu incarnate. there is a statue showing him with the attributes of wisnu. more significant to our purpose, a sculpture of wisnu mounting garuda was found in his sanctuary, the candi belahan. now exhibited in the museum of mojokorto, it shows a ferocious garuda, trampling the snakes and ready to fight. another famous king of east java, the king jayabaya, the ruler of kediri, was said to be wisnuatmaka, or wisnu incarnate. but the most famous king associated with wisnu was ken arok, the adventurer made king who founded the kingdom of singasari, from which originated the empire of majapahit. in the pararaton chronicle, wisnu said to one of the characters: “stop worshipping the statue, i am not there any more. i have incarnated in java under the name of ken arok.” ken arok was eventually killed by his son-in-law, anusapati, but the wisnuite tradition was carried on. the reliefs on the walls of his sanctuary, candi kidal, tell the episodes of the garuda story. on the western side, garuda is shown visiting his mother while on the eastern relief he runs away with the vessel of water of immortality. the tradition associating the king and wisnu persisted during later reigns. (couteau, jean. archipelago. vol 1, no. 1) as islam became the religion of java, the garuda now began to serve the sultan. the javanese rulers became sultans, indeed, heirs to the prophet and commanders of the faith. thus they appropriated the symbols of islam for political benefit as they had earlier appropriated the symbols of hinduism, notably garuda. but they did not renounce the old stories nor the old symbols. they enrobed islam in an hindu garb. resilient wisnuite influences are numerous. the biggest ceremony of the sultanate of yogyakarta involves a gunungan (mountain) of rice, the gunungan is the cosmic mountain and the goddess of rice is wisnu’s wife. direct garuda94 prajñâ vihâra related symbols are also involved. the sultan of yogyakarta, implicitly a wisnu incarnate, still rides in parades in a garuda-winged vehicle, the garuda kencono. the sultan is also protected by garuda, as shown in the garuda banners used in his paraphernalia. the signs of garuda’s presence in java are too numerous for all of them to be included here. (couteau, jean. archipelago. vol 1, no. 1) today in indonesia he is a symbol of the power of the state. garuda indonesia airlines is a state company, and so the name garuda is still connected to this symbolism of state power. thailand today, in thailand the garuda is both the state and royal symbol. this is based upon the identification of the thai king with narai or narayana, the thai version of vishnu. since narayana is always accompanied by the garuda, he became witness to the acts of god. royal commands are thus certified by the image of the garuda. the image of the garuda now becomes fixed as a seal connected to the king. as there was no dry and fixed rule how the posture of garuda should be, king rama vi realized that it should be of advantage to have it fixed. he finally selected the “krut ram” or “dancing garuda” posture to be the permanent official symbol. this posture is called in full “phra rajalancakorn phra khrut phah” which simply means “the seal-mark in the form of garuda the vehicle”. the act on the state seals of siam, issued in his reign specified that this state seal should be permanent. (garuda. p. 193) the use of the garuda symbol is highly restricted and controlled. it can only be used by businesses and banks that have demonstrated long service to thailand. in fact, the image is considered to have so much power that businesses adjacent to a garuda-adorned business will often mount a mirror to deflect the powerful gaze of the garuda (this use of mirrors is originally a chinese practice). recently in thailand there was an intense controversy over the selling by the prime minister of a satellite to a business in singapore. one important reason, and a very symbolic one, is that the satellite has imprinted john t. giordano 95 gateway to mosque sendangduwur, badjanegara photo from the art of southeast asia, philip rawson 96 prajñâ vihâra upon it an image of a garuda. here this brings us to the shore of a vast problem, the problem of intellectual property and the manner in which its dynamic differs from traditional cultural transmission. but so far we have found one way to navigate through this problem the idea of “sovereignty”. trade-marks peter drahos in his work, a philosophy of intellectual property, attempts to characterize the phenomena of intellectual property in various ways. one is through the idea of “abstract objects”. this stresses the incorporeality of intellectual property and how it moves from being considered a thing, to an abstract expression of relationships between people (notice that this emphasis on abstraction would differentiate intellectual property from the ancient indian practice of trade-marking more corporeal goods with the royal symbol). another is through the distinction between “negative” and “positive communities” as it has been developed by grotius and pufendorf. in relation to the control of the commons, laws concerning intellectual property were shaped based upon the idea of negative rather than positive community. that is, a situation where everyone competes for rights over the commons, rather than a situation that stresses joint ownership. and finally, another way is through the idea of “sovereignty”. drahos summarizes the argument of morris cohen that private property is a kind of sovereignty over other. cohen’s analytical argument rests on the now accepted view that property consists of a relation between persons in respect of an object rather than a relation between a person and an object. the link between john t. giordano 97 official “dancing garuda” seal, thailand dominium and imperium is accomplished by arguing, quite plausibly, that the dominant feature of property is the right to exclude others; the capacity to exclude others from things where those things are important or necessities gives the property owner considerable or even great power over others. hence cohen’s conclusion is that ‘dominium over things is also imperium over our fellow human beings’. (drahos, peter. a philosophy of intellectual property. p. 147) drahos points out that this seems to be in conflict with foucault’s very significant rethinking of the mechanisms of power. while he tries to retain foucault’s understanding of the flow of power within a network, he also wants to retain cohen’s idea of sovereignty. thus we should not follow foucault when he suggests that we should ‘eschew the model of leviathan in the study of power’. instead we need to recognize that, through mechanisms of power, leviathan changes its shape and produces progeny, which ultimately come to threaten its supremacy. (drahos, peter. a philosophy of intellectual property. p. 150) and this is important. the sovereignty of intellectual property is a mechanism where private “factions” (a word drahos borrows from the 98 prajñâ vihâra american statesman james madison) come to replace the power of the state. abstract objects are then mechanisms to concentrate power and sovereignty into private hands. we have opted for the view that abstract objects are fictional entities, albeit highly useful ones. our question is: what role do these entities play in the concentration of power? our answer will be that within law they form the basis of identity judgements, judgements that ultimately determine who has access to vital capital resources. the fact that these judgements are made using fictional entities suggests that the judgements are themselves pragmatic and based on conventions. (drahos, peter. a philosophy of intellectual property. p. 153) this should also remind us of guy debord’s definitions of spectacle. “the spectacle is capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image.” (debord, guy. the society of the spectacle. p. 24). capitalist cosmologies kenelm burridge, in his essay new heaven, new earth: a study of millenarian activities, discusses the growth of millenarian or messianic movements in indigenous cultures faced with foreign western influence. he gives special emphasis to the introduction of money. if money is to circulate significantly, if an indigenous community is to have a satisfactory access to money, then the community must so adapt and alter its prestige system that money becomes a basic measure of worth. unless and until money begins accurately to assess those qualities which a people or community finds meaningful, so long will they not be able to use money as it was meant to be used, so long will they not have a satisfactory access. belonging to, and connoting, the complex social order of those who have minted it, use it, and bring it to foreign shores, money … demands acceptance of the dint of social ordering adopted by those who make it. (burridge, kenelm. new heaven, new earth: a study of millenarian activities p. 45) the dilemma is how to balance the traditional measure of man with the foreign monetary measure. significant imbalances, according to john t. giordano 99 burridge lead to millenarian cults, or cargo cults, which have become ritualized methods of addressing these imbalances. of course, burridge is speaking here of traditional melanesian, polynesian, and australian cultures. but we can witness this same drama in the highly developed urban landscapes of southeast asian cities. southeast asia has a long history of monetary trade in shells, silver, gold, salt, cloth and silk. in these more indigenous forms of exchange, there are complex values added to the mere exhange of money. [the] form of a transaction must be viewed, not in isolation, but as a consequence of the monetary conventions adopted by the society and the context in which the transaction operates. the major transactional forms include direct exchange, indirect exchange, and linked transfers. each of these becomes monetized in a different way, due chiefly to the disparate contexts in which each is carried out, i.e. how the transaction fulfills some social, fiscal-administrative, commercial, or religious obligation. the context of a transaction includes its articulation with transactions which preceded it and those which will follow as a consequence of it, as in interconnectedness of the links of a chain.(wicks. money, markets and trade in early south east asia, p. 7)) yet the emphasis on westernized monetary measures in contemporary global capitalism has the tendency of strpping local monetary transaction from its deeper values and rituals. the western approaches to exchange emphasize individual consumption. marshall sahlins in his essay “cosmologies of capitalism” discusses the development of the unique connection of consumption and freedom in the west. so by the time of adam smith, every person’s permanent misery – that is, scarcity and need – had become the premise of economic wisdom and the source of national welfare. the social and moral sublimation of temporal desires had indeed been dissolved by an oncoming capitalism. what for augustine was slavery, the human bondage to bodily desires, was in the bourgeois view the essential human freedom ... the new rationality was based on an exquisite sensitivity to pleasure and pain, … but, then, the capitalist economy had made a supreme fetish of human needs in the sense that needs, which are always social and objective in character, had to be assumed as subjective experiences of bodily affliction. (sahlins, marshall. “cosmologies of capitalism” p. 455) 100 prajñâ vihâra perhaps sahlins overstates the sensual aspects of western capitalism, yet i think the observation concerning the subjectification of experience and its connection with freedom and desire is significant. this capitalist cosmology is indeed a form of individualist spirituality at the deepest level. it is here that western culture still finds itself in tension with asian cultures. it is not so much a matter of asking the question of “how these tensions can be resolved?” this would be a political problem. but the question i would like to address here is: “how are these tensions resolving themselves?” sacred commodities if we take a step into an urban landscape like bangkok, we find on street level, various syncretic mechanisms which attempt to preserve the flow of cultural value within the circulations of value in global capitalism… namely, in the commodification and circulation of sacred images in amulets. stanley tambiah has done very careful studies on the lives of the forest monks (arahants) and what he calls the “cult of amulets” connected to their powers. at the end of his work he attempts to understand this within a sociological framework. the possession and circulation of amulets in thailand represents still another semiotic code. the ascetic saint of the forest distributes his charisma as a donation inspired by compassion and loving-kindness (metta). he himself does not expect a return from his gift to the worldlings at large. the amulet is indexically or metonymically related to the ascetic monk and represents a materialization of his virtue, achieved by means of a rite of transfer. amulets are made in plenty and distributed to many, for the saint’s metta is inexhaustible and does not diminish by sharing, provided he continues to cleave to his ascetic and meditative life and to experience the bliss of tranquil joy and detachment. but of course we know that, in the thai instance, amulets are comparable on the basis of the differential charisma of the saints and ascetics; though donated to the public at large, they in practice become scarce and assume a commercial value. they become, at a second less obvious round of social relations, private and hidden possessions of laymen who expect to use the amulets’ john t. giordano 101 potency to manipulate, overpower, seduce, and control their fellow men and women in an ongoing drama of social transactions. this there is a two-level discourse – the charisma of the saint, who in transcending the world is able to shower upon it his virtue, and the gratification of desires on the part of the laymen, for whom prosperity and fortune approach the logic of a zero-sum game. (tambiah, stanley. j. buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. p. 342) according to tambiah, the circulation of amulets becomes a mark of status among the ruling elite. it also represents a kind of spiritual decay of the original function of the sacred image through capitalist exchange and commodity fetishism. i believe however this is a limited reading of this phenomenon. we need not consider the commodification of amulets only as form of decay, we can also see it as a kind of resistance to the leveling of value within capitalist exchange itself. western capitalism is based upon an idea of individual consumption and fulfillment. but when western consumer-culture is imported into a much older foreign culture where individual fulfillment and transformation is less important, then subtle modifications are made to the exchange principle. we seem to see here a resistance to appropriation into full abstraction by mixing of traditional mythical symbols with capitalist exchange. not a mere commodification but a resistance to commodification by the alteration of the spiritual aspects of exchange. the exchange of money and goods are anchored to spiritual realities connected to religion, royalty, and state. notice that this would show the weakness of critical theory which condemns “commodity fetishism” in a crudely over-generalized manner. it is not a matter of overcoming fetishism, but the manner in which the fixation on objects is ultimately connected to the more stable elements of culture and community. this is the lesson of amulets. likewise, foreign goods cannot function in the abstract (pseudospiritualized) sense in which they wish. so they collapse again into mere corporeality – mere discs to be cheaply traded, mere labels which are sewn onto clothes and handbags. 102 prajñâ vihâra violations along the streets of bangkok and at the smaller shopping malls, pirated dvds, vcds, and computer software are offered for sale. at one shopping center, all the dvds are lined on the counters of small stalls … the glossy reproductions of movie posters with famous actors and actresses … the simple reproductions of the film encoded and burned into the cheap discs. the problem of piracy of intellectual property is a complex one. especially when viewed from street level. without pirated software, many small countries would simply cease to function. without pirated music, many musicians would not be exposed to the best and most interesting experiments in music. and without pirated dvds, many film professors and students would not be exposed to classic cinema. around the world, the transmission of high culture runs deepest through piracy. back at the shopping center, the police suddenly appear, and behind them, cameramen from the tv station. the merchants from one shop are lined up behind the counter with their illegal ware, the police lined up standing behind. a show is put on for the cameras. then the merchants are led out, the dvd covers packed in boxes. the cameramen pack up and leave. and business resumes as usual at the other shops. the merchants spend a couple of nights in prison punished for an extremely liminal style of trading which has been going on in asia for thousands of years. the violation of abstract property is addressed in an abstract way, a drama as thin as the surface of a television screen, as thin as a label, as thin as the foil on a dvd. this media drama is designed to create a sense of corporate authority aligned with state authority. but this use of illusion and force to achieve justice is unconvincing because the corporate authority is unconvincing. as drahos points out… one of the distinguishing features of [abstract objects] is that they are fuzzy, indeterminate objects. their boundaries depend on the identity judgements of a legal elite. these judgements are judgements of fragile convention that may easily break down or be influenced by specific interest groups, with the consequence that they cease to serve the broader, more john t. giordano 103 diffuse societal interests to which they are meant to be directed. (drahos, p. 158) but just as the fuzziness and fragility of abstract objects leads to their accumulation and abuse, outside of the western perspective, this fragility also leads to the forces that undermine the fixing of intellectual property. the dark waters of piracy continue to flow even under the electronic gaze of corporate authority. microsoft does not ride on the wings of the garuda. it is merely a distant foreign corporation, a faction, an abstract body dealing with abstract objects. the gods of gucci, universal, and fox, can never adequately exercise their authority because their authority is not rooted in the culture itself. corporate authority can never be convincing in the manner of state authority because it has no responsibility to the community, and so it is as drahos points out a “fragile convention”. the sovereignty of corporations and factions cannot be complete because of their fragility, because they are too one-sided. corporate mythology is not held in a holistic syncretic relationship with older traditional and state mythologies. re-balance in traditional indian mythology we always see a balance reestablished between contending opposites. although garuda demonstrates his power over the battling forces of nature represented by the tortoise and elephant, and preserves the wisdom of the brahman sages clutching the branch, the power of the garuda, that is, the power of order and control, itself must remain in a kind of balance with the forces of nature represented by his cousins the naga. not only does vishnu recline upon the great cosmic serpent ananta, but also reconciles directly with the forces of nature in the form of krishna. krishna, as an avatar of vishnu, defeats kaliya, the great naga king. he is addressing an imbalance where the forces of nature undermine the establishment of ordered culture. yet kaliya is himself divine and merely acting according to his own nature. kaliya recognizes that krishna is in 104 prajñâ vihâra fact vishnu, and explains… “i have only acted according to my nature. as you created me with strength and endowed me with my poison, so have i behaved. had i comported myself otherwise, i should have violated the laws laid down by you for every creature according to its kind.” (zimmer, heinrich. myths and symbols in indian art and civilization. p. 85) to which krishna-vishnu replies… “you shall not henceforth reside in the waters of the yamuna, but in the vastness of the ocean. depart! moreover, i declare to you that garuda, the sun-bird of gold, arch enemy of all serpents and my vehicle through the reaches of space, forever shall spare you, whom i have touched.” (zimmer, heinrich. myths and symbols in indian art and civilization. p. 86) heinrich zimmer points out that krishna-vishnu plays the role of the “moderator” rather than the “annihilator”. this is a theme seen through the syncretism of south east asia. buddhism and islam appropriate these older images and set them in peace with one another. we see this in the buddhism of the tenth century ad. in the kathasaritsagara, there is a story of a garuda who is ready to consume a young naga boy. the mother naga pleads to take her son’s place. the garuda is moved by the mother’s devotion for her son and vows never again to eat a naga. there are also instances in khmer statuary of garudas intertwined peacefully with nagas. i wish here to return to coomeraswamy. concerning art history, he stresses that it is better to read into an image than to try to read meanings out of them. and it is essential to consider the conditions under which a work is made. no explanation of a work of art can be called complete which doesn’t account for its actual composition … in other words, no art history can be called complete which merely considers the decorative usage of a given motif, and ignores the raisons d’être of the elements of which it is built up and the logic of the relationship of its parts. it is begging the question to attribute the precise and minute particulars of a traditional iconography merely to the operation of an “aesthetic instinct”; we have still to explain why the formal cause has been imagined as it was, and for this we cannot supply the answer until we have understood the final john t. giordano 105 cause in response to which the formal image arose in a given mentality. (coomeraswamy, p. 337) we might not be able to isolate one final cause, as coomeraswamy suggests, but he calls attention to a problem which is important to us. it is not so much the formal image and its circulation through cultures which is significant, it is also the use and adaptation of those images, and why they arise in a given mentality. the more “organic” situation would be an appreciation of the possibilities of transformation. this is what allows a culture to change, adapt, grow and prosper. the form is assimilated and transformed, hands work upon the material in the creation of objects, the objects work upon the mind. and we can contrast the early transmission of language (sanskrit and pali), with the colonial transmission of western languages, and present day transmission of licensed computer languages. in each case there is an opening of possibilities. yet the traditional transmission seems to be the more balanced reciprocal relationship. colonial transmission begins to develop more controlling and oppressive aspects while still providing new possibilities of knowledge and expression, finally, the transmission of computer languages vastly increases the possibilities for knowledge, but also vastly increases the possibilities of control. with this increasing emphasis on control and order, we are facing a situation where assimilation of influences and the natural growth of culture is obstructed. frozen corporate images are brittle. they are not given as a gift as in traditional cultures and so organically assimilated. they do not allow for local adaptation and expression but are merely rented. they do not represent legitimate local power (which would be in the service of humanity, nature, culture and community), but are controlled and sold by distant factions who serve limited interests and who quickly punish those who do not appropriate their cultural objects correctly. the structure of control of intellectual property is an example of a solar power detached from the lunar power. it is one-sided. but such structures also become fragile and deep counter-currents begin to undermine them. perhaps we are beginning to see this process now. perhaps uncontrollable piracy is the necessary counterpart to the excessive control of languages and images of our time. 106 prajñâ vihâra and what about these images and ideas that flow through me like blood? what is the place of my own reflection and writing? as a scholar i attempt to navigate a tradition of texts and names from the past of which i have the responsibility to formally and accurately cite. and i apply these ideas and languages of the past to contemporary situations, images from the media, and corporate and economic phenomena. so far scholarship is relatively free with respect to intellectual property and corporate control. one still has relatively free access to information and the use of images, although this is now threatening to change. if it does, we will find ourselves in the same position as the pirates selling intellectual property on the streets. we will be practicing blackmarket philosophy. but scholarship and art are pursuits which still have a relative freedom, and place themselves in the role of mediator. and in this role, they have the power and the responsibility to address the imbalances of power and conflicts in the contemporary world … to pass through the walls of legal restriction, and find connections to something much more timeless. how ironic, that in this age of the greatest dissemination of traditional ideas, voices and images, the land itself is in danger of falling silent. bibliography (legal and otherwise) burridge, kenelm. new heaven, new earth: a study of millenarian activities. new york: schocken books, 1969. calasso, roberto. ka. new york: vintage books, 1998. coomeraswamy, ananda. selected papers: traditional art and symbolism. princeton: bollingen, 1977. couteau, jean. archipelago. vol 1, no. 1 (downloaded from the internet). debord, guy. the society of the spectacle. new york: zone books, 1995. drahos, peter. a philosophy of intellectual property. singapore: darthmouth, 1996 (pirated copy). kam, garrett. ramayana in the arts of asia. singapore: select books, 2000. sahlins, marshall. “cosmologies of capitalism” in culture in practice: selected essays. new york: zone books, 2000. saran, malini and vinod c. khanna. the ramayana in indonesia. delhi: ravi dayal publisher, 2004. john t. giordano 107 tambiah, stanley. j. buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1988 (pirated copy). wicks, robert s. money, markets and trade in early south east asia. ithaca: cornell south east asia program publications, 1992. zimmer, heinrich. myths and symbols in indian art and civilization. princeton: bollingen, 1946. the working group on garuda, prime minister’s office. garuda. bangkok: amarin printing and publishing public company limited, 2000. 108 prajñâ vihâra garuda indonesia airlines corporate logo john t. giordano 109 10(134-138)note for authors religious and secular origins of morality within the yoruba framework: implications for man and society olatunji a. oyeshile university of ibadan, nigeria abstract to what extent can we accept the proposition that morality in african culture is exclusively derived from religion or from the people’s conception of the deity? our answer to the above question is important considering its effect on interpersonal relationship and the people’s attitude towards the community. we therefore in this paper consider again the lively debate on the religious and secular origins of morality in traditional african society. our conclusion is that although religion plays a prominent role in the life of africans, morality from which the people derive and exhibit their sense of right and wrong, good and evil is never exclusively based on religion. rather there are many origins of morality such as religion, rationality, prudence, societal custom and habit, and need for peaceful co-existence in society. introduction conflicts, especially religious ones concerning the socio-political configuration of many african states on the one hand, and the individual’s commitment to his community on the other, would seem to be based upon the fusion of morality and religion. the intellectual dimension to these presuppositions is even more poignantly expressed by scholars like bolaji idowu1 and john mbiti who claim that “africans are in all things religious and that religion is the basis of morality”2. but to what extent can we 82 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 82-99 © 2000 by assumption university press accept the proposition that morality in african culture is exclusively derived from religion? our answer to the above question is important considering its effect on interpersonal relationship and the people’s attitude towards the community. we therefore in this paper consider again the lively debate on the religious and secular origins of morality in traditional african society. our conclusion is that although religion plays a prominent role in the life of africans, morality from which the people derive and exhibit their sense of right and wrong, good and evil is never exclusively based on religion. rather there are many origins of morality such as religion, rationality, prudence, societal custom and habit and need for peaceful co-existence in society. our revisit to the origin of moral values at this material point in time is expedient and relevant considering the contribution it makes to our understanding of man and his commitment to community. a case for a secular origin of moral values will show that religiosity (theism) or the lack of it (atheism) cannot be an obstacle to approaching and finding solution to human predicaments. a secular approach to morality is a positive development towards common humanism as it is devoid of dogmatism and unnecessary sentiments which make resolution of conflict difficult in most african countries beset with one conflict or the other. above all, we show that both the secular and religious origins of morality if properly internalised can enhance development since they both aim at the achievement of the good society although from different perspectives. morality and man morality in every human society arises from the need to distinguish right or good conduct from wrong or bad conduct so as to ensure harmonious living in society. harmonious co-existence is important not only to ensure the continued survival of the society but also of its qualitative development. when we are concerned with good or bad conduct, we are at the realm of morality. furthermore, due to the importance attached to morality men have internalized the principles, values and conduct that would guide in choosing the right course of action from time to olatunji a. oyeshile 83 time. this is not to say, however, that men do not consciously choose a wrong course of action. morality is therefore concerned with human conduct. in other words, it is concerned with right and wrong actions; judgments and beliefs about what is good and bad, without which the society (any human society) cannot develop. it is obvious then that morality is necessarily tied to human behaviour or conduct because if this was not the case, there would be no need for praising or blaming people for their actions or training them to behave in certain desirable ways in the society3. what makes an issue moral and how do we distinguish between a moral issue and a non-moral issue? let us note that moral issues arise in everyday life when one is presented with such questions as: what should i do or not do? how should i act? and what kind of a person should i be? these are questions that concern both the individual’s behaviour and character4. though these questions can be seen to emanate from an individual’s point of view, an analysis of these questions would show that they affect the well-being of others in society. we can say therefore that moral issues arise “fundamentally when the choices people face will affect the wellbeing of others by either increasing or decreasing it, causing either harm or benefit”5. going by the analysis above, wearing a blue shirt instead of a red one, drinking beverages rather than coffee, playing football rather than baseball are not moral issues because they do not affect the well-being of other people. they can only become moral issues if it is established, for instance, that by playing football rather than baseball the well-being of others will be affected. on the other hand, the selling of drugs, the battering of a spouse are moral issues because the choices which an individual has made concerning these issues affect the well-being of others. the selling of expired drugs, or drugs to teenagers without prescription can cause physical as well as psychological harm to others. let us note again that moral issues are not restricted to matters that concern the well-being of others alone, they also arise in cases where only the agent’s well-being is affected6. for instance, the agent’s choice of committing suicide or continuing to struggle for survival in a desolate environment is a moral issue not because the act of suicide indirectly affects the well-being of others in society, but also because it affects the agent’s well-being. this is better appreciated when it is realised that the ultimate 84 prajñâ vihâra goal of morality is human well-being or the good life. from our analysis of morality, we have seen that choice, freedom and well-being are very important. we have also shown that others matter when an agent makes a choice. this perhaps shows that morality is a social phenomenon. ethics as a branch of philosophy studies the principles of morality such as the rightness of human actions, moral obligation and justification of moral actions. frankena says that “ethics is a moral philosophy or philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems and moral judgments”7. moral philosophy or ethics, according to frankena, arises when we pass beyond the stage in which we are simply directed by traditional rules and move beyond the principles we have internalized to the stage in which we think for ourselves in critical and general terms, just as the greeks were beginning to do in socrates’ day, to achieve a kind of autonomy as moral agents8. we say here that moral philosophy or ethics involves critical selfreflection by moral agents themselves, which ultimately helps in providing general rules about morality. this means that ethics is the systematic study of morality. in other words, “ethics consists in the systematic and critical study of man’s moral beliefs. it deals with the principle of right conduct, especially with reference to universal or specific modes of life”9. the concept of character in yoruba moral universe there is a general consensus among the yoruba that morality is summed up in the word iwa which, in its ordinary english translation means character10. iwa (character) has many derivatives and it is the very stuff which makes life joyful and pleasing to god. due to this, it is often stressed that “good character must be the dominant feature of a person’s life”11. from this conception of iwa, it is common to hear such aphorisms as: iwa rere leso eniyan (good character is one’s guard or the beauty of a person inheres in his good character). the term iwa sometimes has ambivalent meaning because it is used in different senses to portray a person’s character whether good or bad. wande abimbola has shed light on the different senses of the term12. olatunji a. oyeshile 85 we can at least distinguish about four or five senses in which the term is used, all of which are related. etymologically, the word iwa is formed from the root wa (to be, to exist) by addition of the prefix i. therefore, the original meaning of iwa can simply be interpreted as “the fact of being, living or existing”13. the second meaning of iwa is character or moral behaviour. this originates from the idiomatic usage of the original lexical meaning of iwa. taking this to be the case, iwa construed as character is the essence of being. simply put, iwa in this sense concerns the ethical aspects of man’s life as distinguished from other areas of human endeavour such as politics and economy. in the third sense, the word iwa (character) is used to refer to either good or bad character. this sense of the term can be demonstrated in such statement as: iwa okunrin naa ko dara (the man’s character is not good) iwa omo naa dara (the child’s character is good). the fourth sense of the term character is when it is used to refer to good character alone as in: obinrin naa in iwa (the woman has good character) the fifth sense, which is a derivative of the earlier senses of iwa is when one talks about iwapele (gentle or good character) and iwa buburu (bad character). the yoruba have high regard for iwa and they see it as one of the aims of human existence. in order to achieve one’s aims in life, one must embrace iwa pele. a person that refuses to exhibit good or gentle character is seen as a brute. the yoruba say of such a person: ki seniyan, nse lo fawo eniyan bora (he is not a human being, he merely assumes the skin of a human being). a well-behaved person is described as o seniyan (he acts the person). he can also be referred to as omoluwabi (one who behaves as a well-born or a morally upright person)14. we should note that we cannot compare iwa (character) with other valuable things such as money, houses, children and other assets which a man may aspire to have in life. the reason according to the yoruba is that if a man has other valuables and lack s character, he is regarded as having lacked all. such a person will not even be respected in society. it is even vehemently believed among the yoruba that such a person who lacks character will sooner than later lose other valuable possessions. although, the contemporary society seems to place less emphasis on character, due to the prevalent quest for materialism, it is still the 86 prajñâ vihâra case that those who uphold the tenets of morality still live a more organised life when one compares their family settings and the social institutions they find themselves in. many scholars have argued that the present level of societal decadence is as a result of our moral estrangement. for the yoruba therefore, since character emanates from olodumare, deviation from the path of good character is not only an affront to olodumare but also results in the estrangement of man from the supreme being. to avoid being punished due to moral estrangement from olodumare, a man must offer sacrifice (ebo) through the divinities to ensure reconciliation. polemics on the religious and secular bases of morality within yoruba universe some religious scholars such as idowu, adewale, awolalu, dopamu and abimbola (the latter a linguist) argue for the religious origin of moral norms. according to bolaji idowu: “morality is basically the fruit of religion and that to begin with, it was dependent upon it”15. this claim by idowu is used to dismiss other sources of morality such as social origin and common sense. he believes that god has implanted the sense of right and wrong in every man, irrespective of whether he realizes this fact or not. the argument is stressed further to the effect that what the yoruba usually regarded as eewo (taboos) are what have usually been disapproved by olodumare (god in yoruba belief). in other words, what has not been sanctioned by olodumare is regarded as bad, wrong or morally pernicious. one interpretation which idowu’s account leads to is that morality is viewed in terms of negative injunctions since they are things that are forbidden and a person is moral as long as he abstains from these taboos. from the issue of taboo there is then a leap to the claim that the yoruba do not make an attempt to separate morality from religion. adewale16, taking inspiration from idowu’s account, claims that in the traditional yoruba olatunji a. oyeshile 87 belief system, the distinction between religious law and moral law is very hard to see. it is what religion forbids that society also forbids and society approves those things which religion approves. what adewale’s account suggests is that in traditional yoruba belief system, there are no differences between religious injunctions and moral injunctions. but to what extent can one agree with this claim? and because it is taken for granted that religious laws are not fundamentally different from moral laws, adewale believes that there are only two questions for the yoruba moralist namely: what conduct do the gods command and what conduct do the gods forbid? this account shows at least that the deity’s concern with morality is not only in terms of prohibitions (negative imperatives or taboos) but also in terms of positive moral commands that are expected to be carried out by men in order to live the good life. perhaps the strong link of religion with morality in traditional yoruba belief system is as a result of what omoyajowo describes as the “spiritual affinity between god and man”17. this affinity is said to embrace the whole personality of man. granted this, it means the whole of man’s endeavour of which morality is an aspect is subsumed under the supreme being and by extension under man’s religious belief. this is a tendency that is believed to be common among all african peoples as shown in the following claim that religious and moral affinity embraces the whole personality of man, such that: it is man’s self-hood, it is an inner capacity for reason, for freedom, and the sense of morality or right and wrong. it is only in acknowledgement of this spiritual kinship that we discuss the concept of man in africa18. an argument for the religious origin of morality in yoruba society can be constructed from the claim that iwa (character) is linked with olodumare19. the reasoning goes thus: if iwa is linked with olodumare, it means the latter is the embodiment of good character. and if olodumare is the embodiment of good character, he expects human beings to have good character as well. for anybody therefore to have deviated from the path of good character will constitute a sin against the divine law of olodumare and as such a person who has deviated from the path of good 88 prajñâ vihâra behaviour will then be punished for his misdemeanor. a person can escape being punished by the divinities if he offers sacrifices to the divinities which will then show that he has reconciled with olodumare. it is also believed that character is very important even in the worship of the divinities and olodumare in yoruba culture. hence, the yoruba regard good character as the essence of religion. this is commonly reflected in the expression “iwa lesin” (character is religion). though akin makinde believes that there are origins of morality other than religion, he makes a strong case for the religious origin of morality supporting his claim from odu ifa corpus and the african religious universe20. for example, he talks about ogbon (wisdom), eko (study), otito (truthfulness) and mimo iwa hu (good conduct), which are used in yoruba moral system as the expression of god’s will for mankind. in making a strong claim for the pre-eminence of religion over other sources of morality, makinde states that: “whatever one may wish to consider as origins of african systems of morality ... religion is certainly the most prominent contender”21. good character is the major sources of happiness destiny, the good life and the life of fulfilment as the odu ifa corpus demonstrates.22 in the odu corpus according to ogbe-egunda, we see how orunmila married iwa and became very successful: e wa womo iwa berere o e wa womo iwa berere iwa gbe dani iwa pon se hin e wa womo iwa berere which translates: come and behold the countless children of iwa, come and behold the countless children of iwa, iwa carries (children) in (her) arms iwa carries (children) on (her) back come and behold the countless children of iwa. furthermore, good character enables one to journey through life as ireteolatunji a. oyeshile 89 idi asserts: iwa pele l’okun aiye fi ro peti l’owo eni o da fun orunmila ti o nlo fi iwa pele gba okun aiye l’owo okan-le-ni-rinwo imale which translates: gentle character it is which enables the rope of life to stay unbroken in one’s hand. so declares the oracle to orunmila who by means of gentle character was going to win the rope of life from the four hundred and one divinities. lack of good character according to the yoruba can be responsible for endless fear and uncoordinated life as shown by oworin-sedin: e jo re, e je o sa: iwa won ni ‘ma le won kiri. o da fun aniwonikun ti yi o ma beru t’osan t’oru; o je hu’wa ‘re, o je hu’wa atata aniwonikun, ki o ye ‘sa kiri bi ojo. which translates: leave him alone, let him run: it is their character that chases them about. so declares the oracle about aniwonikun who fears incessantly day and night will you but practise good character, will you but practise sound character, aniwonikun, and stop running about like a coward. some of the odu ifa corpus quoted above shows that morality in 90 prajñâ vihâra yoruba society has a deep root in the people’s conception of olodumare, the supreme deity, who is believed to be the orisun (source) of human existence. the other group of scholars consisting of gbadegesin, oluwole and oladipo argues for the secular basis of morality in traditional yoruba belief system. to them religion is just one of the factors that account for the moral norms of the yoruba people. other factors include rationality, custom and habit within the society. according to gbadegesin, those who argue for religion as the base of morality because of the close connection between iwa and ifa corpus must have misconstrued the nature of the ifa corpus as solely the signification of the supreme deity. but ifa is not just a religion, it is also a source of yoruba collective wisdom23. the reason is that orunmila (yoruba deity of divination) speaks in parables and whenever traditional thinkers have the need to establish a point, they make allusion to old age parables. furthermore, the fact that orunmila was even blamed in a story for maltreating his wife shows that the oracle itself is not spared as far as moral judgment of actions is concerned. gbadegesin believes therefore that the yoruba adopt a pragmatic approach towards morality. this means that the yoruba apply suitable measures to ethical situations without relying on any rules. this attitude may be extended to religion which sometimes serves as the motivation force but not the ultimate appeal in moral matters24. though no one can dispute the fact that religion influences the moral norms of the yoruba, “it is still the case that the yoruba separate the secular from religious in their moral thinking”25. in other words, the fact that there is a close connection between religion and morality or the fact that the moral system is religiously coated is not enough a premise to show that the moral norms of the people are logically derived from the existence of a god. it is not even an axiom in terms of which a moral system is rationally justified. our claim here is that within the yoruba moral universe, it is often the case that some moral issues are decided on general or universal moral imperatives. for instance the saying: ‘biaba begi nigbo, ka fi oran ro ara eni wo’ (when we fell a tree in the forest, let us put ourselves in the position of the felled tree). the metaphorical implication of this statement is that we do not do unto others what we will not want done unto us. even the saying that, “boju bari, enu a pamo” (it is not all that the olatunji a. oyeshile 91 eyes see, that the mouth reveals) and “olofofo o gba egbaa, ibi ope lo mo” (the tale-bearer earns no monetary reward but only thanks) all point to the fact that these moral injunctions are designed by men themselves to be able to live successfully. we can imagine what interpersonal relationship will become, if a person reveals all that he sees or gossips about other peoples’ affairs. sometimes a man’s inability to search to the depth of other people’s mind with regard to ethical issues does not make the creation of a god inescapable and hence forces the yoruba to the conclusion that “a philosophical solution to the problem at hand cannot consist of scientifically proven judgment”26. the implication of the above therefore, is that the yoruba now leave judgments concerning the issue of justice in the hands of the gods. hence, it is common to hear such utterances as: olorun a da (god will decide/adjudicate justice) or oju olurun to (the eyes of god see it all)27. to say all the above things however is not to indicate that the yoruba individual despises secular ethics to constitute an irrational endeavour. on the contrary, when the individual gets to the end of a rational process, especially when a solution is not forthcoming, he introduces god into the scheme of things. from our analysis, it is perhaps clear why oluwole suggests that even though the yoruba system can be said to incorporate some religious elements, the morality of the yoruba is a system involving the evaluation of human action28. the moral norms of the yoruba if it is said to be founded on religion, or explained in due reference to good will mean simply that all their rules of behaviour are taboos. furthermore, it is often stated that the gods forbid some forms of behaviour, for instance, we can say that ogun (god of iron) does not allow stealing while oya (river goddess) forbids telling lies. according to oluwole, if the yoruba man is asked why he thinks these acts are wrong, he does not refer to the gods but to factual reasons for explanation why one ought not to steal or tell lies. hence, the gods are made rational in terms of moral matters, because what they sanction or do not sanction must be acceptable to the rational mind29. in a similar vein, the yoruba do not always wait for the gods to dispense justice in hell or heaven in matters they are capable of handling themselves and this explains the reasons why people are blamed or praised for their actions and the existence of penal codes to check the behaviour 92 prajñâ vihâra of people. in fact, to leave judgments in the hands of god when man is capable of determining the factual basis of the issue at hand would be to deny him of his freewill and embrace a fatalistic interpretation of predestination. by fatalistic interpretation, we mean that orientation of holding to the belief that what will be, will be inspite of human effort. this attitude will seem to discourage the belief in cause and effect. to the contrary however, the yoruba believe that events have causes which are natural and man-made. they only appeal to the supreme being when natural and human explanations to account for events fail. it has been suggested that to claim that olodumare is the sole origin of yoruba moral norms is inconsistent with the existential aspects of the people’s life. for instance, when one examines some of the proverbs and institutionalized practices of the people there is lack of consistency and coherence of an outlook based on the conception of a deity. rather, what one find is an outlook that one would call an essentially “this-worldly” and pragmatic orientation30. let us note that our claims here are substantiated in the everyday life of the yoruba as discernible in their attitude towards one another, in their proverbs and wise sayings. the yoruba belief in morality is primarily “this-worldly” and pragmatic because the people try as much as possible to find natural reasons for why things happen in particular way and it is pragmatic because they are ready to manipulate events, even the ifa oracle to ensure that things favour them. this is aptly captured by d.o. fagunwa when he reports on the musings of the great hunter akara-ogun in ogboju ode ninu igbo irumale as he proceeds to divine what lies in store for him: when i cast the pieces of kola, the result was inauspicious. for if it spoke good, would two pieces not face down and the other two up? alas it was not so for me; sometimes three pieces faced down and one up, and at other times all four faced down-the matter of this kolanut was simply beyond my comprehension. so when i had cast them many times without good augury, with my own hands i turned two up and faced two down saying, “with his own hands does a man mend his fortune; if you kola pieces will not predict good, i will predict that good for you.31 their pragmatic nature also stems from the fact that they are ready olatunji a. oyeshile 93 to abandon some of the divinities and lesser deities that serve as intermediary between them and olodumare if the divinities do not respond favourably to their requests. it is often common to hear such saying as: “orisa ti a ke ke ke ti ko gbo ike, ti a ge ge ge ti ko gbo ige, oju u popo ni ngbe” (the divinity who is incessantly coddled but fails to respond to coddling, who is incessantlypampered but does not respond to pampering, will end up discarded in the street)32 this even explains why some divinities are not being worshipped in some traditional yoruba communities. to say therefore that the attitude of the yoruba concerning morality is “this-worldly” and pragmatic does not mean that they have totally abandoned olodumare, rather they appeal to olodumare in cases where moral problems, dilemmas and crises cannot be simply solved by human efforts. and this suggests also that both the religious and secular origins of morality are complimentary. furthermore, if we grant that some of the moral norms of the people are associated with their conception of god, these moral norms do not exhaust the variety of norms that we have in yoruba culture33. the reason is that there are certain norms of behaviour that arises out of the attempt by the people to grapple with the different strata of human existence. this becomes the case because morality is inextricably linked with human action and as such covers a wider range of human activities and experiences than religion. it also accounts for its diversity and variety from time to time within a society and among societies34. from the various arguments presented so far, we can see that though religion plays considerable role in determining the moral norms of the yoruba, it is definitely not the sole origin as there are other sources of yoruba moral norms such as custom and habit, human rationality and even human experience. it would therefore be wrong to claim that yoruba morality is exclusively dependent on religion. what one cannot deny or dispute in yoruba and other african societies, according to kudadjie, is that: religion significantly influences what africans consider good or bad, right or wrong. religion determines much of the moral code of an african people, especially those values which may be called negative the don’ts, the taboos35. 94 prajñâ vihâra what the statements above indicate is that moral values in yoruba and other african societies have some elements of supernaturalism. based on this, good acts would then be taken to include those acts that have been approved by the oracles, those laid down by the builders of the community, comprising mostly of elderly people and those built on the stock of experiences that a given society has36. let us re-emphasize that there are various origins or sources or foundations of yoruba moral norms all of which revolve around the concept of iwa from which other related concepts such as iwapele and omoluwabi are derived. the implications of a secular origin of morality for man within the african society are far-reaching. for instance, a case for a secular origin makes the individual more committed to human values because it prevents religious dogmatism and unnecessary transcendentalism in moral issues affecting people from diverse backgrounds. the secular basis also emphasizes common humanity and avoids division along religious basis in society’s development. it also gives a proper basis for assessing conflict in a society like africa, by removing the religious veil that may lead to and may not help in resolving ethnic conflicts that often lead to civil wars. it is on this basis that we submit that even though there is a strong fusion of morality and religion in almost all societies, especially african societies, human beings are still tied together in moral matters by factors other than religion. implications of morality for contemporary society the preceding sections have afforded us the opportunity of establishing the interconnection between the religious and secular origins of morality in yoruba culture. the pertinent question at this juncture is this: what are the implications of iwa (character) towards achieving sustainable development in contemporary african society marred by violence, corruption, selfishness, bad leadership, dearth of integrity and fall in the standard of education? the answer is simply that the full embrace of moral values as enunciated in traditional yoruba belief system will help to overcome, some of the problems stated above. whether from religious or olatunji a. oyeshile 95 secular origin, the yoruba moral system abhors selfishness, wickedness, greed, adultery, covenant breaking and such other moral vices. the best we can do in this circumstance is to adhere to this moral values strictly. for instance, economic and political activities are marked by impatience the urge to make it fast. but yoruba moral system tells us that one cannot achieve anything without patience (suru). suru (patience) is taken to be baba iwa (father of character). it is through suru that olodumare organizes the world. it would have been difficult to achieve any social control in human organizations if no one exercises patience. in interpersonal and international relations, patience plays a prominent role. for instance, in a situation of war between two countries, the warring parties still have to go to the negotiating table and this is only possible through patience. the strictly positive moral norms like good neighbourliness, loyalty among friends, selflessness, fidelity between husband and wife, truthfulness among others are moral norms that enjoin co-operation, which we are in dire need of in contemporary society. this is important because the yoruba realize that no man can live in isolation and, therefore, the individual must be ready always to sacrifice or suppress personal interest for the general good. the yoruba saying that: “emi abata ni nmu odo san” (the influence of the fountain makes the river flow) clearly illustrates the need for interdependence. since the goal of morality is primarily to ensure human well-being through the injunctions of olodumare and other human designs, then every individual as a social being has to ensure the good of the community to which he belongs since this is the only way his own well-being can be ensured. olodumare, not only as the source of our being, but also that being from which some of our moral injunctions emanate does serve as the basis of cohesion in human society. the argument is simply that the awareness that we all accept and internalize the belief that we have a common source of being reinforces the belief in men that they should live together in harmony. although we may ask the question: if this is the case why is it that human beings are still engaged in conflicts of various forms and magnitudes? to answer this question an appeal is then made to the secular nature of man. taking it for granted that olodumare created all, we do not all live in the same environment. not only this, we have different desires and aspirations. even the means by which we fulfill the desires 96 prajñâ vihâra and aspirations varies from individual to individual depending on custom, habit, economic position and political affiliation. this is the reason why men then appeal to such factors (secular in origin) which allow them to come together since there has to be social order and harmony before each individual can achieve his goal. another implication of the religious basis of morality especially among the yoruba is that a person’s conduct on earth is believed to be the sole determinant of the judgement which he receives in the life after death. the yoruba say: “iwa ti a ba hu laye ni a o fi dani lejo, oun na ni a o jere” (a person’s character on earth will be used to judge him and it will also determine his inheritance hereafter). this to some extent is an admonition that one should behave well on earth and desist from what will bring pain to others. there is a meta-question here: since people are well aware of this, why do we still have people who behave contrary to the injunctions of olodumare? although, the scope of our essay does not extend to this sphere, suffice it to say here that this question has been a major problem in religious circles. perhaps, this is why legal and political sanctions have been introduced to govern human conduct. above all, many people still believe that the fear of god is the beginning of wisdom, progress and development. even though people’s immoral attitude is at variance with religious institutions and places of worships, man still need to return to god to make meaning of his secular life. endnotes 1. e. bolaji idowu, olodumare: god in yoruba belief (london: longmans, 1962). 2. j.s. mbiti, african religions and philosophy (london: heinemann, 1969). 3. o. oladipo, “morality in yoruba thought: a philosophical analysis”, quest, vol. i, no. 2 (1987), pp. 43-51. 4. e. barcalow, moral philosophy: theory and issues (california: wadsworth pub. comp., (1994), p. 3. 5. ibid. 6. ibid. 7. w.k. frankena, ethics, second edition, (new delhi: prentice hall of india private ltd., 1995), p.4. 8. ibid. 9. j.o. kayode, “african ethnics on sex” in s.o. abogunrin (ed.), religion and olatunji a. oyeshile 97 ethics in nigeria, (ibadan: daystar press, 1986), p. 51. 10. idowu, op. cit., p. 154. 11. ibid. 12. w. abimbola, “iwapele: the concept of good character in ifa literary corpus” in w.abimbola (ed.), yoruba oral tradition, (ibadan: ibadan university press, 1975). 13. ibid., pp. 393-395. 14. idowu, op.cit., pp. 154-155 15. ibid., p. 45 & pp. 145-146. 16. s.a. adewale, “ethics in ifa” in s.o. abogunrin (ed.), religion and ethics in nigeria, (ibadan: daystar press, 1986). see also p. 60. 17. j.a. omoyajowo, “the concept of man in africa” in j.s. pobee (ed.), religion, morlality and population dynamics, (legon: university of ghana press, 1977), p. 70. 18. ibid. 19. abimbola, op. cit., p. 416. 20. m.a. makinde, “african culture and moral systems: a philosophical study”, second order, new series, vol. 1, no. 2, (july 1988). see also p. 18. 21. ibid. p. 18 22. idowu, op. cit., pp. 155-159. 23. s. gbadegesin, “yoruba philosophy: individuality, community, and the moral order” in e.c. eze (ed.), african philosophy: an anthology, (oxford: blackwell, 1998), p. 140. 24. ibid. 25. s.b. oluwole, “the rational basis of yoruba ethical thinking”, the nigerian journal of philosophy, vol. 4, nos. 1 & 2, (1984), p. 14. 26. ibid. 27. ibid. 28. ibid., pp. 21-23. 29. ibid., pp. 22-23. 30. oladipo, op. cit., p. 46. 31. soyinka’s the forest of a thousand demons cited by o. owomoyela ‘the pragmatic humanism of yoruba culture” journal of african studies, vol. 8, no. 3, (19981), p. 129. 32. owomoyela ibid., p. 130. 33. ibid., p. 49. 34. ibid., see also olusegun oladipo, “religion in african culture: some conceptual issues” in k. wiredu (ed.), a companion to african philosophy, (oxford: blackwell, 2004), pp. 355-363. 35. j.n. kudadjie, “aspects of african ethics”in j.s. pobee (ed.), religion, morality and population dynamics, (legon: university of ghana press, 1977), p. 20. see also j.o. awolalu and p.a. dopamu, west african traditional religion, (ibadan: onibonoje press, 1979). 98 prajñâ vihâra 36. g.o. ozumba, “african ethics” in a.f. uduigwomen (ed.), footmarks on african philosophy, (ikeja: o.o.p. ltd., 1995), p. 5. olatunji a. oyeshile 99 sanjeewa vijitha kumara 53 sāṅkhya teachings found in theravada buddhism: an inquiry into an analogy depicted in the visuddhimagga sanjeewa vijitha kumara mahidol university, thailand abstract in the study of philosophies in religions, occasionally, parallel concepts among the religions are also found. for that reason, to understand the original form and precisedoctrine of the religions, it is essential to study their history too. the analogy “blind and lame” found in the visuddhimagga was applied by buddhaghosa to explain the teaching of dependent origination. the same analogywas utilized by iśvara kṛṣna to explain the interrelationship betweenprakṛ ti and puruṣa in sāṅkhya kārikā. in consequence, a doubt arises whether the theravada buddhist texts were shaded by non-buddhist systems accepted soul theory. also, this doubt leads to misunderstand that the teachings of the dependent and origination and prakṛti and puruṣa are identical. nevertheless, examining the historical records related to these two different religious texts and their traditions, it is obvious that they were different teachings in different contexts. so, this article aims to corroborate the variationsof them with reference to the history of religions: buddhism and sāṅkhya. prajñā vihāra vol. 16 no. 2, july-december 2015, 53-71 © 2000 by assumption university press 54 prajñā vihāra introduction the grand commentary of pali literature, the visuddhimagga, was compiled by buddhaghosa in ceylon in the 5th century ad. basing itself on the tipiṭaka, it attempts to systemize the essential teachings of the theravada tradition. buddhaghosa had to deduce certain sources, which were not admitted by mahāvihāra monks.1 it indicates that his writing was thoroughly supervised and evaluated by mahāvihāra monks. nevertheless, it is apparent that some illustrations which come to light in the vism are similar to those found in buddhist sanskrit texts.2 it is presumable that the vism might be influenced by the sāṅkhya system too. for instance, the following analogy found in the sāṅkhya kārikā3 is also found in the vism: “tattha jaccandhopi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena sakena balena gacchati, pīṭhasappīpi nittejo dubbalo na sakena tejena sakenabalena gacchati, na ca tesaṃ aññamaññaṃ nissāya gamanaṃ nappavattati, evamevaṃ nāmampi nittejaṃ na sakena tejena uppajjati,”4[here, the blind man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy and power, the lame man is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with his own efficacy and power, in the absence of their mutual co-operation walking does not come to be, thus, name is also inefficient and powerless, does not move with its own efficacy and power, form is also inefficient and powerless,does not move with its own efficacy and power]. apart from the above analogy, three commentaries, (the vism, the paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā and the sammohavinodanī) clearly criticize the doctrine of sāṅkhya by corroborating that ‘avijjā’ is not the primordial entity of the world.5 besides, defining ‘emptiness’, the vism, repeatedly rejects sāṅkhya teaching linked to dependent origination.6 sanjeewa vijitha kumara 55 yet, buddhaghosa takes in the analogy ‘blind and lame’ incorporated even in the sāṅkhya kārikā in his great pali work, without any ambivalence. in this article, i will attempt to break through the background of how the sāṅkhya teachings7 influenced the vism with special reference to the analogy of ‘blind and lame.’ early buddhist aspect of the analogy the ‘epistemology’ involved is the way of gaining knowledge in regard to the world and being. the variability of the ‘theory of knowledge’ appears in relation to the forms of the final emancipation. thus, buddhism admits perception (including extraordinary perception)8 and inference9 to be the epistemological means of gaining knowledge. it is to say that some disagreements among present scholars are set up with regard to the inferences discussed in buddhist literature.10 in the nikāya texts, the term ‘anumāna’ and ‘anvayañāṇa’ are employed in the sense of inference.11 buddhist inference appeared as a correlated concept in terms of dependent origination. in this regard, jayatilake suggests that the buddhist inference is based on the ordinary and extraordinary perceptions.12 hence, it is clear that this suggestion generalizes the prevalence of inference in early buddhistteaching. accordingly, the analogy can be defined as the technical part of the inference.13in consequence, obviously buddhism also applied analogies in the way of epistemology. the analogy ‘blind and lame’ in the visuddhimagga illustrating the interdependence of name and form, buddhagosa adopts the analogy of ‘blind and lame’ in the diṭṭhivisuddhi-niddesa of the vism. this analogy leads to the view that the name does not exist without form and vice versa.14though the aim of using this analogy was to explain buddhist doctrine, herein, buddhaghosa had borrowed it from the sāṅkhya kārikā. regarding this identical feature in both vism and sāṅkhya, i intend to draw four different postulates as follows. 56 prajñā vihāra 1. buddhaghosa was influenced by sāṅkhya system directly. 2. sāṅkhya was influenced by buddhism. 3. this was not a mistake done by buddhaghosa. he simply followed the elders’ sources only. 4. the likeness of the analogy used in the vism and the sāṅkhya kārikā is demonstrable in the sense of epistemology only, not incontext. relationship between buddhaghosa and sāṅkhya system the strong brahmanical background of buddhaghosa inherited by birth signifies a possibility of sāṅkhya philosophy influencing his works. particularly, as the mahāvaṃsa and the buddhaghosuppatti have recorded, buddhaghosa studied brahmanic teachings and developed mastery in three veda-s in his teen years.15 moreover, the history of the birth of buddhagosa (buddhaghosuppatti) explicitly gives an account that buddhaghosa was from a brahmin family16that both kesi and his son ghosa were well-versed in three veda-s. on the other hand, buddhaghosa, before his leaving for ceylon, made an effort to convert his father to be a buddhist and succeeded.17the effort he made to convert his father also indicates how strong his father as a brahmin was. however, kosambi dhammānanda traces a divergent suggestion to the facts found in the mahāvaṃsa and the buddhaghosuppatti. he emphasizes that buddhaghosa was not a brahmin.18 the attestation brought to prove his suggestion was that buddhaghosa demonstrated unawareness in explaining the doctrine and culture of brahmanism in india.19 prof. abeynayake logically overrules the opinion given by kosambi dammānanda and corroborates that buddhaghosa did not think to practise further as a brahmin since he had been trained in the buddhist order.20 venerable revata, the teacher of buddhaghosa, was a great theravadamonk and there is no dependable clue to conclude that buddhaghosa inserted brahmanical teachings in his works completed while he was in sanjeewa vijitha kumara 57 india. on the other hand, it can be inferred that venerable revata, after recognizing the non-buddhist influence in buddhaghosa’s works, advised to arrive in ceylon and translate the commentaries existed in sinhalese as an assessmentto rectify his understanding in another way. but, there are insufficient facts to support corroborating the above inference. likely buddhist influence on sāṅkhya the second attempt is to inquire whether this analogy appeared as an outcome of buddhist influence towards the sāṅkhya system. the sāṅkhya kārikā contains a few analogies which are parallel to pali post canonical and commentarial literature. even so, the analogy ‘lame and blind’ in the vism cannot be found in the pali canonical or post canonical literature and in consequence, this analogy can be counted as a teaching borrowed from sāṅkhya. accordingly, the nettippakaraṇa incorporates the analogy milk and curd,21 which is more familiar with sāṅkhya teachings.22 nevertheless, the nettippakaraṇa falls under the category of the post canonical literature and is dated to the 1st century bce.23 in a further inquiry on the nettippakaraṇa, norman suggests that it was compiled in north-india.24 as he says, the arya meter which was familiar to vedic texts have been employed in the nettippakaraṇa and this text often was used by buddhaghosain his works. if his assumption is accurate, inevitably, the author of the nettippakaraṇa also was inclined to brahmanic teachings like sāṅkhya. besides, the historical facts revealed in the pali literature connected to the sāṅkhya also support this postulate. unanimously, scholars accept that the founder of sāṅkhya was the seer kapila. kapila is recognized as an independent seer and also a representative of the godhead. no doubt, this difference damages the claim that kapila obtained a great reputation as an outstanding philosopher. in any case, the correlation between sāṅkhya and upaniśad is irrefutable because the two upaniśad texts give accounts of the seer kapila, especially in the śvetāśvatara upaniśad.25 moreover, the bhagavad-gita and the mahabharata refer to the term sāṅkhya.26 as 58 prajñā vihāra muller finds, the classical upaniśad refer only to two names of indian philosophical systems; sāṅkhya and yoga.27 these factors signify that kapila the founder of the sāṅkhya philosophy has to be stratified into early strata of the upaniśad (before the composition of the bhagavad-gita, the mahabharata and the śvetāśuatara upaniśad.) yet, it should be noted here that the name kapila is not unique to sāṅkhya or hindu philosophy. the uttarajjhaya, one of four mūla texts of the jain canon, also gives details with reference to kapila, who attained pacceka-buddha hood.28 and, the buddhist literature also holds a sizeable account of seer kapila. particularly, the buddhist history records about two kapilas. therein, kapila encountered in the sutta-nipāta was an evil person.29 but, referring to the commentaries, the next kapila could be recognized as a great seer, who practised hard practices and later on sacrificed his own monastery and the region to build the city kapilavatthu.30 the saundarānanda also affirms that kapila was a great seer and he dedicated his territory to build kapilavasthu .31 if the commentary of the sutta-nipāta is acceptable the kapila found in this commentary could be the same person, who set up the sāṅkhya system. also, it would be the most historical evidence in terms of seer kapila or the sāṅkhya philosophy in both pali and sanskrit literature and as such sāṅkhya could be considered as more antique than buddhism. the critical note on sāṅkhya teachings found in the pañcappakaraṇa-anu-ṭīkā would be vital source leading to clear evidence regarding this discussion. in this sub-commentary, venerable ānanada also pointed out that kapila was a seer who founded the sāṅkhya teachings.32as modern scholars claim, the sāṅkhya kārikā written by ishvara kṛshṇa would be better considered as the most historical text in the sāṅkhya philosophy33 accordingly, i presume by referring to the attestations of the mahabharata, the bhagavad-gita and the śvetāśvatara upaniśad that the sāṅkhya teaching was found by kapila between 7th century and the 5th century bce. the statement, “pakati kho esā, kassapa, lokasmiṃ ‘dukkaraṃ sāmaññaṃ dukkaraṃ brahmañña’,34 found in the mahāsīhanāda-sutta is another controversial reference to consider seriously. maurice walshe sanjeewa vijitha kumara 59 translates the term ‘pakati’(prakṛti?); “so they say in the world.”35 it is observed that he evades this term ‘pakati’ without giving a direct translation. the commentary of the dīgha-nikāya defines the term ‘pakati’ as a kind of teaching.36 moreover, the dīgha-nikāya-ṭīkā illustrates the term ‘pakati’ (prakṛti?) to be “lokasiddhavāda.”37 as pali sub-commentarial literature explains, “loka-siddhavāda” can be defined in three contexts. firstly, it seems to be a way of functions related to nature.38 the other meaning is connected to the teaching of epistemology. particularly, defining the term “yathā nāmā,” the majjhima-nikāya-ṭīkā, notes “to demonstrate that this is the reality, comprehending after analyzed the objects what not analyzed is called yathā nāmā.”39 the third context is the practice followed by non-buddhist ascetics.40 so, herein the last two contexts are identical in both theoretically and pragmatically. the teaching of mahāsīhanāda-sutta is familiar with the third explanation. in this respect, i understand the term “loka-siddhavāda” in the sub-commentarial literature leads to a religious teaching. probably, that could be sāṅkhya. apparently, it can be assumed that the term “loka-siddhavāda” depicted in the sub-commentaries in the context of epistemology means “the teachings of origin or form of the world.” as yoga teachings believe, “loka siddha” is a practitioner, who attained all yogic accomplishment.41 therefore, it is possible to accept that “loka-siddhavada” signifies the teaching of sāṅkhya because sāṅkhya and yoga are inseparable. after considering all the facts, it has to be accepted that by explaining “pakati” the ṭīkā literature refer to sāṅkhya. thus, if the interpretations come to light in the ṭīkā-s are acceptable, beyond a doubt, it should be admitted that even in buddha’s time, the sāṅkhya, which accepts primordial entities, was existent. accordingly, a hypothesis can be traced whether the antiquity of sāṅkhya was the cause to insert this analogy into the vism. but, the mahāsīhanāda-sutta contains the term “pakati” in the sense of nature, common or universal characteristic only. the illustrations of commentators are insufficient to say that the mahāsīhanāda-sutta indicates any clue regarding this discussion. and, it should be remembered that though we accept that the mahāsīhanāda-sutta refers to sāṅkhya system, the sutta itself demonstrates that the buddha kept it away (pakati) pointing out its futility. 60 prajñā vihāra further accounts that the sāṅkhya system existed in buddha’s time are implied in the mūlapariyāya-sutta of the majjhima-nikāya. the first evidence on this subject is found in the introductory note given by bhikkhuthanissara in his translation of the mūlapariyāya-sutta.42 as he has discussed, the history of sāṅkhya system extends back to the time of uddaka and it developed up to the classical stage at the time of the buddha. bhikkhu thanissara claims that the listeners of this sutta were mastered in sāṅkhya. consequently, because the buddha’s explanation was not equal to the views they already held, they were displeased with this discourse. in a further inquiry into its commentary, facts may be found which partly advocate the aforementioned suggestion. the listeners were brahmanas, and this sutta was delivered in the form of arisen needs (aṭṭhuppattika).43 moreover, the sutta notes that the buddha intended to elaborate “the root causes of all the dhamma-s” (sabbadhamma mūlapariyāya). especially, this teaching leads to substantiate non-self [(he does) not conceive nibbāna, in nibbāna, from nibbāna or nibbāna as mine].44 it indicates the listeners held a conceit on the ultimate truth and buddha wanted to get rid of their conceit completely. notably, sāṅkhya also admitted theory of evolution except mūla prakṛti. in other words, sāṅkhya does not accept non-self in relation to the ultimate truth (puruṣa).45 so, did the buddha try to make these brahmanas understand, who held views that the ultimate truth is eternal, by delivering this sutta that there is no self even in nibbāna? however the followers were not pleased with the explanation given by the buddha. this postulate tends to agree with the suggestion made by bhikkhu thanissara. nevertheless, the information provided in the commentary is that these followers were full of conceit in terms of their knowledge of buddhism and the buddha delivered this sutta to demolish their conceit. the same accounts that the commentary has given are found in the mūlapariyāya jātaka too. seemingly, the aim of delivering the sutta, as the commentary notes, runs counter to the bhikkhu thanissara’s suggestion. in this respect, it is difficult to come to a precise conclusion regarding this assumption. as i understand, without an awareness of the geographical background of the history of sāṅkhya, it is difficult sanjeewa vijitha kumara 61 to affirm the above argument. in other words, if we have dependable facts that the city ukkaṭṭhā, where the buddha delivered this sutta was a territory for sāṅkhya followers, it could be accepted that the listeners of this sutta were sāṅkhya followers. accordingly, the second hypothesis i posited should be overruled due to its lack of evidence. multiplicity of sources in line with the third point, i assume that the vism was not merely an independent treatise and it was guided by the vimuttimagga (vim). but, popular opinion is that in compiling the vism, buddhagosa applied the old sinhalese commentaries accepted by mahāvihārins only. consequently, still, there is no explicit agreement among the pali buddhist scholars that buddhaghosa followed the vim in compiling the vism. to this point, bapat notes; “and so, the only theory that seems to us as most probable, is the theory,no 1: that buddhaghosa had upatissa’s book, vimuttimagga, before himand that he, taking the framework of the upatissa’s vimuttimagga,simplified it with his scholastic erudition and composedhis work visuddhimagga, which has certainly far outshone upatissa’s vimuttimagga.”46 as he points out, the vism was structured as the vim. malalasekara also remarks in this regard, “there is, i feel, no need to conclude, therefore,that “the visuddhimagga, which has been considered to be entirely buddhaghosa’s own work is in reality a revised version of upatissa’s vimuttimagga”.47in this respect, he also partly agrees to admit that the vim influenced the vism. in this discussion, hinuber suggests that the vim was earlier than vism and later than the commentary of the paṭisambhidā.48 to the same point, norman advocates that the vim took the reins to the vism.49 accordingly, it is clear that the vism was structured 62 prajñā vihāra in the shade of the vim. in fact, this analogy is found in the vim. so, it is acceptable that the vism was shaded by the vim.50 as modern scholars assume, the author of the vim is encountered in the list of the lineage of the theras.51 also, he was living in north india, while he was composing the vim.52 to the above evidence, he was an elder of theravada lineage and the text was composed in india. thus, it is possible to influence contemporary sanskrit or brahmanic literary features towards the vim. as the outcome of following the vim, the analogy ‘blind and lame’ may have been incorporated in the vism. accordingly, if we accept that compiling the commentaries, buddhaghosa was interested in using trustworthy sources beyond elders’ notes, it is not difficult to admit that this analogy also was borrowed by him from the vim. contextual diversity the fourth postulate is that buddhaghosa borrowed some analogies from sāṅkhya to substantiate buddhist teachings. in connection with it, he intended to use the analogy ‘blind and lame’ in the sense of epistemology because it was an ideal analogy to describe dependent origination. especially,in accordance to sāṅkhya, puruṣa is defined to be the psychological part and prakṛti is the physical part. prakṛti cannot move ahead just as the cripple cannot walk alone. the puruṣa does not function independently just as the blind man cannot see, but can walk. further, it is equal to a charioteer without a chariot and a chariot without a charioteer. this simile was appliedby buddhaghosa to explain the interrelationship between name and form.53 in applying the analogy which comes in sāṅkhya kārikā to the context deliberated in the vism; the name (nāma), similar to the concept puruṣa in saṅkya like a blind man. as sāṅkhya interprets, the puruṣa is the primordial principle. yet, the vism has not defined either name or form to be primordial. in the same passage, buddhaghosa, having cited the nalakalāpa-sutta, substantiates that both name and form are interrelated. in addition to that, the sāṅkhya accepts that the causation is allowed for prakṛti only. in this manner, if buddhaghosa sanjeewa vijitha kumara 63 imitated outright the sāṅkhya, he would have symbolized that causation is rendered in matter only. but, buddhaghosa’s way of explaining was completely different in the context than the teachings of sāṅkhya. conclusion sāṅkhya philosophy manifests a few similarities with buddhism by accepting the concept of suffering. besides, analyzing the analogy ‘lame and blind’ found in the vism, it is difficult to say unanimously that buddhaghosaabsorbed the teachings of the sāṅkhya kārikā. in this regard the first hypothesis i traced should be avoided. undoubtedly, buddhaghosa had mastery of brahmanism. but the evidence is not adequate to prove that the life of the buddhaghosa was influenced by sāṅkhya. also, it is impossible to corroborate that buddhism influenced sāṅkhya. as i understand, this analogy in the vism was the result of following the vim, which was composed in north-india where the brahmanic teachingscritically spread. upatissa, the author of the vim, was an indian monk, and entered to the buddhist order from a brahmin family. therefore, it is possible to conclude that he thrived with traditional brahmanical knowledge and he utilized the analogy to explain buddhist doctrine. also, both buddhaghosaand upatissa were from brahmin families and were familiar with this analogy. however, it is not difficult to accept that upatissa borrowed this analogy from the sāṅkhya kārikā this is because he had more freedom in compiling the commentaries than buddhaghosa, who had to adhere to the rules introduced by mahāvihāra monks. but, hinuber suggests that the vim also used the theravada tipiṭaka.54 finally, it should be noted that even though buddhaghosa cited the analogy, explicitly it can be substantiated that buddhaghosa used the analogy which is found in sāṅkhya merely in a structural manner. he had no intention to absorb or follow the doctrine of sāṅkhya in the context. 64 prajñā vihāra end notes 1“he also mentions the andhaka-aṭṭhakathā, although almost always to reject its views,” k. r. norman, pali literature, (wiesbaden: otto harrassowitz, 1983) 121. further he discusses and puts forward his opinion that this rejection was not merely due to the content of the texts, but due to the language that they used: dravadians, ibid, 122. 2the kaṅkhāvitaraṇavisuddhi-niddesa of the vism contains a series of stanzas referring to the elders (porāṇās). some stanzas among them are similar with the stanzas of the karma karmaphala parīkṣā of the mūlamadyamaka kārikā. for instance: “karma cen nāsti kartā ca kutaḥ syāt karmajaṃ phalaṃ, asaty atha phale bhoktā kuta eva bhaviṣyati.” david. j. kalupahana, madyamaka kārikā of nāgarjuna. ed. and trans. (delhi: motilal banarasidas, 1999) chap. 17-30. ‘‘kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako suddhadhammā pavattanti, evetaṃ sammadassanaṃ, c. a. f. rhys davids, visuddhimagga, ed. (london: pali text society, 1975) 602. 3puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya paṅgvandhavadubhayorapi-saṃyogastatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ, swami virupakshananda, sāṅkhya kārikā. ed. and trans., (madras: sri ramakrishna math, 1995) stnz. 21. 4rhys davids, 596. / n. r. m., ehara, somathera & khemindathera, the path of freedom (vimuttimagga), (colombo: d. roland d weerasuriya, 1961) 284. 5kiṃ pakati viya avijjāpi akāraṇaṃ mūlakāraṇaṃ lokassāti? na akāraṇaṃ. ‘‘āsavasamudayā avijjāsamudayo’’ti, rhys davids, 525. / a. p. buddhadatta, vibhangappakaraṇa aṭṭhakathā. ed. (london: pali text society, 1980) 133. / c.v. joshi, paṭisambhidāmagga aṭṭhakathā. ed. (london: pali text society, 1979) 198. 6nirodhasuññāni vā tīṇi, nirodho ca sesattayasuñño. phalasuñño vā ettha hetu samudaye dukkhassābhāvato, magge ca nirodhassa, na phalena sagabbho pakati viya., rhys davids, 513. 7in an etymological inquiry of the term sāṅkhya, sanskrit english dictionary discloses that it was based on numbers. sāṅkhya means ‘reckoning up’ or ‘enumerating.’, monier williams, sanskrit-english dictionary, 4thed. (new delhi: motilal banarshidass publishers, 2005) 1199. because this teaching is utterly systematized on 25 true entities (tatvas), it is known to be a philosophy entitled by numbers or numerical system. the sāṅkhya philosophy comes to exist parallel to yoga. typically, the sāṅkhya is sanjeewa vijitha kumara 65 considered to be the philosophical part of yoga, brian carr, & indira mahalingam, asian philosophy. ed. (london: routledge, 1997) 139. companion encyclopaedia of asian philosophy highlights only one significant difference between these two philosophies; one important difference is that yoga is theistic whereas sāṅkhya is atheistic. ibid. 8in addition to normal perception, there is cognition of paranormal or extrasensory perception, as a valid means of knowledge, k. n. jayathilake, early buddhist theory of knowledge. (london: goerge allen and limited, 1963) 437. 9along with perception, both normal and paranormal, seems to have gone inference (anumāna). ibid, 441. 10jayatilake points out; “the word ‘anumāna’ occurs apparently in the sense of ‘inference’ despite mrs rhys davids’ statement that ‘anumāna apparently does not occur at all’ in the piṭaka-s (v. ere.,vol. 8, p. 133, fn. 4)”., ibid, 441442. yet, further he explains referring the anumāna-sutta too. 11‘‘tatrāvuso, bhikkhunā attanāva attānaṃ evaṃ anuminitabbaṃ – ‘yo khvāyaṃ puggalo pāpiccho, pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gato, ayaṃ me puggalo appiyo amanāpo; ahañceva kho panassaṃ pāpiccho pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gato, ahaṃpāssaṃ paresaṃ appiyo amanāpo’ti. evaṃ jānantenāvuso, bhikkhunā ‘na pāpiccho bhavissāmi, na pāpikānaṃ icchānaṃ vasaṃ gato’ti cittaṃ uppādetabbaṃ., r. v. trenckner,, majjhima-nikāya. ed.vol. i. (london: pali text society, 1983) 97. 12‘these inferences are made on the data of perception, normal and paranormal. what is considered to constitute knowledge are direct inferences made on the basis of the data of such perceptions. ibid, 443. 13the remotest connection, natural or magical, between two things is sufficient for the brahmanas to draw the analogy that ‘a is like b’ on the basis of which inferences are made. ibid, 30. – sometimes, jain canonical texts signify that inference and analogy are in two different ways to obtain knowledge “the sutras, however, regard upamā or comparison (analogy) as a means of knowledge different from inference. we have seen that the word pramäṇa was used in the sense of a ‘means of knowledge’ in the above quotation from the uttaradhyayana sutra” ibid, 167. 14apicettha nāmaṃ nittejaṃ na sakena tejena pavattituṃ sakkoti…… nāmaṃ nissāya rūpaṃ pavattati, rūpaṃ nissāya nāmaṃ pavattati… imassa panatthassa vibhāvanatthāya imaṃ upamaṃudāharanti – yathā ca pīṭhasappīca, rhys davids, 595. 66 prajñā vihāra 15bodhimaṇḍasamīpamhi, jāto brāhmaṇamāṇavo -vijjāsippakalāvedī, tīsu vedesu pārago. mahāvaṃso, chap. 37-215 / “sopi sattavassiko hutvā vedāni ca uggahetvā sattavassabbantareyeva tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ nipphattiṃ pāpuṇi”, james gray, buddhaghosuppatti, trans. (london: luzac. 1892) 39. 16buddhaghosa was born in a small village. it was called ‘ghosa’ because there were colossal sounds produced often by cowboys. his father’s name was kesi. he was a chaplain of the king and had mastered the three veda-s. once, he came across a knotty statement in one of the veda and was unable to solve it. at that time, ghosa explored simply the knot that kesi failed to comprehend. 17gray 47. 18henry clarck warren, visuddhimagga of buddhaghosacarya, ed. (hos,1989) x. 19“bandhupādāpaccā” is a considerable argument in this regard. but, it may not be an error made by him. he might have been forced by elders’ sources to provide this kind of definition. also, the second argument, to me, is not stronger than the earlier one. “brunahā” was defined by buddhaghosa in a different way than the original form of brahmin texts. i suppose that from a buddhist perspective, the commentator has an authority to give different interpretations. 20mahamitawa pannarathane & pahalagama dhammika, pali adhyayana vimarshana, (colombo:wijesuriya, 2009) 26. 21yathā vā pana ghaṭe duddhaṃ pakkhittaṃ dadhibhavati, na catthi e k a k ā l a s a m a v a d h ā n a ṃ d u d d h a s s a c a d a d h i s s a c a . e v a m e v a ṃ n a t t h i ekakālasamavadhānaṃ hetussa ca paccayassa ca. e. hardy, nettipakaraṇa. ed. (london: pali text society, 1902) 78. 22here it should be remembered that the context in the two teachings are different. but the analogy is apparently the same; “curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes.” surendranath dasgupta, a history of indian philosophy, (university press: cambridge, 1922) 255. / “or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? sāṅkhya says that “as the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate energy.” ibid.254 23norman 110. sanjeewa vijitha kumara 67 24ibid. 25carr & mahalingam, 139. 26ibid 27it is of considerable importance to remember that of the technical names of the six systems of philosophy, only two occur in the classical upanishads, namely sāṅkhya and yoga or sāṅkhya-yoga., f. muller max, the six systems of indian philosophy, (london: longmans, 1899) 111. 28jarl charpentier, uttaradhyayana, ed. (upsala, 1922) chap. 12. 29sopi kapilo evaṃ taṃ sāsanaṃ osakkāpetvā kālakato avīcimahāniraye nibbatti., smith, h. sutta-nipata-atthakatha, ed. (london:pali: text society, 1966) 307. 30tattha nagaramāpanokāsaṃ pariyesamānā himavati kapilo nāma ghoratapo tāpaso paṭivasati pokkharaṇitīre mahāsākasaṇḍe, tassavasanokāsaṃ gatā. so te disvā pucchitvā sabbaṃ pavattiṃ sutvā tesu anukampaṃ akāsi. so kirabhummajālaṃ nāma vijjaṃ jānāti, yāya uddhaṃ asītihatthe ākāse ca heṭṭhā bhūmiyañca guṇadose passati. athekasmiṃ padese sūkaramigā sīhabyagghādayo tāsetvā paripātenti, maṇḍūkamūsikā sappe bhiṃsāpenti. so te disvā ‘‘ayaṃ bhūmippadeso pathavīagga’’nti tasmiṃ padese assamaṃ māpesi. tato so rājakumāre āha – ‘‘sace mama nāmena nagaraṃ karotha, demi vo imaṃ okāsa’’nti. ibid, 353. 31e.h. jhonston, the saundarananada of aśvaghoṣa, (london: oxford university press, 1928) 1. 32na hi paccakkhato pakatisiddhā kapilassapi isino tassa apaccakkhabhāvassa kāpilehi anuññāyamānattā, chatthasangayana, pañcappakarana-anu-ṭīkāṭ (vipassana research institute. 1995) 62. 33swami virupakshananda vi. 34t. w. rhys davids, & j. e. carpenter, dīgha-nikāya. ed. vol. i. (london: pali text society, 1966) 168. 35maurish walshe, the long discourses of the buddha, trans., (boston: wisdom publication,1995) 154. 36“pakati kho esāti pakatikathā esā”. moreover, it illustrates; “athassa bhagavā taṃ pakativādaṃ paṭikkhipitvā.” t. w. rhys davids, & j. e. carpenter dīghanikāya aṭṭhakathā (sumaṅgalavilāsinī). eds.vol. i-iii. (london: pali text society, 1968) 358. thus, it is clear the commentator attests that the term ‘pakati’ comes in the mahasihanada-sutta signifies a type of religious or philosophical system 68 prajñā vihāra 37“pākaṭabhāvena kāyati gametīti pakati, lokasiddhavādo” lily de silva, dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā ṭīkā līnatthavaṇṇanā, ed. iii vols. (london: pali text society, 1970) 464. 38“pittasamuṭṭhānādisamaññā loka siddhattā,” cscd, s-ṭ (my. ed ii) 361 39“gahitavatthūsu vibhāgato gahaṇaṃ lokasiddhavādanti dassetuṃ” cscd, m-ṭ (my. ed ii) 77 40taṃ pakativādaṃ paṭikkhipitvāti yaṃ pubbe pākatikaṃ sāmaññaṃ, brahmaññañca hadaye ṭhapetvā tena acelakassapena ‘‘dukkaraṃ sudukkara’’nti vuttaṃ, bhagavatā ca tameva sandhāya ‘‘pakati kho esā’’tiādi bhāsitaṃ cscd, d-abhi-ṭ (my. ed ii) 358. 41a loka siddha or world siddha is one, who has attained all yogic accomplishment, or power over human existence, both physical and psychical, and, as in this instance, is also an adept in the astrological sciences. w.y. evans-wents, the tibbeten books of the great liberation (usa: oxford university press, 1954) 122. 42http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.001.than.html, 30, november, 2013. 43j. h. woods & d. kosambi, majjhima-nikāya aṭṭhakathā (papañcasūdanī), ed. vol. i. (london: pali text society. 1977) 16. 44nibbānaṃ na maññati, nibbānasmiṃ na maññati, nibbānato na maññati, nibbānaṃ meti na maññati, trenckner 6. 45swami virupakshananda stnz. 3. 46p.v. bapat, vimuttimagga and visuddhimagga, (poona:1937) lviil. 47g. p mallasekara, the pali literature of ceylon, (colombo: m. d gunasena, 1958) 86-87. 48oskar von hinuber, a hand book of pali literature (walter de gruyter: berlin, 1996)126. / norman has dated that it could be before fourth century a.d., see norman 133. 49its importance lies in the fact that it was made use of by buddhaghosa when he wrote the visuddhimagga. buddhaghosa does not quote the vimuttimagga by name, but the author of the ṭīkā upon the visuddhimagga states that the word ekacce refers to the thera upatissa who was responsible for proposing a refuted method of classifying temperaments in the vimuttimagga. norman 113. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.001.than.html sanjeewa vijitha kumara 69 50to illustrate the nature of nāma and rūpa, upatissa has given here the simile of drum and sound, as well as that of a blind man and lame man. bapat113. 51noman 113. / m. nangai, 71. 52“the fourth of these early prose texts which were probably composed in north india is the vimuttimagga, and as will be noted below there is some doubt as to whether this work is still extant.” norman 113. / bapat also makes an attempt to stress that this text was from india. bapat liv. 53rhys davids 596. 54von hinuber 124. abbreviations vim vimuttimagga vism visuddhimagga references buddhadatta, a. p. (1980).vibhaṅgappakaraṇa aṭṭhakathā. ed. london: pali text society. carr, b. & mahalingam, i. (1997). asian philosophy. ed. london: routledge. charpentier, j. (1922).uttaradhyayana. ed. uppsala. chatthasangayana, (1995). mahāvaṃsa. ed. vipassana research institute. dasgupta, s. (1922). a history of indian philosophy. cambridge: universitypress. de silva, l. (1970). dighanikayaṭṭhakathā ṭīkā līnatthavaṇṇanā. ed. iii vols.., london: pali text society. ehara, n. r. m., somathera & khemindathera. (1961). the path of freedom(vimuttimagga). colombo: d. roland d weerasuriya. evans-wents, w.y. (1954). the tibetan book of the great liberation. usa: oxford university press. gray, j. (1892). buddhaghosuppatti. trans. london: luzac. hardy, e. (1902). nettipakaraṇa. ed. london: pali text society.bapat, 70 prajñā vihāra p.v. (1937). vimuttimagga and visuddhimagga. culcata: sarkhel. jayatilake, k. n. (1963). early buddhist theory of knowledge. london: goerge allen and limitted. johnston, e. h. (1928). the saundarananda of aśvaghoṣa. london: oxford university press. joshi, c.v. (1979). paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā. ed. london: pali text society. kalupahana, d. j. (1999). madyamaka karikā of nagarjuna. ed. and trans., delhi: motilal banarasidas. mallasekara, g. p. (1958). the pali literature of ceylon. colombo: m. d. gunasena. muller max, f. (1899).the six systems of indian philosophy. london: longmans. nagai, m. (1919). the vimutti-magga, pali text society journal, 69-80. norman, k. r. (1983). pali literature. wiesbaden: otto harrassowitz. pannarathane, m. & dhammika, p. (2009). pali adhyayana vimarshana, colombo:wijesuriya. rhys davids, c. a. f. (1975). visuddhimagga, ed. london: pali text society. rhys davids, t. w. & carpenter, j. e. (1966). dīgha-nikāya. eds. vols. i-iii, london: pali text society. rhys davids, t. w. & carpenter, j. e. (1968). dīghanikāya aṭṭhakathā (sumaṅgalavilāsinī). ed.vols. i-iii. london: pali text society. smith, h. (1966). sutta-nipata-atthakatha. ed., london:pali text society. swami dasji, s. p. (2010). indian philosophy. bhuj: sri swaminarayan mandir. swami virupakshananda, (1995). sāṅkhya kārikā. ed. and trans., madras: sri ramakrishna math. tipitaka: the pali canon (2013 november, 30,) http://www.accesstoinsight.org/ tipitaka/index.html trenckner, r. v. (1983). majjhima-nikāya. ed. vols. i-iii., london: pali text society. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/index.html http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/index.html sanjeewa vijitha kumara 71 von hinuber, o. (1996). a hand book of pali literature. berlin: walter de gruyter. walshe, m. (1995). the long discourses of the buddha, trans., boston: wisdom publication. warren, h. c. (1989). visuddhimagga of buddhaghosacarya. ed. hos. woods, j. h. & kosambi, d. (1977). majjhimanikāya aṭṭhakathā (papañcasūdanī), ed. vol. i. london: pali text society. 11(158-162)note for authors african social ethics and the global ethical challenge ayantayo j. kehinde university of ibadan, nigeria abstract the contemporary african continent and the world in general are confronted with various ethical challenges needing urgent attention. more often than not, such solutions are sought from western ethical thought with little or nothing taken from traditional african ethical ideologies. this work explores ethical values inherent in african religion and its responses to global ethical challenges such as individualism, health, ethnicity, war, crime, and civil disobedience. however, the paper understands the problem of applying traditional mechanisms of social control given development in science and technology, and social change. yet, the paper concludes that since many global ethical challenges have a cultural dimension, there should be place given to african social ethics in the global ethical values project. introduction the contemporary african continent and the world in general are confronted with various ethical challenges needing urgent attention. more often than not, such solutions are sought from western ethical thought with little or nothing taken from traditional african ethical ideologies. this is a handicap for the project of reducing immorality in africa and in other countries where traditional moralities are ignored. we believe that in spite of the strong campaign for the universality of morality, a course pioneered and popularized by immanuel kant, one fact, which remains indisputable, prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 25-43 25 © 2000 by assumption university press is that, certain ethical values are relative to specific people, places and times in their application to social relations.1 graham and benedict kath have seriously defended this view.2 this presupposes that there is no one way for seeking solutions to ethical problems, especially since many of them have a cultural flavour. africa, as one of the largest continents in the world, is known for its many linguistically differentiated ethnic groups, which none the less bound them together.3 fundamentally, african social ethics is firmly rooted in her religions, which also provides significant meaning to african philosophy, business, economics, psychology and metaphysics. for example, the african social ethics echoed in religious customs, regulations, taboos, proverbs, myths, arts, signs and symbols.4 on the account of this, this paper examines african social ethics in the context of its relevance in meeting global ethical challenges. african ethics and its social elements it is important to know what ethics is and the context in which the word is used. without going into too much detail, ethics can be defined simply as a normative science of human conduct, dealing with norms or standards of human behaviour. in other words, ethics is concerned with the question of right and wrong in human behaviour with emphasis on how men ought to behave and why they behave in a particular manner, some of which are regarded as in certain ways right and others wrong.5 using this definition as a good background to understanding the meaning of ethics generally, we can define african social ethics, the do’s and don’ts in the context of african religious and secular mentality and with a foundation based on african culture. regarding its context, content and intent, african social ethics is predominantly communal in outlook. it is essentially interpersonal and social with a concern for human well being because its essence consists of doing good to others. corroborating this, mbiti remarks that: ...the essence of african morality is that, it is more ‘societary’ than ‘spiritual’, it is a morality of ‘conduct’ rather than a morality of being. this is what one might call ‘dynamic ethics rather 26 prajñâ vihâra than ‘static ethics for it defines what a person does rather than what he is.6 beyond theory, the essence of african social ethics is practically demonstrated because africans always show concern and how the behaviour of an individual affects the entire society since a higher premium is placed on we rather than i. the basic african notions of individual’s visà-vis society are that of “i am because we are, and since we are, therefore i am”. this means that the communal well-being of the africans is more important than that of the interests of the individual, a thought-form, which seems to underlay weldon’s organic theory of society that has informed the bedrock of democracy in the world.7 the communal features of african social ethics are also manifested in the following ways: community life, good human relations and hospitality. the african sense of community life is explicitly expressed in a lozi proverb which says: go the way that many people go; if you go alone, you will have reason to lament.8 africans perceive their community as the custodian judicial and religious centres where behaviour of individuals and group of individuals are assessed and upon which judgement is pronounced. the community in turns gives the individual adequate protection, which will enhance the individual’s as well as the community’s well being. for this important reason and other related ones, an average african looks at himself\herself as his/her brother’s/sister’s keeper; therefore, individualism is abhorrent to the traditional african mentality. it is in this sense that africa historical heroes like kwame nkrumah, julius nyerere and leopold senghor argue that the traditional african society is based on communalism. in fact, julius nyerere has seriously popularized this thesis in his theory of african socialism, which we know as ujamaa; ujamaa, in its literal sense means “togetherness” or “familyhood”.9 this communal nature of the traditional african way of life is also evident in the extended family and in several aspects of social relations. africans normally do not make a sharp distinction between a brother, half-brothers, half-sisters, etc. hence, the traditional africans refer to all blood, relations close and distant, as “our brother or our sister”, “brother and sister”.10 from the above, we can then argue that in african social ethical concepts there is ayantayo 27 practically no egoism and reclusivism. in the african traditional way of life, emphasis is placed on the philosophy of human relations. thus, interpersonal and intercommunity relationship is realized in african communities without any difficulties. this humane living among the african people is a notion, which ifemesia has defined as “a way of life emphatically centred upon human interests, and values; a mode of living evidently characterized by empathy, and by consideration and compassion for human beings”.11 to africans, the relationships between individuals in the community are based on the recognition of the worth of the human being and not only on what they possess or what they can do for each other, which is only a secondary consideration concerning reciprocity, and interpersonal relationship. it is this same sense of being our brother/sister’s keeper which makes africans to incorporate strangers and give them hospitality in the wider sense; land to settle on, food to eat, and at times, clothes to wear, and shelter to live in. okafor aptly summarizes this phenomenon as follow: in traditional african culture, whenever there is food to be taken, everyone present is invited to participate even if the food was prepared for far fewer numbers of people without envisaging the nature of visitors. it would be a height of incredible bad memory for one to eat anything, however small, without sharing it with anyone else present, or at least expressing the intention to do so.12 this explains while economic problems like poverty and unemployment was not rampant in the traditional african society. even today where traditional social ethics is still in practice, social well-being of cofellow is still considered important the impression of an average african person is that every moral action done by an individual, whether negative or positive has serious implication, for both the perpetrator as well as his family, (nuclear or extended family) and the culture community. it is in this note that the family and the entire community act as agents of inculcating morality in african society in dealing with several unethical practices such as adultery, stealing, lying and covenant breaking because they are conceived as socio-ethical issues.13 28 prajñâ vihâra foundations of african ethics there are two major sources of african social ethics. these are religion and human rationality. but one point that should be made clear is that the two are mutually exclusive. discussing them one by one is for the purpose of emphasis, which we shall allude to later. african religion, no doubt, is the main foundation of african social ethics however, a few scholars think that human rationality must be considered as basis for discussing the subject. but as a matter of fact african morality has a religious connotation, as we will unfold later. to describe african traditional religion, as the basis of african social ethics is no exaggeration because in the words of mbiti and idowu, africans are notoriously religious in everything because religion permeates all departments of life so it is not easy or always possible to separate them.14 taking this seriously, we can argue that to overlook the role of african religion in african ethics will mean a lack of understanding of african behaviour. religion is generally thought to be the strongest element in which the greatest african character influence upon the thinking and living patterns of african people. in practical terms, social order and peace are recognized by africans as essential and sacred to well being. most african peoples accept or acknowledge god as the final guardian of law and order, and of the moral ethical codes. the popular opinion held by africans is that ethics is rooted in their religious dogma, that is to say, god is the absolute source of ethical values, the supervisor of man’s actions and the ultimate goal of human striving and ambitions.15 there is no demarcation between religion and morality in the african thought system, because god is conceived as a moral being, who created man as a moral being, possessing the potentials not only to know what is right but also to behave rightly. africans believe that the moral quality inherent in man is manifested in his possession of conscience, which god implanted in him during creation enterprise. as the yoruba would say that conscience is the oracle of the earth or eri okan that is, the witness of the heart. ayantayo 29 the african belief in god the originator of morality is also expressed in their beliefs in divinities, ancestors, spirits and magic and medicine. all these constitute the five principal beliefs of african traditional religion. african people believe that the divinities are ministers of god who perform the duties of inculcating ethical values and punish their defaulters. divinities such as sango (god of thunder) and ogun (god of iron) are taken as upholders of social morality among the yoruba because they believe that they will punish thieves and liars or covenant breakers with their mysterious powers.16 the ancestors too, which mbiti describes as the living dead, are the past heroes and heroines who during their lifetime lived good moral lives worthy of emulation.17 because of their records, africans regard them as the guardians of family affairs, traditions and ethics. therefore, they regard them as being able to afflict any member of the family who behaves immorally with sickness, failure in trade, and even death. thus, they have power to coerce the recalcitrant and the intransigent. conversely, they also equally reward family members who are of good moral behaviour with success in trade, good luck and robust health. in addition, a third tier of divine beings that takes charge of morality is made up of spirits, some bodies very akin to the greek daemons which exert great influence on the moral behaviour of members of the society. for africans perceive that everything possesses spirit, which can hunt and harm evildoers. for example, african people believe that whoever steals another man’s yam will be seen and punished by the spirits of the earth, the sky, the sun and the general environment where the stealing has taken place. africans also take magic and medicine as instruments of moral control. this explains why they are used as tools by religious functionaries such as priests and priestesses as tools for inculcating morality within and without their religious milieu. africans in general believe in the potentiality of magical charms that can enhance fidelity in marital life. talismans of this kind are meant to reduce premarital, extramarital as well as promiscuous sexual relations in the society.18 in some african societies__the yoruba example comes to mind__once the magical charm is put on women or men, the victims cannot have sex until it is removed. in fact, the use of this magical talisman to control sexual morality in society is still very common in rural areas where strong emphasis is placed on fidelity in marriage 30 prajñâ vihâra or virginity before marriage. the practice has remained persistent despite the onslaught of the influences of christianity and islam in the african continent. as mentioned earlier, human rationality also constitutes a good source of african social ethics. this view is popularized by african philosophers such as wiredu19, oluwole20, temples21 and claude summel22, who argue that man’s quest for a moral life is conditioned by the fact that he is a rational being. they contend that to be obliged by the moral law is part of what it means to be a human being, for it is also part of man’s rationality. they interpret morality as a product of man’s rationality rather than god’s rule, because to them man is a rational being, his rational faculty will tell him that certain actions are bad and must be avoided and others are good and should be done. however, they accept that divinities are agents of inculcating morality in the society and acknowledge the role of taboo as a factor regulating the behaviour of african people. we quite appreciate the argument for the rational basis of african social ethics since it at least points to the fact that one does not necessarily need to be religious before one can be morally upright. however, this statement is not totally valid in the traditional african society, because, as we have said repeatedly above, religion manifests itself in every aspect of life including man’s rationality. and does this account for the philosophers’ acceptance of the important roles of divinities and taboos in the moral life of african people? to our mind, what oluwole and others failed to recognize is that man’s rationality, which they make as the basis of african social ethics, is believed to be created in man by god. for this single reason, there is no doubt that african religion is the main basis of african social ethics. basic socio-ethical principles in africa we turn to the basic socio-ethical principles, which are the standards of moral behaviour, the norms on which man’s conduct in african society should be founded. these principles provide guidance to human conduct; they indicate certain things or ways of behaviour, which they ayantayo 31 should either avoid or entertain. for idowu, a renowned author of a book on yoruba religion, character (iwa) is the essence of yoruba ethics and upon it depends even the life of a person. he argues that the people often say that gentle character enables the rope of life to stay unbroken. again, it is good character that is man’s guard, which is manifested in the following ways: chastity before marriage and faithfulness during marriage, hospitality, generosity, honesty as essential virtues. others include: keeping a covenant and avoiding falsehood; protecting the poor and the weak, especially women, giving honour and respect to older people and respecting the authority.23 what idowu has catalogued as the essence of yoruba ethics is also the essence of ethics in africa in general. but besides these, there is a long list of acts, which one must avoid because they can be both selfdestructive as well as being ruinous to the society where one lives. these include murder, stealing, adultery, incest, rape, false oaths, cheating, selfishness, hatred, hypocrisy, suicide, backbiting, etc. we must note at this juncture that the ethical principles outlined above serve the purpose of protecting the society’s ethical values. by this, we mean those types of behaviour, which are desirable for human existence, and survival. a high premium is placed on these values. they include the fundamental human values, such as human life the highest value on earth, the value of justice, the value of honesty, fidelity, human freedom, etc. for example, the moral principle which prohibits the killing of human beings is meant to protect the right of every man to the ownership of his property; while the principle which prohibits telling lies is meant to protect the value of honesty and so on.24 the articulation of the ethical principles in african society is a collective responsibility of religion, social, business, economics and political institutions. adherence to the ethical values or principles by the individual is taken as a duty. in fact, this is one part of the contract a person makes (implicitly) when he becomes a member of society. this is what makes life in society possible and meaningful. as henry benson has put it, it is for one’s interest to live a moral life by observing the moral laws of the society.25 it is in this sense that albert schweitzer correctly remarks that, 32 prajñâ vihâra “the prospering of a society depends on the moral disposition of its members”.26 consequently, the lists of what should and should not be done in africa are so long and detailed that they constantly confront one with moral demands throughout one’s life time. contemporary socio-ethical issues and the african response this section deals with examination of some contemporary global ethical issues and african’s response to them. today, there is no doubt, that the contemporary world is bedeviled with some ethical issues demanding urgent and serious analysis. these, among others, include selfhood and community, sex, family, divorce, the gap between the rich and the poor, war, violence, suicide, euthanasia, abortion, authority etc. we will discuss each of these briefly. sex and marriage for africans, sex is sacred in all its forms and interpretation. the sanctity of sex is such that talking about it overtly is certainly not easy. the religious sanctification of sex shapes the thinking of all the african peoples for there exist many taboos and rituals, which regulate its performance and the time of its performance. for example, for traditional africans, sexual intercourse is restricted to nighttime in one’s own room and rightly between spouses. thus, premarital and extra marital sexual relations are prohibited in african society. to act otherwise is to incur the wrath of the community god, goddess, and divinities in charge of morality. it is no wonder that activities such as kissing and petting are not only alien to africa, when indulged in around public places, but are indeed counter-culture in african traditional societies. anything that relates to romance and sex is to be done secretly.27 the practice of pornography, which is common in the contemporary society, is morally objectionable because of its tendency to lead people to show disrespect for woman and her private parts. pornography itself manifests a kind of behaviour, which violates the moral principles of respect for persons. and in the african way of life it is taken also as treating women as mere sex objects to be exploited and manipulated.28 ayantayo 33 arising from the sacredness of sex in african society is the quest for sexual purity and discipline among those who by tradition qualify to engage in sex. in traditional african society, acts of adultery, homosexuality, masturbation, lesbianism, incest, rape are counter-culture. therefore, they are condemned as unethical practices which are to be avoided in whatever forms they are manifested in the traditional past and contemporary african society. marriage in the traditional african worldview is maintained as an important institution and is controlled by ethics. a fundamental african traditional notion about marriage is that “everybody must get married and bear children.” the desire to propagate is extended to those it is pertinent and compelling to arrange surrogate marriages to produce heirs. africans believe that it is through procreation via marriage that they can preserve the individual’s name. an unmarried person is considered antisocial; if he dies, he cannot become an ancestor worthy of worship. consequently, eunuchs are made to marry for their brothers to bear children who will normally answer the names of the eunuchs. a typical african marriage ceremony is often elaborate because it is one of the ways marriage can be solemnized between a man and a woman. bridegroom is expected to present bride-gifts to both the bride and her parents. african customary marriages bring the families of both parties together in at least two or three occasions. this is a way of legalizing and solemnizing the marriage through several religious rituals, which accompany marriage ceremony in africa, and any breach of the traditional course is taken as breaking the morality under girding marriage institutions. one ethical issue in marriage is manifested in the high premium placed on virginity. african morality demands that the bride must remain a virgin until the night after wedding when they expect the husband to deflower her.29 therefore, every young girl must follow what her parents and the socity teach about sexual morality as a matter of duty. such training will make her understand the importance of sacredness of sex. therefore, a virgin lady will bring glory, honour, praise, dignity, and respect not only to herself but also to her parents and relatives while the one who has lost 34 prajñâ vihâra her virginity before marriage will incur shame, molestation, the husband’s disrespect, and become a disgrace to both herself and her entire family. this is the reason why africans emphasize fidelity in premarital and marital lives. africans are known for the practice of polygamy which allows a man to marry two or more wives, depending on his economic or social status. it is a social duty for husbands to take care of their wives; traces of inability or unwillingness on their part to take up their responsibilities of feeding, maintaining and providing shelter and security for their spouses often attract condemnation by society. the wife on her part is expected to love and be faithful to her husband. strict adherence to both obligations helps to reduce cases of divorce in african society. the relatively rarer occurrence of divorce among africans than other races is due to many factors. a widow for instance is put under the care of the deceased’s brother to take over the affair of the woman in regards to matters of care and procreation. thus, they permit levirate marriage in africa. also, when there are misunderstandings between husband and wife and in order to thwart divorce, members of the extended family always intervene to settle the dispute through dialogue, persuasion and marriage counseling. at times, the elders of the extended family, as a punishment, could be on the side of husband if he is guilty of offending the wife. thus, for all traditional africans, marriage is a lifetime affair, which is maintained by the principles of honesty, dedication, faithfulness, respect and honour. selfhood and community we have established in our foregoing previous discussion the fact that african society is communal in outlook. this suggests that selfishness, egoism and other activities of man entailing self-centeredness are abhorred. it is true that man is by nature selfish and self-seeking, but africans in general do not encourage egoism. thinking mainly of oneself at the expense of the society is regarded as morally wrong for anyone; therefore, the society teaches man to be altruistic. this accounts for the practice of the extended family system in africa. by extension, because africans are their brothers’/sisters’ keepers, the society also takes care of the poor, ayantayo 35 destitute and even strangers. the application of the principle of altruism to social relations in africa is discernible in what are regarded as rights and duties, responsibilities and obligations of the rich toward the poor, the unfortunate, and invalid and the handicapped. for instance, a man has the obligation to cater for the widow and orphans of his dead relatives. the rich are expected to provide for the poor. this is why finding someone in the community without help is difficult; hence, no beggars existed in the unadulterated traditional african society. even today, some of those who beg are doing so because they are not contented with the financial assistance or support their family and relatives offer them. offering moral or financial support is praiseworthy and inability or unwillingness to help the needy earns strong public opprobrium.30 sanctity of life suicide, abortion, euthanasia are acts that terminate life of self or of another person. africans regard all these acts as unethical practices, which are unacceptable in the traditional african social setting. africans possess a very strong view of the sacredness of life. for africans, god is the giver of life and he is the only one who has right to end it. consequently, africans believe that no human being, for any reason, has right to end his own life (by committing suicide) or terminate other people’s life through abortion, war and euthanasia. africans abhor the shedding of blood. life of man is taken as a sacred element, which at all time must be handled with a high sense of sacredness. little wonder the decision to go to war, which involves killing, is taken, only when necessary that is, when all formal and normal courses of action to search for peace have failed. letting blood out is defiling even during wartime or in self-defense. for this reason, someone who has killed a human being, whether during war or during an attack cannot partake of communal meals with undefiled persons without first performing ritual cleansing. africans therefore consider abortion as sinful if not outright criminal. to avoid the problem of committing abortion, traditional africans had their birth control methods, 36 prajñâ vihâra which involved the use of magical talisman such as a ring, which was worn on a finger before engaging in a sexual intercourse. sexual intercourse engaged in under such condition will never lead to pregnancy. the sacredness associated with life goes to explain the african emphasis on the protection of a bride’s virginity before marriage. in the african belief system: the blood of virginity is the symbol that life has been preserved, that the spring of life has not already been flowing wastefully, and that both the girl and her relatives have preserved the sanctity of human reproduction.31 from these considerations, the idea of the sanctity of life from african perspective makes it an abomination for anyone, under any circumstances to take his own life. thus, any form of materialism, medical activities, scientific and technological advancement which ultimately add to the destruction of life are strange to and destructive of the african culture and idea of human life. preservation of man’s life is taken as the highest human value in africa. ethnicity we must note that nepotism and tribalism in their past and present forms are not offshoots of african social ethics. in fact, studies carried out on tribalism by some scholars in nigeria affirm the fact that ethnicity which is manifested in nepotism and tribalism is not indigenous to the traditional african cultural ideas and practices. we can, therefore, argue that their slight appearance in the body politics in present day african societies can be associated with european cultural contact. as mentioned earlier, africans have a very high sense of hospitality. this value enables them to know that the other man from another tribe, clan, community is his brother and is equally a human being. respect for authority and civil responsibility for the african, god is the highest authority, but traditional politiayantayo 37 cal heads which mbiti describes as the earthly viceroy or vicegerent of god act for helping him. the traditional rulers, too, are in turn helped by the elders in the community. for africans, old age is maturity, so, strong emphasis is placed on eldership as divine authority in african societies. in the words of william canton: africans generally have deep and great respect for old age, and even when we can find nothing to admire in an old man, we will not easily forget that his gray hairs have earned him right to courtesy and politeness.32 this, as a matter of fact suggests that elders deserve respect because of their long experiences. indeed, we take elders as the repository of communal wisdom and therefore, are always called upon in the affairs of the society in the maintenance of customs and traditions. as the youth show respect for the elders in form of greeting them each time they meet, help them carry their loads, run errands for them, the elders too, are duty bound to reciprocate the good gestures of the young ones by commending and giving them presents and gifts regularly. in addition, younger persons are not expected to stare at the faces of their elders, abuse them, or refuse to run errands for them. on a final note, the care of the aged is taken as a family responsibility. every member of both nuclear and extended families always comes together to take care of aged people. africans so cherish these practices that there is hardly the need, in the african setting, for the establishment of homes for the aged as obtains today in europe and america. crime and punishment although traditional african societies do not have written legal documents setting out their laws yet, they have what makes up crime. crime is interpreted as violation of ethical rules or principles earlier discussed (adultery, breaking of covenant, burglary, fornication, incest, kidnapping, irreverence and unkindness to elders and parents, murder, swearing falsely, theft, sodomy, malice, etc).33 they are thus morally bad as well as being criminal acts. culprits meet each form of crime with appropriate punishment. 38 prajñâ vihâra justice comes into play in determining the type and forms of punishment for each crime. for example, an adulterous woman could be warned verbally, and if she fails to change, could be beaten, ostracized and made to do rituals to appease the gods of the community. a thief could be ostracized, songs about his deeds in the public to ridicule and disgrace him. he shares the ridicule, molestation and mockery along with members of his own family and relatives. at times, they may be denied marrying within the community from where he has stolen another man’s goods. one important feature of the african attitude towards crime is the emphasis on instantaneous judgement. africans believe that justice delayed is justice denied. they mete out punishment for an offence according to the degree of the offence. for instance, murderers are executed to serve as deterrent to others. african social ethics in global milieu having discussed the response of africans to some contemporary ethical issues, it is important to evaluate, and assess the african social ethics milieu in a global context. we must note at this juncture that african social ethics is not indifferent to the wind of social change being swept across the african continent by western and arabian religions, to be specific, coupled with the wave of modernity occasioned by the advancement of science and technology, which have tremendously affected african social ethics. for example, few people in african society today have doubted the powers of ancestors, divinities, spirits, magic and medicine and even that of god to punish any person who erred morally. like in the words of bultman, many africans of twenty-first century have opined that: it is impossible to use electric light and the wireless, and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the new testament world of demons and spirits.34 in the light of this, some african people feel under no pressure to believe in ancestors, divinities as agents of inculcating ethical value just ayantayo 39 because their forebearers had believed. the influences from both the oriental and occidental worlds on african societies have also led to cultural diffusion which today pose great threat to the belief in what constitutes the basis of african social ethics. for example, we have cases of harlotry, adultery, individualism, suicide, abortion and other forms of crime very common now among africans. this is the negative effect of acculturation. another important fact which needs to be understood while assessing african social ethics in the global context is that ethical values are universal. the only point of difference, say, between african social ethics and european social ethics, is the application of the especial ethical values to social relations. for example, while both the africans and europeans place strong emphasis on fidelity or faithfulness in married life, there are differences in terms of their practical application to marital life. for example while the european does not permit sex outside marital life, the african does not see it wrong if it is done to preserve the name of a dead brother as earlier explained. the differences are associated with the fact that while europeans insist on monogamy, progressive monogamy at least, africans permit levirate marriage and even polygamy. the case being made here is that, some of the morally accepted practices in africa (polygamy for example) are morally unacceptable in western europe or america. on the other hand, some of the things done and morally acceptable in europe and america such as kissing in the street or in public places or the settling of one’s aged parents in homes for the aged rather than taking care of them in one’s own house, as earlier discussed, are morally unacceptable in africa. it is true that people of different cultural background do have different moral practices or a people may take that what a certain culture considers as right for wrong from another culture. this does not, however, mean that morality is relative. similarly, it does not show that the basic moral principles are not universal. for example, the concept of fundamental human values, which from the legal point of view are interpreted as fundamental human rights across the globe is a universally accepted concept; its degree of acceptance might vary from place to place. for this reason, we can argue that african social ethics is not in dissonance with the global ethics. 40 prajñâ vihâra the fact is that ethical principles are objective in nature; they are good on their own account, independent of our emotions or feelings towards them. for instance, honesty as a moral principle is good in itself, because it is good to be honest. a liar will not want others to lie unto him, rather, he expects people to be truthful in their relation towards him. it is in this sense that people often say “honesty is the best policy”. concluding remarks the basic support underlying african social ethics is african religion. african social ethics is manifested in the sense of community, of good human relation, of the sacredness of life, of hospitality, respect for instituted authority. in relating african social ethics to the global society, we discover that ethical values such as honesty, discipline, responsibility, and truthfulness among others are universal; they are not peculiar to african countries, but certain ethical practices are relative to africa in terms of their application. in other words, african principles are similar to what operates, say, in europe or america; hence, there is a universality of ethical values. while european and american countries apply the principle of sexual ethics loosely, africa applies it rigidly. however, an important issue to be noted is that african social ethics is today experiencing an unprecedented change occasioned by social change in the global milieu of social ethics. these western influences through christianity, islam and modern technology have greatly challenged the authenticity of african traditional religious beliefs, which are the bedrock of african social ethics. this, notwithstanding, africans are still known globally for the peculiarities of certain ethical practices which, even today as before constitute the pride of africa. what is left to be done is provision of allowance and opportunity for explorations of the ethics within the agenda of globalization ethical apparatus. endnotes 1 j. i. omeregbe. ethics: a systematic and historical study. lagos: joja ayantayo 41 educational research and publishers ltd, 1993, pp.219-226. 2 w, lillie. an introduction to ethics. new york: harness and noble, inc. 1961, pp.102-110. 3 e. o. ayisi. an introduction to the study of african culture. london: heinemann educational books ltd, 1972, pp.2-5. 4 w. colton. the african. london: heinemann, 1966, p.37. see also o.a. onwubiko, african thought, religion and culture enugu: snap press ltd, 1991 p.1. 5 a. j. dyck. on human care: an introduction to ethics. nashville: the pantheon press, 1977, p.9. 6 j. s. mbiti. african religion and philosophy. london: heinemann educational books ltd, 1969, p.214. 7 t. d. weldon. state and morals: a study in political conflicts. london: john murray, 1940, p.16. 8 b. davidson. the african genius. boston: an atlantic monthly press book, 1969, p.31. 9 j. nyerere. ujamaa: the basis of african socialism. london: oxford university press, 1971, pp.16. 10 b. davidson. the african genius. boston: an atlantic monthly press book, 1969, p.31. 11 c. ifemesia. traditional human living among the igbo. enugu: fourth dimension, 1979, p.2. 12 f.c. okafor. africa at cross rivers. new york: longman, 1974, pp.14-24. 13 s. a. adewale. “crime and african traditional religion” in orita: ibadan journal of religious studies xxvi/1 2, june and december 1994, pp.54-63. 14 j. c. mbiti. african religion op cit, p.1., and e.b. idowu, olodumare: god in yoruba belief london: longman, 1962, p.6. 15 j. s. mbiti. concepts of god in africa. london: heinemann, 1969, p.67. 16 j. o. awolalu. yoruba beliefs and sacrificial rituals. london: longman group ltd, 1978, pp.31-32. 17 j. k.ayantayo. “myths, rituals and reality of traditional concept of death and immortality among the people of ora: a phenomenological “approach”, b.a. original thesis, obafemi awolowo university, 1988. 18 j. i. ogunsakin-fabarebo. “contemporary heroes of magic: magun’s disparate characteristics” in orita: ibadan journal of religious studies xxvii 1&2 june and december 1998, p.20. 19 k. wiredu. “morality and religion in akin thought”, philosophy and cultures. odera, h.o. waaola, d.a. (eds) kenya: bookwise ltd, 1963, p.7. 20 s. b. oluwole. “the rational basis of yoruba ethical thinking” in the nigerian journal of philosophy vol. 4, 1989, pp.14-23. 21 p. tempels. bantu philosophy. paris: presence african, 1999, p.121. 22 c. summer. “an ethical study of ethiopian philosophy” in oruka, h.o. and manaola, d.a, philosophy and cultures pp.91-101. 23 e.b. idowu. olodumare op cit, p.24. 42 prajñâ vihâra 24 r.b. brandt. ed. value and obligation. new york: harcourt brace jovanovich, inc, 1961, p.20. 25 j. i. omeregbe. ethics: a systematic and historical study. lagos: joja educational research and publishers ltd, 1993, pp.23. 26 a. schweitzer. civilization and ethics. london: unwin ltd, 1961, p.76. 27 j. o, kayode. “african ethics on sex” in abogunrin, s. o. ed religion and ethics in nigeria ibadan: day star press, 1986, pp.51 59, p.51. 28 a. carry. “pornography and respect for women” in arthur, j. ed morality and moral controversies englewood cliff. practice hall inc, 1986, pp.67-74. 29 j. o, kayode. “african ethics on sex” in abogunrin, s. o. ed religion and ethics in nigeria ibadan: day star press, 1986, pp.51 59, p.51. 30 r. a. akamidu. ethics and poverty: inquiries on moral philosophy. lagos: pacific educational publishers, 1995. 31 j. s. mbiti. op cit, p.141. 32 w. conton. the african. london: heinemann, 1966, p.29. 33 s.a. adewale. “crime and african traditional religion, op.cit, pp.54. 34 r. bultman. “new testament and my theology”, kerygma and myths. borscht, h.w. (ed), london; spck, 1953, p.3. ayantayo 43 a report on emotional education for young children: nonviolence as ethical spirituality: the case of the dalai lama lloyd steffen lehigh university, usa abstract the dalai lama is a political and spiritual leader who, like mohandas gandhi and martin luther king, jr. before him, has voiced strong opposition to violence and oppression while also calling for resistance to injustice. unlike gandhi and king, the dalai lama has not been on site with his people to protest oppression. in a unique move necessitated by exile from tibet, he has taken to the world stage to expose the suffering of the tibetan people while advocating justice, for preservation of tibetan culture, and for a peaceful solution to the tibet-china conflict. this paper analyzes the dalai lama’s understanding of violence as grounded in afflictive emotions that create suffering both in the spiritual as well as in the political realm. the dalai lama’s analysis of “anger-hatred” as a destructive afflictive emotion requiring spiritual attention underwrites his moral argument for nonviolent resistance. this paper argues that the dalai lama not merely examines violence as a problem of spiritual affliction but that he addresses peace and nonviolence as an ethic. rather than seeking public validation in terms of religious particulars, the dalai lama presents an ethic that can be universalized, that is benevolent and otherregarding, and that employs the language of normative action guides and rational principles. no figure on the world stage is more widely recognized today as a proponent of nonviolence than the spiritual and political leader of the tibetan people, tenzin gyatso, the 14th dalai lama. an exiled leader who has become a true global citizen, the dalai lama stands before the world a “simple monk,” as he calls himself, who has achieved high honor, world-wide notoriety and even celebrity status in the west. in his scores of books and countless lectures and teachings around the world, he has over the last half century brought attention to tibet, to buddhism as a philosophy and religion, and to the continuing conflict between tibet and the people’s republic of china. in the wake of the chinese invasion and subsequent occupation that 1 forced his exile in 1959, the dalai lama has campaigned throughout the world to advance the welfare of the tibetan people and preserve tibetan culture, including religious culture, and in that campaign he has maintained an unwavering commitment to nonviolence. the dalai lama’s stature as a worthy successor to mohandas gandhi and martin luther king, jr. was confirmed by many when in 1989 he was awarded the nobel peace prize for his efforts to resolve tibet’s conflict with china peacefully and through nonviolence. the dalai lama is a religious and spiritual leader who has brought the central insights of buddhism to an appreciative worldwide audience. many of his books wind up on the new york times bestseller list, but the readers who seek his wisdom in his popular and accessible writings are not necessarily interested in delving more deeply in the mysterious and exotic tradition of tibetan buddhism, which he has also written about with scholarly authority. tibetan buddhism is an ancient and complex tradition that would be quite obscure as a sect of buddhism were it not for the dalai lama’s writings and teachings. that tradition encompasses four schools (including the yellow hat or gelug school to which the dalai lama himself belongs), six grades of tibetan monks, eight types of consciousness, four complete abandonments, seven branches of the path to enlightenment, three kāyas of the base, six elements of meditation, three categories of phenomena, a bodhisattva vow comprised of eighteen major and forty-six minor precepts, the monk’s one hundred and fifty precepts—and this is just to scratch the surface. the dalai lama is a bona fide expert in the tradition and his ability to unravel philosophical obscurities and explicate difficult texts is appreciated and admired by scholars of tibetan buddhism around the world. but this expertise is not the reason for his appeal. his appeal rests in part from the story of his elevation and his exile, and from his personal charm, enthusiasm and irrepressible good 2 humor as a charismatic individual. and of course his message is powerful. in his popular writing and teachings, the dalai lama addresses the central spiritual issues of life, proposing a pathway to human happiness based on attunement to the suffering of others, acceptance of impermanence and countering self-defeating emotions with equanimity of mind. he has mastered public communication through various media relying on catchy, popular formats, even offering an occasional “how to” book.1 in all of his writings he emphasizes the serious buddhist ideas of detachment and selflessness, advocates forgiveness and love in human relationships, and calls for personal responsibility. he also commends to his readers the buddhist practices of mindfulness, meditation and nonviolence as the way to happiness both in the psychological and spiritual world of the inner life as well as well as in the moral world of self-other relationships. the dalai lama has translated core values and insights from his buddhist tradition and then presented them as rational responses to the problems of contemporary life, never asking people to become buddhist in order to accept the wisdom they offer. his public teachings acknowledge the importance of spiritual wisdom as it comes to humanity through all kinds of cultural lenses, and while he will acknowledge that what he teaches is itself grounded in buddhism, he appeals to universal aspirations for human happiness and fulfillment. in this effort, so far removed from proselytizing or promoting for public consumption a particular religious viewpoint, the dalai lama has extracted spiritual truths from his tradition in order to present the wisdom of that tradition in the universal language of morals and ethics. in his public teachings and writings, the dalai lama addresses ethics through spirituality and spirituality in conjunction with ethics. the need to acquire inner peace is never separated from the need to eliminate the anger that leads to violent emotions. he exhorts people to better their conduct while urging nonviolent and meditative practices that lead to greater awareness of 3 the suffering of others. he addresses human rights, goods of life like friendship and respect for life, and virtues like humility and patience, which he assures his audiences can be cultivated in the interests of peace. his aim may be spiritual, but his focus is on moral development, for “. . . when we engage in the practice of morality, we lay the foundation for mental and spiritual development” (hhdl, 1995: 20). the dalai lama frames his advocacy of peace and nonviolence not in the exclusively religious terms of buddhist belief or doctrine, but through a moral point of view, appealing to the idea that peace and human well-being are universal aspirations of all people of good will. any ethic that expresses the moral point of view will include such an appeal to rationality and universality; and in addition, any ethic will attend to impartiality and justice, regard for the wellbeing of others, and hold a general attitude of benevolence toward others (runzo, 2001: 23). these characteristics of a global ethic are all highly visible in the dalai lama’s teachings and writings, allowing us to say that dalai lama is a moral philosopher as well as a religious teacher. he is, in fact, an ethicist who reflects on the meaning of action, values, choices, attitudes, motives and intentions, and he will ask: “why do people do what they do?” “what should they do if they are to advance goodness for themselves and others?” “how should they account for others in the decisions they make?” and “what are the virtues, practices, and commitments required if one is to realize happiness?” these are the ethicist’s questions, and they are the dali lama’s. the dalai lama will note a difference between the ethical and the spiritual: an ethical act is one where we refrain from causing harm to others’ experience or expectation of happiness. spiritual acts we can describe in terms of those qualities [emphasis added]. . .of love, compassion, patience, forgiveness, humility, tolerance and so on which presume some level of concern for others’ wellbeing(hhdl, 1999: 61). 4 even in drawing this distinction, the dalai lama cannot separate spiritual acts from concern for others, the traditional locale of ethics attention. for all he may be as a religious practitioner, as an expert interpreter of his tradition and a successful communicator of a spirituality grounded in buddhism, he is also an ethicist. his role as an ethicist is never separated from concern for spiritual development; his role as a spiritual director is never isolated from the ethicist’s focus on the meaning of action and attention to such matters as responsible conduct, concern for others and the aim of human flourishing. as we move to consider a specific question related to the dalai lama’s teachings, this essential interconnectedness between ethics and spirituality must be kept to the fore, for it is critical to any attempt to analyze the dalai lama’s contributions as a thinker on the world stage. the immediate issue before us is violence; and the context for his reflections on violence has been in many ways political, given his criticisms of the chinese occupation of his tibetan homeland. yet even in this context of personal political involvement and his push for a nonviolent resolution to that conflict, the dalai lama has brought together the spiritual and ethical dimensions of nonviolence to address the political conflict so much a part of his experience. for his public statements about the need for nonviolent resolution of the tibetan conflict, which the dalai lama believes constituted an unjust act of aggression, are integrally tied to his public teachings that violence and aggression are but symptomatic of inner disquiet and spiritual perturbation. the ethical and the spiritual may be distinguishable, but, as the dalai lama presents them, they are also inseparable. we shall now move to consider that interconnectedness between the ethical and the spiritual on the question of violence and nonviolence, looking at the inseparability of the two first from the spiritual side, then from the ethical. 5 violence and the inner life: the spirituality of peace although unfashionable in the world of postmodernism, where foundations are denied, ethics are relativized—gutted of universal applicability, and qualities suggestive of essentials or a “nature” are practically ridiculed—the dalai lama asserts rather unabashedly a theory of human nature and casts it in terms of a disposition to nonviolence: “. . . fundamental human nature is gentleness. not only human beings but all sentient beings have gentleness as their fundamental nature” he writes (hhdl, 1997: 4). elsewhere he observes that “. . .basic human nature is not only non-violent but actually disposed toward love and compassion, kindness, gentleness, affection, creation and so on . .. .” (hhdl, 1999: 71). this passage from ethics for the new millennium then leads into a discussion of the need we all have to live with sensitivity to one another’s needs and suffering, for we share a basic human nature and “. . . we are all ultimately brothers and sisters, [and] there is no substantial difference between us” (hhdl, 1999: 71). this foundation of a common human nature expressive of gentleness and disposed to nonviolence is crucial for grasping the way the dalai lama relates ethical reality to spiritual matters. so, for instance, he will locate the source of spiritual affliction, as well as positive spiritual possibilities, in various “qualities” framed in the language of non-discursive awareness and understanding, particularly in the language of emotion. these qualities of spirit are integral to the dalai lama’s understanding of violence, which he conceives as the destructive emotion and mental negativity through which people inflict harm on another. although buddhism seeks to cultivate compassion and detachment from desire, and corresponding actions such as patience, tolerance and forgiveness, the negative emotions and mental states of anger, hatred, and 6 resentment—“afflictive emotions” the dalai lama calls them—are always possible (hhdl, 1997: 23). if publicly observable actions in the sphere of self-other relations are subject to moral critique, the springs of those actions, for good or ill, are subject to spiritual critique. these states of mind and heart locate the underlying causes for action. they affect the motives, aims and purposes that dispose persons to act in particular ways consistent with the emotion, so that angry persons or persons acting out of hatred will not only lose calmness of mind but create through the hatred barriers to “peaceful” relationship with others. the spiritual affects the moral and actually shapes it, giving action its meaning and through the law of karma affecting subsequent actions. anger, hatred and the desire for vengeance constitute “pollutants of the mind” that express inner affliction and suffering that individuals then recreate in the moral world of their relations with others. the dalai lama invites readers to consider buddhism as distinctive—even “unique”—in its focus on “the possibility of the total cessation of negative impulses” (hhdl, 2000: 28). the buddhist focus on impermanence opens up the possibility that negative thoughts and emotion can be overcome, although “the broader and more fundamental question is whether it is possible to eliminate these pollutants of mind completely” (hhdl, 2000: 27). buddhism, of course, says that this is possible, for the basic mind is “neutral” in the sense that it can be influenced by positive or negative thoughts and emotions, and this understanding then makes possible the hope that the negativities can be eliminated. to eliminate the inner violence of harm-causing negativities of thought and emotion requires spiritual practices that can deliver the mind and heart to the unpolluted state of true mental and emotional clarity—enlightenment. the person who has eliminated inner violence and achieved the dharma or way of life of inner peace will 7 then be present to others in the world as one able to act consistently with the achievement of calm and equanimity. the dalai lama argues that if the pollutants of mind can be eliminated and inner peace attained, the individual practitioner will be attuned to the true disposition of human being, which is then free from the suffering these pollutants cause both the self and others. to be free of the negativities of thought and emotion that can result in harmful actions toward others is to remove the obstructions to the natural human disposition to gentleness and nonviolence. nonviolence is critical to progress in the spiritual life, for the achievement of inner peace through non-harminducing, nonviolent spiritual practice (e.g., meditation and cultivation of virtues) is a necessary precondition for attaining peace in human affairs. the dalai lama indicates that the buddhist pathway toward peace or dharma can be translated into broad ethical terms and, as i read it, this pathway is no less effective or valid when constructed as a universally accessible moral program. “love and compassion,” he writes in his autobiography, “can be developed by anyone, with or without religion” and he even explains the value of religion in universal moral terms: “. . .all religions pursue the same goals: those of cultivating goodness and bringing happiness to all human beings”( hhdl, 1990: 270). this ethical understanding would seem to subsume religion under it, but the dalai lama will also note “i have found my own buddhist religion helpful in generating love and compassion” (hhdl, 1990: 270), and he will emphasize the specific and unique buddhist contributions to the achievement of peace and nonviolence: in the context of ethics [we can] speak about refraining from killing, from lying and so forth, and about engaging in virtuous activities. however, this is dharma only in a very general sense of the word, since ethical guidelines are not particularly unique to buddhist teaching. the understanding of spiritual practice that is unique to buddhism lies in this possibility of the total cessation of negative impulses. this is called nirvana—total relief from, and cession of, the afflictions of mind.. . . all aspects of the dharma 8 practice have to be understood in the light of this ultimate spiritual aim of gaining freedom from the pollutants of mind (hhdl, 2000: 27, 28). ethical living does not aim at the spiritual goal of totally eliminating all negative impulses--nirvana is a specifically religious idea. but the idea that human persons must learn to manage and dissipate interior violence as expressed through negative thoughts and destructive emotions is essential to any moral vision that seeks to promote a way of ethical living where persons do not inflict harm on one another, where they observe precepts concerning the goodness of life and commit themselves to acting in ways that do not harm the self or cause injury to others. the moral vision held up by the dalai lama conforms in this regard to any ethical vision that seeks to promote and encourage human flourishing. he calls for a spirituality that encourages people to become reflective about who they are and what they value. this call for spiritual development has moral consequences as persons acquire the habits and virtues that finally express the positive “qualities” previously mentioned: “love, compassion, patience, forgiveness, humility, tolerance and so on which presume some level of concern for others’ wellbeing.” the example of anger the dalai lama frames nonviolence in a buddhist understanding that is, as he has said, “unique,” and which could not be said on that basis to constitute a universal ethic to which all rational persons of will could be expected to consent. yet the dalai lama also advances nonviolence as an ethic, so that nonviolence is understood to be directed toward the good of human flourishing; and as an ethic it is cast as any ethic would be—as universally applicable, as beneficent, as other-regarding and as a normative action guiding actual conduct. as much he 9 takes pains to explain how buddhism contributes and informs the ethic of nonviolence, in the end it is the ethic itself that the dalai lama commends to his wide audience: the ethic—not any particular religious view of the ethic. nonviolence is finally a committed and transforming way of being in relation with oneself and others, and the challenge of nonviolence is not necessarily to grasp how different philosophies and religions could endorse nonviolence (and not all do), but to grasp that nonviolence is a rationally accessible mode of operation required for human happiness and well-being. nonviolence is an ethic, a normative principle for action that is universally commendable. but how do we get to it? the fact that persons do not, in fact, universally endorse nonviolence ought to be no barrier to its status as a rational principle worthy of such endorsement. people do not always do what is best for them, and people can resist nonviolence the same way they resist truth-telling. the dalai lama would undoubtedly say that people can resist the rational pull of nonviolence and violate the norm of conduct it upholds and endorses. the violence in the world provides ample empirical evidence to establish that fact. but the dalai lama also would attribute such resistance to the nonviolence that is our natural inclination and disposition to the unrest and afflictions people experience in their spiritual lives. the human heart is troubled and the mind unsettled, and without spiritual discipline and understanding, the dalai lama would say, the ethic of nonviolence cannot rise to the level of universal acceptance. the dalai lama has written much about anger and hatred, and it is worth considering his insights on this topic since his understanding of anger-hatred is critical to understanding how inner violence gives rise to violence in the moral sphere of self-other relations. first of all, the dalai lama understands that because anger can sometimes be a good thing, any discussion of anger as an afflictive emotion must focus on hatred, which is “totally 10 negative”: “there are many afflictive emotions such as conceit, arrogance, jealousy, desire, lust, close-mindedness and so on, but of all these, hatred or anger is singled out as the greatest evil.”(hhdl, 1997: 7). anger is an obstacle to developing a “good heart” and it “destroy[s] one’s virtue and calmness of mind.” (hhdl, 1997, 7). if the “purpose of our existence is to seek happiness and fulfillment,” then the “state of one’s mind is critical” and “the state of mind is crucial in determining whether or not we gain joy and happiness” (hhdl, 1997: 8) peace of mind is required if people are going to attain happiness and fulfillment, and peace of mind is “rooted in affection and compassion” so that “if we examine how anger or hateful thoughts arise in us, we will find that , generally speaking , they arise when we feel hurt. . . there is a sense that [anger] comes as a protector, comes as a friend that would help our battle or in taking revenge against the person who has inflicted harm on us. so the anger or hateful thought that arises appears to come as a shield or protector. but in reality that is an illusion. it is a very desultory state of mind.” (hhdl, 1997: 9) anger-hatred distorts reality, causing the object of anger to be “more awful than is actually there” (hhdl, 2005: 16). “anger is fomented by the misconception that the object [of anger] and yourself are established this way as enemy and victim in and of themselves. hatred is not part of the mind’s foundations (hhdl, 2005: 16). as the nature of water is not destroyed by pollutants, anger does not destroy the essential character of mind as disposed to gentleness and nonviolence. anger, however, creates out of the object of anger an “enemy” in relation to which one sees oneself as “victim. the practices of spiritual discipline, however, can dissolve the anger and cause the enemy to disappear and restore the mind to its true nature, which is peace-loving and gentle. the dalai lama demonstrates the method of inward reflection and assessment that allows the anger to dissipate: in that flash of rage we feel that both the subject, “i”, and the object, the enemy, are solid and independent. because we accept 11 these appearances as inherently established, anger is generated. however, if at that first flash of rage you make use of reason to ask yourself, who am i? who is this one who is being hurt? what is the enemy? is the enemy my body? is the enemy the mind? this solidly existing enemy, who previously seemed to be inherently created as something to get angry at, and this “i,” who was inherently created to be hurt, seems to disappear. and the anger breaks apart. (hhdl, 2005: 16) anger and hatred are emotions. they are afflictive and cause suffering. they are destructive. they are violent, causing harm to self and motivating persons to inflict harm on others. yet they are also subject to control and can be overcome with nonviolence, which in the above passage emerges from a practice of rational inquiry into the nature of anger. the dalai lama presents a philosophically sophisticated understanding of emotions in his discussions of anger-hatred, and he joins with many contemporary philosophers who have analyzed emotions not as episodic feeling states but as cognitive states which may or may not, or to lesser or greater degree, be accompanied by certain feelings. emotions, however, entail a cognitive core and are associated with the cognitive activities of perception and evaluation. they are involved in basic knowing and awareness, even if they are experienced nonlinguistically or non-discursively. yet emotions have objects and those objects are perceived and then subject to emotional interpretation and assessment, and they motivate decisions and actions. as cognitive capacities, they are subject to influence and control through thought and interpretation. on this understanding of emotion as cognitively centered perceptions and evaluation, the dalai lama could be interpreted as saying that detaching from the immediate and unreasoning energy of an emotion like anger-hatred is necessary so that it can be reflected upon and analyzed. this detachment and assessment allows anger’s construct of the self as victim and the object of anger as enemy to be called into question. the potential destructiveness of the opposition between self as “victim” and other as “enemy” generated by the emotion can be, upon 12 reflection, diffused; and the illusion of a substantial self standing independently of, and unrelated to, the other can be discerned. meditation and spiritual reflection are essential to coming to grips with the dynamics of this emotion. detaching from anger-hatred allows one to subject the dynamics of the emotion to critical reflection, which in turn allows one to redirect and finally dissipate negative emotional energy through rational reinterpretation: use your common sense. is anger useful? if you get angry at someone, the result is good neither for you nor for the other person. nothing helpful comes of it. in the end, anger does not harm others; it hurts yourself. when you are angry, food is not tasty. when you are angry, even the faces of your spouse, children, or friends are irritating, not because their faces have changed but because something is wrong with your own attitude. . . . once lit anger feeds off the air of exposure and can rage out of control. the only alternative is to control anger, and the way to do this is to think, what is the value of anger? what is the value of tolerance and compassion?. . . actions stemming solely from anger are of no use to us; realizing this can serve to strengthen your determination to resist them (hhdl, 2005, 147, 148). the inner world can be churned into a violent state through negative emotions like anger hatred. negative and destructive emotions create inner violence due to the way such emotions fester and harm oneself and those to whom one is in relation. but anger-hatred can be subdued and overcome, and for that reflection—thinking—is required. in the above paragraph the dalai lama is subjecting anger-hatred to a reflective process that can surely be also seen as a detached and critical analysis of the anger-hatred dynamics, which is precisely what people gripped by anger seem to find themselves unable to do. the dalai lama holds, however, that failure to move toward such a detached critical state with respect to negative emotions is a failure of thought and will, for we are all capable of addressing anger by reflecting on its lack of utility by considering rationally and in a detached way what is wrong with our own attitude. anger is a 13 projecting emotion and the dalai lama reels it in as if to say, “think about how you are projecting the negativity of this emotion on others.” above all, think. the moral and spiritual task of addressing and then overcoming anger-hatred, as the dalai lama advocates, requires the cultivation of certain counter-capacities that function to detach one from the energy of the negative emotional states. those afflictive and negative emotions cloud the luminosity of the mind that is always capable of seeing things as they really are and avoiding the traps of illusion. the mind must be tamed, the dalai lama warns, for an immediate consequence of hatred is an “ugly physical transformation” in which anger makes the best part of our brain, the ability to judge right from wrong and assess long-term and short-term consequences, become totally inoperable. it can no longer function. it is almost as if the person had become crazy. these are the negative effects of generating anger and hatred. . . . and it is necessary to distance ourselves from such emotional explosions” (hhdl 1997: 10-11). with the loss of “the sense of right and wrong,” the constraints of rational morality are loosened and without such constraints violence ensues. violence, on this account, is rooted in anger; anger feeds the victim-enemy relation; and anger creates destructive effects that must be overcome so that the basic aim of existence—happiness and fulfillment—might be realized. the dalai lama directs attention to the inner life to address the problem of anger in human existence, and he claims insight into a process of defusing anger and hatred by means of a detachment that allows reason to counteract the press of the emotional response. that counteraction is ethical activity because it eventually appeals to the need to develop moral virtues like patience and tolerance to adjust the attitude of the hate-filled mind and diminish the negative effects in the moral world of self-other relations. the dalai lama frames anger’s negative effects in a language of ethical spirituality and practice: “the only factor that can give refuge or protection 14 from the destructive effects of anger and hatred is the practice of tolerance and patience” (hhdl, 1997: 11). anger, according to the dalai lama, is inner violence reflecting a mind in a state of unrest and an ego feeling assaulted and victimized by some “enemy” other. anger-hatred creates fractures in moral relations with others, and the solution to it, the dalai lama asserts, can be interpreted as a moral solution: cultivate the moral virtues of tolerance and patience so that one will be disposed out of one’s very character to respond to anger—one’s own as well as that of others—with compassion. tolerance and patience are, in this moral construction of angerhatred, effective responses to the violence of anger, and they present a counter-force to anger sufficient to dissipate anger through nonviolent means—through compassion-related virtues. violence between persons: the ethic of peace the dalai lama understands violence to be connected to the spiritual life. inner unrest is tied to turmoil in the world. mental pollutants and afflictive thoughts and emotions affect how people enter into relation with one another. this connection between violence and spirituality allows us to inquire into the dalai lama’s understanding of violence as an ethical matter in the sphere of self-other relations, which is also the political world. as the spiritual and exiled political leader of the tibetan people, the dalai lama has faced the question of what to do—how to act—in the face of foreign invasion, occupation, and perceived injustice. how has the concern to address inner violence nonviolently been reduplicated in the world of political engagement? what is the dalai lama’s response to injustice and engagement with those who present themselves as enemies and who then visit harm on their adversaries? this inquiry turns now to the question, what has been the dalai lama’s general approach to the question of justice and 15 response to injustice? is the call for nonviolence so strong that it will not resist injustice with any kind of force, even the force of nonviolence?2 and then, with reference to the dalai lama’s role as a political figure advocating justice for the tibetan people, we can also ask about the role political context plays on the idea of using force to address injustice. how does the reality of a concrete political context where conflict has arisen affect or alter the moral commitment to nonviolence? we can get at all of these questions by inquiring into the issue of justice and injustice. justice invokes an idea of fairness and impartiality regarding how one treats others and is in turn treated by others, and the dalai lama endorses such a notion of basic human equality and the good of fair, nondiscriminatory, unbiased treatment based on that idea of human equality. he writes that “. . .when you have developed an affinity for all sentient beings and desire that they should all have happiness, such desire is valid because it is unbiased”(hhdl, 2005: 102). furthermore, [r]emember that in the practice of altruism there is no possible reason for an exception, treating one person better while neglecting others. in this world alone there are several billion, who, like yourself, do not want suffering and do want happiness. . . .there is no reason to treat some better and others worse. . . .once we recognize our community in deprivation, there is no sense in being belligerent with each other” (hhdl, 2005: 114). the dalai lama lays out in reflections like these, a foundation for a particular view of human rights. the appeal is not to a kantian notion of the intrinsic value of persons but a buddhist notion that all persons are equal in that whatever one’s life situation or circumstance— all are connected in a common condition of suffering and all share a common desire for happiness and fulfillment. human beings share natural aspirations and “based on this natural aspiration you have the right to obtain happiness and to get rid of suffering” (hhdl, 2005: 115). recognition of human equality and the common condition should prevent any from exploiting or 16 doing injustice to another, and clearly in the sphere of self-other relations people should not assert themselves and claim privilege at someone else’s expense—“i am not unique; i have no special privilege. you are not unique; you have no special privilege” (hhdl: 2001: 113). the appeal here to a notion of radical equality among all people forms the basis for affirming universal human rights. but in the world of human relationships, injustice exists. people do assert themselves over against others and seek power to impose their will on others, doing so unjustly at someone else’s expense. what is the right thing for a person facing such injustice to do? does one fight against injustice, resist injustice, or let injustice be? in the following passage the dalai lama’s provides counsel about what is really at stake in any act of injustice—and how injustice itself is to be understood: if one has been treated very unfairly and if the situation is left unaddressed, it may have extremely negative consequences for the perpetrator of the crime. such a situation calls for a strong counteraction. under such circumstances, it is possible that one can, out of compassion for the perpetrator of the crime and without generating anger or hatred, actually take a strong stand and take strong countermeasures. in fact one of the precepts of the bodhisattva vows is to take strong countermeasures when the situation calls for it. (hhdl, 1997: 10) the call here is not to ignore injustice or to offer violent resistance but first of all—to think. the call is to think about why the injustice is occurring and to take “strong countermeasures” to oppose the injustice. the dalai lama is certainly aware of the many terrible injustices in the world, asking at one point: what are we to say about those individuals whose lives seem given over wholly to violence and aggression? during the past century alone there are several obvious examples to consider. what of hitler and his plan to exterminate the entire jewish race? what of stalin and his pogroms? what of chairman mao, the man i once knew and admired, and the barbarous insanity of the cultural 17 revolution? what of pol pot, architect of the killing fields? (hhdl, 1999, p. 71) in his autobiography he again reflects on his own experience with injustice, offering in a best-selling book read the world over his own effort at strong countermeasures, namely, truth telling about injustice: the truth remains that, since the chinese invasion, over a million tibetans have died as a result of peking’s policies. when adopting its resolution on tibet in 1965, the united nations stated plainly that china’s occupation of my homeland has been characterized by ‘acts of murder, rape and arbitrary imprisonment; torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of tibetans on a large scale’ (hhdl, 1990: 267). the dalai lama knows about injustice and advocates resistance to it. yet in advocating thoughtful reflection, he responds to the violence of hitler, stalin and pol pot by saying “. . . i must admit i can think of no single explanation to account for the monstrous acts of these people” (hhdl, 1999, 71). and of the chinese invasion of tibet his first response as recorded in his autobiography is the same: i remain at a loss to explain how this happened, how the noble ideals of so many good men and women became transformed into senseless barbarity. nor can i understand what motivated those people within the chinese leadership who actively counseled the total destruction of the tibetan race (hhdl, 1990: 267-68). the reason i think the dalai lama expresses mystification in the face of these horrors is that the dalai lama approaches such issues in a political context where universal ethical principles tied to decency and respect for humanity—as opposed to the particularities of religious doctrines—should rule the day. in the dalai lama’s own understanding of ethics, the ethical act is a non-injuring act. yet if ethics is tied to rationality and to universal norms of conduct that serve the end of human happiness and human flourishing, the destruction of peoples and their cultures—the genocidal destructions of the 20th century—present themselves as outside the reach 18 of ethics and even rationality itself. ethics will of course condemn such unjust, destructive and murderous actions and do so without controversy. yet the rational person will not claim to understand why these things happened. a rational moral person not only is, but should be, mystified by such murderous and unjust activities. and responding with anger-hatred and violence simply compounds the injustice and thus increases the mystification: “there is a certain irrationality in responding to injustice or harm with hostility,” the dalai lama writes (hhdl 2001, 11). in the face of such injustice as is represented by these various human rights violations and political tragedies, the dalai lama makes three responses. first, he acknowledges the injustice and sees it as a duty connected to the bodhisattva vow to resist the injustice through strong countermeasures. since the dalai lama did not lead protests with the tibetan people in the streets of lhasa, it appears that he did not act as his hero, gandhi, did when gandhi led the march to the sea to protest the british salt tax. nor did he adopt the tactics of nonviolent resistance martin luther king, jr. used to lead a bus boycott in montgomery. the dalai lama did not stay on site. having good reason to believe his life was in immediate danger, he chose to flee tibet, and by doing so he devised a new form of protest and began to conduct resistance in exile from his new home in india. from that position, he has campaigned against the chinese invasion and occupation and brought to the attention of the world the injustice his people have suffered under chinese rule. his circumstances were different from gandhi’s and king’s—in some ways his enemies were, arguably of course, even more ruthless. but in examining his form of off-site nonviolent resistance to injustice, the question can be put: “what has been the effect of his efforts?” 19 the dalai lama’s campaign for justice has brought shame on china in the eyes of many in the world community. that same world community has expressed support for the tibetan people and the tibetan culture in many ways: in united nations resolutions; in a burgeoning of scholarly attention to tibetan buddhism chronicled by such scholars as donald lopez, who relates the story of the development of america’s tibetan buddhist doctoral programs (lopez, 1998: 156-80); and in the warm reception the dalai lama has received throughout the world as he has spoken up for the tibetan people and continued to extend peace offers and compromise proposals to the chinese. in all of these responses, the injustice of the invasion and occupation has been brought to the fore and kept there for decades in the countless appearances and public statements the dalai lama has made. the dalai lama appealed to the world community—and to the chinese—for justice, even referencing “just war” thinking in its ethical requirement that a use of force to counter injustice must itself establish warrants for resistance, including a requirement or criterion of “just cause.” in his nobel prize acceptance speech the dalai lama said “our cause is just” and again in his autobiography offered the comment that “our cause is 100 per cent just and in accordance with the wishes of the entire population of tibet” (hhdl, 1990: 225-26). in assessing how effective his nonviolent actions have been as resistance to injustice, we note that the dalai lama has gone to the world community to protest his homeland’s political situation. given the chinese response to the dalai lama and the continued chinese suppression of his image in tibet and any communications from him to tibetans, one could fairly conclude that his efforts to be heard and to make the unjust suffering of the tibetan people known to the world have been successful—that is to say the dalai lama has taken actions that the chinese have experienced as “strong countermeasures.” 20 secondly, the dalai lama has found the reality of injustice an occasion for reflecting on the spiritual dimension of political conflict. he refers in his autobiography to the chinese as tibet’s enemy, but he never relents from his view that . . . people are neutral. they are neither friend nor enemy, buddhist nor christian, chinese nor tibetan. our true enemy is actually within us. it is our selfishness, our attachment and our anger that harm us. . . . [w]hen powerful emotions like extreme anger, hatred, or desire arise, they create disturbance the moment they occur within our minds. they immediately undermine our mental peace and create an opening for unhappiness and suffering to undo the work of our spiritual practice (hhdl, 2001: 112). despite being a political leader and engaged in a political contest over national sovereignty with the people’s republic of china, the dalai lama’s attention to the justice question at the center of the conflict never strays from the disciplined view that there is a spiritual as well as a political contest at stake, and the spiritual contest is vitally important. in fact, so important is what one decides to do in response to such a conflict that the dalai lama urges a reflection that reenvisions the enemy through the lens of gratitude, for the enemy creates the opportunity for spiritual growth. the enemy has a conscious will to harm you. but this [is not] a valid reason not to respect the enemy. in fact, if anything, it is additional grounds to revere and be grateful to your enemy. indeed it is this special factor that makes your enemy unique. if the mere inflicting physical pain were sufficient to make someone an enemy, you would have to consider your doctor an enemy. . . .[i]n order to practice sincerely and to develop patience you need someone who willfully hurts you. thus these people give us real opportunities to practice these things. they are testing our inner strength in a way that even a guru cannot. even the buddha possesses no such potential. therefore, the enemy is the only one who gives us this golden opportunity (hhdl, 1995: 82). the adversary never loses status as one’s equal in deserving respect, even in conflict and even when acting to inflict harm. the dalai lama continues to push his ethical spirituality into 21 that understanding of persons as equal and tied together in a common condition, from which basis he maintains respect for the enemy and even honors the enemy as one who creates the conditions where the virtues of patience and tolerance can be developed and practiced. for this opportunity the dalai lama expresses gratitude, for “it is almost as if the perpetrator of the harm sacrifices himself or herself for the sake of our benefit” (hhdl, 1995: 81). this conclusion conforms to a religious ideal advanced in buddhism (and christianity as well: “love your enemies, and do good to those who hate you”); yet in the respect he directs to the adversary the dalai lama continues to advance a rational moral perspective built upon the equality of persons and the sharing of all in a common lot of suffering. and lastly, conflict and injustice, while they create the occasions for anger-hatred to spill over into violence, also provide the occasion to practice nonviolence. “my basic belief is that human problems can only be solved through human contact,” he has observed in his autobiography (hhdl, 1990: 225), and the dalai lama has continued over the years to express openness to settling the conflict with china nonviolently. he has offered to negotiate with the chinese, even going so far as to accept chinese presence in running governmental operations, thus relinquishing his political authority in tibet, so long as tibetan buddhism and the tibetan culture receive assurances of protection. the dalai lama, in reflecting on the chinese incursion, shared in his autobiography that in his view the chinese leadership had proved to be “untrustworthy” and that “through countless atrocities, they had shown a total disrespect for human life. it seemed to the chinese mind, perhaps because of the huge size of their own population, human life is considered to be a cheap commodity—and tibetan lives to be of still less value” (hhdl, 1990: 225). 22 although these are experiences of terrible suffering for the tibetan people, the dalai lama has never advocated or condoned violent resistance in response to them. violence itself is deemed a mode of action that is neither morally justifiable nor spiritually authorized. nonviolence includes within it an attitude of respect for the adversary—that had been gandhi’s perspective as well—and also a confidence that injustice can be overcome by holding open the possibility of changing another’s mind and perceptions. the way to effect this change is through nonviolence. nonviolence is, then, a way of acting effectively to resist injustice in the moral sphere of human relations. it is a spiritual attitude that resorts to thought and reflection and practices designed to diffuse anger and hatred, to maintain respect for the enemy, and to bring about the peace that is integral to human flourishing, happiness and fulfillment. in the end, what the dalai lama offers to a discussion on violence is a spiritual ethic of peace, or, from the other pole, an ethical spirituality that will not divorce what happens in the external world between persons from what happens in the inner world of the heart and mind. in the karmic cause and effect world of the buddhist, violence will beget violence and nonviolence will counter violence, opening the door to friendship and effecting change in the direction of justice—that is the dalai lama’s belief. the dalai lama never loses sight of the moral and spiritual end of happiness that all persons seek, and he calls for an ethic of responsibility based on a theory of human nature, where all are connected to one another in a grand unity of interrelatedness. it is an ethical spirituality he calls for, casting the spiritual in terms of the ethical and envisioning the ethical as a function of the spiritual: . . . the problems we face today –violent conflicts, destruction of nature, poverty, hunger, and so on—are mainly problems created by humans. they can be resolved—but only through human effort, understanding and the development of a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood. to do this, we need to cultivate a universal 23 responsibility for one another and for the planet we share, based on a good heart and awareness. (hhdl, 1990: 270) 24 endnotes 25 1consider for example his volume entitled how to expand love: widening the circle of loving relationships,” (new york: atria books, 2005) which assumes the “how to” format yet is translated by one of the outstanding tibetan buddhist scholars in the united states, jeffrey hopkins from the university of virginia. 2 for a discussion of the way gandhi used non-violence as resistance to injustice and as a means of force to achieve political objectives, see lloyd steffen “gandhi’s nonviolent resistance: a justified use of force?” journal of philosophy and the contemporary world 15: 1 (june 2008): 68-80; and a broader treatment involving king and gandhi in lloyd steffen, “the presumption of peace: where just war and non-violent resistance meet (and diverge),” jason daverth, ed., conflict and conciliation: faith and politics in an age of global dissonance (dublin, ireland: columba press, 2007): 20-38. references bstan-‘dzin-rgya-mtsho, dalai lama xiv (cited in text as hhdl) 1990 freedom in exile: the autobiography of the dalai lama (new york: harpersanfrancisco). 1995 the world of tibetan buddhism: an overview of its philosophy and practice, trans. and ed. geshe thupten jinpa (boston: wisdom publications). 1997 healing anger: the power of patience from a buddhist perspective, trans. geshe thupten jinpa (ithaca, ny: snow lion). 1999 ethics for the new millennium (new york: riverhead books). 2000 transforming the mind: teachings on generating compassion, trans. geshe thupten jinpa (london: thorsons). 2001 an open heart: practicing compassion in everyday life, ed. nicholas vreeland (boston: little, brown & co.). 2005 how to expand love: widening the circle of loving relationships, trans. jeffrey hopkins (new york: atria books). lopez, donald s., jr., 1998 prisoners of shangri-la: tibetan buddhism and the west (chicago: university of chicago press). runzo, joseph. 2001 “being religious and doing ethics in a global world,” in ethics in the world religions, eds. joesph runzo and nancy m. martin (oxford: one world) sangharakshita 1996 tibetan buddhism: an introduction (birmingham, england: windhorse publications). 11(158-162)note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 1-15 1 © 2000 by assumption university press meta-goods in fashion-myths: philosophic-anthropological implications of fashion advertisements roman meinhold national university of lesotho abstract this paper intends to investigate which aspects of human nature are responsible for the recurrence of new fashions. it is divided into five sections: the first explains the multidisciplinary approach used in the research on this phenomenon, the second provides a very brief and stroboscopic historical overview of the issue in question, the third distinguishes different notions of fashion, the fourth introduces the term meta-goods as indicators of values and symbols for philosophic-anthropological features in fashion advertisements and the last section elucidates the myths narrated by fashion advertisements, which have philosophic-anthropological implications. historical prelude plato in his dialogue, phaidon states that a real philosopher does not really care about clothes since he considers them to be merely the “wrapping” of the body (phaidon 64 d-e). clothes, therefore, have quite a low ontological status. the highest ontological status – for the human being – is, of course, occupied by the soul, while the body is just more or less a vehicle of the soul. since clothes wrap the body, they are merely a “wrapping of the wrapping of the mind” in karen hanson’s provocative criticism on plato’s en passant statement on clothes (1990, 109). 2 prajñâ vihâra aristotle did not write about clothes – but, according to diogenes laertios – he was dressed elegantly (5/1,1-2). the first german philosopher, and, to my knowledge, the first philosopher who dedicated an entire book to fashion, was christian garve, a contemporary of immanuel kant. in his book on fashion, which was published in 1794, he indicates the important philosophical anthropological implications of fashions, but does not elaborate on them in detail.1 one of these anthropological implications is variation: it means that we do not enjoy being confronted with the same issues and things for long, preferring change. an anthropological phenomenon which is related to variation is neophilia, which, literally translated, means love of the new, in particular, it means love of new things. fashion is also a manifestation of the human wish and capacity to imitate, which was an important theme in aristotle’s poetics where it was considered an anthropological factum (1448 b 4-9). all three phenomena – mentioned by christian garve – variation, neophilia and imitation, have to be considered as essential aspects of human nature, as we will see later. the first famous philosopher who wrote briefly on fashion was immanuel kant in his anthropology, published in 1798. according to kant, imitation is an anthropological feature by which human beings tend to imitate the “better ones”. the french poet charles baudelaire was also concerned – intellectually and aesthetically – with beauty and amelioration as anthropological features (1988, 9 and 38). amelioration basically means improvement. he was the first author who holistically embraced the phenomenon of fashion in a positive way and was not as deconstructively critical as his predecessors. an economic-sociological approach on fashion can be found in thorstein bunde veblen’s 1899 theory of the leisure class where he emphasizes the sociologically important aspects of distinction: he believed that through clothes in general and fashion in particular, we distinguish ourselves from others (1997, 173). georg simmel, in various papers published between 1885 and 1908, wrote on fashion – and roland barthes in his system of fashion (1987) emphasized two important aspects, namely the relation of fashion to the present time and the fixation of humans by fashion to presence.2 the notions of fashion we can now distinguish between various notions of fashion. one notion – which i call fashion iv – includes, for example, features from architecture, but also non-material entities like theories – plato’s theory of ideas, for example – and techniques, for example, the usage of tools. in general, it can be said that the notion of fashion iv includes all human actions or thoughts and their results. this means, theoretically, that fashion could be anything and everything could be fashionable. fashion iv thus refers to material or non-material trends: human actions, and/or their results, since paleolithic times. for a historically narrower notion of fashion, fashion iii, we can give examples such as mobile telephones as means of mass communication or cars as means of mass transportation. this type of fashion can be detected since the democratization of luxury of a particular good, which does not refer to a single point of time in history, rather, it has to be seen in a relative way: each and every consumer product which has been transferred from a luxury item into an everyday product by mass production emerged, at one time in history, as a mass product. before the time of its luxury democratization, it was only used by consumer elites. the mobile phone, for example, was initially only used by a minority of wealthy people, but now it is a product used by nearly everybody who lives a “western lifestyle”. another significant characteristic of the fashion iii notion is that a fashionable product is up to date. this applies especially to stateof-the-art products. so, the notion of fashion iii could be seen as a trend since the democratization of luxury. i already mentioned that the democratization of luxury is relative to the consumer product. the notion of fashion ii includes, for example, sandals in antiquity, but also fashionable ones today. this means it applies particularly to clothes which have been (or are) in fashion since paleolithic times (including haute couture). meinhold 3 4 prajñâ vihâra fashion i applies to presently fashionable clothes, for example, a silk shirt or a wool skirt in a particular season. the elementary features are (1) the democratization of luxury, (2) clothes (including accessories) and the fact of (3) being up to date. so this means that the notion fashion i does not include clothes in general but it does include clothes since democratization of luxury which are presently up to date. fashion i excludes haute couture, since those fashionable clothes are – although up to date – not products for mass consumption. the notion of fashion i will be used for further analysis in this paper and will, henceforth, just be called ‘fashion’. other notions of fashion will be used with their qualifying labels. the notion of fashion iv includes the notion of fashion i, fashion ii and fashion iii since everything can be fashionable in the widest sense. the notion of fashion iii includes the notion of fashion i since clothes are usually mass products like cell phones, but it excludes haute couture. the notion of fashion ii includes fashion i, but also haute couture because it refers to all clothes. meta-goods: indicators of philosophic-anthropological implications of fashion having introduced the above analytical distinction of the four notions of fashion, i will now present an approach to the philosophical dimensions of fashion which is analytically divided into three aspects, which are, of course easier to distinguish in theory than in practice. the approach focuses, in particular, on philosophic-anthropological implications of fashion in fashion-advertisements. the first aspect refers to social or philosophic-sociological phenomena: performing on the stage of our everyday life but also imitation of the better ones are important features of today’s fashion. the latter aspect is an aesthetic one which is concerned with improvement in general and beautification in particular. the term amelioration signifies improvement of life in general. beautification and aesthetization refer to the endeavor to improve the beauty of something. the third aspect is – in relation to fashion – perhaps the remotest one imaginable; it has metaphysical implications and is related to the wish for transcendence of time and decay. on the one hand, human beings transcend time with fashions and stay routed in the present by fashions; on the other hand, fashion “reincarnates” (“reinvestinates” see below) a human being symbolically and metaphorically into the “right time”. to approach these three aspects of fashion from a philosophicanthropological point of view, let us recall the main research question: which aspects of human nature are responsible for the recurrence of new fashions? we are interested in those aspects of human nature which are not responsible for the utilization of clothes in general, but which are responsible for our urge to buy new clothes with every new season. meinhold 5 6 prajñâ vihâra thus these aspects are indirectly responsible for the recurrence of new fashions because – as will be shown below – marketing strategists utilize those philosophic-anthropological implications in fashion advertisements. the question why human beings use and buy clothes has traditionally been answered with the classical functions of clothes; the answer comes in a form of an analytical distinction as well: there are four basic functions of clothes (which do not entirely explain the recurrence of new fashions). the first one is protection: human beings want to be protected by clothes from climatic conditions and other physical influences. the second aspect refers to sexual features which are usually covered by clothes. the third aspect emphasizes an aesthetically important feature, namely that clothes serve as decoration for the human being. the fourth aspect is that clothes can serve as symbolic insignia, for example, as attire or uniform. although the aspect of decoration points in the direction of beautification, the first two features, namely physical protection and protection in a more psychological-sociological way, do not explain the recurrence of new fashions, since we even buy new clothes when old clothes are still catering for those two aspects of protection, that is, protection from climatic conditions and covering of primary sexual features. meinhold 7 wolford (source: vogue, heft 6, juni 2001, hamburg) although all of the four functions are still served by old clothes, the question, ‘why do we buy new clothes?’ has been answered by roland barthes in his the system of fashion. he emphasizes an economical fact according to which producers want to sell their products faster than they are worn out. thus something must be added to the product to create a new appetite to seduce the consumer to buy a new product although the old product still performs its functions (1995, 10). we can now introduce the notion of meta-good. an example of such a meta-good is beautification. in an advertisement which was pub8 prajñâ vihâra lished by the german edition of the fashion magazine vogue the brand wolford published an advertisement for stockings in a quite aesthetisized manner. in the picture – which itself is a form of aesthetization – we can see a woman, but we do not see the stockings. the text which is displayed to the left of the woman’s upper legs reads “culture” followed by “with wolford, you acquire beauty for your body and mind”.3 the products which the company obviously wants to promote with the help of that ad are stockings. but the stockings are neither mentioned in the text nor are they displayed. what the “reader” and viewer (or voyeur) of the advertisement can recognize is a woman who is regarded to be beautiful – at least from a western aesthetical mass-perspective – and the text. exactly that beauty – mentioned in the text, and recognizable in the picture – for body and mind is something which is good, is a “good”, but it is not an ordinary consumer product, it is a good which somehow is attached to the (invisible) stockings and it is somehow behind (greek: meta) the consumer product, it is a meta-good. the context and the style of the advertisement show that the beauty as “good” or value (manifested in picture and text) is of even greater importance than the mere product, the (invisible) stockings. what are the features or characteristics of such meta-goods? very often the meta-good is placed behind or around the real product. in many cases, the meta-good also represents the motivation why a certain product will be bought by the consumer. meta-goods are existential, intellectual, psychological, emotional, social and spiritual values or symbols. they are immaterial “by products” of products or services. when bought, meta-goods are, apparently transferred (in)to the consumer. in the above example, the product is the stockings, while the meta-goods are beauty and intelligence. what is really sold by the company is just the product, what they pretend to sell additionally are the meta-goods namely beauty and intelligence. what is offered in the advertisement is a “charged” product namely beautifying stockings. using the semiotic interpretation, the product becomes the signifier of the meta-good which is the signified, the “charged” product is the sign. diagram: holistic melioration aristotle in his peri psyches already analytically divided the human being into body, soul and mind. this, of course, is an analytical division and the lines of demarcation between these spheres, physical, psychological and mental/spiritual are anything but clear or do not exist at all. the holistic human being in advertisements especially in fashion advertisements, are complimented by additional components. so the human being is not just composed of body, soul and mind, but of mind, soul, body, clothes and other consumer products. thus, in such advertisements, the human being is even ‘more holistic’. if the consumer buys a product which usually includes meta-goods, a holistic melioration of the human being takes place. not only will the repertoire of clothes of a human being be improved, beautified or ameliorated. in addition, there is a beautification for the body itself, for the mind and for the soul. typically, in fashion advertisements, we can observe three streams of meta-goods which are analytically distinguishable and which modify the human being in a holistic manner: the human being is improved, ameliorated holistically with the help of the consumer product. in that way, fashion advertisements are “narrating” three myths. the first meinhold 9 myth tells the consumer that fashion guarantees perfect staging in everyday life. the second one holds that fashion is a holistic amelioration, beautification or improvement. thirdly, fashion renews the consumer with the help of new products; this is a kind of pseudo-reincarnation which i coined reinvestination (see below). fashion-myths – philosophic-anthropological implications of fashion advertisements the first myth is closely related to the phenomenon of performance and staging. very often consumers appear to perform in the theater of their every day life with the help of consumer products. the metagood which is used in that context helps “to make the scene” with the product (to which the meta-good is attached), or to get into the limelight, or simply to act as if one were famous. here, the producers of fashion advertisements use two anthropological facts which were already highlighted and explained by aristotle in his poetics and by immanuel kant in his anthropology. according to aristotle, imitation is part of human nature. according to kant, imitation of the better ones is also a natural anthropological feature. this is exactly what happens in many fashion advertisements: the models depicted in advertisements imitate or act like famous people (this myth often becomes reality or is already reality). this imitation of prominent individuals or the imitation of better ones i call imitatio prominentis. this term is parallel to the term imitatio dei, frequently used by mircea eliade, who used the term in his comparative religious studies in ritual, cultural and religious contexts (e.g. 1957, 59). in rituals, priests imitate gods and due to that imitation the priest or the shaman is part of the world creation, part of transcendence or eternity which leads to a renewal, purification or catharsis (eliade 1988, 15). in that regard the imitatio dei’s purpose is a kind of therapy or catharsis. imitatio prominentis refers to the imitation of prominent people in the consumer sphere. with the help of imitatio prominentis consumers 10 prajñâ vihâra are part of the life-style of prominent figures which leads to the symbolical improvement or amelioration of the self of the consumer and might lead to a kind of pseudo-catharsis, pseudo-therapy or might be only a compensation. there is much more to say and to research about those allegedly therapeutic aspects of consumerism which cannot be discussed here in detail.4 the third fashion-myth refers to reinvestination (re-in-vesti-nation) a form of pseudo-reincarnation. reincarnation is often used interchangeably with metempsychosis; both denote the transmigration of the soul upon death. the soul takes up residence in a new body. these phenomena are found in many religions in different parts of the world, and in various cultures. this is the most complicated philosophical anthropological implication of fashion. it is based on the natural fear of human beings to die, our fear of decay and our rejection of aging which is particularly obvious in developed societies. the cosmetics industry, in particular, makes use of that philosophical anthropological implication to market their products. the neologism reinvestination is a parallel-construction to reincarnation. re-in-car/n/ation literally means “being-born-back-into-flesh”; reinvestination means “being-born-back-into-(new)clothes”. with new clothes, the consumer feels new as well. one of the diesel advertisements mentions that one can be “young, beautiful and sexy for ever”. additionally with new clothes, the human being is fixed to the present and not to the past. behind that phenomenon lies a rejection of decay and death. meinhold 11 12 prajñâ vihâra advertisement: diesel (source: advertisement supplement by diesel in vogue: issue 612, august 2001, milano) thus the three myths narrated by fashion advertisements are based on philosophic-anthropological features namely: the human being wants to be recognized by others in a social context. aristotle already mentioned in his politics that a human being is a zoon politikon which needs the company of others (1253 a 2-3); secondly, the human being lives and thinks in a comparative mode. and thirdly, the human being is concerned with metaphysical questions and transcendence. one interesting feature of human beings is that they do not merely think in a positive mode, for example of being beautiful. according to common sense, human beings think in a superlative mode; if that claim would be right some human beings would like to be simply the most beautiful. nevertheless, this seems not to be true since once a person has achieved an allegedly superlative status, s/he will think that this superlative in reality, is not a superlative at all, because there is always something that (or someone else) is bigger, more beautiful or nicer. the former superlative – after comparison – loses its status as a superlative. it seems that the human being mainly lives and thinks in a comparative mode, since human beings want to be more beautiful and the car should be faster, bigger or more powerful (than, for example, the neighbor’s or the colleague’s car). this is why we live and think in a comparative mode. conclusion human beings desire to be recognized in a social context. they also think and live in a comparative mode and are concerned about metaphysical problems and transcendence. thus human beings consume fashionable products in relation to an imitation of the better ones: the imitatio prominentis. they consume those products in expectance of an amelioration and holistic improvement and beautification, but also for reinvestination, a pseudo-reincarnation: with fashion the human being is anchored in the present time and thus rejects age, decay and death. therefore – according to the narration of fashion advertisements – fashions stage, improve and renew human beings and their lives.5 endnotes 1 garve 1987, e.g. 57, 75, 105, 196. 2 simmel [1895] zur psychologie der mode; [1905] philosophie der mode; [1905] die mode; [1908] die frau und die mode. barthes 1985, e.g. 279. 3 translated from the german text by the author. the original reads: “gewinnen sie mit wolford schönheit für körper und geist”. source: vogue, heft 6, juni 2001, hamburg. meinhold 13 4 for detailed explanations compare meinhold 2005 chapter ii. 5 how to deal with such myths, which are essentially lies, i have discussed elsewhere (meinhold 2005, chapter iv and meinhold 2001 a and b). references aristoteles. (1993). poetik [i]. stuttgart. __________. (1995). aristoteles philosophische schriften. vol. 6: physik (zekl, hans günter [übers.]); über die seele [pp] (theiler, willy [übers.]). hamburg. aristoteles. (1993). politik. stuttgart. barthes, roland. (1964). mythen des alltags. frankfurt am main. __________. (1995). die sprache der mode. frankfurt am main. __________. (1982). das dandytum und die mode. in: heydenrynsch, verena v.d. (hg) (1982) riten der selbstauflösung. s.304308 münchen. baudelaire, charles. (1988). das schöne, die mode und das glück – constantin guys, der maler des modernen lebens. berlin __________. (1946) mein entblößtes herz. die beiden tagebücher nebst zeichnungen. münchen. diogenes laertios. (apelt, otto [übers.]; reich, klaus [hg.]) (1990) leben und meinungen berühmter philosophen. hamburg. garve, christian. (1987). über die moden. frankfurt am main. eliade, mircea. (1957). das heilige und das profane. vom wesen des religiösen. hamburg. __________. (1988). das mysterium der wiedergeburt. versuch über einige initiationsriten. frankfurt am main, leipzig. hanson, karen. (1990). dressing down dressing up – the philosophic fear of fashion. in: hypatia vol. 5, no. 2 (summer 1990). 107-121. kant, immanuel (1988) anthropologie in pragmatischer hinsicht. stuttgart. meinhold, roman. (2001a). konsum – lifestyle – selbstverwirklichung. konsummotive jugendlicher und nachhaltige bildung. weingarten. 14 prajñâ vihâra __________. (2001b). lifestyle und selbstver-wirklichung auf dem weg zur nachhaltigkeit in: awt-info. weingarten. s 110-125. __________. (2005). der mode-mythos: lifestyle als lebenskunst. philosophisch-anthropologische implikationen der mode. würzburg. platon. sämtliche werke. in der übersetzung von friedrich s c h l e i e r m a c h e r mit der st e p h a n u s-nummerierung, herausgegeben von walter f. otto, ernesto grassi, gert plamböck. hamburg. __________. sämtliche werke in zehn bänden, griechisch und deutsch. nach der übersetzung friedrich schleiermachers, ergänzt durch übersetzungen von franz susemihl und anderen. herausgegeben von karlheinz hülser. frankfurt am main, leipzig. simmel, georg. (1895). zur psychologie der mode. in: wiener zeit, 12. okt. 1895. __________. (1996b) philosophie des geldes [phg] (gsg 6). frankfurt am main [zu “mode” s. 639-641]. __________. (2000) philosophie der mode... (gsg 10). frankfurt am main. s. 7-37. __________. (1996a) die mode. in: hauptprobleme der philosophie. philosophische kultur [phk] (gsg 14). frankfurt am main. s. 186-218. __________. (1997) die frau und die mode. in: aufsätze und abhandlungen 1901-1908 (gsg 8). frankfurt am main s. 344347. veblen, thorstein bunde (1986) die theorie der feinen leute. eine untersuchung der institutionen. frankfurt am main. meinhold 15 07_(138-153)trans forative education trans-formative education for the future of humanity1 joseph i. fernando assumption university, thailand บทคัดย่อ การศึกษาในฐานะท่ีเป็นการบอกข้อมูลข่าวสาร การอบรมบ่มนิสัย และ การปฏิรูปน้ัน ไม่เพียงพอท่ีจะเผชิญกับความท้าทายต่างๆ ในโลกปัจจุบัน เช่น ความเส่ือมโทรมของส่ิงแวดล้อม ความยากจน ความอยุติธรรม ความวุ่นวายไร้ สันติภาพ และความเสื่อมโทรมของมนุษย์เอง เพื่อที่จะรับมือกับสิ่งเหล่านี้ การศึกษาจำเป็นต้องคำนึงถึงการแปรสภาพด้วย นักศึกษาทุกระดับช้ันต้องได้รับ การปลูกฝังให้มีจิตสำนึกท่ีจะต้องรับมือกับความท้าทายต่างๆ เหล่าน้ี ดังน้ันจึง จำเป็นท่ีจะต้องผนวกวิชาต่างๆ ท่ีตอบสนองต่อการเผชิญหน้ากับส่ิงท้าทายเหล่าน้ี ในหลักสูตรของมหาวิทยาลัย (ท้ังในภาคทฤษฎี และภาคปฏิบัติ) การท่ีสถาบัน การศึกษามุ่งผลิตแต่บัณฑิต นักวิชาชีพ ช่างเทคนิค นักบริหารจัดการ แต่ว่าขาดจิต สำนึกในหน้าที่ของตนในการปกป้องรักษาโลกนั้นย่อมไม่เพียงพอ ถ้าหากเรา ตระหนักว่าโลกไม่ใช่ของเราแต่ตัวเราต่างหากเป็นของโลก นี่แหละจะเป็น ก้าวแรกท่ีนำไปสู่การปกป้องตัวเราเองและโลกได้ abstract education as information, formation and reformation is inadequate to meet the challenges of the contemporary world. to address such challenges as environmental decay, poverty, injustice, lack of peace, and the degradation of humans, education could become trans-formative. almost at all levels of education, students need to be made conscientious with regard to these challenges. so it is crucial to incorporate in the regular university curriculum courses (consisting of both theory and field work) 138 prajna vihara, volume 11, number 2, july-december 2010, 138-153 2000 by assumption university pressc ~ which address these challenges. it is not enough for the university to merely produce graduates, professionals, technicians, and administrators, who lack a commitment to protecting the world. if we realize that the world does not belong to us but we belong to it, this will be a first step towards saving ourselves and the world. education can be viewed variously as in-formative, formative, reformative and trans-formative. it involves more than mere information because information is insufficient for human development __ a kind of formation which is vital for social life. in addition to formation, education needs re-form as well. but in the final analysis, education as transformation will be the translation of information, formation, and reformation into a meaningful praxis. there are five major challenges to the survival of the world today, and educational programs in all disciplines ought to include courses on these challenges. such a course will consist of both theory and field experience. it is not enough to study such subjects as medicine, engineering, science, humanities, and professional courses if the students are not critically aware of what is happening to the world and communities everywhere and what they ought to do for the sake of global well being and fellowship. students need to be exposed to such ideas at a tender age so that lasting impressions will be formed in their minds. this is not indoctrination but conscientization for the sake of the survival of the world and humanity. it would be tragic if educators ended up teaching all sorts of courses without paying attention to the very survival of the world and humanity. if the world and humanity are in grave danger, what will be the use of all the subjects educators have been busy teaching all along? most fundamentally, humanity needs a world to live in. 1. informative education: today’s education seems inadequate to equip students to face the challenges of the world. education has come to be seen primarily as information in service to a world of information technology. some educators advocate the educating of minds as if the human being were mere mind or intelligence. this view is a fallacy because it ignores the multidimensional reality of the human person and the 139joseph i. fernando need for the development of the total personality. contemporary education only provides people with knowledge and development of skills needed for employment. consequently, we have increasingly efficient employees, managers, administrators, professionals, yet for millions of people, the world does not seem to be a good place to live in. ‘the wretched of the earth’ are getting more wretched. science and technology, economics and politics, philosophy and religion have not sufficiently succeeded in enabling people to live a truly human life. so education as information cannot constitute a satisfactory definition of education. 2. reformative education: there are attempts to “reform” education from time to time. the factors contributing to reform may be new discoveries in the field of knowledge, new demands placed by the society, industry and so on in keeping with the changing times, and new international relationships. educational reform is generally initiated by those with wealth and power because education is in their hands and they have the resources. industrialists and businessmen in collaboration with educational institutions mould education to suit the needs of their enterprises. i tend to think capitalist profit has much to do with educational reform. the market dictates education. capitalism creates artificial needs. it is said that the best salesman is one who makes you buy what you don’t need. as rousseau would say, civilization brings about a certain decadence. in his emile he explores how children can be educated and saved from the decadent influences of civilization. geraint parry writes: “in emile [rousseau] produces an account of an education that is designed to allow persons to live an honest life even when surrounded by the pressures of a corrupt society. it is intended to portray an ideal of education that is as close to nature as it is possible to attain in the world as we now find it”.2 such an education sounds utopian since humans cannot be isolated from society. rousseau is right in his advocacy of closeness to nature; but that does not mean the savage was always noble. rousseau believed in the natural goodness of humanity. if humans have natural goodness, how is human-made evil explained? i fear even rousseau’s emile would not escape the effects of an exploitative consumer society. nowadays an mba is a coveted degree because of its “value” in 140 prajna vihara~ a market economy. software engineers are some of the most wanted employees of the technocrats. such reformative education is not going to save the world because it does not address the fundamental maladies of our societies. it only provides cosmetic therapy. if educational reform is radical, then it becomes transformative education. but, in my opinion, the market economy would not want that to happen and would do all it can to prevent it from happening. i think educational reform will continue till capitalism will collapse under its own weight. there seem to be signs of such a collapse. 3. formative education: on the one hand, information is essential to humans, without which life on earth would be impossible. on the other, education as information would be incomplete without the multifaceted development of the human person. that is why education has to be seen as formation as well __ formation of the human person physically, mentally, intellectually, morally, emotionally, socially and spiritually. mere possession of knowledge without a humane dimension would be disastrous. education as information would end up producing highly knowledgeable and skilled brutes devoid of empathy. today’s education can be best described as information due to technology and commercialization. as marx pointed out long ago in capital vol.1, chap. xv technology in the hands of the capitalists would lead to greater exploitation of the masses. commercialization of education is business as usual. profit is the highest goal for the capitalists, and education as information serves this goal. there is a worldwide crisis with regard to formation of the human person. some educators reject the view that the human is a moral being. they say there is no such thing as morality and humans act out of mere self-interest. if that is the case, how would they explain such traits as selfsacrifice, patriotism, humility, loyalty, tenderness, laying down one’s life for others? are all these virtuous deeds motivated by self-interest? if the answer is yes, what kind of self-interest is served? persons doing such virtuous deeds often lose their lives. losing their lives cannot be in selfinterest. was gandhi’s nonviolent struggle against british rule in india an act of self-interest? some may argue that he was interested in fame which is an instance of self-interest. those who know gandhi truly well would 141joseph i. fernando disagree with this argument. t.s. elliot in his murder in the cathedral portrays so well the argument of a tempter who tempts thomas beckett with the fame and glory of martyrdom to which beckett does not yield. he is interested in what he believes to be truth to which he is deeply committed. parry comments on rousseau’s position. “rousseau saw the impossibility of constructing society on the basis of self-interest alone. members of society willy nilly take an interest in one another. unlike earlier modern thinkers… he concluded that if man was naturally asocial and motivated solely by self-interest, he also could not have actively desired to do injury to others. without society, he would also have lacked language, and with it the abstract concepts necessary for the pursuit of goals other than those resulting from pressing material need”.3 nevertheless, it cannot be argued against the fact that some human actions are governed by self-interest. but to say that all human actions are based on self-interest would go against human experience. denial of morality is the primary cause of the crisis of formation. although a lot of people are highly knowledgeable, they may lack a moral sense. they may not be capable of being warm, compassionate and caring, which are essential for communal and social life. tension in the world is mounting day by day because of an increasing inability to live together, to accept others, to create communities and so on. self-interest can degenerate into excessive forms of selfishness resulting in personal and structural injustice, hoarding, violence, exploitation and so on. without embracing certain moral ideals, the human race would not survive. whether humans like it not, they are condemned to be moral! today more than in any period in human history, there is a greater need of the formation of the human persons to make social life possible. 4. trans-formative education: although information, formation and reformation better constitute education, the latter would be incomplete without transformation. education as transformation would mean that the educated persons are not only aware of contemporary challenges, but also sufficiently trained and committed to tackle them. thus education can become praxis, a saving power. education as transformation presupposes information, formation and reformation. information provides one 142 prajna vihara~ with the facts, the ‘what-is-what’, the state of affairs, so that one is aware of what, how, when and where is to be done. formation enables one to identify oneself with others, to strive to be virtuous especially in terms of goodness, truth, justice, peace, fairness, fraternity, respect for life, and so on, to set reasonable goals for oneself and for the community, to realize the importance of social life and so on. reformation is the updating of education. education as transformation would be involvement in the world both natural and social. humans’ relation to the natural world needs to be defined and their relation to the social world calls for radical change in their perception in terms of economics, politics, race, religion and so on. if education is not trans-formative, the educational enterprise will be an exercise in futility because it defeats its own purpose. i think trans-formative education cannot succeed without critical thinking which is of paramount importance. trans-formative education is embedded in critical thinking. let me try to portray briefly the virtue of critical thinking essentially needed for the realization of trans-formative education. 5. critical thinking: thinking is the unique ability which distinguishes humans from other beings. thinking is a natural endowment. humans do not give it to themselves. rather they are born with the capacity for thinking. everyone thinks. but what is the content of their thinking? not everyone thinks critically. some people, like philosophers and intellectuals often think critically. but all those who think critically need not be philosophers and intellectuals. in my opinion, critical thinking cannot be easily taught. i tend to believe that thinkers are born, not made. but i believe people can be trained in critical thinking to some extent. training presupposes the capacity for critical thinking. reflecting seriously on certain principles, events and happenings, reading good books, listening to great lectures, participating in inspiring seminars, interacting with critical thinkers, and so on provide opportunities for critical thinking. critical thinking is intrinsic but can be developed by extrinsic factors. to be critical means to disapprove of something or to disagree with something or to say something about what you dislike or to find something wrong with something or to say something when something is not in order or to be unwilling to accept things as they are, and so on. 143joseph i. fernando philosophy itself is a critique. it is a critique of existence. critique means a work of criticism or an enquiry into, or an investigation of, something. here, one is reminded of the works of philosophers like wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations, husserl’s logical investigations and hume’s an enquiry concerning human understanding. critical thinking does not mean repeating someone else’s ideas though one may agree with them. critical thinking means to reflect critically on things on one’s own. it means what sort of ideas one has on certain issues. one may ask oneself: what is the purpose of life? what is the best life? do i have a reason for living and a reason for dying? what is the best form of government? why is there so much poverty and injustice in the world today? wouldn’t it be possible to live in a world without wars? couldn’t nations settle disputes through non-military means, through negotiation and dialogue? wouldn’t the world a better place to live in without a superpower? isn’t racism irrational and antihuman? isn’t poverty inhuman? the list of questions would be very long indeed. one cannot provide world-changing responses to such questions unless one thinks critically. to think critically means one cannot accept things at their facevalue. one cannot accept something just because it is said by some famous personality, a great authority, or religious scriptures. one needs to critique it before subscribing to it. skepticism is a stepping-stone to truth. truth demands an honest inquiry into things. criticism can be both constructive and negative. negative criticism fails to appreciate the strength of someone’s arguments. it can undo someone’s good work and damage their reputation. instead of edifying, it can lead to destruction. on the other hand, constructive criticism appreciates others’ arguments. it may suggest how to argue better or point out what the argument lacks. constructive criticism builds up communities, leads to progress and advancement in knowledge. it contributes to the eternal quest for truth. 6. traits of a critical thinker: i think the following traits can be found in a critical thinker: 6.1 passion: one needs to be passionate, enthusiastic and com144 prajna vihara~ mitted to the search for the truth. without passion one cannot be a critical thinker 6.2 ability to argue: one needs to argue one’s case and state the reasons for holding a particular position. for instance, if one says god exists, one has to demonstrate his existence through arguments. if one says the contrary, one has to argue one’s case as well. the strength of one’s statement lies in one’s arguments. 6.3 knowledge of the subject matter: one needs to be familiar with the discussions in the field before criticizing others. 6.4 prophecy: the critical thinker is in some ways a prophet because he says what others usually do not say. he sees what others do not see. thus his utterances can have a saving power and be a prophetic warning in some cases. totalitarian regimes always view his activities as subversive. 6.5 courage: if one is not daring and brave, one cannot think in new ways, challenge the prevalent concepts and order and blaze new trails. 6.6 concern: without concern for the welfare of others, it is hard to seek and love the truth. social concern and welfare is a part of one’s quest for truth. 6.7 a disciplined and trained intellect: one cannot say whatever one likes. one’s thinking must display discipline, responsibility and rigour. a critical thinker does not accept any and every truth without subjecting it to scrutiny. this may take years of training and hard work. 6.8 creativity and originality: a critical thinker not only sees what exists but also what does not. he creates something new, and brings forth something unseen and unheard of before. he reads not only the lines but also between the lines. he listens to not only what is said but also looks for what is not said. he perceives the subtle and the unrevealed and tries to see light in darkness, hope in despair, life amidst death, truth amidst untruth, immortality amidst mortality. 6.9 innovation: he sets new standards, challenges tradition, employs new methodology, new writing style, and so on. innovation is not for the sake of innovation but at the service of truth in a new age, in new circumstances, in keeping with the demand of the community. 6.10self-criticism: a critical thinker is his own best critic. one 145joseph i. fernando with an inflated ego hates criticism whereas a critical thinker not only welcomes criticism but also criticizes his own work. for example, wittgenstein wrote philosophical investigations by way of criticizing his earlier work tractatus logico-philosophicus. 6.11openness to truth: one opens oneself to truth through what heidegger calls meditative thinking, listening to the word in humility, and long hours of work without which there is no reward. openness to truth presupposes giving up one’s prejudices, preconceived notions and unhealthy mindset. 7. challenges to contemporary education: critical thinking may enable one to identify certain challenges to education today and to respond to them as effectively as possible. i have identified the following five important challenges to contemporary education. 1. environmental decay 2. poverty 3. injustice 4. lack of peace 5. objectification of the human being 7.1 environmental decay: the greatest challenge to contemporary education involves saving humanity by saving the planet. so far the planet earth is the only home we have. but today it is under severe attack. we are destroying the ground under our feet. the life sustaining ecosystem is threatened. air, water, food and land are massively being polluted and poisoned. many species of flora and fauna are rapidly disappearing forever. their disappearance may foreshadow that of humans. but capitalist greed does not concern itself with the welfare of the world. what is the origin of environmental decay? i think descartes’ body-mind dichotomy has much to do with it. the thinking thing (res cogitans) and the extended thing (res extensa) hardly have anything in common. the belief in the primacy/supremacy of the mind could be a cause of human domination over nature. it is the belief that the human being is the lord of the earth because of his rationality. he is the subject and everything else an object. the object is under the control of the subject. since the object 146 prajna vihara~ cannot think, the subject is free to deal with it as he likes. francis bacon’s inductive logic was one more step towards exploitation of nature. nature was meant to be controlled and used to fit human purposes. it must be reordered, rearranged, redesigned to suit human needs. polluting the atmosphere began with the industrial revolution as factories were set up for large scale production. the industrial revolution and colonialism fortified capitalism. raw materials were shipped from the colonies to european factories and the colonies were gradually devastated by both material and human exploitation. capitalist profit paved the way for greed as well. everything came to be seen in terms of use-value and cashvalue. today the world is viewed as a totality of commodities. the world is for sale. it is partitioned and sold in installments. humans have imposed their brokenness on the world and consequently the world is suffering this brokenness, and longing for redemption. we need to save the world to save ourselves. we need to understand that the world does not belong to us; but we belong to it. we have to redeem the world from decay and destruction. the world is not only for the present generation to live in but also for those in the future. 7.2 poverty: a huge challenge is how to eradicate poverty so that the marginalized, the underprivileged and the disadvantaged will be enabled to live a life of decency. throughout the world, the poor are becoming poorer and the rich richer. poverty has become globalized. the number of the poor is alarmingly on the rise especially in the third world. millions of people live under subhuman conditions with no access to decent housing, food, clothes and medical care. thousands of children die every day because of malnutrition and lack of medical care. there are several causes of global poverty, the chief being colonialism. the european powers exploited the colonies so severely that some of the former colonies are still very poor. e.f. schumacher writes in his small is beautiful: “the primary causes of extreme poverty are immaterial, they lie in certain deficiencies in education, organization and discipline”. some third world countries have chronic political instability affecting development. i tend to think although colonialism is a thing of the past, neocolonialism exists and the developing nations are still exploited by the developed ones. war and fear psychosis drain the resources of several developing nations. western armament industries are the beneficiaries of wars be147joseph i. fernando tween poor nations. racism too is linked to poverty. those who believe in racial superiority behave as if they are the first class citizens of the world and all others exist for their sake. if the so called first class citizens keep grabbing for themselves much of the resources of the world, then not much will be left for others. whatever may be its causes, poverty is an evil and must be eliminated. it will not vanish automatically; people will have to struggle together against the forces which perpetuate poverty. but this struggle cannot be violent because violence generates more violence. humans need to have a world without poverty because such a world would befit human dignity and decency. but the question is, does everyone believe in dignity and decency? no, there are people who do anything for the sake of profit. poverty is essentially a moral issue __ much more than a socio-economic-political phenomenon. 7.3 lack of peace: humans live in a world where peace is elusive. the deadly weapons piled up on the earth can blow up the world sixteen times. what an unethical waste of resources! our civilization is characterized by fear psychosis, terrorism, large scale violence, suicide bombs, xenophobia, paranoia, fundamentalism including the secular type, racism, militarism and so on. the rarest thing in the world today is peace. people are dying in some countries almost every day as terrorist bombs explode. the islamic fundamentalists and the west have been engaged in violent attacks on each other. why do they target one another? we need dialogue to air differences and settle disputes, yet there seem to be no global structures to accomplish this. there is insecurity everywhere. even a mechanical error can trigger a nuclear holocaust which is a devastatingly apocalyptic possibility. there cannot be peace without disarmament. peace is more than disarmament. absence of peace too is fundamentally a moral problem. it is an outcome of humans’ inability to dialogue, to have fellowship, to transcend narrow barriers. no social life would be possible without peace. the hardest question is: how shall humans redeem the world from violence, destruction and death? 7.4 injustice: there has never been a just society in the fullest sense of the term, in the history of the world. justice is not a constitutive but a normative principle. there have always been instances of injustice. a perfectly just society is an ideal realizable perhaps only in plato’s world of ideas or in heaven. yet today, humans find themselves in a glaringly 148 prajna vihara~ unjust world shaped by selfishness, indifference and callousness. peace is a byproduct of justice. unjust structures perpetuate injustice and thereby destroy peace. with increasing injustice, social life would not be possible. how shall the humans be human and social? how will they redeem themselves from unjust structures? these are hard questions indeed since the world is very complex today. the issue of the process of redemption from unjust structures will have to be discussed in the philosophy of liberation. 7.5 objectification of human: human dignity, worth and value are increasingly eroded by the market economy and consumer society. pornography treats humans as objects. that means sexuality is taken out of the context of the mutual self-giving of the spouses in acts of love in marriage. pornography caters to the base instinct of lust. like much of contemporary violence and terrorism, pornography is an immoral excess of unbridled capitalism. human persons are being treated more and more like things for use. they are valued as resources like money, water, electricity and so on. even the terminology used nowadays reflects such an attitude. for instance, what was earlier known as personnel management is today human resource management. the human body can become raw material for products. human beings can be produced in factories. to put it in religious language, what is happening to the human person, atman/created in the image and likeness of god, called to a life of dignity and decency and finally to mukti/nirvana/everlasting beatitude? humans need to rediscover the philosophy of the human person to understand what it means to be human. 8. how to address these challenges? these challenges can be best addressed by trans-formative education. i suggest the creation of an academic course which would deal with these and other challenges. students in high schools, colleges and universities need to be conscientized about these issues. it is not enough to teach them only the courses relevant to the respective disciplines. more has to be done. teaching a course on saving the world through transformative education can certainly have some impact. they may realize how important it is to work for the creation of a world without alarming environmental decay and poverty, a world where peace and justice are largely possible, and a world where humans will be 149joseph i. fernando treated as persons and not as objects. some educational institutions run courses on environmental awareness, justice and peace. i feel they are not enough; much more concerted academic and practical efforts are necessary to prepare students for social praxis. those interested in enormous profits may not bother about the major challenges to the survival of the planet and humanity. addressing these challenges may even entail loss of profits for some. but then what would be the use of profit if there were no world to live in? what would it be like to live in a constantly violent and insecure world? what would be the quality of life in an increasingly unjust world? if humans were treated as objects, would that signal the cessation of the distinction between things and persons? could humans be human in such a society? to say that human is not a moral being is to ask for trouble. the being of human is unthinkable without a moral sense. i believe humans need to transcend even morality to recognize the spiritual dimension of humanity. human is more than a moral being. openness to transcendence marks the plenitude of freedom in humans. without reference to a beyond, human life would lack meaning and significance. the world will be a safer place to live in with less crime, poverty, degradation and injustice, and more of fellowship, compassion, forgiveness and fairness, if humans are awakened to the realization of the transcendent within them. i hope trans-formative education would make such a realization possible. it is not enough to do merely the routine things of everyday life without responding to the existence-threatening challenges the world faces today. humans have to make the ultimate choice between saving the world and perishing. time is running out! in the last analysis, love shall save the world __ love of god/transcendence, love of neighbour, and love of nature shall save the world. 9. trans-formative education and hope: some people predict the end of the world as imminent. some others say there is going to be no escape from a nuclear holocaust and frankenstein will destroy his creator. there are others who say that fundamentalism is a greater threat to the world than a probable nuclear conflagration. for some, there is no room for optimism and an optimist is one who does not understand what 150 prajna vihara~ he reads in newspapers. despite the major challenges to the survival of the planet and humanity, everything is not lost. there is reason to hope for a better tomorrow. the predictions of the prophets of gloom and doom may be proved false. humans cannot afford to lose hope because if hope is lost, everything is lost. it is hope that keeps one going. humans find themselves in a three-dimensional temporality of the past, present and future. they are in touch with the past through memory and with the future through hope and anticipation. the events of the past and present are seen in relation to what is yet to come. the meaning of one’s life lies in the ongoing realization of one’s potentials. what matters is not just being but becoming. for instance, an undergraduate student looks forward to the day of her graduation, then to successful completion of further studies and training, career, achievements and so on. it is hope that keeps motivating humans towards fulfillment. to be human is to hope for something. take away hope from humans and they will collapse like a pack of cards. to be human is to make mistakes. to be human is also to learn from mistakes. humans have made many mistakes and messed up the world. the world is a mixture of good and bad. it is not entirely bad; it may not be so good either, but humans have the tremendous capacity to make it good. they can undo the bad to a great extent and move forward to create a better tomorrow. they are not governed by fate but by their intentions. they need not be victims of circumstances since they can overcome them, though not always easy. trans-formative education seeks to understand how to bridge the gap between the powerful and the powerless. the powerful have access to the world’s resources. they have the power of politics, decision-making, money, influence, technology and power over people’s lives. they enjoy privileges and supposedly desire to have them always. understandably, those who are used to privileges will not easily part with them. the western model of development combined with technology has three serious drawbacks: one, concentration of wealth in fewer hands; two, rapid depletion of natural resources and three, poisoning of the environment. as a result, a small minority gets rich and the majority poor. to maintain their status quo, the rich, if needed, resort to violence covertly and overtly. they are not averse to perpetuating structural violence too. 151joseph i. fernando the consequence of their actions is obvious in the prevalence of glaring injustice, abysmal poverty and retaliatory violence. their greed results in environmental decay (due to excessive consumption, indifference to the laws of nature, etc.) objectification of human and so on. on the one hand, it is not a sin to be rich. on the other, the resources of the world belong to all of its inhabitants. the trouble with the world today is that a few have too much and the rest have too little or nothing. to make matters worse, the political and economic environment favours the rich in a world where there is a greater interest in becoming shareholders than being good citizens in communities. it is not wrong to be shareholders. but excessive interest in shares may work against the shared interests of the community and citizens. scanty attention is given to morals and faith/transcendence which are necessary for civilizing human beings. the current emphasis on humans as consuming beings in a market economy is lopsided and will result in social upheaval, wars, mental and family breakdown and so on. humans need to be understood in their multidimensional reality. there is an ongoing confrontation between the rich and the poor of the world. the powerful would resist any attempt to strip them of power. nietzsche asserts that humans have the will to power. does will to power mean only power over humans and nature? it may mean even power over god by declaring him dead. i do not think that the will to power is a universal phenomenon. everyone does not have the will to power. there are several cases of those who renounced power for the sake of certain higher pursuits in life. persons like buddha (born as prince), st.francis of assisi (born in a wealthy family in medieval italy), st.thomas aquinas (born in a castle in medieval italy) and so on did not have the will to power. there are religious men and women who take the vow of obedience to renounce their will and thereby to seek the will of god. nevertheless, few would voluntarily give up power, position, wealth, comfort, influence and so on for the sake of a higher goal in life. a historical fact is that thousands of people all over the world who protested against dictatorial regimes, demanded justice, worked for promotion of human rights either disappeared or were imprisoned, persecuted, tortured and so on. confrontation with the ruling class is an ongoing phenomenon and the brave cannot be silenced. threats, persecution 152 prajna vihara~ and loss do not deter those filled with hope, though they are not numerous. the poor will continue to struggle against the rich and mighty. mass movements, mass protests and mass solidarity are not without success stories. hope plays an enormous role in energizing people for action. international organizations, geo-politics, global economic structure, state machinery and so on are hardly pro-poor. democracy which is considered the best form of government does not necessarily guarantee the legitimate welfare of the poor, since it can be manipulated by the rich. but the struggle against oppression and injustice must go on. the long nonviolent struggle of the indians under gandhi’s leadership against the british led to the independence of india. martin luther king jr. and his supporters of the civil rights movement had hope. they had a dream and believed deep in their hearts that they would overcome oppression. gandhi and king were protagonists of trans-formative education which is rooted in hope, compassion and courage. unfortunately, these values are rare today and humans need to rediscover them. endnotes 1i am thankful to my colleague dr. john giordano for suggesting the title of this paper. the original title was ‘save the world through trans-formative education’. he felt ‘save the world’ is a clicheè to avoid. however, that does not minimize my concern about saving the world. 2parry, geraint, emile; learning to be men, women, and citizens. in (ed.) riley, patrick, the cambridge companion to rousseau, cambridge university press, 2001, p.249. 3meld, shell susan, emile; nature and education of sophie. in (ed.) riley, patrick, the cambridge companion to rousseau, cambridge university press, 2001, p.274. 4schumacher, e.f. small is beautiful, rupa &co, india, 1990, p.140. 153joseph i. fernando 03_(51-65) technology technology and the problems of freedom: phenomenological reflections of martin heidegger mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia abstract inspired by the impact of science and technology on western society, many eastern leaders requested their societies to learn and live in by logic of science and technology. in this instrumentalist point of view, we control technology, or technology, as tool, can be controled to serve human interests. the article, however, wishes to suggest that our existence can be technologically textured (with respect to the rhythms and spaces of our daily life), or that technology controls us. this article, following the phenomenological reflections of martin heidegger, proposes a thesis that the relationship between technology and humans are ambiguous. on the one hand, technology can become a stock which is ready to use for our interests, but on the other hand, it can enframe human beings according to its created systems. in such a situation, the thinking or questioning, of this essence of technology, can be seen as a way towards human freedom and salvation. introduction in a meeting with the indonesian science academy (isa), b.j. habibie, former president of the republic of indonesia requested that the isa elevate the quality of indonesian human resources. he felt convinced that only through the promotion of science and technology can indonesia become a superior nation. like other asian figures in asia, such as fukuzawa yukichi and hashida kunihiko in japan,1 habibie contended that the direction of the way the eastern people think needs to be altered in line with the logic of science and technology so that they can compete with other nations in the western world. this attitude implies that science and technology is a system of learning different from the traditional system of learning. a major difference between the two systems of learning lay in their distinctive relaprajna vihara, volume16, number 1, january-june 2015, 51-65 51 2000 by assumption university press c ˜ tionships with the established social order. while much of the traditional learning buttressed the feudalistic social system, modern natural science and technology promoted independence from such social order largely because they were constructed separately from such order. however, the question remains, if technology has become the texture of human life,2 how can we speak of it giving promise to the future of eastern nations? the question is phenomenologically rooted. according to this perspective, technology is not a technical procedure or a neutral fact isolated from human world. by contrast, all human’s experience in technology presupposes a human act and practice which involves the community, society, and the world. also, our experience in technology is not merely subjective, but always contains ontological claims about human’s existence.3 thus, in our technologies we recognize the world and ourselves. to understand the relationship between man and technology, this article focuses on some important questions such as: what is technology and how can it present itself? is there a space for freedom in the technological world? if there is a room for freedom, is technology neutral? if not, is it controlled? if it can be controlled, under what authority can it be controlled? more fundamentally, how can we talk about the relationship between man and technology?4 the question concerning technology these questions lead us to examine the question of the essence of technology. the question itself builds its own way, as martin heidegger put in his die frage nach der technik, a paper which was presented in a series of academic seminars with the theme “arts in technological era” held in munich in 1953.5 heidegger believed that the question concerning technology is an extraordinary question. this is because such a question is not considered through our daily interaction with technology, but through a more philosophical and fundamental reflection. moreover, such a question is considered extraordinary because one’s success in answering this question can be seen as an initial step to understand a free relationship with technology.6 with this in mind, heidegger began his essay, die frage nach der technik as follows: “in what follows we shall be questioning con52 prajna vihara ̃ cerning technology”.7 using italics for the word ‘questioning’ heidegger wanted to stress he is conducting a philosophical inquiry, an inquiry which relies on the ability in human questioning and thinking. before an audience who were not all experts in philosophy, heidegger asserted that the core of philosophy is thinking, which is unique to humans. philosophy is not an alien from human life involving abstract concepts, but a thinking activity which can be done by everyone, including in this case, artists. all humans can think and their genuine thoughts can make them free and open to the existence of reality in general and of technical reality in particular.8 the same tone is also expressed in his closing mark of the essay. heidegger wrote: “for questioning is the piety of thought”.9 the term “piety” here refers to religious tradition, where thinking is not seen as an arrogant or dominating attitude, but an obedient and submissive attitude, it would suggest a submissiveness to the reality which has its own way. to question technology, therefore, means to listen to the reality of technology. with the target of characterizing humans as thinking subjects who are open to the reality of technology, heidegger commenced his essay by criticizing instrumentalism. according to this view, technology is merely a means to an end. in heidegger’s view, this idea of instrumentalism is beneficial for understanding the development of technology and its user community. war technology, for instance, has developed rapidly in nations suspicious of other nations, and that’s why it has become both an instrument for self-defense, and one for threatening foes. machine technology has developed when the society developed manufacturing industries in aristocratic societies for the sake of improving productivity. information technology developed when information became commodity, and at the same time, a means for the development of democratic communities after world war ii. however, this instrumental conception of technology conditions and distorts every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. heidegger recognized that in the instrumental approach, humans are conditioned to use technology to dominate. he writes: “on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means, we will ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually in hand’”.10 technology is no longer seen as its own reality, but as only a means for dealing with technical and social problems humans are facing. for heidegger, what is never thought in the instrumental approach is the fact that technology has its own truth which should not be limited mikhael dua 53 to instrumental logic. with this argument, heidegger wanted to emphasize that the instrumental approach is not wrong. the technological concept of a thing has even become one of the key thoughts in being and time which was published in 1927. in his example of the hammer,11 he emphasized that it was not possible for an object to become a thing because every object always becomes “something for something others” (etwas um-zu). however, it needs to be added that technology never becomes something which is under our plan and control. conversely, technology has its own causality, which brings certain effects which we have never imagined before.12 it has its own truth which can reveal itself to us.13 or to put it in a more extreme manner, technology can become something through which we can recognize our world more clearly. to pursue this question concerning technology, heidegger discusses aristotle’s thoughts on causality, namely: causa materialis (the material cause), causa formalis (the formalist cause), causa finalis (the final cause), and causa efficiens (the effect or efficient cause). taking an example of a silver chalice, which is commonly used in a liturgical ceremony, heidegger tried to explain four sources of causalities which made the silver chalice possible to be present as an object ready to be used in a liturgical service.14 just as a silver chalice has causality in its own prior to being used in a liturgy, so does technology: every technology has its own causality which makes it possible to be called technology. in this way heidegger highlighted that the instrumental view of the essence of technology is presupposed by a more fundamental view of causality which is technology itself. to understand the essence of technology we need to understand the principles of its causality which undergirds all truth on technology. phenomenology of technology the question concerning the essence of technology is not easy to answer because technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology itself.15 with the ambition of using a phenomenological approach, heidegger tried to investigate the way technology exists. in a formulation which was almost close to nietzsche’s style, he tried to explain that technology itself had a “desire” to manifest itself. it had its own law which was not determined by humans; on the other hand, humans experienced it as something moving with its own logic. 54 prajna vihara ̃ to understand this view, heidegger used the term bringing-forth or pro-duction,16 a term he used beforehand in his book being and time, when he talked about humans as dasein, a being-there, who always exist in space and time.17 this term contains meaning that technology has the ability to reveal itself and the world around it. in his example of a watch, for example, heidegger explained that in seeing a watch, we also see the sun as a measurement of time, because the watch was developed in a theoretical system concerning time and solar rotation. thus, using a watch reflects a certain attitude concerning reality.18 a similar understanding is explained using another way in die frage nach der technik. heidegger wrote: we are questioning concerning technology, and we have arrived now at aletheia, at revealing. what has the essence of technology to do with revealing? the answer: everything. for every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing…. if we inquire, step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. the possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing.19 technology, therefore, is not a mere thing or a means to an end. conversely, it has its own existence and way to capture the world, the place where we live. it is for this reason that technology cannot sufficiently be understood in an instrumental rationality, but it needs to be viewed comprehensively as a way of existence and revelation where the existence of technology and the truth of the world can reveal itself (aletheia). with this understanding of technology as a way of revealing itself, heidegger did not mean to account for the fact that all kinds of technology conceal itself in a similar way, but any kinds of technology can conceal itself differently in accordance with the contexts where technology develops __ that’s why, this difference determines the way we view the world and the earth where we live. here lies the difference between traditional technology and modern technology. traditional farming technology reveals the unique relationship between farmers and their world: the knowledge for caring and cultivating (poiesis). by way of contrast, modern technology, because of its basis in natural science as an exact science, has the tendency to order the world (gestell, enframed) as mikhael dua 55 a system with a planned intricacy and interest which we ourselves are unaware of:20 be they in business, political and power engineering, or education. to understand this difference heidegger talked about how the development of water electricity power and windmills changed the relationship between humans and their world. windmills have long emerged in a period when humans used natural power without changing its surrounding environment. this is in contrast to the hydro-electric dams created along the rhein river, a river which comes from springs in the alps and flows through large german cities to the sea. modern humans who use the latter technology no longer allow nature to provide energy as was used in the windmills technology. the hydro-electric dam, and modern technology provokes/challenges (herausfordern) nature. if traditional technology had the character of revealing itself, modern technology presents itself with the character of provoking/challenging.21 explaining what he meant by provoking/challenging, heidegger expressed his uneasiness with the development of hydro-electric power. the rhein river had been challenged to become a source of power which could be stored and distributed to regions through power lines. as such, the technology of hydro-eclectric power revealed itself in a certain systems which was neatly ordered: the energy stored in the nature is transformed; what has been transformed is stored; and what has been stored is distributed; and what has been distributed can be switched on. transforming, storing, distributing, and switching on power are systematic steps of revealing the technology of hydro-electric power.22 using these examples, heidegger explains that life in the world of technology, without our awareness, always means living in the system of order of the technology. for this reason, the essence of technology does not lie in certain artifacts but in the technological desire which makes those certain artifacts show its meaning in a certain system. being in that system we view our own world and humans around us differently. the fundamental issue comes into being in its own: modern technology develops itself and has the tendency to develop itself as a center. humans cannot escape themselves from such a realm, meaning that they were as if being thrown away or entrapped in an instrumental technology point of view. humans no longer become free as rational beings. in this perspective of technology, the world has never become something in its own and been approached in a reciprocal care.23 if traditional humans constructed a wooden bridge so that they pass over the river, while let56 prajna vihara ̃ ting the river flow, modern humans with their technological desires see the same river as a possibility for a hydro-electric project which can change the river into a source for further planning. the world, nature and humans are seen as sources that need to be taken into account, and as such humans are entrapped in a system of meaning created by technology. technology is no longer a means to an end, but an end in itself. through technology, nothing is allowed to reveal itself. all things are swept away together with a massive network. they only bear a meaning, provided that they have a significant contribution to the whole network. all things are under the control of these networks. heidegger calls this condition bestand, standing-reserve.24 technology orders everything for the perpetuation of its order. technological freedom the strength of heidegger’s philosophy lies in its effort to understand the reality of technology which can reveal itself. however, as has been alluded to before, heidegger also asserted that technology can become a gestell or a metaphysic framework which determines the way we live and understand the world around us, both nature and humans. with this new view, the concrete questions for us in the context of the ethics of technology are: who holds responsibility for the process of technological enframing? in what kinds of ethics are we allowed to talk about technology as enframing? heidegger did not specifically talk about the ethics of technology. nevertheless, all his thoughts on technology have on ethical orientation because of his deep understanding of ethical problems. the fundamental ethical issue in heidegger’s thinking is always related to the possibility of occurrence of the free relationship among humans, technology and nature, a relationship based on sorge, care between humans and humans and between humans and nature. as a consequence, in his essays, we never find basic ethics principles as have been expressed in golden rules, the sermon on the mount, or even deontological and utilitarian normative theories of ethics. heidegger even casted doubts over the basic assumptions of traditional ethics, because in facing with technological problems, we are not concerned with human superiority, but with human impotence. if francis bacon optimistically expressed his credo knowledge is power, then heidegger expresses the pessimistic idea mikhael dua 57 that human beings are dominated by their own technologies. he writes: where do we find ourselves brought to, if now we think one step further regarding what enframing itself actually is? it is nothing technological, nothing on the order of a machine. it is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve. again we ask: does this revealing happen somewhere beyond all human doing. no. but neither does it happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man.25 however, all heidegger’s philosophy projects concerning technology is predicated on the conviction that humans are moral subjects who must hold responsibility for all developments of themselves and technology, although it must be noted that humans cannot control activities and technological development, and they even cannot control the technology’s revealing process where the reality of technology can reveal itself to us. “but, never too late comes the question as to whether we actually experience ourselves as the ones whose activities everywhere, public and private, are challenged forth by enframing”. said heidegger.26 heidegger, however, sees a way out. “the essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becoming standing-reserve. to start upon a way means to send in our ordinary language. we shall call that sending-that-gather which first starts man upon a way of revealing, destining (geschick). it is from out of this destining that the essence of all history is determined”.27 this means that humans alone can determine their own fate as a core of their history. in a situation where they find themselves entrapped in technology as a fate, they still see themselves as a subject that does not bow to the blind fate,28 because they still have the ability to hear and listen to their situation.29 for this reason, humans can still attain a degree of freedom toward technological enframing. however, the idea of freedom in heideggar’s thinking is not conventional, as has been thought in john stuart mill as a freedom from the shackles of society and politics. also, the fundamental essence of freedom is not related to a will or even to causality of humans’ desire as has been developed in the philosophy of immanuel kant. on the contrary, when speaking of freedom, heidegger talks about events or moments of truth.30 freedom means letting the 58 prajna vihara ̃ truth penetrate fate, so the reality of the fate can reveal its own path.31 with this concept of freedom, heidegger reminds us that the technological enframing process indeed contains a real peril to the relationship between humans with themselves and with their surrounding nature,32 a mechanism which allows us to reveal ourselves only according to technological logic by ignoring other possibilities to reveal ourselves through reality of nature. this is a process which can be compared to a monochromatic picture of world, and leads us to ignore other perspectives such as arts and literature. heidegger emphasizes that technological enframing blocks truth that came spontaneously, and because of this it could entrap us to ignore the mystery of reality.33 however, he also emphasized that humans have the ability to release themselves from this peril. here heidegger appeals to hölderlin’s statement: “but where danger is, grows the saving power also”34 salvation is not used here in the sense of saving something from danger. instead, it means to reunite something with its nature in the sense that it acknowledges something as its origin or home.35 this means that the technological enframing process tends to endanger, and effort to reunite technology in its essence is an initial step to salvation. heidegger wrote: “if the essence of technology, enframing, is the extreme danger, and if there is truth in hölderlin’s words, then the rule of enframing cannot exhaust itself solely in blocking all lighting-up of every revealing, all appearing of truth. rather, precisely the essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving power”.36 technology has the ability to reveal and salvage itself. and for heidegger, humans, as dasein, are called to be a medium where technology reveals itself. so, human beings are the subject of power that salvages. heidegger wrote: “here and now ... that we may foster the saving power in its increase. this includes holding always before our eyes the extreme danger”.37 heidegger, therefore, was convinced that the development of technology has ethical function; that is, the ability to salvage humans, if humans open themselves to the truth of technology. however, heidegger himself did not explain in detail how this technological salvation can take place, if in reality the technological enframing process indeed changes humans. mikhael dua 59 the problems of the dehumanization heidegger’s thoughts on the essence of technology touch on several key issues. first, technology conceived of as a machine or instrument. although the idea on instrumentality has colored being and time, in an essay die frage nach der technik heidegger candidly rejected instrumentality. the difference in emphasis is very much determined by the goal of the essay, namely to account for technology as a process of revealing the natural and the human. with this goal, technology has functions which are the same as arts and literature whose goals are to reveal the world. in heidegger’s view, both art and technology have the same basis, namely poiesis, a creative ability to reveal itself. second, heidegger’s view that humans are always entrapped in the technological gestell process suggests sophocles’ idea that humans have passed.38 because of the gestell process, humans become an object of technology. of course, this does not mean that heidegger did not have hope. he still viewed humanity as a historical subject who could direct their destiny if they are sensitive toward what has been revealed by technology. in other words, technology is a semantic field which can illuminate the world where we live. third, heidegger realized that human subjectivity is not determined by their absolute consciousness, but is conditioned by space and time including the context of technological gestell. thus, heidegger has paved the way to the postmodernism understanding that humans are always contextual. technological enframing is a form of contextualization of human existence in their social and cultural scopes. however, heidegger does seem to take into account that humans can no longer be sensitive to what technology reveals or can no longer maintain a critical attitude towards technology. what heidegger does not consider is that technology had contributed to new anxieties. technology continues to deepen its own trap. according to hans jonas, technology not only alters the nature, but also alters humans. he provided the following three examples.39 first, the advancement in the field of biological which can slow down the aging process in humans. the advancement of knowledge and technique in this field has a consequence for our view of death. in a traditional view, we learn that death is inevitable. traditional humans believe without questioning the words of the psalmist that “the days of our years are threescore years; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, 60 prajna vihara ̃ and we fly away”. yet, the modern technique hitherto seems to have revived a big dream of george bernard shaw and jonathan swift that humans are immortal. it appears that modern humans no longer take heed of the words of psalmist that say: “so teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom”. (psalm, 90). death is no longer seen as inevitable, but as something to be avoided. thus, for the first time in human history we face the problem of individual desire fighting against death and fate of humans as a species. death has no longer had a positive correlation with a creative newborn, as was envisaged by hannah arendt,40 which give birth to a new generation that brings an optimistic future. can we imagine a generation with long-lived people, without younger generations? it seems that the discovery in the field of biological cell compels humans to realize their own ambition, so that death is no longer viewed as meaningful for the emergence of a more creative newborn. second, the emergence of scientific behavior-control techniques. social engineering approaches are used increasingly for ruling over the masses. however, the use of the social engineering method has become a big problem especially when it touches on our ideas of human rights and of what it means to become humans. can we induce drugs to our kindergarten children so that they can learn easily without being motivated to be independent and to be free as children? can we program a child to be an individual who fits the behavior system we desire? it is perhaps no exaggeration to say here that those questions emanate from a traditional view that every person has autonomy in the sense that he can make his own decisions based on his own considerations and be a valuable member in a community. modern technology raises a question: how can we account for an individual’s autonomy if this individual is not seen as a value which needs to be respected? every person must be held accountable for recognizing himself as the human individual he wishes to become. third, the new development of genetics and the genetic control technique over future humans. according to jonas, humans nowadays seem to want to determine their own genetic development. evolution no longer plays the role of species integrity. but, do we really have the right to play the role in creating ourselves? what will the human being become in the future? aside from the above three instances, we can add another example which is related to the advancement of information technology mikhael dua 61 such as television and computer. many communication experts explain that information technology can facilitate communication among humans. however, such technology can entrap us. concerning television, for example, robert e. denton, an expert in american political communication once wrote: “historically, television was valued as the main instrument of democracy. no other media that can unite us, educate us, and as a consequence can improve our action and choice over public policies...(however), because its ability to penetrate, we tend to forget that television too plays a role as a power and control.41 the above examples highlight that technology is not a mere fruit of excellence of human civilization. of course, humans reap many practical benefits of the development of technology: our life and work has become easier to deal with.42 however, as has been said by ihde,43 technology traps in a technological network which controls our behaviors and actions. or in the words of herbert marcuse in his one dimensional man and jacques ellul in his the technological society, technology is not only dominant, but total, it has changed into a milieu that determines how humans must live and how a community must be built. endnotes 1akira tachikawa, “localism and universalism in scientific training and research” in philosophical reflections on globalisation in the asia-pacific region. manila: ateneo de manila university and append, 2006 2don ihde, technology and the lifeworld, from garden to earth (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 1990), p. 1 3theodore, adorno, minima moralia, reflections on a damaged life (new york: verso, 2005), p. 7 4i have proposed my efforts in answering the questions in my book, kebebasan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi, sebuah esei etika (yogyakarta: kanisius, 2011), especially p. 53-69 5martin heidegger, the question concerning technology and other essays (new york: harper & row 1977), p. 3. i owe mahon o’brien for his “commentary on heidegger’s ‘the question concerning technology’” printed in thinking together. proceedings of the iwm junior fellows’ conference, winter 2003, ed. a. cashin and j. jirsa, vienna: iwm junior visiting fellows’ conference, vol. 6. this writing became the basis for my interpretation of the text. 6ibid 7ibid., p. 5. 8ibid. compare william j. richardson, heidegger, through phenomenology to thought (louvain: the hague 1967), p. 16 62 prajna vihara ̃ 9ibid., p. 35 10ibid., p. 5 11martin heidegger, being and time, trans. john macquarrie and edward robinson (new york: harper and row, 1962), p. 95-99 12martin heidegger, die technik und die kehre (tubingen: gunther neske pfullingen, 1962), p. 10. 13ibid., p. 7. “wo zwecke verfolgt, mittel verwendet werden, wo das instrumentale herrscht, da waltet ursachlichkeit, kausalitat”. the translated version reads, “wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality”. 14causa materialis is a silver substance used to make a chalice; causa formalis is a flat chalice; causa finalis is the use of the chalice which at the same time determines the shape and substance of a chalice; causa efficiens, the cause that determines an actual chalice. 15martin heidegger, the question concerning technology and other essays, op. cit., p. 5 16ibid., p. 12 17martin heidegger, being and time, op.cit., p. 274. 18ibid., p. 101 19martin heidegger, the question concerning technology and other essays, op. cit., p.12 20ibid., p. 14. the verb stellen (to put) has varied uses. it can refer to put an object to a certain place, to arrange, to order, to supply, and in a military sense can mean to challenge and to occupy. 21ibid., p. 14-16 22this did not happen in a windmill technology. its propeller rotated in line with the compass -so it relied heavily on the power of the wind. 23this idea became heidegger’s main idea in being and time. as dasein, humans have been thrown away to a world with a certain system. however, the relationship between humans and their world is marked by sorge, and care, and maintenance. 24ibid., p. 16 25ibid., p. 23-24 26ibid., p. 24 27ibid. 28ibid. 29the concept of listen or hoeren is important for explaining the fact that a body activity is a basic indication of the basic indetermination/freedom of humans. besides, hoeren becomes a primitive attitude of an act of communication. 30ibid., p. 25 31ibid. fate in heidegger’s thoughts is not an unchangeable path, but a horizon full of possibility which opens a room for freedom. 32ibid., p. 26 33ibid., p. 27 34ibid., p. 28 35ibid. mikhael dua 63 36ibid. 37ibid., p. 33 38sophocles is an ancient greek playwright who had a positive view of humans. he viewed humans as not only the inhabitants of this world, but with the techniques they had, they tried to change the nature he wrote: nothing extraordinary but humans only they can explore the rough ocean which was caused by the winter’s wind the earth, the creation of the immortal god they used it from year to year with their power. 39hans jonas, op.cit., p. 47-53 40hannah arendt, the origin of totalitarianism (london: secker and warburg, 1951), p. 473 41robert e. denton, jr. (editor), political communication ethics, an axymoron? (london: praeger series in political communication, 2000), p. 91 42bertrand russell illustrated the impact of science and technology on society in his book the impact of science on society which was already translated in indonesian language under the title, dampak ilmu pengetahuan atas masyarakat. 43don ihde, technology and the life world, from garden to earth, op.cit., p. 6 bibliography adorno, theodore. 2005. minima moralia, reflections on a damaged life. new york: verso arendt, hannah. 1951. the origin of totalitarianism. london: secker and warburg denton, robert e. jr. 2000. political communication ethics, an axymoron? london: praeger series in political communication gray, john et. 1991. john stuart mill in focus. on liberty. london: roultledge heidegger, martin. 1962. being and time, trans. john macquarrie and edward robinson. new york: harper and row heidegger, martin.1962. die technik und die kehre. tubingen: gunther neske pfullingen jonas, hans. 2003. das prinzip verantwortung. versuch einer ethik fur die technische zivilisation. frankfurt am main: insel verlag heidegger, martin. 1977. the question concerning technology and other essays. new york: harper & row. ihde, don. 1990. technology and the lifeworld, from garden to earth. bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press o’brien, mahon. 2003. “commentary on heidegger’s ‘the question con64 prajna vihara ̃ cerning technology’ in thinking together. proceedings of the iwm junior fellows’ conference, winter 2003”, ed. a. cashin and j. jirsa, vienna: iwm junior visiting fellows’ conference, vol. 6. richardson, william j. 1967. heidegger, through phenomenology to thought. louvain: the hague russell, bertrand. 1995. dampak ilmu pengetahuan atas masyarakat an indonesian translation of the impact of science on society. jakarta: gramedia pustaka utama tachikawa, akira. 2006. “localism and universalism in scientific training and research” in philosophical reflections on globalisation in the asia-pacific region. manila: ateneo de manila university and append mikhael dua 6 5 spirituality and mysticism: a global view philosophy and culture: the role of religion? edward j. alam notre dame university, lebanon abstract this paper examines the relationship between philosophy and culture. it contends that contrary to common understanding, it is philosophy which determines the unity of a culture. yet this is an active and ongoing process. in our unifying and very diverse world, it is philosophy which has the task of providing a new humanism, by identifying those common values and ideas that ground individual cultures and that complement, in their diversity, the one culture of humanity. fifty years ago, while developing what may be called his ‘philosophy of culture’, jacques maritain stated, “what determines the unity of a culture is first and above all a common philosophical structure, a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, a common scale of values—in short, a common idea of the universe, of man and of life, of which the social, linguistic, and juridical structures are, so to speak, the embodiment.”1 such a formulation seems to suggest that culture has emerged from philosophy, not the other way around. to be sure, from ancient times until the present, philosophy and culture have been intertwined, but the challenge is to determine the precise cause/effect nature of this relation in each era and to point out its consequences. though a daunting task, it is a crucial one, since the difference in approach makes all the difference when it comes to that which really matters for our world in the present moment: the cultivation of a new humanism. maritain, and many others like him in the last century, devoted their lives to the cultivation of this new humanism and consistently approached the study of culture in this context. reflecting upon the way in which this new humanism could bring a new and needed unity to culture, he stated that in essence it “render[ed] man more truly human and [could] manifest his original greatness by enabling him to partake of everything in nature and in history capable of enriching him.”2 not a few philosophers of the last century saw this new humanism emerging, as the only alternative, from the ashes of what may now be described as the in-humanism of the two world wars—wherein the old monster of man’s inhumanity to man took ‘new’ and unimaginably horrific forms. writing just a few years before the end of world war ii, maritain wrote, “in my mind the notion of the present trials endured by civilization [is] inseparable from that of a new humanism, which is in preparation in the present death struggle of the world, and which at the same time is preparing the renewal of civilization….”3 this renewal, as maritain and many others realized, is not inevitable or necessary, but must be creatively sought after and freely chosen and discovered anew in each generation. “culture,” he writes, “is the expansion of the peculiarly human life, including not only whatever material development may be necessary and sufficient to enable us to lead an upright life on this earth, but also and above all the moral development, the development of the speculative and practical activities (artistic and ethical) peculiarly worthy of being called a human development.”4 such moral development, of course, cannot be imposed from top-down structures or principles, but must be based on convictions that are born in freedom. a similar point was aptly put by benedict xvi recently in his encyclical on hope, when he wrote, “[w]e must acknowledge that incremental progress is possible only in the material sphere. here, amid our growing knowledge of the structure of matter and in the light of ever more advanced inventions, we clearly see continuous progress towards an ever greater mastery of nature. yet in the field of ethical awareness and moral decision-making, there is no similar possibility of accumulation for the simple reason that man's freedom is always new and he must always make his decisions anew. these decisions can never simply be made for us in advance by others—if that were the case, we would no longer be free. freedom presupposes that in fundamental decisions, every person and every generation is a new beginning. naturally, new generations can build on the knowledge and experience of those who went before, and they can draw upon the moral treasury of the whole of humanity. but they can also reject it, because it can never be self-evident in the same way as material inventions. the moral treasury of humanity is not readily at hand like tools that we use; it is present as an appeal to freedom and a possibility for it.”5 when we return, in the light of all this, to our original quote concerning the relation between philosophy and culture, we are better able to see the value of the philosophical approach to culture taken by maritain; he does not claim that the philosophical structure determines culture per se, but that it determines the unity of culture. this approach distances itself from the one that sees culture as a mere by-product of a top-down philosophical enterprise which restrictively applies broad principles in a mechanistic and deterministic way, emphasizing universality, but neglecting subjectivity and particularity. although maritain speaks about a common philosophical structure, which necessarily entails a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, it is crucial to see that by common he does not simply mean the same. though he speaks about a common scale of values and a common idea of the universe, of man and of life, he precludes a universalistic, deterministic, interpretation of the word common by noting that the embodying structures of this common idea, namely, the social, linguistic, and juridical constructions, are by nature diverse and subjective, and if they aren’t supple enough to change, they die. thus, the common idea of the universe, of man, and of life, too, must not be static; it must be open and dynamic, if it is to remain alive and fruitful. in this, he has certainly appropriated the heideggerian emphasis on subjectivity, which played such a key role in the transition from modern to contemporary philosophy. it is well known that this emphasis on subjectivity enabled philosophers to begin appreciating the world’s cultures as genuine philosophic sources, which, in turn, has brought us today to the threshold of what we may be able to speak about as a new philosophy for global times—a philosophy that is profoundly connected to a new humanism. now to speak of a new philosophy for global times is not to undermine what has been called the ‘unity of philosophical experience’ by important historians of philosophy, but to insist, rather, that genuine philosophy is always alive, growing and changing; growth presupposes continuity, just as seeds grow into roots and trees. thus, in an attempt to generate new philosophical insights for global times it is important to focus momentarily upon this ‘unity of philosophical experience’ that constitutes the very history of philosophy; this will help to guarantee that the new insights will spring from the living tree of thought and will be able to provide not only fruit that looks delicious, but fruit that really is delicious, and nourishing at the same time. in this context, then, i want to suggest that the whole history of western philosophy from thales to the present is one magnificent metaphysical drama wherein the most genuine human sages, and indeed the entire human race, are caught up in a fierce and ferocious intellectual battle that almost completely transcends them, even though they occupy center stage in the conflict.6 these lofty intellectual hostilities are ardently associated with an ancient and bitter spiritual dispute over the nature of universals. glimpses of this struggle are seen only occasionally and only by the most attentive and astute philosophers. this sublime discord, to which all authentic intellectuals are drawn, is what defines metaphysics. such metaphysical speculation, far from a pedantic ivy tower pondering, set in the historical context of a so-called myopic scholasticism, is at once the most basic and most exalted speculation possible—a reflection in which, to varying degrees, all people of all times, whether wittingly or not, are involved. for the essence of the dispute revolves around the very meaning and destiny of the universal “man.” thus, this metaphysical drama is the key to a proper understanding of history itself, for the question ends ultimately in demanding human persons to choose sides and to daily align themselves, as they “write” history, with either the violent and deceptive spiritual powers of iniquity and corruption, that are passing away, or with the kind and true sacred forces of goodness and beauty, that shall last forever. in a word, the dynamic discourse of universals is the most universal discourse of all. after the advent of nominalism and even after cartesianism had attempted to radically reduce philosophy to mere epistemology, metaphysics stubbornly refused to give up its historical role of defining the very essence of the philosophical enterprise. one part of this cartesian reduction consisted in trying to remove the universal ideas from the mind of god, where augustine, in his attempt to modify plato’s “exaggerated realism,”7 had so masterfully placed them. once descartes had disassociated the universal ideas from the divine, his methodological decency compelled him to find the orphaned universal concepts a proper home. his devotion to this daring procedure finally came to an end when, with a masterful stroke of surgical precision, he delicately undertook to place the universal concepts into the very mind of man. but a surgical error had gone unnoticed during this grandiose epistemological experiment. and such an imprisonment could not last. the metaphysical debate emerged again and again in the most unlikely of places, much to the dismay of those who thought the controversy (associated as it was with theology at best and with religious superstition at worst) had disappeared forever. in the last century, for instance, when willard quine asked what mathematics was really all about, it quickly became evident that the three supplied answers, logicism, formalism, and intuitionism, clearly corresponded to the traditional philosophical positions in regard to the question of universals, with logicism corresponding to realism, formalism to nominalism, and intuitionism to conceptualism.8 in the words of quine, “classical mathematics . . . is up to its neck in commitments to an ontology of abstract entities. thus it is that the great mediaeval controversy over universals has flared up anew in the modern philosophy of mathematics.”9 to his credit, quine himself came down on the side of logicism, thereby committing himself to a variety of realism. to be sure, neither modernity nor the arrival of post or late-modernity lessens the importance of the universals debate, in fact, they intensify it. modern science and technology testify to both the significance of the debate and to the weighty consequence of coming down on the right side. in the case of modern science and technology, of course, there is no contention over which side is the right one. if universals did not really exist, how could we ever refer to laws, for instance, which cause all specific electromagnetic spheres or fields to act in certain expected ways? if modern technology did not presuppose the genuine existence of universals, would we ever have confidence to stake our lives on the reliability of our cars and airplanes?10 and those who think that post-modernity’s deconstructionism11 has toppled the western metaphysical tradition, have understood neither deconstructionism nor the universals quandary at the heart of the metaphysical tradition. the former is primarily, a response to, not simply a rejection of, the phenomenology of edmund husserl, and thus counts as another contribution to metaphysics. surely, both husserl and derrida strongly resisted certain systems of metaphysical programming, but this is not to say that philosophers of such magnitude weren’t engaged in metaphysics. john paul ii description of phenomenology is helpful here, for he described it as “…first of all a style of thought, an intellectual relation with reality, whose essential and constitutive traits one hopes to gather, avoiding prejudices and schematism.”12 if this is an accurate characterization of phenomenology, who could imagine derrida disagreeing with it,13 and who could fail to see its important metaphysical implications? besides, it is appropriate to call to mind here the famous statement of e. a. burtt, in his monumental work, the metaphysical foundations of modern physical science, who wrote in the early part of the last century, “the only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing.”14 suffice it to say, then, that for our present purposes, any emergent philosophy for global times must also entail a new metaphysics that takes a clear stand on the question of universals. and whereas i do not see how any lasting and viable metaphysics can ever unqualifiedly reject realism, i want to suggest that a new brand of philosophic realism emerges when we take seriously the possibility of cultures as philosophic sources. this new brand of philosophic realism implies the real existence of universals, but insists that no truly existing reality is entirely unitary, and that all realities and indeed all reality is constituted precisely through relation. upon this approach, neither universal nor particular terms have any metaphysical or ontological meaning whatsoever except when defined in the context of an ‘immanent intrinsic complementarity of at least two personal beings constituting the absolute’. this particular expression comes from the work of a contemporary spanish metaphysician, fernando rielo, who while accounting for the real existence of both the universals of description and the universals of definition, also significantly shifts the vantage point of the traditional question concerning “whether” or “where” the universal exists.15 while considering the goodness and beauty of a light purple flower, for instance, the question now is not so much about “whether” or “where” the descriptive universal “purple” exists, or “whether” or “where” the universals of substance, “flowerness” or “colorness” or “beauty” or “goodness” exist, it is much more about “how” such realities exist in the sense of being what they are and more than what they are simultaneously, since his very notion of being is not simply that being is being, as in parmenides, but that being is more than being, a notion of being that he tries to capture with the expression “being +”. to say that no truly existing reality is entirely unitary, and that all realities and indeed all reality itself, all being, is constituted precisely through relation, is commensurate with the results of a series of conferences held in indonesia that discussed the emergence of philosophy from the specific contributions of the cultures of java. as the council for research in values and philosophy stated it recently on their website, “javanese culture has a distinctive notion called memayu hayuning bawono. this notion has the phenomenological dimension that human consciousness is not a solipsistic entity but a disclosure. according to this cultural conception, human consciousness is not trapped within a microcosm (bawono cilik), but reaches toward the macrocosm (bawono gede). this brings new meaning to self consciousness and its ethical implication, for self-consciousness is not a substance, but a relationship. this suggests a radical shift in our ethical paradigm. it is not only by a categorical imperative that we develop ourselves through fulfilling certain universal maxims, but we are continuously developing an ethic of cosmic solidarity.”16 this rich philosophical insight emerging from indonesian culture is commensurate with the results yielded by the work of rielo as he redefines and purifies the language surrounding the problem of universals by applying his understanding of metaphysical language as the living transcendental definition. the first term he purifies is the term universal itself. he rejects the notion of “universal,” when that notion is qualified by the term “abstract.” for rielo, abstraction, in spite of the claims made by hegel, husserl, frege, and russell, to have introduced new and better usages of both the term and the process, always consists, for rielo, whether in ancient, medieval, or modern philosophy, of “extracting from a plurality something which is common to it in order to form a supposedly universal entity by separating it from the singular instances.” such a method is what rielo calls a “squinting variety of metaphysical vision,” and can only lead to the production of a concept lacking syntactic, semantic, and metaphysical meaning.17 a further mistake occurs, according to rielo, when this empty concept is “raised to the absolute” to serve as a universal, necessary, axiomatic and absolute principle. such an illformed procedure, rather than “augmenting a notion [in order to] discover its consistency, completeness, and decidability,” acts to reduce the supposedly abstract property, whatever it may happen to be, say “flowerness” or “color” or “purpleness” or “beauty” or “goodness,” in such a way as when separated from its singular instances, becomes a tautology so that “flowerness is flowerness,” and “color is color,” and “purpleness is purpleness,” and “beauty is beauty” and “goodness is goodness.” needless to say, such statements are meaningless and can never help to realize the new humanism or ‘ethics of cosmic solidarity’ we desire. for rielo, the “raising to the absolute” must confirm the singular (not the universal) character of relation. for this purpose, he introduces the term absolutivization rather than absolutization. thus he absolutivizes all universal concepts in such a way that when we say, for instance, that the rose is beautiful, we are not saying that an abstract reality called “beauty” exists and that that particular rose participates in the abstract “beauty,” but rather that a “singular” absolute beauty exists, which is constituted by a binity, that is to say, by at least two transcendent entities in complementary relation; this means that the singular “beauty” of that particular rose is “in” the rose in virtue of the two transcendent entities that constitute and sustain its existence. in this way, the mystical beauty of the rose is a vestige of the transcendentrelational (or divine) beauty. now when universal concepts such as “beauty” or “goodness” are predicated of a particular human being, we are not to claim, just as we did not claim in the example of the rose, that an abstract reality called “beauty” or “goodness” exists. for instance, if we say that joseph is “good,” this does not mean that there exists an abstract reality called “goodness,” in which joseph participates. what exists rather, according to rielo, is the singular absolute goodness, constituted by at least two transcendent entities in relation. the singular goodness of joseph is in joseph, then, in virtue of the transcendent constitutive presence of the absolute goodness of the transcendent entities (or divine persons) in joseph, who, in their relation with one another, constitute joseph as mystical goodness of the ‘divine’ goodness. now if we take the universal concept man or humanity and absolutivize it in the same way, something quite profound emerges. first, it necessitates the rejection of an abstract reality called “humanity”, in which each particular human participates, and claims, rather, that the singular “humanity,” of say, joseph, is “in” joseph in virtue of the divine constitutive presence of the absolute “humanity,” of the ‘divine’ persons in joseph, who, in their relation with one another, constitute joseph as mystical humanity of the divine humanity. a serious objection from certain philosophical circles is easily anticipated here, since talk of divine or transcendent persons entails religion and revelation, which is not, some may argue, properly philosophical. however, if we take seriously the possibility of philosophy emerging from cultures, and also see that at the heart of every genuine culture, there is a profound religious tradition that has provided insights into the transcendent and mystical dimensions of human interiority and consciousness, then we should, i believe, accept these insights as properly philosophical. in other words, and to put it more simply, we must accept, at the least, that in their various traditions of religious revelation, religious cultures possess many ideas about the nature of man, the universe, and life that are reasonable, and it would be unreasonable (un-philosophical) to simply dismiss them out of hand. returning then, to the way a new metaphysical approach to the problem of universals can provide us with a definition of man that is dynamic, mystical, and even ‘divine’, and one that complements an account of self consciousness as a relationship, rather than a substance, we are struck by the ethical implications of such a view in bringing about the new humanism. for those who would reject such a vision as idealistic and unattainable, i would suggest the way forward, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, by first pointing back to a period in history that in some ways provides a model for philosophers today, who see the value in eliciting philosophical insights from living religious cultures. beginning in the sixth century, and continuing well into the seventh, an explosion of philosophical insight occurred as a result of an extremely dynamic synthesis that can rightly be described as emerging from culture. syriac speaking christians, heirs to mesopotamian and jewish culture, living primarily in the regions of what are today syria and southeast turkey, began to translate, develop, and transmit ancient greek thought and culture into syriac. in the ninth and tenth centuries, the great arab translators, under the patronage of the ‘abassid islamic dynasty, and in conjunction with these syriac speaking christians, who also knew arabic and had begun to assimilate arabic culture as well, began to translate this great and living heritage from syriac into arabic, thereby not only transmitting the ancient greek wisdom, but substantially developing it. this latter stage, because of the geographical, political and economic realities at that time, also received the insights and wisdom of persian, indian, and (later during the mongolian period) chinese thought, culture and religion, making this period one of the most dynamic cultural and philosophical interchanges in history. the philosophical result was dynamic and long lasting, providing both the solid foundation and building materials for the further construction of what would come to be known as modern science and civilization, once texts were brought to spain via northern africa and translated into latin in the tenth and eleventh centuries. even a cursory examination of what may rightly be called arabic philosophy, (in which jews, christians, and muslims all participated in developing) reveals that the fundamental impetus at the heart of this philosophical and cultural exchange was a religious one, overwhelmingly concerned with reconciling scientific insights with the similar versions of revelation contained in the holy texts. these scientific insights were not merely the scientific achievements of greek science transmitted to the west via syriac and arabic, in the precise form they were received, but, as stated above, were substantially developed by oriental christians, and then by arab and persian muslims and jews, aided to some extent, by insights from indian and then later (in the mongolian period) chinese religious cultures. the crucial point here is that in the process of transmitting greek science, those jews, christians, and muslims concerned with reconciling science and revelation, actually moved the scientific and philosophical project forward; their concern to reconcile their religious truths with scientific truths did not hold science or philosophy back, but propelled it forward. with respect to science, the new achievements included “a far more advanced number theory and algebra, a new system of trigonometry, a medical corpus much greater than that available in the greek world, and an entirely original theory of optics more powerful than anything known to the greeks and that was not only to form the mathematical basis for the renaissance art but also to inspire new directions in scientific practice.”18 with respect to the philosophical achievements, there were notable advances in ontology and epistemology; questions about whether the world was eternal or created in time pushed the ontological project forward, whereas questions concerning the existence of necessary causes in nature stimulated epistemological discussion. and needless to say, at the heart of both the ontological and epistemological discussion, was the age-old question of universals. the deliberations in this regard naturally took up the question concerning the universal ‘humanity’, and quite often in the context a theological anthropology that laid particular stress upon the ‘mystical’ and ‘divine’ nature of the individual man in relation first to god and then to other personal beings, including angels and other human beings. it is not the time to explore the details of this medieval discussion, but again, the central point here is that progress, both scientific and philosophical, emerged as a result of open and dynamic interchange among religious cultures. to return now, by way of conclusion, to the question of the cause/effect relation between philosophy and culture in the light of our reflections above, i suggest that since the unity of each individual person, like the unity of every individual thing, is constituted by being in relation to another ‘thing’ transcendent to it, then ultimately there is only one culture, the culture of man. but this one culture emerges naturally as many cultures springing from the rich diversity that each individual man is by nature. the unity and development of distinct cultures, as well as the deeper unity and development of the one ‘culture of man’ is not natural, however, in the sense of being automatic, they must be chosen and appropriated anew by each new generation if they are to endure. this process of development is precisely the role of philosophy in that the philosopher, reflecting upon both the diversity and unity of culture and cultures, which is found as a given in the world, identifies those common values and ideas that ground individual cultures and that complement, in their diversity, the one culture of humanity. in this way a new humanism emerges wherein the individual person and peoples are simultaneously human and more than human—perhaps we should say divine: simultaneously one and many, changing and immutable. this is what maritain, and many others like him in the last century, devoted their lives to the cultivation of, and why they approached the study of culture in the context of a new humanism that could “render man more truly human and [could] manifest his original greatness by enabling him to partake of everything in nature and in history capable of enriching him.”19 the philosopher, reflecting upon the unity and diversity of cultures, who can draw upon the treasures contained in the religious roots therein, is able to cultivate a balanced epistemology, wherein the objective, necessary, and universal dimensions of knowledge are properly complemented by the dimensions of subjectivity, the contingent, and the individual. such an epistemology guards against the two extremes of moral and cultural relativism on the one hand, and against the scientistic terrorism and fanaticism of moral, cultural, and religious absolutism on the other. 1 jacques maritain, st. thomas aquinas, rev. ed., trans. evans and peter o’reilly (new york: macmillan, 1958) 69. this quote, and the majority of the quotes from the writings of maritain are taken from john a. gueguen jr.’s “maritain’s philosophy of culture: an old teacher questions himself about the present time.” gueguen’s paper was originally presented to the american maritain association conference on “faith, scholarship, and culture in the 21st century” at the university of notre dame on october 19, 2000. gueguen’s insights were of great help while developing the themes in this present paper. 2 ibid., 3. (my emphasis in italics) 3 maritain, the twilight of civilization (new york: sheed & ward, 1943) viii. 4 maritain, religion and culture, in essays in order, ed. christopher dawson and t. f. burns (new york: sheed & ward, 1940) 5 benedict xvi, spe salvi 2007, 24. 6 this statement and the material that follows on pages 5-8, ending with footnote 14, appeared in a slightly different form in the metaphysics proceedings of 2003, second world conference (rome: fondazione idente di studi e di ricerca, 2004) as a brief overture constituting a suitable setting in which i addressed the main themes of that conference; i have included it here as it is highly relevant for the theme of this paper as well. 7 these are the terms that frederick copleston uses to describe plato’s position on the nature of universals. plato claims, of course, that universals are real things that exist apart from any particular object and are outside of the human mind. 8 see ed. l. miller’s questions that matter (new york: mcgraw-hill, 1998), pp.71f. 9 willard van orman quine, “on what there is,” in from a logical point of view: nine logicophilosophical essays, second ed., rev. (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1980), pp. 13f. 10see here the very fine article of lawrence d. goodall, “of universals, angels, and inklings,” in the international catholic review communio 29 (fall 2002). 11the meaning of the term is much debated. barbara johnson’s book, the critical difference (1981) is helpful in sorting out the plethora of meanings associated with the term. 12john paul ii goes on to say: “i would like to say it [phenomenology] is almost an attitude of intellectual charity toward man.” this and the above comment (my emphasis in italics) were public statements of john paul ii when in march of 2003 he received a delegation from a world phenomenology institute based in the united states. see zenit news: ze03032407, march 24, 2003. 13with respect to the way in which the thought of jacques derrida can actually push the metaphysical project forward, see george f. mclean’s key note address, “metaphysics and culture: the bridge to religion,” at the conference “metaphysics for the third millennium.” this conference was an official event of the holy see’s celebration of the great jubilee, which was held in rome, 2000. mclean asked whether “. . .the postmodern thought of jacques derrida, joined to the thought of immanuel levinas, [could] take us further as metaphysicians in the judeo-christian tradition?” in this regard, he referred to john caputo’s very insightful book the prayers and tears of jacques derrida: religion without religion (bloomington: indiana university press, 1997). 14 e. a. burrt, the metaphysical foundations of modern physical science (new york: harcourt, 1932) p. 227. 15this statement and the material that follows on pages 9-11, concluding with footnote 16, also appeared in a slightly different form in the metaphysics proceedings of 2003, second world conference, referred o above in footnote 6. again, i have included it here in a revised from because of its relevance to my topic. 16see http://www.crvp.org/conf/2007/java.htm. accessed on june 28 2008. 17 i must acknowledge the work of father robert badillo here, who, at my request, so graciously translated into english portions of rielo’s mis meditaciones desde el modelo genético. i can give no page-number references as the english translation edition is still under preparation. these quotes, however, come from the section titled, from prior question. http://www.crvp.org/conf/2007/java.htm 18 see arun bala’s the dialogue of civilizations in the birth of modern science (new york: palgrave macmillian, 2006) 53-54. 19maritain, st. thomas aquinas. 3. 11(158-162)note for authors rawls and habermas on religion and politics: reflections on philippine political culture christopher ryan maboloc linkoping university, sweden abstract what is the role of the church in politics? is there a way to justify such role? this paper will explore the answer to this problem in the area of deliberative democracy, and will seek to strengthen the idea that political and democratic discourse may allow for religious arguments, if and only if these arguments also purport to express public values. to shed light onto this problem, i will bring into dialogue john rawls and jürgen habermas, most especially with emphasis on their respective ideas concerning civil society, and hope to reconcile the role of politics and religion in philippine democracy. church involvement in politics has always been controversial, especially in third world democracies like the philippines. this paper intends to examine the involvement of the catholic church in philippine political affairs, and find legitimate justifications for such crucial engagement. historically, the catholic church in the philippines has always played an important role in charting the course of philippine politics, most notably during the dark years of ferdinand marcos which ended in the first people power revolution in 1986. the church has also been active in its protest against controversial proposals such as abortion, reproductive health (house bill 4110), divorce and many others. the church and its leaders has also served as a beacon of hope for a vibrant democracy in the philippines. but of course, this involvement is not without its opposition. there prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 69-83 69 © 2000 by assumption university press are sectors who argue that church involvement in political issues violates the separation of church and state. there is also a view that sees the church as meddling in the areas concerning women’s rights to reproductive health. but what really is the role of the church in politics? is there a way to justify such role? this paper will explore the answer to this problem in the area of deliberative democracy, and will seek to strengthen the idea that political and democratic discourse may allow religious arguments, if and only if these arguments also purport to express public values. to shed light into this, i will bring into dialogue john rawls and jürgen habermas, most especially on their idea of civil society, and hope to reconcile the role of politics and religion in philippine democracy. civil society and comprehensive doctrines according to rawls, civil society, or the “background culture”, includes “the culture of churches and associations of all kinds, and institutions of learning at all levels, especially universities and professional schools, scientific and other societies” (rawls 1999, 134). civil society belongs to the nonpublic use of reason, which comprises many of its questions (rawls 1993, 220). it is undeniable, however, that members of civil society may base their political opinions on certain religious insights. church doctrines which oblige the individual to respect human life from the moment of conception can form part of the convictions of individuals, and as such, are important in the way they comprehend political matters. the person who professes belief in god is the same person who votes, decides, and performs other acts in the public realm as a social being. but there can be conflict when one introduces comprehensive doctrines in public debates in a liberal democratic society, for bringing them in can offend others who may not share the convictions of those who profess such. such is the reason why the public realm must be independent from religious arguments. this neutrality is in view of the very nature of public reason. in a democratic society, according to rawls, “public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise the final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their 70 prajñâ vihâra constitution” (ibid., 214). simply put, public reason in this sense is always political in nature. for instance, people come into an agreement to a constitution that defines public policy. they also agree on the way upon which public institutions are to be established. public reason, however, for rawls, does not apply to the background culture. (see rawls 1993, 215) public reason, he says, “does not apply to our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning about them by members of associations such as churches and universities” (ibid.). political power rests in the constitutional framework of government, and this framework is independent of the religious convictions of the background culture. any liberal democratic state must therefore be neutral. (see audi 1997, 39) generally, it can be said that setting aside comprehensive norms is understandable because the basis of political stability is the consensus shared by all on matters pertaining to the general interest of the public. the constitution, for instance, is a product of this agreement. any legislation can only be legitimate if it is constitutional. thus, no single religious opinion from the background culture can override what has been established constitutionally. questioning the idea of neutrality in the context of third world cultures, it is important to note that religion plays a great part in the lives of people, and therefore in the kind of government they wish to establish. put into the context of philippine society, which is 85% catholic, the presence of catholic values permeate the many areas of politics, including the constitution and the laws passed by congress. more importantly though, members of civil society in the philippines are influenced by strong religious values. the church has been a strong voice on contentious political issues like abortion, divorce, and the death penalty, to cite a few examples. as one filipino scholar notes, involvement in social issues can take place at the level of basic ecclesiastical communities where the parish is able to generate some kind of dynamism (gaspar 1997, 151). the church finds itself as an active participant in philippine political issues. for instance, the church through its many affiliated associations have delivered their arguments against the bill on reproductive health maboloc 71 care in legislative hearings called for by congress. the church has also been active in the peace process, another political issue. in the 1996 mindanao peace congress, “church leaders categorically stated that peace is the wholeness of life where every person can live with dignity. peace must be based on justice for all, whether they are christians, muslims, or indigenous peoples” (gaspar 1997, 168). moreover, the church also takes part in electoral advocacy. during philippine elections, the church and civil society groups openly endorse candidates who support their agenda. as karl gaspar notes, “there is no denying that in a number of areas, the church, despite its claim to be neutral, did support certain candidates, directly or indirectly (ibid., 156) thus, it can be said that in the philippines, it is impossible for the church to be neutral. the church, according to gaspar, through its program for conscientization, supported the people’s aspiration to participate actively in making decisions that affect them, thus internalizing democratic values, empowering them towards setting up a just and caring society (gaspar 1997, 164). for instance, if the church criticized some development programs of the government, it was not because the church was interfering with government affairs. (ibid.) in such an instance, the church was simply expressing its concern for the poor and the oppressed. what justifies this involvement? the proviso rawls says that the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another (rawls 1999, 132). for rawls, public reason accounts for the concerns that involve matters pertaining to political justice. (ibid., 133) he says, “as reasons of free and equal citizens, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice” (ibid.). although he limits the role of civil society, that doesn’t mean that citizens can no longer hold their government officials accountable. (ibid., 135) citizens, according to him, can realize the function of public reason in society, and most notably, he says, they have the duty “to repudiate 72 prajñâ vihâra government officials and candidates for office who violate public rules”, which is, in fact, for him, “one of the political and social roots of democracy and is vital to its enduring strength and vigor” (ibid., 135-36). the church in the philippines, for instance, noted gaspar, was the first to publicly denounce martial law, and called for president marcos to lift it, long before other groups found the courage to do so (gaspar 1997, 149). in today’s philippine society, the duty of civility is realized in the availability of venues to file complaints against corrupt officials through the office of the ombudsman, and the public nature of congressional hearings on concerns like health, the environment, and education. participating in formal venues is an inherent requisite because discussions pertaining to the public must be governed by rules set by the institutions which deal with public matters. since members of civil society are better educated than the majority of the people in the philippines, they are expected to be the sounding board in the halls of congress. as rawls points out, citizens have a duty to involve themselves in issues of public concern, for it is an ideal “that imposes a moral, not a legal duty – to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason” (rawls 1993, 217). rawls designates the duty of civility as a moral duty. (ibid.) such duty is not a legal obligation, but it is a duty which proceeds from the ideal of political justice. citizens must seek, actively participate, and hope for the realization of what is good for society. thus, in filing complaints or seeking remedies for grievances against government officials, one is performing something not for his own private sake but for the sake of the public. it is important to note that participation in the public sphere in the philippines is heavily indebted to the values taught by the church. not only that, the church itself is active in promoting its stand on public issues. for instance, combating the government’s promotion of artificial means of birth control has pre-occupied family-life programs of the church (gaspar 1997, 163). given this influence of the church in philippine political culture, it is important here to introduce the notion of the proviso, where rawls says, “reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in maboloc 73 due course political reasons and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines, are presented” (rawls 1997, 777; also in habermas 2006, 5-6). rawls requires that the introduction of religious arguments must be grounded on the principles of political justice and that the values that these religious arguments purport to express must also be public values. (ibid.) in philippine political culture, basing political decisions in the church’s teachings regarding respect for human life is not at all arbitrary, for this value is something that filipinos do share, a value which they have in fact chosen when they ratified the constitution. poor filipinos (30 percent of the population or 24 million people) find strength in the church. if the church demands from the government that it protects the interests of the poor, a stance that can be based on the doctrine of love for one’s neighbor (a catholic teaching), the church is advocating something that is fair and rational. it is also at the same time a demand for responsible politics. it is worthy to note that the “philippines was the first country to articulate its vision of becoming a church of the poor” (gaspar 1997, 150). concern for human life and care for the poor are matters of political justice. i also believe that these are two public values that any democratic society would strongly uphold. in mindanao, one of the major islands in the philippines, many dioceses involve lay leaders in most decision-making processes through regular assemblies attended by priests, religious and lay people to promote active lay participation (gaspar 1997, 163). such assemblies prepare and immerse church leaders and lay people in the ideals of democratization. it is in these assemblies where the church echoes its positions and hold public dialogues. the promotion of christian values in the public sphere by the church help define the moral viewpoint of the public. by opposing abortion, the church is simply trying to protect the life of the unborn child, and is acting on the basis of human values. the contribution of the church on matters of public concern is vital. philippine society as a whole counts on the church as a moral voice on public issues. this is done within the context of a constitution that promotes and protects the value of human life. because of the active involvement of the church in forming public opinion, its influence on the issue of reproductive health has been felt by most filipinos. naida pasion states, “nowhere is the influence of the church 74 prajñâ vihâra more felt than in government programs on reproductive health. nurses deliberately absented themselves during the scheduled days for iud insertions rather than defy the teachings of the church” (pasion 1997, 226). it must be noted that there is no direct intervention on the part of the church. what it does is voice out its opinion on many vital public issues. habermas says, “religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. in the event of corresponding political debates, this potential makes religious speech a serious candidate to transporting possible truth contents” (habermas 2006, 10). religion in the public sphere “the liberal state”, according to habermas, “has an interest in unleashing religious voices in the political public sphere, and in the participation of religious organizations as well” (ibid.). if allowing the balance between religious and public values contributes to consensus in society, then there is no reason to silence the voice of the church on public matters like abortion, divorce, and reproductive health care. habermas says that “in a secular state only those political decisions are taken to be legitimate as can be impartially justified in the light of generally accessible reasons, in other words equally justified vis-à-vis religious and non-religious citizens, and citizens of different confessions” (ibid., 5) habermas writes, “a liberal state must not discourage religious persons and communities from also expressing themselves politically” (ibid., 10). the church cannot be excluded in the public debate on abortion and other morally sensitive issues. religion and politics are intertwined in philippine political culture because filipinos consider the church as their protector from the excesses of their government. some religious values have become part of public morality. it does not appear as an imposition of one religion to another, because in issues like abortion and reproductive health care, the values of “respect for human life” and “respect for the dignity of the human person” concern public morality in the philippines. kent greenawalt affirms such when he says that in settling the issue regarding the infusion of religious norms on matters of public policy, “much depends on history, culture, the religions, maboloc 75 and other comprehensive views that people hold” (greenawalt 2003, 275). habermas says that religious doctrines potentially deliver the truth on important public matters. (habermas 2006, 12) they must therefore be allowed in the public given the legitimate reasons. there is no arbitrariness in bringing in religious arguments if they are supported by equally reasonable arguments other than the religious arguments themselves. (see rawls 1997, 777) habermas requires, however, that these arguments be translated before they are allowed in the public sphere. (see habermas 2006, 10-11) this translation means finding the political reasons for these religious arguments, meaning, their accessibility in terms of “what citizens owe one another as good reasons for their political statements and attitudes” (habermas 2006, 11). he adds that the truth content of religious contributions can enter into the institutionalized practice of deliberation and decision-making if the necessary translation occurs in the pre-parliamentary domain, i.e., in the public sphere itself (ibid., 12) for habermas, the political public sphere acts as a sounding board for problems that must be processed by the political system because they cannot be solved elsewhere (habermas 1996, 359). for him, civil society’s attunement to societal problems in the private sphere can make it effective in transmitting and amplifying reactions to the public sphere (ibid., 367). the reason for this openness, is that the public is made up of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations of their social interests, and who may want to have an influence on institutionalized opinion and will-formation (ibid.). this explains the important role that the church plays in the philippine public sphere. habermas explains that the public sphere must amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems, but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions (ibid., 359). obviously, social and political problems are issues that religious and lay people talk about in meetings and even in informal gatherings. even with the absence of the formality of public hearings, assemblies contribute to public enlightenment on important issues. as an example, the mindanao assembly for peace, convened by archbishop fernando capalla in davao city, committed itself, christians, muslims and indigenous peoples alike, to become peacemakers, called on government to provide basic services essentially in depressed areas, and con76 prajñâ vihâra duct peace education (gaspar 1997, 167). the church always play a vital function in the public sphere. according to habermas the political system must remain sensitive to the influence of public opinion (habermas 1996, 367). habermas acknowledges the influence which may come from religious leaders suggesting that this political influence supported by public opinion is converted into political power – into a potential for rendering binding decisions (ibid., 363). he assigns a big role for civil society, pointing out that, “basic constitutional guarantees alone, of course, cannot preserve the public sphere, and civil society from deformation. the communication structures of the public sphere must rather be kept intact by an energetic civil society” (ibid., 369). democracy is healthier with a more active civil society in the public sphere. jean cohen asserts that the survival and expansion of basic rights depend very much on political cultures that allow and even promote its mobilization (cohen 2002, 217). the active role of the church makes the people more involved in open discussions on political issues, thereby empowering an otherwise helpless populace. this is strongly grounded in the fact that “the church in the philippines believes that ministering to the needs of the poor and the oppressed is a moral option, a moral obligation” (gaspar 1997, 163). critique of the liberal tradition the liberal tradition’s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines, according to wolterstorff, seems to be telling people to “step out of their religious community and enter the public debate without any appeal to their religious convictions” (wolterstorff 1997, 172). kent greenawalt suggests, granting that there will be disagreements, or that some people might disagree, it can still be said that “we can revert to the possibility that one set of background beliefs might be better than any other, and that human beings have the capacity to identify sound background beliefs” (greenawalt 2003, 262). for wolterstorff, it seems to be too much of a generalization to throw away religious arguments simply because they are religious without even examining their value in the discussion of matters maboloc 77 that concern the life and well-being of citizens (see wolterstorff 1997, 180). the intention of engaging in politial dialogue is to provide better choices for the people. for wolterstorff, it is not necessary that religious arguments are shared by all. (see wolterstorff, 181) for him, it is sufficient that the argument stands and that the majority supports it (ibid.). as greenawalt adds, “if a respected religious authority like the pope, a divinely inspired text or one’s personal sense of how god relates to human beings suggest that we should help those who are less fortunate,” (ibid., 269) it should not be taken as something negative. as wolterstorff suggests, instead of forbidding to offer religious reasons in the public space, why not invite people to continue saying with civility what they do believe (wolterstorff 1997, 180). for him, anybody who has a sound religious argument and wants to contribute to dialogue must be admitted, for the healthy exchange of ideas is good for democracy. (ibid.) wolterstorff seems to be saying that the constitutional restraint that rawls’ proviso requires is unnecessary. (see habermas 2006, 11) he seems to be suggesting that any sound religious opinion must be listened to and that it is sufficient that the majority agrees to these arguments (see wolterstorff 1997, 181). majority religion and constitutional essentials comprehensive doctrines tend to shake the balance of political culture in any society for these doctrines can present themselves as impositions from outside for the members of society who do not share such convictions. (see habermas 2006, 12) recalling rawls, he says that political autonomy is “realized by citizens when they act from the principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons” (rawls 1993, 77). freedom and equality are the essentials of a liberal and democratic society. (ibid., 216) this means, according to habermas, that citizens are meant to respect one another as free and equal members of their political community (habermas 2006, 5). given that in the liberal state only secular reasons count, citizens 78 prajñâ vihâra who adhere to a faith are obliged to establish a kind of balance between their religious and secular convictions (ibid., 5-6). for habermas, public deliberation needs some kind of restraint before any religious opinion is admitted. (ibid., 12) he finds the proposal of wolsterstorff problematic (ibid.). habermas says, since no institutional filter is envisaged between the state and the public domain, wolterstorff’s version does not exclude the possibility that policies and legal programs will be implemented solely on the basis of the religious or the confessional beliefs of a ruling majority (ibid., 11). he adds that parliaments in this sense will become a battlefield of religious beliefs and governmental authority can evidently become the agent of the religious majority that asserts its will and thus violating the democratic procedure (ibid.). there is a great possibility in this sense of a majority religion simply imposing its will on the whole populace if constitutional safeguards are not provided for. legislatures cannot just allow any religious opinion. constitutional grounds must be set as basis before any religious argument is admitted. habermas says that it seems that for wolterstorff, the argument between different conceptions of justice grounded in competing religions and world views can never be solved by the common presupposition of a formal background consensus (ibid., 12). according to habermas, wolterstorff rejects the whole idea of a reasonable background consensus on constitutional essentials (ibid.). habermas is against the position of wolterstorff because for habermas the democratic procedure has the power to generate legitimacy precisely because it both includes all participants and has a deliberative character (ibid.). it is possible for other religions not to compromise on what they believe is right. but agreement can still be possible, because “conflict of existential values can be contained by losing any political edge against the background of a presupposed consensus on constitutional principles” (ibid.). in this sense, constitutional essentials are important to legitimize whatever religious argument are introduced in the public sphere. the constitution safeguards the public sphere from any possible excesses that any majority religion might do, which in the end will only disturb the spirit of social cooperation and undermine social unity which the constitution as the fundamental law of the land protects. religious arguments, therefore, must find resonance in the constitution to be legitimate. maboloc 79 civic virtue and theo-ethical equilibrium one author asserts that the question is not whether religion and politics can be mixed; they are mixed and will continue to be mixed (audi 1997, 38). we have explained above why accommodating religious values in the public sphere is not at all inconsistent with democracy and human freedom given that they find resonance in the constitution. to be able to elaborate on the relation between religious insights and secular norms, it is important to explain the meaning of civic virtue. for robert audi, civic virtue is the individual’s way of being socially responsible without having to disregard the values of his religion, with the former playing a major role on the latter. (ibid., 54) he says further, “in a society that is complex, pluralistic, and so, inevitably somewhat divided, civic virtue implies trying to take reasonable positions on important issues” (ibid., 48). audi says, if one’s only reason is to promote religious devotion, then even if one is expressing a kind of religious virtue, one is not exhibiting civic virtue (ibid., 57). such seems far from the mind of the church or of civil society. if anything, the church and civil society are simply advocating what is just and reasonable for all filipinos. audi says that the concept of civic virtue realizes what he calls a theo-ethical equilibrium (ibid., 62). he says, “i propose a principle of theo-ethical equilibrium: where religious considerations appropriately bear on matters of public morality or of political choice, religious persons have a prima facie obligation – at least insofar as they have civic virtue – to seek an equilibrium between those considerations and relevant secular standards of ethics and political responsibility” (ibid.). civic virtue implies doing one’s responsibility as an individual using the balance between one’s moral and religious convictions. it implies responsible political participation in a liberal democracy (ibid., 48). such an idea proceeds from what audi calls a secular rationale, which is “intended to benefit people within a religious tradition, for instance in different denominations or even in the same denomination, as well as to facilitate good relations between different religious traditions, and between religious and non-religious people” (ibid., 56). such rationality, therefore, 80 prajñâ vihâra intends to foster dialogue among different sectors in society. this balance requires that “a seemingly sound moral conclusion that goes against scriptures or one’s established religious tradition should be scrutinized for error; a religious demand that seems to abridge moral rights should be studied” (ibid., 52) those who advocate abortion on the basis of reproductive rights should be able to examine their conscience if the life of the unborn child is worth compromising for the sake of their secular view. if the church defends the rights of the unborn child by using religious values, it should not be barred from doing so simply because one thinks that the argument is based on some religious ground. the church must be allowed and does have good reasons for its arguments. audi thinks that this arrangement does not defy reason. (ibid., 53) he adds that inasmuch as secular reasons may change one’s religious views, religious considerations can also lead to the revision of one’s secular moral views. (ibid.) for audi, the separation of church and state does not require that churches should not publicly take moral positions, even if there is political controversy about them (ibid., 65). articulating reasons based on religious grounds like the teachings of the church on the value of human life in order to argue against a proposed law that it perceives to be morally unacceptable should help enlighten rather than complicate the discussion. in view of the importance of human life as a whole, the church has a big role to play in every democratic society. the separation of church and state does not mean that the church has to be helpless in the face of grave social and moral problems. the role of the church in the public sphere is clear. in the context of a third world country like the philippines, it can be said that “the church needs to truly practice what it preaches in terms of lay empowerment. it should support the laity in playing their role in the political arena, not only in casting their votes, but in pressuring the government to allocate resources for the poor, to promote ecology and human rights” (gaspar 1997, 166). references audi, robert. 1997. “the state, the church, and the citizen” in religion and contemporary liberalism, edited by paul weithman. notre maboloc 81 dame: university of notre dame press. cohen, jean. 2002. “discourse ethics and civil society” in jürgen habermas, volume 3, edited by david rasmussen and james swindal. london: sage publications. freeman, samuel. 2007. rawls. london: routledge. gaspar, karl. 1997. “patterns of the mindanao catholic church’s involvement in contemporary social issues” in making civil society, edited by miriam ferrer. third world studies center. greenawalt, kent. 2003. “religion, law, and politics: arenas of neutrality” in perfectionism and neutrality: essays in liberal theory, edited by steven wall and george klosko. rowman and littlefield publishers, inc. habermas, jürgen. 1996. between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, translated by william rehg. massachusetts: mit press. ______________. 2006. “religion in the public sphere”, european journal of philosophy, 14 (1): 1-25. mccarthy, thomas. 1994. “kantian constructivism and reconstructivism: rawls and habermas in dialogue”, ethics, 105. _______________. 2002. “practical discourse: on the relation between morality to politics”, in jürgen habermas, 2. london: sage publications. pasion, naida. 1997. “civil society and the church in the arena of reproductive rights” in civil society: relations in policy-making, edited by marlon wui and glenda lopez.third world studies center. quevedo, orlando. 2003. pastoral letter. catholic bishops conference of the philippines. http://www.cbcponline.net/v3/documents/2000s/2003housebill_4110.htm. rawls, john. 1999. a theory of justice. (revised edition) cambridge, ma: harvard university press. __________ 1993. political liberalism with “a new introduction and the reply to habermas”. new york: columbia university press. __________ 1997. “the idea of public reason revisited”, the university of chicago law review, 64: 765-807. __________ 1999. “the idea of public reason revisited” in the law of peoples with “the idea of public reason revisited”. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. wolterstorff, nicholas. 1997. “why should we reject what liberalism tells 82 prajñâ vihâra us about speaking and acting in public for religious reasons” in religion and contemporary liberalism, edited by paul weithman. notre dame: university of notre dame press. excerpts from house bill 4110. http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/a2.asp. excerpts from the 1987 philippine consitution. http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/ a2.asp. maboloc 83 a report on emotional education for young children: resignifying the universal: critical commentary on the postcolonial african identity and development adeshina afolayan university of ibadan, nigeria abstract the dimension of the debate on the relation between the universal and the particular in african philosophy has been skewed in favour of the universalists who argued that the condition for the possibility of an african conception of philosophy cannot be achieved outside the “universal’ idea of the philosophical enterprise. in this sense, the ethnophilosophical project and its attempt to rescue the idea of an african past necessary for the reconstruction of an african postcolonial identity and development becomes a futile one. a recent commentator even argues that works concerning african identity are now totally irrelevant and misguided. in this essay, i will be arguing, on the contrary, that the universalist’s argument, much like its critique of ethnophilosophical reason, mistakes the nature, significance and necessity of such a resistance (rather than original) identity that the ethnophilosophical project promises. i will also argue that the fabrication of such an identity facilitates the avoidance of an uncritical submersion in the universal as well as a proper conception of an african development. this, furthermore, is the only avenue by which the imperialistic ontological space of universal humanism, in which most universalist claims are rooted, can be made more polygonal and mutually beneficial for alternative cultural particulars. l’homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers (man is born free but is everywhere in chains) --rousseau the work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for particular purpose. --wittgenstein introduction: on the universal and the particular philosophers celebrate perennial problems. one of such problems is that of universals and their relationship to particular concrete objects. from the specifically metaphysical altercations between the realists and the nominalists, we can abstract certain culturally specific problematics: how does the universal category of, say, the human appropriate 1 particular cultural experiences? or, to use a heideggerian terminology, what does it mean for various human beings to be? consequently, how can we theorize the african’s “being-in-the-world”? and, what role does the african philosophical project play in such theorisation? african philosophers’ confrontation with these problems has been particularly mediated by the need to specify the conditions necessary for the possibility of an african philosophy and development. in other words, given the unique confrontation with europe that gave rise to the body of works we refer to as “african philosophy,” african scholars were faced with the problem of identifying certain cores of african experiences that will serve as the basis for deriving philosophy from a specific cultural environment. they saw the need to differentiate the african experience from specifically western experience and its influence on philosophical speculation. and on the basis of this differentiation, to reconstruct an african identity that will serve as the fulcrum for determining a path for african development after colonisation. the debate in african philosophy has been ably divided between the universalists and the culturalists (or, in strictly african philosophical terms, between the ethnophilosophers and the professional philosophers).1 the universalists contend that the only justification for an “african” philosophy is as a particular instantiation of a universal philosophy originating in the west. on the other hand, the culturalists argue that all philosophies are particular cultural phenomena that follow specific cultural evolutionary pathways. in the controversy concerning both the proper methodology of doing this african philosophy and the means of achieving an african identity suitable for the proper 2 conception of an african development, the universalist seems to have won. however i will be arguing that this triumph is actually pyrrhic in the sense that what the universalist seems to have gained both methodologically and substantively, is at the great cost of misunderstanding the issue of an african postcolonial identity. specifically, my argument is that it is only an uncritical adoption of universalism in the shape of the concept of the human that can warrant its critique of the ethnophilosophical project central to the culturalists. the strategy i will adopt is to examine a recent universalist claim that maligns the necessity of an african identitarian project as a veritable path towards a beneficial conception of african development. the universalist position is ably represented by paulin hountondji, kwasi wiredu and kwame anthony appiah. according to hountondji, “by ‘african philosophy’ i mean a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by africans themselves and described as philosophical by their authors themselves.”2 this characterisation stems from his contention that philosophy itself is a theoretical discipline—like physics, mathematics and linguistics—with a methodological orientation and some set of substantive issues with which practitioners are preoccupied. philosophy, for hountondji, begins when the discipline discursively begins to confront its own problematics. on this tradition of discursiveness, he writes: …philosophy never stops; its very existence lies in the to and fro of free discussion, without which there is no philosophy. it is not a closed system but a history, a debate that goes on from generation to generation, in which every thinker, every author, engages in total responsibility: i know i am responsible for what i say, for the theories i put forward….a philosophical…work…is intelligible only as a moment in a debate that sustains and transcends it. it always refers to antecedent positions, either to refute them or to confirm and enrich them. it takes on meaning only in relation to that history, in relation to the term of an ever-changing debate in which the sole stable element is the constant reference to one self-same 3 object, to one sphere of experience, the characterization of which, incidentally, is itself part of the evolution.3 given this explanation, authentic philosophical cogitations become textual, while orature (fables, dynastic poems, epics, proverbs, myths, and so on) pales as only a pretext of the tradition of discursivity peculiar to a universal philosophy. hountondji’s absolutism about the theoretical circumference of autonomous philosophy therefore excludes the ethnophilosophers’ conception of philosophy as primarily a cultural field preoccupied with the analysis of oral literature and other items of the preliterate culture. the theoretical move, by ethnologists, social scientists and cultural anthropologists, from a descriptive analysis of human cultural ideas and institutions to the attempt to study “… beliefs and values and draws conclusions about the mode of thought that are imputed to their formulation and observance…”4 is, for hountondji, an unjustifiable ethnophilosophical strategy. wiredu’s universalist argument is also very simple. for him, the theoretical and critical nature of philosophy cannot afford the ethnophilosophical view of it as an uncritical communal undertaking. the adequacy of any philosophy has nothing to do with its origination but rather with its discursivity: its ability to “generate theories that can illuminate the problems of the day” and thus provide “the context of ideas within which particular choices and preferences in the realm of action—whether economic, political, cultural or scientific—can be made.”5 in this sense, philosophy has a cogent relationship with science or rather with the habits of mind characteristic of science: “habits of exactness and rigour in thinking, the pursuit of systematic coherence and the experimental approach.”6 although he is specifically clear on the culture-relativity of philosophy, he is insistent that philosophy 4 can be universal.7 such a universal philosophy, for instance, would be aided by what wiredu calls “the fundamental biological unity of the human species.” this derives from the fact that “there is a human way of developing in which instinctual drives are in due course transformed into structured thought, discourse and action.” the basic essentials of this process proceed “in similar ways among all human beings.”8 hountondji’s and wiredu’s universalism is marshaled against the culturalists’ position summed up in hountondji’s pejorative term: ethnophilosophy. the ethnophilosophical reason is represented fundamentally by what hountondji sees as an attempt to postulate unanimity in philosophical beliefs among africans, and hence to uncritically initiate a confrontation with the african traditional past. on this understanding, “critics of ethnophilosophy [therefore] argue that a focus on the past detracts from a critical posture that evaluates all practices in terms of what they contribute to the liberation of africa... for african philosophy need not express a particular outlook for africans.”9 in “humanistic cultural universalism,” oyeshile provides a critical elaboration of this critique of ethnophilosophical reason, and particularly an argument for a cultural universalism that can motivate africa’s search for a paradigm of an authentic postcolonial development. though not really directed at the ethnophilosophical project in a way that hountondji’s and wiredu’s critiques were, his critical analysis also negates ethnophilosophy and especially its search for an african postcolonial identity. his basic argument in the essay is that “african development should only be sought in universalist terms which should involve certain humanistic values.” for this reason, therefore, “most works concerning african identity are now irrelevant, and if they are not, they are 5 misguided.” the urgent task in africa and of the african scholars is, in this regard, “human development in all its ramifications and not the assertion of the african personality (identity) which was more relevant at a particular period in our history.”10 oyeshile’s two claims are that (a) a humanistic cultural universalism provides a veritable starting point for launching the project of an african development, and (b) this universalism excludes a search for a cultural identity from the vantage point of the african. in his own admission, oyeshile’s argument draws largely from appiah’s universalist conception of african philosophy and his critique of african cultural nationalism (read: ethnophilosophy). appiah’s universalism is based on the contention that cultural nationalism in its pan-african guise is really a racial construct created by europe as a subjugating strategy. as such, it assumes a cultural or racial unity of the african and african diasporic people. however, according to appiah, since the biological and cultural arguments for races failed to establish their existence, then pan africanism fails also for that reason. its vision of a completely different or a completely homogeneous africa in dialectical opposition to the west is also false. this is the fulcrum of appiah’s thesis. if it is correct, for him (as well as for hountondji), to argue that africa really does not have a common traditional culture, a common language, a common religion, or even belong to a common race, then a case can be made for the alignment of africa to the universe of humanity. 11 the first part of this case is that africa, apart from being a geographical entity accommodating diverse peoples and cultures, “shares too many problems and projects to be distracted by a bogus basis for solidarity.” these problems include those that every modernising region is facing in a rapidly globalising world: common ecological problems; a situation of 6 dependency; the problem of racism; the possibilities of the development of regional markets and local circuits of production; and so on.12 thus, since we as africans are now confronted with a new self more individualistic and atomic than the self of the precapitalist societies, then its inescapability becomes something to celebrate. within this modern society therefore, what exists is not the cult of difference or race but rather the solidarity of humanity. the second part of appiah’s case is that, like every other universalists, he also deploys arguments for an autonomous philosophy with a substantive concern for certain fundamental problems. these problems—causation, good and evil, mind-body, justice, illusion, reason, reality, truth, etc—may really appear western but are actually universal in scope. while these problems may be seen as constituting the core of the western philosophical tradition, appiah contends that they can as well be seen “as growing out of a history of systematic reflection on widespread, prereflective beliefs about the nature of humankind, about the purposes, and about our knowledge of and place in the cosmos.”13 something therefore counts as philosophy if it confronts these issues critically with the required “traditional philosophical method.” (we therefore arrive at the logic of hountondji’s definition of african philosophy.) for appiah, it would be extremely difficult to conceive of a human culture where nothing like these fundamental issues is present or that does not have “any crucial organizing concepts.” essentially therefore, for appiah, we [africans] will solve our problems if we see them as human problems arising out of a special situation, and we shall not solve them if we see them as african problems, generated by our being somehow unlike others… if there is a lesson in the broad shape of this circulation of cultures, it is surely that we are all already contaminated by each other, that there is no longer fully autochthonous echt-african culture awaiting 7 salvage by our artists (just as there is, of course, no american culture without african roots).14 africans must, in other words, jettison the illusion of a unique african identity in a global world that is not only interdependent but also rapidly integrating. furthermore, the project of an african development becomes realisable within this humanistic universalism that ensures cultural interrelationship rather than insularity. it seems quite obvious how oyeshile could arrive at his argument of a humanistic universalism unburdened by the unnecessary encumbrances of cultural nationalism and its identity illusion. following appiah, the two horns of his contention becomes clearer. on the one hand, the issue of african identity was relevant “as a rallying point for a people who wanted to have a belief in themselves, a people who wanted to be capable of determining their own destiny in the face of motley values.” on the other hand, such a reason no longer applies because “the identity issue does not address the urgent problems confronting africa. it lays more than enough stress on the african personality rather than on the compelling problems of scientific development, hunger, religious emancipation and political anarchy.”15 in a straightforward reflection of the overt optimism of appiah’s universalism, oyeshile also remarks that of course, it is a truism that africa is currently enmeshed in political and economic problems. solutions to these problems would go a long way to engender development. however, these problems can only be solved if we as africans see ourselves as an integral part of the world order. it is then that political rights and other political values will be respected by african political leaders. it is also then that the goal of economic emancipation can be pursued vigorously.16 what i have done in this section of the essay is to lay down the case for universalism and the impossibility of an unnecessarily provincial burden of identity 8 within its imperative. the most common denominator among the universalists is their trenchant critique of the (african) identity issue. this is followed, especially in appiah and oyeshile, by a simplistic, one-dimensional optimism in the efficacy of humanistic values and concert as the ultimate panacea for the resolution of human problems. though oyeshile does not seriously consider metaphilosophical issues in his critique, philosophy plays a pivotal role in the construal of their humanism. in the next section, i will critically examine how a supposedly universal construal of philosophy led to a “universal” humanism whose ethnocentric bent constrict the ontological space. it will be clear from this that most conceptions of the universal use it as a conceptual forum for a particular identity manifestation. philosophy and the shape of the human the philosophical enterprise, as we noted above, is crucial to the universalists’ conception of a viable universal humanism. it is equally significant for the specification of the conditions for an african philosophical project oriented towards a postcolonial african identity and development. the universalists divorce an authentic philosophical discourse from a purely provincial need. for them, philosophy must be autonomous of all identity issues since it promises a virile humanistic universalism. after all, philosophy, according to the argument, is the ultimate human achievement! how does this idea of autonomous philosophy contribute to our formulation of the utility of african identity contra the universalist’s contention? as i will be showing, a critical interrogation of these concepts (i.e. the human, the philosophical) will lead to the particularist concepts, theories, canons and identities which have been denied to individual cultures in the putative necessity of universal humanism.17 9 the foundation of modern philosophy is supposedly derived from descartes’ unique confrontation with the perennial problems of philosophy. basically, the cartesian weltanschauung differentiates between the human and the animal domain and on this basis claims that the mental is different from the physical. in short, it demanded the predominance of epistemology in modern philosophy. thus, from the presumption that philosophy is a uniquely human phenomenon, cartesians postulate the absolute autonomy of philosophy. they presuppose that there is a distinct set of philosophical problems independent of culture, society and history. for them, philosophy stands outside the various conventions on which people base their social practices and transcends the cultural heritage and political struggles of people.18 on this account, hountondji, wiredu, appiah and oyeshile would be cartesians. the point is not really a strange one given the scientific positivism consequent upon such a view of philosophy. it is in the cartesian philosophical framework, that is, that we witness the unique coincidence of episteme and scientia. yet, descartes, a 17th century french philosopher, scientist and mathematician, was only responding to specific historical circumstances in relation to the medieval period. for example, the rise of science and the advent of the capitalist production. cornel west explores the metaphilosophical insights in heidegger’s, wittgenstein’s and dewey’s metaphilosophical arguments against the ahistorical character of cartesian autonomous philosophy. through his critique of the historical hermeneutics of heidegger, the cultural descriptions of wittgenstein and the pragmatic orientation of dewey, he arrives at a definition of afro-american philosophy as “…the interpretation of afro-american history, highlighting the cultural heritage and political struggles, which 10 provides desirable norms that should regulate responses to particular challenges presently confronting afro-americans.”19 it is a wonder that in spite of this particularist definition west goes on to explicate a humanistic view that can guide an understanding of afro-american culture and politics. i will argue later why his humanism is more robust and critical than that of oyeshile and the others. but for now, we need to interrogate what made the cartesian conception of autonomous philosophy a unique ontological strategy for invading the space of the universal anthropos. i suspect that an attempt to answer a similar question would have given oyeshile and the universalist movement a critical outlook on “the universal.” in his discussion of the utility of social memory—of preservation, selection, elimination and invention—in the process of identity formation, mazrui gives us an opening into the analysis of the western appropriation of the ontological space of the human. this began with the arbitrary incorporation of ancient greece into the ancestral lineage of euro-american cultural heritage. this, for mazrui, is a blatant case of false memory—inscribing into one’s past what is originally not a part of it—as well as that of macro-plagiarism, “a massive borrowing by one civilization from another in a manner which deliberately obscures origins and denies acknowledgement and attribution.”20 since philosophy as the ultimate rational enterprise is putatively the discovery of the greeks, the archetypal humans (from whom hegel’s absolute spirit began its nonhistorical march towards substantive objectivity and “essential universality” culminating in euro-american cultures), the cartesian autonomous philosophy is thereby complemented by an ahistorical conception of humanism as “something essential, above and beyond the accidents of historical or national difference.”21 11 the history of the signification of the “human” is certainly one that bears out what a commentator has described as the humpty dumbtean conclusion that the meaning of humanism belongs to politics rather than to semantics. politics, that is, speaks to the issue of which, among all the available meanings, is to be master. according to davies, for the meanings of a powerful and complex word are never a matter for lexicography alone. they are tied inescapably to the linguistic and cultural authority, real, absent or desired, of those who use it. the important question, over and above what the word means in a particular context, is why and how that meaning matters, and for whom.22 a panoramic view of all perspectives on the concept—civic humanism, protestant humanism, rationalistic humanism, romantic humanism, positivistic humanism, liberal humanism, nazi humanism, heidegger’s antihumanist humanism, and the humanist antihumanism of foucault and althusser—reveals that they have been imperial, “they speak of the human in the accents and interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.”23 this exclusionary as well as smothering element is what symonds traced from the discovery of romantic humanism to the dawn of modernity in europe. for him, the essence of humanism consisted in a new and vital perception of the dignity of man as a rational being apart from theological determinations, and in the further perception that classic literature alone displayed human nature in the plenitude of intellectual and moral freedom… the study of greek opened up philosophical horizons far beyond the dream-world of the churchmen and the monks; it stimulated the germs of science, suggested new astronomical hypotheses, and indirectly led to the discovery of america…24 we seem to have, on symonds’ testimonies, imperial colonisation flowing from a romantic conception of the human! we therefore arrive at the triumph of the arnoldian “central, truly human point of view”: essential, above and beyond historical or national differences. 12 we must wonder, as davies does and most of the universalists do not, about the accent placed on “central,” “truly human” and “human.” the implication seems to be that every appeal to an abstract and essential humanism is an appropriation of at worse a suffocating, and at best a discompassing perspective that perpetuates the domination of those who are perceived to be inauthentically human. thus, each of us lives our human-ness as a uniquely individual experience; but that experience, we are asked to feel, is part of a larger, all-embracing humanity, a “human condition”, to which the great poets of the european tradition, homer and dante and chaucer and shakespeare and milton and goethe, can give us the key.25 however, given this protean adaptability of the term, it would only be logical to explore its nebulous boundaries and depths from a particular human perspective. oyeshile is not cautious enough to investigate the specific historical and local interests that may be at work within such a grand concept. this is necessary because universalism is meant to dissolve such particularities like race, sex, class, culture from which most people experience human-ness. according to davies, “humanism” is an anachronism that is still deeply embedded in contemporary consciousness and everyday common sense to the extent that it requires a conscious effort, every time someone appeals to “human nature” or “the human condition”, to recall how recent such notions are, and how specific to a particular history and point of view, and how very odd it would seem, in cultures historically or ethnologically unlike our own, to separate out and privilege “man” in this way.26 this cultural appropriation of the anthropos is followed by a denial of an african influence not only on the greek cultural heritage, but on world history as a whole. in other words, there is an ontological attempt to efface black, african identity from the template of a supposed universal culture. gordon theorises this as the ontological attempt at the phenomenological invisibility or disappearance of africans and afro-americans. 13 the existential-phenomenological approach of gordon theorises the interactive dynamics of the ontologies of white and black ego-genesis and the resultant “imperial battles for ontological space” (as a space of self-positing and its realisation). these battles are imperial because euro-americans have defined the ontological space of white egogenesis in such a way that makes it possible to evade the humanity of africans.27 in his account of bad faith, gordon argues that since human beings generally deal inauthentically with the specific—political, economic, racial or, for gordon and sartre, ontological—hindrances between self-positing and self-realisation, it implies that the self’s project of being always falls short of its projected ideal. however, in bad faith, we pretend to a greater degree of self-integration than our ego has in fact achieved. this pretense must however be concealed through certain evasive or compensatory existential activity of exploitation. for the white, this manifests through an acute racial stereotyping, a “projective non-seeing” that performs “the phenomenological disappearance” of black humanity.28 this constitutive act of absence, invisibility, displacement and anonymity is …fundamentally phenomenological, that is an absence that is constituted as a meaning in the white consciousness. this spell of phenomenological invisibility is an important contribution of the european and euroamerican philosophical consciousness to the larger encompassing cloud of non-seeing conjured by european imperialism to veil the humanity of africans.29 the result is that the formation of the white ego is simultaneously the deformation of the black ego. paradoxically, however, in denying “the forces of civilizational origins” and in the effacement of african humanity, it becomes quite obvious that the euro-american cultural establishment unwittingly undermines its quest for the universal.30 thus, if a people’s humanity is seriously interrogated as the africans’ was in colonialism, then why should it not be logical to question the putative universal 14 humanism? that is, if they have been ontologically effaced from the anthropos, what possible means could they have of participating in it? it must therefore become obvious why it is really awkward to claim, as oyeshile does, that the issue of self-identity of the africans was only useful at a point in their cultural development. on the contrary, a culture’s dynamic relation with others is, inter alia, a constant reevaluation of its identity and esteem, “the act of self-definition forever remains open-ended, with no guarantee of triumph. indeed, the process takes precedent over the result, since any static self-identity soon disintegrates the self.”31 and since the ontologically invisible africans would always experience europe and america as the questioning of their very existence, oyeshile would definitely be wrong to claim that any attempt to reclaim that identity is irrelevant or misguided. it becomes unimaginative to formulate the counter-thesis that it is the problem of identity rather than that of development that is primary for africans. without the former, the latter is meaningless. what then makes this reclamation possible? african experience and the constitution of modernity friedrich nietzsche, the ancestor for many dimensions of antihumanism, has argued, in human all too human, that all philosophers involuntarily think of “man” as an aeterna veritas, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things…lack of historical sense is the family failing of all philosophers; many, without being aware of it, even take the most recent manifestation of man, such as has risen under the impress of certain religions, even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one has to start out…32 what does a “historical sense” require in the attempt to ensure the phenomenological visibility of the africans in the ontological struggles for relevance? gordon argues that 15 the question of existence is, in itself, an empty one; it is always a conjunctive affair. in other words, the question must always be situated in the existential realities of theorising blackness and the african. according to him, at the heart of existential thought are two questions; “what are we”? and “what shall we do?” these questions can be translated into questions of identity and normative action. they are questions, further, of ontological and teleological significance, for the former addresses being and the latter addresses what to become—in a word, “purpose.”33 since the elements of african cultural identity have been undergoing significant changes in response to their confrontation with european imperialism and american racism, it would seem necessary to reformulate a new context for the confrontation with the questions of identity and normative action. i suspect that oyeshile and most of the universalists mistook the need for such a “resistance identity” for the attempt to glorify a “mystique of pure coherence” that is usually associated with the ethnophilosophers’ perception of the traditional african past. in constructing such a resistance identity, some kind of reinvention would serve the africans well. many african scholars, including appiah, see the need for such an imagined locus of solidarity. like appiah, mazrui argues that “real pan-africanism must go beyond the twin stimuli of poetry and imperialism. pan-africanism is based on a positive false memory—that africa was divided by colonialism and was previously one.”34 this project of reclamation radically confronts the necessity of an ethnophilosophical examination of the african cultural past beyond any romantic idealisation. henry gives two reasons for the necessity of a phenomenological analysis of african traditional heritage. 16 one, through a shutzian (reference to alfred shutz, the phenomenologist) proprietary relationship, african philosophers have a significant tie with these cultural constructs as invaluable properties in a way such that “expectation, (particularly of continuity), obligations and constraints are imposed upon us. this legacy is our responsibility in ways that cannot be for non-african groups.” we are therefore saddled with the responsibility of preserving and developing “this heritage by examining it ethnophilosophically, by reflecting on it in [our] own lived experience, or collectively with contemporaries and consociates.” two, henry further contends that this proprietary relation with the symbols and discourses of traditional africa is extended to a unique egogenetic relation with the predecessors in such a way that the relations “establish certain common cultural or mythopoetic elements in the formation of african, africanamerican, and african-caribbean egos.”35 this formative role of the cultural elements will constitute them as common elements that will facilitate the self-reflection of african/a philosophers on their own ego-genetic processes, and on the cultural identity of an african/a philosophy. after immersing ourselves in historical thinking, a bit of nietzschean modesty is in order. this is because nietzsche holds that the “virtue of modesty” is required for historical philosophising. this takes many dimensions. the first is that after the ontological determination of the self-identity of africans and african philosophy, african philosophers must go on to confront the socio-existential dimension of the african predicament that bears directly on the problems of african development. this is generally the problem of how african cultures can be modern. this, after all, is the basis for the universalism of appiah, hountondji, wiredu and lately oyeshile. 17 however, as the preceding arguments have revealed, modernity is originally and incredibly constituted as a western—euro-american—phenomenon together with its exclusionary ontology. west rightly defines modernity as the descriptive notion that connotes the historical state of affairs characterized by an abundance of wealth resulting from the industrial and technological revolution and the ensuing cultural isolation and fragmentation due to a disintegration of closely-knit communities and the decline of religious systems.36 the question of how african can become modern is only meaningful from the background of the rescue of african cultural visibility from the anonymity of euroamerican philosophical and cultural imperialism and humanism. a regained cultural distinctiveness provides a strong arsenal for meeting a modernity defined by science and technology. in other words, since the scientism of euro-american modernity requires the “phenomenological disappearance” of myth, tradition, religion and other supposedly extra-scientific discourses, and since these “extras” are crucial for the authentic formation of an african postcolonial identity or ego, then a dialectical relationship between the two will be significant for the constitution of an african modernity as an important dimension of the modernity project itself. africa’s relationship with euro-american modernity constitutes an ambivalent challenge: that of participating in its achievement without simultaneously surrendering to its ethnocentric underpinnings. here, we achieve our second point of nietzschean modesty through benhabib. in “cultural complexity,” she also confronts the question of ethnocentric discourse and global imperative: “whence does the moral imperative to treat others with universal respect and according to egalitarian reciprocity derive?” she replies: 18 i think the only honest and sensible response…is that indeed these norms only make sense against the background of the hermeneutic horizon of modernity; but also to point out that modernity, although the most significant elements constituting it were first assembled in the west, is a world-wide process and phenomenon. from its very inception, the dynamic of modernity has set world-historical forces into motion which have in turn transformed it into a common human project, and not just a western one. once the ideas of universal equality, liberty, and brotherhood—and eventually sisterhood—were formulated through the political revolutions of modernity, there no longer was a historical option of going back to premodern conceptions.37 even in this context of a world-historical modernity, an african dimension of such a modernity—the challenge of nation-building, of evolving viable and appropriate democratic institutions; the problems of inculcating a political morality and eradicating rampant political corruption; the problems of traditional moral standards disintegrating vis-à-vis urbanization; and even the problems of aids and globalisation—requires, still following benhabib’s concession, “the continuing identity of a society and culture” which is based upon “its capacity to deal with outside challenges and contingencies while also retaining the belief of its member in its normative systems and value structures.”38 we next turn to the implications of these ruminations for the constitution of a universal humanism not partial to one imperial perspective. the imperative of resignification the fundamental argument i have been developing hitherto is that oyeshile’s humanist universalism is not only myopic about the formation, significance and necessity of a postcolonial african identity that is resistant rather than a glorification of a mystique, his theoretical framework betrays a naïve understanding of the complex amalgam of issues that accompany the imperial conception of such universalism. in other words, he fails to 19 analyse critically the concept of the universal in its particularity and ideality; for example, that the paradox that humanity is one and many. we cannot argue that since the supposed “human”, the cartesian subject, is really invented in the image of euro-america—that is, this subject “is not a woman, not black, not a migrant, not marginal, etc”—then we should abandon the concept or its general rhetoric as “a hopelessly contaminated concept, to be thrown out with the bathwater of humanist delusion.”39 this, i suspect, would be the fundamental objection of the universalists. but i maintain that an awareness of this delusion strengthens the concept and guides one against any uncritical humanistic optimism, pace oyeshile and others. it is the humanist delusions that necessitates the imperative of resignification. the first point in that project is to note that before the conscription of a humanist universalism to the processes of imperial power, conquest and empire fed by the desire for the “discovery of the future,” the early humanists—before “humanism”—were orientated on the excitement surrounding the “recovery of the past.” this implicitly identitarian orientation was broadened by their peripatetic desires. i suppose that such nomadic contact beyond their own provincialities enlarged their humanistic sensibilities and sensitivities beyond the desire to dominate. their physical and intellectual peregrination led to the development of inter-generational and inter-racial collaboration around the theme of friendship unmarred by ideological perceptions. put in other words, just like machiavelli who, through the pages of the recovered ancients’ manuscripts, felt their generosity and kindness (humanità) in responding to his modern probing, the early humanists too were generous in their accommodation of those who do not share their 20 peculiarities and cultural milieu—as long as they were humans. and this is in spite of being partial to their own linguistic idioms.40 in the early humanists, we have the form of an encompassing humanist universalism that is multivocal; a coherent vision of the human from its multidimensionality or concrete plurality rather than in a hollowed, ethnocentric singularity.41 this leads to the second point in the project of resignification. once again, let us return to benhabib’s struggle with “the problem of universalism and concrete ethical communities” or what she calls “the problem of the concrete universal.” the concept of concrete universality has to do with the problem of situating or concretizing the universal. this concept, for her, recognises the distinction between the “two visions of universalism”: “one which considers the other as a generalized other, as a being entitled to the same rights and duties which we would grant ourselves, and the other which sees the human person as a ‘concrete other’ with specific histories, needs, and trajectories.”42 contrary to the essentialism of an imperial humanism, benhabib argues that [m]y anti-essentialism is simply introducing this moment of narrative articulation [in the sense of an “account giving”] into the concept of culture and seeing how members of cultures identify themselves as members in creating narratives of belonging. these narratives of belonging, of history, of memory, always have references to other narratives, to other moments of identification. i’m interested in the interaction between the self and other, the “we” and the “they.” and i think this is a universal aspect of all human communities. we are different from those over there, on the other side, insofar as we narratively identify ourselves with a group.43 such an anti-essentialist reading of culture and the universal is similar to west’s idea of a humanist tradition of african-american thought and behaviour. his basic argument is that culture is more fundamental than politics in regard to afro-american 21 self-understanding, “it presupposes that afro-american cultural perceptions provide a broader and richer framework for understanding the afro-american experience than political perceptions.”44 however, out of all the traditions that provide an explanatory matrix—the vitalist, the rationalist, the existentialist and the humanist traditions—west favours the humanist conception of afro-american history because it neither romanticises nor reject afro-american culture (as the vitalist and the rationalist traditions did). rather, a humanist understanding accepts this culture for what it is, the expression of an oppressed human community imposing its distinctive form of order on an existential chaos, explaining its political predicament, preserving its self-respect, and projecting its own special hope for the future… the humanist tradition provides a cultural springboard useful in facing the ever-present issue of self-identity for afro-americans and join their political struggle to other progressive elements in american society.45 it seems that benhabib’s and west’s portrayal of a humanistic universalism gives more hope for a culture’s advancement than oyeshile’s. this is because it becomes a concept that allows one to gaze into one’s humanity from the perspective of a cultural past. it has the fundamental task of enlarging the ontological and political spaces of existence for the self-definition and self-determination of all particular cultures. it is exactly this significant cultural mooring that oyeshile denies as being unnecessary for the understanding of african development. without such a root or self-image, however, africa’s gaze into a developmental future will always be with perplexed eyes. 22 notes 1. this characterisation is really simplistic, but it mirrors the most important schism between the universalists and the particularists. this basic, unsophisticated distinction has been elaborated into four methodological approaches: the ethnophilosophical (or descriptive) school, the sagacious (or sage-ethnological) school, the nationalist (or nationalist-ideological-political) school, and the professional (or linguistic-analytic) school. in recent times however, there had been other methodological schools: the hermeneutical (or phenomenological) approach, the narrative approach (or the narrative-hermeneutic approach), literary/artistic approach, and so on. 2. paulin hountondji, african philosophy: myth and reality, trans. by henri evans with an introduction by abiola irele (london: hutchinson university library for africa, 1983), p. 33. 3. ibid. pp. 72, 83. 4. barry hallen, “modes of thought, ordinary language and cognitive diversity,” in claude sumner and samuel wolde yohannes (eds.) perspectives in african philosophy: an anthology on “problematics of an african philosophy: twenty years after (1976—1996)” (addis ababa: addis ababa university press, 2002), p. 215. emphasis in original. 5. olusegun oladipo, philosophy and the african experience: the contributions of kwasi wiredu (ibadan: hope publications, 1996), p. 17. 6. kwasi wiredu, philosophy and an african culture (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1980), p. 32. 7. for a theoretical elaboration of his universalism, see kwasi wiredu, cultural universals and particulars: an african perspective (bloomington, indiana: indiana university press, 1996). 8. kwasi wiredu, “canons of conceptualisation,” the monist: an international journal of general philosophical inquiry, vol. 76, no. 4 (october, 1993), p. 461. emphasis in original 9. tommy l. lott and john p. pittman, “introduction to part three,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy (malden, ma: blackwell, 2003), p. 153. 10. olatunji a. oyeshile, “humanistic cultural universalism as a veritable basis for africa’s development,” concordia: international journal of philosophy, 51, 2007, pp. 43, 44. 23 11. kwame anthony appiah, in my father’s house: africa in the philosophy of culture (oxford: oxford university press, 1992), p. 26. 12. ibid. p. 180. the preceding quote is from p. 26. 13. ibid. p. 86. 14. ibid. pp. 136, 155. 15. olatunji oyeshile, “humanistic cultural universalism,” p. 48, 49. 16. ibid. pp. 57-58. 17. in formulating this strategy, i have simply appropriated fashina’s argument against appiah’s critique of nativism. the argument reads thus: but i think appiah dismisses the [cultural] nationalists too easily. what are we to say about a cultural nationalist who studies the concepts and theories of other cultures seriously not because she mistakes them for universals but because she believes that this would lead to the “particularist” concepts, theories, and canons which she asserts of her own cultural productions? see dipo fashina’s review of appiah’s in my father’s house, ethics, vol. 104, no. 4, july 1994, p. 901. 18. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy, p. 8. 19. ibid. p. 11. 20. ali a. mazrui, “cultural amnesia, cultural nostalgia and false memory: africa’s identity crisis revisited,” african philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2000, p. 92. 21. tony davies, humanism (london and new york: routledge, 1997), p. 19. i owe my critical approach to davies’ historical excursion into the signification of the concept of humanism. 22. ibid. p. 6. 23. ibid. p. 131. 24. symonds, j. a., the renaissance in italy, 1898, pp. 52, 2 cited in davies, humanism, pp. 22, 23. 25. davies, humanism, pp. 21-22. emphasis added. 26. ibid. p. 25. 24 27. paget henry, “african-american philosophy: a caribbean perspective,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy, p. 52. see also lewis gordon, bad faith and antiblack racism (new jersey: humanities press, 1995), and fanon and the crisis of european man (new york: routledge, 1995). 28. lewis gordon, fanon and the crisis of european man, p. 24, cited in henry, “african-american philosophy,” p. 52. 29. ibid. 30. cf. ali mazrui, “cultural amnesia…” p. 96. 31. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,’ p. 25. 32. friedrich nietzsche, human all too human, 1880, cited in davies, humanism, pp. 32-33. emphasis added. 33. lewis r. gordon, “african-american existential philosophy,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy, p. 34. 34. ali mazrui, “cultural amnesia…’ p. 90. 35. paget henry, “african-american philosophy,” p. 56. (the preceding quotes are from the same page.) henry makes use of shutz in methodologically constructing ways of relating to the ego-activities of traditional african predecessors whose lived experiences do not overlap with ours. shutz argues that we can reach the world of the predecessors through records, documents, artifacts and other expressions of their subjectivity left behind; or through a living person who may have had a contact with them. though this relation lacks the reciprocity of faceto-face contact, one can achieve such reciprocity through what shutz calls the bequeathing of property (as cultural heritages) in which the predecessors continue to influence our lives. 36. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,” p. 12. 37. seyla benhabib, “cultural complexity, moral interdependence, and the global dialogic community,” in martha nussbaum and jonathan glover (eds.) women, culture and development: a study of human capabilities (oxford: clarendon press, 1995), pp. 252-253. 38. ibid. p. 238. 39. tony davies, humanism, p. 59. 40. ibid. pp. 78, 79. 25 41. such a conception of a singular “hu-man-ism” can be traced to a huge editorial and interpretive mistake around the quotation: “what a piece of work is man.” this can be referred to as the most distinguished of humanist mottos. yet, this quotation appeared in shakespeare’s hamlet (ii, ii) as: “what a piece of work is a man!” the omission of the indefinite “a” shifts the burden of interpretation from plurality to singularity, a “generic inclusiveness of the human” limited by an ethnocentric folie des grandeurs. 42. seyla benhabib, “concrete universality and critical theory,” an interview with alfredo gomez-muller and gabriel rockhill on june 16th 2006. interestingly, this interview appeared in the same volume of concordia that featured oyeshile’s universalist rejection of african identity. 43. ibid. p. 34. 44. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,” p. 13. 45. ibid. pp. 24, 27. 26 190-note for authors prajñâ vihâra, volume 7, number 2, july-december, 2006, 157-183 157 © 2000 by assumption university press contrasting the philosophy of life in eastern philosophy and in the philosophy of aquinas from the perspective of immanence and transcendence eui-chai tjeng sogang university, korea abstract within asia, the tradition of western christian thought coexists with eastern thought. in this paper, i wish to compare, contrast and synthesize the conceptions of life found in asian philosophies and religions, on the one hand, and on the other hand what i consider the essence of western christian philosophy, namely the thought of st. thomas aquinas. this is for the purpose of finding a common culture of mankind based on the love of life. through mutual understanding and cooperation christianity and chinese civilization can contribute to the formation of a unified asia and a unified mankind. introduction today, due to the astonishing advances in science and technology and the corresponding expansion of human knowledge, a true unity of mankind is rapidly becoming a reality. however, because of the historical, regional differences in philosophy, religion, ideology, and interest, it is also likely that the world will experience much conflict and confusion in the process of achieving this unity. as the birthplace of some of the most profound philosophies and religions, asia will play a crucial role in this process. without a unified asia, a unified world can scarcely be imagined. among the asian civilizations, the chinese civilization is one of the oldest and richest. it is then only appropriate that we initiate a conversation between the chinese civilization and christian philosophy as we enter the new millenium. this is made even more timely and urgent since it is clear that the pacific rim will increasingly become the world center of thought, economics, politics and culture in the future. the chinese civilization has never been expansionist, but rather peace-loving and has always been able to absorb and indigenize foreign cultural influences. as one of the oldest civilizations in the world, chinese civilization has encountered, and has many times been invaded by foreign civilizations. however, it has always absorbed those cultures to create dazzling syntheses. moreover, the chinese civilization has helped in the further development of all those cultures that it came into contact with, providing them with new incentives and directions. in the recent era, she has absorbed and indigenized communism. now, as we enter the new millennium china will have to meet the challenge of a global culture that is increasingly becoming one. in this process, it cannot avoid an encounter with christianity. during the past 2000 years, christian thought has been the spiritual foundation on which the western civilization has been built. on the other hand, by undergoing a process of indigenization through its encounter with chinese thought, christianity needs to absorb all the nutrients that the rich soil of chinese civilization has to offer. through mutual understanding and cooperation, christianity and the chinese civilization can contribute to the formation of a unified asia and a unified mankind. at the same time, christianity and the western civilization need to be aware of the fact that since the latter half of the 20th century, as western colonialism came to an end, the younger generations in many asian countries began to express an attachment to their traditional cultures ever more frequently. during the past few centuries western imperial powers, by using their advanced science and technology (guns, cannons and the art of war), have colonized vast stretches of asia. however, they have not been able to dominate asia in cultural and spiritual terms. as far as i can see, the younger generations of asia are delving into the study of their traditional cultures with increasing conviction, partly as a reaction against the past western dominance and partly based on the newly found conviction that their traditional culture is superior to that of the west. there are many instances of young intellectuals with doctorates from leading universities of the west who have been absorbing themselves in the study of asian 158 prajñâ vihâra thought, especially their own native thought. as we embark on the process of promoting the unity of all mankind, christian philosophy, chinese culture, and all other religions and cultures of asia have to take as their starting point the most basic point on which all can agree. in other words, we need to start our conversation from something that all people, individuals, religions can accept as being the most fundamental and common. then we should try to build on that point so as to build a common culture for all mankind. this common point, i think, is none other than love of life. that is why i have titled my paper “contrasting the philosophy of life in eastern philosophy and in the philosophy of aquinas from the perspective of immanence and transcendence“. in this paper, i wish to compare, contrast and synthesize in some sense the conceptions of life found in asian philosophies and religions, on the one hand, and on the other hand what i consider the distillation of christian philosophy, namely aquinas’ thought. this is with a view towards constructing a common culture of mankind based on the love of life. in 1991, sogang university of korea founded the research institute for life and culture. at that time, korean society was witness to a rash of horrible crimes such as child kidnapping and murder while environment destruction through air and water pollution was becoming increasingly acute as the result of rapid industrialization. in response to these problems, various governmental agencies, academic institutions, the media, and religious organizations convened seminars, hearings, and meetings so as to increase people’s awareness. however, none were as effective as the institute which was founded under the motto, “pro mundi vita, for life in the world (john, 6, 25)” by sogang university, a mission school. with enthusiastic response and support from the media and the public, the institute and the university were instrumental in stemming the tide of child kidnapping and murder and in instilling an awareness of environmental issues among the public. for someone who has participated in the institute from its inception and also served as the first president, it has been a personally gratifying experience. from 1991-2, i also served as the chairman of the national committee which drafted a ‘national declaration of the environment’. through this experience, i was able to meet and exchange views with eui-chai tjeng 159 leaders from many segments of korean society, including religious leaders and civic organization leaders all of whom were experts on the environment and issues of life in korea. this has instilled in me an even stronger sense of the sacredness of human life and nature and it has been a privilege and an honor to have been a part of this massive and successful effort to instill in the korean public those same sense and values. the research institute for life and culture has convened many seminars and the statements of religious leaders and intellectuals read on these occasions as well as other writings and publications on the issue of life have provided much aid in preparing the current paper. section 1. taoism and life life in taoism taoists believe that the “tao” ( 道 translated as way or direction) is the origin of all things in the universe and the origin of life. the tao is the supreme master of the universe and its origin.1) it is the origin of all things in a sense that all things came from the tao and they return to it in the end. lao tzu frequently identified the tao with “void” ( 無 ). the tao is a state of void, which is invisible (無形 ), nameless ( 無名 ). it is also the absence of desire( 無慾 ), absence of knowledge( 無知 ), and inaction( 無爲 ). the notion that the tao is a state of void also means that the tao in essence is a limitless existence. in other words, the tao is understood as void, because it transcends the limit of human perception.2) being void, the tao can embrace all things in the universe, which have different shapes and characters, and at the same time leave them to exist separately giving expression to their individual characters.3) chuang tzu ( 莊 子 ), who refined the teaching of lao tzu ( 老子 ) two hundred years later, explained that the tao exists inside all things in the universe. it is omnipresent ( 無 所 不 在 ). according to chuang tzu, the tao forms one body embracing all things and at the same time it lets all the creatures radiate their individual characters.4) although the tao is the origin of the universe, it produces the universe out of inaction by letting things follow their natural course. chuang tzu said that “water springs out and flows down not because it tries to (inaction), but it does it spontaneously 160 prajñâ vihâra (natural way).” 5) inaction in taoism does not mean that no action is taken. both lao tzu and chuang tzu ascribed the origin of life to the tao. in addition chuang tzu introduced the concept of “chi ( 氣 )”(translated as spirit or breath or vital force) to explain the process of birth and death. according to chuang tzu, birth and death are a result of the gathering and dispersion of chi. while life lasts for only a short moment and vanishes into the ever-evolving universe, chi, the origin of life, exists forever and presides over the evolution process. chuang tzu further introduced the yang (positive) and yin (negative) sides of chi.6) yang chi and yin chi interact with each other and produce the universe. but the yang chi and yin chi do not exist separately. they merely reflect the two facets of one chi. taoists emphasize spiritual life. chuang tzu said that the spirit comes out of the tao.7) human life is distinguished from other creatures because of its spiritual nature. a human being can reach the state of the “tao” through spiritual intuition, by elevating his spirit and ultimately assimilating it with the tao. the elevation of spiritual life is a way of returning to the origin of life. this is called “returning to the root”(復歸於根 , 歸根 ). the tao works to produce all things and let them converge back to the tao. returning to the root enables man to peel off the layers of pleasures of the secular life, one after another, ultimately entering into the state of void. returning to the root is a way of nature. lao tzu emphasized returning to the root, as it enables man to grasp the complete view of the real life. taoists view all things of the universe in the context of one organic body of life. we, human beings, can perceive the universe as one body of life by adhering to the tao and assimilating oneself into it.8) the tao cannot be touched. it has no substance but contains the substance of all things. it produces, penetrates, nourishes, and fulfills all things. it has no form but contains all possible forms. man follows the laws of the earth. earth follows those of heaven. heaven follows those of the tao. the tao is spontaneous. the tao is then in itself without law. the tao is the void. the tao cannot be understood as god in the sense of ruler, monarch, commander, architect, and maker of the universe.9) eui-chai tjeng 161 natural life and moral life the taoist is interested in natural life while the confucianist attaches great importance to the moral life. the taoist view of life can be found in yang chu’s ( 楊朱 ) theory of selfishness ( 爲我主義 ). mencius says “yang chu chose selfishness: if by plucking out a single hair he could benefit the world, he would not do it.”10) lü spring and autumn ( 呂氏春秋 ) says “yang chu values self.”11) the huainan tzu ( 准南子 ) says “preserving life and maintaining what is genuine in it, not allowing things to entangle one’s person, this is what yang chu established”. mencius criticized it.12) the han feitzu ( 准南子 ) says “there is a man who despises things and values life.”13) he is yang chu. from the above quotations we can conclude that yang chu’s basic thought was to value life and despise external trappings of life, e. g., fame, wealth, high rank etc. the follower of yang chu, seek extreme selfishness. they might be given to self indulgency or free indulgence of the appetites. the yangist regards oneself not as a moral self but as a sensual self. therefore the selfishness cannot help degenerating into greed. they are susceptible to nihilism. man cannot live alone. he lives according to many relations e. g., father and son, ruler and ruled, husband and wife, elder and younger, friend and friend, which we call the five cardinal relations ( 五倫 ) in confucian ethics. in order to avoid conflict between members of society, there are norms that make a society vibrant and stable. the norm which maintains good relations is called propriety ( 禮 ). however, propriety of kinship society can become empty. confucius( 孔子 ), who is the founder of confucianism (儒家 ), vitalizes it with his teaching of human heartedness (仁 ,benevolence). the chinese character 仁 consists of two words, man ( 人 ) and two ( 二 ). it cannot be attained through selfishness. human heartedness comes out through a respect for the life of others. mencius( 孟子 ) develops the concept of human heartedness in his theory of human nature, and debates with his opponent kao-tzu ( 告子 ), who might have been influenced by the yangist. the two philosophers have opposite views of the problem of human nature. while kao-tzu maintains that human nature only has a natural life, e.g., eating and sexuality, mencius insists that it not only has a natural instinct but also contains a moral inclination, e. g., human heartedness and righteousness. 162 prajñâ vihâra moral inclinations belong to nature in the same way as the physical growth of the body. mencius says that man has four cardinal inborn virtues ( 四德 ) which emerge from four shoots ( 四端 ). mencius gives an exactly parallel account of the conflict between appetites and morality. he says “life i desire, the right too i desire, if i cannot have both, rather than life, i choose right”. life means natural life and right is the moral life ( 舍生取義 ).14) this saying is exactly contrary to the teaching of yang-tzu, who says despise things and value life ( 輕物重生 ).15) section 2. confucianism and life life in confucianism heaven and earth are the fountain of all beings and the space where all beings make their living. heaven and earth are logically prior to all beings. they are the source of all life.1) heaven and earth determine the direction. the vital force of mountain and lake are united. thunder and wind arouse each other, water and fire do not combat each other. thus are eight trigrams intermingled.2) heaven, earth, mountain, lake, thunder, wind, water, fire, these eight (things) are the basic beings, which compose nature and through the interrelation of these things, the natural world is constructed. the image of the natural world is that, as mentioned above, heaven and earth each takes its right position, viz. above and under, and together they combine their virtue.3) between heaven and earth, the vital force of water in the lake rises to the mountain and becomes clouds and rain, the stream of the fountain on the mountain flows into the lake and becomes the fountain and water.4) thunder and wind encounter and respond to each other. kan ( 坎 ) water and li ( 離 ) fire are irreconcilable opposites. however, they do not conflict; on the contrary, they balance each other and make an harmonious world. thunder awakens and brings vitality to all things, which are dormant; wind disperses vital energy to all things; rain sprays water over all the withering things, gives moisture to all thing and makes them luxuriant; eui-chai tjeng 163 the sun brings warmth; the mountain makes all things complete; lake brings pleasure. heaven brings about rulership, the receptive earth brings about shelter and conception and nourishes all things.5) as mentioned above, heaven, earth, mountain, lake, water, fire, each plays its own role, and is interrelated and intermingled; together they bring about all living creatures.6) confucius systematized the tradition. he spoke of tien ( 天 , heaven). his heaven is purposeful and the master of all things. it is not the “greatest of all spiritual beings who rules in a personal way”, but a supreme being who only reigns, leaving his moral law to operate by itself. the first principle in neo-confucianism chou tun-i (chou lien-hsi, 1017-1073) is the pioneer of neoconfucianism and was influenced by taoism. he used the concepts of the great ultimate or wu-chi ( 無極 , non-ultimate) which came from laotzu ( 老子 ). he blended the taoist element of void with confucian thought but chou never explained the nature of the great ultimate. this was explained by chu-hsi ( 朱熹 , 1130-1200) who was also influenced by taoism, but interpreted it in his own way. he said, “the great ultimate is nothing other than principle” and added, “the great ultimate is merely the principle of heaven and earth and the myriad things. with respect to heaven and earth, there is the great ultimate in them. with respect to the myriad things, there is the great ultimate in each and every one of them. before heaven and earth existed, there was assuredly this principle. it is this principle that through movement generates the yang. it is also this principle that through tranquility generates the yin. he states then that man and heaven form one body, i.e. he stated the unity of man and nature.7) in fact, the confucian view of life seems even more illuminating on the aspects of morality. confucian moral views such as three cardinality ( 三綱 ), five constant relationships ( 五倫 ), benevolence, righteousness, ritual and wisdom ( 仁義禮智 ) etc., articulated the most profound version of natural morality. to discuss its content further, however, will inevitably bring us to a broader realm, beyond the focus of this paper. therefore i shall conclude the confucian view of life at this point. 164 prajñâ vihâra section 3. buddhism and life it is generally said that the reality of man is divided into two parts. one is man’s body made up of four elements-earth, water, fire and windand the other is man’s spirit in man’s body. this is the view of life in buddhism. in buddhism the essence of human life is buddha nature. buddhism maintains that all sentient beings in this world, even insects have buddha nature in them. every creature in this universe has already existed in various incarnations by karma. karma is the law of moral causation. basically it is volition. volitions may be good or ill, so actions may be wholesome or unwholesome according to their results. this endless play of action and reaction, cause and effect, seed and fruit, continues in perpetual motion, and this is becoming, a continually changing process of the psycho-physical phenomena of existence. therefore the natural law is that if this exists, that also exists. otherwise, that doesn’t exist, either. this is the reality of life and the principle of existence. this shows us that everything in this universe is one, the whole, and an object is one and you and i live in mutual society or in mutual karma. in both five precepts and ten precepts, the thought “not to kill anything which has its own life” is, as one of the practice items in human moral principles. the view of life about human spirit made the thought of karma. and the thought of rebirth originated with karma. karma is the corollary of rebirth; rebirth, on the other hand, is the corollary of karma. all things in the universegreen leaves, red and yellow flowers, mountains, rivers, the sun, murmurs of the stream, the sound of wind, and so onis the sound of life. this is the essential view of life in buddhism. as i am a small universe as well as an element in the big universe, i am the reality of life. this is the dignified view of life in buddhism. we live in an age of self-alienation and dehumanization, not realizing the thought of the same substance and great compassion, the buddhist commandments and sanctity of life. what makes us to be cruel, to be mean and to be blind to anything? what on the earth prevents us from getting out of the recycle of birth, and death, and evil passions? eui-chai tjeng 165 that’s because there are three poisonsgreed, anger and stupidityin our mind.1) the buddha saw the suffering of people and started to search for a solution to this problem. he became aware of the futility of social living and of philosophical discourse and taught that they hindered man’s right living. finally, he came to the conclusion that nothing was eternal and thought that all was impermanent (sanscrit: anitya), even gods. for him, all was a flowing reality (be it external things or human beings), all existence meant suffering, and all was a concatenation of points called dharmas. the buddha also denied the essential or ultimate reality of things and the existence of the self or soul (ãtman). consequently, he said that there was no eternal “i”. for him human beings and gods are caught in the cycle of births and deaths (samsãra) because the extinction of life is only a projection toward a new existence. this cycle goes on until the effect of a completed deed (karman) is stopped. karman is not substantial but after a man dies his acts remain in another kind of corporeal form. those acts are rewarded or punished in heaven or hell but even heaven and hell are impermanent. for buddha then, there will be further reincarnation and transmigrations, i.e., new births or new existences which are also subject to misery and suffering. nirvãna means etymologically to extinguish or blow out, and is man’s main goal. it can be reached by following the “way of the buddha”, i.e., his teaching. nirvãna is a condition which is achieved by the elimination of the ego, craving, and all bonds. this elimination lets man overcome his karman and the succession of lives and births (samsãra). when man reaches nirvãna “neither man not gods will see him again.”2) the original teaching of the buddha denies all gods and states that everything is impermanent and thus nothing is eternal. later mahayãnã buddhism developed the existence of a supreme and eternal being, the “absolute buddha”, which is contrary to the original buddha’s thought. for them, this absolute buddha also cannot be known, is one, etc., i.e. it was presented along the lines used to present tao.3) thoughts about life in buddhism can be explained on the basis of human centeredness. purification of our mind to restore the true-self ( 眞我 ) is a buddhist’s thought about life. more specifically, suffering as a characteristic of all living beings comes from a false life that maintains the 166 prajñâ vihâra transmigration of life and death, thus one must seek release from the wheel of rebirth which will lead to the restoration of the true-self based on “true permanent mind ( 眞如心 ).” this truth is the essence of the character of spiritualism. one should not abuse this wisdom for this is a buddhist’s thought of life.4) this kind of ‘true life’ should be done in the present life, that is, immanent character. section 4. shamanism and life (in the context of korean shamanism) life is one of the most interesting concerns in many religions, east and west. nonetheless it is not so easy to find a very clear discourse about “this is life!” in the world of religions, they say that all living things, human beings included, are created by god. in the folk religion of korea, this kind of belief is expressed by “god blesses with a baby.” the deity of pregnancy, birth and bringing up a child is called samshin ( 삼신 ) in korean folk-belief and/or in korean shamanism. according to research, the belief in samshin is a wide spread phenomenon all over the country. so in this article i have tried to find out the identity of samshin in the stories about the life-giving deity in folk-belief and in the shamanistic world in korea. the belief in samshin appears in various forms. especially materials about the prayer for delivery of a son that is related to the samshin shows the following characteristics: firstly, this samshin-belief is dominated by women. secondly, it is directed towards natural things. for example, people pray mainly to huge rocks and big trees. thirdly, they pray in famous mountains and near big rivers. so it is a kind of belief in mountaingod[sanshin 산신 ] and in water-god[sushin 수신 ]. according to the shamans’ transmission of words, the first deity among samshin is for the pregnancy, the second is for the birth and the third is for the child rearing. in addition, the first deity gives flesh, the second gives bones and the third gives soul. these three deities have functionally different roles, but they are originally only one god. it seems to be a kind of cosmic triad theory in korean shamanism. the effort to secure life is a natural conclusion, if one holds that life is sacred. we can often hear of the samshin-myth in the shaman’s epos, eui-chai tjeng 167 even nowadays in shamanistic rituals. e.g, we can analyze the identity of samshin in the shaman’s song, named samt’aejap’uri( (삼태자풀이 ) ), chesokponp’uri( (제석본풀이) ) or tanggumagit’aryong( (당금아기타령) ). according to this epos, samshin is born from a deity disguised as a buddhist monk and a girl named tanggumagi( 당금아기 ). in this story we can see the religious thought that the direct cause of human birth is the sexual relationship between a man and a woman, but the fundamental reason is the ‘nomination’[chomji 점지 ] of the deity[samshin]. in the field of korean folk religion, it is believed that birth, bringing up and death are beyond human control. it is supposed that the control over life belongs to the supra-mundane realm of the deity[samshin]. here we can see that folk religiosity expresses what the human life itself possesses. god gives life to human beings. therefore the vital force or vital principle belongs to the divine realm. so a human being should not dare to invade this holy realm. the shaman’s explanation, through the samshin-story, about the origin and principle of life shows that phenomena such as life and death are personalized or deificated. they speak of the strong impurity which the phenomenon such as death accompanies, of the cautiousness and prudence that tries to secure life from the contagion of death. they think, this dark shadow, far from the order of life, tries to access living people. this kind of attitude would confirm the characteristics of the religious life of most korean people. we can say this is the search for holiness. the right way which human beings should follow, is finally, the prudential method and the practical application of how we can secure our life. in this sense, life is a victorious figure that overcomes death. in the context of korean folk religion, one can be really free when in harmony with samshin who is the source and donor of life. we call it the divine law or divine order which connect samshin with life.1) now let me say something about the shaman (called mudang in korea) who is a mediator between the spirits (kwisin) and man. from early times the ancestors were honored as members of the family and clan. their descendants believed in their ancestors’ postmortem power. this belief propitiated the formation of an anxiety to keep them placated in order to receive protection and blessings from them. the people feared evil spirits and venerated the good ones. the relations between the spirits and man were arranged with the 168 prajñâ vihâra shaman’s help. the shamans are said to have personal spirits to help them, and to possess magical forces. they dance, perform exorcisms, and offer sacrifices to the spirits to propitiate them. their rites are called kut. the shamanist’s main goal is to bring blessings and avoid misfortune. the shamanist’s idea of a supreme god who rules the universe and gives rain and grain for a good harvest is very appealing.2) section 5. philosophy of life in the philosophy of thomas aquinas thomas aquinas explains his theory of life at first from the view point of experience, then transcendence. that is why he considers vegetative life, sense and intellectual life, and finally divine life which is life itself and the first principle of all life. so, i treat here thomas aquinas’ theory of life according to his summa theologiae i, 18, 75 and 78 where he explains the essentials of his theory of life. life in general aquinas considers life in general in the summa theologiae systematically. first of all he questions ‘what things have life?’ that is, ‘are all natural things a life?’ 1) here it might be better if we talk about the etymological consideration of life i.e. psyche (in greek), nephesh (in hebrew), soma and psyche, zeo and zeo aionis ‘sarx and pneuma’ and ‘pneuma zoopoioun’ (in new testament) etc., and also the history of philosophy of life i.e. plato, aristotle, plotinus, augustinus, boetius, albertus magnus, fransis of assisi, bonaventura, r. decartes, i. kant, g. w. f. hegel, k. marx, s. kierkegaard, h. bergson, teilhard de chardin, m. heidegger, g. marcel, h. jonas, fritjof capra, mother theresa etc. but aquinas questions directly ‘what things have life?’ in his summa theologiae. he agrees with the words of dionysios’ de div. nom.2) that is, ‘plants live with life’s last echo.’ according to this view, ‘plants have the lowest degree of life. therefore inanimate bodies which are lower than the plants, do not possess life.’3) then aquinas discusses animal life. obviously quoting the words of aristotle’s de plantis, i, 4,4) he writes, ‘life in animals is plain to see.’ eui-chai tjeng 169 that is why ‘we first say that an animal is living when it begins to have movement of itself (ex se) and we judge that it is still living so long as this kind of movement appears in it and when it no longer has any movement of itself we say that life has failed and the animal is dead.’ 5) we can understand the movement (motus) in two ways, that is, in the strict sense and the wider sense. in the strict sense ‘we take movement as “the act of that which is incomplete,” i.e. in potentiality for (further) existence, or in the wider sense as including “the act of that which is already completed,” in the way that an act of understanding or of sensation is also called movement.’ 6) this is what aristotle says in de anima iii. 7) ‘thus we call “living” those things (viventia) which produce in themselves some kind of movement or operation.’ 8) aquinas then asks: ‘is life an activity?’ he quotes in ‘sed contra’ of this article the words of aristotle’s de anima ii 9) that is, ‘for living things, to live is to be’ (vivere viventibus est esse). here he considers the meaning of the words ‘to live’ and ‘life’ which discloses the principle or the root of appearance that is, the phenomenon and the relation of both. ‘the word is applied to things because of something in their external appearance, namely self-movement; nevertheless it is not applied to indicate precisely that, but rather the substance which of its nature has the power of moving itself or giving itself any kind of impulse to activity. in the latter sense ‘to live’ means simply to exist in such a nature (secundum hoc vivere nihil aliud est quam esse in tali natura); and ‘life’ means the same but in the abstract. hence ‘living’ is not an accidental predicate but a substantial one. yet sometimes “life” is taken in the less proper sense to mean the activities of life, from which things are said to have life.’ 10) here he quotes the words of aristotle’s ethic. ix 11) that is, “to live is primarily to have sensation and understanding.” here aquinas clarifies the derivation of phenomenon or operation from esse. so he continues to say ‘sensation and understanding and the like are taken to mean sometimes certain activities, sometimes the existence itself of things which have those activities.’ 12) he also quotes here the words of aristotle’s ethic. ix 13) that is, ‘for living things “to be is to have sensation or understanding” i. e. to possess a nature ready to sense and understand.’ 14) he then considers the reality of the vegetable, sense and intellectual 170 prajñâ vihâra lives with their different activities, and then in gradation of table life, intellectual life is more perfect than sense-life. finally the life of god which is the first principle (source) of all lives, 15) is most perfect that is, life itself. he says: ‘life is attributed to certain things because they act of themselves and not as moved by other things; hence the more perfectly this is verified in a thing the more perfectly does it possess life.’ in the matter of movers the principal agent is that which acts through its own form.’ 16) vegetable life ‘some things move themselves without consideration of the form or end in view provided for them by nature, but only so far as concerns the carrying into effect to movement. such things are plants, which move themselves by growth and decrease according to the form with which nature endows them.’ 17) sense-life ‘other things move themselves in a further sense: not merely with respect to the carrying into effect of the movement, but also with respect to the form which is the principle of movement, which form they acquire for themselves. such are animals, the principle of whose movement is not the form implanted in them by nature but one received through the senses. hence the more complete their sense, the more extensive their selfmovement. thus in creatures which have only the sense of touch, their self-movement consists merely in dilatation and contraction, like oysters scarcely more than the movement of plants; while those which have complete sense-equipment, enabling them to know not only what is joined to them or touches them but also things at a distance, advance to what is at some distance from them.’ 18) in this way aquinas clarifies the essence of the sense-life with self-movements not only that in itself but also self-movement to the things at distance but this kind of life is limited to implantation by nature. hence his consideration on life goes further; to a higher level of life which is an intellectual one transcending all the sense activities. intellectual-life ‘but although such animals receive through the senses the form eui-chai tjeng 171 which is the principle of their movement, they do not independently determine for themselves the end of their activity or of their movement; that is implanted in them by nature, and an instinct of nature moves them to a particular activity by means of the form apprehended by the senses. higher than such animals are those which move themselves with reference also to the end in view, which they provide for themselves. this can be done only by reason and intellect, to which it belongs to know the relation of end and means to end, and direct the one to the other. thus beings which have intellect have a more complete kind of life in that their selfmovement is more complete.’ 19) although intellectual activity or intellectual life is a higher one than the others, but still it is restricted to the implantation of nature that is, the first principles and ultimate end of intellectual life, etc. aquinas’ consideration of life goes still further to reach the highest life without any limitation, that is, life itself by nature. such life is being itself as it is always in the state of activity. ‘although our intellect is self-actuated in certain ways, still certain things are provided for it by nature, e.g. first principles (prima principia), about which it has no choice, and the ultimate end (ultimus finis), which it is not free not to will. hence although the intellect moves itself to some extent, still it must in some things be moved by another. that being, then whose own nature is its act of knowledge, which also does not have what belongs to it by nature determined for it by another, is the being which has life in the highest degree (summus gradus vitae). such a being is god. therefore god possesses life in the highest degree (in deo maxime est vita).’ 20) aquinas here refers to aristotle’s metaphysics xii, 21) that is, aristotle, ‘having shown that god has intellect, concludes that he has life the most perfect and eternal; because his intellect is most perfect and always in the state of actuality.’ aquinas then considers the principles (sources) of lives that is, the principles of the vegetable, sense and intellectual lives from the different activities of three kind of souls, that is, of anima vegetativa, anima sensibilis and anima rationalis. he writes, ‘the various sorts of soul are distinguished from one another according to the different ways in which the activities of soul transcend the activities of inanimate bodies. (in the whole physical world) there is one particular activity of the soul which so greatly transcends the 172 prajñâ vihâra physical that it is not even exercised through a bodily organ, and this is the activity of the rational soul (anima rationalis, vel intellective). another level of activity, below this, takes place through a bodily organ but is not itself a physical transaction (corporea qualitas), and such is the activity of sensesoul (anima sensibilis vel sensitiva). (for though hot and cold and moist and dry and other such physical qualities are needed for sense activity, their activity is not the medium (mediante virtute) in which the activity of the sense-soul has its being (operatio animae sensibilis procedat), but is needed solely to render the organ ready.) then the lowest level of activity belonging to a soul is that which takes place through a physical organ and by virtue of physical qualities. this sort of activity is more than merely physical because physical change depends on external agents, whereas this has an internal source. for this is common to all activities of the soul; anything animate (omne animatum) in some fashion moves itself. and such is the activity of the vegetative soul (anima vel nutritiva).’ 22) aquinas here refers to aristotle’s de anima ii. aristotle says ‘digestion and its sequel takes place through the instrumentality of heating.’ further more, he considers the modes of living in terms of grades of living things. ‘for there are some living things, namely plants, which are purely vegetative. but there are some with sensation as well but without movement in place, motionless animals such as shellfish. some again have the power of movement from place to place, the higher animals namely, which need many things in order to stay alive and hence need to move if they are to obtain distant things which their life requires. and some living things have intellect along with these powers, namely men (with the power of the intellect man can have the notion of universal being “ens universale”). the appetitive powers, however, do not give rise to any distinct mode of life, since appetitive is a property following necessarily on senseknowledge.’ 23) furthermore, scholastic philosophers and theologians explain the spirituality of the rational soul from its immateriality as rational soul transcends total materiality. accordingly, such a spiritual soul bears immortality as it has not been composed of any material parts. from this point of view an eternal life can be endowed to the soul of a human being supposing the grace of god. moreover the theory of aquinas that ‘everything in god is life’ is eui-chai tjeng 173 gaining a more profound meaning in the period of the progress of human knowledge, and life science and its technology. aquinas, reflecting on the moment of creation writes: ‘god’s life is his actual knowing. but in god intellect, that which is known, and the act of knowing, are the same. therefore whatever is in god as known is his actual living or his life. hence, since all the things god produces are in him as know, it follows that in him all things are the divine life itself.’ 24) we can also add next to aquinas, the words of genesis:. ‘in the beginning god created heaven and earth. and the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. and the spirit of god moved over the waters.’ 25) so all the creatures bear the vestiges of the spirit of god. iii. conclusion the notion of immanence and transcendence in philosophies of life there are many similarities between the oriental philosophies of life based on religions and the christian notion of life, especially as shown in thomas aquinas in the phenomenal dimension. however, among them there is also a great difference in the ontological dimension. their differences arise from the notions of immanence and transcendence. oriental philosophies, in general, concentrate on the studies of the first principle (source) that makes up the phenomenon of life that is, on the studies of the beginning of life phenomenon and its returning to the first principle. this is a kind of transcendence in a large sense, but in this case, we can say that the root (source) and phenomenon, strictly speaking, philosophically are homogeneous or univocal in general. in this view point, oriental philosophies of religion are pantheistic, naturalistic, and anthropomorphic more or less. the tao ( 道 ), in taoism, is the first principle of the existence of all things, including human life. all things come into existence from the tao and return to the tao and the tao infiltrates all the things in the universe. the notion of the tao is void ( 無 ). then, is the tao different from all things in the universe? it is very difficult to understand the reality of the tao as just “void.” so there is not clear distinction between the tao and all the 174 prajñâ vihâra creatures. in confucianism, the origin of all things is explained by the eight elements, that is, heaven, earth, mountain, pond, thunder, wind, water, and fire. the movement of the universe and the natural phenomena are explained by in-yang( 陰陽 ) that is, by shade and light, the five functions ( 五行 ), the tao ( 道 ), and chi ( 氣 ), the great ultimate etc.. moreover, confucianism views human life as purely natural. the sacrifice ceremony for ancestors in confucianism is an expression of valuable humanity and has some kind of transcendent character in the sense that it is a representation of the communication between the soul of the dead and living human being. today the sacrifice ceremony for ancestors in korea has become the national ceremony for ancestor’s reverence. but the material and the form of the sacrifice ceremony for ancestors is purely natural, human, and anthropomorphic. the notion of the supreme emperor( 上帝 ) and chon( 天 ) and the great ultimate which are developed through the long passage of history contains the idea of transcendence in some sense. these notions, too, in strict philosophical meaning, are anthropomorphic as they are considered from only the view point of the realm of nature and human life. to become a buddha in human life ( 成佛 ), in buddhism, is to enter into nirvana by passing over imperfect earthly life. this is the stage which is achieved only by the self-discipline of human beings. in fact, karma effects ( 業報 ), nirvana ( 涅槃 ), and becoming a buddha ( 成佛 ), in buddhism, are the manifestation of the various forms in human life. in short, the great oriental religions, in general, explain the first principle and ultimate goal of human life within the limit of nature and the human being, but also include some kind of a notion of transcendence in that they seek to reach to a higher stage by passing over the present state of life. also, it is common that nearly all religions believe in a supernatural being, its power, and the communication of a human being with it. therefore, although the oriental religions are consistent with the immanent element, they also include a transcendent tendency in their basis due to human nature. in other words, the oriental religions have a good disposition for the real transcendence, especially shamanism. rather we can say, they are very open for the real transcendent. the korean religious mentality, in general, is affected deeply by shamanism since korean’s existence on eui-chai tjeng 175 the korean peninsula. that is why in korea, even nowadays, christianity is flourishing with a lot of conversions and fervent devotion. on the other hand, the christian notion of life, especially the philosophy of life of thomas aquinas, explains life by the theory of three kinds of souls and considers human life or the soul as its source having immanent and transcendent character. individual human life derives from the intellectual, spiritual and immortal soul. consequently, thomism revealed that the immortal life, which is the deep hope of the human spirit, can be achieved by revelation and the grace of god. in fact, great oriental religions have achieved a high level in spiritual and moral life, but from the view point of philosophy of religion, the ontological search, especially the question of transcendence, is incomplete. they are obscure in the origin and ultimate goal of human life, that is, its final destiny. due to this incompleteness of the point of view of confucianism, catholicism was introduced into korea about 220 years ago by a pagan confucian scholar from china. when confucian scholars in korea, who belonged to a ruling party at those times, came to read 天主實義 (de deo verax disputatio), which was written by matteo ricci, a jesuit missionary in beijing, they were impressed by its clear explanation of the transcendent idea of the origin and ultimate goal of human life, and one of the confucian scholars was sent to beijing to study it. he learned the catechism by writing (although he knew chinese characters very well, he didn’t know the chinese pronunciation) and was baptized in beijing. returning to korea, he did missionary work, and this was the beginning of the catholic church in korea. these confucian scholars tried to build up a so-called ‘supplemented confucianism’ in korea. in the ‘supplemented confucianism’, they added to confucianism the clear christian notion of the origin and ultimate goal of human life, which is lacking in confucianism, that is, the christian notion of transcendence and immortality. thomas aquinas notion of life, is based on the fact that human beings are the image of god.1) christianity explains that the first principle of all things is god. therefore, the christian notion of life is originally derived from god by creation 2) as he is life itself, so that thomas aquinas recognizes the spirituality and immortality of the human soul 3) which is immaterial. in other words, the first principle of human beings and life is explained by a divine being who creates it. human life exists for the 176 prajñâ vihâra participation in eternal life. human dignity, sociality, and community life are explained from this ontological point of view.4) furthermore thomism developed the theory of the inter-action and inter-communion of the divine life and human one. there is no univocal meaning between divine being and its creature, they are different, but somewhat the same, therefore there is analogy 5) between the life of god and human life. the notion of analogy is very important to explain the so-called identity (secundum quid) and difference (simpliciter) between the first principle and the creature. oriental philosophies, which are based on religions, lack the notion of analogy. in fact in almost all the oriental religions there is a strong folk believe in transcendence, although there is not an exact philosophical or logical explanation of it. that is why there is approximately a univocal notion between the first principle and creature ex. gr. between the tao, heaven, nature, supreme emperor, buddha and samshin etc. and all things in the universe. therefore there is not a clear notion of distinction between them. rather here we can conclude that in the oriental philosophies, in strict philosophical meaning, there is not any ontological distinction between the first principle of all beings in the universe and all beings derived from it, and there are only psychological projection and religious tendency of human nature for transcendence. the important point is that human reason is not logically convinced of such a transcendent reality in the oriental philosophies. therefore in the ontological sense there is only a so-called notion of immanence. on the contrary, in thomism there is a clear notion of the distinction between ‘ens contingens’ and ‘ens necessarium’ that is, the beings of the universe and the first principle by the notion of analogy. moreover in thomism the theory of creation is sustained by the notion of analogy. that is why the catholic confusian scholars at the early time of the catholic church in korea preferred the word ( 天主 dominus caeli, the lord of heaven) to the supreme emperor ( 上帝 ), although they used both of them for god. life is precious, and, above all, human life is the most precious in the universe. since every religion agrees to this, all the religions give their priority to protect and enrich human life. thus, religions also have similarity or homogeneity in moral life, which is the proper domain of the human being. the comparison of the decalogue in christianity with the three eui-chai tjeng 177 fundamental principles ( 三綱 , the three bonds) and the five moral disciplines in human relations ( 五倫 , the five relationships), and the comparison of the decalogue with septem vitia capitalia in christianity with the five and the ten buddhist commandments, can be such an example. common culture based on love of life today, we are in need of a common culture in which all humanity can live together as one and the same. in fact, today in the intellectual world there is a strong tendency to shape the unity of mankind. so they propose “universal declaration of human responsibilities”, “universal values of ethics” etc.6) our catholic philosophy can propose a more fundamental common way of living, that is, a common culture of mankind, based on love of life. moreover, the incredible development in life science and technology, such as the progress of the cyber world and the success of the genome project and the revival of some lives from two hundred and fifty million years ago by scientists and the survival of some organisms in boiled water, along with the invasion of the holy realm of human life with human cloning and ru 486, the taking medicine internally for abortion etc., cause the urgent need for the formation of a common culture based on the true love of a right life, as life, especially human life should be the proximate value criterion of all things in the universe. the slogan, which has led humanity for the last few centuries, was ‘justice’. the quickening of this slogan was due to marxism, which was shown up as a reaction against the harsh reign over the colonies all over the world, and the strenuous exertion of the catholic church, which enhanced the right of ‘human dignity’ and ‘justice’. asia, being the birthplace of most of the distinguished religions, profound philosophies and having the widest region with the largest population, fell down to become the colonies of the great powers. now the colonial period, in terms of territorial rights is ended, but colonialism still exists in the sense of economic exploitation. under this circumstance, the concept of ‘human right’ and ‘justice’ is strongly and continually required. moreover such a concept is always required in human life. but the new culture is needed for mankind in this new millennium. such culture should be a common culture which can solve the problem of 178 prajñâ vihâra life that all people, all cultures and all religions care for. in the new millennium, we need to form a common culture based on the love of life, this kind of love implies justice based on human dignity, further more, human dignity as image of god. this new culture should be equally participated in by all human beings even by those who live in the hinter lands and isolated regions. in fact, the love of life is a requisite for all human beings. so now it is desired that the consciousness of “common vocation” and “participation” 7) is fostered. it is expected that, within a few centuries, asia will play an important role for the unity of mankind in the world as the era of pacific rim, especially of asia is coming. the unity of mankind must be preceded by the unity of asia. in this point, all religions in asia can contribute through their constant dialogue and co-operation. such dialogue and co-operation are in a good process in korea right now. religions in asia, including christianity, should study and enrich each other through constant dialogue 8) not only in the phenomenal notion of life, but also in the primordial notion of life, including the tao ( 道 ), the supreme emperor ( 上帝 ), heaven ( 天 ), becoming a buddha ( 成佛 ) and samshin ( 삼신 ) of shamanism, etc. which are a dimension of transcendence in a wider sense, and the notion of phenomenal and ontological dimension of life in christianity. and such efforts will be able to form a common culture based on the love of life which is required in the third millenium. especially, in this point, the catholic church can play an important role with wisdom and practice of ‘unitas in diversitate’ and ‘diversitas in unitate.’ the catholic church has to open more and more her mind and spirit to the future and to asian thoughts and life as the catholic church is universal and eschatological. in fact, in korea, the research institute for life and culture, as mentioned above, has held many seminars on life for many years. and it has taken extensively the opinions on the notion of life of the korean religions. in fact, now there are some organizations for co-operation among religions for social welfare activities in korea. recently, some catholic institutes and periodicals in korea are trying to study and practice the notion of life and inculturation. catholic philosophy can perform its part in the formation and the expansion of a common culture with its ontological notion of being, including the transcendental notions of the one ( 一 ), the true ( 眞 ), and the good ( 善 ). up to now, thomism has explained the ontological notion of being in the eui-chai tjeng 179 order of the ‘one’, the ‘true’, and the ‘good’, but nowadays it is required that the catholic church practice the ‘good’, which all human beings and religions can sympathize with. in practicing, the ‘good’ must be based on the ‘true’, and this must be based on the ‘one’. then, by explaining the meaning of life in the order of the ‘good’, the ‘true’, and the ‘one’, that is, basically by explaining the oneness of god, catholic philosophy can contribute a lot toward the formation of such a new culture. in this way, mother theresa in india can be considered as a great sign for formation of the common culture of love of life in the new millennium. endnotes endnotes to section 1 1) wang bi, “lao tzu tao te ching”, zhong hua publishing co., 1984. 2) la kuang, “history of chinese philosophy and ideology”, xue sheng publishing co., 1982. p. 177. 3) fang tong mei, “primitive confucian ethics & philosophy”, li ming cultural corp.,1983, p. 215. 4) chuang tzu, “chi pei you”, pp. 749-750. 5) chuang tzu, “tian tzu fang”, p. 716. 6) chuang tzu, “chie yang”, p. 913. 7) chuang tzu, “chi pei you”, p. 741. 8) catholic theology and thought, vol. 20, 1997, pp. 39-63 (im keum ja, “taoists’ view of life”). 9) hector diaz, m. g., a korean theology, nene zeitschrift für missionswissenschaft, ch-6405 immensee 1986, pp. 142, 172. 10) mencius, “chinhsin(a)”(doing one’s utmost mind) ‘yang chu chose selfishness: if by plucking out a single hair, he could benefit the world, he would not do it’. 11) lü spring and autumn, “buer”(non-two) ‘yang sheng values self ‘). 12) huainan tzu, “fanlunshun” great series of chinese literature. p. 12) (han fei-tzu, “hsien shüeh 48”(prominent learning 48) p. 26). 14) mencius, “kao-tzu(a)” great series of chinese literature 7, p. 8) 15) chung, in-chae, the natural life and moral life, ‘studies on life and culture’, vol. 1. sogang univ. 1993. pp.578~1-578~4. endnotes to section 2 1) kwuak shinhwuan: “thought of eternal creation of life in i ching”, catholic theology and thought, vol. 20, 1997. summer, pp. 5-7). 180 prajñâ vihâra 2) shuo kua, discussions of the trigrams 3. 3) kong yingda, analytic center of i ching. 4) great compendium of interpretation of i ching: small commentary). 5) shou kua, discussion of the trigrams 4, chen guying, a study and commentary on the i ching, 1999, p. 692). 6) choi youngjin, “the relationship between man and nature from the point of i ching’s viewnew culture of life-” 21 century culture of life and religion, 19th seminar manuscript, institute for life and culture, sogang university, 2000. pp. 40 seq. 7) hector, ibid. pp. 173, 174, 175. endnotes to section 3 1) seo, eui-hyun (president korean buddhist chogye order headquarters), buddhism and life, studies on life and culture, vol. 1, sogang univ. 1993. 2) hector, ibid. pp. 134-136. 3) hector, ibid. pp. 172-173. 4) oh, hyong-keun, ‘buddhism and life,’ catholic theology and thoughts, no. 20, catholic university, 1977, pp. 21-28; 35-38. endnotes to section 4 1) park, il-young, ‘shamanism and life’, philosophy and life, uri academy, 2000, pp. 166-174. cf. jo za young, people’s thought on shamanism, cana art, 1995. cf. j. a. kister, a drama of life, sogang university, 1997. 2) hector, ibid. pp. 130-132. endnotes to section 5 1) cf. thomas aquinas, summa theologiae(s. th), i, 18, 1. in my article i quote the english translation of thomas aquinas’ s. th(latin text and english translation, black-friars, 1964~). 2) iv, 1, pg. 3, 856b, s. th. lect, 1. s. th. i. 18, 1. sed contra. 3) s. th. i. 18, 1c. 4) 1, 815a10-10. 5) s. th. i. 18, 1c. 6) ibid. 7) c. 4. 429b22-430a9, s. th. lect. 9, 720-727; c. 7, 431a4-8, s. th. lect. 12, 765-767-cf lib. ii. c. 11, 423b26-424a10, s. th. lect. 23, 546-548. 8) s. th. i. 18, 1c. 9) c. 4, 415b13, s. th. lect. 7, 319. 10) s. th. i. 18, 2c. 11) c. 9, 1170a16-19, s. th. lect. 11, 1902. 12) s. th. i, 18, 2 ad 1. 13) c. 9, 1170a30b, s. th. lect. 11, 1908. eui-chai tjeng 181 14) s. th. i. 18, 2 ad 1. 15) s. th. i. 18, 3c. 16) ibid. 17) ibid. 18) ibid. 19) ibid. 20) ibid. 21) c. 7, 1072b26-30, s. th. lect. 8, 2544. 22) s. th. i.76, 3c et 78, 1c. 23) ibid. 24) s. th. i. 18, 4c. 25) gen. 1, 1-2 endnotes to conclusion 1) cf. s. th. i. q. 93. 2) cf. s. th. i. qq. 99, 44, 45, 67-72. 3) cf. s. th. i. qq. 99, 75, 84, 87. 4) cf. all through s. th. i-ii, ii-ii. 5) cf. s. th. i. qq. 9, 13, 9, 5 6) for instance, ‘in 1997, some thirty former heads of state and government who constitute the inter-action council submitted a draft of a “universal declaration of human responsibilities” to all heads of state and government and of the united nations, unesco. and “a declaration of human duties and responsibilities” was presented to unesco(1999) by the third millennium project of the city of valencia, spain, in cooperation with unesco and adc nouveau millénaire. the document was drafted by a “high-level group” chaired by south african justice richard j. goldstone and including richard falk, bernard kouchner, rudd lubbers etc.’ moreover now prof. yersu kim who was the director of division of philosophy and ethics at unesco, paris until april 2000 and one of my friends, is preparing “universal value of ethics” for the year, 2001 of the “dialogue among cultures” of un, collecting materials through some international conferences. now he is planning a world wide conference for that in korea in 2001 to propose “universal value of ethics” to un through unesco. still he desires to have a conference of religious scholars ex. gr. catholics, protestants, confucianists, hinduists, buddhists, and islamics etc. in some place, especially in the vatican city. so if we can help him, it will be a good contribution for the shaping of the unity of mankind. yersu kim, a common framework for the ethics of 21st century, unesco, paris, 1999. pp. 14-16. 7) cf. tran van doan, “the search for the pentecostal spirit: jean ladriere on culture”, humanity in the 21st century: towards a new vision, acta of the fourth international conference of asian association of catholic philosophers, catholic university, seoul, 2000, pp. 213-238, cf. tjeng eui-chai, metaphysics, 1997-10th, pp. 364-366. 182 prajñâ vihâra 8) the words of cardinal augustino sodano, the secretary of state, the vatican, given on the occasion of the korean translation of summa theologiae by st. thomas aquinas with pope john paul ii’s special interest, words and blessings are very meaningful, saying: ‘is this approach itself not a solid point of contact with great philosophical systems of the east and a sure promise of a very fruitful dialogue between intellectual tradition of east and west? such a dialogue in turn is the obligatory of the progress of human culture, as well as a requisite for a deeper inculturation of christianity among the peoples of vast continent of asia.’ eui-chai, tjeng, ‘welcome address’ acta of fourth international conference of the asian association of catholic philosophers, 1999. p. xix. eui-chai tjeng 183 spirituality and mysticism: a global view what is at stake in the debate on marxism and postmodernism? yubraj aryal purdue university, usa abstract in contemporary political philosophy, marxism is often considered at odds with postmodernism. marxists often charge postmodernists with nihilism and obscurism, and a lack of commitment to society. this paper will address these charges and show the contribution which postmodernism can make to marxism and the addressing of social problems. there is currently an interesting debate occurring between the advocates of marxism and the advocates of postmodernism. these two camps often pit marxism against postmodernism in such a way that they allow no middle ground. they behave in a way that echoes george w. bush’s famous remark: “either you are with us or against us.” to rephrase this remark to the best fit of these respective advocates of marx and postmodernism: either you are marxist or a capitalist and vice versa. the paper attempts to enter into the heart of debate between the marxism and postmodernism, specifically the marxist charges against postmodernist thought. let me first try to characterize the postmodernist approach before addressing some of the charges against it by the advocates of marxism. at the heart of postmodernism is an attack on an enlightenment rationality founded upon a transcendental all-knowing subject who can bring to us secure, all-pervasive and unquestionable truth. postmodernism, on the contrary, questions the possibility of transcendental truth which exists beyond a given socio-cultural linguistic form of life. postmodernist radical skepticism, hence, smashes every vestige of the greco-roman 1 tradition that claims for a trans-historical truth and human reason attributing it a grand narrative and totalizing essentialism. it replaces the notion of truth, knowledge and reality as contingent, subjective and local. they are considered as the “'modes of subjectivity, like theories of society or versions of history, are temporary fixings in the on-going process in which any absolute meaning or truth is constantly deferred.” 1 the postmodernist project seems to challenge every authority/center who in the name of trans-historical and unquestionable truth and sovereignty dictates over its ‘other’/margin but this considers only the negative side of the authority, what about its ‘technical and positive’ side? hence forward, i will try to present a commentary on some of the marxist allegations against postmodernism. is postmodernism nothing more than neo-nietzschean nihilism? is postmodernism nothing more than neo-nietzschean nihilism and pessimist obscurism as tim hall regards it: “in the name of a nietzschean irrationality, any philosophical heritage for revolutionary thought is thrown out the window and replaced with a drunken speculation detached from history and material reality?”2 can’t postmodernism promise us something beyond what its critics often charge it as ‘apocalyptic irrationalism,’ ‘cognitive atheism,’ or ‘dogmatic relativism”? can we claim that postmodernism has no commitment to people and their politics and history, therefore, a useless nihilist attitude? perhaps we can recognize the postmodernist advocacy for plural and mutual coexistence that transformed european societies with its inclusion of various marginal voices from different social spaces during the decade of the 1970s? or the surge of various social movements of the 2 1970s in europe and the rapid ongoing social transformative movements in nonwestern societies in the recent decades are the implications of postmodernist philosophy accompanied by the unprecedented booms of capitalist technocratic mode of production. can we also not give credit to the postmodernist challenges of the west’s colonialism, genocide, anti-semitism, slavery and patriarchy under the veneer of its civilization? or do we still want to resurface totalitarianism in the name of an absolute which dictates our social life either in the church in the name of an ambassador of god, in the family in the name of the head, in school in the name of all-knowing agency? or we can even ask: does nihilism and pessimism have no function in society? can we so ignorantly disregard their humanistic contents? the radical nihilism of post-world era inspired the europeans to question every authority, and opened the new hope for liberation. for instance, kierkegaardian nihilism inspired a challenge to the inhumanity of christian religion. likewise, nihilism, thus, has its own humanist promise. we cannot term it simply as irrelevant! subversion and displacement of ‘naturalized and reified’ views of human truth and reality cannot be relegated merely to sheer nihilism and nothingness but have potential to herald a neo-humanist emancipation of human politics and history at the same time being critical to its goal itself. our questioning of foundational assumptions of european enlightenment modernity does not kill it. instead of its death, it is transformed into a new stage. maybe we can call it neo-enlightenment. does postmodernism still seem to be nihilism and ahistorical? david wood says no: it is very difficult to ask the question of derrida’s humanism without invoking the legacy of heidegger (letter on humanism) and sartre (existentialism and humanism), each of whom tried to rethink humanism in such a way that they could still claim to be 3 humanists, albeit in a deeper sense. derrida follows this path, in a way, when he goes so far in reaffirming the importance of justice as to identify deconstruction with justice (just as sartre will identify existentialism with radical freedom and responsibility). is this compatible with nihilism? surely so! if nihilism marks the recognition of the death of god, the absence of ultimate or absolute values, but rather the relocation of the excavation site, and perhaps too the attempt to wean us off a certain kind of desire for transcendence. derrida surely inherits nietzsche’s hope that we can ‘be true to the earth.’3 voes postmodernism herald the death of history, class and consciousness? postmodernism does not banish consciousness from human discourse but redefines it. for the postmodernists, no objective pre-given cartesian (or kantian) subjectivity exists in us. the ‘self’ is constructed, fabricated, weaved and interpreted fiction. it is a function not fact, a process not essence, an effect (of language), not cause. this very notion of self suspends the rousseauesque ‘self’ in natural man, the classical marxist notion of ‘self’ (manipulated by a bourgeois ‘false consciousness’) and the liberal notion of ‘self’ (which strives for and achieves self-betterment in a democratic society). there is no coherent substance that we can call ‘self’, which can be politicized by talking about its alienation, its betterment and its naturalness or innocence. there is no unchanging core ‘self’ as such to be alienated, to be kept innocent or to be made better. all that we have in postmodernity are split selves in a constant flux which both jameson and deleuze and guattari analyze in terms of a ‘schizophrenic’ self. foucault says that ‘self’ is not as independent, ‘transcendental’ subject of cartesian or kantian discourse. 4 it is as a locus of multiple, dispersed or decentred discourses. for the traditionalists, discontinuity was both “the given and the unthinkable”; the past is made up of innumerable instances: “decisions, accidents, initiatives, discoveries” which the historian must annihilate by moulding them into a continuous narrative. in contrast foucault stresses the fact that certain forms of knowledge (about the human mind and body, about biology, politics or language), after periods of stability in which the fundamental processes of a discourse remain largely unquestioned, and undergo rapid transformations4 however, our need for a coherent self to define us and our humanistic endeavors is one thing and to try to avoid the critical look over the very structure of the ‘self’ is another. the necessity of the thing should not preclude criticism of the thing. we can make a commitment to our history, class, consciousness, ‘realism’, ‘praxis’, ‘institution’, ‘organisation’, ‘revolution’ etc but we should do so without critical examination. if the postmodernist effort is meant to abolish them, i am not sure what kind of society we will have. but this is not what postmodernism means. the fact that some people try to vilify postmodernism does not mean it is a ‘monster’ out to destroy our commitment to our civilizational goals. therefore the claim below by tim hall seems to be mere malice: i found academic postmodernists (are there any other kinds?) to be smug and way too pleased with themselves. i think this is somehow connected with their rejection of almost everything that marxism commits itself to: realism, praxis, organisation, revolution. so they can pose as some kind of leftists without any of the stigma of marxism attaching. 5 5 is postmodernism textual and irrelevant to the society and its existing reality? the postmodernist rejection of meta-narrative certainly assumes the responsibility for alternative narratives. it has its commitment to the local forms of life to empower them and give voices. at the same time, it is skeptical of any authority, even its own. in the name of empowering the other, it does not attempt to prevail over the other. certainly deconstructive critics concentrate on the texts and their linguistic analysis of the texts. but this does not mean that postmodernism in general is textual. postmodernism, in its commitment to society, is in fact a “critique of the way modern societies control and discipline their populations by sanctioning the knowledge claims and practices of the human sciences: medicine, psychiatry, psychology, criminology and sociology.”6 can we separate text from society? is not it just like an impossible attempt to separate dance from dancer? a textual critique is a critique of the social because text is born out of social contents. since text is already social, the charge that postmodernism is textual and irrelevant to the society itself seems irrelevant. does postmodernism demolish humanist ideals such as truth, reality and knowledge? the answer seems to be no. it has put these values into question but does not eliminate them. there exists no such thing as unquestionable truth. truth is the “leap of logic” between the premise and the conclusion mediated through discourse. all claims for truth have equal status. there is no truth but only truth claims. or as gadamer says there is no single truth claim but there are truth claims: truth1, truth 2, truth 3, and so on. there is nothing prior to interpretation 6 or theoretical methods, and nothing that stands outside of interpretation or its methods that can be taken as a basis for judging its validity. the fact that there is no ultimate truth/reality/knowledge does not mean knowledge has no relevance. it does not mean that to gain more knowledge (even if that knowledge sometimes goes against itself) is not necessary for us. but it does mean that the conditions of the knowledge are not absolute. the conditions are contingent. is postmodernism nothing more than a meaningless neologism? does postmodernism still have a room for chomskian resentment? chomsky writes: as for the "deconstruction" that is carried out, … i can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. but if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that i can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. that will cure my deficiencies–of course, if they are curable; maybe they are not, a possibility to which i'll return. ... in short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and i find it hard to see why mine is "elitists," not theirs. the opposite seems to be transparently the case, though i won't amplify. 7 the truth is that academic space itself is an elitist space. it uses certain kinds of specialized jargon. these jargons are certainly unfamiliar to most people. academic language is different 7 from language of everyday life. chomskian jargon too may be difficult to understand for the common folk. postmodernists are not the exception. let me answer the chomskian reservation concerning postmodernism in the above remark as “theoreticians" and “elitists”. one can often view that those who cannot theorize the social contents are mediocre. we cannot excuse the chomskian silence to the question of rhetoric. on this ground many intellectuals today are reluctant to call chomsky a scholar. about the charge of elitism, let me reiterate that academic space itself is elitist space. the space in which chomsky’s works are manufactured and sold, is itself an elitist space. is postmodernism nothing more than “a mental slavery to the bourgeoisie”? is postmodernism as tim hall says “a mental slavery to the bourgeoisie”? hall in communist voice writes: postmodernism has produced diverse offshoots and projects. it poses as a radical challenge to the capitalist establishment, but in reality its philosophy undermines resistance to the ruling class. its essence is a subjective idealism which attacks human reason itself and the materialist world view of science, reserving particular vehemence for marxist revolutionary theory. its logic prevents a coherent analysis of the natural world and especially of capitalist social reality and undermines revolutionary theoretical and political struggle against capitalism. pomo claims to be a radical opponent of the "totalizing" critiques it sees embodied in rationalism and marxism, but its own positions imply a complete ("total") destruction of all but the most fragmentary opposition of the oppressed class, the proletariat, to the capitalist exploiters. in the end, only "deconstructive" word-play is considered resistance. 8 8 postmodernism is no less critical to capitalism and its blind followers who brag about the capitalism as the best of all possible system. postmodernism is more a philosophical system and capitalism a political one. they are not identical. postmodernism is even critical to capitalism. foucault, a postmodernist, regards capitalist modernity as the mindset of the dehumanizing logic of industrial capitalism. maybe some cheap so-called postmodernists used and manipulated postmodernist thought for their vested interests but a genuine postmodernist has no malice to any system of thoughts. but he/she is, of course, critical of the nature of truth, knowledge and reality that were explained by foundationalists. he/she rejects any form of totalitarianism even capitalism if it ceased to speak the language of pluralism and mutual coexistence. he/she rejects the claim that what i speak is truth and any claims against me are false. conclusion i do not want to contend that postmodernism is the best of all possible philosophies. but i believe that despite some of its seemingly nihilist (however, nihilism too has its humanist contents) assertions, its philosophical implications can pragmatically be coordinated with the findings of the research in the social sciences to achieve certain social goals. the insistence on the fusion of postmodernist philosophy with some of the core aspects of marxian humanism seems to be more plausible in the politics of the ‘new international’ today. it seems counterproductive to place marxism and postmodernism in hostility. in other words, it is very hard to see the difference of the advocacy made either by marx and derrida on behalf of the proletariat/margin. their humanism desires to liberate the oppressed, to empower them, to give voice to them. their prospective social goal is the same but the way they interpret it makes only 9 the difference. marx analyzes the condition in terms of the existing reality of nineteenth century european society; derrida interprets in terms of the ‘new international’. it is improper to say marxism and (post) modernism are opposite. both marxism and (post) modernism resist the cultural conditions of capitalist modernity. marx was already (post) modernist (because he has challenged the logic of capitalist modernity) and derrida is still under the spell of marx (see his book specters of marx). one cannot be marxist without being postmodernist (marxism anticipates radical skepticism of authority) and postmodernist without the philosophy of marx (because (post)modernism without certain kind commitment to society is an anachronism (even though anachronism has its own logic). in his book specters of marx, derrida recognizes the relevancy of marx in the new international. … communism has always been and will remain spectral: it is always still to come and is distinguished, like democracy itself, from every living present understood as plentitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a presence effectively identical to itself. capitalist societies can always heave a sigh of relief and say to themselves: communism is finished since the collapse of the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and not only is it finished, but it did not take place, it was only a ghost. they do not more than disavow the undeniable itself: a ghost never dies, it remains always to come and to come-back.9 his dissatisfaction is with the orthodox marists who are reluctant to recognize a new global scenario. what is needed as far as he is concerned, a change in the thinking of dogmatic marxist pundits because so many things like the nature of capital, labour, exploitation, market value etc have changed. the increased sophistication of life world of the workers and “the egalitarian 10 distribution of income, increased workplace democracy, the end of economic exploitation and the eradication of class differences” has transformed the life world of the workers. they are not only workers but also owners of wealth and income. marxism must adjust to this new reality. and it needs to question itself: . . . how will intellectuals in the marxist tradition respond. . . to the global transformations now occurring? how has the crisis in eastern europe and the former soviet union affected the way intellectuals, scholars, and government officials in those countries and around the world reconceived their intellectual and political projects? what is to be the status of marxist social goals that informed so many marxist thinkers and social revolutionaries throughout the world–the egalitarian distribution of income, increased workplace democracy, the end of economic exploitation and the eradication of class differences–given the current rush to various forms of capitalism in eastern europe, russia, and china? does the “end of history also portend the end of marxist theory? what is living and what is dead in marxism? 10 let me point out that i cannot wholly agree with the grand claims concerning “the egalitarian distribution of income, increased workplace democracy, the end of economic exploitation and the eradication of class differences.” while it may be true for the western world, the condition of factory workers in the third world is still more or less the same as marx saw in europe in his time. yet derrida’s assertion still remains true that self-assessment is essential within marxism and perhaps within capitalism too. this means that so-called postmodernist pundits should stop bragging that the philosophy of marx has no relevance today, so-called marxists pundits should not see postmodernism “merely as [a] regressive inclination of the west, but [rather as] a new 11 reflexivity about itself that includes an acknowledgement that the west cannot define on its own ‘world history’ or even ‘western history’. rather, it must construct far more tentative, changing, and dialogic views of itself, as it accounts for the contributions and criticism of the other agents in the global arena” 11. likewise, so-called postmodernist pundits must stop claiming that there is no truth, no reality and that the disciplines of the past are ‘dead.’ to say there is no truth does not deny a room for the truth claims that human beings need to live by on the earth. they create their own local and infinitesimal forms of truth and to pass their life. postmodernism has no intention to plunder that form of truth from people and leave them in a world without truth value. to say that every interpretation is misinterpretation and everything is text does not mean that interpretation is not possible and texts are irrelevant. it means that our modes of interpretation and nature of textuality of the text are contingent and are often prone to give a mistaken views of reality. to recognize this fact is to avoid possible misinterpretation. certainly we cannot say everything is misinterpretation. we must believe and almost we have no choice not to believe in the habermasian communicative potential of human language. for as john locke has already pointed out, we have no other means to think and communicate our thoughts than through language itself. all fundamental reality is accessible to us through/in language. whether there is an independent reality beyond language is debatable. but we can agree that language brings things into intelligibility. even marx and engels in the german ideology say that language bears the immediacy of the actual of ‘thought.’ the nature of language, as john locke has shown, does not reflect reality but a translated version of reality. david hume seems to be correct when he says that the intelligibility of the world does not give us access to the reality of the world but to the habits of human mind. but all this means we should not underestimate any potential revolution 12 for the emancipation of the human beings. we should not underestimate the crude reality of exploitation of one class over the other. there is still a grim reality of exploitation and misery of the life-world of a big section of the population. we can question whether the exploitation is a cause or effect (of language). but our commitment toward the exploited cannot be withheld. commitment and cognition sometimes go unparallel. but no one should preclude the other. in other words, our postmodernist sensibility and marxist commitment to the ‘have nots’ should go parallel with the progress of society as well as its consciousness and knowledge. endnotes 1chris weedon’s feminist practice and poststructuralist theory (blackwell publishing, 1997) offers a clear and lucid interpretation of poststructuralist theory with the focus on the issues of language, subjectivity and power. 168. 2 tim hall , editor of struggle, a revolutionary working-class literary magazine accuses postmodernism of undermining the struggle of working class against capitalist ruling class in “postmodernist philosophy is old subjectivist wine in new bottles.” communist voice #15, october 25, 1997. url:> http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html 3 see tyrus miller’s interview response to me in my book the humanities at work: international exchange of ideas in philosophy, aesthetics, and literature (kathmandu: sunlight publication 2008 ) 43. 4 the quote is adopted from notes of the second session of the postmodern meeting group held on july o7, 2007. url:> http://www.newphilsoc.org.uk/postmodernisam/postmodernism.htm 5 the extract is adopted from discussion of robert day and carlos rebello about the debate between marxism and postmodernism. rober day is accusing postmodernism of being an academic bourgeois enterprise. url:> http://www.marxmail.org/archives/july99/marxism_and_postmodernism.htm 6 the quote is adopted from notes of the sixth session of the postmodern meeting group held on july o7, 2007. url:> http://www.newphilsoc.org.uk/postmodernisam/postmodernism.htm 7 the quote is adopted from the electronic version posted by one jenm289@aol.com to rec.arts.books, 13 nov 1995 where it is written: "the following was written several months ago by noam chomsky in a discussion about po-mo and its contribution to activism et al. the discussion took place on lbbs, z-magazine's left on-line bulletin board. . . .” url:> http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html 8 tim hall “postmodernist philosophy is old subjectivist wine in new bottles.” communist voice #15, october 25, 1997. url:> http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html 9 jacques derrida, specters of marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new international (new work: routledge, 2006) translated ed. by peggy kamuf. derrida says that the capitalist declaration of ‘the death of marxism’ does not mean it is dead or that it is no longer relevant to the new politics. 13 http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/toc15.html http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/toc15.html 10 bernd magnus and stephen cullenberg wrote the introduction to derrida’s book specters of marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new international (new work: routledge, 2006). the quote of their view of marxism in consistent with derrida’s view in the book. 11 see david wood’s, interview response by me in my book the humanities at work: international exchange of ideas in philosophy, aesthetics, and literature (kathmandu: sunlight publication 2008 ) 243. 14 11(180-184)_note for authors buddhist economics of compassion and communion s.r.bhatt university of delhi, india. abstract the current economic models which promote materialism, individualism and consumerism have led to a global crisis which requires a new economic paradigm. this paper contends that buddhism contains within its doctrines a paradigm which is well equipped to provide a solution to this crisis, one based upon the buddha’s middle path. it is universally felt that all is not well with the present day sphere of economics and that this calls for serious thinking as to what ails the prevailing state of affairs and how to rectify the root causes of the problems facing the humankind. it also necessitates rethinking economic principles, policies, planning and programs. this paper has limited concerns and stems from the disillusionment with the dichotomous, exclusivist and lopsided economic situation that exists in the modern world. it also offers and outlines a brief sketch of an indian buddhist approach to structure and manage economy at the national and global levels. it is hoped that the latter can possibly offer an effective and more beneficial alternative to the present day individualisticmaterialistic-consumerist-profit seeking-competitive-exploitative economy which is bereft of welfare contents, sustainability of economic resources and spiritual orientation. the motivating factor in presenting this paper is that if we possess something which may prove helpful and useful to world peace, progress and plenitude, we should not hesitate in sharing it with the world at large. rather than being burden to the world or being idle spectator to the universal suffering or being hesitant to our cultural heritage with others, we 86 prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 86-95 © 2000 by assumption university press should attempt to partake in cooperative endeavor to resolve the problems of the world and creatively reconsider what our culture, civilization and traditions can contribute to the present world for a bright future. the inquisitive mind is always searching for redemptive knowledge. western economic thought seems to have exhausted itself. therefore it requires us to search for the source of a new paradigm shift. one such source can be found in classical buddhist thought. the buddhist approach is that of a moderate economy based on ‘buddhist middle path’ which is sustainable both in production and consumption; the two aspects of economic planning and development. the buddhist way is an economy of balanced development, balancing different pairs like production and consumption, individual and society, nation and universe, physical and spiritual, present and future and so forth. it is holistic and integral approach to economic issues ranging from micro to macro perspectives. it also measures development in terms of prosperity, health and happiness of the present and the future generations in terms of intra-generational and inter-generational justice. it provides for a cosmos-friendly economy in which instrumental and intrinsic goods are harmonized. to explicate its details would be a large task, but allow me to offer here only a blueprint. buddhism is both a view of reality and a way of life seeking to realize the summum bonum of existence. it has therefore a comprehensive perspective on all facets of reality and life. its understanding of economic aspects of our life, while ancient, also provides something fresh, unique and of great contemporary relevance and may serve the need for a desirable alternative models of economics at the national and global levels. it attends to all the four drivers of economic development, viz., human resources, natural resources, capital resources and innovative technology. though it has not been presented very systematically in the classical buddhist literature, it can be reconstructed from the early buddhist literature and given a coherent shape. buddhist economy is based on and can be derived from the teachings of lord buddha in the well-known dhammacakkapavattanasutta in which the ‘four noble truths’ and the ‘eight-fold noble path’ are also contained. in these pali texts we are provided sufficient material for constructing an economic theory. buddhist economy is essentially characterized by love and compassion, benevolence and altruism, interdependence and interrelation, s.r.bhatt 87 mutual openness and reciprocity, fellowship and participation, plenitude and happiness, giving and renouncing, caring and sharing. the four noble virtues for ideal human conduct named as brahmaviharas of universal friendship and amity (maitta), universal compassion (karuna), universal responsibility making others happy (mudita) and indifference to narrow self-interest (upeksha) are the guiding principles on which economic thought and planning, and the economic behavior of individuals and society are to be based. it is an integral and organic approach which is holistic and nondivisive and takes into its purview well being of the entire cosmos (lokanukampaya). morality and universal responsibility are the very heart of buddhism and therefore buddhist economics is dharmic (ethical) being guided by virtuous mind (kusala citta). it can be described as dharmaoriented and dharma-based economy. its motto is morality first, money thereafter. morality is not a policy but a principle of life and existence. there are three facets of dharma; it is sustaining, it is regulating and it is instrumental for the good. prajna (wisdom) and sila (morality) as karuna (compassion) are the foundations on which it rests. economics, like other human pursuits, is only the means and its ultimate goal is cosmic wellbeing and happiness (bahujana hitaya, bahujana sukhaya) leading to realization of summum bonum of life (nirvana). one of the most significant implications of the buddhist idea of the non-substantiality (anatmavada) of reality is that the cosmos, rather the cosmic process, is a totality of fleeting occurrences and not of things. it is a highly complex, complicated and intricate but planned and purposive networking of events and not a mechanistic arrangement of preexistent entities. every worldly existence has a dependent origination out of a causal collocation characterized by mutuality and openness, interrelatedness and reciprocity. each one has a specific nature, place, role and function in the cosmic setup as determined in the scheme of the universe. human existence cannot be conceived in isolation from the rest of the universe. it is not in the form of just “i” but also “we”. in the economic functioning, every one has to contribute according to one’s ability. the cosmos is a network of relationships which give rise to an organic collective living entity (samgha jivana), like an organism. as hua-yen buddhism puts it, in one is all, in many is one 88 prajñâ vihâra one is identical to all, many is identical to one. the natural implications of such a view point are non-individualistic, non-isolationist, non-selfishness, and lead, instead, to mutual dependence, collective living and corporate functioning. this model of a living organism is best illustration of this position. a living organism is a dynamic totality of multiple organs at once holistic and integral, centrifugal and centripetal, collective and individual. here the whole lives for the parts and the parts live for the whole. there is mutuality and reciprocity in a natural way, a sort of pre-established harmony. every one discharges one’s duties and obligations without caring for one’s rights. it is duty-oriented rather than rights-oriented. there is coordination and cooperation which is generally smooth and if it gets disturbed the result is sickness and ailment and possible decay. the ideal requirement is maintenance of harmony. harmony is natural and must be preserved, and imbalance is unnatural, must be avoided. this organic approach, which is holistic and integral also has some elements of pan-psychism. the basic concepts underlying the buddhist approach to economics are the middle path (madhyama marga), right living (samyag ajivaka), collective living (samgha jivana), interdependence and interrelation of all phenomena (pratitya samutpada), preservation, conservation and consolidation of all resources (ksema), enhancement and revitalization of all existing resources (yoga), non-profiteering and non-deprivation of others ensuring intra-generational justice (asteya), safeguarding and preserving the resources for the posterities as intergenerational justice (aparigraha), management of end, means and modalities in a planned, purposive and efficacious manner (upaya kausala), and self-reliance (purusartha). in his discourses on economic issues, on agriculture, trade, commerce and industry, on business enterprises, on monetary transactions and the like buddha has expounded these ideas very clearly and the tripitakas (buddhist sacred literature) are replete with them. sometimes he explains them directly, and sometimes through stories and parables. the non-substantial approach has deep and tremendous impact in shaping the buddhist economy. since it advocates egoless-ness it avoids individualism and all its corollaries. no individual is an isolated existence. every individual depends on the other. there is a supportive mutualism. s.r.bhatt 89 individual-centeredness degenerates into narrow individualism which breeds all sorts of economic offences, conflicts and deprivations. it leads to consumerism and profiteering, unlawful practices and alienation. the buddhist idea of economy, on the other hand, while respecting individual freedom, personal initiative, preferences, choices and actions, also calls for universal responsibilities. it believes that any pursuit of individualistic goods at the cost of others is counterproductive in the ultimate analysis. since every existence is interdependent and interrelated buddhism advocates holistic and integral understanding of the nature of reality in general and of economic reality in particular. it is the feeling of oneness and selfsameness with all. this is the meaning of spirituality in indian context. santideva in the eighth chapter of the bodhicaryavatara, uses two poignant words for this: paratmasamata (feeling of selfsameness with others) and paratmaparivartana (transforming oneself as others, a sort of empathy). it also finds expression in the famous four brahmaviharas of maitri (fellowship), karuna (compassion), mudita (rejoicing at the happiness of others) and upeksa (indifference to self-interest) referred to earlier. buddhist economy is based on the doctrine of middle path avoiding the extremes of materialism and idealism, capitalism and communism, individualism and totalitarianism, poverty and affluence, self-negation and self-indulgence. it ensures consumption without consumerism. it accepts profit without profiteering. profit is not to be used solely for personal purposes. it is to be utilized for growth and development, for helping the needy and for benevolent purposes like education. buddhist economy emphasizes social component with the ultimate goal of cosmic well-being. as lord buddha exhorted his disciples, “o monks! move around for the well-being of every one, for the happiness of every one, showering compassion on the entire world; for the good, for the welfare of divine and human.” (vinaya pitaka i.23) in the present day economic situation, people are first induced to desire and use things which are produced or will be produced. this is consumerism. in consumerism, demand follows production. more and more consumption is sought through inducements of various types so that 90 prajñâ vihâra sales increase and profit accrues. whatever is produced must be sold and consumed and profit generated. as far as possible disposable goods should be produced so that they can soon be discarded and new production required. newer demands are created by producing more attractive and enticing goods. this also leads to competition among the producers and sellers. the entire management of economic planning, production and distribution is geared towards this goal. those who can help in doing so are termed as ‘management gurus’. in the buddhist system the scenario should be just the opposite. the human being is not born to consume whatever is produced. production is for human beings and not human beings for production. production should be for the purpose of meeting demands and, as far as possible, demands are to be curbed and not increased. since production follows demand and since demands should be reduced to minimum, production has to be need-based. any sort of crass materialism is not in keeping with the buddhist viewpoint. economic enterprise is only designed to meet legitimate needs and necessities, and not to cater to greed. thus, in contrast to the individualistic-consumerist, profitoriented economy of the present times based on the culture of ‘having’, of acquisition and possession, of extravagant consumption and excessive indulgence, buddhism offers an alternative model of the culture of ‘giving’, of sacrifice, of renunciation, of peace, harmony and cooperation, of lawfulness and of respect to environment. it calls for fulfillment of needs but not catering to greed. it repudiates competitive economy and calls for cooperative economy. the buddhist economy can therefore offer a new approach, fresh insights, deeper intuitions and a new rationality for a paradigm shift, a shift which is natural as human fulfillment lies only in the alternative set of values. in this shift the focal point of economy is not profit but service, not exploitation but judicious employment of resources. digganikaya (iii.p.168) gives the example of a bee which gathers honey without damaging flower and spares honey for consumptions by others. this cares for ecological purity and balance, justice and fair play. it is conducive to holistic growth, human and cosmic. the culture of ‘giving’ is not motivated by the selfish considerations of achieving fame, power or prestige. the greatness of a person depends not in amassing wealth or in showing it off in acts of charity. it depends on the character of true benevolence. it is not for ego-satisfacs.r.bhatt 91 tion or for seeking return-favors. it is for cosmic well-being (bahujanahitaya). it is selfless giving. it is giving for social and cosmic peace, prosperity and plenitude. it is giving with joy and for joy. it is the sharing of material and spiritual goods. it is an economy in which needs of everyone is taken care of but it does not cater to individual greed. it is not an economy of extravagance, spendthrift-ness and wastefulness. this calls for the role of wisdom and compassion in economics. in a discourse with king pasenadi in the suttanipata buddha tells him that a person who acquires wealth and does not use it for the wellbeing of himself and others is not praiseworthy. buddhism recognizes importance of wealth for happy and contented worldly life. in buddhist economy wealth is a means and not an end. the means must be pure and conducive to end which also has to be pure. this is samyak ajivaka. the end is not hedonistic pleasure but moral and spiritual uplift. wealth is neither an evil nor is it a final end. it is to be acquired in a dharmic (pious and righteous) way, with legitimate limits and restraints. this is known as utthanasampada. in the andhasutta of anguttaranikaya buddha says that a person who is poverty stricken is like the blind. one who tries to acquire wealth but does not care about the righteousness of means of acquisition is like one-eyed person. the two-eye person is one who distinguishes between good and bad. ethical and spiritual orientation is the key note of buddhist economy. wealth and virtue should go hand in hand. buddhism calls for balancing of wants and consumption, of labour and leisure, of income and expenditure. this moderation is technically known as samajivita. (anguttaranikaya, iv. p.281). this balancing is possible by cultivation of apramada (vigilant attitude). in following the middle path there should be neither poverty nor affluence, neither austerity nor excessive indulgence. life should be neither stringent nor extravagant. there should be neither misuse of wealth nor enslavement to wealth. one should not feel elated when wealth comes nor should one be miserable and depressed when wealth departs. this sort of indifference is best suited to mental peace. the attainment of given end with minimum means is upayakausala (skillful employment of means). it is a symbiosis of end, means and modalities. it is maximum output with minimum input, maximum realization with minimum possession and consumption. it involves the will to exist, and to exist in a moderately good 92 prajñâ vihâra way. buddhist economy cares for quality of life and good standard of living but this is to be measured qualitatively and not quantitatively. moreover, buddhist economy is economy of non-violence, non-violence to ones own self, non-violence to others and to the total cosmos. for buddhist way of life, economic behavior is purposeful in gathering tangible wealth for balanced material consumption and for accumulating merits for future life. it provides a basis to worldly life and also to moral and spiritual life. the buddha realized the need and importance of wealth. with empty stomach one can not get wisdom nor can one teach wisdom. buddha, therefore, did not preach to hungry persons. with poverty all evils come, economic offences are generated and social institutions are disrupted and destroyed. with economic growth social order and peace are established. it is advocacy of mixed economy with individual initiative and state control. this message is clearly conveyed in the cakkvatthisimhanadasutta and katadantasutta. the buddhist idea of economy has both micro and macro dimensions. it attends to all facets of economy: agriculture, industry, trade and commerce, business and fiscal policies. it deals with employment, production, distribution, consumption and development of economy. it explicitly states what is to be produced, how to be produced, how much is to be produced and for whom it is to be produced. the same applies to consumption as well. the economy is to be evaluated depending upon the way of production and consumption. care is to be taken that there is no violence or harm to self and to other living beings and to nature. as stated earlier, non-violence is at the center stage of buddhist economy. the doctrine of karma comes as a guiding principle in structuring the economic system in so far as it emphasizes rational action and intentionality coupled with universal responsibility. one must possess pious mind for righteous livelihood. humane development is the keynote of buddhist economy. development is for human beings and not vice-versa, but it is sustainable development of the entire cosmos and not just human development. it involves seven factors, viz., human agency, human motivation, material resources, monetary system, technological support, management at different levels, and market for distribution. the development and management of economy in the buddhist framework touches all the three phases s.r.bhatt 93 of production, distribution and consumption, keeping in view the law of demand and supply. the motivating factor is not first production and then creation of demand; rather it stands for production only for satisfaction of legitimate demand. economic planning comes under upaya kausal. it has two stages. one is management of action and the other is management of the results of action. it emphasizes that we must know what it is to act, why to act, and how to act. we must act in most skillful manner so as to realize the desired result. management of results is to be guided by intra-generational and inter-generational justice. our wants are unlimited but resources are limited and exhaustible, though renewable to some extent. our wants are increasing day by day; our desires remain insatiable. consumerism has led to more and more pursuit after sensuous pleasures, and fulfillment of carnal appetites. strictly speaking our needs are limited but wants are becoming unlimited. so we have to set limits to our wants and cease to be ‘ever-wanting storehouse’. we wrongly think that nature has infinite resources or that all resources should be geared for our benefits only. according to buddha, the problem of scarcity leads to unjust distribution and consequent poverty. wealth can generate resources but cannot remove scarcity. so we have to control our wants and desires (tanha). buddhism as a school of thought and a way of life is at once both ancient and modern. it proved useful in the past and could spread all over asia, not by force but by conviction and usefulness. in modern times also it has attracted the minds of the elites all over the world. but ramifications of its seminal ideas are yet to be worked out in different fields of human and cosmic life, and applied to modern needs and aspirations. buddha was a practical and pragmatic person and he had genuine concern for human and cosmic wellbeing. it is high time that buddha’s teachings were allowed to out step beyond the confinements of religious or academic discourse (although useful), and applied to other disciplines. it involves revisiting buddhism with fresh insights and innovative ideas and creative reinterpretations. perhaps a collective thinking and multidisciplinary team work may be more helpful. it is hoped that the buddhist alternative will be reconstructed and given a fair chance to ameliorate the human miseries. this was after all the objective of the buddha. 94 prajñâ vihâra 11(180-184)_note for authors rawls and habermas on religion and politics: reflections on philippine political culture christopher ryan maboloc erasmus mundus scholar in applied ethics, linkoping university, sweden abstract this paper examines the involvement of the catholic church in philippine political affairs, and questions whether there is legitimate justification for such crucial engagement. to shed light into this, i bring into dialogue john rawls and jürgen habermas, most especially concerning their idea of civil society. this dialogue shows a possibility for the reconciliation of politics and religion in philippine democracy. church involvement in politics has always been controversial, especially in third world democracies like the philippines. this paper intends to examine the involvement of the catholic church in philippine political affairs, and examine whether there is a justification for such crucial engagement. historically, the catholic church in the philippines has played an important role in charting the course of philippine politics, most notably during the dark years of ferdinand marcos which ended in the first people power revolution in 1986. the church has also been active in its protest against controversial proposals such as abortion, reproductive health (house bill 4110), divorce and many others. and the church and its leaders have served as a beacon of hope for a vibrant democracy in the philippines. but of course, this involvement is not without its opposition. there are sectors who argue that church involvement in political issues violates the separation of church and state. there is also a view that sees the church as meddling in the areas concerning women’s rights to reproducprajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 129-143 129 © 2000 by assumption university press tive health. but what really is the role of the church in politics? is there a way to justify such role? this paper will explore the answer to this problem in the area of deliberative democracy, and will seek to strengthen the idea that political and democratic discourse may allow religious arguments, if and only if these arguments also purport to express public values. to shed light on this, i will bring into dialogue john rawls and jurgen habermas, most especially on their idea of civil society, and hope to reconcile the role of politics and religion in philippine democracy. civil society and comprehensive doctrines according to rawls, civil society, or the “background culture”, includes “the culture of churches and associations of all kinds, and institutions of learning at all levels, especially universities and professional schools, scientific and other societies” (rawls 1999, 134). civil society belongs to the nonpublic use of reason, which comprises many of its questions (rawls 1993, 220). it is undeniable, however, that members of civil society may base their political opinions on certain religious insights. church doctrines which oblige the individual to respect human life from the moment of conception can form part of the convictions of individuals, and as such, are important in the way they comprehend political matters. the person who professes belief in god is the same person who votes, decides, and performs other acts in the public realm as a social being. but there can be conflict when one introduces comprehensive doctrines in public debates in a liberal democratic society, for bringing them in can offend others who may not share the convictions of those who profess such beliefs. such is the reason why the public realm must be independent from religious arguments. this neutrality is in view of the very nature of public reason. in a democratic society, according to rawls, “public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise the final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution” (ibid., 214). simply put, public reason in this sense is always political in nature. for instance, people come into an agreement to a constitution that defines public policy. they also agree on the way upon which public institutions are to be established. public reason, however, for rawls, 130 prajñâ vihâra does not apply to the background culture. (see rawls 1993, 215) public reason, he says, “does not apply to our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning about them by members of associations such as churches and universities” (ibid.). political power rests in the constitutional framework of government, and this framework is independent of the religious convictions of the background culture. any liberal democratic state must therefore be neutral. (see audi 1997, 39) generally, it can be said that setting aside comprehensive norms is understandable because the basis of political stability is the consensus shared by all on matters pertaining to the general interest of the public. the constitution, for instance, is a product of this agreement. any legislation can only be legitimate if it is constitutional. thus, no single religious opinion from the background culture can override what has been established constitutionally. questioning the idea of neutrality in the context of third world cultures, it is important to note that religion plays a great part in the lives of people, and therefore in the kind of government they wish to establish. put into the context of philippine society, which is 85% catholic, the presence of catholic values permeate the many areas of politics, including the constitution and the laws passed by congress. but more importantly, members of civil society in the philippines are influenced by strong religious values. the church has been a strong voice on such contentious political issues as abortion, divorce, and the death penalty. as one filipino scholar notes, involvement in social issues can take place at the level of basic ecclesiastical communities where the parish is able to generate some kind of dynamism (gaspar 1997, 151). the church finds itself as an active participant in philippine political issues. for instance, the church through its many affiliated associations have delivered their arguments against the bill on reproductive health care in legislative hearings called for by congress. the church has also been active in the peace process, another political issue. in the 1996 mindanao peace congress, “church leaders categorically stated that peace christopher ryan maboloc 131 is the wholeness of life where every person can live with dignity. peace must be based on justice for all, whether they are christians, muslims, or indigenous peoples” (gaspar 1997, 168). moreover, the church also takes part in electoral advocacy. during philippine elections, the church and civil society groups openly endorse candidates who support their agenda. as karl gaspar notes, “there is no denying that in a number of areas, the church, despite its claim to be neutral, did support certain candidates, directly or indirectly (ibid., 156) thus, it can be said that in the philippines, it is impossible for the church to be neutral. the church, according to gaspar, through its program for conscientization, supported the people’s aspiration to participate actively in making decisions that affect them, thus internalizing democratic values, empowering them towards setting up a just and caring society (gaspar 1997, 164). for instance, if the church criticized some development programs of the government, it was not because the church was interfering with government affairs. (ibid.) in such an instance, the church was simply expressing its concern for the poor and the oppressed. what justifies this involvement? the proviso rawls says that the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another (rawls 1999, 132). for rawls, public reason accounts for the concerns that involve matters pertaining to political justice. (ibid., 133) he says, as reasons of free and equal citizens, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice (ibid.). although he limits the role of civil society, that doesn’t mean that citizens can no longer hold their government officials accountable. (ibid., 135) citizens, according to him, can realize the function of public reason in society, and most notably, he says, they have the duty “to repudiate government officials and candidates for office who violate public rules”, which is, in fact, for him, “one of the political and social roots of 132 prajñâ vihâra democracy and is vital to its enduring strength and vigor” (ibid., 135-36). the church in the philippines, for instance, noted gaspar, was the first to publicly denounce martial law, and called for president marcos to lift it, long before other groups found the courage to do so (gaspar 1997, 149). in today’s philippine society, the duty of civility is realized in the availability of venues to file complaints against corrupt officials through the office of the ombudsman, and the public nature of congressional hearings on concerns like health, the environment, and education. participating in formal venues is an inherent requisite because discussions pertaining to the public must be governed by rules set by the institutions which deal with public matters. since members of civil society are better educated than the majority of the people in the philippines, they are expected to be the sounding board in the halls of congress. as rawls points out, citizens have a duty to involve themselves in issues of public concern, for it is an ideal “that imposes a moral, not a legal duty to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason” (rawls 1993, 217). rawls designates the duty of civility as a moral duty. (ibid.) such duty is not a legal obligation, but it is a duty which proceeds from the ideal of political justice. citizens must seek, actively participate, and hope for the realization of what is good for society. thus, in filing complaints or seeking remedies for grievances against government officials, one is performing something not for his own private sake but for the sake of the public. it is important to note that participation in the public sphere in the philippines is heavily indebted to the values taught by the church. not only that, the church itself is active in promoting its stand on public issues. for instance, combating the government’s promotion of artificial means of birth control has pre-occupied family-life programs of the church (gaspar 1997, 163). given this influence of the church in philippine political culture, it is important here to introduce the notion of the proviso, where rawls says, “reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course political reasons and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines, are presented” (rawls 1997, 777; also in habermas 2006, christopher ryan maboloc 133 5-6). rawls requires that the introduction of religious arguments must be grounded on the principles of political justice, and that the values that these religious arguments purport to express, must also be public values. (ibid.) in philippine political culture, basing political decisions on the church’s teachings regarding respect for human life is not at all arbitrary, for this value is something that filipino’s do share, a value which they have in fact chosen when they ratified the constitution. poor filipinos (30 percent of the population or 24 million people) find strength in the church. if the church demands from the government that it protects the interest of the poor, a stance that can be based on the doctrine of love for one’s neighbor (a catholic teaching), the church is advocating something that is fair and rational. it is also at the same time a demand for responsible politics. it is worthy to note that the “philippines was the first country to articulate its vision of becoming a church of the poor” (gaspar 1997, 150). concern for human life and care for the poor are matters of political justice. i also believe that these are two public values that any democratic society would strongly uphold. in mindanao, one of the major islands in the philippines, many dioceses involve lay leaders in most decision-making processes through regular assemblies attended by priests, religious and lay people to promote active lay participation (gaspar 1997, 163). such activities prepare and immerse church leaders and lay people in the ideals of democratization. it is in these assemblies where the church echoes its positions and hold public dialogues. the promotion of christian values in the public sphere by the church help define the moral viewpoint of the public. by opposing abortion, the church is simply trying to protect the life of the unborn child, and is acting on the basis of human values. the contribution of the church on matters of public concern is vital. philippine society as a whole counts on the church as a moral voice on public issues. this is done within the context of a constitution that promotes and protects the value of human life. because of the active involvement of the church in forming public opinion, its influence on the issue of reproductive health has been felt by most filipinos. naida pasion states, “nowhere is the influence of the church more felt than in government program on reproductive health. nurses deliberately absented themselves during the scheduled days for iud in134 prajñâ vihâra sertions rather than defy the teachings of the church” (pasion 1997, 226). it must be noted that there is no direct intervention on the part of the church. what it does is voice out its opinion on many vital public issues. habermas says, “religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. in the event of corresponding political debates, this potential makes religious speech a serious candidate to transporting possible truth contents” (habermas 2006, 10). religion in the public sphere “the liberal state”, according to habermas, “has an interest in unleashing religious voices in the political public sphere, and in the participation of religious organizations as well” (ibid.). if allowing the balance between religious and public values contributes to consensus in society, then there is no reason to silence the voice of the church on public matters like abortion, divorce, and reproductive health care. habermas says that “in a secular state only those political decisions are taken to be legitimate as can be impartially justified in the light of generally accessible reasons, in other words equally justified vis-à-vis religious and non-religious citizens, and citizens of different confessions” (ibid., 5) habermas writes, “a liberal state must not discourage religious persons and communities from also expressing themselves politically” (ibid., 10). the church cannot be excluded in the public debate on abortion and other morally sensitive issues. religion and politics are intertwined in philippine political culture because filipinos consider the church as their protector from the excesses of their government. some religious values have become part of public morality. it does not appear as an imposition of one religion to another, because in issues like abortion and reproductive health care, the values of “respect for human life” and “respect for the dignity of the human person” concern public morality in the philippines. kent greenawalt affirms such when he says that in settling the issue regarding the infusion of religious norms on matters of public policy, “much depends on history, culture, religions, and other comprehensive views that people hold” (greenawalt 2003, 275). christopher ryan maboloc 135 habermas says that religious doctrines potentially deliver the truth on important public matters. (habermas 2006, 12) they must therefore be allowed in the public given the legitimate reasons. there is no arbitrariness in bringing in religious arguments if they are supported by equally reasonable arguments other than the religious arguments themselves. (see rawls 1997, 777) habermas requires, however, that these arguments be translated before they are allowed in the public sphere. (see habermas 2006, 10-11) this translation means finding the political reasons for these religious arguments, meaning, their accessibility in terms of “what citizens owe one another as good reasons for their political statements and attitudes” (habermas 2006, 11). he adds that the truth content of religious contributions can enter into the institutionalized practice of deliberation and decision-making if the necessary translation occurs in the pre-parliamentary domain, i.e., in the public sphere itself (ibid., 12) for habermas, the political public sphere acts as a sounding board for problems that must be processed by the political system because they cannot be solved elsewhere (habermas 1996, 359). for him, civil society’s attunement to societal problems in the private sphere can make it effective in transmitting and amplifying reactions to the public sphere (ibid., 367). the reason for this openness, is that the public is made up of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations of their social interests, and who may want to have an influence on institutionalized opinion and will-formation (ibid.). this explains the important role that the church plays in the philippine public sphere. habermas explains that the public sphere must amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems, but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions (ibid., 359). obviously, social and political problems are issues that religious and lay people talk about in meetings and even in informal gatherings. even with the absence of the formality of public hearings, assemblies contribute to public enlightenment on important issues. as an example, the mindanao assembly for peace, convened by archbishop fernando capalla in davao city, committed itself, christians, muslims and indigenous peoples alike, to become peacemakers, called on government to provide basic services essentially in depressed areas, and conduct peace education (gaspar 1997, 167). 136 prajñâ vihâra the church has always played a vital function in the public sphere. according to habermas, the political system must remain sensitive to the influence of public opinion (habermas 1996, 367). habermas acknowledges the influence which may come from religious leaders suggesting that this political influence supported by public opinion is converted into political power into a potential for rendering binding decisions (ibid., 363). he assigns a big role for civil society, pointing out that, “basic constitutional guarantees alone, of course, cannot preserve the public sphere, and civil society from deformation. the communication structures of the public sphere must rather kept intact by an energetic civil society” (ibid., 369). democracy is healthier with a more active civil society in the public sphere. jean cohen asserts that the survival and expansion of basic rights depend very much on political cultures that allow and even promote its mobilization (cohen 2002, 217). the active role of the church makes the people more involved in open discussions on political issues, thereby empowering an otherwise helpless populace. this is strongly grounded in the fact that “the church in the philippines believes that ministering to the needs of the poor and the oppressed is a moral option, a moral obligation” (gaspar 1997, 163). critique of the liberal tradition “the liberal tradition’s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines, according to wolterstorff, seems to be telling people to step out of their religious community and enter the public debate without any appeal to their religious convictions” (wolterstorff 1997, 172). kent greenawalt suggests, granting that there will be disagreements, or that some people might disagree, it can still be said that “we can revert to the possibility that one set of background beliefs might be better than any other, and that human beings have the capacity to identify sound background beliefs” (greenawalt 2003, 262). for wolterstorff, it seems to be too much of a generalization to throw away religious arguments simply because they are religious without even examining their value in the discussion of matters that concern the life and well-being of citizens (see wolterstorff 1997, 180). christopher ryan maboloc 137 it can be that the intention of the church, to engage in political dialogue, is to help find a better choice for the people. for wolterstorff, it is not necessary that religious arguments are shared by all. (see wolterstorff, 181) for him, it is sufficient that the argument stands and that the majority supports it (ibid.). as greenawalt adds, “if a respected religious authority like the pope, a divinely inspired text or one’s personal sense of how god relates to human beings suggest that we should help those who are less fortunate,” (ibid., 269) it should not be taken as something negative. as wolterstorff suggests, instead of forbidding the use of religious reasons in the public space, why not invite people to continue saying with civility what they do believe (wolterstorff 1997, 180). for him, anybody who has a sound religious argument and wants to contribute to dialogue must be admitted, for the healthy exchange of ideas is good for democracy. (ibid.) wolterstorff seems to be saying that the constitutional restraint that rawls’ proviso requires is unnecessary. (see habermas 2006, 11) he seems to be suggesting that any sound religious opinion must be listened and that it is sufficient that the majority agrees to these arguments (see wolterstorff 1997, 181). majority religion and constitutional essentials comprehensive doctrines tend to shake the balance of political culture in any society for these doctrines can present themselves as impositions from outside for the members of society who do not share such convictions. (see habermas 2006, 12) recalling rawls, he says that political autonomy is “realized by citizens when they act from the principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons” (rawls 1993, 77). freedom and equality are the essentials of a liberal and democratic society. (ibid., 216) this means, according to habermas, that citizens are meant to respect one another as free and equal members of their political community (habermas 2006, 5). given that in the liberal state only secular reasons count, citizens who adhere to a faith are obliged to establish a kind of balance between 138 prajñâ vihâra their religious and secular convictions (ibid., 5-6). for habermas, public deliberation needs some kind of restraint before any religious opinion is admitted. (ibid., 12) he finds the proposal of wolsterstorff problematic (ibid.). habermas says, since no institutional filter is envisaged between the state and the public domain, wolterstorff’s version does not exclude the possibility that policies and legal programs will be implemented solely on the basis of the religious or the confessional beliefs of a ruling majority (ibid., 11). he adds that parliaments in this sense will become a battlefield of religious beliefs and governmental authority can evidently become the agent of the religious majority that asserts its will and thus violating the democratic procedure (ibid.). there is a great possibility, in this sense, of a majority religion simply imposing its will on the whole populace if constitutional safeguards are not provided for. legislatures cannot just allow any religious opinion. constitutional grounds must be set as basis before any religious argument is admitted. habermas says that it seems that for wolterstorff, the argument between different conceptions of justice grounded in competing religions and world views can never be solved by the common presupposition of a formal background consensus (ibid., 12). according to habermas, wolterstorff rejects the whole idea of a reasonable background consensus on constitutional essentials (ibid.). habermas is against the position of wolterstorff because for habermas, the democratic procedure has the power to generate legitimacy precisely because it both includes all participants and has a deliberative character (ibid.). it is possible for other religions not to compromise on what they believe is right. but agreement can still be possible, because “conflict of existential values can be contained by losing any political edge against the background of a presupposed consensus on constitutional principles” (ibid.). in this sense, constitutional essentials are important to legitimize whatever religious arguments are introduced in the public sphere. the constitution safeguards the public sphere from any possible excesses that any majority religion might do, which in the end will only disturb the spirit of social cooperation and undermine social unity which the constitution as the fundamental law of the land protects. religious arguments, therefore, must find resonance in the constitution to be legitimate. christopher ryan maboloc 139 civic virtue and theo-ethical equilibrium one author asserts that the question is not whether religion and politics can be mixed; they are mixed and will continue to be mixed (audi 1997, 38). we have explained above why accommodating religious values in the public sphere is not at all inconsistent with democracy and human freedom given that they find resonance in the constitution. to be able to elaborate on the relation between religious insights and secular norms, it is important to explain the meaning of civic virtue. for robert audi, civic virtue is the individual’s way of being socially responsible without having to disregard the values of his religion, with the former playing a major role on the latter. (ibid., 54) he says further, “in a society that is complex, pluralistic, and so, inevitably somewhat divided, civic virtue implies trying to take reasonable positions on important issues” (ibid., 48). audi says, if one’s only reason is to promote religious devotion, then even if one is expressing a kind of religious virtue, one is not exhibiting civic virtue (ibid., 57). such seems far from the mind of the church or of civil society. if anything, the church and civil society are simply advocating what is just and reasonable for all filipinos. audi says that the concept of civic virtue realizes what he calls a theo-ethical equilibrium (ibid., 62). he says, “i propose a principle of theo-ethical equilibrium: where religious considerations appropriately bear on matters of public morality or of political choice, religious persons have a prima facie obligation at least insofar as they have civic virtue to seek an equilibrium between those considerations and relevant secular standards of ethics and political responsibility” (ibid.). civic virtue implies doing one’s responsibility as an individual using the balance between one’s moral and religious convictions. it implies responsible political participation in a liberal democracy (ibid., 48). such an idea proceeds from what audi calls a secular rationale, which is “intended to benefit people within a religious tradition, for instance in different denominations or even in the same denomination, as well as to facilitate good relations between different religious traditions, and between religious and non-religious people” (ibid., 56). such rationality, therefore, intends to foster dialogue among different sectors in society. this balance 140 prajñâ vihâra requires that “a seemingly sound moral conclusion that goes against scriptures or one’s established religious tradition should be scrutinized for error; a religious demand that seems to abridge moral rights should be studied” (ibid., 52) those who advocate abortion on the basis of reproductive rights should be able to examine their conscience if the life of the unborn child is worth compromising for the sake of their secular view. if the church defends the rights of the unborn child by using religious values, it should not be barred from doing so simply because one thinks that the argument is based on some religious ground. the church must be allowed and does have good reasons for its arguments. audi thinks that this arrangement does not defy reason. (ibid., 53) he adds that inasmuch as secular reasons may change one’s religious views, religious considerations can also lead to the revision of one’s secular moral views. (ibid.) for audi, the separation of church and state does not require that churches should not publicly take moral positions, even if there is political controversy about them (ibid., 65). articulating reasons based on religious grounds like the teachings of the church on the value of human life in order to argue against a proposed law that it perceives to be morally unacceptable should help enlighten rather than complicate the discussion. in view of the importance of human life as a whole, the church has a big role to play in every democratic society. the separation of church and state does not mean that the church has to be helpless in the face of grave social and moral problems. the role of the church in the public sphere is clear. in the context of a third world country like the philippines, it can be said that “the church needs to truly practice what it preaches in terms of lay empowerment. it should support the laity in playing their role in the political arena, not only in casting their votes, but in pressuring the government to allocate resources for the poor, to promote ecology and human rights” (gaspar 1997, 166). references audi, robert. 1997. “the state, the church, and the citizen” in religion and contemporary liberalism, edited by paul weithman. notre dame: university of notre dame press. christopher ryan maboloc 141 cohen, jean. 2002. “discourse ethics and civil society” in jürgen habermas, volume 3, edited by david rasmussen and james swindal. london: sage publications. freeman, samuel. 2007. rawls. london: routledge. gaspar, karl. 1997. “patterns of the mindanao catholic church’s involvement in contemporary social issues” in making civil society, edited by miriam ferrer. third world studies center. greenawalt, kent. 2003. “religion, law, and politics: arenas of neutrality” in perfectionism and neutrality: essays in liberal theory, edited by steven wall and george klosko. rowman and littlefield publishers, inc. habermas, jürgen. 1996. between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, translated by william rehg. massachusetts: mit press. ______________. 2006. “religion in the public sphere”, european journal of philosophy, 14 (1): 1-25. mccarthy, thomas. 1994. “kantian constructivism and reconstructivism: rawls and habermas in dialogue”, ethics, 105. _______________. 2002. “practical discourse: on the relation between morality to politics”, in jürgen habermas, 2. london: sage publications. pasion, naida. 1997. “civil society and the church in the arena of reproductive rights” in civil society: relations in policy-making, edited by marlon wui and glenda lopez. third world studies center. quevedo, orlando. 2003. pastoral letter. catholic bishops conference of the philippines. http://www.cbcponline.net/v3/documents/ 2000s/2003-housebill_4110.htm. rawls, john. 1999. a theory of justice. (revised edition) cambridge, ma: harvard university press. __________ 1993. political liberalism with “a new introduction and the reply to habermas”. new york: columbia university press. __________ 1997. “the idea of public reason revisited”, the university of chicago law review, 64: 765-807. __________ 1999. “the idea of public reason revisited” in the law of peoples with “the idea of public reason revisited”. cam142 prajñâ vihâra bridge, ma: harvard university press. wolterstorff, nicholas. 1997. “why should we reject what liberalism tells us about speaking and acting in public for religious reasons” in religion and contemporary liberalism, edited by paul weithman. notre dame: university of notre dame press. excerpts from house bill 4110. http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/a2.asp. excerpts from the 1987 philippine consitution. http://www.gov.ph/ aboutphil/a2.asp. christopher ryan maboloc 143 ferry hidayat 35 on the struggle for recognition of southeast asian and regional philosophy ferry hidayat hikmah perennial institute, indonesia abstract world philosophies are gradually gaining in recognition. today, philosophers in southeast asia can freely construct their regional philosophies without philosophical tyranny of the west. however, this situation has not come so easily. many asian and african philosophies have experienced a struggle for acceptance. and even this recognition is limited by selectivity and philosophical fashion centered in western academia and perpetuated by western educated eastern intellectuals. this paper attempts to show how regional philosophy in general and southeast asian philosophy in particular can be constructed and accepted. these regional self-constructed philosophies can serve to correct the legacy of the racism and bigotry of the tradition. and the paper also promotes the idea of establishing a philosophical umbrella called ‘southeast asian philosophy’ under which regional philosophies can develop and thrive. key words: minor traditions of philosophy; regional philosophy; southeast asian philosophy. prajñā vihāra vol. 16 no. 2, july-december 2015, 35-52 © 2000 by assumption university press 36 prajñā vihāra racism and bigotry in the western tradition etymologically, philosophy means love of wisdom, but what if a lover of wisdom disrespects, overlooks, or belittles traditions other than his own? can such a philosopher be still a lover of wisdom? in fact, some western philosophers did adopt a racist standpoint to non-western philosophical traditions. david hume once wrote the footnote to his essay “of national characters” (1753), where he remarks that non-whites, particularly negroes, are naturally inferior to the whites. i am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. there scarcely ever was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. no ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. on the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites such as the ancient germans, the present tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. not to mention our colonies, there are negroe slaves dispersed all over europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. in jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.1 ferry hidayat 37 in a similar vein, hegel had a notion that african people had not yet realized objective existence such as god and law, and they had not yet attained the knowledge of an absolute being; they possess a completely wild, untamed, barbarous, unhistorical and undeveloped spirit; they lack thought of reverence and morality—in short, africans are unhuman and inhuman; thus they have no capacity for philosophizing and theologizing. in negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence—as for example, god, or law—in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his own being. this distinction between himself as an individual and the universalityof his essential being, the african in the uniform, undeveloped onenessof his existence has not yet attained; so that the knowledge of an absolute being, an other and a higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting. the negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. we must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality—all that we can call feeling—if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character…2 at this point we leave africa, not to mention it again. for it is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or developmentto exhibit. historical movements in it—that is in its northern part—belong to the asiatic or european world. carthage displayed there an important transitionary phase of civilization; but, as a phoenician colony, it belongs to asia. egypt will be considered in reference to the passage of the human mind from its eastern to its western phase, but it does not belong to the african spirit. what we properly understand by africa, is the unhistorical, undeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on threshold of the world’s history…3 38 prajñā vihāra many other western philosophers, such as bertrand russell, indirectly suggest the superiority of western philosophy, when they assert that ‘philosophy begins with thales.’ martin heidegger in his essay was heisst denken? (1952), rejected chinese or indian philosophy as philosophybecause of the absence of the notion of ‘das seiende in seinem sein’ (‘the being in its being’), the notion of which, heidegger asserted, is typicallyeuropean. heidegger writes: so gelangt denn im bereich dieser zwiefalt zum vorschein, was allein hier zu befragen bleibt: was ist das seiende in seinem sein? der stil der gesamten abendländisch europäischen philosophie — es gibt keine andere, weder eine chinesische noch eine indische — ist von der zwiefalt »seiendes — seiend« her bestimmt. ihr vorgehen im bereich der zwiefalt ist maßgebend von der auslegung geprägt, die piaton dieser zwiefalt gegeben hat. daß sie als teilhabe erscheint, ist in keener weise selbstverständlich.4 according to aawani (2002), these western philosophers dismissive views about the other philosophical traditions have their root in aristotle’s later opinion about the origin of philosophy. previously, aristotle entertaineda similar opinion to his teacher plato, that the persian magians had precedenceover the egyptians in philosophy; however, later in the metaphysics, he began to assert that philosophy was essentially of greek origin (aawani 2002:192). the non-western responses there are four kinds of responses made by non-western philosophers to western philosophers’ racism or bigotry: unveiling their racism in their academic writing, re-writing a history of western philosophy, creating a two-way flow in the passage of ideas between eastern philosophers and ferry hidayat 39 western philosophers, and lastly, heightening western philosophers’ awareness that they had so far been developing misosophy rather than philosophy. the african philosopher olufemi taiwo unveils western hegel’s racism, in his essay “exorcising hegel’s ghost: africa’s challenge to philosophy” (1998). he believed that this unveiling is important so that hegel’s philosophical descendants will in the future ‘go better than their ancestor’, and will not maintain the ungrounded racism (taiwo 1998:11). if these biases are unrecognized, peculiar exclusion of africa from the discourse of philosophy constructed by tradition of historiography of westernphilosophy will always be present (taiwo 1998:1-2). secondly, an egyptian philosopher hassan hanafi (born 1934) re-wrote a history of western philosophy in his muqaddimah fí ‘ilm al-istighrâb (english, introduction to occidentalism) (2000). he believes western philosophers’ racism can be corrected by re-viewing the history of western philosophy through a non-western’s eye and by revealing the hidden non-western cultural raw materials which contributed to the formation of the western philosophical tradition. in his opinion, western philosophers ignore or deliberately hide any eastern philosophical influences on westernphilosophy so as to maintain its supremacy over the east and even to conceal the west’s cultural inferiority to the east (hanafi 2000: 153-154). by disclosing the ancient afroasiatic cultural heritage—such as chinese, indian, persian, mesopotamian, canaanite, african as well as muslim—and the pre-christian native european heritage (like teutonic, viking, vandalic, frankish, anglo-saxon, etc.) which help shape today’s western cultural consciousness, the western philosophers’ triumphalism can be diminished (hanafi 2000:154-170). thirdly, a singaporean thinker and statesman kishore mahbubani (born 1948) contended in his can asians think?: understanding the divide between east and west (1998) that non-westerners had lived in an essentially unbalanced world; the flow of ideas, reflecting five hundred years of western domination of the globe, remains a one-way street: from the west to the east. ironically, most westerners are blind 40 prajñā vihāra to the fact that they have arrogated to themselves the moral high ground from which they triumphantly lecture the world, whereas the rest of the world can see this clearly (mahbubani 2002:10). to burst the bubble of moral pretentiousness that had enveloped the western intellectual universe since the period of western triumphalism that followed the end of the cold war, a two-way flow in the passage of ideas between eastern and western thinkers must be created, challenging the prevailing western ideas, such as democracy, human rights, freedom of the press, capitalism, etc. (mahbubani 2002:12-15). this two-way flow of ideas, consequently, will prevent the western mind from assuming that western civilization represents the only universal civilization and will make them ‘conceive of the possibility that the western mind may also be limited in its own way.’ (mahbubani 2002:11). what mahbubani had done is not something new, before him, a chinese modern intellectual liang qichao (1873-1929) had reflected on the corruptions of american democracy and capitalism in an academic manner (mishra 2012:419). finally, an iranian philosopher seyyed hossein nasr (born 1933) contended that western philosophy has in fact been developing a misosophy or antisophy rather than philosophy in his masterpiece, knowledge and the sacred (nasr 1989:35). beginning with the time of hegel and karl marx and extending through auguste comte and rudolf carnap, western philosophers had secularized and desacralized philosophy or wisdom — that is, the wisdomthey had for so long embraced in the era of pythagoras, empedocles, plato, the church fathers, the christian neoplatonists throughout the era of reformation philosophers to the one of renaissance philosophers (nasr 1989:14-33); through this desacralization, modern philosophers have since developed misosophy (the hatred of wisdom) or antisophy (the opposition to wisdom). to re-embrace philosophy in its true sense, the modern philosophers must re-sacralize and re-collect their ancient wisdom, the wisdom of which originated mostly from the eastern world; ‘where knowledge has never become divorced from the sacred.’ (nasr 1989:4). ferry hidayat 41 the western ‘apology’ criticisms aimed at the racism of western philosophers have slowly made them realize that the philosophical tradition not only belongs to them but also to the other races and cultures. western universities now have opened their doors for more intensive study of eastern, asian, or world philosophy. some western writers like robert bernasconi & sybol cook (2003) and peter k.j. park (2013) had finally revealed how racist western philosophers were to non-western philosophers,5 while some others, such as will durant (1954), martin bernal (1987), john m. hobson (2004), and david weir (2011) had crossed the eurocentric line by writing books unveiling the world contribution to the establishment of western civilization.6 there are various sub-disciplines of philosophy through which the attempt to accommodate non-western traditions is conducted. these attempts can be placed into three categories: works in ‘the encyclopedia of philosophy’, works in ‘asian philosophy’, and works in ‘world philosophy’. first of all, in the the encyclopedia of philosophy edited by paul edwards (1967), western writers have shown their appreciation of the world philosophy by publishing articles of one egyptian philosopher, one iranian philosopher, one pakistani philosopher, and four chinese philosophers. edward craig (1998), author of routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, and robert l. arrington (1999), author of a companion to the philosophers, have also included philosophies of east asia (japan, china, korea, among others) and of south asia (india, pakistan, etc.) in their works. secondly, in the works concerning asian philosophy, writers have elaborated upon asian philosophies such as arab/muslim philosophy, iranian/persian philosophy, chinese philosophy, indian philosophy, japanese philosophy, korean philosophy, in their books. by way of illustration, companion encyclopedia of asian philosophy by brian carr & indira mahalingam (1997) includes entries on persian philosophy, indian 42 prajñā vihāra philosophy, buddhist philosophy, chinese philosophy, japanese philosophy, and islamic philosophy, while encyclopedia of asian philosophy by oliver leaman (2001) contains entries on zen buddhism, chinese philosophy, japanese philosophy, indian philosophy, tibetan philosophy, persian philosophy, korean philosophy, islamic philosophy, jewish philosophy, australasian philosophy, and melanesian philosophy. concerning works in world philosophy, western writers have recently included ‘minor traditions of philosophy’ such as navaho indian philosophy, polynesian philosophy, and mexican philosophy. to illustrate, ideological differences and world order: studies in the philosophy and science of the world’s cultures by f.s.c. northrop (1949) provided a forum for philosophers of navaho, latin americans, and france, among others, to discuss their philosophies, whereas eliot deutsch & ron bontekoe, authors of a companion to world philosophies (1999), include articles on polynesian philosophy and african philosophy in addition to ‘major traditions of philosophy’ such as chinese, japanese, indian, buddhist, and islamic philosophies. in the same vein, a. pablo iannone in his dictionary of world philosophy (2001) includes contributions of native america, bologna, paris, bantu, barcelona, nahua, maori, and madrid. most of these sub-disciplines of philosophy in the western academic world are increasingly giving some recognition to non-western philosophies. the continued struggle of minor traditions but despite this increasing recognition and apologetics eastern philosophers still suffer from discrimination against their philosophies, particularly those of regional and ‘minor traditions of asian philosophy’; all the three western literary traditions aforementioned feature restricted selectivity when treating the minor traditions. by way of illustration, oliver leaman in ‘introduction’ of his encyclopedia of asian philosophy, explicitly stated ‘… it would be interesting to have a reference work which looked at some of the most important thinkers and ideas in asian ferry hidayat 43 philosophy.’ (leaman2001:viii). this implies that the philosophers or the ideas he did not include in his work — that is to say, the minor traditions of asian philosophy — are deemed low in importance. this is very likely to confirm what finngeir hiorth had noted that southeast asia was a part of the world of lesser importance to western professional philosophers due to weak tradition of philosophy in those countries (hiorth 1983:2). in literary tradition of encyclopedia of philosophy, for instance, standard western philosophical literature such as paul edwards’s (1967), edward craig’s (1998), robert l. arrington’s (1999) only discusses the major philosophical traditions of east asia and south asia; it excludes minor traditions of central asia, let alone of southeast asia. the tradition of asian philosophy has also ignored the minor traditions. for example, philosophies of tibet, korea, pakistan, the philippines, malaysia, singapore, thailand, burma, laos, cambodia, vietnam, or indonesia, have not received any mention in the western standard philosophical literature like st. elmo nauman’s (1978), brian carr & indira mahalingam’s (1997), joel j. kupperman’s classic asian philosophy (2001) and learning from asianphilosophy (1999). this is also the case in the works of world philosophy, exemplified by the works of f.s.c. northrop (1949), eliot deutsch & ron bontekoe (1999), ben-ami scharfstein’s a comparative history of world philosophy: from the upanishads to kant (1998), h. gene blocker’s world philosophy: an east-west comparative introduction to philosophy (1999), and robert l. arrington’s world’s great philosophers (2003). they only recognize the major traditions of chinese, indian, and japanese philosophy; none of them recognize the importance of minor traditions.7 in actual fact, western academia’s reluctance to acknowledge the minor traditions of asian philosophy is mirrored by eastern academia’s unwillingness to do so to the minor traditions of western philosophy, such as of lithuania, italy, poland, czech, bulgaria, georgia, yugoslavia, romania,or hungary. however, the western academia’s reluctance exerts more harmful impact than its fellow easterners’ oversights. the western academic world spreads its agents throughout all parts of the world by 44 prajñā vihāra way of the graduates of western universities, and casts its spell of western academic superiority through them. it does this in various ways: by its established departments of philosophy in its famous universities, its established professorship which uses its power to anoint certain traditions of asian philosophy as being worthy to be studied, its standardized textbooks with its inclusions and exclusions, its alumni who perpetuate its misunderstandings, and the power and money which gives certain ways of thinking legitimacy. as a direct consequence of this western academic hegemony, a group of ‘elitists’ are established in non-western parts of the world, who believe all products of western academia are far superior to those produced in their own countries.8 as a result, the minor traditions of world philosophy are not given a voice in any academic discourse in non-western universities. but occasionally some minor tradition gains recognition. sometimes a certain philosophy becomes popularized. this is in fact what happened to african philosophy, korean philosophy, tibetan philosophy, melanesian philosophy, polynesian philosophy, among others. all the mentioned philosophies had not been previously accepted by the western academic world, yet, once the west realizes their philosophical importance, they became fashionable, and academics blindly accept their significance. the emergence of regional philosophies it is the elitist epistemic hegemony, conventionalizing the westernview of asian philosophy with only the major traditions of indian, chinese, and japanese philosophies, that makes many philosophers from minor traditions upset. rolando m. gripaldo stated that ‘the onslaught of oriental and western philosophies in the philippines has marginalized filipino philosophy.’ (gripaldo 2003:1). to him, it is high time for filipino philosophy to be a specific philosophy making its way through the thick cloud of filipino academic unknowing. this opinion is shared by other southeast asian philosophers like soraj hongladarom (1996), ferry hidayat (2005), and pham van duc (2008). soraj hongladarom believes ferry hidayat 45 that thai philosophy as a definite philosophy is important for thai people so as to ‘surge forward and remain responsive to the changes brought about by world conditions’, to make them ‘alert, active and responsive to change’ (hongladarom 1996:2). also, thai philosophy is an important tool for thai community ‘to revitalize itself, to turn back upon itself so that it would not become redundant amidst the rapidly changing world.’ (hongladarom 1996:5). ferry hidayat, by the same token, contended that the emergence of indonesian philosophy as a particular philosophy was significant so as to discover phenomenon of thinking tradition in indonesia and to foster a sense of pride amidst international academic competition (hidayat 2005a:2). likewise, pham van duc maintained that the appearance of vietnamese philosophy as a separate philosophy was rich in significance because of four reasons: 1). it articulates differences between vietnamese, chinese, and indian philosophies that seems prima facie to be similar; 2). it restores vietnamese past philosophical thoughts; 3). it clarifies their positive meaningsand values for the life of vietnam and its people today; and 4). it preserves national cultural identity in the present context of globalization (duc 2008:6-7). all the southeast asians mentioned above find it important to put their regional philosophies forward in order to positively contribute to the tradition of asian philosophy. they do not have to wait until western academia’s recognition approves or until their elitist fellow countrymen’ acknowledgement comes; they establish their regional philosophies so that the spell of epistemic hegemony is broken. their shared struggle is to make their minor traditions of philosophy equal to the major traditions that had highly developed before, to take up a respectful position, to achieve high status, and to play a prominent role in the advancement of the prevailing asian philosophy. a considerable advantage that can be gained with this regional philosophical enterprise is that it can contribute to the enrichment of asian philosophy by popularizing regional philosophers that have not been popular or merely popularized through the medium of western academia. by establishing filipino philosophy, for instance, rolando m. gripaldo 46 prajñā vihāra can popularize filipino philosophers such as jose rizal, andres bonifacio, and emilio jacinto, amongst others (gripaldo 2003:1). the founding of thai philosophy by soraj hongladarom perfectly enables him to set the stage for thai philosophers like sulak sivaraksa and phra dhammapidok (aka prayudh prayutto), and of course soraj hongladarom himself, to be well-known to the world (hongladarom 1998:97). the establishment of indonesian philosophy by its popularizer ferry hidayat makes popularization of indonesian philosophers such as mpu tantular, mpu kanwa, mpu panuluh, syeikh siti jenar (2015)—besides the world-renowned logician dharmakirti—possible. the future agenda once all the important philosophers of all the regional philosophies emerging in southeast asia had achieved recognition and the support of their institutional and national sponsorships, what could be done next? the answer would be the establishment of a network of southeast asian philosophy. a.b. shamsul said in his invitation to the inter-southeast asian study of southeast asia: for a long time, students and scholars from southeast asia studied and learnt about the region not from one another directly but rather in an indirect manner, from the experts located at the various centres of southeast asian studies in the united states of america, the united kingdom and australia. very rarely, a malaysian would enroll as a graduate student at universitas indonesia to study about indonesian history, or at chulalongkorn university to study thailand’s bureaucracy, or at the university of the philippines to study philippine society and culture. the malaysian would usually end up either at cornell university, or the school of oriental and african studies, university of london or monash university in australia as a graduate ferry hidayat 47 student. the question is why don’t southeastasians learn and study about southeast asia from one another? (shamsul 2007:140) shamsul’s invitation must be herein understood not only as the establishment of an inter-asia cultural studies but also to that of southeast asian philosophy. there are four reasons why its construction is imperative. first, to be soon well-acknowledged as one of the major tradition of asian philosophy, the regional philosophies should be united under one philosophical umbrella and cooperate each other so that all the regional philosophies equally have a high standing in the world of philosophy. second, the construction of southeast asian philosophy will consequently encourage each country in southeast asia (brunei, cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia, myanmar [burma], the philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam) to construct her regional philosophy as a distinct academic study, then to develop it, and finally to popularize her philosophers through it. when one region has troubles setting up its philosophy, another region can lend a hand. also, each region of southeast asia can help each other in how to best formulate the subject-matter of the philosophical study. for example, rolando m. gripaldo’s ‘three approaches’ (traditional/ philosophical, cultural, and nationality/constitutional) (gripaldo 2012:2-3) and soraj hongladarom’s comparison between ‘thai area study’ and ‘thai philosophy’ to clarify a demarcation line between the two (hongladarom 1996:1), pham van duc’s three key orientations in philosophical research (duc 2008:1), and ferry hidayat’s e-book pengantar menuju filsafat indonesia (english, introduction to indonesian philosophy) (2005b) can inspire philosophers of the other southeast asian countries in developing their approaches. third, as an adage says ‘only asians can best understand asians’, the establishment of southeast asian philosophy will ward off materialistic modernist western bias and misunderstanding over the still-spiritual southeast asia. finally, ending the west’s philosophical racism, philosophical desacralization, and philosophical academic selectivitytowards the minor traditions of world 48 prajñā vihāra philosophy, which include southeast asian philosophy, is its mission sacrée. the dream of philosophers in many parts of the world today, is to work in equal standing with all other wisdom traditions; it is only in this way that the word philosophy as the true love of wisdom (a wisdom not only of the major but also the minor traditions) can maintain its true meaning. endnotes 1david hume, “of national characters’ in raymond geuss & quentin skinner (eds.), david hume, political essays: cambridge texts in the history of political thought, cambridge: university of cambridge, p. 86. 2georg wilhelm friedrich hegel, the philosophy of history, with preface by charles hegel, trans. j. sibree, m.a., kitchener: batoche books, 2001, pp. 110-111. 3ibid., p. 117 4martin heidegger, gesamtausgabe i. absteilung: veröffentlichte schriften 1910-1976, band 8: was heisst denken?, frankfurt: vittorio klostermann, 2002, p. 228 5other racist philosophers such as nietzsche, heidegger, voegelin, and hannah arendt are mentioned in robert bernasconi & sybol cook (eds.), race and racism in continental philosophy, indiana university press, 2003; some less famous figures like christoph meiners (1747-1810), dieterich tiedemann (1748-1803), tennemann, de gérando, friedrich august carus (1770-1807), being racist historians of philosophy, are mentioned in peter k.j. park, africa, asia, and the history of philosophy: racism in the formation of the philosophical canon, 1780-1830. suny press, 2013. 6the most classic literature verily appreciating the non-western heritage is will durant’s the story of civilization i:our oriental heritage, simon and schuster, 1954. david weir’s american orient: imagining the east from the colonial era through the twentieth century, university of massachusetts press, 2011, is a book revealing eastern heritage penetrating american culture. the most controversial books unveiling the afroasiatic roots of western civilization are respectively martin bernal’s black athena: the afroasiatic roots of classical civilization. volume i. rutgers university press. 1987; martin bernal’s black athena: the afroasiatic roots of classical civilization. volume ferry hidayat 49 ii. rutgers university press. 1991; martin bernal’s black athena: the afroasiatic roots of classical civilization. volume iii. rutgers university press. 2006; martin bernal’s black athena writes back: martin bernal responds to his critics. duke university press. 2001; john m. hobson’s the eastern origins of western civilization. cambridge university press, 2004, only combined the findings of bernal and other historians in one. 7due to the most recent information technology, the minor traditions of philosophy find their way to be popular online. two most important western institutions to propagate the minor philosophies duly mentioned herein are wikipedia and george f. mclean’s council for research in values and philosophy (crvp). visit his website at www.crvp.org. 8what is meant by ‘elitist’ herein is a non-western philosopher graduating from philosophy department of western university, who blindly holds her/his western professors’ view of western supremacy of philosophy. on the other hand, there is an ‘egalitarian’, who means a non-western philosopher graduating from philosophy department of either western or eastern university, who holds her/his critical view that all kinds of philosophy in the world (including the western) are of very equal importance as enrichment of her/his wisdom. references aawani, gholamreza. 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(1983). philosophers in indonesia (southeast asian monographseries no.12). james cook university of north queensland. hobson, john m. (2004). the eastern origins of western civilization. cambridge university press. hongladarom, soraj. (1996). how is thai philosophy possible?. retrieved november 26, 2015, from http://pioneer.chula.ac.th/~hsoraj/web/ thai.html. hume, david. (1994). “of national characters” in raymond geuss & quentin skinner (eds.). david hume, political essays: cambridge texts in the history of political thought. university of cambridge. iannone, a. pablo. (2001). dictionary of world philosophy. routledge. kupperman, joel j. (1999). learning from asian philosophy. oxford university press. kupperman, joel j. (2001). classic asian philosophy: a guide to the essential texts. oxford university press. leaman, oliver. (ed.) (2001). encyclopedia of asian philosophy. routledge. mahbubani, kishore. (2002). can asians think?:understanding the divide between east and west. steerforth press. mishra, pankaj. (2012). from the ruins of empire: the revolt against the west and the remaking of asia. penguin books, ltd. nasr, seyyed hossein. (1989). knowledge and the sacred. state university of new york press. nauman, st. elmo. (1978). dictionary of asian philosophies. philosophicallibrary. northrop, f.s.c. (1949). ideological differences and world order: studiesin the philosophy and science of the world’s cultures. yale universitypress. https://www.academia.edu/3647863/pengantar_menuju_filsafat_indonesia https://www.academia.edu/3647863/pengantar_menuju_filsafat_indonesia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/indonesian_philosophy http://pioneer.chula.ac.th/~hsoraj/web/thai.html http://pioneer.chula.ac.th/~hsoraj/web/thai.html 52 prajñā vihāra park, peter k.j. (2013). africa, asia, and the history of philosophy: racism in the formation of the philosophical canon, 1780-1830. suny press. russell, bertrand. (2003). history of western philosophy. routledge. scharfstein, ben-ami. (1998). a comparative history of world philosophy: from the upanishads to kant. suny press. shamsul, a.b. (2007). “producing knowledge of southeast asia: a malaysianview” in chen, kuan-hsing. & huat, chua beng. (eds.). the inter-asiacultural studies reader. routledge. taiwo, olufemi. (1998). exorcising hegel’s ghost: africa’s challenge to philosophy. african studies quarterly 1(4): 3-16. weir, david. (2011). american orient: imagining the east from the colonial era through the twentieth century. university of massachusetts press. yong luo 107 photo essay: guanyin worship among the thai chinese photos and text by yong luo introduction guanyin came to thailand with chinese immigrants and has since been worshipped among the thai-chinese. guanyin worship continues to grow in popularity for both thai-chinese and thais in general. she has several identities. she is considered as a bodhisattva and plays an important role in mahayana buddhism. she is also considered as a goddess of compassion and possesses miraculous powers. guanyin has become rooted in thai popular religion and is considered to have power to grant the worshiper’s requests and provide protection. the various meanings and identities of guanyin are quite complex, but in general, guanyin worship shows a manner in which the ethnic thai-chinese are able to adapt to theravada buddhism, while maintaining something of their chinese identity. it also provides a spiritual focus (especially for empowered business women) for adapting to the urban commercial environment. prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 107-129 © 2000 by assumption university press 108 prajñā vihāra 1. guanyin worship as a kind of superstition. guanyin worship has often been viewed as merely a superstitious practice for pursuing wealth. guanyin statues and images can even be seen as one of the deities exhibited by fortune-tellers. 1.1 the statues of guanyin in the house of a fortune teller at wat mahabut, bangkok. 1.2 the statue of guanyin on the back table of a fortune teller at wat mahabut, bangkok. yong luo 109 1.3 the statue of guanyin on the table of a fortune teller at wat mahabut, bangkok. 1.4 the image of guanyin in front of a fortune teller on silom road, bangkok. 110 prajñā vihāra 2. the worship of guanyin in the commercial world guanyin has also become a deity considered helpful for pursuing wealth for many of her followers in the thai commercial world, especially women. satha-anand explains the reasons for the popularity of guanyin is that official buddhism is incapable of meeting the modern needs, and emerging religious movements to meet these spiritual requirements (sathaanand, 1990). nithi aeusrivonges considers the worship of guanyin a moral justification for achieving success in life and addressing the difficulties of the middle class in commercialized society (aeusrivonges, 1994). kitiarsa holds that popular buddhism and folk beliefs (including the belief of guanyin) is where religion converges with the multi-dimensional structural forces of the nation-state, market economy, modernization and globalization (kitiarsa, 2012). 2.1 the statue of guanyin at the gate of a thai temple at chinatown, bangkok. yong luo 111 3. guanyin in thai buddhist temples guanyin statues can be seen in many thai buddhist temples, such as the grand palace, wat pho and wat arun. however, in thai temples, the positions of guanyin statues are not as important as the positions of statues of the buddha. in practice, thai buddhism often departs from its scriptural form, as it is combined with thai folk religious beliefs and rituals. thai buddhists believe in buddha, not only just an abstract religious belief, but as a god who possesses special powers. thai buddhism also combines characteristics of indian brahmanistic and thai prehistoric religions. often it focuses on gaining magical powers for various purposes. even buddhist monks, are expected to deal with magical powers. that is why in thailand there are many deities that accompany the buddha and guanyin is one of the most important. 3.1 the statue of guanyin in front of the emerald buddha temple in the grand palace, bangkok. 112 prajñā vihāra 3.2 the statues of guanyin in wat pho, bangkok. 3.3 the statue of guanyin in wat arun, bangkok. yong luo 113 3.4 a small statue of guanyin in front of a big statue of buddha in a thai temple. 3.5 statue of guanyin in wat mahabut, bangkok. 114 prajñā vihāra 4. guanyin in chinese temples and shrines among bodhisattvas, guanyin, an avalokitesvara of compassion, is the most popular and appears in more forms than any other bodhisattva. yü concludes that there are four roles of guanyin: as one of the buddha’s attending entourage, as a close associate and future successor of the amitabha buddha, as a savior associated with sakyamuni buddha, and as an independent savior. this last role has become the dominant one especially in china (yü, 2001, p.32). the lotus sutra is one of the most important sutras for the guanyin bodhisattva. in chinese mahayana buddhism, she is the most popular bodhisattva and appears in more forms than any other. therefore, there is a separate room for the statues of guanyin in china in taoist shrines, guanyin is considered as the immortal cihang zhenren, and occupies a position under the emperor yu huang. she is also identified with the ultimate taoist deity doumu. guanyin buddhist hall chockchai 4 in bangkok is the largest guanyin temple and was established in 1983. the founder was a successful thai chinese businesswoman. in this temple, there is a 21-level great compassion stupa with four large thousand-hand guanyin statues. there are many statues of guanyin and other buddhist and traditional chinese religious deities in this temple. yong luo 115 4.2 the statues of children-giving guanyin in the guanyin buddhist hall chochchai 4, bangkok. 4.2 statues of guanyin (rear) and the founder of the guanyin buddhist hall chochchai 4 (front), who claimed that she is the incarnation of guanyin. 116 prajñā vihāra 4.3 statue of guanyin in the guanyin buddhist hall next to the river kwai bridge, kanchananburi province. 4.5 statue of guanyin at a guanyin shrine at chinatown, bangkok. yong luo 117 5. guanyin as an independent goddess in public spaces some new large guanyin temples have been built in recent years around bangkok and other provinces. many bangkok residents go to attend ceremonies or activities held at guanyin temples in the region. 5.3 statues of guanyin in the seacon shopping mall during a buddhist festival, bangkok. 118 prajñā vihāra 5.4 statue of guanyin in guanyin shrine, suphanburi province. 5.7 statue of guanyin in a folk shrine, siam taidiangong, samutprakan province. yong luo 119 5.8 statues of guanyin in virtue hall, bangkok. 5.9 the statues of guanyin in the heavenly mother shrine, cholburi province. 120 prajñā vihāra 5.10 the images of guanyin on thai postage stamps 6. guanyin worhsip for merit making and salvation guanyin also provides a model of salvation to assure happiness in this life as well as the next lives. the belief of guanyin requires doing good deeds which brings merit to the followers. not all the followers come to worship guanyin to request something. many of them are happy just to see and worship guanyin, as they believed they had gained merit already. in fact, many followers do not ask anything from guanyin. they believe that they possess merit according to their belief of guanyin, and the most important thing is the action of doing good deeds. guanyin therefore is a model for action. she is compassionate, diligent, devoted, patient and skillful in helping others; she is the exact model for people to practice her role in their daily lives. yong luo 121 6.1 people chanting with monks in front of a statue of guanyin at a chinese shrine. 6.2 worshippers at the opening of a guanyin shrine, suphanburi province. 122 prajñā vihāra 6.3 a man is chanting in front of the statue of guanyin at wat mahabut, bangkok. 7. guanyin and charity guanyin belief and practice often go together with social organizations and social charities. most of the chinese communities in thailand have established charities, especially the communities organized in the name of religions. thai-chinese donate more to charities than they do to buddhist monks. thian fha hospital is a famous hospital and charitable foundation with a large number of council members who are all wealthy businessmen. it receives great support from the thai-chinese communities. at thian fha hospital, guanyin is considered as a protector and savior for all the people. guanyin’s role corresponds to thian fha’s identity as a charity and as a hospital. it has therefore gained significance as both a religious site and charitable foundation. princess sirindhorn has made offerings of incense and candles to guanyin on the first day of the chinese new year every year since 2004. yong luo 123 7.1 guanyin hall in the thian fha hospital at chinatown, bangkok. 7.2 the statue of guanyin in thian fha hospital at chinatown, bangkok. 124 prajñā vihāra 8. guanyin and the vegetarian festival guanyin is also worshipped during vegetarian festival sometimes called the nine emperors festival. the vegetarian festival has become popular in thailand, especially in southern thailand. it takes place in the first nine days in the ninth month of the chinese lunar calendar (late september or early october). during this period, people are encouraged to abstain from eating meat, especially from beef. while there are many activities all over thailand, it is best known in phuket for the staging of magic performances. for guanyin worshipers, abstaining from beef isrequired at all times. the reasons are several: guanyin does not eat beef, guanyin’s father was incarnated as a cow, guanyin’s incarnation is a cow, the cow is considered to possess a soul, and the cow is an attendant of guanyin. guanyin also plays a special role during the festival. in this way, the belief of guanyin continues to spread all around thailand with this vegetarian festival. 8.1 statue of guanyin in the vegetarian festival in bangkok’s chinatown. yong luo 125 9. guanyin and the identity of thai-chinese guanyin has been transformed into a deity with modern features, and this attracts many modern urban thai-chinese middle class people who are thirsty for an identity and spirituality (chalermsripinyorat, 1999). the thai-chinese have intentionally preserved their ethnic identities with a dynamic cultural perspective. ethnic identity does not require any fixed cultural perspective, and it can exist and adapt to a society that is already facing changes. leo suryadinata states that “through religious identification, the chinese are able to retain their ethnic identity” (chantavanich, 1997, p.15). it also allows the thai-chinese to embrace theravada buddhism while retaining their chinese identity. 9.1 thousand-hand guanyin performance at the bangkok chinese culture center celebrating the 40th anniversary of the diplomatic relationship between china and thailand, july 18, 2015. 126 prajñā vihāra 9.2 committee members of thian fha hospital and monks chanting in front of the statue of guanyin at guanyin hall of thian fha hospital, bangkok. 9.3 statues of guanyin in the hall of the kwong siew association of thailand. yong luo 127 9.4 statues of guanyin in a thai-chinese home. 9.5 a thai-chinese woman carrying a wooden guanyin sculpture at guanyin shrine, suphanburi province. 128 prajñā vihāra conclusion there are diverse understandings of guanyin among her followers. during the process of merit making, most of the followers of guanyin emphasize a good heart and moral deeds, which lead to wealth and success. guanyin belief fulfills the requirements of her followers for their spirituality, fostering moral action and maintaining identity. people often pray to guanyin to request something, however, most of the followers focus on their spirituality, which strengthens their power, self-control, compassion, kindness, purity, happiness, and salvation. their spiritual aspirations lead to their moral actions, which in turn contribute to the well-being of the individuals, family and society. references aeusrivonges, n. (1994). “latthi phithi chao mae kwan im”. sinlapa wattanatham. [art and culture] eg “wattanatham yuk lokkanwat” [culture in the globalizing era]. pp. 92-94. bao, jiemin, (2005). marital acts: gender, sexuality, and identity among the chinese thai diaspora. university of hawai’i press. basham. r. (2001). ethnicity and world view in bangkok. in c. k. tong and k. b. chan (eds). alternate identities: the chinese of contemporary thailand. singapore and leiden: times academic press and brill academic publishers. burusratanaphand, w. (2001). chinese identity in thailand. in c. k. tong and k. b. chan (eds). alternate identities: the chinese of contemporary thailand (pp.67-84). singapore and leiden: times academic press and brill academic publishers. yong luo 129 chalermsripinyorat, r. (1999). doing the business of faith: the capitalistic dhammakaya movement and the spiritually-thirsty thai middle class. netherlands: paper of the seventh international conference on thai studies. chantavanich, s. (1997). ethnic chinese as southeast asians. suryadinata, l. (ed.). singapore: institute of southeast asia studies. cohen, e. (2001). the chinese vegetarian festival in phuket: religion, ethnicity and tourism on a southern thai island, white lotus, bangkok. coughlin, r. j. (2012). double identity: the chinese in modern thailand. white lotus press. bangkok. kitiarsa, p. (2012). mediums, monks and amulets: the popular buddhism today. silkworm books. satha-anand, s. (1990). religious movements in contemporary thailand: buddhist struggles for modern relevance. asian survey. vol. 30. no. 4, pp.395-408. yü, chun-fang, (2001). kuan-yin: the chinese transformation of avalokiteivara. institute for advanced studies of world religions. new york: columbia university press. 10(134-138)note for authors metaphysics of change and continuity: exactly what is changing and what gets continued?1 soraj hongladarom center for ethics of science and technology, faculty of arts, chulalongkorn university, thailand abstract this is a metaphysical and conceptual analysis of the concepts ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. the buddhists are in agreement with heraclitus that all are flowing and nothing remains. however, the buddhists have a much more elaborate theory about change and continuity, and this theory is a key element in the entire buddhist system of related doctrines, viz., that of karma and rebirth, the possibility of liberation and others. the buddhist emphasizes that change is there in every aspect of reality. a later teaching, known as the doctrine of emptiness, extends this idea even further to deny that there are essences to things which endure through all the changes. since things are empty they can change, and continuity is possible, not because there is something that exists and endures, but only because there is change. this has many implications for the dialog between science and religion, especially the object/subject distinction. introduction change and continuity are the topics that have been discussed and debated for as long as there is philosophy. as with other basic concepts, change and continuity are necessary for our understanding, indeed our making sense of the world around us. without the concepts of change and continuity, we would not be able to understand how discrete events are tied up together in such a way that they create a coherent story that makes sense of our surrounding, our situation, our bodies, our identities. prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 1-22 1 © 2000 by assumption university press in this paper we look at the metaphysics of change and continuity from a buddhist perspective. the buddhists are in agreement with heraclitus that all are flowing and nothing remains. however, the buddhists have a much more elaborate theory about change and continuity, and this theory is a key element in the entire buddhist system of related doctrines, viz., that of karma and rebirth, the possibility of liberation ( ) and others. simply put, the buddhist emphasizes that change is there in every aspect of reality. an earlier buddhist theory, the abhidharma, has it that all perceptible reality is composed of minute ‘thought-moments’ and ‘thought-in stants’ (cittakhana) which form the basic building blocks of reality. the idea is very much like that of modern science. however, the abhidharmists hold that these minute particles are unchanging and have no particular characteristics. and here they are more like democritus than modern science. having no properties of their own, they mix up with one another in varying patterns so that the results are seen to be, say, a table of this particular color or a flower of this particular smell. change and continuity are nothing but these particles forming patterns among themselves and later becoming dissolved and forming other patterns. the change from a table to a heap of ashes is nothing but these rearrangements of the basic particles, which themselves are unchanging. here one sees that there is an objective continuity—the particles themselves do not change. according to a later developed form of the buddhist teaching, however, change is absolutely pervasive, and even these particles are subject to change as they are nothing more than putative objects which are conceptualized to be such and such, and without the conceptualization they are ‘nothing’ at all. (this is known as the doctrine of emptiness). hence it seems that continuity is not possible. but in fact according to the later theory, change is not only possible, it is accepted as part and parcel of everyday life. the fact that nothing at all remains the same does not imply that continuity is not possible, since continuity does not always have to be that of an inherently existing object. a changing object can be continued also, in roughly the same sense as we say that an event, like a drama, continues even though everything in it is changing. the thread that ties the disparate elements of the event together in this case lies within our own conceptual imputation. this does not imply that everything is subjective, 2 prajñâ vihâra since the distinction between subject and object presupposes the idea of an absolutely existing individual self, which all buddhist schools rejects. so in this later theory, absolute change is not possible because there is, ultimately speaking nothing to change, and when there is no change there is no continuation either. this is not to deny the empirical fact of changes and continuities that are present to us; things are there and they are indeed changing. what is being denied here is the belief that that there are essences to things which endure through all the changes. since things are empty (of inherently existing nature) they can change, and continuity is only possible, not because there is something that exists and endures, but because there is change. a drama that does not move cannot be continued. these accounts of the buddhist schools are supplemented by the thought of the japanese philosopher nishida kitarô. according to kitarô, aristotle’s logical system prevalent in the west has a serious flaw in that it fails to account satisfactorily to the lived experience of change and continuity. this is because aristotelian logic centers around the notion of the subject. kitarô’s answer to this predicament is to base the center of the logical system to the predicate rather than the subject. it is kitarô’s “logic of predicate” that is apparently able to solve the dilemma arising from the aristotelian one. and we shall also see that kitarô’s thoughts are intimately bound up with that of the mâhâyana buddhism, especially nâgârjuna’s analysis of change and continuity. so what is in fact changing? according to the abhidharma, nothing at all, because ultimate reality consists in the basic particles of thoughtmoments as discussed above. but according to the mâhâyanists, everything does change. the doctrine of emptiness states that nothing whatsoever remains the same in the sense that they retain their material identity, and these abhidharmic basic thought-moments are not excepted. and what is continued? for the abhidharma, of course, it is these thoughtmoments, and for the mâhâyanists, nothing continues in the sense that it is false that there is something that retains its material identity even for a shortest period of time. this seems to be an internecine dispute of different buddhist schools, but as i shall make clear in the paper, this has a far reaching consequence in our understanding of the concepts of change and continuity and their relevance in contemporary situation. soraj hongladarom 3 the foregoing discussion of the buddhist theories have many implications for the dialog between science and religion. one point is that science still seems to subscribe to the object/subject distinction. but if change and continuity are not real in the ultimate sense, then perhaps the distinction should be reconsidered. another point concerns how to find continuity amidst all the change. but perhaps in some important sense continuity depends on us. in what follows i shall elaborate on the abhidharma and the mâhâyana on these issues, and then we will have a discussion on these issues as a key toward a dialog and perhaps a synergy between buddhism and science. the abhidharmic theory of change and continuity a basic view of reality according to the abhidharma is that the reality is divided into four major kinds, viz. consciousness (citta), mental states (cetasika), matter (rûpa) and . consciousness is described as the ‘aware factor’ that when present in us makes us someone who knows and thinks. mental states are manifestations of consciousness and they can be divided and subdivided further according the different kinds of emotions or modifications of consciousness. matter is what constitutes the material reality and is what things like mountains or stars are composed of. the last kind of basic reality is the most difficult to describe, because it is simply not mentioned in the vocabulary of science, and is something unique to buddhism. is the state of liberation from all sufferings, and in the abhidharma is categorized as a basic kind of ultimate reality. in the abhidhamattha , (or nibbâna in pali) is described as “nibbâna is an objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, non-conditioned, and incomparable.”2 the idea is that is completely different from mundane reality, which itself consists of mental and physical phenomena. is completely different because both the mental and physical phenomena are subject to change; they are always conditioned by various factors and are always caused. they do not last and are insubstantial in that they do not have any kind of essence that would make them what they are in objective reality. by contrast is none of these, and hence the abhidharma masters clas4 prajñâ vihâra sified as a basic kind of reality. this is rather surprising because such a categorization seems to lead one to believe that itself is part of objective reality, and is of a different kind of thing altogether from the mental and physical phenomena that make up the first three kinds. this will be an issue that the mâhâyanist, through the doctrine of emptiness which will be discussed later, will take up. the abhidharma is consistent in analyzing the first three types of reality to be constantly changing and composed of very minute particles called rûpa-kâlapa. all kinds of matter (there are 28 kinds in all, but to enumerate all in this paper would be quite tedious) are produced by four kinds of cause that come in groups of very tiny particles, or kâlapas. according to mehm tin mon,3 these have four main features: 1. all the rûpas in a kâlapa arise together; i.e., they have a common genesis. 2. they also cease or dissolve together; i.e., they have a common cessation. 3. they all depend on the four great essentials present in the kâlapa for their arising; i.e., they have a common dependence. 4. they are so thoroughly mixed that they cannot be distinguished; i.e., they co-exist. mehm tin mon also notes further that “kâlapas are so small that they are invisible even under electronic microscope. the size of a kâlapa in the human realm is just a 10-5 of a paramânu, which is smaller than an atom. so kâlapas are comparable to electrons, protons and neutrons in size.”4 it should be clear that what he is getting at is that the abhidharma states that physical and mental phenomena are constituted by tiny groups of causes and conditions. for example, in the case of the eye there are as many as ten conditions working together as its cause. these are the eight ‘inseparable qualities’ (avinibhoga-rûpa), one life element (jîvitarûpa and one eye element (cakkhu-pasâda). the eight inseparable mental qualities consist of earth, water, fire, air, color, smell, taste and nutritive essence (ôja) are bound together, and when these eight basic elements are added the eye element (what is there in the eye that makes it function as an soraj hongladarom 5 eye) and the life element then what results is the ‘eye-decad’, which is nothing more than the functioning, living eye. and the eye-decad here is just one kind of kâlapa, there being 21 kinds in all.5 so one can see that even one kâlapa consists of a number of yet smaller elements. here one sees the methodology of the abhidharma in analyzing phenomena into smaller components. the purpose, of course, is to aid the meditating mind in the quest for liberation. when the dharma practitioner sees that the eye itself is composed of so many small elements, he or she is then released from the attachment in the eye and what it sees. understanding that a functioning eye is nothing but a repository of various separate elements, the practitioner then realizes that the eye itself is nothing; there is just no thing in the world that is an eye apart from the fact that various elements and particles are working together in one very particular way such that there emerges the eye. there is no ‘essence’ to the eye such that it defines this collection of various elements forever as an eye. the eight inseparable elements are present in many other organs, and the eye element itself (cakkhu-pasâda) is only a result of yet further working of other elements concerning lights and electrochemical compounds that result from light falling on the retina. these elements by themselves are not the eye-essence either, for they still depend on many other factors for their functioning. the foregoing is an analysis for a rather complicated object, namely the eye, but what about ordinary, everyday inanimate object, like a stone or a table? the abhidharma says that each object is composed of numerous smaller objects, the most basic of which is very tiny. in the abhidharmattha sanghaha, there is a description of all material qualities ( ) in terms of material productivity, continuity, decay and impermanence. material productivity is also known as arising; continuity as abiding; decay as ceasing, and impermanence as the overall characteristic of all material phenomenon which are subject to the earlier three characteristics. all buddhist schools concur that all physical and mental phenomena are subject to these four characteristics, and in the text we find the following explanation of the term : the life-term of conditioned rûpa is normally 17 thought-moments or 51 minor thought-instants. the first thought-moment is 6 prajñâ vihâra like the upacaya, the last thought-moment is like the aniccata, the intermediate 15 are like the jarata. aniccata is the dissolution of rûpa. strictly speaking, there are only three , viz: birth, growth-decay, and death. aniccata is synonymous with marana (death). the entire interval between birth and death constitutes decay or development. with the exception of the five rûpas—namely, two viññattis, jati, jara, and aniccata, all the remaining 23 rûpas last for 17 thoughtmoments.6 never mind the rather excessive details in the quote above, the basic picture is that all physical phenomena are subject to arising, abiding and ceasing, and they do so at a tremendously fast speed. it is explained that billions of ‘thought-moments’ are present in only one flash of lightning.7 hence, suppose that a flash of lightning is around one hundredth of a second in duration, a thought-moment is at least one hundred billionth of a second, and this is only a very conservative estimate because a lightning flash may be shorter and there may be much more than one billion thoughtmoments in one flash. here the accurate number of the duration is inconsequential; the main point is that a physical phenomenon is composed of very tiny events or instants and hence one can find no substance behind any such phenomenon. it is stated in the text above that a conditioned rûpa last for exactly 17 thought-moments, and each thought-moment can even be further subdivided into three ‘thought-instants’. thus the duration of a conditioned rûpa is equal to 51 “minor thought-instants”. one might wonder how the author(s) of these abhidhammic text knew exactly how many thought-moments or thought-instants there are in a conditioned rûpa, and the standard answer is that this was taught by the buddha himself, who, being omniscient, knew exactly what he taught. the buddha (or anyone who was the author of the abhidharma) engaged in deep meditation beyond the power of ordinary human beings, and immediately ‘saw’ these thought-instants and other things. however, we actually do not need to speculate on the epistemology of the abhidharma here,8 it is more important to note that, no matter how short each thought-moment is, it is still something that can be counted and identified, and hence has duration. this will be taken up by the mâhâyanist critics, as we shall see later on. soraj hongladarom 7 these characteristics of material qualities also point to the fact that change and continuity occur at a very rapid rate in a physical phenomenon. change is right there in the very nature of a material thing. this of course is in accordance with the findings of modern physics. a material object, such as a table, is composed of very tiny atomic particles, each of which is in turn composed of many more subatomic particles and at this level it is quite hard to distinguish which is an event, which is an individual thing, which is matter and which is energy. the abhidharmic worldview, then, is a step further from the commonsensical view that ordinary human beings take to be an accurate description of reality. one should bear in mind that the main purpose of presenting such a finely detailed picture of the material qualities is for the realization of the ultimate goal of buddhism, which is release from samsâra and finding permanent salvation in , which cannot be attained if the practitioner still does not know the exact nature of reality as something that is always subject to arising, abiding and ceasing. when these three characteristics of impermanence are thoroughly analyzed, it is found that a thing that previously might be thought to contain an essence is in fact insubstantial. no essence can be found. what separates two material objects from each other, for example, the mug on my table and the table itself, is not that these two things are by their very nature separate and distinct from each other, but merely because we impute our conceptual apparatus on them that way. according to the abhidharmic picture that we have seen, the mug and the table are nothing but collection of a tremendously vast numbers of thought-moments, which are collected in kâlapas. these things are so short in duration that billions of them can fit in but one flash of lightning. the purpose of this picture is not the same as in modern science, which the latter aims at presenting an accurate picture of objective reality; the picture of the abhidharma is rather more like an aid to the practice of realizing the impermanence and insubstantiality of all things, which is an important step toward becoming released from sufferings. as for change and continuity, then, the picture that emerges from the abhidharma is that change seems to be all pervasive; each thought-moment and thought-instant does not necessarily connect with one another. as they are very short in duration and are juxtaposed to one another, 8 prajñâ vihâra change is analyzed as just this juxtaposition. there is then change, but perhaps at the expense of continuity. everything is subject to arising, abiding and ceasing, and thus is subject to change. however, these thoughtmoments or thought-instants themselves are not subject to change according to the abhidharma. there is an analysis of ordinary macro-objects such as mugs and tables. but the text does not mention how these thought-moments or thought-instants are to be analyzed. the presupposition seems to be that these are basic and cannot be further analyzed and subdivided. thus if one is intent on finding continuity in the abhidharmic picture, it is these thought-moments and thought-instants individually that do continue. of course no thing in the world does remain the same, but according to the abhidharma these thought-moments and -instants do remain the same, and it is only their composition and dissolution in various forms that account for the production, existence and decay of material things. the idea of continuity seems to presuppose that there be something that remains, which functions as the subject of change. it is this subject that continues and provides the basis by which the change is judged to occur to a same thing, hence there is continuity. in the abhidharma, it is clear that all material and mental entities do change and do so by virtue of the arrangements and rearrangements of thought-moments and thoughtinstants. at one level, then, there is no enduring thing at all, no selfsame entity that persists through any change. but at the deeper level, there is material, psycho-physical and objective continuity. this deeper level, on the other hand, is not accessible to ordinary perception, and it is only high level practitioners who could perceive them directly. it is only through perception tinged by ignorance that leads one to believe that there is really an existent, enduring object before one, such as a coffee mug. nishida kitarô and zeno’s paradox an interesting account of the problem of continuity and change is given by japanese philosopher nishida kitarô.9 the problem is demonstrated in zeno’s paradox of motion. observing an arrow that has been shot from the bow, one can’t coherently assert that an arrow is actually moving, according to zeno, because the arrow needs to be at a certain soraj hongladarom 9 place at each point of time, which by definition cannot contain any duration at all. but if this is the case, then the arrow is not moving because all of its trajectories consist of a series of these moments and at each moment it is not moving. so if it is not moving at one moment, then it is not moving at all. the argument is valid and has baffled logicians ever since. the saliency of the problem lies in the fact that this valid argument purports to show that our normal perception of everyday reality is wrong. the arrow is actually not moving, even though we see that it is moving toward the target. there are two choices. either we have to accept that our everyday perception is wrong and we have been deceived all the time, or we need to find a way to explain the paradox. according to aristotelian logic, which is the one system accepted in the west, there is the problem how to account for both change and continuity together. kitarô calls the aristotelian a “logic of subject”, because its locus is on the subject as opposed to the predicate of the statement. this accords with the aristotelian notion of individual substance as something that has properties but itself is not the same as the properties. individual substances function as subjects of statements and the properties work as their properties. a key aristotelian schema of a descriptive statement which is capable of bearing truth value is “a is f” where ‘a’ stands for an object, an individual substance functioning subject of the statement, and ‘f’ stands for the property that a has. hence in the zeno case the object of investigation is then the statement “the arrow is moving”. the focus is on the arrow itself, and the question is whether it is moving or not. according to zeno, it is not moving at all as we have seen. however, attending to zeno’s argument, one finds a real difficulty of not being able to account for the apparent fact that the arrow is indeed moving. if at any instant of time the arrow is at rest, then it is at rest throughout, there being no one particular instant where it is moving. one cannot solve the problem by pointing out that such points of time do not exist. one might, for example, argue against zeno that points of time containing no duration at all do not actually exist, and what does exist are only chunks of time which contain a length of time however small. hence there is not such a thing as a point in the line of time, and what does exist exist in the line are smaller sections of the line which can be divided and further divided, but no absolute point can be reached. the arrow, then, moves in 10 prajñâ vihâra these smaller chunks of time, and since these chunks are not points the arrow can move within those chunks. this argument does not seem to work, however, because one would then need to find an account of how the arrow moves from the beginning of the chunk to the end. suppose there is a small chunk (and we imagine it to be very small indeed), c, since c is a chunk and not a point there must be a moment at which c begins and another later moment at which c ends. this is always the case no matter how small c is. to say that these starting and ending points do not exist would contradict our understanding of c being a chunk in the first place, for being a chunk just means that the starting and ending points must be different. if this is the case, then accounting for the arrow moving within chunk c is not different from accounting for its movement in the bigger chunk of time from the bow to the target. the problem that aristotelian logic has with zeno’s paradox is precisely that of finding an account that does justice both to change and continuity at the same time. in the case of the arrow, as long as it is assumed that it is the same arrow that is moving toward its target, then the difficulty arises. for how could one account for the arrow’s moving from point a in time to point b, there being an infinite number of points lying between a and b? one way to solve the movement problem is to assume that movement in nature is similar to movement in a movie. that is, movement consists of a series of changes in position at particular moments in time and when these series are strung together there emerges the continuous movement. let’s call this the ‘cinematographic theory’. in this theory the movement is always disjointed because the arrow would need to ‘jump’ from one film in the movie to another, adjacent one. a consequence is that there is no thing that stays the same from one cinematographic film to another; hence in order to preserve change, continuity has to be compromised. on the other hand, if one were to preserve continuity, if one, that is, would want to maintain that the arrow that moves is the same one throughout, then one would find oneself at an impasse because in order for the arrow to be absolutely the same, it cannot move because once it moves, it moves from one cinematographic film to another with nothing that remains as before. according to nishida, this is precisely where the problem with aristotelian logic lies. it cannot account for the existence of both continuity soraj hongladarom 11 and change in the case of the moving arrow. either the arrow does not move at all, which is contradictory to perception, or it does not remain the same, which is also contradictory. nishida’s way out is to argue that the root cause of the problem is with aristotelian logic itself, namely its presupposition that the center of attention is the logical subject. so long as it is presupposed that there is the logical subject, attention is then fixed on whether it, in this case the arrow which is either moving or not, has or does not have certain properties. according to nishida this logical subject is always an abstract one since it is supposed to lack all properties, functioning only as a core that possesses the properties. so long as the logical subject is presupposed, there is always the problem of how to account for its change or continuity. nishida’s way out is to propose the ‘logic of predicate’; instead of assuming that the basic block of reality is the individual substance, nishida argues that it is the properties that function as predicates in logical statements. according to the logic of predicate, the moving arrow is accounted for by presupposing that the moving is what ultimately exists in this case, and that the arrow does move because it is an instantiation of the moving, the arrow itself having an independent existence. on the other hand, the arrow also can be said to be at rest at each moment of time, as zeno argued. this is so because there is the predicate of ‘being at rest’, which is instantiated by the arrow. hence according to nishida’s logic of predicate, the arrow can both be at rest and be moving at the same time. this contradiction, however, is not possible in aristotelian logic. the upshot is that, in nishida’s logic of predicate, change and continuity are entirely possible, and i would like to argue that this is the only way in which the two concepts are possible. at each moment, the arrow is both moving and at rest. this is possible because the arrow itself, as the subject, does not have an independent existence apart from its properties. thus there is no self subsisting thing to possess contradictory properties in this case; what is there are two different contexts—that of an arrow frozen at a certain time-instant, and an arrow moving toward its target, and it is in reference to these contexts that the arrow is said to be either at rest or moving. change and continuity, then, is configured not as properties of self subsisting or independently existing individual objects, but as part and parcel of contexts of discourse (called bâsho in japanese) in which they 12 prajñâ vihâra stand in a web of semantic relations to other concepts in the same context. nâgârjuna: change and continuity in mâhâyana buddhism nishida’s account of change and continuity and his critique of aristotelian logic is much influenced by mâhâyana buddhism. in fact it could be said that his account does not diverge at all from the thoughts of nâgârjuna, the buddhist saint who lived in the 2nd century a.d. in southern india. in nâgârjuna’s most famous work, the fundamental verses of the middle way (mûlamadhayamakakârikâ),10 he outlines teaching on emptiness (sûnyatâ), which is the fundamental teaching of mâhâyana buddhism. the similarities between nishida’s and nâgârjuna’s account of change and continuity is that both accept that the two concepts are dependent upon human cognition. for nishida, it is our perception of smooth change and continuity in the cinematographic movement of things that is in fact responsible for there being movement and continuity. and this is the same for nâgârjuna. however, nâgârjuna goes one step further. for nâgârjuna movement is empty; that is to say, there is no inherent existence to movement, or by extension change as well as continuity. to say that change and continuity are empty is just to say that they lack inherent existence such that they do not exist independently of other things, and that they owe their existence in an important way as referents to conceptual thought. according to nâgârjuna, to say that motion (or change and continuity) is nonempty would entail many absurd consequences. commenting on chapter ii of the mûlamadhayamakakârikâ, jay garfield has the following to say: nâgârjuna argues that from such a view [that motion is nonempty] a number of absurd consequences would follow: things not now in motion, but which were in motion in the past or which will be in the future, would have to undergo substantial change, effectively becoming different things when they change state from motion to rest or vice versa; a regress would ensue from the need for the entity motion itself to be in motion; motion would occur in the absence of moving things; the moment at which a thing begins or ceases motion would be indescribable. nâgârjuna concludes that soraj hongladarom 13 a reification of motion is incoherent. motion is therefore empty.11 applying nâgârjuna’s argument here to zeno’s paradox of the moving arrow, one finds that for nâgârjuna, the arrow neither moves, nor is at rest, nor both moves and is at rest, nor neither moves nor is at rest. this is so because, for it to be moving, it has to be identifiable through time, which we have seen from nishida’s discussion not to be the case. but we can’t say that it is at rest either, for that would starkly contradict ordinary perception. however, the third option is not available either because it contradicts itself, and the fourth option is also untenable because there is in this context just nothing else that the arrow does except for moving or being at rest. nâgârjuna denies all these four possibilities (termed ‘negative tetralemma’) because all of them result from the presupposition that there is an arrow as an individually self subsisting thing, whose property (whether being at rest or moving) is the subject of investigation. so long as the arrow is presumed to be an inherently existing thing in itself, there will be these problems. his way out, famously, is to claim that the arrow itself is empty. not only that, but the property of motion itself is also empty, as summarized by garfield in the quote above. we can then see that nâgârjuna’s approach seems to be a logical consequence of nishida’s theory of logic of predicate. nishida allows for statements of the form “a is f and a is not f”, arguing that this does not violate basic logical principle because otherwise zeno’s paradox would not be solvable. nâgârjuna, on the other hand, not only accepts the form to be possible, but also accepts statements of the form “neither a is f nor a is not f” and “it is not the case that neither a is f nor a is not f” too. the idea of the positive and negative tetralemma is that all statements of the form a is f a is not f both a is f and a is not f neither a is f nor a is not f are tenable (‘positive tetralemma’) and untenable (‘negative tetralemma’) at the same time. this apparent paradox and outright con14 prajñâ vihâra tradiction is explained by showing that the tenability of all the components of the tetralemma works because there is a presupposition of the existence of the logical subject, ‘a’ in this case. so long as a is considered to be ‘empty’ of inherent existence or essential characteristics which would fix its own identity comes what may, then it does not make the same sense as in the more familiar aristotelian logic to say that a is or is not f, or any other horns of the tetralemma. the arrow, in this case, would be both moving, at rest, both moving and at rest, neither moving nor at rest, and none of these at the same time. without there being the arrow as the fixed logical subject, anything seems to follow. the following two verses contains nâgârjuna’s view of change and motion, which has a far reaching implication toward what we are discussing in this paper: motion does not begin in what has moved, nor does it begin in what has not moved, nor does it begin in what is moving, in what, then, does motion begin? prior to the beginning of motion, there is no beginning of motion in the going or in the gone. how could there be motion in the not-gone? (mmk ii: 12-13).12 in the first verse, the idea is that motion does not begin anywhere, hence it is empty and any attempt to impute motion to things is always an act of conscious, conceptual imputation without objective basis in reality. (this does not mean that no motion exists in ‘objective’ identifiable reality doctrine of two truths). motion does not begin in what has moved because a thing that has moved would presumably be now at rest, so does not have any motion, or it is moving, in that case motion does not begin there because it is moving by virtue of having been moved in the past, and hence motion obviously did not begin at that particular moment of presently moving. it does not begin in what has not moved, because things that are at rest necessarily do not have motion. but motion is not in things that are moving either, because it is moving and must have been moved earlier. soraj hongladarom 15 hence motion is not in the going, nor in the gone, and certainly not in the not-gone. but does this entail that nothing is moving at all? is nâgârjuna a philosopher of the same stripe as zeno, who pursues arguments to the effect that the world as we know it is not possible at all? being a buddhist, nâgârjuna cannot accept that nothing is changing, because that would be opposite to one of the most basic teachings of all schools of buddhism. but at the same time we also see in the verses above that motion does not begin anywhere. the second verse shows that the beginning of motion in things that are moving and have already moved seems to arise from nowhere, there being nothing in motion prior to it. the idea is that there must be a definite beginning of motion in things that are moving and have already moved. but where exactly is that beginning? prior to the beginning the moving or the moved is not that at all, and if one were to assume that the moving or the moved have essential characteristics of moving, then one would be at loss to explain how such things could arise in the first place. if this applies to the moving and the moved, then the case of the not-gone would of course be easy because there is no motion there at all. nâgârjuna’s conclusion from these difficult verses is that if one takes motion to be an essential property of things which are taken to be inherently existing, then one finds this problem of not being able to find motion in them. this is strikingly reminiscent of zeno. hence, one might conclude that paradoxes like zeno’s arise because of a misconception of ultimate reality. when one mistakenly believes that there are such things as arrows that are taken to possess essential characteristics (arrowness, for example), one finds oneself mired in the paradox. for nâgârjuna, the way out of the paradox would be to realize that the arrow itself is empty of any essential characteristics. not only that, but the movement of the arrow is empty too. nâgârjuna clearly states his position in the following verse: neither an entity nor a nonentity moves in any of the three ways. so motion, mover, and route are nonexistent. (mmk ii: 25)13 16 prajñâ vihâra the ‘three ways’ here refer to past, present and future. that no thing moves in any of the three ways would then mean that it does not move in the past, present or future. both an entity and a nonentity (such as the unicorn) do not move at all. this is also zeno’s conclusion. all the mover, motion and route are nonexistent because, since there is no motion, there is necessarily no mover or route taken. all things exist in the past, present and the future, but if they existed in the past, they could not be said to contain any movement because the past moments have already passed away and exist now only in memory. they could not be said to exist in the future either because the future has yet to come to existence. so the only possibility for changing things to exist in at the present, but as zeno has demonstrated the present itself is nothing but a point of time, an instant in the timeline with no duration, so changing things in fact do not change at the present moment for the same reason. hence there is no change. but, as with zeno’s paradox, that there is no change is so contradictory to our understanding of the world that we just cannot accept it at face value. nishida, as we have seen, explains the fact of change in his logic of predicate, pointing out that the basis of reality should be the logical predicate rather than the logical subject. for nâgârjuna, the way out is the realization that there are two levels of understanding the world. at the conventional level, there is of course change, and things are always changing all the time. this is the level of ordinary understanding and perception, together with conceptualization and language use. at the deeper, ultimate level, however, things are not what they seem, and it is at this level that nâgârjuna’s analysis shows that there is actually no change in any thing and at any time. the picture is not that of the ultimate reality lying there as the basis and the conventional is merely ‘what appears’. that would be to denigrate the conventional truth, with the consequence that the buddha’s own teachings, conveyed in normal language, would be taken to be merely conventional hence having to real force. the issue here is very complicated, and would obviously exceed the limits this paper. suffice it to say here that for nâgârjuna, change is indeed possible at the conventional level, which does not mean that it is merely conventional and hence merely apparent. but a correct understanding of the buddha’s teaching also necessarily relies on an understanding of the ultimate level, the level of emptisoraj hongladarom 17 ness, wherein there is no change as we have just discussed. perhaps a way toward a reconciliation of these two truths would be for one to recognize that the conventional level of reality is as real as it gets, but still its reality does depend on language and concepts, and as such they open a way toward a realization of the same reality without language and concepts, reality as emptiness. understanding things this way, change and continuity would then be concepts lying on the conventional side of things. the point is that these two concepts are not written in stones; they are but our tools in dealing with the world around us, both conceptually and physically. but in themselves they do not have inherent existence such that we could grasp them as ultimately real. continuity and change: buddhism and science so what are the consequences of all this for the discussion on buddhism and science? if change and continuity are, strictly speaking, not there in objective reality, then these key concepts, which are relied upon extensively in science, would point toward science itself as something of a construct. this does not mean that science itself loses all its objectivity and its status as the paradigm of knowledge in today’s world. but it does mean that we should always be aware that science, or scientific knowledge, is composed of concepts and as the concepts of change and continuity lie at a very deep level of scientific analysis and understanding, and as both concepts are, according to buddhism, only parts and parcel of conventional, and not ultimate, reality, science itself is part of conventional reality too. what this does mean is that there is no such thing as absolute objectivity such that there is an absolute connection between concepts and reality. after all concepts are our own tools that we use to carve out whatever it is ‘out there’ so that we make sense of it. the lesson for science would then be that we should stop thinking of science as an enterprise that drives toward an eventual complete correspondence between understanding and reality. of course this is not new at all, and many historians and philosophers of science have long pointed this out. what is my point in this essay is simply that this has not been new for more than two thousand years, since buddhism has indicated this for a long time. this, however, must not be taken to mean that there is no objectivity 18 prajñâ vihâra in science. those who believe that if scientific knowledge is found to be composed of concepts, like ‘change’ and ‘continuity’, whose meanings are not there in outside reality then nothing is objective at all are firmly convinced that there is an all-or-nothing dilemma between something being absolutely objective and something absolutely subjective. that is, these persons believe in the dichotomy between the object and the subject. since science, they argue, belongs to the realm of the object, to say that science is composed of concepts whose meanings are constructed would mean that they are not objective, which for them mean the concepts are purely subjective and arbitrary. but in buddhism it is precisely this dichotomy between the subject and the object that is suspect, for the dichotomy presupposes the existence of a self which is found to be actually non-existent. the distinction between subject and object exists because it is supposed that there is a self, the one who thinks, which stands in contrast with what is thought about, or the object. but if the subject is nothing but a series of juxtaposing mental episodes, with nothing substantially and inherently existing that binds them together, then the whole foundation of the dichotomy breaks down. of course this does not mean that in buddhism there is absolutely no conception of the self; what it does mean, on the contrary, is that any conception of a self is a construction, in quite the same way as the notions of change and continuity are constructed out of the ineffable reality. only that this ‘ineffable’ reality is in an important sense one and the same with the empirical reality we are all familiar with. the point is that, if one accepts that the dichotomy between the subject and the object is itself a construction, something that is not inherently there but arises as a consequence of our dealing with the world, then one would be less worried about science losing its supposed ‘objectivity’ if their concepts are found to be merely labels. conclusion through the abhidharma, we have learned that change and continuity somehow have their basis in reality outside of our own conceptualization. hence the abhidharma maintains a realist position. even though such a basis consists of very tiny particles, these particles do not change and the apparent changes that are perceptible to our eyes are only apparent, since soraj hongladarom 19 in fact these change are nothing more or less than arrangements and rearrangements of these tiny particles. however, one can certainly carry on the analysis further, and zeno’s paradox shows that it is mathematically possible to divide duration in time and distance in space further and further with no end, and a consequence is that change is in fact not possible at all. if we would like to uphold our intuition and argue that change does in fact exist, we would do so only through rethinking of zeno-type paradoxes, and one way to do this is through nishida’s critique of aristotelian logic. the analysis is carried on to the furthest extent in nâgârjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, which states that nothing whatsoever is real in the sense of existing substantially and inherently without any intervention by the perceiver. in this sense, nothing is real, in the abhidharmic sense of the tiny particles themselves being real. even the abhidharmic particles are themselves consequences of conceptualization of reality. without any words to name those particles, it does not quite make a lot of sense to say that they exist, because it does not make much sense even to talk about them in the first place. this is also the case with concepts such as ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. so what have we learned? as the analysis of space and time can indeed be carried out with consciousness and the sense of the ‘i’, buddhism has found that self-consciousness is in fact an illusion, a simulacrum. in the same way as continuity is assembled out of disparate, juxtaposing physical episodes, the sense of an ‘i’ is also assembled out of disparate episodes in the always changing thoughts of a person. this, of course, does not mean that the person does not exist, for if she did not exist, who would be responsible for action? and the whole ethical edifice of buddhism would break apart. in the same vein, continuity does exist through the changing physical episodes, for the episodes are conceptualized and labeled in such a way that there is something that ‘carries over’ through the episodes. likewise, the sense of the self is also conceptualized in the same way. what this points to is that the dichotomy of subject and object, on which modern science bases itself (as in the separation between the observer and the phenomenon, etc.), is not quite tenable. it is only as tenable as it needs to be, such as when one needs to found a system of knowledge, such as modern science, on a kind of shared certainty. but buddhism teaches us that this is in fact something constructed, that the 20 prajñâ vihâra distinction between subject and object is not based on reality per se. reconsidering the epistemic basis of science in this way might help us realize that science is an on going phenomenon and nothing is settled. and that the dialog between science and religion such as buddhism has a lot of substance left that should be carried on further. endnotes 1 this paper was originally presented at the conference on continuity & change: perspectives on science and religion, june 3-7, 2006, in philadelphia, pa, usa, organized by the local societies initiative, a program of the metanexus institute (www.metanexus.net). 2 bhadanta anuruddhâcariya, a manual of abhidhamma being abhidhammattha , nârada mahâ thera transl., 4th ed. revised. (kuala lumpur: buddhist missionary society, 1979), p. 354. 3 mehm tin mon, buddha abhidhamma: ultimate science (penang: sukhi hotu sdn bhd, 2002), p. 247. 4 mehm tin mon, buddha abhidhamma, p. 248. 5 mehm tin mon, buddha abhidhamma, p. 248. 6 anuruddhacariya, abhidhammattha sanghaha, p. 334. 7 anuruddhacariya, abhidhammattha sanghaha, p. 334. 8 there are a number of buddhist texts and scholars dealing with this issue. see, for example, dharmakîrti’s epistemology in john dunne, foundations of dharmakîrti’s philosophy (boston: wisdom publications, 2004). 9 jiang, tao, the problematic of continuity: nishida kitarô and aristotle philosophy east and west 55.3(july 2005): 447-460. 10 nâgârjuna, the fundamental verses of the middle way: nâgârjuna’s mûlamadhayamakakârikâ, jay l.garfield transl. (oxford university press, 1995). 11 nâgârjuna, the fundamental verses, pp. 124-125. 12 nâgârjuna, the fundamental verses, pp. 7-8. 13 nâgârjuna, the fundamental verses, p. 9. references bhadanta anuruddâhcariya. a manual of abhidhamma being abhidhammattha . nârada mahâ thera transl., 4th ed. revised. kuala lumpur: buddhist missionary society, 1979. dunne, john. foundations of dharmakîrti’s philosophy. boston: wissoraj hongladarom 21 dom publications, 2004. jiang, tao. “the problematic of continuity: nishida kitarô and aristotle.” philosophy east and west 55.3(july 2005): 447-460. mon, mehm tin. buddha abhidhamma: ultimate science. penang: sukhi hotu sdn bhd, 2002. 22 prajñâ vihâra héctor sevilla 39 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 39-58 © 2000 by assumption university press philosophy centered on nothingness: the kyoto school, heidegger, and other nihilistic philosophies héctor sevilla university of guadalajara, mexico abstract in this study, the existing link between heidegger’s philosophy and the main representatives of kyoto’s school will be demonstrated. for it, a brief synthesis of nishida and tanabe’s philosophy will be presented; in their conceptions about nothingness, whether as something absolute or dynamic that allows the movement of everything else, a first matrix can be observed of what for heidegger represents nothingness: the source of all philosophical approaches; a something which, upon being, ceases to be or loses its being. the article ends with the reference to three consequences of this contemporary nihilistic approach: the one which sustains the need for a return to faith in order to avoid the abysm of nothingness, proposed in unamuno; the one which implies a denial of all hope and the openness to the no-sense, implicit in bataille, cioran, camus, and caraco; just as the one which bases a hope of reconstruction on nihilism, according to vattimo. 40 prajñā vihāra introduction the problem of nothingness has been a persistent topic, generating interest from many distinct perspectives. since heraclitus, philosophers have attempted to understand it. since sophocles, intellectuals have attempted to describe it. since the atomists, mathematicians have attempted to decipher it, as the mayans did with the number zero and its personification. theologians like saint augustine denied it in order to vindicate divinity, while others like meister eckhart, unified it with the deity itself. astronomers have attempted to locate nothingness beyond the world, and since the stoics it has been understood as beyond the universe. scientists filled with ether that which could be nothingness, until arriving at quantum physics which conceives it in dialectic with being. hence, nothingness has not only been in distinct disciplines of knowledge but is implied in, and related with, the most fundamental questions that man may ask himself. issues such as life and death; existenceand non-existence of values; knowledge and its limits; being and not-being;change and eternity, nothingness is always present. how is it, then, that something which is always present can be excluded from our perception? how can nothingness, that allows all that which is, not be? in the last century, there have been two major approaches to the study of nothingness. in asia, the kyoto school, centered on the writings of kitaro nishida and on hajime tanabe, fully maintain the importance of the study of nothingness for the comprehension of being; with similar intentions, the western philosopher martín heidegger provides a clear meditation on the philosophical significance of nothingness. in this paper i will present the central postulates of both positions and develop the implicit links between them. héctor sevilla 41 1. nothingness in the orient: the kyoto school there is no possibility of a phenomenology of nothingness since it does not show itself directly. raimon panikkar, in the prologue to los filósofos de la nada [philosophers of nothingness] by james heisig, mentions that “there is no transcultural phenomenological epoché. we cannot place our deepest convictions between parentheses. we cannot understand outside of our category”.1 in that sense, nothingness is that which in order to be conceptualized must enter the categorical spheres of what is. so, upon defining it we make it be, therefore, the real nothingness is incognoscible. in the same manner it can be affirmed that: when human thought scrutinizes reality to the maximum of its strength, it trips over its own limits. but to discover the limit is to become aware that there is an insurmountable “beyond”; impassible to thought but not to conscience, since we become aware that it is a limit. a great part of the western culture has put the name of god to this limit.2 now, can we say that nothingness is and, due to it, submit it to the category of what is and what isn’t? certainly we would have to search for another verb for that which is not an object noun, unless we attempted to create ontology of nothingness. hence, to speak of nothingness supposes to make it something and, in that sense, it becomes impossible to speak really of it. it would seem that nothingness is a contradiction but, in the end, as panikkar mentions, “reality does not have to be contradictory or not contradictory unless it is believed that our “diction” about it affects reality in such a way that it exhaustively tells us what it is”.3 therefore, the problem of nothingness is often not accepted in western culture, the roots of which are bound to aristotelian thought. greek thought was unable to conceive the status of nothingness since “the ancient greeks, who developed logic and geometry which constitute the basis of all modern mathematics, never introduced the symbol of the zero; they profoundly 42 prajñā vihāra apprehended the idea”.4 it is to be understood, from there, the impossibility that aristotle could have conceived in terms of nothingness that which he finally called the unmoved mover. kitaro nishida and absolute nothingness returning to the issue of the east, in kitaro nishida we have a representative of the philosophy of nothingness in its most radical form. born in ishikawa, japan, this philosopher (1870-1945) is considered as one of the most important oriental philosophers. to a large extent, the transcendence of the school of kyoto in the panorama of world philosophy is due to his work and philosophical innovation. among his main lines of work was the conciliation between the intuitive and hardly reflexive conscience of the east with the west’s logical and rational conscience. his first book, indagación del bien [an inquiry into the good], shows a nishida centered on his own ideas, creative, and brave in the depths of the ordinary in order to find answers about the absolute. for nishida, there was no doubt in affirming that “the most important things are the spiritual ones and that the objective of the spirit consists in digging deeper and deeper into the nooks and crannies of the soul in order to reach the true and authentic self and become one with it”.5 the self is the conscience and it is this which unifies reality for the individual. so much so, that “to say that our self is consciously active is to say that our self, as an expressive point of the world, forms the world. for the world to express itself in the self, it must be subjectively approved by the self”.6 this subjectivity is situated in the perception of the counterparts and such an issue is a fact of the conscience from which our conscious world acquires order; in such a way that “we call our self the perspective or reflection of the self in its own self”.7 but what we conceive as our self is precisely not our self, in such a way that we are not what we are; or, stated differently, we are somewhat different to our perception of ourselves. héctor sevilla 43 the affirmation of the absolute in self-denial is a key element in nishida’s philosophy; so much so that “our self should be understood as absolute denial and affirmation as a response to the one, as that which is bottomless…”.8 in the grasping of this being bottomless is where the liberty which one has already can be found; not the liberty which is to be found externally, but rather a liberty that is already possessed; which is why, according to nishida: authentic liberty has a place in the point of inflection in which the self, through its self-denial, self-affirms itself as the self-denial of the one. in this point, the self touches the beginning and end of the world. beginning and end are also the alpha and omega of the own self. this is the point, stated differently, in which our self acquires consciousness of the absolute present.9 in nishida, there is no isolated self but always a wrapped self. that which wraps the self is the absolute nothingness; which is why the self doesn’t ascend to transcendence like he who climbs a mountain, but rather like he who descends to the depths. this is a self which needs to deny itself in order to affirm itself, since “it is not about a self that affirms and thrusts itself outwards, but instead denies and submerges itself to discover a larger self in its depth; it transcends inwards more than upwards or outwards”.10 in such a way that in denying oneself and leaving oneself, reality is presented such as it is, for one is then (and only then) situated in the place of nothingness. this place is the eternal present that nishida also usually binds to divinity; though this does not suppose a theocentrism, an egocentrism, or a cosmocentrism, but rather emptiness from all centers. heisig suggests, “nishida recognized that the step towards ontology of nothingness was defying a fundamental presupposition in philosophy until then”.11 he believed that the fundamental aspect of western philosophy is to have taken the being as the fundament of reality; however, the counterpart is to consider nothingness as such fundament. 44 prajñā vihāra we can understand the being as something absolute but situated in something more absolute which even precedes it: absolute nothingness. the desire of nishida is bound to the need of the self of denying the self and be able to open up to a greater reality that possesses it, from which nothingness could even be a hermeneutic possibility. it is about denying the self as a subject that perceives reality and continuing on to the self which, denying itself, perceives a greater reality. that is why “this self should be made nothingness or annulled to open up to a truer dimension”.12 it is about, even more, a denial of the self which is not only rational but “a denial constructed on the disciplined effort of dispensing the prejudice of seeing oneself as a subject placed in a world of objects”.13 naturally, this supposes a transition from the term nothing, going from the simple denial to the metaphysical affirmation of an absolute distinct from the being: nothingness. now, in regard to the adjective absolute as referred to nothingness, nishida tells us that it: does not come to be nor cease to be and, in this sense, is distinguished from the world of the being. it is called an absolute nothingness – or nothing of the absolute – because it cannot be contained by any phenomenon, individual, event, or relation in the world. if it is absolute, it is precisely because it is not defined by anything in the world of the being which would oppose it. it is absolved from all opposition which would make it relative, so it’s only opposition to the world of the being is that of an absolute in regard to the relative.14 nishida’s proposal has resulted so radical and contrary to the common metaphysical structures of the west, that even more than half a century after his death he has not received the necessary grasping nor, in many cases, even the required attention. that proves, in part, the impossibility of breaking with the blinding categorical structures where there is only that. héctor sevilla 45 hajime tanabe and nothingness as dynamo tanabe (1885-1962) received the invitation from kitaro nishida to be included in the academic activities of the university of kyoto, though later on they had discrepancies among them. i concur with hajime when he affirms that: the discipline which has to do with nothing is philosophy. religion encounters nothing and defeats it in faith, the art in sentiment; but only philosophy is occupied in knowing nothing from an academic point of view. since aristotle, metaphysics has been defined as the study of existence as such, of the being per se. but if the being is something that can only be concretely known through the mediation of nothing, it would be more appropriate for us to define philosophy in terms of nothing, despite how paradoxical this may seem at first.15 the latter is sufficient to affirm the conception of nothingness in tanabe as a dynamo which allows the interrelation of all things, an “élan vital”16 which supposes the dialectic necessary to comprehend things based on their own difference with the observer. this perception of nothingness which tanabe supposes does not subtract power from human will but rather does the contrary. antagonical to nishida, he does not assume in nothingness the beginning of the order of reality, but rather only the prelude which allows the connection between things, in spite of their difference and due to their coincidence in nothingness which permeates them. 2. martin heidegger: the being of nothingness martin heidegger (1889-1976) is possibly the most influential german philosopher of the twentieth century. his most important piece is ser y tiempo [being and time]. heidegger has been the most pointed 46 prajñā vihāra out representative of the contemporary existentialist trend, in spite of his reluctance to include himself in it and adopt the term. the problem of the meaning of the being is what worries heidegger the most. for him, such a concept is the indispensable and essential presupposition of any other one. the essence or substrate of “existing” is precisely the existence in abstract; a way of being which, for heidegger, is equivalent to “being in a world”. now the being, in other words the essence of existing, is timeliness. in his study about the being, heidegger appeals to the phenomenological method considering that the phenomena are the aspects in which being manifests itself. for heidegger, the ontology that searches for the true being is only possible as phenomenology. the aforesaid is clearly described in the following text: “the question which interrogates about the sense of the being is the one which ought to be posed. with this we find ourselves before the need of elucidating the question which interrogates about the being under the point of view of the structural elements indicated”.17 further along, heidegger notes that we, men, tend to the question being but that we have a preconception that, in some way, is the necessary though insufficient starting point: we already always move in a certain comprehension of the being. from it does the question arise which expressly interrogates about the sense of the being, and the tendency to forge the corresponding concept. we don’t know that “being” means. but then when we ask, “what is being?” we remain in a certain comprehension of the “is”, without being able to fix onto concepts what “is” means. this comprehension of the being, on an intermediate term, is a factum18 it is convenient to be aware, however, that this “existing” cannot be separated from the concept or experience of one’s own individual being. the essence of “existing” is something profoundly ours or, better expressed, something essential and irrepressibly individual and human. héctor sevilla 47 in parallel, to exist is also to transcend from the ego to the world of the noumenal, of everything that is beyond our own selves, this would include nothingness. for man, “existing” is always a possibility, something unfinished, for it ends with death; in other words, with “ceasing to be”. so, this “existing” contains anguish, which is no other thing than the perspective of death; this is to say, the connection with the fact of being finite. such a concept appears essentially bound to time. from it, the title of heidegger’s main masterpiece is derived. the starting point of various heideggerian propositions is in the concept of the dasein, which could be translated as the “being-there”. but heidegger uses it to designate the manner of existence proper to man; a being which is a nothing but is in time in the manner of a partial nothing. this manner of existence implies that, for man, to exist is not to be, but rather, to be able to be; this is to say, an existential possibility. this necessarily supposes the not-being which has not yet been but which supposes its possibility. the concept of heidegger’s dasein turns out to be a conscience of existence itself in terms of possibility. however, in the comprehension of existence it should not be seen as a cognitive act properly said, but rather something more fundamental and original than knowledge; in other words, the grasping of a possibility which lies in the execution of existence.19 what the dasein vitally explains is the essential finiteness of man. the human being is found in the world, given to itself as a fact. its possibilities, since it is born, are exhausted because death is not something exterior for him but – on the contrary – something that belongs to his essence. hence, when man forgets or ignores this reality that – is unavoidable to him by the fact of existing – he does not live authentically. from this unauthentic environment, however, man can exit through anguish; the anguish before nothingness, which reveals to us all of which our ordinary existence locks up as artificial, false, and apparent. anguish, after all, is what “reveals his own essence to man”.20 in such thesis about anguish is where the influence exerted by kierkegaard over heidegger can best 48 prajñā vihāra be grasped; though the latter, in difference to nietzsche, does not end up positing nihilism as the final consequence of awareness but instead supposes that anguish is something that the will cannot avoid due to its need of continuing to find answers. man finds himself trapped by the problem of his own being and by the experience of his irrepressible loneliness. his anguish flows from the conscience of his timeliness like an anemic state which makes man project and anticipate himself over the future. however, for every being, individually considered, the final future is nothingness; in other words, what follows after his end. and it is in nothingness as well, paradoxically, where man finds the possibility of getting to conquer his own identity, getting to be oneself with the death that liberates him from all future. the previous premises explain the paradoxical conclusion to which heidegger arrives. human existence cannot relate itself with the being if it is not holding itself within nothingness. this transcending is, precisely, metaphysics. this is why metaphysics belongs to man’s nature. in his reflections about thinking, he admits: that which should be object of thought, moves away from man; it is removed from him. but how can we know the most minimal aspect; how can we name that which has always been removed from us? what escapes from us, denies arriving. however it’s removing itself is not merely nothing. the removal of itself is an event. what escapes from us can incite and affect us more than everything present, which comes out to meet us and concerns us.21 this is why the “sense” or the “future, upon removing itself before us, are a pair of concepts that attract us even more. for heidegger, metaphysics is not only a special philosophical discipline, but rather a dark “intellective cosmos” into which man’s individual and irrepressible existence plunges its roots. this is also sartre’s starting point. héctor sevilla 49 heidegger and ernst jünger together made “the most penetrating contemporary analysis of the problem of nihilism […] to the fit of the twentieth century”.22 both assume the centrality of the topic of nothingness in the world, to the point that jünger mentions that “whoever has not experienced over himself the enormous power of nothingness and does not know its temptation, knows very little of our era”.23 for him, the emptiness of values and sense pertaining to the era, does not give way to a defeatist and negative attitude. on the contrary, it considers a heroic nihilism of the action of such an individual that elevates himself further from it. the experience of the interior is what, for jünger, constitutes a type of final barricade before planetary nihilism, no longer only european as nietzsche considered it. it is advocated for the overcoming of nihilism from nihilism itself. in turn, heidegger is neither so optimist nor does he assume the possibility of overcoming nihilism but, instead, warns that jünger himself must have been absorbed by nihilism when he considers a static definition of the being; making him lose with it, its substantiality. therefore, the nihilism overcome by man’s will without the knowledge of nothingness’ being is only the reiteration of nihilism itself. even rationalism is, for heidegger, the expression of subjectivity and anthropocentrism which allows us to catapult ourselves beyond nihilism. if one truly desires to escape nihilism, it is necessary to overcome our resistances and to not erect weak blockades, but, instead, to allow the enormous power of nothingness to be liberated and all the possibilities of nihilism to be fulfilled. with this, i am completely in agreement and further along i will present it when i refer to post-rationalism. in turn, josé ferrater mora, in the introduction to a book by priscilla cohn, mentions that “the notorious heideggerian being can very well result a trip through nothing”.24 in the same way, cohn dos not have any doubt in assuring that the thought of the german philosopher is properly a philosophy centered on nothingness, since: 50 prajñā vihāra in order to demonstrate the importance of nothingness it is more fructifying to attempt to comprehend what heidegger wants to say when he describes the dasein as a being in whose being its being fades […] it can almost be considered that the totality of el ser y el tiempo [the being and time] is an intent to explain – and demonstrate – the implications of this description. i affirm, like this, that the heideggerian notion of the dasein as a being in whose being its being fades cannot be deeply comprehended without understanding nothingness.25 in such a case, as much with heidegger as with aristotle, we would have to recognize that even centering in on nothingness they do not call it as such; they sketch it, they show it, they caress it without touching it, perhaps respecting it too much knowing that nothingness, upon naming it, slightly loses its value for us. certainly – as has already been said – nothingness does not suppose that understanding it makes us nihilists in a pejorative sense. on the contrary: recognizing the magnificence of nothingness is recognizing man’s minimization and, in it, precisely its possible grandeur. being so, and following givone, “for heidegger it is nothingness which reveals the absolute sense of the being”,26 for in it, it is possible to have an experience of the absolute since, “nothing is the nothing not of this or of that being but of the being in its totality”;27 and due to it, “nothingness makes possible the evidence of the being as such for the human being”.28 one should let oneself, therefore, be possessed by nothingness, not so that things may lose their sense but rather to reconstruct it. in the end, with heidegger it is about questioning being, but from the perspective of nothingness and not only being. it is clear that heidegger considers nothingness as equal in importance to being. nothingness in dialectic with the being. just as in heidegger there is no being without being and no being without being, i would additionally assert that there is no being without nothingness, while nothingness can be nothingness even without being. i do not connect nothingness with the being in the héctor sevilla 51 same way as heidegger, since what he considers on occasion as the being, is what i consider nothingness. in any event, the dasein is not the same as nothingness but is in relation to it. man’s conscience over its own nothingness, the understanding of being constituted as a being in whose being its being fades, is the idea that nothingness allows man’s being; it represents its dasein. man is always a possibility, never a reality. the possibility is always latent; a possibility always sustained by nothingness, in whose imaginary arms human fragility is extended. man may or may not become aware of this, but such conscience is independent to its being, or not, this way. 3. the result of assuming nothingness in philosophical thought three more perspectives considering the significance of nothingness for philosophy must be discussed. firstly, unamuno’s proposal, important in the history of philosophy, especially for recognizing, in spite of his christian creed, the limitations of christianism and the need of renewing it from a perspective that can manage to overcome nothingness through the absolute. from another perspective, the pessimistic vision derived from nihilisim which, without a sketch of hope, recognizes the no-sense and fallacy of knowledge and of the future world. bataille’s atheological summa, the perception of man as a “conscious nothing” in cioran, camus’ anarchism, and the recognition of the alienating chaos promoted by caraco, are clear examples of it. in another corner, though with a similar beginning, centered on the primal hopelessness, an apology of nihilism can be found in vattimo which recognizes in nothingness itself, that which is so feared; an alternative for survival in a world whose primordial problem is the denial of emptiness as an experience which, if allowed, could help to sensitize and to construct new bridges of sense. 52 prajñā vihāra unamuno and the impossibility of fusion with nothingness miguel de unamuno (1864-1936) was an important figure within the spanish culture of the first-half of the twentieth century. unamuno – coinciding with kierkegaard – affirms that reason does not provide humanity with the ability to know and inquire about life in its profound essence. instead, one has to appeal to the imagination and live in such a manner of foreseeing death. thus to know life, which is temporary, unamuno makes use of the ‘existential’ or ‘personal’ novel as a method. in his piece del sentimiento trágico de la vida [of the tragic sense of life], unamuno briefly presents the sense of philosophizing: at the starting point, at the true starting point, the practical not the theoretical one, of all philosophy, there is a: for what? the philosopher philosophizes for something more than philosophizing […] and since the philosopher is man before philosopher, he needs to live in order to philosophize; and, in fact, he philosophizes to live. and he usually philosophizes either to resign himself to life or to find some purpose in it, or for enjoyment and forgetting sorrows, or for sport and game.29 further along, unamuno critiques descartes (and sartre) over the issue of thinking as a condition of existing30 and establishes that before accepting the cartesian ideas about the necessity of thinking to be able to exist, he would assume that sum ergo cogito; this is to say, that we exist and later think. two of the fundamental questionings of his philosophy are: “would a pure thought actually be possible, without self-consciousness, without personality? does pure knowledge actually take place without feeling, without this type of materialness that the feeling lends to it?”31 my position is that because of the fact that thought has self-consciousness or personality, it is not pure, precisely because of the implication of such sentiments. héctor sevilla 53 since unamuno centers in on the material man of flesh and bone, he affirms that the greatest conscience possible is that of existence and, thus, one of the main desires will be to maintain it always; in other words, to become immortal. if the problem of personal immortality is man’s basic problem since “we cannot conceive ourselves as not existing”,32 and if the uncertainty with regard to an ultra-earthly existence is derived from it, then this uncertainty – in contrast with the intimate need for survival that man experiences – explains its agony as a state of the spirit which, in spite of everything, he has to “use”. in this “the tragic sentiment of existence” certainly consists. before the “ineffectiveness of christianity”33 which usually provides simple, magical, and accessible answers before the problem of “the beyond”, man no longer has support between his desire of immortality and knowing that his time for existence is finite; and that, therefore, since in existence he is, he will cease to be. in the same way as “christianity kills western civilization, at the same time as this one to the other and that’s how they live, killing each other”34; in man, the desire of immortality kills him at the same time as death is that which breaks that desire. living is tragic since it implies dying. this is what we can specifically relate to nothingness, for the human desire to live always is, precisely, the tragic aspect of man’s life; a life which represents – furthermore – his impossibility of penetrating nothingness and the paradoxical possibility of his plenitude as a function of nothingness itself. the spanish philosopher strives to raise the debate over the physical man prior to the metaphysical one, the limited man prior to the super-man, the man that exists prior to thinking, and who thinks about his existence prior to the thought which engenders existence. unamuno is the philosopher of the flesh and bone that takes existence, and its demands, to the starting point of all knowledge, or subsequent reflection. 54 prajñā vihāra bataille, cioran, camus, and caraco the french georges bataille (1897-1962) constitutes one of the main representations of twentieth-century french nihilism. in his work, the conscience that nihilism inevitably accompanies us in each humanly constructed circumstance is observed. in his three main texts l’expérience intérieure, le coupable, and sur nietzsche; which united are known as summa atheologica; he clearly demonstrates the inevitable dailiness of nothingness in human life. regarding emile cioran (1911-1995), we find ourselves with a thinker who fearlessly delves into the nausea of nothingness. someone who, such as volpi says: “poisons all the ideals, hopes, and metaphysical rages of philosophy; this is to say, all attempts of anchoring existence into a single sense that calms it before the abysm of the absurdity, which threatens it at every moment”.35 man for cioran is “he who is not”; a conscious nothing in the world. the proximity of cioran to the topic is centered on the inoperability of existence, which is tinged with literary images and effects. today there is a flourishing of cioran’s thought in latin america, which is evidence of the translation of the majority of his works into spanish. albert camus (1913-1960) who has full conscience of his anarchist position underlying his own existentialist and nihilist reflection. more than the issue of nothingness itself, camus treats the issue of the absurdity of life, which has to do with the human incomprehension of the nothingness that surrounds us as humans. in el mito de sísifo [the myth of sisyphus] he assumes that life is to be lived without explanations or reasons, once the gods have been silenced or died. our rebellion would be, in any case, living in the face of this absurdity. in turn, albert caraco (1919-1971) affirms that being is nothing other thing than chaos and indifference, and that “the future will tell that the only clairvoyants were the anarchists and nihilists”.36 in his work bréviaire du chaos [handbook of chaos] we find not only a defense of nothingness but a resignation before its supremacy. many texts of this héctor sevilla 55 philosopher (who in the end, put a blade to his throat and terminated his life) remain as yet unpublished. in a way, this demonstrates that nihilism is not necessarily always a beginning of constructions. gianni vattimo and the apology of nihilism some philosophers recognize in nihilism something more than the manifestation of the contemporary era’s evils. such is the case of the italian philosopher gianni vattimo (1936), who considers present-day man’s lack of conscience as the cause of the uneasiness in the face of nothingness in daily life. the world is not sufficiently nihilist. nihilism is not the problem, the problem is rather man’s lack of adaptation to this situation. in his main writings like la muerte del sujeto [the death of the subject], la posmodernidad [post-modernity], or el pensamiento débil [weak thought], he makes his nihilistic vocation noted and recognizes that metaphysics has ankylosed western thought upon searching for categories that explain the being, and forgotten that which can be beyond this scheme. gianni vattimo invites, summing up, to recognize present times and to assume the inexistence of unity in the perception of the real, the fragmentation of linguistic explanations, and the impossibility of absolute knowledge in certainty. we should not have nostalgia for the lost absolutism, nor should we feel resignation – which characterizes the existentialist thinkers – but, rather, we should embrace this new perspective, recognizing it as part of the progress of human understanding; an understanding that supposes the recognition of its own limits. it is precisely in the recognition of the inexplicable coming forth of new perceptions of reality, that the absolute principles are demolished. 56 prajñā vihāra conclusion although the dasein that heidegger proposes is not the same as nothingness, its reason for existence and the platform which sustains it can be found in nothingness. without nothingness there is no dasein and without it there would not be any heideggerian philosophy. human existence, therefore, cannot sustain itself if it is not through nothingness. in a similar appoach, when tanabe attributes the characteristic of dynamo to nothingness. though tanabe did not conclude, together with nishida, the absoluteness of nothingness, he does recognize its generalized presence in order for all other things to be able to be. this also corresponds with vattimo, who in a way performs a very interesting fusion of the japanese vision with heidegger’s, and shows us there is an urgent need to return attention to what nothingness means and what contemporary philosopher has neglected. it could be that through finding a new inspiration to live in nothingness, upon utilizing it as a platform to create new meanings for existence, the contemporary individual may choose to maintain his or her faith, in unamuno’s style, or definitely discard it as camus or cioran promoted; nevertheless, regardless of the final destiny of the philosophical reflections about nothingness, the feasibility of propitiating from it through a sensible and thinking election, which is the finality of all committed philosophy. héctor sevilla 57 end notes 1 heisig, los filósofos de la nada, p.10. 2 ibid., p.11. 3 ibid., p.14. 4 barrow, el libro de la nada, p.25. 5 heisig, op. cit., p.67. 6 nishida, pensar desde la nada, p.28. 7 ibid., p.29. 8 ibid., p.103. 9 ibid., p.105. 10 ibid., p.123. 11 heisig, op. cit., p.93. 12 ibid., p.94. 13 ibídem. 14 ibídem. 15 ibid., p.164. 16 ibídem. 17 heidegger, el ser y el tiempo, p.7. 18 ibídem. 19 ibid., pp.18-23. 20 ibid. pp.428-434. 21 heidegger, ? qué significa pensar?, p.20. 22 volpi, el nihilismo, p.107. 23 jünger & heidegger, oltre la linea, p.104. 24 cohn, heidegger: su filosofía a través de la nada, p.6. 25 ibid., p.11. 26 givone, historia de la nada, p.255. 27 ibid., p.258. 28 ibid., p.262. 29 unamuno, del sentimiento trágico de la vida, p.18. 30 ibid., p.20. 31 ibid., p.21. 32 ibid., p.23. 33 vid. unamuno, la agonía del cristianismo, 1983. 34 ibid., p.237. 35 volpi, el nihilismo, p.124. 36 caraco, brévaire du chaos, p.103. 58 prajñā vihāra bibliographical references barrow, john, el libro de la nada, barcelona, crítica, 2001. caraco, albert, bréviaire du chaos, lausanne, l´âge d´homme, 1982. cohn, priscilla, heidegger: su filosofía a través de la nada, madrid, guadarrama, 1975. givone, sergio, historia de la nada, buenos aires, ah editora, 1995. heidegger, martin, el ser y el tiempo, méxico, fce, 1951. heidegger, martin, ? qué significa pensar?, madrid, trotta, 2005. heisig, james, los filósofos de la nada, barcelona, herder, 2002. jünger y heidegger, oltre la linea, milán, adelphi, 1989. nishida, kitaro, pensar desde la nada, salamanca, sígueme, 2006. unamuno, miguel, del sentimiento trágico de la vida, méxico, porrúa, 1983. unamuno, miguel, la agonía del cristianismo, méxico, porrúa, 1983. volpi, franco, el nihilismo, buenos aires, biblos, 2005. after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi hermeneutics in the theravada buddhist texts: an overview of research veerachart nimanong assumption university of thailand abstract this paper investigates hermeneutical theories of buddhism for the purpose of solving conflicts among different buddhist sects, in particular the different interpretations of the buddha’s teachings (buddhadhamma). it has three objectives: (1) to analyze the general theories of hermeneutics from the ancient to the contemporary periods, (2) to investigate the theories of hermeneutics in theravada buddhism from the precommentaries to the post-commentaries, and (3) to compare and contrast the general hermeneutics with the buddhist hermeneutics in order to apply those founded hermeneutics to interpret the controversy in some issues of the buddhist teaching. it will show that the buddhist hermeneutical theory known as ‘catupatisaraṇasutra’ could be compared with that of schleiermacher’s. hermeneutics in buddhism can be characterized as ‘interaction-ism’, which is of ‘interpretation-explanation combined’ theory, exemplified in the nettipakarana text and in those of thai buddhist scholars, who try to solve the problem of ‘whether nibbana be self or not-self’. it is also found that hermeneutics could better support mutual understanding among various religions in general than other approaches, this is demonstrated by buddhadadasa bhikkhu’s hermeneutics based on two kinds of language, and hans-georg gadamer’s hermeneutics. introduction in buddhism, there persist many controversies. for instance, whether nibbana can be considered self or not-self, whether prince siddhartha could walk seven steps immediately when he was born from his mother’s womb, or whether to be an arahant is to be an ungrateful person. these controversies require interpretation for mutual understanding among the buddhists. we may therefore ask: “is hermeneutics necessary for buddhism?” and “how can hermeneutics give rise to mutual understanding among different religions or within the same religion?” when asked: what is meant by hermeneutics? does hermeneutics have any rule and regulation? when did hermeneutics originate? was there a person who invented it? one answer is: no one invented the hermeneutics; it originated by its own nature (terry, 1979, p. 174). others suggest that hermeneutics can be considered a part of post-modernism. 1 the term ‘hermeneutics’ has been defined in many ways. for heidegger, hermeneutics is understood with regard to human existence (1962, p. 183), in other words, “human beings exist through interpretive activity” (stiver, 1996, p. 91), in order to understand oneself and the external world. hans-georg gadamer opined further, “hermeneutics is an understanding of meaning, and accordingly equated with an interpretation”, (1991, p. 259). richard e. palmer extended its meaning, “a study of how to understand a text or a book is hermeneutics”, (1969, pp. 8-9). he further states: “it could be said that scientists call an analysis of data as hermeneutics, a literary critic calls an examination of a literature as hermeneutics, a language translator is also known as a hermeneutician, a news critic interprets the news, so in our daily lives, we interpret our activities, sometimes the interpretation of ours is right and sometimes it is wrong. we sometimes interpret the sideboard along the roadside, when we are traveling by a public bus. we interpret a receiving letter, and so on. according to richard e. palmer, even an animal survives its life through the activity of its interpretation, when it instinctively goes for food”, (1969, p. 9). david e. klemm holds that hermeneutics is centered on a process of understanding of meaning through signs and symbols. according to klemm, hermeneutics attempts to understand others, and in short hermeneutics is a theoretical investigation of meaning through a method of understanding, (klemm, 1986, vol.i,p. 2). klemm has divided hermeneutics into 4 kinds of understanding, namely (1) understanding as activity, (2) understanding as language, (3) understanding as dialogue, and (4) understanding as an application (for life). after having defined the hermeneutics as such, he then divided hermeneutics into 4 types corresponding to the four kinds of understanding: (1) hermeneutics as an interpretation, (2) hermeneutics as moral ethics, (3) hermeneutics as speculative ontology, and (4) hermeneutics as theology. klemm gives special emphasis to the centrality to the understanding for language, so for him, hermeneutics’ meaning can be distilled into a simple phrase “i understand you”. each of the terms possesses special meaning, for instance, the term “i” stands for the “hermeneutics as speculative ontology”, “understand” refers to “hermeneutics as ethical understanding”, and the “you” refers to “hermeneutics as interpretation”. the emphasis on the term “you”, implies the interlocutor in hermeneutic understanding. when asked: is there any hermeneutics in buddhism? there are various opinions from buddhist scholars. donald s. lopez, in his edited book “buddhist hermeneutics”, answered thus: “there are a number of recurrent issues that appear central to the hermeneutical enterprise in buddhism. these include the use of the doctrine of upāya as a hermeneutical principle, the role of spiritual development in understanding a text, the relationship between hermeneutics and soteriology”, (1988, p.5). in this paper, the researcher sides with lamott (1988, pp. 11-27), who says that “buddhism has dhamma as stated by the buddha to be a criterion for determining of the teaching and discipline whether it is right or wrong”. george bond (1988, pp. 29-45) also says, “buddhist hermeneutics has already existed in the scriptures known as the ‘nettipakaraṇa’ and the ‘petakopadesa’, which are specified as a kind of hermeneutics in the light of two texts known as the visuddhimagga and the vimuttimagga.” buddhaghosacariya says, “all the buddha’s teaching is comparable to hermeneutics”. hermeneutics is taken as a new logic different from the aristotelian logic, for the latter is based on argumentation, but the former is on understanding. research approach although western hermeneutics is often critical of the idea of “method,” it is helpful for us to be aware of the guidelines set by phra dhammapitaka (p.a. prayuth payutto) in his book entitled universities and buddhist researches. there he states: “there are three steps in studying and doing research in buddhism in modern times: (1) to apply the framework of modern science for the buddhist thought, in order to search for the buddhist thought corresponding to a particular field; (2) to compare and contrast between the modern thought and buddhist thought properly; and (3) to step beyond the framework of modern thought and concentrate more on the buddhist thought, (2534/1991, pp. 81-84). to apply the framework of modern sciences for research in buddhism is to integrate buddhism into the modern sciences with the idea of allowing an acceptance of the later developments of the modern sciences for the purpose of solving the present social problems. the above mentioned theoretical framework consists of two parts, namely (1) the reality of world view, and (2) the proof of world view through direct experience in real life, and all that is called a problem solving in the light of ‘the four noble truths’ (ariyasacca) (p.a. payutto, 1986/2529, pp. 731-732), which can be divided into theory and research:2 a. theory is divided into three stages, viz.: 1. the stage of determining a problem (dukkha): that is to create an understanding of where the problem is and what is its scope.. 2. the stage of tracing back to the cause or origin of the problem (samudaya): 3. the stage of speculative extinction of the cause of the problem (nirodha): it is a stage of establishing hypotheses concerning the solving of problems. b. research involves finding the path or way of problem solving, which could be related to modern scientific method, and divided into three stages, viz.: 1. esanā, which is the stage of seeking a possible solution or experimentation and data collection. 2. vimaṁsā, which is the state of examining and organizing the collected data of both the buddhist and general hermeneutics. 3. anubhoda, which is the stage of concluding and presenting the research findings and is a stage of accepting or denying the hypothesis. this analytical approach is very popular and valuable. yet we can begin to examine whether there is a basis for hermeneutics within the buddhist texts themselves. but first it will be helpful to characterize the various periods and characteristics of western hermeneutics. periods of western hermeneutics we can divide western hermeneutics into three periods for ease of understanding,. this leads to the groupings: (1) pre-modern hermeneutics, (2) modern hermeneutics, and (3) postmodern hermeneutics. each of these groupings can be distinguished by four attitudes: (1) attitude to the concept of ultimate reality, (2) attitude to the external world, (3) attitude to life, and (4) attitude to interpretation (of those before mentioned aspects), (klemm, vol. i, 1986, introduction). pre-modern hermeneutics: pre-modern hermeneutics occurs prior to the western enlightenment. its attitudes can be characterized as follows: (1) attitude towards the concept of ultimate reality: there is no distinction between the ultimate reality and its symbol, for example, in hinduism there is a belief in trimurti and that of trinity in christianity, (2) attitude towards the external world: people perceived the world as holy, for it was created by god, (3) attitude towards life: people were religious, attached to religious ceremonies, and lived their life in a simple way, and (4) attitude towards interpretation: people followed literal interpretation, for instance, christians really believed that the world was created by god in six days, the buddhists believed that siddhartha could walk seven steps immediately when he was born from his mother’s womb. the prospective theory of hermeneutics is three types of the biblical hermeneutics, such as the negative way interpretation, etc., (stiver, 1996, pp. 19-20). this included the group of hermeneutics known as ‘transcendentalist’ such as the allegorical interpretation theory. (terry, 1979, p. 168). modern hermeneutics: this begins in the enlightenment and can be characterized as such: (1) attitude towards the ultimate reality: there is an emphasis on using reason to ascertain human self-existence, such as descartes’ trying to prove the existence of the self, (2) attitude towards the external world: people believed in the endless evolution of the world instead of the creation by god, (3) attitude towards life: people believe in modern development and new technologies and turned away from religion, (4) attitude towards interpretation: hermeneutics is strictly attached to the scientific reason, the characteristics of which is doubtful about the ultimate reality and the important hermeneutical theory is centered on the interpretation of naturalist group, such as the mythical interpretation, etc. the philosophical hermeneutics originated in this time, such as “hume’s fork,” positivism, and so on. in other words, the hermeneutical trend of this time is known as the “hermeneutics of suspicion.” wittgenstein’s ideal language or language as the picture of the world can also be included here. post modern hermeneutics: this is the hermeneutics of the present period, the essence of which is summarized thus: (1) attitude towards the ultimate reality: people no longer trust mere scientific development but also turn back to religion. there is the belief that both science and religion will have to be integrated, that science without religion is lame, and religion without science is blind. following buddhism this can be called the middle way of science and religion. more emphasis is placed on language as a medium to establish the relationship between man and modern sciences covering culture, social, politics and economics. (2) attitude towards the external world: the world is perceived as neither holy nor unholy, but people think of language as a tool for understanding the world together with the belief that everything coexists relatively. (3) attitude towards life: the belief that the collaboration among diverse peoples will lead to survival of the world. and (4) attitude towards interpretation: people accept the importance of hermeneutics as necessary for working together for understanding each other through texts. apologetic interpretation is considered as essential. the hermeneutical theories of this period include those of schleiermacher, heidegger, gadamer, and ricoeur, and can be categorized as a “hermeneutics of suspicion.” it also shows some similarities to wittgenstein’s theory of “language games.” buddhist hermeneutics we can also distinguish buddhist hermeneutics into different periods. this is based upon the periods of the buddhist scriptures. they are: (1) pre-commentary hermeneutics, which includes the tipiṭaka and nettipakaraṇa, (2) commentary hermeneutics, and (3) postcommentary hermeneutics, which include hermeneutics as practiced by thai buddhist scholars through both hermeneutics of dhamma studies (pariyatti) and insight meditation (vipassanā). the pre-commentary hermeneutics: the tipiṭaka consists of the essential doctrines that could be taken as the hermeneutical theories, such as the doctrine of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda), and twenty-four relations (paccayas), etc., four great authorities (mahapadesa), non-disagreeable method (apaṇṇaka), ten principles of faith, metaphor, parable, simile, dialogue, etc. although these doctrines are normally taken as dhamma, that must be put into practice through direct experience, they can also be taken as the hermeneutical theories that could be used to interpret other teachings as well, (khemananda, 1993, pp. 76-114). hermeneutics in theravada buddhism is known as the “gradual path” (anupubbamagga), following the buddha’s teaching step by step from morality, concentration and insight. this gradual path corresponds to the five graduated sermons (anupubbīkathā), starting from ‘talk on giving’ (dānakathā), (d.i.148). the hermeneutical principles of “gradual path” are mentioned in the nettipakaraṇa and petakopadesa texts, including the visuddhimagga, as bond points out, “both the netti and the petakopadesa develop the notion of the ‘gradual path’ to nibbana and employ it as a hermeneutical strategy for explaining the dhamma” (bond, 1988, p. 29). but in mahayana, the well-known “skillful means” method (one of the ten perfections of bodhisatva’s doctrines) is generally accepted. the “skillful” signifies cleverness in training living beings for the attainment of nibbana. (the saddharmapundarikasutra, cha-em keawklaiy, tr., p. 30) the nettipakaraṇa, recognized as an authentic text and compiled after the time of the tipitaka but before the commentaries, proposes its own system for dividing hermeneutics, namely five methods (naya), sixteen kinds of conveying (hāra) and the sixteen patterns of dispensation (sāsanapaṭṭhāna). here, the conveying of teaching (desanāhāra), one of the sixteen types of conveying, will be explained. the conveying of teaching consists of six gradual interpretations, namely (1) gratification (assāda), (2) disadvantage (ādīnava), (3) renunciation (nissarana), (4) consequence (phala), (5) skillful means (upāya), and (6) persuasion or instruction (ānatti). all kinds of events and happenings could be analyzed through this process of gradual instruction. and this type of instruction must be able to be examined by the four noble truths and categorized in the ‘graduated sermon” (anupuppīkathā). for example, a concept of worship (pūjā) can be interpreted as follows: 1. gratification (assāda): pleasant happiness (sukhasomanas), which is a pleasant feeling due to the worship as such, and due to desire in enjoying this-worldly things (logiyadhamma), that is called ‘gratification’ (assāda). gratification as such is taken as ‘the truth of the cause of suffering’ (samudyāriyasacca) and also taken as the first three ‘gradual sermons’ (anupuppīkathā), namely ‘talk of charity’ (dānakathā), ‘talk of precept’ (sīlakathā), and ‘talk of heavenly world’ (sakkakathā). 2. disadvantage (ādhīnava): dhamma leading to be born in three worlds (tebhūmikdhamma): the three worlds are known as ‘the plane of the senseenjoying-creature’ (kāmabhūmī), ‘the plane of the form creature’ (rūpabhūmī), and ‘the plane of the formless creature’ (arūpabhūmī). and to be born in these three worlds after death is taken as ‘suffering in the wheel of life’ (saṁsāradhukkha), which is known as a ‘disadvantage’ (ādhīnava) in the nettipakaraṇa, so it is to be regarded as ‘the noble truth of suffering and as ‘a talk of the disadvantage of sensual pleasure’ (kāmādīnavakathā) in the gradual sermon. 3. dissolution (nissaraṇa): nibbana is known as ‘dissolution’ (nissaraṇa) and this is taken as ‘the path leading to extinction of suffering’ (nirodhāriyasacca) and is grouped in the gradual sermons as ‘the talk of advantage of renunciation’ (nekkhammānisaṁsakathā). 4. advantage (bhala): results of such worshiping leads the worshiper beyond blame, by his or her own self or by others, and escape from being born in the hellish world. it is called ‘bhala’, which is also taken as ‘the truth of the path leading to the extinction of suffering’ (maggāriyasacca). 5. skillful means (upāya): the worshiping which is a cause of attaining the result is called ‘upaya’, and it is also categorized as ‘the truth of the path leading to the extinction of suffering’ (maggāriyasacca). 6. instruction (ānatti): the instruction for worshiping the persons that should be worshiped: those persons are known as the buddha and so on. this is called ‘instruction’ (ānatti), and is taken as ‘the truth of the path leading to the destruction of suffering’ (maggāriyasacca). (phravisuddhacariya, 1990, p. 4). hermeneutics in the commentary period appeared prominently in the vissuddhimagga, which analyzed a style of questioning into 4 types, for instance, the concept of fire could be questioned as to “what are the fire’s characteristics, duty, result, and origin or basis?”, and the answer of which is thus: “the heat, burning, light and one of three elements, are the characteristics, duty, result, and basis of the fire respectively”, (khemananada, 1993, pp. 115-116). this style of question-answer can be applied to the remaining teachings of ‘four noble truths, twelve links of dependent origination, five aggregates, twelve bases, and eighteen elements, as contained in the visuddhimagga. post-commentary hermeneutics: in this section, the forms of interpretation as performed by thai buddhist scholars are investigated in some details. for example, mention is made of the buddhadasa’s theory of two kinds of language, namely “human language and dhamma language; phradhammakittiwong’s hermeneutics of the buddha’s sayings (buddhabhāsita); prof. wit witsadawet’s hermeneutics of unity in plurality; prof. kirti bunchua’s hermeneutics of the five paradigms, etc. an investigation has been made to cover the hermeneutics of two kinds of meditation practice, namely tranquility and insight meditation as practiced in thai buddhist sangha. comparisons and observations it is said that “without comparison is without comprehension”. with this idea in mind, the researcher has tried his best to make the following comparisons. the four hermeneutical principles of refuge as mentioned in the catupaṭisaraṇasutra could be compared with schleiermacher’s hermeneutics based on two constituents of psychological and grammatical factors. heidegger’s hermeneutics of speculative ontology could be compared and contrasted with the buddhist hermeneutics of not-self based on insight meditation (vipassanā). klemm’s hermeneutics of “i understand you” based on four types of hermeneutical understanding could be compared with the buddhist doctrine of three ultimate realities (saddhamma), gained by ‘study’ (pariyattisaddhamma), ‘practice’ (paṭipattisaddhamma), and ‘realization’ (paṭivedhasaddhamma). buddhadasa bhikkhu’s theory of two kinds of language of ‘human’ and ‘dhamma’, can be comparable to wittgenstein’s theory of two kinds of language as ‘picture of the world’ and ‘game’. ricoeur’s narratology can be compared with the buddhist theory of the pattern of dispensation in the nettipakaraṇa. the milinda hermeneutics of two cornered questions can be compared with gadamer’s theory of ‘explanation-understanding-application’ theory as mentioned in his book truth and method. the buddhist theory of apaṇṇakadhamma is comparable with john hicks’ theory of post-mortem verification. prof. fr. george mclean’s theory of “philosophical dialogue” could be compared with the buddhist theory of dhammic dialogue (dhammasākacchā), since both theories have been directed towards sustainable peace. my comparison of the two hermeneutical traditions does not intend to underestimate one tradition or the other, but to show that they can supplant one another. another attempt has been made to propose a combined activity of comparison of hermeneutical theories between buddhism and general hermeneutics and of an application of the two mentioned groups of hermeneutical theories to interpret the controversial issues in buddhism. the nine types of biblical hermeneutics, especially the three moderate groups, could be compared with the buddhist doctrine of middle dhamma-practice (majjhenadhammapaṭipadā), which is a combination of both “dependent origination” (paṭiccasamuppāda) and “eightfold noble path” (aṭhaṅgikamagga). the application of hermeneutics has been for the purpose of understanding the perennial debate on the question: “is nibbana accepted as self (attā) or not-self (anattā)”. another question is: what is the real meaning of the term “dhamma”? the investigation has been citing examples of the thai scholars’ interpretation of some problems in the different discourses of the tipiṭaka, for example, the case of phra mano mettanando’s interpretation of the cause of the buddha’s passing away in the mahaparinibbānasutta. further interpretations have also been made to understand the controversial issue of making merit through the offering of one’s wife and children to others as in the case of the vessantara king. the research results have included the achievement of some renowned thai scholars in applying the buddhist hermeneutical principles to interpret the buddha’s teachings. for instance, budhadadasa bhikkhu’s application of ‘metaphor’ (upama) and ‘conveying of teaching’ (desanāhāra) in the nettipakaraṇa; or his use of ‘dhamma dialogue’ (dhammasākacchā) with kuek rit prāmot, who argued against his idea of ‘freed-mind’ (citwāng). also valuable is king bhumibhol’s (rama ix) interpretation of the jātaka story known as mahājanaka. we can also cite the special case of phrapisāladhammavādī’s using the ‘conveying of teaching’ method to interpret the daily-life-stories ‘catugāma-rāmadeva’. the researcher has made an investigation of the relationship between hermeneutics and intra inter-faith dialogue. buddhadāsa bhikkhu is a good example of thai buddhist monk, who succeeded in applying his hermeneutics to interpret god as dhamma, and has made possible mutual understanding between buddhists and christians. other examples of thinkers who have contributed to this goal are assumption university’s professors, kirti bunchua and warayuth sriwarakuel, who have developed their own theories of hermeneutics. recommendations for further research i agree with the group of translators who translated the nettipakaraṇa into thai that the nettipakaraṇa text is perfect in both aspects of teaching and grammar, so it should be accepted by the thai sangha council as a text for classes in pāli study, (translators of commentary texts, 2003 (๒๕๔๖), pp. 24-26). however, an appreciation should really be given to mahachula buddhist university for incorporating the nettipakarana as a separate course in their master degree program. further research could be conducted on the following issues, such as “an application of buddhist hermeneutics to understand dhamma in various scriptures of theravada buddhism”. in this way, buddhist hermeneutics could be taken as an alternative research methodology in other faculties of modern sciences such as the faculty of education to help solve the present educational problems in the present society. further contributions can be achieved by comparing a particular hermeneutical theory between buddhist hermeneutics and the general hermeneutics. a hermeneutical study of vipassanā meditation of different schools of buddhism, both theravada and mahayana would also be valuable. references: 1. จ��เน ยน แก�วภ��. (๒๕๒๙). หล�กวรรณคด บ�ล ว�จ�รณ�. กร�งเทพฯ: ส��น�กพ�มพ�โอเด ยนสโตร�. (camnian kaewkoo. (2529/1986). the principles of pālī literature critique. bangkok, odianstore.) 2. จร�ญ ธรรมด�. (๒๕๔๖) (บรรย�ย). เนตต�ฏ�ปปน . กร�งเทพฯ: ไทยร�ยว�นก�รพ�มพ�. (caroon dhammada. (2546/2003). nettidīpanī. bangkok, thai daily publishing hourse.) 3. ค�ณ�ร�กษ� นพค�ณ. (๒๕๔๔). เนตต�ปกรณ�แปลและเนตต�ส�ร�ตถท ปน . กร�งเทพฯ: ท�พยว�ส�ทธ�0 . (gunarak (gunarak noppakhun. trans. (2544/2001). the nettipakaraṇa and nettisāratthadīpanī. bangkok, dippayavisuddhi press.) 4. พระธรรมก�ตต�วงศ� (ทองด ส�รเตโช). (๒๕๕๐). ก�รต คว�มพ�ทธศ�สนส�ภ�ษ�ต. กร�งเทพฯ: เล 4ยงเช ยง. (dhammakittiwong (thongdee suratejo). (2550/2007). an interpretation of the buddha’s words. bangkok, liangsiang press.) 5. พระว�ส�ทธ�จ�รย�. (๒๕๒๓). เนตต�ส�ร�ตถท ปน . กร�งเทพฯ: มห�จ�ฬ�ลงกรณร�ชว�ทย�ล�ย. (phravisuddhacariya. (2523/1980). nettisāratthadīpanī. bangkok, mahachula buddhist university press.) 6. พระธรรมป� ฎก (ประย�ทธ ปย�ตโต) (๒๕๒๔). มห�ว�ทย�ล�ยก�บง�นว�จ�ยท�งพระพ�ทธศ�สน�. กร� งเทพฯ มห�จ�ฬ�ฯ. (phradhammapitaka (p.a. payutto bhikkhu). (2524/1981). university and research in buddhism. bangkok, mahachula buddhist university press.) 7. มห�ก�จจ�ยนะ. (๒๕๔๖). เนตต�-เปฏโกปเทสปกรณ�. กร�งเทพฯ: โรงพ�มพ�มห�ว�ทย�ล�ย มห�จ�ฬ�ลงกรณร�ชว�ทย�ล�ย. (mahakaccayana.(2546/2003). netti-petakopadesapakaraṇaṁ. bangkok: mahachula buddhist university press. 7. พระร�ชวรม�น (ประย�ทธ� ปย�ต8โต) (๒๕๒๙). พ�ทธธรรม. กร�งเทพฯ: มห�จ�ฬ�ลงกรณร�ชว�ทย�ล�ย. (phrarajavaramuni (payuth payutto). (2529/1986). buddha-dhamma. bangkok: mahachula buddhist university press. 9. พงสว�สด�0 สว�สด�พงษ�, ดร. (๒๕๓๐). ระเบ ยบว�ธ ก�รศ9กษ�ปร�กฏก�รณ�ท�งส�งคมว�ทย�แนวพ�ทธและส�งคมว�ทย�แนว ว�ทย�ศ�สตร�. ใน ส�งคมว�ทย� ต�มแนวพ�ทธศ�สตร�. กร�งเทพฯ: ส��น�กง�นคณะกรรมก�รว�ฒนธรรมแห�งช�ต�. (pongsawat sawaddipong. (2530/1987). a approach of social phenomena of buddhism and social science. bangkok: the commission of national culture press) 10. วรย�ทธ ศร วรก�ล, ผศ.ดร. (๒๕๔๕). “ปร�ชญ�กระบวนก�ร: ว�ทย�ศ�สตร�และศ�สน�”, บทคว�มเสนอในก�รอบรมปร�ชญ� ม�ถ�น�ยน ๒๕๔๕, มห�ว�ทย�ล�ยอ�สส�มช�ญ กร�งเทพฯ. (warayuth sriwarakuel, asst. prof. dr. process philosophy: science and religion. a paper presented at a conference of philosophy training workshop at assumption university, bangkok, thailand, on june 2002) 11. ___________________. (๒๕๔๔). “ทฤษฎ น�ยว�เคร�ะห�ในฐ�นะตรรกว�ทย�แบบใหม�” บทคว�มเสนอในง�นส�มมน� ท�งว�ช�ก�ร ณ มห�ว�ทย�ล�ยศร นคร�นทรว�โรฒ ประส�นม�ตร ๒๒ ต�ล�คม ๒๕๔๔. หน�� ๑-๙. (warayuth sriwarakuel, asst. prof. dr. hermeneutics as new logic. a paper presented at an academic conference held at srinakarindavirot university, 22 oct. 2001) 12. พระธรรมป�ฎก (ป.อ. ปย�ต8โต). (๒๕๔๐). เกณฑ�ว�น�จฉ�ยคว�มหม�ยและค�ณค��ของพ�ทธ ธรรม.กร�งเทพฯ: ธรรมสภ�. (phradhammapitaka (p.a. payutto). (2540/1997). a judgment criteria of meaning and value of buddha-dhamma. bangkok: dhammasabha.) 13.________________. (๒๕๓๙). ก�รสb4อภ�ษ�เพb4อเข��ถ9งส�จธรรม, กร�งเทพฯ: ธรรมสภ�. (phradhammapitaka (p.a. payutto). (2539/1996). a language communication to attaining ultimate truth. bangkok: dhammasabha.) 14. ม�รค ต�มไท. "แนวค�ดบ�งประก�รเก 4ยวก�บย�คหล�งสม�ยใหม�". ว�รส�รร�มพฤกษ� ป ท 4 ๑๕ เล�มท 4 ๒ ต�ล�คม ๒๕๓๙มกร�คม ๒๕๔๐. (mark tamthai. some concepts aboutpost-modernism. rompruek. vol. 15 no. 2. october 1996-january 1997.) 15. klemm, david e. (1986). hermeneutical inquiry. 2 vols. atlanta: scholars press. 16. khemananda, ven.hegoda. (1993). logic and epistemology in theravada. colombo: gunaatne & son ltd. 17. lopez, donald s. (ed.). (1988). buddhist hermeneutics. honolulu: university of hawaii press. 18. palmer , richard e. (1969). hermeneutics. (evanston: northwester university press. 19. stiver, dan r. (1996). the philosophy of religious language. cambridge: blackwell publishers. 20. terry, milton s. (1979). biblical hermeneutics. michigan: zondervan. ***** 1according to the history of philosophy, it may be said that hermeneutics is an outgrowth of continental philosophy, which emphasizes value and interpretation and is different from analytical philosophy, which emphasizes perceptual precision and clarity (warayuth sriwarakuel, 2544, p. 1). post-modern philosophy is a criticism of modernity and it is characterized by the belief that “reason is hardly worth appreciation from now on, moreover, we cannot depend on reason to determine what we are doing in daily life, (mark tamtai, 2540, p. 51). 2this type of four noble truths research methodology would correspond to research in the social sciences. it would consider buddhism as the foundation of science, which allows statistical evaluation and questionnaires. an interview is an additional factor of research in religious studies especially buddhism. the social science research approach is divided into 5 stages, viz.: (1) observation, (2) empirical generalization, (3) theory, (4) hypothesis, and (5) a decision making to accept or deny the hypothesis, (dr. pongsawad sawadipong, 2550, pp. 51-65). 168 prajñā vihāra prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 168-172 © 2000 by assumption university press trolleys, transplants and other dangerous things: an intellectual exercise brian garrett australian national university, canberra, australia 1. i want to present what i take to be a tension in our moral thinking. the examples i shall use are perfectly familiar from the literature. i will try to show that there is a tension in our ordinary or common-sense moral thinking, and suggest that this is best resolved in a way that supports the views of the utilitarian. 2. the two cases i want to discuss are well-known. what i’ll do is describe these cases, about which we have completely opposed moral intuitions. the challenge will then be to find some morally relevant difference (mrd) which explains this difference in intuition. i shall argue that there is no mrd to be found. 3. consider the following two cases: transplant: five patients are in a hospital, all in need of organs which could be supplied from one person. without organ transplants, the five will die. there happens to be a healthy young man, mr x, walking past the hospital. let us suppose that he is the only person available at the brian garrett 169 time who matches all five patients. the surgeons grab him, put him under general anaesthetic, remove the various organs, which are then transplanted into the original five. end result: the five live and mr x dies. trolley: you are a bystander at a track. you see an out of control trolley heading for five people further down the track. if you do nothing, the five will die. there is only one thing you can do: pull a lever which will redirect the trolley down a siding, killing one person, mr y. you pull the lever: the five live and mr y dies. 4. i take it to be a datum that our ordinary, untutored reaction to these examples is: it’s impermissible to kill mr x in transplant, but permissible to kill mr y in trolley. but why do our reactions to these two cases differ? what is the mrd which explains the difference in our moral judgements? after all, at one level of description, the cases seems very similar: in both we kill one person to save five. why should this be permissible in one case but not the other? maybe this question can be answered; so let’s look at some answers. 5. can we find a mrd between the cases which explains and justifies our difference in moral judgement? here are five candidates: (i) rights: in transplant, but not in trolley, the right to life of the one is violated. reply: why think that? in both cases, one person is killed in order that five live. it is hard to see any sense in which mr x’s rights are violated and mr y’s not. (ii) means: there is a sense in which the one in transplant is used as a ‘mere means’ to the five surviving, but not in trolley. 170 prajñā vihāra but what does that amount to? well, notice one difference between the cases: if mr y just disappeared in trolley, the five would still be saved; but if mr x just disappeared, the five would die. in other words, the death of the one is (causally) necessary for the survival of the five in transplant, but not in trolley. so let’s say: a is used as a ‘mere means’ to secure outcome b just if a secures b, but had a suddenly disappeared, b would not have been secured. thus, mr x is used as a mere means in transplant, unlike mr y in trolley, and that explains the difference in our moral judgements. reply: this account is vulnerable to the following counterexample. imagine that the siding in trolley was a loop which would carry the trolley back over the five. in loop trolley, mr y is now a mere means to the survival of the five, and according to (ii) it ought to be impermissible to turn the trolley. but surely our initial judgement is unaffected – we would still judge it permissible to kill mr y in loop trolley. (iii) killing and letting die: in trolley the choice is between killing one and killing five; in transplant it is between killing one and letting five die. killing is always worse than letting die, but killing one is better than killing five. reply: first, it is questionable whether killing one is worse than letting five die. people who think that killing one person is worse than letting one person die, other things equal, need not agree that killing one is worse than letting five die. second, the choice in trolley is not between killing one and killing five; it is between killing one and letting five die. trolley and transplant are exactly alike with respect to killing and letting die. we are not here comparing brian garrett 171 a case of killing with an otherwise similar case of letting die. rather, in each case we are faced with a choice between killing and letting die. (iv) doctrine of double effect: in transplant, the surgeon intends the death of mr x; in trolley, you just intend to turn the trolley (though you know that someone will die as a result). reply: first, the idea behind dde implausible. is there really a moral difference between intending someone’s death and merely intending something which you know will result in their death? second, dde is anyway inapplicable: the surgeon can reply that he doesn’t intend the death of mr x, he merely intends to remove his organs, knowing he will die as a result. thus the dde can be used to support the view that killing the one is permissible in both examples, so it can hardly explain the difference in our moral judgements. (v) deflect: it is permissible to deflect an already existing threat so that it threatens a smaller group instead, but impermissible to introduce a new threat to another individual. this is an interesting attempt to give a deeper, more theoretical, rationale for our differing judgements. in trolley one merely deflects an existing threat; in transplant one introduces a new threat to another individual. but is this account right? no. consider: fat man: a trolley is heading towards five people, and there is no siding. but there is something we can do: grab a fat man standing by the track and throw him in front of the trolley, thus stopping the trolley, saving the five, but killing the fat man. 172 prajñā vihāra i think most of us would classify fat man with transplant: it’s wrong to kill the one in both these cases. yet, according to the present account, it should be permissible to kill fat man, since one is making an existing threat threaten one rather than five. admittedly, by bringing the man to the threat, rather than vice-versa, but what moral difference does this make? 6. if there is no mrd, common-sense morality is inconsistent and must be revised. either we say that it’s permissible to kill mr x in transplant or we say that it’s impermissible to kill mr y in trolley. we should not give up the moral principle that it’s permissible to deflect a threat from a larger group to a smaller one (which is what underwrites the idea that it is permissible to kill mr y in trolley). this seems a non negotiable moral principle. in which case, we should revise our first belief and conclude that it is permissible to kill mr x in transplant. this is, of course, in line with the thinking of the utilitarian. 10(134-138)note for authors reading levinas on ‘the other’ from a christian perspective1 kajornpat tangyin assumption university of thailand abstract this paper is concerned with the meaning of levinas’ ‘the other’, and the relation between this and the christian teaching about the other. levinas and the theme of ‘the other’ have been discussed among many thinkers, yet its meaning remains elusive. levinas’ works are still open to new interpretations from readers. as one of levinas’ readers, i want to translate levinas’ ‘the other’ into the concrete person – the neighbor. by this translation of ‘the other’ to ‘the neighbor,’ i see a possibility of how to relate levinas’ thought to the teaching of christianity concerning the neighbor. i will also discuss the need of being ready to respond responsibly to the call of the other, our neighbor. i reading levinas’ texts always compels readers to question whether they have understood him correctly. levinas’ philosophy always remains open for different interpretations, or to use gadamer’s words: “all reading that is understanding is always a kind of reproduction and interpretation” (gadamer, 1975, p.142). this, for colin davis, is called “levinas effect” which means “the ability of the levinasian text to appear differently to each of its readers” (davis, 1996, p.140). for peperzak, “his writings force us to a discussion through which our own thought and action can be renewed” (peperzak, 2000, p.184). i am just one of many readers of levinas’ texts, and i expect that my reading levinas’ the other in christian context will take place, as in gadamer’s words, and open for “the fusion of these horizons” (gadamer, 1975, p.273). for christianity, what, or who is the other? this question is quite prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 51-66 51 © 2000 by assumption university press complicated. on one hand, to understand levinas’ the other would ultimately be to betray levinas’ understanding of it. further, the understanding of the other, is quite a difficult task, and for christianity even more difficult. who speaks on the behalf of christianity? i agree with peperzak when he says, “who could boast of having a total knowledge of levinasian thought at one’s disposal, or venture to say that one can grasp the entirety of christian thinking “in one’s own words” and thoughts?” (peperzak, 2000, p.184). therefore, what i want to do is to try to find the place of levinas’ the other in the teaching of christianity. for this study i have no aim to construct any system of thought, or try to found theological basis from two different traditions. i just try to find the possibility of reading levinas’ the other in the christian context. ii what does levinas mean by the “other”? levinas uses the term the “other” (autre) to refer to alterity, or otherness in general, and the “other” (autrui) to refer to the personal other, or the other person. levinas puts ethics as first philosophy prior to ontology, and his ethics begins at the encounter with the other in society. in the encounter with the other, levinas’ philosophy of ethics gives priority to the other. the primacy of ethics over ontology, according to levinas, is the ethical relation with the other, in which this relation shows itself as the movement from the “i” toward the other, never to return to the “i.” so true for western philosophy, it has to move from the same to the other and never return to the same. the example he likes to use is the contrast between the story of ulysses who always returns to ithaca, and the story of abraham, who wanders from his fatherland and never returns to his homeland. western philosophy, like the myth of ulysses, is always nostalgic, always returns to the place where it leaves. levinas says: “a work conceived radically movement of the same unto the other which never returns to the same. to the myth of ulysses returning to ithaca, we wish to oppose the story of abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring back his son to the point of departure” (tto, 348). the movement from the same to the 52 prajñâ vihâra other and never return to the same, for levinas, is the radical, and at the same time, irreversible movement. levinas is perhaps pushing western tradition towards the jewish tradition, so that the greek and the jewish traditions could be bridged. levinas sees that western philosophy from parminedes to heidegger has no place for otherness, and on the contrary strives to overcome otherness of the other by transmuting it into the same. levinas, in totality and infinity, writes: “western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being” (ti, 43). levinas believes that western philosophy is, in the end, often a projection of totality (especially apparent in heidegger’s ‘being’ or hegel’s ‘absolute spirit’). this philosophy has the tendency to absorb the otherness of the other into the structure of the system. for levinas, this project will begin at “thematization and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not at peace with the other but in suppression or possession of the other, for possession affirms the other, but within a negation of its independence. “i think” comes down to “i can” – to an appropriation of what is, to an exploitation of reality. ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (ti, 46). levinas puts western philosophy into question, and his critical view of heidegger’s ontology and hegelian totality as the philosophy of power is his main point of departure. levinas seems to see western philosophy exemplified by hegelian totality, and he wants to break up this totality and give a place for the otherness of the other. he confessed that his critique of totality came after a political experience that we have not yet forgotten (ei, 78-79). his experience of the holocaust is his basic motivation for the move from totality to otherness. whereas western philosophy reduces all difference to the same, levinas’ philosophy of ethics poses the question of totality and the concept of being open to otherness of the other without returning to the same. he says, “the other as other has nothing in common with the same; it is not thinkable in a synthesis; there is an impossibility here of making comparisons and synchronizations…. and the ethical relationship no longer has to be subordinated to ontology or to the thinking of being” (gt, 127). for levinas, the idea of the other is not the enemy of the same and its alterity does not bring us to the play of dialectic (lr, 209). the kajornpat tangyin 53 dialectic is avoided so that the other will not be absorbed again into totality in which levinas attempts to depart. the otherness of the other, for levinas, is beyond any synthesis, any comparison, and any thematizability. what is the otherness of christianity? if christianity places other religions as the other, how is christianity oriented towards other religions? is it possible to apply levinas’ criticism to western philosophy to christian theology? then the question of the meaning and significance of other religions should concern the christian theologian. in the world religions, christianity has to accept truly and sincerely that christianity is only one of other religions, and the plurality of religions is no mistake. the history of christian church in the period under the domination of mono-political theology allowed no place for other faiths resulting in violence and war. the presence of other religions seemed to be considered as a sign of the lack of efficiency of evangelization. further, the sense of superiority implicit in colonialism tended to denigrate the diversity of cultures and religions. then the mistrust of plurality and the oppression of the other become the source of conflict among people in both the same culture and between cultures. christianity, then, should have to begin again, with openness to the presence of the other religions. the difference among religions should not be a cause for concern, but on the contrary, it should be an opportunity for mutural enrichment. a fruitful dialogue among religions has to begin with the acceptance of the presence of the other. iii levinas’ philosophy of ethics begins with the priority of human relation in society, namely, the priority of the other person over the ‘i.’ the other, according to levinas, is the other human being (ib, 171). if western philosophy moves from the same to the other and never returns to the same, the ethical relation, for levinas, also has to move from the ‘i’ to the other person without returning to the ‘i.’ for levinas, the relationship between me and the other is asymmetrical, like the irreversibility of time (ib, 118). the ‘i’ is not the last word, and the ‘i’ or the self, for levinas, seems to be the most problematic of western philosophy. he says, “the i is the very crisis of the being of a being (l’être de l’étant) in the human… 54 prajñâ vihâra i already ask myself whether my being is justified, whether the da of my dasein is not already the usurpation of someone’s place” (at, 28). concerning the ‘i’, levinas echoes what pascal said long time ago in pensées, “the self is hateful” (pascal, 1995, 494). pascal’s the hateful ‘i’ directs levinas to depart from the self and places the other prior to the self. modern western philosophy begins with descartes’ cogito – a foundation which has no place for the other. but for levinas, “in positing the relation with the other as ethical, one surmounts a difficulty that would be inevitable if, contrary to descartes, philosophy started from a cogito that would posit itself absolutely independent of the other” (ti, 210). for descartes, knowledge begins with the thinking subject, and the self becomes the source of his epistemological foundation. the other becomes the object for self-reflection, and so the other is not absolutely the other. for levinas, the absolutely other is not reflected in consciousness. it resists it to the point that even its resistance is not converted into a content of consciousness (tto, 352-353). to give priority to the other is to put the self into question as he says, “the proximity of the other, origin of all putting into question of self” (at, 99). when the self is put into question, according to levinas, is precisely the welcome of the absolutely other (tto, 353). the other is recognized while the self is put into question, such is the beginning of levinas’ philosophy of ethics. the other is beyond any comprehension, or any thematizability, or in other words, the other is beyond ontological questioning. the other is neither initially nor ultimately what we grasp or what we thematize (ti, 172). for levinas, if we could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power (to, 90). the other, for levinas, is not a part of any program of knowledge and power. we could not reduce the other to be the same, and we could not possess the other because the other is beyond our grasp. levinas says, “the relationship with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility” (to, 76). levinas’ philosophy moves radically beyond ontological relation, and his irreducibility of the other becomes the total departure from the self without any return. for levinas, “the departure from the self is the approach to the neighbour” (lr, 246). this approach to the other is to serve the neighbour. “to be in oneself is to express oneself, that is, alkajornpat tangyin 55 ready to serve the other. the ground of expression is goodness” (ti, 183). to serve the other is an ethical demand from the other to the self without any return to the self. it is a kind of going outside the self without expecting something in return. for levinas, an ethical relation with the other is beyond knowledge and ontology. the other cannot be put into any category, and if the other is put into any category, the other is not the other. levinas, in his book time and the other, talks about the other that is beyond graspable, or thematizable, like time. he sees time as beyond any conceptualizing, and prior to any understanding. we experience time but do not possess time, and we have no power over time. we experience the other but we could not possess the other and have no power over the other. levinas anticipates time and the other as a mystery (to, 75). his positing of time and the other as mystery leads him to give us an account of the relationship with the other as the relationship with the future. the future seems to be completely unknowable, and beyond our grasp. the future is always beyond any expectation, and it is still the mystery of mankind. the future that we can talk of is only a presencing of the future, not the real future. levinas says, “the future is what is in no way grasped…. the other is the future. the very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future” (to, 76-77). levinas does not want to define the other by the future, but the future by the other (to, 82). when levinas connects the other with time, he seems to accept the limit of human knowledge to take account of these two concepts. actually, levinas does not mean the other and time in form of concepts, but something prior to our conceptualization. he prefers to use the term ‘alterity’ of the other. for levinas, the alterity of the other must be respected at the moment of the encounter between human beings. otherwise we are tempted to appropriate the other into the same, reducing it to an object. the other will not be absolutely other if the alterity of the other is not recognized. levinas says, “i think that the true humanity of man begins in this recognition, before any cognition of being, before onto-logy. that is why i said to you that the question of the other seemed to me to be anterior to the problem of ontology” (ib, 106). for levinas, the irreducibility of the alterity of the other is the moment where the ethical relationship between human beings begins. this is not ontology for the sake of understanding, 56 prajñâ vihâra or knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but it is ethics, or goodness in which the alterity of the other is fully respected. any program of reduction of the other to the same, or the return to the self, has to be put into question. for christianity, who is the other? the other person, or the ‘neighbor’ seems to be the point where levinas and christianity intersect, more specifically: inseparability between the love of god and the love of neighbor. levinas’ ethics obliges us to approach our neighbor with love without concupiscence, and this asymmetrical relation has to move from the self to the other without returning to the self. for christianity, jesus christ is the clear witness of this sacrificial love for the other person. then to give priority to the other without trying to concern much of self-salvation is the way that christians can build up their relationship to god through their neighbors. our love of god is made practical through our love of our neighbor. christians could not say that he loves god by being indifferent to the other. “anyone who says, ‘i love god’, and hates his brother, is a liar, since a man who does not love the brother that he can see cannot love god, whom he has never seen” (1 jn 4: 20). levinas’ philosophy of ethics in general seems to be the articulation of this love of the neighbor. this seems to be the most direct form of ethical relation which begins at the encounter with the face of the other. the face of the other is not an obstacle but an obligation. this obligation commands me not to let the other die in solitude as he says: “no face can be approached with empty hands and closed home” (ti, 172). therefore the love of neighbor is not just the principle but it is the deed. you should ‘love your neighbor’ is not the same as ‘love your neighbor’. and this love of neighbor has to begin with their material needs such as welcoming a stranger, clothing those who are naked, giving a drink to those who are thirsty, feeding those who are hungry, etc. dostoyevsky, in the brothers karamazov, says: “strive to love your neighbor actively and constantly. in so far as you advance in love you will grow surer of the reality of god and of the immortality of your soul. if you attain perfect self-forgetfulness in the love of your neighbor, then you will believe without doubt. doubt will no longer be able to enter your soul” (dostoyevsky, 1999, p.64). if levinas and christianity mutually agree with each other about how to do before the other, then it is not difficult to see how levinas’ philosokajornpat tangyin 57 phy of ethics can play even in the teaching of christianity. he speaks little about ‘love’ but he prefers to use the word ‘responsible’ because the word ‘love’ can quite easily lead us to return to the self. we have to be responsible for the other and our responsible is not limited by any condition. if christianity holds jesus christ as the model of their life, then to carry the cross and follow jesus christ means to be responsible for all men’s sins. salvation is not supposed to be a private affair. i think that levinas follows the teaching of the elder, father zossima in the brothers karamazov, who says, “there is only one means of salvation. make yourself responsible for all men’s sins. as soon as you sincerely make yourself responsible for everything and for all men, you will see at once that you have found salvation” (dostoyevsky, 1999, p.310). levinas stresses this form of responsibility which is not demanded from the other but from our self. christianity and levinas speak in the same language concerning the identity of the other. it is our neighbor, the stranger, the poor, the widow, and the orphan, etc. this is the answer of jesus christ when tested by the lawyer, who asks the question: who is the neighbor? (lk 10: 29-37) the story of the good samaritan opens the line that draws the distinction between the jews and the samaritan. even though jesus was expelled from samaria a couple weeks before this story, and even james and john asked jesus to bring fire from heaven to burn this town, jesus makes this good example to redefine the meaning of neighbor beyond any line of race, ethnicity and country. neighbor is not just someone who lives around our house, is not just someone we are familiar with, but she/he is the one who stands in front of us. we have to be ready for the presence of the other. the teaching in the gospel in many parts such as the story of the wise and the foolish bridesmaids (mt 25: 1-13), or in the gethsemane when jesus urges his disciple to stay awake with him (mt 26: 36-46), points out the significance of always being wakeful. levinas takes into account of being vigilant or to be wakeful, not for the second coming of jesus christ but the coming of the other. then in the next part i will try to study the possibility of the relation between levinas’ vigilant ethics and christianity’s wakefulness. 58 prajñâ vihâra iv levinas’ philosophy of ethics begins at the encounter with the other person, and this encounter puts the self into question. the calling into question of self-existing is the ethical, and he begins his philosophy of ethics with the response “here i am.” this is the response to god from abraham (gn 22:2), from samuel (1 s 3:4), from isaiah (is 6:9), and others. levinas seems to use this as the paradigm for his ethical response to the other person as well. according to him, i have to respond “here i am” to the other and in this response it puts myself into question and opens myself totally for the other. the disclosure of the self is to be ready for the call of the other, and the response “here i am” is an ethical response of responsibility. i could not allow myself to sleep because i have to be ready for the call. samuel was awakened by the three calls of yahweh, and his answer “speak, yahweh, your servant is listening” (1 s 3:9) is supposed to be my response to the other as well. the call actually dismisses the self and brings the other into my place. the call always interrupts my self-existing. the call of my own being is challenged by the call of the other. the call of the other always asks for a sacrifice to the other. this is the call to holiness as levinas says, “the call to holiness preceding the concern for existing, for being-there and being-in-the-world” (en, 216). at the moment i hear the call, i have to respond, and levinas asks me to respond responsibly. actually i can exercise my freedom to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to that call, but for levinas, that call implements an ethical demand that i cannot leave the other alone and enjoys my own solitary existence. but i have to respond: “here i am,” and this response is an obligation, not a choice. cohen says, this moral insomnia reminds us of an other of levinas’s formulae for the psyche, the biblical expression, “here i am” (hebrew: hineni), referring to an availability, a vulnerability, a responsiveness to the call of the other. god calls abraham, and abraham responds: “here i am.” abraham calls isaac, and isaac responds: “here i am.” “here i am” – already a sacrifice. insomniac, the self is wakened by the other and for the other, by its obligations to and for the other. (cohen, 2001, p.204) kajornpat tangyin 59 “here i am” is passively receiving the command from god, and for levinas, it is also the paradigmatic response to the other. levinas uses the prophet’s response to god as the template for our ethical relationship to the other person. for levinas, the other is not god, but through the epiphany of the other’s face i hear the word of god. he quotes matthew 25 (ib, 52), concerning the last judgment, in which we will be judged according to what we do to our neighbor, not to god directly – acts such as giving a drink to those who are thirsty, feeding those who are hungry, welcoming a stranger, clothing those who are naked, visiting those who are sick, or are in prison. god will say to those who act accordingly to neighbors: “i tell you solemnly, in so far as you did this to one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did it to me” (mt 25:40), and on the contrary god will say to those who deny their neighbors: “i tell you solemnly, in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to me” (mt 25:45). as to the question about the relation between god and the other, levinas says: i cannot describe the relation to god without speaking of my concern for the other. when i speak to a christian, i always quote matthew 25: the relation to god is presented there as a relation to another person. it is not a metaphor; in the other, there is a real presence of god. in my relation to the other, i hear the word of god. it is not a metaphor. it is not only extremely important; it is literally true. i’m not saying that the other is god, but that in his or her face i hear the word of god. (ib, 171) when levinas mentions the teachings in the gospel, matthew 25, he is reminding us that the way we treat the other is the way we treat god. the infinite is revealed through the other. he often refers to the jewish proverb: “the other’s material needs are my spiritual needs.” ethical relation, for levinas, begins at the response to the other’s material needs. to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give shelter to the shelterless, are my responsibility. holiness begins with ‘practical’ morality. and he stresses that practical morality is essentially based on an ethical relation which cannot be separated from human relationships. he says, “i have been speaking about that which stands behind practical morality; about the extraordinary relation between a man and his neighbour, 60 prajñâ vihâra a relation that continues to exist even when it is severely damaged” (lr, 247). through our ethical relation to the other, we are truly in relation to god. for levinas, “the trace of the infinite is inscribed in my obligation toward the other, in this moment that corresponds to the call” (at, 106). the call of the other and our response is the beginning of our spiritual growth, and we could not approach the other with empty hands. he writes: “that the glory of the infinite is glorified only by the signification of the-one-for-the-other, as sincerity, that in my sincerity the infinite passes the finite, that the infinite comes to pass there, is what makes the plot of ethics primary, and what make language irreducible to an act among acts” (ob, 150). then the glory of the infinite will be glorified by our response “here i am” to strangers, widows, orphans, neighbors. through the epiphany of the face of the other, god leaves a trace, and for levinas “to know god is to do justice to the neighbour” (gt, 199). at the moment i hear the call, levinas’ philosophy of ethics plays the central role in my conscience, and it reminds me of the primacy of the other over me. the call of the other replaces the call of my own being, the other’s call ruptures any coherent idea of systematic ethics. the call to sacrifice myself for the other is always prior to an exercise of my freedom. i am not free before the call of the other, and i have to respond responsibly “here i am” for the other. levinas’ ethical is always attached to the other person, and without even prior knowledge of the other, if i hear the call, i have to answer. if i close myself to his or her call, i will be judged in the manner of matthew 25 where my service to the other is always prior to any other ethical principle. levinas’ philosophy of ethics teaches me not to separate ethical commandment from the openness to this call of the other. i could not live securely in a closed-home but i have to open the door to welcome my unknown guest, as abraham welcomed the three men warmly and respectively by saying, “my lord, i beg you, if i find favour with you, kindly do not pass our servant by. a little water shall be brought; you shall wash your feet and lie down under the tree. let me fetch a little bread and you shall refresh yourselves before going further. that is why you have come in your servant’s direction” (gn 18:3-5). for caputo, this is the law of the land of the semitic world, or the law of god, and he questions whether it kajornpat tangyin 61 is the same law. to welcome the stranger like abraham welcomes the three men is to welcome god. caputo says, in the semitic world of desert wanderers, nothing is more important than hospitality. hospitality is the fundamental condition of survival, an unconditional necessity of life. the duty owed the wanderer and the stranger is holy and inviolable, and without it the world of wanderers would perish by its own hand. to provide a place of respite and refuge, to offer bread and water, even to take food out of one’s own mouth in order to share it with the stranger, in short, to make welcome, that is the law of the land, indeed, that is the law of god (are these the same law? is it the one law because it is the other?). the traveler who appears at our door is marked by god, who has signed the face of the stranger and placed him or her under divine protection. the one who receives the stranger receives god and bears the mark of “the god who loves the stranger.” (caputo, 2000, p.276) this clarifies the relation between the dramatic event of abraham and levinas’ philosophy of ethics, which levinas does not limit to the law of the land of the semitic world, but attempts to translate into an ethics of humanity. levinas’ philosophy of ethics obliges me to be open to the call of the other, and my ethical response must begin with the saying “here i am.” i have to be always wakeful and vigilant to the call of the other and i have to respond responsibly to the call which always comes to me before my choice. i am chosen to receive the call, and for me this seems to be the divine call, which is the call of stranger i have to welcome, or the call of prisoner i have to visit, or the call of those who are hungry i have to feed, or the call of those who are naked i have to clothe. v reading levinas’ philosophy of ethics leads us to deal with his religious point of view. he accepts that his highest aim in philosophy of ethics is holiness, and this ideal of holiness seems to be the ultimate aim of humanity. i am not surprised to see that the other, for levinas, is the stranger, the widow, and the orphan (ti, 215); (at, 97). these are the people 62 prajñâ vihâra behind levinas’ other, and when he mentions a jewish proverb: ‘the other’s material needs are my spiritual needs,’ he means it is necessary to begin ethics not with theoretical ontology, but with sensible morality. he does not aim at the rational principle as in kantian ethics, but for him, ethics arises in relation to the other and not straightaway by a reference to the universality of a law (ib, 114). ethics, for levinas is all about goodness, mercy, and charity. and this ethics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished through service and hospitality (ti, 300). he adds, “i am for the other in a relationship of deaconship: i am in service to the other” (gt, 161). if these sentences reflect levinas’ philosophy of ethics, we could say his philosophy of ethics begins with service to the other: the stranger, the widow, and the orphan. levinas echoes the words from the mount of sinai when he says: the alterity of the other is the extreme point of the “thou shalt not kill” (en, 169). this commandment does not mean only not to kill the other, but also to defend the life of the other. for levinas, it is not just a matter of mortality of the other that we have to defend but also the living of the other that we are called for. the other, therefore, is always my concern. for my part, i do not think that christianity can reject the significance of this call. jesus christ, in his summary of the whole law, says, you must love the lord your god with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. this is the greatest and the first commandment. the second resembles it: you must love your neighbour as yourself. on these two commandments hangs the whole law, and the prophets also.” (mt 22: 37-40). this is not just an ethical principle, but it is a commandment. both the two commandments go together. we could not accept the first without the second, which means “anyone who loves god must also love his brother” (1jn 4: 21). this is not a guiding principle or a theoretical statement that you ‘ought’ to love your neighbour, but it is the commandment: you ‘must’ love your neighbor. the other is your neighbour to whom you have to be wakeful to receive his or her call. levinas often says, “you cannot let the other die in solitude,” and you have to help the other even “take the food from our own mouth.” the calling of our neighbor whether jewish or christian is a divine call, and we cannot ‘not’ respond. the needs of our neighbor are always our responsibility. christianity and levinas concur with each other concerning the significance of kajornpat tangyin 63 the calling of the other. we are chosen to receive the calling of the other, and the biblical tradition reminds us to receive the call with the holy word: “here i am.” acknowledgements i would like to express my grateful thanks to iasact (institute for advanced study in asian cultures and theologies) and asian christian higher education institute of united board for christian higher education in asia, who granted me a fellowship for doing a research at chung chi college, the chinese university of hong kong, during 9 june – 21 july, 2007. thanks are due to prof. david kwangsun suh, iasact scholars 2007, mentors, and all staffs, who encouraged and supported me along the six-week seminar there. endnote 1 this paper was presented at iasact (institute for advanced study in asian cultures and theologies) seminar, chung chi college, the chinese university of hong kong, 9 june – 21 july, 2007. abbreviations the following abbreviations are in use throughout this article referring to works by levinas. at alterity and transcendence. michael b. smith. (trans.). new york: columbia university press, 1999. ei ethics and infinity. richard a. cohen. (trans.). quezon city: claretian publications, 1985. en entre nous: on thinking-of-the-other. michael b. smith & barbara harshav. (trans.). new york: columbia university press, 1998. gt god, death, and time. bettina bergo. (trans.). stanford: stanford university press, 2000. ib is it righteous to be? interviews with emmanuel levinas. jill robbins (ed.). stanford: stanford university press, 2001. lr the levinas reader. seán hand (ed.). oxford: blackwell, 1989.ob otherwise than being or beyond essence. alphonso lingis. 64 prajñâ vihâra (trans.). dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1991. ti totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority. alphonso lingis. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1969. to time and the other. richard a. cohen. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1987. tto the trace of the other. in mark c. taylor (ed.). deconstruction in context: literature and philosophy. alphonso lingis. (trans.). chicago: university of chicago press, 1986, pp. 345359. references caputo, john d. (2000). adieu – sans dieu: derrida and levinas. in jeffrey bloechl. (ed.). the face of the other and the trace of god: essays on the philosophy of emmanuel levinas. new york: fordham university press. pp. 276-311. cohen, richard a. (2001). ethics, exegesis and philosophy: interpretation after levinas. cambridge: cambridge university press. davis, colin. (1996). levinas: an introduction. indiana: university of notre dame press. dostoyevsky, fyodor. (1999). the brothers karamazov. constance garnett. (trans.). new york: a signet classic. gadamer, hans-georg. (1975). truth and method. new york: continuum. jones, alexander. (ed.). (1966). the jerusalem bible. new york: doubleday & company, inc. pascal, blaise. (1995). pensées and other writings. honor levi. (trans.). oxford: oxford university press. peperzak, andriaan t. (2000). the significance of levinas’s work for christian thought. in jeffrey bloechl. (ed.). the face of the other and the trace of god: essays on the philosophy of emmanuel levinas. new york: routledge. pp. 185-199. kajornpat tangyin 65 after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi metaphysical entities and healthcare in an african culture adebola babatunde ekanola university of ibadan, ibadan, nigeria abstract the paper examines the traditional yoruba conceptions of illness, sound health and healthcare practices to show that they are not contrary to the western orthodox medical practice and also establishes that the yoruba healthcare practice offers a holistic approach. thus, it highlights the yoruba ontology, focusing on the impact of the yoruba belief in various spiritual entities on both their traditional and modern medical practices. it also examines how the belief in spiritual agents persists in the minds of the modern yoruba people and the implications of this on his/her health condition and the orthodox western medical practice. introduction at least two factors affirm the belief, among some africans, that some obstinate sicknesses are not susceptible to orthodox medical cures and can only be cured using unorthodox traditional medical means. the first is the common affirmation, made even by african orthodox medical practitioners, and often inscribed on the walls or the signposts of hospitals, that “we care, only god cures”. the second is the referral of 1 patients afflicted with what appears to be intractable illnesses from orthodox hospitals in some african countries to their homes with the advice that they should seek for unorthodox and traditional cures. this normally includes some spiritual or supernatural procedures. without prejudicing the nature of african traditional medical practice, two facts appear common to and axiomatic in all forms of medical practice, be it orthodox or unorthodox: the first is that the objective is the physical and psychological health of human persons. attaining this can take either of two approaches, prophylactic and therapeutic. the second is that the extent to which a medical practice or procedure is able to enhance human health is dependent on several fundamental factors. these include the correct conception of the human person, identifying the factors that affect human health, positively or negatively as well as the effective preventive and curative measures for adverse health conditions. the focus of this paper is on the yoruba traditional medical practice as an instance of african medical practice. we aim to critically examine its contents and determine the extent to which it can effectively preserve and promote human health. however, to achieve this end, we need to have a clear understanding of the yoruba ontology, its conception of the human person, its understanding of human health, and its convictions about entities and factors that can possibly stand in causal relations to the health conditions of persons and the procedures for maintaining good health or restoring a person to good health. 2 yoruba ontology the yoruba conception of reality, couched in a religious language like many of the other african conceptions of reality, is hierarchical in nature (oladipo, 1990: 76, gyekye, 1987: 68-70). the supreme being (olodumare) occupies the apex of the ontological hierarchy, followed by a multiplicity of gods or deities (orisa) and then an array of ancestral spirits (alale). these are all spiritual beings that are invisible to the ordinary eye though actively involved in events taking place in the physical plane. however, africans generally believe that diviners who have undergone certain rites can see these spiritual entities at will. for ordinary people, however, spiritual entities are only known to exist indirectly, through their effects on the material plane of existence, or when they choose to manifest in a physical form (oladipo, 1990: 84). certainly, for the traditional african person, spirits are as real as the chair i am sitting on, the computer i am working with right now and the book you are reading at this moment. they are not merely some kind of logical constructions. apart from pure spiritual entities, we have human beings (eniyan), conceived as quasi spiritual, having both physical and spiritual attributes. there are also other living and non-living physical objects occupying the natural world; that is all the entities that are perceptible empirically. a similar hierarchical order is presented in other african traditional cosmology (gyekye, 1987: 68-70). however, it is interesting to note that the traditional yoruba do not see the spiritual and the physical elements that make up reality 3 as constituting two rigid compartments. rather, they are seen as constituting a continuum, with a constant intermingling and interaction of the two. for instance, it is strongly believed by the yoruba that it is possible for some powerful diviners to transverse the spiritual and spiritual realms at will to dialogue with purely spiritual entities. god in yoruba ontology the idea of god is central to virtually all metaphysical discourse, and the african (yoruba) metaphysical discourse is no exception. for the yoruba, the supreme god occupies the apex of the cosmological order, and his existence is taken as given and beyond doubt. he is believed to be the creator and maker of all things in existence. hence, the yoruba calls him eleeda and aseda. he is also seen as the giver of life, eternal, supreme judge and absolutely dependable. to connote his life giving attributes, the yoruba call him eleemi. his eternal attribute earned him the name oba aiku. however, it is important to note, for its implication on the yoruba traditional medical healthcare, that the yoruba do not consider olodumare as all-powerful. a number of factors limit the powers of olodumare, one of which relates to the yoruba belief in destiny. we examine, briefly, this belief below. the person in yoruba traditional thought the human person for the yoruba is a complex of a physical aspect, known as the body (ara) and a spiritual aspect, which has several elements. prominent among these are the human soul (emi) and spiritual head and bearer of destiny (ori). the emi is the life-giving 4 element in a person and it is believed to be immortal. although there are a number of different mythical accounts of the creation of the human person and the pre-natal selection of destiny (abimbola, 1976: 95-115, gbadegesin,1984: 173-188, idowu, 1962: 169-186, oduwole, 1996: 48), the following are believed to be true of each individual person: first, each person determines her/his destiny when coming into the world, by the choice of an ori, which olodumare merely seals to ensure its fulfillment in life. second, each person loses all knowledge of the content of the chosen destiny at the point of birth. however, the yoruba hold that, at least, some aspects of the chosen destiny might be discovered through consultation with orunmila, the deity of divination, through the ifa oracle (abimbola, 1976: 63). destiny, for the yoruba, involves the entire life course of an individual, the major events in his/her life as well as the factors that would culminate in these events. it is held that although individuals are usually not aware of the destiny they have chosen in heaven, all their actions in life unwittingly work together to ensure the fulfillment of that destiny. ironically, the yoruba also believe that destiny can be altered for good or bad, not by olodumare, but by other forces in the world. these include witches, powerful medicine men and iwa (human character) (oladipo, 1990: 84). the seeming contradiction between the yoruba belief in destiny and the belief in the possibility of altering destiny has been the subject of much philosophical debate among african philosophers. the yoruba concept of health 5 the yoruba word for health is alafia: “it embraces the totality of an individual’s physical, social, psychological and spiritual well-being in his total environmental setting” (ademuwagun, 1978: 89). a healthy person is said to have alafia or ilera, while the sick or unhealthy person is described as having aisan or ailera. for the yoruba the presence or absence of health is measured in terms of the ability to carry out routine and productive functions, and in the process fulfill one’s life aspirations. this ability is a function of a complex involving the physical state, psychological disposition, and the social and spiritual relations of an individual. thus, health for the traditional yoruba person is not merely a physical condition, but a state of “total harmony with all the forces that assail man’s well-being” (sogolo, 1993: 109). it is not just about the physical state of the body, but also about the relationship between a person and some social and spiritual factors or agents. the yoruba normally make reference to a specifiable part of the human anatomy as being diseased only in the case of external injuries and very simple ailments like headaches. so, when a traditional healer is consulted with regards to complicated cases, he does not usually start with an examination of the physical body, but with an inquiry into the patient’s socio-cultural and spiritual relations to locate the possible cause(s) of the sickness. causes of sickness in traditional yoruba thought the traditional yoruba people generally recognize three broad categories of agents or factors that are causally relevant to the health condition of persons. the first is physical and direct in nature. they can easily be connected with the manifestation of an illness. it 6 is in this sense that exposure to mosquito bites is said to cause malaria, eating of certain poisonous food is identifiable as the cause of acute stomach ache, diarrhea, vomiting and dysentery and prolonged exposure to cold air as the cause of catarrh. such physical causal factors constitute robin horton’s common sense causal explanation (horton, 1998: 181-191) and godwin sogolo’s secondary causal explanation (sogolo, 1993: 111115). the second is spiritual/supernatural and usually indirect in nature but, with very potent effects on the health condition of individual persons. hence, the yoruba often attribute as the cause of some sicknesses, the anger of some gods, which might have been incurred as a result of the violation of a taboo or the neglect of a divine instruction. for instance, ailments like insanity, leprosy and measles are believed by the yoruba to be some deities’ special ways of punishing errant people. (sopona, for example, is reputed for punishing people with measles). other illnesses may be traced to the activities of malicious agents like witches (aje), evil diviners, sorcerers, angry ancestors or simply a person’s ori. one feature that is common to illnesses believed to be produced by supernatural causes is that we are unable to draw any direct or physical connection between the supernatural causal agent and the manifested illness. the causal connection is usually only discerned by divination, and this appears to be very incompatible with the principles of modern medical explanations (sogolo, 1993: 111). the third category of causal agency is social and moral in nature. the traditional yoruba hold that it is possible for an individual to become ill as a result of the contravention of 7 some communal moral standards or a strained relationship with other members of society. the connection between the social or moral factor identified as the cause of an illness and the illness itself may be no more than psychological. in the case of the contravention of a communal norm or strained relationship, the individual in question might develop a deep sense of guilt which would in turn place her/him under a lot of stress. this might eventually reduce the immune system of the person, thereby making her/him susceptible to sickness that s/he would otherwise have been resistant to. at least, even orthodox medicine recognizes that there are some stress-induced diseases like hypertension, arthritis and peptic ulcers (sogolo, 1993: 112). however, there are occasions when we can draw a close connection between the sociomoral category of causal agency and the supernatural category: for instance, people, described as the custodians of the culture, can invoke the wrath of some deities to ensure that some ill comes to the person that has contravened a communal social standard. sopona (a deity in yoruba thought believed to be responsible for measles), for instance, may be asked to afflict the person with measles. in the case of strained relationship between some members of society, a diviner or sorcerer might be consulted by an aggrieved party to invoke the wrath of some gods against their adversaries. in cases of specific illnesses, the traditional yoruba may appeal to only one or different combinations of the causal categories identified above. when an ailment sets in, the first assumption is that it has a physical and ordinary cause, and routine treatment is administered using medicinal herbs (fadahunsi and oladipo, 2004: 90). it is only when 8 such treatment, based on the perception of a natural/physical cause of the illness, fails that the yoruba would begin to search for other causal explanations at the supernatural or socio-moral level. traditional healthcare in yoruba culture we have stated earlier that the yoruba see a person as healthy only when he is in total harmony with all the forces, physical, social and supernatural that affect his/her wellbeing. in effect, their system of healthcare consists of procedures that start from the physical, but can extend to the social and the supernatural. the precise medical procedure to follow is determined by the nature of specific ailments. simple cases of sicknesses, like ordinary headaches and fever, caused by purely physical factors, are effectively treated with the administration of medicinal concoctions. but whenever seemingly ordinary illnesses defy ordinary medications, a traditional yoruba would begin to “feel that there is something in the illness” (fadahunsi and oladipo, 2004: 90.), and takes medical inquiry into the cause(s) and nature of the illness beyond the physical to the social and supernatural levels. oracles are consulted in order to discern the actual cause of sickness and the correct medical procedure to adopt. at this level, causal explanation shifts to the anger of some gods, activities of some malicious agents or a breach of some social norms. at this point, investigations in orthodox western medicine would still be physical: series of laboratory tests would be carried out in an effort to come up with correct diagnosis. this is done against the backdrop of assumption that the causes of sicknesses are always explainable in physical terms. 9 for the traditional yoruba, however, diagnosis and treatment cease to be purely a matter of physical medical procedure: they would now include some oracular consultations to determine the type of rituals and sacrifices to offer to appease the angry gods, witches or ancestors, restore broken communal fellowship or neutralize whatever a malicious agent might have done to render the patient sick. the yoruba believe that it is only after this has been done that the administration of medications can be effective. one of the principal deities consulted in order to identify the right medication to administer is osanyin, the deity in charge of medicine and healing (babalola, 1993: 8). a question that needs to be answered relates to the connection between the sacrifices and rituals performed and the administration of medications in yoruba traditional healthcare. how precisely do sacrifices and rituals contribute to the healing of a sick person, especially where previous administration of medications has proved to be ineffective? this question is important given the fact that it is usually impossible to draw any direct and empirically verifiable connection between supernatural and socio-moral causal categories and the ailments they are credited with. to provide an adequate answer to the above question, we need to understand the distinction between the cause(s) of a sickness and its manifestations. the yoruba believe that medications can only effectively check the cause and manifestations of illnesses having only physical causes. in the case of sicknesses emanating from supernatural or socio-moral causes, administering medications would be ineffective against the cause. 10 even if the manifestation of the problem were alleviated, it would only be superficial and short-lived. thus, before an afflicted person is successfully healed, the root of the problem must be addressed appropriately: supernatural causes must be addressed supernaturally and socio-moral causes checked in the same manner. it is only after the requisite steps at the supernatural/social levels have been taken that the use of medication becomes effective. an example may be helpful in this regard. a man insulted a female traditional medical practitioner by accusing her of being fraudulent and devoid of any capacity to help her patients resolve their problems. she specialized in helping barren women conceive and deliver babies safely. her procedures cut across the ordinary administration of drugs that would enhance fertility and the offering of sacrifices to the deities in charge of fertility and childbearing. in reaction to the charge leveled against her, she consulted another diviner, and together they carried out a ritual to harm her accuser, who shortly after the ritual came down with massively swollen lips, cheek and neck. all medications proved ineffective and he was only able to procure healing after he consulted another diviner who, upon divination, advised him to plead with the lady he insulted. when he did, she instructed him on the requisite sacrifices to make and the medications to take. these secured his healing. while many africans still believe that an individual’s health can be affected supernaturally, a number of africans, especially those enamored by western science, and many non-africans, unfamiliar with the african reality have expressed skepticism about this possibility. the latter express doubts about the existence of those metaphysical 11 entities credited with the capacity to affect human health. but, just as no one has been able to establish, philosophically or scientifically, that god exists or do not exists, questions about the existence of such metaphysical entities may not afford a final solution. the fact remains, however, that many africans still believe these entities exist and are capable of affecting human health. indeed, there are several cases of illnesses that orthodox medical practitioners in africa have considered as intractable that have been cured using the combined therapy of drug administration and rituals to some metaphysical entities. there is a plausible explanation of how belief in metaphysical entities and the offering of sacrifices to them affect human health. when someone who believes in the existence and capacities of these entities does something that is reputed to invoke the wrath of the gods, ancestors or even witches, he is likely to suffer from a sense of guilt and anxiety of the impeding wrath. this places him under great stress, which in turn erodes his/her normal immunity to infections and diseases and also renders him vulnerable to ailments; especially those that are stress induced (sogolo, 1993: 112-113). this possibility is corroborated by carother (1953: 121), who maintained that anxiety from the fear of bewitchment or the wrath of some metaphysical entities produce phobias, which in turn can cause such physical symptoms as gastric and cardiac neurosis and impotence. in these cases, healing would require, apart from the administration of drugs, the restoration of confidence that the aggrieved spiritual entities are no longer angry and out to destroy the patient. the standard way to do this, for the yoruba, is through rituals and sacrifices. 12 we must grant that the above explanation is reasonable in that there is ample empirical proof, even in orthodox western medical practice, that the psychological state of an individual can induce or complicate some physical ailment and also promote or hinder healing as the case may be. this is why many orthodox medical practitioners employ deception and lying, when they feel it would produce the right psychological state that would enhance restoration of health (elin, 1998: 135-137, collins, 1998: 139-141, bok, 1998: 143-145). hence, even if there were really no metaphysical entities, the fact that the yoruba people believe in their existence and capacities makes them relevant in their healthcare procedures as far as the development of the mental attitude that is favorable for healing is concerned. nonetheless, a problem with the explanation above is that these entities do not seem to affect only those who believe in them, but also those who profess disbelief. the yoruba often asks skeptics of the reality of metaphysical entities to allow them to invoke the wrath of these beings against them as proof of their existence. this is usually done in consultation with sorcerers, witches, magicians or native doctors (oluwole, 1992: 18). indeed, there are accounts of africans with the powers to evoke and manipulate spiritual powers to achieve specific objectives repeatedly even though they are not able to explain in scientific terms their nature (neal, 1966). likewise there are ample reports of cases of people who have been forced to believe in the existence of supernatural entities by the invocation of some gods to impinge upon their health. so, the possibility that these entities can still affect those who do not believe in them suggests that the appeal to metaphysical entities in yoruba traditional healthcare practice serves more than 13 emotional and aesthetic needs (fadahunsi and oladipo, 2004: 91). however, most african scholars that have examined this issue agree that the significance of reference metaphysical entities is primarily to satisfy emotional and aesthetic needs, to answer the question of “why” rather than the question “how” (sogolo, 1993: 115). nonetheless, it is worthwhile to raise the question: how precisely can spiritual entities possibly affect the health conditions of those who do not believe in their existence and capacities? to answer this question, we need to refer to the fact that in yoruba ontology, there is no rigid dichotomy between the spiritual/metaphysical and physical realms of existence. the two forms a continuum in which there is a mutual interaction between them, such that some spiritually powerful people as well as purely spiritual beings can transverse the two spheres to bring about certain effects in either. also, the entities in the two realms constitute a hierarchical order that straddles both the metaphysical and physical domains. additionally, spirits are believed to inhabit, steer and control practically every physical entity that we ordinarily regard as living or non-living, humans inclusive (idoniboye, 1973: 84-85). now, the understanding that the “causes of illness are a blend of supernatural forces (gods, deities, spirits, etc.) and natural forces (germs, parasites (kokoro), etc.)” (sogolo, 1993: 114) coupled with the african conception of spiritual entities’ as steering and controlling everything in existence leads to an hypothesis to explain how metaphysical entities can affect the health of human beings, irrespective of their belief system: metaphysical entities whenever they want to afflict an individual would simply steer the 14 natural force or micro-organism required to effect a sickness to attack the target and consequently bring the person down with the particular ailment. similarly, healing may be effected supernaturally after the offer of sacrifices on the instruction from the relevant spiritual entity to the relevant natural forces to quit their siege on the person. then, the administration of drugs would facilitate the physical healing of the body. this hypothesis is corroborated by the yoruba belief that there are specific deities in charge of specific ailments. thus, using measles as an example, the yoruba recognize that it is possible for a person to contact measles through ordinarily physical means. in this case the standard administration of drugs alone would be considered adequate to effectively cure the afflicted person. but when the infection is believed to result from the wrath of sopona, the deity that controls measles, it would be crucial to ascertain why the deity has afflicted the patient and offer necessary sacrifices to appease the deity for the patient to be cured. at this point, we must concede that we are not yet able to offer a detailed account of how supernatural entities steer natural forces to afflict individuals, but this is not a problem peculiar to the yoruba or african metaphysical reality. it is quite similar to the perennial mind-body problem in western philosophy. and, just as it would be fallacious to insist that the hypothesis is correct for want of contrary evidence, it would equally be fallacious to reject it as incorrect or implausible for lack of adequate empirical proof. in addition, many scholars engaged in the discourse on african metaphysics have consistently argued that metaphysical entities, properties and events constitute a form of life that is closely 15 connected with, but still essentially different form of life to which physical entities, events and properties belong (horton, 1998: 181-192). hence, it would be a category mistake to demand the kind of proof required in the natural form of life for the supernatural realm just as it would be erroneous to assess football using the rules of handball, even though the two are rightly called sports. besides, the fact that we are not yet able to give a detailed analysis of the causal connection between a supernatural entity and an illness does not imply that we may not be able to do so in the near future. conclusion earlier, we identified the affirmation often made by african orthodox medical practitioners that “we care, god cures” and the practice of referring patients with obstinate and apparently mysterious illnesses to use traditional medical techniques to procure healing. these suggest the realization by some of the western orthodox medical practitioners that their method of healing is not always effective in a typically african setting. the inadequacy is due to at least two facts: first is that africans and the yoruba in particular, believe in the involvement of metaphysical entities in their health conditions. consequently, western orthodox medical care is handicapped because it does not take adequate cognizance of the psychological aspect of illnesses and the implications of the belief in metaphysical entities for healthcare in africa. second is that modern medical practice does not make any provision for the actual possibility of metaphysical entities impacting the health of africans. 16 today, many africans (yoruba) are no longer practitioners of indigenous religions. they are largely either christians or moslems. as such, they are reluctant to offer sacrifices to metaphysical entities now regarded as pagan and evil. besides, while these deities, ancestors and other spiritual entities are believed to still have the capacity to affect human health, the supreme being, as presented in christianity and islam is believed to be omnipotent, possessing the divine ability to override or at least neutralize the powers of these metaphysical entities. hence, many yoruba people in contemporary times would approach him rather than any other spiritual entity for answers to their medical problems. however, the important issue to note is that underlying the effort to approach either the god of christianity or the allah of islam is the persistence of the traditional belief that some sicknesses are not ordinary, but have metaphysical foundations and can only be healed by some metaphysical (religious) intervention. the above suggests that orthodox medicine in africa would achieve a higher degree of success in the health cases that have been hitherto obstinate if adequate attention were paid to the african belief in the existence of metaphysical entities and its implications on the african psyche. encouraging africans to seek metaphysical or religious intervention (be it traditional, christian or muslim) to counter what is construed as the metaphysical origins of their health problems as a complement to the orthodox medical practice is likely to be productive in at least two distinct ways: first, it would boost the confidence of african patients in the medical care administered by orthodox practitioners. in as much as there is some truth in the claim that the psychological state of an individual can 17 promote or hinder healing, it follows that healing would be enhanced if african patients are allowed to take relevant spiritual steps (like offer prayers or sacrifices to whatever supernatural agency they believe in) that would convince them that they have effectively taken care of all supernatural conditions that might be contrary to their healing. this would be a sort of placebo, which is often fruitfully employed even in orthodox medical practice. second, since there is really no way to substantiate, in empirical terms, 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(2). oduwole e.o. 1996. ‘the concepts of ori and human destiny’, journal of philosophy and development 1(1&2). 19 oluwole, s. 1992. witchcraft, reincarnation and the godhead. lagos: excel publishers. sogolo, g.s. 1993. foundations of african philosophy: a definitive analysis of conceptual issues in african thought. ibadan: ibadan university press. 20 a report on emotional education for young children: the paths social-emotional education curriculum with reflections on felt bodily experience and buddhist principles by michael s. drummond msdrummond49@yahoo.com abstract this report focuses on the paths (promoting alternative thinking strategies) social-emotional education curriculua for preschool and elementary school students developed in the 1990s, by dr. mark greenberg and colleagues at pennsylvania state university, university park, pennsylvania, usa. in considering greenberg’s discussion of the paths program with his holiness the dalai lama, the article first offers a brief buddhist context for emotion education. of interest is that the paths curriculum also uses the concept of “feelings that arise in the body” and so in the later part of the article i draw out the implications of this concept in my discussion on the nature of bodily experienced emotions. in this discussion, i also give reference to developments in humanistic psychology, neuropsychology and buddhist mindfulness meditation. introduction 1 the buddhist view of human suffering is based on the habit of craving (tanhā).1 in buddhist psychology, craving is the foundation of all negative emotional habits: greed, worry, jealousy, anger, aversion, hate, fear, passion, etc. although craving is the basis of all negative emotions, it also cannot be separated from them. so when one works to reduce craving, all other negative emotional habits are likewise reduced, and vise-versa: when one works to reduce various negative emotional habits, craving is also reduced.2 buddhism says that these habits are developed from early childhood onwards (mn.i.432-3)3 the palī suttas (discourses of the buddha) have many passages that analyze craving in various ways, for example, the buddha said that due to craving, kings quarrel with kings, rich with rich, monks with monks, householders with householders; mother quarrels with child, child with mother, father with child, child with father; brother quarrels with brother, brother with sister, sister with brother, friend with friend. then men take swords and shields and buckle on bows and quivers, and they charge into battle massed in double array with arrows and spears flying and swords flashing; and there they are wounded by arrows and spears, and their heads are cut off by swords, whereby they incur death or deadly suffering (mn.i.86-7). on the other hand, it is well known that buddhist vipassanā meditation is effective in taking out craving and interconnected negative emotional habits. indeed the buddha gained awakening by the mindful observation of bodily feelings (dn.1.17).4 but we see in the suttas that the buddha said it took him many lifetimes to get to the point to root out all habits of craving. 2 we do not know if there is such a thing as past or future lives, but the real point is that it takes a lot of ‘inner work’ to become free of negative emotional habits. but what if our schools could teach young children emotional intelligence, that is teach them to avoid developing deep levels of negative emotional habits. it seems that this would be, overall, in accordance with buddhist views. also this would help students to have a more wholesome and fulfilling life; if later in their lives these children began to practice meditation or participate in counseling or therapy, they would start from a higher level of purification and be able to root out deeper levels of negativities. it is for these reasons that, in this article, i give an overview of the pioneering school-based program known as paths (promoting alternative thinking strategies). i have chosen the paths program due to its wide use and its ability to benefit children across various categories of negative emotional habits. moreover, paths is both a preschool and an elementary social-emotional curriculum and as such it is comprehensive. moreover, the studies on its efficacy indicate that it successfully teaches students, when taught three times a week at 20 to 30 minutes per class, to identify and defuse negative or difficult emotions. i will close this introduction with mention of one of many outcome studies. this particular 2004-5 study followed 114 students from five schools in hampshire county, uk. of the five, four were pre-schools and one was a primary school. at the time of the study, these schools had been 3 using the paths program for three years. this study measured students across five categories: 1. emotional symptoms, 2. conduct problems, 3. hyperactivity/inattention, 4. peer problems, 5. pro-social behavior. the results were positive, showing statistically significant positive change across these five categories, in the students in the study.5 with this example, let us now directly consider the paths (promoting alternative thinking strategies) program. the paths program the concept of emotional intelligence was popularized in daniel goleman’s 1995 book, emotional intelligence, wherein he shows that people can develop intelligence about the nature of their emotions and how to protect themselves against their own negative emotional reactions. but starting in the mid-1980s psychologists were at work developing emotional education programs (greenberg et al., 1995: 119). one of these leading programs, paths, was co-created by dr. mark greenberg6 and carol kusche; it is a social-emotional education curriculum. more recently, greenberg and colleagues have created a paths preschool program (domitrovich et al., 2007).7 this program leads into the paths elementary school program. greenberg et al., 1995: 117 explains that children in the paths program learn to integrate emotion, thought and behavior (ibid.: 118). in riggs et al., 2006, greenberg explains that children usually are not able to talk about their emotions and so are more ‘reactive’, i.e., they act on their negative emotions without considering the consequences. herein lies 4 a significant part of the reason it is important to use educational methodologies to help children to develop their emotional intelligence, so that they can begin to integrate, the emotion and objective reasoning. this then can result in more balanced, less harmful behavior. in his dialogue with his holiness the dalai lama (at the 8th mind and life conference), greenberg goes back to the importance of the mother-child relation in the raising of children. research findings show that “when parents help their young children, including infants, to cope with negative emotions such as strong desire, anger or sadness, their children develop better regulation of their emotions and show more positive behavior” (goleman, 2006). unfortunately there are also parents who react negatively (with anger or indifference) to the emotional states of their young children. obviously they do not understand their children’s emotional behavior, and so the children grow up lacking, in various degrees, healthy home taught emotional development. greenberg notes that, when parents ignore or punish infants for showing these emotions … over time, children, knowing that certain emotions can’t be shared [with mother and father], shut down [suppress their emotions]. this makes a child overstressed, both physiologically and psychologically, because the emotion is still there, and it puts an obstacle in the way of developing a basic trust between the child and adults. mary ainsworth’s observations of infants and their mothers identified such patterns. by one year of age, some 5 infants will avoid contact with the mother rather than go to her when they are upset and distressed (ibid.). children create negative emotional habits to protect themselves from parents who are not skilled in understanding emotions. greenberg also tells us that infants are negatively affected when their mothers lack well-being: mothers who suffer from depression pass this on to their children. as these children grow up, they often have higher levels of aggression and depression than normal(dawson et al., 1999). this means that early childhood emotion education actually begins with the mother working to keep her own emotions healthy; this is in harmony with buddhist teachings. however there is a need for professional assistance as adults are often not aware of their emotional health. the implications are clear: the optimum situation is that students receive social-emotional education so that they develop an adequate background in emotional intelligence to limit the amount of negative emotional habits that they absorb. unfortunately, when parents do not understand the importance of their child’s emotional life, the children often develop behavior problems in school. the student will under-perform in her or his studies. young students who display impulsive anger and other negative reactions to various school situations are actually showing us that they are having problems understanding their emotions at the logical, rational, thinking level; they are not skillful at using their rational abilities to logically project or “plan ahead,” i.e., ‘what will be the result if i hit this person, or take this person’s bag?’ this is one of the key areas that the paths curriculum works to 6 develop: alternative, emotionally cognizant, socially harmonious thinking strategies. this begins with the student being able to identify her or his emotional states and to be able to disengage from them. such ability then acts as a brake, inhibiting the habit to follow an impulsive emotional state to the extremes of fight or flight: children who have good planning skills and are aware of their emotions by the time they are five or six, are at much lower risk for … having problems of aggression and anxiety disorders (goleman, 2006) consequently, if schools become involved in teaching emotional education, practical emotional knowledge can develop in the same way as mathematical knowledge through the teaching of math. how is this done? the paths elementary curriculum teaches the identification of 35 emotions, while the paths preschool curriculum teaches 11 emotions. the teaching of these emotions is integrated with the development of emotionally cognizant thinking strategies. how do we think about the emotion that is now affecting us? how do we experience it? how do we defuse it? these are issues of using logical and rational analysis to assist in maintaining emotional balance. as schools in general teach children how to think, it is possible to go further and teach children how to think strategically about the emotional states that they experience from day to day. they also regularly see others experiencing such emotions and learn 7 how to work with emotions so their situations do not become negatively inclined. for these reasons the paths programs are multi-modal or multiskill teaching across various domains of emotion and social competency. one of the basic structures the mature human personality is self-control. this becomes all the more important with the awareness and understanding of one’s currently arising emotions, as self-control and emotional awareness will tend towards integration, a self-control that is consciously in control over destructive emotions. this then serves for the development of “peer-related social skills” and the ability to extricate oneself from unhealthy social, peer-related situations (cf. bierman et al., 1999: 649). five aspects of emotional education the paths curriculum is for pre-school and elementary school environments, as the paths elementary curriculum has been adapted for pre-school settings (domitrovich et al., 2007: 83). both curriculua are concerned with reducing “children’s aggressive, disruptive, and withdrawn behavior” while also developing their ability to identify and work with emotions in themselves (ibid., 69). in the paths curriculum there are five important aspects in teaching competence. (1) students, when excited with negative emotions, learn how to recognize them [the cues or characteristics of the emotions] and calm down; (2) they develop the ability to see emotional states that other students are affected by; (3) they learn to talk about one’s current emotional experience; (4) they develop the ability to 8 plan ahead: this helps the student to learn how to stay away from situations that cause negative emotions. it also helps the student to come out of an emotion with the least delay; (5) students develop the skill of seeing how our emotional behavior impacts other people (goleman, 2006). this last skill helps to develop the student’s empathy towards other people a paths student will learn that his or her anger will negatively affect other students; so paths students learn to work with these five tools for defusing emotion. greenberg et al., 1995: 123-4 notes several other important teaching points of the paths program:  that emotions (happy/sad, sad/mad, love/anger) cannot arise simultaneously.  students learn that emotions can be hidden, instead of showing them in a difficult situation. they learn how to develop this skill.  students learn that feelings can change, they are not permanent.8 findings in greenberg et al., 1995 shows that the intervention training of the paths elementary curriculum results in the students developing, in somewhat less than a full school year, a systematic foundation in the paths curriculum. domitrovich et al., 2007, as is mentioned below, had similar findings for the paths preschool curriculum. students developed a range of emotion related vocabulary while developing the ability to provide appropriate personal examples of the experience of basic feelings [while developing an understanding] that they can hide, manage, and change their feelings, and understand cues for recognizing feelings in others (p. 131). 9 the therapeutic value of felt bodily experience the paths curriculum teaches students how to understand, at the thinking level, their emotions and the impact of these emotions; this facilitates not acting on negative emotions. a second method of negative emotion ‘therapy’ is also used in the paths curriculum and it has important ramifications. this is the teaching of the awareness of emotion-related feelings that “arise inside our body.” we would like to ask here, just what does this mean? greenberg has said that the paths elementary curriculum teaches that “feelings are important signals. they can arise inside our body … and … provide very important information (goleman, 2006).” he likewise mentions that the paths curriculum teaches the students that such feelings “should be investigated.” similarly domitrovich, greenberg’s colleague who works with the paths preschool curriculum, says that “teachers are encouraged to foster children's awareness of the bodily experiences of emotions”. i assume that these two statements are referring to the same phenomenon. in domitrovich’s case, the teaching of the “the bodily experiences of emotions” is a “standard part” of each chapter or lesson wherein an emotion is taught, and the paths pre-school program teaches 11 emotions.9 these statements have important implications and their methodological or conceptual aspects need more drawing out than what is found in the paths outcome studies. for example, greenberg, 1995: 125 10 and 133 briefly refers to bodily experience of emotion: “inner feelings might be different” and “inner states of feelings,” while in riggs et al., 2006: 4, there is mention of “comfortable or uncomfortable feelings.” none of these statements provide any explanation of what this implies, or how to understand these phenomena.10 there is ambiguity in how the literature uses the term, ‘feelings.’ for example, domitrovich et al., 2007: 74, seems to use the term ‘feelings’ as emotions and ‘feelings’ as bodily experienced emotion. it is the perspective of this article that they are not the same.11 for example they say that happy, sad, scared and mad are feelings. it is clear from the context that this refers to mental emotions, and not feelings that arise inside our bodies. greenberg et al. 1995: 122-3 states, “the unit also includes instruction on such issues as cues for recognition of feelings in oneself and in others.” here it appears that the first mention of “feelings in oneself” could refer to feelings in the body, rather than to an emotion. on the other hand, when referring to feelings “in others,” it seems that this refers to emotions, not bodily feelings. page 123 then explains that when measuring the children for understanding of emotional states, the “children were asked to define five complex feelings (proud, guilty, jealous, nervous/anxious, and lonely).” again, this appears to be using the term ‘feeling’ as an emotion rather than a “bodily experienced emotion” or a felt bodily experience. this is confirmed a few lines below wherein the measurements are given: a score of 1 if their answers were correct but concrete or idiosyncratic “(e.g., for 11 proud: “when you do something right”), or a score of 2 for responses that were correct but less idiosyncratic (e.g., for proud: pleased with yourself when you accomplish something”). both examples appear to use the term ‘feelings’ as referring to emotions. similar examples are found on page 124, and in less detail in riggs et al., 1999: 651. i suggest that in the actual paths curriculum materials we will find more comprehensive teaching about bodily experiences of emotions than what is found in the literature.12 it also seems likely that if the paths students are learning to be aware of their felt bodily experience when they are confronted with difficult emotions, then they are learning, at least indirectly, that the purposeful awareness of bodily feelings, when in a strong emotion, is an important tool to help one get free from that emotion. bodily sensations as a tool in emotional healing is something that humanistic psychology has long utilized. the role of bodily feelings in emotion is also a focus of noted research in neuropsychology. likewise bodily feelings as a cause of negative emotional habits and bodily feelings as a tool to be free from such negative habits, is a central aspect of buddhist meditation. it is my view that the information acquired in these three disciplines also is pertinent for the paths programs. for example, as paths students progress in their training, they would understand, perhaps through guided investigation,13 that some emotions, such as fear and anger, have unpleasant feelings while other emotions, such as happiness and passion, have pleasant sensations. they would also learn that the strength of the unpleasant (and the pleasant) feelings reduces as and when they are 12 observed with awareness (gendlin, 1964: 12). along with this they could also progress, perhaps at a more mature age, to seeing and understanding that the bodily experienced negative emotions can be separated from the negative thinking component of the emotion and that when that is done, both phenomena disintegrate (drummond, 2006: 121). i have now examined aspects of the paths programs that are related to feelings and so i wish to briefly consider the experience of inner bodily feelings as discussed in humanistic psychology, neuropsychology and palī buddhism, as represented, respectively, by a.r. damasio, e.t. gendlin, and the buddhist palī language suttas, or discourses of the buddha. 13 discussion: paths, psychology, neuro-psychology, buddhist psychology and bodily feelings domitrovich et al., 2007 reports that their nine-month long clinical trial of the preschool paths curriculum, which was adapted from the elementary school level paths curriculum (c.f., greenberg et al., 1995), showed positive results. student assessments were gathered at the beginning and end of the school year, a period of nine months. the results of the trial show that the preschool students in the paths program developed skills in what domitrovich et al. call “emotion knowledge.” moreover, teachers and parents saw that the children were more skillful in social situations (“socially competent”) than the control group, and by the end of the school year, they were more socially active as compared with the control group who were more socially withdrawn. they explain: the results of this randomized clinical trial of the preschool paths program suggest that … teachers can effectively deliver a universal curriculum and improve children’s emotional knowledge, self-regulation, social interaction level and social skills in less than one preschool year … the findings provide preliminary support for the adapted version of the elementary [school level] paths curriculum. but as was noted earlier, domitrovich also stated that the preschool paths program has standardized the teaching of awareness of the bodily experience of emotion, while greenberg has likewise introduced the 14 awareness of feelings in the body in the paths elementary school program. it is the hypothesis of this article that the ability to be consciously aware of bodily feelings is a very important skill in the gaining and protecting of emotional health and so also it must be seen as an important component of social-emotional education. why is this so? to explain, i will take examples from three disciplines: 1. neuropsychology’s understanding of bodily feelings as represented by the work of a.r. damasio, 2. humanistic psychology’s focusing therapy, also known as experiential therapy, 3. palī buddhist studies as seen in the palī language discourses of the buddha (suttas). the work of a.r. damasio has led the way in neuropsychology in explaining the function of bodily feelings in decision making, while the work of e.t. gendlin has shown, in both his theoretical and practical work, how bodily feeling is a basis of meaning (his philosophical work, titled, experiencing and the creation of meaning) and how it can also be the basis of effective psychotherapy (his practical work, titled, focusing). when looking at the buddhist suttas, we see that bodily feelings are seen as the basis of the self as well as the base of negative emotional habits. on the other hand, and pertinent to our discussion, awareness of bodily feelings is a major mindfulness technique that dissolves the deepest of negative habit. 15 felt bodily experience in neuro-psychology it is interesting that the paths curriculum of social-emotional education emphasizes the knowledge and experience of bodily feelings. but exactly what are these feelings that manifest on or in the body? damasio argues that bodily feelings have evolved over time (damasio, 1999) to be the basis of advantageous decision making (bechara et al., 1997), and that this is intricately connected to the functioning of the self (damasio, 1999), thus both advantageous decision making and the functioning of the self are connected to emotional experience. i will illustrate this: the experience of anger at something or someone who is putting me in danger is felt on the body prior to its conscious manifestation as thought. the biological or evolutionary purpose of the bodily experience of anger is to prepare for protective action ahead of the [slower] creation of a conscious strategy to deal with the problem. in the case of an ancient nomad dealing with an animal, or a member from a hostile tribe in a jungle, the time saved by acting [i.e., deciding] on the bodily felt experience could easily have been the difference between life or death (ibid.). considering this, it is understandable that bodily feelings are intricately connected to the human sense of self. felt bodily experience in experiential psychotherapy as important as damasio’s findings are, he has not, so far as i know, considered the therapeutic effect of awareness of bodily sensations. it was the pioneering philosophical and therapeutic work of e.t. gendlin,14 16 formalized in his 1978 book, focusing,15 that showed the way of systematically utilizing, through his ‘direct reference’ and ‘handle’ techniques, awareness of bodily feelings in emotion regulation and the deconstructing of negative emotional habits. he shows that amidst a negative emotion, these feelings, which are different from but closely related to emotions, can be manipulated in such a way that an emotion is defused and deconstructed. gendlin’s direct reference/handle technique16 allows for this defusing and also facilitates the process to reach deeper and deeper levels of neutralizing the emotion’s root. it is important to note that gendlin found that the more a person observes the bodily feeling associated with a negative emotional situation, the more the unpleasant tone or quality of the feeling decreases (gendlin, 1964: 12).17 let us now move to the next section that considers how the palī language suttas understand the basic aspects of bodily felt experience. felt bodily experience and buddhist psychology the psychology system that is found in the palī suttas, is about 2400 years old. the discourses of the buddha (suttas), shows the buddha getting awakened by the mindful observation of bodily feelings or sensations (dn.1.36).18 the suttas show that bodily feelings are generated when ever there is sense cognition with the sense objects of the eyes, ears, nose, tongue body and mind.19 therefore, we can see that a feeling flows on the body when the mind comes in contact with a sense object and this feeling 17 then conditions the manifestation of an emotion. thinking is one part of this emotion. it is stated as follows: dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. the meeting of the three is contact. with contact as condition there is feeling. what one feels, that one perceives. what one perceives, that one thinks about20 [it is here that the emotion begins to man. what one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. with what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable through the eye (mn.1.111112). buddhism sees bodily feeling as the bridge which connects mind with body while the feelings are said to have three basic qualities: pleasant, unpleasant or neutral.21 i will now present five passages from the suttas so that the reader can better understand the depth of analysis that buddhism has given to understanding bodily feelings. passages 1 and 2 reflect the purification of negative emotional habits through awareness of feelings that arise in the body. passages 3 and 4 assert that craving is the basis of negative emotional habits while also being the basis of the human personality. passage 5 shows that the basis of craving is bodily feeling. 18 the body, feelings and knowing feelings: 1. this body … is old kamma/karma,22 to be seen as generated and fashioned by volitional forces, as something to be felt (vedaniya)” (sn.ii.64-5, adapted from bodhi 2000). analysis: this is an interesting statement. i interpret it to mean, at a minimum, that the body is impacted by our emotional habits. the dissolution of these habits is through being aware the bodily feelings, i.e., of one’s bodily felt experience.23 2. just as many diverse winds blow back and forth across the sky … so in this very body … various kinds of feelings arise, pleasant ones, and unpleasant ones, and those neither unpleasant nor pleasant. having fully understood feelings in their entirety, the practitioner is awakened in this very life (sn.iv.218, ibid.). analysis: this passage supports my interpretation of the first passage. it is very direct in its statement that the body is the field on which the feelings play out their role. this passage also makes a strong assertion that the full knowledge of feelings and their characteristics results or is equal to, awakening. with reflection on other suttas, it is clear that the “full understanding of feelings” refers to understanding the role that bodily feelings play in the establishment and growth of all emotional habits. conversely, the same the mindful observation of bodily feelings results in the deconstruction of all negative emotional habits. 19 here the suttas explain the relation between craving and the personality: 3. how does the blessed one explain the origin of personality? ‘friend the blessed one explains the origin of the personality as craving … it is accompanied by delight and lust: delights in this and that; that is, craving for sensual pleasures (including the craving to escape from unpleasant experience)’ (mn.i.299, ibid.). here the passage shows the relation between feelings and craving: 4. a pleasant feeling arises in an untaught ordinary person. touched by that pleasant feeling, he craves after pleasure and continues to lust after pleasure. then that pleasant feeling … ceases. with the cessation of the pleasant feeling, an unpleasant feeling arises. touched by that unpleasant feeling, he sorrows, grieves and laments [and wishes for the pleasant feeling to return] (mn.i.239, ibid.). here is shown the relation between suffering and craving: 5. and what is the origin of stress, unsatisfactoriness and unpleasant emotional experience (suffering)? it is craving … 20 and it is accompanied by delight and lust. [suffering also originates from a desire to escape from the unpleasant]. (mn.i.48-49, adapted from ñāṇamoli, 1995). analysis of passages 3, 4, and 5: these passages show the relationship between  craving and the development of the personality  between craving and bodily feelings  between craving and human suffering. when thinking of the human situation, these three passages are interlocking and when one is examined, the other two are implicated. 21 conclusion i have given a brief overview of the paths social-emotional education curriculum with reference to certain buddhist concepts, to highlight the benefit that it can give to young students, including those from buddhist cultural backgrounds. lastly, i have examined the outcome studies on the paths program and found that although there is mention of the therapeutic use of bodily feelings, it is not fully articulated. it is for this reason that i have taken time in the second half of the article, to examine other academic materials that more fully articulate the emotion-related nature of bodily feelings and how observing them in particular ways results in a therapeutic change in the personality. this was done in hopes of deepening the discussion on an important aspect of the effective paths program. abbreviations mn majjhima nikāya sn saṃyutta nikāya dn dīgha nikāya an aṅguttara nikāya bibliography bechara, a., damasio, h., tranel, d., damasio, a.r. (1997). ‘deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy,’ science, 275, pp. 1293–5. bierman, k.l., coie, j.d., dodge, k.a., greenberg, m.a., lochman, j.e., mcmahon, r.j. & pinderhughes, e.e. 1999, ‘initial impact of the fast track prevention trial for conduct problems: ii. classroom effects.’ 22 journal of consulting and clinical psychology, 67(5), 648-657. bodhi, bhikkhu (trans.), 2000. the connected discourses of the buddha. summerville, ma: wisdom. bowen, s., parks, g.a., coumar, a., marlatt, g.a., 2006. ‘mindfulness meditation in the prevention and treatment of addictive behaviors’. in buddhist thought and applied psychological research: transcending the boundaries, d.k. nauriyal, m.s. drummond & y.b. lal (eds), pp. 393– 412. london, routledgecurzon. damasio, a.r. 1994. descartes’ error, new york: putman’s damasio, a.r., (1999). the feeling of what happens, new york: harvest. damasio, a.r. 1999. the feeling of what happens. heinemann: london dawson, g., frey, k., panagiotides, h., yamada, e., hessl, d., and osterling, j. (1999) “infants of depressed mothers exhibit atypical frontal electrical brain activity during interactions with mother and with a familiar, nondepressed adult,” child development 70, 1058-66. domitrovich , c.e., cortes, r.c., greenberg, m.t. (2007). ‘improving young children’s social and emotional competence: a randomized trial of the preschool “paths” curriculum.’ the journal of primary prevention, vol. 28, no. 2. drummond, m.s. (2006). conceptualizing the efficacy of vipassanā meditation as taught by s.n. goenka. buddhist studies review, 23(1), 11330. gendlin, e.t., (1962/1997). experiencing and the creation of meaning. evanston, il: northwestern university press. gendlin, e.t., (1982). focusing. new york: bantam. 23 gendlin, e.t., (1964). ‘a theory of personality change’. in personality change, p. worchel & d. byrne (eds.). london: john wiley and sons. downloaded from www.focusing.org (20 february 2006). gilpin, r. (2006). the use of theravāda buddhist practices and perspectives in mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. thesis for master of arts in buddhist studies. sunderland, uk, sunderland university. goleman, d.j. (2006). destructive emotions. in buddhist thought and applied psychological research: transcending the boundaries, d.k. nauriyal, m.s. drummond & y.b. lal (eds.), london, routledgecurzon. greenberg, m.t., kusche, c.a., cook e.t., & quamma, j.p. (1995). ‘promoting emotional competence in school-aged children: the effects of the paths curriculum.’ development and psychopathology, 7, 117–136. ñāṇamoli bhikkhu (trans.) & bhikkhu bodhi (ed., revision), 1995. the middle length discourses of the buddha. kandy: buddhist publication society. riggs, n.r., greenberg, m.t., kusche, c.a., & pentzl, m.a. 2006. ‘the mediational role of neurocognition in the behavioral outcomes of a prevention program in elementary school students: effects of the paths curriculum.’ prevention science, 1389-4986/06 walshe, m., 1987. the long discourses of the buddha. london: wisdom publications 24  this report, concerning the paths emotion education curriculums for preschool and elementary students, is inspired by dr. mark greenberg’s dialogue about his paths (promoting alternative thinking strategies) social-emotional educational curriculum, with his holiness the dalai lama in the 8th mind and life conference in dharamsala, india. this dialogue was recorded by daniel goleman in his book, destructive emotions: a scientific dialogue with the dalai lama, under the section titled, ‘schooling for the good heart.’ this report also considers various academic articles that focus on outcome studies of the paths program. mark greenberg is the director of the prevention research center and professor of human development and psychology at penn state university, usa. the prevention research center aims to promote the well-being of children and youth and to reduce the prevalence of high-risk behaviors and poor outcomes in children, families and communities. 1 when this article refers to buddhism, it is actually referring to early buddhism as represented by the buddhism in sri lanka, burma and thailand. the canonical texts of this buddhist school are in the palī language, which is a sanskrit-based language. all palī terms, except for proper nouns, have been italicized. gentium fonts are required for reading the palī fonts. 2 this is also the implication found in the research of bowen, s., parks, g.a., coumar, a., marlatt, g.a., 2006. ‘mindfulness meditation in the prevention and treatment of addictive behaviors’. in buddhist thought and applied psychological research: transcending the boundaries, d.k. nauriyal, m.s. drummond & y.b. lal (eds), pp. 393–412. london, routledgecurzon. 3 the code, ‘mn.i.432-3’ tells us the collection and page number of the sutta passage. all sutta references are from majjhima nikāya, dīgha nikāya, saṃyutta nikāya and aṅguttara nikāya. ‘nikāya’ is translated as ‘collection’, thus the ‘majjhima nikāya’ is translated as the ‘collection of middle length suttas’, ‘dīgha nikāya’ as the ‘collection of long suttas’, ‘saṃyutta nikāya’ as the ‘collection of connected suttas’ and ‘aṅguttara nikāya’ as the ‘collection of numbered suttas’ ). next, ‘majjhima nikāya’ = ‘mn’, ‘dīgha nikāya’ = ‘dn’, ‘saṃyutta nikāya’ = ‘sn’ and ‘aṅguttara nikāya’ = ‘an’. the roman numbers refer to the book and arabic numbers refer to the page of the original palī language nikāyas. this is according to the pali text society pagination system. therefore, ‘mn.i.432-3’ refers to book i, page 432-3 of the majjhima nikāya. 4 i say this based on the various sutta passages that identify the body as the field of feeling (vedanā), as in normal sutta passages there is little or no qualification as to what exactly is ment by feeling. i quote such an explicit sutta passage in the last section of the article. in the last section, i also discuss findings in neuropsychology and humanistic psychology that lend substantial credence to the assertion that feelings in nikāyan psychology can only mean feelings that arise in or on the body. 5 www3.hants.gov.uk/paths-evaluation-review.pdf (february 16, 2009). 6 greenberg is at pennsylvania state university in the usa, where he is the director of the prevention research center and professor of human development and psychology. 7 in general, all descriptions of the paths program applies to both paths pre-school and paths elementary programs. 8 experiencing the 1st and 3rd is important for not suppressing emotion. 9 in personal email exchange with dr. domitrovich on 15 dec 2008. 10 i also suggest that greenberg’s mention of feelings that provide “important information” which “can arise inside our body” and domitrovich’s use of the phrase “bodily experiences of emotions,” can likewise be termed, ‘bodily feelings,’ ‘bodily sensations’ or ‘felt bodily experience.’ 11 i follow e.t. gendlin’s view of bodily feelings as a “felt sense” and as such see that bodily feelings, what are sometimes termed as “sensations”, to be different from emotion. gendlin is the initiator of the influential focusing technique that is intricately connected with emotional intelligence through incorporating the felt sense as its main object of inquiry (gendlin, e.t. (1998). foreword. in k. flanagan, everyday genius. focusing on your emotional intelligence, p. 7. cork: http://www.mindandlife.org/pubde.html mercier press/marino books). gendlin’s focusing institute says that “felt sensing is … a dimension of experience which is not emotion and not thought, which is subtle yet concretely felt” (http://www.focusing.org/cornell_three_key_aspects.html). 12 but the actual curriculum is difficult to obtain as it has been licensed to the channing bete company. 13 my supposition. 14 perhaps the main student of carl rogers. 15 http://focusing.org/folio_current.asp. december 30, 2008. gendlin began using the focusing technique in the late 1960s. rogers called the focusing technique “original, innovative and exciting”. (in email correspondence with dr. purton campbell, one of the leading authorities on focusing and person centered therapy. 16 the direct reference and handle techniques are basically two sides of the same coin, so that in this sentence i do not pluralize the noun ‘technique’. 17 this is also seen in the palī buddhist suttas: the mindful awareness of unpleasant feelings must cause the unpleasantness of the feeling to decrease, as it is stated that the observation of bodily sensations results in the gradual freedom from negative emotional habits (see my discussion about the arising of the latent habitual tendencies in drummond, 2006: 115 and the dissolution of them at page 120). 18 “i, having truly understood the arising and passing away of feelings, their attraction and peril and the deliverance from them, am liberated without remainder” (adapted from, walshe, 1987). the buddha’s chief disciples also gained full awakening by the observation of bodily sensations: c.f., mn.i.500-1, the dighanakha sutta, wherein sāriputta gains awakening by observing felt bodily experience. 19 the suttas (an.iv.385) say that all intentions and thoughts arise with feelings (saṅkappavitakkā vedanāsamosaraṇā), while other passages (an.iv.339) show that all mental phenomena arise with feelings (sabbe dhammā vedanāsamosaraṇā). 20 it is here that the emotion begins to manifest. my assertion is based on the structure of the 5 th through to the 9th factors of the 12-factored model of dependent origination (do). basically, i am suggesting that when the above passage mentions perceiving and thinking this is actually at the special and temporal occurrence of the 8th and 9th factors of do (do 8 and 9), the emotions of craving and attachment. 21 this is the same for sense contact through the ears, nose, tongue, body and mind. each has its own object and class of consciousness: the ears, sound, and ear consciousness; the nose, odor and nose consciousness; the tongue, flavor and tongue consciousness, the body, tactile objects and body consciousness; the mind, thought and mind consciousness. when any of these spheres come into contact, a feeling arises and flows on the body. 22 the suttas (an.iii.415) define kamma as intentional behavior (cetanāhaṃ kammaṃ vadāmi). i understand that as meaning emotion-based habit. 23 i draw the reader’s attention to the above discussions on damasio’s and gendlin’s work. both have explicitly, in their various publications, used the word ‘feelings’ to indicate sensations that run through the body and can be ‘felt’ in the body, due to the cognizing of a sense object. the way in which they describe their findings leads us to understand that the nikāyan discussions on feelings, must always be referring to a bodily experienced sensation or feeling. moreover, these feelings have an affective aspect or tone to them (mostly being either pleasant or unpleasant) in that they guide the individual to choose one object over another, or one experience over another or one description over another. in following gendlin as well as the nikāyan model of dependent origination, it is clear that bodily feelings are not emotions. for one thing, emotions are more complex phenomena. qusthan firdaus 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 1-32 © 2000 by assumption university press on taqiyya, or on how not to lie qusthan firdaus universitas buddhi dharma, tangerang, indonesia abstract this article attempts to clarify the concept of taqiyya (or dissimulation for religious purposes). it will examine if the concept is coherent, and whether practices of taqiyya follow its concept. the article first discusses the concept of taqiyya. second, it reviews historical examples of its practice. third, it examines the implications of the ninth commandment in the bible. fourth, it discusses the notion of ‘speaking justly’ in the qur’an. and fifth, it examines the manner in which the practice of taqiyya, often deviates from its concept. introduction can we lie in order to protect ourselves and protect our faith? this article aims to examine the concept and the practices of taqiyya. by examining it, i wish to demonstrate that taqiyya is conceptually coherent though its practice might be abused to the degree that it deviates from the concept. in other words, this article will be an intellectual exercise comparing the concept and practices of taqiyya. moreover, 2 prajñā vihāra one of the ten commandments prohibits us to bear false witness. this article brings into focus some questions such as: what is the concept of taqiyya? is such concept coherent? do practices of taqiyya concur with its concept? does taqiyya violate the ninth commandment or the duty to not lie? what i mean by ‘to violate’ is failing or breaking to comply with a rule. in this particular case, the rule is the ninth commandment. firstly, i will discuss the concept of taqiyya. secondly, its historical references as well as its practices will be discussed. thirdly, it will examine the implications of the ninth commandment. fourthly, it will examine the notion of speaking justly in qur’an. fifthly, it will review a deviation of the practices from the concept of taqiyya. then, i will conclude the discussion in the last section. the concept of taqiyya this section strives to illuminate the formal concept of taqiyya. the concept of taqiyya needs to be distinguished from other ideas such as zaringί (cleverness), kizb (lie), hίlah (artifice), gúl (wiles), makkár (crafty), talbίs (deceit), firiftan (deceive) rihá (evasion), riyá kardan (dissemble), zabán-bazi (prevarication), firίb (fraud), jίb (fob), ίlchί-gari (diplomacy), sákhtah (trick), and probably the arcane discipline (due to its virtue of silence). indeed, there are two constitutive elements of the concept of taqiyya, to wit, religious dissimulation and persecution. in other words, the concept is religious dissimulation for the sake of preserving life – not necessarily religion – to the extent that one’s belief remains firm under the threat of persecution. moreover, dissimulation refers to hiding or to concealing one’s character, feelings, thoughts, or preventing those things to be known by others. therefore, practitioners of dissimulation use it as a type of precautionary measure against persecution. persecution itself means oppression, ill-treatment and hostility which can be caused by religious, political or racial factors. these factors do not have to appear all at once. if one factor is present, then the dissimulation could be justly conducted for the sake of preserving life. qusthan firdaus 3 unfortunately, proponents of taqiyya seem to conduct the religious dissimulation merely based on danger which is a bit different from harm and indeed true persecution. on the one hand, danger refers to the mere possibility of being injured or harmed. on the other hand, harm refers to the real physical injury, pain, distress or hardship which is conducted directly. if harm is intentionally done based on political, racial or religious discrimination, then it is considered persecution. in short, danger could imply harm while the latter could imply persecution. yet, they are not the same things. interestingly, some people think that the best form of taqiyya is tawriya (evasion). for instance, as-sayid ar-radi gives an example about who the legitimate vicegerent of prophet is. an evasive view would be, on the one hand, “he that his (prophet’s) daughter was in his house,” to wit, ‘ali or, on the other hand, “he whose daughter was in his (i.e., prophet’s) house” viz., abu bakr (as-sayid ar-radi in rizvi, 1992: 11-3)” if such rhetoric is accepted, then taqiyya includes cunning because evasion contains the intention to deflect a controversial truth. such deflection is exercised by a cunning person to deceive others. however, if such person did not face any persecution in replying, then his reply cannot be taken as taqiyya because persecution constitutes the existence of taqiyya. additionally, two further questions might be considered here: is a son in law (the holy prophet) a part of the family of his father in law (abu bakr)? or is a father-in-law (abu bakr) a part of the family of his son-in-law (the holy prophet)? the answer actually depends on the concept of a family in a particular culture. if arabic culture exercises patriarchy, then those two questions are irrelevant because the holy prophet has no lineage from abu bakr. in other words, it might be useless to evade others who are aware about the cultural meaning of such tricky utterance. on the contrary, imam ali is really the part of holy prophet’s family due to his position as a cousin as well as a son in law of the holy prophet. therefore, we could say that his answer is to hazrat ali instead of abu bakr. 4 prajñā vihāra the concept should also be distinguished from the notion of ‘deception’ which means deliberately promoting a falsehood as a truth. in contrast, taqiyya deals with the notion of hiding instead of deceiving. as a proverb compels (x) ‘tell the truth,’ and then an arabic wisdom compels (y) “not all that is known should be said.” at this point, proposition (y) does not mean deceiving though it could be considered as an evasion as well as a diplomacy, and it could not be considered as taqiyya because there is no one slain. moreover, such proposition is sound due to the absence of moral obligation to share all things but the obligation not to lie. here, there is a distinction between telling lies and keeping information. the previous implies a violation of moral obligation while the latter implies a limited sharing of information. mahon furthermore identifies four categories that are essential to the determination of lying or deception. these are: the intention, the addressee condition, the untruthfulness condition and the statement condition (2008). first of all, the intention comprises three types viz., (1) the intention to deceive the liee about the content of the statement, (2) the intention to deceive the liee about the liar’s beliefs, (3) the intention to deceive the liee about the liar’s being sincere (mahon, 2008). here, taqiyya seems to include the second intention because by hiding the agent’s belief for the sake of avoiding persecution, then he or she is lying about his or her belief to the liee. moreover, mahon emphasizes that such intention should be addressed to persons. thereby, expressing false statements to, for instance children or insane adults, could not be considered as lying (mahon, 2008). secondly, the addressee condition requires two persons or more. therefore, this condition does not recognize the notion of self-deception (mahon, 2008). thirdly, the untruthfulness condition distinguishes between ‘believed to be false’ and ‘be false.’ indeed, the notion of believing is central here. as a consequence, an intended lie cannot be a deception if the lie is, unknown to the liar, actually a fact. in short, a truth might be formed through an untruthful statement (mahon, 2008). fourthly, the statement condition includes a person’s utterance, expressions and language. however, silence might imply a qusthan firdaus 5 lie even though it is not spoken. mahon indeed claims that ‘lying under duress’ is a contradictio in terminis because such action is made on the condition of no freedom (mahon, 2008). if taqiyya is a form of lying under duress, then taqiyya itself is a contradictio in terminis. however, one might distinguish thoroughly between the notion of lying and hiding in order to rebut such claim. interestingly, mahon poses the question whether the wrongness of lying is an analytic or a synthetic judgment (mahon, 2008)? by the same token, i could pose a similar question, whether the rightness or wrongness of taqiyya an analytic or a synthetic judgment? on the one hand, if one examines the concept of taqiyya, then he or she is actually making an analytic judgment. on the other hand, if one examines the practices of taqiyya, then he or she is actually making a synthetic judgment. this distinction highlights the potential difference between the concept and the practice of taqiyya. the word taqiyya is not explicitly mentioned in qur’an. yet, there might be a hidden concept as well as the dalil naqli of taqiyya in the holy book. chapter ali imran verse 28-9 says: “let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from god: except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them. but god cautions you (to remember) himself; for the final goal is to god. say: ‘whether ye hide what is in your hearts or reveal it, god knows it all: he knows what is in the heavens, and what is on earth. and god has power over all things” (in ali, ny: 47). tafsir al-jalalayn interprets such verse: “tuqātan, ‘as a safeguard’, is the verbal noun from taqiyyatan” in qur’an 3: 28 (al-mahalli and al-suyuti, 2007: 58). indeed, barletta interprets such verse: “the english phrase ‘guard yourselves against them, guarding carefully’ in the verses above comes directly from the arabic tattaqu¯ minhum tuqa¯tan, and both 6 prajñā vihāra tattaqu¯‘you [pl.] guard’ and tuqa¯tan (an adverbial intensifier) share the same root (w-q-a¯) as taqiyya...” (barletta, 2008: 564). moreover, verse makes the point that (1) favouring unbelievers instead of believers to be the friends and helpers is forbidden, and (2) an exception can be made when a believer would be harmed if they do not make friendship with the unbelievers. yet, the qur’an does not specifically indicate political affiliation of unbelievers because the qur’an never deals with details. indeed, an emphasis should be made here on the distinction between the unbelievers and the non-muslims (including christians, jews and other religious people). moreover, the context of the verse is a warning from allah after a previous warning – from sa’d bin hatsamah, abdullah bin jubair and rifa’ah bin al-mundzir – was ignored by some people of the anshar community. these people were induced to leave islam as well as appoint non-muslims to be their protectors. however, the unbelievers such as alhajjaj bin amr, qais bin zaid, ibnu abil haqiq, and ka’b bin al-asyraf fail to convince them because of this warning (qamaruddin shaleh et. al, ny: 90). nevertheless, allah provides an exception where muslims might conduct a precautionary action against persecution by taking the unbelievers either as helpers or as alliances. another hidden concept as well as the dalil naqli of taqiyya is chapter al nahl verse 106 which commands: “any one who, after accepting faith in god, utters unbelief -except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith -but such as open their breast to unbelief, on them is wrath from god, and theirs will be a dreadful penalty” (in ali, ny: 257). there are two historical contexts for such verses. firstly, the quraisy ethnic groups tortured some individuals who strove to relocate themselves from mecca to medina. as a consequence, some of those migrants are forced to be infidels. then, allah made a revelation to the prophet muhammad saying that allah will forgive such a thing if, and only if, there is faith in their hearts. secondly, there was a dialogue between the prophet muhammad and ammar bin yasir who just saved himself from an unjust detainment by a tribe of polytheists. indeed, ammar’s qusthan firdaus 7 eloquent rhetoric astonished the polytheists, and he was therefore set free. the prophet muhammad asked ammar whether his rhetoric was sincere. ammar replied no. this verse confirms that allah will not put a curse on those who are forced to be atheists insofar as they keep the faith (shaleh et al., ny: 286-7). by these two examples, allah seems to allow a practice of taqiyya. the concept holds that no one may convert unless under the compulsion, and if they are forced to convert, they ought to hold the faith firmly in their hearts. the notion of compulsion questions the coherency of such concept. imagine that the compulsion is an unjust one, then how can we know that the faith is genuine? the prophet muhammad himself could not examine directly whether or not ammar bin yasir was being honest. moreover, allah and islam do not allow hypocrisy in the sense of there is no consistency between utterances and deeds. therefore the idea of taqiyya cannot be simply understood through the above examples, although the notion of ‘a firm faith in the hearts’ is still essential for us. in addition, the concept of taqiyya is unlikely to be similar with the concept of piety. rizvi, for example, conceives that taqiyya equals tuqat which is accordingly synonymous to piety (rizvi, 1992: 2). according to abu ja’far ibn babawayh, such equivalence roots in imam ja’far’s view especially when he gave a comment on the holy qur’an surah al-hujuraat verse 13. to put it precisely: “imam ja’far was asked concerning the word of allah, mighty and glorious is he: “verily the noblest among you, in the sight of allah, is the most pious” [49, 13]. he said: (it means) he who adheres most scrupulously to the practice of taqiyya” (babawayh, 1999: 97). additionally, taqiyya equals tuqat equals piety according to rizvi (rizvi, 1992: 2). nevertheless, piety has a different concept compared to taqiyya viz., the quality of reverence or being religious. thereby, aligning the concept of taqiyya with piety implies two questions at least: how could a religious dissimulation (against persecution) be similar with the quality of being religious? does not reverence need no dissimulation at all because god will assist all pious persons? unfortunately, rizvi provides no further explanations and 8 prajñā vihāra answers to such questions. an answer to the first question might be in the realm of consequentialist account of ethics, but unfortunately proponents of taqiyya treat the concept as a virtue or a duty. if this is the case, then the first question could not be replied convincingly because it seems to be a contradictio in terminis. shouldn’t a religious person express his or her religious belief without concealment? by showing his or her religious belief, this person would be able to propagate his or her faith. moreover, the second question deals with a contradictio in terminis of aligning taqiyya with piety or tuqat. briefly, proponents of taqiyya seem to obfuscate the concept. in a nutshell, taqiyya is a coherent concept to the extent that the concept is dissimulating one’s religious belief in order to preserve life (not necessarily religion) against persecution. the claim of coherency lies in the prerequisite of religious dissimulation viz., the existence of persecution. yet, its proponents might practically deviate from it as i will discuss in the next section. the practices of taqiyya the way people put taqiyya into practice often deviates from its concept. in this section i will examine these pseudo-practices. such distinction is based on the concept of taqiyya as i have discussed in the previous section. the historical fact that sayyidina ali lived under three caliphs be fore him (abu bakar, umar ibn khattab and usman ibn affan) is usually taken as a classical example and a justification for taqiyya . for example, walker refers taqiyya to imam ali’s life. walker claims that ali swore loyalty to the three caliphs (walker, 2014). nevertheless, such claim ignores the political background. jafri et al., for instance, believe that the case demonstrates a tension between the northern and southern arabian traditions concerning who the successor of late prophet muhammad should be. on the one hand, seniority in age and ability in leadership are two decisive points to succession in the northern arab tribes (jafri et al., qusthan firdaus 9 2014). thereby, proposing abu bakar – who is also the prophet’s fatherin-law – who is persuaded by umar ibn khattab (mutahhari in thalib, 2009: 240). on the other hand, divine rights and hereditary sanctity are two main essential points to succession in the southern arab tribes. therefore, ali – the prophet’s cousin; his son in law; the first man who recognized muhammad’s prophecy; and had been educated by the prophet since he was child – should be the first caliph. indeed, such view is justified by the gadhir khumm [a pond between mecca and medina] sermon delivered by the prophet (mutahhari in thalib, 2009: 211-25). in other words, one might say that the case is about the struggle of power between primarily the companions of the prophet against the family of the late prophet. on the contrary, ali remained calm and he did not pursue the opportunity to be the first caliph because he realized that there would be a total war within arabia. even though ali and his family faced persecution and attacks on their home, he did not conduct the religious dissimulation and did not acquiesce to the rulers though the latter sometimes asked ali’s views on many problems. furthermore, he did not join the government because ali followed a reclusive life right after the death of fatima and the holy prophet at the same year. in a nutshell, taqiyya could not be referred to ali’s reclusive life from 11 a. h., up to 35 a. h. furthermore, taqiyya does not imply estrangement from the world. in other words, taqiyya allows involvement in the world including politics and government. moreover, taqiyya implies a boundary between an agent and a persecutor. on the contrary, hazrat ali lived an unsocial reclusive life. yet, such reclusion was only because of his circumstances. the prophet had appointed ali as his vicegerent on the gadhir khumm, but then some companions “conspired” against him. however, ali continued to impart his knowledge and wisdom for the three caliphs. umar ibn khattab, for example, made some consultations to ali, and the latter supervised sincerely though umar is the one who persuaded banu sa’ida, ansar and muhajirun to elect abu bakar as the first caliph instead of ali. furthermore, umar ibn khattab enjoyed the transfer of power from abu bakar to himself by no election. in short, there is no alienation from 10 prajñā vihāra the world ali’s refusal to join the government. ali continued to give supervision due to his knowledge and wisdom. additionally, we could learn from the history of imam hassan and hussein. on the one hand, had imam hussein ibn ali – the younger one – held taqiyya, he would not be beheaded by yazid ibn muawiyah in karbala. in this particular case, it is difficult to support a view which says that imam hussein was not in favor of taqiyya because he thought that the consequence of taqiyya would damage the belief of his followers (rizvi, 1992: 13). however, a more prudent interpretation would be that he felt that taqiyya would be useless since yazid’s main purpose was eliminating imam ali’s offspring. what would the historical evidence be that imam hussein really held such a view? in addition, imam hussein could never know what the result of taqiyya would be because he did not practice it. indeed, imam hussein was inclined to follow his beloved father who did not join the government of three caliphs. therefore, taqiyya seems to be practiced neither by imam ali nor imam hussein. in the case of imam hussein, one might distinguish between being slain and being conquered. hobbes interestingly conceives it in leviathan: “conquest, is not the victory itself; but the acquisition by victory, of a right, over the persons of men. he therefore that is slain is overcome, but not conquered: he that is taken, and put into prison, or chains, is not conquered, though overcome...” (hobbes, 1985: 720). this means that, if one does not resort to taqiyya, then neither he himself nor his conviction can be conquered, as in the case of being slain. here, hobbes account concurs with our analysis that the preservation of islam, not necessarily its school of thoughts, does not rely on the existence of its adherents but rather on the holy qur’an. in contrast, imam khomeini relates some fascinating accounts of taqiyya because his account not only holds that the existence of islam and its school of thoughts rely on the existence of its adherents but also qusthan firdaus 11 strives to inhibit the agents of taqiyya. his argument proceeds as below: 1) one must determine the number of agents of imperialism as well as pay close attention to the principle of taqiyya in order to establish and speak about an islamic government (khomeini, 1979: 20). 2) one must consider the main cause of taqiyya viz., the fear of the existence of true religion before the tyrannical rulers instead of the safety of themselves. if they are reluctant to conduct taqiyya, the existence of islam would be put at stake (khomeini, 1979: 54). 3) taqiyya must not be done by the islamic jurists (fuqaha) due to their functions and positions as the experts of islamic law, and islam would be unclean had the jurists resorted to taqiyya. indeed, khomeini emphasized that imam ja’far saying (‘taqiyya is my religion, and the religion of my forefathers’) does not apply to the jurists unless there is a rational basis for doing so. in other words, taqiyya could be perceived as ablution either by water or dust, dependent on the situation (khomeini, 1979: 115-6). 4) fear for the existence of islam is the real basis of taqiyya instead of fear for one’s life (khomeini, 1979: 118). nevertheless, imam khomeini’s account (of taqiyya and the jurists) – respectfully – is open to some criticism. the first premise is important because, i suppose, khomeini would like to distinguish friend from foe. nevertheless, if an islamic government relies on taqiyya, then it means the government should wait for the threat of persecution because the concept of taqiyya requires the existence of persecution. the second premise is unfortunately unsound because the purity of islam does not depend on individual jurists but is located in qur’an the holy book which is guaranteed by allah to be pure forever. the fourth premise also seems 12 prajñā vihāra unconvincing because the jurists (not necessarily the imams) have the same rights as ordinary people on the issue of preserving life. indeed, the existence and the purity of islam do not depend on the jurists but rather on the qur’an which is guaranteed by allah to always be pure. another practical deviation of taqiyya is presented by this account: “and imam ja’far said: verily, i hear a man abusing me in the mosque; and i hide myself behind a pillar so that he may not see me. and he (imam ja’far) said: mix with the people (enemies) outwardly, but oppose them inwardly, so long as the amirate (imratun) is a matter of opinion. and he also said: verily diplomacy (arri ‘a’) with a true believer is a form of shirk (polytheism); but with a hypocrite ( munafiq) in his own house, it is worship” (babawayh, 1999: 97-8). such account is not taqiyya. some cases should be examined separately because they are arguably dissimilar. first is the case of physical dissimulation. it is different because it is visible as opposed to religious dissimulation which is invisible. the former does not imply the latter. if it did, then playing hide and seek world require children to dissimulate their beliefs as well. yet, this is implausible because such game merely practice physical dissimulation while, in contrast, taqiyya requires religious dissimulation. second is the case of mingling with enemies. insofar as conflicting political communities do not wage neither a limited nor total war, then mingling is normal under an oppressive regime. one does not need to resort to taqiyya for living together. here, there is a confusion of taqiyya with mingling. third is case of doing diplomacy with enemies. such an exclusion is implausible because people negotiate in all situations including war. if two warring political communities have the opportunity to negotiate a truce, then all proponents of taqiyya would favor diplomacy. furthermore, taqiyya is perceived by some proponents as an obligation which holds the same importance as shalat. babawayh claims: “our belief concerning taqiyya (permissible dissimulation) is that it is obligatory, and he who forsakes it is in the same position as he who qusthan firdaus 13 forsakes prayer” (babawayh, 1999: 96). if this is the case, can prayers be replaced by taqiyya? if shalat is a pillar of islam, then is taqiyya also a pillar of islam? babawayh’s argument needs to be considered thoroughly, and one should not accept it uncritically because it might be a deviation of taqiyya, as i will discuss in the last section. a controversial practice of taqiyya is seen in india and spain. the indian guptis lived incognito as hindus instead of sunni muslims, and indeed they even burned corpses (virani, 2011: 99-100). according to virani, two details of taqiyya might be dismissed by shi’i dissimulators viz., (1) do not disseminate esoteric teachings to those who are not ready, and (2) conceal the link between the imam and his followers, as exposure would lead to danger (virani, 2011: 101). interestingly, the guptis believe that they could be both hindus and muslims. they believed that there is no contradiction between those two faiths. they furthermore argue that if it is admissible to be a muslim as well as believing the teaching of isa a. s., then there is no contradiction to be a muslim and believing in the avatars (virani, 2011: 125-7). nor as a temporary mechanism, the guptis are in favour of prolonging taqiyya for the lifetime of its preachers should they deal with pogroms. moreover, they perceive that taqiyya has an adaptive, dynamic nature. consequently, the pure hidden identity should also be preserved by a strong intrinsic nucleus which is -in the case of ismailis -manifested in the imam of the time (virani, 2011: 132-3). actually, taqiyya which involves a second religion is not unique to the guptis but had been practiced by the 16th century moriscos against the spanish inquisition. interestingly, they did it for centuries rather than for a short period of time. they practiced taqiyya for more than one generation because the turks unfortunately did not restore the islamic power as the mufti of oran previously announced it through his fatwa (rosa-rodriguez, 2010: 153). similarly, barletta claims “...the principle of taqiyya came to have an important place within the underground religious activities of castile’s recently converted muslims after 1502, and it was rapidly applied within the communities of aragonese converts after 1526” (barletta, 2008: 564). nonetheless, the gupti’s ismaili 14 prajñā vihāra dissimulation as hindus and the spanish moriscos are some “extreme” examples of inappropriate practices of taqiyya though they were in response to harassment. it is extreme because the veneer in both cases is neither as sunni muslims, sufi nor the twelver. in contrast, why didn’t they emigrate (hijrah as the prophet did from mecca to medina) instead of living under the hostile hindu regime? for instance, besides resorting to taqiyya, some other moroccans migrated to iran in 1986 right after the persecution against the baha’is (zweiri and konig, 2008: 520). hijrah is essential here to avoid resorting to taqiyya. if muslims live under occupation, then why didn’t emigrate as the prophet did? however, this criticism could not be used on the case of palestine where they arguably maintain al-quds (jerusalem). the 1979 islamic revolution of iran could be considered a turning point against the practices of taqiyya. shiite muslims around the globe now have an established shi’ite political power. few days before the returning of imam khomeini, an iranian magazine published a poem as following: “the day the imam returns no one will tell lies any more no one will lock the doors of his house; people will become brothers sharing the bread of their joys together in justice and in sincerity...” (in simpson, 1989: 36-7). the second line of such poem might refer to taqiyya because iranians formerly eschewed the perils of pahlevi’s military and savak. campbell, for example, pays a very serious attention to taqiyya in the case of iran and wrote at least four articles in the national observer. firstly, campbell points to four factors which are responsible for iran’s propensity for deception through history viz., taarof (“a form of deception through diversion of meaning from the subject or issue under discussion”), khod’eh (“trickery or claiming one’s true position by half-truths rather than outright lies or deception”), kitman (deception) or taqiyya. yet he claims that these terms are “often used synonymously” (campbell, 2006b: qusthan firdaus 15 1, 5). but he is mistaken because these terms have distinct meanings. campbell fails to recognize the appropriate concept of taqiyya which deals with the notion of persecution. he also employs his misunderstanding of taqiyya as a basis for dissimulation over the case of iran’s alleged nuclear weapons. indeed, he claims: “given the proven iranian capacity for deception, combined with the parlous state of intelligence coverage of iran by western intelligence, there may be a parallel clandestine programme and concealed facilities or research programmes using cover organisations (campbell, 2006b: 48).” secondly, he furthermore claims that taqiyya played an important role in the 1979 islamic revolution. to put it in his own words: “the cia documents seized during the iranian 1979 takeover of the u.s. embassy revealed that the approximately 5,000 “sources of information” were recruited...the documents showed that many iranians agreed to “become informants, informers or outright spies partly in order to advance their own careers in business or the civil service”. consequently, they fed the united states with “information that suited their own personal schemes”. in the 1970s, this meant that an unusually high percentage of the information gathered was biased or unreliable and contaminated by the iranian passion for deception. the documents also demonstrate the vital role of counterintelligence in checking the bonafides of iranian humint (i.e., human intelligence) sources” (campbell, 2006b: 43). moreover, he claims that american and european diplomats have been deceived by iranian diplomats for three decades in the case of iran’s nuclear program. the latter have exercised a combination of taqiyya, khod’eh and kitman to do so (campbell, 2006b: 44). campbell also distinguishes between diplomacy and taqiyya because he considers the e.u.-3 as no more than, on the one hand, showing the impotence of i.a.e.a., and on the other hand, reflecting the appeasement of european diplomacy (campbell, 2006a: 12-3). he also comprehends that kitman 16 prajñā vihāra contains an equal meaning to secrecy (campbell, 2006a: 12). however, rizvi rebuts such distinction, and he believes that taqiyya equals diplomacy as i will discuss below. he erroneously puts taqiyya as a part of kitman (campbell, 2006a: 18). in fact, some imams establishes the concept of taqiyya, and such establishment does not deal with the idea of kitman. moreover, campbell notes, “the significant clandestine nuclear network of dr abdul qadeer khan — the pakistani nuclear engineer who had begun supplying iran with nuclear designs, prototypes and advanced technology in the late 1980s — was not targeted by u.s./u.k. intelligence until the late 1990s” (campbell, 2006a: 24). additionally, rothwell believes that even the president of iran does not know about the nuclear program. he wrote: “rothwell describes the secrecy cloaking iran’s nuclear programmes: “the reality … is hard even for quasi-insiders to fathom. one tehran observer with former ties to the power structure said in an interview that not even [the then] president khatami and his ministers would know the truth about iran’s nuclear program. outside the closed scientific facilities, said this source: ‘you could count on the fingers of one hand the number of people who know the real goal of iran’s nuclear project’”” (rothwell in campbell, 2006a: 19-20). how extensive is secrecy in iran that even its president did not know about the nuclear program? if khatami’s administration knew nothing, then who would know it? if supposing the supreme leader was one of the few who knew the truth about nuclear program, then, why not share it with the president? insofar that neither rothwell nor campbell give a sound argument for such ultimate secrecy of the nuclear program, then such a claim would be no more than a fantasy. furthermore, campbell describes how big the political contribution of taqiyya for the islamic revolution was leading the cia to repeatedly err their analysis from 1977 up to 1979. qusthan firdaus 17 “the c.i.a. has an especially poor predictive record. in august 1977, its 60-page study, iran in the 1980s, assessed that the shah would be “an active participant in iranian life well into the 1980s”. in august 1978, the c.i.a.’s benign 23-page assessment of the pahlavi dynasty/shah’s régime, iran after the shah, declared in its preface: “iran is not in a revolutionary or even a ‘prerevolutionary’ situation.” 58 in november 1978, an assessment was satisfied that the shah was “not paralysed with indecision” and was generally “in touch with reality”, 59 even though he was suffering from cancer and adversely effected by his medication. only two months later, the shah and his régime collapsed. according to a former c.i.a. officer: “even when ayatollah khomeini was in exile outside of paris, the c.i.a. avoided him and his entourage. so when the iranian revolution went down in 1979, the c.i.a. was blind and deaf in iran”” (campbell, 2006a: 20-1). the prevalent methodological vulnerability of cia is accordingly the failure to recognize taqiyya and kitman in the first place (campbell, 2006a: 23). contrary to campbell’s account, an appropriate orientalist account of taqiyya is given by bernard lewis. he precisely conceives, “the term taqiyya, caution, precaution, denotes an islamic concept of dispensation – the idea that under compulsion or menace, a believer may be dispensed from fulfilling certain conditions of religion … it was used to justify the concealment of beliefs likely to arouse the hostility of the authorities or the populace”” (lewis in campbell, 2005a: 13). this is an objective orientalist view about taqiyya. it converts the concept of taqiyya which is passive, into the active one. campbell provocatively notes: “of the 55 caliphs (successors list), including the first four caliphs, an estimated 18 to 26 were assassinated. the assassins pioneered islamic “martyrdom operations”, whose volunteers called themselves fidaen from the arabic fidaii — a person ready to sacrifice his life for islam. 18 prajñā vihāra the fidayiyaah (fidais or fidawis), or the “self-sacrificers”, specialised in targeted assassination of elite political, religious or military leaders...using taqiyya, the assassins became masters of disguise and often assumed the shape of the enemy...using taqiyya the assassins posed as servants, advisors, soldiers, sufis or christian monks and ascetics to gain access to their target and humiliated and shamed the victim” (campbell, 2005a: 15). additionally, he also loosened taqiyya into some modes such as outwitting and the role-playing as victims (campbell, 2005a: 16, 20). such claim is unfortunately inaccurate since neither sunni nor shi’i muslims recognize all of those 55 caliphs. he also ignores that the concept of taqiyya does not deal with an aggressive attack but rather a mechanism of defense against hostile rulers. in other words, campbell supports the practical deviation of taqiyya from its concept. furthermore, campbell fallaciously believes that multiculturalism is a favorable milieu for taqiyya because of immigration policies which permit muslims to live in western countries. furthermore, unproductive disagreements among muslim leaders are misleadingly based on taqiyya. taqiyya also complicates the counter-terrorism especially on some occasions such as refusing to investigate other muslims or writing some misleading translations (campbell, 2005b: 27-30). however, campbell’s analysis is wrong because the oppressive regimes imply the need for taqiyya. had multiculturalism created a favorable condition for taqiyya, muslims would not split into various sects. in other words, shia muslims, indian guptis, and spanish moriscos didn’t need to face unjustified oppression across history had there been a spirit of multiculturalism. moreover, campbell erroneously generalizes that taqiyya be applied to all muslims across the school of thoughts (mazhab). he dismisses the fact that not all muslims accept taqiyya either as a concept or a praxis. moreover, he unconvincingly proposes that taqiyya supports terrorism, and he dismisses the most important concept of jihad akbar (the greater jihad) as a personal struggle against one’s own natural appetite. qusthan firdaus 19 taqiyya under the threat of persecution is obviously different from infiltrating intentionally into a country and then camouflaging themselves like chameleons do. the former is justified while the latter is an aberration of taqiyya. in taqiyya, there is no feeling of guilt because faith remains intact. if a person of taqiyya feels guilty, then his or her faith might not be firm, and this case could not be considered as taqiyya. in other words, the notion of disgust does not exist in the concept of taqiyya because one faces the threat of persecution. moreover, taqiyya cannot be morally used as a military tactic to attack others as applied by the assassins and fedayeen led by hassan-i sabbah (1040-1124); but it is merely a shield against unjustified persecution. therefore, taqiyya should be practiced in a passive way. in contrast, some practices of taqiyya which i have discussed above seem to be an aberration of the concept of taqiyya because those practices ignore the existence of persecutions. furthermore, i will consider taqiyya as a duty which is embedded in the ten commandments in the following section. the ninth commandment by considering the connection of taqiyya with the ninth commandment, i wish i could show whether or not taqiyya could be considered a negative moral duty. one out of the ten commandments states “thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.” such command is literally the particular negative. consequently, some questions could be raised here. is such a commandment comparable with the prohibition on lying? this section suggests that they are a bit different due to their scope and acts. the scope of the ninth commandment is relatively specific compared to the prohibition on lying. the former encompasses merely our neighbors but it suggests that one is allowed to bear false witness against, for instance, strangers. not only did god reveal the torah and the bible where god commands directives for living in a specific society at a specific time. in contrast, it is considered that god revealed qur’an for all societies at all times. 20 prajñā vihāra moreover, is there any similarity between ‘bearing false witness’ and ‘lying’? there is according to its conceptual components. evidence, proof and testimony constitute the component of witness. in contrast, saying falsehoods constitute the component of lying. therefore, one could see a difference between ‘bearing false witness’ and ‘lying.’ next, is it essential to distinguish between our neighbors and non-neighbors? it is essential because neighbors play a direct interaction to us while non-neighbors do not. indeed, some (if not most) indonesians conceive neighbors as equal family. this might also be the case in other south east asian countries such as malaysia, brunei darussalam, southern thailand, southern philippines. in other words, some cultures allow to distinguishing neighbors and non-neighbors based on the notion of familiarity. therefore, there might be some differences between our duties to our neighbors and our duties to non-neighbors. on the one hand, for one lying to neighbors is unjustified while, on the other hand, for one lying to non-neighbors is justified according to a strict interpretation of the ninth commandment. there are two prohibitions here. firstly, is a prohibition not to bear false witness against our neighbors (the particular negative due to its scope), and suggests that one might bear false witness against non-neighbors. secondly, is a prohibition not to lie (the universal negative due to its scope). this prohibition is a universal duty that one ought not to break under any circumstance. taqiyya violates the ninth commandment because the latter is a token of a deontological approach. it means that one ought not break it in any situation. this seems to be consistent with the prophet’s, imam ali’s and imam hussein’s positions as i have discussed above. speaking justly this section will attempt to demonstrate that the obligation stated in the ninth commandment is different from the obligation stated in the holy qur’an. by establishing such distinction, i hope i could show that qusthan firdaus 21 muslims follow a moral obligation that differs somewhat from jews and christians. moreover, advocates of taqiyya could argue that taqiyya does not deal with lies but rather with justice because qur’an does not express its message in the way the ninth commandment does. surah al-an’am verse 151-2 states: “say: “come, i will rehearse what god hath (really) prohibited you from”: joint not anything as equal with him; be good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of want; we provide sustenance for you and for them; come not nigh to shameful deeds. whether open or secret; take not life, which god hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law: thus doth he command you, that ye may learn wisdom. and come not nigh to the orphan’s property, except to improve it, until he attain the age of full strength; give measure and weight with (full) justice; no burden do we place on any soul, but that which it can bear; whenever ye speak, speak justly, even if a near relative is concerned; and fulfill the covenant of god: thus doth he command you, that ye may remember” (q. s. al-an’am: 151-2 in ali, ny: 133). those two verses speak about the negative duties for muslims such as 1) no allegiance against allah; 2) be good to our parents (the second commandment in a sequential order); 3) no killing of our own children (be specific than the ten commandments); 4) avoid disgraceful deeds; 5) no unjustified, unlawful killing; 6) no appropriation of orphans’ wealth unless it is for the purpose of improving their condition; 7) speak justly though our own relatives might not be in favor of it; 8) fulfill the gods’ covenant. the deontological approach in ethics pays attention to such duties though it refers the ten commandments. yet, there is a distinction concerning the duty about speaking between the ninth commandment and the qur’an. on the one hand, the former only deals with the prohibition against lying to our neighbors as i have discussed in the previous section. on the other hand, the latter deals with the command to 22 prajñā vihāra speak justly. speaking justly means expressing one’s feeling concerning what is morally fair or right. therefore, it compels humans to speak the truth even though our own relatives could consequently suffer punishment. speaking justly is obviously different from the ninth commandment in the old testament. an obvious difference is that just speaking has the scope of universal affirmative, to wit, a general positive command towards all human beings. if speaking honestly implies a persecution, then one can lie for the sake of their life, and such lying should be considered as a form of justice over himself or herself. such preservation is much more important compared to, for instance, breathing and eating which are also essential for our life. in short, speaking justly might include taqiyya in a very specific context, lying for the sake of preserving ourselves against the threat of persecution. by those differences on such categorical syllogism, we can see that the ninth commandment -according to the old testament -contains some differences compared to the one within qur’an. this is significant for our comparison because we should comprehend taqiyya and its justifications correctly. speaking justly could not establish taqiyya because they comprise different structures. on the one hand, taqiyya comprises persecution and religious dissimulation. on the other hand, speaking justly comprises utterances and justifiable aims. the notion of speaking justly might imply taqiyya but not necessarily establishing it. similarly, the concept of speaking justly is not compatible with the concept of taqiyya because the previous deals with a larger scope compared to the latter. taqiyya’s opponents might perceive taqiyya to be equal with cunning in the sense of skills to evade or deceive in order to achieve goals. on the one hand, evasion could contain a lesser moral problem compared to deception because it means answering questions indirectly. on the other hand, deceit obscures the true sense of taqiyya, and indeed it distorts it. here, i should reiterate dissimulations do not necessarily mean deceptions though it might be consistent with evasion. indeed, evasion plays a significant role in the realm of diplomacy. interestingly, qusthan firdaus 23 some people -such as najmuddin tufi -refers taqiyya to other ideas such as diplomacy, common sense and tolerance (tufi in rizvi, 1992: 14). unfortunately, neither tufi nor rizvi create any argument to support it. yet, we could comprehend that in taqiyya, evasion and diplomacy are consistent though this could not be the case with common sense and tolerance. here, tufi’s argument rebuts campbell’s distinction between taqiyya and diplomacy as i have discussed above. moreover, imam fakhruddin ar-razi conceives four rules of taqiyya. first, professing religion and manifesting enmity or friendship are two permissible conditions for conducting taqiyya. yet, taqiyya could not be misused as tools for disclosing the weakness of muslims’ defense, defaming a married woman, usurping properties, adultery and implying the killing of the third parties. secondly, taqiyya – according to the mazhab imam syafi’i – may be conducted in the case of facing polytheistic rulers although the qur’anic indirect permitting of taqiyya strictly refers to the case of facing infidels. thirdly, taqiyya may be conducted in the case of protecting property due to the prophet’s view that the holiness of muslims’ blood is equal with the sanctity of their property. therefore, they who are slain in defending their property could be regarded as martyrs. fourthly, due to the obligation to avoid harm, muslims are permitted to conduct taqiyya up to the day of resurrection (ar-razi in rizvi, 1992: p. 7-8). nonetheless, the third point is problematic due to the concept of taqiyya itself. the concept pays no attention to the protection of property unless our own bodies can be considered as a sort of property as in the case of nozick’s libertarianism. thereby, releasing property in order to avoid costly calamity could be consequentially justified as a trade off with the religious belief. furthermore, the fourth point exposes the criticism such as what sort of harm might justify a long-run taqiyya? harm which is done in a just war is obviously morally different from harm which is caused by terrorism. thereby, extending the duration of taqiyya up to the day of resurrection is a form of exaggeration. interestingly, imam ali expressed an interesting account against taqiyya whenever he received an oath of loyalty from the companions as 24 prajñā vihāra follow: “by allah, i have not concealed a single word or spoken any lie and i had been informed of this event and of this time (sermon 16 in thalib, 2009: 351). it means that imam ali himself was arguably reluctant to lie and conceal words or, to put it in other way, he does not resort to taqiyya because the latter does not allow us to speak justly either to ourselves or to other persons. therefore, adherents should not apply taqiyya to hazrat ali’s life but consider it in the sense of speaking justly. by developing it, proponents would take benefit from the art of speaking including an evasion, as diplomacy, and not telling ‘all’ known things. this mode of thinking would shape the practices of taqiyya in a positive way though it would constitute a deviation of taqiyya from its original concept. persecution or social exclusion? this section will discuss whether dissimulators can justify their actions based on mere social exclusion instead of persecution? additionally, can the social exclusion be a prerequisite of persecution? and if so, can performing taqiyya based on social exclusion be justifiable? taqiyya should always be understood through consequentialist and utilitarian (the maslahat-mafsadat) approaches because its concept actually reflects trade off between life and faith. if taqiyya is examined by the deontological and virtuous approaches, then taqiyya would be in contradiction with the ninth commandment as i have discussed above. by allowing religious dissimulation against persecution, life – under the banner of taqiyya – is given emphasis over religion. nevertheless, some shi’ite imams conceive this differently; that it is not life but religion which should be preserved by taqiyya. by placing religion as the taqiyya’s sole aim, taqiyya enjoys the status of urgency in islam. additionally, they wish taqiyya would be widely accepted by all muslims in such a way. therefore, they imply that religion is more important than life. they nevertheless dismiss the fact that religion without the life of its ummah would be meaningless for a certain period of time. moreover, they also push aside the existence and purity of islam which are located in the holy qur’an instead of its ummah. therefore, religions could not outweigh life. qusthan firdaus 25 persecution and preserving life justify the existence of taqiyya. by preserving life, one has more chance to develop one’s belief, knowledge, and other meaningful things. another argument in favor of taqiyya is apparently concealing faith justly. a just concealment contains a lesser evil compared to being killed or unjustly persecuted. however, taqiyya seems to be ineffective concerning some injustices. for example, indonesian shii muslims do not face persecution nowadays, but unjust expulsion by indonesian sunni muslims. based upon the latter’s ignorance some conflicts occurred in sampang, madura, jawa and timur. misunderstanding of what shiism is seems to be the cause. they argue that shia is not a part of islam because it follows different pillars of islam. in contrast, maduranese shii muslims cannot resort to taqiyya based on expulsion. if expulsion is persecution, then their taqiyya would be justifiable on the basis of persecution. mortimer pays attention to the role of taqiyya in the sense that the imams of ithna ashari allows their followers to hide their religious beliefs if necessary. moreover, mortimer does not believe that taqiyya preserves the existence of twelver shiite but rather the latter was not political or did not historically involve in the action-oriented-politics. indeed, nine out of twelve imams after hussein did not pursue their rights to reign. they preferred instead to live an ascetic life (zuhd) (mortimer, 1984: 37-8). the cost-benefit analysis approach is sometimes rejected, because it seems to involve the idea of a trade-off. indeed, it exchanges things that are not commodities such as life, pride, and honor. nevertheless, such analysis can be useful for islamic reasoning to some extent. for example, imam ja’far sadiq exercises a cost-benefit (mafsadat-maslahat) analysis to rebut abu hanifah: “then, in order to invalidate ‘analogical reasoning’, the holy imam mentioned some instances of islamic legal rulings opposed to this principle. he said, “which one is worse, killing somebody unjustly or committing adultery?” “killing someone unjustly.” 26 prajñā vihāra “now if acting upon analogical reasoning is to be correct, why are two witnesses enough to convict somebody of murder, but four are necessary for convicting somebody of adultery? is this islamic ruling in accordance with analogical reasoning?” “no.” “which one is more important, prayer or fasting?” “prayer.” “so why is it incumbent on menstruating women to make up for obligatory fasting, while this is not the case with obligatory prayer? is this islamic ruling concurrent with analogical reasoning?” “no” (‘ala’i, 2012: 50-1). by rhetorically asking abu hanifah, imam ja’far weighs those two worships in the sense of consequentialism but not necessarily a trade-off. thereby, weighing is also necessary in order to rebut the way abu hanifah issued a fatwa which is based on an analogy. such dialogue teaches us that a consequentialist approach could be exercised in islam to some extent. if i am right, then taqiyya is one example of such account which is morally allowable under the threat of persecution. nowadays, proponents of taqiyya seem to hide their belief on the basis of avoiding social exclusion rather than unjustified persecution. social exclusion means the state or the process of being denied or being removed from consideration. in ancient greek, they practiced social exclusion on the basis of popular vote as in the case of the ostracism of thucydides. such basis is however problematic because it does not refer to the concept of taqiyya. if this is the case, then they do not actually practice taqiyya. qusthan firdaus 27 a constant worry about historical violence could blur a significant distinction between persecution and social exclusion. such exclusion leads followers to be cautious while living among the majority of either sunni muslims or infidels. the idea that ‘social exclusion equals persecution’ is used as a justification for dissimulating their beliefs. this assumes that there is a slippery slope where social exclusion leads ultimately to persecution. but social exclusion refers to denial of privileges, rights and status in a social system as a consequence of his or her identity. if you deny someone for any reason, then you do not necessarily need to persecute him either. so the difference between social exclusion and persecution is clear although they share a similarity. but if the claim of a slippery slope can be rejected and so the practices of taqiyya can be seen to violate its concept. this phenomenon is problematic because the reason for taqiyya seems to be misused by its proponents. if the discontent of social exclusion is confused with the fear of persecution, then such dissimulation can no longer be considered taqiyya. conclusion to understand the concept of taqiyya involves understanding its connection with the threat of persecution and religious dissimulation. these fundamental components cannot be ignored in practicing taqiyya. indeed, taqiyya is conceptually coherent though some practices divert from the concept. the obvious diversion is shifting the notion of persecution by the social exclusion. if this is the case, then such practice is no longer taqiyya. moreover, taqiyya violates the ninth commandment in the way we comprehend it according to the old testament viz., the commandment ‘not to bear false witness.’ on the contrary, taqiyya does not violate any moral duty because muslims comprehend such duty according to the qur’an, to wit, speaking justly which could be perceived as a positive duty. if my argument is sound, then the deviant practices of taqiyya can be compared with the defense tactics of chameleons. chameleons need not hide themselves since their ability to adjust their 28 prajñā vihāra color with their environment is more than enough to protect themselves. if the gap between the concept and the practice remains as it is, then the maxim could be, ‘taqiyya is like a hiding chameleon, the hiding chameleon of my forefathers. they who do not have taqiyya, are not chameleons.’ endnotes 1even lipi’s (the indonesian institute of sciences) researchers inappropriately attribute the word taqiyya to the nii (the islamic state of indonesia) ix. they claim, “if violence could be avoided so far, according to asep, that is because they realize that their group is too small to fight against the islamic mainstream. under this condition, they exercise the taqiyya doctrine which is hiding their actual belief” (afadlal et. al, 2005: 247). as a consequence, those researchers think that taqiyya is not a specific utilitarian account in the realm of shi’ism but could also be applied in other school of thoughts (mazhab). 2debates about the sequence of commandment among judaism, catholicism and christianity are beyond the constraints of this article. the septuagint, philo, talmud and the reformed christians agreed to perceive it as the ninth. 3interestingly, the word ‘dissimulation’ means ‘mudárát’ while ‘to dissimulate’ means ‘durúghί nimúdan’ in farsi. therefore, one could argue that taqiyya contains mudárát in and of itself though this view is unlikely to be defended in a case like persecution. 4taqiyya is not equal to hypocrisy for some reasons. firstly, both ideas contain a different concept. hypocrisy refers show off about the high standards anything though this is not the case. moreover, hypocrisy connotes to the inconsistency between deeds and utterances while, in contrast, taqiyya means the religious dissimulation in the face of persecution. secondly, taqiyya means concealing beliefs and displaying nonbeliefs but otherwise hypocrisy means concealing unbeliefs and declaring faith as be indicated by al-baqarah verse 14: “when they meet those who believe, they say: “we believe;” but when they are alone with their evil ones, they say: “we are really with you: we (were) only jesting” (ali, ny: 3). 5interestingly, abdullah yusuf ali does not use the word ‘piety’ but rather ‘righteous’ in such verse. he translates as follow: “o mankind! we created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). verily the most honoured of you in the sight of god is (he who is) the most righteous of you. and god has full knowledge and is well-acquainted (with all things)” (ali, ny: 514). ‘piety’ is constituted by the qusthan firdaus 29 quality of being reverent or religious but ‘righteous’ deals with the moral status or the justifiable conditions of actions or things. 6some capital letters are originally given by hobbes. 7campbell conceives kitman to be equal with deception in his later writing (campbell, 2006b: 5). 8here, i should admit that i am neglecting the potentially different meanings in arabic and english words. but any discussion regarding the problem with these translations would be beyond the scope this article. 9robert nozick mentioned once the notion of self-ownership in his anarchy, state and utopia. then, g. a. cohen extrapolated it as the fundamental idea of nozick’s libertarianism. cohen indeed conceived that the concept of self-ownership is coherent in and of itself though the thesis might be false. further discussion about self-ownership could be gained from cohen’s self-ownership, freedom, and equality. 10the existence of divine justice (adil) and imamah (a recognized authority on islamic theology, law and a spiritual guide) in shiism are two substantial differences from sunni. regarding the imamah, one might argue that such idea is discriminatory due to its lineage to the prophet. nonetheless, such argument is irrelevant because the shii imamah is based not only on the lineage but also knowledge and to some degree the bravery to call a resistance against unjust regimes. this bravery indeed implies various sects even within the shii muslims such as the twelver/itsna asyariah, the sevener/ ismailiyah, the fiver/zaydi, the druze, the nizari/agha khani, the daudi/bohra, the hafizi and the other bohra. 11zuhd does not contain an equal meaning compared to asceticism. a further explanation about such distinction could be obtained from mutahhari’s introduction in nahjul-balagha (mutahhari in ali, 2009: 112-3). 12according to snodgrass, the ostracism is caused by his failure to rescue an athenian colony called ampipholis from the invasion of brasida of sparta (snodgrass, 1988: 303). 30 prajñā vihāra bibliography afadlal et.al., islam dan radikalisme di indonesia (edited by endang turmudi and riza sihbudi. jakarta: lipi press, 2005). ‘ala’i, muhammad nasir husayni. “a biography of imam ja’far al-sadiq (a),” message of thaqalayn, vol. 13, no. 2, 2012, pp. 45-58. ali, abdullah yusuf. the holy qur’an: text and translation (kuala lumpur: islamic book trust, ny). ali al-arfaj, muhammad ibn. what must be known about islam (riyadh: darussalam, second edition, 2003). al-mahalli, jalal al-din., and jalal al-din al-suyuti, tafsir al-jalalayn (translated by feraz hamza. amman: royal aal al-bayt institute for islamic thought, 2007). armstrong, karen. the great transformation: the world in the time of buddha, socrates, confucius and jeremiah (london: atlantic books, 2006). babawayh, abu ja’far. a shiite creed: a translation of i’tiqadatu ‘l-imamiyyah (translated by asaf a. a. fyzee. tehran: world organization for islamic services, third edition, 1999). barletta, vincent. “deixis, taqiyya, and textual mediation in cryptomuslim aragon,” text & talk 28–5 (2008), pp. 561–579. campbell, andrew. “’taqiyya’: how islamic extremists deceive the west,” national observer, nn, winter, 2005a, pp. 11-23. _______________. “’taqiyya’ and the global war against terrorism,” national observer, nn, spring, 2005b, pp. 26-36. _______________. “iran’s nuclear deception: taqiyya and kitman (part i),” national observer, no. 67, summer 2006a, pp. 8-25. _______________. “iran and deception modalities: the reach of taqiyya, kitman, khod’eh and taarof,” national observer, no. 70, spring 2006b, pp. 25-48. hobbes, thomas. leviathan (edited with an introduction by c. b. macpherson. london: penguin books, 1985). qusthan firdaus 31 jafri, syed husain m., kechichian, joseph a., dabashi, hamid., and moussalli, ahmad. “shīʿī islam,” the oxford encyclopedia of the islamic world. limited access on [http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/article/opr/t236/e0736?_ hi=3d1&_pos=3d1]; last access 25 september 2014. khomeini, ayatollah sayyed ruhollah. islamic government (translated by hamid algar. tehran: the institute for compilation and publication of imam khomeini’s works, 1979. available at [http://www.shiamultimedia.com/englishbooks3.html]; last accessed 10 october 2014). mahon, james edwin. “the definition of lying and deception,” the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2008 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), url = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/ entries/lying-definition/>; last access 28 september 2014. mortimer, edward. islam dan kekuasaan (translated by enna hadi and rahmani astuti. bandung: penerbit mizan, 1984). rizvi, syed saeed akhtar. taqiyah (dar es salaam: bilal muslim mission of tanzania, 1992. available at [www.shiamultimedia. com/englishbooks7.html]; last accessed 10 october 2014). rosa-rodriguez, maria del mar. “simulation and dissimulation: religious hybridity in a morisco fatwa,” medieval encounters 16 (2010) pp. 143-180. shaleh, qamaruddin, dahlan, h. a., dahlan, m. d. asbabun nuzul: latar belakang historis turunnya ayat-ayat al-qur’an (bandung: penerbit c. v. diponegoro, second edition, ny). simpson, john. behind iranian lines: travels through revolutionary iran and the persian past (london: fontana/collins, revised edition, 1989). snodgrass, mary. greek classics (ed. gary carey. lincoln, nebraska: cliffs notes, 1988). thalib, ali ibn abu. peak of eloquence: nahjul-balagha (edited by yasin t. al-jibouri. new york: tahrike tarsile qur’an, inc., seventh u. s. edition, 2009). 32 prajñā vihāra virani, shafique n. “taqiyya and identity in a south asian community,” the journal of asian studies, vol. 70, no. 1 (february) 2011: 99–139. walker, paul e. “taqīyah,” the oxford encyclopedia of the islamic world. limited access on [http://www.oxfordislamicstudies. com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/article/opr/t236/e0784?_hi=3d0& _pos=3d1#match]; last access 25 september 2014 zweiri, mahjoob and konig, christoph. “are shias rising in the western part of the arab world? the case of morocco,” the journal of north african studies, vol. 13, no. 4, december 2008, 513–529. 11(158-162)note for authors engaging with wirkungsgeschichte: romans 13:1-7 as a case study arnold t. monera, ph.d. s.t.d. introduction an interesting and stimulating development in biblical studies is a method called wirkungsgeschichte1 – a german compound term difficult to pronounce, difficult to spell and nearly impossible to translate. this term was originally coined by hans-georg gadamer in his philosophical work wahrheit und methode (truth and method) published in 1960.2 this new discipline which has won gradual recognition aims at reading a text while being conscious of the different ways in which it has been interpreted in the course of time. it is a technique of analyzing the history of a text’s influences and effects. it examines the way the bible had been interpreted in different historical eras under the influence of the concerns readers have brought to the text. in the english world, wirkungsgeschichte has been rendered by at least three names: “reception history”, “history of influence” or “history of effects.” all these names attempt to describe the sum total of varied interpretations and appropriations of a text which have been made through history. the pontifical biblical commission’s document the interpretation of the bible in the church (1993) translates wirkungsgeschichte into english as “history of the influence of the text” and considers it as one of the approaches based on tradition, alongside canonical approach and recourse to jewish traditions of interpretation.3 this approach to the text which we call wirkungsgeschichte, although not entirely unknown in antiquity, was developed in literary studies between 1960 and 1970 at a time when literary criticism became interested in the relation between a text and its readers. as the 1993 pbc document confirms: the mutual presence to each other of text and readers creates its own dynamic, for the text exercises an influence and provokes reactions. it makes a resonant claim that is heard by readers … the reader is in any case never an isolated subject. he or she belongs to a social context and lives within a tradition. readers come to the text with their own questions, exercise certain selectivity, propose an interpretation and, in the end, are able to create a further work or else take initiatives inspired directly from their reading of scripture.4 wirkungsgeschichte reminds us that a text has history – a history that begins after it has left the hands of its author. hence, biblical studies should not only be focused on the hypothetical reconstruction of events that led up to the writing, for instance, of the new testament, but likewise pay attention to the varied ways on how the texts have been handled in history. it is widely recognized that the person responsible for pushing this way of reading biblical texts is the swiss scholar ulrich luz as exemplified in his threevolume commentary on the gospel of matthew. writing this commentary, luz realizes that he consistently found greater inspiration in the attempt to understand matthew by going to luther, calvin and the like, than he did when he delved into the morass of historical-critical works of scholarship of the last century or so. for luz, the study of a text’s reception history can also shed light on the origins of a document. 5 this approach (of wirkungsgeschichte) has likewise been the focus and intention of the new blackwell series of bible commentaries. in its preface the series editors declare their aim: “readers should be given a representative sampling of material from different ages, with emphasis on interpretations which have been especially influential or historically significant.”6 certainly, the growing number of commentaries recently published on the history of interpretation of various books of the bible reflects the increasing interest in wirkungsgeschichtliche studies in the field of biblical hermeneutics. it is in this light that i wish to employ this method called wirkungsgeschichte to a controversial text such as romans 13:1-7 as a case study. 1. the passage itself in this self-contained literary unit, the apostle paul shows that the roman christians have an inescapable political responsibility towards the imperial rome, as he 2 exhorts them to be subject to the imperial authorities affirming that civil authority is divinely instituted (vv. 1-2), and claiming that rulers reward good and punish evil (vv. 34). part and parcel of what it truly means to be subject is to pay taxes (vv. 6-7). this exhortation to the roman christians to be subject to the political “powers that be” is unique in several ways: (a) it is the clearest passage in the whole new testament dealing with the relationship of the christian to the civil authority; (b) it is the only one of the kind in his genuine letters in respect to form and subject matter; and (c) specifically, romans is the only extant letter of paul where the issue of taxes is raised. this text can be considered the most significant text from the emerging church dealing with the roman empire. being so, the passage has received the careful attention and analysis of exegetes and commentators throughout the history of christianity. its exegesis and hermeneutical implications are among the most discussed in the history of nt interpretation. no biblical text has received more attention in public debate and church-state conflict than rom 13:1-7. take a brief glance at how some nt scholars have described rom 13:1-7, a veritable crux interpretum: “[rom 13:1-7 is] perhaps the strangest and most controversial passage in the entire letter” (brendan byrne7); “rom 13.1-7 is arguably the most historically influential paragraph paul ever wrote.” (robert morgan8); “chapter 13:1-7 … became perhaps the most influential part of the new testament on the level of world history. this happened in spite of the fact that the interpretation of the passage has never been found easy and is nowadays more disputed than ever before.” (ernst bammel9); “these verses have caused more unhappiness and misery in the christian east and west than any other seven verses in the new testament by the license they have given to tyrants …as a result of the presence of rom 13 in the canon.” (j.c. o’neill10); [rom 13:1-7 has] “caused perhaps the greatest perplexity on the part of exegetes of romans.” (a. j. guerra11). 3 “ich hoffe ja immer noch im innersten meines herzens, daß paulus röm 13,1-7 nicht geschrieben hat…” (e. schweizer12). throughout the centuries, the text of rom 13:1-7 has provided “a foundation for the discussion of church-state relations and of christian obedience even to non-christian rulers, and it has placed a limit on the christian conception of the right of resistance.”13 ecclesiastics and political leaders have used this passage to justify various political orders, be they benevolent or oppressive in practice. in the middle ages, for instance, vv. 3-4 of rom 13 were often combined with luke 22: 38-39 (“lord, look, here are two swords.”) to justify the medieval church’s exercising political power. against john of salisbury (policratus 8) and st. thomas aquinas (summa theologica ii, 2, 42, art. 2), the council of constance (1415) decided that rom 13:1-7 forbade tyrannicide.14 during the time of the reformation, martin luther used this text in his lectures on romans in 1515 as a springboard for a systematic functional division between church and state as he criticized the temporal affairs of the contemporary roman catholic church.15 this passage has likewise served as a justification for unquestioned obedience to the third reich in germany and the subjection of christians to the atheistic communist regimes in eastern europe during the cold war.16 these are just a few examples of the use and misuse of rom 13:1-7 in history where paul’s voice has sometimes been pressed to serve the ungodly and inhumane forces. 2. the wirkungsgeschichte of rom 13:1-7 for a biblical text that has a remarkably wide realm of influence, which includes areas of religion, law, political philosophy, public administration, education, among others, a knowledge and appreciation of its wirkungsgeschichte is crucial – for only a retrospective glance into the past will provide us the necessary background for the understanding of the origins and development of the varied trends or tendencies of interpretation of this text. yet not wanting to be thoroughly exhaustive in our present treatment, this paper limits its focus on the history of the influence of the effects of rom 13:1-7 on writers during the patristic period. 4 a. the new testament period only occasionally did nt writers reflect upon christian responsibility towards secular powers. living in an empire ruled by one man and struggling for their survival as a church, nt writers were ambivalent about political matters. depending on the sitz-imleben of the document and the particular problem to which the author wishes to respond to, the nt demonstrates a wide range of attitudes and responses towards civil authority. one of such responses is paul’s exhortation in rom 13:1-7 – a passage claimed to be the most important nt document from the early period next to mark 12:17 (“give to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to god the things that are god’s”). the other later nt passages which give guidance on the proper attitude of christians towards the secular authorities (e.g., 1 tim 2:1-2; tit 3:1; 1 pet 2:13-17) were considered by scholars as the earliest commentaries of rom 13:1-7.17 in spite of the different attitudes towards civil authority that we find in the nt – from subordination (e.g. rom 13:1-7), critical distancing (e.g., mark 12:13-17), to resistance (revelation 13) – “on the whole, christian interpreters have tended to find the norm in the response of subordination to the state.”18 this does not, however, claim that submission to civil rulers is not without limits since it ceases when the line between honor and worship is transgressed (cf. acts 5:29). b. apostolic fathers while none of the so-called apostolic fathers explicitly cited rom 13:1-7, yet allusions of the pauline exhortation can probably be detected in their writings. scholars, for instance, have noticed certain similarities between 1 clement (96 c.e.) and rom 13.19 in writing to the corinthians after successive periods of persecution during the reign of domitian, clement of rome included a beautiful and famous prayer which forms a concluding part of his letter on behalf of secular rulers: you, master, have given them the power of sovereignty through your majestic and inexpressible might, so that we, acknowledging the glory and honor which you have given them, may be subject to them, resisting your will in nothing. grant them, lord, health, harmony, 5 and stability, that they may blamelessly administer the government which you have given them.20 this part of the prayer has been termed ‘a grand testimony’ to the profound conviction of early christianity that the authority of the civil rulers is from god (cf. rom 13:1). clement does not go beyond the apostle paul’s conception of the sanctity of government. the late bible scholar raymond brown is convinced that the author of 1 clement was familiar with the pauline exhortation.21 hence, the statement in 1 clement is viewed as the earliest allusion to rom 13:1-7. polycarp of smyrna reveals another example of second century christian attitude with respect to civil authority. in his epistle to the philippians (ca. 135 c.e.), polycarp urges his readers to pray for emperors, authorities and rulers, including their persecutors (12:3).22 in the work martyrdom of polycarp (ca. 156-160 c.e.) there is a dialog between polycarp and the political rulers where he said, “you, i should deem worthy of an account; for we have been taught to render honor, as is befitting, to rulers and authorities appointed by god.”23 it is difficult to ascertain whether this statement is an allusion to rom 13:1-7. in general, there is little that we know about rom 13 during the period of the apostolic fathers, yet their writings generally reflect the tradition of respectful submission to political power and their divinely established rule. this is despite of the fact that christianity was denounced as a religio illicita from about 118 c.e. onwards, which brought about sporadic, and on occasions, severe persecutions. they resisted the state unto death when it required the kuvrio~ kaì sar of them.24 their only fear was idolatry, that is, when the roman authorities demanded from christians the acknowledgment of the divinity of the emperor. there is probably another reason for the apparent absence of rom 13:1-7 in the period of the apostolic fathers. no christian writer before 150 c.e., or even before 180 c.e., ever refers to it or quotes it.25 in fact, in marcion’s text of the epistle of paul to the romans, the pericope was apparently omitted or deleted since his chapter 13 starts immediately with verse 8b. bruce metzger reminds us that, “[t]he apostolic fathers seldom make express citations from new testament writings.”26 why? the answer is aptly given by robert badenas who states, “during the 6 first 150 years of our era, the greatest part of christian exegesis was that of the old testament. its main concern was to prove that the hebrew scriptures have been fulfilled in jesus the messiah.”27 c. the apologists realities gradually changed during the period of the apologists in the second half of the second century. because the eschatological belief had largely faded, the early church had to reckon with the world. during this period, christianity was perceived by many roman officials as a movement that contributed to political unrest, and hence a movement to be wary.28 as the apologists began to argue with the graeco-roman world they defended christianity against false teachings and representations. they tried to convince the romans that the christians were no anarchists and revolutionaries; but were in fact good citizens, if not the best citizens of the emperor. they appealed to the emperors for recognition or, at the least, toleration.29 yet, except for theophilus of antioch, none of the second-century apologists directly quoted rom 13:1-7 as an apologetic argument to demonstrate the loyalty of christians to the roman empire. it must have been difficult for the early christians to wrestle with the idea that even pagan and sometimes persecuting rulers derive their authority from god. writing to his friend autolycus (ca. 181 c.e.), theophilus of antioch states: accordingly, i will pay honour to the emperor not by worshipping him but by praying for him. i worship the god who is the real and true god, since i know that the emperor was made by him. you will say to me, ‘why do you not worship the emperor?’ because he was made not to be worshipped but to be honoured with legitimate honour. he is not god but a man appointed by god [cf. rom 13:1], not to be worshipped but to judge justly. for in a certain way he has been entrusted with a stewardship [1 cor 9:17] from god. … similarly worship must be given to god alone.30 that the emperor is no god but a person appointed by god reflects rom 13:1. when synthesizing the christian teaching on secular rulers, theophilus laid emphasis on rom 13: jeti mh;n kai; peri; tou` ujpotavssesqai ajrcai`~ kai; ejxousivai~ kai; eu[cesqai ujpe;r aujtw`n keleuvei hjma~ oj qei`o~ lovgo~, o{pw~ 7 h[remon kai hjsuvcion bivon diavgwmen. kai; didavskei ajpodidovnai pa`sin ta; pavnta, tw`/ th;n timh;n th;n timh;n, tw`/ to;n fovbon to;n fovbon, tw`/ to;n fovron to;n fovron, mhdevni mhde;n ojfelei`n h] movnon to; ajgapa`n pavnta~.31 tw/` the words ujpotavssesqai ajrcai`~ kai; ejxousivai~ are probably an allusion to rom 13:1-3. the passage tw`/ th;n timh;n th;n timh;n, tw`/ to;n fovbon to;n fovbon, tw`/ to;n fovron to;n fovron, mhdevni mhde;n ojfelei`n h] movnon to; ajgapa`n pavnta~ is almost literally taken from rom 13:7-8a.32 this explicit citation of rom 13:7 (-8a) by theophilus seems to be the oldest extant quotation of rom 13 in its political sense in patristic literature at the end of the second century. d. anti-heretical literature the second century is also characterized by christianity defending itself not only against the enemies from without, but also from enemies from within, namely gnosticism and montanism. for instance, in its fondness for dualistic thought, gnostic heresy teaches that humanity is enslaved under hostile, cosmic powers. this world lies under the bondage of the a[rconte~ (‘rulers’) whose god is satan. it is in this context that the greek church father irenaeus extensively referred to rom 13:1-7 in his adversus haereses to discuss the origin of government, of the circumstances which made the government necessary, and the purpose which it is intended to serve. he was the first ecclesiastical writer to clearly quote rom 13:1-7 against the gnostic demonological interpretation of the text by illustrating that power over the kingdoms of this world belongs to god, and not satan.33 in adversus haereses he emphatically denies the gnostics’ claim that the government/state is a creature of satan, but of god. irenaeus strongly argues that “the powers that be” referred to by paul in rom 13 are human authorities, not as demonic or angelic powers, or invisible rulers, as some gnostics claimed.34 furthermore, irenaeus argues that a demonological interpretation of rom 13 is mistaken since paul in v. 6 tells his readers to pay taxes: “propter hoc enim et tributa praestatis, ministri enim dei sunt in hoc ipsum deservientes.”35 one does not pay taxes to angelic powers, but only to human authorities. irenaeus was also the first among the fathers to express the view that the state is a necessity because of human sin and is a divinely appointed remedy to it. government, according to irenaeus, became necessary 8 because humans departed from god and hated their fellowmen and fell into confusion and disorder of every kind. irenaeus further explains, earthly rule, therefore, has been appointed by god for the benefit of nations… so that under the fear of human rule, men may not eat each other up like fishes, but that, by means of the establishment of laws, they may keep down an excess of wickedness among the nations.36 by implication, irenaeus is saying that had humanity not sinned, there would have been no government. a perfect society has no need for civil rulers. political authority has been developed in order to oppose savagery and crime. hence, the origin of authority lay in sin, and not as a natural consequence of human nature as such. e. the church of the third century the christians heeded paul’s advice to submit to the divinely-bestowed secular powers as long as it did not conflict with the commands of god. the roman empire, however, was not contented with a qualified obedience. consequently, persecutions of christians became worse during the third century.37 the pagan rulers persecuted the christians because they would not venerate the gods, upon whose good will the empire’s well-being depended. these rulers interpreted the refusal of christians to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor as political disloyalty.38 in the description of luise schottroff, “… the accused christians made a declaration of loyalty in the sense of rom 13:1-7, and in spite of this they were executed.”39 the writings of tertullian and origen, for instance, mirror the antagonism that christians experienced in their dealings with the empire and society during this period. tertullian (ca. 160-230 c.e.), a latin church father and a patriotic roman citizen who lived in africa, loved and admired the empire, but detested its religion. “of all the writers of the early period, tertullian shows the greatest reserve towards the state,” kurt aland writes.40 he labored to make a case for pacifism and fought for christians’ religious freedom. he wrote at length to debunk the allegation that christians were a subversive society: “a christian is an enemy to no man – certainly not to the emperor, for he knows that it is by his god that the emperor has been appointed. he is bound 9 therefore to love him, to revere him, to honour him….”41 in effect, tertullian is saying that there is no incompatibility between the christians and the emperor. in fact, he regards the emperor as human being next to god and without any rival on earth. in his other writing, scorpiace xiv, tertullian loosely quotes rom 13:1-4 to emphasize that the political order must be respected and that temporal power is a minister of god for their good.42 since tertullian was writing against the background of actual persecution, the virtue of martyrdom becomes a strong force in his interpretation of rom 13. he saw in the pauline exhortation a providential guarantee and justification of his own patriotism. 43 like irenaeus, tertullian “had to find a compromise acceptable both to themselves and to the emperor – if only to stop the persecutions that were depleting their ranks.”44 yet, he never conceded to the divinization of the imperial power. finally, history will remember tertullian for his famous saying, “the blood of martyrs is the seed of christians.”45 in his commentary on daniel (iii. 23), hippolytus of rome (who died as a martyr in 235 c.e.) identifies rome with the fourth beast, permitted to rampage, yet doomed to be destroyed by the fifth empire of christ and his church. in that same commentary he mentions rom 13:1-4 in order to exhort obedience to all governing authorities so long as they do not ask christians to disown their faith.46 in the meantime, while they are awaiting the downfall of “babylon”, christians should continue to “subsidize it [roman empire] by their taxes and obey its laws and magistrates unless there was direct conflict with obedience to god.”47 at a time when the pagan romans deified the secular order and even identified it with the religious, how should christians relate to the secular, temporal order? should they completely withdraw from the secular perceived to be evil, and cling to the religious exclusively? these were the pressing concerns of the christian church at the time of origen. born in alexandria of christian parents, origen (ca. 185–254 c.e.) is often regarded as the greatest and the most learned of the early greek fathers. he devoted himself to a systematic explanation of the scriptures. in his exegesis of matt 22:21 (“give therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to god the things that are god’s”), origen gives a completely new interpretation: caesar refers to the 10 prince of this world, the devil, and before we can come to god, we must divest ourselves of all that is of this world, handing it over to its possessor, the devil.48 for origen, this text never meant at all that we are to obey the secular powers as we obey god. thus, when he comes to paul’s exhortation in rom 13:1-7 (of which he is considered as its earliest commentator49), he is confronted with a real difficulty. what does he do with the text? origen interprets rom 13:1 with matt 22:21 as background so that for him the pauline text becomes an authority for the radical distinction between church and state.50 according to origen, paul has rightly employed the term “every soul” (omnis anima), instead of “every spirit” in rom 13:1. origen is here obviously influenced by the trichotomous anthropological structure, which he partly borrowed from paul, where the human person is seen as a hierarchy of body, animating soul, and spirit.51 the audience that paul is addressing, in the mind of origen, is considered somewhere between the weak flesh and the willing spirit. the soul signifies that humans, by reason of their imperfection, are still bound to this world, and subsequently subject to the higher powers of this world. on the contrary, the “just,” the “perfect,” or the “spiritual ones” (or still the “pneumatic” persons) are exempt from obedience to these powers, because in them the “spirit” is already in control. it means that the closer the humans come to god the more they live by the “spirit”, the less need there would be for temporal powers. origen states that if we are so …joined unto the lord that we are one spirit in him, we are said to be subject to the lord. but if we are not yet such, but still share the common ‘soul,’ that has within itself something of the ‘world,’ then the precept of the apostle [paul] must be followed and we are obliged to subject ourselves to the powers that be.52 with matt 22:21 at the backdrop of his interpretation of rom 13:1, origen’s distinction between “soul” and “spirit” becomes the equivalent of the difference between “caesar” and “god”. having lived his whole life under a government that was opposed to christians, origen interprets rom 13:2 (“whoever resists authority resists what god has appointed”) as not applying to pagan potestates who persecute the faith, but only to those who are going about their proper business.53 the civil authority exists only for the wrongdoer and their power does not extend to the just and the perfect. obedience to the [state’s] commands can be exacted only if they are not in contradiction to the divine 11 law. origen appeals to acts 5:29 (“we must obey god rather than any human authority.”) to justify his restriction of v. 2, “a qualification that grants readers the moral space to resist some governments.”54 for origen, christian subordination to the worldly powers is merely a matter of expediency, that is, in order to avoid greater calamities. to sum up: origen, who is probably the earliest commentator of rom 13:1-7, employs an anthropological argument (yuchv – anima in v. 1) to narrow down the proper audience of this pauline exhortation. he likewise uses a scriptural argument (by appealing to acts 5:29) to narrow the kind of government against whom resistance means resistance toward god. these two arguments provide the door out of an absolute, universal reading of rom 13:1-7. f. the golden age of the fourth and early fifth-century by april 313 c.e., constantine and licinius, the two rulers of the entire roman world, published the so-called edict of milan which contained their new religious policy of complete tolerance for every kind of cult that might be practiced within their territory.55 as far as christianity is concerned, this was a landmark since it meant the recognition of the christian church as a religio licita, hence, the formal end to the persecution of christians in constantine’s domains, and the restitution of previously confiscated christian properties.56 constantine elevated “christianity to a privileged position among the religions of the roman empire.”57 after constantine, except for the brief reign of julian (361-363), all succeeding emperors were christians. things have changed for both the empire and the church from the fourth century onwards. a christianizing empire entails an alliance between empire and church – a relationship that was not without risks. k. m. setton has accurately described the situation: “with the christianization of the empire, however, and the growing power of the universal church the question arose whether the church was in the state or the state was in the church.” 58 but what about when emperors intrude directly in the internal affairs of the church, as it happened with some of constantine’s successors?59 can she just condescend to the rulers’ whims? is the christian religion merely a department of the state? how would they interpret paul’s exhortation in rom 13 given their particular situation? as the imperial authorities in the late fourth century became more and more connected with the 12 false doctrine of arianism, the western church saw herself slowly separating from these rulers as she became more conscious of her autonomy. this consciousness of autonomy would lead her “to confront the emperor with her demands even when he was a ‘good’ emperor, and to subject him and his office to the demands of the christian message instead of placing herself at his disposal and obeying his order.”60 these are the concerns of the fathers during this period of church-state alliance as the church redefines her role in the socio-political sphere. basil the great. a fine example of the close bond between the imperium and the sacerdotium in the eastern church is in the person of basil the great (ca. 330-379 c.e.), one of the three great cappadocian fathers. commenting on rom 13: 3-4, basil stresses on the two functions of the government and its rulers, namely the power to punish and the power to foster the common welfare of society. 61 it is clear to basil that the divinelyordained imperium is not merely confined to its punitive function, but also necessary for the attainment of the society’s common good. in basil we find a view of civil authority that is prelapsarian, i.e., the authority and power of the imperium is necessary for society regardless of original sin.62 epiphanius of salamis. the greek bishop epiphanius (315-403 c.e.) shares basil’s conviction of the ordering function of civil authority for the sake of the common good. in his principal work panarion (40.6), epiphanius states: “and authorities exist for this reason, the good ordering and disposition of all god’s creatures in an orderly system for the governance of the world.”63 quoting freely rom 13:1-4 in panarion (40.4), he deduces that civil authorities are ordained by god, “for the sake of the good” (ujpe;r toù ajgaqoù ) and “for the sake of the truth” (ujpe;r th ~̀ ajlhqeiva~ ).64 john chrysostom. he was appointed to the special duty of preaching in the principal church of the city of antioch from 386-397 c.e. he loved so much the letters of paul that he wrote a complete collection of homilies on them. of the 32 homilies he wrote on romans, homily 23 is a commentary primarily devoted to rom 13:1-7. it is a compact treaty on christian political thought – on the origin, nature and properties of authority. according to chrysostom, the exhortation to be subject to civil authority in 13 rom 13:1 includes even ecclesiastical authorities (priests and monks), not merely the laity. pa s̀a yuchv (“every soul”) exempts no one from paul’s exhortation. in the same homily, chrysostom elevates the submission of citizens to civil authority to the level of a religious duty. submission to civil authority is something not paid to any human being, but to god who framed these laws.65 authority is natural and submission universal (e.g., relationships of man and wife, father and son, old and young, free and slaves, master and disciple). anarchy of all sorts is evil and cause of confusion. while his esteem of civil authorities is remarkable, when provoked he insists on the superiority of ecclesiastical powers over civil authority.66 when empress eudoxia opposed him, chrysostom stood his ground and refused to compromise. chrysostom is in consonance with other patristic writers in teaching that secular authority is the result of sin; it is because of our depravity. as to the historical background of rom 13:1-7, he conjectures that the text was intended to refute the charge of fostering revolutionary activities, a conjecture that is without any historical backing.67 ambrose. an important figure in the history of the evolution of imperiumsacerdotium relations in the western church is ambrose, bishop of milan (333-397 c.e.). it was he who courageously challenged the christian emperor theodosius when he thought that the latter behaved unjustly and unbecomingly of his authority by excommunicating him until he did public penance.68 ambrose regards the imperium and sacerdotium as two independent authorities, each autonomous within its own sphere, but both must collaborate. drawing inspiration from rom 13, ambrose affirms that no power is intrinsically evil but what is evil is ambition and abuse (“non ergo potestas male, sed ambitio”). the ruler is only truly dei minister if he makes proper use of his power. ambrose insists on the complete immunity of the church from imperial interference in ecclesiastical and religious matters.69 “priestly power and secular authority might be parallel, but parallels never meet. of the [two] swords, the ecclesiastical was the sharper.”70 the emperor is a son of the church and must submit to the authority of the church: “imperator enim intra ecclesiam, non supra ecclesiam est.”71 14 ambrosiaster.72 he was an early exponent of the divine rights of kings. it was he who coined the maxim: “dei enim imaginem habet rex, sicut et episcopus christi.” 73 the king is some sort of an “imago dei”, while the bishop typifies god the son. in another passage he speaks of the king as vicarius dei (“vicar of god”) – a concept that will be repeated in the middle ages. by placing the king next to god, he deserves adoratio in terris, a privilege which no other official on earth shares. ambrosiaster considers the king to be above the law.74 he sees the obligation to obey rulers in rom 13:1 as “the law of heavenly justice.” explaining v. 3, ambrosiaster asserts that even pagan rulers must be obeyed since god also appoints them and they enforce god’s order.75 jerome. quoting rom 13:1 in his commentary on the epistle to titus, jerome explains the historical setting of paul’s insistence on civil obedience. according to jerome, what provoked paul was to warn against the christian judaizers who were still expecting the overthrow of rome and the establishment of the temporal messianic kingdom.76 paul feared that judas galilaeus and his teachings had still followers among some christians. these christians refused obedience to civil authorities and, moreover, were rebellious toward rome, the seat of the empire.77 in this same commentary, jerome explains that the greek word ajrcaiv (as found in tit 3:1) means principalities rather than princes, hence, this refers to the power itself, not the persons who are in power. 78 like chrysostom and ambrosiaster, jerome differentiates between the “power” and the “ruler”. pelagius. an interesting feature of pelagius’ commentary on romans is the presence of alternative interpretations besides the commonly accepted one. thus, his alternative interpretation of the “powers that be” in rom 13:1 includes ecclesiastical authorities: “possunt sublimiores potestates ecclesiasticae dignitates intellegi.”79 in v. 4 pelagius asserts that priests bear a spiritual sword “as when peter struck down ananias and paul, the sorcerer” (cf. acts 5:1-6; 13:4-12).80 he is the only patristic writer who extends the pauline demand of paying taxes in rom 13:7 to almsgiving.81 like jerome, pelagius also identifies the historical context of rom 13:1-7 as being addressed to certain christians who had misinterpreted their christian freedom as license to ignore the 15 authorities or not to pay taxes.82 the apostle’s intention was to correct their wrong attitude and to humble down their pride. in pelagius’ mind this attitude is dangerous because it reflects badly on christ. the haughtiness of these christians may lead the pagan public to believe that christ taught his disciples to be proud. in short, pelagius seems to be “concerned more about the misconceptions that an antinomian attitude in christians will convey about christ than about disruption to orderly society.”83 augustine. as a prolific and persuasive writer, augustine’s thought dominated the philosophy, theology, and ethics of the middle ages.84 emperors and popes would appeal to his political thought “for support in their age-long contest for the supreme power: the former to vindicate their independence in secular affairs, and the latter to prove their lordship over all other earthly potentates, whether temporal or spiritual.”85 while augustine’s political thought is no longer merely an exegesis of rom 13, as parsons observes, still that passage exercises a profound influence.86 his writings (like de civitate dei, letters, sermons, retractions, and anti-donatist writings) frequently cited rom 13 when speaking about the legitimation of the authority of civil rulers over christians.87 he likewise employed that pauline text to remind christian political rulers of their religious obligation to govern justly.88 from his expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad romanos (sections 72-74), which he wrote around the time he became a bishop (ca. 394-395 c.e.), one finds a commentary on rom 13.89 commenting on v. 1 augustine states that paul was perfectly right when he warned the christians lest anyone, because his lord has called him to liberty and made him a christian, be exalted by pride. and let him not suppose that in this life’s journey he should not keep his place, nor let him suppose he ought not be subordinate to those higher authorities who, for the time being, may govern temporal things.90 submission to temporal powers signifies a kind of humility – a recognition of one’s partiality and finitude. subsequently, anarchy is never an option for christians.91 augustine maintains that christians err greatly when they think that they do not need to pay taxes or tribute, nor to show respect due to those authorities which look after 16 temporal life: “si quis ergo putat, quoniam christianus est, non sibi esse vectigal reddendum aut tributum aut non esse exhibendum honorem debitum eis, qui haec curant potestatibus, in magno errore versatur.”92 conversely, christians commit greater error when they surrender their faith on the pretext of submission to higher authorities administering temporal affairs.93 in this regard, augustine soundly prescribes the dominical saying: “give therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to god’s the things that are god’s” (matt 22:21). while never losing sight of the christian’s final destination, a kingdom where temporal authority is no longer necessary, augustine, nevertheless, exhorts the christians to endure the present condition for the sake of daily social order.94 in this same commentary on rom 13, augustine likewise implies that subordination to higher authorities belongs to the very nature of humans: for we are both soul and body [anima et corpora], and however long we exist in this temporal life, we use temporal things to support it. thus it behooves us in our temporal, physical aspect to be subject to the authorities, that is, to the men who administer human affairs in some office.95 in fact, these words furnished the middle ages the foundation of the concept of human unity: the human person is a composite being of body and soul.96 at one time, augustine quoting rom 13:1 from memory wrote ordo (order) instead of potestas (authority): “all order is of god” (omnis ordo a deo est). years later when he corrected himself, augustine argued that although he had misquoted the text there was truth in it.97 for the text would mean something like, “all that is, is ordered by god”. the original slip clearly reveals his understanding of political authority, i.e., the idea of order. potestas, which comes from god, is subject to his ordering. in augustine’s mind, ‘order’ (ordo) is “that which if we follow it in our lives, will lead us to god.”98 the ordering of a complex society, like the state, towards the common good of earthly peace can be effective only through the exercise of authority. augustine’s predecessors usually have recourse to the words of peter, “we must obey god rather than man” (acts 5: 29), in order to exempt anybody from submitting to unjust and sinful commands. for him, however, faith and morals are not subject to 17 secular government, as the soul is not subject to the body. he states: “but concerning our spiritual selves, by which we believe in god and are called into his kingdom, we should not submit to any man desiring to destroy that very thing in us through which god deigned to give eternal life.”99 subjection to civil rulers involves only the “necessaries of this life.”100 civil rulers must not interfere with human’s spiritual allegiance, for god’s and caesar’s are distinct – an assertion we already saw in ambrose. in one of his sermons, after citing rom 13:1-2, augustine deals with the problem, “what if the ruler commands what one ought not to do?” his answer is plain and simple: “do not obey evil commands!”, “despise the power”!101 he warns that the civil ruler may threaten one with prison, but god threatens with hell. a god-impregnated state is augustine’s ideal. since the ruler is also a minister of god (rom 13:4), augustine holds that the king has the duty to forward the interests of the true religion, a thought which was taken seriously in the middle ages as exemplified in the history of charlemagne. in his letter 93, augustine exclaims, “let the kings of the earth serve christ even by making laws in behalf of god.”102 in that same letter he appealed to rom 13:1-3 as a biblical warrant justifying the state’s use of compulsion to make people good. thus, for instance, he claims: “but the donatists are much too active and it seems to me it would be advisable for them to be restrained and corrected by the powers established by god.”103 to sum up: augustine has appealed to rom 13 in many of his writings to explain the origin, nature, purpose, and even limits of political authority. at the same time, he has used the text as an exegetical warrant to justify the government’s prosecution of the church’s enemies. while there are those authors who emphasize that for augustine civil authority had been brought into existence by the sinful condition of humankind, that is, as the necessary result of adam’s fall and of humanity’s consequent propensity toward sin, there are also others who argue for the “naturalness” of the state. this implies that political rule would have been present even if humanity had never sinned. augustine holds that christians owe the state full cooperation and subjection. the state takes care of the bodily aspects of human life. it must not, however, interfere with human’s 18 spiritual allegiance.104 when the temporal ruler contravenes a divine command, then it ceases its legitimate authority to be obeyed. disobedience in that case becomes a duty. summary and conclusion by way of conclusion, we draw the following summarizing statements based on the wirkungsgeschichte of paul’s exhortation in rom 13:1-7 during the period of christian antiquity. 1. the seeming allusions or references to this passage by the apostolic fathers are difficult to establish since they may well derive from oral tradition rather than witness to the written text. the apologists employed this passage as a valuable apologetic argument to demonstrate the loyalty of christians to the roman empire. theophilus’ citation of rom 13:7 seems to be the oldest extant reference to the exhortation. irenaeus was the first patristic writer to clearly cite the whole passage. origen, however, was the first commentator of rom 13:1-7. 2. there is no doubt that the patristic writers understood rom 13:1-7 politically and even expounded it. they appealed to the text when speaking about the origin, nature, and extent of political authority and subjection. except for pelagius who offers an alternative interpretation, the fathers interpreted ejxousiva / potestas in rom 13 as the earthly, civil authorities. as to the origin of civil authority, the patristic writers, following rom 13, maintain that government is a divine institution. thus, “caesar” is a minister of god, because his power comes from god. the “caesar” has a claim on people’s conscience. christian liberty does not exempt anyone from subordination, not even ecclesiastical authorities. 3. the patristic writers developed different attitudes towards civil authority. there were those who taught that the necessity of civil authority and institutional subjection was the result of sin (e.g., irenaeus, john chrysostom). it was made necessary because humans departed from god, hated their fellowmen, and fell into confusion and disorder. thus, law and government were regarded as coercive restraints over evil passions. the implication is that if humanity had not sinned, there would have been no 19 political rule. but there were those, especially represented by eastern fathers basil and epiphanius, who attributed the origin of the state as a natural consequence of human nature itself, and not merely to sin. common good requires the establishment of a directive or “ordering” power of the imperium for the sake of peace and harmony among the people. accordingly, the political obligation to submit to civil authority is grounded in the law of god and nature. 4. aware that the rulers may abuse the authority instituted by god, the patristic writers in their interpretation of potestas in rom 13:1 have always distinguished between the power (‘government’) and the ruler (‘governor’). the former is of divine origin, while the latter human. paul’s exhortation, in the mind of the fathers, is speaking of authority in general, and not of individual rulers. authority is not intrinsically evil; it is rather the abuse of power that is reprehensible (e.g., ambrose). the king shall derive his name from right acting. the good ruler is the imago dei and vicarius dei, placed second to god without any rival on earth (tertullian and ambrosiaster). laws do not bind him, though still subject to the divine laws. 5. the patristic writers condemned all kinds of armed attacks, rebellion, usurpation against the sovereign, even if such a ruler is evil (e.g., irenaeus, ambrose, john chrysostom, augustine). yet, political authority and subjection was not without limits. because of the apparent absolute, unconditional tone of rom 13:1-7, some of the fathers created a kind of exegetical space to narrow down the passage by appealing and relating it to other nt texts (e.g., matt 22: 21; acts 5: 29; 1 pet 2: 13-17). even under threat of martyrdom, the fathers never conceded to the divinization of the emperor. in fact, passive resistance leading to martyrdom was seen as a duty, for it is god who must be obeyed rather than humans. they honored the emperor, but they feared god alone. 6. while recognizing that the church and state are two independent authorities, each autonomous in its own sphere, ambrose was the first church father who ever dared to intervene decisively in temporal affairs in order “to insist that the public acts of the emperor or of the government should conform to the canons approved by the christian 20 reason and conscience.”105 the church exercises jurisdiction over all christian people, even over the chief of state. 7. lastly, the period of antiquity witnessed a shift from a non-christian setting in the first three centuries, that is occasionally hostile toward christians, to a christianizing empire in the fourth century, and then finally to a christianized empire in the fifth century. yet in spite of these shifting contexts there is a continuity of teaching among patristic writers on the pauline exhortation to be subject to the civil powers that god allows to rule, with a caveat, i.e., provided they do not contradict divine commands. christians are the emperor’s subjects, but they are first and foremost god’s. 21 1 wirkung could mean “impact” or “effect”, while wirden can be translated as “to work” or “to weave”. 2 hans-georg gadamer coined the term to describe the way that history works on and within interpretation ( wahrheit und methode: grundzüge einer philosophischen hermeneutik [tübingen: mohr, 1960]). 3 see part i c of the pontifical biblical commission (pbc) document. 4 j. l. houlden (ed.), the interpretation of the bible in the church (london: scm press ltd, 1995) 32. 5 see ulrich luz, matthew in history, interpretation, influence and effects (minneapolis: fortress, 1994). 6 judith kovacs & christopher rowland, revelation (oxford: blackwell publishing, 2004) xii. 7 brendan byrne, romans (sacra pagina, 6; collegeville, mn: liturgical press, 1996) 385. 8 robert morgan, romans (new testament guides; sheffield: sheffield academic press, 1995) 134-135. 9 ernst bammel, “romans 13,” in jesus and the politics of his day (ed. ernst bammel & c.f.d. moule; cambridge: cambridge university press, 1984) 365-383, esp. 365. 10 j. c. o’neill, paul’s letter to the romans (pntc; london: penguin, 1975) 209. 11 anthony j. guerra, romans and the apologetic tradition: the purpose, genre and audience of paul’s letter (sntsms, 81; cambridge: cambridge university press, 1995) 160. 12 cited in ulrich wilckens, “die gehorsam gegen die behörden des staates im tun des gutes zu römer 13,1-7,” dimensions de la vie chrétienne [röm 12-13] (série monographique de benedictina, 4; rome, 1979) 85-150, esp. 133. 13 richard a. muller, “calvin, beza, and the exegetical history of romans 13:1-7,” in the identity of geneva: the christian commonwealth, 1564-1864 (ed. john b. roney & martin i. klauber; constitutions to the study of world history, 59; westport, cn – london: greenwood press, 1998) 39-56, esp. 39. 14 morgan, romans, 135. 15 martin luther, lectures on romans (trans. & ed. wilhelm pauck; library of christian classics, 15; louisville, ky: westminster/john knox press, 1996) 358-366. 16 see a. f. c. webster, “st. paul’s political advice to the haughty gentile christians in rome: an exegesis of romans 13: 1-7,” st. vladimir’s theological quarterly 25 (1981) 259-282, esp. 260; ernst christian helmreich, the german churches under hitler: background, struggle, and epilogue (detroit, mi: wayne state university press, 1979; 2nd printing 1980) 343-344; neil elliot, liberating paul: the justice of god and the politics of the apostle (maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 1994) 14. 17 f. f. bruce, “paul and ‘the powers that be,” bulletin of the john rylands library 66 (1983-1984) 78-96, esp. 89; walter wink, naming the powers: the language of power in the new testament (philadelphia: fortress, 1984; 21986) 46; oscar cullmann, christ and time: the primitive christian conception of time and history (philadelphia: westminster, 1964) 197. 18 walter e. pilgrim, uneasy neighbor: church and state in the new testament (minneapolis: fortress, 1999) 184. 19 a good number of scholars have noticed the similarities between 1 clement and romans 13. see for instance, william l. lane, “roman christianity during the formative years from nero to nerva,” in judaism and christianity on first-century rome (ed. karl p. donfried; grand rapids: wm. b. eerdmans, 1998) 237. andreas lindemann, commenting on 1 clement 61.1 states: “in der sache zeigt sich hier eine große nähe zu röm 13, 1-7; daß der verfasser diesen paulinischen text kenntt, ist klar, auch wenn sich spuren einer dirkten benutzung nicht zeigen” ( die clemensbriefe [hnt, 17; tübingen: mohr, 1992] 174). w. schäfke, referring to 1 clement, writes, “eigentlich handelt es sich nur um eine interpretation von röm 13,1-7, die sich aber standing bewußt bleibt, daß der wille gottes und des herrschers sich widersprechen können” (“frühchristlicher widerstand,” anrw ii, 23.1 [berlin – new york, ny: walter de gruyter inc, 1979] 460-723, esp. 558). 20 j. b. lightfoot, the apostolic fathers, vol. i (london, 1891) 63. 21 raymond e. brown & john p. meier, antioch and rome: new testament cradles of catholic christianity (new york: paulist, 1983) 172. 22 “pro omnibus sanctis orate. orate etiam pro regibus et potestatibus et principibus atque pro persequentibus et odientibus vos et pro inimicis crucis, ut fructus vester manifestus sit in omnibus, ut sitis in illo perfecti ” see johannes b. bauer, die polykarpbriefe (kommentar zu den apostolischen vätern, 5; göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht, 1995) 72. 23 the greek text runs: “oj de; poluvkarpo~ ei\pen: se; me;n kai; lovgou hjxivwsa: dedidavgmeqa ga;r ajrcaì ~ kai; ejxousivai~ ujpo; toù qeoù tetagmevnai~ timh;n kata; to; prosh̀ kon, th;n mh; blavptousan hjmà ~ ajponevmein …” see  das martyrium des polykarp 10.2, in die apostolischen väter (ed. f. x. funk & karl bihlmeyer; tübingen: mohr, 21956) 125. commenting on this text, schäfke claims that polycarp “zitiert gegenüber dem statthalter fast wörtlich röm 13,1 – der situation gemäß aber mit deutlicher einschränkung” (frühchristlicher widerstand, 558). polycarp taught that the christians must give loyal obedience to the authorities so long as they do not attack their faith and do not force them to say that the emperor is god. the state is to be shown every honor so long as it stays with the tavxi~, the ‘order’ of god (tetagmevnai ujpo; tou' qeou' ). gerd buschmann, das martyrium des polykarp (kav, 6; göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht, 1998) 69, 127, 199, mentions rom 13 in relation to mpol 10.2. see also edouard massaux et al., the influence of the gospel of saint matthew on christian literature before saint irenaeus: book 2: the later christian writings (ngs, 5/2: macon, ga: mercer university press, 1992) 50. contra, ernst barnikol who maintains, “polykarp (70-156) kennt und nennt nichts von römer 13,1-7, weder in seinem brief an die philipper, noch bei seinem martyrium” (“ der nichtpaulinische ursprung der absoluten obrigkeitsbejahung von römer 13, 1-7,” in studien zum neuen testament und zur patristik [tu, 77; berlin: akademie, 1961] 65-133, esp. 108). 24 to cite an example, when polycarp was arrested, herod, the police captain, and his father, nicetes, tried to persuade him, saying, tiv ga;r kakovn ejstin eijpei;n: kuvrio~ kai;sar, kai; ejpiqù sai kai; ta; touvtoi~ ajkovlouqa kai; diaswvzesqai ; (“what harm is there to say ‘lord caesar’, and to offer incense and all that sort of thing, and to save yourself?”). at first polycarp did not answer them. but when they persisted, he said, ouj mevllw poiei;n, o} sumbouleuvetev moi (“i am not going to do what you advise me”). see das martyrium des polykarp, 8.2, in bihlmeyer, die apostolischen väter, 124. also cyril charles richardson, early christian fathers (library of christian classics, 1; london: scm, 1953) 152. 25 for an extensive study see barnikol, der nichtpaulinische ursprung, 65-133. on p. 81: “römer 13,1-7 fehlt gänzlich bei marcion um 130 … aus kp. 13 ist erst vers 8b durch epiphanius bezeugt, also bot marcion in seiner bibel den abschnitt 13,1-7 nicht….” 26 bruce m. metzger, the canon of the new testament. its origin, development, and significance (oxford: clarendon press, 1987; paperback edn. 1997) 40. 27 robert badenas, christ the end of the law: romans 10.4 in pauline perspective (jsntsup, 10; sheffield: sheffield academic press, 1985) 8. 28 walter h. wagner, after the apostles: christianity in the second century (minneapolis: augsburg fortress publishers, 1994) vii. 29 for example, the apology of aristides addressed to emperor antoninus pius (written ca. 138-147 c.e.) is considered the earliest defense of christianity that has come down to us. “christianity … is worthy of the emperor’s attention because it is eminently reasonable, and gives an impulse and power to live a good life” (metzger , the canon, 128). see charles munier, l’apologie de saint justin: philosophe et martyr (paradosis, 38; fribourg: éditions universitaires, 1994) 1-6, for a good background of the christian greek apologists in the second century. 30 theophilus of antioch, ad autolycum [hereafter ad autol.] (tran. robert m. grant; oxford: clarendon, 1970) 14-15. the greek text runs: toigaroù n mà llon timhvsw to;n basileva, ouj proskunw ǹ aujtw /̀, ajlla; eujcovmeno~ ujpe;r aujtoù qew de; tw /̀ o[ntw~ qew /̀ kai; ajlhqeì proskunw ,̀ eijdw;~ o{ti oj basileu;~ ujpæ aujtoù gevgonen. jereì ~ ou\n moi: „dia; tiv ouj proskuneì ~ to;n basileva óoti oujk eij~ to; proskuneì sqai gevgonen, ajlla; eij~ to; timà sqai th /̀ nomivmw/ timh̀ /. qeo;~ ga;r oujk e[stin, ajlla; a[nqrwpo~, ujpo; qeoù tetagmevno~, oujk eij~ to; proskuneì sqai, ajlla; eij~ to; dikaivw~ krivnein. trovpw/ gavr tini para; qeoù oijkonomivan pepivsteutai: ou{tw~ oujde; proskuneì sqai ajllæ h] movnw/ qew. see miroslav marcovich (ed.), tatiani oratio ad graecos: theophili antiocheni ad autolycum (berlin – new york, ny: walter de gruyter, 1995) 30. 31 english translation: “furthermore, the divine word gives us order about subordination to principalities and powers [rom 13:1-3; tit 3:1] and prayer for them, so that they may lead a quiet and tranquil life [1 tim 2:1-2]; and it teaches us to render all things to all men, honour to whom honour is due, fear to whom fear, tribute to whom tribute; to owe no man anything except to love all [rom 13,7-8].” see grant, ad autol. 3.14, 118-119. 32 here theophilus simply dropped twó to; tevlo~ to; tevlo~ and changed the sequence, as though he had read the pauline text in reverse. see edouard massaux, the influence of the gospel of saint matthew on christian literature before saint irenaeus, book 3: the apologists and the didache (ngs, 5/3; macon, ga: mercer university press, 1993) 141. 33 ernst käsemann, an die römer (hnt, 8a; tübingen: mohr, 41980) 339: “daß er erst durch irenäus, haer v, 24,1 zitiert wird, um gnostische mißdeutung der gewalten auf engelmächte abzulehnen ….” 34 “quoniam haec autem non de angelicis potestatibus nec de invisibilibus principibus dixit, quomodo quidam audent exponere, sed de his quae sunt secundum homines potestates.” see w. w. harvey, sancti irenaei lugdunensis libros quinque adversus haereses (cambridge, 1857) 388. because the gnostics misunderstood rom 13 to mean evil, metaphysical (angelic) powers, this must have been the reason why it is claimed that they rejected obedience to earthly government. 35 see a. rousseau et al. (ed.), irénée de lyon: contre les hérésies, v.24. (sources chrétiennes, 153; paris: editions du cerf, 1965) 296, 298. hereafter referred to as sc. 36 the latin text is: “ad utilitatem ergo gentilium terrenum regnum positum est a deo; …ut timentes regnum hominum, non se alterutrum homines vice piscium consumant, sed per legum positionem repercutiant multiplicem gentilium injustitiam.” see irénée de lyon: contre les hérésies, v.24.2 (sc, 153) 300, 302, for the latin text. others translate “ad utilitatem ergo gentilium terrenum regnum positum est a deo” as powers that “have been appointed by god for the utility of the ‘gentiles’” in order to stress that while these powers are indeed “ministers of god”, yet they remain “gentile” powers, essentially foreign to the people of god. this latter translation views civil authority as an essentially pre-christian, “secular”, power. see gerard e. caspary, politics and exegesis: origen and the two swords (berkeley: university of california press, 1979) 141; grant, irenaeus of lyons, 174; maurice wiles & mark santer, documents in early christian thought (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1975) 226. 37 according to joseph f. kelly & brian e. daley (the world of the early christians [message of the fathers of the church, 1; collegeville: liturgical press, 1997] 187-188), the third century began with a persecution on the southern shore of the mediterranean. the african martyrs perpetua and felicity are among the victims of this persecution. around 230s larger persecutions broke out again in rome and asia minor. 38 after tertullian’s lifetime, the emperor decius (249-251 c.e.), believing that the christians threatened the empire, launched the first empire-wide persecution. christians were required to sacrifice to the gods, upon which they received a libellus, a receipt acknowledging that they had sacrificed (kelly & daley, early christians, 191). 39 luise schottroff, “give to caesar what belongs to caesar and to god what belongs to god”: a theological response of the early christian church to its social and political environment, in the love of enemy and nonretaliation in the new testament (ed. willard m. swartley; louisville, ky: westminster/john knox, 1992) 223257, esp. 225. 40 kurt aland, “the relation between church and state in early times: a reinterpretation,” journal of theological studies 19 (1968) 115-127, esp. 123. 41 the english translation is taken from wiles & santer, early christian thought, 227. for the latin text, see tertullianus, ad scapulam ii, 6 (crit. edn. e. dekkers; corpus christianorum, series latina [hereafter ccsl] 2; turnhout: brepols, 1954) 1128: “christianus nullius est hostis, nedum imperatoris, quem sciens a deo suo constitui, necesse est ut et ipsum diligat et reuereatur et honoret et saluum uelit….” tertullian is here alluding to rom 13:1. 42 see scorpiace, xiv, 1 (crit. edn. a. reifferscheid & g. wissowa; ccsl 2;turnhout: brepols, 1954) 1096: “plane monet romanos omnibus potestatibus subici, quia non sit potestas nisi a deo, et quia non sine causa gladium gestet, et quia ministerium sit dei, sed et ultrix, inquit, in iram ei qui malum fecerit. nam et praemiserat: principes enim non sunt timori boni operis, sed mali. vis autem non timere potestatem, fac bonum, et laudem ab ea referes. dei ergo ministra est tibi in bonum. si uero malum facias, time”. 43 wilfrid parsons, “the influence of romans xiii on pre-augustinian christian political thought,” theological studies 1 (1940) 337-364, esp. 345. in a similar note, eric osborn confirms that tertullian “found a place for the roman empire in the divine purpose” (tertullian, the first theologian of the west [cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997] 84). 44 francis dvornik, early christian and byzantine political philosophy: origins and background (dumbarton oaks studies, 9; washington, d.c.: dumbarton oaks center for byzantine studies, 1966) 584. 45 tertullianus, apologeticum l, 13 (ccsl, 1) 171: “etiam plures efficimur, quotiens metimur a vobis: semen est sanguis christianorum!” 46 hippolyt, kommentar zu daniel (crit. edn. georg nathanael bonwetsch; die griechischen christlichen schriftsteller der ersten drei jahrhunderte [hereafter gcs], neu folge 7; leipzig: walter de gruyter, 2000) 176-179. 47 g. clark, “let every subject be subject: the fathers and the empire,” in images of empire (ed. loveday alexander; jsotss, 122: sheffield: jsot press, 1991) 251-275, esp. 261. 48 erich klostermann (ed.), origenes matthäuserklärung. i. die griechisch erhaltenen tomoi (gcs, 40; origenes 10; leipzig: akademie verlag, 1935) 653-663. 49 origen’s commentary on romans is available only through the latin version made by rufinus of aquileia. see caroline p. hammond bammel, der römerbriefkommentar des origenes: kritische ausgabe der übersetzung rufins. buch 7-10 (vetus latina, 34; freiburg: herder, 1998); theresia heither (trans.), origenes: commentarii in epistulam ad romanos (fontes christiani, 2/1-6; freiburg: herder, 1990-1999). origen’s commentary on rom 13:1-7 is found in vol. 5 (1996). 50 caspary, politics and exegesis, 141-142. 51 cf. 1 thess 5: 23. in origen’s tripartite division, the spirit refers to some nobler aspect of one’s being which is incapable of evil, and standing in opposition to the flesh. the body/flesh, our physical existence, is not a part of god’s original and basic creation, but rather a punishment for the fall of the pre-existent soul. the soul is in a mid-way position between the weak flesh and the willing spirit, capable of turning either to good or evil. in origen’s view, the soul is that part of the human being which has fallen away from its original status, but which is capable of restoration through association with the spirit. all three elements are to be found in every human being. origen is, however, not anxious to draw the distinction between the three elements too sharply. in fact, he does not find it easy to give clear expression to the precise nature and function of the soul. see maurice f. wiles, the divine apostle: the interpretation of st. paul’s epistles in the early church (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1967) 31-32. 52 the latin text is: “et si quidem tales simus qui coniuncti domino unus cum eo spiritus simus domino dicimur esse subiecti si uero nondum tales sumus sed communis adhuc anima est in nobis quae habeat aliquid huius mundi quae sit in aliquo alligata negotiis huic praecepta apostolus ponit et dicit ut subiecta sit potestatibus mundi…” (com. rom. 9.25, in hammond bammel, der römerbriefkommentar des origenes, 748-749). 53 gerald bray (ed.), romans (ancient christian commentary on scripture: new testament, vi; downers grove, il: intervarsity, 1998) 326. 54 mark reasoner, “ancient and modern exegesis of romans 13 under unfriendly governments,” society of biblical literature seminar papers 38 (1999) 359-374, esp. 362. 55 see lactantius, de mortibus persecutorum 48.2-12 (trans. j. moreau; sources chrétiennes, 39; paris: editions du cerf, 1954) 132-135. for the english text, see p.r. coleman-norton, roman state and christian church: a collection of legal documents to a.d. 535 (3 vols.; london: spck, 1966) i, 30-32, for the document. it must be noted that while this edict made christianity licit, it does not yet establish christianity as the imperial religion – a development to take place only in 380 c.e. with theodosius i (378-395) and his western colleague gratian (378-395). see also pp. 353-354 for the english translation of the edict of gratian, valentinian ii, and theodosius i on the establishment of the catholic religion. 56 john meyerdorff, imperial unity and christian divisions: the church 450-680 ad (crestwood, ny: st. vladimir’s seminary press, 1989) 5. 57 timothy d. barnes, constantine and eusebius (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1981) 50. 58 kenneth meyer setton, christian attitude towards the emperor in the fourth century (new york: columbia university, 1941; repr. 1967) 41. 59 an example at hand is when constantius supported arianism, which the church resented. 60aland, “the relation between church and state in early times,” 127. 61 see basil, moralia 79 (patrologia graeca 31, 860); saint basil, ascetical works (trans. m. m. wagner, fathers of the church, 9; washington: catholic university of america press, 1950; repr. 31970) 196. society, for basil, is the converging together of people of diverse customs and habits for the sake of the common good. but common good requires the establishment of a directive power of the state for the sake of peace and harmony among the members. 62 g. f. reilly, imperium and sacredotium according to st. basil the great (the catholic university of america studies in christian antiquity, 7; washington: catholic university of america press, 1945) 8. in basil’s work entitled moralia, he quotes faithfully rom 13 in regula 79 to emphasize the authority of the imperium as a means of fostering the welfare of the society, distinct from its power to punish. 63 epiphanius, panarion, 40,4.6: “ijna eij~ eu[takton suvntaxin th ~̀ toù panto;~ kovsmou dioikhvsew~ ta; pavnta ejk qeoù kalw ~̀ katatacqh/̀ / kai; oijkovnomhqh̀ / …” (p. 85). 64 epiphanius, panarion, adversus haereses 40.4 (eds. k. holl & j. dummer; gcs: epiphanius ii; berlin: akademie verlag, 1980) 84. this nuanced paraphrase of rom 13:1-4 clearly reveals his understanding of the purpose of the “powers that be”, that is, they are ordained by god, “for the sake of the good”(ujpe;r toù ajgaqoù ) and “for the sake of the truth” (ujpe;r th ~̀ ajlhqeiva~ ). the translation goes: “the powers that be are ordained of god,” as the apostle says, “whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of god, since the rulers are not against the good, but for the good, and not against the truth, but for the truth. wilt thou not be afraid of the power?” he says. “do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. for he beareth not the sword in vain. for he is a minister ordained of god for this very thing, for him that doeth evil”. see the panarion of epiphanius of salamis book i (sects 1-46) (trans. frank williams; leiden: brill, 1987) 265 for the english translation. 65 chrysostom states: “for lest the believers should say, you are making us very cheap and despicable, when you put us, who are to enjoy the kingdom of heaven, under subjection to rulers, he shows that it is not to rulers, but to god again that he makes them subject in doing this. for it is to him, that he who subjects himself to authorities is obedient. … and gives it a more precise form by saying that he who listeneth not thereto is fighting with god, who framed these laws. and this he is in all cases at pains to show, that it is not by way of favor that we obey them, but by way of debt.” see homily 23, in p. schaff (ed.), st. chrysostom (the nicene and post-nicene fathers [hereafter: npnf], 1st ser. 11; grand rapids: wm. b. eerdmans, repr. 1979) 512. 66 in his homily on the statues (3.6), he tells the people of antioch that their bishop [flavian], who has gone to ask pardon from the emperor [theodosius] on behalf of the city, is himself a ruler of even higher rank than the emperor: “for the sacred laws take and place under his hands even the royal head. and when there is need of any good thing from the priest, the emperor is accustomed to fly to the priest: but not the priest to the emperor.” see npnf (1 st ser. 9), 356. this position of superiority will be restated a century later by pope gelasius in his letter of 494 to anastasius. 67 chrysostom thinks that paul is attempting to show that the teachings of jesus were given “not for the subversion of the commonwealth… but for the better ordering of it, and to teach men not to be taking up unnecessary and unprofitable wars.” see the opening words of homily 23 (npnf, 1st ser. 11), 511. also k. h. schelkle, “staat und kirche in der patristischen auslegung von rm 13,1-7,” zeitschrift für neutestamentliche wissenschaft 44 (1952/53) 223-236, esp. 227ff. 68 in 390 c.e. theodosius massacred some 7,000 people in thessalonica as punishment for the death of the roman commandant of that city. see louis j. swift, the early fathers on war and military service (message of the fathers of the church, 19; wilmington, de: m. glazier, 1983) 107. 69 when ambrose was asked by valentinian ii to surrender the basilica to the arians so that they might celebrate their easter liturgy, he refused and argued that the property of god was not subject to the emperor. the emperor is given jurisdiction over public buildings, but not over sacred buildings. see ambrosius mediolanensis, contra auxentium de basilicis tradendis (recensuit m. zelzer; corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum [hereafter csel], 82: sancti ambrosi 10/3; vienna: f. tempsky, 1982) 82-107. 70 w. h. c. frend, “church and state: perspectives and problems in the patristic era,” in studia patristica xvii: part one (ed. elizabeth a. livingstone; oxford: pergamon press, 1982) 38-54, esp. 49. 71 ambrosius, contra auxentium de basilicis tradendis, 36 (csel, 82) 106. for english, see npnf, 2nd ser. 10, 436. 72 according to maria grazia mara, “ambrosiaster (pseudo-ambrose) is the name commonly given to the author of the commentaries on the pauline epistles written presumably at rome in the second half of the fourth century (“ambrose of milan, ambrosiaster and nicetas,” in patrology, vol. 4: the golden age of latin patristic literature from the council of nicea to the council of chalcedon (ed. angelo di berardino; westminster, md: maryland: christian classics, 1986) 180. this unknown writer has certain similarities to ambrose, hence, the name ambrosiaster. however, at one time his writings were also attributed to augustine and to hilary (of poitiers). cf. a. di berardino (ed.), encyclopedia of the early church, vol. i (trans. a. walford; cambridge: oxford university press, 1992) 31: “some texts name ambrose as author, others hilarius.” for a discussion of the problems of authorship, see a. souter, the earliest latin commentaries on the epistles of st. paul (oxford: clarendon press, 1927) 49. ambrosiaster composed commentaries on thirteen pauline letters. the commentary on paul’s letter to the romans exists in three different versions or recensions. for the text, see ambrosiastri qui dicitur commentarius in epistulas paulinas. pars i: in epistulam ad romanos (recensuit h.j. vogels; csel, 81; vienna: f. tempsky, 1966). 73 pseudo-augustinus, quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti, xxxv (recensuit a. souter; csel, 50; vienna: f. tempsky, 1908) 63. to explain his point in question 35, ambrosiaster quotes rom 13:1. 74 ibid., cxv, 45 (csel, 50) 332. 75 ibid., xxxv (csel, 50) 63. in ambrosiaster’s commentarius in epistulam ad romanos, commenting on rom 13:1, he explains that subjects should obey ministers of the earthly law because they “have god’s permission to act, so that no one should despise it as a merely human construction” ([csel, 81] 417). 76 jerome states: “quod quidem praeceptum, et hic, et ibi propterea puto editum, quia judae galilaei per illud tempus dogma adhuc vigebat, et habebat plurimos sectatores…” see his commentariorum in epistolam ad titum, cap. iii (patrologia latina [hereafter pl] 26, 590-591). 77 parsons, “pre-augustinian,” 338, 363; idem, “the political theory of the new testament,” catholic biblical quarterly 4 (1992) 218-229, esp. 223. 78 hieronymus, com. in epis. ad tit., cap. iii (pl 26, 591): “arcaiv quippe quae leguntur in graeco, magis principatus quam principes sonant: et ipsam significant potestatem, non eos qui in potestate sunt hominess.” 79pelagius, in epistolam ad romanos, in adalbert hamman, patrologiae cursus completus supplementum i, (paris: garnier, 1958) col. 1167; theodore de bruyn (trans.), pelagius’s commentary on st. paul’s epistle to the romans (oxford early christian studies; oxford: clarendon papaerbacks, 1998) 136. see ulrich wilckens, der brief an die römer (ekknt, vi,1-3; neukirchen-vluyn: neukirchener, 1978-82) 46: “bei pelagius findet sich neben der üblichen deutung von röm 13,1f auf die staatliche gewalt eine andere, nach der es um die gewalt der kirchlichen führer, der bischöfe, gehe.” also w. affeldt, die weltliche gewalt in der paulus-exegese. röm 13,1-7 in den römerbriefkommentaren der lateinischen kirche bis zum ende des 13. jahrhunderts (forschungen zur kirchenund dogmengeschichte, 22; göttingen: vanhenhoeck & ruprecht, 1969) 96-97. 80 the alternative comment given by pelagius to 13:4: “die priester tragen das geistliche schwert, wie petrus den ananias und paulus den magier damit geschlagen hat.” see schelkle, “staat und kirche in der patristischen auslegung von rm 13,1-7,” 231. 81 he teaches that “even alms that are given to the poor can be called a due, as the scriptures say: ‘incline your ear to the poor and pay your due’.” pelagius says: “revenue is ours to give to those who are passing by, or to give to those who are seated by the road while we pass by, and thus to bestow upon those who are alive” (de bruyn, pelagius’s commentary, 138). see also affeldt, die weltliche gewalt, 110: “nur pelagius wagt es, die paulinische forderung umzudeuten und daraus die aufforderung zu machen, daß man almosen geben müsse.” 82 pelagius, in epis. ad rom., col. 1167: “haec causa adversus illos prolata est qui se putabant ita debere libertate christiana uti, ut nulli aut honorem deferrent aut tributa dependerent.” 83 de bruyn, pelagius’s commentary, 50. 84 augustine lived in 354-430 c.e. according to r.a. markus, “two conceptions of political authority: augustine, de civitate dei, xix. 14-15, and some thirteenth-century interpretations,” journal of theological studies 16 (1965) 65100, esp. 68: “thirteenth-century scholastics were addicted to quoting statements of saint augustine’s, as of other sancti, as auctoritates in support of their opinions.” 85 f.w. loetscher, “st. augustine’s conception of the state,” in church and state in the early church (ed. e. ferguson; studies in early christianity: a collection of scholarly essays, 7; new york: garland publishing, 1993) 16. 86 parsons, “the influence of romans xiii,” 326. 87 see, for example, letter 87.7: to emeritus (the fathers of the church [hereafter fch], 18) 18; letter 93: to vincent (fch, 18) 76; letter 100: to donatus (fch, 18) 141; letter 134.3: to apringus (fch, 20) 10; letter 153: to macedonius (fch, 20) 295-296; letter 220: to boniface, (fch, 32) 104; exposition on the book of psalms 104, 35 (npnf, 8) 518; exp. on ps 119, 159 (npnf, 8) 586; tractates on the gospel of john, 105 (fch, 90) 258; tractate 116 (fch, 92) 29; retractiones bk 1, ch. 12, par 8 (fch, 60) 55; de catechizandis rudibus xxi, 37 (ccsl, 46) 161; sermo xiii, 6 (ccsl, 41) 181; concerning the nature of good, against the manicheans, ch. 32 (npnf, 4) 358; reply to faustus the manichean, bk. 22, 75 (npnf, 4) 301. see also william r. stevenson, christian love and just war. moral paradox and political life in st. augustine and his modern interpreters (macon, ga: mercer university press, 1987) 62. 88 r. dorado, “church and state,” in augustine through the ages: an encyclopedia (ed. allan d. fitzgerald; grand rapids: wm. b. eerdmans, 1999) 176-184, esp. 182. 89 see expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad romanos, 64-66 (recensuit i. divjak; csel, 84: sancti aureli augustini opera sect. iv pars i; vienna, 1971) 44-47; also in paula fredriksen landes, augustine on romans. propositions from the epistle to the romans. unfinished commentary on the epistle to the romans (society of biblical literature texts and translations, 23; early christian literature series, 6; chico, ca: scholars press 1982) 40-43. augustine’s text of rom 13 tends to follow closely the vulgate. 90 expos. prop. ep. rom. 64.1 (csel, 84) 44: “… rectissime admonet, ne quis ex eo, quod a domino suo in libertatem vocatus est factus christianus, extollatur in superbiam et non arbitretur in huius vitae itinere servandum esse ordinem suum et potestatibus sublimioribus, quibus pro tempore rerum temporalium gubernatio tradita est, putet non se esse subdendum.” 91 according to p. burnell, this is part of augustine’s anti-dualistic argument (“augustine on unjust regimes,” in the city of god. a collection of critical essays [ed. dorothy f. donnelly; new york: peter lang, 1995] 41). 92 expos. prop. ep. rom. 64.4 (csel, 84) 45. when compared to the text of vetus latina (which reads: “reddite ergo omnibus debita: cui tributum, tributum: cui vectigal, vectigal: cui timorem, timorem: cui honorem, honorem”) what is lacking in augustine’s statement is “fear” (timorem). tributa refers to direct taxes; while vectigalia means indirect taxes, e.g. border dues. 93 “item si quis sic se putat esse subdendum, ut etiam in suam fidem habere potestatem arbitretur eum, qui temporalibus administrandis aliqua sublimitate praecellit, in maiorem errorem labitur” (exp. prop. ep. rom. 64. 5 [csel, 84] 45]). 94 exp. prop. ep. rom. 64.6 (csel, 84) 45: “…pro ipso rerum humanarum ordine….” 95 exp. prop. ep. rom. 64.2 (csel, 84) 44. for english text, see landes, augustine on romans, 41. 96 according to parsons, “augustine to hincmar,” 329, “to man, a composite being of body and soul, yet one being, corresponds a twofold government, the church ruling the affairs of the soul and the state ruling the affairs of the body.” this idea of human unity under the kingdom and the priesthood was the culmination of christian political thought. however, it must be noted that augustine’s argument that the state was the necessary consequence of sin and of human’s inclination toward sin was used by medieval churchmen to defend their belief in the natural superiority of the spiritual power over the temporal. 97 de vera religione xli, 77 ([crit. edn. k.-d. daur; ccsl, 32: aurelii augustini opera iv,1; turnhout: brepols, 1962] 237). he noted the slip in his retractiones i, xiii. 8 (ccsl, 57) 40: “et alio loco illud quod dixi: sicut ait apostolus: omnis ordo a deo est.” 98 de ordine i, 9,27 (recensuit p. knöll; csel, 63; vienna: f. tempsky, 1922) 139: “ordo est, quem si tenuerimus in vita, perducit ad deum”. see also markus, the latin fathers, 108. 99 exp. prop. ep. rom. 64.3 (csel, 84) 45: “ex illa vero parte, qua credimus deo et in regnum eius vocamur, non nos oportet esse subditos cuiquam homini idipsum in nobis evertere cupienti, quod deus ad vitam aeternam donare dignatus est.” english translation by landes, augustine on romans, 41. 100 exp. prop. ep. rom. 66.1 (csel, 84) 46: “…sed in necessariis huic tempori constituenda est.” 101 cf. sermon xii, 13 (trans. r.g. macmullen; npnf, 1st ser. 6; grand rapids: wm. b. eerdmans, repr. 1996) 302. also here augustine speaks of “hierarchy of human affairs.” in this hierarchy god is always above the emperor. this explanation solves the old problem of what to do with a bad king. 102 letter 93 (fch, 18) 75. 103 letter 93 (fch, 18) 56-57. the latin text goes: “sed donatistae nimium inquieti sunt, quos per ordinatas a deo potestates cohibere atque corrigi non mihi uidetur inutile”(epistola xciii [csel, 34, pars 2, p. 445]). cf. charles j. scalise, “exegetical warrants for religious persecution: augustine vs. the donatists,” review and expositor 93 (1996) 497-506, esp. 497. 104 the popes after augustine would insist that the power to rule the world is twofold: the regalis potestas and the auctoritas sacrata pontificum. of these the latter carry the greater weight. this theory of the two-fold power from god is best enunciated by pope gelasius (reigned 492-496 c.e.) and this so-called gelasian theory will become the standard statement of the church’s position for the next six hundred years. 105 f. h. dudden, the life and times of st. ambrose, vol. 2 (oxford: clarendon press, 1935) 500. spirituality and mysticism: a global view philosophy, science and axiology k. srinivas pondicherry university, india abstract the economic progress of any society is invariably linked up with the advancement of science and technology. therefore, philosophical idealism must be combined with scientific realism to create a world that is worthy of human living. it is axiology that serves as the scaffolding of such a world. philosophy and axiology become all the more important and significant in a society that is marked by scientific and technological advancement. in this paper an attempt is made to show the interface between philosophy, science and axiology which preserves the richness of human life. introduction philosophy, science, and axiology are necessary conditions for a well balanced human life, but none of them is a sufficient condition by itself. a well balanced human life is that which absorbs all the three nutrients in their proper proportions. excess dosage of any of these nutrients may cripple the very human life by causing imbalance of one sort or another. this is often witnessed in the present day world. by and large the two neglected nutrients in the present day world are philosophy and axiology. the nutrient that dominates the present day human life is science. as rational beings we are not opposed to science and scientific temper. but we must also realize that science has its limitations. if science is completely divorced from philosophy and axiology, then the fall of human beings is imminent. similarly, philosophy and axiology must go hand in hand with science for they cannot promote material progress on their own. the economic progress of any society is invariably linked up with the advancement of science and technology. therefore, philosophical idealism must be combined with scientific realism to create a world that is worthy of human living. it is the axiology that serves as the scaffolding of such a world. as a matter of fact, philosophy and axiology become all the more important and significant in a society that is marked by scientific and technological advancement. in this paper an attempt is made to show the interface between philosophy, science and axiology which form essential ingredients of human life on the globe. the task of philosophy in a way to inquire into the function or role of philosophy in human life is to inquire in to its subject-matter. to define the subject-matter of philosophy is the most difficult part of our current exercise. it is said sarcastically that philosophy either covers everything, or nothing under the sun. most of the misconceptions about philosophy arose out of our inability to realize its intrinsic worth. partly it is due to the reason that “each age and each thinker has offered a new conception of philosophy which cannot be brushed aside by merely calling it a misconception.” 1 it is the tendency of many to look for extrinsic worth of everything that they possess or pursue in this world. if a thing does not have extrinsic worth then it is simply discounted as worthless. if an individual is asked to choose between knowledge and material wealth it is the latter which is preferred to the former because of its extrinsic worth. our vision of life is often myopic. adding fuel to the fire, of late it has become a general practice of many to ask the question: what purpose does the discipline in question serve for the betterment of human life? when such a question is asked, what is basically at the back of the questioner’s mind is to seek a justification for pursuing any discipline in terms of enhancing the living standards (material well-being) of any individual. in other words, one deliberately chooses and pursues a discipline which is materially profitable to lead a comfortable life-style. this is the order of the day. in the process, we often fail to differentiate between the standards of living (material well-being) from those of life (general well-being). an individual under the sway of the recent developments in science and technology cannot but think in terms of enhancing his /her standards of living. thus, as aptly remarked by herbert marcuse, the modern man has only one dimension, namely, the pursuit of material wealth. he/she is hardly bothered about the general well-being. the mesmeric effect of science and technology makes us believe that science is the only paradigm of human life and we, knowingly or unknowingly, allow scientism to percolate through every form of human life. this is virtually the starting point of human decadence. the quality of life essentially consists in realizing the meaning and purpose of human life and the standards of living essentially consist in the pursuit of material wealth and comforts. the following analogy may help us in understanding the difference between the standards of living and the standards of life. in our day-to-day life we come across two types of physician: the general physician and the specialist in a particular branch of medicine. the general physician is basically interested in monitoring the overall health of an individual. for him the general health of any individual is supreme or paramount. on the contrary, a specialist is interested in one aspect of human health in which he is a specialist. for example, a cardiologist is only interested in the sound condition of an individual’s heart. he hardly pays attention to the other parts of the patient’s body for his knowledge is limited to his specialty. a philosopher can be compared with a general physician for he is chiefly concerned with overall well-being of an individual. the overall well-being of individuals paves the way for the overall well-being of a society. in other words, philosophy is concerned with the overall development of a society, whereas the incidental sciences, both natural and social, are basically concerned with those aspects of society in which they specialize. certainly this is not to undermine their contribution to any society for the incidental sciences have their own role to play in the development of a society. philosophy provides an integral or holistic view of the human life which accommodates every branch of knowledge. ultimately the progress of any society is linked up with the philosophy on which it rests. it appears as though philosophy, science and axiology are completely independent of each other for they have their own subject-matters to deal with. this may be true from the point of view of mere academic exercise. what is studied under the label philosophy is not studied under the other two disciplines and vice versa. for the purpose of academic organization there is every need to distinguish one discipline from another just as we distinguish one branch of knowledge from another within the same discipline. as students of philosophy we often claim that we are specialized either in metaphysics or in epistemology or in logic or in ethics and so on. similarly, a student of mathematics may claim that he or she is specialized either in arithmetic or in algebra or in trigonometry and so on. this is true of other disciplines too. but ultimately all these branches within the same discipline provide us with a comprehensive account of the subject-matter of that discipline. unlike other disciplines, whose subject-matters are well defined, the subject-matter of philosophy is very broad in the sense that it covers a very wide spectrum of issues concerning man, nature, and man’s relation to nature. in other words, the subject-matter of philosophy virtually covers everything that concerns human life in general. this is the reason why philosophy is often branded as an abstruse and abstract discipline. in fact, it is the prerogative of a philosopher to venture into any area of inquiry for philosophy is a reflective activity. of course, the art of philosophizing may differ from one philosopher to another and one school of thought to another for the art of philosophizing is not monolithic. therefore, the subject-matter of philosophy cannot be narrowed down or restricted to any specific area. this is the advantage with philosophy. in the beginning all the disciplines were covered under the label philosophy. a natural scientist was known as a natural philosopher, a social scientist a social philosopher, and a mathematician a philosopher of mathematics. therefore, “it is customary to reckon many early thinkers as philosophers whose main interests were rather in what we should now call mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, economics, or philosophy.” 2 after the renaissance the sciences listed above gradually branched off from philosophy and established themselves as independent branches of knowledge primarily due to the reason that scientists unlike philosophers are not interested in reflective activity, but basically engage themselves in explaining the natural phenomena by means of observation and experimentation. thus their methods of inquiry and objectives are completely different from those of philosophers. however, as observed by ewing: “the fundamental concepts of the sciences and the general picture of human experience, and of reality in so far as we form justified beliefs about it, remain within the purview of philosophy, since they cannot from the nature of the case be determined by the methods of any of the special sciences.” 3 unlike the subject-matter of philosophy, which is very broad, the subject-matter of each specialized science is well defined in the sense that the domain of each science is specific and restricted. in addition to that, scientists, especially the natural scientists, always swear by objectivity and proof for their explanation. this is also true of most of the social sciences which make use of prevailing empirical data for their objective analysis. thus natural sciences take an experimental turn in that they seek justification for their own discoveries. this is the reason why the objectives of a philosopher and a natural scientist are clearly demarcated. if a philosopher is interested in understanding the nature of a given phenomenon, a scientist, on the contrary, is interested in explaining its nature. at this juncture let us not go into the details of explaining the fundamental differences among natural, social and exact sciences. right now the expression ‘science’ is specifically reserved to refer to natural or experimental sciences. the natural or experimental sciences provide us with knowledge of the various aspects of the reality. prima facie it appears that each of the natural sciences is completely independent of one another. but when they develop it becomes more conspicuous that they can no longer claim to be independent of one another. for example, today we talk of subjects like bio-physics, physical chemistry, bio-informatics, biochemistry, and so on. mathematics becomes an integral part of all sciences in one way or another. there is hardly any science that can dispense with mathematics. in spite of the fact that each and every specialized science is completely independent of itself for each specialized science has its own subject-matter to deal with, yet there is a scope for the study of the general principles on which they rest and the points of their interaction. this is normally taken care of by the philosophers of science. there is another significant distinction made between philosophy and science in general. philosophers as lovers of wisdom, as interpreted by the ancient greek tradition, try to pursue wisdom which is always rated higher than knowledge. the latter is the knowledge of natural sciences whereas the former is not. wisdom is an end itself. we always talk of knowledge of something, but we do not talk of wisdom of something for wisdom does not have any object of reference, but knowledge always has an object of reference. a philosopher aims at the knowledge which is insightful. it may not belong to any specific field of inquiry but may be applied to all fields of inquiry. to put it in a nutshell, philosophy “is a human and cultural enterprise to be inquired into, rather than a mere term to be defined.” 4 a philosopher’s discussion about knowledge, sources of knowledge, limitations of knowledge, and justification of one’s claims to knowledge is more insightful in the sense that he tries to provide a general framework on which the theory of knowledge in general rests. thus his approach is more holistic rather than fragmentary. more than anything it is the reflective and evaluative spirit of philosophy that makes philosophy a discipline worth pursuing. the objectives of science as a matter of fact, the “expression” science is used in two different senses. in one sense, science is said to be a systematic study of any branch of knowledge. accordingly, we can interpret astronomy as the science of celestial bodies, botany as the science of plants, physics as the science of physical bodies and their properties, ethics as the science of morals, religion as the science of divinity and so on. thus science in this sense is in no way different from philosophy. this is the reason why the ancient greek philosophers treated philosophy as the science of all sciences or the first science. therefore when science is understood in its broader sense, there appeared hardly any distinction between science and philosophy for science entertains both the questions of ‘why sort’ and ‘how sort’. the former are basically the questions of teleological nature and the latter are the questions of empirical nature. the interaction between philosophy and science can be summarized in the following manner: philosophy and scientific thinking, in fact, were born together; and again and again philosophic reflection has been revitalized by fresh contact with the concepts, methods and standards of scientific inquiry. and finally, those comprehensive visions of the world and of human destiny which we cherish as the great philosophical systems of speculative thought are surely among the most imposing artistic achievements of the spirit of man. the outstanding philosophers, indeed, have been endowed with something of poetic imagination, critical acumen, natural piety, and spiritual insight. 5 in another sense, science is viewed as a rational enterprise that deals with empirical phenomena or the physical world. it is a systematic study of the description and analysis of empirical facts. thus in its restricted sense science is only concerned with empirical facts. it hardly bothers about the questions of teleological nature. as a persuasive enterprise science tries to justify all its claims by advancing verifiable proofs. it is “a conscious artifact of mankind, with well-documented historical origins, with a definable scope and content, and with recognizable professional practitioners and exponents.” 6 what is most important in the above mentioned passage is the expression ‘definable scope and content’. science with its well defined boundaries is altogether a distinctive branch of knowledge which swears by objectivity. there is no scope for subjective opinions and speculative thinking. such a description of science is often viewed as a reaction to philosophy which accommodates subjective opinions and speculative thinking. with a view to distinguish the distinctive approaches of philosophy and science, ziman writes that “science, by contrast, is rigorous, methodical, academic, logical, and practical. the very facility that it gives us, of clear understanding, of seeing things sharply in focus, makes us feel that the instrument itself is very real and hard and definite.” 7 then there is a danger of science pointing out an accusing finger at “concepts like nous, preestablished harmony, karma, or moksa, and concludes unilaterally that philosophy is nothing but wool-gathering.” 8 fundamentally science and philosophy adopt two distinctive approaches to reality. but this difference between science and philosophy need not be stretched beyond a point. although the approaches of science and philosophy are different they need not be viewed as antagonistic to each other. strictly speaking they supplement each other. to invoke the argument from polar concepts here, the expression ‘objective’ derives its meaning from its opposite expression ‘subjective’ and vice versa. in other words, both objectivity and subjectivity have their own role to play in our scheme of knowledge. there are evidences in history that science made use of fictions to arrive at certain deductions which served as its starting points. when it referred to the substances like ether to explain natural phenomena it is no longer claim that it deals with only tangible hypotheses. when the scientific deductions based on fictions are found to be true it does not mean that the fictions of science are also true. in fact, it results in the fallacy of the affirming the consequent. as karl popper rightly held that the scientific predictions are no more than wild conjectures. these wild conjectures turn out to be hypotheses to explain certain phenomena. hypotheses advanced by scientists may turn out to be genuine or may not. there is another interesting thing about science. it is often claimed that science is critical whereas philosophy is speculative. but this is not true. sometimes science becomes speculative and philosophy becomes critical. for instance, physicists’ explanation of the origin of the earth is attributed to big bang theory; and darwin’s explanation of the evolution of the species is attributed to mutations and natural selection. both these explanations, by all means, are nothing but the scientific speculations. even the evidences on which the paleontologists rely to assess the age and era of any extinct animal or plant are also based on speculations. the popular view that there existed dinosaurs some millions of years ago is also speculative. the well-known heisenberg’s theory of indeterminacy in quantum physics is another example where speculations about an electron’s behaviour are based on thought experiments. therefore, one should not jump to the conclusion that science is always realistic and objective and critical. similarly, philosophy is not always speculative, but also critical. in the history of philosophy we come across a number of instances where philosophers were highly critical of certain concepts and methods of philosophy. there were also certain philosophical traditions like logical atomism, logical positivism that attempted to get rid of speculative thinking from the sphere of philosophy. of course whether they were successful in their attempt to eliminate speculative thinking from the sphere of philosophy is secondary. both the philosophers and scientists made use of flashes of insight to explain various phenomena. they hardly employed any logical reasoning to explain these insights. what is interesting to note is that the scientists who pursued philosophy could not turn philosophy into a science; and the speculations about atomic and sub-atomic structures in physical sciences could not turn science into philosophy. the descriptive and analytical approach of science distinguishes it from philosophy whose approach is reflective and evaluative. the distinctive approaches of science and philosophy do not make them antithetical to each other. there is yet another misconception about science and philosophy. the former makes uses of reason extensively whereas the latter solely relies on intuition. this is a myth. just as reason is not the prerogative of scientists, intuition is not the prerogative of philosophers. a philosopher is a good logician, and a scientist does not mind using intuition as a source of insight for intuition “in the sense of immediate grasping of truth or receiving illumination on a problem is inevitable in all knowledge. there can be no science or philosophy worth the name in the absence of flashes of insight into experience.” 9 further it is argued that science being limited in its scope it achieves definite results while the scope of philosophy being very wide it remains as a perennial inquiry. in addition to that, philosophy harps on the same set of questions “while each concrete science, having solved a problem, never returns to it but poses and elaborates new ones.” 10 this argument may appear to be realistic, but the fact remains that none of the theories in science is final. this only shows the scientific inquiry is also a never ending quest for knowledge. the problems of philosophy are eternal not because they cannot be solved, but because each age poses them in a different way. basically the problems of philosophy are nothing but the problems of life. the problems of life are invariably linked up with the prevailing social conditions. the social dynamics of any given situation often necessitates a new way of looking at the problems of life. this is how novelty is experienced in philosophy. as aptly remarked by william james, all formulations in science, theology, or philosophy are only mere approximations to truth. a theory in any field of inquiry is upheld not for its internal consistency but for its problem solving capacity. 11 similar view is expressed by wittgenstein in his philosophical investigations when he said philosophy survives insofar as the puzzles in philosophy survive. the puzzles of philosophy are the same as the puzzles of life. if one puzzle is dissolved there exists another. science in general relies on certain postulates. they are ---observation, experimentation, reasoning, and hypothesis formation. but philosophy examines these postulates of science in order to understand their significance. in this sense philosophy can be viewed as an extension of science. a genuine scientist always appreciates the role of philosophy. similarly a philosopher does not hesitate to say that science is considered to be “a major part of the stock of our minds; its products are the furniture of our surroundings. we must accept it, as the good lady of the fable is said to have agreed to accept the universe.” 12 it is a well acknowledged fact that one of the fundamental objectives of modern science is to improve the living standards of humankind. the artifacts of science are enjoyed by every one of us. a philosopher is not an exception to this. but a philosopher does not mind to warn us about the impending dangers posed by science in any society. to quote ravetz in this context: “if we are to achieve the benefits of industrialized science, then both the commonsense understanding of science and the disciplined philosophy of science will need to be modified and enriched.” 13 the need of the hour is to regulate our scientific knowledge with proper philosophical reflection and evaluation before it destroys the social life of humankind. the vulgar reduction of science and technology to commercial and military purposes is witnessed in the present day world. mass production and mass consumption have become primary objectives of modern science. science is no more pursued as a value neutral enterprise. its results are used for the material progress of a section of people who exercise their power and domination over the others. to minimize this damage philosophy needs the support of a sound axiology or science of values. just as logic as a science of reasoning is within the bounds of laws of thought, philosophy as a reflective and evaluative enterprise must be within the bounds of certain basic human values. a philosophy which is based on certain fundamental human values alone can check or regulate the excesses of science. the significance of axiology axiology as a science of values comes to our rescue when morality loses its ground in a society where philosophical idealism (wisdom) is completely set aside due to the demands of scientific realism. axiology as an important branch of moral philosophy reminds us of our duty as philosophers not to remain merely as lovers of wisdom but to act with wisdom in order to prevent social catastrophes. the bhagavad-gita advocated a philosophy of action. under the sway of scientific realism modern man inculcates only those material values which are basically instrumental in promoting science and technology as the only legitimate mode of rationality. such a view has dangerous consequences for it fails to recognize the role of reason or rationality in any other field of inquiry. in this context it is interesting to observe the following statement of david ingram. today, many philosophers would argue that the rightness of moral choices is and values cannot be rationally determined. if the moral decision is relegated to the sphere of arbitrary (private) preference, then only science and technology, logical and calculating thought, can lay claim to universal reason. but in a society in which the rightness of basic goals and values is assumed to be beyond rational assessment social practice itself-----however scientifically enlightened it may be-------becomes irrational. when science and technology exclusively dominate social life they themselves become ideological. 14 if rationality is the sole property of science and technology, then, as ingram held, moral values remain as mere exhortations to certain virtues for they are arbitrary, private and emotional appeals of the speakers. the emotive theory of ethics propounded by the logical positivists like a.j. ayer precisely holds this view. but it is not the case. of course the fact (is)–value (ought) distinction is not new to philosophers and scientists. in his tractatus logico-philosophicus wittgenstein made the physical world as the domain of facts. and in this world there is no scope for values. if at all there are values they exist outside this world. but the later wittgenstein realized this folly and brought them back to the realm of the physical world to show the co-existence of facts and values. this is a healthy sign for otherwise there would a perpetuation of hobbes’s state of nature in which there is war of all against all. moralists have often argued that values can neither be reduced to facts nor be derived from facts. this does not mean that rationality is confined to the realm of facts alone as if moralists are completely bereft of rationality while advocating a system of values. as regards the significance of values, one of the contemporary indian philosophers hiriyanna writes: “the place which values occupy in life is so important that no philosopher, whose theme is the whole of experience, can omit to take account of them.“ 15 broadly speaking a value is something that is desirable. what is desirable is often contrasted with what is desired. the former has an altruistic appeal while the latter is pursued only to satisfy ones desired end. in other words, facts are apprehended, values are realized. these values are further divided into material and non-material ones. material values are always weighed in terms of their immediate material value. a gold ornament has immediate material value. it can be exchanged for a sum of amount. more than its aesthetic appeal it is for its material worth people would like to possess it. by and large material values are only treated as instrumental values. they have mere extrinsic worth. on the contrary the non-material values such as ethical, religious, and aesthetic values are ends in themselves. they have intrinsic worth. when socrates held that knowledge is virtue what he meant is that it is an end in itself. but there are always exceptions when people sell knowledge for material gains like the sophists and claim to speak the truth, when in fact they are congenital liars. one can always find an exception to a rule. further it is asked: do values belong to things, or do we endow things with value? as we know that the material value of a thing is not within the thing unlike the quality of hardness which is within the thing. this day-to-day example poses another question; are values subjective or objective? there are moralists who treat them as subjective and there are also moralists who treat them as objective. their arguments proceed in the following manner. the subjectivists argue that our experience tells us that values are relative for they differ from one social group to another and from one individual to another. what is viewed as an utmost value by one social group or individuals may not be so for another social group or an individual. what is sincerely admitted as desirable for one social group often turns out to be undesirable for another social group. on a cold night what is valuable for a person is a fire in the fireplace but not a diamond or a gold coin. similarly the objectivists argue that values are not relative but they become relative to varying social groups and individuals. the reasons attributed to such a view is that values are consistent but they vary from one group or individual to another group or individual due to changing environment or circumstances or biological constitution and so on. colours and beauty provide feast to our eyes, but it may not be so for a person who is blind or suffering from colour-blindness. we are unanimous in holding that a glass of milk is conducive to maintaining good health but not a glass of coco. if anything and everything is conducive to good health then we may value everything as good for maintaining good health. but it is not so. to treat values as subjective or objective does not go well with them at all. it is unfair to values. a careful examination of values which we experience in our day-to-day life suggest that values are neither the exclusive property of objects or acts nor exclusively created by human beings. values are both subjective and objective. they are subjective insofar as the process of evaluation is concerned and objective as the evaluation is always the evaluation of something objective or concrete. we evaluate standards of education, of life, of health and so on. the process of evaluation is the outcome of our reflective thinking. as it is held by philosophers in general that reflection is the essence of rationality. therefore it is meaningless to say that there is no involvement of rationality in moral evaluation. rationality is not the prerogative of scientists. as rightly held by later wittgenstein rationality assumes different forms in different forms of life. similarly, both subjectivism and objectivism operate in all forms of life. science cannot be an exception to this rule. one of the best criticisms of objectivism is found in kant’s critique of pure reason. the pure precepts, which are supposed to be objective, without proper conceptualization do not yield any knowledge. what is called conceptualization is an inner process and its objective significance is only realized in the form of a judgment. similarly evaluation of any objective phenomenon is an inner process but its objective significance can be realized when it is experienced. concluding remarks the upshot of the above discussion is to show that philosophy, science, and axiology have their own subject-matters to deal with, yet they are not divorced from each other. for the healthier growth of any society all the three are essential. we cannot lead a balanced life just by professing philosophical idealism without any goals to realize. these ideals turn out to be mere showcase pieces. the reification of platonic ideals is no good for human life. similarly when we talk of science and its achievements in the form of technological innovations we are blindly adhering to scientific realism without realizing the meaning and purpose of life. as aptly held by socrates, a life is not worth living without proper examination. it is philosophy which distinguishes true needs of society from false ones. a scientist must carry out his research in tune with the true needs of society. thus he must take the clue from philosophy. there is no point in pursuing scientific research that is going to be detrimental to human life. it is axiology which shapes our philosophical thinking in order to preserve the basic human values. in the absence of values human life is as good as the life of a beast. we do not live just for the sake of living, but we always make our lives worthy of living. it is rather inconceivable to think of man without philosophy and axiology. philosophy in this sense is a complete reflection of man’s praxis. science is a product of man’s praxis. therefore, there is every need for man to control science. man should not allow science to control him. this is where axiology comes into the picture. a pseudo-scientist often forgets the fact that he is primarily a man and secondarily a scientist. on the contrary a genuine scientist is one who takes guidance from philosophy and axiology to judge or foresee how best his discoveries and inventions would be useful for the furtherance of human race on the globe. endnotes 1. s. s. barlingay and padma b. kulkarni, a critical survey of western philosophy, new delhi, the macmillan company of indian limited, 1980,p.2. 2. j. s. meckenzie, elements of constructive philosophy, london, george allen & unwin, 1917, pp.12-13. 3. a. c. ewing, the fundamental questions of philosophy, new delhi, allied publishers private limited, 1967, indian edition, p.10. 4. john herman randall jr., and justus buchler, philosophy: an introduction, new york, barnes & noble books, 1971,revised edition, p. 1. 5. ibid.p.2. 6. j. m. ziman, public knowledge, london, cambridge university press, 1974, p.1. 7. ibid. 8. s. s. barlingay and padma b. kulkarni, a critical survey of western philosophy, p.3. 9. ibid.,p.4. 10. galena kirilenco and lydia korshunova, what is philosophy?, moscow, progress publishers,1985, p.34. 11. samuel enoch stumpf, socrates to sartre: a history of philosophy, new york, mc graw hill book company, 1982, third edition, p. 386. 12. j. m. ziman, public knowledge, p.1. 13. j.r. ravetz, scientific knowledge and its social problems, harrmondsworth, penguin books, 1973,p. 9. 14. david ingram, critical theory and philosophy, new york, paragon house,1990, p. xxvi. 15. m. hiriyanna, indian conception of values, mysore, kavyalaya publishers, 1975, p.1. 11(158-162)note for authors towards a critique of globalization joseph i. fernando assumption university of thailand abstract globalization heralds a great epoch in human history. yet, despite certain advantages of globalization, its disadvantages cannot be overlooked. it is necessary to ask certain questions. is globalization a form of neocolonialism? what is its impact on the southern hemisphere? is it necessarily linked to violence, militarism and eco-unfriendly technologies? and are these problems essentially moral rather than merely economic and ecological? globalization is a key word in contemporary discourse. humankind has entered a new epoch. at the dawn of a new millennium we find ourselves joining the conversation of humanity facilitated by stupendous communications network. this is a new beginning and could be a great leap forward for the global community.1 socially, globalization can promote the unity and oneness of the human race through cooperation, interdependence and sharing of knowledge, expertise, personnel and resources. economically, the world has become one huge market. technologically, globalization is accelerated by the use of machines so much so that man today is homo technologicus. despite the advantages of globalization, some questions concerning it are very disturbing indeed. what is happening to the world in the name of globalization? who benefits most from globalization? does globalization make the world a better place to live in? is globalization neo-colonialism? the colonial legacy 44 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 44-53 © 2000 by assumption university press colonialism dates back to the discovery of the new lands by the maritime powers of europe from the 15th century onwards. this was the beginning of the exploitation of the non-europeans and it is apparently a nonstop process till today. what were the presuppositions for the justification of colonialism? the europeans treated the new lands they had discovered as their property. what made them owners of the colonies? when the europeans encountered the non-european cultures, the former considered the latter inferior. what were the reasons for this inferiority? perhaps the europeans suffered from the assumption that the non-european cultures were inferior to that of europe. is this assumption baseless since these cultures had their own antiquity? for example, the civilization of india is older than that of europe. the british archaeologist gordon childe remarks that at the time of the indus valley civilization known for its palatial buildings and highly developed urban culture, the people in england were in the stone age. probably the possession of gunboats and technology boosted the european consciousness of superiority. compared to the europeans, the natives had hardly any developed technology; so the europeans might have viewed the natives as inferior. this was an era of the combination of racism, invasion, oppression and exploitation in the colonies. colonizing somebody else’s land amounts to robbery, lawlessness and gross violation of the principles of justice. the colonial powers were christian nations and one wonders whether or not christianity was a failure in europe. ironically, there were both european mercenaries and missionaries in the colonies. the former plundered the people and the latter preached the gospel. it is hard to comprehend how both plundering and evangelizing could go together! discovery of new lands, colonialism, industrialization, and capitalism have strengthened eurocentrism. it would seem europe was the centre of the world and the rest of the world existed for the sake of europe. the economy of europe was fortified by exploiting the colonies. the superior military technology of the europeans silenced the natives of the colonies. westcentrism joseph i. fernando 45 the 20th century witnessed freedom movements in the colonies in asia and africa. the native people rose to affirm their right to selfdetermination. it appeared as if the days of colonization were over. on the contrary, eurocentrism assumed greater proportions. the term west means not only europe but also includes america, canada, australia and new zealand, which the europeans grabbed from the natives. professor gary dorrien rightly remarks, “the united states was founded on a genocidal conquest…”2 eurocentrism has evolved into what i call westcentrism, which means the west is the centre of the world and the rest exists for the sake of the west. in my opinion, the west today has enormous power and resources due to science and technology, and exploitation of non-western nations. the medieval age in europe, also known as the age of faith, gave way to the renaissance and enlightenment, the age of reason and later the age of science. with advancement in science and technology, the world was increasingly desacralized, the gods had fled and what is now left is stark matter. even man is a kind of living matter. the west has tasted a comfortable life made possible largely by exploitation and the western lifestyle has to be maintained at any cost, no matter what happens to the rest of the world. ironically, europe embraced the very beliefs of marxism, which it attempted to repudiate. in a desacralized and secular world, man is primarily an economic being, a consumer. religion as the opium of the people deserves elimination. hence, the death of god and of christianity. it is also time for the death of ethics. all we have is stark matter and naked power, derived from unlimited wealth. wittgenstein wrote in his tractatus logico-philosophicus: “the world is the totality of facts, not of things.”3 but today the world is a totality of marketable commodities. planet earth itself as commodity is for sale. the world can be fragmented and sold on installments. the world is no longer the home of man but a huge bundle of resources for marketing. everything in the world has a use-value for man and this use-value must be converted into money. the world is a generator of money. money is deified and man reified. money determines the power of individuals. samuel p. huntington in his clash of civilization and the remaking of world order writes: “western nations, as one author summarized it: 46 prajñâ vihâra own and operate the international banking system control all hard currencies are the world’s principal customer provide the majority of the world’s finished goods dominate international capital markets exert considerable moral leadership within many societies are capable of massive military intervention control the sea-lanes conduct most advanced technical research and development control leadership edge technical education dominate access to space dominate aerospace industry dominate international communications dominate the high-tech weapons industry.”4 irrespective of another theory that the power of the west is in the decline, it is obvious the west continues to wield enormous power. worldview of globalization i infer some presuppositions of globalization from the praxis of globalization. globalization views the universe as a totality of material beings, which constitute nature and the environment. all of them just exist. there is no ultimate reason why they should exist. these beings depend on and use each other. in this sense they are relational. this relation is one of use and interdependence. man is different from other beings in the sense he can have a greater use and enjoyment of these beings. all beings including man are resources. think of the human resource department of any organization which reduces man to one of the resources like electricity, water, timber and so on. all beings as resources are for consumption. the teleology of being is both proximate and remote. consumption is the proximate teleology of beings. the possession of consumable goods and capital endows man with power. this power derived from wealth makes man feel good. the greater the power one has over others, the greater the sense of well-being. the remote teleology of beings is power joseph i. fernando 47 realized in man. one is reminded of nietzsche’s will to power. the philosophy of globalization originating from the west is materialistic and egocentric (not ecocentric). it views the world solely in terms of exploitation and use. the world as container of resources is the object of insatiable greed and endless power, which inflate the ego. the impact of globalization in my opinion, the greatest threat to the world comes from the west. the rest of the world has been suffering since the days of colonialism, industrial revolution, capitalism, communism and more so today due to neocolonialism or globalization. colonialism had inflicted untold suffering on the natives of the colonies – it robbed them of their freedom, self-respect, resources and so on and left them with poverty, slavery, dehumanization and a host of other problems. the industries in the west sucked the raw materials out of the colonies. the west converted the colonies as market for the goods made out of the raw materials from the colonies themselves. the insatiable appetite of western capitalism devours people and nature. man and nature are raw materials for manufacturing commodities. man himself is a commodity selling his labour power in the labour market. marx was one of the first thinkers to perceive the disastrous consequences of capitalism on man and nature. he ventured to suggest communism as an alternative to capitalism. communism as a product of the west meant to be emancipatory; unfortunately it ended up enslaving people. with the implementation of communism the world was divided into two camps of the cold war era. colonialism, capitalism, communism and cold war have been the creation of the west. industrialization, science and technology ushered in the era of modernization. the rest of the world believed that modernization was the best thing that could happen. the rest of the world aped the western model of modernization while mostly forsaking time-honoured, native wisdom. the consequence is a long list of woes: disappearance of native manufacture, exodus to the cities, desertion of the rural areas, cut-throat competition greed, consumerism, destruction of nature, disintegration of the family, 48 prajñâ vihâra artificial life-style, deforestation, junk food, pollution, poisoning of water, air, soil and food, arms race, terrorism, suicide bombs, fundamentalism and numerous conflicts ultimately leading to the possible decimation of both man and nature. the problems of globalization are essentially moral rather than economic or ecological. globalization is the product of the predatory western civilization, which is spiritually and morally bankrupt. globalization coming from the west is a threat to the asia pacific region. asia has been home to great civilizations and religions from time immemorial. today asia faces the inevitable challenge of globalization as it did in the case of modernization. our forests are disappearing and together with them varieties of fauna and flora and the displaced communities. the rivers, mountains, valleys and coasts plead for mercy. the globe is under attack in the name of globalization. globalization enhances the concentration of wealth in a few hands and the pauperization of the masses at an alarming rate. not only will there be desertification of the land but also of the lives of millions of people in the poor nations. globalization as it is today is unacceptable. john p. hubert, jr. writes, “…once christian western culture has devolved into a virulent form of neo-pagan secularism. it is marked by moral relativism combined with utilitarianism, materialism including largely unregulated freemarket capitalism, wild inequitable consumption of precious resources and the goods of production and a dangerous version of rabid personal “freedom” in which truth itself is sacrificed at the “altar” of the autonomous self, which pursues various “preferences” in the name of “human rights.”5 globalization is part of this neo-pagan secularism. since the days of colonialism, european civilization has come to stay as a predatory civilization. therefore, is globalization, which is neocolonialism predatory? many westerners seem to assume that they have more rights to a comfortable life than the non-westerners. their assumption is linked to their belief in racism and violence, which go along with globalization. for the westerners, racial discrimination seems to be necessary so that the non-westerners can be kept out of mainstream economic opportunities. violence too is necessary since the days of colonialism to subjugate the non-westerners. violence continues to perpetuate itself through armament technology, arms race, military attacks and invasions. the trinity of racism, joseph i. fernando 49 militarism and materialism are built into globalization. for the u.s., globalization is part of its empire-building exercise. hence, uneven trade agreements. alternatives to globalization globalization as it is today is unacceptable for the following reasons: 1. it is unjust. the corporations exploit the world. 2. it is destructive. it destroys the natural resources all over the world, particularly in the developing nations. 3. it increases global poverty. 4. it threatens world peace. 5. it leads to dehumanization. therefore, it is imperative to seek alternatives to globalization. the good news is that “…millions of people … are already hard at work constructing the building blocks of a post-corporate–post-capitalist civilization. they are demonstrating alternatives far more attractive and viable than socialism or the failed economic models of the former soviet union. the most promising alternatives center on applying the familiar principles of democratic governance and market economics to create societies that function in service to life and treat money as a facilitator, not the purpose, of our economic lives. “the determined pioneers are creating new political parties and movements, strengthening their communities, deepening their spiritual practice, discovering the joyous liberation of voluntary simplicity, building networks of locally rooted businesses, certifying socially and environmentally responsible products, restoring forests and watersheds, promoting public transportation and defining urban growth boundaries, serving as peacemakers between hostile groups, advancing organic agriculture, practicing holistic health, directing their investments to socially responsible businesses, organizing recycling campaigns, and demanding that trade agreements protect the rights of people and the environment. 50 prajñâ vihâra “they are present in every country. they come from every race, class, religion, and ethnic group. they include landless and illiterate peasants but also corporate executives; they include union members, shareholders, ranchers, teachers, housewives, small-business owners, farmers, local government officials, inner-city kids, loggers, wealthy intellectuals, and reformed gang leaders. the majority are women. fed up with the failures of elitist leadership and distant bureaucracies, they are demonstrating the powerful potential of truly democratic forms of leadership in which people take direct responsibility for the health and well-being of themselves, their families, their communities, and the planet.”6 technology today is at the service of globalization and militarization. globalization is not possible without technology and violence. the search for alternatives to globalization includes a humane perspective of technology and a nonviolent world order. i would like to draw inspiration from heidegger with regard to technology. heidegger views technology as a disclosure of being. a close look at his treatment of technology reveals that he calls for an authentic understanding of man’s place in the world, especially of man’s relation to nature. for heidegger, technological devices have arisen because our understanding of being changes. he calls the essence of technology das gestell i.e. the ‘disclosive framework’. this ‘disclosive framework’ or enframing lets the world be understood primarily in terms of how it can be arranged, transformed and utilized for realizing some human goal. thus the rhine river is no longer the home of the rhine maidens, nor as something of intrinsic value, but as something to produce hydroelectric power. river, forests, landscapes and animals are destroyed and rearranged to suit some human project. man sees the forest no longer as a display of the magic and beauty of life, but as raw material. heidegger cautions that if man treats nature as standing-reserve and goes on extracting from it as much as he wants as orderer of the standing-reserve, there is the danger he himself will become the standingreserve. with the loss of transcendence, man himself may be treated as the most important raw material. one day we may have factories to produce human beings. the will to power is never satisfied and craves for more and more. as a result, the demand on the standing-reserve becomes unlimited. what heigegger fears is not the deadly technological devices joseph i. fernando 51 like the nuclear weapons but the loss of being human. if man ceases to be man, what will happen to the world? on the one hand, we already face the consequences of man considering himself the lord of being. on the other, there is the possibility of an extreme situation wherein man becomes a standing-reserve, a very useful raw material. is it possible for man to rediscover his relationship to nature? should we give up technology and go back to the arcadian, idyllic simplicity of the past? we cannot eliminate technology. overcoming technology requires collective, ethical action. man is primordially homo ethicus before becoming homo technologicus. man’s relation to nature and human beings is ethical. technological issues are basically moral issues which elicit an ethics of technology.7 a peaceful world order requires the renunciation of violence. what is needed is globalization of peace. disarmament is an imperative not only for the survival of the planet, but also for peace and prosperity. nonviolent solutions have to replace the military ones. as intelligent beings, men and women the world over are capable of ushering in an era of peace, liberty and prosperity to all. it is high time for the world community to reflect seriously on how to make disarmament a reality. globalization of peace presupposes globalization of disarmament. the gods that had fled have to come back so that as heidegger would put it, the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities can be gathered. instead of messing up the world any more and thrusting globalization on it, the west must apologize and repent for its colonial exploitation. apology and repentance must be accompanied by restitution. the principle of restitution demands that the west provide the former colonies with internationally supervised economic aid. as martin luther king, jr. put it, a great nation is a compassionate nation. when justice and compassion are combined, one can expect miracles to happen. the united nations as a world body must be reformed, strengthened, and made more democratic; this would be part of genuine globalization. member nations are bound to respect the decision of the u.n. disregarding the decision of the u.n. would spell disaster to the world. a typical example is the invasion of iraq by the u.s. so, whither globalization? endnotes 52 prajñâ vihâra 1 joseph i. fernando. “globalization with a human face” in john p. hogan (ed.) cultural identity, pluralism and globalization, washington d.c: the council for research in values and philosophy, 2005. 2 http://www.kzoo4peace.org/dorrienapr9.html. 3 ludwig wittgenstein. tractatus logico-philosophicus 1.1. 4 samuel p. huntington. the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon &schuster, 1997, p.82. 5 http:www.catholic.org/printerfriendly.php?id=2993&section= featured+tod…20-02-2006. 6 david c. korten. the post-corporate world. san francisco: berretkochler publishers, inc. 1999, pp.2-3. 7 joseph i. fernando. “heidegger and technology”. prajna vihara (january – june 2003). joseph i. fernando 53 ananya barua 121 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 121-144 © 2000 by assumption university press re-visiting the ethics of war in the philosophy of st. augustine, mahatma gandhi and the dalai lama ananya barua hindu college, delhi university, india abstract in the western imagination, both gandhi and the dalai lama are the icons of non-violence, one a hindu, the other a buddhist, and both are pioneers of renewing the bond of one spiritual family of mankind that alone could spread the noble message of, ‘vasudha iva kutumbaka’ ‘all men our kinsmen’. they are the representatives of some of the best spiritual traditions of asia. while one followed the footsteps of the buddha, the other imbibed all noble truths from noble traditions of the world, showing equal reverence for the love of god in ram-rahim or jesus, drawing inspiration from the bhagavad gita to the sermon on the mount, from the works of henry david thoreau to john ruskin. yet one also witnesses events that contradict these idealistic movements. katherine young points out that “because of gandhi, people assumed that indian was a pacifist society.” yet she writes that the stereotype of hindu non-violence “was shattered in may 1998 when india tested five nuclear bombs (young, 2004).”1 this leads one to ponder the efficacy of these doctrines of non-violence and its implications in the 122 prajñā vihāra pragmatic affairs of the world. how can one address the urgent issues of our time; such as war, violence, terrorism and threats of insecurity to life and property? i will cite instances from gandhi’s ethics and then an attempt will be made to provide a distinctively buddhist perspective. finally, these two asian perspectives are to be understood in terms of the contemporary moral perspectives that debate over issues of ‘just war’, a tradition that was originated in the philosophy of st. augustine. introduction when the first atomic bomb was tested in new mexico, robert oppenheimer quoted from the bhagavat gita: “now i am become death, the destroyer of worlds.”2 for gandhi, non-violence is the only antidote to evil, the only precious thing an atomic bomb cannot destroy. with this in mind, gandhi states, “unless now the world adopts non-violence, it will spell certain suicide for mankind.” (singh, jasawant: 1999).3 singh explains that indians don’t really follow mahatma gandhi. “his non violence was not really a debilitating creed, it was in reality an empowerment. still, do we really feel empowered by non-violence. we say we are essentially non-violent, but when you look around at india today or in the past six years we are an extremely violent land,” he says.4 when the first prime minister of independent india, jawaharlal nehru, became the first world statesman to plead for universal disarmament, it was still a continuation of the gandhian legacy of the human dimension of life that alone should restore dignity of dehumanized mankind. nehru also sought to revive the faith that science and technology could bring benefits to human life. he began by redirecting change in policy in matters of science, and he advocated disarmament so that that ‘the atoms for peace’ should be the slogan. the death of nehru in 1962 marked a shift from the acceptance of gandhian principles of non-violence to a greater acceptance of the use of force for national security. “the continuing conflict with pakistan over kashmir and the 1962 border crisis with china, among other factors, had undermined confidence in nehru’s gandhian-style politics.” (singh, ananya barua 123 jasawant :1999). during these decades, hindu intellectuals began to make a case for legitimate violence based on the need for selfdefense. arvind sharma wrote in 1993, “india must maintain military preparedness of strictly defensive nature.”5 ( sharma :1993).6 let us now ponder deeply into the nature of this peculiar ethical dilemma confronted by moralists between ‘ahimsa’ and justified ‘himsa’. is violence ethically acceptable in some cases? st. augustine and the “just war tradition in christianity”: we have to begin by understanding ethical issues of violence, war and terrorism within the context of both the christian and the hindu notions of ethical law (dharma) through which we can re-interpret these two contradictory stances on violence. one position is taken by ‘just war’ tradition that is sometimes traced to st augustine when he sought to legitimize the use of force by christians to protect the innocent. the innocent are those in no position to defend themselves, to protect them from certain harm. in the city of god, augustine grappled with the idea that christian teaching can sometimes challenge violence with counter violence or with use of force. he comes to the conclusion that wars of aggression and aggrandizement are never acceptable, but there are occasions when resorting to force may be necessary; not as a normative good, but as tragic necessity. david hoekema writes: as the roman empire was under attack by invading barbarians, he asked if the christian could justify taking a human life. augustine gave a very qualified “yes”. force could be justified ‘in defense of the vulnerable other.’ augustine did not even include self-defense in the first list of just war principles. it was another saint, thomas aquinas, who added self-defense to the list of possible justifications of war by persons of religious conscience. his list of limitations and justifications of force are still the guiding tenets of just war theory. they are: just cause (usually taken to mean defense against an attack), right 124 prajñā vihāra authority (established political authorities, not private citizens), right intention (not the love of cruelty nor the lust for power), good outcome (there must be more good resulting than the evil done by violence), proportionality (do not use more force than necessary), reasonable hope for success (have a reasonable chance that peace will indeed result), and last resort (all non-violent means of diplomacy must have been exhausted). (hoekema, 2009)7 pacifists and defenders of just war can agree that every life is tainted with sin, and that evil will inevitably arise, but still disagree about how we ought to respond when it does arise. while the advocates of christian pacifism take a position of absolute non–violence with their firm conviction that a true christian should follow a way of life in which violence and division are overcome by sacrificial love. we must not return evil for evil, jesus taught, but must return good for evil; we must not hate those who wrong us but must love our enemies and give freely to those who hate us. these themes in jesus’ ministry were deeply rooted in the hebrew prophetic tradition, and jesus’ ministry and his sacrificial death were a continuation and a fulfillment of that tradition. (hoekema, 2009) 8 christian pacifists insist that followers of jesus, must follow both his example and his teachings: they must “show love for all in their actions and seek healing and reconciliation in every situation.” (hoekema). such optimism requires a selective and unrealistic assessment of human behavior and human capacities. hoekema observes: if pacifism rests on a trust that people have a natural capacity and an irrepressible tendency to resolve their differences justly and harmoniously, then pacifism is a delusion, and a dangerous one. such trust is not, however, essential to pacifism. there can be a realistic pacifism, a pacifism that gives due weight to the sinfulness and perversity of human nature.” (hoekema, 2009). 9 ananya barua 125 for st.augustine, the reality of human sinfulness demands a realistic assessment of a situation so that when sustained attempts at nonviolent action fail to protect the innocent against fundamental injustice, then legitimate political authorities are permitted as a last resort to employ limited force to rescue the innocent and establish justice. for augustine, it is always better for the christian to suffer harm rather than to commit it, although the fragile human situation at times compels one to accept a lesser evil to avoid a greater evil. the basic moral perspective on which christian ethics is based demands loyalty to the principle of abstaining from doing harm to others, and that it is “better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.” david hoekema comments, in plato’s gorgias socrates states metaphorically: ‘it would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus i direct were out of tune and loud with discord, and that most men should not agree with me and contradict me, rather than that i, being one, should be out of tune with myself and contradict myself (482b-c).’ if i harm others, then i will not be able to live with myself. the potential internal discord stops me. it is an internal, spiritual mechanism of restraint. in situations of conflict, our constant commitment ought to be, as far as possible, to strive for justice through nonviolent means.” (hoekema, 2009) 10 hoekema observes that prior to sept. 11, 2001 official catholic teaching on the just war had already evolved as a composite of nonviolent and just-war elements. he continues: this was a departure from post-reformation catholicism, when the just war alone was the formal catholic stance. the change, which had begun at vatican ii, accelerated as a result of the successful nonviolent revolutions in eastern europe that brought an end to communist rule in 1989. reflecting on those events in his 1991 encyclical centesimus annus, pope john paul ii offered praise for the nonviolent 126 prajñā vihāra activists who toppled the communist regimes that had ruled eastern europe and voiced his opposition to war as a means for resolving conflict”. (hoekema, 2009).11 hinduism on non-violence as a result, different interpretations of a text are recognized and dharma becomes ambiguous, ‘it is difficult to fathom the subtle ways of dharma’ (dharmanam gatim suksmam duranvyam. mahabharata 8.49.28) dharma ‘holds firm’, or ‘sustains’, and its dharmic acts such as vows, offering gifts, and chanting the name of god, create a positive power and make a firm connection between this world and the other. dharma also has traditional meaning, customs, duty, virtue, and it is one of the prime basic goals of human life along with artha (governance,politics,economics), kāma (leisure,pleasure), and moksa (liberation). dharma is in the first position as it establishes the ethical constraints for artha and kāma. dharma is both saāmānya (general ) in that it is universal in nature and is applicable to all mankind, and visesa (situational) in that it involves particular duties defined by sex, position, caste, stages in life, occupation etc. the four sources of dharma are: transcendent and eternal “heard” scriptures (sruti), human i.e. “remembered” scriptures (smriti), the behavior of the good people (sadācāra) and knowledge based on personal experience (anubhava)”. (young, 2004)12 moral dilemmas may occur because of ambiguity; no clear cut guideline is to be found whether satya is superior to ahimsā as in the case where telling a truth leads to death of a person. gandhi later emphasized truth as his predecessor yuddhistira once did. first the sāmānya virtues became mandatory for the ascetic tradition, later in the yuga sutras it was further developed and in the arthasastra of manu they were viewed ananya barua 127 as common virtues that are applicable to one and all. young comments: “this view may have developed to allow hindus to compete with buddhists and jains, who were criticizing the brahmanical tradition for its legitimization of violence in animal sacrifice.” (young,2004).13 david fowley calls attention to the classical hindu teachings that honored defensive war. to quote fowley: the hindu kshatriya tradition is not one of aggression but of protection, not of forcing conversion to a religion but upholding the dharma. it is a tradition of holding to truth and creating a culture in which freedom to pursue truth, not only in the outer world, but in the religious realm, is preserved. is this not what the global age really requires? it is time for that kshatriya to arise again. (fowley, 2003).14 the often quoted “ahimsa paramo dharma” (meaning non violence is the highest duty) was popularized by gandhi. but what is not quoted is the latter part of the sanskrit stanza “dharma himsa tathaiva cha” meaning “so too is all ‘righteous’ violence.” it should be clearly realized that, apart from the specifics of the situation, the hindu ethos, as distinguished from the buddhist and the jain, provides for both options. arvind sharma points out, the saying of the great epic ahimsa paramo dharmah, that non-violence is the same as supreme dharma, is often quoted; but it is also supplemented by the saying: “dharmya himsa thaiva ca,that dharmic” violence is equally so. the million dollar question of course, is: what is dharmaya? (sarma :1993). ahimsa paramo dharmaha, dharma himsa tathaiva cha!” non-violence is the greatest dharma, so too is all righteous violence. – mahabharata in line with such observations, hinduism has distinguished two types of war, ‘just’ and ‘unjust.’ the principles that legitimize just war are establishing justice and combating injustice, following clear cut rules, 128 prajñā vihāra restricted its place to avoid civilians harm, restriction to a particular caste, conducting war in a limited time and place, maintaining fairness and equality, following the golden rule ‘one should not do harm to others that which is unpleasant to oneself,’ and limiting war to self-defense. m.a. mahendale observes that the ramayana represents the just war tradition in clear cut terms, as there is no moral ambiguity about the fact that ravana abducted sita, the legitimate wife of rama and this moral transgression is to be punished for the preservation of righteousness. however, in the mahabharata, the other great epic of the hindus, there are occasions when there are occasional transgressions and just war rules are violated. that way the mahabharata depicts a deeper narrative that transcends the duality of good-evil, right and wrong. in the mahabharata, war has been dramatized as a cosmic sacrifice analogous to the destruction of the worlds at the ‘end of the yuga’ (yugānta). the weapons of war are compared to the fire at the end of a yuga… the destruction is represented as a gigantic funeral pyre in which the old order of the world, pandavas and kauravas alike, must perish to a new order established with the assistance of the divine incarnation krsna (krishna ) from the remnant represented by pariksit, the perfect monarch embodying the qualities of both arjuna and krsna.” (woods, 2001)15 ahimsa is mentioned many times in different scriptures ranging from the vedas (upanishads), itihaasas like the mahabharata, dharma shastras like the manu smriti, the patanjali yogasutra (2-35) says “ahimsa pratisthayam tatsannidhau vairatyagah” meaning “in the presence of one firmly established in ahimsa, all hostilities cease”. this is the case in the boudhayana dharmasutra and various other dharmic texts. in the holy gita it occurs in the list of rules prescribed for all human beings. the bhagavad gita depicts the dilemma between just war and unjust war and it praises just war as a heroic act that can prevent injustice and counter tyranny. ananya barua 129 the gita’s solution for the conflict between ahimsa and himsa is to insist that warriors do their military duty but with a new yogic perspective. this is called ‘renunciation in action’ (nais-kamya-karma-yoga).god himself both manifests violence (himsa) and non violence (ahimsa) in the cosmic cycles, but also transcends them. (woods, 2001).16 however, it should be understood that this is no sanction for violence. it is imperative to correctly understand the word ‘dharma’ before we even talk about violence and non-violence. without fully understanding and imbibing dharma there simply is no justification for any harm. though gandhi was not the inventor of ‘ahimsa’, this was the very principle behind his style of struggle against injustice. ultimately ahimsa is based on right cause, righteousness and dharma – devoid of any selfish motivation.17 the jain granth ‘acaranga sutra’ supports non-violence by saying: “all beings are fond of life; they like pleasure and hate pain, shun destruction and like to live, they long to live. to all, life is dear”. so what gandhi did successfully was to incorporate ahimsa in his philosophy called ‘satyagraha’ which was the way of non-retaliation, civil disobedience, non-payment of inhuman taxes, non-cooperation, fasts etc. according to gandhi, the objective of this philosophy was to convert, not to coerce the wrong-doer. his idea was to convince his opponents of their injustice and demonstrate the brutality of oppression. thus gandhi promoted the principle of ahimsa particularly to politics, for the very first time. but gandhi’s version of ahimsa also has its critics who blame him for taking it too far. like in jainism, gandhi believed that ahimsa is the standard by which all actions are judged.”18 ahimsa is confused with the gandhi’s ‘satyagraha’ which some said was nothing but ‘passive resistance’. to which gandhi clarifies “satyagraha is as far away from passive resistance as the north pole is from the south pole. passive resistance is the weapon of the weak and, therefore, the application of physical pressure or violence 130 prajñā vihāra are not ruled out in the efforts to reach its aims. in contrast, satyagraha is the weapon of the strongest. the use of force of any kind is ruled out…. this law of love is nothing other than the love of truth. without truth there is no love”. the gita interprets ahimsa also in a positive sense when it denotes protecting acts of soldiers, military and ksatriyas when it emphasizes that warfare is restricted to ksatriyas only who are prohibited from acts of renunciation. however the gita re-interpreted renunciation with the doctrine of disinterested action, himsa and violence no longer remains violence when the motivation is changed to a yogic perspective, as an unpleasant duty one must perform for the sake of protecting the many. we have also seen that at times the human act is more dependent on divine plan (daiva) than human efforts (purusartha) as the confusion that leads to proper understanding of the just war status of the mahabharata. what appears to be deviation from the rules of dharma yuddha at times, is sanctioned from a divine and a wider perspective that it is bound to happen that way irrespective of individual human’s restricted goals, aspirations, motivations, etc. the war unfolds cosmic events that are destined to happen for the greater good, which humans fail to understand. gandhi on non-violence when we compare mahatma gandhi’s distinctive position here we find that the gita has remained one of his major sources of inspiration on his experiments with truth and non-violence. ironically, according to mehendale, the most important hindu source for gandhi was the bhagavad gita.19 gandhi admitted that the gita was not written as a treatise on nonviolence but argued that its meaning could be “extended” by interpreting it as an allegory-the eternal duel between the “forces of darkness and of light”, because hinduism is always evolving as living religion. his own interpretation, gandhi said, emerged from his study of hindu texts, other religions, and his own experience. gandhi focused his commentary on the second chapter, which is about disinterested action ananya barua 131 (naiskarmya-karma-yoga), but limited his understanding of action to no-violent action.” (young ,2004).20 gandhi’s basic values were closely allied to the samanya principles, but he politicized and modernized them. “he made no distinction among types of war (defensive vs. offensive, just vs. unjust) or types of person (ascetic vs. non ascetic). killing, he often argued, is inherently wrong for anyone in any situation.” (young, 2004). gandhi’s position is more extreme than traditional hindu ethics when he advocates ahimsa both as a means and as an end. although such optimism requires a selective, and at times, unrealistic assessment of human behavior and human capacities, gandhi’s pragmatic and down to earth approach to life allowed him to understand the hard realities of life and human nature, that people sometimes do not resolve their differences justly and harmoniously, that evil is very much there as part and parcel of goodness, that himsa is also an unavoidable part of ahimsa. there are occasions when it appeared to gandhi that some wars are inevitable and justified when war becomes a tool for empowering the weaker and the powerless advocates of love and non-violence. gandhi identified ahimsa and non-violence with supreme moral courage rather than as acts of cowardice, and he would rather call the use of himsa an act of cowardice. himsa is, according to him, an injustice, and therefore a wrong act. at times war is undertaken to give strength to those who oppose violence;, it empowers non-violence if there is need for it. “gandhi himself supported the british war effort in the world war, “arguing that he was opposed to war, but if there had to be war, then it should be on the side of the justice.” (sharma, 1993).21 is this not an acceptance of the just war tradition? how do we reconcile the common gandhian stance which, in principle, opposes all kinds of war, with his statements which leave room for some kinds of war? we have to understand that while mahatma gandhi was also strongly nurtured by the religious traditions of the country, including vaishnavism and jainism, besides drawing inspiration from all world religions with selective assimilation of various noble principles. war, in principle, is to be avoided because nonviolence is an inner principle 132 prajñā vihāra of man. humans are not herd of animals or robotic machines that are to be controlled by force or compulsion. violence mechanically begets violence but the spiritual dimension of non-violence can transcend this mechanical and causal dimension as long as the spirit rules over flesh! with this basic understanding, the mahatma takes recourse to war, as a last alternative, in order to prevent erosion of the loving and spiritual dimension of life that alone would humanize life. gandhi’s religious and spiritual position was sustained by a deep faith in the goodness of human nature, a goodness he thought nonviolent action could call forth. “if love or non-violence be not the law of our being,” he wrote, “the whole of my argument falls to pieces”22 with this tremendous faith in the basic goodness of all human beings, gandhi once tried to see if he could kindle that divine spark which is in all. gandhi firmly believed that love and tolerance are supreme principles that should rule and that should humanize life. one acting out of non-violence should try to change the hearts of those willing to use violence for just causes over those who use it for unjust ones. gandhi never gave up his faith in the basic goodness of man. gandhi believed that it is possible to revitalize the hardness of heart. on december 24, 1940, gandhi wrote to adolf hitler addressing him as a friend: that i address you as a friend is no formality. i owe no foes. my business in life has been for the past 33 years to enlist the friendship of the whole of humanity by befriending mankind, irrespective of race, color or creed. i hope you will have the time and desire to know how a good portion of humanity who have been living under the influence of that doctrine of universal friendship view your action. we have no doubt about your bravery or devotion to your fatherland, nor do we believe that you are the monster described by your opponents. but your own writings and pronouncements and your friends and admirers leave no room for doubt that many of your acts are monstrous and unbecoming of human dignity, especially in the estimation of men like me who believe in universal friendliness… hence we can not possibly wish success to your arms.”23 ananya barua 133 david a. hoekema writes: “nazism would surely have been destroyed by sustained nonviolent resistance had christians and others not averted their gaze from its evil for so long. but whether nazism could have been destroyed by nonviolent means in 1939 is a far more difficult question.”24 the buddhist perspective on war and terrorism: it is not an easy task to define a buddhist perspective on war and terrorism. to quote prof. chandra wikramagamage: “buddhism can respond to individual, national or global terrorism at two levels, namely the level of the buddha and the bodhisattva. the level of buddha is applicable to people of intellectual advancement and the level of bodhisattva is applicable to the public.” (wikramagamage,online 2008).25 the dalai lama, living in exile since the chinese communists brutally took over his hereditary kingdom of tibet, revered for his wisdom and adherence to peace and non-violence, puts it this way: in principle, any resort to violence is wrong. initially, terrorism was a certain mixture of politics, economics, and religion. now, it seems that terrorism is more individual and done to avenge personal grudges. so there are two kinds of terrorism. countermeasures for such things are not easy. we need two levels. one level—the immediate—various governments are taking, including some violent methods, right or wrong. (the dalai lama interview, online 2006).26 the dalai lama cites instances of buddhist monks and buddhist rulers who often confuse these two realms of dharmic and political solution to the evils of the time and in turn took recourse to violence in order to combat violence. what an individual should do is also determined by each individual’s karmic relation to the event.” he continues,” in the 1930s, one mongolian leader became a very, very brutal dictator and eventually became a 134 prajñā vihāra murderer. previously, he was a monk, i am told, and then he became a revolutionary. under the influence of his new ideology, he actually killed his own teacher. pol pot’s family background was buddhist. whether he himself was a buddhist at a young age, i do not know. even chairman mao’s family background was buddhist.” (the dalai lama interview, 2006).27 contrary to this political solution to the problems of evil, the dharmic strategy on war and terrorism is to adhere to the principles of non-violence knowing well the constraints put by the ‘individual karmic limitations of an individual. like jainism, buddhism too allows provisions for absolute non-violence for monks and renouncers and pragmatic application of the principle of ahimsa for worldly people. at the level of individual enlightenment, one is on the path of spiritual progress through constant practice of meditation, prayer, ethical conduct, suffering sensitivity etc. that way a true buddhist is one who takes refuge in the “triple gem” (tissrana), namely the buddha, dhamma and sangha. the triple gem is also described as follows: the buddha the acme of universal wisdom the dhamma the perfect code of discipline the sangha the exemplary model for a layman28 it must be asserted that the five precepts (pancha sila) do not necessarily make a person a buddhist, but to be a real buddhist, one has to rigorously practice and observe the five precepts. buddhist sermons have a therapeutic note as well, the very practice of non-violence will not only heal the wounds of war, conflict and violence, as well as relieve all human and social sorrows; but it can also create a peaceful and joyful society, tightly tied to the esteemed values of equality, fraternity and liberty. the dhammapada’s prohibition against killing, that “all tremble at punishment; to everyone life is dear. taking oneself as an example, one should neither strike nor kill,” this is s a true reflection of the way of the buddha. the buddha reportedly told his followers: ananya barua 135 all are afraid of the rod. of death, all are afraid. having made oneself the example. one should neither slay nor cause to slay. (dhammapada: chi. 10)29 the first of the five precepts (pancha sila) admonishes one to refrain from taking life, and early monastic codes list the taking of life as one of the four grave offenses. mahayana texts carry this rejection of violence forward; for example, the daśabhūmika-sūtra proclaims that buddhists “must not hate any being and cannot kill a living creature even in thought.” (dhammapada: chi. 10) historically, buddhists have formulated institutional and ritual supports for this ideal, as seen in the uposatha ceremony when theravada monks twice a month recite the precepts and confess transgressions. but the important question is how best to apply the most important buddhist teachings to our present situation. how to combat terrorism in these two levels, both politically and religiously and thereby therapeutically? it is an unfortunate fact, well documented by eminent scholars such as edward conze and trevor ling, that not only have buddhist rulers undertaken violence and killing, but also monks of all traditions in buddhism. nonetheless, buddhism has no history of specifically religious wars, that is, wars fought to impose buddhism upon reluctant believers. violence and killing are deeply corrupting in their effect upon all involved, and buddhists will therefore try to avoid direct involvement in violent action or in earning their living in a way that, directly or indirectly, does violence. the buddha specifically mentioned the trade in arms, in living beings and flesh.30 in our complicated social situation today, where the majority is often more corrupt than the minority, when terrorism becomes a way of the world, one should explore practical strategies to deliver the buddhist message of non-violence to all, including the terrorist. the question remains: in the face of the social situations today, how do we deal with the so-called material chalenges? how do we maintain traditions, human dignity, and social order? 136 prajñā vihāra a buddhist activist would firstly give persuasive explanations and typical evidences of gravely social and human damage resulting from war, violence and terrorist actions; and then skillfully encourages and guide humans toward practicing buddhist non-violence (aims) by cultivating compassion and sympathy for true peace, happiness and welfare for oneself and all sentient beings. even then, one finds that in its treatment of violence, however, the buddhist tradition sometimes offers mixed messages. buddhism prescribes the short-term goal of correcting a perverted situation, while the main objective is the eradication of suffering and violence and existential anxiety. in principle, the buddhist texts, doctrines, and ritual practices advocate not-harming or nonviolence, yet there are occasional exceptions in extreme cases, such as one’s need for self-defense, or for protecting the helpless and the weak from the tyranny of the oppressor. if we look for the buddha’s attitude toward violence in the buddhist texts including the pali nikayas, we find that in many cases violence and punishment are described as a kind of lesser evil, an unfortunately unavoidable part of the life of the householder or within civil society. james stroble comments: the fact that these are for the most part descriptions rather than normative statements is to be stressed, however. when there is occasion for the buddha himself to deal with one who is deserving of punishment, the method he uses is manifestly one of non-violence. the difference between the descriptive portrayal of violence and the normative example of the buddha then establishes a distance between the world of the civil authorities and that of the sangha. (stroble, 2010)31 in the dalai lama’s attitude, we find the basic commitment to buddhist non-violence at all costs when he condemns hardness of heart and dictatorship of buddhist kings, rulers and also of monks turned activists. in order to prevent violence one should not transform oneself ananya barua 137 into the role model of the enemy. however, there is also some concession made for counter attack in case of self-defense etc. in his book instinct for freedom the contemporary dharma activist alan clements, a former buddhist monk in the burmese tradition of mahashi sayadaw, puts the constraints that make the path of love and ahimsa almost ineffective when one faces a murderer or a psychopath who becomes killer machine. “how can one mediate for peace when brothers and sisters are being killed and to love when a gun is pointed on your head...?”32 is there any way to correct the situation within buddhist scheme? to what extent can one leave open options for dialogue with the one who has fallen from the path? when this dialogue seems to be an impossibility and the terrorist and the dictator needs to be addressed by force and manipulation than by religious and therapeutic means? here the dalai lama gives some hints when the buddhist monk faces an extreme situation while facing a terrorist whose mind is closed, to all kinds of dialogue. the buddha’s pragmatic and therapeutic approach to the human suffering leaves room for healing the wounds of one and all, the one who is caught in the vicious circle of past karmas and the wrong and evil effects of those karmas are often victims of wrong acts, wrong intentions, wrong mindfulness etc. which are to be corrected by buddhist guidance. but is the terrorist a victim or a victor? buddhism will prescribe a special treatment for one who inflicts suffering on others, a terrorist. he is more a victim and his case is diagnosed pathetically. no ordinary dialogue is possible in extreme cases when the terrorist is closed to all such humanitarian appeals simply because his mind is closed to dialogue. once there is no hope for dialogue and all kinds of interpersonal communication fail, there is no other way but to identify the situation as needing urgent intervention for restoring a human dimension. the dalai lama, a lifelong champion of non-violence, councils utmost restraint and expresses doubts if sheer good will and optimism would suffice. when the so-called partners in peace dialogue do not stand on equal footing and when there is no reciprocity between the one and the other, between the one who talks and the one who listens. in such 138 prajñā vihāra situations, dialogue becomes monologue and situation becomes dehumanized. dialogue is only feasible when there is openness from both sides and that way terrorism cannot be addressed if the minds of terrorists are closed and non-communicative. “the tibetan spiritual leader termed terrorism as the worst kind of violence, which is not carried by a few mad people but by those who are very brilliant and educated... but a strong ill feeling is bred in them. their minds are closed,” the dalai lama said. ‘terrorism is the worst kind of violence, so we have to check it, we have to take counter measures.’ with terrorists, the dalai lama said, applying a buddhist analysis, ‘their whole mind is dominated by negative emotions.’ but he emphasized that ‘the real antidote’ to terrorism in the long run is ‘compassion, dialogue -peaceful means’ even with terrorists. ‘we have to deal with their motivation, ‘he said’. terrorism comes out of hatred, and also short-sightedness.33 however buddhism offers a framework for exploring psychological causes of violence. (pratīitya-samutpāda or śūnyatā). man should explore his inner dimension and its strengths and weaknesses, and seek to curb the roots of all passions and hatred. all these spring from the human’s threefold defilements (desire, hatred and ignorance). central to the buddhist analysis of the cause of duhkha (suffering) is the doctrine of the three poisons: greed or craving, anger or hatred, and ignorance. buddhism asks us to look at these defilements in ourselves and those who might confront us, and how, in each of us as both perpetrator and victim of violence. these hindrances derive from certain conditions and cause certain actions. the second of these defilements, anger and hatred, relates most directly to violence.34 due to the desires for fame and wealth, social position, mammon, personal property, promotion, man has become a slave of lust, anger and delusion. even though he has been able to win and subdue nature with all sorts of advanced scientific inventions, he has still failed and is tied down with the sufferings of birth, old age, sickness and death.35 even though recognition is made of the vicious circle of karmic chain of greed, delusion, shortsightedness, temptation and insensitivity, ananya barua 139 that are the root causes of violent activities on earth, the circle continues unless there is opening in human nature and human mind to receive spiritual light. once the mind is completely closed, even the best spiritual and healing aids becomes ineffective. in such cases, buddhism offers pragmatic solution to terrorism by pointing out both short term and long term strategies to humanize an inhuman situation. but the hope remains that one day mankind will peruse the path of non-violence and love. therefore, at the general public level we must cultivate the notion of not just one religion, one truth, but pluralism and many truths. we can change the atmosphere, and we can modify certain ways of thinking. second, there should be a spirit of dialogue. whenever we see any disagreements, we must think how to solve them on the basis of recognition of oneness of the entire humanity. this is the modern reality. whenever a community is destroyed, in reality it destroys a part of all of us. so there should be a clear recognition that the entirety of humanity is just one family. any conflict within humanity should be considered as a family conflict. we must find a solution within this atmosphere.36 what is required is a well-thought-out, long-term strategy to promote globally a political culture of non-violence and dialogue. the international community must assume a responsibility to give strong and effective support to non-violent movements committed to peaceful changes. we must draw lessons from the experiences we gained. if we look back at the last century, the most devastating cause of human suffering has been the culture of violence in resolving differences and conflicts. the challenge before us, therefore, is to make this new 21st century a century of dialogue when conflicts are resolved non-violently.37 conclusion one striking similarity between st.augustine, mahatma gandhi and the dalai lama is their strong faith in the religious dimension of life and their recognition of the basic goodness of all men despite their straying from the ideal through materialism, greed and temptation. they allow for 140 prajñā vihāra a certain concession for war and use of force when these become lesser evils to combat a greater evil. in such a dharmic or religious solution to the evils of our time, there is hope for restoring the lost and dehumanized dimension of life and the hope for salvation from sin. hoekema writes, an essential companion to the doctrine of sin is the doctrine of grace. though human nature is corrupted by sin, it is also illuminated by god’s presence and guidance; god’s grace shows itself in countless ways in the lives of christians and non-christians alike. in light of this fact, evil demands a response that overcomes rather than compounds evil.” (hoekema, 2009)38 while the just war tradition associated with st.augustine is a war for self-defense, in hinduism , the warriors or the ksatriyas were entrusted with the duty of protecting the brahmins as the custodians of ‘dharma’, who at a later phase of history, would become as powerful as ‘gods on earth.’ gandhi made no provision for taking recourse to war or violence even for protecting dharma, nor does dalai lama. despite their basic faith in absolute ahimsa, there is tragic realization of the fact that terrorism cannot be addressed by applying the principle of ahimsa alone because the minds of terrorists are closed. the just war tradition too admits its own defeat if, its recourse to violence intended for good is turned to evil purposes. while the just-war theory can widen its scope by accommodating the non-violent principles into its fold, religious pacifism can engage in constructive dialogue with the political, military and civil institutions for evolving meaningful solutions to common concerns. in light of what is quoted below, the article concludes with an optimistic note that despite some differences in basic philosophy and theology, there is hope for more meaningful dialogue in the near future not only for dialogue among diverse religious traditions that still cherish some common minimum goals, there is hope for bridging the gap between the worldly and the otherworldly spheres of life in an amicable manner. ananya barua 141 the following statements from the u.s. bishops are relevant balancing the just war tradition of christianity with non-violence in order to preserve its truly dharmic dimension. while the just-war teaching has clearly been in possession for the past 1,500 years of catholic thought, the “new moment” in which we find ourselves sees the just-war teaching and nonviolence as distinct but interdependent methods of evaluating warfare. they diverge on some specific conclusions, but they share a common presumption against the use of force as a means of settling disputes. both find their roots in the christian theological tradition; each contributes to the full moral vision we need in pursuit of a human peace. we believe the two perspectives support and complement one another, each preserving the other from distortion.” (u.s. pastoral on war and peace, 208).”39 the dalai lama is equally optimistic that both the religious and political perspectives will set some common goals for empowering the non-violent traditions of humankind to eradicate suffering as well as for restoring peace and security of all forms of life. he writes, what is required is a well-thought-out, long-term strategy to promote globally a political culture of non-violence and dialogue. the international community must assume a responsibility to give strong and effective support to non-violent movements committed to peaceful changes. we must draw lessons from the experiences we gained. if we look back at the last century, the most devastating cause of human suffering has been the culture of violence in resolving differences and conflicts. the challenge before us, therefore, is to make this new 21st century a century of dialogue when conflicts are resolved non-violently.”40 142 prajñā vihāra end notes 1 young, katherine k.” hinduism and the ethics of weapons of mass destruction” in ethics and weapons of mass destruction: religious & secular perspectives, ed. sohail h. hashmi and steven, 277-307. (cambridge, uk: cambridge university press, 2004). 2 hijiya, james a. the “gita” of j. robert oppenheimer. proceedings of the american philosophical society, vol. 144, no. 2 (jun., 2000), pp. 123-167. american philosophical society. “lord krsna said: i am terrible time the destroyer of all beings in all worlds, engaged to destroy all beings in this world; of those heroic soldiers presently situated in the opposing army, even without you none will be spared.” 3 “kargil and beyond-”, talk by jaswant singh (eam) july 20, 1999 4 google’scacheofhttp://twocircles.net/2013 nov 05/indias_foreign_policy_ trapped_between_its_borders_jaswant_singh.html 5 sharma, arvind.gandhiorgod’s? power,forceandnonviolence,” in ethicalandpoliticaldilemmas of modern india, ed. ninian smart and shivesh thakur (new york: state martin’s,1993), p.26 6 http://www.academia.edu/6424200/hindu_traditions_and_nature_survey_ article 7 hoekema, david a. a practical christian pacifism (online 2009.web: www.christiancentury.org. 8 hoekema, david a. a practical christian pacifism (online 2009.web: www.christiancentury.org 9 hoekema, david a. a practical christian pacifism (online 2009.web: www.christiancentury.org 10 hoekema, david a. a practical christian pacifism (online 2009.web: www.christiancentury.org 11 hoekema, david a. a practical christian pacifism (online 2009.web: www.christiancentury.org 12 young, katherine k. “hinduism and the ethics of weapons of mass destruction” in ethics and weapons of mass destruction: religious & secular perspectives, ed. sohail h. hashmi and steven, (cambridge,uk: cambridgeuniversity press, 2004). pp.277-307 13 young, katherine k . “hinduism and the ethics of weapons of mass destruction” in ethics and weapons of mass destruction: religious & secular perspectives, ed. sohail h. hashmi and steven,. (cambridge,uk: cambridgeuniversity press, 2004). pp. 277-307 14 fowley, david “india’s nuclear tests,gandhi and non-violence “(published in the orgabizer and bjp today) ; (see www.vedane.com/indias.html (december) http://www.academia.edu/6424200/hindu_traditions_and_nature_survey_article http://www.academia.edu/6424200/hindu_traditions_and_nature_survey_article http://www.vedane.com/indias.html(december ananya barua 143 15 woods, julian f. destiny and human initiative in the mahabharata. albany :state univesrity of newyork press, 2001). 16 woods, julian f. destiny and human initiative in the mahabharata. albany :state univesrity of newyork press, 2001). 17 http://www.indiasutra.co.nz/blog/ancient-wisdom-behind-gandhis-style-ofprotest/ 18 ram lingam, ancient wisdom behind gandhi’s style of protest, http:// www.indiasutra.co.nz/blog/ancient-wisdom-behind-gandhis-style-of-protest/ 19 m. a. mehendale, reflections on the mahabharata war (shimla: indian institute of advanced study, 1995). 48 20 young, katherine k. “hinduism and the ethics of weapons of mass destruction” in ethics and weapons of mass destruction: religious & secular perspectives, ed. sohail h. hashmi and steven, 277-307. (cambridge, uk: cambridge university press, 2004). 21 sharma, arvind. gandhi or god’s? power, force and non-violence,” in ethical and political dilemmas of modern india, ed. ninian smart and shivesh thakur (new york: state martin’s,1993), p.26 22 mahatma gandhi, in gandhi on non-violence, edited by thomas merton [new directions, 1964], p.25). 23 m.k. gandhi, “letter to adolf hitler” (wardha 24 december 1940-15 april 1951) 24 hoekema, david a. a practical christian pacifism (online 2009.web: www.christiancentury.org 25 wikramagamage, chandra. “buddhist response to global terrorism” in http:// www.buddhivihara.org/buddhist-response-to-global-terrorism 26 the dalai lama interview|theprogressivehttp://www.progressive.org/ mag_in tv 0106 27 ibid. 28 asoka devendra, pancha sila, the five precepts of buddhism http:// www.maithri.com/links/articles/panchasila.htm+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in 29 all references or quotes introduced with “§” are from the dhammapada, translated by david kalupahana.) dharmasiri, gunapala. fundamentals of buddhist ethics, “objective justification of moral actions”, p.32-3. http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stroble/ buddhism_and_war.html 30 1995 buddhism and social action an explorationby ken jones http:// www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/jones/whee l285.html 31 stroble, james. “a study of the status of violence in early buddhism” in buddhism and war: www2.hawaii.edu/~stroble/buddwar.htm .accesed january 2010. 32 the role of buddhist preacher: a modern ven. dr. thich quang http:// longquanzs.org/articledetail.php?id=4468 http://www.christiancentury.org http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stroble/buddhism_and_war.html http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stroble/buddhism_and_war.html http://longquanzs.org/articledetail.php?id=4468 http://longquanzs.org/articledetail.php?id=4468 144 prajñā vihāra 33 the dalai lama interview by amitabh pal, january 2006 issue http:// www.progressive.org/mag_intv0106 34 ives, christopher. ‘sitting with violence ‘in buddhist responses to violence http://www.worldfaiths.org/articles/sitting with violence.doc 35 the role of buddhist preacher: a modern ven. dr. thich quang http:// longquanzs.org/articledetail.php?id=4468 36 http://www.weaselzippers.net/blog/2009/01/dalai-lama-says-nonviolencedoes-not-work-against-jihadists.htm 37 ibid. 38 david a. hoekema, reformed christian pacifism, christian century, october 22, 1986, pps. 917-919. co http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php/58434 reformed-christian-pacifism 39 https://books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0814721869; jean bethke elshtain -1992 just war theory-page 106-google books result 40 statement of his holiness the dalai lama on the thirty-ninth anniversary of the tibetan national uprising day. http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/ 10th-march-archive/1998 http://www.progressive.org/mag_intv0106 http://www.progressive.org/mag_intv0106 http://www.worldfaiths.org/articles/sittingwithviolence.doc http://longquanzs.org/articledetail.php?id=4468 http://longquanzs.org/articledetail.php?id=4468 10(134-138)note for authors ‘fides et ratio’: a process response santiago sia milltown institute, dublin abstract the catholic encyclical document fides et ratio strongly supports the link between faith and reason, and endorses the tradition of using philosophy, with specific reference to metaphysics, to express, develop and defend theological doctrines. in this paper i will develop the implications of this document by referral to the process philosophy of whitehead and hartshorne. i will elaborate what i call ‘philosophy in context’, ‘context’ interpreted in two distinct but related meanings: first, as the concreteness of life as providing the starting point of philosophical reflection, and second, as a unifying vision. these two understandings are connected in the claim that philosophising is intimately connected with metaphysical thinking. introduction reason has been subjected to much criticism from various quarters, including philosophy itself. in contrast, the document fides et ratio—and more recently, the lecture by pope benedict xvi at regensburg—affirms and defends its significance for religious belief. strongly supporting the link between faith and reason, the encyclical endorses the tradition of using philosophy, with specific reference to metaphysics, to express, develop and defend theological doctrines. it also discusses the importance of metaphysics for one’s philosophical outlook in life. in this paper i will offer some observations on the relationship between the catholic tradition and philosophy and make some comments on the suggestions for the future as presented in the encyclical fides et 100 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 1, january-june 2007, 100-115 © 2000 by assumption university press ratio.1 then i will provide a response that has been influenced by the process philosophers, a.n. whitehead and charles hartshorne. i set out and elaborate what i call ‘philosophy in context’, ‘context’ interpreted in two distinct but related meanings. ‘philosophy in context’ first of all means the concreteness of life as providing the starting point of philosophical reflection. but ‘philosophy in context’ is also understood as referring to some kind of a unifying vision or at least the need to recognise its significance. these two understandings are connected in the claim that philosophising is intimately connected with metaphysical thinking. support of philosophy given the interest shown in this encyclical in philosophy itself as well as its recognised importance for theology, one cannot but accept that such a situation will lead—as indeed it has done so—to promoting philosophical pursuits.2 with any pursuit, no matter in what discipline, the volume and quality of support, material or otherwise, go a long way towards advancing it. this advantage is compounded when the pursuit serves a certain goal—in the case of philosophy, its special service to theology— because, though secondary, the benefits may be important enough to stimulate more interest in the subject.3 both history and actual results can confirm the developments in philosophy which have occurred because of the catholic tradition. but the catholic church’s patronage of philosophical research and the link between philosophy and theology have led some to question the kind of philosophy that has resulted.4 it might even make one compare the situation to the suspect beneficence of patrons that artists enjoy. centuries ago, the athenian stranger in plato’s laws had bemoaned the practice in italy and sicily of leaving the judgment of poets in the hands of the spectators. such a practice spelled the destruction of the poets since they were in the habit of composing their poems to suit the taste of the judges. or one may have serious reservations with a philosophy that has been endorsed by a church body in the same way that there are those who frown upon any corporate sponsorships for various activities. the suspicion is not just about the motives but extends also to the end-prodsantiago sia 101 uct. similarly, a philosophy that meets with the approval of ecclesiastical bodies runs the risk of being isolated or largely ignored. worse, it could be dismissed as being subservient and therefore lacking in integrity. the papal document which we are examining has addressed this criticism. but it is worth adding that the criticism itself seems to be founded on a certain questionable assumption; namely, that philosophical thinking occurs or should occur in a vacuum. it does not. the act of philosophising always takes place in a specific context, and every philosopher brings into it personal as well as communal presuppositions and assumptions. in addition, one’s motives as well as intended goals always colour one’s pursuit of the truth, whether one does this in the religious or non-religious context. autonomy is never absolute, nor is freedom of thinking. the encouragement and support of the catholic church of philosophy do not in themselves constitute restrictions that would prevent it from attaining standards which would be possible without them. we need to distinguish perception or isolated cases from the total reality. my point is not to deny that philosophical research has at times become parochial because of the catholic church’s attempt to oversee it, but rather to reject the claim that such cases constitute a general adverse effect on philosophical thinking. the criticism is also grounded in another suspect assumption; namely, that philosophy must be entirely accountable to its own standards, methods and terms. hence, any association with faith would be seen as an unacceptable crossing of boundaries.5 again, the encyclical provides a response to this point. but perhaps it is not out of place to note that in alerting us to the demands of faith on philosophy,6 we are actually being reminded that human experience in its reality, which includes a certain awareness of transcendence, is much wider than its conceptual or its intellectual expression.7 thus, no philosophical conception can exhaust experience, simply because its expression is merely one, albeit probably the most important, feature of the human reality.8 in distancing philosophy from faith, some philosophers mistake the important conceptual distinction between reason and faith for the reality of human experience.9 moreover, this criticism takes a rather narrow interpretation of human rationality to be the exercise of reason whereas the latter arises from, is grounded in, and serves human rationality. the two are not the same. this means that philosophy, which employs reason, must be more open to its wider 102 prajñâ vihâra base which gives us more access to the truth than what human reason can achieve.10 in fides et ratio john paul ii draws our attention to an important relevant consideration. he distinguishes between philosophy as a system and philosophy as human aspiration: “every philosophical system, while it should always be respected in its wholeness, without any instrumentalization, must still recognize the primacy of philosophical enquiry, from which it stems and which it ought loyally to serve.”11 and he contextualises that comment by observing the changed role of philosophy itself in modern culture. “from universal wisdom and learning, it has been gradually reduced to one of the many fields of human knowing; indeed in some ways it has been consigned to a wholly marginal role”12 in other words, it seems to have forgotten the wider basis. faith and reason on the issue of the relationship between faith and reason itself, the encyclical traces and comments on christianity’s early encounter with philosophy and shows its acceptance of the positive role of reason in the development of the christian faith.13 st. paul, for instance, entered into discussion with certain epicurean and stoic philosophers. his action was an acknowledgment that it was possible to have natural knowledge of god. he also affirmed the belief that the voice of conscience is present in every human being. the fathers of the church on their part regarded the rational analysis provided by philosophical thinking as helpful in purifying the concept of divinity. the pope points out that to claim that the first christians were not interested in philosophical thinking is therefore not true. admittedly, their first and foremost concern was the proclamation of the good news. but they certainly did not ignore the task of deepening the understanding of faith and its motivations. he cites justin, for whom christianity is ‘the only sure and profitable philosophy’, and clement of alexandria who regarded the gospel as ‘the true philosophy’ and who turned to greek philosophy for the defense of the christian faith. an even more robust example that he mentions is st. augustine. in augustine’s work one can see the first great santiago sia 103 synthesis of philosophy and theology, which the pope describes as ‘a great unity of knowledge, grounded in the thought of the bible, confirmed and sustained by a depth of speculative thinking’. furthermore, in the pope’s mind, the ways in which the fathers engaged with philosophy was not limited to transposing the truths of faith into philosophical categories. rather, their intensity in living the content of their faith led them to the deepest forms of speculation. philosophy enabled them to disclose more completely what was merely implicit and preliminary in their faith. moving ahead in time, the pope then reminds us of anselm’s concept of intellectus fidei: faith is to be understood with the help of reason while reason at its summit acknowledges the significance of faith. considerable attention is given to what the pope describes as ‘the enduring originality of thomas aquinas’. in aquinas there is harmony of faith and reason. both are gifts from god, so there can be no contradiction between them. aquinas is said to exemplify the christian believer who seeks truth wherever it might be found, thus demonstrating its universality. moreover, aquinas saw how faith itself can enrich reason. he maintains that through the work of the holy spirit, knowledge matures into wisdom. this kind of wisdom is higher than philosophical wisdom, which is based upon the capacity of the intellect to explore reality. it is also distinct from theological wisdom, which has its source in revelation and which explores the content of faith. the wisdom that comes from the holy spirit is explained as presupposing faith but eventually formulating, with the use of reason, its right judgment on the basis of the truth of faith itself. on further reflection, however, i find that the interpretation of the relationship between faith and reason adopted by the encyclical leaves one with a number of philosophical concerns. its understanding of faith is still rather too intellectualised and its interpretation of the function of reason in relation to faith, despite disclaimers and modifications, still gives reason a rather subservient role. moreover, one could question the conception of truth that the document takes for granted. the document merges the understanding of truth set out in vatican i (truth as eternal and timeless) with that of vatican ii (the historicity of truth), two understandings which are not, at first glance, compatible. in addition, any attempt to reconcile two distinct and autonomous realities—and in this context faith and reason are so regarded—begs the question: what is it that enables us to 104 prajñâ vihâra harmonise them, is it faith or is it reason? the document gives faith priority yet interprets and justifies that status and the attempted reconciliation philosophically. another look at the relationship between faith and reason in the hope of furthering the discussion of this topic, i would like to suggest that one could view faith as an awareness of transcendence. it is an implicit human experience that can be made explicit in various ways. a religious context is one such way. but it is the exercise of human reasoning that enables us to interpret it in a certain way whether religiously or not. in other words, there is more unity and continuity between faith and reason despite their respective qualities. let me try to develop this suggestion a little further.14 the exercise of reason within the context of faith is actually a process which involves the stages of rejection, recognition, re-adjustment and response. by describing it in this way it is possible to liken our efforts to develop our faith, which is called for by the encyclical, to the work done by the early christians. furthermore, it means that this task is a continuous challenge and that the use of reason is not being restricted to the philosophical discipline. an early stage in making explicit our experience of transcendence and in arriving at a satisfactory conceptuality or doctrine is the rejection of alternatives. to some extent, it may be a matter of being clearer as to what something is not, rather than of what something is. in the case of the first christians who had the important task of formulating christian doctrine which was faithful to what had been experienced by the believing community, they had to weed out at the same time doctrines which could not be considered part of the christian experience. the encyclical notes that adoption of philosophy by the early church was cautious. paul himself warned against esoteric speculation, while other writers, especially ireneus and tertullian resisted the temptation to subordinate revelation to philosophy.15 moreover, the early christians rejected the customary belief in ‘gods’ since ‘god’ was used by the popular religious cults of the day. when these christians spoke of their god, they did not want their concept of god to be associated with the gods of popular religion.16 rejectsantiago sia 105 ing something, even within the context of religious faith, does not necessarily mean ‘being negative’. it could, in effect, be a genuine search for something better. the philosophical questions we ask about our faith, even if they sometimes lead to rejecting accepted beliefs, could be a healthy step towards a deeper understanding and appreciation of our faith. the next stage in this process is that of recognising or becoming aware of the value of a particular conceptualisation. here there is partial acceptance, and some similarities are noted. this stage in the process of describing god’s reality, for example, reveals the reasons why the early church opted in favour of a particular philosophical framework, that of stoic philosophy, in its attempts to conceptualise its faith-experience. the first christians belonged to the greco-roman world and were concerned to speak to it. they wanted to convey the christian message to their neighbours. greek philosophy was an excellent medium then. moreover, they wanted to show the reasonableness of christianity and the ability of christian teachings to withstand a thorough examination by philosophy. philosophy, understood as a search for truth, was critical of the mythical interpretation of reality. there was a parallel, therefore, between the philosophers’ task and that of the first christians. both wanted to differentiate their beliefs from those of popular religions which they regarded as superstitious. the early christians furthermore found that philosophical categories helped them understand christian revelation even more deeply than had been possible with biblical images. philosophy met the need to achieve greater clarification of terms and ideas. aquinas found much in aristotelian philosophy to help him clarify, deepen and defend christian beliefs. on this point, however, one could ask whether a different conceptuality, compared to what the early church and aquinas found helpful, would not be better suited to meet the needs of our faith today. it is for this reason that i am suggesting that we search for other conceptualities. process thought is a good example. one does not simply take over a favoured formulation. there is need for the third stage: that of re-adjustment. one has to reshape what one has recognised as helpful. thus, there is adaptation prior to adoption, transformation before acceptance.17 despite aligning itself with philosophy (thereby rejecting popular religion) the early church did not com106 prajñâ vihâra pletely identify its teachings with those of the philosophers either. for example, the philosophers’ god, in spite of its acceptability as the ground of all being, did not have any religious significance. this god was absolute perfection and the culmination of one’s intellectual pursuit, but one could neither pray to nor establish a personal relationship with this god. thus, some transformation was called for. but one wonders how satisfactory the early church’s transformation of philosophical ideas was, particularly in its conception of god. one suspects that the present demand for more relevant and adequate concepts of god harks back to this period in christian history. the fourth stage, that of response, is the acceptance of the transformed conceptuality. it is really a further development. but it should not be regarded as a final stage if by that is meant that no improvement can be expected.18 as time goes by, certain intellectual expressions or formulations of our faith can become irrelevant or even misleading. thus, the search for newer formulations is in reality an attempt to recover what has been obscured.19 the dissatisfaction felt by some with the conceptuality worked out by the early church has led to calls for more appropriate and contemporary expressions of the same christian experience of the faith and of god. to recall what had been stated previously, as far as the relationship between faith and reason is concerned, i would rather refer to it as “the exercise of reason within the context of religious faith”, because the starting-point for reflections, whether one is a theist or a secular, is the common starting-point of any thinking being: our own humanity and our experience of it as we interact with one another. what distinguishes the theist is that the use of reason is done within the context of religious faith. religious beliefs, therefore, are an acknowledgement of and an articulation of that specific context. it is a context that of course can be challenged insofar as the theist makes claims. but challenge and dispute by anyone who does not operate from the same context is possible only because there is a common starting-point that i have just referred to. this understanding of the relationship between faith and reason is thus different from fides quaerens intellectum because in that interpretation religious faith is already the starting point. nor should this understanding be described as intellectus quaerens fidem because for me it is santiago sia 107 experience rather than an intellectual act that grounds the intellectual process. philosophy thus is not regarded as ancilla fidei, nor are reason and faith symbolised as the “the two wings” (as are described in the encyclical). instead i regard the same human experience as occurring in different contexts, one of which is described as “religious”. i will explain my use of “context” a little later. future tasks for philosophy the encyclical refers to future tasks for philosophy, thus re-affirming its solid support for its continued study and development. such support will no doubt stimulate further scholarship and teaching of this subject. aside from individual interests in specific issues or school of thought, the shape of such philosophical research will also be influenced by the response to official guidance or directives. john paul ii in fides et ratio outlines what he considers to be the current requirements and tasks for philosophy. although addressed specifically to catholic thinkers, he has a wider audience in mind. the context in which he presents his suggestions is the acknowledged relationship between faith and reason, and for this reason he turns to the christian vision as expressed in sacred scripture. for philosophers, it is probably neither the source nor even the vision itself but the possibility of having a vision (a metaphysical as well as an epistemological issue) that will be of interest. and here john paul touches on an issue that should indeed concern contemporary philosophers—even if it runs counter to much of the work that is being presently done in philosophy. noting the fragmentation of knowledge in various fields, including philosophy, and its consequences, one of which is the crisis of meaning, he speaks of the need for philosophers to retain and develop a vision of reality.20 he wants us to recover what he calls “the sapiential dimension” of the pursuit of truth, reminding us that “a philosophy which no longer asks the meaning of life would be in grave danger of reducing reason to merely accessory functions, with no real passion for the search for truth.”21 the encyclical bemoans the loss of 108 prajñâ vihâra metaphysical thinking that characterises much of contemporary philosophy, and in doing so illustrates well what had been averted to earlier; namely, that the magisterium does more than just point out lacunae but also sparks off a renewal, and in this case, in the study of metaphysics. john paul provides us with the reason: “if i insist so strongly on the metaphysical element, it is because i am convinced that it is the path to be taken in order to move beyond the crisis pervading large sectors of philosophy at the moment, and thus to correct certain mistaken modes of behaviour now widespread in our society.”22 it is a call worth heeding.23 another issue touched upon by the encyclical that hopefully will be pursued by those engaged in philosophical pursuits, is the nature and status of human reason. according to john paul ii, this is “one of the tasks which christian thought will have to take up through the next millennium of the christian era.”24 given the fact that this is the very tool of philosophers, it should be of interest to contemporary philosophy, particularly since its capabilities have been largely curtailed by—of all people—philosophers themselves.25 variations of kant’s criticisms abound in the writings of many contemporary philosophers. in contrast, the encyclical states emphatically the conviction that humans can arrive, having been endowed with reason, at a unified and organic vision of knowledge.26 since in some ways the future of philosophy is very much linked to our claims regarding reason’s capabilities,27 this topic certainly merits much closer attention. john paul’s own words on this matter are worth quoting in full: i appeal to philosophers, and to all teachers of philosophy, asking them to have the courage to recover, in the flow of an enduringly valid philosophical tradition, the range of authentic wisdom and truth—metaphysical truth included—which is proper to philosophical enquiry. they should be open to the impelling questions which arise from the word of god and they should be strong enough to shape their thought and discussion in response to that challenge. let them always strive for truth, alert to the good which truth contains. then they will be able to formulate the genuine ethics which humanity needs so urgently at this particular time. the church follows the work of philosophers with interest and appresantiago sia 109 ciation; and they should rest assured of her respect for the rightful autonomy of their discipline. i would want especially to encourage believers working in the philosophical field to illuminate the range of human activity by the exercise of reason which grows more penetrating and assured because of the support it receives from faith.28 philosophy in context as the quotation above shows, fides et ratio does not limit itself to a discussion on the relationship between faith and reason. it undertakes to set out a certain understanding of philosophy. drawing from the insights of process thought, i should now like to provide a further response to the encyclical regarding its conception of philosophy and of metaphysical thinking by pointing to the need to regard philosophy as “in context”. the detaching of philosophy from its main context—basically, the concerns of everyday life—can be detrimental. not only does it deviate from the origins of philosophy, but it loses much of the value of this truly human act. it can also lead to isolation from other academic disciplines, whereas continual dialogue with these can be an advantage not only to these disciplines but also to philosophy itself. it must be added, however, that fortunately there have been others who pursue ‘philosophy in context’. a.n. whitehead’s description of speculative philosophy as like the flight of an airplane provides an appropriate imagery: it starts from the ground, soars up into the rarefied atmosphere and lands back on the ground. i need to explain further in what sense i have used the term “context” here since that word is sometimes interpreted differently by other philosophers, particularly by those influenced by wittgenstein’s philosophy. what it does not mean is that the act of philosophising is fenced in by one’s subjective experiences such that one finds it impossible to transcend them. rather, i take it to mean—and use the term accordingly—that the act of philosophising takes place in what process philosophers calls ‘the 110 prajñâ vihâra concreteness of life’. these are specific life-situations, but they are not completely subjective nor are they entirely particular instances, such that one does not see any resemblance to other situations. the concreteness of life serves as the starting points for our reflections. “context” as used here also refers to some kind of a unifying vision or at least the need to recognise its significance.29 the specific lifesituations on which the act of philosophising is based serve as pointers because it is through these specific situations that we become somewhat aware of a larger picture. in fact, we can only recognise them as specific because there seems to be a broader background against which they are set. whitehead’s analogy of “seeing the wood by means of the trees” can be helpful here.30 it is the trees that we initially encounter, but it is also they which enable us to become aware of the wood. in seeing the wood, we have gone beyond merely noticing the trees. we may even see them in a different light because we see them against the backdrop of the wood. similarly, the larger picture or the vision, that are opened up by the various contexts in which we philosophise, can enlighten us when we look again at the specific situations, including those that have set us off initially on our philosophical pursuits. or as t.s. eliot put it: “…we arrive where we started/and know the place for the first time.” these two understandings of “context” are connected in the claim that philosophising is intimately connected with metaphysical thinking. as a philosophical discipline, metaphysics has been severely criticised by many contemporary philosophers. i believe, however, that the negativity towards metaphysics is really toward certain metaphysical systems. the metaphysical spirit which stirred the ancients in their search for true wisdom—and which i suspect has not really been abandoned by many of its critics, including those in the postmodern mode—should direct us towards a different route in metaphysical thinking, for example, that mapped out by a.n. whitehead and charles hartshorne. “context” is being used then in two distinct but related meanings: (1) the concreteness of our human experience as the basis for our philosophical reflections; and (2) a unifying vision that underlies our response to that experience. the question that inevitably arises is how something concrete (or detailed) can be reconciled with what is essentially abstract (or general). in insisting that philosophy is always in context, am i theresantiago sia 111 fore claiming that philosophy is at all times both concrete and abstract? that would be a correct conclusion except that as these terms apply, they refer to different dimensions of the philosophical act. insofar as philosophical thinking emerges out of the concreteness of life, it is concrete. it is based on and grounded in the day-to-day questions—whether it is the challenge of suffering or what ethical course of action to take—which need to be addressed as we live our lives and carry on our daily routine. but philosophical thinking, if it is not to be a superficial or an ad hoc response, must address those questions against a more general framework that helps to provide a sharper focus. this is the abstract dimension since it is general and comprehensive. there is something about human nature that is not fully satisfied with mere instances or selected examples. it is for this reason that, despite several contemporary criticisms of metaphysics, i have linked the second meaning of “context” with metaphysical thinking. the human desire for some continuity, comprehensiveness, and unity in our understanding of reality, and in our attempts to make sense of it, is what i believe drives us to metaphysics. admittedly, certain metaphysical developments do not satisfy us. but it is regrettable that in some quarters, the mention of “metaphysics” is enough to elicit or provoke criticism. in this regard, i agree with h.o. mounce when he writes that it is not the word “metaphysics” that is important but what it represents. as he puts it: it is to be hoped that we do not see the end of metaphysics in its traditional sense…. but we can dispense with the word in its modern usage…. simply to use it, in its modern sense, is to misrepresent what it purports to classify and simultaneously to enforce the categories of the post-kantian or positivist worldview. so by all means let us see the end of ‘metaphysics’. but let us retain what it used to mean, for that is simply the activity of philosophy itself.31 i had earlier indicated that philosophy and its close association with rationality are also in need of some further scrutiny. rationality, at least in much of the western tradition, has been understood in almost exclusively intellectual terms. reasoning and indeed philosophising are recognised as an exercise of the intellect—with the consequent neglect of 112 prajñâ vihâra the other facets of the human act, e.g. the imagination, in our philosophical pursuits. it is not surprising therefore that philosophy is being studied as distinct from theology or from literature. i accept that there are good reasons for maintaining and upholding this distinction, but the strict separation can be quite detrimental. to some extent it has impoverished the development of philosophy. it seems to me that this can be traced back to equating rationality with reason (in the intellectual sense). as whitehead and hartshorne have done in their philosophies, we need in our philosophical thinking to incorporate the imagination, faith and scientific insights (among others) in our quest for wisdom. for only in this way can we truly advance towards the truth. endnotes 1 for a more extended discussion, see my religion, reason and god (frankfurt: peter lang publishers, 2004). 2 this was repeated by pope benedict xvi in his lecture on “faith, reason and the university” at the university of regensburg, 12 september 2006. 3 one can perhaps draw a parallel here with the teaching of philosophy courses in a core curriculum. in my experience of teaching these courses in the usa to nonphilosophy students (who need these courses to graduate), a number of students have become quite interested in the subject even to the extent of switching their major or taking a minor in philosophy. another is the incentive to achieve highest merit (in salaries of american academics) and the receipt of grants, both of which can lead to greater scholarship in philosophy. 4 i have limited my exploration to the relationship between philosophy and theology. fides et ratio also discusses the relationship between philosophy and culture, cf. par. 100. it is important to bear in mind too that catholic tradition has always held that philosophy plays an important role in enabling theists and secularists to engage in dialogue with each other. 5 this strict separation between disciplines runs throughout the academic curricula, and is fortunately being countered by interdisciplinary studies. 6 “the truths of faith makes certain demands which philosophy must respect whenever it engages theology,” fides et ratio, par. 77. 7 it would be instructive to compare this point with what some contemporary european philosophers have become aware in their philosophical thinking; namely, the need to incorporate the imagination. 8 see my “concretizing concrete experience” in religion, reason and god, 141158. 9 the separation of reason and faith, or philosophy and religion, is more evident in western compared to asian thought. i believe that the task is not to re-think but to reconstruct the relationship between reason and faith in more holistic ways. cf. my “faith and reason: a process view” in religion, reason and god, 1-9. to santiago sia 113 me, the reality is the one human experience, interpreted and acknowledged differently by the religious believer and by the humanist. faith thus is awareness and acknowledgement of transcendence. religious faith develops when that takes place within the context of a religious community. 10 this is, of course, an epistemological question which gives rise to the debate between rationalism and empiricism. the point i am making does not side with either but is inclusive of both. 11 fides et ratio, par. 4. in a certain sense, such an observation could well be expressed in shakespeare’s words: “there are more things in heaven and on earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy”! 12 fides et ratio, par. 47. 13 see the introduction. also, cf. andré cloots and santiago sia (eds.), framing a vision of the world: essays in philosophy, science and religion, louvain philosophical studies 14 (leuven university press, 1999). 14 ibid., par. 81. in veritatis splendor, he refers to the crisis of truth and its consequences. 15 ibid. par. 83. 16 in response to this call a major conference, “metaphysics in the third millennium international conference,” was held in rome in september 2000. 17 ibid., par. 85. 18 there is a certain irony here when one takes into account that the tool being called into question is the very one used to question it! the same observation can probably be made of those who reject metaphysics. one wonders whether they are merely substituting one kind of metaphysical thinking for another. or sometimes the debate develops into a linguistic one: what one means by “metaphysics”. 19 john paul refers to this topic also in more specific terms: “how can one reconcile the absoluteness and universality of truth with the unavoidable historical and cultural conditioning of the formulas which express that truth?” fides et ratio, par. 95. on this point i believe that the metaphysics developed by the philosophers alfred north whitehead and charles hartshorne has much to offer with its distinction between the abstract and the concrete. 20 it seems to me that an even more crucial issue is re-thinking the western conception of reason. this also seems to me to have been what pope benedict xvi means by “broadening our concept of reason and its application.” cf. his lecture on “faith, reason and the university” although what he is referring to is the positivistic (rather than the intellectualistic) conception of reason. 21 fides et ratio, par. 106. 22 a.n. whitehead in adventures of ideas (cambridge university press, 1942), 125126, notes the important role that philosophy plays in human civilisations in providing “that sense of importance which nerves all civilized effort,” for it is the lack of a “coordinating philosophy of life” that has doomed civilizations. he 114 prajñâ vihâra issues a call to re-create and re-enact a vision of the world. cf. also andré cloots and santiago sia (eds.), framing a vision of the world: essays in philosophy, science and religion, louvain philosophical studies 14 (leuven university press, 1999). 23 i discuss this quotation further in “seeing the wood by means of the trees: a view on education and philosophy,” process papers: proceedings of the association for process philosophy of education, no. 10 (march 2006). 24 h.o. mounce, “the end of metaphysics,” new blackfriars (september 2005), 527. santiago sia 115 04_(66-78) dimension dimensions of epistemology and the case for africa’s indigenous ways of knowing amaechi udefi university of ibadan, nigeria abstract the debates within african philosophical practice have concerned its status, relevance and methodology appropriate or usable for doing it. many african philosophers still express reservations concerning the importance of africa’s indigenous ways of knowing. paulin hountondji, a leading african philosopher, famously denies that african traditional thought is true philosophy, classifying it as mere ethnophilosophy, since it deals with orality and other ethnographical materials like proverbs, parables, folklores, fables, songs etc. hountondji’s position is, to say the least, exclusionist, since it denies traditional heritage a position in the on-going philosophical conversation or discourse. the paper suggests that hountondji’s position rests on one-sided conception of epistemology. and wishes to show that philosophical practice is as old as the history of mankind in africa, two senses of the word epistemology the introduction of african philosophy as part of the curriculum in nigeria’s higher education system was marked or preceded by a long debate centering on its methodology and status as an academic discipline. as this debate continued, african philosophers and scholars were polarized. on the one side were those who took a position arguing that african philosophy was still in the making. on the other side were those who believed that african philosophy was continuous with african culture. paulin hountondji, one of leading african philosophers, characterized the position of the latter group as ethnophilosophical, which he takes to be an attempt to “define a specific african philosophy, a worldview common to all africans, past, present and future, a collective, im66 prajna vihara, volume16, number 1, january-june 2015, 66-78 2000 by assumption university pressc -˜ mutable system of thought in eternal apposition to that of europe”1. this way of understanding african philosophy, according to hountondji, prompts some african philosophers to see it as a matter of duty to “reconstruct the thought of his forefathers, the collective weltanschauung of his people”2. he avers that ethnophilosophy has as its main objective; …to reconstruct a particular weltanschauung, a specific world-view commonly attributed to all africans, abstracted from history and change and moreover, philosophical through an interpretation of the customs and traditions, proverbs and institutions in short, various dataconcerning the cultural life of african people3. hountondji would not have been worried by the anthropologisation of african philosophy if it had identified itself as a form of “cultural anthropology”, and not, as its proponents would want us to believe, as representing the proper methodological rendering of african philosophies’4. the assumption here is that philosophy cannot exist as an implicit, collective, and communal thought, which characterizes all africans. neither can philosophy be masked in the form of poems, myth, legends, etc, since these, according to hountondji, are “artistic literature as distinct from scientific literature”5. hountondji, like the members of the analytic african philosophy, understands philosophy in the active sense __ a rational and critical study with argumentation and clarification as its essential hallmarks, which persistently “questioning the untiring dialectic that accidentally produces systems and then projects them towards a horizon of fresh truths”6. the key targets of hountondji’s denunciation of ethnophilosophy include; (i) orality (ii) myth of unanimity (iii) collective or communal thought as opposed to individual thought (iv) unconscious, spontaneous and implicit world-view (v) cultural uniqueness. based on his uncompromising adherence to philosophy as it is defined or understood in a western context, it is natural that he would reject terms like igbo philosophy, yoruba philosophy, dogon philosophy, akan philosophy etc. in the same manner, he would dismiss the idea amaechi udefi 67 of african theory of knowledge for the same reasons, despite the effort of african philosophers to demonstrate the existence of such philosophy and epistemology as found amongst indigenous african people. therefore in an effort to defend the idea of an african philosophy we need to clarify the various senses of the word ‘epistemology’. this can in turn allow an appreciation of a collective epistemology. ordinary or broad sense of epistemology epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, especially the question of how we know what we claim to know and the extent to which we know it7. but epistemology can possess another sense, where it is taken to mean the communal beliefs of a people, because any group of human beings will certainly have to have some world outlook, that is, some general conceptions about the world in which they live and themselves both as individuals and as members of society8. concerning traditional african philosophy, we do not need to assume that there is any kind of metaphysical or mythic unity among africans with respect to their conceptions of nature, man, existence, society, etc. it is also not necessary to suggest that these conceptions are unique to them. we do not have to make any of these suggestions because of the diversity of the cultures and traditions in africa and the possibility that these cultures and traditions might share some of their essential attributes with those of other societies. the point however, is that in spite of the diversity, we can still identify some deep underlying affinities running through the various african cultures and traditions by which we can consider their unity. the point we are making here is well stated by anyanwu when he says: …a skeptic may doubt whether what i have described as the basic assumptions of african culture refer to all black african cultures or to specific or particular cultures of certain groups of people in africa. i would say that it makes no difference whether one speaks about the philosophy of a particular ethnic group in africa or the philosophy of african culture in general,…the underlying principles inherent in all african cultures are applicable in any form in which one may formulate african (traditional) philoso68 prajna vihara ̃ phy9. thus on the basis of this illuminating insight by an african philosopher, we can say that there is a certain underlying identity even in the face of plurality of african traditions and heritage.10 if we assume that there is a traditional african philosophy, then this philosophy is certainly not a stock of metaphysical notions common to all africans. rather, it is 'an abstraction standing for those interrelated conceptions of nature, man, society, morality’ etc. it is important here to distinguish between objective and subjective, or the material conditions that enable one or other philosophy and the vehicles for its expression to come into being. this point is taken by joseph dietzgen, when he writes: just as the reformulation was conditioned by the material base of the 16th century, so the theory of human intellectual operations just like the discovery of the electric telegraph is conditioned by the material base of the 19th century. accordingly the contents of this tract are not the product of an individual mind, rather there are a plant born on historical soil…11 what emerges from this would be that there is no necessary link between the existence of philosophy and the effort of the individual since every philosophy that finds expression does so after a period of gestation. a mode of thought cannot therefore be the emergence of individual philosopher. rather it must be what dietzgen has rightly called ‘the material base’. the point here is that philosophy like history in general, cannot be conceived as merely the product of individual works of genius. for there is abundant evidence in african traditional thought to show that indigenous thinkers are capable of reflective philosophical thinking and that philosophical world-views are characteristic of a people’s communal outlook upon the universe. it would be said then that any attempt to reject this in preference to ‘the theoretical effort of the individual’ is to be guilty of stealing the fruits of the work, both manual and intellectual of the mass of the people.12 scholars such as hountondji, who reject african traditional thought because it is a collective philosophy, ignore the relevance and impact of culture on the reflections of the individual thinker. they misamaechi udefi 69 takenly believe that philosophizing is a wholly individualistic affair, and fail to realize that the so-called individual thinker must draw as his raw data the communal ideas and belief systems preponderant in his community. they are rooted in the beliefs and assumptions of the culture. here, the term culture is taken from its latin roots, cultura meaning cultivating or tilling the land. it was taken by cicero and others as the cultivation of the soul or mind since the human spirit will not achieve its proper result if it is not trained or educated13. however, we shall define culture following e.b. tylor, to be “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and -habits acquired by man as a member of society”14. we are therefore justified in saying that socrates and plato are greek philosophers and locke and berkeley are british philosophers because the ideas of these individuals are rooted in the traditions and mentalities of the greek or british culture. philosophy (epistemology) is the product of a culture because it is inconceivable to say that a culture can exist without those elements of thought that are shared in common. hence, we can say that all individualized philosophies stem from the general experience and problem confronting a particular people in a given cultural environment. on this anyanwu says: the philosophies of individuals are still subordinate to public philosophy, and in the ultimate analysis public (collective) philosophy.15 in order to corroborate the point we are developing here, it may be instructive to examine some of the philosophical doctrines of some individual thinkers in the western philosophical tradition to see how they appropriated the dominant ideas of their culture to formulate their doctrines. in ancient philosophy both thales, anaxamander and anaximenes were credited for explaining natural phenomena in purely systematic and scientific terms, shifting away from the explanation natural phenomena in terms of supernatural agencies. it is important to note that the main pre-occupation of these philosophers was to discover the ultimate principles that underlie the various things in the physical world. thales contended that all things in the world derive from ‘water’. aristotle later pointed out that the idea that water subsists in all things in the universe was common in the mythological traditions of the greeks and the peoples 70 prajna vihara ̃ with whom they come into contact.16 the issue here is that the notion of water and the beliefs and practices associated with it were already embodied in the greeks’ conception of natural phenomena. the philosopher merely draws for his analysis the ideas or raw data embedded in the communal world outlook of his people. as a matter of fact, the minds of the philosophers are not a tabula rasa where ideas are imprinted, but are already furnished with the ideas, beliefs, thoughts of their society. based on this, we can argue that philosophical discussion in any given epoch is determined by a set of assumptions which are the groundwork of current conceptions shared by all men of a given culture.17 thus, it can be argued that greek philosophy or any other arises out of the minds of the people and is in fact a component part of that culture. this fact is obvious when we consider what bertrand russell says: my purpose is to exhibit philosophy as an integral part of social and political life, not as the isolated speculations of remarkable individuals.18 technical or strict sense of epistemology what we are attempting here is to examine epistemology in its strict or technical sense with a view to showing that both the broad or general and narrow or technical sense shade into each other in many forms as well as unraveling some of the pitfalls associated with the technical sense of the term. the word ‘epistemology’ is a compound greek word formed from two simple parts, ‘episteme’ which means ‘knowledge’ and ‘logos’ which connotes ‘theory’. hence, epistemology is referred to as ‘theory of knowledge’. even though epistemology embraces a variety of concepts and issues, its central questions have remained the same. these include, what are the criteria of knowledge? how does one know or come to know anything at all? these questions, we believe, serve as an invitation to analyze the status of our knowledge claims, the validation of our cognitive experience, and the relationship between our cognitive experience and the various objects in the world. this is what michael williams intends when he says that epistemology is concerned with the nature or structure of the justification of our most important beliefs, our belief in amaechi udefi 71 the existence of the physical world.19 now apart from the above questions, there is even a larger question which is: why is it necessary to have a theory of knowledge? this is connected to the problem of what we understand by the term knowledge, and what deserves the title of knowledge20. it suggests that only those that are equipped with the proper methodology can achieve the solution to these problems. the knowledge of the philosopher, because of his understanding of what constitutes knowledge, is different than the knowledge of the man on the street, or knowledge in the real sense of the word. the philosopher can criticize certain knowledge claims based upon the idea that certain logical conditions are not being met. the point then is that any claim to knowledge, if it is to be a valid claim, presupposes a prior satisfaction of the conditions concerning grounds, truth, meaning etc. thus, the task of the philosopher, concerned with the theory of knowledge, is to investigate and elucidate, in a practical manner, the conditions for true knowledge. the word ‘know’ is very complex. whereas some philosophers describe the word as psychological or propositional attitudes towards statements or a state of affairs, others reject and instead claim that it has distinctive meaning as a private mental state that intuitively distinguishes it from other psychological attitudes.21 for these people, such statements as ‘i know x: will then refer to only that distinctive state of mind at that particular time. but its ordinary english usage tends to suggest that the word is commonly used in a dispositional or behavioral sense. concerning this, h.h. price writes; now in ordinary everyday english the verb ‘to know’ generally used in a dispositional sense: not quite invariably perhaps, but certainly the dispositional use of it is by far the most common.22 whenever we talk of knowledge or the ordinary english verb ‘to know’ in epistemology.23 what we are aiming at is the sense in which a person knows that something is the case (knowing that or propositional knowledge), or the sense in which a person could be said to be acquainted with a state of affairs (knowledge by acquaintance). for instance, when a person claims to know that the atomic weight of gold is 197.2; or that a.j. ayer is the author of the problem of knowledge, we believe that this sense of knowing entitles someone to talk of knowledge as being a 72 prajna vihara ̃ sub-set of belief. additionally, the way we justify different claims to knowledge differs; hence the justification of the claim that a person knows that the atomic weight of gold is 197.2 is quite different from the justification required to prove the truth of the claim that a.j. ayer is the author of the problem of knowledge. now if this is accepted, then what justification do we have to say that these examples fall under the same concept? to answer this will imply also our knowledge or understanding of certain similarities they share especially in the ordinary usage. so this seems to be one of the sources of the philosophical importance of trying to find an adequate definition of knowledge, that is, a definition that could provide satisfactory criteria for assessing certain claims to knowledge.24 interconnections between the broad and strict senses of epistemology as stated above, the distinction between the broad and strict or narrow senses of philosophy is akin to those between ‘critical’ and ‘collective’ epistemology. hence, the explication of one can be used to understand the other since epistemology is a core branch of philosophy. some philosophers and scholars have made postulations alluding to the distinction between the broad and strict senses of the terms, philosophy and epistemology. witness, for instance, f.c. copleston’s distinction between broadfield and second-order philosophy25; claude sumner’s broad and narrow philosophy26; d.a. masolo’s ordinary sense and second sense philosophy27. what is clear in all these two senses of philosophy (epistemology) is that these philosophers do not take them as autonomous and as existing independently of each other. for them, however, both overlap and shade into each other in a complementary manner. the symbiotic relationship, as it were between the two senses or philosophy and/for epistemology is well expressed by sumner when he argues that: philosophy in a broad sense is still philosophy. ‘in this way, he justifies using the words ethiopian philosophy in the titles of his books’… he sees his own distinction between broad and narrow philosophy to be a bridge or compromise between western version of philosophy and what amaechi udefi 73 is needed to include african wisdom traditions within the field of philosophy, thus making the definition more universal rather than narrowly european28. as was discussed earlier, hountondji, and some members of the analytic african philosophy have argued that traditional african thought cannot and should not constitute african philosophy. hountondji, in his seminal work, african philosophy myth and reality, made a distinction between what he calls ‘popular’ and ‘strict’ senses of philosophy. the former, according to him, refers to “wisdom, individual or collective, which is made of coherent principles and meant to guide daily action”. however in the strict sense, hountondji argues that it cannot be spontaneous or collective philosophy, but is based on the scientific model of free discussion during which hypotheses are tested’29. kwasi wiredu, a member of the analytic school of african philosophy, while not as dismissive of traditional african thought as hountondji, still holds (what sumner calls) “a colonized version of philosophy which accepts western definitions instead of creating african definitions of philosophy”.30 concerning traditional african philosophy, wiredu has this to say; if african philosophy means traditional african philosophy as surprisingly many people seem to think, then we can forget any pretence of modern philosophizing. in most parts of africa, we would have, in that case, to abstain from such disciplines as symbolic logic and its philosophical interpretations, the philosophy of mathematics and of the natural and social sciences, the theory of knowledge associated with the foregoing disciplines and the moral, political and social philosophy which has arisen as a response to the needs of modern times…31 according to olusegun oladipo, wiredu’s rejection of the equation of african philosophy with african folk thought is informed by two considerations namely; ‘practical and theoretical’. on the practical side, such equation, according to wiredu, would amount to being “content with the mere narration of the ideas africans lived by as an adequate fulfillment of the philosopher’s task in contemporary africa”32. from the theoretical angle, “it would deny africans the opportunity of engaging 74 prajna vihara ̃ fruitfully in the activity of modern philosophizing”.33 but the hostilities against ethnophilosophy in particular and traditional african philosophy in general by the analytic group is unwarranted because their views will definitely hurt africa by robbing it, according to barry hallen, of engagement in “a positive and fruitful relationship between africa’s indigenous intellectual heritage and technical systematic academic (western) philosophy”.34 one aspect of their position against traditional african philosophy is simply that it is largely oral and unwritten. in other words, “its various aspects have usually been transmitted from generation to generation by word of mouth”35. however some scholars have shown that proverbs, myths, folklores etc, are important vehicles for the transmission of traditional thought and as ‘sources of traditional conceptions and ideas, whether metaphysical, epistemological, ethical etc”36. by advocating the method of science and technology as the basis of social development by the analytic african philosophers, they were uncompromising in calling for a break or total destruction of “traditional idols” and other heritage resources. but it is fruitless to pursue this project because africa’s past cannot simply be eliminated. in the views of some scholars, particularly j.f. ade ajayi, …development is not simply an activity in which the old is replaced by the new in a mechanical manner. rather, it is a process of social reconstruction in which the past survives in the present, though in a modified form…37 based on the insight offered by the doyen of african historiography, ade-ajayi, we can make the bold claim that these views of the analytical african philosophers are unilluminating and do not serve as an adequate critique of ethnophilosophy. this essay wishes to show that the attack on ethnophilosophy and the rejection of traditional african thought is misguided. this is because ethnophilosophy is still an important fruitful discourse in contemporary africa. apart from promoting positive aspects of culture, it also promotes indigenous knowledge, which is “a paradigm shift from the mechanistic top-down models primarily concerned with economic development towards dynamic participatory approaches concerned with all facets of human development”. in other words, the utilization of ‘indigenous institutions and culture in effecting more positive governance and amaechi udefi 75 development emphasizing participatory processes’ at the socio-political and economic layers of the society is the interest of ethnophilosophers in postcolonial africa. references 1. paulin j. hountondji, african philosophy myth and reality, with an introduction by abiola irele, london: hutchinson university library for africa, 1983, pp. 51-52. 2. ibid, p.52. 3. ibid., p.34. 4. barry hallen, african philosophy, the analytic approach trenton, nj.: africa world press, inc., 2006, pp.107-108. 5. paulin j. hountondji, african philosophy myth and reality, pp.8283. 6. ibid., p.53. 7. e.a. rush, the ‘ways of knowing and thinking’, lesotho: national university of lesotho, 1977, see introduction. 8. kwasi wiredu, ‘on defining african philosophy’ in tsenay serequeberhan (ed.) african philosophy: the essential readings, new york: paragon house, 1991, p.87. 9. k.c. anyanwu, the african experience in the american market place, new york: exposition presss, 1983, p.60. 10. w.e. abraham, the mind of africa chicago: university of chicago press, 1962, p. 11. c.f. olabiyi yai, ‘theory and practice in african philosophy: the poverty of speculative philosophy’ in second order, an african journal of philosophy vol. vi, no.2 july 1977, pp.3-20. 12. ibid, p.11. 13. cf. george f. mclean, ‘person as essentially cultural: from individual self-interest to cultural traditions’; in william sweet et al. (eds.) the dialogue of cultural traditions: a global perspective washington dc: the council for research in values and philosophy, 2008, p.23. 14. e.b. tylor, primitive culture london; john murray, 1871, vii, p.7. 15. k.c. anyanwu, the problem of method in african philosophy in c.s. momoh (ed.) the substance of african philosophy nigeria: african philosophy projects publishers, 1989, p.140. 76 prajna vihara ̃ 16. aristotle, metaphysics, 1983b 20-984a 4 17. w.k.c. guthrie, the greek philosophies: from thales to aristotle london: methuen, 1967. 18. bertrand russell, a history of western philosophy 2nd edition new york; n1965, p.174. 19. michael williams, groundless beliefs, an essay on the possibility of epistemology, new haven, conn: yale university press, 1977, p.8. 20. these points are due to d.w. hamlyn, the theory of knowledge, london: the macmillan press, 1970, p.4. 21. barry hallen and j.o. sodipo, knowledge, belief and witchcraft: analytic experiments in african philosophy london: ethnographica ltd., 1986, p.8. 22. h.h. price, belief, london: george allen and union, 1969, p.42. 23. for an illuminating account of the different senses of the verb ‘to know’, see a.j. ayer, the problem of knowledge, harmondsworth: penguin book 1956, p.8. 24. these points are due to o.t. oladipo, ‘knowledge as justified belief’; unpublished m. a. project, university of ibadan, 1984, pp.34. 25. f.c. copleston, philosophies and cultures, oxford: oxford university press, 1980, pp.12-12. 26. claude sumner, classical ethiopian philosophy, los angeles: adey publishing co., 1994, p.17. 27. d.a. masolo, african philosophy in search of identity, bloomington; indiana: indiana university press, 1994, p.59. 28. claude sumner, classical ethiopian philosophy, p.17. 29. paulin j. hountondji, african philosophy myth and reality, pp.5662. 30. cf. gail m. presbey, ‘broad’ and ‘strict’ distinctions proposed by claude sumner regarding ethiopian and african philosophy claude sumner and samuel w. yohannes (eds.) perspectives in african philosophy: an anthology on problematics of an african philosophy: twenty years after (1996), addis ababa: addis ababa university printing press, 2002, p.78. 31. kwasi wiredu, “african philosophical tradition: a case study of the akan”, the philosophical forum: a quarterly vol. 24, nos. 1-3, 1992-93, p.1. 32. olusegun oladipo, philosophy and the african experience. the conamaechi udefi 77 tributions of wiredu, ibadan: hope publications, 1996, pp. 1415. 33. barry hallen, african philosophy the analytic approach, p.106. 34. ali. mazrui, ‘the written word and collective identity’ in east africa journal vol. 9 no.5, 1972, p.3. 35. kwame gyekye, ‘the philosophical relevance of akan proverbs’ in second order: an african journal of philosophy, vol. iv, no.2. july 1975, pp.45-53; see also d.n. kaphagawani and h.f. chidani modzi, “chewa cultural ideas and systems of thought as determined by proverbs: a preliminary analysis” in journal of social sciences, vol. 10, 1983, pp.100-110. 36. j.f. ade ajayi, ‘the past in the present: the factor of tradition in development’, national merit award lecture delivered at lagos in december, 1990, pp.1-10. 37. ibid., p.10. 78 prajna vihara ̃ after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi islamic theology of religious pluralism: qur’an’s attitude towards other religions imtiyaz yusuf assumption university of thailand abstract this paper deals with the teachings of the qur’an regarding the role of religion in human history, and its attitudes towards different religions. the paper also contends that the distortion of these teachings within muslim history is due to reasons of power and politics and its influence on islamic theology. finally, the paper urges the muslims to view other religions such as buddhism from the perspective of the qur’an a perspective which recognizes religious pluralism. 1) introduction being involved in teaching research in islamic studies and religion in thailand for the last 19 years (ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university) i have come to appreciate islamic – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asia. as a result, i feel i am a muslim among buddhists and a buddhist among muslims and also as a muslim among catholics and catholic among muslims. religions coexist in thailand but they are rarely in dialogue. while this mere coexistence maybe good, the worldwide process of globalization and emerging multicultural types of living is illustrating that peoples and societies tend to become more insular and exclusivist resulting ultimately in ethnoreligious violence in different parts of the world as seen in bosnia, sri lanka, rwanda, and indonesia. hence the emergence of exclusivist religious tendencies which draw lines of theological and doctrinal difference 1 between religious communities. this phenomenon is largely influenced by the rise of fundamentalist and puritanical tendencies in all religions which spread between geographic regions e.g. the rise and spread of puritanical wahhabi islam in saudi arabia and its export to asian and african muslim communities; the spread of western christian evangelism to asia; rise of hindu and buddhist fundamentalism in asia. fundamentalist/puritanical religious trends are exclusivist and non-dialogical in orientation, they view their own religions as correct and divinely ordained and depict other religions as unbelief, false and misguided. they also cast the followers of other religions in negative light, as communities to be shunned or opposed. the arrival of such fundamentalist/puritanical trends in thailand does not augur well for the future of religions here. in light of the above development, this paper aims at dispelling the misunderstanding concerning islam’s view of other religions proliferating in the thai muslim community and also elsewhere. this objective of the paper is in line with commitment to the strengthening of religious tolerance and pluralism. religious pluralism means accepting religious validity and equality between religions, it holds that religious truth is not the exclusive property of one religion but is available through the teachings of different religions. religious pluralism promotes the building of unity, cooperation, dialogue and understanding, both between different religions and within a single religion. it aims at peaceful coexistence between religions and promotes the recognition that religious diversity is a boon and not a bane for humanity. 2 this paper draws its information from the teachings of the qur’an regarding the role of religion in human history and its attitudes towards different religions. the paper also contends that the distortion of these teachings within muslim history due to power struggles and politics and its influence on islamic theology. finally, the paper urges the muslims to view other religions such as buddhism from the perspective of the qur’an – a perspective which recognizes religious pluralism. 2) islamic theology of religions – the meaning of “muslim” as the youngest religion, islam faced a religiously pluralistic space from its start. the qur’an contains many verses concerning the existence of plurality of religions. and thus the topic of ننننن نننننننن نننننننن ننننننن al-ilum al-illahiyat al adyan islamic theology of religions constitutes an important topic of discussion within islamic discourse. muslims have discussed this topic throughout islamic history since the time of the prophet muhammad when he established it practically through instituting the misaq-imadina or the constitution of medina determining interreligious relations in the city of the prophet. the earliest qur’anic reference to the word “muslim” in qur’an chapter/surah 68 verse 35 is universal in meaning. the qur’anic usage of the term muslim means, one who submits/surrenders [or “has surrendered”] himself/herself to god or ultimate reality. it is important to note that this has been a human religious practice in all times of human history, it does not only refer to the followers of the prophet muhammad. 3 muhammad asad comments that, “the term muslim signifies (means) ‘one who surrenders himself to god’; correspondingly, islam denotes ‘self-surrender to god.’ both these terms are applied in the qur’an to all who believe in one god and affirm this belief by an unequivocal acceptance of his revealed messages. since the qur’an represents the final and most universal of these divine revelations, the believers are called upon, in the sequence, to follow the guidance of its apostle and thus to become an example for all mankind.” 1 islam always accepts possibility of salvation outside its boundaries. it affirms the religious truth of judaism and christianity and those of all religions. prophet muhammad himself laid no restrictions on the interpretation of the above verses. for the deen or the religion is one but the shariah or the paths to it are different. both the islamic revelation and islamic history support a theology of pluralism which is founded upon the belief in surrender to god and righteousness. however, this qur’anic view of the recognition of other religions was lost when, “the universal narrative that emphasized the common destiny of humanity was severed from its universal roots by the restrictive islamic conception of its political order based on the membership of only those who accepted the divine revelation to muhammad.”2 islam recognizes religious diversity as a normal aspect of human life. it calls for the recognition of other religions and also for the freedom of religion for all. it is only when islam became a political force that such concepts were pushed into the background. the islamic theology concerning other religions seeks to address and resolve issues that affect us all across cultural boundaries. its goal is to do things in ways different from the past for there has been a fundamental change in the ways in which 4 societies communicate and interact with each other. it emphasizes adopting an attitude of friendliness towards all religions. hence, a mere superficial or literal understanding of the pieces of religio-cultural puzzle is no longer sufficient, rather the putting of these puzzle pieces together is the need of the time. it aims at facing the ongoing regional crises and global challenges in a multidimensional manner, its demands go beyond rhetoric and repetitions. for what is at stake is a universal message of religion which is inter-cultural and interreligious in orientation and not restricted to the politics of the time. the objective of this undertaking is to build and promote friendly and functional relations between islam and different religions. to repeat, the qur’an does not condemn other religions nor their believers, rather it calls for the building of religious humanism for the benefit of building peaceful interhuman relations and societies. this will hopefully contribute towards starting discourse and dialogue of religions within the thai muslim community by removing the spread of the plague of emerging insularism and negative attitudes towards other religious communities currently spreading within the thai muslim community and also muslim community at large at the global level. such tendencies can only hurt the muslims themselves and create islamophobia among non-muslims. 3) the qur’an on the emergence of religious diversity the prophet muhammad, his successors and later muslim scholars have all addressed the question of islam’s view towards other religions. islamic attitudes towards other religions also contain the trends of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, similar to those found in other religions. this will be discussed in more detail later. 5 since no religion is founded in a vacuum hence all of them have to express their attitudes towards other religions through developing a theology/doctrine of religions. from an islamic perspective on the history of religions, the religion of the first human beings was din al-fitrah or religio naturalis.3 the concept of din al-fitrah is rooted in the belief of human beings submission/surrender to ultimate reality; it is similar to the first pillar of islam which is belief and submission to god. the qur’an describes it as follows: all mankind were once one single community; [then they began to differ ] whereupon god raised up the prophets as heralds of glad tidings and as warners, and through them bestowed revelation from on high, setting forth the truth, so that it might decide between people with regard to all on which they had come to hold divergent views. (qur’an 2:213) from this first stance of religious belief emerged the different historical religions found in the different parts of the world, which have been recorded and studied by medieval and modern scholars of history of religions such as mircea eliade and his predecessors in the east and west. the historical religions include all views and forms of human worship of ultimate reality such as personal, non-personal, monism, polytheism, monotheism and non-theism, etc. the qur’an does views religious diversity as a natural way of human life, thought and society, which should not be seen as abnormal. rather it should serve as a means for competition to do good between religious communities. unto every community have we appointed [different] ways of worship, which they ought to observe. hence, [o believer,] do not let those [who follow ways other than thine] draw thee into disputes on this score, but 6 summon [them all] unto thy sustainer: for, behold, thou art indeed on the right way. and if they [try to] argue with thee, say [only]: “god knows best what you are doing.” [for, indeed,] god will judge between you [all] on resurrection day with regard to all on which you were wont to differ. (qur’an 22:67-69) unto every one of you have we appointed a [different] law and way of life. and if god had so willed, he could surely have made you all one single community: but [he willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what he has vouchsafed unto, you. vie, then, with one another in doing good works! unto god you all must return; and then he will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ. (qur’an 5:48) in order to further affirm the islamic view of universality of religious belief and commonly shared religious history of humanity, muhammad asad, mentioned above stresses that the word meaning submission, as used in the qur’an has a universal meaning; it is applied to anyone or one who believes in god/ultimate reality even though they are not muslims. commenting upon the qur’anic verse 6:52 which reads: hence, repulse not [any of] those who at morn and evening invoke their sustainer, seeking his countenance. thou art in no wise accountable for them-just as they are in no wise accountable for thee -and thou hast therefore no right to repulse them: for then thou wouldst be among the evildoers. muhammad asad comments that the muslims should not rebuff followers of other religions, that is, “ ...people who, while not being muslims in the current sense of this word, believe in god and are always ("at morn and evening") "seeking his countenance" … the exhortation voiced in this passage is directed to all followers of the qur’an: they are enjoined not to repulse anyone who believes in god-even though his beliefs may not fully answer to the demands of the qur’an.”4 for the qur’an says that god has created 7 humanity to worship god, “o mankind! worship your lord, who hath created you and those before you, so that ye may ward off (evil).” (qur’an 2:21). thus islam recognizes all believers in religion(s). 4) exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism in islam all the three types of religious attitudes of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism are found in muslim community; muslims, like followers of other religions interpret their own scripture, the qur’an, in a variety of manners. exclusivists hold that only their religion is true and all others are false, inclusivists believe that their own religion is true and others are included within its salvation plan as anonymous followers, and pluralists believe that all religious are true and to that i also add that in my view all religions are equal. the qur’an contains two types of verses: 1) those which have historical and contextual relevance to the situation of muhammad in arabia and 2) universal moral teachings of eternal relevance. the majority of contemporary muslims under the influence of fundamentalist and puritanical interpretations of the qur’an see the historical and contextually relevant teaching of the qur’an as being relevant under all times and conditions, hence they attach more importance to such verses of the qur’an than those with universal moral application. such an approach to the qur’an leads to largely exclusivist understanding of islam. this viewpoint goes against the pluralistic grain of the qur’an and the principle of religious pluralism as presented in the qur’an. most of the muslim scholars while accepting democracy in the political sphere of life opt for 8 religious exclusivism or inclusivism which influences their attitudes towards other religions. since the qur’an comments on judaism and christianity, but rarely on other religions, several muslim scholars of the qur’an tend to be inclusivists as far as judaism and christianity are concerned, and exclusivists with regard to other religions of humanity – naively labeling the religions of asia, africa, oceania and also that of the eskimos and siberians as being false and polytheistic forms to be rejected, just as muhammad himself rejected arab paganism during his time. exclusivists and inclusivists interpreters in all religions view pluralism as being a relativistic position which dissolves religious differences and results in an “anything goes position.” exclusivists and inclusivists largely misunderstand the pluralists. the pluralists stand for both openness and commitment to particular tradition and community. they respect the particularities of each religious tradition.5 as a pluralist, diana eck comments that the pluralists seek, “to create the space and the means for the encounter of commitments, not to neutralize commitment … for unless all of us can encounter one another’s conceptual, cultural, religious and spiritual expressions and understand them through dialogue, both critically and self-critically, we cannot begin to live with maturity and integrity in the world house.”6 contemporary religious pluralism is different from mughal emperor akbar’s attempt to form a new religion of din-e-ilahi or ancient manichaeism. the problem with the inclusivist position espoused by many religious scholars and theologians is that secretly it may in fact be a "closet exclusivism" pretending to be inclusivist. the inclusivist position represents the controlling role of religious institutions 9 on religious interpretation. religious institutions and religious authorities, fear the religious pluralist position for it challenges their power and privilege. religious institutions are built/constructed after the death of the founders of religions and seek to control religion in the name of the founders. religious institutions are later developments in religion and seek to control and restrict its freedom of religion from within religion through the use of power. inclusivists fear the power of religious institutions instead of god. the religious pluralist position is not a relativist position because it is based on reading of scripture in a way that is different from the inclusivist. this position is a frank and confident position based on sources from within each religious tradition. religious pluralists cannot afford to be “closet inclusivists.” they develop a free and frank position from within the tradition itself where others fear to tread. while the religious pluralists are committed to building peaceful relations between religions, religious exclusivists and inclusivists – though paying lip service to peace – prefer to keep alive constant quarrels and tensions between religious sects at various intensities. in spite of the presence of muslim exclusivists there are still several muslim scholars of islam who have embraced pluralistic positions or commented positively on the need for recognition of pluralism in islam. some are inclusivists and some are pluralists. while it is not possible here to delve into their individual views, i should mention their names for reference, they are: maulana abul kalam azad. yusuf ali, muhammad marmaduke pickthall, muhammad asad, prof. hassan askari, frijthof schoun, prof. muhammad hamidullah, prof. ismail al-faruqi, prof. fazlur rahman, prof. seyyed hossein nasr, prof. mahmoud ayoub, prof. abdul aziz sachedina, dr. 10 asghar ali engineer, maulana waheedudin khan, dr. chandra muzaffar, prof. osman bakar, prof. nurcholish madjid, prof. khaled abou el fadl, prof. farid esack, mohammad khatami, prof. abdul karim soroush, abdul rahman wahid, and the young scholars of jaringan islam liberal (jil) group in indonesia. 5) recognition of religious pluralism in the qur’an all religions claim to be true religions, offering true revelation and true path of salvation. such claims amount to what paul knitter calls as “myth of religious superiority.” 7 it is difficult for exclusivists and inclusivists to accept religious pluralism that recognizes all religions as true paths for salvations and being equal in terms of interreligious relations. yet, each religion’s claim of superiority is historical, spatial and contextual. contemporary research in the history of religions demands a shift from above mentioned types of perspectives to one that recognizes equality of religions. this is not an easy task but a struggle for the adherents of different religions. yet there will remain many who stubbornly hold onto exclusivist or inclusivist positions and will continue to deny the equality of religions. there are many muslims who hold exclusivist or inclusivist perspectives about islam in its relations to other religions, be they middle east, asian, african, etc. yet, a deep, reflective, historically researched and holistic understanding of the message of the qur’an points to islam’s recognition of religious pluralism. some of the verses of the qur’an are a source for building an islamic pluralistic theology of religions. such a theology is based on the distinctions between the teachings of the qur’an, the practices of the prophet muhammad, and the later exclusivist/inclusivist islamic theology. this latter 11 form took shape when islam took on the forms of a religious, missionary and legalistic institution whose power was managed by the political authorities and knowledge came to be narrowly interpreted by the ulama – the religious scholars who claimed sole authority in the task of interpreting islam. an historically researched and phenomenological reading of the qur’an and the hadith – narratives of muhammad – point to the theological recognition of religious pluralism. in light of the fact that the qur’an employs the term “muslim” to mean a believer in transcendent or ultimate reality and does not refer to an ethnic muslim community, hence the qur’an embraces the following positions on religious pluralism. a) everyone who believes in ultimate reality and does good, is guaranteed salvation. this is mentioned in the following two verses of the qur’an. verily, those who have attained to faith [in this divine writ], as well as those who follow the jewish faith, and the christians, and the sabians – all who believe in god and the last day and do righteous deeds – shall have their reward with their sustainer; and no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve. (qur’an 2:62) for, verily, those who have attained to faith [in this divine writ], as well as those who follow the jewish faith, and the sabians, and the christians – all who believe in god and the last day and do righteous deeds – no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve. (qur’an 5:69) the above verse which occurs twice in the qur’an sets down a fundamental teaching of islam that salvation/liberation/enlightenment is conditional upon three 12 beliefs: belief in god/ultimate reality, belief in the day of judgment and performing of good deeds and righteous action in life. b) allah and other definitions of ultimate reality are identical. we believe in that which has been bestowed from on high upon us, as well as that which has been bestowed upon you: or our god and your god is one and the same, and it is unto him that we [all] surrender ourselves. (qur’an 29:46) c) diversity of religions is a part of god’s plan and will last as long as the world lasts. unto every one of you have we appointed a [different] law and way of life. and if god had so willed, he could surely have made you all one single community: but [he willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what he has vouchsafed unto, you. vie, then, with one another in doing good works! unto god you all must return; and then he will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ. (qur’an 5:48) muhammad asad comments on the above verse as follows, “thus, the qur'an impresses upon all who believe in god muslims and non-muslims alike that the differences in their religious practices should make them “vie with one another in doing good works” rather than lose themselves in mutual hostility.”8 d) muslims must be tolerant and reverential toward other religions. in keeping with the spirit of religious pluralism the qur’an categorically declares, “there is no compulsion in religion” (qur’an 2:256). this means that nobody is to be 13 forced to believe or convert to islam, and everyone is free to leave islam. everyone is free to believe or disbelieve in islam, “then whosoever will, let him believe, and whosoever will, let him disbelieve.” (qur’an 18:29). prophet muhammad did not only reject compulsion in religion but also practiced it as seen from below mentioned events. many commentators cite some events in which the prophet himself implemented the requirements of verse 2:256 and prohibited his companion from compelling people to accept islam. for instance, tabari mentions that when the two jewish tribes of qaynuqa and nadr were expelled from medina, they had in their charge children of the ansar (medinian muslims) who had been placed with jewish families. the biological parents asked the prophet’s permission to take their children back and raise them as muslims, but the prophet said, ‘there is no compulsion in religion.’ tabari mentions another event which indicates how this verse worked in practice. a muslim named al-hussayn had two sons, who having been influenced by christian merchants, converted to christianity and left medina to go to syria with these missionary merchants. al-hussayn pleaded with the prophet to pursue the convoy and bring his sons back to islam. but the prophet once again said, ‘there is no compulsion in religion’, that is let them follow the religion of their choice, even though it is not islam.9 furthermore everyone is free to choose and practice their religions. “to you your religion and for me mine” (qur’an 109:6). the diversity of languages, races, and ethnicities are to be honored and respected. this natural diversity is also considered from a divine perspective. the qur’an remarks: o human beings! behold, we have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. verily, the noblest of you in the sight of god is the one who is most deeply conscious of him. behold, god is all-knowing, all-aware. (qur’an 49:13) 14 muslims are reminded to be cordial toward non-muslims. muslims should neither be judgmental nor condemnatory towards non-muslims. hence, repulse not [any of] those who at morn and evening invoke their sustainer, seeking his countenance. thou art in no wise accountable for them-just as they are in no wise accountable for thee – and thou hast therefore no right to repulse them: for then thou wouldst be among the evildoers. (qur’an 6:52) god is our sustainer as well as your sustainer. to us shall be accounted our deeds, and to you, your deeds. let there be no contention between us and you: god will bring us all together – for with him is all journeys’ end. (qur’an 42:15) e) islam is not a new religion but a re-confirmation of truth revealed before. muslim believe in all prophets without making any distinction between them. the qur’an attitude towards religious pluralism is reflected in its contention that islam is a reconfirmation of the message brought by previous prophets. and unto thee have we revealed the scripture with the truth, confirming whatever scripture was before it, and a watcher over it … for each we have appointed a divine law and a traced out way. had allah willed he could have made you one community. but that he may try you by that which he hath given you (he hath made you as ye are). so vie one with another in good works. unto allah ye will all return, and he will then inform you of that wherein ye differ. the apostle, and the believers with him, believe in what has been bestowed upon him from on high by his sustainer: they all believe in god, and his angels, and his revelations, and his apostles, making no distinction between any of his apostles; and they say: we have heard, and we pay heed. grant us thy forgiveness, o our sustainer, for with thee is all journeys' end! (qur’an 2:285) 15 and it is the fundamental belief of the muslims that though muhammad is the last of prophet, muslims believe in all prophets without making any distinction between them. say: “we believe in god, and in that which has been bestowed from on high upon us, and that which has been bestowed upon abraham and ishmael and isaac and jacob and their descendants, and that which has been vouchsafed by their sustainer unto moses and jesus and all the [other] prophets: we make no distinction between any of them. and unto him do we surrender ourselves.” (qur’an 3:84) behold, we have inspired thee [o prophet] just as we inspired noah and all the prophets after him as we inspired abraham, and ishmael, and isaac, and jacob, and their descendants, including jesus and job, and jonah, and aaron, and solomon; and as we vouchsafed unto david a book of divine wisdom; (qur’an 4:163) above qur’anic references and comments illustrate that contemporary muslims in their efforts to brand the followers of other religions as kafirs – unbelievers, infidels have very much deviated from the tolerant and pluralistic spirit of their own scripture. 6) is islam, god’s only religion? a need for reinterpretation the majority of muslims opine that islam is the only religion preferred by god and it will prevail over other religions. this muslim view is based on a literal reading of the following verse in the qur’an. behold, the only [true] religion in the sight of god is islam. (qur’an 3:19) and whoso seeketh as religion other than the surrender to god (islam) it will not be accepted from him, and he will be a loser in the hereafter. (qur’an 3:85) 16 actually, the qur’anic use of the word “islam’ in the above mentioned verses and as discussed above means “self-surrender” and thus applies universally to all those who have surrendered to belief in god/ultimate reality since the dawn of human history, it does not refer the ethnic usage of the term islam which refers to the muslim community only. secondly, the above verse has a historical context, it tells the pagan arabs of muhammad’s time that the only true religion is self-surrender to god and not idolatry. for the arabs were conscious of the historical presence of monotheism in arabia since abrahamic times. often it became corrupted into idolatry. the above verse necessitates a distinction between philosophical islam, which regards faith as belief in god/ultimate reality and righteous living, and institutionalized islam of the post-muhammad era. a narrow literal and legalistic interpretation of the usage of the word “islam” in the verses above, contradicts the quranic view of religious pluralism as illustrated in the verses provided in this article. hence, for the sake of religious pluralism, there is a need for muslims to engage in a broadened reading of their own religious sources. the qur’an is book with a universal message. it is not a book of contradictory teachings, if it was, it could not be considered a divine revelation. 8) conclusion contemporary islamic exclusivism present in the muslim world and wherever muslims reside as minorities is the result of the rise and impact of narrow minded and 17 exclusivist approach of islamic religious nationalism, this phenomenon emerged in 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to nationalist secularism. the development of religious nationalism and radicalism was not only an islamic phenomenon but is found across all religions of the world as evident in the rise of hindu nationalism in india, jewish nationalism in israel and christian fundamentalism in the west.10 the second reason for the spread of muslim religious exclusivism is educational; the majority of muslim scholars attended religious seminaries which offered narrowlybased religious studies curricula which bred insularity and supported narrow approaches to life and views about others. the third factor for the development of muslim exclusivism is the challenges from globalization and modernity which have led to the strengthening of parochial ethnic and religious identities and nationalisms as evident from the rise of various ethnoreligious conflicts such as in rwanda, bosnia, sri lanka, pakistan, afghanistan, southern thailand, southern philippines, irian jaya and the moluccas in indonesia, etc. pluralism is itself an ideal environment in which to project not narrow formalisms but core islamic values, including the genuinely islamic concept of human dignity. these core islamic values are the same values that promote unity in the secular world – values such as seeking knowledge, equality, freedom, human rights, justice, and altruism. the principles of a new world are embedded in the pluralistic vision of islam and were embodied in the prototype of an islamic society existing during the time of the prophet and in al-andalus – a vision capable of reconciling the demands of diversity and unity in humane framework.11 18 thus if a muslim minority such as that in thailand prefers to adopt an exclusivist and narrow interpretation of the universal message of the qur’an it will lead to its own peril. instead it should opt for a religiously pluralistic understanding of the message of the qur’an with focus on participating in the building of thai civil society with democratic institutions, along with thai buddhists and thai christians. and this has to be initiated not only at the level of elites but at the grass-roots level. the contemporary age asks muslims to rethink their views and attitudes towards other religions. the way of the future is that of religious pluralism. verily, god does not change the condition of a people unless they change it themselves (with their own souls). (qur’an 13:11) 19 1endnotes muhammad asad, the message of the quran (gibraltar: dar al-andalus, 1980) p. 518. 2 abdulaziz sachedina, the islamic roots of democratic pluralism (new york: oxford university press, 2001) p. 50. 3 the concept of din al-fitrah or religio naturalis of the qur’an is different from the eighteenth century enlightenment view of religion concept of “natural religion” founded by liberal theologians influenced by deism. 4 muhammad asad, the message of the quran, p. 179, n. 41. 5 jeremy henzell-thomas, the challenge of pluralism and the middle way of islam (richmond, surrey: the association of muslim social scientists (uk), 2002) p. 16. 6 quoted in above, ibid., p. 16. 7 paul f. knitter, the myth of religious superiority (maryknoll: orbis books, 2004). 8 muhammad asad, the message of the quran, p. 154, n. 68. 9 quoted in adnan aslan, religious pluralism in christian and islamic philosophy the thought of john hick and seyyed hossein nasr (london: routledgecurzon, 1994) p. 191. 10 mark juergensmeyer, global rebellion: religious challenges to the secular state, from christian militias to al qaeda (berkeley: university of california press, 2008). 11 jeremy henzell-thomas, the challenge of pluralism and the middle way of islam p. 16. widya sakyabhinand 29 logical expression in the tipitaka: a case study of the use of definition in the sikkhãpadavibhaṁga and the pãdabhãjanĩya of the four pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline widya sakyabhinand kasetsart university, thailand abstract this research article deals with 1) logical definition 2) definitions of the sikkhãpadavibhaṁga (definition on the training rules) (svbh) and the pãdabhãjanĩya (classification of words) (pbh) of the four pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline and 3) a synthesis of svbh and pbh with the definition principle so as to evaluate them with the theravãda buddhist philosophical outlook. there are two categories of definition: real definition and nominal definition. the former explains the essential meaning of words while the latter explains the verbal meaning. a good definition must be equivalent in meaning between definiendum, the term to be defined, and definiens, the defining term. for instance, an offence involving expulsion from a buddhist monkhood is called pãrãjikas (defeat). there are four pãrãjikas out of 237 sikkhãpada (training rules) formulated by the buddha for training behavior of bhikkhus. the four pãrãjikas consist of six segments embodied as the training rules, one of which is the svbh & pbh. the definition of words in the four pãrãjikas is prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 29-52 © 2000 by assumption university press 30 prajñā vihāra related to the svbh and the classification used to define them more is related to the pbh. there are 379 definitions in total used in svbh & pbh: 0.5% are real definition and 99.5% are nominal definition. it could be asserted that definitions in the svbh & pbh are all nominal because they state something natural, though their 0.5% might be understood as real definition. this is compatible with the theravãda buddhist philosophy that rejects anything ‘supernatural’ in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. introduction based on the buddha’s statements in the kãlãmasutta kangkhãniyatthãna “be not led by mere logic, nor after considering reasons” (the book of the gradual sayings, vol. i, 1995: 172), there is a misunderstanding that buddhism does not attach any importance to logic. but in fact, the core essence of kãlãmasutta focuses on teaching people not to accept anything without examination and pondering. therefore, we are justified in looking more closely into the kãlamãsutta and its understanding and use of logic. in fact, the tipitaka consists of logical themes such as deduction, induction, division, classification, fallacy and definition. this is evidence which confirms that human beings, no matter what culture they belong to, or what historical period, are rational beings, that is, they know how to employ logical thought. or as stated over thousand years ago by aristotle that man is a “rational animal” (aristotle,1999: i.13) among the three scriptures of the tipitaka, the vinaya pitaka is considered the most important one as it is the basis of buddhism. what is more interesting in terms of logic is the segments called svbh & pbh of sikkhãpada, particularly the first three sections – the four pãrãjikas, the thirteen sanghadisesas (an offence entailing initial and subsequent meeting of the sangha), and the two aniyatas (undetermined offences) under the patimokkha (fundamental rules of the order). g. s. p.misra has spoken of the role of definition in the vinaya: widya sakyabhinand 31 in logical formulation and discussions it is an essential thing that the exact meaning of each and every word used should be laid down in a precise manner. the authors of these early buddhist texts made sincere efforts toward giving dictionary-type definitions of words. the vibhaṅga of the vinaya is replete with definitions which are in nature not very different from those given in modern dictionaries.” (misra, 1984: 158) this means it has placed importance on the meaning of language which is similar to the greek philosophers of the same period and prior to what we now understand as the linguistic turn in philosophy. it is clear that the definitions in the svbh & pbh have developed the buddhist philosophical outlook in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics based upon the importance of definition. realizing the role of the logic shown in the tipitaka above, i intend on examining the definitions of early buddhist texts, especially the segments called the svbh & pbh of the four pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline through a philosophical approach. a logical definition definition is a procedure that explains meanings of words and involves two elements, namely, definiendum, the term to be defined, and definiens, the defining term (reese, w.l., 1980: 121) the definiendum may be compared to the subject, while the definiens may be compared to the predicate as in the categorical proposition of aristotelian logic. although both, definitions and categorical propositions have similar structures, they are not the same thing because the former emphasize only the meaning of a term/word while the latter focuses on the fact of a statement. nevertheless, the use of definition is very helpful for categorical syllogistic reasoning because if the predicate used to explain the subject in a categorical proposition has the right meaning, it will not only make a proposition truthful, but will also make such a syllogistic reasoning in valid form more trustworthy. 32 prajñā vihāra in the history of western philosophy, a systematic development of definition took place when socrates had applied the dialectical method to find the meaning of such words such as piety, justice, wisdom and courage. plato understood that a concept is something essential which lies behind the terms or words. he calls these forms or ideas. aristotle, while rejecting that these forms or ideas exist in their own world, has nevertheless accepted that there is some real essence. (aristotle, 1994-2009 (b): book 1, part 4) the modern philosopher john locke shares aristotle’s view when he is of the opinion that there is a “real constitution of substances, upon which depends this nominal essence”. (locke, 2014: iii. vi. 2). although their thoughts are different in some points, philosophers as varied as immanuel kant, david hume, edmund husserl, heinrich rickert and g. e. moore, can be considered as essentialists. (abelson, 1972: 316). the difference between the real essence and the nominal essence is a topic which has been debated in the western philosophical tradition, and has become the source of the distinction between the real definition and nominal definition in later years. the following quotation expresses succinctly the difference between the two definitions: …to discover the real definition of a term xx one needs to investigate the thing or things denoted by xx; to discover the nominal definition, one needs to investigate the meaning and use of xx (gupta, 2015:2) for example, when socrates asks “what is virtue?” he is asking for a clear meaning of this word by explaining its root and synonyms. on one hand it is a nominal definition, but since it deals with virtue as an ethical ideal, it can be regarded as a concept or a real definition. there are various types of real definition and nominal definition. the type of real definition which is generally known is aristotle’s “definition by genus and specific difference”1 (smith, 2015:13), for instance: • a triangle is a geometric shape with three straight sides. • a human being is a rational animal. widya sakyabhinand 33 the terms “triangle” and “human being” are the definiendum, “geometric shape” and “animal” are the genus, while “three straight sides” and “rational” are the specific difference. a nominal definition2, is definition by etymology, by synonyms, by examples, and by description, for instance: • philosophy derives from greek language, i.e. philo “loving” + sophia “knowledge”, so philosophy is love of knowledge. (by etymology) • philosophy is philosophia. (by synonym) • southeast asian countries are thailand, singapore, and brunei etc. (by example) • the police are the ones who protect public peace (by description)3 definitions are an important part of logic because when one starts to argue, his/her premises must be clear. only in this way can the argument be sound argument. this could be exemplified by aristotle’s syllogistic logic thus: the one who completes bachelor degree is a graduate. somchai is the one who completes a bachelor degree. therefore, somchai is a graduate. the truth of the conclusion “somchai is a graduate,” depends on the truth of the second premise “somchai is the one who completes a bachelor degree,” but also important is the truth of the first premise (or the concept) “one who completes bachelor degree is a graduate.” hence, to make our concept clear out of each issue, one needs to have definition. though there are many principles of good definition, the important one is definiendum and definiens which must be equivalent or can be replaceable with its meaning remaining the same such as the definition of “graduate”, “graduate means the one who completes a bachelor degree.” in reverse, it can be said “the one who completes a bachelor degree is a graduate”. once the definition is made as such, the concept 34 prajñā vihāra of the informant has become clear-cut and cannot be understood in any other way. or as morris r. cohen. and ernest nagel have claimed over this rule of a good definition from the book entitled “principia mathemathica” by a. n. whitehead and bertrand russell thus: …a definition of this type is written by putting the definiendum to the left and the definiens to the right with the sign of equality between them and the letters “df.” to the right of the definiens. thus implication, symbolized by ⊃, is defined thus: p ⊃ q = p’ v q. df. or, in words, “p implies q” is equivalent by definition to “not p or q.” (cohen and nagel, 1978: 238) however, criticisms of real definition had taken place since the 17th century, with the development of science, starting with francis bacon and thomas hobbes. at present, some philosophers have applied logical method of language analysis which resulted in refusal of real essence. bertrand russell called the belief in existence of an essence as “a hopelessly muddle–headed notion” (russell, 1948 :187), while richard robinson writes: they (real and nominal definitions) are too central to the history of man’s philosophical reflections and logical theories. they are ubiquitous and fundamental in the sources of western philosophy, plato and aristotle. the concept of definition arose in the complex and confused form represented by the phrase ‘real definition’, not in the simple and clear form represented by the phrase ‘nominal definition’. we shall have, therefore, constantly to use the term ‘real definition’ in referring to past literature and studying the history of thought. my suggestion is only that we should no longer use it in writing philosophy ourselves. (robinson, 1972: 191 widya sakyabhinand 35 ludwig wittgenstein, in his “philosophical investigations” (1986) asserted that the meaning of language depends on a context of usage, while the meaning of terms is to be realized through ostentation (part 1, 43). this means to say that wittgenstein has rejected the essence or real meaning of terms. in addition, wittgenstein also viewed that ostensive definition, which is nominal definition, enables us to know only the terms and not the meaning of terms (part 1, 26-34). wittgenstein refuses to define every term except when it is necessary to prevent misunderstanding (part 1, 87), so language, according to its context of usage, has a flexible meaning because the language itself is a form of life and helps us understand the meaning of words in various contexts. in conclusion, wittgenstein has dismissed real definition, viewing that if there needs to be a definition, we may use ostentation (ostensive definition), which is a kind of nominal definition. john hospers believed that if anybody wants to define a thing or the real essence, it should not be called definition at all, but should rather be regarded as “analysis of a thing, either the chemical analysis, or the conceptual analysis” (hospers, 1983: 40). besides, hospers also viewed that in giving meaning to a term we cannot merely say that “meaning is use” (22), because the word “use” is slippery in meaning. so, in making definition, we have to use equivalent terms both in terms of definiendum and definiens, so there will be no change in its meaning. “this is the most usual, most accepted and most “standard” sense of the word “definition” (22). therefore, according to hospers the definition of terms must be nominal definitions, not real ones, and when viewing from its equivalences, it should be definition by synonym rather than nominal definition, one by etymology or by example. definition in the svbh & pbh of the four pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline the primary document of theravãda buddhism is the tipitaka, consisting of three major scriptures i.e. the vinaya pitaka, the suttanta pitaka and the abhidhamma pitaka. the vinaya pitaka is a compilation 36 prajñā vihāra of sikkhãpada of bhikkhus (monks) and bhikkhunis (nuns), consisting of three main parts i.e. suttavibhaṁga (classification of rules), chapters concerning with the sikkhãpada or 237 disciplinary rules of bhikkhus and 311 disciplinary rules of bhikkhunis; the khandhaka (division), chapters regarding details of saṁghakamma or saṁgha’s activities, routine practices, etiquettes, and general behavioral codes of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis; and the parivāra (accessory), chapters comprised of a collection of questions and answers to facilitate teaching and understanding. in conclusion, the vinaya pitaka is consisted of two major parts: adibrahmacãriyakasikkhã or a training for physical, verbal and mental practices which is primary one for strict practice of chastity called sikkhãpada, and abhisamacãrikasikkhã concerned with customs, etiquette, and the noble livelihood of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis. sikkhãpada is a provision concerning prohibitions and approvals issued by the buddha for bhikkhus and bhikkhunis concerning violations of proper conduct in the sangha. these are likened to articles or sections of the law, but the difference is that it is meant for physical, verbal and mental training. if any violation takes place, “an action that violates, resulting from such provision and carries punishment over yourself called āpatti or an offence” (somdejphramahãsamanajao kromprayãvajirayãnvaroros, 2523 (1979): 11). most of sikkhãpada consist of six segments as follows: 1. first transgressor means a story of the first bhikkhu who behaves so badly that results in enactment of each sikkhãpada by the buddha 2. act means sikkhãpada that the buddha had enacted to prevent bhikkhus and bhikkhunis from violation and a violator shall face an ecclesiastical punishment. 3. sub-act means additional acts enacted later to comprehensively cover the sikkhãpada. 4. sikkhãpadavibamga and padabhãjaniya explains or defines significant terms in each sikkhãpada more clearly, while any terms which are unclear and less comprehensive must be classified and defined additionally in the padabhãjaniya. widya sakyabhinand 37 5. anāpattivāra means exceptions which are not ecclesiastical offences. 6. vinitavatthu means a study case of violation of sikkhãpada which has been judged by the buddha himself. the four pãrãjikas means sikkhãpada which carry penalty for bhikkhus who violate any of the four pãrãjikas as detailed below: the first defeat whatever monk, possessed of the training and mode of life for monks, but not disavowing the training and not declaring his weakness, should indulge in sexual intercourse, even with an animal, is one who is defeated, he is not in communion. (the book of discipline. vol. 1: 41-42) the second defeat whatever monk should by means of theft take from a village or from the jungle what has not been given to him in such manner of taking as kings, catching a thief in the act of stealing, would flog him or imprison him or banish him, saying, ‘you are a robber, you are foolish, you are wrong, you are a thief,’ – even so a monk, taking what is not given him, is also one who is defeated, he is not in communion.” (the book of discipline. vol. 1:73) the third defeat whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human being of life or should look about so as to be his knife-bringer, or should praise the beauty of death, or should incite (anyone) to death, saying, ‘hello there, my man of what use to you is this evil, difficult life? death is better for you than life,’ or who should deliberately and purposefully in various ways praise the beauty of death or should incite (anyone) to death: he also is one who is defeated, he is not in communion. (the book of discipline. vol. 1: 125-126) 38 prajñā vihāra the fourth defeat whatever monk should boast, with reference to himself of a state of further-men, sufficient ariyan knowledge and insight, though not knowing it fully, and saying: ‘this i know, this i see,’ then if later on, he, being pressed or not being pressed, fallen, should desire to be purified, and should say: ‘your reverence, i said that i know what i do not know, see what i do not see, i spoke idly, falsely, vainly,’ apart from the undue estimate of himself, he also is one who is defeated, he is not in communion. (the book of discipline. vol. 1:159) any bhikkhu who violates any one of the four pãrãjikas are considered the defeated, that is to say, they can no more prosper in the religion of the lord buddha, and have been compared to a man who is beheaded, yellow leaves that fell from the extreme end, a thick rock that was broken, and topless sugar-palm tree which cannot be deeply connected and grow as beautifully as previously did. this is the same to most sikkhãpada, the four pãrãjikas comprise six segments especially segment on the svbh &pbh which define or explain the content of four pãrãjikas which is the core topic of this research. in brief, svbh is the definition of the significant terms in each sikkhãpada such as the definition of “bhikkhu”, “indulges” and “sexual intercourse” etc. (the book of discipline. vol. 1:47) of the first pãrãjika. pbh means classifying the defined terms in the svbh making additional definition clearly and comprehensively. for example, the second pãrãjika has defined “‘what has not been given’ means what has not been given; nor granted, nor thrown away; what is guarded, protected, cherished, what belongs to others” (the book of discipline. vol. 1:74), but it does not give detail on type of property, so it needs to have the pbh to figure out that such property means what kind of property it covers. a study found that there was an explanation to define terms and phrases totaling 377 definitions. once these definitions are synthesized into four pãrãjikas, they can be classified as follows: widya sakyabhinand 39 table 1: category & type of definitions used in the svbh &pbh category &type of definition 1st defeat 2nd defeat 3rd defeat 4th defeat total percent 1 real definition by genus & specific difference 1 (1) 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 2 (2) 0.5 (0.5) 2. nominal definition by synonym by example by description by synonym & example 253 (243) (10) (0) (0) 56 (18) (31) (5) (2) 38 (11) (6) (0) (21) 30 (14) (16) (0) (0) 377 (286) (63) (5) (23) 99.5 (75.5) (16.7) (1.3) (6.0) total 254(254) 56(56) 39(39) 30(30) 379(379) 100 note: number in bracket denotes type of definitions that fall in each category of definitions among 379 definitions, 2 are real definitions (0.5%), 377 are nominal definitions (99.5%), out of which 286 are definition by synonym (75.5%), 63 are definitions by example (16.7%), 5 are definitions by description (1.3%), and 23 definitions are definitions by synonym –cumexample (6.0%). detailed points in the table should be considered as follows: 1. 377 definitions are nominal definitions and 286 are definition by synonym. the definition by synonym is using the term with similar meaning to explain the definiendum. the following tables are examples to characterize the popular definition by synonym: 40 prajñā vihāra table 2: definition by synonym in a dictionary style (term-by-term basis) definiendum definiens source boat that by which one crosses padabhãjanĩya, 2nd defeat* being in a vehicle the goods are laid down in vehicle padabhãjanĩya, 2nd defeat* an arranged thief a crowd having arranged together padabhãjanĩya, 2nd defeat** (the book of discipline. vol. 1:80-81*, 88**) however, the definition by synonym in a dictionary style is used less than the one defined by approximate equivalent words as the definition of the term “monk” (bhikkhu) in the next table. table 3: definition by synonym with approximate equivalent words definiendum definiens source monk he is a monk because he is beggar for alms, a monk because he submits to wandering for alms, a monk because he is the one who wears the patchwork cloth, a monk by designation, a monk on account of his acknowledgement; a monk is called “come, monk, a monk is endowed with going to the three refugees, a monk is auspicious, a monk is the essential, a monk is a learner, a monk is an adept, a monk means one who is endowed with harmony of the order, with the solution at which the motion is put three times and then followed by the decision is put three times, with actions, with steadfastness, with the attributes of a man perfected. sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 1st defeat (the book of discipline.vol.1:42) each definiens points to the same meaning of the term definiendum monk. widya sakyabhinand 41 there is also definition by synonym with equivalent words that explain phrases instead of terms. it comprises 240 definitions. all define such phrases as “the declaration of weakness, the training not being disavowed” and “the declaration of weakness, the training being disavowed”. to take one example, the phrase “the declaration of weakness, the training not being disavowed,” has a definition runs as follows: table 4: definition by synonym to define phrase with approximate equivalent words definiendum definiens source the declaration of weakness, the training not being disavowed the monk who is chafing, dissatisfied, desirous or passing from the state of a recluse, anxious, troubled and ashamed at being a monk, longing to be a householder, longing to be a lay follower, longing to be a park (monastery) attendant, longing to be a novice, longing to be another sect, longing to be a disciple of another sect, longing not to be a recluse, longing not to be a son of the sakyans-says, and declares: “what now i were to disavow the enlightened one?” padabhãjanĩya, 1st defeat (the book of discipline.vol.1:43) although the buddhist definition by synonym exemplified in table 3 and table 4 is not in a dictionary style, it could also be understood as a definition by synonym seen in western logic, coinciding with rhys davids’ view that using a group of overlapping synonyms can define a term, and should not be considered a fallacy as it would normally be in western logic (davids, 1993: xxxv). k. n. jayatileke shares the same view by raising it in the context of wittgenstein’s approach to language. we substantiate the meaning of a term through usage because each term has its meaning “by virtue of family resemblance” that the informant can infer in it. (jayatilleke, 1980: 300). 42 prajñā vihāra 2. the second with 63 definitions in total is the definition by example. unlike the definition by synonym which is mostly used in the first sikkhãpada of the four pãrãjikas, the definition by example is used in almost equal number of the four pãrãjikas, especially used mostly in the second sikkhãpada due to its connection to things like property and places. the definition by example is thus more clear: table 5: definition by example with property and places definiendum definiens source village a village of one hut, and a village of two huts, and a village of three huts, and a village of four huts, and a village with human beings, and a village with beings who are not human, and a fenced-in village, and a village which is not fenced in, and a village arranged fortuitously, and even a caravan that is camping for more than four months is called a village. sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 2nd defeat* king king of the earth, local king, king’s deputies, subordinate chieftains, judges, chief ministers; moreover those who administer torture and maiming are called kings sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 2nd defeat* park a park with flowers, a park with fruits padabhãjanĩya, 2nd defeat** (the book of discipline.vol.1:74*, 82**) 3. another type of definition in the svbh &pbh of the four pãrãjikas are definitions which are both definition by synonym–cumby example, totaling 23 definitions, and most of them are 21 definitions belong to the third pãrãjika: widya sakyabhinand 43 table 6: definition by synonym–cum-by example definiendum definiens source he praises by means of the body he makes a gesture with the body, saying “whatever dies thus receives wealth or receives glory or goes to heaven.” padabhãjanĩya, 3rd defeat* a support he puts a dagger in a support, or smears it with poison, or makes it weak, or he arranges it in a deep ravine, or a pit, or a steep precipice, and says: “falling down, he will die.” padabhãjanĩya, 3rd defeat** offering a sight he arranges a dreadful sight, saying: “seeing this frightful, horrible thing, and being terrified he will die.” padabhãjanĩya, 3rd defeat** (the book of discipline.vol.1:132*, 135**) “he makes a gesture with the body” is synonym of “he praises by means of the body”, “putting a dagger in a support” is synonym of “a support”, and “arranging of a dreadful sight” is synonym of “offering a sight”, whereas the following statements are to set examples. 4. there have been seven statements of the definition by description under the second defeat, for example: table 7: definition by description definiendum definiens source the jungle what remains leaving a side the village and the outskirts of the village. sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 2 nd defeat* a thief he who takes by means of theft (anything) having the value of five māsakas or more than five māsakas that has not been given. sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 2 nd defeat** a field where grain and pules are produced. padabhãjanĩya, 2 nd defeat*** (the book of discipline.vol.1:74*, 75**, 83***) 44 prajñā vihāra 5. of the total 379 definitions, definitions, there are 2 places that should be called “real definition”. they are as follows: table 8: real definition by genus and specific difference definiendum definiens source sexual intercourse what is not verily dhamma, village dhamma, low caste dhamma. wickedness, the final ablution, secrecy, between couples. sikkhãpadavibhaṁga, 1st defeat* human being (the body)4 from the mind first arising, from (the time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death. padabhãjanĩya, 3rd defeat*** (the book of discipline.vol.1:47*, 87**,126***) that it is regarded as real definition because “dhamma (tradition)”, and “the body” are raised as a genus for classification, whereas the following terms/phrases, namely, “not verily, village, low caste , wickedness, the final ablution, secrecy, and having in couples” are employed as specific differences for “sexual intercourse”; and “ the mind first arising, from (the time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death” are employed as specific differences of “the body”. discussion 1. among the 379 definitions, there are some definitions which are interestingly close to the use of definition in the modern english dictionary. or as g. s. p. misra’ words, “the authors of these early buddhist texts made sincere efforts toward giving dictionary-type definitions of words. the vibhanga of the vinaya is replete with definitions which are in nature not very different from those given in modern dictionaries.” (1984:158). hence we will compare the definition of the same word in the svbh &pbh from “the book of the discipline, vol.1” (1992) with that from “longman dictionary of contemporary english” (2009), for example : widya sakyabhinand 45 table 10 : example of comparative definitions the book of the discipline thief means he who takes by means of theft (anything) having the value of five māsakas or more than five māsakas that has not been given. (75) longman dictionary thief means someone who steel things from another person or place. (1831) the book of the discipline boat means that by which one crosses. (80) longman dictionary boat means a vehicle that travels across water. (171) the book of the discipline a field means where grain and pules are produced. (83) longman dictionary a field means an area of land in the country, especially one where crops are grown or animals feed on grass. (636) the book of the discipline intentionally means a transgression committed knowingly, consciously, deliberately. (126) longman dictionary intentionally means done deliberately and usually intended to cause harm. (917) however, the definitions of the svbh &pbh of the four pãrãjikas and of longman dictionary of contemporary english has significant differences due to the contextual differences of words. the first one had been used 2,500 years ago in the context of each pãrãjika, while the one under longman dictionary of contemporary english is the definition that covers all current contexts of words, so it has multiple meanings as shown in the dictionary. 2. among 379 definitions, only two of them can be considered real definition in terms of definition by genus and specific difference, but not a real definition in terms of an abstract intangible truth which is supernatural. these are empirical truths because the two definitions i.e., “sexual intercourse means what is not verily dhamma, etc”, and “human being means the body from the mind first arising, from (the time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death.” 46 prajñā vihāra these examples remain under the realm of nature which corresponds to the viewpoints of phra phromkunaporn (p. a. payutto) (2555 (2012): 166 -167) and kalupahana, (1982:19) that what we understand as supernatural is a natural thing, but due to its being complicated and unattainable, it is then viewed as supernatural and miraculous. it may be for this reason that theravãda buddhism did not develop a variety of definitions as did by western philosophy, especially definition by genus and specific difference, in order to find an essence or real meaning of a term. however, the two definitions which appear in the svbh &pbh which correspond to the definition by genus and specific difference could agree through a typical usage of language. 3. based on the reasons in no.2 and with 377 definitions (99.5%) being the nominal definition, suggests that in theravãda buddhism there are no real definitions which would indicate abstract or supernatural things, and this applies to abstract concepts as well. real meaning should be one type of nominal meaning which agrees with what hongladarom calls “the abstract object that can be analyzed” (hongladarom: 2555 (2012): 43), so only the nominal meaning should be the meaning of language because the main function of language that holds the logical value is its informative function (copi, 1978: 56), if the receiver understands the information, whether the communication is true or false, it can be considered that the function of language is accomplished. to assert that only the nominal definition exists not only coincides with the theravãda buddhist metaphysics which does not believe in anything supernatural, but also coincides with the theravãda buddhist epistemology and ethics as stated in the majjhimanikãya: visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement, feelings are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of the number of perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material widya sakyabhinand 47 shapes cognizable by the eye, past, future, present. (other consciousness that arises from the contacts between ear and sounds, nose and smells, tongue and tastes, body and touches and mind and mental objects, has been described in the same way). (the middle length sayings, vol.1., 1992: 145) according to the majjhimanikãya mentioned above, when the sense-organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind) converge with the sense-objects (form, sound, smell, taste, tangible objects and mind objects), there arises consciousness or perception (epistemology). after this follows the positive or negative behavior called an action or kamma towards perception through three channels of action – bodily, verbal, and mental (ethics). hence according to the kamma principle as the basis of human’s behavior, human language is a verbal action which expresses facts of human activity, and this language should communicate nominal meaning. so according to the theravãda buddhist philosophical outlook, the definition in the svbh & pbh of the four pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline should be understood only by nominal definition. natural things nominal definition real definition therefore, with all mentioned above, the features of definition in the svbh & pbh of the four pãrãjikas of the bhikkhu’s discipline can be concluded in the following illustration. 48 prajñā vihāra conclusion and suggestions the 379 definitions that have been taken from the svbh & pbh for analysis reflect an overall view of theravãda buddhist philosophy on the problem of meaning in language. they show that philosophical approaches to linguistic meaning such as “meaning is use”, “nominal meaning” and “real meaning” can be understood from a buddhist perspective. what theravãda buddhist philosophy emphasizes would be nominal meaning, because the so-called real meaning, according to the buddhist viewpoint, would be just another form of the nominal meaning. therefore, if we go through the buddhist scriptures and encounter metaphysical words such as nibbãna, kamma, dhamma. vinnãna, jhãna and samsãra, we should understand them in the sense of nominal meaning. however, much more work needs to be done. a study of the definitions of the svbh & pbh which would allow us to develop a theravãda buddhist position on the nominal definition still requires more comparative study of scriptures of the tipitaka, or between the scriptures of tipitaka and their commentaries. it is also important to study the use of abstract definition which explains dhamma topics in the abhidhamma pitaka. this would allow us to understand the theravãda buddhist refusal of the western concept of real definition. also important would be the comparison of the use of definition in the tipitaka on specific topics with the definitions of the thai dictionary of the office of royal society, or with english dictionaries to develop an awareness on the precise meaning of words for the right understanding of the buddha’s teachings. widya sakyabhinand 49 endnotes 1 another type of aristotle’s real definition which is not included here and could be regarded as another form of definition by genus and specific difference is the definition by cause. it states the genus of the term by substituting specific difference with a cause. a cause is something material, formal, efficient and final for its existence. (aristotle,1994-2009(a): part 3) 2 excerpted from : 1. baum (1975: 429-456), 2. copi (1978: 126-154), 3. moore and parker (1992:28-31) and 4. porter (2002 : 43-63) 3 this definition takes a logical property of a term to describe the definiendum. 4 the term “body” is introduced here as a genus to facilitate our classification because the pali term “viggaha” in the compound word “manussaviggaham” (translated as “human being”) could also mean “the body” (attabhavam). see :1) samantapasadika, vol. ii, (1969:437) which explains the term “manussaviggaham” as “manussattabhavam” (human body) and 2) davids and stede (1975: 615). the term “body” has denotative meaning as the genus in the sense that it refers to either living or dead body etc. references abelson, raziel. (1972). “definition”, the encyclopedia of philosophy. vol. 2. ed. by paul edwards. new york: macmillan publishing, pp.314-324. aristotle. 1999. nicomachean ethics. trans. by w. d. ross. accessed may 18,2016. https://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/ aristotle/ethics.pdf _____.1994-2009 (a). physics. trans. by trans. by r. p. hardie and r. k. gaye. accessed december 10, 2014. http://classics.mit.edu/ aristotle/physics.2.ii.html _____.1994-2009 (b). posterior analytics. trans. by g.r.g. mure. accessed september 15, 2014. http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/ posterior.html baum, robert.1975. logic. new york: holt, rinehart and winston. cohen, morris r. and nagel, ernest, 1978. an introduction to logic and scientific method. bombay: allied publishers. https://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/aristotle/ethics.pdf https://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/aristotle/ethics.pdf http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/physics.2.ii.html http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/physics.2.ii.html http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/posterior.html http://classics.mit.edu/aristotle/posterior.html 50 prajñā vihāra copi, irving m. 1978. introduction to logic. 5th edition. new york: macmillan. davids, caroline a.f. rhys .1993. a buddhist manual of psychological ethics. oxford: pali text society. davids, t. w. rhys and stede, william. 1975. pali english dictionary. new delhi: munshiram manoharlal. gupta, anil. 2015. “definition”, stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. accessed august 30, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu./entries/ definitions/ hongladarom, soraj. 2555(2012). philosophy of language. (in thai). bangkok: chulalongkorn university publication. hospers, john. 1983. an introduction to philosophical analysis. bombay: allied publishers. jayatilake. k. n. 1980. early buddhist theory of knowledge. delhi: molital bararsidass. joyce, george hayward. 1916. principles of logic. london, new york: longmans, green and co. accessed february18, 2015. https:// archive.org/stream/principleslogic00joycgoog#page/n6/ mode/2up kalupahana, david j.1982. buddhist philosophy: a historical analysis. honolulu: the university press of hawaii. locke, john. 2014. an essay concerning human understanding. accessed july 31,2014. https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/ john/l81u/ longman dictionary of contemporary english. 2009. 5th edition. london: pearson education. misra, g. s. p. 1984. development of buddhist ethics. delhi: munshiram manoharlal. http://plato.stanford.edu./entries/definitions/ http://plato.stanford.edu./entries/definitions/ https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81u/ https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81u/ widya sakyabhinand 51 moore, brooke noel and parker, richard .1992. critical thinking. california : mayfield publishing. plato, 1994-2009. euthyphro. trans. by benjamin jowett. accessed july 8, 2014. http://classics.mit.edu/plato/euthyfro.html porter, burton f. 2002. the voice of reason fundamentals of critical thinking. oxford: oxford university press. phra phromkunabhorn (p. a. payutto). 2555(2012). buddhadhamma. (thai enlarged edition). 35th reprint. bangkok: plidharma publication. robinson, richard.1972. definition. oxford: the clarendon press. russell, bertrand. 1948. a history of western philosophy. london: gorge allen &unwin. reese, w. l. 1980. dictionary of philosophy and religion: eastern and western thought. new jersey: humanities. smith, robin. 2015. “aristotle’s logic”, in stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. accessed july 17, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ aristotle-logic/#spegendif samantapasadika (buddhaghosa’s commentary on the vinaya tipitaka). vo.ii.1969. ed. by j. takakusu m. nagai. london: pali text society. somdejphramahasanajao kromprayavajiarayanvaroros. 2523 (1979). vinayamukh (the entrance to the vinaya). (in thai). vol.1, 32nd reprint. bangkok: mahamakutrajavidyalaya press. stcherbatsky, th. 1963. buddhist logic. vol. i new york: dover publication. the book of the discipline. (vinaya pitakam). vol.1. 1992. trans. by i.b. horner: oxford: pali text society. http://classics.mit.edu/plato/euthyfro.html 52 prajñā vihāra the book of the gradual sayings (anguttaranikaya). vol. i. 1995. trans. by f. l. woodward. oxford: pali text society. the middle length sayings (majjhimanikaaya). vol. 1.1992.trans. by i b. horner. oxford: pali text society. the tipitaka (pali in thai script). 2538 (1995). vols.1, 12 and 20. siamese edition. bangkok: mahamakutrajavidyalaya press. the tipitaka (thai translation). 2521 (1978). vols.1, 12 and 20. royal edition. bangkok: mahamakutajavidyalaya press. the tipitaka (thai translation). 2539 (1996). vol.1 mahachulalongkorn rajavidyalaya edition. bangkok: mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya press. the vinaya pitakam.vol. 3. 1993. ed. by hermann odenberg. oxford: pali text society. wittgenstein, ludwig.1986. philosophical investigations. trans. by g. e. m. anscombe. accessed september 17, 2015. https://docs.google.com file/d/0bw-duxxyihdvwvlfauhzcly5vmc/view https://docs.google.com/file/d/0bw-duxxyihdvwvlfauhzcly5vmc/view https://docs.google.com/file/d/0bw-duxxyihdvwvlfauhzcly5vmc/view a report on emotional education for young children: education for peace joseph i. fernando assumption university of thailand abstract education for peace has become extremely urgent for the world today. for the first time in human history both humans and other living beings in the world face the threat of obliteration. we live in a world where violence has almost become a way of life. we are not only increasingly violent towards each other but also towards nature. we seem to be living in a dark age. the crucial question is: can we save the planet and ourselves? we can if we are willing to re-discover ourselves. rediscovering ourselves is through reeducating ourselves. reeducating ourselves means rediscovering a peace that comes ultimately from within. i education for peace has three dimensions: how to live in peace with oneself, with others and with nature. education for peace is not merely a part of individual ethics but also of social and global ethics. education for peace includes both formal and non-formal kinds of education. formal education is through our institutions, our schools, colleges and universities. non-formal education including adult education takes place outside the curricula of these institutions. living in peace does not happen to us naturally. we need to learn how to live in peace 1.1. how to live in peace with oneself i think only men and women of peace can bring peace to the world since we cannot give what we do not have. peace is first and foremost a spiritual gift. only those who have it can share it with others. peace is something that flows out of one’s being. is it possible for every human to attain peace? yes, it is; but one needs to undergo years of training to acquire peace. acquiring inner peace depends on what one wants out of life. some important questions like the following need to be answered: why am i here on earth? what should i do with my life? what are my 1 priorities in life? what could be the best goal of my life? answers to these questions may be from both theistic and non-theistic perspectives and differ from person to person. the genuine religious believers perceive peace as arising out of right order. right order is found in obeying the commandments of god. to conform to the will of god is to have peace. to turn away from god’s will in favour of one’s own will is to lose peace. for such believers, god is the source of peace or peace itself. the peace of the believer is a reflection of or participating in the peace of god. in the divine scheme of things, the creator is the source of the universe and all things will ultimately find their fulfillment in him. humans are on earth with a purpose: to live a life that is pleasing in the sight of god, to live a life in response to the call to holiness. humans can never have peace apart from union with god. st.augustine would say our hearts have been created for god and they are restless till they find their rest in him. for aristotle, the final goal of life is to be virtuous. for aquinas, the final goal of life is god and a virtuous life is only a means to attain union with god. it is not enough to be morally good, one needs to be deeply spiritual to seek god. such a person would not be a mere pleasure-seeker. yet, in a sense, he is pleasure seeker in that his pleasure is joy/ananda/beatitude which he seeks in god. he has no desire to be the wealthiest person although he does not despise wealth because life on earth is impossible without wealth. wealth in itself is not an end but a means to seek higher things in life. he would not seek exclusively the pleasures the world offers, but only those which are legitimate and do not destroy his soul. for him, things in moderation are good, but god as the summum bonum is the best. truly lasting happiness and peace are found in the creator and not in the creatures. a devout muslim seeks allah, a devout hindu vishnu or shiva as their final end. in the indian tradition, there are the purushartas or the four goals. they include dharma (morality/righteousness), artha (wealth), kama (pleasure) and moksha (liberation/heaven). dharma is almost untranslatable into english because it means not only morality/righteousness, but also all the virtues and much more. a life of dharma is not incompatible with the pursuit of wealth and pleasure: but the ultimate goal is moksha (liberation/heaven/union with god). dharma, artha and kama can be viewed too as means to attain moksha. in the theistic tradition, a man or woman of peace is deeply directed towards transcendence. peace is not merely seen as a byproduct of human efforts but as a divine gift, a disposition obtained in union with the 2 ultimate reality. a seeker of peace is not a materialist pursuing worldly goals for their own sake, but one committed to worldly activities which have their final reference to transcendence. such a person is involved in the community not with a view to create an earthly paradise but a human community of fellowship seeking meaning in existence. in an increasingly secularized world of today, peace-makers with a theistic view are not many. the following characteristics may be found in a believer who lives in peace with himself/herself. the virtues listed below are not finished products but in the process. a person of peace is not considered as a paragon of virtues but someone striving after them. he is finite, fallible, keeps struggling and is not without disappointments and pitfalls. 1. profound faith in god/transcendence 2. obedience to the will of god/ultimate reality 3. belief in love as the greatest force in the universe 4. a life of simplicity and service 5. freedom from anger, hatred and arrogance 6. calmness, serenity and gentleness 7. acceptance of peace as god’s gift 8. forgiveness, compassion and generosity 9. spirit of sacrifice, fellowship and labour 10. joyful acceptance of all humans as brothers and sisters 11. the belief that the world does not belong to us but we belong to it. 12. the belief that the world is not for sale but to be used prudently to support life. 13. greed replaced by creed. 14. a man or woman for all seasons 15. the firm belief that building peace is possible although not without suffering and hardship. this list is not exhaustive, and many of these characteristics may be found in a person with a non-theistic perspective of peace as well. a non-theistic understanding of peace stems from morality. scores of people have difficulty in believing in god for several reasons. some of them cannot reconcile the existence of evil, the undeserved suffering of the innocent with a loving god. if 3 there is a loving god, how do we account for the holocaust, genocides, rapes, murders, starvation, accidents, killer tsunamis, earthquakes and so on? there are others without belief in god for several reasons; but hardly anyone would deny human is a moral being. based on our moral understanding, we differentiate between good and bad, right and wrong, true and false. one’s moral sense is a guide to live in peace with oneself, with others and with nature. it would not make sense to be at war with oneself, others and nature. common sense dictates that peace is desirable and social life is unthinkable without peace. therefore, we need to seek peace at all times. 1.1.2. how to live in peace with others it seems living in peace with others is more difficult for us than landing on the moon or the mars. why do we find it so difficult to live in peace with others? there may be several reasons for this. there is a tendency in humans to distinguish people in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘us’ may be the homogeneous groups like the family, clan and community of the same race, language and religion. ‘us’ also refers to a nation as distinct from another nation. ‘them’ refers to another group which is within itself homogeneous. one homogeneous group considers itself as ‘us’ and treats another as ‘them’. the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is often a source of conflict. we are born into communities which have their own distinct linguistic, racial, and cultural identities which we must celebrate. but at the same time, we need to form solidarity with all humans. if it is wonderful to be human, it is even more wonderful to celebrate our humanity transcending tribal sentiments and parochial perspectives. there may not be a clash of civilizations, if we are ready for dialogue among civilizations. dialogue is a vital component of establishing peace. we can solve several problems if we are committed to dialogue. dialogue has no place for finding fault with others or accusing others. dialogue does not mean imposing one’s viewpoints on others or converting them to one’s way of life. nor does it mean defeating others through clever arguments. dialogue does not claim victory over others but seeks truth, peace and fellowship. dialogue presupposes humility. it is not that some have everything to teach others, but all of us need to learn from each other in humility. dialogue means listening to the voice of truth. in dialogue, we are guided by the subject-matter. as gadamer says, in dialogue, both the parties have their own horizons of understanding 4 and when both the horizons merge, the result is a fusion of horizons. understanding takes place in the fusion of horizons. thus understanding is an event of truth. understanding is not a mental act which we produce, but it is the revelation of truth. it is truth that sets us free. the refusal to dialogue is to block the emergence of truth. dialogue takes place in an atmosphere of openness and mutual trust. dialogue is possible when people prefer wisdom to arrogance and force. dialogue happens among reasonable people. what shall we do when some people refuse to take part in dialogue? they may reject dialogue for several reasons which may vary from group to group. for instance, it is said the buddhists in thailand do not prefer dialogue with the catholics because the former suspect the latter of the hidden agenda of conversion. in some cases, animosity is so deep-seated between two groups that they are not ready for dialogue. in such cases we need pre-dialogue efforts to make dialogue gradually possible. in some other cases, persuasion and third party mediation may be required. ultimately what matters is a friendly attitude towards the fellow humans. a friendly attitude is possible if we understand what is to be human. to be human is to be born naked and helpless. to be human (in the words of heidegger) is to be old enough to die as soon as one is born. to be human is to be in the world. to be human is to be finite. to be human is to have dignity and worth to be human is to need food, clothes and shelter. to be human is to love and be loved. to be human is to make mistakes. to be human is to be in need of forgiveness and acceptance. to be human is to have dreams, desires and aspirations. to be human is to labour. to be human is to be social. to be human is to be creative. to be human is to be linguistic. to be human is to belong to a community and culture. to be human is to be historical. 5 to be human is to understand the purpose of life. to be human is to live a life of decency. to be human is to die with dignity. this is not an exhaustive list. but the basic human condition is the same though the circumstances vary. finite as we are, we are not omnipotent beings. the possession of science knowledge and technologies, or living in countries with large powerful economies, do not make us almighty. mortal as we are, we need to explore the avenues of being fully human during our lifetime before we vanish from the planet forever. it is unwise to seek military solutions instead of resolving conflicts practically through dialogue. the confrontation between the muslim extremists and the west has resulted in death and destruction, hatred and agony. what prevents the leaders of the west and the muslim extremists from dialogue? is not the armed confrontation between the two a failure of reason and sensibility? nations are caught up in fear psychosis; they mistrust each other. the result is arms build-up on which enormous sums are spent. if we can resolve our problems through peaceful dialogue, what a staggering amount of money will be saved since we will not require weapons any more! this amount could be spent on education, health care and welfare of citizens. fear psychosis is the reason for the possession of nuclear weapons. is it possible to eliminate nuclear weapons? can nations eventually disarm themselves in favor of dialogue and nonviolence? can the united nations be made a more democratically structured world body in such a way that it takes the lead in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament? nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are not immediately possible but highly desirable in the near future. can we have a world without the big brother? citizens, especially the students, have to be taught about the non-military ways of resolving conflicts. that is why we need education for peace. 1.1.3. how to live in peace with nature since the dawn of the industrial revolution in britain in late 18 th century and early 19th century, humans have been violent towards nature. francis bacon developed inductive logic with a view to controlling and using nature for human comfort. rené descartes advocated the philosophy of rationalism which enthrones 6 human as lord of the universe because of the power of reason. for the human subject, everything else is an object. science and technology have not only strengthened capitalism but also have been instrumental for humans to manipulate, rearrange and reorganize nature to suit human purposes. schopenhauer laments that science is at the service of the body and its will. technology prompted the unbridled exploitation of nature for the purpose of earning huge profits. the end result today is environmental decay and disaster. we have failed to perceive ourselves as part of the world. we have been imagining that the world belongs to us, to be treated as we wish rather than seeing ourselves as belonging to the world. the ruthless exploitation and poisoning of nature finally threatens our own existence. we need to rediscover the primordial harmony our ancestors had discovered in the universe and to reestablish peace with nature. we have to save the world so that we can save ourselves. we are no longer the lords of the universe, but as heidegger puts it, we are shepherds of being. we must become custodians, caretakers and stewards of the world. we are called upon to live in peace with nature. education for peace is indispensable in this regard. ii education for peace should provide the students with the following three objectives: information, formation and transformation. ii.1. information we live in an age of information technology. the mass of information available today is infinite. therefore we have to select what is relevant to us. education for peace must impart to the students the necessary information about peace. this would include the following: why it is of paramount importance to be at peace with oneself, others and nature, the steps required for this three-fold peace, the terrible consequences of armed confrontation and how it can be avoided, exploring the possibilities of dialogue and nonviolence, individual and community efforts to foster peace, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament, local, national and international movements committed to peace, how to remove the obstacles to peace, how to work for the cause of justice which is a prerequisite for peace, networking of peace activists and groups, positive steps to foster peace and so on. since the topic nonviolence is a very important component of peace education, the 7 students need an exposure to nonviolence. i would like to discuss the relevance of nonviolence as exemplified by gandhi and martin luther king, jr. ii.1.1. experiments with nonviolence there is too much of violence in the world today. our salvation shall hopefully come from nonviolence. despite severe attacks from some critics, nonviolence has not lost its meaning, value and efficacy. space does not permit an exposition of criticism of nonviolence and responses to the critics. but a discussion on nonviolence is pertinent to education for peace. although it is hard to practise nonviolence, it is possible for humans to be nonviolent. what are the characteristics of nonviolence? nonviolence means abstaining from harming oneself and others. it is essentially a moral quality. there are three ways of being nonviolent. the first is nonviolence in thought. we must not entertain violent thoughts about harming others. violence of heart means our heart is filled with anger, hatred and desire for retaliation and destruction. a nonviolent person is free from the violence of the heart. he is incapable of anger and hatred and is calm, gentle and kind. nonviolence is a soulforce. the second is nonviolence in speech or nonviolence of the tongue. a nonviolent person avoids hurting others by violent and abusive utterances like “i will hit you.” ‘i will kill you” and so on. one who is violent in thought cannot be nonviolent in speech. only he who is nonviolent in thought can be nonviolent in speech because the mouth utters what the heart thinks. the third is nonviolence in deed. this means avoiding violence of the fist. a nonviolent person does not attack others physically. gandhi would say if one cannot be nonviolent it is better to be violent because violence is preferable to cowardice. when someone strikes a nonviolent person, he does not strike back. it is easier to hit back but it requires enormous courage not to hit back. nonviolence demands great moral strength. one who is violent in thought and speech cannot be nonviolent in action. one needs to be consistently nonviolent in thought, speech and action. practice of nonviolence does not happen naturally. we need to train ourselves to be nonviolent and the training takes time. nonviolent action produces lasting results. 8 gandhi calls nonviolent resistance ‘satyagraha’ which means adherence to or holding onto truth (satya=truth; graha=holding onto). nonviolence or ahimsa is part of one’s commitment to truth. nonviolent resistance can be demonstrated by civil disobedience and non-cooperation. people have the right to civil disobedience and non-cooperation. we cannot obey an unjust law because an unjust law is not a law. we can obey only just laws and it is our duty not to obey unjust laws. similarly, we cannot cooperate with an unjust system or government. if we do, it means we cooperate with evil. nonviolent resistance through civil disobedience and noncooperation is a moral duty performed by a satyagrahi (one committed to truth). gandhi challenged the mighty british empire in india with his nonviolent resistance. he was able to silence the guns of the british by his satyagraha. some critics say it was not because of his nonviolent resistance that india won freedom from the british rule, but because the british had a conscience and decided to leave india. as an indian i am aware of the atrocities the british committed in india. if they had a conscience, they would not have done the terrible things unfortunately they did in india. i do not wish to give a list of those terrible things. gandhi exposed the british atrocities to the world, when the british attacked the unarmed, innocent nonviolent resisters. some critics reject nonviolence as impractical. it is impractical if one is not trained in nonviolence. it is easy to grab a gun to shoot somebody. but to undergo spiritual and moral purification is hard and takes time. nonviolence is more than a strategy; it is a way of life. violence is a shortcut. a violent act leads to retaliation and the chain of hatred remains unbroken. ‘an eye for an eye’ policy will produce a nation of blind citizens. the civil rights movement spearheaded by martin luther king, jr. in the us in the 1960s was inspired by gandhi’s nonviolent struggle. king was in search of a method to usher in a just american society. the american society was unjust because it did not treat the african-americans with respect and dignity. it denied them equal opportunities in education, employment, housing and so on. it practised segregation of races and king knew that segregation was an evil and laboured for integration. king was deeply fascinated by gandhi’s campaigns of nonviolent resistance and profoundly impressed by the idea of satyagraha or truth-force. he realized for the first time the potency of nonviolent love in the area of social reform. he came to believe that gandhi was probably the first person in history to transform the interpersonal love ethics of jesus christ into a powerful social force on a large scale. 9 king says, “love for gandhi was a potent instrument for social change and collective transformation. it was in this gandhian emphasis on love and nonviolence that i discovered the method for social reform which i had been seeking for so many months.”1 king did not borrow nonviolence from gandhi, but the field tactics he learnt from gandhi. why did he choose nonviolence as a weapon in his battle against the powerful white oppressors? was it because the african-americans were economically so weak that they could not afford to arm themselves against their oppressors and that nonviolence was inevitably the only available weapon to attack the whites? or was there something more to the story? king was not driven to choose nonviolence due to the non-availability of other means. he deliberately chose it because of his perception of nonviolence for what it is. he described his entire life as a ‘pilgrimage of nonviolence’. in his prolonged struggle against organized, immoral, oppressive measures king was convinced of the saving power of nonviolence. he knew too well it is possible for human to gather enormous moral strength to rise nonviolently against oppression. the painful reality of liberation can be achieved with dignity and tenderness of heart together with firmness of purpose and a basic affirmation of faith in people. gandhi had demonstrated that nonviolence is active, not a passive form of resistance. active resistance is governed by a higher law and not by lower principles such as immediate gains. active resistance eschews violence. in active resistance one suffers in one’s own person for the conquest of opponents. active resistance is a nonviolent method of conversion. king accepted gandhi’s approach. gandhi did not promise that nonviolent resistance would produce change immediately. india became free after forty years of nonviolent struggle. king realized that it would take many years for the african-american struggle to bear fruits. nonviolence does not seek to defeat the opponent but to win his friendship. though the nonviolent resister shows his protest through boycotts, he realizes that these are not ends but merely means to awaken a sense of moral shame in the opponent. the end is reconciliation. the aftermath of nonviolence is the beloved community, while the aftermath of violence is hatred and bitterness. in nonviolent resistance the attack is directed against forces of evil than against persons who happen to be doing evil. king said to the people in montgomery. “the tension in this city is not between white people and negro people (read african-americans). the tension is, at bottom between justice and injustice, between the forces of light and the forces of 10 darkness. and if there is a victory, it will be a victory not merely for …negroes (read african-americans) but a victory for justice and the forces of light. we are out to defeat injustice and not white persons who may be unjust.” 2 king summed up the gandhian approach to nonviolence as follows when he told his opponents: “we shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. we shall meet your physical force with soul force. do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you. we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws, because non-cooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with the good… we will wear you down by our capacity to suffer. one day we shall win freedom, but not only for ourselves. we shall appeal to your heart and conscience that we shall win you in the process, and our victory will be a double victory” 3 nonviolent resistance is characterized by a willingness to accept suffering without retaliation, to accept blows without hitting back. gandhi says “rivers of blood may have to flow before we gain our freedom, but it must be our blood.” the nonviolent resister is willing to accept violence, but never to inflict it. one might ask how he is justified in suffering violence. the answer is that unearned suffering is redemptive. suffering has tremendous transformational and educational possibilities. gandhi says “things of fundamental importance to people are not secured by reason alone, but have to be purchased with their suffering… suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting the opponent… shut to the voice of reason.” an important ingredient of king’s nonviolence is creative or redemptive suffering which is unearned. it issues from the evil of the inflictor rather than that of the victim. it is redemptive in the sense that by suffering the pain inflicted upon by the oppressor, the victim makes an appeal to the inherent goodness of the inflictor of pain. king says “forced to stand before the world and his god splattered with the blood of his brother, he will call an end to his self-defeating massacre… if physical death is the price that a man must pay to free his children and his white brethren from permanent death of the spirit, then nothing could be more redemptive”. 4 another redeeming feature of nonviolent resistance is that it avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. the nonviolent resister not only refuses to fire at his opponent but he also refuses to hate him. the principle of love occupies the centre of nonviolence. in their struggle for human dignity, the oppressed people must not become bitter and hateful. retaliation of evil would only 11 intensify the existence of hatred in the world. “along the way of life, someone must have sense enough and morality enough to cut off the chains of hate. this can only be done by projecting the ethic of love to the center of our lives.”5 king’s social ethics revolves around nonviolent love. one of the great virtues of nonviolent resistance is that it reduces hostilities to a minimum. “nonviolence not only produces goodwill, but also offers the greatest opportunities for evolving communal harmony. it maintains moral, rational and cooperative attitudes amidst conflict and thus increases the moral forces instead of destroying them”. another important merit of nonviolent resistance is its practicality especially for an oppressed minority group. the africanamericans could hardly depend on the ‘moral sense’ of the whites; nor could they take to violence in order to be free. those who hated the african-americans outnumbered them and violence would only produce more violence to the utter disadvantage of the african-americans. the doctrine of nonviolence does not demand an eye for an eye, but summons one to ‘open the eyes of blind prejudice’. according to king, the african-americans rejected violence not only because he knew he could not gain freedom through physical force, ‘but also he believed that through force he could lose his soul’. winning is not everything, but being human is. king says that from history we know instances of successful nonviolent resistance. the nonviolent resistance of the early christians shook the roman empire. nonviolent boycotts and protests in colonial america heralded the independence of the colonies. gandhi’s satyagraha won india’s independence from british rule. king wanted the african-americans to be ready to risk martyrdom in order to stir the conscience of america and to force the oppressors to commit brutality for the whole world to see. acceptance of nonviolence was a mark of sophistication on the part of the african-americans because it showed that they dared to break away from the established concepts of the american society. king says “the eye-for-an-eye philosophy, the impulse to defend oneself when attacked has always been held as the highest measure of american manhood. we are a nation that worships the frontier tradition, and our heroes are those who champion justice through violent retaliation against injustice. it is not simple to adopt the credo that moral force has as much strength and virtue as the capacity to return a physical blow; or that to refrain from hitting back requires more will and bravery than the automatic reflexes of defense.”6 12 the nonviolent tactics put enormous pressure on the government and forced those in power to repeal the unjust laws and to implement the just laws of desegregation, voting rights and so on. under the weight of nonviolent pressure the whites were forced to recognize the african-americans as human persons, not slaves or things. the power released by the nonviolent african-american revolution initiated by king shook the white america, the first nation to bomb the nonwhite japan. mighty in weapons, white america had to yield to the unarmed africanamericans whose greatest weapon was the conviction that they were right in being nonviolent. king’s nonviolent movement changed the face of america to a large extent. nonviolence gave a measure of manhood and self-respect to the africanamericans oppressed for generations; it gave the whites the realization of decency and to both the experience of brotherhood and the possibility of peace. i am convinced that we need to rediscover nonviolence and put it into practice in our much troubled times . ii.2. formation mere information on fostering peace is not enough. information is knowledge. knowledge alone is not going to change things. what is needed is commitment to action guided by knowledge. the students must be exposed to living with heterogeneous groups so that they can learn to respect and accept differences. the students must be formed in such a way that peace education will have a profound impact on them and that they become seriously involved in fostering peace wherever they are, and at all times. formation of men and women of peace could take place in several ways. peace begins at home. some students may come from families which lack peace. if the members of their families are not at peace with each other, well trained and highly motivated peace educators would do well to be mediators in such families provided their mediation is not rejected. fellow students could be of help to each other in this regard. dialogue groups must be formed among the students of diverse background. with the help of peace educators, there must be ongoing dialogue among the students. dialogue must be extended to interaction between students and others. students of diverse nationality, religions, languages and so on must form not only dialogue forum but also activity groups. travel must be encouraged. visits to different countries, at least to those in the region promote mutual understanding and students can participate in the life of the 13 local communities. learning about other religions and visiting places of worship of other religions is an important component of peace-building. learning foreign languages opens the window to hitherto unexplored worlds. every student must be encouraged to learn a foreign language in addition to english. participating in the festivities of others can be a joyful, educational and communitarian event which brings people together and fosters better understanding. being friendly and sympathetic goes a long way in fostering peace. above all else, we need role models for the students. peace educators have a tremendous obligation to be role models to the young students who look up to the elders for guidance and inspiration. the problems we have in the world today are essentially moral in nature; therefore, they need moral solutions and not merely technological, economic and military ones. if the students see the peace educators genuinely committed to peace, they will certainly be motivated by them. the students can interact with peace groups and peace activists at local, national and international levels. they can also acquaint themselves with the biographies of outstanding men and women of peace who may inspire them. the educational institutions can network with ngos and peace groups so that the students may be in touch with real situations in life and can be trained to meet the challenges of peace. if peace education fails to have an impact on the students, then there may be serious flaws in the way it is done. ii.3. transformation information and formation are meant for making the students become agents of social transformation. after graduating from the educational institutions, the young men and women, it is hoped will be involved in fostering peace at various levels. respect for the dignity and worth of the human person and for human rights, promotion of peace through justice and so on are foundational to peace efforts. in the course of time, as the young men and women mature into responsible adults, they will have a better grasp of problems and greater confidence in addressing them. transforming the world into a better place than it was when we were born is a noble task performed by noble souls. nobility of heart and mind is a moral quality found in morally upright persons. humans are primarily moral persons. if we understand what it is to be moral, we will certainly be peace-makers. but if we pursue other things than required by morality, then peace may be elusive and even a casualty. to be a peace14 maker is a choice, a commitment, an act of love and sacrifice. “blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons and daughters of god.” references copleston, frederick, history of philosophy, vol.ii, search press, london, 1950 fernando, joseph i, dynamics of liberation, agape publications, madurai, 1992 gadamer, hans-georg, philosophical hermeneutics, university of california press, 1977 __________________, truth and method, continuum, new york, 1989 heidegger, martin. being and time, oxford: blackwell, 1995 king,jr, martin luther, stride toward freedom, harper and row, new york, 1953 ___________________, strength to love, harper and row, new york, 1963 ___________________, why we cannot wait, the new american library of world literature, inc. 1964 krell, david (ed.), martin heidegger: basic writings, harper and row, new york, 1977 palmer, richard, hermeneutics, northwestern university, 1969 endnotes 15 1 1. martin luther king, jr. stride toward freedom, harper and row, new york, 1958. p.97 2 ibid.p.82 3 martin luther king, jr. strength to love, harper and row, new york, 1963. p.77 4 m.l.king, stride toward freedom, p.177 5 ibid. p.83 6 martin luther king, jr. why we can’t wait, the new american library of world literature,inc. new york, 1964, pp.27-28 anders kølle 39 the roleless role of man anders kølle copenhagen, denmark abstract in a world increasingly governed by data-analytics and algorithms and with the continued development and sophistication of machine-to-machine technologies and communication, the very significance of human labor and human praxis is today being questioned and tested in radically new ways. decentered and displaced from his previous position as the main gatherer and interpreter of information, man´s hitherto exclusive role in the monitoring and administration of his environment is emphatically challenged by automation and ubiquitous computation. while these technological developments undoubtedly provide still greater precision and efficiency, they also prompt a series of less instrumental and more existential questions: what happens to human self-perception and self-valorization as machines take over the channels of communication? where does man situate himself in an environment increasingly beyond his grasp and outside his possibilities of apprehension? on the threshold to tomorrow´s big data-land these are among the questions that arise with still greater pertinence and urgency. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 2, july december 2017, 39-46 © 2000 by assumption university press 40 prajñā vihāra introduction with the continuing development and sophistication of sensors and mobile chips and ubiquity of wireless networks we are quickly approaching what commentators call the internet of things. despite the formidable range of possibilities that the internet of things appears to open and despite the seemingly countless areas of imagined future application from the benefits in agriculture to the effectivization of anything from healthcare equipment to cars and refrigerators the underlying commonality and unifying trait is the value and principle of data. or as the american author samuel greengard states unambiguously: “at the most basic level the iot and industrial internet are about data and extracting value from it.”1 in order to understand the impact on human existence and human interaction that the internet of things will have, it is therefore necessary to take the question of data seriously and to ask what we may all assume to know already: what do data truly mean? when does something qualify as precisely datum? how do data represent or signify and thereby provide us with possible information? what can data tell us about nature, about our environment, about ourselves? since futurists as well as engineers and scientists agree that we are only becoming still more dependent on data and that data indeed will function as the currency of tomorrow, it is of great importance that we do not take data for granted but ask on what we are basing both our future existence as well as our future economy. the human bottleneck let us begin our inquiry into the nature and logic of data by pointing to the crossroads that characterizes our current situation: whereas knowledge historically was the product of information and data collected by humans and analyzed, categorized, and computerized by humans, we are increasingly not only superfluous to the process but even a constraint or a bottleneck to the far superior sensibility and accuracy of sensors and m2m technologies that benefit from bypassing humans altogether. as the british technology pioneer kevin ashton describes the development: anders kølle 41 today computers and, therefore, the internet are almost wholly dependent on human beings for information. nearly all… data available on the internet were first captured and created by human beings by typing, pressing a record button, taking a digital picture or scanning a bar code. conventional diagrams of the internet include servers and routers and so on, but they leave out the most numerous and important routers of all: people. the problem is, people have limited time, attention and accuracy all of which means they are not very good at capturing data about things in the real world… we need to empower computers with their own means of gathering information, so they can see, hear and smell the world for themselves…2 in other words: due to the limited attention span and precision of human capturing people being far too easily distracted and far too spontaneous and unpredictable the task of gathering information is indeed too important to be left to human imperfection. where man fails the computer will prevail: without the inhibition of human fallacies what the future promises is a world where nothing remains hidden, unnoticed, and unregistered but where every change or alteration, every detail and every fact and feature is surveyed, captured, communicated, and archived. as such the dream of ubiquitous sensoring and ubiquitous computing is not only a dream of complete transparency and perfect surveillance but also the realization of an age old human fantasy and phantasm where humans finally will have made nature and objects communicate. as in a fabulous story by lewis carroll, the future will be populated by talking cars and coffee machines, tweeting plants, trees, cows, and sheep. behind the “looking-glass” of ubiquitous computing the silent world of nature and the silent world of things will finally have found a voice to drive the melancholic speechlessness away. a spokesperson from motorola summarizes the change in the following way: “something is happening. things are starting to talk to other things. you will see it all around you. we know, because at motorola, we´re making it a reality.”3 42 prajñā vihāra however, as objects and nature appear to find a voice, man himself is growing increasingly silent. not only will his previous role as gatherer and analyzer of information disappear in the foreseeable future but so will a great many of the jobs that m2m technologies in combination with artificial intelligence render obsolete. an analysis conducted by associated press in 2013 makes the stakes and development perfectly clear: most of the jobs will never return, and millions more are likely to vanish as well, say experts who study the labor market. what´s more, these jobs aren´t just being lost to china and other developing countries, and they aren´t just factory work. increasingly, jobs are disappearing in the service sector, home to two-thirds of all workers… they´re being obliterated by technology.4 and as the associated press report concludes: “the developed world may face years of high middle-class unemployment, social discord, divisive politics, falling living standards and dashed hopes.”5 the paradoxes that the report reveals are thus both manifold and mind boggling: while man´s own environment is becoming still better equipped and still more connected, man himself is increasingly taken out of the loop, expelled from the world of data exchanges, and disconnected in the very midst of ultimate connectedness. what man is engineering is, when regarded from this perspective, nothing but his own obsolescence what he is fabricating is his very insignificance and his future isolation. the world around man talks, but it will no longer speak to man who will have become the remnant or the vestige of the grand technologized evolution. what the associated press report points to is, in other words, the fundamental discord between a summing, active world of machine communication and the silenced world of human existence: it is from the depths of the future divide between sound and muteness, between data and absence, information and nothingness that humanity will be asked to define itself; it is in the image of the computer that man will question and judge himself and soon be judged in return. anders kølle 43 data and the human environment let us try to approach the silence that will increasingly envelop us and address the disconnection that threatens to isolate us. perhaps the most immediate and palpable expression of the disengagement that awaits us comes from the very way that iot technologies will change and estrange our relationship with the environment. today our daily praxis, our multiple routines, and our everyday doings are still wholly governed by reliability. we rely on our surroundings as our surroundings rely on us because a certain knowledge and a particular understanding forms a bond and produces a familiarity that makes us and our environment mutually responsive and reactive. it is the knowledge that lies in our hands for example: our grasp of things, our touch and apprehension. what distinguishes my house, my home, my neighborhood from any other environment, house, street or city, lies in the very confidence and trust by which my senses, my limbs, my body navigate and interact with the things in my most immediate surroundings. my feet know every crack in the pavement and the exact size and shape of every tile along the road. my hands know every doorknob, every light switch and every handle that are part of the rhythm of my daily going and routinely return. we may say that we truly rely on our surroundings in the word´s most original sense: meaning to gather and assemble. together the multiple and hardly noticeable or noteworthy doings and interactions of my daily existence are assembled and form the threads in a larger fabric which constitute the very stage curtain and backdrop of my understanding of everydayness itself. it is a sense of belonging that cannot be reduced to or contained by any one particular thing neither this concrete tile nor that precise handle since belonging indeed describes a relationship in the formation of a private and irreducible world. thus prior to the imbedding of sophisticated sensors and well before the accomplishment of m2m communication fills the air, the world of my daily existence is already a place of multiple networks and incessant interconnectedness: in my daily praxis the street with its trees, the cracks in the road, the window with its blinds are already assembled and already speaking: not in the clear voice 44 prajñā vihāra of data and information but in the whisper only audible to the one who dwells there. herein lies the richness, the true fullness of what we call our environment. it is the encirclement and enveloping that constitutes a whole equally shared by all things, equally inscribed in the gestures, the grips, the movements of my hand, my legs, and my feet. however, this enveloping and encirclement will soon be disrupted. as automation and m2m technologies takes over in our homes, at our workplace, in our streets and cities, my involvement and interactions will be supplanted by data-exchanges between machines that no longer necessitate any monitoring, guidance, handling or understanding of the individual. abi formulates it in the following way: as the controlled things become smarter, enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence, it is likely that the need for human input will gradually decrease. the things that today require such guidance to be aware of what the human user prefers will in the future be immersed into the environment in which they operate. in this sense, it can be argued that the ioh is a stepping stone towards a more immersive level of intelligence.6 if the human environment used to describe a relationship based on contact and reliance, founded on the knowledge of our senses and the actions of our bodies, then the reality that awaits us in big data-land renders all of this obsolete. smart machines will push the human engagement aside since every need, desire, or change is better and more efficiently met and administered by things and objects on their own. but as precision increases and efficiency reaches new and previously unimaginable heights, the human surroundings are still more emptied of significance. what importance do i have, what role do i play, when my knowledge and my perceptions are no longer valid and seem to always arrive too late? when everything from the car to the shower, toaster, and refrigerator operates independently and even better without my interference? something is lost that goes well beyond any simple question anders kølle 45 of pride, craftsmanship or ingenuity. the divorce is of a profounder and more ontological order: it is my very irrelevance as a human being that the new technologies manifest and expose. vis-à-vis the magnitude, the precision, and the ubiquity of data, any human skill and ability is a priori deemed insufficient. human hands are too clumsy, human vision is too faint, human memory is too flawed, human minds are too feeble. in an environment fully dependent on data-exchanges, man can only excuse himself and retreat. the environment will no longer ask anything of him except the data and information that he too emits through his monitored body and calculated movements. monitoring vs. natality the world of ubiquitous computing could therefore easily prove to be a wasteland for human thought. the data-land of tomorrow describes a world that is always already given always already rearranging, organizing, and monitoring itself. the need for human questioning, doubting, examining, creating, intervening is easily eclipsed and almost automatically pre-closed given that there appears to be nothing that is not already surveyed, registered, and admonished. where nothing seems to escape or bypass the hyper-sensitive and all-capturing sensors of tomorrow, there will be nothing for the human eye or mind to unearth, examine and discover. increasingly full of data the world is simultaneously emptied of importance. space and time are less the vast and promising dimensions continuously rich on events, creations, and possibilities as they become the narrowed horizons of a preordered and predisposed reality. to the extent that ongoing attempts of ameliorating and enhancing predictive analytics prove successful, not even the future will remain untouched by the undressing eyes and unconcealing calculations of technology. while this may allow a bank to anticipate the behavior of its clients or a car vendor to identify a potential customer in advance, it is also a technology that risks stripping time itself from the promise of the unexpected, the irregular, and the advent of absolute otherness. a certain fatalism seems inevitable: when even the unexpected is expected and the unpredictable 46 prajñā vihāra resides inside an algorithm, the very potentiality of existence appear hollow and abstract. let us not forget the very redeeming energy and powers that the german philosopher hannah arendt attached to the term natality: without the opportunity, the disruption, the surprise that the birth of an idea, a dream, or a vision bring, man remains inside the prison of recurrence and repetition. freedom and hope are the twin offspring of the occurrence of the unexpected. while the etymology of the word data in fact derives from the latin verb “to give”, the very gift of data is not natality but control: a monitoring that will soon bypass our human capabilities so emphatically that we can never be the steersmen but only the humble servants of tomorrows data streaming. the role of man is already changing and undergoing multiple transformations. but before our image and features are wholly besieged by the buffeting of bits, we may evoke a picture of man that is more of a promise than a prescription. endnotes 1 greengard, samuel: the internet of things, 54 2 greengard, samuel: the internet of things, 20 3 kellmereit, daniel and daniel obodovski: the silent intelligence, 15 4 greengard, samuel: the internet of things, 150-151 5 greengard, samuel: the internet of things,152 6 greengard, samuel: the internet of things,p.18 bibliography kellmereit, daniel and daniel obodovski: the silent intelligence, dnd ventures, san francisco, 2013 greengard, samuel: the internet of things, the mit press, cambridge, 2015 spirituality and mysticism: a global view intersubjectivity, “other intelligences” and the philosophical constitution of the human-roboticsinteraction 1 bernhard irrgang university of technology, dresden abstract questions of validity are not questions of nature, but rather emerge from the conditions of constitution of the anthropological potentials and subjectivity of the embodied-human subject. through the body as coping-mastery, the lifeworld of humans is both socially and technically signed. essential for an analysis of intersubjectivity is a threefold hermeneutics of the other as natural, artificial and human. the human lived body is a special case, in which all three dimensions of this hermeneutics are incorporated. hence, the body can serve as a model for intersubjectivity. heidegger’s ontological evaluation of practical rationality (praktische vernunft) is not unproblematic. it leads to a certain marginalization of theoretical and practical rationality (vernunft). therefore, supplements are needed. (figal 2006, 25-57). among these, first and foremost, would be a “thesis of handling” (“umgangsthese”). the development of such a thesis requires the development of a phenomenological conception of intersubjectivity. questions of validity (geltungsfragen) are not questions of nature, but rather emerge within the post-phenomenological perspective from the questions regarding the conditions of constitution of the anthropological potential and subjectivity of the embodied-human subject. corresponding to my thesis, through being-body (leibsein) as “coping-mastery” (umgehenkönnen), the lifeworld (lebenswelt) of humans is both social and technically formed. essential for an analysis of intersubjectivity is a threefold hermeneutics of “the other” (der andere) as nature, artificial and human. the human (lived) body (leib) is a special case, in which all three dimensions of this hermeneutics are incorporated. hence, the body can serve as a model for intersubjectivity. from intersubjectivity to the hermeneutics of “other intelligences” in the phenomenology of husserl, intersubjectivity is the term for all forms of togetherness of multiple transcendental or mundane egos (iche). this togetherness, is rooted in a collectivisation, which comes from transcendental ego (ich). the archetype of this collectivisation is the encounter of the other, which means the constitution of the first not-i or other. the constitutive course of the not-i (nicht-ich)-experience leads us from the collectivisation of the transcendental monads (monaden) to the all-monads and from their mundane objectivation to the constitution of the world for everyone. for husserl, this world is the actual objective world (heldt 1976, 521). shaun gallagher talks about pragmatic intersubjectivity (gallagher 1996) and takes a first step in my direction, because he interprets personal intersubjectivity, from the 2nd-person-perspective. by the time children start to integrate actions in pragmatic contexts, they achieve some sort of second intersubjectivity. approximately at the age of one, children are able to go beyond direct and immediate personperson-relation of primordial intersubjectivity, leave it and capture other contexts. in his treatise “the philosopher and his shadow” merleau-ponty outlines the philosophy of the (lived) body (leib). his assumption is that there is an objective interpretational dilemma when it comes to the arbitrary, accidental or ambiguous. this dilemma is closely linked to the philosophy of the body (leib). to comprehend the body in the husserlian sense, we need a reduction that leaves the natural attitude behind. the natural attitude refers to the human body in a way opposed to nature. furthermore, we need an attitude with regard to the body, which implies a certain relation between nature and the human mind (merleau-ponty 1960, 202-205). my body is integrated in the visible world. aside from that, my body is able to feel, for instance, my right hand. in this process the (lived) body (leib) is perceived. the body is characterized by its fleshy texture, and respective structure. but the human being can become an alter ego for others as well. in this respect he/she is not just flesh (merleau-ponty 1960, 215). important for the body (leib) is the co-presence of my consciousness and my body (körper). this body extends to the bodies beyond me, i. e. into intersubjectivity. for this, empathy is needed (merleau-ponty 1960, 220f.). within the spectacle of the world, i have to find means to gather my thoughts and make them a piece of my life (merleau-ponty 1960, 224). whether with or against his will, husserl is revealing a wild world and mind. things can only be understood from perspectivity, as the renaissance illustrated fairly well. there emerges a projective world according to requirements of a panorama. this baroque world is not merely the minds concession to nature. rather this world is rediscovered by the mind, namely pure mind without affection from culture. in fact, this pure mind has to build a new culture. the non-relative however, is neither given by nature itself, nor by the absolute mind’s systems. it is grounded in being (sein), which precedes the human (merleau-ponty 1960, 228). the heterophenomenology of other humans is indeed based on the second-personperspective (2 pp). while heterophenomenology of other intelligences, namely the intelligence of animals and machines, is a result of the third-person-perspective (3 pp). therefore, it is not right to call it heterophenomenology. instead, next to a phenomenology of other humans, we should develop a phenomenology of other non-human intelligences. dennett’s differentiation between a phenomenology of the “i” and a phenomenology of others misses the self-conception of phenomenology. phenomenological inquiries on the presence of others turn against the illegitimate occlusions of cartesian philosophy of consciousness, which created the problem of foreign psyche. wittgenstein pointed out already, that the everyday speech provides no clue for sceptical considerations about foreign psyches. the human infant discovers the 2 pp or other humans as something special between the ages of 9 to 12 months. this is important for the development of morality and an adequate consciousness of self and ego too. during these months, the child realizes the other (usually the mother) as a human person, distinct from other things and creatures, equipped with own intentionality, norms and value. the heterophenomenology suggested by dennett implies the expansion of the concept of intersubjectivity to discussions about other intelligences. given the different achievements of the species, it is absurd to compare chimpanzees with humans. they don’t have a human body (leib) and corresponding human competences. while we have perhaps underestimated the mental competences of animals, nevertheless they don’t come close to human bodily competences. to restrict oneself to an atomization of mental states misses the real problem: namely the problem of human embodiment (leiblichkeit) and the interpretation of that embodiment in the framework of a corresponding theory of subjectivity. a robot behaves within a frame. an animal behaves within a frame of behavioural patterns. but humans act inside a horizon. for this reason, it seems to me, the problem of intersubjectivity and heterophenomenology arises against the background of the perspectivity of human subjectivity. the question regarding perspectivity of human intersubjectivity constitutes the problem of horizon for human-embodied action. competences have horizons; they are not constituted by omnipotence. the frame-problem in the context of a functionalistic theory of representation needs to be questioned for its grounds through a phenomenological reduction. if we do this, we will see that active, perspectival and embodied personality designs its own emotional-mental horizons. situated robotics is in need of programmed frameworks. these frameworks are given through technology and the technician. abstractly speaking, the behaviour of the animal is determined by nature. but human action already calls for greater active participation and has to be partially shaped by human itself. heterophenomenology, in a time of the technological superman, involves new dimensions. these are threefold: the heterophenomenology of other bodies (leiber) (human intelligences), other living intelligences (organic intelligences, mostly in an animal manner), and other technical intelligences. the gradualism used here operates according to analogy. it involves other bodies (leiber) in the sense of others, who are sensitive to pain. it is about other bodies (leiber) in terms of the possession of emotions. and other bodies (leiber) in terms of behaviour which can be modelled through simulations of action. the phenomenology of the given, in terms of the subject taking place, needs to be separated from a phenomenology of the created. the heterophenomenological perspective in terms of a transclassical phenomenology allows three types of other intelligences: (1) the other human being (with awareness of future and death and a model of self); human intelligence (2) other biological intelligences in terms of animals (with consciousness, and perhaps self-consciousness); natural intelligence (3) autonomous operating machines (without a model of self and consciousness), artificial intelligence. we don’t need a heterophenomenology but a new hermeneutics of the living, of nature, and of technology. based on our embodied (leiblich) nature, we can allow animals and things to speak. so a hermeneutics of other intelligences, of animals as well as of technology or nature is absolutely necessary. the advance of human potentials for action will create new changes in old values and also create new values. therefore, humans create new matters of fact. but these new matters of fact alone do not move values forward, but rather, this is provided by interpretation. the unification of the laboratory and discourse is the way in which science proceeds. the constitution of the lifeworld (lebenswelt) happens by means of constant expansions with interpretations, valuations, discussions, conflicts and integration into hierarchies and institutionalization. collectives, as well as praxis and actions, are based on acceptance. lifeworlds and cultures are worlds we always take for granted, until we reflect on them. on interpretation of natural intelligences (organic intelligence) in many ways we have to be careful about the interpretation of animal behavior. we must first decide, which facts are really facts. in any case, we assume a deep and close connection between mental states and behavior. we observe, following our theoretical arguments, that many of our mental states are correlates of characteristic behavior. we observe other people and detect the same features of behavior or patterns of behavior. therefore, we inductively presume that they are accompanied by various mental states. an inductive argument based on just one case, allows no such generalization (gertler, shapiro 2007, 407-410). even if chimpanzees can pass the mirror-test, there are substantial doubts that they can identify mental states of others or even their own (gertler, shapiro 2007, 431). what seems clear is that research has underestimated the whole field of implicit (tacit) knowledge and competence in mammals, and even in humans. but humans generated implicit cultural and strategic competences based on sensorimotor dexterity and technical competences and handling of speech resulting from that dexterity. these implicit competences and knowledge have no complement in the realm of the animals. humans are more open and adaptive, but are also more prone to illnesses and abnormal behavior. already the surplus in tacit knowledge and competence, incorporates the potentials of the “homo faber” explicit knowledge, reflection and self-reflection, rationality and freedom of action all exclusively count as specific human. even what we consider as animalistic in our human nature, is specifically human. this includes “homo technicus” as well. we have certain traits of tacit knowledge in common with animals. this includes even potential self-knowledge. we have also implanted a part of our instrumental tacit knowledge into machines. the development of the human body is far less determined by genetic dispositions than that of other biological organisms. therefore in contrast to other creatures, the development of the human brain and competences are more contingent on the environment and hence more individualistic. these are first clues and aspects of freedom and action-competence (handeln-können) in humans. it seems to me that chimpanzees have varieties of mental states, but that they don’t build up the subjectivity of an embodied human subject, with its extensive sensorimotor, linguistic and theoretical competences. an objection against the so-called one-case-induction is that one achieves knowledge not based on one case, but based on many states involved in the 1st person-perspective. this includes not only mental states, but also the effects of certain actions. basically, we need to accept that the attributions of mental states, as well as the attributions of values, are just that: attributions and not descriptions. we can’t describe the mental states of other humans, animals or machines. we can only describe our own perceptions, not the ones we make available to others. indeed, there are good and plausible reasons for attributing human intelligence only to humans and not to animals, and for denying this kind of intelligence when it comes to machines. thus, animals have non-human minds or intelligences. they may perhaps possess some kind of consciousness, some kind of intentionality and in part self-consciousness. based on genetic dispositions and instructions, they are able to learn certain actions. machines exhibit a non-human mechanical mind without conscious, intentionality, or selfconsciousness. they can behave according to programming. compared to other humans, humans exhibit a different intentionality, self-awareness, fine motor skills and a verbal speech, which is capable of abstraction, graphical representation and formalization. it is important to locate the problem of other intelligences or other minds in the context of praxis. “intelligence” embedded in machines; embedded in biological organisms and embedded in human bodies (leiber) is always something different. animals have merely a 1 st-personperspective, robots have no perspectivity. obviously, the human-animal-comparison gives support for the assumption, that human mind is a construct of interpretations. the humananimal-comparison atomizes the characteristics and behavior and compares only particular individuals. instead the “thesis of handling” considers machines, animals and humans as a whole. handling of artificial intelligence: how autonomous can robots become? the basic idea of the agent was created in the 1950s. john mccarthy’s software pioneered the underlying system, but the term came to be used decades later, at the time apple developed the knowledge navigator in 1989. agents are basically digital valets or butler. the metaphor of the “butler” has turned out to be useful in this context. it’s a matter of digital butlers, info-butlers and agents in man-shape. this visual metaphor is malleable. it supersedes the simulation (johnson 1997). the idea of agents, censors, zombies, which came to the fore in the ai, replaced philosophical ideas of the acting “i” (ich) with a conglomeration of pseudo-“i´s” and names. what is accomplished by this replacement? the acting “i” is interpreted as a robot. the basis of the connectionist model in ai is a positivisticmechanistic and reductionistic model of the human mind. the question then emerges: is there a human thinking, which can escape embeddedness in the lifeworld? a thinking that is not libidinously emotionally or communicatively embedded? such a thinking, has been constituted in the application of our technologies. the construction of houses, temples, weir systems and irrigation systems required a technical-constructive thinking, which was increasingly translatable to mathematics and typified the simulation of technical praxis. many want to assign moral status to machines and their “actions”. as for humans it is often vice versa. to epiphenomenalism the “will” is an epiphenomenon of neuronal activity. therefore the neural impulse generates two different effects: a mental and a physical effect, an act of volition and physiological body movement. we mistake the will as cause of the body movement (zoglauer 1998). the delegation of the chain of means and ends to technical systems and machines leads to an instrumental reduction of the schemes of action (handlungsschemata). robots are upgraded machines, but they remain machines. there is no fundamental difference between an automatic loom and a humanoid robot. robots which can act in an “autonomous” way, or more precisely, which in many situations act like an animal, remain technical products. they are mere tools and not acting subjects. the acting of a robot is a case of action without acting subject. the reproduction of technical schemes of action (handlungsschemata) took place since the industrial revolution. there, with the replication of the spinning activity and connection of looms, the first reproduction of complex technical action occurred. therefore, the modeling and simulation of human competence including tool-use isn’t something new. but indeed, what could be possible in robotics in the future, is extension of the basic schemata to non-technical action-sequences, such as perception, mobility etc., which can be used for non-technical ends. with it, a further mechanization (technisierung) of everyday life will take place. but this is not a fundamental new fact (irrgang 2008). the different levels of intelligence in humans and machines can be found in the fringeconsciousness, to allow ambiguity, to differentiate between essential and non-essential aspects and in the graspable composition. to find a plausible register of terms (begriffsverzeichnis) for just one domain is associated with enormous effort. the natural language shaped up as more complex than assumed. without the existence of a global context, reciprocal understanding is impossible. insofar, a contextual frame is to be sought. this frame is the shared culture. human intelligence has the ability to unlock the sense of the words out of their context. therefore it is not possible to analyze human behavior as a mere rule-guided processing of a certain amount of elements (dreyfus 1985, 154-173). very helpful for an understanding of some issues in robotics and ai is ricoeur’s concept of action without an acting “i” (ricoeur 1990, 73). following ricoeur, we have to ask, whether robots are able to act and how we can evaluate the actions of robots. in the framework of possible behavior patterns of a robot, it is undeniable that a robot in general can fulfill action-schemata (handlungsschema). action-schemata in general meaning is given, when intentionality and end of the action are shaped in advance. furthermore, the idea of a machinelike action should be introduced. afterwards, machine-actions and human actions seem determined. actions which at first seem not to follow any explicit rules, may be subsumed under a rule afterwards. rules formulated in retrospect do not apply for the future (collins 1991). robot-actions are a case of action without an acting subject. but the question is still open, of whether a machine could possess an awareness of its own schematics of action through programming. we can’t assume this, because the types of action performed by a certain computer should simulate human behavior as objective schemes of behavior (3 pp). the nature of the execution (vollzugsaspekt) of a human agent or a human scheme of action can’t be simulated in a machine, because it is a first person perspective (1 pp), in other words, the perspective of the execution. there may be comparability between the external aspects of human behavior and robot-behavior due to the similarity of the action-procedure (irrgang 2005a). but without the aspect of execution (vollzugsaspekt) given in 1 pp, one cannot speak of human action. in the action-schemata meaning is given, when intentionality and end of action are shaped in advance. for robots, the structure of action in terms of action-procedures and the goal of action need to be programmed and created beforehand. therefore an actual action-i (handlungs-ich) is not necessary, if there is a created goal-structure. thus the features of action seen from the 3 pp can be given, without an acting i (1 pp). the goal-structure of an action-schemata can be ethically assessed without an acting i (ich). i can judge if a robot is performing ethically positive or negative action-schemata. however, a non-embodied (nichtleiblich) action is action only in the abstract sense of the word, and whose consequences, the programmer who created the action-schemata and implemented it is responsible, and not the robot. action itself is a construct of interpretation, a phenomenon of attribution. viewed as pure physical procedures (3 pp), actions don’t differ from events (ereignisse). that’s why positivists claim that moral action and human freedom don’t exist. but our self-awareness tells us the opposite (irrgang 2005a). while the engineer makes it possible for the machine to operate, by switching it on and off, or pausing and resuming operations (irrgang 2005c), this is much different from living bodily execution (leiblicher vollzug). routine is operating according to a plan, innovative action involves acting for an end not in the same way. based on dispositions we acquire certain competences during action. already existing skills are being updated, extended and advanced. the handling-thesis (umgangsthese) calls for a phenomenological conception of technological artifacts (i.e. orientation towards surface-structures) and not a causal theory. the objective part of technical competenceaction-schematacan be implemented into machines. insofar, spinning machine and weaving machine have been created through transfer of human patterns of manufacturing into mechanic production. therefore the basis of technology is laws of nature and the objectifiable human action procedures and their possible implementation into technical artifacts. the coping-mastery (umgehen-können) of machines, instruments and infrastructure (with its measurable results) is a part of technical, and hence, technological praxis. technology is objectification of both technical coping-knowledge (umgangswisssen) and technical competence, the crosslinking of technical structures with modes of human-machineinteraction. robots as well as synthetic life-forms are consequent results of this technological development. technological understanding and natural scientific explanation should be applied together, in the sense of “...as well as...” (sowohl-als-auch). technical praxis is always present in the creative process of construction, invention and research. for a general technology, the object of investigation is the relation between technical routine and technical innovation. the technical potential of an artifact is based on its inherent action-schemata. in the case of the robot, an individualization of general technical operation-schemata takes place (irrgang 2008). a formal action-structure of a robot or of its process sequence, detached from body (leib), is imaginable and maybe programmable. the robot will behave in the frame of a predetermined action-pattern (handlungsmuster). a robot can’t give instructions to itself, but is bound to a given structure of instruction due to his construction. the “action” is preinterpreted through the style of programming. robots don’t have “world”. they do not orient themselves within the framework of human rationality, but within the framework of a given action-frames (handlungsrahmen). ultimately this is good, because ai is technical intelligence. also the fact that there is a limit in the formalization of implicit (tacit) knowledge speaks against the assumption, that ai someday will achieve the status of natural or even human intelligence. if we accept the limitations of technicality we don’t lose anything, except some of our prejudices. references collins, harry m. 1991: “artificial experts.” social knowledge and intelligent machines. cambridge mass./london (1990). dennett, daniel 1993: consciousness explained. 1991, london. dennett, daniel 2007: “heterophenomenology, reconsiderd” in: phenomenology of cognition and science. 2007 6, 247-270. figal, günter 2006: gegenständlichkeit. das hermeneutische und die philosophie. tübingen. gallagher, s. 1996: “the moral significance of primitive self-consciousness” in ethics 107, 129-140. gallagher, shaun 2004: “hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences” in journal of consciousness studies 11/2004. gallagher, shaun, dan zahavi 2008: the phenomenological mind: an introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. london, new york. gertler, brie, lawrence shapiro 2007: (hg.) arguing about the mind. new york, london. heidegger, martin 1972: sein und zeit. tübingen. heidegger, martin 1994: zollikoner seminare. protokolle, zwiegespräche, briefe. hg. v. medard boss; (1987) frankfurt. heidegger, martin 2002: phänomenologische interpretationen zu aristoteles: ausarbeitung für die marburger und die göttinger philosophische fakultät (1922) hg. von g. neumann. stuttgart. heldt, k. 1976: “art: intersubjektivität“ in hwp iv, 521f. husserl, e. 1952: ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie bd. 2; ed. mary biemel, husserliana bd. iv, den haag. husserl, e. 1973: zur phänomenologie der intersubjektivität. texte aus dem nachlaß. teil 2 (1921-1928), husserliana bd. xiv, ed. i. kern, den haag. husserl, e. 1976: die krisis der europäischen wissenschaften und die transzendentale phänomenologie. ed. w. biemel, husserliana bd. vi; den haag 1976. irrgang, b. 2005a: posthumanes menschsein? künstliche intelligenz, cyberspace, roboter, cyborgs und designer-menschen anthropologie des künstlichen menschen im 21. jahrhundert; stuttgart. irrgang, b. 2005b: einführung in die bioethik. münchen. irrgang, b. 2005c: “ethical acts (actions) in robotics” in philip brey, frances. grodzinsky, lucas introna (hg.) ethics of new information technology. proceedings of the sixth international conference of computer ethics (cepe 2005); enschede 2005, 241-250. irrgang, b. 2005d: “der cyborg als der übermensch friedrich nietzsches? anmerkungen zur posthumanismusdiskussion“ in. r. kaufmann, h. ebelt (hg.) scientia et religio. religionsphilosophische orientierungen. fschr. für hanna-barbara gerl-falkovitz; dresden 2005, 315-333. irrgang, b. 2007a: hermeneutische ethik. pragmatisch-ethische orientierung für das leben in technologisierten gesellschaften. darmstadt. irrgang, b. 2007b: gehirn und leiblicher geist. phänomenologisch-hermeneutische philosophie des geistes. stuttgart. irrgang, b. 2008: philosophie der technik. darmstadt. jaffard, r. 2005: “das facettenreiche gedächtnis“ in spektrum der wissenschaft spezial 2/2005. gedächtnis 6-9. meltzoff, a. n.; r. brooks 2001: “like me as a building block for understanding other minds: body, acts, attentions, and intentions” in b. malle, l. j. moses; d. a. baldwin: (hg.) intentions and intentionality: foundation of social cognitions. cambridge mass., 171-191. merleau-ponty, maurice 1960: signes. paris. merleau-ponty, m. 1966: phänomenologie der wahrnehmung. übersetzt von rudolf böhm; berlin. merleau-ponty, m. 1976: die struktur des verhaltens. übersetzt von bernhard waldenfels; berlin, new york. merleau-ponty, m. 2000: die natur. aufzeichnungen von vorlesungen an collège de france 1956-1960. übersetzt von m. köller (11995). ricoeur, p. 1990: soi-même comme un autre. paris . stern, d. 1985: the interpersonal world of the infant: review from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. new york. zoglauer, thomas 2002: konstruiertes leben. ethische probleme der humangentechnik. darmstadt. 1endnote this paper is translated by steffen steinert, tu dresden. 11(158-162)note for authors the violated universe: fanon and gandhi on violence in colonial situations dipo irele university of ibadan, nigeria abstract there is in man the perennial quest for freedom and selfactualization and this lies at the root of the urge to destroy oppressive institutions and unjust arrangements and recreate in their places a humane society which allows for freedom, for freedom alone is the ultimate pre-condition for meaningful creativity. the aim of this paper, therefore, is to carry out a critical assessment of fanon’s violent approach and gandhi’s non-violent approach in colonial situations with a view to determining whether both or either of them are relevant to the contemporary postcolonial situation. violence is other-directed, insofar as it is exercised by an already constituted “ego” whose interests and identity are thoroughly defined at the onset of the process. a liberation struggle aims not only to achieve external objective of liberating the people from alien rule, but first and foremost to transform the individuals who participate in it, for this guarantees that the struggle will result in a new man whose humanity would be restored. given this, it is important to understand in what respect fanon and gandhi parted ways. we shall try to clarify the socio historical reasons and the value system that are at the origins of either model. there is now a revival of interest in frantz fanon due to a discourse known as post-colonial discourse. frantz fanon is generally re84 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 84-99 © 2000 by assumption university press garded as one of the greatest african revolutionary theorists as well as an irrepressible activist. fanon was born in the french colony of martinique and he grew up not just as a nationalist fighting the african cause, but also a revolutionary and a relentless advocate for the total liberation of the african continent. to fanon, liberation struggle ought not to end with decolonization but must manifest in the well-being of the people, freed from all forms of alienation, domination and on the whole neo-colonialism. before he died on 6th december 1961, at the age of thirty-six, he had exerted a great influence on the course of the liberation struggle in africa and other parts of the world. fanon’s views on revolutionary practice are widely known for their emphasis on violence as a sine qua non for authentic decolonization. these views were expressed in his writings which include black skin, white mask, a dying colonialism, the wretched of the earth and towards the african revolution.1 the institutionalization of violence by the colonizer in the colonized society not only enthrones the supremacy of the ruling class which is also a racial category in fanon’s analysis – but facilitates the process of oppression and dehumanization of the colonized people. now, we may ask, what does fanon mean by violence? the issue of violence is an important one in fanon’s thought.2 it is in view of this that it becomes necessary for us to make a distinction between his thesis that the colonial situation is an inherently violent one and his ethical justification of violence as a potent instrument of liberation. for as l.a. jinadu puts it: “failure to make this distinction, or to emphasize it, is a major defect in much of the discussion of the aspect of fanon’s thought.” one reason for this one-sided treatment of violence in fanon, according to jinadu, is that much of the discussion is devoted not so much to fanon’s claim that the colonial situation is by definition violent as to his claim that violence is degenerating and spiritually purifying. what we see in fanon is a total condemnation of the violence inflicted on the colonized people by the colonizer. he believes that such violence is not conducive to the self-realization of the colonized. he recognizes the instrumental value of violence as a means to a desirable end when socially organized and ideologically directed to achieve the liberation of the colonized. in this sense fanon regards violence as the praxis of irele 85 decolonization and freedom as self realization. to discover what fanon’s conception of violence in colonial situation is one need to appreciate his three-fold categorization of violence, which helps to clarify those socio-political phenomena that in his view constitute violence in the colonial situation. in short, a reading from most of works of fanon, especially the wretched of the earth, suggests that fanon makes a distinction between physical, structural and psychological violence and this we shall turn to presently. physical violence involves bodily injury inflicted on human beings, the most radical manifestation of which is the killing of an individual. this conception of violence as involving the killing or wounding of human beings is reflected in many passages in the wretched of the earth. thus, when fanon claims that “colonialism…. is violence in its natural state”3 part of his meaning is that colonial rule was preceded, inaugurated and maintained by the use of physical violence. according to fanon, to “pacify” indigenous people and force them to accept the new alien order, the colonizer often found it necessary to wage wars against them. this situation was clearly evident when indigenous people resisted the establishment of colonial rule and violence was used to subjugate them. it is in view of this that fanon advocates the use of force to liberate the colonized from the colonizer. fanon deduced his advocacy of the use of physical force to replace the colonial situation precisely from his thesis that the colonial situation, together with the social roles and institutions that define it, rests on the basis provided by physical violence. as he wrote, “… it is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force.”4 according to him, appeals to the conscience of the colonizer are, in certain contexts, misplaced and misdirected. this is because such appeals cannot bring about the termination of colonial rule. structural violence, on the other hand, is what fanon refers to as the manichaeism of the colonial situation. used in this sense, structural violence is a condition of social injustice. according to fanon, the abject poverty of the colonized is in stark contrast to the affluence of the colonizer: the colonial world is a world divided into compartments. it is 86 prajñâ vihâra probably unnecessary to recall the existence of native quarters and european quarters, of schools for natives and schools for europeans: in the same way we need not recall apartheid in south africa.5 in fanon’s view the purpose of colonialism, indeed the essence of the colonial state, is the perpetuation of this condition of social injustice. and according to fanon, the colonizers are less concerned with bridging the gulf that separates them from the colonized than with sapping the colony of its economic wealth. this assumption obviously runs counter to the view that colonies were economically unprofitable and therefore burdensome to the colonizer. according to fanon, “in every concrete way europe has stuffed herself inordinately with the gold and raw materials of the colonial countries.”6 the question that readily comes to mind now is the question of whether there is any connection between physical and structural violence. one answer to this involves yet another reference to fanon’s belief in the influence of socio-economic and political structures on the behavioral calculus of individuals. for example, fanon’s thesis is also partly that structural violence as a condition of social injustice invariably drives the colonized people to desperate ends and to the conviction that one way to redress the condition is to resort to the use of physical violence. the truth is that the privileged position of the colonizer is envied by the colonized who, as a result, is likely to run to radical political action to change the situation. in the case of psychological violence fanon means the injury or harm done to the human psyche. according to jinadu7 this includes brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds and threats, all of which not only serve to decrease the victim’s mental potentialities but also constitute “violence that works on the soul.”8 in other words, this form of violence moulds the consciousness of the colonized. this psychological violence represents the attempt, conscious or unconscious, by the colonizer to create alienated colonized individuals who reject indigenous values and institutions because they are deceived or brainwashed into believing these values and institutions are inferior to those of the colonizer. the colonized people, therefore, embrace the values and institutions of the colonizer and irele 87 also “wear white masks.” psychological violence then becomes a form of cultural imperialism in the context of the colonial situation, and this, according to fanon, prevents its colonized victims from achieving self-realization. this situation becomes very pathetic when one recalls what fanon wrote: in the man of color there is constant effort to run away from his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence.9 in developing his thesis on psychological violence or psychic alienation, fanon owes much tosartre-the existentialist philosopher. sartre had argued that a person, in this case the jew, is defined by the gaze of the other, namely the anti-semite. according to sartre, the mistake of the “inauthentic” jew is to have allowed himself to be poisoned by the stereotype that the other had for him. it is in this sense that the action of the “inauthentic” jew is over-determined from the inside.10 it is in the same vein that fanon says that the alienated colonized individual accepts the stereotype view that equates black with evil, he or she becomes the object of the other’s view that denies him or her of humanity. fanon’s arguments, however, go further than sartre’s in that the blackman experiences alienation as an individual as well as outside himself because of his colour. on the question of whether there is any relationship between psychological and structural violence, fanon says that the nature of the relationship is to be found in the fact that the attempt to become white reflects the superior socio-economic and political status of the colonizer. we may also ask: is there a relationship between psychological and physical violence? again fanon thinks so. some commentators on fanon, like jinadu, agree with fanon. according to jinadu, “his thesis is that the effective disalienation of the black person demands the use of physical violence, the extent and scale of which should be viewed situationally.”11 thus, fanon looks upon physical violence which, when utilized under certain conditions and just not indiscriminately, should free the colonized from their inferior complex and confer on them again their self-respect and restore their humanity. we can now pose the question: to what extent is fanon’s three88 prajñâ vihâra fold categorization of violence useful. to jinadu the categorization is useful for heuristic purposes. according to him, this is particularly so with the distinction between physical and psychological violence. it makes sense to say that violence has been done to one’s soul or humanity in more than a metaphorical sense. this is an important dimension of violence in the colonial situation and elsewhere for that matter; it focuses on all kinds of indoctrination to which the colonizers are exposed without their necessarily suffering physical or bodily harm.12 the categorization though useful for heuristic purposes, may give rise to confusion and ambiguity when it comes to employing it for empirical purposes. thus, the dividing line between the three types of violence may be a tenuous one. for example, how do we classify action of a government that secures compliance to its orders by threatening, without really intending to do so, to use force to disperse a group of protesters? secondly, there was a glaring and abominable condition of social injustice in the colonial situation. the force of fanon’s analysis of structural violence, for example, lies in his identification of, and emphasis on, its racial basis, and on the fact that the colonizers are not responsible, that is not accountable to the colonized, which is to say that the question of redressing or equalizing the structural polarity was hardly posed. again, fanon’s references to structural violence raises some interesting questions about intentionality and motivation which have some consequences. it is one thing to claim that a structure performs certain functions; it is another thing to say it is specifically set up to perform those functions. it is, therefore, not clear whether fanon is referring to the objective consequences of the colonial situation or to the subjective intentions of the colonizer’s; or even to both. what makes the distinctions a useful one to make is that it is not always the case that there is congruence between intentionality and consequences. fourthly, it has been argued that fanon’s categorization makes no distinction between violent and non-violent behavior. some non-violent acts may even involve as much bodily harm or injury as violent acts. for example, a fast-unto–death can involve doing harm to one’s body. now let us turn to gandhi at this point. mahatma gandhi is one of the foremost political philosophers irele 89 advocating non-violent approach to liberation in a colonial situation. after 1857 when britain ruthlessly put down the indian rebellion and acquired direct control over india, many indians began to feel that their freedom could be attained by means of violence and that such violence was fully justified. although india’s struggle for independence was largely nonviolent, it was dominated and periodically vitalized by a small but vocal terrorist movement. when gandhi later appeared on the scene, he attacked terrorism and justified his uncompressing insistence on non-violence. though gandhi was familiar with the terrorist movement, he was wholly unpersuaded by their arguments. however, he was convinced that they had a great appeal to his countrymen, and that their advocacy of violence was likely to receive support unless their advocacy of violence was effectively countered. even though gandhi agreed with the “school of violence” that the liberal methods of rational discussion, parliamentary opposition and electoral pressure were either not available or ineffective in india, he was convinced that violence was not the answer for two reasons. first, violence was in principle unacceptable, and second, it was inappropriate and undesirable in the specific context of india’s struggle for independence. gandhi disapproved of violence on four grounds, namely the ontological, the epistemological, the moral and prudential. his ontological argument is hinged on his belief that the universe is grounded in and sustained by a supreme principle, which he calls reality or truth and, as a concession to convention, god. the supreme principle regulates the movement of the natural world and is manifested in living beings in the form of a soul. gandhi also believes that both animals and human beings have souls; the difference between them is that the soul of an animal is dormant and ‘unself conscious’. all living organisms thus embody the divine and are sacred. for gandhi then all men are “sons of the same god”, and ‘kith and kin’, ‘ourselves in a different form’, and ‘ultimately one.’13 gandhi goes further to say that since all men are one, their relations can only be based on love and good-will not hatred and ill-will. according to gandhi, love springs from and sustains human unity, whereas hatred and ill-will are divisive. now love implies care and concern for others, an active desire to help them grow and flourish, and thus rules out violence. gandhi be90 prajñâ vihâra lieves that the use of violence is incongruous with man’s spiritual nature and detracts from his dignity as a human or spiritual being. for gandhi, violence ultimately rests on the assumption that some men are so fallen that they can never be won over by love and must be destroyed by force. in his view, these amount to denying the fundamental ontological fact about men, namely that each of them embodies a spirit which, however deeply buried under the thick crust of prejudices, can eventually be awakened.14 gandhi also advances an epistemology argument against violence. the argument is that the use of violence implies a belief in the absolute and infallible knowledge. that in order to be justified in taking the extreme step of harming or killing someone, one must assume that one’s objectives are absolutely right, violence will definitely achieve them and that one’s opponent is totally mistaken. that the consequences of violence are irreversible in the sense that a life once terminated or damaged can never be revived or easily put together. and irreversible deeds require infallible knowledge to justify them. for gandhi such infallible moral and empirical knowledge is denied to man. to gandhi fallibility of man undermines the very basis of action, for a man can never act if he constantly entertains doubt that his objectives might be wholly wrong. we must, therefore, acknowledge our fallibility and leave room for reflection and reconsideration, a sort of reflective equilibrium, to use rawls’s phrase. in his view, violence does not allow this. it generates bitterness which ‘blurs our vision’ and prevents us from appreciating the opponent’s point of view. for gandhi then violence is doubly flawed; it assumes infallibility and rules out corrigibility. gandhi also bases his rejection of violence on moral grounds. for him, morality consists, not merely in doing what is right, but doing so because one believes it to be right. for gandhi, therefore, morality requires the unity of character and conduct, harmony between belief and behavior. in his view violent disrupts this unity. by creating a split between belief and character on the one hand and conduct on the other, violence undermines a person’s moral integrity and diminishes his status as a moral being. finally, gandhi rejects violence on the ground that it can never achieve lasting results. according to him, when we describe a particular act of violence as successful, we mean that it has achieved a specific irele 91 objective. judged within the context of this narrow framework, the act of violence has no doubt been successful. gandhi contends that if we are to view it in terms of its long term consequences and the kind of society it creates, our judgment would be very different. its apparent success encourages the belief that violence succeeds and it alone succeeds, and it develops that habit of using it every time when one runs into resistance. gandhi also claims that violence has a habit of generating a vicious spiral. with every apparently successful act of violence, the community concerned comes to accept it as inevitable and becomes used to it. its tolerance of violence increases, and overtime an increasingly larger amount of it becomes necessary to achieve the same objective. according to gandhi, each act of violence adds to an escalating spiral and contributes to the eventual disintegration of the community from which no one benefits. it may also become part and parcel of the society after independence might have been achieved. as we have noted, gandhi not only objected to the use of violence in general, but also in the specific context of india’s independence struggle. for him independence means absence of foreign rule; and if it involves nothing more than replacing the foreign with indigenous masters and exploiters, it does not make a significant improvement and is hardly worth dying for. in gandhi’s view indian independence is desirable to arrest the utter moral degradation of the colonized by the colonizer and to educate the colonized against accepting an alien civilization being forced on them by the colonizer. for gandhi then, independence is necessary for the regeneration of the indian character and civilization. he subsumes both these under the concept of swaraj. swaraj which means self-rule or self-government implies a form of polity in which self-disciplined and ‘manly’ people conduct their personal and collective affairs. according to gandhi, independence is merely legal and political, whereas swaraj is a moral concept referring to the quality of the character and civilization of a community. he believes that independence can be given, swaraj can only be won; independence can be a gift, swaraj is an achievement; independence is essentially negative, swaraj is positive. in gandhi’s view then, the struggle for independence cannot be dissociated from the far more important struggle for swaraj. since inde92 prajñâ vihâra pendence is only desirable as a condition of ‘swaraj’ the struggle for it must be organized that it facilitates the achievement of swaraj, for otherwise independence would only lead to the rule by arrogant minority just as keen as their colonial predecessors to keep their subjects ‘unmanly’ and just as out of sympathy with the indigenous civilization. violence, in gandhi’s view, is by its very nature confined to a few and does not actively involve the vast masses of men. it is thus elitist in orientation, encourages the cult of leadership and likely to do little more than replace the british with a small minority of indigenous rulers. further, since the masses are not actively involved, the violent struggle for independence cannot arrest their moral degrading, let alone develop ‘manly’ qualities in them. nor can it generate a sense of community based on solidarity of suffering, and the consequent sense of having a stake in political power. for gandhi then, violence was not a proper method of struggle against the british. it was morally undesirable, incapable of achieving swaraj and, given the enormous disparity in the instruments of violence at the disposal of the government and the people, unlikely to achieve independence either. gandhi then went on to propose an alternative method which, he claimed, was in accord with man’s spiritual nature and sure to achieve both swaraj and independence. he called this method satyagraha. it required that the goals of struggle should be just or truthful, and those engaged in it guided by love for and desire to ‘convert’ their opponents by patiently suffering whatever punishment was meted out to them. gandhi developed several forms of action which collectively constitute his method of satyagraha. of these, non-cooperation, civil disobedience and fast were the most important. gandhi’s view is that a government cannot exist and operate successfully without the cooperation of the subjects. this is because the authority of any government draws its base from the subjects, that is their consent is necessary. it is the moral responsibility of the subjects to refuse to co-operate with the government is if it is unjust. in gandhi’s view, noncooperation can take many forms which include among others refusal to serve in the armed forces, boycotting of schools and surrendering of honors and titles conferred by the government. the refusal to obey the laws of the government is also a form of irele 93 non-cooperation, and this leads to civil disobedience. according to gandhi, civil disobedience means an open, peaceful, principled and courteous violation of laws believed to be unjust. civil disobedience, gandhi claims, can “bring the whole legislative and executive machinery to a stand-still.”15 in addition to the methods of civil disobedience and non-cooperation is the method of fasting. according to gandhi, fast –unto-death was an expression of courage at an evil practice, and it was also a last desperate attempt to stir the ‘sluggish conscience’ of his opponent. he does not believe that fast was a cowardly suicide, nor a quasi-romantic gesture of self-immolation, but an act of martyrdom for a cause. having outlined gandhi’s critique of violence and his alternative theory of satyagraha we are now in a position to ask: to what extent are his arguments tenable? in fact many criticisms have been raised against gandhi. one line of criticism, for example, against his position is his attempt to link swaraj with the rejection of industrial civilization which is considered as anachronistic. he is wrong to suggest that violence is essentially western and that india civilization is basically non-violent. again, gandhi fails to appreciate the fact that the struggles for independence and swaraj are rather different in nature, cannot be easily integrated and that his attempts to combine them lead to confusion and lack of direction. his belief that violence somehow remains confined to a few terrorists and does not require the more or less active support of the community at large, and that non-violent struggle avoids elitism, are also mistaken. apart from the above criticisms raised against gandhi’s critique of violence, his own alternative theory of non-violence or satyagraha suffers from other severe limitations. first, he was wrong to regard violence as a carnal and non-violence as spiritual in nature. second, it could be argued that he exaggerated the difference between non-violence and violence. third, he failed to fully appreciate the nature and role of violence in human affairs. and finally, although he did not intend it, his theory of satyagraha tended to glorify suffering. there is necessarily a sense in which political thinkers are products of their social milieu. their thoughts and writings are profoundly affected by the complex nature of the various social influences and forces to which they are exposed and sub94 prajñâ vihâra jected.16 in the case of fanon, his theory of violence in colonial situation was rooted in the socio-economic and political milieu created by french colonial rule in martinique and algeria. the theory of french colonial rule, reflected in the french colonial policies of assimilation and association, is based primarily on the assumption of the superiority of french culture and civilization, an assumption that rests on the denial of the authenticity of indigenous culture. fanon’s experiences in martinique and france pointed to the gap between the theory and practice of assimilation. although he had ‘assimilated’ french values in martinique, he discovered in martinique and france that colonialist society was a rigidly stratified or racist society in which the color question was an overriding one that precluded his admission to, and mobility within, french society on equal socio-economic and political terms with white frenchmen, despite the fact that one puts on white mask though having black skin.. the portrait of fanon that should emerge is that of a moralist and humanist. he had a passionate concern for, and commitment to, humanity and the human condition; he felt uneasy in a hypocritical world where lip service was paid to the ideals of social justice, equality and freedom. he brought moral concerns to bear on the social and political questions. gandhi also was a humanist. he felt for his people’s subjugated condition. he had the feeling that india’s rich civilization was not allowed to flourish during the colonial period. his discourse on non-violence relied on the rich heritage of india though he tapped from other cultures, especially the western culture which he was familiar with. he was able to innovate indian culture through his vast knowledge of it which he combined with other cultures, and he formed an integrated discursive strategy on nonviolence. fanon’s position is best understood when contrasted with gandhi’s, which presents us with an opposite model of anti-colonial struggle. for gandhi did not approach the question of liberation from the viewpoint of a population dispossessed, but from the view point of a nation endowed with a rich cultural heritage and a unique civilizing mission in the world. gandhi was always inspired by a deep sense of national and irele 95 personal value as well as the belief that the mind has primacy over the body and the individual can achieve inner freedom in the face of all external constraints. thus, he was convinced that india’s culture embodied universal values, that, once realized, should provide a source of strength, a “soul force” for its masses, and become a key element in their emancipation. gandhi was also influenced by the hindu creed that life in the body is an imperfect status from which only death can liberate us. not only is the individual a battlefield of two opposite natures: higher selfeternal, imperishable, and a lower self caught in the life-death cycle. as life in the flesh is a chain which binds us to our essential freedom, the aim of our existence is to overcome the body and manifest in the course of history, our true, divine nature.17 from this conception of the self and national identity where selfhood and india’s honor are deeply intertwined stems both gandhi’s rejection of violence and his doctrine of satyagraha, which he first developed in south africa in the course of his long campaign for indian rights. the two models of violence have had a lasting impact on the struggles of people of the third world countries. besides, both fanon’s and gandhi’s positions still continue to have an impact in the socio-economic political landscapes of african countries and india. violence has become part and parcel of african political system, where the violent structures of colonial system are still being used by the african elites against their people. the african elites have turned the state into a personal fiefdom.18 african psyche is still affected by the historical encounter with the west. gandhi’s romanization of suffering as a means of political change has had an impact on the psyche of his countrymen. suffering has become so much a part of life that death and misery no longer arouse any response in people. people have turned suffering into a ritual, a cult in that part of the world and despite the recent economic growth of india, majority of the people are still wallowing in poverty. there is still large scale poverty in india that it is unimaginable considering the economic growth that is highly enormous and has not transformed the life of the ordinary people in all areas of their life. there is class stratification now and the gap between the elite and the poor has widened greatly. this situation has not made the majority to be conscious of the need to change it because, as earlier pointed, suffering has become part and parcel of the normal life in that part of the 96 prajñâ vihâra world.19 gandhi’s theory has had this kind of effect on the people in that they do not think that the system can be changed. in a nutshell, the two models still continue to have an impact and here lies their relevance to the post-colonial situation.* endnotes 1 f. fanon, black skin, white masks (n.y.:grove press, 1967; f. fanon, a dying colonialism (n.y.: grove press, 1967); f. fanon, the wretched of the earth (n.y.: grove weidenfield, 1961); f. fanon, towards the african revolution (n.y.: grove press, 1964). 2 l. a jinadu, in search of the african revolution. (enugu: forth dimension, 1980) p.42. i am much indebted to jinadu for the numerous borrowings of his idea in this paper, but have used them in my own way. for other works on fanon see, n. gibson (ed), rethinking fanon: the continuing dialogue (amherst, n.y.: humanity books, 1999); r. zahar, frantz fanon: colonialism and alienation trans. w.f.feuser (n.y.: monthly review press, 1974); t. serequeberhan, the hermeneutics of african philosophy (n.y.: routeledge, 1994). some thinkers have condemned fanon for his espousal of violence, for this see e. kedourie, nationalism in asia and africa (n.y.: world publishing co., 1970). 3 f. fanon, the wretched of the earth (n.y.: grove press, 1961), p.61. 4 ibid, p.40. 5 ibid, p.37. 6 ibid, p.102. 7 l. a jinadu, op. cit, p.47. 8 j.t galtung, “violence, peace and peace research”, journal of peace research, vol.3, 1964, p.167. 9 f. fanon, black skin, white mask. (n.y.: grove press, 1967), p.60. 10 jean-paul sartre, anti-semite and jew. trans. g.j. becker (n.y.: shocken books, 1965) p.90. 11 l. a jinadu, op.cit, p.50. 12 ibid. 13 culled from young india (18th december, 1924), p.3. i gained a lot from the works of a.j. parel, gandhi’s philosophy and the quest for harmony (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006) and gandhi: struggling for autonomy (cambridge: cup, 2002). see also bhikhy parekh, gandhi’s political philosophy: a critical examination (london: macmillan academic press & professional ltd, 1989). gandhi is recognized for his position of non-violence and because of this u.n.o. has declared oct 3rd every year as gandhi’s day. 14 gandhi, young india. op. cit. p.8. irele 97 15 m. k. gandhi, constructive programme. (navajivan, 1948), p.8. 16 for this line of position, see m.h. lessnoff, political philosophers of the twentieth century. (oxford: blackwell publishers, 1999); see also my work, dipo irele, introduction to contemporary social and contemporary thinkers (ibadan: new horn press, 1993). 17 g. richards, the philosophy of gandhi. (n.y.: curson press, 1982), pp.3235. 18 for some positions along this line see chinua achebe, the trouble with nigeria. (london: heinemann press, 1983) jean-francois bayart, the state in africa: the politics of the belly (london: longman, 1993); g.b. ayittey, africa betrayed (n.y.: st. martins press, 1992). jean-francois bayart, s. ellis, b. hibou, the criminalization of the state in africa (london bloomington: james currey and indiana university press, 1999). see chapters 1, 2, 4; s ellis (ed) africa now (london: james currey, 1996); p. bond, looting africa (london books ltd, 2006), chapter 5. f. fanon, a. cabral and walter rodney had foreseen this kind of scenario before independence and had warned people about this. for their position on this, see fanon, the wretched of the earth, especially chapter 3 entitled “pitfalls of national consciousness” for cabral’s position, see his works, revolution in guinea: selected texts (n.y.: monthly review to the press, 1973); unity and struggle (london: heinemann, 1980). w. rodney, how europe underdeveloped africa (london: bogle l’o uverture publications, 1972). 19 for some positions along this line, see some papers in state of the nation in the context of social change (ed) t.v. sathyamurthy vol.1 (delhi: oxford university press, 1977) see also armartya sen position his text, development as freedom (n.y.: anchor books, 1999). * i wish to thank my brother prof. abiola irele of harvard university, u.s.a., for his comments and suggestions for the improvement of this paper. 98 prajñâ vihâra spirituality and mysticism: a global view habermas, the jesuits and religion: notes on a discussion about the role of religion in society lukas kaelin university of vienna, austria abstract in 2007, a public panel discussion took place between jürgen habermas and professors of the jesuit university in munich about the place and importance of religion in and for the (post-) secular society. habermas there explained that the relation between society and religion has its counterpart on a personal level as the relation between reason and faith. habermas points out that practical reason can only understand itself, if it clarifies its relation to the religious consciousness. this paper attempts to articulate and clarify the form of this twofold relation. introduction for some time in western civilization, religion has been seen as an aspect of society fading away due to individualization and modernization. secularization debates within the academe in the 70s and 80s have diagnosed a withering of the impact of institutionalized religion on societal processes.1 whether this dawn of the secular society was real or whether it was always a diagnosis put forward by an elite academic culture remains undecided. what is clear now, however, is that religion reemerged as a crucial topic in society and politics. 9/11 certainly was a powerful sign of this reemergence. alas, religion reemerges in different areas of social life, in form of religious symbols in film and advertisement, in political staging and a more public dialogue on religion. religion is not dying out. it looks as though it will keep playing a significant role through the modern and post-modern stages of society. throughout his long-lasting prolific academic career, habermas has attempted to describe society as a whole. in his theory of communicative action (1981, engl. 1984/1987), religion appears as “historical development phase”2 on the way to a modern, democratic society. in recent time, habermas returned to religion reflecting on it from a different angle. religion is no longer viewed as a stage in this historical process of society, but rather as a moral resource that secular society dwells upon. especially in the discourse on biotechnology, habermas understood religion as an important ally to grapple with the issue.3 1 this paper will present the most recent pronouncement of habermas on the topic of religion in its relation to society. habermas took part in a public panel discussion at the jesuit university in munich [hochschule für philosophie s.j., münchen] in early 2007. the proceeding of this panel discussion between habermas and the jesuit professors was published in german the following year. although the discussion was concerned with religion in general, the focus lies clearly on the religion present in europe, especially christianity. this paper will reflect on habermas’ train of thoughts and the arguments of his jesuit debaters. a historical-philosophical analysis of our time as in other recent comments on questions of our time, habermas starts his reflection on the place of religion in contemporary society with a philosophical-historical analysis of the time we live in. in the future of human nature (2001, engl. 2003), habermas reflects on the withdrawal of philosophy from questions concerning the good life. philosophy, at the turn of the 21st century, is unable to give advice on how to live a good life. habermas’ train of thoughts in that book, which deals mainly with the dawn of biotechnological interventions, led him to question this complete withdrawal of philosophy. moral questions – in habermas’ terminology – deal with the just organization of society, and need to be addressed in philosophy. philosophy does not have the luxury of remaining agnostic about questions that affect our human nature and that might affect the social balance.4 in his recent thoughts on the relationship between faith and knowledge, habermas addresses this topic of the just social interaction from a different angle. in his reflection on religion, habermas’ main focus is on the interplay between society and religion on a social level and reason and faith on the individual level. more particularly he asks about the resources provided by religion for a just organization of society. what is required in order to understand our time is an analysis of the intellectual history. starting point of habermas’ reflection is the axial age [achsenzeit]. this age, dated roughly between 200 and 800 bc, gave birth to the world’s main religion and world views from taoism and confucianism in china, and hinduism and buddhism in india, to the talmud judaism and zoroastrianism in the orient and to the ancient greek philosophy. karl jaspers, who coined this term, would see in this age (which is sometimes called the age of transcendence) the basis of all great civilizations and the categories of thought, which still shape modern consciousness. in other words, world civilization dwells upon spiritual and philosophical 2 developments that took place about 2500 years ago, which still shapes the way we understand, deal and interact with the world. on this basis, habermas perceives a unity between religious and metaphysical world view, which shaped the outlook of western civilizations, with their centers of judaism, christianity and islam in jerusalem and western philosophy in athens. 5 both world views attempted to provide a comprehensive understanding of nature and history. ancient metaphysics was able to take a transcendent view on the world as such and to differentiate between phenomenon and essence. this similarity of these two worldviews enabled christian thinkers from st. augustine to st. thomas to forge a harmony between metaphysics and christianity, between knowledge and faith. however, modern reason has withdrawn from metaphysical belief and is unable and unwilling to provide a comprehensive view of nature and history. in this intellectual historical setting, the question of the relation between religion and society, faith and reason has to be addressed. habermas understands faith and reason as two “complementary forms of spirit”6. such a comprehension rejects a naïve notion of enlightenment, which sees in religion only an irrational, outmoded understanding of reality. but it rejects also a hegelian understanding of religion, in which religion is a form of spirit subordinated to philosophy. faith necessarily eludes reason’s understanding: “faith remains somehow opaque for knowledge.” (habermas 2008: 29) reason should neither ignore nor simply accept this notion of the opaqueness of faith, rather it had to grapple with it. habermas’ motive – as he states explicitly – of dealing with religion is his wish “to mobilize modern reason against its inherent defeatism.” (habermas 2008: 30) practical reason, as habermas explains, doubts of its motivating power in view of the derailing modernity, which can hardly be kept in check by the weak force of moral beliefs about justice.7 hence habermas’ interest is in the political and social function of religion. it is not the very nature of religion, which stimulates habermas’ concern; rather he hopes to find in religion moral resources for our modernity in crisis. how could these originally religious resources be appropriated by a secular society? moreover, what are these resources? in other words: what is lacking? what is lacking? on modern society’s deficiency habermas’ account of what is lacking remains itself diffuse. the clearest aspect of the lack of secular society is its failure to provide adequate rituals. habermas recounts his experience 3 of the funeral service of the swiss writer max frisch in 1991. the venue of the obsequies was a church in zürich, but no minister was present, no blessing was given, no amen was said. frisch, an agnostic like habermas himself, felt that the enlightened modernity was lacking an adequate ritual of this last rite of passage, and chose the setting of a religious site, a church, for his own funeral service. secular society, as frisch must have felt, is unable to provide an adequate venue (habermas 2008: 26). but this lack of a set of secular symbols is not the only thing lacking. pondering about this question, the first thing coming to mind is that human beings in a secular society are lacking a certain sense of transcendence. this assumption seems to be backed as habermas explicitly refers to theodor w. adorno as the main influence for the formulation of the title. adorno’s negative dialectics is conscious of an ontological need of human beings and adorno directs his metaphysical speculations towards an inarticulable transcendence, not unlike a negative theology.8 however, habermas is interpreting adorno on the immanent plane of society and reason. reason, on the subjective level, and society, on the objective level, is lacking its other side, faith or religion. it is thus reason who is lacking something, and it is only faintly aware of it. following hegel, habermas understands philosophy and religion as “complementary forms of the spirit”9. against hegel, habermas does not see a hierarchy between these two forms of the spirit. friedo ricken s.j., in his reaction to habermas, points out that “complementary” indicates that philosophy and religion supplement and depend on each other. secular reason draws from religious tradition and translates them into secular language. religion needs to test its beliefs against the demands of reason; reason in turn is aware of its own incompleteness according to this quite strong understanding of an interdependence of religion and philosophy.10 but what then is reason lacking? norbert brieskorn s.j., in his answer to habermas, points out four areas where reason is lacking something: first, as already pointed out, it lacks a ritual to solemnize the last passage at the end of our lives. modern reason fails to take serious human finitude, and it remains undecided for the time being, whether reason can (re-)integrate this element. second, the (motivation for) solidarity is lacking. secular reason fails to infuse solidarity into human communities. the question is whether reason can be transformed in such a way to transgress its individual character and motivate for habits of solidarity. third, religious communities not only have to adjust to the liberal state, as habermas points out, but the democratic constitutional state also needs a legitimation out of persuasion. more than a simple, 4 rational commitment is required. in order for the political community to avoid disintegration, more than reason alone is needed. (habermas 2008: 32, brieskorn 44). lastly, the political public space profits from religious statements.11 habermas appreciates the recent public statements from organized religion; especially concerning the bioethics debate concerning research on embryonic stem cells and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. from the four lacking aspects pointed out by brieskorn, it is mainly the lack of sources of solidarity in secular society that habermas is concerned with as his replica shows. 12 from an historical perspective, the religious topos of an inverted and lost world has become profane and was transformed into the marx’ notion of alienation. social movements from the 19th century onward absorbed the religious longing for another world. marx in that sense was deeply rooted in the basic structures of monotheistic belief systems, which he transferred on the social plane. however, the term “alienation” turned out to be too general for scientific description of reality. even if alienation is not an adequate tool of description of social reality, the phenomenon that the term sought to describe is still very much alive. habermas gives this phenomenon a more general turn, referring to the distorted living conditions: “without the normative description and selfdescription of distorted living conditions, which are violating elementary interests, there can be no consciousness of ‘what is lacking’.” (habermas 2008: 95) the consciousness of what is lacking refers to a privation within this world; a privation that becomes apparent in outrageous injustices. given this injustice, habermas turns to religion to provide resources of motivational power to overcome the “unjust distribution of life chances” (habermas 2008: 95). his argument about the something that is lacking plays on the social as well as on the philosophical level. on the social level, habermas is concerned with a desolidarization [entsolidarisierung] of society, which is caused by the expansion of the logic of the market into previously protected areas of life. the more the performance principle and cost-benefit analysis influence our lives the more solidarity is threatened as this economic logic forces humans into objectifying attitudes. the injustices of society are still considered wrong, the sense of right and wrong is still present, however it is overwhelmed by the powerlessness of a single actor. hence, “understandably the withdrawal into the private and the repression of awkward cognitive dissonances.”13 this tendency of a desolidarization of society is even more disturbing given a dynamic global situation moving towards a “multicultural global community” (habermas 2008: 96). therefore, habermas hopes for a social movement which would alter the political mentality which is stuck in social 5 darwinist power play. habermas does not explicitly mention religious communities in such a project, however undoubtedly he looks at them in view of resources of solidarity.14 shifting to the philosophical level, habermas points out the “motivational weakness of a ‘rational morality’ [vernunftmoral]” (habermas 2008: 97). this rational morality sharpens our judgment and can motivate us with “the weak force of good reasons to act morally” 15. however, it is directed towards our individual acting and can indeed stimulate responsible action, but it fails to provide a drive for collective, solidary action. while it can motivate on the individual level, it fails to do so on the collective one: “the secular moral as such is not innately connected with common practices.”16 the secular moral stands in contrast to the religious moral, which is always linked with the life of the community. out of the global character of religions such as christianity and islam, a universal communitarism can be developed. it is this in principle universal communitarism that can provide a stronger motivation for actions of solidarity than the ‘rational morality’.17 habermas refers to kant, who has already sensed this inability of practical reason. kant’s remedy against this lack of practical reason was to turn to religious tradition and translate it into philosophical language. in kant, reason might come up with the same solutions with hindsight that religion already offers. habermas does not completely subscribe to kant’s view, as he doubts that reason can provide these resources out of itself. he rather believes that reason needs to acquire these resources elsewhere. religion is seen as the paramount resource and thus it is important to rethink the relation between philosophy and religion.18 habermas leaves no doubt that practical reason fails if it is unable to create a “consciousness of the worldwide injured solidarity, a consciousness of what is lacking, of what shouts to the heavens.”19 it is this passage of habermas, that echoes in the statements of his respondents. josef schmidt s.j., following habermas, criticizes reason and challenges a narrow concept of reason: “secular reason has to ask itself where she has put up her own boundaries of reason prematurely.”20 reason might have delimited itself hastily and failed to recognize her true nature. reason has to be thought more inclusively and should not be reduced to a scientific rationalism that rejects any metaphysical or religious speculation. to this point of the discourse, the debating jesuits and habermas agreed on the importance of a dialogue as well as some of the basic features of the relation between faith and reason. however, the answers are different when it comes to point out in detail the relation between reason and faith, between religion and secular 6 society. in the following, i will elaborate on this disagreement and on different views on this crucial relation further. diverging notions of reason and religion while the debaters agree on the importance on readjusting the relation between faith and reason, they disagree on the extension and implications of the two central concepts in question: reason and religion. habermas understands reason as a social process, where questions of truth are negotiated in an argumentative discourse. reason is understood as a social construct in an historical perspective, as his account from the ancient, holistic reason to the post-metaphysical, particular reason has shown. brieskorn disagrees with such a notion of reason determined by social and historical conditions. understanding reason from a historical perspective reduces it to the consensus of all citizens; such a consensus – as important as it may be – overburdens reason. reason, as brieskorn suggests, following spinoza’s tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), is beyond the social and historical dimension; in stark contrast to religion which has to be understood as a social and historical phenomenon. but how can religion be properly understood? michael reder in his article questions two aspects of habermas’ account. his first concern is the danger of an instrumentalization of religion. religion should not be reduced to a mere provider of moral resources; religion’s social importance consists in a variety of different features such as providing ethical world-views, shaping cultural life and reflecting on the relation between transcendence and immanence (reder 55). second, reder doubts the possibility of a strict separation between reason and religion, and maintains the existence of a “plurality of religious-cultural hybrid forms” (reder 55). seen from a global perspective, religion cannot be strictly separated from its cultural strata. habermas’ dwells upon kantian philosophy and its crucial connection between religion and morality; however, globally, the kantian heritage which shaped modern thinking and modern political institutions based on the core notion of autonomy, is far from being a shared heritage. although habermas’ notion of reason is embedded in a social and historical situation, his account does not take into consideration different socio-historical circumstances. reason in the 21st century might not be easily reducible to a monolithic, post-metaphysical rationality. put in a more general way: habermas’ argument depends on a western strict separation between the different spheres of life, which is a result of philosophical as well as economic 7 developments in the last two centuries. these distinctions between public and private, between religion and society, between faith and reason, are products of western history and result in a form of life shared only by a minority. but from a global perspective, the prevalence of religiouscultural forms of life, the lack of separations between the different domains of life, put habermas’ argument in a different light. although understanding reason through the historical lenses, and although differentiating between different forms of rationalities, habermas sticks to the kantian heritage and cannot accommodate culturally different impregnated rationalities. the status of religious moral resources surprisingly at first glance is the willingness of the agnostic habermas to turn to age-old religion to deal with a fairly recent problem of desolidarization of modern society. why is habermas searching for these moral resources in religious communities? in his article, brieskorn is doubtful about the ability of religion to provide these resources. religious communities are not protected islands in a sea of modern egoism, but rather the modern tendencies of desolidarization and egoism are penetrating, as habermas would agree, all forms of life. the agnostic habermas appears to have a greater confidence in the motivating power of religion than the jesuit brieskorn. taking a step back, one might question habermas starting point more fundamentally. bearing in mind that habermas understands himself as a marxist philosopher, one wonders at the lack to search for sources of solidarity in shared living conditions or shared experiences of exploitation. socialism (how problematic its implementation was) attempted to foster communal action and solidary behavior on that basis. these institutionalized forms of solidarity in the formers socialist countries achieved the social coherence habermas is looking for. the transition period of the former socialist countries to capitalist democracies was painful for large segments of society precisely because of the loss of these forms of institutionalized solidarity. certainly, revitalizing a failed political system is for no one’s benefit, but these mechanisms could serve as a starting point for reflections about the requirements of a solidary society. after all historically, the workers movement was able to create strong ties of solidarity due to its common condition of life in the area of rapid industrialization. of course, these moral resources of the workers movement are in decline. however, there have been contemporary attempts to revitalize this notion of solidarity by elaborating on the old 8 notion of the working class, but modifying it for the 21st century. michael hardt and antonio negri’s concept of the multitude, for example, attempts to forge shared solidarity in the midst of globalized capitalist environment. sources of solidarity might not be merely waiting to be discovered, but will need to be actively created. from that perspective, habermas’ religious turn and his attempt to recover moral resources in the field of established religion looks dated. conclusion at the beginning of his text, habermas lays down the preconditions for both sides for a dialogue between religion and reason. not any religion is deemed fit for such a dialogue. as habermas puts it: “the religious side has to recognize [anerkennen] the authority of ‘natural’ reason in form of the fallible results of the institutionalized sciences and the principles of a universal egalitarianism in law [recht] and morality. inversely, secularized reason must not appoint itself as a judge about truths of faith.”21 this quote highlights different aspects of the debate between habermas and the jesuits. it shows on the one hand, habermas’ understanding of religion and his interest to engage in a dialogue with religion. reason’s two demands – acceptance of the authority of science and recognition of a universal egalitarianism – exclude a number of religious communities. thus, habermas thoughts have their place genuinely in a modern western context. at the same time, this quote illustrates the openness and willingness of habermas to engage in a discourse with proponents of organized religion and his hope to find there moral resources to deal with the desolidarization of modern societies. in the reflection on the limits of post-metaphysical reason, religion might be able to enlighten reason about its very own nature. the task of an adequate understanding of the relation between society and religion, and between faith and reason, certainly requires further reflections, however, the discussion between habermas and the jesuits has shown the importance to conduct this discussion and provides links to future fields of inquiry. references 9 adorno, theodor, theodor w., negative dialectics. translated by e.b. ashton, london: routledge, 1973 brieskorn, norbert, “vom versuch, eine beziehung wieder bewußtzumachen”, in: reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.): ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008, p. 37 – 51 dressler, bernhard, “ein bewusstsein von dem, was zum himmel schreit”, frankfurter allgemeine zeitung, 21 july 2008, p. 35 habermas, jürgen, religion in the public sphere, speech given at the kyoto symposium in san diego on march 5, 2005, online accessible on: http://www.sandiego.edu/pdf/pdf_library/ habermaslecture031105_c939cceb2ab087bdfc6df291ec0fc3fa.pdf (retrieved july 21, 2008) habermas, jürgen, “ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt”, in: reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.): ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008, p. 26 – 36 habermas, jürgen, “ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. über glauben und wissen und den defätismus der modernen vernunft, neue zürcher zeitung, 10 february 2007 habermas, jürgen, “eine replik”, in: reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.): ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008, p. 94 – 107 habermas, jürgen, the future of human nature, translated by hella beister and william rehg, polity press, 2003 hardt, michael and negri, antonio, empire, cambridge/london: harvard university press, 2000 maly, sebastian, “die rolle der religion in der postsäkularen gesellschaft. zur religionsphilosophie von jürgen habermas“, in: theologie und philosophie (80) 2005, p. 546-565 obama, barack, dreams from my father. a story of race and inheritance, new york: random house, 2004 reder, michael, wie weit können glaube und vernunft unterschieden werden? religionsphilosophische und ethische anmerkungen, in: reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.): ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008, p. 51 – 68 reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.), ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. eine diskussion mit jürgen habermas, frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008 10 http://www.sandiego.edu/pdf/pdf_library/%20habermaslecture031105_c939cceb2ab087bdfc6df291ec0fc3fa.pdf http://www.sandiego.edu/pdf/pdf_library/%20habermaslecture031105_c939cceb2ab087bdfc6df291ec0fc3fa.pdf ricken, friedo s.j., „nachmetaphysische vernunft und religion“, in: reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.): ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008, p. 69 – 78 schmidt, josef s.j., „ein dialog, in dem es nur gewinner geben kann“, in: reder, michael and schmidt, josef (eds.): ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008, p. 79 – 93 11 1endnotes this introduction is loosely based on the opening chapter of the discussed book entitled “habermas und die religion” [habermas and religion] by michael reder and josef schmidt. next to the introduction is habermas article entitled „a consciousness of what is lacking“ followed by the article of four professors of the jesuit university in munich, who reflect and develop on habermas’ text. the book closes with an answer of habermas giving the anthology the character of an ongoing discussion. (michael reder and josef schmidt (ed.): ein bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt. eine diskussion mit jürgen habermas [a consciousness of what is lacking. a discussion with jürgen habermas], frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2008). a translation into english of this anthology is in preparation. 2 “in der perspektive der theorie des kommunikativen handelns erscheint religion letztlich al seiner historischen entwicklungsphase auf dem weg zur modernen, demokratisch verfaßten gesellschaft zugehörig.” (reder/schmidt: 13) 3 an overview on habermas’ philosophy of religion is provided in sebastian maly’s article “die rolle der religion in der postsäkularen gesellschaft. zur religionsphilosophie von jürgen habermas” [the role of religion in post-secular society. on jürgen habermas’ philosophy of religion] 4 it is on the issue of a just balance in society that habermas gains a skeptical view on the advent of biotechnological diagnosis and intervention. habermas worries about two fundamental aspects of our human nature, which might be brought into an imbalance by a liberal eugenics (ie. biotechnological intervention based on individual choices about their offspring): first, the equality within society which would be threatened by the advent of a new type of relationship between “designer” and “product” (“designer baby”) in the case of genetic engineering, and second, the autonomy of the “product” would be threatened. 5 the following paragraph is a summary of the first couple of pages (27-30) of habermas’ essay “ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt” (a consciousness of what is lacking). 6 „[k]omplementäre gestalten des geistes“ (habermas 2008: 29) 7 habermas’ point in his german text might even be stronger as he speaks of the “despair of practical reason“: “anders verhält es sich mit einer praktischen vernunft, die ohne geschichtsphilosophischen rückhalt an der motivierenden kraft ihrer guten gründe verzweifelt, weil die tendenzen einer entgleisenden modernisierung den geboten ihrer gerechtigkeitsmoral weniger entgegenkommen als entgegenarbeiten“. (habermas 2008: 30) 8 adorno, theodor w., negative dialectics, translated by e.b. ashton, london: routledge, 1973. see especially the last chapter entitled “metaphysical meditations”. 9 “indem ich von komplementären gestalten des geistes spreche, wende ich mich gegen zwei positionen – einerseits gegen die bornierte, über sich selbst unaufgeklärte aufklärung, die der religion jeden vernünftigen gehalt abstreitet, aber auch gegen hegel, für den die religion sehr wohl eine erinnerungswürdige gestalt des geistes darstellt, aber nur in der art eines der philosophie untergeordneten vorstellenden denkens’.” (habermas 2008: 29) 10 ricken p. 69f. ricken proceeds in his essay by demonstrating habermas translation of the gen 1:27 into an argument of secular reason. gen 1:27 runs as follows: “god created man in his image; in the divine image he created him.” men is an image and creation of god. philosophical thought dwells on this notion by understanding men as free (as image of god) and equal, being all equally creations of god. this notion of freedom and equality implies on the ethical plane that a determination of another human being in its nature [sosein] would cross the boundary between creator and creature. upon this argument, habermas puts his critical stance towards biotechnology. (ricken 70) 11 brieskorn over-interprets habermas’ point. habermas is more careful in formulating the role of religion in public discourse: “wenn aber religiös begründete stellungnahmen in der politischen öffentlichkeit einen legitimen platz haben, wird von seiten der politischen gemeinschaft offiziell anerkannt, daß religiöse äußerungen zur klärung kontroverser grundsatzfragen einen sinnvollen beitrag leisten können.” (habermas 2008: 34) 12 the following paragraph is a recapitulation of habermas’ concise argument, which can be found on p. 95-98 of his “replik”. 13 “um so verständlicher der rückzug ins private und die verdrängung peinlicher kognitiver dissonanzen. ” (habermas 2008: 96) 14 barack obama, in his first book dreams from my father, describes his time as a community organizer in chicago and makes it very clear that the religious resources of solidarity are absolutely necessary for bringing together a community. although sceptical of religion at the onset of his work, he quickly learns that any community organizing effort will need to dwell upon the resources of the different churches. 15 “die vernunftmoral schärft unser urteilsvermögen für die verletzung individueller ansprüche und individueller pflichten und motiviert mit der schwachen kraft guter gründe auch zum moralischen handeln. ” (habermas 2008: 97) 16 “die säkulare moral ist nicht von haus aus in gemeinsame praktiken eingebettet. ” (habermas 2008: 97) 17 habermas does not claim that more solidarity results from religious consciousness. moreover, he even doubts that this resource is still available: “if this is still the case today, that may be as it is.” (“ob das heute noch der fall ist, lasse ich dahingestellt.” (habermas 2008: 98) 18 this task of rethinking the relation between religion and philosophy should happen in view of the axial age, which brought about a shift from the myth to the logos. (“ich halte es deshalb für sinnvoll, das verhältnis von philosophie und religion mit einem blick auf die achsenzeit erneut zu prüfen.” habermas 2008: 98) 19 in his essay, habermas expresses this in strong language: “gleichzeitig verfehlt die praktische vernunft ihre eigene bestimmung, wenn sie nicht mehr die kraft hat, in profanen gemütern ein bewußtsein für die weltweit verletzte solidarität, ein bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt, von dem, was zum himmel schreit, zu wecken und wachzuhalten.” (habermas 2008: 30f.) 20 “die säkulare vernunft muß sich fragen lassen, wo sie die eigenen vernunftsgrenzen voreilig gezogen hat, so daß diese ihrer wirklichen weite nicht entsprechen.” (schmidt: 88) 21 “die religiöse seite muß die autorität der ‘natürlichen’ vernunft als die fehlbaren ergebnisse der institutionalisierten wissenschaften und die grundsätze eines universalistischen egalitarismus in recht und moral anerkennen. umgekehrt darf sich die säkulare vernunft nicht zum richter über glaubenswahrheiten aufwerfen.” (habermas 2008: 27) 162 prajñā vihāra book review the mark of the sacred by jean-pierre dupuy by anders kølle in the mark of the sacred (2013) the french economist and philosopher jean-pierre dupuy sets out on a journey across the vast terrain of human rites, rituals, sacrifices and violence that constitute an essential and unneglectable part of human history. for dupuy this history is first and foremost a history of limits, borders, and transcendence. the sacred is the very means by which man searches out boundaries and marks out lines of demarcation – between what is permissible, sayable, and praiseworthy on one hand, and what is impermissible, taboo and profane on the other. from the perspective of dupuy there is therefore always something of a territorial animal walking its rounds at the very heart of religious thinking. as a lion or a wolf meticulously and persistently secures and defends its territory from trespassers and intruders, so a religious community fiercely protects its domain. the rituals and the rites are in a way nothing but the routine repetition of a difference: between what is inside and what is outside, between what properly belongs and what is foreign and external. separation and discrimination is therefore as much the objective of religious rituals as it is the aim of the territorial animal-however with one crucial wanpat youngmevittaya 163 difference: unlike the wolf or the lion, religious man does not solely mark out limits and borders in order to keep others out – he does it in order to delimit and restrict himself. what the production of difference guards is, in other words, not exclusively the trespassing of others but also – and even more importantly – the trespassing and straying off of religious man himself. only through the creation of otherness does something like selfhood and a notion of self emerge. and only through the production of exteriority does man find something beyond himself which helps define and settle his own role and place. far from repeating or miming traditional hegelian dialectics, dupuy thus makes contradiction and not synthesis the main purpose of religious thought: it is only to the extent that man recognizes an otherness which forever remains outside his control and grasp that man finds the necessary means to control and delimit himself. the sacred is, for dupuy, precisely this gift to humanity: the gift of self-restriction and self-governance. now, it is this very gift that modernity with its tendencies toward disenchantment, demystification and desacralization threaten to take away. following in the footsteps of the sociologists max weber and emile durkheim, dupuy identifies the unlimited rule of rationality as the source of modern distress and destruction. where nothing outside human ambitions and wants is appraised and worshipped, where no exteriority and otherness is there to delimit the actions of man, the purified reason turns into a madness of immanence: the moment everything is brought within reach and control is also the moment man loses control of himself. the gift of modern technology and of modern sciences is, according to dupuy, also a poison; modern man´s omnipotence is at the same time his impotence. in his self-aggrandizing pursuit of progress, man loses not only the respect and value of nature but also the respect and value of human life itself: 164 prajñā vihāra modernity was born amidst the rubble of traditional symbolic systems, in which it could sense the presence only of the irrational and the arbitrary. but in its urge to do away with these systems once and for all, to utterly demystify the world, modernity failed to see that traditional systems, by setting limits to the human condition, endowed it with meaning; in replacing the sacred by reason and science, it lost sight of the fact that the very finiteness of life is what makes it worth living.1 this blindness that inhabits and cripples the clear sight of reason and science is also what dupuy, following the german philosopher günther anders, calls the “promethean discrepancy”: in modernity “our power of making and doing infinitely exceeds our capacity for feeling and imagining.”2 just as this discrepancy led to the unforgettable horrors of holocaust and hiroshima, it is now leading all of mankind towards the brink of doom: nuclear weapons, global warming, nanotechnology, and biotechnology are all the offspring of man´s ability to create his own menace as the rotten fruit of his unwise wisdom. what has already begun to limit the possibilities of man in the form of ecological catastrophes is thus a limitation born of man´s own limitless behavior. for dupuy, the loss of the sacred and the desacralization of the world is therefore not, as commonly believed and argued by enlightenment thinkers, what will emancipate and free man, but rather what will enslave him and chain him to his own unlimited immanence and turn him into a victim of his own conquests. the “iron cage” of rationality only entraps man the moment he believes to have been set free. dupuy therefore fundamentally agrees with martin heidegger when the german philosopher once stated that “the sciences do not think”. but he disagrees concerning the cure: to bring the sciences in touch with philosophy and with the insights and wisdom of philosophical thinking is not enough, cannot save us from the imminent danger that modernity has placed us in. nor can philosophers take it upon themselves to think on the scientists´ behalf. rather thinking must in fact turn towards its limitations, embrace its own finitude and wanpat youngmevittaya 165 insufficiencies, treasure its own shortcomings. in a strange and paradoxical way this means to think what must always remain outside thought – as an exteriority that can never, should never, be internalized and as an otherness that must remain forever foreign. perhaps for this reason one inevitably has the feeling when reading dupuy that he constantly defers or postpones the essential – that the sacred remains outside and untouched by his words. but in this case how could language do otherwise than constantly push what it wants to name in front of itself? pursue it only in the hope of never reaching it? to rethink an exterior – an exterior that remains forever outside language and thought is the paradoxical objective of dupuy´s own thinking. for to circumvent it is to kill it, to describe it is to annul it. but to forget it, as modernity has sought to do, is to be on the path to self-destruction. hence everything depends on the right distance – and everything in dupuy´s text becomes an art of keeping this distance: advancing without coming too close, retreating without ever losing sight of what is essential. an awkward position indeed, which cannot hide its own awkwardness: the madness of immanence and the smothering of the sacred await the text on both sides of its course and of its movement. hence writing must in a sense become ritualistic and performative itself: an endless return to that which always escapes – and the escape of that which always returns. the linear progression of thinking and writing is no longer an ideal or an intellectual virtue. perhaps it is therefore no coincidence that the literature of jorge luis borges and the films la jetée by chris marker and vertigo by alfred hitchcock find their way into dupuy´s book on the sacred. this is not solely because great works of art, like the sacred itself, seems to place us in the immediate proximity of an infinite distance: the irreducible distance that smiles back at us from the lips of mona lisa or from the waterlilies by monet. much closer to dupuy´s own writing is the abysmal dread and fascination that borges and hitchcock expressed so well: the vertigo that accompanies the sacred whether this appears to us as the irreproachable beauty of kim novak or as the spirits of animistic beliefs. 166 prajñā vihāra end notes 1 dupuy, 2013, p.79 2 dupuy, 2013, p.185 gerhold k. becker 99 on the integration of science and religion: between sacred science and wilāyat al faqīh m. ma’ruf stfi sadra research department, indonesia abstract this paper deals with the integration of science and religion based upon the wilāyat al faqīh. it will critique the attempt by nasr called “sacred science” as incomplete, as it is based merely on esoteric principles. then it will proceed to show to what extent wilāyat al faqīh can accomplish the ideal of science integration through the analysis of four aspects: the religious, the metaphysical, the epistemological and the ethical. to do this it will draw from the transcendental epistemological approach of jawadi amuli. introduction this paper was inspired by an intriguing statement by nasr: “islam is a primordial religion (fithrah) as well as civilization, and a social order.” general questions then surfaced in the form: what kind of social order of islamic civilization can maintain this fithrah, and who has the right to decide the best system to ensure that islamic civilization is not disconnected from prajñā vihāra vol. 16 no. 2, july-december 2015, 99-116 © 2000 by assumption university press 100 prajñā vihāra god, as is the case of western civilization and modern science? among muslims, a common response seems to have been a discourse on the integration of science and religion through what is called “sacred science” (science sacrée). nasr and the supporters of this approach aspired to create a relation of science and religion, using the islamic world-view, harmonizing reason and revelation, to make science more committed to justice. but the question remains concerning how can these ideals be realized, and through what social system, so that they can be more concretely accommodated? this essay discusses the potential of the concept of the wilāyat al faqīh system to accomplish the ideals of integration of science. it attempts to examine how wilāyat al faqīh, together with sacred science, can accomplish the ideals of integration of science and religion. understanding concepts integration of science: sacred science the integration of science has four characteristics; 1. science which has a common spectrum (islam). 2. science which recognizes knowledge as ma’rifat occupying the highest level. 3. science that seeks to revive or re-integrate science and religion, as in the golden age of islam. 4. science which can question the legitimacy of modern science (scientism) an lead to an islamic science. this essay will discuss these four features. but it considers the second characteristic, namely the recognition of the knowledge as gnosis (ma’rifah), as most fundamental. this is because according to nasr and gholshani that the integration of science and religion should be rooted in an islamic metaphysics. this islamic metaphysics is derived from the core source of islamic teachings, namely tawhīd. m. ma’ruf 101 101 wilāyat al faqīh wilāyah in persian means government, authority and power. in arabic, the word is derived from wala, means something that follows without pause. therefore, the word is rich in meaning. it can suggest friendship, help, assistance, participation, compliance, protection, authority and leadership. all of these meanings are interconnected. but in the quran, the emphasis is on protection (qs: al-maidah: 55).1 “only allah is vali and his messenger and those who believe, those who keep up prayers and pay the poor-rate while they bow”.2 therefore, wilāyah in the context of wilāyat al faqīh means power (authority) of a scholar (faqīh). a. aspects of religion for nasr, the starting point of the construction of sacred science is derived from religion, particularly perennial philosophy and islamic philosophy. both of these approaches see religion in its esoteric aspects. as revealed by nasr, religion is the fastest way to merge science with sanctity. the interpretative method used is esotericism (ta’wil) in the sense of the doctrine of wahdatul al-wujūd, of ibn al-arabi. in this doctrine, the concept of al-insān al-kāmil by nūr muhammad sees the relationships of creation in terms of modes, so that the relationships of man, nature and god are based on an ontological framework (at-takwini) and manifestations (tajallī). the approach of esotericism can be seen all products of islamic civilization: science, philosophy, art, science, building mosques and calligraphy. wilāyat al faqīh on the other hand supplies a more concrete approach concerning the perfection of religion (islam) brought by muhammad, the last prophet. the perfect religion encompasses all aspects of eksoterisme, namely belief, morality and law in various fields: political, legal, social 102 prajñā vihāra and religious rituals, and the aspects of esotericism (wilāyah) through the implementation of islamic law. wilāyat al faqīh also defines the authority of the wali faqīh with ijtihad, namely science and charity, in order to steer the entire potential of civilization in accordance with islamic values. in comparing the two approaches, nasr relies only on the esoteric aspects of religion in the typical sense, wahdatul al-wujūd, without involving eksoterisme aspects of religion. that is how the value of esoteric and religious sanctity can be manifested in scientific civilization. concerning the wilāyat al faqīh, building a civilization which integrates knowledge and science in accordance with islam, means realizing the esoteric aspects, while enabling the exoteric aspects, specifically sharia law in various fields. religious law ensures that the power and authority of religion, even during the absence of definitive authority as in the era of ghaibah, will allow the integration of science and religion to run smoothly in practice. that is, science as knowledge is a sacred light that comes from god. on this basis, science is a manifestation of god’s name. as knowledge will not stand without a subject, god is manifested in human beings as a “locus” so that he represents that name. because of the identity of manifestation and the locus, god, knowledge and the subject are united completely, so that religion can guide us through the plurality of meanings manifested in different subjects. so even though science is a manifestation of the name of god, its manifestation in particular subjects opens another dimension, which hints towards darkness and apostasy. but when science is placed within the framework of wilāyat al faqīh and absolute authority (al-wilayāh al-muthlaqah), there is a connection between the esoteric and exoteric. this is the case even when knowledge is produced by scientists who do not follow wilāyat al faqīh. m. ma’ruf 103 103 b. aspects of metaphysics the relations between wilāyat al faqīh and integration of science in metaphysical framework can be observed in some of the following themes: god both sacred science by nasr and wilāyat al faqīh, view god as absolute and infinite. however, nasr took the absoluteness of god’s attributes as a source of knowledge (intellect) with intermediate al-insān al-kāmil (ontological dimension / at-takwini). the absoluteness of god is also confirmed in the wilāyat al faqīh as his seat of power. however, in the absence of al-insān al-kāmil, this is delegated to the ‘adalah faqih (al-wīlāyah at-tasyri’ iyyah). this is in line with the doctrine of god’s absoluteness emits tajallī where his name through the medium of science al-insān al-kāmil and al-wilayāh al-muthlaqah that holds two areas: wīlāyah: at-takwiniyyah and at-tasyri‘iyyah (prophet and the imams). the retrieval of the knowledge of god is through this ontological dimension of tajallī, al-insān al-kāmil which is an intermediary emanation of god (al-wāsithah fī al-fayd al-ilāhī). so, through the mediation of his appointed guardian, a certain kind of knowledge is revealed. taking the source of the knowledge of god yet being ignorant of the science or the law of god is tantamount to acknowledging at-takwini – the knowledge of god – but lacking at-tasyri’ iyyah. it is crucial to remember that the presence of god as al-insān al-kāmil has the status of the truly esoteric and becomes unknowable, although nature is never completely empty of the al-insān al-kāmil. the absence of al-insān al-kāmil during certain ages of the world (the era of occultation) does not mean the absolute absence of al-insān al-kāmil; god remains in the form of an intermediary emanation in the world, although its presence is esoteric and confidential. we ought to consider how al-insān al-kāmil at the level of manifest exoteric knowledge can reveal the esoteric laws of god, and how to explain 104 prajñā vihāra the presence of esoteric al-insān al-kāmil within exoteric power in the world. nasr does not touch upon this issue. so we need to understand how the earlier sacred science refinement process leads to a more complete implementation of the al-wīlāyah at-tasyri’ iyyah within wilāyat al faqīh. tawhīd nasr understands islamic metaphysics by reference to the first shahādah, “i testify that there is no god except allah”, precisely in the form of concept wahdatul al-wujūd as it was discussed by ibn al-arabi. that is, nasr attempts to revive an islamic metaphysics, as it was understood by the majority of muslim scholars of medieval islam. however, these ideals encounter obstacles when muslim scientists also must commit to the second shahādah, “and i testify that muhammad is the messenger of god”. muhammad here is al-insān al-kāmil as a foundation for understanding nature and man. the physical muhammad (eksoterisme) exists in the dynamics of history. notice that this is important for saving nasr’s approach. the esoteric interpretation of tawhīd (al-insān al-kāmil) can only occur through muhammad’s physical presence through a literal revelation (quran). that is, without the physicality of the historical muhammad, the doctrine of wahdatul al-wujūd would not achievable.3 stages of tawhīd realization not only take place in the individual (self improvement) as in nasr’s sacred science, but also in the the social sphere, namely through the implementation of justice by running the al-syarīāh. tawhīd individual values can be actualized by scientists who muwahhid within the framework of wilāyat al faqīh. if many medieval muslim scientists were able to achieve much during a period of despotic rule, then it is certainly possible for contemporary scientists to work optimally, because the law of wilāyat al faqīh is ‘adl (fair) and pious. m. ma’ruf 105 105 the essence of science (‘ilm) nasr defines science as light (nonmaterial), knowledge of which is identical with being and consciousness. science comes from experience, through hudhūrī, revelation and enlightened intellect (intellectual intuition). in short, it is knowledge (‘ilm) which is one with being (manifestation) and consciousness. in response to the question: who experiences the unity of knowledge with its manifestation, nasr recognizes only the prophets and saints, but he did not explain clearly: how ordinary people can access it. nasr merely refers to the verse, “allah is the light of the heavens and the earth” (al-nur: 35). concerning the essence of science as light, imam khomeni, in book 40 of the mystical tradition (hadits), bases his explanation also in the al-qu’ran4, where the term “light” is interpreted as a science, as stated in the following history: abu-fudhail ibn yasar said, “i asked abu ‘abd allah al-saduq as to the meaning” god is the light of the heavens and the earth “. he replied, “that’s god almighty and the sublime.” i asked him (about the meaning of the phrase) his parable light. he said, “that means muhammad.” i asked him, “what is the meaning, ‘as niche’?” he replied, ‘muhammad chest’ “i asked him, what is the meaning of’ in which there is light ‘?” he replied, “in it there is a light of science, which is prophetic.” i asked him, “what is the meaning, ‘the lamp is in a glass’?” he replied, “science prophet muhammad ali radiating to the heart.”5 imam khomeini explains that light can be understood in a sensory or scientific sense, but also in a figurative sense as divine knowledge. this light has various levels according to the level of one’s faith and science, “he is like a light radiating sensually according to the activity of the soul. this light will illuminate our path (ash-shirāth). if in this world we are on the straight path (ash-shirāth), prophetic and saintly (wilāyah), and do not deviate from the wilāyah ali bin talib, then we will not be afraid and easily pass through (ash-shirāth) on the day of judgment. why is that? because of the nature of “ ash-shirāth “ the day of judgment is the shape of the inner wilāyah.” 106 prajñā vihāra from the explanation of imam khomeini, it appears that the intensity of the light understood in the context of the prophetic and wilāyah, as wilāyat al faqīh is a combination of these two divine positions. thus, the science of light will continue to shine not only for particular individuals, but also for the general public. thus, in the attempt of sacred scientists to access the light of god, as in nasr’s attempt to cope with modern science, science is raised to its dignity of its essence as light, particularly when it is in the framework of the dimensions of wilāyat al faqīh. creature and god in the concept of the sacred science by nasr, god through his divine names becomes the source of knowledge. consequently, the divine in man as caliph (khalīfah) is interpreted in connection with the understanding of earthly science. but god has other properties, such as creator (al-khāliqiyyah), owner (al-mālikiyyah) and grace (fayyadiyyah). beings are god’s creation, are in the possession and his mercy. through grace (fayyadhiyyah) and the nature of the dependence of man as a mumkin al-wujūd, god has absolute power over all aspects of human existence. humans require all the living facilities of the lord, heart rate, breathing, air, food. “o men, you are those who stand in need of allah and allah is he who is the self-sufficient the praised one. “6 man is god’s absolute, sense and fithrah realize wujūd owned is god. thus in the quran the power and absolute right of god is expressed in the statements, “there is no law except allah” (yusuf (12): 40 & 67), “god’s leaders and rulers” (al-shura (42): 9), and “or have they taken guardians besides him? but allah is the guardian, and he gives life to the dead, and he has power over all things. (al-shura (42); 9) because of his status as a creator, god imposes obligations. nature and human action requires god to actualize its will. so human freedom is limited by the power of god through his law. therefore, god provided a chosen (infallible) man in the form of the prophet muhammad, then the authority of the imams and, in their absence, the faqīh. m. ma’ruf 107 107 because the authority of a faqīh in wilāyat al faqīh is a form of delegation of the power of god, the concept of man as the inheritors of the earth who have no direct function in carrying out the knowledge of god can be realized in the wilāyat al faqīh based systems. thus, in the opinion of the author, because of the position of man and god in the sacred science, nasr was able to offer merely a metaphysical concept, and therefore it is difficult to find the connection between the metaphysical concept of god’s creation and the social concept of man (i’tibariyyah āqliyyah). other problems arise in the relationship between revelation and reason, and between transcendent and immanent world, so that he is ultimately unable to explain the link between the nature of matter (the world) and an intangible (god). he is unable to connect science with the power of god in human life. b. aspects of epistemology source of knowledge both the wilāyat al faqīh and the ideal of integration both use the basic science of religion (islam) as epistemological ground. both discuss the entire faculty of knowledge (senses, reason, intuition, revelation). nasr discusses the importance of revelation and reason as a source of sacred knowledge, yet he was unable to deal with the conflict of science and religion. nasr is directly focused his analysis on the legitimacy of modern science, and the separation of the revelation from reason (‘aql), and offers a sacred science as a solution. but to clarify this problem it is important to look at the position of god and the sanctity of human knowledge. we need to understand the relationship between sacred knowledge (revelation) and impure knowledge (‘aql), so that the connection of science and religion can be solved by religious epistemology. according to jawadi amuli and his transcendental philosophical approach, the entire faculty of knowledge must be discussed in terms of the home religion. religion (islam) determines the direction of the faculty of knowledge. if there is a contradiction of science and religion, it is because of an error in comparing science and religion.7 108 prajñā vihāra according to this theory, reason (intellect) is divided into three aspects: (a) reason (intellect) not at the level of religion or revelation, but the level of the text. the relation between scientific theory and religious texts may be sometimes contradictory. here reason is based upon experimentation and scientific procedures. according amuli such knowledge cannot be total and final. on this point he is aligned with nasr. (b) reason (‘aql) and religious texts correspond with one another. in this context, nasr also asserted that revelation and reason should not be detached. (c) the intellect (‘aql), ijtihad is authoritative and valid as a narrative. the intellect and text have one root. text is what god revealed, and the intellect is the inspiration of god. the authority of the interpretation of religious texts (faqīh) should appeal to sacred knowledge possessed by the prophet and the imams. according to jawadi amuli, revelation or divine intellect has a commanding authority delegated by the authority of the lord. following the approach of amuli, the author has not found in nasr’s exposition a respect for knowledge gained from interpretation of religious texts. nasr does not consider religious authority important for evaluating the results of the discoveries of scientists who claim scientific insight through the inspiration of god. islam holds that knowledge cannot be separated from human authority. while scientists may have authority in their respective disciplines, theories which deal with issues revealed in religious texts must also appeal to religious authority. just as medical doctors have to go through the certification of halal and haram by scholars (marja’), scientific theory, such as the theories of evolution, and astrophysics, should be discussed with the religious authorities. revelation is at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge as a source of islamic law that must be obeyed by wali faqīh, scientists and the whole society. religious texts (revelations) can act to guide the individual and society, through the implementation of islamic law, to achieve perfection. m. ma’ruf 109 109 the knowledge function what still needs to be explained is the difference between the function of the wali faqīh faculty of knowledge, and that of the scientists. the wali faqīh deals with knowledge of ijtihad, and is used to recognize islamic law in the light of its sources (al-quran, sunnah and reason). science relies on reason, the senses, and intuition, as a means of discovering truth. in the view of nasr, intellect and intuition (‘aql-intuition) are both involved, so that even the divine gnosis can be a goal of scientists. however, this raises a series of questions such as whether scientists do science per se (science for science); whether they produce scientific theories or scientific products, and whether these theories and products exist in some ideal space, independent of its use, and if so, who is authorized to assess these products of science. nasr recognizes the historical development of art and science as products of islamic civilization. but he is unable to distinguish between the architectural art of a mosque, calligraphy, or painting from the contemporary “arts” of human cloning and nuclear weapons. such criteria of distinction are lacking in nasr, and this lack can only be closed with the concept of wilāyat al faqīh. under the umbrella of wilāyat al faqīh, the faculty of intuition is considered as a driver of scientific theory which of course must be justified by the scientific method (science) in general. scientists use reason (‘aql) and experimentation to formulate theories. intuition can also be used to aid in discovery. the intuition that produces islamic art is also appreciated by wilāyat al faqīh. such an intuition guided by ijtihad, following islamic law (revelation) may identify, for example, where art needs to be developed. from the above explanation, it appears that the ideal of the integration of science can be realized, when revelation, reason, sense, and intuition are considered within the framework of wilāyat al faqīh. knowledge relations between the sacred and the non-sacred in nasr’s understanding of sacred science, ordinary people cannot achieve full sanctity, only prophets and saints (imams). however, nasr 110 prajñā vihāra does not use the sacred aspects of prophets and imams as a measure of sanctity to construct ethical ideals. it is as if all muslim scientists in the past embraced wahdatul al-wujūd in its abstract meaning without involving the prophet. this is because the majority of references quoted nasr come from sufis and ibn arabi. this is evident from his book, science and civilization in islam. in the shiite tradition, wilāyat al faqīh, is a knowledge free from errors and exclusively owned by the prophets and the holy imam. it is only possessed by caliphs mandated by god. the content of sanctity includes aspects of speech, action and inaction. thus the wilāyat al faqīh is a benchmark for the sanctity of the prophet and the twelve imams, so that the individual receives ultimate sanctity only by reflecting on god through them. sanctity can indeed come from self (through individual effort), but at the highest level it comes from authority wali faqīh pious and fair (‘adl) which is subject to islamic law and governance. if we understand chastity only through the individual, without commitment to shari’a (dhāhiriyyah) which can be seen by others, then everyone is entitled claim sacred knowledge. therefore, the theory of sacred science nasr should be refined to include the knowledge of the holy prophet and the imams. god reveals himself to the prophets in the form of “kalam” (which is a root word in al-quran). therefore, sacred speech, action and inaction are the properties of the holy prophet of the qur’an. the prophet and imam are not only equipped with the sacred knowledge but, also wilāyah ash-shari’ah (dhāhiriyyah), which involves governance. thus sanctity must not be measured only individually but also through the general public under the umbrella of wilāyat al faqīh. thus, the concept of wilāyat al faqīh functions as a bridge at the operational level of sacred knowledge, which radiates from god, through the prophet and imams, and finally down to the community level. the distinction between holy and unholy depends on the intensity of the implementation of islamic law. this is what imam khomeini means when he claims that faqih government has the benefit of an inner wilāyah -nubuwwah, to achieve exoteric welfare (dhāhiriyyah). m. ma’ruf 111 111 thus god’s wisdom radiates through the sacredness of knowledge (the prophet and imam) connects the world (material) and immaterial (hereafter). although god does not require anyone beside himself to legitimize his sacredness (absolute being), in the context of human knowledge, there is also a transcendental sacred knowledge possessed by the prophet and the imams. this means that if we pursue the notion of wilāyat al faqīh and the ideal of integration of science, only through the human scientist and their access to the entire faculty of knowledge, there still remains a gap. but using the transcendental epistemological approach of jawadi amuli, the problem of sacred knowledge and profane is resolved. because the ultimate source of sacred knowledge and authority is clear here, the “holy” prophet and imam relate not only epistemologically but also ontologically. this is the meeting point both in knowledge and revelation. c. ethical aspects teleological aspects: ma’ rifatullah wilāyat al faqīh and the ideal of the integration science understands humans as beings as created by god, so that there is a relationship between man as servant and god as creator. as god’s creation, man has a responsibility to carry out his mission as caliph (khalīfah). if the wilāyat al faqīh, caliph (khalīfah) practiced by state leaders (socio-political power) who possess divine authority (deputy of imam mahdi), then the ideal of integration of science, and the role of the caliph (khalīfah) are placed as the duty of every human being to find useful knowledge (maslahah), this leads to a society where we do not destroy the balance of nature and instead, regard and study nature as a sacred thing. however, wilāyat al faqīh together with integration of science emphasizes science and power as an attribute for ma’rifatullah and so closer to allah. because science not only concerns the caliphate (khalīfah) as an individual task, but also involves scientific activities (cultural 112 prajñā vihāra science) which ultimately creates a community of scientists and science users. thus, the ideal of the integration science is ethically impossible if not associated with governance. for example, in the realization of ideals such as the use of science that is only useful for humans (mashlahah), arises the question of who has the authority to identify certain types of “mashlahah science” for the interests of the nation. in the concept of wilāyat al faqīh, the task is in the hands of wali faqīh. although scientists and holders of religious authority (faqīh) have an opinion, the final decision is in the hands of wali faqīh, for example, laws concerning the utilization of nuclear technology or the cloning of humans and animals. all legal inference is in the hands of wali faqīh, although the technical expertise is still provided by experts and scientists in various fields. the purpose of justice the purpose of man as caliph (khalīfah) both in terms of the ideal of integration and wilāyat al faqīh equally envisioned the establishment of a fair society. scientific activities must also involve a consideration of justice. justice as a companion of tawhid, is the criterion of faqīh and the measure of the welfare of the community. with justice, wilāyat al faqīh can accommodate the various goals concerning the integration of science, involving the scientific community. the general public must also bind tawhid and justice to guarantee the legal execution of divine justice through the hands of wali faqīh. it ensures that the rules which become established are equitable laws, because the same rules were used by the prophet to guide the execution of wali faqīh. the ideal of the integration of science and wilāyat al faqīh uses science as a tool to improve the welfare of the people. but this is different from the ideology of progress in modern western science and technology. science under the wilāyat al faqīh, as a tool can build a dynamic movement leading towards a perfect society. science in the wilāyat al faqīh m. ma’ruf 113 113 means an integration of the economic, cultural, artistic and national to create a society that is just and divine. thus, through the wilāyat al faqīh ethical relationships and the ideal of the integration of science gain common ground and integrate with each other, for the goal of ma‘rifatullah and justice (social, political, cultural and economic). sanctity (sacred science), which became the main goal in the integration of science (esotericism) meets with political sovereignty (god) in the exoteric dimension. domains of science and politics (power) are brought together by a single source (god), and following this, an ethics of justice and ma’ rifatullah. end notes 1prof. j. subhani, panorama pemikiran islam, translated by mukhtar lutfi. (jakarta: nur al-huda, 2013) hal. 294 2this is indication to imam ali’s leadership (wilāyah) the belief in and following of which are divinely incumbent on muslims as regarded as one the principles of islam. it also refers to famous incident showing the unparalleled character of imam ali. for more details, see all books of tafsir (exegesis of the holy qur’an)-holy quran/translated by muhammad s shakir; qum, ansyarian 2006 3sayyed hosein nasr, the essential seyyed hosein nasr, (indiana: world wisdom, 2007) hal. 51 4imam khomeini, 40 hadis, translated by musa kazhim (bandung: mizan, 2004) hal. 505 5imam khomeini, 40 hadis, hal. 505 6qs: (35):15 7eshkevari, fana’i, an introduction to contemporary philosophy, (london: miu press 2012), hal. 187. 114 prajñā vihāra references bagir, zaenal abidin, intergrasi ilmu dan agama, bandung: penerbit mizan 2005 barbour, ian g, juru bicara tuhan; antara sains dan agama, diterjemahkan oleh e.r muhammad, bandung: penerbit mizan, 2002 eshkevari, muhammad fana’i, an introduction to contemporary philosophy london: miu press, 2012 golshani, mehdi, issues in islamic and science, tehran: institute for humanities and culture studies (ihcs), 2004 _______, melacak jejak tuhan dalam sains, diterjemahkan oleh ahsin muhammad, bandung: penerbit mizan, 2004 _______, filsafat-sains menurut al-quranditerjemahkan oleh agus effendi penerbit mizan, bandung, 2003 heriyanto, husein, menggali nalar saintifik peradaban islam, jakarta: mizan publika 2001 hought, john f, perjumpaan sains dan agama, diterjemahkan oleh fransiscus borgias, bandung: penerbit mizan, 1995 islami, hasan, politik khomeini diterjemahkan oleh ali yahya, jakarta:penerbit citra, 2012 irsyadi nia, reza, antara penafsiran filsafat dan penafsiranteks-teks agama diterjemahkan oleh iwan setiawan, jakarta: penerbit sadra press, 2012 khomeini, ruhullah, pemikiran politik islam dalam pemerintahan diterjemahkan oleh muhammad anis, jakarta: penerbit shadra press, jakarta, 2001 _______, 40 hadis telaah atas hadis-hadis mistis dan aklaq, diterjemahkan oleh musa kazhim, bandung:2004 lakza’i, najaf, dinamika pemikiran politik khomeini, diterjemahkan oleh muchtar luthfi, jakarta: shadra press, 2010 m. ma’ruf 115 115 mishbah yazdi, muhammad taqi, dar partoye velayat, qom: muassesehe imam khomeini, 1383 hs muthahhari, murthadha, pengantar epistemologi islam, diterjemahkan oleh muhammad jawad bafagih, jakarta: penerbit sadra press, 2010 ________, tafsir holistik,kajian seputar relasi tuhan, manusia dan alamditerjemahkan oleh ilyas hasan, jakarta: penertib citra, 2012 nasr, hossein, the essensial seyyed hossein nasr, indiana:world wisdom, 2007 ________ , knowledge and the sacred, lahore: suhail academiy, chowk urdu bazar, 1988 ________, islamic philosophy from its origin to the present, new york: new york state university of, 2006 ________, islam, religion, history and civilation,sanfrancisco: harper, 2003 ________, sains dan peradaban di dalam islam, diterjemahkan oleh mahyudin bandung: penerbitpustaka, 1997 qardan qaramaliki, muhammad, al-quran dan sekulerisme, diterjemahkan oleh ammar fauzi heryadi, jakarta: sadra international institute, 2011 sulaiman, dina, pelangi di persia: menyusuri eksotisme iran, depok: pustaka iiman, 2007 subhani, ja’far, panorama pemikiran islam, diterjemahkan oleh mukhtar lutfi, jakarta: penerbit nural-huda, 2013 sadar, ash-shadar, m. bagir dan murthada, muthahari, pengantar ushul fiqh, jakarta: pustaka hidayah, 1993 shahab, umar, khumaini dan negarasyi’ah modern (desertasi) jakarta: paskasarjana uin syarifhidayatullah, 2006 sachedina, abdulaziz a, kepemimpinan dalam islam, prespektif syi’ah diterjemahkan oleh ilyas hasan, bandung: penerbit mizan, 1991 116 prajñā vihāra vaezi, ahmed, agama dan politik, diterjemahkanoleh ali syahab, jakarta: penerbit citra, 2006 yusufian, hasan, akal dan wahyu, diterjemahkan oleh ammar fauzi heryadi jakarta: penerbit sadra press, 2011. yamani, antara al-farabidan khomeini, filsafat politik islam, bandung: penerbit mizan, 2002. 11(180-184)_note for authors cultural differences in advance directives relating to end of life decision making bolatito a. lanre-abass university of ibadan, nigeria abstract this paper offers an examination of end of life decision making in western and african cultures. while western medical practice focuses on individual rights, autonomy and self-determination, african societies emphasize communitarian values. it argues that “advance directives” in western medical practice put so much emphasis on the autonomy of the patient that as a result, they are inconsistent with african traditional morality. the paper further argues that contrary to western medical practice, the african practice of making decisions on behalf of an incompetent patient is based on african conception of death and dying and african communal values. the paper concludes by stressing that in spite of the value of “advance directives” in western medical practice, they can be criticized based on the problems of precedent autonomy and atomistic individualism respectively. introduction making end of life decisions for patients who have lost the capacity to make their own decisions pose one of the most difficult ethical challenges for physicians and family members. in an attempt to extend patient autonomy, western medical practice “relies on living wills, a formal document written by a competent person that is designed to guide medical treatment in the event of future incapacity” (quill, 1993: 177). besides, medical practice relies on patient’s surrogates to make end of life treatment decisions and are instructed to use the substituted judgment standard, which directs them to make the treatment decision that the patient prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 23-49 23 © 2000 by assumption university press would have made if he or she were capacitated (shalowitz, et. al 2006). this paper examines the roles advance directives play in end of life decision making. it argues that, in spite of the value of advance directives in end of life decision making in western medical practice, advance directives prove themselves to be inconsistent with african communitarian values particularly in their adherence to the autonomy of persons. it further argues that, the western practice of relying on advance directives in end of life decision making is too individualistic and, as a result, undermines african communal values relating to end of life decision making. the paper underscores the fact that african conceptions of death and dying, and african communal values justify making decision for an incompetent patient at the end of life in many african societies. it concludes by stressing the problems of precedent autonomy, atomistic individualism and other practical problems which prevent the acceptance of advance directives in many african societies. advance directives in western medical practice advance directives are “formal documents that are completed when one has full mental capacity, and are intended to guide medical treatment in case one loses the ability to speak for oneself in the future” (quill, 1993: 177). public interest in cases involving patients who are unable to make decisions in end of life care has grown since 1976 when karen ann quinlan’s parents obtained permission from the court to remove their daughter’s respirator. ms. quinlan survived for ten years in a persistent vegetative state, not needing a respirator, but receiving nutrition through a feeding tube (mccarrick, 2008). another event which shows an increased interest in establishing some measures for decision making in case the patient becomes incompetent is the cruzan case. this is illustrated below: in 1983, nancy cruzan was severely injured in a car accident. with the help of extensive, invasive medical measures, including the initial use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, ms. cruzan survived. unfortunately, she emerged from the process with severe brain damage, incapable of higher brain functions and unaware of her surroundings. since she could not eat, a permanent feeding tube was surgically placed into her stomach to mechanically, provide hydration and nutrition. because the rest of her body survived the accident, she could be sustained indefinitely in this state as long as the feeding tubes were continued. her parents hoped she would24 prajñâ vihâra get better and waited for four years before reluctantly accepting that she would not recover. then, out of love for their daughter and respect for what they felt would be her wishes, her parents formally petitioned the courts to allow removal of the feeding tube. they based the petition partially on their daughter's statement that she would not want to go on living if she could not be “at least half way normal” (quill, 1993: 180). in spite of her parents’ petition, the court did not permit life support to be removed unless there is “clear and convincing” evidence that the patient had formed that wish. the court said that if nancy had executed a formal living will that would have provided the necessary proof but that the informal causal statements her family and friends remembered did not (dworkin, 1993). eventually, family and friends were able to collect and present enough evidence about nancy’s statements and wishes before her accident to meet a “clear and convincing” legal standard that she would not want this lifesustaining treatment, given her persistent vegetative state. the court subsequently ruled that her feeding tube be removed and she died thereafter. a more recent account that calls for the necessity of completing a living will when competent is that of terri schiavo. her story is illustrated below: “terri schiavo was an american woman who suffered brain damage and became dependent on a feeding tube. she collapsed in her house on february 25, 1990 and experienced respiratory and cardiac arrest, resulting in extensive brain damage, a diagnosis of persistent vegetative state and fifteen years of institutionalization. in 1998, michael schiavo, her husband and guardian petitioned the pinellas county circuit court to remove her feeding tube. robert and mary schindler, her parents opposed this arguing she was conscious. the court determined that schiavo would not want to continue life-prolonging measures”1 the controversy surrounding shiavo’s case continued for seven years and drew the attention of pro-life groups, disability groups and the media both at national and international levels. terri’s case also became more problematic because of the absence of a living will. although it was confirmed by the court and also physicians in charge of terri’s treatment that she is indeed in a permanent vegetative state, the judge who was bolatito a. lanre-abass 25 appointed as the second guardian doubted michael’s (her husband) petition which according to the judge “might have been influenced by the potential to inherit what remained of terri schiavo’s estate”2. other lawyers also raised the issue of conflict of interests despite the fact that there was no possibility of improvement in terri’s condition. even factors such as terri’s religious background came into play where it was interpreted that she would not have wanted to violate the catholic church’s teachings on euthanasia. the feeding tubes were later removed in 2005 when it was found that schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state and that she had made reliable oral declarations that she would have wanted the feeding tube removed. the stories of nancy, quinlan and that of terri schiavo serve to explain the importance of writing advance directive when competent. the ordeal of the victims and their family members in the above examples would have been more persuasive if there is adequate knowledge about the need to complete formal advance directive. to prevent apprehension about future treatment if one becomes terminally or critically ill and incompetent to communicate, it is often recommended that people should execute written advance directives, often known as living wills. advance directives guarantee legal protection to the physician who is to execute its content. another goal of advance directives is to help persons plan their own treatment decisions while capable and competent. as a result, it offers a medium of extending the patient’s autonomy and self-determination into the future. according to mishkin (1986), advance directives do not create rights but allow one to exercise the fundamental right to make choices in health care. brock describes this fundamental right as the right to selfdetermination stressing that “self-determination, as it bears on treatment decision making, is the interest of ordinary persons in making significant decisions about their lives for themselves, according to their own values or conception of a good life” (brock, 2001: 232). degrazia identified two types of advance directives: instructional directives which is also commonly known as living wills and proxy directives. while instructional directives “give instructions for what sorts of medical interventions to provide or withhold from the patient, proxy directives designate a surrogate decision maker to stand in for the patient if 26 prajñâ vihâra he is incompetent” (degrazia, 2005: 161). living wills: these are documents stipulating that specified medical procedures should not be used to keep the signer alive in certain specified circumstances. living wills arose as a response to the decision making problem which often occurs when the question is whether to forgo the medical interventions sustaining the life of someone who is no longer able to make his or her own decisions known (beauchamp and childress, 2001). because health care providers and relatives of patients find it difficult to withhold further interventions or withdraw those medical interventions which have been commenced, lius kutner, a chicago attorney active in a right to die organization in 1967 drafted what he called a ‘living will’ (capron, 2001). kutner’s living will allows a person to give instructions about end of life care. without a living will, an incompetent patient runs the risk of having his/her treatment guided by the values of the physician or family members than by the patient’s own values and wishes. living wills serve several purposes. first, by executing a living will, a person could lift the burden of decision-making off the shoulders of anxious relatives and physicians. second, if the wishes expressed in the living will are honored, a person could in effect participate in treatment decision-making even after he or she has lost competence. and finally, the existence of living wills and the recent interest being shown in them help to educate people about the necessity of writing living wills, and educate the physician about the public’s sense that life-prolonging treatments of patients who are incompetent is not always regarded as good (capron, 2001: 263). although living wills help to extend the autonomy of an incompetent patient, a major problem often associated with this decision procedure is that the variations of illness associated with incompetence are myriad, so it would be impossible to anticipate and account for all possibilities. also, the form forces respondents to make decisions in advance about highly technical interventions that they may not know about. thus patients might refuse treatments that would have enhanced their overall goals, and they might request treatments that interfere with their goals (quill, 1993). these problems can be reduced if each individual tailors his /her living will to his/her own personal philosophy about potentially losing bolatito a. lanre-abass 27 capacity in the future. hence the ideal living will is clear and direct about a patient’s treatment goals and objectives, and specifies the type of existence such patient values or views as intolerable, so that physicians can continue to help patients meet their unique needs when they become incompetent. the criticism that it is impossible to anticipate the type of illness that will befall a person should he/she become incompetent in the future calls for the need to name a proxy. the advantage of naming a proxy stems from the realization of the limitations of living wills. health care proxy or surrogate decision maker: designated surrogate decision makers are authorized to make decisions for incompetent patients. decision makers typically make substituted judgments or apply the best interest standard without any judicial proceeding. ordinarily, courts are involved only where there are significant uncertainties about what the law requires in the situation at hand (degrazia, 2005: 161). beauchamp and childress (2001) have identified the capacities of a surrogate. they include “the ability to make reasoned judgment (competence), adequate knowledge and information, emotional stability and a commitment to the incompetent patient’s interest that is free of conflict of interest” (beauchamp, and childress, 2001: 154). a surrogate who satisfies these four criteria should use the standards of substituted judgment and the patient’s best interests in making decisions for the incompetent patient. these standards are also appealed to by courts in cases where an incompetent patient had not completed an advance directive while competent (degrazia, 2005: 161). a) the substituted judgment standard: this standard permits a family member or another appropriate surrogate to determine what the patient would have wanted in the present circumstances (degrazia, 2005: 161). the central idea of the substituted judgment standard is that decisions about treatment belong to the incompetent patient by virtue of his right of autonomy. the patient in this regard has the right to decide but is incompetent to exercise it, and it would be unfair to deprive an incompetent patient of his right to decide just because he is no longer competent. this standard requires the surrogate to make the decision the incompetent 28 prajñâ vihâra patient would have made if competent. the surrogate’s attempt at answering the question ‘what would the patient want in this circumstance?’ rather than ‘what do you want for the patient?’ portrays the substituted judgment standard as the appropriate standard which reaffirms the incompetent patient’s autonomy. this standard according to beauchamp and childress “helps us understand what we should do for once competent patients whose relevant prior preferences can be discerned; so interpreted, it translates into a pure autonomy standard that respects previous autonomous choices” (beauchamp, and childress, 2001: 100). b) the best interest standard: if there is no reasonably clear basis for determining what the patient would have wanted, the law turns to the doctrine of best interests: treatment decisions are to be determined by what appears to be in the patient’s best interests (degrazia, 2005, 161). this standard requires the surrogate to determine the highest net benefit among the available options, assign different weights to interests the patient has in each option and subtract inherent risks or costs. the surrogate should maximize benefit through a comparative assessment that locates the highest net benefit. the well-being of another is protected by this standard. this is done by assessing the risks and benefits associated with various treatment options, by considering pain and suffering for the incompetent patient, and by evaluating the possibility of the patient being restored or the eventuality of loss of functioning (beauchamp, and childress, 2001: 102). the need to assess the quality of life of the incompetent patient along with his/her best interests is the focus of this standard. hence surrogates applying the best interest standard should consider the formerly autonomous patient’s preferences, values and perspectives as they affect the incompetent patient's interpretation of quality of life, direct benefit and so on. since quality of life judgments are comparative ways of expressing a person’s worth, surrogates employing the best interest standard should focus on the value of life for the person who must live it rather than on the value the person’s life has for other persons. a major criticism against the surrogate form of advance directive is the likelihood of the surrogate imposing his values and beliefs on those of the incompetent patient while trying to decide for the patient. nevertheless, because a living will has the shortcoming of not being able to bolatito a. lanre-abass 29 anticipate all possible future circumstances, surrogate decision making has been suggested as more flexible not only because it can cover a broader range of health care decisions but also because it is more responsive to changing medical circumstances. physicians should endeavor to respond to the directive of those who have clearly expressed their wishes that they would not want to live under conditions of incompetence. this can be done by treating them as conservatively as possible, avoiding all life-extending treatment and doing everything within their power to minimize their discomfort, maximize their dignity, and facilitate an easy death (quill., 1993). for those who have expressed such wishes in their advanced directive, all treatments in all settings would be directed exclusively toward enhancing comfort and dignity and explicitly not to prolong life. the goal would be to make death as humane, dignified and as easy as possible, using medical intervention to ease the way. in spite of the roles of living wills and surrogate decision-makers in western medical practice, beauchamp and childress (2001) have examined some likely problems of advance directives in general. first, very few people take the initiative to complete advance directive forms. also, even when a patient designate a surrogate when competent, such surrogate may not be available when needed, may be incompetent to make good decisions for the patient or may have conflicts of interest particularly if he/she stands to gain from the decision he is about to make. again, some state laws often severely restrict the use of advance directives. for exam, “advance directives have legal effect in some states if and only if the patient is terminally ill and death is imminent. but decisions must be made in some cases when death is not imminent or the medical condition cannot appropriately be described as terminal illness” (beauchamp, and childress, 2001: 153). furthermore, advance directives provide no basis for physicians to overturn instructions of the patient as contained in the advance directive that may turn out not to be in the patient’s best medical interests although the patient could not have reasonably anticipated these circumstances while competent. finally, some patients do not have an adequate understanding of the range of decisions a physician or a surrogate might be called upon to make and cannot foresee clinical situations and possible future experi30 prajñâ vihâra ences with an adequate understanding. for instance, how can anyone really know what he or she would want done in medical cases such as cancer, stroke or heart attack five or ten years before it occurs? perhaps new treatments might be developed which were not in existence when the advance directive was drafted. apart from the problems highlighted above, a major problem often associated with writing advance directives is that of precedent autonomy; this is the problem of trying to reconcile the incompetent patient’s earlier self with his present self. when a patient loses his/her status as an agent capable of guiding his/her actions, how can his/her earlier autonomously chosen values be allowed to continue to govern what happens to him despite his/her current inability to appreciate these values? would autonomy require that such patient’s earlier wishes be respected now by those in charge of the incompetent patient’s care? it is important to note that many of the arguments often put forward to justify the authority of advance directives are derived from the moral principle of autonomy. hence the need to examine the principle of autonomy as it relates to advance directives in end of life decision making. autonomy advance directives are meant to extend and reaffirm the autonomy of the competent patient to the future in case of incapacity. according to beauchamp and childress (2001), the term autonomy when applied to individuals implies self-governance, liberty rights, privacy, individual choice, freedom of the will, causing one’s own behavior, and being one’s own person (beauchamp and childress, 2001: 58). the autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan while a person of diminished autonomy is controlled by others or incapable of deliberating or acting on the basis of his or her desires and plans (beauchamp, and childress, 2001). almost all theories of autonomy agree that liberty and agency are essential for autonomy. in these two senses, the traits of the autonomous person which include capacities of self-governance, such as understanding, reasoning, deliberating and independent choosing are taken into acbolatito a. lanre-abass 31 count. autonomous actions are analyzed in terms of choosers who act intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling influence that determine their action. to respect an “autonomous agent therefore is to acknowledge that person’s right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and beliefs” (beauchamp, and childress, 2001: 59). respect, on this account, involves acknowledging decision-making rights and enabling persons to act autonomously, whereas disrespect for autonomy involve attitudes and actions that ignore, insult or demean others’ rights of autonomy. respecting the autonomy of an incompetent patient involves taking the contents of his advance directive seriously which often reflects his interest in directing his life according to his conception of a good life. in contemporary ethics, immanuel kant (1959) and john stuart mill’s (1977) interpretation of respect for autonomy have contributed to the subject of autonomy. for kant (1959), respect for autonomy flows from the recognition that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the capacity to determine his or her own moral destiny. to violate a person’s autonomy is to treat that person merely as a means, that is, in accordance with others’ goals without regard to that person’s own goals. mill’s (1977) concern is with the individuality of autonomous agents. according to him, society should permit individuals to develop in relation to their convictions as long as they do not interfere with a like expression of freedom by others; but he also insists that we sometimes are obligated to seek to persuade others when they hold false or ill-conceived views (mill, 1977: chps1, 111). these two conceptions are in support of respect for autonomy: mill emphasizes not interfering with and actively strengthening autonomous expression while kant stresses a moral imperative of respectful treatment of persons as ends in themselves. if mill’s account is plausible, then respecting an incompetent patient’s advance directive requires not interfering with his wishes as stated in the advance directives. john harris describes the main idea of autonomy in the following ways: “the point of autonomy, the point of choosing and having the freedom to choose between competing conceptions of how and indeed why, to live, is simply that it is only thus that our lives become in any real sense our own. the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives. and we do 32 prajñâ vihâra this, so far as this is possible at all, by shaping our lives for ourselves. our own choices, decisions and preferences help to make us what we are, for each helps us to confirm and modify our own character and enable us to develop and to understand ourselves. so autonomy, as the ability and the freedom to make the choices that shape our lives, is quite crucial in giving to each life its own special and peculiar value” (harris, 1995: 11). the implication of the above is that competent patients have the capacity to make free and informed choices about whether to live or end their lives and this can be expressed through an advance directive which has to be respected in order to guarantee and extend the autonomy of the patient in case he becomes incompetent. it will be unfair to fail to respect an incompetent patient’s choice (in his advance directive) on the grounds of incompetence. since competent patients generally have the right to make their own health-care decisions, even decisions that others believe are contrary to the patient’s interests (elliot, 2001), such choices can be extended to the future through an advance directive. when applied to patients in end of life decision making, the moral consideration of autonomy gives rise not only to the problem of precedent autonomy but also to that of atomistic individualism. i will first sketch the problem of precedent autonomy in advance directives then after that of atomistic individualism. the problem of precedent autonomy and advance directives the need to extend the incompetent patient’s right of self-determination into the future raises theoretical problems. the tendency in bioethics has been to view the rights of incompetent individuals as an extension of the rights of competent individuals. this has created the problem of precedent autonomy. because cases of permanent incompetence feature former preferences, bioethics speak of a special kind of autonomy known as precedent autonomy. john k. davis (2007) defines precedent autonomy to comprise acts of self-determination under conditions where the agent’s earlier preference becomes a former preference, during at least part of the time for which it was meant to be satisfied because the patient lost the competence to reaffirm it. some bioethicists (for example buchanan and bolatito a. lanre-abass 33 brock, 1990; dworkin, 1993) hold that a competent person’s right to autonomy requires that his past decisions about how he is to be treated if he becomes incompetent be respected even if they contradict the desires he has at a later point. the above position held by buchanan and brock (1990) and also dworkin (1993) raises the question of whether respect for autonomy implies respect for precedent autonomy. the principle of respect for autonomy requires respecting the preferences formed earlier by a now incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. the concept of precedent which concerns just such preferences is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now incapacitated patient a preference which that patient never disaffirmed but can no longer understand. davis (2002) opines that if we cannot make such attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomyafter all, how can one respect patients’ autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? (davis, j.k 2002). realizing that a person’s values and treatment preferences can change over time and advance directives are not always updated to reflect such changes, this gives room to doubt the authority of advance directives. hence it was held that just as a patient’s current choice has less moral weight when the patient is uninformed about the issue in question, so the moral authority of advance directive is weakened to the extent that patient did not understand or foresee the medical issues that would later arise (president commission, 1983: 182-183). in a similar vein, robertson (1991) opines that following the earlier preferences or promoting the earlier interests may harm the now incompetent patient. according to robertson, in most medical cases, when a patient’s treatment preference conflicts with his or her current welfare interests, medical ethics tells us to respect the preference --so long as the patient is choosing autonomously. however, in most cases, the patient has that preference when the treatment is given; this may not be true when the preference was formed before the patient became incompetent and unable to comprehend that preference (robertson, 1992: 7) robertson’s main argument is that the focus should be on incom34 prajñâ vihâra petent patient’s needs and interests as they now exist and not view them as retaining interests and values which because of their incompetence, no longer apply. this i think is because treatment options might change between the time the directive was executed and the time it must be followed. despite the apparent absurdity of respecting incompetent patient’s autonomy by giving them what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, some bioethicists conceive of the problem of precedent autonomy as no problem at all. buchanan and brock (1990), for instance, explain that a person can exercise self-determination not only by accepting or rejecting treatment that is now offered but also by making decisions that will influence what is to happen in the future, when the person becomes incompetent. consequently, following an advance directive can be viewed as a case of respecting self-determination even if the individual has no self-determination to respect at the same time the advance directive is carried out (buchanan and brock, 1990: 98-99). similarly, dworkin (1993: 228) explains that “if we refuse to respect an incompetent patient’s autonomy, if we refuse to respect her past decisions, though made when she was competent, because they do not match her present, incompetent wishes-then we are violating her autonomy on the integrity view” (dworkin, 1993: 228). he makes a distinction between the evidentiary view of autonomy and the integrity view of autonomy. the evidentiary view holds that “we should respect the decisions people make for themselves, even when we regard these decisions as imprudent, because each person generally knows what is in his own best interest better than anyone else” (dworkin, 1993: 223). the integrity view of autonomy on the other hand holds that “people often make choices that reflect weakness, indecision, caprice, or plain irrationality-that some people otherwise fanatical about their health continue to smoke, for example” (dworkin, 1993: 224). accepting the integrity-based view of the importance of autonomy, recognizes that any judgment about whether incapacitated patients have a right to autonomy will turn on the degree of their general capacity to lead a life the way they want. to be plausible, an integrity view of autonomy must distinguish between the general point or value of autonomy and its consequences for a particular person on a particular occasion. since autonomy encourages bolatito a. lanre-abass 35 and protects people’s general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character (a sense of what is important to and for them), then one principal value of that capacity is realized only when a life does in fact display an overall integrity and authenticity (dworkin, 1993: 224). but the right to autonomy protects and encourages the capacity in any event, by allowing people who have it to choose how far and in what form they will seek to realize that aim. if the integrity view of autonomy is recognized, then a competent person making a living will providing for his treatment if he becomes incompetent is making the kind of judgment that autonomy, on the integrity view, most respects: “a judgment about the overall shape of the kind of life he wants to have led” (dworkin, 1993: 226). naturally, many competent people who are concerned about the end of their lives express fear about how they might be treated if they become incompetent. a competent patient for instance may be anxious to ensure that his life is not unnecessarily prolonged by medical treatment because the character of his whole life would be compromised if this is done. he therefore takes the initiative of completing an advance directive when competent asking not to be kept alive in a hopeless medical condition or when permanently vegetative. since it is obvious that this patient dreads unconsciousness, if such patient’s past request is to be respected, then his wishes not to be kept alive when unconscious as contained in his advance directive should also be respected. it goes without saying that patients are incompetent if they are unable, whether permanently or temporarily, to make decisions about their medical care. competence has been defined as the ability to perform a task (culver, and gert, 1982: p.123). it depends not only on a person’s abilities but also on how that person’s abilities match the particular decision-making task he or she confronts. patients are competent if they are able to understand the available information about their conditions, to consider with medical advise the risks, benefits and burdens of different treatments or courses of action, and thus to make informed decisions (walton committee, 1994: paragraph 24). pointedly, many bioethicist discuss the problem of precedent autonomy in terms of personal identity, invoking a theory of personal identity provided by bioethicists such as degrazia (2005). degrazia (2005) at36 prajñâ vihâra tempts to address issues relating to the authority of advance directives. he explains that in some cases, the authority of advance directives is sometimes challenged on grounds of partial competence when completing the directives or that even if fully competent, the patient may not have foreseen the sort of circumstances he now finds himself. if he had, “he would have decided differently about the present case than a literal reading of his directive suggests” (degrazia, 2005: 164). the assumption that one can write some of one”s narrative in advance and include sections that will, or may, occur when one can no longer appreciate one’s own narrative creates the someone else problem. degrazia describes the problem of precedent autonomy as the someone else problem because it creates identity problem. according to degrazia (2005), the someone else problem is the problem that the person who wrote the advance directive is not the individual to whom it will apply. this constitutes a problem for the authority of advance directives because the advance directive one completes is supposed to authorize certain decisions regarding one’s own future medical treatment, not someone else’s (degrazia, 1999: 373-91). advance directives have been criticized even by western critics based on the someone else problem. central to this criticism is the claim that the authority of advance directive is weakened by the fact that in cases where a patient undergoes massive psychological and mental change, the individual who exists after such change is not only literally a distinct individual from the person who completed the directive, he is also no longer psychologically connected to the life of the person who completed the directive (degrazia, 1999: 373). if this is the case, then it creates the someone else problem and there is good reason to question the authority of the directive which is supposed to apply to the individual who completed it, not to someone else. since the someone else problem also gives rise to the identity problem, degrazia attempts to resolve this problem by making a distinction between the numerical sense of identity and the narrative sense. numerical identity tries to address the question of whether person x at time t1 is the same person at time t2. the basic idea according to degrazia is “whether “a1-at-sixty-five” and “a1-at-seventy-five” are the same individual or numerically distinct individuals” (degrazia, 2005: 165). on the other hand, a person’s narrative identity involves his self-conception, his bolatito a. lanre-abass 37 self-told story about his own life and what is of importance to him. it orders events and facts about a person, “highlights certain features and people, and organizes what is highlighted into a more or less coherent story of one’s life and character” (degrazia, 2005). in an attempt to further respond to the someone else problem, degrazia explains that the someone else problem can be effectively dissolved by appealing to person essentialism. this is the view that “a1-atsixty-five is essentially a person and therefore cannot exist at any time without being a person at that time” (degrazia, 2005: 167). also, degrazia holds that a person can claim that “numerical identity confers authority on the directive she is now completing (“after all, it would be me”), while the disruption of narrative identity (“i wouldn’t be myself”) justifies a decision now to forgo life supports at that later time” (degrazia, 2005: 176). in both instances, there are strong moral reasons in favour of respecting autonomy which also extends to favouring the authority of advance directive. in other words, these two concerns about numerical and narrative identity “do not undermine the presumptive authority of advance directives” (degrazia, 2005: 188). in these two forms of identity, what matters to everybody about their existence is “the ability to continue our lives as persons with unfolding narratives and, if possible, self-creation” (degrazia, 2005: 173). one’s significant decisions stem from the story as told up to that point and project into the future in a way that expresses one’s values and priorities” (degrazia, 2005: 179-180). therefore, one can autonomously make decisions for oneself in future times of nonautonomy if one has self-regarding intentions that extend beyond the time when one has explicit narrative-telling capacity. degrazia (2005) tried to make a case for the authority of advance directives by arguing that the author of an advance directive and the vegetative individual to whom it applies are numerically identical. she drew on dworkin’s (1986) argument that appeal to precedent autonomy must assume that “it is correct to regard a vegetative patient as a person who has become vegetative that is, that the competent and incompetent stages of life are stages in a single life, that the competent and incompetent selves are parts of the same person” ( dworkin, 1986: 4). the central idea is that even when one is no longer autonomous, as long as one still exists, his autonomous self-regarding wishes can be respected. hence, in order to 38 prajñâ vihâra justify a strong presumption favouring the authority of advance directives, appeals to precedent autonomy depend on the assumption of numerical identity and narrative identity. since a person's narrative identity involves his self-conception, his self-told story about his own life and what is of importance to him, degrazia (2005) is of the opinion that one can autonomously make decisions for oneself in future times of nonautonomy if one has self-regarding intentions that extend beyond the time when one has explicit narrative-telling capacity. another way to vindicate precedent autonomy and the associated preferences going by degrazia’s account is to prioritize the ethical principle of respect for autonomy over that of beneficence. in contemporary moral thinking, when beneficence and respect for autonomy conflict, consideration is often given to respect for autonomy which allows the individual to make self-regarding choices even where others doubt that a particular choice serves his best interests. if beneficence gives way to respect for autonomy when the agent is capable of autonomous decisionmaking, since the persistent vegetative patient’s recent preferences cannot be autonomously formed, respecting autonomy requires respecting precedent autonomy whenever the relevant, previously expressed preferences are known as specified in the advance directive (degrazia, 2005: 182). in this way, earlier autonomous preferences will be allowed to trump current nonautonomous preferences, consistent with the doctrine of precedent autonomy. the implication of the above is that both numerical and narrative identity are necessary conditions for advance directives to carry authority. these two identity approaches also “concur that precedent autonomy establishes the presumptive authority of advance directives” (degrazia, 2005: 186). and if this is the case, then degrazia (2005) sums up her argument in this way: “precedent autonomy can extend to states of permanent unconsciousness so long as one is still alive and therefore still exists. whether because living, permanently unconscious former persons can have interests, or because precedent autonomy can extend to times when one lacks interests so long as one still exists, i am inclined to accept the claim that precedent autonomy and narrative identity can extend to pvs or permanent coma” (degrazia, 2005: 199). because of the problem of atomistic individualism which many bolatito a. lanre-abass 39 communitarians attribute to advance directives, advance directives have been criticized as too individualistic for communitarian societies such as africa. atomistic individualism is “the idea that the isolated individual is the only fundamental reality and that the individual is the natural atom in artificial social composite (sanchez-gonzalez, 1997: 287). it views the individual as inventing himself rather than discovering himself within a social setting hence it abstracts the individual from the details of his social circumstances. since african societies are famously communalistic, the importance of advance directives is not acknowledged by these societies. this is due to a major feature often attributed to advance directives by communitarians; that of atomistic individualism. for many communitarians, the society is ontologically prior to the individual and the polis is that which makes man, as human being possible (kymlicka, w., 2002). as a result advance directive is viewed as too individualistic. this is because the individual is not an isolated being but somebody who is brought up from the beginning with a sense of belonging, solidarity and relatedness with others. this is the basis of solidarity; a system of reciprocity in which each individual has obligations to a larger set of other individuals. this explains why african tradition does not recognize the roles of advance directives in end of life decision making for an incompetent patient but relies on social norms which dictate that decisions at the end of life reside with the family or community as the case may be. it is in line with this that callahan (1994) sees the need to address this cultural dilemma---“a dilemma about the good society and whether such a society should leave crucial life and death decisions in the hands of individuals or let them be decided, at least in great part, by commonly shared cultural notions of what is and is not fitting, embodying such notions in ordinary medical practice” (callahan, 1994: 866-867). african conceptions of death and dying african culture recognizes a difference between the physical person who dies and is buried and the non-physical person who lives on. this is quite unlike the western dualism that separates ‘physical’ from ‘spiritual’3. in africa, when a person dies, his /her whole person continues to 40 prajñâ vihâra live on not some part of him. it is the whole person who continues to live in a spirit world, receiving a new body identical to the earthly body, but with enhanced powers to move about as an ancestor. this can be attributed to the african belief that life does not end with death, but continue in another realm. hence the concept of ‘life’ and ‘death’ are not mutually exclusive and there are no clear dividing lines between them4. although death is dreaded by many, it is perceived in african culture as the beginning of a person’s deeper relationship with the whole of creation, the complementing of life and the beginning of communication between the visible and invisible worlds5. according to african conception of death and dying, the goal of life is to become an ancestor (people who have died but who continue to live in the community and communicate with families) after death and this cannot be achieved if a person asks for an unnatural death through an advance directive. this accounts for the traditional african explanation that anybody who dies a natural death must be given a correct and proper funeral which is often supported by a number of religious ceremonies. if this is not done, then this implies that the person did not die a natural death and may become a wandering ghost, unable to live peacefully after death and therefore a danger to those who remain alive. it can be argued here that the proper death rites are more a guarantee of protection for the living than to secure a safe passage for the dead. an african person prefers a slow and lingering death not through the aid of a machine but a natural prolongation of the dying process so that he/she could make their peace, say farewell to friends, relatives and give final instructions to immediate relatives. among many african people is the widespread belief that those who die unnatural death as requested and contained in an advance directive are not admitted to the spirit world and are therefore refused proper burial. sometimes their bodies are subjected to actions that would make such burial impossible; such as burning, chopping up and feeding them to hyenas. to be cut off from the community of the ancestors (people who have died but who continue to live in the community and communicate with families) going by the african belief system is an equivalent of hell6. africans, like others, resist the daily contemplation of death; often people do not write their living will. unlike the western world, africans bolatito a. lanre-abass 41 do not tend to set aside money for their funerals while still alive. they do not make preparation towards their dying just as they do not make preparation for the future in case they become incompetent. they prefer not to think about it at all and rather leave the burden to their living family members. this death-denying attitude is attributed to the way africans conceive of death. though there exist this consolation of an afterlife and its connection with present life, traditional africans hold a belief in the sanctity of life and fear of death for it is an enemy to life7. fear of death lead many to use fetish charms for self-protection, though death is invisible, it can be held at bay as many africans believe because life is to be preserved at all cost. thus, an average african would not be inclined to discontinue life-sustaining treatment once it has commenced. likewise, africans do not favor any artificial means of terminating life, this is viewed as sacrilegious. in any event, such decisions would be arrived at through family concensus8. it would be offensive to other family members and extended relatives if one of them decides to write an advance directive without at least considering what others thought and felt. this is evident in the south african guidelines to assist doctors confronted with living wills where it was specifically stated that “it is the responsibility of a patient to ensure that the existence of an advance directive is known to his family and to those who may be asked to comply with its provisions”9. this communitarian spirit accounts for a major reason why the roles of advance directive is not acknowledged among africans and its value not recognized. african communal values the defining characteristic of african societies is communitarian. communitarianism emphasizes the value of specifically communal and public goods and conceives of values as primarily rooted in communal practices10. communitarians argue that the community rather than the individual, the state or the nation is the ultimate originator of values and in their analysis of human rights, group or communal rights rather than individual rights are emphasized. accordingly, for the survival and the preser42 prajñâ vihâra vation of the community and hence its members’ personal lives, it would be perfectly justifiable for some individual rights and acts to be restricted or even banned especially those right claims of individuals whose actions are not in harmony with the ways of society and are considered to pose a threat to the maintenance of the good of the community at large11. a communitarian ethos is embraced by many african societies as a solution to the alienation and disintegration of ethical values and social institutions in modern life. many african scholars claim that the roots of a communitarian ethos go back to indigenous african societies with a social structure which was communitarian in character. leopold senghor (1964) for example explains that negro african society is communal because it is a communion of souls rather than an aggregate of individuals. negro african societies put more stress on the group than on the individual, more on solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion of persons than in their autonomy (senghor, 1964: 34). this attitude of negro african societies explains why an advance directive which emphasizes the autonomy of the incompetent patient is not valued. senghor’s emphasis on the communal nature of africans is similar to that of julius nyerere who advocates ujamma (african solidarity) as the ideal of social solidarity where people agree to subordinate their individual interests to the interest of the common objective of the collective. nyerere maintains that ujamma emphasizes “the africanness of the politics we intend to follow----it brings to the mind of our people the idea of mutual involvement in the family and regards all human beings as members of this ever extending familyhood” (nyerere, 1968: 2). this african communal attitude has been attributed to cultural upbringing. putting more emphasis on this, chukwudum okolo (1985) explains that the african, through cultural upbringing is not individualistic and “there is no question of rugged individualism in outlook and life-style so characteristic of the european or the american” (okolo,1985: 397). human persons are intrinsically communal beings embedded in a context of social relationships and have common values, interests and goals. giving support to this view, ifeanyi menkiti (1984) asserts the ontological primacy of the community over the reality of the individual’s life. he maintains that it is the community which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory (menkiti, 1984: 172 and 179). bolatito a. lanre-abass 43 in essence therefore, the african understanding of human community plays a crucial role in the individual’s acquisition of full personhood. this also implies that the individual is submerged in community and that community interests and its continued existence takes preference above the will and interests of the individual. one can infer from menkiti’s argument that the individual must of necessity be subject to the normative power of the community and is thus not seen as the primary reference point for moral actions. rather, his/her moral status is linked to the fact that the cultural community is the primary context or social space within which he or she is regarded as a moral agent (menkiti, 1984: 172 and 179). in order words, the importance of individual human rights is denied in terms of the priority of group rights. therefore, the moral self develops within a social context where culture and history play vital roles. the above analyses by african scholars serve to explain why advance directives are not valued in african culture. allowing this will amount to emphasizing the autonomy and right to self-determination of the individual at the expense of the society and communal values; this, according to african communal thought system, is not acceptable. there are other practical barriers to completing advance directives in african societies. a major problem militating against the completion of advance directive documents in africa is lack of awareness on the part of many about the need to complete one. very few percentage of the population in many african societies has thought it wise to complete a living will or formally select someone to serve as their health care proxy. even those who strongly belief in the ‘right to die’ lack this awareness therefore making it difficult for physicians to handle cases of incompetent patients who did not make their wishes known while competent through completing an advance directive or nominating a health care proxy . even those that are aware find it difficult to understand the forms and concepts of advance directives. the consequence of this is the misunderstanding of vital information about their preferred treatment option. another problem is that of fear of death and the grief that often accompanies the acknowledgment of an advance directive. although many africans may be fascinated, fearful, or preoccupied by the possibility of suffering unnecessarily before death, it is very difficult to think about death in personal terms (quill., 1993). for some africans who have strong feel44 prajñâ vihâra ings and a clearly articulate vision about what they would want in case they become incompetent, it still takes months or even years to actually sign an advance directive form and have it witnessed. it is difficult to come to terms with one’s own death because the possibility of one’s death seemed real after an advance directive has been signed. for the very ill patient whose quality of life is deteriorating and for another who is gradually losing his competence, “the completion of an advance directive is often the sad acknowledgment of an unwanted but inevitable future” (quill, 1993: 197). furthermore, lack of physician initiative is also a barrier to issuing advance directives in many african societies (emanuel et.al 1991). many physicians in african countries lack the initiative to discuss the necessity of completing an advance directive with their patients. this breakdown in communication consequently results in patients misunderstanding their options to refuse or withdraw treatment or to choose palliative care in completing an advance directive. lastly, african belief system makes it difficult to value the roles of advance directives in end of life decision making or even complete an advance directive form. many africans believe that a person does not have control over his destiny hence should not determine the course of his life; this should be left in the hands of god. hence whoever decides to prolong his/her life or shorten it by signing an advance directive is interfering with the work of god and this is unacceptable in many african societies. for many africans, nature should be allowed to take its course. this belief makes it difficult for even the educated ones to complete an advance directive or choose a health care proxy. thus far, this paper has examined the roles of advance directives in end of life decision making. it argued that while western medical practice focuses on autonomy and self-determination in end of life decision making, african tradition emphasizes communal values according to which decision at the end of life for an incompetent patient has to be arrived at through family consensus. the paper also examined the rationale behind this practice by highlighting african conception of death and dying and african communal values. the paper further argued that advance directives are not valued in african culture due to the problem of precedent autonomy and that of atomistic individualism. the paper showed that there bolatito a. lanre-abass45 are other practical barriers that militate against the completion of advance directive in many african societies. endnotes 1terri schiavo, from wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, online .available at : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/terri_schiavo. [accessed, 18th april 2008] 2ibid. 3“african religions: the african concept of death, african concept of the afterlife. in encyclopedia of death and dying”. online. available: http://www. deathreference. com/a-bi/african-religious.html. [accessed, 22nd april, 2008]. 4ibid. 5ibid. 6ibid. 7onyewuchi, g.o. “death and dying in the african context.” chickenbones: a journal for literary and artistic african-american themes. online. available: http: //www.nathanielturner.com/deathanddyingafrican.htm. [accessed, 25th april, 2008] 8ibid. 9guidelines for medical practitioners on living wills prepared by the south african medical association. online. available: http://www.livingwill.co.za/ guidelines.htm. [accessed, 25th april, 2008]. 10on a communitarian ethos, equality and human rights in africa, international humanist and ethical union, the world union of humanist organization. online. available: http://www.iheu.org/modules/news/-ik. [accessed, 25th april, 2008]. 11ibid. references beauchamp, t.l and childress, j.f. 2001. principles of biomedical ethics, fifth edition. oxford: oxford university press. buchanan, a.e and brock, d.w. 1990. deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decision making. cambridge: cambridge university press. callahan, d. necessity, futility and the good society. journal of the american geriatrics society 1994; 42: 866-867. capron, a.m. 2001. “advance directives.” in: kuhse, h and singer, p., 46 prajñâ vihâra (eds.) a companion to bioethics. united kingdom: blackwell publishing ltd. culver, c.m. and gert, b. 1982. philosophy in medicine, (new york: oxford university press). davis, j.k. the concept of precedent autonomy, bioethics 2002; vol. 16 issue 2,: 114-133, april. davis, j.k. “precedent autonomy, advance directives and the end of life care,” online.available: http://hssfaculty.fullerton.edu/philosophy/ johndavis/documents/precedent%20autonomy. 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[accessed 22nd april, 2008]. menkiti., i.a. 1984. “person and community in african traditional thought.” in: wright, r.a (ed.) african philosophy: an introduction. lanham, md: university press of america. mill, j.s. 1977. “on liberty.” in: collected works of john stuart mill, vol. 18, (toronto: university of toronto press. chps.1, 111. mishkin, b.1986. “new approaches: advance directives.” in: a matter of choice: planning ahead for health care decisions. washington: the american association of retired persons: pp.19-35. nyerere, j.1968. ujamma: essays on socialism. dar-es-salam: oxford university press. okolo., c.1995. “the african person: a cultural definition.” in coetzee, p.h., and mes van den berg (eds.): an introduction to african philosiophy. pretoria: unisa press. president commission for the study of ethical problems in medicine and biomedical and and behavioural research. 1983. “deciding to forgo life-sustaining treatment: a report on the ethical, medical and legal issues in treatment decisions.” in: a.r jonsen, r.m veatch and l. walters, (eds.), source book in bioethics: a documentary history 1998: washington, d.c: georgetown university press: 159-219. quill, t.e.1993. death and dignity: making choices and taking charge. new york: w.w.norton and company. robertson, j.a. “second thoughts on living wills.” hastings center report 1991; 21(6): 6-9. sanchez-gonzalez, m.a. “advance directives outside the usa: are they the best solution everywhere?,” theoretical medicine 1997; 18, 283-301. senghor, l.s.1964. on african socialism. trans by mereer cook. new york: praeger. shalowitz et. al. the accuracy of surrogate decision makers: a systematic review. arch intern med 2006, vol. 166, march, 13: 493-497. walton committee 1994. report of the select committee on medical ethics, london: hmso. 48 prajñâ vihâra a report on emotional education for young children: violence, culture, and history in africa curtis a. keim moravian college, usa abstract violence in modern africa is still often explained in the west as a result of persistent primitivism and tribalism in african cultures. this culturalist view of african conflict appears in some scholarly work as well as in much of popular culture, including the media. what such analysis misses is that european colonialism in africa fostered non-modern, ethnically based societies through indirect rule, and post-colonial governments have largely relied on versions of the colonial system to maintain their power. moreover, interventions by the west in post-colonial african affairs have only infrequently helped to reduce ethnic tensions. more commonly, western intervention has been ineffective and selfserving and western governments have been able to obscure their actions because of popular ignorance of african culture and history. african tribalism is real, but it is much more a result of modern historical events than age-old hatreds. greater understanding of african history and culture and greater care for africa can result in reduction of ethnic violence. of all the regions of the contemporary world, the one most commonly associated with violence is sub-saharan africa. it doesn’t take much effort to name ten, twenty, or even thirty recent african civil wars, genocides, coups, riots, interstate conflicts, and political murders (south africa, rwanda, somalia, sudan, liberia, sierra leone, zaire/congo, zimbabwe…) and despite recent gains for democracy, regimes that maintain power through force are still common. it comes as no surprise, then, that the first four cases of the international criminal court, founded on 1 july 2002 and dealing only with incidents occurring since that date, were related to africa: congo (drc), uganda, sudan, and central african republic. likewise, it does not surprise us that indicators of poverty, injustice, and failed states are found widely among sub-saharan african countries.1 how should we account for the physical and structural violence in sub-saharan africa and what can be done? below i discuss two ways that are sometimes opposed in explaining african violence: culture and history. it is tragic that “traditional culture” persists in the west as a primary explanation for african violence. if violence is primarily cultural in origin and if cultures are age-old, deep, and immutable, then we can conclude that there is little that can or ought to be done to resolve africa’s conflicts. in such a case the proper response might justify isolation, neglect, or benign management of conflict. but if culture responds to history then we might take it as our responsibility to work with africans to find cultural and historical solutions to violence. culture is, in fact, responsive to events even if it is persistent, and caring outsiders can assist in resolution of african conflict if they improve their knowledge of culture and history. little more than half a century ago, a third explanation for african violence, biology, would have been debated seriously. the overt racism of the first half of the twentieth century is more or less behind us, but one suspects that some violence in africa goes unaddressed because of covert racism. it is difficult to know, because one of the tenets of racism is that biology determines culture: inferior biology, inferior culture. in the racist era, black africans were deemed less evolved and therefore biologically and culturally similar to children, or, in kipling’s well-known verse, “half-devil and halfchild.” until the 1950s, virtually every western academic discipline except anthropology adduced “facts” about inferior african culture that demonstrated african biological inferiority.2 thus some of today’s cultural arguments about the inferiority of african culture sound eerily similar to racist arguments and may disguise actual racism. *** 2 the cultural argument for the behavior of civilizations is most famously and broadly drawn by samuel p. huntington who proposes that the post-colonial, post cold war world is typified by the reemergence of seven ancient civilizations characterized by common values and languages: western, latin american, islamic, sinic, hindu, orthodox, and japanese. in the wake of the supposed western victory in the cold war and western triumphalism, huntington argued that belief in the universality of western values was “false, immoral, and dangerous.”3 for huntington, cultures were so persistent that they resisted westernization (although not necessarily modernization), and thus competition between civilizations would be the most notable feature of the coming world order rather than the so-called end of history. huntington’s delineation of civilizations was imprecise, but he identified the sinic and islamic civilizations as being the most important challengers to the west. as for sub-saharan africa, it is only a “possible civilization,” because it doesn’t have a common linguistic or religious heritage. it is, rather, a collection of cultures, of tribes. “tribal loyalties,” said huntington, “are pervasive and intense,” and the major source of persistent violent conflict.4 conflict over resources and power can be negotiated, but conflict over culture cannot. it is “human to hate,” huntington added, and people need enemies to define and motivate themselves.5 for huntington, africa’s ancient cultural divisions make violence inevitable. post cold war anxiety produced other culturalist interpretations of africa’s violence. in a widely read article, “the coming anarchy,” robert kaplan warned of a future world of “scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease,”6 not long before the publication of huntington’s book. kaplan pointed to the horrific violence in sierra leone and côte d’ivoire as evidence that african civilization would be the first to 3 crumble. he noted that in africa, animism, polygyny (leading to overpopulation), and the reciprocity expectations of communal living, provide “a weak shield against the corrosive social effects of life in cities.”7 thus african violence can be understood as a defect in african culture. despite the fact that huntington and kaplan frame their arguments historically— as the reemergence of civilizations or the result of growing scarcity, overpopulation, and urbanization—they can be classified as culturalists because they view so-called culture rather than, say, reason or experience of the world, as the key to human action, and as more or less immutable. huntington says that the west cannot expect other civilizations to adopt or even respect the universalist vision of western civilization. thus by insisting on the universal applicability of its values, such as individualism and democracy, the west is more likely to irritate than to reform other civilizations. kaplan writes that african culture is the weakest of global cultures and therefore “the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress.”8 since making their arguments in the 1990s, both authors extended them frequently, and their continuing commitment to culture has been evident in their arguments for the wars in iraq and afghanistan (huntington died in 2008). kaplan, indeed, has typified the non-modern parts of the world as “injun country” (indian country, referring to america’s violent conquest of its west) and has recommended a culturalist response, that the west adopt a “pagan morality” of retribution, conquest, and realpolitik in place of the softer judeo-christian morality.9 huntington also co-edited a volume of essays, culture matters, which mainly supports the culturalist position toward the modern world. in that collection, a 4 remarkable essay asks, “does africa need a cultural adjustment program?” author daniel etounga-manguelle, a cameroonian scholar, answers a vociferous yes: “…we can no longer reasonably blame the colonial powers for our condition.” nor can africans blame post-colonial actions by the west. rather, africa needs to question its culture, which, despite belonging to fifty countries, has a generally common core. that core, says etounga-manguelle, is characterized by i) hierarchical distance (an elite distant from commoners because commoners can survive without elites in the salubrious tropical environment), ii) security in uncertainty (lack of concern for tomorrow because of african religion), iii) tyranny of time (the past will repeat itself; no need to plan for a different life), iv) indivisible power and authority (jealousy in interpersonal relations aimed at preventing change in social status; you must be born with power or seize it, rather than earn it), v) the community dominates the individual (there is no operative set of individual rights and responsibilities), vi) excessive conviviality and rejection of open conflict, vii) inefficient homo economicus (except for a very few well-known ethnic groups), viii) high costs of irrationalism (everyone who is successful has a witch doctor or sorcerer), ix) cannibalistic and totalitarian societies (metaphorically, africa eats itself). etounga-manguelle concludes by urging africa to keep its valuable humanistic culture while “moving into modernism” through education.10 etounga-manguelle provides hope for change, but his arguments rely on essentializing african culture and placing its present in the pre-colonial past. this is culturalism. it is also the basis of tribalism as practiced by africans who essentialize other ethnic groups.11 there is a fertile american field in which such culturalist arguments can flourish. modern american popular culture is littered with evolutionist ideas about western 5 exceptionalism and progress and african primitivism and backwardness. news reports, documentaries, advertisements, movies, amusement parks, mission literature, and other forms of popular culture focus on exotic africa, wild africa, troubled africa, helpless africa, unchanging africa, and so forth.12 news reports still frequently imply that africa’s conflicts are caused by so-called traditional cultures.13 most commonly, tribalism and racism are blamed for the inability of africans to overcome african violence.14 this is seen clearly in the reports of genocide in rwanda and of north-south conflicts across the sahel (desert edge) and sudan (grasslands) stretching from senegal to the country of sudan. this violence, we are told, results from age-old hatreds between tribes, or from racial animosity between long-resident farmers and racially distinct newcomers. indeed, everywhere one looks in africa there are conflicts that are explained in the west by tribalism and racism: rwanda (tutsi/nilotes-hutu/bantu), sudan (arabs-fur/african), south africa (white-black, zulu-xhosa), kenya (bantunilotic, kikuyu-kamba-luo-kalenjin), nigeria (hausa-yoruba-igbo), congo (kongoluba-lendu-hema-etc.), and so on. it is not that such culturalist interpretations are completely ahistorical, for they almost always place african actors in an historical context. rather, they presume that actors are guided primarily by their culture, which is assumed to be ancient, parochial, and immutable. it is culture itself that is understood ahistorically. *** this culturalist argument has recently been strongly challenged by a more historical argument for the causes of african violence in the work of political scientist mahmood mamdani. mamdani, who grew up in uganda, believes that european 6 colonialism in africa deeply shaped african history and resulted in the tribalism, tyranny, underdevelopment, and violence we see today. for mamdani, african conflicts are primarily historical and political, rather than cultural, and cannot be resolved unless they are understood as such. his most recent work, saviors and survivors. darfur, politics, and the war on terror, is illustrative.15 trying to comprehend the recent violence in darfur, mamdani does not describe fur, arab, or janjawiid culture, but recounts the political history of sudan and darfur. while that history, as told by mamdani, is much more complex than can be quickly or adequately summarized here, a few points can give the reader a sense of how mamdani understands the darfur violence. mamdani begins with the fact that so-called arabs in sudan are not immigrants from southwest asia but rather local peoples who have converted to islam over centuries and invented lineages that link them to prestigious arab families. during the colonial era, the british fostered the idea of sudanese arabs as immigrants and settlers, and hence a separate race, because the british thought according to racial divisions and because it served their divide-and-conquer policies. in the region of darfur, the british also sought to fragment the centralizing successes of a seventeenth and eighteenth century african empire. thus the british “retribalized” darfur as well as the rest of sudan. in darfur, the british further distinguished between “natives” and “settlers,” the former gaining rights to land and tribal government posts, the latter having to give “gifts” to local chiefs in return for the use of land. camel nomads in the north, who were neither natives nor settlers, lacked all claims to land and citizenship and cattle nomads in the south of darfur received land and political rights only if they belonged to large groups that couldn’t be ignored. “tribe” became an administrative unit, not just a kinship unit. 7 at independence in 1956, the primary political struggle was not between the two major political parties, which represented regions and divisions in islam. rather, it was between modernizers and traditionalists, with modernization favored by the army, merchants, and intellectuals and tradition favored by both major islamic parties and by local chiefs. following a colonial rule that fostered so-called tribalism and custom, the modernizers saw that democracy could only result in victory for tribally oriented traditionalists. under the circumstances, military coups were inevitable, but they could not easily solve political problems. the period of jaffer nimeiry’s military rule from 1969-1985 saw efforts to modernize political administration, but it also saw the devolution of central power in 1972 in an effort to defuse north-south tensions. limited autonomy was further extended to darfur in the east and to other regions in 1980. in darfur, this autonomy “unleashed internal political competition” and resulted in heightened ethnic politics, because citizenship continued to be defined culturally.16 this was the situation at the beginning of the environmental crisis of the early 1980s. over the next two decades, the desert moved southward putting increasing pressure on the camel nomads of the north, who claimed arab ancestry. lybia and chad also figure in this story, with lybia attempting to extend its influence and with chad torn by similar north-south ethnic tensions and trying to maneuver between lybia, sudan, and france. growing tensions and the impending sudanese government agreement to provide the non-muslim south with autonomy and eventual independence (after a 2011 referendum), prompted the darfurians to armed revolt in 2003. the government, unable to use the army because of its involvement in the south, began to arm the camel nomads and bandits to stop the rebels. 8 but, according to mamdani, the darfur conflict was never genocide of “africans” by “arabs,” as was claimed by the save darfur movement. the central government never intended to eliminate or cleanse the fur or any other ethnic group, nor was all of the fighting between so-called arabs and non-arabs. cattle nomads who were nonarabs in southern darfur, for example, also fought for land during this period. moreover, the number of those killed during the worst part of the crisis and afterwards was highly exaggerated by the save darfur movement. in this, they were helped by so-called “africans” (non-arabs) in darfur who saw political advantage in western support and thus promoted the save darfur exaggeration. the united states government, says mamdani, was more or less forced—by save darfur and by guilt over rwanda—to declare the darfur conflict genocide. thus darfur became “arabized” and part of the war on terror, a struggle between so-called arabs and so-called africans rather than a localized struggle resulting from an environmental crisis, a colonial legacy of exclusivist local rule, and an incompetent government. mamdani writes, “the war on terror has displaced the history and politics of darfur while providing the context to interpret and illuminate ongoing developments in darfur. the more such an interpretation takes root, the more darfur becomes not just an illustration of the grand narrative of the war on terror but also a part of its justification.”17 mamdani has written extensively about the causes of so-called tribalism in contemporary africa and locates african ethnic conflict primarily in european colonial indirect rule. almost all of sub-saharan africa was ruled through customary rulers who were expected to collect taxes, provide labor for colonial enterprises, and keep public order. colony-wide laws mostly referred to the colonial sphere of economic exploitation, 9 small urban areas, and interethnic affairs. citizenship was largely defined as existing within “tribal” affiliation and local chiefs using customary law judged so-called tribal affairs. as in sudan, europeans thus ruled colonies using two sets of laws and two definitions of citizenship, one customary and one for rulers and the few african urbanites who escaped traditional jurisdictions. in addition, where europeans identified different races, such as in sudan, rwanda, zanzibar, and south africa, the colonial state legislated racial discrimination. thus, writes mamdani, “racial discrimination in the civic sphere reproduced race as a political identity, just as ethnic discrimination in the customary sphere translated ethnicity from a cultural to a political identity.”18 post-independence leaders rarely departed from the colonial order. to do so would have threatened both the stability of rural areas where “customary” rulers held sway, and also the power of the new urban elites who largely led africa to independence. thus unscrupulous tyrants and elites left the tribalized colonial formula for citizenship intact and proceeded to manipulate it for their own benefit. tanzania stands as a significant and rare exception in post-colonial east, central, and southern africa. there, president julius nyerere attempted to delineate “a single unified citizenship, both deracialized and deethnicized.”19 we should add, so as not to ignore other important factors in the construction of citizenship, that tanzania is different from most african countries in that it has many small ethnic groups with no group or groups dominating the others. thus tanzania’s experience demonstrates that leadership is only one factor in post-colonial history. there are, of course, many accounts of africa’s crises and their resolution (or lack of resolution) that are not culturalist. for example, there have been excellent analyses 10 that situate rwanda’s genocide in the late twentieth century instead of merely in racism and tribalism.20 likewise, for sierra leone, the place that robert kaplan said best illustrates the extreme weakness of african culture, lansana gberie’s a dirty war in west africa provides a perspective that is neither culturalist nor hopeless.21 gérard prunier’s africa’s world war describes the recent history of central africa and while emphasizing the role of traditional african culture also takes ample account of outside influences and recent developments in regional culture.22 non-culturalist analyses are available for most african conflicts. *** the essentialist ideas of the culturalists cause more problems than they resolve. culturalists abandon hope in african peace and thus promote western reactions to african conflicts that sustain and perpetuate violence: barbarian morality, survival of the fittest, neo-imperialism, neglect, and unjust cultural, economic, and political adjustment regimes. in reality, african cultures respond to incentives and interests just as other cultures do. indeed, africans have already undergone cultural and other adjustment programs for more than a century, because africa is not isolated from the rest of the world. while some of african culture is traditional, much has been deeply transformed by the modern world. african history and culture are shaped by the same forces that shape the rest of history, including great power politics, modern education, international markets and globalization, modern technology (guns, airplanes, radio, television, cell phones, internet…), urbanization, personality, and so forth. and most african identities are based on multiple affiliations including kinship, religion, occupation, gender, 11 geography, and so on. despite africa’s troubles, and sometimes because of them, africa is modernizing, and is reaping the attendant benefits and ills. given ignorance in the west of both history and culture in africa, it is easy to be confused and to confuse. thus westerners have descended on africa with quick-fix, half-considered prescriptions for africa’s problems. or, our leaders purposefully obscure the truth with culturalism and false histories. in other words, culturalism and historical misinterpretation are not necessarily a result of ignorance and honest error. in public policy, culturalist approaches can justify poor policies and lack of care for africa. during the cold war, for example, the west and the soviet union supported african tyrants and justified their violence as a product of african culture. when the cold war ended, however, the west quickly demanded multi-party democracy, accountability, and transparency.23 in a few places this new policy helped foster democratic processes, but in rwanda and elsewhere it failed precisely because it used simple formulas in situations that the west little understood. mamdani writes, “the donor community force-fed rwanda a reform agenda out of a textbook, without regard to the situation on the ground and secure in the knowledge that they would not have to suffer the consequences of their actions.”24 later, when the genocide began, the west failed to intervene quickly, even when it knew what was going on. when the genocide ended, the united states supported a tutsi regime that reproduced and reproduces the errors of the colonial past. similarly, president clinton sent jesse jackson in 1999 to negotiate a settlement in the sierra leone conflict. jackson went to lomé instead of a senior diplomat because the clinton administration was involved in kosovo and because it did not take sierra leone seriously. jackson—inept, ignorant, hurried, and egotistical—forced the 12 government to hand over wealth and power to the rebel leader, whom jackson compared to nelson mandela, thus prolonging the war. in fact, the war was over diamonds and was prosecuted by bandits, not ethnic groups or liberators. meanwhile, clinton denied that the united states had dictated the lomé settlement, a lie that astounded those who were present and convinced sierra leoneans that the united states could not be trusted. they were right. meanwhile, clinton was telling americans how important africa was to the united states.25 the bush administration involvement in the 2006 darfur negotiations in abuja, nigeria, had much the same character. eager to reach an agreement, impatient with the parties, and ignorant of the situation in darfur, the international actors, especially the united states and britain, forced a settlement that did not include all of the major actors and could not have been the basis of a lasting peace.26 in general, the united states government tried to do as little to resolve the darfur conflict as possible. mamdani also sees the 2008 indictment of sudan’s president, omar hassan ahmad al-bashir, by the international criminal court (icc) as part of a united states hijacking of the darfur conflict for the war on terror. under the bush administration, the united states voted in the un security council to refer al-bashir to the icc, which led to al-bashir’s indictment in 2008. by intervening through an international regime of justice, the icc made darfur more difficult to resolve because, according to mamdani, it substituted absolutist “victors’ justice” for locally based “survivors’ justice.” to reflect on the difference between the two, we might speculate how much more difficult it would have been to resolve apartheid in south africa had white government officials been under indictment by the icc. given sudan’s historical and cultural situation, says mamdani, 13 sudan would find a more lasting peace through the mediation of “wise persons” rather than the victors’ justice of the icc.27 mamdani might be both right and wrong about the icc in sudan. perhaps the united states did see al-bashir as an actor in the war on terror. but subsequent to the indictments the government of sudan has worked to negotiate an end to the conflict (despite also ejecting international aid organizations from darfur), and the obama administration has softened its stance toward the sudan government. what remains to be seen is whether the court’s actions will deter future violence in sudan and elsewhere. if the court is allowed to be impartial and not become a tool of the big powers, then it might be useful in resolving and preventing future violent conflict. in the ongoing conflict in eastern congo, the war has claimed far more lives than the war in sudan or the genocide in rwanda, yet the conflict is almost invisible outside of africa.28 with its enormous death toll, why has this conflict not become an international cause and why has the world not intervened seriously? is our global conscience only attuned to genocide? does this war not matter to global politics because there are no arabs, nuclear weapons, or oil deposits involved? does the united states ignore the war because it supports the tutsi government in rwanda, which participates in the war? is it that despite the war the world can continue to purchase the rebel-mined coltan (columbite-tantalite; used in cell phones and other electronic devices) and other conflict minerals that fuel the war? serious intervention would surely be messy because a postcolonial state has never really established order there, but can we truly say that the conflict doesn’t matter as much as that in sudan? 14 since the end of the cold war, western governments have told their citizens that they care about helping africa resolve its political conflicts. but if, as they claim, they have made their best efforts, then citizens in the west can conclude that africa’s political problems must be too deep-seated to solve. such a false conclusion relies on the west’s ignorance of african culture and history and can only reinforce culturalism. in much the same way, many western efforts at african economic and social development have fostered culturalism. frequently, development projects promote dependency and corruption and cannot be sustained by local people once the development agency moves on. donors want quick results and new projects so that development workers rarely have time to understand thoroughly cultures and historical situations. moreover, critics say, the development workers rather than africans gain the skills and resources needed for development. africa is “being developed” rather than developing; ordinary people are not learning to solve their own problems. and when projects eventually fail, it is easier to blame africans and their cultures rather than the misunderstanding, impatience, and self-promotion of outsiders. *** “tribalization,” “retribalization,” and “underdevelopment” of africa by european colonial powers is a common theme in modern histories. mamdani’s contribution as a political scientist has been to reemphasize the way that colonial policies have carried over into post-colonial politics. europeans established a colonial system in which white elites maintained power by conferring citizenship based on culture (and race), and modern black elites have largely reproduced this system. thus in the context of the colonial and 15 post-colonial state, ethnic tension is inevitable. this tension is not, however, the age-old tension that culturalists propose. would it have been possible to create a colonial state on a non-cultural basis? given the unwillingness of europeans to invest in the political development of their colonies, probably not. colonies were primarily economic enterprises meant to extract wealth. however, not all modern cultural tension need be attributed to the exploitative structure of colonial or post-colonial states. integration of the many precolonial african societies into larger political and economic units was bound to cause cultural tension. indeed, such integration and tension had been features of precolonial africa. thus no matter what political model colonists applied, cultural integration and conflict were inevitably features of colonialism and of post-colonialism. indeed, one might even ask whether the cost of cultural integration in africa has been much different from the historical costs of integration in other parts of the world. we should not forget, for example, the centuries of violent european conflict that precede our own era. to ask this question does not excuse the exploitation of colonial or post-colonial powers nor make future violence inevitable, but it admits that up to now historical change globally has often brought terrible violence. along with many others, outsiders and insiders alike, mamdani insists that peace in africa’s multicultural states requires a separation of political and cultural identities. citizenship should be based on one’s place of residence, not on one’s culture. peace also requires constitutions and state-run judicial systems (not tribal courts) that protect individual rights, and, as a prerequisite for participation in government, the renunciation of violence.29 but given its century-plus history of zero-sum tribalization and 16 authoritarianism, most of africa will move much more slowly in this direction than mamdani envisions. just as the culturalists count too little on the flexibility of traditional cultures and the ability of modern ideas and actors to cause change, mamdani and others seem to count too much on them. in sub-saharan africa, only a very few states have established successful political and judicial systems that primarily rely on individual rights and substantially exclude cultural politics. these states are special cases that are culturally homogeneous (botswana), culturally plural with no one large group (tanzania), or semi-modern and class-based (south africa). a few other states have done moderately well in reducing cultural politics (e.g., namibia) and establishing individual over cultural rights, but the path to mamdani’s ideal will not be easy or rapid. to reduce conflict, africans might best attempt to create multicultural states that protect both state unity and cultural identity, both individual and cultural choice. the 2004 human development report of the united nations development program provides examples from around the world of states working to protect cultural liberties (such as spain, belgium, india, new zealand, and guatemala).30 existing models may or may not work in situations such as rwanda, where tutsi and hutu live side by side, or in sudan, where some cultural groups do not even have access to the resources they need to survive, yet africans should be encouraged to look for models that allow cultural choice without providing the basis for cultural chauvinism, aggression, or secession. in the same way, the west and others who say they want to help africa need to modify their reactions to african conflict. in somalia, rwanda, sierra leone, liberia, sudan, congo, and elsewhere the west has generally prolonged violent conflict through slow, inappropriate, half-hearted, and self-serving interventions. in some cases, such as 17 sierra leone and liberia, the international community eventually found a combination of international force and aid that helped build peace, but the overall record of peacemaking by the west and others is dismal. given the ignorance of african culture and history in the west and among outsiders in general, it is still possible for those who say they are trying to resolve african conflict to obscure their lack of care or incompetence with false pictures of culture and history. thus we cannot yet hold our governments, international organizations, development agencies, churches, multinational corporations, and media accountable for actually helping africa. while traditions of small-scale and regionalized cultures still exist in african states, we must not abandon africa or any other part of the world to culturalist pessimism and ahistoricism. the events of the twentieth century taught some people in africa how to gain power and wealth by emphasizing cultural difference, but no culture is inevitably tribalist or violent. indeed, the twentieth century should also have taught us that in a technologically advanced age the emotions of tribalism and nationalism must be abandoned everywhere so that we do not destroy ourselves. to survive, we must build global and local cultures and structures that promote care, cooperation, and justice rather than conflict and self-interest. fortunately, all cultures have resources—traditions, creative individuals, outside influences—that allow them to respond to history in peaceful as well as violent ways. it is our responsibility—that of the west, africa, and the rest of world—to develop the cultural and structural resources for peace. 18 endnotes 19 1 fund for peace, “failed states index 2009,” accessed 9 september 2009 at http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=99&itemid=140. 2 curtis a. keim, mistaking africa (boulder, co: westview press, 2009), 51-59. 3 samuel p. huntington, the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, (new york: simon and schuster, 1997), 310. 4 ibid., 47. 5 ibid., 120-130. 6 robert kaplan, “the coming anarchy,” the atlantic monthly, 273, no. 2, (february 1994): 44. 7 ibid., 46. 8 ibid., 46. 9 robert kaplan, warrior politics: why leadership demands a pagan ethos (new york: vintage, 2003). 10 daniel etounga-manguelle, “does africa need a cultural adjustment program?” in lawrence e. harrison and samuel p. huntington, culture matters. how values shape human progress (new york: basic books, 2000), 65-77 11 see, for example, binyavanga wainaina, “in gikuyu, for gikuyu, of gikuyu,” granta accessed 30 july 2009 at www.granta.com/magazine/granta-103/letter-from/1. i normally do not use the words “tribe” and “tribalism” because they usually misrepresent what actually is happening in africa. here, however, the words are appropriate because they are used by my sources and/or indicate certain values imputed to africans by westerners. see curtis a. keim, “africans live in tribes, don’t they” in curtis a. keim, mistaking africa. curiosities and inventions of the american mind (boulder, co: westview press, 2009), 113-127. 12 keim, mistaking africa, 51-59. 13 i wonder whether ordinary asians also see africa this way. if chinese popular images of africa are indicative, the chinese may see african cultures as even more primitive than westerners do. 14 see, for example, julie hollar, “’tribal’ label distorts african conflicts,” extra! may/june 2008. accessed 9 august 2009 at www.fair.org/index.php?page=3409. 15 mahmood mamdani, saviors and survivors. darfur, politics, and the war on terror (new york: pantheon, 2009). 16 mamdani, saviors and survivors, 188. 17 ibid., 71. 18 mahmood mamdani, when victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in rwanda (princeton: princeton university press, 2002), 29. 19 ibid., 32. see also mamdani, citizen and subject (princeton: princeton university press, 1996). 20 see, for example, recent works by rene lemarchand, the dynamics of violence in central africa. national and ethnic conflict in the 21st century (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2008) and lee ann fujii, killing neighbors. webs of violence in rwanda (ithaca: cornell university press, 2009). also see a work produced immediately after the genocide by gérard prunier, the rwanda crisis: history of a genocide (new york: columbia university press, 1995). 21 lansana gberie. a dirty war in west africa. the ruf and the destruction of sierra leone. bloomington, in: indiana university press, 2005. 22 gérard prunier, africa’s world war. congo, the rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe (oxford: oxford university press, 2009). 23 this was not true everywhere. for example, the united states still purchases oil from equatorial guinea despite the fraudulent election of the president, teodoro obiang, a tyrant from the mold of many african dictators. although the cia might have assisted in a coup attempt, the united states puts little pressure on obiang to resign or hold fair elections. 24 mamdani, when victims become killers, 214 25 ryan lizza, “where angels fear to tread,” the new republic, 223, no. 4 (24 july 2000): 22-27. 26 julie flint and alex de waal, darfur. a new history of a long war (london: zed books, 2008), 200-229. http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3409 http://www.granta.com/magazine/granta-103/letter-from/1 27 mamdani, saviors and survivors, 282-300. 28 see, for example, howard w. french, “kagame’s hidden war in the congo,” the new york review of books, 56, no. 14 (september 24, 2009): 44-47. 29 ibid. and mamdani, when victims become killers, 264-282. 30 united nations development program, “world development report, 2004. cultural liberty in today’s diverse world.” accessed 8 september 2009 at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/chapters/ references french. howard w. “kagame’s hidden war in the congo.” the new york review of books, 56, no. 14 (september 24, 2009): 44-47. fujii, lee ann. killing neighbors. webs of violence in rwanda. ithaca: cornell university press, 2009. fund for peace. “failed states index 2009.” accessed 9 september 2009 at http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=99&itemid=140. gberie, lansana. a dirty war in west africa. the ruf and the destruction of sierra leone. bloomington, in: indiana university press, 2005. hollar, julie. “’tribal’ label distorts african conflicts.” extra! may/june 2008. accessed 9 august 2009 at www.fair.org/index.php?page=3409. huntington, samuel p. the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon and schuster, 1997. kaplan, robert d. “the coming anarchy.” the atlantic monthly, 273, no. 2, (february 1994): 4477. ______. warrior politics: why leadership demands a pagan ethos. new york: vintage, 2003. keim, curtis a. mistaking africa. curiosities and inventions of the american mind. boulder, co: westview press, 2009. lizza, ryan. “where angels fear to tread,” the new republic, 223, no. 4 (24 july 2000): 22-27. mamdani, mahmood. citizen and subject. princeton: princeton university press, 1996. ______. saviors and survivors. darfur, politics, and the war on terror. new york: pantheon, 2009. ______. when victims become killers. princeton: princeton university press, 2001. prunier, gérard. africa’s world war. congo, the rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe. oxford: oxford university press, 2009 united nations development program. “world development report, 2004. cultural liberty in today’s diverse world.” accessed 8 september 2009 at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/chapters/. wainaina, binyavanga. “in gikuyu, for gikuyu, of gikuyu.” granta. accessed 30 july 2009 at www.granta.com/magazine/granta-103/letter-from/1. http://www.granta.com/magazine/granta-103/letter-from/1 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/chapters/ http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&itemid=140 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&itemid=140 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2004/chapters/ wanpat youngmevittaya 79 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 79-120 © 2000 by assumption university press justice and the public sphere: a critique of john rawls’ political liberalism wanpat youngmevittaya university of york, uk abstract this article criticizes john rawls’ conception of political liberalism, which insists that political sphere governed by his two principles of justice can be separated from any comprehensive moral doctrines, and that the validity of his conception of justice is political, not metaphysical nor comprehensive. i argue that rawls’ project is flawed by showing that his two principles of justice and political liberalism are presupposed by the very comprehensive/ metaphysical doctrines which he denies. whether he realizes it or not rawls chooses a particular comprehensive theory of the good/person, specifically that of an unencumbered self. i discuss rawls’ political liberalism from two points of view. first, i discuss rawls’ political liberalism from political economy points of view, which i argue that the foundation of rawls’ principles of justice lies in his particular theory of the person. second, i discuss rawls’ political liberalism from philosophical points of view, which i argues that rawls’ political liberalism and theory of the person are comprehensive, and that political sphere cannot be separated from private sphere. 80 prajñā vihāra introduction this article aims to criticize john rawls’ political liberalism, which proposes that his principles of justice governing public sphere are derived from none of any comprehensive moral doctrines so that they should be acceptable to ‘everyone’ whose moral comprehensive doctrines are different; it is not only possible, but also ought to separate justice from any comprehensive doctrines. in other words, he claims that his principles of justice are justified on the basis of a political consensus, which is neutral among competing conceptions of comprehensive doctrine. i will argue that rawls’ political liberalism is flawed in the sense that his principles of justice are far from being neutral, and that it is impossible to separate political sphere from any comprehensive doctrines as he claims. the political sphere requires a judgment of comprehensive moral doctrines instead of the claim of neutrality between them. this article consists of three main parts. first, i give an outline of rawls’ political liberalism, which i link his theory of justice (1971) with his political liberalism (1993), and other works such as the law of peoples (1999). i argue that rawls’ project is to preserve kantian morality without referring to any comprehensive doctrines as kant did. second, i discuss how rawls’ principles of justice are really justified from the perspective of political economy, especially from works of harsanyi (1975; 1977) and hampton (1980). in this section i show that the secret of rawls’ principle of justice is not based on the social contract, but on his particular theory of the person or the circumstances of justice in the original position. finally, i discuss how rawls’ theory of the person is comprehensive rather than political, in which i argue that it is comprehensive because it is justified on the basis of rationality which one needs to assume what characteristics can be called rational and good or just in the first place. wanpat youngmevittaya 81 rawls’ political liberalism: an outline in a theory of justice (1971), rawls’ powerful claim is that any theory of justice governing the whole society must be acceptable to ‘everyone’ in the society. one of the most important tasks of rawls (1971) is to defeat utilitarianism, the dominant theory in economics and political philosophy at that time, in defining “justice” for the society, which argues that any just principle governing the whole society must maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number (bentham, 1879; harsanyi, 1975; sandel, 1994; swift, 2014). according rawls, utilitarianism is not a proper principle of justice because its violation of the principle of the separateness of persons; it prioritizes the welfare of society as a whole over individual rights, as rawls (1971, pp.3-4) argues: “each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. for this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. it does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. the only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising.” rawls, like other social contract theorists like hobbes, locke, rousseau, and kant, tries to base the justification of the principle of justice on the agreement of individuals. metaphysically, they all believe that there is no right principles independent of and prior to individuals themselves; instead, justice or right principles must be found in individuals themselves, as rawls (1980) argues that “the parties to the original 82 prajñā vihāra position do not agree on what the moral facts are, as if there were already such facts. it is not that, being situated impartially, they have a clear and undistorted view of a prior and independent moral order. rather (for constructivism), there is no such order, and therefore no such facts apart from the procedure as a whole” (underline added) (p. 568). therefore, rawls’ project is to show that his principles of justice is justified not because of any merit or moral desert, but of a social contract; that his principles of justice is not based on any particular conception of the good, but simply on an agreement of individuals. it should be noted that rawls’ project is very influenced by kant’s morality in the sense that both of them try to separate justice as a first principle from any particular conception of the good. for kant, to act morally is to act as a rational being whose moral duty is determined by the universal maxim rather than his own desires or happiness. this is not to say that desires and happiness are wrong and should be eliminated, but that they are inappropriate to be the first principle that every rational being can will as a universal maxim (kant, 1785). kant proposes that, as a rational being, we must prioritize the noumenal self, whose actions are determined by pure practical reason which is independent from any conception of the good life, over the phenomenal self whose actions are determined by our own conception of the good life. it is not that kant does not want us to live according to our conception of the good, but kant thinks that it is wrong to set any particular conception of the good as the moral constraints for all of us, as kant (1788) argues that “the concept of good and evil is not defined prior to the moral law, to which, it would seem, the former would have to serve as foundation; rather the concept of good and evil must be defined after and by means of the law” (p.65). this idea can be called deontological liberalism (sandel, 1982). rawls (1971), despite the very influence of kant, tries to make deontological liberalism more acceptable to contemporary political philosophy by insisting that deontological liberalism can be affirmed by the phenomenal self rather than the noumenal self (p.264, 587). since kant’s project is to put individuals into the noumenal world which is very wanpat youngmevittaya 83 metaphysically controversial, rawls tries to justify the moral law without requiring individuals to forgo their own conceptions of the good (sandel, 1982, p.23). in other words, rawls’ project is to show how individuals who are free to pursue any conception of the good eventually come to agree upon the same first principle. at first glance it seems that rawls’ principles of justice are not separated from a conception of the good, but, indeed, they are separated because, according to rawls’ logic, even though his principles of justice were chosen by individuals who have different conceptions of the good, the fact that they would be accepted by everyone reflects that his principles of justice are not based on any particular conception of the good. in other words, since the theories of justice are universally accepted by “every” conception of the good, and not based on any “particular” conception of the good, they are neutral between competing conceptions of the good. in this sense rawls confirms kant’s deontological liberalism which bases justice as the first principle on the primacy of right rather than any particular conception of the good (sandel, 1982). therefore one way to critique rawls is to show how his theory of justice is actually based on a particular conception of the good rather than some neutrality between them, and this is my primary task in this article. but it is very important to understand that what rawls means by ‘everyone’ here is ‘hypothetical’ persons, not ‘actual’ persons; only the former is regarded as a moral agent who is entitled to participate in the deliberation of principles of justice, while the latter is not because they are not yet guaranteed by certain circumstances of justice. in order to come up with a theory of justice, rawls creates the original position and the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment1 to reach a social agreement. the original position is the state where everyone is assumed to inhabit before entering into the actual society. the veil of ignorance is the idea that people in the original position should be blind to any conception of the good at all in the sense that they must decide any theory of justice without knowing what social position and conception of the good they are going to take until the veil of ignorance is uncovered. in other words, 84 prajñā vihāra individuals in the original position must conceive themselves as rational beings who want to maximize their position (the maximin principle), but do not know yet what conception of the good they will pursue. by doing so, everyone would reach the same principles of justice which would consist of “(1) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. (2) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (swift, 2014, p.25). these two principles of justice determine the roles of the state and political institutions. his theories of justice have been criticized by communitarians like macintyre (1981), sandel (1982; 1984), walzer (1983), and taylor (1985a; 1985b; 1989) that he fails to understand the metaphysical conception of the person; they argue that we could not conceive of ourselves as a rational being whose self is prior to our given goods/ends as rawls assumes in the original position. thus, rawls’s principles of justice are not appropriate to do justice for actual persons (mulhall & swift, 1996). in response to those criticism, rawls proposes the idea of political liberalism (rawls, 1977; 1985; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1993; 1999). the main argument of political liberalism is that his two principles of justice do not require that everyone must apply liberal doctrine to their personal affairs and think of themselves as a rational being whose self is antecedent to their ends/ goods all the time; they just need to be liberal in political sphere where they need to decide about the best principle of justice for a well-ordered society; his principles of justice do not rule out any ‘reasonable’ moral comprehensive doctrines. in this sense, his liberalism is different from kant’s and mill’s, which are comprehensive liberalism; while rawls claims that people need to be liberal in political sphere only, not in personal affairs, kant and mill claim that they need to be liberal in both of their public and private spheres. as rawls (1993) argues that “this idea of a shared political life does not invoke kant’s idea of autonomy, or mill’s idea of individuality, wanpat youngmevittaya 85 as moral values belonging to a comprehensive doctrine. the appeal is rather to the political value of a public life conducted on terms that all reasonable citizens can accept as fair” (p.98), and that “the first difference is that kant’s doctrine is a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of autonomy has a regulative role for all of life. this makes it incompatible with the political liberalism of justice as fairness” (p.99). to put it another way, rawls thinks that it is possible to separate political sphere from any moral comprehensive doctrines, and everyone, including communitarian critics, should legitimize his principles of justice as they are just political, not comprehensive. next i will show how his principles of justice are not merely political but comprehensive, and thus, his political liberalism cannot claim its neutrality between competing conceptions of the comprehensive doctrines. it should be noted that what rawls (1993) really proposes to revise is not about his two principles of justice proposed in rawls (1971) at all, but he merely revised how we should understand them. as rawls (1993) writes that “all these elements [two principles of justice] are still in place, as they were in [a theory of justice]; and so is the basis of the argument for them. hence i presuppose throughout these lectures the same egalitarian conception of justice as before; and though i mention revisions from time to time, none of them affect this feature of it” (p.7), and what he really wants to propose about political liberalism is that “political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a freestanding view. it offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception itself. as an account of political values, a free standing political conception does not deny there being other values that apply, say, to the personal, the familial, and the associational; nor does it say that political values are separate from, or discontinuous with, other values” (p.10). therefore, if i can prove that rawls’ two principles of justice are comprehensive and metaphysical rather than political, then this can prove that rawls’ political liberalism is also comprehensive, not merely political; rawls’ political liberalism is inconsistent. 86 prajñā vihāra a theory of the person and the impossible project of political liberalism my main argument is that rawls has a particular comprehensive theory of the person. i intentionally use the term ‘comprehensive’ rather than mere ‘metaphysical’ or ‘moral philosophy’ because although rawls may claim that his theory is not metaphysical2 (rawls, 1985), he cannot deny that his theory suggests a particular conception of the artificial person in the original position (rawls, 1993, p.75). for example, rawls may say that his political liberalism does not rely on a particular theory of actual person, whether they are unencumbered or encumbered selves. this may make him avoid the metaphysical debate about the real nature of the person by claiming that his theory does not say that the person described in the original position must be true in the reality. he may reason that he needs to ‘assume’ some certain characteristics3 of the person in the original position just for the sake of representation, and does not mean that he actually thinks that the real person must really possess those certain characteristics. but i will argue that this does not make his theory of the person in the original position less comprehensive. the most important question is why rawls must ‘assume’ those certain characteristics of the person in the original as the way he does? why does he think that the moral power ‘should’ be given to ‘each individual’ rather than the community? to criticize rawls’ political liberalism, i divide the discussion into two main parts: (1) i will show how rawls’ original position and principles of justice can be criticized from political economy points of view, which will tell us that rawls’ argument is not based on any social contract, and the secret of his principle of justice lies in a theory of the person; (2) i will show how rawls’ political liberalism can be criticized from philosophical points of view, which will tell us that rawls’ argument and his theory of the person is not neutral between competing conceptions of the good as he claims. wanpat youngmevittaya 87 a political economy critique of rawls’ theory of justice before i will discuss this philosophically, i would like to show that even those who agree with him about the role of the original position and that each individual should be given the moral power equally may disagree with him about principles individuals would choose. harsanyi (1975; 1977) are good examples. he agrees that the original position is an indispensable condition of the social contract, but he disagrees that parties in the original position would always adopt the maximin principle as rawls claims. harsanyi (1977) proposes to separate “moral” preferences from “personal” preferences. moral preferences refer to the decisions of individuals in the situation where they are all ignorant of their actual particular preferences. he believes that to decide this way they all must decide universally as if they take everyone’s preferences into account. personal preferences refer to the decision of individuals in the situation where they all know their actual places in the society. even though harsanyi embraces the same idea as rawls’ original position, he does not assume that parties in the original position would adopt the maximin principle as rawls does, and this indicates that different theories of the person (how should they behave?) amount to different characteristics of principles of justice. harsanyi (1975) proposes that parties in the original position would choose any principles of justice according to the average utility maximization principle (p.598). he argues that if a society has a mentally retarded individual and other normal individuals, and if the only way to improve the mentally retarded one is an expensive treatment which requires diverting funds from the education of normal people, and if this treatment can only improve the mentally retarded person only slightly, then what principle would parties in the original position choose? according to the maximin principle, they should want the treatment to be done because it improves the least advantaged member of the society. but harsanyi argues that this is irrational (p.597), and he proposes that parties would adopt the average utility maximization principle which 88 prajñā vihāra assumes that everyone has the same probability (1/n); they have to choose social systems which yield a higher average utility level. for the sake of simplicity, let’s consider the figure 1 as follows. p1 p2 average a 100 200 150 b 145 145 145 c 144 600 372 figure 1 how would parities in the original position choose? according to the figure 1, let’s assume that there are two persons (p1 and p2) whom parties in the original position may turn out to be, and there are three states of the world or social systems (a, b, and c) that might happen to each person. the rows can be read as follows: of the state a, we have a 1/2 probability of being born as p1 with 100 utility, and p2 with 200 utility; of the state b, we have a 1/2 probability of being born as p1 with 145 utility, and p2 with 145 utility; of the state c, we have a 1/2 probability of being born as p1 with 144 utility, and p2 with 600 utility. the question is what social systems or principles of justice we would choose? according to rawls’ maximin principle, we would choose the state b because this social system makes us maximize the least advantaged; since the least advantaged of the state a receives 100, of the state b receives 145, and of the state c receives 144, a rational being who adopts the maximize principle must go for the state or social system b. but, according to harsanyi’s average utility maximization principle, we should choose the state c because this social system makes us maximize the average utility, which is 372, while the state a and b give us only 150 and 142, respectively. even if we follow rawls’ experiment of the original position and the veil of ignorance, we do not need to agree with him that his two wanpat youngmevittaya 89 principles of justice will always be chosen. this indicates that rawls’ attempt to make the social contract more acceptable has certain problems. rawls’ two principles of justice lies not in the pure procedure of the social contract, but in the certain characteristics of the hypothetical person in the original position. in this sense a theory of the person plays a significant role in determining any principle of justice. even though rawls may claim that his theory of the person is merely a thought experiment rather than the metaphysical truth, he cannot deny that the discussion of a theory of the person is very important as different characteristics of the person lead to different principles of justice; thus communitarian critique of rawls’ theory of the person is very relevant and powerful. kymlicka (1989) defends rawls’ political liberalism4 on the basis that it does not take a “possessive individualist theory of motivation” (pp.887-8). he argues that rawls’s political liberalism does not take the view that “what people want in life is to maximize their share of social resources (rather than promote the good of others), and indeed to maximize their material good (rather than promote their spiritual or emotional well-being)” (p.886). instead rawls allows everyone to pursue their own conceptions of the good life; no one is barred from taking other people’s welfare and spiritual well-being into account. this implies that rawls’ political liberalism is far from being comprehensive liberalism which biased against some particular way of life. to put it simply, according to kymlicka and rawls, political liberalism does not take any particular comprehensive theory of the person as everyone is still allowed to take any comprehensive theory of the person as they see fit. but i believe this argument is flawed. first of all, kymlicka and even rawls himself misunderstand that communitarians like macintyre, sandel, and taylor discuss a theory of the person “before” the original position and the veil of ignorance are taken out, not “after” that. as i just said, a theory of the person in the original position is very important to justify the principles of justice because different theories lead to different principles, and we have seen that rawls’ theory of the person is merely one of possible alternatives 90 prajñā vihāra rather than the only conceivable one, so whatever theory of the person rawls chooses, he cannot deny that it is based on a particular conception of the person rather than a neutrality between competing conceptions. before i will continue discussing a theory of the person, i would like to show that, indeed, rawls’ social contract theory is not really a social contract argument because according to any social contract theory, a just principle must be justified on the basis of individual agreements rather than of any independent principle. for example, if p1 and p2 come to agree upon the social system b, then we say that the state b is just not because it is just by itself but because it is the result of the contract, and if both p1 and p2 change the content of the contract to other systems (a or c), then we say that the state b is not just anymore. this means that any just principle of justice must be the result of the contract, not something just in itself. in this sense rawls’ argument is far from being called the social contract because his argument does not allow any changes of the content of the contract at all, and, most importantly, his theory of the person is characterized by himself “before” any actual person and contract occur; this means that his theory of the person is justified independently of any result of the contract. as i said, since different theories of the person lead to different principles of justice, and rawls’ theory of the person is assumed “before” any social contract happens, rawls cannot deny that his principles of justice are justified not based on the social contract, but on his particular conception of the good. i will defend my argument through the discussion of hampton (1980)’s argument. for hampton, any contract must be the procedure of mediation between two or more parties who have different preferences and needs5, and the contract must be irrevocable until every party voluntarily agrees to end or redo the contract; any contract must be based on the procedure rather than the finality (the content of the contract). for example, if mr.a lends mr.b a certain amount of money and mr.b promises to repay mr.a that certain amount of money with another certain amount of interest, the contract must be irrevocable until both mr.a and mr.b voluntarily wanpat youngmevittaya 91 agree to end or redo some characteristics of the contract. this is the reciprocity condition. but in the original position every party is forced to have the same preference (risk-aversion) and goal (maximin rule), to face the same situation (complete uncertainty); everyone is forced to be the same person and they actually contract with themselves rather than other people at all. even though rawls may argue that they need to take into consideration other people’s needs (the demands of reciprocity), he fails to understand that the reciprocity condition requires two things that are unavailable in his original position: (1) every party must be allowed to represent his own preference and advantages from their point of view; (2) every involved party must be allowed to end/redo the agreement at any time they all want. all of this means that the reciprocity condition cannot ensure any principle as the finality because it just ensures that each party voluntarily agrees upon an agreement, whatever characteristics of the contract. but rawls seems to suggest that the original position, plus the veil of ignorance, require the reciprocity condition, and thus the two principles of justice are chosen by a social choice process. hampton rightly argues that rawls’ two principles of justice are actually chosen by individual choice, not social choice because the reciprocity condition cannot guarantee any principle as the unconditional finality. thus even though every party in the original position may actually choose the two principles of justice, they are entitled to change them at any time they all agree to do so; the two principles of justice must be contingent, conditional, and revocable. as we have seen that parties in the original position do not necessarily need to adopt the maximin principle and choose two principles of justice as rawls expects, therefore to prevent any other principle than the two principles to be reached, rawls needs to ‘force’ every party to accept the two principles as the unconditional finality. now we can see that rawlsian theory is inconsistent; if he claims that any principle of justice is justified only if it is the result of the contract, then he must not take any contract as the unconditional finality, but if he claims that the two principles are always the finality, then he must rule out any attempt to redo the contract even though every party agrees to do so. 92 prajñā vihāra for hampton, rawlsian contract is merely an individual choice under conditions of uncertainty; an individual has to choose the best possible outcome for himself without a consideration of other people because there are no longer other people; even though there are a million people, there are no real “other people” in the rawlsian contract insofar as everyone is forced to have the same preference (the more, the better) and same way of reasoning (maximin rule). according to rawls, if one is not sure if he will be born in a rich or poor family, then he needs a principle of justice that makes him better off if he actually turns out to be a poor, and since everyone thinks in the same way, everyone finally agrees upon the same principle of justice. this seems to be the result of contract, but actually it is not. the key word lies in the assumption that ‘everyone is the same’ which implies that everyone has no different goals; everyone has the same goal in the first place. the question is that if there is no any different goal among parties, then on what point do they need any contract in the first place? if there is no conflict about the way of reasoning and they are all the same person, why do they need to come to contract with each other in the first place? in this sense hampton is right in saying that there is no contract in the original position because everyone has the same preference and goal, thus there is no need to have a contract among them in the first place. now i want to show how, according to hampton’s argument, rawls’ original position does not raise problems of social choice at all. i will do so by using my own representation. the real problem (puzzle) of social choice is about how to reach an agreement among different preferences. problems of social choice are raised in arrow’s impossibility (arrow, 1951). one impossibility is the ‘unrestricted domain’ axiom which requires that all preferences are allowed, but rawlsian theory violates the unrestricted domain as it rules out some certain preferences in the first place. let me make this argument more concretely. let’s assume that there are three persons – rich, middle, poor – in which rich is assumed to be the most advantaged, middle is the middle advantaged, and poor is the least advantaged, and there are three policies (a, b, c). let’s assume wanpat youngmevittaya 93 also that policy a is most favored by rich, b by middle, and c by poor. this can be put in table as the following figure 2: rich middle poor most preferable a b c middle preferable b c a least preferable c a b figure 2 problem of social choice6 from the figure 2, any social decision cannot be made as the following reasons. according to rich, a > b > c, hence we can say that a > b and b > c. according to middle, b > c > a, hence we can say that a < b and b > c. according to poor, c > a > b, hence we can say that a > b and b < c. we can see that policy a is preferred over policy b by a 2-1 margin, that is, rich and poor prefer a to b, while middle prefers b to a; and that policy b is also preferred over policy c by a 2-1 margin, that is, rich and middle prefer b to c, while poor prefers c to b. since there are three persons in the society, if we use the majoritarian rule, then the society should choose policy a because a is preferred over b, and b over c. however, this social choice does not hold because of its irrationality. according to the principle of rationality, individuals must be able to tell what they prefer (completeness) and the correct order of their preferable choices (transitivity). for example, someone is rational if he can tell that he prefers a to b, and b to c (complete), and he can also tell that he prefers a to c (transitive) (hausman & mcpherson, 1996). therefore, in the figure 2, if a is preferred over b and b over c, then a must be preferred over c always. but this is not the case as, indeed, we found that c is preferred over a, not vice versa; that is, rich is the only one who prefers a to c, while middle and poor prefers c to a. therefore, from the figure 2, we can have the following social ordering: a > b and b > c, but a < c, which is irrational and any social choice or principle 94 prajñā vihāra of justice cannot be made through the social contract. according to arrow’s impossibility theorem, insofar as those ranking preferences from the figure 2 are allowed, any social decision cannot be made because any social rank is inconsistent. according to sen’s liberal paradox, any social decision cannot be made because any social decision violates the minimal liberty (sen, 1970; 1983; 1984). this raises problems of social choice: how to make a social decision which is transitive (arrow) or consistent with the minimal liberty (sen). but the rawlsian contract would solve this problem by ‘forcing’ three of them to be the same person who faces the same situation, that is, no one actually knows their own preferences and that of others. in the original position, for example, rich cannot claim his own preferences (a > b > c) in the first place because he may turn out to be middle and poor equally. therefore, he must think of the worst case (poor) and, according to the maximum rule, he must choose a policy that maximizes his worst outcome, that is, he must choose policy c. at the end, everyone should prefer policy c, and this seems to be a social decision. but we can see that this is not because it violates the unrestricted domain axiom. according to hampton (1980), the original position is the place where there are no differing preferences and all people are “faced with the same problem of uncertainty” and “there is only a series of independent but identical deliberation” (p. 326). therefore, rawlsian contract does not actually raise problems of social choice, and cannot be called a social contract. the question is if rawls’ two principles are not justified by a social contract (voluntary agreement), then what justifies them? i suggest that the original position and the veil of ignorance are not just conditions of justice as rawls claims, but they are the normative justification of the two principles itself. the original position already provides what is justified and what is not by ruling out some certain motivations and preferences in the first place (restricted domain). it is not surprising at all that individuals in the original position choose the two principles because they are ‘forced’ to do so in the first place. rawls’ argument is at best a rational choice theory, not a social choice theory: while the former assumes a certain wanpat youngmevittaya 95 motivation, the latter does not. now we can see that rawls’ justification of his two principles of justice cannot be justified by social contract argument, but by his own particular conception of the good which is realized in the form of the circumstances of justice; since different circumstances of justice and theories of the person lead to different principles of justice, rawls’ secret of two principles of justice lies not in the social choice, but in his particular theory of the person. the next question i will deal with is if rawls’ theory of the person is comprehensive and metaphysical? a philosophical critique of rawls’ political liberalism i think that political liberalism is comprehensive because it is very individualistic and biased against some other ways of life. this is absolutely not to say that political liberalism and individualism as such are morally wrong, but simply that the fundamental idea of political liberalism, which is the belief that it is free of any comprehensive and metaphysical controversies and that it has no says about private sphere, is indefensible. even though it is true that it does not say that the only motivation of individuals is to maximize their own utility or be self interested, it obviously says that each individual equally has the moral power to choose their own conceptions of the good life. the question is that if rawls claims that he does not take any particular comprehensive theory of the person, why does he assume that it is ‘each individual’ who should have the moral power rather than the community or why everyone should be morally equal in the first place? according to sandel (1982; 1984), human beings are encumbered selves in the sense that our ends are prior to our selves and our community is constituted of our selves, so it is wrong to conceive a person as an unencumbered self7 whose self is prior to the good and the community is conceived in the sentimental sense. rawls would argue that political liberalism does not demand that everyone must conceive of themselves as an unencumbered self; instead, insofar as they ‘voluntarily’ choose to be encumbered selves, no one can intervene in their decision. but this argument fails to realize that it still 96 prajñā vihāra gives the moral power to ‘each individual’ in the first place. even though people may have different kinds of motivation and conceptions of the self, their actions are still justified/legitimated on the basis of ‘freedom of choice’ of individuals, and an encumbered self is important at best as the second-order justification. as we have seen and will see more, rawls’ principles of justice, which were chosen by rational/unencumbered beings in the original position, are the first virtue of all institutions and even our private lives in such a way that if there is a conflict between principles of justice and our subjective conceptions of the good, the former must be decisive always. in this sense rawls always gives the priority of principles endorsed by an unencumbered self over any other principles. in other words, rawls conceives the person as an unencumbered self all the time. to understand my argument clearer, i will show how rawls takes a particular comprehensive theory of the person in the original position and why his difference principle is very comprehensive, and then why he fails to distinguish between political sphere and comprehensive sphere. in the original position, rawls takes the deontological theory of the person in the sense that everyone is assumed to be blind to any conception of the good, and they must think of themselves as a self-interested unencumbered self. although rawls may claim that this is just a device, he cannot deny that the characteristic he assigns to the person is merely one of all possible alternatives, as i have shown in the previous section, and more importantly, he cannot deny that he already accepts the possibility of the self-interested motivation. why does he think that one ‘can’ be self-interested? of course, he does not say that one ‘should’ be self interested, but he actually thinks that it is ‘permissible’ and ‘acceptable’ for one to be self-interested. he should be aware that to be called ‘moral comprehensive doctrines’ (non-neutrality), one does not need to suggest that the right thing to do is to do a particular action and think in a certain way, but, indeed, it is enough to judge that what action is permissible and what action is not. in this sense, political liberalism, which insists that one ‘can’ do whatever they want, given that they do not physically8 harm other people, is a kind of comprehensive doctrine despite the fact wanpat youngmevittaya 97 that it does not suggest what particular actions people ‘should’ do. for example, liberals may say that one ‘can’ choose whether to donate to a charity or not. of course, they do not say that one ‘should’ or must donate to a charity, but they accept the possibility of both choices (donate and not donate) in the first place. this means that they already judge that it is acceptable not to donate, so their judgement is based on the premise that one should be conceived as an unencumbered self. i argue that there are two main answers to the question of why we should hold that everyone is morally equal in the first place? one is metaphysical/comprehensive, another is political. i will show that only the former can be defensible, while the latter, which is held by rawls, cannot. a comprehensive theory of the person there are many reasons for accepting the notion that everyone should be morally equal. john locke (1690) argues that everyone has natural rights to life, liberty, and property which are determined by natural laws (p.9). it should be noted that these natural rights and laws are given by god. as locke (1690) writes that, in transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equality, which is that measure god has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slightly and broken by him (p.10). god, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience (p.18). 98 prajñā vihāra as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. nothing was made by god for man to spoil or destroy (pp.20-1). god having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it (p.42). god and nature never allowing man so to abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another power to take it (p.88). locke’s argument is based on a very comprehensive/metaphysical theory of the person as he argues that a person’s essence (true nature) is given by god, and to act morally is to act according to god’s command. many would find the notion that everyone should be morally equal because it is the command of god is very comprehensive and vulnerable to objection as the existence of god, is extremely controversial. even though i agree that locke’s argument is quite controversial, i do not think that we can defeat his argument by claiming that there are better arguments which are less controversial/comprehensive. in other words, i would like to suggest that if we want to defeat locke’s argument, we cannot argue that his argument is wrong because it is controversial, but because it is too unreasonable; since every theory of the person is very controversial and comprehensive, so the best argument is not the one which is less controversial/comprehensive, but the one which is more reasonable. this is a very important issue which i will discuss later. aristotle argues that a person’s essence is a social being whose ends are given by its own teleology or merits, which he argues that happiness wanpat youngmevittaya 99 is the most noble virtue we all should attain in our lives together, and governments should exist not only to protect freedom but also to promote those virtues/goods of individuals. aristotle’s theory of the person is different from that of locke in that the telos or nature of a person is not given by god, but by the nature itself, as brown (2009) argues that “there is a way human beings ought to be and ought to live. this is not because god created them for a purpose – something aristotle did not hold – but simply because they are a certain king of living being, and every living species has its own work or function” (p. xi). for aristotle, to act morally is to act according to the nature of the self, which is to live a happy life, as he writes in the nicomachean ethics that: happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. (book i, 1097b) if this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. but they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described. happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world (book i, 1099a). now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for the sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right people, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from pain – least of all will it be painful (book iv, 1120a). it is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the purpose; for it is in virtue of his state of character and by being a man of a certain kind that he is a boaster (book iv, 1127b). 100 prajñā vihāra we now can see that, for aristotle, to act morally is to act not according to our subjective pleasures or happiness but according to the nature of the things themselves. the right thing to do exists prior to individuals and individuals must discover the telos or virtue of any social practice. for example, they should realize what characteristics are required for one to be called a good person. moreover, aristotle also believes that the purpose of government is to help men pursue noble actions, as he writes in the politics that: it is clear therefore that the state is not an association of people dwelling in the same place, established to prevent its members from committing injustice against each other, and to promote transactions. certainly all these features must be present if there is to be a state; but even the presence of every one of them does not make a state ipso facto. the state is an association intended to enable its members, in their households and the kinships, to live well; its purpose is a perfect and self-sufficient life ... so we must lay it down that the association which is a state exists not for the purpose of living together but for the sake of noble actions (book iii, 1280b29-1281a2). now we can see how locke and aristotle reason for their comprehensive/metaphysical theories of the person. for locke, a person is created by god, and doing the right thing is to act according to god’s command; for aristotle, a person is created and defined by the nature/ telos of itself, and doing the right thing is to act according to the highest nature of the self. so far, i may be criticized for failing to acknowledge that both locke and aristotle do not hold that everyone is morally equal as some may be masters some may be slaves. i would argue that my real point of discussing them is not to say that both of them really give moral power to each individual equally, but that their arguments can support the notion metaphysically. in other words, i suggest that one may borrow this argument (god’s command – locke; teleology – aristotle) to advocate wanpat youngmevittaya 101 the notion that everyone should be morally equal. now let me explore another comprehensive/metaphysical theory of the person of immanuel kant. according to kant (1785), a person is perceived to live in two different worlds, the noumenal and empirical/ phenomenal world9; but to be a moral person, one needs to move from the empirical world, in which his actions are determined by their own different empirical conditions and conceptions of the good, to the noumenal world, in which his actions are determined by pure practical reason or universal moral laws; only in the noumenal world that a person can realize his real self or higher nature10 of the self, which is a rational being. as kant (1785) writes that: hence he has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and recognize laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which being independent on nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone (pp.84-5). if therefore i were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if i were only a part of the world of sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (the former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) (p.86). what he morally “ought” is then what he necessarily “would” as a member of the world of the understanding, and is conceived by him as an “ought” only inasmuch as he likewise considers himself as a member of the world of sense (pp. 87-8). 102 prajñā vihāra in this sense sandel (2009) concisely articulates kant’s theory of the person: “kant argues that every person is worthy of respect, not because we own ourselves but because we are rational beings, capable of reason; we are also autonomous beings, capable of acting and choosing freely. kant doesn’t mean that we always succeed in acting rationally, or in choosing autonomously. sometimes we do and sometimes we don’t. he means only that we have the capacity for reason, and for freedom, and that this capacity is common to human beings as such” (p.105). therefore, according to kant, the fact that a human being is capable of reason is the foundation of the moral action. one may argue that kant’s theory of the person is more acceptable than that of locke and aristotle because it does not base moral judgement on god and the essence of the person, which is quite controversial, but i would argue that kant’s theory is not less controversial than that of locke and aristotle. it should be noted that there are clearly two different statements of the notion “since we are all rational beings who are capable of reason, so we should act according to the moral laws determined by rational beings”; the first statement, which is “we are all rational beings who are capable of reason,” can be scientifically proved; the second statement, which is “we should act according to the moral laws determined by rational beings,” cannot be scientifically proved because it is a normative statement engaging with the language of moral judgement, e.g. good or bad, moral or immoral, and so on. in this sense moral and political philosophy which must engage in judging what’s the right thing to do is scientifically unprovable; it may be provable that doing action a may make me happy, but it is unprovable that i should do action a, as it may be the case that i should do something else despite it does not make me happy; moral judgement does not lie in the scientific/provable facts, but in a given unprovable premise. in this sense i may accept that “we are all rational beings who are capable of reason” as it can be scientifically proved, and this is less controversial; but despite of that acceptance, i do not need to follow that “so we should act according to the moral laws determined by rational wanpat youngmevittaya 103 beings.” why do we use the sentence “since ..., so ...” here? i would argue that these two sentences can be combined rationally only if we already give our unprovable moral values to the first sentence; that is, we must already value the fact of the capacity for reason in the first place, otherwise one can refuse to accept the second sentence that “so, we should act according to the moral laws.” i agree with taylor (1985b) who brilliantly argues that “the mere possession of the capacity will have no normative consequences at all for us if we do not share the conviction that this capacity commands respect” (p.192), and that “beings with these capacities command our respect, because these capacities are of special significance for us; they have a special moral status” (p.193). in this sense kant’s theory of the person is also controversial as it is based on an unprovable moral value he gives to the world in the first place; he must see that the capacity for reason is good in itself, otherwise the mere fact that we are all capable of reason cannot support his moral viewpoint. it is worth noting that my above argument can be applied to other similar notions, e.g. “since individuals are the smallest atomistic creatures, so they should have equal moral power.” again, this notion is controversial and based on a particular comprehensive/metaphysical theory of the person, as those who hold this notion must value the being of the smallest atomistic creature in the first place, otherwise being of this creature would be nothing to with its normative statement at all. so far, we have seen that a theory of the person is indispensable because different theories mean different principles of justice, and that any theory of the person must be based on any particular comprehensive and metaphysical doctrines. the next question is if rawls’ attempt to create a theory of the person rather than comprehensive and metaphysical is defensible, that is, is his political liberalism defensible? 104 prajñā vihāra a political theory of the person: why is rawls’ political liberalism indefensible? having seen that many previous theories of the person must engage in controversial comprehensive doctrines in one way or another, rawls’ project is to construct a theory of justice without relying on any comprehensive theory of the person in order to make his principle more acceptable as it does not involve any controversies about the nature of the person; as rawls (1977, p.165) argues that the problem is this: to develop a viable kantian conception of justice the force and content of kant’s doctrine must be detached from its background in transcendental idealism and given a procedural interpretation by means of the construction of the original position. it must then be shown that the construction, which draws upon the idea of the social contract, is not subject to the cogent objections that idealists raised against the contract doctrine of their day ... i have tried to show how the conception of justice as fairness avoids these and similar objections. the procedural interpretation of kant’s view not only satisfies the canon of a reasonable empiricism, but its use of the idea of the social contract meets hegel’s criticisms [italics added]. rawls’ political liberalism aims to complete two tasks; one is to preserve a kantian conception of justice, another is to replace kant’s transcendental idealism, which is comprehensive, with a reasonable empiricism, which rawls thinks is not comprehensive as it is based on the idea of the social contract. if he can accomplish these two tasks, then rawls’ political liberalism is defensible. however, i argue that rawls’ political liberalism is indefensible because these two tasks are theoretically impossible in the first place. as i have shown, rawls’ argument is not based on the idea of the social contract, but on his particular theory of the person; since different theories of the person lead to different principles of justice. rawls (1977) himself accepts this fact: “once we think of the members of society as free and equal moral persons, it is wanpat youngmevittaya 105 natural for a social contract view to take the basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice” (p.164). rawls’ principles of justice are impossible without his particular theory of the person, which is a person who is morally free and equal. i will argue in this section that, however reasonable his theory of the person is, his theory of the person is also comprehensive/metaphysical. this is not to say that everyone should be morally free and equal, but that the notion is based on a particular comprehensive conception of the person/good. rawls would argue that his theory of the person is merely a device of representation is untenable because, as i have shown in the section of “a political economy critique,” his theory is just one of all possible alternatives; even though i agree with him that a theory of the person is simply a device of representation, i do not need to agree with him that a person should be blind to any conception of the good or morally equal and free, and so on; therefore rawls’ theory of the person must be based on a particular comprehensive conception of the person. to defend his political view, rawls can criticize my argument with two possible arguments; first he may reply that his theory of the person is political, not comprehensive because it is widely accepted by democratic values; second he may reply that this is because it is more reasonable than other theories of the person, that is, it is simply a “thin” theory of the person, which assumes simply a quite general characteristics of the person (rawls, 1971). let me discuss the first reply. rawls (1999) argues that i suggest that we leave aside how people’s comprehensive doctrines connect with the content of the political conception of justice and, instead, regard that content as arising from the various fundamental ideas drawn from the public political culture of a democratic society. putting people’s comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignoranceenables us to find a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism [italics added] (p.32). 106 prajñā vihāra this is the fact that citizens in a pluralist liberal democratic society realize that they cannot reach agreement, or even approach mutual understanding, on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. thus, when citizens are discussing fundamental political questions, they appeal not to those doctrines, but to a reasonable family of political conceptions of right and justice, and so to the idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. this does not mean that doctrines of faith or nonreligious (secular) doctrines cannot be introduced into political discussion, but rather that citizens introducing them should also provide sufficient grounds in public reason for the political policies that religious or nonreligious doctrines support [italics added] (p.125). therefore this reply/argument can be articulated as follows: since a democratic society requires pluralism which enables its members to pursue their own comprehensive doctrines in the private sphere, it is unreasonable to impose any particular comprehensive doctrines on the whole society as other members may not share the same doctrine; it is more reasonable to use a political principle like democratic value or pluralism to govern the whole society; it does not embrace any particular comprehensive doctrine, but simply a political value. in other words, persons should be conceived morally free and equal not because it is metaphysically true but because it is reasonable to a democratic society. despite the soundness of this argument, it is far from being neutral among any particular comprehensive doctrines. it may be true that to preserve a democratic society, we need political liberalism, political conception of the person, reasonable pluralism, the public political culture of a democratic society, and so on, but the question is why a democratic society in the first place? why should a democratic society be valued in the first place? rawls may argue that this is because a democratic society is best suitable for individuals who are morally free and equal, but this indicates that a theory of the person is the foundation of his argument. thus the real question would be why should we hold that wanpat youngmevittaya 107 every individual is morally equal and free in the first place? this question can be answered straightforwardly through comprehensive doctrines, e.g. this should be so because this is a metaphysical truth, and doing the right thing is to fulfill the nature of the person, and so on. but this answer is clearly impossible for political liberalism; instead, it must be answered through political conceptions, e.g. this should be so because it is reasonable for individuals who are morally free and equal. and the old question would be raised again: why should we hold that individuals are morally equal free and equal in the first place? at the end, political liberalism would become merely an arbitrary principle which lacks foundation. now let me discuss the second reply. as i said, the secret of rawls’ principles of justice relies on his theory of the person in the original position, which is articulated as the “circumstances of justice,” so i will discuss why rawls’ circumstances of justice are comprehensive. it should be noted that rawls himself accepts that he needs some conception of the good to form the person in the original position, but this conception must be too thin and weak to be called a comprehensive doctrine, as rawls (1971) argues that, but to establish these principles it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties motives in the original position. since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. this account of the good i call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods requires to arrive at the principles of justice. once this theory is worked out and the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what i shall call the full theory of the good [italics added] (p.396). 108 prajñā vihāra there is no inconsistency, then, in supposing that once the veil of ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have ties of sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interests of others and to see their ends attained. but the postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position is made to insure that the principles of justice do not depend upon strong assumptions. recall that the original position is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions. a conception of justice should not presuppose, then, extensive ties of natural sentiment. at the basis of the theory, one tries to assume as little as possible [underline added] (p.129). but a human society is characterized by the circumstances of justice. the account of these conditions involves no particular theory of human motivation. rather, its aim is to include in the description of the original position the relations of individuals to one another which set the stage for questions of justice [italics added] (pp.129-30). they assume that they would prefer more primary social goods rather than less. of course, it may turn out, once the veil of ignorance is removed, that some of them for religious or other reasons may not, in fact, want more of these goods. but from the standpoint of the original position, it is rational for the parties to suppose that they do want a larger share, since in any case they are not compelled to accept more if they do not wish to, nor does a person suffer from a greater liberty [italics added] (p.142). we now can see that rawls distinguishes between the thin/weak theory of the good/person and the full/strong theory of the good/person; while the former is acceptable to a party in the original position, the latter is not. please notice that, despite his use of conceptions of the good, he still believes that his conception of the good is not based on a particular comprehensive theory, as rawls (1993) argues that “the veil of ignorance, to mention one prominent feature of that position, has no specific wanpat youngmevittaya 109 metaphysical implications concerning the nature of the self” (p.27). rawls believes that by using the thin/weak theory of the good/person, which is the “the more, the better” motivation and the maximin motivation, he can avoid any comprehensive doctrines. but i will argue that his thin/weak theory of the good/person is also comprehensive. first of all, how do we distinguish between the thin and full theory of the good? what is the definition of the thin theory? rawls does not discuss these issues in detail, but we can articulate as follows: the thin theory is any characteristics of the person which are widely accepted and less controversial; the full theory is any characteristics which are less common and quite controversial. but this definition is controversial itself, as sandel (1982) asks that “weak or strong with respect to what?” (p.45). i am sure that rawls would say that a self-interested motivation is a weak/thin theory, while benevolence and altruism are full and strong. the question is how does he know that this is true? rawls can only answer this question in two different ways. first, he might argue that this is true because of empirical facts; since many or most people see it that way, he also sees it that way, too. but this is problematic. while it is true that many modern societies would accept that thin-full distinction, it is also true that many pre-modern societies may not; from those pre-modern societies’ points of view, benevolence/altruism may be more widely stressed than self-interest, and so it should be a thin theory to them. rawls might argue that we do not need to take those pre-modern societies into account because they are irrational. but this raises another serious problem: he must judge who is rational/irrational by his own particular conception of the good because he must assert this even before any social contract begins. let me assume that there are only 100 people in the world, and that 90 of them hold that self-interest is a thin theory while benevolence is a full theory, and another 10 hold otherwise. in this sense it is clearly that the notion that self-interest is a thin theory is more widely accepted, and so rawls should hold this view. but if he really holds this view, then what is the difference between his liberalism and his enemies, utilitarianism, which 110 prajñā vihāra favors the majority’s views? don’t forget that rawls’ theory of justice is constructed to overcome utilitarianism in the first place, so rawls cannot hold this view. second, he might argue that this is true because of its rationality itself; since people may have different views concerning the thin and full conceptions, we must assert that it is always rational to assume that self-interest is thin, and benevolence is full. but this reply is also problematic: how do we know if a theory is more or less controversial and widely accepted if we do not refer to actual persons? since the concept of ‘controversy’ would be meaningless if it is beyond real persons’ opinions, rawls now has only two choices. first, he must embrace only the first reply, which holds that the distinction between the thin and full theories depends on empirical facts. second, he must embrace only the second reply, which holds that the distinction between the thin and full theories depends on his own conception of rationality. whatever he chooses, his political liberalism would collapse because for the first choice, empirical facts cannot support his theory, and for the second choice, his theory is based on a comprehensive/controversial doctrines. i also want to argue further that even though he is successful in distinguishing between the thin and full theories of the good, his thin theory is also comprehensive. now let’s assume that his definition of the thin theory is sound and clear, the question is why should we hold that the thin theory is more reasonable than the full theory? as i have argued, rawls cannot refer to the majority’s views as it would undermine his whole theory. the only reason is that he already values the thin theory as such, and this will also undermine his political liberalism as the following reason. for instance, if a person really believes in god’s command which teaches him that everyone is not morally free and equal, and everyone is not born by accident but by god’s intention; it is not accident that someone is born rich and someone is born poor, and so on, thus any income redistribution is unjust because it violates god’s command. how would rawls respond? i guess he would say that his belief is too strong to be accepted by everyone, so his belief cannot become the theory of justice. wanpat youngmevittaya 111 but, as we have seen, it is impossible for any single principle, weak or strong, to be accepted by everyone. rawls would argue that he means only every ‘rational’ person, not everyone in the usual sense. but where does his conception of rationality come from? it is clearly not from actual persons’ opinions, but from his own reasoning. one may argue that we should not give the moral power to those who believe that everyone is not morally equal and free because they violate the rights in the first place. but this argument is clearly irrelevant and misplaced because we must realize that rawls’ theory of the person is formed “before” any principle of justice occurs, and, as rawls claims, “before” principles of justice come to play no one can claim his “rights” absolutely. but rawls (1971) seems to violate his own theory by asserting that “these assumptions [conception of goodness] must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right” (p.396). this means that, for rawls, what is just/unjust can be judged “before” any principle of justice is chosen, as rawls (1971) himself accepts that “the idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just” [italics added] (p.136), and that “if anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached” [italics added] (p. 139), and that “if a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies” (p.141). let’s us discuss these passages critically. indeed, the ultimate moral judgement of his theory of justice is not based on the agreement of the social contract, but on the circumstances of justice (fair procedure/ due reflection) characterized by rawls himself. as he accepted, simply the fact that people come to agree upon the contract cannot guarantee that the really just principles of justice would be reached, this is why he must propose that the agreements would be just only if they are proceeded under a fair procedure characterized by “his” certain characteristics. the notion that particular knowledge is arbitrary contingency may seem rational to many people, but this clearly cannot be the case for everyone; thus his notion is also controversial and comprehensive as it is merely a 112 prajñā vihāra particular theory. since rawls’ principles of justice are already guaranteed by his own circumstances of justice, which holds that it is “unjust” for a person to know his particular conceptions of the good before the contract, the ultimate justification of his theory is based on his own particular comprehensive doctrines rather than the social contract; that is, he already knows what is just and unjust before any social contract happens. according to the difference principle, rawls embraces two different conceptions of the comprehensive doctrine: one is a particular assumption of the human motivation, another is the deontological theory of the person. for the first conception, it would be impossible to talk about economic (dis)advantages if we could not make a comparison between each individual’s good/end. he needs to assume that ‘everyone’ prefers ‘more to less’ and material wealth is very important to them. again, this assumption seems very common to many of us, but there is no good reason to believe that this is what ‘everybody’ actually wants unconditionally; thus, to make the difference principle possible he needs to lean on a particular assumption of the human motivation which is not neutral/political. for the second conception, the difference principle reflects his deontological theory of the person in a deep sense. it is true that he allows ‘actual’ persons to pursue their own goods and properties as they see fit, but it is also true that he does not allow ‘anyone’ to be entitled to their own goods and properties absolutely; instead they all have to be subject to the difference principle which emerges from the agreement among deontological persons. all of this means that his theory of justice is more acceptable to those whose comprehensive doctrine is individualism than those whose comprehensive doctrine is not. let’s us come back to my example of someone who believes that any income redistribution is unjust because it violates god’s command. rawls would argue that those claims are too ‘strong’ and ‘contingent’ to be a ‘general’ conception of the person who is rational enough to choose the best principles of justice. but this is problematic; since he finds that some ‘actual’ persons are irrational and are not suitable to do the task of discovering the principle of justice, the first task would be to make them ‘rational’ by forcing them to conceive wanpat youngmevittaya 113 themselves as an unencumbered self. in other words, rawls has to insist that those who have such ‘strong’ conceptions of the person are irrational, and they need to ‘change’ their minds by accepting the notion that we are all born accidentally, not according to our choices in previous lives, or by god’s command. this is not to say that it is reasonable, but that rawls cannot avoid choosing a particular conception of the good/person which is very comprehensive. rawls may argue that this conception is not comprehensive/ metaphysical because he still allows anyone to hold that we are all born as a result of our choices in previous lives, by god’s intention, but only if he or she accepts the difference principle. but this is very paradoxical since the foundation of the difference principle is the belief that we are all born by accident, thus any belief that holds otherwise can be accepted at best as the second-order truth. since rawls’ two principles of justice are always the first virtues of the whole society, to accept them is to also believe that his theory of the person in the original position is metaphysically true. rawls may argue that his theory of the person is simply a device to represent his philosophy, and actual persons do not need to hold it in the reality. but if this is really the case, then why doesn’t he allow actual persons to hold their “strong” conceptions of the good as the first principle rather than his two principles of justice? rawls would argue that since they already choose the two principles of justice by themselves in the original position, they cannot refuse to accept them. but they may argue that they never accept such principles or anything in the original position at all, why do they need to accept them? rawls would argue that even though they never actually do so, they must accept them because if they had thought of themselves rationally, then they would have accepted them. now we reach the climax. rawls’ principles of justice can be justified only if every actual person accepts that his real nature/essence is what described by rawls’ theory of the person in the original position. to accept that i myself have chosen those principles of justice is to accept that the conception of my real essence as a person has already been 114 prajñā vihāra described by rawls himself. in this sense anyone who believes that he was born not by accident must accept that his comprehensive doctrine is at best the second-order truth; there is something truer than his own conception. even though they are free to pursue their own conceptions of the good, they must be aware all the time that a theory of the person described in the original position is always truer than their conceptions. sandel (1982) rightly argues that “we must be prepared to live with the vision contained in the original position, mutual disinterest and all, prepared to live with it in the sense of accepting its description as an accurate reflection of human moral circumstance, consistent with our understanding of ourselves” (p.48). if rawls still insists that “if they had thought of themselves rationally, then they would have accepted them,” then he cannot deny that people are first required to understand themselves as rawls described in the original position, otherwise he or she cannot accept that they have chosen principles of justice by themselves; since two principles of justice are chosen by a deontological person characterized by rawls, these principles are just for those who really possess those characteristics. in this sense even though a person holds a strong conception of the good which is incompatible with principles of justice in his private life, he cannot take it too seriously because he must realize that that is not his real nature of the self as his real self must be compatible with principles of justice. although rawls would say that they are free to believe that we are not born by accident, he implies that the belief is less true than the belief that we are born by accident. but if rawls insists that they must hold the two principles of justice even though they do not view themselves that way, then his principles of justice would simply be arbitrary, because they must accept principles which they themselves may disagree or have nothing to do with their selves at all. his principles use people as a means. the only way to get out of this situation is to insist that his principles require people to realize their real selves. to force them to accept two principles of justice is not merely to use them but to make them realize their real selves. in other words, rawls needs to accept that his theory is wanpat youngmevittaya 115 comprehensive/metaphysical, and since his principles of justice (political sphere) are comprehensive, so the ‘private sphere’ must be determined/ constrained by some particular comprehensive doctrines, not neutral/ political values. it is impossible to separate the ‘political’ sphere from the ‘private’ sphere, both political and personal spheres equally require some particular moral comprehensive doctrines. conclusion in contrast to rawls’ political liberalism, which holds that it is possible to separate justice and the political sphere from any moral comprehensive doctrines in the sense that principles of justice are not based on any of those doctrines but on political values themselves, i have argued that political liberalism, embraces a particular metaphysical/ comprehensive theory of the good/person, which is an unencumbered self. from a political economy perspective, i have argued that rawls’ principles of justice and the idea of the original position are justified not on the basis of the social contract argument, but on rawls’ theory of the person or the circumstances of justice, which are determined by his own conception of rationality. without his theory of the person his principles of justice would be impossible because different theories of the person lead to different principles of justice. from a philosophical perspective, i have argued that rawls’ theory of the person in the original position is comprehensive rather than political because its characteristics are given by what rawls thinks are just in the first place, and that political sphere cannot be separated from private sphere because principles of justice governing political sphere are always prior to any other comprehensive doctrines in private sphere. 116 prajñā vihāra end notes 11 rawls sometimes uses the term ‘device of representation’ instead (1993, p. 75). 2 to be clear, i think that rawls’ political liberalism is also metaphysical. but i intentionally use the term ‘comprehensive’ in many places because this should be boarder than merely ‘metaphysical,’ and rawls would find it harder to deny. 3 important certain characteristics of the person in the original position are that each individual has the equal moral power to decide the best principle of justice and that they do not know their own social and economic positions and conceptions of good life in the reality until the veil of ignorance is uncovered. thus, the person in the original position is described as a rational being whose self is prior to any end/good (deontological/unencumbered self). 4 in fact, kymlicka (1989) defends rawls’ political neutrality, but the neutrality and political liberalism share the same aspects so i think we can say that kymlicka also defends political liberalism. 5 she usually uses the term “considerations.” 6 this table is revised from stiglitz & driffill (2000, p. 381). 7 my point here is not to judge whether we are all encumbered or unencumbered selves as sandel claims. i just want to show that rawls’ theory of the person cannot avoid this debate, and so his theory must be comprehensive. 8 the question is why is physical harm more concerned than spiritual harm? why is it possible to criticize someone’s beliefs but impossible to attack him physically? this implies that liberals already judge that physical harm is more dangerous/wrong than spiritual/intellectual harm. in other words, since an individual is conceived as an unencumbered self who is prior to any ends/beliefs, so it is ‘acceptable’ to attack his belief as it is just a contingent part of his self, but it is ‘unacceptable’ to attack his body because this is the most fundamental element of his self. 9 kant (1785) actually uses the term the intelligible world or the world of understanding instead of the noumenal world, and the term the world of sense instead of the empirical/phenomenal world. but i think that the noumenal and empirical/phenomenal world are also appropriate here. please see sandel (1982). 10 one may argue that kant does not defend a rational being on the basis of higher goods/nature of the person. but i would argue that without this assertion, kant’ theory would be inconsistent. this is because since kant wants to avoid using people as a means and to respect them as an ends in itself, to say that every rational being must obey the universal moral laws without making it clear that doing so is the way to realize their real selves would be to say that they must do things which they may not agree and has noting to do with their selves at all; it is like imposing the moral laws on people regardless of their consent. to avoid using people as a means and to preserve the moral laws is to propose that complying to the moral laws are things good in itself and good for every rational being. in this way to impose the universal moral law on everyone can avoid using people as a means because even though they may not consent to do so, we can argue that this is the real nature of a rational being which they need to realize, despite wanpat youngmevittaya 117 they may not realize it now. in this sense i agree with taylor (1985b) who argues that “rationality thus imposes obligations on us. being rational agents, that is possessing a capacity so much higher than nature, puts us under an obligation to live up to this status. we could say that the fundamental principle underlying kant’s whole ethical theory is something of this form: live up to what you really are – rational agents. because it is something higher, rationality commands our respect. that is why we experience the moral commands as higher than the demands of nature. we recognize that the moral law is something that commands our respect (achtung)” (p.324). bibliography aristotle. the nicomachean ethics, translated by ross, d. oxford: oxford university press, 2009. ——. the politics, translated by ernest barker. oxford: oxford university press, 1995. arrow, k.j. 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(1983). spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality. new york: basic books. emmanuel nweke okafor 145 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 145-162 © 2000 by assumption university press the concept of igbo spirituality and environment emmanuel nweke okafor assumption university of thailand abstract in a techno-scientific age where conflicting views on the reality of environmental ethics as well as ethical, environmental and ideological concerns emerge continuously, there is the need to constantly reinstate the vertical-horizontal dimensions of man’s peaceful co-existence with living and non-living things. added to the above task is retrieval of indigenous beliefs and practices which are be relevant to sound environmental and social development. this research focuses on what the igbo people actually believe and practice and the values inherent in igbo spirituality. employing a hermeneutic approach, this study demonstrates how to interpret environmental values that are present within igbo spirituality. a major finding in this study is that, in spite of modern developments, environmental values of igbo spirituality are still preserved and practiced, and have practical functions within community life. considering the nature and diversified forms of challenges to the igbo spirituality in this age of science with some environmental devaluating attitudes of the human person, the study proposes that mankind cultivate this traditional sense of love, care and harmonious co-existence with the mother earth already present in igbo spirituality. 146 prajñā vihāra introduction man is a social animal that lives in a network of relationships. in his numerous life endeavors: political, religious, cultural and economics, man is found in a deep-rooted sense of belonging and oneness with both animate and inanimate things. however, in this techno-scientific era where the world is fast becoming a global village, there is the need to constantly reinstate the vertical-horizontal dimensions of man’s peaceful co-existence with living and non-living things. thus, in recent times, there has been a clarion call for the conservation of nature. within the african perspective, this concern goes beyond the mere care for the environment, it involves a return to the traditional african sense of value and respect for the order of created things, especially the mother earth. in such a deep rooted tradition, the sacredness of the earth (land, trees and other natural endowments) forms a great part of the african traditional religion, thereby showing the sources of the rich african cultural and spiritual heritage. based on these assumptions, words of wisdom embedded in the african folklores, myths, proverbs and other traditional practices confirm a sense of reverence and respect accorded to the natural world. this paper seeks to examine man’s harmonious encounter with the environmental values and his fellow men by investigating the role of environmental care and respect for the human person in the igbo spirituality; which is capped in the commensurably-oriented attitudinal approach to life. the concept of spirituality from the igbo perspective spirituality is not a peculiar property of one religion or the other; thus, it remains eminent in several human practices. this aspect is therefore an exploration of the concepts of spirituality from the african, especially igbo point of view, a spiritual guide and the possible roles of the spiritual guide in the attainment of spiritual excellence. additionally, in line with the igbo cosmology, the earth which is called ani in igbo is regarded emmanuel nweke okafor 147 as the handwork of god, the creator and maker of all things. for f. a. arinze, the earth spirit is the most important spirit after chukwu and she is the great mother spirit in the igbo hierarchy of beings (arinze, 2008, p.27.). the ancestors believed that god can be worshipped through the created natural things like trees, water bodies, and animals among others. this supposition characterizes some of the various religious rituals in traditional igbo society in an attempt to attain spiritual growth. this implies that conservation and preservation of these sources of their spiritualities remain an essential part of the traditional practices of the igbo people. nonetheless, there is a need for this attitude to be upheld and promoted in the light of the current environmental pollution and crisis that is daily emanating across the globe. however, the igbo holistic understanding of the inter-relationship that exists in the eco-system negates the nature-culture, rural-urban polarization. worthy of mention is the fact that the nature of the igbo spirituality cherishes the need for the interaction of beings for efficacy. it is this understanding that helps the community of persons to develop and practice the culture of environmental preservation of existing realities which equally creates a balance in the natural world; trees, animals and other things in nature that today face extinction. fundamentally, the igbo approach to spirituality is built on the belief in a supreme beinggod chiukwu, lesser deities, and ancestors and in the after-life. these are the anchors unto which spiritual orientation for the igbo is rooted. this clue thus throws more light on the nature of the igbo and their interaction with both temporal and non-temporal life forces within their vicinity. in the view of the igbo traditional perception of reality, the world is made up of two main interrelated parts: the heavens (eluigwe) and the earth (elu-uwa) the house of man, animals, plants and a host of other created beings. it is a place where two realms of existence: (ala mmadu and ala mmuo), man and deities interact (nwala, 1985, p.30). according to metuh: “all beings known to african worldviews belong to either worlds-the visible world (ala mmadu), and the invisible world (ala mmuo). the invisible world is made up of the heavenly realm, said to be the home 148 prajñā vihāra of the creator and deities; and the spirit land; the home of the ancestors” (metuh, 1992, p. 51). the ancestors in igboland are believed to participate in all important family affairs. it is believed that there is a continuous interaction between the supreme being and the other beings in the universe irrespective of the realm to which each belongs and operates. they inhabit the natural phenomena and are involved in men’s daily activities. it is thus difficult to talk of a strict dichotomy between the natural and the spiritual worlds because they are in constant communion and communication (nwala, 1985, pp.31-34). in a similar vein, in igbo tradition, an indispensable channel through which spiritual communication, worship and atonement ensues is music. it permeates all religious and social gatherings and ceremonies meant to establish harmony with god and the community. for example, music accompanies child naming, marriages and other festivities. prayers, invocations, and blessings are also made. prayer is the first act of worship addressed to god to intervene in the lives and workings of the people. formal blessings are also made and declared on all or specific people and purposes. after this comes the final greetings and salutations. there is also the belief that the spiritual worlds inform belief in the afterlife because death is not the final end of human existence in the igbo belief system. it is believed that every person has a spiritual quality or characteristic that transforms into another form of existence after death. hence, it is only those who live a good life that go to the world of the ancestors (the spirit land) where they continue to have influence on earthly life and family matters. the ancestral home is a perfect prototype of a good life on earth (nwala, 1985, p.34). living a good life in the igbo sense means to carefully observe the customs, taboos, laws and traditions of the land called omenala. omenala (tradition) is the hidden point of reference in any moral discourse among the igbo (ekennia, 2000, p.166). in a nutshell, omenala is the embodied spirituality of any existing igbo community and is meant to provide and protect all values inherited from the ancestors. emmanuel nweke okafor 149 chi in the igbo spirituality chi is a unique personal life-force and the principle that determines each individual’s destiny. each person possesses his own chi believed to be the spiritual force that accompanies the life journey of the individual (mozia, 1982, p.212). thus in the submission of ekennia: chi gives each person infinite possibilities to realize himself in the community and this personalized inner force in each individual, is always in harmony with the person. when the person acquires mastery of himself or has attained certain self-knowledge, he examines the inner force and becomes fully in control of any situation. it is at this point that the igbo say “onye kwe, chi ya ekwe” (ekennia, 2000, p.154). consequently, the igbo person regards his chi as the explanatory principle for his successes or failures in life. even though the igbo person can have some control over his chi, there is an aspect of determinism in his life which is usually manifested when the person records failures in his life despite his determined efforts. he sees himself as (‘onye chi ojoo’) an unlucky man while on the other hand, he is seen as (‘onye chi oma’) a lucky one with good chi (mozia, 1982, p.184). religiously speaking, therefore, the igbo are united by their belief in one god (chukwu) and in the spirits and ancestors. their belief in god is responsible for their inseparable relationship with god and the members of the community. this relationship also extends to non-igbo. worthy of note is the fact that the igbos have two notions of chi-the material and the immaterial nature of chi. the material part of man (ahu), body (ahu) is the igbo term that stands for the material aspect in him, which is without the soul. nevertheless, the same ahu can be into used in various contexts by the igbo to mean different things like-ahu gi kwanu meaning ‘how is your body?’ this is a way of further greetings among the igbo. the immaterial part of man (mind and soul) which is the spiritual or invisible part of the human person is the defining principle 150 prajñā vihāra of his personhood and actions. with this very dimension of his being, mankind cultivates a relationship with the transcendental world. man being a composite of soul and body, the igbo runs into the conflict of choice of words in defining the human soul. for instance, edeh employs three terms in identifying the soul-‘mkpuruobi’, ‘chi’ and ‘mmuo’. ‘mmuo’ is the most suitable that conveys the idea of the soul. this is so because immortality suggests that which is unseen as against that which is seen. thus, every activity that is not of the body must be from the soul (edeh, 1985, pp. 80-82). this view is not however conclusive as some other scholars like metuh have other notions. these arguments notwithstanding, the respective functions played by either of the terminologies employed in describing soul or body point to the different aspects of the human person. all these considerations point to the fact that ‘mmuo’ (spirit) refers to something immaterial (ekennia, 2000, p.155). fundamentally, it designates the invisible spirit world. this leading analysis points to the impact of the igbo people and their anthropology on their approach to spirituality. god in the traditional igbo belief system the igbo system of belief in the supreme being anchors heavily on their understanding of the hierarchy of forces/being. the igbo hold tenaciously to the interplay of forces in their life which forms their concept of a higher being that is superior to all other beings. this explains the genesis of some terminologies like ‘chi-ukwu’, ‘olisa-ebuluwa’, and ‘onye-okike’. for the igbo, it is this being that sustains every other being. e. edeh argues that the existence of things in the universe coupled with the igbo concept of ‘chi’, life after death-reincarnation stand as reliable proofs for the reality of such a supreme being in whose reverence their spirituality anchors (edeh, 1985, p.59). more so, the igbo believe that no one equals this supreme being in power and he knows everything, he is altogether a good and merciful god (arinze 2008: 18). hence, it is widely believed among the igbo people that ‘chukwu’ controls and emmanuel nweke okafor 151 directs everything that happens in the world of men, and indeed the entire universe. the igbo man believes firmly in the omnipotence of ‘chukwu’. arinze (2008, p.15) opines that ‘chukwu’ has three chief names: ‘chukwu’ (chi-ukwu, the great spirit), ‘chineke’ (the spirit that creates) and ‘oseburuwa’ (the lord who upholds the world). these names however, portray the three dimensional functions of ‘chukwu’ among the igbo. ‘chi-ukwu’ represents the spirit that is above and beyond all other smaller spirits. ‘chineke’ represents the spirit that causes everything into being out of nothingness. finally, ‘oseburuwa’ represents the spirit that governs, sustains, controls and guides the activities of human beings. thus, these local names for the supreme being were mostly culled from the igbo people’s perceived level of relationship and activities between human beings and god; and this is their spirituality. peace and personhood in the igbo society this portion focuses on peace and personhood in the igbo society by positing that a habitable environment is the key to happy living in the igbo society. this explains the igbo people’s high sense of value for the earth and why they see nature as the ultimate in human life. spiritual guide and the human person in a traditional igbo society existence in every traditional igbo society is institutions traditionally set up by the people through which law and order are kept in such a society. therefore, the functionality of the government of igbo society is built on the workability of institutions like age grade, ozo titled men, women folk-otu ada, among others. these social setups are not far from the religious aspects of the people’s lives and practices (arinze, 2008, p.18). in this same line of thought, spiritual guide and the human person in a traditional igbo society becomes crucial. in these spiritual guides among the igbo, strong reference is always made to traditional sage wisdom, folklore, and myth. here, the people’s historical account 152 prajñā vihāra provides the horizon on which moral issues regarding the conservation and distribution of resources are evaluated in juxtaposition to environmental ethics. nature embraces a wider scope which includes history and religion which has the person at the centre of the entire drama. the human person cannot exist outside of the natural environment because environmental quality is a necessity for human life. this quality means that humans must develop a sustainable relationship with their environment (rolston, 2003, p.515). peace: a necessity in human society peace according to mbiti “is a good relationship well lived; health, absence of pressure and conflict, being strong and prosperous. peace is the totality of well-being, the fullness of life here and hereafter, what the yoruba call alafia. this is the sum total of all that man may desire-an undisturbed harmonious life” (mbiti, 1975, pp.162-163). this by extension explains some of the names the igbo people answer like obiajulum, nwaforaku, udochukwuka, among others. in addition, peace denotes the absence of bodily violence, war or conflict. ikenga metuh proposes peace as a beneficent adjustment of harmony between the individual and his creator on the one side, and his fellow men on the other side all in relation to the environment in which mankind inhabits. in this, one discovers the concentric dimensions of peace between individuals, communities and nations. in the igbo worldview, correlated to the concept of peace are justice and development (metuh, 1992, p.55). for the igbo, peace entails a just relation among men and with the community in whose life they share. contrary to this, a person can fight like a wounded lion whenever his rights are trampled upon and can even call upon the gods for remedy. when on account of one’s misdeed the peace of the land is contravened by involvement in any sort of abomination or taboo, the communal dimension of peace is still seen. emmanuel nweke okafor 153 peaceful co-existence in a traditional igbo society in no way is the igbo society known and identified with individualistic or self-centered way of life. for instance, the igbo family system is usually extended to clan and that is why people of the same clan cannot intermarry, but people of different clans cannot be included in the family cycle since they have their own lineage. the philosophy “we are better than animals because we have kinsmen” is so pronounced in the igbo communalistic way of life. according to achebe, “an animal rubs its itching flank against a tree, a man asks his kinsman to scratch him” (achebe, 2008, p.132). he considers the support a family gives one another as the defining characteristic of humanity. without family or respect for one’s family, one might as well be an animal. in igbo society, family feast celebration is a sign of communal reunion and not only for eating and drinking since each family can afford what to eat and drink. this is properly expressed in an igbo proverb, “ihe e ji aputa ama bu ka ihu na ihu hukorita, o nweghi onye onwa anaghi eti na mpku ya” hence, “we come together because it is good for kinsmen to do so” (achebe, 2008, p.133). this brings together both the living and the dead members of the family and kinsmen. traditional igbo approach to conflict resolution significant to igbo life is its closely knit to culture and tradition. traditions and customs are considered to be uniting factors in igbo society. to be recognized and respected in igbo land, one must follow traditions and customs. just as the success of the individuals in the society depends on the communities’ effort as well to keep to the dictates of the gods, so does the entire community also suffer the consequences of disobeying the gods. nevertheless, conflict resolution in any igbo society has some peculiar approaches. the igbo worldview holds that the purity of the land is determined by the purity of the people. in igbo tradition, it is believed that no wise and normal human person will ask his chi for a duel. tending 154 prajñā vihāra to go against the wish of the gods is risking one’s life. no one fights the spirits and remains the same (achebe, 2008, p.149). since the oracles are human beings but speak and interpret the minds of the gods and foresee the future, even on the most difficult and controversial issues, the people have to accept the words of the oracle. from the foregoing, conflict resolutions are often given communalistic approach when they arise between a man and his fellow man, between communities or families, and towns are often given communalistic approach. from the okpala, to the kindred, titled men, umuokpu (for women’s folk), the elders representing each town or community-ndi ojiani, conflicts are addressed in every traditional igbo society whenever they arise. these men are regarded as the upholders of the truth and justice in each community and their duty is to see that truth reigns in each case and peace restored. the practice of making sacrifices to appease the gods, for atonement and reconciliation is equally an indispensable part of conflict resolution in igbo society. this is based on the fact that every offence in the community is of two dimensions. it affects both the living and the dead and their interactions with the community. traditionally, a successful conflict resolution in every traditional setting is marked by a common sharing in kola nut and drinking of palm wine often with the same cup. respect for kola nut is one of the most important traditions in igbo society. igbo people show much respect to kola nuts for what it represents in igbo culture. kola nut is a symbol of life and life is sacred, as the common igbo adage says ‘onye wetara oji wetara ndu (he who brings kola brings life as well). much significance is attached to kola nut in igbo culture. kola nut is a symbol of acceptance and unity. for an igbo man to tell his neighbor, “we do not share, eat and drink in common” means that there is a great problem (olorunsola, 1972, p.157). this approach to conflict resolution is however informed by the igbo notion of sin. achebe in things fall apart defined sin as a “crime against the gods”. such transgressions occur when a member of a society violates bonds of family or insults an ancestral spirit. as the gods are emmanuel nweke okafor 155 not slow in anger, sinners get quick and severe punishment from the gods, and some of these punishments are known and carried out by the community where the sin was committed. the punishments are meted out as a deterrent and also to appease the gods who are directly offended. animal sacrifices, a heavy fine, exile from one’s fatherland, or even death are instances of the punishments (achebe, 2008, pp.8-17). if such atonement is not done, not only is the sinner subject to the wrath of the gods, the entire community suffers. social and environmental challenges in igboland the igbo are united by ethnicity, culture and the geographic features of their location. their location has a rainforest climate. the ecosystem is rich in rain forest reserves, rivers, etc., and this defines the livelihood of the local people as farmers, traders, food processors and local manufacturers of items linked to subsistence economies. there is a rich biodiversity of various species of plants and organism in the ecosystem. there are lots of palm trees, cassava, yam, plantain, pepper and palm kernel. some environmental challenges in igboland are deforestation, toxic waste dumping, soil destruction, flooding and erosion, noise pollution, lack of community participation due to failed government promises and policies, indifference and aloofness, weak or non-existent environmental policies, low agricultural production, socio-economic problems like poverty, joblessness, loss of farmlands, and low living standards. other challenges include air pollution with poisonous chemicals and greenhouse emissions leading to increased cases of heart and lung cancer and diseases. environmental challenges are community problems and go beyond the condition of the soil, land, water and atmosphere. the issue also touches on the quality of living conditions since human persons are “at the center of concerns for sustainable development and are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature” (un, rio declaration, 1992). people make up part of the environment; therefore environmental degeneration will lead to human degeneration. onuoha notes that: 156 prajñā vihāra environmental degradation deals with the misuse or overuse of the resources of the environment which include fresh and safe water, fisheries, arable land, plants, animals, mineral resources, air, wildlife, and flora. one notable implication of environmental degradation for social existence is that it usually disrupts socio-economic life of the immediate human population that depends on natural resources for sustenance (onuoha, 2008a, p.1027). the igbo face this challenge more because they are agrarians who depend more on land resources for sustenance than on government. the solution to this issue will be the effective application of environmental laws that regulate the use of resources and also sanction individuals’ acts like careless waste disposal, unhygienic conditions and dirty neighborhoods, destruction of trees and plants. in line with this, the united nations declared: indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop, and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs, and ceremonies, the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites, the right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects, and the right to the repatriation of their human remains. indigenous people have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons (un, 1992). thus, one of the many ways of preserving and promoting the igbo ecological thought is to engage it as a rational discourse and make it part of the educational curriculum. igbo traditional thought must dialogue with other disciplines so that it will not be rendered redundant. dialogue makes ideas and values relevant without loss of the basic tenets. it also contributes to knowledge to show its epistemological relevance given its raw data emmanuel nweke okafor 157 form. agbakoba, who supports the transition from intuitive to a rational inquiry, opines that such a move is important as it makes no difference schooling pupils in science and technology without a corresponding attention to the cultural thought and praxis that form their socialization and outlook. thus, it is important to engage the igbo spirituality as it contains scientific discoveries from its observation and interaction with nature (asiegbu and agbakoba, 2006, pp.309-328). call for a new igbo environmental awareness the western denigration of africans as a primitive people lacking rationality contributed to the neglect of their ideologies, perspectives and cultural experiences. thus, inadequate attention to their epistemology and worldviews stems from this marginalization. african ideologies have been in quest for identity and recognition in the midst of other universal ideologies. to put this study in the right perspective, it is imperative to reflect on the cruise of the argument which questions the possibility of an african philosophy. for instance, such question as whether the “untutored african” can conceive of god raises alarm among the people of africa. it is a question that borders on the validity or ability to have a body of knowledge that is typically african and without any western influence or imposition. to do justice to the issue then, environmental ethics in africa requires a dialogue with other ideas while maintaining the african concrete thoughts and experiences. the data of experiences about the african environment remains the platform for any further discussion on fashioning a new environmental ethics for africans and by implication, the igbo. in addition, attention must be paid to differences in the climatic inclinations across nations as a guide when considering any ethics or indigenous thoughts. oladipo is of the view that what is needed is not a restoration of traditional culture as such but a retrieval of the humanistic impulse already present in traditional thoughts (oladipo, 2009, p.86). in other words, the rich elements in the tradition must be engaged with 158 prajñā vihāra the western intellectual traditions. to do justice is to recognize that traditional thought plays a big role in the rational discourse even if it is not complete in itself. to be relevant, it must converse with other ideas from across its boundaries. western ideas must not be totally absorbed without examining them because some were not developed in or for igbo contexts. thus, all environmental ethical theories have western perspectives and cultural experiences signaling the need to embrace other enterprises in the world that is not western. furthermore, africa has suffered the problem of identity crisis as an effect of her involvement with colonialism and neo-colonialism but the way for the traditional-modernity relationship is not one in which they remain incommunicado. nkrumah holds that it must be done in such a way that both sides are “in tune with the original humanistic principles underlying african society” (nkrumah, 1968, p.268). the question we are asking is: what is the current and real situation in the midst of current discourse on the african environmental ethics? the real situation is that the igbo cultural and moral values that make up the indigenous mindset of the people are challenged by the scientific and technological community and values. the latter runs counter to the former and the danger is to overrule or believe that those who subscribe to the traditional ways of relating with nature or doing things are archaic or their thoughts moribund. the igbo are prone to borrowing from other cultures uncritically without considering the implications because of western education and the fact that the society already operates on western developed policies, images, ideas, values and programs (mbon, 1991, pp.101-109). the igbos need a re-evaluated environmental ethics since they operate neo-colonialist ideas based on land usage and ownership. the problems with this is in the erroneous conception of seeing land solely as a commodity for economic use identified with erroneous modern thoughts that consider not the intrinsic value of the human person but only by what he produces. it is such view that does not represent the indigenous understanding and values about land preservation and conserving its natural cycle which is closer to the much needed universal planetary ethics championed by the modern environmental movement. emmanuel nweke okafor 159 without the value of the igbo thought system, life will be artificial and synthetic thereby compounding more of the environmental problems plaguing the society. this is because traditional ethics is regulated by law based on sacred sanction (mbon, 1991, p.102). what is needed is a critical and creative synthesis of existing creative ecological values (dirkirr, 2008, p.28), keeping in mind the peculiar nature of our struggle to create a sustained growth and development for our people. such reconstruction is central to a culturally developed environmental ethics because no ideological principle or policy alien to the african people in its totality would last (onunwa, 2005, p.185). evaluation and conclusion in sum, the focus of this study so far has been on the reality of peaceful environment as a fruit of the practices of igbo spirituality. from the deliberations in this work, the igbo spirituality is no doubt a spirituality of peace-making. since definitions and deconstruction of main ideas and concepts are key ways to the in-depth comprehension of any study, this research has taken into consideration such concepts as peace, spirituality, environment, traditional igbo society, among others and their vitality in the building of a peaceful environment. as viable instrumenta labores in the realization of this peace mission in the human igbo society, the study employed the functionalities of spiritual guides, spiritual disciplines, traditional approaches to conflict resolution, to mention but a few. these views factored together drive home the truth of peaceful environment in igbo spirituality which is the core of this study. as such, this study concludes by making a few recommendations for a better cultivation of peaceful environment in the practice of igbo spirituality. as a result of the current environmental challenges facing mankind today via deforestation, incessant bush burning and other unhealthy exploitations of the mother earth, it becomes crucial for the government and all other law enforcement agencies to consider providing policies that will aid man in being friendlier to the mother earth. earlier inadequate 160 prajñā vihāra government policies have given room to the demolition of forests by the local people and allowed for the government to satisfy economic ambitions. all these policies can be revised in a way that will help promote environmental preservation. on the side of the igbo spiritual practices, the human person must not in the name of civilization jettison cherished traditional practices that have helped for centuries to preserve the environment. among the igbo, history accounts for the praiseworthy lifestyles of their ancestors and how eco-friendly they were. the same demand is today being made on mankind. to achieve this, plantation must be encouraged in sync with love for nature. references achebe, chinua (2008). things fall apart. england: heinemann, aws. arinze, f. (2008). sacrifice in igbo traditional religion. onitsha: st. stephen’s press. asiegbu, m. f. and agbakoba, j. a. (2006). globalization and african identity: philosophy and praxis in africa, ed. ibadan: hope publications. dirkirr, p. m. (2008). the challenges of indigenizing african environmental goals. the journal of pan african studies, 2, pp. 81-99. dirkirr, 2008, p.28 edeh, e.m.p. (1985). towards an igbo metaphysics. chicago: loyola university press. ekennia, justin. n. (2000). african modernity crisis. benin, nigeria: barloz publishers. mbiti john. (1975). the prayers of african religion. london: spck mbon, friday m. (1991). african traditional social-religious ethics and national development: the nigerian case. in african traditional emmanuel nweke okafor 161 religion in contemporary society. edited by j. k. olupona. mn: paragon house. metuh, (1992). comparative study of african traditional religion. onitsha: imico publishers. mozia, m. i. (1982). solidarity in the church and solidarity among the igbosan anthropologico-theological study. rome: tipografica. nkrumah, (1968). consciencism: philosophy and ideology of decolonization. london: panaf books. nwala, uzodinma (1985). igbo philosophy, p. 30. lagos: lantern books. oladipo, o. (2009). philosophy and social reconstruction in africa. ibadan: hope publications. olorunsola,v. a. (ed.) (1972). the politics of cultural subnationalism in africa. anchor books. onunwa, udobata (2005). tradition, culture and underdevelopment in africa. suffolk, uk: amina publishing. onuoha, f. c. (2008a). oil exploitation, environmental degradation and climate change: assessing the vulnerability of the niger delta to natural disasters. conference proceedings of the international conference on the nigerian state, oil industry and the niger delta. port harcourt: harey publications company. rolston, h. (2003). feeding people versus saving nature? in a. light and h. rolston (ed.), environmental ethics. malden, ma: blackwell publishing. united nations conference on environment and development. (1992). rio declaration on environment and development. retrieved from http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp? documentid=78&articleid=1163&l=en on 20.04.2015. http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163&l=en http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163&l=en 01 a buddhist a buddhist perspective on human enhancement and extension of human lifespan soraj hongladarom chulalongkorn university, thailand abstract buddhism has nothing in principle against either human enhancement or lifespan extending technologies. everything depends on motivation. in the case of human enhancement technologies in general, the argument that enhancing humans is unethical because it commits an unnatural act is found wanting because it relies on the untenable premise that the natural and the ethical are identical. however, somparn promta’s argument to the effect that in buddhism there is no unnatural act is criticized because the argument conflates two different senses of “natural”, one being natural law and the other presupposed in the premise that the ethical and the natural are identical. then the paper moves on to discuss the central idea in buddhism concerning the emptiness of all things. since there can be no essence or core of identity of anything, person or non-person, any argument based on there being a subsisting person whose body is to be enhanced or whose life is to be extended is based on an untenable premise. finally the paper discusses steven horrobin’s recent attempt to base the value of the extended lifespan on the ability to enjoy more pleasures. this is also found wanting because the extended life will contain not only pleasures but also pain and boredom. moreover, the value of life, either extended or not, lies more on how well it is lived rather than how much pleasures the subject can consume. introduction this chapter proposes to discuss the buddhist viewpoints on human enhancement and extension of human lifespan. current technologies are being developed with the aim of providing bodily and cognitive prajna vihara, volume16, number 1, january-june 2015, 1-19 1 2000 by assumption university press c ˜ enhancements of human beings in very significant ways. developments in human-computer integration, made possible by nanotechnology and increased understanding of the workings of the inner mechanisms of the brain, have made scenes in science fiction a likely scenario in the near future. there are many applications of these technologies; for example, patients suffering from memory loss due to the decrease in the activity of the brain can have those functions enhanced or restored through implantation of computer chips inside the brain itself, so that the neurons and the switches inside the chip can become integrated and interact with one another seamlessly. further research is also being done on how to restore sight back to blind people through integration of artificial eyes that transmit visual information to the brain or to restore the lost functions of the visual processing parts of the brain itself. another area of research on extending human capabilities focuses on extending the lifespan itself. recently there has been increased understanding of the mechanisms underlying the aging process, and there is a hope that one day humans could live indefinitely through mastering the art of manipulating these aging processes or stopping them before they happen. this requires the same kind of sophisticated technologies that are being developed for physical and cognitive enhancements alluded to above. futurist ray kurzweil, for example, foresees the day when human beings will become “transhumans” or “posthumans”, both terms signifying an emergence of a new type of organism, one that will perhaps supersede the human form we are familiar with. according to kurzweil, it will be shortly possible for a human being to upload all the content of his or her mind onto a huge server, only to be downloaded to a new body when the opportune moment arrives. in that way it is foreseen that human beings (or a later version thereof) can live indefinitely. though this research work is still at its beginning stages, it carries a strong potential for altering the lives of us human beings forever. moreover, it will not only affect the lives of individuals, but also of human societies as a whole. these enhancement technologies will have tremendous impact on human relations. when only some groups of humans are enhanced and others are not, inequality among the groups will widen, and this surely will lead to a host of social, cultural and political problems. furthermore, even among the enhanced beings themselves, there will be changes in how they relate to one another. for example, when one’s lifespan is increased significantly, there will need to be changes in life insurance schemes and policies concerning retirement, and age 2 prajna vihara ̃ regulations. these are just small examples in the changes in the characteristics of society due to enhancement technologies. it is the aim of this paper to reflect on these developments through the lens of buddhist teachings.1 even though there are many schools of buddhism, chief among which are the theravada and mahayana traditions, what is offered here is a common thread that runs through all buddhist schools. both mahayana and theravada schools rejects the idea of the self as an inherently subsisting and enduring entity, and it is this thread that is relied on as the basis of buddhist thought presented in this paper. furthermore, one of the most important aspects of buddhist teachings both the theravada and mahayana schools is that the emphasis on motivation as the basis on which ethical value of action rests. thus according to buddhism action such as enhancing the physical and cognitive functions of humans or extending their lifespan is not good or bad in itself, it is the motivation behind the act that is ultimately responsible. the basic saying in buddhism is that when the motivation is good or “wholesome” then the act is also good, and vice versa, and a motivation is good when it is directed at the well-being of other sentient beings and away from the egoistic attitude of the subject. another important aspect of the teaching is that the subject itself is constituted not by a self-subsisting self or soul as in other religions, but by a series of ever changing episodes of bodily and mental activities. this point has a very strong impact on much of the motivation behind enhancement and lifespan increasing technologies. these technologies are perhaps motivated by the desire to be stronger, more intelligent and to live longer, but all these are effects of the ego itself. it is the ego that wants to be stronger, to be more intelligent, and to live longer. according to buddhism these motivations are unwholesome indeed. another point concerns the conceptual issue of extending one’s lifespan itself. in attempting to increase the lifespan, it seems to be the individual ego that wants to extend its stay in the world for as long as possible. but according to the buddhist analysis this is clearly impossible as the ego does not stay the same from a moment to another moment, and there is no underlying entity that remains unchanged behind all these changes. this is a metaphysical point, and this paper will try to develop this point in philosophical terms. this, if true, will show that the motivation for extending one’s lifespan or to increase one’s physical and cognitive abilities simply to extend the duration or the existence of the ego is always a wrong one because it is based on a wrong conception of soraj hongladarom 3 reality. however, this does not mean that buddhism is not completely opposed to human enhancement or increased lifespan. it is only opposed to performing these out of wrong or unwholesome motivations. when these technologies are used on humans for altruistic purposes, then they can do really good things for both individuals and their societies. the hard part lies in how to consider the use of these technologies for altruistic purposes. human enhancement according to the eu document on the issue, human enhancement is defined as “a modification aimed at improving human performance and brought about by science-based and technology-based interventions in the human body” (directorate general for internal policies, 2009). basically speaking, attempts at enhancing humans originated from attempts to restore the human body and human functioning that has been lost due to illness. thus enhancing or restoring can be performed through the use of medication, surgical means (for example in case of restoring the use of limbs), implanting device to restore sight or hearing, and other measures. as technologies aimed primarily at restoring the human functions are being developed, it is but a short step until someone imagines that the same technologies can also be used to enhance human capabilities in the way that may exceed those of a normal, average human being. for example, a drug may, prima facie, be developed with the objective of treating the memory function of the brain, which has been lost through illness such as alzheimer’s. however, if the drug is such that it can be used in normal people so that they have more powerful memories, then the issue seems to exceed that of normal medicine. it is here that the ethical questions surrounding human enhancement are centered. there seems to be a basic conceptual distinction on this issue between the therapeutic purpose of enhancing technologies and their newer, non-therapeutic and augmentative, purposes. due to the latter, the goal of the technologies is not merely to restore the normal functions, but to push the boundary of what it is to be a human being, possibly in the future even to create an entirely new kind of being itself. however, the distinction between the therapeutic and augmentative use of human enhancement technologies has been criticized by some 4 prajna vihara ̃ as not being very clear cut, since it is the same technologies that can be employed on both sides, and since the very concept of a normal human being can be a contested. this shows that the most salient ethical issue surrounding human enhancement is the question what constitutes a normal human being. what most people find objectionable about human enhancement is that the technologies are poised to create a new kind of human being. talks about human enhancement seem to conjure an image of the grotesque __ a body significantly different from a typical human __ and this seems to be a source of uneasiness. here the assumption is that the ethical corresponds with the normal or the natural. any attempt to diverge from the norm, to create a kind of human being that is too different from it, would simply be unethical. the story of the frankenstein monster is a very good example of this. the doctor who created the monster committed an unethical act because he tried to overcome nature. by creating the monster, the doctor violated a natural and ethical norm. this feeling that the ethical coincides with the normal and natural is also a leading cause of the public backlash against the genetic modification technologies. it is not a surprise to find people labeling food created through these technologies “frankenstein” food. the root cause is one and the same. on the issue of human enhancement technologies, what seems to be ethical objectionable at the first sight is the possibility that humans will be created which violate the view that the ethical and the normal. if the purpose of the enhancement is not therapeutic, then, given the predictably more widespread and powerful technologies in the near future, it is quite likely that many of the enhancing technologies will become routine, with the consequence that a new type of human being, if not a totally distinct kind, will emerge. this will certainly violate the assumption that the normal and the ethical are one and the same. for example, it is conceivable that a drug will be available which significantly enhances memory capacity of those who take it. so when the drug is in general use, we will have created a new type of human who have a more powerful memory than those who do not take the drug. if a critical threshold of population who take the drug is crossed, then even the conception of what constitutes the ‘normal’ itself could change. in this scenario, the ‘normal’ will be those who take the enhancing drug, leaving those who don’t to be branded as out of the normal range. those who find this scenario ethical objectionable typically reasons that the new norm is unnatural, hence it cannot be an ethical one. soraj hongladarom 5 another ethical issue concerning human enhancement concerns groups of people rather than individuals. suppose a group of human beings are enhanced in one way or another. suppose, for example, that the group takes the memory-enhancing drug on a regular basis. what will happen will be that there are other groups who might not be as fortunate and do not have the opportunity to take the drugs regularly. the result could be that, in the long run, the group that take the drug will enjoy more cognitive and memory capabilities than those who don't. this will surely be used as a justification for segregation, only that this time the issue that separates one group from another is not entirely socio-cultural, but physical. this is tremendously important, because it is based on internal physical characteristics, whereas in the past it was based on sociocultural characteristics (such as the fact that one is born to such and such family). it is true that certain physical characteristics were used in the past to segregate people into groups, such as skin colors and so on, but with the enhancement technologies the segregating characteristics will be those that enable those who possess the new found abilities to perform tasks that might not be possible for those who are not so enhanced. this is in stark contrast with the earlier physical characteristic such as skin color which was not relevant as a marker of more enhanced capabilities. the group who take the memory-enhancing drug will in theory be able to remember more things and remember them more clearly than those who do not take the drug. hence it appears that the human enhancement technologies have a much more serious impact on the issue of equality among groups of people than any natural physical characteristic ever could. of the two main ethical concerns surrounding human enhancement __ the view that the normal and the ethical are one and the same, and the other view that the technologies could segregate humans into unequal groups __ the former one is more basic. we can imagine a scenario where every human being receives the benefits of these technologies, so nobody will be left out. in this case there will be no inequality among the people since everybody will become equally enhanced. however, even if everybody is enhanced in the same way, the first ethical objection seems to remain, because in this case everybody then deviates from the norm, so the whole development becomes unethical. 6 prajna vihara ̃ a buddhist response we will discuss each of the two main ethical concerns of human enhancement and see how the buddhist responds to them. the first issue, as we have seen, concerns the identification of the normal and the ethical. on this topic, somparn promta has argued that according to buddhism nothing is in fact unnatural. that is, promta sees that in buddhism there is nothing unnatural since everything has to follow natural law. creating a frankenstein is a natural act since the creation has to follow natural laws, frankenstein himself, is therefore an object in the natural scheme of things. here is what promta says on the issue: in buddhism, morality can be separated from the concept of being natural because according to buddhist teaching it seems impossible to say that such and such a phenomenon is unnatural. buddhism proposes that the moral goodness or badness attributable to any action depends solely on the moral properties. actually, buddhism does not think that there is anything unnatural. buddhism believes in the five laws of nature as we have observed previously, and thinks that there is nothing which is beyond these laws of nature. in buddhist texts, for example, reproductive methods other than the sexual one we are acquainted with are mentioned. for those of us who never perceive such methods, they could be considered unnatural. but they are natural in the sense that they are permitted to appear in the universe through any of the five natural laws (promta, 2005). the five natural laws mentioned in the quote above are: physical law (utuniyama), biological law (bijaniyama), law of action (kammaniyama), law of mind (cittaniyama), and law of dhamma (dhammaniyama) (promta, 2005). in short, these laws represent all action in nature, both physical and psychological. physical law refers to what is happening in the physical world. biological law refers to what happens in the biological world; thus genetic inheritance, for example, belongs to this law. law of action refers to the relation of cause and effect that obtains in the world. the fourth law, that of the mind, covers action of the mind and the relation between the mind and the world, soraj hongladarom 7 while the last law covers everything else. we don’t need to concern ourselves with the details of each of the laws here. suffice it to say that these laws cover everything in the psycho-physical world. according to promta, nothing is unnatural in buddhism because everything that happens does so according to one or more of these five laws. furthermore, he argues that, since nothing is unnatural, any argument purporting to show that an action is ethical because it leads to unnatural result is not tenable as it rests on a false foundation. promta uses this argument to claim that human genetic research, for example, is not unethical in itself because the research necessarily follows natural laws. it is quite clear that this argument rests on an equivocation of the meaning of the word “natural”. on the one hand, things in the physical world proceed according to natural laws; this much is totally uncontroversial. on the other, however, when someone makes an argument to the effect that an action is unethical because it leads to unnatural products such as a grotesquely enhanced human, they are not referring to the natural law, but the fact that the resulting product is out of the range of the normal for a thing of its kind. when one creates a frankenstein, the act is unethical precisely because it distorts what has come to be agreed upon as normal. the fact that creating a frankenstein is only possible through reliance on natural laws is not relevant to the ethical value of the act. it may be the case that buddhism teaches that everything happens according to natural laws, but that does not imply that acts which create grotesquely unnatural things are for that reason an ethical one. what constitutes ethical value of an action in buddhism is not whether the action is natural or not. in buddhism what determines the ethical value of an act is not its functioning according to natural laws, but the motivation behind the act itself. an act, considered in and of itself, is neutral regarding its moral value; it is the motivation of the one who is doing the action that is important. if the motivation is such that it leads to harmful results, then an act is an unethical one, but if the motivation is for beneficial purposes, then the very same act can become ethical. buddhist ethics is sometimes regarded as a consequentialist one, but an important difference from a standard consequentialist ethics is that buddhism pays much more attention to the motivation behind an act, and it is the motivation that is more important in determining an ethical value of an act rather than purely the consequences. for example, in developing a human enhancement technology, such as one that enables a human to hear better. the act can be a 8 prajna vihara ̃ good one just in case the motivation is for the good of everyone as a whole, such as when one tries to develop the technology in order to help deaf people. however, if the motivation is a selfish or narrow-minded one, such as developing the technology out of the desire to gain monetary benefits just for oneself, then it is unethical. sometimes, however, the motivation can be mixed, as in the case where one develops a technology motivated both by the desire to help the deaf and to reap material reward. in this case buddhism would say that the action would be both ethical and unethical. it is ethical just to the extent that the act is performed out of altruistic motivation, and it is unethical just in case where there is a selfish motive. there is no direct contradiction here since each of the ethical values are dependent on their respective motivations. in one of the most important passages in the buddhist canon, there are the following verses that emphasize the supreme role that the mind plays in determining the value of an action: mind precedes all mental states. mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. if with an impure mind a person speaks or acts suffering follows him like the wheel that follows the foot of the ox. mind precedes all mental states. mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. if with a pure mind a person speaks or acts happiness follows him like his never-departing shadow (yamakavagga, 2010). this passage opens the dhammapada, one of the most widely read buddhist scriptures. it says that the mind is the most important thing; everything proceeds from the mind and everything also is made up by the mind. thus if the quality of the mind is not pure, such as when one performs an action with selfish attitude, or with one or more of the defilements such as greed, anger and delusion, then the act itself cannot be said to be pure. on the contrary, if the quality of the mind is pure, then the act itself will also be pure. the act in both cases here can well be one and the same, but it becomes vastly different in terms of its ethical value due to the quality of the mind that is involved. thus, in the case of human enhancement technologies, what is at issue is not the act per se, but the quality of mind behind it. if this is the case, then what about an act such as enhancing solsoraj hongladarom 9 diers to become more powerful than ordinary human beings? could such an act be ethical according to buddhism? this question can be asked in another way, which is: could there be a positive, altruistic motivation behind creation and enhancement of human soldiers so that they are more powerful than their enemies? could there be a good motivation behind an act of war at all? the answer is yes. we could imagine a situation where creation of robo-soldiers who are half machines-half humans for certain altruistic purposes, such as saving humankind from devastation. on the contrary, if the reason behind the creation of enhanced humans is not an altruistic one, but the opposite, such as when one enhances one’s body in order to defeat others for the sake of material gain only for oneself, then the act is certainly an unethical one according to buddhism. extension of human lifespan one of most interesting applications of human enhancement technologies concerns how the technologies will be used to extend the length of human life. knowledge and technologies are being developed that extend the lifespan beyond what has been hitherto possible. this requires highly advanced knowledge into the working of the human body at the cellular and molecular level, something that is being done with the development of nanotechnology and human enhancement technologies. as is the case with other applications of human enhancement technologies, the goal is not only to restore the normal function of a healthy human body, but to enhance it, in this case in order that the normally aging body will function in the same way as does a healthy, youthful one. humankind has searched for millennia for the fountain of youth, something which promised to defeat the most feared enemy of life, namely death itself. recent advances in sophisticated technologies have appeared to make this age-old search closer to reality. as with the other applications of human enhancement technologies, the normal application is focused on treating diseases and disabilities that afflict human beings as they get older. diseases such as parkinson’s or alzheimer’s attack humans when they get old, and technologies are being developed to combat them, mostly by studying the working of the brain and to restore its functions through various means. for example, chips can be planted inside an elderly person’s brain to help the brain function normally. this will prevent brain deterioration and thus postpone dementia. here it is quite clear that the line between the restorative or therapeutic function and the non-therapeutic, enhancing functions of human enhancement technologies are becoming blurred. 10 prajna vihara ̃ the problem lies in how one can specify, clearly and objectively, exactly what is the normal functioning of the brain and what is the goal that restorative technologies should aim for. what, exactly, is the “normal” level of brain functioning for someone who is, say, eighty-five years old? shouldn't the brain of a “normal” 85-year-old function in a slightly less efficient manner than the brain of a 25-year-old? to “restore” the brain of an 85-year-old so that it functions exactly as well as that of a 25-yearold could be regarded as an “enhancement” beyond what is normal for people of that age. if this enhancement is accepted, then there would not seem to be any barrier against an attempt to extend the capabilities of a 25-year-old brain, perhaps to extend it beyond any brain of any naturally existing human being. again all this hinges on our conception of what is “normal”. if it shifts, then the distinction or the line between restorative and purely enhancing technologies will shift too. so in a nutshell, the ethical problem of human enhancement technologies with regarding to the elderly and extension of lifespan is this: is it ethical to use the technologies in such a way as to extend the lifespan of an individual further and further? does extending the lifespan mean that we humans are again doing something that is unnatural, hence unethical at least according to some views? these questions are difficult to answer without a clear conception of what constitutes the normal functioning of an elderly human being. if, as is likely, one is to insist that the normal functioning of an elderly should be exactly the same as that of a healthy, youthful human being, then one seems to admit that enhancement beyond what is therapeutically required is all right, since there is no clear line between the two to begin with. the ethical value of extending lifespan can be determined roughly in two ways. the first way is to look at death itself. if death is something to be avoided at all cost, then extending lifespan for the purpose of avoiding death seems to be tenable. if everything else is equal, one should always choose living rather than death if death is always to be avoided according to this point of view. epicurus is well known to have a view on death such that death can be nothing to us, because when we are living, death does not occur to us, so death is purely negative when we are living and thus can be nothing to us. however, when we are dead, we are no more. we are totally non-existent and since there is no “we”, death cannot be anything to us at all. if this argument is sound, then death cannot be a factor in any argument at all. but if this is the case, then any argument in favor of extending lifespan cannot depend on the fact that we soraj hongladarom 11 would like to avoid death. a buddhist response steve horrobin argues that life has an intrinsic value such that it is always desirable to extend the lifespan and that since the person is a process rather than an entity, lifespan extension has an “inalienable” intrinsic value (horrobin 2006a; 2006b). extension of lifespan enables the person to realize his or her potentials and to live out all kinds of dreams and goals that would not have been possible if the lifespan were limited by ones normal biological nature. in other words, according to horrobin one should always strive for extending one’s lifespan because not only is life intrinsically worthwhile in itself, but the extended life would make it possible for one to become anybody or to enjoy any kind of pleasures that life has to offer. horrobin’s example is particularly telling: consider the notion and ideal of a renaissance man. a person fully integrated with their cultural milieu was once at least possible. what hope now that a single person may within the scope of their lifetime understand or know all concerning even the single discipline of biology, let alone further and other realms of knowledge? the harsh and bitter rigours of the procrustean lifespan cut us off, increasingly, from the possibility of integrated experience and understanding of our own created realm of culture and of knowledge (horrobin 2006a, p. 286). so horrobin would like to be able to experience all things, know all things and perhaps to enjoy everything possible that life has to offer in its unlimited variety. in the past the ideal of the renaissance man was taken seriously because it was then still possible for one person to master all fields of knowledge and to enjoy all kinds of artistic creations that were in existence at the time. however, in today’s world that has not been possible at all because of the tremendous explosion in all branches of knowledge and in creative works, so there is simply not enough time for an individual person to master them all. from this observation horrobin then argues that life is worth being expanded indefinitely. given that the current human enhancement technologies might start to make 12 prajna vihara ̃ this seemingly unrealistic scenario a reality, this demands a response from the buddhist. in a nutshell, horrobin is arguing that life is intrinsically valuable because it gives us the chances to enjoy so many things; hence extending life is valuable because it gives us more chances. ideally becoming immortal would then be the ultimate good because it gives us an unlimited amount of time to experience and to enjoy an unlimited number of things.2 note that horrobin emphasizes one’s experiences and enjoyment of life that requires that there be one and the same person who does the experiencing and enjoying. for horrobin it is not possible for there to be a series of persons who live successively and who experience things in turn. the reason is that some kinds of enjoyment require that one spends a long amount of time on education and training which would make it possible for the person to enjoy those things in the first place. a person may not be able to appreciate the intricacies of bach’s music on the first hearing, but after repeated trainings and experiences the person may start to enjoy bach’s music fully. thus horrobin’s view requires that there be one and the same person whose lifespan should be expanded. this view is in stark contrast to the buddhist one. firstly, buddhism holds that even at a moment of time it is unwarranted to hold that there is a personal identity, since the person is a process, something comparable to a flowing river. thus the buddha and heraclitus share this important aspect of their thinkings in common, as when heraclitus says that one cannot step in the same river twice. horrobin, however, may object that his view does not require that a person must be a self-subsisting entity. in fact horrobin also argues that the person is a process and it is by virtue of the person’s being a process that lets him or her enjoy and experience all that life has to offer (desirably indefinitely) (horrobin 2006a; 2006b). however, as horrobin’s argument against the series view of persons makes clear; in order for one person to be able to enjoy and understand all of bach’s music, one has to undergo rigorous musical training, and in order to enjoy all of bach's music and its perhaps unlimited depth in full, one has to be able to live longer than a normal human being does. hence a person may be a series but horrobin’s view requires that the person in question has to be one and the same; in other words even if the person is a process, there has to be a core identity behind this process which enables the process itself to be part of one and the same person. without such a core, the carrying over of identity across time is not possible. for horrobin the desired picture is that of a man or a woman soraj hongladarom 13 who can live, say, for two hundred years, enjoying all the niceties of life and learning all the knowledge that there is to be learned. the man or the woman here, then, has to be one person. this is the type of view that buddhism has troubles with. a key component of buddhist philosophy is that for any thing whatsoever, one cannot find a substantive core for such a thing such that it functions as the seat of identity for the thing itself. in other words buddhist denies that there be anything comparable to aristotle’s “the what-it-is-to-be” or an essence that functions as the core identity of a particular thing. this is the main contrast between horrobin’s view and the buddhist’s. in arguing for the kind of person that is able to enjoy all the experiences that the extended lifespan will bring, horrobin presupposes that there must be an enduring person, even though he argues that the person is essentially a process. the buddhist, however, refuses to acknowledge that there be such an enduring person. instead what we normally take to be a person, for example when we refer to others using personal pronouns, is only, ultimately speaking, what appears to our perception and functions in our daily lives as though they are enduring entities. behind these appearances, however, there are nothing but episodes of mental and physical events that all together make up, to the perceiving mind, the appearance of a person. there is obviously not enough space in this paper to lay out this important buddhist view in any detail. but at least we can see it relies on analysis. when one pares down a person one finds nothing that functions as the core that serves as the seat of the identity of the person. for example, when one pares down someone’s body, one finds nothing but bodily parts, none of which looks like the core seat of identity. the brain seems to be the most promising candidate, but even the brain, physically speaking, is merely an organ and does not remotely resemble the person whose brain it is. alternatively, the analysis might also be directed at the mind. but when we were able to inspect our own mental content, we would find that the content consists of ever changing episodes of mental events, such as memories, desires, passing thoughts, plans, ruminations, and so on, none of which appears to be the core seat of identity either. thus the buddhist concludes that the belief that there be a core seat of identity which functions as the essence of the person himself or herself is an illusion created by our habits. this is a very complicated argument. but for the purpose of this paper, we can see that, if the buddhist view is tenable, this will pose a serious problem for horrobin’s view. 14 prajna vihara ̃ but if the person is ultimately a perceived entity, a construction, then what consequence does this view have on the problem of lifespan extension? if there is ultimately no person, then what exactly is extended when the technologies are applied? one might say that, according to the buddhist view, no self persists through time. the fact that i very closely resemble my previous self that existed yesterday shows that there is a sense in which there is an ‘i’ that endures. but according to buddhist this is an illusion. there is nothing that gets carried over from yesterday to today; anything that looks like there being the same person as the one who is typing this paper is merely due to a habit that takes up similar episodes of an event to be an enduring entity. and with the dramatic changes of aging, then there is a real sense in which i may not be the same person i am today. if this is the case, then this contradicts horrobin’s view that one can maintain one’s identity throughout. horrobin argues that extending life is valuable in terms of accumulating the knowledge and experiences that one would not have been able to enjoy had one’s lifespan not been extended. he dismisses the series view of person as being “conservative”, and not being able to accommodate his preferred view of being able to enjoy things with the extended life. for horrobin life is worth living precisely because it enables one to enjoy the good things, and if there are more good things to enjoy, then it is good to extend the life so that one is able to do so. according to the buddhist, however, the question whether human lifespan should be extended should be based on what kind of motivation lies behind the attempt to develop the lifespan extending technologies. as in the case of human enhancement technologies, the buddhist gives prominence to motivation. thus the act of extending lifespan is not ethical or unethical per se, but its ethical value depends on the nature of motivation behind it. perhaps one would like to develop lifespan extension technologies in order to save human beings from extinction (in this case we need to suppose that all humans have lost their capabilities of reproducing themselves, perhaps due to all the chemicals that humans have ingested throughout the years). however, if the development of the technologies is such that it responds to the selfish need of someone’s desiring to extend his or her own lifespan simply for the purpose of expanding his or her own time for enjoying the pleasures, then the motivation is not a wholesome one and hence it is unethical. since horrobin’s focus seems to be mostly the possibility of enjoying the pleasures (and to learn all the knowledge, which is also a kind of pleasure) that life has to offer, soraj hongladarom 15 then horrobin’s motivation does not seem to be an other-regarding one. instead one would want to extend one’s lifespan only because one wants to experience more pleasures for oneself. if this is so, then horrobin’s view would be criticized by the buddhist as being “unwholesome”. furthermore, there is another dimension of horrobin’s argument where he assumes that life has nothing but pleasures to offer. however, in reality life has both pleasures and pain. even though tremendous progress in science and technology has been made which has made extension of healthy lifespan a serious matter, there is no guarantee that the extended life will always be pain free. this is because pain is both physiological and mental; both physical and mental factors are involved in one's experiencing of pain. moreover, people differ in their perception and in their threshold of feeling pain. hence it is difficult to predict that future life will be always free of pain. even if all the known physiological causes of pain will be eliminated, that will provide no guarantee that people in the future will experience no pain at all because it is possible that pain can happen even if there are no physiological causes, such as when one feels pain in their phantom limbs. if this can be the case, then horrobin’s picture of someone living an extended life enjoying all sorts of pleasures may be too rosy. as pain will almost certainly be with us, it is possible that in the extended life there will be both pleasures and pain. this seems to undercut horrobin’s argument that life is worthwhile because it gives us only the pleasures. when the pain is factored in, the worth of the extended life would be the same as the normal, unextended one. if one lives significantly longer, then one almost certainly experiences both pleasures and pain, just as one experiences both sensations when one lives the old style, unextended life. thus the worth of the extended life is not augmented by the premise that there will be more pleasures. since there will be both pleasures and pain, the two can cancel each other out, rendering horrobin’s argument vacant. if there is anything that makes the extended life worth living, it is not the premise or the promise that it will bring us more pleasure. another kind of sensation that could almost certainly happen to the extended life is boredom. this is easily understandable considering that one lives far more than what has been possible for humans up until now. if one were able to live for, say, three hundred years, one might enjoy all the pleasures and learnings that horrobin talks about for a while. but what would prevent one to feel bored by all this? if there is seemingly indefinite time frame open up to someone, there might be at first a 16 prajna vihara ̃ feeling of elatedness in realizing that one can now experience unlimited things. but if one feels bored by all of this, then the pleasures will not seem to be pleasurable any more. this can happen to anybody when they have too much of good things. the worth of those good things would seem to diminish. furthermore, if the time available for someone would be almost indefinite, then it is almost certain that at some time in his or her extended life he or she will feel bored. when one is bored, then all the pleasures that used to excited one will not be so pleasurable or exciting any more. the situation is different that experienced by someone who lives in a more limited time frame. for those living the unextended life, they know that death is imminent. it can happen to them at any time. this makes them live their lives to the full, squeezing every moment as if it were their last. in this situation there is no time to feel bored; on the contrary one would feel very intensely, as if a whole lifespan could be compressed into only a few hours or minutes. this kind of life, however, is not available for those who have the extended lifespan, because they can always postpone any events to a future date. the point is that the reason for the value of the extended life does not seem to lie in the putative fact that it can bring us pleasures. more often than not it will bring us boredom, which can be as bad as pain. according to the buddhist perspective, the value of someone’s life, or in other words the meaning of someone’s life, lies in whether he or she has pure, altruistic motivation in living the life or not. the life can be short or long__buddhism has nothing in principle against the development and use of lifespan extending technologies, which in fact are subsets of the human enhancement technologies that we have talked about earlier. in any case, the meaning and worth of life does not consist in how short or how long the life is lived, but it does consist in how well it is lived. if the development and use of lifespan extending technologies arise out of pure and altruistic motivation, then buddhism would have nothing against it and in fact would commend the effort. but if the development arises out of the desire to continue consuming the pleasures indefinitely, then buddhism would strongly advise against the attempt. one reason for doing so would be that it is totally unreliable to predict that one’s life extended in this way would consist totally of pleasures. at the very least boredom will set in. an extended life will contain not only pleasures but also pain and boredom. moreover, the value of life, either extended or not, lies more on how well it is lived rather than how much pleasures the subject soraj hongladarom 17 can consume.3 acknowledgement research leading to this chapter has been partially supported by a grant from the commission on higher education and the national research university project, project number hs1025a and as569a. endnotes 1there are a number of fine introductions to buddhist philosophy. one is mark siderits (2007); another is gethin (1998). these works, nonetheless, do not even scratch the surface of the enormous amount of literature on buddhism and buddhist philosophy. 2being immortal in this sense is different from what floridi (2008) describes as being ‘e-mortal’ where an “artificial companion” acts as a surrogate to a person and could even survive the person himself due to large memory storage that contains the person’s private information. in horrobin’s sense, being immortal here is that of flesh and blood. it’s our own body that borders on being immortal, and not of any surrogate. 3the chapter presents how a general tenet of buddhism would look at these issues. however, there are obviously a variety of religious viewpoints in existence, some of which might be similar or different from that of buddhism offered here. it would be interesting to see how the values of other religions, such as christianity, islam or hinduism, would look at the issues of human enhancement and extension of human lifespan. see, for example, mark hanson (1999) for a christian (protestant) perspective of human enhancement, and athar (2008) for an islamic perspective on the same issue. references directorate general for internal policies. (2009). human enhancement: a study. retrieved july 16, 2011, from http://www.itas.fzk.de/ eng/etag/document/2009/coua09a.pdf. athar, shahid. (2008). enhancement technologies and the person: an islamic view. journal of law, medicine and ethics 36(1): 59-64. floridi, luciano. (2008). artificial intelligence’s new frontier: artificial companions and the fourth revolution. metaphilosophy 39(4-5): 651-655. 18 prajna vihara ̃ gethin, rupert. (1998). the foundations of buddhism. oxford university press. hanson, mark j. (1999). indulging anxiety: human enhancement from a protestant perspective. christian bioethics 5(2): 121-138. horrobin, steven. (2006a). immortality, human nature, the value of life and the value of life extension. bioethics 20(6): 279-292. horrobin, steven. (2006b). the value of life and the value of life extension. annals of the new york academy of science 1067: 94-105. promta, somparn. (2005). buddhism and human genetic research. polylog: forum for intercultural philosophy 6. retrieved july 10, 2011 from http://them.polylog.org/6/fps-en.htm. siderits, mark. (2007). buddhism as philosophy: an introduction. aldershot: ashgate. yamakavagga: pairs (dhammapada i). (2010). translated from the pali by acharya buddharakkhita. access to insight, 19 september 2010. retrieved july 10, 2011, from http://www.accesstoinsight. org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.01.budd.html. soraj hongladarom 19 sanjeewa vijitha kumara 1 buddhist teachings about the middle: a critical study of the majjhe-sutta of the aṅguttara-nikāya sanjeewa vijitha kumara mahidol university, thailand abstract the majjhe sutta, which comes in the book of the sixes (chakka nipāta) of the aṅguttara-nikāya, incorporates six interpretations (by six different elder monks) of the buddha’s phrase ‘the middle’. later, they await the verdict of the buddha to make it clear whose understanding was the most reliable. after hearing a report of their discussion, the buddha consented to all six definitions and further drove away their doubts by explicitly confirming the first monk’s version. the term ‘majjhena’, which means ‘the middle’ or ‘central philosophy’, occasionally appears in the nikāya texts and is similar to the term ‘majjhe’ ([in] the middle). furthermore, while the term ‘majjhimā’ symbolizes ‘the middle path’, the ‘majjhe’ of the majjhe sutta stands for neither of these two meanings. however, by using the term ‘majjhe’, the sutta does present expositions akin to ‘majjhena’ as ‘central philosophy’. thus, this paper proposes to compare the similarities and dissimilarities between ‘the middle’ (majjhe) and ‘central philosophy’ (majjhena). in addition, it aims to question the possibility of the setting up of a different middle teaching in the majjhe sutta, one prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 1-19 © 2000 by assumption university press 2 prajñā vihāra which differs from the kaccāyanagotta sutta. the scope of this paper addresses the “philosophical” aspect of ‘the middle’ in buddhism. introduction the majjhe sutta acts as a commentary on a verse (#1042) of the tissametteyya sutta in the pārāyana-vagga of the sutta-nipāta. the verse runs: so ubh’anta-m-abhiññāya majjhe mantā na lippati taṃ brūmi mahāpuriso ti, so idha sibbinim accagā’’ ti. scholars have used various terms for translating ‘majjhe’. fausboll’s translation is ‘the middle’ while n. a jayawickrama translates it as ‘in between’. k. r. norman translates ‘majjhe’ as ‘the middle’. among them, the most precise meaning for ‘majjhe’ would be ‘the middle’, that which rejects the two extremes. the aim of the verse is to refer to the two extremes and avoid being attached to either of the extremes as well as to the middle. the statement “by wisely not clinging to the middle” (majjhe mantā na lippati) refers to the early buddhist teaching of the non substantiality of dhamma (dharma nairātmyatā) as described in the alagaddūpama-sutta. in other words, according to the kaccānagotta sutta, the middle causality paṭiccasamuppāda or as later traditions suggested, śūnyatā (as the middle) , are also to be avoided. thus, the statement “by wisely not clinging to the middle” (majjhe mantā na lippati) is similar to “the doctrine also should be removed” (dhammāpi pahātabbā). the six interpretations concerning ‘the middle’ offered by the monks are: the cessation of contact, the present (moment), feeling neither displeasure nor pleasure, consciousness (which appears twice among these six) and the cessation of personal existence. sanjeewa vijitha kumara 3 01. contact is an extreme, arising of contact is the second extreme, ceasing of contact is the middle (phasso kho, āvuso, eko anto, phassasamudayo dutiyo anto, phassanirodho majjhe) 02. the past is an extreme, the future is the second extreme, the present is the middle (atītaṃ kho, āvuso, eko anto, anāgataṃ dutiyo anto, paccuppannaṃ majjhe) 03. pleasure is an extreme, displeasure is the second extreme, neither displeasure nor pleasure is the middle (sukhā, āvuso, vedanā eko anto, dukkhā vedanā dutiyo anto, adukkhamasukhā vedanā majjhe) 04. name is an extreme, form is the second extreme, consciousness is the middle (nāmaṃ kho, āvuso, eko anto, rūpaṃ dutiyo anto, viññāṇaṃ majjhe) 05. the six senses are an extreme, the six objects are the second extreme, consciousness is the middle (cha kho, āvuso, ajjhattikāni āyatanāni eko anto, cha bāhirāni āyatanāni dutiyo anto, viññāṇaṃ majjhe) 06. personal existence is an extreme, arising personal existence is the second extreme, ceasing personal existence is the middle (sakkāyo kho, āvuso, eko anto, sakkāyasamudayo dutiyo anto, sakkāyanirodho majjhe) it should be noted here that although these six interpretations are given in the pali version, the āgama literature offers only five interpretations. another significant difference between the pali text and the āgamas is that the latter do not offer a definition of ‘the middle’. based on this, i would argue “the middle” as discussed in the majjhe sutta has no categorical connection with the kcc of the saṃyutta-nikāya. these interpretations evidently were dependent upon the intuition (sakaṃ paṭibhānaṃ) of each monk. on the other hand, these interpretations are not strong enough to lead us to conclude that the teachings of the majjhe sutta are totally different from the kcc. after examining the content of the majjhe-sutta and the kcc, the following hypotheses can be formulated: 4 prajñā vihāra 1. the discussion between kaccāyanavaccagotta and the buddha took place after the discourse of the majjhe-sutta in the aṅguttara-nikāya. 2. none of the six monks had learned the kcc before they created their own interpretations on ‘the middle’. 3. there may be a significant likeness between ‘the middle’ and the central philosophy discussed in the majjhe-sutta and in the kcc respectively. 4. there might be dissimilarities between ‘the middle’ and the central philosophy discussed in the aforementioned sources. ‘the middle[s] discussed in the majjhe sutta the majjhe-sutta is explicitly based on the sutta-nipāta, a text which is considered one of the earliest parts of the pali canon. the doctrinal validity and reliability of the sutta-nipāta places the parayana vagga in a high position among the early texts. also, four of the interpretations found among the six monks are related to the twelve-fold causality of paṭicca-samupāda discussed in the kcc: contact (01), feelings (03), name and form (04), six faculties (05). however, the two additional ones [time and personal existence (sakkāya)] are seemingly independent and the kcc might have developed a different middle teaching in buddhism. since there is no known reason to suspect the majjhe sutta as added later, a possible argument could be that these six interpretations came out before kaccanavaccagotta met the buddha and, thus, the six monks might not have been aware of the twelve links as being ‘the middle’. another possibility is that the kcc had already been taught as a discourse, but the six monks had not learnt of it. or, they might have intentionally avoided the middle teaching in the kcc. regardless of which case happens to be correct, we can say that two independent interpretations arose among the six. sanjeewa vijitha kumara 5 contact-based middle in the first monk’s interpretation, contact is considered an extreme, arising of contact is considered the second extreme, and the cessation of contact is the middle. the contact (phasso) and the cessation of the contact (phassanirodho) are common to the kcc and appear in descending order (saḷāyatananirodhā phassanirodho; phassanirodhā vedanānirodho). as the kcc remarks, the cessation of contact depends on the ceasing of the senses. however, the first interpretation declared in the majjhe sutta undertakes a more comprehensive exposition than the teachings of the kcc. considering the framework of the majjhe sutta, three steps can be deduced, the third one being cessation (of contact, consciousness, feeling and personal existence). this form of expression is similar to the third truth of the four noble truths and to the teachings of the sammādiṭṭhi sutta (mn. sutta 9), which appears in the framework of the four noble truths. thus, it is clear that the above has applied the framework of the four noble truths. the “cessation of the contact” found in the majjhe sutta becomes “the middle”. the same ‘contact’ is met in the twelve links, which is known as the middle in the kcc. again, the cessation of contact appears to be the third step of fourfold contacts in the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta. the other notable factor here is, referring to all the above three sources, is its restriction to a philosophical perspective. apparently, the majjhe sutta does not discuss the practical path for going beyond the middle. the kcc also is taken as a discourse describing the middle in its philosophical aspects. also, in the third of the four-fold steps in the sammāditthi sutta, we see that “cessation” should be taken in a philosophical sense, since it is the fourth step which explains the practical path required to cease what has originated. 6 prajñā vihāra time-based middle the second monk’s interpretation is based on the time. the past is considered an extreme and the future is considered another extreme. the present is the middle. a similar teaching found in the vibhaṅga-vagga of the majjhima-nikāya leads to understanding time to be the middle. arahant kaccāna proclaims: how is one vanquished in regard to presently arisen states? in regard to the eye and forms that are presently arisen, one’s consciousness is bound up with desire and lust … one delights in that. when one delights in that, one is vanquished in regard to presently arisen states. this contends that one who hopes to reach the supra-mundane stage has to cut off attachment to the present moment. in other words, the supra-mundane state could be perceived beyond the present moment. how could this teaching be compared to the majjhe-sutta? the statement “ubhantamabhiññāya” means “knowing both past and future” and “majjhe mantā na lippati” means to go beyond the present moment. in addition, the attadaṇḍa-sutta of the sutta-nipāta also imparts the same teaching “he who has passed beyond sensual pleasure here, the attachment which is hard to cross over in the world, does not grieve, [and] does not worry. he has cut across the stream, he is without bond”. further, this commentary also provides the explanation as “not clinging to the middle means, not attaching to the objects like forms even in the present moment.” in addition, the commentary of the bhadrāvudha mānavapucchā defines the present to be ‘the middle’. similarly, the jatukaṇṇimānavapucchā also contains the same teaching. sanjeewa vijitha kumara 7 feeling-based middle pleasurable feeling is here considered one extreme, painful feeling is considered as the second extreme, and neither displeasure nor pleasure (adhukkhamasukha) is the middle. in the synthesis of the above three, a connection with the kcc appears based on the occurrence of ‘feelings’ (vedanā), which are elsewhere (see: d.iii.216) divided into three. however, ‘neither displeasure, nor pleasure’ cannot be shown to be acting as ‘the middle’ of vedanā in the kcc. nevertheless, it is claimed that the cessation of the feelings, or the holder of adukkhamasukha or upekkhā, ought to cross one more step. pertaining to this, the aṭṭhakanāgara sutta shows that the fourth jhāna centered on upekkhā leads to the attainment of nibbāna. accordingly, a person going beyond the fourth jhāna (majjhe mantā nalippati), and entering nibbāna would be in the middle. name and form-based middle the name (nāma) is considered an extreme, form (rūpa) is considered a second extreme and consciousness is the middle. the kcc suggests the possibility of ascribing consciousness (viññāṇa) as the link of the middle. however, viññāṇa’ in buddhism is a difficult concept to understand because it is used in multi-contexts. the question here concerns which perspective of the viññāṇa could be defined as the middle. the commentary of the majjhe-sutta interprets that “in the middle is called the relinking-consciousness and the rest of consciousness placed between name and form arisen depending on name and form.” the first part of this interpretation could be accepted. nevertheless, it should be noted that the ‘viññāṇa’ found in the majjhe sutta appears in two different contexts. therefore, it is presumed that the ‘viññāṇa’ (placed between name and form) implies the birth consciousness only. as the mahānidāna-sutta of the dīgha-nikāya shows, consciousness depends on the name and form and vice versa. especially, understanding that name and form are two extremes which should be avoided, and 8 prajñā vihāra going beyond the birth consciousness (in the sense of not clinging to the relinking), should be understood as not clinging to the middle. six-senses-based middle the six-senses are considered one extreme, the six-objects are considered the second extreme, and consciousness is in the middle. according to the commentary of the majjhe-sutta, the viññāṇa found in this context is called the kamma consciousness. both the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta and the kcc contain the links of name and form and six sense faculties. the dissimilarity regarding the six sense faculties in the above suttas only regards the format followed by the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta, which explains the six sense faculties within the framework of the four noble truths. however, the six-sense-faculties -based middle in the majjhe-sutta corresponds to the third step of the four-fold framework in the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta. however, there is no structural similarity between the majjhe sutta and the kcc. yet, it should be noted that cessation of the six sense faculties is identical for all the above three sources. it indicates that the majjhe sutta was not a discourse which appeared accidently in the sutta pitaka, and it could well be taken as a variant on the way of teaching the middle as that found in the kcc. personal existence-based middle the sixth and last interpretation is based on personal existence. personal existence (self-body or five aggregates) is considered one extreme, arising of personal existence is considered the second extreme and the middle is the cessation of personal existence. the kcc does not give any relevant account of personal existence (sakkāya). the sakkāya, a synonym for the five aggregates, and its arising leads to extremes. by this explanation, the middle is known to be the cessation of personal existence (aggregates). however, the sakkāya-sutta in the saṃyutta-nikāya presents sizable evidence to understand personal existence through the structure of four noble truths. as the this sutta has explained, the way to sanjeewa vijitha kumara 9 cease the personal existence is based on the noble eightfold path. also, the cūḷavedalla-sutta of the majjhima-nikāya gives a similar account on the ‘cessation of personal identity’ (sakkāyanirodha). further, defining sakkāyanirodha, the cūḷavedalla sutta asserts, “it is the remainderless fading away and ceasing, the giving up, relinquishing, letting go, and rejecting of that same craving.” although this interpretation of the majjhe-sutta is identical with the teachings of sammaditthi sutta, it is impossible to find anything which establishes a direct connection with the middle discussed in the kcc. the development of different middles in early buddhism the question remains as to why the theravada or mahayana do not refer to the majjhe-sutta. though we find this in the saṃyutta āgama, substantial evidence has not come to light that this sutta was used by sanskrit scholars to describe the middle in buddhism. in portraying the middle, the theravada treatises refer to the kcc of the saṃyutta-nikāya. for instance, the paññābhūmi niddesa, the most essential chapter of the visuddhimagga, refers to the kcc. obviously, the middle teachings in the majjhe-sutta were disregarded in the most famous theravada treatises. however, the commentator of the cullaniddesa (a commentary on the pārāyana-vagga), venerable upasena, was not interested in applying the kcc to describe the two extremes and the middle. his response manifests how he disagreed with the traditional belief in defining the middle. on the other hand, it can be possible that venerable upasena might have been influenced by the opinions of the elders as explained in the cullaniddesa. disagreements were common among the reciters regarding the doctrinal and historical intepretation. therefore, by not referring to the kcc, and portraying the middle in the cullaniddesa or its commentary, it can also be inferred that the authors of these texts followed a different tradition from the group who adopted the kcc to explain the middle. however, this leads to a speculation that venerable upasena practiced a specific tradition that followed a typical [early] buddhist doctrine. 10 prajñā vihāra further, there were certain elders who understood the middle in contrast to the kcc. an assumption that can be drawn from this is that the chain of dependent-origination was a teaching applied in response to the brahmins or the monks who entered the buddhist order from brahmin families. as venerable rahula suggests, the buddha predominately applied two types of expositional ways to substantiate the concept of non-self (anatta). one of them was the chain of dependent-origination that, according to collins, the buddha introduced to oppose the brahmins’ teachings. while the buddha was referring to dependent-origination to explain the middle, the listeners were brahmins or monks from brahmin families. for instance; in the kcc, the listener (kaccāyana) was a brahmin. in the dhammadāyāda-sutta, the buddha addressed arahant sāriputta, who was from a brahmin family. also, certain suttas in the nidāna-saṃyutta of the saṃyutta-nikāya like aññatara, jāṇussoni, lokāyatika, which do not record the details of the listeners also presumably were delivered to brahmins. except for the above sources, no other reference in the pali canon that holds the term ‘majjhena’ in the philosophical sense of ‘the middle’ could be found. the reason for this could be that the method in twelvefold causality was more familiar to brahmins in understanding the middle in buddhism. this point can be fortified with a view proposed by joanna jurewicz in one of her articles. she argues that the paticcasamuppāda in buddhism was directed against vedic ideas. as just mentioned, collins also notes that the twelve-fold dependent-origination was applied to oppose brahmanism. as taber argues, the buddha learnt the vedas either second or third-hand during his ascetic period. it is obvious that buddhism incorporated many non-brahmanical methods. we might therefore suggest that the way of understanding the middle in buddhist teachings by non-brahmins was different because they were freer from dogmas than the brahmins. thus, it is clear that the commentator upasena evaded the kcc, which explained the middle to a brahmin using the paticcasamuppāda, while buddhaghosa referred to it. accordingly, i suggest that these six monks in the majjhe-sutta were from non-brahmin families. and furthermore, sanjeewa vijitha kumara 11 their way of elaborating the middle might have been followed by the different groups of elders like upasena. conclusion this discussion shows that the majjhe-sutta significantly developed a verse which appears in the tissametteyya-sutta of the sutta-nipāta and led to six new varied interpretations. the well-known middle, the chain of dependent-origination revealed in the kcc of the saṃyutta-nikāya varies from ‘the middle’ that comes to light in the majjhe-sutta. this demonstrates that there are multiple methods for understanding ‘the middle’ in buddhism. however, the majjhe-sutta shows similarities with the kcc in relation to the contact-based, name-and-form-based, six-senses-based, and feeling-based middles while the other two remain independent. i understand that feeling, six-senses-based and personal identity are closer to the format of the four noble truths than the paṭicca-samuppāda. the time-based middle is identical to that we find in the bhaddekaratta-sutta (mn. sutta 131). also, sakkāyanirodha, saḷāyatananirodha and viññānanirodha, which became the middle are similar to the teachings in the third step of the four noble truths. this careful analysis indicates that the pali canonical literature holds various (philosophical) teachings concerning the middle, and there is no justification for considering dependent-origination to be the only way to understand ‘the middle’ philosophically in buddhism, because it was especially directed against the brahmins. the non-brahmin followers were familiar with different middles (like cessation of contact or cessation of feeling) because their thoughts or views were not influenced by vedic or brahmanical teachings, particularly, with the belief of a creator or ātman. 12 prajñā vihāra acknowledgements hereby, i would like to thank dr. warren todd, prof. kapila abhayawansa and dr. waruni thennakoon for their insightful feedback on an early draft of this article. abbreviations a aṅguttara-nikāya a-a aṅguttara-nikāya aṭṭhakathā bd buddhist dictionary bv-a buddhavaṃsa aṭṭhakathā d dīgha-nikāya d-a dīgha-nikāya aṭṭhakathā kcc kaccāyanagotta-sutta m majjhima-nikāya m-a majjhima-nikāya aṭṭhakathā mmk mūlamadhyamakakārikā nidd niddesa aṭṭhakathā ped pali english dictionary s saṃyutta-nikāya sn suttanipāta sn-a suttanipāta aṭṭhakathā sanjeewa vijitha kumara 13 end notes 1 d. andersen & h. smith, suttanipāta, (london: pali text society1913), 199. 2 v. fausboll, a collection of discourses (oxford: sacred books of the east 1898) 183. 3 n. a. jayawickrama, the sutta nipata (the text and translation) (university of kelaniya : postgraduate institute of pali and buddhist studies 2001), 389. 4 k. r. norman, the group of discourses, (oxford: pali text society 2001), 132. 5 d. andersen & h. smith, suttanipāta, 198. 6 “bhikkhave, kullūpamo mayā dhammo desito nittharaṇatthāya, no gahaṇatthāya. kullūpamaṃ vo, bhikkhave, dhammaṃ desitaṃ, ājānantehi dhammāpi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā.” m i, p134 [bhikkhus, when you know the dhamma to be similar to a raft, you should abandon even good states, how much more so bad states. bhikkhu ñāṇamoli & bhikkhu bodhi, the middle length discourses of the buddha [majjhimanikāya], (kandy: buddhist publication society1995) 229. 7 see mmk 24.18 [yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe]. 8 see mmk 13.8, where it is suggested that anybody who holds on to emptiness as a view is “incurable”. 9 e. m. hare, the book of the gradual sayings [aṅguttaranikāya], (london: pali text society 1955) 285. 10 ibid 399. 11 see the numerical discourses of the buddha, translated by bhikkhu bodhi (boston; wisdom publication 2012) 1766. bhikkhu bodhi is to be credited for comparing these two sources. his reference could be the first note on this point by a pali scholar. 12 https://suttacentral.net/lzh/sa1164 13 ibid 14 o. hinuber, a handbook of pali literature, (berlin :walter de gruyter 1996), 49-50. / b. c. law, a history of pali literature, (new delhi : motilal banarshidass1933), 42. / k. r. norman, pāli literature, (wiebaden: otto harrassowttz 1983), 63. 15 saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso / passapaccayā vedanā / viññāṇa paccayā nāmarupaṃ l. feer, saṃyutta-nikāya ii (london: pali text society 1888), 1. 16 in addition to this, the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta of the mn also occurs; nāmarūpasamudayā saḷāyatanasamudayo, nāmarūpanirodhā saḷāyatananirodho., v. trenckner, majjhimanikāya. vols. i. (london: pali text society 1993), 52. 17 l. feer, saṃyutta-nikāya ii. 2. 18 it is assumed that the majjhe sutta has used a more standard methodology than the kcc by using a three-lined illustratable method. as it records, phasso kho, āvuso, eko anto, phassasamudayo dutiyo anto, phassanirodho majjhe. it runs parallel to the structure of the four noble truths and evaded the fourth (path of cessation of the suffering) only. further, the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta can also be drawn on 14 prajñā vihāra to back up the above suggestion. the only thing we find as a different teaching in the majjhe-sutta from the sammādiṭṭhi sutta is the fourth step of the process. consider the underlined areas chayimāni, āvuso, āyatanāni – cakkhāyatanaṃ, sotāyatanaṃ, ghānāyatanaṃ, jivhāyatanaṃ, kāyāyatanaṃ, manāyatanaṃ. nāmarūpasamudayā saḷāyatanasamudayo, nāmarūpanirodhā saḷāyatananirodho, ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo saḷāyatananirodhagāminī paṭipadā, v. trenckner, majjhimanikāya. i. 52. 19 “let not a person revive the past or on the future build his hopes; for the past has been left behind and the future has not been reached. instead with insight let him see each presently arisen state; let him know that and be sure of it, invincibly, unshakably”, trans. ñāṇamoli bhikkhu & bodhi bhikkhu. the middle length discourses of the buddha, 1039. 20 ibid 1048. 21 d. andersen & h. smith, suttanipāta, 199. 22 k. r. norman, the group of discourses, 123. 23 majjhe ce no gahessasīti paccuppanne rūpādidhammepi na gahessasi ce., h. smith, suttanipātaaṭṭhakathā, iii. (london: pali text society 1984), 568. 24 d. andersen & h. smith, suttanipāta, 213. / uddhaṃ adho tiriyañcāpi majjheti. uddhanti anāgataṃ; adhoti atītaṃ; tiriyañcāpi majjheti paccuppannaṃ. l. de la vallée poussin, and e.j thomas, niddesa ii. (london: pali text society 1917) 151. 25 yaṃ pubbe taṃ visosehi, pacchā te māhu kiñcanaṃ; majjhe ce no gahessasi, upasanto carissasi., d. andersen & h. smith, suttanipāta, 213. 26 vedanāpaccayā taṇhā,. l. feer, saṃyutta-nikāya ii. 16. 27 tisso vedanā – sukhā vedanā, dukkhā vedanā, adukkhamasukhā vedanā., carpenter, j. e., dīghanikāya. eds. vols.iii. (london: pali text society, 1976), 216. 28 sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubbeva somanassadomanassānaṃ atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṃ upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṃ catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja vihāsiṃ, v. trenckner, majjhimanikāya. i. 21. 29 according to this sutta, the buddha realized that when consciousness does not go beyond name and form to condition other factors such as the six sense bases etc, then beings are not born again. as long as consciousness and name and form mutually condition each other for their emergence, they live, die and are born again. this realization of the buddha again implies that if the cause (mental formation) of both consciousness and name-and-form does not appear, then, one can completely stop the entire wheel of suffering., abhayawansa kapila: 163 30 once, it is found in the chain of dependent origination. again, it comes as a part of five aggregates. next, it appears as the connection of the inner sense and external object. the sumangalavilāsinī throws light on the term viññāṇa. this text solves the controversial concept by interpreting viññāṇa as ‘nibbana’ (‘viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ/ettha āpo ca pathavī, tejo vāyo na gādhati./ettha dīghañca sanjeewa vijitha kumara 15 rassañca, aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ;/ettha nāmañca rūpañca, asesaṃ uparujjhati;/ viññāṇassa nirodhena, etthetaṃ uparujjhatī’ti. t. w. rhys davids, & j. e. carpenter, dīghanikāya. i. (london: pali text society 1975), 222. 31 catutthavāre viññāṇaṃ majjheti paṭisandhiviññāṇampi sesaviññāṇampi nāmarūpapaccayasamudāgatattā nāmarūpānaṃ majjhe nāma., h. kopp, aṅguttaranikāya aṭṭhakathā (manorathapūraṇī). iii. (london: pali text society 1966), 404. 32 ‘‘‘viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpa’nti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tadānanda, imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ samuccissathā’’ti? ‘‘no hetaṃ, bhante’’. ‘‘viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā’’ ti? ‘no hetaṃ, bhante’’. ‘‘viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissathā’’ ti? ‘‘no hetaṃ, bhante’’. ‘‘tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa – yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ’’ t. w. rhys davids, & j. e. carpenter, dīghanikāya. ii. (london: pali text society 1966), 62. moreover, this opinion can be understood by a metaphor found in the commentary of the same sutta thus; yathā hi rājā attano parisaṃ niggaṇhanto evaṃ vadeyya – ‘‘tvaṃ uparājā, tvaṃ senāpatīti kena kato nanu mayā kato, sace hi mayi akaronte tvaṃ attano dhammatāya uparājā vā senāpati vā bhaveyyāsi, jāneyyāma vo bala’’ nti; evameva viññāṇaṃ nāmarūpassa paccayo hoti. atthato evaṃ nāmarūpaṃ vadati viya ‘‘tvaṃ nāmaṃ, tvaṃ rūpaṃ, tvaṃ nāmarūpaṃ nāmāti kena kataṃ, nanu mayā kataṃ, sace hi mayi purecārike hutvā mātukucchismiṃ paṭisandhiṃ agaṇhante tvaṃ nāmaṃ vā rūpaṃ vā nāmarūpaṃ vā bhaveyyāsi, jāneyyāma vo bala’’nti. t. w. rhys davids, j. e. carpenter, & w. stede, dīghanikāya aṭṭhakathā (sumaṅgalavilāsinī). ii. (london: pali text society 1971), 502. 33 in addition to this interpretation, the commentary posits another two definitions; whatsoever consciousness which obtains the actions of the internal faculty or faculty of the mind is embodied in this context as ‘viññāṇa’. otherwise, it would be considered as the javana consciousness. h. kopp, aṅguttaranikāya aṭṭhakathā (manorathapūraṇī). iii. 403. 34 chayimāni, āvuso, āyatanāni – cakkhāyatanaṃ, sotāyatanaṃ, ghānāyatanaṃ, jivhāyatanaṃ, kāyāyatanaṃ, manāyatanaṃ. nāmarūpasamudayā saḷāyatanasamudayo, nāmarūpanirodhā saḷāyatananirodho, ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo saḷāyatananirodhagāminī paṭipadā, v. trenckner, majjhimanikāya. vols. i. 52. it is obvious that the sammādiṭṭhi-sutta indicates the cessation of the six faculties. it is based on the cessation of name and form. nevertheless, the majjhe-sutta does not hold any corresponding teaching to this format and it signifies that the cessation of the consciousness (viññāṇa) is the way to cease the two extremes based on six senses. 35 although venerable nyanatiloka suggests that it cannot be accepted as ‘own body’ (buddhist dictionary, kandy: buddhist publication society 1980: 288.) 16 prajñā vihāra which derives from sva+kāyo [like sajjhāya; sajjhāya would be formed by sva+adhyāya i assume that it is possible to admit as the term sakkāya is etiologically based on sva+ kāya or own body which is rejected in buddhism. 36 this statement can be seen even in the dīgha-nikāya j. e. carpenter, dīghanikāya. i. 216. 37 sakkāyoti pañcupādānakkhandhā., kopp, aṅguttaranikāya aṭṭhakathā (manorathapūraṇī). iii. 992/esa sakkāyo yāvatā sakkāyoti yattako tebhūmakavaṭṭasaṅkhāto sakkāyo nāma atthi, sabbopi so esa sakkāyo, na ito paraṃ sakkāyo atthīti paṭisañcikkhati i. b. horner, majjhimanikāya aṭṭhakathā (papañcasūdanī). iv. (london: pali text society 1976), 67. anyway, i am in doubt whether the majjhe-sutta takes into account ‘sakkāya’ to be the view of personality. notably, sakkāyadiṭṭhi or ‘personality view’, would be better to understand with sixty-two views of the dutiya isidatta sutta (yāni cimāni dvāsaṭṭhi diṭṭhigatāni brahmajāle bhaṇitāni; imā kho, gahapati, diṭṭhiyo sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti, sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā asati na hontī’’’ ti). in case of this, i postulate that this sutta suggests ‘the personality’ (sakkāya) only. 38 katamo ca, bhikkhave,sakkāyanirodho? yo tassāyeva taṇhāya…pe… ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sakkāyanirodho katamā ca, bhikkhave, sakkāyanirodhagāminī paṭipadā? ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo. seyyathidaṃ – sammādiṭṭhi…pe… sammāsamādhi. ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sakkāyanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’’ti., feer, l., saṃyutta-nikāya, iv. (london: pali text society, 1894)159. 39 ñāṇamoli bhikkhu & bodhi bhikkhu. the middle length discourses of the buddha, 397 ‘‘yo kho, āvuso visākha, tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo; ayaṃ kho, āvuso visākha.sakkāyanirodho vutto bhagavatā’’ti v. trenckner, majjhimanikāya. vols. i. 299. 40 the two together: since any given states are produced without interrupting the [cause-fruit] continuity of any given combination of conditions, the whole expression “dependent origination” (paþicca-samuppáda) represents the middle way, which rejects the doctrines…, rhys davids, kindred sayings, ii, (london: pali text society, 1972)12. 41 ubhantamabhiññāyāti ubho ante abhijānitvā. mantā na lippatīti paññāya na lippati. [‘ubhantamabhiññāya’ means: having known both ends. ‘mantā na lippatī’ means: by wisely not clinging to (the middle)] h. smith, suttanipātaaṭṭhakathā, 588. 42 ko ubhantamabhiññāyāti ko ubho ante abhiññāya jānitvā tulayitvā tīrayitvā vibhāvayitvā vibhūtaṃ katvāti – ko ubhantamabhiññāya. majjhe mantā na lippatīti majjhe mantāya na lippati, alitto anupalitto nikkhanto nissaṭo vippamutto visaññutto vimariyādikatena cetasā viharatīti – majjhe mantā na lippati. vipassana research center, nidd ii (miyan) 41. 43 controversies among theravadins regarding doctrinal or cultural issues were common in history. for instance; the madhuratthavilāsinī suggests that prince siddhatta experienced the ‘four sights’ in a single day. nevertheless, the others say that sanjeewa vijitha kumara 17 it happened in monthly intervals (dīghāyukā bodhisattā vassasate vassasate atikkante jiṇṇādīsu ekekaṃ addasaṃsu. amhākaṃ pana bodhisatto appāyukakāle uppannattā catunnaṃ catunnaṃ māsānaṃ accayena uyyānaṃ gacchanto anukkamena ekekaṃ addasa. dīghabhāṇakā panāhu – ‘‘cattāri nimittāni ekadivaseneva disvā agamāsī’’ ti., i. b. horner, madhuratthavilāsinī nāma buddhavaṃsa aṭṭhakathā, (london: pali text society 1978), 279. this explicitly shows that there were different opinions among the theravada tradition. thus, it is not hard to assume that venerable upasena, the author of the commentary of the cullaniddesa, held a different opinion on the two extremes and the middle. 44 “the doctrine of anatta or no-soul is the natural result of, or the corollary to, the analysis of the five aggregates and the teaching of conditioned genesis {paticca samuppada, w. rahula, what the buddha taught. (new york: grove press 1974), 52. 45 “in considering the teaching of dependent origination, which buddhism used to oppose brahmanism on the conceptual level, it is crucially important to distinguish between the general idea of conditionality, and the twelve-fold series which has come to be the traditional way in which the teaching is expressed.” s. collins, selfless person. (cambridge: university press 1982), 106. 46 in this sutta, arahant sariputta extended the teachings that had been delivered by the buddha in brief. it is an example to understand this point clearly. 47 in the khandha-saṃyutta we find the term ‘majjhena’. nevertheless, it can be confirmed that it was a direct quotation from the kcc of the nidāna-saṃyutta. 48 see pali text society journal (2000) 170 49 “certainly, the buddha did not formally study the veda, for he was not a brahmin; he was not qualified. had he heard the veda recited? did he know sanskrit? perhaps he heard sermons based on vedic texts given by other religious teachers, perhaps indeed the teachers he studied yoga under shortly after his renunciation (though other brahmin teachers are mentioned in the canon).”, john taber (buddhist studies review, 30.1 2013) 134 50 buddhaghosa and ācārya nāgārjuna both referred to the kcc or the nidāna vagga that contained the teaching of dependent-origination, and both were brahmins. see mmk xv.7 18 prajñā vihāra bibliography anālayo bhikkhu, satipaṭṭhāna: the direct path to realization. kandy: buddhist publication society, 2003. andersen, d. & smith, h., suttanipāta. eds. london: pali text society, 1913. bodhi bhikku, connected discourses. trans. boston: wisdom publication, 2000. collins, s. selfless person. cambridge: university press, 1982. dhammajothi, k. l. & karunadasa, y. a critique on some modern interpretationswith special reference to samkhārapaccayā vinnānam. buddhist and pali studies. 2010. pp 439-457 fausboll, v. a collection of discourses. oxford: sacred books of the east, 1898. feer, l., saṃyutta-nikāya, ed. vols. i-vi. london: pali text society, 1884-1904. fuller, p. the notion of ditthi in theravada buddhism. london: routledge curzon, 2005. gombrich, r. what the buddha thought. london: oakvill, 2009. hare, e. m. the book of the gradual sayings [aṅguttaranikāya]. vols. i-iv. london: pali text society, 1955. hare, e.m., aṅguttaranikāya. trans. vols. iv. london: pali text society, 1965. harvey, p. the selfless mind: personality, consciousness and nirvāṇa in early buddhism. oxon: routledge curzon. 2004. hinuber, o. a handbook of pali literature. berlin : walter de gruyter, 1996. horner, i. b., madhuratthavilāsinī nāma buddhavaṃsa aṭṭhakathā, london: pali text society, 1978. sanjeewa vijitha kumara 19 horner, i. b., majjhimanikāya aṭṭhakathā (papañcasūdanī). eds. vols. iii. london: pali text society, 1976. jurewicz, j., ‘playing with fire: the pratītyasamutpāda from the perspective of vedic thought’, journal of the pāli text society 26 (2000): 77–103. jayawickrama n. a. the sutta nipata (the text and translation). university of kelaniya : postgraduate institute of pali and buddhist studies, 2001. kalupahana, d. j. mūlamādyamakakārikā. new delhi: motilal banarshidass, 1991. kopp, h., aṅguttaranikāya aṭṭhakathā (manorathapūraṇī). ed. vols. iii. london: pali text society, 1966. law, b. c. a history of pali literature. new delhi : motilal banarshidass, 1933. morris, r. & hardy, e., aṅguttaranikāya. eds. vols. i-v., london: pali text society, 1885-1900. ñāṇamoli bhikkhu & bodhi bhikkhu. the middle length discourses of the buddha [majjhimanikāya]. kandy: buddhist publication society, 1995. ñāṇatiloka bhikkhu, buddhist dictionary. kand: buddhist publication society, 1980. norman k. r. pāli literature. wiesbaden: otto harrassowitz, 1983. norman k. r. the group of discourses. oxford: pali text society, 2001. rahula, w. what the buddha taught. new york: grove press, 1974. rhys davids, t. w. & carpenter, j. e., dīghanikāya. eds. vols. i-iii. london: pali text society, 1890-1976. rhys davids, t. w., carpenter, j. e. & stede, w., dīghanikāya aṭṭhakathā (sumaṅgalavilāsinī). eds. vols. i-iii. london: pali text society, 1968-1971. 20 prajñā vihāra smith, h. suttanipātaaṭṭhakathā, iii. london: pali text society, 1984. taber, j., book review: what the buddha thought, by richard gombrich , buddhist studies review, 30.1 (2013) 129-136 trenckner, v. & chalrners, r. majjhimanikāya. eds. vols. i-iii. london: pali text society, 1948-1951. vallée poussin l. de la, and thomas, e.j. niddesa ii. london: pali text society, 1917. walshe, m. thus have i heard: the long discourses of the buddha [dīghanikāya]. london: wisdom publications, 1987. woodward, f. l, saṃyuttanikāya aṭṭhakathā (sāratthapakāsinī). ed. vols. i-iii. london: pali text society, 1977. woodward, f. l. gradual sayings [aṅguttaranikāya]. vols. i-ii. london: pali text society, 1979-1982. after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi what sort of essence has technology? wathin chatkoon srinakharinwirot university abstract the question concerning the essence of technology is still relevant in the philosophy of technology. in the contemporary debate, many constructivist philosophers and sociologists believe this concept is an illusion, an abstraction or an historical misunderstanding, arising from methodological inadequacy in technological studies. however, many essentialist philosophers argue that without its essence, we cannot properly understand an effect that technology has made upon human, society or environment. this paper is a philosophical investigation of this crucial issue. first of all, while essentialists provide contemporary concepts of essence which are helpful in understanding technological phenomena, they cannot deal with technological evaluation at a satisfactory level. on the other side, while constructivists provide strong arguments against an essence of technology and technological determinism, they cannot dismiss technological essence completely. i’ll propose a new concept of essence that takes advantages from both sides: a relational concept of technological commitment, which in itself is indeterminism and also covers evaluation issues. introduction since the emergence of the philosophy of technology, the concept of its essence has played an important role. technological essentialism, a position referring to philosophers who declare themselves against instrumentalism and value-free neutralism in the conceptual understanding of technological phenomena, has argued that technologies, involve not only merely instruments or tools but have substantially deeper essence. heidegger’s concept of “enframing” (heidegger 1977), as well as ellul’s “technique”, a technological order (ellul 1964) are the very first examples of attempts to argue philosophically for an essence of technology. while it is undeniable that technology involves many aspects of modern life, we not only live with technology but also live within it. so essentialist philosophers believe, more or less, that technology dominates our relation to each other and the world. technology is no longer our means but is an end in itself. technology becomes an underlying structure of the modern way of life and we are now living within this movement of technological progress. while the concept of technological essence provokes us to pay more attention to our life in a technological society, it also creates controversial issues. to conceive a man-made thing as an autonomous entity that is a determining force or has a causal power of its own is not easy to swallow. in three decades, technological essentialism and its relational concept: technological determinism (which is often understood as expressing the same thing) has led to heated debates in history, philosophy and sociology concerning technological studies. (heilbroner 1967, pinch and bijker 1987, winner 1993, bimber 1994, brey 1997, feenberg 2000, thomson 2006) our discussion in this paper focuses on the second and third area in the contemporary scene. it is good to start with new and recent attempts to defend an essentialist position. three kinds of technological essentialism in general, recent concepts of technological essence share some agreements. 1) technology is autonomous. 2) it is possible to free ourselves from technological constraint. the first is an autonomous thesis: a core assertion of essentialism that technology has a substance; it has a life-of-its-own which (a) dominates our way of life and (b) its development or growth is often beyond our control. in other words, technology is not merely a means but also an end in itself. this thesis, which arose from first generation of essentialists, gives us helpful insight concerning the “effect” that modern technologies have made upon modern society and how it has considerably changed our modern life from pre-modern times. however, in order to avoid determinism, essentialists have to impose a second controversial feature, a possibility of a “free relation” between man and technology. according to degrees and justifications on these features, essentialism can be categorized into three kinds, ontology essentialism, paradigm essentialism and moderate essentialism. ontological essentialism, or heideggerian essentialism, admits that the endangering of modern technology is not its consequential social and environmental problems, but a threat to our ontological “condition”, the way we understand ourselves in relation to the world. technology, in the thought of martin heidegger and his followers such as herbert dreyfus, is not merely an instrument, but can be conceived ontologically as a world disclosure, things-we-use to reflect our level of “understanding of being” (heidegger 1977, dreyfus 1995, dreyfus and spinosa 1997). an old japanese clay cup used in tea ceremonies represents a meaning of life in traditional japanese culture, while a foam cup in fast food culture reflects a life of aggressive individualism. the heideggerian concept of technological essence is “enframing”, an order of things that exists for its own further ordering. everything in modern society, the way of thinking included, is “standing reserve” or becoming a resource for technological ordering which shifts the ontological structure of the subject-object relation. an airplane can be conceived as “subject” of high efficiency transportation and passengers become only its “object”, as cargo, to fill in. so, any relation to technological ordering are merely “pure relation” and we are now becoming “a part” of a system where nothing remains in human control except for growth for the sake of growth itself. however, in order to defend their position against determinism and fatalism, ontological essentialists propose their indeterministic solutions in a more controversial way. they insist that technology is not our “fate”. while we can expertly use technology without recognizing any ontological condition, we can also become aware of “a technological understanding of being.” we can use our instruments while “remaining true to ourselves”, and the danger of technology will become a saving power for us. with a transformation of our sense of reality, we can reorient our relation with technology and transcend a duality of technological pros-and-cons. ontological essentialists call this a “free relation” with technology, being-with-technology without any constraints or attachments. a second kind of essentialism is paradigm essentialism, as presented in the works of langdon winner and albert borgmann (winner 1977, borgmann 1984, winner 1986). modern technology, in their view, has an impact on modern society, but not in a total and deterministic sense such as ellul’s concept of “technique” or technological order. technology is not “rule” or “law” of technological society, but is at best a “paradigm” or “way of life” of modern times. winner calls this “technological somnambulism”: acceptation and acquainting of new technology that leads to transformation of our life activities. for winner, “technology” can be understood as a “form of life”, a concept he draws from wittgenstein, which is represented in the language of our daily life activities. we often say for example “my mind is not programmed in that way” or we compare our mind with a computer without seeming odd. as cars, mobile phones, computers, etc, are very common things in our daily life, it follows that the innovation of technologies are not leading to alienation, as some futuristic novels (1984, the brave new world) suggest. in order for new systems and inventions to function, human activities must be adapted to them. thus, technology becomes our “second nature” and life without them cannot be imagined. while we’re all inescapably living a technological way of life, winner suggests that we still have chances to persuade our free, creative, intelligent and self-governing acts. green technology, participatory technology, or flexibility technology, to name a few, shall result from our “wise” choices according to those kinds of acts. but our problem is any knowledge we have now is not sufficient for us to disentangle ourselves from our “second nature” and create an alternative paradigm against technological somnambulism. for this reason, winner purposes a “luddism epistemology: an experimental inquiry of life-unplugged that will provide us a new kind of information to reconstruct and reconnect ourselves with technology in new ways. borgmann agrees with winner’s concept of “technology as a form of life”, which he calls “device paradigm”. but borgmann’s primary concern is how modern technology relates to a good life. modern instruments or tools, such as heaters, microwave ovens, are “useful” but not “good” things. they may simplify our tasks in some ways, but can also reduce us to mere consumers. technology in device paradigm is essentially a fixed-function and context-separated commodity. using microwave ovens in a modern kitchen, compared to hand-kitchen tools, is very fast and an easy way to “cook”, but many activities and skills of food preparation are also diminished. these kinds of activities, such as “culture of the table”, for example, are believed to be “life-flourishing” and encourage a good life. in summary, good-life activities are excluded from the device paradigm. borgmann contrasts device paradigm with “focal things”. a hearth, for example, is not just a device but the centre of a traditional house, a place where everyone in the house can experience lifeactivities together. focal things cannot be separated from their world or context of use, others tools or natural environment, and also require some human skills. even through a burdensome task, these kinds of skills are a practice of living. gathering wood in the forest for the fire place in winter, preparing food by oneself, or running and walking in the morning are what borgmann calls “focal practices”, lifeflourishing activities which brings meaningful living back within modern world. in borgmann’s point of view (which is different from winner’s unknown future), to be “free” from the device paradigm is to live by re-engaging one’s life with focal practices as much as possible. taking balance of a device paradigm with practice of engagement, he believes, will “reform” our lifestyles, society or technological forms which shall support a better way of life. a third and final kind of essentialism in our discussion is moderate essentialism, a theory which was developed by don ihde (ihde 1990, 1993). instead of perceiving artifacts as world-disclosure, as ontological essentialism, ihde focuses his attention on how modes of world-disclosure are made possible by artifacts. artifacts and tools are our perceptive mediation to the world by two types of relations. one, embodiment relation, a “micro perception” in which artifacts “enhance” our perceptive capacities of outside world. an example is a telescope which magnifies our vision and brings about images of the world (larger or smaller) which we’ve never seen before. the other one is hermeneutic relation, a “macro perception” in which one’s perception is “perceived” in specific context. for lay people, data from a spectrometer is something scientific that is not easily understandable. however, for an astrophysicist, this data obviously shows components of a star in a distant galaxy. in order to be understandable, any physical perception must acquire its meaning in appropriate context. idhe points out that two relations co-exists, interweave and cannot be separated from each other in our lifeworld. thus, in ihde’s theory of technological lifeworld, technology is not a separate entity from its users and the culture in which it is used. in this sense, technology is “technology-in-order-to” as well as “technology-in-use”. while the former represents a universal structure of technology, the later shows a diversity of its localization. ihde calls this “multistability”: a pattern that shows how a universal intended technological innovation can be “stabilized” in very different ways in different cultures. for ihde, multistability is just like a gestalt switch, and by its incommensurable feature, we cannot tell which technology is more effective. more importantly, a different form of technology is equally successful according to its own “technological pairing”, whether an ancient way of sailing or a western one. however, to avoid falling into constructivism, ihde believes that technology possesses an essential feature, namely “technological intentionality”. as a mediation to the world, technology inevitably frames and supports a particular type of action. for example, writing a text by word processor makes us less careless about contents but much more concerned with sentence arrangement. one of the critics of essentialism, especially ontological and paradigm essentialism is andrew feenberg (feenberg 1999, 2000). feenberg criticizes heideggerian’s concept of free relation as merely attitude changing. in other words, having free relation with technology is not committing us to alter technological forms which, for feenberg, is not a solution for an “environmental concerning” generation. the ontological concept of technology in their account seems too much abstract, monological and ahistorical, compared to new concepts provided by constructivism. for this reason, even though ontological essentialism calls for a re-examination of our deep understanding between ourselves and the technological world, it remains too romantic and has no place for a should-be-technology for the future or even for the present. for paradigm essentialism, that is more “social critique” than ontological one. apart from an unclear and experimental analysis of winner’s solution, feenberg argues that borgmann’s theory restricts itself due to the incompatibility between device paradigm and focal things. it is too early to say that we cannot find any “meaning” in some modern artifacts or turn away from technological society to find out an alternative way of life. feenberg’s empirical studies suggest that some types of internet use, for example, a use of internet chat, by aids patients, to discuss their problems which could not be directly spoken to a doctor face to face, can be considered as focal things. furthermore, their activities through cyber communications altered the way they should be treated and cured. feenberg points out that in borgmann’s model, we not only face an impossibility of hermeneutic transformation in device paradigm on one hand, but also an ambiguity of alternative reformation of technologies in another. while feenberg seems to show his empathy to idhe’s theory (feenberg 2003), idhe acknowledges our world is englobed by modern technology, especially image technology (ihde 1993). comparing to multi-screens television in news station, while image technology enhances our “plural vision”, we are unavoidably facing cultural diversity and conflicts with “the others”. our lifeworld appears to lose its “core” values and seems to have no universally standard norm. we are forced to choose or create one harmonizing identity for ourselves out of this pluralism. in this perplexing situation, for ihde, our critical issues should not be considered merely locally, but globally. from this point, his concerns unfortunately shifts to environmental crisis or social crisis to find a way to establish post-enlightenment means to maintain tolerance with each other and the world, instead of searching for alternative attitudes and paradigms, either ontologically or culturally. so, as is the case with other kinds of technological essentialism, moderate essentialism seems to be silent on an important question about technology: how can we, as users, evaluate technological forms and create a should-be-technology? an essence of technology: constructivist’s rejections constructivism agrees with essentialism that technology is non-neutral and value-laden, but their point of divergence is their rejection of the essence of technology. the constructivist’s attempt to reject technological determinism is a rejection of technological essence altogether. at first, the constructivists present an indeterministic understanding of technology in order to undermine the autonomous thesis that was widely accepted in philosophical discussions on technology. they propose democratizing technologies and giving it a normative relevance. there are two types of constructivism: a strong constructivism and a weak one. a strong constructivism is “social construction of technology” (scot) (bijker, hughes and pinch 1987), while a weak constructivism can be considered as “social shaping” (mackenzie and wajeman 1999) and “actorsnetwork-theory” (ant) (latour 1992). considering first the strong position which now has a major impact on technology studies, scot can be seen as an extension of sociology of science to technology studies. with proper methodology intended to demystify “black box” of technological progress, bijker and his colleagues (pinch and bijker 1987, bijker 1993) insist that we can see development of technologies as a non-linear progress with multiple possibilities of outcomes. technologies, rather than being a force leading to social change, are merely a products or results of agreement among social groups who are involved in technological controversies. in other words, technologies are not determinations of society, but it is social progress that determines technological change. a central element of scot is interpretative flexibility: an ability of relevant social groups to give their own meaning to artifacts or technologies in discussion. in this sense, not only do technologies lack any causal force, but they also lack any essence in themselves. if bijker is right, how can we explain the obvious “effect” of technologies? in their view, scot states that any effect in question can be understood within a technological frame, a paradigm-like conception, which arises after social controversy, is dissolved. at first, relevant social groups entered a technological controversy or conflict with their different interpretations upon one or another forms of artifacts. sooner or later, scot persists, a conflict must be dissolved somehow and an artifact becomes stabilized in form and design. with a higher degree of stabilization, there is a higher degree of closure, the the less it is interpreted. in this way a technology becomes a “black box” and a determining paradigm of society. a concept of technological frame is different from essentialist’s notion of technological paradigm in two crucial points. first, it is not a fixed entity, as an essence of technology, but a dynamic and interactive one that possibly opens to any change in the future. second, technological frame implies inseparability between technology and society. in the process of the social construction of artifacts, technology and society can be considered as “sociotechnical ensembles”, or two sides of the same coin. for if there is no separate entity such as technology, how can it cause any effect upon another entity? thus the efficacy of technology does not arise from any causal force within technology itself – an essence of technology – but is a phenomenon explainable only within a technological frame constructed by society. interpretive flexibility, technological frames and sociotechnical ensembles are not only conceptual refutations to essentialism, but also support scot to pursue more normative evaluations, and consider the democratic participation in technological choices (bijker 1996). the social construction of technology involves choice interests or value judgments which are political matters. with this process, we can, in principle, make interventions to stabilize artifacts. but at the same time, scot reminds us, that intervention may not be so easy. bijker speaks of two kinds of power which exists within sociotechnical closure: micropolitics of power and semiotic power structure. on a sub-network scale, micropolitics represents our ability to alter already-existing patterns of technology in our own ways, but the fixity of its structural meaning prevents us from doing that. as a car owner, rush hour or oil prices uncertainty is unavoidable, but we are still free to choose a proper time, occasionally, to avoid traffic jams. under this condition bijker suggests that scot shall pay attention to empirical studies of social conflict on public facilities projects; how groups involve in such conflict reach their agreement and reconsider themselves according to their negotiation. from his studies, bijker insists that dynamic mechanism of scot is conceptually compatible with “strong democracy” (barber 1984) in at least three senses. first, there are no prior assumptions (ideals of democracy or essence of technology). second, two views agree that ends are archived by social interaction. and finally, relevant social groups’ involvement has priority over elites such as politicians or technical experts. bijker has already showed how scot is compatible with strong participatory democratic means but he has not answered why it has to be democratic. in his analysis, bijker sometimes speaks about this compatibility just like an “analogy” between each one, something that is not clearly committed that they are one and the same entity with two different features. but if we consider social and technical spheres as two sides of the same coin, we would assume democratic value to be an “intrinsic value” within an ensemble. if this is right, it also leads to the following problems. first, as we know, not all societies have democratic values, let alone possessing them intrinsically. second, if interactions in the technical sphere inescapably lead to democratic values normatively, does this not suggest that democracy is an “essence” of a socio-technical ensemble? does scot’s attempt to refute technological essence implicitly endorse some pre-existing ideology, such as democracy, to be itself an essence. this shifting of essence suggests that it fails to convincingly reject technological essence? actor network theory (ant) is weak constructivism because it allows non-human entity, such as technology, to take part in seamless web of socio-technical changes (latour 1992, 1995). as an actor (or “actant” in ant own term), bruno latour points out that technology is non-human delegation: something to replace our labor and “reversed of forces”. electronic door closers, for example, establish a human and non-human association. while this technology is more efficient than a human doorman, we have to tradeoff some habits or behaviors by hurrying up to pass the door before it returns to hit our face. a door closer is “programmed” or “pre-scripted” in someway by its designer, but when it interacts with human users, some difficulties occur. in response to an “antiprogramme”, designers have to “re-script” the order to make an artifact work conveniently again. a pre-scripted and re-scripted relation happened along the way when inventions and society co-evolve. when one programme takes control over most areas of antiprogramme, we can eventually say that an association gets stabilized, even if some minor resistance still remains. for ant, their preference is a mechanism of adjustment rather than reducing some essential features into either a technical or social sphere. ant defenders find normative evaluation of their theory in user-centre-design, a new research framework which relates closely to democratizing technology (garrety and badham 2004). however, ant still faces some difficulties. in their framework we can clearly see that ant pays more attention to pre-existing social structures than scot. according to their adjustment mechanism, the ant model can approach greater variety of social structures than scot which is implicitly oriented to western society. studies of latour and akrich (latour and akrich 1992, akrich 1992) show that in area of technological transfer, there could be user’s “de-scription” of inventions in stead of designer’s re-description. just as readers “read” same text differently, users can adjust their use of instruments in their own way. whether these adjustments are successful or not, it is not something intended by the designer. our interest is that a de-scription-in-process does not exclude any possibility of owner-designer-politician involvement. in other words, they can also re-script for advantages for their side, and there is also the possibility that some might use democratic means to achieve their goal (such as a case of electricity in the ivory coast.), while some other successful de-scription case might not necessarily involve democratizing process at all. in summary, even though ant framework is compatible with a democratic ideal, but within their association-in-action, it does not guarantee that these normative values arise out of and orient sociotechnical evolution in the way it should be. again, we can’t clearly see how these could happen without some democratic values which were “pre-existing values” (as in a case of scot) or “extrinsic values” as an end beyond a sphere of interactions. feenberg’s theory of instrumentalization as we have already discussed, one problem with the argument of constructivism is that it cannot completely dismiss some form of essence from their theory, and one problem with essentialism is that its concept of technological essence does not commit us to practical technological evaluation. while both sides have weak points on their positions, a question that may arise is how do we find another concept of essence that takes advantages from these two standpoints? andrew feenberg (feenberg 1995, 1999, 2000, 2003a) proposes an answer with his own concept of essence: an instrumentalization theory. based on marcuse’s critical theory, feenberg says that while marcuse, his mentor, admitted some technological restrictions upon modern society (which is called “one dimension society”) (marcuse 1968), he also acknowledged that these restrictions occurred in western society at a particular time. this is important because it suggests an alternative way to respond to technology for those in other societies or other periods of time. beginning with where marcuse left off, feenberg develops his own critical theory of technology with help from constructivists’ insights. feenberg doesn’t deny that there could be “romantic” solutions as essentialists proposed. but these solutions do not entail any changes in technological forms and they are all undemocratic in nature. instead of a nostalgic return “back to nature”, feenberg’s major concern is not only an alteration in artifacts but also a democratic means to do so. here is where insights of constructivists enter, lay people and sub-groups who were previously marginalized by earlier socio-technical closures are empowered, in principle, to participate and intervene in a process of technological change. let us consider the struggle of the handicapped for changes in street and pedestrian design. perhaps no designers or architects have previously thought that their works excluded the handicapped, but they had their consciousness changed as a result of this struggle for handicapped rights, which led to political change, and to a new sociotechnical closure. in this sense, a technological change-in-progress is not merely compatible with democratic means, as some constructivists thought, but it is democratizing-in-itself. as opposed to the process of technocratic rationalization, feenberg calls this democratic or subversive rationalization. feenberg’s democratic rationalization involves instrumentalization at two levels (feenberg 1999). in order to become instruments, at primary level, things must be instrumentalized in four common aspects. decontextualization: to become technical objects, natural objects must be de-worlded from its original context. (a tree must become wood.) reduction: quality of technical objects is reduced to its primary aspects. (wheels had only quality of wood: roundness.) automation: action of technical objects shall be considered separately from its reaction. (the impact of gun on a hunter’s shoulder is not equal to an impact upon the world: killing animals.) positioning: users can position himself in order to gain more advantage from technology. but primary instrumentalization, which is a universal and non-local feature of technology, as essentialists’ technological essence, cannot function in its own right. it needs contextual and cultural installment, a secondary instrumentalization, which has another four aspects. systematization: the technical object must be designed to co-operate with other technical objects and re-contextualize with the natural environment. mediation: before they are used, technical objects must be mediated via social negotiations, ethics or aesthetics. vocation: a hunter is not merely a gun-user but requires some specific skills, specific thoughts or attitudes that make him act professionally. these attitudes are defined collectively by the community which shares the same practices and commitments. initiation: lay users who have a lower position in technical hierarchy can potentially initiate a new technological culture or at best a new technological transformation. is feenberg’s instrumentalization theory sufficient in its own? in the first place, feenberg does not completely deny an essential and universal feature within technology, in the essentialists’ sense, but he implies it: a primary instrumentalization is conceptually abstracted or constructed from a concrete secondary instrumentalization. so, in his theory, this kind of essence does not play an important part in socio-technological change at all. feenberg’s examples of teletel or aids patients’ case seem to suggest that. along with his criticism of his essentialist counterparts, changing one’s attitude or turning to alternative ways of life seems to play no significant part in subversive transformation. however, we should not ignore a simple lesson from ant case studies, that secondary instrumentalization does not necessarily exclude an elite or power dominant groups from re-positioning themselves against subversive and democratic transformation that feenberg suggests. many studies also point out that computers and the internet do not always support democratic ideals as we think they can. we thus find a gap in feenberg’s theory that democratizing technology is not necessarily one and the same as democratizing society. some technological transformations do correspond with democratic movements, as feenberg suggests, while others are not. now an important question arises: what do we really want, a should-be-artifacts or shouldbe society or culture? if our answer is the former, we can doubt feenberg’s anti-essentialist position because it obviously implies democratic values as a core of a should-be-artifact. but if the answer is latter, we can ask why feenberg’s subversive rationalization does not re-enforce or re-integrate with the ontological transcendental attitude or an alternative way of life. our question remains as how? technological commitment now, i’ll present the conceptual reconciliation between constructivism and essentialism which is against feenberg’s subversive rationalization, i’ll call it “subversive reformation” and its possibility relies on a new concept of technological essence. on the essentialists side, we have a substantive and nonrelational concept, something which is technologically a priori, and which lies beyond any cultural complexity. while on the other side, constructivists speak about a constructed and relational concept of essence, a conceptual generalization of actual technological practice and progress, something which is embedded in the complexity of culture and open to change. my own proposal is a possibility of an essence of technology, one that is substantive but also relational in nature. taking inspiration from martha nussbaum’s concept of “human capabilities” (nussbaum 1992), for instance, the human “skill” to invent and use instruments is found universally; nevertheless it is rooted in a certain context. in every culture, people invent and use some tools, simple or complex, in their own way. these various capabilities as tool-inventors or tool-users are undeniable common features of human ability. let us examine a few. (a) we can not dismiss using technology: considering the fact that technology is fallible, we can change from one type of technology to another, but to avoid using any tools or technologies at all seems impossible for us. (b) we cannot use technology privately: we can own device or instruments individually but can not use them privately (while nothing prevents us to do that, such as using a car as plant-base, but that does not count as car-using and that thing is not called “car” any more.) definition of tools or devices (car, mobile phone, television, etc) are not separate from how they were used, and are collectively set up within the boundary of interactive and interpretation of one group or society. as a tool inventor/user, we are committed to the common features mentioned above, which open the possibility of a new substantive and relational concept of essence, an essence that is not of “things”, as the essentialists suggest, but of something we commit together interactively when we use one thing or another. this is not an “agent of change” type of essence, nor an abstracted generalization type, as the constructivists suggest. i call this kind of essence “technological commitment”: a condition which inevitably draws us, as tool-users, to participate in the process of technological change. conclusion a new kind of essence, technological commitment, agrees with essentialism that technology has a “force of orientation” or “intention” in itself. but, as constructivism points out, it is not a determining factor and will vary according to complexity and constraints in each society or cultural context. introducing and accepting one technological form in one’s own community, one is forced, consciously or not, to adapt oneself to new habits or patterns of living. but the fact remains that technology is a fallible thing. whatever technological domination takes place, it will lose its force if that technology malfunctions or breaks down. however, our commitment to technology as a tool-user won’t let our life go on without one or another kind of technology. so if “old” technological forms decline, other “new” ones must arise in the form of technological choices. owing to the fact that technology is also a social thing, in one society there must be a dominant, widely accepted and centered technology, as well as alternative, communally accepted and marginal technologies. in ordinary circumstances, when a dominant form works well, there are clear boundaries between different forms of technologies. however, in “decline” situations, these boundaries seems to disappear; and alternative technologies come to the forefront, accordingly alternative ways of life as presented by essentialists can enter and present themselves as new technological choices. i would like to call this: subversive reformation. finally, some may object that “decline” situations are a rare occurrence, and hence technological commitment is not a concept necessarily worth considering. i do not deny that “decline” situations rarely occur, but in our “normal” situations, for example, in the case of our environmental or energy crisis, i think we do not have to wait for the decline situation in order to begin our search for new technological forms. this cannot happen without some consciousness of technological commitment as i mentioned earlier. it is right to say that our acquaintance with technology may overwhelm our technological commitment, but it is our deep commitment with technology, a relational concept of technological essence, that gradually calls for “awareness” rising and beginning a search, globally or locally, now. so, our issue is how we can create a “shared space” of technological choices where we can extend, as far as possible, the boundary of centered technologies to include the marginal ones. conceptually, this “shared space” is not only open for experimental, alternative technologies to compete with the mainstream, but also brings them into the evaluation stage on a wider context, where its outcome remains varied based upon what is considered as “good things” for each society. however, we must take note that this process of evaluation must be cautious about social determinism (the belief that only democracy is right) or alternative determinism (the belief that only alternative technologies are right), if we are to guard against constructivism or essentialism falling into another kind of determinism again. bibliography akrich,m.1992 “the de-scription of technical objects.” in bijker,w.e.and low,j.(eds), shaping technology building society: studies in socio-technical change. pp205-224. ma:mit press. barber,b. 1984. strong democracy. berkeley: university of california press. bijker, w.f,hughes,t.p.and pinch, t.j.(eds) 1987. the social construction of technological system : new directions in sociology and history of technology. ma:mit press. bijker,w.b. 1993. “do not despair:there is life after constructivism.” science,technology and human values. vol.18 no.1: 113-138. bijker,w.b. 1996. “democratization of technology, who are the experts?” http://www. angelfire.com/laesst/bijker .html. bimber,b. 1994. “three faces of technological determinism.” in smith, m.r.and marx,l(eds), does technology drive history? the dilemma of technological determinism.pp79-100.ma:mit press. borgmann,a. 1984. technology and the character of contemporary life : a philosophical inquiry. chicago:the university of chicago press. dreyfus,h. 1995. “heidegger on gaining a free relation to technology.” in feenberg,a. and hannay,a. 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“active and passive bodies:comments on don ihde’s bodies in technology.” techne 7:2 winter. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/spt/v7n2/ feenberg.html. garrety,k.and badham,r. 2004. “user-centered design and the normative politics of technology.” science,technology and human values. vol 29.no.2.spring:191-212 heidegger,m. 1977. the question concerning technology and others essays. trans.lovitt,w. new york:harper and row. heilbroner,k.l. 1967. “do machines make history?” in smith,m.r.and marx,l.(eds)1994, does technology drive history? the dilemma of technological determinism. pp 53-65.ma:mit press. ihde, d. 1990. technology and lifeworld. in:indiana university press. ihde, d. 1993. philosophy of technology : an introduction. new york:paragon house publishers. latour,b. 1992. “where are the missing masses? the sociology of a few mundane artifacts.” in bijker,w.e.and low,j.(eds), shaping technology building society: studies in socio-technical change. pp225-258. ma:mit press. latour,b. 1995. “a door must be either open or shut:a little philosophy of techniques.” in feenberg,a.and hannay,a.(eds), technology and the politics of knowledge. pp 272-281. in:indiana university press. latour,b.and akrich,m. 1992. “summary of a convenient vocabulary for the semiotics of human and nonhuman assemblies.” in bijker,w.e.and low,j.(eds), shaping technology building society: studies in socio-technical change. pp259-264. ma:mit press. mackenzie,d.and wajeman,j.(eds) 1999. the social shaping of technology (second edition). philadelphia: open university press. marcuse,h. 1968. one dimensional man. boston: beacon books. nussbaum,m.c. 1992 “human functioning and social justice: in defense of aristotelian essentialism.” political theory. vol.20,may:202-246. pinch,j.p.and bijker,w.e. 1987. “the social construction of facts and artifacts: or how the sociology of science and sociology of technology might benefit each other”. in bijker, w.f,hughes,t.p.and pinch, t.j.(eds), the social construction of technological system : new directions in sociology and history of technology. pp17-50. ma: mit press. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ http://www/ thomson,i. 2006. “what’s wrong with being a technological essentialist?:a response to feenberg.” in veak, t.j.(ed), democratizing technology:andrew feenberg’s critical theory of technology. pp53-70. albany:state university of new york press. winner,l. 1977. autonomous technology:technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought. ma:mit press. winner,l. 1986. the whale and the reactor:a search for limits in an age of high technology. chicago:university of chicago press. winner,l. 1993. “social constructivism:opening the black box and finding it empty.” in scharff,r.c.and dusak,v.(eds) 2003, philosophy of technology : the technological condition. pp23-243 oxford:blackwell publishing. after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi cultural tradition and cultural renewal wu xiaojiang shanghai academy of social sciences, china abstract one of the important paths to renew traditions of eastern culture and of western culture in the era of globalization is to selectively retain, absorb and identify with rational elements or quintessence in both sides’ traditions, into which organic integration and creative development are added. the path contains the following four aspects: integrating the rational elements of eastern holism with the positive elements of western individualism; integrating the values of respecting family in eastern cultural tradition with the values of respecting self-dependence of individual in western cultural tradition; integrating the positive elements of the values of “rule by morality” in eastern cultural traditions with the values of “rule by law” in western cultural traditions; integrating eastern “static civilization” with western “dynamic civilization”. national cultural traditions are long-standing and historically accumulated entities which act as foundations on which national characteristics and status are preserved. however, the tradition is not merely a simple continuation of past history or an unchanging heritage but something that changes with time and requires the injection of new contents so as to be necessarily renewed and gain vitality. one of the important paths towards the renewal of the traditions of eastern culture and of western culture in the era of globalization is to selectively retain, appropriate, and identify with the rational elements or quintessence of both sides’ traditions, which allows for a certain level of prajñâ vihâra, volume 11, number 1, january-june, 2010, 1-14 © 2000 by assumption university press 1 organic integration and creative development. the basic principles for the selection of and identifying with rational elements or essential elements in traditional cultures should be: first, whether it is beneficial to social progress of one’s own nation; and second, whether it is beneficial to harmonious dealings with other nations and to mutual development. i believe that the process of renewal of the traditions of eastern culture and western culture through the selection of values have the following four aspects. 1. the integrating of the rational elements of eastern holism with the positive elements of western individualism for those involved in chinese new cultural movement in the early 20th century or those involved in contemporary neo-confucianism after the new cultural movement in the 1980s recognized that one of the major differences and particularities of eastern and western cultural development was that the former paid attention to the whole, the latter to the individual. it was the representative actors of new cultural movement who had firstly pointed to the positive meanings of “individual as an entity” and “individuality development” in western culture. chen duxiu believed, in the west “all ethics, politics, and laws, the orientation of society, what the country is hoping for, advocate the right of individual freedom and welfare. the freedom of speech and thinking is the search of individuality development; everyone is equal before the law; the right of individual freedom is written in the constitution that even the state can’t deprive the people of that right”. eastern thought is characterized as a patriarchal society which relies on holistic cultural tradition “disgraces the independent and respectable personality”, “suffocates the freedom of individual thinking”, “deprives people of equality before the law”, and “encourages dependence upon others and mars the productive capacity of individuals”.1 li dazhao also believed, “the easterner regards sacrificing oneself as an obligation of life while the westerner regards satisfying oneself as a demand of life. and therefore eastern morality keeps on suppressing individuality while western morality is to pursue the movement of liberation of 2 prajñâ vihâra individuality”. eastern nations “very seldom respect individual authority and power” but “often regard individual as an incomplete part of a whole so that the value of individual survival is entirely gulfed by the whole”.2 neo-confucianism also recognized the positive connotations of the concept of “individualism” in western culture. du weiming, a noted american scholar of chinese origin, remarked, “in the course of the development of western democracy, a major force which had started since the middle ages and evolved from enlightenment to modernization, by degrees, to become an irresistible trend in 19th century was individualism. up till today, it is still hard for us to apprehend western individualism by whatsoever translation. now some even think the correlate of ‘individualism’ in chinese language shouldn’t be connected to the english word because it becomes too easily associated with western ideas of self-concern. yet western ‘individualism’ in its original sense is a deeper concept, which doesn’t merely relate to individual’s independent personality, individual’s honor, or individual’s right, free from coercion, but also relates to the individual’s indomitable spirit of justice, equality before god, and equality before the law. all these basic values are implied in the original meaning of ‘individualism’ in western culture”.3 those who participated in comparative studies of eastern and western culture in the mainland of china in 1980s questioned in-depth the relationship between “individual” and “community”. some noted scholars suggested that the theory of man in western humanism believes “man is an independent individual who possesses reasoning, sentiment, and will, and the understanding of above concept of man includes love, friendship, freedom, equality, dignity, and right”, “everybody is a creature with his own intrinsic elements and responsible for his own fate”. however, the theory of man in chinese humanism sees it this way: “from relationship to everything to feeling for everything, man is seen as a part of a community, having a role in a community, not only an individual; so man is seen as an interacting individual which entails a responsibility for the survival of the community he belongs, consciousness of its ethics and morality. moreover, the understanding of above concept of man includes kindheartedness, justice, leniency, harmony, obligation, and contribution so that each man is a derivative of the relationship he belongs to where his fate is closely linked to the community”.4 wu xiaojiang 3 huntington’s the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order points out that individualism is one of the eight major characteristics that differentiates western civilization from other civilizations. the value of this individualism involves the support of the individual’s right of choice, known as “the romeo and juliet revolution”, a value which claims equal rights for all individuals.5 eastern people often condemn “individualism” in western culture and equate it with “egoism”. actually, connotations of such “individualism” are very complicated as it also contains such values as self-respect, self-confidence, self-dependence, self-determination, self-striving, self-consciousness, self-discipline, selfresponsibility, self-improvement. this is vastly different from mere “egoism” which remains “self-interested” and “self-centered”. the gravity of “individualism” is the emphasis of individuality and uniqueness of an individual. contemporary society is fraught with diverse opportunities for development. scientific and technological explorations of the possible world, and diverse inventions and innovations need to encourage each human being to bring his or her individuality, uniqueness, initiatives, and creativity into full play. this requires the respect for personal interest, courage and decision. moreover, the difference, diversity and free development of the individual must be treated and accepted as a valuable thing or a form of wealth. the pioneers of american high technology enterprises by microsoft and intel conspicuously embrace vivid individuality with self-determined and self-dependent spirit so that they could initiate their unprecedented undertakings. the proportion of american expression of willingness to establish or having established self-owned businesses not only is far higher than that of non-western countries, but also higher than that of the eu by three times. these facts prove that the american cultural tradition of “individualism” mainly connoting self-confidence, self-dependence and self-striving has become one of the great sources of cultural innovation which has led to national scientific and economic strengths. the negative side of eastern or chinese tradition of “holism” is that it stifles individuality and creative development, and regards “esteeming and pursuing commonness” and “echoing and obedience” as virtues, hence suffocating independent thought and uniqueness of opinion. some western people said, “the chinese are usually concerned about 4 prajñâ vihâra what the others are doing but unaware of what they should do by themselves; american care naught for what the others are doing but know what they will have to do”.6 this saying may belie some degree of prejudice, but it points to the truth that the concept of personality in the chinese cultural tradition lacks a self-determined and self-dependent individuality and supports a submissive mentality. it is beneficial for us to reflect upon this lack of independent innovation and entrepreneurship in the fields of sciences and technology. however, in eastern holism what is worth the whistle and should be passed on are its underlying positive values including its emphasis on the interests of the majority, appreciating fraternity, friendly and harmonious relations, promoting concern about the overall situation, intensifying social responsibility, feeling for and aiding the have-nots, implementing public equality, overcoming egoism and law-of-the-jungle competition, maintaining social stability and improving living standards for all. in 1989 the singaporean government publicized four basic values for its citizens: “placing society above self, upholding the family as the basic building block of society, resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention, and stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony”. this led to extensive discussions in singapore concerning the values which emphasize holism. the result was an additional addendum respecting the “regard and community support for the individual”.7 a singaporean legislator had expressed that the philosophy of their government didn’t only rest on the foundation of confucianism but on the philosophy of western democracy. he specifically highlighted, “our institution of public administration is built on the concept of the western individual rights, and on the foundation of a kind of special understanding of individual”.8 as a result, singapore has created economic miracle and realized a modernization which owed its success to the rational elements of eastern holism, integrated organically with the progressive individualist values which originated with the western enlightenment movement. 2. the integration of the values of respecting family in the eastern cultural tradition with the values of respecting self-dependence of individual in the western cultural tradition wu xiaojiang 5 eastern nations have been based upon an agrarian society for much of their history. such a society relies on the family acting as a production unit, and families as a community. this social structure pays special attention to patriarchal blood relationships and respects the authority and standing of the patriarch. china leaders of the new culture movement highlighted that one of the differences of fundamental thoughts between eastern and western nations is that the former takes family as an entity while the latter takes individual as an entity. likewise, representative personnel of contemporary neo-confucianism expressed, “the standing of ‘family’ in chinese social life is of importance without comparison”. under the influence of the new culture movement (may 4th movement of 1919) the progressive intellectuals in literature and art circles opposed the feudal cultural traditions, and crusaded fiercely against “family” which disabled individual freedom of choice, freedom of thought, even life. family, a magnum opus of ba jin who was a remarkable writer in china, gained extensive influence upon society because it had exposed the decay of the traditions of feudal family culture and criticized it without reservation. many intellectuals at that time attempted to “get away from family” which subsequently became the starting point for democratic revolution. in the industrialized society, family no longer is a unit for basic production, the members of family often receive equal education opportunity and gain relatively equal opportunity in terms of economic and social standing. the power of patriarchy and power of husband has substantially faded. this can be considered a part of the phenomenon of social progress. yet on the other hand, some social problems also come to light. along with the fading of the family, individuals’ independency increases, cases of divorce increase, numbers of single-parent families increase, children of the single-parent families don’t have proper guidance and family education from their guardians. along with the numbers of threegeneration families decrease, increasingly the aged live isolated, without care or attention from their offspring so that they are lonely and pessimistic. some well-educated and high-income single females prefer not to marry, or prefer to conceive through artificial insemination. for eastern society, to avoid the problems which arise with the abrupt introduction of individualist values drawbacks which developed 6 prajñâ vihâra gradually in western society through modernization it is important to selectively retain and identify with those positive elements in their own cultural traditions that attach importance to family. while singapore identifies with the western concept of individual rights, it also stresses the ethical norms that define the rights and obligations of father and son, husband and wife, and siblings, the responsibility of taking care of and teaching the next generations, filial piety to seniors, honesty to peer groups, and placing family interest above individual interest. japan also extols the virtue of women who, when they acquire a certain academic credentials and social standing, still act as a good assistant for their husband and guardian for their children, be a filial daughter-in-law, loving wife, and respectable mother.9 when eastern countries are moving forward on their path towards industrialization, family-style corporations brought the positive elements of their traditional cultures into full play. for example, some japanese firms blended family-style human warmth and loving care into their business management. it adopted lifetime employment and salary paid according to seniority that was beneficial to enhance employees’ sense of belonging and loyalty to the firms and boosting of team spirit. the result was an increase in product quality, growth of market shares, and increase in brand loyalty. but upon entering into the era of information revolution, for some industries the japanese family-style corporation's culture was found disadvantageous to innovation and created difficulties in competing with their western counterparts. right now, some famous manufacturers including matsushita (panasonic) are in the process of transforming their corporate culture, “they are shifting to put a premium on employees who are enriched with individuality and remarkably talented as the global society in 21st century is going to be more individualized, irrespective of which industry or profession, only those corporations with talents full of individuality can survive to remain in the international competition”.10 matsushita (panasonic), fujitsu and others have set off to reform their management and distribution system, and encourage employees to bring their individual talents into full play. other giant japanese corporations like honda also make effort to fade out the color of family-style management by stressing that the corporations are not family businesses, and must forsake the past hereditary system which “passes the managerial right on to son not to wu xiaojiang 7 capable successor”. these corporations select the virtuous and talented persons for office, and appoint people on their merits in order to intensify their competitiveness.11 asian emerging industrialized countries have also awoken to the fact that the values linked to the patriarchal system such as nepotism, decision-making according to seniority rather than ability, have been a handicap for meeting the requirements of the information age. lee kuanyew, minister mentor of singapore, blamed the catastrophic losses in asian financial crisis in the late 1990s to the emphasis placed on nepotism, so that the decision-making in their investments depended not on validity and soundness of the investments themselves, but on whether they were connected with someone the decision-makers were familiar with. he decreed that the singaporean government and financial institutions must adhere always to transparent economy and rule of law so they could ride out the financial storm. he also pointed out, in the information ages a certain limitation exists in the values of confucianism of “respect the aged”, and success in information technology requires “persons in the prime of life, full of vitality, wisdom and courage. a father is not necessarily most knowledgeable, perhaps a grandson has more knowledge”. “in the times of information, the youth and quick-witted mind are in a position of tremendous superiority”. if decision-making is conducted only by the older generation, many opportunities will slide away.12 3. integrating the positive elements of the values of “rule by morality” in eastern cultural traditions with the values of “rule by law” in western cultural traditions the qin dynasty practiced a general policy of “relying on extremely harsh penal laws to govern the nation” and “entirely using laws to replace morality to govern the nation”. it lasted for just two generations until its fall. with the han dynasty ancient china began to adopt a confucian general policy which stressed “rule by morality” in governing the nation. chinese tradition of “rule by morality” consists of “morality politics” and “morality education”. morality policy itself also consists of two layers of understandings: first, in governing a country, it puts people first, en8 prajñâ vihâra hances people’s welfare; second, for government officials, only men of virtue, of justice, and of honesty and cleanliness are suitable. confucianism stresses that officials must see themselves as an example and conduct their behavior to educate others. they must set top-down examples of what a rightful social climate should be. this old tradition deserves to be passed on to future generations. but the confucian idea regarding the “virtue and morality” of rulers of a country as a premise of governing a country and advocating “the politics of virtuous person” gradually gives way to “rule by man” as long as it is ruled by virtuous person, even if laws are imperfect, the government and society will be fair; when the virtuous person is gone, even if the laws are perfect, they will be of no help. therefore, the values of “the virtuous person is superior to ‘perfect laws’ and ‘rule by man’ carries more weights than ‘rule by law’”. the confucian traditional concept of “rule by morality” is negative, is different from today’s political situation whose core is democracy and rule by law. both laws and morality have the function to normalize and regulate human’s behavior but within a different scope. chinese traditional “rule by morality” boundlessly magnified the regulating function of morality so as to enable political life to become ethical, to become “ruled by man”. but our today’s construction of politics civilization requires us to rid ourselves of the negative influences of the traditional “rule by morality” and to practice the institutionalized, normalized, and proceduralized “rule by law” in the political life. in china, many people believe that the western “rule by law” boundlessly applied, is becoming increasingly complicated. the costs of legislation, enforcement and litigation are high, and the functions of moral regulation, moral education, and moral norms are often neglected. moral education in traditional chinese “rule by morality” emphasizes persuasive and inspiriting effects of morality to raise people’s moral quality and often relies on literature and the arts, such as poetry and music, to nurture and cultivate people’s moral sentiments and lofty ideas. this is the inherited cultural capital that is still required to boost our social progress for today. but experiences tell us that merely relying on education and cultivation to make morality capable of regulating people’s behavior and inter-relationship is not sufficient, we still require institutional arrangements and institutional protections (such as morality pacts, morality guidelines, regulation systems, credit systems, supervision systems, and wu xiaojiang 9 evaluation systems, incentive and punishment systems) that take shape based on laws and “rule by law” so as to enable the integration of moral education with social management, and of self-governing with being governed-by-other. in reality, the experience of today’s western society in the establishment of morality institution, and in the measures for “rule by morality” that based on “rule by law” should be blended into chinese contemporary culture of “the rule by morality”. it is worth noting that in chinese traditional concepts of “both law and punishment are synonymous” and “morality and law are separate”, from which some people misunderstand that “rule by law” is merely to punish evils and governed-by-other and take stopgap measures whereas “rule by morality” is to promote virtue and self-control, and take radical measures. this improper conception that “rule by law” is passive and “rule by morality” is positive distorts the understanding of the essence and function of contemporary laws and “rule by law”. in essence contemporary laws and “rule by law” also embrace the function of promoting virtue and self-control, and taking radical measures. in history, as chinese people long lived in the feudal society of “rule by man” and the more pernicious elements of this tradition still haunts people’s mind today. what contemporary china is facing is the insufficiency in the construction of new, but not too complex, legal systems. in general, in the makings of the people of our nation one of the major problems is that the concept of “rule by law” is so weak that our ethical climate and social order is undermined by the lack of protection by laws. for china, lacking the contemporary spirit of “rule by law” for so long, the only way for the nation to continue to govern and prosper is to continue to invest in our legal system, such a process has brought about huge returns of economic prosperity and social stability. conversely, any construction of morality without protection from a proper “rule by law” is merely a “rule of morality” with no ground to support it, and eventually leads to high costs and low returns. therefore, integrating chinese sentimental, art-style and poetic traditional morality education with western contemporary rational, institutionalized morality construction and legal construction is important for boosting social progress. 4. integrating eastern “static civilization” with western “dynamic 10 prajñâ vihâra civilization” in the controversy regarding eastern and western culture before the eve of the may 4th movement of 1919, some well-known scholars pointed out that the fundamental difference between chinese civilization and western civilization is that the former is a “static civilization” and the latter is a “dynamic civilization”. life in a “static civilization” is inward, it values less competition, and advocates a relaxed mindset whose normal state is being at peace. but the life of “dynamic civilization” is outward, it values victory in competition, and whose normal state is at war. li dazhao, one of the pioneers in the new culture movement at that time, basically agreed with this perspective and believed: “for the easterner, their daily life is oriented in a static state, whereas a dynamic state is an exception. for westerners, their daily life is oriented in a dynamic state, whereas a static state is an exception”. the easterner believes “nothing is worth competing for” and the westerner seeks for “progressive evolution, firmly believing that human society can progress, irrespective of one’s purpose, is forward-looking and respects advancement and struggle”. in the controversy regarding eastern and western culture after the may 4th movement of 1919, liang shuming, a representative actor of contemporary neo-confucianism, published a famous literature entitled the eastern & western cultures and their philosophies, in which he believed that chinese and western culture represents different directions: “western culture’s fundamental spirit shows that its intention likes to go forward, and look to the future”, “the fundamental spirit of chinese culture shows that its intention always looks for harmony and moderation”.13 the west’s “dynamic civilization” sees unlimited progress and unlimited development as the highest value, and endless exploration and adventures as joie de vivre leading them to ceaseless efforts to try to conquer nature, to transform environment, and make every effort to get the things they want. chinese “static civilization” takes the attitude of “harmony between humanity and nature”, “feel at ease under all circumstances”, “contentment brings happiness”. it was the west’s “dynamic civilization” that had brought about sailing around the earth and discovery of new continents, and immeasurable developments in the fields of sciences and technologies in the past four centuries, and created an industrial civilization with astounding prowu xiaojiang 11 ductive capacity, and which pioneered the ages of economic globalization and ubiquitous association for human beings. chinese “static civilization” condemned us to remain stagnated in our history. worse than that is that from the late period of qing dynasty till 1940s our laggardness and poverty have pushed us to a predicament, where we have become passive and vulnerable to bullying. “progress” has been a core concept in the west since the enlightenment in the 18th century. yu ying-shih, a famous american scholar of chinese origin, pointed out that the chinese culture characterized by stability and tranquility can no longer adapt itself to contemporary life, and chinese modernization can’t afford not to “act” or adopt a conception of “progress”.14 i would further believe that the makings of the western “dynamic civilization” such as ceaseless exploration, ceaseless progress, ceaseless exploitation, and ceaseless innovation are exactly what we need to speed-up our modernization. the transformation of chinese culture must involve the accommodation of “act” and “progress” which are spiritual elements in western civilization. on the other hand western modernization has also led to spiritual decadence. anxiety, fear, a feeling of homelessness, and alienation and loneliness occurred in the hearts of many western people accompanying their over-abundance of desires, competition, efficiency-orientation, speedorientation, and striving for growth of material wealth. liang shuming in his comparison of eastern and western culture and their philosophy writes: “western people strive forward at great speed like gale and lightning and have made them feel a loss of spiritual fulfillment so that they sink into a depressive mood; they achieve a lot but in fact they have not the time to enjoy the fruits of their own labor”.15 yu ying-shih profoundly remarked, the west’s current crisis is that they can “act” but can’t “calm”, can “progress” but can’t “still”, can “prosper” but can’t “tranquilize”, can “bustle” but can’t “stabilize”. “if it is said that in the early stage of modernization the values such as ‘tranquility’, ‘stability’, ‘calmness’ and ‘stillness’ are unsuitable, when entering into the stage of post-modernization such values are worthy of our attention”.16 therefore contemporary western people need to change their mindset so they “can reach the higher ideal of frugal living”, “can maintain a peaceful mind and possess lofty aspirations”, “can adopt a simple and unadorned style of life”, and “can reduce excessive desires for material profit”. following the chinese cultural tradition, they 12 prajñâ vihâra need to mollify their “search for wealth”, “search for movement”, and “search for progress” as these are values that diminish one’s humanity. finally they need to heal their spiritual anxiety which is caused by excessive competition. for china, while we are in the process of accelerating modernization, we must cool-headedly rethink the values connected with western “progress, must rely on dialectic wisdom of our own national cultural tradition to calculate the proper relationship between “act” and “calm”, “progress” and “stillness”, “prosperity” and “tranquility”, and “bustle” and “stability” in this age of economic, scientific and technological development, and realize that social progress, with humanity and poetic life as a foundation, will lead to a society possessing a harmony between human and nature, harmony between human and human, and harmony between mind and body. endnotes 1chen duxiu: “fundamental differences of thoughts between eastern nations and western nations”, edited by chen song: analects of controversies about eastern and western culture around the may 4th (movement of 1919) (additional issue), beijing: chinese social sciences press, 1989. pp.13-14. 2li dazhao: “fundamental differences points between eastern civilizations and western civilizations”, ibid. pp.67-68. 3du weiming: “confucian humanism and democracy”, contemporary transformation of confucian traditions, beijing: chinese broadcast television publishing house. p.381. 4pang pu: “the humanism spirit of chinese culture (outlines)”, re-estimation of chinese traditional culture, shanghai: the people’s press, 1987. pp.5051. 5samuel p. huntington: the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, touchstone rockefeller center, new york, first touchstone edition 1997. p.71. 6lu qiutian: differences-eastern and western thought in the eyes of a chinese ambassador, shanghai three joints book company, 2003. p.103. 7samuel p. huntington: the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, touchstone rockefeller center, new york, first touchstone edition 1997. p.319. 8tu wei-ming: singaporean challenge, shanghai three joints book company. p.183 wu xiaojiang 13 9lee kuan yew: “speech made in the third meeting of humanity forum of chinese scientists-eastern culture in the process of globalization”, wen hui daily, may 7, 2004. 10“denial of extreme equalitarianism by matsushita (panasonic)”, beijing: reference for news (chan kao xiao xi), october 26, 1999. 11“realization of managerial innovation of japanese families businesses”, beijing: reference for news (chan kao xiao xi), may 25, 2001. 12“behind-the-times of confucian values in the era of information”, beijing: reference for news (chan kao xiao xi), march 2, 2001. 13liang shuming: “eastern and western culture and their philosophies”, analects of controversies about eastern and western culture in and around the may 4th (movement of 1919) (additional issue), beijing: chinese social sciences press, 1989. p.423. 14yu ying-shih: “contemporary meanings of chinese culture in the sight of values system”, the path of intrinsic transcendence, beijing: chinese broadcast television publishing house. 15liang shuming: “eastern and western culture and their philosophies”, analects of controversies about eastern and western culture in and around the may 4th (movement of 1919) (additional issue), beijing: chinese social sciences press, 1989. p.424. 16yu ying-shih: “contemporary meanings of chinese culture in the sight of values system”, the path of intrinsic transcendence, beijing: chinese broadcast television publishing house. pp.24-25. 14 prajñâ vihâra thomas menamparampil 1 fairness must be combined with economic growth thomas menamparampil federation of asian bishops’ conferences (fabc) abstract in this paper i follow the main lines of argument that arnold toynbee developed in his “study of history” in explaining the growth and destinies of societies and civilizations. he documents how the absolute rulers of every age have had recourse to force as the most reliable tool for the consolidation of power. but this paper wishes to show that enforced changes have no future. innovations, on the other hand, that are introduced through creative individuals or communities and are true engines of economic growth. in hope that the negative experiences of the past may not be continually repeated, this paper is an appeal to wisdom, sobriety and far-sightedness, in order to secure a peaceful future. prajñā vihāra vol. 16 no. 2, july-december 2015, 1-34 © 2000 by assumption university press 2 prajñā vihāra greatness emerges when collective energies harmonized a society grows in greatness in proportion to the harmony it maintainsbetween its components: the economic, political, and ‘cultural’. and if it does manage true greatness, then this greatness radiatesin all directions. a disintegrating society manifests opposite traits (toynbee ii, 140). as societies emerge from their relative isolation and interact with other societies and civilizations, new psychic energies are generated;the synergy thus created makes amazing things happen. that is why it is good for us to reflect how societies and civilizations arise, what attitudes favour their growth, how they enter into relationships with others and promote the common good, and what can bring about their decline and even demise. civilizations grow responding to challenges “a principle of a great civilization ought to be that it focuses intensely on how to develop the capability latent in everybody. the more that is done, the more we all benefit from one another” (martin 386). one of toynbee’s central arguments is that great civilizations rise on hard terrain, not on easy ground. earnest and sincere effort is the only way to greatness. the sumerian civilization for example came up on the jungle-swamps of the tigris-euphrates (toynbee i, 95). the civilization of china rose on the marshy banks of the yellow river (hwang ho) amidst jungles and high water (toynbee i, 97); a river far more challenging than the navigable yangtse (toynbee i, 112-13). the hellenic civilization was born on the rocky soil of greece: while in contrast rich boetia remained rustic, and its people cold and unimaginative, the austere land of attica favoured the emergence of a creative and enterprising people. when attica’s pastures dried up and plough-field grew barren, the athenians thomas menamparampil 3 turned from stock-breeding and grain-growing to olive-cultivation; they exchanged the oil so produced for scythian grain. the energies generated by these endeavours and creativity produced further energies: the athenians explored the subsoil, developed silver-mines, and introduced currency. they built pottery, ships (toynbee i, 113-14). the hard nature of their land only added strength to their sturdiness. “if necessity is the mother of invention, the other parent is obstinacy, the determination that you will go on living under adverse conditions” (myres j.l.) the measure of effort a society puts into its survival provides it with the stamina needed for further achievements. toynbee asserts that it was the exertion that the early romans put into transforming their barren soil that gave them the energy to build up their vast empire extending from egypt to britain (toynbee i, 108). the neighbouring capuans, on the contrary, who lived in luxury remained permanently weak, and were conquered repeatedly. in fact, capuan luxury softened the character of rome’s arch-rivals,the carthagenians, during a winter that hannibal’s soldiers spent in that city amidst plenty. the carthagenian cause was lost at capua. greek epicsdescribe how odysseus who did not yield to the mighty cyclops, fell to the charms of circe and ended up in the pig-sty. the lotus-eaters could not resist the enticing invitation of the sirens, nor the israelites shed the memories of the ‘flesh pots of egypt’. the hard soil of tyre and sidon raised the phoenicians to greatness. it was they who gave us the alphabet. they dominated the mediterranean for a long time. their venturesome spirit led them to found the city of carthage in africa and several colonies in spain. in the same way, it was on the rocky hills of judea that the hebrews gained their religious insights which gave birth to two religious traditions (jewish and christian),and continue to inspire the world to this day (toynbee i, 117-18). the badlands of eastern germany produced the resolute prussians who unified germany and set a model for europe in the areas of compulsory education and efficient social security system. the barren soil of scotland brought up a well-educated people with a strong sense of economy and unlimited stamina; toynbee could not notice the same grit and 4 prajñā vihāra determination in the english. amazingly the contribution of the scots to the building the britishempire was out of proportion to their numbers; they gave the british several outstanding church leaders and prime ministers (toynbee i, 120). in our own times, more successful nations make a serious mistake if they decide to settle on a comfortable way of life. for, as william james says, “...a permanently successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy. we must make new energies and hardihood continue” in the form of hard work and service, if we wish to survive (barzun 673). otherwise, sturdier peoples, working hard, will move ahead, leaving us behind. situational challenges if accepted, serve as a stimulus to a society “soft countries invariably breed soft men”, cyrus, the persian emperor (herodotus ix, ch. 122) “in next two decades, this new international system will be copingwith the issues of ageing populations in the developed world; increasing energy, food and water constraints; and worries about climate change and migration” (taroor 21). it is not only the challenge of the environment that stirs a society to achievement but also pressure or competition from other societies. the value of competition is widely accepted in the commercial world today. in the history of civilizations we notice that it is a society under strong pressurethat emerges to greatness; however, it does so only if it finds a way to offer an adequate response. toynbee adduces any number of examples to prove his point. but the most interesting part of toynbee’s argument is that it was the persian pressure that awakened the sleeping greek states and ultimately led to the rise of alexander; that it was the carthaginian aggressiveness that stirred the roman energies to throw back the invading forces and sent them conquering gaul, spain and north thomas menamparampil 5 africa, with the energies so generated; that the westward expansion of islam was a belated response to the thrust of greece and rome into asia, and it was this islamic pressureon the west that provoked the european society to gather strength not only to drive the alien forces out of the iberian peninsula, but “carried the spaniardsand portuguese overseas to all the continents of the world” (toynbee i, 193). their experience inspired france, netherlands, england and others to build empires round the globe (toynbee ii, 238). taking this argument further, we may see in the rise of many nations of asia and africa a belated response to the colonial pressure. recent trends seem to show that the third world economies are awakening in a big way. with the rise of new powers, we hope that the negative experiences of the past may not be repeated. this paper is an appeal to wisdom, sobriety and far-sightedness in a period of success. the future belongs to those who wisely consider their options. a growing civilization is guided by a creative minority “increasing inter-connectedness seems to lead to increasing interdependence, which in turn demand new, ever wider, ultimately worldwide ‘frameworks’ for action, transcending old nations, blocs and civilizations” (fernandez-armesto 560). toynbee believed that it is the manner in which a society responds to the challenges from the environment or from other societies that gives rise to a civilization. one can choose to shrink before a challenge and withdraw into an obscure corner merely to survive; one may opt to sink below other dominant societies and lose one’s identity and allow one’s genius to be stifled. many societies have done this and have disappeared from history. but others may decide to take the challenge head on, plunge themselves into a determined struggle; it is this tenacity and determination that place them definitively on the way of progress. 6 prajñā vihāra this determination need not be in the area of military aggressiveness. progress comes, says bergson, when a society has “allowed itself to be convinced, or else allowed itself to be shaken; and the shake is always given by somebody” (bergson h., les deux sources de la morale et de religion, pp. 333, 373). toynbee calls them creative personalities; they reshape others after their own thinking (toynbee i, 251). even if their ideas do not win acceptance immediately, those of a kindred spirit take note of them, understand them, and begin to gradually take after them. new and creative ideas often come into the minds of several persons at the same time quite independently. that is the law of nature. ordinary people have remained much the same all through history. they need creative personalities who think, reflect, transform themselves and introduce unforeseen changes into their society that lead them to new destinies (toynbee i, 253-54). that is the mission we assign to intellectuals in the context of today’s discussions. there have been times when changes were introduced into a societyby force and maintained through drill or mere mechanical imitation. absolute rulers of every age have had recourse to force as the most reliable tool. but enforced changes have no future. innovations, on the other hand, that are introduced through the inspiring figure of creative individuals or communities are more enduring (toynbee i, 255). toynbee argues that it is an inwardly transformed person that takes up the challenge of assisting his/her fellow beings. the examples he gives are of those who initiated religious and intellectual movements in human history. plato believed that a nation is best led by a philosopher-king, a truly enlightened person (toynbee i, 258). in the same way, pythagoras and neo-platonists emphasized the importance of deep reflection and inner pilgrimages for self-transformation and social change. so, whether it be an individual, a team, a community, or a nation, that develops a new conviction through the power of inspiration (enlightenment, discovery of a new insight, a new set of ideas), it has something valuable to contribute to the rest of humanity. such persons and communities alone will be able to offer a helping hand to the human family in its hour of its need. thomas menamparampil 7 force can neither create nor sustain a civilization “the basic rule was always the same. when a state seemed to be too powerful....its neighbours would jointly tilt the scales in the opposite direction so as to make it more moderate and better behaved” (braudel 416). during the dynamic period of a civilization, the ideals and values of the creative minority win enthusiastic acceptance among the members of their society, and even among others. as long as the various elements of a culture or civilization are in harmony, it continues to grow (toynbee i, 327) and win adherents. but at a later period of history some form of imbalance creeps into that society, inequality grows among its members, and the leadership and the upper classes become exploitative in the political and economic fields. unfairness deepens. the creative minority atrophies into a closed clique of vested interests; it degenerates into a ‘dominant and exploiting minority’ which seeks to maintain itself in power by the use of force. that is what happened to the leadership in greek society. its impressive democratic institutions ceased to function, and its energies were lost in internal struggles, and ultimately it had to submit to macedonian imperialism. something similar happens when a society becomes so complacent with its achievement that it begins to rest on its oars. creativity dies; self-importance increases; idolatry of the self begins. achievement in certain limited spheres of life, like economy, technology, military expansion is taken as total human achievement. and pride goes before a fall. in this context, it may be good to point out that expansion of territory is not a sign of the advance of a civilization. during the colonial period european nations cannot be said to have reached the height of civilization just because they held much territory. they were in fact being inexorably driven by values that led them to the two suicidal world wars and to their decline. similarly, neither the military showmanship of superpowers during the cold war nor the present hegemonic pretensions 8 prajñā vihāra of regional powers in asia or in the rest of the third world are signs of progress in civilization. for toynbee, the rise of an empire or of military might is not the high point of a civilization, as it is often thought even today; it is rather the final effort of a society to rescue itself from collapse. communities reach this position when the values that gave rise to their civilization have been enfeebled or lost. tao te ching “he who stands on tip-toe does not stand firm, he who takes the longest strides does not walk the fastest...he who boasts of what he will do succeeds in nothing. he who is proud of his work does nothing that endures”. aggressiveness and pretensions to greatness are not useful assets. it is good for the members of a society to ask themselves whether the values that their high performance possible are being forgotten,marginalized, or lost. it is to this exercise that this paper is inviting participants today. once a society gets divided into a dominant minority and exploited majority, force begins to play a greater role in its functioning. compulsion enters into the picture and the ideals and goals that were greatly esteemed and enthusiastically pursued come to be imposed. the leaders cease to be admired or respected and ordinary people sink to the level of the oppressed. there may be a period of suppression, forced conformance, anarchy and uncertainty. toynbee’s main argument is that anything built on force in this way has no future. violent solutions to problems only retards progress, does not promote it. force does not pay in the long term, within the country or in the neighbourhood, despite immediate advantages. the example he gives is the one of sparta. she was a leading nation in the early period of greek history. but once the spartans had conquered the messinians and subjected them to slavery, they had no option but try to maintain their dominant position by force. that compelled them to impose severe discipline upon themselves. every spartan had to keep himself ready for war at any time. this form of imposed discipline crushed the public spirit (toynbee i, 214-15). thus sparta fell far behind athens when the latter was becoming the marvel of the world during the 4th and 5th centuries bc (toynbee i, 216). the spartan citizen became no more than a war-robot. a spartan training can contribute to immediate thomas menamparampil 9 effectiveness, but in the longer term it damages the inner being of persons and communities (toynbee i, 323). machiavelli may not agree with this statement. he would say, when persuasion fails, use force (toynbee i, 617). many dictators and fascist leaders in modern times have admired the spartan model and used it very successfully for some period of time, only to fail in the end. and their failure had disastrous consequences. excessive militarism is a perversion of the human spirit. neighbouringstates gather together in frantic self-defence against an apparent hegemonic threat. what results in the immediate context are tensions, and in the longer term, a fratricidal war. toynbee’s argument is that the art of war is always learned at the expense of the art of peace (toynbee i, 226). everyone becomesthe loser. in the context of arms race between neighbouring nations in asia, these reflections gain great importance. no one wins a war today except arms-producing corporations. they alone have the last laugh. ongoing violence is suicidal “german, japanese, french and british power declined not because of debt but because of wars that devastated those countries’ economies...” (friedman 17). “the terrible notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ has entered our discourse, as the often benign forces of religion, culture and society have become causes of conflict, rather than succour, in many places” (shashi taroor quoted in taroor 17). asia can collapse long before it rises, if a suicidal war takes place. so can any other part of the world. wars or violence, internal or external, leave long term consequences behind. culture and civilization stand threatened most of all. in the immediate context, technologies related to war may seem to stimulate progress, but it is humanity that takes the blow when one community inflicts cruelties on the other. the hellenic society opted 10 prajñā vihāra for a suicidal conflict when it conducted the peloponnesian war in 431 bc (toynbee i, 305). thucydides calls it the “beginning of great evils for hellas”. it does not matter whether the conflict is between states, classes, ethnic groups, religious groups, or communities within the same society or within the neighbourhood, the damage is in many directions. the winners become irrationally cruel and the losers build up anger and begin dreaming of retaliation. at the moment of success, the athenians were cruel to the losing melians, as the romans became more and more harsh upon the conquered people in the later period of their history. ultimatelythat cruelty itself turned against their best interests. the polarisation between classes, communities and interests in the roman society led to such tensionsand instances of violence that their democratic society had no choice but surrender an absolute ruler. the roman empire was born over the dead bones of roman democratic traditions (toynbee i, 344). the republic was overwhelmed, and the ambition for money and power devastated the ‘republican virtues’ that were the greatest pride of roman citizenship (friedman 31). something similar would happen again in france after the cries of “equality, fraternity, and liberty” grew fainter; napoleon emerged from the ranks with absolute power. what begins with force returns to force; violence of every kind is self-destructive in a society. the consequences of the assyrian militarism caught up with their empire ultimately even though the assyrians dominatedsouthwest asia for two and a half centuries. their mighty power disappeared and even the name ‘assyrian’ was forgotten where it had held absolute sway. xenophon was not even aware of such a name (toynbee i, 390). no other factor was the direct cause of the breakdown of civilizations than violence: wars between neighbouring states, civil conflicts within the same state, social upheavals of all kinds (toynbee ii, 301). we are living through times when such tensions dominate the world scene at diverse levels. this paper is an invitation to reflect more deeply. thomas menamparampil 11 how winners turn losers hellenism withered from within. the free cities were torn asunderby mutual hatred and by class wars. “they found no place for the greatest minds of the age” who had to take shelter with tyrants (dawson 62). “perhaps we are justly punished. we were insolent and unjust in our dealings with foreign nations in our day of power. now in our adversity you trample us” (ahmed vefik, referring to ottoman humiliation before western forces, quoted in mishra 62). those who emerge victorious in a disastrous war are tempted to rejoice at their success. but victory imposes its own type of punishment on the winners. “victory, like revolution, can devour its own children, particularly those who expect more from it than what it actually delivers. the idealists who realize too late that violence never achieves their goals are among history’s most common losers in victory” (schivelbusch 98). macedonians who went conquering nations right up to india turned against each other in a suicidal conflict (toynbee i, 395). that is again what happenedto european nations which, after reducing the rest of the world to the statusof the colonies, turned against each other during the two world wars. it was a suicide-attempt on the part of mighty europe. and today, many neighbouringnations in the newly emerging situation in the third world are busy at the same game, learning little from the experiences of the western world in the early 20th century. exaggerated forms of nationalism are fatal. in the nineteenth century, nationalism rose to have the status of a religion in europe, and wars became ‘total wars’ involving the entire population. when democratic nations are in conflict every citizen is roused to anger. the negative consequences that such wars leave behind remain for centuries. exaggerated forms of political nationalism, that once led many 12 prajñā vihāra western nations into conflict, are taking many third world nations in the same direction. and arms producers rejoice. great victories pose great dangers world war i was represented as a war to ‘save civilization’. but later historians have always wondered whether it was a civilized way of settling differences (fenandez-armesto 10). the winners are tempted to think that once the enemy (another class, caste, ethnic group, economic or political interest or a nation state) are humbled, their own future is safe. they lose all sense of realism and forget that they have just wounded a tiger; they do not know when it will spring back to life. this can be applied to inter-class, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, or inter-national conflicts. we know that to every action there is a reaction. the humiliation of athens by the persians in 480-479 bc inspired her to build up a fleet that led her to the victory of salamis and to the glory of the periclean times. xerxes the successor of darius took aggression to european greece provoking a hellenic counter-attack under alexander(toynbee i, 610). the defeat of germany in 1914-18 and the french occupation of ruhr basin in 1923-4 roused the nazi claim to justice. every victory is a judgement, but the process starts again. winners must be ready to face the contest. this is true not in the sphere of war alone, but today more especially in the area of economy, industry, marketplace, fashion, ideas, sports, competitions, political elections (schivelbusch 2). but people seem to be slow to learn. usually the winners seek to humiliate the vanquished as much as possible in their own eyes with a view to destroying their self-confidence (schivelbusch 6). they may glorify themselves, but the defeat remains an injustice in the minds of the defeated which, they feel, must be rectified. thomas menamparampil 13 a mood is created where all citizens want to fight for the nation (schivelbush 11).curiously, a national defeat is a moment when a nation looks back with pride at its glorious past and revive energies to rebuild a new future (schivelbusch 31). and the struggle begins all over again. the contestants copy fighting skills from each other seeking to outwit the other. as the art of war develops, the greatest loss of all is the weakening of culture especially on the winningside. nietzsche said in 1871 that “great victories pose great dangers and that the triumph of the german empire would lead to the demise of the german culture” (schivelbusch 4). today’s victors are tomorrow’s losers “...the more effective the terrorist attack is, the more frightened the population is, and the more compelled the government is to respond aggressively and visibly”. in other words, war against terrorproduces more terror (friedman 77). the last shall be the first (the gospel of st. matthew 20:16). the victorious romans used to cry, “woe to the defeated”, until they began to lose battles themselves. after every victory, there is a tomorrow:whether it is for a nation, community, class, caste, business interest, or political alliance. fortune is a wheel that revolves. there is a central christian teaching, “the last shall be the first”. the great historian renan used to say, “today’s victors are tomorrow’s losers”. defeat comes from an earlier victory and prepares the ground for another one (schivelbusch 126). the tables are turned, and victory comes in the opposite direction. the relationship between germany and france from the time of napoleon till world war ii can provide abundant example of this, a drama that could be avoided in many parts of the world if there is sufficient good will. 14 prajñā vihāra the psychology of victory is more damaging than that of defeat: it brings to birth an aggressive generation. destructive heroism becomes seductive on both sides. when the anger is high, all public statements are couched in aggressive terms. the ‘enemy’ is always “barbaric, violent, predatory, uncultured, without spirit, disloyal, assimilative, imitative, servile, lacking in character” (schivelbusch 159). even well-meaning men take pride in making themselves the heirs and prisoners of a heroic past, but at the same time become victims of their own high rhetoric, unrealisticpropaganda, and symbolic gestures. today several situations in the developing world remind us of this condition; people are made victims of political propaganda and commercial deception, the contestants adopting aggressive postures against each other within the country or beyond borders. such anger may be expressed in contexts of polarizations between classes, castes, ethnic groups, political parties or alliances, or regional interests. le bon wrote “among the masses, ideas, emotions, passions, and systems of belief are transmitted with the same infectious capacity as microbes” (schivelbusch 213). encounter of the best, not the worst “asia is one. the himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the chinese with its communism of confucius, and the indian with its individualism of the vedas...arab chivalry, persian poetry, chinese ethics and indian thought, all speak of a single asiatic peace...”, (kakuzo okakura quoted in mishra 230). “today, whether you are a resident of delhi or dili, durban or darwin, whether you are from noida or new york, it is simply not realistic to think only in terms of your own country. global forces press in from every conceivable direction” (taroor 3). thomas menamparampil 15 when there is a conflict between nations, it is the weaker communitieson both sides that are the greatest sufferers. in earlier times, conquered people were reduced to slavery. after the hannibalic wars, whole hordes of slaves from the east were brought to work in the plantations of southern italy. they formed the working class from 2nd cent. bc to 6th cent. ad. (toynbee i, 155). unexplainably, a spiritual force can come into the picture to strengthen the weakest in their condition of helplessness. for example, during the interactions between the upper classes in rome and their helpless slaves, the religious perceptions of the slaves won out in the end; their gods survived not the gods or the philosophies of the masters (toynbee i, 156). the philosophies of the dominant classes were too abstract and too impersonal to appeal to the masses, and ultimately they yielded to the spiritual insights and divinities of the lower classes. there were encounters of cultures not only in rome, but also on the borders where the romans interacted with barbarians creating veritable ‘melting-pots’ of cultures. there was mutual assimilation, both sides pickingup bits and pieces of each other’s culture. but often these were the less worthy elements. it is not the noblest qualities that communicate fastest, but the art of war or skills of exploitative trade (toynbee ii,142). in the process of this mutual sharing, some representatives of the roman elite sank to the level of the people they had subjugated (toynbee ii, 41). similarly, in this globalized world an erosion of cultures and values is continuously taking place, every community picking up the less noble elements from the other. there is no criterion for selection, there is no integrating principle. there is a danger that the worthless elements gradually will constitute the ‘common ground’. on the other hand, a meeting of cultures can be stimulating when the best elements are shared. in order that this may happen, there should be an appreciation of one community for the other. pretensions to cultural or civilizational superiority on the side of those who are technologically or economically advanced is unrealistic. we need to give equal respect to the many streams of culture and civilizations that contribute to the ultimate destiny of the human race. the great works of greek thinkers and 16 prajñā vihāra writers were introduced to the western world by arabic scholars (toynbee i, 193). it was a great contribution of the east to the west. modern society ought to be grateful to the wisdom and knowledge of ancient civilizations like those of egypt, greece, india and china which have gone into shaping the modern world today. civilizations progress through mutual borrowing. the arabic numerals, for example, are of indian origin; the printed word of chinese. similar asian contribution in the past has been great (mishra 299). today, more of this is possible, and it will be all the greater when our debt to the west is also equally recognized. technology and economy alone do not constitute civilization unfortunately in our times, “....mass education, cheap consumer goods, the popular press and mass entertainment are combined with deeply felt rootlessness, confusion and anomie” (mishra 302). ‘dharma’ is rooted in culture rather than politics (das 60). unfortunately, today we judge a society’s stature by its technologicaladvances. toynbee considers it exalting the homo faber above homo sapiens, placing the technician above the philosopher. he contends that a civilization has often declined while technique moved ahead. for example, homo pictor has declined while homo faber has flourished; art has sufferedwhile industry has bloomed (toynbee i, 230). he says, it was precisely when the athenian economy expanded with plantation-farming for export that they introduced slavery into the colonies of agrigentum and sicily. this was not a step forward for the athenian civilization (toynbee i, 232). something similar would happen again during the post-hannibalic period in roman history when oriental slaves were brought on a large scale to work in the estates owned by the roman elite. while it brought increased productivity and profits, it drove the pauperized peasants into thomas menamparampil 17 the cities creating a parasitic urban proletariat. it was the beginning of the collapse of the roman system which was to reach its climax in the 4th century (toynbee i, 233). the mass production-centres in our times give a similar impression. unless there is intelligent evaluation of the newly emerging situation in the new urban agglomerations in the developing world, especially in asia, major difficulties can arise in the days to come. the saving factor remains that “family customs have been among the slowest of all asian institutions to change” (jacques 158). we do not deny that technological skills and economic assets are of enormous importance; however, what is even more important are the less visible assets like the values that a society lives by, relationships that hold it together, ideals it places before its members, spiritual dreams it assiduously pursues. these make homo truly sapiens. in the east, the wise man is held in high esteem. we need to affirm this, because in today’s globalized society the invisible values that gave birth to different cultures and civilizations are getting marginalized and forgotten. the manager or the technocrat of our days stands for impersonal technology, not for the community or its interests (schivelbush 256); his task is to rationalize processes, which means increased production and greater competitiveness. it is true, rationalization helps to reduce prices and ensure easier availability of the goods produced; and the improvement in the quality of consumer goods adds to their competitiveness (schivelbusch 279). however, we cannot afford to forget the human person and his/her individuality, communities and their values, human society and civilizationalheritages. there is an abundance of moral rhetoric in today’s political statements, but there is no seriousness. “none of the mission statements i have come across says anything worth saying, unless you are a fan of badly written platitudes” (hobsbawm 2). 18 prajñā vihāra economic progress must be guided “the things we admire in men, kindness and generosity, openness,honesty, understanding and feeling, are the concomitants of failure in our system. and those traits we detest, sharpness, greed, acquisitiveness,meanness, egotism and self-interest, are the traits of success. and while men admire the quality of the first they love the produce of the second” (john steinbeck quoted in das 182). schools of economy today forget that even an economic world order could not be built on economic foundations alone (toynbee i, 337). universal values of fairness cannot be sacrificed to the self-interest of a few who control affairs. while it is true that the market is productive and raises living standards, it tends to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few, pass on environmental costs to society and to abuse workers and consumers. “markets must be tamed and tempered” (stiglitz xiii). big corporations and bankers should not be allowed to have recourse to fraudulent and unethical ways (stiglitz xxiii) nor take advantage of the weak. democracy cannot be limited to a ritual of periodic elections, it must listen to people’s voices. poor governance in many countries is due to too cosy relationships among business houses, civil servants, and politicians. large business houses have excessive power (das 158). the government should play a regulating role, when, for example, producers seek to make profit by making their products more addictive or are indifferent to the damage they inflict on the environment (stigltiz xviii), or consumer interests are ignored. the ethical consciousness in society has to be kept alive and the market too must be given a ‘moral character’. the movers of the economy seem to have lost their ‘moral compass’ (stiglitz xvii). the consequence is the constant restlessness we notice in society. anger is intensifying. the spanish youth, marginalized by their economy, called themselves ‘los indignados’ (the angry) (stiglitz x). when genuine grievance gets mixed up with anger engineered by people thomas menamparampil 19 with political interests, matters become more complicated. in many places we faced with such situations. our options become limited. certainly street revolutions are not always the right answer to social problems. however, we have yet to find other effective alternatives. people do not have sufficient confidence in the ideas or in the sincerity of the leadership. today, it is not only the anger of the working class that is growing, but that of the ‘middle class’ as well. moises naim says that the middle class is the fastest growing segment in the world, “and it will be the main cause of coming conflicts. they have anger from unfulfilled expectation. the middle class is shifting from rich countries to the poor countries” (das 179). this is what makes it difficult to say whether street demonstrations are signs of regeneration and self-confidence or of anarchy (das 19), or plain political irresponsibility. if the prompters of protests inspire violence, the scenario changes dramatically. there are enough instances of violent citizens making themselves stronger than the state, joining politics and becoming lawmakers. criminality in politics is in the ascendant (das 200-03). in any case, if our political structures only reinforce the unfair systems rather than correct it, hard days are ahead. the anxiety is that the rewards of the new economy are not always going to the most deserving. “much of this vast rise in private wealth has gone to a small segment of the ultra-rich...” (hobsbawm 50). ram charan says, “some who are in the know tell me that the key decisions in the global financial system are made by a cozy group of fifty or fewer people from these firms. they move frequently from one company to another” (charan 42). even considering this statement an exaggeration, there seems to be some truth in it. the 1% that are earning most are not great thinkers or innovators (stiglitz 27), they are self-rewarding executives. they are people, it is alleged, who know how to manage the government machinery for their own interests. they know how to skirt the law, shape it in their favour, take advantage of the poor (stiglitz 37); who know how to win monopolies, get control over natural resources (stiglitz 49), sell to the government above market prices (stiglitz 40), get taxes and wages lowered (stiglitz 20 prajñā vihāra 63), silence unions (stiglitz 64), fire workers (stiglitz 67), marginalize minority groups (stiglitz 68); push austerity programmes to the areas of medical care, health, education in aid of the poor (stiglitz 230-31). for them even unemployment serves a useful purpose, since it will create a climate that favours the lowering of wages (stiglitz 263). “inequality and unemployment grow as highly mobile corporations continually move around the world in search of cheap labour and high profits, evading taxation and therefore draining much-needed investment in welfare systems for ageing populations” (mishra 296). monopolists in general are not good innovators (stiglitz 46). the mighty task they seem to perform may be described as macro-mismanagement. and ultimately the bubble bursts (stiglitz 82). looking more closely at the third world, we notice that “much of the ‘emerging’ world now stands to repeat, on an ominously large scale, the west’s tortured and often tragic experience of modern ‘development’. in india and china, the pursuit of economic growth at all costs has created a gaudy elite, but it has also widened already alarmingsocial and economic disparities” (mishra 307). uneven distribution prompts people to join populist movements, or follow ethnocratic politicians, or fundamentalist radicals, nationalistic fanatics (mishra 308). this is the context in which inter-national rivalries get accentuated (mishra 309). the tragedy is that the privileged third world minority aspire for nothing higher than the conveniences and gadgets of their western consumer counterparts (mishra 308). values must be given a place in the economy “companies are competing against countries--not just other companies” (charan 7). “one might describe history as a dialogue between societies, in which those with grave internal contradictions fail and are succeeded by others that manage to overcome those contradictions” (fukuyama 61). thomas menamparampil 21 growing inequality in the economy can spell doom for the economy itself, because it impairs efficiency by weakening the motivation of the workers and undermines growth by distorting market mechanisms or introducing asymmetries and unfair competition (stiglitz 6). if you create wealth, society is enriched. if you take it from others through dishonesty or raising prices or adulterating goods, it is impoverished (stiglitz 32). unequal societies create continuous political instability; here stiglitz quotes the example of latin america (stiglitz 83-84). on the contrary, in more egalitarian societies people work hard and seek to preserve social cohesion (stiglitz 77). it is in such societies that high levels of social responsibility are achieved and rules for environment protection respected (stiglitz 100). there, people see the need to invest in infrastructure, education, health and research (stiglitz 93). mutual trust is generated. business leadership with high sense of dharma will be trusted (das 160). it is such a society that creates a climate for good economy. mutual trust is an invaluable social capital (stiglitz 121). so it is evident that human values must be given a place in economy for the very success of economy. the market becomes inefficient if it ignores the human dimension (stiglitz xi-xii). freedom for enterprise and venture must combine with responsibility for the common good (toynbee i, 339). some cities in the developing world are growing at a monstrous pace, serving a vigorous economy but not the interests of communities, nor the natural environment. unskilled workers are reduced to conditions less than human. meanwhile consumerism keeps sapping physical stamina, moral energies getting exhausted, sources of ethical inspiration going dry. consequences can be summarized in the words of sebastian haffner writing about his own country in 1923: it is as though “an entire generation had a spiritual organ removed: an organ that gives human beings constancy, balance, even gravity”. no space is left for “conscience, reason, wisdom of experience, fidelity to principles, morality and piety” (schivelbusch 270). the slave-owning states of america and the slave-using plantations of the later roman period were prosperous. but that prosperity was 22 prajñā vihāra built on exploitation. the only difference is that today’s ‘slaves’ are better paid, better fed and better entertained. but we should not forget that the roman slaves also were provided with ‘bread and circus” (food and entertainment). the painful reality was that their destinies were not in their own hands. people in our times little realize how much of their self-determination (freedom) and self-articulation (creativity) is stifled under an oppressive economy. our society is fast becoming more and more impersonal with scope for human growth narrowing every day. this type of economic success cannot become the measure of civilization. the true measure of civilizationaccording to toynbee is the ability for self-determination and the art of self-articulation (toynbee i, 225). the economy of our days needs values to give it a direction and a destiny. “when there was neither kingdom, nor king; there was neither governance, nor governor, the people protected themselves by dharma” (mahabharata, xii.59.14). dawson says, as life passed out of hellenic civilization, there was the gradual disappearance of those vital traits in which the spirit of their earlier culture was embodied… and individual native qualities came to be choked within the context of a formless, cosmopolitan society, with no roots in the past and no contact with a particular region. this was the degradation of the greek type (dawson 63). is some form of degradation of our cultures and civilizations taking place at a massive scale today? regimentation of society invites resistance “rome became more and more a predatory state that lived by war and plunder, and exhausted her own strength with that of her victims” (dawson 67). the global crisis is that the publics of the major countries do not trust the political or financial elites...hence the political elite find it hard to manage affairs. “without public trust, it is impossible” (friedman xxixxii). thomas menamparampil 23 the era of the world wars introduced many elements of regimentationinto social life. the memories of military discipline, straight lines, similar dress for men and women, imposition of ideas from above lingered on even afterwards. the rationalization of the economy and production turned out to be another form of regimentation: rigid schedules, mass assemblies, record performance. mass-produced goods came in abundance in compensation, but that alone could not satisfy human longing for spontaneity.there was a reaction, more especially in western society: rejection of restraints, chaotic movement of tourists, weird fashions, deafening jazz and rock, irresponsible movies (schivelbusch 268). the conclusion of the war brought further rejection of restraints: e.g. the rigidities of the military code, the high ideals of nationalism, ideological zeal, and hypocritical moral codes. the external expressions of such reactions were imitated in asia and other continents with little understanding of the reasons for the trends in the world’s leading nations. then came the cold war, each side over-confident about its ideologies and theoretical stands. it created a climate of fierce challenging of opponents, denunciation of each other’s points of view, and productionof abundant propaganda material (anti-communist on the one side and anti-capitalist on the other) with evident exaggerations on both sides. there was diverse reading of history in support of each one’s ideology and military strategy. everyone was too sure of his/her theoretical stand; everyone wanted to play the ‘prophet’. the denunciation of what you differ from became close to a moral precept. once again there was a reaction to excessive ideological zeal. recent postmodernist trends have been to reject all ideologies, meta-narratives, any pretension to a comprehensive explanation of reality (religious or philosophical), as having no validity. more and more people begin to adopt the attitude that each person is ‘thrown into the world’ to make meaning and shape codes of conduct in the best way he/she can. 24 prajñā vihāra existentialism arose out of the harsh experiences of the world wars: a recognition of “man’s incapacity to direct civilization along any precise course” and “the gap between the actions of men and their stubbornly professed ideals” (barzun 755). for many, this was evidence enough that humanity has no destiny. but self-reduction to helplessness is not an intelligent solution to problems. but in this sense of impotence, people began to make some meaning of life, accommodating to the rationalization of the economy, rejoicing in high levels of production and yielding to ardent habits of consumerism. if this path of rationalization is pursued to its furthest possible limits, human beings will be reduced to the status of mere producers and consumers, victims of mind-manipulation by commercial advertisements and political propaganda. society gradually becomes impersonal and even inhuman. the war-era also brought defence policies of nations too much under the influence of industrial giants who produced weapons. and the long term disadvantage of it was that arms-producing companies and nations developed a vested interest in keeping international tensions, insurgencies, and local conflicts, going. arms control became impossible; arms-race became not the ‘sports of kings’ as in medieval times, but the source of income for arms-producers. today, people engaged in ethnic wars, ideological dissenters, secessionists... all fall victims to the manipulations of arms-traders, though they little realize this truth. poor third world countries are the greatest victims. but they consider themselves heroes when they keep struggling against their neighbours. toynbee says that the stature of a civilization is to be judged by the progress towards self-determination (toynbee i, 324), not an abundance of consumer goods. it should stand for freedom of thought, intellectual activities, self-organizationand self-expression, with utmost scope for creativity, always with a strong sense of social and cosmic responsibility. this is what is precisely lost in a value-less economy. thomas menamparampil 25 spiritual search is a social capital “the central conviction which has dominated my mind ever since i began to write is the conviction that the society or culture which has lost its spiritual roots is a dying culture, however prosperous it may appear externally” (dawson xxxi). under the pressure of circumstances people are compelled to develop new skills. for instance, forbidden to engage themselves in other forms of economic activities in the west, jews developed the skill for trade and finance; so did the parsees in india and the armenians and georgians under the ottomans (toynbee i, 164). the people’s outlook also is conditioned by their historical experiences. the greeks developed an aesthetic outlook, indians a religious vision of reality, the west a fascination for machinery and parliamentary system and military mobilization (toynbee i, 284). this is how cultural/civilizational differentiation takes place between communities. taking such diversity for granted, today we are in search of a universally appealing worldview or perspective, a leading concept or vision, and generally acceptable moral norms which people have called ‘global ethics’,which would give even to our material culture a transcending quality. toynbee argues that progress of a civilization is to be measured by its capacity to move steadily to higher levels of human activity, e.g. from the enhancement of practical efficiency to achievements in aesthetic and intellectual fields, thus moving from lower sphere of action to a higher one. he calls it ‘etherialization’. at the earliest stages of the existence of a society, it seeks to defend itself against the harshness of nature or pressure from a neighbouring adversary. if it is successful in this endeavour,it begins to address the challenges it faces in a higher sphere of action, moving on to various forms of self-articulation and self-determination (toynbee i, 236). thus a growing civilization moves its concern from its 26 prajñā vihāra achievements in the outer sphere to those in the inner, thus enriching the collective personality of the civilization (toynbee i, 246). this inward journey is nothing unfamiliar to the asian peoples. rabindra nath tagore, while rejoicing over japan’s victory over russia in 1905, said “asia today is set to realizing herself consciously, and thence with vigour. she has understood, know thyself that is the road to freedom. in imitating others is destruction” (mishra 225). mahatma gandhi’s understanding of civilization was something similar; he said that “true civilization is about self-knowledge and spiritual strength” (mishra 228). this movement from the outer to the inner becomes necessary when a society is compelled to pursue certain basic options, especially in the moral sphere (toynbee i, 244), e.g. when the latest technical advance a society makes becomes a tool for enslaving its weaker members or is used for the destruction of a sister-society or a sister-civilization. the constructionof the pyramids, for example, stood for a great measure of technical advance; but they were built on oppression (toynbee i, 245). napoleonic wars carried the liberating ideas of the french revolution and the advanced technology of the french nation, but these blessings went only to aggravate the horrors of war (toynbee i, 330). toynbee laments that today’s mass education does not include what he calls ‘etherialization’ of interest and motivation (toynbee i, 339). nowadays, gurucharan das has expressed a similar concern, emphasizingthe need of education in citizenship and ‘public dharma’ (das 148). he insists on inculcating moral habits rather than shouting moral slogans (das 140). the present system of education, toynbee feels, is defective; it leads to the ‘vulgarization’ of tastes in our society, as it happened in the case of the urban masses in rome who were content with their ‘bread and circus’. ardent consumers in our times little realize how much they are being ‘used’ by profit-makers, being treated to the trivializing entertainmentprovided by commercial entrepreneurs and taken advantage of by the propaganda of interested parties like political ideologues or media barons. this is the modern form of slavery to which we already referred. the pity is all the greater when the victims are not aware how they are being ‘used’ (toynbee i, 340). thomas menamparampil 27 the meek shall inherit the land “for nearly all of world history the richest and most developed societies have been in asia” (ponting 9). “for most people in europe and america the history of the twentieth century is still largely defined by the two world wars and the long nuclear stand-off with soviet communism. but it is now clearer that the central event of the last century for the majority of world’s population was the intellectual and political awakening of asia and its emergence from the ruins of both asian and european empires” (mishra 8). hobsbawm calls the present period of history an “ era…that has lost its bearings and which in the early years of the new millennium looks forward with more troubled perplexity than i recall in a long lifetime, guidelessand mapless, to an unrecognizable future” (hobsbawm ix). however, as toynbee sees it, there is redemption for all. in the hardest times, destiny unfailingly intervenes in behalf of the weakest. the future belongs to the exploited masses who allow themselves to be led by the enticement of ‘etherilization’. they have aspirations, they have energies. philosophical theories and ideologies developed by the elite is abstract, cold, distant, impersonal and elusive. but spiritual insights entertained by the oppressed masses are dynamic. but they have to make a decisive choice between a violent approach or a peaceful one:1) ongoing exploitation can create a sense of helplessness, stir up collective anger and end up with a revolution; that is what happened in france, russia, china and other places. 2) but it can also lead to the stirrings of the inner person for a new search for deeper meaning and fulfilment. the energy so generated can provide new spiritual insights lighting up a new path to unforeseen destinies. nietzsche said, “one must possess a chaos within to give birth to a star”. 28 prajñā vihāra it is with the breakup of an old order, that a new one comes into existence. toynbee sees abraham emerging at the disintegration of the sumerian civilization, moses during the decadence of the ‘new empire’ in egypt (toynbee i, 442). judaism developed among the jews who endured hardship during their exile, ‘by the waters of babylon’. in fact, toynbee believes that the babylonian exploitation called into existence two religious movements: zoroastrianism and judaism. christianity rose from among the exploited roman labour-class. buddha and mohammed too appeared when an old order was passing away. a new world can be born only through a “tremendous spiritual travail” (toynbee i, 443). possibly,we are beginning to experience similar travails. when people are condemnedto live in a society without really belonging to it (in it, not of it), it is exploitation; the choice that remains is between a violent and a gentle way of facing the ordeal. marx proposed a violent solution. it has been tried out in different ways and different places, with different results. a milder approach too has been attempted. buddha had no violent answers, but he changed the world (toynbee i, 457). the message of jesus too was one of peace. his inspiration caught the imagination of the oriental slaves in roman italy who needed to cling to a spiritual ideology for strength and inner motivation. it was their example that inspired their roman masters who were living in a spiritual vacuum. and the spiritual spark caught on. hindu reformers like chaitanya, tukkaram, mirabai, ramakrishna, aurobindo, vivekananda, sankardev, mahatma gandhi and others, did not propose violent solutionsto the problems of the weaker communities. but they sustained their hopes. in the western world, groups like the english quakers, the german anabaptists in moravia, the dutch mennonites sought to offer a gentle approach to the problems of the down-trodden people whom toynbee calls the “internal proletariat” (toynbee i, 456). quakers prospered and they ceased to belong to the proletariat, showing the validity of maxims like ‘meek shall inherit the land’, and ‘honesty is the best policy’. buddhismbrought solace to the proletariat in china. the taoist and confucian formulae too were peaceful, but world-transformative. thomas menamparampil 29 keeping true to toynbee’s vocabulary, the “internal proletariat” of the globalized world today are seeking a new inspiration, a fresh enlightenment, a relevant spiritual insight, a peaceful revolution. only, it has to be made intelligible by the creative minority that proposes it. that is the mission of intellectuals today. the proposal should be based on the emerging realities (toynbee i, 489) and should make an appeal to the subconscious psyche of the communities concerned (toynbee ii, 316). norms proposed for inter-relationship among people and communities should reflect the infra-personal layers of the subconscious psyche (toynbee ii, 317). they should mirror the internal harmony that the creative leaders has consciously cultivated (toynbee ii, 317-18). for, we know too well “we are betrayed by what is false within” (meredith, g, love’s grave). today’s ‘creative minority’ must help society to search for the common good “the growing ties between nations over the last decade have made every one of them less inclined to allow their trade partners to go under” (sharma 252). “i used to think that the causes of war were predominantly economic. then i came to think that they were more psychological. i am now coming to think that they are decisively ‘personal’ arising from the defects and ambitions of those who have the power to influence the currents of nations” (basil liddell hart quoted in khanna xxiii). in one respect, the globalized world offers a vast variety of ideas and choices. yet society itself seems to be in the grip of diverse uncertainties. not every concept generated in one part of the world or by a civilization finds ready acceptance in another. while western technology was welcomed, social and religious attitudes prevailing in the west have found equal acceptability. while the traditions of western democracy have 30 prajñā vihāra attracted several asian countries, some regimes have pursued unlimited powers. while western theories about free enterprise are winning favour day by day, not all feel equally convinced. moreover, certain new trends seem to be emerging: “wealth is moving from north to south, and so are jobs. companies in the south, big and small, have a fierce entrepreneurial drive. many are enjoying double-digit revenue growth, bringing jobs and prosperity to their home countries” (charan 5). further, “postwar asian experience demonstrated that later modernizers had an advantage relative to the more established industrial powers, just as earlier liberal trade theories had predicted” (fukuyama 101). reflecting carefully over these phenomena, we need to remember that economic breakthroughs are not everything. many perceptions and hopes are mere bubbles, based on passing trends. when any country in the world boasts about its economic or military achievements, we need to consider the following: “what is most striking…is the speed of the roman empire’s collapse. in just five decades, the population of rome itself fell by three-quarters. archaeological evidence from the fifth century---interior housing, more primitive pottery, fewer coins, small cattle---shows that the benign influence of rome diminished rapidly in the rest of western europe. what one historian has called ‘the end of civilization’ came within the span of a single generation” (ferguson 292). ferguson was addressing this message to the leading nationsof the world, who often have declining populations. there may be differences of perceptions among nations about free enterprise or regulated economy, but there will not be much differenceabout the need for a global ethic, and an equitable world order, a spiritual vision of the human and cosmic reality. we have no choice but to respond to reality. “this active response is an awakening to a sense of unity which broadens and deepens as the vision expands from the unity of mankind, through the unity of the cosmos...” (toynbee i, 492). this takes place spontaneously when there is a true encounter of cultures and civilizations. “the great civilizations of the past have often been focused on their own cultures. in the future, they will increasingly thomas menamparampil 31 study the greatness of other civilizations” (martin 388). for example, toynbee holds that “the spiritual event that had liberated gandhi’s ‘soul force’ was an encounter, in the sanctuary of the soul, between the spirit of hinduism and the spirit of the christian gospel embodied in the life of the society of friends” (toynbee ii, 251). this is an amazing statement. no matter how alien the spark, a stimulus is welcome when and where it is needed (toynbee i, 488). today we long for such stirring stimuli through genuine encounters between the geniuses of different societies/ civilizations. also in this case, it will not be the philosophy of the elite that will bring salvation, but the spiritual dynamism of the masses. though horace said odi profanum vulgus (i hate the vulgar crowd), carl jung is of the opinion, “great innovations never come from above; they invariably come from below...(from) the much-derided silent folk of the land--those who are less infected with academic prejudices than great celebrities are wont to be” (modern man in search of a soul pp 243-4, as quoted at toynbee i, 549). elevated discussions are too elitist for the masses. it touches the intellect, not the heart. its main weakness is a lack of vitality. it fails to attract the masses and motivate its propagators. the defeat of ideological theories is a foregone conclusion, unless they link themselves in some manner with the vision of the newly rising generation (toynbee i, 548). the possibility is that a stage comes when the philosophy of the dominant classes meets the popular spirituality of the proletariat (toynbee i, 547). when the heart and the head meet, human life becomes more complete. scientificallyformulated theology too may prove like a philosophically formulated theology an ephemeral success, it does not satisfy the soul. diverse forms of achievements are possible. our greatest achievement would be a deeper insight into human nature. in spite of the immense importance of science, “the most important questions that man must answer are questions on which science has nothing to say”. he/she must look deeper into himself/herself. toynbee feels that the agonies of the world wars helped the western man to attempt searchinghis subconscious depths. at that level the human being discovers 32 prajñā vihāra his/her deeper identity with all his/her weaknesses, but also where he may find himself “wiser, more honest, and less prone to error than the conscious self” (toynbee ii, 119). bergson h. thinks, “the natural man is buried under the acquired characteristic, but he is still there, practically unchanged” (toynbee ii, 123). it is at the deeper level that a person stands face to face with his true self and the ultimate reality. the global agonies today may be an invitation that we look deeper into ourselves to discover certain hiddenstrengths that got “buried” under acquired tastes and artificial priorities. fully in keeping with his thesis, toynbee argues that it is precisely because spiritual concerns are under strain in modern society that we can be confident that they have a future. just as physical challenges stimulatedphysical achievements, so too spiritual challenges may lead modern society to spiritual achievements. “physically hard environments are apt to be nurseries of mundane achievements, and, on this analogy, it is to be expected that spiritually hard environments will have a stimulating effect on religious endeavour” (toynbee ii, 135). material prosperity and spiritual poverty will serve as a double-stimulus (toynbee ii, 136). hobsbawm says that today’s anti-intellectual and crudely materialistic societytoo “has a greater need of people who have ideas, and of environments in which they can flourish” (hobsbawm 202). when the intelligence of such great minds meet the spiritual insights of the masses, wonders take place (hobsbawm 203). but a creative minority must show the way. that remains the mission of the intellectuals who are transformed by such reflections as we hope we do today. they must return to the masses and help them to move in a new direction. human destinies are interlinked. we are not at the parting of ways, but at the converging point of human destiny. a transformed society might open up “some hitherto unknown avenue for an unprecedented spiritual advance” in order to prevent fratricidal wars among aggressively nationalistic states (toynbee ii, 322), classes, castes, ideologies, ethnic groups, economic and political interests. “confucius’s pious zeal for the revival of the traditional code of conduct and ritual, thomas menamparampil 33 and lao tse’s quietist belief in leaving a free field for the spontaneous operationsof the subconscious forces of wu wei, had both been inspired by a yearning to draw from springs of feeling that might give rise to the saving power of spiritual harmony…” (toynbee ii, 323). references braudel, fernand, a history of civilizations, penguin books, london, 1993 charan, ram, global tilt, random house books, london, 2013 danielou, alain, india: a civilization of differences, inner traditions, rochester, vermont, 2005 das, gurucharan, india grows at night, allen lane (penguin), london, 2012 dawson, christopher, dynamics of world history, isi books, wilmington (delaware), 2002 eric hobsbawm, fractured times, little, brown new delhi (noida), 2013 fernandez-armesto, civilizations, pan books, london, 2001 ferguson, niall, civilization, allen lane (penguin), london, 2011 friedman, george, the next decade, anchor books (random house), new york, 2012 fukuyama, francis, the end of history and the last man, penguin books, london, 1992 jacques, martin, when china rules the world, penguin books, london 2012 khanna, parag, the second world, allen lane (penguin, london, 2008 martin, james, the meaning of the 21st century, eden project books, london, 2006 mishra, pankaj, from the ruins of the empire, allen lane (penguin), london, 2012 ponting, clive, world history, pimlico publishers, london, 2000 34 prajñā vihāra roberts, j.m., the new penguin history of the world, penguin books, london,2004 schivelbusch, wolfgang, the culture of defeat, granta books, london, 2004 sharma, ruchir, breakout nations, allen lane (penguin), london, 2012 stiglitz, joseph, the price of inequality, allen lane (penguin), london, 2012 taroor, shashi, pax indica, allen lane (penguin), new delhi, 2012 toynbee, arnold, a study of history, d.c.somervell’s abridgement, vol i & ii, dell publishing co., new york 1969 11(180-184)_note for authors emmanuel levinas’s personalist philosophy and christian pacifism: towards a responsible process of peacemaking/peacebuilding kenneth obiekwe katholieke universiteit louvain, belgium abstract this paper first locates levinas within the currents of twentieth-century philosophical and theological thought and presents his philosophical anthropological view. it also discusses the ethical and anthropological logic of christian pacifism and connects this with levinas’ personalist philosophy as an approach for dealing with todays conflicts. the paper concludes with a call to commitment in nonviolence. introduction emmanuel levinas’s personalist philosophy or ethics of responsibility provides significant support for the logic of christian pacifism and the pacemaking/peacebuilding approaches for dealing with today’s violent conflicts. contemporary violent conflicts are dominantly identity conflicts. they are intrastate, and asymmetric in nature. rooted in relationship, most of them are protracted. this nature of conflict, the paper argues, require an inner-oriented nonviolent peacemaking/peacebuilding approach, which is capable of addressing the dynamics of human relationships, motives and frustrations that lead to conflict, and of working toward personal and structural transformation and the restoration of justice and relationship. this pacifist perspective of peacemaking/peacebuilding is based on jesus' normative humanity and anthropological purview, which understands human beings as fundamentally relational, moral, and capable of self-tran96 prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 96-116 © 2000 by assumption university press scending acts. it is this anthropological construct of levinas, which endears him to christian pacifists. the paper will first locate levinas within the twentieth-century philosophical and theological currents and then present his philosophical anthropological view. next, it will show the ethical and anthropological logic of christian pacifism and follows with an elucidation of the elements for responsible process of peacemaking/ peacebuilding in dealing with today’s conflicts as levinas’s personalist philosophy and the logic of christian pacifism support. the paper will conclude with a call for a commitment to nonviolence. locating levinas in the twentieth-century philosophical and theological current theology and philosophy battled similar challenges in the twentieth-century of proving their relevance; having something to say that is of benefit to humanity which has legitimacy in the scientific age. the philosophical approach to this crisis varied. the analytic philosophy, launched by bertrand russell, arose and dominated the anglo-saxon world. existentialism arose in europe, adopted phenomenology’s approach and focused on practical issues, which finds in human inner life of anguish, the seeds of self-evaluation. significantly, theology aligned with philosophy in this effort, thus, bringing theologians under the rubric of one broad philosophical mode (existentialism) with atheists. however, the crisis between theology and philosophy in the twentieth-century is no less critical. the whole existentialist philosophical movement was carried out within the triumphant milieu of liberal individualism, of which traditional christianity's community structure is the gravest question it places itself on trial. what is common and central to all the philosophers is that the meaning of religion and religious faith is recast in relation to the individual. some of the philosophical views put religion itself radically in question such that the faith or the denial of faith they produced was disconcerting to those interested in popular religion. however, although the philosophical theologians find themselves under the rubric of existentialism, they wind up in different religious camps, with some of them desperate to establish their religious roots. kenneth obiekwe 97 no religious group resisted the liberal individualism and the philosophical current that supported it as the roman catholic church, whose philosophical theologians “dug in behind ancient barricades and called for a neo-thomism in which ‘being’ was the subject matter that was beyond science and hence open for philosophy.” notably, for nearly two centuries, the catholic church remained aloof to the important subject of human rights, primarily because of their formulation in context and philosophy of liberal exaltation of the individual over community. a change only came with pope john xxiii encyclical, pacem in terris, which endorses human rights as linked with human dignity. arguably, however, the catholic church’s resistance to liberal individualism was concerned, primarily, with protecting the church and its authority, institutionally and dogmatically, in the world. this contention finds support in the fact that classical theology offered no adequate and compelling treatment of biblical personalism or of integration of person and community than was lived and transmitted in the church. but the church was more an institution than a community, such that true emancipation of the individual could hardly be affirmed. however, protestant theologians like karl barth and reinhold niebuhr were no less strong critics of (protestant) liberal individualism and inordinate optimism of human possibilities with sophisticated reason and modern scientific civilization. remarkably, it was the personalist philosophers from within the broad existential philosophical current who provided a sound and balanced anthropology that complements the christian traditional anthropology, provided the necessary corrective to the one-sided extravagant liberal individual, and the context upon which contemporary ethics build. jewish scholars, among them martin buber and emmanuel levinas, are outstanding in the group. buber presents an anthropology founded on what he calls the “i-thou” relationship, contending thereby that the human being is constituted in the relation with the other and not with the material world. his “i-thou” relationship is one of stimulation and reciprocity, which is opposed to heidegger’s desein as a creature of solitude, whose authentic existence is secured to oneself alone rather than in community with the other. for buber, as jos? comblin puts it, “what the ‘i’ discovers in the ‘thou’ and vice versa is not the subjectivity of the other, nor the projection of the subjectivity of the ‘i,’ but really the other, by virtue of a 98 prajñâ vihâra certain immediate communication.” for levinas, buber and heidegger have elements that are true to the nature of the human person. thus, they are unavoidably his interactive partners. however, he comes onto the scene with an originality that broadens the perspective of buber while integrating the element of heidegger’s isolated being. what is levinas’s anthropology? levinas’s personalist philosophy or ethics of responsibility levinas makes morality his ‘first philosophy,’ the central thesis of which is intersubjectivity and responsibility as the essence and realization of the human person. he draws from his hebraic tradition, which sees the whole of human life to lay in fidelity to relationship, with the covenant god at the center, in developing this thesis. from this background levinas develops his ethics of responsibility as first philosophy against the western prioritizing of the self, which is the root of the violent totalizing structures in which the “i” seeks to annihilate the other. levinas’s project is not to destroy the subject, but to develop an ethical suspension of the ideal prioritizing or sovereignty of the self by a radical prioritizing of the other. thus, his first step is to establish that the human person is radically relational and realizes oneself only in responsible relationship. to be sure, to say that levinas grounds his thought in his hebrew religious tradition does not mean that his philosophy cannot stand apart from this tradition. according to him, he never introduces a talmudic or biblical verse into his philosophical texts to try to prove or justify a phenomenological argument except to illustrate.9 levinas’s anthropology presents a balanced view of the human person in a phenomenology of sociality and ethical responsibility, a disclosure of personality that transcends both the individual and the collective without underestimating the “isolated subjectivism” (the problem with buber), or locating sociality in the subject alone (the problem with heidegger).10 this philosophical anthropological stance opposes any ontology seen as analogia entis, but tries to establish a transcendence that cuts diachronically through “the unity of being and the univocity of its esse.”11 for levinas, the i-thou relationship is not one of a synthesis of beings. the relationship with the other (autrui), accordkenneth obiekwe 99 ing to him, is through an absence of the other (autre), for which the i-thou dialogue concentrates on the rupture of the individual from the whole, thus, making the dialogue or relationship not one of symmetry as it is to assure the i of its independence. it is from this asymmetrical structure that levinas develops the concept of the ego as the accusative “me” the subjectum rather than the normative “i”.12 for levinas, “subjectivity is not a modality of essence.”13 the subject is constituted by responsibility to the other, a responsibility that precedes human freedom, that is, dates before my beginning, dates in an immemorial and unrepresentable past. what this means in levinas’s construct is that ethics or responsibility is the condition of being, yet, a site outside ontology, anarchic to the totalizing of ontological categories. it is an anarchic responsibility to my neighbor to which nothing in the rigorous ontological order binds me, but which summons me from nowhere. this dateless responsibility lies beyond all significations. levinas locates the condition for its appearance and signification in the rupture of proximity.14 evidently, the anarchy of proximity brings to a halt the ontological play, for consciousness begins only with relation to my neighbor to whom “i am obliged without this obligation having begun in me, as though an order slipped into my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in, like an effect of one of plato’s wandering causes.”15 this is a relation that is prior to every representation or phenomenality. this means that the other, as roger burggraeve points out, is not secured in the horizon of the surrounding world or any other system or totality. the other exceeds every historical, sociological, psychological, and cultural framework of meaning and representation.16 the other is secured in the “absolute other,” the “being of beings” or the “wholly other,” the concept of which levinas calls illeity, meaning the transcendence of the infinite beyond all thematization or entering into conjunction with me while still concerning me. yet, the infinite other leaves its trace in the other whose face is the epiphany of the infinite other that obliges me into responsiveness to and responsible relationship with the other as the signification of the other. levinas identifies the operation of illeity god.17 let me note precisely that because ethics or responsibility or otherwise than being (autrement) is fundamental, for levinas, it is not cognition prior to approach, but vice versa. 100 prajñâ vihâra the point deserves stressing that it is because the other, whose face bears the irreversible presence of the other, appears against the totalization of the self, that the other puts me in the accusative. the “i” the accusative “me” encounters my neighbor, the other (autrui), as one who has priority over me, thus, placing me as a sub-jectum and speaks to me of the wholly other (autre).18 so being, the i remains forever open to the impress of the other/other, because it is always in the accusative sub-jectum, passive and dedicated to alterity. as he writes: the epiphany of the absolute other is a face, in which the other calls on me and signifies an order to me through his nudity, his denuding. his presence is a summons to answer. the i does not only become aware of this necessity to answer, as though it were an obligation or a duty about which it would have to come to a decision; it is in its very position wholly a responsibility or a diacony, as it is put in isaiah, chapter 53. to be an i means then not to be able to escape responsibility, as though the whole edifice of creation rested on my shoulders. but the responsibility that empties the i of its imperialism and its egoism, even the egoism of salvation, does not transform it into a moment of the universal order; it conforms the uniqueness of the i. the uniqueness of the i is the fact that no one can answer for me.19 this ever openness witnesses to the passing of the infinite thou, which finds expression in communication the said, so inevitable because its signifyingness provokes signification by provoking the responsibility of the-one-to-the-other, which is the structure of ethics.20 significantly, it is in this ethical relationship that a person becomes a person or is liberated “an anarchic liberation.”21 with the concept of the “thirdness” or the illeity, levinas transcends the ontology of buber’s i-thou relationship, providing his concept of gemeinschaft with a transcendental condition. the ethical implication of responsibility to the other which did not arise from a free contemplative subject, but which reduces the subject to passivity of an accusative ad infinitum, is that the self is the one who has not right. in this context, the self is not a conqueror, swept up in the self-consciousness of continuous rivalry with enemies and the need for powerful self-assertion of its existence, which is the image of the person that has de facto prevailed in the modern western world and breeds war. from this purview, war, for kenneth obiekwe 101 levinas, has an ontological metaphysical root the totalization of being. consequently, the idea of peace for him can be affirmed and pursued only beyond this ontology or totalization, possible only from an eschatological point of departure. levinas’s idea of eschaton or eschatology is the seeking of a relationship of beings beyond the objective totality of existents and not the end of history, as it exists in christian theology. eschatology, in his view, “draws beings out of the jurisdiction of history and the future; it arouses them in and calls them forth to their full responsibility.”22 levinas’s eschatological responsibility is characterized by hospitality to the other, which entails the recognition of the dignity and unconditional rights of the other as one to whom i am subject and through whom i realize my freedom. invariably, in levinas’s thought, justice, which is crucial for peace, begins not in my self-asserted ego or freedom, but in the other. however, the superiority of the other, or rather, the asymmetric structure of the relationship, is one that is ethical. the other teaches me from an ethical height.23 the content of taking responsibility for the other in self-disinterestedness is goodness, which lies outside the other. in levinas’s construct, it is what the other teaches of me that is original, awakening in me in the epiphany of his or her face a guilty conscience and responsiveness towards his or her wellbeing in complete disinterestedness a responsibility in which the idea of infinity is consummated. because of the uniqueness of the self in the passivity or the passion of the self, subjectivity for levinas correlates with suffering or persecution. the proximity of the face of the other affects or wounds the self, leaving the self vulnerable, guilty, a debtor, even when the self has not made a choice. as adriaan peperzak puts it, “only a persecuted subject is a subject who without so desiring, against his will lives for the other.”24 levinas well illustrates his idea of persecution with the idea of substitution by which he means that the subject is subject to every thing, responsible for all that has to do with the other.25 the option open to the subject in this unconditional hostage is not death, but to live beyond egoism and altruism. this means the religiosity of the self. it is in this religiosity, that is, the condition of being hostage, according to levinas, that pity, compassion, forgiveness and proximity exist, which is the condition of all solidarity.26 let me recall the point that for levinas the other is not only my 102 prajñâ vihâra immediate neighbor. the third party whom i also stand in relationship with extends to the other other whom i do not even know. the third party introduces into my relationship the question of justice as necessary and togetherness in a place as the meaning of essence.27 invariably, levinas’s ethical rule of responsibility to the other, as john milbank says, calls us “to place first the general community, which is bound together by such respect to the generalized otherness ... for no other ever demands my self-loss, my giving myself up no neighbor, but only a threat to the neighbor which is at the same time a threat to a community principle of mutual self-sacrifice to maintain solidarity in order to preserve the fiction of community into the future.”28 in the community context, equity becomes necessary. the third party balances the asymmetry of proximity, thus making the i stand in symmetric relation with the other.29 on the same reason of the third party who makes human relationship fundamentally communitarian, non-resistance, for levinas, cannot be generalized. for him, as burggraeve explains, the individual can decide not to respond violently to his or her persecutor, thus, breaking the circle of violence, but cannot make the decision for the other. i cannot leave others defenseless before an unjust aggressor. while levinas is of the view that no effort should be spared in nonviolently settling conflict, he maintains that we cannot hold, a priori, that there is no situation in which the use of violence is legitimate. for him, the violence to the third party justifies my opposing the other’s violence even with violence.30 i will turn at this juncture to the logic of christian pacifism. the ethical and anthological logic of christian pacifism arguably, the greatest challenge of christian pacifism since the constantinian fusion of church and state in the fourth-century has been to overcome the overpowering influence of the (augustinian) negative assumptions about human beings upon which the construct of just-war ethic for social morality has been based. the christian pacifist anthropological framework calls for a reformulation of the anthropological question for the construct of both personal and social morality. the first aspect of this anthropological reformulation is the change from seeing the fundamental tendency of the human person as negative (evil), with a pervasive pathology of pride and urge to dominate, to moral, as a relational being who kenneth obiekwe 103 reveals oneself to the other because of love and towards whom the only appropriate attitude is love. in other words, in the christian pacifist anthropological framework, to overcome the dominance of the negative anthropological assumptions upon which power morality has been constructed and dominated christian position and teaching for centuries is to take a new approach to ethics based on the positive viewpoint of the possibility of human self-transcending acts and responsible relationships.31 from the pacifist anthropological base and framework, which, as levinas’s personalist philosophy supports, sees the human person and fundamental tendency as relational and responsible loving relationship with the other, the ethical orientation in the construct of social morality cannot be how or when to provide a metaphysical distinction and moral privilege to a violence we intend using to counter the violence we loath as morally outrageous. it is rather how to awaken and draw human beings into moral sensibility, imagination, and creativity in continuous self-transcending act against the passions that tend to belie our authentic personality and destroy our relation with the other. the orientation is toward an ethic of nonviolence, the epitaph of which can be said to be that there is someway to appeal to and instill moral sensitivity to human beings, to give them the assurance to love, the security to be kind, and the integrity necessary for a functional empathy and responsible relationship. this will give us a more enduring just and peaceful society.32 the christian pacifist anthropological framework correlates with community the second aspect in the reformulation of the anthropological question. although the christian pacifist ethic transcends the dichotomy between individualism and communalism, it sees community as fundamental to the realization of the human person. however, the christian pacifist anthropology does not entertain the subordination of the individual to community to entail denying or undermining the individual's rights, freedom, and dignity. on the contrary, it seeks authentic community seen in nurturing human freedom and the fuller realization of the human person, safeguarding human rights and dignity against arbitrary exercise of power. this understanding of community prioritizes the place of the poor. as levinas’s philosophical anthropological ethical construct informs us, it is in such community that transcends the traditional opposition between individualism and communalism that the individual enters into symmetric 104 prajñâ vihâra relationship with the other and gains his or her wholeness. however, it is with the question of which means the community can use in safeguarding the individual’s rights and dignity and the common good against arbitrary exercise of power that the question of what the community is vis-à-vis the individuals that constitute it critically arises. levinas posits ethics that transcend both the individual and community in the disclosure of personality. as he writes: justice is born from the signfyingness of signification, the one-for-theother, signification. this means concretely or empirically that justice is not a legality regulating human masses, from which a technique of social equilibrium is drawn, harmonizing antagonistic forces. that would be a justification of state delivered over to its own necessities. justice is impossible without the one rendering it finding himself in proximity…. justice, society, the state and its institutions, exchanges and work are comprehensible out of proximity. this means that nothing is outside of the control of the one for the other.33 drawing from this, whether the community is a collection of individuals or more than the sum total of the individuals, as different opinions may hold, it is a moral agent subject to the same ethical authority as the individuals that constitute it. even though one may argue that there is a common community interest that is beyond individual interest, community is not an abstract entity and does not exist apart from the individuals that compose it. here, too, is the position of christian pacifism, which, as i will show below, derives from a higher moral authority to either of individual or community. what this means is that violence cannot be bad in the hands of individuals and good in the hands of community, which is subject to the same ethics with the individuals that constitute it and exists for the fuller realization of their personality. however, given human limitation or the effect of sin, there remains the serious problem that there will always be some people who would tend to dominate and threaten the lives of others. indeed, it is in the community context that control becomes very pertinent, which may require the use of force. but this does not mean that there has to be a new ethics for community the main thrust of which is violence or that the community has a blanket authority in use of violence. what the pacifist anthropological ethical framework enjoins the community is to kenneth obiekwe 105 spare no effort in engaging in loving, construction of nonviolent ways of controlling human irrational and selfish impulses and settling of disputes, while at the endpoint it can engage the ethics of justice within the limits of relative prudence and self-defense.34 the above argument is more compelling from the point of view of revelation on which the logic of christian pacifism lies. christian tradition believes that the human person is a creature that bears an inherent, irreducible relation to his or her creator. while the christian tradition shares with a number of other religions a belief in the goodness and unity of the created universe, it distinguishes itself by confessing that god, in jesus, became genuinely human.35 jesus christ is the person par excellence who reveals to us a new anthropos, and redeemed and restored humanity to a state of unsurpassable worth. for christians, no epistemological commitment precedes their faith in god. ethics is an inexorable and inextricable part of this faith, and it is jesus who “defines” it. a proper theological approach drawing from revelation will ask what the human person or dignity means first and foremost as revealed by god through jesus christ and in relation to god. what jesus' humanity reveals to us is that the human person is a person of unsurpassable worth and dignity. let us note that the person of christian biblical revelation is a person in community with others and with christ at the center. levinas talks of the third who is always involved in my relationship with the other, who plays a fundamental role in the values and philosophies of the self in that relationship, such that the relationship is not i-thou, but i-you and the third a threesome relationship. it is in this ethical relationship that god is thought of. in our christian context, as graham ward rhetorically posits, “cannot that you in levinas’s jewish triad be read christologically? as christians we too are ‘always threesome: i and you and the third who is in our midst.’”36 matthew 25 is one of the powerful biblical passages that evidence this trinitarian pattern of relationship. in this passage christ tells us that whatever we do to anyone we do it to him. what he taught and showed us about how to deal with every human being is glaring: love and nonviolence, which he demonstrates by his own character of unbounded love unto death. as john howard yoder says, this is the only valid starting point for christian pacifism.37 christian pacifism is based on faith in jesus christ as lord. like levinas, christian pacifism is concerned with the realization 106 prajñâ vihâra of the human person in a community of love, justice and peace, but unlike levinas, the absolute other determining the principle of responsible relationship is not knowable only through ethical command, but a real person of flesh and blood, jesus christ, yet, truly god. the implication of the new testament anthropology and ethics is that the human person is constituted in community or rather called into relationship with the other, not with the background of the self, but of christ. this means, as yoder stresses, that neither the neighbor nor the intrinsic sacredness of life account for the reason we love our neighbor, including our enemy, and repudiate violence. the reason is not that we think our enemies are wonderful people or that we are unconcerned with the life of our innocent neighbor/ s. the simple reason is that it is what christ did and asks us to do.38 as is the view of levinas, for christian pacifism, it is praxis (obedience to christ) first before reflection. following the example of christ, pacifism is not a stance of passive spectatorship in the face of evil. it is a way of life in active pursuit of justice and peace. here lies the logic of nonviolent conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding as a product of faith the way, following the example of christ, the new testament shows us .to keep from turning our moral outrages into newfangled versions of the thing that outraged us.39 what elements in the process of nonviolent process of conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding do the logic of christian pacifism and levinas’s ethic of responsibility suggest for responsibly and adequately dealing with contemporary conflicts? elements of nonviolent peacemaking/peacebuilding for responsibly and adequately dealing with today’s violent conflicts there are four key elements, we can take from the logic of christian pacifism and levinas’s ethics of responsibility, and apply for responsible process of peacemaking/peacebuilding 1. a responsible peacemaking/peacebuilding process should be a sustainable community process and community-oriented as well as in pursuit of holistic change. seen either from a philosophical, theological, or experiential point of view, the radical nature of human beings is the sensitivity and responkenneth obiekwe 107 siveness to boundness and boundedness. both commonality and plurality are essential parts of our human nature and need to be recognized for a peaceful community. however, in an age that encourages selfishness, materialism, relativism, and discrimination, indeed, in which personal relations are forced into buber’s “i-it,” it is important to stress our common humanity, that a person is a person only in relation with other people. our interrelatedness and interdependence requires, in the first place, that a responsible process of peacemaking/peacebuiding should be communityoriented. thus, it should work toward a proactive encounter between the conflicting parties to thrash out their conflict issues as problems to be solved and not problems to be won. also, given that today’s conflicts are entangled in a complex web of relationships and that human relationship and wellbeing have personal, interpersonal, structural and cultural dimensions and elements, a responsible and adequate peacemaking/peacebuilding process must seek holistic change. to be precise, this means, first, that the process must seek to change both the immediate presenting issues of the conflict as well as the underlying issues, the deeper level of relationships in which the conflicts are entangled. second, it means that the process must pursue constructive changing cutting across all dimensions of human relation and systems and structures, which contribute to human wellbeing. this correlates with the idea that peace is not simply the absence of war, but involves human wholeness and integrity. thus, the quest for peace entails creating those conditions and structures necessary for human wellbeing or the fuller realization of the human person and dignity. because of this holistic change orientation, peacemaking/peacebuilding activities must be carried out at the different levels of society at the same time. invariably, it must be a community process, involving multiple actors. evidently, a responsible and adequate peacemaking/peacebuilding process must move beyond a number of frontiers that characterized the traditional paradigms of peacemaking/peacebuilding. as john paul lederach eloquently puts it: we must move beyond a short-term, crisis orientation and toward development of our capacity to think about social change designs in terms of decades. we must move beyond a hierarchical focus on politics and toward the construction of an organic, broad-based approach that creates space for genuine responsibility, ownership, and participation in 108 prajñâ vihâra peacebuilding. we must move beyond a narrow view of postconflict peacebuilding as a political transition and toward the formation of a web that envisions a whole body politic, whole persons seeking change in a radically changing environment. 2. a responsible peacemaking/peacebuilding process should be a process of restorative justice and relationship. the christian pacifist perspective of peacemaking/peacebuilding sees peace as rightly the work of justice, for love, which is at the heart of human dignity and relationship, cannot be separated from justice. love and justice exist in dynamic and paradoxical relationship.41 love engenders justice. but the justice love engenders, and which respects human dignity and is concerned with community building, is not the retributive kind of justice the aim of which is to punish. it is restorative justice the aim of which is to correct and heal broken relationships. restorative justice and relationship defines a paradigm of peacemaking that neither neglects the dignity and wellbeing of the victim of injustice nor violates the dignity of the perpetrator, but works towards change and reconciliation and future mutual relationship. let me state it categorically that the central thesis of the peacemaking in the paradigm of restorative justice and relationship is not that justice is an absolute prerequisite for reconciliation, but that “true peace is possible only through forgiveness and reconciliation.”42 however, the centrality of forgiveness does not mean that there is no genuine debt of justice. forgiveness and repentance go together. this is necessary, as the paradigm of restorative justice and relationship is also concerned with the moral integrity of the offender. on its own, forgiveness is not easy in a context of violent conflict. it requires the healing and purification of memory. at the heart of the process of restorative justice and relationship is the creation of a social space of proactive encounter between the conflicting parties, where the past is probed in an atmosphere of acknowledgment of truth or the wrong committed, validation of the pain caused, acceptance of repentance, offer of forgiveness, and then restoration of the broken relationship.43 levinas is insightful to this process. as burggraeve succinctly puts his view: kenneth obiekwe 109 according to levinas, the conditions necessary for a genuine, legitimate and complete pardon can be realized only in intimate community where both partners are fully open to one another and thus in complete control of their actions. when in an intimate relation with the other i commit an injustice against him, this pardon is available to me only in the form of judgment of my actions made on the basis of a careful analysis of my intentions or examination of my conscience. only after i thus confess my fault can the other person grant me forgiveness and forget what i have done. in this way, the relation with the other can free me from pain at actions escaping my will and intentions.44 from this purview, justice and truth can rightly be described as requisites for reconciliation. this critical task in peacemaking/peacebuilding process can be seen here as creating such environment and space of encounter, which enables both parties to transcend their selfish orbits, anxieties, and conflict issues and enter into a new reassuring and trustful relationship. 3. a responsible peacemaking/peacebuilding process should be an eschatological peace process. a christian pacifist perspective of conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding takes the issue of justice seriously. however, it recognizes that we cannot achieve full justice in this world. it suggests that a responsible peace process must be carried out within an eschatological setting. this means acknowledging god’s creative and redemptive presence in human history. the historical event of christ, as george weigel observes, reveals the ultimate creative intention of both human beings and the history we now live in. as far as the historical incarnation is concerned, we live in an anticipatory way. thus, the christian proclamation about human nature and destiny flows directly into eschatology.45 although levinas’s notion of eschatology is not about the end of history understood chronologically as is the christian notion, it shares with christianity the notion that eschatology determines the nature of ethics. eschatology, from his transcendent ethics and in the measure in which it calls us into full responsibility in relation beyond the totality or beyond history, posits a limit to our behavior. set in the context of ‘incarnational humanism,’ eschatology is not a call for inaction. it calls us to responsibil110 prajñâ vihâra ity and action for the cause of justice and peace. it is one that affirms human possibility under divine grace. from this perspective, shalom serves as a kind of check-and-balance in a peace process. it defines the orienting horizon the pacifist perspective of peacemaking/peacebuilding, but cautions us against thinking that we must achieve complete justice on earth for peace to flourish.46 the eschatological setting of peace tells us that complete justice is an eschatological reality. 4. a responsible peacemaking/peacebuilding process should embrace certain spirituality. as christian pacifist’s and levinas’s anthropology tells us, human dignity and relatedness, or, to use levinas’s language, the face of the other makes a demand on us, which responding to it calls us to certain spirituality. the face of the other invites us into solidarity, which, in turn, demands of us to engage in peacemaking/peacebuilding work, and responsibly too. levinas talks of sacrifice, pity, compassion, pardon and proximity as the condition of all solidarity. these define the spirituality peace actors needs, coupled with humility and patience, for responsible peacemaking/ peacebuilding. a responsible peacemaking/peacebuilding requires a noninstrumental and non-dispassionate approach. conclusion levinas’s ethics of responsibility is in accord with the central anthropological and ethical concerns of christian pacifism. his work is evidence that a sound ethics needs a sound anthropology. with his ethical subjectivity, which dethrones the self as the guarantor of morality and freedom as the highest of primary values in establishing the primacy of heteronomy of our response to the human other, or to god as the absolutely other, he reminds christians that obedience to our christological nonviolent ethics lies at the heart of our genuine humanity and christian vocation. generally, both views encourage us to take a new approach, personally and socially, to the pursuit of justice and peace, and to see kenneth obiekwe 111 peacemaking as a demand of our common humanity. endnotes 1see peter wallensteen and karin axell, “armed conflict at the end of the cold war, 1989-92,” journal of peace research 30, no. 3 (1993); lotta harbom and peter wallensteen, “armed conflict and its international dimensions, 1946-2004,” journal of peace research 42, no. 5 (2005); john p. lederach, building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (washington, d.c.: united state institute of peace press, 1997). 2see william hordern, speaking of god: nature and purpose of theological language (new york: the macmillan company and london: colliemacmillan, 1964), 17-18. 3among the christian and jewish philosopher and theologians include karl jasper, karl barth, paul tillich, rudolf bultmann, gabriel marcel, emil brunner, martin buber, and emmanuel levinas. 4see william barrett, irrational man: a study in existential philosophy (new york: doubleday & company, 1958, anchor books edition, 1962), 17. 5hordern, speaking of god, 20. 6see josé comblin, being human: a christian anthropology, trans., robert r. barr (turnbridge wells: burns & oates, 1990), 46, 50. 7ibid., 51. 8emmanuel levinas, totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority, trans. alphonso lingis (pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1969), 304. 9richard kearney, dialogue with contemporary continental thinkers (manchester: manchester university press, 1984), 174. see robert j. s. manning, interpreting otherwise than heidegger: emmanuel levinas’s ethics as first philosophy (pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1993), 142-154. 10here is levinas’s claim: “just as in all the philosophies of communion, sociality in heidegger is found in the subject alone; and it is in terms of solitude that the analysis of dasein in its authentic form is pursued. against this collectivity of side-by-side, i have tried to oppose the ‘i-you’ collectivity, taking this not in buber’s sense, where reciprocity remains the tie between two separated freedoms, and the ineluctable character of isolated subjectivity is underestimated. i have tried to find the temporal transcendence of the present toward the mystery of the future. this is not a participation in a third term … it is a collectivity that is not a communion. it is the face-to-face without intermediary.” emmanuel levinas, time and the other, trans. richard a. cohen (pittsburgh: duquesne, 1987), 93-94. 11emmanuel levinas, otherwise than being or beyond essence, trans. a lingis (dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1991), 94. 12ibid., 90; emmanuel levinas, “martin buber and the theory of knowledge, in the levinas reader, ed. sean hand (oxford: basil blackwell, 1989), 72-74. 112 prajñâ vihâra see graham ward, barth, derrida and the language of theology (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1995), 140-141. 13levinas, otherwise than being, 17. 14levinas, “ethics as first philosophy,” in the levinas reader, ed. sean hand (oxford: basil blackwell, 1989), 84. levinas describes proximity as “anarchically a relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ideality. what concretely corresponds to this description is my relationship with my neighbor, a signifyingness which is different from the much-discussed “meaning-endowment”, since signification is this very relationship with the other, the-one-for-theother.” emmanuel levinas, “substitution,” in the levinas reader, ed., sean hand (oxford: basil blackwell, 1989), 90; levinas, otherwise than being, 100. 15emmanuel levinas, “essence and disinterestedness,” in emmanuel levinas basic philosophical writings, eds. adrian t. peperzak, simon critichley, and robert bernasconi (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 1996), 119. 16roger burggraeve, the wisdom of love in the service of love: emmanuel levinas on justice, peace, and human rights, trans. jeffrey bloechl (milwaukee: marquette university press, 2002), 88. 17see levinas, “essence and disinterestedness,” 119; levinas, otherwise than being, 147. writes levinas, “illeity overflows both cognition and the enigma through which the infinite leaves a trace in cognition. its distance from a theme, its reclusion, its holiness … is its glory, quite different from being and knowing. it makes the word god be pronounced, without letting ‘divinity’ be said.” levinas, otherwise than being, 162. it is important to note here that though god is everpresent in levinas’s philosophy, god, for him, as manning observes, “is not the manifest god of natural theology, nor the mysterious but still comprehensible (by some) god of mysticism, nor the god who is understood as the first and most excellent being. for levinas, god is the absolutely unknowable, absolutely transcendent, and wholly other god of traditional judaism. what isn’t so traditional about levinas’s god, what isn’t so commonplace about levinas’s ‘certain kind of judaism,’ however, is his insistence that god can be known only through the ethical command.” manning, interpreting otherwise than heidegger, 147. 18as burggraeve explains, “concretely, the other appears over against the totalizing effort to be, as a fact or giveness which resists the noetic and practical totalizations of the self-interested ego. in the process of affirming its own centrality in a world assembled around it, the ego is struck by this appearing precisely in so far as the other appears as “radically other” (which is what levinas has in mind when he capitalizes the word other). precisely where this other escapes the concerns of the ego, levinas speaks of the human face.” burggraeve, wisdom of love, 88. 19emmanuel levinas, “meaning and sense,” in collected philosophical papers, tran. alphonso lingis (dordrecht : martinus nijhoff , 1987), 97. 20see levinas, otherwise than being, 146; ward, barth, derrida and the language of theology, 111. kenneth obiekwe 113 21see levinas, “substitution,” 114. 22levinas, totality and infinity, 23. elaborating further, levinas writes: “eschatology institutes a relation with being beyond the totality or beyond history, and not with being beyond the past and the present… it is a relationship with a surplus always exterior to the totality, as though the objective totality did not fill out the true measure of being, as though another concept, the concept of infinity were needed to express this transcendence with regard to totality, nonencompassable within a totality and as primordial as totality.” 22-23. 23see ibid., 267; burggraeve, wisdom of love, 105. 24adrian peperzak, to the other: an introduction to the philosophy of emmanuel levinas (west lafayette: purdue university press, 1993), 222. 25according to levinas, “substitution is not an act; it is a passivity inconvertible into an act, the hither side of the act-passivity alternative, the exception that cannot be fitted into the grammatical categories of noun or verb, save in the said that thematizes them. this recurrence can be stated only as an in-itself, as the underside of being or as otherwise than being. to be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-interested, is to bear the wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the responsibility that the other can have for me. to be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to have one degree of responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other.” levinas, “substitution,” 107. 26levinas, “substitution,” 107. 27levinas, otherwise than being, 157. 28john milbank, the word made strange: theology, language, culture (oxford and cambridge: blackwell publishers, 1997), 223. 29levinas, otherwise than being, 158. 30burggraeve, wisdom of love, 158; burggraeve, emmanuel levinas: the ethical basis for a humane society, bibliography 1929-1977, 1977-1881 (leuven: center for metaphysics and philosophy of god institute of philosophy leuven, 1981), 56. in the view that a priori one cannot hold that there is not situation where the use of violence is permissible, it seems levinas’s raises the violence used in protecting the third party against the unjust aggressor to a moral level, an integral element of his transcendent ethic of responsibility. arguably, therefore, his ethics do not offer us answer, strictly speaking, as how to break the circle of human violence. the question here is not whether or not it is humanly possible to avoid violence. the objection is raised objectively in assessment of his ethics. irrespective of this critique however, i see levinas’s position as one that supports a qualified pacifism, which requires that no effort should be spared in seeking nonviolent ways of settling dispute, but which, at the endpoint, given human limitation, permits an ethic of justice within the limits of relative prudence in protecting the other or oneself. 31to be sure, the idea of overcoming the over-powering influence of augustinian anthropological assumptions is not to deny that war is rooted in human sinful passions, or that in the human fallen state pride and its concomitant passions 114 prajñâ vihâra of greed and lust for power will continue to generate strife. it is not to say that with correcting the errors within the political, social, and economic systems and structures we will establish perfect just and peaceful social order in this world. that will be naïve optimism, the more naïve optimism, as history has shown, of which will be to think or say that with violence we shall bring a perfect or enduring just and peaceful social order. however, it is important to recognize the symbiosis of human sinful impulses and the unjust structures in the cause of violent conflict, which are the immediate factors behind today's conflicts. they are correctible. without denying the serious dilemma that exists in the case of unjust aggressor between the exercise of responsibility and charity that call to protect the innocent neighbor and the preventing of the unjust aggressor who is no less a neighbor to be loved, no tough-minded realist can deny the ambiguity involved in the use of violence. even if we continue to kill the unjust aggressors, we cannot guarantee that there will no longer be unjust aggressors in this world. how one should deal with the unjust aggressor calls for excruciating decisions that require weighing alternative nonviolent options, which include persuasion, negotiation, and the more direct control of the behavior of others by institutional controls, restraints, sanctions, or privileges. the pacifist anthropology viewpoint sees the just war ethics based on negative assumptions of human egocentric and animalistic impulses, where it serves as the main thrust of social ethical construct, as a naïve approach to the question of justice, peace, and war. it sees power morality as masking the basic fact about human moral capacity and suggesting that human egocentric negative impulses are more powerful than love, kindness and empathy, and urge for relationship to be the determinant in defining social morality. indeed, it sees just war ethic as freezing our moral imaginative power and creative ability to develop loving, nonviolent ways of conflict reconciliation and social transformation. just war ethic, it must be noted, is not itself a search for conflict resolution before they escalate to war, neither does it inspire or encourage that. 32see kenneth b. clark, pathos of power (new york: harper & row, 1974), 38, 78. 33levinas, otherwise than being, 159. 34see john h. yoder, the christian witness to the state (scottdale: herald press, 2002), 23. 35see adam g. cooper, “redeeming flesh,” first things 173 (may 2007), 31. 36ward, barth, derrida and the language of theology, 146. 37john h. yoder, the original revolution: essays on christian pacifism, with new forward by mark t. nation (scottdale and waterloo: herald press, 2003), 56. 38yoder, original revolution, 42; john h. yoder, “living the disarmed life: christ’s strategy for peace,” in waging peace: a handbook for the struggle to abolish nuclear weapons, ed. jim wallis (san francisco and sydney: harper and row publisher, 1982), 127-130. michael elliot rightly observes, “our biblical vision leaves no room for separating our strategies and tactics from our objectives. the methods we employ to achieve the vision have themselves to be embodiments kenneth obiekwe 115 of the vision. thus we cannot establish a peaceful and just society through tactics which regard human life as expandable.” michael c. elliott, freedom, justice and christian counter-culture (london: scm press and philadelphia: trinity press, 1990), 117. 39gil bailie, violence unveiled: humanity at the crossroads (new york: crossroad, 1995), 208. 40john p. lederach, “remember and change,” in transforming violence: linking local and global peacemaking, eds. judy z. herr and robert herr (scottdale and waterloo: herald press, 1998), 189. 41see thomas d. williams, who is my neighbor? personalism and the foundations of human rights (washington, d.c.: the catholic university of america press, 2005), 187. 42pontifical council for justice and peace, compendium of the social doctrine of the church (cittá del vaticano: libreria editrice vaticana, 2004), 517. 43see lederach, “remember and change,” 189. 44burggraeve, wisdom of love, p. 125. see emmanuel levinas, “the ego and the totality,” in collected philosophical papers, 30-31; levinas, otherwise than being, 159. 45george weigel, tranqullitas ordinis: the present failure and future promise of american catholic thought on war and peace (oxford: oxford university press, 1987), 340. 46see weigel, tranqullitas ordinis, 336-41. see also gregory baum, amazing church: a catholic theologian remembers a half-century of change (maryknoll: orbis books, 2005), 49. 116 prajñâ vihâra qusthan firdaus 33 pancasila and the struggle for a moral grammar1 alexander seran university atma jaya, indonesia abstract this paper attempts to clarify the nature of law, specifically the distinction between individuals who implement laws within an existing social system and those who struggle to change the system. in particular, it challenges the possibility of emancipation through social transformation. this paper will suggest that the indonesian concept of pancasila – promoted by its former president soekarno – fulfills this function of morality grounding the validity of laws. it represents the ethical life of the people uniting them into a nation. but it can be extended to international relations as well and serve as validating principles in implementing international laws in economic, social, and political co-operation. this paper will explore pancasila in connection to the approaches of habermas and honneth. it will also contrast this approach with that of huntington. prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 33-50 © 2000 by assumption university press 34 prajñā vihāra introduction one of the leading online news outlets, republika, presented a report on 30 september 2013 that claimed that indonesia has 183 disadvantaged regions, 143 of which are conflict-prone areas many of them in eastern indonesia. according to the report, the roots of conflict are economic, socio-cultural, religious, and political. the reporter observed that there is a link between disadvantaged regions and conflict. conflicts or natural disasters damage the economy and many infrastructure which sets back development. preventing social conflict requires participation by both local people and international communities. seminars and workshops need held to seek ways to improve coordination and collaboration between conflict-affected groups, non-governmental organizations, and decisionmakers of public administration at all levels.2 we need to educate ourselves on how to deal with social conflicts such as understanding and accepting differences between conflicting parties. pancasila can be used in dealing with such conflicts on the basis of its guiding principles as a moral grammar for attaining mutual recognition and resolving social conflicts. the aim of this paper is to examine how social conflicts can be resolved based on mutual respect and solidarity. by comparing the theory of the clash of civilizations of samuel p. huntington (1927-2008) and soekarno’s vision on pancasila as a universal principles of morality we can arrive at a particular grammar for the remaking of the world order after cold world war. through the use of a phenomenological method, a moral grammar of mutual respect and solidarity can be expected to establish a new paradigm on how global politics can be established to build a new world. it is the idea of “ethical life” that may be used to ground the validity of laws for sustaining integrity within the diversity of cultural identities and political ideologies. jürgen habermas (1929-) whose theory of communicative action and axel honneth (1949-) whose theory of the struggle of recognition are useful theories for building a new grammar for social relations in modern societies especially when they need to solve social conflict. alexander seran 35 moral grammar in general, the term grammar is the set of structural rules governing the composition of clauses, phrases, and words to make sentences that are understood and can be used in communication. the nature of language is to communicate and the function of communication should be to reach understanding. there is therefore a need for both linguistic grammar and communication skills in order to do exchange ideas and come to understand one another. this is all about communicative competence for an effective interaction especially in dealing with social conflict resolutions by conflicting parties themselves. but communicative competence is only the means by which an effective social interaction can lead to mutual understanding. the ultimate end of social interaction rests in the heart of man as a political animal he/she is seeking the well-being and not just an economic welfare. this is the importance of political philosophical accounts, from the time of socrates, focusing on the good life of men how to live both as individual and political being in a political community. one of the collected dialogues is crito in which socrates shows that the truths of great men speak to us only so far as we have ears and souls to hear them. genius hears the overtones, and the music of the spheres. genius knows what pythagoras meant when he said that philosophy is the highest music. socrates reminds us that philosophy aids men in choosing the best life as within a political community. socrates told crito to do not mind to listen to the teachers of philosophy whether they are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. try to examine her well and truly; and if she be evil, seek to turn away all men from her; but if she be what i believe she is, then follow her and serve her, and be good cheer. this means the structural components of the state is deduced from the idea of the good on which laws are established. laws are therefore reflections of morality for the state, the officials, and the people to realize the ultimate end of life which is the well-being. this is what socrates’s main concern in crito when he asks his friend crito not to disobey 36 prajñā vihāra the laws because it will destroy the laws and the whole state as well.3 retaliation is a violation to living political communities. finally socrates asked crito not to retain all arguments against the law. it is repeated in republic that good laws are only necessary means for the state, the people, and the officials to be guided to the end of life. to order a state rightly men’s souls must be raised to behold the universal light so that men can always be just, and only the just men can know what justice is.4 in politics, aristotle has explained that the state is the highest form of community and aims at the highest good. the structural components of the state constitute villages, households, male and female, master and slave in seeking all the need of men. therefore the ultimate end of the state is satisfying the good life of men. political communities are founded on a natural impulse in order to secure a bare subsistence.5 plato discussed ideal state on the principle of the good by which he would promote unity in the strictest sense. this, according to aristotle, is wrong because it is against natural affection of men. the good citizen may not be a good man. the good citizen is one who does good service to his/her state while this state may be bad in principle. in a constitutional state the good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. the good man is one who is fitted to rule. but a citizen in a constitutional state learns to rule by obeying orders. therefore citizenship in such a state is a moral training.6 hobbes pointed out in leviathan that when men are in the state of nature, fear and liberty are consistent. but when men are in the state of civility, liberty is not a right of ordinary people because individual liberties are given to the sovereign. therefore fear of the leviathan would civilize people by restraining their evil inclinations toward one other. to illustrate his argument, hobbes used the analogy of a ship that would sink if the passengers did not throw their possessions overboard. if possessions were not thrown overboard, the ship would sink and possessions as well as life would be lost.7 hobbes’ view of desirable government contrasts with that of locke. locke viewed society on a scale from subjugation to personal freedom and declared personal freedom to be the ideal. locke stands firmly in social contract theory that there are inalienable rights to alexander seran 37 be given to the state. the basic grammar of the rule of law is to guarantee personal freedom. there is therefore the state developed to accomplish personal liberties that men have in the previous stage of living in families and particular communities. social contract is no less than a rational construction to ground the existence of a political community from what is already experienced. rousseau looks at the state as symphony where each part is sustained by all the other parts. but in this symphony a single melody should have primacy over all other musical parameters. the general will is this single melody that allows the state to come into existence. comparing it with musical clarity also implies that the listener can choose what to hear.8 kant’s understanding of the state was as a persona civitatis. for him the state in the hand of the sovereign has the will to command. the will of the state is above the will of citizens because it is the personification of the will of citizens. in connection to his categorical imperative, the expression of the will of the sovereign state corresponds to the goal of the will of citizens. a study of michael blome-tillmann shows that kant’s doctrine of state sovereignty is an ambiguous foundation for liberal internationalist theory because on the one hand, he suggests that any existing form of sovereignty is adequate to the goal of freedom. on the other, he claims that all existing sovereigns are compelled to undergo self-reform.9 kant grounds his political project on a conviction that the public use of reason and open debate will gradually lead us away from an initial preoccupation with anarchy and coercion in creating the space for reflection and increased autonomy. arendt is correct saying that kant never truly wrote about political philosophy. this is the reason why in his critique of judgment one can see how kant developed a grammar of political philosophy rather than a moral philosophy. his question is about politics and is reflective rather than practical. if thinking of morality as a purely private matter of the individual’s conscience seems too abstract, the hegelian criticisms show that moral reflections are empty unless they take account of the social world in which 38 prajñā vihāra they can be realized in concrete actions. in reference to inclusive context of sittlichkeit which is the ethical life of the people in which social action can be understood as expression of a moral will taking place in social, political, and historical context.10 as descendants of the frankfurt school, habermas and honneth try to integrate kant’s concept of freedom with hegel’s phenomenological idea of the sitlichkeit in order to shift from a grammar that is neither merely formalist reason nor merely embedded social action. habermas’ approach to social problems is similar to durkheim’s sociological theory of solidarity. for him, solidarity expresses a regularity in answering the question concerning how society is possible. this question is put in the context of modern and contemporary societies that seek solidarity neither simply as a form of altruistic action, nor as a derivation of the catholic ‘ethos of brotherliness’. using linguistic analysis, habermas considers solidarity as a frame of shared values and/or rules that keeps society together. the question about how society possibly can be analyzed from a set of shared values and rules institutionalized and available to everyone within the public space.11 this thesis relies on the ideas of mutual respect, solidarity, and generalized interests that coincides largely with hegel’s idea of sittlichkeit and kant’s idea of freedom. solidarity is now considered the moral will of all concerned and it is now accepted as the inconditionnalité conditionnelle, unconditioned condition that all informed participants would freely accept. thinking solidarity along this normative line is not inconsistent with the principle of the social order and social integration where values of a post-conventional identity can be expressed into modem laws. in an age of bitter “identity politics” and pseudo-claims to “inclusivity” social theorists felt compelled to go back to foundational premises, to start all over again and rebuild a model of society based on reason, shared values, and individual autonomy. axel honneth, a social philosopher and hegelian scholar attempts to construct a model which draws on the early hegel (of the jena period). he claims that social theory starts with social conflict resolution. aside from nicolo machiavelli alexander seran 39 and hobbes, social conflict resolution can be explained through hegel’s phenomenology of spirit where the spirit develops its social life by means of a series of negations. especially through “the struggle for recognition.” honneth explains that human societies evolve from simple to complex, from ascribed or status-based honor to achievement, from an undifferentiated whole to a division of labour, from indifference to the fate of others to a recognition of interdependence, from private interests to shared values, from particularistic norms to universal laws and human rights, from authority based on tradition to a devaluation of tradition itself. as a third generation philosopher of the frankfurt school, honneth shows that the end point of the struggle for recognition is modernization without materialism and without techne. in this struggle for recognition, the social forms are family, civil society and the state which correspond respectively to love (affective bonds), law and solidarity, while on another level: intuition, cognitive recognition and rational intellectual intuition. the struggle for recognition links them reciprocally towards the final achievement of a “moral grammar” that is reconstruction of modern societies based on love, rights, and solidarity in seeking social integration within cultural diversities.12 the clash of civilizations huntington’s book the clash of civilizations describes the remaking of a global politics after the cold war. huntington claims that the clash of civilizations occurs when civilized modern societies are not governed by balancing the real conditions concerning dos and don’ts in both private and public domains.13 it is because the clash of civilizations is potentially rooted in the way we look at the world from the point of differences. huntington has provided us with the three maps about the world divisions in terms of differences. first is the division of the world in 1920s between the ‘west’ and the ‘rest’. second is the division of the world in 1960s by the cold world war into the free world, the communist 40 prajñā vihāra bloc, and the unaligned nations. third is the division of the world of civilizations in 1990s into western, latin american, african, islamic, chinese, hindu, orthodox, buddhist, and japanese.14 huntington contends that global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational after the collapse of communist world in 1980s and that the distinctions among peoples are no ideological, political, or economic but cultural. huntington acknowledges the condition of the clash of civilizations as something serious. the recognition of this condition may actually help us to question: “who we are? where are we going? and what will we become?” of course the question is answered by reference to things that mean most to us such as what religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions do we have? people use politics not just to advance their interest but also to define their identity. many conflicts are based on a false definition about our identity that is made only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.15 this is because the most important groupings are no longer ideology but cultural preferences. it follows that the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts are conflicts between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. what underlies huntington theory is therefore a particular grammar for the remaking of world order by balancing multipolar and multicivilizational world by which the shift to a new global politics after the post cold world war is made possible. francis fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history places western liberal democracy as the end of seeking commonalities of civilizations in dealing with social conflicts. but huntington makes sure that the main concern of geopolitics is to safeguard peace and international order based on commonalities of civilizations that are still in the making. the question is how do we benefit out of different civilizations? how do we prevent war? what foundation can we make to safeguard world peace and international order? what kind of morality can be developed to include different worldviews in different cultures? alexander seran 41 cultures are relative while morality is absolute. cultures prescribe institutions and behavior patterns to guide human actions which are right in any society. but morality refers to truth and justice in any given culture. it might be said that human society is universal because it is human. likewise human society is also particular because it is a society. as at times we march with others, at times we march alone, and yet a thin minimal morality does derive from the common human condition; a universal dispositions which is present in all cultures. this is the pragmatic ethical concern which demands a search for what is common to most civilizations, instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one civilization. and so the constructive course in a multicivilizational world is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities.16 pancasila before huntington’s provocative analysis about the new force in global politics, indonesia’s president soekarno has delivered a speech before the world delegations, in the united nations 15th general assembly on september 30, 1960. it represented a revolutionary understanding of international affairs. soekarno’s speech was a plea to make peace and justice the un’s main task. for soekarno, the un general assembly is only the means by which every independent country can be encouraged by this world organization to achieve its full glory. soekarno was ahead of huntington in seeing the problem of international order before and during the cold world war. he believed that this order was politically wrong and culturally lacking in respect. his speech in the un about the need “to build the world anew” was his attempt to share with the un a particular grammar on how to make the un work for international cooperation in seeking the well being of its members. the speech of soekarno was inspired by indonesia’s state philosophy – pancasila – which pointed to mutual respect and solidarity among independent countries joining the un. the first manifestation of pancasila for the international cooperation was the dasasila (ten 42 prajñā vihāra principles) formulated as the plea among asian and african countries in bandung, indonesia from 18 to 24 april, 1955. the basic theme in pancasila was reflected in dasasila bandung to ground the new politics of coexistence among asian and african countries and could possibly be extended to include all independent countries in the un. pancasila consists of two old javanese-sanskrit words panca and sila. panca means five and sila means principle. the five principles are (1) belief in the one and only god, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) the unity of indonesia, (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, and (5) social justice for all of the people of indonesia.17 development of these basic values in dasasila according to soekarno can be extended to the un formulations of universal principles as the particular moral grammar in seeking peace and justice for a new world. the un general assembly is tasked to strengthen the very essence of being a nation to its members whose end is to realize the well-being of the people. there is therefore the need for a particular grammar in the renewal of an international order. huntington’s claim that culture to be made the core of seeking moral grammar is less comprehensive than soekarno’s claim about pancasila which is beyond cultural consciousness. in pancasila, the task of remaking international relationships involves ideology, culture, religion, politics, economics, and fellowship. soekarno’s concepts of pancasila reflect back upon indigeneous peasant concepts of gotong royong literally meant the collective bearing of burdens and figuratively meant the piety of all for the interests of all. it is morally universal and culturally rooted in the everyday life-world of the people. it is beyond pragmatic consideration of ideological and cultural differences. the concern of pancasila is all embracing universal values. it is about the ethical life that validates the rules of law in any given independent nation state.18 pancasila serves to ground international order in peace and justice. it is similar to max scheler claims for social interactions to be based on an order of love (ordo amoris). it is because love is the maximum of justice and justice is the minimum of love. for social relations to last in any given society must be based on the universal order of mutual respect. alexander seran 43 the first principle (sila i) is “belief in the one and only god”. it suggests that the role of religion is moral power and not political power. as a result, religion is not the opposition to the state. the state protects and guarantees the freedom of worship. second principle (sila ii) is “just and civilized humanity” which means universal values of humanity must be protected by the law for all its citizens, such as protection of physical security, family, ethnicity, property, and profession. third principle (sila iii) is “the unity of indonesia”. it means political nationalism and not an ethnic nationalism. political nationalism is against sectarianism, primordialism, and discrimination. fourth principle (sila iv) is “democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives” which means democracy as the political system based on a liberal political culture. fifth principle (sila v) is “social justice for all of the people of indonesia”. it means solidarity and political decision-making must respect those who are the least advantaged. through pancasila, soekarno shows that there is a synthesis in the struggle for recognition because pancasila achieves its aims through a communicative process involving structural components of the life-world. therefore pancasila can be used to serve as social norms in establishing social interactions and seeking social conflict resolutions. it is conceived as a communicative imperative that respects diverse cultural identities. it is formulated on the basis of the better argument and therefore universally considered valid for all affected in their capacity as participants. unlike huntington, soekarno inclusively allowed whatsoever differences to be made part of setting the agreement. culture, politics, and economy are matters in competing for the reasonable foundations for all affected to preserve differences through mutual respect and solidarity. the end of the cold world war is not the end of competing ideologies because what huntington named cultural identities is basically expression of ideologies. what soekarno experienced before the independence of 44 prajñā vihāra the republic of indonesia was political ideologies such as liberalism versus communism, capitalism versus socialism, and free world versus colonized world. during the end of cold world war soekarno feared new emerging forces of ideological dominations through neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. huntington’s division of the 1920s’ world map still remains: there is the free world and the rest. the fact that cold world war is over does not change the situation of the 1960s, rather there are new forms of ideological competition that result from what soekarno called necolim (neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism). the fear of the clash of civilizations cannot be handled only by means of awareness of cultural identities. since cultural values are relative, we need to form solid foundations in morality as the grammar of our struggle for recognition. the formulation of such grammar can be found in habermas’s theory of communicative action in which pancasila reflects the basic idea that moral recognition validates enacted laws. the latin well-known proverb says quid leges sine moribus which means laws without character worthless. this trajectory to the young hegelian concept of sittlichkeit come to terms with honneth’s anerkennung as the result of the struggle for recognition on which enacted laws can only attain validations for their being enforced if and only if they reflect morality of the people. this is for habermas the sollgeltung prinzip of the validity of laws in modern societies. these are rules that command validity in speaking and acting by which social conflict resolutions are rationally accepted and procedurally well-arranged. pancasila is the recognition that we must meet cultural diversities half way. therefore it can be used as a moral grammar in seeking the better argument for all affected in their capacity to make decisions which benefit them equally. pancasila is both the (u)niversal and the (d)iscourse principles in reference to habermas’s theory of communicative action. as far as the five principles of pancasila are concerned, pancasila can be understood as the (u)niversal concept of morality while such principles open to further (d)iscourse within diverse cultural identities in modern societies. using habermas’s distinction between the (u) and the (d) principles, pancasila fulfills the following conditions:19 alexander seran 45 (u) all affected can accept the consequences, and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone (these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation). universal (u) principle is distinguished from discourse (d) principle which stipulates the basic idea of moral theory (theoretical discourse) but does not form part of a logic of argumentation (practical discourse). (d) only those norms can claim to be valid that meet or could meet with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse. the principle (d) is the assertion that the philosopher as a moral theorist ultimately seeks to justify, and already presupposes principle (u). from here one can see that habermas’s discourse ethics deals with a rule of argumentation rather than testing normative claims. the aim is to redeem normative claims into validity claims through argumentations. habermas emphasizes that only in the concrete life-world laws are legitimized by an argumentation that is free from any compulsion whether internal or external of a practical discourse. this means that laws are legitimate only if the following presuppositions are fulfilled. (1) every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in discourse. (2) a. everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b. everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into discourse. c. everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 46 prajñā vihāra (3) no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).20 using habermas’s analysis of kohlberg’s theory of moral developmentto relate stages of moral consciousness with models of democracy one can see that pancasila is already in the sixth stage of moral grammar for grounding the validity of laws. table 1: types of laws and the development of democracy kohlberg’s stages of moral development relationship between morality and law habermas’s types of legal paradigms pre conventional level a stage 1 right: punishment and obedience stage 2 right: instrumentalpurposive exchange magical ethics 1. tribal societies • revealed doctrines • sacred traditions conventional level b stage 3 right: mutual interpersonal relation and exchange stage 4 right: social system and conscience maintenance tradition 2. traditional societies • customs • ethical codes based on tradition alexander seran 47 kohlberg’s stages of moral development relationship between morality and law habermas’s types of legal paradigms postconventional level c stage 5 right: social contract and utilitarianism stage 6 right: universal ethical principles universal principles • ethical/ political and moral discourses • utilitarian and pragmatic discourses • procedural discourse 3. modern pluralistic societies • natural laws • modern natural laws: system of rights a. classic liberalism b. civic republicanism • modern law: system of actions a. legal positivism b. legal realism • reflective law: a. universalized laws based on systems of actions and rights soekarno believes that pancasila involves universal ethical principles that come to existence through a procedural discourse from may 29 to june 1, 1945 held by bpupki (abbreviation of indonesian to badan penyelidik usaha persiapan kemerdekataan indonesia which means the committee for preparatory work for indonesian independence). on august 18, 1945, the day after the proclamation of indonesia’s independence, pancasila was finally established as the state philosophy by ppki (abbreviation of indonesian to panitia persiapan kemerdekaan indonesia which means the preparatory committee for indonesian independence).21 pancasila can be proposed as a model of the struggle for a moral grammar that can be discovered by modern societies in dealing with social conflicts and 48 prajñā vihāra resolutions if and only if they place mutual respect and solidarity on the highest priority. conclusion huntington’s approach to social conflict in modern societies through the clash of civilizations does not reflect phenomenological attitudes in the life-world since social conflicts are myriad of reasons. culture is one of them. fukuyama’s theory of the end of history seems to simplify the complexity of social systems into a liberal democratic system and therefore ignoring variety of cultural systems. as a shift in geopolitical paradigm, both huntington and fukuyama believe global politics must be based on a universal reason whether it is a universal culture or democracy. soekarno’s concept of pancasila involves the idea that the struggle for recognition requires communicative action to preserve cultural identities while establishing laws on universally validating principles of morality. as habermas’s theory of communicative action and honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are concerned, pancasila manifests the dialectic process in generalizing different cultural worldviews involving economy, culture, and politics and therefore pancasila is compatible with the search for a moral grammar, through which the dreams of a new world can be built. endnotes 1the term sollgeltung is taken from german language as it is used as validating principle of social norms on morality. “…as used for the validity component of legal validity, the expression “legitimacy” designates the specific kind of prescriptive validity (sollgeltung) that distinguishes law from “morality.” valid moral norms are “right” in the discourse-theoretic sense of just. valid legal norms indeed harmonize with moral norms, but they are “legitimate” in the sense that they additionally express an authentic self-understanding of the legal community, the fair consideration of the values and alexander seran 49 interests distributed in it, and the purposive-rational choice of strategies and means in the pursuit of policies. see jürgen habermas, between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, 2nd edition, translated by william rehg (cambridge, massachusetts: the mit press, 1996) p.156. 2www.republika.co.id/…al-politics/12/05/08/m3pkhx 3plato, crito. par.50 b sq 4plato, republic…op.cit. book ix. par. 591 d sq. 5aristotle, politics, book i. 6ibid. book iii. 7arye l. hillman, “hobbes and the prophet samuel on leviathan government” in public choice,vol. 141, no. 1/2 (oct., 2009), pp. 1-4. published by: springer. stable url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40270940. accessed: 31-07-2015 11:21 utc. 8jacqueline waeber, “jean-jacques rousseau’s unité de mélodie”, in journal of the american musicological society, vol. 62, no. 1 (spring 2009), pp. 79-143. published by university of california press on behalf of the american musicological society. stable url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jams.2009.62.1.79. accessed: 31/07/2015 07:39. 9michael blome-tillmann, “moral non-cognitivism and the grammar of morality” in proceedings of the aristotelian society,new series, vol. 109 (2009), pp. 279-309. published by: on behalf of wileythe aristotelian society. stable url:http:// www.jstor.org/stable/20619410accessed: 31-07-2015 12:09 utc. 10david couzens hoy, “hegel’s critique of kantian morality” in history of philosophy quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2 (apr., 1989), pp. 207-232. published by: on behalf of university of illinois press, north american philosophical publications. stable url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27743893accessed: 31-07-2015 12:13 utc. 11massimo rosati “solidarity and the sacred: habermas’s idea of solidarity in a durkheimian horizon” in durkheimian studies/études durkheimiennes, new series, vol. 6 (2000), pp. 93-103. published by: berghahn books .stable url: http:// www.jstor.org/stable/23867077 accessed: 31-07-2015 12:44 utc. 12thelma mccormack, “review on the struggle…” in the canadian journal of sociology / cahiers canadiens de sociologie, vol. 22, no. 1 (winter, 1997), pp. 134-136. published by: canadian journal of sociology. stable url: http://www.jstor.org/ stable/3341573.accessed: 31-07-2015 12:35 utc. 13samuel b. huntington, the clash of civilization and the remaking of world order (new york: simon & schuster, 1996), p.13. 14ibid. pp.21-27. 15ibid.p. 21. 16samuel p. huntington…op.cit., p. 318. 17cliford geertz, the interpretation of cultures (new york: basic books, 1973), pp.224ff. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40270940 http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jams.2009.62.1.79 50 prajñā vihāra 18cliford geertz …op.cit. 19jürgen habermas, moral consciousness and communicative action. translated by christian lenhardt and shierry weber nicholsen(cambridge, mass: mit press, 1991), pp.65-66. 20ibid., p. 89. 21saafroedin bahar et al. (eds) (1995), risalah sidang badan penyelidik usaha-usaha persiapan kemerdekaan indonesia (bpupki) panitia persiapan kemerdekaan indonesia (ppki) (proceedings of the committee for preparatory work for indonesian independence (bpupki) preparatory committee for indonesian independence (ppki)), sekretariat negara republik indonesia, isbn 979-8300-00-9 (in indonesian) a report on emotional education for young children: the philosophy of life in oriental philosophy and in the theory of thomas aquinas tjeng, eui-chai introduction * the title of this conference is “violence and peace in our times.” the reason we chose this is because 9.11 was a shock that woke us all from the sense of boundless optimism with which we greeted the third millennium. ever since the dawn of history, man has lived with violence. even in our socalled ‘civilized’ age, we have lived with violence, both major and minor. with the fall of communism, the violence of the “liberation front” has been weakened only to be succeeded by “racial cleansing” of kosovo, the genocide of east timor and then finally 9.11. of course, by violence here, we mean intentional violence perpetrated through overt, physical acts. ‘even while waging a war every man wants peace whereas no one wants war while he is making peace,’ said st. augustine. (omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem quaerit: nemo autem bellum pacificando. (de civitate dei, 19, 12)1 however, true peace comes from a peaceful order and the right human order can only be based on justice. in this paper, i will be comparing st. thomas’ theories on violence, justice and peace with those of confucianism. 1 * for this article, the latin text of st. thomas' summa theologiae (marietti, roma, 1952) and the english translation of the summa with latin text by the members of a.p. (blackfriars, new york, 1960-), to confer the english composition, are used. augustinus, de civitate dei, 19, 12. translated by gerald g. walsh, s.j., grace monahan, a.s.u., daniel j. honan. image books, new york, 1958. i. violence st. thomas explored the essence of violence through an investigation of will. an act of will is an inclination which arises from an inner and conscious principle. however, violence and coercion comes from the outside. as such, violence and coercion stands fundamentally against the specific nature of will. it works against natural inclinations. it is like a stone is thrown upwards against its natural tendency. man can be led through coercion, however, it is not rooted in his will. so violence is against human nature. if an action is based upon his will, it is against the essence of coercion.2 moreover, even if the will inevitably seeks the ultimate end, it is not as if will is forced to want it. coercion (coactio) indicates the application of force. as aristotle expounds in the 3rd book of ethics violence is of external origin. one does not suffer violence through internal inclination. this is clear from the example of the stone given above. therefore, if will desires something through natural inclination, even though it does so out of necessity, it is not because of coercion but nature.3 2 s. theol. la 2ae, 6, 4, c. 'actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, sicut appetitus naturalis est quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione. quod autem est coactum vel violentum est ab exteriori principio. unde contra ratione m ipsius actus voluntatis est quod sit coactus vel violentus; sicut etiam est contra rationem naturalis inclinationis vel motus lapidis quod feratur sursum; potest enim lapis per violentiam ferri sursum, sed quod iste motus violentus sit ex eius naturali inclinatione esse non potest. similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi, sed quod hoc sit ex eius voluntate repugnat rationi violentiae.' cf. s. th. la, 82, 1, c. 3 quaestio disputata de veritate, 22. 5, c. 'quamvis autem quadam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo conceden dum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae cuiusdam inductio. violentum autem est, secundum philosophum in ill ethic.(l, 1110 a 13, b 1-4,1617), cuius principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo; sicut si lapis sursum proiiciatur; quia nullo modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur, sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio eo quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violente velit, etiam etsi aliquid naturali inclinatione velit. patet igitur quod vulntas non necessario aliquid vult necessitate coactionis, velut ii. human nature (natura) i now wish to speak of nature that is subjected to external force, that is, violence. st. thomas regards the essence of being as nature. st. thomas refers to “i. de duabus naturis" by boetius and aristotle’s statement in v. metaphysics that substance (substantia) is nature (natura). st. thomas says, “the philosopher, too, says that every substance is a nature. (aristotles, metaph. v. 4. 1014 b 35) the term nature in this sense means the essence of a thing as directed to its specific operation, for no reality lacks its specific operation.”4 as such “homo est (aliquid) compositum ex anima et corpore”, that is, "man is a compound of soul and body.”5 st. thomas regarded human beings as having both material (materialitas) and non-material nature (immaterialitas), or spiritual nature (spiritualitas). this is because man engages in not only material but non-material activity. in his cognitive activity, man also recognizes himself. material operation operates on other beings but not on itself. this is clearly seen in the act of self-reflection of man. such non-material spiritual operation is the operation of an intellectual soul.6 tamen aliquid necessario necessitate naturalis inclinationis.' 4 the original latin text. de ente et essentia, marietti, 1957, transl. by tjeng, eui-chai with the latin text, 1995, seokwang publishing co. seoul p. 20. 'boetius, de duabus naturis et una persona christi, (cap. 1) assignat; quod natura dicitur esse illud quocumque modo intellectu capi potest et sic etiam dicit philosophus in 5 metaphysicae, quod omnis substantia est natura. nomen autem naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significareessentiam rei secundum quod habet ordinem vel ordinationem ad propriam operationem rei, quum nulla res proria destituatur operatione.' on being and essence, trans. armand maurer, the pontifical institute of medieval studies, 1983, toronto. pp. 31-32. natura: ibid. footnote 12: 'etymologically, the latin word natura, like the greek equivalent physis; and the english 'nature', means the 'birth'.' andre leonard, il fondamento della morale, 1990, san paolo, trino, milano, p. 217. 'il termine natura viene dal substantivo latino natura che si costruisce a partire dal participio passato natus del verbo nasci, che significa nascere. etimologicamente il termine natura designa la situazione nativa di un essere, 10 stato che eredita in virtu della sua nascita.' 5 s. th. la. 75, 4, c. 'homo est (aliquid) compositum ex anima et corpore.' 6 s. th. la. 87, 3, c. 'dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. ultima autem perfectio intellectus est ejus operatio: non enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut perfectio et actus ejus, ut dicitur ix metaphys. (c. 8, 1050 a 23 b 2) hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum iii. human person human dignity is rooted in personality. from a christian perspective, a human person (or personality) attains its dignity precisely because it is a divine image (imago dei), that is to say, image of the divine essence and divine person (persona divina). “among all other substances, individual beings with rational nature have a special name, and this is ‘person’. that is why in this definition of person, the terms ‘individual’ is used to mean a singular being in the category of substance; ‘rational nature’ is added to mean the singular being among rational substances’.”7 this conceptualization of person by st. thomas was influenced by boetius’s de duabus naturis that “persona est naturae rationalis substantia”.8 thus, st. thomas defines person as “omne indiviuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona.”9 seen in this light, the concept of person contains “substantia individualis”, “inseitas/perseitas”, “integritas”, “incommunicabilitas” and “inviolability”.10 it is in this way that the essence of humanity or human nature is explained in terms of person. person, thus conceived, attains even spirituality, because a human soul is characterized by “immaterialitas” that excludes “materialitas”. ejus intelligere. sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent. est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. et sic in deo idem est quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam: quia sua essentia est suum intelligere. est autem alius intel1ectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sed tamen primum objectum sui intelligere est ejus essentia. unde etsi aliud sit in angelo, secundum ratione m, quod intelligat se inteligere, et quod intelligat suam esentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit: quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est objectum primum ipsa ejus essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. et ideo id quod prima cognoscitur ab intellectu humano est hujusmodi objectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur objectum; et per acturn cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cujus est perfectio ipsum inteiligere. et ideo philosophus (de anima ii, 4, 415a 16-22.) dicit quod objecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis. cf. in i sent. d. 17. 1, 5 ad 3. expositio super liberum de causis 1. 7. paolo siweck, psychologia metaphysica, 1956, universitas gregoriana, roma pp. 465-477. 7 s. th. la. 29, 1, c. ' … inter ceteras substantias quoddam speciale nomen habent singularia rationalis naturae, et hoc nomen est 'persona'. et ideo in praedicta definitione personae ponitur 'substantia individua', inquantum significat singulare in genere substantiae; additur autem 'rationalis naturae', inquantum significat singulare in rationalibus substantiis.' 8 boetius, de duabus naturis et una persona christi, c 3 in migne, pl 46 col. 1345. 9 s. th. la. 29, 3, c et ad 2 10 tjeng, eui-chai. metaphysics. yeolin, 2001 edit. 11th, pp. 305-306. iv. imago dei a) a possessor of reason and will st. thomas explains the meaning behind the idea that we are made in the image of god. according to him, “man is made to god’s image, and since this implies, so damascene tells us, that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of himself, so then, now that we have agreed that god is the exemplar cause of things and that they issue from his power through his will, we go on to look at this image, that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his responsibility and control.”11 in the trinity, the son issues as the logos of mind and the holy spirit as the love of will, likewise in rational creatures there are an idea (verbum conceptum) and love (amor procendens). it means that ‘man is made after god’s image.’12 god exists in things in two ways. firstly as an operative cause (causa agens) and this way he exists in everything he creates. secondly god exists in a special fashion in the reasoning creatures that are actually knowing and loving him, or are disposed to do so.13 nonetheless, that the image of god is immanent within a personality does not mean that it exists perfectly it exists only imperfectly. this is what the holy script means when it says that man was made after the image of god. thus, the preposition 11 s. th. la 2ae, prologus: 'sicut damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaglnem dei dicitur, secundum quod per imagine m significatur intel1ectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativium, postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum ejus voluntatem, restat ut consideremus de ejus imagine, idest de homine secundum quod et ipse est suorumoperum principium, quasi liberum arbiruim habens et suorum operum potestatem.' 12 s. th. la. 45, 7, c. 'processiones autem divinarum personarum attenduntur secundum actus intel1ectus et voluntatis; nam filius procedit ut verbum intel1ectus, spiritus sanctus ut amor voluntatis. in creaturis igitur rationalibus in quibus est intel1ectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio trinitatis per modum imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor procedens.' et s. th 2ae, prologus. 13 cl s. th. la. 8, 3. 'deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. uno modo per modum causea agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. alio modo sicut objectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in operationibus animae secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente et desideratum in desiderante. hoc igitur secundo modo deus specialiter est in rationali creatura quae cognoscit et diligit ipsum actu vel habitu.' here, that is, “ad” in latin, implies an "approach" that is adequate a description only when a distance [between god and humanity] is presupposed.14 b) the image of the holy trinity when st. thomas regards man as containing the image of god, he means that humanity reflects the image of the holy trinity, that is, god’s one nature in three persons.15 furthermore, he makes a distinction between: the resemblance to god (similitudo dei), the image of god (imago dei) and his trace (vestigium). “while all creatures bear some resemblance to god, only in a rational creature do you find a resemblance to god in the manner of an image; other things resemble him in the manner of a trace.”16 following damascenus, he also makes the clear distinction between the image and likeness. the likeness to god in terms of image means that “his being in god’s image signifies his capacity for understanding, and for making free decisions in master of self”, while that in terms of likeness means that "he is in his likeness refers to the likeness of divine virtue, in so far as it can be in man.”17 here, we are reminded of the openness and transcendency of personality insofar as it takes after the image of god. man exists in a material world, in which he encounters other persons as well as material objects. man actualizes himself by virtue of sharing trust and love and through communication with other intellectual (spiritual) beings that is, man can reach full self-development only in full communication with 14 s. th. la. 93, 1, c. 'et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago dei, non tamen perfecta sed imperfecta. et hoc significat scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem dei; praepositio enim 'ad' accessum quendam significat, qui co.mpetit rei distanti.' 15 s. th. la. 93, 5, c. 'sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem dei et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad trinitatem personarum; nam et in ipso deo in tribus personis una existit natura.' 16 s. th. la. 93, 6, c. 'cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo dei per modum imaginis; in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii.' 17 s. th. la. 93, 9, c. 'et secundum hoc damascenus dicit (de fide ortl-l il, c. 12) quod id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat et arbitrio liberum per se potestativium; quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem.' (de fide orthodoxa il, 12.) other men. a human community (family, fraternal society, religious community, the state, international community) is formed through man's reaffirmation of his own interiority and communication with other personalities based on a respect for their dignity. this type of community is predicated on love. since the possibilities of personality are boundless (open to the infinite), this kind of human communication ushers in an ultimate transcendence that leads to god. in fact, this personality conceived of in terms of god’s image is identical with the image of the holy trinity that consists in a communication of being, life and love that circulate from eternity to eternity within the divine nature and divine persons. herein lies the dignity, inviolability, holiness and uniqueness of the human nature and human person that are the image of the divine nature and divine persons. from this follows our renewed recognition that our human nature and human person, which constitutes the supreme value of the humanity, are threatened by unjust violence. v. justice (iustitia) achieving justice is a necessary precondition for ending violence and establishing peace. the 9.11 catastrophe reveals a profound gulf between the islamic and american (including israeli) concepts of justice. even within the western world, there are conflicting understandings of justice. the 9.11 incident, which was caused by islamic extremists using american technology and all the american facilities, also struck hard the materialism and libertinism of the western civilization, as was symbolically captured by the destruction of the world trade centre and pentagon, which after all embody american technology, freedom, wealth and power. a few thousand souls were lost, and the world was horrified. as a response, us declared a war of an endless justice on terrorism and launched an offensive on the terrorist organization of osama bin-laden's al quaeda in afghanistan. muslims replied in kind, in the name of a holy war. invoking the first-borns' rights of ismael and isaac, two of abraham's sons, muslims protest the israeli policy of occupation in palestine, perpetuating the bloody conflicts. the latent resentment against the historical role that western colonialism played in the region, needless to say, cannot be ignored. under such circumstances, humanity is hard pressed to reexamine the question of justice in the new light, thereby cultivating an inter-civilizational dialogue. the catholic church has been instrumental in promoting peace in our violent times. most notably, it made a large spiritual contribution to the demise of communist regimes that threatened world peace in the name of emancipation. achieving justice was always at the heart of a catholic approach to peace, and the catholic concept of justice was always predicated on its understanding of universal value of personality that can suggest a concrete solution to the problem. . the catholic understanding of personality and justice is dominated by st. thomas's interpretation of the holy scriptures. in what follows, i will explore the traditional catholic theory of justice in the light of recent circumstances, while comparing it to its confucian counterpart for the asian-pacific age. a) st. thomas's theory of justice justice is the indirect cause of peace, and not its immediate cause. that is to say, peace is an indirect consequence of justice. for justice removes the obstacles to peace. the immediate cause of peace is love.18 justice is beneficial to people in violence and peace.19 justice ushers war into peace. in order to realize peace, justice is an indispensable precondition, whether in the orient or occident. therefore, i will present st. thomas's and confucian 'theories of justice in the light of today's topic, ‘violence and peace in our times’. 1) definition of justice st. thomas defines justice as “the lasting and constant will of rendering to each one his right.”20 this definition is predicated on his understanding of human nature. as a being endowed with life in this world, man is given the rights that nature demands in order to lead a human life. as this nature is innately communitarian, it demands that we 18 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 3. 'pax est opus justitiae indirecte, inquantum scilicet removet prohibens. sed est opus caritatis directe, quia secundum propriam rationem caritas pacem causat.' 19 s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 12, c. 20 s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 1, c. 'iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit' realize ourselves in the community we are embedded in. this demand is tantamount to that of justice. accordingly, justice necessarily entails a relationality. human nature, thus understood, is expressed as persona/personality once seen as an individual. thus, “rendering each one his right” touches on the individual and personal deed of justice in relation to its proper field and objective.21 2) justice and virtue for st. thomas, justice is one of the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance).22 these virtues make human acts just and a natural man good. this is relevant to justice. in justice, above all, shines the lustre of virtue.23 3) categorizations of justice the first two categorizations of justice can be called particular justice (iustitia particularis): particular justice is about the individual personality, that is to say, it is realized when individual personality relates to the common. this relationship is akin to that between parts and the whole. here, two modes of relationship need to be distinguished. one is that between parts, that is, the way in which an individual personality relates to that of the other. commutative justice applies to this kind of relationship, securing the mutual relationship between two personalities. the other is the relationship between parts and the whole, that is, the way in which the common is related to each personality. distributive justice applies to this relationship, in which the common is distributed to the individual personality by proportionality. so 21 s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 1, c. 'dicendum quod praedicta justitiae definitio conveniens est, si recte intelligatur. cum enim omnis virtus sit habitus qui est principium boni actus, necesse est quod virtus definiatur per actum bonum circa propriam materiam virtutis. est autem justitia proprie circa ea quae ad alterum sunt, sicut circa propriam materiam. et ideo actus justitiae per comparationem ad propriam materiam, et objectum, tangitur cum dicitur, jus suum unicuique tribuens.' cl s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 7, c. 'ita etiam praeter iustitiam legalem oportet esse particularem quamdam iustitiam, quae ordinet hominem circa ea quae sunt ad alteram singularem personam.' cl ad 1, 2, 3, ibid. 11, c. 22 s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 3, sed contra. 'sed contra est quod gregorius(moralium libri it, 49.) dicit quod in quatuor virtutibus, scilicet temperantia, prudentia, fortitudine et justitia, tota boni operis structura consurgit. ' 23 s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 3, c. 'human and moral virtue is that which makes a human act and the man himself good. and this applies to justice. for men's acts are good inasmuch as they reach the measure of reason, which is the norm of their rightness. now since justice makes human acts right, it is clear that it makes them good. cicero declares that men are called good chiefly because of their justice, and that in justice above all shines the luster of virtue.' particular justice can be divided into two types, namely commutative and distributive.24 a) commutative justice (iustitia commutative): as said above, this form of justice applies to a mutual relationship between two individual personalities. it commands that exchange of goods and services takes place according to strict equality of values. aristotle holds that the mean (medium) in commutative justice is taken according to arithmetical proportions.25 duties and rights that commutative justice entails are contractual. it is thus also called a contractual justice.26 the subject of rights and duties here is an individual in a social relationship, predisposed towards private interests. the bearer of rights is an individual (or corporate individual), and the object of the rights is private interest and private goods of the individual.27 b) distributive justice (iustitia distributiva): this applies when the whole relates to its parts. the relationship is about that between the common and the individual personalities. the distribution in this relationship follows the principle of proportionality. the bearer of duties and rights is an individual in a social, relationship, and the goal, the private interests of the individuals who comprise the society. the representatives, such as society or the state, are held responsible for the realization of distributive justice. 'the mean (medium) is taken in distributive justice according to geometrical proportion. so then the virtuous mean taken in distributive justice, not according to an equality between thing and thing, but according to a proportion between things and persons, and such a way that even as one person exceeds another so also that which is melted out to the other. accordingly aristotle [v ethics, 3 et 4 1131a 29 et b 32] describes the mean here as being according to 24 s. th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c. 'justitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comparatur ad communitatem secut pars ad totum. potest autem ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi. unus quidem partis ad partem, cui similis est ordo unius privatae personae ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa justitia, quae consistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. alius ordo attenditur totius ad partes, et huic ordini assimilatur ordo ejus quod est commune ad singulas personas: quem quidem ordinem dirigit justitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. et ideo duae sunt justitiae species, scilicet commutative et distritiva.' 25 s. th. 2a 2ae, ibid. 61, 2, sed contra. 'philosophus dicit, in v ethic. (cc. 6, 7, 1131 a 30 b 15; b 32-1132 a 7) quod in justitia distributiva accipitur medium secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in commutativa autem secundum arithmeticam.' cf. s. th. 2a 2ae, 61, c. 26 c. henry peschke, christian ethics it,c. goodliffe neale, dublin, 1978. p.217(a). 27 s. th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c. geometric proportionality, in which the even balance or equality lies in a comparative relation, not in a fixed quantity.28 c) general or legal justice (iustitia generalis vel legalis): this category of justice is about common good which all the members of a society have to perform. it is called a general justice, for it pursues the general good of the community. in case of the state, this justice imposes on its citizens such duties as tax or military service as stipulated in law. thus, it is also called a legal justice.29 d) social justice (iustitia socialis): drawn from pius xi quadragesimo anno, this concept of justice is highly relevant to our age. in pursuing common good, this mode of justice relies less on legally defined rights than on the natural rights of a community and its members. quadragesimo anno was promulgated at a time when labour conflict was intensifying. against this background, the labour question could not find its final solution in distributive, legal, or communitative justice. the final solution had to be found in a set of basic human natural rights. that is to say, everyone's right to lead a humane life needed to be protected and respected, by the society as a whole (and wealthy people), regardless of their material possessions, as long as they do not forfeit it on account of evil deeds. children, for example, are entitled to survival, fostering, and education. this right needs to be upheld and respected by family, the state and all communities. following the principles of social justice, parents are obliged to foster and raise, spiritually and physically, their children on account of their given status as parents. children, in turn, are obliged to pay respect and return love to their parents. 28 s. th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c, 2, sed contra and c. 29 s. th. 2a 2ae, 58, 5c. 'iustitia ordinat hominem in comparatione ad alium; quod quidem potest esse dupliciter: uno modo ad alium singulariter consideratum; alio modo ad alium in communi, secundum scilicet quod ille qui servit alicui communitati servit omnibus hominibus qui sub communitate illa continentur. ad utrumque ergo se potest habere justitia secundum propriam rationem. manifestum est autem quod omnes qui sub communitate aliqua continentur comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad totum; pars autem id quod est totius est; unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. secundum hoc ergo bonum cujuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat justitia. et secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad justitiam pertinere secundum quod ordinat hominem ad bonum commune. et quantum ad hoc justitia dicitur virtus generalis. et quia ad legem pertinet ordinare in bonum commune, inde est quod talis justitia praedicto modo generalis dicitur justitia legalis, quia scilicet per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtu tum in bonum commune.' cf. c. henry peschke, ibid. pp. 217-218. economically, workers are entitled to compensation for their labour on account of their status as .the supporters of their families. politically, all and every type of government is obliged to provide its citizenry with opportunities for life, livelihood and labour, just as the citizens in turn have a duty to sustain such a government and society. the principle of social justice commands as a duty aides to the poor who cannot lead a humane life. one's entitlement to this form of right derives from the natural rights of the poor, or simply, their right of survival. the question then becomes how to expand and deepen our understanding of the basic right of survival. in this light, the belief in divine creation will revitalize our appreciation of social justice. for god created the wealth in this cosmos, not for a few, but for everyone in this world, that is, for all those who are coming by creation of his goodness and love.30 e) vindicative justice (iutitia vindicativa, retributive justice): according to st. thomas, vengeance is an evil allowed for punishment of (malum poenale) those who have given offence and committed a crime. in vengeance, therefore, the intention (animus) of the avenger must be considered. should his intention be centered chiefly upon the evil done to the recipient and is satisfied with that, then the act is entirely unlawful. taking delight in evil done to another is in fact a type of hatred, the opposite of that love with which we are bound to love all. however, vengeance is lawful when the avenger intends a certain good, such as redemption of the sinner, peace of all, preservation of justice, or the honour of god.31 4) justice and love 30 pius xi quadragesimo anno, 1931. cf. bernard mixing, la loi du christ, vol. 1, 1955, desclee & co., tournai (belg.) pp. 305-307. c. henry peschke, christian ethics ii. pp. 218-219. 31 s. th. 2a 2ae, 108, 1, c. 'vindicatio fit per aliquod poenale malum inflictum peccati. est ergo in vindicatione considerandus vindicantis animus. si enim eius in tentio feratur principliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum: quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet ad odium, quod caritati repugnant, qua omnes homines debemus diligere. nee aliquis excusatur si malum intend at illius qui sibi iniuste intulit malum: sicut non excusatur aliquis per hoc quod odit se odientem. non emin debet homo in alium peccare, propter hoc quod ille peccavit prius in ipsum: hoc enim est vinci a malo, quod apostolus prohibet, rom. 12,21, dicens: noli vinei a malo: sed vince in bono malum. si vero intentio vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohibitionem eius et quietem aliorun, et ad iustitiae conservationem et dei honorem, potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis.' although, without justice, neither a firm social order nor lasting peace is sustainable, justice needs to be bolstered by love even in the question of social order. as much as justice is a necessary precondition for peace, true peace is predicated on the practice of love for individuals and nations, and in that sense, peace is a consequence of love. peace, as a consequence of love, cannot be achieved with recourse to justice only. in fact, love is a higher virtue than justice is, which is a minimal requirement for our normative action. all duties of justice are those of love, and yet not all duties of love are those of justice. love transcends justice. by nature, justice presupposes love. the demands of social justice, in particular, can make full sense and be put into practice effectively only when seen from the perspective of brotherly love.32 thus, the true and lasting justice in this worldly order needs to be anchored in love, and true love needs to be righteous and just. unjust love is an oxymoron. to summarize, st. thomas's theory of justice follows the precepts of love in the holy scriptures; "jesus replied: listen, israel, the lord our god is the one lord, and you must love the lord your god with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind and with all your strength. the second is this: you must love your neighbor as yourself." [mark 12: 29 31] b) confucian conception of justice we are unable to find a "definition" of justice in the ethical systems of either confucius or mencius. living as they did during periods of constant warfare, their philosophy was devoted to diagnosing the sources of injustice of their times and to eradicate them. as such, we can arrive at their conceptions of justice indirectly by looking at what they regarded as "injustice." 1) confucius' diagnosis of the sources of injustice and its remedy confucius regarded injustice from three different perspectives: 32 cf. c. henry peschke, christian ethics, vo!. it. c. goodliffe neale, dublin, 1978. pp. 219-220. a) in the relationship between the king and his vassals. he observed that many vassals overstep their authorities. composing and reforming music and systems of rituals were regarded as the provenance of the king and those vassals who oversteped their authority and meddled in these affairs were subject to punishment. however, at a time when the feudal order of chou was crumbling, there were many vassals who disregarded such constraints on their authority. this confucius regarded as injustice. b) in terms of the relationship amongst feudal lords, the stronger constantly invaded and otherwise harassed the weaker ones. this confucius regarded as unjust. c) feudal lords supplied their war machines by exploiting the people and through conscription, forced labor and taxation, extracted resources from the people which they used to enrich themselves. this confucius also regarded as injustice. against these types of injustice confucius proposes three remedies: a) in order to restore the just order between the king and his vassals, confucius advocated the "rectification of names"(正名) and "overcoming the self and returning to propriety"(克己復禮)33 "rectification of names" is a rule of behavior that seeks to have people realize and return to their particular duties and rights appropriate to their station and status in life. confucius also emphasizes the principle of "overcoming the self and returning to propriety.": "the master said, 'to subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue.'" only when people of all classes and backgrounds (in particular feudal lords) overcome self-interested behavior and perform duties and claim rights appropriate to their status can injustice disappear and a peaceful society achieved: "there is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."34 b) for those feudal lords involved in a battle of the "survival of the fittest", confucius prescribes "human-heartedness" (仁) and "reciprocity." (恕) "human heartedness" is something that only a perfect human character can achieve, but in specific contexts it means "love" (愛). when people forsake the pursuit of self-interest and love one another, conflicts over interest would disappear and so would injustice. 33 『論語』「顏淵」1.”顏淵問仁, 子曰: 克己復禮, 為仁”. confucian analects, book xii, yen yuan chapter i. 34 『論語』「顏淵」11.”齊景公, 問政於孔子, 孔子對曰: 君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子.” cf. ibid., chapter xi. c) the third remedy that confucius puts forth is "reciprocity." this is universal rule which exhorts people to regard the interests of others as one's own thereby enabling an equal distribution of profit.35 this will lead to a stable society. in order to ensure communal harmony, confucius places greater emphasis on just distribution of goods rather than on their production.36 in confucius we find a "perfectionist conception of justice" in which he seeks to eradicate the sources of injustice through the perfection of human character. this is the principle behind his exhortations of "rectification of names," "overcoming oneself and returning to propriety," and "human heartedness." another principle that we find in confucius is the concept of "justice by agreement." in order to assure a just distribution of goods, one must arrive upon a universal principle of ethics through agreement.37 2) mencius' reinforcement of confucian prescriptions for eradicating injustice mencius reinforces confucius "perfectionist conception of justice" through his thesis that human beings are by nature good. by regarding the relationship between the rulers and the ruled as a contractual relationship he also reinforces confucian principle of "justice by agreement." mencius argues that man is born with a sense of pity, shame, yielding, and rationality. it is when he expands and nurtures these innate abilities that he can achieve complete humanity. mencius urges kings to have a sense of pity towards the people. mencius thinks that if man can overcome selfishness and desire, conflict of interest can also be resolved. as such, mencius says that if man seeks private wealth he cannot be human-hearted and if he seeks human-heartedness, then he cannot become wealthy.38 35 李承煥, 「儒家思想之社會哲學的再照明」高麗大學校, 1998, pp.51-56 參考 cf. lee seung-hwan, re-interpretation of confucian sociai phiiosophy (korea university press, 1998), pp. 5156. 36 宋榮培, ‘理想的社會觀及平和的倫理’ 「傳統及現代」7卷. cf. song young-bae, "confucian vision of the ideal society and ethics of peace," jontong gua hyundae quarterly, vo!. 7, 1999, p. 234. 37 李承煥, 同上書, pp.56-61 參考. cl lee seung-hwan, op. cit., p. 57. 38 『孟子』,「滕文公」上 3. “陽虎曰, 為富不仁矣，為仁不富矣”. mencius, tang wen kung, part i, chapter 3. mencius appeals to the sense of pity and exhorts the overcoming of selfishness in order to avoid conflict of interest over distribution of wealth, but at the same time thinks that rule based on human-heartedness is necessary in order to ensure mutually beneficial relationship between the ruler and the ruled.39 in fact, he takes a step further and tries to re-define the ruler-ruled relationship in terms of a contract.40 mencius' philosophy is based on a philosophy of "for the people" in that he thinks the foremost task of government and rule is to feed and clothe the people. human rule is a rule that ensures people's basic needs by providing them with land. this is where he proposes his famous theory of the "well-field system." (井田制)41 vi. theory of peace a) st. thomas's theory of peace st. thomas explores the question of peace in his summa theologiae (2a 2ae, 29, 1-4). 1) peace and concord (pax et concordia) in article 1, he clarifies the notion of concord and peace saying as follows: 'concord, strictly speaking, involves other people who, in spite of their different feelings, come together in mutual agreement. sometimes it also happens that in one person, the heart hankers after things opposed to each other. this occurs in two ways: either as regards the diverse appetitive powers, the sense-appetite often going contrary to the rational; or when one and the same appetitive faculty wants diverse things which cannot in fact be had together, and so a conflict among the movements of appetite must follow. but harmony or union among such movements belongs to the very notion of peace; for even though a man has something he wants, his heart is restless as long as there still remains something else for him to want but cannot have 39 『孟子』, 「離婁」上 9. mencius, ibid., chapter 9. 40 『孟子』, 「公孫丑」下 4. cf. mencius, gp. cit., part 11,chapter 4. cf. lee seung-hwan, op. cit., pp. 56-61. 41 宋榮培, 同上書, pp.236-237 參考. cf. song, young-8ae, gp. cit., pp. 236-237. at the same time. a union of this sort is not included in the notion of concord. hence concord involves union of diverse appetites, but as between different people, whereas peace, in addition to this includes union among the appetites of the same person.'42 so st. thomas goes beyond the concord of the diverse appetites of many people and considers peace which consists in the harmony or union of diverse appetites in the same person. so that peace derives fundamentally from the personality. as an external pressure applied to this human nature or a personality, we recognize the concept of violence as opposed to that of peace. st. thomas clarifies his point that peace and harmony be established within a single personality first by drawing from augustine's dictum that "pax hominum est tranquillitas ordinis" (city of god, vol. 19: c.13). of course, augustine is talking about the peace that exists between man and man. however, there is no real peace where a man comes to an agreement with another not freely and of his own will, but forced into it by fear. therefore, st. thomas took augustine's definition of peace as a "tranquility of order" to mean that such a peace begins with a restful status within a personality in which all the movements of appetites are at harmony with each other.43 st. thomas asks if all things desire peace, to which he answers in the affirmative by drawing from dionysius (de divinis nominibus, 11) and augustine's saying that "omnia pacem appetunt."44 42 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 1, c. 'pax includit concordiam et aliquid addit. unde ubicumque est pax ibi est concordia; non tamen ubicumque est concordia est pax, si nomen pacis proprie sumatur. concordia enim, proprie sumpta, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt. contingit etiam unius hominis cor tendere in diversa, et hoc dupliciter. uno quidem modo, secundum diversas potentias appetitivas: sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in contrarium rationalis appetitus, secundum illud, cam concupiscit adversus spiritum(ad gal. 5, 17). alio modo, inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit quae simul assequi non potest. unde necesse est esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus. unio autem horum motuum est quidem de ratione pacis; non enim homo habet pacatum cor quamdiu, etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen adhuc restat ei aliquid volendum quod simul habere non potest. haec autem unio non est de ratione concordiae. unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem.' 43 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 1, ad 1. 'augustinus loquitur ibi de pace quae est unius hominis ad alium. et hanc pacem dicit esse concordiam, non quamlibet, sed ordinatam; ex eo scilicet quod unus homo concordat cum alio secundum illud quod utrique convenit. si enim homo concordet cum alio non spontanea voluntate, sed quasi coactus timore alicujus mali imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax; quia non servatur ordo utriusque concordantis, sed perturbatur ab aliquo timorem inferente. et propter hoc praemittit quod pax est tranquillitas ordinis. quae quidem tranquillitas consistit in hoc quod omnes motus appetitivi in uno homine conquiescunt.' 44 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 2, sed contra. 2) peace and order (pax et ordo) "the fact that a man desires a thing means that he desires to obtain what he desires, and consequently, the removal of anything that stands in the way of his doing so. now such an obstacle, in the form of a contrary desire, can come either from oneself, or from another, and in both cases it is through peace that the obstacle is removed. hence it must needs be that everything that desires anything at all desires peace, inasmuch as it desires tranquility and without hindrance to obtain its object, which is the very meaning of peace, defined by augustine as the tranquility of order."45 st. thomas's opinion that theologically explains peace as innate in our predisposition towards the tranquility of order needs to be examined ontologically, that is, from the perspective of our human nature and indeed the nature of everything. that is to say, pursuing peace derives especially from human nature. 3) peace and love (pax et caritas) in article 3, st. thomas asks if peace is "charity's own characteristic effects", and goes on to answer in the affirmative. this way, he thinks that charity is the cause of peace. this article is the culmination of his discourse on peace. "peace implies two kinds of union: one, a bringing of all one's own desires to an ordered unity; the other, union between one's own desires and those of another person. in both cases, it is charity that brings it about. in the first case, since charity means that we love god with our whole heart by referring everything to him, all our desires become focused on one object. likewise with the other kind of union; for loving our neighbor as ourselves makes us want to do his will even as our own. this is why, says aristotle [ethic. ix, 4, 1166a7-10], that one thing that is necessary where friends are concerned is that they choose the same things, and cicero says the same [de amicitia, c, 17] when he writes that friends have the same likes and dislikes."46 45 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 2, c. 46 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, c. 'duplex unio est de ratione pacis: quarum una est secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum in unum; alia vero est secundum unionem appetitus proprii cum appetitu alterius. et utramque unionem efficit caritas. primam quidem unionem, secundum quod deus diligitur ex toto corde, ut scilicet omnia referamus in ipsum, et sic omnes appetitus nostri in unum feruntur. aliam vero, prout diligimus proximum sicut nosipsos, ex quo contingit quod homo vult implere voluntatem proximi sicut et sui ipsius. et propter hoc inter amicabilia unum ponitur identitas electionis: ut patet in ix ethic. (c. 4,1166 a 7-10); et tullius dicit, in libro de amicitia(c. 17), quod amicorum est idem velle et nolle.' this way, st. thomas articulates the essential elements of peace based on christian love, that is, love of god and one's neighbor. peace, that is to say, originates from the love of god and one's neighbor. the love of god of the human being is the most characteristic self-realization of human nature as the image of god and the love of one's neighbor based on the love of god is likewise. however, st. thomas is also aware of human imperfection here. "sin makes a man turn away from the end he has to pursue, that is, the true good, which is the final goal of his existence. this means that his will is fixed on something that appears good. therefore, a man needs the help of sanctifying grace to achieve true peace."47 to the dissent that there are irreducibly differing opinions about peace and love, st. thomas responds by arguing that, insofar as a concord on primary goods exists, trivial differences in opinion does not amount to a disagreement in this life.48 "peace belongs to the virtue of charity. peace is caused by love according as charity loves god and neighbor, and so there is no other virtue to which peace belongs as proper to it."49 4) peace and justice (pax et iustitia) in his reply to the third (ad3), st. thomas claims that justice is an indirect cause of peace. as i explored earlier, justice is rendering each what is his due; it thus removes obstacles to peace and resolves dissensions. peace is thus a consequence of justice, but only indirectly. for it results directly from love, which by its nature causes peace. "for love, as dionysius says, is a unifying force, and peace is a union of appetites and tendencies."50 47 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 1. 'a gratia gratum faciente nullus deficit misi peccatum, ex quo contingit quod hono sit aversus a fine debito, in aliquo indebito finem constituens. et secundum hoc appetites eius non inhaeret principaliter vero finali bono, sed apparenti. et propter hoc sine gratia gratum faciente non potest esse vera pax, sed solum apparens.' 48 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 2. 49 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 4, c. 'cum igitur pax causetur ex caritate secundum ipsam rationem, dilectionis dei et proximi, non est alia virtus cuius pax sit proprius actus nisi caritas.' 50 s. th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 3. 'pax est opus iustitiae indrecte, inquantum scilicet rremovet prohibens. sed est opus caritatis directe, quia secundum propriam rationem caritas pacem causat. est enim amore vis unitiva, ut dionysius dicit 4 cap. de divinis no minibus. pax autem est unio appetitivarum inclinationum.' 5) peace and wisdom (pax et sapientia) wisdom conduces to peace. st. thomas follows augustine in explaining this dictum; "augustine (de serm. dam. in monte i, 4. ml34, 1235) teaches that wisdom befits the peacemakers. in them, there is no movement of rebellion, but a compliance with reason." he also invokes augustine's definition of peace as "tranquility of order," (pax est tranqullitas ordinis, de civitate dei, xix, 13, ml 41, 640) adding that the act of ordering requires wisdom. from this follows the dictum that peace requires wisdom. this is what wisdom does, as aristotle (metaphysics. i, 2, 982a 182) says. therefore peace making is well suited to wisdom. achieving peace is a work of love and making peace is a work of wisdom that creates a proper order. this argument is based on paul's letters to romans (8:29): "romans, they are the ones he chose especially long ago to become true images of his son, who is wisdom begotten."51 therefore, wisdom, along with justice, is the indirect cause of peace. but its direct cause is love. 6) peace, joy, and happiness (pax, gaudium et beatitudo) st. thomas focuses here on the first three of twelve fruits in paul's letters to the galitians (5:22) they are, love, joy, and peace. 'the spirit is well disposed in itself when it conducts itself well amid both good and evil. in regard to the good, the first disposition of the human soul is brought about by love, which is the first affection, and the root of all the others. therefore, charity is given as the first fruit of the spirit. in it, the holy spirit is given especially, as in his proper likeness, since he himself is love. hence, it is written, god's love has been poured into our heart through the holy spirit who has been given to us. the love of charity is necessarily followed by joy. for every lover rejoices in being united with the one he loves. but charity always has god whom it loves present, as it is written, he who abides in love, abides in god, and god abides in him. hence joy follows charity. the perfection of joy, however, is peace, in two respects. first, as regards freedom from outward disturbances. for one cannot have perfect joy in the good which he loves if he is disturbed by other things. likewise, he whose heart is perfectly 51 s. th. 2a 2ae, 45, 6, c et ad 1. satisfied by one thing, is not able to be disturbed by anything else, since he values everything else as nothing; thus it is written (psalm 118: 165), "great peace have those who love your name, and there is nothing to make them stumble.” that is to say, external things do not disturb them in such wise as to keep them from rejoicing in god. secondly, the perfection of joy is peace as regards the calming of restless desire. for one cannot rejoice perfectly in something that does not satisfy him. peace, however, implies these two things: that no outward thing disturb us, and that our desires should come to rest in one object. hence, peace is listed third, after love and joy.'52 b) confucian conception of peace here i will discuss confucius and mencius' conception of peace. because they lived during a period of constant turmoil and warfare their theory of peace centers around a theory of kingship and focuses on the concepts of human-heartedness(仁) and rule of human-heartedness(仁政) from a political and social perspective. 1) confucius' concept of peace human-heartedness (仁) was the new meaning that confucius gave to the formality of ritual propriety (禮). he says that if man is not human-hearted, ritual propriety is of no use. that is, propriety without love (仁) is meaningless. humanheartedness means to love man, to suppress oneself and to recover social norm. overcoming oneself and achievement of human-heartedness can be had "when the love of superiority, boasting, resentments, and covetousness are repressed."53 as stated earlier, confucius' emphasizes the "rectification of names" which is the principle that "there is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is 52 s. th. la 2ae, 70, 3, c. 53 「論語」, 憲問, ‘克己怨欲不行焉, 可以為仁矣’. cf. confucian analects, book xiv, ch.ii. minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."54 confucius thought that it is when name and reality do not match that we have chaos and even war.55 confucius wished to erect a new order based on ritual propriety. that is because ritual propriety is founded upon love. indeed, the social consequence of ritual propriety is value peace.56 confucius' philosophy of human-heartedness is succeeded by the mencian theory of the rule of human-heartedness (仁政) and the rule of the way (王道政治). during the sung and ming dynasties, such philosophy gave rise to a philosophy of "all things are one" (萬物一體論) which promoted not only love between men but also between man and all other creatures, leading to a very active conception of peace.57 2) mencius' concept of peace mencius inherited confucius' thoughts but was much more clear in the details and practical recommendations. mencius is opposed to coercion and war: "therefore, those who are skillful to fight should suffer the highest punishment. next to them should be punished those who unite some princes in leagues against others; and next to them, those who take in grassy commons, imposing the cultivation of the ground on the people."58 his clearest statement of a philosophy of peace can be seen in the following passage: "mencius said, 'there are men who say-"i am skillful at marshalling troops, i am skillful at conducting a battle!"-they are great criminals."59 what mencius calls “rule of the way” (王道政治), way of the ancient kings, way of kings yao and shun, rule of king wen, is connected to what he calls the 54 「論語」, 顏淵, ‘君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子. ’ cf. confucian analects, book xii, yen yuan, chapter xi. 55 鄭仁在, ‘中國之平和思想’ ,「平和哲學」, 西江大學校, 哲學研究所, 1995. p. 248. cl chung in-jae, "choongguk ui pyongwha sasang," (chinese philosophy of peace) pyunghwa jui cholhak, sogang university, institute of philosophy, 1995, p. 248. 56 「論語」, ‘禮之用, 和為貴’. cf. analects, book i. chapter xii 57 鄭仁在, 上書, pp. 245-251, 參考. cf. chung, in-jae, gp. cit., pp. 241-250. 58 「孟子」, 離婁上, ‘故善戰者服上刑, 連諸侯者次之，辟草萊, 任土地者次之’. mencius, book iv, part i, chapter xiv. 59 「孟子」, 盡心下, “有人曰: ‘我善為陳, 我善為戰, 大罪也! ’ ” mencius, book vii, part n. chapter iv. “rule of the human-heartedness” (仁政). rule of human-heartedness is to apply the moral imperative of human-heartedness to the spheres of politics and society. what mencius means by rule of human heartedness is based on the idea that man cannot suffer to see others in pain, a philosophical foundation for his theory that man is innately good (性善论). as he was sure of this, it was clear to him that without the rule of human-heartedness, peace in all-under-the-heaven cannot be had.60 mencius makes a distinction between the “rule of power” and the “rule of way.” the rule of way is what everyone wishes for and it is the only way to ensure peace. rule of human heartedness can bring peace to all-under-heaven because it can capture the hearts of the people. he insists that only the rule of way and rule of human-heartedness can bring peace and that "opportunities of time vouchsafed by heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the earth are not equal to the union (human concord) arising from the accord of men."61 harmony among men means a state of peace.62 vii. conclusion a) just use of force st. thomas rejects violence because it goes against human nature and dignity which is based on the holy trinity and also against christ's commandment of love. however, he does admit just force. the standard for just force has to do with self-defense and the preservation of a community's welfare and peace. in such cases, individuals as well as sovereigns of a state or public office can exact private revenge and war. however, it cannot exceed the bounds of vindicative justice. particularly in the case of war, it is only when there is sovereign order, just cause, and just intentions that one can speak of a just war. it is also allowed in the case of resistance against unjust rulers. this is when the sovereign 60 「孟子」, 離婁上, ‘堯舜之道, 不以仁政, 不能平治天下’. "the principles of yao and shun, without a benevolent government, could not secure the tranquil order of the kingdom." mencius, book iv, part i, chapter i. 61 「孟子」,公孫丑上, ‘天時不如地利，地利不如人和’. mencius, book ii, part ii, chapter 1. 62 鄭仁在, 上書, pp. 250-253 , 參考. cf. chung in-jae, op. cit., pp. 250-253. forsakes his duty to protect public interest and peace.63 as such, just force is allowed when it is the only means to preserve and promote human life and property. b) comparison of st. thomas' and confucian conceptions of justice as we enter the third millennium, and as east and west seeks to be one, it is important and meaningful that we compare and contrast st. thomas' and confucian conceptions of justice. this is because otherwise, there is the danger of conflict between east and west. in the middle east israel and muslim states are engaged in a vicious cycle of revenge and bloody violence. in many countries that overcame colonial rule it was only through lengthy periods of violence that such feats were accomplished as we have witnessed in the cases of algeria, vietnam, south africa, china, etc. st. thomas first defines justice and then regards its violation as injustice. on the other hand, confucians first describes the situation of injustice as it obtained during the period of constant warfare in which they lived. this was a highly pragmatic and realistic way of approaching the issue. st. thomas employs a finely honed logical argument to define and distinguish commutative justice, distributive justice, and vindicative justice. the modern conception of social justice was developed since the promulgation of 'quadragesimo anno' (1931) by pope pius xi based on st. thomas' conception of justice which is based on human-ness and human community. in contrast, confucians try to realize justice by eradicating the sources of social injustice. here, a much more synthetic conception of justice is employed to explain commutative justice, distributive justice and what we today call social justice. however, since it presupposes the ancient feudal order of china, it focuses on the duties of the rulers, the discussions are concentrated more on distributive justice. such a conception is mostly concerned with political and social aspects of justice. however, both conceptions are similar in that they regard the issues of justice ultimately in terms of a man's state of mind. confucians arrive at justice through human-heartedness and the rule of human-heartedness while st. thomas emphasizes 63 cf. s. th. 2a 2ae, 44, 64, 66: cl chae yi-byung, jongdanghan poknyok un hoyongdoenunga? (is a just use of force permissible?) tulsumnalsum, 2002. 2. 28-29. love of god and one’s neighbors as fundamental to justice. in practical contexts, confucians interpret human-heartedness as love of man. in order to realize humanheartedness confucians emphasize "rectification of name," "overcoming the self and returning to ritual propriety," "sense of pity," "sense of shame," "sense of compromise," and "sense of discernment." this is similar to the emphasis that christianity places on self-discipline and love in the decalogue and christ's teachings. as for the principle of rectification of names, christianity has its own distinct and more fundamental interpretation that the body has many parts and that each part has a different function to fulfill, thus leading to a healthy body (i cor. 12, 12-13). of course, this speaks to the mystical body of christ, but it can also be applied to social life. with regard to self-discipline, christianity also refers to something more fundamental as it exhorts one to even give up one's life to realize love: 'anyone who does not take his cross and follow my footsteps is not worthy of me. anyone who finds his life will lose it; anyone who loses for my sake will find it." (mt. 10, 38-39.); "i tell you, most solemnly, unless a wheat grain falls on the ground and dies it remains only a single grain; but if it dies, it yields a rich harvest. if anyone serves me, my father will honor him." (john 12, 24-26); "love is always patient and kind; it is never jealous; love is never boastful or conceited; it is never rude or selfish; it does not take offence, and is not resentful. love takes no pleasure in other people's sins but delights in the truth; it is always ready by excuse, to trust, to hope and to endure whatever comes." (i cor. 13, 1-7); "a man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for his friends." (john 15, 13); "if your enemy is hungry, you should give him food, and if he is thirsty, let him drink. thus you heap red-hot coals on his head. resist evil and conquer it with good." (rom. 12, 20-21.) in confucianism we encounter a more naturalistic, humanistic and immanent conceptions such as "rectification of names," "overcoming the self and returning to ritual propriety," "sense of pity," "four constants," etc. the teachings of christ, on the other hand, because they are based on the relationship between god and man, explain human life from the view of transcendence and immanence. also in the teachings of christ, the communion through prayer and grace is emphasized. the bible says "set your hearts on his kingdom first, and on his righteousness (iustitiae), and all these other things will be given as well." (mt 6, 33) and "for i tell you if your virtue (iustitia) goes no deeper than that of scribes and pharisees, you will never get into the kingdom of heaven." (mt 5, 20) c) comparison of st. thomas' and confucian conceptions of peace both st. thomas and confucians think that peace is impossible without justice. st. thomas is more explicit on this point by saying that justice is not a direct, but indirect cause of peace. confucians in general, and mencius in particular, define war as evil and thereby reject it completely, while striving for an ideal state of peace without war, government of human-heartedness (仁政), rule of way (王道政治). st. thomas, on the other hand, admits the use of just force in cases of personal and state-based selfdefense. however, he makes it clear that peace and order in this life is an incomplete peace in comparison to the real peace without war, peace without conflict and instability, and eternal peace achievable in the next world. the incomplete peace in this life is on the way towards the eternal peace. such peace can be achieved first and foremost in one's heart, achievable through ordering the inner self. this is in turn achieved through loving god and one's neighbors. love is the direct cause of peace. here we witness the analytical as well as comprehensive nature of st. thomas' conceptions of justice and peace. while confucian conceptions are limited within the bounds of this world, that is, they are of an immanent character. st. thomas' are of this world while fundamentally transcendental as they are based on revealed truth. however, in the confucian conception of man as juxtaposed with 'heaven' we also find an abundant potentiality for transcendence, but as such the potentiality is explained by merely anthropomorphic description. st. augustine who said "peace is tranquility of order", posits an interesting dialectic of peace: "there can be peace without any kind of war, but no war that does not suppose some kind of peace."64 human nature thus rejects violence and desires peace. 64 pax quaedam sine ullo bello, bellum vero esse sine aliqua pace non potest. (de civitate dei 19, 3) d) conception of peace for the future to solve the problem of violence and peace of our times we must start from "giving back that which belongs to each." (unicuique sum retribuere). in our times we have the likes of gandhi, schweitzer as champions of peace and, of course, mother theresa, the embodiment of love. in addition, we have pope leo xiii (rerum novarum), pius xi (quadragesimo anno), john xxiii (pacem in terris), paul vi (gaudium et spes) who have contributed to the building of peace on the foundations of god's words, and on st. thomas' theories of human nature while condemning the unjust violence. also, numerous catholic philosophers, theologians and intellectuals of diverse fields have worked as theorists and activists of peace in order to articulate conceptions of justice and peace for our times. now, we need also to look towards the works of confucian scholars who have also been working to produce their own distinct conceptions of justice and peace for our times. in fact, in recent years, numerous korean scholars have been putting forth powerful new interpretations of confucian justice and peace.65 today, in the face of astonishing advances in science and technology, mankind is increasingly forced to humanize them. man's conscience and living environment, especially social institutions have been fundamentally altered with the advances in science and technology. the invention of fire, casting of iron and steel, helio-centric worldview, development in navigation and aviation, invention of steam power and electricity, of rockets and nuclear power, etc. have brought enormous changes and benefits to mankind and caused tremendous problems, too. intellectuals in the fields of religion, sciences, and culture have worked hard to articulate new values and ethical vision for each new advances in science and technology which brought new dimensions of human life. now, science and technology are opening up new frontiers with the completion of genome mapping, human cloning, the digitalization, the cyber-world and the internet, etc. the enormous capacity and genius of mankind is once again in full display. science is enabling mankind to overcome space and time in a way never imagined possible in the past, thereby prolonging life and providing a fast-paced and comfortable life, etc. at the same time 65 hahm chai-bong, lee seung-hwan, kim seung-hye, park young-il, chung in-jae are some of the leading scholars in this field who have come back to korea after receiving advanced degrees from leading chinese, north american, and european universities. it is shaking our worldview and values from their foundations, thereby seriously injuring the image of god within man. such advances in science and technology can also be put in the service of violence, leading to unimaginable tragic consequences. in the first few centuries of the new millennium mankind must eradicate violence. it therefore needs to rearticulate a vision of justice and peace for the new era. what is needed then, is a more profound investigation, further appreciation and strengthening of a conception of justice based on the principle, "to each his own" for human being as the image of god and nature as the vestigium of god. this is especially true for asia. asia is not only the largest in terms of land mass as well as population, but also is the home to major world religions, philosophies, and civilizations. people in asia still lead deeply religious lives. they still feel victimized by colonial powers for centuries and that their spirit was repressed, economies exploited, and cultural treasures looted. such feelings will continue to have major consequences for the future. here, mankind must heed the old saying that "things call for their masters" (res c1amat ad dominum). the perpetrators must compensate the victims. the best way is through conversation. the necessity for holding conversations with a mutual respect, wisdom and courage, and mutual compromise and love where the east and west can truly come to a mutual understanding and co-operation on these issues has never been greater. otherwise, we could be facing much more backlash and reaction. and also, the underdeveloped countries must recognize that they have benefited from the advanced science, technologies, bio-medicines, economic development, social institutions, social welfare, democracy, human rights, etc. from the developed countries. so they must do their best to improve their quality of life. moreover they also have to contribute to the progress of mankind by the tireless toil, especially for the peace of mankind. above all, the developed countries must help the underdeveloped countries to extricate themselves from poverty, starvation and disease that brings thousands of deaths. they also must help without any second thought to educate the people of underdeveloped countries to allow them to live a human life in the image of god. and also, it is quite desired that the developed countries invest their capital in the underdeveloped countries and let them participate fully in advanced technologies. human conscience of our time is experiencing such a turn whether we know or not, that is, history of human life and culture proceeds according to the oeconomia of the creator. i believe that here lies the great vocation of the catholic church and the catholic philosophers. it is therefore heartening to see that in recent years, the vatican and others of the catholic world are hosting numerous cultural and scholarly conferences. for these things to come to fruition and produce concrete results it is imperative that we realize the universal values of love of mankind and nature while conducting further inquiries into life philosophies of both the east and the west that can assure peaceful coexistence, co-life and co-prosperity. this is where various religions can make a major contribution.66 66 tjeng, eui-chai. the philosophy of life in the oriental philosophers and in the theory of thomas aquinas. presentation in 'philosophical perspectives for the third millennium' 2000, fu jen university, taiwan. pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 69 fischer’s semicompatibilism and its consequences pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin assumption university abstract in this paper i argue that the symmetric approach to moral responsibility, proposed by john martin fischer, should be focused merely on the consequence-particular. fischer employs the symmetric approach with the intention to solve the asymmetric problems on moral responsibility. the problem arises from frankfurt’s case, which rejects the principle of alternate possibilities (pap), and relies on the action, rather than omission resulting in asymmetric problems. fischer solves the problem by using his guidance control and returns the symmetry the idea of moral responsibility. i am convinced by his idea of guidance control that moral responsibility for an omission is the same as moral responsibility for an action. notwithstanding, i found that fischer appears to broaden his conclusion from the consequence-particular to the consequence-universal. this issue becomes more explicit when he argues against the case of “direct argument”. but i contend that this argument is unnecessary. the attempt to stretch out responsibility to the consequence-universal is only designed to address a certain kind of problem in his moral responsibility’s theory. this can also be seen when fischer tries to solve other problem by using his overdetermination example. prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 1, january june 2018, 69-86 © 2000 by assumption university press 70 prajñā vihāra i believe that his theory of moral responsibility and guidance control should limit itself merely to the consequenceparticular. introduction in order to develop my argument, i will clarify some relevant terms. i will start by briefly explaining the principle of alternate possibilities, which is repudiated by harry g. frankfurt. i will then go on to explain fischer’s theory of moral responsibility and his concept of “guidance control.” after that i will demonstrate that even if the principle of alternate possibilities is rejected, there are by all accounts some complications with the cases of non-action or omission. although moral responsibility for an action does not require the ability to do otherwise, moral responsibility by omission does seems to require the ability to do the action in question. at this point, i will show how fischer employs his concept of guidance control to solve the problem and restore symmetry to frankfurt’s rejection of alternate possibilities. i will then raise my concerns on his use of the consequence universal, and i will argue that fischer’s approach to moral responsibility should limit itself to the consequence-particular. i will conclude by giving suggestions on how to more properly use fischer’s theory of moral responsibility. section 1: frankfurt’s type example often it seems that when we are making a decision, we are standing on a forking path. a path that indicates our freedom to choose whether to do right or wrong action. this leads us to judge somebody to be praiseworthy or blameworthy for his actions because we believe that he could have chosen differently or could have done otherwise. harry g. frankfurt named the principle as “the principle of alternate possibilities” or pap for short. pap states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.1 however, frankfurt shows problems with this principle. he contends that a person is morally responsible for what he has done pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 71 even though he could not have done otherwise. frankfurt provides a novel example to illustrate his view. this has become known as a “frankfurttype example” or “frankfurt-case”. for the purpose of this paper, i have created my own version of frankfurt-type example: jack and john hates their friend, lina, who has borrowed money from them but never returned it. jack therefore decides to kill lina at a specific time. john agrees with his friend’s decision. however, he believes that jack might not go through with his plan for he loved lina in the past. so john secretly implants a device into jack’s brain to ensure that if jack had shown any sign of hesitation, the device would intervene in his thinking process and make jack kill lina anyway. but as it turns out, jack kills lina without showing any sign of hesitation. thus, the implanted device did not do anything. following this case, we can see that moral responsibility is not dependent solely on the capacity to do something else. jack is ethically in charge of his act of killing lina, despite the fact that he could not have ceased from his plan. after frankfurt published his paper in 1969, numerous literature emerged in reaction to this. criticisms of his idea came in two forms. there are those who rejected it on the basis of preserving pap or maintaining that the ability to act otherwise as a requirement for moral responsibility. they employ either the flicker of freedom strategy or the omission strategy. another is a group of philosophers who insisted that if causal determinism is true, then it rules out moral responsibility directly. the prominent principle of this group is the principle of transfer non-responsibility. i will now clarify both approaches. section 2: fischer’s theory of moral responsibility the most prominent proponent of the frankfurt example is john martin fischer.2 he addresses frankfurt’s case in his approach called 72 prajñā vihāra semicompatibilism. semicompatibilism claims that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism, despite the fact causal determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. fischer distinguishes two sorts of control: regulative control and guidance control. regulative control is freedom in the sense of the agent having the ability to do otherwise. guidance control is freedom in a sense of the agent having control over his own behavior. fischer claims that guidance control is a freedom relevant to moral responsibility, not regulative control.2 one might ask on what condition we could establish our moral responsibility if we could not have done otherwise? fischer answers this question by insisting that our action should be a result of guidance control issuing directly from the moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism and this mechanism needs to belong to the agent himself.4 there are two approaches for moral responsibility: the hierarchical and non-hierarchical approach. the well-known hierarchical approach is developed by frankfurt. this approach sees desire functioning at many levels. desire at one level can conflict with desires in another level. for instance, there are two orders of desire: the first order and the second order. one might have a first-order desire to eat candy. the same person also has the second-order desire not to eat the candy. moral responsibility comes from the ability of the agent to identify himself with the secondorder desire through the use of reason.5 while the hierarchical approach requires moral responsibility to emerge from these various levels of desire, the non-hierarchical approach does not. it requires association between the agent and the value (or reason). the non-hierarchical model can be divided into two sorts: agentbased and mechanism-based theory. the agent-based theory requires the agent to be responsive to reasons, where the mechanism-based theory requires the mechanism on which the agent acts to be responsive to reasons. fischer’s approach to moral responsibility can be classified as mechanism-based reasons-responsiveness. in his version, he distinguishes “strong” and “weak” versions of the theory. fischer describes that the strong reasons-responsiveness would be obtained when: pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 73 a certain kind k of mechanism actually issues in an action and if there were sufficient reason to do otherwise and k were to operate, the agent would recognize the sufficient reason and thus choose to do otherwise and do otherwise.6 in other words, the agent must acknowledge a sufficient reason to do, or choose, in accordance with reason, and act in accordance with the choice to complete the condition of strong reason-responsiveness. this approach has problems when dealing with the scenarios involving weakness of will. for instance, i acknowledged that eating candy is bad for my health. nevertheless, i decide to eat the candy anyway. does it mean that i am not responsible for my action of eating candy? obviously not. thus, the condition for strong-responsiveness may be too strong to satisfy all of three conditions. failing one of the three conditions does not mean that i am not responsible for my action. consequently, there is a looser version of reasons responsiveness which is described by fischer: weak reasons-responsiveness, which requires only that there be some possible scenario in which the actual mechanism operates, the agent has reason to do otherwise, and he does otherwise.7 from this definition, any kind of reason to do otherwise, and the agent doing otherwise, easily fulfills the condition of this weak reason-responsiveness. note that the reason to do otherwise need not be a sufficient reason. it could be any kind of reason. thus, we face the problem of the theory being either too strong or too weak for the reasonsresponsive mechanism. fischer suggests a third approach for the mechanism called “moderate reasons-responsiveness” to solve the problem of the model being too strong or too weak. here i present a clear definition of moderate reasons-responsiveness given by todd r. long.8 74 prajñā vihāra an agent’s responsibility-relevant mechanism k is moderately reasons-responsive if (1) k is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral; this requires (a) that holding fixed the operation of a k-type mechanism, the agent would recognize reasons in such a way as to give rise to an understandable pattern from the viewpoint of a third party who understands the agent’s values and beliefs; and (b) that some of the reasons mentioned in (1.a) are moral reasons; and (2) k is at least weakly reactive to reasons; this requires that the agent would react to at least one sufficient reason to do otherwise (in some possible scenario), although it does not follow that the agent could have responded differently to the actual reasons; and (3) k is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means “taking responsibility” for k; this requires that the agent (a) sees herself as the source of her behavior (which follows from the operation of k); and (b) believes that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes as a result of how she exercises her agency in certain contexts; and (c) views herself as an agent with respect to (3.a) (3.b) based on her evidence for these beliefs. there are two crucial components for the moderate reasonsresponsiveness mechanism, which are: reasons-recognition and reasons-reactivity. reasons-recognition means the ability to recognize the reasons that exist. reasons-reactivity means choose in accordance with reasons that are recognized as good and sufficient. fischer contends that merely have the guidance control which is connected to the moderate-reason responsiveness is insufficient to be considered as a control for moral responsibility. he suggests that the guidance control must contain two elements: reasons-sensitivity of pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 75 the appropriate sort and the mechanism-ownership. the condition of mechanism-ownership could address such problems as brainwashing. by the mechanism-ownership, fischer also argues by using the subjective approach. he insists that the agent, in some senses, needs to see himself in a certain way.9 fischer’s theory of moral responsibility usually is challenged in two ways: by indirect and direct argument. the indirect argument argues against semicompatibilism based on the desire to preserve the alternative possibilities. the direct argument contends that moral responsibility is ruled out straightforwardly by causal determinism regardless of the alternative possibilities. i will briefly clarify eight possible cases of the indirect argument and exhibit how fischer handles those cases. therefore, i will introduce two notions: the consequence-particular and the consequence-universal, which are my main concern of this paper. fischer and ravizza provide a clear explanation of this distinction: consequences can be construed as either particulars or universals. this distinction is made in terms of criteria of individuation: the causal antecedents of a consequenceparticular are essential to it, while there can be various different causal routes to the same consequence-universal. (fischer and ravizza 1998: 244) the following table represents my analysis of both action and omission case for the frankfurt-type example. i will call this table for a balanced analysis. there is no middle ground in which agent is not responsible for anything by this analysis. 76 prajñā vihāra no. case to do counterfactual consequence -particular consequence -universal morally responsible 1 action good good good good praiseworthy 2 action good good good bad praiseworthy 3 action bad bad bad good blameworthy 4 action bad bad bad bad blameworthy 5 omission good (omit) good (omit) good good blameworthy 6 omission good (omit) good (omit) good bad blameworthy 7 omission bad (omit) bad (omit) bad good praiseworthy 8 omission bad (omit) bad (omit) bad bad praiseworthy case 1 and 2 are counterparts to case 7 and 8, as well as case 3 and 4 are counterparts to case 5 and 6 respectively. the “to do” and “counter-factual” column will always be the same to guarantee that the agent has no alternative possibilities. the consequence-particular can be interpreted as an action directly issuing from the moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism. thus, by this analysis, there is no case in which the agent does not deliberate his or her ability to do or to omit the action. the only one column which is possible to be different from “to do”, “counterfactual” and the “consequence-particular” is the “consequence-universal”. this is because the consequence-universal might be obtained from a totally different causal chain as in the overdetermination case.10 to answer the question of what we actually hold a person to be morally responsible for, let me explain case by case from case 1 to 8. i will use the “hero” case, which fischer mentions in his work “my way” as an example for case 1 and 2: in “hero,” matthew is walking along a beach, looking at the water. he sees a child struggling in the water, and he quickly deliberates about the matter, jumps into the water, and rescues the child. we can imagine that matthew does not give any thought to not trying to rescue the child, pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 77 but that if he had considered not trying to save the child, he would have been overwhelmed by literally irresistible guilt feelings that would have caused him to jump into the water and save the child anyway.10 matthew is praiseworthy for his action, even though he could not have done otherwise. the “irresistible guilt” acts as a counter factual intervener in the alternative scenario. the consequence-particular is that he saves the child. the consequence-universal is the child is saved by him. this is case 1 of my analysis. however, if the child is not saved by matthew, but is killed by a shark or simply drowns regardless of matthew’s action, it will turn case 1 into case 2. also, the fact that the child is dead from the other causal chain should not turn the case of matthew’s praiseworthy action into blameworthy or even neutral one. he is praiseworthy because of his action which is issuing directly from his moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism. case 3 and 4 can be considered by using the case of normal frankfurt’s example. using the case at the beginning of this paper “jack kills lina without showing any sign of hesitation”, i assume that jack is morally responsible for his action, even though he could not have done otherwise. in addition, if he had tried to kill lina, but failed because someone saved her, he would still be responsible for trying to kill lina. for case 5 and 6 suppose that: john is walking along a beach, and he sees a child struggling in the water. john believes that he could save the child with very little effort, but he is disinclined to expend any energy to help anyone else. he decides not to try to save the child, and he continues to walk along the beach. is john morally responsible for failing to save the child? unknown to john, the child was about to drown when john glimpsed him, and the child drowned one second after john decided not to jump into the water.12 78 prajñā vihāra in this case, the fact that the child is about to drown is not a counterfactual as we would see in frankfurt’s example, which would be considered counterfactual within the agent deliberation process. the consequence-universal that the child is about to drown is the fact from the different causal determinism. however, frankfurt himself recognized such a problem and suggested a modified case using guilt to direct the agent to doing something else rather than saving the child. nevertheless, i would insist that john is morally responsible for the fact that he did not try to save the child. he omitted saving the child. even though the child is not dead and saved by someone else, he is still responsible for not trying to do what he believes he could do. for the case of omission to do a dreadful thing 7 and 8 using fischer’s example: imagine that you are a small-time thug strolling along a dimly lit street in a deserted part of town. suddenly, you spy a shiny, new mercedes with a flat tire stranded by the side of the road. the driver of the car is a well-dressed, elderly gentleman with a bulging billfold in his breast pocket. you are tempted to hurry over to the car, assault the old man, and steal his money. fortunately, you decide against this, and you continue along your way. are you morally responsible for failing to rob the driver? well, unknown to you (and the driver of the car), the mafia has put drugs into the trunk of the car. five mafioso thugs are watching the car from five other cars in the neighborhood. they have strict instructions: if anyone threatens the driver of the car, they are to shoot that person with their uzis. in these circumstances, we can safely imagine that, if you had attempted to rob the driver, you would have been killed.13 fischer explains this case of omission to do a terrible thing as the agent is responsible for that fact that he did not try to rob someone (this is considered praiseworthy action), even though according to the pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 79 consequence-universal, if he did, he would have been killed. i believe that we could entitle the agent to be morally responsible for action or omission solely on his or her action issuing directly from the mechanism. but the problem emerges when fischer construes the case of omission to be a simple omission and complex omission. the simple omission is the omission of the body’s movement. the complex omission involves both the act of omitting the body’s movement and the consequences. to find whether the agent is morally responsible, he gives the condition that: it is natural to say that an agent has guidance control of his failure to do a (where this is a complex omission) just in case: (1) his movement of his body in a certain way is moderately responsive to reason, and (2) the relevant event in the external world is suitably sensitive to his failure to move his body in a different way.14 i do not agree with him on the second condition. the relevant event in the external world should not be counted as the condition to entitle the agent to be morally responsible. consider the following: we contend that, when an agent’s omission is a complex omission, he should be construed as bringing about a relatively narrowly specified negative consequenceuniversal. so, for example, imagine that, in “good fortune,” john walks along a beach, sees a child struggling in the water, and simply decides to continue walking (and not to bother to try to save the child). here, it seems (at first blush) that john brings about the negative consequence-universal, that the child is not saved (from drowning). but suppose that the child is saved from drowning by floating to a nearby island within a few seconds of john’s decision. john has failed to save the child, but he has not brought about the negative consequence-universal, that the child is not saved 80 prajñā vihāra (from drowning). what he does bring about, however, is that the child is not saved by him. and, in general, we contend that it is fruitful to construe complex omissions on this model, that is, as the agent’s bringing about relatively finely specific negative consequence-universals.15 this example is exactly the same as case 5, in which the agent omits doing something good but the consequence-universal yields as a good result. however, if the consequence-universal turns out to be a bad one, as the child drowning in case 6. this situation can be construed as the relevant event in the external world is suitably sensitive to agent’s body movement, thus he is responsible for the consequence-universal. but, why should consequences-universals that are not in the power of the agent be considered as the condition for someone to be responsible? the problem might not be clear at this point, but it will reveal itself on the direct argument, which i will now turn to explain. section 3: the direct argument as previously stated, the argument against frankfurt and fischer that moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism notably comes in two forms: alternative possibilities and direct argument. now, i will turn to the principle of transfer non-responsibility (or principle of transfer nr). it can be roughly stated “if no one is responsible for p, and no one is responsible for the fact that p leads to q, then it follows that no one is responsible for q.”16 thus, if causal determinism is true, then no one is even partly morally responsible for anything. these propositions rule out moral responsibility directly without paying attention to the alternative possibilities. such a proposition seems to go well with the case of a natural disaster such as a tsunami. in that case, no one is partially responsible, the tsunami simply occurs. the reason is that there is no human agency in the case. fischer response to such an argument seems to extend his conclusion more than warranted. fischer responds to the argument by using an example that: pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 81 betty plants...explosives in the crevices of [a] glacier and [intuitively speaking, freely] detonates the charge at t1 causing an avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress at t3 [a result intended by betty]. unbeknownst to betty... however, the glacier is gradually melting, shifting, and eroding. had betty not placed the dynamite in the crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken free at t2, starting a natural avalanche that would have crushed the enemy camp at t3. this example could be simply summarized that betty did nothing that the glacier would not have one naturally. betty entered into the causal chain sharing the consequence-universal with the natural disaster. this is the case of overdetermination. betty seems to be morally responsible for her action because her action of planting the device issues from her moderate reasons-responsiveness. mckenna argues that fischer still hangs criticism of the principle of transfer nr. this is because fischer uses his ‘two-path’ case to solve the problem itself, not the ‘one-path’. the principle of transfer nr is designed to rule out the moral responsibility within the chain directly and is ‘one-path’. this is the reason why it is called a direct argument. if fischer cannot employ one-path example rather than the overdetermination one, it might imply that moral responsibility could be ruled out directly by causal determinism. nevertheless, mckenna granted that the transfer nr cannot rule out causal overdetermination.17 this gives chance for fischer to argue that, “to point out that transfer nr poses problems for developing a plausible compatibilist theory of moral responsibility is one thing; to suppose that it generates a successful argument for incompatibilist is quite another”. according to fischer, even if the principle nr could reject the compatibility between causal determinism and moral responsibility, it does not successfully establish the incompatibility between causal determinism and moral responsibility. it merely poses another problem in the case of overdetermination. 82 prajñā vihāra be that as it may, i do not agree with fischer on this point. i do not think it is a clever idea to extend the scope of moral responsibility to the consequence-universal, but should instead, limit itself to the consequence-particular. at first, when fischer argued the case of omission he stated on the second condition of the complex omission that “the relevant event in the external world is suitably sensitive to his failure to move his body in a different way”. the relevant event, in my opinion, is the consequenceuniversal. thus, it is appropriate to understand that consequence-universal is within the scope of moral responsibility’s condition for fischer. this condition has been confirmed again when fischer argued against mckenna by using his overdetermination approach. i argue that moral responsibility should solely focus on the consequence-particular issuing from the moderate-reason responsiveness mechanism. there are two main reasons that motivate me. firstly, it is possible to say that the consequence-universal is not always a direct consequence of the action issuing from the moderate reasonresponsiveness mechanism. as in the example of glacier, the consequenceuniversal obtained from the natural disaster along with betty’s action. the consequence-universal is not stable, because it can issue from natural phenomena and another people’s intentions. while the consequenceparticular can be either good or bad and the consequence-universal can also be either good or bad, the consequence-particular always follows directly from the moderate-reasons responsiveness. the consequenceuniversal, on the other hands, could be responsive to the consequenceparticular but it can also follow from something else such as a natural disaster. secondly, when compatibilist (or semi-compatibilist) agrees that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism without regard to the causal chain “prior” to the agent’s deliberation process, why should we consider the chain that comes “after” the agent’s action? the fact that the agent “chooses” and “acts” is already sufficient to consider him to be morally responsible for his action. pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 83 nonetheless, it is possible that the agent does not deliberate about the issue and trigger his action, but is responsible for the consequenceuniversal. but this responsibility is not morally responsible in the sense of “intentionally”. thus, it is appropriate to say that the agent is “partially” responsible for the consequence-universal in the sense that he does not mean it to happen. for instance, i plan to kill a person by shooting at him. unbeknown to my knowledge, another person is walking past the bullet’s trajectory and is shot. conclusion i believe that moral responsibility should concern merely these two main aspects: intention and action which is issuing directly from the intention. in fischer terms, it means the action responsive to the moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism. the motivation to limit merely on intention and action since it is not always the case that consequenceuniversal would be a direct result from action issuing directly from the mechanism as it appears on the case of overdetermination. by grasping this standpoint, i am acknowledging that the thesis of causal determinism and the consequence argument are both true. be that as it may, these acknowledgments do not mean that moral responsibility could not happen within the causal chain. moderate reason-responsiveness mechanism and guidance control are adequate to be considered conditions for moral responsibility within the chain of causal determinism. they help us to locate the starting point to inquire from where does the action originate. the action itself, is within the causal chain of determinism. nevertheless, we should confine the subject of who ought to be in charge of the outcome merely to the action resulting from the mechanism. if we ignore the chain prior to the agent, for what reason should we accept the following chain from the agent, especially the chain that allows something else to happen rather than the agent’s original intention? where will it be halted? truly, i trust that we should be in charge of our original intention and the following action we resolved to do, on the grounds that we believe it is within our power to do. in other words, the 84 prajñā vihāra action that receptive to our intention. unfortunately, consequence of an action is not always corresponding to its original intention and action. it possibly includes numerous factors, such as the natural law and other people endeavors. it is conceivable to claim partially moral responsible for the consequence-universal. in any case, it is not completely accredited solely to the agent’s action. i trust that fischer should be a little more concerned with the epistemic status of the agent. in all of frankfurt’s example, the there is always something ‘unbeknown’ to the agent. this ‘unknown’ condition is not taking into account the agent’s deliberation process. in this way, the agent believes that it is within his power to perform something different. he neglects to perform what he considers to be the best among his alternatives or at least he believes that it is his best option at the time. therefore, i believe that an agent is morally responsible for the action that he believes he has potential to bring about, the action that is required for the desired result. we should restrict our moral judgments merely to these conditions and there is no need to extend the conditions to something, which might not belong to the agent. pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 85 endnotes 1 harry g. frankfurt, “alternate possibilities and moral responsibility,” journal of philosophy 66, no.3 (1969), p.829. 2 the beginning of fischer’s theory of moral responsibility is the effort of fischer and his co-author mark ravizza. however, fischer is known widely and later develop the theory far beyond this early effort. 3 john martin fischer, my way: essays on moral responsibility (new york: oxford university press, 2006), p.13. 4 ibid., p.17-18. 5 ibid.,, p.25. 6 ibid., p.30 7 fischer and ravizza, perspectives on moral responsibility, p.31. 8 todd r. long, “moderate reasons-responsiveness, moral responsibility, and manipulation,” freedom and determinism, 2004, p.3. 9 john martin fischer, deep control: essays on free will and value (oxford; new york: oxford university press, 2012), p.11. 10 consequence-particular and consequence universal appear on peter van inwagen, ability and responsibility, philosophical review 87 (1978): 201–24. his argument against fischer is not in the scope of this paper. however, i have simplified the meaning of both terms in context to ensure reader’s understanding. 11 john martin fischer, my way: essays on moral responsibility (new york: oxford university press, 2006), p.84. 12 ibid., p.85 13 john martin fischer, my way: essays on moral responsibility (new york: oxford university press, 2006), p.86. 14 ibid., p.91 15 ibid., p.91. 16 mark ravizza, “semi-compatibilism and the transfer of nonresponsibility,” philosophical studies 75, no.1–2 (1994): 61–93. 17 mckenna, m. (2001). source incompatibilism, ultimacy, and the transfer of non-responsibility. american philosophical quarterly, p. 86 prajñā vihāra references fischer, john martin. deep control: essays on free will and value. new york: oxford university press, 2012. ———. my way: essays on moral responsibility. new york: oxford university press, 2006. fischer, john martin, and mark ravizza, eds. perspectives on moral responsibility. 1st edition. ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 1994. fischer, john martin, and mark ravizza, 1998. responsibility and control: an essay on moral responsibility, cambridge: cambridge university press. frankfurt, harry g. “alternate possibilities and moral responsibility”. journal of philosophy 66, no.3 (1969): 829–39. long, todd r. “moderate reasons-responsiveness, moral responsibility, and manipulation.” freedom and determinism, 2004. mckenna, michael. “source incompatibilism, ultimacy, and the transfer of non-responsibility.” american philosophical quarterly 38, no.1 (2001): 37-51. ravizza, mark. “semi-compatibilism and the transfer of nonresponsibility.” philosophical studies 75, no.1–2 (1994): 61–93. van inwagen, peter. “ability and responsibility.” the philosophical review 87, no.2 (1978): 201-24. mikhael dua 1 dromological speed and its relationship to democracy and human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, jakarta abstract technology does not only help humans to overcome natural challenges, but also has a dromological function in terms of channelling, communicating, connecting goods, information and messages, anonymous masses, and the needs from one pole to another, from one region to another, and even from one organ to another. in treating this phenomenon, paul virilio is fascinated by the accident which is assessed as value and danger of technologies. this article, then, aims to deal with the problem of dromological technology and its ethical implications for democracy and human rights. introduction in the 2014 indonesian presidential debate, the presidential candidate joko widodo asserted that he would use the “speed principle” to handle technical and social problems in indonesia. the candidate who campaigned himself as a “speed-hard worker” has now become the seventh president of republic of indonesia. what the president said is not a simple matter in terms of politics. speed is a technical principle which is applied to the physics of motion and acceleration, while politics, as aristotle put it,1 is a practical problem prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 2, july december 2017, 1-21 © 2000 by assumption university press 2 prajñā vihāra which could not be understood on the basis of technical knowledge, but on the basis of people’s practical engagement. if speed is applied to politics, then the main problem becomes how politics can adapt to the logic of speed without necessarily disrupting societal coexistence and human rights? or more broadly, how can the political logic of social values and expectations go hand in hand with the logic of speed which focuses on individual success and efficiency? these questions are increasingly difficult to answer. bertrand russell once described this difficulty in his reflections on the impact of science on society.2 he found that science and technology have tended to support the development of capitalist economies and despotic powers rather than improve the culture of reason. even after the second world war, modern technologies have resulted in wide ecological crises. this critique of modernism and technology has been taken up by phenomenologists like martin heidegger and hans jonas and much more deeply by members of frankfurt school like herbert marcuse and theodor adorno. a powerful critique of the essence of technology can be found in the thought of the contemporary french philosopher paul virilio. based on his phenomenological understanding of human experience in the world and his observations on speed in the field of transportation and audiovisual technology, virilio found that politics is increasingly conducted as the practice of speed. the adage ‘time is money’ that previously prevailed in business, now is applied to politics in a sense that the implementation of the state’s policies should be carried out in the shortest possible time. the faster the government works, the more successful a country becomes. without the speed, the government is ineffective. this paper aims to discuss the implications of technological speed in politics, especially in developing democratic life and human rights. the first part of the paper will delve into virilio’s ideas on the technological speed in structuring of modern society.3 the second part of this paper will focus on the emergence of a dromocratic society – a society governed by prosthetics as an implication of the development of dromological technology. since, dromocracy is not automatically coherent with the mikhael dua 3 ideas of democracy and human rights; an effort to develop a healthy democracy is needed by taking into account the security side of society and its citizens. dromological techniques unlike many thinkers who understand modernity as a development of the human mind in all spheres of life, virilio sees that the essence of modernity lies in the logistical effectiveness of making things possible. under the influence of maurice merleau ponty, virilio explains that modernity is not an abstract concept, but a concrete human experience of his world, an experience of logistical movement in human space and time in his world. in such experience of space and time, we can see the history of the city, the division of territory, trading circuits, satellites, and software development. we can also see political landscapes governed by competing technologies of surveillance, mobilization, fortification, and their interdependent administrations. in all these phenomenological experiences, logistics permit mobilization and administration, integration and disintegration, control and coincidence. without technological logistics, we cannot make sense of modernity. his thoughts on logistical effectiveness originated from his discussion with claude parent, an architect, in the 1960s. under the influence of parent, virilio shifts from topography to dromology, a study and analysis of the ever increasing speed in the field of transportation and communication. the term dromology, derived from the greek word ‘dromos’, which denotes both rapid movement and races, is used to mean the government of differential motility, of harnessing and mobilizing, incarcerating and accelerating things and people. in a broader sense, virilio uses the term dromology to explain the logistics of governance that serves to map and divide the masses to move according to the direction of an intended path. the main object of dromology is the city, because the city is a landscape consisting of roads and vehicles which move dynamically through it, and software infrastructure which effectively assists the vehicles and mass transportation. for virilio, the city is the center of 4 prajñā vihāra movement and social revolution, since only there, does mass transportation gain it’s logistical meaning. in this city, everyone is not seen as a person, member of a community or society, but as ‘passers-by’, without a fixed identity therefore it is difficult to identify everyone according to sociocultural terms. the city, thus, is a fixed place because it is situated between two speeds of transit, acting as brakes against the acceleration of penetration. therefore, in the analysis of dromology, the city is understood through the opposition between “brake” and “accelerator.”4 this concept of the city and its logistics has its implication in the design of urban space. until now we see the map of urban spaces, first of all, as a static picture of the city in which the city is viewed from a geographical location: on a hill, along a river, and near the sea. this geographical picture is certainly important because it is directly related to the understanding of city boundaries and the administration of the city. however, the geographical picture of the city does not show the dynamic space of mass movement. for virilio, the city is a technological space which performs metabolic functions: channeling, strengthening, bringing to the center, and taming humans and non-humans as parts of the city. therefore, in this dynamic perspective, the city map can be seen as a depiction of the mass movement from the residence areas of the population to the centers of production and city administration. also in this dynamic depiction, the road is seen as a rapid flow of movement and communication (river, road, high way and railway). the map of the city, therefore, is not just a geographical picture, but a phenomenological one which depicts the territory of the city as a habitable circulation,5 a space which is suitable for humans to stay in. “the new city with its riches, its unheard-of technical facilities, its universities and museums, its stores and permanent holidays, its comforts, its knowledge and its security seemed an ideal spot for the tiring journey to end, the ultimate dock for the mass’s migrations and hopes after a perilous crossing.”6 mikhael dua 5 as the “bloodstream” of the of the body of the city, roads make logistical speed predictable and calculated so that everyday necessities can be obtained by the town’s people. in the cycle of the exchange of goods the road plays an important role. imagine if we were in a supermarket and standing in front of the shelves of goods. the shelves themselves do not stand as isolated facts in the supermarket. instead, they serve as a meeting place between humans and a number of networking objects: including the networks of supply and demand, of customer relationship management software, of freight containers, factories, and capital exchange protocols all of which form a complex organization of the economic process of production and distribution. therefore, we face accompaniment of items consisting of millions of tons of consumer goods that are in the process of transit in the trading zone. this is all thanks to the technological efficiency and legality of the company that governs the transportation, activation, internalization and exteriorization from ship ports to aviation, from banks to the web software that manages data security protocols. so, the street is a dromological path through which we understand the trading network. in addition to transportation, which consists of trains, airplanes, highways, electric trains, and many others which connect one region to another, virilio also sees other dromological technologies, namely transmission technology and transplantation technology. transmission or information technology which was pioneered by the electrical discoveries of edison and marconi is a dromological technology that allows humans to interact with one another. communication studies have long explained the dromological function of radio and television; radio is an informational technology which links community members who share common themes and interests; more than radio, television links people in different parts of the world so it’s no wonder that mcluhan explained that television can make the world a ‘global village.’ for virilio since the beginning of the 20th century, acceleration is mainly about the increasing speed of information transmission. transportation has been constantly speeded up too, but the major development is the increasing speed of information transmission. transmission technologies move us from localized real 6 prajñā vihāra space to globalized cyberspace. today transplantation technology can also be seen as dromological technology. this type of technology utilizes telecommunication equipment and nano-technology in the human body as if it is a city. we are still in the early stages of augmentations, implants, and stimulators, but virilio sees the prospect of ‘bio-machines’, ‘hyper-stimulated’ people and new bio-elites who may oppress the naturals.7 thus, technology does not only help humans to overcome natural and human challenges, but also has a dromological function, in terms of channeling, communicating, and connecting goods, information and messages, anonymous masses, and the needs from one pole to the other, from one region to another, and even from one organ to another. like heidegger and merleau ponty, virilio sees dromological technology having its world network: the city with all its complexity. but more than heidegger and merleau ponty, he adds that we cannot understand our history and technology if we do not come upon the phenomenon of speed and acceleration in many realms of our society: transportation, information, music, and transplantation. towards a dromocratic society in the late 1970s, virilio was concerned about dromocratic conditions. in popular defense & ecological struggle, he discusses the theoretical concept of pure war and makes a practical political case for revolutionary resistance against the tyranny of speed politics and the military industrial complex. he tells us that since world war ii, the development of dromological techniques has been difficult to predict. war and military institutions become the main mode of political logistics. this state of war is also directed by the power of the bourgeoisie as he writes: “with the help of accumulation of capital, pure war can be everywhere and affect all areas of life.”8 in the dromological perspective the state is the legal bearer of war and will progress at the speed of its weapon systems.9 virilio tells us that mikhael dua 7 the history of totalitarianism everywhere has a direct relationship with the state’s ability to handle the mass circulation by using dromological machines in order to violate the constitution. he acknowledges that every totalitarian leader understands this fact when he proclaims war. the nazis, for example, took over germany, city after city, street by street, and through the long journey from one country to another, as if the german masses were ‘set to move’ by their unstoppable leaders. it is just because immediately after seizing power, the nazi government promised the german people sport and transport/highways in order to seize control of the mass movement.10 the apparatus of this totalitarian state includes functions, artifacts, and dromocratic machines which go beyond the constitution. such a state functions like a machine that processes permanent attacks on the world and human nature11 which does not only destroy the flora and fauna, but also the social, cultural and existential systems of a nation. with this in mind virilio wants to say that there was never an industrial revolution that paved the way for democratic thinking. on the contrary, it launched dromocracy, a government determined by artificial logistics, where war is a distinctive form. “in fact there is no ‘industrial revolution’ but only a ‘dromocratic revolution;’ there is no democracy, only dromocracy; there is no strategy, only dromology.”12 in terms of warfare, state logistics are not limited to ground transportation. virilio sees sea and air transportation as alternatives which open up different spaces. if ground transportation is limited to a territorial field therefore warfare is restricted to a particular territory air and sea transportation indicate an open space so that war no longer occurs within a particular territory but becomes infinite. also, with the advent of the sea and air as open space, the concept of war is changed. war runs in society; as fish lives in water, soldiers run a war in society. in this new space, war is no longer understood in terms of physical resistance, but has a broader meaning, namely economic, social, and cultural resistance. in the new understanding, speed remains the main characteristic of war because it is the hallmark of the dromological progress. 8 prajñā vihāra in one interview with james der debian, virilio asserts that war always evolves along with the logistics of perception. traditional warfare is done within the horizon of the eye and the telescope. however, modern wars have different logistical perceptions. using satellites, modern war has become a global war involving the whole planet. in one sense the gulf war for example, can be called a local war, because it involves local interests. but since this war involved satellites and remote commands, the war falls into the global war category. therefore, the more advanced the technology is, the wider and intensive is a war.13 the concept of the state as the subject of war had been discussed by carl schmitt,14 a german philosopher at the middle of the 20th century. in schmitt’s thinking, the state is the main political subject who has the right to distinguish the friend from the enemy. war is the consequence of this. however, in a dromological perspective, war is the clearest model of what it means to regulate and control the speed of the masses that are constantly on the move. in line with joseph goebbles who wrote, “who controls the road, controls the state” virilio states that the main political task is to control the space. and the state has the political right to control the speed of such logistics. our history, then, utilizes violence both for the defending the existence of society and for binding together the members of the society. metaphorical l y, this conjures the idea of a primordial bunker and the camps of dromocratic society. the first is a result of architecture against the enemy, while the second is a metaphor for the attitude of expelling and fencing others out. thus the dromocratic life is a life that rubs against others as enemies, prevents them from entering into our world, and confines us in ourselves. both of these mechanisms are completely defensive. with these descriptions, virilio’s political theory can hardly be understood as a traditional one. it changes our perception on the history of politics, and suggests that we never build a democratic society but a dromocratic one. every state employs dromological techniques to exercise power, but a s in michel foucault, the state apparatuses are functions or artifacts of dromocratic machinations that exceed their constitutions mikhael dua 9 and incorporations. “dromocratic intelligence is not exercised against a more or less determined military adversary, but a permanent assault on the world, and through it, on human nature.”15 in phenomenological perspective, total war can be identified as existential experience of fear. following th e se insights we can ask if dromocracy has become a world-wide and lasting form of technological society? and if total war is a real condition, how can we maintain some sense of freedom? the state of freedom, fascism, and nihilism nietzsche once described the dramaturgic context of society with regard to the development of the state of freedom.16 briefly, he explained that human rights are not a static concept, but have developed according to the balan c e between two impulses: between the apollonian which involves the principle of form, order, and individuation, and the dionysian which involves the powers of intoxication, disorder, and the dissolution of individual ego in collective ecstasy and sensual surrender. he thought that the intense dionysian passion should be harmonized, spiritualized and refined b y apollonian form. rather than rejecting the apollonian principle, nietzsche calls for a synthesis and conjures the ideal of socratic society which combines the powers of reason and creativity, the rational and the irrational. from nietzs c he’s perspective, we are now living in a state of imbalance. under the influence of capitalism, we develop an individualism which ignores intra-and inter-communal solidarity. in such a society it is very difficult for political parties, religious groups, and universities to become a “home” for everyone. people float between traditions without cultivating a certain direction (what is usually known as postmodernism). everybody r emains like a monad living without any relationship with the surroun ding community. gaining great freedom, every individual nonetheless loses their own personal orientation. emile durkheim identifies this situation as an anomaly. in this new context, tools of communication may change the game of power. although the state is still seen as a dominant organizational 10 prajñā vihāra form in the world system, it is not the only one, perhaps not the most powerful. i nstead of political power, economic and military power can play a major role in this postmodern society. thus, we face a new paradox: nationalism is growing everywhere, but as a reaction to a loss of power and control. in such situation, people who lose their orientation may generat e direct violence within and between communities. this increasingly widespread cultural violence often cannot be overcome by the state, because the structure of the state is unable to overcome racial, religious and tribal hatred. violations of human rights which occurred in rwanda, somalia, bosnia, and afghanistan have their base in racial, religious and tribal hatred. the conflict of civilizations is the new model of our global society.17 the question, then, arises as to whether the logic of technological speed can help us develop a social body that gives space for the development of community, critical thinking and human rights? this question is a difficult one, but virilio’s ideas can offer some help. on the one hand, virilio himself realizes that war as a ‘factory speed’ cannot be used as a means to protect human rights and democracy. he explains that if we do it in the name of human rights, then the war will eliminate the chance for us to develop negotiations with our opponents. however, he also adds that if the enemy is an enemy of humanity, then there is no alternative but to mobilize into a total war or perform unconditional surrender.18 the fundamental issue behind this dilemma is the possible rebirth of fascism against humanity. fascism doesn’t need to be reborn; it never died.19 it becomes totalitarian when it intends to be totally dromocratic. virilio tells us that in china, from 1964 onward, we find the revolutionary slogan: “ta ke the army as our model.” under this slogan, the entire population was forced to wear a similar uniform, a kind of ambiguous, asexual outfit. in a different way, in france the soldier was called upon to wear the combat uniform, the outfit of the laborer, even during official parades.20 according to the research led by department of philosophy, university of indonesia in 2006, fascism is still growing through the panopticon techniques directed upon new order political prisoners mikhael dua 11 and their families, religious faith based terrorism, and ethnic and racial violence.21 fascism is still alive because “both total war and total peace have engaged the headquarters of the great national bodies (the armies, the forces of production) in a new spatial and temporal process.”22 but, virilio warns we are not always aware of its presence. he writes “the precious lesson of the camp and the gulag has not been heeded, because it was erroneously presented not only as ideological phenomenon, but also as a static one, an enclosure. its absolute inhumanity is … the bestiary of the immense biomass, proletariat subsumed under logistical demands.”23 technological developments in transportation, war and information is a real challenge to democracy and human rights when it is coupled with individualism and racial, religious, and tribal hatred which is growing in our postmodern society. the emergen ce of info sphere a world of information – may become a new possibility of the state of freedom. the searching software today has made our own world into an interactive metaphor between us. google interactive folder/searching/visual data as well as its programs (api: appli cation programming interface) is a logistics software designed to make personal life more rational. we expect each user to be openly l inked. therefore, information technology becomes one of the important instruments for democracy and vice versa: democracy is virtually impossible to run well without information technology. through the interne t everyone can fight for their aspirations both concerning themselves, society and the environment. we can see how civil society today is building net politics to give a broad influence on global politics to build an emancipatory relationship.24 this ability to communicate will reduce our world as a real space. the new space is a social environment that draws us closer to each other. in this information space, the future man will live in a confined feeling and may be more tolerant than the previous society. with this expectation, i think virilio tacitly agrees with heidegger that the disclosure of dasein always happens in unity with others.25 it is possible because people are 12 prajñā vihāra given time to move, to feel, to imagine, and to make decisions into the new social space. behind these opportunities, however, lies technological nihilism. thanks to in formation and communication technologies, everything arrives everywhere at once, including that which is least expected. to privilege the present is however to privilege accidents. new technologies bring into effect three existential problems.26 the first one is technological control. while the problem with speed is always the problem of accidents, the very rapidity of technologies that stress immediacy and ubiquity bring problems ove r and above their continued control. these technologies operate so q uickly that they leave us little time to judge. in fact, key decisions seem to be ceded to the machines and devices that transport us, our goods and information. the second p roblem is the disappearance of contemplation in our culture. debate and cooperation also become difficult. this means that the very basis of humanity is threatened. living is replaced by mere existence. technological acceleration increases existential risks and that collateral d amage necessarily accompanies life’s new velocities. with increasingly rapid technology, reflexes replaces reflection. virtualizati on is the third existential problem. technological development means that we no longer live in real time or real space. we dwell in accidental space. reality has been replaced by technologically mediated rea lity effects. its effect tears at the social fabric such that physical dimensions (including human) lose their meaning. as such all of our traditional benchmarks of intelligibility – norms and values, anchors, standards and reference points – cease to serve or guide us. instead we live in a pe rpetual present in which tradition, memory and collective sentiments offer no comfort. disorientation prevails. virtual technology does not just alienate us from time and place; it also estranges us from our own bodies. our machines are disturbingly lively and w e ourselves frighteningly inert. this is because action at a distanc e, mediated by technological structures, trumps immediate unmediated agency. our technologies move for us, and do so far faster than we mikhael dua 13 ever could. we can stay where we are, although there are profound phenomenological implications for us. since we can extend our actions across time and space our precise location is open to question. where are we prese nt? and how do we experience our place in the world? technological speed, then, has deleterious effects on living, over and above the obvious accidents and the damage it does to territory and chronology. security and the metaphysics of accidents the dromological revolution is moving faster than we realize. we live in a world where technological speed becomes the only reality whose objectives is difficult to predict: “all that counts is the speed of the moving body and the undetectability of its path.”27 this observation is not just about war technology, but concerns the speed of technology itself. speed becomes a destiny, a form of progress, a civilization. speed is war and war is nothing other than a “speed factory.”28 to succeed is to reach greater speed. according to this criterion, society will be divided into hopeful populations and despairing populations. the first has access to the speed which provides them with possibilities – that is, the project, the decision, and the infinite, while the second, hindered by inferiority of their technological vehicles, condemns them to live in a finite world. “western man,” virilio gives an example, “has appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid. in colonial genocide or ethnocide, he was the survivor because he was in fact super-quick (sur vif).”29 for virilio, all societies are pyramidal in nature: the higher speed belongs to the upper reaches of society, the slower to the bottom. what worries virilio mostly is the fact of accident. he tells us that we can neither understand our history nor the technology which propels it without coming to terms with a related phenomenon of speed and acceleration: the accident.30 the progress of speed is nothing other than the unleashing of violence. when we invent a new technology we also always invent the possibility of unintended and unfortunate outcomes. the ship’s invention creates the shipwreck, the railway’s invention 14 prajñā vihāra creates derailment, the airplane’s invention creates plane crash. indeed, qualitative achievements in science are accompanied by a quantitative logic: the greater the intensity of techno-scientific progress the greater the catastrophes. the invention of the ocean liner is also the invention of its catastrophic sinking (the sinking of the unsinkable titanic in 1912), the internal combustion engine is itself the invention of greenhouse gases, the discoveries of genomic science also bring with them the latent horrors of a genetic bomb and comprehensive integration of personal social lives into information networks is also their inevitable crash, taking with them the very social bonds that they contain and mediate for us. technology is not only a human solution but also increases the scale of our shared risk. virilio envisions the most extreme danger in connection with war and communication technologies. he predicts that accidents cannot be restricted in a certain space and time, here and now, but become un localized. therefore, accidents in war technology and communications technology in the future will involve the whole of humanity. not only nuclear war but the spread of the viruses in communication technology. these potential accidents bring us closer to the critical threshold where the possibilities for proper human political action will disappear. virilio calls this situation a “state of emergency”31. this is the state where everything suddenly happens as if each protagonist’s own arsenal becomes his enemy, communication between statesmen will stop, in favor of an interconnection of computer systems, modern calculators of strategy, and consequently of politics. in facing the contemporary regression of strategic arms limitation agreements, virilio proposes his own idea of the deterrence principle. he agrees that every country should be encouraged to exercise restraint and act rationally by not continuously developing technology just to threaten and destroy others. he writes: “the essential aim of throwing ancient weapons or of shooting off new ones has never been to kill the enemy or destroy his means, but to deter him, in other words, to force him to interrupt his movement.”32 but he also adds that we cannot deter an enemy from inventing new weapons, or from perfecting their mikhael dua 15 performance. following sun tzu who said that all weapons are tools of “ill omen,”33 virilio believes that we need a deterrence that leads us to reduce our own freedom not only of action and decision, but also of conception. “the logic of arms systems is eluding the military framework more and more and moving toward the engineer responsible for research and development.”34 by saying ‘to reduce our freedom not only of action and decision, but also of conception’, virilio proposes that all parties should have the willingness to submit to reason – they have to learn to discipline their own passions and to submit to the law even when they think the law is unjust and iniquitous. he argues that what a social body really needs is security.35 even in a liberal-capitalist society, we still need social security in terms of consumption and freedom from fear. the demand for security is a moral basis for the protection of everyone from the misfortunes that they should not have. it has its roots in justice, civil rights and political rights for every citizen. the neglect of the interests of those who are powerless such as the elderly, the poor and the victims of political conflict and war are the real tendencies of the dromocratic society.36 besides this ethical consideration, virilio invites us to understand the metaphysical meaning of the technological accident. he criticizes two typical ways of understanding it: a philosophical one which denotes accident as the inessential and a common sense one which identifies it as the unexpected. accidents are neither trivial nor should they be unanticipated. they are programmed into every technology. they are also not relative and contingent, as aristotle reasoned in the metaphysics.37 virilio says, “as soon as something is well established, it is necessarily accompanied by something unreliable, which can trigger off forces to contain at any moment.”38 the technical progress is largely determined by the findings in the mechanics, chemistry, and electricity. a high dependence on the material basis as its substance will position the invention of a technology to always involve the invention of its accompanying accident. the accident therefore reveals the substance of technology. for virilio, substance and accident are symmetrical. 16 prajñā vihāra to deny the dual nature of technology, the substance and the accident, is to fundamentally misconstrue the object. “to censor evidence, as is so often the case, is to practice dissimulation, ensure disinformation, and so contribute to a loss of confidence in the effects of science, analogous today only to what happens in politics.”39 it also means reality is only partially grasped. this is the confusion lying at the heart of today’s technological crisis. discovery and creation beget catastrophe. security, then, is not only based on ethical considerations of protection of human life and the environment but also is supported by a metaphysical understanding that every technical body of speed is pregnant with accidents. the security of humanity and nature should be insured by providing a large space for autonomy of individuals, regions, universities, and the media, so they can understand and discuss the relation of technological risks to technological discovery. conclusion i have pointed out that the threat to democracy and human rights does not entirely come from the abuse of political power but also comes from the effectiveness of dromological speed. the authoritarian state is a real danger to humanity, but its powers will not be effective unless it is supported by war as a dromological technology.40 beside war, the media is another tool of dromocratic society. instead of serving to provide accurate information, media can be framed according to political interests. so many important innovations in technological searching are sponsored by state security interests to control the power of critical thinking in society. in the dromological perspective, technologies can never become a logistic for democracy. starting from the premise that the state is the subject of the technology of warfare, virilio draws the conclusion that human history evolved with its weapon systems. in this generalization, politics, power, military, and war become the model and the texture of human life. following his reasoning, virilio goes far beyond what is thought by other phenomenologists such as husserl, heidegger, merleau-ponty, and don mikhael dua 17 ihde who still see technology as a vehicle for the personal and social life of man. for virilio, the state is the subject of technology and therefore the technology will follow the logic of power. in this logic, the bunker, the camp, the city, and the war became models of technological development. some experts appreciate virilio’s emphasis on security and develop it in in relation to the architecture of the camp as a space of the exception.41 this interpretation is given by giorgio agamben who sees the camps and forts as extra-legal territory.42 he explains that state maintains authority and power above the law for the sake of social cohesion. the camps and forts have the status of a “state of exception” in relation to the normal law of a state. the same view was also expressed by slavoj žižek who demonstrated that the logic of the camp is beyond the normal power relationships. but, as benjamin h. bratton writes, “the lesson is not the pretentious self-image of hyper-efficiency that such networks communicate, but rather the exception that remains within the exception itself: the accident.”43 the accident-within-the-accident emerges from the identification with the exception that žižek names, perhaps in ways that virilio might not himself recognize. the problem of terrorism, as well as the state of emergency which characterizes counter terrorism, is neither entirely a resistance to the law, nor entirely outside it, but instead is related to the sovereign›s power of the state of exception to the law. with this recognition of the accident, we can say that the state cannot negate human rights in the name of a state of emergency. behind his analysis of dromocratic society, virilio wants to make it clear that the only fact in technological society is nihilism.44 in reality, there is no open society which preserves itself under the principle of democracy or the principles of eternal peace. maybe there is no social capital which is based on the trust and respect of the people. politics is just a dromological body that works mechanically. in this way, virilio has anticipated that politics has no relation to social capitals.45 the current political institutions and actors in most liberal democracies do not enjoy the trust and respect of the people. also the market, one of the most sanctified 18 prajñā vihāra terms today, advances individualistic rather than social goals, in that, the consumers speak the language of ‘me’. it sounds pessimistic when virilio says: “the more speed increases, the faster freedom decreases.”46 but for me, staging the accident, virilio would have an important instructional function. three arguments are advanced in favor of it: it helps us become more aware of the risks in our world; it would move us beyond the idea that we are simply passive victims of progress, and it would help restore symmetry between accident and substance. virilio sees this as nothing less than our responsibility. the museum of accidents therefore provides an important ethical function. endnotes 1 aristotle, the politics 1252a1, translated by t.a. sinclair (london: penguin books, 1992), p.54 2 bertrand russell, the impact of science on society (london: george allen & unwin publishers ltd., 1961), chapters 3 and 4 3 paul virilio, speed and politics, an english translation of vitesse et politique by marc polizzotti, los angeles: semiotexte, 2006.virilio was born in 1930 in paris and studied at the ecole des métiers d‘art. after world war ii he studied phenomenology under maurice merleau-ponty at the sorbonne. 4 ibid., p.33 5 ibid., p.31 6 ibid., pp.32-33 7 steve matthewman, “accidentology: a critical assessment of paul virilio’s political economy of speed”cultural politics volume 9, number 3, november 2013 8 speed and politics, p. 85 9 ibid., p.90 10 in this awareness we can understand why in the 1930s, when america was experiencing an economic crisis, the most worrying thing to the authorities was the ‘temptation of the road’. the increased transportation capabilities created by mass production of cars (ford already started in 1914) could empower social assault and revolution, if not controled to support state power by transforming consumer needs. 11 speed and politics, p.86 12 ibid., p.69 13 james der debian, “interview with paul virilio“ in www.infopeace.org/ vy2k/futurewar.cfm. https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=id&prev=_t&sl=id&tl=en&u=http://www.infopeace.org/vy2k/futurewar.cfm https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=id&prev=_t&sl=id&tl=en&u=http://www.infopeace.org/vy2k/futurewar.cfm mikhael dua 19 14 carl schmitt, der begriff des politischen, text von 1932 mit einem vorwort und drei corollarien (berlin: duncker & humbolt, 1963), p. 27 15 speed and politics, p. 86 16 fr. nietzsche, the birth of tragedy and other writings, translated by ronald speirs (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007), pp. 6-25 17 samuel p. huntington, “the clash of civilizations?” in foreign affairs 72 (1993), number 3, pp.22-49 18 paul virilio, the vision machine, translated by julie rose (indianapolis: indiana university press, 1994), 34 19 speed and politics, 134-135 20 ibid., 135 21 l.g. saraswati, et.al. hak asasi manusia: teori, hukum, kasus (jakarta: filsafat universitas indonesia press, 2006), 306, 323, 356 22 paul virilio, popular defense and ecological struggle (new york: semiotext(e) foreign agenes series, 1986 23 speed and politics, 98 24 john armitage, “from modernism to hypermodernism and beyond, an interview with paul virilio” theory, culture and society, volume 16 (5-6) (london: sage, 1999), 25-55 25 martin heidegger, being and time, an english translation of sein und zeit by john macquarrie and edward robinson (new york: harper & row, publishers, incoporated, 1962), 67 26 i am following steve matthewman, “accidentology: a critical assessment of paul virilio’s political economy of speed”cultural politics volume 9, number 3, november 2013 27 speed and politics, 151 28 ibid., 157 29 ibid., 70 30 john armitage, “from modernism to hypermodernism and beyond, an interview with paul virilio,” op. cit., 40 31 speed and politics, 159 32 ibid., 161 33 ibid., 164 34 ibid., 165 35 ibid., 139 36 ibid., 140 37 aristotle, metaphysics,1007a20, the complete works of aristotle, edited by jonathan barnes (princeton: bolingen series lxxi.2, 1995), 1590 38 steve matthewman, “accidenology: a critical assessment of paul virilio’s political economy of speed” cultural politics, volume 9, issue 3, november 2013 20 prajñā vihāra 39 speed and politics, 81 40 compare to don ihde, technology and the lifeworld, from garden to earth (indianapolis: indiana university press, 1990), 1 41 benjamin h. bratton, “logistics of habitable circulation” in paul virilio, speed and politics, op. cit., p. 22 42 agamben, state of exception (chicago: university of chicago press, 2005), 52-64 43 ibid., 23 44 speed and politics, 110 45 putnam, robert d, “bowling alone: america’s declining social capital”, journal of democracy, volume 6 no. 1, 65-78 46 speed and politics, 158 references agamben, giorgio. state of exception. chicago: university of chicago press, 2005 aristotle, the complete works of aristotle, edited by jonathan barnes. princeton: bolingen series lxxi.2, 1995 armitage, john. “from modernism to hypermodernism and beyond” an interview with paul virilio in theory, culture, and society, volume 16 (5-6), 1999 bratton, benjamin h. “logistics of habitable circulation” in virilio, paul. speed and politics, an english translation by marc polizzotti. los angeles: semiotexte, 2006 heidegger, martin. being and time, an english translation of sein und zeit by john macquarrie and edward robinson. new york: harper & row, publishers, incorporated, 1962 huntington, s.p. “the clash of civilizations?” in foreign affairs 72, number 3, 1993 ihde, don.technology and the lifeworld, from garden to earth. indianapolis: indiana university press, 1990 mikhael dua 21 matthewman, steve. “accidentology: a critical assessment of paul virilio’s political economy of speed” cultural politics volume 9, number 3, november 2013 nietzsche, fr. the birth of tragedy and other writings, translated by ronald speirs. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2007 putnam, robert d, “bowling alone: america’s declining social capital”, journal of democracy, volume 6 no. 1 russell, bertrand. the impact of science on society. london: george allen & unwin publishers ltd., 1961 saraswati, l.g. et.al. hak asasi manusia: teori, hukum, kasus (human rights: theory, law, and cases). jakarta: filsafat universitas indonesia press, 2006) schmitt, carl. der begriff des politischen, text von 1932 mit einem vorwort und drei corollarien. berlin: duncker & humbolt, 1996 virilio, paul. popular defense and ecological struggle. new york: semiotext(e) foreign agenes series, 1986 virilio, paul. speed and politics, an english translation by marc polizzotti. los angeles: semiotexte 2006 virilio, paul. the vision machine, translated by julie rose. indianapolis: indiana university press, 1994 james der debian,”interview with paul virilio” in www.infopeace.org/ vy2k/futurewar.cfm http://www.infopeace.org/vy2k/futurewar.cfm http://www.infopeace.org/vy2k/futurewar.cfm 11(158-162)note for authors visions of ecumenism in a troubled world: sufism in the 21st century arthur saniotis the university of adelaide, australia abstract arguably, the post september 11 world has been characterized by defining cultures along civilisational lines in accordance with samuel huntington’s notion of the clash of civilisations. according to huntington, islam is antithetical to western civilization, ideologically, politically and historically. furthermore, islam poses a potential threat to ‘enlightened’ western nations. in this paper i will propose how sufism may provide an alternate vision for promoting ecumenism between the west and islam. it can provide a humanizing response to the emergence of modernist models and their ruthless debunking of traditional forms of religion and cultural systems. the current tension between the west and islam has plunged the world to an uncertain period. the promises of universalism have been overshadowed by pervasive fundamentalist ideologies which encourage exclusivity and linkages to the past. the early years of the 21st century are reminiscent of the nascent period of the 20th century which saw the advent of technological war and genocide. this period has witnessed the birth of new forms of collective terror, vehicled by global medias. the attack on the world trade center on september 11, 2001, was a seminal event which forayed into the collective consciousness of cultures and nations. arguably, the post september 11 world has been characterised by defining cultures along civilisational lines in accordance with samuel huntington’s notion of the clash of civilisations.1 according to huntington, islam is 134 prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 134-152 © 2000 by assumption university press antithetical to western civilization, ideologically, politically and historically. furthermore, islam poses a potential threat to ‘enlightened’ western nations. huntington’s vision evokes “the indeterminacy of modernity which has shattered the modernist belief” of the “existential safety of larger totalities”,2 “assured by western governments.”3 in this paper i will propose how sufism may provide an alternate vision for promoting ecumenism between the west and islam. abdul aziz said views sufism as a humanizing response to the emergence of modernist models and their ruthless debunking of traditional forms of religion and cultural systems. but how will sufism act in this new social environment with its entourage of fundamentalist discourses? an overview of sufism’s past may shed some light as to how it can ecumenically respond to a 21st century global arena. sufism: ecumenical beginnings sufism or (arabic, tassawuf) is a form of islamic mysticism with the fundamental aim of experiencing a direct communion with the allah, which in sufism thought is called fana fil-haqq (annihilation of truth)4 sufism stipulates that this kind of engagement with allah is achievable through the cultivation of intuitive and emotional faculties as a means of diminishing the nature of the false ego or false self (nafs), which prevents human beings attaining union with allah. nicholson (1914)5 and stoddart (1994)6 suggest that the nature of this union between mystic (sufi) and allah aims in the mystic’s detachment from the nafs, toward absorption into the divine (fana). from its beginnings in arabia in the eighth century, sufism showed signs of syncretism and religious ecumenism which was to be one of its crucial hallmarks. writers such as stoddart (1994), schimmel (1975),7 knysh (2000),8 izutsu (1967-68),9 faruqi (1984),10 engineer (1991),11 begg (1972),12 burkhardt (1995),13 and , arberry (1950)14 claim that elements of sufi ideology and practice were influenced by various religious and philosophical schools of thought, for example, judaism, christianity, neo-platonism, zoroastrianism, and hinduism, as well as other “ancient arthur saniotis 135 oriental” influences.15 early sufi thinkers had “sometimes borrowed formulations deriving from neo-platonic and other spiritual doctrines” in order to enrich and broaden islamic thought.16 sufism’s ability to incorporate beliefs and practices from other cosmologies probably enabled it to adapt to the particular socio-cultural environments where it found itself in. early sufis were inspired by the quranic passages which extolled the unity of humankind and all existence. sufis found in the qur’an both a criterion for right thought and action and a blueprint for sociality. o mankind! we have created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes that you may know each other, (not that ye may despise (each other) (qu’ran, 49:13). o mankind, be mindful of your duty to your lord who created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and from the two created and spread many men and women (qur’an 4:1). the modus operandi of sufism was posited on the notion of tawhid (divine unity). sufism’s elaborate system of esoteric knowledge and social action were “integrated by the principle of tawhid, running as an axis through every mode of knowledge and being.”17 within the framework of tawhid sufis could explain the inter-relatedness of “natural and human phenomena” and the “inexhaustible creativity” of the universe.18 no longer was nature viewed as an arena of ambiguous power but rather a tapestry of divine design, “a vestigia dei or signs of god (ayat allah),”19 perfect in its symmetry – imbued with telos. the unity of humanity was a reflection of cosmic unity. behind the “manifest diversity” of cultures was an underlying unity bonding humankind.20 as islam spread into north africa, asia and europe during the 7th century it began to take on a cosmopolitan feel. islamic scholars and administrators began to incorporate various knowledges from civilisations which they had encountered, inevitably leading to an efflorescence of scientific learning and inquiry – the age of islamic science had been sparked. 136 prajñâ vihâra generally speaking, early muslims saw their relationship with their nonmuslim hosts as complementing their particular worldview. the saying of the prophet muhammad to “seek knowledge as far as china” prompted this spirit of co-existence and conveyed the “genius of authentic islam”.21 thus, the formation of muslim societies was informed and contoured by their relationship with older civilisations. the rationale of tolerance was further conveyed by various sufi orders (tariqa) which spread throughout the islamic world from the ninth century onwards. the indian sufi orders provided the most outstanding example of this syncretistic attitude. for example, the chistiyyah order became renowned for its broad range of humanitarian activities and practice of religious tolerance, which became an integral ideological bridge between islam and hinduism. there is little doubt that sufi orders such as the chistiyyah adopted a more liberal understanding of hinduism, and emphasised communal harmony between hindus and muslims. khizer even claims that: the sufis, unlike the ‘ulama’ did not keep themselves aloof from the indian mainstream. they adopted local idiom and preached the message of love and universal brotherhood.22 on this note, it seems that sufi orders were often more aware of the social conditions of the common people and tended to their spiritual and physical needs than the islamic clerics. the golden age of islam (8th-13th centuries) hosted a litany of ecumenical figures. the celebrated persian sufi poet jalaluddin rumi (1207-1273) wrote many poetic works privileging the spirit of ecumenism and was respected by christian and jewish communities. excerpts of rumi’s ecumenical poems are illustrated in the following: cross and christians, end to end, i examined. he was not on the cross. i went to the hindu temple, to the ancient pagoda. in neither was there any sign. to the heights of herat i went, and kandahar. i looked. he was not on height or lowland. resoarthur saniotis 137 lutely, i went to the top of the mountain of kaf. there only was the place of the ‘anqa bird. i went to the kaaba. he was not there. i asked of his state from ibn sina: he was beyond the limits of the philosopher avicenna. ... i looked into my own heart. in that his place i saw him. he was in no other place. what is to be done, o muslims? for i do not recognize myself. i am neither christian, nor jew, nor gabar, nor muslim. i am not of the east, nor of the west, nor of the land, nor of the sea; i am not of nature’s mint, nor of the circling heavens. similarly, the sufi philosopher muhiyuddin ibn ‘arabi (1165-1240) created a pantheistic doctrine referred to as wahdat-ul-wujud (unity of being) which viewed creation as constituting a unity. hirtenstein cites that “ibn arabi’s vision points precisely to this direct taking from god, in which there is unanimity across all traditions.”23 ibn ‘arabi’s poem called wonder encapsulates this sentiment: wonder, a garden among the flames! my heart can take on any form: a meadow for gazelles, a cloister for monks, for the idols, sacred ground, ka’ba for the circling pilgrim, the tables of the torah, the scrolls of the quran. my creed is love; wherever its caravan turns along the way, that is my belief, my faith. elsewhere ibn arabi writes on the unity of religions: there is no knowledge except that taken from god, for he alone is the knower... the prophets, in spite of their great number and the long periods of time which separate them, had no disagreement in knowledge of god, since they took it from god. 138 prajñâ vihâra although ecumenism was not a feature of all medieval sufi orders, those which did follow ecumenical principles seemed to have had a better understanding of local communities and their social and religious needs. in many cases, the various heads of sufi orders were viewed as saints in their own right and venerated at their shrines by muslims and non-muslims alike. the cult of sufi saints became popularized by poor folk and aristocrats throughout north africa and asia, and provided an avenue for communal relations between muslims and non-muslims.24 nowhere was this more evident than at muslim shrines in north india which incorporated muslim and hindu symbols. these shrines were also important centers for humanitarian service and religious teaching. indian sufi saints such as mu’inuddin hasan chishti (1142-1236) and nizamuddin auliya (12431325) were venerated by both muslim and non-muslim alike. among chisti’s saying were: a friend of god must have affection like the sun. when the sun rises, it is beneficial to all irrespective of whether they are muslim, christian, or hindu. of all the worship that pleases almighty allah, the most is the granting of relief to the humble and the oppressed. when i was conducting field-work during 1994-5 at the famous muslim shrine of nizamuddin auliya in delhi i regularly witnessed muslims, hindus, and sikhs performing pilgrimage there. it was also common practice for hindus to pray in the mosque there and for sufi teachers to have non-muslim disciples. one sufi even compared the saint’s shrine to an open bar where all people were welcome. this kind of communal harmony was all the more astonishing in light of the religious riots between hindus and muslims over the destruction of the barbri mosque in ayodha which had taken place in late 1992, as well as, the flagrant discrimination of muslims in maharashtra state and elsewhere in india. evans-pritchard’s classic study of the sanusi order of cyrenaica (1954) not only aroused a generation of studies of north african sufi orders, but emphasised their social and political implications for north african societies. evans-pritchard pointed out that the austere nature of arthur saniotis 139 islam in north africa was considered by many lay muslims as too rigid.25 consequently, sufi orders tended to adopt more individualistic and experientialist approaches which found their social expression in present day saints’ cults. a similar scenario is observed in many muslim societies today, reaffirming sardar’s view that traditional muslim communities are constantly reinventing and innovating tradition.26 towards the end of the ottoman era many muslim reformists who had been frustrated by colonial rule and the lack of social progress to modernise, became increasingly vitriolic against sufi orders for their syncretistic practices.27 the islamic scholar bernard lewis even claimed that sufis “were out of touch with the modern world, against which the new elites were struggling, and which at the same time they were striving to join”.28 in addition, in the modern period, sufism was considered as “a shameful and dangerous superstition”.29 however, such allegations failed to realise the importance of sufi culture in preserving local cultures in the face of systematic colonial repression of traditional forms of knowledge. sufi culture also continued to fulfil “the psychological and communal needs of large segments of urban populations who sought refuge and solace from their daily struggle for existence caused by the displacements wrought by modernization.”30 sufi ecumenism in the muslim world what can sufi interpretations of islam offer muslim and non-muslim societies in the present day and beyond? in order to examine this question there needs to be a reassessment of sufism. this begins by dispelling the popular notion of sufism as being an outdated and irrelevant form of “dervishism”. the fact remains that in many muslim societies such as india, pakistan, the central asian republics, and north africa, sufism continues to play a significant role in shaping and “sustaining communal identity”.31 in these societies a crucial source for the maintenance of islamic cultural knowledge and practice derives from the belief in sufi saints. to believe in the collective of god’s saints (auliya) and to perform pilgrimage at their shrines are personal forms of piety, which confer spiritual merit to 140 prajñâ vihâra believers. not only are saints’ shrines prominent features in the islamic landscape, but they clearly demonstrate the religious sway of sufism for millions of muslims. what the sufi ecumenical model indicates is not only the possibility for muslims to live peacefully with people from other religions, but assists in the development of conflict resolution strategies in those muslim societies experiencing civil turmoil. in one interview, hussein aidid, son of the deceased somali warlord, stated his intention to implement a system of law in somalia based on a sufi model which is in accordance with somalia’s clan based social system. aidid’s remarks in large reflects the “popularist and grass roots”32 backing of sufism by many muslims. given its respect for “native traditions and customs” sufism is strongly placed as a relevant social model for islamic liberalism in the 21st century. as abdul aziz said notes: in the new international environment, viable conflict resolution requires an understanding of the beliefs, values, and behaviour of conflicting parties.33 in this vein, sufism has provided and continues to offer a viable political and social rebuff of authoritarian regimes. afghanistan is a case in point. during the soviet invasion of afghanistan sufi orders played a significant role of resistance, “offering solidarity and stability” to afghans without consideration of their ethnic backgrounds.34 although the sufi orders went underground during the ensuing civil wars, sufi followers had pervaded every section of afghan society. sufi followers are also included in the present interim government.35 the sufi orders in the central asian republics were also highly effective in fostering armed and ideological resistance against tsarist and soviet expansion.36 a case in point is the central asian republic of turkmenistan. turkmen muslim shrines were important places for sufi activities and “for the transmission of local traditions and “communal history.”37 soviet rule attempted to suppress shrine activities from the 1960’s up to until the late 1980’s through the use of anti-religious propaganda.38 in post soviet arthur saniotis 141 turkmenistan the tradition of pilgrimage to muslim shrines (ziyarat) was given official recognition by turkmenistan’s president saparmïrat nïyazov (türkmenbashï) “as an expression of patriotism and an integral part of being turkmen.”39 in recent years the turkmenistan media have extolled the pilgrimage tradition, albeit, refraining from condoning some of the healing practices that are conducted there.40 similarly, uzbekistan, has recently recognised its sufi tradition after decades of soviet imposed atheism, by promoting pilgrimages to its various muslims shrines.41 these include the shrine of baha’uddin naqshband in bukhara, as portrayed in a “recent film produced by the foreign trade association of bukhara.”42 sufi ecumenism has also played an important role during the fifteen year lebanese civil war. the ahbash movement, “a lebanese sufi group of african origin”, established a program of religious pluralism at a time of extreme sectarian violence.43 by positioning itself as a non-militant movement, the ahbash attracted sunni muslims from professional and business classes within urban centers.44 in addition, ahbash encouraged religious moderation and internecine peace. significantly, ahbash was able to converge social values and socio-economic interests of sunni middle classes within a secularist framework.45 according to ernst, the message of the ahbash spiritual leader shaykh habashi wedded arab nationalism and lebanese identity, and a non-reproaching attitude towards the syrian government.46 sufism and the global citizen in the 21st century in the current climate of islamist resurgence sufi inspired paradigms of inter-ethnic tolerance and liberal humanism (an islamic development) are still a potent social force. given the profound influence of sufism on muslim polity47 it is unreasonable to suggest that sufism is a spent force in the 21st century. it is because sufism draws much of its social and moral power from the grass roots level that makes it a positive model for social change. ironically, it is the emerging global system’s symbiotic paradigm 142 prajñâ vihâra which corresponds with sufism’s integral approach to social relations. here perhaps, sufism may offer a crucial ideological nexus between islam and the west in the 21st century and beyond. from a sufi perspective, there is a need to reinvest in spirituality in the collective consciousness of nations. my position coincides with abdul aziz said’s, that a reinvestment in spirituality ensures the human species with the possibility for a realistic and sustainable development. the concern in implementing holistic modes of being has been compelled by three failing points of an “unmitigated secularism”, namely, “civilized peoples’ capacity to commit acts of mass destruction” against each other and the natural world:48 eric hobsbawm (cited in geras 1994) calls the period from 1914 to 1990 “the most murderous era so far recorded in history;”49 secondly, by the economic uncertainties of rapid globalisation, and thirdly, by the de-mystification of the universe via the scientific paradigm. in commenting on the last point, the mythos of science has been a poor substitute in providing ontological meaning which is kernel to human consciousness. max weber’s concept of the “disenchantment of the world” explained the moral and intellectual conundrum of the modern age. consequently, the “disenchantment of the world” has had a profound impact in the way in which modern humans have construed nature. for rupp, the loss of the judeo-christian idea of universe as telos has verified human assertion over nature.50 ernest gellner (cited in greene 1999) writes that: our identities, freedom, norms are no longer underwritten by our vision and comprehension of things…nietzsche referred to this intellectual development as “the death of god.” c.s. lewis spoke of it as “the abolition of man.51 if anything, the history of modern thought tells us that human progress and human activity are borne out of a struggle of consciousness, or what thomas berry refers to as “allurement”. the evolutionary pursuit of allurement is towards greater “self-reflexive awareness”, which deepens human knowledge of humankind’s role within the universe.52 joseph campbell avers that it has been the apparent loss of our mythical traditions and their privileging of intuitive modes of being which has contributed to modernity’s anomie. berry points out that we now live at a time that the arthur saniotis 143 “transformation in culture” involves a shift from a mechanistic understanding of the universe to a “self-organizing universe as having a psychic-spiritual aspect.”53 sufism’s universalism provides a vital paradigm here. from its inception sufism viewed the human world as intrinsically connected with the natural world. nature was consistently consecrated by means of sacred activities which adumbrated sufis’ lives. for instance, the indian sufi practice of chanting the ‘beautiful names of allah’. (asma-ul-husna) mediates their engagement with the non-human world. wherever north indian sufis go they seem to recite prayers, mystical chants or tell sacred stories. thus, sufis’ journeys within spiritual spaces are measured according to the cycles of sacred words and poetic narratives. in this way, a sufi’s mystical words empower the sacred landscape. in said’s words “the consecration of the human” means that human activity is contoured to live harmoniously with the other.54 the vision of ibn ’arabi offers a relevant inroad for realising “the consecration of the human.” in his philosophy wahdat-ul-wujud all creation manifests unity. all universal systems are inter-related and work towards maintaining singularity. humankind (insan) is also ultimately one community expressed in plurality. the fulfillment of human existence lies in participating in the self disclosure of existence as a unified reality. as peter young puts it, “so, with this conjecture of the unity of existence, informed by knowledge, we live and it is our prayer, and the order itself it is knowledge, the knowledge of certainty.”55 ibn ’arabi’s vision of the disclosure of being in the world is characterised by the movement towards globalisation in various areas. firstly, the formation of the united nation and the universal charter of human rights, reflects a conjoined effort between nations to understand humankind as a single entity. unsurprisingly, the need to create the united nations was prompted by the megadeaths of world war and the jewish holocaust, and the concomitant ideologies which had renounced the humanity of others. on this note, george mombiot’s hope for a world government of the people corresponds with the medieval sufi poet attar 144 prajñâ vihâra of nishapur’s famed work called parliament of the birds (mantiq altayr) in which a congregation of birds search for ultimate realisation. a parallel phenomenon has been the exponentialise rise of technology which has engendered new organising principles. for instance, the advent of the internet and global communication networks has catapulted human consciousness. for the first time in human history human consciousness has been able to venture into space via space rockets and satellites. in the latter, human consciousness has been transformed into a “noosphere” enveloping the earth in an infinitesimal communication matrix. here, the symbiosis of silicone based cyber machines and biologically based consciousness are extending ontological boundaries. in ibn arabi’s thought, the predominating technologies of our time are none other than the “self disclosure of being” in its desire to be known.56 there is little doubt that globalisation has expedited the appeal of sufism in the west in a way in which orthodox islam has not. a striking example is the popularity of jalaluddin rumi’s poetry, especially in the united states where it has attracted a list of luminaries from the journalist bill moyers, martin sheen and madonna.57 as ernst claims, rumi has become a modern day doyen for rethinking identity in a non-dogmatic manner.58 from an ethnomusicological viewpoint, sufi music has become widespread due mainly to the efforts of musicians such as the pakistani qawwali exponent nusrat fateh ali khan and the senegalese yossou n’dour.59 these and other artists have created various fusion styles, combining traditional sufi lyrics with pop dance music. sufi’s ecumenical message has been exported by the pakistani-american group junoon whose music has been informed by the sufi poet bulle shah as “a message of liberation” to “youth worldwide.”60 the introduction of modern printing technology, as well as, generations of dedicated islamic scholars has made it possible to access and disseminate the works of many sufi masters including ibn ’arabi, jalalludin rumi, sa’di of shiraz, hafiz, amir khosrau dehlavi, hakim arthur saniotis 145 sanai, shabistari, and attar of nishapur. the print and audio propagation of “cultural products associated with sufism” exemplify changes in some muslim societies in publishing esoteric sufi knowledge.61 however, the spread of sufi thought in the west and in some muslim societies has provided different functions. while in “muslim countries sufi publications functioned as apologetics, to keep in touch with distant followers, and as acts of piety, sufi material in europe and america has joined the shelf of new age teachings, in a veritable marketplace of spirituality.”62 at present, relations between the west and islam are posited on two distinct ideological approaches. the first approach is the retreat to traditional values which has increased polarisation and the appeal for fundamentalisms.63 the global spread of wahabism is an example how globalisation has assisted in the spread of a local ideology to a legitimate player in the conversion stakes. while the majority of muslim societies are dissuaded by wahabism’s puritanism, it is having widespread appeal to some muslims who have become disillusioned by the failure of secularism. the reversion of european and middle-eastern muslim youth to wahabist strains of islam is proving tenuous to moderate muslims who preach the ecumenical teaching of the qur’an. for the latter, their hope is to ensure that muslims are treated in a non-discriminatory fashion in their host countries. like huntington, influential thinkers like daniel pipes posit a real confrontation between “judeo-christian civilisation and militant islam”,64 daniel pipes, ‘the muslims are coming! the muslims are coming!’ national review, november 19, 1990. while claiming the looming threat of fundamentalist islam. for pipes, the west’s response to islamist fundamentalism is learning how to contain it, without specifying how. the problem here lies in pipes’ analogy between militant islam and soviet communism which is tenuous to say the least.65 eikelman’s rebuff is relevant here as he ensures that the west’s overt attention to islamism distorts the immense social transformation that is taking place in the muslim world.66 one’s perusal of the muslim world will notice distinct differences in how islam is practiced, from the wahabist model of the saudi arabs to the sufi inspired models found in south asia and south-east asia. 146 prajñâ vihâra this intellectual angst is further provoked by the apparent fixation with muslim procreative prowess which is viewed as a problem especially for western societies with low birth rates. here pipes cites that the natural increase in birthrates in muslim countries is 2.8 percent while in developed countries it is only 0.3 percent.67 to put in another way there are “6 children born per muslim women” to “1.7 children born per woman” in the developed world.68 putting birth rates and civilisational clashes aside, the fact remains that from its inception islam has been intertwined with the west, religiously, politically and intellectually.69 the cross-cultural dialogue between the two has shaped both judeo-christian and muslim societies for over a thousand years. in various periods and places (i.e. pre 12th century moorish kingdom in spain, early ottoman era) there was a real intellectual and spiritual collaboration between christians, muslims, and jews. moorish spain’s intellectual liberalism promoted an array of scientific and philosophic ideas which later influenced the european renaissance. on this theme, vlahos points out that the initial period of the ottoman state (14th-15th centuries) saw the emergence of an islamo-christian hybrid civilisation.70 the ottoman cultural melange becomes clearer when one learns that of the four men who founded the ottoman state, “two of them were greek and catalan christians”, while “five of the six initial ottoman rulers had greek mothers”, including “mehmet ii, conqueror of constantinople, who “was almost wholly greek by blood.”71 in the new ottoman state, christianity and islam were often preached as one religion. for example, in the early 15th century, the brklce mustafa movement stressed fraternization between muslims and christians supported by a mystic love of god, in which all differences of religion were overlooked in an attempt actually to unite two faiths as one.72 the sufi undertones of the brklce mustafa movement indicate the ottoman intent to become a cosmopolitan force in eastern europe at a time when western europe was still reeling from the ravages of the great plague. arthur saniotis 147 the second ideological approach is the embracing of “universal tendencies” as espoused by both sufism and globalisation73 the promulgation of xenophobia post september 11 on various national and political fronts necessitates a re-evaluation of modernity. the western legacy of dividing religion and state will be supplanted according to martin e. marty to a “religio-secular world”.74 this is apparent in the genesis of ‘democratic’ iraq and neighbouring iran. however, it is in the emergence of a global culture which is compromising, inclusive and moderate that will eventually lead to the development of other synthesisations and new kinds of self disclosure. as eikelman tells us, mass communication and mass education facilitate new modes of awareness which inform ways in which western and muslim values can conjoin.75 global networks have “multiplied the possibilities for dissolving previous barriers”, and “opening new grounds for interaction and mutual recognition.”76 in this ‘global renaissance’ societies will be able to invest their energies to solving growing global problems with a singularity of purpose. endnotes 1 samuel huntington, ‘the clash of civilizations?’ foreign affairs, summer vol. 72, no. 3, 1993, pp.22-49. 2 zygmunt bauman, in search of politics, polity press, cambridge, 1999, p.39. 3 arthur saniotis, ‘spectres of fear: jihadism as the global bogeyman’, popular culture review, vol. 16, no. 1, winter 2005, p.31 4 arthur saniotis, ‘sacred worlds: an analysis of mystical mastery of sufis in north india’, phd thesis, the university of adelaide, 2002, p.11. 5 r. a. nicholson, the idea of personality in sufism, idarrah-i-adabiyat-i delhi, delhi, 1976. 6 william stoddart, sufism: the mystical doctrines and methods of islam, taj company, new delhi, 1994, p.43. 7 anne-marie schimmel, mystical dimensions of islam, university of north carolina press, 1975. 8 alexander knysh, islamic mysticism: a short history, leiden, boston and köln, 2000. 9 toshihiko izutsu, a comparative study of the key philosophical concepts in sufism and taoism, the keio institute of cultural and linguistic studies, tokyo, 1967. 10 i. h. a. faruqi, sufism and bhakti: mawlana rum and sri ramakrishna, abhinav publishers, new delhi, 1984. 11 ali aghar engineer, 1991. ‘sufism and communal harmony’, in ali asghar 148 prajñâ vihâra engineer (ed.), sufism and communal harmony, george allen and unwin, london, 1991. 12 w. d. begg, the big five of india in sufism, national press, ajmer, india,1972. 13 titus burkhardt, introduction to sufism, thorsons, london, 1995. 14 arthur john arberry, sufism: an account of the mystics of islam, allen & unwin, london, 1950. 15 schimmel, p.10. 16 stoddart, p.43. 17 marjorie hope & james young, ‘islam and ecology’, cross currents, summer 1994, vol. 44, issue 2, pp.180-194. 18 khurshid ahmad, ‘islam: basic principles and characteristics’,world assembly of muslim youth. <http://www.iad.org/books/ipc.html> 19 ibrahim kalin, march 2, 2001.<http://www.holycross.edu/departments/ religiousstudies/ikalin/articles/nasr-entry-revised.htm> 20 khurshid ahmad, ‘islam: basic principles and characteristics’. 21 abdul aziz said, 2001. “islam and the west: toward common ground,” muslim futures network, march-june 2002, viewed 21 april 2006, <http:// www.wnrf.org/cms/islam_west.shtml>. 22 m. m. khizr, sufism and social integration’, in ali asghar engineer (ed.), sufism and carnival harmony, printwell, jaipur, india, 1991, p.109. 23 stephen hirtenstein, ‘muhyiddin ibn ‘arabi: the treasure of compassion’, beshara magazine, issue 12, autumn 1990.<http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/ treasureofcompassion.html> 24 see begg (1972) and desiderio pinto, ‘the mystery of the nizamuddin dargah: the accounts of pilgrims’, in christian w. troll (ed.), muslim shrines in india: their character, history and significance, oxford university press, delhi, 1992, pp.112-124. 25 edward e. evans-pritchard, the sanusi of cyrenaica, clarendon press, oxford, 1954, pp.1-3. 26 ziauddin sardar, ‘islam and the west in a transmodern world’, islamonline.net, august 18, 2004, <http://www.islamonline.net/english/contemporary/2002/05/article20.shtml> 27 meir hatina, ‘where east meets west: sufism as a lever for cultural rapprochement, p.2. <http://www.historyschool.tau.ac.il/forumbaer.hatina paper.pdf> 28 bernard lewis, islam in history, new ed., library press, new york, 1993, p.12. 29 ibid. 30 hatina, p.2; e. sirriyeh, sufis and anti-sufis, curzon, richmond, 1999, pp.29-43. 31 d. tyson, ‘shrine and pilgrimage in turkmenistan as a means to underarthur saniotis 149 stand islam among the turkmen’, central asian monitor – on-line supplement, 1997, no.1, p.1.< http://www.uga.edu/islam/turkmen.html> 32 r. j. ferguson, ‘meeting on the road: cosmopolitan islamic culture and the politics of sufism’, the centre for east-west cultural and economic studies, research paper, december, 1996, no. 4, school of humanities and social sciences, bond university. 33 abdul aziz said, ‘a sufi response’, religion and world order symposium,’ 1994, p.4.< http://www.globaleduc.org/said3.pdf><http://www.rferl.org/nca/ features/2002/02/01022002104035.asp> 34 35 ibid. p.3. 36 r. j. ferguson, ‘meeting on the road: cosmopolitan islamic culture and the politics of sufism’. 37 david tyson, ‘shrine pilgrimage in turkmenistan as a means to understand islam among the turkmen’, central asia monitor-on-line supplement, no.1, 1997.<http://www.uga.edu/islam/turkmen.html> 38 ibid. 39 ibid. 40 ibid. see also ‘din ïnsan kalbïnï tämizleyän ulï güychdür’, watan, 20 sept. 1994, p.2-3. 41 carl w. ernst, ‘sufism, islam, and globalization in the contemporary world: methodological reflections on a changing field of study’, paper presented at seminar on islamic spiritualityuniversity of malaya, kuala lumpur, malaysia, may 24-25, 2005. <http://www.unc.edu/~cernst/articles/global.doc> 42 ibid. see also ‘beaming one,’ (ozma productions for the foreign trade association, city of bokhara, 1993). a copy is available in the media resource center of the library of the university of north carolina, catalog no. v4816. 43 carl w. ernst, ‘sufism, islam, and globalization in the contemporary world: methodological reflections on a changing field of study’. 44 ibid. 45 ibid. 46 ibid. see also a. nizar hamzeh and r. hrair dekmejian, ‘a sufi response to political islamism: al-ahbash of lebanon,; international journal of middle east studies, vol. 28, 1996, pp.217-229. < http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/alahbash.html> 47 r. j. ferguson, ‘meeting on the road: cosmopolitan islamic culture and the politics of sufism’. 48 nikki r. keddie, ‘secularism and its discontents,’ daedalus, summer, 2003. p.20. 49 norman geras, ‘human nature and progress,’ new left review, vol. 1 no. 213, september-october, 1995, p.152. 50 george rupp, ‘religion, modern secular culture, and ecology,’ daedalus, 150 prajñâ vihâra fall 2001. <http://www.amacad.org/publications/fall2001/rupp.aspx> 51 howard f. greene, ‘elaboration of the initial ideas for the founding of the center for ecozoic studies,’ center for ecozoic studies, summer 1999. p.7. 52 brian swimme, ‘the universe is a green dragon,’ in context: a quarterly of humane sustainable culture, 1997. pp.7-9. <http://www.context.org/iclib/ ic12/swimme.htm> 53 howard f. greene, ‘elaboration of the initial ideas for the founding of the center for ecozoic studies.’ 54 abdul aziz said & nathan c. funk, ‘sufi prescriptions for world politics: a way to global community,’ the ‘shakir’ world encounters, marrakech, morocco, september 10-12, 2004 p.5. <http://www.american.edu/aasaid/sufi%20 prescriptions%20for%20world%20politics.pdf> 55 peter young, ‘ibn ‘arabi: towards a universal point of view’, delivered at the mias symposium oxford, 1999, p.8. <http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/ pyoung.html> 56 this passage was taken from an unpublished paper entitled ‘reinventing nature: thomas berry’s “new story” as universal communitas’, february 2006, p.13. see also ibn ‘arabi and modern thought. extract for chapter 3: ibn ‘arabi and the era.’ <http://www.ibn-arabi.com/modernextract.htm> the guiding thought of ibn ‘arabi is contained in the sacred prophetic tradition of islam which states: “i was a hidden treasure and i wanted to be known, so i created the world, so that all things could live in me, and i could live in all things.” 57 carl w. ernst, ‘sufism, islam, and globalization in the contemporary world: methodological reflections on a changing field of study’. 58 ibid. 59 ibid. 60 ibid. 61 ibid. 62 ibid. 63 bryan turner, orientalism, postmodernism, and globalism, routledge, london and new york, 1994, pp.77-114. < www.danielpipes.org/article/198> 65 ibid. 66 dale f. eickelman, ‘the coming transformation in the muslim world’, p. 1. <http://www.drsoroush.com/pdf/e-cmo-20000100-eickelman.pdf> 67 daniel pipes, ‘the muslims are coming! the muslims are coming!’ 68 ibid. 69 see richard w. bulliet, ‘the case for islamo-christian civilization,’ retrieved on 21 april 2006. <www.columbia.edu/cu/cup/catalog/data/023112/ 0231127960.htm> 70 michael vlahos , ‘the muslims are coming! the muslims are coming!’, august 2003,tcsdaily, <http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=082603a> 71 ibid. arthur saniotis 151 72 ibid. 73 bryan turner, orientalism, postmodernism, and globalism. 74 vali nasr, ‘lessons from the muslim world,’ daedalus, summer, 2003, p.67. 75 dale f. eickelman, ‘the coming transformation in the muslim world’. 76 ibid. 152 prajñâ vihâra 22 prajñā vihāra market intervention and human rights alexander seran atma jaya catholic university, indonesia abstract today human rights are often described in terms of the rule of law, constitutionalism, civil liberties, constitutional rights, and fundamental rights. this paper aims to understand the responsibility of a government to intervene into markets to answer the calls for justice and sustainability. the requires a theory of economic welfare connected to the faith in fundamental human rights. one such social theory of economic welfare is provided by karl polanyi who calls for government intervention into the market to compliment the market’s self-interest – something he calls a “double movement.” amartya sen also criticized one-sidedness understanding of economics contending that it violates the two roots of economics in both, engineering and ethics. this paper will show that government intervention into markets is not just acceptable according to a formalist economic theory, but also necessary as a preservation of fundamental human rights, and to protect justice and sustainability in economic and social advancement. keywords: human rights, government intervention, economic welfare, justice prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 21-36 © 2000 by assumption university press alexander seran 23 introduction our faith in fundamental human rights cannot be dissociated from economic theory. there is also the responsibility of the government intervention into markets known as economic intervention. the 30 articles of the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) refer to the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the people. therefore, the udhr is considered as a milestone document in history in which the protection of human rights is closely related to the concrete problems in the domain of economic welfare. critical analysis of economic welfare presupposes an understanding of the nature of economy which in the time of the ancient greeks was called oikonomia and chrematistik. the former embraces chiefly wealth consumption in the satisfaction of the households. the latter deals with exchange in wealth-getting thus necessitates justice and sustainability. the rise of social contract theories in 17th to 18th centuries involved a speculation concerning the state of nature of a war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes). this hypothetical condition was created to pave the way for a theory of the state to emerge. one can hypothetically state that in the lawless condition the strong will rule over the weak and the rich will control over the poor. as a consequence, there is an increasing inequality. critical social theorists tried to resolve this inequality in the state of nature by theorizing a social contract aimed at organizing human beings in a community of law and order known as civitas or society or simply the state in modern sense. this state of law and order was designed to mirror the city-state or polis in the ancient greeks. the development of the idea of the social contract and natural rights occurred during the 17th and 18th centuries with hobbes, locke and rousseau. although these social contract theorists had different interpretations of the nature of the social contract they all contributed to the underlying idea that human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. the power of the state has the responsibility to protect these fundamental rights because these rights justify the reason for the state’s coming into existence. but the question is what if the state fails 24 prajñā vihāra in protecting fundamental human rights? are there indicators to measure the conduct of the state regarding fundamental human rights, and can one evaluate the liability of the state to intervene into the problems that threaten human rights? the inequality of income is placed at the top of the list of fundamental human rights violations in 2017. this reflects both the cause and the results of human rights violations in the field of economic welfare. the main cause of inequality of income is conditioned by the economic situation where the top 1% of the world’s population now owns more than everyone else put together. for example, in the united states of america (usa), the top 1% of the population secured over half of all income growth since the 2008-2009 financial crises. the result of this is an inequality which erodes labor rights, increases discrimination, and raises barriers to political participation, and threatens the protection of human rights. economic inequality of income impacts human rights in indonesia in the form of terror, freedom of religion, women’s and girls’ rights, children’s rights, disability rights, etc. michael e. porter, a professor in harvard business school points out that business prosperity requires a healthy community. for a business to gain prosperity it should comply with community standards. good business integrates societal improvement into economic value creation. by shared value, porter refers to business that creates economic value by creating societal value, using capitalism to address social problems, and resolving social problems. porter’s point is that creating shared values in business requires being able to include the societal values of the community. but in the real world, communities where corporations actually operate, vary in terms of cultures and religions of the people, and often involve conflicts in value within the communities and against the claims of the corporations. alasdair macintyre in his book after virtue presents a challenge to the believers in the universal human rights when he questions whether there can be a moral consensus generated on basis of an ideal rationality, and whether there is a common historical narrative. this was the mistake of the enlightenment project which reduced truth alexander seran 25 claims to an ideal rationality. his book whose justice? which rationality was written in response to an epistemic crisis in which truth claims must be understood historically in rival traditions. samuel huntington, in his provocative book the clash of civilizations, hypothesized that the imposition of one’s view over another ends up in social conflicts because people use their cultural and religious traditions as their guiding principles. today we witness cultural and religious conflicts almost all over the world. most of them arise in multicultural societies. in contrast, global market and politics tend to end the diversity of cultures and religions and regard human beings as members of a market society under a universal law of freedom. francis fukuyama in his book the end of history and the last man called for a universal law of freedom to unite all nations into one polity. democracy, for him, is a universal form of world politics. the problem is the concept of human rights in western constitutionalism paves the way for neo-liberalist proponents of the self-interested market to enforce an ideal rationality of individual freedom, while ignoring practical rationality based on cultural and religious beliefs in rival traditions. actual rival traditions can split apart when one is trying to impose the one-sidedness of a truth claim over others. but they can also be integrated through shared and analogous values in dialogues. macintyre’s main point is to articulate a politics of self-defense for local communities that aspires to protect their practices and sustain their way of life from corrosive effects of capitalist economy, while allowing cultural and religious traditions by recourse to practical rationality where mutual recognition among cultures and religions can be achieved. the question is how justify government intervention into markets in support of fundamental human rights? the answer is to consider economic welfare as the combination of private and public wealth. this involves the recognition of a plurality of traditions which have rival and largely incompatible forms of practical rationality 26 prajñā vihāra theory of economic welfare the theory of economic welfare refers to the level of prosperity and quality of living standards that help improve economic wellbeing of the people. economic welfare is measured through a variety of factors such as real income, real gross domestic products (gdp) and other indicators. this creates difficulties in measuring economic welfare. for examples, there are difficulties in measuring living standards due to purchasing power parity (ppp) compared to neighbor countries. there are economic activities that cannot be measured such as black markets. the externalities resulting from growth often lead to decline in living standards. poverty can be widespread even though the country may have high gnp per capita. there are intangible factors, such as literacy and access to education. economic welfare is basically referred to the quality of life. such factors which lead to the quality of life often cannot be made available by the people themselves. this often requires government intervention. this is especially important because economic policies and programs are necessary due to the problem of justice and sustainability mainly to those who are the least-advantaged. karl polanyi’s economic welfare theory can be used to deal with the problem of dis-embedding the market economy from society. the capitalist market tends to develop only in the self-interest of capitalist private economic institutions. the advance of this socially dis-embedded economy must be countered by economic policies and programs that respect the well-being of the people. government intervention may affect inefficient markets at the same time promote justice and sustainability as the main task of the government. this is what he called a “double movement.” the liability of the government intervention is considered a social responsibility to maintain justice and sustainability, and which supports fundamental human rights. the methodology used by polanyi in bringing his theory of economic welfare is radically different from conventional methodologies aiming at renewal of capitalist market into a social market. polanyi’s argument is that the social, political and economic spheres of human alexander seran 27 existence are deeply interlinked and cannot be analyzed in isolation. polanyi uses historical analysis to understand the emergence of industrial society and the influence of science and technology on economic behavior. through historical analysis of social context, polanyi arrives at an understanding of the economy as a kind of functioning for greater good for the whole society. this insight is historically embedded in both praxis and theory since plato and aristotle in the ancient greeks. the notion of the greater good for the whole society implies in the task of the government is to protect justice and sustainability in economic affairs in order to be consistent with democratic system in seeking the well-being of all members of the society. faith in fundamental human rights is concrete because it is about well-being that is the fulfillment of economic, political, and ecological necessities that can only be realized through and within the state. the importance of history in analyzing economic conditions is based on hegel’s idea that history realizes the principle of rational freedom in the world through the mechanism of human history. thus, history is shaped by larger forces which leads it to the realization of greater freedom and rationality. history is about the concrete progress of human beings in relation to economy, politics, and ecology. in his book on economics, amartya sen, a 1998 nobel prize winner in economics sciences points the way to further analysis of more specific notion of economic welfare implied in the term economics itself. economics was for a long time seen as a branch of ethics. for ethics is about doing the right thing then economics is understood as a discipline that can help us answer the question how to do the right things in dealing with scarcity of resources in order to increase well-being of individuals and that of the whole society. thus economics is not limited to its service to the accumulation of money and the stock market. economics is about answering socratic question, how should one live? it is not about having but about well-being. wealth is not abstract but concrete in the sense of fulfilling human ends requiring understanding of the two origins of economics, both engineering and ethics. based on understanding of the two origins of economics, engineering and ethics can be used in advancing the 28 prajñā vihāra greater good for man as a political animal. engineering relates to science and technology that we develop, while ethics relates to norms and values to what extent we are to abstain from self-interest. both engineering and ethics are part of politics in which man as individual, social, and natural being relates to family, community, society, and ecology. therefore, economic welfare necessitates freedom and justice to be sustained in a community of beings. from this point, the government intervention into markets is necessary to safeguard justice and sustainability as faith in fundamental human rights. the methodology used by sen in his theory of economic welfare is to harken back to the ancient greek theory of the social market to understand the present condition of the self-interest markets. by analyzing the previous historical developments in economic praxis and theories, sen comes to distinguish rationality as consistency in choice and rationality as maximization of self-interest. one is no better than the other since they are complimentary. rationality as consistency maybe unjust while self-interest can lead to selfishness. we need to be consistent to be fair while fairness does not exclude caring for oneself. dilemmas in decision-making requires aristotle’s idea of prudence which allows decision-maker to avoid danger or risk. it is the cardinal virtue that, according to aristotle, rightly directs particular human acts. therefore, history presents the insight of substantive ethics in seeking economic well-being as something worthwhile for the whole community. it seeks to address the socratic question concerning “how should i live?” in seeing economics as a combination of engineering and ethics, sen finally stresses that economic welfare can be substantially enriched, in a predictive economics or a descriptive economics, only if by paying more attention to ethics. discussion 1. shapes of faith in fundamental human rights the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) is a declaration adopted by the united nations general assembly on 10 december 1948 at alexander seran 29 the palais de chaillot in paris, france. the declaration emerged directly from the experience of the two world wars. the declaration consists of 30 articles that have been elaborated into international treaties, economic transfers, regional human rights instruments, national constitutions, and other laws. this is known as the international bill of human rights which consists of the universal declaration of human rights, the international covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights, and the international covenant on civil and political rights. they are offered as international instruments by the united nations aiming at protecting succeeding generations from war that will bring untold sorrows to mankind. all of these will be of help to a variety of readers who are specialists in political science, international relations, law and ethics in promoting justice and sustainability in economic and social advancement. the aim of udhr is first to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person, in equal rights of men and women. second, it is established to promote justice and respect for the obligations that arise from treatises and other sources of international law. third, it is used to promote social progress and better standards of life in relation to human freedom. the significance of having faith in fundamental human rights is mainly to guide practice of tolerance and living together in peace with one another as good neighbors. it follows that in practice of tolerance we may be united to work together to maintain international peace and security. the result of tolerance and solidarity is to make international machinery for the promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples work. 2. the history of human rights most declarations of human rights emerged in times of social conflict. the united kingdom’s bill of rights was created in 1688 after a revolution demanding the crown and parliament in order to create an equitable demarcation of powers. this has come to have universal significance influencing the formulation of france’s declaration of the rights of man and citizens in 1789, the united states’ bill of rights in 30 prajñā vihāra 1791, and the union of soviet socialist republics’ constitution in 1936. the united nations’ universal declaration of human rights in 1948 followed these earlier pioneering efforts. the english bill of rights rested on the parliamentary supremacy but later it inspired more sophisticated development of human rights present in the constitutions of many countries today. the basic elements of human rights written into a constitution consists of the civic liberties that allow man to live in freedom and equality upon public utility, opinion, and assembly to do whatever as long as it does not injure another or is not prohibited by the law. it means that no one shall be accused, arrested, and imprisoned on presumption of guilt. they must be presumed innocent until the time they are proven guilty. in a constitutional state, freedom to worship, speech, assembly, and petition to the government for a redress of grievances are recognized by the law. we witness that in a country that suffers from poverty and illiteracy, access to justice is very limited. economic inequality hinders the ability of the the least-advantaged people in society to seek justice. it erodes labor rights, leads to discrimination, and limits political participation. these problems require economic policies and government intervention. to bring equality in economic welfare into existence the government must assess through the history of economics that the greater good in economic welfare comprises both, private and public wealth. only by economic intervention into markets can governments reliably unite corporations and civil society to achieve economic change for a greater good. 3. insights as the knowledge of being plato’s economic theory of the division of labor in the republic considered justice and sustainability as the maintenance of politics in a city-state called polis. for aristotle, the concept of economic welfare involved both the household management of wealth and the mutual respect of citizens under the rule of law. for one to become a good citizen required training to be mature in virtues to act according to his nature as both rational and social being. being both rational and social alexander seran 31 are complementary elements of intellectual virtue and important in the formation of the young. his virtue ethics holds that human beings always act in order to obtain that which they think is good. therefore, the state or political community possess the highest degree of the good and should be the highest aim. the rise of the civitas in european societies was considered the beginning of modern civilization that has begun in the middle ages (from 5th century to 15th century), passed through renaissance in the early modernity and reached its culmination in 17th and 18th centuries wherein social contract theories come into existence. t. hobbes’ leviathan was first published in 1651 at the end of the collapse of feudal system in 16th century in which mercantilist economy took the lead in economic system mostly in england and physiocratism was developed in france. they both were made up into free market economic theory and hitherto supported by positive sciences brought to european societies by political revolutions in england, france, the usa inter alia the copernican scientific revolution in 17th century and the great transformation caused by industrial revolution in 19th century. by the end of mercantilism, development of capitalist markets in 18th -20th centuries were challenged by socialism developed by the marxist tradition with a goal to end the capitalist class society into a classless society. to this point, democratization in politics appeared to remove the one-sidedness of capitalist self-interest with social interest of socialism to reconciled both individual liberty and social responsibility into a form of democratic form of a welfare state. increasing inequality in many countries has become a problem that requires government intervention to create conditions for human rights in a concrete sense. the liability of the government to intervene into markets has been defended since the great recession in 1932 to 1933 in the usa. it led keynes to argue for government intervention to enhance the well-being of the people. this was subsequently rejected by neo-liberalists. they believed that intervention into the market would harm and violate basic rights of human beings to seek their individual self-interest. robert shiller, a nobel laureate in economics, shows that 32 prajñā vihāra after the experience of the great depression in 1932-1933, and the great recession in the usa in 2007-2009. there is now some acceptance in keynes’ ideas concerning economic intervention. although the world’s major banks have kept short-term interest rates at near zero levels we have seen in this government intervention the greater good that results from economic intervention actually protect economic welfare for all as shown in graph below. sweden is a proof of the viability of a state-oriented economic welfare system. the increasing equality has been made by the country as one of the world’s most compressed income distributions. one can see the rise of the welfare state from an economic policy that calls for defending justice and sustainability rather than seeing it from a diehard position of fighting taken by either capitalism or socialism. the decline of socialism in the 20th century was seen by neo-liberalist proponents as proof that nationalizing the means of production, distribution, and exchange to serve some ideal of social justice was a failure. the real battlefield of today is recovering the idea economic welfare in respect to freedom, justice and sustainability against the emphasis on efficiency and profit for self-interest. pareto’s theory of an optimal equilibrium leads to efficiency but not justice and sustainability. only through some form of economic intervention can justice and sustainability be achieved alexander seran 33 which serves fundamental human rights. although economic intervention impacts efficiency, it does not promote economic and social advancement in the long run. sometimes the acceptance of a loss is justified for the greater long-term good.. conclusion an economic theory that fits the idea of economic welfare goes back to the ancient greek theory of social market economy and continues in the insights of both karl polanyi’s theory of double movement and amartya sen’s theory of two origins of economics both engineering and ethics. this double movement is an ethical imperative requiring active intervention by the government as a corrective to the dis-embedding of private from public wealth. it has a dual function that is reflected in the very idea of economics. sen refers to formal economics or the science of economics that necessitates scientific and skilled training to allow it to serve the whole of society. this means we should not neglect the importance of ethics. through ethics, economics is directed to the service of people’s need for food, shelter, education etc. in concrete manifestations of the knowledge of well-being. 34 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 “universal declaration of human rights”, ohchr, http://www.ohchr.org/ en/udhr/documents/udhr_translations/eng.pdf. 2 “shaping policy advancing practice strengthening accountability”, institute for human rights and business (ihrb), https://www.ihrb.org/library/top-10/top-tenissues-in-2017. 3 “world report january 2017: events of 2016”, human rights watch, https:// www.hrw.org/report/2017/01/12/world-report-2017/events-2016. 4 t. porter and r. derry, sustainability and business in a complex world, business and society review, vol. 117, issue 1 (1 march, 2012) pp.33-53. 5 alasdair macintyre, whose justice? which rationality? (notre dame.: university of notre dame press, 1988). see also alasdair macintyre, after virtue: a study in moral theory (london: bloomsbury, 3rd edition, 2007). 6 samuel p. huntington, huntington, the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. (new york: simon & shuster, paperbacks edition, 2007) 7 fukuyama, francis., the end of history and the last man: the origins of political order. new york: free press in paperbacks edition, 2006). 8 matěj. vančura, “polanyi’s great transformation and the concept of the embedded economy”. (prague: institute of economic studies, faculty of social sciences charles university in prague, 2011) 9 karl polany, the great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times (1944), foreword by joseph e. stiglitz and introduction by fred block (boston: boston beacon press., 2001). see also gareth dale, karl polanyi: the limits of the market. (cambridge: polity press, 2010). 10 amartya sen, on ethics and economics, edited by john m. letiche (oxford: oxford university press, 1990). 11 ian brownlie, ed., basic documents on human rights (oxford: clarendon press,1971) 12 georges enderle, “defining goodness in business and economics” in dimensions of goodness, edited by vittorio hösle (new castle upon tyne uk: cambridge scholars publishing, 2003). 13 plato, the collected dialogues including the letters edited by hamilton and huntington with introduction and prefatory notes (princeton: bollingen series lxxi, 18th printing, 2002), pp.575 -844. 14 the basic works of aristotle, edited by richard mckeon (new york: the modern library, 2001). 15 thomas hobbes, leviathan (1651), edited by mikhael oakeshott with an introduction by richard s. peter (new york: a touchstone book, 1997). alexander seran 35 16 f.a. hayek, the constitution of liberty (chicago: routledge, 2006) 17 “top ten issues in 2017”, institute fo human rights and business, https:// www.ihrb.org/library/top-10/top-ten-issues-in-2017 18 jeroen c.j.m. van den bergh,. “a precautionary strategy to dangerous climate change is affordable: 12 reasons” in green economy reader: lectures in ecological economics and sustainability, edited stanislav hmelev. oxford: environment europe, ltd., 2011) 19 hayek, the constitution…op. cit 20 gregory. n. menkiw makroekonomi edisi 6 (jakarta: erlangga, 2008). bibliography aristotle, πολιτική, tralated into english politics, book i aristotle, 2010. οἰκονομικά, translated into english economics, book ii. clarendon book. bergh, jeroen c.j.m. van den., 2011. “a precautionary strategy to dangerous climate change is affordable: 12 reasons” in green economy reader: lectures in ecological economics and sustainability, edited stanislav hmelev. oxford: environment europe, ltd. brownlie, ian., ed.,1971. basic documents on human rights. oxford: clarendon press, council of economic advisers (u s), january 2017. “economic report of the president together with the annual report of the council of economic advisers”., enderle, georges., 2003. “defining goodness in business and economics” in dimensions of goodness, edited by vittorio hösle (new castle upon tyne uk: cambridge scholars publishing. dale, gareth,. 2010. karl polanyi: the limits of the market. cambridge: polity press. 36 prajñā vihāra fred, alford. c. 1985., “ is jürgen habermas’ reconstructive science really science?” in theory and society, 14 (3), 32. published by: springer. stable url: http://www.jstor.org/ stable/657118accessed: 29/11/2010 21:41 fukuyama, francis., 2006. the end of history and the last man: the origins of political order. new york: free press in paperbacks edition. hayek, f.a., 2006. the constitution of liberty. chicago: routledge. hobbes, thomas., 1997. leviathan (1651), edited by mikhael oakeshott with an introduction by richard s. peter. new york: a touchstone book. honneth, axel., 1995. kamf um anerkennung (1949), translated into english the struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflict by joel anderson. cambridge, massachusetts: the mit press https://www.ihrb.org/library/top-10/top-ten-issues-in-2017 http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/documents/udhr_translations/eng. pdf human rights watch, world report 2017: events of 2016 huntington, samuel p., 2007. the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon & shuster, paperbacks edition. macintyre, alasdair., 1988. whose justice? which rationality?. notre dame.: university of notre dame press. macintyre, alasdair., 2007. after virtue: a study in moral theory. london: bloomsbury, 3rd edition. menkiw, gregory.n. 2008. makroekonomi, edisi 6. jakarta: erlangga. polanyi, karl., 2001. the great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times (1944), foreword by joseph e. stiglitz and introduction by fred block. boston beacon press. https://www.ihrb.org/library/top-10/top-ten-issues-in-2017 alexander seran 37 plato, πολιτεία, translated into english republic. book ii and ix. poespoprojo, s dan seran a. 2015. filsafat ilmu pengetahuan. jakarta: penerbuku kompas, sen, amartya. 1990. on ethics and economics, edited by john m. letiche. oxford: oxford university press. tekippe, terry j., 1996. what is lonergan up to in insight?: a primer. collegeville, minnesota: the liturgical press. vančura, matěj., 2011. “polanyi’s great transformation and the concept of the embedded economy”. prague: institute of economic studies, faculty of social sciences charles university in prague. spirituality and mysticism: a global view socio-religious dimensions to chieftaincy affairs in yorubaland, nigeria, west africa jacob kehinde ayantayo university of ibadan, nigeria abstract this paper examines the socio-religious dimension in chieftaincy in africa, with regard to history, categories of chiefs, choice of chiefs, and their acts of governance. it observes that, in spite of the wind of social change that has affected african cultural heritage positively and negatively, chieftaincy institutions still remains vibrant. this paper also examines the problems and prospects of the chieftaincy institution in the contemporary age. stating the problem as a matter of historical fact, the chieftaincy institution is one of the age-old cultural heritages of yoruba on the one hand, and of africa in general. this institution, in spite of the wind of social change affecting it positively or negatively, still remains vibrant even in the contemporary age of globalization. thus, it retains its glory that makes it a pride of africa in the world polity. but the relevant questions which this paper seeks to answer are: what factors have contributed to its stability and sustainability? and, what are its problems and prospects? what efforts should be put in place to preserve the institution? to the best of our knowledge, the socio-religious belief, sentiment, conviction, attitude, creed, dogma, feeling and ideology of yoruba people, among others, constitute formidable forces enhancing the continuity of this institution. in order to understand this fully, this work is divided into eight sections to cover the following: chieftaincy institutions in history, categories of chiefs, choice of chiefs, chiefs and their acts of governance. others include chieftainship in modern time, factors enhancing the 1 sustainability and stability of chieftaincy institution, problems and prospects of chieftainship. our scope of study is yoruba land where we have access to first hand information, records, and historical facts. however, when necessary, reference could be made to africa in general. we shall discuss the above inter-related variables one after the other. chieftainship in the history in yoruba land one cannot say precisely when chieftaincy institutions started in yoruba land. it must have started since the creation of society. the creation of civil society for any reason presupposes governance. certain people constitute the governing agents. governance has to do with formulation and execution of rules and regulations for the benefit of society. rules and regulations become necessary in civil societies when one considers the state of nature of man which, according to hobbes, is the state in which men lived prior to the setting up of organized society. in that state, there were no laws, no authority, no morality, no sense of justice and injustice, no notions of right and wrong. everybody simply pursued the satisfaction of his desire (hobbes 1946:32). the creation of society put an end to this situation. the emergence of state therefore created room for governance. one can assume that chiefs are governors of their respective societies. on this note, we can then argue that chieftaincy as an institution, whether or not it is well organized as a state, began in antiquity following the formation of any given society. for the yoruba society, we can say that the chieftaincy institution began with the emergence of oduduwa as the ruler of ile-ife (the first town in yoruba land) and the dispersal from there of his descendants who later headed their respective kingdoms. yet, what is at least certain is that the socio-political history of the yoruba over the years 2 before colonization was characterized by the existence of several kingdoms. these kingdoms were under the headship of chiefs whether major (as in the case of kings) or minor (as in the case of lesser chiefs) because chieftainship deals with act of governance. from this point, we can establish two things. one, a discussion of the origin of yoruba kingdom could be associated with the place of ife in yoruba history and cosmology. ileife is regarded in history as the cradle of yoruba race. oduduwa was the founder of ileife. therefore, he could be regarded as the first chief in ile-ife. this should be so because as history has it, under oduduwa, ife developed a centralized and highly sophisticated political system. (adediran 1998:2). as afolayan has put it, the climax of this development was the emergence of kingdoms (under the headship of chiefs) in different parts of what later became yoruba land. (afolayan 1998:14). in other words, the origin of chieftaincy is dated to the time immemorial. categories of chiefs in yoruba society for the purpose of emphasis, we need to know who a chief is before we discuss the categories of chiefs we have in yoruba society. the term chief simply refers to a ruler of a tribe, clan, dynasty, family, group, horde, house, native pedigree, people and race. within the context of our discussion, a chief is a ruler of a town, village or hamlet. the chief derives his authority from god and people. a chief is invariably a leader, i.e. the one who leads his people. leadership goes with chieftaincy, which is the power of control over a group of people. in other words, chiefs are traditional leaders. they include paramount chiefs like obas, obis, waziris and emirs. there are different categories of chiefs in yoruba land. the categorization follows yoruba political tradition, which is embedded in yoruba theology, cosmology, 3 cosmogony and philosophy. (nabofa 1999:31). in yoruba society there are two categories of chiefs viz. major and minor chiefs. each of these is also in degree, caliber, grade, status and class. regarding the major chiefs, we have kings or oba – who are crowned chiefs and also the councils of chiefs. the council of chiefs headed by the oba consists of six main chiefs. in oyo kingdom, they are regarded as oyo-mesi. they are very powerful and the oba cannot do without them. they are also the kingmakers and the highest ruling body; however, the oba appoints them. there are six categories of minor chiefs: palace chiefs – they are appointed by the oba to discharge certain responsibilities such as up-keep of the palace, running errands for the king, cleaning the palace and ensuring good running of the palace. these chiefs because of their closeness to the king could be regarded as the king’s confidants. warrior chiefs – they consist of hunters and the powerful people in the society. the oba appoints them chiefs. these chiefs defend the town against internal threats and external invasions. they provide security network for the town as soldiers of the community and ensure peace in their community in time of war and social unrest. market chiefs – they can include both males and females. they oversee the smooth running of market places in town. they ensure free access to the market. they are in charge of welfare of marketers regarding buying and selling. they also ensure that sanity prevails and also work towards cleanliness of the market. women chiefs – they see to women affairs. they are not what we would today call feminists per se, but they protect the interests of women in community affairs. they 4 provide the council of chiefs with information about women, and how women could be mobilized to contribute to the smooth administration of the town. the youth chiefs – these are few chiefs appointed from different age groups to represent the interests of youth. the youth constitute an important social class in yoruba society and therefore, their interests are always taken into consideration because of their capacity to offer valuable services that will enhance the welfare of community members. for example, they engage in various communal works such as the construction of roads, dams, market places, and the repair of fallen bridges, the channeling of streams, and at times, the building of king’s palace. religious chiefs – these consist of diviners, prophets, prophetesses, magicians, and medicine men. precisely, they are leaders of devotees of different divinities in town (ray 1999:72). these chiefs, a few of whom appointed by the oba, are constantly called upon to meet and offer prayer, ritual or sacrifice during both critical and less critical occasions such as planting and harvest seasons, war, drought, pestilence and annual propitiatory sacrifice for ensuring the welfare of the community (fadipe 1970:206). honorary chiefs – these are appointed by the kings. in the yoruba society, it is the tradition that honorary chieftaincy titles could be given to indigenes or non-indigenes who have brought outstanding honour and glory to town through personal dedication and patriotic commitment to their community. all the chiefs regardless of their status and functions work hand in hand towards rendering selfless service to humanity and towards the improvement of community. this goes by way of offering outstanding services in the defense of a cause popularly adjudged 5 to be positive, relevant and beneficial to the town and humanity and of bravery in the protection and defense of community interest, public service, safety of life and property. choice of a chief (oba/king) in order to appreciate the factors that foster the sustainability of chieftaincy institution in yoruba land, it is important to consider methods of choosing chief, which are both social and religious enterprises. since the oba is the head of chieftainship, we shall discuss methods of installing an oba in yoruba land, the phenomenon that makes the institution an enduring one. yoruba people are traditionally methodical in everything. for example, there are specific procedures to follow in enthroning oba (the major or head chief). following the demise of an oba, the kingmaker will swing into swift traditional actions, which involve searching for the next oba through spiritual and secular means. the starting point is the kingmaker’s request made upon the next ruling house to nominate candidate(s) as the case may be. let us note that there are ruling houses where obaship candidates are selected on a rotational order. there is always healthy competition among candidates within the next ruling house. candidates engage in persuading, campaigning and petitioning the kingmakers and the elders in the house to favour them in the selection exercise. public opinion also is important in selecting one out of many candidates. this is why we say that chieftainship is somewhat a social enterprise. for instance, the whole house expects the prospective candidate to meet certain social standard, which is a reflection of yoruba social morality. that is, prospective chieftaincy title holder should be courageous, brave, intelligent, wise, patriotic, a man of good character and should be 6 relatively rich or wealthy – richness to yoruba is a manifestation of hard work, which is expected of prospective office holders. in addition, the person must have a stable and good family life, because the yoruba believe that charity begins at home. after wide consultation and lengthy consideration among elders of the ruling house, the head of the house will announce to the kingmaker the name of the candidate unanimously chosen by the whole house. once the whole house arrives at this decision, all the remaining candidates will rally round and give their supports to the emerging nominee for the glory of the ruling house in question. today, unlike in the past, an aggrieved candidate may challenge the decision of the house in court of law; but more often than not, the whole exercise is not always a do or die affair. however, in the case where it is difficult for the ruling house in question to arrive at a decision, the kingmakers will be called upon to intervene. what they do is to bring religious dimension to the whole exercise. this involves invitation of ifa diviner who will use his divination object(s) in order to divine who the ifa wishes should become oba. it is important to note here in passing that the diviners who have esoteric knowledge are capable of interpreting the mysteries of life, the hidden information, convey, and uncover the past and to look into the future and also convey the messages of a god or gods. since a chief is regarded as representative of god, yoruba people always call upon diviners to give guidance in daily affairs especially regarding the choice of king. once the diviner conveys the message of god by naming one person out of the candidates, the king makers will move to the next action, which is the installation of the oba. installation of oba (chiefs) 7 traditions vary from town to town, regarding the methods and procedures for enthroning the oba. we shall discuss only the common features. the first step is the invitation of religious leaders by the kingmakers to prescribe and perform necessary religious rites, rituals, ceremony, formality, observance, practice and traditions, associated with enthronement. all these are addressed to the ancestral spirits, past heroes, heroines and rulers of the community in order to ask them to transfer authority to the next oba and to support and guide him in all his political administration. these rituals could be performed a week before the formal installation of the oba. on the day of installation proper, certain rituals also will be performed, some secretly and some openly in the presence of the teeming populace who as a matter of tradition troop out to witness the ceremony. this is not only to demonstrate their approval of the appointment but also to show their happiness and loyalty towards the enthronement of the new oba. before the teeming populace, the kingmakers instruct the oba-elect to prostrate three times to woo the approval of ancestral spirits and that of every male and female member of the society. as he rises from the third prostration, the whole crowd will echo “ka-bi-ye-si”, which means, “no one dares to query his authority”. this is a sign of approval of his candidacy. the kingmaker will now pronounce that the oba will no longer in his lifetime prostrate before anybody. this is followed by sticking to his cap a certain leaf (ewe – akoko) a symbol of authority on the part of the oba. after this rite, the oba will be taken to the palace for further rituals. tradition says that he will be offered the tongue and the heart of the last oba, which was preserved for him. this consumption finalizes the transfer of power and authority from the past oba to the new oba. 8 all these religious rituals among others make the oba a sacred personality and a hallowed person. this is because the rituals performed will allow him to acquire a sense of communion with mystical forces, directing him out of himself into the world of an ancestral spirits. the impression here is that the chieftaincy title of the oba symbolizes the divine nature of the oba who is now regarded as the representative of the ancestral spirits. mbiti calls the oba earthly viceroy or vice-regent. (mbiti 1980:184). the yoruba according to idowu regarded the oba as oba alase ekeji orisa – the king, the commander and wielder of authority next to the orisa (supernatural object of worship). he is regarded with a level of respect approaching veneration. the installation of the oba is immediately followed with merriment, which involves feasting, eating, drinking, drumming, singing and dancing. the ceremonies are performed periodically within specific days such as the first, the third and the threemonth periods preceding the installation. such ceremonies are always accompanied with payment by the oba to the council of chiefs certain number of kola, bitter kola, cowries, honey, bag of salt, palm oil, goats and chicken among others. the ceremonies will involve the whole town and is for the enjoyment of the whole town. the purpose of the ceremony is to incorporate the king into the palace and also to introduce him to method of governance. the feasting of the people in town is a way to solicit their support towards effective administration of the town. chiefs and their acts of governance in yoruba land administration of yoruba community rests in the hands of oba and his council of chiefs. they meet every five-day mostly (on the market day), except in cases of emergency, to deliberate, consider, debate and examine both positive and negative issues 9 or matters affecting the society in general. they start every deliberation with prayer and invocation of ancestral spirits to take preeminence and bestow guidance in all their deliberations. there is no strict agenda, but they discuss the issues as member of the council who have freedom of expression in raising them. what makes their discussion fluent and peaceful has to do with the custom of deferring to seniors. the senior chiefs speak first before the junior ones. in all, there was room for tolerance of opinions. (lenski 1966:20). the council of chiefs constitutes the legislative, executive and judicial arms of traditional system of government, which perform several civil and military functions. for example, the legislative functions include making laws on issues related to intra and inter town civil affairs, commercial and overall economic activities, security of life and properties of the members of the community. laws are made concerning penalties awaiting whoever violates the laws of the land. the executive functions performed by chiefs consist of taking decisions on question of policies, relation between towns, its offshoots, and tributaries and external relations. under external relations come questions of peace and war, question of finance (whether to raise funds by special taxation), and public works (the clearing of paths and bush, the bridging of swollen streams, the building of town wall and moat, the building and repair of the king’s palace and the making of roads. in like manner, the judicial function of the council of chiefs consists of settling disputes between chiefs, between parties belonging to different wards. they also entertain criminal cases or indictable offences such as murder, treason, burglary, arson, unlawful wounding, manslaughter, incest, witchcraft and sorcery. 10 while the chiefs engage in these civic duties, they always seek the support and loyalty of members of their community who are always cooperating. this political structure derives its stability from the custom of regarding the chiefs as representative of ancestral spirits who should be held in honour. holding the chiefs in honour embraces loyalty and patriotic acts on the parts of members of the society. chieftaincy and modern time modernity, which entails the use of very recent ideas, fashions or ways of thinking to approach an issue, has both negative and positive effect on chieftaincy institution in yoruba land. the negative impact could be understood in the way the europeans maltreated and rendered redundant the chieftaincy institution following the introduction of western system of government; this has made traditional system of government subsidiary. (oyeweso and osin 1998:39). today, the chiefs are not seriously recognized owing to the emergence of the councilors, chairmen, governors, senators, members of house of assembly and the president as the governing agents at ward, local, state and federal levels of government. people in the society now show more allegiance to these personalities than to the oba. on this account, it can be reasonably argued that the changes, which are occurring in traditional societies, are affecting both the structure of chieftainship and the values attached to this sacred institution. worse still, the government in power sometimes politicizes the chieftaincy institution. during civilian government, we had instances in which the government is not favorably disposed to particular chiefs (on the ground that the chief belonged to a party different from the party in power) has punished, maltreated and banished certain chieftaincy titleholders. for example, an alaafin of oyo was deposed by the then action group government in the 11 late 50s in the then western region. on that account, chieftaincy institution and its survival were subjected to the whim and caprices of the government in power. for this reason, many chieftaincy titleholders unavoidably have to dance to the tune of the government in power for favour even when such action is against the tradition. this is one of the negative developments of modern time. however, we still notice positive aspects of the change which, to our mind, enhance the preservation of chieftaincy institution. for example, the present political arrangement necessitates the need for politicians to start their political enterprise from the grassroots level. arising from this, they do solicit the support, approval, assistance, backing, cooperation, loyalty, patronage and succor of the kings whom they believe have control over their subjects. by so doing, chieftaincy institution becomes indispensable as a force to reckon with consciously or unconsciously in the political arrangement in the nigerian nation. it is the recognition of this fact that obliges the present government to provide certain facilities for the chiefs such as building palaces for them, giving them cars, furnishing their palaces, supplying them with water (through boreholes) and constant supply of electricity (through standby generators). as a matter of fact, most chiefs in yoruba land are on the payroll of the government to various degrees. besides, the chiefs are always referred to by the government during critical times especially during impasse between certain individuals, ethnic groups and various arms or organs of government. in history we remember when the late sani abacha, an ex-head of state in nigeria called on the first class oba to help resolve crisis between his government and certain ethnic 12 groups in nigeria. from the above instance, we can see that the chieftaincy institution is an enduring one. more importantly, the chieftaincy institution has gained credibility and accreditation from the government by virtue of the legalization of the institution. it is a legalized institution because some of the chieftaincy titles are gazetted. evidence of these abounds in nigeria national archives. in fact, starting from colonial time to date we have government laws and edicts passed and enacted at different times concerning chieftaincy matters, on issues related to enthronement, deposition and death of chiefs. (western regional gazette, 1954). this political apparatus establishes instruments of council of chiefs across the country. based on this system, the government issues white papers on chieftaincy matters. this provides the reason why the government always presents the office staff to the chiefs especially first class chiefs in nigeria as a way of legalizing, confirming and ratifying the entire enthronement procedures. factors sustaining chieftaincy institution in yoruba land at least, there are two distinctive factors which enhance the sustainability and stability of chieftainship in yoruba. these are social and religious factors. we shall consider this in turn as brief as possible. 1. social factors in order to understand this social factor, we need to lay the premise that chieftaincy is a social affair and therefore it is an element of social status. status in this context refers to one’s position in society. by implication, chieftaincy is a symbol of social status, which involves ideas about the political and legal rights of persons within socio-political community (turner 1988:1). on this note, we believe that chieftaincy is 13 connected with social prestige, credit, distinction, eminence, fame, glory, honour, importance and influence as far as yoruba people are concerned. it is a common thing that many people wish to become chiefs because chiefs are universally respected. this is so because chieftaincy connotes the power and authority to control, direct and influence others – especially non-chieftaincy titleholders. it is this consciousness that sustains the institution directly or indirectly. it is no wonder why the status and symbolic nature of chieftaincy has been incorporated into the present religious circles. for example, both the contemporary islamic and christian social structure makes provision for conferment of chieftaincy honour to some members of the church or mosque. today in religious circles, we have chieftaincy titles such as mayegun ijo (the one who ensures that peace reigns supreme in the religious circle), majekobaje (the chief who ensures that everything goes smoothly in the church/mosque), otun and osi ijo (the two can be considered as lieutenants of the head of the church/mosque). all these chiefs constitute the governing authorities in the church/mosque; they perform legislative, executive and judicial functions for their respective religious centres. it is ironical, that all the chieftaincy titles are replica of traditional chieftaincy titles. the same mentality has even been extended to the wider society. for example, as a sign of honour and desire for social class, we have a type of social arrangement, which makes it possible for non-indigenes in a particular town to become chiefs who govern indigenes residing in that particular town. for instance, we have eze ndi igbo, chief, who represents the interest of all igbos in ibadan. we also have seriki hausawa (who represents the interest of hausa people in ibadan, a yoruba town). all these chiefs have palaces and their own sets of chiefs. the importance the yoruba or african people placed 14 on chieftaincy as status booster could not be divorced from the awards of honour and degree to graduates in nigerian universities. the same is the reason for the (national) honour awards given at local, state and federal levels to distinguished citizens in nigerian society. the honour and awards, according to yoruba, is synonymous with chieftaincy titles. because yoruba people are title conscious, chieftainship remains an enduring one. on this note, lipset is right to define status as the positive estimation of honour, or prestige received by the individuals or position (lipset 1968:301-302). thus, chieftaincy titles involve the felt perceptive of people in yoruba society. 2. religious factors in all ramifications, traditional religion is the basis of chieftaincy institution in yoruba land. this is so because in yoruba land, there is no distinction between religion and politics. politics relates to chieftainship. for the yoruba, political laws are embedded in religious laws. this goes with the impression popularized by idowu about yoruba people that in all things including their philosophy, politics, law and business, they are religious. in fact, idowu proves that religion forms the foundation and the all governing principles of life for them and that it forms the themes of songs, makes topics for minstrelsy, finds vehicles in myths, folktales, proverbs and saying and is the basis of philosophy (idowu 1996:5). it is within this premise that the chiefs are regarded as sacred personalities as earlier discussed. given this fact, every person in the society is obliged to be loyal to the oba. as the kabiyesi, nobody has the right to question his authority. this is why ifa oracle condemns any act of disobedience to the king in strong terms as this: 15 ida ni i m’eje ida ni i m’eje eni ba gbe oju ogangan s’oba. ti oba ni ase; ti oba ni ida. nje eso, mo ni eso ki ogbon inu eni ma gbe ‘ni lu ida oba. the sword sucks the blood of those who are disobedient or rude to the king. to the king belongs authority; to the king belongs the sword then take it easy. i say, take it easy that one’s cleverness may not push one against the king’s sword. (adewale 1986:67). the above makes it incumbent on the part of members of the society to be loyal to the chiefs and to render their support, allegiance, and respect to the institution. since there is no vacuum in chieftainship, as it is a religious position, the institution enjoys continuity and respect by all, regardless of their classes in yoruba society. in fact, the position of obaship is so respected that every celebrant of events such as naming, funeral, or birthday parties must take some quantity of food whether raw or cooked to the oba in his palace. 16 problems and prospects of chieftainship in yoruba land the status – symbolic nature of chieftaincy titles, which makes kingship attractive or appealing to all and sundry, goes with its attendant problems. some of these are unhealthy rivalry between contestants for titles, especially major chieftaincy titles like obaship. this has resulted in numerous court cases. whenever the case is not well resolved by the courts of law, the aggrieved party and his sympathizers resort to conflict, insult and argumentation, which often result in destruction of life and property and finally to social unrest. this is common in yoruba land e.g. owo crisis regarding olowo’s stool in ondo state of nigeria. in addition, we observed cases of unnecessary power tussle or struggling among certain categories of chiefs over the question of superiority. a case in yoruba land was the power tussle between the alaafin of oyo and ooni of ife. the struggle eventually led to the creation of osun state from oyo state. this provided an opportunity for alaafin and ooni to become chairmen of their respective state councils of oba. to this day, there is still crisis among first class obas in yorubaland. another problem associated with chieftaincy affairs in yoruba land is that some of the occupants of chieftaincy posts are educated and as a result are sometimes tainted with western attitudes. this causes them to look down upon some traditions and values associated with the office. this is a negative development. also associated with this is the abuse of power or office by some chiefs. for instance, those who became chiefs with political or economic interests are fond of exploiting their subjects by denying them certain rights. this is contrary to tradition. by so doing, the institution has lost the aura of 17 mystique that goes with it. today, through the courtesy of foreign religions – islam and christianity, an average chieftaincy holder has been de-collateralized. all the above notwithstanding, the chieftaincy institution will have a better future when one considers the caliber of people who have shown and who are still showing interest in becoming chiefs. for example, in the early nineties we read in the dailies about oba (prof.) ololade folayan – the akesin of ora, a biochemist who resigned from the dept. of biochemistry, obafemi awolowo university, to become the oba of a rural area in osun state. the same goes for many academicians, business tycoons, industrialists and retired civil servants who show positive interest in being made chiefs. in the light of this, we envisage that these new sets of people will try to refine the institution by demystifying and by removing all the archaic religious traditions associated with obaship institution in primitive times. at the same time, they will attempt to legitimize the institution by modernizing it for the global age. but, for the institution to maintain itself as a living tradition, certain steps should be taken by individuals and the government. on the part of the individual chiefs, we advocate a return to tradition. the chiefs should start to think and act honorably as it was in the past. suggestively, a chief should commit no action that has any element of opprobrium. yielding to the recommendation of ayisi, chiefs should not engage in adulterous practices or incestuous congresses, stealing, sorcery, or kindred actions (ayisi 1972:48). rather, the virtues expected of chiefs are generosity, kindness, humility, and respect for elders, fecundity, respects for ancestral spirits, living exemplary life, preservation of traditional values and moral consciousness in all their doings. (ayantayo 2002:1). 18 the government has a role to play. this includes reviewing chieftaincy laws in order to close any loopholes that have led to court cases that have sometimes diminished the institution. the government in collaboration with king makers should be fair over the appointment, conferment, enthronement and deposition of chiefs. the judges who handle chieftaincy cases should be impartial and make justice their watchword. all stakeholders in chieftaincy matter should be fair to the tradition, which sustains the institution. concluding remarks from the various arguments regarding the chieftaincy institution in yorubaland, we believe that the institution has come to stay regardless of the winds of change that might have affected it. since chieftainship is a cultural affair, and since the chiefs or kings never die because there is no vacuum in ruler-ship in yorubaland, we are optimistic that chieftaincy institution will never die. given the socio-religious dimension to it in yorubaland as explored in this work, we have a ray of hope that chieftainship will continue to survive and thrive in africa and even in the global context. this is so because it is one of the african cultural heritages, that will never die, but can only transform for the better. 19 references adediran, b. (1998). “yorubaland up to the emergence of the state” in culture and society in yorubaland (eds) ogunremi d and adediran b. ibadan: rex charles publication: 1-13. adewale, s.a. (1986). “ethics in ifa” in religion and ethics in nigeria (ed) abogunrin, s.o. ibadan: daystar press: 60-71. afolayan, f. (1998). “kingdoms of the yoruba: socio-political development before 1800” in culture and society in yorubaland, (eds) ogunremi d and adediran b. ibadan: rex charles publication: 14-26. ayantayo, j.k. (2002). “invoking traditional political values towards a new political culture in nigeria”, forthcoming in journal of institute of benin studies, 20 ayisi, e.o. (1972). an introduction to the study of african culture. london: heinemann educational books ltd. fadipe, n.a. (1970). the sociology of the yoruba ibadan: ibadan university press. hobbes, t. (1946). leviathan, london: oxford university press. idowu, e.b (1996). olodumare: god in yoruba belief (revised and enlarged) lagos longman nigeria. lenski, g.e. (1966). power and privilege, the theory of stratification new york: mcgraw hill. lipset, s.m. (1968). “social stratification, social class” in international encyclopedia of social sciences new york: crowell collies and macmillan. nabofa m.y. (1999). “theocracy and democracy from the perspective of african traditional religion” orita: ibadan journal of religious studies, xxxiiijune & dec. pp. 29-44. mbiti, j.s. (1980). african religions and philosophy, london: heinemann educational books, ltd. oyeweso, s and oshin o (1998). “british conquest and administration of yoruba” culture and society in yorubaland (eds) ogunremi d and adediran b. ibadan: rex charles publication. pp. 39-50. ray, b.c. (1999). african religions: symbol ritual and community (2nd ed) new jersey: prentice hall. turner, b.s. (1988). status, minneapolis: university of minnesota press. western region gazette, 1954. p. 2. 21 napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 47 thomas hobbes’ concept of sovereignty and its relevance for thailand and asean napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong assumption university, thailand abstract the paper’s objective is to analyze the concept of sovereignty in political philosophy with special reference to thomas hobbes for the purpose of understanding the changes facing thai sovereignty from the origin of the modern state to the present time. especially relevant is hobbes’ distinction between internal and external sovereignty. internal sovereignty can be used to understand the factionalism in thai society resulting to the escalation of tensions since 2005. for the security of state, the thai military staged a coup and has taken absolute power since 2014. external sovereignty can be used to understand the relation of the thai state and the power of the asean community. this can itself be understood as a social contract for the maintenance of security the in the same manner that hobbes describes in state formation. this phenomenon results from the changing international system under globalization. the concept of sovereignty hobbes’ concept of sovereignty, which is related to his social contract theory, emerged in the 17th century. during this time, the development of the sciences created a separation of the nation state from religious beliefs and fostered a new realm of economic development. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 2, july december 2017, 47-83 © 2000 by assumption university press 48 prajñā vihāra the separation of state from religion meant that the king wielded more power, he became the sole sovereign and did not depend upon the church. hobbes’ concept of sovereignty concerned with the relationship between the state and the populace by the agreement between men to submit their ‘individual natural power’ to the sovereign, to bring about the security of the society. the ancient sophists together with socrates, plato and aristotle understood society from the perspective of nature or convention.1 thomas hobbes was the first philosopher who explained the origin of commonwealth or state in terms of the nature of human beings who constitute the entity of the state. hobbes argued that the condition of men in the state of nature is insecurity. in the state of nature, each man claims his natural right to do as he thinks fit in order to preserve his own life. this lack of a unifying entity leads to a chaotic situation in which all fight for their own self interest. so, they must agree to transfer their individual right of governing themselves to a sovereign ruler whose role is to protect them from the state of war characterized by all men fighting against each other. according to hobbes, the greatest utilization of human power is to compound the power of all men in one person in order to unite the power for the common benefit.2 since the basic nature of men is equal, there is no sure way for any man to protect himself against the threat of others. hobbes compared the difference between man and others creatures that live in society. he noted that for man there is a necessity for coercive power, whereas this need was not present in the societies of other creatures. 3 by nature, men quarrel with each other on the grounds of competition, diffidence, and glory. if men live together without this common power, they are bound by the condition called ‘state of war,’ in which everyone is against everyone. as long as the natural rights of every man endures, there can be no security to any man. so men have to transfer their rights to a sovereign entity in order to unify their power by means of the social contract. locke preferred the concept of ‘trust’ instead of ‘contract.’ the words ‘trust,’ ‘compact,’ ‘agreement’ and ‘political power,’ are more general napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 49 than “contract” and avoid being too specific in a legal sense. according to locke, man in the state of nature is rational, and can never consent to surrender all of their power in a social contract. rousseau is another philosopher who explained the concept of ‘body of politics’ or ‘commonwealth’ likes hobbes. for rousseau, every man has his own strength, but individual strength is not enough for self-preservation. due to the fact that men cannot generate new strength, they must find a form of association which can unify and control each individual’s strength in order to be sufficient to overcome the obstacles facing them. it is a form of association, where each man obeying individually, establishes an agreement of all men together, and is called a ‘social contract’.4 although through the formation of the social contract, the individual loses his natural freedom and unlimited right to do what he likes, he gains civil freedom and the right of property over his possessions. hobbes, locke, and rousseau all explained the significance of the social contract, which was the origin of the idea of sovereign power during the 17th to 18th centuries. all of them mention the relationship between the state and its sovereign ruler and the population, consisting of the mass of subjects ruled by the sovereign. in other words, they tried to explain domestic sovereign power. however, they did not go into great detail about the relationship between states, or external sovereign power, which explains matters of war and peace. the leviathan hobbes developed his concept of sovereignty on principles of natural science after meeting galileo in the year 1636. douglas m. jesseph investigates the influence of galileo’s natural philosophy on the philosophical and methodological doctrine of thomas hobbes. he argued that hobbes takes away from his encounter with galileo the fundamental idea that the world is a mechanical system in which everything can be understood in terms of mathematically-specifiable laws of motion. the title page of leviathan, includes the famous engraving by abraham bosse.5 keith brown argued that it is an image of oliver cromwell, or 50 prajñā vihāra the future charles ii. noel malcolm argued that all the faces which make up the leviathan’s body illustrate the key features of hobbes’ theory.6 figure 1 hobbes explains that the power of state is comprised of individual subjects or the ‘body of leviathan,’ which is also called ‘artificial man’ or ‘body politic’. so in the leviathan, in the first part ‘of man,’ he explains the characteristics of the individual man who is in possession of their own power. then in the second part, ‘of commonwealth,’ he explains the sovereign which gains power through the authorization of each subject. hobbes explained the right of the sovereign to make war and peace with other nations and commonwealths. besides hobbes, rousseau also emphasized that social contract is not only about the internal relationship between the sovereign and subject within the state, but it also involves external relationships, such as international law, trade, the law of warfare and conquest, public law, federations, negotiation, treaties etc..7 so, both philosophers insisted that state has both internal and external sovereign power. napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 51 hobbes’ concept of sovereignty hobbes’ works are also not just theories, but poignant philosophical insights which have remained relevant. during this time, much debate concerning hobbes has taken place among philosophers and scholars. some have argued that hobbes’ concept is now outdated, while others claimed that hobbes’ leviathan is arguably the most brilliant and influential political treatise ever written in english.8 some scholars argued that hobbes’ political symbol in his leviathan is a failure. carl schmitt has argued that hobbes’ theory of the sovereignty of absolute state has never existed in england. the huge machine of leviathan was always undermined by individual freedom.9 jean hampton explained the problems with hobbes’ social contract, outdated in relation to contemporary political life. however, she acknowledged that the structures of the modern democratic institutions are too complicated to provide an adequate analysis of them. david p. gauthier points out three major problems with hobbes’ concept of absolute sovereignty. firstly, it would be difficult for such a commonwealth to exist and be preferable to the state of nature. secondly, it would be impossible men to give to one man or assembly the right and power which hobbes deems necessary. finally, such a power would be difficult to exercise. however, gauthier’s view begins with a state of peace, not state of war. gregory s. kavka argues that the hobbesian theories are limited. he maintains that the scope of argument is overly restricted, oversimplified and ignores relevant complicating factors, and so yields wrong conclusions to relevant questions. kavka points out that there are no entirely adequate moral-political theories now in existence nor will there be in the foreseeable future, because the phenomena being treated are too complex, the values are too various and the intellectual resources are too limited.10 on the other hand, a. p. martinich argued against gauthier, kavka, and hampton, who applied the prisoner’s dilemma to explicate hobbes’ idea of the state of nature which entails war of all against all. he asserts that in the state of nature the past behavior of each person is likely to be known 52 prajñā vihāra to the other people, while the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma can only be applied in the situation where both parties have never known each other before. for hobbes, the subject maximizes power by transferring their power to the sovereign in order to preserve their own lives, not to maximize utility like the theory of motivations which modern scholars try bringing to bear on hobbes’ philosophy. according to martinis, we cannot analyze state level by individual level due to the problem of level analysis.11 quentin skinner sees mistakes in the reading of hampton and other philosophers. he thought that the subject giving up their natural right to the sovereign can be likened to somebody lending something to someone else. that is, if person a lends something to person b, the benefit from the thing belongs to person b. but in sovereign power, if person b acts on the authorization of person a to buy something, the benefit still belongs to person a, not to person b. the sovereign is only authorized to act in the name of the subject, not for himself or themselves. for instance, in the thai constitutions, sovereign power belongs to all thai population, the king exercises power through parliament, cabinet, and court. so, the thai population maintain power in their own hands. but if men still agree to unite in society, then hobbes’ concept of sovereignty is still relevant in its explanation of sovereignty. in the past, many scholars have disagreed with hobbes and tried to find new models, but increasingly, more and more scholars have come to support hobbes’ concept. in fact, there is no single explanation that can completely explain all social and natural phenomena. for this reason, some aspects of hobbesian philosophy are still relevant, but there is also room for alternate interpretations or complementary concepts. hobbes’ theory and social philosophy according to hobbes, science can be divided into natural philosophy and civil philosophy. natural philosophy is consequences from the accidents of bodies natural; and civil philosophy is consequences from the accidents of political bodies (leviathan, ch. ix). in hobbes time, scientific knowledge was developing in importance beyond religious belief. this napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 53 is the reason hobbes’ leviathan, turns to science to understand politics. any study of hobbes’s philosophy must pay some attention to his views on scientific method.12 he saw the human as consisting of bodies and motion, and he believed that the human being is like a desiring machine that can be predicted, and so he believed that the body politic can be understood scientifically. but, in order to utilize hobbes’ philosophy, we need to take a step beyond his and consider that no single theory both natural and social, can explain every phenomenon. for example, newton’s law of universal gravitation, published in 1687, explains only gravitation phenomena. it cannot explain fluid pressure which is explained by pascal’s law. social science is different than natural science, and it encounters many problems which have no correlate to the natural sciences. karl popper, explained the difference between natural and social sciences. he pointed out that in physics, a law of nature can apply every ‘time and space’. sociology can’t apply physical or scientific methodology to explain social phenomena due to differences in the way it resists generalization, experimental, complexity, prediction and holism.13 society is based upon man-made laws, not laws of nature. for popper, social science can’t apply equally in every time and space. for instance, the eu member states were in anarchy after ww ii, but now experience a certain order. in 2011 there was anarchy in the middle-east states; tunisia, libya, syria, egypt, and yemen. but in the same year, there was order within the others states in the world. so, the unit in international system is anarchy or hierarchy depends on the time and space. in other words, sovereign powers of state both internal and external are being changed. in social philosophy, it is very difficult to use the level of analysis approach. some explanations can apply at the low level; some can apply at the high level. no single theory or concept can explain the integration of power between father and children in the family up to the power between states in the world level. so, if we want to discuss hobbes’ theory at regional level, we have to apply social philosophy, especially methodological 54 prajñā vihāra individualism. there are two different concepts in level of analysis. max weber, who saw social object, resulted from human behavior. so, he began his explanations from an individual level, and then worked up to social and institutional level. this is what is meant by “methodological individualism”. on the other hand, emile durkheim, worked from external results to the individual. so, he started to study from the social level and social forces, then down to individual level and individual behavior or “methodological collectivism”.14 both concepts can relate to arguments regarding hobbes’ concept of sovereign power. does the difference between the integration to regional and state? can we use concept which designed at state level to explain at regional level? methodological individualism hobbes’ concept of sovereignty regional family children statestate subject figure 2 as illustrated in figure 2, hobbes explained that sovereign power comes from individual power, so we can claim that hobbes’ concept of napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 55 sovereignty is ‘methodological individualism’. by the same analogy, if we consider that a regional power such as asean or the eu comes from each member state, hobbes’ concept can apply both from the power of subject to the power of state and from the power of state to the power of a regional body. the power of a father over his children in a family, would be called ‘methodological collectivism’. but, no one would claim that the power of father comes from their children. and the state is comprised of individual subjects, not families. so, we cannot use the relation within family to explain the relation at the regional level. according to hobbes, the family is not concerned with the political power of state. rousseau agreed with hobbes that the relation between father and children is a natural bond, it is not consent. but he argued that this natural bond persists only when the father has the duty of care to the children and the children obey their father. when the children grow up, they all become equally independent. if they want to continue to remain living together, it is no by force of a natural bond, but voluntary, and the family unit is maintained only through ‘convention’.15 both hobbes and rousseau agree the relation between father and children in the family is a natural bond; it is not consent of the family members. they just show the difference between the source of state and family power. so, we can’t use methodological collectivism to explain the relation between family and children. hobbes stated that city or body politic which is one man or one council is called “sovereign” and every member of the body politics is called a “subject” of the sovereign. sovereignty consists of the power and the strength that every member has transferred to sovereign from themselves by covenant.16 so, hobbes’ concept of sovereign is methodological individualism. thai sovereignty and asean community (external sovereignty) the asean community is comprised of ten member countries. the main purpose of asean is to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region. during 1970’s, a certain anarchy dominated international theory, a situation 56 prajñā vihāra where states as rational actors acted independently. this condition often offhandedly characterized as analogous to hobbes’s state of nature, a war of all against all. but, it does not explain why states should integrate into a regional body such as asean. williams argued that a more adequate understanding of international political theory after hobbes may require not only a different vision of hobbes and the hobbesian legacy, but also a wider re-examination of key assumptions about political modernity as a whole.17 in this section, i will show that the relations between states in self-help condition is analogous to hobbes. all states give up their power to integrate into a regional body to provide security and avoid the state of war. state subject subjectsubject regional state state figure 3 from figure 3, hobbes stated that every subject gives up their own power to sovereign, that is the reason why the sovereign has power. then, regional power comes from each state member giving up power to a regional institution such as asean or eu. regionalism has raised big questions about the continued existence of the sovereign state. the principles of the asean charter are to respect the sovereignty of member states, not to interfere in the internal affairs of asean member states and to base decision-making in asean on consultation and consensus. these principles mean that the asean community can do anything if napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 57 all member states’ consent, including restricting the sovereignty of some member states. the state of war among men before the formation of the commonwealth is the same as state of war between states in the international society. an organization such as asean or eu performs the function of uniting common power in a way that is not different to the unification of individual power by the sovereign in the state. within the state, men are members of the state society, while in the world; states are members of the world society. in the state, the sovereign has power by consent of every subject.18 men give up their own power to the sovereign to use common power in order to get benefits such as security. likewise, if each state exercises its own power without respect for common international power, then the international society is liable to fall into a state of war. the comparison between men in the nation state, and state in world society is different only on level of analysis. if the world society lacks an international social contract transferring power to a common entity, the result will again be a state of war. if the state relinquishes some aspects of its sovereign power to an international community entity, then the state loses its sovereign power just like men in the state relinquish their natural power in order to prevent the state of war. the more the state gives up its power to a regional power, the more security is guaranteed, but the less sovereign power the state maintains for itself. therefore, hobbes’ concept can also be applied to the regionalism phenomena in world society, including thailand in the case of asean community. thai sovereignty and political conflict since 2005 (internal sovereignty) hobbes, locke, and rousseau’s idea of the social contract based on the real situation in england and france, when the absolute power of the monarchy was being challenged in the 17th and 18th centuries. during this time, the people were divided into royalist and non-royalist factions. there were also authoritarian leaders such as cromwell and napoleon who tried to unite the fragmented social units into one society. 58 prajñā vihāra gradually this situation would change to democracy. but the transition between the end of absolute monarchy to the consolidation of democracy in each country is different. king rama v established the thai modern state in accordance with absolute monarchy where sovereign power belongs solely to the king. after the 1932 revolution, the sovereign power was transferred to all thai people, but thai society have mechanisms to deal with this sovereign power. the struggle for power therefore has escalated up to now, no different from england and france in the 17th and 18th centuries. after the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, there were a chain of authoritarian leaders from general plaek, general sarit to general tanom. however, there were restorations of the importance of monarchy again during general sarit’s government.19 the political crisis in thailand since 2005 has been just one part of the development of democracy from absolute sovereignty to consolidation democracy. in thailand, hobbes’ concept of sovereignty is useful for understanding the conflict between the redshirts and yellowshirts which led to the military government. after thaksin crisis in 2005, both factions didn’t trust each other, and tried to eliminate the other by every means. the clashes between yellowshirts and the government in 2008, redshirts and soldiers in 2010, and pdrc and pheuthai government in 2013 proved that the effort to construct a social contract in thai society is not yet complete. when the society has no social contract, it has no sovereign power of state. according to hobbes, it reverts back to the state of nature where people use their own power to protect their rights. since 2005, the protestors occupied the airports, a shopping center, and a television station. they occupied the parliament and even the government house. during may 2010, a financial crash extended throughout the country. and since january 2014, the situation has come close to civil war. for hobbes, war consists not in battle only or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the ‘will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.’ so, the situations in thailand since 2005 can be called a state of war. napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 59 during state of war, a conflict among people exists, where every person uses their natural rights and individual powers to protect themselves. before the state collapsed, general prayuth staged a military coup in 2014 to provide security and stability in thai society, the same as cromwell or napoleon. after that, general prayuth has been the only absolute power in thailand. the challenge of the roadmap to restoration is to make a social contract for every party to agree upon and sign. summary sovereign power is an important concept of political philosophy which involves two aspects. the first is power within a state between the ruler and populace, or internal sovereignty. the second is power between states or external sovereignty. hobbes’ concept of sovereignty or commonwealth was developed 370 years ago after the treaties of westphalia. commonwealth is social phenomenon or artificial man. so, it can’t endure like natural phenomenal. that reason why almost states eventually have their sovereignty challenged both internally and externally. according to hobbes’ concept of sovereignty, before we know the power of state, we have to know the power of the individual. that is the reason why the first part of the leviathan is characteristic of individual men, and the sovereign’s picture in the title page of leviathan consists of people. during hobbes’ time, the anarchical problems occurred at individual level. so, hobbes explained how to solve this problem in anarchical situation within the state. at the present time, the anarchy within the state has been reduced, but has escalated outside of the state level. for external sovereignty, the units in the world have been changed continuously along with mankind. sovereign states or leviathan are just one type of unit. before sovereign state, the units were tribe, city state, kingdom, and empire. hobbes’ sovereign state does not come from nature, but it is a man-made or artificial man. that reasons why 370 years later, the units gradually changed from sovereign states to regionalism, such as eu and asean for security purposes. hobbes’s concept of sovereign power explains the integration of the individual within state at that time. 60 prajñā vihāra nowadays, it can be applied to explain the integration of states to regional political units. for instance, the integration of nation states like thailand into asean. for internal sovereignty, the long political conflicts in thailand have been proved that thai people want to exercise their own natural power. this situation is a state of war which breaks the formation of the state or the artificial man. in order to maintain the survival of state, an absolute sovereign needs to be applied as it was in europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. the military government led by prime-minister prayuth since 2014 shows that hobbes’ concept of the social contract and absolute sovereignty is useful in understanding the complex struggles taking place in thailand. endnotes 1 hobbes, t. leviathan. 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(2011) recasting the hobbesian legacy. in international political theory after hobbes: analysis, interpretation and orientation, raia p. and gabriekka s. (eds.).hampshire: palgrave. prajnaviharav20n1.indd 52 prajñā vihāra on bitcoin and simmel’s idea of perfect money siwittra chainiyom and john giordano assumption university, thailand abstract georg simmel in his book philosophy of money, described how money evolves through history and predicted that it will evolve to the point where it no longer relies on any substance. he called this stage “perfect money,” which he described as “money detached from every substantial value”. today we are faced with the development of cryptocurrencies, of which bitcoin is the best known. bitcoin presents a new system of transaction which does not require governments or middlemen to regulate trade. since such currencies are completely beyond substantial value, the philosophical question emerges whether bitcoin is “perfect money.” this essay will argue that bitcoin can be understood in connection with simmel’s idea of “perfect money.” but will also consider simmel’s claim that perfect money is only possible in a stable society and will show the limitations of cyrptocurrencies and bitcoin in light of this. keywords: money; bitcoin; cryptocurrency; simmel; philosophy of money prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 1 january to june 2019, 52-65 © 2000 by assumption university press siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 53 introduction georg simmel in his book philosophy of money,1 written in 1907, described how money evolves through history towards the point where it no longer relies on any substance. he claimed, for instance, that the development of paper money, represented a move from substantial to functional value, and that the evolution of money will not be finished until money becomes fully abstract and functional. he called this stage “perfect money,” which he described as “money detached from every substantial value”. this however, did not occur in simmel’s time. but today we are faced with the development of virtual currencies and cryptocurrencies, of which bitcoin is the best known. cryptocurrency emerged with the evolution of internet in the 1990s. one of its characteristics is that it is not authorized or controlled by a government. this has led to resistance too its widespread use as a medium of exchange. however this is beginning to change, “the usability of the currency has increased rapidly and today it is possible to pay in digital currency, bitcoin, for a wide variety of commodities and services from electronics and computer hardware to restaurant meals, legal services, and even college education”2. the increasing use of cryptocurrency has caught the attention of every international economic organization, and has become one of the most interesting and heated topics in economics. not only is it attracting public attention, it is increasingly attracting scholarly interest. according to fatf3, virtual currency is “a digital representations of value that can be digitally traded and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction”4. it performs its functions based upon agreement within the community. however, virtual currency is different from e-money because e-money is considered a digital transfer instrument for fiat currency, but, “digital currency can mean a digital representation of either virtual currency (non-fiat) or e-money (fiat) and thus is often used interchangeably with the term virtual currency”5. 54 prajñā vihāra fatf divides virtual currency into 3 kinds; closed virtual schemes – this currency cannot exchange for any virtual goods or services for real goods. it usually functions in online computer games, normally known as gill. virtual currency schemes with unidirectional flow – this can be purchased by real currency for exchange goods and services, however it is unable to be exchanged back to real money. examples would be facebook credit or coin in line application. virtual currency schemes with bidirectional flow – this currency can be purchased by state money and also exchanged back to state money such as bitcoin, omg and other cryptocurrencies. there are many virtual or cryptocurrencies being used over the internet, but bitcoin is the most well-known and discussed. bitcoin was developed as an alternative monetary from traditional economic system. it also functions differently than state money. bitcoin was conceived in a “white paper” in january 2009 by “satsohi nakamoto” an assumed name for either a person or group of researchers. satsohi nakamoto announced in this white paper that “we the author himself defines bitcoin as an electronic money system operating within the peer-to-peer system”6. it is explained that it is a truly virtual currency and “refers not only to a unit of money, but also to software and the p2p network”7. bitcoin from then on became a new form of money which had an autonomous payment system removing middlemen from financial transactions. to defend the move to the use of bitcoin, many complain that in the traditional financial system “national governments often impose undesirable controls, such as restrictions on convertibility, while central banks may facilitate an oversupply of currency, leading to hyperinflation”8. furthermore, banks often charge exorbitant fees without justification. they point out that in the peer-to-peer system of bitcoin these injustices are avoided. in a report of the bank of boston, stephanie and christina has listed the advantages of bitcoin: siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 55 1) bitcoin conduct less prone to exploitation or corruption because it is not associated with any sovereign entities; 2) it features pseudonymous accounts; 3) it imposes no direct fees on transactions and promises the potential for lower transaction fees in general.9 this is obvious that many people in society support cryptocurrencies and bitcoin as a form of money. they see it as addressing certain problems that plague the current financial system. it is obvious that bitcoin is created and adopted with respect to various political, economic and sociological considerations. it can be studied academically from these perspectives. but based upon the many questions emerging with bitcoin, we must first ask the question: “how is bitcoin money?” bitcoin as money to explain bitcoin as a legitimate form of money, first, it is necessary to understand the concept of money. generally, economists consider money as an instrument which serves three functions; as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account, and as a store of value. money’s main duty to be a medium of exchange. it had the purpose to facilitate trading and was created to replace the bartering system. furthermore, money also functions as a store of value, because money is a kind of property that maintains its value without depreciating, or as john locke would point out, without spoiling. lastly, in its accounting function, money provides a standard measurement of the value for all commodities being exchanged. in order to determine if bitcoin can be considered money, we need to analyse how it fulfils these functions of money. the bank of england observes that; 56 prajñā vihāra from the perspective of economic theory, whether a digital currency maybe considered to be money depends on the extent to which it acts as a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of account.10 bitcoin, in the present day, works as a medium of exchange but it is still limited in its acceptance. since bitcoin was launched, it has grown and become widely used as an alternative money in society. “bitpay, world’s largest bitcoin payment processor, reported 100,000 transactions in 2015. bitcoin has slightly over 50% market share of the bitcoin payment market, if we extrapolate the volume, roughly 200,000 bitcoin transactions were completed in 2015”11. while bitcoin is not acceptable in government transactions, it is an increasing medium for payment among businesses. however, the price of bitcoin is still very volatile, so establishments which accept bitcoin as payment tend to still post the price their goods with reference to state money such as yen, euros and dollars. “to the extent that customers incur a psychological cost when they see the posted price (in dollars) of a typical good fluctuate rapidly, bitcoin’s extreme volatility renders it less, or not at all, suitable as a unit of account”12. even bitcoin’s supporters accept that bitcoin is diminished in its ability to function as a medium of exchange because its value is very volatile, leading to uncertainty concerning the amount of bitcoin needed for transactions. in its function as a store of value, bitcoin is mainly considered to be a vehicle for investment. there are many online markets which trade bitcoin and other crytocurrencies for various investors. if considered from a perspective of economic theory, bitcoin can clearly claim to be money because it meets all the requirements of money as abovementioned. but to consider the status of bitcoin as money, we need to move beyond a mere economic perspective, to a philosophical point of view. one of the great writers besides hegel and marx that considered the philosophy of money was georg simmel. during the time of simmel, there was no such things as computers or digital transactions, siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 57 yet simmel’s reflections on money’s substance and value, are still very helpful in understanding the status of a digital currency such as bitcoin. his famous book, the philosophy of money, written in 1907, examined money not merely as an economic phenomenon but also questioned the nature of money itself. money, for simmel, is an instrument whose value is not merely intrinsic and can therefore take various forms. “money is really that form of property that most effectively liberates the individual from the unifying bonds that extend from other objects of possession”13. money is independent from the particular form of commodities in order to make all transactions and all commodities commensurable. in addition, money, for simmel, is an instrument which creates relationships between humans, and relationship between the humans with the world. simmel also writes that “money has been defined as abstract value. as a visible object, money is the substance that embodies abstract economic value”20. it is an instrument to compare the values of objects in exchange, or a way of determining an objects worth in terms of other objects. to use coins and paper money, also requires trust in the state which represents the interests of the people in a community. the state has the authority to guarantee the value involved in the exchange process. therefore, the people in a community can conduct their exchange without worry. but the material form of money, simmel claims, is one of the obstacles in transferring money in long distances or large quantities. the state needs to guarantee the substance-value of the material. he writes “the circulation of state money is confined to the geopolitical borders of that state, since the state cannot guarantee international traders will accept the domestic currency”21. therefore, initially, the state needed to use materials of high intrinsic value, such as gold and silver, in order to insure its acceptance in international trading. but if the state would further wish to facilitate global trading which requires trust and interdependencies, it would require the “diminishing intrinsic value of money and its replacement by functional value”22. this is the reason that 58 prajñā vihāra money evolved to paper notes, checks, cards (debit or credit) and online payment systems. simmel explains further that through its evolution, money becomes more than a medium of exchange but it also represents a symbol of membership in the economic society. he writes, “this development eliminates all individualistic and isolating elements from the nature of money, and makes the centralizing forces of the most inclusive social circle the representatives of money”23. thus, it is necessary for money to become more abstract so it can be accepted by all members of a global society. furthermore, with the ability to transcend distances or international trading, money requires “perfect form or abstract form” for both parties, buyers and sellers, to be accepted in their trade, while state money is still restricted by geopolitical borders. state money, for simmel, needs a third party to organize its transactions and therefore the size of economic and financial institution is limited. however, “the digital currency community reveals a preference for a more coherent and inclusive economic society, mediated instead by the relationship of each transacting member to one another under such a society”24. simmel calls money a perfect tool. people in society use it to reach their ends and “it is a special kind of tool since a tool of endlessly diverse and extensive uses; highly flexible and liquid. therefore, simmel argues, “money is the purest form of the tool and as a pure means and a perfect tool”17. he writes: a tool continues to exist apart from its particular application and is capable of a variety of other uses that cannot be foreseen. money as the means par excellence fulfils this conditions perfectly; money is the tool that has the greatest possible number of unpredictable uses18. and he continues, siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 59 money’s flexibility is only that of an extremely liquid body which takes on any form, and does not shape itself but receives any form it may possess only from the surrounding body19. simmel showed that money has a development process and it does not rely on any material substance. it moves further in the direction of a perfect tool. “in the past, money has often taken substantial, material forms, and did so in the time of simmel in the form of paper money”14. simmel saw that the development of paper money, signified a move from substantial to functional value. he believed that the evolution of money will not be finished until money becomes fully functional, however, this was far from being realized in simmel’s time. but he believed that money will increasingly become pure symbol and pure function. he called this “perfect money” or “money is detached from every substantial value”15. money in this case would not have an intrinsic value and would “retain its value unchanged”16. a perfect money would necessarily have this stability as its property. according to simmel, the evolution of monetary form is driven by international economics, then bitcoin is the next step of money’s evolution. “continuing along simmel’s logic, as money approaches a purely abstract form, further abstraction promotes growth of the economic societies by including a more vast population”25. this would emphasize that the evolution of money is partly driven by the movement beyond the nation state. “nakamoto’s white paper” indicates an intent to establish an autonomous payment system that eliminates the need for third-party mediation and relying on financial institutions and states to ensure online transactions to purely peer-to-peer online exchange”26. hence, following the ideas of simmel, bitcoin would be one of the natural stages of money’s evolution. it is a money without substance and the adaptation to a global world connected by information. bitcoin uses the global internet to communicate and trade which reduces the possibilities of counterfeit and double spending. moreover, the highest purpose of bitcoin is to eliminate the need for institutions of trust. 60 prajñā vihāra however, the state still does not accept cryptocurrency and treats it as a commodity. this is because, unlike state money, it is uncontrollable. and its critics deny its global aspirations: they write “if bitcoin is truly meant to be a payment instrument that transcends the binds of the state in the name of creating one global economic society, then it appears to have already failed in practice”27. the main reason to deny bitcoin the status of money is that bitcoin does not pay state taxes. nevertheless, bitcoin can be understood from simmel’s evolutionary perspective as money moving toward a more immaterial global form. the resistance to its existence is understandable from the perspective of state control. but now that we have clarified its position, the next question we need to ask is whether it can be completely accepted? because even if it has the status of perfect money according to simmel’s criteria, the society which uses it is still not perfect. there are many cases shown bitcoin is used in black market transactions such as the drug trade and corruption. therefore we need to consider bitcoin in relation to society and ethics. bitcoin and ethics normally, the study of computer ethics or the ethics of finance focus on human behaviour and the fairness of financial institutions. however, the ethics of cryptocurrency, “focus on the understanding how technologies configure people narrative understanding”28. because the technology of bitcoin is based upon new processes of transaction and trust, it involves changes in the understanding of money. transaction and trust becomes the main concepts in the analysis of the ethics of cryptocurrency. bitcoin also has a religious dimension. in her article entitled “money’s unholy trinity: devil, trickster, fool” cameron shows the coincidence between the abstract financial process and religion. she explains that the abstract transaction system of bitcoin was organised based upon strong ethical considerations. she writes that bitcoin was created “by presenting an alternative based on the decentralisation of power and the delegation of trust from legal authorities to the authority siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 61 of the blockchain protocol”29. therefore, the appeal of cryptocurrencies can be explained through ethical considerations. furthermore, money is based on trust and belief. it gains its value from the acceptance of people in society, paper money has value because people believe it does. “money demands faith and belief which is shared by a community”30. similarly bitcoin’s value is raised based on the degree people trust and believe in it. since it was introduced, bitcoin’s death has often been predicted, but it continues to live on and gradually widening in global influence and use. bitcoin is completely abstract, it is not based on anything of material value, and so “it represents a rare intersection of technology, ideology and religiosity”31. furthermore, “with faith, it brings people together, it makes them believe in something strong, and emerge as a strong person”32. it is not limited to the benefit of individual users and investors in cryptocurrency, but it also has the potential to change society or the way people understand society. this is how bitcoin can be explained in a religious sense. simmel also discussed the coincidence between faith and consumption in society. he writes “from a shared belief in the stock market prices, the value of gold as money, or believing in national currencies as a method of payment, money operates on the virtue of keeping faith”33. consumption and religion have shared an uneasy but close relationship. bitcoin uses technology of “blockchain” to conduct and safeguard its transactions which has the aim to bring all transactions to the same standard. but this equality extends beyond monetary transactions to the very understanding of the world. it can be said that bitcoin is a kind of vehicle which is brings about a new understanding of the world. it is a revolution in social innovation. this new technology of bitcoin reflects our interconnectedness through information, networks of computers and the internet. it is obvious that bitcoin’s system allows peer-to-peer connection through the network. it a sign of the developing global interconnection based upon a common trust. or as sharma writes “it would not be wrong to claim that bitcoin is a religious belief of people which has brought people from across the globe on one platform”34. it has 62 prajñā vihāra becomes a revolutionary development not only in the economic system, but in global interaction in general. endnotes 1 georg, simmel. the philosophy of money (london: routledge and kegan paul ltd, 1978), 163. 2 ole, bjerg. “how is bitcoin money?,” sage journals 33, no. 1 (2015): 53. 3 fate (the financial action task force) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. 4 fate. “virtual currencies key definitions and potential aml/cft risks.” (paper presentation, fate conference, paris, june 2014), fate. 5 ibid., 4. 6 satoshi, nakamoto. “bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system.” bitcoin. last modified march 5, 2015. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 7 nowakowski, w. “kryptograficzne aspekty technologii wirtualnej waluty bitcoin” elektronika, accessed february 12, 2019. http://www.imm.org.pl/imm/plik/ elektronika2013-05-2013_mm255.pdf. 8 christina wang and stephanie lo. “bitcoin as money?.” current policy perspectives, no. 4 (2014) (boston: federal reserve bank of boston, 2014), 2. 9 ibid., 2. 10 john, barrdear et al. “the economics of digital currencies.” (paper presentation, bank of england quarterly bullentin, england, 2014), bank of england quarterly. 11 business which now accept bitcoin include: various retailers of material goods, music download websites, game providers, gambling sites, software providers, and high-profile online businesses such as expedia, wordpress, reddit, namecheap, and mega (nigel, dodd. the social life of bitcoin. (london: the london school of economics and political science, 2017). 12 wang and lo, bitcoin as money?, 3. 13 simmel, the philosophy of money. 356. 14 mark, coeckelbergh. “money as medium and tool: reading simmel as a philosopher of technology to understand contemporary financial icts and media.” research in philosophy and technology 19, no. 3 (2015): 356. 15 simmel, the philosophy of money. 163. 16 ibid., 190. 17 ibid., 210. siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 63 18 ibid., 212. 19 ibid., 329. 20 ibid., 191. 21 andrew, barber. bitcoin and the philosophy of money: evaluating the commodity status of digital currencies (new york: ltd press, 2015), 14. 22 simmel, the philosophy of money. 181. 23 ibid., 183. 24 barber, bitcoin and the philosophy of money: evaluating the commodity status of digital currencies. 14. 25 ibid., 14. 26 ibid., 14. 27 ibid., 14. 28 mark coekelbergh and wessel reijers, “cryptocurrencies as narrative technologies.” sigcas computers & society journals 22, no. 3 (2015): 174. 29 ibid., 175. 30 mariam humayum and russel blek, “in ones and zeroes we trust?: money: religion & bitcoin.” consumer research 45, no. 1 (2017): 677. 31 david, nobel. the religion of technology: the divinity of man and the spirit of invention (new york: knopf press, 1997), 78. 32 kumar, sharma. “blockchain council.” blockchain council, accessed february 20, 2019. https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@danyelk/bitcoin-trust-andkinda-religious-faith-buy-eggs-with-iota-adaptation-continues-and-new-informationon-project-qubic-short. 33 david, graeber. debt: the first 5,000 years (brooklyn: melville house publishing, 2014), 172. 34 kumar, blockchain council. 64 prajñā vihāra bibliography ali, r., barrdear, j., clews, r., & southgate, j. “the economics of digital currencies.” paper presented at the bank of england quarterly bullentin, england, 2014. the bank of england quarterly bullentin. auerbach, d. “understanding the ethics of bitcoin through the ideas of 19th-century thinker georg simmel.” accessed march 3, 2019. https://www.tabletmag.com/scroll/276153/understandingthe-ethics-of-bitcoin-through-the-ideas-of-19th-century-thinkergeorg-simmel. barber, a. bitcoin and the philosophy of money: evaluating the commodity status of digital currencies. new york: ltd press, 2015. bjerg, o. “how is bitcoin money?.” sage journals 33, no. 1 (2016): 53-72. chaum, d. “blind signatures for untraceable payments.” accessed march 3, 2019. http://www.hit.bme.hu/~buttyan/courses/ bmevihim219/2009/chaum.blindsigforpayment.1982.pdf. coeckelbergh, m. “money as medium and tool: reading simmel as a philosopher of technology to understand contemporary financial icts and media.” research in philosophy and technology 19, no. 3 (2015): 356-380. coeckelbergh, m., & reijers, w. “cryptocurrencies as narrative technologies.” sigcas computers & society journals 22, no. 3 (2015): 174-178. cox, j. bitcoin and digital currencies. the new world of money and freedom. chicago: lfb press, 2013. dodd, n. the social life of bitcoin. london: the london school of economics and political science, 2017. siwittra chainiyom and john giordano 65 fatf. fatf report vitual currencies key definitions and potential aml/cft risks. paper presented at fate conference, paris, june 2014. fatf. godsiff, p. bitcoin: bubble or blockchain?. brooklyn: bibliobazaar press, 2015. graeber, d. debt: the first 5,000 years. brooklyn: melville house publishing, 2014. hoffman, a. “the seven characteristics of money.” accessed march 10, 2019. http://blog.milesfranklin.com/the-seven-characteristics-ofmoney. humayum, m., & belk, r. “in ones and zeroes we trust?: money, religion & bitcoin.” consumer research 45, no. 1 (2017): 677678. lo, s., & wang, c.j. “bitcoin as money?.” current policy perspectives, no. 4 (2014): 1-22. nakamoto, s. “bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system” accessed february 22, 2019. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. noble, d.f. the religion of technology: the divinity of man and the spirit of invention. new york: knopf press, 1997. nowakowski, w. “kryptograficzne aspekty technologii wirtualnej waluty bitcoin” accessed february 12, 2019. http://www.imm. org.pl/imm/plik/elektronika2013-05-2013_mm255.pdf. sharma, k. “blockchain council.” accessed february 20, 2019. https:// steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@danyelk/bitcoin-trust-and-kindareligious-faith-buy-eggs-with-iota-adaptation-continues-and-newinformation-on-project-qubic-short simmel georg. the philosophy of money (london: routledge and kegan paul ltd, 1978) walker, f.a. money. new york: bibliobazaar press, 2010. 98 prajñā vihāra from wealth to well-being and finally nibbana: a bridge from traditional to buddhist economics apichai puntasen rangsit university, thailand abstract the idea of economic growth measured by gdp has long been the development objective of almost all nations. this idea of growth has resulted in the rapid depletion of natural resources and the deterioration of the environment. an alternative paradigm of sustainable development was formally proposed by the united nations in 1987. unfortunately, sustainable development within the framework of systems analysis, serves only as the output without a clear process and the subsequent outcome. the concept of gnh proposed by former king of bhutan in the 1970’s and made known to the world also in 1987, could be used to serve as the outcome of sustainable development. also, among the four pillars of gnh, “good governance” in the broadest sense served as the process leading to sustainable development and its outcome, gnh. this concept serves as the bridge linking the western concept of sustainability to the eastern concept of “happiness” which is similar to that of “good life” or “moral life” of aristotle during the greek time. this concept of gnh has become increasingly popular globally within a short period of time. king bhumibol adulyadej of prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 98-140 © 2000 by assumption university press apichai puntasen 99 thailand advanced his concept of “sufficiency economy” in 1974. this concept complements that of the gnh as it completes the systems analysis approach to sustainable development. the concept consists of inputs, process output, outcome and impact, also within a buddhist tradition of sukha that does not imply the word “happiness” in english. however, according to the buddhist tradition, the ultimate sukha is the state of mind when it is completely liberated or free from all defilements. this is actually the ultimate goal of buddhist economics, which is not widely known or clearly understood in the west. therefore, sustainable development, gnh and sufficiency economy serve as the bridge for westerners and those who claim to be buddhists but do not clearly understand the essence of the teaching of buddha, to gain deeper understanding of buddhist economics that will lead the world to eternal peace. introduction the birth of economics can be traced back to the greek writer hesiod about 800 years b.c. he suggested that an economic utopia for a human being would be like living in heaven. everything that one desires would be available without any limit. unfortunately, the real world is not like this. its main feature is scarcity. scarcity can be managed when labor and raw materials are used in the production process in the most efficient way. work is the most important thing for a human being. for human life, unlike an angel, work is necessary to satisfy needs. competition can also can help manage the problem of scarcity (rothbard, 1995). the ancient economic thought during the time of aristotle (384-322 b.c.) did not advocate a life of unlimited desire, but the “flourishing” of life which has more than the necessities for survival. yet, it is the idea of the “good life” that counts. aristotle explained further that the “good life” is the moral life of virtue through which human beings attain “happiness”. therefore, the relevant economic aim in this regard is to produce enough materials to meet the basic needs as well as to attain “happiness” or “good life”. wealth is good for people because of its use-value for people. 100 prajñā vihāra however, there is other kind of value which is exchange-value. this value is determined in the market and originated from market demand driven by desirability. aristotle did not advocate this value because it is neither necessary nor good for life. according to aristotle the highest good was eudemonia, happiness, or “human flourishing” (summer & tribe, 2008). ever since the development of money in europe three centuries before aristotle, money was widely used already as a medium of exchange. the concept of exchange-value of goods and services gained much wider acceptance than their use-value, as increasingly more trading through markets. at the same time, the concept of happiness itself had shifted gradually from that of aristotelian eudemonic tradition of living a good and virtuous life through self-actualization, to the hedonic tradition of the good in life in the form of enjoyment, excitement, pleasure and prosperity. this is similar to the modern concept of “happiness”. this tradition started with thomas hobbes (1588-1679). hobbes explained good and bad in terms of pleasure and pain. a thing was good because it resulted in our own pleasure, and a bad thing was the one that brought pain. therefore, to live a gainful life was to seek as much pleasure as possible (burns 1958). it was no longer a “good life” that counted but rather what was good in life. jeremy bentham (1784-1832), a utilitarian philosopher, translated hobbes’ pleasure into utility. from then on, the concept of “utility” has become the supreme goal in economic life. however, bentham always advocated greater social utility, currently known as social welfare, rather than individual utility. his follower, john stuart mill (1806-1873) contended that the great social enjoyment could only be achieved when individuals were allowed to seek their enjoyment freely. government intervention into individual rights would only result in pain, hence reducing social enjoyment (randall, 1976). it should be observed that to mill, the word utility also means enjoyment which is close to the new meaning of the word “happiness” (puntasen, 2007). such a concept of “happiness” was developed in parallel to the concept of progress that implied “scientific progress” that eventually was used to represent and replace the concept of “god” itself. this idea can apichai puntasen 101 be traced back to st. thomas aquinas (1225-1274) who emphasized not faith but rationality. whitehead believed that this theology has led to the development of the sciences in ways never anticipated by st. thomas aquinas (whitehead, 1967). the concept was demonstrated by isaac newton (1642-1727) in the form of the law of gravity that controls the movement of all stars in the universe, especially for the solar system. this idea further led to the beginning of enlightenment in the 18th century (berlin, 1968). as scientific progress continued during the industrial revolution in the 18th century, it led to changes in living. scientific progress was equated to technological progress, and technological progress also implied more material wealth. material wealth was further interpreted as the source of hedonic tradition of happiness. towards, the end of the 18th century after the publication of “an inquiry into the wealth of nations” by adam smith in 1776, material wealth was considered to be the only thing that a human being must seek. since then, under the various forms of capitalism, wealth has become synonymous with happiness. this new understanding marks the end of eudemonic tradition of happiness put forward by aristotle. the search for wealth the search for wealth actually began a long time before the “wealth of nations” of adam smith in 1776. the scramble for colonies by the europeans (especially spain and portugal) that fully emerged between the 16th and 18th century under the guiding principle of mercantilism, brought with it the era of gun boat technology. the source of wealth was gold and silver. this could be accumulated through trade by buying cheap and selling dear. colonies served as the sources for cheap raw materials as well as the markets for their finished products. if necessary, silver and gold could be obtained through direct plundering from the weaker nations and indigenous people. gold and silver would bring about prosperity and progress to the colonizers. adam smith (1723-1790) did not condemn the accumulation of wealth but pointed out that trade monopoly was not the source of wealth. 102 prajñā vihāra wealth came from real production, and the only way to increase production in the most efficient way was through specialization and division of labor. specialization and division of labor were made possible through perfect competition where many buyers and sellers were available in the markets such that none of them could dictate the market price. the price mechanism was the one that kept the economy moving, and more production implied a genuine progress for humankind. as production was only means to the end of consumption, and the purpose of consumption was to generate utility, and as jeremy bentham (1784-1832) advocated greater social utility, production as the source of national wealth of adam smith faced no challenge. from then on wealth and progress became synonymous. the goal of economic process was to produce as much wealth as possible in order to produce the highest social utility possible. there had been various attempts at measuring the national wealth as the indicator for national economic success. the person who was finally successful in doing so was simon kuznets (1901-1985), a russian american economist. he won the 1971 nobel memorial prize “for his empirically founded interpretation of economic growth which has led to new and deepened insights into the economic and social structure and the process of development” although kuznets is not the first one who tried to measure gross national product to represent national wealth, he was the first one who did this systematically and calculated the u.s. gnp dated back to 1869. he broke the gnp down by industry, by final product, and checked it with the expenditure side. however, he warned that his measure of national income should not be used to imply the welfare of the nation as many kinds of production could result in undesirable situations such as crime, air pollution and poor health care. (http://wikipedia. org/wiki,simion_kuznets 8/1/2010). in spite of his warning, however, almost everyone took economic growth as a desirable thing and continue to use economic growth as a basis to measure welfare improvement. for most countries, economic development is considered to be good when it grows as fast as possible. in most cases, rapid growth means over-utilizing resources and promoting http://wikipedia.org/wiki,simion_kuznets http://wikipedia.org/wiki,simion_kuznets apichai puntasen 103 unnecessary production. apart from growth, this has been accompanied by rapid depletion of natural resources and deterioration of the environment that are not conducive for human lives. the first sound of warning came as early in 1962 in the book of rachel carson (1962), “silent spring”. before too long robert kennedy as a candidate for the post of president of the united states of america offered the following campaign speech at the university of kansas on march 18, 1968 before his being assassinated in california in june 1968. “too much and for too long, we seemed to have surrendered personal excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. our gross national product, now, is over $800 billion dollars a year, but that gross national product – if we judge the united states of america by that – that gross national product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. it counts special locks for our doors and the jails for the people who break them. it counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. it counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in our cities. it counts whitman’s rifle and speck’s knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. it does not include the beauty of our poetry, of the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate, of the integrity of our public officials. it measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. and it can tell us everything about america except why we are proud that we are americans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/robert f. kennedy 8/1/2010.) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/robert 104 prajñā vihāra the warnings continued. in 1972, mainstream economics suffered another jolt from a new report, “the limit to growth: a report for the club of rome’s project on the predicament of mankind” by meadows et al (1972). this time the shock was more real because it was followed by the first oil price spike in 1973/74 driven by the organization of petroleum exporting countries (opec). the result was known among all the so-called developed nations or organization for economic cooperation and development: oecd members as “stagflation”. it was stagnation with inflation, a condition that had never existed before and was not predictable from the known economic theories. at the same time, another little book that became famous, “small is beautiful” by schumacher (1973). although being a british catholic, buddhist economics was introduced in this book in chapter iv. he reminded us that buddhist economics could serve as example for those who regard human beings more highly than money. buddhist economics must be based on sustainability not unlimited growth (sulak sivaraksa, 2009 pp.30-31). in spite of the continuous warnings that gdp cannot reflect well-being and human dignity and the emergence of the new concept of sustainable development in 1987 by the united nations in the form of brundtland report, the use of gdp as the indicator to measure national economic performance to represent the improvement of national welfare still continues. many of those whose attempts to look for alternative indicators that can reflect national wellbeing will traditionally start from criticizing gdp. ronald coleman (2008) in his attempt to develop the new index called genuine progress index (gpi), began his work by saying that. “we are not seeking either to replace or modify gdp. rather we seek to replace the widespread misuse of gdp as a measure of progress, wellbeing, and prosperity-a purpose for which it was not intended or designed. gdp will always be needed to assess the size of the market economy. but, confined to that role and put in its proper place, so to speak, it becomes far less important – and certainly not needed nearly as frequently as currently produced. even logically, apichai puntasen 105 a quantitative measure of economic size cannot possibly assess quality of live. we know well what’s wrong with gdp-based measures – no need to dwell further on that.” according to coleman, gdp is precise only for measuring the size of the market economy and should be left for that function only. the problem in calculating gdp is that it only calculates the value of product based on all the market costs of all factors of production involved. it does not take into consideration all the externalities that have actually become part of the cost of production. neither does it consider any undesirable or harmful effect from consumption of such product. such failure to include all other related costs in the production process and all “clean up” costs after the consumption process are the causes of the complaint of why gdp cannot be used to measure national welfare or wellbeing. these have become the reasons why the new index such as genuine progress index must be attempted. after the so called, “hamburger crisis” caused by inflating the sub-prime assets also known as the sub-prime crisis that originated in the united states in 2008 and started to spread globally especially in europe, the french president nicolas sarkozy who was not satisfied with gdp and its growth as indicators for economic success appointed two nobel laureates prize winners, joseph stiglitz and amartya sen to be members of the commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress in february 2009. the two produced the final report in early 2010. like coleman, stiglitz began by explaining why gdp was not a good measurement of wellbeing. “there’s no single number that can capture anything as complex as our society. so what we argue for is the need for an array of carefully-chosen numbers, with a better understanding of the role of each of those numbers” “gdp could be misleading as a quality of life index. an increase in fuel consumption would boost growth figures 106 prajñā vihāra even if it only reflected more unproductive traffic jams and pollution” “the run up to last year’s credit crunch (was due in part to), many world policy makers had sought to follow the american growth model because it had produced impressive gdp increases for the united states” stiglitz in his report suggested the alternative, if countries had focused instead on plans to increase the median income of households, they might have protected themselves better from the crisis and improved the general well-being of their population, the new systems (should) take into account environmental health, safety and education -what bhutan already calls it gross national happiness. countries should publish an annual report much like a corporation does, and the figure given should include measures of household buying power and of inequality between genders, age groups and social classes. the data should be recorded in such a way as to enable policy makers to evaluate the population’s level of “well-being and make plans to increase it.” (htt://www.france24.com/en/20090914-france-advocates-new-waysmeasuregrowth-ba-9/1/2553). in spite of this criticism, the use of gdp to measure welfare and wellbeing still continues. its own attraction is that it is a single indicator that has been widely used for comparison within and among countries over a long period. many are still hooked on it as long as they are not convinced by the equally handy alternative. another possible reason is also that most people consider wealth as the means to achieve happiness. sustainability as a middle path philosophy towards the end of 20th century, it became obvious that pursuing material wealth had its own physical limits. the most obvious limits are apichai puntasen 107 environmental and ecological. also the belief that economic growth can eradicate poverty had become increasingly questionable as the problem of modern poverty is not the absolute one, but more of a relative poverty caused by an increasing income gap. it becomes obvious that material growth alone cannot contribute to reducing, not to mention eradicating this income gap. clearly material growth can never serve as a tool to reduce the problem of poverty. on the other hand, social problems seem to be on the increasing trend globally, in spite of continuing material growth. both environmental and social problems have been increasing at such rapid rates to the point that they represent threats to the material growth itself. as such, the call for sustainable development has become much more urgent. however, those who advocate for sustainability must start from the point of human needs and not human greed, or as gandhi once said“the world has enough for everyone’s need but not everyone’s greed” in this case, “human need” is the starting point in speaking about sustainability. those who advocate sustainability also follow this tradition. in 1987, the united nations released the brundtland report, which defines sustainable development as “development which meets the need of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” it has now been recognized that without environmental sustainability, and sociopolitical sustainability, the economy alone cannot be sustainable. the well accepted definition for sustainable development nowadays is the creation of environment, social and economic balance. however, among various international forums, a fourth pillar for sustainability, namely that of culture has been added. the universal declaration on cultural diversity (unesco, 2001) further elaborates the concept by stating that cultural diversity is necessary for human kind as biodiversity is for nature; it becomes one of the roots of development understood not simply in terms of economic growth, but also as a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence. 108 prajñā vihāra the key to the success of sustainable development is the balance among these four pillars, environment, society, economy and culture. as the word balance is used, it resonates with the word ‘moderate’ and ‘middle path’ of the buddha dhamma, otherwise known as the teaching of buddha where the middle path or the middle way plays a core role in all aspects of a human life. the middle way or majjhima patipada in buddha dhamma is not the middle position between the two extremes as it is commonly understood. in his own words, the buddha explained the following to his followers (puntasen, 2008). dear monks, these two extremes are the ones that those who seek purification must avoid. one is indulgence in kamasukha or sukkha from acquisition and sensual pleasure. this is the common and low level of sukha. it is for common people and not for ariya or a noble one. it does not result in any useful thing.” the other is to live in hardship or live a very difficult life, or to live in dukkha (or pain). it is not the way for a noble one either. it does not result in any useful thing. tathagata or the accomplished one has already achieved enlightenment. it is the middle way that does not involve the two extremes. it is the way to create the “eye” to see, to create paňňa to know. it is the way for peace, for ultimate knowledge, for enlightenment and for nibbana. what is the middle way? it is the way for a noble one consisting of the whole eight parts. they are sammaditthi or right understanding, sammasankappa or right mental attitude, samavaca or right speech, sammakammata or right conduct, sammaajiva or right livelihood or right means of living, samavayama or right effort, sammasati or mindfulness, and sammasamadhi or right concentration. so this middle way is the way that does not involve the two extremes and is not the middle between the two extremes. apichai puntasen 109 the two extremes are: 1. kamasukkhallikanuyoga, the extreme of sensual indulgence or extreme hedonism. 2. attakilamathanuyoga, the extreme of self-mortification or extreme asceticism. like sustainable development, the middle way or middle path serves only as a tool but it has a definite goal. that is the eradication of dukkha or pain which leads to the attainment of the conditions of emancipation or freedom from all defilements of the mind or being free from pain. thus the conditions required for the mind to reach the stage of nibbana is the complete eradication of dukkha. unfortunately, the concept of sustainable development as introduced in the west is restricted to the output of the development process, without any final goal or outcome. most of the time sustainable development has been considered as a goal in itself, with the implicit goal for human race to survive “happily.” but as it is restricted merely to a goal in itself, it does not necessarily imply the relationship between sustainability and happiness. unlike sustainable development as conceptualized in the west, the middle path explains further that dukkha or pain is mainly caused by avijja or ignorance of things, or to be more specifically, ignorance about what is dukkha itself, ignorance about the causes of dukkha, ignorance about the cessation of dukkha, and ignorance about the magga or the way to end dukkha. the tool to combat avijja or ignorance is vijja or better known as paňňa, the ability to understand everything in its own nature. paňňa can only be acquired through the continuous training of the mind known as sikkattya or the threefold training, adhisilasikkha (training in high morality), adhicittasikkha (training in higher mentality or mental discipline) and adhipaňňasikkha (training higher level of paňňa). this threefold training serves also as magga or the path to end dukkha. thus, the middle path in buddhist economics contains also a relationship between the mind, happiness, and material production. 110 prajñā vihāra the middle path was taught by buddha because without the middle path, paňňa cannot be generated. both extremes of sensual indulgence or extreme hedonism and extreme of self mortification or extreme asceticism only result in ignorance, especially with extreme hedonism, while extreme asceticism will result in perpetual pain which prevents paňňa. this is why the middle path or moderation has become a necessary condition for the generation of paňňa which is considered to be the most important tool to end dukkha caused by ignorance. it can be clearly seen that sustainable development conceptualized as balanced development among the four pillars, namely, environment, society, economy and culture for sustainable living of a human being can be considered to be heading in the same general direction as the middle path philosophy. it can be concluded at this point that the concept of sustainable development that moves away from the extreme concept of material growth orientation is moving towards the middle path philosophy available in buddha dhamma, or the teaching of buddha. unfortunately, in the world where most decision makers all over the world believe that scientists’ measurement is the only way to evaluate the application of any policy, there are problems in finding such measurements for sustainable development. so far, there has been no widely accepted indicators to measure the level or even the direction of sustainable development. various attempts have been made in this direction. among the most recent one is by jon hall (2009) the director of the global project on measuring the progress of societies, supported by oecd who also planned the world forum on “charting progress, building visions, improving life” in busan, korea during 27-30 october, 2009. what is explained below was his view given to the audience in thailand in july 2009 at sasin international business college, chulalongkorn university. instead of defining progress, he questioned what should be defined as progress. one suggestion among many others was the balance development of the three components, namely, economy, environment and society which is the same as sustainable development. in the end he suggested that the measure should include the interdependence between the two systems, apichai puntasen 111 namely, the human system and ecosystem or the condition of ecosystem. the set of measurements for ecosystem condition should include, health that includes the quality of air, land, fresh water, oceans, and biodiversity. for human system, it should include culture, economy and governance. the cultural aspect should comprise the creative, expressive, and symbolic aspects of way of life, including art, crafts, food, games, gardens, literatures, language, music and religions. the economy and government should include the stocks and flows of an economy (income and wealth), democratic participation, access to services, order and safety, political rights, responsiveness, and transparency. the human system must eventually lead to human wellbeing. such measurements should include health, knowledge and understanding freedom and subjective well-being, individual and social / relational wellbeing, while the economy, governance and culture must support the said wellbeing. it should be observed also that the category of subjective wellbeing has been used for such scientific measurements. however, jon hall also admitted that it is difficult to measure and also very difficult to find policy relevance for measures (at least for generalized measurement of life satisfaction). nevertheless, he indicated the evidence of a strong relationship between subjective wellbeing (happiness) and good physical health. in the end he also admitted that progress or in this case, it may be termed as sustainability, was only useful as a process. in the end he also questioned one direction of such progress. the above discussion actually tries to demonstrate how difficult it could be in order to put the good idea of sustainable development into actual practice. the resurgence of the eudemonic tradition of happiness in the small and remote himalayan kingdom of bhutan, however, things have been developing along different lines. it is very difficult to imagine that such a small kingdom with the population of less than one million can ever successfully compete in producing material growth compared with most material growth oriented nations. almost at the same time as the book of meadows in 1972 on “limit to growth” was 112 prajñā vihāra published, in the buddhist kingdom of bhutan, jigme singe wangchuck ascended the throne at the age of 16 as the king of bhutan. he cautiously led his country to development following a new concept currently known as “gross national happiness”. in response to the accusation in the 1987 by a journalist from uk’s financial times that the pace of (material) development in bhutan was slow, the king said, “gross national happiness is more important than gross national product” (greenwald, 2004). it should be noted here also that 1987 coincided with the year that the united nations released the brundtland report on sustainable development. such activity may have helped increase the confidence of the king in formulating his approach. it should be observed also that the king stood firmly on the issues that jon hall mentioned but did follow through because of the problems of measurement of subjective well-being or what aristotle called “good life”. in this case, the king also went further in answering jon hall’s question of progress towards what. for him, it was progress towards happiness. since then, the study of happiness has received much greater attention from economists. even nobel laureate daniel kahneman questioned the link between the level of income and happiness (kahneman, 2000). richard layard (2003) the well known british economist took this further in writing his book on “economics of happiness”. in his work, layard concluded, “happiness depends on your inner life as much as on your outer circumstance”. like schumacher, layard looked at buddhism for an inspiration for an alternative path, and from this used the insights that people are adaptable; that they need to cultivate trust, compassion, and positive thinking to overcome envy; and the society needs to concentrate more on “education of the spirit” (undp 2007). no doubt that the work of both stiglitz and sen discussed earlier was also inspired by the gnh arguments as well. the most difficult part of this concept is still the question of how to measure it after the agreement on the term, since this is largely a subjective concept with highly complex characteristics. however, after he introduced the concept, the now former king of bhutan also provided the guidelines to achieve that in the name of the apichai puntasen 113 four pillars. being a dominant buddhist country, it follows the conviction that it is bound by nature to search for happiness, and that is the single most desire for every citizen (thinley, 2007). the four pillars are, sustainable and equitable socio-economic development, conservation of the environment, prevention and promotion of culture, and good governance. furthermore, gnh is also a balanced approach to development. from the carefully identified four key pillars, the insensible pursuit of economic growth can be balanced out with the goal of preserving environment and culture (thinley, 2004). so he attempted to come up with a set of indicators that could measure progress on all the four pillars that jon hall tried to develop, and in addition he also tried the addition of measuring subjective well-being which he already acknowledged that it would be difficult to do so. finally, the gnh index has actually been developed. while the four pillars serve more as the process, the goal of gnh is gross happiness at the national level. the engineer of this index is karma ura (2008) of the centre for bhutan studies. the index was released on the coronation date of november 7, 2008 of the 5th king of bhutan, his majesty jigme khesar namgyel wangchuck, the son of the previous king, popularly known as king khesar. it is the measure for collective happiness of the people of bhutan. it goes beyond individual self-interest which is considered egocentric and unethical. it is a perception of happiness that blossoms through enhanced relationship, arising unbidden when the relationships improve. so the whole development is about progress in relationship, not of individuals. gnh is a single number index and its component indicators provide bhutan with three different levels and types of indicators: • gnh status indicators. hundreds of such indicators are calculated from the primary data • gnh demographic indicators. they show distribution of gnh dimensions across different social, economic and demographic groups. 114 prajñā vihāra • gnh causal and correlation indicators. the gnh indicators have been designed to include nine core dimensions that are regarded as components of happiness and well-being in bhutan. they are selected on normative grounds and equally weighted as equal intrinsic important as a component of gross national happiness. within each dimension several indicators that seem to remain informative across time, with high response rates and relatively uncorrelated are selected. the nine dimensions of gnh and their related set of indicators are shown below: 1. psychological well-being • general psychological distress indicators, • emotional balance indicators, and • spiritual indicators 2. time use an important function of trading time use is to acknowledge the value of non-work time for happiness. the time available for non-work activities such as sleeping, personal care, community participation, education and learning, religious activities, social and cultural activities, sports and leisure and travel. these diverse activities can add in rich life and contribute to levels of happiness. 3. community vitality • family vitality indicator • safety indicator • reciprocity indicator • trust indicator • social support indicator • socialization indicator and • kinship density indicator apichai puntasen 115 4. cultural diversity and resilience • dialect use indicator • traditional sport indicator • community festival indicator • artisan skill indicator • value transmission indicator, and • basic precept indicator. 5. health • health status indicator • health knowledge indicator, and • barriers to health indicator. 6. education • education attainment indicator • dzongkha language indicator, and • folk and historical literacy indicator 7. ecological diversity and resilience • ecological degradation indicator, • ecological knowledge indicator, and • afforestation indicator 8. living standard • income indicator • housing indicator • food security indicator and • hardship indicator 116 prajñā vihāra 9. good governance • government performance indicator • freedom indicator, and • institutional trust indicator. in calculating gnh, a “sufficiency” cutoff point is applied to all indicators. the one that is at the sufficiency cutoff point and above is considered to be well-being. the further away from the sufficiency point indicates the increasing degree of unhappiness. the distance from the sufficiency point is what is used for measurement. finally, gnh can be calculated from the following relationship gnh = 1-average square distance from the sufficiency cutoff point it currently appears that gnh is not merely a policy framework of the bhutanese government but it also has explicit indicators to measure it that will result in the government policy to improve it from the existing situation. it is premature to argue against the validity of all these indicators, as they are still in the process of development, and can be improved more in the future. however, the bhutan government is not content just with such an incremental approach. it continues to look for the way to instill the values of gnh in the long term in the people of bhutan themselves. changing the mindset of the people of bhutan in the direction of gnh is deemed to be essential. after all, happiness is a subjective value that people can gradually orient towards. in 2009, the centre for bhutan studies was asked by the government to find the way to develop gnh value education in schools (karma ura, 2009). the work in this direction has been continuing. from what we have discussed in this section, it is without any doubt that, like sustainable development, gnh has been developed along the same middle path philosophy in buddha dhamma. it already moves one step beyond sustainable development in that it has a much clearer apichai puntasen 117 vision of the goal that it wants to achieve. namely, gnh is not meant for individuals alone, but for the collective members within the society. it is also ready to face the challenge in trying to measure the subjective happiness which is considered to be the most difficult one raised by jon hall. moreover, the country also looks for a transformation into gnh value in the longer run through proper forms of education. all these activities indicate a clear commitment to the eudemonic tradition of happiness of what aristotle simply called “good life”. sufficiency is both necessary and sufficient conditions for happiness unlike bhutan where the main emphasis is on gnh, in the kingdom of thailand placed emphasis on identifying the process for sustainable development and eventually happiness from the idea of usefulness for all (similar to that of gnh). in trying to measure gnh, the centre for bhutan studies tried to locate the area of unhappiness and using the concept of sufficiency as a cutoff point, given the implication that any point higher than the cutoff point is already in the realm of happiness. the point or a band of sufficiency is the one that separates the region of unhappiness from the happy one. therefore, the concept of “sufficiency” is used as a demarcation between happiness and unhappiness in bhutan and is used as a process to achieve happiness in thailand. the commonality of this concept reflects the fact that both gnh of bhutan and sufficiency economy of thailand are drawn from the middle path philosophy from buddha dhamma, and the concept of sufficiency is common for both countries. king bhumibol adulyadej, was born as a prince in the united states in 1927 and received the most part of his formal education from switzerland. he ascended the throne in 1947 at the age of 19. after his marriage, the young royal couple traveled extensively overseas mostly among developed countries to learn about the development and the state of technological progress in those countries. after that, they both toured all undeveloped regions in thailand and saw the suffering of most rural thai people with their own eyes. in 1961 when the thai government adopted the first economic development plan suggested by experts from 118 prajñā vihāra the united states together with those from the world bank, the king offered no comment but probably had his own reservations, as the focus of the plan was to stimulate material growth. after gaining additional confidence based on his own empirical evidence, in 1974, one year after the launching of schumacher’s “small is beautiful”, the king already had the following to say: national development must be carried out step by step, starting with laying the foundation to ensure that the majority of the people have enough to live on and to live for as a basic step using economical yet theoretically sound methods and equipments. when the basics are securely established, higher levels of economic growth and development should be promoted. (the national research council committee on economic branch, office of the national research council of thailand, 2004) this comment shows that, the king personally advocates the development approach based on an initial stable economic base, rather than emphasizing growth itself. the word “enough” in bold letters above is the key word to understand the use of the term “sufficiency”. unfortunately, the king’s comment in 1974 did not reach the ears of most policy makers in thailand. they all continued with the business as usual scenario in pursuing growth only, as they have been coached by foreign experts and most thai economists trained abroad. as the course of development did not change in the way that his majesty wished to see it happened, he continued to work in his royal-initiated projects with the goal of promoting sufficiency for all thais. even when the thai economy began to grow in 1987, the king was not much impressed. even at peak of the long period of growth in 1994, the king surprised many by announcing a scheme that seemed to contradict thailand’s formula for miraculous growth. he unveiled a model of the self-reliant family farm on which he had begun his experiments a few years earlier (undp, 2007). after 1994, in spite of the well performing apichai puntasen 119 economy judged by the measurement of gdp, the king already saw the economic danger. during the eve of his birthday, he warned the thai people to live their lives according to the principle of sufficiency and not to be greedy. but it was only in the economic collapse of 1997 that his advice on sufficiency economy was heard loud and clear. yet again, this scenario repeated itself in 2008 when the “hamburger crisis” started in the united states, spread rapidly all over europe and eventually hit thailand. this fact indicates that, unlike bhutan, the thai government policy had greatly deviated from the advice of the king. the difference was that although, the king has been highly respected by most thai people, he has to operate under the constitution from the outset, and that the thai government followed a policy of economic growth rather than the king’s advice. this fact explains why sufficiency economy did not make a rapid progress in the thai soil as much as gnh for bhutan. having mentioned the key factors explaining the slow progress of sufficiency economy in thailand, it is still very much worth while to discuss sufficiency economy as the alternative development paradigm in thailand and the rest of the world. sufficiency economy is officially defined as follows: “sufficiency economy” is a philosophy that stresses the middle path as an overriding principle for appropriate conduct by the populace at all levels. this applies to conduct starting from the level of the families, communities, as well as the level of national development and administration so as to accommodate change in line with globalization. “sufficiency” means moderation, reasonableness, and the need of self-immunity for sufficient protection from impact arising from internal and external shocks. to achieve this, an application of knowledge with due consideration and prudence is essential. in particular, great care is needed in the utilization of theories and methodologies for planning and implementation in every step. at the same time, it is essential to strengthen the ethical integrity of the nation, so everyone, particularly public officials, academics, 120 prajñā vihāra businessmen at all levels, adheres first and foremost to the principles of honesty and integrity. in addition, a way of life based on patience, perseverance, diligence, wisdom and prudence is indispensable to create balance and be able to cope appropriately with critical challenges arising from extensive and rapid socioeconomic, environmental and cultural changes in the world. the keywords in bold characters are explained in term of systems analysis in the diagram below. diagram 1: systems analysis of sufficiency economy from the above diagram, inputs of this sufficiency economy process can be divided into two conditions, namely knowledge and ethical integrity. knowledge serves as the necessary condition and consists of wisdom or paňňa and due consideration that can be interpreted as sati or mindfulness and great care that also implies sati. this necessary condition of knowledge can be interpreted as the situation where paňňa must work under the control of mindfulness or sati all the time. this condition will ensure that any knowledge or a clear understanding of anything must apichai puntasen 121 work under the control of mindfulness all the time in order to achieve the best possible result. under such condition, all knowledge or clear understanding must work for positive results. this is a necessary condition for having ethical integrity which will become a sufficient condition for the process of sufficiency economy. it is necessary because without paňňa being controlled by sati, ethical integrity will make no sense for people who are greedy and want to accumulate wealth by all means. having paňňa controlled by sati, such immoral or unethical behavior can never be justified. on the other hand, ethical integrity can be classified further into honesty and integrity, patience, perseverance, diligence and compassion. these are the five qualities for a person who tries very hard to do good things not only for the benefit of that person but also for the others with compassion in an ethical and honest way. this condition of ethical integrity is sufficient for continuing the process that can be called the middle path; the path that does not involve the two extremes that work against the development of paňňa. it can be clearly seen at this point that sufficiency economy does belong to the middle path philosophy explained in buddha dhamma. within this middle path, it can be further classified into three related sub-processes starting from the most practical and easy one, the “way of doing” or being resilient or prudent. the “way of thinking” or the understanding of the concept of sufficiency or moderation and the regular practicing of the concept until it will become “the way of living”, which is the component known as the causal relationship. in other words, these three components are formed into one process known as the middle path. resilience, prudence or “way of doing” is the first step in the direction of sufficiency economy. this is so because there can be various motivations for being resilient. the main purpose for that is to be able to endure any unforeseeable event happening without any warning and to be flourish in the long run. the result from such endurance is a longterm benefit through avoiding short term risk by not considering any short term gain. it may be called a risk aversion attitude or behavior. it is purely for self protection not for any other reasons. there are also various 122 prajñā vihāra methods for doing so. however, once one begins with the sub-process of resilience or prudence, it can be rightly considered that such person has already moved in the direction of sufficiency economy. hence, the practice of resilience or prudence alone for whatever motivation, should be considered as “partial practice” of sufficiency economy. the real understanding of sufficiency economy comes from the clear knowledge that actually sufficiency means moderation, a natural law for optimal living with regard to life itself, for all living things. anything that is either too little or too much is not good for the life, the point of optimality must be the one that lies between the two points. for example, having too little food is not good and too much food is not good either. the moderate amount of food is good for the body and the life involved. we can extend this to other examples: too little rest and too much rest, too little exercise and too much exercise, too little clothing and too much clothing. this extends to too little wealth and too much wealth. the most difficult part of this concept is that most of the time people do not know that their minds have been controlled by greed and/or ignorance. they try to accumulate more than what is optimal for their lives due to greed or insecurity. this way, they tend to accumulate more than what is optimal for their own lives. this unnecessary accumulation has become part of the global crises nowadays. it needs paňňa being controlled by sati to know at what point or what level of having the thing in question is optimal for one’s life. if sufficiency or moderation is understood this way, it can be considered as a “way of thinking”. it can be also considered that such practice of sufficiency economy is at the level of “comprehension”. with this understanding, the practice of resilience or prudence will be done through a clear understanding the concept of sufficiency economy. a person should be able to understand in addition that the practice of self-reliance is the best way to achieve resilience or prudence. after thorough understanding of sufficiency economy this way, a person may always cultivate good causes and all other good supporting factors in order to achieve good results in return. practicing this way, a person will understand the “causal relationships” from his good deed, the apichai puntasen 123 last process in the middle path of sufficiency economy. having always experienced the good consequences is logical for a person to practice this all the time as his “way of living”. at this level of practice of sufficiency economy, can be called “inspiration”. the understanding and practicing of ethical integrity as a way of living with the aim to avoid any undesirable results will definitely yield only right livelihood. it can be considered as the ideal way to live one’s life. all the said three components are part of the process of the middle path, that will lead to the output from this sufficiency economy process. the output is basically sustainability of the four components, namely, economy, society, culture and environment. output of this nature is the same as sustainable development that consists of the balanced development of the four pillars, namely, economy, society, culture and environment. it is also similar to the three out of the four pillar of gnh, namely, economy and society, culture, and environment. however, the gnh considers good governance as the fourth pillar. in fact good governance can also serve as one component of the process for sustainable development that eventually lead to gross national happiness (gnh). as for sufficiency economy, it is the process leading to the output of sustainable development in such a way that the economy, society, culture, and environment are sustainable, balanced and stable. this output of sustainable development can be interpreted as the process that results in at least the maintenance of all forms of capital or to result in some increase or the increase of all the following capital, namely, human capital, social capital, environmental capital and physical capital. human capital implies increase in human knowledge, skill as well as work satisfaction that would lead to increase in productivity. sufficiency economy considers human capital to be the most important one among the four. after all, the happiness of a human being is the only thing that matters. social capital is the capital resulting from human interaction in the way that capital can be generated. in this respect, culture is also considered as part of a social capital. in the west, trust is considered as the most important social capital because it will result in significant 124 prajñā vihāra reduction of transaction costs in the market. in thailand, apart from trust, the more important aspects of social capital are compassion, mutual help or assistance and unity or social cohesion. these various aspects of social capital will contribute to the increase in productivity of any social organization. unlike capitalism where physical capital is regarded as the only relevant form of capital, sufficiency economy ranks physical capital as the least important one. the priorities are given more to human capital and social capital. environmental capital and physical capital that also include financial capital can always be regenerated, if human capital and social capital are most efficient in the production process. therefore, according to sufficiency economy, the priority list begins from human capital, social capital, environment capital and physical capital, respectively. the increase in at least one form of capital while the rest are not decreasing implies sustainable output of this system. although, only resilience or prudence can easily lead to sustainability. however, sustainability is not the final goal or objective of any human being. all living things especially human beings are anticipating happy lives. such happy lives can be gained especially, from a balance living. anything that is out of balance will lead to some kind of problems which will never result in happiness. on the other hand, moderation that implies not too much and not too little actually implies the concept of balance as well as optimal for life which also means a happy life. therefore, one can conclude that moderation also implies a balance as well as a happy life. sufficiency economy philosophy is applicable to the individual, the family, the community, the organization, the society, the nation or to the world. in the case of the individual, the outcome will be a happy life or “good life”. if the unit is a family, the outcome will be a happy family. if a community, the outcome will be a happy community and so on and so forth, up to national and global levels. at the national level, the outcome will be similar to gnh. however, sufficiency economy stresses more on the part of inputs and process to be assured that sustainable development will be the output, and the outcome from moderation will lead to balance and finally happy life, eventually. sufficiency economy does not apichai puntasen 125 stop at happiness of the unit who practice it, there is also a question of those who cannot practice prudence and moderation. but the practice of sufficiency economy ensures that those who practice it will offset those who do not and so provide stability. an additional relevant concept is “prayote sukha” or happiness from being useful for others. following the concept of causal relationship by practicing it as the way of life, will result in not only happiness for the one who practices this concept but also for the others who do not for various reasons. if more people do good things not only for themselves but for others, the community and the society will achieve stability from “proyote sukha” or happiness from being useful for all others. in this way, sustainability, balance, and stability will be all attained goals. this last part can be considered as the impact of sufficiency economy. it can be seen clearly that not like sustainable development where only the output is emphasized without much elaboration of the process and the outcome of happiness. sufficiency economy starts from inputs, process, output and also the outcome that is happiness as well as its impact of achieving happiness through being useful for oneself and others. while gnh discusses output and outcome more clearly than sustainable development, it only considers good governance in the broadest sense as the process with no clear inputs. therefore, sufficiency economy can be considered as complementing gnh by providing a more complete picture of its systems analysis component. unfortunately, in terms of its actual application, gnh has been more advanced than sufficiency economy. apart from being the idea initiated by the revered former king of bhutan at the time of absolute monarchy, the concept of gnh is rather simple and more straightforward than most people, even western economists, can also understand. the philosophy of sufficiency economy is much more complex especially as the concept gives more emphasis on the inputs and the process than the output, outcome and its consequential impact. it is difficult even for the thai people who claim to be buddhist but do not understand the essence of buddha dhamma to clearly understand this sufficiency 126 prajñā vihāra economy concept. this fact has become the most important reason why the concept has been advanced by the revered king of thailand himself but also why it has been so slow in its actual application in comparison with that of gnh of bhutan. in fact, king bhumibol of thailand proposes this philosophy for all the thais and not only for buddhists, even though the concept has been drawn directly from buddhism. the common ethical ground of sufficiency economy available in all religions are honesty and integrity, patience, perseverance, diligence and compassion with strong emphasis on sufficiency which also implies not to be too greedy. most muslims and christians and those who believe in other major religions, all admit that they have no difficulty in following sufficiency economy philosophy. in fact, most devout muslims will claim that according to islam, they already practice sufficiency economy in their daily lives. unfortunately, the most difficult part of sufficiency economy for most people to embrace is rejection of greed. being against the raw nature of the human being that has been conditioned by capitalism for more than five centuries makes it very difficult for most people to change their mindset within a short period of time. this condition also explains a very slow progress of sufficiency economy in thailand and not to mention elsewhere, in spite of many favorable factors available within the country. the study of boonyarattanasoontorn and komoltha (2009) revealed that factors causing the slow progress in adopting sufficiency economy for practical purpose have been national and local governments in thailand. this is because most political parties that compete in political arena to form government in the past (before 2015), subscribe to business politics dominated by the ideology of capitalism. as sufficiency economy tends to work in the opposite direction to business interest in politics, politicians are only good at giving lip service but act in opposite direction. among these setbacks, there is still a little light at the end of the tunnel. the private business sector and civil society are the ones who have been more active in adopting the sufficiency economy philosophy. they have been doing this out of their own necessities and found the apichai puntasen 127 concept to be quite useful for them to solve their own problems. the main problem was caused by the 1997 economic crisis in thailand as most businesses suffered from severe losses, to the point of bankruptcy. adopting sufficiency economy to their businesses helped them improve their businesses significantly. many have followed the most successful cases. at the same time most farmers with small land-holdings in thailand also suffer from losses resulting from the practice of monoculture. adopting new approaches to agriculture, promoted by king bhumibol since 1984, helped them regain and improve their livelihood significantly. the good examples have been replicated and in many cases they have formed into a sufficiency economy communities. these are the two sectors that have made some advancement in the direction of sufficiency economy philosophy. incidentally, the military coup in thailand in september 2006 justified their overthrow of the elected government of thaksin shinawatra based upon its business policies. the action of the coup also implied that the old constitution of 1997 must also be abolished. consequently, a new constitution was drawn up and approved. the new constitution of 2007, proclaimed sufficiency economy as a national development direction. an autonomous organization by the name of national economic and social advisory council (nesac) had the responsibility to evaluate the incumbent government to make sure that the government acts within the objectives of the constitution of 2007. on that basis, indicators used to evaluate the performance of the incumbent government on whether its followed the development of the country in the direction of sufficiency economy have already been developed in thailand. such set of indicators was completed in 2007 (working group on academic affairs, nesac, 2007). unfortunately, such indicators have not been used for the intended evaluation, as the return of the elected regime made the amendment in the law of the nesac to limit its responsibility to provide advisory service to the government only. in the area of education, priyanut dhammapiya, director of sufficiency economy unit, bureau of the crown property under the 128 prajñā vihāra guidance and support of h. e. chirayu israngura na ayuthaya, director general of the bureau of the crown property and the cooperation from ministry of education, curricula of basic education for schools in thailand to operate under the direction of sufficiency economy have been formally designed for all levels (12 years) since 2007. presently (2016), there are altogether around 20,000 schools all over thailand that have successfully adopted sufficiency economy curricula for their schools. (http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/info.school search.php 25/1/2010). not much progress can be said in others direction of sufficiency economy in thailand than what has been indicated above. unlike the gnh movement in bhutan, that already has gnh index and all related indicators as well as a long term plan to instill gnh value into education there, the sufficiency economy in thailand has made less progress. nevertheless, both gnh of bhutan and sufficiency economy of thailand have already laid some firm foundation for further development in the direction of buddhist economics,. buddhist economics can save this catastrophic world plagued by consumerism. 1 buddhist economics is the fusion of two words, “buddhist” and “economics”. it is generally defined as “the subject that is derived from the lessons of the buddha’s discoveries on his path to enlightenment to explain economic activities with the aim for both individuals and society to achieve peace and tranquility under resource constraints”. (puntasen, 2005) the difference between buddhist economics and mainstream economics reflects different paradigms of human nature. under scientific materialist paradigm, mainstream economics observes that each human being normally follows his/her self-interest. therefore, following self interest of any individual is a “rational” behavior. economics also adopts the darwinian theory of “the survival of the fittest” to imply that competition http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/info.school apichai puntasen 129 leads to progress. hence, the core values of mainstream economics (more popularly known as “capitalism”) are “self-interest” and “competition”. because of such development of thought, mainstream economics defines pursuing of self-interest as a rational behavior as well as competition as factors contributes to more generation of utility. the thought behind buddhist economics is buddhism, with the clear understanding that for all living things, once their lives exist they can never be without dukkha or suffering or pain. such suffering or pain is basically caused by change into older age, illness and eventually death. for animals with the highest level of development like human beings additional dukkha or suffering can also result from their minds being controlled by all defilements such as kilesa or stimulation caused by greed and avijja or ignorance. those who have vijja or pañña will understand that, it does not make any sense to inflict more pain to the others, since inflicting more pain to the others does not guarantee that the one who caused the pain will be happy. on the other hand, helping the others to reduce their pain can result in better feelings or happiness. buddhist economics advocates non-self (since everything is changing all the time including the concept of “self” itself) compassion and cooperation while, the emphasis of mainstream economics is on self-interest as a rational behavior and competition. in a system of capitalism together with industrialism and consumerism, one often visualizes growth without end. nevertheless, the increase of economic growth is limited by the amount of non-renewable resources available and the carrying capacity of the globe for waste from production and consumption. in reality pushing for more production all the time will turn to be an unsustainable downward-spiral resulting in more waste generation and resource depletion causing environmental degradation and eventually: human self-destruction. because of the nature of capitalism influenced by industrialism and consumerism, consumption-efficiency becomes the key for the survival of humanity in a foreseeable future – yet, this cannot be discussed in a meaningful way in the mainstream economics. only buddhist economics can deal with this key concept in a meaningful way; it can actually save 130 prajñā vihāra this world from the end of humanity in much more meaningful ways. efficiency of consumption when consumption is no longer being promoted for its own sake, it can be understood in terms of efficiency, as the consumption process can be analyzed in the same way as the production process. the fact that mainstream economics cannot explain efficiency of consumption as clearly as that of production is because the goal of consumption has already been set to maximize pleasure or utility rather than optimize consumption efficiency. but can we understand consumption without reference to pleasure? at this point buddhist economics can provide the answer by looking at the meanings of the two words, “needs” and “wants”. it can be traced back to the explanation of abraham maslow where needs are classified into three levels, physiological needs, social needs and moral needs. in buddha dhamma, there is only one form or one level of needs; that is physiological needs. the other levels in maslow’s hierarchy are not needed. they all can be accounted for through understanding the concept of pañña. to summarize, according to buddha dhamma, consumption is needed to relieve the pain from physiological needs and sufficient resources needed for the development of mind and is to be distinguished from the consumption to satisfy desires and wants (kammasukha). if a person has sufficient pañña to understand that kamasukha is in fact dukkha, that person will understand that consumption for kamasukha is not really needed. consumption, informed by needs, can be considered the most efficient as it is the only consumption needed and it can also minimizes resource used for consumption. the ultimate goal of most human beings is to be completely free from dukkha or to reach the stage of nibbana. the most direct way to nibbana is through the middle path or middle way. consumption to satisfy desire or craving is not conducive to the development of mind. it only relieves craving temporarily, but stimulates craving to a higher apichai puntasen 131 level in the next round. it also promotes excessive utilization of limited natural resources. thus, it is not a way to bring about true sukha. such consumption is clearly inefficient. at the same time consumption that is inadequate to maintain a healthy body and a healthy mind cannot be considered as efficient consumption2 either, since it does not optimize the output of sukha. therefore, efficient consumption is consumption according to the principle of the middle path or majhima patipada. this consumption cannot be analyzed by mainstream economics for lack of a proper concept. buddhist economics recognizes that a certain level of pañña is a necessary condition to being able to consume by the principle of the middle path. as a result, pañña is a crucial factor for the most efficient consumption: that is, the least utilization of resources given the goal of being free from dukkha. the mainstream economic term that is closest to the concept of efficient consumption is cost effectiveness. it shares a meaning similar to efficiency of production but looks from a different angle. combined production and consumption for sustainable development and increased well-being after looking at efficiency consumption that is similar to production efficiency from the point of view of buddhist economics, one can link efficient production and consumption together. this linkage will demonstrate the conditions for sustainable development as well as improvement of well being in a society. it should now be evident that well-being or sukha does not come from consumption. consumption only serves as a process to provide for the basic necessities and the elimination of the pain due to their absence. without this level of consumption (sufficiency), there would be a negative impact on the further development of samādhi and pañña. consumption beyond sufficiency will stimulate tanhā (craving or more desire). apart from being the cause for dukkha or suffering or pain, excessive consumption will also lead to the wasteful use of resources, or inefficient consumption. consumption only serves as a necessary condition that enables us to live in the way of majhima patipada or the middle path. 132 prajñā vihāra the true well-being or sukha can only result from the development of pañña through the rigorous training of sikkhattaya. having gained a clear understanding of these related components in buddhist economics (production, consumption and well-being or sukha), diagram 2 can be used to show the way that one can achieve the conditions for sustainable development and the improvement of well-being through the development of mind to the point of nibbana. diagram 2: consumption and production theories of buddhist economics. the above diagram demonstrates the interaction of production and consumption in buddhist economics that can eventually lead to a peaceful life and eventually nibbana, the state of mind that is free from all defilements and sustainable development on the production side. pañña is the mode of production in the sense that it controls all input factors ranging from human resources to man-made resources and natural resources. all these resources can be further divided into brain and muscle power for human resources, and energy and other natural resources for natural resources. man-made resources are the product of human intelligence and energy and other resources that can be either renewable or non-renewable. pañña will apichai puntasen 133 in turn control human intelligence in a way that man-made resources are produced only in a creative and positive way and natural resources should be used in such a way that non-renewable resources are used minimally. all these are aimed at producing products most needed for production for sustaining lives with minimum amount of harmful waste. production in this way is considered to be the most efficient or sufficiency production in buddhist economics. it can be seen from this diagram that the consumption process, the first part yields net products to be used in consumption through the assumption that part of the products can be used to clean up waste from the production process. the second part is waste resulting from the consumption process itself. consumption in buddhist economics is not to gain “satisfaction” as explained by mainstream economics but rather for the maintenance of the physical needs of human beings as well as the physical production process to continue on it own course. the goal of the whole production process is actually to produce well-being that eventually leads to the state of nibbana. the main emphasis in this diagram is a circular flow of goods and services for the maintenance of the whole production process. the nature of this flow will indicate whether the system is sustainable or not. the real wellness of human beings only depends on sikkhattaya, which is a separate process but directly related to pañña. pañña also controls production and consumption processes in this diagram as already discussed. please observe the two-way arrow-head between sikkhattaya and pañña. it demonstrates the dynamism between the two concepts. the two represent the possibility to solve the current crises that is causing great damage of resources and the environment on earth by both the production and consumption processes. unlike gnh and sufficiency economy, the ultimate goal of buddhist economics does not stop at happiness or well-being that has already been advanced into a spiritual realm beyond the worldly pleasure. it is aiming at the state of nibbana whereby the mind will be completely liberated and being free from all defilements. it is not an easy process 134 prajñā vihāra that every human being can achieve in his/her existing life without many supportive pre-conditions. yet, each one can make an attempt at approaching it. it is the stage for the ultimate stage of spiritual well-being. like sufficiency economy, buddhist economics puts more emphasis on the process that will lead finally to spiritual well-being. the process can be classified into three sub-processes already discussed above. the first sub-process, production efficiency has been designed to lay a firm foundation for other sub-processes to build upon. having pañña as the mode of production not capital in the mainstream economics, efficiency in this case goes much beyond the concept of minimizing inputs for maximum output. it must be global efficiency in the sense that external diseconomy cannot be allowed. if external diseconomy cannot be avoided, it must be kept at minimum, or alternatively such process should be terminated before starting it. what is meant by global efficiency is that the process must generate all four forms of capital, human, social, environment and physical capital at the same time especially human and/ or social capital while at least being able to preserve environment and/ or physical capital. the next and the crucial sub-process which is the key to, and rather unique for buddhist economics only, is consumption efficiency or sufficiency consumption. the consumption of output at this level must be a little more than the level of survival for life that actually meet the four basic needs, namely, food, clothing, housing and medication. it must cover the cost of the process to facilitate the training of human mind for further development (phra brahma-gunabhorn-p.a. payutto, 2008). this level of sufficiency consumption is similar to that of “good life” of aristotle. the next and the most important sub-process is the process of the training of the mind itself, through sikkhattaya, the threefold training of pañña, sila and smadhi. this nature of training is only available in buddhism. it helps purify the mind to lead to a calm mind, a concentrated mind, and finally a clear mind. when these three qualities of the mind exist at the same time, this is the mind in the state of nibbana. at this stage the mind will be free from all defilements, the ultimate goal of buddhist economics. without any attempt at improving apichai puntasen 135 the existing situation dominated by consumerism under the ideology of capitalism the whole system can easily be degenerated in the direction of self-destruction. the only way out of this undesirable situation is to develop “global pañña” existed in buddhist economics as rapidly as possible, through sustainable development, gnh and sufficiency economy serving as the bridge leading to this new development direction. conclusion this paper began by pointing out that spiritual well-being or “good life” as the goal of the economic activities at the dawn of the economic subject during the greek civilization led by hesiod (800 b.c.). the concept was advanced further by aristotle (384-322 b.c.). he elaborated this concept of “good life” to be a flourishing life with a little more material than the -necessities for survival. “good life” for aristotle is a moral life of virtue through which human beings attain happiness. therefore, the relevant economic dimension in this regard is to produce enough materials to meet the basic human needs as well as to attain happiness or “good life”. it can be clearly seen that aristotle understood fully well that happiness was a stage of mind rather than pleasure or comfortable from having more materials. the world has only acknowledged the alternative paradigm of sustainable development since 1987, followed by the announcement of gnh of bhutan to the world co-incidentally on the same year of 1987. sufficiency economy in thailand contributes more in this direction by incorporating necessary and sufficient conditions of inputs and more elaborate process. the two will eventually serve as a solid foundation for the west to understand buddhist economics for the eventual concrete path to nibbana,. under the present deteriorating resources and environment of the existing globalized world, such understanding of human life is quite crucial to the survival of humanity itself. the race in the direction to destruction and to revival from the existing situation is still going on. it is the same race for more advanced pañña or vijja against increasing avijja or ignorance caused by increasing materialism partially supported 136 prajñā vihāra by increasingly rapid rate of technological progress. the survival of humanity in the long run is still at risk. endnotes 1 this section is drawn mostly from puntasen, apichai, “buddhist economics : evolution, theories and its application to various economic subjects “the chulalongkorn journal of buddhist studies : special issue one, center for buddhist studies, chulalongkorn university, 2008. 2 it may also be called “sufficient consumption” as sufficiency also means moderation. moderation is a natural law that governs all forms of life. where anything that is too little or too much is not optimal for life, the point of moderation is the optimal point for life in that specified time and circumstance. hence consumption efficiency is the same as sufficient consumption. references in english 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(2004): “system of values and development : gross national happiness”, in gross national happiness: toward the new paradigm of development. bangkok. suan nguen mee ma. website (in english) http://wikipedia.org/wiki,simion_kuznets 8/1/2010. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/robert_ f._ kennedy 8/1/2010. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sustainable development 8/1/2010 http://www.france24.com/en/20090914-france-advocates-new-ways-measure-growthba-9/1/2553. http://www.yogajournal.com/views/1332_1.cfm/. retrieved: 24 june 2007. website (in thai) http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/info.school search.php 25/1/2010. keynote speech venerable phra brama gunabhorn (p.a. payutto) (2009) : “buddhist economics in the globalized world” given at the 2nd buddhist economic research platform ubon rajathanee university, thailand april 5. http://wikipedia.org/wiki,simion_kuznets http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/robert_ f._ kennedy 8/1/2010 http://www.france24.com/en/20090914-france-advocates-new-ways-measure-growth-ba-9/1/2553 http://www.france24.com/en/20090914-france-advocates-new-ways-measure-growth-ba-9/1/2553 http://www.yogajournal.com/views/1332_1.cfm/ http://www.sufficiencyeconomy.org/info.school 140 prajñā vihāra speech hall jon. (2009) : “the global project on measuring the progress of societies” sasin international business college, chulalongkorn university, july. 11(180-184)_note for authors transversality and comparative political philosophy in the age of globalization* hwa yol jung moravian college, usa abstract taking a cue from ralph waldo emerson, who is widely known as “the first american public intellectual,” this essay is an attempt to define the critical function of comparative political philosophy in today’s world of multiculturalism in the era of globalization which is in dire need of dialogue on a global scale. in the first place, western modernity has overlooked and marginalized the non-west, the phenomenon of which is called eurocentrism. all ethnocentrisms, including eurocentrism, are myopic and have no place in the globalizing world of multiculturalism. this essay proposes that eurocentric universality be replaced by transversality which is consonant with the multiple realities of the changing world. transversality as a global imaginary allows all kinds of border-crossing and thus blurs traditional disciplinary genres. thus it is at once intercultural, interspeciesistic, and interdisciplinary. in the second place, the role of comparative political philosophy radically shifts from the individualistic and anthropocentric tradition of “rights talk” to the ethics of responsibility based on the primacy of alterity. if, according to levinas, ethics is “first philosophy,” then responsibility becomes “first ethics.” for deeply caring mm 144 prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 144-173 © 2000 by assumption university press where there is no vision, the people perish. the scholars are the priest of that thought which establishes the foundation of the earth. -ralph waldo emerson true theory does not totalize, it multiplies. -gilles deleuze the solution to the problem of identity: get lost. -norman o. brown if we keep on speaking the same language together, we’re going to reproduce the same history. -luce irigaray prologue this essay explores the idea of transversality in the globalizing world of multiculturalism. let me begin with emerson, who is regarded as the first american “public intellectual.” he is an unrivaled essayist whose pithy words and passages are often quoted and misquoted in the american intellectual circle. i do have, however, one serious reservation concerning emerson’s epigraph. it is the designation of “scholars” as “priests.” i take a cue from leszek kolakowski’s (1968: 9-37) contention that throughout ages there is an incurable antagonism between “a philosophy that perpetuates the absolute” and “a philosophy that questions accepted absolutes.” there is, in other words, the antagonism between the “priestly” and the “jesterly” which are the two most general forms of intellectual disposition at any given period of time and in history. the “priestly” attempts to preserve the absolute and established ideas, while the “jesterly” distrusts the absolute and a stabilized system and intends to deconstruct it.1 in this context, it is worth quoting in full a passage from harvey cox’s (1969: 82) work the feast of fools that describes the anti-ideological “political vision” of carnivalesque culture as follows: the rebirth of fantasy as well as of festivity is essential to the survival of our civilization, including its political institutions. but fantasy can never be fully yoked to a particular political program. to subject the creative spirit to the fetters of ideology kills it. when art, religion, and imagination become ideological tools, they shrivel into caged birds and toothless tigers. however, this does not mean that fantasy has no political significance. its significance is enormous. this is just why ideologues alwayshwa yol jung 145 try to keep it in harness. when fantasy is neither tamed by ideological leashes nor rendered irrelevant by idiosyncrasy, it can inspire new civilizations and bring empires to their knees.2 by making the existing world upside down and inside out, the aim of the carnivalesque dispositif is to bring about a “reversible world.” it symbolizes a culture of dissensus (dis-sensus). the carnivalesque is the “jesterly” play of difference that aims at the creation of an alternative or “reversible world” order. as a ludic form of transgression and subversion, it intends to transform playfully a “real” world into a “possible” world: in short, it nonviolently deconstructs the world. carnivalesque culture attempts to create a “reversible world” in which the “master” is placed at bottom and the “servant” on top. humans as players (homo ludens) dethrone the stable and established hierarchy of all kinds. in the bruegelian and rabelaisian themes of mikhail bakhtin’s dialogical body politics, which is opposed to enlightenment rationalism and contains a hidden critique of stalin’s totalitarianism based, rightly or wrongly, on the hegelian and marxian dialectic, to carnivalize the world is to dialogize it: in them carnivalization and dialogization go hand in hand. as a protest against the monological “misrule” of (soviet) officialdom, the carnivalesque model of life transgresses and transforms the canonical order of truth and the official order of reality. as bakhtin (1984: 33-34) writes forcefully: [it] is past millenni’s way of sensing the world as one great communal performance. this sense of the world, liberating one from fear, bringing one person maximally close to another (everything is drawn into the zone of free familiar contact), with its joy at change and its joyful relativity, is opposed to that one-sided and gloomy official seriousness which is dogmatic and hostile to evolution and change, which seeks to absolutize a given condition of existence or a given social order. from precisely that sort of seriousness did the carnival sense of the world liberate man. but there is not a grain of nihilism in it, nor a grain of empty frivolity or vulgar bohemian individualism.3 as it is exemplary of dissensus, the carnivalesque celebrates dialogue and community; it liberates people and brings them together and invites them to participate in communal living. in this light, the scholar is a 146 prajñâ vihâra (kolakowski’s) jester and (camus’s) rebel rather than a (emerson’s) priest and dialectical revolutionary. he/she changes the world by first changing the conception of it. as her epigraph makes it clear, the paradigmatic french feminist philosopher irigaray, who calls herself une philosophe, means to reverse the mainstream (i.e., “malestream”) tradition of western philosophy. she offers a helping hand to a paradigm shift in philosophizing. notably in the east with which she attempts to familiarize herself, the reputed chinese book of changes (yijing) is predicated upon the basic thesis that change is the order of things in the cosmos, i.e., everything changes except change itself without a philosophical baggage of linear progress as in western modernity. standing by a river, confucius, too, remarked that everything, like a river, flows ceaselessly, day and night. time, however, does not travel only in a uni-linear direction. it travels multi-directionally: it travels forward and backward and even multilaterally. in this sense, the past is never prosaic and irrelevant. even the prodigal son of the past is allowed to come back home again. here again, the invocation of bakhtin, who admires the personages of dostoevsky as well as rabelais, is helpful. for him, the recycling of past meanings for today and tomorrow is infinite. to use his own expression, it is “unfinalizable.” according to the often-quoted epigram of the american novelist william faulkner, “the past is never dead, it’s not even past.”4 meanings in the past can be recouped for the present and can conserve them for the future. bakhtin is immeasurably profound when he (1986: 170) writes: there is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all)-they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue. . . . nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival (italics added). indeed, bakhtin’s dialogism, which is totally open-ended, transcends the facile ideological dichotomy between “conservatism” (the preservation of the past tradition at all cost) and “radicalism” (change for the future by abandoning the past altogether) because radical changes can be hwa yol jung 147 made by the use of the past or past meanings.5 as the american philosopher george santayana puts it wisely, those who forget the past or past mistakes are condemned to repeat them. the missionary position: europe on top the enlightenment is the soul of mainstream western modernity. its legacy continues today.6 some speak of modernity as an unfinished project, a second modernity, even the modernization of modernity, or the second coming of enlightenment itself. they have an unflinching faith in it as the absolute “end of history.” enlightenment’s unbridled optimism is alleged to promote and crown the promethean progress of humanity based on the cultivation and universalization of pure and applied reason. kant, who had a dim view of non-europe (especially africa), spelled out the civilizing mission of enlightenment in the clearest and simplest term: to sanctify the autonomous benefaction of reason in rescuing and emancipating humanity__perhaps more accurately european humanity__from its selfincurred immaturity. in so doing, he institutionalized the major agenda of european modernity whose rationality was never seriously challenged until the auspicious advent of postmodernity in friedrich nietzsche, martin heidegger, jean-françois lyotard, michel foucault, gilles deleuze, emmanuel levinas, jacques derrida, gianni vattimo, and others in the twentieth century. while privileging and valorizing the authority of reason for allegedly human progress and emancipation, european modernity unfortunately overlooks, marginalizes, and disempowers the (reason’s) other whether it be the orient (or so-called non-west), body, woman, or nature at the altar of enlightenment’s reason. orient, body, woman, and nature are not randomly isolated but are four interconnected issues: most interestingly, it is no accident that orient, body, and nature are invariably genderized as feminine, while their counterparts-occident, mind, and culture-are masculine or “malestream” categories (see jung: 2002a).7 the institution of western thought called eurocentrism as well as the practice of imperialism is that habitus of mind which privileges europe or the west as the cultural, technological, political, economic, and moral capital of the entire globe. “modernization” is nothing but the all-encom148 prajñâ vihâra passing catchword given to the totalizing and hegemonizing process of this eurocentric phenomenon. as the astute interpreter and critic of modernity zygmunt bauman (1987: 110) relates: from at least the seventeenth century and well into the twentieth, the writing elite of western europe and its footholds on other continents considered its own way of life as a radical break in universal history. virtually unchallenged faith in the superiority of its own mode over all alternative forms of life contemporaneous or past allowed it to take itself as the reference point for the interpretation of the telos of history. this was a novelty in the experience of objective time; for most of the history of christian europe, time-reckoning was organized around a fixed point in the slowly receding past. now, . . . europe set the reference point of objective time in motion, attaching it firmly to its own thrust towards colonizing the future in the same way as it had colonized the surrounding space. indeed, this eurocentric idea of colonizing the future gives a new meaning to the conception of modernity as an unfinished project or the end of history. the dao of transversality transversality is a keyword in the existential phenomenology of calvin o. schrag in pursuit of discovering a “diagonal” crossing (xing) in resolving the deadlock between western modernity and postmodernity.8 sitting in a philosophical cockpit, as it were, it is a balancing act of navigating through the stormy time and space between the dichotomous poles of the modernist obsession with identity and universalism, on the one hand, and the postmodernist exhaustive drive for difference and pluralism, on the other. transversality actively seeks a transformation. it is, according to schrag (ramsey and miller, 2003: 26), the recognition of difference that keeps open “the prospect for invention, intervention, transgression, re-creation, etc.” it looks for “convergence without coincidence”__to use his repeatedly emphasized expression. thus, it broadens the “in-between” for the sake of the “beyond” by splitting the difference between modern identity and postmodern difference. hwa yol jung 149 transversality is primarily a derivative concept of geometry. it denotes the crossing (xing) of two diagonal lines in any given parallelogram. schrag exacts l’esprit de finesse by way of a geometric configuration: in addition to the two “diagonals” crossing or intersecting each other at the epicenter of any rectangle, there are also the hermeneutical “circle” and the rhetorical “triangle.” by way of the “middle voice” of transversality, he means to subvert and transgress particularly the dichotomy between “the scylla of a hegemonic unification”/“a vacuous universalism” on the one hand, and “the charybdis of a chaotic pluralism”/“an anarchic historicism” on the other. insofar as it is a negotiated or compromised “middle voice,” transversality touches the soul and heart of buddhism. the newly emerging face of transversality may be likened to the famous wooden statue of buddha at a zen temple in kyoto whose face marks a new dawn of awakening (satori) or signals the beginning of a new regime of ontology, ethics, politics, and culture. from the crack in the middle of the old face of the buddha’s statue, there emerges an insterstitial, liminal face that signifies a new transfiguration and transvaluation of the existing world. the icon of the emerging new face symbolizes the arrival of maitreya (the “future enlightened one” or bodhisattva) or middle way__the third enabling term of transversality which is destined to navigate the difficult waters of intercultural border-crossings. we are warned not to take it as a middle point between two poles. rather, it breaks through bipolarity (e.g., modernity and postmodernity, nature and society, mind and body, femininity and masculinity, and east and west). what is important here is the fact that transversality is the paradigmatic rendition of overcoming bipolarity itself. the bipolar solids melt into the air of transversality, as it were.9 as disenchantment calls for transcendence, transversality is used here as a deconstructive concept. it deconstructs eurocentrism the mission of which is to proselytize the universal and the “‘catholicity’ of the rational” (see sartre, 1965: 113). transversality first dismantles or unpacks the status quo and then goes beyond what is given, received, or established by constructing a new formation of concepts. it, in short, attempts to challenge the assumed transparency of truth as universal and overcome the limits of universality as the eurocentric canon of truth in western modernity. it means to decenter europe as the site of “universal 150 prajñâ vihâra truth” whose “identitarian” and “unitarian” motivation fails to take into account the world of multiculturalism. the pluralist johann gottfried herder (1969: 199) challenges: “i find myself unable to comprehend how reason can be presented so universally as the single summit and purpose of all human culture, all happiness, all good. is the whole body just one big eye?” the french philosopher and sinologist françois jullien (2002 and 2003) calls the effort of this decentering eurocentrism or western modernity__with kant in mind__“a new ‘copernican reversal.’” he contends that in “shaking up” western modernity, china becomes a “philosophical tool.” he uses chinese thought to interrogate western philosophy and to liberate it from its own “mental cage.” most radically, he wishes to replace the very concept of “truth” itself with that of “intelligibility” because the concept of truth is bound up with the history of western philosophy. jullian puts foucault to test in order to vindicate the eurocentric “legislation” of truth for all global humanity. in his 1978 visit to japan, the vintage foucault remarked that as the warp of knowledge and the woof of political power are interwoven as one fabric, european imperialism and the era of western philosophy together have come to an end. foucault is not alone in conjecturing that philosophy of the future must be born “outside europe” or in the “meetings and impacts” between europe and noneurope (see jung, 2002b: 1).10 the interlacing of the east and the west, in other words, will give birth to a new philosophy. for too long, the east has been living in the dark shadow of western modernity. in this background there lurks an intriguing question that the singaporean intellectual/ statesman kishore mahbubani, who is now dean of the lee kuan yew school of public policy, asked a few years ago: “can asians think?” (1998). long before foucault and jullian, maurice merleau-ponty spoke of the “lateral universal” and the lateral continuity of all humanity both “primitive” and “civilized” across history. he was unmistakably a consummate transversalist avant la lettre. the lateral universal is for him a new paradigm for world-making as well as philosophy. “lateral” rather than “vertical” thinking is paradigmatic in that instead of digging the same hole deeper and deeper in which there is no exit in sight, it digs a new hole in another place. for merleau-ponty, all history is not only contemporahwa yol jung 151 neous and written in the present tense but also an open notebook in which a new future can be inscribed. it is rather unfortunately, i think, that his deconstructive effort for comparative philosophy and his sensitivity to the global scope of philosophy have escaped the attention of comparativists as well as specialists alike. i would venture to surmise that this inattention is woven out of the same fabric in our eurocentric propensity and orientation in philosophy. merleau-ponty’s deconstructive effort in philosophy, in comparative philosophy, is evidenced in his critique of eurocentric hegel who was a priest and missionary of the universal and the rational.11 merleau-ponty (1964, see appendix) is critical of hegel who arbitrarily draws “a geographical frontier between philosophy and non-philosophy,” that is, between the west and the east. merleau-ponty argues that philosophy is destined to examine its own idea of truth again and again because truth is “a treasure scattered about in human life prior to all philosophy and not divided among doctrines.” if so, western philosophy is compelled to reexamine not only its own idea of truth but also related matters and institutions such as science, economy, politics, and technology. besides philosophy’s own constant vigilance on what it is doing, merleau-ponty’s phenomenological orientation demands its attention to the ethnography of the socio-cultural life-worlds without which philosophy is a vacuous if not fatal abstraction. the way of ethnography’s thick description practiced by marcel mauss and claude lévi-strauss, who also taught at the collège de france, provides merleau-ponty with the idea of the lateral continuity of humanity between the “primitive” and the “civilized,” that is, with the incessant ethnographic testing of the self by the other and the other by the self which has a “diacritical value” for humanity’s coexistence and its planetary solidarity. ethnography redeems western narcissism precisely because it is the human science of understanding the “foreign other.” merleau-ponty contends that while for hegel philosophical truth as absolute and universal knowledge is notarized and certified by the occidental seal of approval alone, the oriental past must also have an honored place in the famed hall of philosophies to celebrate its hitherto “secret, muted contributions to philosophy.” he (1964: 139) writes resolutely: “indian and chinese philosophies have tried not so much to dominate existence as to be the echo 152 prajñâ vihâra or the sounding board of our relationship to being. western philosophy can learn from them to rediscover the relationships to being and an initial option which gave it birth, and to estimate the possibilities we have shut ourselves off from in becoming ‘westerners’ and perhaps reopen them.” “if western thought is what it claims to be,” he challenges further, “it must prove it by understanding all ‘life-worlds’” (italics added) as multiple geosociocultural realities. thus merleau-ponty suggests that in contrast to the “overarching universal” of objective sciences or, we might add, western metaphysics, the “lateral universal” is acquired through ethnographical experience as the way of “learning to see what is ours as alien and what was alien as our own.” his lateral universal is a passport, as it were, that allows us to cross borders between diverse cultures, enter the zone of intersections and discover cross-cultural connections and convergences. while the european geophilosophical politics of identity claims its validity as universal truth, the lateral universal takes into account “local knowledge” prior to planetary knowledge (dubbed by some as “glocalization”) and allows the hermeneutical autonomy of the other who may very well be right. indeed, merleau-ponty’s lateral universal is contextualized as an open-ended and promiscuous web of temporal and spatial (i.e., chronotopic) interlacings. the (eurocentric) universalist has failed to take into account seriously the question of diversity or multiplicity in the world of multiculturalism. he is still entangled in the cobweb of absolute universal truth and cultural relativism. as difference marks multiplicity and all relationships, heidegger’s differenz as unter/schied edifies our discussion here because it plays and feeds on the coupled meaning of the words which connects, preserves, and promotes both difference and the relational in one breath. in differenz as unterschied, the other is neither assimilated/incorporated nor erased/segregated: the integrity of the other is well preserved.12 here we would be remiss if, in light of merleau-ponty’s above-mentioned “lateral universal” including a critique of hegel’s eurocentrism, we fail to recognize the seminal contribution of the caribbean francophone edouard glissant (1989 and 1997) to the making of the transversal world. educated in philosophy and ethnography in france, he is a philosopher, a poet, and a novelist whose “poetics of relation” shaped caribbean (antillais) discourse on “diversality” and “creoleness”. hwa yol jung 153 glissant has an uncanny convergence in the name of transversality with merleau-ponty in his critique of hegel the eurocentric universalist and absolute rationalist when he articulates without equivocation that transversal relation means to replace “the old concept of the universal.” “thinking about one,” gllissant puts it concisely, “is not thinking about all.” speaking of hegel’s conception of history, glissant (1989: 49) retorts: history is a highly functional fantasy of the west, originating at precisely the time when it alone “made” the history of the world. if hegel relegated african peoples to the ahistorical, amerindian peoples to the prehistorical, in order to reserve history for european people exclusively, it appears that it is not because these african or american peoples “have entered history” that we can conclude today that such a hierarchical conception of “the march of history” is no longer relevant. glissant unpacks hegel’s history by dissolving it as irrelevant or passé in the postcolonial world of diverse cultures which rejects “the linear, hierarchical vision of a single history.” transversality is proposed and constructed by glissant in opposition to and as a replacement of universality. for him, it is the “poetics” of cross-cultural encounters. it is the way of crossing and going beyond (i.e., creolized) ethnic, lingual, and cultural boundaries. it is indeed the site of hybridity. as glissant himself puts it, transversality is “the site of converging paths” or the “convergence that frees us from uniformity.” the british postcolonial theorist robert j. c. young (2001: 68), who regards eurocentrism as a “white mythology,” makes an interesting and unusually astute observation that “[p]ostcolonialism is neither western nor non-western, but a dialectical product of interaction between the two, articulating new counterpoints of insurgency from the long-running power struggles that predate and post-date colonialism.” it may be said that the postcolonial mind works like a “double helix.” more specifically, paul gilroy’s (1993) reputed thesis of “the black atlantic” is in favor of hybridity or “double consciousness” that sums up the transcultural intermix of african and european things. hybridity is a converging middle path of “multiple, interconnecting axes of affiliation and differentiation.” in the final analysis, gilroy’s “black atlantic” is constructed quintessentially as “a counter-culture of modernity.” 154 prajñâ vihâra the so-called “recognition” or “acknowledgment” of difference, which is not one but many, is not the final but only the first step in the making of hybridity. in in praise of creoleness/éloge de la créolité-a caribbean manifesto which is purposely written bilingually (in french and english), “diversality” (la diversalité) in opposition to universality is defined as “the conscious harmonization of preserved diversities” (l’harmonisation consciente des diversités préservées). when harmonization is understood musically, it enriches the totality and even coloration of “diversality” when two or more tones are put together (i.e., orchestrated), there emerges harmonization (or symphony) in which each individual tone is not lost but preserved, whereas when two colors are mixed together, there is no “harmony” but another color. in the name of “a polyphonic harmony,” “diversality” frowns upon “the obsessional concern with the universal.” the above-mentioned caribbean or “creolized” manifesto begins with the sentence: “neither europeans, nor africans, nor asians, we proclaim ourselves creoles” (“ni européens, ni africains, ni asiatiques, nous nous proclamons créoles”). the creole (as hybrid) is neither unitarian nor separatist, but is likened to be a hybrid “butterfly” who frees himself/herself by breaking off from an “ethnocentrist cocoon.” glissant (1989: 98) himself describes the principium of creoleness as the end of “diversality” which can hardly be paraphrased: diversity, which is neither chaos nor sterility, means the human spirit’s striving for a cross-cultural relationship, without universalist transcendence. diversity needs the presence of peoples, no longer as objects to be swallowed up, but with the intention of creating a new relationship. sameness requires fixed being. diversity establishes becoming. just as sameness began with expansionist plunder in the west, diversity came to light through the political and armed resistance of peoples. as sameness rises within the fascination with the individual, diversity is spread through the dynamism of communities. as the other is a source of temptation of sameness, wholeness is the demand of diversity. you cannot become trinidadian or quebecois, if you are not; but it is from now on true that if trinidad and quebec did not exist as accepted components of diversity, something would be missing from the body of world culture__that today we would feel that loss. in other words, if it was necessary for sameness to be revealed in the solitude of individual being, it is now imperative that diversity should “pass” through whole communities and peoples. hwa yol jung 155 sameness is sublimated difference; diversity is accepted difference. ethics as “first philosophy” and responsibility as “first ethics”13 philosophy as made the “ethical turn” in the latter part of the twentieth century which was previously unthinkable in the heyday of logical positivism when i was a graduate student in the late 1950s and early 1960s. is this ethical turn a right turn, a left turn, a wrong turn, or a uturn? none of the above. i would venture to call it a “copernical turn” after the fashion of the nineteenth-century german philosopher ludwig feuerbach (1966) who discovered (the importance and primacy of) “thou” in speculating the future of philosophy. the reason for my proposal is twofold. first, it is an alternative to the american exceptionalism of “rights talk” whose (daniel bell’s) “end of ideology” and (francis fukuyama’s) the “end of history” are tantamount to the triumphant declaration of angloamerican liberalism turned into one universal ideology in disguise.14 the american exceptionalism of “rights talk,” i would contend, is a misfit for the world of multiculturalism in the age of globalization which demands the maximum of cooperation and harmony on its way to cosmopolitanism. instead, it results in “clashes” the end of which is resolved by way of violence rather than dialogue toward the domination of one single ideology and one single nation. in other words, “rights talk” magnetizes, magnifies and even glorifies the self and one nation at the expense of others. second, a new humanity for the future is in need of the ethics of responsibility for nature or the nonhuman world as well. unlike the old tradition of humanity, this new humanity is no longer going to be anthropocentric. anthropocentrism eventually brings the death of humanity as well as that of nature. the ethics of responsibility has been overshadowed by and subservient to “rights talk.” the hegemony of anglo-american “rights talk” has obscured and misguided the importance of responsibility. “rights talk” is directly founded in and funded by the liberal thought of john locke which is judiciously characterized by the late canadian political theorist c. b. macpherson (1962) as “possessive individualism.” possessive individualism places the individual at the center of the inviolable rights of 156 prajñâ vihâra possession which locke called “property.” property is for him a composite of “life, liberty, and estate.” “estate” has been replaced with the “pursuit of happiness” in the american exceptionalism of “rights talk” (cf. ignatieff, 2005). the american political theorist louis hartz accurately measures the temperament of american ideology when he remarks that all americans are born lockeans. in rights talk, mary ann glendon (1991) characterizes the american “rights talk” as the dialect of the “i’s have it.” she explains its pervasiveness and dominance when he writes concisely that “the american rights dialect is distinguished not only by what we say and how we say it, but also by what we leave unsaid.” as america is the world, the so-called american “rights dialect” has become the universalized language of the world. to repeat: fukuyama is the “last american liberal” whose “end of history” is a celebration of the global triumph of american liberalism. his “endism” is disguised in the garment of one ideology. is the twenty-first century becoming american? perhaps so. in his philosophy of history, hegel envisioned america as “the land of the future” (see chisolm, 1963: 25). however, it is far too early to tell with certainty (cf. valladão, 1996). lockean liberalism conceives of society as “a series of market relations” in which each and every individual enters voluntarily or contractually into a relationship with others with a view to maximize his own interest. as it heralds “economic man” (homo oeconomicus), economic rationality underwrites it. as the proprietor of his own person, the individual carries on his daily life as if he owes nothing to society. the theory of social contract stipulated in lockean liberalism insures and warrants its individualism. what must be recognized in lockeanism is a sea change or paradigmatic shift from the primacy of the political to that of the economic when locke makes unequivocally clear that the sole function of government is the protection of private property. with locke political categories have become subservient to economic ones (i.e., economism). economism is the distinct herald of lockeanism which shook and made western modernity. notwithstanding its fundamental opposition to lockean liberalism as possessive individualism, locke’s economic rationality__especially its labor theory of value__is also the linchpin of marxism in particular and socialism in general. to put it otherwise, economism is the ideological hwa yol jung 157 underpinning of western modernity. the theory of “economics as a vocation” is yet to be written. for levinas, who is regarded by many as the most important moral philosopher of the twentieth century, ethics is “first philosophy” (philosophie première or prima philosophia).15 as such it precedes both epistemology (descartes) and ontology (heidegger). “when i speak of first philosophy,” he declares, “i am referring to a philosophy of dialogue that cannot not be an ethics.” for him, heteronomy alone is the site of responsibility if not ethics itself.16 by heteronomy, he means to favor the other in an asymmetrical relationship. the heteronomic ethics of responsibility is anchored in the primacy of the other over the self where the other (“thou” or “you”) rather than the self (“i”) is placed at the altar (“higher place”) of all relationships. altruism for its name sake, therefore, is exemplary of responsibility. the ethics of responsibility based on the other-centeredness (“heteronomy”) is a radical shift from “rights talk” which magnetizes the self in everything we do and think. the former is “otherwise” than the latter. what “rights talk” is to ptolemaic geocentrism, the heteronomic ethics of responsibility is to copernican heliocentrism. responsibility thusly defined is a copernican reversal of social and ethical thought which began with ludwig feuerbach who discovered “thou” at the center of human dialogue for the future of philosophy. in this connection, it is of utmost importance to note that hannah arendt’s (1963) controversial reportage concerning adolf eichmann’s “banality of evil” is correlated to “thoughtlessness.” by “thoughtlessness,” she means eichmann’s utter inability to think from the standpoint of an other, i.e., the amnesia or erasure of the other’s difference. eichmann’s “banality of evil” is indeed a sobering reminder that the politics of identity or the abolition of the other’s difference results in the inhumane politics of cruelty, suffering, violence, and extermination. the infliction of violence and terror by the invisible enemy was transparent in the faces of americans on the fateful day of september 11 (9/11), 2001. september the eleventh and its ensuing events unmistakably prove that violence has its own vicious cycle. shashi tharoor, who was a high senior united nations official, summed up the magnitude of the demolition of the twin towers of the world trade center as birthing of the twenty-first century. it began with a big bang rather than a little whimper. 158 prajñâ vihâra its birth pang is likely to last for some time. the famous or infamous dictum of karl clausewitz’s realpolitik may be incontrovertibly true. it pertains to the inseparability of violence from politics since for him “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” in his humanism and terror (1969/1947 in french), the french phenomenologist maurice merleau-ponty declared that “humanism”__machiavellianism notwithstanding__is not immune to violence. he asserted with firm conviction that one who abstains from violence toward the violent is an accomplice of violence itself. not only is violence the common origin of all political regimes, but also violence is our lot as long as we humans are incarnate beings. however, we should not confuse “what is” with “what ought to be” on the one hand and hope on the other. the southern confederate general robert e. lee was pensive when he warned that we became too fond of war. violence based on the politics of identity (e.g., imperialism, colonialism, and assimilation) is without doubt an utter failure of human dialogue, of communication.17 it eschews responsibility: it is intrinsically an irresponsible act because it intends to efface, harm, or kill an other. the abolition of difference courts violence, while the acceptance of difference is an act of civility (see ozouf, 1988: 12). disagreement, too, governs our academic interdiscourses. to contradict or deny it is to authenticate it. as a freshman in college in 1954, i was introduced to alfred north whitehead’s inspiring work adventures of ideas (1954) which left an indelible impression on me. it taught me the enduring idea that human civilization or human civility is the victory of persuasion over force (whitehead, 1954: 105). whitehead convinced me to date that violence has no place in civilization. as a measured failure of persuasion, violence takes a heavy toll on humans and nonhumans alike in abolishing differences. the breach of civility is predicated upon one’s epistemological infallibility and moral inculpability which is a deadly mix: i can never err and be morally wrong. j. glenn gray’s the warriors (1959) is a classic and superb study of homo furens (warriors). among the issues that gray describes such as the appeals of battle, camaraderie, death, guilty, and even a delight of “fearful beauty” in destruction, there is the “abstract” image of the enemy that anestheticizes man the fighter. it is the monstrous__totally dehumanized__image of the enemy who is at best “subhuman.” to repeat: hwa yol jung 159 violence is an irresponsible act because it intends to eradicate the other’s difference. i would be remiss if i fail to bring václav havel into my discussion here. he is a playwright who turned into a statesman of extraordinary courage, sagacity, and moral tenacity in coping with the political exigency of his time: he is truly a postmodern philosopher-statesman of our time. he has been the most prominent voice of post-communist eastern europe. havel was deeply influenced by jan patoèka who was a student of phenomenology, an admirer of masaryk’s democratic humanism and comenius’s pansophic humanism, and an active political dissident who died in 1977 during a police interrogation. from the side of conservatives, havel represents the death of communism as a totalitarian political system and the “end” of ideology and history as the transparent triumph of american liberalism. from the side of political radicalism, he is a champion of the powerless. havel is above all a levinasian. he closely read levinas during his prison years in czechoslovakia. following levinas, he considered responsibility as the innermost secret of moral humanity. havel’s is an ethics of responsibility as humanity’s “destiny” and “first politics.” for havel, freedom and responsibility are interlocked. freedom is a requisite element of responsibility. the former, however, is not independent from responsibility. responsibility is more inclusive than freedom because humans can be free without being responsible but they cannot be responsible without being free. havel’s signature idea of “living in truth” (1987) marks the heart of his conception of morality. he may also be likened to bakhtin’s dialogist who transgresses and subverts the canonical or “priestly” order of truth and the monological “misrule” of hierarchized officialdom. havel’s “dissident” is first and foremost camus’s “rebel” (l’homme révolté) (1958) who is a critic of marxism as the dialectical metaphysics and eschatological politics of revolutionary violence. for the rebel is one who justifies the existentialist thesis that the human is the only creature who refuses to be what he/she is. he/she protests against death as well as tyranny, brutality, terror, and servitude. havel’s dissident is a true rebel who senses and cultivates his allegiance to human solidarity with no intention of obliterating the other. he is able to say that i rebel, therefore we exist. in an interview 160 prajñâ vihâra published as “the politics of hope,” havel (1991: 165-206) also talked about the role of an intellectual as a perpetually “irritant” rebel (or gadfly) who is self-consciously capable of detaching himself/herself from the established order of any kind and who is vigilant to and suspicious of belonging to the “winning side.” havel shows that__to borrow the eloquent language of roger scruton (1990: 88) in writing about masaryk and patoèka__“the individual soul is the foundation of social order and . . . the care of the soul, and the care of the polis, are two aspects of a single concern.” for havel, in conclusion, morals are the basic stuff of all politics. thus, politics is never a tetragrammaton (or four-letter word) precisely because it is deeply rooted in and inseparable from the moral makeup of humanity. he often speaks of politics as “morality in practice” “practical morality,” “anti-political politics,” and even “the art of the impossible” (1997) with machiavelli’s politics as the “art of the possible” in mind which for havel promotes “living in untruth,” that is, manipulation, image-making, deception, and above all violence. in the end, the heteronomic ethics of responsibility is for havel the postmodern alternative to realpolitik as the modern “art of the possible.” epilogue transversality replaces universality: it is spelled and comprehended as “trans(uni)versality.” it is, as i have above proposed and intimated, the touchstone of correlating and negotiating differences in the postmodern world of multiculturalism. it makes connections__as carol gilligan (1982) puts it18__“in the face of difference.” instead of coming to hasty judgments and conclusions, therefore, we are obliged to study an anthropology of globalization thoroughly rather than selectively by taking stock of its losses as well as its gains. the transversalist is a “fox” rather than a “hedgehog.” i am alluding here to isaiah berlin’s line (1986: 1) from the fragments of the greek poet archilochus which reads: “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” for the transversalist is one who has both deftness and agility to weave many ideas, whereas the universalist has one big thought. hwa yol jung 161 i am hesitant to use unconditionally the term humanism both new and old because it is more or less anthropocentric. therefore, i prefer to use the expression “a new philosophy of life” which is intrinsically organic rather than artificial. the hope of constructing a new philosophy of life for the future, more specifically for the twenty-first century, is hitched onto the very existential thesis that humans are capable of making/remaking and unmaking themselves and their world. hope is nothing but the passionate and never-ending pursuit of the “impossible.” interbeing (or “midworld”) has been the pivotal concern of eastern thought, while western philosophy has been preoccupied with and consumed by the question of being. the way of transversality demands drawing insights from both east and west. what is deficient in one is augmented and supplemented by the other. sinism, which is embodied in confucianism, daoism, and chan (zen) buddhism, provides us with two indispensable ideas for a new philosophy of life in which the fabric of nature and humanity is inseparably interwoven-one is woof and the other warp: (1) interbeing and (2) homo ecologicus. they are the two sides of the same coin, as it were, because they share the common ontological assumption that everything or every event is connected to every other in the cosmos and nothing exists in isolation. to be in isolation is no longer to be. it follows, therefore, that there cannot be just one center, the center is everywhere or multitudinous. consequently, eurocentrism or sinocentrism must be decentered and unpacked. a new philosophy of life is intrinsically organic rather than artificial. life encompasses all life-forms. as such, according to the principle of interbeing, there is no reason why the helping hand of heteronomic responsibility cannot be extended to the life-world of nonhuman beings and things. what homo ecologicus is to the heteronomic ethics of responsibility, homo oeconomicus is to “rights talk.” there is no need to emphasize here that human prosperity can never be measured solely by material things. to put it philosophically, “being” cannot be identified with “having”: the former cannot simply be reduced to the latter. economics, however important it may be, is only a means to the end (telos) of life. the heteronomic ethics of responsibility is based on an asymmetrical relationship which favors the other, while “rights talk” favors the self. ethics in general and responsibility in particular, according to the long and cher162 prajñâ vihâra ished tradition of sinism, is grounded in “fidelity” (hsin__literally, “the human standing by his/her words”) and “sincerity” (cheng__literally, “wordperformed” or “word-accomplished”). sincerity is quintessentially performative: it means “we perform in action what we promise in words.” to be sincere, speaking cannot be rendering just a “lip service.” in sincerity, therefore, knowledge and action are correlative: knowledge without action is empty, while action without knowledge is blind. sincerity is a prescription for what and how to do things with word and deed. it embodies the moral foundation of humanity. ultimately, the future cultivation of humanity in the world of multiculturalism depends on the interchange (inter-change) of thinking and doing at the “crossroads” (x-roads) of the east and west on the one hand and the north and the south on the other. this transversal interchange may be called an “intercritique” (dosse, 1999: 345) in search of cultural confluence/convergence, hybridity, or creolization. globalization is nothing but the way of cross-pollinating and cross-fertilizing cultural meanings, ideas, and values in multiplicity.19 the new phoenix of postmodern cosmopolitanism, whose language is governed by the important prefix inter, con, or trans has risen from the ashes of sovereign nation-states which the modernist hegel deified as the ultimate telos of his dialectic. with the newly rising phoenix, the “rights” of sovereign individuals, including their moral self-righteousness, give way to the heteronomic ethics of responsibility which is accompanied by a declaration of interdependence. in the postmodern age of cosmopolitanism,20 the virtue of civility promotes our communication and interaction with “foreign” others without holding their “foreignness” against them (i.e., xenophilism) (see bauman, 2000: 104). in the end, the good fortune (fortuna, moira) of globalization will be determined and sustained by the generosity or hospitality of the earth which provides all earthlings both human and nonhuman a natural habitat (see derrida, 2001 and toulmin, 1990).21 in concluding my thought on “humanity in transition” or the cultivation of humanity, let me recite the celebrated devotional meditation of the english poet john donne in its old original english: “no man is an iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the continent, a part of the maine; . . . any mans death diminishes me, because i am involved in mankinde; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee” hwa yol jung 163 (quoted in jung, 2002b: 10). endnotes *this paper was given as a lecture at pusan national university in busan, south korea in june, 2008. 1there is a contrast between the masculine “priest” and the feminine “jester.” arendt (1972: 144) notes that “the greatest enemy of authority, . . . is contempt, and the surest way to undermine it is laughter.” cf. woolf (1938: 182) who says: laughter is “an antidote to dominance.” 2cox (1969: 162) writes elsewhere: “the world symbolized by the feast of fools is neither [b. f. skinner’s] walden two nor [george orwell’s] 1984. it is much more heterogeneous, messier, more sensuous, more variegated, more venturesome, more playful. it is a world for which a fiesta or even a love-in is a better symbol than a computer or a rocket. technology need not be the enemy of the spirit in the modern world. but it should be a means to man’s human fulfillment, not the symbol or goal of that fulfillment itself.” 3it is more interesting to note that “he [bakhtin] felt that rabelais drew his inspiration primarily from the comic grotesque of the carnival, of life turned upside down and of the parody of everyday life: this was rabelais’s language. bakhtin condemned the mistaken interpretations of rabelais as the poet of the flesh and of gluttony (victor hugo) and those who saw in him the expression of the bourgeois interest in the economic individual; rabelais’s style could only be understood as the translation of a popular, comic effect lay a whole cosmogony in rabelais, and his focus on orifices, protuberances, and outgrowths corresponded to corporeal parts that put the individual into contact with the external world” (dosse, 1997: 55. italics added). 4raymond aron is quoted as saying that “we must accord to the past the uncertainty of the future” (see dosse, 1999: 308). 5hobson (2004: 283) speaks of”a kind of intellectual apartheid regime in which the superior west is quarantined off from the inferior east.” noteworthy is russell’s work (1945) which is properly entitled history of western philosophy. russell (1922) had knowledge of china which he admired because, unlike japan, it appreciated the social and cultural values of the west. 164 prajñâ vihâra 6gadamer (1991: 270) wisely speaks of “the fundamental prejudice [vorurteil] of the enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power.” 7for a decade, i have been on a transversality binge, so to speak. see (jung, 1995, 2002b, 2002d, 2006b, 2007a, and 2007b). 8it is interesting to note that david farrell krell sketches das geviert envisioned by heidegger in the diagram of a rectangle which connects sky, earth, gods, and mortals with two diagonal lines having being at its epicenter: the cross of being is not a crossing out (durchstreichung) but a crossing through (durchkreuzen) (see jung, 1987: 243n.27). 9recently i stumbled on the very important and interesting “garden theory” or gartenkunst in germany in the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century whose notable proponents were karl heinrich heydenreich (1764-1801), friedrich schiller (1759-1805), and johann christian august grohmann (1769-1847). instead of detailing it, i wish to note here only its importance for the concept of transversality. the core concept of garden theory is “mittelweg” (middle way). first of all, it is an expression of eighteenth century “german identity” or “german exceptionalism” by carving out the german “middle path” between the two english and french extremes. second, the mittelweg was intended to be the way of resolving binary oppositions such as art and nature, freedom and determinism, rationality and sensibility, and the city and the country. third, heydenreich is most noteworthy for our purpose here. he was influenced by kant and kant’s third aesthetic critique (critique of judgment) in particular. the idea of the mittelweg or mitte includes the “‘between’ condition as a form of unification that incorporates elements of both [extremes whatever they may be].” my reading of “garden theory” in general and the idea of “mittelweg” in particular is confined to lee’s (2007) secondary source. there is an important difference between garden theory’s mittelweg and transversality. that is to say, the former focuses on the idea of “mediation,” whereas the latter is intended to create the face of a new paradigm. be that as it may, i intend to explore fully in the future the implications of the mittelweg and their relevance to the conception of transversality. 10before he became interested in japanese aesthetic culture and the iranian revolution, foucault (afary and anderson, 2005: 18) wrote with the inerasable sense of a great divide between the east and the west: “in the universality of the western ratio, there is this divide that is the east; the east thought of as the origin, dreamt of as the dizzy point that is the place of birth, of nostalgia and promises of return, the east which offers itself to the colonizing reason of the west but is indefinitely inaccessible, for it remains always as a boundary, the night of beginning in which the west was formed but where it drew a dividing line, the east is for the west everything which the west is not, yet it is here that it has to seek whatever might be its originating truth. it is necessary to do a history of this great divide.” the foucaudian said (1978) wrote the best-known critique of eurocentrism. see also ansell-pearson, parry and squires (eds.) (1997) for an excellent collection of hwa yol jung 165 essays on a critique of eurocentrism with a focus on said. for a critique of eurocentrism, see also hassan and dadi (2001). it is worth nothing that heidegger (see jung, 1987: 217-218) expressed his bewilderment that the japanese tend to forget the beginnings of their own thinking in their pursuit of the newest and latest in european thought. 11hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy in three volumes were concerned with “oriental philosophy” (chinese and indian) in thirty-one meager pages in english translation. however, he was willing to make rather rash judgments about it. hegel (1892: 121) asserted with no substantiation whatsoever: “we have conversations between confucius and his followers in which there is nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the form of good, sound doctrine, which may be found as well expressed and better, in every place and amongst every people. cicero gives us de officiis, a book of moral teaching more comprehensive and better than all the books of confucius. he is hence only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom-one with whom there is no speculative philosophy” (italics added). 12in her critique of the french politics of the veil or headscarf (hijab in arabic and foulard in french) in school, scott (2004: 182) judiciously writes that “oneness” or “unanimity” produces “exclusions that are contrary to democratic ideals of inclusiveness,” whereas the concept of “wholeness” recognizes “the existence of disagreement and differences within a ‘multitude of citizens’ and thus opens the way for the kind of political engagement that negotiates rather than excludes.” 13in developing the heteronomic ethics of responsibility, i am deeply indebted to four philosophers: the scottish philosopher john macmurray, the jewish-french philosopher emmanuel levinas, the russian literary theorist mikhail bakhtin and the émigré american philosopher hans jonas. see jung, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002c, and jonas (1984). here i have not explored jean-luc nancy’s (2008) neologism exonomy which is proposed to move out of “the binary familiarity of the self and the other” (p.10). it signifies “neither the same nor the other” (ibid.). it may work as a “social imaginary” because by invoking the term exonomy, nancy “enthusiastically give[s] the last word to [the french playwright samuel] beckett: ‘imagination dead, imagine.’” the translator manjali of nancy’s work (2008) offers his interpretation of this passage as “the reinvention of an entire mode of existence”: “exonomy is the name that nancy gives to this alternative law or mode of existence, distinct from heteronomy but conceptually akin to exogamy. the space of exonomy is outside the space of both self and other; it is an in-between space, always not yet given” (p.xii). exonomy may and can be tied to nancy’s (1991) idea of human existence as “being-in-common” or of the commonality of common beings (i.e., “communalism”). moreover, it would be worthwhile to relate nancy’s exonomy or the space of in-betweenness to the east-asian conception of the human (inkan in korean and ningen in japanese) (see particularly watsuji, 1996). nancy’s exonomy is perhaps an attempt to move into the eastern “in-between166 prajñâ vihâra ness” or interbeing out of the western bipolarity of self and other. there is a radical difference between the east-asian geography and the western geography of philosophical difference, that is, the difference between interbeing and being from heraclitus to heidegger and derrida. 14as contrasted with fukuyama’s kojevean “end of history,” mahbubani (2008) speaks of “the irresistible shift of global power to the east.” 15eaglestone (2004: 182) suggests that “postmodernism is first an ethical position before anything else.” perhaps he has levinas in mind. 16gould (2004) attempts to “universalize” and “globalize” democracy on the basis of interculturalism and “human rights.” although she focuses on “rights,” benhabib comes close to the heteronomic ethics of care and responsibility when she speaks of the “rights of others.” for an attempt to “internationalize” or “globalize” the feminist theory of care, see robinson (1999). 17glover (1999) is concerned with the moral history of humanity in the twentieth century. it is so littered with violence that the twentieth century may be characterized as the century of humanity’s inhumanity to humanity. 18gilligan’s work (1982) is considered to be a ground-breaking basis of “care ethics.” however, mayeroff (1971) developed earlier the idea of “caring” as heterocentric or other-oriented. 19multiplicity is typically a postmodern concept. according to calvino (1988: 110), it refers to our “inability to find an ending.” for him, there are five other memos or categories in addition to multiplicity: they are “lightness,” “quickness,” “exactitude,” and “visibility.” ambiguity in its etymological sense is an intrinsic property of pluralism. it cannot be otherwise. in this sense, merleau-ponty is often regarded as a philosopher of ambiguity in that any meaning is not univocal but has an element of bothness. for a discussion of the issue of plurality and ambiguity from a perspective of postmodern hermeneutics, see tracy (1987). 20woolf (1938: 109) defines cosmopolitanism succinctly when she writes: “as a woman, i have no country. as a woman i want no country. as a woman my country is the whole world.” 21arendt (1958: 2) affirms humanity’s dependence on the earth or nonhuman world: “the earth is the very quintessence of the human condition and earthly nature, for all we know, may be unique in the universe in providing human beings with a habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and without artifice. the human artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environment, but life itself is outside this artificial world, and through life man remains related 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responsibility. chicago: university of chicago press jullien, françois. 2002. “did philosophers have to become fixated on truth?” (trans. janet lloyd), critical inquiry, 28: 803-824 __________. 2003. “‘china as philosophical tool’,” diogenes, no. 50: 15-21 jung, hwa yol. 1987. “heidegger’s way with sinitic thinking,” pp.217244, in heidegger and asian thought. ed. graham parkes. honolulu: university of hawaii press __________. 1995. “the tao of transversality as a global approach to truth: a metacommentary on calvin o. schrag,” man and world, 28: 11-31 __________. 1999. “difference and responsibility,” pp.129-166, in phänomenologie der natur (phenomenology of nature), a special issue of phänomenologische forschungen. ed. kah kyung cho and young-ho lee. freiburg/münchen: karl albert __________. 2000. “taking responsibility seriously,” pp.147-165, in phenomenology of the political. ed. kevin thompson and lester embree. dordrecht, the netherlands: kluwer __________. 2001. “john macmurray and the postmodern condition: from egocentricism to heterocentricism,” idealistic studies, 31: 105-123 __________. 2002a. “enlightenment and the question of the other: a postmodern audition,” human studies, 25: 297-306 __________. 2002b. (editor’s) “introduction,” pp.1-22, in comparative culture in the age of globalization. lanham, md: lexington books __________. 2002c. “responsibility as first ethics: macmurray and levinas,” pp.173-188, in john macmurray: critical perspectives. ed. david fergusson and nigel dower. new york: peter lang __________. 2002d. “transversality and geophilosophy in the age of globalization,” pp.74-90, in calvin o. schrag and the task of philosophy after postmodernity. ed. martin beck matuštik and 170 prajñâ vihâra william l. mcbride. evanston, il: northwestern university press __________. 2005. “interbeing and geophilosophy in the cultural topography of watsuji tetsuro’s thought,” pp.691-702, in why japan matters! ed. joseph f. kess and helen lansdowne, vol. 2. victoria, bc, canada: centre for asia-pacific initiatives, university of victoria __________. 2006a. “transversality and comparative political theory: a tribute to fred dallmayr’s work,” pp.230-250, in letting be: fred dallmayr’s cosmopolitical vision. ed. stephen f. schneck. notre dame, in: university of notre dame press __________. 2006b. “transversality and comparative culture,” ex/ change, no. 16: 11-17 __________. 2007a. “edouard glissant’s aesthetics of relation as diversality and creolization,” pp.193-225, in postcolonialism and political theory. ed. nalini therese persram. lanham, md: lexington books __________. 2007b. “merleau-ponty’s transversal geophilosophy and sinic aesthetics of nature,” pp.235-257, in merleau-ponty and environmental philosophy. ed. suzanne l. cataldi and william s. hamrick. albany: state university of new york press kolakowski, leszek. 1968. toward a marxist humanism. trans. jane zielonko peel. new york: grove press lee, michael g. 2006. the german “mittelweg”: garden theory and philosophy in the time of kant. new york: routledge levinas, emmanuel. 1999. alterity and transcendence. trans. michael b. smith. new york: columbia university press locke, john. 1960. two treatises of government. cambridge, uk: university press macpherson, c. b. 1962. the political theory of possessive individualism. oxford, uk: clarendon press mahbubani, kishore. 1998. can asians think? singapore: times books international __________. 2008. the new asian hemisphere. new york: public affairs mayeroff, milton. 1971. on caring. new york: harper and row merleau-ponty, maurice. 1964. “everywhere and nowhere,” pp.121hwa yol jung 171 158, in signs. trans. richard c. mccleary. evanston, il: northwestern university press __________. 1969. humanism and terror. trans. john o’neill. boston: beacon press nancy, jean-luc. 1991. “of being-in-common” (trans. james creech), pp.1-12, in community as loose ends. ed. miami theory collective. minneapolis: university of minnesota press __________. 2008. philosophical chronicles. trans. franson manjali. new york: fordham university press ozouf, mona. 1988. festivals and the french revolution. trans. alan sheridan. cambridge, ma: harvard university press ramsey, ramsey eric and david james miller (eds.). 2003. experiences between philosophy and communication. albany, ny: state university of new york press robinson, fiona. 1999. globalizing care. boulder, co: westview press russell, bertrand. 1922. the problem of china. london: george allen and unwin __________. 1945. history of western philosophy. new york: simon and schuster said, edward e. 1978. orientalism. new york: random house sartre, jean-paul. 1965. anti-semite and jew. trans. george j. becker. new york: shocken books schrag, calvin o. 2004. convergence amidst difference. albany, ny: state university of new york press scott, joan wallach. 2007. the politics of the veil. princeton, nj: princeton university press scruton, roger. 1990. “masaryk, patoèka and the care of the soul,” pp.74-88, in philosopher on dover beach. new york: st. martin’s press toulmin, stephen. 1990. cosmopolis. new york: free press tracy, david. 1987. plurality and ambiguity. new york: harper and row valladão, alfredo g. a. 1996. the twenty-first century will be american. trans. john howe. london: verso watsuji, tetsuro. 1996. rinrigaku. trans. yamamoto seisaku and robert e. carter. albany: state university of new york press west, cornel. 1990. “the new cultural politics of difference,” pp.19172 prajñâ vihâra 36, in out there. ed. russell ferguson, martha gever, trinh t. minh-ha, and cornel west. new york: the new museum of contemporary art whitehead, alfred north. 1954. adventures of ideas. new york: macmillan woolf, virginia. 1938. three guineas. new york: harcourt brace young, robert j. c. 2001. postcolonialism. oxford, uk: blackwell hwa yol jung 173 after teaching and doing research for 19 years about islamic studies and religion in thailand ten years at public universities and nine years at assumption university, i have come to appreciate islam – buddhist – catholic relations in thailand and asi resignifying the universal: critical commentary on the postcolonial african identity and development adeshina afolayan university of ibadan, nigeria abstract the dimension of the debate on the relation between the universal and the particular in african philosophy has been skewed in favour of the universalists who argued that the condition for the possibility of an african conception of philosophy cannot be achieved outside the “universal’ idea of the philosophical enterprise. in this sense, the ethnophilosophical project and its attempt to rescue the idea of an african past necessary for the reconstruction of an african postcolonial identity and development becomes a futile one. a recent commentator even argues that works concerning african identity are now totally irrelevant and misguided. in this essay, i will be arguing, on the contrary, that the universalist’s argument, much like its critique of ethnophilosophical reason, mistakes the nature, significance and necessity of such a resistance (rather than original) identity that the ethnophilosophical project promises. i will also argue that the fabrication of such an identity facilitates the avoidance of an uncritical submersion in the universal as well as a proper conception of an african development. this, furthermore, is the only avenue by which the imperialistic ontological space of universal humanism, in which most universalist claims are rooted, can be made more polygonal and mutually beneficial for alternative cultural particulars. l’homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers (man is born free but is everywhere in chains) --rousseau the work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for particular purpose. --wittgenstein introduction: on the universal and the particular philosophers celebrate perennial problems. one of such problems is that of universals and their relationship to particular concrete objects. from the specifically metaphysical altercations between the realists and the nominalists, we can abstract certain culturally specific problematics: how does the universal category of, say, the human appropriate 1 particular cultural experiences? or, to use a heideggerian terminology, what does it mean for various human beings to be? consequently, how can we theorize the african’s “being-in-the-world”? and, what role does the african philosophical project play in such theorisation? african philosophers’ confrontation with these problems has been particularly mediated by the need to specify the conditions necessary for the possibility of an african philosophy and development. in other words, given the unique confrontation with europe that gave rise to the body of works we refer to as “african philosophy,” african scholars were faced with the problem of identifying certain cores of african experiences that will serve as the basis for deriving philosophy from a specific cultural environment. they saw the need to differentiate the african experience from specifically western experience and its influence on philosophical speculation. and on the basis of this differentiation, to reconstruct an african identity that will serve as the fulcrum for determining a path for african development after colonisation. the debate in african philosophy has been ably divided between the universalists and the culturalists (or, in strictly african philosophical terms, between the ethnophilosophers and the professional philosophers).1 the universalists contend that the only justification for an “african” philosophy is as a particular instantiation of a universal philosophy originating in the west. on the other hand, the culturalists argue that all philosophies are particular cultural phenomena that follow specific cultural evolutionary pathways. in the controversy concerning both the proper methodology of doing this african philosophy and the means of achieving an african identity suitable for the proper 2 conception of an african development, the universalist seems to have won. however i will be arguing that this triumph is actually pyrrhic in the sense that what the universalist seems to have gained both methodologically and substantively, is at the great cost of misunderstanding the issue of an african postcolonial identity. specifically, my argument is that it is only an uncritical adoption of universalism in the shape of the concept of the human that can warrant its critique of the ethnophilosophical project central to the culturalists. the strategy i will adopt is to examine a recent universalist claim that maligns the necessity of an african identitarian project as a veritable path towards a beneficial conception of african development. the universalist position is ably represented by paulin hountondji, kwasi wiredu and kwame anthony appiah. according to hountondji, “by ‘african philosophy’ i mean a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by africans themselves and described as philosophical by their authors themselves.”2 this characterisation stems from his contention that philosophy itself is a theoretical discipline—like physics, mathematics and linguistics—with a methodological orientation and some set of substantive issues with which practitioners are preoccupied. philosophy, for hountondji, begins when the discipline discursively begins to confront its own problematics. on this tradition of discursiveness, he writes: …philosophy never stops; its very existence lies in the to and fro of free discussion, without which there is no philosophy. it is not a closed system but a history, a debate that goes on from generation to generation, in which every thinker, every author, engages in total responsibility: i know i am responsible for what i say, for the theories i put forward….a philosophical…work…is intelligible only as a moment in a debate that sustains and transcends it. it always refers to antecedent positions, either to refute them or to confirm and enrich them. it takes on meaning only in relation to that history, in relation to the term of an ever-changing debate in which the sole stable element is the constant reference to one self-same 3 object, to one sphere of experience, the characterization of which, incidentally, is itself part of the evolution.3 given this explanation, authentic philosophical cogitations become textual, while orature (fables, dynastic poems, epics, proverbs, myths, and so on) pales as only a pretext of the tradition of discursivity peculiar to a universal philosophy. hountondji’s absolutism about the theoretical circumference of autonomous philosophy therefore excludes the ethnophilosophers’ conception of philosophy as primarily a cultural field preoccupied with the analysis of oral literature and other items of the preliterate culture. the theoretical move, by ethnologists, social scientists and cultural anthropologists, from a descriptive analysis of human cultural ideas and institutions to the attempt to study “… beliefs and values and draws conclusions about the mode of thought that are imputed to their formulation and observance…”4 is, for hountondji, an unjustifiable ethnophilosophical strategy. wiredu’s universalist argument is also very simple. for him, the theoretical and critical nature of philosophy cannot afford the ethnophilosophical view of it as an uncritical communal undertaking. the adequacy of any philosophy has nothing to do with its origination but rather with its discursivity: its ability to “generate theories that can illuminate the problems of the day” and thus provide “the context of ideas within which particular choices and preferences in the realm of action—whether economic, political, cultural or scientific—can be made.”5 in this sense, philosophy has a cogent relationship with science or rather with the habits of mind characteristic of science: “habits of exactness and rigour in thinking, the pursuit of systematic coherence and the experimental approach.”6 although he is specifically clear on the culture-relativity of philosophy, he is insistent that philosophy 4 can be universal.7 such a universal philosophy, for instance, would be aided by what wiredu calls “the fundamental biological unity of the human species.” this derives from the fact that “there is a human way of developing in which instinctual drives are in due course transformed into structured thought, discourse and action.” the basic essentials of this process proceed “in similar ways among all human beings.”8 hountondji’s and wiredu’s universalism is marshaled against the culturalists’ position summed up in hountondji’s pejorative term: ethnophilosophy. the ethnophilosophical reason is represented fundamentally by what hountondji sees as an attempt to postulate unanimity in philosophical beliefs among africans, and hence to uncritically initiate a confrontation with the african traditional past. on this understanding, “critics of ethnophilosophy [therefore] argue that a focus on the past detracts from a critical posture that evaluates all practices in terms of what they contribute to the liberation of africa... for african philosophy need not express a particular outlook for africans.”9 in “humanistic cultural universalism,” oyeshile provides a critical elaboration of this critique of ethnophilosophical reason, and particularly an argument for a cultural universalism that can motivate africa’s search for a paradigm of an authentic postcolonial development. though not really directed at the ethnophilosophical project in a way that hountondji’s and wiredu’s critiques were, his critical analysis also negates ethnophilosophy and especially its search for an african postcolonial identity. his basic argument in the essay is that “african development should only be sought in universalist terms which should involve certain humanistic values.” for this reason, therefore, “most works concerning african identity are now irrelevant, and if they are not, they are 5 misguided.” the urgent task in africa and of the african scholars is, in this regard, “human development in all its ramifications and not the assertion of the african personality (identity) which was more relevant at a particular period in our history.”10 oyeshile’s two claims are that (a) a humanistic cultural universalism provides a veritable starting point for launching the project of an african development, and (b) this universalism excludes a search for a cultural identity from the vantage point of the african. in his own admission, oyeshile’s argument draws largely from appiah’s universalist conception of african philosophy and his critique of african cultural nationalism (read: ethnophilosophy). appiah’s universalism is based on the contention that cultural nationalism in its pan-african guise is really a racial construct created by europe as a subjugating strategy. as such, it assumes a cultural or racial unity of the african and african diasporic people. however, according to appiah, since the biological and cultural arguments for races failed to establish their existence, then pan africanism fails also for that reason. its vision of a completely different or a completely homogeneous africa in dialectical opposition to the west is also false. this is the fulcrum of appiah’s thesis. if it is correct, for him (as well as for hountondji), to argue that africa really does not have a common traditional culture, a common language, a common religion, or even belong to a common race, then a case can be made for the alignment of africa to the universe of humanity. 11 the first part of this case is that africa, apart from being a geographical entity accommodating diverse peoples and cultures, “shares too many problems and projects to be distracted by a bogus basis for solidarity.” these problems include those that every modernising region is facing in a rapidly globalising world: common ecological problems; a situation of 6 dependency; the problem of racism; the possibilities of the development of regional markets and local circuits of production; and so on.12 thus, since we as africans are now confronted with a new self more individualistic and atomic than the self of the precapitalist societies, then its inescapability becomes something to celebrate. within this modern society therefore, what exists is not the cult of difference or race but rather the solidarity of humanity. the second part of appiah’s case is that, like every other universalists, he also deploys arguments for an autonomous philosophy with a substantive concern for certain fundamental problems. these problems—causation, good and evil, mind-body, justice, illusion, reason, reality, truth, etc—may really appear western but are actually universal in scope. while these problems may be seen as constituting the core of the western philosophical tradition, appiah contends that they can as well be seen “as growing out of a history of systematic reflection on widespread, prereflective beliefs about the nature of humankind, about the purposes, and about our knowledge of and place in the cosmos.”13 something therefore counts as philosophy if it confronts these issues critically with the required “traditional philosophical method.” (we therefore arrive at the logic of hountondji’s definition of african philosophy.) for appiah, it would be extremely difficult to conceive of a human culture where nothing like these fundamental issues is present or that does not have “any crucial organizing concepts.” essentially therefore, for appiah, we [africans] will solve our problems if we see them as human problems arising out of a special situation, and we shall not solve them if we see them as african problems, generated by our being somehow unlike others… if there is a lesson in the broad shape of this circulation of cultures, it is surely that we are all already contaminated by each other, that there is no longer fully autochthonous echt-african culture awaiting 7 salvage by our artists (just as there is, of course, no american culture without african roots).14 africans must, in other words, jettison the illusion of a unique african identity in a global world that is not only interdependent but also rapidly integrating. furthermore, the project of an african development becomes realisable within this humanistic universalism that ensures cultural interrelationship rather than insularity. it seems quite obvious how oyeshile could arrive at his argument of a humanistic universalism unburdened by the unnecessary encumbrances of cultural nationalism and its identity illusion. following appiah, the two horns of his contention becomes clearer. on the one hand, the issue of african identity was relevant “as a rallying point for a people who wanted to have a belief in themselves, a people who wanted to be capable of determining their own destiny in the face of motley values.” on the other hand, such a reason no longer applies because “the identity issue does not address the urgent problems confronting africa. it lays more than enough stress on the african personality rather than on the compelling problems of scientific development, hunger, religious emancipation and political anarchy.”15 in a straightforward reflection of the overt optimism of appiah’s universalism, oyeshile also remarks that of course, it is a truism that africa is currently enmeshed in political and economic problems. solutions to these problems would go a long way to engender development. however, these problems can only be solved if we as africans see ourselves as an integral part of the world order. it is then that political rights and other political values will be respected by african political leaders. it is also then that the goal of economic emancipation can be pursued vigorously.16 what i have done in this section of the essay is to lay down the case for universalism and the impossibility of an unnecessarily provincial burden of identity 8 within its imperative. the most common denominator among the universalists is their trenchant critique of the (african) identity issue. this is followed, especially in appiah and oyeshile, by a simplistic, one-dimensional optimism in the efficacy of humanistic values and concert as the ultimate panacea for the resolution of human problems. though oyeshile does not seriously consider metaphilosophical issues in his critique, philosophy plays a pivotal role in the construal of their humanism. in the next section, i will critically examine how a supposedly universal construal of philosophy led to a “universal” humanism whose ethnocentric bent constrict the ontological space. it will be clear from this that most conceptions of the universal use it as a conceptual forum for a particular identity manifestation. philosophy and the shape of the human the philosophical enterprise, as we noted above, is crucial to the universalists’ conception of a viable universal humanism. it is equally significant for the specification of the conditions for an african philosophical project oriented towards a postcolonial african identity and development. the universalists divorce an authentic philosophical discourse from a purely provincial need. for them, philosophy must be autonomous of all identity issues since it promises a virile humanistic universalism. after all, philosophy, according to the argument, is the ultimate human achievement! how does this idea of autonomous philosophy contribute to our formulation of the utility of african identity contra the universalist’s contention? as i will be showing, a critical interrogation of these concepts (i.e. the human, the philosophical) will lead to the particularist concepts, theories, canons and identities which have been denied to individual cultures in the putative necessity of universal humanism.17 9 the foundation of modern philosophy is supposedly derived from descartes’ unique confrontation with the perennial problems of philosophy. basically, the cartesian weltanschauung differentiates between the human and the animal domain and on this basis claims that the mental is different from the physical. in short, it demanded the predominance of epistemology in modern philosophy. thus, from the presumption that philosophy is a uniquely human phenomenon, cartesians postulate the absolute autonomy of philosophy. they presuppose that there is a distinct set of philosophical problems independent of culture, society and history. for them, philosophy stands outside the various conventions on which people base their social practices and transcends the cultural heritage and political struggles of people.18 on this account, hountondji, wiredu, appiah and oyeshile would be cartesians. the point is not really a strange one given the scientific positivism consequent upon such a view of philosophy. it is in the cartesian philosophical framework, that is, that we witness the unique coincidence of episteme and scientia. yet, descartes, a 17th century french philosopher, scientist and mathematician, was only responding to specific historical circumstances in relation to the medieval period. for example, the rise of science and the advent of the capitalist production. cornel west explores the metaphilosophical insights in heidegger’s, wittgenstein’s and dewey’s metaphilosophical arguments against the ahistorical character of cartesian autonomous philosophy. through his critique of the historical hermeneutics of heidegger, the cultural descriptions of wittgenstein and the pragmatic orientation of dewey, he arrives at a definition of afro-american philosophy as “…the interpretation of afro-american history, highlighting the cultural heritage and political struggles, which 10 provides desirable norms that should regulate responses to particular challenges presently confronting afro-americans.”19 it is a wonder that in spite of this particularist definition west goes on to explicate a humanistic view that can guide an understanding of afro-american culture and politics. i will argue later why his humanism is more robust and critical than that of oyeshile and the others. but for now, we need to interrogate what made the cartesian conception of autonomous philosophy a unique ontological strategy for invading the space of the universal anthropos. i suspect that an attempt to answer a similar question would have given oyeshile and the universalist movement a critical outlook on “the universal.” in his discussion of the utility of social memory—of preservation, selection, elimination and invention—in the process of identity formation, mazrui gives us an opening into the analysis of the western appropriation of the ontological space of the human. this began with the arbitrary incorporation of ancient greece into the ancestral lineage of euro-american cultural heritage. this, for mazrui, is a blatant case of false memory—inscribing into one’s past what is originally not a part of it—as well as that of macro-plagiarism, “a massive borrowing by one civilization from another in a manner which deliberately obscures origins and denies acknowledgement and attribution.”20 since philosophy as the ultimate rational enterprise is putatively the discovery of the greeks, the archetypal humans (from whom hegel’s absolute spirit began its nonhistorical march towards substantive objectivity and “essential universality” culminating in euro-american cultures), the cartesian autonomous philosophy is thereby complemented by an ahistorical conception of humanism as “something essential, above and beyond the accidents of historical or national difference.”21 11 the history of the signification of the “human” is certainly one that bears out what a commentator has described as the humpty dumbtean conclusion that the meaning of humanism belongs to politics rather than to semantics. politics, that is, speaks to the issue of which, among all the available meanings, is to be master. according to davies, for the meanings of a powerful and complex word are never a matter for lexicography alone. they are tied inescapably to the linguistic and cultural authority, real, absent or desired, of those who use it. the important question, over and above what the word means in a particular context, is why and how that meaning matters, and for whom.22 a panoramic view of all perspectives on the concept—civic humanism, protestant humanism, rationalistic humanism, romantic humanism, positivistic humanism, liberal humanism, nazi humanism, heidegger’s antihumanist humanism, and the humanist antihumanism of foucault and althusser—reveals that they have been imperial, “they speak of the human in the accents and interests of a class, a sex, a ‘race’. their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.”23 this exclusionary as well as smothering element is what symonds traced from the discovery of romantic humanism to the dawn of modernity in europe. for him, the essence of humanism consisted in a new and vital perception of the dignity of man as a rational being apart from theological determinations, and in the further perception that classic literature alone displayed human nature in the plenitude of intellectual and moral freedom… the study of greek opened up philosophical horizons far beyond the dream-world of the churchmen and the monks; it stimulated the germs of science, suggested new astronomical hypotheses, and indirectly led to the discovery of america…24 we seem to have, on symonds’ testimonies, imperial colonisation flowing from a romantic conception of the human! we therefore arrive at the triumph of the arnoldian “central, truly human point of view”: essential, above and beyond historical or national differences. 12 we must wonder, as davies does and most of the universalists do not, about the accent placed on “central,” “truly human” and “human.” the implication seems to be that every appeal to an abstract and essential humanism is an appropriation of at worse a suffocating, and at best a discompassing perspective that perpetuates the domination of those who are perceived to be inauthentically human. thus, each of us lives our human-ness as a uniquely individual experience; but that experience, we are asked to feel, is part of a larger, all-embracing humanity, a “human condition”, to which the great poets of the european tradition, homer and dante and chaucer and shakespeare and milton and goethe, can give us the key.25 however, given this protean adaptability of the term, it would only be logical to explore its nebulous boundaries and depths from a particular human perspective. oyeshile is not cautious enough to investigate the specific historical and local interests that may be at work within such a grand concept. this is necessary because universalism is meant to dissolve such particularities like race, sex, class, culture from which most people experience human-ness. according to davies, “humanism” is an anachronism that is still deeply embedded in contemporary consciousness and everyday common sense to the extent that it requires a conscious effort, every time someone appeals to “human nature” or “the human condition”, to recall how recent such notions are, and how specific to a particular history and point of view, and how very odd it would seem, in cultures historically or ethnologically unlike our own, to separate out and privilege “man” in this way.26 this cultural appropriation of the anthropos is followed by a denial of an african influence not only on the greek cultural heritage, but on world history as a whole. in other words, there is an ontological attempt to efface black, african identity from the template of a supposed universal culture. gordon theorises this as the ontological attempt at the phenomenological invisibility or disappearance of africans and afro-americans. 13 the existential-phenomenological approach of gordon theorises the interactive dynamics of the ontologies of white and black ego-genesis and the resultant “imperial battles for ontological space” (as a space of self-positing and its realisation). these battles are imperial because euro-americans have defined the ontological space of white egogenesis in such a way that makes it possible to evade the humanity of africans.27 in his account of bad faith, gordon argues that since human beings generally deal inauthentically with the specific—political, economic, racial or, for gordon and sartre, ontological—hindrances between self-positing and self-realisation, it implies that the self’s project of being always falls short of its projected ideal. however, in bad faith, we pretend to a greater degree of self-integration than our ego has in fact achieved. this pretense must however be concealed through certain evasive or compensatory existential activity of exploitation. for the white, this manifests through an acute racial stereotyping, a “projective non-seeing” that performs “the phenomenological disappearance” of black humanity.28 this constitutive act of absence, invisibility, displacement and anonymity is …fundamentally phenomenological, that is an absence that is constituted as a meaning in the white consciousness. this spell of phenomenological invisibility is an important contribution of the european and euroamerican philosophical consciousness to the larger encompassing cloud of non-seeing conjured by european imperialism to veil the humanity of africans.29 the result is that the formation of the white ego is simultaneously the deformation of the black ego. paradoxically, however, in denying “the forces of civilizational origins” and in the effacement of african humanity, it becomes quite obvious that the euro-american cultural establishment unwittingly undermines its quest for the universal.30 thus, if a people’s humanity is seriously interrogated as the africans’ was in colonialism, then why should it not be logical to question the putative universal 14 humanism? that is, if they have been ontologically effaced from the anthropos, what possible means could they have of participating in it? it must therefore become obvious why it is really awkward to claim, as oyeshile does, that the issue of self-identity of the africans was only useful at a point in their cultural development. on the contrary, a culture’s dynamic relation with others is, inter alia, a constant reevaluation of its identity and esteem, “the act of self-definition forever remains open-ended, with no guarantee of triumph. indeed, the process takes precedent over the result, since any static self-identity soon disintegrates the self.”31 and since the ontologically invisible africans would always experience europe and america as the questioning of their very existence, oyeshile would definitely be wrong to claim that any attempt to reclaim that identity is irrelevant or misguided. it becomes unimaginative to formulate the counter-thesis that it is the problem of identity rather than that of development that is primary for africans. without the former, the latter is meaningless. what then makes this reclamation possible? african experience and the constitution of modernity friedrich nietzsche, the ancestor for many dimensions of antihumanism, has argued, in human all too human, that all philosophers involuntarily think of “man” as an aeterna veritas, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things…lack of historical sense is the family failing of all philosophers; many, without being aware of it, even take the most recent manifestation of man, such as has risen under the impress of certain religions, even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one has to start out…32 what does a “historical sense” require in the attempt to ensure the phenomenological visibility of the africans in the ontological struggles for relevance? gordon argues that 15 the question of existence is, in itself, an empty one; it is always a conjunctive affair. in other words, the question must always be situated in the existential realities of theorising blackness and the african. according to him, at the heart of existential thought are two questions; “what are we”? and “what shall we do?” these questions can be translated into questions of identity and normative action. they are questions, further, of ontological and teleological significance, for the former addresses being and the latter addresses what to become—in a word, “purpose.”33 since the elements of african cultural identity have been undergoing significant changes in response to their confrontation with european imperialism and american racism, it would seem necessary to reformulate a new context for the confrontation with the questions of identity and normative action. i suspect that oyeshile and most of the universalists mistook the need for such a “resistance identity” for the attempt to glorify a “mystique of pure coherence” that is usually associated with the ethnophilosophers’ perception of the traditional african past. in constructing such a resistance identity, some kind of reinvention would serve the africans well. many african scholars, including appiah, see the need for such an imagined locus of solidarity. like appiah, mazrui argues that “real pan-africanism must go beyond the twin stimuli of poetry and imperialism. pan-africanism is based on a positive false memory—that africa was divided by colonialism and was previously one.”34 this project of reclamation radically confronts the necessity of an ethnophilosophical examination of the african cultural past beyond any romantic idealisation. henry gives two reasons for the necessity of a phenomenological analysis of african traditional heritage. 16 one, through a shutzian (reference to alfred shutz, the phenomenologist) proprietary relationship, african philosophers have a significant tie with these cultural constructs as invaluable properties in a way such that “expectation, (particularly of continuity), obligations and constraints are imposed upon us. this legacy is our responsibility in ways that cannot be for non-african groups.” we are therefore saddled with the responsibility of preserving and developing “this heritage by examining it ethnophilosophically, by reflecting on it in [our] own lived experience, or collectively with contemporaries and consociates.” two, henry further contends that this proprietary relation with the symbols and discourses of traditional africa is extended to a unique egogenetic relation with the predecessors in such a way that the relations “establish certain common cultural or mythopoetic elements in the formation of african, africanamerican, and african-caribbean egos.”35 this formative role of the cultural elements will constitute them as common elements that will facilitate the self-reflection of african/a philosophers on their own ego-genetic processes, and on the cultural identity of an african/a philosophy. after immersing ourselves in historical thinking, a bit of nietzschean modesty is in order. this is because nietzsche holds that the “virtue of modesty” is required for historical philosophising. this takes many dimensions. the first is that after the ontological determination of the self-identity of africans and african philosophy, african philosophers must go on to confront the socio-existential dimension of the african predicament that bears directly on the problems of african development. this is generally the problem of how african cultures can be modern. this, after all, is the basis for the universalism of appiah, hountondji, wiredu and lately oyeshile. 17 however, as the preceding arguments have revealed, modernity is originally and incredibly constituted as a western—euro-american—phenomenon together with its exclusionary ontology. west rightly defines modernity as the descriptive notion that connotes the historical state of affairs characterized by an abundance of wealth resulting from the industrial and technological revolution and the ensuing cultural isolation and fragmentation due to a disintegration of closely-knit communities and the decline of religious systems.36 the question of how african can become modern is only meaningful from the background of the rescue of african cultural visibility from the anonymity of euroamerican philosophical and cultural imperialism and humanism. a regained cultural distinctiveness provides a strong arsenal for meeting a modernity defined by science and technology. in other words, since the scientism of euro-american modernity requires the “phenomenological disappearance” of myth, tradition, religion and other supposedly extra-scientific discourses, and since these “extras” are crucial for the authentic formation of an african postcolonial identity or ego, then a dialectical relationship between the two will be significant for the constitution of an african modernity as an important dimension of the modernity project itself. africa’s relationship with euro-american modernity constitutes an ambivalent challenge: that of participating in its achievement without simultaneously surrendering to its ethnocentric underpinnings. here, we achieve our second point of nietzschean modesty through benhabib. in “cultural complexity,” she also confronts the question of ethnocentric discourse and global imperative: “whence does the moral imperative to treat others with universal respect and according to egalitarian reciprocity derive?” she replies: 18 i think the only honest and sensible response…is that indeed these norms only make sense against the background of the hermeneutic horizon of modernity; but also to point out that modernity, although the most significant elements constituting it were first assembled in the west, is a world-wide process and phenomenon. from its very inception, the dynamic of modernity has set world-historical forces into motion which have in turn transformed it into a common human project, and not just a western one. once the ideas of universal equality, liberty, and brotherhood—and eventually sisterhood—were formulated through the political revolutions of modernity, there no longer was a historical option of going back to premodern conceptions.37 even in this context of a world-historical modernity, an african dimension of such a modernity—the challenge of nation-building, of evolving viable and appropriate democratic institutions; the problems of inculcating a political morality and eradicating rampant political corruption; the problems of traditional moral standards disintegrating vis-à-vis urbanization; and even the problems of aids and globalisation—requires, still following benhabib’s concession, “the continuing identity of a society and culture” which is based upon “its capacity to deal with outside challenges and contingencies while also retaining the belief of its member in its normative systems and value structures.”38 we next turn to the implications of these ruminations for the constitution of a universal humanism not partial to one imperial perspective. the imperative of resignification the fundamental argument i have been developing hitherto is that oyeshile’s humanist universalism is not only myopic about the formation, significance and necessity of a postcolonial african identity that is resistant rather than a glorification of a mystique, his theoretical framework betrays a naïve understanding of the complex amalgam of issues that accompany the imperial conception of such universalism. in other words, he fails to 19 analyse critically the concept of the universal in its particularity and ideality; for example, that the paradox that humanity is one and many. we cannot argue that since the supposed “human”, the cartesian subject, is really invented in the image of euro-america—that is, this subject “is not a woman, not black, not a migrant, not marginal, etc”—then we should abandon the concept or its general rhetoric as “a hopelessly contaminated concept, to be thrown out with the bathwater of humanist delusion.”39 this, i suspect, would be the fundamental objection of the universalists. but i maintain that an awareness of this delusion strengthens the concept and guides one against any uncritical humanistic optimism, pace oyeshile and others. it is the humanist delusions that necessitates the imperative of resignification. the first point in that project is to note that before the conscription of a humanist universalism to the processes of imperial power, conquest and empire fed by the desire for the “discovery of the future,” the early humanists—before “humanism”—were orientated on the excitement surrounding the “recovery of the past.” this implicitly identitarian orientation was broadened by their peripatetic desires. i suppose that such nomadic contact beyond their own provincialities enlarged their humanistic sensibilities and sensitivities beyond the desire to dominate. their physical and intellectual peregrination led to the development of inter-generational and inter-racial collaboration around the theme of friendship unmarred by ideological perceptions. put in other words, just like machiavelli who, through the pages of the recovered ancients’ manuscripts, felt their generosity and kindness (humanità) in responding to his modern probing, the early humanists too were generous in their accommodation of those who do not share their 20 peculiarities and cultural milieu—as long as they were humans. and this is in spite of being partial to their own linguistic idioms.40 in the early humanists, we have the form of an encompassing humanist universalism that is multivocal; a coherent vision of the human from its multidimensionality or concrete plurality rather than in a hollowed, ethnocentric singularity.41 this leads to the second point in the project of resignification. once again, let us return to benhabib’s struggle with “the problem of universalism and concrete ethical communities” or what she calls “the problem of the concrete universal.” the concept of concrete universality has to do with the problem of situating or concretizing the universal. this concept, for her, recognises the distinction between the “two visions of universalism”: “one which considers the other as a generalized other, as a being entitled to the same rights and duties which we would grant ourselves, and the other which sees the human person as a ‘concrete other’ with specific histories, needs, and trajectories.”42 contrary to the essentialism of an imperial humanism, benhabib argues that [m]y anti-essentialism is simply introducing this moment of narrative articulation [in the sense of an “account giving”] into the concept of culture and seeing how members of cultures identify themselves as members in creating narratives of belonging. these narratives of belonging, of history, of memory, always have references to other narratives, to other moments of identification. i’m interested in the interaction between the self and other, the “we” and the “they.” and i think this is a universal aspect of all human communities. we are different from those over there, on the other side, insofar as we narratively identify ourselves with a group.43 such an anti-essentialist reading of culture and the universal is similar to west’s idea of a humanist tradition of african-american thought and behaviour. his basic argument is that culture is more fundamental than politics in regard to afro-american 21 self-understanding, “it presupposes that afro-american cultural perceptions provide a broader and richer framework for understanding the afro-american experience than political perceptions.”44 however, out of all the traditions that provide an explanatory matrix—the vitalist, the rationalist, the existentialist and the humanist traditions—west favours the humanist conception of afro-american history because it neither romanticises nor reject afro-american culture (as the vitalist and the rationalist traditions did). rather, a humanist understanding accepts this culture for what it is, the expression of an oppressed human community imposing its distinctive form of order on an existential chaos, explaining its political predicament, preserving its self-respect, and projecting its own special hope for the future… the humanist tradition provides a cultural springboard useful in facing the ever-present issue of self-identity for afro-americans and join their political struggle to other progressive elements in american society.45 it seems that benhabib’s and west’s portrayal of a humanistic universalism gives more hope for a culture’s advancement than oyeshile’s. this is because it becomes a concept that allows one to gaze into one’s humanity from the perspective of a cultural past. it has the fundamental task of enlarging the ontological and political spaces of existence for the self-definition and self-determination of all particular cultures. it is exactly this significant cultural mooring that oyeshile denies as being unnecessary for the understanding of african development. without such a root or self-image, however, africa’s gaze into a developmental future will always be with perplexed eyes. 22 notes 1. this characterisation is really simplistic, but it mirrors the most important schism between the universalists and the particularists. this basic, unsophisticated distinction has been elaborated into four methodological approaches: the ethnophilosophical (or descriptive) school, the sagacious (or sage-ethnological) school, the nationalist (or nationalist-ideological-political) school, and the professional (or linguistic-analytic) school. in recent times however, there had been other methodological schools: the hermeneutical (or phenomenological) approach, the narrative approach (or the narrative-hermeneutic approach), literary/artistic approach, and so on. 2. paulin hountondji, african philosophy: myth and reality, trans. by henri evans with an introduction by abiola irele (london: hutchinson university library for africa, 1983), p. 33. 3. ibid. pp. 72, 83. 4. barry hallen, “modes of thought, ordinary language and cognitive diversity,” in claude sumner and samuel wolde yohannes (eds.) perspectives in african philosophy: an anthology on “problematics of an african philosophy: twenty years after (1976—1996)” (addis ababa: addis ababa university press, 2002), p. 215. emphasis in original. 5. olusegun oladipo, philosophy and the african experience: the contributions of kwasi wiredu (ibadan: hope publications, 1996), p. 17. 6. kwasi wiredu, philosophy and an african culture (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1980), p. 32. 7. for a theoretical elaboration of his universalism, see kwasi wiredu, cultural universals and particulars: an african perspective (bloomington, indiana: indiana university press, 1996). 8. kwasi wiredu, “canons of conceptualisation,” the monist: an international journal of general philosophical inquiry, vol. 76, no. 4 (october, 1993), p. 461. emphasis in original 9. tommy l. lott and john p. pittman, “introduction to part three,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy (malden, ma: blackwell, 2003), p. 153. 10. olatunji a. oyeshile, “humanistic cultural universalism as a veritable basis for africa’s development,” concordia: international journal of philosophy, 51, 2007, pp. 43, 44. 23 11. kwame anthony appiah, in my father’s house: africa in the philosophy of culture (oxford: oxford university press, 1992), p. 26. 12. ibid. p. 180. the preceding quote is from p. 26. 13. ibid. p. 86. 14. ibid. pp. 136, 155. 15. olatunji oyeshile, “humanistic cultural universalism,” p. 48, 49. 16. ibid. pp. 57-58. 17. in formulating this strategy, i have simply appropriated fashina’s argument against appiah’s critique of nativism. the argument reads thus: but i think appiah dismisses the [cultural] nationalists too easily. what are we to say about a cultural nationalist who studies the concepts and theories of other cultures seriously not because she mistakes them for universals but because she believes that this would lead to the “particularist” concepts, theories, and canons which she asserts of her own cultural productions? see dipo fashina’s review of appiah’s in my father’s house, ethics, vol. 104, no. 4, july 1994, p. 901. 18. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy, p. 8. 19. ibid. p. 11. 20. ali a. mazrui, “cultural amnesia, cultural nostalgia and false memory: africa’s identity crisis revisited,” african philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, 2000, p. 92. 21. tony davies, humanism (london and new york: routledge, 1997), p. 19. i owe my critical approach to davies’ historical excursion into the signification of the concept of humanism. 22. ibid. p. 6. 23. ibid. p. 131. 24. symonds, j. a., the renaissance in italy, 1898, pp. 52, 2 cited in davies, humanism, pp. 22, 23. 25. davies, humanism, pp. 21-22. emphasis added. 26. ibid. p. 25. 24 27. paget henry, “african-american philosophy: a caribbean perspective,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy, p. 52. see also lewis gordon, bad faith and antiblack racism (new jersey: humanities press, 1995), and fanon and the crisis of european man (new york: routledge, 1995). 28. lewis gordon, fanon and the crisis of european man, p. 24, cited in henry, “african-american philosophy,” p. 52. 29. ibid. 30. cf. ali mazrui, “cultural amnesia…” p. 96. 31. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,’ p. 25. 32. friedrich nietzsche, human all too human, 1880, cited in davies, humanism, pp. 32-33. emphasis added. 33. lewis r. gordon, “african-american existential philosophy,” in lott and pittman (eds.) a companion to african-american philosophy, p. 34. 34. ali mazrui, “cultural amnesia…’ p. 90. 35. paget henry, “african-american philosophy,” p. 56. (the preceding quotes are from the same page.) henry makes use of shutz in methodologically constructing ways of relating to the ego-activities of traditional african predecessors whose lived experiences do not overlap with ours. shutz argues that we can reach the world of the predecessors through records, documents, artifacts and other expressions of their subjectivity left behind; or through a living person who may have had a contact with them. though this relation lacks the reciprocity of faceto-face contact, one can achieve such reciprocity through what shutz calls the bequeathing of property (as cultural heritages) in which the predecessors continue to influence our lives. 36. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,” p. 12. 37. seyla benhabib, “cultural complexity, moral interdependence, and the global dialogic community,” in martha nussbaum and jonathan glover (eds.) women, culture and development: a study of human capabilities (oxford: clarendon press, 1995), pp. 252-253. 38. ibid. p. 238. 39. tony davies, humanism, p. 59. 40. ibid. pp. 78, 79. 25 41. such a conception of a singular “hu-man-ism” can be traced to a huge editorial and interpretive mistake around the quotation: “what a piece of work is man.” this can be referred to as the most distinguished of humanist mottos. yet, this quotation appeared in shakespeare’s hamlet (ii, ii) as: “what a piece of work is a man!” the omission of the indefinite “a” shifts the burden of interpretation from plurality to singularity, a “generic inclusiveness of the human” limited by an ethnocentric folie des grandeurs. 42. seyla benhabib, “concrete universality and critical theory,” an interview with alfredo gomez-muller and gabriel rockhill on june 16th 2006. interestingly, this interview appeared in the same volume of concordia that featured oyeshile’s universalist rejection of african identity. 43. ibid. p. 34. 44. cornel west, “philosophy and the afro-american experience,” p. 13. 45. ibid. pp. 24, 27. 26 muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 2 july to december 2019, 1-12 © 2000 by assumption university press mocopat syafaat: from neo-sufism toward a new civilization muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar gadjah mada university, indonesia abstract often theologians and academics overlook very important popular religious movements. they fail to appreciate their significance, the way they have adapted themselves to changing realities, answer peoples needs, or contribute to significant society reforms. one such movement is the neo-sufi movement of emha ainun najib called the mocopat syafaat emha ainun najib. this essay will show the significance of this movement in comparison to earlier neo-sufi movements such as the nurcholis madjid neo-sufism movement. what they share in common is both try to cultivate the self-autonomy of their followers, and emphasise that with this self-autonomy, anyone can access god directly without having to go through the intermediaries of a murshid, as in the order of the tarekat. but the mocopat syafaat movement has advantages not possessed in the nurcholis madjid neo-sufism community, namely its more egalitarian and mass dialogue. this is why it is overlooked by academics, but it is why it can play a larger role in society. mocopat intercession can be seen as a new civilization movement reviving the character of 2 prajñā vihāra islamic civilization that once triumphed in the golden age of islam. keywords: neo-sufism, emha ainun najib, mocapat syafaat, popular religious movements, islam although not always appreciated by academics, emha ainun najib’s ideas have spread throughout his various works which span a variety of forms, whether literary works, social, cultural, political, and religious. this has inspired many people, not only the middle class, but also the lower classes and those who have been marginalized due to state policies. sharpness, honesty, criticism and analysis is one of the characteristics inherent in emha’s thoughts about a wide variety of phenomena. emha’s ideas or statements are often fatalistic, in the sense that the social damage in indonesia is very difficult to fix without the intervention of god. the thought of involving god is often regarded as a form of fatalistic understanding, but it is common in islamic philosophy, especially the jabariyah school of thought. in addition, the basis of this fatalist thinking was also developed by a great islamic philosopher of the eleventh century named al-ghazali, who is famous for his work titled ihya’ulumuddin. one of the important ideas in the book is the concept of “god’s omnipotence” which is free to act outside the law of cause and effect. the idea of al-ghazali’s thinking was then severely criticized by another islamic philosopher named ibn rush (avicena) in his book titled tahafut-at-tahafut which emphasizes the importance of the principle of causality in the development of the sciences, because without the law, there the sciences could not develop. the debate of these two islamic philosophers can be succinctly found in a book entitled ancangan metodologi alternatif1. emha’s lectures that lasted for many years in various forums, such as maiyah, mocopat syafaat, banbang wetan, kenduri cinta whose themes varied, ranging from politics, religion, economics, culture muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar 3 and often indirectly illustrated how important god is in human life and the universe. as a culturalist, religious figure, artist, activist, it cannot be denied that emha is indeed a phenomenal figure in indonesia. the contribution of political thought and action has a high urgency in order to develop an independent attitude both in the scope of individuals, social and nation in the midst of the flow of dominant political culture that is feudal, manipulative, corrupt, oppressive, and dominating. all emha’s movements are simply based on the basis of political thought and action that is distanced from power, be it formal power (state, political parties), economic power and the media. at least the consistency of the emha movement is still maintained to this day. the macapat syafaat forum, banbang wetan, kenduri cinta, etc. all continue to this day. neo-sufism is a concept introduced by fazlur rahman, a historian from pakistan, to explain the sufi renewal movement in the early 18th and 19th centuries. he noted that some sufi orders (derived from arabic with plural forms of turuq; singular forms of tariqo; in indonesian known as tarekat) gave importance to the teaching of religious law and moral education to the community at large. a number of new orders formed during this period, such as sanusiya from north africa, and muhammadiya in india, both aimed at replacing what they called the sufi bankruptcy of religious orthodoxy2 many people consider the movement around emha as a neosufism or new sufism movement which is diametrically different from sufism a few centuries ago which emphasized a strict distancing from the sufi against various social, political, aspects of culture. the basis for this distance is the concept of “uzlah”, namely self-seclusion to focus attention on worship (dhikr and tafakur) to allah. but the term above is also used by a group of muslim scholars in indonesia, where one of the main figures is nur cholis madjid, who is also often called ‘cak nur’. he received a traditional islamic education (pesantren), but also received his tertiary education from the state islamic institute (iain). he became known as a ‘neo-modernist’ figure and promoted a contextual interpretation of islamic law (fiqh). because his 4 prajñā vihāra approach develops a contextual interpretation of islamic law that had implications for the relationship between the state and religion, scholars often give him the title ‘liberal’3 to balance the neo-modernism movement, madjid tried to make a counterweight that was known later as neo-sufism. that is a new way to develop spirituality, in this case islamic law (sharia and fikh) with the challenges of modern life. neo-sufism madjid is defined as an effort made carefully to balance inner life with the outer dimension. as howell explained that modern sufis inspire muslims to be fully involved in all aspects of life, and contribute based on all the talents that exist for the good of society. madjid even encourages muslim communities to develop their inner spiritual life independently so that they are not bound by a spiritual direction that binds and impedes their critical capacities4 it was alleged by howell that the movement carried out by madjid had actually been developed by his predecessor, hamka, in the 1930s, who wrote a book titled modern sufism. however, as one researcher explained, that madjid’s movement generally targets the upper middle class and university campuses, although some activities are carried out with other intellectuals. examples would be the study institutions under the paramadina foundation, such as iiman. this was done with haidar bagir, najib burhani, in the 1990s. in addition there is the icnis (the intensive course and networking for islamic sciences) which was founded by nasaruddin umar.5 the path taken by emha reflects the modesty and independence of a life chosen, and whose independence is reflected in the management of the study communities or better known as the sinau bareng (learning together) forum without answering the power of sponsors. these study communities are established throughout indonesia, such as tthe maiyah community in yogyakarta, gambang syafaat in semarang, banbang wetan in surabaya, and kenduri cinta in jakarta. the entire recitation community or “learning togather forum is always managed independently, and are open to anyone, not only muslims, but from any religion, social backgrounds, ethnicity, and education. it eve welcomes atheists. there muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar 5 is no obligation to pay to become a member. emha, both individually and together with members of his community (such as cak fuad, sabrang, kyai muzamil, totok, and kyai kanjeng music crew who are always present in almost all “learning together” activities with cak nun) always take part to solve various problems that exist in the community, such as the defense of farmers in kedung ombo in the new order era, helping shrimp farmers, dealing with entrepreneurs in the lampung area, embracing the interests of the people affected by the lapindo mudflow in the era of the government of susilo bambang yudoyono (sby), the deradicalization program in jokowi’s national leadership era. all the problems faced by this community are of course not only seen from the nationalist perspective. emha and his group also often address various global entities which influence social events in indonesia, such as the united nations, the imf, the world bank, and international corporations. in the community formed by emha, both in the mocopat intercession, maiyah, banbang wetan, etc., the murshid intercession is not known, because what exists is the concept of a “love triangle”, namely love that is built up between god, the prophet muhammmad, and humans as his servants. in this formulation, if someone wants to be close to god, and have their prayers heard, then one must not forget to remember the name of the “lover” of god, namely muhammad, in every request and prayer. this idea is a formula that is often emphasized by emha. anyone who claims to be a muslim must know that muhammad was the last prophet who was blessed with a holy book directly from god through the mediation of the angel gabriel. even in one verse of the qur’an, sura al-ahzab 56 is said that: “verily, allah and his angels worship for the prophet. o you who believe, you pray for the prophet and say hello to him”6. the verse, according to emha, indicates that special muhammad’s position was before god, to the point that allah and his angels offered him blessings. the interpretation of the relationship between allah, the prophet muhammad and the human community is an example of emha’s unique creative understanding. this also illustrates a creativity in the manner of 6 prajñā vihāra establishing “intimate communication” with god. however, not everyone understands emha’s thoughts, as well as academics who are accustomed to thinking using mainstream views and logic, so it is not surprising that many intellectuals find it difficult to accept emha’s way of thinking. emha also uses dialogical methods, so that it differs from most religious lectures that are delivered by scholars or clerics, who are accustomed to a one-way delivery model. this allows for opportunities for confirmation, cross-checking, criticism and deeper explorations. unlike other study forums that only approach various issues only from the perspective of fiqh. from the various descriptions above, the recitation forum organized by emha implicitly reminds the writer of two elements of the golden age of islamic civilization, namely sufism (esotericism) and science. the sufism component emphasizes the importance of the dimension of depth or essence, in contrast to the islamic symbol movement which often undermines the spirit of islamic teachings aimed at bringing mercy to the universe. for example, invoking the name of allah almighty is often aimed at marginalizing others who have different beliefs and views. the science component, recognzises the absorbing by islam of many of the great ideas of world civilization, one of the most important is the greek mind through the translation of a number of important philosophical works of greek philosophers, such as plato, and aristotle. this led to the flowing of islamic science and philosophy through such figures as al-ghazali, suhrawardi, ibn-sina, ibn-arabi, as well as the philosophy of existence in mulla sadra that transcends the previous philosophical ideas of existence.7 in various emha learning together forums there is no strict plan concerning what philosophical material is discussed. as mentioned above the forums are conducted with openness and dialogical discussion. such discussion is related to life and the study of science, truth, and wisdom. in this point of view too often emha’s thinking is not easy to understand in academia, because knowledge is given priority over wisdom. why does the scholarly world sometimes have difficulty muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar 7 understanding emha’s thoughts? the academic world is the heir to the aristotelian thought and western logic. yet this emphasis on logic is also sometimes a weakness. as eric fromm writes: since aristotle, the western world has followed the principles of the logic of aristotelian philosophy. logic this is based on the law of identity which states that a is a, the law of contradiction (a is not non-a) and the law of no middle ground (= the excluded middle) (a cannot be both a and non-a nor a nor non-a.8 emha’s learning together forum also encourages those present to think about issues, not just to take them for granted. therefore, such study forums have the potential to produce people who not only value multicultural differences, but are also critical thinkers and live a reflective life. the various elements mentioned above are of course very much needed for a very diverse indonesian society, and to increase creativity, innovation, togetherness, vitality and optimism about the future. this is indicated by the statements of several informants who actively participated in the “sinau together” forum collected in a survey conducted by researchers. one study was conducted at the department of sociology-faculty of social and political sciences, gadjah mada university. here the researchers interviewed a number of informants, where the first informant, “aa” worked as a teacher at the vocational school (smk) who teaches arts performance. as a teacher, he always teaches in a way that is very accommodating to the opinions and imagination of students. he is also willing to provide free consultations about the problems faced by their students. he also felt that each child is unique, since to generalize would hamper the child’s character development. he also introduces and instills in students the values of life such as how to deal with parents who often quarrel, and overcoming family economic constraints that inevitably affect learning. mr. “aa” believes that he should always be able to benefit the 8 prajñā vihāra environment he occupies. another informant is mr. “amin”, his job is a pedicab driver. he strongly believes that what is sung will definitely be useful. pak amin is unique, because in delivering his pedicab service user to a destination, he never charges a rate for the services he has provided. the pedicab service user is given the freedom and flexibility to determine what he can afford. in addition, every friday he offers his service for free. the third informant, named “iz”, since joining the recitation of maiyah, he has increasingly established himself in his neighborhood. he was also moved to make recitations with a concept similar to maiyah. a second study, was conducted at the sociology-faculty of social and political sciences, ugm.9 in this study there were several informants who were interviewed in depth. one involved astutics. in such an approach, humans are animalized and animals are humanized. in addition, astutik is a figure for helping to take care of a patients in a hospital in solo who have no family relations. the next informant who interviewed was mrs. asia, who was a trader. she had been trading for decades. however, since she followed the mocopat syafaat, she began trading with the intention of serving, in a way beneficial to others. for her to trade is not merely to pursue maximum profit, but to establish brotherhood and promote charity. another informant named fauzi claimed that since attending the mocopat syafaat he was inspired by the idea that repaying the good deeds of others is good, but it is better to do good for its own sake. as a result, he became the distributor of mocopat syafaat merchandise. fauzi provides the needs of maiyah worshipers, such as emha’s books, special screen printing shirts, stickers, audio and video recordings, skullcaps and caps, calendars and so on. being a distributor means that he has the opportunity to serve the needs of the jamaah maiyah followers. another informant, totok, was one of the founders of the music group shalawat kyai kanjeng. for totok, the recitation of mocopat intercession at best provides awareness to the congregation. this inspired him to create the salam school (sanggar anak alam). he applies a muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar 9 curriculum based on nature to his students. at the school there is also a parent forum which is a medium of communication between students’ parents, facilitators and salam organizers. he also formed the salam community to promote the importance of basic education for positive change. this community facilitates children of the community around salam. it develop productive economic ventures, or helps build networks for the distribution of organic salam products, such as rice, breadfruit flour, sweet potato flour, soap, etc. from the various explanations and secondary data stated above, we can affirm that the mocopat syafaat forum, or learning together (sinau bareng) was able to encourage social cultural transformation at the individual level. this happened at the level of individual professional lives, whether pedicab drivers, teachers, or traders. they conduct their activities with the attitude of sacrifice, sincerity, and service to others. why can such transformation occur in the informants? because in the mocopat syafaat forum the informants recieve not only religious lectures, they get religious understanding in a deep and broad sense, which involves a combination of exoteric dimensions such as religious law, and the esoteric or inner dimension, the appreciation of values. this integration results in a more comprehensive religious understanding. in mocopat syafaat, as mentioned above, religion does not only mean fiqh or religious rules, but everything in life has a relationship with religion. in this mocopat syafaat forum people are also free to ask anything, ranging from everyday problems, politics, economics, culture, to philosophical issues, in short there is no limit on the themes of the conversation. in addition, this forum may be attended by anyone from any social, religious background. in addition, this mocopat syafaat recitation or forum is always held in an open place, such as a field or the like, because of the high number of participants. therefore, it can be concluded that the macapat syafaat forum initiated by emha ultimately has very basic differences when compared to the neo-sufism movement carried out by such figures as nurcholis madjid. in terms of the social basis, the nurchilis madjid neo-sufism movement 10 prajñā vihāra only targets the upper middle class, while mocopat intercession is mostly followed by the lower middle class. and its base is not just the world of the university, but the community as a whole. thus, the nurcholis madjid neo-sufism movement is arguably very elitist, while what emha is doing is more mass-oriented neo-sufi movement. on the other hand, despite these differences between the nurcholis madjid neo-sufism movement and the mocopat syafaat emha ainun najib, both try to cultivate self-autonomy, and emphasise that with this self-autonomy and authenticity, anyone can access god directly without having to go through the intermediaries of a murshid, as in the order of the tarekat. in addition, the mocopat syafaat movement has advantages not possessed in the nurcholis madjid neo-sufism community, namely its more egalitarian and mass dialogue, so this movement can play a role that can surpass cak nur’s neo-sufism. mocopat intercession can be seen as a new civilization movement reviving the character of islamic civilization that once triumphed in the golden age of islam. why can it be a civilization movement? this is because in mocopat syafaat involves a comprehensive dialogue which spans issues of politics, culture, religion in the strict sense, and the discourse of moral and scientific transformation in the broad sense. of course the contexts of the golden age of islam and the contexts of contemporary indonesian society has differences, but the dialogue between religious tradition and the acceleration of technological advances is also important to consider. endnotes 1. louay safi, ancangan metodologi alternatif (yogyakarta: tiara wacana, 2001). 2. julia d. howell, “introduction: sufism and neo-sufism in indonesia today,” accessed november 6, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/8805253/introduction_sufism_ and_neo-sufism_in_indonesia_today. 3. howell. 4. howell. muhamad supraja and nuruddin al-akbar 11 5. howell, “introduction.” 6. “tafsir surat al-ahzab, ayat 56,” accessed november 6, 2019, http://www. ibnukatsironline.com/2015/09/tafsir-surat-al-ahzab-ayat-56.html. 7. muthahari murtadha, pengantar pemikiran shadra, bandung: mizan, 2002 8. erich fromm, the art of loving, jakarta: sinar harapan, 1987 9. kaisar atmadja, “bagaimana pemaknaan shalawat pada kehidupan sehari-hari di pengajian mocopat syafaat, di desa kasihan bantul, yogyakarta, terhadap beberapa orang pengikutnya yang memiliki beragam profesi”, master thesis at sociology department, faculty of social and political science”, gadjah mada university, 2014 references fauzan saleh, teologi pembaruan : pergeseran wacana islam sunni di indonesia abad xx, jakarta: serambi ilmu semesta, 2004 julia d. howelll, “introduction: sufism and neo-sufism in indonesia today,” accessed november 6, 2019 luay safi, ancangan metodologi alternatif, yogyakarta: tiara wacana, 2001 “tafsir surat al-ahzab, ayat 56,” accessed november 6, 20019, http:// www.ibnukatsironline.com/2015/09/tafsir-surat-al-ahzab-ayat-56. html. muthahari murtadha, pengantar pemikiran shadra, bandung: mizan, 2002 emha ainun najib, allah tidak cerewet seperti kita, bandung: nourabooks, 2019 erich fromm, the art of loving, jakarta: sinar harapan, 1987 wahyu aji kusworo, “komunitas maiyah sebagai sebuah gerakan sosial baru menuju masyarakat multikultural”, thesis of under graduate student at sociology departmen, faculty of social and political science, gadjah mada university http://www.ibnukatsironline.com/2015/09/tafsir-surat-al-ahzab-ayat-56.html http://www.ibnukatsironline.com/2015/09/tafsir-surat-al-ahzab-ayat-56.html http://www.ibnukatsironline.com/2015/09/tafsir-surat-al-ahzab-ayat-56.html 12 prajñā vihāra kaisar atmadja, “bagaimana pemaknaan shalawat pada kehidupan sehari-hari di pengajian mocopat syafaat, di desa kasihan bantul, yogyakarta, terhadap beberapa orang pengikutnya yang memiliki beragam profesi”, master thesis at sociology department, faculty of social and political science”, gadjah mada university, 2014 justin lewis 53 ellul, bataille, zhuangzi & technological man justin lewis assumption university, thailand abstract the impact of modern technological society on the human spirit and on human values is undeniable. but the ability to philosophically engage with this impact and also to gain the means whereby we could evaluate it lucidly and soberly is a whole other matter. it is difficult for us today to find a place where we could stand outside the contemporary cultural matrix that has come to create our very selves, so as to identify and assess the aspects of our humanity that have always managed to outstrip the cultural conditioning and construction of our most basic senses of identity and self. this paper will take this as a central theme by briefly looking at three specific philosophers of culture and humanity, and will explore their insights on the concepts of technology, culture, utility, and efficiency. by extension, all the perspectives outlined here will also imply a philosophical portrayal of the condition of contemporary man therein. through examining some specific writings of jacques ellul, georges bataille and the chinese sage zhuangzi, as they bring to bear on these aforementioned concepts, it is my contention that we will be in a better position to assess the relationship between the human spirit, technology and society in general, as well as explore the ways in which prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 53-72 © 2000 by assumption university press 54 prajñā vihāra we can reclaim the inalienable and fundamental existential sovereignty of the human spirit in particular. jacques ellul, the technological society cultural philosopher and sociologist jacques ellul wrote in his 1964 work, the technological society, that one of the main principles upon which the trajectory of contemporary technological civilization rests is in the premise that any modern human undertaking can essentially be valued and assessed solely in terms of how efficiently it completes the task it was meant to do.1 what this emphasis on utility implies is that ours is a modern society which is primarily and fundamentally oriented toward developing a series of technological solutions for as many problematic aspects of contemporary society as possible, as we are always already socially and personally engaged in principles of technique; and ellul notes that this predominant emphasis on, “technique presents man with multiple problems.”2 for ellul, the concept of technique can be summarized as follows: “the term technique, as i use it, does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an end. in our technological society, technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity. its characteristics are new; the technique of the present has no common measure with that of the past.”3 the problems this presents are manifold. contemporary technological society presents itself today as a kind of cultural monolith in the sense that it demands from us a kind of totalized conformity to the need for all of our existential ends to be realized in the most efficient manner. it can be therefore characterized as a kind of “dictatorship of efficiency.” a primary part of its own efficiency lies in the fact that all other values are seen to be simply arbitrarily chosen personal values, and the supreme communal value, efficiency, then comes to subordinate justin lewis 55 these more personal values to it in a wider cultural sense. furthermore, technique serves to reinforce the instrumental thinking of contemporary human action, innovation, societal goals, and even our own basic desires, inasmuch as one must begin to think and act in a more mechanized and efficient way so as to appropriately and harmoniously function in a more mechanized humanly-altered environment. what is at stake here for ellul is our freedom as sovereign, creative and autonomous human beings. this is because the contemporary search for the absolute heights of efficiency, through the refined development of technique as both a means and as an end in itself, is not ultimately subordinate to any other facet of the human intellect, desire, morality, aesthetic, or passion. the sum of our contemporary culture is absolutely and in every phase geared toward the development and sustenance of technique, technology, and of their marriage to the modern economic system. as such, ellul states that technological progress “is no longer conditioned by anything other than its own calculus of efficiency.”4 as these contemporary forms slavishly follow their function aesthetically speaking, so too does human freedom and sovereignty become subordinate to the cultural necessity for the manifold advancement of techniques. michel foucault has elsewhere noted, that most of these contemporary techniques are largely situated in their application at the nexus between power and knowledge in modern society.5 for foucault, as well as for ellul, what this essentially means is that the contemporary emphasis on the value of technique, and the correlative cultural construction of technical efficiency as a preeminent value, are not only inculcated into modern humans as the most favored forms of thinking, but they also create a kind of human being that favors these forms of thinking above all else. that is to say, the power and primacy of technically oriented and overtly mechanized thought processes also become a primary mechanism of power’s transmission throughout society and human bodies at the same time. 56 prajñā vihāra “we need to see how these mechanisms of power, at a given moment, in a precise conjuncture and by means of a certain number of transformations, have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful...it is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole.”6 for ellul, technique, technology and efficiency are not all the same things, but yet are all similarly intertwined within an overarching and modern cultural value system. and, as this value system of contemporary emphasis on technique becomes more and more autonomous, and also more pervasive, human beings begin to lose their individual power to control it; and they therefore inevitably end up being controlled by it. this is precisely the point where elementary and fundamental human freedom and sovereignty become fully compromised. jacques ellul is clear that basic human existential freedom of choice and action runs counter to the mindset of contemporary technically oriented values. “no technique is possible when men are free. when technique enters into the realm of social life, it collides ceaselessly with the human being to the degree that the combination of man and technique is unavoidable, and that technical action necessarily results in a determined result. technique requires predictability and, no less, exactness of prediction. it is necessary, then, that technique prevail over the human being. for technique, this is a matter of life or death. technique must reduce man to a technical animal, the king of the slaves of technique. human caprice crumbles before this necessity; there can be no human autonomy in the face of technical autonomy.”7 justin lewis 57 so, for ellul, just as for foucault, to recapture our originary human autonomy means to firmly face the fact that individual human beings are for the most part socially constructed entities and primarily directed toward the goal of the perfection of the technological edifice that qualifies our modern society. that is to say, we now need to understand the true fundamental nature of contemporary culture and its relationship to individual freedom and sovereignty, so as to more fully understand our place in it, and thus perhaps where our existential freedom may lie on its furthest shore. “the enormous effort required to put this technical civilization into motion supposes that all individual effort is directed toward this goal alone and that all social forces are mobilized to attain the mathematically perfect structure of the edifice. (“mathematically” does not mean “rigidly.” the perfect technique is the most adaptable and, consequently, the most plastic one. true technique will know how to maintain the illusion of liberty, choice, and individuality; but these will have been carefully calculated so that they will be integrated into the mathematical reality merely as appearances!) henceforth it will be wrong for a man to escape this universal effort. it will be inadmissible for any part of the individual not to be integrated in the drive toward technicization; it will be inadmissible that any man even aspire to escape this necessity of the whole society. the individual will no longer be able, materially or spiritually, to disengage himself from society.”8 as mentioned before, what is at stake here is our human existential freedom and sovereignty and as such, disengage we must; if we are to realize and maintain our fullest physical, intellectual and spiritual capacities as human beings. this presupposes that we can be something more as human beings; more than simply becoming just another social production. it also presupposes that we have more to our fundamental natures than what we have been culturally predisposed to develop. the loss of the full 58 prajñā vihāra range of our existential liberty is therefore the crux of the issue. there is an excess of humanity available to us that lies outside and beyond our civilization. and furthermore, “we see in this loss of liberty the downward path into which technique is leading us.”9 the fundamental forms of conflict for ellul lie somewhere in between the spiritual and the material realms of human being. there seems always to be an excess of human spirit that lies beyond the cultural manipulation of the material basis of life itself. this is the reason why fundamental values and ways of thinking are so important in relation to human sovereignty and existential freedom. this is because, “the very assimilation of ideas into the technical framework which renders them materially effective makes them spiritually worthless.”10 what he means by this is that by placing a primacy on technique and efficiency, contemporary society has come to neglect our most basic and fundamental human impulses. these impulses do come to the fore and are at times given shape and form in the developments of various artistic and literary movements, but this too has already been anticipated and integrated into the overarching thrust of modernity it seems. “the basic human impulses are unpredictable in their complex social consequences. but thanks to “movements” which integrate and control them, they are powerless to harm the technical society, of which henceforth they form an integral part.”11 so, it seems that even the harnessing of this existential spiritual excess whether through the forms of artistic or social revolution, has already managed to become little more than just another commodity in the end, and simply just another pre-calculated strategy of commodification and population appeasement which further strengthens the efficiency and the ubiquitousness of technological society. ellul concludes, “with the final integration of the instinctive and the spiritual by means of these human techniques, the edifice of the technical society will be completed. it will not be a universal concentration camp, for it will be guilty of no atrocity. it will not seem insane, for everything will be ordered, and the stains of human passion will be lost amid the chromium gleam. we shall have nothing more to lose, and nothing to justin lewis 59 win. our deepest instincts and our most secret passions will be analyzed, published, and exploited. we shall be rewarded with everything our hearts ever desired. and the supreme luxury of the society of technical necessity will be to grant the bonus of useless revolt and of an acquiescent smile.”12 georges bataille, the accursed share, vol. 1 at first glance, georges bataille’s work doesn’t seem to be as direct nor as incisive as ellul’s the technological society. however, this impression is a deceptive one. bataille’s volume may be a self-professed treatise on political economy, but for all that, it is a philosophical work that also essentially describes in detail the manner in which the fundamental nuances of the human spirit not only manage to outstrip the basic cultural economy of regionalized technical efficiency, but also manage to escape ellul’s pessimism by advancing a more holistic perspective on humanity’s modern emphasis on technique as forms of intellectual and social value. it also introduces a more metaphysical and biological perspective on human culture and individual sovereignty that serves to broaden our awareness of both our individual possibilities, as well as the inherent parameters of our contemporary existential paradigm. bataille begins his work by distinguishing between the restricted economy, the general societal economic perspective of most contemporary economic theory, and the general economy, which is the fundamental flow and movement of the sum total of available solar energy and its effects on the terrestrial globe. in this sense then, the general economy is nothing more than a complete “circuit of cosmic energy,” and as such, it realizes its nature as a naturally excessive and non-recuperable part of the economy. as a basic surplus or excess of cosmically conditioned life-energy, bataille argues that this primary aspect of the general economy must in fact be uselessly squandered, by metaphysical necessity.13 what this means is, that a naturally occurring surplus of cosmic energy (or wealth), must be diligently spent without regard to consequent material gain or profit on various “luxurious” cultural episodes such as art, eroticism, 60 prajñā vihāra fashion, spectacles, or sumptuous monuments; or else, this same energy is destined to be spent or released in any case, now as a forced catastrophic outpouring, in a manner that threatens the prevailing system in particular, and humanity in general. bataille’s emphasis is on the excess of energy, in sum total on the earth, which begins with the unrestricted outpouring of solar energy over the terrestrial sphere, and then with the existential surpluses produced by life’s basic chemical reactions; and also the excessive pressures which are regularly put on the earth’s various ecosystems by the life-processes of organisms themselves, in like manner.14 in terms of a more restricted economy, and of classical economic theory, organisms are motivated by scarcity and necessity, but when viewed from the perspective of the more general economy of the entire terrestrial plane of existence, organisms are rather burdened with the dispensing of an overall surplus. as bataille puts it, burdened with le part maudite, or the accursed share. any growth or expansion of life always eventually runs up against its natural limits, either in space, or through time; and it is there, at this point, that the focus of life turns toward the useless squandering and dissipation of energy. so, for bataille, this expenditure of energy, which serves to form the complete and total movement of energy on the earth, is the most important focus of his work. his concern is, “that of excess energy translated into the effervescence of life.”15 this is a focus on a point in life where energy meets its natural limit, where the “subject is at its boiling point,” and it is this which in fact animates the entire globe.16 one primary consequence of this particular perspective advanced by bataille is the shortsightedness and narrow mentality of the common utilitarian and calculative perspectives towards efficiency in economy and life. this is the domain of the restricted economy where humans manipulate energy for immediate and localized gains as well as immediate technological developments for immediate ends. the more general economic perspective shows however, that accumulation and profit reach their natural limitations organically which in turn, necessitate an adjustment toward extravagant energy expenditure, a natural overflow and justin lewis 61 profit-less dissipation of energy (or accumulated wealth) which cannot be used for a system’s growth (as it has reached its natural limitations), or, as bataille puts it, “the sexual act is in time what the tiger is in space.”17 both examples stand at the apex of energy confluence and dissipation. this reality “…requires thinking on a level with a play of forces that runs counter to ordinary calculations, a play of forces based on the laws that govern us…it is not necessity but its contrary “luxury” that presents living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems.”18 so then, is technique, and efficiency as an ultimate value, and modern technology as a cultural reflection of these values, simply a natural predicated consequence of human luxury, or more succinctly, are these realities just needless and worthless luxuries themselves? luxuries which lead us to disregard our true material basis in favor of illusionary ideological, or fantastic culturally constructed hyper-realities? according to bataille, all terrestrial economic activity acts as a part of the cosmic movement of energy as gained from solar radiation as its source. it is the resultant movement that is produced on the surface of the globe by cosmic forces that come to be from the free circulation and flow of energy at this particular point in the universe. as he says, “beyond our immediate ends, man’s activity in fact pursues the useless and infinite fulfillment of the universe.”19 in this sense then, the sum total of man’s general economic activity naturally resists any specific form of cultural appropriation. one’s particular cultural matrix can define one’s particular mode of economic expression within a particular and limited regional system only. and nothing more. bataille’s main line of reasoning in its most fundamental aspects, mirrors the developmental life-cycle of organisms and organic populations, and can be summarized in the following way: the living organism receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life, the excess energy (or wealth) can at first be used for the growth of a system or organism, if the excess cannot be absorbed in its natural growth, then it necessarily must be lost without profit; in the end, this excess must be spent, “willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.”20 this wanton destruction or lavish 62 prajñā vihāra expenditure of excess unneeded energy is seen by bataille to be the inevitable naturalistic solution to the problem of the accumulation of excess energy or wealth on the planet. the reality of this proposed theoretical architecture is perhaps best shown in the cultural complex of the “potlatch” among the indigenous peoples of vancouver island in canada. here, we can see their culturally circumscribed and ritualized acts of sumptuous gift-giving on a large scale, and also the destruction of huge amounts of property and excess wealth (or cosmic energy) in exchange for non-materialistic cultural prestige and status. anthropologist marcel mauss notes, “we are here confronted with total prestation in the sense that the whole clan, through the intermediacy of its chiefs, makes contracts involving all its members and everything it possesses. but the agonistic character of the prestation is pronounced. essentially usurious and extravagant, it is above all a struggle among nobles to determine their position in the hierarchy to the ultimate benefit, if they are successful, of their own clans.”21 this cultural event of extravagant and conspicuous energy dissipation is by no means restricted to a single iconoclastic population historically situated on vancouver island, but rather it is also a salient characteristic of many human populations both ancient and modern, though it exists in varying forms and degrees worldwide. reasons of brevity and space here prevent me from exploring some other culturally constructed examples of certain cultural forms of energy dissipation further however (such as human sacrifices among the aztec and maya for example). the main point to be made at this juncture is that, “a surplus must be dissipated through deficit operations: the final dissipation cannot fail to carry out the movement that animates terrestrial energy.”22 this is because bataille’s conception of the general economy cannot be conceived of simply in terms of particular regional operations with limited ends as simply dictated by economic necessity or cultural prestige. justin lewis 63 through this then, we can come to understand with bataille that both necessity and sovereignty must meet to compel the human being, in his position on the earth, towards the directive of useless consumption. our own limited consciousness of restricted economic necessity amounts to nothing more than a denial of the sovereign naturalistic movements of the universe and of man’s proper place within it. we can see that although individuals or local population systems may be driven by necessity to seek resource accumulation, the global movement of energy, as a whole, seeks nothing more than its own death and renewal, useless consumption, and the squandering of excess energy reserves. it is our basic existential ignorance then that, “causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way.”23 this ignorance deprives us of a most suitable dispersion of energy or wealth, which like the “potlatch” for the native peoples of vancouver island, is the most suitable one for a given particular cultural and ecological niche. instead, by focusing only on the particular necessities of resource accumulation as dictated to us by the nature of the perspective of the restricted economy, we allow and even encourage a dangerous buildup of excess energy (or wealth) to occur where it will in turn, inevitably come to destroy the prevailing system of its own volition. what this means is simply that if we don’t consciously excrete or squander the excess energy that we have managed to accumulate, then it in turn will come to destroy us. bataille notes that all societies somehow manage to accommodate and dissipate the excesses of life force which, “locally block the poorest economies [and] are in fact the most dangerous factors of ruination. hence relieving the blockage was always, if only in the darkest region of consciousness, the object of a feverish pursuit. ancient societies found relief in festivals. some erected admirable monuments that had no useful purpose, we use the excess to multiply “services” that make life smoother and we are led to reabsorb part of it by increasing leisure time.”24 64 prajñā vihāra without developing a proper amount and intensity of these culturally sanctioned “release valves,” or likewise, with our unchecked and insatiable appetite for resource accumulation, the persistence and unthinking pursuit of accumulated excess dooms populations to war and destruction as organic forms of energy release. soaring industrialized techniques and activities lead to the presence of ever more destructive forces. so, to avoid new and globalized forms of warfare we must divert our surplus production, “either into the rational extension of a difficult industrial growth, or into unproductive works that will dissipate an energy that cannot be accumulated in any case.”25 the necessary movement from the perspective of the restricted economy toward the general economy of the whole terrestrial sphere amounts to a “copernican revolution” in economics, as well as in human values. here, basic self-interested calculative thinking, economics of accumulation, and emphasis on technique and efficiency run up against their natural limitations, and we face the stark realization that our precious commodities and wealth must simply be surrendered without return. a “margin of profitless operations” must come to be established in the exact same manner that “solar radiation results in a superabundance of energy on the surface of the globe.”26 the concept of self-interested calculative thought, and of pure resource extraction as a means to dominate the globe with an eye to profit margins, is at fundamental odds with the primary desire of life itself to organically exceed the natural given limits of growth and then again, to dissipate this excess. it occurs in any case. for us this becomes a matter of securing the acceptable losses over being forcibly subjected to catastrophic and unacceptable losses. unlike jacques ellul, bataille does not assess our technological society in terms of its own internal and historical cultural morality and inherited values. rather, he rejects the modern hyper-rationalized emphasis on technique, and the overvalued extension of technical praxis in our society which is unthinkingly employed in the name of a wanton accumulation of efficient techniques (a supreme value and highly desirable end in their own right), in the name of a naturalistic materialism justin lewis 65 which, he says, is fundamentally opposed to our current contemporary mindset and value system. ellul points to the fact that our technological society compromises our fundamental human sovereignty and freedom to self-determination. bataille emphasizes the fact that the nature of our current contemporary political economy is limited and ignorant and it runs counter to the naturalistic flow of the universe, with inevitable disastrous consequences for us. zhuangzi and wu-wei zhuangzi also has written critiques of placing primacy on the mentality of calculation, efficiency and technique as fundamental forms of human value. this is slightly paradoxical in that over and above being books of philosophy, the zhuangzi and lao tzu’s tao te ching are both books about technique themselves. the life techniques they espouse are existential for the most part and therefore are excellently situated to conclude this essay which has largely concerned itself with the existential implications of technical and economic thinking and of contemporary technological society in general. zhuangzi’s doctrine of wu-wei (無為) refers equally to his notions of non-action, to effortless action, or more appropriately, to action-less action. despite its paradoxical and multi-faceted nature, it is first and foremost a refined technique of action and a precise manner of engagement with the world. it is also quite difficult to simply describe although it has played a central role as a concept in the chinese classical period of philosophy. “...although the term wu-wei itself does not come into widespread use until relatively late in the warring states period, the ideal that it describes – acting effortlessly and spontaneously in harmony with a normative standard and thereby acquiring an almost magical efficaciousness in moving through the world and attracting people to oneself can be identified as a central theme in chinese religious thought in texts as early as the book of odes and the book of history, and later chinese commentators adopted wuwei as a term to describe this ideal.”27 66 prajñā vihāra ellul highlights contemporary human activity as placing primacy on instrumental values and techniques of efficiency. bataille sees human activity as being wrongly centered on restricted and limited interests for limited ends, and of contemporary man as being dangerously ignorant of our proper place in the universe. by contrast, zhuangzi advocates wu-wei, “a technique of action without artifice…a type of action that does not impose artificial constraints, but that senses and follows things, events, and processes.”28 this is advocated as a fundamental means for humanity to move through the world in a spirit of harmony with the natural flows of nature itself. as a kind of general economy of action. whereas, ellul and bataille both offer carefully constructed critiques of modern technological society and economy, zhuangzi simply offers us a way forward. this attitude of engagement with the world naturally follows from the establishment of a place without boundaries as providing the basis for one’s actions and thinking. so it is that, wu-suo (無所) or literally “no-place,” is precisely the right place from which one can become familiar with wu-wei (無為). what i take this to mean is that the dissolution of both rationalistic and culturally constructed boundaries is the beginning point of elevating non-calculative, and non-technical thinking to a position of primary existential value. wu-suo is therefore the necessary starting point for “proper” human thinking, proper here simply meaning a form of being which is fundamentally harmonious with our place in the natural fabric; and therefore it provides an equally fundamental basis for the justification of transcending basic self-interested interpretations of reality. it allows us an existential space from which to assess our true human natures, and also to evaluate the most harmonious way to proceed in meeting our respective futures. “if people were to sleep in a marsh, they would develop a deathly lumbago – but is this so of a fish? if they were to set up a home in a tree, they would shudder with anxiety, fear and dread – but is this so of apes and monkeys? of the three, which knows the right place to live? people eat livestock; deer eat grass. centipedes relish juicy maggots; justin lewis 67 while owls and crows delight in rat flesh. of these four, which knows the right taste? apes take apes for their mates; deer mix with deer; fish prefer the company of fish…of which knows the world’s true beauty?”29 this is less an argument for some sort of cultural relativism than it is an acknowledgement that each kind of organism has its own boundaries and limitations which circumscribe their existential “appropriateness,” and senses of harmony, taste, and beauty in terms of their particular natures. in short, each organism has a place. but does each organism possess the capacity to evaluate that place? wu-suo is precisely no-place. and it is this “no-place” which can serve to ground our evaluations of the qualities of our own particular place and time, and give us new meanings to the way in which we choose to engage the world. simply engaging in self-interested pursuits of wealth accumulation and elevating techniques of efficiency above all else does not acknowledge that there is a place where we can stand outside of this rubric (wu-suo) and from which to assess the existential value of these same pursuits. it does not acknowledge the excess of energy (bataille) and the qualities of authentic human being (ellul) that exist beyond and outside the boundaries of our technological society and its particular restricted economic pursuits; and which serves to provide us a place from which to judge its worth to both ourselves and to the world. and it is a most fundamental existential simplicity of life which allows us to engage the world from the perspective of wu-suo. following from ellul’s critique, it becomes clear to us that it is a manner of being that clings to simplicity as a first principle, and as a means of retaining one’s freedom and sovereignty not by subordinating one’s self to techniques of efficient activity. simplicity as a first principle of wu-wei emphasizes the restriction of one’s activities and desires “to what is necessary and what is natural.”30 as simplicity dethrones efficiency of technique and self-interested calculations as a primary guiding principle of life, we can see that this becomes a matter of forgetting one’s 68 prajñā vihāra culturally constructed desires and knowledge, of foregoing a reliance upon calculation, and also of relinquishing a slavish adherence to technical efficiency in favor of achieving the desired result of realizing what is natural in oneself in relation to the world. this is also the domain of ellul’s freedom, sovereignty, and self-determination. there is a story in the writings of zhuangzi of a particular country farmer who is irrigating his vegetable garden by carrying jars of water from a well, working very hard, and yet getting very little material results. a disciple of confucius one day remarks to the farmer that there exists a machine that can make this work of watering the garden go much faster with little or no extra effort on his part. the gardener seems at first to be quite curious about the device, but after hearing of its design, he complains that such a machine would give him too many “machine worries” and “machine thoughts.” presumably, machine thought is instrumental thinking about means and ends in life, and machine worry is the natural concern for mechanical problems arising out of an increasing dependency upon technology to resolve basic life processes. even though the machine would ultimately save him a large amount of time and effort, and get more work accomplished in the end, the gardener ultimately claims that simplicity would be ruined and his mind would become too unsettled. the gardener finally judges that there would be more lost than gained in using the machine.31 to achieve this kind of determination of the value of technology, technique and efficiency, as well as the value of unthinking wealth accumulation, one has to be able to achieve a manner of existing in a place outside of these undertakings. this requires that one be fully engaged with the world in general, as bataille emphasized, not merely within the restricted, limited and narrow precepts of one’s technological society. zhuangzi’s disregard for the particular ebb and flow of the political life of his time stems from “his conviction that the best government is no government.”32 similarly, bataille sees the need for wealthy governments to bend their own restricted economic policies to the flow of the universe rather than to their own limited desires. “the industrial development justin lewis 69 of the entire world demands of americans that they lucidly grasp the necessity, for an economy, of having a margin of profitless operations.”33 and the bending of one’s reality to the flow of the universal will, rather than imposing one’s self-interested desires upon it, is precisely the heart of wu-wei as a technique of action. zhuangzi also highlights the utility of uselessness as a way to understand how humans should engage in the world in accordance with nature rather than self-interest. like bataille who emphasized the value of the “useless” squandering of wealth and resources so as to fulfill a higher function of conformity to the universal order, so too does zhuangzi emphasize the value of the manifestly useless as an integral aspect of harmony with nature. and yet, there is the mistaken contemporary perception of uselessness that is proven to be restricted and limited when seen from a more general perspective, as bataille would also argue. there is a story of a man who has been given some enormous gourds, but he complains to zhuangzi that he could not use them for containers because they were just too heavy to carry. he said that they were likewise useless as dippers because there was nothing large enough to dip them into. he decided that they were of no use at all and he simply destroyed them. zhuangzi asked why he did not think of using them as boats to float around on the rivers and lakes, and he tells a story about a medicinal salve that allowed a poor family to make a small living bleaching silk. the same salve was bought later by an entrepreneur who made a fortune selling it to a king, who, in turn, used it to win a significant naval battle. so then, what produced a meager living in one case, made a fortune and saved a kingdom in another case. the first kind of instrumental thinking was limited to one form of usefulness whereas the other kind of instrumental thinking was open to redefining what was useful and seeing a new wider form of usefulness in what otherwise would be regarded as useless.34 this story highlights that utility and usefulness depend far more on creativity and freedom of thought than on conformity to the contemporary values of technological society, its calculative thinking, and on its valuation of the efficiency of technique. in fact, all of these 70 prajñā vihāra latter existential realities actually serve to stultify and suppress the kind of creativity which is necessary for its fulfillment; which is precisely both ellul and zhuangzi’s point. furthermore, misidentifying what is actually most existentially useful for us can have disastrous consequences for us as bataille has argued. zhuangzi goes on elsewhere to tell the story of a tree: “it is so large that ten thousand chariots might be sheltered under it and its shade would cover them all. a master carpenter walks by without stopping, remarking that the tree is quite useless as it has too many small, twisted, crooked branches: “this, indeed is a tree good for nothing, and it is thus that it has attained to such a size.” later that night the tree speaks to the master carpenter in a dream: “suppose that i had possessed useful properties – should i have become of the great size that i am…all men know the advantage of being useful but no one knows the advantage of being useless.”35 this perspective also reinforces bataille’s arguments with respect to the profitless and useless expenditure of energy as actually having a supreme existential value that goes beyond the narrow and restricted conceptions of utility and efficiency. and it is this question of existential value that also throws into question the intellectual and ethical foundations our own contemporary technological society, and our modern emphasis on the restricted economy and self-interested economic gain. zhuangzi’s wu-wei can be seen as a kind of existential corrective to the problems raised here by ellul and bataille. this is primarily because, “it involves acting without desire, where desire is understood as the force that causes people and things to behave unnaturally. the natural is seen as being complementary to the tao, while the unnatural is contradictory to it. thus, wu-wei can be defined as: taking no action, loving tra quility, engaging in no activity and having no desires— all of which lead to natural transformation, correctness, prosperity and simplicity.”36 justin lewis 71 this is not to say that ellul and bataille, (who in particular, had much to say on the topic of desire) would precisely agree with zhuangzi on this matter, and perhaps they emphatically wouldn’t in the end, but in effect, i am arguing that this is a most reasonable extension of their views, existentially speaking. zhuangzi essentially places primacy on man’s harmony with nature over the culturally constructed and rationalistic, self-interested engagement with the world that contemporary mankind is engaged in through his technologically oriented society and restricted economic concerns. this is the way to realize the full nature of human being in the world. the tao simply has no fixed boundaries and just is; nothing that can be defined as being this or that thing absolutely and those who choose to follow the tao cannot be said to have, or even not have, a fixed “this or that” quality.37 just as all qualities are fluid and in motion, so too is the doctrine of wu-wei a fundamental process of naturalistic engagement with the world, and at the same time, a most fluid means of overcoming its more dictatorial aspects as they relate to the over-valuation of technique, efficiency as an end in its own right, and the restricted economy in contemporary life. endnotes 1 ellul, j. the technological society. new york: vintage. 1964. 2 ibid. p.xxxii. 3 ibid. p.xxv. 4 ibid. p. 74. 5 foucault, m. power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings. 1972-1977. ed. by c. gordon. new york: pantheon books. 1980. 6 ibid. p.101. 7 ellul, j. the technological society. new york: vintage. 1964. p.138. 8 ibid. p.139. 9 ibid. p.218. 10 ibid. p.425. 11 ibid. p.426. 12 ibid. p.426-427. 72 prajñā vihāra 13 bataille, g. the accursed share, vol. i. new york: zone books. 1993 14 ibid. 15 ibid. p.10. 16 ibid. 17 ibid. p.12 18 ibid. 19 ibid. p.21 20 ibid. 21 mauss, m. the gift: forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies. trans. by ian gunnison. new york: norton & company. 1967. p.4-5. 22 bataille, g. the accursed share, vol. i. new york: zone books. 1993. p.22. 23 ibid. p.23. 24 ibid. p.24. 25 ibid. p.25. 26 ibid. p.29. 27 slingerland, edward. “effortless action: the chinese spiritual ideal of wu-wei.” journal of the american academy of religion. june 2000, vol. 68 (2), pp. 293-328. p.296. 28 coutinho, s. zhuangzi and early chinese philosophy. hampshire: ashgate. 2005. p.33. 29 ibid. p.63. 30 fung, yu-lan. a short history of chinese philosophy. (ed. by derk boddee). new york: macmillan. 1966. p.101. 31 chuang tzu. the complete works of chuang tzu. burton watson (trans.). new york: columbia university press. 1968. p.134. 32 höchsmann, h. on chuang tzu. wadsworth: belmont. 2003. p.64. 33 bataille, g. the accursed share, vol. i. new york: zone books. 1993. p.25-26. 34 chuang tzu. the complete works of chuang tzu. burton watson (trans.). new york: columbia university press. 1968. 35 höchsmann, h. on chuang tzu. wadsworth: belmont. 2003. p.65-66 36 liu xiaogan, “wuwei (non-action): from laozi to huainanzi,” taoist resources 3.1 (1991), 41-56. p. 43. 37 chuang tzu. the complete works of chuang tzu. burton watson (trans.). new york: columbia university press. 1968 giuseppe mario saccone 69 christian ethico-political philosophy and the roots of liberalism giuseppe mario saccone asian university, thailand love your enemies, do good to those who hate you st. luke, 6:27 abstract this paper examines how the ancient greek and hellenistic notions of political ethics were incorporated within an evolving christian thought which emphasized the importance of agape within a universalist perspective. this evolution can be most clearly seen through the works of st paul, augustine and aquinas who elaborated a doctrine involving the universality of jesus’s message but with adaptation and evolution according to the historical circumstances. this process has deep contemporary resonances not only theologically but also in terms of social and political philosophy. i will argue that pauline cosmopolitanism ends up setting legitimacy as the main criterion by which to assess governance and offer allegiance. the ethical demands of christianity are very stringent. accordingly, it would appear that, in order to fulfil those demands, whenever possible, christians should seek the right sort of social and political context. this context was to be developed by st. augustine prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 69-90 © 2000 by assumption university press 70 prajñā vihāra and st. thomas aquinas. augustine held that the most one can reasonably expect from a political structure is that it should promote peace. and he viewed this central political task negatively – as the suppression of anarchy and of those forms of evils that most disturb civil tranquility. for aquinas, on the other hand, political organization, chiefly through the instrumentality of human law, has the capacity of furthering, in a positive way, the natural aspects of the human function. introduction christian ethics stems from the teachings and the example offered by the life of jesus combined with judaic monotheism, roman stoicism and greek philosophy. by creatively developing both a practical and an intellectual synthesis of these beliefs, christian thought claimed to embody at first a critique and then increasingly the truest and most complete expression of their cultural legacy. while making these claims, christianity advanced three basic principles concerning the conduct of human life: the first is that we are supposed to strive for spiritual salvation, in fellowship with the saved; the second is that we cannot achieve this salvation solely by our own individual or social efforts, but we also require the grace of god operating mainly by the guidance of the church; the third is that in order to love god, you have to love your fellow human beings, and you have to love and care for the rest of creation. in the following sections, i will also point out how, in turn, these ethical and religious principles gave rise to a corresponding political philosophy, which over the millennia acquired an almost universal influence and relevance. my thesis is that the universality of this message lies in the fact that it does not embody a static doctrine but principles that are amenable to be adopted, adapted and progressively developed and actualized according to changing historical circumstances. st. paul, augustine and aquinas, more than others, were instrumental in mediating between christian core beliefs and the greek and hellenistic cultural legacy. giuseppe mario saccone 71 legitimacy and political universalism the ethical precepts of st. paul, like the ones of hellenistic stoicism, have a markedly universal range, and were instrumental in how the new christians understood political legitimacy. aristotle inherited from protagoras the idea that nomos, or what is customary, conventional and cultural in society, can aid in the pursuit of eudaimonia, or individual flourishing. according to aristotle, morality and politics to fully play their role in the construction of the virtuous citizen require a greek identity, therefore becoming matters of local rather than universal concern and fruition. there are no criteria of government legitimacy behind its capacity to ensure effective and fair rule. in contrast to this, st. paul and the stoics were arguing for more universal concerns. the early christian believed that fulfilling the human function is a matter of obtaining the right understanding about the universe, or creator and creation. cosmopolitanism is thus connected with the establishment of some general, although as yet not very specific criteria for government legitimacy. for christians, gaining the right insight about the world required correctly grasping and following the doctrines taught by the church. everything hanged on coming to understand, receive, willfully accept and implement the grace of god through the ecclesiastical administrations of the sacraments. this implied getting at least some rational grasp of the role of the divine providence in achieving the proper human good and flourishing. but achieving such a rational insight about god’s creation also required understanding the functions that god attributed to legitimate rulers and governance. for this to happen, then all disorderly passions should be subjected to the control of a substantive notion of (practical) reason. the volitional faculty will thus became strong and make the faithful act only according to his/her new insight and correct belief in a process that has some resemblance to the stoic concept of homologia. achieving spiritual regeneration depends upon the personal efforts of the believer, rather than their enculturation. in other words, some form of secular polity is required for humans to achieve salvation. 72 prajñā vihāra christian cosmopolitanism and universalism was concerned with defining the nature and boundaries of legitimate political rule and of the allegiance required by believers to the secular authority, and raised very profound questions about the proper role that secular political institutions have in promoting the christian message and the purpose of human life. thus, the new way of looking at things according to pauline cosmopolitanism also saw legitimacy as the main criterion by which to assess governance and offer allegiance. consequently, there were universal or cosmopolitan political suggestions in christian doctrine which became criteria for legitimate endorsement or allegiance by the faithful. the fundamental christian moral imperative to love one’s neighbour clearly has social and political implications. in regard to this, the ethical demands of christianity are very stringent. hearts must be changed in order to fulfil the church’s mission in solidarity with the poor and for achieving the necessary structural changes in society which would give voice to the voiceless, as required by christian agape.1 accordingly, it would appear that, in order to fulfil those stringent demands, whenever possible, christians should seek the right sort of social and political context. the desire to create a political context where demands for justice are made possible can thus become the criterion to assess the legitimacy of political institutions. although, unfortunately, these demands have largely remained unfulfilled, and their effective political implementation has been mostly discouraged by the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. nevertheless, it is important to point out that, because of christ’s and st paul’s teachings, at least in principle, a criterion of legitimacy based on the delivery of justice to the needy has always been formally maintained. this has inspired countless examples of dedication to the cause of the poor epitomized by figures such as st francis of assisi, more recently mother teresa of calcutta, and many of their less famous followers. however, these noble endeavours have mostly (but not always exclusively) concerned the all important practical ethical activity on behalf of the needy in the social sphere, but without directly calling to giuseppe mario saccone 73 task the powers that be by questioning their legitimacy to rule for their lack of support for the poor. reversing this almost apolitical trend, liberation theology, by reinterpreting early pauline thought, may have significantly contributed to a renewed sensitivity to the idea of distributive justice as a measure to evaluate the legitimacy of existing political institutions. moreover, these demands for social justice, now, both within and without liberation theology, are no longer confined merely to the economic sphere. indeed, these pressing demands are becoming increasingly wedded to a quest for democratic rule by governments chosen by free and fair elections and to a quest for a broader respect of human rights within liberal constitutional frameworks. so liberation theology saw salvation as something achieved not only through faith, but through concrete action against poverty, injustice and other human rights abuses. interestingly, new readings of st paul were made not only by progressive or leftist christian believers and theologians such as gustavo gutierrez, leonardo boff, giovanni franzoni, hans küng, and john milbank, but also by so called secular non-believers of marxist orientation such as alain badiou, and slavoj zizek. according to badiou, st paul combines truth and subjectivity in a way that continues to be relevant for us living in the 21st century; allegedly, he does so by simultaneously overcoming both the ritual strictures of judaic law and the formal rational conventions of the greek logos. in other words, st paul plants a revolutionary seed by making the subject of the conversion to christianity undertake a radical and dramatic change that leads them to reject the order of the world as it is, with its present injustices, and strive for a new world dominated by christian agape.2 in other words, all traditional interpretations of st paul are turned upside down, and the existing power structures of society are deprived of any moral legitimacy, and their subjects, following their inner transformation as believers in christ, are mandated to create a new social and political order.3 74 prajñā vihāra moreover, according to this ‘subversive’ interpretation of early pauline thought, the fundamental principles of aristotelian ethics and politics were completely rejected or reinterpreted, by the early christian base communities. in particular, aristotle’s application of his very notion of phronesis had to be changed, if conversion to the new faith was to be meaningful. for aristotle, the apogee of practical reason, when applied to the art of governance, was supposed to be the understanding of how to avoid situations of radical crisis in order to preserve stable constitutional systems. but, according to liberation theology, as leonardo boff points out, christian agape mandates a totally different attitude from the classical aristotelian one. following from the conversion, and spiritual rebirth in christ, prudence is now supposed to become the understanding of situations of radical crisis, and thus to indicate a new search for wisdom and insight, which does not avoid, but shares in the pain of the victims.4 this implies a total transformation and a sort of rebirth, in that the believer in christ must actively seek situations of crisis to immerse herself in. it also means being in solidarity with the poor. this is of course a very radical and revolutionary message, which implies a rejection of the political status quo in so far as there is oppression, poverty, exploitation and injustice in society. it follows that political legitimacy would be conditional on the powers-that-be showing effective action against all injustices. in other words, according to this politically radical interpretation, the christian agape advocated by st paul mandates a ‘preferential option for the poor’, with all its ethico-political implications, also as far as political legitimacy is concerned.5 badiou’s thesis, and indeed some tenets of radical versions of liberation theology remain highly controversial (in particular, their tight ideological wedding with marxism, and association with messianic political millenarianism), but there is no doubt that the problem of how to create a social and political context conducive to the exercise of the christian theological virtues necessary for salvation (faith, hope and love), was high on the agenda also of the more traditional interpretations of pauline thought. giuseppe mario saccone 75 indeed, specific concerns about how to develop a social context conducive to the fulfilment of the stringent ethical demand to love one’s neighbour sets what were to become the two most historically influential answers to the questions about the role of the political structures for the life of christians. these answers were developed by st. augustine and st. thomas aquinas. most starkly put, augustine held that the most one can reasonably expect from a political structure is that it should promote, to a greater or lesser degree, peace. and he tended to view this central political task negatively – as the suppression of anarchy and of those forms of evils that most disturb civil tranquility. thus, he set a very limited criterion of political legitimacy. for aquinas, on the other hand, political organization, chiefly through the instrumentality of human law, has the capacity of furthering, in a more direct or positive way, at least the natural aspects of the human function. he thus set a wider criterion of political legitimacy. however, there is a sense in which the magisterial works of the two greatest christian philosophers were only drawing two possible, but different conclusions already more implicitly and less systematically set by the apostolic and pauline criteria for political legitimacy, which in turn were only partly novel, finding some roots and correspondence in earlier as well as contemporary roman eclectic stoicism. both augustine and aquinas together with other saintly figures, like st. francis of assisi, constitute the spiritual heirs of pauline and apostolic thought on ethics and/or politics (but st. francis took a more practical approach). but, unfortunately, as in all human matters, together with these noble legacies, there is also a darker side concerning the political consequences of the new christian way of looking into things. as soon as it became dominant ‘the new way’ was hijacked for more expedient purposes than the original evangelical ones and religion became a tool in the hands of the powers that be. but the question is: what caused the church over the centuries to underestimate the gospel’s core message, which is love (agape)? the answer may lie in the fact that, after the emperors constantine and theodosius embraced christianity, in the fourth century, it instilled a 76 prajñā vihāra spirit of power and dominance. however, the full effects of this corrupting attitude can be most clearly and famously seen at work much later in the crusades, inquisition, and other tragic bloody events constituting the dark side of european history. many members of the church, including some leaders like pope gregory vii, tried heroically, but unsuccessfully, to stop this trend. and yet conversely, european rulers were successful in taking advantage of the situation, by staking their legitimacy on their claim to universal moral authority and religious orthodoxy. the consequence of this was that, by extension, all those who were not religiously orthodox were considered suspect, persecuted and, in some cases, eliminated. thus, first, the pagans were targeted, then the muslim and jewish communities, then the heretical christian groups. the reformation led to a series of bloody wars. more recently, some secularized ideologies, like fascism and stalinism, which emerged in the last century at least in part as a reaction or consequence of these events. the roman catholic church reacted to these tragic events especially in the 1960s, by elaborating its own program of renewal and reform, which, through the second vatican council, manifested the intent of opening up itself more to the modern world, and by developing some new and more inclusive doctrines that eschewed the intolerant practices of the past. accordingly, the mission of all catholics is defined as to show people how to see the love of god, while at the same time not imposing it on them. this requires the correct application of the golden rule of doing unto others as you would like them to do unto you. in the same fashion, the current pope francis is delivering a universal message of forgiveness, reason and tolerance aimed at reaching the hearts and minds of all throughout the world, without making any distinction between race, political stance, or religious creed. according to him, the main challenge facing the church today is not simply to resolve long standing controversial issues like celibacy of the clergy, admission to sacraments of the divorced, etc., but to relearn how to communicate a deeper, more intelligent and relevant religion that leads to a life of acceptance and love. giuseppe mario saccone 77 pope francis’ position remains loyal to the traditional theological, ethical and political teachings of the catholic church. these doctrines were inherited from st. paul and the apostolic thought of the late classical antiquity, and also from the church’s two most influential philosophers: augustine and aquinas, who developed the two main political implications of the christian conception of human nature, or human purpose. i will next examine more in detail the specific contribution that each of the two have respectively given to the development of christian, and more in general to western political philosophy. augustine’s political pragmatism augustine introduces the contrast between the concept of enjoyment (which refers to the latin word fructus) and the one of use (referring to usus). whereas enjoyment pertains to that which per se brings about happiness, use refers conceptually to that which is supposed to aid us in achieving what will make us happy and achieve a blessed state. alas, augustine laments, we tend to strive for the objects of use, and not our own ultimate aim, or telos.6but even worse, we often strive to enjoy what we should altogether avoid even as object of use (and sexual misconduct constitutes a major embodiment of this fault, according to augustine). thus, there are two different kinds of people: the blessed ones who succeed in enjoying the love of god, and are to be saved at the end of time, and the “fallen” ones who improperly enjoy the world. however, according to augustine, the two civitates, where these two different kinds of people (figuratively) inhabit, are not cities in a literal sense, and are not to be identified with any specific historical, social or political institution. this means that the earthly city does not coincide with the roman empire nor with any other existing or future secular state, while the heavenly city cannot coincide with the (catholic) church. they cannot coincide because, on the one hand, those who love the world can be found both in the state and in the church, and, on the other hand, there are some in the state who love god. therefore, the two civitates cut 78 prajñā vihāra across both worlds achieving independence of them in an invisible way. that is to say, whenever and wherever there are people who love god, there is the heavenly city, and conversely the earthly city whenever and wherever there are those who love the world. nevertheless, the church instituted by christ the saviour still resonates with the power of his love, and therefore constitutes the most natural, although not exclusive, home of those belonging to the heavenly city. augustine thought that the tension between these two cities offered him not only the key for his own personal understanding of history, but also the divine logic of salvation. this logic involved the need to reconcile humanity to its creator through the saving acts and the sacraments instituted by christ. it also explains why augustine reacted so strongly against the views of the celtic thinker pelagius who thought that christians are not infected with original sin and hence not giving, to augustine’s dismay, a central role to god’s grace.7 according to augustine, humans inherit from adam the propensity to sin, and our freedom consists only in the way in which the divine providence may draw us to the good. we are incapable to achieve goodness except through god’s grace. augustine was at pain to escape the conclusion that either god brings about or that there is a separate source of evil. as he had earlier abandoned manichaean dualism, he developed a theory which derived from neoplatonism, the idea that all that exists comes from god and that evil therefore cannot exist, it is the absence of good. it follows that humans are free to choose evil, but when they do so, they are not under the direct influence of the grace of god. moreover, augustine thought that individual good and evil should be seen in the wider context of society in what became a major contribution to political thought about the relation between the church and the state. thus, as it appears from the following passage, the contrast between the earthly and the heavenly answered to his eschatological views concerning his philosophy of history: giuseppe mario saccone 79 in this wicked world,… in these evil times, the church through her present humiliation is preparing for future exaltation … in this situation, many reprobates are mingled in the church with the good, and both sorts are collected, as it were, in the dragnet of the gospel … and enclosed in nets until the shore is reached. there the evil are to be divided from the good.8 it follows from this that, unfortunately, until the final judgment it is not possible to precisely identify the two cities and their spiritual dwellers, beyond the general guidance provided by the bible. the earthly city or babylon, which was ruled by self-interest rather than by christian charity or agape, could be akin to the assyria of the old testament. however, augustine did not intend to precisely associate it with the roman state, whilst at the same time also not endorsing the opposite view that considered the empire as the main instrument for the onward transmission of the faith. but he did fully endorse the view that the state should be fully subservient to the church, in so far as the latter was an imperfect embodiment of the heavenly city. the state could thus be used as an instrument to suppress the existing heresies. and augustine somewhat reluctant support for the bloody suppression of donatism had fateful consequences for the subsequent history of the church, and its intolerance for intellectual dissent.9 perhaps, augustine, who also used various arguments, including an earlier proto-version of descartes’ cogito ergo sum to confute the scepticism influencing the academy, could have been a little bit more open to the kind of intellectual freedom which he himself had enjoyed earlier on. but as the situation was developing, the times were not yet ripe for that. the relative tolerance of antiquity was coming to end, and the medieval dark ages were inexorably approaching. augustine still belonged to the late imperial civilization, and the synthesis which he constructed between revelatory and philosophical concepts remains one of the greatest intellectual achievements in the history of the church. thus, the theoretical political consequences he draws from the 80 prajñā vihāra exercise of the temporal power have to be seen in the light of this synthesis between the revelatory and the philosophical, and of his eschatological concerns about the ends of human history. accordingly, the theory of the two cities led augustine to believe that the state is not, on its own, supposed to advocate or endorse any particular world view, ideology or organic conception of how society should be organized. indeed, as a temporary human institution with a limited scope and range of competencies it should not have any particular ultimate historical mission, beyond maintaining peace and public order. the prevention of major social turmoil and unrest, together with the punishment of crimes, and restraint for the would be offenders, is the most that members of the heavenly city can expect as the outcome of the administration of the temporal power. to put it bluntly, the spiritual inhabitants of the civitas peregrina must always bear in mind that all human institutions are fallible because they are morally incapacitated as the result of the original sin. augustine consequently, was skeptical about the feasibility of finding political solutions to human problems. however paradoxically, this seemingly discouraging skepticism, pessimism, or realism about the capacity of secular governments to promote human redemption has far-reaching theoretical consequences, providing some positive, however limited suggestions about how to organize public policies. it is indeed such a prudential skepticism that leads augustine to draw a distinction of sorts between private morality and public law, a distinction which also renders him extremely wary of endorsing the ideal of the state as a promoter of the personal virtue of its members. it also inspires him to pragmatically consider secular governments as providers of ‘neutral means’, which can be used by citizens who do not share the same ultimate concerns. this may seem, prima facie, and perhaps with a bit of a stretch of imagination, to anticipate the political neutrality of the state advocated by some versions of modern liberalism. accordingly, it is not uncommon to find political theorists assuming that augustinian thought does in fact foreshadow some features of the liberal conception of the state, which giuseppe mario saccone 81 together with political and religious neutrality predicates also the distinction between private morality and public law.10 nevertheless, any such comparison needs to take into account they involve different notions of political justice. on the one hand, augustine, unlike liberalism, does not develop a fully-fledged political theory centered on a notion of human justice. but he merely provides suggestions for prudential and pragmatic accommodations with what he regards as necessarily morally flawed, and thus intrinsically inadequate, government of temporal matters. according to augustine, the most that can be expected from the state is a kind of equity according to which power is exercised not arbitrarily, but in conformity with those relatively vague principles of natural justice and dictates of conscience which even the wretched earthly city members may have some inkling. on the other hand, liberalism develops a fully fledged political theory centered on a notion of justice. thus, the liberal theory of justice is based on a principle of equality prescribing as a normative principle, a certain degree of political, ideological, religious neutrality or impartiality by the state out of respect for the different, but morally equal, interests and identities of its members. this is not a political priority for augustine, even though it may be a moral corollary of christian agape.11 accordingly, the augustinian conception of the task of temporal and therefore secular politics is much more modest and limited, even though not radically at odds with rousseau’s inspired ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. this is because for augustine, a certain state non-interference in the private life of people is more a matter of prudential considerations, which could be adjusted or even withdrawn according to circumstances and changing historical situations rather than a strict prescriptive doctrine. this political pragmatism, was in the service of the christian philosophy of history, which was announcing an imminent parousia. the result of this discrepancy is that the world has currently turned into a space of contestation between two differing sets of ethics also with diverging political implications: the first is the liberal ethics of autonomy, according to which people are primarily autonomous individuals 82 prajñā vihāra with subjective and specific wants, needs and desires; the other is the more traditional conservative and politically more authoritarian ethics of divinity/community, where people attain meaning as members of larger entities such as families or communities of faith. however, augustine does not attribute great importance or priority to a ‘positive’ political or legal doctrine. unlike the case of contemporary liberal political theory stemming from john locke, augustine does not construct a theory of governance in which a degree of political, religious and ideological neutrality, together with freedom of thought and expression, and the distinction between moral and legal obligations figure as necessary conditions for the exercise of legitimate political authority. for augustine, these are not fundamental principles, but could at best be practical conditions offering members of the city of god the best opportunity to fulfil their function and spread the divine message. but the augustinian philosophy of history makes christian wisdom and secular power under the most favorable conditions very uneasy partners, and more often than not in downright disagreement on how to conduct human affairs. according to augustine, it may be superficially true that some polities are better than others, but what really matters is that none of them, by their own temporal and limited nature, will ever be able to satisfy our deepest and everlasting aspirations. this points to the fact that, at least in the deepest meaning of the concept, man, for augustine, is not the political animal described by aristotle, but a divine creature who can only fulfill his ultimate telos by rejoining god. thus, the heavenly city to which all humans are summoned is very distant not only from the aristotelian ideal polis but also from any existing political community. it is left to thomas aquinas to try to fill the gap between this ideal augustinian spiritual polity, which is far removed from earthly considerations, and the practical demands of our own political, biological and mortal life. giuseppe mario saccone 83 aquinas’ christianized ethico-political aristotelianism …whatsoever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law… man has a natural inclination to know the truth about god, and to live in society… aquinas12 aquinas recognizes a natural sphere of rational and ethical values, universally applicable to all believers and non-believers. this universally known rational standard of justice is what he calls natural law. but to fully account for the coherence and organic unity of his rational understanding of the contiguity, even though not identity, that he postulated between politics and theodicy, thus significantly altering the augustinian paradigm. it is essential to refer, at least briefly, to aquinas’ famous systematic description of four types of laws: the first is the eternal law, which consists in the plan of government in god. all other laws, in so far as they accord with right reason, derive from it. the second is the divine law as set forth in the holy scriptures, which serves as additional guidance to those commands of natural law known by all rational men. the third is natural law, which, with some aristotelian connotations, for aquinas applies only to humans as conscious, rational, moral, social creatures, teaching them to seek self-preservation, avoid ignorance and not give offence to or harm others with whom they associate. thus, unique to men is their natural inclination to know the truth about god and to live in society. for this reason, he assumes that humans are naturally religious, and share one standard of truth and rightness. however, the specific circumstances where standards of truth are applied vary, and therefore, so does natural law. therefore, aquinas argues that as history changes, progressing towards its ultimate end, secondary precepts and conclusions derived from the immutable first principles may also vary. this is consistent with the idea that the world historical evolution is to be seen as 84 prajñā vihāra the gradual unfolding of a divinely ordained plan. thus, aquinas’ theory of natural law allows him to reinterpret more optimistically augustine’s philosophy of history without directly contradicting it. the fourth type is human law, which is promulgated by the rulers of the community, according to the political regime governing the state. while the natural law establishes that its transgressors shall be punished, it is the positive human law which determines the specific penalty. however, as positive enactment it has the quality of law in so far as it proceeds according to reason. it is further divided by aquinas into the law of nations (ius gentium), similar to what we may call today international law, and civil law (ius civilis), i.e. the specific laws of each single country. accordingly, the former concerns the general norms governing buying and selling, and the other activities necessary to social exchange in all countries; the latter comprises the particular applications of the natural law to local conditions. concerning the three forms of government described by aristotle, aquinas is mostly in favor of monarchy, but in true aristotelian spirit, one that shares at least some features of a mixed government with the other two forms, especially with aristocracy, and even with democracy. one of the advantages of such a mixed monarchical rule is that the consequent division of power involved makes it clear that there is never a right to depose or kill a tyrant because such an action should only be undertaken by a public authority, preferably under the moral, spiritual and even political guidance of the church. in any case, aquinas prudently argues, the toppling of tyrants should be avoided if the disorder or scandal resulting from such move is likely to result in a greater harm than that already existing. but besides preventing and punishing the various human mischief and evil doings, civil law should actively contribute to the virtue and well being of citizens. and with regard to the promotion of the people’s welfare, aquinas points out that the human agreement enshrined in positive law also determines the rights of private property, which has a utilitarian purpose. property, therefore, while permissible and natural in moderate quantity, should not be accumulated superabundantly, and usury always shunned. most significantly, in conformity with christian agape, help for the poor and giuseppe mario saccone 85 needy should be ensured and promoted by the public authority according to natural right, and in cooperation with the church. but the theme of the promotion of agape brings in wider questions concerning moral and political philosophy also discussed elsewhere in summa theologiae. aquinas is well aware that when more than two people are involved, the expression of love involves being fair to each of them. this not only frames questions of corrective and distributive justice, but even the issue concerning the justification of conflict. in regard to this, he discusses the rudiments of a doctrine of just war in his detailed treatment of love or agape.13 for aquinas, love presupposes justice, even when transcending it; otherwise it would degenerate into sentimentality. paradoxically, those who mean well commit some of the worst sins against love. as the old saying goes, the roads to hell are often paved with good intentions. accordingly, aquinas lists three conditions for waging a just war. by quoting augustine, he argues that it must be declared by a legitimate authority, a just cause is required, and the belligerent should have a rightful intention. in this context, he quotes the biblical exhortation to “rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner.”14 on the other hand, aquinas also points out that aristotle’s supposition that the state could provide everything that the people need, was based on his ignorance of the divine revelation contained in the holy scriptures. taking care of these needs, is definitely important, and leads to proper human flourishing, but it is insufficient. this aspiration qualifies human nature in a different way than in aristotle’s philosophy.15 in regard to this, aquinas thought that the state it is not equipped to provide precise direction concerning how to achieve our ultimate ends, only the church can do this. thus, the former is supposed to be subordinate to the latter. nevertheless, the state still maintains the important legitimate function of providing for the natural ends of the human existence. this function makes it relatively, but not absolutely autonomous from the church, which is supposed to deal with the praeter-natural ends. here, in particular, aquinas departs from aristotle in that he thought that besides the natural and the human law, people should be directed to their end by 86 prajñā vihāra a law, prophetically delivered by god, found in the holy scriptures. this is the divine law that is not the product of human reason, but is granted to us through the creator’s grace and mercy to help us know how to fulfill our natural and, especially, our praeter-natural destiny. consequently, the difference between the natural and the divine law consists in that the former embodies our rational understanding of the good by which our practical reason, in aristotelian fashion, directs our wills to control our appetites and passions, thus leading us to fulfill our natural end by achieving the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. therefore, aquinas, on the one hand, subscribes to aristotle’s view that virtue is that by which one lives well. on the other hand, by the means of the divine law, which comes directly from god through the gift of revelation, we are directed to our supernatural destiny by receiving the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and agape or love (in latin: fides, spes, caritas). this means that the theological virtues are infused into human nature by divine grace, and are not the result solely of our own human capabilities, although they surpass and complete them. in this way, aquinas accomplishes the no mean task of superseding aristotle without directly contradicting him. he does so by describing how our highest nature is perfected through the grace of god. but, apart from his unrivalled greatness as a moral theologian, aquinas’ philosophical doctrines also prefigured the various later western secular and progressive liberal, utilitarian and democratic theorists, and especially by thomas hobbes, john locke, jean jacques rousseau, jeremy bentham, immanuel kant, hegel, marx, john stuart mill, and john rawls. these doctrines were: 1. the principle of the natural moral equality of all humans in terms of rights and duties. 2. the political importance of the no harm principle. 3. the theory of the separate sphere of authority for the church state. giuseppe mario saccone 87 4. a conception of the limits of sovereign power, and of the state in general. 5. the idea that law must be directed towards the common good and must be fair to all, justly distributing burdens and benefits (distributive justice) and rectifying the wrongs (commutative justice). 6. and finally, he introduced the concept that the source of human law is fundamentally the whole people, and only derivatively any authority acting on their behalf. conclusion i want to throw open the windows of the church so that we can see out and the people can see in. (sentence famously attributed to st. john xxiii16) the legacy of the universalist doctrine developed by st paul, augustine and aquinas can be seen in the slowly changing reactions of the upper echelons of the catholic church towards death penalty, liberalism, modernism, and, especially after the vatican council ii, liberation theology. with regard to the progressively mutating positions involved, it is possible to make a significant comparison with the much earlier changing attitudes towards classical thought. the ancient pagan greek and hellenistic thought was initially viewed with a certain amount of suspicion, if not utter rejection, by the early church but then became increasingly incorporated in the mainstream teachings and eventually even theology. in the same fashion, political and theological tendencies inspired by liberalism, modernism and liberation theology, were initially condemned by the hierarchy of the catholic church. however, these philosophies or religious interpretations are now being progressively adapted, and, in some cases, even wholly adopted by the officially approved papal theology. it is my hope that, once again, these progressive changes will motivate people to act socially and politically with renewed energy in favor of 88 prajñā vihāra liberty, democracy, social and cultural progress, and, especially, against poverty and injustice. this means taking decisive action to uphold the notion of universal human rights, as well as rights extended to all sentient beings, to the earth itself, and parts of god’s creation. christian theology decisively contributed to establish the theoretical underpinning of this extended notion of “human rights”, to which secularists and people of other faiths have also significantly contributed. alas, the full unfolding of the implications of this theory, and its practical implementation is a long, complex, process, but one which can provide inspiration to those who strive for justice. yet, in terms of magnitude, this process today has striking similarities to the task undertaken by the great theologians like st paul, augustine and aquinas as they transformed the ancient greek and hellenistic pagan cultural heritage. end notes 1this is the interpretative perspective of st paul’s letters developed by liberation theology, many of whose theological insights, even though, arguably, not the whole corresponding political ideology, now constitute integral part of pope francis’ renewed message of preferential option by the church for the poor. see: 1 cor. 3:16-17; 1 cor. 6:19; also, for instance, gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, ed. and trans. by sister caridad inda and john eagleson. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1990, pp.193-195, 300. 2see, alain badiou, saint paul: the foundation of universalism (cultural memory in the present), for example, p.74. 3although liberation theology is usually regarded as a 20th century development, the roots of its ideas lie in the much older tradition of political millenarianism. literally, this means a belief in the millennium, the establishment on earth of a thousand-year kingdom of god. however, moderate versions of liberation theology reject all connections with extremist millenarianism highlighting, instead, the importance of political expediency in the historical fight for liberty and social justice, and the necessity to combine the purity of the dove with the wisdom of the snake in order to improve and/ or change existing societies and polities. giuseppe mario saccone 89 4see, for instance, leonardo and clodovis boff, salvation and liberation, transl. from portuguese by robert r. barr. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1988, p.25. 5however, a socially conservative view of christianity, which has been more often dominant, takes a completely different interpretative stand. it identifies pauline thought with a call for a fervent, but more apolitical morality drive relying on strict social controls as the best form of governance, and problem solving in society; underpinning this position is the belief that no struggle to obtain fundamental political changes in the direction of liberty and social justice is required to obtain salvation. i think, it would be fair to say that it is possible to read st paul in many different and not univocal ways, hence the different interpretations. 6here, as an obvious example of the improper use of things, a modern reader could see augustine as preventively stigmatizing the unlimited desire for the acquisition of money, goods, properties and power advocated by what c. b. macpherson, last century, famously called possessive individualism. this reading would thus, somehow, counterbalance the vision of those who take augustinian calvinism as anticipating and embodying the spirit of capitalism, as it was earlier assumed by max weber. 7pelagius, who lived from about 360 to 431circa, was a moral reformer who wished to stress human freedom and moral obligation. he regarded perfection as possible and mandatory. he did not believe that the original sin was an obstacle to salvation, arguing that adam and eve only set a bad example, but that just by following christ’s moral teaching and exemplary life it was possible to achieve human redemption. consequently, god’s grace and the administration of sacraments by the clergy became all but redundant. his views were condemned as heretical by the church following from his controversy with augustine. 8city of god, 18.49 9the donatists were purist in that they did not want to let back into the church those who had shown themselves unworthy during the times of persecution. in particular, they considered some priests unworthy, and for this very reason not entitled to administer the sacraments. according to their doctrine, even ordinary, but serious sinners would need rebaptism in order to rejoin the church again. augustine strongly argued against this position by pointing out that the church it is not a perfect institution, and it is not to be identified with the heavenly city. it contains sinners, truly penitent people as well as some of those bound to be damned. however, it constitutes the extended body of the sacramental christ. augustine pointed out that the donatists’ rigorist doctrine was ultimately damaging the church itself. for this reason, the donatists were later suppressed by imperial edict. 10see, for example, edmund n. santurri, ‘rawlsian liberalism, moral truth and augustinian politics,’ journal for peace and justice studies 8:2 (1997), 1-36. 90 prajñā vihāra 11corollary here is understood as the ethical consequence of the fact that every human being is created by god, and therefore, for this very reason, deserves love and respect regardless of the specific individual physical or psychological features, and social position. indeed, a corollary of something is an idea, argument, or fact which is the direct result of it. 12aquinas, summa theologiae, i-ii, q.94, a.2 (i added the capital letters at the beginning of the two sentences.) 13see, summa theologiae, 2a, 2ae, q.40 articles 1-3. 14see, ps. lxxxi 4 15however, at least in my view, this position does not really contradict, as some conservative interpreters have tried to construe, the guiding christian principle that as pointed out by liberation theologians such as gustavo gutierrez and leonardo boff, agape mandates to act within the existing historical contexts to change and improve them, on behalf of, on the side of, and with the poor and the oppressed. 16born angelo giuseppe roncalli (1881-1963), pope from 1958; he has been recently canonized together with st. john paul ii, by pope francis i in 2014. bimal dahal 13 on rationalities of terrorism from an eastern perspective bimal dahal payap university, chiang mai, thailand abstract this paper will investigate to what extent dominant conceptions of rationality can contribute to the understanding of extreme violent human behavior like terrorism. second, it will explore rationalities outside of the western tradition. finally the paper explores the application of these ideas to understanding terrorism in the context of nepal. it will demonstrates that rationalities are culturally relativistic. as the cultures are often in a process of development, so are the rationalities. from this point of view, understanding terrorist rationalities demands a contextual analysis of the complex cultural components and their constant change and development. rationalities: traveling across conceptions rationality is one of the chief characters of terrorism. contrary to the popular belief, robert f. trager and dessislava p. zagorcheva, assert that terrorists are not irrational in such a way that they cannot be deterred; rather they are rational “to choose strategies that best advance them. the resort to terror tactics is itself a strategic choice of weaker actors with no other means of furthering their cause.”1 after a serious survey on the contemporary incidences of terrorism, martha crenshaw reports, “there is an emerging consensus that suicide attacks are instrumental in prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 1, january june 2018, 13-40 © 2000 by assumption university press 14 prajñā vihāra or strategic from the perspective of a sponsoring organization . . . they serve the political interests of identifiable actors, most of whom are non-states opposing well-armed states. this method is mechanically simple and tactically efficient.”2 there are many supporting arguments in favor of the rationality of terrorism. but the question is what these rationalities are. is there any theory of rationality which could be utilized to understand terrorism? how about the empirical understanding of rationalities to be employed in terrorism studies? in this regard, one end of the discussion simply rejects the presence of any rationality in terrorism, branding them just “crazy” or emotional agents. whereas, many others agree that terrorists have rationalities of their own which could be understood scientifically under specific condition in which terrorism breeds. to demystify the complexities of terrorism decision making, various notions of rationalities need to be considered. the following aims to chart basically three prominent approaches to rationality from the perspective of terrorism studies. first, weberian concepts of instrumental rationality and its implications for terrorism decision making will be critically discussed. thenceforth, two other prominent concepts of rationality--bounded rationality and communicative rationality--will be examined in the context of terrorism. instrumental rationality rationality is one of the major themes in max weber’s oeuvre. out of his topologies of rationality the instrumental and the value rationalities are highly employed to understand terrorist rationalities. instrumental rationality adheres to the notion of cost benefit aspect of human action. according to this notion, a rational human agent is informed of the practical realities of life and determines the most cost efficient means to achieve desired ends. from this perspective, terrorism is rational if it helps the actor efficiently achieve his goal which is more valuable than the means employed. that is to say, terrorism can be a means for a rational actor to achieve a desired end if it is instrumentally efficient. bimal dahal 15 but, the ends of terrorism are different at different levels of operation. at the organizational level, the goals are often tangible like achieving political power, inciting provocation, encouraging recruitment drives, consolidation of the organization, strengthening the position of the group at the bargain table or even derailing the ongoing peace process. at the individual level, however, the goals are not necessarily the same as they are at the organizational level. an individual might be motivated by different goals than the goals of the terrorist organization. individual goals may include desire for martyrdom, redemptive violence, dignity, personal gain in rank of the terrorist organization, self-esteem, personal revenge, love, among others. hence, the goal is often determined by the psychological factors of the actor concerned, which does not necessarily respect the tradeoff situation, particularly in terrorist actions that involve factors other than economics. other situational factors also influence terrorist rationalities in instrumental sense of understanding. for example, if the targets are vulnerable and symbolic in nature, terrorist actions are commissioned “rationally” in order to yield propaganda which could be further utilized to strengthen their position in the political struggle against the government. terrorist attacks on such symbolic targets send a message to the public that the government is not strong enough to protect the public and its honorable institutions, therefore such attacks are sanctioned expecting public support and recruitment drives. but the situation may change if such targets are hard and are not of symbolic significance. together with this, the symbolic value of the target and the cost of the attack depending upon its severity are also perceived by different people in different ways. what a terrorist values symbolically may not be valuable to the government, and cost involved in terrorism is also influenced by the understanding of the parties concerned. for example, the cost of a human life would be substantial for a democratic government, but very little for a terrorist organization relative to the outcome that it would generate. the availability of incentives and opportunities, to a great extent, determines terrorist action. within this framework, a terrorist’s decision 16 prajñā vihāra making involves the availability of the opportunity to attack a certain target and the incentives associated with such attacks. in some cases, from rational perspective, terrorist organizations can employ abstract notions of symbolic value like religion, ethnicity, nationalism, caste, regionalism, instrumentally for the sake of power and propaganda. in many other cases, they may employ a calculative approach from economic point of view. frey and luechinger attempted to explain the likelihood of terrorism incidences on the basis of demand, marginal benefit to terrorist, and supply, and marginal cost.3 nonetheless, instrumental rationality can be manipulated within the framework of means-ends dynamics. it does not explain terrorist actions under various conditions. for example, if means required to achieve certain ends are not available, then the terrorists have to redefine their ends that can be achieved by the available means. or they have to look for appropriate means that could help them achieve the preconceived ends. in another case, they need to change the whole operational endeavor to accommodate the prevailing socio-political situation. hence, efforts to understand and predict terrorist actions from an instrumentally rational point of view do not offer a comprehensive cue. terrorists can act according to their own evaluation and understanding of the situation in question. additionally, such econometric speculation has little space particularly when the actors of terror are ready to kill, and if necessary, die for their political ideals. joseph raz (2005) argues this type of tendency in terrorist organization in the framework of the “facilitative principle”, which states: if one has a sufficient reason to pursue an end, one also has a reason to take any course of action that facilitates that end.4 hence, ends determine the means offering rationalizations to take a certain course of action. the weberian concept of rationality has been interpreted by different actors for different purposes. many of them understood rationality as the “disenchantment of the world,” bureaucratization, or an increasing lack of freedom, that is in opposition to the emotive impulses of human beings. many others understood weberian rationality as bimal dahal 17 an increasing pervasiveness of the means-end (zweckrational) type of social action.5 some of them even tried to understand weberian rationality within a specific sphere of life like religion. additionally, weber’s own inconsistent use of the term “rationality” throughout his prominent works such as economy and society and the collected essays in the sociology of religion” is more likely to “mystify than to illuminate”, notes stephen kalberg.6 various decision-making models based on instrumental rationality have only focused on the economic aspect of rationality. one of them is rational choice theory which is considered “the most powerful paradigm in the political science discipline.”7 instrumental models have been widely used in predicting and deterring terrorist actions. however, they have not been able to address terrorism in an efficient manner. it is primarily because they have failed to emphasize its multivalent embodiment, to explain how individuals can be motivated by the instrumental principle or utility maximization. though they provide a scientific basis for explaining political decision-making by providing casual explanation of political phenomenon, they do not explain how decisions are made. normally decisions are made on the basis of a real or perceived value of the terrorists, which are not understood by others. the instrumental model assumes that choice can be predicted, but it does not say anything about the choices terrorists have. while the model recognizes that human actions are guided by the desire, preference or beliefs that are consistent, it does not explain the causes of those desires, preferences and beliefs. for these reasons, the instrumental rational model is inadequate to explain such a decision-making process. additionally, it also does not differentiate between political decisions and economic decisions. in terrorism studies, motivational factors are of great importance in making decision which cannot be predicted by mathematical or economic model.8 weber argues: 18 prajñā vihāra to apply the result of this analysis [means-ends analysis] in the making of a decision, however, is not a task that science can undertake; it is rather the task of the acting, willing person; he weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world.9 bounded rationality employing the idea of rationality to predict human decision making (which was promoted by mainstream economic theory) portrayed human agents as fully rational bayesian maximizers of subjective utility. this notion was further utilized in game theory, statistics and other disciplines to predict human action including terrorism. but herbert simon has argued that the action of the individual is not necessarily based on fully rational choices. rather, decision making is a search process guided by aspiration levels that satisfy the subject. since aspiration levels are not fixed, but dynamically adjusted to the situation, decisions are also made to achieve a satisfaction level which is not constant. therefore, decision making process is not fixed; rather it is guided by bounded rationality. rationality in the instrumental sense requires unlimited cognitive capabilities, which is not available to human beings. they do not know everything all the time and are not capable to utilize the available information to construct optimal decision making. it is because the individual in question may not be sufficiently focused, adequately informed or capable to know and utilize the available information in the maximal pursuit of rationality. therefore, human actions can better be explained through bounded rationality than purely instrumental rationality.10 according to this notion, people act not to maximize their selfinterest (as accepted by conventional decision-making models). rather, in real life situations, human action is dependent upon a contexts that demand a typical response which could even be irrational. it is a sort of non-optimizing adaptive behavior of real people. out of the limited resources, computational skills, time limitations, effective emotional bimal dahal 19 strengths and cognitive limitations, a subject makes decision which, according to his/her own belief system, satisfies his/her contextual needs. therefore, bounded rationality assumes that human action is not instrumentally rational in economic terms; rather it is bounded by other factors that influence decision making process. sometimes human beings act out of the “weakness of will” knowing that specific action leads to harmful consequences. it is banithat is habit or addiction in english, or lachari that dictates human actions in many circumstances. for example, an individual may know that heavy alcohol drinking invites serious health complications. knowing the bad consequences of drinking alcohol he may not be able to resist the temptation of drinking more and more. this typical action of the individual does not maximize his self-interest but he keeps on repeating this action – drinking alcohol in his everyday life. in terrorism studies, understanding the notion of bonded rationality can offer an important cue to understand terrorist violence. for example, a terrorist may know that killing people in a bus terminal might not serve his interest. rather, it would attract the attention of the authorities towards him or his family. and his life would be more miserable and uncertain than before. but, he commits violence in response to his subjective understanding of the situation and his compulsive impulse which prefers acting against better judgement – a term known as akrasia in the ancient greek lexicon. in the same way, contemporary terrorist leaders are more aspirational than operational. the organizational structure of terrorism often lacks a unity of command and operation. in this situation, contemporary actors of terrorism are often autonomous. they are likely to take action according to their own perception of the situation and what they believe that enhances their goal. under such cases, terrorist actions are aspirational-adaptive than utility maximizers, where beliefs have secondary role in decision making. for example, in suicide terrorism in the islamic world, many believe that they would gain rewards in the afterlife for sacrificing their life for islam. but very few put their lives at risk. similar cases are also found in revolutionary terrorism in developing world. for example, 20 prajñā vihāra to die for a higher human cause or justice or for the nation is considered to be morally acceptable in revolutionary terrorism. those who sacrifice their lives for such causes are revered as martyrs who are considered to be immortal. many people believe this line of thinking, but most refrain from engaging in terrorism at the cost of their lives. additionally, terrorist leaders often encourage others to die for causes, but they hardly put their own lives at risk. in such situations, the context, in guiding human action, is more important than what one believes. the notion of bounded rationality tends to involve all these ingredients in understanding decision making; however, it is not of much practical use. it tends to be a catch-all category explaining deviations from maximizing rationality;11 it does not help predict terrorist action that involves various culturally constrained habits, beliefs, and resources. under the rubric of bounded rationality, a rational agent is goal-oriented but bounded, who decides on an action in the light of the contextual variables. but, how a subject decides is a complex phenomenon. for example, a subject can decide what to think about, but not what to think. in the same way, the result of thinking is a conscious, while the process of thinking is, to a great extent, unconscious. this unconscious is not even accessible to introspection. to understand the process of thinking, which subsequently leads to decision making, understanding the underlying psychic structure of the subject becomes an imperative. the psychological structure of a subject is, to a great extent, influenced by various socio-cultural as well as economic factors having both historical as well as future oriented dimensions. the idea of bounded rationality hereby does not offer practical solutions to understand the making of decision-making process so that terrorist actions could be predicted in advance. however, it sets a stage to explore further into the terrorist’s mindset focusing cultural ingredients that create terrorists. communicational rationality the two dominant aforementioned types of rationalities seem to have been entirely dependent on the philosophy of the subject. in the case bimal dahal 21 of instrumental rationality the subject evaluates tradeoffs that maximize utility; whereas bounded rationality argues to involve contextual variables that bound the subject. hence, subject-centered notion of rationality not only obscures but also blocks the way to understand the intrinsic intersubjective and dialogical character of communicative action, which, as rasmussen points, “is victimized by its own instrumental formulation”.12 jürgen habermas, a second generation scholar of frankfurt school, building upon the works of horkheimer and adorno’s critical theory, offers an alternative approach to understand rationality free from the domination of subjectivity. he argues that there is no “pure” rationality; rather it is embedded in the complexities of communicative action and in the structure of the lived-in world. this explanation leaves behind the conventional understanding of rationality from marxist paradigm consisting of means of production, the base structure in marxist lexicon, as the key for reconstructing history. it also negates the evolutionary aspect of human rationality in weberian term. alternatively, it offers a new paradigm, a paradigm of communication, the super-structure as the basis of social reproduction. habermas classifies human action into four forms: teleological action, norm-regulated action, dramaturgical action, and communicative action. each form of human action is guided by specific interest of the person or the community. each form employs its own set of rationalities which adheres to the prevailing degree of knowledge, moral justification and legal norms of a particular society. hence, rationality of an action depends upon the reliability of knowledge embodied in it. in the same manner, the moral codes and normative legal frameworks of the community dictate human rationality. additionally, habermas offers a notion of three worlds: the objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. he argues that individual or collective human action is guided on the basis of the quality of relationship of the actors to these three worlds. if the actor is interested primarily in the objective world, then he/she chooses appropriate instrumental means to achieve desired ends in the real-life situation. 22 prajñā vihāra but those interested in subjective and social world can have their own ways of achieving ends. hence, rationality in a human action depends upon the perception or relative importance of the worlds from the actor’s perspective. in the same way, human actions are dependent upon the nature of the actors as well. if the actor seeks “success” then he/she tends to be more objective and instrumental without regarding the interests of the others. in general sense, teleological human actions are motivated by a “success” drive. in terrorism, the duty of a man in one’s lifetime, rewards in the afterlife, moral imperatives, liberation, and moksa are interpreted as teleological functions, therefore they demands strict objective commitment. but an understanding seeking actor, a social actor, however, in communicative action acts to solve a certain problems on the basis of learning, both at individual and collective levels, to develop common understanding by arguments, consensus, and cooperation rather than strategic action to realize their specific goal.13 in another word, a social actor aims to seek consensus in communication which constructs his/her rationality for a particular action. when a subject engages in a communicative act, he/she claims something – validity claims – that are understandable to all those in the system of communication, which could be approved or denied by others with whom the subject communicates. the conflicts in communication may arise as long as there are disagreements in respect of the validity claims which are resolved by “the force of the better argument” in the communication process. reason in communicative action deals with the validity claims, which are of three types: (1) cognitive-instrumental reason, (2) moral-practical reason, and (3) aesthetic-expressive reason. the first type predicts and controls the realm of science through the interplay of practices and theories; the second type applies to moral and political deliberations; and the third type governs arts and literature.14 in terrorism studies, the second type is important. it offers rationality for a certain action that is considered to be moral. in a broader sense, it offers rationalities even for a violent action, including terrorism, within bimal dahal 23 the framework of moral or ethical justification. however, the point to focus is that the process of justification is not universal. rather, it varies from culture to culture and philosophy to philosophy. many processes are unique in nature which cannot be employed to justify various types of validity claims. for example, if one claims that it is raining; this claim can be justified by looking outside through the window. but a claim like federalism is counterproductive for a land-locked country like nepal and cannot be justified in the same manner. in the same way, making consensus through communicative action demands similarities of the agents and situational constraints. some people from a particular culture are likely to reach at an acceptable agreement through discussion, but many others prefer no discussion.15 likewise, communication does not necessarily promote understanding through discussion. it is culturally relativistic. many actors are likely to misunderstand each other than to understand while communicating.16 it follows that the notion of communicative rationality does not say much about the power inherent in communicating agents. a powerful agent can manipulate meanings and arguments to its favor. thus, understanding reality through rationalities inherent in communication could be one of the many ways to understand reality, but not the only way. there may be multiple agents with a variety of cultural backgrounds resulting in complex situations offering various types of constraints. in such situations, exploring rationality as communicative action reflects only a part of the entire picture which cannot be theorized for diverse human actions. problematizing rationalities of terrorism what is the utility of the contemporary theories of rationality in understanding terrorism decision making? the answer is not simple. it depends upon the type of terrorism, the type of terrorist agent, and many other things that terrorism involves in its development. hence, counter questions could be: which terrorism? which terrorist? for example, urban revolutionary terrorists tend to attack soft targets due to their vulnerability and easy access. hence, counterterrorism tactics to secure the target may 24 prajñā vihāra drive the terrorists to decide or rationalize another course of action. but a jihadist would not care much about his or her life if there is a chance of success to strike at the head of the enemy, or even to attempt an attack is valuable in itself. in the same way, tightening security measures at airports with the establishment of metal detectors and screening devices may influence terrorist decision making. in such cases, terrorists may change tactics, not motives. recent terrorist attacks in shopping malls and passenger buses suggest that terrorists act out of motivation derived from different sources. some motives are inherent in socio-cultural factors, whereas many others are derived from historical as well as personality factors of the individuals involved in terrorism. commonly, an ardent motive to strike against an enemy--real or perceived--derives its rationality from the socio-psychological factors upon which terrorism grows. these socio-psychological factors are culturally relativistic, therefore, they vary culture-wise. a comprehensive approach to understanding terrorist rationality is, therefore, not feasible from this perspective, because every culture has a unique set of rationalities for terrorism which resist generalization. practitioners and academics often employ weberian model of rationality in understanding terrorism, and it is sometimes helpful. however, it ceases to function when there is value conflict. instrumental rationality does seem to function as long as it is shielded from value conflict. in economics, where consumers are considered informed human beings, their actions are usually instrumentally rational. but, in cases involving struggles for liberation, dignity, love or similar goals involving passion and memories, such an approach does not work. people value things differently. values may conflict with others, or remain irreconcilable. and when there is an irreconcilable value conflict, choice tends not to be rational but seemingly arbitrary. the mainstream literary canon does not shed enough light to the conceptions of rationality that are applicable in terrorist decision making. however, weber’s notion of irreconcilability of values can lead scholars and practitioners to see rationalities outside of the weberian model, bimal dahal 25 particularly the instrumental model. thomas kuhn offered an alternative theory of rationality through his influential work the structure of scientific revolutions in 1962.17 according to this theory, the rational must conform to the actual. the structure upon which rationality is based can accommodate minor theoretical changes in this situation. however, there still exists a chance of revision and wholesale rejection the total structure, called the “paradigm” in kuhn’s word, whenever the scientific community faces problems in solving certain questions. as the scientific community faces more problems in solving the outstanding questions by employing the existent paradigm, it passes the community into a state of crisis. thenceforth, the community debate actively both offering a new paradigm and justifying the old one. the debate will continue until a new paradigm is established or the old one retains its dominance to solve the problem in question. in many cases, the proponents of different paradigms are unable to communicate with each other because of their different set of exemplars and world views. even if they communicate, the point is, in justifying their respective paradigms; both the communities try to reassert their own paradigm. thus, according to kuhn, there is incommensurability between paradigms, making it irrational to choose between paradigms. but, the theory of revolutionary science does not strictly prove that the proponents of two paradigms do not understand each other at all. since rationality is a rule-governed process and scientific process itself, therefore, is a cumulative one, it would be inappropriate to assume that a new paradigm evolves independently only because of the accumulation of anomalies in the old paradigm. rather, a transition from one paradigm to another involves an inclusive transformation that enhances the problem solving ability of the scientific community. however, there exists incommensurability about values between paradigms, which is particularly important in understanding social phenomena because of the availability of multiplicities of the values sprouted out of the pluralities of the cultures. 26 prajñā vihāra various other thinkers of the western tradition agree with the multiplicity of rationalities in cultures. rationality derived from the absolute notion of truth has been critically scrutinized by thinkers like richard rorty. according to this point of view, there are various notions of truth depending upon the community. whenever two or more communities come together consensually, they do agree to recognize something as “true,” which would be “untrue” in other communities and at another time and space. therefore, in complex social situations, rorty asks to “redescribe” the situation which means speaking differently, rather than arguing well. for, arguing in the same tradition does not offer a chance to unearth entrenched rationalities that have been silenced by the dominant discourse. in the same line of thinking, alasdair macintyre insists scholars to see rationality in traditions which vary greatly across cultures. thus, an emerging belief in the western tradition is that, there is no rationality as such. rather, there are rationalities in cultures which can be understood in their own respective contexts. understanding terrorism in nepal notable eastern approaches to rationality are not much different than the western. for example, manusmriti understand rationality not as a universal entity, rather a particular entity which depends upon the actor, assigned profession, the time or stage of life and the space. rationality of a male agent of a higher caste would be different than that of a female of the same caste. it further depends upon their stage of life. if a person is at student stage (bramhacharya), his action must be directed to attain education, whereas house holder (grihasta) strives to earn wealth. actions that enable individuals to attain their respective goals at their respective stages are considered to be rational. another important point to note in understanding the rationality of terrorism is the role of motivators. most of the agents of a terrorist organization are not autonomous and well informed. rather, they just follow their leaders. it is a belief that involves a sense of belonging, justice, dignity, solidarity, truth, and above all ultimate purpose of life. bimal dahal 27 whenever they receive orders from authority, they act without considering its rationality or its consequences. they derive rationality from the authoritative figure. in an ancient text mahabharata, the most skillful archer, ekalabya even cuts his thumb off when he was asked to do so by his guru, dronacharya. this phenomenon from mahabharata can be equated with the modern suicide bombers in terrorism studies. from this perspective, terrorists believe something or someone as ideal and just, and this justifies their following of orders. in the same line of thinking, the position of guru in the eastern society is venerable, one no less than a god. the guru-sysya (master– disciple) tradition is as old as vedic tradition, called parampara in nepalese lexicon. an established parampara is called a sampradaya, sect or cult. in the vedic tradition, a guru often hands down knowledge and wisdom to his disciples orally, shruti, through sutras, or formulas. this tradition reached its height during the upanishadic period, when a disciple is supposed to receive wisdom only at the presence of the guru. the term upanishad means “to sit down near” a guru.18 this tradition is dominant in the eastern religions like hinduism, jainism, buddhism and sikhism, and it has transcended the religious boundaries to influence human behavior in economics, politics and other institutions. in terrorism studies, the presence of various parampara and sampradaya in eastern society offers a way of constructing a rationality for violence according to the goals and interests of the guru concerned. since there are many parampara and sampradaya, there are many gurus of each parampara and sampradaya. each guru may have his own perception of reality and goals, which may rationalize terrorism in their own way. a guru is often a male who is blindly trusted to lead the disciples towards perfection or happiness or moksa. in general, there is a single guru with many disciples in a certain sect or cult. the disciples have to be unquestionably faithful to the guru; however, they do not necessarily need to be faithful to their fellow comrades. therefore, any command from the guru is executed without question, because there is no space for discussion of the command issued by the guru at the level of the disciples. 28 prajñā vihāra hence, disciples are exempt from the fruit of their actions, for the guru is supposed to bear the responsibility on his own. acts of terrorism to execute the command of the guru is a considered a rational act in such communities or sects. there are many gods and goddesses in hindu cosmology together with personal gods known as iswara. so are there many gurus in the hindu tradition in a certain structured hierarchy. many personal gods are stationed around the supreme god. in the same way, gurus are also organized in a fixed hierarchical structure. the position of a certain guru depends upon his distance from the main power center. if a guru is nearer to the power center, he is considered more powerful. whenever there is a dispute about the decision of a guru in a certain society, people opt to consult another guru of higher order to resolve the conflict. to execute an act of violence against a real or perceived enemy, the command from the guru of higher order is effective. hence, terrorists often derive their rationalities for violence from the hierarchy of the gurus. each guru may have his own world view which may contradict the others. whenever there is a confrontation between gurus in their understanding of the world and beyond, a certain guru may declare another guru an enemy, and commands his followers to fight against the declared enemy to save their religion, and sometimes to purify the tradition. in such a situation, followers of a certain guru employ whatever means possible to “punish” the followers of another guru. in some cases, a guru interprets a certain event or a natural phenomenon in such a way that draws a clear demarcation line between communities or classes. the guru may demand a certain act in favor of his sect from the other communities or classes. and if the target community does not comply, then the guru declares that community as “evil”.19 in this situation, an extreme act of violence, terrorism, is a rational act in defending one’s own guru. a guru is influential within a certain social and geographical territory. but a guru as a human being is a mobile entity as well. they move from place to place to preach or to explore better living opportunites commonly known as sukha and santi (happiness and peace) in this life. bimal dahal 29 whenever a guru travels, it happens to invade another guru’s territory. hence, the territory includes not only geographical or sociological, rather it also involves cultural and spiritual territory. at this point, sects of two or more gurus collide. in some cases, they are able to negotiate peacefully, but in many cases, they employ means of extreme violence to exterminate the influence of the other declaring them as the enemy of their gods. act of terrorism to defend one’s own territory or to invade other’s territory is a rational act from this perspective, because both the terrorists are doing their god’s work. hierarchical caste-based society of the eastern tradition categorizes human beings on the basis of their birth.20 accordingly, it assigns duties and responsibilities together with an ultimate aim of life to an individual suited for a particular stage of life and inheritance (see table 3.1). if there is a goal of life, there must be a method to realize that goal. an individual ought to do something to meet his/her desired ends. hence, rationality is useful for an individual to achieve the goals prescribed by the tradition in order to enhance his position in the society. however, such goals are dynamic depending upon the acts of an individual in question. additionally, there exists a chance for inter caste/ class mobility, or to move upward in the archeology of the society by opting for a better goal which is not prescribed to the individual on the basis of his birth or genealogy. it means an individual of lower order can improve his situation in the society if he successfully achieves the goals of higher order prescribed by the tradition to an individual of higher order. hence, the most powerful indicator of success is wealth. wealth makes everything possible, both kama and moksa. this drive for wealth to upgrade one’s own status and dignity in the society offers rationalities for individuals to embrace even extreme acts of violence that constitutes terrorism. for example, a poor person of higher caste may descend the social ladder if he is unable to attain the goals of his life. likewise, a rich man of lower caste may move towards higher order if he has sufficient purusastra, particularly wealth. and the rule of the game is: the higher the order, the 30 prajñā vihāra nobler the man. so, individuals strive to attain the goals of life to maintain their position in society. this notion of becoming a better man by doing something extraordinary or valuable in society motivates individual to pursue certain acts deemed to be instrumental. popular culture and media often reinforce this world view, particularly in nepal where bollywood movies are influential in constructing such world views in the public. in this process, any means, irrespective of its ethical or moral consequences, is acceptable as long as it helps individuals attain the desired ends. but this social order frequently encourages the lower tiers of the society to employ violent means to attain social status that enables the individual to pursue happiness, which is otherwise impossible for the individuals of the lowers class. caste (verna) assigned profession stages (ashram) aim of life (purusastra) brahmins education bramhacharya (student) dharma (knowledge) kshatriya administrator/ military grihasta (householder) artha (wealth) vaisya commerce vanaprastha (retired) kama(pleasure) sudra service sannyas (renunciation) moksa(liberation) no caste to create and defend one’s class or caste territory is another aspect that offers rationalities for terrorism in the eastern tradition. hierarchical society constitutes different layers and tiers. at the core of this structure lies the state power that dictates all other forms of power. individuals of different tiers strive to move towards the core power center both to uplift their situation in society and to achieve spiritual bliss. spiritual bliss is reserved for those who have sufficient artha, or wealth. in this situation, a certain individual from the marginalized class employs selective verses of religious and philosophical texts to prove the existing state of affairs bimal dahal 31 is unjust and oppressive. then, he motivates others outside the group to fight against the existing structure that oppresses them. those convinced by his arguments form a group to wage war against the “unjust” discriminating social order. this group, launches attacks at various tiers of the social structure to weaken the boundaries that separate the different tiers. once the structure is weak enough to allow these individuals to be included in a higher order, then a new group is formed at each tier involving the old members and the newcomers. this new group again launches attacks both within the group and outside of the group to consolidate their “achievements.” hence, they reinforce the boundaries to “safeguard” the new tier and also to exclude the others as well. in so doing, they employ all measures, including terrorism. buddhist notions of impermanence, annica, offer an alternative way to understand multiplicity of rationalities in the eastern tradition. according to this notion, the world is changing every moment, so are its content, including human beings and their attitudes. rationality cannot be understood in isolation; therefore, rationality of a man for violence is constantly changing with the changing world. a local nepalese dialect reflects this notion: kunda kunda pani; munda munda buddhi (water differs by ponds whereas the idea or intellect differs by heads) as water of a certain pond cannot be the same as that of another, in the same way, the mind of a certain man cannot be the same as that of the other. in this light, the rationality applicable to a certain person cannot be applicable in the same way to another. so, every person has his/ her own rationality to act in a certain way. this notion can be useful in understanding terrorism: every terrorist has his/her own way to rationalize violence under his/her own specific context. fatalism is another notion that dictates rationality in the eastern tradition. according to this world view, every living being has its own 32 prajñā vihāra fate composed of two components: bhagya and karma. bhagya is fortune, whereas karma is destiny. everything happens to a man in this world is attributable to the dictates of bhagya or karma. if something happens well, then it is because of his fortune, or bhagya, otherwise it is because of his karma. therefore, an individual is not responsible for his act, because he is simply observing his bhagya or karma. the idea of bhagya or karma is also related to the position of different celestial bodies during the time of the birth of the person and in his or her different life phases. it is commonly called graha (planet but not necessarily the planets of only the solar system). if the graha of a person is in favorable position, anything would yield good result. everything may go waste or counterproductive when the grahas are in bad position. so, the act of a person is not an outcome of rationally calculated decision making process, but the one dictated by his or her grahas. but the question may arise: how to know the position of graha? in many cases, it is something unknowable through conventional knowledge. therefore, an individual is free to do anything if he or she thinks or believes it is appropriate to act in that particular way in that particular situation. in many cases, rituals are observed to make grahas favorable to the person in question. in this regard, graha santi puja (worship of planetary objects) is observed to receive blessings from graha. in decision making process the idea of graha plays important role because it rationalizes an act of a man, including an act of extreme violence, terrorism, as an outcome of some external consequences for which the actor is not solely responsible. an act of terrorism, is not only dependent on the will or interests of both the victim and the perpetrator, but because of the resultant consequences of their respective grahas. the position of the graha brings fortune, bhagya and karma, therefore one need not be worried towards the consequences of a certain act. in this respect, lekhanta (the end of the writing) is an important notion to understand. on the sixth day after the birth of a child, bhavi, the writer of the fate of the new born person, visits the baby and writes bhagya on his or her foreheads, which dictates his or her life until he or bimal dahal 33 she dies. the final lines of the writing describes the way that person is destined to die. if someone is murdered by an act of violence, then it is understood that the last lines of his fate was written in that way, so no one should feel guilt concerning the incident that killed the person in particular. in rationalizing terrorism, this notion offers scope to interpret the event in a particular way that reinforces the motive for terrorism. so, how a person derives rationalities for terrorism is not a universal phenomenon. various traditions, both in the west and the east, have their unique ways for rationalizing terrorism. both the eastern and western traditions acknowledge a diversity of rationalities across cultures. however, the dominant western notions of rationality oversimplify it and tend to employ generalized notions insensitive to cultural differences. it further asserts that only human beings are capable of reason, therefore only human beings are rational. the rationality that sanctions terrorism in a certain community also depends upon the structure of the community. at a certain point, rationality given by a certain tier of the community can be instrumental, but it may not remain so forever. society is dynamic in nature, therefore the status of the individuals is also changing, and so are the rationalities. in a certain context, the speaker can become a listener, and the former listener can become a speaker. in this changed position, the rationalities also go through a changing process to suit the interest of the dominant group of that community. therefore, we need to ask questions like: who is constructing rationalities in a society? why rationalities are constructed in that manner? who is the actor or the speaker? who is the follower or the listeners? what is the power relationship between the speaker and the listener? for whom do those sorts of rationalities benefit? for whom does it harm? how and why, under certain conditions, a certain set of rationalities are constructed more preferable than other rationalities? how are rationalities made functional in a certain community? rationality does not exist outside the relationships constructed by the dominant knowledge and ideology of the society. this dominant knowledge is often constructed to serve certain interest of a certain group 34 prajñā vihāra in the community. the outsiders of the community often are informed about the dominant rationality that represents the interest of a particular group, whereas the operating rationality of the underclass remains obscure. in terrorism studies, the actors are often classified as oppressed or marginalized or the victims of injustice, who rarely get a chance to have their voice heard in the mainstream discourse. since the studies on terrorism are also influenced by the social structure, many researchers tend to understand it through the eyes of the dominant discourse. generally, the functional ingredients of terrorism are often collected, categorized, analyzed, and treated as rationality from the perspective of the dominant ideology; therefore, the rationalities and perspectives of terrorist actors are often ignored, or misrepresented by the mainstream discourse. so, which rationality is the authentic rationality? the rationality of the actor is the authentic one, because it offers a foundation for the act itself. other sets of rationality are merely a representation of the same from particular perspectives. as every representation is misrepresentation, rationality represented by a certain theory of knowledge does not necessarily reflect the rationality that operates in the real world. therefore, to understand the rationalities of terrorism of a certain terrorist group, it is important to understand it from its own context that involves its culture, history, belief systems and traditions. since various methods to understand rationality of terrorism from the dominant perspective have become unable to offer practical expedients to predict and address terrorism effectively in the contemporary world, understanding it from within is an alternative way for both scholars and practitioners in the field of the terrorism studies. conclusion rationality is a contentious issue to understand in terrorism studies. however, there have been tremendous attempts to understand it objectively from various perspectives. prominent among them are the western and the eastern perspectives. bimal dahal 35 the dominant western perspective to understand rationality of terrorism suffers from the european economistic determinism. it tends to understand the basis of a certain act, including that of terrorism, in its instrumental value to generate more benefit than the means employed. but the idea of benefit is conceived by the value given to that particular outcome. value is often given to a certain outcome according to the beliefs and attitudes of the subjects in question. these beliefs and attitudes are culturally shaped. disregarding the cultural components in shaping values fails to capture the real motivating factors behind a certain act. from such orientation, the western approach fails to differentiate types of terrorists. it may be helpful to capture the rationalities of terrorists who are pursuing private or collective prosperity by employing terrorism instrumentally, but it is not sufficient to understand the rationalities of terrorists who act in selfless opposition to oppression, or to achieve their ultimate goals of life. the western tradition, however, tries to engage with the native voices to understand the rationalities of terrorism in a certain cultural context. but the problem with this is that the western scholars or western educated scholars employ their own means or methods to see the social phenomenon through a western lens. this tendency reinforces phenomena like colonization or globalization. thus, the very western ideas of rationality become canon for the production of knowledge to understand and control social endeavors in the east. in this way, native voices are silenced by the cacophony of dominant western discourses, and the mainstream scholarship tend to endorse the “tested” western models of rationality. this applies to the understanding of terrorism. “home-grown” scholars and practitioners in the field of terrorism studies do also suffer from the eurocentric views due to their scholarly or institutional relationships with the western institution or body of knowledge. general patterns of scholarly enterprises in the third world are guided by the knowledge developed in the west. the scholars and the practitioners tend to test their theories developed in the west on the laboratory of the east, collaborating with institutions and scholars who are guided by the same western lines of thinking. 36 prajñā vihāra for example, a team of scholars from the western tradition visits or studies eastern culture and trains his colleagues and students to analyze the issue from the same paradigm. particularly in terrorism studies, most of the academicians as well as practicing institutions are from the western hemisphere. moreover, the funding and other financial and nonfinancial incentive to conduct that particular research influences the outcome. this is a type of scholarly adventurism. the outcome often serves western interests in eastern communities. such types of investigation is not a recent. rather, as said notes, it has its roots in “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory.”21 religious books like vedas, ramayana, mahabharata, puranas, not only influence but guide human behavior in indian subcontinent. these religious texts are ambivalent concerning violence. in addressing violence as a means to the ends, however, selective interpretations of these texts by ancient scholars like manu, kautilya and kamandaka often encourage human beings to use violence in the pursuit of the objective of human life and to defend one’s own dharma. this special condition of the eastern community demands a closer view to understand what it means by the words like purusartha (objectives of human life) or dharma. these very ideas and ideals offer rationalities for actions which is considered to be unacceptable in other situations. but the problem again appears is that there are multiple layers in the eastern social world. each layer has its peculiar tradition that offers rationalities for violence which may not be compatible with the other. in such situations, an attempt to understand rationalities for violence in a certain tradition or sub-tradition cannot be comprehensive. rather it may offer an explanation from a particular perspective which eventually fails to have universal validity. the problems we discussed earlier concerning the role of the guru apply to knowledge in general. individuals in a community often depend upon guidance of authority and are not well informed about ethical action at an individual level. they depend upon someone who is considered bimal dahal 37 to be more knowledgeable and who is venerated by the community as a good man. this person, as a guru, or a leader, determines the value or the course of action to attain particular set of values. in so doing, he appeals the community members to act in a certain way, sometimes including acts of terrorism, to achieve a better state of affairs for the community. hence, terrorism derives its rationality, particularly operating rationality, from the leaders of the organization or the community. in nepalese context, understanding rationalities for terrorism invite multiple perspectives. the mainstream discourses on terrorism are heavily influenced by the western tradition. scholars outside of the west often find it easy to position their arguments in the light of the western tradition. various researches conducted with such views have not been able to shed enough light on the rationalities entrenched in various cultures and sub-cultures of asia, including the nepalese community. for this reason, they have not been able to offer practical tools for the practitioners to understand terrorism in the contemporary world. there have been few serious scholarly works in the field of terrorism studies in nepal from a socio-psychological point of view involving culture as the basis of rationality. many of the previous researches have attempted to explore relationships between terrorism and other sociological factors like poverty, literacy, age group, and in some cases, ethnicity and globalization. but their findings are contradictory in nature. they have been useful to reinforce conventional arguments about the particular instances of rationalities of terrorism, but they have not been able to offer some specific tools for effective counterterrorism strategies. the complex socio-political space of nepal is evolving in such a way that conventional theories of social sciences have been unable to capture its dynamics. bidhan golay notes: nepali history seems caught in a time warp where the same old hackneyed events unfailingly keep appearing in its unchanging form over and over again. for some strange reason the paradigm of social enquiry in the hills remains 38 prajñā vihāra ossified and immune to the world of social and cultural theories.22 positioning the above arguments in the political space of nepal, it is important to investigate the issue of rationality for terrorism from the contextual cultural perspective endnotes 1 robert f.trager and dessislava p. zagorcheva, “deterring terrorism: it can be done”, international security 30 winter 2005/2006, pp.87–123. 2 martha crenshaw. “explaining suicide terrorism:a review essay”, security studies, vol.16 no.1, january 2007, p.141. 3 frey, b.s., luechinger, s., 2002a: “terrorism: deterrence may backfire.” paper prepared for the diw workshop on “the economic consequences of global terrorism” in 2002. available at: http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/39104/ diw_ws_consequ ences200206_frey_luechinger.pdf (last accessed on 30 june 2014). 4 raz, joseph (2005). “the myth of instrumental of rationality”, journal of ethics and social philosophy 1 (1): 2-28. http://www.jesp.org/ 5 nelson, benjamin, 1973. “civilizational complexes and intercivilizational encounters.” sociological analysis 34 (winter): 79-105. p.85 6 kalberg, stephen, “ max weber’s types of rationality: corner stones for the analysis of rationalization processes in history”, vol.85 american journal of sociology, (march, 1980) p.1146. 7 dryzek, j.s., deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations (oxford: oxford university press, 2000) p.31. 8 human actions are not guided by economic profit. individuals can sacrifice some of their benefits for the benefit of others and to achieve non-economic goals as well. see camerer, colin, behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. 2003, princeton university press, princeton, nj. see also andreoni, james (1990) “impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm glow giving,” economic journal 100:464-77. there are similar arguments like the notion of inequity aversion (fehr, ernst and klaus m. schmidt (1999) “a theory of fairness, competition and cooperation,” quarterly journal of economics, 114:817-68); preferences for fairness (rabin, matthew (1993) “incorporating fairness into game theory and economics,” american economic review, 83(5):1281-1302); preferences for reciprocity (falk, armin and urs fischbacher (2006) “a theory of reciprocity,” games and economics behavior bimal dahal 39 54(2):293-315); and combinations of intrinsic and reputational concerns (benabou, roland and jean tirole (2006) “incentives and prosocial behavior,” american economic review, 96(5):1652-1678). 9 max weber. 1949. the methodology of the social sciences (new york: free press, 1949), p.52. 10 see, simon, h.a., 1957, models of man (new york: wiley & sons, 1957). daniel kahneman, p. slovik, and a. tversky, judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1982). see also b. p. stigum and f. wenstop (eds), foundations of utility and risk theory with applications (dordrecht: reidel, 1983); isaac levi, hard chouces (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1986); l. daboni, a. montesano and m. lines, recent developments in the foundations of utility and risk theory (dordrecht: reidel, 1986) richard thaler, quasi-retional economics (new york: russell sage foundation, 1991); daniel mcfadden, ‘rationality for economists’, journal of risk and uncertainty, 19 (1999). 11 see, conlisk, john. 1996. “why bounded rationality?,” journal of economic literature 34: 669700. aslo see casson, mark and nigel wadeson. 1997. “bounded rationality, meta-rationality, and the theory of international business,” working paper no. 242 (discussion papers in international investment and management), dept. of economics, university of reading. 12 rasmussen, d.m. (1990). reading habermas. cambridge: basil blackwell. 13 see, ljubiša mitrović, “new social paradigm: habermas’s theory of communicative action”, the scientific journal facta universitatis, philosophy and sociology vol.2, no 6/2, 1999 pp.217 223. 14 for further reading, see, habermas, j. (1984). the theory of communicative action: reason and the rationalization of society (thomas mccarthy trans.). 1.boston: beacon press. 15 elster, jon (1997). ‘the market and the forum’, in: james bohman and william rehg (eds.), deliberative democracy (cambridge, m.a.: mit press). 16 pronin, emily; carolyn puccio and lee ross (2002). ‘understanding misunderstanding: social psychological perspectives’, in: thomas gilovich, dale griffin and daniel kahneman (eds.), heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgement (cambridge: cambridge university press). 17 kuhn, t.s. (1962). the structure of scientific revolutions (chicago: university of chicago press (2nd edition published in 1970)). 18 upa means near, ni means down, and sad means to sit. it refers to the tradition of getting knowledge and wisdom necessary for moksha by sitting down near a guru in the upanishadic system. 19 in nepal, the sweating of the statues of gods and goddesses is often interpreted as “divinity being angry with the rulers” by local gurus. in return, the ruler community offers resources, both materials as well as nonmaterial, to please the angry divine images. 40 prajñā vihāra after receiving the resources from the ruling elites, the religious community conducts a special ritual, chhema puja (worship for forgiveness) in order to pacify the angry god or goddess. if they fail to offer such special donation, then the community, normally in the periphery, confronts with the center with various means. sweating of a stone that represents god bhinsen in dolakha district of nepal is an illustrious phenomenon. 20 for hierarchical order of hindu society, see dumont, louis. homo hierarchicus: the caste system and its implications (originally published in french in 1966), university of chicago press, chicago, 1980. 21 said, edward.1993 culture and imperialism (new york: knopf), p.8. 22 golay, bidhan, “rethinking gorkha identity: outside the imperium of discourse, hegemony and history”. peace and democracy in south asia, volume 2, numbers 1 & 2, 2006, available at http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/ journals/pdsa/pdf/pdsa_02_01_02.pdf, retrieved on 12 december, 204.p.33. 48 prajñā vihāra classical greek architecture at the end of history: on hegel and greek architecture martyn amugen mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya buddhist university, thailand abstract in the following paper, i will attempt to argue that hegel’s theory concerning the end of art is possessed of solid aesthetical dialectic grounds when viewed against the background of classical greek architecture. it shall be argued that the perennial appeal of greek/neo-classicism in architectural form and to a somewhat lesser extent in interior decoration (the latter being slightly less visible) makes a good supporting argument for the end of art theory, because in the western world the greek classical form continues to appeal through neo-classicism. i shall diverge from hegel’s theory of the human form and statuary in greek classicism and confine myself in so far as is possible to architectural form as these are far more visibly prominent. the article will seek to make an argument for a form of metaphysical underpinning to the continual aesthetic appeal of classical greek architecture. keywords: aesthetics, greek-classicism, architecture, religion, perennial philosophy, beauty, intellect/spirit prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 2 july to december 2019, 48-60 © 2000 by assumption university press martyn amugen 49 i shall begin this paper by giving a brief overview of the three principal greek classical architectural periods. and show the perennial appeal of greek architectural classicism and neo-classicism on a metaphysical level. this will be done using the perennial philosophy to show how the spiritual makeup of man is touched by the majestic nature of greek architectural classicism and neo-classicism. we will then look at hegel’s end of art theory to see in what ways this timeless impact of greek architecture illuminates hegel’s approach. thus, we shall begin by just giving a brief overview of the three primary classical greek architectural structures, doric, ionic and corinthian and their concomitant accoutrements; as these will be necessary for understanding perennial nature and appeal of greek architectural classicism. the oldest structure (circa 600 bc) is that of the doric order, which according to becker in his article entitled greek architectural orders, marks the transition from construction in wood to stone for monumental structures. the doric column is largely plain in nature when compared image courtesy of thought.com 50 prajñā vihāra to the ionic and corinthian columns. doric columns were largely fluted unless unfinished and are characterized by not having a base which rests on the stylobate. good examples of the early doric would include the temple of artemis in corfu and the temple of hera in olympia both circa 580 bc. the next architectural order is that of the ionic, which is easily recognizable because of the two large eye like twirls that are at the top of each column and which are known as the volute, the abacus unlike that found in the doric style, is much thinner and the horizontal architraves are typically made up of three layers which then have a further thin horizontal layer which is decorated with very short vertical flutes, this layer in turn supports a thicker horizontal layer which contains the mouldings which can typically be decorated with images of the gods or heroic greek figures. there is a gable/pediment which ends with a raking cornice unlike its doric equivalent which has an acroterion at the edge of its gable. returning to the shaft/column, the flutes are narrower and the column itself terminates in a rounded base. the period for this particular style is around 500 bc and examples include the aigina, temple of aphaia from around 500bc and paestum, temple of ‘neptune’, early or mid-fifth century. the third of the greek classical architectural styles is that of the corinthian column which is typically characterized by its upwardly flowing acanthus leaves, the said columns tended to be slender and were largely favoured by the romans for use in more elaborate buildings like the temple of mars and the pantheon in rome. “the earliest known corinthian capital comes from the temple of apollo circa 427bc.” apart from the leaves the column normally possess a rosette in the centre at the top of the acanthus leaves and above this on either side a volute which in the top centre has a boss. it may be argued that hegel’s perspective on art was to try and understand it from an historical perspective. for hegel, art is ‘manifestation of truth’ but it fulfils this function only during the greek classical period, a form of art-religion. but, according to hegel, art in the modern world is no longer the highest instrument of truth. it still speaks to us from the martyn amugen 51 past, but not as the highest organon of truth. in hegel’s words art has lost its edge, it no longer appeals in the same way as it did in ancient greece: once the perfect content was manifested in perfect forms, the searching [weiterblickende] spirit turns away from this objectivity toward its own interior and shuns the former. such a time is ours. we can still hope that art will continue to rise and to perfect itself, but its form has stopped to be the highest necessity for the spirit. we might find the greek statues of the gods most excellent and god the father, christ and mary represented most dignified and perfect – it changes nothing, we still don’t bow our knee anymore. (13. 142) so, the role of art for the greeks during the classical era was one in which form was the highest necessity of spirit. in our time, art no longer fulfils that role in the human psyche. ancient greek art is a movement beyond symbolic art, for the depiction of the gods and goddesses is one akin to human form and thus mirrors the human mind. one may ask oneself what then is the problem here why can’t we in the modern age turn to those forms of gods and goddesses? because we are not entirely at home in our world in the way that the ancient greeks were, we just don’t have the same harmony between culture and nature, the human and the divine. the epics and tragedies that played such an important part in their religious beliefs, depicted the insolvable conflicts in lives of the greeks. poetry, music. and painting which inwood labels romantic art, could not adequately express itself because it had too much to express. “reflection on art, and in general reflection on the current state of the mind, gave rise to philosophy and to a theology independent of art. art was now open to philosophical and theological assessment, and no longer the final authority on the absolute.” 52 prajñā vihāra “romanticism”: is a term associated both with mediaeval christianity and with the romantics of hegel’s time. hegel argues that romantic art points to hidden depths that can’t be answered with art but with philosophy and theology. the need for philosophy and theology represents a disruption of the harmony of classical greek art since art is never entirely divorced from religion. before the ancient greeks developed philosophy they lived close to the surface of things. he gives then four explanations as to why art has declined from its peak in ancient greece. firstly he says that the perfect art of the ancient greeks will never reoccur, secondly that art will never regain the spiritual importance that it had for the greeks, thirdly that modern art is not as good as mediaeval or renaissance art and finally that no matter how good future art may be it will not make any additions to the pantheon of art or the development of the resources of the human mind. yet we are still touched by the various forms of greek architecture and we need to ask why this is so. we will argue that although the metaphysical underpinnings of greek art have largely been obscured by modernity, there are still traces, metaphysical underpinnings that appeal to the intellect and spirituality of man. they manifest themselves in the human desire for the majestic expressed practically and without excessive ornamentation. but what is the root of this? could it be spiritual, i.e. something appeals to the human artistic spirit that was best enshrined in classicism and neo-classicism? and if so, what is the basis of this spirit? or is the appeal purely an aesthetic one, without any appeal to spirituality? if one is to deal with the matter from a spiritual point of view, then there is no better place to begin than with plato and his ideas on how to get craftsmen to “pursue what is fine and graceful in their works…” plato is looking for what makes things kalon, fine, or that “ by which all fine things are fine.” and his answer is that which “makes us be glad, not with all the pleasures, but just through hearing and sight” this trace of kalon seems to persist to this day when we view greek classical architecture. one is then forced to ask concerning these underpinnings. it can be argued that it conforms with the notion in the symposium of a beauty that neither martyn amugen 53 waxes or wanes and is not beautiful in one place and ugly in another. because no matter from which angle one might stare at a column on a greek classical temple, it retains its spherical symmetrical beauty. greek architectural classicism possesses a form-like appeal in what one might call a reflective momentary glimpse of truth or spirit in an illusory world, a sense of some greater beauty that we should continually aspire to. all buildings require some form of physical support columns why not clad them in an ionic or corinthian façade as opposed to just leaving them as plain square columns; especially if they happen to be inside. why choose to decorate the top of door frames with a classical grecian temple pediments or when it comes to the entablatures of buildings with raking cornices, friezes, architraves, when simple blocks would suffice. which of us fails to marvel at the august nature of such classical architectural structures again and again, yet they are far more universally appealing than those fine things that a connoisseur might delight in, such as the taste of a fine wine or an aesthete who marvels at the harmonies of a bach chorale; for this classical and neo-classical architecture is not a matter of fashion or passing taste, or a refined education but one of continual appeal. even the humblest of us with limited education backgrounds can hardly fail to be impressed by buildings such as the southern entrance of the british museum with its neo-classical ionic façade, pedimented and supported by ionic columns. it is almost as though the building is saying “enter there is something great to be experienced here.” it is a building designed to appeal to both the humblest and the highest members in society. when we look at the united states supreme court building with its quadruple rows of corinthian columns, this venerable and imposing facade sends out a message of majesty and power. in addition, its east pediment depicting images of great figures from ancient civilizations, it is as though it seeks to convey a message of finality of judgement. like the british museum it is a building designed to have a universal appeal. one may argue that the appeal goes beyond the work itself in the following sense: 54 prajñā vihāra “if the eye is satisfied, it is because a physical order in the organ of perception corresponds to the rational order present in whatever is intelligible, and not because the work of art was for the sake of the eye or ear alone.” to see it is to be in awe of it. therefore, it must correspond to a kind of rational order. we could argue that neo-classicism and classicism itself draw us beyond the surface of their aesthetic structures, to some kind of order which is why their appeal is perennial. this most certainly conforms to the first two requirements of beauty as laid down by st. thomas aquinas in his summa theologica, “first, integrity or completeness, for broken things are ugly; second, due proportion and harmony.” st thomas also adds that this clearness and proportion is rooted in our minds, allowing him to conclude that beauty dwells in a contemplative life. might we not argue that part of the appeal of greek classicism is precisely this contemplative aspect? “clearness and proportion are both rooted in mind, whose function it is to order and light up a symmetry. hence beauty, pure and essential, dwells in the contemplative life, wherefore it is said of the contemplation of wisdom; and i became a lover of her beauty. beauty is shed on the moral virtues in so far as they shine with the order of reason, especially on temperateness, which clears the lusts that fog the light of intelligence.” whether or not this appeal is due to some kind of metaphysical or platonic underpinning, greek architectural classicism and neo-classicism has a perennial appeal to the spiritual nature of man. we need not to characterize this spiritual aspect but point to its presence. the maitri upanishad says “one comes to be of just such stuff upon which the mind is set.” in this sense we can appeal to perennial philosophy to understand this relationship to something called spirit, martyn amugen 55 something within us that is uncreated and awakened by the forms of classical greek and neo-classical architecture. those who adhere to the perennial philosophy believe that there is a hidden reality of which orthodox religions are mere manifestations. according to the traditional metaphysical view man has a three-part make up: spirit, soul and body. this is the spirit which is sometimes referred to as the intellect, the latter should not be confused with the general use of the term, which tends to refer to the cognitive function of the mind. for the purposes of this work we shall use the term spirit with a capital ‘s’, the second part of the make-up of man is his soul and then thirdly and finally, his body. the spirit is the part of man that allows him to be able to conceive the absolute, to quote william stoddart in situating the psyche; “it is the source of his capacity for objectivity, and of his ability—in contradistinction from the animals—to free himself from imprisonment in subjectivity it is the very definition of the human state.” the argument advanced by the adherents of the perennial philosophical school is that the spirit can know through recollection in the platonic sense. sotillos points out that the spirit “is the only supra-individual, ‘archetypal’ or objective element in man’s constitution. the soul on the other hand, is formal and individual.” we could argue that the spirit is appealed to by the majestic nature of greek architectural classicism and neo-classicism. using mystical theology as opposed to ordinary theology which makes the distinction between god, soul and man, the distinction is now fivefold. god/godhead, god the creator, spirit, soul, body. the spirit is the reflection of the absolute within the relative, or the uncreated within the created. this reflection manifests itself in truth, beauty, virtue, symbol and sacrament. we would argue that the architectural classicism of ancient greece and neo-classicism are a manifestation of beauty and symbol in the perennial philosophical sense. there are many forms of art that can make this claim, but the focus here is on greek architecture because of the omnipresence of its forms. it is more common than other sacred iconography and religious symbolism, and moreover its form has remained largely unchanged throughout the ages. for perennial philosophy, it is not 56 prajñā vihāra the symbol that is worshipped but what it symbolizes. this is to emphasize the danger of worshiping the symbol itself or its aesthetic surfaces. the symbol is but itself an avatar of the whole which is greater than itself. another analogy would be to read dante’s divine comedy, enjoying its use of prose and verse and not see its deeper meaning, “the teaching behind the strange verses.” in our argument concerning the perennial appeal of greek classical and neo-classical architecture one might make the argument that these are reflections of the platonic forms, harmony, beauty and so on. one might liken greek classicism to the iconography of a lost religion, where the deeper meanings have been obscured but the aesthetic appeal continues unabated, because it still possesses the forms which open to those deeper meanings. “the appeal of beauty is not to the senses, but through the senses, to the intellect.” thus far we have sought to defend hegel’s end of art theory on the grounds of the perennial appeal of greek architectural classicism and neo-classicism in its various forms as a physical form of symbolism that appeals to the spirit of man due to its reflection of meta-physical archetypes. one of the reasons the failure of modern man to appreciate the metaphysical aspects of greek architectural classicism is perhaps because its metaphysical foundations are considered to be outdated. most people are likely to consider the platonic ideas or forms as mere superstition. the following passage from coomaraswamy perhaps best illustrates the point of how man has moved away from perceiving the metaphysical to perceiving that of the functionally physical: “to have seen in his artifacts nothing but the things themselves, and in the myth a mere anecdote would have been a mortal sin, for this would have been the same as to see in oneself nothing but the “reasoning and mortal animal,” to recognize only “this man,” and never the “form of humanity.” it is just insofar as we do now see only the things as they are in themselves, and only ourselves as we are in ourselves, that we have killed the metaphysical man martyn amugen 57 and shut ourselves up in the dismal cave of functional and economic determinism.” yet despite this lack of feeling for the metaphysical we would argue that light, so to speak still manages to shine through just like a window painted over, a few shades of light manage to peak through the darkness. we have sought to defend hegel’s end of art theory on the grounds of greek classical architecture and neo-classicism’s continuing appeal using the perennial philosophy. we have not sought to defend it on the grounds of theology or a specific religious spirituality which hegel himself alludes to. although we have alluded to cultural difference, we have not given this as a reason for the lack of understanding on the part of modern man. we have instead sought to argue that modern man still possesses a psyche receptive to the same spiritual experience that his ancestors had, yet it has been heavily obscured. yet through this great span of history the symmetrical majesty of greek architectural classicism still continues to touch us in some way. endnotes 1. https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ancient-art-civilizations/greek-art/ beginners-guide-greece/a/greek-architectural-orders 2. a. lawrence, revised by r.a tomlinson, greek architecture, (new haven & london: fifth edition, yale university press, 1996), 97. 3. ibid., 101. 4. https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ancient-art-civilizations/greek-art/ beginners-guide-greece/a/greek-architectural-orders. 5. david james, art, myth and society in hegel’s aesthetics, (london & new york: continuum international publishing group, 2009), 4. 6. kai hammermeister, the german aesthetic tradition (cambridge, new york & melbourne: cambridge university press, 2002), 102. 7. ibid., 102. 8. michael inwood, edited by b. gaut & d. mciver lopes, hegel, routledge companion to aesthetics, (london & new york: third edition routledge 2013), 59. 9. ibid., 59. 10. ibid., 59. 58 prajñā vihāra 11. ibid., 61. 12. plato, edited by. john. m. cooper, complete works, (indianapolis: hackett 1997) republic 401 c-d (all quotations from plato’s works that are cited above are taken from this volume.) 13. ibid., 911. hippias major 294 b. 14. ibid., 915., 298 e. 15. ibid., 493. symposium, 211 a. 16. https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/eastpediment.pdf (accessed 9th march 2017) 17. ananda coomaraswamy, the essential ananda coomaraswamy, edited by r. coomaraswamy, (indiana world wisdom, 2004), 100. 18. thomas aquinas, summa theologica, 1a. xxxix. 8 trans. fathers of the english dominican province, rev. daniel j sullivan great books of the western world vols. 19-20. (chicago, illnois: encyclopaedia britannica 1925), 2a-2ae. cxlv. 2. 19. ibid., 2a-2ae. clxxx. 2, ad 3. 20. ibid., 2a-2ae. clxxx. 2, ad 3. 21. samuel b. sotillos, editor, psychology and the perennial philosophy: studies in comparative religion (indiana world wisdom, 2013), 158. 22. ibid., 25. 23. ibid., 25. 24. ibid., 27. 25. coomaraswamy., 104. 26. ibid., 104. 27. ibid., 106. 28. ibid., 130. https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/eastpediment.pdf martyn amugen 59 bibliography aquinas, thomas. the summa theologica. translated by the fathers of the english dominican province, rev. daniel j sullivan. great books of the western world, vols. 19–20. chicago: encyclopaedia britannica, 1925. burckhardt, titus. the essential burckhardt: reflections on sacred art, faiths and civilisations, edited by william stoddart, indiana; world wisdom, 2003. coomaraswamy, ananda. the essential ananda coomaraswamy, edited by r. coomaraswamy, indiana world wisdom, 2004. croce, benedetto. the essence of aesthetic, translated by douglas ainslie, london: william heinemann, 1921. ______________. what is living and what is dead of the philosophy of hegel, translated by douglas ainslie, london, bombay, calcutta, melbourne: macmillan, 1915. eco, umberto. on beauty: a history of a western idea, translated by alistair mcewen, london: seeker and warburg, 2004. hammermeister, kai. the german aesthetic tradition, cambridge, new york & melbourne: cambridge university press, 2002. hegel, georg, wilhelm, frederic. aesthetics: lectures on fine art, translated by t.m knox, oxford, new york & toronto: oxford university press, 1988. hume, david. of the standard of taste, 1757. inwood, michael. edited by b. gaut & d. mciver lopes, hegel, routledge companion to aesthetics, (london & new york: third edition routledge 2013 60 prajñā vihāra james, david. art, myth and society in hegel’s aesthetics, london & new york: continuum international publishing group, 2009. lawrence, a. revised by tomlinson, r.a. greek architecture, new haven & london: fifth edition, yale university press, 1996. perry, whitall. a treasury of traditional wisdom, new york: simon & schuster, 1971. plato. edited by. john. m. cooper. complete works, indianapolis: hackett 1997. schuon, frithjof. transcendent unity of religions. wheaton, il: quest books, 2005. ______. the essential frithjof schuon. edited by s. hossein nasr. bloomington, in: world wisdom, 2005. ______. light on the ancient worlds. bloomington in: world wisdom, 2006. ______. spiritual perspectives and human facts. bloomington in: perennial books, 1969. sotillos, samuel b. editor, psychology and the perennial philosophy: studies in comparative religion, indiana world wisdom, 2013. vernant, jean-pierre. the origins of greek thought, ithaca, new york: cornell university press, 1982. hume question of taste 106 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand abstract the global integration of economic, social and cultural activities has pushed the importance of translation to a new level. with the sheer volume of translation, and the increased demand for near instantaneous translation, there is a growing reliance on technological systems. this paper begins from the assumption that an examination of the conceptual foundations of translation is needed to understand the growing reliance on technological systems. the philosophy of language in later wittgenstein provides a rich resource for reconsidering current translation theories and practice, especially his ideas concerning “language games” and his theory of meaning. this paper discusses translation from a wittgensteinian perspective and urges caution against over-reliance on technological systems. key words: wittgenstein, chinese translation, language games, meaning theory translation and the philosophy of language translation is intimately connected with the concept of meaning: a translation is good insofar it is meaning preserving. but the concept of meaning is philosophically controversial, and it may be that the practice prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 107-113 © 2000 by assumption university press thuang fayang and michael clark 107 of translation is sensitive to philosophical issues about the nature of meaning (and related semantic concepts). the philosophical thought of later wittgenstein centres on the study of ordinary language. crucial to his later thought were the concepts of a language game and that of a form of life. these concepts are used to articulate a theory of meaning, expressed by his famous slogan: “meaning is use”. in addition to this account of meaning, there is a metaphilosophy in wittgenstein’s later work, according to which “philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.”1 this is ordinary language philosophy, according to which many traditional philosophical debates rest upon the misuse of language. the idea of “language going on holiday” refers to language that stops playing its normal function and begins to fail to achieve its original expressive effect. by carefully studying ordinary usage, these philosophers hoped to dissolve many traditional philosophical problems by correcting the linguistic confusions they rest upon. in wittgenstein’s framework, the words with which we communicate are props in ‘language games’ and you will only understand the language being used if you are able to play the game. that is the reason for wittgenstein’s claims that “[t]he language of religion is meaningful only to the religious followers.”2 the followers of the same religion often use the same words in their internal organizations, which have a communicative meaning among them. for those who are not believers of the same religion, we do not think that these religious words have any meaning or influence on us, because we are outside the game. words gain their meanings only from the context of the game. if you do not know the rule of soccer then, in your eyes, two soccer teams become just people running madly and meaninglessly. he admitted that certain similarities and commonality exist among different games; however, these commonalities are like crisscrossing ‘family resemblances’ and there is no deep or interesting feature that all games share and that distinguishes them as games. 108 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december chen jiaying points out that “the meaning of the original german sprachspiel is much wider than the meaning of the word game in chinese. it is too narrow to translate sprachspiel into language game while too broad into language activities, comparatively the first one will be better. however, we cannot understand sprachspiel totally based on the original meaning of game”3. so, the original intention of wittgenstein was to emphasize the rules, context and flexibility of language games, which can also be applied in the process of translating. before we start a translation, we must have a good cognition of the rules of both source language and target language, not only the usage of single word or sentence, but also handling slang, special terminologies, fixed collocation, interjection and metaphor, etc., which are also a parts of language games. take a chinese phrase “敷” (pronunciation: “fu yan”), for example, which means behave irresponsibly or treat others insincerely, and only deal with problems superficially. when it is translated into english, it should be translated as “lip service” in accordance with its implied meaning and fixed collocation, instead of literal translations like “say it but do not act”, “empty promise” that follow the chinese meaning. wittgenstein studied language in a descriptive way, saying “do not think, but look”. recently, a newly popular star draws much of the public attention. she is yang chaoyue, a member of a girl’s band. however, for some reason she is called “jinli”. in traditional chinese language, “jinli” refers to a kind of shining and bright red carp, which are popular in chinese culture for being colourful and joyous. in 2018, it became a buzzword on the internet, referring to good luck and great popularity. so, in the process of translation, it should be sufficiently understood and the changes between the traditional and new meanings should be distinguished. the translation “lucky people, lucky dog” is better and more appropriate than that of “koi fish”. people are using languages smoothly in language games without being restricted by past usage, instead, more and more fresh and vivid linguistic phenomena are created. so, firstly, translators cannot get stuck in traditional standards. secondly, an inclusive mentality that recognizes and learns new meanings learning is essential for effective translation. thuang fayang and michael clark 109 meaning is use the transformation of wittgenstein’s thought from tractatus logico-philosophicus to philosophical investigations reflects a wider turn of philosophical thought from logical positivism to behaviorism and pragmatism, in the 20th century. it shifts from the idea that language is a fixed structure to the realization that language is a rheological structure closely related to our daily life. later wittgenstein believed that creating a meaningful language is not to depict the logical formation of the world, but to use its conventional meanings in our daily life in a way of language games. “in most cases, meaning is use,” which is one of the most wellknown statements in his book philosophical investigations. “it’s not about what you say, it’s about the way you say it and the context in which you say it. the meaning of words is how to use them.”4 when investigating meaning, the philosopher must “look and see” the variety of uses to which the word is put. the meaning of a word is closely related to its use in the context, instead of being a designated referent. the philosophical view on language from wittgenstein, which blends language expressions into social practice, provides significant guidance to groups of people that want to communicate clearly and effectively. writers, journalists, and translators are often asked to put themselves in the audience’s shoes and prepare their own content accordingly. the thoughts of wittgenstein pushed this issue beyond the scope of linguistics and entered into the field of ethnology: listen and look how they play language games if you want to understand and communicate with certain social ethnic groups. within many contexts, slang, jokes, etc. are not merely secondary communication, but a form language system adopted within the social group. as to translation activities, wittgenstein’s theory of meaning can also be valued as guidance. the generation of meaning comes from the use of words in daily contexts, which emphasizes that we should accurately interpret and grasp the context in the process of translation. the style and content of the translation should be determined in accordance with the specific context. contexts can be interpreted on macro and micro levels. 110 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december the macro-level context refers to cultural, social, historical background of the text and its topic, theme and communicative function, which decide the “above-referential meaning.”5 take the american presidential election as an instance. when topics on politics are discussed and reported, a better acquaintance and understanding of american political system and election mechanism is necessary in order to reach the goal of translating the relevant reports correctly and conveying information factually. conventionally there are no two presidents existing in one country in the same reign period. however, when we translate american election news, the phenomenon of two presidents may appear in the target language. without a thorough study of the political and cultural background, it may not be possible to tell the difference between president and president-elect because there is no term to express the concept of “elected but not on the job” in chinese language. on the other hand, when the new president is waiting for his inauguration, the on-job president who is going to be relieved of his office soon is usually called a “lame duck”, referring to the decrease of his political influence. when being translated into chinese, the term “即将卸任的总统” should be adopted, meaning “outgoing president” instead of “跛脚鸭” (“lame duck”) which has an underlying implication of being crippled, clumsy, with the slight insult. this second, less successful, translation is widely used among newspapers and social media. the micro context refers to the context within the text, including a variety of words collocations, phrases and non-phrases, text, etc., which can determine meanings. translation texts of science and technology require preciseness; literary translation requires elegance; journalism translation requires conciseness and poem translation requires neatness. under different micro contexts, the usages and style should be carefully considered. in law texts translation, the nominalization of verbs is widely adopted, and sentences are simplified to the greatest extent, to avoid ambiguity as much as possible and guarantee the authority and prestige of law texts. thuang fayang and michael clark 111 wittgenstein believed that meaning is determined by use, so what we should make clear is how words are used. use is here understood broadly, to include social forms of life and scenarios. the meaning of words lies in use within various forms of social life. therefore, another aspect is needed to be mentioned here, that is, the acceptability of audience in ordinary language system also influences the meaning of language. besides context and content currency in target languages, the comprehensive quality of audience group needs to be taken into consideration: elite groups or just ordinary people in the neighborhood. the same financial report might be translated by adopting different translation strategies in text style and sentence-making. the methods and tools such as analogy, amplification, metaphor, free translation can be taken into consideration for audiences that possess no professional knowledge. the challenge that confronts any translator – human or ai – is that of playing, or simulating playing, the language games that are at issue in the context at hand. this requires sensitivity to all the features of context just mentioned. and it requires creativity, as we have to interpret novel usages – language is constantly adapting, after all, and the internet seems to accelerate this process exponentially. current ai translation programs work by accessing huge data banks of past usages of expressions, and exploiting statistical correlations between expressions. but past usage – even terabytes of data about past usage – does not suffice to determine the language game that is relevant for interpreting this use of some expression. and determining this kind of fact is the essential prerequisite for accurate translation, from the wittgensteinian perspective. conclusion the concept of a language game is central to wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language. i have not, in this paper, attempted a detailed exposition of this concept. however, the problem just noted would seem to arise on any candidate interpretation. for understanding and participation in language games requires more than just information of past usages (many of which will likely be irrelevant, for any given 112 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december context of translation). it requires participation – or the simulation of participation – in the form of life that is involved in the context at hand. and for ai technology to simulate such participation would require a quite different approach to translation than that which is used in extant translation systems. endnotes 1 wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, macmillan publishing company, 1953. 2 wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, macmillan publishing company, 1953. 3 chen jiaying, philosophy of language. beijing: peking university press, 2003. 4 wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, macmillan publishing company, 1953. 5 sun li, “on the influence of wittgenstein on liu miqing’s translation theory,” journal of northeast agricultural university, 2011. references c h e n j i a y i n g , p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . b e i j i n g : peking university press,2003. sun li, on the influence of wittgenstein on liu miqing’s translation theory[j], journal of northeast agricultural university,2011. wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, first edition: macmillan publishing company,1953. _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand prajnaviharav20n1.indd mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 1 january to june 2019, 1-17 © 2000 by assumption university press indonesian student perspectives on a humanity-based nationalism mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo atma jaya catholic university, indonesia abstract do the indonesian students revive the radical movements or do they have their own way in grasping nationalism in a globalized-world-perspective? how do they identify themselves as nation and how far they understand themselves the meaning of national solidarity? how effective their understanding on solidarity in the process of nation building? the aim of this study was to portray the perspectives of the indonesian higher education students on nationalism. this study applied qualitative approach, by implementing series of focus group discussion (fgd) and key informant interview (kii). forty students of three private universities located in three provinces in indonesia participated in six series of fgds and three political figures play role as resource persons in the kiis. the results of the study revealed that the students had three models of nationalism, that are, nationalism under the spirit of anticolonialism, nationalism under the national interests, and nationalism under the humanity perspectives. key words: higher education, indonesia, nationalism, political movement 2 prajñā vihāra introduction nationalism is an important buzz word in indonesian political movements. it can be traced back to the spirit of the indonesian youth oath in october 28 1928 when the indonesian people were ready to put aside regional, ethnic, and religious interests in building a nation. during this period, nationalism was effective in addressing the racial discrimination created by colonial society. the idea of an indonesian nation became a weapon to fight the colonial system. in this period, nationalism was coupled with the spirit of solidarity, togetherness, and sense of justice.1 during the period of indonesian struggle for independence in 1945, it became the fundamental tool for soekarno and hatta, the first indonesian president and vice president, to resist the dutch agitation. nationalism was then linked to the issue of state sovereignty. as soekarno stated “indonesian nationality is a unanimous decision! not javanese nationality, not sumatran nationality, not borneo nationality … but indonesian nationality which forms the basis of one nationale staat.”2 after the indonesian independence, nationalism the unity of indonesia becomes one of the five principles known as pancasila which includes the belief in one supreme god, a just and civilized humanity, a democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives, and social justice for the whole of the people of indonesia. in practice it was used to overcome the financial, economic, and political crises in 1998 and basically became the basic strategy in handling social and political conflicts such as conflicts in aceh, maluku, poso, and papua. in sum, nationalism is a principle which places the religious, regional, and ethnic interests under the national interest. rather than just being trapped in primitive tribalism and religious fundamentalism, to be loyal to the nation was the way to be indonesian. this historical understanding has become one of the basic arguments for defending nationalism in indonesia. its relevance, however, might be questioned. many believe that nationalism among the younger generations is on the decline since they are fascinated with global pop culture and its music, movies, fashion products and lifestyles.3 nowadays, all national mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 3 identities in the world are challenged by the process of globalization which seems to be accelerating and taking place on a grander scale than ever before. though such change is natural to human societies, the fear of the loss of indigenous cultures and the spirit of nationalism is growing. easy movements of capital, knowledge, technology and workforce across national borders which is accompanied by easy transfer of ideas, values and life-styles of different national origins, arouse fears among many of homogeneity and standardization. but our question is, within the context of this ‘easy transfer of ideas, values and life-styles of different national origin,’ is the idea of nationalism still relevant? how can it survive in this new wave of globalization? or better, in which way should it now be interpreted and understood? nationalism defined nationalism is defined by ernst gellner as “a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”4 gellner suggested that nationalism should not be regarded merely as sentiment which is coupled with the militant attitude5 but as a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across the political ones. this definition reflects an ethical universalistic spirit which holds that all ethnic identities exist under a political body and each state or political body should desire to preserve cultural diversity. this concept of nationalism involves principles, values, standards that guide behavior on various levels of awareness. most of the studies of nationalism in indonesia connect it with various ethical values and principles. yudi latief’s book on pancasila gave a historical sketch on the development of nationalism as a force fighting against colonialism in a diverse manner: both personal and public, archaic and rational, and religious and secular. the study ends with a discussion about the urgency of re-establishing unity within the framework of pancasila as state ideology.6 4 prajñā vihāra edward aspinall, in an article entitled “the new nationalism in indonesia” emphasized the idea that nationalism is an “increasingly bellicose rejection of alleged foreign inference in indonesia’s affairs and demands for greater international recognition of indonesia’s power and status.”7 this mood of nationalism is reflected in the ways indonesia tries to protect its domestic production and markets against foreign competition, defend indonesian traditions in promotional and marketing activities, and defend territorial integrity in the face of aggression and internal division. through this understanding, nationalism functions to connect individual citizens to a wider national narrative. aspinall concluded that contemporary nationalism is strikingly un-ideological but mostly connected with a preoccupation with national dignity. the emergence of a new nationalism in indonesia, as aspinall wrote, is the product of the democratization of indonesia political life.8 both latief and aspinall agree that the awareness of being colonized by the dutch and the preoccupation with national dignity are two aspects of indonesian nationalism. on one hand, nationalism is based on identification of the dutch as the common enemy. here, political unity is determined in contrast to a perceived threat. on the other hand, nationalism is also often based on the awareness that each nation has its own dignity. recent phenomenological studies on indonesian local wisdom carried out by armada riyanto reached this conclusion. he found out that nationalism is based on the readiness of all ethnicities in indonesia to accept plurality of ethnic identity as a fact. the study concluded that nationalism is a new phenomenological experience of what it means to be indonesian, which is broader than the local ethnic or religious communities. to be indonesian means to be multicultural. the desire to build a nation, to respect human dignity, and serve the general will of the people, are the conditions of the possibility to be a nationalist. through such a phenomenological awareness, the indonesian people realize that they are unified under the principle of unity in diversity.9 mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 5 method this study is intended to explore the models of indonesian’s students’ nationalism. it applies qualitative research methodology by implementing series of focus group discussions (fgd) and key informant interviews (kii). students from three private universities in three provinces in indonesia, namely sekolah tinggi ilmu ekonomi (stie) tri bhakti in bekasi, west java, universitas katolik atma jaya (unika) in jakarta, the capital city, and universitas sultan agung tirtayasa (untirta) in kota serang, banten participated in the fgds. the selection of the university participated in this study was based on the criteria of ethnicity and faith based affiliation. a phenomenological approach was used in analyzing the data. fgd participants from stie were students from class of pancasila (a required subject to be followed by first year students). there were 20 stie students (female= 13; male= 7) which was divided into two groups of fgd. the fgd participants from unika were senior activist students (female=2 and male=9; total 11 students). the fgd participants from untirta were both activist and first year students, and was divided into two groups (female =8; male= 9; total 17 students). in total, there were 5 fgds participated by 48 students (stie= 20; ajcui = 11; untirta= 17), and three political figures involved in kiis. fgd and kii protocols were developed as guidance for discussion and interviews. the focus of the questions was on the indonesian students’ political awareness, including were questions on, “does the indonesian students revive the radical movements or they have their own way in grasping nationalism in a globalized-world-perspective? how they identify themselves as nation and how far they understand themselves the meaning of national solidarity? do they prefer to realize that nationalism is congruent with the idea of freedom, independence, development, democracy, and justice? how effective is their understanding of solidarity in the process of nation building?” 6 prajñā vihāra results: models of nationalism the students generally understand that the aim of politics should be to produce the common good. it should give everyone dignity to live as a rational human being. based upon this understanding they are critical of those in the government and the parliament who practice politics as an art to gain power for the sake of power itself. one of the students relates: “we know that indonesia is the third largest country in the world which adopts democracy. but the country does not guarantee the welfare of the people. i think most of the political elites have no concern to the welfare of the people, except for themselves and the parties. vox populi, vox dei is actually not real in indonesia as long as the political elites are obsessed to power”. they understand that such political practices endanger the existence of the nation. for them, conflicts that occur in society most often have its roots in social and physical dissatisfaction. these problems can be solved through this ethical spirit of nationalism. “in case of national conflicts, all citizens and politicians should present themselves as one nation that should work together.” in such togetherness, every element of the nation should be recognized. one student claims that citizens, “should not be discriminated according to his or her socio-economic and political background.” nationalism, then, has two references. on the one hand, it refers to reality of the unity of the indonesian people, but on the other hand, it refers to the ethical norms which promote the social and political rights of the people. the students are using at least three models of nationalism based on their argumentation. the first one is confrontation-based nationalism: nationalism is based on the spirit of confrontation against an identified colonial enemy. their argument is historical: “we must remember that indonesia has been colonized for hundred years by the dutch. fighting against colonization is the spirit of our nationalism.” they describe that during the nineteenth century there were many small-scale rebellions mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 7 against dutch colonialism. the pattimura war, the diponegoro war, the padri war demonstrate this kind of nationalism. at this stage, nationalism was a tool of resistance by local communities against discriminatory treatment and exploitation by the colonial rulers. this nationalistic spirt of confrontation was also embraced by the indonesian intellectuals in the 1900s. this group spoke malay language, developed basic education for all, were united in religious and ethnic brotherhood, and had an interest in cultural and economic progress. this historical portrayal shows that nationalism is a long process: from local and regional movements to national movements which involved all elements of the nation. the aim of this national movement was to gain indonesian independence from colonialism. when the students explain nationalism as a political struggle against the dutch they are working at one level with a conception of nationalism whose political roots are in the identification of enemies. this is understandable, since historically this model of nationalism colored the early stages of the birth of indonesian nation. nationalism took the form of a common spirit to resist colonialism.10 for the students, soekarno was the main figure of this model of nationalism. nationalism meant love and be loyal to the state as a political organization in confrontation to colonialism and imperialism as common enemy. for the students, soekarno was an admirable figure who sacrificed his life for the nation. they seem to agree with sosrodiningrat who said: “[to] dare to be independent means [to] dare to defend indonesia and this means dare to fight” for the unity of the nation itself. in the words of the student: “nationalism means sacrifice.”11 besides historical argumentation which produced confrontationbased nationalism, many students also understand that nationalism is based on the spirit of pancasila. as they say: “indonesian nationalism is embedded in pancasila.” like soekarno, the students understand pancasila as the soul, the feeling, and the philosophy of the nation. almighty god, humanity, indonesian unity, democracy, and social justice are culturally based as they say: 8 prajñā vihāra “long before independence, the indonesian people had adored god as almighty, appreciated humanity as the crystallization of spiritual and cultural richness, practiced democracy as the indonesian way in reaching consensus, and idealized social justice as human telos in reaching happiness without humiliation, exploitation, and oppression”. but they also add, although nationalism is represented by the third principle of pancasila all other principles have their reference to this national interest. even the principle of the unity of god means that the indonesians must recognize all religions and must live according to the principle of tolerance. one of the students explains straightforwardly. it is true that “the majority of indonesian people are muslim, so indirectly the values adopted are religious values pivotal to islam. but indonesia is also an archipelagic country in which hundreds or even thousands of ethnicities live whose religions vary from each other. for this reason, tolerance must be our ethical norm.” for the students, tolerance is not an abstract ethical principle but has its ground on indonesian experience as nation. “we are one, we are indonesian.” they explain, encounters with others is the common experience for all indonesians. it is difficult to find in indonesia a tribe living homogeneously in one area. intermingling with “others” is a common experience for indonesians. so by saying, “we are one, we are indonesian” the students want to say that as human beings they are basically connected with others. “our life cannot be separated from others, from our group, from our ethnicities, and from our nation. in unity with others we become ourselves.” bhineka tunggal ika, the principle of unity in difference, is not just a motto, but an indonesian way of life. an indonesian has two sides: on the one hand he is a human being but on the other hand he is a cultural being. as a human being, everybody sees themselves as connected with the universe and the others. but as a cultural being, they live within a group or a religion. mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 9 this communal experience of humanity and of nation also underlies the indonesian understanding of the practice of democracy. democracy cannot be successful if the interests of nation are not addressed. democracy has no meaning if national unity is sacrificed for the interest of power. we can witness this in the recent cases of politicians who violate the spirit of plurality and diversity just for the sake of power. the students are especially disappointed by the political elites who inflamed religion sentiment in connection with jakarta’s governor’s election in 2016. they identify such a political practice as moral setback, because it sacrifices religious diversity and the spirit of cooperation which had been practiced for centuries by indonesia. nationalism also has its own basis on social justice. in a simple way one of students says that justice means to respect the rights of others. in a larger sense it means that they understand that the content of the constitution should follow the principle of social justice, that is ‘for the greatest benefit of the people.”12 nationalism then is not just an abstract principle but has its roots in the indonesia historical experience of living together as nation. through the encounter with others, everyone learns how to live as nation and has to be open to other realities. nationalism is a part of the learning process to be indonesian. one student describes this experience as follows: “actually, i graduated from an exclusive boarding school. in this school we are taught that ‘islam is number one’. nonmuslims are bad. the doctrine is still clear in my mind when i went to college. there were three non-islamic students in my class. my first impression was very shameful. i judged them on the fact that they ate pork. i had no desire to get to know them of sit with them. i even avoided touching their hands. but gradually as i got to know them, i felt there was no problem to sit with them, and talk with them. now finally i have concluded that people often become cruel when they live only in one closed environment. by understanding and entering into non-muslim’s lives, the 10 prajñā vihāra lines of separation between us and them, will disappear. i also asked my non-islamic friends: do you see things like us? now we can be one team, one study group. we enjoy that. so there must be spaces for togetherness if we really want to eliminate the gap”. students believe that nationalism has deep roots in indonesian human life. in the islamic communities they praise several role models, such as gus dur, quraish shihab, and gus mus. according to the students, these figures understand religion and also understand the plurality of indonesian cultures. we call this model of nationalism as national-interestbased-nationalism. as far as nationalism is a learning process, a movement among the young people toward a humanity-based-nationalism can also be considered. this would be a third model of nationalism. the students realize that nationalism is not merely based on the political interests but on the recognition of cultural and religious diversity. one of the students says: “in reality, we are living harmoniously in a pluralistic society. muslims and christians are all my neighbors. we are living in a harmonious way, except in moments of parliamentary or presidential elections. at those events we have to be more sensitive to the situation.” this means the encounter with others in all his or her differences is common for the students. for them, diversity is the truth of humanity and respect of other human persons means to be open to other religions and cultures. this kind of nationalism is appreciated by students who are educated in a critical environment. this group of students is quite unique because they no longer live in a specific political and social ghetto but in a multinational world which based on relationship, friendship, equality, and brotherhood with many other people outside indonesia. they no longer live according to the collective identity that we created, but in a new identity that transcends the national, cultural, and religious identity. digital technology and social media have brought them out of a merely national horizon. basically, they are very critical of the authoritarian mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 11 leadership, to the violations of privacy, and to the hatred and black campaigns in social media. for them, nationalism should be embedded in the spirit of humanity, democracy and social justice. with a critical tone, they emphasize that all human beings are equal and should be treated as an end not as the means for political interests. to live as a nation means to meet other human beings in all his or her differences. based on this understanding they cursed the jakarta governor election in 2016 as a human tragedy. one of them says: “it is shameful that religion is used as a means for politics. this practice endangers the solidarity which has been developed so far among religions, ethnicities, and races in indonesia.” the students realize that religion is not just the personal choice but also the way everybody exercises his or her life as human beings in a community. it should not be used as instrument for politics and power since any act of instrumentalization of religion will damage the social life and collective solidarity. in addition, they argue that democracy is the basis of nationalism. for them people should be given the opportunities to express their freedom, aspirations and capabilities to control the power they have been entrusted with. one of them says: “precisely because there is democracy, demonstration is a possibility. there used to be no democracy unless actually you can talk freely.” they argue that under soeharto, democracy has been practiced under the primacy of economic and political interest. in such context, the possibility for people to freely express their opinions is closed. for them, the quality of democracy is determined by freedom of expression. as far as people are free, democracy can become one of the pillars for nationalism. lastly, nationalism has a close relationship with justice. as an illustration, one of the students explains: “the economy in my village is still poor; the way the people work on land is still traditional; we do not have sophisticated technology; education is still lacking. so we need equal distribution of development.” for this student, nationalism means that every citizen should have the same opportunity to enjoy welfare, health and education. nationalism is here connected to equality and prosperity. 12 prajñā vihāra the nation as the experience of humanity phenomenologically speaking, at the heart of the students’ models of nationalism is the proposition that each nation has a unique contribution to the experience of humanity. unlike the confrontation-based-nationalism where each nation stands in confrontation with an enemy, and unlike the national-interest-based-nationalism where nation can be seen as the principle which gives form to unity in diversity, the humanity-basednationalism is an ethical imperative for the indonesian to develop him or herself according to new values such as humanity, democracy, and justice. understood in this way, the national experience of the humanity cannot be replaced.13 “in fact, we are not afraid. we already live together as a minority and a majority, the christians and the muslims. it is certain in our experience: to be indonesians means to be humans”. the students claim that there is correspondence between the religious, cultural and social experience, and the nation experience of the humanity. on the one hand, each religion, ethnicity, and culture are not only responsible for the realization of their values, but assist in the enhancement of the values of living together as nation. on the other hand, insofar as the nation is based on humanity, the nation can work together for the enhancement of the values of religion, ethnicity, and culture. students’ notions of humanity-based-nationalism is not merely a summation of the confrontation-based-nationalism and nation-interestbased nationalism models. the students’ ideal notion of humanity-basednationalism transcends the confrontation model and the national-interest model in the sense that the former is the standard to measure the latter models of nationalism. students’ notions of nationalism are often attempts to transcend a one-sidedly confrontation conception, and a one-sidedly national-interest conception. but the students do not completely deny the relative importance of mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 13 the confrontation-based-nationalism. the students have in mind that the confrontation-based-nationalism in some sense is necessary to defend the interest of the nation and its uniqueness. but insofar as the confrontation model fall short of its conception of nation’s uniqueness, the students’ ideal performs the critical function of pointing to the possibility of respecting the uniqueness of every nation. and on the other hand, insofar as the national-interest model recognizes the nation as uniqueness, this humanity-based-nationalism appropriates the idea of the national-interest-nationalism and intensifies it so that diversity is instrumental in the creation of human values. while the national-interest-model subordinates religious and ethnic interests to the national interest, the students’ ideal form of humanity-based-nationalism sees the nation as a community of human persons where all the members of the society can be enhanced. a nation then is not just a compilation of the individuals but precisely a community of human persons in interaction, where the variety of religions, cultures and educational background are important parts of their social experiences. as renan writes, “a nation is a soul, a spiritual being.”14 it is not a descriptive concept. it is not a fact but a status nascendi. in its nature, it is always in potentia, never becomes in actu. anchoring to this concept of nation, nationalism is not just an ideology but a social experience of human beings in its togetherness. from a phenomenological perspective, nationalism is not just an acknowledgement of nation as a political unity15 or a representation of collective identity16 but a kind of human solidarity in which the dialogue between cultures and values effects the quality of the whole value of a nation as moral cosmos.17 soekarno once called it gotong royong, or being together.18 such moral cosmos has certain social boundaries according to indonesian historical, cultural, and religious experience. conclusion nationalism does not have a single meaning. the indonesian students surveyed are developing their own meanings according to their religious, cultural and social experiences as national and global citizens. 14 prajñā vihāra whatever model they tend to embrace, they include religion, culture, education and social relationships in their understanding of nationalism. we may conclude that the more open the scope of education and social interactions, the more progressive their understanding of nationalism as an experience of humanity will be. the models represent the 20s years old students’ political awareness. this means that the students involved in this research are a part of the global culture and the internet generation. the results of the study show that the encounter with others can change their perspectives on the world, culture, and religion. this means that the confrontationbased-nationalism is possible as far as the students live and are educated in a traditional closed environment. in such environment, they can often be suspicious of otherness. this tendency however, can be reduced. in the globalized internet, the students are invited into the virtual world in which everybody is involved in shared knowledge and values with cultural and religious “others.” in this new environment, the students can identify themselves both as indonesian and human. based on this identification, nationalism is the possibility of being cosmopolitan or international.19 it is possible because the encounter with other religions, ethnicities, and races can open up the possibility of understanding each other as humans. in such a new moral cosmos, the students can be very critical concerning issues of social justice. the gap between the rich and the poor can become a trigger for the rise of anger. for the students, the legitimacy of nationalism lies in two things, namely prosperity and economic growth. if it fails to provide these two, nationalism will lose its meaning. for the students, nationalism is congruent with the people expectation for better life and an improved standard of living. these findings concerning the evolution of nationalism, of course, are connected to the times. the students are now living in a period of ideas: nationalism, freedom, equality, and brotherhood, justice, and democracy. but these ideas cannot have a hold on their imagination without their practical presence within the community. the older nationalism which regarded the outsider as enemy still has an influence on indonesian mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 15 emotional and mystical experience. so radicalism remains a real possibility when nationalism is separated from the people expectations for prosperity and a better life. endnotes 1 singgih tri sulistiyono, “the importance of indonesian’s nationalism revitalization in the globalization era: a historical perspective,” journal of maritime studies and national integration 2/1 (2018): 1-15 2 soekarno, di bawah bendera revolusi (under the flag of revolution) vol. 1 (jakarta: panitia di bawah bendera revolusi 1964), p. 102 3 teriska rahardjo, “penumbuhkembangkan nilai-nilai karater kebangsaan melalui pendidikan formal, non-formal dan infromas (“values and nation building”) in daoed joesoef and pontjo sutowo, nilai-nilai keindonesiaan (indonesian values) (jakarta: kompas, 2017), p. 259 4 ernst gellner, nations and nationalism (oxford: basil blackwell publisher limited, 1983), p. 1 5 max sylvius handman. “the sentiments of nationalism,” political science quarterly 36/1 (1921): 104-121 6 yudi latief, negara paripurna, historisitas, rasionalitas, dan aktualitas pancasila (the pure state: the historicity, rationality, and actuality of pancasila) (jakarta: pt gramedia pustaka utama 2012): p. 332 7 edward aspinall, “the new nationalism in indonesia,” asia & pacific studies. 3/1 (2015): pp. 72-82 8 ibid. 9 armada riyanto et.al., (editors) kearifan lokal pancasila butir-butir filsafat keindonesiaan (pancasila and local wisdom, an indonesian philosophy) (yogyakarta: kanisius 2015), pp. 36-37 10 yudi latief, negara paripurna, historistas, rasionalitas, dan aktualitas pancasila (the pure state: the historicity, rationality, and actuality of pancasila), p. 305 11 ibid., p. 329 12 the constitution of republic of indonesia, article 33 13 armada riyanto et.al., (editors) kearifan lokal pancasila butir-butir filsafat keindonesiaan (pancasila and local wisdom, an indonesian philosophy), p. 27 14 ernst renan, “what is a nation?” text of a conference delivered at the sorbornne of march 11th 1882, an english translation by ethan rundell. the text is taken from the internet: ucparis.fr/lifes/9313/6949/9943/what_is_a_nation.pdf 16 prajñā vihāra 15 carl schmitt, der begriff des politischen. text von 1932 mit einem vorwort und drei corolarien (berlin: duncker & humblot 1996), p. 24 16 lutz niethammer and axel dossmann, kollektive identitaet, heimliche quellen einer unheimlichen konjunktur (reinbeck bei hamburg: rowohlt taschenbuch verlag gmbh, 2000), p. 19 17 r.a. reinier ibana, solidarity and social analysis (manila: cardinal bea institute 1993), p17 18 soekarno, pantja-sila sebagai dasar negara (pancasila as state philosophy), jilid 3 & 4 (jakarta: kementrian penerangan ri 1958), p. 57 19 sudiarja. a. et.al., (editors) karya lengkap driyakara esai-esai filsafat pemikir yang terlibat penuh dalam perjuangan bangsanya (driyarkara: complete works) (jakarta: penerbit pt gramedia pustaka utama, 2006), p. 846 bibliography aspinall, edward. 2015. “the new nationalism in indonesia,” asia & pacific studies. vol.3, no. 1: pp72-82 gellner, ernst. 1983. nations and nationalism. oxford: basil blackwell publisher limited. handman, max sylvius. 1921. “the sentiments of nationalism,” political science quarterly. vol. 36, no. 1: 104-121 ibana, r.a. reinier. 1993. solidarity and social analysis. manila: cardinal bea institute joesoef, daoed dan sutowo, pontjo. 2017. nilai-nilai keindonesiaan (indonesian values). jakarta: kompas latief, yudi. 2012. negara paripurna, historisitas, rasionalitas, dan aktualitas pancasila (the pure state: the historicity, rationality, and actuality of pancasila). jakarta: pt gramedia pustaka utama niethammer, lutz und dossmann, axel. 2000. kollektive identitaet, heimliche quellen einer unheimlichen konjunktur. reinbeck bei hamburg: rowohlt taschenbuch verlag gmbh mikhael dua and clara r. p. ajisuksmo 17 rahardjo, teriska. 2017. “penumbuhkembangkan nilai-nilai karakter kebangsaan melalui pendidikan formal, non formal dan informal” (“values and nation building”) in joesoef, daoed dan sutowo, pontjo. nilai-nilai keindonesiaan (indonesian values). jakarta: kompas renan, ernst. 1882. “what is a nation?” text of a conference delivered at the sorbonne of march 11th 1882, an english translation by ethan rundell. the text is taken from the internet: ucparis.fr/ lifes/9313/6949/9943/what_is_a_nation.pdf riyanto, armada et.al. 2015. kearifan lokal pancasila butir-butir filsafat keindonesiaan (pancasila and local wisdom, an indonesian philosophy). yogyakarta: kanisius schmitt, carl. 1996. der begriff des politischen. text von 1932 mit einem vorwort und drei corolarien. berlin: duncker & humbolt soekarno. 1964. di bawah bendera revolusi (under the flag of revolution), vol. 1. jakarta: panitia di bawah bendera revolusi soekarno. 1958. pantja-sila sebagai dasar negara (pancasila as state philosophy), jilid 3 & 4. jakarta: kementrian penerangan ri sudiarja. a. et.al. 2006. karya lengkap driyakara esai-esai filsafat pemikir yang terlibat penuh dalam perjuangan bangsanya (driyarkara: complete works). jakarta: penerbit pt gramedia pustaka utama sulistiyono, singgih tri. 2018. “the importance of indonesian’s nationalism revitalization in the globalization era: a historical perspective” journal of maritime studies and national integration, (2/1): 1-15 11(158-162)note for authors book review the gospel according to judas by benjamin iscariot, recounted by jeffrey archer with the assistance of prof. francis j. moloney. london: macmillan, 2007, 96 pages. isbn-13:978-0-230-52901-4 the name judas brings a negative connotation to the mind of most christians. no parent would have their son bear the name judas at baptism. that name has become the symbol of treachery and betrayal throughout christendom. in april 2006 national geographic society, after spending more than two years restoring the document and translating it from coptic1, an ancient egyptian language, unveiled publicly the controversial gospel of judas – a fourth century text, a 31-page papyrus document bound in leather and discovered in a cave in egypt.2 the announcement of this document unleashed a controversy regarding its authenticity since it now challenges the popular christian version of the story of jesus’ betrayal. in contrast to the canonical gospels, the supposed gospel of judas portrays judas as jesus’ most beloved and trusted disciple. moreover, it describes the betrayal of jesus as an event planned by jesus himself and as part of the divine plan. the gospel of judas asserts that the disciples had not learned the true gospel, which jesus taught only to judas iscariot. while the original author is unknown, the church father irenaeus mentions a gospel of judas in his anti-gnostic work adversus haereses (against heresies) in the year 180 c.e., and he called the group who possessed the gospel cainites, or followers of cain.3 it is a known fact that during those early days of christianity, texts considered heretical by the orthodox church authorities were ordered destroyed. many texts survived since their adherents buried them in obscure places. some of these texts would be unearthed many centuries later. as far as the gospel of judas is concerned, an egyptian farmer rediscovered it in the early 1970s in a cave. the document was being sold to the scholars at a price of $3 million. not being purchased it found its way to a bank safe-deposit in new york for 17 years until it was finally acquired by the national prajñâ vihâra, volume 8, number 2, july-december, 2007, 153-157 153 © 2000 by assumption university press geographic society as its private collector. what is the historical value of this document? this document could be helpful in reconstructing the history of gnosticism, especially in coptic-speaking areas. besides that, the nt scholar a.j. levine emphatically stated that the gospel of judas contains no new historical information concerning jesus or judas. there have been on-going controversies and disagreements as to the accuracy of the english translation of the coptic text. to counter-act this gnostic text, an intense collaborative effort between a storyteller [jeffrey archer] and a scholar [fr. francis j. moloney] resulted in the writing of the gospel according to judas, by benjamin iscariot. when archer sought the advice of the scripture scholar cardinal carlo maria martini of milan “on who should guide him through this demanding project”, the latter particularly singled out his former student at the pontifical biblical institute, the salesian francis j. moloney. the introduction to the novella described the project as: “archer would write a story for twenty-first-century readers, while moloney would ensure that the result would be credible to a first-century christian or jew.” archer confesses, “i’ve always been mystified why judas has been called the evil traitor.” fr. moloney finds the traditional interpretations of judas as too simplistic. who is jeffrey archer? according to los angeles times, jeffrey archer is “one of the top ten storytellers in the world.” he is britain’s topselling novelist who produced series (e.g., kane and abel [1979], the prodigal daughter [1982], and novels (e.g., the eleventh commandment [1998], honour among thieves [1993], first among equals [1984], and prisoner at birth [2008]. he has likewise written numerous plays, picture books, and short stories. archer was a former member of british parliament and deputy chairman of the conservative party. as a storyteller, archer is indeed a master who “plots with skill and keeps you turning the pages” (boston globe). this provocative gospel according to judas, purportedly written by judas’s first born son, benjamin, is written in numbered verses and follows the narrative style of the canonical gospels. it consists of twenty154 prajñâ vihâra five chapters with a total of 792 verses. it retells of the story of jesus through the lens of judas by using the canonical texts as its basic point of departure. the tone of the novella is that of a loyal son attempting to rehabilitate his father’s name because he could not accept him as a notorious traitor. this judas-friendly interpretation of the gospel presents to us judas iscariot as a misunderstood disciple and dispels the rumor that he was a traitor, bribe-taker and killer of self. it also sheds light on what happened to him after the crucifixion of jesus. judas did not kill himself but survived to tell his story to his son. besides the canonical gospels as main reference, what intrigues me is archer never mentioned his other sources. it is not also clear what role moloney precisely played in the writing of the story. what are the contentions of the re-created gospel according to judas? . jesus was a child born of joseph and mary conceived in the conventional way (p.5). . in order to bring about jesus’ messianic enthronement, judas is willing to sacrifice his own life for jesus (p.41) . judas offered to identify jesus to the scribe to save jesus from unnecessary death (pp.71, 72). . judas eventually came to believe that jesus was not the messiah and he never believed that he was the son of god (pp.63, 75, 83). . judas denied that jesus walked on water (p.87). . jesus did not change water into wine at a wedding feast in cana (p.87). . judas wept after the scribe accused him of being a betrayer (p.77). . at the governor’s fortress where pilate presented jesus to the people, judas was all alone shouting, “save him, save him”. his lone voice was overwhelmed by the brutal cries of the masses (p.78). . judas could not have taken his own life because: (a) only one of the four gospels said so4 (p.88); (b) it is prohibited in the hebrew scripture to take one’s life. no pious jew would book review 155 ever consider taking his own life (p.88). . judas could not accept that jesus had risen from the dead (p.83) archer and moloney depict that judas was unremorseful and motivated, not by greed, but by disenchantment over jesus’ refusal to throw the romans out of the jewish homeland. judas belonged to those first-century hard line jews who expected jesus to restore the throne of david via military means. but to judas’s disappointment, jesus was more concerned about helping the poor and the destitute, healing the sick rather than getting rid of the romans. thus, when jesus chose to ride the donkey as he entered the city of jerusalem in the midst of a powerful roman army that was a decisive indication for judas that jesus is surely not the longawaited messiah. the gospel according to judas is very readable account. whether archer and moloney succeed in rehabilitating judas as the infamous betrayer of jesus is hard to tell. the authors have solicited the support of leading churchmen including lord carey, the former archbishop of canterbury, and archbishop desmond tutu of cape town, to vouch for the book. the sunday times issue of january 7, 2007 reports that “while the archbishops enjoyed reading it, they do not accept all its theories.” pope benedict xvi has admitted that “the betrayal of judas remains a mystery.” could it be that history has not treated judas fairly? in this case, the gospel according to judas is indeed a compelling story for twenty-first century readers. reviewed by arnold t. monera 156 prajñâ vihâra endnotes 1 coptic was the indigenous language of egypt spoken from c.e. 200 to 1000. 2 the current coptic 4th century text may be a translation from an older greek manuscript dating to approximately ce 130-180. there is no certainty however whether this text mentioned by irenaeus is in fact the same as the coptic “gospel of judas” of the extant fourth century. the codex originally contained 31 pages, recto verso, but when it came to the market in 1999, only 13 pages remained. it is speculated that individual pages had been removed and sold. see http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/gospel_of_judas. retrieved on 31 january 2008. 3 according to the church father, epiphanius of salamis (ca. 310-403 c.e.), the cainites boasted of being relatives of cain, the sodomites, esau and korah. those who know their bible well will be reminded that these characters are biblical villains. it is no wonder therefore that these people admired judas iscariot, the greatest villain of all. 4 of the four gospels, only matthew describes judas’s death by hanging himself. book review 157 72 prajñā vihāra prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 71-92 © 2000 by assumption university press between east and west: religion and morality in the thought of nietzsche, zen buddhism and jordan peterson christopher ryan maboloc ateneo de davao university, philippines abstract this paper investigates the proximate relation between religion and morality through the shared features of the philosophy of f. nietzsche, zen buddhism, and the psychologist jordan peterson. peterson associates the concept of multiple hierarchies in the evolution of life and society to the behavior of lobsters, also drawing from religion, psychology, and nietzsche’s thought. while finding a common theme between eastern and western philosophy appears difficult if we follow peterson’s concept of an ethos, this study will reveal that transcendence as self-overcoming is a dominant idea that can be found in all three perspectives. keywords: nietzsche, zen, peterson, self-overcoming, ethos christopher ryan maboloc 73 introduction what does it mean to be human? how can man rise above himself? what is the relation between evolution and truth? are morals built upon a longer historical process? what is truth? in what truth is religion rooted? these important questions often draw our attention into the structure of an ethos that determines for us the meaning of human life. in pursuing the connection between the eastern and western views of the self, this paper will put into contrast the thoughts of friedrich nietzsche, zen buddhism, and the psychologist jordan peterson. the focus of this investigation is the latter, who offers an insight by making an association between the human ethos and biology. peterson begins his book, 12 rules for life: the antidote to chaos, by citing the relevance of the study of lobsters to his concept of multiple hierarchies: if you are like most people, you don’t often think about lobsters – unless you’re eating one. however, these interesting…crustaceans are very much worth considering. their nervous system is comparatively simple, with large, easily observable neurons, the magic cells of the brain. because of this, scientists have been able to map the neural circuitry of lobsters very accurately. this has helped us understand the structure and function of the brain and behavior of more complex animals, including human beings.1 peterson sees a proximity between the behavior of lobsters and the character of humans. like lobsters, human beings struggle to reach the apex of a hierarchy. to survive, peterson says that human beings must be assertive. humans have a natural ability to climb up into dominant positions. inequalities for peterson are not necessarily wrong. for him, the presence of inequalities in society simply means that some have the competence to rise above others. societies, he thinks, would not survive without multiple hierarchies. the ability to lead and pursue novelty is more powerful than any type of ideology which for peterson only 74 prajñā vihāra retrogress humanity. against the anomalous conception of history by socialism, peterson believes that the source of the ethos of human survival is evolutionary. as such, the individual must understand himself through the constant questioning of both the ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ territories of human existence. things in the cosmos change beyond the control of the individual. man is put into that type of conflict in which one part of his life is placed comfortably in a ‘world of order’ and another in the ‘reality of chaos’. the depth of this view was explored by nietzsche. nietzsche’s position appeals to greek mythology to explain the apollonian and dionysian elements in man, the two conflicting forces that compose the human spirit. for nietzsche, the meaning of life comes from the fateful unity of the two. to survive the nihilism of our time, nietzsche proclaims the ‘death of god’ so that man can reconstruct his moral values. the will to meaning zen buddhism manifests the desire for meaning through ‘transcendence’. transcendence for zen is about the ‘ineffable’. it is beyond logos. to overcome the self, man must stop the self-destruction caused by the negation of human existence. zen buddhism proposes going beyond dualistic thinking. the essence of reality is ‘affirmation’. this ultimately constitutes the meaning of self-realization. zen buddhism is grounded, according to alfredo co, in the assertion that, “all reasoning must be destroyed and a new form of consciousness that defies logic must be realized.”2 zen, by description, goes beyond the empirical. it prevails over ordinary reason. christmas humphreys says that, “zen is beyond discussion and is beyond the sway of opposites by which all description and argument are carried on.”3 peterson has formulated a similar trajectory.4 firstly, he attacks the idea of nihilism in maps of meaning: the architecture of belief. the idea of nihilism is that ‘movement into nothingness’ wherein the nihilist attitude rejects any framework of value. for peterson, human beings are oriented towards a hierarchy of values. human finitude, in this case, christopher ryan maboloc 75 suggests that while life is suffering, the more fundamental truth of human life is that man is in pursuit of the meaning of life. man is responsible for the meaning of his life. this meaning dwells in the ability of the individual to find his place in the world. this is what ‘transcendence’ all about. peterson says that man prepares himself for meaning and makes the ‘unknown’ as motivation.5 for nietzsche, the principles and values of christianity has wrongly defined for individuals their moral world. the thinker assails christianity, branding it as a form of “slave morality”. he despises not only the religion, but also the institution which he considers as corrupt. nietzsche writes in the anti-christ: “all the ideas of the church are now recognized for what they are as the worst counterfeits in existence, invented to debase nature and all-natural value.”6 in this way, nietzsche thinks of religious men as usurers and christianity “the religion of pity.”7 he says that a priest exchanges the real world for something that seems glorious but is actually fictional, and christianity, through pity, multiplies and increases the loss of strength in human beings. like nietzsche, peterson also draws from myths and explains how religious value systems developed from them over time. for him, myths provide an ethos for understanding reality. this ethos puts order into chaos. this is interwoven in that narrative in which the gods assume specific roles that serve as the mirror-image of man’s actual place in the universe. peterson says that “the mythological perspective has been overthrown by the empirical; or so it appears. this should mean that the morality predicated upon such myth should have disappeared, as well, as belief in comfortable illusion vanished.”8 peterson believes that man might now finds himself in an absurd situation. he often loses track of the meaning of life, forgetting that fact that “life is intrinsically, religiously meaningful.”9 in zen buddhism, religion must go beyond any form of conceptualization. it belongs to an unobstructed higher plane. the deeper meaning of religious experience in zen buddhism surpasses formal abstraction. upon examination, we find that the intellect must deal with 76 prajñā vihāra worldly functions and concerns. the brain is limited to that which is simply pragmatic, calculable and practical. life becomes a problem-solving activity. but beyond this worldliness, co explains that zen, through meditation, is “in the search for inner peace, tranquility of the mind or insight into the unknown, realization of the absolute, the intellect proves to be of very little importance.”10 nietzsche believes that buddhism sees suffering in the negative sense. freny mistry, in nietzsche and buddhism, explains that “in proclaiming suffering to be an ontological reality, buddhism, in nietzsche’s view, does not do justice to this insight by embracing suffering as the fount of human creativity; it views suffering in terms of an evil engendered by the accretion of past guilt and action, and therefore to be eliminated.”11 mistry thinks that nietzsche’s response to human suffering or “affliction reveals a greater consonance of outlook than nietzsche would have us believe.”12 however, he also affirms that, “nietzsche’s life and writings reveal suffering as an experience of self-overcoming.”13 peterson believes that some framework is necessary so that humans would not return to a universe of disorder. without culture, he says that man would succumb to the uncertainty of his values. the pursuit of values for peterson means that natural species, through the long process of evolution, create complex relations. he writes: “the ancient part of your brain specialized for assessing dominance watches how you are treated by other people. on that evidence, it renders a determination of your value and assigns you a status.”14 the hierarchies define who is competent. for him, this type of characterization cannot be based on gender roles or group identity. in this way, inequalities become natural because of the pareto optimal occurrence in the structures of the human organization. to such a hierarchy belongs the power to generate new actualities. in zen buddhism, everything is metaphysically characterized by the idea of impermanence. for that matter, everything that exists “is always moving, moving, moving, changing, changing, changing, – nonstop.”15 indeed, nothing is permanent. in the same way as nietzsche conceives of reality as becoming, zen also endorses the idea that truth is ‘changing’. christopher ryan maboloc 77 this sense of continuity, makoto ozaki says, means that “zen is centered upon a moment of every present without mediating the historical epochs between the present and eternity with the result of the immediate unity of the present time and eternity, remaining abstract.”16 meaning, for peterson is the chief antidote to chaos. to illustrate this point, he opines that “there is an unspeakably primordial calculator, deep within you, at the very foundation of your brain, far below your thoughts and feelings.”17 however, humans also need to know where meaning comes from. nihilism points to a lack of goal or purpose in life which makes people mere “playthings.” the “death of god,” in this way, also becomes some kind of a prognosis in terms of an individual who comes into terms with his existence to determine where the meaning of life is. this enables him to organize himself, according to peterson, as a part of the hierarchy. the person acquires, by means of his psychological motivations, the instinct that will elaborate his sources of meaning. for peterson, there is a complex structure in man which allows him to endure life. man can derive the meanings therein which make him function in the world. thus, the preservation of the hierarchy is the goal because it is where meaning dwells. what is truth? the truth for nietzsche is in a constant flux. in beyond good and evil, nietzsche writes that “the more abstract the truth is that you would teach, the more you have to seduce the senses to it.”18 nietzsche is explicating the character of platonic concepts. plato taught a dualism – the ‘world of forms’ and the ‘world of objects’, indicating that only ‘forms’ are real whereas ‘objects’ are mere copies. for nietzsche, one has to overcome plato’s metaphysics. nietzsche appears to attack logos as truth. andre van der braak explains that for nietzsche, man has to overcome his rootedness in the platonic world and aim “at becoming able to incorporate more and higher perspectives, not in order to know the truth, but in order to become an embodiment of it.”19 zarathustra teaches man to burn himself and rise from the ashes. in this way, man 78 prajñā vihāra recreates himself into something new. through this novel interpretation of human existence, man would be able to overcome the impermanence of human existence. for peterson, the truth is primordial. here, we can interpret this as some form of a ‘will to power’ in the nietzschean sense. braak writes in nietzsche and zen that the ‘will to truth’, as opposed to the ‘will to power’ only seeks to discover truth as the object of the senses.20 what this means is that the ‘will to truth’ is limited to the mirror-image of the world. truth emerges as a representation of human finitude. for nietzsche, ‘the will to truth’ is to know what is empirical. but peterson, in this light, expresses that empiricism and rationality have distorted the power of myths. peterson says that humans must act on the basis of an ethos, an evolutionary framework that is for him is much older than the rational tradition of the enlightenment, one that arises from millions of years in the evolutionary process, evident in the behavioral traits of some animals, preserved as myth, passed on as a narrative, and then finding its way by being coded into laws that guide how people must behave and act. in zen, the truth is beyond words. master sahn says that, “zen means not being attached to words and speech. if you are attached to words and speech, you cannot understand your true nature and the nature of this whole universe.”21 rising above words means that zen, “consists in acquiring a new viewpoint on life that we forego ordinary thinking that controls our usual life.”22 but words do not only express what people do. words also decode who we are. but precisely, this is what limits our perspective. co says that the “tranquility of the mind or insight into the unknown, realization of the absolute, the intellect proves to be of very little importance.”23 it is logos that controls us. yet, it is only by means of the ‘ineffable’ in which we are able to know the meaning of what is inside of us. nietzsche emphasizes the affirmation of human existence through the apollonian element in man. this expresses the importance of myth for nietzsche. man is depicted as god and hero in greek tragedy, demonstrating his struggles and the poetic ways in which such can be christopher ryan maboloc 79 overcome. young explains that for nietzsche, “the good artist is never an ‘educator’ in this sense – it does produce a simpler world, a shorter solution to the riddle of life, an abbreviation of the endlessly complicated calculus of human action and desire.”24 art for nietzsche ought to be a signpost that guides humans into the future.25 the concrete attributes of man, his capacity to celebrate life in the midst of all the disorder, giving balance into disunity, is the way in which man builds a future. this is how man rises above himself. nietzsche writes in human, all too human: the artists of earlier [greek] times who imaginatively developed the existing images of the gods and imaginatively develop a beautiful image of man: he will scent out those cases in which, in the midst of our modern world and reality and without any artificial withdrawal from or warding off of this world, the great and beautiful soul is still possible, still able to embody itself in the harmonious and wellproportioned and thus acquire visibility, duration and the status of a model, and in so doing through the excitation of envy and emulation, help create the future.26 nietzsche, as cited by peterson, exclaims the demise of the christian god: “have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, ‘i seek god! i seek god!’ as many of those who do not believe in god were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter.”27 transvaluation may be a necessity in the nietzschean sense, but peterson thinks that the emergence of any civilization could not have occurred without some meaningful framework that organized belief systems in the first place. peterson counters, by asking this equally thought-provoking question: “how is it that complex and admirable ancient civilizations could have developed and flourished, initially, if they were predicated upon nonsense?”28 peterson acknowledges that the ultimate demise of all religious values would result to the destruction of what holds everything together. as an example, he mentions the emergence of totalitarianism. 80 prajñā vihāra the fall of religious values caused the many horrors and evils in history, the most appalling of which is the death of millions in the two world wars. that being the case, it is wrong to assume that there is no meaning to life. in nietzsche’s aesthetic celebration of the superman, to go beyond what is terrifying and ugly about this world is to overcome absurdity. while peterson does not object to nietzsche, it can be said that the latter disagrees with the former in terms of religion. nietzsche’s contempt for christianity is apparent. for nietzsche, christianity makes people weak and incapable of choosing the course of their own fate and destiny. nietzsche clearly expresses this in the anti-christ: “against this theological instinct i wage war: i have found its tracks everywhere. whoever has theological blood in his veins is from the start crooked and dishonorable toward all things.” zen buddhism might offer some respite. co explains that zen enlightenment concerns, “a direct looking into the nature of reality bypassing the analytical phase of intellection, instead penetrating into the unknown where the knower and the known become one in a spiritual unity.”30 man must live the truth from within. becoming the embodiment of truth means man goes into a higher realm, beyond the sensual and the intellectual, into that perspective of becoming. for ozaki this means that idea of eternal enlightenment occurs “through the negative mediation of self-transformation and self-development in a diversity of different forms and other disguises.”31 it is this type of unfolding that opens the window that reunites man to his very primordial origin. the truth is always what lies beyond us in the horizon of meaning. while terrible things have been done in the name of god, the distortion of values results to the drift toward a secular world in which we live in the rottenness of an unjust society. overcoming the self for nietzsche, “suffering is an existential imperative meant to serve the will to power which implements and interprets it.”32 as such, human suffering does not really result n resignation but to a celebration that “offers resistance and challenge to this will.”33 it is about saying christopher ryan maboloc 81 “yes” to life amidst all adversities. this is also the whole point of ozaki. suffering, in the positive sense, makes the individual stronger, and anyone who overcomes it feels the positive “experience of recurrent joy.”34 the true joy of man is not in having avoided suffering but in having gone through it. when man masters its ill effects to realize a greater sense of self-realization, he brings himself to a higher perspective. beyond all the pain, man sees the ultimate value of human life. this is what dionysius meant for nietzsche. while dionysius was punished and stripped of all his godly attributes, he surpassed his ordeals to lay his claim to glory. dionysius is the symbol for that man who has triumphed over life by overcoming his struggles and pains. peterson thinks that suffering is a necessary consequence of the evolutionary process. but he also believes that a life of meaning is the final goal of the human species. man is formed, both by his nervous system and the moral frameworks which emerged out of two millennia of tradition and belief, as that being who is predisposed toward realizing the basic truth of his life. peterson asserts, hence, that “the answer was this: through the elevation and development of the individual, and through the willingness of everyone to shoulder the burden of being and to take the heroic path.”35 this heroic path for peterson is that sense of individual responsibility. man must carefully choose those ideas that usher a sense of meaning, elevating himself into the hierarchy in order to assume his important leadership role in the world. peterson says that “we must each adopt as much responsibility as possible for individual life, society, and the world. we must each tell the truth and repair what is in disrepair and break down and recreate what is old and outdated. it is in this manner that we can and must reduce the suffering that poisons the world.”36 according to braak, “the perspective of dionysian man, necessarily affirmative of suffering as also superior to it, is in essence commensurate with the buddhist axiom of the necessity of transforming dukkha into nirvana.”37 suffering is inevitable in human life. thus, man is simply limited to two options: to affirm human life or to resign to his fate. braak writes that for zen, “liberation from such clinging to 82 prajñā vihāra wrong views is the way to end suffering,” and that once one is liberated, “one is able to perceive reality and function freely in the world without compulsively needing to take refuge in limiting perspectival instances.”38 for buddhism, one needs to find a way out of suffering. this is a call for inner peace, for greater self-knowledge in order to be liberated from the illusions of the self. indeed, nietzsche, according to mistry, saw human suffering as “an existential and ethical imperative,” and one that “owes concurrently to his psychological study of his fellow man in whom he diagnosed a desire to bypass affliction.”39 while schopenhauer only saw pessimism as the route for man, nietzsche perceived suffering as an affirmative driving force in man. indeed, suffering should result to a self-discovery that can catapult man to a stronger sense of himself. the “will to power” is that courage to face human life. for nietzsche, it determines how man as an individual elevates himself. braak makes a nuance on its religious meaning: “buddhism is about overcoming suffering, whereas nietzsche aimed at affirming suffering.”40 now, this is where nietzsche and peterson must go separate ways. while nietzsche rejects religion and the fundamental tenets of christianity in favor of the secular order, peterson defends tradition and how the same provides the uniting force that somehow govern the order of things in the world. the source of this unity for peterson is the “unknown.” the great unknown (culture, religion, morality), or what we believe in, is what organizes the known (facts, the world). there is no way then for man to destroy what has been established over thousands if not millions of years that has allowed the human species to evolve. peterson explains: the unknown…provides a constant powerful source of “energy” for exploration and the generation of new information. desire to formulate a representation of that which supersedes final classification and remains eternally motivating might well be understood as a prepotent and irresistible drive. that drive constitutes what might be regarded as the most fundamental religious impulse— christopher ryan maboloc 83 constitutes the culturally universal attempt to define and establish a relationship with god—and underlies the establishment of civilized historical order.41 we need to clarify some things. nietzsche writes that “the ego subdues and kills.”42 what does nietzsche mean by this? firstly, the self is the source of man’s concept of the truth, in the same way as peterson elevates the sense of individual responsibility as the fundamental truth of life. ozaki explains that, “behind this reciprocal identity of word and truth lies the way of thinking tending towards affirming actuality as the self-manifestation of truth.”43 according to braak, the “peculiar and paradoxical thing is that both nietzsche and zen also deny that any such thing as a self ultimately exists. their self-overcoming therefore is a self-overcoming without a self.”44 braak says that for nietzsche, the true nature of man is a will to power.45 nietzsche replaces notions of the self with the conception of the human individual as a multiplicity of forces.46 in contrast, the self for zen is made up of five aggregates (skandhas): the first aggregate is matter (rupa). the material part of our existence consists of the five sense-organs. the second aggregate is sensation (vedana). it results from the contact of the senses with the external world (visaya). the third aggregate corresponds to our conception (samjna). it is the power to form abstract images of objects. the fourth aggregate is action (sanskara). we act according to the sensations we receive. these actions are either mental (caitta) or non-mental (prayukta). the fifth aggregate is consciousness (vijnanas).47 mistry explains that the self for zen, “is not a substance category or eternal essence but a designation for the composite of the five attachment groups.”48 indeed, the five aggregates characterize our attachment to reality. the five aggregates, however, lead us to a self that is ignorant. this ignorance makes people suffer. by comparison, peterson recognizes 84 prajñā vihāra the reality of suffering and the necessity to overcome it. the psychologist writes that “suffering cannot be disbelieved away, however: rejection of the process that constantly renews the positive aspect of the constituent elements of experience merely ensures that their negative counterparts gain the upper hand.”49 to end suffering, buddhism says that we have to recognize its cause. buddhists believe that the main cause of suffering is human desire. since suffering is a reality of life, the right attitude to it is to examine oneself and find the strength from within to be able to overcome its source. true courage in this regard is all about finding that will to rise above the self. braak writes that “for nietzsche, life, conceived as will to power, is that which continually overcomes itself,” where the person, “as an individual, it is in one’s nature as a creature of will to power that one must continually overcome oneself.”50 for peterson, this concept of overcoming is that instantiation of man in a hierarchy in which one recognizes that the same is the actual source of meaning in the universe. expressing his affirmation of tolstoy, he writes that the russian writer sees nihilism as that “disgust with the individual and human society, combined with the desire for the eradication of existence—is one logical “evil” consequence of heightened self-consciousness.”51 but what is the nature of this self-overcoming for these thinkers? self-overcoming for nietzsche, according to braak, is that struggle toward “realizing emptiness.”52 this emptiness, similar to the idea of the “unknown” in peterson, is seeing the nothing of human existence. in way, some commentators are wrong in suggesting that nietzsche is simply nihilistic toward life. rather, nietzsche is trying to counter the meaninglessness that characterized europe during his time. morality was on a tailspin. nietzsche’s real message is for man to assert his bold claim against the dark clouds enveloping his singular existence. meanwhile, peterson has faith in the ability of man toward self-transformation. man has learned to adapt and develop ways. through this, he has also constructed systems that determine the course of his life and those around him. this is the power of having created multiple hierarchies that are so christopher ryan maboloc 85 grounded in the freedom of man that defines for the same his proper place in the system. citing the behavior of lobsters, the canadian psychologist writes: in the aftermath of a losing battle, regardless of how aggressively a lobster has behaved, it becomes unwilling to fight further, even against another, previously defeated opponent. a vanquished competitor loses confidence, sometimes for days. sometimes the defeat can have even more severe consequences. if a dominant lobster is badly defeated, its brain basically dissolves. then it grows a new, subordinate’s brain—one more appropriate to its new, lowly position.53 zen enlightenment is the escape from a cycle of rebirth (samsara). if man is not reborn, he would still be attached to the pleasures and sins of the world. braak adds that “to study the buddha way is to study the self. to study the self is to forget the self.”54 mistry concurs on this when he intimates that “the buddhist perspective of (non-self) is analogous with nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of god, a critique of man and directed against human stupidity and egoism.”55 self-centeredness is a weakness that brings man tremendous suffering. to escape from his suffering, man must rise above his ego. braak explains that “zen, as a somatic practice, aims to extinguish the incorporated basic error of an egocentered perspective.”56 zen, in its essential meaning, “is a technique of seeing within and discovering one’s own being with the view of liberating oneself from the bondage of the ego, experienced here and now.”57 in man’s ordinary life, he is attached to the world and is therefore a slave to his desires. he is easily corrupted by his whims and in this regard, he loses his true sense of self-liberation. but man can only overcome suffering when he turns away from that concept of self. this turning away is not meant to disregard oneself. rather, it is meant to make one’s existence full by emptying it of self-centeredness. in this way, braak suggests that “the metaphor of self-cultivation and self-overcoming, 86 prajñā vihāra which suggests a conscious pursuit of emancipation and authenticity to a sovereign individual.”58 finding one’s place in the universe is the true meaning of human freedom. morality as self-mastery western and oriental thought are portrayed by sharp contrasts, foremost of which is the idea that in oriental thought, religious tenets also expresses a philosophy of life. while both in a way exhibit an ethos, western philosophy is characterized by rationality at its very core whereas oriental thought dwells on oneness with nature. co clarifies that in buddhism, for instance, “all reasoning must be destroyed and a new form of consciousness that defies logic must be realized.”59 humphreys is more emphatic and points to an enigma when he says, “zen is incommunicable.”60 and so, one is tempted to suggest that morality must be thrown away in favor of the ethos of the superman. nietzsche, for instance, attacks christian morality as ‘decadent’. he writes: “the over-valuation of goodness i already regard as a consequence of decadence as a symptom of weakness, as incompatible with an ascending.”61 yet, christian ethics is grounded in the concept of human equality. the idea of human dignity had been actually influenced by the judeo-christian tradition. man is created in god’s image and likeness, and so therefore he is endowed with the attribute of perfection that is present in the absolute sense in the transcendent. in beyond good and evil, nietzsche sets out the task of his philosophical itinerary, which is “the revaluation of all hitherto existing values themselves.”62 zen buddhism, in the writings of d.t. suzuki, speaks of the distinction between religion and morality or of religious feeling and conscience while placing the latter on a ‘higher plane’ compared to the former. suzuki starts by admitting that “religious feeling is first awakened by the self-critical conscience.”63 there is a metaphysical distance between the two. whereas morality deals with human action, zen brings us into “the abyss of being.”64 nietzsche writes that “the ladder is tremendous upon christopher ryan maboloc 87 which he climbs up and down; he has seen further, willed further, been capable of further than any other than man.”65 still, this ladder points to the unknown and mysterious. for peterson humans, “produce models of what is and what should be, and how to transform one into the other.”66 ozaki talks about the ‘original essence’ of zen as the deeper ground and source of man’s self-negating capacity. the idea of overcoming in this respect dwells in the capacity of man for time-reversal or his power to surpass being bound by the excesses of human finitude by going back into an original essence or that sense of self-emptying. this ‘original essence’ might as well be the framework that peterson talks about. he explains that “we imitate and map adaptive behaviors – behaviors that efficiently reach a desired end – so that we can transform the mysterious unknown into the desirable and predictable; so that the social and nonsocial aspects of our experience remain under our control.”67 the human being, in this way is a product of processes that enable the same to conceive of his stories of right and wrong. peterson then exclaims that the “particular behaviors we imitate and represent, organized into a coherent unit, shared with others, constitute our cultures; constitute the manner in which we bring order to our existence.68 suzuki warns that morality is unable to account for its foundational or metaphysical source – god. christianity relates conscience to god as its ultimate origin. for christians, conscience as a moral imperative defines for humans the meaning of right and wrong. in this regard, it is the way upon which christians connect religion with morality or that reality wherein “religion becomes some an outgrowth of morality.”69 but suzuki makes a clear distinction between the christian and the buddhist view. for him, defining conscience as ‘external’ places it outside the religious sphere. suzuki says that “the essence of the religious life is absolute freedom, perfect spontaneity, or utter abandonment.”70 for christians, conscience is a moral restraint that guides human action toward the good and the possibility of punishment. for peterson, religion may be somewhat indispensable when it comes to the design of our moral principles. peterson writes: 88 prajñā vihāra it has taken mankind thousands of years of work to develop dawning awareness of the nature of evil—to produce a detailed dramatic representation of the process that makes up the core of human maladaptation and voluntarily produced misery. it seems premature to throw away the fruit of that labor or to presume that it is something other than what it appears before we understand what it signifies. consciousness of evil emerged first as ritual enactment, then as dynamic image, expressed in myth.71 moral responsibility comes from within as part of man’s nature. suzuki explains that since human “responsibility is the core of morality; the moral man cannot be irresponsible.”72 peterson also expresses the same when he talks about the individual who is able to account for himself and take a hold of his own vessel of the truth. humphreys says that “zen, being the essence of freedom, resents all rules which hamper and constrain the mind.”73 self-mastery, in nietzsche’s sense, is the freedom from the world of the ego, or in a way, freeing the ego from the bondage of the world. d.t. suzuki reminds us, in eight lectures on ch’an, that ultimate freedom can only be achieved once the self is mastered or once it can “work through a principle higher than itself.”74 on a similar note, peterson explains that “a moral philosophy, which is a pattern for behavior and interpretation, is therefore dependent for its existence upon a mythology, which is a collection of images of behaviors, which emerge, in turn, as a consequence of social interaction (cooperation and competition), designed to meet emotional demands.”75 in thus spoke zarathustra, nietzsche expresses: “how to surpass man? the superman, i have at heart; that is the first and only thing to me: not the neighbor, not the poorest, not the sorriest, not the best.”76 nietzsche appeals to the primordial understanding of man or that dionysian element in us that affirms human greatness or that zenith of the individual which is realized in the overflowing beauty of life. this is to locate the individual in his greatest glories; it is man extolling the values of courage and perseverance, and repudiating the values of the weak, and this happens christopher ryan maboloc 89 only when man conquers himself. the buddha says: “if a man were to conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, another conquers one, himself, he indeed is the greatest of conquerors.”77 conclusion this paper has shown the proximate connection of the philosophies of f. nietzsche, zen buddhism, and jordan peterson. myth overcomes human reason. this is apparent in the concepts of meaning, the truth, and self-overcoming. for peterson, evolution is part of the formation of the ethos of society. but there is a theme that unites their thoughts and that is the element of rising above the self or self-overcoming as the profound meaning of human freedom. while nietzsche and peterson go separate ways in their respective views on christianity, they meet halfway in the idea of transcendence. zen buddhism also expresses the same in the notion of enlightenment. the will to meaning, in this way, is the claim that makes manifest the importance of truth as human beings affirm the higher value of human life. indeed, the distinct philosophies cited above involve a primordial understanding of human finitude. the concept of multiple hierarchies implies that the natural order of things is for man to assume a dominant role in the world. humans suffer in life, but what remains constant is the human capacity for transcendence. 90 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 jordan peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, (canada: random house, 2018), 1. 2 alfredo co, philosophy of the compassionate buddha. (manila: ust publishing house, 2003), 106. 3 christmas humphreys, zen buddhism, (melbourne: william heinemann, 1949), 4. 4 jordan peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, (new york: routledge, 1999), 269. 5 ibid., 24 6 friedrich nietzsche, the anti-christ, translated by thomas wayne, (new york: algora publishing, 2004), 106. 7 julian young, nietzsche’s philosophy of religion, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006), 179. 8 peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, 5. 9 ibid., 7. 10 co, philosophy of the compassionate buddha, 106. 11 freny mistry, nietzsche and buddhism, (new york: walter de gruyter and co., 1981), 116. 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 14 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, 16 15 seung sahn, the compass of zen, (massachusetts: shambala publications, 1997), 272. 16 makoto ozaki, “heidegger and the lotus sutra on the beginning: opening up of truth as unhiddenness,” in biocosmology – neoaristotelianism, volume 5:2 (2005): 241. 17 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, 15. 18 friedrich nietzsche, beyond good and evil. translated by walter kaufman, (new york: vintage books, 1966), 87. 19 andre van der braak, nietzsche and zen, (plymouth: lexington books, 2011), 28. 20 ibid., 34. 21 sahn, the compass of zen, 302. 22 co, philosophy of the compassionate buddha, 107. 23 ibid., 106. 24 young, nietzsche’s philosophy of religion, 53. 25 ibid., 74. christopher ryan maboloc 91 26 friedrich nietzsche, human, all too human, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1986), 99. 27 friedrich nietzsche, thus spoke zarathustra, (london: penguin classics, 1995), 126. 28 peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, 7. 29 nietzsche, the anti-christ, 106. 30 co, philosophy of the compassionate buddha, 108. 31 ozaki, “heidegger and the lotus sutra on the beginning,” 246. 32 mistry, nietzsche and buddhism, 118. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, xxvii. 36 ibid. 37 braak, nietzsche and zen, 14. 38 ibid., 36. 39 mistry, nietzsche and buddhism, 116. 40 braak, nietzsche and zen, 13. 41 peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, 152 42 friedrich nietzsche, the will to power, translated by walter kaufman. (new york: vintage, 1967), 403. 43 ozaki, “heidegger and the lotus sutra on the beginning,” 246. 44 braak, nietzsche and zen, 28. 45 ibid. 46 ibid. 47 mistry, nietzsche and buddhism, 54. 48 ibid. 49 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, 328. 50 braak, nietzsche and zen, 25. 51 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, 328. 52 braak, nietzsche and zen., 29. 53 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, 7. 54 braak, nietzsche and zen, 92. 55 mistry, nietzsche and buddhism, 81. 56 braak, nietzsche and zen, 92. 57 co, philosophy of the compassionate buddha, 106. 58 braak, nietzsche and zen. 83. 59 co, philosophy of the compassionate buddha. 60 humphreys, zen buddhism, 2. 61 nietzsche, the anti-christ, 92. 62 nietzsche, beyond good and evil, 79. 92 prajñā vihāra 63 suzuki, d.t. eight lectures on chan, ed. gishin tokiwa, (kamakura: matsugaoka bunko foundation, 2011), 99. 64 humphreys, zen buddhism, 3. 65 nietzsche, the anti-christ., 74. 66 peterson, 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos, 14 67 peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, 102. 68 ibid. 69 suzuki, eight lectures on chan,4. 70 ibid., 99-100. 71 peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, 323. 72 suzuki, eight lectures on chan, 100. 73 humphreys, zen buddhism, 3. 74 suzuki, eight lectures on chan, 100. 75 peterson, maps of meaning: the architecture of belief, 242. 76 nietzsche, thus spoke zarathustra, 243. 77 mistry, nietzsche and buddhism, 50. bibliography co, alfredo. 2003. philosophy of the compassionate buddha. manila: ust publishing house. braak, andre van der. 2011. nietzsche and zen. plymouth: lexington books. hua, hsuan. 1996. buddhism: a short introduction. burlingame: buddhist text translation society. humphreys, christmas. 1949. zen buddhism. melbourne: william heinemann. mistry, freny. 1981. nietzsche and buddhism. new york: walter de gruyter and co. nietzsche, friedrich. 1966. beyond good and evil. translated by walter kaufman. new york: vintage books. nietzsche, friedrich. 1967. the will to power. translated by walter kaufman. new york: vintage. christopher ryan maboloc 93 nietzsche, friedrich. 1986. human, all too human. cambridge: cambridge university press. nietzsche, friedrich. 1995. thus spoke zarathustra. london: penguin classics. nietzsche, friedrich. 2004. the anti-christ. translated by thomas wayne. new york: algora publishing. ozaki, makoto. 2015. “heidegger and the lotus sutra on the beginning: opening up of truth as unhiddenness.” in biocosmology – neo aristotelianism, volume 5 (2): 240-248. peterson, jordan. 1999. maps of meaning: the architecture of belief. new york: routledge. peterson, jordan. 2018. 12 rules for life: an antidote to chaos. canada: random house. sahn, seung. 1997. the compass of zen. massachusetts: shambala publications. suzuki, d.t. 2011. eight lectures on chan, ed. gishin tokiwa. kamakura, japan: matsugaoka bunko foundation. young, julian. 2006. nietzsche’s philosophy of religion. cambridge: cambridge university press. a report on emotional education for young children: the relevance of st. thomas’ philosophy of education to information technologies and the structure of the human brain rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university abstract this paper attempts to reflect on the method of teaching by returning to st. thomas aquinas’ insights on education. teaching, as st. thomas puts it, is nothing else than “the awakening of the power of reasoning in another person.” important to this idea of education as a kind of therapy is the process of discovery. the task of the teacher, therefore, is to create the external conditions for the possibility of discovery. this is investigated in connection with contemporary technologies and with support of findings in the neurosciences. in de magistro (question 11, a.1 of de veritate), st. thomas posed the question of whether humans can teach each other. after considering the possible responses to this question, he concluded that “the teacher inspires the student to understand what he is teaching, just as any cause can realize the potential in another thing.” he arrived at this conclusion by treading the middle ground between avicenna’s claim that ideas flow into our minds from the intelligent cause and the platonic teaching that learning is remembering and considering the things that the soul already knows. in contrast to these two intellectual positions by upholding the integrity of the material universe, “which is woven together by the order and connection of causes.” st. thomas wrote that “the primary cause, from its outstanding goodness, makes other things not only to be, but also to be causes.” he thereby endowed with utmost respect the autonomy of secondary causes and the interweaving relationships formed among them because they can awaken in us, humans, “the divine truth which speaks in us through an impression in us of its likeness.” st. thomas then applied the aristotelean principles of act and potency to the field of education by asserting that the common seeds of knowing are already imbedded in the knower but they have to be actualized by an external influence through the mediation of the teacher. he believed that these common seeds are self-evident in the principles of non-contradiction and identity which are eventually rooted in our insight into the primary act of being. thinking is therefore nothing else but taking the paths of thinking towards being. since the pure act of being refers to god, he is eventually in agreement with avicenna and plato that intellectual cultivation is actually the soul’s path to god but this path can only be taken, and can actually be waylaid through the material universe. teaching, therefore, may be achieved, according to st. thomas, by means of a teacher’s instructions in an aristotelian manner, on the one hand, and by way of discovery by the students themselves as plato and avicenna taught, on the other hand. the former takes 1 the form of discipline imposed externally by teachers while the latter is achieved by the student’s internal powers of natural reason. thomas gives primacy on the latter because learning eventually depends on one’s own reasoning and teachers will have to first discover what they teach to their students. as the popular adage puts it, “we cannot give what we do not have;” we can teach only what we actually knew. teaching, as st. thomas puts it, is nothing else than “the awakening of the power of reasoning in another person.” he compares it to the art of healing: “just as the doctor is said to cause health in the sick man with nature working, so also one is said to cause knowledge in another [by means of reasoning]” st. thomas’ existential methods of learning/teaching as a therapeutic activity, teaching is best achieved by abiding by the laws of nature, that is, by beginning with what the knower already knows. words and signs are meant to point to the direction of what is yet to be known from the standpoint of what is known already by the knower. when words and signs themselves become the norm of the reality that they are supposed to merely refer to, learning becomes a mere parroting of sounds signifying nothing. learners, therefore, must always tie down the concepts and words of their teachers to that which is really real. thomas’ famous parting words that what he has written seems like straw compared to what he has seen emphasizes the primacy of vision and discovery in the processes of learning over and above textbooks and teaching manuals. the latter are meant to serve as guideposts, mere directional concepts towards that which is real. our grasp of ultimate reality, admittedly, is always mediated by finite beings. yet, the primary act of being conditions all possible modes of being, including our own acts of breathing, walking, listening, waking, sitting; even the realities beneath our names, our bodies, our stomachs and innards. in our acts of affirming the reality of contingent beings, ultimately become aware of our own very being. the reality that we are: “i am, i exist.” this personalized path to being serves as the primary analogate, the starting point, for all other possible experiences of being that extend from the material world below and up to the spiritual world above us. the shortest way to our knowledge of the world and of god, as st. augustine discovered early on, therefore, is through ourselves. it is in this sense that st. thomas may be appropriated today as the existentialist par excellence. his philosophy offers an immediate and indubitable path towards an experience of the personal act being. but in order to arrive at an insight into the act of existence, the mind must proceed, à la platonic dialectics, through discourses that ascend towards increasing degrees of universality until everything else is ultimately reduced to the act of being itself. under the guidance and protection of the logical principles of non-contradiction and identity the 2 mind must systematically proceed in its path or missteps towards the abyss of errors that lie between the cracks of absurdity and inconsistency. the paths of knowing proceeds by way of discovery; beginning from the awareness of shared experiences with other beings and increasing the intensity of the level of participation with other existents as one ascends towards the ultimate act of existence. these paths are longer or more winding depending on whether one goes down, sideways, or upwards in the ladder and levels of beings. by reducing the focus of intelligence to the mediation of sensation and gravitation, one steps down to the world of animals, plants and minerals while as one intensifies the intellectual experience of being with immaterial forms of being, the soul ascends towards the spiritual world of human souls, the choir of angels, and god, the most intensive act of being. the contemporary relevance of st. thomas’ philosophy of education new learning technologies such as the internet and the other communication technologies require the awareness of the important role of discovery in the processes of learning. these virtual technologies serves as teachers, textbooks and lesson plans that mediate and instrumentalize learning processes in so far as they lead to the process of discovering actual reality itself. the learner should be able to critically distinguish, at every point of the inquiry, whether the subject matter at hand is really real, virtually real, or unreal. students can get so attached to information technologies to the extent that they are already being governed by them, unknowingly being shaped by their creators and producers. they become prey to the consumerist ethos of technological innovations that threaten to annihilate the autonomy of their very own being. one colleague proposed writing a paper entitled “ipod, therefore, i am” in order to warn the youth from the upper classes of our society about their loss of identity and interconnection with others by being wired up and tied down by the latest gadgets and technologies. against the backdrop of a consumerist culture that fuels these technologies, one is tempted to respond to my colleagues’ unwritten text with a rejoinder: “i shop, therefore, i am.” bereft of a critical and evaluative mind, these new technologies are teaching luring people become mere consumers, and not producers of knowledge. it is undoubtedly convenient to post and communicate insights and information on the internet through webpages and other digital technologies. but if we merely consume these knowledge without contributing to them by way of production and invention, these technologies will trap its consumers within the ambit of those who ultimately profit from these technologies. consumers merely adapt themselves to what others have originally constructed for them. call agent operators, for example, we have to change accents in order to suit american customers and they have to master english and other foreign languages in order to satisfy the mopping up, out-sourcing, operations of medical and legal professionals from first world countries. they do create jobs in the short and medium term, but in the long run, the rates of consumption will overcome productive capacities if these technologies themselves are 3 not modified and controlled. educational systems, unfortunately, also fall prey to this consumerist and subservient ethos of the market place at the expense of the more productive and creative arts that will make the population of recipient technologies the leaders, instead of mere followers, of the world market. it is therefore important, at this trajectory of intellectual history to retrieve st. thomas’ perennial insight on the primacy of the logic of discovery over the logic of instruction in order to reverse the trend of intellectual domestication as manifested by the third world population’s becoming the domestic helpers and cleaning-up operators of the world. the cultivation of the intellectual capabilities of students, therefore, is the key to coping with the fast changing technological innovations. these new technologies are certainly providing access to the multitudes who would rather have whatever jobs are available under the pains of starvation and subservience to the demands of material and biological necessities. there were even incredible instances when workers demanded the government for lower wages so that they can be hired by overseas contractors. in the age of information technologies, higher wages is a function of more sophisticated intellectual capabilities and well-cultivated decision-making skills. improving students’ capabilities can be achieved by learning how to follow instructions. the cultivation of decision making skills such as prudential judgment and a sense of fairness toward others requires philosophical reflections that will allow people to discover the broad contexts that they find themselves in. confirmations from the neurosciences the startling discoveries about the learning systems that constitute the human brain during the last two decades reveal that neural systems are composed of neurons that are connected by synapses that mediate electro-chemical transmitters activated by stimulations from the learners’ surroundings. ideas, therefore, flow through the mind, as avicenna and aristotle thought and not immediately from the divine as confirmed by the neural connections of the senses. knowledge is also not already achieved prior to human experiences, as plato once speculated, since knowing is a process shaped and instructed by events and directions pointed out by others. the task of the teacher, therefore, is to create the external conditions for the possibility of discovery; to ignite that “aha!” experience that made archimedes jump out of the tub and run naked through city streets in order to proclaim his discovery. neuroscientists, such as dr. paul mclean of the national institute of health based in bethesda, maryland, report that the human brain is composed of three vortices that emerged from the evolutionary past: the reptilian brain that responds to innate desires for survival, the mammalian brain that is oriented towards caring for others, and the human neo-cortex that allows for planning for the long-term needs of humanity.1 in may, 2001, 4 newsweek magazine published ground-breaking experiments that show how the frontal lobe of the human cortex lights up during meditation, showing the neurological counterparts of religious states such as enlightenment and feelings of awe (may 14, 2001, p.42). this triadic structure confirms aquinas’ formulation of the three precepts of natural law: (1) “the preservation of human life and all that impedes death,” (2) “instinct such as union of husband and wife, the education of children and so forth,” and (3) “a natural inclination to know the truth about god and to live in society” (st i-ii, q. 94, a. 2). since the human neo-cortex is the most malleable of all the vortices due to its recency in the evolutionary process, educational systems can still mold the development of students by creating the external conditions that support, rather than stunt the natural structure of the brain. relational and multidimensional modes of thinking, for example, are more in affinity with the natural orientation of the neurons to extend itself towards other neurons rather than the disciplinary regime of instructions that rely on rote memory and inert ideas. while the latter can aid in the strengthening of existing neural connections, they do not promote the habits of exploration and discovery that are essential to a more effective participation in contemporary technological and innovative societies. this new knowledge about the neurosciences must therefore be adopted to educational systems by creating learning environments that expand and strengthen the neural connections of the human brain. in the concrete, this will entail allowing students to emerge from their anonymity by making them participate in class discussions and creating learning modules that will allow them to interact with others. opportunities to participate in activities that promote the common goods of the community instead of competitive exercises that stimulate their reptilian instincts must also be encouraged in order to cultivate the learners’ higher faculties. the triadic structure of the brain also implies that under situations of stress and duress, the neocortex can be taken over by its more primitive parts that make it vulnerable to emotional reactions such as irritability and lapse of judgment.2 learning environments, therefore, must also make room for play and recreation in order for students to optimize the energies of a well-rested brain and to creatively channel the energies of the lower parts of the brain. in terms of moral education, this information about the brain means that learning environments can be devised to provide for the further development of the human neocortex while starving the passions that fuel its primitive parts. virtues, as aristotle and aquinas defined them, are habituated by human choices even if they have to be moderated by reasonableness. conclusion 5 from the perspective of st. thomas’ educational precepts, human choices are circumscribed by the available ideas that have been discovered by the human mind, while habits are inculcated by following instructions. repeated choices send new neural connections to the nervous system in the same manner that original discoveries eventually become petrified by instruction manuals. the task of teachers, therefore, is to make their instruction manuals and textbooks alive, just us students have living thoughts that are waiting to be aroused from the dogmatic slumber of social institutions that are turning them into passive consumers of the global market. the educational endeavors that shape the future of students are therefore living mirrors of the intricate grandeur of the universe that require teachers to share in the creative task of the first cause who has given them the privilege and honor to direct and shape the trajectory of his creation by following the basic principles of learning that will lead human beings to discover the magnificent being who made other beings be. 6 1 richard restak, the brain (new york: bantam books, 1984), pp. 136-137. 2 w. norris clarke, “living on the edge: the human being as frontier-being and microcosm,” international philosophical quarterly vol xxxvi no. 2 issue number 142 (june 1996), p. 197. a report on emotional education for young children: thomas merton’s troubling questions on violence: from auschwitz to vietnam donald p. st. john moravian college, usa abstract this paper presents some of the major “questions” and points of inquiry concerning war and peace, ethics and conscience, language and duplicity directed at secular governments and religious institutions by the catholic monk and writer thomas merton (1915-1968). in a series of essays penned during the 1960s this popular spiritual writer shook his more conservative readers with his strongly worded attacks on the passivity of religious institutions in the face of extremely violent wars, genocidal campaigns and nuclear terrorism sponsored by the governments with which they were aligned. merton draws lessons for his own era from the trials of auschwitz personnel to the ruthless conventional and atomic bombings by the allies, and uses them to raise troubling questions about attempts to justify the insanity of nuclear escalation and the vicious quagmire that was vietnam. and in the midst of raising moral questions, merton examines the language used to distort the reality of auschwitz, dresden and hiroshima, of first strike capabilities and the “free fire zones” of vietnam. this paper also attempts to demonstrate something of the prophetic fire and philosophical coolness of merton’s thought as well as its literary power. the final section suggests that merton’s questions are as troubling and germane today as they were when initially raised. prajñâ vihâra, volume 10, number 1-2, january-december, 2009, 3-50 © 2000 by assumption university press 3 thomas merton (1915-1968) was one of the most prolific and influential catholic writers of the twentieth century.1 he combined the critical thinking of a philosopher, the moral outrage of a prophet, and the penetrating insight of a contemplative, delivering his message with the literary command and creative imagination of a writer and artist. these various voices of merton did not always harmonize with each other, and sometimes one or the other would either fall silent or overwhelm the others. nevertheless, and more times than one would expect, they pulled together to produce memorable works of prose and poetry. thomas merton had the ability to raise troubling questions with great power and penetrating insight. often they came unexpectedly, as when two contexts not normally related were shown to be connected or when surprising conclusions were reached after an argument took an unusual turn. merton’s unnerving ability to draw a moral lesson about a contemporary issue from a discussion purportedly about a past situation won him both friends and foes. this method was especially effective when merton made connections between the moral behavior of nazis and their religious sympathizers and the contemporary rhetoric and actions of western political, military and religious leaders. this paper will examine some of the more “troubling” questions merton posed to his contemporaries, both secular and religious, occasioned by the horrific and continuing episodes of extreme violence, such as the genocide of nazi death camps, saturation bombing of cities with conventional and nuclear weapons, nuclear brinksmanship and escalation during the cold war, and finally the interface of superpower and guerilla forces in a rural setting (vietnam). in this context, we will explore merton’s reflections on the moral implications of language and “logic” as they were used by the actual or potential perpetrators of extreme violence. being a highly literate and literary person, merton was fascinated with how language operates in extreme situations and how the logic of “necessity” (“i/ we had to do it”) works both to explain and justify the contemplation, initiation, or continuation of extreme violence. we have chosen a few seminal essays that illustrate the range of merton’s thinking and have supplemented them with material from other essays to present a fuller view or to raise additional questions. it is important when dealing with a writer like merton to keep the tone and flavor of 4 prajñâ vihâra his own words, especially in the many places where how merton expresses himself is important to grasping what he is saying. sometimes merton’s ability to evoke a particular image, recreate a specific experience, or elicit a certain response (humor, disgust, anger, etc.) is crucial to grasping or sometimes being grasped by his message. auschwitz language thomas merton, a poet, novelist, literary critic and essayist, had a sophisticated appreciation for the use and abuse of language. in the summer of 1961, he wrote two unusual prose poems that signaled a willingness to experiment in new styles, a renewed interest in world affairs, and a decision to reengage the modern world in a significant way. he already had made a decision to engage in an apostolate to intellectuals and other persons of importance around the world. his famous correspondence with and public defense of boris pasternak in 1959 and 1960 marked the beginning of this new phase. merton’s prose poem “original child bomb”2 used wartime images, slogans, official statements, code words, and news releases in a cool journalistic recounting of the events leading up to the bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki. his “chant to be used in processions around a site with furnaces”,3 a sardonic and ironic poem, recreated the style of language used by nazi war criminals and found in documents pertaining to the running of death camps. if truth is the first casualty of war, language is its murder weapon. gandhi understood this deeply and so did merton. merton was not so interested in the crude but honest language of personal violence, but in the ultimately more dangerous and subtle language utilized by governments and their bureaucracies, by military think-tanks, by politicians and even the mass media to express, conceal, encourage and normalize violence and its effects. merton’s essay “auschwitz: a family camp”4 was a lengthy review of auschwitz by bernd naumann (1966) with an introduction by hannah arendt, one of merton’s favorite political philosophers. naumann's is a disturbing work, filled with pages of testimony by former ss men, employees, and survivors of auschwitz. the testimony was presented donald p. st. john 5 during a twenty-month trial which began in frankfurt in december, 1963. as merton notes: “language itself has fallen victim to total war, genocide, and systematic tyranny in our time”. at auschwitz, language itself was so dangerous and so guarded in its use that all military and civilian personnel took what amounted to a “vow” of secrecy. anyone revealing information about what was occurring at auschwitz was accused of the unforgivable sin of “defeatist talk”. truth became as much of an enemy as the allies, perhaps more. when it was absolutely necessary to write or speak to outsiders, language had to be cast in “officialese”, which “has a talent for discussing reality while denying it and calling truth itself into question”. merton would observe the same thing in relation both to the nuclear war and to vietnam. yet, truth could not be totally hidden. one of the unavoidable side effects of the use of so much doubletalk and doublethink, euphemisms and clichés was the unavoidable suggestion that something was missing, like a doughnut encircling its hole. the literature is full of euphemisms like: “special treatment”, “special housing”, “special custody”, “reeducation”, “recovery camp for the tired”, “disinfectants”, “material for resettlement of the jews”, and “ovaltine substitute”. auschwitz language is merely an extreme example of all official bureaucratic languages in their “celebration of boredom, of routine, of deadness, of organized futility”. yet it is unique in containing “a kind of heavy lilt in its mockery”. for example, “work makes free”, the words over the entrance to auschwitz, really mean that in here we work everyone to death; freedom is death and death is freedom. the sign, “to the bath”, means that there we will purify and cleanse you of everything. merton notes how a fetish for cleanliness characterized the crew caring for the gas chambers and crematoriums. such fastidiousness left not a speck of dust to indicate that a human being had ever been there. and the s.s. order “assigned to harvest duty”, means that you have been assigned to auschwitz to “harvest” people. merton suggests that the key to unlocking the coded auschwitz language “is its pathological joy in death”. the military and civilian “employees” of auschwitz displayed a remarkable virtuosity at creating a virtual reality when placed on trial for war crimes. this led the judge at one point to sarcastically remark that from what the defendants said, no one had done anything at auschwitz. one guard, when asked about the practice of shooting prisoners in the 6 prajñâ vihâra back and then claiming they had tried to escape, indignantly responded that such a charge was ludicrous. why would anyone want to escape from auschwitz? after all, was it not “a family camp”? the surreal quality of that world was conveyed by an ex-prisoner who recalled seeing a group of children playing ball when a woman guard (there were woman guards) clapped her hands and shouted “all right now, let’s stop. now we take showers”. the woman guard picked up one of the little girls and carried her down the steps to the “bath”. the little girl, noticing the eagle emblem on the guards’ hat, asked, “what kind of birdy is that?” the exprisoner sadly noted that that was the last time he saw that little girl. there was also the case of the one hundred and twenty children from the polish town of zamosc. their parents were dead and so eventually they were led into an “examination room”. klehr, an ss male nurse, was expert in injecting “patients” in the heart with phenolic acid. it cured all health problems. he waited for the boys and then proceeded to methodically “treat” them one after another. when he tired, others took over but they were not always up to the demands of the work. his successor “broke down under the strain and ran out of the room, refusing to kill any more children”. but a third ss man finished the task. merton rhetorically asks: “reason for the death of the little boys from zamosc?” the answer given in testimony was: “as a precaution against ‘immorality’ in the camp”. as with its ovens, “auschwitz had to be very, very clean!” observes merton. merton was, of course, interested in more than the language of auschwitz. as a highly moral and spiritual person he was intensely interested in finding answers to the many questions that troubled his own mind: questions about human nature and about the negative effects on the human mind and heart of social and political forces. above all he wondered whether we could learn anything that might help us avoid similar horrendous events in the future. merton’s first question flowed from his observation that the “demonic sickness of auschwitz emanated from ordinary people, stimulated by an extraordinary regime”. most grew up in christian homes, attended church and received a good education in a civilized city. they lived and moved among respectable citizens in the years preceding and following hitler’s rule. yet, merton asks, how is it that, during the years in between, “they could beat and bash and torment and shoot and whip and murder thousands of their fellow human beings, including donald p. st. john 7 even their former neighbors and friends, and think nothing of it?” merton used this troubling question to shake his readers out of their smug complacency and make them confront their own darker possibilities. merton was not a pessimist regarding human nature, and he understood how important social environments are in shaping people. but he also knew how essential is the development of critical thinking, moral conscience and the spiritual qualities of compassion and love if one is to be empowered and equipped to criticize and counter the pressures toward acquiescence and conformity. merton’s second question flowed from the first: “how is it that auschwitz worked?” it worked, merton answered, because a lot of people, both inside and outside of the camp, “wanted it to work”. instead of rebelling against its existence or resisting it, they put their energies into turning genocide into a reality. the few legitimate psychopaths who worked in this system could have gotten nowhere without the committed assistance of bureaucrats, managers and military police at the camp as well as the owners and employees of the companies that profited from the cheap slave labor provided by the camp and the many people who knew something was terribly wrong but did nothing. merton’s third question concerns the issue of individual conscience. most individuals at the trial claimed that they were only following orders. but, merton asks, “was there no choice?” there were individuals who did refuse to torture and murder their fellow human beings. “why was not this done more often?” merton asks. merton suggests that the relative “security” of the camps for employees was an incentive to stay silent. the camps were a safe assignment, preferable to being sent to the front, and they were not in danger of being bombed. there were also “privileges” that went with this kind of work: cigarettes, drinks, and extra rations. but, then there was the gratuitous violence perpetrated by camp workers; violence that went beyond their orders. most of these acts “were forbidden even by gestapo’s own rules”. in fact, some individuals were punished by the ss for their overly enthusiastic use of violence. one would think that there were plenty of opportunities to inflict pain and death on the inmates and a wide enough selection of perversities that extracurricular activities would not be necessary. but, regardless of whether individuals stepped over the official line or not, it was evident that “many of these men tortured 8 prajñâ vihâra and killed because they thoroughly enjoyed it”. fourth, “what does all this add up to?” merton fears that given the right situation places like auschwitz can spring up again and people could easily be found to do this kind of work. what would it take? first, a legitimating authority willing to assume responsibility or to whom responsibility can be transferred for acts of violence. second, an official ideology of hate that affirms one basic principle: “anyone belonging to class x or nation y or race z is to be regarded as subhuman and worthless, and consequently has no right to exist. all the rest will follow without difficulty”. if such a principle became acceptable there would be no need for monsters: “ordinary policemen and good citizens would take care of everything”. one must remember that merton was writing against the backdrop of the recent history of the civil rights movement with its scenes of police dogs, water cannons, racial hatred and racist murders, even of children. merton was vehemently opposed to the way blacks were being treated in america, especially in the southern u.s., where he lived. merton wrote extensively on matters of race and in support of the civil rights and nonviolent movement led by dr. martin luther king, jr. although this essay does not deal with this aspect of merton’s life and writings, its historical and biographical context must be kept in mind, especially when reading his writings on the anti-semitism of nazi germany. in 1968, dr. king would cancel a retreat he was to take under thomas merton to attend the memphis boycott. he was planning to journey to the monastery at gethsemane to see merton soon afterwards. the meeting never took place. king was assassinated in memphis and by year’s end merton would be dead. merton’s “chant” merton wrote “chant to be used in processions around sites with furnaces” in the summer of 1961, well before his review of the auschwitz book or the eichmann trial, but after his reading of william shirer’s the rise and fall of the third reich.5 merton’s prose poem broke new ground, both in style and in content. it reflected his donald p. st. john 9 reengagement with the world and the crucial issues of his day. merton “borrowed” the language for this prose poem from actual statements or documents connected with the trials of death camp personnel found in shirer’s work. in this prose poem, the major voice is that of a commander of auschwitz who uses language that appears on the surface to be too objective, unemotional, and rational. the reader knows to what he is alluding, i.e. a camp structured to take in thousands of living beings and destroy them: some gradually, most immediately. while this advantage allows the reader to “see through” the façade, the reader is led to wonder whether he or she is blind and deaf to his or her own linguistic universe when it presents violence as normal business or as an excusable necessity. a few rearranged excerpts from this poem are presented below. the commander of the camp is the narrator and his voice and tone are so dispassionate that one suspects that they mask a sick smirk. he loves cleanliness and efficiency though death’s greedy grasp finally encircles even him. i was the commander i made improvements and installed a guaranteed system taking account of human weakness i purified and i remained decent how i commanded i made cleaning appointments and then i made the travellers sleep and after that i made soap... when trains arrived the soiled passengers received appointments for fun in the bathroom they did not guess... how i often commanded and made improvements and sealed the door on top there were flowers the men came with crystals i guaranteed always the crystal parlor... all the while i had obeyed perfectly so i was hanged in a commanding position with a full view of the site plant and grounds you smile at my career but would do as i did if you knew yourself and dared... violence, even mass murder, can be conducted in a business-like manner. there is always the necessary business correspondence for equip10 prajñâ vihâra ment, arrangements and bills. business language seems well suited in merton’s mind both for conducting for-profit transactions and ignoring any ethical implications. merton had drawn from examples of correspondence he had come across in his reading. he was to develop this insight in his later discussion of structural violence. the commander is so enthusiastic over his newly purchased machinery which functions so coldly and efficiently that he begins to identify with the equipment itself. a big new firm promoted steel forks operating on a cylinder they got the contract and with faultless workmanship delivered very fast goods how i commanded and made soap 12 lbs fat 10 quarts water 8 oz to a lb of caustic soda but it was hard to find any fat “for transporting the customers we suggest using light carts on wheels a drawing is submitted” “we acknowledge four steady furnaces and an emergency guarantee” “i am a big new commander operating on a cylinder i elevate the purified materials boil for 2 to 3 hrs and then cool” for putting them into a test fragrance i suggested an express elevator operated by the latest cylinder it was guaranteed finding words with which to mask the horrendous murder of children or the gruesome task of gathering wedding rings from dead bodies was challenging and met by simply making words mean something other than what they would normally mean. jewish inmates were recruited for some tasks and rewarded by being given “adequate food”. this proves perhaps to the commander both that humans can be reduced to their basic needs but also that he is not a pure racist but that maybe there were the more and the less deserving inmates. children of tender age were always invited by reason of their youth they were unable to work they were marked out for play they were washed like the others and more than the others . . . donald p. st. john 11 jewish male inmates then worked up nice they had rubber boots in return for adequate food i could not guess their appetite . . . their love was fully stopped by our perfected ovens but the love rings were salvaged thanks to the satisfaction of male inmates operating the heaters without need of compensation our guests were warmed . . . finally, the commander__and merton__cautions the reader against assuming a self-righteous position. as he often does, merton makes a surprising connection between actions done in the past that the reader finds repugnant and present actions in which the reader might be complicit. do not think yourself better because you burn up friends and enemies with long-range missiles without ever seeing what you have done. eichmann was sane? the testimony of nazi war criminals and the historical record of the third reich demonstrate the power of language to justify, conceal, and normalize the most atrocious kinds of brutal violence. but it was the famous jerusalem trial of adolf eichmann so penetratingly reported on by hannah arendt that most affected merton and moved him to reflect on some of the implications of that trial. in a journal entry dated march 23, 1963, merton writes that perhaps his reading of a book on nicholas of cusa provides some… comfort to which i respond inordinately after reading the first two of hannah arendt’s articles on the eichmann case. it’s incredible, and shattering. the trial is not just an indictment of one man or one system, but is in fact a sordid examination of conscience of the entire west and one which has proved singularly inconclusive because no one seems to grasp anything definite about it (if they have even tried to grasp anything). all that remains is a sense of loss, of horror, and of disorientation. and even the horror is diffuse and superficial. where does one begin to respond to the 12 prajñâ vihâra multiple indictment of our world? the stereotypical answers all collapse, and there are no new ones, and there is no faith!6 yet merton quickly recovers and cautions that the “total irrationality” of the trial should not make us distrust reason or humanity. reason, conscience, humanity have not been destroyed by the “inane cruelties” of the times. such thinking leads to “a more complete surrender to a more absolute irrationality, and a more total cruelty”.7 merton notes that eichmann had appealed to “blind obedience” or “corpse-like obedience” to explain his actions. eichmann claimed that he lived his life from childhood in accord with kant’s “moral precepts” and “conception of duty”. he later admitted that kant did not approve of “blind obedience”. eichmann also confessed that when following hitler’s program for the “final solution”, he went beyond kant’s principles and took as his grounds for blind obedience the dictum “act as if the führer would approve of it if he saw you!” this goes beyond duty, to an identification with the “legislator”. eichmann seemed bothered by two exceptions he made to the rules. in those cases, instead of following his duty to his führer, he allowed jews to escape. “all along, the terrible thing about the eichmann case”, merton suggests, “was the fact that his motives were always motives of conscience and duty, not of fanaticism”.8 while merton obviously is fascinated with arendt’s “banality of evil” argument, this remains in the background, and is not the main concern of his essay “a devout meditation in memory of adolf eichmann”,9 merton, as usual, wants to draw a lesson from eichmann to apply to his ongoing concern with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war. and he wants to raise a troubling question that goes to the core of his understanding of human beings: what are the implications of eichmann’s being judged “sane” for our understanding of the human person and his or her relationship to society? merton’s famous essay begins with these words: “one of the most disturbing facts that came out in the eichmann trial was that a psychiatrist examined him and pronounced him perfectly sane. i do not doubt it at all, and that is why i find it disturbing”. merton goes on to describe eichmann as orderly, punctual, and unimaginative with a “profound respect for system, for law and order”. he was obedient and loyal. he didn’t develop donald p. st. john 13 any psychosomatic illnesses and seemed to sleep well. he had some disturbing experiences but bore them “bravely” for the sake of the fatherland in the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice. yes, “the sanity of eichmann is disturbing”, because we usually equate sanity with “a sense of justice, with humaneness, with prudence, with the capacity to love and understand other people”. we depend on the sane people to protect us from madness and destruction. but what if it is the sane ones who are “the most dangerous”? merton bitingly suggests: “it is the sane ones, the well-adapted ones, who can without qualms and without nausea aim the missiles and press the buttons that will initiate the great festival of destruction that they, the sane ones, have prepared”. we are naïve to think that a psychotic will push the button. no one suspects the sane, and the sane ones will have perfectly good reasons, logical, well-adjusted reasons, for firing the shot. they will be obeying sane orders that have come sanely down the chain of command. and because of their sanity they will have no qualms at all. when the missiles take off, it will be no mistake. merton then raises the question of whether the whole notion of sanity as the ability to act in a “cool, orderly manner”, adjusting to the needs and varying expectations of society makes any sense when that society has lost its spiritual values. if the test of sanity is “adjustment”, then perhaps these people could be perfectly adjusted in hell. if the people who planned, supported, and ran the death camps are deemed “sane”, then obviously the definition of sanity does not include empathy, compassion, or other qualities that indicate an ability to experience the suffering of others as one’s own. sadly, the possession of these “spiritual” qualities is not deemed necessary for one to be declared clinically “sane”. does that mean that a spiritual person who has developed these qualities to a high degree is not sane? would that person not feel out of place in an insane society, much as a conscientious person would have felt as an employee of a death camp? or perhaps christians should be realistic and just try to “fit in”. after all, christians have been “sane” in the past: torture is nothing new, is it? we ought to be able to ratio14 prajñâ vihâra nalize a little brainwashing, and genocide, and find a place for nuclear war, or at least for napalm, in our moral theology. certainly some of us are doing our best along these lines already. there are hopes! even christians can shake off their sentimental prejudices about charity and become sane like eichmann. eichmann was sane, according to merton. so were the military leaders on both sides during world war ii who obliterated whole cities. and sane were those involved in the creation and detonation of the abombs and h-bombs, and sane are those who plan the strategy for the next war including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. these are the sane ones, the cool-headed ones who estimate “how many millions of people can be considered expendable in a nuclear war”. the truly insane people, of course, the real “crazies”, as every sane person knows, are the pacifists and the ban-the-bomb crowd. merton thinks that perhaps sanity is “no longer a value or an end in itself”. just as the dinosaurs proved counter-productive when things changed, so might sanity in a nuclear age. perhaps, though, there is a chance for survival if we are a little less sane, a little more conscious of our “absurdities and contradictions”. but if we are sane, too sane, well “. . . perhaps we must say that in a society like ours the worst insanity is to be totally without anxiety, totally ‘sane’”. hitler and the failure of the churches traditional western christianity has always held that there is a special connection between christ and the “spirit” of western civilization. conquistadores and colonialists brought both sword and cross, western civilization and the gospel to “heathen” cultures and in some cases even after a separation had developed between institutional christianity and secular political institutions. while there were still some areas of “friction” between christian teachings and the practices in secular western societies, a general agreement developed that if the church did not encroach on the powers of secular authority, it could do pretty much whatever it wants. however, governments expected the churches to support them in time of war and would look unkindly at wholesale opposition and resisdonald p. st. john 15 tance. “one of the few demands for heroic sacrifice still made by the church was that the faithful put aside their scruples and fears and obey the nation without question when it summoned them to go to war, even against other supposedly “christian” nations. theirs not to reason why. the government knew best”.10 merton notes that the “violence of believers” has played a significant part in the history of the west. if practice is a form of preaching, then by their practice christians have often preached that violence and not nonviolence proves the strength of one’s faith. in the twentieth century during two world wars “christians, on both sides, were exhorted to go out and kill each other if not in the name of christ and faith, at least in the name of ‘christian duty’”. even more strangely, german christians during wwii were urged to go out and kill and die “for a government that was not only non-christian but anti-christian and which had evident intentions of getting rid of the church”. and so it was, notes merton, that “god was drafted into all the armies and invited to get out there and kill himself”.11 recent studies on the role of the churches in nazi germany raised questions in merton’s mind about the moral passivity of the protestant and catholic churches. to examine this, he turned to the testimony of christians who opposed the third reich and therefore their churches, sometimes at the cost of their lives. we shall consider three people about whom merton wrote, what they taught him, and how he applied the lessons learned sometimes to the discomfort of his fellow catholics. the first person we shall consider is fr. ignace lepp whose diaries, written during the nazi occupation of france, had just been published (1962).12 lepp’s book struck a chord with merton. ironically, on the twenty-fourth anniversary of his baptism (november 16, 1962) and in the middle of his own period of enforced silence, he records in his journal that he is reading lepp’s book and that “in a certain sense i am scandalized by my own catholicism”. he complains that it is “bad enough” that one has “constantly to yield to officialdom and follow the decisions and regulations of bureaucrats”, but increasingly there are clear cases of “conflict between the dead regulation on the one hand and living, spontaneous moral action on the other”.13 merton’s sympathetic review of fr. lepp’s book also provided him the opportunity to critically examine the use and abuse of authority by 16 prajñâ vihâra the church especially in dealing with individuals who presented a challenge to its passivity over issues of war and peace.14 fr. lepp opposed the vichy puppet government and nazism but received little support and considerable opposition from his fellow catholic priests. merton focused on what he characterized as a mentality of evasion which was responsible for the failure of bishops, clerics, and especially wealthy laity to resist and attempt to undermine the nazi puppet government. the bishops and clerics in vichy france supported the nazi installed regime because in their minds it was the only alternative to communism. such an either/or characterization of the situation reflects a “latent despair of freedom and of democratic government”, which is another trait of the psychology of evasion. theirs was not a genuine “choice” but a regressive “capitulation to power”. lepp’s fellow priests could not understand or support his resistance activities and tried to dissuade him from being involved in the underground. “the authoritarian character of the church”, wrote fr. lepp, “has developed in many catholics a tendency to evade all spiritual responsibility; they wait to be told what to do by authorities”. when ministers of the church encourage such morally immature ideas and practices, they abuse their authority and thereby weaken rather than strengthen the moral life of catholics. thus, the lay people do not take any initiative when serious social evils appear but passively await instructions from priests who themselves are frequently out of touch with the real world and give useless advice. “this results in an abdication of responsibility and passive submission to an evil that ought to be identified, denounced, and resisted, not ‘obeyed’”, says merton. not only that, men such as fr. lepp and emmanual mounier who had the courage and christian values to oppose evil were often refused comfort and support by their church when imprisoned by vichy. according to lepp, mounier, a courageous and articulate catholic writer, went on a hunger strike but was refused “absolution on the grounds that he had disobeyed legitimate authority and was not prepared to repent his disobedience”. this false understanding of christian obedience, notes merton, leads to a “mechanical and irrational submission” to an “official machine”. this is not the freedom of the “sons of god” but a “compliance of functionaries”. merton’s point could not be lost on the hierarchy and lay people donald p. st. john 17 of his day. in fact, he directly challenges them, charging that the church either refuses or is unable to face and to protest against injustice as well as the threat of nuclear war. “one of the grave problems of religion in our time”, writes merton, “is posed by the almost total lack of protest on the part of religious people and clergy in the face of enormous social evils”. these people suffer from a moral blindness because “they are no longer fully capable of seeing and evaluating certain evils as they truly are: as crimes against god and as betrayals of the christian ethic of love”. merton cites the rampant social injustice in latin america and the possibility of nuclear war in north america which most catholics “tend to accept passively and without question because it is ‘better than being a communist’. it is a ‘lesser evil’”. this is not a moral judgment but simply “a psychology of evasion, irresponsibility, and negativism” which cloaks itself in concepts such as “self sacrifice”, “obedience to civil authority” and “defense of freedom and religion”. persons in authority encourage this evasive helplessness and take advantage of it. true christian obedience should “liberate” a person from all forms of servitude and free him or her to criticize and refuse to cooperate with injustice and dehumanization no matter what the source. this understanding of freedom has gradually been replaced by a “psychology of subservient opportunism” which supports the worst habits of the “mass mind” and threatens both christianity and democracy. in “an enemy of the state”,15 merton presents the case of the austrian peasant franz jägerstätter who was beheaded by the nazis for repeatedly refusing to take the military oath and for declaring hitler’s wars “unjust”. jägerstätter was a convert to catholicism and thought that he was taking a very traditional catholic stand. unfortunately most of his fellow catholics including clergy thought otherwise, and everyone from friends to judges tried to convince franz to change his mind. what were their arguments? first, they claimed that there was simply nothing that one person could do against the nazi regime. therefore, franz should serve, and if he was forced to engage in immoral acts, those who gave the orders were responsible, not him. this sounds like the eichmann defense. jägerstätter disagreed, claiming that a christian would be guilty of a grave sin if he or she simply obeyed whatever a civil ruler ordered, however immoral. whether or not it shakes the regime, christians are obligated to resist and to fight evil, not with physical weapons but 18 prajñâ vihâra with spiritual ones. second, they argued that since bolshevism was antichristian and since hitler at least tolerated the churches (for the present), his refusal to fight for hitler was a refusal to defend the faith against godless communism. merton, of course, would note many times in other places that this “mentality of evasion” with its lack of faith in democracy or in the power of christ was a characteristic of the “better dead than red” crowd, christian and non-christian, who would rather commit national suicide and genocide in a nuclear exchange than to live under godless communism. third, they accused him of pride and arrogance for presuming to be a better judge of what constitutes a “just war” than those in authority. this, of course, was an invitation to abdicate one’s responsibility as a moral creature with reason and free will. fourth, they pointed out that thousands of catholic priests and lay people were serving in the military. was he better than they? here was an invitation to join a herd of sheep who blindly follow where they are led. fifth, the bishops had not officially opposed the war and, in fact, his own bishop had tried to convince him to serve. in other words, the moral failing of the bishops was to be replicated by their lay people. fifth, he could contribute better to the salvation of others by joining the army where he could practice the “apostolate of good example”. as merton points out, these arguments could be heard in his day (and in ours, one could add). the bishop of linz neither openly condemned jägerstätter’s action nor praised him as a moral hero. at best he could be considered a unique witness. but he was not to be a model for others. the bishop did not approve of conscientious objection as a legitimate catholic option. rather, he stated that the true heroes were “those exemplary young catholic men, seminarians, priests, and heads of families who fought and died in heroic fulfillment of duty and in the firm conviction that they were fulfilling the will of god at their post. . . .” these men were acting out of “a clear and correct conscience” while jägerstätter was “in error” even if “in good faith”, the bishop decreed. merton suggests that the bishop may have had things in reverse and that he and many of his clergy were the ones with “ill-formed consciences” due to their weak seminary training. many in the hierarchy shirked their responsibilities for correctly forming the consciences of young people donald p. st. john 19 in matters pertaining to war and peace. merton was concerned in his day about the responsibility of “those who help men to form their conscience__or fail to do so”. the unnerving question was to what extent the “innocently erroneous” convictions of church people in nazi germany were shared by clerics and bishops of merton’s day who were charged with the correct formation of consciences regarding war and peace. all of this “gives food for some rather apocalyptic thought”, given the nuclear saber rattling on both sides, merton warns. the real question, then, raised by the jägerstätter story was “the question of the church’s own mission of protest and prophecy in the gravest spiritual crisis [humanity] has ever known”. [italics are mine] there were those, however, who reached across political and ideological borders and who worked for peace and unity among all peoples. some laid down their lives in this effort. one such person was fr. max josef metzger who was imprisoned and executed in 1944 in germany. his life stood in stark contrast with that of many of his fellow christians__a fact not lost on merton in his essay, “a martyr for peace and unity: father max josef metzger (1887-1944)”.16 merton points out that when germany invaded poland and plunged the world into war, the german catholic press, with some exceptions, supported hitler’s war in order to stay in business. but this less than laudatory choice goes far beyond just the catholic press. the situation in the modern world (both under hitler and the nuclear cloud) often demands that christians make heroic moral choices against war and on behalf of peace because the survival of humankind may hinge on enough people resisting evil. and yet “in order to preserve our institutional freedom of action” we can blind our consciences “with a false conception of duty and of sacrifice”. this allows us to quietly “participate in colossal injustices and barbarities”. christians too often forget their primary duty to christ and allow their “duties to caesar” to justify cowardice, greed and deafness to the cries of suffering that can be heard everywhere. merton laments that it is easier to prefer “infidelity to conscience and christ” to social ostracism. and, when economic interests are involved, christians can be easily persuaded “that the side of god is the side on which our bread happens to be buttered”. however, the example of father metzger reminds us that “not everyone needs to be a passive utensil of the militarist”. metzger had been 20 prajñâ vihâra a chaplain in wwi and had seen the senseless horrors of war close up. after the war he spent his life working for peace. he founded organizations dedicated to “the works of mercy”. a special cause of his was christian unity and he was a crucial player in una sancta, an ecumenical movement among protestants and catholics that began in 1939. he was a frequent participant in peace conferences and congresses. he was arrested several times by the gestapo who tried to pin sedition charges on him without success. he had written that: “the ‘just war’ of which the moralists wrote in former days is now no longer possible. war today is a crime. we need to organize peace as men have organized war”. metzger was betrayed by an undercover swedish woman who pretended to want to work for international peace. he was arrested for the last time in 1943. his “treason” was his efforts to procure the help of bishops in other countries to request from the allies something short of the demand that hitler surrender unconditionally, so that the cities could be spared thousands of deaths. he was executed by the gestapo on april 17, 1944. he did not live to find out that the allies were not disposed to receive such overtures. regarding the witness of christians like lepp, jägerstätter, and metzger, merton writes: the point to be emphasized, however, is not only that these christians were nonviolent but that they resisted. they refused to submit to a force which they recognized as antihuman and utterly destructive. they refused to accept this evil and to palliate it under the guise of ‘legitimate authority’. in doing so they proved themselves better theologians than the professionals and the pontiffs who supported that power and made others obey it, thus cooperating in the evil.17 terror from the air: the (il)logic of war the allies began the war against germany in 1940 rightly convinced that if ever there was a just war, they were fighting it. good and donald p. st. john 21 god were on their side (no matter what the vichy and german clerics said). in only five years (1940-1945) the christian ethic of the “just war” was turned upside down. but it did not happen suddenly with the dropping of the a-bomb. in fact, dropping the a-bombs on japan was but the horrific culmination of a series of decisions made during world war ii concerning the morality of “area bombing” or “terror from the air”. these practices were made possible by new military technologies, encouraged by military leaders, acquiesced in by civilians, and justified by recourse to a logic and language of “necessity” and other appropriate obfuscations. for their own part, the christian churches largely remained silent even though they knew that once the line between combatants and non-combatants was erased, the just war theory flew out the window along with the dove of peace. terror from the air began with the fascist generalissimo franco of spain at guernica, a christian city in the basque country, in 1927. the nazis, of course, practiced the indiscriminate bombing of civilians and civilian targets from the beginning of their expansion. they were rightly condemned by other countries for this immoral and barbaric practice. in his essay, “target equals city”,18 merton notes that the british government took the high ground__at least for awhile__and declared that the raf would adhere to traditional rules and would bomb only military and industrial targets. in 1942, however, air marshall sir arthur travers harris decided to abandon these traditional ethical guidelines. he argued that since the “precise bombing” of military and support sites during daylight hours was too dangerous, “area bombing” during the night would become standard practice even though it meant that the urban areas surrounding the targets would be destroyed and its civilians killed. this would save the lives of british airmen and the cost of planes. if that wasn’t justification enough, an additional reason was given: such bombings would “destroy enemy morale”. to achieve that end, churchill declared: “there are no lengths in violence to which we will not go”. one spokesman bluntly remarked that: “our plans are to bomb, burn and ruthlessly destroy, in every way available to us, the people responsible for creating this war”. and by “the people” he did not mean only the military and political leaders. when america entered the war, roosevelt announced that the aaf would bomb only strategic targets.19 by 1944, however, oblitera22 prajñâ vihâra tion bombing by the “yanks” had begun in earnest. some americans, especially pacifists, objected. roosevelt, following the brits, defended the tactic as “necessary” if the war was to be shortened. public opinion polls were on the side of this thinking and tactic. americans by a fifty-to-one margin supported saturation bombing and opposed their “overly scrupulous”, if not “defeatists”, compatriots who raised moral objections.20 (shortening the war mysteriously had become an ultimate and unquestionable end that justified, presumably, any means. but in order to shorten the war one must intensify the pressure and increase the damage. as the fire grows, larger logs must be thrown on.) the old rule of “double effect” where one could “justify” the unintended and limited killing of innocent non-combatants when the action served a greater “intended” good became mote. these deaths were not unintended. america had every intention of inflicting horrific damage on german cities and death to their occupants. as merton says, “this was pure terrorism. and the traditional doctrine of war excluded such immoral methods”.21 dresden was a good example of what modern “conventional” weapons could do and how that possibility quickly pushed aside reason and morality. wave after wave of bombers reduced this german city to rubble. there were more people killed in the saturation bombing of dresden than as a result of the a-bombs dropped on hiroshima and nagasaki combined. and, although dresden was an industrial city, no special attention was paid to industrial sites. the city itself was the target with its men, women, and children. in fact there was what one official called a “bonus”, in that the city was filled with refugees fleeing the advancing russian army. while some tried to defend the bombing “as an inescapable necessity”, it was bombed, in fact, for political reasons. it was “a ferocious and massive act of destruction . . . a calculated atrocity, perpetrated for the effect it might have on the russian ally. but as ever in such cases, it was rationalized as an inescapable necessity”.22 the americans expanded their practice of targeting german cities to japanese cities even as they were developing the atomic bomb. in early 1945, general curtis lemay, another general acting under his own responsibility, launched a campaign of obliteration, bombing japanese cities. napalm bombs set tokyo ablaze, fire storms sucked away oxygen, killing more people than were later killed in hiroshima. low-flying night donald p. st. john 23 raids on fifty cities were conducted to destroy “phantom industries” located in neighborhoods amidst civilians.23 finally, the japanese cities of hiroshima and nagasaki were obliterated with one bomb each, leaving innumerable civilians dead and many others so burned and sick that they came to envy the dead. claims that industrial targets were the intended bombing sites were quickly withdrawn. the purpose again was “to shorten the war” and to avoid american casualties. the story of backdoor diplomacy remained hidden, as was the split between the emperor and the military. the demand for “unconditional surrender” was to remain the only option on the table. as the eighth “meditation” in merton’s sardonic prose poem “original child bomb” reminds us: 8. when they bombed hiroshima they would put the following out of business: the ube nitrogen fertilizer company; the ube soda company; the nippon motor oil company; the sumitoma chemical company; the sumitoma aluminum company, and most of the inhabitants.24 there is an irrational logic to modern warfare, one that leads inevitably to committing acts that had once been considered unethical. it is then “rationalized as an inescapable necessity”.25 merton compares it to an addict who swears that he or she can control their drinking but finds that as they take each drink their resistance to having another one weakens until they end up where they swore they wouldn’t be. with nuclear weapons, merton notes, indulging in the first “drink” could swiftly turn into a “binge” that would end with the destruction of the world.26 war, even with modern conventional weapons, is no longer an activity that can be easily controlled rationally and morally once the terrible spirit is out of the bottle__and imbibed. there is one winner in war. the winner is war itself . . . though moralists may intend and endeavor to lay down rules for war, in the end war lays down the rules for them. he does not find it hard to make them change their minds. if he could, he would change god’s own mind. war has power to transmute evil into good and good into evil 24 prajñâ vihâra . . . now more than ever he is omnipotent. he is the great force . . . with his globe of sun-fire, and his pillar of cloud. worship him.27 several times during his recounting of the history of obliteration bombing, merton notes that the language of necessity was appealed to. one assumes that using the language of necessity (“i had to do it”) absolves the perpetrator of responsibility for his or her actions. the resort to such a rationale strangely resembles the most common auschwitz defense. the language of necessity suggests that there is a will or force stronger than one’s own which is morally and perhaps ontologically superior. this powerful momentum of war overrules one’s misgivings and leads to the surrender of one’s will. fr. lepp and franz jägerstätter could have easily resorted to it and declared that the will of god impelled them to put aside their qualms about giving in to the nazis. they could have said “the church made me do it”. other “religious” people would have understood and even praised their decision. yet people like them__the death camp refuseniks, the peaceniks in america, or the scientists who objected to the use of the a-bomb, spoke against the systems of authority that condoned genocide and mass murder. in all cases, the larger social order had an ideology/theology that it claimed superior to and more universally valid than the “opinion” or “viewpoint” of a single individual. the larger order also claimed to have a moral authority, either politically or religiously grounded, that overruled all individual claims to a different moral axiom. any “sane” person or “devout” catholic must acknowledge and adjust to such “obviously” superior forces. it was “necessary” for them to do so and in doing so they experienced the thrill of being swept along by the inevitable currents of history or of the divine will. the language of wars cold and hot the cold war merton wrote “war and the crisis of language”,28 in 1968, the final year of his life. in it he reflects on the use and abuse of language in both the cold war and the vietnam war. this was the latest episode of a donald p. st. john 25 century-long corruption of language in the interests of war-making. “the incoherence of language that cannot be trusted”, says merton, “and the coherence of weapons that are infallible, or thought to be: this is the dialectic of politics and war, the prose of the twentieth century”. the language of the cold war was characterized by the “more pompous and scientific jargon of the war mandarins in government offices and military think-tanks”. this language was “scientifically antiseptic, businesslike, uncontaminated with sentimental concerns for life . . .” the “men” huddled together in their war-rooms and around the conference tables of their think-tanks, trying to prove their “manliness” by playing with statistics about the deaths of millions, if not of the whole earth. like auschwitz language, “it is this playing with death, however, that brings into the players’ language itself the corruption of death: not physical but mental and moral extinction”. because of the irrationality of “winning” a nuclear war (winning equals suicide), the language of goals and noble ends quickly gives way to the language of strategies and tactics (process) which serves one purpose: “to mask this ultimate unreason and permit the game to go on”. the language of nuclear escalation is “the language of naked power” but is ‘all the more persuasive” because it proudly displays its ethical illiteracy and because it affirms as realistic its own irrationality. the language of escalation expresses a massive death wish through a superb mix of “banality and apocalypse, science and unreason. . . .” given currency through the mass media, this language can “quickly contaminate the thinking of everybody”. it can spread to other countries who are also eager to play the game. u.s. experts at the time were opining that the country could survive a war where only fifty million people were killed and china was predicting that it could spare 300 million people and still make it. in such a world, merton concludes, “it is obvious that we are no longer in the realm where moral truth is conceivable”. true, and it is also a surreal world like that of auschwitz where one is sure that what one’s comrades or party says is true and what is being repeatedly reinforced by the highest authorities must be fact and therefore is to be accepted as the real picture of the world. behind this these same keepers of meaning and of authority play on fear: fear of god’s wrath, of the death squad, of nuclear annihilation, even of social ostra26 prajñâ vihâra cism. only someone able to find and maintain an alternative base from which to think, judge, and feel can oppose such a totalizing world. the interplay of reason and madness that ran through the language of nuclear “diplomacy” and escalation fascinated and frightened merton. he made connections with other events and found insights in unexpected places. reading michel foucault’s madness and civilization (random house, 1965), merton was struck “by the way in which the ‘reason’ of the age of enlightenment unconsciously shares so much of the madness with which it was in dialogue”. foucault described a method by which doctors tried to “fool” the inmates of insane asylums by adopting their own “logic” in order to act out scenarios that would push patients into a crisis where they would have to confront the illogical nature of their own delusions. for example, people who feared they were dead and hence would not eat food (because dead people don’t eat) were shown pictures of dead people eating. they were therefore disarmed by their own logic and began to eat. this reminded merton of the modern “language of power and war”. our enemy is considered mad and must be treated as such. people of his ilk only understand force and violence. to enter his world, we employ the “language of escalation”, building up our stockpiles while threatening a pre-emptive use of the h-bomb. if we strike first, it will prove that force was necessary because we were facing “various bunches of madmen who understand nothing else”. even as we conclude that words are of little use in dealing with such people, we continue to use the language of diplomacy and negotiation. but it is the mutual escalation of weapons that becomes the real “dialogue”. so there are terms offered, there is the appearance of dialogue on the political level but “the real dialogue is with weapons” even though this might contradict what our words are saying. after all, you are dealing with someone who is mad and who only understands the language of force. this is a circle, of course, because we begin with a tacit conviction that negotiation through words is meaningless and we do in fact “render the language of negotiation meaningless”. one might note that in the nuclear rhetoric of the cold war the argument from “necessity” is developed, promoted and reinforced by both sides. the spiral of reciprocal escalation turns: it is necessary for the u.s. to escalate because the u.s.s.r. escalated because the u.s. escalated, donald p. st. john 27 and on and on. to use merton’s metaphor of drinking, the drunks are now buying each other drinks while loudly proclaiming their respective intentions to “control” things themselves. or, following foucault, when one enters the world of the madman one must discard one’s old logic. unfortunately, and unlike the case of the enlightenment doctors, one may also lose one’s old identity and adopt the reality of the world of the madman. like those who adopted and internalized the language of auschwitz, one can rename reality and justify actions that one’s old language would have found insane. it is good to remember what was being justified and what was being permitted by silence in those early years of the 1960s. writing in his journal on a hot august 21, 1962 merton updates us on nuclear tests: up to mid-august__there have been 106 nuclear tests in the last year. 31 by the ussr, 74 by the u.s.a. and 1 by britain (in nevada). the u.s. tests have been 29 in the atmosphere (the south pacific) (three in nevada), 1 high altitude and 44 underground (new mexico). total tests since the beginning. u.s.a. 229, ussr 86, uk 22, france 5. grand total 342 of which 282 in the atmosphere. nice going, boys!29 the church and the bomb the dramatic increase in the destructive capabilities of weapons during world war ii, with the accompanying decrease in the moral capacity to control them, weighed heavily upon merton’s mind as he listened to the propaganda spewing forth from both nuclear powers. also weighing heavily upon his mind was the fear that the current moral posture of the churches was not significantly different from the passivity that characterized the churches on both sides during ww i and ii. in a letter to the polish poet czeslaw milosz, in march of 1962, merton explained why he had spoken out, and revealed something of the climate of the early 60s. the chief reason why i have spoken out was that i felt i owed 28 prajñâ vihâra it to my conscience to do so. there are certain things that have to be clearly stated. i had in mind particularly the danger arising from the fact that some of the most belligerent people in this country are christians, on the one hand fundamentalist protestants and on the other certain catholics. they both tend to appeal to the bomb to do the “holy” work of destruction in the name of christ and christian truth. this is completely intolerable and the truth has to be stated. i cannot in conscience remain indifferent.30 merton recognized the coming together of conservative protestants who had always considered america a “christian” nation and roman catholics who in his time were flexing their muscles and flashing their credentials as loyal americans. after all, a catholic was now president and the political power in major u.s. cities was in the hands of catholics. the formerly despised immigrants had become mainstream americans. merton himself had been a leading figure in this upsurge in catholic respectability, influence and power. now he was in the process of severely criticizing the church for its cozy embrace of american political and military power. merton raised troubling questions and engaged in harsh rhetoric over the inability __ or even the unwillingness __ of the church to fulfill its primary mission as peacemaker and representative of the king of peace, especially in the face of the current apocalyptical possibilities. if there ever was a time for the churches to speak up, merton thought that this was it. but silence ruled the day, interspersed with feeble attempts by institutional theologians to justify nuclear war. by and large, the church again ceded the moral ground to the state. there was, of course, a longer history to this. merton’s interpretation is that even as the state became secular in the west and wrested temporal authority from the “sacred” domain of the church, it looked to the church for certain social services such as moral training, “good works”, and in some cases, education of the young, but especially “moral” support in time of war. the church responded too eagerly, in merton’s view. as with augustine’s promulgation of the just war theory, religious authority was exercised to persuade church members that following the secular authorities was their “sacred” duty. (one need only think of the position of the churches on both sides during the american civil war). the church donald p. st. john 29 thereby also assured itself of survival and special treatment (tax breaks, no military service for clerics, etc.). however, as merton notes, when the church equates secular authority with divine authority and cedes to it the right to decide whether a war or its tactics are moral, the church abdicates its mission.31 in short, just because the church no longer coaches the team does not mean that its only possible role is that of cheerleader. merton thought that in the united states, most christians just did not understand or were unwilling to face the profound moral and religious issues then facing humankind. the attitude of most priests and ministers was not much different from their countrymen who were agnostics and atheists. they confused the interests of the church, america, nato and the west in general. hence, many claimed that a first strike was not too high a price to pay for freedom and religious liberty. but merton insisted that “genocide is too high of a price and no one, not even christians, not even for the highest ideals”, has a right to kill millions of noncombatants and “defenseless populations of neutral nations or unwilling allies”. western society does not equal christ and russia is not the anti-christ; the cause of the west is not the cause of god. (one can imagine the anger and outrage these kinds of remarks elicited from american christians).32 in america, loyalty to a country that sees itself as a “city on a mountaintop” and claims to be influenced by christian history and principles, becomes a “religious” justification for supporting the planned nuclear obliteration of the cities of america’s enemies. but, the church “does not belong to any political power bloc”, merton points out, and it exists on both sides of the iron curtain. yet, some theologians attempted to justify the mass slaughter of civilians, including fellow christians, in russia and eastern europe. the christian ethical sense had been corrupted “by theorizing in a vacuum, by juggling with moral clichés devoid of serious content, and the weakening of genuine human compassion”.33 merton is concerned in many places with the “bombardment” of a populace by and the circulation among them of patriotic slogans, catch words and clichés which substitute for rational and ethical thinking. propaganda serves to build up an image of the enemy as subhuman and demonic and hence as an object of anger, hatred, or fear but certainly not of compassion. one would have thought that following the awful spectacle of hiroshima and nagasaki, any “civilized” nation that threatened to inciner30 prajñâ vihâra ate the human residents of major cities would be condemned for terrorizing these populations. (incineration, a method used in the nazi death camps, was now being threatened on each another by the two major victors over nazi germany). while christian moral teaching allowed for a war that was defensive in nature, and where evil did not outweigh good, it never condoned terrorism. in all-out nuclear war, there is no longer [a] question of simply permitting an evil, the destruction of a few civilian dwellings, in order to attain a legitimate end: the destruction of a military target. it is well understood on both sides that all-out nuclear war is purely and simply massive and indiscriminate destruction of targets chosen not for their military significance alone, but for their importance in a calculated project of terror and annihilation.34 and yet, both the soviet union and the united states engaged in nuclear escalation under the umbrella of what was later dubbed, mad: mutually assured destruction. writing in the early 1960s merton noted that even a conservative estimate placed the u.s. stockpile of nuclear weapons as equivalent to “ten tons of tnt for every human being on the face of the earth”.35 while many considered a nuclear war “unthinkable”, the lessons of wwii demonstrated that, when pushed both by the logic and force of events and by expediency, leaders could initiate and justify what were heretofore “unthinkable” and grossly immoral actions. in fact, a campaign had been launched in america to acclimate people to thinking the unthinkable. as the pressures of the cold war become more intense, the fallout shelter scare has had a direct and intimate connection with the policy of nuclear deterrence. it has been clearly and explicitly part of a campaign to “engineer consent” and make nuclear war more thoroughly acceptable, at least as a reasonable possibility, in the american public mind. this, in turn, is intended to convince our enemies that we “believe in” the bomb, and that, though we still utter pious hopes that it will never be necessary, we thoroughly intend to use it if we feel ourselves to be sufficiently threatened.36 donald p. st. john 31 the moral passivity and patriotic activity that had characterized american catholic support of obliteration bombing in wwii continued into the nuclear age. “never was religious protest so badly needed”, claimed merton. but “[s]ilence, passivity, or outright belligerence seems to be characteristic [of] official and unofficial christian reactions to the h-bomb”. merton observed that what debate there was within the churches in the early 1960s concerning nuclear war “has been marked above all by a seemingly inordinate hesitation to characterize the uninhibited use of nuclear weapons as immoral”.37 moral theologians who wanted to save the notion of a just war tried to tie it to the policymakers’ concept of a limited nuclear war that was tactical in nature. but, in order to do that, they usually had to accept the idea of total nuclear war in self-defense. the idea that a nuclear war could be limited and somehow “won” by one side seemed to fly in the face of history-and commonsense. if one side felt itself to be losing, why would it not resort to “total” war? hence, merton found ludicrous the attempt by some theologians to reintroduce a just war defense to justify the american use of nuclear weapons.38 in nuclear warfare, victims are estimated in “mega-corpses” or millions of deaths. and so merton asks the churches how far they are willing to go in giving over the decision on whether to push the button that would inflict this carnage to politicians and military personnel? how do christians really know that these people are “worthy of our confidence”? and do these individuals actually realize the full ramifications of what they are doing? or are they merely following the protocols they and their cohorts set up, making the next move as dictated by their position in the chain of events defined by their job description and the specific orders given to them? merton directs this troubling question to his fellow christians: “to what extent can we assume that in passively following their lead and concurring in their decision__at least by default__we are acting as christians?”39 (are we back to the non-responsibilities of the bureaucrats of the third reich__and the silent collusion of the churches?) in short, merton is asking if the church’s desire to be seen supporting the country’s nuclear strategy places it in a position where it accedes to the destruction of much of god’s creation and millions of human beings created in his image? vietnam 32 prajñâ vihâra the claim by some that the cold war with its nuclear standoff would bring world peace and eliminate conventional small wars would be proven wrong. in addition to a series of small “hot” wars, brutal violence was inflicted on millions of people by dictators and super-power client states whose only virtue was their loyalty to one bloc or the other. “bad dictators” were those supported by our enemy, “good” dictators were those supported by us. the language used to explain these incongruities and justify these proxy wars was filled with euphemisms and doublespeak. this became even more apparent as the u.s. involvement in vietnam deepened. merton had warned early-on about the dubious nature both morally and geopolitically of what america was doing in vietnam. he became increasingly aware of the widening gap between what was being touted as the case by washington and what the events on the ground seemed to indicate. as for the latter, the language coming from the ground was itself beginning to take on a surreal tinge. a u.s. major, seeking to defend the indiscriminate shelling of civilians in a village in south vietnam (supposedly the country america was there to defend), and with no visible appreciation for the irony, declared that “it became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it”. merton pointed out that: here we see, again an insatiable appetite for the tautological, the definitive, the final . . . the destruction of the village and the killing of the people earn for them a final and official identity. the burned huts become “enemy structures”; the dead men, women, and children become “vietcong”, thus adding to a “kill ratio” that can be interpreted as “favorable”. they were thought to be vietcong and were therefore destroyed. by being destroyed they became vietcong for keeps; they entered “history” definitively as our enemies, because we wanted to be on the “safe side”, and “save american lives”__as well as vietnam.40 the cold war slogan: “better dead than red” leapt into merton’s donald p. st. john 33 mind as he considered this piece of rationalization for another vietnamese tragedy. in both cases, to be made “dead” is to be saved from becoming “red”, a fate obviously worse than death. thus rescue and destruction become identical. “the logic of war-makers” applied this bit of cold war speak to the fate of asian villagers on the other side of the world. in effect, says merton, “we decide, in their place, that it is better for them to be dead__killed by us-than red, living under our enemies”. the asian caught in the middle finds himself in a no-win situation. if he is on their side-a “bad guy”__he certainly must be killed. if he is on our side-a “good guy”__then he should be willing to die for our highest value, freedom, rather than to fall under the sway of our enemy. hence we protect his virtue (and ours) as well as defend his interests (and ours). of course, one dare not ask the troubling question: “what might happen if he fell under communist rule and liked it!” all of these convoluted linguistic acrobatics deflect attention from the underlying “logic of power”. this is the same logic that hitler expressed following his viewing of the aftermath of the luftwaffe’s brutal bombing of warsaw. “‘how wicked these people must have been’, he sobbed, ‘to make me do this to them!’” ironically, hitler is here confessing that these people are stronger than he is or that his hate for them is stronger than his moral sentiments. “they made me do it”, he is saying, “so don’t look at me; don’t blame me”. but there is a certain insecurity behind this pronouncement: a fear of dialogue. and so he speaks with weapons in order to silence, preemptively, all speech from the “other”.41 the vietnam war, of course, had other euphemisms such as “pacification”, “liberation” “winning hearts and minds”, and “free zone”. as to how the latter worked, an american captain declared that the army had marked off a triangle and designated it a free zone. there were villages, of course, within the triangle. unfortunately for the occupants, the captain announced: “‘from now on anything that moves around here is going to be automatically considered v.c. and bombed or fired on’”. the villagers were to be considered “hostile civilians”. when asked how he would distinguish between hostile civilians and refugees, the captain explained that there were only three categories of people in this area. first, the v.c., second, the v.c. sympathizers, and third, fumbling with language, but sure of the underlying logic, he blurted out: “‘i can’t think of the third just now 34 prajñâ vihâra but . . . there’s no middle ground in this war’”.42 merton also hears echoes from the “old frontier” in the language and attitudes of the military in vietnam. the old myths, learned from history books, teachers, scout leaders, movies, church leaders, drill instructors and parents are adapted to new contexts. many of the metaphors bandied about by the military clustered around images associated with “clearing” the jungles of vietcong and “cleaning out” an area of “hostiles”. merton is reminded of how settlers and frontiersmen spoke about the necessity of clearing the woodlands or the plains of hostile indians. this use of images connected with “cleansing”, “purifying”, and “clearing out” makes the aggressor himself feel clean, like someone engaged in a hygienically beneficial task. other images such as “vermin”, paint a slightly more negative view of the inhabitants who must be “cleared out” of towns and forests in order to make way for more “acceptable” folk. of course, one has to hide the fact that innocent men, women and children are being sanitized by these housecleaning activities. at first, this killing of women and children, whether in the old west or southeast asia, is permitted as an unintended “side effect” of “something more important” that has to be done. overtime there is “more and more killing of civilians and less and less of the ‘something more important’ which we are trying to achieve”.43 of course, modern military weapons made the bombing of cities “infested” with civilians easier than cleaning out the frontier of “dirty injuns”. one recalls that the operators of auschwitz were also obsessed with cleanliness and with purification activities; the ovens had to be cleaned of any dust from the remains of jews. clearing the world of jews, indians or any other undesirables seems a “final solution”. but if successful the result will be a world of soulless sameness: a non-threatening, non-diverse environment-socially and naturally. everything would look like us-and we would eventually be so nauseated that we would have to clear the world of ourselves__which is perhaps the secret hatred behind it all anyways. of course, the act of “ethnic cleansing” borders on genocide. the western and christian “mission” to conquer the world for cross and crown brought europeans to the american shores and led to both cultural and physical genocide. the international use of the term “genocide” began after the second world war and was defined with the holocaust in mind. but, as merton points out, “the destruction of races is not new__just donald p. st. john 35 easier”. americans tend to forget that “a century ago white america was engaged in the destruction of entire tribes and ethnic groups of indians”.44 in north america the puritans in imitation of the ancient israelites came into the “promised land” and proceeded to “clear out” the idolaters. theirs was a divine mission much as that of the conquistadores in latin america.45 the explicitly religious myths that guided and justified the destruction of these “aliens” continue to propel america in a modified form today, merton argues. but contrary to its myth, “the united states has received from no one the mission” to police the world or to dictate to other peoples how they should live.46 or how they should die! taking on a global presence and responsibility but carrying myths of divine missions and manifest destinies, america oversimplified the complexities of southeast asia and misunderstood its various peoples. as is usually the case, americans were surprised when the effects of their “good” intentions turned out to be so different from what was anticipated. at best, the language of war, power blocs, “dominoes”, “friends and foes”, suffers from a lack of sophistication. at worse, it creates a virtual reality that traps its articulators and leads to an obliteration of the humanity of the “other” and anyone connected with him. as merton so pointedly notes: the tragic thing about vietnam is that, after all, the “realism” of our program there is so unrealistic, so rooted in myth, so completely out of touch with the needs of the people whom we know only as statistics and to whom we never manage to listen, except where they fit in with our psychopathic delusions. our external violence in vietnam is rooted in an internal violence which simply ignores the human reality of those we claim to be helping.47 merton notes that the newspapers reported that a youth leader in the south who originally believed that the americans could be trusted, changed his mind. he complained that while the americans kept making declarations about how they have come to help his people, their actions and the effects of the war on the people made them hate the americans. this, of course, surprised the americans. while an american catholic bishop whispered words of comfort and encouragement into the ear of 36 prajñâ vihâra president johnson, a buddhist nun in south vietnam burned herself to death to protest the war. billy graham proclaims the war to be a “spiritual war between good and evil”. merton wryly notes that graham is right but not in the way he intends.48 the myth declares that america doesn’t lose wars to “bad guys”. neither lyndon johnson nor his supporters wanted to be the first to expose it as myth. as the anti-war movement grew in number and strength, generals like westmoreland insisted that the war is winnable__with a few more troops, a little more napalm, several powerful air strikes (and, if all else fails, then threaten to “nuke ’em”). merton suggests that the language used by governments in wartime distorts reality since it only presents one side of a complex picture and is unwilling to solicit “other” voices. “because the language of the war-maker is self-enclosed in finality”, it can only be expressed in speeches, threats, press releases, position papers, anonymous leaks, and white papers from think-tanks. it does not invite reasonable dialogue, it uses language to silence dialogue, to block communication, so that instead of words the two sides may trade divisions, positions, villages, air bases, cities__and of course the lives of the people in them. this was the language of nuclear escalation as well as of the vietnam war. in addition, one of the mistakes of the war planners was listening to the language of military-industrial-intellectual “experts” was bathed in overly optimistic predictions about the effectiveness of the superior military technology of the u.s. (no doubt with dollar signs in the eyes of some consultants). they thought that technology would allow the u.s. to do what neither the french nor the south vietnamese army could do. false pride, wrapped in its presuppositions by technological thinking, becomes blinded to “decisive realities that do not fit those suppositions”. the u.s. cranks up its propaganda machine and enlists its network of statisticians to “prove” that it is winning the war and that its basic assumptions are coming true. of course, as merton notes, the tet offensive of february 1968 shatters much of that façade.49 during the vietnam war, “officialese” had to carry the additional burden of denying the actual flow of events. “modern politics is a matter of defining how you think things ought to be and making them come out that way by cunning or by force”.50 yet vietnam shows that even with enormous technological power, one cannot always make one’s words donald p. st. john 37 come true, says merton. the language from washington took on the twisted logic and defensive tone of a group that finds itself in a situation where its heroic myth keeps insisting that it should be on the edge of victory but reality keeps insisting otherwise. “we are getting to the point”, warns merton, “where american ‘victory’ in vietnam is becoming a word without any possible human meaning”.51 the word is kept but the meaning is ejected because alternative terms which might better describe the situation are unacceptable. they might be words of the enemy. and dialogue with the enemy is prohibited by the logic of power. “one of the curious things about the war in vietnam”, merton notes, “is that it is being fought to vindicate the assumptions upon which it is being fought”.52 here is the awful tautology again! if the only acceptable language is that which interprets what is happening so as to vindicate the original reasons behind our doing it, then if the course of events or new information threaten to prove our assumptions wrong we must either distort the meaning of present events so they comport with our assumptions or reveal the “real” meaning of our assumptions in order to fit with current events. nothing must happen that would prove us wrong and empty the present of its justification, forcing us to change course and/or admit mistakes. (the difficulty with admitting mistakes is intensified when doing so implies that young men were sent to die in vain. the only way to “save” these heroic acts from becoming meaningless is to offer more lives as proof that they had not died in vain. thus we get caught in a demonic spiral, in an historical tautology). the problem is that these assumptions have been proven wrong, claims merton. the administration originally tried to make vietnam look like korea, with north invading south with support from china. that way, the war could be fought like a “conventional limited war”. this turned out to be wrong and the u.s. got mired down in a guerilla war in the south. and, of course, the fact that the vietnamese and chinese were ancient and current enemies did not fit the narrative of china being behind the war. merton had a prescient feeling that the tonkin bay incident was faked to allow johnson to push congress to pass a resolution that supported turning the war into the war we thought we were fighting. so, troop numbers were escalated and bombing raids were carried out on the north. of course, unlike korea, it was not the north that had attacked us 38 prajñâ vihâra but we had invaded the north. such minor details were irrelevant.53 the united states government strove mightily to gain support at home and abroad for its version of the war by increasing its attempts to turn that version into reality. this effort had the unintended effect of further undermining the credibility of america as well as its “basic human integrity and sincerity”. “the political language of the united states, which was suspect before, has now been fatally denatured”, claims merton. it has lost its “intellectual currency” because of its double-talk about the war, about race in america, about domestic programs that go unfunded. “the tragedy is not so much that america has come out of its pristine isolationism but that it has decided to rule the world without paying serious attention to anybody else’s view of what the world is about”. as a result, “language has been distorted and denatured in defense of this . . . attitude”.54 those who lead others into war claim that war is a reasonable if the last resort. merton, however, insists that “war is not made by reason, its conduct is not governed by reason. to appeal against war to reason is to make an appeal that cannot have any serious effect on the war makers themselves”.55 officials, of course, must sound rational, appealing to “hard” facts and “irrefutable” evidence while shaping them so as to point to fearful scenarios should this “evidence” go unheeded. “the awful danger of war is then, not so much that force is used when reason has broken down but that reason unconsciously inhibits itself beforehand (in all the trivialities of political and military gamesmanship) in order that it may break down, and in order that resort to force may become ‘inevitable’.” in other words, the events that are pointed to as “evidence” that war or its escalation are necessary are themselves selected so that “the occult determination to resort to force in any case” will become reality.56 epilogue: one more troubling question thomas merton is no longer with us. and neither are the soviet union, the cold war, and the vietnam war. the united states is the only super-power. but one troubling question remains. we can be sure merton would have asked it: have things really changed? merton might have assumed that after the demise of the soviet donald p. st. john 39 union in the early 1990s that the united states could scale back on its military expenditures and use its considerable ideological, moral, and economic resources to help the world enter an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity. large arsenals of nuclear weapons would no longer be necessary or even useful in this era. in fact, the danger of nuclear blackmail or unscrupulous scientists selling plans or transferring weapons grade uranium to terrorists or rogue states would encourage both the u.s. and the ex-u.s.s.r. to dismantle and safely dispose of all nuclear weapons. hence, to the extent that the negative image of the united states had been linked to its dangerous nuclear weaponry, that image would have dissolved. and the extent to which its negative image was tied to its support for petty dictators, that image would have changed. excuses for supporting right-wing dictators or ongoing structures of violence including death squads could no longer be made, absent cold war competition. military interventions would be used only to prevent genocides or brutal repression by governments of their own citizens. no rwandas. no srebrenicas. no darfurs. a new era would dawn in which the u.s. would seek international consensus before taking military steps that could result in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. the idea of the u.s. unilaterally attacking a weaker country would be unthinkable. without the soviet union there would no longer be a military that could come close to that of the u.s. even involvement in a protracted war in vietnam could be marginally understood given the cold war background. certainly, given american protestations that it abhors the idea of becoming an empire, merton’s charge that the united states had “decided to rule the world without paying serious attention to anybody’s view of what the world” was about, could never apply forty years hence when the u.s. would definitively lay to rest any charges that it desired to “rule the world”.57 the u.s. would certainly have shifted its heavy defense expenditures into peaceful uses like establishing educational and diplomatic institutions that would be dedicated to a sophisticated study of other cultures and a cooperative dialogue on how best to join with other nations in ushering in an era of reduced poverty and increased peaceful global existence. in march of 2003, the united states of america, with little international support, bombed, invaded and then occupied an arab nation 40 prajñâ vihâra with a third rate military and a dictator that had been courted and armed by the americans in the 1980s. one among many of the reasons given for the invasion of iraq was the assertion that saddam hussein, a secular dictator, might give sanctuary and aid to an extremist religious islamist group (one the u.s. gave aid to in the 1980s to fight the soviet union) responsible for the deadly attacks on the world trade center towers in new york city on september 11, 2001. the justifications for the iraq war kept changing and turned out to be mainly a smokescreen behind which was hidden a desire and perhaps a decision to attack iraq even prior to september 11, 2001. as a result, “language has been distorted and denatured in defense” of this duplicity as it had during the vietnam war.58 the claim that the iraq war with its hundreds of thousands of casualties was absolutely necessary, only undertaken as a “last resort”, after reason and reasonable steps had proven insufficient, was a charade. merton had written that, “the awful danger of war is then, not so much that force is used when reason has broken down but that reason unconsciously inhibits itself beforehand (in all the trivialities of political and military gamesmanship) in order that it may break down, and in order that resort to force may become “inevitable”.”59 a series of orchestrated events with their predetermined outcomes are pointed to as “evidence” that the enemy is duplicitous, hiding something and hence an imminent danger to national security. they merely hid an “occult determination to resort to force in any case”.60 merton suggested that the language of war-makers in the twentieth century had proven useless as an instrument of peace. he would say the same thing of the language of american war-makers in the twenty-first century. why? “because the language of the war-maker is self-enclosed in finality. it does not invite reasonable dialogue, it uses language to silence dialogue, to block communication . . .”61 are these remarks of merton still relevant? one need only recall the frequent attempts to minimize or discredit the united nations weapons inspectors, some of whom were americans; the fear mongering and push for invasion through the use of such memorable lines by bush and condolezza rice as “the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud”; the cheney-inspired claim by president bush in his 2003 state of the union address that hussein was trying to buy yellowcake donald p. st. john 41 for the production of nuclear weapons (which of course would be given to terrorists); the presentation of “irrefutable evidence” of iraq’s secret weapons program at the united nations by the secretary of state; and the intimidation of domestic dissenters by white house press secretary ari fleischer, who warned that “americans need to watch what they do and watch what they say”. even when veil after veil of lies had been torn from the face of truth, members of the administration continued to spout the party line on sunday morning talk shows or in interviews with conservative news outlets. statements, declarations, press releases, staged “interviews”, and manipulated press conferences continued the tradition of monologue and indicated no willingness for dialogue. the administration consistently displayed an arrogant contempt for democratic and legal processes-an ironic way for promoters of freedom in iraq to act. playing the 9/11 card, the administration presented their war to americans as a war of self-defense launched preemptively. they presented it to iraqis as liberation from a dictator. unrealistic images of iraqis greeting americans in baghdad as if they were americans in paris, and the premature unfurling of a “mission accomplished” banner showed a horribly deficient understanding of the actual situation. the bush administration, like the johnson administration in the 1960s, tried to “turn the war into the kind of war it was supposed to be in america”. there had been aggression, but for the iraqis like many vietnamese, “the aggression was the other way around”.62 to the iraqis and their sympathizers this war of necessity was a war of choice; this war of self-defense was an invasion and occupation. for merton, “american ‘victory’ in vietnam [was] becoming a word without any possible human meaning”.63 the opposing interpretations of what america’s presence and intentions in iraq were, combined with a lack of serious planning for post-invasion conditions, contributed to the country spiraling into an inferno of sectarian conflict, i.e.ds. (improvised explosive devices) and suicide bombings caused by foreign and domestic terrorists and insurgents. in the midst and mist of it all came another mantra enclosed in finality: “we fight them (al qaeda) in iraq so that we don’t have to fight them here (in the usa)”. merton claimed that the vietnam war was “being fought to vindicate the assumptions upon which it is being fought”.64 the al qaeda that bush claimed was in iraq 42 prajñâ vihâra but wasn’t, soon is. and so, fighting them in the present vindicates the past decision to go to war. as merton noted, “modern politics is a matter of defining how you think things ought to be and making them come out that way by cunning or by force”.65 if the political language of the u.s. had “lost all its value as intellectual currency” by 1968, it had become absolutely bankrupt by 2008.66 even wars begun with the best of intentions and with high purpose have a tendency to turn moral convention on its head. merton certainly felt that had been the case with saturation bombing, nuclear bombing, and the treatment of civilians in vietnam. he concluded that, “there is one winner, only one winner in war. the winner is war itself . . . war has power to transmute evil into good and good into evil”.67 this is especially true when a nation is convinced that god is on its side and hence need not suspect self-deception or the gradual corruption of ideals. if whatever one does is good by definition, there is no need to defend one’s actions or apologize for one’s tactics. yet the administration realized that some people would object if they knew all of the facts, and some people were not as enlightened about such matters as the neo-conservatives__especially their political enemies. therefore, it was decided that a certain level of secrecy might be prudent. thus arose illegal wiretaps, “extraordinary renditions”, and “enhanced interrogation techniques” __ most infamously, the long-condemned practice of waterboarding. just as the language of “necessity” justified the war itself, it could be used to justify actions that most americans would find abhorrent if committed by “the enemy”. even if the intelligence provided by the “suspected terrorists” or “enemy combatants” in u.s custody proved useless, or if they had been erroneously imprisoned, they should be willing to be “inconvenienced” in the service of a good cause__the war on terror. as merton noted of the catch-22 of vietnam, the vietnamese civilian was caught in the middle (in more ways than one) if he lived in a free fire zone. if he was a “bad guy” (v.c. or a vietcong sympathizer), then death was deserved. if he was “a good guy” (on our side), then he should be “ready to die for freedom”. we take it upon ourselves to decide, “in their place, that it is better for them to be dead” or traumatized, than to be red or, in the case at hand, to live under a fundamentalist muslim regime (not counting saudi arabia).68 in one of his last essays merton asks the troubling question, donald p. st. john 43 “what next? the illness of political language . . . is characterized everywhere by the same sort of double-talk, tautology, ambiguous cliché, self-righteous and doctrinaire pomposity, and pseudoscientific jargon that mask a total callousness and moral insensitivity, indeed a basic contempt for man. the self-enclosed finality that bars all open dialogue and pretends to absolute conditions of one’s own choosing upon everybody else ultimately become the language of totalist dictatorship, if it is not so already.69 of the vitriolic language of extremist islam, merton would undoubtedly level the same criticism as he did to some revolutionary groups of his day. that is, as long as it “remains another language of power, therefore of self-enclosed finality, which rejects dialogue and negotiation on the axiomatic assumption that the adversary is the devil with whom no dialogue is possible”.70 ultimately merton’s condemnation of war and violence and his pleas for peace rested on his religious humanism, which holds to the sublime dignity of the human person rooted in the person of god. he feared at times that his own language, while condemning violence, was itself too violent and could sow further seeds of conflict rather than bring peace. in many writings merton worked out a vision of universal peace and a gandhilike program to pursue it. his dialogue through writings and meetings with leading thinkers and spiritual figures of all religious and political persuasions around the world was a witness to his positive belief in dialogue. the following is from a prayer composed by thomas merton and read in the house of representatives on april 12, 1962. it still resonates today. almighty and merciful god… save us then from our obsessions! open our eyes, dissipate our confusions, teach us to understand ourselves and our adversary!… save us from the compulsion to follow our adversaries in all that we most hate, confirming them in their hatred and suspicion of us. resolve our inner contradictions, which now grow beyond belief and beyond bearing… grant us prudence in proportion to our power, 44 prajñâ vihâra wisdom in proportion to our science, humaneness in proportion to our wealth and might. and bless our earnest will to help all races and peoples to travel, in friendship with us, along the road to justice, liberty and lasting peace…71 endnotes 1born in france on the eve of wwi, young tom merton fled with his family to america as the war clouds gathered. merton returned to and lived in france (1925-1929) with his now-widowed father and then traveled to and was educated in england (1928-1934). following his father's death in england and amidst personal turmoil at cambridge university, merton returned to america and entered columbia university (1934-1938) to study english literature and writing (b.a., m.a.). merton converted to roman catholicism (1938), taught briefly at st. bonaventure’s college (1940-41), and, at the beginning of wwii (december 10, 1941) he entered the order of the cistercians of the strict observance. the trappists, as they were also called, still lived a basically medieval existence separate from the world and under a vow of silence. during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, merton broke most of the precedents of this silent life. following the publication in 1948 of his bestselling autobiography the seven storey mountain, he soon establishes himself as one of the major voices of the post-war american catholic renaissance, focusing on the revitalization of the spiritual and mystical traditions of the church. in the late 1950s merton became more engaged with the world and until the end of his life wrote extensively on some of the important issues of the 1960s including: nuclear war, civil rights, church reform, eastern religions, vietnam, marxist humanism, and the american counter-culture. in a letter to etta gullick written in october, 1961, merton revealed that “there is one task for me that takes precedence over everything else: working with such means as i have at my disposal for the abolition of war”. he felt compelled to speak out especially on the issue of nuclear war because “there is such apathy and passivity everywhere, with people simply unable to face the issue squarely, and with only a stray voice raised tentatively here and there, it has become an urgent obligation”. (the cold war letters; orbis books: maryknoll, n.y., 2006; 9). articles poured out over the next six months. given who he was and how he could write, attitudes towards him on the part of many conservative catholics including some members of the hierarchy changed dramatically. he was notified by his abbot in april, 1962 that he had been forbidden by the superior general of the order to publish or submit to the censors for review, anything having to do with issues of war and peace. merton obeyed but circulated letters and other writings privately and on occasion published under a pseudonym. however, things began to loosen up when many of his views showed up in april 1963 in pacem in terris, a donald p. st. john 45 papal encyclical of pope john xxiii. merton half-jokingly wrote to his superior general suggesting that the pope was lucky he wasn’t a trappist. merton was to find additional support for many of his views in december 1965 in an important document of vatican council ii (“the pastoral constitution of the church in the modern world”). with a new abbot at gethsemani, merton began to travel more and undertook a trip to asia in 1968 to explore and meet with leaders of eastern religions such as the dalai lama. after delivering a keynote address at a conference in bangkok, thailand, thomas merton returned to his room and was “accidentally” (conspiracy theories abound) electrocuted. the date was december 10, 1968 seventeen years to the day that he entered the abbey of gethsemani. the body of this critic of the vietnam war was flown home on a usaf transport plane that was also carrying the bodies of young americans who had lost their lives in that war. 2merton, thomas. original child bomb. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 3-11. 3merton, thomas. chant to be used in processions around a site with furnaces. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 261262. 4merton, thomas. auschwitz: a family camp. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 150-159. 5shirer, william h. the rise and fall of the third reich; simon and shuster, inc.; new york. 6merton, thomas. turning to the world: the journals of thomas merton,volume 4. 1960-1963. ed. victor a. kramer; harpercollins; san francisco, 1996; 306. 7merton, thomas. turning to the world: the journals of thomas merton,volume 4. 1960-1963. ed. victor a. kramer; harpercollins; san francisco, 1996; 307. 8merton, thomas. turning to the world: the journals of thomas merton,volume 4. 1960-1963. ed. victor a. kramer; harpercollins; san francisco, 1996; 308. 9merton, thomas. a devout meditation in honor of adolf eichmann. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 160-162. 10merton, thomas. violence and the death of god: or god as unknown soldier. the nonviolent alternative. farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 205. 11merton, thomas. violence and the death of god: or god as unknown soldier. the nonviolent alternative. farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 205. 12lepp. fr. ignace. the christian failure; the newman press, westminster, md, 1962. 13merton, thomas. turning to the world: the journals of thomas merton, volume 4. 1960-1963; ed. victor a. kramer; harpercollins; san francisco, 1996; 265. 14merton, thomas. passivity and abuse of authority. the nonviolent 46 prajñâ vihâra alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 129-133. 15merton, thomas. an enemy of the state. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 134-138. 16merton, thomas. a martyr for peace and unity: father max josef metzger (1887-1944). the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 139143. 17merton, thomas. towards a theology of resistance. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 191. 18merton, thomas.target equals city. the nonviolent alternative; 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farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 96. 36merton, thomas. target equals city. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 100. 37merton, thomas. peace: a religious responsibility. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 107. 38merton, thomas. target equals city. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york; 1980; 100-101. 39merton, thomas. peace: a religious responsibility. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 120. 40merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 238-239. 41merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 239. 42merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 239-240. 43merton, thomas. ishi: a meditation. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 253. 44merton, thomas. ishi: a meditation. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 248. 45merton, thomas. conquistador, tourist, and indian. a thomas merton reader; image doubleday; new york, 1974; 306. 46merton, thomas. the vietnam war: an overwhelming atrocity. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 196. 47merton, thomas. the vietnam war: an overwhelming atrocity. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 195. 48merton, thomas. the vietnam war: an overwhelming atrocity. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 195. 49merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 245. 50merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 244. 51merton, thomas. the vietnam war: an overwhelming atrocity. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 195. i write during the summer of the iraq “surge” and following years of the promise of “victory” and the redefining of what victory means. this writer also remembers how the power of “victory” as a symbol to rally support still held sway in 1968. to the “greatest generation” who had fought in europe and the pacific in wwii, “victory” had a profound significance. their children might have taken to the streets to protest the vietnam war but they were still willing to trust in their president and military leaders. most of them also trusted in their religious leaders. 48 prajñâ vihâra 52merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 244. 53merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 244-245. 54merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 245. 55merton, thomas. love and living; ed. naomi burton stone and patrick hart. harcourt, brace, jovanovich; new york, 1985; 131. 56merton, thomas. love and living; ed. naomi burton stone and patrick hart. harcourt, brace, jovanovich; new york, 1985; 131. 57merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 246. 58merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 245. 59merton, thomas. love and living, ed. naomi burton stone and patrick hart. harcourt, brace, jovanovich; new york, 1985; 131. 60merton, thomas. love and living, ed. naomi burton stone and patrick hart. harcourt, brace, jovanovich; new york, 1985; 131. 61merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 244. 62merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 245. 63merton, thomas. the vietnam war: an overwhelming atrocity. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 195. this writer remembers the power that the concept of “victory” still had in the 1960s. for my father and other members of the “greatest generation” who had fought in europe and the pacific in wwii, “victory” had a profound significance, as did the implications of “loss”. the manipulation of that term and a deliberate mystifying of its meaning during vietnam, and now in the war on terrorism, cynically extend conflict and bloodshed while the government looks for some face-saving way to extricate itself and its military from a morass. public trust is needed however and is woefully lacking today. 64merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 244. 65merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 244. 66merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 245. 67merton, thomas. target equals city. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 94. 68merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent aldonald p. st. john 49 ternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 239. 69merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 246. 70merton, thomas. war and the crisis of language. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 247. 71merton, thomas. prayer for peace. the nonviolent alternative; farrar, straus and giroux; new york, 1980; 269. 50 prajñâ vihâra 110 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june the essence of kanyu in feng shui and the tombs of the chinese emperors wang jing and john giordano1 abstract chinese geomancy is also known as feng shui. it is an ancient philosophical ideological system that uses interdisciplinary knowledge such as astronomy, geography, and anthropology to realize the “harmony between heaven and human”. at present, chinese geomancy mainly focuses on urban construction, large-scale architecture, interior design, and applied research in the fields of ecological environment, but there is very little discussion on the location of the tomb of the ancient emperors. based on the concept of kanyu and the principles of chinese geomancy, this article compares the location of the tombs in the emperor valley in ancient china and the valley of the kings in egypt, combined with reflections on representational space in eliade, heidegger, bachelard, and lefebvre. it shows that the employment of kanyu in the layout of the emperors tombs, there is a unity of ‘the representation of space’ with ‘representational space’. keywords: emperor valley of the east; feng shui; tombs; sacred space; eliade; heidegger; bachelard; lefebvre; prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 2021, 110-122 © 2000 by assumption university press wang jing and john giordano 111 introduction chinese geomancy is also called feng shui and xiang di shu (site investigation). according to the ancient chinese, the orientation of human activity to space is of the utmost significance. it is the subjective evaluation system of the ancient chinese natural environment, and it is also the theoretical basis for chinese people to plan the layout of residential buildings during their life and the location and layout of tombs after their death. chinese geomancy reflects the cosmology and values of chinese people. it is regarded as the “fossil of life” of traditional chinese culture. at the same time, it is also a practical philosophical theory that explains the relationship between ancient humans and their geographical environment. while many scholars in the past have considered it as a pseudo-science or superstition, but in recent years, more and more scholars are appreciating its value in such areas as urban planning, large-scale architecture, and interior design. but seemingly forgotten is its application to the location of tombs after death and the element of the sacred in connection with these locations. this article will explain its significance for the burial sites of the chinese emperors within the emperor valley. it will compare this with egyptian burial practices in the valley of the kings of ancient egypt. and finally it will show that a consideration of chinese geomancy when applied to death, tells us something about life and its relationship to the environment. it can demonstrate the significance of sacred space for contemporary humanity. the philosophy of chinese geomancy chinese geomancy originated in the very earliest periods of chinese history. it can be seen in settlement sites in the shang (商) and zhou (周) periods (1600bc-256bc), it gradually spread throughout the sui (隋) and tang (唐) periods (581ad-907ad), it became well-established in the song (宋) period (960ad-1279ad), and continued to develop in the ming (明) and qing (清) periods (1368ad-1911ad). each historical period has its own approach, and it is only gradually that coherent systems or schools of geomancy form. its most common schools are called the mountain school（luan tou pai）and the regulating qi school（li qi pai).2 112 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june the term “feng shui” first appeared in pu guo’s (郭璞) “book of burial”（葬书),3 where it is said that (generally “positive”) energy (qi气) comes with the arrangement of a location with respect to wind and water. the task of the art of feng shui is to direct energy to remain in a house or a tomb by means of using either an existing or a created artificial landscape that allows air and water to ‘profit’ a location. the air uses wind to disperse, so a slow flow of vitality is directed so that the “qi” can continuously flow in and accumulate on a piece of land. this requires a very specific and auspicious location. this location must be able to contain the wind so that the “qi” flow does not dissipate, and water is used as a boundary “qi”, so that the “qi” accumulated in the burial site of the deceased can be retained. the term kanyu (kān yú 堪舆) when applied to geomancy is very significant. the word “kan 堪” contains various meanings. it can refers to the heavens, and the act of surveying. “yu 舆” refers to the earth. so kanyu in chinese geomancy refers to surveying the topography to choose a place that is conducive to living dwellings and burial sites. the “chinese geomancy” is called “feng shui” which means “wind”: flowing air; “water”: the blood of the earth (the basic necessity for the growth of all things). the essence of geomancy is considered consistent with science, and it is considered as something necessary to achieve “harmony” between human beings and nature. to achieve this harmony, kanyu employs astronomy, geography, and human science as its three scientific pillars. the unity of heaven, earth, and people is considered the highest principle, and has been a very important idea throughout chinese history. there is an attention to the organic connection and interaction between human beings and nature, attention to the advantages and disadvantages of “shape” (the visible) and “qi” (the invisible), and the realization that they are mutually generated. there are four schemes in chinese geomancy. the first is called ‘looking for the dragon (龙) vein’. in his book “shaking the dragon”, yang junsong specifically discusses the situation of mountain ranges, which he describes rolling mountains as “dragon veins”. these ranges which involve “mountains, mountain ridges, peaks, and mountain chains” should undulate continuously and vertically from east to west, just like the “dragon” in the myth, where the changing directions, the topography, the changes of direction of the mountains are represented both physically wang jing and john giordano 113 and mythically. there is a process involving finding the main chain of undulating mountains to serve as a back-drop or what is called ‘ancestor mountain’, and naming them according to their characteristics. the second is called ‘looking for the target points (xue 穴). the ancient chinese believed that astrology corresponds to the formation of the mountains on earth based on the eight diagrams. the third involves ‘looking for the branch mountains or spurs (sha 砂)’ this is self explanitory and involves looking for the positions of ridges or other tall objects around the main mountain range. they create a sheltered spaces. both “sha” and “dragon” refer to mountain bodies, but the difference is that “dragon (main mountain)” is like “master” and “sha” (branch mountains, spurs or other tall objects)” are like “servants” (they are important for resisting flooding and preventing strong winds). the fourth or water system (shui 水) is closely related to dragon veins, and it is believed by scholars that “good places cannot be without water.” therefore, in chinese geomancy, we usually look at water systems first and then look at mountains, and pay special attention to the quality and shape of the hydrologic system. “water observation” refers to observing this system (paying close attention where the water enters and where the water exists a specific site) in relation to the mountain topography.4 figure 1. the four formulas of the topological pattern of chinese geomancy2 orientation (xiang 向) is also important. it refers to means direction, orientation, and generally refers to the direction perpendicular to the location of the building base point. therefore the basic tools for selecting the location of tomb spaces in geomancy are the compass (also called a needle plate) and the ding lan ruler.5 114 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june the emperor valley of china and valley of the kings of egypt the guanzhong area of shanxi is called the “emperor valley of the east”, where 72 chinese emperors are buried. from the four formulas of the topological pattern of geomancy to analyze the site selection of 72 emperors’ tombs in the guanzhong plain, shanxi province, china: (1) from the perspective of the choice of the dragons vein 龙 (the main mountain range), the qinling mountain range is the middle mountain range of the three major mountain ranges in china. it is located in the center and is in the middle of the five elements; (2) from the perspective of sha 砂 (surrounding auxiliary mountain ranges or spurs), the mountain on both sides is lower than the main mountain range, surrounded by triangles, and the layout of the blue dragon and white tiger has auxiliary functions; (3) from the perspective of shui 水 (water system), the incoming water is the yellow river, and the outgoing water is the yangtze river. the two major water systems are china’s main water systems, which meet in the guanzhong plain of shaanxi, and there are many side branch water systems; (4) from the perspective of xue 穴 (the target point where the mausoleum was built). it involves aligning the layout of the tomb with the positions and movement of the stars. the first of nine stars, the alpha ursae majoris (also known as kuixing in the nine-star map) is a class a star in ziwei doushu (紫微斗数). it is a star of wisdom and auspicious, symbolizing power and wealth. the valley of the kings of ancient egypt is located in an uninhabited limestone valley not far from the ruins of thebes, the ancient egyptian capital. under the cliff is the place where the pharaohs were buried during the new kingdom period of ancient egypt (from 1570 to 1090 bc). it used to be a majestic tomb complex, with more than 60 emperor tombs, burying 64 pharaohs from the 18th to the 20th dynasty of egypt. from the four formulas of the topological pattern, we can analyze the site selection basis of the pharaoh’s tombs in the valley of the kings in egypt as follows: (1) from the selection of the dragons vein 龙, the main mountain range of the valley of the kings chooses the pyramidshaped peak al-qurn on the west bank of the nile. (2) the surrounding mountains (sha 砂) are lower than the main mountain range, which has the function of embracing and concealment. (3) from the view of water 水 (peripheral water system), the nile water system in connection with the position of the mountains symbolically forms the boundary between wang jing and john giordano 115 life and death. (4) from the perspective of xue 穴 (the place where the target mausoleum was built), from the satellite image, the shape and position of the first star in the nine-star map of geomancy is the same. also known as kuixing（魁星) it is the main star in ziwei doushu (紫微 斗数). it is a star of wisdom and auspiciousness, and it also symbolizes power and wealth. so the features in the nile valley are very similar to the chinese emperor valley. the significance of sacred space the emperors are considered witnesses to human history, and the spatial locations of palaces, cities, temples, and tombs built during their reign are all comprehensive cultural manifestations of cosmology and philosophy from a certain period time. but what does this mean for contemporary humanity? today we have been conditioned to see space much differently. the scholar who systematically analyzed the concept of sacred space in earlier civilizations is mircea eliade. he regards the nonhomogeneous spaces constructed through symbols and architecture as special places that can connect to the sacred world, which was more primordial than the profane world in which people lived, and was the source of its existence. the purpose of myth and religion was to reenact the myths of the primordial sacred space so these repetitions could renew the profane world. mircea eliade believes that pre-modern people, which he called “homo religious,” generally lived in a sacred universe.6 for them, the universe has a religious dimension. this religious experience is closely related to the myth of the origin of the universe: the creation of the world means the emergence of reality, which is “the irruption of the divine into the earth”; the creation of the world is a great “theophany,” (an expression of the order of the deities) and the ‘showing’ of this order is called a “hierophany” through which the sacred manifests itself to an individual or group.7 with the eruption of the sacred reality, the space of the universe is established, given form and order, and sanctified to become the “world” in the true sense. this suggests the importance of human dwelling. 116 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june homo religiosus lives in an open cosmos and is in turn open to the world. “this means (a) that he is in communication with the gods; (b) that he shares in the sanctity of the world. that religious man can live only in an open world, we saw when we analyzed the structure of sacred space; man desires to dwell at a center... his dwelling is a microcosm; and so too is his body. the homology house-body-cosmos presents itself very early.8 this connection between microcosm and macrocosm with the dwelling is also investigated by others. one. philosopher who develops an approach very similar to the idea of kanyu is the german philosopher martin heidegger. feng shui recognizes the unity of heaven, earth, and human beings. heidegger speaks of the fourfold. heidegger in his essay “building, dwelling, thinking” reflects on the connection of building, and dwelling. he contends that the human capacity to dwell comes prior to building. this dwelling involves the interconnection of earth, sky, the divinities and the mortals. this is what he calls the “fourfold.” significant here, is the idea of death that accompanies being mortal. heidegger writes: the mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities. they keep hope in the divinities that which is unhoped for. they wait for signs of their arrival and do not mistake the signs of their absence. they do not make their gods for themselves and they do not worship idols. in the very depth of misfortune, they wait for the withdrawn salvation. the mortals dwell in so far as they direct their own being, that they are capable of death as death, and they are able to use this capacity in order to have a good death. leading the mortals to the nature of death in no way means to make death, as the empty nothing, the goal; it also doesn’t mean to darken dwelling by blindly staring at the end.9 we do not dwell because we build, we build because we dwell. our building gives us the site which brings the fourfold together. heidegger wang jing and john giordano 117 uses the example of the bridge, but you can see, that the tomb of the emperors in feng shui also brings together earth, sky, the divinities and the mortals in a very clear way. it is not only an establishing but also a form of guarding. building erects locations that make a site of the fourfold. out of the onefold, in which earth and sky, the divinities and the mortals belong to each other, building receives the directive for its erecting of locations. out of the fourfold, building takes over the measurement for all the gauging and every surveying of the spaces that are, in each case, made room for by the locations that have been founded. the buildings guard the fourfold. they are things that in their own way spare the fourfold. to spare the fourfold, to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities, to lead the mortals, this fourfolded sparing is the simple nature of dwelling. in such a way, genuine buildings share dwelling in its nature and enclose this nature.10 the french philosopher gaston bachelard attempted to develop a phenomenology of the relation of the poetic imagination to space. he draws from the space of the house with its various rooms – the attic, the cellar, the living room – and points out the qualitative difference of spaces, which eliade connects with archaic man. bachelard distinguishes his approach from the archetypal psychology of jung. the poetic image is not subject to an inner thrust. it is not an echo of the past. on the contrary: through the brilliance of an image, the distant past resounds with echoes, and it is hard to know at what depth these echoes. will reverberate and die away. because of its novelty and its action, the poetic image has an entity and a dynamism of its own; it is referable to a direct ontology. this ontology is what i plan to study.11 we can see the construction of the emperor’s tombs in a way similar not only to eliade, but also similar to bachelard’s poetic imagination. through the creation of sacred space, we create a connection or a reawakening of the past within the topology of the present. we create a 118 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june sheltered environment that maintains a relationship to eternity. bachelard resists a merely psychological interpretation of space as being too reductive. it loses the phenomenological aspect of “exaggeration.” this means that the dialectic of inside and outside is reversed and the space we inhabit appears within our consciousness. this function of the imagination in space shows the power of space to create a connection with something eternal. and so in a sense the tomb is the creation of an eternity. a resistance against the dangers of time and change. referring to a short story by edgar allan poe, “the fall of the house of usher” bachelard writes: meanwhile, consciousness increases; not, however, in relation between human beings, upon which psychoanalysis generally bases its observations. for it is not possible to concentrate on human problems in the face of a cosmos in danger. everything lives in a sort of pre-quake, in a house about to collapse beneath the weight of walls which, when they too collapse, will have achieved definitive burial for a dead woman. but this cosmos is not real. as poe himself said, it is a sulphurous ideality, created by the dreamer with each new wave of his images. man and the world, man and his world, are at their closest, it being in the power of the poet to designate them to us in their moments of greatest proximity. man and the world are in a community of dangers. they are dangerous for each other. all this can be heard and pre-heard in the sub-rumbling murmur of the poem.12 here the imaginary space is still not the real space. our representational spaces connected to our dreams is different than the representational space that we find in the sciences. but what if the two can be brought together? this relationship of representational spaces to representations of space are also taken up by the french philosopher henri lefebvre who distinguishes the representation of space which is associated with scientific thought, with representational spaces which symbolically project space and its meaning and often provides a resistance to modernity: wang jing and john giordano 119 whether the east, specifically china, has experienced a contrast between representations of space and representational spaces is doubtful in the extreme. it is indeed quite possible that the chinese characters combine two functions in an inextricable way, that on the one hand they convey the order of the world (space-time), while on the other hand they lay hold of that concrete (practical and social) space-time wherein symbolisms hold sway, where works of art are created, and where buildings, palaces and temples are built.13 reflecting on death lefebvre writes: lastly, death must be both represented and rejected. death too has a ‘location’, but that location lies below or above appropriated social space; death is relegated to the infinite realm so as to disenthral (or purify) the finiteness in which social practice occurs, in which the law that that practice has established holds sway. social space thus remains the space of society, of social life.14 lefebvre’s interesting observation concerning the possible unity of representational space and the space of representation in chinese thought, points to the idea that in kanyu, the architect must place the tomb must be situated securely in relationship to a real cosmos to prevent the collapse of memory and the collapse of the cosmos itself. these approaches, lead us to the understanding that spatial representations involve a unified malleability, which presents different forms of expression through time. our modern experience is removed from earlier experiences of space, so that different functions of space can by united together for the modern consciousness. the tomb as a historical site brings together different modes of representational space so that they can be seen within the same space and time. this points to the importance of the memories of historical existence. in some ways this is similar to heidegger’s idea of poetic dwelling. 120 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june this idea of kanyu in feng shui, whether it is the spatial location of the palace and temple during the lifetime of the egyptian emperor’s tomb15, or the spatial relationship between the location of the tomb and the temple, the palace — the temple — the emperor’s tomb constitutes a stable triangular spatial relationship. this can also prove that ancient egypt has organically integrated the sacred factors of religion, the environmental factors of geography, and the location of space. similarly, the tomb of qin shi huang (first emperor of qin) in ancient china, from site selection, construction, to the structure of the tomb, embodies the balance of “heaven, earth and man”, and believes that the outlook on life of “immortality” is consistent with the outlook on the universe. therefore, the tomb of qin shi huang is consistent with the magnificent xianyang palace built during his lifetime presents the corresponding relationship between the north and south meridians. although we live in a different historical time and spaces, when we are close to the tombs of the emperors, we can still feel the traces of history. when we read about such places or see images of them, we can little appreciate them, but when we stand in these spaces we experience complex psychological changes. space is brought to us, is internalized within us, and communicates to us something of the past. it maintains the energy (qi) of the past. what has died is given life. endnotes 1 wang jing (清新柠檬) is currently studying in the philosophy and religion program at assumption university of thailand. she is doing research on chinese geomancy. email: 119271237@qq.com 2 li chengzhi li, jia huiru jia, ancient chinese geomancy, kyushu publishing press, 2008, pp66-68, pp105-131. 3 pu guo, book of burial, shanghai ancient books publishing press, 2015 4 xiaojiang zheng, chinese mysterious culture – chinese feng shui, contemporary world publishing press, 2008, 198-199. wang jing and john giordano 121 5 da lin, ancient chinese surveying and mapping: shaking the dragon scripture, shanxi normal university press, 2009, pp78 106． 6 mircea eliade, the quest: history and meaning in religion, chicago and london, the university of chicago press, 1969, 51． 7 “homo religiosus” is a concept first proposed by max scheler. he summarized people’s general view of oneself as their “self-image.” he summarized five historical images of oneself in chronological order, “homo religiosus, “wisdom man”, “craftman”, “dionysus man” and “creator” etc. 8 mircea eliade, the quest: history and meaning in religion, chicago and london, the university of chicago press, 1969, 172 9 heidegger, “building, dwelling, thinking,” 6. this version is translated by adam bobeck and can be accessed at: https://www.academia. edu/34279818/building_dwelling_thinking_by_martin_heidegger_ translation_and_commentary_by_adam_bobeck_) 10 martin heidegger, “building, dwelling, thinking,” 13. 11 gaston bachelard, the poetics of space. translated from the french by maria jolas, with a new foreword by john r. stilgoe. boston: beacon press, 1994, xvi. 12 gaston bachelard, the poetics of space, 1994, 176. 13 lefebvre, henri. the production of space. translated by donald nicholson smith. cornwall: t.j. press ltd. 1991, 42 14 lefebvre, henri. the production of space, 35. 15 zhaofeng ma. the return of the pharaoh: the mysterious ancient egyptian civilization, beijing industry press, 2014 references bachelard, gaston. the poetics of space. translated from the french by maria jolas, with a new foreword by john r. stilgoe. boston: beacon press, 1994. chen tuan [song] & yong, shao, luohe real numbers, kyushu press, 2013. da lin. ancient chinese surveying and mapping: shaking the dragon scripture, shaanxi normal university press, 2009. eliade, mircea. images and symbols: studies in religious symbolism. translated by philip mairet, harvill press, 1961 122 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june eliade, mircea. history of religious thought, shanghai social science press, 2004. eliade, mircea. the sacred and the profane: the nature of religion, houghton mifflin harcourt,1987. huaijin nan. a brief history of the development of taoism in china. fudan university press, 2013. haishan xu. a brief history of ancient egypt, china yanshi press, 2006. lefebvre, henri. the production of space. translated by donald nicholson smith. cornwall: t.j. press ltd. 1991. pu guo. book of burial. shanghai ancient books publishing press, 2015. qingzhu liu. chinese archaeological discovery and research (19492009). people’s publishing press, 2010. shihua he. astronomical symbols in yangshao culture. china social sciences press, 2016. wenyuan liu. huang bin and luo zhewen, chinese mausoleum. baihua literature and art publishing press, 2003. yuxin hou. underground labyrinth – the legend of the tomb. shanghai people’s publishing press, 1998. yueqing he. chinese mysterious cultures – geomancy culture. foreign languages publishing press, 2011. yun song yang. geographic acupuncture shake. hualing publishing house, 2011. youlan feng. a short history of chinese philosophy. yilin publishing house press, 2018. zhaofeng ma. the return of the pharaoh: the mysterious ancient egyptian civilization. beijing university of technology press, 2014. pisit marnil and kajornpat tangyin 87 developing interreligious dialogue in myanmar: reflections on the vatican document educating to intercultural dialogue in catholic schools matthias saw san win assumption university, thailand abstract for the roman catholic church beginning with vatican ii, interreligious dialogue has been promoted as an instrument to obtain mutual understanding. this has been outlined in the document nostra aetate. the bishops of myanmar, fully aware that interreligious dialogue is highly necessary for witnessing the gospel of jesus christ in this buddhist-majority nation, have taken steps in their respective dioceses to further promote this approach. this paper is an analysis of the ways this has been implemented. it will show that a positive attitude towards interreligious dialogue must be developed in the lives of seminarians while they are undergoing clerical training. as future priests, seminarians should understand and advocate the true meaning of dialogue with other religions in order to carry out their missions seamlessly and successfully. introduction the roman catholic church beginning with vatican ii, began promoting interreligious dialogue as an important instrument for obtaining mutual understanding. this task was continued by pope paul vi and pope john paul ii, as well as by pope benedict xvi. pope benedict xvi prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 1, january june 2018, 87-97 © 2000 by assumption university press 88 prajñā vihāra declared in naples, italy, on october 21, 2007, that “religion should not be a vehicle of hatred but of love.”1 this follows the teachings of the document nostra aetate.2 this presents an important challenge for a country like myanmar, a land of predominantly buddhist people. buddhism is a deeply rooted way of life for the majority of myanmar people (world mission, 2006). although christianity came to myanmar later, it still has a long history. it set roots in myanmar as early as 1287, as evidenced by the discovery of frescos containing crosses (england, 1987, p.147) and evidenced by the presence of latin and greek inscriptions in some places in pagan, once a flourishing kingdom in myanmar (the official catholic directory of myanmar, 2012, p.10-16)3. overall, the main religions of the country are buddhism (89.2%), followed by christianity (5.0%), islam (3.8%), hinduism (0.5%), spiritualism (1.2%) and other minor religions (0.2%) (www.mofa.gov.mm/aboutmyanmar/religion.html).4 since christianity is a minority religion, it needs to engage with people of different faiths, and to approach them with a positive attitude which can cultivate long-term trust. the myanmar catholic church needs to join other christian denominations as well as other faiths to maintain a unity in diversity. this can be accomplished only through mutual dialogue. education is a force for changing the world and addressing the central challenges of the future according to the vatican document gravissimum educationis. catholic schools have great responsibility to train students develop a spirit of intercultural dialogue without losing one’s own identity. by acquiring theoretical and practical knowledge, students may value their own culture as well as the cultures of others. by understanding differences and having ability to witness and dialogue, the common goals of peace and harmony can be achieved. therefore, this new document encouraged parents, educators/formators, national and diocesan episcopal commissions to take the path of intercultural dialogue. religious leaders, too, can contribute to the public’s benefits. the clergy are the leaders of catholic communities and need to be well-trained on the nature and benefits of interreligious dialogue. they matthias saw san win 89 need to view it positively, and nurture it throughout their lives. while elements of interreligious dialogue is already taking place in the formation of diocesan clergy in major seminaries in myanmar, it has yet to be emphasized as a mainstream subject. the declaration of the congregation for catholic education educating to [sic] intercultural dialogue in catholic schools: living in harmony for a civilization of love is a new vatican document published by congregation for catholic education on 28, october, 2013.5 this new document outlines the program for education to encourage intercultural dialogue to be conducted by catholic schools. the second vatican council’s declaration gravissimum educationis6 was proclaimed by his holiness pope paul vi on october 28, 1965. that declaration was one of the earlier documents illustrating the importance of education. the whole document was developed under twelve sub-titles: 1. the meaning of the universal right to an education 2. christian education 3. the authors of education 4. various aids to christian education 5. the importance of schools 6. the duties and rights of parents 7. moral and religious education in all schools 8. catholic schools 9. different types of catholic schools 10. catholic colleges and universities 11. faculties of sacred sciences 12. coordination to be fostered in scholastic matters this document concluded that education is important in the life of man and that the responsibility for education should be in the hands of the young people themselves who should be made aware of this so they can strive in their quest for true knowledge. 90 prajñā vihāra by observing gravissimum educationis we are aware of the following points: 1) christian education, 2) the importance of schools, and 3) coordination to be fostered in scholastic matters. the purpose of christian education is to help students to “become actively involved in various community organizations, open to discourse with others and willing to do their best to promote the common good.” the phrase coordination to be fostered in scholastic matters means “to foster suitable cooperation between catholic schools, and between these and other schools that collaboration should be developed which the good of all mankind requires.” this document clearly points out that the true meaning of education is for the benefit and development of mankind. to achieve this goal, catholic schools should foster the spirit of collaboration and cooperation. to further support this teaching there is the recent document “educating to intercultural dialogue in catholic schools: living in harmony for a civilization of love” issued by congregation for catholic education in october, 2013. this document is published to mark the 48th anniversary of the promulgation of the second vatican council’s declaration gravissimum educationis. this document concludes with a quote from pope francis: do not be disheartened in the face of the difficulties that the educational challenge presents! educating is not a profession but an attitude, a way of being; in order to educate it is necessary to step out of ourselves and be among young people, to accompany them in the stages of their growth and to set ourselves beside them. give them hope and optimism for their journey in the world. teach them to see the beauty and goodness of creation and of man who always retains the creator’s hallmark. but above all with your life be witnesses of what you communicate. educators … pass on knowledge and values with their words; but their words will have an incisive effect on children and young people if they are accompanied by their witness, their consistent way of life. without consistency matthias saw san win 91 it is impossible to educate! you are all educators, there are no delegates in this field. thus collaboration in a spirit of unity and community among the various educators is essential and must be fostered and encouraged. school can and must be a catalyst, it must be a place of encounter and convergence of the entire educating community, with the sole objective of training and helping to develop mature people who are simple, competent and honest, who know how to love with fidelity, who can live life as a response to god’s call, and their future profession as a service to society (rome, 28 october, 2013). respecting other cultures in reading this document we can see that the catholic church values the following three things: 1) cultures and intercultural relationships, 2) education and the important role of catholic schools, and 3) intercultural dialogue. this document strongly urges us to respect other cultures. catholic schools should prepare their students to hold on to their own beliefs or identities without prejudice to others’ beliefs and cultures. this means that christians should not view christianity as “truer”7 than other religions and cultures. the researcher must admit that in the context of myanmar at present, it would be very difficult to translate this into practice. in myanmar, buddhism is the national religion and all other religions, christianity included, are regarded as foreign religions. the followers of “foreign” religions have been suffering under this situation for so long, that it would be an uphill task to change the majority way of thinking and to persuade them to become more open. yet we must continue to find ways to get along with others. this document insists that such change is possible, and we can train our younger generation to reshape their thinking. specifically, they must not hold any prejudicial views towards other cultures, or think too highly of their own cultures. they must keep in mind that any culture is as good as their own and deserve our sincere respect.8 92 prajñā vihāra this document also has very clear message: catholic schools need to be multicultural and should foster a culture of dialogue. religion is a choice that we can make, but culture is not, and we need to adapt and adjust according to the current situation in which we can show our “humanness” and “otherness”. teachers and students of catholic schools should know that all cultures and nations can and should live together in harmony. they should be able to discern the differences between good and evil, truth and falsity. they should dare to cross over from monoculturalism to multiculturalism. nowadays, in the world of catholic education “multiculturalism”9 is strongly encouraged. however, multiculturalism would be meaningless if the true recognition of “otherness” is not sincerely demonstrated. learning from each other we should be aware that all cultures do have disagreements about values, but we should also be aware that we all share the same human nature and need to learn from each other 10 and will continue to do so. therefore, multicultural approach or “intercultural approach” is strongly needed. the nature of catholic education and catholic educational community should be for all different peoples in spite of different moral criteria among cultures.11 thus, “multicultural” curriculum is needed in catholic schools. both documents therefore help and suggest a standard for the study of other cultures outside our own. the idea or notion of “multiculturalism” helps the young to see common features of human experience and the moral law as a valuable part of one’s education. from the teaching of the popes discussed and from these documents, we can apply the spirit of “intercultural dialogue” in all catholic schools especially seminaries in order to help seminarians to move beyond monoculturalism from the very first day of priestly formation. it is true for myanmar seminarians who are studying in seminaries that they need to open their eyes to appreciate the beauties shown in various cultures that are quite different from catholic traditions. matthias saw san win 93 they need to find time to learn things that they do not understand. the more they learn the more positive attitude they have. although at present myanmar seminarians are trained within a limited local framework; they need to be prepared to embrace the globalized world. they need to learn from others, only then they will understand and accept “otherness” which will enable them to engage in “intercultural dialogue” without bias. the catholic religion is one of the religions that cannot exist without various cultures and traditions. thus, myanmar seminarians should bear in mind that they are carrying not only catholic faith but also the rich tradition of the church and its history. at the same time, they are dealing with people of different faiths and different cultures in their daily life. in order to walk peacefully along with their neighbors, first and foremost, myanmar seminarians need to learn, to understand and to recognize “multiculturalism”13 they need to overcome their monocultural bias. only then can they go forward. although this is not easy to achieve it is a necessary task for all seminarians who are going to work in the area that they are assigned. it is very true to say that myanmar seminarians’ situations are quite different from seminarians from other countries because of different cultural context and traditions. all teachers or administrators also need to be open and embrace multiculturalism in accord with the curriculum. by this way, they may transfer their positive attitude towards multiculturalism and knowledge to their students. openness to other cultures must not only be taught in the class-room, but it must also be practiced in daily living.14 myanmar seminarians should be aware that they live among a plurality of cultures. they should know that there is strong link and connection between culture and religion. in order to engage in fruitful interreligious dialogue, intercultural education is necessary. by knowing and following an intercultural approach, the interreligious dialogue goal is constructed. to be able to construct intercultural dialogue, seminarians need to follow the realization that ‘man cannot exist outside of culture’. the teaching of the catholic church is based on theological foundation, 94 prajñā vihāra anthropological foundation, and pedagogical foundation. all these foundations refer to understanding and to obtaining common good. to achieve common good, education is one of the best ways for people who live in a country with diverse cultures. the spirit of respect and dialogue can help students to become aware of their own identity and cultural traditions. the contribution of catholic schools is to support different ethnic groups and religious beliefs. by this way, students may have confidence to hold on to their own ‘identity’ while having the courage to engage in intercultural dialogue with others. by respecting the values of others’ cultures and religions, students can build up a vision which recognizes the equal dignity of other persons. good formation for this reason, the formation of the formators is important.15 formation programs should not only concentrate on traditional teaching and administrating but should also train seminarians sensitivity to diverse cultures. the good formation is to equip a person to be a professional and to have responsible personal relationships with various other subjects. thus, a teacher needs power of listening, respect, dialogue and the value of diversity. a catholic school’s sole objective is to train and to help students to develop maturity and the self-security and sensitivity to engage in intercultural dialogue. this document supports the formulation of myanmar seminaries’ curriculum which can help seminarians in their future tasks. therefore, myanmar seminarians must understand the importance of this task and be committed to it throughout their lives. catholic priesthood is a service for all those who know jesus christ as well as those who do not. their target is not only a selected group but all men and women. it means that they should be messengers who are sent to work and live among the different groups of people. they should dare to enter into the communities of people of diverse cultures. by this way, myanmar seminarians become not strangers or intruders but good news proclaimers in the soil of myanmar in which they are born and assigned to matthias saw san win 95 work. this task may not be easy but is a big challenge for all seminarians. as a whole, catholic schools especially seminaries realize the presence of different cultures, at the same time cultural diversity is much appreciated and seen as a great source for mutual enrichment. openness to other cultures offers an opportunity for mutual understanding that can lead to intercultural dialogue without losing their own identities. myanmar seminarians need the ability to show their identities, and energy to engage in intercultural dialogue. all these ability and energy must be well rooted in their formation program that can change them like the apostles of jesus. this document is a means of dialogue to be reflected by all catholic schools especially catholic seminaries which help to prepare seminarians for their future task of witnessing jesus’ love shown to all people. without recognizing the importance of cultures and neglecting the role of intercultural dialogue, a peaceful society cannot be built. building up a peaceful society is dependent on education that can transform a person of monocultural view into a multicultural one. this is a difficult task to be pursued by all. it is a noble project for myanmar seminarians who will meet many diverse people in their mission. there can be no peace and development in myanmar if there is no intercultural dialogue and the cultures of minority groups are still neglected. this document provides a message which, while not new, still constitutes a gift of enlightenment that helps us to revive cultures and education more intensely; it is a ray of light for educators and formators of our time. thus the message of this document is also implicitly a message about the value of the human being. conclusion it is a good point to realize and rethink about the value of the church’s declaration on education. how do we answer its demand? forty-eight years after the promulgation of the declaration on christian education myanmar catholic church did change her formation programmes for myanmar seminarians. the most important point 96 prajñā vihāra well-noted in this document, perhaps, is that the church and her schools depend upon educators and formators for the development of students. the work of educators and formators is necessary as a true service for the accomplishment of real education offered to society. we can instil this idea into our seminarians who are undergoing priestly formation that this declaration is a pathway that they have to walk. this pathway is the source for their growth and ability to encounter intercultural dialogue. this document, in general, represents the catholic church’s notion of the importance of education, and the urgent necessity to equip a young generation with the ability to reflect their own identity, and to be open to plurality and differences. interreligious dialogue could help end major conflicts among believers of different faiths, especially in a multi-ethnic country such as myanmar. it is interreligious dialogue that can lead people of different faiths move towards a better world of justice and peace. matthias saw san win 97 endnotes 1 see pope benedict xvi’s visit to naples italy, on october 21, 2007, when he declares “religion should not be a vehicle of hatred but of love.” 2 nostra aetate. declaration on the relation of the church to nonchristian religions, october 28, 1965 3 the official catholic directory of myanmar, 2012, p. 10-16 4 www.mofa.gov.mm/aboutmyanmar/religion.html accessed 05 december 2017 5 see “educating to intercultural dialogue in catholic schools living in harmony for a civilization of love.” vatican city 2013 6 see pope paul vi’s declaration on christian education gravissimum educationis on october 28, 1965 7 see hsane hgyi. “religions and culture in myanmar.” paper presented at the fabc-oeia, bangkok, july 2009 8 see ariarajah, s. w. (1994). the bible and people of other faiths. maryknoll, n.y.: orbis books, 1994. 9 see swidler, l. j. after the absolute: the dialogical future of religious reflection. minneapolis: augsburg fortress, 1990. 10 see swidler, l. j. towards a universal theology of religion. maryknoll, n.y.: orbis books, 1987 11 see arinze, f. church in dialogue: walking with other believers. san francisco: ignatius press, 1990. 12 see hsane hgyi, “religions and culture in myanmar.” paper presented at the fabc-oeia, bangkok, 2009 14 see “educating to intercultural dialogue in catholic schools: living in harmony for a civilization of love,” no. 63, vatican city, 2013. http://www.mofa.gov.mm/aboutmyanmar/religion.html a report on emotional education for young children: 1 gandhi and the ethic of active non-violence1 anthony parel university of calgary, alberta, canada abstract this paper argues that gandhi’s active non-violence is an ethic that (a) resists the use of illegitimate violence to solve conflict and (b) seeks to remove the material and moral conditions that engender conflict. it gets its ultimate strength from “soul-force” as gandhi calls it. its effectiveness depends on the deep spiritual life of its practitioners, the respect for human rights and social justice. a society can be governed by non-violent means only if the vast majority of its members are already non-violent in their civic behavior. gandhi does not advocate radical pacifism as he recognizes the right of self-defense, and the legitimacy of the constitutionally limited state. the reduction, not the elimination, of violence is its general policy. mahatma gandhi is universally admired for his philosophy of non-violence. at the same time the meaning of his non-violence is not always well understood. some identify him as a radical pacifist while others dismiss him as being too impractical. i argue that he is not a pacifist or even a conscientious objector but a moderate realist who firmly believed that the ethic of nonviolence was not only practical but also necessary for lasting peace in the world. let me begin with a brief description of gandhian non-violence. it is an ethic that disposes one (a) to resist social and political violence by peaceful means, and (b) to take positive 2 measures to remove the material and moral conditions that foster violence. as you can see, there are two aspects to this ethic. the first stresses the need to resist violent social and political practices and institutions. it is not enough personally to abstain from acts of violence; it is necessary to take steps to resist violence wherever it is found, whether in society or in the state. in this respect gandhian non-violence is different from buddhist non-violence, as traditionally understood, which is preeminently the ethic of the monk and the nun, who are in search of nirvana. the buddhist practitioner of non-violence would rather leave the active world of politics and social reform for the safety of the monastery, being content to focus on selfperfection. gandhian non-violence, by contrast, is the ethic of the citizen whose end is not only the well being of the individual but also the good of society taken as a whole. and the good of society requires active, non-violent resistance to violence. the most well known form of such resistance is civil-disobedience or satyagraha. the second aspect of gandhian non-violence is that it is not content with offering resistance. resistance is necessary but not sufficient. in addition to resistance you need to take positive steps to reform society and polity. that is to say civil disobedience should be matched by social reform. this insistence on social reform distinguishes gandhi’s civil disobedience from the other well-known forms of civil-disobedience, such as those of socrates and henry david thoreau. the great socratic motto was that it was better to suffer violence than to inflict it. according to plato’s apology,2 socrates accepted the punishment meted out to him by athens, but it is not known whether he took any measures that would reform athenian society. likewise, thoreau3 gladly went to jail to protest against the policies of the government, but he did not initiate any social reform movement in the united states. gandhi however not only went to prison, he also launched major social and political reform movements. in his view civil3 disobedience and social reform were two sides of the same coin. as he put it, civil disobedience without social reform would be like a paralyzed hand attempting to lift a spoon. we may compare gandhi’s approach to that of the good samaritan: far from ignoring the victims of violence, they both took active measures to help them and to alleviate their suffering. the underlying philosophy4 there is a philosophy underlying gandhi’s non-violence. to begin with, there is a specific view of human nature, society and the state. humans in gandhi’s philosophy are bodysoul creatures. the body-soul combination, or embodied existence is the key point. the body or the materiality of our existence is the root of violence. the soul, in contrast, is the source of nonviolence, of sociability, compassion, natural justice and spiritual awareness. in the embodied existence, both body-force (sharer bal) and soul-force (atma bal) are at work. the ego, which is the agent of material interests, is in potential conflict with the soul, which is the agent of ethical principles. the ego is the source of radical individualism, while the soul is the source of sociability. there is therefore an existential struggle between the passions of the ego and the aspirations of the soul. how to resolve this inner struggle is the key to the ethics of nonviolence. this inner struggle should be solved in terms of the aspirations of the soul. at the same time, gandhi accepts violence as a fact of life, though not as its norm. and he is very clear on this. “all life in flesh exists by some violence. the world is bound by a chain of destruction . . . violence is an inherent necessity of life in the body. none while in the flesh can thus be entirely free from violence because one never completely renounces the will to live.”5 “no doubt destruction in some form or other is inevitable. life lives upon life. i cannot become wholly 4 free of violence as long as the feeling that this body is mine.”6 that is to say, perfect nonviolence is not possible in the embodied existence; it is possible only in the disembodied state. accordingly, what his ethics seeks to achieve is not the total elimination of violence but the reduction of its intensity and frequency. that is why the ethics of gandhian non-violence does not require the absence of all forms of violence. that is why it is compatible with the exercise of legitimate self-defense. while we have an obligation not to use violence against others, we also have a duty to protect ourselves from the violence of those who do not act according to the requirements of sociability. this also applies to the state. it has the right and the duty to provide for internal order and external security. but the state that gandhi approves of is morally bound by the principles of ethics or natural dharma. according to these principles, the state may not exceed the limits of natural justice. it may not assume absolute or totalitarian power to itself. when it assumes such power it becomes aggressive and oppressive, and citizens have the right and the duty to disobey it through non-violent civil disobedience. it is crucial to emphasize that gandhi’s ethic of non-violence grants the state the right to self-defense even by military means. this too is consistent with the natural necessities of embodied existence. no doubt this right has to be exercised within the bounds of dharma or natural moral law and international conventions. his positive attitude towards the state makes him a moderate realist, and not at all a utopian. in this respect he differs from leo tolstoy. tolstoy, as is well known, was a radical pacifist and a utopian, who denied the legitimacy of the state. according to him those who wanted to live a non-violent life had no option but to withdraw from the state and retreat into small self-contained communes—like the dukabhors. 5 gandhi by contrast accepts the state: instead of withdrawing from the state he wanted to struggle for its betterment. there is no question that gandhi took the need for self-defense very seriously. for evidence we need only to refer to his formal statement on this matter at the constitutional conference (the second round table conference) held in london in 1931 . . . “i think that a nation that has no control over her own defense forces and over her external policy is hardly a responsible nation. defense, its army, is to a nation the very essence of its existence, and if a nation’s defense is controlled by an outside agency, no matter how friendly it is, then that nation is certainly not responsibly governed.” it was his “dream” and “ambition,” he said, to have an india that was capable of defending itself from external aggression. “that is really my ambition, and therefore, i say i would wait till eternity if i cannot get control of defense. i refuse to deceive myself that i am going to embark upon responsible government although i cannot control my defense.”7 let me very briefly sum up the philosophy underlying gandhi’s non-violence. it involves a definite view of human nature: humans are body-soul composites. though the soul is guiding principle of life, the body has its own legitimate claims. in the embodied state there is a struggle between the body and the soul, material interests and moral duties, which should be resolved according to the principles of natural sociability, justice, and compassion. the state is a necessary institution, and its acts are legitimate so long as they are in harmony with the principles of dharma or natural moral law. when illegitimate, the citizen has the right and the obligation to disobey and to take such steps as are necessary to reform society. two major challenges 6 here we must consider the two great challenges that gandhi’s philosophy faces today. they are radical secularism and radical islamism. i distinguish between radical secularism and moderate secularism: the one is totally opposed to religion and a spiritual vision of reality, whereas the other is compatible with them. the source of radical secularism can be traced to the 17th century, to the philosopher thomas hobbes.8 he eliminated the soul from his scientific analysis of human nature, and with it, natural sociability was also eliminated. humans are basically animated bodies, led by hostility towards one another. they are asocial, and in their natural condition, are in a state of war of all against all. reason, considered as the slave of the passions, replaces reason considered as capable of transcending passions. in such a society only the greater violence of the state can keep peace between naturally violent human beings. this violent view of life is reinforced by later thinkers such as karl marx, sigmund freud and the social darwinians. according to the radical secularists, human progress depends on revolutionary violence. the french revolution with its reign of terror, the russian revolution and its gulags, and the chinese cultural revolution (in which reportedly about 70 million perished)9 are regrettable but necessary means of human progress. violence must be judged by the good it produces, and not by its moral evil. the end always justifies the means. there is a paradox in the radical secularist position: on the one hand, violence is taken to be natural; and on the other hand, it is regarded as irrational, something to be restrained by the greater violence of the state. there is no place for spiritual values in the restraining of violence. and this is because radical secularism has removed the soul from the human equation. the physical brain has replaced the soul. hobbes, marx, freud, and darwin, inaugurated a vision of the universe that is inherently violent. 7 the challenge from modern jihadism is different and in one respect even more serious. it is more serious because it is based on specific notions of god and spirituality. to put it bluntly, it is based on the fundamentalist interpretation of the will of allah, as revealed to the prophet muhammad. according to that revelation, as a condition for peace, humanity as a whole should accept allah’s will. all those who resist it will be dealt with according to the requirements of jihad. there are of course two kinds of jihad: the first is called inner jihad, which is basically individual spiritual self-improvement. the second kind is called the outer jihad, which is a form of warfare directed against those who threaten or flout allah’s will. i mention the challenge to gandhi from modern jihadism, not only because of its contemporary relevance but also because of its historic connection. the chief philosopher of modern jihad was abul ala mawdudi, an indian muslim and a contemporary of gandhi.10 in his early days he was an admirer of gandhi, having written a short laudatory biography of the mahatma. but he underwent a sudden religious conversion which led him to embrace militant islam. his treatise jihad in islam, published in india in 1927, remains to this day the universal reference book of modern jihadism.11 mawdudi became convinced that gandhi and the hindus in general posed a threat to islam and therefore had to be opposed. lasting peace could be reached only if the whole of india was converted into islam. the frightening challenge of jihadism comes from its spirituality, and from mawdudi’s interpretation of muslim theology. whereas gandhi argues that god is truth and therefore can be reached only under conditions of freedom, mawdudi argues that those who oppose god would have to pay a price here and now. it may well take the form of jihad. gandhi’s position, on this matter, is not unlike that articulated recently by pope benedict xvi in his regensburg 8 address. the pope spoke of the incompatibility of god and the logos on the one hand and violence on the other. briefly, gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence faces two formidable challenges. the radical secularists challenge its notion of spirituality—on the ground that it is ineffective and only the greater violence of the state is capable of managing violence. and the jihadists challenge it on the ground that jihad is a legitimate form of defending allah’s will. four ways of making the world less violent gandhi’s philosophy outlines four ways for making the world less violent. they are the promotion of (1) human rights, (2) social justice, (3) religious pluralism, and (4) a deep spiritual life. the violation of human rights is perhaps the most prolific source of violence in the world today. the main culprit here is the modern state, the symbol of institutional and structural violence. i am not talking about the liberal democratic state, which is the least violent of all the state-forms available to us. i am talking about states that are totalitarian or authoritarian in character, military dictatorships, states that are based on communist, fascist, quasi-theocratic, ethnic or islamist ideologies. gandhi’s non-violence became famous because it developed the non-violent techniques of satyagraha or civil disobedience of resisting the state. he developed them at the turn of the 20th century against the state in south africa, and later against the colonial state in india. his example has been followed by others in other countries, most notably in the united states by martin luther king, jr.. if we look around the world today, we notice that it is the denial of human rights that is at the root of most instances of violence. and these rights include the right to religious freedom, 9 freedom of conscience, economic liberty, social equality, and civil liberty. but gandhi’s defense of human rights is quite different from the defense of the same by radical libertarians. radical libertarians place rights above duty, whereas gandhi considers rights and duties as correlated. according to him there can be no rights without their corresponding duties. if i have a right to be protected from violence, i also have a duty not to inflict violence on others. and so on with the other elements of human rights. in liberal societies, however, such as canada, the emphasis is primarily upon rights. and unless the emphasis is placed on both rights and duties, there is little chance of reducing the intensity and frequency of violence. the second way of reducing violence is through the promotion of social justice. although too broad a subject to be adequately treated here, gandhi’s perspective explains why social justice is critically important to the ethic of non-violence. the basic goal of social justice is to fight social injustice in all its forms, whether hidden or open—whether economic, racial, ethnic, religious or ideological. here the worst culprits are social institutions that perpetuate or hide forms of injustice. of all the forms of injustices, it is perhaps economic injustice that is the most obvious. no society, whether developed or underdeveloped, is free from it. gandhi has a well thought out economic philosophy. it is opposed to both radical capitalism and marxism. by radical capitalism is meant a form of capitalism that considers wealth as more important than people. gandhi favors a moderate form of capitalism that recognizes the right to private property. this right is not absolute but conditional to meeting the needs of society at large. he was critical of radical capitalism for making enlightened self-interest the sole motivation at work in economic relations. such a view takes humans merely as bodily creatures, or “money-making machines,” to use his phrase,12 denying or at least ignoring the fact that they 10 are also embodied souls. because they have a soul, they are capable of acting out of motives of compassion and natural justice. moderate capitalism combines legitimate self-interest with natural justice and compassion. gandhi’s economic philosophy was greatly influenced by two parables from the gospels —the parable of the workers in the vineyard and the parable of the rich young man. the parable of the workers in the vineyard is a parable about economic justice in labor relations. the workers in the parable came to work at different times of the day. yet they all received the same wage. even the worker who came last got a just wage. the point is that everyone who engages in an honest day’s work has a right to a living wage. john ruskin had written his famous book unto this last, based on this parable. gandhi’s economic philosophy was inspired by this work, which he regarded so highly that he translated it into gujarati under the title sarvodaya. sarovodaya, meaning the welfare of all, was deliberately chosen to indicate his dissatisfaction with benthamite concept of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.13 the parable of the rich young man also had a great influence on gandhi’s economic thought. this parable is about a rich young man who comes to jesus for advice. he was no ordinary rich man, for he had acquired his wealth honestly, without cheating others. still he felt an inner vacuum that the ethical life by itself could not fill. it was that inner emptiness that prompted him to come to jesus. jesus intuited his problem and advised him that if he was serious about his inner life, he should be prepared to give up his wealth, at least be detached from it. at this the young man grieved and went away, for he loved his wealth more than his soul. gandhi used this parable to argue that economic justice by itself cannot satisfy our spiritual needs. wealth is not a reliable index of happiness. spiritual progress does not come in the same proportion as economic progress. there is no strict correlation between economic development 11 and spiritual development. on the other hand, without spiritual development, economic development leaves us empty. this parable exposes the shallowness of modern policy makers who argue that the solution to all the problems of humanity is economic in nature. economic prosperity, if it is to lead to genuine human prosperity, would need the support of spiritual detachment. otherwise it could become an end itself, perhaps the ultimate end of life, which it could not possibly be. gandhi’s point is that the field of social justice is broader than that of economic justice. for every society has its blind spot. this is especially true of economically well-advanced societies. social reform in the broad sense is needed to find out what these blind spots are. and social reform in gandhi’s view should not be left to the state alone. the responsibility for social reform should be borne by both the state and non-governmental agencies.14 the more the state shares its power with voluntary organizations, the better the chances of success of social reform. the more vigorous the voluntary agencies, the less violent would society be. turning now to the third way to reducing violence in the world. this involves religion and the violence arising from religious conflicts. contemporary radical secularists such as christopher hitchens accuse religion as the source of all violence in the world. gandhi, in his day, was aware of such accusations.15 his response was that the use of violence as a means of religious propaganda is pathological, that the pathology of religion should not be confused with religion itself. moreover, there is such a thing as development in religious consciousness, which now seeks to cure the pathology, by admitting the mistakes of the past and attempting to make religion as free of violence as possible. radical secularism by contrast makes no effort to disown its gory past and still justifies the revolutions of the past and the present as salutary. 12 gandhi offers two cures to religious pathology. the first is the norm of de jure religious pluralism. the denial of the legitimacy of one religion by another is one of the major sources of religious intolerance and persecution. in this regard there is a developing field of the theology of religious pluralism, which is worthy of serious study. here i recommend two very important books by jacques dupuis, a belgian jesuit, who taught theology in india for many decades and who ended his illustrious career as a professor at the gregorian university in rome. his towards a christian theology of religious pluralism and christianity and the religions: from confrontation to dialogue are indispensable for gaining a christian perspective on religious pluralism.16 gandhi’s second solution is to place more emphasis on religious ethics than on theology. all religions teach a basic code of ethical behavior—fairness, honesty, truthfulness, compassion and the like. it is easier to establish contact with people professing another religion on the basis of ethics than on the basis of theology. theology is concerned with beliefs, while ethics is concerned with actual practice. theology is for the internal life of religions while ethics is for external relations. this is not to diminish the importance of theology, for theology is necessary for pointing out the internal coherence of religious beliefs. at the same time it is easier to agree on ethical principle than on theological principles. ethics will dispose people belonging to different religions to interact with each other, in spite of their theological differences. interestingly, in recent times hans küng, the catholic theologian, has come close to the position taken by gandhi several decades ago. finally, we come to the fourth and final way of reducing violence in the world. it is the way of the spiritual life. as we saw in gandhi’s interpretation of the parable of the rich young man, human development can never be complete without spiritual development. each religion 13 has its own tradition of spirituality. as in the field of ethics, so in that of spirituality, there is plenty of common ground between religions. the spiritual life requires daily readings of the scriptures, the practice of prayer and meditation, and appreciation of religious art and music. throughout his busy schedule gandhi maintained a very strict prayer schedule. one day a week was set aside as the day of silence. prayer for him was a means of gaining the truth about ourselves as contingent creatures, depending on god. it also was a means of self-purification, of taming the ego which is in struggle with the soul. prayer makes us realize that a major source of violence in the world is the unregenerate state of the ego. without a deep spiritual life it is virtually impossible to manage the ego. the four fields of non-violence nothing illustrates gandhi’s ethical realism more vividly than his concept of the fields of non-violence. by “fields” he means the “communities” in which the ethics of non-violence was practiced. he distinguished four such fields. they are the family, the political community, the religious community, and the international community. the underlying idea is that though nonviolence is a universal norm, it operates differently in different communities. what works in one community may not work in another. thus what works in the family may not work in the political community. the point is that the ethic of non-violence has to remain adaptable to the nature of the community in question. let us take the family first. gandhi calls it “the best field”; the “nursery” in which the alphabets of non-violence are learnt.17 what are these alphabets? they are of course the habits of kindness, mutual appreciation, forbearance, forgiveness, and unconditional love—all cultivated in normal families and all necessary for a non-violent life. if these habits are not acquired at 14 home, they will most likely not be acquired in later life. the norm is clear enough: violence has no place in the family. yet the facts speak otherwise. we have therefore to examine what threatens the family today. is the very concept of the family under threat? how about monogamy? sexual ethics? alcohol and drug abuse? parental neglect? the list is too long to be comfortable. gandhi’s point is simple: if we make the family less violent we make a real contribution to world peace. let us move on to the second field—the political community. this “field” includes constituted public authority. here the norm is different from that of the family. for the state is permitted to exercise minimum necessary violence for the sake of internal order. but the fact is that often the state exceeds this limit. the worst culprits here are authoritarian, fascist, communist, theocratic and other forms of totalitarian states. the least offending are the democratic states. the conclusion is clear enough: the larger the number of democracies in the world, the greater the chance of peace in the world. let us now turn to the third “field”—the religious community. here, as in the family, the norm is non-violence. but facts prove otherwise. for historically and psychologically religions have often acted violently. we saw earlier why this was so. this was so because the norm of religious pluralism had not come into vogue. but today two new sources of religious violence have been added—religious nationalism and the new interpretation of jihad. the conclusion is clear enough: the more religions dissociate themselves from nationalism, the better. and the more islam disinherits jihadism, peace has a better chance. finally, we turn to the international community of states. here the norm is that states have a right to self-defense even by military means. but the exercise of this right is limited by the generally accepted rules of war. but we are faced with a new phenomenon. non-state 15 organizations such as hamas, the taliban and the al-quaida do not recognize the existing rules of war. what this will do to international peace has become the critical question of the 21st century. what drives these groups is the belief that they have the approval of allah behind them. for it is allah’s will that the whole world should accept islam, and that those who do not should be overcome by war. this fits in with the old islamic notion that the world is divided between the land of peace (dar ul islam) and the land of war (dar ul hurb). and it is islam’s mission to convert the land of war into the land of islam. the major obstacle standing in the way is the west, which therefore must be defeated in every way possible. as for the rest of the world, wherever muslims are in a majority, they have a right to form a muslim state. this is their position in southern philippines, southern thailand, kashmir, chechnya, and kosovo. india was a test case. because certain parts of india had a muslim majority, those parts had to form a muslim state. this had the sanction of the shariah. gandhi knew all this firsthand in his dealings with the muslim separatist movement in india. it must be made clear that the leaders of most muslim states today do not support the interpretation of jihad that the hamas, the taliban and the al-quaida have given to it. but public opinion in those countries favors fundamentalism. in any event, it does not actively oppose it. under these conditions what chance of success has gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence? very little, it would seem. however, gandhi has a fall back position. it is expressed through one of the most important principles, viz. the “vast majority principle.” the vast majority principle 16 the principle is simple enough. unless the vast majority in a country is ready to live non-violently, it is virtually impossible to govern that country non-violently. gandhi writes: “i believe that a state can be administered on a non-violent basis if the vast majority of the people are non-violent.”18 only “when a large majority of people are willing to abide by the law of ahimsa [non-violence]” could state policies become non-violent. “when this happy state prevails, the spirit of violence will have all but vanished and internal order will have come under control.” “quarrels between labor and capital will be few and far between in a non-violent state, because the influence of the non-violent majority will be so great as to command the respect of the principal elements in society.”19 this is ethical realism at its best. the implications of this principle are worth close scrutiny. the first implication is that peace is everyone’s business. the common tendency is to put the onus on the leaders of a country. the vast majority principle shifts the burden of peace from the leaders to the people, or at least distributes it equally between the leaders and the people. the leaders of a country can promote peace only to the extent that the vast majority of that country is peaceful. and the vast majority can be peaceful only to the extent that they eliminate violence in their private lives as well as in the structures of their society. it is not enough for the vast majority to abstain from violence on a personal basis; it is necessary for them to be actively non-violent in opposing the violent minority. applied to the muslim countries, this means that the vast majority should become active in opposing violent religious fundamentalism. this they can do only if they are willing to reexamine the prevailing violent structures of islamic society. just imagine what would happen if the vast majority of muslims in muslim countries were to become really fed up with fundamentalist violence. 17 the same principle applies to non-muslim countries. the vast majority in those countries would have to examine to what extent they passively tolerate the violent structures of their own societies. just imagine what would happen if the vast majority of consumers in the developed countries were to become fed up with the behavior of the international corporations towards the environment and towards the developing countries. what gandhi’s vast majority principle asks for is a change in the moral awareness of the vast majority in every country. they have to cease to be passive and have to become active in their non-violence. his appeal is directly to the people and only indirectly to the state. gandhi’s vast majority principle is comparable to immanuel kant’s “republican principle.” kant in the 18th century had proposed a program of “perpetual peace.” if the states were to have a republican constitution they are likely to be peaceful, and if there is a circle of republican states, then relations between them are likely to be peaceful too. but gandhi goes one step beyond kant. he places emphasis on ‘the people’ themselves rather than on their ‘constitution.’ his position is that only if the vast majority of the people of a country are actively non-violent, can the ethic of non-violence really succeed. conclusion the question then is how to make the vast majority habitually non-violent? we can answer this question by way of summarizing what we have been discussing. to begin with, the vast majority would have to take an active interest in human rights, social justice, religious pluralism, the spiritual life and the family life. secondly, the vast majority will have to re-think the meaning of spiritual life. it is not enough to say that i lead a spiritual life. it is now necessary to ask what sort of spiritual life i 18 lead. what are the social implications of my spiritual life? does my spiritual life lead to my involvement in the political issues of the world or does it cause me to withdraw from them? does my involvement in politics make my politics more violent or less violent? these questions are very relevant today because of the islamist claim that certain acts of political violence are compatible with deep spirituality. gandhi’s response to such an interpretation of spirituality is well known: god is truth and therefore could not be reached by violent means. the search for truth and violent behavior are incompatible. indeed, the search for truth is precisely the best means of making our behavior less violent. in this connection, i refer once again to the similarity between pope benedict xvi’s position and gandhi’s position on the incompatibility between violence and spirituality. in christian thought, as the pope stated in his regensburg lecture, not acting with the logos, was acting contrary to the nature of god. this is comparable to gandhi’s position that not acting according to truth is contrary to the nature of god. what the vast majority in every country needs, then, is a renewed understanding of the true meaning of the spiritual life. gandhi can be, and indeed is, a great help here. for his philosophy stands for the harmony of all human strivings—political, economic, ethical, and spiritual. it is this harmony that both radical secularism and radical islamism seek to threaten. but it is this harmony that the vast majority everywhere aspires to. gandhi makes his appeal directly to the vast majority and only indirectly to the state and the community of states. it is the vast majority that shapes the character of culture at any given time, and it is culture that shapes the nature of society and its institutions. and in order to shape or transform culture, the ethic of non-violence has to become truly active. peace depends of activity, not passivity. 19 and if we want to sum up gandhi’s position in one sentence, what would it be? it would be, i think, something like this: there can be no peace in the world unless the vast majority in each country stops being merely passive, but becomes active in their non-violence. 20 endnotes 1. this is the text of a lecture that i delivered at st. mary’s university college, calgary, canada, on 23 november 2006. i thank the president and fellows of the college for their kind invitation. 2. in 1908 gandhi paraphrased the apology and published it under the title story of a soldier of truth. see gandhi, the collected works of mahatma gandhi, 100 vols., 1958-1994, new delhi: publications division, government of india (hereafter cw), vol. 8. 3. gandhi was greatly influenced by thoreau’s on the duty of civil disobedience and life without principle. they were put in appendix i of his seminal work hind swaraj. see a. parel (ed.), gandhi: hind swaraj and other writings (hereafter hs), cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997, p. 120. 4. for a full account of gandhi’s philosophy, see a. parel, gandhi’s philosophy and the quest for harmony, cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006. 5. gandhi, cw, 37: 314. 6. gandhi, cw, 34: 130. 7. gandhi, cw, 48: 304-07. 8. see thomas hobbes, the leviathan. 9. see the times literary supplement, 22 july 2005, p. 22. during the chinese cultural revolution, the revolutionaries could fetch 20 yuans for killing suspected young boys, 50 yuans for killing senior counter-revolutionaries. in mao’s own province, revolutionaries were paid only 3 yuans per killing; see the times literary supplement, 20 october 2006, p. 11. for a full account of the atrocities of the chinese cultural revolution, see jung chang and jon halliday, 21 mao: the unknown story, london: cape, 2005, and roderick macfarquhar and michael schoenhals, mao’s last revolution, london: belknap press, 2006. 10. for an account of mawdudi’s role in contemporary islamic revivalism, see syyed vali reza nasr, mawdudi and the making of islamic revivalism, new york: oxford university press, 1996; john l. esposito, unholy wear: terror in the name of islam, new york: oxford university press, 2002; and gilles kepel, jihad: the trail of political islam, cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2002. 11. mawdudi, 1986 reprint, lahore: idarah-i tarjumanu’l quran. 12. gandhi, cw, 8: 241. 13. ibid. 14. gandhi developed his ideas on the role of non-governmental agencies in his important work called constructive programme. see cw, 75: 146-66. 15. see gandhi, hs, ch. 8. 16. jacques dupuis, s. j., toward a christian theology of religious pluralism, maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 1997; and christianity and the religions: from confrontation to dialogue, maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 2003. 17. gandhi, cw, 72: 271. 18. gandhi, cw, 71: 407. 19. gandhi, cw, 72: 403. 68 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021, 68-82 © 2000 by assumption university press defending mental causation by appealing to grounding pornthep chawla assumption university, thailand abstract recently, clark and wildman have argued against a thesis about mental causation, due to kroedel and schulz, called the causal grounding thesis. a programmatic idea driving the causal grounding thesis is that instances of mental causation are always grounded by corresponding instances of purely physical causation. the causal grounding thesis goes beyond this programmatic idea by providing a substantial specification of how this occurs. the causal grounding thesis is of considerable philosophical interest because it is instrumental in kroedel and schulz’s attempt to develop non-reductive physicalism about the mind in such a way that the infamous exclusion problem is avoided. this paper extends kroedel and schulz’s defense of the causal grounding thesis and replies to clark and wildman’s concerns. keywords: non-reductive physicalism; exclusion argument; causal grounding; mental causation pornthep chawla 69 section 1 introduction to non-reductive physicalism and its exclusion argument. non-reductive physicalism (henceforth: nrp) has many variants but, following list and menzies, i will understand nrp as the conjunction of the following the claims 1. all mental properties are distinct from physical properties. 2. mental properties supervene on physical properties in the sense that there cannot be a difference with respect to mental properties without a further difference with respect to physical properties. 3. the mental properties are the causes and effects of other properties.1 claim (1) articulates the non-reductive aspect of nrp as the idea that mental properties2 are irreducible to physical properties. as a version of physicalism, nrp also claims that physical properties are more fundamental than the mental properties. finally, claim (3) ensures that nrp is not a version of epiphenomenalism – it is a view on which mental properties are causally active and so it is supposed to capture our intuitive thought about how our minds can influence, and be influenced by, the world around us. the exclusion argument according to the exclusion argument, the three theses of nrp are jointly inconsistent. this argument – first developed by jaegwon kim – depends on the exclusion principle: if a property e is causally sufficient for some effect f then no distinct property e* that supervenes on e can be a cause of the effect f.3 since – according to physicalists, at least – the mental supervenes on the physical, the exclusion principle implies that mental states and 70 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 their physical grounds cannot play the same causal roles. one of them has to be excluded. the physical property is more fundamental for the nrp, leaving the physical cause as the sole cause and the mental cause is causally excluded. e.g., if the pain is a mental event that supervenes on the physical event c-fibres firing, then the latter is causally sufficient for bill to wince and the mental state – the pain – is causally redundant. the exclusion principle expresses skepticism about systematic overdetermination. when there are two causes for one effect, there is causal overdetermination. two balls, each simultaneously thrown at a window hard enough to break it, might overdetermine the window’s breaking. when applied to mental causation, the pain and its physical grounds both cause the wincing. moreover, for any mental state m that causes some effect e, it seems there will be some distinct physical state that is simultaneous with m – namely, m’s grounds (or supervenience base) – which is itself a sufficient cause for e. hence nrp seems to imply the existence of widespread causal overdetermination: whenever we have a putative mental cause for some effect e, there will also be a corresponding physical state (perhaps a state of the brain) which causes e. and widespread causal overdetermination seems problematic. so, the question is: what causal-explanatory role is left for mental states to play, under nrp? it seems that we could deny all instances of mental causation without commitment to any more causally unexplained events, since any causal-explanatory role that a mental event m can play is also played by the physical (e.g., brain) events that m supervenes on. it is tempting to conclude that we should deny the existence of mental causation for reasons of parsimony, since such a denial enables us to avoid ontological commitment to a class of entities (namely, instances of mental causation) without reducing the explanatoriness of the overall theory. grounding and grounding physicalism the notion of “ground” arrived into contemporary analytic metaphysics at the beginning of the twenty-first century; however, the notion’s roots arguably go back to aristotle (see fine, 1995 and pornthep chawla 71 schaffer, 2009). sometimes grounding is understood as being a form of “metaphysical explanation.”4 grounding is most intuitively understood as a relation of noncausal determination. it is a metaphysical relation between a ground and a grounded entity. the ground is considered more fundamental than the grounded entity, and the grounded entity depends, non-causally, on its more fundamental grounds. the following plausible examples of grounding are taken from clark and liggins (2012) (a) the brittleness of the cup results from the way its constituent atoms are arranged. (b) the truth-value of a proposition is determined by how the world is. (c) actions have their moral properties in virtue of their non-moral properties. (d) non-empty sets depend on their existence on their members. (e) a mental state is grounded in the brain state which realizes it.5 clark & liggins (2012) pointed out that none of the above examples is plausible if understood causally. for one thing, none of these examples exhibits the temporal asymmetry that is characteristic of causal relations. furthermore, the explanatory connections cited in (a)-(e) seem to be modally stronger than causal relations – they seem to hold of metaphysical, rather than merely causal, necessity. grounding physicalism, as developed by kroedel and schulz, is a version of nrp that is formulated explicitly in terms of grounding, and claims that all instances of mental properties are grounded by instances of physical properties. (kroedel and schulz, 2016, p.1-2; stenwall, 2020, p.3). in particular, grounding physicalism adds the following thesis to nrp: grounding necessarily, all mental property instances are grounded in physical property instances. 72 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 given that grounding is closely connected to the concept of fundamentality, grounding physicalism seems to imply that mental properties are less fundamental in the instances of grounding. the concept of supervenience is not closely connected to the concept of fundamentality. so, grounding physicalism captures – as nrp arguably does not – the physicalist’s intuition that the physical is prior to the mental. (kroedel and schulz, 2015) section 3 causal grounding the grounding thesis says that mental events are always grounded by physical events. but what about mental-causal relations? this is where the causal grounding principle plays a role, since this principle implies that mental causation is not fundamental and depends on its physical grounds: causal grounding let m be a mental event, and let e be a physical effect of m. then there is a physical event p such that p grounds m and m causes e because p causes e.6 in this way, ontological worries about mental causal relations – worries that such relations are gratuitous additions to the causally closed physical system revealed by science – are assuaged by the thought that mental causal relations are always physically explainable and can thus “dispel the worry that the overdetermination of the physical effects of mental causes is a surprising coincidence” (kroedel and schulz 2015). thus, causal grounding provides the materials for an intuitively plausible solution to the exclusion argument. one of the benefits of causal grounding is the solution to the exclusion problem. but clark and wildman (2018) argue that the causal grounding principle is undermotivated and subject to plausible counterexamples. pornthep chawla 73 these counterexamples rely on the idea that some mental states are grounded by facts that are external to the mental state’s bearer – mental states that are not fully grounded by “going on in our heads” but also require external factors to be included in their grounds.” clark and wildman argue that causal grounding is incompatible with certain externalist theses about the mind and mental content. they conclude that it remains unclear whether causal grounding can be appealed to in a plausible response to the exclusion argument. i will by offering two arguments for the causal grounding thesis, one being an argument from ontological parsimony, and another concerning narrow content. argument from ontological innocence grounding physicalism implies that all mental events are grounded in purely physical events. following schaffer, we can take this to imply that mental events are ‘ontologically innocent’ – nothing ‘over and above’ their physical grounds. in armstrong’s phrase, they are ‘ontological free lunches’: armstrong makes crucial use of the notion of ‘the ontological free lunch’: ‘whatever supervenes … is not something ontologically additional to the subvenient, or necessitating, entity or entities. what supervenes is no addition to being’. [i]n aristotelian terms, there is a straightforward way to understand armstrong: whatever is dependent is not fundamental, and thus no addition to the sparse basis. thus, armstrong’s notion of an ontological free lunch seems best understood against an aristotelian background.8 in another paper, schaffer develops this idea as follows: 74 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 derivative entities are an ‘ontological free lunch’, in the sense that they are genuinely new and distinct entities but they cost nothing by measure of economy …. derivative entities are additional commitments, but they cost nothing. more precisely: derivative entities cost nothing further, beyond the cost incurred for positing their fundamental grounds.9 clark and wildman point out that, just because mental events are grounded in physical events, it does not automatically follow that mental causation is physically grounded as well: [e]ven if mental events are ontologically innocent, this is not enough to secure the ontological innocence of the causal relations into which those mental events enter. even if mental events are grounded in physical events, it doesn’t automatically follow that mental causation is. if mental event m is grounded in physical event p, it doesn’t automatically follow that m’s causing some event, e, is physically grounded, nor does it follow that m’s causing e doesn’t require the addition of something ontologically significant. worries about parsimony apply not only to events, but also to the causal relations into which they enter. consequently, non-reductive physicalists have to tell us why mental causation is ontologically innocent, why it adds nothing ontologically significant. 10 we can concede this point. but still, if the causal grounding thesis is true, then the ontological innocence of grounded mental events passes directly over to the causal relations that those mental events enter into. this enables us to endorse commonsensical claims about mental causation without ontological commitment to ungrounded mental-causal relations. this is a powerful argument from parsimony in favor of the causal grounding thesis. even if, as clark and wildman argue, the theory is inconsistent with externalist theses about mental content, this argument pornthep chawla 75 from parsimony might lead us to reconsider those externalist theses. argument from narrow content often, mental states have meaning or content. broad content mental states are those whose meaning depends, not just on the states internal to the thinker – specifically, their brain states – but also on aspects of their wider environment. narrow-content mental states are intrinsic and depend only on states internal to the thinker. brown (2016) summarized: narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual’s environment. narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual’s environment as well as on features of the individual. it is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined by the individual’s intrinsic properties.11 clark and wildman (2018) argue that some mental states, including knowledge and belief states, plausibly depend on external factors. moreover, they claim that some such broad-content mental states are causally efficacious. this idea is the crux of their critique of the causal grounding thesis. for, if a person s has a causally efficacious mental state m, and if m’s physical grounds are scattered across s’s wider environment, then there is no reason to expect that those physical grounds are apt to play m’s causal roles – after all, they likely do not share m’s spatio-temporal location. perhaps we could reply by saying that only narrow-content mental states are causally efficacious. philosophers sometimes contrast wide content beliefs, whose content depends on features of the believer’s external environment, with narrow content beliefs, whose contents do not so depend. with this distinction in hand, 76 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 defenders of cg might respond to the present objection by following fodor (1987) in only taking narrow content beliefs to be causally efficacious. this ensures that the grounds for any given belief will be local to the believer and so will be suitable for slotting into the belief’s causal role (and likewise for other kinds of causally efficacious mental states).12 but they go on to argue that this is mistaken, appealing to externalist ideas familiar from the work of putnam (1975) and burge: [c]onsider a person who is familiar with aluminium but who lacks an account of aluminium that would enable him to distinguish it from all other actual or possible metals. he is able to think about aluminium, despite his lack of theoretical knowledge on the matter. for example, his belief that aluminium is lighter than lead concerns aluminium, as opposed to an imaginary superficially identical but chemically different metal twaluminium. this is not because he is able to distinguish the two metals. it is about aluminium because he happens to have encountered aluminium in the world in which he lives; the external fact that he is in a world containing aluminium and not twaluminium partly explains why his beliefs are about aluminium and not twaluminium. in this way, his aluminium beliefs are externalist; moreover, if externalism about aluminium beliefs is warranted, it seems that a very large body of our beliefs about the world will require an externalist treatment as well. whatever we say about knowledge states, it seems intuitively clear that many of our beliefs are causally efficacious. jimbo’s belief that a certain chunk of metal is aluminium might cause him to say “aluminium” if somebody asks him to identify its chemical kind. but if this belief is partly grounded by an expansive portion of jimbo’s surrounding environment, there is no reason at all to expect that the full grounds of jimbo’s belief will be hooked up to the effects of jimbo’s belief in the manner that cg predicts pornthep chawla 77 a narrow content belief in the vicinity of jimbo’s belief that his chunk is aluminium would be a belief whose content does not vary between aluminium and twaluminium worlds. a narrow content surrogate for jimbo’s aluminium belief might be a belief that the chunk is a grey metal, with such and such relevant additional properties. but, while this narrow content belief may be causally efficacious in its own right, it is no substitute for jimbo’s belief that the chunk is aluminium. for all we have said, jimbo may not even have the narrow content belief in addition to the wide-content one (for instance, he might lack the concept of greyness). moreover, aluminium-concerning beliefs seem to have effects that narrow content surrogates lack. if we want to causally explain why jimbo picked up a piece of aluminium, it is his aluminium-concerning beliefs and desires that we need to cite. narrow content beliefs and desires, being neutral between aluminium and twaluminium, are not suitable for bringing about the effect that jimbo picks up a lump of aluminium: in the terminology of yablo (1992), they are not proportional to this effect, since in a twaluminium-infested twin world, these beliefs and desires would result in jimbo picking up a lump of twaluminium instead. in this sense, the narrow content beliefs are not causally sufficient for the effect in question.13 these views are highly contentious and are disputed, for example, by bach (1998) and crane (1991), who writes: the putnam/ burge arguments do not, i think, force us to opt for broad or narrow mindedness. i will argue not only that their conclusions are fundamentally opposed to crucial assumptions we are obliged to make about causation and the causal role of mental states, but also that the arguments for these conclusions are unsound. there is no twin earth problem of the kind putnam, burge and many others think there is. so there is no need to respond to it with broador 78 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 narrow-mindedness. but here i shall return to putnam’s and burge’s original arguments, and dispute them. my excuse for adding another paper to the already vast literature is that if my arguments are right, they will help not just to solve, but to dissolve the twin earth problem.14 it is impossible to assess these controversies here. but clark and wildman (2018) make a dialectical point: that the causal grounding thesis incurs a substantial theoretical cost, in the form of a commitment to strong internalist claims about mental content or to the claim that only narrowcontent mental states are causally efficacious. in reply, it seems to me that, since the debate about externalism is ongoing, it is unclear how much of a cost this is. indeed, taking into account a wider range of costs and benefits might persuade us that taking on these internalist commitments provides the best overall package of views. let us consider the ledger. on the one hand, we have grounding physicalism, with the causalgrounding thesis, and whatever unobvious but non-absurd internalist assumptions are needed, allowing us to combine non-reductive physicalism with all the common-sensical mental-causal claims we like. this is an appealing combination of views. the alternative seems to be accepting a view on which the only way to endorse common-sense mental-causal claims is to posit a host of ungrounded mental-causal relations. this, i claim, is a more costly overall package of views. section 5 conclusion i have argued for the causal grounding principle. causal grounding is an assumption worth making and taking it as a default view for physicalism because it assumes fewer fundamental entities and facts. although, as clark and wildman note, it comes with substantial theoretical commitments, it is unclear how costly these are – and by accepting the causal grounding thesis, we can get a plausible version of non-reductive physicalism that has materials for an intuitively satisfying reply to the exclusion argument. pornthep chawla 79 endnotes 1 list, christian. & menzies, peter. nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle. journal of philosophy 106 (9):475-502. 2009. 2 i will frame the discussion in terms of mental and physical properties but it could be generalized straightforwardly, to take account of states, facts, events, or entities of other ontological categories. indeed, i sometimes use state-talk interchangeably with property-talk in this paper. 3 kim, jaegwon. mind in a physical world: an essay on the mind-body mental causation. cambridge, ma: mit press. 1998a. kim, jaegwon. physicalism, or something near enough. princeton: princeton university press. 2005. 4 for relevant discussion, see tuomas e. tahko, & e. j. lowe, ontological dependence. (stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2020). ricki bliss & kelly trogdon, metaphysical grounding. (stanford encyclopedia of philosophy,2008) fabrice correia & benjamin schnieder, grounding: an opinionated introduction. in fabrice correia & benjamin schnieder (eds.), metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. cambridge university press, 2012) pp. 1. 5 clark, michael and liggins, david. recent work on grounding. analysis, 72(4), 812–823. 2012. pp.1 6 kroedel, thomas. and schulz, moritz. grounding mental causation. synthese 193 (6):1909-1923. 2016. pp.6 7 clark, michael & wildman, nathan. grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination. synthese 195 (8):3723-3733. 2018. pp.7 8 schaffer, jonathan. “on what grounds what.” in metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology, ed. d. j. chalmers, d. manley and r. wasserman. oxford: oxford university press. 2009. pp.353 9 schaffer, jonathan. what not to multiply without necessity, australasian journal of philosophy, 93:4, 644-664. 2015. pp.647-648 10 clark, michael & wildman, nathan. grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination. synthese 195 (8):3723-3733. 2018. pp.4-5 11 brown, curtis. “narrow mental content”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy edward n. zalta (ed.), 2016. 12 clark, michael & wildman, nathan. grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination. synthese 195 (8):3723-3733. 2018. pp.9 13 clark, michael & wildman, nathan. grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination. synthese 195 (8):3723-3733. 2018. pp 9-10 14 crane, tim. “all the difference in the world,” philosophical quarterly, 41: 1–25. 1991. pp.1-2 80 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 references bach, kent. “content: wide and narrow,” routledge encyclopedia of philosophy (version 1.0), london: routledge.1998. brown, curtis. “narrow mental content”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy edward n. zalta (ed.), 2016. burge, tyler. “individualism and the mental”, midwest studies in philosophy, 4: 73–121. 1979. burge, tyler. “individualism and psychology”, the philosophical review, 95(1): 3–45. 1986. clark, michael and liggins, david. recent work on grounding. analysis, 72(4), 812–823. 2012. clark, michael & wildman, nathan. grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination. synthese 195 (8):3723-3733. 2018. correia, fabric. & schnieder, benjamin. (eds.) metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. cambridge university press. 2012. crane, tim. “all the difference in the world,” philosophical quarterly, 41: 1–25. 1991. crane, tim. & mellor, hugh. ‘there is no question of physicalism’, mind, 99, pp. 185-206. 1990. dasgupta, shamik. the possibility of physicalism. journal of philosophy, 111, 557–592. 2014. fine, kit. xiv—ontological dependence. proceedings of the aristotelian society 95 (1):269-290. 1995 fine, kit. the question of realism. philosophers imprint, 1(2), 1–30. 2001. fine, kit. guide to ground. in fabrice correia & benjamin schnieder (eds.), metaphysical grounding. cambridge university press. pp. 37—80. 2012. pornthep chawla 81 fodor, jerry. psychosemantics: the problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind, cambridge, mass.: mit press. 1987. kim, jaegwon. mind in a physical world: an essay on the mind-body mental causation. cambridge, ma: mit press. 1998a. kim, jaegwon. physicalism, or something near enough. princeton: princeton university press. 2005. kroedel, thomas. and schulz, moritz. grounding mental causation. synthese 193 (6):1909-1923. 2016. list, christian. & menzies, peter. nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle. journal of philosophy 106 (9):475-502. 2009. pappas, george. “internalist vs. externalist conceptions of epistemic justification”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2017 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.). 2017. putnam, hilary. philosophy and our mental life. in h. putnam (ed.), philosophical papers (pp. 291-303). cambridge: cambridge university press. 1975. ricki bliss & kelly trogdon, metaphysical grounding. stanford encyclopedia of philosophy,2008 rowlands, mark., lau, joe. and deutsch, max. “externalism about the mind”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (winter 2020 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), 2020. schaffer, jonathan. contrastive causation. philosophical review, 114, 327–358. 2005. schaffer, jonathan. “on what grounds what.” in metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology, ed. d. j. chalmers, d. manley and r. wasserman. oxford: oxford university press. 2009. schaffer, jonathan. grounding, transitivity and contrastivity. edited by correia & schnieder, 2012, 122–138. cambridge university press. 2012. 82 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 schaffer, jonathan. what not to multiply without necessity, australasian journal of philosophy, 93:4, 644-664. 2015. schaffer, jonathan. the ground between the gaps. philosophers’ imprint 17. 2017. stenwall, robin. a grounding physicalist solution to the causal exclusion. synthese 2020. tahko, tuomas. and lowe, edward j. “ontological dependence”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2020 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.). 2020. 11(180-184)_note for authors contemporary media society in the age of hyperreality marc oliver d. pasco ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract this paper will examine jean baudrillard’s reflections regarding the contemporary relation of the public with a society that has been seemingly dominated by the hyperrealized function of the media. for baudrillard, contemporary society’s engagement with truth as it relates to the everyday issues of life is structured, and to a certain extent, manipulated by the hyperrealized media. the masses, however, baudrillard observes, are far from being simply exploited and controlled by media and may have in fact “adapted” to the systemic indifference of the hyperreal. consumer society and the contemporary social order “no more altercations; nothing at stake. it is the parting of the dead sea.” -jean baudrillard in “the perfect crime” indeed, this provocative yet prophetic proclamation of one of the most renowned postmodern critical theorists especially in media culture circles, may very well be the picture that could portray our world todaya world devoid of meaning and robbed of hope. a world where as he says, “the stars flicker out.”1 a society in stupor-“vacant, withdrawn, lacking meaning in our own eyes.”2 a society of indifference pressing forward aimlessly, like a new york city jogger, “oblivious to his surroundings, running purposelessly straight ahead, dangerous when dis50 prajñâ vihâra, volume 9, number 1, january-june, 2008, 50-70 © 2000 by assumption university press turbed.”3 a kind of society that just lets anything come along and dialogue about foundations simply disappears into that that dismissive etc….4 these are things worthy of reflection; for signs of such a tragedy are as ubiquitous as the kind of deceivingly weighty headlines we have in our newspapers today. this paper aims to expound on jean baudrillard’s thoughts regarding the contemporary relation of the public or the so-called masses with a society that has been seemingly dominated by the hyperrealized function of the media. in order to lay out a historical background for the subject of this essay, it will be quite helpful to illustrate the socio-historical events that prompted the radical overtones of baudrillard’s thought. fredric jameson, in an essay entitled “postmodernism and consumer society” gave a quite thorough description of the kind of society we live in today. he writes: as i have suggested, non-marxists and marxists alike have come around to the general feeling that at some point following wwii a new kind of society began to emerge (variously described as postindustrial society, multinational capitalism, consumer society, media society and so forth). new types of consumption; planned obsolescence; an ever more rapid rhythm of fashion and styling changes; the penetration of advertising, television and the media generally to a hitherto unparalleled degree throughout society; the replacement of the old tension between city and country, center and province, by the suburb and universal standardization; the growth of the great networks of superhighways and the arrival of automobile culture-these are some of the features which would seem to mark a radical break with that older prewar society….5 the rise of the free market economies in advanced capitalist societies around the world during the early 1960’s centered on questions of consumption. the so-called “smokestack” economies of the industrial era began to give way to an entirely new wave of consumer-based production line, which catered not simply to the masses as such, but to individuals. flexible marketing strategies allowed for the increased customization of products to closely targeted population segments. niche marketing became the locus of economic activities. all of these economic and marketing structures were designed to make the consumer feel a heightened sense of freedom and individuality in terms of having the ability to continually re-invent herself according to the various lifestyle catalogues and prodmarc oliver d. pasco 51 uct brands available in the market and advertised in newspapers, magazines, radio and television. the de-massifying of media that tried to reach different niches with their own images was shattering consensus from mass standardized culture.6 governments pursued privatization policies on the promise that they would increase consumer choice. as graham murdock narrates, “marketing men set about mapping style communities based on shared tastes, and academics, reading these signs of the times, declared the arrival of the postmodern age where the appearance eclipsed substance and what you saw was all you got.”7 it was no longer a question of a product’s reliability or price, but one of image. identity was equated with what one wore, where one ate, where one lived and what car one drove. ironically, the market was driven by the demand to create more commodified lifestyles to add in their marketing portfolios and productrelated activities to sell their brands in the masses’ clamor for individualization and personalization. the popular cigarette brand marlboro, for instance, signified the essence of the typical contemporary working-class male, and at the same time, became coupled with the widely consumed beer product, budweiser, both of which became symbols of the all-american male worker and the kind of places (mostly bars and clubs) he hung out in after a long day at work, thus also connoting the ambiance of the essence of relaxation. all products were always associated with other products to create an ensemble of lifestyle options for the consumer. these lifestyle options began to define the general ideologies for middle-class societies. in connection with this, as liberal democracy became the global model for political systems and the market began to dictate the pace of society, the ideology of consumerism and advertising, together with new forms of media technologies soon held an even greater power over citizens than the nation-state itself. trans-national corporations replaced the nation-state as arbitrators of production in a new era of global production that erases previous boundaries of space and time.8 local products gained international status with the development of television and its international syndication. advertisements for western commodities traveled from an advertising agency in manhattan to bangkok in just a matter of days from its conception. soon thereafter, everybody is suddenly smoking marlboro’s and acting like cowboys in small fishing villages in the pacific. jean 52 prajñâ vihâra baudrillard amplifies this point as such: modern man spends less and less life in production, and more and more in the continuous production and creation of personal needs and of personal well-being. he must constantly be ready to actualize all of his potential, all of his capacity for consumption. if he forgets, he will be gently and instantly reminded that he has no right to be happy. he is therefore not passive: he is engaged, and must be engaged, in continuous activity. otherwise, he runs the risk of being satisfied with what he has and of becoming asocial.9 consumer culture carries with it a system of ideological values and a system of communication that surgically carves a nest in the consumer’s mind concerning guidelines for a “productive and well-lived life.” this so-called “life” that this kind of culture fosters is usually identifiable with a certain product line or brand that a certain celebrity endorses. in the media and consumer societies that emerged after the second world war, identity has been increasingly linked to style, to producing an image, to how one looks. (mc, 232-233) in short, everybody began to act trying to be like the people they saw on television and movies. the self-constituting subject of modernity was gradually leveled down and dissolved by the rationalized, bureaucratized and systematized ideology of postmodern consumer society. people attain status and prestige according to the products they consume. in this accelerating proliferation of images, signs and norms, the self, as modernity knew it, is being shattered and reconfigured according to the rhythm of objects. it is indeed the triumph of the image that marks the break between the industrial and post-industrial age. we are no longer consuming products; we are assuming an identity. we are no longer buying soaps, cars, clothes; we are consuming a lifestyle. appearance, in the end, takes precedence over substance. baudrillard, in an early work tells us that, “consumption is the virtual totality of all objects and messages presently constituted in more or less coherent discourses. consumption, insofar as it is meaningful, is a systematic act of the manipulation of signs.” (the system of objects in sw, 25) we are governed and absorbed by the perpetual play of significations proliferated in media. in all this, there springs a sort of stupefied acquiescence on the part of the consumer to the rhythm of the marc oliver d. pasco 53 ideology of consumption by the very magnitude and density of the information and commodities made available for her through media. as herbert marcuse writes: the so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form. the need for possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and imposed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one’s own destruction, has become a ‘biological’ need…. globalization, for its part, has engendered the forthright flow of commodities, capital, technology, ideas, forms of culture and people across national boundaries via a global networked society. the free movement of goods and services across trans-national borders facilitated by the internet infrastructure has promptly set the stage for a fundamental transformation of the world from one that had its basic unit in the nation-state into what marshall mcluhan called a “global village”. (the masses: the implosion of the social in the media in sw, 210) the new electronic tribalism that mcluhan advocates has, as its core, the supposition of an optimistic outlook on the new forms of technology that inaugurate a generalized planetary communication system, which makes possible mass participation in global economic, political and cultural matters. great physical distances are traversed with a phone call or a click of a mouse via the internet. the free market, with its infrastructure in place would then ideally be able to forge multilateral market-economic treaties and agreements between different countries from different geographic locations with little difficulty. for instance, the united states has been able to establish syndication and distribution agreements for its tv shows and movies globally with little resistance. the promise of wider horizons and embraced plurality in this global village is enough motivation for any society to welcome free market ideologies and capitalist principles to its shore. it is no longer so much the kinds of products and information that the infrastructure of media technology can provide the consumer, as much as it restructures the way societies relate with one another. the increasing commodification of all aspects of life; be it aes54 prajñâ vihâra thetic, cultural or political may indeed have helped a great lot in giving people what they want, but at the same time, brings with it a halo of suspicion especially among critical theorists in terms of the ideology it promotes. the cultural logic of capitalism in the so-called “network society”, grounded in new communications and information technology may indeed mark the triumph of capitalism and its market economy, but as with any other system or ideology, with it comes the danger of hegemony and opportunism. worldwide audiences, through transnational syndication have been ideologically indoctrinated by western influence.11 the ideologies that are transmitted from advanced capitalist societies such as the united states can be interpreted as a subtle and cunning form of cultural hegemony, which comes in the form of cultural homogenization or americanization. according to edward said, “cultural imperialism is the theory, practice and the attitudes of the ruling metropolitan center ruling a distant territory.” (tm, 94) the media are often linked to the accumulation of strategies on the part of capital-hegemonic attempts by powerful social groups aiming to legitimize certain world-views over others. the various products, advertisements, lifestyles, movies, tv shows and even news distributed by media corporate conglomerates from a powerful center that has virtually expanded its territory through media technology, transnational partnerships and capital, may indeed leave no room for alternative lifestyle possibilities from marginalized societies. these voices from the margins themselves are challenged to keep up with the changing times and are slowly exchanging their malongs for a pair of levis jeans. indeed, there is a lurking danger with this phenomenon of capitalist excrescence and network expansion. the global media can therefore be seen as a function of the dramatic evolution and reorganization of modern societies patterned around the production and consumption of commodities into the postmodern the social order, which is now organized around the play and exchange of images and signs. certainly, it is beginning to become harder and harder for us to secure a substantial perspective to regain a sense of coherence and stability in our lives amidst the deafening and overwhelming spectacles and commodities peddled by the formidable tandem of capital and technology. the “increased volume of information possible, imploded established conditions between private and public, the rapidly emerging inmarc oliver d. pasco 55 formation highways, the multiplication of tv channels, increasing power of communication conglomerates and the development of new media technologies are all driven by the instrumental logics of science and profit.” (tm, 158-159) we are in the age of technocapitalism wherein the novelty and immediate availability of new technology, coupled with potent marketing strategies incessantly inundates society not only with new gadgets and products and means of communication, but more importantly, with an overwhelming barrage of signs and images; all offered under the guise of progress. thus, we ask, “what has the post-industrial age made of man and his society?” “is this a simple case of cultural imperialism?” “is this a kind of destiny that the age of modernity logically leads to?” “or is it more of an unforeseen challenge that has befallen postmodern man?” it is at this point where i think, we may find baudrillard’s insights exceptionally valuable. the era of obscenity the ipod, youtube, mindless sitcoms and reality tv, flash newsreports, live data streaming-these are just some of the articles of contemporary society. instead of receiving long, coherent, and related strings of ideas, organized and synthesized for us, we are increasingly exposed to short, modular blips of information-ads, commands, theories, shreds of news that resist classification and organization. the 90-second news clips intercut with 30-second commercials have become both the formal and essential unit of knowledge that we have of our society. the potentially infinite play of signs and information tidbits in the form of trivia provides postmodern man with an illusory sense of freedom and feeds his senses with a continuous supply of stimuli for entertainment. in this vertigo of opaque and rhythmic serial signs, things have found a way to elude the dialectic of meaning through infinite proliferation. what we have is the virtual prostitution of images and signifiers without any reference. “the narcotized and mesmerized media-saturated consciousness is in such a state of fascination with image and spectacle that the concept of meaning itself (which depends on stable boundaries, fixed structures, shared consensus) dissolves.”12 56 prajñâ vihâra the postmodern condition, as jean baudrillard sees it, marks the age of the “dissolution of the subject”13; not simply due to her conscious withdrawal into the private; a capitulation from a society where she finds no refuge-but is essentially brought about by the relentless and overwhelming proliferation of the hyperreal14. baudrillard’s postmodern society, as kellner notes is: one of hyperreality in which entertainment, information and communication technologies provide experiences more intense and involving than the scenes of banal everyday life. the realm of the hyperreal (media simulations of reality, disneyland and amusement parks, malls and consumer fantasylands, tv sports) is more real than the real, whereby the models, images and codes of the hyperreal come to control thought and behavior. (cr, 8) the subject as such, has become fully absorbed by a kind of reality, which is “more real than the real.” the real no longer needs to be counterfeited, since they are going to be produced all at once on a gigantic scale. “hyperreality is the volatilization of the real by its endless reproduction, stimulation and simulation that produces the self-referential system of signs between each other without any signified reality (since the dominance of the play of signs has made reality nothing but a nostalgic phenomenon).” (symbolic exchange and death in sw, 150) baudrillard adds, “the problem of their uniqueness, or their origin, is no longer a matter of concern.”15 the serial repetition and reproduction of objects-a proliferation of signs, images and spectacles according to demand. a world colonized by a staggering play of lights and shadows without a director or a script. a society which is no longer that of the spectacle, but a society of obscenity, where spectator and scene are undifferentiated from each other and the smooth, digital operation of hyperreality conditions the everyday operations in the lifeworld. the staggering density of objects and images in their perpetual proliferation and expansion, to the superlative exhibits a careening of growth and excrescence of society, which hypertrophically expands and continuously excretes more goods, services, information, messages, demands, surpassing all rational ends and boundaries in a spiral of uncontrolled growth and replication. (cr, 15) the endless barrage of images and sound bytes proliferated by these media has driven the postmodern subject, as well as marc oliver d. pasco 57 society itself into an impasse of non-causality and incoherence, where the rapid rhythm of the show and its props leaves both actors and spectators alike in a vortex of perpetual unrest where temporality and causality break down. interestingly characterized as a schizophrenic, baudrillard describes the postmodern man as such: no more hysteria, no more projective paranoia, properly speaking, but this state of terror proper to the schizophrenic: too great a proximity of everything, the unclean promiscuity of everything which touches, invests and penetrates without resistance, with no halo of private protection, not even his own body to protect him anymore.16 the schizophrenic is vulnerable to attack from all sides. her vulnerability however, does not merely come from an innate defect or weakness or a dementia, but from the overwhelming capacity of the hyperreal to launch its attack from all possible entry points; be it a shopping window in a shopping mall, a brother’s new pair of jeans, a website, a giant billboard, an internet pop-up, a newsflash, a text message; all prowling at the gates as it were, covering all peripheries in their conspicuous visibility. reality is being replaced by something more real than reality itself. the intensification of human experience in the virtual realm relegates reality into mere nostalgia. “every characteristic thus elevated to the superlative power, caught in an intensifying spiral-more true than the true, more beautiful than the beautiful, more real than the real-one is assured a vertiginous effect that is independent of all content or specific quality, and which presently has tendency of being our only passion. the passion of intensification, of escalation, of ecstasy…” (fatal strategies in sw, 189) slowmotion replays, computer graphics, virtual reality, extreme sports, spas, paparazzi, audience-oriented tv shows, celebrity scandals, this mysterious indulgence and fascination with larger than life spectacles and experience are but a few signs of contemporary society. such that in a rather compelling metaphor, baudrillard would say, “the day there is a real war you will not even be able to tell the difference.” (the gulf war did not take place in sw, 253) the masses clamor for spectacle and no longer for meaning-an adrenaline rush. the experience of intellectual and emotional stimulation 58 prajñâ vihâra for its own sake, or even that aimless window-shopping in crowded shopping malls, the tourism industry, internet chatting, our enthrallment with hollywood, our craving for juicy political scandals, or even our unquenchable soap opera frenzy may not be as innocuous as they seem. these leisure activities have developed into cottage industries for the very reason that people are more and more developing a pathological, almost stupefied need for them. and as this happens, these activities become institutionalized and consequently become the locus of hyperreality. people begin to demand for their daily doses while the industry is more than willing to give them even more than they could handle. these activities which we have grown fond of may very well be symptomatic of an epidemic of schizophrenia that has blown in our midst. we may have very well fallen prey to the ecstasy of hyperreality. baudrillard explains: it is the excess of reality that makes us stop believing in it. the saturation of the world, the technical saturation of life, the excess of possibilities, of actualization of needs and desires. how are we to believe in reality once its production has become automatic? the real is suffocated by its own accumulation. there is no way for the dream to be an expression of a desire since its virtual accomplishment is already present.17 the schizophrenic person is no longer a victim of her hallucinations, of deceit nor of counterfeit; she now experiences reality in its sublimation, in its transparent and superlative configuration. she collapses in vertiginuous unrest as the inertial thrust of hyperreality takes over the functions of her everyday existence. “it is no longer of imitation, nor of parody, but a matter of substituting signs of the real for the real itself.” (simulacra and simulations in sw, 170) the continuous simulation of reality by capital and new media technologies has breached the dividing line that separated the real from the virtual and has taken ground on the very soil from which reality once stood. he aptly explains this point as such, “what i mean is this: what was projected psychologically and mentally, what used to be lived out on earth as metaphor, as mental or metaphorical scene, is henceforth projected into reality, without any metaphor at all, into an absolute space which is also that of simulation.” (ec, 128) hyperreality has created an entirely new dimension where the formerly marc oliver d. pasco 59 mundane activities in the life-world become short-circuited, reconfigured and translated in its more euphoric versions. postmodern man himself may have indeed unconsciously or consciously consented to the rule of the hyperreal. “info-tainment” becomes an end in itself and creates its own reality, more real than reality itself. media technology has “already broken down reality into simple elements that it has reassembled into scenarios of regular oppositions, exactly in the same way that the photographer imposes his contrasts, lights, angles on his subject.” (simulations, 420) reality is being reconfigured not only by its unconstrained reproduction, but is produced according to the scenarios and playhouses of hyperreality. at first glance, this may sound nothing more than a fantastic excursion of thought-a hallucination itself. this may possibly be just a case of radical technophobia on baudrillard’s part. however, if one thinks about it, it may very well be that it is by virtue of the smooth and subtle operation of the hyperreal itself that precisely allows baudrillard’s theory to be easily dismissed as an exaggeration. the hyperreal presents itself as a harmless and even as a proud sign of a society’s technological and communicative progress. the new means of communication along with the icons it has created are insignias of a society that cultivates freedom and embraces progress. we ask the question-is there anything wrong or worthy of concern with this situation? this question is now more than ever, the question we have to ask ourselves. the vibrant billboards, “well-balanced” 30minute newscasts, unlimited text messaging, on-line encyclopedias, soap operas, virtual video games, the density of information as suchis there any cause for alarm? he describes this enigmatically precarious situation as such: [t]he entire universe comes to unfold arbitrarily on your domestic screen (all the useless information that comes to you from the entire world, like a microscopic pornography of the universe, useless, excessive, just like the sexual close-up in a porno film)… today there is a whole pornography of information and communication, that is to say, of circuits and networks, a pornography of all functions and objects in their readability, their fluidity, their availability, their regulation, in their forced signification, in their performativity, in their branching, in their polyvalence….(ec, 130-131) 60 prajñâ vihâra for baudrillard, what we have today is a “whole pornography of information and communication.” (ec, 130) pornography in the sense of the infinite proliferation of signs and images in their availability and polyvalence. for baudrillard, “visible things do not terminate in obscurity and in silence; they vanish into what is more visible than the visible: obscenity.” (fatal strategies in sw, 191) for him, the chronic creation of pseudoneeds and the continuous reproduction of self-referential signs and images by the cultural and economic mechanisms of leisure and consumption, services and entertainment have situated the postmodern subject in an era of obscenity. from the reporting of the sex lives of politicians, to the tragic consequences of war and famine, information as such, is promiscuously prostituted, “where the most intimate processes of our life become the virtual feeding ground of the media.” (ec, 130) “obscenity begins precisely when there is no more spectacle, no more scene, when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of information and communication. (ec, 130) there is no space for retreat. media incessantly peddles eye-candies and solicits responses from its audience from the time they wake up to the time they fall asleep watching television. we cannot help ourselves from getting involved and excited with all the spectacular events that the media has in store for us. in short, we have been assimilated by the logic of the hyperreal; such that now more than ever, tv shows, commercials and the internet cater to ordinary men on the street and make money out of the “candid and the unrehearsed.” real life is not only getting colonized, but is actually auditioning and getting casted in every show. as alvin toffler succinctly puts it, “an information bomb is exploding in our midst, showering us with a shrapnel of images and drastically changing the way each of us perceives and acts…”18 baudrillard paints a picture of a society where implosions in the differences between the private and the public, of art and commodity, of good and evil, truth and falsehood has left us with a society that has lost its foundations. baudrillard’s world is one of “dramatic implosion, in which classes, genders, political differences, and once autonomous realms of society and culture imploded into each other, erasing boundaries and differences in a postmodern kaleidoscope.” (mc, 297) everybody gets marc oliver d. pasco 61 their 15 minutes of fame. any event, no matter how ludicrous and inconsequential as it seems, gets airtime. media shows and societies themselves have become orgiastic extravaganzas. he writes: video, interactive screens, multimedia, the internet, virtual reality-we are threatened on all sides by interactivity. what was separated in the past is now everywhere merged; distance is abolished in all things: between the sexes, between opposite poles, between stage and auditorium, between the protagonists of action, between subject and object, between the real and its double. and this confusion of terms, this collision of poles means that nowhere-in art, morality and politics-is there now any possibility of a moral judgment. with the abolition of distance-of the ‘pathos’of distanceeverything becomes undecidable.19 does anything surprise us anymore? live video feeds of war hostages getting decapitated, politicians suddenly switching parties, “breaking news” that showcase people buried alive in mudslides have literally desensitized us and created a culture that has indeed, seen it all__where everything, in their absolute proximity and infinite reproduction has totally eradicated the possibility of gaining any “real” perspective on anything, be it politics, culture or economics. the sensational has indeed become ordinary. he adds, “today, every event is virtually without consequences, it is open to all possible interpretations, none of which can fix meaning: the equipropbability of every cause and every consequence.” (fatal strategies in sw, 196) here, the question of relativism immediately comes to mind. however, if we come to think of it, this may indeed be the case, especially in the philippines. debates concerning the zte corruption scandal probe for example, are never in the end, entirely blamed on any party. an inhumane act of a terrorist group for instance may headline the news on monday, but surely, tomorrow, after pompous political analysts have finished conjuring their own analyses and making them sound scientific, everybody begins to point their fingers on the government, and people begin to suspect that the government itself staged the whole thing. until in the end, after all speculations got their airtime and newspapers made their profits, a juicier scandal comes along and as the old saying goes, “everything else becomes yesterday’s news.” it is always a question of entertaining one’s fancy and exploring various possibilities; a route, which tragi62 prajñâ vihâra cally never arrives at any veritable conclusion and never solves anythingbut at least it sold newspapers and kept the public “informed”. the thin line between real and fake, staged and unrehearsed, show and reality has been expunged by the subtle operations of the hyperreal. in the end, what we have are nothing but speculations__speculations that made reality more exciting and more engaging. “a game of the undecidable; a game of chance; a game of undecidability of the political scene, of the equifinality of all tendencies.” (the masses: the implosion of the social in the media in sw, 215) media bytes, info-bits, dramatic photographs, and marvelous storytelling that make one feel as if the headlines took place in one's backyard flood the minds of stupefied spectators and consumers. in the end, we have to ask, “are the people actually getting informed and do the contemporary forms of communication, as they would claim, really promote the pursuit for truth and solidarity?” the strategy of the masses and the hyperreal “real society is losing interest in the political class, while nonetheless availing itself of the spectacle.” (so, 80) -jean baudrillard in screened out if we are to apply baudrillard’s ideas with the kind of media that we have today, the so-called contemporary locus of the public sphere, it is quite intriguing to see how “news” itself is virtually prostituted and hyperrealized just as how one would sell any commodity. this process in turn undermines its primordial function as the vehicle for free speech. the media was essentially established to encourage participatory democracy where issues concerning the society are made available for everyone. however, as we know, ownership of the members of society’s upper crust naturally results in publicity for even the most trivial affairs of the rich and the viewpoints, which appear in print and television, are often controlled by a few powerful interests. such that the media, as the arena where reason and coherence would ideally find its base is actually conditioned and manipulated by a few. since only sensationalized news sells, the people are often exposed to information and opinions that undermine the basic principle of news itself. spaces that are ideally allotted for pressmarc oliver d. pasco 63 ing matters of public concern are usually occupied by a disproportionate amount of advertisements and sensationalized news. the ideal is indeed a far cry from what is actually happening. larger than life scandals and spectacles that are open to all points of interpretation are the news’ bread and butter. all arguments are (in)validated by speculation and opinion cloaked by the benevolent quest for truth, justice and other ideals. all we have are opinions that ride the airwaves and knock on every person’s front porch as anonymous insignias of an “eventful and exciting society” until everything becomes a possibility and the truth is shelved for the sake of expediency and democracy withers into idle talk and gossip. baudrillard amplifies this point: is any given bombing in italy the work of leftist extremists; or of extreme right-wing provocation; or staged by centrists to bring every terrorist extreme into dispute and to shore up its own failing power; or again, is it a police-inspired scenario in order to appeal to calls for public security? all this is equally true, and the search for proof__indeed the objectivity of the fact__does not check this vertigo of interpretation. we are in a logic of simulation which has nothing to do with a logic of facts and an order of reasons. (simulacra and simulations in sw, 178) in the end, it is the show that matters. it is a matter of gaining profit and marketing eye-candies. this media-driven society, in all its various forms claim to inform the public with relevant issues and consequently reinforce our democratic institutions. however, if we flip the coin for a moment, baudrillard shows us, not simply in a crude and cynical way, the possibility of the media being the very obstacle for the values it claims to uphold, that of truth, democracy and free speech. maybe, the media does not even aspire to know the truth, much less report it. maybe, it is content with stirring people’s emotions and keeping them at the edge of their seats, so to speak, incited and excited, waiting for the next scandal to unfold. maybe it tells stories that were written without an ending, yet purposely designed with chapters loaded with exciting and escalating twist and turns, imbued with larger than life characters and magnificent settings that serve no other purpose than to dazzle and overwhelm, with the next chapter more exciting than the previous, making yesterdays news seem a decade 64 prajñâ vihâra old; as it is with the fashion industry. maybe, as fredric jameson thinks, “the very function of the news media is to relegate such historical experiences as rapidly as possible into the past…they are the agents and mechanisms of historical amnesia.”20 maybe, there is no truth in the media. perhaps, there is no longer a demand for such a thing. caught up in the universe of simulations, “the masses, the silent majorities are bathed in a media massage without messages or meaning.” (cr, 10) the narcotics of hyperreality may in fact have lodged completely in our consciousness and have desensitized us from everything. we may indeed be living in a society devoid of meaning, a universe where theories float in a void, unanchored in any secured harbor. (cr, 11) the obscenity of information and the transparency of reality may have indeed amassed enough inertia to run down any form of resistance. the people may indeed no longer be interested in knowing the truth. they may very well be becoming extensions of the logistical system of the hyperreal. baudrillard sees a model of the media as a black hole of signs and information, which absorbs all contents into noise, which no longer communicates meaningful messages where substance and truth implode into form. the medium and the message implode in such a way that it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between media representations and the reality they supposedly represent. the real catastrophe of television and the internet for instance, has been how deeply they have failed to live up to the promise of providing information, its supposed modern function. we dreamed of the media as giving us freedom, new public space. (so, 189-190) instead we get nothing but a noisy and congested complex of expressways that lead nowhere. as baudrillard poignantly notes: the information superhighways will have the same effect as our present superhighways or motorways. they will cancel out the landscape, lay waste to the territory and abolish real distances. what is merely geographical and physical in the case of our motorways will assume its full dimensions in the electronic field with the abolition of mental distances and the absolute shrinkage of time. (so, 58) in the ecstasy of communication everything becomes transparent, time becomes an illusion and there are no more secrets, scenes, privacy, depth or hidden meaning. instead, a promiscuity of information and commarc oliver d. pasco 65 munication unfolds in which the media circulate and disseminate a teeming network of seductive and fascinating sights and sounds to be played on one’s own screen and terminal. baudrillard gives an interesting theory concerning the relationship between the masses and media. refining his previous position that media engenders a culture of passive absorption by the recipient, he now presents his position as such, “i would no longer see it as a sign of passivity and alienation, but to the contrary, as an original strategy.” (the masses, the implosion of the social in the media in sw, 211) the masses may have indeed developed a kind of stupefied tolerance for the condition and content of the media these days. as we have mentioned earlier, we may have indeed seen it all and our remaining interest in any quest for ideals could have dissipated in the vociferous corridors of our spectacular society. we may actually be witnessing the collapse of the real to hyperreality. humanity may have indeed (d)evolved into a society of disjointed and indifferent media junkies that are challenged to survive in a world of infotainment for no higher purpose. perhaps, there is no point in willing anything or becoming concerned about something anyway because nothing can be accomplished. baudrillard however, as i have noted, sees this phenomenon from an interesting angle. he states: the present argument of the system is to maximize speech. to maximize the production of meaning, of participation, and so, the strategic resistance is that of refusal of meaning and speech or the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is another form of refusal by over-acceptance. (the masses: the implosion of the social in the media in sw, 222) for baudrillard, it is not a simple case of indifference on the part of the masses, which can be seen as an original reaction towards the noisy and image-saturated media. they are willing to enter the game, but in their own terms. the masses themselves, as baudrillard sees them may actually play the game to gain control of the show, take the directors chair and revise the script anytime they wish. he adds: the masses, which have always provided an alibi for political representation, take their revenge by allowing themselves the theatrical representation of the political scene. the people have become public. they even 66 prajñâ vihâra allow themselves the luxury of enjoying the fluctuations of their own opinion in the daily reading of the opinion polls. (the masses: the implosion of the social in the media in sw, 215) the masses have developed an “obsession” with themselves and the power that the media may have wittingly or unwittingly handed over to them such that the media becomes a mere function of the whims and opinions of people who may not really be sharing what they think. baudrillard gives an example of opinion polls wherein he observes a certain culture of continual voyeurism of the group in relation to itself. he detects a certain strain of connivance among the masses, which translate into the senseless charts and demographics and statistics. the masses in the end implode into the social and relinquish any trace of rational will, reality and sincerity in an opinion__just like children hogging the camera and making faces. they enjoy the fluctuations of the statistics and the effects it has on the social order. they may not actually care about issues. they may simply be enjoying the reaction and the anxiety of other sectors with their opinions. they may not actually care about the ending. they may simply be enjoying the show. it is no longer a question of producing an opinion, but of reproducing them__like how the gnp’s and gdp’s of economics serve as the imaginary mirrors of productive forces without regard to their social ends or lack thereof. (simulations, 421) do they really affect the vote? do they give an exact picture of reality? or are they just configurations of the indeterminate operations of hyperreality? this is how baudrillard thinks the people bypass the incessant solicitation and noise of the media, which tragically ends in the perversion of public opinion. again, this may indeed sound nothing more than a crude, contemptuous and cynical theory. and yet, do we not live in an era where speculation and cynical reason fuel the engines of society? i find nothing wrong in entertaining skeptical rhetoric so long as i see in it an impetus for change. maybe baudrillard has a point. perhaps there is no harm in lending an ear to his orations. although it is a much grim and frightening notion, it is nonetheless one worthy of thought and reflection. and it is at this juncture that we ask, “are the new media technologies responsible for undermining a sense of community by robbing the masses of participatory marc oliver d. pasco 67 public spaces through the proliferation of the hyperreality; or are they the sites where more diversified relations of solidarity can be made?” jean baudrillard took us for an odyssey into a dream world. a dream as real as life itself. may we have the resolve and capacity to wake up and face reality as it slowly dissipates before our eyes. endnotes 1jean baudrillard, revenge of the crystal, ed. paul foss and julian pefanis (sydney: plato press, 1990), 186. 2jean baudrillard, the perfect crime, trans. chris turner (london: verso publishing, 2002), 143. 3stuart sim, beyond aesthetics (great britatin: harvester wheatsheaf, 1992), 131. 4ibid., 133. 5fredric jameson, “postmodernism and consumer society” in the antiaesthetic: essays on postmodern culture, ed. hal foster (new york: bay press, 1998), 124-125. 6alvin toffler, the third wave (new york: bantam books, 1980), 158. 7michael scoumand and kim christian schroder, ed., media cultures: reappraising transnational media (new york: routledge, 1992), 17. 8douglas kellner, media culture (new york: routledge, 1995), 17-18. (henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as mc and affixed at the end of the quote) 9jean baudrillard, “consumer society,” in jean baudrillard: selected writings, ed. mark poster (stanford: stanford university press, 2001), 51. [henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as sw and affixed at the end of the quote with the specific title of the essay from which the quote was taken from, eg. (symbolic exchange and death in sw, 150)] 10marcuse, herbert, an essay on liberation (harmondsworth: pelican books, 1972), 20-21. 11nick stevenson, the transformation of the media: globalization, morality and ethics (new york: pearson, 1999), 100. (henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as tm and affixed at the end of the quote.) 12douglas kellner, ed., baudrillard: a critical reader (cambridge: blackwell, 1994), 9. (henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as cr and affixed at the end of the quote) 13hal foster, ed., the anti-aesthetic: essays on postmodern culture (new york: bay press, 1998), xi. 14baudrillard builds on the supposition that our age is the era of hyperreality. this term signifies a system of self-reproducing, self-referential signs with no trace68 prajñâ vihâra able origin much like walter benjamin’s idea concerning the dissolution of the aura of the work of art due to its endless reproduction (see walter benjamin’s “the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction” in continental aesthetics, ed. richard kearney and david rasmussen. massachusetts: blackwell publishing, 2001. 166-181.) 15jean baudrillard, “simulations”, in continental aesthetics, ed. richard kearney and david rasmussen (massachusets: blackwell publishing, 2001), 414. (henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as simulations and affixed at the end of the quote.) 16jean baudrillard, “the ecstasy of communication,” in the anti-aesthetic: essays on postmodern culture, ed. hal foster (new york: bay press, 1998), 132. (henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as ec and affixed at the end of the quote.) 17jean baudrillard. the intelligence of evil or the lucidity pact, trans. chris turner (new york: berg, 2004), 19. 18alvin toffler, the third wave (new york: bantam books, 1980), 156. 19jean baudrillard. screened out. trans. chris turner (london: verso publishing, 2002), 176. (henceforth, references to this work shall be abbreviated as so and affixed at the end of the quote.) 20fredric jameson, “postmodernism and consumer society” in the antiaesthetic: essays on postmodern culture, ed. hal foster (new york: bay press, 1998), 125. references baudrillard, jean. the intelligence of evil or the lucidity pact. translated by chris turner. new york: berg. 2004. __________. the perfect crime. translated by chris turner. london: verso publishing, 2002. __________. screened out. trans. chris turner. london: verso publishing, 2002. __________. “simulations” in continental aesthetics. ed. richard kearney and david rasmussen. massachusetts: blackwell publishing, 2001. __________. revenge of the crystal. ed. paul foss and julian pefanis. sydney: plato press, 1990. foster, hal, ed. the anti-aesthetic: essays on postmodern culture. new york: bay press, 1998. kellner, douglas, ed. baudrillard: a critical reader. cambridge: blackwell marc oliver d. pasco 69 publishing, 1994. __________. media culture. new york: routledge, 1995. marcuse, herbert. an essay on liberation. harmondsworth: pelican books. 1972. poster, mark, ed. jean baudrillard: selected writings. stanford: stanford university press, 2001. scoumand, michael and kim christian schroder, ed. media cultures: reappraising transnational media. new york: routledge, 1992. sim, stuart. beyond aesthetics. great britain: harvester whaetsheaf, 1992. stevenson, nick. the transformation of the media: globalization, morality and ethics. new york: pearson, 1999. toffler, alvin. the third wave. new york: bantam books. 1980. 70 prajñâ vihâra peter paul ejera elicor 59 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 59-78 © 2000 by assumption university press emmanuel levinàs and matthew lipman: towards a critique of the totalizing tendency in formal education peter paul ejera elicor ateneo de davao university, philippines abstract in this article, i argue that education should neither function simply as a social apparatus that “grooms” individuals for their future societal roles nor merely supply the need of the global labor market. rather, borrowing from levinàs’ ethics, education must ultimately respond to the call of justice that springs from the proper recognition of the alterity of the other, and the responsibility that goes along with it. i further argue that a totalizing tendency of formal education occurs on two-level interactions: a.) the basic interaction between all the participants in the education system, and b.) the interaction of the students with the school curricula. it is in this context that i introduce matthew lipman’s version of the community of inquiry, which, i propose, is one of the many effective pedagogical practices that respond to the call for an ethically driven formal education. 60 prajñā vihāra introduction in democracy and education, dewey outlines the inevitability of education in the preservation of the biological and social life of any group of people. he argues “the primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members in a social group determine the necessity of education”.1 the transmission of a particular social group’s beliefs, ideals, symbols, tradition and even language from one generation to the next is by all means necessary in preserving and securing the continuity of life, culture and identity. even the skills and methods in physical sustenance have to be acquired under the guidance and supervision of an elder, which in most cases, a role assumed by the parents. what this means is that even prior to the emergence of modern social institutions, relationships that are essentially pedagogical are primordial among members of social groups as they manifest in the most basic human encounters such as between parents and children, siblings and family relatives. in other words, pre-institutionalized human encounters carry with it an inevitable trait of education. however, it may be well to note that the educational merit of these encounters is incidental, that is, subsidiary to the primary aims of a social group which center on survival, adaptation and propagation. this means to say that insofar as human beings are inherently rational and social, the propensity to observe, adapt, generalize, apply and analyze using the usual modes of induction, deduction and trial-and-error are natural and expectable for the greater purpose of the social group. these and the many other forms of learning with and among the other members of a social group are basically referred to as modes of informal education. formal education, on the other hand, is the “deliberate educating of the young” which is analogous to the natural occurrence of learning by interacting and living with the other members of a society.2 as societies advance, it becomes increasingly difficult to teach the young simply through the direct transmission of knowledge and skills as would have sufficed in the pre-modern social group interactions. the necessity to peter paul ejera elicor 61 train individuals to specifically teach the young, the agencies devised to specifically organize the pedagogical process, and the materials that are indispensable in the modes of instruction become more systematized and organized. formal education, hence, is the institutionalized mode of a basic pedagogic encounter that initially stems from the inherent human propensity to learn and impart learning. the very structure of academic institutions is predicted on such propensity, which essentially involves “bringing up, training and rearing”. following this premise, learning for the purpose of both developing the self and the society is constitutive of formal education. this then would be the hallmark of all formal educative models so that anything that falls short of it renders the entire educational system futile and cut-off from the ideals of a society. in concrete terms, when students begin to undergo the process of formal education, it is implied that they seek to be “brought up” by qualified educators that follow a judiciously conceived curricula that do not only address certain societal economic needs, but ultimately, teach and preserve universal human values. it cannot be emphasized enough that the relationship between these two goals is decisive because their intersections are possible areas where a potential problem may ensue. the need to balance the economic necessities to address the current demands of a society (e.g. labor force) on one hand; and the preservation of universal human values (e.g. justice, freedom and truth) on the other, is a crucial tension which any academic institution is constantly challenged to be sensitive about. my position in this article is that education should neither function simply as a social apparatus that “grooms” individuals for their future societal roles nor to merely supply the need of the global labor market. rather, education must ultimately respond to the call of justice that springs from the proper recognition of the alterity of the other, and the responsibility that goes along with it. it does not always follow, therefore, that “education is present by default wherever modern institutionalization and organization of formal schooling occur, especially in today’s neoliberal 62 prajñā vihāra climate where schooling’s aim seems to be producing disciplined and docile economic bodies ready to be cogs in the world economy”.3 while it is true that in the usual state of modern societies, those who are formally “schooled” have the higher probability of getting secure jobs and promising compensation, being “schooled”, in this sense, however, does not necessarily mean being “educated”. this is to say that formal education does not necessarily lead to learning, while learning does not necessarily require formal education. it is in this context that i introduce matthew lipman’s version of the concept of community of inquiry, a term coined by charles sanders pierce. drawing from the ethics of levinas, i propose that one of the many ways by which the call to recognize alterity and the infinite responsibility to the other is best concretized and exercised within the context of a community that espouses collaborative inquiry and fosters critical, caring and creative thinking. this article is divided into three parts. the first part is a brief account of emmanuel levinas’ salient ethical points. the second part consists of an attempt to describe the totalizing tendency of formal education, which i argue, happens on two-level interactions: a.) the basic interaction between all the participants in the education system, and b.) the interaction of the students with the school curricula. the third part consists of a discussion on lipman’s community of inquiry which is a model to concretize the response to the call for an ethically driven formal education. this will be followed by a conclusion. the face of the other emmanuel levinàs’ (1906-1995) whole reflection begins in a concrete situation where “violence is the order of the day”.4 all forms and levels of violence, social, interpersonal and individual, have something to do with the encounter of the other. this other may be a group of people, a society, a neighbor, or even one’s own self. the other is seen as such due to its inherent nature as an entity separate from that of the subject. peter paul ejera elicor 63 in other words, it is naturally perceived as the other precisely because it is not the i, that is, it does not form part of what one considers the self. sean hand comments that levinàs rejects the husserlian conception of intentionality which “reduces wisdom to a notion of increasing self consciousness, in which anything that is non-identical is absorbed by the identical”.5 in a husserlian encounter, the structural form of inter subjectivity is symmetrical, which allows for the reduction of the other to the subjective understanding of the i. it could not be emphasized enough that the experience of the radical alterity or the otherness of the other takes place when “the other is not reduced to, not transformed to an object”.6 on the other hand, there is violence when alterity is disregarded, if not deliberately denied. violence takes place when what is not the i is subsumed to be part of the i, that is, when the non-self is reduced to the self. likewise, violence occurs when the other is subjectively interpreted on the basis of the self, and not on the basis of the radical otherness of the other. it may be well to note that violence, in this context, does not refer only to the cruel physical encounters with certain individuals or groups of people but also to the implicit refusal to recognize basic human differences. this is why the seemingly harmless attitude of indifference, for instance, is actually as violent as any act of terrorism. levinàs explains that “violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action”.7 in such case, the one which the violent action is intended to is perceived simply as a receiver of such act – almost like a numerical datum. it does not take into account the “person” who receives, because what only matters is its human capacity that is reduced to a mere target of violence. in other words, the other is reduced to an object, a faceless other stripped off of human autonomy and identity. it is in this context that the face finds its significance. the face arrests the attention of the subject and conveys a tacit message of its refusal to be enclosed. the face protests, so to speak, to the possibility of its containment in the perceiver’s subjective categories. accordingly, “it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed”.8 64 prajñā vihāra objects, on the other hand, does not present any face. it is for this reason that violence is easily inflicted upon objects, or better still, upon others whose faces are left unnoticed, if not totally denied. the occurrence of this objectification simultaneously intersects with the occasion of totalizing the other. the individuality of the other is lost. it is all summed up into an object of thought, and as a consequence, an object of violence. on the contrary, the presence of the face is precisely “the very possibility of understanding one another”.9 by understanding, it means taking the other as completely other which involves looking to and through the other without using any reductive subjective lens. it is through its face, that the other invokes an irreducible relation of responsibility. according to deroo, the “pure constituting subject is essentially opened to something outside itself: the subject is not only self-constituted but is also other constituted”.10 this movement of the i exiting itself (which is concretized in the act of responsibility) is naturally evoked in the epiphany of the face of the other. it entails a transcendental experience with the other which requires the self to remain external while being concerned with the other. this could not be emphasized more fully than levinàs’ exhortation that “the other becomes my neighbor precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question”.11 when beholding the face of the other, it is necessary to recognize the asymmetrical relationship that disrupts any attempt of the i to subsume. levinàs’ insists that one should always identify the unevenness of the plain between the self and the other. it is only through the recognition of such asymmetry that the alterity of the other is preserved. and interestingly, it is because of the alterity of the other that the i is moved to leave itself, so to reach out for the other as a wholly other. this goes to say that, the asymmetrical relation with the other is constitutive of the experience of inter-subjectivity. one would always fail to enter into an inter-subjective realm with another human being until both recognize the inherent differences that make them subjects in the first place. the very condition of the possibility of an authentic human encounter is precisely peter paul ejera elicor 65 the asymmetrical relation of the i and the other. and where does this transcendental relation naturally begin than through the utilization of language, that is, by means of communication and conversation? “the banal fact of conversation, in one sense, quits the order of violence”.12 this implies that to listen to another person is to allow them to be who they are, which necessarily includes recognizing their uniqueness and exteriority, and not to fall prey into subsuming the other under one’s subjective paradigm. in the next section, i will discuss the two levels of interactions in formal education where totalizing tendencies may occur. these levels of encounters are potential areas where there is a refusal to recognize the alterity of the other and the denial of the face. the totalizing tendency of formal education whether informal or formal, education is essentially a form of encounter. insofar as it constitutes human individuals as participants or “stakeholders” in the whole process, education essentially involves various human encounters. these encounters are non-homologous. they are multi-layered human concurrences that are oftentimes conditioned by the individuals’ roles emanating from aggregate societal arrangements. one may be quick to imagine a classroom setup when thinking of education, but such scenario is but a fraction of the entire educational enterprise. this is because education, formal education at that, is an institution. as such, it involves a huge network of human collective that functions to orchestrate a self-sustaining system that aims at certain immediate and long-term goals. the immediate goals may vary from one academic institution to another, but ultimately they share a common formative agenda which is operative throughout the entire process. these agenda are normally carried out through classroom instruction, research, evaluations, immersion/exposure, trainings and the like. these processes follow certain curricula that aid learners to gradually develop their potentials to concrete actualities. 66 prajñā vihāra insofar as there are no perfect human pedagogical encounters, it is also impossible to think of a perfect educational institution. the possibility of totalizing, that is, reducing the other as an object, always lurks within the walls of any academic setting. there are two levels of interaction in which a totalizing tendency in a formal education normally takes place. one is on the basic social interaction between all the participants in the education system, while the second level takes place in the interaction of the students with the school curricula. the first totalizing tendency of formal education, which is rather obvious, is located within the intersections of the roles and functions of every individual in the system – the stakeholders. it goes without saying that each participant in the entire educational process plays a vital role that is essential, in varying degrees, to the proper functioning of the whole system. just as a pair of nut and bolt has the capacity to spell the overall performance of a machine, so as the individual whose role is deemed the least important in school can actually affect the entire process of the educational structure. these roles carry with them certain social functions that are aligned with the vision and mission of the institution. as an institutional body, a school seeks to respond to a certain societal need. hence, the said functions are justified – and compensated – on such bases. human encounters necessarily pass through these social functions. these encounters, therefore, are mediated by socially determined roles. the problem, however, arises when individuals get “trapped”, so to speak, within their social function, conditioned by the social arrangements implicit in the school system. the logical result of these mediated encounters is the reduction of individuals to mere social actors; one among the many cogs that serve to contribute to the overall performance of the entire educational machine. consequently, students are reduced to mere statistics whose economic value outweighs their personal intrinsic worth. most often than not, they are trained to become “kids for the market” whose future role is to cater certain economic industries’ urgent needs and demands. this basically reflects the “exodus” of a multitude of citizens from the third world countries to fill in the labor peter paul ejera elicor 67 gap among the highly industrialized countries, leaving families behind in pursuit of a greener pasture. furthermore, administrators and the members of the faculty are sometimes defined by their abstracted roles, fashioning them as “hollowed” persons of authority. this is particularly true among the academic institutions that still uphold the traditional notion that the authority of teachers is infallible. on this note, gale observes that the teacher’s authority is no less than the “product of the ideology of the dominant class and that the teacher’s discourse is an embodiment of the dominant class’s ideology and its power”.13 it cannot be emphasized enough that most intellectual violence that happens inside the classroom stem from the imbalance of authority between teachers and students. traditionally, teachers are deemed as knowledge providers, transmitters of information and masters of certain skills whose authority was generally accepted as something beyond question. such pedagogical authority, nevertheless, serve to perpetuate a dominant class through its own dominant discourse thereby maintaining a social hierarchy that divides people according to social classes and categorizations. while a totalizing act is obviously present in the imposition of a teacher’s authority over the students, the teachers paradoxically become totalized within the pedagogical ideology that they themselves represent. in the same manner, other employees, who hold less authoritative, but equally important positions, are looked upon simply as data and figures – always dispensable. from an ethical standpoint, these people are not supposed to be treated any less than one treats a person with distinction. by and large, regardless of position in the educational organization, individuals are susceptible to objectification, which necessarily results to a subtle but brutal commodification that violates a person’s irreducibility to totality. these totalizing relations and encounters tend to diminish one’s personal sense of transcendence. whenever objectification occurs, there is always a failure to dissociate the person from the function. in other words, any act of totalizing occurs when one only sees the distinction and not the individual, the position and not the person, the role and not the face. 68 prajñā vihāra the second level of interaction in which formal education manifests its totalizing tendency is the students’ obligation to follow an inherently hegemonic school curriculum. joldersma observes that the “western thought generally has involved the desire to reduce reality to a rationally grasped system”.14 what this means is that the western paradigm – where most school curricula are basically patterned – gravitate towards an absolutist truth-paradigm generally leading to a unified system of thought. such paradigm is no less than totalizing. quoting levinàs, he adds, “the history of western thought can be interpreted as an attempt at a universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience . . . to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaving nothing other outside itself, and thus becomes absolute thought”.15 a school curriculum is, no doubt, an essential roadmap that provides the proper directions towards a particular career destination. it stipulates clear oversight as to which “path” one should follow to arrive at pre-conceived desired outcomes. it arranges the necessary steps that facilitate in the gradual transformative process and also allows for evaluative measures in order to recognize progress, spot hindrances, and determine areas for development. however, insofar as a curriculum specifies what learning areas should be covered, it inevitably leaves out what it deems unnecessary. by necessity, it emphasizes one thing and strikes out another. this is where the totalizing tendency may actually take place. a curriculum reduces knowledge into a whole, a unified concept that can be contained within a course or a discipline as if there is nothing more to it. one must be quick to note that this does not mean that the tendency for totality should be eradicated. it is not a matter of choosing between a totalizing or non-totalizing curriculum. a concept for example, already involves totality. one cannot clearly grasp a thought without the mind “totalizing” that particular thought into a single concept. however, in the realm of human relationships and education, what is imperative is to recognize that there is always an overflowing of totality. this means that one cannot totally objectify a particular knowledge, much less an-other person. something always eludes intellectual grasp. something always peter paul ejera elicor 69 escapes the boundaries set by human thought and judgment which demand proper attention. hence, in formal education, a curriculum can only do so much. it should not be taken to mean that it is all there is to know. it cannot be emphasized enough that those who are involved in instruction and research are obligated to impress on the learners that, like a roadmap a curriculum only points to a way, but it never assumes to claim that it is the only way. moreover, this totalizing tendency also occurs in the area of assessment and determination of a learner’s “grade”. most often than not, the assessment tools usually utilized for student evaluations are based on certain criteria that are rather totalizing. it is not surprising that within academic institutions, competition among students to vie for the top position of a class or to finish school with honors is tolerated, if not given more emphasis. but we may ask, what is really the purpose of giving students grades and honors? do they not serve merely as indicators of progress, which also determine the areas for further development? ironically, what may be at times observed in a class setting is the students’ eagerness to pursue grades rather than learning, rank rather than skill. this is why an unhealthy competition may ensue between and among students who are driven by a certain need for approval through the achievement of excellent grades, rather than the achievement of excellent learning. the view that formal education has a totalizing tendency through these levels of interactions is the key to understanding the challenge for its constant reconfiguration and re-evaluation. if one were simply to accept the status quo of academic practices based on traditional erroneous assumptions as normal, then it would not be surprising that the kind of graduates produced will be as totalizing as they themselves had been totalized within the very institutions they came from. this is not to say that formal education is inherently defective and unethical. what this means is that the intersections of power and authority within the structure of formal education should be guarded from human excesses and from the subtle totalizing tendencies that normally stem from the multitude of interactions within the system. 70 prajñā vihāra in what follows, i will argue that matthew lipman’s version of community of inquiry may be used as a pedagogical model that avoids the totalizing tendencies that are susceptible in a normal formal education setting. lipman’s community of inquiry matthew lipman (1922-2010) re-emphasizes the modern critique against the normal standard of pedagogical practices which are driven by traditional and flawed assumptions. in his thinking in education, he explains that the dominating assumptions of the standard paradigm include the erroneous idea that education consists in the transmission of knowledge and that the teacher’s role is infallible. also, this paradigm adheres to the assumption that knowledge is unambiguous, unequivocal and un-mysterious; that knowledge is spread into different disciplines which are exhaustive and do not overlap; and worse, that the students learn by absorbing information. to counter this, he offers what he calls “reflective paradigm of critical practice” which basically follows a set of pedagogical practices driven by assumptions totally opposite to that of the traditional standard practice.16 in this paradigm, education is essentially inquiry-based and that the teacher is not infallible. it regards knowledge as always marked by traits of ambiguity, equivocality and mystery; that the different disciplines or bodies of knowledge are non-exhaustive and overlapping; and most importantly, the students’ themselves already possess the inherent capabilities for thinking, reflecting and judging.17 the community of inquiry, a term he borrowed from charles sanders pierce, is a pedagogical model that he used for his main project, i.e. philosophy for children. for lipman, education should be administered along the lines of collaborative pedagogy which emphasizes inquiry over explication, redistributes power and authority in the classroom and fosters multidimensional thinking. he describes that “the progress of a community of inquiry is guided by the gestalt quality of the unique, peter paul ejera elicor 71 immediately experienced inquiry situation… and that the educational community of inquiry actively discusses the subject matter under investigation”.18 in other words, in the said community, everyone (including the teacher) is concerned about discovering new forms of knowledge and painstakingly reaching an “aha moment” through collaborative inquiry. it, therefore, does not merely conform to a prepared curriculum, absorb its contents and answer its pre-defined examinations. the role of teachers does not include the traditional conception that they act as pedagogical philanthropists, that is, knowledge providers for impoverished minds. on the contrary, teachers are deemed as facilitators and collaborators. their role is to “mediate not to dominate”.19 in this way, the students are constantly prodded to examine their process of thinking, encouraged to look at things from different perspectives and enjoined with the rest to follow where the argument leads. drawing from pragmatism’s notion on education, the community of inquiry operates on the assumption that knowledge is produced through a dialogical interchange with the other members in a social group. an individual can only learn so much. but the richness of experiences and knowledge in a community, which come from diverse individuals, actually result to a deeper and more impactful learning experience. it is in this context that individual differences – or alterity – are given emphasis. a group of individuals do not automatically make up a “community” especially if it is removed from the values of respect and responsibility. likewise, a group of individuals do not necessarily become a “community” if they only have one voice, and stubbornly adhere to such voice. in other words, what constitute a community, in the first place, are the inherent differences each member brings to the group. these differences manifest in the uniqueness of each other’s experiences and points of view. hence, without the recognition of the otherness of each other, chances are, such group would either become anarchic or totalitarian. 72 prajñā vihāra creative, caring and critical thinking the community of inquiry fosters multidimensional thinking. lipman argues that, contrary to common opinion, critical thinking is not all there is to know about proper thinking. in fact, there are other modes of thinking that are equally essential in education. we may mistake the notion that thinking critically is the only paramount, and therefore should be given more priority over other mental skills. this, however, should not be the case. for lipman, “one must be on one’s guard not to give the impression…that critical thinking is equal to the whole of thinking”.20 in other words, thinking does not follow a linear process because there are different modes of thinking as there are intentions for thinking. these modes are: critical, creative and caring thinking. it may be well to note that these three modes of thinking should not be construed as isolated and independently compartmentalized since they are in a continual transaction with each other. most importantly, these three modalities are best cultivated within the context of a community of inquiry. critical thinking, according to matthew lipman is thinking that “facilitates judgment because it relies on criteria, is self-correcting, and is sensitive to context”.21 it cannot be emphasized enough that reliance on a sound logical criteria is vital in arriving at any form of judgment. this prevents students from making judgments based merely on impulse, emotions and groundless claims. likewise, it essentially consists of a meta-cognitive skill that involves a constant evaluation of the quality of one’s own thinking. in other words, critical thinking requires that the thinker subjects its own thinking into constant assessment by determining his/her assumptions and reasons. also, to think critically involves sensitivity to the context. in other words, it does not operate by merely using general ideas as “templates” that can be applied in all circumstances. moving forward, critical thinking intersects with equally decisive values of creative and caring thinking. lipman lists twelve (12) values that are to be found in creative thinking. these are: originality, productivity, peter paul ejera elicor 73 imagination, independence, experimentation, holism, expression, self-transcendence, surprise, generativity, maieuticity, and inventiveness. these values, however, notes lipman, do not represent the entire spectrum of creative thinking, but rather serve as a summary of generic values under which other specific values may be included. among these twelve values, four are worth expounding in relation to their resistance to the totalizing tendency in formal education.22 originality generally refers to the cognitive process of arriving at products of thought without basing from prior patterns. it is carefully treating the circumstantial elements as building blocks in reaching a different point of view that offers new solutions. productivity, on the other hand, is a value-concept that aims at achieving practical and appropriate results. it does not stop at the meta-cognitive process but dives deep into realizing tangible productive consequences. independence is another value-concept that stimulates thinking outside the “normal” ways of thinking. in other words, it tries to access the type of thinking that does not subscribe to what the “crowd” would normally think. overlapping with the meaning of originality, independent-thinking also emphasizes uniqueness and innovation which may, or may not be, consonant with what the majority thinks. lastly, experimentation is another reliable creative thinking-tool that places importance in following a process that is guided by hypotheses. just like a scientific experiment, this value-concept does not bypass the essential roles of trial and error, testing, validation and repetition. moreover, lipman mentions several manifestations of caring thinking, namely, appreciative thinking, affective thinking, active thinking, normative thinking and empathic thinking. three (3) out of these six are likewise worth expounding due to their inherent values that run counter to the totalizing tendency in formal education. appreciative thinking is paying close attention to things that are important. essentially, it involves valuing. it is only when we look closely – hence, appreciatively – at certain things that we come to value their individualities and respect their differences. active thinking, on the 74 prajñā vihāra other hand, is an act of caring for something or someone, which in a sense, is active. this thinking manifests in some forms of cognition that necessarily lead to action. further, normative thinking is constitutive of caring thinking. insofar as each act of caring involves an awareness of the ideals of a caring behavior, such thinking is normative, which is essentially cognitive. by and large, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that critical, creative and caring thinking are essential in the process of education. unlike many academic settings, the community of inquiry values a balanced and holistic process of thinking in education. it does not only highlight critical thinking, which if used wrongly, might lead to absolutism and dogmatism. rather, it also seeks to develop a kind of thinking that is not bereft of emotions, valuations and care. it is for this reason that a community of inquiry thrives despite the varying and even conflicting views among the members. the value-concept of thinking critically, creatively and caringly provide a “safety net” that prevents the students from resorting to acts of violence, which is one of the many possibilities when there are conflicting points of view. in particular, critical questions provide, according to browne and keeley, a “stimulus and direction for critical thinking; they move us forward toward a continual, ongoing search for better opinions, decisions, or judgments”.23 this is why the community of inquiry serves as a counter-witness to the traditional classroom atmosphere where rigid competition and individual performance are valued and emphasized. instead, it aims at providing an ambiance that promotes cooperation and mutual trust that makes healthy argumentation and discussion possible. in a community of inquiry, “students could work together without the fear of failing or disappointing their classmates”.24 in a bbc documentary, lipman stresses that a community of inquiry …is not a community of solidarity where everybody feels the same and has the same ideas and sensations and so forth, but [a kind of community] where there’s a division of peter paul ejera elicor 75 feeling; there’s a complementarity of feeling and of thinking. so they rely on each other, depend on each other. it’s very much like a team where there are certain people who are good at passing and others good at running. and they depend on each other; they know they can count on each other. and that’s the community we are trying to create.25 the values in a community of inquiry are not normally fostered in the traditional standard of education. what is more emphasized in the standard paradigm is the students’ gradual ascent from their own levels to that of the teacher through passive absorption of knowledge and skills. consequently, this leads towards competition, jealousy and even antagonism towards the so-called “academic achievements” of some students. hence, the classroom becomes an arena, a place where a student is compelled to prove to others his/her capabilities. just like the standard paradigm of educational practice, the community of inquiry aims to enhance the students’ cognitive skills, such as building an argument, evaluating criteria and responding to certain propositions. however, unlike the standard paradigm, the community of inquiry goes a little further as to provide an avenue for the students to develop their creative and caring modalities of thinking. in other words, inasmuch as the students are taught to be rational and critical, they are also, and most importantly, taught (in the process of collaborative inquiry) how to feel, to care for the other, to take responsibility for the other and to stay creative. in the process, the students learn the manner of “listening to objections carefully, taking them seriously and disagreeing with them without fighting or feeling hurt by the disagreement”.26 what is interesting is that these values are not taught didactically by a teacher. the students do not learn their meaning in the same way as they learn an object or a concept. rather, they learn these through experience as they go through the process of collaborative inquiry. in other words, in a community of inquiry, learning actually takes place without the teacher’s explication. 76 prajñā vihāra conclusion i have argued that formal education – being an institution – has the tendency to reduce its stakeholders into mere social actors that simply function according to their assumed status. however, levinàs reminds each individual’s infinite responsibility to the other which begins by recognizing the radical alterity and irreducibility of the other to some object devoid of identity and worth. pedagogical encounters remain superficial when it does not penetrate into the depths of one’s subjectivity. in other words, learning is not guaranteed when a distance is always maintained between the participants in the entire process. a teacher, for instance, does not do well in collaborating with the students’ intellectual journey if s/he treats them merely as a “class”, that is, a group of students without voices of their own. this generalizing and totalizing tendency in formal education bypasses the most important element in the learning process: the individual face. matthew lipman’s community of inquiry unsettles such traditional mode of interaction within the formal education setting where individuals (e.g. students and teachers) become susceptible to objectification. in a community of inquiry, the process of learning begins from the basic assumption that each member is unique, important and valued. it avoids the usual pedagogical mistake of treating all students under a uniform academic standard. in turning ordinary classrooms to communities of inquiry, all become participants in the collaborative process of learning, including the teacher. it must be emphasized that the teacher’s role is not to feign ignorance or impose mastery. rather, the teacher sees to it that the values of dialogue and the nurturance of critical, creative and caring thinking are fostered and maintained. in such context, the totalizing tendency in the level of interaction between the teacher and the students is diminished precisely because, in the process of dialogue, each one allows everybody to be who they are. the students are not fearfully subjected under the totalizing gaze of the teacher. in the traditional formal education setup, the curricula take precedence in determining the trajectory of the students’ education in peter paul ejera elicor 77 a given period of time. in other words, it is the school that primarily determines what they should learn and how they are supposed to learn. on the contrary, in a community of inquiry, the curricula simply focus on developing the students’ capability to inquire and to think well. this does not mean to say that a curriculum is useless and therefore should be dispensed with. rather, a curriculum must not go beyond what it is made for, that is, to guide and to serve as a roadmap towards higher forms of learning. this means to say that it does not serve as the sole determinant of what a student ought to know, much less dictate the manner by which to know. the basic assumption here is that, the students already possess the capabilities for learning. hence, if the students are exposed on a dialogical environment where thinking critically, creatively and caringly is given primacy over contents, they will actually learn the mental tools that are necessary to use their reasons appropriately. this is why it is important that any learning process should run along the lines of collaborative inquiry. by this, the students are constantly prodded to inquire, discover and learn by themselves. end notes 1 john dewey, democracy and education, an introduction to the philosophy of education (india: aakar books, 2004), 3. 2 ibid., 7. 3 clarence joldersma, a levinasian ethics for education’s commonplaces: between calling and inspiration (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2014), 3. 4 eduardo calasanz, “ethics with a human face”, in commentaries on moral philosophy (philippines: the philippine commission on higher education, 1998), 163. 5 sean hand, emmanuel levinas. (new york: taylor & francis e-library, 2008), 75. 6 calasanz, 1998, 167. 7 emmanuel levinàs, difficult freedom: essays on judaism, trans. sean hand. baltimore: the johns hopkins university press, 1990), 6. 8 emmanuel levinàs, totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority. trans. alphonso lingis (the hague: martinus nijhoff publishers, 1979), 194. 9 levinas, 1990, 9. 78 prajñā vihāra 10 neal de roo, futurity in phenomenology promise and method in husserl, levinas, and derrida (new york: fordham university press, 2006), 57. 11 emmanuel levinàs, the levinas reader, ed. sean hand (oxford: basil blackwell ltd., 1989), 83. 12 levinas, 1990, 7. 13 xin liu gale, teachers, discourses, and authority in the postmodern composition classroom (new york: suny press, 1996), 23. 14 joldersma, 2014, 85. 15 ibid. 84. 16 see matthew lipman, thinking in education 2nd ed. (new york: cambridge university press, 2003) 18-19. 17 ibid. 18 ibid., 86. 19 ibid., 84. 20 ibid., 201. 21 ibid., 212. 22 for a complete discussion on the forms of creative and caring thinking, see lipman’s thinking in education, 243-271. 23 niel browne & stuart keeley, asking the right questions, a guide to critical thinking (new jersey: pearson prentice hall, 2007), 2. 24 ed elbers, “classroom interaction as reflection: learning and teaching mathematics in a community of inquiry”, in educational studies in mathematics, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 77-99 2003, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3483216, (accessed: 16-07-2016 04:07 utc), 78. 25 “philosophy for children by matthew lipman,” youtube video, 56:00, from bbc documentary 1990, posted by pascal lacroix, march 29, 2010, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=lp-8li8h7gg. 26 philosophy for kids: sparking a love of learning by dr. sara goering” youtube video, 10:42, from tedxoverlake, posted by tedx videos, june 30, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dlzxajscxk. 01_(1-38) becoming bridgebuilders.pmd becoming bridge-builders in periods of transition: towards a communion of civilizations in our times thomas menamparampil federation of asian bishops’ conferences (fabc) abstract the process of globalization poses many new possibilities for communication of solutions to our many problems. this paper reviews these problems and then discusses the roots of the possible solutions to such problems. the solutions are rooted in communities, traditions and the individual in our present world. it is rooted in the dialogue among civilizations. º·¤ñ́ âèí ¡ãðºç¹¡òãâå¡òàôçñµ¹ì·óãëéà¡ố ¤çòáà»ç¹ä»ä é́ãëáè æ ã¹ç§¡òãê×èíêòã·õè ê×èíçô̧ õá¡é»ñ­ëòµèò§ æ ¢í§àãò º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ð¾ô̈ òã³ò¶ö§»ñ­ëòµèò§ æ àëåèò¹õé áåð¨ð íàô»ãòâ¶ö§ãò¡àë§éò¢í§çô¸õ·õèà»ç¹ä»ä´é㹡òãá¡é»ñ­ëò á¹ç·ò§ã¹¡òãá¡é»ñ­ëò àëåèò¹õéáò¨ò¡ªø᪹ »ãðླõáåð»ñ¨à¨¡ª¹ã¹âå¡»ñ¨¨øºñ¹ «öè§áõãò¡°ò¹íâù躹 ¡òãêò¹àêç¹òãðëçèò§íòãâ¸ããáµèò§ æ 1. the situation to be one with the world is wisdom (tirukkural) with the world becoming more and more globalized, we are moving into exciting times. the world economy is taking new directions, innovations in communications are bringing people and communities together, international solidarity offers indefinite possibilities of self expresprajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 1-38 1 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ sion; a good idea generated at any place has the opportunity to reach out to the remotest parts of the world; and good values preserved in any civilizational tradition can offer inspiration to persons and societies in any place on the planet. there is every possibility for cultures, civilizations, and faiths to dialogue with each other, to listen to each others’ insights, and learn from each others’ wisdom. a. violence violence is flourishing. pride is at its height! violence produces more wickedness (ezekiel 7:1011). violence is suicide (mahatma gandhi). if we look at the world today we see that tensions are mounting: nation against nation, class against class, ethnic group against ethnic group, majority against minority and vice versa. the strong usually have their way. no wonder that dominant nations and groups are perceived as exploiting the weaker. those who feel that they are unjustly treated take to violence in response. all slogans are about ‘rights’; there is not enough reference to duties. every claim of rights seems to be valid until its exaggerations make its limitations evident. meantime peace continues to elude the human race. all religions have taught peace, impartiality, and fairness. and yet there are conflicts in the name of religion in any number of places: israelis-palestinians, serbs-croats-muslims, indians-pakistanis, singhalastamils, catholics-protestants (n.ireland); tensions in chechnya, somalia, sudan, philippines, indonesia. nor can we forget the violence caused by the ‘secular religions’ (ideologies) of our days. eric hobsbawm calls the ideological wars of last century “the most militant and bloodthirsty of the religious wars”, which were linked with secular pieties like personality cults and promise of permanent solutions to human problems (hobsbawm 563). solutions however have never come. wars in ages past were between kings, emperors, dynasties or sovereign nations. today they are often between ethnic groups and local activists. there have been civil wars in angola, bosnia, chechnya, croatia, el salvador, ethiopia, guatemala, iraq, liberia, mozambique, somalia, 2 prajna vihara __ __ ~ sudan, tajikistan, uganda (pinker 303). there are battles going on between fundamentalists of various types: religious, secular, cultural, political, economic, and ideological. the political scientist stanley hoffman says he had fondly hoped for an era of peace when the cold war ended. but his hopes were soon shattered when he kept hearing news only of violence, terrorism, suicide bombings, displaced people, and genocides; of civil wars, battles between militias, guerillas, paramilitaries; ‘new wars’, ‘low intensity conflicts’, and genocide, ethnic cleansing (pinker 296). the situation has grown so alarming that norman podhoretz brought out a book called ‘world war iv’ (pinker 295). hobsbawm argues that the weakening of state power during the second half of the 20th century led to the “democratization or privatization of the means of destruction” (hobsbawm 560). studying the present trends, there is no way we can feel confident that the age of holocausts, hiroshimas, and bloody revolutions is over. b. human beings evaluated in market terms there is none high or low amongst you. you are all brethren and therefore strive altogether to attain prosperity (rig veda 5,60,5). they themselves are slaves of destructive habits (2 pet 2:19). slavery and absolute poverty reduce human beings to levels less than human. violence takes them down one step lower. but when people are evaluated only in market terms, when they are classified merely as ‘labour’ or evaluated solely in reference to the ‘market’, their status goes down further still. in other words, when their worth is calculated only in terms of their use to the economy, they become less than human beings and bearers of dignity. and yet, the tragedy today is that entire nations are opting for this form of self-abasement by making economic growth their sole goal. this process is assisted by the dogma of ‘free choice’ propagated by big business.1 they have an evident interest in promoting the dogma; it benefits their profit-making strategies. meantime big corpothomas menamparampil 3 rations are making themselves less and less accountable to anybody. they manipulate mass media, impose uniform ways of thinking and acting on society, seek to monopolize knowledge, subject people to consumerism, imprison them in artificial environments and isolate them from nature. those who fall victims to their mesmerizing and psychologically numbing influence, lose their concern for society, commitment to compassion and solidarity; they lose sight of ecological responsibilities and grow in their greed for wealth (hathaway xvii), often acquired unethically. c. need for a dialogue of civilizations leading to a communion of civilizations the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, the leopard lie down with the kid....nothing vile or evil shall be done (judaism: isaiah 11:6-9). all people are a single nation (koran ii). in the face of these and other difficulties, we must not act as though we have no resources to count on. our civilizational heritages provide enormously valuable assets on which we can build, making use also of the dynamic new ideas of our times. we are not helpless. we make ourselves helpless only by isolating ourselves from each other or wasting energies in constant rivalry. as thomas berry said, “we live immersed in a sea of energy”. this energy primarily belongs to the community, and a big portion destined for each person is to be found in the other. it has to be discovered and tapped, not by violent snatching, but by drawing it forth gently from each other: sharing thoughts, evoking emotional support, eliciting collaboration. we are legitimately proud of our rootedness in our own culture and civilization (each one of his/her own). but we are also happy to reach out to other heritages which too have a proud history deserving our respect. we know that we are mutually dependent. our destinies are interlinked. historians tell us that civilizations that grew side by side were always locked in relationships that were mutually acknowledging and mutually sustaining, even amidst tensions. it is hard for any civiliza4 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tion to maintain high standards in isolation (fernandez-armesto 19). nor can we limit ourselves to the wisdom of the past; we must remain open to the new insights of our own times. it was confucius who said, “if by keeping the old warm one can provide understanding of the new, one is fit to be a teacher” (analects 2.11). may be the uncertainties of the present era is inviting us to play a bridge-building role between the old and the new. time has come for the west to meet the east, the north the south. the old and the new must dialogue. commerce must be attentive to ethical values, and scientific and technological research must draw inspiration from spiritual search. the painful memories of the past need to be healed and restored, and a future of harmony constructed together. such ‘impossible’ dreams can be realized, not through a ‘clash of civilizations’ in which the strongest will emerge on top to solve problems, but through a dialogue that will lead to a communion of civilizations. that is the only way all cultures and civilizations will be able to make a rightful contribution to human destiny. arnold toynbee wrote in 1972, “the two world wars and the present worldwide anxiety, frustration, tension, and violence tell the tale. mankind is surely going to destroy itself unless it succeeds in growing together into something like a single family. for this, we must become familiar with each other; and this means becoming familiar with each other’s history…” (toynbee 10), and each other’s civilizational assets. that is what we seek to do through our efforts together as intellectuals. 2. violence he who has killed multitudes of men should weep for them with the bitterest grief (tao te ching 31). do not take revenge on someone who wrongs you. if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, let him slap your left cheek too (matthew 6:39). we have already referred to the phenomenon of ongoing violence in our times. we call those who are its cause ‘terrorists’. some go to the point of calling them “insane fanatics, mindless gangsters, pathological thomas menamparampil 5 thugs, brainwashed adolescent misfits, envy-driven. but that may not be true” (lott 22). it is good therefore that we understand them in their own contexts. cynicism or hasty condemnations will not help. there is a french saying, to understand is to forgive. it is good to search for those “mind-wounding, soul-warping events”, realities, that lead to violence…. which includes at times self-destruction (lott 82). as lott says, “if one closes eyes to ‘rational’ causes of terrorism, it is irrationality” (lott 22). when a society feels severely humiliated, there is bound to be a reaction (germany after world war i, china before the revolution, nations that emerged from colonial rule). the hindu society, for example, feels it has gone through a thousand years of humiliation. so does the islamic society. the tragedies in afghanistan and iraq, ‘imbalance of power, asymmetry in battle’…all these fan the flame of anger that had already been existing. when a group of poverty stricken people are brought together, organized and made to feel they are fighting for a good cause, acts of terror seem to empower them and help them to discover a new emotional identity (lott 20-21). in such contexts, prophetism and messianism begin to emerge on either side of the battlefront: one proclaims democracy, the freedom of the individual and human rights; the other, national and ethnic pride. a community fights to the last person to defend their history and cultural identity. in the process of defending themselves, at times they go to excesses inflicting injury on the enemy and other groups, reaching to the point of ethnic cleansing (lott 43). thus, we cannot always believe that the strong are always wrong and that weak always right, that victims of injustice cannot turn unjust themselves. exaggerations can be on either side. when people decide to go in for harshness, they place no limits to what they can do. “we have arrived at a global society, but with the clannish instincts inherited from the tropical savanna. or, as e.o.wilson put inimitably in his forward to my book common wealth, ‘we exist in a bizarre combination of stone age emotions, medieval beliefs, and godlike technology’” (sachs 260-61). article 5 of the universal declaration of human rights says, “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. but why do even normally fair-minded persons 6 prajna vihara __ __ ~ surprise the world with cruel, inhuman deeds during ethnic or religious clashes? there are times when one should ‘stand out’ of one’s own identity and distance oneself from the immediate issue and listen to a sober voice, whoever is able to give it. are you able? if not, why don’t you equip yourself to be able? in contexts today when people rob, rape, torture and kill each other, these words of the great buddha seem most relevant, “one cannot steal, lie, commit adultery or go along the banks of the ganges striking, laying waste, mutilating and commanding others to mutilate, oppressing and commanding others to oppress”, without reaping the consequences (digha nikaya i, 52). 3. corruption use honest scales, honest weights, and honest measures (judaism: leviticus 19:36). keep your promises; you are accountable for all that you promise…weigh with even scales; that is fair, and better in the end (quran 17:35-39). today corrupt practices have risen to the world stage. no one can plead to be totally innocent. that is why all must join hands together in order to wipe out this plague from society. corruption is not only about the wrong use of money, but also about the wrong use of power. it is not only about taking bribe in government offices, but also about various forms of manipulation and blackmailing, political arm-twisting, pushing a particular party’s or ethnic group’s political interests through underhand ways, unfairness of dominant classes and castes to weaker sections, the imperceptible manner of bulldozing or marginalizing legitimate claims, silencing the voices of the weaker communities, physical elimination of political opponents or commercial competitors, interfering with election processes, using ‘strong men’ for vacating land or realizing bills, fixing matches, selling drugs. corruption also has reference to hidden transactions, unpaid salaries, underpaid employees, unfair pressure. the globalized world has become a refuge for corrupt business. thomas menamparampil 7 the global market provides distances, creates anonymity, gives opportunities for dishonest deals, enables one to take advantage of the weak, evade laws, and make an unfair proportion of profit. let us make a distinction: 1. if greater profits are made through harder work, greater efficiency, more effective customer service or through path-breaking innovation, it is certainly legitimate. 2. but if it is made by underpaying the worker, evading taxes, ignoring safety laws, producing counterfeits, ruining the environment, abusing custo-mer confidence, falsifying accounts or labour figures, double book-keeping, deceptive advertisements, industrial espionage, it is undoubtedly criminal. “would it not be better for you to be robbed? instead you yourselves wrong one another and rob one another, even your brothers!” (1 corinthians 5:7-9). investigative journalism has often highlighted specific cases of dishonesty. but media men also can bend to mammon, and sell their services for money: cooking up stories to defame or defend a party leader, distorting facts to press an argument, presenting allegations as proven truth for minor favours. plagiarizing, pirating cassettes, and violating intellectual property rights are very common in our days. engineers in government service get opportunities to embezzle huge amounts. doctors are accused of patronizing particular pharmaceutical companies or diagnostic centres, and even dealing in human organs. when citizens are not alert, the mechanisms of accountability and sanction are not activated, and structures of enforcement lie idle. society remains silent. you and i give a tacit approval. we may take a message from the buddha’s times. the economy had grown brisk in his days: credit, debt, interest and market-nothing was absent. there were rich people going bankrupt and poor people gathering a fortune, honestly and in other ways. a warning against corruption was timely. a passage from early buddhist poetry says, “let no one deceive anyone else, nor despise anyone anywhere. may no one wish harm to another in anger or ill-will” (samyutta nikaya 146-8). and a taoist teaching says, “when rulers live in splendor and speculators prosper, while farmers lose their land and the granaries are emptied; when governments spend money on ostentation and on weapons; when the upper class is extravagant and irresponsible, indulging themselves and possessing more than they can use, while the poor have nowhere to turn. all this 8 prajna vihara __ __ ~ is robbery and chaos. it is not in keeping with the tao” (tao te ching 53). are we in such an age? 4. hypercommercialization invest money in foreign trade, and one of these days you will make a profit (ecclesiastes 11:1-2). if you love money, you will never be satisfied; if you long to be rich, you will never get all you want. it is useless (ecclesiastes 5:10). corruption has something to do with economy. it is precisely in this field that ethical values are often lost. if they are threatened, they must be defended; if they have been lost, they must re-acquired and restored. science and technology have given us good things, but they must be regulated by the norms of wisdom contained in our cultural traditions. the tao te ching has this message, “the sage does not accumulate. the more he does for the people, the more he saves. the more he gives to people, the more he has” (tao te ching 81). in confucian tradition, a gentleman is concerned with what is right; the inferior man with profit, with material welfare. mencius too looked down on the profit motive. in the west, the first generations of capitalists were models of asceticism. their aim was to earn, to accumulate, and not to overspend. in fact, weber and keynes refer to high accumulation and low consumption (sachs 150). today’s capitalists on the contrary are prone to profligacy: they believe in lavish parties, weddings, anniversaries, election victories. hypercommericialism has thrown up a class of super-rich and dumped the weak in dire poverty (sachs 152). we agree that economy has its own importance. it plays a central role in world affairs today. anyone who neglects economy will have to pay for it in due time. however, economy is not everything. economic success cannot be made the ultimate goal in human affairs. it cannot be allowed to entice and enslave human beings, wipe out cultures, and ruin the environment. just as the political empires of the past brought some advantages to subject people even when they exploited, the commercial thomas menamparampil 9 empires of multi-national corporations too bring some advantages to people (cheaper goods and efficient dispatch of affairs); but they exploit. as the political empires of old took advantage of weaker nations, in the same way the commercial empires take advantage of weaker people (sometime the customers, sometimes the workers, and at other times the shareholders, usually smaller business concerns, generally the uninformed society). the subtle manner in which this is being done is becoming more and more evident today. economy organized on a vast scale, whether controlled by the government (state capitalism) or by corporations, tend not to respect persons, human concerns, families, communities, values, natural environment. gigantism always has its victims. we are not opposed to the bigness of things, but are anxious that its weaknesses should be recognized. correctives should be sought. the manner in which some companies compete looks more like an expression of the aggressive and destructive streak in human nature than of its constructive instincts. they ignore the inner worth of human beings, underestimate persons, communities, cultures, ethical and aesthetic traditions. after having invaded millions of human lives and damaged them, when things go wrong, the only solution that profit-makers can propose are drugs, tranquilizers, sedatives, stimulants, and antidepressants (fleischcker 16); not silence, reflection, self-criticism or self-improvement. we are moving into an age when it is technology, not human beings, that decides values. human destiny has gone into the hands of big corporations. kalle lasn said, “a corporation has no heart, no soul, no morals. it cannot feel pain. you cannot argue with it… no sorrow or remorse” (hathaway 44). what is said of corporations would be true equally of state-owned business concerns. meantime consumer goods are in abundance, and most people are happy. they do not know what they are missing, how they are losing values that have taken shape over centuries and what their fate ultimately will be. gradually speculators take over the economy. and then, of course, there comes the collapse. if a collapse had not taken place, no one would believe that it was possible. but it has taken place. the reasons for the recent economic meltdown are not hard to find. john maynard keynes said years ago, “speculation may do no harm as bubbles on a 10 prajna vihara __ __ ~ steady stream of enterprise. but the position is serious when the enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” (hathaway 46). the market is considered a ‘self-organizing system’, ensuring efficiency and preventing waste. but it does not always work that way. the ‘invisible hand’ many times remains truly invisible! milton friedman said, “i believe that we economists in recent yeas have done vast harm__to society at large and to our profession in particular__by claiming more than we can deliver” (capra 199). and when, during periods of recession, corporations and banks collapse and are gasping for breath, it is the tax-payer’s (the average man’s) money that is being used to bail them out. it is as though the poor are rushing to the rescue of the rich. this may sound paradoxical, but there may be some truth in it. it is similar to the paradox about international aid that has not reduced inequality or brought the needed assistance to the poor. international aid so often turned out to be the poor in rich countries coming to the aid of the rich in poor countries, and then the poor in poor countries being compelled to pay back the debt to the rich in rich countries. thus, even plans formulated with good intentions go wrong in unforeseen ways. truly, “a gentleman takes as much trouble to discover what is right as lesser men take to discover what will pay” (analects iv, 16). we said that economy is important. but it must be made ‘human’ in order to be meaningful to human beings. in fact, wilhelm ropke spoke of the need for ‘humane economy’, e.g. not to victimize customers through exaggerated advertisements. hans kung keeps insisting, “being human must be the ethical yardstick for all economic action”: which means giving importance to human dignity, mutual respect, tolerance, compassion, care for nature, rule of law, justice, solidarity, truthfulness, reliability. we must hold up new icons before our eyes for imitation. we must make them speak to our collective unconscious, address our collective fears, respond to our common longings and desires. it is for us to make the right options. will we choose an economic wizard or a saint for our model, a speculator or a sage? it is our choice. there are consequences. today more money is spent on display than on life. “basic survival goods are cheap, whereas narcissistic self-stimulation and so.. thomas menamparampil 11 cial-display products are expensive. living doesn’t cost much, but showing off does” (sachs 167). people move from living and sharing to showing off and grabbing. 5. damage to environment these classes of living beings have been declared by the jinas: earth, water, fire, wind; grass trees, and plants; and the moving things, both the egg-bearing and those that bear live offspring, those generated from dirt and those generated in fluids. know and understand that they all desire happiness. by hurting these beings, people do harm to their souls. plants are beings possessed of natural development. their bodies require nourishment, and they all have their individual life. reckless men who cut them down for their pleasure destroy many living beings. by destroying plants, when young or grown up, a careless man does harm to his own soul (jainism: sutrakritanga i.7.1-9). a wise man should not act sinfully toward the earth, nor cause others to do so, nor allow others to act so (jainism: acaranga sutra5) unquestionably the technological age has brought us many blessings: e.g. reduction in infant mortality, lengthening of life expectancy, literacy, access to healthcare. but along with these blessings there have come also the destruction of ecosystems and erosion of traditional cultures, and undermining of the quality of life (hathaway 17). we may well recall how the great empires of mesopotamia, crete, greece, rome, maya, and the indus valley collapsed because they ruined the very environment that had brought them into existence. deforestation has always had disastrous consequences. felipe fernandez-armesto says “…civilizations commonly exploit their environments, often to the point of self-destruction” (fernandez-armesto 5). lester brown’s “mobilizing to save civilization” speaks of pov12 prajna vihara __ __ ~ erty, depletion of resources, falling of water tables, drying up of wells, shrinking of forests; of collapsing fisheries, eroding soils, grasslands becoming deserts. the list of disasters can be made longer: loss of forests, release of carbon dioxide, hole in the ozone layer, undermined the fertility of the soil, chemicals in the air, soil, water; wiped out species; overuse energy (hathaway 6). there has been consistent neglect of traditional systems: of healing, cultivation, child care, family relationships, community living, problem-solving.2 though genetically modified species can add to quantity, quality remains uncertain. moreover, corporations control the production, supply, replacement, and storing of those varieties (hathaway 42). the insensitivity that prompts people to overuse resources also inspires them to exploit the poor, reducing them to the status of ‘labour’ and ‘market’. the tragedy today lies precisely in placing quantitative growth before quality of life. and we gloriously lose out between different choices. this is an hour when we need to preserve the mental balance taught to us by the wisdom of the ancients, give attention to human dignity affirmed by the moderns, and look towards the beauty that reminds us of our eternal destiny. 6. misuse of the media there is a way to get the people: get their hearts and the people are won over (mencius 4:9) he (the sage) is free from self-display, and therefore he shines (tao te ching 22) communications have made the greatest contribution to modern age. they have assisted people to come together and co-reflect, and be of assistance to each other. international solidarity has grown in a way that was never considered possible in earlier times. but these very same instruments of communications can also be misused. they are fast falling into the grip of big business and centralized governments. “the media and the politicians are in splendid symbiosis. the airwaves promote corporate products, consumer values, and thomas menamparampil 13 the careers of friendly politicians. the politicians promote media deregulation, low taxes, and freedom from scrutiny of performance and public service” (sachs 145). power slides into the hands of a small number of transnational corporations that are less and less accountable to democratic structures. someone has described the tragedy in this manner: humanity is made subject to the market; the corporations control the market subjecting every field of human activity to serve their interests. mass media strengthens this effort by promoting consumerism (hathaway 16). humans are reduced to the level of being mere objects. jeffrey sachs is certain that even his own countrymen, living in a free country, are allowing themselves to be manipulated by corporate propaganda. this is just what the propaganda machinery of totalitarian governments did a few decades ago. what today’s commercial media proposes is not serious, responsible thinking about the long term good of society, but overconsuming, overborrowing, overgambling, excessive tv viewing, and other addictions (sachs 133). they are not asking people to sit back and reflect, study the consequences, or plan for the good of humanity, as asian sages would have done. may be that is where thinking people could make their contribution. that remains a challenge for asia’s intellectuals. there is a big difference between the needs of the rich and those of the poor. what the poor want are: food, clothing and shelter. but the rich want also to display their wealth. their ‘wants’ are created for them by brand managers and advertising executives. advertizers spend $300 billion to manipulate minds, create cravings, whims, addictions, confusions, and quests for status (sachs 134-5). they play on human weaknesses and aggravate them. they know that people spend less on enjoying things than for showing off what they have (for “conspicuous consumption”). here the media rushes to their assistance. taking advantage of their weakness, they beguile them into big spending, entice them with attractive things until they become addicted. how one would wish that media would do a more conscientious job in informing, educating, explaining, motivating, guiding, uniting, and strengthening. the technologies of mass persuasion are being used as instruments for manipulating minds. edward berry, a nephew of sigmund freud, used to refer to marketing skills as the skills for ‘engineering 14 prajna vihara __ __ ~ consent’ with regard to sales. they are also used during elections, even during a military coup. he considered it the art of hidden manipulation of public’s unconscious, taking advantage of people’s tendency to run in herds. we had been for decades warned about the manipulative power of the tv: george orwell (1940s), vance packard (1950s), john kenneth galbraith and marshall mcluhan (1960s) (sachs 137-38). could we grow a little more conscious of this danger? nearly all the wise teachings of the east spoke of the need for resisting ‘illusions’ and attaining ‘truth’. how relevant those teachings seem to us in our times when so many of us spend any length of time in the ‘unreal’ world of the tv, in the world of ‘illusions’? today’s tv heroes/heroines are not telling us to “buy less, think more, be critical, think about the future” as asian prophets would have done. drawn by the powerful pull of the tv, families have become distanced from other families, and even family members have become estranged from one another. it is no surprise that high tv viewing and low social trust go together. scandinavian countries are low tv viewers, but have high levels of social trust. in the same way, not surprisingly, high tv viewing goes along with the consumption of junk food and its resulting obesity (sachs 139-41). we little realize how vulnerable we are to manipulation by the vast advertising and public relations industry. hindu and buddhist traditions counseled the shedding of ‘illusions’. and jesus’ mission was precisely this, “for this i was born, and for this i have come into the world, to bear witness to the truth. everyone who is of the truth hears my voice” (john 18:37). 7. poor governance when a ruler’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders (confucius: analects 12,5). it is because he (the sage) is free from striving that no one in the world is able to strive with him (tao te ching 22). thomas menamparampil 15 all these evils would have found remedies if the right people were leading public affairs. confucius thought, like plato, that political power should be wielded by men of wisdom and virtue. for him the qualities the rulers needed most were: confidence of the people, food, weapons (analects 12.7). in that order. if this teaching were taken seriously, how much money spent on arms by asian nations could have been spared for food, education, and health! even democracy does not necessarily guarantee the right priorities when elected members keep a distance from people. how much control are people given over policies, in fact over their own very destinies? even the structures of democracy can be rendered ineffective, they can be misused. rulers should make sure to consult people’s interests if they wish to win their hearts. confucius would say, “if you desire good, the people will be good. the nature of the gentleman is like the wind, and the nature of small people is the grass. when the wind blows over the grass it always bends” (analects 12.19). leaders should excel in civic virtues and their concern for the common good. their goals should not be merely economic prosperity, but also social justice and environmental sustainability. if they succeed in creating a set of values in society that are motivating and unifying, it will bring long-term benefit to that society. and every citizen has the duty to awaken public consciousness about the importance of such values.3 today governments are too closely linked with private interests, with the families of the leaders, with business groups and corporations that remunerate them for their services. jeffrey sachs feels that even military establishments are being controlled by megalobbies (sachs 105). corporate lobbies form a caucus in law-making bodies, shape policies, determine elections. they press for deregulation, cut taxes on the rich, reduce expenditure for the poor, and aggravate inequalities. whenever in any nation the army is too closely linked with private industry, the nation condemns itself to militarization. and the better a nation is equipped for war, the greater the possibility of neighbouring nations seeking to arm themselves better still. thus reckless military expenditure turns out be counterproductive: it merely increases the insecurity. meantime the poor are impoverished further, and the global arms industry thrives. one may think that challenging the enemy with full force of arms 16 prajna vihara __ __ ~ will awe them. it may happen that way; but it may also happen another way. it may provoke the enemy into a desperate action at a moment and in a manner that none is expecting. and the damage they inflict can be fatal. as we well know, the atom bomb was the discovery of scientists who had been desperate refugees from nazi oppression (hobsbawm 545). is it possible to choose a strategy which seeks to complete and complement the role of the opponent (in yin-yang manner), of the competitor or the enemy, rather than compete, confront, and eliminate? can we make place for wisdom, for the reconciliation of opposing interests, care for the poor, and ecological responsibility? when corporations grow into giants (or when the government assumes the same role), they move away from workers and shareholders. they become impersonal and lose their adaptability. gradually they lose credibility before those very persons who are most closely associated with them. all the more, average citizens, less informed and less interested, develop an attitude of distrust towards governments and corporations. their general experience with those structures has been negative. so it happens that there is a growing suspicion in society about all institutions. this in turn has led to exaggerated views about personal freedoms in opposition to institutional control, going to the point of ignoring common norms and collective decisions: to let every individual pursue his or her satisfaction without restraint, and to accept the result as the best that can be achieved (hobsbawm 565). loss of credibility of institutions leads to cynicism and inaction. inaction, in turn, gives rise to further institutional abuse, and finally to total indifference from the part of the public. ultimately irresponsible institutions and ruling elite are left unhindered to do what they like. and we sit back in self-imposed helplessness and blind complacency.4 8. communities and cultures are sources of ethical principles a better understanding of the way that societies have evolved over the centuries can help. let us look at the early days of human existence. may be, the communities that we call ‘primal’ (tribal) today can thomas menamparampil 17 teach us how human society used to be at an earlier stage of its evolution. each of them (tribe, ethnic group, ‘volk’) constituted a coherent, singular, unique group of people with its own internal norms. each had its own set of beliefs, values, customs, and traditions. these traditions, rooted in culture, were inherited, not reasoned out,5 not debated and consciously developed. they are a ready source of ethical principles for each community. the buddha’s immediate followers were members of tribal communities. he wisely recommended to each group to follow its own ancestral morality and tradition. he was fully aware that people’s values were closely linked to their own history and culture. recognizing their usefulness and relevance, he brought some of those values and traditions into his monastic traditions (e.g. that of concord, unanimous decisions, respect to elders and to inherited code of behaviour). the intention of confucius too was to build on traditional values in his times. in recent years, several anthropologists (margaret mead, melville herskovits, clifford geertz) have been insisting on the validity of ‘primal’ traditions, and proposing them as correctives to the counter-values proper of modern society like individualism, material-mindedness, insensitivity to nature, lack of community sense. pride in one’s ethnic identity and culture does not necessarily lead to fanaticism, fascism, racism or fundamentalism, as it has occasionally done. as every community is proud of its own individuality and heritage, it should respect similar sentiments in others. even though there can be differences in the values prevalent in different communities, they are generally complementary. for example, some value freedom, others discipline; some give importance to wisdom, others to happy relationships; some insist on frankness, others on courtesy. greeks look for wisdom, jews for miracles (1 corinthians 1:22). the west may insist on freedom of the press, the east on respect for religious sentiments. it is unfair to impose one’s own perceptions or priorities (even democracy) on others ignoring the path of history that different people have trodden. we ought to allow each community to walk at its own pace towards the goals that it has chosen for itself. however, at the same time, in many things we agree. nearly everyone sees evil in murder, torture, slavery, genocide, separation of fami18 prajna vihara __ __ ~ lies, desecration of religious symbols. all communities encourage helpfulness to each other within the community and sympathetic dealings with outsiders. a concern for others is considered central. as buddhists respect all sentient things, confucians teach human-heartedness, muslims compassion, christians generous service. at the same time everyone has the duty of making space for selfcriticism. a broadminded person, while questioning his own ethnocentrism, understands and accepts a measure of it in others (people of other castes, tribes or communities: brahmins, hutus, easterners, westerners, christians, muslims, hindus). self-criticism is important because we know that no one is perfect and no culture is complete. moreover, the more worrying problems of life are not ultimately economic or academic, but existential. they call for serious reflection. that is what made insightful asians long for apartness, silence, contemplation, peace of mind, community-building, self-realization (capra 440). 9. we belong together: community, family never in this world will hatred cease by hatred…hatred is ceased by love (the buddha). in order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family (confucius). we spoke of the need for beginning with our own individual tradition and community. however, we cannot live in isolation; we belong to each other. nature gives us models of several patterns of inter-relationships and integrated systems: atoms, molecules, organs, body; individuals, families, tribes, societies, and nations. as the material world is made up of an inseparable network of linkages, and as the human body and nature itself are self-regulating systems, in the same way we belong to each other in an intimate fashion within the human family. therefore, what we need to make of life is not a competitive struggle, but a cooperative venture, each person and community playing a complementary role with the other, like musicians in a concert. and when it does turn out that way, something surprising happens. we notice the creative forces in thomas menamparampil 19 nature continuously causing the emergence of something new in the universe. we see that whatever happens in society speaks of connectedness, relationship, interdependence...giving expression to a common, shared spiritual experience. that is what makes individualism and altruism, self-care and social commitment, not mutually exclusive but complementary. self-renunciation in behalf of others is not ego-killing, but self-realization (fulfilling) in the true sense. at such a moment, one wins the same joy as when one composes a poem or a piece of music, or makes a marvelous discovery, or accomplishes an impossible task…it may even be greater. when a person is lost in his concern for others, he has an intense feeling that he is loved and cared for! in this broken world today (broken families, damaged communities, fragmented societies, divided humanity) we must return to the spirit of primal communities which were characterized by love, relationship and solidarity. we should invite each other into a fellow-ship of co-belonging. we need to construct new narratives to strengthen the bonds of our togetherness, building on what we have inherited. at an earlier section, we referred to several problems that seemed to be beyond our strength. it is precisely when we feel helpless that we begin to hear an inner voice, a soft whispering. a new inspiration awakens in our minds. a new insight is churned out from the running stream of the cultural wisdom that comes to us from our ancestors who were a little closer to the origin of things than we are. it is a spark that flies out of a mysterious collective mind (collective psyche, collective unconscious). it takes shape in some form of co-thinking. when we say we have a ‘gut feeling’, it is as if the universe is revealing a secret to us. things that look like chance, coincidence, or casual inspiration, have been pre-ordained towards an undefinable goal in some unutterable manner even before the foundation of the world. these are the ways in which our lives are shaped and our societies led forward. we cannot be blind to this higher energy that guides the course of history even amidst the ordinariness of our daily lives. the true meaning and purpose of life is to realize the potential of every human being as a creative, active life-enhancing participant in life’s festivity. the deeper the interiority of an individual and the clearer the 20 prajna vihara __ __ ~ collective identity of a community, the stronger the society to which they belong. such persons know that they are participants in the subtle mystery of an unfolding cosmic destiny. they know that when they do what is good (e.g. show an extraordinary gesture of generosity, make a unique discovery, have an intense experience of the divine, hit a target with perfection, write an inspired poem, give a spiritual message) they are in harmony with the universe, and they are fulfilling a plan formed long ago (eph 1: 9-10) without realizing it. they will not allow any narrow selfinterest to limit, diminish or trivialize this perception of reality. when several scientific discoveries take place at the same time, we know that they come from the collective unconscious of humanity where those ideas had been floating for some time. an awareness of this truth itself translates into energy. today’s science tells us that subatomic particles are more like waves of information and energy than matter. collective thought and energy, when used for positive purposes (in a human assembly, a team, a group, a community, country, in the world at a particular moment or era), the future is being built up.6 when we develop a holistic outlook, we see clearly how one reality completes another, and how one vision of life enhances another: economy with ecology, physics with psychology, scientific research with spiritual search, technology with mysticism, social struggle with self-realization. thus we see that one gleam of truth is not complete without the other. 10. the greater the challenge the greater our determination people in their conduct of affairs are constantly ruining them when they are on the eve of success (tao te ching 64). if you shed tears when you miss the sun at night, you also miss the stars (tagore). if we feel that the world is in bad shape today, that is no reason for being discouraged. it only gives us an additional stimulus to gather up our energies, clarify our goals and commit ourselves to remedial action. violence has become so common in our times that there is a compasthomas menamparampil 21 sion-fatigue. we are caught into a series of vicious circles: violence__ counter__violence__desperate response__violence in return. ideological fanaticism__religious fanaticism-political fanaticism-ethnic fanaticism. during the fierce violence of the first world war arnold toynbee wrote, “…about half the number of my school fellows were killed, together with proportionate numbers of my contemporaries in other belligerent countries. the longer i live, the greater grows my grief and indignation at the wicked cutting-short of all those lives. i do not want my grandchildren and great-grandchildren to have the same fate. the writing of this book (the study of history) has been one of my responses to the challenge that has been presented to me by the senseless criminality of human affairs” (toynbee 11). this paper expresses a similar concern. one explanation that psychologists give for today’s tense atmosphere everywhere is overcrowding in cities. asian cities are growing into unmanageable monsters. there should be a concerted effort to search for ways of helping people to remain ‘human’ in the inhuman atmosphere of megalopolises. recent scandals caused by leading persons in society have been shocking the world and weakening the credibility of persons holding public offices. there is a feeling that public truth telling, like ethical business, is on the way out. as a result, even the most solemn public statements (including un declarations, reports to the parliament on the financial state of the nation, government accounts with regard to military expenses, or impressive advertisements) find few takers. the failure of some of these public agencies has damaged the image of others as well. there is a general distrust of banks, corporations, news media, the entertainment industry, unions, government and its agencies (sachs 12), and of public organizations in general. the desperateness of these and similar situations itself should be a motivation for a determined search for solution. we believe with john kennedy “no problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable__and we believe they can do it again” (sachs 262). 22 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 11. judging for oneself, acquiring authority what is man that you have been mindful of him, mortal man that you have taken note of him, that you have made little less than divine, and adorned with glory and majesty (psalms 8:5). one ignorant of the land asks of one who knows it; he travels forward instructed by the knowing guide. this, indeed, is the blessing of instruction; one finds the path that leads straight onward (rig veda 10.32.7). scientists sometimes describe the origin all things as though the universe came into existence and developed through a series of coincidences. according to big bang theory, ‘particles’ collided with ‘antiparticles’ and annihilated each other. particles had a quantitative advantage and they created the universe. ever since, it has held itself precariously in existence. the universe could go awry any time, but it has not. ‘a sense of purpose is all pervasive and deeply ingrained in the fabric of the universe’. if this provides the cue, we have hope that every problem invites its own solution. this invitation is extended to us, and the solution may be reached only through our intervention. there is an interesting story in the life of the buddha. the kalamans had been conquered by the kosala kingdom. under the kosalan dispensation the tribal norms under which the kalamans had lived until then did not seem to hold good any more. too many wandering preachers were approaching them to propose their own theories, one contradicting the other. what is the right thing to do under the changed circumstances, which teaching is true? they wanted buddha’s advice. buddha had only a simple answer: ‘judge for yourselves’. he asked them not to go by hearsay, or legend or some proposed theory or out of respect for an ascetic, but by the personal verification of what was true (anguttara nikaya a i 188-93). the wisdom in the kalaman tradition had to be re-evaluated through reflection and re-appropriated, and what was valid in the new proposals carefully integrated. we are in a similar period of transition today. solutions dawn in the minds of ‘alert’ people, people who cultithomas menamparampil 23 vate their inner consciousness. such people acquire ‘authority’ when they know how to make their insights respond to the needs and agonies of the society in which they live. this sort of ‘authority’ comes not from some ego-claims or self-pretensions, but from profound convictions about what is true and good, arising out of one’s constant attention to the deeper causes of things. in consequence, the solutions they propose appeal to the deeper-selves of others and convince them. people listen to those who address their anxieties with keen interest and propose solutions that are realistic; who also teach them to transcend their own petty interests and small-mindedness as situation demands. this is mission of true intellectuals. if more people would try to acquire this sort of ‘authority’ and share their insights, the world would be a better place. if communities, cultures, and civilizations were to exchange their deeper spiritual perceptions as profit-makers exchange goods, a ‘natural selection’ (darwin) of good intuitions would result, and an ‘invisible’ hand would lead humanity to unforeseen achievements. there has been a continuous exchange of ideas between human societies from the earliest times. while the eastward flow of the concepts of modernity has been sufficiently noted, clive ponting refers to the westward flow of civilization from egypt and mesopotamia, to crete, greece, italy, the iberian peninsula and to western europe (ponting 7), and finally to the rest of the world. such flows and counter-flows continue. we are convinced like margaret mead that “a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. indeed, it is the only thing that ever has” (hathaway 214). confucius suggested five things to those who wished to offer effective leadership, “if you behave with courtesy, then you will not be insulted; if you are generous, then you will win the multitude; if you are of good faith, then other men will put their trust in you; if you are diligent, then you will have success; and if you are kind, then you will be able to command others” (analects 17.6). why do we not seek to acquire this sort of authority? 24 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 12. equipping oneself “the master said…but if even a simple peasant comes in all sincerity and asks me a question, i am ready to thrash the matter out, with all its pros and cons, to the very end” (analects ix, 7). o lord, grant me such qualities of head and heart as would endear me to the enlightened and learned among us, to the ruling class and to all that have eyes to see (atharva veda 19,62). in times of persistent troubles, there emerge spontaneously persons with a strong sense of mission. the first thing they do is to equip themselves adequately for the challenge; they gather knowledge. they begin with what is already within reach. confucius said, “at fifteen i set my heart on learning” (analects 2.4). he continued, “i silently accumulate knowledge; i study and do not get bored; i teach others and do not grow weary__for these things come naturally to me” (analects 7.2). next, they commit themselves to the cause they have chosen with unflagging zeal. they do not give up because of difficulties, even repeated failures. “he’s the one who knows it’s no good but goes on trying” (analects 14,41) said confucius. a similar teaching we find in the bhagavadgita which insists on perseverance in duty, work, action…detachment from fruits, from results, from remunerations and rewards. a lack of appreciation from others does not disconcert persons who are mentally set. for them, their commitment is everything. the pleading of archimedes while he was being attacked by invading soldiers was not to spare his life, but not ruin his diagrams! (hobsbawm 557). the most important thing for those of us with a sense of mission in asia today is to be acquainted with the foundational literature of various asian traditions. the concepts, images and symbols contained in them remain deeply imbedded in the collective unconscious of respective communities. they refer to the origins of the human race, its purpose and destiny. it is a symbolic interpretation of the spiritual journey on which homo sapiens set out centuries ago.7 with the passage of time, even the most cherished words of wisthomas menamparampil 25 dom can grow stale, boring and uninspiring, and irrelevant to the current situation. history can associate them with un-genuineness and superficiality. therefore, their inner potentiality must be re-awakened. old teachings need to be re-interpreted and made relevant and capable of addressing the problems of our times: violence, corruption, nuclear arms, abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, exploitation of minorities, economic imbalances, destruction of nature. “he who by reanimating the old can gain knowledge of the new is fit to be a teacher…”, said confucius. persons with a sense of mission help humanity to regain its balance by relating the present to the past, looking to the future, and by putting the diverse cultural heritages of the world in relationship. confucius insisted on self-cultivation to respond to the challenges of his times. the gentleman practices moral cultivation, develops a moral personality, acquires tranquility. self-cultivation makes one strong, generous, humble, caring, conciliatory, gracious…and therefore successful. man’s differences are due to disparities in education (analects 16.9). “the master said, without goodness a man cannot for long endure adversity, cannot for long enjoy prosperity” (analects iv, 2). a prepared mind meets with opportunity, which is often described as ‘good luck’. what is considered chance, luck, coincidence is part of the cosmic plan, universal mind, and the providence of god. 13. is a middle path possible? can we open out a path to peace? this is my servant, whom i uphold; my chosen one, in whom i delight. i have put my spirit upon him. he shall teach the true way to the nations. he shall not cry out or shout aloud, or make his voice heard in the streets. he shall not break even a bruised reed, or snuff out even a dim wick. he shall bring forth the true way. he shall grow dim or be bruised till he has established the true way on earth (isaiah 42: 1-4). you shall speak to men good words (quran 2,83). let us take as an example of a problem that has been continuously 26 prajna vihara __ __ ~ plaguing the world: the problem of war and violence. at the end of the world war, the leaders of countries that had for centuries been in conflict (france, germany and others) decided they would no further adopt the path of war to resolve problems. that was to become a historic decision. in them humanity itself was taking a new direction. and they succeeded. many other countries joined them, and today we have the european union. the impossible became possible. let us now look at our own continent. inter-national tensions keep several asian nations continuously on the defensive against each other. deterrence only adds to anxiety. it is a repetition of the european drama of the early 20th century. toynbee calls an excess of nationalism ‘tribalism’, each nation claiming to be a universe in itself ‘self-contained and self-sufficient’. “all nation states, from the greatest down to the least, put forward the same claim to be enduring entities, each sufficient unto itself and independent of the rest of the world” (toynbee 34-5). it had disastrous consequences. asian nations are tempted to make the same mistake that europe made a century ago, easily becoming over-ambitious, aggressive, and mutually provocative. arms selling nations and companies fan the flame. their business would collapse if there were no international tensions. so, conflicts continue, and, in each nation, growing social tensions leave many things unpredictable for asia’s future. nonetheless, peace is possible. in recent times we have seen how mikhail gorbachev made a radical option for peace. if such enormously great changes could be worked out in a peaceful way, similar successes are possible for those who set their hearts on a peaceful solution to problems. historians can show us how the great world wars could have been avoided… how people need not have died in korea, or vietnam, or in afghanistan, or pakistan. “do not do to others what you would not like yourself” (analects 12.2). if this message were brought creatively to the world scene as gandhi did while struggling for his nation’s independence, such tragedies would not have taken place. history has shown that force is low-quality power. “…violence produces resistance. its victims or its survivors look for the first chance to strike back” (toffler 15). the buddha spoke of the middle path, aristotle of ‘moderation in all things’. if people had adopted a ‘middle path’, could not the ecothomas menamparampil 27 nomic sanction on iraq which killed a million iraqi children and other vulnerable people have been avoided? if there was moderation in all things, the attack on world trade centre would never have taken place. we need to seek sobriety and balance in all things. “as individuals, we need to regain the balance of our own lives between work and leisure, saving and consumption, self-interest and compassion, individualism and citizenship” (sachs 161). self-assertion and affirmation of others national interests and the long term good of the human race. could we seek balance with regard to other human interests as well? 14. we need communities of vision i neither stood still, nor sat nor lay down until, pacing to and fro, i has mastered that fear and terror (the buddha). oh men, direct your energies to promote the good of all mankind. let your relations with all be characterized by love, peace and harmony. let your hearts beat in unison with human hearts (rig veda 8,49,4). when we are satisfied with quick-fix solutions as a regular habit, permanent solutions keep evading us. a dosage of drugs will not serve as a permanent solution to psychological problems. a few personality-development tips will not take away guilt feelings from human hearts. a double share of consumer goods will not satisfy the spiritual hunger of a society. financial compensations will not make up for the injury inflicted on the culture and identity of a dying community (tribe, ethnic group). in the same way, a list of punishments will not be an adequate response to the needs of a society that is agonizing with pain for the absence of ethi28 prajna vihara __ __ ~ cal and spiritual guidance. it is hoped that gradually we may awaken to the truth that a scientific worldview need not exclude religion, a modern outlook need not marginalize spiritual and ethical values. it may also be helpful to understand that it is in opposition to aggressive secularism that religious fundamentalism has arisen. so it happens that just at a time when the dominant regions of the world are thinking that religion should be privatized and marginalized, there is a global resurgence of religion (lott 252), going to the point of exaggeration. a new beginning takes place when we gain access to the inner chambers of our hearts and stay for a while deep within ourselves, where we discover the profound nature of things. yes, that depth is within the reach of everyone. that is why self-reflection can be extremely educative and many asian sages have attached great importance to it. when we reach that level of our being, the nonlocal intelligence takes over. we are admitted into a subtle cosmic process (hathaway 247) and even the least thing we think of or do can have vast consequences. it is like a butterfly flapping its wings causing a storm on the other side of the globe. we need today persons of deeper insight and ‘communities of vision’, who are able to anticipate the future and make it come about through committed action. asians should not forget that “for nearly all of world history the richest and most developed societies have been in asia” (ponting 9). asia has shown the way on many occasions, it can still do in the future if it will remain true toits identity and to its vocation. as the universe constantly keeps re-building balance within itself, in nature and in the human body, so our inner world keeps making an effort continuously to attain balance, proportion, and harmony. persons who cultivate their interiority pass on the waves of their thoughts to others, far and near. the universe vibrates with them and takes unforeseen steps forward in its process of self-creation. it is said that one hundred trillion cells in the human body are doing one million things per second to support the human being. therefore we should not be surprised that even a simple thought, a soft whisper, a casual happening, an accidental encounter, can take a message across to the other person, then to another person, and then to the entire world. when it comes from a person who has searched his inner world, his/her communication can be thomas menamparampil 29 compared to the generative moment of the big bang. gandhi conveyed his message through religious silence and ritual defiance. when a person receives the ‘mandate of heaven’ (braudel 187), his spirit is awakened. the ‘invisible hand’ becomes visible. so we feel confident to take seriously what alfred lord tennyson said, “more things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of”, which would mean, when we connect with the universal and the supreme, we come to be related to everyone else, to all living organisms, and ultimately to everything. 15. a period of transition: a period for new ideas and new happenings first establish yourself in the good; thereafter you should counsel others. the wise man who acts thus will be above reproach (dammapada 12,2). for this purpose i was born, and to spread this religion god appointed men; go and spread righteousness everywhere (guru govind singh). the early 6th century the buddha’s world was in the process of rapid cultural changes: from a tribal government to political empires, village economies to commercial cities, classless society to new social classes based on wealth, vedic sacrifices to upanishadic meditational thinking (kramer 73). he lived at the rise of a new civilization, just as socrates did at the rise of hellenic civilization. old patterns were making way for new ones. it can generally be said that the decline of a culture (civilization) takes place when its ideas, customs and social organization become lifeless and its internal harmony is lost; things stagnate, society is lost in superficial issues, uncertainty and confusion prevail. it is at this juncture that creative minorities appear proposing new solutions to the new problems. the need for this arose in buddha’s times when communities (tribes) that had lived in isolation were compelled to live with others in a wider political dispensation. traditional patterns of thought did not seem 30 prajna vihara __ __ ~ to hold good any more. the earlier moral norms looked unrelated to the needs of the times. in the composite, impersonal atmosphere of an urban world people unused to mixed societies found themselves fendless. buddha's message came into such world. though very contextual, his teaching was not meant for his own community only. it transcended his culture and had a universal application. his insistence on right understanding and right action opened out a path to new possibilities. he taught the shedding of the ego, remaining unconcerned about flattery or criticism…and concentrating on the right thought and right action. the bhagavadgita too emphasized similar ideas. buddha’s middle path proposes moderation, avoids exaggerations so typical of innovators, provides new insights, points the way to wisdom and peace. 16. inter-relating civilizational heritages cultivate the friendship of the good, cultivate the friendship of the noble ones (dhammapada 6,3). you have become a disciple in order to benefit the world (silbhadra, the buddhist professor of nalanda university, to hiuen tsang). we can begin taking up the issues we have been discussing only within the framework of our own individual culture (each one his/her own) that gives us an identity and a collective being. while it provides the immediate support we need for our work, our efforts can attain sustainability only by building up relationship with a family of cultures, which in turn derive sustenance from a civilization.8 it is true, our immediate consciousness is concerned about our existence in a political society; but a civilization transcends this reality. while the political society is an association for practical ends, civilization is a spiritual communion (dawson 53-4). it cannot be bought or sold, budgeted or planned. it is a spiritual heritage that has taken shape over centuries. everyone within its influence benefits from it, and can make a contribution towards its development. thomas menamparampil 31 great societies like those of asia have a variety of civilizational heritages within the context of which we work out solutions to our problems. there is a renewed understanding and appreciation of these great civilizations of our continent in these days. they are showing their sturdiness in the face of challenges and winning the attention and respect of the world. they have been great in their own times and have played an educative role in the global society in different periods of history. it is good to remind ourselves that the inspiring ideas that have roots in our ancient civilizations will prove ultimately more precious than the volume of accumulated capital or an abundance of natural resources that we boast of. communities whose innovative ideas turn out to be relevant and inspiring, gradually begin to make an impact on others. they transform the world. arms assail and crush, economies entice and enslave, ideas enlighten, unite and motivate. we do not deny the fact that every civilization possesses some negative elements as well. however, given the needed good will, the worst can be averted and the best ensured. 17. societies must be saved from self-alienation do not walk proudly on the earth. you cannot cleave the earth, nor can you rival the mountains (quran 17:39). a person of good acts and good, agreeable, and sweet speech, has no equal (mahabharata, shanti parva, 84,10). today civilizations and cultures are in crisis. they are in rapid transition. when the ideals and values on which they were built get marginalized, the society concerned goes through an experience of selfalienation and estrangement from its collective self. the insecurity such a process generates leads it to a frantic search for a substitute. if the society chooses to re-affirm the ideals and values on which it was established, it witnesses the revival of its ancient glory. if it fails to do that, it puts itself on the path of decline. at a moment of self-delusion, it opts for an alternative: glorification of an artificially constructed ‘self’, a distorted form of the original, an unreal collective identity. in the roman empire it 32 prajna vihara __ __ ~ took the form of emperor-worship, which ended up in statolatria. effectively, it was the empire’s self-worship, ignoring its real identity: in fact, worship of the ‘false self’. when nationalism verges on state-worship or cultural imperialism, it makes the same mistake: worship of a distorted form of a ‘collective self’. persons who advocate such forms of nationalism could learn from the mistakes of those nations who were the principal actors in the last world war. they admitted their mistake, changed their mind and opted for peace. they hold out a message for today’s state-worshippers and cultural nationalists, the fascists of the day. those who rely on military might are placing too much trust on the strength of the “mindless fist” or the “congealed mind” (toffler 17). since every idea involves its opposite, even in the present difficult situation there is the possibility of a new hope-filled future arising, towards which we all can contribute. this paper is an invitation to do so. when cultural processes are undergoing rapid changes, very few people succeed to integrate the old and the new and make a synthesis of ideals, values, ethical norms, philosophical principles, and religious traditions. malachi proposed the bringing of “fathers and children together again” (malachi 4:6). we all can play a role in this endeavour. jesus said, “think not that i have come to abolish the law and the prophets (meaning, earlier traditions); i have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them” (matthew 5:17). history makes it abundantly clear that unity and motivation imposed by dominant personalities (conquerors) or by exploiting minorities (ruling cliques) in the form of an empire has a limited future, that selfworship is suicidal. similarly, the togetherness built on people’s anger, ambition or ignorance, egged on by ideologies of hatred is counterproductive. in the same way, enthusiasm constructed on impressive successes in the field of economy can last only for a brief while. muscle and money fail us when we least expect it. societies gathered round values construct a great future. thomas menamparampil 33 18. gathering round great values and high ideals let my life be a life of dedication, let my vital breath, eyes, intellect and spirit be dedicated to service; let my love and my understanding, my prosperity and my knowledge be dedicated to service. let the service be made in a spirit of utter sacrifice (upanishads). the journey of thousand miles begins with a single step (tao te ching 64). the unity based on the spiritual bonds provided by a ‘communion of civilizations’ will have the strength to bring together our diverse cultural and religious groups, economic and political interests, ideological and philosophical visions. when we begin to re-capture the spirit of our ancient civilizations, express it in today’s vocabulary, and live them out in dynamic ways and relevant styles, we shall begin to regain our lost energies. when they are brought to actual life situations, they will manifest their strength and validity once again. with growing instances of violence, corruption, erosion of culture, damage to environment, and poor governance, there is no denying the fact that our inherited ideas and values are in danger. and the threat comes from those trends in our society that weaken our moral fibre, social bonds, sense of common belonging, commitment to shared values and ideals, and those that promote sectarian thinking. many of communities that were rural, agricultural, living generally in isolated villages, eking out an existence from seasonal labour, have moved into investment economy and global economy in a matter of a few decades. along with these changes, new political forces (even radical ones) have arisen at national levels in a manner that could not easily have been foreseen before. the new economy is uprooting people from their homes, families, religious beliefs, cultures, community identities, and familiar terrain, and throwing them into the high seas of uncertainty. they have little sense of security or belonging, and experience the weakening of family and community support; no sure concept of the future, no consistent vision or convictions. they miss the cultural continuity that the presence of par38 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ents and grandparents, uncles and cousins used to give, the sanctions that the parents or the community used to impose, the certainties that a common heritage used to hand down, and the solidarity that the village community used to offer in moments of crisis. the entire value-system itself is under threat. we need to stand aside and develop a detached view of things, and reflect and meditate. we know that another world is possible. victor hugo once said, “there is one thing stronger than all the armies of the world: and that is an idea whose time has come”. may be such a time has come for bringing human civilizations into a communion. however, this possibility can be made a reality only if we build up our inner sturdiness. mahatma gandhi said, “such power as i possess for working in the political field has derived from my experiments in the spiritual field”. no wonder he conveyed his message as much through religious silence, as by political interventions. 19. gentle action love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. it does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth (corinthians 13:46). may my life, each breath of life, the eyes, the ears, the speech, the mind, the soul and all other acts and deeds, be put to the service of humankind (yajur veda 18,29). i refer to toynbee again, “in order to save mankind we have to learn to live together in concord in spite of traditional differences of religion, civilization, nationality, class, and race. in order to live together in concord successfully, we have to know each other, and knowing each other includes knowing each other’s past… historical forces can be more explosive than atomic bombs…we must try to recognize and, as far as possible, to understand, the different cultural configurations in which our common human nature has expressed itself in the different religions, civithomas menamparampil 35 lizations, and nationalities into which human culture has come to be articulated in the course of its history… we shall, however, have to do more than just understand each other’s cultural heritages, and more even than appreciate them. we shall have to value them and love them as being parts of mankind’s common treasure and therefore ours too….” (toynbee 47). our message is something similar. all we add is, “be gentle as doves” (matthew 10:16); that is the ‘asian way’ of communicating a message. for we know and appreciate the wisdom contained in such teachings as this: “those who lead others in harmony with the tao (way) do not use force to subdue others, or attempt to dominate the world through force of arms. for every force there is a counterforce. violence, even when well intentioned, always rebounds upon oneself” (tao te ching 30). a non-adversarial approach to each other listening to other voices than our own…., readiness to accept the wisdom of the wider community…that is closer to the asian way. dhammapada says, “do not speak harshly to anybody; those who are spoken to will answer thee in the same way. angry speech is painful, blows for blows will touch thee” (x, 133). the physicist david peat speaks of ‘gentle action’ in this manner, “gentle action is global… it addresses itself not just to practical issues, as the price of oil or the efficiency of a given factory, but also to values, ethics, and the quality of life…. like the ripples around the point, it moves inward to converge on a particular issue. gentle action works not through force and raw energy but by modifying the very processes that generate and sustain an undesired or harmful effect… gentle action… gives a new dimension to the whole idea of social action…it suggests that the origins of effective action can lie in ordinary people, both as individuals and as members of a group-and with their values, ethics, goals, and desires” (hathaway 387). “learn from me”, jesus said, “because i am gentle and humble in spirit” (matthew 11:29). endnotes 1eric lott says, “the much trumpeted freedom of choice has no much room 36 prajna vihara __ __ ~ in modern corporations and military giants” (lott 253). 2the prevailing manner of developing industries is fast leading to the degradation of environment and depletion of topsoil. deepak chopra quotes social scientists who claim that our collective behaviour is creating an unsustainable environment due to depletion of timber and fossil fuels, leading to devastating effects such as the greenhouse effect, changing weather patterns, hurricanes, and rising ocean tides. “on the surface these different events don’t seem related, but they are. they are the result of constricted collective sense of self, and they synchronistically, simultaneously co-arise. religious conflict, pollution, terrorism, nuclear plants, drug addiction, extinction of species, poverty, crime, drug wars, the gun industry, floods and famine, dangerous chemicals in the food chain, and wars are causally related” (synchro-destiny, rider, london, 2003, pg. 266). the taoist position would be something similar. ecologists have suggested soft technologies that do not damage environment, the use of renewable resources, recycling of material. they recommend solar energy collectors, wind generators, organic farming, regional and local food production, recycling of waste. “wisdom demands a new orientation of science and technology towards the organic, the gentle, the non-violent, the elegant and beautiful” (quoted at capra 443). it is gradually being realized that ethics needs to be also ecological: e.g. an ecological awareness and frugal consumption ensuring inner growth (capra 459). 3“he who rules by means of virtue may be compared to the pole-star, which keeps its place while all the other stars pay homage to it” (analects 2.1). 4“when rulers live in splendor and speculators prosper, while farmers lose their land and the granaries are emptied; when governments spend money on ostentation and on weapons; when the upper class is extravagant and irresponsible, indulging themselves and possessing more than they can use, while the poor have nowhere to turn. all this is robbery and chaos. it is not in keeping with the tao (tao te ching 53). such a message seems to be most relevant in our times. 5it is good to remember in this context that “reason (itself) may depend on something unreasoned”, though it may sound like a paradox (fleischacker 54). but it is true. 6“what we learn and what we think can affect other people by morphic resonance. our souls are bound up with those of others and bound up with the world around us” (fox and sheldrake in hathaway 222). 7cave paintings, 17,000 years old, give indications that homo sapiens was also homo spiritualis (a spiritual being). 8this reality called ‘civilization’ has something to do with our collective identity as a ‘people’, the memory of its past, experience of the present, and the hopes for the future. our respective civilizations cannot be ignored as we pursue our goals to a common destiny. thomas menamparampil 37 references braudel, fernand, a history of civilizations, penguin books, london, 1993. capra, fritjof, the turning point, flamingo, london, 1983. chopra, deepak, synchro-destiny, rider, london, 2003, pg. 266. dawson, christopher, dynamics of world history, isi books, wilmington (delaware), 2002. fernandez-armesto, felipe, civilizations, pan books, london, 2001. fleischacker, samuel, the ethics of culture, cornell university press, new york, 1994. hathaway, mark & boff, leonardo, the tao of liberation, orbis books, new york, 2009. hobsbawm, eric. the age of extremes, vintage books, new york, 1995. kramer, kenneth, world scriptures, paulist press, new york, 1986. lott, eric, religious faith, human identity, atc & utc, bangalore, 2005. pinker, steven, the better angels of our nature, penguin, london, 2011. ponting, clive, world history, pimlico, london, 2001. sachs, jeffrey, the price of civilization, the bodley head, london, 2011. thomas, keith, ed., founders of faiths, oxford university press, 1986. toffler, alvin, power shift, bantam books, london, 1992. toynbee, arnold, a study of history (one-vol. ed. thames & hudson), oxford, 1995. 38 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ~ hiren sarkar 51 happiness, contentment, wealth creation and sustainable development hiren sarkar mahidol university, thailand abstract how wealth is created is the subject matter of economics. on the other hand, values, morals and ethics are often relegated to the domain of religion. the question this paper addresses is whether religion and its teachings on ethics and morality can influence the economic mechanisms through which needs are satisfied? can the current single-minded pursuit of economic growth and materialism be reformed to serve social and environmental needs? to address these issues, this paper contrasts the current development paradigm with alternative paradigms. many alternate development models are now beginning to recognize the importance of morality and the inner virtues of mankind. among these alternative paradigms, the sufficiency economy philosophy (sep) promulgated by the king bhumibol of thailand based on buddhist principle of middle path bears special promise. it conceives a development process that can satisfy the overall needs of this as well as future generations contributing to prosperity, stability and overall happiness. prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 1, january-june 2016, 51-68 © 2000 by assumption university press 52 prajñā vihāra happiness, contentment and wealth creation a person cannot be content if his material and spiritual needs are not met. material needs can be classified as consumption of goods and services, social needs and a need for a secure environment. it is not difficult to comprehend that wealth is a necessary requirement for the satisfaction of material needs. spiritual needs, on the other hand, often consist of inculcation of values (virtues), morality and ethics which can be promoted by religion. economics studies the behaviour of individuals, households and organizations (agents) when they manage or use scarce resources, which have alternative uses, to achieve desired ends(wealth creation and its expenditure). agents are assumed to act rationally, have multiple desirable ends in sight, limited resources to obtain these ends, a set of stable preferences, a definite overall guiding objectives, and the capability of making a choice. on the other hand ethics, moralities and values are about human actions and decisions and, more often than not, connected to religion. religion is a set of variously organized beliefs about the relationship between natural and supernatural aspects of reality, and the special role of humans in this relationship. one of the most important roles of humans is to act as economic agents to meet various ‘materialistic’ needs. it is only natural that ethics, morality and values derived from a ‘non-materialistic’ belief system embodied in religion will impact on the ways economic agents go about realizing their ‘materialistic’ needs. how do they balance these two not so related aims? can religion and its teaching on ethics and morality influence the quality and quantity of the ‘needs’ itself in addition to influencing the means and efficiency through which the needs are realized? is single-minded pursuit of economic growth and fulfilment of materialistic(mainly consumption) needs, which is the main driving force of the current development regime, is good for overall happiness of mankind when inadequate attention is given to social and environmental needs? to address these questions, the general aim of the paper has been to review, identify and analyse the interaction between hiren sarkar 53 religion, belief systems and economic performance, introduce alternative indicators of economic performance based on both narrow and broad objectives of economic development and discuss the possible role of the sufficiency economy philosophy (sep) in realizing a development process so as to satisfy the overall needs of this as well as future generations. a comparison is also made with available alternate development models according to principles of buddhism and of mahatma gandhi. the sufficiency economy philosophy (sep) which tries to blend external activities (economic, social and environmental) with internal activities (inculcating the habit of following “middle path” in decision making, ethics and morality) for development of individual, community and nation, is being implemented in thailand. the spirit of capitalism weber postulated that the development of capitalism occurred in connection with the protestant (particularly calvinist) ethic emphasizing hard work, frugality and diligence. 1 this ethic was a constant display of a person’s salvation as opposed to the catholic tradition’s focus upon religious attendance, confession, and ceremonial sacraments. this ethic began to encourage large numbers of people to develop their own enterprises, engage in trade and accumulate wealth for investment in the secular world. this idea is known as the “protestant ethics thesis.” weber argued that the religious ideas of groups such as the calvinists played a role in creating the capitalistic spirit. weber first observed a correlation between being protestant and being involved in business . he argued that the modern spirit of capitalism saw profit as an end in itself. towards this end protestantism offered a concept of the worldly “calling,” and gave worldly activity a religious character. furthermore, calvinism preached predestination; that god has already chosen who will be saved, and that one’s success in worldly activity was a sign of one’s salvation. he argued that this new attitude broke down the traditional economic systems, paving the way for modern capitalism and an unprecedented economic prosperity. 54 prajñā vihāra however, this embrace of the “spirit of capitalism” which was true in the earlier period of modern era is no longer true now. the “protestant’s edge” has given way to a “universal spirit of capitalism” available to whoever is able to embrace it. economic prosperity became more widespread due to availability of opportunities offered by the “globalization-liberalization” regime; a number of asian countries were quick in grabbing the opportunities for promoting capitalism and became prosperous “ one way of measuring material wealth for a country as a whole is through the gross domestic product (gdp). this is the market value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a year, or over a given period of time . level as represented by per capita gdp is a measure of average standard of living of a country. the annual growth rate of gdp (adjusted for inflation) is used to measure the (material) progress of a country. these indicators are extensively used in economic analysis. there are two ways to measure (estimate) gdp; the income approach and expenditure approach . gdp can be estimated as the sum of wages and profits generated within a year or the sum of expenditures (in the same year) on consumption, investment and exports of goods and services of domestic origin. in “quality of life” jargon gdp can be taken as “materialistic/quantitative” quality of life at a national scale. gross national happiness (gnh) and its four pillars the idea of a gross national happiness (gnh) was created in an attempt to measure the quality of life and social progress in more holistic and psychological terms than the more materialistic gross domestic product (gdp). the term “gross national happiness” was coined in 1972 by bhutan’s fourth dragon king, jigme singye wangchuck . he used this phrase to show his commitment to building an economy that would serve bhutan’s unique culture based on buddhist spiritual values. like many psychological and social indicators, gnh is somewhat easier to state hiren sarkar 55 than to define quantitatively. nonetheless, it served as a unifying vision for bhutan’s five-year planning process and all the derived planning documents that guide the economic and development plans of the country the bhutanese grounding in buddhist ideals suggests that beneficial development of human society takes place when material and spiritual development occur side by side to complement and reinforce each other. the four pillars of gnh are (1) the promotion of sustainable development (2) preservation and promotion of cultural values (3) conservation of the natural environment, and (4) establishment of good governance. at this level of generality, the concept of gnh is trans-cultural; a nation need not be buddhist to value sustainable development, cultural integrity, ecosystem conservation, and good governance. through collaboration with an international group of scholars and empirical researchers the centre for bhutan studies further defined these four pillars with greater specificity into eight general contributors to happiness — physical, mental and spiritual health; time-balance; social and community vitality; cultural vitality; education; living standards; good governance; and ecological vitality. the gnh measure is designed to include nine core domains which are considered to be essential part of happiness in bhutan. the measure itself is based on robust indicators representing performance of individuals in each domain. the nine domains have been selected on the basis of normative and statistical considerations. equal weight is assigned to the domains as they are thought to be equally important for generating happiness. the nine domains are as follows: psychological well-being health time use education cultural vitality and resilience good governance community vitality ecological diversity and resilience standard of living 56 prajñā vihāra the green gdp green domestic product (green gdp) is an index of economic growth with the environmental consequences of that growth factored into a country’s conventional gdp. green gdp monetizes the loss of biodiversity, and accounts for the costs created by climate change. some environmental experts prefer physical indicators (such as “waste per capita” or “carbon dioxide emissions per year”), which may be aggregated to indices such as the “sustainable development index”.. the buddhist middle way and gandhi’s self-reliant economy great spiritual masters like buddha and spiritual/social activists like gandhi have given the world their thoughts which can be used as ingredients to mark out alternate paths in which people can live their lives and grow with minimal negative economic, social and environmental impact. the term “middle way” was used in the dhammacakkappavattana sutta. in this sutta, the buddha describes the middle way as a path of moderation, between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self mortification. this, according to him, was the path of wisdom. the middle path leads to “noble eightfold path:” right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. the path of “right livelihood” is the central point of buddhist economics. buddhist economics is a spiritual approach to economics. it examines the psychology of the human mind and the anxiety, aspirations, and emotions that direct economic activity. a buddhist understanding of economics makes a distinction between what is harmful and what is beneficial in the range of human activities involving production and consumption, and ultimately tries to make human beings ethically mature. it tries to find a “ middle path” between a purely “ascetic” society and a society based on “greed and extravagance”. hiren sarkar 57 gandhi’s economic ideals, much like everything else in his life, were governed by ethical and moral considerations. his stress on rural economy and emphasis on a simple life, coupled with his concern for universal well-being formed the foundation of his unique views on economics. gandhi himself believed that the model could be employed on an international scale as well. it should be remembered that gandhi’s economic models are particularly humanitarian in nature and for him no economic model is worth implementation unless it aims towards the general well-being of mankind. gandhi’s views on economics were simple and straight forward at the outset, however, they have been sometimes criticized from being utopian to regressive. but the idea suited very well for promoting the nationalistic fervour required in the pre-indian independence era to gain freedom . he understood economic motives to be the basic principle of imperialism and colonialism. and he therefore understood that the only way to attack and weaken the colonial forces would be to attack the basic economic profits that the british gained from the colonies. this coupled with his actual understanding of the indian condition led to the development of a unique brand of economic re-orientation of the indian society that he propagated throughout his life. however, it will be erroneous to consider his economic model to be merely a political tool shrouded in spiritual rhetoric. his concern for the welfare of the indian villagers was genuine, as was his concern for the relentless mechanization of the world economy devoid of ethical considerations. gandhi’s concern about improving the conditions of rural people, inculcating self-reliance through promotion of production and use of “locally grown” goods and services using locally available materials and expertise, instilling dignity of work along with moral and ethical values are still valid and point towards the importance of establishing a “human centric” alternate development model for economic prosperity as well as happiness of mankind. 58 prajñā vihāra the sufficiency economy philosophy of king bhumibol as a young monarch in the 1950s, his majesty started his learning process by visiting all parts of his country, observing the real conditions of the thai people especially in rural areas and seeking solutions to their problems during his travels, his majesty found that drought had become severe in certain areas of the country due to inconsistent rainfall. as a result the farmers at times did not have enough water for crop production. rice farmers suffered most as the crop required more water. in drought years they often go deeply into debt due to reduced income and extravagant spending habit. he advised the farmers to change from planting a single type of crop to integrated farming through land and water management. thirty (30) per cent of the land was to be devoted to rice cultivation which could produce enough rice for the household needs. thirty percent of land was to be used for a reservoir to preserve water. another 30 per cent of the land could be used for growing more rice or horticultural crops, depending on the local conditions and the market demand. the remaining 10 per cent of land was meant to be used for building a house, paths and ditches and also for growing household vegetables and raising livestock. this was his majesty’s “practical” vision on “new theory of agriculture” to make farming sustainable and stable so that the farmers do not suffer due to the vagaries of weather and market. to make their efforts successful his majesty has prescribed perseverance and industriousness. also for social harmony people were advised to be compassionate towards one another . this is one example where his majesty has used his vision and wisdom to directly alleviate the suffering of common people through re-orienting the ways through which they do their business and conduct their lives. there are innumerable examples where he has visualised both practical and moral programmes intended to be used by common people to reduce their suffering and create happiness hiren sarkar 59 his majesty’s lasting contribution to the people of thailand and of the world has been to articulate the philosophy behind these programmes. the philosophy is known as “sufficiency economy philosophy.” the following discussions detail out the concept of this philosophy in its various interpretations and linkages. although the king has been promoting self-reliance and sustainable farming since the 1950s, it is generally accepted that the idea of sufficiency economy had been formalized in the 1970s based on many of his speeches.9 in various statements, king bhumibol showed concern that modern development which emphasized only economic growth might eventually lead the country to crisis. therefore, he stressed the importance of building a ‘good and stable foundation’ before further progress could be pursued. this means that instead of placing emphasis on the expansion of the industrial sector prior to development, the stability of the basic economy should be established first, that is, assuring that the majority of rural people have enough to subsist. this is a method of development that stresses the distribution of income to build the overall economic foundation and stability of the country before moving on to higher levels of development. this is a dynamic philosophy which also promotes prosperity. the three pillars of sufficiency economy the philosophy is based on the following three pillars and a set of associated conditions. moderation: sufficiency at a level of not doing something too little or too much at the expense of oneself or others, for example, producing and consuming at a moderate level. reasonableness: the decision concerning the level of sufficiency must be made rationally with consideration of the factors involved and careful anticipation of the outcomes that may be expected from such action. 60 prajñā vihāra risk management (self immunity/resilience): the preparation to cope with the likely negative impacts and changes in various aspects of one’s action and decisions by considering the probabilities of likely outcomes. decisions and activities must be carried out at a sufficient level depending on the following two conditions: 1. creation of knowledge: comprehensive knowledge in the relevant fields and prudence in bringing this knowledge into practical action strategies so as to use them to aid in the planning and implementation of ground level activities. 2. virtues to be promoted: developing awareness of honesty, patience, perseverance, and intelligence in leading one’s life. his majesty explained that sufficiency meant living in moderation and being self-reliant in order to protect against changes that could destabilize the country10. the principle of self-reliance furthermore, his majesty has recommended securing balance in the five following aspects to achieve the principle of self-reliance: state of mind: one should be strong, self-reliant, compassionate and flexible. besides, one should possess a good conscience and place public interests as a higher priority than one’s own. social affairs: people should help one another, strengthen the community, maintain unity and develop a learning process that stems from a stable foundation. natural resource and environmental management: the country’s resources need to be used efficiently and carefully to create sustainable benefits and to develop the nation’s stability progressively. hiren sarkar 61 technology: technological development should be used appropriately while encouraging new developments to come from the villagers’ local wisdom. economic affairs: one needs to increase earnings, reduce unnecessary expenses, and pursue a decent life. the sufficiency economy is a ‘happiness development approach’, which emphasized the middle path as an overriding principle for appropriate conduct by people at all levels. the middle path is a way of thinking in which no one lived too extravagantly or too thriftily. it encouraged people to live in a way where they consumed only what they really needed, chose products carefully, and considered the impact of their production and consumption on others and the resources of the planet. the sufficiency economy concept had the potential to enhance the nation’s ability to modernize without defying globalization but with moderation and due regards to sustainable development. the concept of sufficiency economy is based on the principle of reducing one’s greed through following the middle path, is also similar to the buddhist teaching concerning ‘panna’. practicing sufficiency economy promotes the freedom from dependency through the reduction of desire. such practices of moderation and control of desire are fully in agreement with the teachings of buddhism.11 sufficiency economy and sustainable development in thailand rapid increase gdp resulting in concomitant increase in income and consumption (often conspicuous) along with urbanization result in phenomenal increase12 in the use of natural resources and corresponding generation of waste of all sorts13. these have put enormous pressure on the environment in the form of water shortages, air and water pollution, depletion of natural resources, loss of biodiversity and land degradation. studies have shown that the earth has already exceeded its capacity to support the current life style. sustainable development is at stake. 62 prajñā vihāra traditional environmental management practices use reactive policies through monitoring and legal measures. 14these are ineffective in that they occur after the damage has been done and cannot fully prevent environmental damage in the future. in order to achieve full sustainable development a paradigm shift from reactive to preventive policy is required. the sufficiency economy which advocates the middle path based on moderation, reasonableness and resilience; is a paradigm which can be implemented. the philosophy of sufficiency economy is designed to promote a lifestyle based on ‘sufficiency’ and not on ‘unchecked greed’ and is therefore more stable and desirable. this sufficiency economic framework is the only available practical “development model” which “packages” stable economic growth, improvement in income distribution, gain in environmental sustainability through ‘life style changes’ and development of positive ethics and values leading to overall happiness of mankind. it is important to emphasize the point mentioned before that sufficiency economy can be applied to all levels, branches, and sectors of the economy. although the principles have been primarily designed for rural economy, which is the backbone of thai society, their application is not necessarily limited to the agricultural or rural sectors. the financial, real estate, international trade and investment sectors can also benefit by following principles emphasizing moderation in performance, reasonableness, creation of positive ethics and values and ensuring immunity for oneself and society so that the growth generated through the non-agricultural sectors are more stable and free from negative impacts caused by sudden downturns as observed during the financial crisis. currently financial crises have caused misery to a large number of people. both “human factors” along with the standard “structural factors” are responsible for such crises.15 as has been quoted before, according to former us treasury secretary “most financial crises are caused by a mix of stupidity and greed and recklessness and risk-taking and hope”16. practising sufficiency economy is a practical way to counter this “evil mix.” hiren sarkar 63 comparison of sufficiency economy paradigm (sep) with the current paradigm the establishment of an alternate development paradigm based on sufficiency economy (which we can call the sufficiency economy paradigm or sep) can correct some of the problems of the current economic paradigm. the negative impacts of the current paradigm have been indicated throughout the paper. in the following table, the current development paradigm and its negative impacts are compared with the sufficiency economy paradigm. current development paradigm (negative impacts in brackets) sufficiency economy paradigm maximization of economic growth (vulnerable to downturns) stabilization of economic growth consumption led growth (unchecked greed leads to environmental and personal degradation) sufficiency/moderate level consumption led stable growth export led growth (vulnerable to downturns) growth led export of surplus after meeting needs of a self-reliant economy emphasis on growth of industry, services and commercial agriculture as growth engines; community level subsistence agriculture and self-reliance are not highlighted (exacerbation of inequality) development of self-reliant communities and rural agriculture as the nation’s foundation before moving to industry and services implementation of target group oriented poverty alleviation programmes to address equity issues especially in rural areas (not sustainable without government or donor intervention) self-reliance at the community level through appropriate use of local knowledge and resources. stressing the distribution of income to build the overall economic foundation and stability of the country 64 prajñā vihāra current development paradigm (negative impacts in brackets) sufficiency economy paradigm environmental damage control (reactive policy and not preventive) sufficiency(moderate) level consumption leading to sustainable environment through effecting lifestyle change r e g u l a t i o n s i m p o s e d b y e x t e r n a l government agencies (requires continuous policing from the outside) self regulation promoted through practicing moderation, reasonableness and risk reduction. no mechanism for inculcating “progrowth” personal values/ethics such as honesty, patience and perseverance (ethics takes a back seat) creation of knowledge, self reliance and virtues like honesty, patience and intelligence;move towards a better ethical society this sufficiency economy paradigm, based upon the three pillars, is not a direct top-down economic theory like the keynesian or monetarist approaches which are used to run an economy. it operates instead at the individual level. whenever any decision has to be made by a single individual or a “group of single individuals” (at levels of family, village, province ,country) about any activity (production, consumption, investment, and many more) under any economic regime, use of sep (moderation, reasonableness and risk aversion) it will always lead to stable and sustainable outcome. if a person who makes a decision is committed to sep, his decision and subsequent actions will produce results which will be stable and sustainable. commitment to “moderation” will make him avoid extreme options and not to “over leverage his resources (financial, natural, environmental) and will contribute towards sustainability of the results of his actions. adherence to “reasonableness” will make him to carefully weigh the ‘pros and cons’ before choosing a particular option. he will consider risks and will devise advance plans to cope with adverse situations. this approach at the individual level contributes towards producing stable results. in case a collective decision is to be made and hiren sarkar 65 all the concerned persons subscribe to sep the final outcome will be consistent with the principles of sep and thus stable and sustainable. putting the new paradigm into practice the issue is how to promote this sufficiency philosophy to people at large; from individuals who make decisions in government and corporations, to individuals who make decisions at family and community levels? there can be wide range of options which are normally used to promote a particular point of view or idea and many of these are currently followed in the country. some of the current strategies are; practical demonstration of the benefits which can be achieved if the idea (sep) is followed ; use of education system, seminars and discussion groups even conferences to highlight the potential beneficial impacts; use of media for a wide scale generation of a visual impact of the potential benefits and how these can be realized; adoption of the principles in national policy-making and many more. however a more “scientific” approach would be to identify the “factors/determinants” which makes an individual committed to the principles of sep. “determinants of sep characteristics” can for instance, be influenced through respect for his majesty the king, the individual’s socio-economic characteristics, education level and type of institutions attended, strength of religious beliefs and participation in religious activities organized by temples, profession, family environment and many more. once the determinants are identified they can be used as instruments to promote acceptance and encourage the use of sep at the level of individual decision. once this is embraced by a large section of the population from every walks of life, establishment of an alternate development paradigm will follow. these concepts can be applied in all economic sectors; agriculture industry and services and in both rural and urban areas. however his majesty the king gave agriculture and rural areas priority as these have been the foundation of the thai society. the concepts have been formalized, 66 prajñā vihāra promoted and disseminated to grassroots beneficiaries, communities and districts/provinces through royal development centers and projects. for establishing the sufficiency economy framework as a practical alternate development model, it is required to identify and measure the accrual of “actual” multiple benefits at different levels; economic, social, cultural, environmental and religious/ethical. this can be achieved through collecting appropriate field data with the help of structured questionnaires and analyzing them subsequently. data collection and analysis can form a priority research agenda in the future. a second line of research in the area of “sufficiency economics” could be developing appropriate “sufficiency” frameworks for industry and services sectors. it is expected that an economy-wide application of sufficiency economy framework will lead to stable economic growth, sustainable environment and an ethical and “happier” society. end notes 1(http://sociology.about.com/od/works/a/the-protestant-ethic-and-the-spiritof-capitalism.htm) dated 01/05/2014 2(http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/protestantethic/summary.html) 3economic performance is also measured by gross national product (gnp) which is (almost similar to gdp) defined as value of goods and services produced in a country in one year using labour, capital and other resources supplied by the citizens of the country (of national origin) 4the income approach and the expenditure approach to measuring the gdp of a nation (http://www.econclassroom.com/?p=2632) 5gross national happiness (http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/articles/) 6green gdp (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/green_gross_domestic_product) 7buddhist economics (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/buddhist_economics) 8economic ideas of mahatma gandhi (http://www.mapsofindia.com/personalities/ gandhi/economic-ideas.html) 9philosophy of sufficiency economy (http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&itemid=293) http://sociology.about.com/od/works/a/the-protestant-ethic-and-the-spirit-of-capitalism.htm http://sociology.about.com/od/works/a/the-protestant-ethic-and-the-spirit-of-capitalism.htm http://www.econclassroom.com/?p=2632 http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&itemid=293 http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&itemid=293 hiren sarkar 67 10self sufficiency economy in thailand (http://www.google.co.in/ url?url=http://ekh.unep.org/files/self%2520sufficiency%2520economy% 2520in%2520thailand.doc&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=u&ei=alt7u6xgc tlj8axshydgcg&ved=0cb8qfjac&sig2=otmv6s37zk4tgg4hvom__a&usg= afqjcnhzo3_zllap670ltnw4vototuc3ma) 11greed and desire (http://buddhism.about.com/od/basicbuddhistteachings/a/ greed.htm) 12sometimes more than proportionate increase 13waste from consumption and production a threat to natural resources (http:// www.grida.no/publications/vg/waste/page/2858.aspx) 14sufficiency economy: a pathway to sustainable development (http:// www.ijmbs.com/14/amit.pdf) 15“structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the ‘new financial architecture”, james crotty university of massachusetts amherst, crotty@econs.umass.edu (http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1017&context=econ_workingpaper) 16http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/26/us-usa-economy-geithner idusbre83p01p20120426 http://www.google.co.in/url?url=http://ekh.unep.org/files/self%2520sufficiency%2520economy%2520in%2520thailand.doc&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=u&ei=alt7u6xgctlj8axshydgcg&ved=0cb8qfjac&sig2=otmv6s37zk4tgg4hvom__a&usg=afqjcnhzo3_zllap670ltnw4vototuc3ma http://www.google.co.in/url?url=http://ekh.unep.org/files/self%2520sufficiency%2520economy%2520in%2520thailand.doc&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=u&ei=alt7u6xgctlj8axshydgcg&ved=0cb8qfjac&sig2=otmv6s37zk4tgg4hvom__a&usg=afqjcnhzo3_zllap670ltnw4vototuc3ma http://www.google.co.in/url?url=http://ekh.unep.org/files/self%2520sufficiency%2520economy%2520in%2520thailand.doc&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=u&ei=alt7u6xgctlj8axshydgcg&ved=0cb8qfjac&sig2=otmv6s37zk4tgg4hvom__a&usg=afqjcnhzo3_zllap670ltnw4vototuc3ma http://www.google.co.in/url?url=http://ekh.unep.org/files/self%2520sufficiency%2520economy%2520in%2520thailand.doc&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=u&ei=alt7u6xgctlj8axshydgcg&ved=0cb8qfjac&sig2=otmv6s37zk4tgg4hvom__a&usg=afqjcnhzo3_zllap670ltnw4vototuc3ma http://www.google.co.in/url?url=http://ekh.unep.org/files/self%2520sufficiency%2520economy%2520in%2520thailand.doc&rct=j&frm=1&q=&esrc=s&sa=u&ei=alt7u6xgctlj8axshydgcg&ved=0cb8qfjac&sig2=otmv6s37zk4tgg4hvom__a&usg=afqjcnhzo3_zllap670ltnw4vototuc3ma http://buddhism.about.com/od/basicbuddhistteachings/a/greed.htm http://buddhism.about.com/od/basicbuddhistteachings/a/greed.htm http://www.grida.no/publications/vg/waste/page/2858.aspx http://www.grida.no/publications/vg/waste/page/2858.aspx http://www.ijmbs.com/14/amit.pdf http://www.ijmbs.com/14/amit.pdf mailto:crotty@econs.umass.edu http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=econ_workingpaper http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=econ_workingpaper 68 prajñā vihāra 22 prajñā vihāra nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness in comparison with schopenhauer and aristotle volkmar enßlin mahidol university, thailand abstract one of the most difficult and controversial concepts in buddhism is the concept of emptiness or śūnyatā. it often attracts the attention of western thinkers, who expend much effort either to embrace or reject it. hence, this concept had led to many contradictory interpretations and endless discussions. emptiness, or śūnyatā, has been so often misunderstood, not only in the west, but also in india itself, even during nāgārjuna’s own time. out of this bed of conflicting interpretations lies the motivation for this article to assist in the understanding of the concept of śūnyatā. i will focus on the concept as taught by the indian monk nāgārjuna of the mādhyamika school. in pursuing this approach, i will show a corresponding interpretation of another mādhyamika monk, śāntideva, and will reveal parallels to the 19th century german philosopher arthur schopenhauer. in order to demonstrate an opposing theory, i will contrast nāgārjuna’s concept to the theory of the ancient greek philosopher aristotle. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 2, july december 2017, 22-38 © 2000 by assumption university press volkmar enßlin 23 introducing nāgārjuna the tradition is that nāgārjuna founded together with his disciple āryadeva the mādhyamika school, a darśana, which is famous for its systematic approach to help seeing things the way they really are. mādhyamika is an important school in the mahāyāna buddhist tradition. its name derives from its middle position between the realism of the sarvāstivāda, the doctrine that all is real and the idealism of the yogācāra, or that all is only mind. hence, paul williams translates mādhyamika as the ‘middling’ or the ‘middle way’.1 the school’s clarification of the concept śūnyatā is regarded as an intellectual and spiritual achievement of the highest order. this led to the recognition of nāgārjuna as a patriarch by several later buddhist schools. there have been many hagiographies written of nāgārjuna; some even refer to him as the “second buddha”.2 various sources describe nāgārjuna in glamorous ways. the encyclopædia britannica article tries to sift fact from fiction: “the fact that various texts ascribe different religious qualities to nāgārjuna and give dates for his life that range over 500 years suggests that the references available may pertain to several persons and may include some imaginary accounts. nonetheless, some historical materials support various elements of nāgārjuna’s biographies. present scholarship indicates that nāgārjuna could have lived as early as ad 50 and as late as ad 280. a common consensus gives his dates as ad 150–250.”3 similarly vague are many accounts of his whereabouts during his lifetime. nevertheless, one hypothesis suggests that he had lived in south india. some archaeological evidence supports this assumption.4 nāgārjuna’s principal philosophical works which have remained available in sanskrit are the mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the ‘fundamental’ or ‘root’ (mūla) ‘concise statements in verses’ (kārikā) on the ‘middle 24 prajñā vihāra way’ (madhyamaka); and the vigrahavyāvartanī, the ‘quarrel’ (vigraha) in terms of a ‘debate’ with the means of ‘averting’ (vyāvartana5) the opponent’s argument. this gives the literal english translation of vigrahavyāvartanī as ‘she who is averting quarrel’. erich frauwallner translated it beautifully into german as “die streitabwehrerin”.6 both works are critical analyses of views about the origin of existence, the means of knowledge, and the nature of reality. these two texts are highly praised as nāgārjuna’s best works – as frauwallner commented on the vigrahavyāvartanī: “es ist eines seiner besten werke und zeigt ihn in seiner ganzen eigenart, vor allem in seiner unbeirrbaren folgerichtigkeit”.7 consequently, this article focuses on nāgārjuna’s discursive texts, which are available to us, with the emphasis on emptiness of all things, rather than on the legends and myths about his life, which will lead to a further examination of the concept of emptiness by the mādhyamika school. mādhyamika’s view on emptiness according to nāgārjuna, the whole world is characterized by being empty. at first glance, this seems quite a complex philosophical position. the idea is that things as we perceive them are ultimately nothing other than projections of our own mind through a process of conceptualization. hence, things in the perceptual world do not possess any inherent characteristics. this implies that individual objects depend for their being on what they are to be taken as through other, external factors. therefore, it is not the case that they possess any features on their own that make them what they are. all dharmas (‘things’) are being seen as śūnya (‘empty’). hence, all things are empty of any inherent or intrinsic existence, and they solely depend on their causes and conditions (pratītyasamutpāda) – and that is what is called śūnyatā (‘emptiness’).8 nāgārjuna describes this in his mūlamadhyamakakārikā in chapter xxiv in verse 18: volkmar enßlin 25 “we declare that whatever is relational origination is śūnyatā. it is a provisional name (i.e., thought construction) for the mutuality (of being) and, indeed, it is the middle path.”9 nāgārjuna further strengthens his argument by nullifying the opposite in verse 19: “any factor of experience which does not participate in relational origination cannot exist. therefore, any factor of experience not in the nature of śūnya cannot exist.”10 (ibid.) to summarize this in my own words: things as they appear to us do not possess any existence on their own. therefore they are seen as empty, as unsubstantial, and it is this emptiness, which is their absolute truth. nāgārjuna’s thought was in the same way expressed half a millennium later by śāntideva in his bodhicaryāvatāra. it is the ‘entry’ (avatāra) into the ‘practice’ (caryā) for ‘awakening’ (bodhi). its popularity came about due to being on the one hand an inspirational poem and at the same time a profound teaching. in chapter ix, verse 2 in the bodhicaryāvatāra śāntideva exemplifies: “this pair of truths we suppose: the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. reality is not a field of intellection; intellection is called conventional truth.”11 in other words: saṃvṛtisatya is the conventional or relative truth, i.e., as things appear to worldly beings. things are seen by ordinary people and at the same time perceived as being real. whereas paramārthasatya is the ultimate or absolute truth, i.e., the ultimate nature of appearing things, which declares saṃvṛtisatya as a perceiving illusion. therefore, the conventional truth is deceiving, and from the perspective of the absolute truth seen as a pure illusion of ordinary people. 26 prajñā vihāra one might understand this point better if nāgārjuna’s view here is contrasted with that of aristotle and the theory of essentialism. the opposing argument of aristotle and the theory of essentialism in contrast to nāgārjuna, for aristotle, individual objects possess some kind of ‘essence’ that makes them what they really are. this ‘essence’ of an individual thing is peculiar to it and is not common to anything else, and in a sense it is identical with the thing itself. aristotle calls this ‘essence’ the ‘what-it-is-to-be-that-thing’.12 “… [i]t is evident that each particular itself, and the essence, not according to accident are one and the same thing, and that to have a scientific knowledge, at any rate, of anything is to know scientifically the very nature or essence of that thing.”.13 the essence being one and the same thing with the particular thing, thus, the ‘what-it-is-to-be-that-thing’ x is just the thing that makes x an x rather than a y. for example, to answer the question “what is it that is a ‘table’?”. it would not be enough to define it by material, i.e., “it is wood.” neither to define it by form: “it is a study table where you can read books.” nor does the material of this thing alone have no individual character nor does form alone tell us what this individual thing really is. things are what they can be said to be. what exists is always ‘this here thing’, ‘this here study table’.14 this is similar to the theory of essentialism. it is the philosophical viewpoint that for any specific entity there are a set kind of characteristics or properties, that any entity of that kind must possess. the members of a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither needed to establish its membership nor exclude its membership. essences cannot just reflect the ways of grouping objects; they must result in properties of the object. an essence characterizes a substance or a form; it is permanent, unalterable, eternal, and present in every possible way. in simple terms, essentialism is a generalization stating that certain properties possessed by a group (e.g. people, things, ideas) are universal, and not dependent on context.15 for example, the essential properties of a tiger are volkmar enßlin 27 those without which it is no longer a tiger, i.e. regardless of whether it is striped, or albino, or has lost a leg. properties, such as stripes or number of legs, are considered inessential.16 nāgārjuna’s response to assumptions about ‘essences’ in chapter xv, verses 1 and 2 of his mūlamadhyamakakārikā he tells us: “the rise of self-nature [svabhāva] by relational and causal conditions is not justifiable. for, such a self-nature will have a character of being made or manipulated.” “how is it possible for the self-nature to take on the character of being made? for, indeed, the self-nature refers to something which cannot be made and has no mutual correspondence with something else.”17 for nāgārjuna one cannot find anything that corresponds to the aristotelian ‘what-it-is-to-be-that-thing’, because what it is to be anything cannot be found in that thing itself. what is to be an x for nāgārjuna depends crucially, but not solely, on the conceptual apparatus of the perceiver and cognizer, such that the thing is perceived to be an x. it also depends on other external factors. thus a table is a table only because it fits with a conceptual category of ‘being a table’ in someone’s mind. ultimately speaking, the table is not what it appears at all, for when one breaks it down, no components remain that can be identified as ‘the table’. even when the components, such as the table’s legs, the top of the table, and so on, are put together in a certain way, the form in which these components are put together itself does not constitute the essential feature of the table because they do not exist ‘inside’ the table, so to speak, and exist as a form in the mind of the perceiver. thus the relation between the object and the perceiver or the subject is crucial. that does not imply the negation of the table as such, but the table is nothing more than an impermanent appearance relative to its causes and conditions.18 28 prajñā vihāra according to nāgārjuna, the opponent (in our case aristotle), is confused about the negation. to negate an entity x, one must first suppose that x exists. it is exactly this particular point where aristotle’s argument is entangled in difficulties. “… [f]or if x does exist, then it cannot truly be said of x that it is not existent. therefore, it is the opponent’s position that is absurd…. furthermore, the opponent cannot take the line that emptiness does not exist without abandoning the principle that negation is only of an existent, for the opponent wishes to negate the doctrine of emptiness, and yet he does not want to say that emptiness exists, either. … [t]he negation of a non-existent entity does not establish the non-existence of that entity, but simply makes its non-existence known …”.19 nāgārjuna points this out through an example about the negation of a mirage in his vigrahavyāvartanī, verse 66: “if that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. that perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed. if that perception of a mirage as water were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. since, however, it comes into existence in dependence upon the mirage, the wrong sight and the distracted attention, it is dependently originated. and since it is dependently originated, it is indeed void by its own nature – as previously stated.”20 in this way nāgārjuna shows that an approach like that of aristotle, is mistaken because it is based on the assumption that one can only negate something that is real – but a mirage is unreal. it can only exist dependently. volkmar enßlin 29 “… and to say that an entity x exists dependently is equivalent to the claim that it cannot be found within the totality of causes and conditions. according to fundamental buddhist principles, this means that the mirage does not exist.”21 similarities between schopenhauer’s and nāgārjuna’s viewpoints arthur schopenhauer was born in danzig in 1788 and studied philosophy at the universities of göttingen and berlin. his main philosophical work was published in 1819 as die welt als wille und vorstellung (the world as will and representation).22 schopenhauer picked up immanuel kant’s concept of the thingin-itself as an act of the self-positing subject. whereby kant maintained that the thing-in-itself, the correlative of the phenomenon, is unknowable; for schopenhauer the correlative of the phenomenon is the will. schopenhauer arrived at this conviction by looking inwards within oneself. “for in inner consciousness or inwardly directed perception lies ‘the single narrow door to the truth’.”. it is the will that become idea or presentation. the whole world is nothing but objectified will, will as a presentation to consciousness. schopenhauer combined his enthusiasm for the hindu philosophy of maya with a great admiration for the buddha. this buddhist viewpoint can be found in schopenhauer’s work if we relate it to nāgārjuna’s insight that the relation between the object and the perceiver or the subject is crucial. for nāgārjuna, an object such as a table is ‘empty of its inherent character’ precisely because there is no thing in the object itself that qualifies to be the object without being related to any other outside factors. thus to be an object requires a subject, and this is also schopenhauer’s point. nāgārjuna’s view that objects are empty, however, should not be interpreted as saying that ultimately speaking there are no such things as tables, chairs or the like, because for a thing to be ‘empty of its inherent character’ does not mean that it does not exist. tables and chairs do really exist in the world, but their ontological status is not an independent one. 30 prajñā vihāra for schopenhauer as well, objects such as tables and chairs do not exist on their own. “the world of experience is the phenomenal world: it is object for a subject. and as such it is the world of our mental presentations (vorstellungen).”23 they are projections or manifestations of the will, and this is where schopenhauer and nāgārjuna agree. another similar point is that for schopenhauer and nāgārjuna there is no duality between the things as they appear and the ultimate reality which they really are. thus objective things and the will or emptiness are essentially expressing one and the same thing. for nāgārjuna this is because emptiness itself is nothing but the fact that all things are interdependent.24 in terms of schopenhauer’s thinking, it does not make sense to say that individual objects are separate from the will, because the whole metaphysical system relies on the idea that there is, essentially speaking, only one entity, namely the will. so for schopenhauer, the will, being the only one entity there is, appears as many things as perceived by an individual subject because the latter is endowed with the principle of individuation, which enables the subject to perceive the world as it appears. “if … the world exists only as object for a subject, it is also true that the percipient subject is correlative with the object.”25 the world is one’s idea. this also corresponds to nāgārjuna’s view that it is conceptual imputation that results in our perception of things as being manifold, as being separated one from another. for schopenhauer matter and intelligence have been “… inseparable correlates, existing only for one another, and therefore only relatively … the two together constitute the world as idea …”.26 hence, the world is one’s own idea, and as such a projection comprises both perceiver and perceived. differences between emptiness and the will although the will and emptiness are similar in several ways, there are clear differences. the will is a blind driving force, which is manifested concretely through our conscious, individual will and bodily action. emptiness, on the other hand, can’t be so described at all and has no individual characteristics whatsoever. in fact, this is consistent with volkmar enßlin 31 nāgārjuna’s claim that emptiness itself is empty: śūnyatā is śūnyatā. which means that emptiness itself is not different from any other individual object because emptiness also lacks any inherent characteristics. what this means is that emptiness itself is also a result of conceptual imputation. it is we, human beings, who use the term ‘emptiness’ to call it and to qualify it in such a way that it ‘lacks inherent characteristics’. this emptiness itself is empty. one cannot ascribe any substantive qualification or property to emptiness. this is in contrast to the will, which for schopenhauer has a number of its own characteristics, which it does not share with other objects. this is a key difference, and it stems from the two philosophers’ differences with regard to how their conceptions of ultimate reality come about. nāgārjuna arrived at the conception of emptiness through analysis of the concept of a thing. for example, a thing has to have a boundary beyond which it is not that thing. it is inconceivable for a thing to have no limit at all, for that would mean no words can describe it. but if there is a limit then it is that very limit that defines the thing in question. and since the limit, or the boundary of a thing, cannot be one and the same as the thing itself, the thing is essentially dependent upon another thing, which it is not. “all things prevail for the one for whom this emptiness prevails. nothing prevails for the one for whom emptiness does not prevail.” (own translation of verse 70 of vigrahavyāvartanī)27 this is not the same as schopenhauer, who models the conception of the will on bodily conscious acts. “… schopenhauer does not wish to base his philosophy on a privileged and exceptional intuition of ultimate reality, but rather on our intuitive perception of our own volition.”28 32 prajñā vihāra nāgārjuna’s and schopenhauer’s way of salvation according to nāgārjuna, it is in the world that one transcends the world and thus transfigures it. there is not the slightest difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. verses 19 and 20 in chapter xxv of the mūlamadhyamakakārikā state: “saṃsāra (i.e., the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from nirvāṇa. nirvāṇa is nothing essentially different from saṃsāra. the limits (i.e., realm) of nirvāṇa are the limits of saṃsāra. between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever.”29 the difference between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is in our way of looking at them. nirvāṇa is saṃsāra without appearance and disappearance, without ‘dependent origination’. as described in verse 9 in chapter xxv of the mūlamadhyamakakārikā: “the status of the birth-death cycle is due to existential grasping (of the skandhas) and relational condition (of the being). that which is non-grasping and non-relational is taught as nirvāṇa.”30 to reach nirvāṇa one first has to overcome one’s defilements. the method of mādhyamika to overcome defilements is through holding to the impression of emptiness, which later on itself has to be discarded by realizing that the impression of existence is nothing at all. ernst steinkellner offers a splendid translation of this method by the mādhyamika, described in the bodhicaryāvatāra in chapter ix, verses 33 till 35: “wenn man sich der tendenz zur leerheit versichert, schwindet die tendenz zum sein, und später schwindet durch die einübung der [erkenntnis], dass nichts existiert, auch diese [tendenz zur leerheit]. volkmar enßlin 33 wenn man auf kein sein mehr stößt, von dem man annehmen könnte, dass es nicht existiere, wie könnte sich dann dem geist ein anhaltsloses nichtsein bieten? wenn sich dem geist nicht sein noch nichtsein bieten, dann findet er, anhaltslos, die ruhe, denn eine andere möglichkeit gibt es nicht.”31 32 our inclination towards existence has to be eliminated through the realization of emptiness. then even the inclination towards emptiness will be eliminated through the realization that also emptiness itself has no substantial existence. hence, the realization (die vergegenwärtigung/das innewerden) of emptiness is capable to break up the binary category of thinking and the dichotomizing category of speaking about ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’.33 schopenhauer describes two ways of escaping the ‘slavery of the will’. firstly, the way of aesthetic contemplation, which he describes as the way of art. in aesthetic contemplation one transcends the original subjection of knowledge to the will, to desire. one becomes the pure will-less subject of knowledge, lost in fixed contemplation. in that state one is freed from the servitude of the will. the mind enjoys a rest from being an instrument for the satisfaction of desire and adopts a purely objective and disinterested point of view. in summary: if the will turns on itself and abolishes itself, nothing is left. this is probably one of the most striking similarities between schopenhauer and the mādhyamika’s approach to even overcome emptiness at the end through realizing the emptiness of emptiness (compare with bodhicaryāvatāra, chapter ix, verses 33 till 35 above). or as nāgārjuna put it: śūnyatā is śūnyatā. the second way is the path of asceticism, which schopenhauer calls the way of salvation. one “… must disown his own nature by extinguishing at the source all sensual desire and gratification, by the voluntary acceptance of poverty, by the mortification of the body which is the visible objectivity of the will.”34 in contrast to the first option, this approach of schopenhauer might be taken as an alternative to the buddhist 34 prajñā vihāra path towards enlightenment, which does not encourage the extremes of asceticism. closing thought after having portrayed the similarities between nāgārjuna, śāntideva and schopenhauer, and contrasted their ideas with the standpoint of aristotle, i hope i have contributed to the closer understanding of the concept of śūnyatā. now, whether nāgārjuna was referring with his expression ‘the middle path’ to the teaching of the buddha or whether he tried to give a definition of his own position (tauscher, 2009: 96), has finally to be left open. at the end nāgārjuna neither denies the world nor affirms it. this view could be seen as ‘the middle path’ – and therefore the name of his philosophy as mādhyamika. i personally gained the impression that nāgārjuna did not aim to give a definition of śūnyatā of his own. i say so because, basically speaking, nāgārjuna elaborates on the buddha’s teaching without adding any substantive ideas of his own. knowing that this is a rather contentious point among buddhist scholars, nevertheless, i think it is clear in any case that nāgārjuna’s intention in his work is not to propound his own view, but to clarify and systematize the buddha’s teaching so as to achieve the soteriological goal of buddhism itself. volkmar enßlin 35 endnotes 1 ibid, p. 63 2 williams, mahāyāna buddhism, 63 3 encyclopædia britannica, “nāgārjuna” 4 the archaeological evidence is based on “... a letter (suhṛllekha, “friendly letter”) credited to him, written to a king of the sātavāhana dynasty, possibly yajñaśrī (c. 173–202); and perhaps by his name, which includes the name of the nāgā people, who lived in south india.” (encyclopædia britannica, “nāgārjuna”). 5 vyāvartanī has the feminine ending -ī to the participle vyāvartana (averting, removing). 6 frauwallner, erich. 1969. die philosophie des buddhismus, p. 199 7 ‘it is one of his best works and shows him in all his idiosyncrasy, especially in his undeviating congruity’. 8 williams, mahāyāna buddhism, p. 68-69) 9 inada, nāgārjuna, 148. the verse reads: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmah | sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamā || 10 inada, nāgārjuna, 148. the verse reads: apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate | yasmāttasmādaśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścinna vidyate || 11 inada, nāgārjuna, 148. the verse reads: saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayamidaṃ mataṃ | buddheragocarastattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtirucyate || 12 randall, aristotle, 118-119 13 m’mahon, the metaphysics of aristotle, 178 14 randall, aristotle, 117-118 15 barrett, “on the functional origins of essentialism,” 3-5 16 hirschfeld, “natural assumptions: race, essence, and taxonomies of human kinds,” 337 17 inada, nāgārjuna, 97-98 18 williams, mahāyāna buddhism, 69 19 wood, nāgārjunian disputations, 114 20 bhattacharya, the dialectical method of nāgārjuna, 133. 36 prajñā vihāra 21 wood, nāgārjunian disputations, 114 22 copleston, a history of philosophy, 25-26 23 ibid., 28 24 cf. verse 18 in chapter xxiv of nāgārjuna’s mūlamadhyamakakārikā on page 4 of this article 25 copleston, a history of philosophy, 32-33 26 ibid., 33 27 prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ | prabhavati na tasya kiṃcinna prabhavati śūnyatā yasya || 28 copleston, a history of philosophy, p. 41 29 inada, nāgārjuna, 158 30 inada, nāgārjuna, 156 31 inada, nāgārjuna, 148. the verse reads: śūnyatāvāsanādhānāddhīyate bhāvavāsanā | kiṃcinnāstīti cābhyāsāt sāpi paścāt prahīyate || yadā na labhyate bhāvo yo nāstīti prakalpyate | tadā nirāśrayo’bhāvaḥ kathaṃ tiṣṭhenmateḥ puraḥ || yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ | tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyate || 32 steinkellner, shantideva p. 131.these above quoted german verses are equivalent to verses 32-34 in the english translation by crosby & skilton: “the influence of phenomena is removed by employing the influence of emptiness, and even that is later eradicated by inculcating the realization, ‘nothing really exists’. [cittamātra] if it is concluded that the entity which does not really exist cannot be perceived, then how does a non-entity which is without basis remain before the mind? [mādhyamika] when neither entity nor non-entity remains before the mind, since there is no other mode of operation, grasping no objects, it becomes tranquil.” (crosby & skilton, the bodhicaryāvatāra: p. 156) 33 ruegg, bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra als lehrschrift und vorhaben, 124. 34 knox, the aesthetic theories of kant, hegel, and schopenhauer, 131. volkmar enßlin 37 bibliography barrett, h. clark. 2001. “on the functional origins of essentialism”. mind & society, 3, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 1-30. bhattacharya, kamaleswar. the dialectical method of nāgārjuna: vigrahavyāvartanī. delhi: motilal banarsidass, 2005. copleston, frederick. a history of philosophy. volume vii. modern philosophy: part ii schopenhauer to nietzsche. new york: image books, 1965. crosby, kate & skilton, andrew. the bodhicaryāvatāra: a guide to the buddhist path to awakening. birmingham: windhorse, 2002. encyclopædia britannica. encyclopædia britannica 2007 ultimate reference suite. chicago: encyclopædia britannica, 2009. frauwallner, erich. die philosophie des buddhismus. berlin: akademie verlag, 1969. hirschfeld, lawrence a. 1998. “natural assumptions: race, essence, and taxonomies of human kinds”. social research, 65, 2, pp. 330-349. inada, kenneth. nāgārjuna: a translation of his mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an introductory essay. delhi: sri satguru, 1993. knox, israel. the aesthetic theories of kant, hegel, and schopenhauer. new york: the humanities press, 1958. m’mahon, john. the metaphysics of aristotle. london: henry g. bohn, 1857. mahoney, richard. 2002. accessed july 6th 2009, 4:20 p.m., url: <http://repositorium.indica-et-buddhica. org/archive/opera/santideva/zan_bca.pdf>. monier-williams, monier. a sanskrit-english dictionary. delhi: motilal banarsidass, 2005. 38 prajñā vihāra randall, john. aristotle. new york: columbia university press, 1960. ruegg, david. 2009. bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra als lehrschrift und vorhaben: zum thema ritual, religion, philosophie und mystik im buddhismus. accessed april 4th 2009, 11:27 p.m., url: <http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/pdf/ digitale_texte/bd3-k07ruegg.pdf>. steinkellner, ernst. shantideva: der weg des lebens zur erleuchtung. das bodhicaryavatara. münchen: heinrich hugendubel, 2005. tauscher, helmut. 2009. die zwei wirklichkeiten. accessed april 4th 2009, 11:14 p.m., url: <http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg. de/fileadmin/pdf/digitale_texte/bd3-k06tauscher.pdf>. williams, paul. second edition. mahāyāna buddhism: the doctrinal foundations. london: routledge., 2009. wood, thomas. nāgārjunian disputations: a philosophical journey through an indian looking-glass. honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1994. prajnaviharav20n1.indd 66 prajñā vihāra towards a neo-aristotelian account of philosophical counseling thesigan nadarajan and michael clark assumption university, thailand abstract at present, there is no generally accepted account of what philosophical counselling is or why we should practice it. the aim of this article is to propose an account of philosophical counselling in terms of an aristotelian concept of eudaimonia. i argue that this concept provides an apt description of what philosophical counselling, in many cases, consists in. one benefit of construing philosophical counselling in terms of eudaimonia is that it provides a natural justification for the practice: since it is plausible that eudaimonia is a desirable state to be in, philosophical counselling is worth engaging in inasmuch as it promotes that state. keywords: philosophical counseling, aristotle, eudaimonia. introduction philosophical counselling is a kind of psychological therapy that aims to promote happiness and mental wellbeing by engaging the patient in broadly philosophical dialogue and inquiry. the main aim of this paper is to show the effectiveness of this kind of counselling when considered from aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia. prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 1 january to june 2019, 66-74 © 2000 by assumption university press thesigan nadarajan and michael clark 67 this paper is structured as follows. in section one, i will explain the aristotelian concept of eudaimonia how such a state is achieved. in section two, i will show how eudaimonia can be considered as the aim of philosophical counseling. lastly in section three, i will provide recommendations for future studies on this topic. aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia aristotle begins the nicomachean ethics by stating that “every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good”2 after pointing out that these goods are sometimes subordinate to others, he seems to adopt the working hypothesis that there is a fundamental good: a good that is intrinsically desirable (at least, for humans) and relative to which all other goods that we might aim at are subordinate, and from which they derive their meaning and value. he labels this ultimate good eudaimonia and proceeds to defend a number of substantive claims about its nature. according to aristotle, the practical benefit derived from discussing the nature of eudaimonia is that, like archers who know the nature and location of their target, we are more likely to achieve our goals. we can, perhaps, all agree that happiness or well-being is ultimately what is desirable in life. but in what do these states consist? aristotle dismisses several candidate conceptions of happiness, as being identical with pleasure3, wealth4, and honor5. a more plausible account, aristotle suggests, will be grounded in mankind’s distinctive nature, which gives rise to “the characteristic function of man.”6 he includes, quite plausibly, the ability to reason as part of mankind’s distinctive nature. and he also connects happiness to moral virtue. eudaimonia, for aristotle, involves the use of reason in accordance with the virtues. to fail to use ones reason, or to live without virtue, is to fail to live in the distinctively human state of well-being – it is to fail to do well, as a human being. aristotle went on to explain that moral virtue is developed through habituation. and for aristotle the process of habituation is beyond mere imitation7 and was very similar to the psychological process called 68 prajñā vihāra reinforcement.8 this is a process by which the contents of a person’s character – consisting, in part, of their reflective judgements, their desires, and their emotional responses is gradually modified and brought into a kind of internal harmony. for example, suppose that a person decides to become kinder, or to learn to appreciate opera. at first, he might encounter dissonance between these decisions and his unconscious responses. he might still feel amused when he sees a stranger slip on ice, and bored at a performance of don giovanni. but, by scrutinizing these unconscious responses, and trying to modify how he sees their objects, over time he might come to feel that other people’s suffering is not funny, and that don giovanni is an entertaining and profound piece of art. through this process he gains a kind of rational control over his inner life. this is something that humans are, perhaps, uniquely capable of. we can decide not to give in to temptation by resisting the second helping of cake – perhaps because we want to lose weight, or in order to leave enough for everybody else. this capacity to regulate our desires in light of our goals and values is essential to our status as persons for aristotle, if we want to live well as a person then we have to exercise this capacity. eudaimonia, then, involves the achievement of an inner harmony between a person’s consciously acknowledged decisions and plans, their desires, and their emotional responses. philosophical counselling, i want to suggest, can help us overcome certain kinds of disharmony and thereby help bring us to eudaimonia. i will illustrate this by considering several kinds of disharmony. eudaimonia and philosophical counseling so what is philosophical counseling? a rough working definition of philosophical counseling extracted from the specific practices in south africa9 describes philosophical counseling that includes a trained philosophical counselor who dealt with problems related to “reasoning or conceiving”, as opposed to “physiological or neuropsychiatric thesigan nadarajan and michael clark 69 dysfunction.” the processes used were interactive, bilateral, “dialogical”, and the use of mutual probing and questioning to resolve “the problem in question.”10 philosophical counselors often deal with problems related to moral reasoning and moral dilemmas which were in line with the concept of eudaimonia. consider cases of akrasia, or incontinence. aristotle posed the question, “but in what sense, it may be objected, can a man judge rightly when he acts incontinently?”11 in other words, how is it possible for a man to act against what he judges, all things considered, to be best? yet incontinence seems an everyday phenomenon, involving an inner disharmony where ones’ beliefs and explicitly avowed values are in conflict with what one desires and ultimately chooses. the philosophical counsellor deals with such issues by guiding clients through their state of disharmony. she does so by asking them to explicitly formulate their goals, the reasons that favor them, and the sources of their countervailing desires. by doing this, the patient can either modify their goals or better understand and regulate their desires. hopefully, this will result in improved happiness and mental wellbeing, and bring them closer to eudaimonia. it is crucial to note that one’s explicit beliefs and goals do not enjoy a carte blanche in cases of akrasia: sometimes these need modifying, and one’s immediate emotional responses and desires actually better represent ones character. this is the lesson to take form the literature on inverse akrasia. for instance, in ethical studies of mark twain’s work adventures of huckleberry finn, bennett. considers the kind of emotional distress felt by huck finn concerning the conflicts of his moral beliefs.12 huck considered his attempts to help the escaped slave jim. as morally wrong from the standpoint of social beliefs. and yet this deeper sense of morality and loyalty to jim was what was truly right. this would be one of the purposes of philosophical counseling: to make 70 prajñā vihāra one see the rightness or wrongness of ones internalized moral beliefs. scenario 1: political decision making mr. a who is a newly elected member of parliament comes in for counseling. his problem is, he must vote for a race-based matriculation system bill that is going to be tabled in parliament by the ruling party of his country. now, the political whip of his party had already forewarned all party mps that they must show collective political support by giving their affirmative vote regardless of their personal feelings. this is to show political solidarity with the ruling party which will ensure the votes from the majority ethnic group in the next general election. personally, he does not approve of racial discriminations as his moral beliefs is in the values of meritocracy. though he and his family would benefit by his affirmative vote as they are from the majority ethnic group, he still cannot support such a bill. but he knows that if he doesn’t cast his affirmative vote then he will be losing favor with his political party and its leadership. that would put his political career into jeopardy. at home, his wife thinks that he should cast his affirmative vote, as they as family would benefit economically. this creates an inner conflict (moral dilemmas) between his moral beliefs and values and what is expected of him resulting in unhappiness, stress and mentally strained. how can i help mr. a through philosophical counseling? here is a proposed approach. as a philosophical counselor, i am merely a moderator who is there to guide mr. a to bring about inner harmony by synchronizing his moral beliefs and values with his political decision making and actions that would bring inner moral harmony of his inner conflicts. so i would begin by asking him to assert what his beliefs and values for the purpose of vocalizing and reinforcing what he already holds and what he wants for the future. questions like, “what is your considered moral belief about the affirmative vote that is expected of you.” or, “since it is expected of you to give an affirmative vote, what would you really like to do?” if he insist upon his moral beliefs and values and resists is against the affirmative vote, then i will raise his fears of the possibility of his political thesigan nadarajan and michael clark 71 career loss and the blame that might come from his wife for not doing what was expected of him the purpose of raising such fears is to prepare him to face his fears even before it happens, and to assist him with the necessary justifications for his eventual decisions and actions. so i will ask, “since you already know the expectations of your party and your wife, do you agree with them?” if he says, “no” then i will ask him what your justifications are for saying no to them. i will then assist him to think and write down all possible justifications he can use to support his rejection of the affirmative vote. but at the same time i would again remind him that there are realistic consequences of career loss and blame from his wife that might result. i will then assist him to think and prepare for such results. the counseling principle is to assist the client to understand his own justifications for his own decisions and actions, as was the case of the huck finn example. and at the same time to prepare him to have his own contingency plans to face the consequences of his decisions and actions. if mr. a has both his own justifications and his own contingency plans, he can then proceed and act in accordance to his deeper moral beliefs and values thereby bringing inner moral harmony that leads to happiness, and mentally wellbeing. overall, it would lead mr. a closer to eudaimonia. on the other hand, if his response is, “well! it is better i do what my party and wife expects and avoid the negative consequences,” i will counter and ask him the following questions. firstly, “how will you justify your response that is in contradiction to your moral beliefs and values.” secondly, “how can you justify decision to the minority constituents who also voted for you?” thirdly, “what will you do if there is a public backlash against your party and you for racial discrimination?” fourthly, “are you ready to lose your personal moral credibility to do what is merely expected of you?” now, the above questions are meant to counter mr. a’s rationalization that disregard his deeper moral reasoning. it is to alert him to long-term moral distress and moral residue of such a decision. the counseling principle is to work with his original desire for inner moral harmony and his desire to attend counseling in order to resolve his moral conflicts and lead him closer to eudaimonia. the next case 72 prajñā vihāra study i would like to discuss involves a tragic moral dilemma in medical decision making. scenario 2: medical decision making ms. j who works as an emergency room doctor in a local hospital comes for counseling. she recently underwent the traumatic experience of having to decide to save a mother’s life over the life of her child who were accident victims. she is suffering from moral distress and carries with her moral guilt after making a life and death decision. what makes her moral guilt unavoidable was whichever person she decides to save, she would lose the other. how can i help ms. j through philosophical counseling? here is a proposed approach. i would begin by asking her to recount and relive her experience. the purpose is to journey with her through traumatic experience in a supportive but objective manner so that she can reflect on her decision making, her present feelings, her responsibilities and accountability. it is also to assist her to overcome her ‘moral residue’ of guilt. as she recounts her experience, i will ask her probing questions. i would begin by asking, “on the day of case, how you were physically, emotionally and mentally feeling?” this question was to establish her prior physical, emotional and mental states. the reason being her state of being would directly affect her decision makings. i would probe about her professional views concerning dealing with patients. this is to remind her of her professionalism. based on her diagnosis, it is obvious that both mother and child were in danger based on the fact that she decided to save the mother rather than her child. i would then probe her justifications of why she chose the mother’s live over the child. this is to ascertain whether she had an option to save both mother and child. again, in this case scenario, she did not have that option judging by her choice to save the mother. next, i will ask her, “if in your professional assessment you decided to save the mother because you assessed that medically she had the best chance of survival, why do you feel guilty? are you having doubts that both patients could have been saved?” this is to ascertain whether her feelings of guilt were due to her thesigan nadarajan and michael clark 73 doubts in her medical assessment. if she has no doubts in her professional medical decision, then it is clear that her feelings the preciousness of life are overwhelming her correct medical decision. finally, i would then ask a rhetorical question, “are not glad that you managed to save the mother’s life?” though her answer of “yes” was expected it was deliberately asked to highlight the fact that she was successful in saving a life thereby cementing her belief in the value of the preciousness of life. by this strategy, i would able to guide ms. j to regain her inner harmony by dispelling her moral guilt and to have resilience for future similar traumatic experiences conclusion and recommendations the above scenarios dealt with moral reasoning and moral dilemmas and which created various states of inner disharmony. eudaimonia therefore became useful as an end goal in philosophical counseling which attempts to resolve these issues. the key is to understand ones deeper moral reason and find ways of justifying it in the face of more superficial circumstances like the expectations of society or family, or professional expectations. especially important is the idea that morality is something habitual, something which needs to be practices. philosophical counseling can resolve conflicts and train one to cultivate one’s inner virtue. aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia. continues to be an important guide in resolving mental conflicts among patients. my recommendations for the future based on this study are: 1. there be more philosophical counseling studies based on the psychological concepts found in the nicomachean ethics. 2. there be more researches done on the correlation between moral reasoning and erroneous thinking. 74 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1. f. h. peters, the nicomachean ethics of aristotle. (kegan paul, trench, trubner & co., ltd, deyden house, gerrard street, w.1906) 2. peters, the nicomachean ethics, i.1. 3. peters, the nicomachean ethics, i.5.3. 4. peters, the nicomachean ethics, i.4.3. 5. peters, the nicomachean ethics, i.5.4-6. 6. peters, the nicomachean ethics, i.7.9-8. 7. peters, the nicomachean ethics, ii.1.1. 8. santi lisnawati, “the habituation of behavior as students’ character reinforcement in global era” jurnal pendidikan islam. 2, 2016, 413-428. 10.15575/ jpi.v2i3.852, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321964888_the_habituation_ of_behavior_as_students’_character_reinforcement_in_global_era. 9. dirk jacobus louw, “towards a definition of philosophical counselling in south africa.” university of south africa, 2-8, 2009, http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/ handle/10500/2949/dissertation_louw_%20dj.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y., pp. 2-8. 10. louw, “towards a definition of philosophical counselling in south africa” 35-37. 11. peters, the nicomachean ethics, 7.2.1 12. jonathan bennett, the conscience of huckleberry finn (philosophy 49, 1974), 123-134. bibliography bennett, j. “the conscience of huckleberry finn”. philosophy 49, 1974, pp. 123-134. lisnawati, santi. “the habituation of behavior as students’ character reinforcement in global era.” jurnal pendidikan islam. 2. 413-428. 2016 10.15575/jpi.v2i3.852. louw, dirk jacobus. “towards a definition of philosophical counselling in south africa.” university of south africa, 2009. peters, f. h., the nicomachean ethics of aristotle. kegan paul, trench, trubner & co., ltd, deyden house, gerrard street, w.1906 38 prajñā vihāra an early history of nothingness in philosophical and theological thought héctor sevilla godínez university of guadalajara, mexico abstract the question of nothingness was always asked in the history of philosophy at the sidelines of philosophical thought. yet there is another tradition beginning with plotinus and ending with mainländer, where nothingness is given priority or is instrumental in making other concepts like being, essence and god distinct. the intention of the text is to demonstrate that nothingness, through its denial or its affirmation, plays an important role in the conceptualization of being and occupies a central place, which is necessary to recover, in the philosophical tradition. keywords: nothingness, god, being introduction one reason to revive the question of nothingness is that we have forgotten that it has been an important question in the past. the question of nothingness has been concealed, feared, or denied throughout the history of human thought. nothingness seems to show itself as the antithesis of our human desire to be and to have. but there are thinkers prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 37-55 © 2000 by assumption university press héctor sevilla godínez 39 within the philosophical and theological tradition that see nothingness as the source and sustainer of being and having. nothingness is the space of potencies, of new beginnings, of the birth of new ideas, and human and cosmic creativity. in order to demonstrate the disparities and links between the different authors conceptions of nothingness, a brief journey regarding their lines of thinking will be undertaken. initially, the attention travel from the concept of one of plotinus to the ideas of nothingness in eckhart. it will proceed to the metaphysical abandonment of pascal, and its denial undertaken by leibniz. then, jacobi’s, idea of the unreality of our knowledge and schelling’s assertion that nothingness is, will be examined. especially important and overlooked by the tradition is leopardi’s belief that nothingness constitutes the beginning and source of all existence; and schopenhauer’s approach which considers nothingness as outside of our will. finally, the article will conclude with a consideration of two opposing positions: the theist position, where the anguish which derives from nothingness leads one to a belief in god, represented by kierkegaard; and the non-theist position, which finds its main representatives in mainländer and nietzsche. 1. one and nothingness in plotinus plotinus gave one of the first philosophical considerations of nothingness, seeing it as the most profound thing which man can aspire to. nothingness has a central place in relationship to the one.1 this is so particularly in relation to art. givone observes that his system “reaches an irreducible esthetic value, the development of which leads not only to recognize that the truth-liberty nexus is founded on nothingness, but that encourages the consideration of this foundation in the breast of art”.2 the one, like nothingness, is a letting-be; more than a creative act, it empowers being itself. the one is, then, an indirect creator and its creation is free, since “its act does not point toward a determined thing, but rather is identical to itself; not a duality, then, but a unity”.3 the one is preceded by nothingness, for he writes “to nothing it is bound and in no 40 prajñā vihāra sense is it contingent, which is why it can be said that it is nothingness itself.4 later, in the tradition beginning with augustine of hippo, passing through bonaventure, and saint thomas, the topic of nothingness was excluded from the center of infinite being which they called god. this dominated christian thought until eckhart. 2. meister eckhart and the divine nothingness it is the dominican meister eckhart (1260-1327) who develops something truly novel in contrast to the thousand years that preceded him. he contends that god is not something to be defined against nothingness, but one and the same reality. this allows for a metaphorical or poetic consideration of god which is not limited by human categories. his heterodox vision brought him the criticism of ecclesiastic authorities of his time. but eckhart knew how to negotiate these controversies which allowed him to die at peace with the church. eckhart’s thought clearly demonstrates an overcoming of thomist metaphysics and assumes that the deity can only be represented in silence; in such a manner that “god wants to have the temple empty, so that there can be nothing in there that is not him”.5 the deity contains itself, “expulses ignorance”,6 “shines splendidly”,7 and is a “generating potentiality”8 that only fructifies when man is “as empty as when he was not yet,”9 in other words, when man has managed to let go of the images and conceptualizations of god. this is because “he who searches for god according to a manner, takes the manner and forgets god, who hides in the manner”.10 if this is accomplished and man can enter nothingness, it is there where he can comprehend that “everything that god does is one; that is why he engenders me in as much as his son without any difference”, and it is there when one can “penetrate into god”,11 therefore, “behave as if one were dead” since no longer is anything more important in life than that union with god. that is how “death gives me a being” since “that proper of god is being”; and to achieve being in him, “it is precise to die to the base, so that neither love nor suffering should affect us”.12 héctor sevilla godínez 41 this new life in god, which eckhart proposes, supposes that one is god oneself, since “that which man loves, that is the man”;13 it is in silence that everything arises; a nothingness, but a fertile nothingness, impregnated with sense. in the eyes of the world, one is seen as poor, “to be who nothing wants, who nothing knows, and who nothing has;”14 but in the union with god, everything is possessed. god is unmentionable since, “if someone knows god and attributes a name to him, this is not god”, as god is “ineffable”.15 what we perceive are only his creations. the cosmos is, in this sense, a text that speaks of god but is not god. god should be seen by seeing nothing, like saint paul who “saw nothing and that nothingness was god [for] there is no possible way towards him […] god is a nothingness and god is a something”.16 therefore, it is also to be considered as “a way without a way and as much as being without being, for it does not have any way”.17 for eckhart, we do not merely lose ourselves in this nothingnessdeity, but must return to our daily tasks, just as christ did, for “there was no member of his body that did not exercise a particular virtue”,18 in such a way that the contemplation does not exclude and, in fact is complemented, with the exercise of virtue. 3. metaphysical impotence in pascal blaise pascal (1623-1662) was a brilliant mathematician, mystic, and writer of christian polemics. in his pensees [pensamientos sobre la religión], pascal focused on the problem of the individual existence of man, who is a rational being but fragile and impotent; a “thinking reed” that suffers, but that possesses an eminent dignity among the creatures because he is able to know god.19 for pascal, not only does thought or knowledge exist, but also another type of knowledge, of spontaneous or intuitive characteristic. he man as caught in a struggle between two extremes, for man is both a great and miserable being at the same time. the fundamental preoccupation of pascal was not the knowledge that man can acquire, but rather man himself as a creature who suffers in middle of the intellectual and metaphysical dereliction. 42 prajñā vihāra 4. wilhelm leibniz and the negation of nothingness in contrast to eckhart, who unites the concepts of the deity with nothingness, leibniz sets them up against each other. in reality, this author doesn’t really ask about the possibility of nothingness but rather centers himself on the question about why things are as they are and are not in a different manner. but the otherness is not evidently the nothingness of which we speak. for him, behind reality there is not, nor can be, nothingness; since if it were, then in it would be the reason of being of the things which for leibniz would be the same as discrediting god himself, as the origin of all existence. the contrast between god and nothingness is resolved by leibniz’s denial of nothingness. but by doing this he indirectly affirms the power of nothingness. this is because “to propose that behind reality there can be nothing, as an alternative to reality itself, means admitting that reality is abysmally unfounded, with everything that this implies. this is to say that, reality would not be over the ultimate reason and over the necessary being as over its own fundament, but rather over the abysm”.20 this situation is inadmissible according to leibniz, but it is precisely what i would like to affirm in this study. the theistic posture of the german philosopher does not permit him to consider this possibility. as givone suggests, the possibility of calling “god” the abysm21 before exorcizing such abysm, indirectly affirms it. in leibniz, through the attempt to diminish nothingness, the real possibility of being is highlighted. therefore, his philosophy is “an elevated bastion against such terrible threat; a vision of light against that which must have seemed a vision of gloom?”22 in the end, leibniz’s, philosophy is about the being of the one as the ultimate foundation but points to the source of being in nothingness naturally, such a recognition of the absolute nothingness would not be possible in the approach of kitaro nishida,23 for example, without the rupture of the beliefs of the idols; without the healthy fragmenting of such partial cosmo-visions of the absolute. héctor sevilla godínez 43 5. jacobi and the unreal knowledge of what is friedrich jacobi (1743-1819) is one of the counter-enlightenment thinkers who begin to reject the enlightenment conception of reason. for jacobi what we know is not related to what is real, but only generated by human desire. in the same manner god cannot be known, since that which is known of him – is by the very fact of knowing it – false. he writes that “to know something such as it is in its truth, it is necessary to conceptually grasp it; but doing this means to annihilate it, reduce to nothing its being in itself and, therefore, to invert the objective in the subjective”.24 if knowledge of what is, is a deformation of reality, then reality itself is nothingness since it is never at the mercy of the conceptualizations which attempt to capture it. knowledge is the deceit that man assumes in order to suppose that once he has conceptually dominated reality. truth, as such, is outside of the man who intends to conceive it, which is why such a man must desperately search for his own conceptual annihilation, since it is his own self which prevents him from reaching reality. man, upon ceasing to be man integrates himself with nothingness. the self that is autonomously constituted, contrary to what could be expected, in reality is only: a reactive function before the vertigo of nothing covering itself it becomes a prisoner of itself, a true curse. in change, if freedom from the self has its origin no longer in the capacity of self-determination but rather in the undetermined, in the absolute, then the experience we undergo here and now, each time we remit the other to the identical, will be a metaphysical figure of real transcendence.25 it can be concluded that jacobi understands nothingness as a constant companion, on the terrain of knowledge. however, there is still not in the conceptual union between god and nothingness, such as is suggested with meister eckhart and in the school of kyoto. 44 prajñā vihāra 4. friedrich schelling and the nothingness that is schelling (1775-1854) greatly radicalizes the issue of nothingness to include it on the plane of philosophy as a synonym of the being, not as a counterpart, or a duality, but rather as part of being. in this german philosopher we find an “authentic nostalgia of nothing[ness]”,26 the question about the possibility of nothingness in schelling must be understood as a question which summons; a question which givone situates in the following context: in the face of the desolating spectacle of human history and its relapse into mistake upon mistake, it culminates in a resonance that is like the anguished cry of one whom finds in nothingness a relief to such absurdity, a detention that soothes the sentiment of the senselessness of everything, a bitter yet effective antidote to the desperate and frustrating condition in which we find ourselves.27 unlike leibniz, schelling does not focus on the affirmation of the being of divinity. instead, he treats it indirectly as an unmentionable paternity, an impenetrable and nameless power. hence a great part of liberation consists precisely in liberating oneself from the desire of liberty itself. hence in schelling, “liberty reaches a more originary level, where the unfounded foundation of reason is at play, the unfounded foundation of the being: in one word, nothingness”.28 the starting point of what is, is not the existent – as leibniz supposed – but rather the pure potentiality of being: nothingness. it is not a wanting to be, but only a potentiality of being. authentic liberty for schelling is, then, in the ability to not be. not in the not-being which will pass into the being, for the not-being cannot be free since it does not yet exist. he writes that “if the potentiality of being remains in itself, the potentiality of being is maintained in relation to the nothingness from which it comes from and it directs itself towards the not-being before, than to being, so liberty is safe-kept”.29 for schelling, the freedom of nothingness is the foundation of being. héctor sevilla godínez 45 it is for this same reason that, “only the being that has in itself the not-being, shadow of the terrible thickness, allows that movement of liberty which, once and again (infinitely), converts the being into the not-being and the not-being into the being. liberty is not, but rather this conversion kept safe by nothingness”.30 in the end, being and nothingness are inseparably bound to the point that nothingness is placed as a foundation of being. and if this is so, it is also the foundation of any change and development of being itself. 5. nothingness as a beginning and source in leopardi more radical is the work of giacomo leopardi (1798-1837) who recognizes in nothingness the origin and beginning of all things. for him, nothingness is that towards which everything tends; final abysm of all the existent. he considers that “the beginning of god himself is nothingness”.31 the things emerge from the lap of nothingness and come to the being with the only intention of returning to nothingness, which is why “to emerge from nothingness and to submerge oneself there is the primary evidence of the things”.32 there isn’t any reason either for something that is not to be such as it is, or not to be absolutely. the absolute is an abyss, capable of annihilating everything, which is why the nothingness of the end is the same as the nothingness of the beginning. that is why “nothingness makes things to be as they are: fragile, ephemeral, mortal, but exactly because to it, worthy of being loved in their reality, suspended over a double denial.”33 even what we understand as truth coincides with the non-truth and is converted one into the other. being and nothingness coincide with one another. very appreciable is the following text, extracted from his piece dialogo de tristano e di un amico [dialogue between tristan and a friend]: 46 prajñā vihāra the human gender will never believe to not know anything, to be nothing, to not be able to come to reach anything. no philosopher that teaches one of these three things would make a fortune nor make a sect, especially amongst the people because, far from these three things being scarce for the purpose of who would want to live; the first two offend the haughtiness of men, the third, though after the others, requires courage and strength of spirit in order to be believed.34 we can only creatively interpret the world since we only know fantasies. we are nothingness and we are headed towards nothingness. the failure of western history of ideas to recognized leopardi’s thought proves, paradoxically, the veracity of his words. after reading leopardi’s ideas concerning nothingness, the reader could remain dumbfounded. but i propose it has a value for an alternate way of approaching human development. development begins with a radical binding nothingness with the fulfillment of the person allowing a new understanding of self. in fact, according to givone, the disenchantment taken to its final consequences constitutes the only opportunity […] of the “ultra-philosophy that is the key of the ultra-nihilism”.35 ultra-philosophy is what leopardi understands as the reconciliation with nature and with the intimacy of things; in other words, “knowing the nothingness from which they come and into which they will be cast”,36 in such a way that nothingness is an opportunity to understand the world that surrounds us, to give a new sense to the life that summons us, to forge the way that we are to travel in our veiled existence. 6. the nothingness outside of the will in schopenhauer naturally, i am to refer as well to arthur schopenhauer (17881860) who, once has considered the will of the individual as the beginning of the representations of the world, and recognizes that what we see does not constitute in reality, in any manner, what is. the world is, then, a representation which, in any case, is also the representation of each héctor sevilla godínez 47 individual in a particular manner. the only reality is the will, the one which conditions our conception of the world. nothingness, from this perspective, is precisely that which remains once we have exiled the will. this is to say, outside of the world of representations, nothingness is what remains – unbound, by it – of our same representation. the representation is “the reality which has been constructed from a determined cognitive system, with its own coordinates and limits”.37 hence, if nothingness is outside of the representation, it is because it is precisely previous to the representation and subsequent to the world of the representations. that is why the human will is limited, for the tendency or line in which the representations are to be constructed based on that same will, are always limited, in context, partial, human. the will is the metaphysical principle that identifies the self, which is why schopenhauer assumes that every self has a will; even further, that the self is will. therefore, it is to be understood that when it is affirmed that nothingness is that which is further than the will, it is also assumed that that same nothingness is beyond the self; and that the self, as will, is an obstacle to the comprehension of the nothingness of which i speak. in the same manner, since the world itself is a manifestation of the human wills and these are the obstacle to the absolute nothingness, it is understood that suicide could be considered as an escape from the world of the will. contrary to it, schopenhauer warns that by living, a salvation from the tedium and boredom of life can be found. amongst the things that the german philosopher proposes specifically for the eradication of the tedium towards life, is the uninterested contemplation of art, at the same time foundation of its esthetics. he also proposes the practice of compassion, support of his ethics. furthermore, he suggests the overcoming of the self through an ascetic life centered on self-control. therefore, if we speak of the consequences that the comprehension of nothingness has for the contemporary man, we are then to refer to these contributions. 48 prajñā vihāra 7. nothingness as a preamble to everything in kierkegaard the danish philosopher kierkegaard (1813-1855) wrote, among others, a fundamental piece titled the concept of anxiety [el concepto de la angustia] in which he presents a peculiar anthropological concept: that of the man in anguish by his own loneliness. he recognizes that ethical theories are limited by their rationalism, which is why man cannot ultimately find spiritual fulfillment in them. from this perspective it is not the rational explanation of things which gives us tranquility in the face of existential anguish, but instead the relationship with god, which is something that flows from the interior of the soul. religion does not imply laws or communities a personal communication or binding with the supreme being. this is even echoed in bertrand russell who writes that, “the existence of god, must be captured existentially because the demonstrations that move in the kingdom of the essence cannot establish that existence, no matter how abundant they may be”.38 in such a way, man finds himself alone before himself. and from this solitude flows the anguish which presides his existence. harald höffding affirms that kierkegaard’s most important contribution to ethics is his description of the so called “stages of life”.39 these stages are three: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. the travel from one to the other is done “by a leap”; in other words, by virtue of an impulse “to think subjectively”, to think each time with greater force and as a function of existence. in his theory of knowledge, kierkegaard affirms that knowledge can neither deplete nor span the whole of existence, and that because of this, new enterprises need to be continually undertaken in thought. in philosophical fragments [las migajas filosóficas] we can read his critique that the rationalist attempt to explain the world, loses the most essential. this essential is bound to the divinity and to the saving message that is found in it. what we could call vital impregnation of thought is, then, one of the most characteristic theses of kierkegaard’s philosophy. after having héctor sevilla godínez 49 developed, in this way, that truth can only be captured and affirmed in a subjective and personal manner, that truth is subjectivity, kierkegaard inverts the phrase and concludes: “subjectivity is the truth because only that which is apprehended with subjective passion and energy can be true”.40 this thesis of kierkegaard contains the existentialist affirmation that truth only has value when we appropriate it by affirming it, through personal impulse or passion. from this perspective, the personal value of truth is the decisive one. the criterion consists in the movement that is awaken within interior life. in this sense, the contemplation of nothingness proposed here can only be lived as a subjective experience, intimately personal. in his piece fear and trembling [temor y temblor] he writes: all of humanity’s life rounds itself, then, and takes the form of a perfect sphere where morality is at the same time the limit and the content. god is transformed into an invisible point and is dissipated like a thought without force; its power is only exercised in the morality that fills life. therefore, if a man imagines himself loving god in a sense different to this one that has just been indicated, he would divert, he loves a ghost.41 the above supposes that kierkegaard renounces a specific manner of a relationship with god through the practice of an ethics. from this earthly perspective, god is an invisible point. in my perspective, man is the visible point in the invisibility of the nothingness which possesses us. that nothingness is only graspable in a state of contemplation. such a state does not involve the elimination difficulties, which is why kierkegaard emphasizes the difficulty of the path: the gentleman of faith does not have any support other than himself; he suffers for not being able to make himself be understood, but he does not feel any vain necessity of 50 prajñā vihāra guiding others. his pain is his security; he ignores the vain desire, his soul is far too serious for that. the false gentleman betrays himself by that ability, acquired in an instant. he does not absolutely comprehend that if another individual must follow the same path, he should come to be an individual exactly in the same way, without consequently having the need for direction from anybody and, above all, from he who intends to impose himself.42 here we are prepared for the next step taken by nietzsche. 8. nothingness as power in nietzsche in contrast to kierkegaard, with friedrich nietzsche (1844-1900) we find ourselves with the man who confronts the presence of faith and assumes it as an obstacle to his own development. with nietzsche, the influence of schopenhauer continues to be demonstrated and is, perhaps, the most representative of the nihilistic thinkers, whose activity concluded in 1889 when he lost his reason. before him, schopenhauer formulated the theory of the will to live, affirming that such a will is an evil, something that damages man upon conditioning him. nietzsche begins with this thesis, but deriving from it the opposite conclusion: that which is fundamental, the definitive value which man should look for is the intensification and elevation of his own existence. nietzsche returns to heraclitus’ idea concerning the eternal return of things and events, but without giving it a fatalistic content, since man can go about transforming the world he lives in just as he can transform himself. this final impulse would bring him close to the superman; in other words, to the man liberated from anguish, possessed with a powerful individuality, capable of overcoming himself and exceeding his own limitations. we move beyond the “morality of slaves” to an aristocratic morality. this involves a criticism of christian ethics and everything that diminishes the world and the will to power.43 the will of the power is a path towards true knowledge. what does nihilism mean? nietzsche asks himself and answers: “it is a consequence héctor sevilla godínez 51 of the way in which the values of existence have been interpreted until now […] the supreme values lose validity”.44 radical nihilism is the belief in an absolute devaluation of existence. while we believe in morality, we condemn life. the conclusion of the principles that nietzsche presents in the first part of the will to power [la voluntad de poder] is that: all of the values by which we have attempted until now to make the world worthy of our appreciation, and by which we have precisely despised it when they were shown to be inapplicable; all of these values are, from the psychological point of view, the results of certain useful perspectives, established to maintain and increase the fields of human domain, but falsely projected in the essence of the things.45 nietzsche affirms that knowledge is finally the consequence of searching for a justification before any determined morality. the explanations, even the most argued ones, are a way of bestowing correctness to our personal way of thinking. little by little i have come to comprehend that all philosophy is no other thing than the profession of faith of he who creates it; a type of involuntary memories. the moral [or immoral] end constitutes the true vital knot of all philosophy, from which every plant will later come forth. in reality, when one wants to explain to oneself how the most eccentric metaphysical affirmations of this or that philosopher originated, it is prudent to ask: what morality does it serve?”46 in this manner, the writer of thus spoke zarathustra [así hablaba zaratustra] induces us to conclude that man is – in his intention to provide reason for his thoughts – the one who constructs knowledge, and that such knowledge is at the same time conditioned. later on, paul feyerabend based himself on similar elements to postulate his proposal of epistemological anarchism. 52 prajñā vihāra finally, nietzsche maintains his nihilistic vision – which is why some leave him out of the existentialist category, in addition to being outside of the historical period – with which he pities the consequent human condition upon affirming that “from any philosophical point of view from which one would want to consider the world in which we believe to live, the most sure and most stable thing is its mistakenness; in confirmation of this, serve many reasons which incite us to conjecture that there exists a deceiving beginning in the essence of the things”.47 this deceiving beginning that is the essence of the things is in reality the distortion that our interpretation makes of the things, and since these are in a constant relationship with nothingness in a constant dialectic. the thought that nietzsche leaves for us is an invitation to liberation; a total liberation, including our most intimate hopes and desires. such liberation is only possible by the man who continues to evolve towards a being of greater will and power. nietzsche’s influence has a powerful impact on the history of philosophy. it has inspired rejection at the same time as recognition. and it is because nietzsche: has touched neuralgic points of our historical condition; the death of god and the vanishing of traditional values, the loss of the centre and the cutting to pieces of the ancient identities, the radical experience of the negative, and the impracticability of all dialectic synthesis; lastly, the impossibility of allocating a name to totality.48 the name of totality – at least the closest to such a notion – is, precisely, that of nothingness. 9. philipp mainländer and paul bourget the leading representatives of nihilism in nineteenth century are philipp mainländer (1841-1876) and paul bourget (1852-1935). the first stands out for his piece die philosophie der erlösung or philosophy of redemption in which, influenced by schopenhauer, he assumes héctor sevilla godínez 53 nothingness beginning with the premise: “the not-being is preferable to the being”. he concludes that the existent is called to death as a natural tendency, more than even one’s own life. few know, for example, that the affirmation about the death of god and the consequent life of the world is not originally nietzsche’s, but was previously referred to by mainländer who, in fact, decided to commit suicide once his piece was published. paul bourget emphasized some of contemporary life’s fatal consequences, and illustrated with precision the decay of the social models of his time. he assumes that social decay consists in the independence of the individuals, and that this decay allows, however, aesthetic values and personal artistic productivity to stand out. the decaying artist extracts spiritual and aesthetic nourishment from the manifestations of social decay. in some way, the loss of the world gives the artist contact with his imperturbable side which, at the same time, makes him sensitive to superior realities. neither mainländer nor bourget have been given the recognition they deserve in western philosophy. conclusion the consideration of nothingness implies a new perspective. nothingness has been seen with different faces; always modeled by human subjectivity, by religious interests, or by topical fears. we have covered it with veils; and we fear the unveiling of nothingness. this has made us understand it as contrary to being; as the counterpart of that which is most laudable and dignified in the human being; as if with it there were no further motives to keep on living; when, in reality, it is from nothingness that we can have the possibility of the re-enchantment of the world. 54 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 vid. plotino, enéadas, iii, 8, 10. 2 givone, historia de la nada, p.79. 3 plotino, op. cit., vi, 8, 20. 4 ibíd., vi, 8, 21. 5 eckhart, m., “el templo vacío” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.35. 6 ibíd., p.36. 7 ibíd., p.38. 8 ibíd., p.40. 9 eckhart, m., “la virginidad del alma” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.41. 10 eckhart, m., “vivir sin porque” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p. 49. 11 eckhart, m., “dios y yo somos uno” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, pp.54-55. 12 eckhart, m., “el anillo del ser” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.57-59. 13 eckhart, m., “la imagen desnuda de dios” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.69. 14 eckhart, m., “los pobres de espíritu” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.75. 15 eckhart, m., “dios es un verbo que se habla a sí mismo” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.84. 16 eckhart, m., “el fruto de la nada” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, pp.87-90. 17 ibídem, p.93. 18 eckhart, m., “martha y maría” en el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, p.111. 19 cfr. montes de oca, historia de la filosofía, p.190. 20 givone, op. cit., p.243. 21 idem. 22 ibíd., p.245. 23 vid. nishida, pensar desde la nada, pp.43-100. 24 givone, op. cit., p.219. 25 ibídem, p.226. 26 ibíd., p.247. 27 idem. 28 ibíd., p.252. 29 ibíd., p.253. 30 ibíd., p.104. 31 cfr. leopardi, zibaldone de pensamientos, 1341. 32 givone, op. cit., p.186. héctor sevilla godínez 55 33 ibíd., p.196. 34 leopardi, dialogo de tristano e di un amico, 28-36. 35 cfr. givone, op. cit., p.207 36 ibíd. 37 sáez, pensar desde la nada: ensayos sobre filosofía y nihilismo, p.39. 38 russell, la sabiduría de occidente, pp.254-255. 39 vid. hoffding, soren kierkegaard, 1930. 40 ibíd., p.99. 41 kierkegaard, temor y temblor, p.76. 42 ibíd., p.90. 43 vid. russell, op. cit., p.259. 44 nietzsche, la voluntad de poder, p.33. 45 ibíd., pp.38-39. 46 nietzsche, más allá del bien y del mal, p.9. 47 ibíd., p.38. 48 volpi, el nihilismo, p.86. bibliography eckhart, meister, el fruto de la nada y otros escritos, madrid, siruela, 1998. givone, sergio, historia de la nada, buenos aires, ah editora, 1995. hoffding, harald, soren kierkegaard, madrid, revista de occidente, 1951. kierkegaard, soren, temor y temblor, buenos aires, losada, 1990. leopardi, giacomo, zibaldone de pensamientos, barcelona, tusquets, 1990. leopardi, giacomo, “dialogo di tristano e di un amico”, en flora, f., tutte le opere, milano, mondadori, 1973. montes de oca, f., historia de la filosofía, méxico, porrúa, 1991. nietzsche friedrich, la voluntad de poder, madrid, edaf, 1981. nietzsche friedrich, más allá del bien y del mal, madrid, alba, 1999. nishida, kitaro, pensar desde la nada, salamanca, sígueme, 2006. 56 prajñā vihāra plotino, enéadas, madrid, aguilar, 1963. russell, bertrand, la sabiduría de occidente, españa, ediciones madrid, 1964. sáez, l., pensar desde la nada: ensayos sobre filosofía y nihilismo, madrid, biblioteca nueva, 2007. volpi, franco, el nihilismo, buenos aires, biblos, 2005. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 57 a91um4xxh_ayh0li_4hc.tmp 24 reconciling god’s omniscience with time and space: a case for islamic atomism abbas ahsan1 abstract my aim in the course of this paper will be an attempt to reconcile the view that god is unrestrained by time and space [ ] along with apparent a particular issue concerning a timeless god and his knowledge of particulars and universals. this points to a possible solution in the understanding of substance and accidents as it is considered by islamic atomism, which is a kind of occasionalism. this theory puts forward the idea that at every instant, the cosmos is created by god anew. the paper will demonstrate how this approach manages to keywords: islamic atomism; god; omniscience; time and space when we talk about god in the traditional sense we usually refer to him, quite intuitively, as a being that always was, is, and will be. he endures eternally while sustaining his creation and acting in human history. thinking of god in this way seems to be more than just ascribing certain attributes to him, it more importantly it refers to his actual existence and being. for god would fundamentally have to subsist eternally in order to maintain the attributes ascribed to him, otherwise vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 24-36 © 2000 by assumption university press 25 god would be constrained by the same limitation[s] as his creation, namely in the form of time and space. it is precisely why western theists insist that god is eternal. nevertheless, exactly what does it mean to be eternal? how exactly should a term of this sort be construed? davies2 has is non-temporal or timeless. it is this view that has been most prevalent throughout the course of theistic history. from amongst its many exponents, boethius [c.480 – 524] and anselm of canterbury [1033 1109] “you were not, therefore, yesterday, nor will you be tomorrow, but yesterday and today and tomorrow you . indeed you exist neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow but are outside all times ( ). for yesterday and today and tomorrow are completely in time; however, you, though nothing can be without you, are nevertheless not in place or time but all things are in you. for nothing contains you, but you contain all things.”3 [2] according to the second approach, the eternality of god means no more than that he has no beginning and no end, he has always existed and will continue to do so forever. notice that this interpretation of god as an eternal being is one in which he is in-time or temporal and yet he has always existed and will go on existing forever. swinburne (1977) is temporal, since for swinburne, to propose that god is outside of time would be incoherent. 26 my aim in the course of this paper will be an attempt to plausibly reconcile the view that god is unrestrained by time [and space] altogether [omniscience]. this would, in turn, make a plausible case to conceive of god as absolutely timeless whilst retaining the ascribed attribute issue concerning a timeless god and his knowledge of particulars omniscience with his timeless nature i hope to investigate the theory of islamic atomism and how well it manages to unite the two attributes of god [his being non-temporal and omniscience]. i have focused my issues which it gives rise to. to think of god as beyond time altogether, which is a denial of the claim that he is temporal, would mean two things, [a] he does not exist in any temporal location and [b] he does not experience temporal succession. this position suggests that a timeless god has no past, present, or future, and furthermore he does not change because whatever is subject a succession of events. however, this view seems to inevitably leads to complications with regards to the fundamental attributes ascribed to god. god’s knowledge a traditional perspective of god would fundamentally uphold even unaware of a creeping black ant beneath a rock on a dark night, it that nothing, not even as much as a particle of dust in the heavens or on the earth remains hidden from his knowledge. this would quite obviously include that god knows, for instance, when an eclipse is due, whilst the eclipse is taking place, and when it has passed. so he is completely aware of the three stages of the eclipse, namely, [1] when there was a 27 however, necessitates a change in the cognisant being because a change in the object of perception implies a change in the content of perception itself which evidently leads to a change in the subject of perception, i.e. the percipient themselves. now, if god is outside of time altogether he would amount to a change. in fact, he, whose state does not alter at all [i.e. is non-temporal] cannot conceivably know these three aspects of the eclipse, because a particular event occurs at a particular moment in time and undergoes a change with the passage of time. similarly, if the object of knowledge succeeds and changes from one state to another, inevitably, knowledge changes as well and if knowledge changes so must the knower. consequently, having to deny perceptual knowledge to god, since perceptual knowledge is characterised both temporally and spatially, would not allow god to be the omniscient divine being understood in the traditional sense. therefore, it would seem that the nature of a timeless god fails to correspond to the primary attribute of omniscience ascribed to him, and as a result a temporal god may appear to overcome issues of this kind. it is why pike (1965) has suggested that the doctrine of omniscience corresponds more with the understanding that god is temporal rather than god is outside of time.4 or circumstances of the natural world] then god could not know a given natural event was going to take place in the future i.e. before it actually happened. if it was the case that god knew what was going to happen occurred before that natural event [or any future event for that case]. in turn this would violate the idea that god bears no temporal relations to natural events. 28 however, in a desperate attempt to preserve the timelessness of god one could go on to suggest, as the medieval persian philosopher avicenna [980 – 1037] had claimed, that god knows everything [i.e. all the particulars] but only in a universal manner so that perceptual emanative cause of all existing things, he would necessarily know both the existents and the relations subsisting between them. in the case of our eclipse example, god knows after such a series of events a solar eclipse would occur, that is along with all the antecedents and consequences of the eclipse. he is completely aware in a determinate manner of its other events of the same nature, i.e. an eclipse in general. so he knows that the sun and moon exist for they are his creations, he knows they make revolutions and their spheres intersect at two points and sometimes they are simultaneously stationed in their nodes, and as a result the body of the moon comes between the sun and the observers, creating what we call an eclipse. however, when this particular eclipse actually occurs in time, god cannot know it because he is completely free from temporal change altogether. nevertheless, he need not know it in time, or the way it actually occurs temporally, simply because he knows it already in a universal manner. his knowledge remains the same, before, during, and even after the eclipse which in turn would not necessitate a change. it implies that god knows the eclipse as well as its attributes and accidents by a knowledge which characterises him from eternity to eternity, which is not subject to any change whatsoever. therefore, all is known to him and laid bare before him in a single view that is homogeneous and now [at that particular instance], nor after the eclipse has cleared [as in that particular time when it has expired] can he know that it has ceased known to him as it would necessitate a change in the knower. 29 although this may seem a rather ingenious way to avoid the temporal, its implications tend to defeat the purpose of defending the “instead of agreeing that god is fundamentally noneternal because he changes with respect to his knowledge, his conviction that god is eternal by denying that he knows what is or was or will be occurring, that he remembers what has occurred, and that he brings about what he has planned. it seems to me, however, that this is clearly to give up the notion of god as a redeeming god; and in turn it seems to me that to give this up is to give up what is central to the biblical vision of god.”5 evidently enough it seems that the above suggested view traditional understanding of god. it would suggest that god cannot know of newly emerging states of his own creation. he would not know john, for instance, as an individual whose actions come to be [or exist] after they had not been [or non-existent]. he would be oblivious to john as a person as well as his actions. furthermore, and quite interestingly, it since for a temporal being such as john to perform any action would necessarily require a temporal location. so if god is oblivious to the action as in when it is happening [in time], he would also have to be oblivious of exactly where [in temporal location] it is taking place, bearing in mind that he is unaware of the accidents of john and his friends but knows man, his accidents and properties only in a universal [general] manner. he knows man has a body comprising of various limbs and organs all acting together to create the actions and movements humans perform, like 30 walking and talking etc. he further knows some organs work singularly, whereas others work in pairs and that the faculties should be distributed among his physical parts and so on. therefore, as far as god is concerned john is distinguishable from his other people only through the senses, and not from the intellect. this is because the basis of distinction is the designation of a particular dimension, whereas the intellect does not occupy any spatial dimension. in addition, this would result in god also desires, beliefs, and even in the belief in god. nonetheless, in an attempt to sustain this particular view of a succession over the same thing a change in that thing is a necessary result. therefore, it could be rightly asserted that he who did not know something then came to be aware of it, underwent a change. this proposition can be substantiated by purporting the following three states: on the left or the right side of something. this situated state can by no means be termed as an essential attribute because if and when something is on your right hand side and then switches position to your left hand side, it is only your relation which alters and not your essence. [2] similarly, the second state, suggests that if you possess the potential power to move certain objects which are at hand, then the absence or those objects will not alter your vital energy or potential in moving them. since your power-to-move is objects is primarily, and to move a particular object is secondary. therefore, the relation of power to a body or object is not an essential attribute, but merely a relation. the existence or nonexistence of bodies or objects involves relation, and not a change of the state of the one who possesses power over them. 31 [3] the third state however, is one which the essence does actually undergo a change of state. this takes place, as mentioned earlier, when one who is ignorant becomes aware. it can also refer to one who lacks a power and then manages to possess it. this amounts to change and thus implies that an alteration in the object of knowledge necessitates an alteration in the involved in this process would inevitably create a change in the knower. in reply to this position one could say that god has only one knowledge of the eclipse at a particular time – one which does not involve change of any kind. suppose that before the happening of the eclipse as relations that do not replace the essence of knowledge, which in turn categorised as pure relations. god’s omnipotence if god manages to know all temporal events whilst non-temporal interacts in human history? that is, not only knowing what is precisely due to happen, what is actually happening, and what has accurately happened, the slightest manner. paul helm (1988) suggests that: whatsoever to any particular thing which he creates. this does not mean that there are no relations at all between the eternal god and his creation, only no temporal relations. there is for, example, the relation of knowledge. god 32 knows his creatures. this knowledge is time-free; it is not, for example, foreknowledge, or memory, nor is it contemporaneous knowledge. it is knowledge about which makes it makes no sense to ask how long the knower has known, or when he came to know.”6 surprisingly enough, helm reduces the matter to the somewhat attempt to raise questions in a strict philosophical manner are guilty of a category mistake. furthermore, davies (1982) provides an analogy in order to overcome this issue in which he suggests that the act of teaching only occurs when learning occurs, no matter how many blackboards i teaching.7 to teach however, i must undergo and experience some change [of whatever kind that may be]. therefore, it is a limitation and a condition on my part that i can only bring about the change required for you to learn by changing myself in time. but there is nothing in the notion of teaching that requires such a change in the teacher themselves. thus, in the case of god why should he not teach you by bringing a change in you without in any way changing himself. islamic atomism to dismiss a philosophical inquiry in order to maintain and support your claim. therefore, i propose to relate a theory which manages to if they were independent of one another, space and time cannot really have a meaning. take space for instance; without possessing a three dimensional body we cannot realise the existence of space [be it all of space or only which a given object may occupy]. the same can be said 33 therefore, let us say that both cannot exist independently – rather they co-exist. further, if they co-exist and are necessarily dependent on one another then space and time are not, as usually held two, but rather one, namely space-time. this space-time is motion which can be rightly said to constitute the matrix of reality. space can be said to play the role of matter and substance, while time can be said to play the role of energy, activity, change, development, and movement. the two are involved in each other like object and energy and thus together constitute motion. furthermore, portions of space which are constituted by matter are actually atoms which are constantly moving in time. bearing this in mind, i now refer to islamic atomism which neatly manages to link the immutability of reality with the observable changes and manifold forms in nature by describing reality as composed of simple and unchangeable minute particles, namely atoms. this kind of atomism suggests that atoms and their accidents subsist for only an instance in time, the reason being is that every object comprises of [a] substance and [b] accident. now a substance is a non-divisible entity having no parts – rather it is categorised as an abstract entity not managing to retain any physical properties whatsoever, without occupied by an accident. however, accidents are instantaneously and constantly altering characteristics which cannot endure two successive states. therefore, for a substance to exist as a physical object in space and time it must be involved in a constantly changing series of accidents. as a result, the atoms and their accidents exist for only an instant in time and space before being destroyed. in islamic atomism, god is repeatedly creating the whole of the universe anew every instant from nothing. the continuity in our experience of the repeated creation of the universe is attributed to the compassionate consistence of islamic atomism based on the principle described above where he states: 34 the capacity to write, creating both will and capacity anew in every instance. then god creates, anew in every instance, concurrent with it. every instant and action in the process of writing is independent from every other; all stages of the process issue from god alone. it is only in appearance that there is a coherent action of writing. similarly, a selfconsistent world in space and time, working harmoniously, is only an appearance. the true one actor is god alone.”8 on the whole then what this theory suggests in regards to time and space is that we only have the present moment [you may loosely call it presentism, although not it the exact sense] which is actual [which exists and only now]. the past, in this case has been destroyed and created anew at every instant to constitute the present, and the future is not yet. however, what implications would this view have on the ascribed attributes of a timeless god such as his omniscience and omnipotence? would this continuing process of creation and destruction aid a timeless god in preserving the traditional attributes? as a matter of fact, this theory creates a much better ground for knowledge of every single existing [and non-existing] thing since he is able to recreate their precise state anew instantaneously. subsequently, since his knowledge is one which does not change [he is non-temporal] his repeated creation can be said to be concurrent with that unchangeable think of it as a god who follows the blue-print of his own unchangeable knowledge in order to re-create his creation at every instant. it can further, history. however, the question of how he can interact – moving from a 35 which would require further analysis. in conclusion, i have discussed in particular the issue relating a timeless god and his omniscience and omnipotence. i have suggested how the view of a god who knows particulars in a universal sense tends to defeat the purpose of positing an omniscient god. i have further, provided the case of islamic atomism or occasionalism to reconcile a timeless in a plausible manner. however, i acknowledge that islamic atomism does and certainly will come with its own set of problems, which may not entirely be in relation to time and space, but what is noteworthy is that it manages to express a theoretical instance which coincides with the and space. endnotes 1 abbas ahsan teaches at the university of birmigham. he can be reached at: abbasahsan@hotmail.co.uk 2 davies, d. (oxford: oxford university press, 1982) 3 davies, d. (oxford: oxford university press, 1982) 4 pike, n. “problems for the notion of divine omniscience.” in: davies. b. . (oxford: oxford university press, 2000) 5 . (oxford: oxford university press, 2000), 501 6 . (oxford: oxford university press, 1988), 528 7 davies, d. , (oxford: oxford university press, 1982) 8 , 14 no.1 (1997), 60 36 references adamson, p., and taylor, r. (2005) , cambridge: cambridge university press. 14, no. 1 (1997): 55 – 66. davies, d. (oxford: oxford university press, 1982) goodman, l. , (london: routledge, 1992) griffel, f. (oxford: oxford university press, 2009) b. . (oxford: oxford university press, 1988): 519 – 530. mcginnis, j. , (oxford: oxford university pres, 2010) pike, n. “problems for the notion of divine omniscience.” in: davies. b. . (oxford: oxford university press, 2000): 465 – 472. swinburne, r. , (oxford: clarendon press, 1977) . (oxford: oxford university press, 2000): 485 – 504. batairwa k. paulin 1 on the nostra aetate: a landmark document of the catholic church’s engagement with other religions batairwa k. paulin fu jen catholic university, taiwan abstract 50 years ago (dec 8, 1965), at the conclusion of vatican ii, the greatest event marking the life of the church in the 20th century, the roman catholic church issued “nostra aetate.” the declaration has been a landmark for the church’s relation and appraisal of other religions. it acknowledged the central role religions play in the history of humanity. humanity has henceforth, been identified as the concrete platform calling for interactions and cross-fertilization among religions. religions are to be more united in what they are best at: striving for answers to the existential riddles and sufferings of human persons. for those on the path of dialogue, the 50th anniversary of na is an opportune occasion to acknowledge shared concerns and learn how respective efforts of religious groups pave the road to more cooperation and mutual enrichment. introduction nostra aetate or the “declaration on the relation of the church to non-christian religions,” promulgated on october 28, 1965 is the shortest of the sixteen documents of vatican ii. still, its significance for the development of relations of the catholic church with other religions has been unprecedented. as ariel ben ami says, “it was the first time prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 1-28 © 2000 by assumption university press 2 prajñā vihāra that a council had laid down principles in a solemn way concerning non-christian religions and recognized in these religions positive values that could be appreciated.” 1 this was in fact to have implications for ways catholics look and interact with followers of other living faith as well their engagement with existing religious traditions. consequently, it has been one of the referential foundations for catholic engagement with believers of other religions as well as their faith traditions. nostra aetate is still a relevant document for asia. asia is the cradle of many religious traditions including christianity, of which catholicism is a branch. nostra aetate strives for a balance between the “general” and the “specific.” it acknowledges a general common ground that religions share in virtue of their essence and the distinctive ways and claims regarding how they achieve their sense of mission. such a balance entices dialogue and cooperation among religions: religions are called to meet and cooperate in what they hold together, without compromising or denying their respective differences. respect and mutual appreciation become crucial from the moment believers enter the logic of the balance implied in nostra aetate. religions need each other and can complement each other only as far as they are able to recognize their common call and positively nurture their differences. the goal of interreligious dialogue is to enhance mutual understanding, enrichment and cooperation among religions. according to the model instituted in nostra aetate, in dialogue, on the one hand one needs to recognize truth and goodness in other religious traditions, and on the other hand, to set parameters for a non-compromising interpretation of catholic beliefs and practices. dialogue cannot be conceived as a strategy to level down the differences existing among religions. this paper offers some generalities on nostra aetate, including its history and significance as a time marker for inter-religious dialogue. it also ponders on the methods the document fosters and their implication for present praxes of interreligious dialogue in asia and elsewhere. batairwa k. paulin 3 generalities on nostra aetate: origin: connection with the jewish question na is one of the three declarations2 of vatican ii. it is the shortest of all the documents and yet it reflects the ebbing inclusivity in vatican ii in one of the areas where the church was known to be conservative. for mgr. michael l. fitzgerald, president emeritus of the pontifical commission for interreligious dialogue, nostra aetate was as surprise result of vatican ii.3 the observation arises from the history behind the document. accordingly, it was not foreseen in the original plan of the council’s documents. there was instead a felt need and a conviction that the church should officially address pending issues related to the plight of the jewish people in europe, known in other words as the jewish question. pope john xxiii wanted to issue a statement about the relations of the church to judaism in order to counter anti-semitism.4 a providential figure in the initial stage was jules isaac, a french historian of jewish origin and a founder of amitié judéo-chrétienne, a study group of jewish and christians, based in paris and which starting from 1947 reflected seriously on the plight of the jewish people in europe and other questions related to anti-semitism. how on earth a christian europe, with its historical heritage of education and human values could have sacrificed two third of its jewish people? moreover, what could be done to prevent the recurrence of similar situations? those were the concerns jules isaac evoked during his meeting with john xxiii during the first meeting of the secretariat for promoting christian unity founded on june 5, 1960. to be concrete, jules isaac presented the pope a program indicating steps towards the eradication of anti-semitism and potential ways to the normalization of jewish christian relations. accordingly, christians were to rectify their teaching concerning the jews and revisit the theological interpretation of the scattering of the jewish people as a divine punishment for the crucifixion of jesus christ. in a particular way, the catholic church had to clarify the inaccuracy of a claim that its tradition had proofs for the deicide raised against the jews. the newly created secretariat for christian unity (05 june 1960), set under the leadership of cardinal bea, 4 prajñā vihāra took charge of those suggestions. moreover, the secretariat had to handle the reactions and oppositions that came along as the church’s interest in the jewish question became evident. the task of the secretariat needed creativity, cautiousness and mostly patience for it was an unprecedented venture exposed to resistance, criticisms and oppositions from within as well as from without. the process needed timely adjustments and solutions. a basic criticism was regarding the initial decision of pope john xxiii to assign the jewish question to the secretariat of christian unity. some jews were apprehensive of the agenda of the council. why would the catholic church be interested in the jewish question? moreover, they feared the pope had not understood that jews were not christians, neither could they be interested in any kind of unity thought for christian believers and within a christian framework. from within the catholic church, a fraction of bishops was concerned by a change of attitude of the church towards the jewish people. would the new approach negate and alter fundamental church doctrine based on the factuality that jesus christ died at the hands of the jewish people? moreover, the council’s interest in the jewish question did not cease to create commotion among arab governments: they feared the trend would lead to the recognition of the state of israel. to address these different apprehensions and sensitivities, the final draft on the jewish question was upgraded to a declaration with inclusive statements referring to other religions. beyond the condemnation of anti–semitism: a declaration on religions with regard to the twists and final achievements of the nostra aetate, thomas stransky recalled a striking metaphor by cardinal bea.5 “the tiny mustard seed of jules isaac’s half-hour conversation with good pope john grew into the large tree that warmly hosts in its branches so many men and women of “non-christian religions.”6 the image concisely depicts the long journey and achievement of nostra aetate. the concern for jews shared by john xxiii and jules isaac during their meeting inspired batairwa k. paulin 5 the first draft. despite the many amendments, the core of the declaration in chapter four remained. however, the apprehensions, criticisms and reactions positively expanded the spirit of the document creating space for the recognition and inclusion of other religious traditions.7 as laurentinnoted, “the difficulties met by the text on the jews had obliged the church, in a positive way, to open herself to extremely new horizons.”8 as a consequence,the final declaration went beyond the original aim of apologizing for and condemning anti-semitism. furthermore, the work produced a paradigm or model for the church’s engagement with other religions. concise content and significance of nostra aetate nostra aetate has only 41 sentences distributed in five paragraphs, speaking concisely of the considerations the catholic church bears with regards to non-christian religions. religions explicitly mentioned are hinduism, buddhism, islam and judaism. almost half of the document is dedicated (17 sentences out of 41) to the latter. in paragraph one, nostra aetate defined the parameters for engagements and cooperation with other faith communities. dialogue and cooperation must primarily address shared concerns among human beings. it is an engagement valuing context and pondering seriously on the courses of events marking the time of dialogue. because it is a religious dialogue, the sharing and cooperation are to enlist the wisdom and guidance of respective religions and faith traditions. in the wordings of the document, dialogue has to consider “what men have in common and what draws them to fellowship.” na 1 to this end, na made a general or working definition identifying potential dialogue partners. religions, accordingly, are institutions striving for ultimate meanings. they can also be considered as establishments seeking to provide answers to unsolved riddles of the human condition. “men expect from the various religions answers to the unsolved riddles of the human condition, which today, even as in former times, deeply stir the hearts of men: what is man? what is the meaning, the aim of our life? 6 prajñā vihāra what is moral good, what is sin? whence suffering and what purpose does it serve? which is the road to true happiness? what are death, judgment and retribution after death? what, finally, is that ultimate inexpressible mystery which encompasses our existence: whence do we come, and where are we going?” na 1. as examples the document cites hinduism, buddhismand other unspecified religious traditions. na 2. in each instance, it offersconcise information on each of these religions. the wording is well studiedto reflect both the commonalities and specificities of each of those religions, using a terminology that is current to the tradition itself. “in hinduism, men contemplate the divine mystery and express it through an inexhaustible abundance of myths and through searching philosophicalinquiry. they seek freedom from the anguish of our human condition either through ascetical practices or profound meditation or a flight to god with love and trust.” na 2 as for buddhism, “in its various forms, [it] realizes the radical insufficiency of this changeable world; it teaches a way by which men, in a devout and confident spirit, may be able either to acquire the state of perfect liberation, or attain, by their own efforts or through higher help, supreme illumination.” na 2 as for the other unspecified religions found everywhere, the document states that they “try to counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing “ways,” comprising teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites.” na 2 the document clearly states that the “the catholic church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. she regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all men.” na 2. the importance of this statement for interreligious dialogue, as i will mention further, resides in the reference to the “ray of that truth.” though subtle, the mention constitutes the other foundational element for catholic engagement with other religions. in fact, catholics have a particular understanding and claims regarding that truth. batairwa k. paulin 7 the paragraph concludes with an encouragement calling christians to dialogue and collaborate with the followers of other religions. christians are to acknowledge, preserve and encourage the spiritual and moral truths found among non-christians; they are not to combat other religions nor oppose their religious and cultural expressions. they are instead to seek and appreciate the spiritual and moral values found in them as well as in the cultures they inspire. moreover, in doing so, christians are reminded not to forget their own faith. dialogue with others is to be carried on concomitantly with the witnessing to one’s faith. though in the middle of the document, this paragraph, which summarizes the core of message and the spirit the entire document would like to promote, could also stand as the conclusion of the whole document.” having spoken of hinduism, buddhism and religions in general, the subsequent paragraphs turn back to the monotheistic – abrahamic religions. na 3 concisely highlights the commonalities shared with islam as a monotheistic religion without forfeiting existing dissimilarities. it starts with a surprising affirmation that “the church has also a high regard for the muslims.” it then refers to elements of islamic faith and practices using words echoing the language of the qur’an regarding the attributes of god and the meaning of islam. “they worship god, who is one, living and subsistent, merciful and almighty, the creator of heaven and earth, who has also spoken to men…. further they await the day of judgment and the reward of god following the resurrection of the dead… they strive to submit themselves without reserve to the hidden decrees of god, just as abraham submitted himself to god’s plan, to whose faith muslims eagerly link their own.” na 3. as for the differences, the document refers to the qualified recognition and acceptance of jesus and mary: “although not acknowledging him as god, they venerate jesus as a prophet, his virgin mother they also honour, and even at times devoutly invoke.” finally, the document mentions the quarrels and dissensions that have marked christianmuslim relations for centuries. they are to be forgotten as all parties commit to a new era “and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together 8 prajñā vihāra for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom” na 3. paragraph 4 does not only provide a concise presentation of judaism but also addresses the original concerns behind the history of the document. it stresses the spiritual ties and patrimony of the abrahamic covenant, reiterating the jewish origin of the revelation of the old testament,the jewishness of jesus, his mother mary, the first disciples as well as the jewish roots of the early church. to enhance mutual understandingand respect, it calls and recommends a review of the interpretation of the jewish reception of jesus and his messages through biblical and theological studies as well as fraternal dialogues. it states that god “does not repent of the gifts he makes or of the calls he issues to his chosen people.” na 4. it further reminds that though the jewish authorities of the time opposed jesus, all jews cannot be held responsible for his death. consequently, the jews are not to be considered an accursed race and no jew of anytime or any place should be charged of deicide. last, it decries hatred, persecution and anti-semitism and recommends that catechesis and preaching be aware of risks of deviations which might unwillingly send wrong messages. the last paragraph strongly enlists the initial anthropological christian approach of the first paragraph.9 “we cannot truly call on god, the father of all, if we refuse to treat in a brotherly way any man, created as he is in the image of god. man’s relation to god the father and his relation to men his brothers are so linked together that scripture says: “he who does not love does not know god” (1 john 4:8).” the other pole of the particularities of na emerges in this paragraph which echoes the inner structure of na 2. in fact, as a whole, na is not a blind praise of or exhortation towards other religions. its dynamic is double: reaching out to the other goes concomitantly with knowing oneself and witnessing to one’s own faith. the document achieves this other dimension through a continuous referral to catholic theological frameworks. the eschatological unity of all people is one of these. the human condition is the locus of the dialogue to which all religions batairwa k. paulin 9 are conveyed. moreover, the content of the dialogue is the respective solutions or answers religions provide to the riddles of the human predicaments. as for the catholic position, those humans with questions are those whose origin and destiny are mysteriously imbedded in the divine plan, which concretely evolve around jesus christ and the church. consequently, the dialogue to which catholics invite other religions is not only a conversation of histories or stories of salvations and search for meanings, it is also primarily a sharing on how the riddles of humanity find specific and unique answers in the catholic tradition. the novelty of the inclusiveattitude consists in the refined recognition of truths present in other religions as rays of the truth that she proclaims. “likewise, other religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing “ways,” comprising teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites. the catholic church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions […] …they often reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all men” na 2. furthermore, “she [the church] proclaims and ever must proclaim christ “the way, the truth, and the life” (john 14:6), in whom men may find the fullness of religious life, in whom god has reconciled all things to himself.” na 2. finally, na 5 links the document to the general trend of vatican ii, namely option for openness, concern and dialogue with the world. the language in this paragraph echoes statements expressed elsewhere in the other documents of the council. for instance, the condemnation of all forms of discrimination on the basis of race, color, condition in life, or religion could be seen as a concretization of general options stipulated in dignitatis humanae, the declaration on religious freedom (dh). the document offers additional clarifications and statements on the nature of religious freedom, now assumed as endowment for interreligious dialogue. dh states that the church respects the right and duty of each person to follow his or her conscience with regard to the acceptance or non-acceptance of religious belief. it further emphasizes that an individual “is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with 10 prajñā vihāra his conscience, especially in religious matters.”dh 3. moreover, dh explains that “it is one of the major tenets of catholic doctrine that an individual’s response to god in faith must be free” dh 3 since, “the act of faith of its very nature is a free act.” dh10. appraisal of nostra aetate the first observation we can make about na is that while it offers a definition of religion, it has none regarding dialogue. yet, we have reiterated that the document has been set as ground for catholic engagements with other religions. how could that be possible? nostra aetate brought to light the silent commitments and efforts of dialogue within the church. in fact there has always been a prophetic voice for dialogue at the heart of the church, fostered as a lifestyle, as a philosophy or as a combination of both. francis of assisi pioneered christian muslim dialogue, when at the height of the 5th crusades, he exchanged peace with ayyubid al-malik al-kamil, sultan of egypt in 12019.10 moreover, the sixteenth centuryhas outstanding examples of missionaries who engaged pro-actively the cultures wherein they were immersed. valignano, matteo ricci, robertode nobili forged what is now considered as dialogue with cultures. modern times saw the spiritual ventures of charles de foucauld, louis massignon, henri le saux, jules manchanin, enomiya la salle, thomas merton, raimon panikkar and others. their knowledge and immersions in the religions of the others unveiled to them the unfathomable presence of the spirit of god at work. their experiences pioneered the immersion and sharing expected from dialogue of religious experiences. taken as an ensemble, the people mentioned above were precursors of interreligious dialogue. their lives featured attitudes called for in dialogue: confidence rooted in the christian faith, identity and sense of mission sustained in the experience of a lived faith, as well as a positive awareness and respect for the other as source of challenges and enrichment. endowed with those attitudes, they lived dialogue even prior to its adoption as church’s praxis. batairwa k. paulin 11 besides individual examples, the pioneering commitment to dialogue could also be discerned through institutions established to foster the understanding of the religions of the others. this was the case for instance with the pontifical institute for arabic and islamic studies founded by the missionaries of africa in 1926 and the dominican institute of oriental studies founded in cairo in 1945. the second observation is the contrast between the limited number of religions mentioned and the pretense of being a magna carta for catholic interreligious dialogue. how could this be possible? any particular consideration on the number of the religious mentioned must take into account the historical development of the document. furthermore, it must ponder on the positive benefits of the adopted functional definition of religion in identifying other dialogue partners. the definition offers basic criteria affirming the otherness and alterity of other religions as well as the common ground of cooperation and interactions. the third consideration is a practical consequence of the awareness of the historical background and development of nostra aetate. the theological reception and interpretation of the document must be looked for elsewhere, namely in the corpus of vatican ii and its magisterium. for instance, the concept of dialogue tightly connected to the document was a creation of pope paul v who in different ways expresses a felt desire for encounter and dialogue with humanity in what he called a “dialogue of salvation” in ecclesiam suam.11paul vi reiterated that “the church must enter into dialogue with the world in which it lives: it has something to say, a message to give, a communication to make.”12 nostra aetate in the corpus of vatican ii in relation with the corpus of vatican ii, nostra aetate concretizes the dialogic openness of vatican ii. an interesting exercise would consist in searching for traces that paved the road to nostra aetate throughout the corpus of vatican ii. liberty/freedom of religion and dialogue are two examples. while religious freedom is specifically addressed in dignitatis humanae, dialogue is a leitmotiv crossing through several documents. 12 prajñā vihāra gaudium et spes speaks of a dialogue with the world which eventually is the place for other religions. it asserts that the church must be involved with society. the description of the social mission of the church is all inclusive, no distinction is made of religions. presumably, believers of other faiths are embraced in the social concern of the church’s mission. “the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of people of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of christ” gs 1. the church-world dialogue is to be all embracing and comprehensive, engaging all people: catholics, other christians, other religious believers, people of good will, and even those who oppose and oppress the church. the goal is to “build up a world in genuine peace.” gs 92. the inspirational impact of gaudium et spes on nostra aetate does not merely consist in the open inclusiveness but also in the approach and perspective which highlight the particularities of the christian faith, precisely catholicism. gs states that “the church has always the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel” gs 4. moreover, the paradigmatic model that christians fostered in that dialogue with humanity is “the mystery of the word made flesh,” in other words, the very person of christ, or “the human face of god.” gaudium et spes states: “in reality it is only in the mystery of the word made flesh that the mystery of humanity truly becomes clear. christ … fully reveals humanity to itself. […] by his incarnation, he, the son of god, has in a certain way united himself with each individual.” gs 22. still, the theological ground of the inclusive openness of nostra aetate is to be found elsewhere. according to lumen gentium, good is found sown not only in the hearts of individuals, but also in the rites and customs of peoples (lg 17). ad gentes goes a step further crediting the inclusive openness in question to the action of the spirit: “without doubt the holy spirit was at work in the world before christ was glorified” (ag 4). the inclusive openness found in nostra aetate emerges from a new awareness and interpretation regarding the mysterious working of the holy spirit. accordingly, the holy spirit does not only operate in batairwa k. paulin 13 in dividuals but also in the respective religious systems to which those individuals belong. the holy spirit operates in different ways and manners only known to god.13 expectedly, the inclusive openness of nostra aetate should have implications for christian relations with followers of other religions. as fitzegerald notes, the “christian is not someone who has everything, meeting with someone who has nothing. rather it is the holy spirit present in the christian who is able to meet the same spirit present in the interlocutor of a different religious tradition.”14 nostra aetate calls christians to discover and practice the wisdom hidden in the folded arms with which hindus believers greet each other as they say: “namaste” the holy in me sees, recognizes and greets the holy in you. it is hence in humility that christians are called to encounter others, for god is bigger than us (christians) and does more than what we (christians) know or can grasp. transposed in theological terms, christians cannot in virtue of their faith claim to have a monopoly on divine things. though the fullness of revelation is given to them in jesus christ, still there should be humility in claims regarding how it is received. christians should be reminded of the challenges inherent in concepts such as “anonymous christians,”15 “unknown christ”16 in the concert of interreligious encounters. room for improvement: na not a perfect document… as to areas that an updated reading of nostra aetate should consider, there are two observations to make. the first is with regard to the restricted numbers of religions mentioned. according to fitzgerald, nostra aetate does not do full justice to the different religions in the world. so, if the document were to be re-written today, it would have to give more attention to other traditional, tribal and native religions such as those found in parts of india and in other parts of asia, the native religions as in the americas, or indigenous religions as among the aboriginals of oceania. it should make room, for instance, for religious realities such as shintoism, sikhism, african religious traditions, terinkyo, i-kuantao, the baha’i, etc.17 14 prajñā vihāra the second is with regard to the method. the basis of religious interaction prompted by nostra aetate is highly theoretical, providing a concise presentation of each of the considered religions. on practical ground, the type of interactions fostered is predominantly bilateral, that is, religions can only be engaged in a one to one encounter. in a bilateral dialogue, the presupposition is that dialogue partners have a sufficient knowledge of the religion of the others. consequently, participants need a solid investment before engaging in dialogue. the danger of reducing or equating a religion to its doctrine is always present. bilateral dialogues are often an exposition of views on a given theme and in a restricted framework of the two religions involved. a one to one dialogue can indeed foster a deeper understanding of each other. however, in case of tension or misunderstanding, dialogue can be very limited and polemical, as each side goes back to its own basis for reference. from the outlook, multilateral dialogue may sometimes look superficial but it offers a wider view and more references that can in the long process enrich bilateral dialogue. it has great potentials for fostering the spirit of harmony and collaboration across religious boundaries. an updated nostra aetate ought also to discover ways of multilateral dialogue and explore the benefits of such a practice. bilateral or multilateral religious dialogue can be compared to a mutual mirroring. it is a demanding task since each side must ensure that it is transparent enough to enable the self-reflection of the partner in dialogue. the mutual mirroring is possible only where there is friendship. in a friendly atmosphere believers set aside hypocrisy and remain courageous enough to let the other spot out the area which needs improvement. mirroring is an amicable and respectful service religions can render to each other… in mutual mirroring, the final responsibility still lies on the subject aware of his/her limitation, potentials and changes, he or she can make. impact of nostra aetate for the praxes of religious dialogue nostra aetate has been a landmark document for religious dialogue for many reasons. it came out as a fruit of discussion, of careful batairwa k. paulin 15 listening to oneself and to the other. the attentiveness helped the church walk away from the constraints of past theological frameworks. a church trapped in a non-contextual interpretation of the “extra ecclesiam nulla salus” would not achieve the openness and awareness of nostra aetate. moreover, in light of nostra aetate, previous adages that marked church policy and dealings with believers of other religions are to be reinterpreted. the image nostra aetate reflects is that of a church awakened to the existence of the other, willing to listen carefully to the other and in that process she feels invited to re-visit her identity. there is in other words, an initial identification of an “i” and “you,” a crucial step for launching a process of dialogue. for scholars in the field of religious studies, nostra aetate is important for its content. the document is a good resource for its methodological insights. nosta aetate is interdisciplinary in many ways. it harmoniously fuses arguments and approaches from philosophy, anthropology, theology and politics. it speaks of deep seated questions of humanity and the riddles of men [and women] of our times, of the answers religions provide to those questions, of god, of christ, of issues of our times, etc. the concise presentation of religion displays the awareness and the attitude one should have while speaking of the religion of the other. a last point regarding the methodological insights drawn from nostra aetate is that dialogue needs some definitions and a cadre or a framework establishing what is common and what is particular to each dialogue partner. the methodological ground for interreligious dialogue in other words, is one expanding unity in diversity. for the document, what religions have in common is the call to address the riddles of the human condition, to face the negativities of human experience. the sharing is to be on the respective answers religions offer. when this dynamic is understood, people of different religions have no reason to compete and fight. all they have are opportunities for mutual appraisal and enrichment. the question remains, however, how to address negative experiences rooted in solutions that religious traditions are providing. was nostra aetate too idealistic or perhaps naïve regarding the limitations inherent in religions themselves? 16 prajñā vihāra significance of nostra aetate for the asian catholics despite its weaknesses and limitations, nostra aetate has been and still is one of the most inspirational council documents for asian catholics. asian bishops welcomed it as the official and ecclesial inspiration for interreligious dialogue. the invitation to dialogue found in the document helped asian bishops to define and formulate a common pastoral and theological vision. as a result, dialogue has been established as a specific characteristic of the church’s life in asia.18 since its creation in 1972, the federation of asian bishops’ conference (fabc), started considering the invitation of nostra aetate. the vision of dialogue, seen as the way of being church and doing mission in asia, was already agreed upon at the 1st plenary assembly of the fabc, held in taipei in 1974. the “triple dialogue” known as the approach for evangelizing asia goes back to that period. the three asian approaches to engage dialogically referred to the socio-economic realities with which asian people negotiate the rich mosaic of ancient cultures of asia and the diverse religious traditions of the asian continent. facing the “teeming millions” of poor people of asia, the catholic church had to announce to them the good news of jesus by way of dialogue. this inspired the vision of the asian church as a church of the poor. moreover, in recognition of the rich mosaic of ancient cultures of asia, catholics were to foster an inculturated church, which is one in dialogue with asian cultures. last, the vision of a church in dialogue with other religions was due to the fact that asia is the cradle of many ancient major religions, starting from those mentioned in nostra aetate. through dialogue, christianity, which is one of the religious traditions of asia, needed to foster ways of mutual and respectful interactions. the fabc practice of dialogue in the last fifty years have unleashed many insights. first, it has propelled catholics to a new appreciation of the holy spirit as the principal agent of religious dialogue. the spirit blows where he wills and works mysteriously in all cultures and religions. dialogue hence challenges catholics to be more appreciative of the dynamism of the holy spirit. god’s spirit works within and beyond batairwa k. paulin 17 the confines of the catholic church. second, the asian praxis is teaching that dialogue has no magic formula. there is no one way, no single approach, no systematic step by step methodology for religious dialogue. what the church in asia has accumulated instead are success stories of cooperation in many fields, achievements and peaceful cohabitation among followers of diverse religious traditions, common challenges and sufferings wherever and whenever religions are politicized to serve ideological interests of a few. these stories show that many of the concerns of the local church, of the parishioners and christian grassroots can be catalysts of interaction with other people. peace, harmonious co-existence, social development, education, sharing of visions and other basic human concerns do not have religious color. stories from the asian praxes of dialogue have been thus inspirational for the systematization of dialogue in four interrelated models: dialogue of life, dialogue of action, dialogue of theological exchange and dialogue of religious experience.19 third, following nostra aetate, the conception, content and focus of dialogue have been essential. preference is given to multilateral dialogue for its potentials of holding together unity and diversity. the message is that despite their diversities, religions can offer a common and concerted answer to the riddles of being human in the asian context. it is not leveling of all religions and denial of specific claims of respective dialogue partners; it is rather an insistence and reiteration of the shared and related mission of religions to help believers answer the riddles of their existence. multilateral dialogue allows religions to create a united front against what disfigures the human person and hinders the believers to achieve the goal his or her religion fosters. with the human person at the center, it becomes easier to identify the burning issues that religions in asia are to address. religions are to be common responsive forces for justice, peace and development. in contexts where religious freedom is denied, fundamentalism and extremism and religiously motivated terrorism dominate, religions must provide adequate answers through multilateral dialogue. moreover, religions are to analyze and provide 18 prajñā vihāra viable solution to the contemporary riddles which threatened human existence in asia today. these include new forms of slavery occasioned by the plight of the migrant workers, sex industry, humanitarian crisis resulting from models of economic development not valuing the integrity of the human person, indigenous population whose existence is threatened by marginalizing models of economic development. other riddles to be answered allude to the ambivalent values of cultural and economic globalization, ecological challenges attested by global warming and climate change. moreover, the status and treatment of women in religions need to be enlisted among common concerns for all religions. religions have not always been exemplar in providing positive approaches towards gender sensitivity and equality. the list of concerns is inexhaustible. more can be added depending on one’s sensitivity towards the “riddles” of human existence attracting people to turn towards religions. the addition that fabc has been bringing to the picture is that the solutions are to be found in a dialogically multilateral framework. the reception of nostra aetate in the asian context the importance of nostra aetate for asia remains relevant. as mentioned earlier in line with the theology of the fabc, it is the document that shaped the reception of vatican ii in asia. the self-understanding of the church in asia as a church in dialogue stems from the reading that the asian bishops made of nostra aetate. moreover, the document must continue serving as referential framework in assessing the achievements of dialogic encounters with asian realities, cultures and religions as well as in addressing concrete challenges linked to the praxis of dialogue in an asian context. with this regard, i would enlist three observations. first, the asian context benefited from the clear indication na made regarding the common ground for religious dialogue: suffering has no religious denomination but intrinsically appends to human nature; the riddles inherent to the human condition are the primary matters religions are required to address. by setting commonality beforehand, nostra aetate came closer to the asian common sense according to which batairwa k. paulin 19 “collectivity,” “the group” precedes the individual. as a matter of fact, asian religions have been favoring multilateral dialogues rather than bilateral dialogue. on concrete ground, religious multilateral dialogues are gatherings of friends standing for a common cause or a value. unlike bilateral dialogues, the focus is on commonality, particular claims seemed to be epoché. however, it is not that they are denied but the collective context does not require them to grab the main spot. would particular claims to be put forward, they should come timely, in a natural way and without offending the harmony and the sensitivity of the collectivity. the second observation is regarding the reception and implementation of nostra aeate in asia. they have often given the impression of forfeiting the particular claims of christianity. people accustomed to bilateral dialogues are dismayed by the lack of thrust in speaking about the uniqueness of jesus christ, his role as the only savior and so on. in bilateral dialogues, the focus is on the identity of the religions. a lack of understanding of the diverse dynamics of those two approaches to dialogue has led to misunderstandings within the church itself which could have been avoided. the concern that the asian way of dialogue might lead to relativism or water down the christian faith has been voiced out in many ways. it is one of the errors dialogue and proclamation refers to in the list of problems the practice of dialogue has raised. “there are those who would seem to think, erroneously, that in the church’s mission today dialogue should simply replace proclamation.”20 cardinal ratzinger addressed that fear by calling those involved in the field to uphold to the true teaching stipulated in his dominus iesus.21 moreover, pope francis reiterated the same concern in an encouraging way at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of nostra aetate: “from the beginning it was clear that such a dialogue was not meant to relativize the christian faith, or to set aside the longing that resides in the heart of every disciple, to proclaim to all the joy of encounter with christ and his universal call.”22 the persistent reminders might suggest that there is a malaise or a misunderstanding that should be solved through an inner dialogue between the two approaches the church leads to encounter other religions. 20 prajñā vihāra each side will benefit from such exchange as it will be led to appreciate deeply the motivations and fittingness of the priorities established. the third observation is that the on-going reception of nostra aetate must take into consideration the epistemic world wherein it is being received. in the east, that framework is one shaped by the quest for conciliation and accommodation of a religion which, though of asian origin, is still looked at as foreign. for this reason, asian christians enter or engage in dialogue with preoccupations that are particular to their background. for the most conscious, dialogue, just as being christian, does not have to be an alienating experience. in fact, the epistemic framework for the dialogue asia is fostering is one affirming the complexity of their setting. the notion of christian identity emerging from that epistemic framework should not be dismissed without prior consideration of the context itself. in fact, some of the formulations are tentative efforts of articulating experiences and feelings and learning from the serious considerations of the others. to name a few examples, gideon goosen’s evocation of “hyphenated christians,”23 peter c. phan’s proposal of “being religiously interreligiously,”24 catherine cornille’s consideration on multiple religious belonging and christian identity25 and felix wilfred’s explanation of his being a christian relativist26 are in fact concrete responses developed in awareness of the complexity of their epistemic context. since at that time, nostra aeatate could not anticipate these responses, it is now timely that they be considered to enhance an intra church dialogue. in the west, the understanding and praxis of dialogue in general, and interreligious dialogue in particular, have largely been influenced by a philosophical trend damian howard qualifies as catholic personalism in reference to the impact and contribution of thinkers such as husserl, scheler, ebner, mounier, marcel, bergson, buber and levinas to the contemporary catholic thinking.27 all these philosophers have helped catholics ponder on the concept of the human person and on alterity; their ideas have penetrated into the contemporary church’s official discourse on dialogue. howard summarizes the epistemic framework shaping the church’s discourse on dialogue as follows: “the concept of the person batairwa k. paulin 21 points towards the intrinsic relationality of the human being and suggests that we find our ultimate fulfillment in a fullness of relationship. the ologically speaking, personhood is expressive of a god who, whilst self-disclosing, always remain a mystery, ever inviting the creature into deeper mutual understanding and trust. hence, dialogue is a personalist category because it betokens not merely the task of communication but also suggests the cumulative effect of on-going conversation which leads each time beyond prejudice and projection into ever truer knowledge. indeed, the concept of the person “expresses in its origin the idea of dialogue and the idea of god as the dialogical being.”28 just as the asian answers to their epistemic context29 could enrich the dialogic praxis of the church, so it is for the contribution of catholic personalism for the asian context. in fact, some of these thinkers have valuable insights into alterity that once known and put in practice can expand the horizons of dialogue. how can dialogue remain the same after interiorizing insights of thinkers such as emanuel levinas as he helps us reflect on how we could go out of ourselves, out of our paths and encounter , think of the other without letting him or her disappear in ourselves? according to levinas, that could only be possible if we assimilate the other to the unknown land towards which we are headed, and which should keep its foreign, untamed character even after we have reached it. being strange or foreign should be considered as an irreducible category in our aspiring to know and encounter the reality that surrounds us. why is the other so important, almost absolute? for levinas, the other remains infinitely transcendent and a stranger because he unveils to me the other, the transcendence, the trace of the infinite.” it is that awareness that must dictate my interaction with the other. in other words, every encounter is always a meeting between two absolutes who reveal the absolute, the transcendent. when every human interaction is enlightened by such awareness, many of the concerns regarding what has to occur in religious encounters are to be reviewed.30 22 prajñā vihāra conclusion: religious dialogue can be compared to a mutual mirroring under the impulse of the silent but active presence of the holy spirit. the mirroring is a demanding task, for besides attentiveness to the partner, it implies awareness of that silent but active presence. friendship, which is a good ingredient for dialogue is a work of the holy spirit. it enables moving beyond hypocrisy and let the other spot out the area which needs improvement. mirroring is an amicable and respectful service religions can render to each other. in mutual mirroring, the final responsibility still lies on the subject aware of his/her limitations, potentials and changes, he or she can make. though not a perfect document, nostra aetate has served as the basis for interreligious dialogue within the framework of the roman catholic church. 50 years later, the assessment of the reception of the teaching of nostra aetate needs to acknowledge the efforts made, the challenges encountered and mostly the directions still unexplored and towards which the spirit is calling the church to move with enthusiasm and determination. fruitful dialogue leads to mutual mirroring and cooperation in addressing the riddles that drive humanity to turn to religions in search of responses. violence inherent or justified by religions, discriminations rooted in religions, sexism, caste system, etc. are concrete, endemic experiences which call religions to cooperate. batairwa k. paulin 23 endnotes 1 ariel ben ami, “the origins and development of nostra aetate,” http://www. catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-developmentof-nostra-aetate (1 august, 2015). 2 in terms of importance the council’s documents are divided into “constitutions (dogmatic and pastoral),” “decrees” and “declarations.” 3 michael l. fitzgerald, “nostra aetate: a guide for ongoing dialogue. “ <http:// columbanird.org/nostra-aetate-a-guide-for-ongoing-dialogue> entered on nov 15, 2015. 4 see michael. l fitzgerald, ibid.; thomas stransky, “the genesis of nostra aetate” america 5 both thomas stransky and cardinal bea were founding members of the secretariat for christian unity, founded by john xxiii in 1960. the secretariat was entrusted the tasks of approaching separated christian brothers and sisters and of enhancing a dialogue with the jewish people. thomas stransky, the genesis of nostra aetate” america, october 24, 2005 issue. 6 thomas stransky, the genesis of nostra aetate” america, october 24, 2005 issue. 7 according to t. fransky and lm fitzgerald, the council needed to answer divergent voices and suggestions of political and ecclesial significance. apprehensive of the consequences of a misinterpretation of a statement on the jews as a support for israel, and the consequences that such a reading could bear for their christians, bishops from the arab world advised that the document also mention islam. meanwhile, encouraged by that move, some bishops from asia and others from africa requested a broader treatment of religions. thomas stransky, the genesis of nostra aetate” america, october 24, 2005 issue. 8 laurentin, declaration on the relation of the church to non-christian religions, p.35. 9 the christian anthropological framework in question is the divine nature of the unity of origin and destiny of humanity stated in the first paragraph. 10 paul moses, the saint and the sultan: the crusades, islam and francis of assisi’s mission of peace. new york: doubleday, 2009. 11 paul vi, ecclesiam suam, 70 12 paul vi, ecclesiam suam, 1964, # 65. 13 inclusive awareness and openness mentioned above have been broadened and instilled in the prayer of the church. it is associated with the holy spirit, working in mysterious ways known only to god. most notable expressions of that openness are http://www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate http://www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate http://www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate 24 prajñā vihāra found in the eucharistic prayers for reconciliation and in particular way, in the fourth eucharistic prayer. it speaks of liturgy of the church, in terms of sacrifice to god and meant for all, a sacrifice acceptable and which brings salvation not only for catholic believers but to the whole world. the prayer also invokes not only catholics but also “all who seek you ‘god’ with a sincere heart;” the dead, not only catholics but “all the dead whose faithfulness is known to you [god] alone. 14 fitzgerald, ibid. 15 as the theme amounts to the karl rahner’s theology of religions, it is important to mention all the publications with this regard. karl rahner, “christianity and the non-christian religions” in theological investigations, v.5. (london: longman & todd, 1966); karl rahner, “anonymous christians,” in theological investigations v.6 (london: longman & todd, 1969), pp. 390-398; karl rahner, “anonymous christianity and the missionary task of the church” , in theological investigations v.12 (london: longman & todd, 1974), pp. 161-178; karl rahner, “observations on the problem of the ‘anonymous christian’” in theological investigations v.14 (london: longman & todd, 1976, pp. 280-298; karl rahner, “anonymous christianity and explicit faith” in theological investigations v.16 (london: longman & todd, 1979), pp. 52-59; karl rahner, “jesus christ in the non-christian religions,” in theological investigations v. 17 (london: longman & todd, 1981), pp. 39-50; karl rahner, “on the importance of the non-christian religions for salvation,” in theological investigations v.18 (london: longman & todd, 1984), pp. 288-95. 16 raimon panikkar, the unknown christ of hinduism: towards an ecumenical christophany. maryknoll, n.y.: orbis books, 1981. 17 fitzgerald, ibid. 18 ecclesia in asia, #3 [ ea, 1999, no. 3]. 19 dialogue and proclamation, 1991, # 42 20 pontifical council for interreligious dialogue and congregation of evangelization, dialogue and proclamation: reflection and orientations on interreligious dialogue and the proclamation of the gospel of jesus christ, (roma: bibliotecha vaticana, 1991), # 4. 21 cardinal joseph ratzinger, dominus iesus, 2000. 22 pro dialogo bulletin 145 2014/1 50 years in the service of interreligious dialogue the pontifical council for interreligious dialogue 1965-2014., p.2. 23 gideon goosen, hyphenated christians: towards a better understanding of dual religious belonging (bern, switzerland: peter lang, 2011). 24 peter c. phan, being religious interreligiously: asian perspectives on interreligious dialogue (maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 2004). batairwa k. paulin 25 25 catherine cornille, ed., many mansions? multiple religious belonging and christian identity (maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 2002) 26 felix wilfred argues that by “christian relativism” one should not think of denying the absolute nature of jesus christ, or water down some truth of the faith. christian relativism instead focalizes on the diverse existential relations from which we perceive and experience jesus as christ. he is related to the father, to the believers… “the spirit of christian relativism is a deeper a reality not to be caricatured as if it were a pusillanimous concession that there is no truth, and if there is, all truths are equal.” felix wilfred, “jesus’ interpretation in asia: some fragmentary reflections on fragments” quest, vol. 5, no. 1 (may 2006), 18-19. 27 damian howard, “risk and resistance: fifty years of interreligious dialogue in the catholic church.” pro dialogo bulletin 145, (2014/1), 39-40. 28 damian howard, “risk and resistance: fifty years of interreligious dialogue in the catholic church.” pro dialogo bulletin 145, (2014/1), 40. 29 hyphenization, double or multiple belonging, “advaita,” cherishing unity while preserving diversity 『求同存異』, searching for correspondence and complementarity 『符合』 rather than choosing, or separating and discriminating. 30 levinas “autrui reste mon maître parce qu’il me révèle l’au-delà, la transcendance, la trace de l’infini: “autrui demeure infiniment transcendant, infiniment etranger” emmanuel lévinas, totalité et infini, p. 168). 26 prajñā vihāra references ariel ben ami, “the origins and development of nostra aetate,” http:// www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate (1august, 2015). cornille, catherine. ed., many mansions? multiple religious belonging and christian identity. maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 2002. damian howard, “risk and resistance: fifty years of interreligious dialogue in the catholic church.” pro dialogo bulletin 145, (2014/1): 33-49. emmanuel lévinas, totalité et infini, la haye: nijhoff,1961 fitzgerald, michael l. “nostra aetate: a guide for ongoing dialogue.” <http://columbanird.org/nostra-aetate-a-guide-for-ongoing dialogue> entered on nov 15, 2015. flannery, austin, o.p., ed., vatican council ii, volume 1 – the conciliar and post conciliar documents. northport, new york: costello publishing company, 1975. g. m.-m. cottier, o.p. “l’historique de la déclaration.” in les relations de l’eglise avec les religions non-chrétiennes. edited by a.m. henry. paris : cerf, 1966 ; pp.37-78. goosen, gideon. hyphenated christians: towards a better understanding of dual religious belonging. bern, switzerland: peter lang, 2011. john paul ii, ecclesia in asia: post synodal apostolic exhortation. vatican, 1999. kovac, edouard. «rencontre avec l’autre: les croyants des autres religions» spiritus 138 (fevrier, 1995): 52-63. http://www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate http://www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate http://www.catholicsforisrael.com/articles/israel-and-the-church/229-the-origins-and-development-of-nostra-aetate batairwa k. paulin 27 lamdam, nerville & alberto melloni, nostra aetate: origins, promulgation, impact on jewish catholic relation proceedings of the international conference, jerusalem 30 oct. 1 nov. 2005. [christianity and history series of john xxiii foundation for religious studies in bologna vol. 5]. munster & berlin: lit verlag. dood w. hopf, rutgers univers, 2007. laurentin, rené and joseph neuner. the declaration on the relation of the church to non-christian religions. glen rock, new jersey: vatican ii documents paulist press, 1966. moses, paul. the saint and the sultan: the crusades, islam and francis of assisi’s mission of peace. new york: doubleday, 2009. panikkar, raimon. the unknown christ of hinduism: towards an ecumenical christophany. maryknoll, n.y.: orbis books, 1981. paul vi, ecclesiam suam: encyclical on the church. vatican, 1964. paul vi, nostra aetate: declaration of the church to non-christian religions. vatican, 1965. phan, peter c. being religious interreligiously: asian perspectives on interreligious dialogue. maryknoll, ny: orbis books, 2004. pontifical council for interreligious dialogue and congregation of evangelization, dialogue and proclamation: reflection and orientations on interreligious dialogue and the proclamation of the gospel of jesus christ. roma: bibliotecha vaticana, 1991. pro dialogo bulletin 145 2014/1 50 years in the service of interreligious dialogue the pontifical council for interreligious dialogue 1965-2014. rahner, karl. “on the importance of the non-christian religions for salvation.” in theological investigations v.18. ondon: longman & todd, 1984; pp. 288-95. rahner, karl. “anonymous christianity and explicit faith” in theological investigations v.16. london: longman & todd, 1979; pp. 52-59 28 prajñā vihāra rahner, karl. “anonymous christianity and the missionary task of the church.” in theological investigations v.12. london: longman & todd, 1974; pp. 161-178 rahner, karl. “anonymous christians.” in theological investigations v.6 london: longman & todd, 1969; pp. 390-398. rahner, karl. “christianity and the non-christian religions.” in theological investigations, v.5. london: longman & todd, 1966. rahner, karl. “jesus christ in the non-christian religions.” in theological investigations v. 17. london: longman & todd, 1981; pp. 39-50 rahner, karl. “observations on the problem of the ‘anonymous christian.’” in theological investigations v.14. london: longman & todd, 1976; pp. 280-298 ratzinger, cardinal joseph. dominus iesus: declaration on the unicity and salvific universality of jesus christ and the church. vatican, 2000. stransky, thomas. “the genesis of nostra aetate” america, october 24, 2005 issue. vorgrimler, herbert, ed., commentary on the documents of vatican ii. 5 vols. trans. lalit adolphus et al. new york: herder and herder, 1969. wilfred, felix. “jesus’ interpretation in asia: some fragmentary reflections on fragments” quest, vol. 5, no. 1 (may 2006): 1-24. a report on emotional education for young children: reading kierkegaard on faith through johannes climacus and johannes de silentio 1 kajornpat tangyin assumption university of thailand บทคคดยยอ บทความน � ม เน��อหาเก �ยวกคบความค�ดเร��องความเช��อของค ยร�เคการ�ด ในการอยานงานของค ยร�เคการ�ด ผ��เข ยนไมยมค�นใจวยาน �ค�อความค�ดท �แท�จร�งของค ยร�เค การ�ดหร�อเป# นเพ ยงแคยความค�ดของนามแฝงท �ใช� การท �จะต กรอบความค�ดเร�� องความเช��อของค ยร�เคการ�ดไมยใชยเร��องงยาย และบางท �เราจะเห#นม)มมองท � หลายหลากของความเช��อพร�อมกคบความหลากหลายของนามแฝงของเขา ในบทความน � ผ��เข ยนต�องการม)ยงเฉพาะความค�ดเร��องความเช��อผยานการอยานจาก สองนามแฝง ค�อ johannes climacus และ johannes de silentio จากหนคงส�อสองเลยมก#ค�อ concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments (cup) แ ล ะ fear and trembling (ft) ในสยวนแรกของบทความน � บรรยายความค�ดเร��องความเช��อตามทคศนะของ climacus และสยวนท �สองจะเป# นเร��อง การเคล��อนผยานส�ยการก�าวกระโดดของความเช��อจากทคศนะของ silentio และท�ายท �ส)ดผ��เข ยนน.าเสนอความค�ดเก �ยวกคบความยากล.าบากและการ ท�าทายจากการอยานงานสองเลยมน � ท �ม ตยอผ��ต�องการจะเป# นคร�สตชน abstract this paper is concerned with kierkegaard’s the notion of faith. in reading kierkegaard’s works one is never sure if they are encountering the real kierkegaard’s thoughts or merely his pseudonyms. to divine what kierkegaard means by the notion of faith is not an easy task, as we encounter different perspectives of faith along with his pseudonyms. in this paper i want to focus on his idea on faith through my reading of two pseudonyms; johannes climacus and johannes de silentio from the books; concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments (cup) and fear and trembling (ft). this paper will first describe the notion of faith from climacus’ point of view, and secondly on the movement to the leap of faith from silentio’s point of view. lastly i will reflect on the difficulties and challenges in reading these two works for those who wish to become christian. ‘were your faith the size of a mustard seed you could say to this mulberry tree, “be uprooted and planted in the sea”, and it would obey you. (luke, 17: 6) 2 i faith is one of the main themes of kierkegaard’s two works, concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments and fear and trembling, and his account of faith aims at answering his own question about the meaning of human existence. in the journal kierkegaard says, “what i really need is to get clear about what i am to do….to see what it really is that god wills that i shall do; the crucial thing is to find a truth that is truth for me, to find the idea for which i am willing to live and die” (kierkegaard, 1978, p.8). it is clear that the idea for which he is willing to live and die for is faith. but what does kierkegaard mean by faith? his account of faith is closely related to his biography. and he is one of the philosophers whose philosophy has essential connection to his real life. likewise his philosophy aims at the meaning of his personal existence. he does not refer to a general conception of truth, a truth for everyone, but, “a truth for me.” this is also a response to the philosophical situation of nineteenth century europe. many thinkers inquire into the objective truth, and consider man in general, but the existing individual is overlooked. but for kierkegaard, human beings are first existing individuals who have a will, through which they can decide what they want to become, and could not be characterized in advance. for kierkegaard, the existing individual could not be reduced to only a part of any system of thought, or any organized religion or formal social structure. this individuality does not exist only in statement or proposition, but in real existence as human person. speculative thinkers often overlook the importance of individual persons and view them too abstractly. according to levinas, the irreducible of individuality is one of kierkegaard’s contributions to european thought. he says, the strong conception of existence which was kierkegaard’s contribution to european thought insists on two basic points. the first is that human subjectivity, together with its dimension of interiority, needs to be maintained as an absolute, as something separate but located on this side of objective being rather than beyond it. but secondly, and paradoxically, the irreducibility of the subject must be protected – on the basis of pre-philosophical experience – from the threat of idealism, even if it was idealism that first accorded a philosophical status to subjectivity. (levinas, 1998, p.26) many philosophers, from its greek beginnings up to the nineteenth century, had attempted to reach, through their pursuit of objective truth, a logical systematic explanation to take account of all things. for kierkegaard, speculative philosophy seems to reach its culmination with hegelian dialectic. everything, according to hegel, could be explained logically within his system of thought, epitomized in his statement: what is rational is real, what is real is rational. and this account of rationality could be applied even to the religious sphere, which means that nothing could escape his rational system of thought. incomprehensibility is attributed to human ignorance which has not yet attained the transcendental intuition. this intuition will move us from our subjective limited reality to the objective reality, or totality. and everything exists as part of this totality. the existing individual is reduced to a part under the shadow of the whole system. the striving for the objective truth moves humans as existing individuals to be human in general, or in the words, the “human being” is separated from individual human beings. for kierkegaard, a resistance against the objective truth of speculative thinkers, especially hegel, has to be awakened to bring “human being” back to existing individual, so that they can find their home in the world, not in the system. kierkegaard, through climacus, says: “speculators cease to be human beings, individual existing human beings, and ‘en famille’ (as a family) become all sorts of things? if not, one is certainly obliged to stop with the paradox, since it is grounded in and is the expression for precisely this, that the eternal, essential truth relates itself to existing individuals with the summons that they go further and further in the inwardness of faith” (cup, vii 183). kierkegaard seems to love the paradox of life. he aims at preserving the paradox as a paradox, not to understand it, but to understand that it is a paradox. by no means does he reject speculative thought; he 2 just tries to show that there must be some sphere independent from speculative reasoning. speculative thinkers, according to climacus, are like dancers who are good dancers in their own way. a good dancer sometimes has a good leap to perform for the audience. but many speculative thinkers are like dancers, who believe they can fly. climacus, in the postscript, rejects this: if a dancer could leap very high, we would admire him, but if he wanted to give the impression what he could fly – even though he could leap higher than any dancer had ever leapt before – let laughter overtake him. leaping means to belong essentially to the earth and to respect the law of gravity so that the leap is merely the momentary, but flying means to be set free from telluric conditions, something that is reserved exclusively for winged creatures, perhaps also for inhabitants of the moon, perhaps – and perhaps that is also where the system will at long last find its true reader. to be a human being has been abolished, and every speculative thinker confuses himself with humankind, whereby he becomes something infinitely great and nothing at all. (cup, vii 102) hegel, according to climacus, might have been a good dancer if he was content merely to dance but not to try to fly. to fly would mean to understand faith. rationality, for traditional thinkers from the middle ages to the enlightenment, is the proper means to help man understand everything including their religious beliefs. god as the infinite also is the object of rationalization for many thinkers. this is the long last temptation of human thought to lift up, or in the other word ‘to fly’, to the infinite through finite thought. for climacus, the infinite could not be comprehensible with finite human thought. the infinite is beyond the finite, and this gap could not be bridged through rationality. hegel is a good exemplar of a dancer who attempts to fly, fly without wings for the infinite. climacus wants to remind hegel to content himself with being a good dancer. for butler, “if one tries to think the infinite, one has already made the infinite finite….the infinite can be affirmed nonrationally and, hence, passionately, at the limits of thought, that is, at the limits of hegelianism” (butler, 1993, p.375). the limits of hegelian system bring climacus reconsider again what an account of faith is supposed to be. rationality is not supposed to be the tool to help man understand faith. for him, the notion of faith that can be grasped by reason is always a misconception. faith, according to him, could not be comprehended through any system of thought. on one hand, faith is related to his definition of truth: “here is such a definition of truth: an objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person” (cup, vii 170). but this definition includes uncertainty and paradox. as such the definition of faith does not grasp faith: without risk, no faith. faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty. if i am able to apprehend god objectively, i do not have faith; but because i cannot do this, i must have faith. if i want to keep myself in faith, i must continually see to it that i hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty i am “out on 70,000 fathoms of water” and still have faith. (cup, vii 170-171) climacus wants to show us that to intellectually apprehend god is, at the same time, to remove our faith, so that faith will have no place in the religious dimension. we still have faith because we could not comprehend god intellectually, and then faith becomes the stairway to lift up man to god, towards this absolute 3 incomprehensibility. what man needs at this stage is to leap into the objective uncertainty. and this leap requires the total risk as an adventure into the unseen which is absolutely unknown. faith, in this sense, has to come out of our passion for the infinite. just as climacus shocks the traditional conception of christianity when he views faith as the highest attainment that nothing can go beyond. for those who want to explain something beyond faith might not agree with him in this point, and some thinkers might not accept his view of faith in form of the infinite passion. many thinkers and theologians may prefer to develop reason as the gift from god to open the veil of mystery, and firmly claim of all mysteries sooner or later will be understandable. he challenges all who use rationality to account for objective truth, and even theologians who want to postion faith within a systematic theology. for climacus, faith that can be understandable is not faith. to understand objectively and with certainty requires no risk, and faith has no place there. faith always requires risk as climacus says: “without risk, no faith.” with risk, faith requires a personal infinite passion, and those who have faith have to commit themselves fully into this passion despite the greatest uncertainty. for climacus, “faith is the objective uncertainty with the repulsion of the absurd, held fast in the passion of inwardness, which is the relation of inwardness intensified to its highest. this formula fits only the one who have faith, no one else, not even a lover, or an enthusiast, or a thinker, but solely and only the one who has faith, who relates himself to the absolute paradox” (cup, vii 532). those who are approach the infinite with objective certainty merely try to know the infinite intellectually, and commitment is not a requirement for them. but for those who live their lives with faith will commit themselves to the infinite with infinite passion even without any guarantee for their faith. a man with faith is a person who is not afraid of uncertainty, and the more uncertainty he encounters the more he commits himself to faith. a man with faith is a man who is ready to accept the greatest paradox, even if this paradox leads to absurdity. what does he mean by this paradox? climacus says, when the eternal truth relates itself to an existing person, it becomes the paradox. through the objective uncertainty and ignorance, the paradox thrusts away in the inwardness of the existing person. but since the paradox is not in itself the paradox, it does not thrust away intensely enough, for without risk, no faith; the more risk, the more faith; the more objective reliability, the less inwardness (since inwardness is subjectivity); the less objective reliability, the deeper is the possible inwardness. when the paradox itself is the paradox, it thrusts away by virtue of the absurd, and the corresponding passion of inwardness is faith. (cup, vii 176) and what does climacus mean by the absurd? he replies: what, then, is the absurd? the absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence in time, that god has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, etc., has come into existence exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable from any other human being, inasmuch as all immediate recognizability is pre-socratic paganism and from the jewish point of view is idolatry. (cup, vii 176) is it possible for a man with reason to understand this paradox? if faith is the highest attainment of human being, then to remain at the level of human intellect is not enough. for climacus, this paradox is not something that can be understood, so 4 ultimately we can only accept this paradox as a paradox. this seems to echo socratic’s irony: to know that i do not know. and this paradox shows us the impossibility to understand how the eternal truth comes into existence in the temporal as the infinite coming to be the finite. this is absurd, just as the christian belief that god comes into existence as an existing individual. from this absurd, climacus strongly insists on the fundamental gap between reason and faith. faith is not the object for rational activity, and reason has its own place to play, but not in religious belief. some may question this irrationality of faith. for westphal, “it is not reason as such that is opposed to faith but modes of human reason that have forgotten their limits as human and have lapsed into self-deification” (westphal, 1998, p.112). but climacus should not be considered an irrationalist. reason is not something to be denied. it is a gift from god, as st. augustine claimed, but we should let it play its own role, and not extend beyond its own power. for climacus, the dancer is not a person who can fly. reason is not the key to faith. instead it is our infinite passion of the infinite, coupled with our acceptance of paradox and the absurd, which lifts us to the level of faith. christianity was very strange and peculiar to greek and jewish people precisely because of this absurdity. and this absurdity has never left christianity as long as it accepts the paradox of god coming into existence as an existing individual. according to climacus, a man who wants to understand faith is called a “comedian”. or there is a man who says he has faith, but now he wants to make his faith clear to himself; he wants to understand himself in his faith. now the comedy begins again. the object of faith becomes almost probable, it becomes as good as probable, it becomes to a high degree and exceedingly probable. he has finished; he dares to say of himself that he does not believe as shoemakers and tailors or other simple folk do but that he has also understood himself in his believing. what wondrous understanding! on the contrary, he has learned to know something different about faith than he believed and has learned to know that he no longer has faith, since he almost knows, as good as knows, to a high degree and exceedingly almost knows. (cup, vii 211) before faith, no one understands better than any other, whether shoemaker, tailor, or professor. we have to understand that it is not understandable. climacus, again, says: “the person who understands the paradox will, misunderstanding, forget that christianity is the absolute paradox (just as its newness is the paradoxical newness) precisely because it annihilates a possibility (the analogies of paganism, an eternal becoming-of-the-deity) as an illusion and turns it into actuality” (cup, vii 506). any dancer who takes a fine leap, seemingly wanting to fly at last will come back to the floor. a flying dancer is ridiculous and becomes a comedian. it is mere fantasy or comedy. what a man can do is only to take a leap, and this leap is taken not through reason, but the infinite passion. and this infinite passion makes human move beyond the limits of reason. for gardiner, “in every case faith demands, not just a leap, but a leap into the rational unthinkable which presupposes divine assistance” (gardiner, 1988, p.76). the leap here, according to gardiner, seems to be the leap made by faith, and it is not the intellectual activity. it is the miracle. it is the highest attainment of human life and there is nothing beyond this. ii kierkegaard, in the book fear and trembling, provides us a narrative through his pseudonym johannes de silentio concerning the story of abraham from genesis 5 22. abraham is the great father of faith for all judeo-christian and islamic religions. however, silentio talks about abraham only in the christian context. the point is: how abraham acts in response to god who asks him to sacrifice his beloved son to god? and we may have further question about how we understand abraham’s act relating to his faith, and what faith is. for those who are familiar with this story may take it for granted like a sermon about abraham and his faith. but silentio leads us to reread again how abraham acts on his belief in god to sacrifice his only beloved son isaac with his conviction that he will get isaac back. how do we understand abraham? silentio, in fear and trembling, begins the preface with this statement: “not only in the business world but also in the world of ideas, our age stages ein wirklicher ausverkauf (a real sale)” (ft, iii 57). many ideas concerning faith are oversimplified and easy, like a clearance sale at a supermarket. any easy answer as we always hear from a sermon might not dig deep enough into the paradox of abraham’s faith: to sacrifice isaac and to receive isaac back. with ethical norms, it may shock the people who hear this story suggesting that abraham would be a murderer. he is going to kill, or to sacrifice isaac as an offering to god. silentio recognizes the paradox of this story by extending it to other persons who would perform the same act like abraham. if faith cannot make it a holy act to be willing to murder his son, then let the same judgment be passed on abraham as on everyone else….the ethical expression for what abraham did is that he meant to sacrifice isaac – but precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a person sleepless, and yet without this anxiety abraham is not who he is….in other words, if faith is taken away by becoming nul and nichts, all that remains is the brutal fact that abraham meant to murder isaac, which is easy enough for anyone to imitate if he does not have faith – that is, the faith that makes it difficult for him. (ft, iii 82) what is supposed to be the ethical norm to justify abraham’s act in this case? because of faith, or only faith that makes abraham to be the father of faith, not a murderer. how could we understand this event on the mount in the land of moriah? along the way to moriah, there is no conversation left for us, and no one knows what abraham thinks. abraham was thrown into the absolute paradox which is unspeakable for the other. he said nothing to sarah, his wife, and not fully answered to isaac by the question: where is the lamb for the burnt offering? this is abraham’s answer: ‘my son, god himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering’. how could he explain to isaac that god demands his life? this story of ‘the binding of isaac’ is not only isaac alone, but for mark c. taylor: “the binding of isaac is a figure for other bindings. this narrative might better be entitled: “the binding of abraham.” the binding of the son repeats and extends the binding of the father, even as it seems to break the tie that binds the two together as one” (taylor, 1993, p.76). this binding does not mean only in physical body that is bound but it links to other questions like human relationship, freedom, rationality, and moral law. as the father who loves his only son, abraham will perform an act that breaks up his relationship to his son. and he will break the moral law that binds all men to live together in society because of god’s command. abraham occupies a place no one knows what he thinks, and no one understands what he is going to do. some may question him in the manner that he negotiated with god for sodom and gomorrah: “are you going to destroy the just man with the sinner?” “will the judge of the whole earth not administer justice?” (gen 18: 23, 25). he dares to raise questions to god for sodom and gomorrah, but in 6 the case of his own beloved son isaac, he keeps silence. “here i am” is the absolute answer for a man of faith like abraham. why does abraham not ask god for his only son and himself? for abraham, his faith might lead him to accept the angel’s statement, “for nothing is impossible to god” (luke 1:37). to sacrifice isaac and to receive isaac back is not understandable for man, that is why silentio states: “in order to perceive the prodigious paradox of faith, a paradox that makes a murder into a holy and god-pleasing act, a paradox that gives isaac back to abraham again, which no thought can grasp, because faith begins precisely where thought stops” (ft, iii 103). i repeat here again: faith begins precisely where thought stops. along the way to the mount in the land of moriah, abraham takes with him not only fire, wood, two servants, isaac, but also faith. because of his faith, he left everything else behind and keeps faith in his blood and bones as he always answers to god: “here i am.” he is ready for everything that god commands. about his character, silentio expresses, “by faith abraham emigrated from the land of his fathers and became an alien in the promised land. he left one thing behind, took one thing along: he left behind his worldly understanding, and he took along his faith”(ft, iii 69). for silentio, “faith begins precisely where thought stops,” it is by no means to his firmly assertion about the contradiction between faith and thinking. on the contrary, faith itself begins only when thinking stops. some may interpret faith begins when thinking is limited. when thinking stops, doubt also cast away from us. as far as we are thinking, questioning, doubting, faith is not there. abraham lives his faith in his real life, not only in proposition or in any system of thought. abraham never doubt in sacrificing isaac and his beloved son never willbe lost because “for nothing is impossible to god.” for silentio, if abraham doubts, he would do something else, as silentio says: but abraham had faith and did not doubt; he believed the preposterous. if abraham had doubted, then he would have done something else, something great and glorious, for how could abraham do anything else but what is great and glorious! he would have gone to mount moriah, he would have split the firewood, lit the fire, drawn the knife. he would have cried out to god, “reject not this sacrifice; it is not the best that i have, that i know very well, for what is an old man compared with the child of promise, but it is the best i can give you. let isaac never find this out so that he may take comfort in his youth.” he would have thrust the knife into his own breast. he would have been admired in the world, and his name would never be forgotten; but it is one thing to be admired and another to become a guiding star that saves the anguished. (ft, iii 73) if abraham begins to doubt and decide to sacrifice his life instead of his beloved son, he might be great like any other great hero who sacrifices himself for his beloved person. his name will be honored and immortal, and becomes the story from generation to generation. but he has faith, and this faith is the absurd for anyone else. how could we believe in abraham sacrificing his son and receiving his son back again? when he begs god for sodom and gomorrah, it is understandable. it is his love of just people as one human being love for mankind. but in the case of isaac, we can only stand with fear and trembling before him. people tend to give this story only lip service and oversimplify its reference to faith, like a fairy tale. but for silentio, faith leaves him in silence. for him, his difficulty to understand hegel is not the same as his inability to grasp abraham’s faith. he says, “thinking about abraham is another matter, however; then i am shattered….i stretch every muscle to get a perspective, and at the very instant i become paralyzed” (ft, iii 84). to understand hegel, according to silentio, is possible if we take time considering hegelian 7 philosophy, but not the case of abraham. it is always beyond our penetration. at that stage of faith, no one else except abraham stands alone before god. faith is not just a consistent set of propositions in a complete system of thought, but it exists where “thinking stops.” faith is not an object of our intellect. it is beyond the category of reason. it is the inward experience of god. it is not just a short story where it ceases to be when that story comes to an end. it does not end after abraham receives isaac back. his response “here i am” is always and everywhere for god from the beginning to the end. his relationship to god is anything, anywhere, anytime, and nothing could separate him from god, even his beloved son. abraham follows the call of god in his own vocation. each one has each own vocation to respond to god. it means that every one can be like abraham in faith, not in his particular trial of faith. kellenberger insists, “what makes abraham the father of faith is his faith, not his trial of faith” (kellenberger, 1997, p.48). we can see many great persons in the history of mankind and the different criteria to justify their greatness. according to silentio, what is the criterion to justify the greatness of abraham? let us read his speech in praise of abraham: no! no one who was great in the world will be forgotten, but everyone was great in his own way, and everyone in proportion to the greatness of that which he loved. he who loved himself became great by virtue of himself, and he who loved other men became great by his devotedness, but he who loved god became the greatest of all….there was one who was great by virtue of his power, and one who was great by virtue of his wisdom, and one who was great by virtue of his hope, and one who was great by virtue of his love, but abraham was the greatest of all, great by that power whose strength is powerlessness, great by that wisdom whose secret is foolishness, great by that hope whose form is madness, great by the love that is hatred to oneself. (ft, iii 69) silentio gives us an account of the degree of greatness, and where his criterion comes from: he who loves god became greater than all; he who expects the impossible became greater than all; he who strives with god became greater than all; and greater than all was the one who believes in god. and this, for silentio, belongs to abraham. however, silentio exalts abraham concerning his love, his striving, his expectation of the impossible, and his faith in god. silentio probably wants to show us the movement to faith as the movement from the great to the greater; from those who love themselves to those who love others and greater than all are those who love god. and those who expect the impossible are like abraham who expects the absurd in his willingness to sacrifice isaac and expectation to receive isaac back. heraclitus of ephesus once said long time ago concerning faith: “if you do not expect the unexpected you will not discover it; for it cannot be tracked down and offers no passage” (barnes, 1987, p.113). to expect the unexpected is the point that heraclitus claims about faith, and we can see the similarity between silentio and heraclitus. the prophet isaiah, in his warning to ahaz, proclaims the character of faith: “if you do not stand by me, you will not stand at all” (isaiah 7: 9). let the angel remind us always: for nothing is impossible to god. silentio makes a comparison between the tragic hero and the knight of faith, between agamemnon and abraham. agamemnon, the commander of the greek forces in the trojan war, has to sacrifice his daughter iphigenia to the goddess artemis in order to calm the wind for his troops. for silentio, agamemnon is the tragic hero who sacrifices his daughter to save the army. in his sacrificing his daughter iphigenia, every one understands how much he has to sacrifice and how 8 difficult to make a decision. and everybody pays respect to his act of suffering leading to the triumph. but agamemnon’s tragic hero is incompatible with abraham’s the knight of faith. mark c. taylor remarks of this distinction between agamemnon and abraham: agamemnon’s slaying of iphigenia is an expression of civic duty. his fellow citizens understand his impasse and empathize with the agony he suffers. furthermore, they admire agamemnon for his willingness to set aside personal feelings and responsibilities for his daughter in order to secure the common good. when understood within its proper social context, agamemnon’s deed is not horrifying but is completely reasonable…. abraham’s sacrifice of isaac suspends or transgresses the ethical in the name of something that surpasses or is exterior to the entire moral order. though faith is not unrelated to morality, religion cannot be reduced to ethics. (taylor, 1993, p.79) for tragic hero, he knows that he acts according to the superior duty in which he himself has to sacrifice something or someone he loves. his act is not something surpassed by the ethical sphere. his ethical duty is within the universal. he suffers from his decision but it is the most reasonable for that moment. the tragic hero is great in his own way, and his name will never be forgotten. agamemnon is great in his moral duty to the state, and his act is always understandable. but it is not for abraham. silentio considers abraham the knight of faith who suspends the ethical sphere to god. morality does not contradict with faith, but faith could not be reduced merely to ethics. there must be a movement beyond the ethical sphere, this is why silentio entitled problema i, is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? (ft, iii 104) and the suspension of the ethical to faith is the great paradox as he says: “faith is precisely the paradox that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal, is justified before it, not as inferior to it but as superior… that the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute” (ft, iii 106). agamemnon might have to make a tragic choice. abraham does not encounter the tragic, but an absolute paradox. this supposes to be the difference between agamemnon and abraham. “the tragic hero relinquishes himself in order to express the universal; the knight of faith relinquishes the universal in order to become the single individual” (ft, iii 124). agamemnon renounces himself for the state through his moral duty and everyone recognizes his justification. abraham sacrifices his beloved son isaac because of his response “here i am” to god, not to save the nation or anything else. he himself alone stands in his relation to god, and at that point ethical norms cannot be applicable. it is not understandable and not within the universality of reason. silentio says: “the knight of faith is assigned solely to himself; he feels the pain of being unable to make himself understandable to others, but he has no vain desire to instruct others” (ft, iii 128). for silentio, this event is only abraham and for abraham, not someone else. and it is impossible for abraham to tell anyone about this event. silentio says: “abraham cannot be mediated; in other words, he cannot speak. as soon as i speak, i express the universal, and if i do not do so, no one can understand me” (ft, iii 110). he just keeps ‘the silence.’ and again he adds: “faith itself cannot be mediated into the universal, for thereby it is canceled. faith is this paradox, and the single individual simply cannot make himself understandable to anyone… the one knight of faith cannot help the other at all” (ft, iii 120). 9 iii the important part of kierkegaard whether in the postscript or fear and trembling is his critical view of hegel and other speculative thinkers who subsume the individual a part of the system. for him, faith is beyond an account of reason and religious experience exists in relation between the existing individual and the absolute. for the case of abraham, silentio can speak about him in his many aspects and shows us conditions and movements of faith. but as for faith itself, silentio maintains ‘silence.’ abraham maintains silence when he leaves his fatherland. before he arrives at the mount in the land of moriah, no one knows what he wants to do. sarah knows nothing and isaac breaks the silence when it reaches the critical point. behind the scenes, only abraham and his god know. at this religious stage, this suspension belongs to the absolute individuality. abraham, according to silentio, seems to be a counter-hegelianism as butler says, “according to kierkegaard, hegel fails to understand that the individual is higher than the universal ethical norm, that there are times when ethical laws must be ‘suspended’ or ‘surrendered’ so that a higher value can be affirmed, namely, the value of faith – which, of course, for kierkegaard, is always an individual affair” (butler, 1993, p.381). this is the confrontation between abraham and hegel, the individual and the totality. silentio probably views that the hegelian system, in the end, will lead to the destruction of faith rather than to support it. abraham, therefore, is the prototypical person who moves beyond any system of thought. faith in any system of thought seems to cease to be faith because it submits to be understood through rational explanation. for silentio, this is a wrong view about faith. and some may ask what faith is, what is the proper answer? silentio, in fear and trembling, just takes account of the movement of faith by retelling the story of abraham. the main question in this project supposes to ask how to be the knight of faith rather than what faith really is. in this point, abraham the knight of faith steps beyond the universal ethical norms, and beyond hegel’s system of thought. to be a knight of faith, for silentio, requires a prior stage of infinite resignation. silentio says: “infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith, for only in infinite resignation do i become conscious of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping existence by virtue of faith” (ft, iii 96). the knight of infinite resignation is a person who feels not at home in the world and wants to renounce everything in order to be back to the infinite. his view of happiness in this world is incompatible with blissfulness in god. “infinite resignation is that shirt mentioned in an old legend. the thread is spun with tears, bleached with tears; the shirt is sewn in tears – but then it also gives protection better than iron or steel….in infinite resignation there is peace and rest and comfort in the pain, that is, when the movement is made normatively” (ft, iii 96). a knight of infinite resignation could not be a knight of faith because he still could not stand on the strength of the absurdity. for silentio, “through resignation i renounce everything….by faith i do not renounce anything, on the contrary, by faith i receive everything exactly in the sense in which it is said that one who has faith like a mustard seed can move mountains….by faith abraham did not renounce isaac, but by faith abraham received isaac” (ft, iii 98-99). for those who could not stand on the strength of the absurdity deserve not to be knight of faith. faith, for silentio, is not a plain word and can have an easy talk to anyone who stays in religion. infinite resignation is prior and necessary to faith. if we stop there, it is not yet faith. faith is like a double 10 movement from his renouncing of everything, and his ‘strength of the absurd’ of receiving back everything. a knight of infinite resignation does not mean one who withdraws from the world. he is not the one who lives an ascetic form of life. on the contrary, he is in the world as ordinary person like tax collector, and any person. but we could not find any means to judge him from outside. he lives with high hopes to attain the infinite but he seems to end with his conviction about this unattainable. he could not live and be satisfied with the perishable and finite things in the world. he could not accept the absurd with joy. he could not climb up to the statement: for nothing is impossible to god. in the movement of faith, silentio confesses: “but this movement i cannot make. as soon as i want to begin, everything reverses itself, and i take refuge in the pain of resignation. i am able to swim in life, but i am too heavy for this mythical hovering” (ft, iii 99). a knight of faith, according to silentio, is the highest attainment and nothing is higher. silentio accepts his limits and could not stand on ‘the strength of absurdity’ as a knight of faith. he says, “for my part, i presumably can describe the movement of faith, but i cannot make them. in learning to go through the motions of swimming, one can be suspends from the ceiling in a harness and then presumably describes the movements, but one is not swimming” (ft, iii 88). silentio just describes the movement of faith like trainer who teaches us how to swim, but he himself can stand only on the edge of swimming pool. he could not take a leap into the absurdity. what the best he can be is only a knight of infinite resignation. this might be the reason why he could not explain what faith is, and he realizes that he could not be like abraham, a knight of faith. “he must be ‘silent’, for he cannot understand faith. he stands in awe before abraham’s faith and cannot comprehend it. but, though he cannot directly state what faith is, johannes can indirectly communicate the nature and demands of faith, which he does by describing and celebrating abraham through retelling the story of abraham’s trial of faith” (kellenberger, 1997, p.12). a knight of faith is not a tragic hero who plays the most ethical significance within the universal, and his act is always understandable for everyone. a knight of faith is not a knight of infinite resignation, but infinite resignation is the prior requirement of being a knight of faith. a knight of infinite resignation just renounces everything he loves and wants to cherish and could not take the additional step through the ‘strength of absurdity’ to grasp back all what he renounces. silentio seems to renounce everything through his infinite resignation but he dares not to take this leap into the absurdity. he merely admires at a distance abraham who is able to take this leap. a man of faith is the one who can hold the ‘strength of the absurd’ and carry it along in his life as abraham carried it through his whole life. before abraham, silentio stood with fear and trembling. he might not have understood how abraham took his leap. faith, therefore, is possible when the movement of infinite resignation takes a leap into the absurdity. that is the paradox of why the particular is above the universal; a knight of faith is above the tragic hero. a tragic hero stands on his moral duty in the universal, but a knight of faith takes a leap beyond the universal ethical sphere. faith is, then, beyond the ethical dimension or: ‘a teleological suspension of the ethical.’ a teleological suspension of the ethical to faith allows the movement from infinite resignation to the state of being a knight of faith. for butler, fear and trembling has to turn into the state of grace because as far as we fear and doubt, we will still be far away from faith (butler, 1993, p.380). doubt and fear will move us from a state of grace and cause us to sink in the water like peter when he begins to fear the storm, whereupon jesus said to him: ‘man of little faith, 11 why did you doubt?’ (matthew 14: 34). and with his disciples on a boat in the midst of storm: ‘why are you so frightened? how is it that you have no faith?’ (mark 4:40). these words might be in accord with what silentio wants to express about faith in fear and trembling. then the character of fear and trembling belongs to silentio, not abraham. abraham continually lives his faith, and his response “here i am” to god’s demand of isaac is beyond any category of reason. for silentio, a positive description about faith in his fear and trembling is: “the essential human is passion, in which one generation perfectly understands another and understands itself….but the highest passion in a person is faith….faith is the highest passion in a person. there perhaps are many in every generation who do not come to faith, but no one goes further” (ft, iii 167). just as silentio was shocked when he encountered abraham’s faith, the readers may be shocked when they encounter silentio’s remarks about faith. iv kierkegaard’s philosophy is essentially related to his biography. he is clever in transforming the problems of his life into his philosophy. the problem of faith is his deepest concern relating to both his family and the religious situation of the time. and he proposes his ideas through pseudonyms in his indirect communication with the reader. we investigated here two main works from climacus and silentio. both of them talked about faith, and they accepted faith as the absolute paradox. silentio does not give us a positive description of faith but retells the story of abraham, the father of faith. climacus gives us some more positive accounts of faith in several places. but both of them have a crucial link in that: one has to set aside an intellectual understanding to faith. faith is the absolute paradox, and the most we can do is to understand that it is a paradox. this is the main point where kierkegaard departs from traditional christian thinkers like augustine’s credo ut intellegam, or anselm’s fides quaeran intellectum. kierkegaard, does not believe in order to understand, nor does he see a role for faith in the search for understanding. but according to him, “faith begins precisely where thought stops.” for kierkegaard, there is no bridge to cross between faith and understanding. for faith, we have to take a leap. so if the question is: is faith understandable? kierkegaard firmly holds on to the negative answer to this question. but a further question is: is faith possible? is it possible to be christian with kierkegaard’s view of faith? for kellenberger, he might say it is possible by seeing a person in the bible like mother mary. he says, mary, like abraham, is immured in silence. it is for this reason that, as johannes says, no one can understand her. and, like abraham, she must therefore proceed in anxiety. this too johannes brings out….although johannes does not make it explicit, mary, like abraham, believes and acts by virtue of the absurd. she trusts god absolutely. she is joyful in the knowledge that she has been chosen. (kellenberger, 1997, p.55) but if one asks the same question to ricoeur, the answer might be different: surely the christianity he described is so extreme that no one could possibly practice it. the subjective thinker before god, the pure contemporary of christ, suffering crucifixion with him, without church, without tradition, and without ritual, can only exist outside of history….to understand him one would need to be able to grasp him unprecedented combination of irony, melancholy, purity of 12 heart and corrosive rhetoric, add a dash of buffoonery, and then perhaps top it off with religious aestheticism and martyrdom…. (ricoeur, 1998, p.13) both kellenberger and ricoeur see kierkegaard from different perspectives. kellenberger applies kierkegaard’s faith with the other persons in the bible whether job or mary, not any person outside the bible. ricoeur, on the contrary, puts kierkegaard’s view of faith applicable to common person in society and he sees that it could not really be put into practice. ricoeur proposes to view kierkegaard’s idea of faith relating to his background, his reacting to hegelian and christendom in denmark during his lifetime. he lived during the time of the critique of ideology. the organized church and hegel’s philosophical system are taken into criticism by his works. kierkegaard wants to defend and differentiate his idea of faith from hegelian system of thought because he views that speculative thought will lead to the abolition of christian faith. he seems to bring christianity back to its origins, an acceptance of the absolute paradox of faith. christianity at that time, for him, seemed too academic and losing the essence of faith. for someone to become christian was too easy, and involved an ignorance involving the difficult nature of what being a christian really is. what it really means to be a christian seems to be a question to which he wishes to supply his own answer. for him, to be christian should come out of the will to become, which begins with his inwardness, not only through innately hereditary or traditionally accepted. it should be based on free decision to become authentically a christian. he may see that being a christian, according to the traditional manner, is too easy, and, does not result from any decision rooted in the will to become. baptism at an early age, according to climacus, is not the proper because a child cannot know what to become a christian is, and cannot decide for himself. climacus says: to become a christian then becomes the most terrible of all decisions in a person’s life, since it is a matter of winning faith through despair and offense. an infant two weeks old cannot have passed the most terrible examination in this life, one in which eternity is the examiner, even if it has ever so many baptism certificates from the parish clerk. but for the baptized person there must also come a later moment…when he, although a christian, asks what christianity is – in order to become a christian. by baptism, christianity gives him a name, and he is a christian de nominee; but in the decision he becomes a christian and gives christianity his name (nomen dare alicui [to give a name to someone]). (cup, vii 322-323) to be a christian by name is not important if we never live our lives as christian. to become christian is to make a choice to be truly christian. the significance of being christian is not on what you are, but how you are. lip service and what is traditionally accepted are not taken into account in being a christian, and climacus suggests here that we need to begin through a free decision at the bottom of our heart. that is why climacus said: ‘to become a christian then becomes the most terrible of all decision in a person’s life.’ and again he says: “but to become a christian is actually the most difficult of all tasks, because the task, although the same, varies in relation to the capabilities of the respective individuals” (cup, vii 326). climacus challenges not only kierkegaard’s lutheran tradition but includes all christian tradition, not only in his situation but also the contemporary. before anyone 13 makes decision to become christian, according to climacus, he has to know indeed what christianity is and is not. for my part, i recognize kierkegaard’s notions concerning faith as difficult and challenging. his task is not to proclaim what christianity is, or what faith is. he uses indirect communication with his readers through pseudonyms concerning the possibilities of becoming christian and becoming a knight of faith. he confessed that he himself could not be a knight of faith and he could not call himself a christian. he says, “the only analogy i have before me is socrates; my task is a socratic task, to audit the definition of what it is to be a christian – i do not call myself a christian (keeping the idea free), but i can make it manifest that the others are that even less (kierkegaard, 1978, p.446). his socratic task aims at not giving the answer to become christian but to make people aware of becoming christian which is not just public affair. kierkegaard wishes “to shake off “the crowd” in order to get hold of “the single individual,” religiously understood” (kierkegaard, 1978, p.452-453). he seems to show the movement from “the crowd” to “the single individual” and for him “there is in a religious sense no public but only individuals” (kierkegaard, 1978, p.453). for kierkegaard, people who have an easy and secure life as part of the public should awaken to think of themselves in order to live their lives guided by their own wills even the will to become a christian. climacus says, “out of love of mankind, out of despair over my awkward predicament of having achieved nothing and of being unable to make everything easier than it had already been made, out of genuine interest in those who makes everything easy, i comprehend that it was my task: to make difficulties everywhere” (cup, vii 155). this seems to be socratic task playing the important role in kierkegaard’s thoughts. if we have to accept kierkegaard’s notion of faith as the essential foundation of religion, religion will be just an individual affair. we could not reject that existing religion is an organized institution, and its structure needs to have an organized system of thoughts and beliefs. it is not just pure faith as in its beginning like abraham’s story, but the point we can learn here is that organized religion should not deny that religious experience, in the end, is the individual’s relationship to god. yet we cannot reject social dimension of religion. religion could not be just a public or private affair. kierkegaard seems to challenge the systematic thought of the organized church by putting more emphasis on faith. when silentio retells the story of abraham and the binding of isaac, levinas might not agree with him about his much emphasis only on the first voice of god demanding abraham to sacrifice isaac. because levinas thinks that the second voice of god telling abraham not to kill isaac is much more important: “do not raise your hand against the boy, do not harm him” (genesis 22:12). levinas says, kierkegaard was drawn to the biblical story of the sacrifice of isaac. he saw in it an encounter between subjectivity raising itself to the level of the religious, and a god elevated above the ethical order. but the story can also be taken in a very different sense. the high point of the whole drama could be the moment when abraham lent an ear to the voice summoning him back to the ethical order. (levinas, 1998, p.33) this is the critical point between kierkegaard and levinas as jeffrey stolle observes: “today nobody will stop with faith; they all go further.” this was kierkegaard’s complaint. “today nobody will stop with ethics; they all go further.” this is levinas’s complaint, and it is his complaint with kierkegaard as well” (stolle, 2001, p.132). for levinas, kierkegaard’s teleological suspension of the ethical 14 seems to be not possible. this is the main difference between kierkegaard’s view of faith and levinas’s philosophy of ethics. levinas claims ethics as first philosophy, prior to ontology and epistemology. but levinas’s ethics is not in the western tradition of deontology, utilitarian, and virtue-based ethics. levinas views ethics differently, in such a way that there is a place for the singularity of the subject. for kierkegaard, kantian ethics and hegelian system of thought have no place for subjectivity because we have to conform to the ethical laws which is applicable for all human beings without realizing the differences among individuals. for kierkegaard, faith could not be reduced to mere ethics in this sense. that is why abraham comes to the point of his suspension of ethics for something higher. faith is beyond, whether we call it irrational or super-rational, or an infinite passion of the finite for the infinite, or the absolute surrender to the divine, or even a mystery. i, for my part, do not think that kierkegaard wants to remove reason away from human affairs, he just shows the sphere where reason cannot be applicable. he challenges the church and provides the alternative way for the individual commitment to religion surpassing the religious structures in society. faith in christianity is perhaps the one single idea that he can live and die for, and because of his inquiring into faith, he strongly challenges the church and hegelian system of thought at that time. even i dare not say that faith is irrational, i nevertheless have to read and reread carefully his reopening the difficulty notion of faith. faith, according to kierkegaard, is not just a common talk, or what many people easily pay lip service to. on the contrary, it is the highest attainment of life which we have no language to positively describe. for faith, he asserts that there is nothing higher and we could not go further. for those who attain faith like abraham could not express in word to other people, and for those who say about faith like silentio and climacus could not attain. i personally realize that philosophers, thinkers, or even theologians take the approach of thomas, the apostle, who wants to prove jesus’s resurrection by his saying: “unless i see the holes and that the nails made in his hands and can put my finger into the holes they made, and unless i can put my hand into his side, i refuse to believe” (john 20: 25). they would like to consider god rationally. like thomas, we always say ‘unless’ and ‘unless’ in order to believe. jesus might perhaps be speaking to philosophers in general when he said to thomas: “put your finger here; look, here are my hands. give me your hand; put it into my side. doubt no longer but believe” (john 20: 27). “doubt no longer but believe” seems to be a hard thing for many thinkers who are always concerned with epistemological or rational proof for their beliefs. they perhaps cannot believe if they cannot prove rationally, and for them understanding is always prior to faith. kierkegaard partly walks in augustinian tradition but he seems to end differently. he moves from augustine’s ‘i believe in order to understand’ to ‘i believe because it is not understandable.’ silentio believes the demands of faith are too high for him to fulfill, but he does not deny the possibility in his reference to ordinary persons like a tax collector for example. because we could not judge any other person concerning his faith from outside aspects, it exists inwardly in his individual relationship to god. many thinkers who always say ‘unless’ and ‘unless’ seem to be very far from faith. faith might not be an object for intellectual exercise, but it is the way of life that people live. this is perhaps why farmers, fisherman, tax collectors, live their faith. but it is hardly for some thinkers as jesus says: “i bless you, father, lord of heaven and of earth, for hiding these things from the learned and the clever and revealing them to mere children” (matthew 11: 25). children here are representative of those who live 15 their faith without any ‘unless.’ for these persons, jesus says to them: “happy are those who have not seen and yet believe” (john 20: 29). happy are those who have no doubt and believe: they live their faith. i repeat again silentio’s words: “faith begins precisely where thought stops.” as long as silentio keeps thinking about faith, he has not yet been the knight of faith even though he renounces all worldly things for the kingdom of god. climacus, the wise and the learned, could not be a christian because he sets so many conditions of becoming a christian. kierkegaard accomplishes his socratic’s task: to make difficulty everywhere. i, one of the readers, could not hide myself from these difficulties. and i cannot take refuge in merely reading his works. at some point i need to stop thinking, writing, and maintain profound silence. and upon hearing the call of god, and my inner experience can awaken me to respond “here i am.” abbreviations the following abbreviations are in use throughout this article referring to works by kierkegaard. cup concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments. howard v. hong & edna h. hong. (eds. & trans.). new jersey: princeton university press, 1992. ft fear and trembling and repetition. howard v. hong & edna h. hong. (eds. & trans.). new jersey: princeton university press, 1983. references barnes, jonathan. (1987). early greek philosophy. london: penguin books. butler, judith. (1993). kierkegaard’s speculative despair. in robert c. solomon & kathleen m. higgins. (eds.). routledge history of philosophy vol. vi: the age of german idealism. new york: routledge. gardiner, patrick. (1988). kierkegaard. oxford: oxford university press. jones, alexander. (ed.). (1966). the jerusalem bible. new york: doubleday & company, inc. kellenberger, j. (1997). kierkegaard and nietzsche: faith and eternal acceptance. new york: st. martin’s press, inc. kierkegaard, s. (1978). the essential kierkegaard. howard v. hong & edna h. hong. (eds. & trans.). new jersey: princeton university press. levinas, emmanuel. (1998). existence and ethics. in jonathan rée & jane chamberlain. (eds.). kierkegaard: a critical reader. oxford: blackwell publisher ltd. ricoeur, paul. (1998). philosophy after kierkegaard. in jonathan ree & jane chamberlain. (eds.). kierkegaard: a critical reader. oxford: blackwell publisher ltd. stolle, jeffrey. (2001). levinas and the akedah: an alternative to kierkegaard. philosophy today. vol.45, no.2, pp.132-143. taylor, mark c. (1993). nots. chicago: university of chicago press. westphal, merold. (1998). kierkegaard and hegel. in alastair hannay and gordon d. 16 marino. (eds.). the cambridge companion to kierkegaard. cambridge: cambridge university press. endnotes 17 1 some parts of this paper were presented at international conference on reasoning in faith: cultural foundations for civil society and globalization. the council of research in values and philosophy. catholic university of america, 15 september – 15 november, 2004. 2 the biblical words through all this paper quoted from the jerusalem bible. alexander jones, (ed.). (1966). new york: doubleday & company, inc. siriphong kharuphankit 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021, 1-25 © 2000 by assumption university press phra phirap (the bhairava śiva of thailand)1 siriphong kharuphankit translated by phatsara phongphit, veerachart nimanong, and john t. giordano abstracts phra phirap is the thai version of the bhairava śiva. the music and dance associated with this deity is considered the most sacred of the various forms of traditional thai art. this is an excerpt from a book by the buddhist monk phra siriphong kharuphankit who is an artist and maker of the “teacher's heads,” or khon masks devoted to the deities of art, music and dance. his intention in writing this book was to preserve a knowledge which he saw in danger of disappearing. it is a record everything he knew about the making of the masks, the history and the teachers of the performance, the katha’s for worshiping the deity in the wai khru ceremony and the music of the ong phra phirap. 2 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 editor’s note: this is the work of phra siriphong kharuphankit who is an artist and maker of the “teachers heads,” or khon masks devoted to the deities of art, music and dance. he is also a buddhist monk which is quite rare for a practicing artist. his intention in writing this book was to preserve a knowledge which he saw in danger of disappearing. the knowledge concerning phra phirap or the thai version of the bhairava śiva. the music and dance associated with this deity is considered a sacred traditional knowledge which is accessible only to those properly initiated. phra siriphong, fearing much of this sacred knowledge would be lost, quite boldly decided to record everything he knew about the making of the masks, the history of the performance, the katha’s for worshiping the deity and the musical notation. more information and illustrations can be found in the original thai publication of the national library. and on the website devoted to phra siriphong kharuphankit at monnut.com. our purpose in publishing phra siriphong’s writing is to continue in this spirit of the preservation and to bring it to the attention of a larger number of people. please also see phra siripong’s autobiography also published in this issue of our journal. vanditvā asuradevānaṃ mahantapalaṃ antarāyaṃ vināssanti2 the importance of phra phirap in thailand the na phat [sacred song and dance] of phra phirap tem ong is the highest of all the various forms na phat. the rules for the study of the songs and dance of phra phirap are very strict, since the gestures and movements of phra phirap are considered to be a direct manifestation of phra isuan [śiva]. he is in fact a dark and wrathful [tamasic] form of śiva called a bhairava, a creator and destroyer, who gives life and death to the universe. professor mattani rutnin in the journal siamrath3 speculated on the direction of cultural transmission from india to suwanabhumi. she considered two possibilities. one possibility is that the early artisans of siriphong kharuphankit 3 india who worshiped phra bhairava and lived in the vicinity of sacred rivers, moved across the indian ocean to the early javanese and khmer kingdoms and then eventually to suwanabhumi. the second possibility is that suwanabhumi culture received this dance tradition directly from india with the arrival of these indian artisan groups who traveled directly from the cultural center of banaras [varanasi]. banaras was the important center of the group that worshiped phra bhairava, and the good relationship between banaras and suwanabhumi was a very important conduit in the transmission of religion and culture throughout suwanabhumi history4. phra phairap (phra bhairava) in nepal and india phra bhairava inspires both fear and great respect because on one hand he is a blood-drinking deity of death and destruction, and on the other hand, he can also bestow grace to alleviate suffering and sickness. in the city of kathmandu, there are many forms of phra bhairava. some are made of bronze and some of stone. some are full statues and some depict khru rongpakdee dancing the ong phra phirap temong in the audience of the king on 16 november 1961. 4 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 only the head. he is usually depicted with bulging eyes, extended tongue and tusks. when professor mattani rutnin went to india to research the art of dance, her archeologist friend bought a small three-inch copper statue called a phra kan bhairava. this is a dark and wrathful [tamasic] form of śiva. many artists and dancers worship him. in the indian theogeny there are eight major types of bhairavas.5 phra bhairava has a direct relationship to dance. this form originates a particular dance called vichitra tāṇḍava.6 this is a marvelous dance as it depicts the 108 gestures of phra shiva. as mentioned earlier, in india, phra bhairava is worshiped especially by artisans in association with sacred rivers, such as the ganges, and rivers in the region of orissa, such as the mahanadi. this cult is especially strong in the region of banaras [varanasi]. the worship of this image protects from misfortune and bestows grace to cure illness. in the temple of phra suriyathep7 at konark in the present state of orissa there is a statue of phra bhairava which is very beautiful and elegant. it is mixture of bhairava and suriyathep. the name of this statue is mārttāṇḍa-bhairava. he is a deity of darkness and death. the rituals connected to this deity are always conducted after sunset. the name mārttāṇḍa means sunset.8 his body is black and nude. he has three faces and has a third eye on the forehead. his mouth is in the form of a grimace-like smile and he has short blunt tusks. the mouth is in fact like our own image phra phirap. he wears a garland of skulls, and wears anklets and bracelets. he has six arms (but two are broken). in one of his right hands he holds a trident, in another he holds a lasso. and in another he holds a skull bowl [kapāla], which can hold either a poison or a cure, since he is the one to not only cause sickness and death but also provide cures and give life. in one left hand he holds small drum called a ban daw [damāru]. his dancing position represents a dance called the silapa sirahatta. this dance involves one leg bent and one leg raised. when i saw this dance i began to suspect that phra phirap is directly connected to phra bhairava and phra śiva natarat [naṭarāja, the famous dancing image of śiva].9 siriphong kharuphankit 5 the person who dances the na phat, is not depicting the dance of a normal yak (a common misunderstanding in thailand) but the dance of a great deity, the same as the dance of the phra śiva naṭarāja. it is done not merely for purpose of artistic beauty, but also involves symbolically the themes of life and death. this shows the dark sacredness of the dance of phra phirap. the highest level of the art of dance is always involved with life and death, creation and destruction. these are opposites, yet they also balance one another. like the dance of phra śiva natarat. while his right leg treads upon an asura [muyalaka] who represents baseness and evil, his left leg is raised in an elegant posture reflecting the beauty of artistic creation. he is surrounded by a ring of fire representing the movement of the universe. some believe that when śiva stops dancing, the universe will burn and will be born again. therefore this dance maintains the universe and keeps it in motion. it suppresses evil, and also renews the universe, maintaining its balance and harmony.10 khru rongpakdee 6 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 phirap in the ramakien because phra phirap is a bhairava śiva with a fierce visage, he has been depicted by thai artists in the same manner in which they would depict an asura or a yak. this often causes confusion with a yak character phirap in the ramakien. according to the ramakien of king rama i, phirap is an asura or yak that was cursed by phra isuan, who condemned him to live only on atsakhan mountain. this yak phirap was very powerful and mischievous. he created his own garden and planted a very beautiful tree called a pawatong. one day, phra ram, phra lak, and nang sida entered this garden to rest and picked the fruit from this tree. the servants of phirap upon discovering this tried to expel them from the garden, but phra ram fought back, killing many of them. phirap, who was absent for seven days, returned and became very angry when king rama ix (bhumibol adulyadej) performs the khob khru phra pirap initiation ceremony of for khru rongpakdee 25 october 1984 siriphong kharuphankit 7 śiva-linga made of sandstone and possessing both indian and javanese influences. with the image of the bhairava or phra pirap, accompanied by a dog vehicle. he holds in a left hand a skull-bowl containing poison. 8 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 he discovered that someone trespassed into his garden. but when he first saw nang sida, he fell in love and wished her to become his wife. using magic, phirap created darkness, whereupon he abducted nang sida. phra ram shot an arrow to lift the darkness, and saw that nang sida being taken away. he shot phirap, with a powerful arrow called phrommas, and he took nang sida back. phirap died as a result. from this story we can see that this phirap is very quarrelsome and not worthy of respect. not like the yak phipet who is very worthy of respect.11 according to the work of professor mattani rutnin, phra phirap is not the same as the yak phirap found in the ramakien. she points out that the character in the ramakien was earlier called yak virap, which was only gradually changed to phirap. this difference is significant, especially since the word virap when translated, would refer to a deviant. when one examines the story of virap in the ramakien one finds he was divinely condemned, so her interpretation seems to be accurate. based on the research of professor mattani rutnin and the ramakien of king rama i, we can see clearly that phra phirap, and his role in the music and the dance of na phat phra phirap tem ong, is very different from the yak phirap we find in the ramakien. on the sacred song of phra phirap tem ong12 this is a song which is very important and deeply revered by all artists of dance and music. it is the sacred song of phra phirap which has existed since ancient times, although the first textual evidence appears in the texts concerning the wai khru of khru khaet (phra ram) during the period of king rama iv (phrabaht somdet phra chomklao chao yuhua). this text had been used in the wai khru ceremony since 1854 (the year of the tiger). the song of phra phirap is song number 14 of the wai khru ceremony (phleng ong phra phirap – prathom rua thamada) and is unique since it has to be performed in a strict series which is as follows: 1. lua sien na 2. sien na siriphong kharuphankit 9 3. ong phra phirap 4. rua sien lang 5. sien lang 6. pan phirap rua tai 7. prathom long (and concluding with) rua la deow. the student who is to learn the song of phra phirap, must be able to reproduce it strictly according to its traditional form. they must proceed through three levels: the beginning na phat, the intermediate na phat, and the high na phat.13 the student must be distinguished by their good character and must possess the qualities maturity, proper age (over 30 years), and must have been an ordained monk. on the sacred dance of phra phirap tem ong this dance has existed since the period of king rama vii (phrabaht somdet phra pokklao chao yuhua). the person who innovated this form was phraya natakanurak (tongdee suwannaparot). he was the one to initiate mr. rongpakdee jarujarana.14 this instruction was conducted on the verandah of phra ubosot of the emerald buddha temple. the first dance was conducted in connection with the white elephant ceremony [phra savetkhotchadetdilok] of king rama vii on 16 november 1927.15 the site of the performance was the stage for the performance of khon drama at the dusit palace for king rama vii and the queen (somdet phra nang chao rambhai barni phra borommarachini). later, his majesty the king rama ix (phrabat somdet phra chaoyuhua bhumibol adulyadej), wishing to preserve this dance, issued a royal command to mr. rongpakdee (jian) jarujarana, who was the senior teacher of the bureau of the royal household, to conduct the pidhi krob ong phra phirap (the ram na phat which is the highest and most sacred of all thai dances). this ceremony was conducted for the instructors of art in the fine arts department at amphon sathan theatre in the dusit palace, on thursday 24 january 1963, on the new moon, in the second lunar month in the year of the rabbit. 10 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 in this ceremony, his majesty the king admitted the members of royal family, the privy councilors, the government officials, the artists, and the students of dance of the fine arts department. in this ceremony the fine arts department arranged for four senior teachers of dance to be initiated to ong phra phirap by khru rongpakdee: 1. mr. arkom sayakhom teacher of phra 2. mr. aram inthornnut teacher of yak 3. mr. yat changthong teacher of yak 4. mr. yosange pakdeedeva teacher of yak these were the four senior teachers of dance who had reached the highest level of skill, knowledge, and maturity. mr. rongpakdee (jian jarujarana), khunying natakanurak (thet suwannaparot), the artists of the fine arts department, and the royal officials on 16 november 1961. siriphong kharuphankit 11 making the phra phirap “teacher’s head” (srisa khru) the making of the phra phirap srisa khru [teacher’s head] is different than the making of the hua khon masks for performance. before the creation of the model of phra phirap, the maker should provide an offering of raw and cooked food, including many kinds of fruit and sweets. also included are baisi [offerings wrapped in banana leaves] placed on the right and left. this also involves the worship of the triple gem of buddhism and the invitation to the devas [chumnum thevada]. and finally it involves the worship of the teacher [bucha khru]. then the creation of the model can begin. traditionally, it involves the use of pure soil which is uncontaminated by the decaying carcass of any animal. nowadays, instead of soil we use clay. when this model is finished a second offering is made. then the model is used as a mould for a layer of lime. a third offering is made in order to “close” the model. the next step involves the covering of the model with a brown papier maché. each layer of paper is inscribed with pali sacred stanzas (katha) and yant diagrams. the first three layers of papier maché use water, which allows the form to be easily removed from the mould. the next nine layers contain a kind of gum or glue. it is then completed with nine layers of rice paper [gradat sa]. these are also inscribed with yant diagrams. the model is further shaped with a hard instrument and left to dry, but not to completely dry, so it can be removed from the mould without cracking. a fourth offering is made which is accompanied by an apology which is offered before the papier maché form is cut and torn from the mould (this apology is also made when making the head of phra rishi). then the form is sewn back together. the contours of the face are made including the eyes, nose and mouth. it then sanded and decorated with tusks and ears [jon hu]. the head is then covered with black lacquer [long rak], and then painted and decorated with gold leaf [pid thong] and colored glass. now a fifth offering is made asking permission to inscribe the line-patterns on the face and hair. the clockwise spiral patterns inscribed 12 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 on the face represent his descent from phra isuan.16 initially the eye is left only white without a pupil. a sixth offering is made where permission is asked to open the eyes [beuk net]17 whereupon the pupils are painted in, and to open the ears, nose and mouth [beuk the yant as applied to the layers of papier maché siriphong kharuphankit 13 stages in the finishing of the mask 14 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 tawan]. this again involves the chanting of pali sacred stanzas which also activate the 32 organs [kamkabdooiagahn samsipsong] which brings the head to life. then the spirit of phra phirap is invited to come to inhabit the srisa khru. the above process needs to be followed for the one who would like to study the making of srisa khru according to phra siripong kharupankit, the student [sitphokhru] of phra paratamuni. this process is very strict and involves right thought and right action. this is because the sacred things that we believe and worship derive ultimately from these divine teachers we are representing, who bring good things for the one who makes as well as the one who worships the srisa khru. it must also be mentioned that both the maker and worshiper require not only a strict spiritual belief but also some material wealth. the artist should own one pair of srisa khru: por khru paratamuni and por khru phra phirap. but it is not that difficult to save the material wealth required to continue the art of making these intricate and beautiful srisa khru, since the divine teacher will reward one’s efforts by bringing prosperity to one’s life and the life of one’s descendents. yant diagrams the yant which are inscribed on the papier maché in order to close the model of the srisa khru rishi and phra phirap. in other words, they are magical diagrams that help bring the mask to life. these yant are accompanied by the chanting of pali sacred words. na natong maha niyom (the highly esteemed face of gold) siriphong kharuphankit 15 na song pan din (preservation of the earth) na charoen sri (prosperity) na rum jai (integrity) 16 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 na ow (possession) na lung leu (fame) na maha laluyai (great wealth) siriphong kharuphankit 17 na long na khon (a type of yant specific to khon) na hua jai rishi (the heart of rishi) pranom katha (for worship of the triple gem) the ceremony for phra phirap begins by invoking the triple gem. jinena yene ānitaṁ lokassa amatamhitaṁ tassa pādambujaṁ vande brahmadevindavanditaṁ ฯ the lord buddha (phra chinachao) who brings the immortal truth (nibbana) to the human animal is worthy of highest respect. i worship him, as did phra phrom (brahma) and thao sakka. 18 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 tassitāṁ munirājena vande dhammadivākaraṁ mohandhakāraviddhaṁsi veneyyaṁ budhabodhanaṁ ฯ i worship the dhamma of the lord buddha, the sun which burns away all anger, so that the human animal can achieve nibbana. sobhitaṁ sῑlaraṁ sῑhi vande saṁ ghaṁ nisākaraṁ pasādakamudaṁ niccaṁ bodhentaṁ janamānase ฯ i worship the sangha, the ray of the moon, like the yellow flower (dok komud), which guides the human animal in their quest for nibbana. natvā vatthuttayaṁ evaṁ yaṁ puññaṁ mayā tassa tejena hantvrāna antrāye asesato ฯ with the merit i gain from worshiping the triple gem, i cast away all dangers. katha bucha phra phirap all three katha of phra phirap are composed in a synthesis of pali and thai language, which is unorthodox, yet has a special meaning. now i would like to examine the meaning of these three katha. katha i triple gem imaṁ buddhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā dhaṁmaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā sagṅhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā siriphong kharuphankit 19 buddho siddhiridh dhammo siddhiridh sangkho siddhiridh sukha sukha chaiya chaiya lābha lābha sabbhadhammānaṁ prasidhime prasidhite buddho savasdeemeechai dhammo savasdeemeechai sangkho savasdeemeechai imaṁ patitang suraṅgadhang adhiṭṭhāmi ฯ this first katha is from the book phra phirap of khru phrapan sukhontachart, who quotes from the text of the wai khru and the pidthi krob khru (initiation rite) of the khon lakhon of phraya natakanurak (tongdee suwannaparot). again, the triple gem is invoked. the first katha begins with the word “buddha” (buddhaṁ), it reads: buddhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā . it asks for the presence of phra phirap. the second line begins with the word “dhamma” and the third line with “sangha”. these three names constitute the triple gem of buddhism. this invocation of the triple gem is not to worship phra phirap, because phra phirap is a deity of brahmanism. but it is included because the person who composed the katha is a buddhist who believes in the triple gem. when we observe the history of phra phirap we find he is a bhairava form of phra isuan (śiva), he is a deity of war and death, and he is also the deity who can cure sickness. his form is that of an asura. it is the tendency of human beings to guard against powers that bring calamity and danger, powers which are hidden and beyond their imagination. for this reason, the person who composed the katha of phra phirap initiates each katha with the worship of the triple gem, in order to bring purity and calmness of heart, and to mollify phra phirap’s violent power. the remainder of the stanza asks for the merit and power of the lord buddha, dhamma, and sangha, to bestow happiness, victory, wealth, fortune for those who participate in the ceremony. these things are asked not of phra phirap but from the triple gem. 20 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 katha ii inviting the presence of phra phirap namo (three times) imaṁ buddhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā dhaṁmaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā sagṅhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā buddho siddhiridh dhammo siddhiridh sangkho siddhiridh sukha sukha chaiya chaiya lābha lābha sabbhadhammānaṁ prasidhime prasidhthite buddho savasdeemeechai dhammo savasdeemeechai sangkho savasdeemeechai (three times) this is from the text of the wai khru of thai music of khru montri tramote who received it from luang pradit phairoh (sorn silapabanleng). in the second katha, the spelling of phra phirap (พริาพ) is changed to phra phiradh (พิราธ). because in inviting phra phirap to come, the sound is similar to the sound pang (พัง), which means to destroy. the human mind always guards against destruction, so we change the voice from pang (พ) to dtang (ธ). when we offer the fruit, we always select them based upon the meaning of their names, especially those which connote good luck. for instance: khanun (jackfruit), lamyai (longan), lychee, pomelo, and matum (bel-fruit). in the offering there is a rule to never offer fruit with names which are inauspicious. for instance: mangkhut (mangosteen), phutsa (jujube), noina (sugar apple), and langsat (iansa). it is feared that if we offer such fruit, we will receive something bad in return. some practices have been influenced by other cultures such as the chinese. the chinese never offer mango since the chinese call the mango suay in thai language the name suay means bad luck. therefore, it is never used as an offering for wai chao. in bangkok there is one textbook about the history of phra phirap where they wrote the name: siriphong kharuphankit 21 phra phirabh (พระพิลาภ). this is because the bh connotes smooth going or good luck. in one case they made a head of phra phirap and used the headdress of rishi for advertising one product and called it poo rishi phirap (ปู่ฤาษีพิลาภ). but according to the stories concerning phra phirap he was never a hermit. i consulted many khrus concerning this, and they all said that it is not right to reduce such a high deity as phra phirap to the level of a hermit. the craftsman apparently did not fear that this might lead to misfortune. katha iii prayer for the worship of phra phirap imaṁ saccavācaṁ adhiṭṭhāmi dutiyaṁpi imaṁ saccavācaṁ adhiṭṭhāmi tatiyampimam saccavācaṁ adhiṭṭhāmi buddhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā dhaṁmaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā sagṅhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā buddhosiddhiridh dhammosiddhiridh sangkhosiddhiridh sukha sukha chaiya chaiya lābha lābha sabbhadhammānaṁ prasidhi me prasidhi te buddhosavasdeemeechai dhammosavasdeemeechai saṅghosavasdeemeechai patitang suraṅgandhang adhiṭṭhāmi dutiyaṁpi buddhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā dutiyaṁpi dhaṁmaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā dutiyaṁpi sagṅhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā buddhosiddhiridh.................................adhiṭṭhāmi tatiyaṁpi buddhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā tatiyampi dhaṁmaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā tatiyampi sagṅhaṁ ongphrapirādhaṁ khoehichongmā 22 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 buddhosiddhiridh..................................adhiṭṭhāmi imassaming vandāmi āeāriyaṁ sappasaiyaṁ vināssanti siddhikāra apparapajā imassaming sidththi bhavatu subbadā namassitavā āeāriyaṁ isilokanāthaṁ buddhasarāmi namassitavā āeāriyaṁ isilokanāthaṁ patipatibhῡjā (vanditavā asῡradebānaṁ mahantapalaṁ antarayaṁ vināssanti) sidthikāriya pirādhāsῡrayaṁ vicāranasaṁpannaṁ namāmihaṁ agghῑpahῡpubhaṁ ahaṅvantā āeāriyaṁ sappasaiyaṁ vināssanti siddhiparapajā imassamiṁ phavantu me dutiyaṁpi agghῑpahῡpubhaṁ ………………… bhavantu me tatiyaṁpi agghῑpahῡpubhaṁ …………………. bhavantu me the third katha is taken from the text of the wai khru of khru arkom sayakhom, who received it from phraya natakanurak (tongdee suwannaparot). it is from the funeral book of khru arkom sayakhom from wat makukasatirityaram bangkok on thursday, 9 december 1982. concerning the third katha. the first part is a repetition of the first and second katha. and the final part is a prayer which is as follows. imassaming vandāmi āeāriyaṁ sappasaiyaṁ vināssanti siddhikāra apparapajā imassaming sidththi bhavatu subbadā namassitavā āeāriyaṁ isilokanāthaṁ buddhasarāmi namassitavā āeāriyaṁ isilokanāthaṁ patipatibhῡjā (vanditavā asῡradebānaṁ mahantapalaṁ antarayaṁ vināssanti) sidthikāriya pirādhāsῡrayaṁ vicāranasaṁpannaṁ namāmihaṁ siriphong kharuphankit 23 the added part is longer and more special than katha number one and two. it is a direct prayer to phra phirap. one day when i went to assist khru arkom with a wai khru at the house of m.r. kukrit pramoj on thursday 25 october 1979. i asked him why is this third part is longer than the other parts. khru arkom explained: “i have another volume of the wai khru in my home which is the volume of chaokun poo phraya suntorntheprabam (plian sutornnat). i combined his katha phra phirap with that of phraya natakanurak to make it more powerful. so i now have three texts of wai khru on account of my parents who are a family of artists.” one personal observation concerning my description of the katha bucha ong phra phirap, i would like to sincerely express that i respect and i would never diminish such sacred matters. if there are any mistakes or misunderstandings, i take full responsibility. but i write this because i am proud to record such things. siriphong kharuphankit khon wang na 1977 editor's endnotes 1 phra siriphong asked the translators to undertake this translation to accompany the exhibition of his work at the national library of thailand. we are presenting only a partial translation to promote the work of phra siriphong. the journal does not hold any rights to this content. it is taken from the book:พิมพ์ที่ โรงพิมพ์ บริษัท ทรงสิทธิวรรณ จำากัด 1017 ประชาชื่น ถนน ประชาชื่น แขวง บางซื่อ เขตบางซื่อ กรุงเทพมหานคร 10800 ชื่อหนังสือ พระพิราพ รวบรวมและเรียบเรียงโดย พระศิริพงศ์ ครุพันธ์กิจ 2 this katha, or pali sacred chant has been left untranslated because it is a sacred prayer which phra siriphong is using before beginning of his account. all transliteration of thai and pali are in accordance with the fine arts department. 3 siamrath sunday, 23 december 1973. see also mattani mojdara rutnin’s book dance, drama and theatre in thailand: the process of development and modernization. 4 suwanabhumi is the preferred name for ancient thai culture. 5 t. a. gopinatha rao, in his work elements of hindu iconography, vol 2, part 1, writes: 24 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 … bhairava’s aspect has eight different forms, named asitāṇga, ruru, chaṇḍa, krōdha, unmatta-bhairava, kāpāla, bhīshaṇa and saṁhāra. each one of these forms is divided further into eight subordinate forms, thus making sixty-four in all.” (rao, p. 180) 6 ananda k. coomaraswamy, in his famous essay “the dance of śiva”, writes: the second well-known dance of śiva is called the tāṇḍava, and belongs to his tamasic aspect as bhairava or virabhadra. it is performed in cemeteries and burning grounds, where śiva, usually in ten-armed form, dances wildly with dēvī, accompanied by troops of capering imps… this tāṇḍava dance is in origin that of a pre-aryan divinity, half-god, half-demon, who holds his midnight revels in the burning ground. in later times, this dance in the cremation ground, sometimes of śiva, sometimes of dēvī, in interpreted in śaiva and śākta, literature in a most touching and profound sense. (coomaraswamy, p. 57) alain daniélou in his book sacred music: its origins, powers, and future, also draws connections between śiva and dionysius. see pages 120-122. 7 this refers to sūrya, the sun deity. 8 rao lists this form as a subordinate form of asitāṅga. see rao, p. 180. 9 coomaraswamy supports this connection of the dance of bhairava and naṭarāja. he writes: śiva is a destroyer and loves the burning gound. but what does he destroy? not merely the heavens and earth at the end of a kalpa, but the fetters that bind each separate soul. where and what is the burning ground? it is not the place where our earthly bodies are cremated, but the heart of the bhakta, the devotee, laid waste and desolate. he brings not peace but a sword. the place where their selves are destroyed signifies the place or state where their egoity or illusion and deeds are burnt away: that is the crematorium, the burningground where śrī naṭarāja dances, and whence he is named sudalaiyādi, dancer of the burning-ground. in this simile, we recognize the historical connection between śiva’s gracious dance as naṭarāja, and his wild dance as the demon of the cemetery. (coomaraswamy, p. 61) 10 this is also supported by coomaraswamy: now to summarize the whole interpretation, we find that the essential significance of śiva’s dance is threefold: first, it is the image of his rhythmic activity as the source of all movement within the cosmos, which is represented by the arch: secondly, the purpose of his dance is to release the countless souls of men from the snare of illusion: thirdly the place of the dance, chidambaram, the centre of the universe, is within the heart. (coomaraswamy, p. 65) siriphong kharuphankit 25 11 the fortune teller of totsakan (ravana) who switched allegiance to serve rama. 12 tem ong has been left untranslated, it refers the full body of the deity. 13 na phat refers to the ritual dance-movements before the piphat ensemble. 14 concerning the lineage of the masters of the dance of phra phirap, please see the section on the biography of khru arkom. 15 descriptions of this ceremony can be found in the book by amranand and warren, the elephant in thai life and legend. 16 the thai word for śiva. a counterclockwise spiral would denote a deity is descended from phra narai or vishnu. 17 the phra beuk net ceremony is often used to “open the eyes” of the buddha statue in its last stage of creation. this process is described in detail in stanley tambiah’s book the buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. further reading amranand, ping and william warren. the elephant in thai life and legend. bangkok: monsoon editions, 1998. coomaraswamy, ananda. the dance of shiva: on indian art and culture. new york: dover, 1985. daniélou, alain. sacred music: its origins, powers, and future. varanasi: indica books, 2003. rao, t. a. gopinatha. elements of hindu iconography vol. 2 part 1. delhi: motilal banarsidass, 1997. rutnin, mattani mojdara. dance, drama and theatre in thailand: the process of development and modernization. chiang mai: silkworm books, 1999. tambiah, stanley. the buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1984. wong, deborah. sounding the center. history and aesthetics in thai buddhist performance. chicago: university of chicago press, 2001. blank page 62 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand abstract in african philosophy and cultural studies, there have been many debates concerning the concept of the human person. many earlier examinations of african thought by european academics have emphasized the merely communal nature of the african person. yet in traditional african thought there is also a tension between this communalism and a recognition of individuality which relates to the dignity of the human being as created by god. this concept of life of the individual is called “chi”. this paper investigates the seemingly complex concept of the human person, not from the western perspective, but from an african perspective, particularly the igbo perspective. because the individual and his/her society share an inseparable symbiotic relationship, this paper aims to show how such a concept can lead to a better understanding of the balances between individual life, with the communal relationships of one’s culture and one’s environment. this balance is a weak spot in much of western thought. keywords: igbo philosophy, individuality, chi, communalism prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 62-81 © 2000 by assumption university press emmanuel nweke okafor 63 introduction a human being, according to the igbo perspective, is a unique being to be understood first, as existing individually, and second, as a collective being existing communally. human life is seen as man’s greatest asset in the igbo concept of the human person, and this is projected in the meaning of the names they use to portray the significance and the value of life in their belief system. names like: ndubuisi, (life is supreme), ndukaku, (life is greater than wealth), nduka, (life is greatest). this life-centeredness of the igbo concept of the human person does not introduce individualism into the igbo perspective of human life. rather, it emphasizes the importance of human life in his relationship with one another. therefore, the concept of the human person in the igbo perspective is viewed better in his relationship with god his creator and other spiritual beings, and his fellow human beings whom he lives within the community. the concept of the human person has been a subject of much debate. dwelling on the concepts in this contemporary time, it is not to eradicate or abolish earlier notions of the concept of the human being, rather, to have an introspective view on the significance of the human person among the community he lives in. this will be done by considering the development of man in connection with his community from prehistoric times, down to contemporary times. the concept of the human being needs to be studied through the theory of ‘communalism’ and its historical development. while this work is limited basically to the african view of human beings, but more restrictedly, to the igbo concept of a human being, the problem of the definition of the human being in relation to his community is of universal relevance. but yet the idea of the human being as a member of the community needs to be balanced by the concept of the individual which is often overlooked in african philosophy. this individual life-force is characterized in igbo philosophy as “chi.” the igbo concept of human being (a person) earlier in history, the ‘god-man’ and ‘man-world’ association was the chief way to give definition to the human being. this approach 64 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december focused fundamentally on man’s relationship with god. however, with descartes’ idea of “cogito ergo sum”, man became aware that he could be the ground and basis of his own self-meaning and philosophizing.1 this was aided by the fast growth of social sciences such as sociology, psychology, and cultural anthropology. within these disciplines, man became central and remained in the spotlight. thus, peter gay has it that, “man is free, the master of his fortune, not chained to his place in a universal hierarchy but capable of all things.”2 from an african perspective, the concept of the human person differs in so many ways from the western views. for european outsiders like leopold senghor, the homo-afrikanus was a being considered as a being, more emotional than rational. this was to suggest that emotion is “black” while reason is greek.3 thus, for him the african person is only a participatory being; otherwise, he/she would lose his/her personhoo.4 for nkrumah, consciencism is the principle of egalitarianism and the view that man is an end, not the means.5 however, the history of man and his origination, different eras of human existence, vary in terms of intellectual benefits and ideologies. this is traceable from medieval times to modern times in which man’s interests ranged from philosophy to technological development. despite those advancements, some concepts barely change, such as knowledge, love, creativity, beauty, and realization of morals; the significant and ultimate goals of humanity. man through self-searching cannot understand himself/herself; rather, man’s work, lifestyle, qualities, and personality are used to describe him or her. to understand effectively the origination of man, certain philosophies deserve to be more deeply examined. the being called human has not been completely examined and has posed great difficulty. this is partly because unlike pure science, philosophy does not essentially build on itself, instead it changes, constantly propagating new views or new ideologies. it is speculative and obtained by a continuous and high level of meditation. unlike a scientist who easily passes on his innovations, a philosopher does not have that ability. the best he or she could do is to encourage others to perceive things emmanuel nweke okafor 65 the way he or she does; he or she is often suggestive and not persuasive. however, the understanding of man as the climax of god’s creation gives uniqueness to the human person in igbo spirituality. therefore, any anthropological study centering on man is progress towards an enhanced comprehension of the mysteries of human existence. this makes the way for the igbo world because there is something in an igbo man which is beyond the psychical world.6 in this regard, ezedike suggests that: another important aspect of igbo life view is the unity of life as the centre of cohesion and solidarity. by this, we mean a relationship of being, and life between each individual and his descendants, his family, his brothers and his sisters in the village, his antecedents and also with god, the ultimate source of life. one can say that unity of life is the vital link which unites vertically and horizontally the living and the departed; it is the life-giving principle which is found in them all. it results from communion or participation in the same reality, the same vital principle which unites a number of beings with one another.7 currently, theologians have paid attention to theism as the foundation and the only concept that matters. fascinatingly, not even science in all its discoveries has been able to give a generally accepted view of man. occasionally, scientists in their efforts to explain man, leaves the whole subject matter ever confusing, showing the inability of science or other fields of study to elucidate man’s nature, origin or final fate. in this work, it is necessary to understand effectively igbo people’s culture and their spiritual facet in understanding the human person as a whole. once decoded or examined meticulously using their results, objectives, properties, mechanics, and differences, then can the mystery-man be unraveled. to this effect, ezedike argues that: 66 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december from the ancient tradition of igbo humanism and their metaphysics comes the life view of the people. for them, life is a gift, chinyelu (gift from god). because it is from god (chinwendu), it is a mystery. it is to be lived to the fullest because it is a gift from god. the igbo accepts the totality of life, both joy, and suffering, for to live is to know conflict and to experience the tension of being pulled in different directions by many forces. yet these tensions are good, reflecting a fundamental acceptance by the people. life is a gift from god, and from this belief, everything else follows and develops.8 in earlier times, man was understood through his association with god. consequently, man’s behavior was in harmony with order set by god and his commandments given through his various prophets. this is still present in the igbo cosmology since everything was viewed from the point of its connection with god and human interactions with other spiritual beings. based on the religious assumption, the root of this notion is the christian holy bible, which claims that the human being is “created in the image and likeness of god.”9 being the zenith of creation, god gave authority to man over every other created things following the biblical version. according to the catechism of the catholic church, the mission of man on earth is to love god, serve him in this world and to be with him in the world to come. from this religious perspective, the study of man is mostly seen as unimaginable or impracticable, but when examined closely, one is forced to conclude that it is actually a possibility. man is a religious being, seeking absolution from sins and guilt. thus, from the religious angle, the human nature becomes not only co-existent with other human persons but also co-existent with another personal “thou” that is, the person of the absolute.10 thus it is believed that once a person dies, the soul goes back to chukwu (the god). olisa puts it more clearly as he submitted that: emmanuel nweke okafor 67 we igbo, living in this part all believe that inside the body of every man is a soul, which we call nkpuluobi and that without this, a man cannot see or touch, but a thing which they can feel. it is without form, or substance such as man or animal has and we believe that, all souls are of one kind, and that each person has not more than one soul.11 this point buttresses the central objective of the igbo cosmology, yet from the traditional perspective. man is by nature a social being existing with males and females of different ages, sizes, not excluding races and tribes. here, one sees again the power of communalism in the igbo system of living. this is expressed in the famous igbo proverb, ‘otu osisi anaghi emebe ohia’ (a tree does not make a forest). in the igbo cosmology, this remains outstanding for whatever one does, considering the positive effects it will be to the entire community. the human person, therefore, is geared towards the concordant growth and development of that society.12 the concept of a person is vital in nyerere’s idea as he describes “ujamaa villages” as people who are socially linked.13 maquet identifies the human person in africa as discovering one’s being in his/ her kin, lineage, and ancestors, marrying many wives, existing for others, and being in harmony with nature.14 in these analyses, the communalistic aspect of igbo cosmology and the supremacy of the human person in the human-divine interactions remain undeniable. a person, therefore, becomes significant only when he has been recognized and accepted by the community. spirituality is centered on the personality of the african, and certainly points to the ability to embrace the life of others and their concerns. senghor describes the african way of life as “a community society”, where more stress is put on the group than on the individual. this quality means that an individual cannot organize his life without the influence of his family, village or clan.15 individual autonomy is thus dependent on the community such that it is said that the individual exists because the community exists. to this, ezedike argues that: 68 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december by this, we mean a relationship of being and life between each individual and his descendants, his family, his brothers and his sisters in the village, his antecedents and also with god, the ultimate source of life. one can say that unity of life is the vital link which unites vertically and horizontally the living and the departed; it is the life-giving principle which is found in them all. it results from communion or participation in the same reality, the same vital principle which unites a number of beings with one another.16 in a society like this, an individual exists both for himself and others because he is completely dependent on the forces upholding the community for his development and contribution. thus in the words of senghor: “the member of the community society claims his autonomy to affirm himself as a being but feels and thinks that he can develop his potential, his originality, only in and by society, in union with all other men.”17 so, it can be said that the personality of an african, hinges on community spirituality and manifests in the self-surrender of the “i” to the “we”. hence, for the igbo, the human person is so cherished and connected, such that the process through which a person is born is communally valued and honored. this tends to spot the birth of the igbo regard for their lineage as a great contributory aspect in their spirituality and value system, such as the marriage system. the igbo consideration of marriage is as sacred as it is an honorable thing to do. hence, the polygamous way of marriage hints at the igbo’s reverence for the human power of procreation. according to munonye, a woman who could not bear children becomes a big problem. thus, he opined that “we could never call her wife until she has produced children for the family; for what use is a kolanut tree if it fails to bear fruit?”18 this also echoed the expression of nwapa on igbo and the human person. in her novel idu, she presented the case of a woman who was ill-fated because she could not give birth a child for the community.19 it is therefore pertinent to observe emmanuel nweke okafor 69 that these religious and ritual observations are aimed at: the preservation of human life through procreation20 and the igbo cosmology which is great life-affirming. in line with this belief, olupona summarized the concept of a human person among the igbo this way: “when a person wears an amulet or sits on a divine throne, divine power is brought into spatial-temporal connection with that person.”21 the igbo concept of human person has a firm religious foundation and it is knotted with the concept of ‘chi’, “the divine spirit that animates human beings.”22 it is this ‘chi’ that is the fulcrum borne in mind by the igbo man in his spiritual dealings; as nothing is done without allusion to one’s chi. for madu, “every life is unique in a significant way and is subject to series of unforeseeable hazards and unexpected rewards all mapped out by the chi.”23 for ekennia, ‘chi’ is the greatest component in comprehending the concept of a person. the idea of ‘chi’ according to ekennia, “is a unique life force, which each person possesses. no two persons have the same ‘chi’. it is regarded as the igbo principle of individualization […] each person is unique and irreplaceable.”24 in line with this position, ojike echoed that “no one’s chi is like another because no two persons are identical.”25 the igbo then has it that, ‘onyena chi ya’ (each with his own chi). the spirituality of most african communities fundamentally centers on the belief and worship of the supreme being called god, belief in the lesser deities, belief in the ancestors and belief in the after-life. chi as the principle of a person chi is a unique personal life-force that is different in each person. each person possesses his chi, believed to be the spiritual force that accompanies the life journey of the individual. according to ekennia: chi gives each person infinite possibilities to realize himself in the community and this personalized inner force in each individual is always in harmony with the person. when the person acquires mastery of himself or has attained certain 70 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december self-knowledge, he examines the inner force and becomes fully in control of any situation. it is at this point that the igbo’s say “onye kwe, chi ya ekwe.26 thus, the igbo person regards his chi as the explanatory principle for his success and failures in life. even though the igbo person can have some control over his ‘chi’, there is an aspect of determinism in his life usually manifested when the person records failures in his life despite his determined efforts. he sees himself as ‘onye chi ojoo’ (an unlucky man). while on the other hand, he is seen as ‘onye chi oma’ (a lucky one with good chi.27 religiously speaking, therefore, the igbos are united by their belief in one god (chukwu) and the spirits and ancestors. their belief in god is responsible for their inseparable relationship with god and the members of the community. this relationship also extends to non-igbos. according to mozia: each individual has a unique bond with god because he possesses his unique ‘chi’, the guiding spirit which assists him to make such a relationship possible... consequently, his religious commitment to this one god creates a personal bond between him and other members of the human community. but because of the special ontological dimension of solidarity with the members of the ‘umunna community’, which includes the ancestors, he feels himself specially bond to this community. from the religious point of view, he believes that god is responsible for creating such an ontological bond and consequently, he feels religiously committed in a particular way to this community.28 chi is responsible for human existence which is given. existence is one of the primary meanings of mmadu (a person). arazu would say that: “the word mmadu comes from two igbo words, ‘mma’ which means ‘goodness’ and ‘du’ which means ‘exist’. these words were first pronounced by god (chukwu) when he looked at the world that he has made and said, ‘mmadu’ meaning ‘let goodness exist.”29 the term mmadu emmanuel nweke okafor 71 distinguishes the human species from other beings. it is often used in contrast to ‘mmuo’(spirit) which are the invincible counterparts of humans. the igbos refers to both of them as persons, that is, spiritual persons and human persons (ndi mmadu na ndi mmuo). the only difference is that the spirits are invincible and are exceedingly more powerful.30 mmadu is the main protagonist in the drama of life while the spirits are the moderators. in the igbo thought system, mmadu refers to the human person, irrespective of his age, sex, and status.31 consequently, a person (mmadu) lives in the visible realm of nature(uwa), an idea made clear when one says that mmadu is at the head of things or controls affairs, that is, mmadubuisi. the idea is also stressed in the igbo saying maduka(the human person is a superior creature), mmadubundu( the human person is life). ndu is the active principle of life, sustaining all existence and also implies being alive and active. the meaning of the word ndu as an active principle sustaining all existence is succinctly highlighted in the word maduka demonstrating “man’s supremacy and primacy in the created order.”32 this concept clearly portrays the material and immaterial part of a human person in igbo society. the material and immaterial part of a person body (ahu) is the igbo term that stands for the material aspect of a man. the term has different senses. first, it designates the bodily dimension called flesh.33 in that context, it can mean the abstract expression of the living being without the soul. secondly, ahu points to the whole man. and there are expressions like, ‘ahu gi kwanu?’, meaning ‘how is your body?’34 generally, the term ahu means the material body as perceptible to the senses and located in space. ahu is thus “the whole of man filled with energy that may be hurt or helped by forces within man and his environment.”35 ibeh on his submission argues that: 72 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december the general belief of the igbos of nigeria is primarily based on their understanding of their world and the interaction of things therein as caused…the world of man and the world of the spiritual (ancestral) world is in a constant causal relationship that the activity of one affects the other.36 man is composed of body and soul. according to ede, the body is ahu but the soul has no general term among the igbos. among the three terms that he identified, mkpuruobi, chi and muo. muo was the most suitable that conveys the idea of the soul. this is so because immortality suggests that which is unseen as against that which is seen. thus every activity that is not of the body must be from the soul.37 metu dealt on four different principles in discussing the immaterial aspect of man; obi, chi, eke, and mmuo. for him, “obi is a man’s life-force, the animating principle which links man with other life forces in the universe. it is also the seat of affection and volition. chi is the destiny spirit believed to be the emanation of the creator in man. eke is the ancestral guardian which links him to the family. mmuo is the spirit that comes from god and goes back at death.”38 for nwala, “man is composed of body (ahu), soul (mkpuruobi) and spirit (mmuo). mkpuruobi is the location of the lifegiving force, ndu. mmuo incorporates the elements of spirit, intelligence, feeling, emotion, conscience. it has no shape or form.”39 for madu, the immaterial does not stop at mkpuruobi and mmuo but includes obi which is the seat of emotion. mmuo (ghost) is attributed with the ability of separate existence.40 from a deliberation of the three classes of traditional medical practitioners (dibia) in igbo land, ukaegbu put forward the idea of the tripartite nature: “dibia ogwu physical body (ahu), dibia afa psychological mind (obi and uche), dibia aja spiritualist soul/ spirit (mmuo).”41 in the position of okoye: the igbo believe that the ahu and mmuo constitute one whole, called the self. this necessarily entails that the igbo maintains a dualistic not a tripartite conception of the self. for the igbo people, the ahu self is made up of two entities emmanuel nweke okafor 73 namely: the spiritual and the physical as in the mmuo and mmadu respectively.42 these different functions point to different aspects of the human person. all these considerations point to the fact that muo or mmuo (spirit) refers to something immaterial. fundamentally, it designates the invisible spirit world – ala mmuo or ndi mmuo as different from ala mmadu (the visible world).43 thus the meaning of mmuo depends on its use. for nwala, it “incorporates the element of spirit, intelligence, feeling, emotion and consciousness.”44 the igbo people always have a desire to nurture a closeness and long-lasting relationship with god, this they tend to attain through pouring oblations and offering sacrifices to the ancestral spirits believing that good things come from him alone, they often offer this sacrifices with a strong belief that it will bring favors from the gods. therefore, the completeness of a person is when he or she is in communication with god and the community. this completeness is seen in his or her constant sacrifices to god. there has been a disagreement among the igbo scholars regarding how the igbo people offer sacrifices to their gods. some igbo scholars think that humans do not offer their sacrifices directly to god, while others insinuate that igbo people hardly ever sacrifice to god directly. the respectful follower of the traditional religion believes that their sacrifice is a perfect way of glorifying god but hardly do they offer this sacrifice directly to god. rather, they do that through a spirit who will help carry their sacrifice to god. for arinze, “igbo people offer sacrifices to god because of four main reasons which include: reparations, sacrifice to avert the attacks of the unknown spirit, solicitations, and appreciation.”45 the idea of sacrifice connects the living and the dead in igbo society. recommendation and conclusion there is an african (congo) proverb that says, “the human being is a social product; he is what he eats, learns, hears, sees, feels, and 74 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december lives”. there is another from the ashanti that says, “one person may kill an elephant, but the whole community may share it”. following the above african proverbs, they have already inculcated communalism into the essentials of their culture. the igbo exemplifies it in their saying, “bunu bunu ibu anyi danda”, meaning, “it is with the cooperation of other ants (danda) that the ants lift heavy load”. danda is the ant known as the “working ant”, or the “working bee”. they are known for unitedly moving and dragging loads of food into their holes together. this comparison is brought into the igbo community to inculcate the spirit of unity; living and working together. therefore, the igbo society is characterized by their manner of working and living together, known as ‘ofu obi’, ‘one heart’. should this principle of ‘ofu obi’ be introduced into other cultures, our places of work and learning, it will go a long way to boost the morality of the society it has touched. ‘ofu obi’ does not involve perpetrating evil together, rather it goes in the positive sense of fighting evil, maintaining peace, protecting lives and properties, keeping good legacies for the living and the yet unborn, and keeping to the rules of the community; preserving posterity. if this is to be maintained and well observed in the society, it will ensure wonderful benefits to both the individuals and the society, and incur blessings from the spiritual beings to whom they have recourse to. the tradition of the igbos (omenala) is reflected in their daily lives and existence, and it is in this, that their spirituality is encapsulated. the mind and soul are incorporated into the body to signify that somebody is fully alive. at death, however, the mind and the soul leave the body and undergo a process of transformation in which the individual becomes a spirit person, ‘onye mmuo’. he/she adopts a ‘nonphysical body’ because he/she is still in communication with the corporeal world. the fact that the soul and mind are immaterial, presupposes the incorruptibility and immortality of man, and it is in this, that the igbo spirituality lies. besides, it is pertinent to highlight and observe critically the role of chi, the protector/ personal god in igbo traditional religion, which the igbo strongly believed that (chi) accounts for the success or failure of a emmanuel nweke okafor 75 person in life, his/her progress and decline in life as he/she toils day after day. at the center of this belief lies an enormous effort to understand what destiny is all about and an inquiry into the choice of one’s destiny. this phenomenon has sparked much debate amongst igbo scholars. some see destiny as a pre decision made by the individual and concurrently with his/her chi before birth which he/she is made to be oblivious of as he/she wakes in the real world; others have it that chi being the personal god of a particular individual is being created with that individual and is assigned with the responsibility of guiding and protecting the destiny of that individual. hence, the function of the chi is a person’s guardian spirit which guards and directs the individual to follow the path that leads to his destiny. the consequences of going against one’s destiny is disastrous. the question arises whether the individual has nothing to contribute in the fulfillment of his/her destiny when his/her life has already been orchestrated and placed in the care of his/her chi? does this not go a long way to contradict the belief of the igbos that has it that hard work has no limit in the self-actualization and accomplishment of a person in the socio-cultural igbo society? this paper argues that though the igbo believe system emphases the power of community but the notion of chi has made it very clear that such a community can only be recognized when an individual is fully realized. this can be seen to reverse the popular notion “i am because we are” to “we are because i am”. without the ‘me’ (the individual), there will be no “us”. this is the prominent point that the concept of ‘chi’ addresses which is often ignored by some african scholars. the igbo concept of chi is a realistic concept and is lived out in an individual’s everyday life and experiences within the community. moreover, it is an effectual principle that has an ongoing and long lasting effect on the individual and whatever he/she stands for. the notion of chi in igbo traditional religion plays a very important role as regards interpretation of a person’s behavior and achievements in life. in order to understand life and comprehend its meaning it would be difficult if the recourse to chi is taken for granted. thus, the igbo ‘principle 76 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december of individuation’ is reckoned in the manner whereby chi controls the destiny of the individual and becomes responsible for his/her success or doom in life. hence no two persons have the same chi, each person’s chi individuates him/her from the others. an important part revealed as regards to chi affirms an essential communion between the individual, his/her chi, the choice he/she makes of his/her destiny and the way his /her goals are actualized in life. this had nothing to do with the community but the individual. however, the question still remains of who is actively responsible for the choice of this destiny which directs the self-actualization and accomplishment of an individual? thus, identity is a difference that is peculiar to a person which distinguishes an individual as a unique being from other persons in the community. therefore it follows that identity is a constant factor in the discovery of one’s self. the chi helps the individual in the acknowledgment of himself or herself, in doing what is expected of him/her in the community. thus without this individuality, the community becomes dead or inactive. it is rather chi that influences and creates an impact on the sharpening and construction of the individual not the community. furthermore, describing other aspects of igbo thought in chi most conveniently in its relation to identity construction and self-actualization in the igbo world holds some elements of absolute which also suggests that igbo community is simply a place to actualize the self. the possibility is that one’s chi might resist an individual points to the necessity for the individual’s to follow his/her chi. this suggests the independent nature of chi and in its mode of operation which the community has no control over. this also means that one’s chi always supports him/her once the individual is determined to succeed. the community would have a minor contribution. thus, the role of chi is very significant in the life of the individual. it requires a ‘handing over’ ceremony which is performed for every individual personally and separately. immediately the choice has been made and the child born, his destiny that has been chosen would be guided by his chi throughout his life time and which cannot be altered by the community, hence, a person’s destiny is permanent so to say and cannot be changed. emmanuel nweke okafor 77 however, to understand well the relationship between chi and individual fulfillment in igbo community, there is the need to consider other self-actualization indicators in the igbo world view with greater reference to the family and the society. there is also an understanding that the existence of an individual in the igbo society is rooted in the family, the kindred, the village, the society in which he lives in, the dead, the living dead (ancestors) and the unborn. as one progresses in life he/ she struggles towards the realization of one’s self-worth. this individual self-worth is made manifest in the community as he or she shares with the other people in the community. with this, some igbo scholars agree strongly with the idea that there is a special influence by the community in the life of an individual living in a given community in the quest for self-realization and acquaintance. this individual self-actualization is accomplished through various means of dialogue and communication within the community which influences his/her belief system of which the chi concept plays an all-encompassing role. thus, it can be argued that there is a deep principle of individuation inherent in igbo thought process. this individuation is also present in many other african worlds with some little variations. endnotes 1 rene descartes, meditations on first philosophy, in elizabeth haldane and g. ross, trans. (cambridge: cambridge press, 1931), 140-150. 2 peter gay, the enlightenment: an interpretation. vol. 2: (new york: afred, 1967), 266. 3 leopold senghor, on african socialism, in mercer cook, trans. (london: pall mall, 1964), 24. 4 ibid. 74. 5 chuka a. okoye, onwe: an inquiry into the igbo concept of the self, ogirisi (a new journal of african studies vol. 8, (2011): 51-66. 6 okafor, f.c. africa at cross-roads (new york: vantage press, 1974), 15. 78 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 7 uzoma e. ezedike, the concept of human person in african ontology: a critical reflection on the igbo notion of man. african research review vol.13, (april 2019): 131-137. 8 ibid. 9 francis spellman, holy bible (new york: catholic book publishing company), genesis 1:27. 10 frantz fanon, black skin, white masks (new york: grove press, 1967), 114. 11 olisa, m. s. taboos in igbo religion and society, west african religion, nsukka 2, (1972): 1-18. 12 keame nkrumah, consciencism (london: panaf books, 1974), 79. 13 julius nyerere, symposium on africa (wellesley, ma: wellesley college, 1960), 149. 14 jacques maquet, africanity, the cultural unity of black africa (london: oxford university press, 1972),3. 15 battista mondin, philosophical anthropology. man: an impossible project? in myroslaw a. cizdyn, trans. (rome: urbaniana university press, 1985), 1-5. 16 ezedike, the concept of human person in african ontology, 131-137. 17 senghor, on african socialism, 1-5. 18 john munonye, obi (london: heinemann, 1987), 99. 19 flora nwapa, idu (london: heinemann, 1987), 34-41. 20 stephen. n. ezeanya, the dignity of man in the traditional religion of africa (nsukka: unpublished article, 1976), 6. 21 jacob k. olupona, beyond primitivism. indigenous religious tradition and modernity (new york: routledge, 2004), 32. 22 ralph, o. madu, problem of meaning in philosophy and theology: the hermeneutic solution (academic paper at the bigard memorial seminary enugu graduation ceremony, 1995),33. 23 ibid. 34. 24 justin n. ekennai, bio-medical ethics (owerri: barloz publishers inc., 2003), 27. 25 m. ojike, my africa (london: heinemann, 1955), 183. 26 justin n. ekennia, bio-medical ethics (owerri: barloz publishers, 2000), 154. 27 m. i. mozia, solidarity in the church and solidarity among the igbosan anthropologico-theological study (rome: tipografica, 1982), 184. 28 ibid. 29 r.a. arazu, ‘a cultural model for a christian prayer’ in african christian spirituality (new york: orbis books, 1980), 114. 30 ikenga metu, african religion in western conceptual scheme, the problem of interpretation (onitsha: imico publishers, 1991), 109. emmanuel nweke okafor 79 31 uzodinma nwala, igbo philosophy (lagos: literamed publications, 1985), 41-42. 32 ibid. 43-44. 33 e.m.p. edeh, towards an igbo metaphysics (chicago: loyola university press, 1985), 98. 34 ralph o. madu, african symbols, proverbs and myths, the hermeneutics of destiny (new york: peterlang publishing incorporation, 1992), 160. 35 nwala, igbo philosophy, 42-43. 36 ibeh, the nature of igbo society (awka: free press ltd., 1995), 75. 37 edeh, towards an igbo metaphysics, 80-82. 38 metu, african religion in western conceptual scheme, the problem of interpretation, 110-111. 39 nwala, igbo philosophy, 42-43. 40 madu, african symbols, proverbs and myths, the hermeneutics of destiny, 160-162. 41 j. o. ukaegbu, unpublished lectures on anthropology (enugu: bigard press, 1992), 42 okoye, onwe: an inquiry into the igbo concept of the self, ogirisi, (2011): 51-66. 43 madu, african symbols, proverbs and myths, the hermeneutics of destiny, 166. 44 nwala, igbo philosophy, 42. 44 francis arinze, sacrifice in igbo traditional religion (onitsha: st. stephen’s press, 2008), 64. references arazu, r.a. ‘a cultural model for a christian prayer’ in african christian spirituality. new york: orbis books, 1980. arinze, francis. sacrifice in igbo traditional religion. onitsha: st. stephen’s press, 2008. descartes, rene. meditations on first philosophy. in elizabeth haldane and g. ross. (trans.). cambridge: cambridge press, 1931. edeh, e.m.p. towards an igbo metaphysics. chicago: loyola university press, 1985. 80 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december ekennia, justin. n. african modernity crisis. benin, nigeria: barloz publishers, 2000. ekennia, justin. n. bio-medical ethics. owerri: barloz publishers inc., 2003. ezeanya, stephen. n. the dignity of man in the traditional religion of africa. nsukka: unpublished article, 1976. ezedike uzoma, e. the concept of human person in african ontology: a critical reflection on the igbo notion of man. african research review vol.13, (april 2019): 131-137. fanon, frantz. black skin, white masks. new york: grove press, 1967. gay, peter. the enlightenment: an interpretation. vol. 2: new york: afred, 1967. ibeh. the nature of igbo society. awka: free press ltd., 1995. madu, ralph, o. problem of meaning in philosophy and theology: the hermeneutic solution. academic paper at the bigard memorial seminary enugu graduation ceremony, 1995. madu, ralph, o. african symbols, proverbs and myths, the hermeneutics of destiny. new york: peterlang publishing incorporation, 1992. maquet, jacques. africanity, the cultural unity of black africa. london: oxford university press, 1972. metu, ikenga. african religion in western conceptual scheme, the problem of interpretation. onitsha: imico publishers, 1991. mondin, battista. philosophical anthropology. man: an impossible project? myroslaw a. cizdyn. (trans.). rome: urbaniana university press, 1985. mozia, m. i. solidarity in the church and solidarity among the igbos an anthropologico-theological study. rome: tipografica, 1982. munonye, john. obi. london: heinemann, 1987. nkrumah, keame. consciencism. london: panaf books, 1974. emmanuel nweke okafor 81 nwala, uzodinma. igbo philosophy. lagos: literamed publications, 1985. nwapa, flora. idu. london: heinemann, 1987. nyerere, julius. symposium on africa. wellesley, ma: wellesley college, 1960. ojike, m. my africa. london: heinemann, 1955. okafor, f.c. africa at cross-roads. new york: vantage press, 1974. okoye chuka a. onwe: an inquiry into the igbo concept of the self. ogirisi. a new journal of african studies vol. 8, (2011): 51-66. olupona k. jacob. beyond primitivism. indigenous religious tradition and modernity. new york: routledge, 2004. senghor, leopold s. on african socialism. mercer cook. (trans.) london: pall mall, 1964. spellman, francis. holy bible. new york: catholic book publishing company, 1963. ukaegbu, j. o. unpublished lectures on anthropology. enugu: bigard press, 1992. _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand pattarawin tipkrailash and michael clark 61 prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 2 july to december 2019, 61-69 © 2000 by assumption university press the trial of commander data pattarawin tipkrailash and michael clark assumption university of thailand abstract this paper’s aim is to explore the moral topics raised in the tv series “star trek: the next generation” season 2 episode 9 entitled “measure of man”. in this episode commander data, an android, is put on trial to determine if can be considered human, or if he has the same rights as a human being. this paper discusses ethical issues raised by this trial. picard’s argument in defence of data appeals to epistemological doubts about whether or not data is sentient. but this paper will take an alternative approach. it will show how inanimate objects can also possess a value which demand ethical obligations from sentient beings. it will also show how the trial reflects back on human morality and the measure of man refers less to the audience and more to the human beings conducting and observing the trial. keywords: star trek, virtue ethics, artificial intelligence, consequentialism, measure of man 62 prajñā vihāra background star trek is one of the most popular science fiction franchises, perhaps rivalled only by star wars. star wars is classified as a space opera, the term used to describe a fantasy novel with space and science as background themes. star trek, on the other hand, is classified as hard sci-fi, a genre characterised by the attention it pays to hard questions raised by advanced technology, including questions that are philosophical in nature. there are, for instance, episodes of star trek that raise questions about morality, the mind-body problem, and artificial intelligence. star trek: the next generation has one of the most interesting characters in the series: lieutenant commander data. created by dr. noonian soong, data is the most sophisticated android ever made in star fleet. he is smarter and stronger than any of his human crew members. with all his superior capabilities, his main responsibility is to research humanity. yet his sole desire is to be more like other crew members of the enterprise. this paper focuses on the events depicted in the episode “the measure of a man”. in this episode, a trial is conducted to determine data’s status in the star fleet. the episode begins with commander maddock, who is researching the work of dr. noonian soong (the creator of commander data) in order to produce a replica of the ‘positron brain’ that gives data his astonishing computation capability and personality. but commander maddock would need to disassemble data in order to study his positron brain. so, he files a request to star fleet for data to be transferred to his command. this request is approved by star fleet command, and so data is to be transferred to maddock’s command. in order to protect himself and the legacy of dr. soong, data tries to evade this order by attempting to resign from star fleet, but his request is denied by the judge advocate philippa, who accepted maddock’s argument that data is not a member of star fleet’s personnel, but is rather among star fleet’s property, akin to any one of its other mechanical devises, and as such is unable to resign from his position. captain jean-luc picard of the enterprise objected to this claim. a hearing is then held to determine pattarawin tipkrailash and michael clark 63 data’s status, with captain jean-luc picard as data’s defence lawyer vs. commander william t. riker as the hostile attorney picard’s argument in defence of data appeals to epistemological doubts concerning the ability to claim that data is not sentient. data shows all the outward signs of being sentient. this casts uncertainty concerning whether data is indeed, as the prosecution alleges, an insentient automaton. in the episode, it becomes then deeply unclear whether maddock’s plan involves merely dismantling a mindless automaton in order to make millions more of them, to be used as cannon fodder – or whether it involves destroying a conscious being in order to create and enslave millions more. the stakes in this case are extremely high and, given the seemingly intractable uncertainty, the judge advocate errs on the side of caution, deeming that data should not be dismantled or treated as mere property. the question i want to raise here is this: what other considerations might the defence team have advanced on data’s behalf? what if we grant riker his premise that data is an insentient machine? does it follow that there is nothing morally at stake in dismantling him? obligations towards our property first, let’s look at commander riker’s argument, which tries to establish that data is just a machine. he starts by having data answer the question “what are you?”, to which data replies that he is an android. riker then proceeds to have data demonstrate his superhuman strength by bending a steel bar, specify his own technical specifications, and remove his arm for inspection. then, he asks who built him. data replies “dr. noonian soong”. riker then press on with the question “more basic, what is he”. data then answer “human”. after that he proceed to say the closing line to his statement: the commander is a physical representation of a dream, an idea conceived of by the mind of a man. its purpose is to serve human needs and interests. it’s a collection of 64 prajñā vihāra neural nets and heuristic algorithms. its responses dictated by an elaborate software programme written by a man. it’s hardware built by a man. and now. and now a man will shut it off. in a dramatic climax, he then approaches data and presses his hidden off switch. riker’s argument can be presented as follows: 1. commander data is an android. 2. android is created by a human 3. humans are owners of their creations. 4. therefore, commander data is a property of star fleet. 5. and therefore, they can dismantle him and study him as they please. this argument is clearly flawed. we can assume that premises 1 – 3 are true. premise 4 raises issues relating to the concept of property – a category whose moral significance is questionable, since its extension is partly determined by legal convention. but we can focus particularly progression from premises 1-4 to the conclusion 5. this inference is entirely unwarranted. that something is legally and justly the property of some person or some organization does not give them right to do whatever they please with it. the mona lisa belongs to the louvre, but that doesn’t give the louvre a right to do whatever they please with it. the same goes for a broken tesla coil that nicola tesla himself was working on before his demise, a rare classic car, light cruiser hms belfast that is moored in thames, the us constitution in boston, and even the wreckage of the uss arizona. all of these things are creations of mankind and none are sentient. yet, given their cultural significance, we have obligations to preserve them – or at least should not do any harm to them. plausibly, the ‘should’ in these claims expresses a moral imperative, as opposed to (or in addition to) a legal or aesthetic one. pattarawin tipkrailash and michael clark 65 it is therefore clear that some inanimate objects have a status that generates obligations for us to protect and preserve them. data arguably falls into this category. we are granting that he is a machine, an android that is the property of starfleet. the point to stress here is that it does not automatically follow that starfleet has the right to dismantle and study him. but what if, by dismantling data and studying him, star fleet can mass-produce androids like him. if a single data is valuable, perhaps a multitude of them would be much more so. in reply, consider the uss enterprise (cv-6 the world war 2 aircraft carrier), which is a ship in yorktown class, alongside cv-5 yorktown and cv-8 hornet. while these ships are identical in design, all three of them are fundamentally different. the name “yorktown” refers to the great losses in midway where many sailors lost their life. the name “hornet” refers to the daring doolittle raid against the mainland of japan. likewise, the uss enterprise has its own aura and significance. in the episodes of the next generation it is mentioned that vessels named “enterprise” are destined for greatness. while seafaring (or space) vessels often share the same class and same design, the meaning and value behind their name are wholly different. physical identity alone does not determine the value of each object. we have considered examples of morally and culturally significant artefacts that we plausibly have a moral obligation to preserve and protect. if data is counted among such artefacts, we should therefore ask: what is it about data that gives him this status and generates these obligations? some things have value intrinsically. a person plausibly has intrinsic value and deserves treatment as an end in himor herself. but other things have value extrinsically – value derived from their relationships to other things. if data is insentient then it is plausible that our obligations to preserve him are due to extrinsic facts about him. there are two such lines of thought that i will consider: one relating data’s relationship to his creator, dr. noonian soong, and the other relating to data’s representational properties. 66 prajñā vihāra wronging the dead starfleet arguably has an obligation to protect dr. soong’s legacy, as he is now the only soong’s android left after his brother lore had been destroyed. data says that: i am the culmination of one man’s dream. this is not ego or vanity, but when doctor soong created me he added to the substance of the universe. if by your experiments i am destroyed, something unique, something wonderful will be lost. i cannot permit that; i must protect his dream. dr. noonian soong, data’s creator, is dead. does that mean that he cannot be wronged by destroying data, his magnum opus? the action is wrong in the same way as peoples running around and “bombing” (terminology in graffiti circle which mean spraying paint over someone else’s work) works of the famous thai graffiti artist mamafaka after he had passed away. how can the dead be wronged or harmed in any way? this is a difficult question and i will not attempt to answer it here. what i do want to show, however, is that it is not at all absurd to think that the dead can be wronged – even if we lack an account of why this is so. if we hold that a dead person is someone that cannot be wronged, why would we be obliged to posthumously execute their will? why would we treat their now lifeless body with respect? or why should we try to preserve their legacy? i think we can agree to a certain degree that there are certain actions, which when done to corpses, are distasteful or outright immoral. consider the case of the infamous count vlad dracula who impaled his political enemies and turkish army on the iron rods. the impaled parties are no longer of this world and presumably do not know what has been done to their bodies. but this action seems distasteful and immoral. another story from thai folklore called sri thanonchai. sri thanonchai is a very smart person, but cruel and used his intellect to pattarawin tipkrailash and michael clark 67 cheat other people. he made many enemies, including the king. the king would try to engage in a battle of wits with sri thanonchai but was always outsmarted. after sri thanonchai’s death, the king and his subordinates try to desecrate the cremated remains of sri thanonchai by urinating on them, only to get tricked by sri thanonchai from beyond his grave, who ordered his coffin and the firewood used for his funeral pyre to be made from nettle wood which would cause irritation to anyone exposed to its smoke. value and representation some things have value because of what they represent. an example would be a national flag. there is nothing about the material composition of a flag that makes it especially valuable, nor is there anything intrinsically valuable about the way its colours are arranged. and yet many people do value their national flag and would be offended by somebody defacing it. they value the flag because it represents their nation and its history and culture. in some countries, the law states that the national flag cannot touch the ground. in thailand, the law states that you need to respect the flag and cannot use it as a decoration. why such concern over some coloured fabric? thailand’s national flag is a symbol of the sovereign state and the monarchy, which have the highest value among thai people. the flag is a good example of something that hold values extrinsic to itself. we can also consider an example from star wars. at the end of “empire strike back,” hans solo was captured by the galactic empire. his body is frozen in carbonite and used as a decoration by jabba the hutt. his body is reduced to an object. even though he is no longer sentient, we judge this as horribly wrong. the reason is that the value in this object is bestowed upon it by the human entity that it once represented. likewise, data is a representation of human being. he is made in the image of man. the whole gamut of good human characteristics is encoded inside him: curiosity, compassion, intellectual and many more, even if he (might not) be conscious. 68 prajñā vihāra virtue-ethics considerations the final line of thought that i will consider takes a cue from virtue ethics. what would a virtuous person do in this scenario? what kind of a person would want to dismantle data? more directly, what kind of a person is maddock? commander maddock is what we can call a “flat-character”. he is represented as being somewhat malicious. he is the very definition of a mad scientist. to maddock, morality is just an impediment to the pursuit of scientific breakthroughs. he is not completely lacking in morality. he merely places morality in lesser priority. data is an important crew of the enterprise, the most esteemed vessel of starfleet. data is an engineering marvel created by the great mind. and given his complex history and existence – not to mention to significant chance that he is indeed sentient – a virtuous person would not treat him as a replaceable machine. one counterargument aims to justify maddock’s proposal in consequentialist terms. perhaps there have been unethical experiments in human history that have led to huge breakthroughs in science. but this observation does more to refute consequentialism than it does to justify the experiments. while the result of these experiments seem to justify them, they are still cruel and unethical. conclusion we can conclude that evidence and argument raised by riker is inconclusive. even if data is insentient, this is not enough to justify maddock’s proposal. but this trial can serve us as a way to learn more about ourselves. in star trek: nemesis, data met his demise during the borg invasion. and in his memory picard says to b-4, data’s brother: i don’t know if all this has made any sense. i wanted you to know what kind of man he was. in his quest to be more like us ...he helped us to see what it means to be human.” “my brother was not human” replied b-4. “no, he wasn’t. but pattarawin tipkrailash and michael clark 69 his wonder, his curiosity about every facet of human nature ...allowed all of us to see the best parts of ourselves. he evolved. he embraced change because he always wanted to be better than he was. in the end, data is perhaps the most humane character in the entire series. he naïvely embraces every side of humanity. he reflected a picture of humanity in the purest and most innocent ways. the name of the episode “measure of man” is ambiguous. who is being measured in this episode exactly? is it data being measured for whether or not he is a “man”? was maddock measured for his lack of ethical virtue? or is it we, the audience, who are being asked to reflect and measure our own value? references nagel, t., 1970. “death,” noûs 4(1):73–80, reprinted in nagel, t., mortal questions, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1979 hursthouse, rosalind and pettigrove, glen, “virtue ethics”, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (winter 2018 edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), url = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/ entries/ethics-virtue/> roddenberry, g., (1988). “star trek: the next generation” [motion picture],united states: paramount domestic television. kershner, i., & lucas, g. (1980). “the empire strikes back” [motion picture]. united states: twentieth century-fox film corporation. marquand, r., & lucas, g. (1983). “return of the jedi” [motion picture]. united states: twentieth century-fox film corporation. baird, s., berman, r. (2002). “star trek: nemesis” [motion picture]. united states: paramount pictures prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 39 vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 39-52 © 2000 by assumption university press a comparative analysis of the idea of the ‘ideal man’ in confucian and yoruba thought oluwatobi david esan1 and adekunle muhydeen adedoja2 abstract the comparative analysis of oriental and african thought is starting to grow. this is not surprising because there are african thought and oriental thought. one concept which is worthy of examination is the concept of the ideal or perfect man. this work sets to compare the idea of the the yoruba thought systems. the work considers the educational, historical and sociological factors that lead to the development of the ideal man. in confucian thought the term used is and in yoruba thought it is . how this formation of the ideal man is increasingly less keywords: man, perfect man 40 introduction tradition. it is considered an important concept in religious thought, for instance in islamic thought and buddhist thought. this is also an important consideration in both african and in chinese thought, especially with regard to the education or the development of the ideal man. in africa, the yoruba people, emphasize respectable character. they believe that education is not just about academic performance but rather encompasses the overall moral and character development of a child. for instance, a good person is not equivalent to a learned person. in chinese culture there is emphasis on character development beginning with the child, and this extends to the idea that only people with good character should be allowed to hold political positions. the yoruba calls a person that exhibits an ideal character , confucianism calls such a person . this paper carries out a comparative analysis and critical evaluation of the ideal man both as and as . the work concludes by the concept of in confucianism “confucianism emphasizes ethics, and the orderly arrangement of society and in correct relationships between people.”3 confucius himself lived during the eastern chou dynasty, a time when china was split up into a number of smaller republics, each of which was ruled by a warlord or aristocrat who gave the emperor, who oversaw the middle kingdom (china) from the capital loyang, little more than lip service. the regular battles between these republics upended the social order. a philosophy of society that would serve as a unifying force and could bring the chinese people together was therefore desperately needed. “a need, of which the philosophy of confucius was eventually the most successful.”4 people according to the confucian moral order are divided into many groups based on their diverse levels of moral development. one who embodies moral excellence is referred to as “the superior person” 41 ( ) “those who not only have superior moral character themselves but also help others to cultivate themselves, are men of humanity (men of bring succor to the multitude, are the sages 5 select few people. if moral perfection is the aim of our existence, we examines human nature. instead, he places more emphasis on the goal of moral development. or as waley says: “confucius is more concerned with what we can become than with what we are born as.”6 examine who we are at birth in order to comprehend our moral objective. that although we are born righteous, we can make mistakes due to our numerous passions. until he turned 70, he could not even assert that he had total control over his desires. smith writes: “therefore, in his view, human beings are not born perfect, but we can perfect.”7 or as state. the superior person is concerned is concerned with personal favors.”8 confucius also says, “the superior person seeks the way and not a mere living... the superior person worries about the way and not about poverty.”9 we cannot devote our complete attention to the development of our moral qualities if we crave worldly possessions and bodily comfort. confucius says: “a fellow who is ashamed merely of shabby clothing or meager food is not even worth conversing with.”10 to fully attend neglected to develop my virtues? have i fallen short of going into what 42 just discovered to be right? have i been able to make up for my mistakes? thus, a person who is interested in seeking the proper way is constantly diligent and never self-justifying. as benjamin schwartz puts it: “moral cultivation is a long and the superior person.” they are superior not by nature, but by their constant practice of self-examination and self-reform.”11 but why is it necessary our present level of comfort? confucius held that discovering what it meant to be a person was the goal of life. he adheres to a moral code that considers all of humanity: ren (humanity). finding a single western ethical standard that may be compared to the concept of live, nor is it something that can be acquired by a single action. the ideal man, the good man, or the superior man is a common theme in confucian moral philosophy. this hypothetical perfect man is the person who embodies every aspect of confucian morality. he is a man of morals who understands how to respond to any challenge in life needs and well-being rather than being egotistical or self-centered. he is impartial rather than narrow-minded, and what is right rather than what will make money drives his behavior. he is a man of action who speaks and a cordial interaction with others. he is a loving man. confucius like aristotle believed that virtues may be found in between two extremes. the ideal man steers clear of extremes and upholds equilibrium in his behavior. he does what is proper in the situation in which he is. he does not exceed this. he also performs the duty of a parent by providing and caring for them while yet alive and helping them complete their projects 43 and care for their descendants after they have died. however, several issues can be raised from the confucius idea of first, if confucius himself did not attain the state until the age of 70. this suggests that such an attainment may never exist among the youth this idea of experience also brings into challenges the entire basis of confucius philosophy. for his positions were not divinely bestowed life experience. so to what extent should a moral principle be guided an objective ethics? because, if we are to hold on to what confucius is saying, it implies that the society has the capacity drive people towards moral goodness but on a contrary, a scholar like jean jacques rousseau would reject such an idea. needless to say that, some of confucius prescriptions are indeed good moral standards that should be adopted. the philosophy is tailored towards regulation of human excesses. but we see that it still needs man. the yoruba conception of the yoruba people of western nigeria have a long tradition and a cherished culture which they strive to preserve. for the yoruba, ethics or morality is of the utmost of importance when considering life. “the moral concept that is most highly valued is the concept of . conceptually, the concept is a derivative noun which has the words – “ ” as its morphological components. literally translated and separately, means the chief or master of (character), and translates as “the baby begotten by the chief of iwa.”12 44 such a child is thought of as a paragon of excellence in character. so, who exactly is an ? generally, an is a individual who combines all the virtues. akinyemi opines that “the principles of yoruba traditional education are based on the concept of translated loosely as an “ideal being”.13 akanbi and jekayinfa in similar way assert that, “the end of yoruba traditional education is to make every is to be of good character. that is why the goal of yoruba traditional education has always been to foster strong character in the individual and to prepare each person to become a useful member of the community”.14 also, “the concept of “ ” is seen as the peak of moral goal is in all cases to be an . this is the popular conception of but it has some ambivalence”.15 segun gbadegesin suggests that every baby is born an omoluwabi and that olu-iwa means “god, the creator of every infant.”16 yet in terms of yoruba linguistic structure, refer to a respectable father with a sterling character. however, there is no assurance that the child would continue to be a person of dignity or an exemplar of character like the biological father who was created by olu-iwa. additionally, the ambiguity may be seen in the chance that the child might end up being an omoluwabi while not being born to a person of honor. the conception of by sophie oluwole cultural experience. 17 according to her, “the phrase is incomplete because it raises the question: (a child whose character takes after... who?)”. in the light of this, oluwole sees “ as ‘ (a person that behaves like someone who is well nurtured and lives by the precepts of the education s/he has been given)”.18 this perspective helps us understand omoluabi in yoruba culture better because it teaches people how to be self-disciplined and responsible in both their private and public lives, which is a quality that wins respect in yoruba society. and 45 contrast to eniyan-keyan or eniyan la-san, which mean “caricature person” and “a worthless child,” respectively. as a result, the yoruba frequently substitute the adjective eniyan-gidi, which means “an ideal person,” for the noun omoluwabi, which means “a good person.” fafunwa then listed roughly seven fundamental aims or objectives of indigenous education, all of which centered on developing the whole man. character. to inculcate respect for the elderly and those in positions of authority. to develop intellectual skills. healthy attitude towards honest labor. to develop a sense of belonging and to participate actively in family and the cultural heritage of the community at large.19 however, the concept of is such that is controversial in itself, because, there are no universal qualities that point to who an to does dilemma. for instance, can an steal in case of death threatening starvation among others. does moral action change the status of who an is, or an remains it the conformity to the societal values that makes someone an , or when someone maintains what he or she thinks is right. because not all societal standing are good, yet they are accepted. for demise a yoruba king in nigeria in early history would not be considered to be an by the society at that time. so who confers the of 46 comparison of the concept of with one of the most important things that must be noted in bringing the features of the chinese philosophy and that of the yoruba together is that the concept of an ideal man, which means someone with good character, an ideal man in chinese philosophy is , which also suggests the understanding of for the yoruba people. an is someone that has iwapele and according to wande abimbola “is ” hence both cultures ensure that people are gentleman and not just gentleness in the aspect of keeping mute, but in the aspect of maintaining a good character. confucius asserted that, “a superior man in dealing with the world is not for anything or against anything.” he follows righteousness as the standard”.20 a crucial moral and psychological characteristic of an omoluabi is called intention towards others. “a person is expected to have, along with being truthful and honest. (character)”21 (iwa rere) and bad character may be found (iwa ibaje or iwa buburu). we can see that the act of performing a righteous deed cuts across the two or a gentleman must follow righteousness and have good intent towards humanity. an ideal man in both systems of thought is a person with a righteous character and good behavior. it must be noted that the hallmark of both philosophies is character formation, which will in turn lead to a better nation.22 this is also consistent with , which is a person that has been able to master himself and can respond to situations in the right way. he knows the right words to say and always speaks the truth. he is hard-working and intelligent. confucius said, “the superior man has nine wishes.”: 47 in seeing, he wishes to see clearly. in hearing, he wishes to hear distinctly. in his expression, he wishes to be warm. in his appearance, he wishes to be respectful. in his speech, be serious. when in doubt, he wishes to ask. when he is when he sees an opportunity for gain, he tries to think of righteousness”.23 these are similar traits that cut across both and . well at ease. this statement of confucius demonstrates the importance of moderation in the life of . the yoruba also preach moderation as a core virtue of . this is evident in the yoruba axiom that says , that is, when you are not moderate in your dealing, you are disgraced or . all this pointer to the fact that must be moderate in all his actions. the yorubas will say which means that an omoluabi is expected to take care of his parents when they grow old, and to obey and be respectful to them while still alive. this they express that, , that is ‘a child that eyes his mother with disrespect who is must be able to obey the parent and take care of them even brothers will show disrespect to superiors, and there has never been a man who is not disrespectful to superiors and yet creates disorder,” and continues, “a superior man is devoted to the fundamental (the root). piety and brotherly respect are the roots of humanity (jen)”.24 this shows that to become it depends on how well you are respectful in your immediate home, the yoruba will also say, , that is the behavior from home takes one to the larger society. 48 moreover, both and also applies to the event of and among the yoruba. a good child to look after the deceased parents and make sure their legacy lives on. these are similar traits in both philosophies. lastly, confucius said, wealth and honor are what every man desires.” but if they have been obtained in violation of moral principles, they must not be kept. poverty and humble station are what every man dislikes. but if they can be avoided only in violation of moral principles, they must not be avoided. if that name? a superior man never abandons humanity, even for the lapse of a single meal. in moments of haste, he acts according to it.”25 this statement is similar to yoruba proverbs that say which means ‘a good name is better than silver the acquisition of wealth. conclusion although the concept of “good man” and “ ” in both confucianism and the yoruba thought systems aim at promoting a better individual, some of the doctrines or positions of these concepts might a need to critically examine some of these basic assumptions, to rescue them from being empty dogmas. first, both worldviews require that a good person should foster the problem comes when the legacy of a deceased parent is not good, or ? we believe that the 49 child should not be pressured into living the legacy of the parent, but rather encouraged to discriminate between the good and bad, and strive to continue the good and acceptable values of the parent. second, both world views do not give special credence to the society one is born into or lives in. taking cognizance of the fact that a as a good man is someone who has been brought up in a good society. what we regard as character formation or mastering oneself is not done in isolation from society, so if society is bad, it is very much possible that it will frustrate or perhaps corrupt the good man. this insight was evident as to say that in recent times, the concept of both and has and political interests. people who are bad are called good because they do what pleases the leaders of the day. both philosophies embrace the fact that a child should take care of their parents when they grow old. undoubtedly, this is a good thing that should be encouraged in all cultures philosophy, but if we consider some older yoruba metaphysical practices, we can understand why children tend to abandon their parents even in old age. needless to say that the concept of good man enhances a humanist philosophy that enables a better life. yet along with preserving this concept we must re-examined some of its characteristics and applications if we hope to try to universalized it as a moral standard. it must be stressed that both and could either be a male or female. this paper has been able to identify the fact that every culture has their idea or conception of a good man and goodness is a core virtue of every culture. through comparative analysis we have been able to draw out critical synergy between the chinese philosophy and the yoruba philosophy. although the in philosophy allows us to search for its more universal elements. by contrasting the idea of the ideal man between the chinese and yoruba 50 culture, we can further clarify the ideal of the ideal man and its meaning endnotes 1 department of philosophy, university of ibadan, ibadan, nigeria. email: esanoluwatobi1@gmail.com 2 muhydeen adekunle adedoja, department of general studies, adeseun ogundoyin polytechnic, eruwa, oyo state. email: lizzycom70@yahoo.com 3 smith, d. h, 4 smith, d. h, , 213. 5 “the perfect gentleman in confucianism” 2. 6 waley, a, , 45 7 smith, d. h, , 214. 8 raymond dawson, confucius, (united kingdom: oxford university press, 1981), 45. 9 raymond dawson, , 46. 10 waley, a, , 112. 11 smith, d. h, , 13. 12 fayemi, a. k, “human personality and the yoruba worldview: an ethicosocial interpretation” the journal of pan african studies, vol. 2, no. 9, (2009): 16. 13 akanbi, g.o. and jekayinfa, a.a, “reviving the african culture of in the yoruba race as a means of adding value to education in nigeria”. international journal of modern education research (2016): 13. 14 “macgregor, kirk”, predestination, accessed july 14, 2022, https://www. researchgate.net/publication/318755205. 11. 15 olusola. v. o, “ : rethinking virtue in yoruba culture and moral system”, africology: the journal of pan african studies, vol. 10, no. 9, (2007): 87. 16 gbadegesin olusegun, “destiny, personality and ultimate reality of human existence: a yoruba perspective,” in ultimate reality and meaning, vol. 7, no. 3. (1984)173. 17 oluwole, b. s, “who are we, the yoruba?” (a key note paper delivered at a pre-word philosophy day conference, june 12 at the national theater. lagos, 2007), 12. 18 oluwole, b. s, “who are we, the yoruba?” 13. 19 a. b. fafunwa, history of education in nigeria (london: george allen & unwin, 1974), 20. 51 references the analects of confucius. http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/analects_of_ confucius_(eno-2015).pdf. accessed may 17, 2022. abiodun and rowland, “identity and the artistic process in the yoruba aesthetic” iwa akanbi, g.o. and jekayinfa, a.a, “reviving the african culture of ‘ race as a means of adding value to education in nigeria”. international journal of modern education research (2016) 13-25. fafunwa, a.b, history of education in nigeria. london: george allen & unwin, 1974. fashola, b. r., “ on, obafemi awolowo university hosted lecture, january 15, 2019), 721. fayemi, a. k, “human personality and the yoruba worldview: an ethicosocial interpretation” the journal of pan african studies, vol. 2, no. 9, (2009): 16-20. 20 lau, d. c, confucius: the analects 4: 10 21 wande abimbola, “ : the concept of good character in the ifa literary corpus”, in yoruba oral tradition: poetry in music, dance, and drama, ed. wande abimbola, (ibadan: university of ibadan press, 1975), 393. 22 “macgregor, kirk”, predestination. 11. 23 lau, d. c, confucius: the analects 16: 10 24 lau, d. c, confucius: the analects 1: 2. 25 lau, d. c, confucius: the analects 4: 5. 52 gbadegesin olusegun, “destiny, personality and ultimate reality of human existence: a yoruba perspective,” in ultimate reality and meaning, vol. 7, no. 3. (1984):173188 johnson, s, . lagos: c. s. s. books, 1921. lau, d. c, confucius: the analects . new york: penguin classics, 1979. macgregor, kirk. “predestination.” accessed july 14, 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318755205. accessed may 17, 2022. olusola. v. o, “ : rethinking virtue in yoruba culture and moral system”, africology: the journal of pan african studies, vol. 10, no. 9, (2007): 87-100. oluwole, b. s, “who are we, the yoruba?” (a key note paper delivered at a pre-word philosophy day conference, june 12 at the national theater. lagos, 2007 12-.23. raymond dawson, confucius. united kingdom: oxford university press, 1981. waley, a., the analects, translated. beijing: waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 2007. wande abimbola, “ : the concept of good character in the ifa literary corpus”, in yoruba oral tradition: poetry in music, dance, and drama, ed. wande abimbola, 390400, ibadan: university of ibadan press, 1975. gerhold k. becker 73 do we know art when we see it? philosophical explorations in aesthetics gerhold k. becker assumption university, bangkok abstract never in history was art more present everywhere and never was it more valuable. yet, in the wake of duchamp and warhol, the understanding of what art is and how it is recognized is more problematic today than any time in history. this paper examines the various approaches to how one recognizes a work of art as a work of art. it examines the history of aesthetic theory and the variousways art was defined. in the end it considers the value of the more hermeneutic and holistic interpretations of art put forward by heidegger, gadamer, danto and beuys. 1. let us begin with a paradox: never in history was art more presenteverywhere and never was it more valuable. yet the question is which values people usually have in mind. a german minister recently expressed this very nicely. when his state considered selling a few warhols to fill up its empty coffers, he remarked: “a piece of art has value when you can sell it.” it’s that simple, it’s just monetary value. prajñā vihāra vol. 16 no. 2, july-december 2015, 73-98 © 2000 by assumption university press 74 prajñā vihāra on the other hand, i would like to claim that art was never less known than today. how can this be? consider this scene which i witnessed not long ago in a famous museum of modern art in munich: i saw a group of people emerging from one of the exhibition halls. apparently, they had just finished their guided tour through the museum and seemed very exhausted. they then went straight to a corner where tables and chairs had been piled up and wanted to take a rest. yet before they got there the frightened voice of the tour guide was heard telling them to keep away from what to everybodylooked as chairs and not to touch these objects. so one of the visitors asked with utter surprise: “what, this is art, too?!” i think this shows that the identification of art works as such and the concept of art in particular have become problematic. it seems that whether or not something is a work of art is no longer obvious or visible in its appearance. in order to find out what we have before us we first need to do some research and enquire into the circumstances of its creation. usually, we rely on the opinion of art consultants and experts, or a whole bunch of them, a committee of experts. in other words, one has to be told by someonein the know that this particular object is a piece of art. yet – who is an expert and on what grounds? 2. in 1917 it still seemed clear that such a question could be answered without much difficulty. and that was just what happened when a committee of experts rejected an art work marcel duchamp had submittedfor the exhibition of the society of independent artists in new york. the committee claimed duchamp’s so-called art work had violated all the major rules of art and therefore could not be accepted for the exhibition. so apparentlythe knowledge of these rules makes the expert, who in turn has to ensure that the rules are respected. what had happened was this: what duchamp had submitted as his work of art came in fact from a shop of sanitary appliances; it was a urinal. his so-called artwork was a simple factory product of a firm called “j. l. mott iron works,” it was unaltered by any artistic intervention; and it could not be distinguished from the hundreds of other urinals that were available in shops everywhere. all duchamp had done was to give it a title, fountain, which was gerhold k. becker 75 certainly funny as it hinted at some deeper meaning. and he signed his factory product,but not in his own name, instead he used the pseudonym “r. mutt”, which resembled the name of the manufacturing firm and set off much speculation.yet the members of the jury were not amused and rejected it in their capacity as experts of art whose job it was not only to evaluate art works but more fundamentally to distinguish art from nonart. but – to make matters more complicated – duchamp himself was a member of the jury, too, and he had strongly objected to the committee’s decision. so, was he no expert? later duchamp explained what for him turned an object of daily use into a piece of art: “whether mr. mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. he chose it. he took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under the new title and point of view – created a new thought for that object.” in other words, duchamp’s main intention was to shift the focus of art from physical craft to thought and intellectual interpretation. for duchamp it is not so much the physical object that makes it an artwork but the thought it evokes. and that is an idea that can be traced back at least to hegel’s aesthetics where it marked a decisive turning point in the philosophy of art – as we will see later. it didn’t take long until in line with duchamp’s argument, the concept of art was extended in such a way that objects like his urinal would now be regarded as works of “conceptual art.” he called them ready-mades, and this new art category could accommodate any object purchased “as a sculpture already made.” they now include pieces such as his bottle rack and his bicycle wheel and others. 3. april 21, 1964 marks another key moment in the development of the modern concept of art. on this day andy warhol opened his second exhibition in the new york stable gallery in which he had placed 400 boxes in 2 rooms that seemed to turn the gallery into a ware house. the visitors were amused, irritated, and scornful. although warhol’s brillo boxes looked exactly like the boxes one would find in shops and real warehouses, they were not unaltered factory products like duchamp’s 76 prajñā vihāra urinal. instead they were exact imitations of the original boxes, executed on warhol’s precise orders by a carpenter and then painted like the original boxes. yet for the eye of the beholder they were indistinguishable from their originals and without any specific artfulness or originality. nevertheless there was one decisive mark of distinction from real brillo boxes, and that was their location: they were stapled in a gallery and not in a warehouse. in this exhibition warhol clearly drew on one of the most enduring conceptions of art but only to call it in doubts, the conception that art is the imitation of nature. this tradition goes all the way back to plato and dominated art history until the arrival of photography and abstract art in the late 19th century. yet warhol’s ironic criticism of this powerful tradition gives a new twist to the philosophy of art. his boxes are imitations of the ordinary factory boxes and not identical with the real ones. but they are completely indistinguishable from the real ones and even could be used for the same purpose the originals were made for, i. e. to transport goods. this adds a new aspect to the development of modern art and gives rise to an interesting question, namely: is art ultimately defined by space? is it important where an object is placed, in a warehouse or in a gallery or a museum? and does this location make all the difference between art and non-art? in fact that is in essence what the institutional theory of art has suggested. since the location where art is found cannot be understood outsidea specific social practice and without a specific art theory – and that seems obvious when we think about the history of the art museum – space may be a decisive criterion for distinguishing art from non-art. this is the gist of george dickie’s argument who is one of the main proponents of this theory. he holds that art is defined neither by content nor by method nor origin of production but exclusively by the specific social practices associated with it. in his highly influential book entitled art and the aesthetic: an institutional analysis, ithaca/london 1974, he writes: “a work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain gerhold k. becker 77 social institution (the artworld).” without an artworld with its galleries, museums, art journals, auctions, art criticisms etc., art simply doesn’t exist. when this artworld places something in a gallery or museum it is turned into a piece of art. clearly, this view has much plausibility and requires thorough examination. yet we may also take it as a symptom of the demise of art as we know it. it may imply that the concept of art has not only been extended but has in fact imploded by its own conceptual weight. and the aesthetic conception of art has finally come to its end. and that is exactly what hegel anticipated, albeit from quite a different philosophical perspective. in order to fully understand what has happened to art we need to reflect on its beginning and embark on a historical exploration into the philosophy of art and aesthetics. i. 4. on january 17, 1756 an event took place in rome that was to change the traditional perception of art and usher in the era of aesthetics. through the mediation of some influential friends johan joachim winckelmannwas invited by pope benedict xiv to visit an inner courtyard of the vatican where ancient greek marble sculptures from the period between 350 and 325 bc had been erected which had been discovered in the 15th c. one of them was a statue thought to represent the greek god apollo. when winckelmann saw it, he was dumbfounded and overwhelmed by admiration. later he summarized what happened to him in his book the history of ancient art (1764) as follows: “in the presence of this wonder of the arts i forget everything, and i myself assume an elevated position so as to become worthy of beholding it. my breast seems to widen and to rise.” winckelmann saw in the sculpture both “the god and the miracle of ancient art.” he was certain that this statue represented “the highest ideal of art among all the works of antiquity.” and for this ideal he found expressionin terms that should have the greatest impact on the conceptualization of art: “the most excellent characteristic of greek 78 prajñā vihāra masterworks is noble simplicityand quiet grandeur (edle einfalt und stille größe) both in presentation and in expression. as in the depth of the ocean the water almost remains calm although it may churn as much as it will on the surface, in the same way the statues of the greeks express grand and calm souls in spite of all their passions.” winckelmann was no art expert in the modern sense but rather a theologian and librarian who was interested in philosophy and classical studies. although he was to become the founding father of archeology, in today’s terminology he was an intellectual and an amateur in art. for winckelmann, what distinguished art from everything else was its ability to directly speak to the whole person in the encounter and to open both their hearts and intellects. great art causes shock that clearly has religious connotations and initiates deep agreement, delight, and appreciation. and for winckelmann it is all too obvious that what causes all this is beauty shining through the works of art. experiencing this beauty doesn’t require a theory but rather religious contemplation. in preparing for the encounter with art winckelmann recommended: “first of all enter the realm of incorporealbeauty so as to get ready for the contemplation of this work of art.” 5. developing these ideas further, objects of art were thought to be beautiful in the emphatic sense of the term as beauty herself is manifest in them and at the same time concealed. in art as a sensually accessible object beauty reveals itself by pointing beyond the object towards the realm of incorporeal beauty. when the modern concept of art emerged with winckelmann, it was still clear that its foundation was beauty and that beauty signified not so much an aesthetic but an ontological category. by establishing aesthetics as a new philosophical discipline, the emphasis was – as indicated in the term – on aisthesis, sensual perception as a specific organ of world-disclosure over against reason. the ground for this new discipline was laid in 1750 by alexander gottlieb baumgarten (1714-1762) who used the term aesthetics for the first time in the title of his book that was to gain enormous influence far beyond philosophy. it played an important role in schiller’s letters on the aesthetic education gerhold k. becker 79 of man (1795) and became the main point of reference for kant’s third critique, the critique of judgment (1790). the perception of art takes place through the senses of which the sense of sight is primordial for the search for truth. what lies open before the eyes does not seem dubitable but is ‘evident’, obvious, illuminates the mind directly, etc. in these and many similar characteristics of sensual perception the importance of the sense of sight shines through even in modern english, and even more so in german. yet very early philosophy noted that cognitive judgments that are exclusively based on sensual evidence can be false. even as we see the sun every day rising in the east and setting in the west, science teaches us that in truth this is not so. although cognition may continue to begin with and from the senses, it does not ‘end’ with them but has to transcend them towards a theory based on reason, which then becomes the true inner light to guide us. this fundamental connection between seeing and knowing is still retained in the term ‘theory’ θεωρια, which has been derived from the ancient greek verb ‘theoran’ ϑεωραν: to see. i take it that this tells us two things: besides the seeing with the eyes of the body there is another kind of seeing that is a spiritual and intellectualseeing with the eyes of reason. this platonic tradition is still alive in winckelmann’s submerging into the realm of incorporeal beauty. in plato’s philosophy this originally religious conception took on an ontological dimension and was placed at the very center of philosophy. beauty is an attribute of pure being at the core of all reality that can only be approached by the intellect. yet this beauty is not so much a defining characteristic of art but of the appearance of the human being in which beauty becomes most visible and can then be imitated in a work of art such as winckelmann’s apollo. although this beauty manifests itself in the human body, it is above all the human soul where it resides. this conception of ontological beauty invites us to an ascending movement from things that are beautiful for the eyes to the beauty of being that is only dimly perceptible to the soul. in the symposium socrates has diotima summarize this grand vision as follows: “one goes always 80 prajñā vihāra upwards for the sake of this beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautifulcustoms, and from customs to learning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful (...) if someone got to see beauty itself, absolute, pure, unmixed, not pollutedby human flesh or colors, but if he could see the divine beauty itself in its one form? do you think it would be a poor life for a human being to look there and to behold it?” (211-212) this ontology stands still in the background of medieval philosophy and the conviction that more than in art works true beauty is found in the beautiful structures and harmonies of the cosmos. it is not in art where this beauty shines most significantly but in the world as god’s creation whose order signifies the eternal wisdom of god not for the physiological eye of the body but for the intellect and the eyes of faith. the order and structureof creation can then become the standard by which all art has to be evaluated. it is this context we must keep in mind when we try to understand winckelmann’s religious overtones in his art appreciation. great works of art are stepping stones for the imagination towards ontological beauty beyond the visible. 6. in spite of this tradition, the 18th c. marks the beginning of what may be called the secularization of beauty. in this process beauty is being stripped of its ontological dignity and turned over to aesthetics. yet this produces another kind of paradox, the paradox of art before art. what will from now on be regarded as art was for many centuries not art but something else, objects of religious worship or rituals for example or expression of social standing that had their places in public and private life. the modern concept of art is in fact the product of aesthetics projected back onto the whole history of humankind, from so-called cave art of prehistoric man to the statues as ritual offerings in athletic competitions to medieval religious representations of biblical scenes and holy persons for worship and ritual. it is noteworthy that – as paul oskar kristeller gerhold k. becker 81 remarked – no philosopher of antiquity wrote a systematic treatise on the fine arts nor attached any importance to them in epistemology. in view of the rise of aesthetics in 18th-century europe nietzsche recognized that its standards were in fact projections onto objects that in their times were not regarded as art but had quite different functions: “winckelmann’s and goethe’s greeks, victor hugo’s orientals, wagner’s edda-personages, walter scott’s 13th-century englishmen – one day the whole comedy will be revealed. historically, it was all false beyond measure, but modern.” 7. from the perspective of the modern concept of art it is indeed astonishing that in greek antiquity there was no place in the temple of muses for the fine arts. precisely those arts are missing among the muses that became the paradigmatic representatives of art in 18th-century aesthetics.in the temple of the muses we find neither a muse for painting, nor for sculpture, and not even one for architecture. instead all types of poetry have their specific muses. there is a muse for epic poetry, and one for comedy, and another for tragedy, and a muse for theatrical dance and lyrics. it is therefore hardly surprising that the elevation of painting to high art that began in the italian renaissance took inspiration from poetry and literature in general. the aesthetic appreciation of art implied, on the one hand, that the temple of the muses be expanded to accommodate the new muses of the fine arts and on the other hand, that the ties traditionally linking the arts to crafts and sciences be severed. thus the emergence of aesthetics in 18th-century thought laid the ground for the institutions of the museum as the specific place for the appreciation of art. the temple of the ancient muses was called the museion, which in its secularized form has become the modern museum. the growing distance to what were previously called the ‘liberal arts’ that represented the educational standard of a free man changed the ranking of the fine arts from an originally quite inferior status that even excluded them from the canon of the liberal arts. they gained their new and higher status by proving that they required more than technical skills based on rules that could be learned. this led to a new self-understanding 82 prajñā vihāra and appreciation of the artist as a man of genius and inspiration who would do more than imitate nature. 8. this struggle for artistic recognition is nicely put in michelangelo’s remark: “one paints with the brain not with the hands” [si pinge col cervello, non colla mano]. this remark clearly draws on the powerful platonic and neo-platonic traditions that in true art beauty itself becomes visible. this beauty is, however, not the aesthetic beauty of the 18th c. but the incorporeal beauty of being as such, the beauty of cosmic order, the beauty of the ideas. the artists of the renaissance claimed for themselves knowledge of this beauty that they saw hidden in matter, e.g. in the marble, and that they had the ability and authority to liberate from its corporeal, material confinement. this is the point michelangelo makes in his famous poetic line: “not even the greatest artist can think of what lies hidden in the marble, but only the hand that completely obeys the mind is able to reach the image in the stone.” non ha l’ottimo artista alcun concettoc’un marmo solo in sé non circonscrivacol suo superchio, e solo a quello arrivala man che ubbidisce all’intelletto. exactly the same idea we find in plotinos, the 3rd-century ad foundingfather of neo-platonism. in the section of intellectual beauty in his famous enneads he makes his point with the following illustration: “suppose two blocks of stone lying side by side: one is formed, quite untouched by art; the other has been minutely wrought by the craftsman’shands into some statue of god or man, a grace or a muse, or if a human being, not a portrait but a creation in which the sculptor’s art has concentratedall loveliness. now it must be seen that the stone thus brought under the artist’s hand to the beauty of form is beautiful not as stone but in virtue of the form or idea introduced by the art. this form is not in the material; it is in the designer before it ever enters the stone; and the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his art.” gerhold k. becker 83 obviously, michaelangelo was fully aware of this philosophic tradition.at the same time, he knew that even an artist of his standing needs employment,and in this regard was not much different from any artisan or craftsman.in a letter of july 20, 1542 he complained bitterly about pope paul’s iii pushing hard for the completion of the frescos for his private chapel while he was similarly pressed by the heirs of pope julius ii to finish the monumentalsculptures for the pope’s sepulchral monument. in this context his remark points out that the artist needs to have a clear head free from any worries about food and employment and free from psychological pressure. yet the remark, however casual it may appear, has a deeper meaningin that it claims artistic freedom and autonomy and thus expresses a new selfunderstanding of the artist. the artist is about to move out of the shadows of the craftsman and employee and to regard himself as someone who is exclusively guided by his artistic vision and by his spirit; he himself sets the standard and defines the rules. in this way michelangelo’s remark points well beyond its historical context and anticipates the conceptions of romanticism and of the artist as genius (genieästhetik). this concept stands at the center of kant’s philosophical aesthetics. for kant great art is the work of a genius who produces according to his own ideas and without following established rules or standards. he is truly and almost divinely creative by producing works never seen before that open up new perspectiveson humanity and human self-understanding. yet he does the work of nature by revealing its hidden beauty. thus the genius is “a favorite of nature” through whom “nature sets art its rules” and we must be able to regard art as if it were nature. as gadamer has explained this point, the genius places the products of art on a par with natural beauty. for “artistic beauty there is no other principle of judgment, no criterion of concept and knowledge than that of its suitability to promote the feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties. whether in nature or art beauty has the same a priori principle, which lies entirely within subjectivity.”3 84 prajñā vihāra 9. let’s pause for a moment and look back on aesthetics. the historicaldevelopment of art appreciation shows a deep ambiguity. on the one hand, it searches for a common denominator in all works of art, for some kind of essence that is identical in all diverse works throughout history. this essence was thought to be visible in and represented by beauty, in other words: art is beautiful, and that unites all individual works of art. in this regard aesthetics educates us to distinguish art from non-art by the beauty that shines through them. beauty is what elevates works of art above works of daily necessities, of products of craft and of technology. yet on the other hand aesthetics cuts the very ties that bind it to an ontological conception of beauty and that dominated the philosophical appreciation of art from plato up to the middle ages and beyond. instead the emphasis of modern aesthetics is not on ontological beauty but on the experiential appreciation of the individual art lover. in this sense modern aesthetics oscillates between essentialist conceptions of art and an aesthetic of reception. beauty is no longer an ontological category but – now in the emphatic sense of the term – an aesthetic category; that is what i called the secularization of beauty. and as a result art becomes a matter of taste. the sense of taste is that specific sensorium by which we distinguish, at an exclusively individual level, things we like from those we don’t. in 18th-century empiricist philosophy aesthetics is grounded in taste, and that means in the senses (aesthesis), and turned into a matter of likes and dislikes, or individual preference. and it reduced beauty to a matter of subjective delight and pleasurable feelings. art is what causes delight and evokes elevating emotions. 10. yet since taste is something private and not a matter of dispute and argument, such move seemed to turn art over to subjectivism and complete arbitrariness. empiricists like david hume were well aware of this danger and tried to answer it by pointing to taste as some kind of anthropological constant. on this account taste was not simply a subjective sensation but a unique form of generalized experience not available to reason. as the cook has developed a special sense of taste to examine gerhold k. becker 85 food, so humans developed a special sensibility for art appreciation that sets its own standards. hume thought that these rules of taste provided an almost universal standard for all humanity. if people in fact deviated from them, it could only be due to some defect in their physiological constitution and the organs of perception. although the objects we find agreeable or ugly must have something that causes such feelings, it was clear for hume that just as sweetness or color are not in the object but in their effects on human perception, so it is with beauty: [b]eauty like wit, cannot be defin’d, but is discern’d only by a taste or sensation, we may conclude, that beauty is nothing but a form, which produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts, which conveys pain; and since the power of producing pain and pleasure make in this manner the essence of beauty and deformity, all the effects of these qualities must be deriv’d from the sensation.4 11. kant, however, did not accept that judgments about art could be exclusively based on taste or derived from subjective sensations. for him even taste is not anthropologically determined in human nature but has evolved in a cultural history of comparable experience. furthermore our judgments about art are usually not merely private statements about personal likes and dislikes but intend general approval. when i judge: ‘this statue or this painting is beautiful’, my judgment has two dimensions. on the one hand, it expresses my private taste and appreciation, but on the other hand, i expect that others will agree with me and thus my judgment claims universal agreement. for kant judgments about art are neither judgments of cognition nor merely matters of individual taste. aesthetic judgments are not scientific in that they add new facts to our knowledge. though they express an individual’s reaction in the encounter with art, they are not mere expressions of private feelings of pleasure and delight. instead, they reflect the harmonious state of our cognitive capabilities and what kant interprets as the ‘free play’ between imagination and 86 prajñā vihāra understanding. thus the pleasureexperienced in art results from this ‘free play’ between our cognitive and imaginative faculties that constitute humanity’s intellectual capacities, and for this reason judgements about art make general claims. art doesn’t merely satisfy individual needs nor answers to personal preferences; art is not a function of utility. instead, art is ‘free’ in the emphatic sense of the term and without serving specific interests. these ideas gained great influence on the romantic movement and equally inspired artists and art critics. they could also explain the differencein pleasure and appreciation derived from products of the mechanical arts (or factory products for that matter) and those from the fine arts. the former satisfy specific needs and the pleasure derived is a direct function of their products’ utility. yet works of art have their own incomparable identity and inner perfection. they are not appreciated because they are useful but their only ‘usefulness’ lies in the delight and pleasure they arouse in the beholder. as karl philipp moritz (1756-1793) has pointed out: “in contemplating a beautiful object …i roll the purpose back into the object itself: i regard it as something which is completed, not in me, but in itself, which therefore constitutes a whole in itself, and pleases me for its own sake…thus the beautiful object affords a higher and more disinterested pleasure than the merely useful object” (1785).5 12. in hegel’s philosophy, art played an even greater role than in kant. and he rejected its sensualist interpretation as well as kant’s formalismand his appreciation of beauty in nature (naturschöne) over beauty in art (kunstschöne). art was now placed firmly within the evolution of the human mind and regarded as one of the mind’s highest manifestations and as such a representation of the absolute itself. as you will recall, philosophy for hegel redraws the steps of the spirit in and through history, from its historical beginnings in chinese and indian thought up to its modern manifestations and to hegel’s own philosophy. art, religion, and philosophy are the highest forms of the spirit’s self-manifestation that works in and through history and finally gains self-consciousness in humanity. gerhold k. becker 87 the true origin of art therefore is the self-understanding of man as a thinking and spiritual being: “the universal and absolute need from which art springs has its origin in the fact that man is a thinking consciousness, i. e. that man draws out of himself and puts before himself what he is and whatever else is. things in nature are only immediate and single, while man as spirit duplicates himself in that (1) he is as things in nature are, but (2) he is just as much for himself; he sees himself, represents himself to himself, thinks, and only on the strength of this active placing himself before himself is he spirit.”6 (31) for this reason hegel understands the artist neither as a favorite or protégé of nature nor as someone who creates unconsciously as if in trance. although all artists need natural talent, their creative process is more defined by thought and reflection than by exercise and skill. the greatest art is not found in beautiful landscapes or scenes of nature or their artistic imitations but in creations of the mind. “the aim of art must lie in something still other than the purely mechanical imitation of what is there, which in every case can bring to birth only technical tricks, not works, of art.” (45) as creations of the mind they rank higher than natural beauty and its artistic imitations. as hegel put it in a famous phrase, art represents the sensible side of the absolute, it is “the sensual appearance of the idea” (das sinnliche scheinen der idee). and that gives art its incomparable dignity, but at the same time defines also its limitations. insofar as beauty is revealed in art as a representation of the spirit, it is the sensual appearance of the spirit that discloses itself in art while at the same time retreating from it. its sensual manifestation attracts and pleases the intellect while directing it beyond the sensual forms towards its pure manifestation in thought alone. in historical development the forms of spiritual manifestation correspond precisely to the evolutionary stages of the spirit’s own development in humanity. art therefore participates in the ascension of mind and spirit that gives all history its teleological drive towards ever higher perfection culminating in self-consciousness. art history is not merely some kind of chronologically arranged coming 88 prajñā vihāra and going of artists and their respective styles but follows its own inner logic as the evolution of mind and spirit. yet hegel claims that art has reached its climax and arrived at its highest form, while the mind has gone further and has emancipated itself from art as its means of self-representation. although the production of art will go on, its purpose and function have changed, since it can no longer meet the conditions of spiritual self-awareness and reflection: “[i]t is certainly the case that art no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in it alone (….). the beautiful days of greek art, like the golden age of the later middle ages, are gone.” (10) when art is being exposed to thought and critical reflection it loses its immediacy and can no longer evoke the emotional and intellectual responses of the unmediated encounter. “we may well hope that art will always rise higher and come to perfection, but the form of art has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit. no matter how excellent we find the statues of the greek gods, no matter how we see god, the father, christ, and mary so estimably and perfectly portrayed: it is no help; we bow the knee no longer.” (103) in other words: “art counts no longer as the highest mode in which truth fashions an existence for itself.” consequently the conditions of our present time are not favorable to art. it is not, as might be supposed, merely that the practicing artist himself is infected by the loud voice of reflection all around him and by the opinions and judgements on at that have become customary everywhere, so that he is misled into introducing more thoughts into his work; the point is that our whole spiritual culture is of such a kind that he himself stands within the world of reflectionand is relations, and could not by any act of will and decision abstract himself from it. (10-11) gerhold k. becker 89 ii. 1. needless to say, many have interpreted hegel’s skeptical remarks about art as a pronouncement on the demise of art and its end altogether. the continued production of art works was therefore thought to represent nothing more than the hollow repetition of experiences from the past. when the nazarenes of the early 19th century attempted to subordinate the visual to the conceptual, particularly by placing art in the service of religion, they seemed to confirm hegel’s view. hegel’s aesthetic is, however, largely ambiguous. it presupposes a universal essence of art, and charges philosophy with revealing in it the essence of the spirit. this process transforms art into a form of self-disclosure of the spirit. as such it gave rise to two rather incompatible developments. on the one hand it could be claimed that art had indeed come to its end and nothing important could be expected from it. on the other hand, art could be seen as liberating itself from the fetters of its aesthetic conceptualization and gaining a complete new self-understanding. 2. if it is true – as i have tried to show – that our traditional conception of art is the product of 18th-century aesthetics, then it is not surprising that it should have been based on presuppositions that we no longer endorse. as will by now have become clear, by the term “traditional aesthetics” i mean something along the lines of william kennick who put it like this: traditional aesthetics is “that familiar philosophical discipline which concerns itself with trying to answer such questions as the following: what is art? what is beauty? what is the aesthetic experience? what is the creative act? what are the criteria of aesthetic judgement and taste? what is the function of criticism?”7 as the question ‘is this art?’, from which i started my reflections, confirms, art is no longer identifiable as the imitation of nature nor as the representation of beauty or even of divine perfection. in a time when garbage installations can be found in galleries and presented as art works alongside works by praxiteles or rembrandt, the concept of “art” has changed drastically. 90 prajñā vihāra the provocation of the new art is caused by its rejection of the traditional concept that presupposed that art had to have an essence that could be clearly defined and that shines through all of its works regardless of historical or cultural contexts. yet as i tried to show this assumption was problematic from the outset as it might exclude works that in other times or cultural periods were clearly regarded as art. in our time, however, all defining limits have been removed and anything can be declared art. this dissolution of boundaries, which has been greeted by many contemporary artists as a liberation from the fetters of aesthetics, has, however, also been regarded with suspicion as art may become a completely arbitrary affair that can include anything and exclude nothing. something without an essence doesn’t have a definition either. definitions of art, however, would presuppose a logically homogeneous set of objects whose principle is being sought. arthur danto compared this endeavor with looking for some kind of species such as the species of zebras all of which have something in common that can be defined. yet as wittgenstein has argued this is not possible for art objects. on his view it is as impossible to define art as it is impossible to produce one single definition for all the plays and games in the world. in a well-known remark he says: “consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. i mean board-games, card games, ball-games, olympic games, and so on. what is common to them all? don’t say: ‘there must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’ – but look and see whether there is anything common to all. – for when you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.” “i can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.” 8 many art critics accepted wittgenstein’s view and began to search for family resemblances in anything that was presented as art. this would identify all diverse objects, happenings, performances, actions, and installations gerhold k. becker 91 as members of one large family, the family of art. yet as arthur danto has pointed out, unlike members of natural families art objects lack any of the ‘natural’, genetic lines of connections real families have and which explain the phenotypical resemblances among them. in the case of art this seems not possible and it remains unclear for what traces one should look. 3. as an alternative, an intuitive approach to art and art objects has been suggested by william kennick. he agrees that art cannot be defined and that it would lead to nothing even if it could. it isn’t necessary either, since all of us have an intuitive understanding of art. he compares this intuition with st. augustine’s famous remark about time: everybody knows what time is as long as he is not asked to provide a definition of it. similarly, “we do know what art is when no one asks us what it is; that is, we know quite well how to use the word ‘art’ and the phrase ‘work of art’ correctly.” he illustrates this in the following thought experiment: “imagine a very large warehouse filled with all sorts of things – pictures of every description, musical scores for symphonies and dances and hymns, machines, tools, boats, houses, churches and temples, statues, vases, books of poetry and of prose, furniture and clothing, newspapers, postage stamps, flowers, trees, stones, musical instruments. now we instruct someone to enter the warehouse and bring out all of the works of art it contains. he will be able to do this with reasonable success, despite the fact that, as even the aestheticians must admit, he possesses no satisfactory definition of art in terms of some common denominator, because no such definition has yet been found.”9 although kennick’s thought experiment may appear plausible, it doesn’t prove the role of intuition as the sole criterion for recognizing art. being able to pick out some art works from those that are not could be the result of training, socialization, or education by which we become familiar with the established canons of art appreciation. and as long as this canon remains stable and unaffected by cultural revolutions, or paradigm shifts in art recognition, it may serve us as a reliable guide in distinguishing art from anything else. yet as duchamp’s example shows such canon and its internalized criteria of art recognition were of little help when he revolutionized the art world by claiming art status for his urinal. 92 prajñā vihāra 4. another option is supplementing it with theory and reflection. this alternative can even draw on hegel’s conception of art as the sensual appearance of the idea insofar as it tries to free the idea from its material enclosure. then hegel’s project would truly have succeeded and the borders that separated art from philosophy would have been removed completely. on this view art is constituted by theory and reflection that alone give meaning to its material realization. in other words, what a particular object really is may no longer be found in it as an artistic object but only in the reflection of it and accompanying texts. for arnold gehlen this new conception of art is most obvious in abstract art. the arrangement of colors on the canvas appeals as much to the senses as it does to the intellect and understanding. yet the intellectual part seems to dominate as this art requires reflection and theory to be distinguishablefrom non-art. in this sense art has been transformed from something appreciative by and through the senses to something for the intellect: for this concept gehlen coined the term reflective art, reflexionskunst. and indeed, if you go to an exhibition of modern art you will usually be provided with heavy catalogues and other reading material that are supposed to guide your appreciation of the art works on display. the implication seems to be that only through reflection, theory, and thought can art be identified and distinguished from all the rest. without theory an object all by itself doesn’t reveal its status as a piece of art. yet when this happens and an art work can no longer be recognized as such, the traditional concept of art is no longer valid and needs to be replaced. for arthur danto this implies that art has indeed some kind of essence and can be defined. yet this is not some species nature and gives it is content, but is rather formal. he calls it art’s aboutness: all art is about something that wouldn’t be there without it. yet what that is the artwork itself can only reveal partially and indirectly; it needs interpretation and art theory. art makes statements about the world, our perception of it, and about ourselves, and that gives it its specific character, its ‘aboutness’. “to perceive something as art, requires nothing less than an atmosphere gerhold k. becker 93 of art theory, knowledge of art history. art is a matter whose existence depends on theory.”10 art shows something that needs our attention and interpretation.usually this has been indicated by the title of a work of art. take for example breughel’s ‘fall of icarus’. without its defining title, which is a piece of additional theoretical information, it would not be clear what the painting was about. although we would expect that it is indeed ‘about’ something, the art work as such would not reveal it. “without art theory black paint is merely black paint and nothing else. the art world cannot exist without theory, since it is logically dependent on theory.” art works need interpretationin order to be art works. and therefore they can be more than appears to the senses when we encounter a work of art as sensual object. in spite of wittgenstein’s objection, danto claims that art has an essence and a common denominator and for this reason it can be defined. it is its ‘aboutness’. this formal and rather content-less definition of art can accommodate all the various traditional views of art as the representation of beauty, as the imitation of nature, as expression, as arousing our cognitive and imaginative faculties, or as the manifestation of idea and spirit without claiming exclusivity for any one of them. instead it integrates the process of defining art as a constitutive dimension in the creative process of the artist and in the receptive encounter with the art object. this turns art into an open-ended process whose only guiding principle is art’s aboutness: all art is about something that becomes as it were accessible in its physical and sensual realization, instigating an open-ended hermeneutical process. while art presupposes art theory, theory can no longer stifle the creative process. danto’s formal definition of art as ‘aboutness’ precludes theoreticalinterventions in the artistic process. anything can be art that has been endowed by its creator with meaning and thus sets in motion a process of interpretation. 5. in a similar move both adorno and heidegger found the defining significance of art in its ability to provoke thought. for adorno art signifies a riddle that sets the intellect to work in trying to unravel it and in that way to understand more about itself and the world in which it exists. 94 prajñā vihāra works of art “are constitutively in need of a philosophical interpretation of the ‘truth-content’”, without resulting in some kind of “explicit, propositional judgment.” yet philosophy “is not to solve the riddle of art’s truth-content, but to extrapolate what is insoluble in works of art.” “works of art do not assure us of anything,” and the task of philosophical interpretation can only be to “exhibit the way in which they open the possibility of the new by implying determinate criticisms on what is and has been.”11 in this sense works of art open a utopian perspective that enriches our perception of the world and provides a measure of critique of the prevailing social conditions of life. for heidegger art has the power to disclose the world and our involvement in it. in other words: art is world disclosure. as the world is not a given, not an object but rather the horizon within which any object can appear, it is not a possible object of knowledge. it can only be disclosed indirectly, for example in our moods and emotional responses to situations, or by exposing us to the many cultures throughout history each of which opens up a world of its own by providing us with a web of significations. art is no longer – as in its aesthetic tradition – understood as expressing the artist’s own life that can elicit similar responses in those who encounter it, but opening perspectives on our common world. heidegger illustrates this in his famous interpretation of van gogh’s painting entitled ‘a pair of shoes’ in which heidegger recognizes a farmer’s shoes and about which he writes: a pair of farmer’s shoes and nothing more. and yet. [ein paar bauernschuhe und nichts weiter. und dennoch.] (….) from out of the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth… the shoes vibrate with the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and the earth’s unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.12 gerhold k. becker 95 van gogh’s painting thus discloses the world of the farmer that seems enclosed in it and opens up new avenues of experiencing the world in which we live. art’s power of world-disclosure is intrinsically linked to the artwork itself whose truth-content is not found in some abstract ideas or philosophical interpretations but in its sensual realization. truth and world-disclosure happen in the specific and concrete of the artwork, not in the abstract. thus art is not simply a vehicle of thought, but its truth is embodied in its physical manifestation as this specific work of art. 6. i conclude my reflections with another defining moment in the development of art and its conception. in october 1985, one year before his death, joseph beuys exhibited an artwork in a london gallery that would have seriously challenged kennick’s intuitive approach. in fact it was an art installation that beuys gave the title ‘plight’. it stretched over two rooms whose walls were completely covered by 284 double-layered felt rolls one and a half meters in height. these rolls created a claustrophobic atmosphere in which all sound was absorbed. this reinforced the impression of being completely isolated from the outside world. in these otherwise empty rooms a concert grand piano had been placed together with a thermometer and a writing tablet. this installation was later bought by the centre pompidou in paris where it is now located. already in 1966 beuys had created a similar installation in which the grand piano too was completely covered in thick felt including the closed keyboard. at one side beuys had stitched in red threads a swiss cross. visitors reported that the installation initially caused anxiety. the disturbance gradually gave way to a more solemn mood when they began to understand that this instrument, created to produce sounds of music, had been forcibly silenced and turned mute. apparently beuys succeeded in gradually calming the turmoil of passions his installation had at first aroused and in transforming it into a meditative sentiment the longer people exposed themselves to the artwork. the soundless and mute piano that usually evokes a world of music and happy moments of musical performances now aroused feelings of loss and deprivation while at the same time provoking a chain of thoughts that almost assumed sensual qualities. 96 prajñā vihāra in an interview at the opening of the exhibition beuys interpreted ‘plight’ as, the result of an experiment about a special type of laboratory whose purpose it was to extend the bounds of art. i draw on the vital human sense of temperature, since i reject the materialistic ideology of the fine arts which tends to reduce everything to a confrontation between subject and object. it is not the business of art to make understand something intellectual. since that can be achieved much better by a logical series of propositions. instead i want people to experience the fields of energy by which they themselves are constituted. for this purpose i not only appeal in my art to visual perception but at the same time also to the sense of balance, temperature, smell, emotion. it is necessary to insist on touching on all the fundamental human faculties: thinking, feeling, willing.13 clearly, in beuys and like-minded artists art took a further step away from traditional aesthetics towards a holistic experience that only the activation of sense and thought together can achieve. while duchamp had a similar agenda that moved the boundaries of art, beuys was not satisfied with simply turning art into thought and thus leaving the dichotomy of subject and object, reception and production untouched. for beuys art was not an object but an open-ended holistic experience without barriers and exclusions. gerhold k. becker 97 end notes 1friedrich nietzsche, aus dem nachlass der achtziger jahre, kritische gesamtausgabe, giorgio colli und mazzino montinari, eds. berlin/ new york: de gruyter, 1967-2004, iii, p. 644 (my transl.) 2plotinos, enneads v, 8, tr. stephen mackenna and b. s. page (http://www. ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/plotinus/enneads-5.asp?pg=87) 3hans-georg gadamer, truth and method, london, new york: bloomsbury publ., rev 2nd. ed., 2004, p. 51. 4david hume, a treatise of human nature [1739] oxford: clarendon, 1896, p. 299 5karl philipp moritz, schriften zur ästhetik und poetik, tübingen: niemeyer, 1962, p. 3 6hegel’s aesthetics. lectures on fine art, tr. t.m. knox, oxford: clarendon, 1975, 31. 7william kennick, “does traditional aesthetics rest on a mistake?” mind, vol. 67, no. 267 (jul., 1958): 317-334, 317. 8ludwig wittgenstein, philosophical investigations, tr. gem anscombe, oxford: blackwell, 1968, §§66-67. 9mind, 321-2. 10my transl. from the german edition: arthur c. danto, die verklärung des gewöhnlichen, frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1991 (orig. the transfiguration of the commonplace. a philosophy of art, cambridge, mass.: harvard university press 1981) 11simon jarvis, adorno: a critical introduction, new york: routledge, 1998, 104-5. 12martin heidegger,“vom ursprung des kunstwerks”, in: holzwege, gesamtausgabe 5, frankfurt: klostermann, p. 19. 13quoted by ruth baumgarten, the guardian, london 19 oct. 1985. 98 prajñā vihāra references danto, arthur c. the transfiguration of the commonplace. a philosophy of art, cambridge, mass.: harvard university press 1981) gadamer, hans-georg. truth and method, london, new york: bloomsbury publ., rev 2nd. ed., 2004. hegel, g.w.f. hegel’s aesthetics. lectures on fine art, tr. t.m. knox, oxford: clarendon, 1975. heidegger, martin. “vom ursprung des kunstwerks”, in: holzwege, gesamtausgabe 5, frankfurt: klostermann. hume, david. a treatise of human nature [1739] oxford: clarendon, 1896. jarvis, simon. adorno: a critical introduction, new york: routledge, 1998. kennick, william. “does traditional aesthetics rest on a mistake?” mind, vol. 67, no. 267 (jul., 1958): 317-334. nietzsche, friedrich. aus dem nachlass der achtziger jahre, kritische gesamtausgabe, giorgio colli und mazzino montinari, eds. berlin/ new york: de gruyter, 1967-2004. moritz, karl philipp. schriften zur ästhetik und poetik, tübingen: niemeyer, 1962. plotinos, enneads v, 8, tr. stephen mackenna and b. s. page (http:// www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/plotinus/ enneads-5.asp?pg=87) wittgenstein, ludwig. philosophical investigations, tr. gem anscombe, oxford: blackwell, 1968. http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/plotinus/enneads-5.asp?pg=87 http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/plotinus/enneads-5.asp?pg=87 http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/plotinus/enneads-5.asp?pg=87 prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 81 vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 81-94 © 2000 by assumption university press the concept of non-self in theravada buddhism and its relation to human behavior obhasa and mohammad manzoor malik abstract anatta or non-self is one of the most important concepts in how a follower of buddhism experiences the world and anatta to contemporary society to understand how it can contribute to the improvement of human behavior and psychotherapy. this includes the fostering of mindfulness to develop empathy and create a therapeutic nexus between the patient and the therapist. it also provides techniques for coping with stress, and can act as a foundational basis for ethical and behavior and mollify the relentless pursuit of psychology constructs and how to correct its weaknesses which are often focused too closely on the idea of the self. keywords psychotherapy 82 introduction the fast-paced nature of globalization has led to increased cultural dialogue among people from various backgrounds. therefore, individuals in other parts of the world. however, as brown et al. observe, despite the increased interest in other cultures, there continues to be a wide gap between how western and eastern philosophical systems and traditions are understood.1 anatta (non-self) is a good example of how some eastern philosophical systems remain unclear among western scholars. western scholars have begun gaining interest in the concept of anatta, signifying a new sensitivity to its comprehension and acceptance in the western world. shin explains that by stressing the importance of viewing things, events, and phenomena from a non-self-perspective, buddhism steers us away from all forms of desires and passion, allowing 2 van gordon et al. expound further on this point of view noting, “the concept of anatta clings to the belief that the state of delusional self or the art of being obsessed with 3 based on such a viewpoint, the use of anatta in western philosophy and psychology could help in helping people overcome stress and its resulting negative emotions. nonetheless, the vitality of the non-self-concept, especially concerning vague understanding and use of the concept in western norms and beliefs.4 a good example is the concerns raised by stout.5 he writes that it was unclear if buddha intended to present a metaphysical argument against self, or only wished to provide human beings with an ideal tool to help a common meaning of the concept of non-self beyond the traditional conceptualization undoubtedly poses an issue for western scholars. 83 information on the concept of anatta and its impact on behavioral research. to achieve this objective, the article will view anatta from the perspective of one of the earliest traditions, theravada buddhism. the concept of non-self in theravada buddhism the comprehension of anatta should be based on the three critical concepts in theravada buddhism, namely anatta, dukkha, and annica. anatta, the concept of non-self, appears in many sutras. one illustration is in sn 22:59 (s iii 66), where buddha expounds that all feeling, form, perception, consciousness, fabrications, and consciousness do not align with the concept of not-self. the same advice is provided by the sutta to monks practicing dhamma. anatta as it is presented in the pali canon intangible aspects. therefore, it is important to delve deeper into the atta in theravada buddhism. the main suttas informing the situation are those found exclusively in the sutta pitaka, which comprises samyutta nikaya, digha nikaya, and majjhima nikaya. anatta in digha nikaya maha nidana sutta (dn 15) states that human beings are inclined here, the teachings inform the tendency of people to be attached to that neither pain nor pleasure is delusional. dn 15 best captures maha relied upon to inform about the self. 84 anatta in majjhima nikaya anatta is mentioned in majjhima nikaya suttas. a good example is the alagaddupama sutta which associates the awareness of the self with the concepts of perception, feelings, form, and consciousness. it discusses the individual self as being linked to the notions of feeling, form, perception, elements, and fabrications of consciousness. it is when they are aligned it is then that one can claim, “this is me, this is my self, these issues of emptiness. however, it warns that the attachment to these groupings results in the delusional perception of self, which ultimately prevents them from aligning with dhamma. anatta in samyutta nikaya samyutta nikaya is vital in this discussion because it furthers the line of thought of majjhima nikaya about the delusional perception of a response, as seen in sn 22 44:10, due to the unwillingness to align to either externalism or annihilationism. notably, sutras in the tipitaka the majjhima nikaya are inclined to enlighten on certain aggregates or phenomena that are considered non-self. however, it is important to point out that considering all phenomena as not-self does not directly imply the non-existence of self. thus, it is safe to assume the existence of the self as per theravada buddhism teachings remains a contentious matter. understanding the relationship between self and non-self is essential for grasping the nature of anatta and its vitality in behavioral studies. the discussions above acknowledge that the pali canon fails to consistent refusal to provide answers to the issue can be linked to the 85 an opening to hypothesize that theravada buddhism denies only the conventional concept of atman under upanishads. however, the existence matter supports the above perspective. at this point, it is vital to acknowledge that any consideration are impermanent. however, to a certain degree, this can be perceived components of the self, irrespective of the inconsistent and dynamic nature that resists identifying them with the self. notably, such a perspective is whichever format implies the individual would experience destruction as soon as they experience nibbana. however, buddha vocally rejects an association between nibbana and destruction in various suttas. tipitaka and its contents categorically object to any correlation between cement this line of thought. as a result, the lack of or existence of self is immaterial from the dimension of the matter being analyzed. the adoption of anatta by modern psychology anatta has begun to be used in modern psychology. sedlmeier et al. among mental health psychotherapists and mental health practitioners, with anatta being a concept that is gaining popularity.6 fulton and giles note that anatta can help the clients achieve emotional positivity, stability, 86 and mindfulness.7,8 of understanding anatta from a psychotherapy standpoint.9 the authors inform how anatta can be useful in modern psychology to enlighten an individual on the concept of attachment. van gordon et al. state that the concept of non-self can assist mental health practitioners in understanding additionally, it can aid in lowering the level of therapist bias. concerning this issue, van gordon et al. states that as the therapist gains more knowledge about the concept of non-self, the chances are lower 10 insight into the use of anatta in modern psychology.11,12 perspective, using anatta is critical for helping mental health practitioners comprehend how mindfulness works. giles adds that reliance on the nonself-concept in academic and clinical practice bears positive results in understanding more about mindfulness and attaining psychological wellbeing. giles expounds further indicating the tendency “to ignore non-selfexperience, teachers and practitioners are falling short of what mindfulness was originally intended to achieve.13 noting that mental health practitioners without comprehending the noncould translate to poor patient outcomes.14 herwitz acknowledges the positive impact anatta can have on westerners by helping them lower their reliance on prescription medicines that are the main go-to option for treating mental health issues. in support of this position, herwitz states that “despite being a concept unfamiliar to most westerners, participants is strongly endorsed as it can assist practitioners in comprehending the buddhist needs and individuals who ascribe to buddhist philosophical 87 used to in traditional approaches. hick et al. is one author who expounds and psychotherapy.15 in their scholarly work, hick et al. indicate that various practices and concepts of mindfulness used in psychotherapy have been retrieved from psychology, with most of those interpretations drawn from buddhism.16 irrespective of the various dimensions in which the evaluation of mindfulness can take place, they can all be understood via anatta is a concept widely used in psychotherapeutic environments and various meditation techniques. kang best expounds on this matter by referring to nyanaponika, an author of theravada traditions, who nature and understanding the importance of events that take place in an 17,18 kang notes that nyanaponika refers to anatta as a tool of bare attention.19 he further describes the bare attention element that involves the processes of observing events and phenomena with the assistance of the six senses before making generalizations which transform practical objects into abstract concepts.20 the author adds that relying on bare attention in the four areas of mindfulness, namely the body, mind, feelings, and mental objects, helps mediators acknowledge that the “self” in any situation cannot be distinguished from the psychosocial access anatta by applying anapanasati. kang expounds further, indicating that mindfulness of breathing is essential in assisting individuals in 21 besides nyanaponika, dhiravamsa is another important thinker of the theravada tradition. he explains that the use of anatta can assist in guiding non-attached awareness practices, as noted by clarke.22,23 the feelings, and thoughts, the individual gains a new point of view about their 88 acquired via sensory systems. consequently, the concept of anatta can buddhism. over time, people begin to realize that the “self” in every individual closely relates to the existence of experiences. therefore, it construed as eternal and separately existing phenomena. meaning because applying the idea of non-self requires the individual to embrace a new understanding of reality.24 as tyson and pongruengplant argue, it is unreasonable for therapists in the western world to use in theravada buddhism.25 in sum, without such cross-cultural training, yet non-self as a buddhist concept, an be used to compliment the self in modern psychotherapy rather than replace it.26 michalon expounds on the same, showing that more therapeutic potential is unlocked when a psychotherapist uses the concept of self and non-self simultaneously as opposed to viewing them antagonistically.27 behavioral research on anatta and its behavioral implications for behavioral research because of its various implications concerning responsible behavior.28 it does so because the path to enlightenment, as guided by anatta, demands the individual to act socially responsibly, which also aligns with the foundational concepts of social psychology. 89 notably, the aspect of social responsibility aligns with the economic theory perspective. an analysis of the western perspective on economics shows they prioritize the concept of self-interest. in contrast, buddhism resists this perspective and emphasizes the non-self, as zsolnai acknowledges.29 western economics can provide an alternate perspective on economic to the individual accumulation of wealth.30 the other behavioral implication of anatta is evident when distinguishing between actions performed by the individual and those performed by others. dogen best captures this line of thought, noting that to be enlightened means eliminating the impediments between oneself and others.31 of the issues linked to the self are temporary and delusional constructs. when an individual successfully manages to use the concept of anatta to eliminate the impediments between self and others, they commendably achieve self-integration, as argued by colzato et al.32 thus, in this scenario, levels of empathy as well as a fresh point of view on their personality and behavior. pressure. in theravada buddhism, shin indicates stress emanates from 33 the pali tyson and pongruengphant note that it is the association of this self to one with strategies they can embrace to cope with stress and alleviate their 34 ability to embrace it in their daily lives can be essential in helping them 90 conclusion it follows from this discussion that anatta should not be considered as a concept intended to strictly refute the existence of self. the buddha yet anatta can has a positive impact on behavioral research. as envisaged in anatta, the adoption of mindfulness can be an important tool for western practitioners due to its ability to develop empathy and create a therapeutic nexus between the patient and the therapist. a good psychotherapy and psychological constructs. an analysis of the content anatta urges people to pursue socially responsible behavior. the second anatta can assist people in coping with stress, which can be helpful in anatta can act as a foundational basis for ethical and behavioral concepts. teaching people anatta would help them know the concept heaps of clinging. such a comprehension could be the cue to liberating those who cling too strongly to the concept of self. through the same of abandoning the relentless pursuit of their desires, especially those that live freely without the danger emotions of frustration and anger. 91 endnotes 1 kirk warren brown, david creswell, and richard ryan, , reprint (the guilford press, 2015). 120. 2 kiseong shin and wesley ariarajah, (pickwick publications, 2017). 3 self: applications of buddhist philosophy in psychotherapy. 11 (2015). 4 buddhism.” 9, no. 1 (2019). 5 jerry stout, “a comprehensive study of anatta and its relative truth within buddhism.” phd diss., 2006. 6 meta-analysis.,” 138, no. 6 (november 2012): 1139–71, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028168. 7 paul r fulton, “anatta: self, non-self, and the therapist.” (2008): 55-71. 8 james giles, “relevance of the no-self theory in contemporary mindfulness.” 28 (2019): 298-301. 9 ibid, 122. 10 ibid, 344 11 ibid, 233 12 ibid, 298. 13 ibid, 122. 14 steven b. hall, ryan g. baird, and jon czarnecki, “engendering flexible social identities as the basis of organizational resiliency.” (2016). 15 steven hick, thomas bien, and zindel segal v, , 1st ed. (the guilford press, 2010). 16 ibid, 34. 17 chris, kang, “anatta and meditation.” (1999). 18 ibid 19 ibid 20 ven nyanaponika, , 1st ed. (routledge, 2013). 21 ibid, 34. 22 ibid, 52. 23 ibid, 65. 92 24 peter clarke, . routledge, 2004. p. 14 25 ibid, 65. 26 paul tyson and rana pongruengphant. “buddhist and western 46, no. 3 (2007): 351-357. 27 ibid, 47. 28 29 limitations and dangers of buddhist psychology for western psychotherapy.” 55, no. 2 (2001): 202-218. 30 ibid, 73 31 32 33 jennifer cantor, “vision and virtue in psychoanalysis and buddhism: anatta and its implications for social responsibility.” 28, no. 5 (2008): 532-540. 34 ibid, 433. 35 laszlo zsolnai, , 2011th ed. (springer, 2011). 36 dogen, i. . new york, ny: weatherhill. 1976. 37 lorenza s. colzato et al., “loving-kindness brings loving-kindness: the impact of buddhism on cognitive self–other integration,” 19, no. 3 (march 17, 2012): 541–45, https://doi. org/10.3758/s13423-012-0241-y. 38 kiseong shin and wesley ariarajah, (pickwick publications, 2017). 39 ibid, 102. 93 references brown, kirk warren, david creswell, and richard ryan. . reprint. the guilford press, 2015. cantor, jennifer. “vision and virtue in psychoanalysis and buddhism: anatta and its implications for social responsibility.” 28, no. 5 (2008): 532-540. clarke, peter. . routledge, 2004. colzato, lorenza s., hilmar zech, bernhard hommel, rinus verdonschot, wery p. m. van den wildenberg, and shulan hsieh. “loving-kindness brings lovingkindness: the impact of buddhism on cognitive self–other integration.” 19, no. 3 (march 17, 2012): 541–45. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-012-0241-y. dogen, i. . new york, ny: weatherhill. 1976. hick, steven, thomas bien, and zindel segal v. . 1st ed. the guilford press, 2010. giles, james. “relevance of the no-self theory in contemporary mindfulness.” 28 (2019): 298-301. hall, steven b., ryan g. baird, and jon czarnecki. “engendering flexible social identities as the basis of organizational resiliency.” (2016). buddhism.” 9, no. 1 (2019). kang, chris. “anatta and meditation.” (1999). limitations and dangers of buddhist psychology for western psychotherapy.” 55, no. 2 (2001): 202-218. nyanaponika, ven. . 1st ed. routledge, 2013. sedlmeier, peter, juliane eberth, marcus schwarz, doreen zimmermann, frederik haarig, sonia jaeger, and sonja kunze. “the psychological 138, no. 6 (november 2012): 1139–71. https://doi.org/10.1037/ a0028168. segal, zindel v. . guilford press, 2010. 94 shin, kiseong, and wesley ariarajah. . pickwick publications, 2017. stout, jerry. “a comprehensive study of anatta and its relative truth within buddhism.” phd diss., 2006. tyson, paul d., and rana pongruengphant. “buddhist and western 46, no. 3 (2007): 351-357. non-self: applications of buddhist philosophy in psychotherapy. 11 (2015). zsolnai, laszlo. . 2011th ed. springer, 2011. soontaraporn techapalokul 141 asean and world peace building from a buddhist economic perspective soontaraporn techapalokul mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, thailand abstract although people nowadays are wealthier and live more comfortably than fifty years ago, they do not feel happier. this claim is supported by many recent economic studies on happiness that show that technological and scientific progress does not lead to happiness. this is because many think that they can only live peacefully and happily if they fulfill their desires. but happiness, particularly in asean countries, does not correlate with economic affluence, race, nationality, or even political ideology. this article attempts to build a right-understanding concerning peace and happiness among the diversity of religions and cultures in the asean and world communities, through the perspective of buddhist economics. introduction technological breakthroughs have provided us with the resources to live longer, healthier, more comfortable, lives. they have accelerated economic and social developments in many parts of the world. but this prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 141-156 © 2000 by assumption university press 142 prajñā vihāra increase in wealth and development has not brought about the happiness discussed by philosophers such as aristotle, epicurus, or bentham and many famous neo-classical economists. we now know that economic development does not necessarily make people happier. the expansion of economic growth, combined with technological advancements, and expanding consumer demand, has led to the expansion of desire. increased business competition has undermined social values and has led to a situation where humanity cannot benefit from its increasing affluence. the aim of utilitarian approach outlined in bentham’s “principle of utility”1 and j.s. mill’s summum bonum or the “highest good,” in his renowned essay, utilitarianism,2 has shown itself as an illusion. such ideas merely promote people’s self-interests over the greatest happiness of the community and the country. actually, economists dream of ‘perfect completion’ of the market where human ‘self-interest’ acts as an ‘invisible hand’ that manages the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people (buyers and sellers). whatever happiness and well-being the economists, politicians, and policy makers can promise to their people are therefore, dependent upon the creation of wealth measured by high gdp, high growth, and high income. but such developments of affluence over the level of subsistence has been shown to actually create poverty, inflation, corruption, financial crimes, unemployment, insecurity, stress, depression, mental illness, violence, and massive environmental destruction. these negative effects of economic development cause the effect known as the “paradox of happiness”. the ‘paradox of happiness’ which is sometimes called the ‘paradox of progress’ has not only decreased the quality of people’s lives, but has also harmed their health. our economic development promotes inequality and severe exploitation. although much has been invested to develop weapons and missiles to ensure peace and security, they have only promoted war. about 795 million people around the globe, according to a unicef report, are suffering from hunger. around 166 million are starving. and, approximately 805 millions are undernourished — especially 780 millions are chronically undernourished and in the developing world.3 soontaraporn techapalokul 143 in this same report, it is pointed out that the world can actually produce more than enough food to feed everyone.4 but if this is the case, why does poverty and hunger still remain. what is the driving force behind a serious problem like terrorism and arms proliferation? it is unlimited desire fulfillment. this causes nation states to strive to surpass their rivals in military power, for the sake of possessing other’s resources. but does greater opulence make people happy? the main objective of this article is, therefore, how buddhist economics can respond by addressing the connection of desire to economics. asean: religious diversity and political economy the development of information technology and telecommunications infrastructure combined with travel, and trade, has led to the increased interaction of cultures and religions. among the people of the globe, roughly 5.8 billion or 84% are religiously affiliated. the population of those having no religion (1.1 billion or 16%) is large as well. it makes the third largest group worldwide, behind christians (2.2 billion or 32% of the world’s population) and muslims (1.6 billion or 23%), but in front of 1 billion hindus (15%), 500 million buddhists (7%), and 14 million jews (0.2%). this demographic survey further shows that the rest, estimated 476 million (7%), practices such other religions as taoism, shintoism, sikhism, jainism, and so forth. buddhism, although small (7.1%), ranks the fifth largest religious group worldwide and the vast majority of the world’s buddhists are concentrated in asean region. buddhism has also grown in importance in the west, mainly, in both literature and in physics. western writers who have been influenced by buddhism include, schopenhauer, gjellerup, rilke, hesse, einstein, and bohr.5 subsequently, buddhism has known to the west for its wisdom and the “middle way” of teaching and practice. endorsed as the state religion in the reign of emperor aśoka of india (268-232 bc) and introduced to the asean mainland, known as suvannabhumi, the teaching of buddha has been popular among the asean 144 prajñā vihāra and the asia-pacific region. because of its emphasis on compassion and its belief in interconnection as the truth of all things, buddhism has been widely adopted and practiced. developed from the preceding organization formed in 1961 (be 2504) called the association of southeast asia (asa), a group composed of the philippines, malaysia, and thailand, the association of southeast asian nations or asean itself was set up on 8 august 1967 (be 2510) under the “asean declaration” which was more commonly known as the “bangkok declaration” signed by the foreign ministers of five countries: indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore, and thailand. asean nowadays is a joint effort of ten member countries aiming to promote the welfare of their peoples, unite the diversity of all nations in southeast asia, and promote collaboration and mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical, as well as scientific and administrative fields. however, asean started its regional development from the social and cultural basis, not the economic and social development one. this is because the asean members are distinguished from each other by diverse social and cultural identities where religion is significant. yet buddhism seems to be accepted by people of various backgrounds in the region due to its emphasis on equality, non-violence, benevolence, and the way to build up peace and happiness through compassion, social harmony, and friendliness. the asean countries since their independence, although religiously and culturally diverse, have been peaceful. according to venerable chao chu, reflected on his travels through the region during the past forty years: i have encountered people who have practiced different religions and spoke different languages within the same family. i have talked to people from increasingly differing backgrounds whether they are locals or travelers as i am, so it is interesting to discuss with them the direction that asean is taking in becoming an active contributor to our global economy.6 soontaraporn techapalokul 145 moreover, these differences extend to differences in strategy regarding political economy. asean is situated at the crossroads of several global economic flows. it is a home to numerous globally competitive companies and was listed, for instance, as the headquarters of 74 companies in the 2013 forbes global. besides, it is a macroeconomic platform for growth since the asean’s gdp is high and its consuming households are expected to double by 2025. on top of this, the region is the export-industry bases around such plentiful natural resources as mineral fuels, iron, non-ferrous, tin, palm oil, chemicals, and so on.7 although beneficial and helpful, the diversity and complexity in religion and culture and in political economy can generate large pressure too. the most significant pressure today seems to be the growing power of ‘political economy’ as it affects the public’s consumption, production, and consumer behavior, and ‘religion’ as it affects the citizen’s character, beliefs, and action. although economic prosperity can bring more goods and comforts, it also dehumanizes and destroys the natural environment, resources, and people’s trust. in the past, conflicting political-economic ideology and its influence could dramatically cause the world to be ready for ‘wars’. although religion can unite different nations to peacefully co-exist, it can also divide countries and the world into various opposing sects, classes, and races. this occurs for various reasons: for autonomy, for natural resources or land, for protecting the sovereignty of nations, and for preserving their religious and cultural identity. to create peace, a revolution in the minds of people and academia must be conducted. hence, i turn now to the human nature. desire, self-interest, and the pursuit of happiness desires connected to self-interest – commonly known as ‘selfishness’ – and the pursuit of happiness are a part of human nature, and sometimes they are the motivations which create “economic greatness.” but also these ambitions have destroyed economic stability and caused increased unemployment, more competition, less cooperation, and insecurity in 146 prajñā vihāra the workplace. we need to consider public morality, and the pursuit of happiness and peace from a moral groundwork. economics should be the first subject in the academia to be reformed. many of the world’s problems result from mainstream economic understandings of economic inequality, corruption, poverty, hunger, starvation, divisibility, immorality, violence, climate change, environmental degradation, and ecological catastrophe. economic greatness, which encompasses the human desire as its main driving forces, is the result of those mistakes and mal-adjustment of the social and economic conditions. desire or ‘demand’ in economics which is characterized ‘unlimited’ causes ‘attachment’ or ‘clinging’ (upādāna) for ‘self-interest’ and the ‘material happiness pursuit’ in our deep-rooted consciousness. moreover, desire or what many prefer to call ‘greed’ (lobha) usually works in association with ‘conceit’ (māna) and wrong views (diṭṭhi).8 the trio – greed or craving, conceit, and wrong views – are human psychological states that can foster violence. therefore, the principle of mainstream economics can be re-examined in light of the philosophy of ‘buddhist middle way’ or ‘buddhist economics’. edgeworth, who developed the utility theory in 1881, stresses in his mathematical psychics writes: “the first principle of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest.”9 this implies the conception of men in economic model that they have inclination to be ‘self-interest seekers’ or ‘egoists’. this principle led to the acceptability of selfishness, individualism, and the pursuit of happiness (which began to mean ‘money’) as the basic behavioral assumption of the economic man or homo economicus. this behavioral assumption, moreover, is assumed to be ‘rational’ by the modern economic theory since adam smith (1723–1790 ce), the first economist to discuss ‘self-interest’ in the context of operation of the ‘invisible hand’ or the ‘supply and demand.’ to smith, humanity would act owing to his ‘self-interests,’ and the self-interest itself would bring benefits to both individuals and societies.10 moreover, smith’s idea of ‘self-interest seeking’ or ‘egoism’ harmonized with bentham’s utilitarianism (1789), the doctrine of an individual’s freedom to seek his or her own greatest utility (material soontaraporn techapalokul 147 happiness); and also with the thomas jefferson’s aspirations at the institutional level. jefferson admired epicurus, the earlier utilitarian whose idea was developed later to a large degree in the 18th century by bentham as ‘the principle of utility’. jefferson’s slogan, “the pursuit of happiness,” in the 1776 american declaration of independence not only stands for the basic goal of the american society,11 but also reflects smith’s egoism and of bentham’s principle of utility, depending on its practical bearing upon the human interests or material happiness. furthermore, edgeworth’s indifference curve, a prime idea of later construction of the utility theory based on bentham’s principle of utility has become a foundation of many approaches where the demand function of an individual is derived, and through which an individual’s preference is revealed.12 egoism and individual preference are what todays economists discussed as ‘individualism’ and ‘individual choice.’ one’s choices are deemed ‘rational’ if all his or her choices are an act of choosing the most preferred alternative — specially, the option motivated by maximization of the producer’s profit or of the consumer’s utility, which will bring a person theoretically the highest utility or pleasure. hence, the trio — that is, self-interest, desire, and pursuit of happiness — is the human nature which is conditioned by craving (taṇhā) in the dependent origination or paṭiccasamupāda to be never-ending. however, the trio in economic sense is the strategic factors to produce economic greatness and prosperity. according to the dependent origination, the pursuit of happiness is indeed impossible to reach its culmination, the highest bliss, because desire is boundless; while happy feelings are ephemeral (anicca), making happiness scarce. this suggests that the economic principles of consumer demand (desire) and competition as the foundation of economic greatness should then be questioned. we should also question the idea that demand, competition, and the pursuit of happiness are keys to workers’ productivity, and without them, the whole economy would fall into depression. the truth is that the trio cannot put an end to human suffering — because human happiness is not conditioned by stimulating taṇhā or desire and its pursuit — but 148 prajñā vihāra suffering, resulting from stimulating and bringing in inequality, poverty, hunger, sorrow, and wars. this truth has not yet been emphasized in people’s consciousness. this is why the world, and asean in particular, must create a change in attitude in both individuals and academia based upon the buddhist economic standpoint. in other words, a revolution in an inner kernel of human mind can lead the right-understanding of desires (or the mind), happiness and peace; whereas the modern economic theory and policy not concerned with spiritual transformation cannot. although rich with natural resources, the asean is pursuing prosperity at a high price, in other words, at the high expense of the air, water, soil, oil, gas, coal, other scarce resources. it pays with destruction to its environment, its climate, and human mental and physical health. in addition, high finance also becomes unstable, as seen in the 1997 financial crisis. although finance and prosperity (globalization) have transformed the economies and allows money to move across the national frontiers with the greatest convenience, it is accompanied by corruption and financial scandal. these crises have upset almost all nations. the resulting damage represents a fundamental moral failure because desire, when expanded to an entire society creates more destruction than benefits. it not only intensifies biases, pride (the desire to dominate others), and mental conflict, but also creates conflicts among social classes and economic injustice. desire then truly undermines the basis of economic prosperity and national power. the solution is, therefore, not to be found in the economic and political systems, or the scientific breakthroughs, but in changing human ‘consciousness.’ buddhist economics: a view on happiness and peace building the german-born british economist schumacher (1911-1977) was attracted by buddhist wisdom and meditation during his time in burma (myanmar). buddhist economics was first suggested in his 1973 small is beautiful.13 this small and renowned book –a bridge between the buddhist values and the economic realm – places emphasis on human soontaraporn techapalokul 149 beings rather than consumption and economic growth or gdp. drawing on the ‘right-livelihood’ (samā-ājīva) of the buddha’s noble eightfold path, also known as ‘the middle way,’ buddhist economics not only serves to augment the human faculty of good work and behaviour, but also purifies the human character. to schumacher, promoting an ever-increasing consumption does not necessarily make people happier. to be happier and to win peace, however, the western economics must be ‘people-mattered’ economics, and humans must be made ‘humane’. today, asean has concentrated on raising economic development. but it emphasizes very little on ‘sustainable human development’ or the ‘people-mattered development.’ the pursuit of high finance, buildings, roads, deep seaports, telecom infrastructures are welcomed as examples of prosperity, although they often leave behind economic ruin. but to change this requires a revolution in individual minds. also, the form of desire that economists speak of as ‘demand’ is also connected to ‘reason’ because desire is derived from the ‘economic reasoning process’ or the ‘rational choice’ in western economic theory. desire is the state of aspiration or wanting which is directed towards wealth, benefits, and consumption of food, products and services. strong desire can lead a person or a society to seek one’s own benefits or self interests or advantages over others. the buddha, the enlightened one, who lived 26 centuries ago in ancient india, has placed human ‘desire’ or ‘craving’ as the second noble truth of life, or the cause of suffering (dukkha samudhayo), that men should abandon (dukkhasamudayaṁ ariyasaccaṁ pahātabban ti).14 in the first sermon after enlightenment, the buddha distinguished three kinds of desire: 1) sensual desire (kāma-taṇhā) — a craving and seeking pleasure in things: in shapes and colors, sounds, scents, tastes, or tactile objects; 2) desire for existence (bhava-taṇhā) — the desire to be this or that based on what one wants; and 3) desire for non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā) — the desiring not to be this or that.15 these are individual problems which these days have turned into what we call ‘institutionalized greed,’ that is, they have become structured into our economy, the stock 150 prajñā vihāra market, financial markets, gold markets, and so on. in other words, human desire can turn itself into a driving force of the economy, of consumer’s rational choice and behavior, and of institutional decision-making. but a world society structured by ‘greed’ (lobha) or ‘desire’ (taṇhā) cannot be peaceful. our economy has been based on individual ‘desire’ and ‘attachment’ (upādāna) and this is what leads to ‘institutionalized greed’. this kind of greed is preoccupied with conspicuous consumption and individualism. the majority of people of capitalism think a lot about competition, and little about sharing. in buddhism, desire or craving is connected to ‘happy feelings’ (sukha-vedanā) or material happiness (kāmasukha). these happy feelings lead to ‘seeking’ (pariyesanā); and finally result in unsatisfactoriness (dukkha). people who are preoccupied with the pursuit of happiness, money, do not as yet see the impermanent and momentary nature of happiness. they do not understand that it is empty, and always leads to dukkha— dissatisfaction or unhappiness. in other words, the principle of dependent origination shows us that the minds of ordinary persons are conditioned. actually, a mind that is controlled by desire is not guided by ‘rational choice’. choice as it is understood in economic theory is just a mechanism for maximizing utility or an inclination to choose an object that gives the highest utility (satisfaction). thus, an economic choice that is controlled by desire cannot be rational, according to the buddhist viewpoint. also, the buddhist idea of dependent origination implies that happy or pleasant feelings are impermanent as they are momentary. in other words, demand (desire), when it arises and is not controlled, cannot be really fulfilled. this, would accord with amartya sen’s example of the ‘rational fool’16 a person fails to develop his own ability to be happy, but can be happy only when his desires are fulfilled. but it is impossible for people to become ‘rational and wise,’ within the present economic model. in other words, the simple virtue or ‘doing good’ is not enough to free the minds from those three forms of desire. it requires a deeper sense of moral practice to lead to happiness and to soontaraporn techapalokul 151 contribute to a peaceful world. the buddhist principle can respond to this. it encourages people, at a deeper level, to develop a ‘mindfulness” to become aware of sense experience. here, the mind achieves an ability of “seeing things (such as happiness, appearances, tastes, smells and so on) as they really are” is arriving at the ‘right-understanding’ or sammā diṭṭhi. this is the truth that life, happiness, and all experiences are fleeting (aniccaṁ), the truth of dissatisfaction (dukkhaṁ), and the truth of the not-self (anattā). in this state, the mind is pure, peaceful, and able to eradicate the three forms of craving. when these are removed, the individual becomes ‘rational and wise’. and he or she is content to live a simple, peaceful life. but, a revolution in the individual’s spiritual practice alone is not enough. to lead the world towards achieving genuine peace and happiness needs a revolution in the entire educational system, particularly, in economics. for instance, the utility theory should be reconsidered. such economic assumptions as self-interest, individualism, and utility or profit maximization should be reformed. and, the culture of incessantly pursuing individual enjoyment should be changed, whereas the public morality and self-sacrifice for the greater good should be maintained. lastly, we must learn together to forgive the past and jointly make commitment to non-violence — the middle way to happiness and peace building. as a result, we go beyond the conflict that creates the crisis via promoting and making friendships, sacrifices, understanding the universal interdependence, pursuing mutual-benefits, and caring for others. when people learn how to coordinate their interests and how to generate an inner peace, they gain knowledge of how to live peacefully with the diversity of asean and world communities. conclusion asean and our world today involves many diverse religious faiths. thus, the religious diversity and economics of human needs is a dimension to which asean and the world must heed before seeking economic wealth and financial prosperity. if greed has been 152 prajñā vihāra institutionalized, it is impossible to solve these structural problems through existing economic theories. to promote peace and happiness is to revolutionize economic theory within academia and the mind of ordinary people. the utilitarianism and the pursuit of happiness must be grounded in moral judgments, not mere desire-fulfillment. government policy and orientation should be rooted in moral values. education as it exists in the world today is not enough to promote wisdom, or samma-ditthi. proper education should also include the practice of samādhi-bhāvanā to develop ‘mindfulness’ in order to control desire and selfishness. then, a wholesome state of mind can be cultivated. thus, merit increases. individuals can further make their decisions through a true reasoning process and become “rational and wise”. endnotes 1 jeremy bentham, an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (1789), (darien, connecticut: hafner publishing, 1970), chapter 1, pp. 1-7. 2 john stuart mill, on liberty (1859); and, utilitarianism (1863), with an introduction by isaiah berlin, (london : david campbell, 1906, ©1992), p. 113. 3 hunger notes, “2015 world hunger and poverty facts and statistics,” viewed 23 june 2016, <http://www.worldhunger.org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-factsand-statistics/#hunger-number>. 4 ibid. 5 techapalokul (2013), op.cit., pp. 114-16. 6 venerable bhante chao chu, “religion and cultural effects in the asean community,” los angeles buddhist union, a paper presented at viewed 27 may 2016, <http://www.undv.org/vesak2015/paper/religion_and_cultural_effects.pdf >. 7 vinayak hv, fraser thompson and oliver tonby, understanding asean: 7 things you need to know, viewed 25 may 2016, <http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ public-sector/our-insights/understanding-asean-seven-things-you-need-to-know>. 8 for diṭṭhi or wrong view, it occurs in the consciousness rooted in ‘attachment’ and thus it gives rise to the conception of ‘me’ and ‘mine’ (ตัวกู-ของกู), a well-known soontaraporn techapalokul 153 phrase coined by venerable buddhadāsa that is connected with one-self. for māna or conceit, although originates with the ‘i’ conception which is connected with one-self and occurs in the same eight-types of immoral consciousness as ‘wrong view,’ both ‘wrong view’ and ‘conceit’ d o not arise concurrently in one particular consciousness. in other words, where there is ‘conceit’ occurring, there is no ‘wrong view’ happening in there, and vice versa. thus, conceit may arise in those four types of immoral consciousness dissociated with ‘wrong view’. — maha thera nārada, a manual of abhidhamma, 4th revised ed., (kuala lumpur, malaysia: the buddhist missionary society, 1979), p. 124. 9 francis. y. edgeworth, mathematical psychics: an essay on the application of mathematics to the moral science, (london: c. kegan paul & co., 1881), p. 16. edgeworth (1845-1926 c.e.) was a brilliant irish economist who invented the ‘indifference curve,’ and the ‘edgeworth box’ (1881), a tool of analysis aided to satisfy economic efficiency in the general equilibrium theory. he also visualized a “hedonimeter,” an un-invented psychological device to constantly one day measuring the height of human’s utility, or happiness or pleasure in his (and our) day. cited in techapalokul (2013), pp. 52, 57. 10 cited in soontaraporn techapalokul, development of the concept of happiness in the economics, a thematic paper concerning qualifying examination in the specified subject in selected topics in development of buddhism, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of doctor of philosophy in buddhist studies, (bangkok, the graduate school: mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, 2012 ce / be 2555), p. 31. 11 ibid., pp. 32, 62-65. 12 ibid., pp. 70-71. 13 ernst friedrich (fritz) schumacher, small is beautiful: economics as if people mattered, (new york : harper & row, 1975). 14 f.l. woodward (tr.), saṁyutta-nikāya: book of kindred sayings, vol. 5 (the mahā-vagga), (no. 17), (book xii, ch. ii: the foundation of the kingdom of the norm—56: dhammacakkappavattanasutta), (oxford : pts, 1994), pp. 359; as at i.b. horner (tr.), vinaya piṭaka: book of discipline, vol. 4, no. 4, (oxford : pts, 1993), [17], p. 15. s v 424. 15 ibid., p. 358. 154 prajñā vihāra 16 the phrase ‘rational fool’ is coined by amartya sen who won the 1998 nobel prize in economic sciences. for detail, see a. k. sen, “rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory,” philosophy and public affairs, vol 6, no. 4 (summer, 1977): 336. references 1. primary sources: texts and translations feer, m. leon (ed.). saṁyuttanikāya. vol 5 (the mahā-vagga). (no. 97). oxford : pts, 1994. horner, i.b. (tr.). vinaya piṭaka: book of discipline. vol 4. (no. 4). oxford : pts, 1993. woodward, f.l. (tr.). saṁyuttanikāya: book of kindred sayings. vol 5 (the mahā-vagga). (no. 17). oxford : pts, 1994. 2. secondary sources: bentham, jeremy. an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (1789). darien, connecticut: hafner publishing, 1970. edgeworth, francis, y. mathematical psychics: an essay on the application of mathematics to the moral science. london: c. kegan paul & co., 1881. mill, john stuart. on liberty (1859); and, utilitarianism (1863). with an introduction by isaiah berlin. london : david campbell, 1906, ©1992. nārada, maha thera. a manual of abhidhamma. 4th revised ed. kuala lumpur, malaysia: the buddhist missionary society, 1979. schumacher, ernst friedrich (fritz). small is beautiful: economics as if people mattered. new york : harper & row, 1975. sen, amartya k. “rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations soontaraporn techapalokul 155 of economic theory.” philosophy and public affairs. vol 6. no. 4 (summer, 1977): 317-44. techapalokul, soontaraporn. buddhist economics of happiness: an analysis of the paradox of happiness in western economics. a dissertation submitted for the degree of doctor of philosophy in buddhist studies. bangkok, the graduate school: mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, 2013 ce / be 2556. ________. development of the concept of happiness in economics. a thematic paper concerning qualifying examination in the specified subject in selected topics in development of buddhism, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of doctor of philosophy in buddhist studies. bangkok, the graduate school: mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, 2012 ce / be 2555. 3. internet sources: chao chu, venerable bhante. “religion and cultural effects in the asean community.” los angeles buddhist union, a paper presented at the 12th international buddhist conference on the united nations day of vesak, 28th -30th may 2558/2015. held at mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, wangnoi, phra nakorn si ayutthaya. viewed 27 may 2016. <http://www.undv. org/vesak2015/paper/religion_and_cultural_effects.pdf >. pew research center. “the global religious landscape.” forum on religion & public life. december 2012. viewed 20 june 2016. <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious landscape-exec/>. pew research center. “religious composition by country, 2010-2050.” december 2012. viewed 20 june 2016. <http://www.pewforum. org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2010/number/all/>. 156 prajñā vihāra vinayak, hv, fraser thompson and oliver tonby. understanding asean: 7 things you need to know. viewed 25 may 2016. <http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/ understanding-asean-seven-things-you-need-to-know>. wikipedia. “association of southeast asian nations.” viewed 5 july 2016. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/association_of_southeast_asian_ nations>. world hunger. “hunger notes: the 2015 world hunger and poverty facts and statistics.” viewed 23 june 2016. <http://www.worldhunger. org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-facts-and-statistics/#hungernumber>. napassorn jintawiroj chanpradab and veerachart nimanong 63 rené guénon on the realization of traditional knowledge barbara batista santos and john giordano assumption university, thailand abstract this paper investigates the ‘metaphysical’ perspectives of the french philosopher named rené guénon. although guénon was french, he was often critical of western ways of thinking. especially with regard to the concept of the metaphysical. turning to the etymology of the word metaphysics, for guénon metaphysics stands for whatever lies ‘beyond physics.’ this is different than the aristotelian understanding of metaphysics, since it is always directed to the idea of the natural sciences viewed as a whole. this is a kind of thinking recognized by ancient traditions. so based on this perspective of thought, guénon is known as a traditionalist or perennial philosopher. the preservation of traditional knowledge is becoming an important issue today with the pressures of conformity with western models of science and rationalism. so this paper will investigate his viewpoint on ‘realization of traditional knowledge’ and its relevance today. the conclusion of this study shows that this ‘realization’ can preserved by the harmonious integration of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, where traditional practices of initiation, oral transmission, performance of rites and use of symbols, are in balance with modern forms of codification and information. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 98-140 © 2000 by assumption university press 64 prajñā vihāra introduction when we consider the age of information, we are considering a system where everything is rationally interconnected. everything is increasingly valued in terms of its purpose, its efficiency or its measurable value. we consider this epoch of information to be an advance beyond earlier ages where everything had not been archived and rendered instantly retrievable. our older traditions and religious beliefs have an uneasy status within the age of information. they become oddities, trivia, superstitions. today we are facing the destruction of traditions, even as we see them colorfully depicted in the media or in travel brochures. what is traditional knowledge? what is its value? and if it has value, how can this value be preserved in our age of information? there have been many scholars throughout history who have been interested in older traditions. we can mention many thinkers from al-biruni to vico to the romantic philosophers to eliade. these thinkers tend to catalogue and rationalize the traditions which they examine or place them in a larger philosophical framework. but the philosopher rené guénon in his many writings attempts to show how traditional wisdom differs from rational scientific thought, and from religious thought as it is understood especially in the west. he attempted to show the dignity of traditional thought on its own terms and show the poverty of a rational thinking that abandons its traditional wisdom. during his lifetime, guénon published several books, the first one – introduction to the study of hindu doctrines – was published in 1921, which becomes the main source of this research. with the title of the book hindu doctrines, some would expect to find only a consideration of hindu doctrines, but in reality, as he writes in the forward, “this book might just as well as serve as a key to the understanding of any of the traditional doctrines, or of them all”.1 in his many works, he frequently attacks western civilization, which according to him, are based upon a greco-roman influence. the west as a result has failed to appreciate the traditional doctrine and metaphysics of eastern thought. yet he sometimes takes this criticism barbara batista santos and john giordano 65 too far. as schuon asserts: “guénon is magisterial in his defense of the traditional east and his condemnation of the anti-traditional west, but he overestimates eastern man as such and underestimates western man as such”.2 but the value of guénon is that he provides a theory concerning why western thought is often incapable of comprehending the metaphysical nature of eastern civilization, failing by defining what cannot be defined, resulting in wrong understandings on traditional doctrines of metaphysical nature. guénon’s masterpiece, the reign of quantity and the signs of the times (1945) together with the crisis of the modern world (1927), “mounted an increasingly elaborate and merciless attack on the foundations of the contemporary european world-view”, explains john herlihy.3 other works such as man and his becoming according to the vedanta, oriental metaphysics, the great triad and other significant publications, allowed guénon to bring back the metaphysical view concerning traditions, which as schuon said, was forgotten by the modern thought. according to herlihy, “what guénon has accomplished is nothing less than the restatement of the traditional doctrines, rites of worship, and universal symbols and planted them as the seeds they were meant to be within the ground of the human soul... in the guénonian worldview, the thinking man or woman is by nature a metaphysician and only later a scientist, teacher, or craftsman”.4 guenón died in 1951 in egypt, and even though his influence seems to be minimal in western academic community, he has contributed greatly to the development of metaphysical thought. philosophers such as coomaraswamy and schuon were deeply influenced by him. guénon has not created or built a new school of thought, what he has done was clarify the universal aspect of metaphysical domain, which has no room for ‘individual considerations’. in agreement, schuon adds “guénon explained the true nature of metaphysical doctrines, by distinguishing clearly from ‘philosophies’ in the current meaning of this term”.5 66 prajñā vihāra guénon on metaphysics schuon observed that “the work of guénon is ‘traditional’ because the fundamental facts that it conveys are strictly in conformity with the teaching of the great traditions, or with one of these traditions when it is a case of one form amongst others”.6 for guénon, since the time of the greeks, a variety of confusions led western civilization to a complete disconnection of humanity with its own origins, that is to say, their tradition. guénon states, “philosophers like plato openly declared that they did not know how to interpret the most ancient writings they possessed concerning the nature of the gods”.7 in the laws, book x, plato asserts: “there are tales preserved in writing [...] whether these stories have in other ways a good or a bad influence, i should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; [...] i cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. of the words of the ancients i have nothing more to say”.8 this ‘silence’ of plato on the ancient writings, is one of the points that leads guénon to affirm the incapacity of western mind in comprehending traditional civilizations. guénon points, “among the greeks especially, rites and symbols inherited from more ancient and already forgotten traditions rapidly lost their original and exact meaning”.9 which means, due to the ‘advancements’ of world, that man begun to be more and more disconnected to his own origins. philip sherrard explains, “according to guénon’s metaphysics of history, the further you go back in time the closer you get to the most primordial form of wisdom”.10 that is to say, the more remote thought, the more metaphysical it may be. according to guénon, his understanding of metaphysics is “equally true of taoism, of the hindu doctrine, and also the inward and extra-religious aspect of islam”.11 in the book introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines, the translator marco pallis, adopted the term ‘metaphysic’, without ‘s’, to describe guénon’s perspectives on metaphysics. this differentiates it from barbara batista santos and john giordano 67 ‘metaphysics’ as it is commonly understood in the west, as a branch of philosophy. it is stated, “adopting the term ‘metaphysic’, in actual fact, taken in its most natural sense, even etymologically, it denotes whatever lies ‘beyond physics’”. the word ‘physics’, guénon explains, does not refer to any sciences in particular, “the word ‘physics’ must here be taken to denote the natural sciences viewed as a whole and considered in quite a general manner, as they always were by the ancients”.12 in this sense, metaphysic is not a branch of philosophy, because according to him, “a philosophical system is always a system of some particular person, that is to say a construction the value of which can only be purely individual”,13 whereas the metaphysic is universal, it refers to the ‘whole’, and “the absolute whole cannot form a part of something nor can anything else whatsoever enfold or compromise the universal”.14 this ‘universal’ aspect of metaphysic, as explained by schuon’s as ‘the one truth’, “it is ‘universal’ inasmuch as it views the different revelations in terms of the one truth, while adopting, as the occasion demands, the language of a particular tradition”.15 in addition, metaphysic excludes any kind of systematization, because a system is limited. guénon explains, “pure metaphysic necessarily excludes all systematization, because system cannot avoid being a closed and limited conception, contained in its entirety within more or less narrowly defined boundaries, and as a such is in nowise reconcilable with the universality of metaphysic”.16 it should be emphasized that guénon did not give a new meaning for ‘metaphysics’, or attempt to define metaphysic, because as he explains, “only something that is limited is capable of definition, whereas metaphysic is on the contrary by its very nature absolutely unlimited, and this plainly does not allow of our enclosing it within a more or less narrow formula”.17 what guénon, in fact, intended, was to place metaphysic to its right position, which is ‘beyond physics’, that is to say, beyond any type of scientific knowledge, where ‘scientific knowledge’ stands for “all knowledge that is confined to the domain of reason, whether or not it is called philosophical, it is strictly speaking scientific knowledge”.18 68 prajñā vihāra to distinguish metaphysic from scientific knowledge, he writes, “the first [metaphysic] is derived from the pure intellect, which has the universal for its domain; the second [scientific] is derived from reason, which has the general for its domain since, as aristotle has declared, ‘there is no science but that of the general’”.19 the pure intellect mentioned above, refers to “a faculty that does not belong to the individual order, and which, by reason of the immediate character of its operation, may be called ‘intuitive’”.20 however, in order to avoid the common understanding of ‘intuition’ as a ‘hunch’, as the definition of bealer, “intuition as unjustified true belief not preceded by inference; in this (the commonest) sense ‘an intuition’ means ‘a hunch’. the existence of hunches is uncontroversial and not of philosophical interest”;21 guénon calls this faculty as ‘pure intellect’ or ‘intellectual intuition’: “to be more precise, it should be said that the faculty we are now referring to is intellectual intuition, the reality of which has been consistently denied by modern philosophy, which has failed to grasp its real nature whenever it has not simply ignored it; this faculty can also be called the pure intellect, following the practice of aristotle and his scholastic successors, for to them the intellect was in fact that faculty which possessed a direct knowledge of principles”.22 the terms ‘pure intellect’ or ‘intellectual intuition’ seem to contradict one another, because the word ‘intellect’ can be understood as the faculty of reason. the researcher understands that guénon uses the term ‘intellect’ because he follows the concept of ‘intellect’ from the aristotle’s view, which guénon states, “aristotle expressly declares that ‘intellect is truer than science’, […] he also says that ‘nothing is more true than the intellect’.23 following the aristotelian idea, ‘intellect’ is beyond reason, and therefore, it is by nature metaphysical (but not metaphysical in the “aristotelian sense”). in addition, the researcher barbara batista santos and john giordano 69 asserts that guénon wanted to avoid the negative use of the term ‘intuition’ in its common usage, as a ‘hunch’, pointed out by bealer. last but not least, guénon says, “intellectual intuition is even more immediate than sensory intuition”.24 in this sense, using the term ‘intellectual intuition’ or ‘pure intellect’, guénon places these terms beyond reason and avoids the negative use of the term ‘intuition’. schuon explains that the understanding of guénon is ‘intellectual’, “because it concerns knowledge and because it envisages this in conformity with its nature, namely in the light of the intellect, which is essentially supra-rational”.25 to conclude the analysis of guénon on metaphysic, it is added “metaphysic must of necessity be self-sufficient, since it is the only kind of knowledge which is really direct, and it cannot be based on anything other than itself from the very fact that it consists of the knowledge of universal principles”.26 thus, the metaphysic of guénon is related to traditional knowledge, which stresses on knowledge in conformity with its nature, where the intellect is supra-rational. metaphysic is therefore the absolute whole, from which the knowledge is collected through the pure intellect of an individual practitioner, who has received an accurate transmission and who has accomplished his practice/performance accurately, from which allows the connection to their teachers – the source of knowledge. tradition tradition, in its most usual sense, is viewed as a transmission of customs and beliefs from one generation to another, which ‘beliefs’ are commonly understood in a religious sense of the word. those who interpret tradition in such limited way, are unable to comprehend the true nature of traditional civilizations, which according to guénon, is a pure metaphysic. guénon explains that the word ‘belief’ which “pre-supposes the presence of the religious view-point, is really confined to certain civilizations only and is not to be found in others”.27 this means that tradition is not always the same as religious belief, the knowledge that is transmitted by traditional civilizations, is based on ‘pure intellect’, and not faith. 70 prajñā vihāra looking at the word ‘tradition’ itself, it comes from the latin word traditium, which means “to deliver, to hand down”. for guénon, tradition is understood in its most etymological sense, “that which is transmitted”. he asserts, “for us tradition, taken in a much more general sense, may be written as well as oral, though it must usually, if not always, have been oral originally”.28 it may be said that all traditional civilizations, before any human interpretation, are metaphysical by nature. guénon emphasizes oral transmission, because it is one of the characteristics that makes a civilization traditional. for guénon, oral transmission belongs to an esoteric nature, while writings, texts or scriptures, are considered exoteric. the differentiation of the terms ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’, using the analogy of transmission of knowledge, either oral or written, brings the understanding of what is tradition. “there is something peculiar to metaphysical doctrines which must always be esoteric”.29 ‘exoterism’ with ‘x’, is explained by guénon as “the ‘letter’” or the writings. “exoterism is the only aspect to be expressed through the writings that have come down to us in a more or less complete form”.30 the traditional texts are recordings of teachings that used to be transmitted orally,. the recordings that attempt to express the metaphysical knowledge, which is unlimited, in format of texts, are considered limited. in this sense, guénon explains that all expression of metaphysic in format of text is imperfect and limited. therefore, exoteric is the anti-traditional, and in any case of limitation of the knowledge that belong to metaphysic nature, it is considered exoteric, because it is imperfect. ‘esotericism’ with ‘s’, is explained by guénon as the oral teachings; “esoterism, being more profound and of a higher order, addressed itself as such only to regular disciples of the school who were specially prepared to receive it, and was the subject of a purely oral teaching,”.31 it consists in something wholly interior, “he who possesses true understanding is always the person who is able to see beyond the words, and it may be said that the ‘spirit’ of any doctrine is of esoteric nature”.32 this term ‘esoteric’ shall not be mistaken with the term ‘esotericism’ that came to be known with the movement in the west called ‘western esotericism’. barbara batista santos and john giordano 71 “‘western esotericism’ could be described in terms of secret organizations or hidden brotherhoods”, that is to say secret spiritual teachings reserved to a specific group of people33. the ‘esoterism’ from guénon has nothing ‘secret’ or ‘hidden’, because it belongs to metaphysic, and accessible to the individual who is initiated. in conclusion, the exoteric is the anti-traditional, because it is the expression of the metaphysical knowledge in a limited form; the esoteric is the traditional, because it is the transmission of the knowledge that goes beyond the words, and therefore, it is unlimited. to complete the understanding of tradition, sherrard explains that tradition must carry two aspects, knowledge and action: “for guénon tradition must cater for the two main aspects of human life, the first being intellectual – knowledge – and the second being the active aspect – action or practice, and which may be described as man’s capacity for art in all its form”.34 this ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’ cited by sherrard, stands for ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, which in a tradition of a metaphysical order, are not treated separately, they are integrated, as one thing, which forms what it is called, the traditional knowledge. the transmission of traditional knowledge in modern societies, it has become usual to oppose theory and practice, but for tradition, they are sympathetic. ersnt cassirer, in his work an essay on man, explains that “we are in the habit of dividing our life into the two spheres of practical and theoretical activity. […] primitive man’s view of nature is neither merely theoretical nor merely practical, it is sympathetic”.35 in traditional knowledge, theory and practice complements each other. theory stands for preparation, which is accomplished by an initiation; “theory is regarded as if it were in some way self-sufficient, an end in itself, whereas it should normally be looked upon as nothing more than a preparation, […] leading to a corresponding realization”36. practice, as sherrard explained, stands for the man’s art in all its forms, which it is what moderns often call ‘art of ancient people’, such as traditional medicine, astrology, music and martial arts. 72 prajñā vihāra initiation is given by a master or a teacher, who works as a ‘transmitter’ or ‘supporter’ for the traditional knowledge, because according to guénon, “initiation must have a ‘non-human’ origin, for without this it can never attain its final end, which extends beyond the domain of individual possibilities”. in this sense, the person who confers initiation does not act as individual, says guénon, “but as the support of an influence not belonging to the individual order; he is only a link in the ‘chain’ of which the starting-point lies outside and beyond humanity”.37 guénon explains that initiation constitutes two aspects, the transmission of spiritual influence and the transmission of traditional teaching. the first aspect, the ‘transmission of spiritual influence’, plays a fundamental importance to the realization of knowledge, not as an end, but as a point of departure. knowing that tradition is esoteric, that is to say, wholly interior, the transmission of ‘spiritual influence’ stands for what guénon calls ‘non-human’ influence, an influence of a ‘supra-human order’. for a better understanding, we can look to guénon’s explanation of ‘vertical’ transmission, from where the spiritual influence comes from: “we could speak of a ‘vertical’ transmission from the supra human to the human […]; the vertical transmission is of course essentially ‘non-temporal’. […] we might add that the vertical transmission, which we have just envisaged as from above, when taken in the reverse direction from bellow, becomes a ‘participation’ by humanity in realities of the principal order, indeed, a participation assured by tradition in all its forms since it is precisely through it that humanity is put into effective contact with a superior order”.38 this vertical aspect of spiritual influence shall not be interpreted as something ‘transcendental’ from the religious sense. the vertical transmission, from which spiritual influence is received, represents the metaphysical aspect itself. being ‘beyond physic’, spiritual influences are, by the very fact, from above traveling downward. barbara batista santos and john giordano 73 the spiritual influence should not be interpreted as ‘clairvoyance’ nor as ‘psychic-powers’. according to guénon, the “communication with the superior states cannot be regarded as an end but only as a point of departure”. in this sense, it serves only as a support towards the end, which is the realization of traditional knowledge. this ‘communication’ may be said to be through the ‘pure intellect’ mentioned before. it is not a kind of ‘grace’ that descends upon the individual, explains guénon, “it is only to permit the prospective initiate effectively to take possession of these states”39. thus, in order to possess these states, an initiation is necessary. the second aspect pointed by guénon, the ‘transmission of a traditional teaching’, stands for the relationship between teacher and student, where the transmission of knowledge is accomplished orally. in traditional civilizations, guénon explains that there is a “deep and indissoluble bond which unites the disciple to his master, […] a relationship that has no parallel in the modern west”.40 the relationship between master and pupil is very important, not only by the fact that the teacher instructs students to the traditional knowledge, but also because teacher, as initiator, links the student to the chain, where spiritual influences are received in order to assist the individual towards realization of knowledge. in another passage, guénon adds, “secular teachers who communicate to their pupils by bookish formulas cannot communicate in the same inwardly way, and that is the importance to maintain in the traditional way of teaching.41 that means, teachers of modern times, who communicate with student under standard forms, are not able to communicate in the same inwardly way as the traditional teachers that preserves the dissemination of knowledge in traditional way. regarding oral transmission, it is an unlimited transmission, it guarantees the perpetuation of knowledge not structured in a standard or scientific way, it may allow the participation of spiritual influence, which is received through ‘pure intellect’. in contrast, as explained before, writings, which are the texts or scriptures, are considered by guénon limited, because they are records of the knowledge that used to be transmitted orally. 74 prajñā vihāra an initiation process is considered as a ‘second birth’ for those who receive it, and for this reason the relationship between teacher and student is similar to a father and son, and teachers are considered one of the most important figures in traditional civilizations. “the function of a teacher is in fact a true ‘spiritual fatherhood’, and the ritual and symbolic act of initiation constitutes a ‘second birth’ for the man who is to receive the teaching through a regular transmission”. it shall be explained that the term ‘spiritual fatherhood’ used by guénon, stands for ‘ancestor’, “’spiritual fatherhood’ which is the name given to a teacher by the hindus and which also bears the secondary meaning of ‘ancestor’”.42 next, let observe us the other constitution of traditional knowledge, which is ‘practice’. observing that in tradition, ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are not oppositions, they are one thing, that forms the traditional knowledge. the practice of traditional knowledge practice is the other aspect that compounds traditional knowledge. practice is action itself, which was mentioned to be the practice of man’s art that implies the performance of rites. on the practice of man’s art, it was explained that it stands for what moderns often call ‘art of ancient people’. the researcher will not go deep at this instance, because the ‘art of ancient people’ is particular to each tradition or art field, which deserves a proper investigation on it. before discussing rites, it should be emphasized that for guénon, ‘rite’ cannot be interpreted as ‘ceremony,’ they are two different things. ‘rite’ is metaphysical in essence, of a universal order, because it is natural and habitual; whereas a ‘ceremony’ is of an individual order, because it is a human creation. guénon asserts, “in a traditional civilization, rites are something altogether natural and in no way exceptional. […] if one goes back to its origins, a rite is nothing other than ‘what conforms to order’, according to the meaning of the sanskrit rita; it is this alone, therefore, that is really ‘normal’”.43 this ‘normality’ means that rites are something accomplished as a routine, it does not require any artifice or organization, there is no ‘formalization’, it may be said to be something habitual. barbara batista santos and john giordano 75 guénon explains that a rite is made of a group of symbols, “every rite is literally made up of a group of symbols which include not only objects used or the figures represented, […] but also the gestures effected and the words pronounced”.44 the words pronounced, mentioned by guénon, are not ‘prayers’ in the religious sense, but recitations of words, called ‘auditory symbols’, such as mantras of hindu tradition. in this sense, it can be seen that theory and practice are intertwined as a single thing, because the teachings from the guru (theory) are important in order to vivified the chanting of mantras (practice). guénon explains that rites are vehicle of spiritual influences, “rites are essentially and above all the vehicle of spiritual influences, which cannot be transmitted in any way without them”, which is only through initiation that an individual is able to have ‘communication’ with spiritual influences. thus, once more, theory and practice are sympathetic.45 symbols, alone, are means of teaching, explains guénon, “symbols are essentially a means of teaching, and not only of outward teaching but of something more insofar as they serve above all as ‘supports’ for meditation, which is at the very least the beginning of inner work”.46 schuon adds “symbolism is necessary because the natural and universal expression of metaphysics is the symbol”. this ‘expression’ is not the same as an exoteric expression, schuon clarifies, “this expression is natural, because it resides in the nature of things, in other words, in real analogies, and it is universal in that it is capable of unlimited applications in the order of the real”.47 therefore, the symbols serve as a support for concentration, in order to connect the individual with the ‘chain’ (or ‘family of traditional wisdom’). therefore, both, rites and symbols are “none other than the ‘correspondence’, that binds together all the degrees of universal existence in such a way that by means of it our human state can enter into communication with the higher states of being”.48 that means, through the performance of rites, and the use of symbols (practice), the individual is able to maintain his link in the chain, which was made on the day of his initiation (theory), allowing thus, the achievement of realization of traditional knowledge. 76 prajñā vihāra theory and practice are sympathetic, which this sympathy stands for the ‘traditional knowledge’, which accepts knowledge as a whole. the theory, which is the transmission of knowledge that is accomplished by an initiation, implies the transmission of spiritual influence and traditional teaching, and guarantees the perpetuation of knowledge not structured in a standard and scientific way. the performance of rites allows the maintenance of the link to the ‘family of traditional wisdom’, ensuring the regular and uninterrupted transmission. in another words, the individual who performs the rite, is able to maintain the communication with spiritual influences, from which the knowledge is also transmitted. the symbols allow the student to remind himself about his commitment to the inner work, which will lead towards realization of traditional knowledge. the differentiation of traditional knowledge from religious and scientific knowledge religion comes from the latin word religare, which means ‘to bond’. latin was the language spoken by the ancient greco-roman, and at that time, according to guénon, “religion, was indissolubly in the body of social institutions, in which recognition of the ‘gods of the city’ and observance of the lawfully established forms of worship played a fundamental part, providing them with a guarantee of stability”. yet according to guénon, at that time, ‘religion’ had “a genuinely traditional character”, that is to say, religion used to be metaphysical.49 however, due to a variety of historical circumstances, the meaning of religion gradually changed, turning to mere social concerns, based on laws created by man. in this way, the metaphysical intellectuality that ‘religions’ of the past used to have, was substituted by a moral and lawful intellect, based on a sentimental order. where ‘sentimental order’, according to guénon, undergoes “the influence of extra-intellectual elements, […] which the very word ‘beliefs’, commonly used to denote religious conceptions clearly reveals this character, for it is an elementary psychological observation”.50 in other words, religion became a kind of moral legislation, ruled by manmade institutions, in order to control their barbara batista santos and john giordano 77 followers. sentimental psychological observations begin to oppose to metaphysical certitude, because the individual, of a metaphysical doctrine, is only able to truly know by reaching realization of knowledge. in religion, it is accepted that a supreme ‘being’ governs and ‘legislates’ over the beings, where such a ‘ruler’ is absent in traditional doctrines. the difference between religion and traditional knowledge can be summarized in the explanation of guénon on religion, “the social and sentimental elements preponderate over the intellectual, both the dogma and cult have their share reduced more and more, so that religion of this kind tends to degenerate into ‘moralism’ pure and simple”.51 in another words, religion became pure moralistic, and thus out of the metaphysical order. moving the discussions to the scientific knowledge, it was said that from the perspectives of guénon, scientific knowledge is confined to the domain of reason, which also includes philosophy. scientific knowledge is based on reason, it is a knowledge by reflection., “science is rational, discursive knowledge, always indirect, a knowledge by reflection; metaphysic is a supra-rational, intuitive and unmediated knowledge”.52 in traditional knowledge, due to its metaphysical nature, it is “absolutely impossible to make any ‘discoveries’”, says guénon; whereas scientific knowledge depends upon experimentation. “the domain of metaphysic is essentially constituted by that of which no external investigation is possible: being ‘beyond physics’ we are also, by that very fact, beyond experiment”.53 for guénon, logic and mathematics are the only scientific knowledges that get close to metaphysical knowledge, because they are not based on experimentation. however, as they fall under general definitions, which are in no doubt limited, they contradict the limitless essence of metaphysic. that is the reason why, in some cases, guénon uses the term ‘pure metaphysic’, to avoid the understanding of things considered by him as ‘pseudo-metaphysic’. in this sense the only way to know the truth is by pure intellect, which leads to realization of traditional knowledge. the realization of traditional knowledge 78 prajñā vihāra guénon’s perspective on traditional knowledge is that traditional knowledge is a knowledge that belongs to the universal, and an intuitive, or immediate knowledge. it is this ‘immediate knowledge’ that leads to the idea of the ‘realization of traditional knowledge’, which is the achievement of the most inward and elevated aspect of knowledge. sherrard explains that guénon gives two distinct stages of realization: “one that it is potential in our human individuality; and other that embarks on the stages of ‘great mysteries’, stages that are supra human”.54 to the second, guénon compares realization of knowledge to the supreme goal of the hindu doctrine called moksha or mukti, “that is to say ‘deliverance’, because the being who reaches it, […] is freed from the bonds of conditioned existence by perfect identification with the universal”.55. however, since the understanding of ‘moksha’ leads to the end of the reincarnation cycle, what concerns us is the realization of knowledge evident in man’s capacity for art in all its form, which is the first stage of realization. therefore, let us observe the first stage of realization by guénon, which is the “development of all possibilities contained in a potential stage in our human individuality”. ‘all possibilities’ means the capacity for art in all its form. as sherrard, explains, “this development is not achieved by way of any exterior action; it is achieved by an ever-deepening process of inner concentration”.56 in order to achieve this ‘inner concentration’, only the sympathy between theory and practice will lead the individual towards realization. when the individual combines theory and practice, he is putting efforts of his own to attain realization of traditional knowledge, achieving all possibilities contained in a potential stage in his human individuality. guénon writes, “if it is only a question of approaching this knowledge, […] it can be effectively reached only by strictly personal effort, which cannot be made up for by any external teaching”.57 in other words, after having been initiated and receiving an accurate transmission, it is the individual’s personal efforts that will lead him to achieve his fullest development of his potentialities as human being, that is to say, his achievement of a barbara batista santos and john giordano 79 realization of traditional knowledge. concluding remarks this gives us some clue to the nature of traditional knowledge. it is a kind of knowledge accessible only through initiation and practice. to reach realization of traditional knowledge, it is necessary for accurate transmission and practice, which is insured as following: (1) initiation is considered as a ‘second birth’ for those who receive it. it is an ‘opening of the doors’ for the traditional knowledge. initiation implies the transmission of spiritual influences and transmission of traditional teachings. the transmission of spiritual influences stands for a vertical transmission, which is ‘non-temporal’, which effectively puts the individual in contact with a superior order. (2) traditional teaching is the relationship between teacher and student where the transmission of knowledge is accomplished orally. for guénon, oral transmission is unlimited, because it is considered esoteric. in contrast, writings are said to be exoteric, and therefore, limited, because they are records of the knowledge that used to be transmitted orally. therefore, oral transmission guarantees the perpetuation of a knowledge not structure by modern science. (3) performance of rites and the use of symbols are used as a vehicle of spiritual influences and as a means of teaching. they serve as points of support to achieve realization of traditional knowledge. through performance of rites and the use of symbols the individual is able to maintain the link to the chain, which was made on the day of his initiation. (4) communication with spiritual influences. after undergoing initiation, the individual is linked to a chain, from where he is able to receive transmission of knowledge from spiritual influences. by performing rites, his link is maintained, which allows the continuing communication with spiritual influences. this ‘communication’ with spiritual influences does not stand for a ‘clairvoyance’ nor as ‘psychic-powers’, because it is not considered the end, but the point of departure for realization of traditional knowledge. 80 prajñā vihāra (5) personal effort is crucial for the development of the individual’s art, so that he will be able to reach realization of traditional knowledge. on personal efforts implies discipline and concentration. now we are living in the age of information. the teaching of traditional rites and practices is now available through the media. tradition has been often reduced to information. but in-formation suggests something coming from the outside and shaping us. information and data are presented as a pool of wisdom which is disconnected and presented in such a way that it lacks the ability to transform us. the value of understanding traditional wisdom and its realization presents us with a more organic idea of wisdoms which recognize it as a continuous process handed down through time. it reminds us of the ethical responsibility of knowledge and the discipline required to master a certain kind of knowledge. from an individual perspective, these insights are important and fundamental for the achievement of the fullest development of individual’s potentialities as human being, it is a self-achievement. therefore, realization of traditional knowledge, of the first stage, from the perspective of guénon, is self-achieved by personal efforts, based on the elements that were here cited. endnotes 1 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press, 1945), 7 2 schuon, frithjof. rené guénon: some observations (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004). p.20 3 herlihy, john. the essential rené guenón: metaphysics, tradition, and the crisis of modernity (bloomington: world wisdom, 2009), 280 4 ibid., xi-x 5 schuon, frithjof. rené guénon: some observations (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004). p.1-2 6 ibid., 1 7 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 93 barbara batista santos and john giordano 81 8 plato, laws, book x, benjamin jowett. 2009 9 guenón, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 93 10 sherrard, philip. the universal tradition. india international centre quarterly, 1987, 8 11 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press, 1945), 119 12 ibid., 109 13 ibid., 147 14 ibid., 138 15 schuon, frithjof. rené guénon: some observations (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004), 1-2 ibid., 1 16 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 147 17 ibid., 110 18 ibid., 139 19 ibid., 118 20 ibid., 116 21 bealer, george. “intuition.” encyclopedia of philosophy. vol. 4. new york: thomson gale, 1996), 722 22 ibid., 117 23 ibid., 117 24 ibid., 168 25 schuon, frithjof. rené guénon: some observations (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004), 1 26 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines. (london: burleigh press., 1945), 140 27 ibid., 88-89 28 ibid., 87 29 note that guénon refers traditional civilizations as ‘doctrines’, sherrard, on the guénon, explains “the aspect of intellect, or knowledge, or wisdom in a tradition is represented by that which we call doctrine,” 6. 30 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 158 31 ibid., 158-159 32 ibid., 162 33 hanegraaff, wouter j. esotericism and the academy. rejected knowledge in western culture. (new york: cambridge university press, 2012), 243 34 sherrard, philip. the universal tradition. india international centre quarterly, 82 prajñā vihāra 1987. 5 35 cassirer, ernst. an essay on man. an introduction to a philosophy of human culture (new haven: yale university press,1944), 82 36 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 170 37 guénon, rené perspectives on initiation (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004) p.52-53 38 ibid.58 39 ibid., 20 40 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 289 41 guénon, rené perspectives on initiation (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004), 25 42 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 289 43 guénon, rené perspectives on initiation (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004), 132 44 ibid., 113 45 ibid., 194 46 ibid., 194-195 47 schuon, frithjof. rené guénon: some observations (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004), 3 48 guénon, rené perspectives on initiation (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004), 114 49 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 93 50 ibid., 103 51 ibid., 104-105 52 guénon, rené. studies in hinduism (hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004) 90 53 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945). 112 54 sherrard, philip. the universal tradition. india international centre quarterly, 1987, 12-13 55 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 282 56 sherrard, philip. the universal tradition. india international centre quarterly, 1987. 12 57 guénon, rené. introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines (london: burleigh press., 1945), 277 bibliography barbara batista santos and john giordano 83 bealer, george. “intuition.” in donald m. borchert. (ed.) encyclopedia of philosophy. vol. 4. 2nd ed. new york: thomson gale, 1996. pp. 722-733. cassirer, ernst. (1944). an essay on man. an introduction to a philosophy of human culture. new haven: yale university press. guénon, rené. (1945). introduction to the study of the hindu doctrines. marco pallis. (trans.). london: burleigh press, 1945. ____________. perspectives on initiation. 1st ed., 2nd impression. henry d. fohr. (trans.). hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004. ____________. studies in hinduism. 1st ed., 2nd impression. henry d. fohr & cecil bethell. (trans.). hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004. hanegraaff, wouter j. esotericism and the academy. rejected knowledge in western culture. new york: cambridge university press, 2012. herlihy, john. the essential rené guenón: metaphysics, tradition, and the crisis of modernity. bloomington: world wisdom, 2009 plato. laws. book x. benjamin jowett translation 2009. retrieved from http://classics.mit.edu/plato/laws.10.x.html on 21/11/2016. schuon, frithjof. rené guénon: some observations. ed. james r. wetmore (trans.). hillsdale: sophia perennis, 2004. sharma, chandrahar. a critical survey of indian philosophy. london: rider & company, 1987. sherrard, philip. the universal tradition. india international centre quarterly, 14(2) 1987, pp. 5-20. retrieved from http://www.jstor. org/stable/23001414 on 12/06/2017. http://classics.mit.edu/plato/laws.10.x.html http://www.jstor.org/stable/23001414 http://www.jstor.org/stable/23001414 wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano 123 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 2021, 123-134 © 2000 by assumption university press developing life-quality indicators for the philosophy of sufficiency economy based upon budhhadhamma wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano1 abstract although, sufficiency economy is a philosophy based on the fundamental principle of agriculture, which is traditionally the occupation of most people in thai society, it can also be applied to other professions. however, this requires some modification so it can guide other professions and can contribute to an integrated economic theory. this modification should be based upon the philosophical principles of buddhism. to enable this movement from philosophy to practical theory and application, this article will suggest how indicators can be developed based in buddhism in order to guide the practitioners on living a good life in terms of economics, society, environment, balance, stability and sustainability. all these indicators are guided by the buddhist middle way. and it will develop these indicators according to his majesty the king bhumibol adulyadej’s idea of the ‘three rings’ consisting of moderation, reasonableness and self-immunity combined with two other conditions: knowledge and virtue. keywords: sufficiency economy; buddhadhamma; king bhumibol adulyadej 124 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june the philosophy of sufficiency economy the philosophy of sufficiency economy was initially introduced by his majesty the king bhumibol adulyadej to his subjects for the first time at kasetsart university’s auditorium on 18th july 1974. in his speech he describes its aims as follows: developing a country or developing an economy must be done step by step. it should begin with the strengthening of our economic foundation, by assuring that the majority of our population has enough to live on. it must be done by the valid methods and by using the correct technologies. only when reasonable progress had been achieved, should we then embark on the next step, to pursuing more advanced levels of economic development. trying to create economic prosperity quickly without developing the public and the government will create imbalances which might become difficulties and eventually lead to failure.2 the king explains that the fundamental happiness of life is to have enough to live on. so one’s lifestyle requires wisdom or intelligence and related technical knowledge to support a simple life before aspiring towards higher economic levels. because if the preliminary economic base were unstable, problems in quality of life and economic failure might follow. such a failure would lead to debt and suffering instead of happiness. the philosophy of sufficiency economy was designed to address the problems not only of the life of poor farmers, but also of people in all professions and levels of society. however, the philosophy of sufficiency economy initially received little attention because of the prosperity of the population at that time. after the economic crisis in 1997, this changed. this economic crisis was seen as a burst bubble. it had affected both the rich and the poor. people now paid closer attention to the philosophy of sufficiency economy in both the government and the private sector, and its power to restore and rehabilitate the economic problems. as one of the royal speeches on 4th december 1993 stated: wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano 125 being a tiger is not important. the important thing is for us to have a sufficient economy. a sufficient economy means to have enough to support ourselves. a sufficient economy, as i already explained, does not mean that every family produces food for themselves, or weaves clothes for themselves, this would be too strict. but we have to take a careful step backward. each village or district must have relative self-sufficiency. something could be produced more than demand; but it should be sold at the place that is not far away in order to save the delivery costs. some economists claim that this method is already outdated; this may be true for economic trade, but is not for sufficiency economy which is no longer a luxury.3 we see that the philosophy of sufficiency economy focuses on the ability of the economic basis in order to support individuals’ life and society. it does not focus on external competition, but instead on internal competition which not only allowing survival but also leads to happiness. it is a philosophy of self-reliance along the principles of buddhism “attahi attano natho: one indeed is self-reliant or one is indeed one’s own master.”4 that is to say, first, a family in a village should first be self-reliant with respect to microeconomics of the community, and only then work towards a higher economic levels of development. the king’s reference to a tiger was a metaphor once associated with development. that is, at one time; the government had a policy to develop the economy of thailand to be the fifth tiger of asean.5 this involved a policy to compete on the field of trade6 especially among the countries within indochina: laos, vietnam, cambodia and thailand. but these ambitions were undermined in 1997 with the asian economic crisis. after their recovery, these countries have turned to a policy of economic cooperation rather than competition. the philosophy of sufficiency economy combines the principles of buddhism with the economics principles of production, consumption, distribution and service. it emphasizes such principles as the tolerance, sharing, diligence, patience and frugality. these principles and virtues are 126 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june rooted in the cultural background of thailand. in short, the philosophy of sufficiency economy creates a special approach to economics based upon the principles of buddhism. in the recent times, the philosophy of sufficiency economy has attracted interest not only among thai people but also from various countries. the leaders of various countries and international organizations including kofi annan, the former secretary-general of the united nations, had an audience of his majesty the king bhumibul adulyadej and admired his philosophy of sufficiency economy and believed it appropriate not only to thais but also to people worldwide.7 the results of sufficiency economy upon happiness is based upon how life is lived or practice. a philosophy of sufficiency economy should help the practitioners develop morals leading to happiness in the practitioner’s lives. that is, the practitioners in a society might pursue happiness together without any adverse social impact on one another, because there is no competition to outdo each through trading, and no competition which would lead to violence. this is because it promotes friendship, broad-mindedness and sharing. social activity involves cooperation and the willingness of people to help one other. finally, the principles of the philosophy of sufficiency economy are not complex, but easy to follow. it simply means to follow the middle way. it involves neither heavy, nor light production, but continuous production. it emphasizes to producers the importance of intellectual reasoning and planning. this provides immunity for the state from adverse economic impact. to understand the deeper connections with the principles of buddhism is to understand how the quality of life is shaped by the law of causation or paticcasmuppada, the chain of phenomenal cause and effect. and to understand way in which the principle of causation affects the quality of life, requires ways of measuring or gauging our economic activity and life style. this requires indicators. twelve main indicators created by researcher are wisdom, mind, dharma, action, occupation, income, property, charity, friendship, wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano 127 health, peace and happiness. all are created by benchmarking with the law of reason on the theory of the chain of phenomenal cause. they are created by shifting from negative to positive, that is to say, the starting ignorance of paticcasmuppada, which is negative component, is shifted to wisdom which is the positive component of the positive circle of quality of life. according to buddhist logic, when a life is led by wisdom, then the effect would be happiness. this happiness becomes the goal of life. there are often doubts concerning the status of sufficiency economy. is it a philosophy or a practical theory? to consider its content, system and method suggests that it may be both. that is, the duty of philosophy is to search for the truth in order to present or unfold it to the public, meanwhile theory is based upon observable facts, which can be explained through logical and practical connections. in summary, we can consider philosophy as the main content, but theory as the tool for practice leading to economic results, for sustainably and the achievement of happiness and a good life which is the highest aim of general people. although, sufficiency economy is a philosophy based on the fundamental principle of agriculture, which was traditionally the main occupation of people in thai society, it can also be applied to other professions. however, this requires some modification so it can guide other professions so it can lead to an integrated economic theory. this modification should be based upon the philosophical principles of buddhadhamma to enable this movement from philosophy to practical theory and application, this paper will suggest indicators based in buddhism in order to guide the practitioners on living a good life in terms of economics, society, environment, balance, stability and sustainability; all indicators are guided by the buddhist middle way. and it will develop these indicators according to majesty king bhumibol adulyadej idea of three rings consisting of moderation, reasonableness and self-immunity with two ingredient conditions: knowledge and virtue. 128 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june according to the philosophy of sufficiency economy, the middle path means moderation, a balance of economic activity one avoids greed, but operates in accordance with one’s roles or duties in society with reasonableness and self-immunity. reasonableness means that decisions must be made rationally with consideration of the factors involved and careful anticipation of suitability, time, chance, environment, capital and kind of work. self-immunity or risk-management means the mental strength, reliability, preparedness to take risks and aptness to listen to comments, suggestions and critiques from others. the condition of knowledge and virtue condition are the requirements of the operation according to the philosophy of sufficiency economy. all operators must possess well rounded knowledge in the relevant fields and prudence in bringing this knowledge into consideration to understand the relationship among the diverse fields so to use them to aid in the planning and ensure carefulness in the operation. to pursue any activity without specialized knowledge risks failure. so operators need to exercise care in decision making. this care is also related to the condition of virtue. these virtues: diligence, endurance, honesty, sacrifice, charity, frugality, austerity, knowledge condition (prudent and appropriate knowledge) integrity condition (honesty, diligence, wisdom, sharing, perseverance) the middle path reasonableness moderation self-immunity wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano 129 intelligence are the mental bases, that underlie and direct the mental powers such as belief, precepts, perseverance, meditation and wisdom.8 the philosophy of sufficiency economy consists of concepts concerning morality, economy and society. they can lead the practitioners to happiness, a high standard of living, which is follows the quality of life according to the principles of buddhism. the word “philosophy”, according to thai dictionary legislated by the royal institute of thailand, means approaching a subject through the principle of knowledge and truth. the word “para + jaña = parajañā” is a word in sanskrit, which is related to a word in pali “paññā”.9 it means knowledge, wisdom, and attainments. however, while the words “parajañā” and “paññā” are used in thai, the meaning does not match exactly. the word “parajañā” (philosophy) means the love of knowledge and the truth rather than as wisdom. the word “ setthakicca = economy” is a compound word between sanskrit language (sețțha) and pali language (kicca). the meaning of this compound word is any activity that earns property or income. this compound word, on the other hand, emphasizes a physical meaning that focuses on the physical principle of general economy. but, according to the definition of economy on buddhist principle, it gains an insight into the property as a mental image or abstract, which exceeds the property as an object. it, then, is called a noble wealth viz., faith, morality, moral shame, moral fear, profound knowledge, charity and wisdom.10 those who occupy these 7 noble properties are the wealthy men along the wise men’s viewpoints. the word “setthakicca = economy”, in conclusion, means to be done perfectly or action that is the best for life. again the words śrestha in sanskrit, settha in pali and trapya in prakrit, one of the languages of ancient india, means a good thing for the life, what is gratifying or what is satisfaction for life. the word “popieng = sufficiency” is from the thai language. the words po and pieng refers to moderation. the compound word is a description of a state of peacefulness, where we are free from the greed which leads to mental suffering.11 to know sufficiency is valuable for 130 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june life as the sages said “knowing sufficiency increase happiness at all”, whereas the insatiable persons not only create suffering for themselves, but also damage to others as well. in times of scarcity, when one has a lot, others will have less or perhaps not at all. it causes inequalities in society which must share resources. but, according to buddhist economics, it is permissible to possess material goods as long as it does not deny others. a definition of the term self-sufficiency in relation to the middle path, would be that one can possess goods, but there should be no extreme inequalities or excesses. according to buddhist philosophy, body and mind are closely related to each other. therefore, when there is a problem affecting the body, it also effects the mind. the body, in fact, is the base of the mind, and the mind is a latent power of the body. mind is a leader and the most important thing of life.12 concerning the mind, the aspect is a system of beliefs and behaviors, the external aspect is the system of economy, society and politics that determine human behaviors. the external system conditions individuals to behave in certain ways. for instance, an authoritarian system might restrict the freedom of opinion demonstration etc. buddhism has methodologically examined the relationship between body and mind, such as the chain of causation or the law of dependent arising, and the law of karma. these principles all discuss the relationship between body and mind. our behavior leads to consequences in the cycle of birth and death. the law of karma is used to explain these consequences of our behavior and actions. in times, in which hermit named sitthattha mortified by mind and body separation apart in accordance with self-mortification method in order to reach mental noble morals that are the highest qualities of life believed on that time.13 until finally, he realized that self-mortification is wrong method, and later on noted that quality of life is physical and mental perfection. he, then, turned to practice along the middle path and discarded both extremes of luxurious living and self-mortification, which is obsession in carnality that is mental satisfaction and selfmortification; denying physical pleasures. after he ate, his body returned wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano 131 to normal, then he determinate to mental practice with the middle path of moderation based on the practice of virtue, concentration of the mind, and the intensive analysis of all psycho-physical phenomena that finally he attained enlightenment and became the supreme buddha. the essence of the philosophy of sufficiency economy shows that activity in society should consist of 3 rings; moderation, reasonableness and risk management or self-immunity with 2 ingredient conditions; knowledge and virtue. these 5 factors will support those who follow this theory to succeed and achieve happiness in life. the method to create and develop indicators of quality of life contemporary education involves systems and metrics to measure the quality of teaching and learning. we are living in an information age where our goals need to be considered and measured based upon variables and indicators. these mathematical and statistical systems insure reliability and unbiased assessment of the evaluators. the same thing can be done for the measurement and promotion of sufficiency economy. buddhadhamma is a very important source for these variables and indicators. to create these indicators require recognizing these elements of buddhadharma being appropriate to the quality of life. the creation of indicators is preceded by comparison and imitation the theory of the law of causation, which can explain the circle of human life. the law of causation has been called several names, such as theory of dependent origination, etc. the reason of carrying the so-called theory to be a prototype is that the theory of the causation is the great and very important to explain the cause of human cycle of birth and death and the method to quench the cycle of birth and death.14 this theory is regarded as the heart principle of buddhism. to create the indicators of life, quality in accordance with the principles of buddhadharma we must start with wisdom. any theory which begins with ignorance of causation leads to dependencies which diminish the quality of life. when we have established wisdom and its 132 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june eleven following indicators as the main indicators of life quality, the next duty is to create the sub-indicators with the philosophy of sufficiency economy. the twelve main indicators can be divided into four main groups: 1. the moral group consists of wisdom, mind, dharma and karma or behavior. wisdom is a virtue considered in contrast to ignorance, which is connected to desire. wisdom is an invaluable resource for beings. this is why it is so valued in buddhist scripture where the wise are considered as the noble ones. in the buddha’s proverbs “pañña hi settha kusalā vatanti: the wise men say that wisdom is an absolute nobility.15 “natthi paññā samā ābhā: light is not always wise.”16 ... paññā lokassami pajjoto: wisdom is the light in the world.”17 when wisdom is the leader, then everything that follows: mind, dharma, behavior will be good. furthermore, when these moral groups are developed in the human being, then the rest of the groups will be developed. it might be said that the virtue of wisdom should be developed before any other in order to solve life’s problems. 2. the economic group consists of occupation, income and assets.18 the valuable living is reliant on these three main indicators. if anyone were absent, a life has to face many problems, because occupation increases income, income increases assets and assets are benefactors to life and others. 3. the social group consists of charity and friendship.19 human life involves both acquisition and loss. charity, means to donate property, time, physical energy, thought and even life for the sake of the public interest. charity also leads to friendship and creates harmony that will be the power to perform social activities. charity and friendship foster the harmonious organization of the state. therefore, they are regarded as models of goodness and the quality of life as well. 4. the happiness group consists of health, peace and happiness.20 health is the concrete indicator, because though the other indicators are important, if one has health problems, the peace and happiness in their life will suffer. therefore, health is an important indicator of quality of life. peace is one important quality of life as well, because if one’s life is wichian chabootbuntharik and john giordano 133 full of turbulence, they cannot lead a good life. internal turbulence results from unusual mental conditions such as passion; greed, anger and delusion, external turbulence results from natural and social environments. when life is disrupted by these factors of internal passion or external violence, then happiness would be certainly missing. this is why the quality of life can be considered by various variables and indicators such as intelligence, good will, morals, virtue, good behavior, good occupation, good income, assets, charity, friendship, health, peace and happiness. these 12 factors are in close relationship with each other. if a life possesses one factor, it can be encouraged to develop the other factors as well. this is why such indicators need to be developed. they show us the interconnection of values and how to cultivate a sufficient life-style which is consonant with buddhadhamma. endnotes 1 wichian chabootbuntharik teaches at mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university buriram, thailand. he previously taught at loei rajabhat university for 28 years. 2 manit kittichungcit, sufficiency economy. p. 19. 3 mis majesty the king bhumibol adulyadej, ibid. p. 20. 4 khu. dh. 25, 36, 66. 5 nowadays asean consists of ten countries. 6 government of gen. chatchai chunhawan, 1988. 7 pladisai sithithanyakic, the developer king, 2000: 219. 6th edition. 8 manit kittichungcit, ibid. 28-29. 9 both of the words in sanskrit and pali “parajañā” and “paññā” are the language of the ancient indian and sanskrit language is used in vedas scripture of brāhmin hindu and in mahāyāna buddhism, meanwhile pali is used in theravada or hinayana buddhism. 10 ang. sattaka. 23.6.5. 11 cirayu israngkur, positioning, suffering economy. p. 58. 12 phrabuddhaghosacariya, dhammapadathhakatha, the text book, part i. p. 1. 13 the self-mortification method at that time has two forms: loosing and 134 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june stitching.. su p.a. payutto, dictionary of buddhism (15). 2551: 63. 14 theory of causality or dependent origination are terms referring to the pali term paṭiccasamuppāda. 15 khu. ja. sattaka. 27. 541. 16 sam. sa. 15. 9. 17 sam. sa. 15. 61. 18 amporn vicitpunthu. the main stream of economics. 2007, p. 2. 19 charity, according to adhitthanadhamma means liberality or renunciation which is the highest state. the pali version of rajadhamama is called pariccaga which means self-sacrifice. 20 khu. du. 25. 42. jan gresil s. kahambing 13 jean-luc marion’s phenomenology of the icon as an apologia for quiapo’s black nazarene traslación jan gresil s. kahambing leyte normal university, philippines abstract the traslación of the black nazarene in quiapo, philippines conducts its rites and practices as a devotion outside the liturgy of the catholic church. as a popular religious practice widely known and attended by millions, it has become considered a religious phenomenon, attesting to the religiosity of filipinos and their patient endurance for god. however, this religious practice is also condemned as idolatry, as one finds with reference to the golden calf in exodus 32:4. in this paper, i create an apologia for this devotion using jean-luc marion’s concept of the icon. to do this i will first describe the various critiques of idolatry and iconography within the church and consider some of the negative interpretations of this devotion. then i will consider the traslación in relation to marion’s project. finally, i will present the apologia itself. this paper provides a defense of various kinds of filipino devotion which addresses the idolatry critique and respects the rich religiosity of these devotions. prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 2 july to december 2019, 13-31 © 2000 by assumption university press 14 prajñā vihāra k e y w o r d s : j e a n l u c m a r i o n ; i c o n ; i d o l a t r y ; phenomenology; quiapo; black nazarene; traslación quiapo’s traslación and its critique the traslación or “procession” (“transfer”) of the black nazarene, celebrated on every 9th of january in the philippines, points historically to the transfer of the statue from intramuros to quiapo. it is a feast attended by millions and is drawing more devotees each year. to make sense of this, we should consider popular devotions as “religious exercises – prayers, methods of meditation, orders of service, rituals, gestures – whose text and rubrics are not contained in the official liturgical books of the roman rite.” they are outside of the liturgy per se, although they can be maintained as a continuing public work about the people where active participation is expected. the document on liturgy from vatican ii says that devotions should lead the people to liturgy and not move away from it. with that in mind, the traslación begins with a eucharistic celebration early in the morning, following the vigil and mass on the eve of the 8th. despite its solemnity and persuasion to enact a secure and smooth procession, the movement is not entirely safe, making the barefoot parade a risky march for the devotees. in the black nazarene traslación of january 2018, one devotee died and more than 800 injured from over 6 million estimated in attendance. but casualties and injuries are considered one of the risks of participation. to engage oneself in the event is considered a religious form of sacrifice. landa jocano, in one of his articles, mentioned the black nazarene “wiping” ritual when different types of devotees patiently fall in line to wait for their turn to wipe the glass-covered case of the santo entierro (black nazarene). there is also the kissing ritual – one devotee anoints the statue with chanel no. 5 perfume first before kissing – and murmuring prayers. this devotion has become both a religious social phenomenon. fr. simon boiser, svd opined that the social phenomenon of popular devotions, albeit not part of the liturgy, explains the spiritual needs of filipinos more than the sunday obligation. jan gresil s. kahambing 15 but how might this phenomenon appear to the non-devotee or examined otherwise from another vantage point? the traslación has been critiqued or demonized as an abject portrayal of fanaticism and superstition. devotees are considered desperate and insensitive to others in their scramble to touch the statue, neglecting consideration of others for the sake of their own salvation. i have even witnessed this myself as a former seminarian who attended the event for seven straight years (from 2010-2016). not only do the devotees appear to be unholy in the manner that they approach the statue, but they also appear to be misinformed in their beliefs. msgr. sabino vengco jr. of the loyola school of theology remarked upon the ignorance of many filipinos concerning the nazareno, and clarified certain misconceptions, concerning the source of its color, its timing, but especially the kissing ritual, or pahalik, to express the extent of one’s religiosity. from this perspective the ritual is considered as magic, superstition, and idolatry. if this phenomenon is then reduced to mere idolatry in the guise of religiosity, it is another instance of split-level christianization involving a disparity of belief and ethical practice? from the data of 1991 and 1998 surveys asking about religious socialization, filipino religiosity appeared to be “a private affair – a matter of personal beliefs and devotion – rather than a social force that shapes and transforms public life.” the critique rests on the golden calf verse of exodus 32 when aaron creates an idol in the shape of a calf, organized a feast providing it with offerings, and worshiped it as a god. phenomenology and apologia with this problem in mind, we can consider what the catholic philosopher, jean-luc marion, can offer an understanding of idolatry. he is also well known as a theologian whose methods correspond to that of postmodernity. marion’s phenomenology does not focus on the primacy of the subject, so the devotee is displaced from the altar at which he worships. he rather utilizes a phenomenology that provides access to 16 prajñā vihāra a revelation beyond what can be described, a “saturated” rather than a diminished perception related to phenomena as mere sense-data. he writes, my entire project, by contrast [to metaphysics], aims to think the common-law phenomenon, and through it the poor phenomenon, on the basis of the paradigm of the saturated phenomenon, of which the former two offer only weakened variants, and from which they derive by progressive diminishment. for the saturated phenomenon does not give itself apart from the norm, by way of exception to the definition of phenomenality. this is in contrast to edmund husserl. husserl’s phenomenology stresses the importance of the transcendental “i” considering phenomena as intuited by the transcendental subject. marion’s phenomenology proceeds to liberate phenomena from the clutch and prejudices of this “i,” allowing the saturated phenomenon to reveal itself. seen from marion’s phenomenological method, the black nazarene traslación can be considered not as an idol but as an icon. by recasting the perspective of the devotee, whose project of worship resembles that of a glorified subject encapsulating god in a wave and wipe of a handkerchief, adoring the gold in which the calf is cast, marion’s phenomenology points beyond the limitations of these critiques. lorman arugay sketches an apologia for marion by proceeding from marion’s phenomenological heritage in husserl, heidegger, and kant. but this research neither achieves an apologia as such nor is able to radicalize previous traditional analyses. instead, this paper proceeds from a short detour of the theological accounts that usually explain the devotee’s relationship towards the statue as an icon and then proceeds to marion’s phenomenology of the icon to address the same critique. jan gresil s. kahambing 17 idolatry critique: a look at theology examining the issue via theology seems to be a preliminary before delving into the phenomenological investigation. for marion, this points to that which is first given, the way of theology that is, as “revelation” qua historicity. his theology contrasts to his phenomenology on the account of revelation but for the latter, as a revelation qua possibility. what is firstly given here is that the statue, the icon of the black nazarene, is an image. the catechism for filipino catholics (cfc) understands an image as having the capacity to either represent reality as in the case of devotion or to substitute for reality, thereby becoming an object of idolatry. this may then offer an interpretation of the traslación not as the mere adoration of the image as an image, but the adoration of the image as a representation of something else. the devotion to the statue of the nazareno then points not just to the statue but to what it representations, jesus christ. the waving of handkerchiefs and the wiping of the statue during the procession as a devotion looks to jesus embodied in the image. the warning is clear in the catechism of the catholic church, that idolatry not only refers to “false pagan worship” but consists of “divinizing what is not god,” (ccc, 2113). but insofar as the procession is giving due to god and not the image itself, the devotee does not commit idolatry and superstition. that is, they do not “attribute the efficacy of prayers or of sacramental signs to their mere external performance, apart from the interior dispositions that they demand (ccc 2111).” the statue of the black nazarene as an image is not the object of devotion in itself. it was aquinas who originally defended this interpretation of the adoration of images. he writes that “religious worship is not directed to images in themselves, considered as mere things […] the movement toward the image does not terminate in it as an image, but tends toward whose image it is.” but this is a problem much older than aquinas. it can be found in the early councils of the church. in the 7th council, the second council of nicaea (a.d. 787), the non-prohibition of icons, in fact, carried over 18 prajñā vihāra some anathemas (detestations). examples of which are the following: “anathema to those who do not salute the holy and venerable images” and “anathema to those who call the sacred images idols.” this points to the idea that icons are to be regarded as holy but not as idols. the council’s convention was a response to the iconoclast movement in seventh-century armenia and in the early eighth century wherein several bishops in asia minor, notably constantine of nakoleia and thomas of claudiopolis, “condemned the veneration of images.” there, this controversy was made more complex by the influences of other religions, namely, manichaeism that rejected matter as evil and extended this ban to artworks, and icons. the other abrahamic religions like islam and judaism share “abhorrence of any representation of the divine.” the significance of the council was the idea that the perception of an image must not be a form of idolatry but must be informed by faith. the problem is that theology projects revelation as a given phenomenon from the perspective of the church. that is to say, it lacks the language to articulate the phenomenon as a phenomenon apart from anathemas and catechisms. homilies, exhortations, and exegesis might express phenomena, but they do not give full access since they first proceed from those hermeneutical injunctions before they try to consider the phenomena’s fullness and incommensurability. fr. rolando dela rosa, op, for instance, considers the difference of the devotees of the traslación from the usual “convenient and normal ways of linking with the divine.” he contends that it not be dismissed as madness; rather as seen from the perspective of one’s love for god; to consider the believer, in st. paul’s words, as “fools for christ.” in addition, cardinal tagle’s recent homily in 2018 interprets the traslación as journeying with jesus, along with carrying one’s crosses. in other words, theology in all its vantage points – e.g. catechesis, patrology, liturgy, church history, homiletics, and even apologetics and dogmatics – address the phenomenon always in an interpretative light: the magisterium as the primary authority or office is established precisely on that purpose. this, however, does not undermine theology. marion’s phenomenology can complement jan gresil s. kahambing 19 theology by freeing phenomena from prior conceptions: the religious phenomenon of the traslación must not only be viewed as devotees worshipping christ but its iconic representation has to be considered as a surprising religious phenomenon in itself. beyond the distance: marion’s icon as apologia in idol and distance, marion already differentiates theological discussions to phenomenology, although he makes the point of reading one in the light of the other. leask and cassidy have described marion’s project “to think a god without being, a god who is free from any condition whatsoever.” the manner by which marion can attain this is, in their words, “by rethinking the whole problematic in terms of an icon that is not reducible to idolatry.” if theology has distinctly defined idolatry as divinizing what is not god, marion’s initial method has to recast also the parameters of idolizing thought from the revelation of the phenomena. he does this by contrasting this to the phenomenology of husserl and heidegger. husserl’s constituting of phenomena and heidegger’s questioning of “being” still retain the limits and conditions to phenomena. the transcendental “i” imposes primacy of its intuition to what appears, and heidegger makes a similar error in contextualizing all phenomena within the realm of being. this can be traced back to cartesian metaphysics and its inability to free itself from the perception of the ego as res cogitans. for marion, the cartesian ego is inherently connected to the self and cannot free itself from itself. in effect, the cogito reduces phenomena into the perception of the ego’s clear and distinct ideas. this apparent limitation of the ability of the subject as the interpreter of phenomena leads it to label, conceptualize, and digest phenomena as a whole – perceiving it as an object graspable to one’s insight. in this sense, god too can be an idol in its conceptualization under a name as an object. to preserve as it were this divine distance, marion proceeds to put god in the realm of love prior to being. the formula in theology is then reversed: if aquinas says in “apprehending the good” that 20 prajñā vihāra one cannot love what one does not know, expressed further by augustine in de trinitate 10.1: nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum (“i cannot love something that which is unintelligible”), marion stresses the primacy of love in which one can only proceed to know what one loves – a task which gives priority to the givenness of love as a gift that is prior to any knowing. marion then in explicating this primacy exposes a love without being, retroactively tracing even philosophy’s birthright as the love of wisdom with its original erotic rationality. the interpretation of philosophy and even of theology borders on the interpretation of being (for philosophy) and revelation (theology). therefore, “rather than hermeneutics being restricted to the interpretations of existence that arise when it is subsequently recounted, human existence is itself considered to be hermeneutic in the very structure of its happening. consequently, phenomena are not only interpreted after they have appeared, but are always already interpreted in their very appearing.” theology, which grounds in revelation as historicity, is one interpretation, and interpretation is “considered in the domains of a historical event,” or the face of another person. marion’s phenomenology insists on the primacy of givenness, and this he expounds more on his phenomenology of the icon. this phenomenology is stated in mackinlay’s words: “the actual appearing of the phenomenon is fully accomplished independent of any such interpretations of its meaning.” what this phenomenology first implies is that the idol, which limits and conditions phenomena, and the icon, which for theology points to something beyond, are for marion, not identifications by which one can classify beings but manners by which phenomena appear in being. one can, therefore, view being as either an idol or an icon, presenting themselves as manifestations of reality. in marion’s analysis, the idol is a limitation of phenomena when it confines perception. petrified by the manifestation of an idol, the subject is “dazzled” because the idol is first and foremost dazzling (éblouissant). figuratively, this points to how a person idolizes a particular object – money, food – and even abstract concepts such as career and identity. jan gresil s. kahambing 21 the extreme in which the perception of the idol suspends reality is when this perception points back to the image of the one perceiving, like a mirror, to which subjectivity plays a major part. in art criticism, a painting is a visible representation of reality, but when a subject interprets the painting, the representation halts, restricts the gaze back to itself. in marion’s words, “the idol thus acts as a mirror, not as a portrait: a mirror that reflects the look’s image, or more exactly, the image of its aim and of the scope of that aim.” seen in itself, the painting as an idol is a particular “mode of apprehension” or “reception” constantly reflecting the gaze of the perceiver. the idol then projects the subjectivity of the gaze, as an object of the gaze and is interpreted only on the account of the gaze. as marion puts it: “the idol with its visibility fills the intention of the gaze, which wants nothing other than to see.” in the case of the black nazarene traslación, the condition is clear when, furthering the accounts of the catechism, an image becomes an idol: the idol for marion’s phenomenology is not just an object divinized as if it is god, but it becomes an idol precisely when the devotion to the image is restricted, fixated to the image itself and more so when it reflects the picture back to the devotee. in which case, the more the devotee sacrifices himself through sweat and blood, the more he sees himself worthy of becoming the devotee to the statue. like the idol in exodus, the golden calf is dazzling only because it reflects the collected molten jewelry from the community of jews themselves. marion neither limits the gaze of the devotee to the image nor to himself but rather to something else. this is explained in a phenomenology that caters to a further provocation beyond. escaping from the trap of the idol’s dazzling image, the icon as a manner of perceiving being does not stop at the image. the icon, in other words, lets the phenomenon reveal itself that it allows saturation to the point of eluding even the perception of the subject. this saturated phenomena is revealed not as an object but as a “non-object” and is experienced not as an experience but as a “counterexperience” when it “resists the conditions of objectification,” to which marion makes use of the term “irregardable.” the phenomenality of the 22 prajñā vihāra icon is irreducible since it evokes infinity. in marion’s words, the icon shows, strictly speaking, nothing [. . .]. it teaches the gaze [. . .] to find in infinity something new. the icon summons the gaze to surpass itself by never freezing on a visible, since the visible only presents itself here in view of the invisible. the gaze can never rest or settle if it looks at an icon; it must always rebound upon the visible [. . .] the icon makes visible only by giving rise to an infinite gaze. the infinity of this gaze dispels the limited gaze of the looker where the icon does not fully give itself in its resistance to being rendered as an object or a spectacle. the icon, no longer offers any spectacle to the look and tolerates no look from any spectator, but on the contrary exerts its own look over that which faces it. the looker takes the place of the looked upon; the manifested phenomenon is reversed . . . the paradox reverses the polarity of manifestation by taking the initiative, far from undergoing it; by giving it, far from being given by it. this resistance, stemming from its irregardability, places an operation that crisscrosses gazes. this is what it means when the devotee is displaced from the altar in which he worships and the spotlight that illuminates his gaze – the icon operates as a visible reminder that it cannot be objectified even by the devotee’s contemplative attitude towards it. it is to be cautioned however that the icon’s visibility “certainly avoids understanding the icon as an object, but without simply inverting the terms and making the icon a subject that objectifies its viewer.” this is the danger that benson also noticed with the thin distinction between the idol and the icon when icons have tendencies to become idols. in which case, it is easy to say that the devotees are adoring an idol over jan gresil s. kahambing 23 an icon, sharing the same fear and perception of the iconoclasts and the religions that abhor them, so that the solution would be to ban them. but this would amount to a totalizing towards the extreme. one must not dismiss altogether a proposition even when it has the tendency to be false as we find in garcia’s apologia to popper. here, marion admits the hazard involved: what is at stake in the operation of an icon concerns not the perception of the visible or the aesthetic, but the crisscrossed trajectory of two looks; in order for one who sees to let himself be seen and to tear himself away from the status of viewer, it is necessary for him to go back up, across the visible icon, towards the origin of the other look, confessing and thus allowing himself to be seen by it. but significant here is the reverence the devotee shows. marion continues that “it may be that only liturgy still summons us to such a decision: it provokes the final judgment of every look, which must, before it and it alone, either persist in still wanting to see an idol or else agree to pray. praying signifies here: letting the other (of the) look-see me.” the devotee, therefore, has the decision to venerate the icon or idolize it, but as mackinlay contrasts: “even though i do not constitute an icon as an object, my affirmation of it as an icon to be venerated entails a conceptual understanding.” will the hermeneutic space, the deciding space that the icon allows for the revelation of god in adoration dispel that notion of the icon’s letting-be of transcendence? this is the space that marion opens. so we can see the traslación no longer as millions of frenzied devotees worshipping a statue; or as a mass of devotees collected to project their belief as believers of christ. an icon escapes the image that it represents. it does not fully picture the nazareno as christ. it is and is not at the same time. when the devotee touches the statue, paradoxically it provides completeness but also incompleteness. based on the spiritual longing or the gratitude that motivates the devotee, the nazareno is 24 prajñā vihāra acknowledged as god, in whose perception the devotee cannot fully grasp. that is to say, if the idol works like a mirror, the icon works like a prism in that it “allows the invisible and transcendent to appear without compromising its invisibility and transcendence.” the devotee should recognize that the icon of the black nazarene is not wholly god, but through the icon, direct his infinite gaze to god. marion echoes the words of st. paul in colossians: “he is the image (eikon=icon) of the invisible god (colossians 1:15).” in the religious phenomenon of the traslación, marion makes use of a heuristic function of phenomenology and not just merely hermeneutical: “god really gives god’s self in the phenomenon of revelation; it is not merely my overly spiritualized psyche that thinks this is what is happening.” in fact, such a phenomenon is for gschwandtner “doubly” saturated when it “transcends (especially hermeneutic) horizons together.” the icon then serves as to counter-act, to counter-experience religious phenomena in such a way that it points to something more than its inception and perception. the image although seen still points to an ungraspable experience that manifests itself often in utter surprise. what matters after the event is that the devotee allows himself to let god dwell in his life, and lets his life respond to the call of god, regardless of whether it appears as idolatry. the icon continues to invert and resist the idolizing perception of the devotee, the traslación icon reveals more than what is firstly, actively, and decidedly seen. revelation, therefore, is not formulaic and god overwhelms the believer. conclusion the black nazarene traslación of quiapo is a popular devotion that caters to the devotees’ creedal faith to god. it has become a religious phenomenon in the sense that it testifies to the inherent spectacle of the filipinos’ faith. this, however, is not the full picture. although the event can be considered from the hermeneutical catechism of the church and its theological distinctions, it nonetheless escapes these determinations even as it reflects an area of humanity aligned jan gresil s. kahambing 25 to fanaticism, superstition, and idolatry. marion provides important insights into his discussion of the phenomenology of the icon. the image of the nazarene considered from this perspective is not an idol in a sense that the devotees fetishize it as a god in contrast to god, but as an icon that points to the religious phenomenon of revelation: god’s act of revealing himself phenomenologically without prior perceptions from the subject or believer. it suggests that workings of god cannot be expected, reduced, and demanded on the side of the believer, even when they encounter the idol. this then provides an apologia to critiques of idolatry when it suggests that the outcome of idolatry is often to allow the ungraspable god to enter the life of the believer. god, as it were, does not become an object of devotion but a non-object, resisting the hermeneutics of the believer and recasting the ideals he has set prior to the revelation of the divine. endnotes 1. peter fink, the new dictionary of sacramental worship (minnesota: the liturgical press, 1990), 331. 2. second vatican council on the constitution of the sacred liturgy, sacrosanctum concilium, 13. 3. rambo talabong, “ex-jail official dies during traslación of nazareno 2018,” rappler, accessed january 13, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/193322-first-deathnazareno-traslacion-2018. 4. see landa jocano, “filipino catholicism: a case study in religious change,” in asian studies 5 no.1 (1967): 42-64. 5. simon boiser. “popular religiosity among filipinos in bayernalee.” the migrant newsletter, accessed january 13, 2019, www.filipinos-in-berlin.de/ berlinews2014jun/seite7.pdf, 7. 6. odi de guzman, “black or white: the nazarene and the pinoy devotion,” gma news online, accessed january 13, 2019, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/ lifestyle/artandculture/400551/black-or-white-the-nazarene-and-the-pinoy-devotion/ story/ 7. jaime bulatao sj, split-level christianity (ateneo de manila university press, 1966). 26 prajñā vihāra 8. ricardo abad, “religion in the philippines,” philippine studies 49, no. 3 (2001): 357. 9. see danilo pajarillaga, “jean-luc marion, a postmodern theologian: an exposition,” in veritatis amor 10, no.1 (2015): 3-28. 10. jean-luc marion, being given: toward a phenomenology of givenness, trans. jeffrey kosky (california, usa: stanford university press, 2002), 227; also 316ff 11. see edmund husserl, paris lectures (the hague, netherlands: martinus nijhoff, 1964). 12. see edmund husserl, the idea of phenomenology, trans. ted klein & william pohl, dordrecht (the netherlands: kluwer publishing, 1995). 13. see lorman arugay, “the phenomenon of the impossible in jean-luc marion,” philippiniana sacra, 52, no. 156 (2017): 575-622. 14. ivana dolejšová, accounts of hope: a problem of method in postmodern apologia (berlin, peter lang, 2001). cf. carlos garcia, popper’s theory of science: an apologia (london/new york: continuum, 2006). garcia circumvents the usual attacks of popper’s philosophy and aims to demonstrate popper’s philosophy as a theory that guides in the understanding of science. 15. jean-luc marion, “metaphysics and phenomenology: a relief for theology,” critical inquiry, trans. thomas carlson, 20, no. 4 (1994): 572-591. 16. catechism for filipino catholics. new edition, eccce word and life publications, manila, philippines. henceforth, cfc (1997). 17. catechism of the catholic church, 2nd ed. strathfield, nsw: st paul’s, 2113. henceforth, ccc (2000). 18. thomas aquinas, summa theologica, trans. the fathers of the english dominican province (charlottesville, va: intelex, 1993), ii-ii, 81, 3 ad 3. 19. norman tanner, the church in council: conciliar movements, religious practice and the papacy from nicaea to vatican ii (new york, palgrave macmillan, 2011), 16. 20. ibid. 21. rolando dela rosa op, “fools for christ,” manila bulletin, accessed january 13, 2019, https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/01/13/fools-for-christ/. 22. luis antonio cardinal tagle. homily on january 9, 2018 traslación in the quirino grandstand, accessed january 13, 2019, https://www.veritas846.ph/emminenceluis-antonio-cardinal-tagle-traslacion-january-092018-quirino-grandstand/ 23. jean-luc marion, the idol and distance, trans. thomas carlson (new york, usa: fordham university press, 2001). 24. ian leask and eoin cassidy, givenness and god: questions of jean-luc marion (new york, usa: fordham university press, 2005), 4. 25. ibid. cf. arugay, “the phenomenon of the impossible in jean-luc marion” jan gresil s. kahambing 27 26. jean-luc marion, reduction and givenness, trans. thomas carlson, illinois (usa: northwestern university press, 1988). 27. jean-luc marion, cartesian questions: methods and metaphysics (chicago, usa: university of chicago press, 1999), 119. 28. jean-luc marion, on descartes’ metaphysical prism: the constitutions and limits of onto-theo-logy in cartesian thought, trans. jeffrey kosky (usa: university of chicago press, 1999). 29. jean-luc marion, “in the name: how to avoid speaking of negative theology,” in god, the gift, and postmodernism, john caputo & m. scanlon, eds. (indianapolis, usa: indiana university press, 1999), 34. 30. robert miner, thomas aquinas on the passions: a study of summa theologiae 1a2ae 22-48 (cambridge university press, 2009), 128. 31. jean-luc marion, prolegomena to charity, trans. stephen lewis (new york, usa: fordham university press, 2002). 32. jean-luc marion, the erotic phenomenon, trans. stephen lewis (usa: university of chicago press, 2003). 33. shane mackinlay, interpreting excess: jean-luc marion, saturated phenomena, and hermeneutics (new york, fordham university press, 2010), 36. italics mine. 34. ibid, 35; cf. jean-luc marion, being given, 211; 295 and jean-luc marion. in excess: studies of saturated phenomena, trans. r. horner and v. berraud (new york, usa: fordham university press, 2002), 33; 43. 35. jean-luc marion. in excess, 123; 148. 36. shane mackinlay, interpreting excess, 35. 37. jean-luc marion, god without being: hors-texte, trans. thomas carlson (chicago, usa: university of chicago press, 1991), 8. 38. jean-luc marion, being given, 229; 320. 39. jean-luc marion, god without being, 12. 40. shane mackinlay, interpreting excess, 120; cf. jean-luc marion, god without being, 9; 18. 41. jean-luc marion, god without being, 10-11. 42. ibid, 17. 43. jean-luc marion, being given, 215, 300, 216, 302. 44. jean-luc marion, god without being, 18. the framing for emphasis matches to that of wardley’s, cf. kenneth jason wardley, “’a desire unto death’: the deconstructive thanatology of jean-luc marion,” the heythrop journal, 49, no. 1 (2008), 84. 45. jean-luc marion, being given, 232. 46. shane mackinlay, interpreting excess, 169. 28 prajñā vihāra 47. bruce ellis benson, graven ideologies: nietzsche, derrida & marion on modern idolatry (downers grove: intervarsity press, 2002), 193. cf. wardley, “a desire unto death,” 85. 48. cf. carlos garcia, popper’s theory of science 49. jean-luc marion, the crossing of the visible. trans. james smith (stanford: stanford university press, 2004), 60. 50. ibid, 65. i share the emphasis with shane mackinlay, interpreting excess, 168. 51. shane mackinlay, interpreting excess, 170. 52. ibid, 167. 53. jean-luc marion, being given, 17, 28. 54. christina gschwandtner, degrees of givenness: on saturation in jean-luc marion (indianapolis, indiana university press, 2014), 189. 55. ibid, 24. bibliography abad, ricardo “religion in the philippines.” philippine studies 50, no. 3 (2001): 337-367. aquinas, thomas. summa theologica. translated by the fathers of the english dominican province. charlottesville, va: intelex, 1993. arugay, lorman. “the phenomenon of the impossible in jean-luc marion.” philippiniana sacra 52, no. 156 (2017): 575-622. benson, bruce ellis. graven ideologies: nietzsche, derrida & marion on modern idolatry. downers grove: intervarsity press, 2002. boiser, simon, svd. “popular religiosity among filipinos in bayernalee.” the migrant newsletter. accessed january 13, 2019. www. filipinos-in-berlin.de/berlinews2014jun/seite7.pdf. bulatao, jaime. split-level christianity. ateneo de manila university press, 1966. catechism for filipino catholics. new edition, eccce word and life publications, manila, philippines, 1997. catechism of the catholic church. 2nd ed. strathfield, nsw: st pauls, 2000. jan gresil s. kahambing 29 de guzman, odi. “black or white: the nazarene and the pinoy devotion.” accessed january 13, 2019. gma news online. http://www. gmanetwork.com/news/lifestyle/artandculture/400551/black-orwhite-thenazarene-and-the-pinoy-devotion/story/ dela rosa, rolando, op. “fools for christ.” manila bulletin. accessed: january 13, 2019. https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/01/13/fools-forchrist/. dolejšová, ivana. accounts of hope: a problem of method in postmodern apologia, berlin, peter lang, 2001. fink, peter, ed. the new dictionary of sacramental worship. minnesota: the liturgical press, 1990. garcia, carlos. popper’s theory of science: an apologia. london/new york: continuum, 2006. gschwandtner, christina. degrees of givenness: on saturation in jeanluc marion. indianapolis, indiana university press, 2014. husserl, edmund. paris lectures. the hague, netherlands: martinus nijhoff, 1964. husserl, edmund. the idea of phenomenology. translated by ted klein & william pohl. dordrecht, the netherlands: kluwer publishing, 1995. jocano, landa. “filipino catholicism: a case study in religious change.” asian studies 5, no. 1 (1967): 42-64. leask, ian, and eoin cassidy. givenness and god: questions of jeanluc marion, new york, usa: fordham university press, 2005. mackinlay, shane. interpreting excess: jean-luc marion, saturated phenomena, and hermeneutics. new york, fordham university press, 2010. marion, jean-luc. reduction and givenness. translated by thomas carlson. illinois, usa: northwestern university press, 1988. 30 prajñā vihāra marion, jean-luc. god without being: hors-texte. translated by thomas carlson. chicago, usa: university of chicago press, 1991. marion, jean-luc. “metaphysics and phenomenology: a relief for theology.” translated by thomas carlson. critical inquiry 20, no. 4 (1994): 572-591. marion, jean-luc. cartesian questions: methods and metaphysics. chicago. usa: university of chicago press, 1999. marion, jean-luc. “in the name: how to avoid speaking of negative theology.” in god, the gift, and postmodernism, edited by john caputo & m. scanlon, 20-41. indianapolis, usa: indiana university press, 1999. marion, jean-luc. on descartes’ metaphysical prism: the constitutions and limits of onto-theo-logy in cartesian thought. translated by jeffrey kosky. usa: university of chicago press, 1999. marion, jean-luc. the idol and distance. translated by thomas carlson. new york, usa: fordham university press, 2001. marion, jean-luc. in excess: studies of saturated phenomena. translated by r. horner and v. berraud. new york, usa: fordham university press, 2002. marion, jean-luc. prolegomena to charity. translated by stephen lewis, new york, usa: fordham university press, 2002. marion, jean-luc. being-given: toward a phenomenology of givenness. translated by jeffrey kosky. california, usa: stanford university press, 2002. marion, jean-luc. the erotic phenomenon, translated by stephen lewis. chicago, usa: university of chicago press, 2003. miner, robert. thomas aquinas on the passions: a study of summa theologiae 1a2ae 22-48. cambridge university press, 2009. jan gresil s. kahambing 31 mooney, timothy. “hubris and humility: husserl’s reduction and givenness.” in givenness and god: questions of jean-luc marion, edited by ian leask and eion cassidy, 47-68. new york, usa: fordham university press, 1997. pajarillaga, danilo. “jean-luc marion, a postmodern theologian: an exposition.” veritatis amor, edited by jan gresil kahambing, 10, no.1 (2015): 3-28. second vatican council. constitution on the sacred liturgy, sacrosanctum concilium. the sixteen documents of vatican ii, edited by marianne l. trouve. boston: pauline books, 1963. tagle, luis antonio cardinal. homily on january 9, 2018 traslacion in the quirino grandstand. accessed: january 13, 2019. https://www. veritas846.ph/emminence-luis-antoniocardinal-tagle-traslacionjanuary-092018-quirino-grandstand/. talabong, rambo. “ex-jail official dies during translacion of nazareno 2018.” rappler. accessed january 13, 2019. https://www.rappler. com/nation/193322-first-death-nazareno-traslacion-2018. tanner, norman. the church in council: conciliar movements, religious practice and the papacy from nicaea to vatican ii. new york, palgrave macmillan, 2011. wardley, kenneth jason. “’a desire unto death’: the deconstructive thanatology of jean-luc marion.” the heythrop journal 49, no. 1(2008): https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2007.00358.x. jesada buaban 55 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 2021, 55-70 © 2000 by assumption university press on masturbation: religious purity and institutional hegemony in abrahamic religions and buddhism jesada buaban1 abstract this paper analyzes the attitudes to masturbation in the abrahamic religions and buddhism. textual interpretation has been used to scrutinize the primary sources within religious texts, while weber’s ideas on legitimacy and domination have been employed to elucidate the effect of religious injunctions against masturbation. the findings reveal that the primary sources used to condemn masturbation in abrahamic religion is not clear, and so it should not be considered dogmatically. the interpretations of those sources draw connection between masturbation and such ideas as lust and impurity, which are measured with reference to a spiritual elite. buddhism sees sexual desire in relation to suffering that must be able to overcome for those who desire enlightenment. though its theological background is different the buddhist examples help clarify the abrahamic worldviews on masturbation. moreover, the holy status of catholic priests and buddhist monks, who are viewed as a spiritual elite, is achieved by abstaining from sex and masturbation, and this hierarchy serves to designate as sinful and impure the practice of masturbation. keywords: masturbation; religious purity; religious hierarchy; abrahamic religion; buddhism 56 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june introduction the topic of masturbation is becoming more studied and discussed in the academic field in general. although, from a religious perspective it has been neglected or avoided. the primary texts of abrahamic religions do not directly discuss it, which makes this phenomenon unclear and also shows the importance of examination. this study will examine: (1) negative views on masturbation, (2) positive impacts of masturbation, and (3) masturbation as freedom from the power of social institutions over the individual’s body. religion, besides seeing masturbation as sinful, also employ modern sciences to convince followers of the negative effects of masturbation, connecting it to addiction and secularizing its condemnation from the language of sinfulness to sickness.2 rabbi boteach wrote the book “the broken american male” to portray the dangers of masturbation contending that it leads males to a state of numbness and emotionless non-feeling.3 moreover, tsuria ruth’ scholarly work mentions a jewish religious website that is dedicated to solve the problem of pornography addiction.4 many recent medical studies of masturbation suggest that it contributes to sexual health,5/6 however, many religious people tend not to believe in such studies.7 one particular threat to religion and its forms of hegemony, is the fact that masturbation can be seen as a power that one has on his/her own body, which is beyond religious control. for example, if women is satisfied by masturbation and does not want to marry, they will free from male domination.8/9 two research questions are raised in this paper as followed: (1) how have abrahamic and buddhist texts talked about masturbation? and (2) what are moral and social consequences of abstaining from masturbation? this paper is organized into main two parts. first, from ambiguity to impurity: demonstrates unclear explanations of masturbation in the primary sources of abrahamic religions, which eventually lead to borrowing some words from other parts of the texts as well as commentaries. this part simply proposes that the unclear notion of the primary texts opens an opportunity for religious scholars to portray the negative figure of masturbation. however, when additional explanations jesada buaban 57 are added, it helps to eliminate the dogmatic faith and represent the rational aspect of abrahamic religion. interestingly, those explanations are similar to buddhism, a non-theistic doctrine, in terms of not holding god as a creator and savior. second, angelic soul in human’s form: elucidates the sacredness of catholic and buddhist priests that has been shaped through abstaining from masturbation. this kind of discipline eventually helps to stabilize the monastic institutions which are in the higher status of religious community. from ambiguity to impurity as mentioned above, the term masturbation is not mentioned explicitly in the primary texts of the abrahamic religions. however, various stories have been interpreted to support its condemnation. in the biblical tradition, the story of onan becomes a main narrative. onan was required to marry and conceive a child with his brother’s widow (genesis 38:6-10). however, onan disobeyed by spilling his seed on the ground and he was finally punished by being put to death. it is not clear that this story refers to masturbation as it may refer to “coitus interruptus”.10/11 it is often claimed that onan is killed for wasting his seed, and so this story has been used to condemn masturbation. yet female masturbation does not involve the wasting of seed.12 according to torah tradition, impurity occurs when there is a loss of life-energy. the dead body, a woman’s menstrual flow, and a man’s ejaculation are examples.13 it can be said that the blood and sperm seed themselves are symbolically not impure, but the loss of energy instead. in 1 thessalonians 4:3-6, it states that “it is god’s will that you should be sanctified; that you should avoid sexual immorality; that each of you should learn to control your own body in a way that is holy and honorable, not in passionate lust like the pagans, who do not know god.” this refers to sexual immorality without clarifying whether what is denoted is homosexuality, adultery, or masturbation. and this is found in several other places such as ephesians 5:3, colossians. 3:5, and so forth. in the testaments, the term “addiction or lust” is emphasized as 58 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june a negative behavior that is condemned (proverbs 6:25, matthew 5:28, and 1 peter 4:3). in contrast, self-control is a desirable act of obedience to god and a fruit of the spirit (galatians 5:22-23), an act that requires restraint, thought, intentionality, and delayed gratification. traditional islamic views hold that masturbation as a sin, for the same reasons found in judaism and christianity. however, it also provides a solution in abdullah:3. the prophet said “o young men, whoever from among you can afford it, let him get married, for verily it is a means to lowering one’s gaze and protecting one’s chastity. and whoever cannot, let him fast, for it will be a shield for him.” for the sake of social order, all religions tend emphasize the sanctity of marriage even though they may consider sexual activity negatively. “be fruitful and multiply (genesis 1:28)” is a sentence often quoted by followers of abrahamic religions. heterosexual sex is promoted in order to support reproduction. sex within marriage is still accepted even of it does not lead to reproduction, because it is often considered to prevent adultery.14 in judaism, in the ketubah (marriage contract), a husband should not take long journeys nor take a vows to abstain from sex for extended periods of time, because he has the responsiblity to fulfill his wife’s sexual desires. in addition, sex should occur in the missionary position, in the dark, and with the least amout of talk15. notably, the missionary position was promoted on the ground that it is believed likely to lead to pregnancy.16 since sex is a gift from god, the marriage bed should be honored, enjoyed, and visited (hebrews 13:4 and 1 corinthians 7:5). it is also a place where souls intertwine and unity occurs (genesis 2:24). the quran chapter 2, baqarah: 222 also supports such sex and only warns that it should be avoided during the period menstruation which is considered impure. however, sex in abrahamic religions should not be viewed in terms of worldly happiness or for personal lust, it is holy in the sense that people are following the word of god. as a result, there are warnings to avoid attachment to sex. marriage, for jesus, is viewed as being ordained by god (matthew 19:4–5), but living a life avoiding sex, either by becoming jesada buaban 59 eunuchs or becoming celibate, is seen as a higher calling and praised as serving the kingdom of heaven (matthew19:12). unmarried persons are similar to angels and sons of the resurrection (luke 20:36). similarly, paul also appreciates the virgin life, but he also adds “if people could not exercise self-control, they should marry” (1 corinthians 7:9). this can be seen in the catholic tradition with its’ emphasis on celibacy and the monastic order. the directives concerning masturbation in islam is also not so clear. islam recommends to those who cannot control their sexual desire to marry instead. this implies that masturbation is something to be avoided. nonetheless, in practice, muslims in many areas, like saudi arabia, do not consider masturbation as a sinful behavior (haram or makrooh). in contrast, it is often totally accepted (halal). in 2018, group of saudi arabians launched a twitter campaign, titled “masturbation is halal” and it went viral. some saudi psychologists also confirmed that masturbation is a human need like the desire for eating and drinking.17 in albaqarah:187, it permits a man to have intercourse with his wife on the night of the fast. being a ‘garment for one another’ is its metaphor. however, one of the criteria of fasting duties, apart from abstaining from consuming food and water, is also abstaining from sex. nonetheless, the notion of masturbation is quite clear in buddhist primary sources. buddhism categorizes its followers into two groups: monks and laypeople. monks are those who dedicated to the monastic life, which is stricter and requires them to observe more monastic precepts. masturbation is obviously prohibited according to the vinaya pitaka, sanghadisesa:1. that is because a monk’s life should follow ascetic practices. they recieve food from donations to dedicate more time to learning and meditating. so buddhists still consider a monk’s masturbation as unacceptable. a layperson’s life on the other hand is more flexible. they must follow only five precepts: refrain from taking life, refrain from taking what is not given, refrain from the misuse of the senses (which includes adultery), refrain from wrong speech (or lying), and refrain from intoxicating substances (like achohol). notably, adultery 60 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june is clearly understood as a sexual intercourse outside marriage. therefore, masturbation, for lay buddhists, is widely accepted by laypeople in buddhism. remarkably, buddhism categorizes the moral life into two levels as mentioned above because heaven and hell in buddhism are not eternal. this means that a good action will cause a rebirth in heaven, for example, but one may also be reborn as a human, an animal, or a hell-being, based on previous actions. the cycle of rebirth or samsara cannot be ended as long as the person cannot eradicate all kinds of desire. therefore, buddhist teaching is flexible in the sense that it opens an opportunity for one to choose their level of morality. people can be reborn again and again to achieve some perfection, while the abrahamic religions there is only one life to prove one’s self and the last judgment seems to be final. in buddhism, one’s pursuits of holiness is up to the devotee. this means that if they want to achieve a higher level of holiness and enlightenment, they can become ordained. in addition, buddhism also provides the eight precepts for laypeople as an intermediate level, where masturbation is also prohibited (pali: abrahmacariya). of course, abrahmacariya covers all kinds of sexual activities: masturbation, pornography compulsion, sexual intercourse with humans as well as with animals. the reason is to reduce one’s craving or lust. it should be noted that buddhist teaching is bases on the karmic law, in which all sufferings and happiness are from the results of their own actions, not from god, (although some do interpret this law as god). buddhism views the cause of suffering as desire (mn:105). therefore, one’s duty is to eliminate desire through different levels of moral conduct. it can be said that buddhism ultimately views masturbation as negative or impure as well in terms of an obstacle for spiritual development. this is similar to the christian view in matthew 5:28, “looking at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart.” of course, abstaining from sex during the fasting period of muslims is also not different. one of many points that abrahamic people criticize ascetic religions like buddhism and hinduism based upon this jesada buaban 61 ascetic emphasis on not having sex or becoming celibate. in fact, if we go back to the root of this doctrine, sexual desire is to be eliminated, so purity will be gained for body and ultimately mind. simply put, buddhism just proposes the way to eliminate craving at various levels without referring to god’s command. while abrahamic religions agree with some ascetic levels in spiritual practice, while others, judaism and islam, choose to promote domestic life. this section should be concluded with some observations on circumcision. some suggest that the purpose is not only for cleanness, but to prevent people from masturbation as well. circumcision is practiced by abrahamic devotees for the sake of tradition and is mostly explained with reference to maintaining cleanliness. but this explanation is questionable. that is because even if a man is not circumcised, to clean his penis is not a difficult task. so some scholars believe that the main aim of circumcision is actually to prevent men from masturbation, which is considered as an impure behavior. that is because when the penis’s skin is cut off, masturbation is more difficult. this becomes clear when we look at circumcision as tradition or culture. in many parts of africa, asia, and middle east, various groups of people who believe in christianity, islam, or local religions also hold circumcision as a part of their culture. beside the male children, girls must also be circumcised based upon the reason that it helps to reduce sexual desire and prevents them from masturbation.18 angelic soul in human form in traditions like catholicism and buddhism, asceticism is promoted for the religious elite. this is for the purpose of transforming the human body into angelic soul, and to allow priests and monks to gain from their self-discipline. in fact, the jewish belief also portrays some groups of ascetics in book of numbers 6:1–21, who did not cut their hair, abstained from eating meat or grapes, abstained from wine, as well as fasting and living as a hermit.19 this can be seen likewise in sufi islam. ascetic sufis were hunted both by sunni and shia rulers in various 62 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june centuries due to the accusation of being heretic.20/21 however, asceticism in christianity especially in catholicism can be traced to the lives of john the baptist, jesus christ, as well as the twelve apostles and the apostle paul and it is finally institutionalized as witnessed nowadays.22 similarly, this kind of practice is popular in indian religions, hinduism, buddhism, and jainism. buddhist monks to this day still practice asceticism.23 notably, though hinduism was started since 3000 bce., acetic practice or sharmana may begin during 600-400 bce., which is the period of arising of buddhism and jainism.24 abstaining from masturbation is a primary way to inner transformation. catholicism and buddhism share the same concept of ascetic practice in the sense that human body is generally seen as a subject to death, but religion can provide immortal life even before death by proposing “living the angelic life” through various monastic practices. in general, the term angel symbolizes a being that does not age, get sick, or die. in christianity, luke’s version of the story of christ can be used to affirm that the life of the resurrection was also available before death, as it wrote “indeed, they cannot die anymore, since they (unmarried persons) are equal to the angels and are sons of god, being sons of the resurrection (luke 20:36). it can be said that the death can overcome only the physical body and the sinful man. referring to the bible story of a woman who married with seven husbands, the question was asked who she will marry in heaven, to which jesus replied, “at the resurrection people will neither marry nor be given in marriage, they will be like the angels in heaven (matthew 22:29-30). virginity is emphasized in christianity since the life of mary and the coming of jesus was considered possible without sexual intercourse. therefore, these ideas legitimate ascetic practice in catholicism.25 in buddhism, five hindrances are obstacles to spiritual development started with “sexual desire” or kamachanda. it includes all kinds of craving, sex, masturbation, delicious food, luxurious material objects, and so forth (an 5:51). since the next life is unseen, living a holy life or to achieve an angelic is the highest goal for catholic priests. protestantism however jesada buaban 63 sees celibacy as unrecommended, and promotes the idea to be fruitful and multiply,26 protestants, nevertheless, follow a protestant ethics (and spirit of capitalism) to assure their next life by showing the worldly wealth and success as a measure of their selection by god.27 similarly, buddhism suggests a way to transform this physical body into the angel soul (or mind) as well. the term brahmacariya means “angelic behavior” used to identify a moral code that abstains from all kind of sexual desire. therefore, buddhists who follow such intermediate and highest levels of moral conducts are defined as those who are like angels or brahma in this very life. the development of asceticism is interesting when it has been shaped the monastic organizations as we see nowadays. catholic priests and buddhist monks position themselves as a spiritual elite, while ordinary people, involved in a life of domestic duties, are considered as followers. undeniably, the priest’s status is elevated because, they can express their superiority based upon their self-discipline. women can also elevate their status by serving christ and becoming ordained. their status will be higher than ordinary men, but they still cannot be equal to the male priests.28 in addition, though the primary texts does not directly support it, the practice of confession has become central in catholicism. by the thirteenth century, annual confession had become a requirement for the catholics.29 in protestantism and islam it exists to a certain degree, but it is not important due to the idea that individuals are able to communicate with god directly, and forgiveness must be from god only. because of this institutional hierarchy in catholicism and buddhism, the clergy becomes a medium between humans and god. in buddhism laypeople tend to view buddhist monks as holy, therefore donating to the temple can produce the good karmic results much more than donating to secular organizations. in this regard, abstaining from masturbation, as well as other kinds of sexual activities, should not be seen as the way to purify the soul only, but it also paves the way to shape the holiness and moral legitimacy of priests in the higher level of religious community, which can be called “traditional domination” as suggested 64 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june by max weber.30 as already mentioned, judaism and islam tend to emphasize domestic life, so institution of the priest is therefore not as strong as catholicism and buddhism. islamic clergies are said to resemble jewish rabbis and not priests. in this regard, they serve as exemplars, teachers, judges, and community leaders, who provide religious knowledge and lead the rituals.31 imam is a leader in ritual performance, while ulama is considered as a muslim scholar. some scholars point out that religious leaders in islam are poorly institutionalized and not organized hierarchically, because islamic teaching does not separate religious duties from worldly life.32 however, this claim can be argued that muslim communities in many areas, indonesia for example, are quite hierarchical. imam and ulama, of course all of them are male, play a leading role in religious issues. when religion is not separated from the worldly life, it means that almost every activity needs to be guided by islamic teaching, and of course, based on interpretations of those leaders. in practice, they are in the position of being respected and should not be questioned. in some cases, they encourage, although indirectly, devotees to protest against other religious groups, ahmadiyya for example. in addition, to serve the local beliefs, muslim leaders also deal in magic, and some may be seen as charismatic. as a result, the hierarchical aspect of muslim leaders and their organization is in some cases no different from buddhism and catholicism. what makes them different from ascetic religions is its characteristic of non-celibacy, while the leaders’ legitimacy can be gained through the status determined by the scriptures. all of these interpretations of holiness, impurity, and the higher status of celibate, has an effect on the ordinary person. it has a dominating effect on the freedom of the ordinary person over their own bodies. conclusion it is quite difficult to imagine the reason why the abrahamic prophets at that time did not directly talk about masturbation. two causes can be assumed here; (1) masturbation was already viewed as a taboo in jesada buaban 65 terms of impurity and should be prohibited as other sexual misconducts, homosexuality, sex outside marriage, coitus interruptus, and so forth. (2) masturbation is probably viewed as a private activity or a minor sin. therefore, religions tend not to take it too seriously. of course, many modern scholars do not view it sinful (foster, 1985) and most theologians view it as a minor sin.33 however, when religion tries to control all the activities of its devotees, theological interpretations must be employed to fulfill that task. this eventually leads to the condemnation of masturbation by connecting it with impurity, lust or addiction. notably, abrahamic religions and buddhism are similar in the sense that they seem to differentiate moral conduct into two levels. marriage is recommended for those who still want to be involved with the worldly life, while celibacy is reserved for the higher level. of course, abstaining from sexual activity of muslims on ramadan implies the impurity of sex even though the full-time celibacy is not recommended and the monastic life is not available as a choice as is the case in catholicism and buddhism. this is interesting when the buddhist view provides the same explanations, which is not based on the idea of god’s command, but is based solely on spiritual aspects like suffering and dependent origination. having compared the worldviews on masturbation, it finds some similarities between abrahamic religions and buddhism when some roots of given reasons are scrutinized. in addition, when self-discipline, becomes equated with abstaining from masturbation, it validates a hierarchical priest-led organization, and can lead to various types of domination of domestic life. endnotes 1 jesada buaban, universitas gadjah mada, yogyakarta. email: jesada.tee@ gmail.com 2 heinze andrew r. jews and the american soul: human nature in the twentieth century. (new jersey: princeton university press, 2006), 1 3 boteach shmuel. kosher sex: a recipe for passion and intimacy. (new york: random house llc, 2000), 36 66 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 4 tsuria ruth. from sin to sick: digital judaism and pornography. (journal of media and religion. vol. 16, no. 4, 2017): 120 5 coleman eli. masturbation as a means of achieving sexual health. (journal of psychology & human sexuality. vol. 14, no. 2-3, 2003): 8 6 meiller carolyn and candice hargons. it’s happiness and relief and release: exploring masturbation among bisexual and queer women. (journal of counseling sexology & sexual wellness: research, practice, and education. vol.1, no. 1, 2019): 3 7 zimmer felix and roland imhoff. abstinence from masturbation and hypersexuality. archives of sexual behavior. vol. 49, no. 1, 2020): 1333 8 fahs breanne and elena frank. notes from the back room: gender, power, and (in) visibility in women’s experiences of masturbation. (the journal of sex research. vol. 51, no. 3, 2014): 241 9 bowman christin. women’s masturbation: experiences of sexual empowerment in a primarily sex-positive sample. (psychology of women quarterly. vol. 38, no. 3, 2014): 363 10 ajzenstadt mimi and gabriel cavaglion. the sexual body of the young jew as an arena of ideological struggle, 1821–1948. (symbolic interaction. vol. 25, no. 1, 2002): 97 11 kwee alex and david hoover. theologically-informed education about masturbation: a male sexual health perspective. (journal of psychology and theology. vol. 36, no. 4, 2008): 262 12 garasic mirko. sexuality in the jewish tradition. (studia bioethica. vol. 11, no. 3, 2018): 31 13 dorff elliot. matters of life and death. (philadelphia: jewish publication society, 2003): 118 14 wiesner merry and merry wiesner-hanks. christianity and sexuality in the early modern world: regulating desire, reforming practice. (london: routledge, 2000): 23 15 garasic, sexuality, 28 16 wiesner-hanks, jews, 31 17 nabbout mariam. masturbation is halal: hashtag goes viral in saudi arabia, sparks debate. (retrieved on january 13, 2021 from https://bit.ly/3bkm49r, 2018) 18 rushwan hamid. female genital mutilation (fgm) management during pregnancy, childbirth and the postpartum period. (international journal of gynecology & obstetrics. vol. 70, no. 1, 2000) 19 brock sebastian. asceticism and christological controversy in fifth-century palestine. (london: oxford university press, 2006): 188) 20 başkan birol. from religious empires to secular states: state secularization in turkey, iran, and russia. (abingdon, oxfordshire: routledge, 2014): 78 jesada buaban 67 21 olson carl. celibacy and religious traditions. (london: oxford university press, 2007): 134) 22 robinson thomas and hillary rodrigues. world religions: a guide to the essentials. (michigan: baker academic, 2014): 148 23 buswell robert and donald lopez jr. the princeton dictionary of buddhism. (new jersey: princeton university press, 2013): 894 24 esposito john, darrell fasching, and todd lewis. world religions today. (london: oxford university press, 2009): 262 25 muehlberger ellen. ambivalence about the angelic life: the promise and perils of an early christian discourse of asceticism. (journal of early christian studies. vol. 16, no. 4, 2008): 451 26 wiesner-hanks, jews, 62) 27 weber max. protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. (london: routledge, 2005) 28 wiesner-hanks, jews, 29 29 inhorn, marcia. islam, sex, and sin: ivf ethnography as muslim men’s confessional. (anthropological quarterly. vol. 91, no. 1, 2018): 26 30 beckert jens and milan zafirovski, (eds.). international encyclopedia of economic sociology. (london: routledge, 2006: 53 31 brown jonathan. misquoting muhammad: the challenge and choices of interpreting the prophet’s legacy. (simon and schuster, 2014): 24 32 brignone michele. religious authorities in islam. (retrieved from https:// www.oasiscenter.eu/en/religious-authorities-islam, 2017). 33 fadl-allāh. hukm al-istimnā. retrieved on january 13, 2021 from https:// bit.ly/35bhlyo, 2009. references alipour, mehrdadali. “essentialism and islamic theology of homosexuality: a critical reflection on an essentialist epistemology toward same-sex desires and acts in islam.” journal of homosexuality. vol. 64, no. 14, 2017. 1930-1942. ajzenstadt, mimi, and gabriel cavaglion. “the sexual body of the young jew as an arena of ideological struggle, 1821–1948.” symbolic interaction. vol. 25, no. 1, 2002. 93-116. beckert, jens, and milan zafirovski, eds. international encyclopedia of economic sociology. london: routledge, 2006. 68 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june brignone, michele. religious authorities in islam. retrieved on january 13, 2020 from https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/religious-authoritiesislam, 2017. başkan, birol. from religious empires to secular states: state secularization in turkey, iran, and russia. abingdon, oxfordshire: routledge, 2014 boteach, shmuel. the broken american male: and how to fix him. new york: macmillan, 2008. bowman, christin. “women’s masturbation: experiences of sexual empowerment in a primarily sex-positive sample.” psychology of women quarterly. vol. 38, no. 3, 2014. 363-378. boteach, shmuel. kosher sex: a recipe for passion and intimacy. new york: random house llc, 2000. brown, jonathan. misquoting muhammad: the challenge and choices of interpreting the prophet’s legacy. simon and schuster, 2014. buswell jr, robert e., and donald s. lopez jr. the princeton dictionary of buddhism. new jersey: princeton university press, 2013. coleman, eli. “masturbation as a means of achieving sexual health.” journal of psychology & human sexuality. vol. 14, no. 2-3, 2003. 5-16. brock, sebastian. asceticism and christological controversy in fifthcentury palestine. london: oxford university press, 2006. dorff, elliot. matters of life and death. philadelphia: jewish publication society, 2003. esposito, john l., darrell j. fasching, and todd lewis. world religions today. london: oxford university press, 2009. fadl-allāh. hukm al-istimnā. retrieved on january 13, 2021 from https:// bit.ly/35bhlyo, 2009. foster, richard. money, sex & power: the spiritual disciplines of poverty, chastity and obedience, 1985. jesada buaban 69 fahs, breanne, and elena frank. “notes from the back room: gender, power, and (in) visibility in women’s experiences of masturbation.” the journal of sex research. vol. 51, no. 3, 2014. 241-252. garasic, mirko. “sexuality in the jewish tradition.” studia bioethica. vol. 11, no. 3, 2018. 27-32. heinze, andrew r. jews and the american soul: human nature in the twentieth century. new jersey: princeton university press, 2006. inhorn, marcia. “islam, sex, and sin: ivf ethnography as muslim men’s confessional.” anthropological quarterly. vol. 91, no. 1, 2018. 25-51. kwee, alex., and david hoover. “theologically-informed education about masturbation: a male sexual health perspective.” journal of psychology and theology. vol. 36, no. 4, 2008. 258-269. kugle, scott siraj al-haqq. homosexuality in islam: critical reflection on gay, lesbian, and transgender muslims. oxford, england: oneworld publications, 2010. meiller, carolyn, and candice n. hargons. “it’s happiness and relief and release: exploring masturbation among bisexual and queer women.” journal of counseling sexology & sexual wellness: research, practice, and education. vol.1, no. 1, 2019. 3-13. muehlberger, ellen. “ambivalence about the angelic life: the promise and perils of an early christian discourse of asceticism.” journal of early christian studies. vol. 16, no. 4, 2008. 447-478. nabbout, mariam. “masturbation is halal: hashtag goes viral in saudi arabia, sparks debate.” retrieved on january 13, 2021 from https://bit.ly/3bkm49r, 2018. olson, carl. celibacy and religious traditions. london: oxford university press, 2007. robinson, thomas., and hillary, rodrigues. world religions: a guide to the essentials. michigan: baker academic, 2014. 70 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june rushwan, hamid. “female genital mutilation (fgm) management during pregnancy, childbirth and the postpartum period.” international journal of gynecology & obstetrics. vol. 70, no. 1, 2000. 99-104. tsuria, ruth. “from sin to sick: digital judaism and pornography.” journal of media and religion. vol. 16, no. 4, 2017. 117-128. weber, max. protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. london: routledge, 2005. wiesner, merry., and merry wiesner-hanks. christianity and sexuality in the early modern world: regulating desire, reforming practice. london: routledge, 2000. zimmer, felix, and roland imhoff. “abstinence from masturbation and hypersexuality.” archives of sexual behavior. vol. 49, no. 1, 2020. 1333-1343. prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 93 vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 93-104 © 2000 by assumption university press soba chettry and mohammad manzoor malik abstract there are two contrasting positions concerning status of women built on biblical verses: egalitarians and complementarians. the egalitarian position asserts that women and men are equal in all senses whereas the complementarian position takes the view that men and women complement one other. therefore, both positions have implications concerning the role of gender in society. this article explores the passages in the bible relevant to the topic and how they provide a ground for both positions. the main focus will be on the understanding and interpretation of bible verse (gal 3:28). based upon this examination, the researcher will try to defend the complementarian position. key words: egalitarianism; complementarianism; gender equality; biblical studies introduction in the bible. they are the egalitarianism and the complementarianism position. the egalitarianism believes that males and females are equal and should hold equal roles and positions of authority based upon their abilities, in the home, church, and society.1 it is understood from the 94 bible verse (gal 3:28), which says that all are equal in christ through baptism. in contrast, complementarianism believes that males and females 2 it is understood from another verse in the book of 1 cor. 11:3 (niv), where it says that the head of the woman is a man. both positions appeal to the inerrancy of the bible.3 this topic is sensitive and controversial; however, the researcher in this article aims to provide more light than heat. the researcher intends the status of women. and in this regard, the researcher defends the complementarian position on the status of women in the bible. the initial impetus of the debate stems from the popularity of feminism. feminist movements have brought many positive changes in themselves as christian egalitarians. in the opinion of the researcher, this often has led to a distortion of the scriptural explanation of the divine role assigned to gender.4 the biblical narrative on women; second, it will discuss the egalitarian position and its argument; and third, it will discuss the complementarian argument could be refuted from the complementarian position. women in the bible regarding the authority of the bible, in the book of 2 timothy 2: 16 (niv), paul says that “all scripture is given by inspiration of god, righteousness.”5 in the book of matthew 24: 35 (niv), jesus christ, the and authenticity by saying that “heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.”6 therefore, the bible insists that it is the 95 highest authority on the matters it discusses, and among these matters is gender. and female. it says, “so god created man in his own image, in the image of god he created him; male and female he created them.” 7 as john calvin interpreted this verse, the man was not complete in himself and needed a partner so that both could be one. the following genesis 2: 18 (niv) says, “the lord god said, it is not good for the man to be alone. i will make a helper suitable for him”.9 this verse clearly mentions that a female is a helper or a partner, which means an assistant to a male. in the following chapter of genesis 3:16 (niv), addressing the woman, it says: “i will surely multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children. your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you”.10 closely connected to the abovementioned details, which show how the bible distinguishes between gender, there is also an assertion that these 22:5 (niv) says, “the woman shall not wear that which pertained unto a abomination unto the lord thy god.” 11 the verse shows us that men and is disgraceful. if god is very particular in the dress code between men and women, why not in gender and its role? the new testament consists of 27 books. the book of matthew 27: being involved in the ministry of jesus christ. it says, “there were also many women there, looking on from a distance, who had followed jesus from galilee, ministering to him, among whom were mary magdalene and mary the mother of james and joseph and the mother of the sons of zebedee.”12 on the other hand, in the book of 1 corinthian 14:33-35 (niv), it is mentioned that the woman should not speak in the church but should be quiet and learn with her husband at home. it says, “for god is 96 not a god of confusion but of peace. as in all the churches of the saints, the women should keep silent in the churches. for they are not permitted to speak, but should be in submission, as the law also says. if there is anything they desire to learn, let them ask their husbands at home. for it is shameful for a woman to speak in church.”13 in addition to that, the book of ephesian 5: 22 (niv) counsels that “wives, submit to your own husbands, as to the lord. for the husband is the head of the wife even as christ is the head of the church, his body, and is himself its savior.”14 egalitarianism egalitarianism argues that everyone is equal and should have the same rights and opportunities.15 alexander strauch, an author of the book entitled , explains the meaning of egalitarian, egalitarianism, that men and women are completely equal and the bible, especially new testament does not instruct traditional male-female 16 supporters of egalitarianism gathered in 1987 to publish their scriptural point of view in a new academic journal, . with the assistance and vision of these people, cbe universal (established as christians for biblical equality) was set up on january 2, 1988. cbe is president of the organization. since 2001, mimi haddad has served as 17 in short, the egalitarian perspective of equality is husband and roles according to gender; males and females are equal before god. egalitarian arguments christian egalitarians use the bible verses to argue against the complementarian position. for example, the book of galatian 3: 28 (niv) says, “there is neither jew nor gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in christ jesus.” christian egalitarians 97 place great importance on this verse and interpret it as asserting total equality. in jesus christ, all are equal; therefore, men and women can both be leaders in the homes, church, or elsewhere. in her book, , groothuis, r. m., an egalitarian, explains that times have changed the christian community. in truth, numerous researchers accept that the early christians asserted their solidarity and correspondence in christ social, or sexual status and is raised to a new life in christ. the book of gelasian 3:27 (niv) says, “for all of you who were baptized into christ have clothed yourselves with christ,” paul announces. women, no less 19 an egalitarian, wayne grudem explains gal. 3:28 as a verse that to salvation by faith or unity in christ. that truth is certainly verbalized all through scripture. yet the verse carries a ring of widespread application to jesus christ. 20 j. lee grady, an egalitarian who wrote a book called “ 9, peter does not specify that this new covenant priesthood is limited to male christians. this passage makes no mention of gender because “there is neither male nor female... in christ, “which is mentioned in (gal. 3:28). 21 complementarianism complementarianism suggests that women and men complete very back to the biblical description of the creation of the woman. the biblical account of the creation of the woman is stated in genesis 2:2024 (niv) that god caused the man to fall into a deep sleep, and while he 98 then the lord god made a woman from the rib he had taken out of the man, and he brought her to the man. the man said, “this is now bone was taken out of man.” that is why a man leaves his father and mother 22 with that is the love that a woman should share with her husband, as mentioned in the book of titus chapter 2: 3-4 (niv), “likewise, teach the older women to be reverent in the way they live, not to be slanderers or addicted to much wine, but to teach what is good. then they can urge the younger women to love their husbands and children”.23 so, to be compassionate so the world can see a lovely partnership between a man and a woman. a collaboration that shows how god engages with his people (the church).24 complementarianism has been in use since december 1987 when the world christian leaders were concerned by the growth of unbiblical ideas concerning gender. so they met to articulate complementarianism in dallas, texas, usa. they agreed to form the council on biblical president of cbmw.25 the organization prepared a statement called the usa, in december 1989.26 the mission of the cbmw was to create lessons derived from scripture, concerning the complementary contrasts between males and females. they considered these lessons as essential for submission to the bible and for the wellbeing of the family and the church.27 the aim was to encourage homes, churches, schools, colleges, institutions, and other services to embrace the standards of the danvers articulation and the nashville explanation and apply them in a steady, heartfelt way. the complementarian stance holds that although there is a gender. children are to love and obey their parents and wives to comfort, 99 teach, and nurture the family and their husbands to protect, lead and provide for the family. according to john piper and wayne grudem, the term complementarianism was chosen because it implied both equality and positive distinctions between men and women. they disliked the label traditionalist because it indicates a reluctance to allow scripture to question old patterns of conduct, and they also despised the term hierarchism because it stresses organized authority while ignoring equality and the joy of interdependence.29 they also reject the term “hardliner” because it implies a refusal to allow the word of god to challenge traditional ways of life. 30 defense of complementarian position based upon the above considerations, the complementarian position seems closer to a biblically authentic position. as we discussed above one of the main claims that egalitarianism has made by their understanding of the biblical verse is that: male and female are both gal. 3:18(niv). however, the context of (galatian 3:18) is all about male or female, all are one before the eyes of god. it is about oneness rather than equality. spiritually, we all are royal priesthood, as 1 peter chapter 2 verse 9 says “but you are a chosen people, a royal priesthood, of him who called you out of darkness into his wonderful light”.31 the author believes that men should be the head of the family and assume the role of pastors and elders in the church. this does not mean a they should act in an authoritarian manner but as humble and christ-like servant leaders. dough batchelor, a pastor of the seventh-day adventist church, says that we cannot be wrong for about 1900 years of church history. if we all become prey to the popular mis-understandings of the feminist style of interpretation, then we are rejecting the age-old views of mathew henry, martin luther, adam clark, john wesley, john calvin, charles spurgeon, john gill, and others.32 100 john piper and wayne grudem say it is critical to carefully consider what paul says in galatians 3:28., “you are all one in christ jesus.” this of their similarity, he emphasizes their unity in christ.33 john piper and grudem conclude, “men and women both are spiritually equal in the eyes of god. (jr., 2011, p. 113). there is no need to assert that galatians 3:28 helps the idea of the egalitarianism of function in the church. it does doubtlessly instruct an followers in christ. the abrahamic guarantees, in their all around to the family of god. questions of performance and duty in that body can be replied to by a study of another bible verse”. 34 conclusion in the discussion above, we have found out that a close traditional reading of the bible seems to support the complementarian position on women. egalitarian interpreters rely on the use of galatians 3:28 (niv), to argue against the complementarian position. but they misinterpret between male or female; women are equal in all aspects with their male counterparts. however, a closer reading of this verse suggests that we all are one in christ as a community but we are not the same individually. 101 endnotes 1 ronald pierce, rebecca merrill groothuis, and gordon fee, (amsterdam, netherlands: 2 john piper wayne grudem, (crossway, 3 1 cor 11:3 (niv). 4 “together for the gospel,” june 17, 2016, accessed february 24, 2023, 5 tim. 3:16 (niv). 6 mt. 24:35 (niv). 7 gen. 1:27 (niv). john calvin, , 1.1 (christian classics ethereal library, 2009), 54. 9 gen. 2:18 (niv). 10 gen. 3:26 (niv). 11 deut. 22:5 (niv). 12 mt. 27:55-56 (niv). 13 1 cor. 14:33-35 (niv). 14 eph. 5: 22 (niv). 15 16 alexander strauch, 17 gal. 3: 28 (niv). 19 rebecca groothuis, (zaltbommel, netherlands: van haren publishing, 1996), 34. 20 wayne grudem, (crossway, 2012), 891. 21 lee grady, (new york, united states: penguin random house, 2006), 100. 22 gen. 2:20-24 (niv). 23 tit. 2:3-4 (niv). 102 24 jennifer heeren, “why did god create woman?” crosswalk.com, july 26, 25 26 (crossway, 2006), 479. 27 . ibid. 29 john piper and wayne grudem, 30 john piper and wayne grudem, (crossway, 2006), 11. 31 1 pet. 2:9 (niv). 32 jesuwiederkunft, “women pastors: a biblical perspective (doug batchelor),” 33 ronald pierce, rebecca merrill groothuis, and gordon fee, (amsterdam, netherlands: 34 john piper and wayne grudem, (amsterdam, netherlands: adfo books, 1991), 157. 103 references cbe international. “history of cbe,” january 4, 2023. . . cbmw. “our history,” april 6, 2021. . cbmw. “our history,” april 6, 2021. . calvin, john. . 1.1. christian classics ethereal library, 2009. grady, lee. . new york, united states: penguin random house, 2006. grudem, john piper wayne. . crossway, 1992. groothuis, rebecca grudem, wayne. . crossway, 2012. heeren, jennifer. “why did god create woman?” crosswalk.com, july create-woman.html. . crossway, 2006. piper, john and wayne grudem. . crossway, 2016. 104 ———. . amsterdam, netherlands: adfo books, 1991. strauch, alexander. “together for the gospel,” june 17, 2016. accessed february 24, 2023. . ferry hidayat 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 1-32 © 2000 by assumption university press on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia abstract the indonesian concept of budaya and its derivatives such as budi, budidaya, kebudayaan, budiman, budi pekerti, as well as budayawan were sacred concepts long ago. however, with the emergence of cultural anthropology by indonesian anthropologists from the 1960s onwards, the concept of budaya became desacralized. its desacralization started when budaya was construed as culture by indonesian cultural anthropologists, and ilmu-ilmu budaya was interpeted as the humanities. this paper explores the sacred concept of budaya prior to the emergence of the cultural anthropology, then investigates the desacralization of the concept of budaya through the history of indonesian cultural anthropology and finally attempts to offer a re-sacralization of the concept of budaya by revitalizing the concept through the indonesian hindu and islamic metaphysical heritage. the re-sacralization of the indonesian concept of budaya will provide a pathway to the emergence of a budaya anthropology which can correct some of the problems of the profanized cultural anthropology. keywords: budaya, budi, culture, cultural anthropology, re-sacralization. 2 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december the original ontological conception of budaya etymologically, the indonesian word budaya is taken from the sanskrit word buddhayah. its devanagri script is . its synonym is , transcripted as buddhi. in hindu literature, buddhayah or buddhi has some meanings, all of which are metaphysical and supernatural. first of all, buddhayah or buddhi means intellectual perception;1 it is an internal faculty which is the source of the two other internal faculties called ahankara (self-consciousness) and manas (mind). buddhayah or buddhi is evolved from an original primordial ‘eternally existing essence’ which evolves or produces everything else called prakriti. prakriti is a primal source of all productions in the universe;2 it is “originary producer” of visible, material nature.3 buddhi or buddhayah is a reflection of prakriti.4 by analogy, in other words, buddhi is a red flower, while prakriti is a crystal. the crystal is often wrongly held to possess red color because it is near the flower. the red color of the crystal is in fact the reflection of the red color of the near flower.5 human beings can activate their buddhayah or buddhi since they have buddhi indriyâni or “the organs of awareness”: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin.6 with these buddhi indriyâni, human beings can grasp the presence of the prakriti.7 secondly, buddhi or buddhayah means ‘the universal intellect’; it is one of manifestations of ‘the divine spirit’ or prajnâ. prajnâ has three modes of manifestation, each being a mystery in itself but descending to a lower outward manifestation. the three modes are ‘universal intellect’, ‘the man-logos’ (also called ‘revelation’) who reveals in human languages, and ‘the intellect’ in human beings.8 buddhi or buddhayah, as the first manifestation of prajnâ, is prajnâ in archangelic personifications in the macrocosm. the second manifestation of prajnâ, lower than buddhi, is ‘the man-logos’, the archetypes of certain human beings; it is khresna or arjuna in his archetypal plane, or in his prajnâ form.9 lower than ‘the man-logos’ in the manifestation hierarchy of prajnâ is ‘the intellect’ within human beings’ soul in the microcosm.10 it is manifest in hindu figures such as ramanuja, shankara, sri vivekananda, ananda e. ferry hidayat 3 coomaraswamy, etc. ‘the intellect’ within the human soul is also called buddhi or buddhayah; it is ‘the highest faculty of knowledge, distinct from manas, that is, mind or reason’. this buddhi or buddhayah is immanent in the heart of every human (schuon 2008:246).11 although buddhi is inherent, it is still potential. to awaken it, a person must do buddhi-yoga, a spiritual exercise and training.12 this buddhi or buddhayah, when awakened, supplies good qualities to human beings such as higher judgement, instant understanding, discrimination between good and evil, intuition, love that has no bounds, and consequent universal forgiveness.13 the person whose awakened buddhi or buddhayah is called in sanskrit, buddhi-cintaka, while a person who lost his buddhi is called buddhi-cyuta.14 prajnâ, whose manifestation is buddhi or buddhayah, is itself the third or the lowest manifestation of the highest mystery. the highest mystery has three levels of mysteriosness in descending order: âtmâ (‘the pure absolute’), being (‘the manifested pure absolute’), and prajnâ (‘the divine spirit’). âtmâ (‘the pure absolute’) is the highest mystery in its purest state; indescribable, unqualifiable, unimaginable, unthinkable.15 lower than it in the hierarchy of mysteriousness is being. it is âtmâ manifested, clothed in an outward lower manifestation. this is what is called vishnu, shiva, or brahma in hindu, who creates, reveals, and judges.16 below it in the hierarchy of the highest mystery’s mysteriousness is prajnâ.17 lastly, buddhayah or buddhi means a ray from the cosmic principle alaya-mahat.18 alaya-mahat is the universal mind, of which buddhi or buddhayah is a temporary reflection.19 the ontological concept of buddhayah or buddhi as an internal faculty of human intellectual perception, as a manifestation of prajnâ in the macrocosm and the microcosm, and as a ray of the universal mind (alaya-mahat) as well, is adopted by indonesian lexicography. kamus besar bahasa indonesia (kbbi, kamus besar bahasa indonesia, ‘the big dictionary of bahasa indonesia’), for instance, still retains the 4 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december spiritual, metaphysical trace of this primordial, ontological concepts of buddhayah or buddhi. the bahasa word ‘budi’ is defined in kbbi as “alat batin yg merupakan paduan akal dan perasaan untuk menimbang baik dan buruk” (an internal faculty which combines reasoning and feeling for discerning the good and the evil), whereas ‘budaya’ is defined therein as a synonym of budi.20 a person who activates his budi to discern good and evil— buddhi-cintaka—is called by kbbi as ‘budiman’.21 the sanskrit word buddhi indriyâni is taken and spelled by kbbi as ‘indra’, or rather ‘pancaindra’— ‘alat perasa yg lima macam yaitu penglihat, pencium, pengecap, perasa tubuh, dan pendengar’ (the five human senses, which are sight, smelling, tasting, touch, and hearing).22 javanese literature also inherits the original, ontological concept of buddhi or buddhayah. as an illustration, serat centhini, an old javanese literary work written in 1903, mentions budi and construes it as an intermediary between being (‘wujud tanpa kahanan’) and âtmâ (‘kak sajati’): wujud tanpa kahanan puniki ing dalem kak sajati lantaran inggih budi lantarané sarupa wujud ing hu pan jumeneng muhammad latip mustakik ing hyang suksma kenyatanipun budi wujud ing hyang suksma inggih budi inggih hyang kang mahasuci budi tatabonira.23 (the being without material existence amidst the pure absolute has an intermediary called budi which is a reflection of the being it is the archetypal muhammad ferry hidayat 5 a reflection of the divine spirit and its manifestation budi is a reflection of the divine spirit budi is the holy spirit budi is the holy spirit’s castle.) presumably, this hindu ontological concept penetrated into javanese metaphysical horizon and had inspired the founders of a javanese intellectuals association in 1908 so as to call their association ‘budi utomo’ or ‘the eminent budi’. the famous members of the association such as wahidin soedirohoesodo, soetomo, m. soeradji, radjiman wedyodiningrat, and supomo, among others, practice a kind of mysticism that displays the hindu spiritualism and primitive javanese religiosity,24 emphasize in their speeches the hindu tradition of java, hold discussions on topics of the continuous hindu influence of ancient java as well as stimulate a new interest to revitalize and reconstruct their hindu-javanese past in their javanese movement, budi utomo.25 the javanese people’s traditional association of their religion as ‘agama budi’ is also indicative of this hindu spiritual heritage.26 even the foundation of kementerian pendidikan dan kebudayaan (indonesia’s ministry of education and kebudayaan), side-by-side with kementerian agama (indonesia’s ministry of religious affairs), is presumed to aim at the retainment of this hindu metaphysics of buddhayah within indonesian people’s national ideology of education.27 the profanization of budaya the indonesian metaphysical, sacred concept of budi and budaya, taken from the hindu ontology of buddhi or buddhayah, had in turn been desacralized and profanized. the profanization was mainly promoted by indonesian modernist thinkers such as tan malaka (1894-1949), sutan sjahrir (1909-1966), sutan takdir alisjahbana (1908-1994), and the indonesian literature movement of the 1945.28 6 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december tan malaka, for instance, in his book massa actie (1926) criticized budi utomo and its roots in hindu metaphysics and opposed the hindu concept of budaya and claimed it as the concept of the slaves which must be eradicated: …dari dulu sampai sekarang kaum b.u. menghabiskan waktu dengan pekerjaan memanggil-manggil arwah yang telah lama meninggal dunia. borobudur yang kolot , wayang dan gamelan yang merana, semuanya buah ‘kebudayaan perbudakan’, ditambah dan digembar-gemborkan mereka siang dan malam. di dalam ‘lingkungan sendiri’ kerapkali dukun-dukun politik itu menyuruh hayam wuruk—raja hindu atau setengah hindu itu—dengan laskarnya yang kuat berbaris di muka mereka. tetapi di luar kumpulan gaib itu seboleh-bolehnya dibicarakan soal-soal yang tak berbahaya. di dalam kongres b.u. berkali-kali (sampai menjemukan) kebudayaan dan seni jawa (?) dibicarakan. soal penting yaitu yang mengenai penghidupan rakyat di jawa—jangan dikata lagi di seluruh indonesia, tak pernah disentuh, jangankan diperbincangkan mereka.29 [... since a long time ago b.u. members have been spending their time by conjuring up the spirits of their ancestors. the ancient borobudur temple, puppet performance and gamelan, all of which are fruits of ‘the kebudayaan of the slaves’, are more and more widespread by them nights and days. in their own ‘circle’ these political shamans conjure up hayam wuruk—the hindu or the half-hindu king—with his powerful troops to march before their presence. out of their esoteric circle, however, trivial political issues are discussed. in b.u. congresses javanese kebudayaan and art (?) are explained on and on (so boringly), while a key issue that concerns with javanese people’s prosperity—let alone with all indonesian people’s prosperity is never dealt with, nor talked over.] ferry hidayat 7 sutan sjahrir, in his memoir of his political exile dated 20 june 1935, criticized the budaya metaphysics as the feudal, aristocratic metaphysics resembling the middle-age western metaphysics that must be destroyed. he called instead for the adoption of a modern western scientific way of thinking: di sini sejak berabad-abad tidak ada kehidupan rohani, tidak ada kehidupan budaya, tidak ada sama sekali kemajuan. memang ada pengungkapan seni timur yang banyak dipuji-puji, akan tetapi apakah itu semua tiada lain dari perkembangan yang tidak sempurna dari kebudayaan feodal, yang tidak mungkin menjadi tempat berpegang bagi kita, orang-orang abad keduapuluh? apa bisanya wayang dengan segala lambang-lambangnya yang sahaja dan mistik itu—yang sejajar dengan cerita-cerita kiasan (allegori) dan ilmu batin abad menengah di eropa—yang menyumbangkan sesuatu yang bersifat intelektual dan kultural secara umum kepada kita? kebutuhan rohani kita adalah kebutuhan abad keduapuluh, masalah-masalah kita, pandangan kita adalah dari abad keduapuluh. selera kita bukan menuju kepada mistik, tetapi kepada kenyataan, kejelasan dan kelugasan (realiteit, helderheid, zekelyheid)… kebutuhan rohani kita, kita tergantung dari barat, bukan secara ilmiah saja, melainkan juga secara budaya umumnya…30 [since a long time ago there has been no spiritual dynamism here, there has been no dynamism of budaya here, there has been no progress at all. it is true that there are eastern art expressions which are much praised here, yet aren’t they only imperfect development of kebudayaan of the feudal society, which are impossible to be withheld by us, the people of the twentieth century? what can the puppet performance and all its mystical symbolism—which are similar to allegorical stories and to the mysticism of the medieval age europe—generally contribute to our intellectual growth and our cultural progress? our spiritual aspiration is the 8 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december twentieth century aspiration, and our problems as well as our perspective are the twentieth century ones. mysticism is not to our taste; ours are reality, clarity, and explicitness (realiteit, helderheid, zekelyheid)... the west doesn’t only fulfil generally our spiritual aspirations but also fulfils our scientific as well as cultural aspirations...] sutan takdir alisjahbana criticized the budaya spiritualism as a cause of the colonialism by the dutch in indonesia and promoted the western materialism, egoism, individualism, and capitalism to be adopted and applied by indonesian people: kalau kita analyseeren masyarakat kita dan sebab-sebabnya kalah bangsa kita dengan perlombaan bangsa-bangsa di dunia, maka nyatalah kepada kita bahwa menjadi statischnya, menjadi matinya, tiada berjiwanya masyarakat bangsa kita ialah karena berabad-abad itu kurang memakai otaknya, kurang egoisme (yang saya maksud bahagiannya yang sehat), kurang materialisme... otak indonesia harus diasah menyamai otak barat! individu harus dihidupkan sehidup-hidupnya! keinsyafan akan kepentingan diri harus disadarkan sesadar-sadarnya! bangsa indonesia harus dianjurkan mengumpulkan harta dunia sebanyak-banyak mungkin!31 [if we analyze our society and the causes of our nation’s failure in the competition among all nations on earth, it is clear that our society have become statisch, and have become dead, and have become unmotivated for centuries due to the fact that our society use their brains less, and they lack of egoism (i mean, the positive part of it), and they lack of materialism... the brain of indonesians must be reeled over and over so as to be similar to the brains of westerners! individuality must be shown over and over! the self-interest realization must be encouraged on and on! the nation of indonesia must be encouraged to get as abundant worldly possession as possible!] ferry hidayat 9 in line with sutan takdir’s criticism of budaya, the indonesian literature movement of the 1945 (whose members are the famous literati like chairil anwar, asrul sani, rivai apin, akbar djuhana, h.b. jassin, and sitor situmorang) criticized the budaya metaphysics believing that it should be cast away in a revolutionary manner on their art manifesto called known as surat kepercayaan gelanggang: …kami tidak akan memberikan suatu kata ikatan untuk kebudayaan indonesia. kalau kami berbicara tentang kebudayaan indonesia, kami tidak ingat kepada melaplap hasil kebudayaan lama sampai berkilat dan untuk dibanggakan,… revolusi bagi kami ialah penempatan nilainilai baru atas nilai-nilai usang yang harus dihancurkan….32 [... we will never tie ourselves with the kebudayaan of indonesia. if we discuss about it, it does not mean that we polish achievement of the old kebudayaan over and over so that it shines out and it can be praised up,... the meaning of revolution to us is to replace new values over obsolete values and to destroy them...] the modernist thinkers’ hatred of the old budaya metaphysics and spiritualism is followed by the secularization of and the desacralization of budaya by indonesian cultural anthropologists in the 1960s onwards. cultural anthropologists like sutan takdir alisjahbana, sidi gazalba (a sutan takdir’s disciple), koentjaraningrat, dick hartoko, etc., began to connect the ontological concept of budaya with the western modern profanized, desacralized concept of culture. as an illustration, sutan takdir’s book was translated into english by benedict r. anderson and entitled indonesia in the modern world (1961), in which anderson translated kebudayaan—the most primary key word in sutan takdir’s anthropological discourse—into the english word culture throughout all pages of the book.33 this translation later influenced all indonesian cultural anthropologists’ construction of budaya. sidi gazalba, a sutan takdir’s 10 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december pupil, closely identified budaya with culture in his book sistematika filsafat (1973): definisi kebudayaan. suatu kebudayaan ialah cara berpikir dan cara merasa, yang menyatakan diri dalam seluruh segi kehidupan sekelompok manusia, yang membentuk kesatuan sosial dalam suatu ruang dan suatu waktu. cara berpikir dan cara merasa itu menyatakan diri dalam cara berlaku dan cara berbuat. dengan demikian definisi itu dapat diperpendek: cara berlaku-berbuat dalam kehidupan. kependekan ini dapat diperpendek lagi: cara hidup (way of life, kata ungkapan inggris). jadi kebudayaan meliputi seluruh kehidupan manusia. kehidupan begitu luas, sehingga menjadi kabur pengertiannya. untuk lebih jelas dapat memperpegangi apa apa itu kehidupan, ia dapat kita bagi dalam sejumlah segi atau faset. segi kehidupan yang kita maksud identis dengan apa yang diistilahkan oleh antropologi dengan cultural universal, atau pola kebudayaan sejagat, yaitu segi-segi kebudayaan yang universil ditemukan dalam tiap kebudayaan….34 [definition of kebudayaan. a kebudayaan is the way of thinking and the way of feeling self-expressing in all aspects of life of a group of people, which establish a social unity in a space and at a time. both the way of thinking and the way of feeling are manifest in the way of behaving and the way of acting. to put it short, it is the way of behaving and the way of acting in life. even shorter, it is the way of life (an english expression). accordingly, kebudayaan deals with whole life of human beings. since life is so vast, its definition could be vague. to clarify what is meant by life herein, we identify some of its aspects or facets. the facets of life which we mean herein are identical to those called by anthropology as ferry hidayat 11 cultural universal, or universal pattern of kebudayaan, or aspects of kebudayaan which are found universally in each kebudayaan.] koentjaraningrat, a cultural anthropologist who graduated from the yale university under the tutelage of professor george p. murdock—and who contributed much to cross-cultural survey initiated by murdock— wrote a book titled kebudayaan, mentalitet dan pembangunan (1974), in which he emphasized the juxtaposition of budaya with the western modern secularized definition of culture: kata “kebudayaan” berasal dari kata sanskerta buddhayah, ialah bentuk jamak dari buddhi yang berarti “budi” atau “akal”… kebudayaan menurut hemat saya antara lain berarti: keseluruhan gagasan dan karya manusia, yang harus dibiasakannya dengan belajar, beserta keseluruhan dari hasil budi dan karyanya itu, maka istilah “kebudayaan” memang suatu istilah yang amat cocok. adapun istilah inggerisnya berasal dari kata latin colere, yang berarti “mengolah, mengerjakan”, terutama mengolah tanah atau bertani. dari arti ini berkembang arti culture, sebagai segala daya dan usaha manusia untuk merobah alam.35 [the word “kebudayaan” originates from a sanskrit word buddhayah, a plural form of buddhi, which means “budi” or “akal”... to me kebudayaan means: an aggregate of human thoughts and human actions which must be made accustomed through learning as well as an aggregate of results of the human thoughts and human actions, hence the term “kebudayaan” is a very suitable term. its english synonym originates from latin word colere, which means “to cultivate, to act”, which particularly signifies land cultivation or farming. out of this significance develops the meaning of culture as all human endeavors and human efforts to alter the nature.] in 1976, dick hartoko translated a book by the dutch cultural 12 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december anthropologist cornelis anthonie van peursen entitled strategie van de cultuur (1970) into bahasa, where hartoko juxtaposed the dutch cultuur with budaya and simultaneously construed budaya as something to be engineered, to be manipulated, and to be shamelessly exploited in the best interests of a powerful political elite.36 such a translation demostrates this process of desacralization of budaya. furthermore, sutan takdir alisjahbana, in his english writings in 1988, equated the bahasa budaya with the english word culture, german kultur and the the tendencies of western modern developmentalism, further desacralizing the old ontological concept of budaya: the appearance of man in the course of evolution has brought a great change in the total process of life on our planet. while the animal lives on the basis of its drives and instincts, in man through his upright position a change took place in the form and structure of his brain, which enabled the emergence of new capacities and potentialities in his psychological make-up which in the english language are called mind and spirit. while the animal lives in nature as a part of nature, man transcends his natural surrounding and creates new entities in which he lives his life, and which we call culture. in the german language the combination of mind and spirit is called geist so that in the german language the geisteswissenschaften run parallel with the kulturwissenschaften. in the indonesian language we have used for the concept of geist, that is the combination of mind and spirit, the word budi which characterized man as the enlightened animal. it is thus especially in the indonesian language that the relation between the psychological makeup of man and his culture is the most clearly expressed since from budi derives directly budidaya or kebudayaan which means the power or result of the budi. it is in the great process of change created by budi and budidaya that the concept of development…has its broadest basis….37 ferry hidayat 13 the profanization of the budaya ontology by indonesian cultural anthropologists is followed later by the desecration of the metaphysical concept of budaya by indonesian linguists and lexicographers. for example, kamus besar bahasa indonesia (kbbi) records the idiom ‘bermain budi’, which means ‘bermain otak untuk menipu’ (to deceive by beating someone’s brains out).38 also, there is a verb ‘memperbudikan’, which means ‘menipu’ (to deceive).39 the phrase ‘budi pekerti’, taken from two metaphysical words ‘buddhi’ and ‘prakriti’, has been desacralized so that it is only construed as ‘tingkah laku, perangai, akhlak’ (behavior, character, habitual act).40 this has aligned its meaning with western psychological behaviorism. the word ‘kebudayaan’, unfortunately, suffers from the worst form of desacralization. kbbi defines it ‘hasil kegiatan dan penciptaan batin manusia spt kepercayaan, kesenian, dan adat istiadat’ (result produced out of human mind activity and creation such as belief, art, and customs).41 to state that religious belief is created through ordinary human thinking is to reduce it to humanism. this profane significance of kebudayaan leads to the production of other profanized words such as ‘budaya politik’, ‘pembudayaan’, ‘budayawan’, ‘budi daya’, and ‘kebudayaan rakyat’.42 it can be reasonably presumed that the juxtaposition of ilmu budaya and the humanities is a result of such a tendency. sutan takdir alisjahbana’s linguistic interpetations in his writing in a book on the politics of language continues this process of desacralization. suasana kebudayaan modern yang berbeda benar dari suasana kebudayaan daerah yang belum modern jelas mengenai suasana hukum dan administrasi kenegaraan dan terutama mengenai segala sesuatu yang menjelmakan unsur progresif kebudayaan modern, yaitu ilmu, teknologi, dan ekonomi yang melingkungi universitas, bank, dan pabrik. pada umumnya kita dapat berkata bahwa dalam kebudayaan modern itu berkuasa rasio, inisiatif, dan perhitungan yang nyata. sebaliknya, suasana bahasa daerah sebagai suasana lanjutan kebudayaan yang lama. perbedaan suasana ini 14 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december makin lama akan makin besar sehingga pada suatu ketika tentang konsep-konsep dan kata-katanya bahasa indonesia sebagai bahasa modern akan lebih dekat kepada bahasa inggris, bahasa jerman, bahasa belanda, dan lain-lain, karena sama-sama menjelmakan kebudayaan modern….43 [the difference between the state of modern kebudayaan and the state of not-yet modern kebudayaan of the regions are clearly seen in terms of law, state administration, and especially in terms of all progressive aspects which represent the modern kebudayaan, such as science, technology, and economy surrounding university, bank, and factory. we can posit generally that in the modern kebudayaan reason, initiative, and real calculation assume power. on the other hand, the state of regional languages is the continuing state of the ancient kebudayaan. the difference of both states of kebudayaan will turn so radical that someday concepts and words in indonesian language will be closer to english, german, dutch languages, etc. since they together represent the modern kebudayaan....] resacralization the re-sacralization of the present cultural anthropology can only be carried out as well by re-discovering the islamic metaphysical concepts which resemble the concept of buddhayah (‘the universal intellect’). it can be found, for instance, in the work of al-fârâbi (870-950) who is famous for his concept of al-‘aql (the intellect). al-fârâbi theorized that allah (god) created al-‘aql as an intermediary so as to create the material macrocosm and microcosm. first, allah created al-‘aql al-awwal (the first intellect). it is a manifested image of allah. it has full capacity for intellection, so through its intellection it gives rise to al-‘aql al-tsânî (the second intellect) and the first material sphere within the macrocosm, called ‘the first sphere’. al-‘aql al-tsânî also has full capacity for intellection, and through its intellectual activity it gives rise to al-‘aql al-tsâlits (the third intellect) and the second material sphere, “the sphere of the fixed stars.” likewise, through its intellection, ferry hidayat 15 al-‘aql al-tsâlits gives rise to al-‘aql al-râbi’ (the fourth intellect) called “the sphere of planets.” the al-‘aql al-râbi’ employs its full capacity for intellection and gives rise to al-‘aql al-khâmis (the fifth intellect) called ‘the sphere of jupiter.” the al-‘aql al-khâmis is followed by al‘aql al-sâdis (the sixth intellect), al-‘aql al-sâbi’ (the seventh intellect), al-‘aql al-tsâmin (the eighth intellect), and al-‘aql al-tâsi’ (the ninth intellect), with the corresponding spheres of mars, the sun, venus and mercury, respectively. the chain of the intellects terminates with al-‘aql al-âsyir (the tenth intellect) which, intellectualizing on itself, emanates the last material sphere called ‘the sphere of the moon.” the al-‘aql al-âsyir, due to its intense activeness in transmitting allah’s message, bestowing allah’s knowledge as well as granting allah’s wisdom inside human beings’ intellects, is also known as al-‘aql al-fa’âl (the active intellect).44 allah also creates al-‘aql in the microcosm—the internal faculty in human beings that functions to receive the transmitted message, the bestowed knowledge and the granted wisdom of allah, and to get connected with the macrocosmic al-‘aql al-fa’âl or the archangel.45 the person whose al-‘aql gets connected with the al-‘aql al-fa’âl is called to have al-‘aql al-mustafâd (the acquired intellect).46 al-fârâbi’s conception of al-‘aql is adopted by al-kindî,47 by avicenna,48 by al-ghazâlî,49 and by shihâbuddîn yahyâ al-suhrâwardî,50 among others, which means that it was very influential among muslim metaphysicians. al-fârâbi’s notion of al-‘aql is revived nowadays by an eminent malaysian metaphysician, syed muhammad naquib al-attas, particularly in his work, prolegomena to the metaphysics of islâm.51 another islamic conception which closely resembles the buddhayah as a ray of alaya-mahat is the notion of al-nûr (‘the light’). al-suhrâwardî theorizes that allah is the light of lights (nûru’l-anwâr) or al-nûr al-awwal (‘the first light’).52 he creates a light which enlightens “... material things to make their existences higher.”53 the light has two kinds: an incorporeal light (al-nûr al-mujarrad) and an accidental light (al-nûr al-‘aradhî). if the light illuminates a being through its al-nûr almujarrad and al-nûr al-‘aradhî, it becomes a soul or a spirit. conversely, 16 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december if a being is not illuminated by the light, a ghasaq (obscurity) or a hai’ah (form) falls on it and it becomes matter.54 the angels (al-malâikah) are the pure lights which gain enlightenment from al-nûr al-awwal. they are totally spiritual, incorporeal and immaterial since al-nûr al-mujarrad totally illuminates them and no ghasaq and no hai’ah (form) falls on it. the purest of the pure lights is called bahman or al-nûr al-aqrab (‘the nearest light’). al-nûr al-aqrab illuminates other pure lights through its al-nûr al-mujarrad and al-nûr al-‘aradhî. the other pure lights in turn illuminate beings around them so that the souls of the stars exist. if the souls of the stars get ghasaq or a hai’ah, the souls turn into matters, creating the material fixed stars and other heavenly bodies in the universe.55 one of the pure lights, called al-nûr al-muhammadî, becomes the archetype of human microcosm.56 al-nûr al-muhammadî illuminates the souls of human beings and creates material human beings.57 within each human being there is a light enlightening his mind, his self, and his body. if the light falls on his mind, it becomes the light of intelligence.58 when a human being loves material things more than spiritual things, his light will diminish. kâfirs (unbelievers) are in fact those who have the ‘gloomy light.’59 conversely, if a human being loves spiritual things more than material things, his light will luminously radiate and reach al-nûr al-awwal.60 the resembling metaphysical conception of al-nûr is also formulated by other metaphysicians among others like al-ghazâlî61 and ibn ‘arabî.62 the ontological notion of al-nûr is revived by a contemporary metaphysician, gibril fouad haddad.63 remnants of this islamic sacred conception of al-‘aql and al-nûr are found in the bahasa lexicography. the kbbi enlists ‘akal’,64 ‘akal budi’,65 ‘nur’,66 ‘nurani’,67 as well as ‘nuriah’,68 and the tesaurus bahasa indonesia clarifies that ‘berbudi’ is synonymous with ‘berakal’.69 the islamic concepts of al-‘aql and al-nûr, as exposed above, can re-sacralize and de-profanize the key anthropological concept of the cultural anthropology. ferry hidayat 17 the revolutionary implications if the hindu buddhayah or buddhi is identical with the islamic ‘aql or nûr, some revolutionary anthropological implications for the bahasa budaya or budi will arise. first, the juxtaposition of budaya with culture which has been established by the profanized indonesian cultural anthropologists is totally fallacious. budaya is not identical to culture at all. budaya is both metaphysical and ontological, whereas culture is very humanistic and secular. budaya is very godly and divine, while culture is very human and humane. budaya is eternal, unhistorical and stationary, whereas culture is changing, evolutionary, historical, and progressive. culture founds a secular and irreligious civilization, but this is not the case with budaya. budaya establishes a religious and sacred civilization. it follows that the english culture is identical with the bahasa kultur, not at all to budaya.70 secondly, cultural anthropologists or cultural philosophers deal with culture, while budayawan or metaphysicians or spiritualists or sufis or muta’allihûn deal with budaya. thirdly, ‘cultural’ products are produced by human beings through their rational, empirical, scientific capabilities to dominate and manipulate nature. while budaya products are produced by human beings under the ontological guidance of al-‘aql al-fa’âl (‘the active intellect) and al-nûr al-muhammadî (‘the muhammadan light’). fourthly, culture manifests itself in the form of arts, sciences, technologies, distinct from religion or metaphysics, while budaya manifests itself in arts, sciences, technologies, in connection with religion or metaphysics. culture considers religions as its something merely functional and useful, whereas budaya considers religion as its center and source of understanding. fifthly, culture is considered progressive where human beings highly develop scientifically or materialistically, while budaya is considered progressive when human beings highly achieve spiritual, religious, metaphysical, and sufistic civilization. 18 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december sixthly, cultural anthropologists utilize natural sciences, statistics, socio-metrics, scientific logics and methodology to discern cultural phenomena, while budayawans or metaphysicians of buddhayah, buddhi, al-‘aql or spiritualists of al-nûr utilize metaphysics, spiritualism, religion, sufism, symbolism, sacred sciences, scientia sacra to discern budaya phenomena. finally and conclusively, budaya highly holds to religious principles and totally submit to god, while culture is sometimes an affront to god and disrespectful of religion. culture and budaya are in many ways diametrically opposed. cultural anthropology is, hence, identical with ‘antropologi kultural’, but not at all to ‘antropologi budaya’. the idea ‘antropologi budaya’; is a oxymoron. the humanities cannot, be translated ‘ilmu budaya’ since this to would be a violation of the sacred conception of budaya. budaya anthropology the following is a rough comparison between how ‘antropologi kultural’ and ‘antropologi budaya’ carries out research; between how a cultural anthropologist studies the culture of an ethnic group and how a budaya anthropologist does so. to make it clearer, an anthropological textbook entitled being an anthropologist: fieldwork in eleven cultures (1970) is taken as an illustration. ‘antropologi kultural’ is represented herein by three anthropologists, while ‘antropologi budaya’ by the author alone. the cultural anthropologists are homer g. barnett, robert k. dentan, and c.w.m. hart. barnett reported on a tribe in the palau islands, oceania; dentan anthropologized the semai people, a tribe in malaysia; and lastly, hart studied the tiwi tribespeople in north australia. to begin with, barnett conducted an anthropological study of the cultural practices of a local tribe of the palau islands. he first met a local tribesman who could speak english and palauan language. with his assistance, barnett met some palauans, did an ethnographic sketch, and interpreted everything he discovered out of his encounter.71 he attended ferry hidayat 19 some dinners, observing how the palauans dined.72 he joined protestant church prayer services, met some protestant preachers, studying on how the palauans understood the biblical message.73 he watched the local dance performances (ngloik), observing how the palauans dance.74 he found a clubhouse decorated with the palauan motif, studying the motif and its symbolical meaning.75 he attended some district court sessions, studying on how they judged and treated the offenders.76 he lived in a palauan’s house, observing some customs practiced by the host and the social taboos which he strictly avoided.77 he attended some palauan religious ceremonies and was instructed on local mythologies, and he interpreted how these mythologies function in society (kinship system).78 out of the data gathered during the research visit, barnett finally abstracted, induced, concluded, and reported in the form of a book, palauan society: a study of contemporary native life in the palau islands (1949).79 both dentan and hart conducted the similar procedures; dentan when investigating the culture of the semais, and hart when scrutinizing the life of the tiwis. they both found informants so as to gain access to the language of the tribes, observed various local customs (passage rite, communal ceremonies, marriage and kinship systems), learned local religious practices and shamanism and related them to their social functions, learned how the christian churches educated and civilized the tribespeople, watched their artistic performances and artistic products and interpreted them in the framework of social patterns they adhered to, and finally wrote study reports in books; dentan wrote the semai (1968), while hart authored the tiwi of north australia (1960).80 this is also what had been carried out by george peter murdock (1897-1985), a professor of social and cultural anthropology at yale university,81 and his indonesian disciples such as koentjaraningrat,82 abdurrauf tarimana, and a cohort of cultural anthropologists they created at universitas indonesia, universitas sumatra utara, universitas andalas, universitas padjadjaran, universitas gadjah mada, universitas udayana, universitas hasanudin, universitas sam ratulangi,83 and universitas haluoleo (tarimana 1993:10-11).84 20 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december all the above-mentioned cultural anthropologists follow the verylong tradition of anthropological study of the cultures of the tribespeople forerun by the famous cultural anthropologists such as margaret mead (1901-1978),85 e.e. evans-pritchard (1902-1973),86 and franz boas (18581942),87 among others, mainly characterized by religious indifference and metaphysical ignorance, whose working principles are, in the words of evans-pritchard: the beliefs are for him sociological facts, not theological facts, and his sole concern is with their relation to each other and to other social facts. his problems are scientific, not metaphysical or ontological. the method he employs is that now often called the phenomenological one—a comparative study of beliefs and rites, such as god, sacrament, and sacrifice, to determine their meaning and social significance... the validity of the belief lies in the domain of what may broadly be designated the philosophy of religion.88 on the other hand, a budaya anthropologist validates ‘the belief... in the domain of... the philosophy of religion’ and takes this as the core of his research methodology.89 in the first place, a budaya anthropologist approaches the culture of the palauan people or the semais or the tiwis by first seeking the holy books or sacred scriptures which enlightening the hearts of people of the three cultures since the books and scriptures are from al-‘aql al-awwal descending from archangelic plane (al-‘aql al-fa’âl) to human sphere (al-‘aql). then, he studies contents of the sacred books, inwardly and outwardly, literally and spiritually, including the study of their inherent symbolisms, parables, metaphors, idioms, etc. and gains a perfect understanding of them to awaken ‘the acquired intellect’ (al-‘aql almustafâd) within his soul. ferry hidayat 21 secondly, he discovers the spiritual or metaphysical texts written by the shamans or witches or the sages and the saints of the tiwi or the semai or the palau which he observes to complete his understanding of the holy books and sacred scriptures for it is only in them that al-nûr al-muhammadî—that is buddhayah manifested within human souls—is fully actualized, realized, and fully awakened. then, just in case the budaya anthropologist does not find any sacred scripture and any metaphysical text of the sages within the cultures due to its lack of writing tradition, the budaya anthropologist attempts to discover the culture’s divine and intellectual revelations in the form of their mythology of origins, the traditional legends which they hand over from generation to generation, the cosmogonic/cosmological songs, dances and sacred music, their dress their architectural forms. he or she investigates all forms of sacred art, since all of these are also al-nûr and al-‘aql expressed in a manner outside of the conventional, philosophical, legal, theological modes of expression. “metaphysical doctrines do not of necessity find their expression only in verbal forms but can be expressed visually and ritually.”.90 being another expression of ‘the light’ and ‘the intellect’, the sacred art of the cultures researched must be fully understood by the budaya anthropologist as ‘a sacred text’ whose symbolism, parables, metaphors, exegesis, idioms, etc. are understood according to its own terms since “every sacred art is… founded on a science of forms, or in other words, on the symbolism inherent in forms. it must be borne in mind that a sacred symbol is not merely a conventional sign; it manifests its archetype by virtue of a certain ontological law”.91 in the last place, the budaya anthropologist works on a ‘thick description’, inducing, describing, discovering all manifestations of the internal buddhayah or internal faculty of al-nûr or al-‘aql in the tribes’ material products which he observes, and finally gaining an appreciation of a culture based upon its metaphysical religious, spiritual and ontological foundations. because as schuon writes, “it is the spiritual, not the temporal, which culturally, socially and politically is the criterion of all other values”.92 22 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december all in all, the real antropologi budaya (and not at all antropologi kultural!) bases its research on metaphysics first, then proceeds with its metaphysical reflections on the tribe’s outmost material civilization inasmuch as the ontology of al-nûr and al-‘aql, and of budi and budaya as well is a mirror; and all kinds of immanent manifestations of the tribe are only its outmost beautiful, handsome reflections of the primeval buddhi.93 endnotes 1 monier williams, indian wisdom: examples of the religious, philosophical, and ethical doctrines of the hindus, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009), 93 2 ibid., 90-93 3 douglas l. berger, encounters of mind: luminosity and personhood in indian and chinese thought, (albany: suny press, 2015), 60 4 karl h. potter (ed.), encyclopedia of indian philosophies volume iii, (delhi: motilal banarsidass publishers, 1998), 20 5 ibid., 86 6 douglas l. berger, encounters of mind: luminosity and personhood in indian and chinese thought, (albany: suny press, 2015), 60 7 karl h. potter (ed.), encyclopedia of indian philosophies volume iii, (delhi: motilal banarsidass publishers, 1998), 241 8 frithjof schuon, form and substance in the religions, (bloomington: world wisdom, 2002), 95 9 frithjof schuon, autumn leaves & the ring: poems by frithjof schuon, (bloomington: world wisdom, 2010), 15 10 frithjof schuon, spiritual perspectives & human facts: a new translation with selected letters, (bloomington: world wisdom, 2007), 130 11 frithjof schuon, christianity/islam: perspectives on esoteric ecumenism, (bloomington: world wisdom, 2008), 246 12 “buddhi-yoga”, mw sanskrit digital dictionary v1.4. 13 “buddhi”, in g. de purucker (ed.), encyclopedic theosophical glossary: a resource on theosophy, electronic version of current manuscript, (california: mario lampic, 2009), 151 14 “buddhi-cintaka” & “buddhi-cyuta”, mw sanskrit digital dictionary v1.4. 15 kautsar azhari noer, tasawuf perenial: kearifan kritis kaum sufi, (jakarta: serambi ilmu, 2002), 201 ferry hidayat 23 16 frithjof schuon, form and substance in the religions, (bloomington: world wisdom, 2002), 95 17 frithjof schuon, logic and transcendence: a new translation with selected letters, (bloomington: world wisdom, 2009), 148 18 “buddhi”, in g. de purucker (ed.), encyclopedic theosophical glossary: a resource on theosophy, electronic version of current manuscript, (california: mario lampic, 2009), 151 19 “alaya-mahat”, ibid., 36 20 “budi” & “budaya”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 21 “budiman”, ibid. 22 “indra”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 23 p.j. zoetmulder, pantheïsme en monisme in de javaansche soeloeklitteratuur, translated into bahasa by dick hartoko, (jakarta: penerbit gramedia, 1998), 3rd edition, 249-253 24 martin ramstedt (ed.), hinduism in modern indonesia, (london: routledgecurzon, 2004), 2-3 25 ibid., 3 26 bani sudardi, sastra sufistik: internalisasi ajaran-ajaran sufi dalam sastra indonesia, (solo: tiga serangkai, 2003), 12; a legendary javanese figure, ki sabda palon naya genggong, as told in serat dharmogandul by prawirataruna, claimed his and all javanese people’s religion as ‘agama budi’, see andjar any, rahasia ramalan jayabaya, ranggawarsita & sabda palon, (semarang: cv. aneka, 1979), 105-109. 27 martin ramstedt (ed.), hinduism in modern indonesia, (london: routledgecurzon, 2004), 6 28 ferry hidayat, antropologi sakral: revitalisasi tradisi metafisik masyarakat indigenous indonesia, (ciputat: ips press, 2010), 31-38 29 tan malaka, massa actie (aksi massa), (jakarta: cedi aliansi press, 2000), 144-145 30 quoted in subagio sastrowardoyo, “sikap budaya takdir dalam polemik kebudayaan serta pengaruhnya”, in s. abdul karim mashad (ed.), sang pujangga: 70 tahun polemik kebudayaan, menyongsong satu abad s. takdir alisjahbana, (yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar, 2006), 353-354 31 ignas kleden et.al. (eds.), kebudayaan sebagai perjuangan: perkenalan dengan pemikiran s. takdir alisjahbana, (jakarta: dian rakyat, 1988), 17-21 32 abdul hadi w.m., “mengenang asrul sani (1927-2004): surat kepercayaan gelanggang dan masalah-masalah kesusastraan kita”, in magazine of literature horison, march 2004, 22 33 sutan takdir alisjahbana, indonesia in the modern world, translated into english by benedict r. anderson, (new delhi: prabhakar padhye, 1961). 24 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 34 sidi gazalba, sistematika filsafat buku i, (jakarta: bulan bintang, 1985), 4th printing, 59-60 35 koentjaraningrat, manusia dan kebudayaan di indonesia, (jakarta: penerbit djambatan, 1995), 15th printing, 19 36 c.a. van peursen, strategie van de cultuur, translated into bahasa by dick hartoko, (jakarta & yogyakarta: bpk gunung mulia & kanisius, 1979), 1-15 37 sutan takdir alisjahbana, “socio-cultural development in global and national perspective and its impact”, in monthly magazine ilmu dan budaya, year x, no. 10/july 1988, (jakarta: universitas nasional, 1988), 721-722 38 “bermain budi”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 39 “memperbudikan”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 40 “budi pekerti”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 41 “kebudayaan”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 42 “budaya politik” & “pembudayaan” & “kebudayaan rakyat” & “budayawan” & “budi daya”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 43 sutan takdir alisjahbana, “politik bahasa nasional dan pembinaan bahasa indonesia”, in amran halim, politik bahasa nasional 1: kumpulan kertas kerja praseminar, (jakarta: balai pustaka, 1980), 39-54. 44 abû nashr al-fârâbî, kitâb ârâu ahli’l-madînat al-fâdhilah, (beirut: dâr al-mashriq, 1982), 37-124 45 majid fakhry, al-fârâbi founder of islamic neoplatonism: his life, works and influence, (oxford: oneworld, 2002), 82-91 46 abû nashr al-fârâbî, kitâb ârâu ahli’l-madînat al-fâdhilah, (beirut: dâr al-mashriq, 1982), 124 47 al-kindî, “risâlat al-kindî fî’l-‘aql”, in muhammad ‘abdul hadi abu ridah (ed.), rasâilu’l-kindî al-falsafiyyah, (egypt: mathba’ah al-i’timâd, 1950), 312-358 48 avicenna, at-ta’lîqât, ed. abdurrahman badawi, (beirut: al-dâr alislâmiyyah, 1972), 48, 114, 175 49 al-ghazâlî, ma’âriju’l-qudsi fî madârij ma’rifati’l-nafsi, (beirut: dâru’lâfâq al-jadîdah, 1975), 55-56 & 123-127 50 shihâbuddîn yahyâ al-suhrâwardî, the shape of light, hayakal al-nûr, translated into english by tosun bayrak, (louisville: fons vitae, 1998), 37-39 51 syed muhammad naquib al-attas, prolegomena to the metaphysics of islâm: an exposition of the fundamental elements of the worldview of islâm, (kuala lumpur: istac, 1995), pp. 143-176 52 shihâbuddîn yahyâ al-suhrâwardî, the shape of light, hayakal al-nûr, translated into english by tosun bayrak, (louisville: fons vitae, 1998), 36 53 ibid. 54 seyyed hossein nasr, three muslim sages: avicenna, suhrawardî, ibn ‘arabî, (new york: caravan books, 1997), 3rd printing, 69-70 ferry hidayat 25 55 ibid., 71-73 56 ibid., 73 57 shihâbuddîn yahyâ al-suhrâwardî, the shape of light, hayakal al-nûr, translated into english by tosun bayrak, (louisville: fons vitae, 1998), 39 58 ibid., 53 59 ibid., 47 60 ibid., 80 61 al-ghazâlî, mishkâtu’l-anwâr wa mişfatu’l-asrâr, ed. al-syaikh ‘abdul azîz ‘izzuddîn al-sirwân, (beirut: ‘âlamu’l-kutub, 1982), 161-182 62 muhammad dâwûd qaysharî, syarhu fuşûşi’l-hikâm li-ibni’l-‘arabî, ed. seyyed jalâluddîn ashtiyânî, (teheran: shirkat intishârat ‘ilmî, 1375 h), 127-131 63 gibril fouad haddad, the muhammadan light in the qur’an, sunna, and companion-reports, (fenton & london: isca, 2012), 103-137 64 “akal”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 65 “akal budi”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 66 “nur”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 67 “nurani”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 68 “nuriah”, kbbi digital dictionary version 1.5.1 69 “berakal”, in dendy sugono (ed.), tesaurus bahasa indonesia pusat bahasa , (jakarta: pusat bahasa departemen pendidikan nasional ri, 2008), 10 70 all readers can surely discover that the concept of culture in the entire production of the western sciences (including cultural anthropology) is based not on any kind of religion or spiritualism or metaphysics at all, in an enlightening book surveying all the uses of the nomenclature culture produced in all fields of science, ranging from the 18th century to the 20th century, by a.l. kroeber & clyde kluckhohn entitled culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions, (cambridge: the harvard university printing office, 1952). e.e. evans-pritchard, an anthropologist of the university of oxford, revealed emphatically that all anthropological researches done since the time of e.b. tylor, durkheim, levi-bruhl, until of freud were obviously based on their critical stance towards theism, “...implicit in their thinking were the optimistic convictions of the eighteenth-century rationalist philosophers that people are stupid and bad only because they have bad institutions, and they have bad institutions only because they are ignorant and superstitious, and they are ignorant and superstitious because they have been exploited in the name of religion by cunning and avaricious priests and the unscrupulous classes which have supported them. we should, i think, realize what was the intention of many of these scholars if we are to understand their theoretical constructions. they sought, and found, in primitive religions a weapon which could, they thought, be used with deadly effect against christianity. if primitive religion could be explained away as an intellectual aberration, as a mirage induced by emotional stress, or by its social function, it was implied that the higher religions could 26 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december be discredited and disposed of in the same way... the impassioned rationalism of the time has coloured their assessment of primitive religions and has given their writings, as we read them today, a flavour of smugness which one may find either irritating or risible... religious belief was to these anthropologists absurd, and it is so to most anthropologists of yesterday and today....”(p.15). evans-pritchard even emphasizes that “...what i have said does not imply that the anthropologist has to have a religion of his own, and i think we should be clear on this point at the outset. he is not concerned, qua anthropologist, with the truth or falsity of religious thought. as i understand the matter, there is no possibility of his knowing whether the spiritual beings of primitive religions or of any others have any existence or not, and since that is the case he cannot take the question into consideration. the beliefs are for him sociological facts, not theological facts, and his sole concern is with their relation to each other and to other social facts. his problems are scientific, not metaphysical or ontological. the method he employs is that now often called the phenomenological one— a comparative study of beliefs and rites, such as god, sacrament, and sacrifice, to determine their meaning and social significance...” (p.17). see e.e. evans-pritchard, theories of primitive religion, (oxford: oup, 1965). 71 george d. spindler (ed.), being an anthropologist: fieldwork in eleven cultures, (new york: holt, rinehart and winston, inc., 1970), 4-6 72 ibid., 6-12 73 ibid., 12 74 ibid., 13 75 ibid., 16 76 ibid., 18 77 ibid., 23-24 78 ibid., 25-26 79 ibid., 28 80 ibid., 90-111 & 145-163 81 his book, among others, is social structure (new york: the macmillan company, 1949). he is the professor that taught and guided koentjaraningrat when writing his final thesis at yale university. murdock’s strictly statistical and sociometrical approach inspired koentjaraningrat’s works. 82 his role in widespreading ‘the yale mafia’ of socio-cultural anthropologists in all over indonesian state universities is pivotal. he gave scholarships to junior anthropologists in order to continue their post-graduate study in the usa and australia. see koentjaraningrat, “commemorative lecture”, a speech when receiving the fukuoka asian cultural prizes, http://www.asianmonth.com/prize/english/lecture/pdf/06_01.pdf, retrieved on 2 november 2020. 83 koentjaraningrat, pengantar antropologi i, (jakarta, rineka cipta, 2005), 3rd printing, 38 http://www.asianmonth.com/prize/english/lecture/pdf/06_01.pdf ferry hidayat 27 84 abdurrauf tarimana, kebudayaan tolaki, (jakarta: balai pustaka, 1993), 2nd printing, 10-11 85 she is famous for her magnum opii: growing up in new guinea: a comparative study of primitive education (new york: blue ribbons books, inc., 1930) & coming of age in samoa: a psychological study of primitive youth for western civilisation (new york: william morrow & company, 1928). 86 his anthropological fieldwork report, among others, is the nuer: a description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a nilotic people (oxford: oxford at clarendon house, 1940). 87 his cultural anthropological work includes the mind of primitive man (new york: the macmillan company, 1938). 88 e.e. evans-pritchard, theories of primitive religion, (oxford: oup, 1965), 17 89 on how a muslim budaya anthropologist does his fieldwork had been as a matter of fact sketched out in my published proceeding entitled “towards islamic anthropology in an indonesian context: a perennialist epistemological perspective” at the 2nd international conference on thoughts on human sciences in islam (ic-thusi), jakarta, 18-19 november 2015, at https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_ islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_ perspective 90 harry oldmeadow, “melodies from the beyond: australian aboriginal religion in schuonian perspective”, in arvind sharma, fragments of infinity: essays in religion and philosophy, (prism, 1991), 10 91 william stoddard, the essential titus burckhardt: reflections on sacred art, faiths, and civilizations, (bloomington: world wisdom, inc., 2005), 88 92 frithjof schuon, the transfiguration of man, (bloomington: world wisdom, 1995), 28 93 ironically enough that akbar s. ahmed’s toward islamic anthropology: definition, dogma and directions (ann arbor: new era publications, 1986), despite islamness of his book title, never adopts or even employs this metaphysical approach he suggestes as kind of islamic anthropology. any sciences based not on ontology and metaphysics are flawed sciences. https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective 28 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december references ahmed, akbar s. toward islamic anthropology: definition, dogma and directions. ann arbor: new era publications, 1986. al-attas, syed muhammad naquib. prolegomena to the metaphysics of islâm: an exposition of the fundamental elements of the worldview of islâm. kuala lumpur: istac, 1995. al-farabi, abu nashr. kitâb ârâu ahli’l-madînat al-fâdhilah. beirut: dâr al-mashriq, 1982. al-ghazali, ma’âriju’l-qudsi fî madârij ma’rifati’l-nafsi. beirut: dâru’lâfâq al-jadîdah, 1975. al-ghazali, mishkâtu’l-anwâr wa mişfatu’l-asrâr, ed. al-syaikh ‘abdul azîz ‘izzuddîn al-sirwân. beirut: ‘âlamu’l-kutub, 1982. alisjahbana, sutan takdir. indonesia in the modern world. trans. benedict r. anderson. new delhi: prabhakar padhye, 1961. alisjahbana, sutan takdir. “socio-cultural development in global and national perspective and its impact”, in majalah bulanan ilmu dan budaya, year x, no. 10/july 1988. jakarta: universitas nasional, 1988. al-kindi, “risâlat al-kindî fî’l-‘aql”, in al-kindi, rasâilu’l-kindî alfalsafiyyah. egypt: mathba’ah al-i’timâd, 1950. al-suhrawardi, shihabuddin yahya. the shape of light, hayakal al-nûr, interpreted by tosun bayrak. louisville: fons vitae, 1998. avicenna, at-ta’lîqât, ed. abdurrahman badawi. beirut: al-dâr alislâmiyyah, 1972. berger, douglas l. encounters of mind: luminosity and personhood in indian and chinese thought. albany: suny press, 2015. boas, franz. the mind of primitive man. new york: the macmillan company, 1938. ferry hidayat 29 evans-pritchard, e.e. the nuer: a description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a nilotic people. oxford: oxford at clarendon house, 1940. evans-pritchard, e.e. theories of primitive religion. oxford: oup, 1965. fakhry, majid. al-fârâbi founder of islamic neoplatonism: his life, works and influence. oxford: oneworld, 2002. gazalba, sidi. sistematika filsafat buku i. jakarta: bulan bintang, 1985. 4th printing. haddad, gibril fouad. the muhammadan light in the qur’an, sunna, and companion-reports. fenton & london: isca, 2012. hadi w.m., abdul. “mengenang asrul sani (1927-2004): surat kepercayaan gelanggang dan masalah-masalah kesusastraan kita”, in majalah sastra horison, march 2004. halim, amran. politik bahasa nasional 1: kumpulan kertas kerja praseminar. jakarta: balai pustaka, 1980. hidayat, ferry. antropologi sakral: revitalisasi tradisi metafisik masyarakat indigenous indonesia. ciputat: ips press, 2010. hidayat, ferry. “towards islamic anthropology in an indonesian context: a perennialist epistemological perspective” at the 2nd international conference on thoughts on human sciences in islam (ic-thusi), jakarta, 18-19 november 2015, at https:// www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_ in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_ perspective kbbi offline digital dictionary version 1.5.1 kleden, ignas. et.al. (eds.), kebudayaan sebagai perjuangan: perkenalan dengan pemikiran s. takdir alisjahbana. jakarta: dian rakyat, 1988. koentjaraningrat, manusia dan kebudayaan di indonesia. jakarta: penerbit djambatan, 1995. 15th printing. https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective https://www.academia.edu/19041027/towards_islamic_anthropology_in_an_indonesian_context_a_perennialist_epistemological_perspective 30 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december koentjaraningrat, pengantar antropologi i. jakarta, rineka cipta, 2005. 3rd printing. koentjaraningrat, “commemorative lecture”, a speech when receiving the fukuoka asian cultural prizes, http://www.asianmonth.com/prize/ english/lecture/pdf/06_01.pdf, retrieved on 2 november 2020. kroeber, a.l. & kluckhohn, clyde. culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions. cambridge: the harvard university printing office, 1952. malaka, tan. massa actie (aksi massa). jakarta: cedi aliansi press, 2000. mashad, s. abdul karim. (ed.), sang pujangga: 70 tahun polemik kebudayaan, menyongsong satu abad s. takdir alisjahbana. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar, 2006. mead, margaret. growing up in new guinea: a comparative study of primitive education. new york: blue ribbons books, inc., 1930. mead, margaret. coming of age in samoa: a psychological study of primitive youth for western civilisation. new york: william morrow & company, 1928. murdock, george peter. social structure. new york: the macmillan company, 1949. mw sanskrit digital dictionary v1.4. nasr, seyyed hossein. three muslim sages: avicenna, suhrawardî, ibn ‘arabî. new york: caravan books, 1997. 3rd printing. noer, kautsar azhari. tasawuf perenial: kearifan kritis kaum sufi. jakarta: serambi ilmu, 2002. peursen, c.a. van. strategie van de cultuur, trans. by dick hartoko. jakarta & yogyakarta: bpk gunung mulia & kanisius, 1979. potter, karl h. (ed.), encyclopedia of indian philosophies volume iii. delhi: motilal banarsidass publishers, 1998. http://www.asianmonth.com/prize/english/lecture/pdf/06_01.pdf http://www.asianmonth.com/prize/english/lecture/pdf/06_01.pdf ferry hidayat 31 purucker, g. de. (ed.), encyclopedic theosophical glossary: a resource on theosophy, electronic version of current manuscript. california: mario lampic, 2009. qayshari, muhammad dawud. syarhu fuşûşi’l-hikâm li-ibni’l-‘arabî, ed. seyyed jalâluddîn ashtiyânî. teheran: shirkat intishârat ‘ilmî, 1375 h. ramstedt, martin. (ed.), hinduism in modern indonesia. london: routledgecurzon, 2004. schuon, frithjof. the transfiguration of man. bloomington: world wisdom, 1995. schuon, frithjof. spiritual perspectives & human facts: a new translation with selected letters. bloomington: world wisdom, 2007. schuon, frithjof. christianity/islam: perspectives on esoteric ecumenism. bloomington: world wisdom, 2008. schuon, frithjof. logic and transcendence: a new translation with selected letters. bloomington: world wisdom, 2009. schuon, frithjof. autumn leaves & the ring: poems by frithjof schuon. bloomington: world wisdom, 2010. sharma, arvind. fragments of infinity: essays in religion and philosophy. prism publisher, 1991. spindler, george d. (ed.), being an anthropologist: fieldwork in eleven cultures. new york: holt, rinehart and winston, inc., 1970. stoddard, william. the essential titus burckhardt: reflections on sacred art, faiths, and civilizations. bloomington: world wisdom, inc., 2005. sudardi, bani. sastra sufistik: internalisasi ajaran-ajaran sufi dalam sastra indonesia. solo: tiga serangkai, 2003. sugono, dendy (ed.), tesaurus bahasa indonesia pusat bahasa. jakarta: pusat bahasa departemen pendidikan nasional ri, 2008. 32 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december tarimana, abdurrauf. kebudayaan tolaki. jakarta: balai pustaka, 1993. 2nd printing. williams, monier. indian wisdom: examples of the religious, philosophical, and ethical doctrines of the hindus. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009. zoetmulder, p.j. pantheïsme en monisme in de javaansche soeloeklitteratuur. trans. dick hartoko. jakarta: penerbit gramedia, 1998, 3rd edition. _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand kunawi basyir 41 cultural cooperation and dialogue between muslims and hindus in bali kunawi basyir islamic university of state (uin), surabaya, indonesia abstract indonesia is renowned as a multicultural state. but for the last ten years, it has been facing social, ethnic, religious, and cultural problems. these tensions can be seen throughout indonesian society, and there are various attempts to address them. one such area is bali. the balinese people live in harmony even as their culture is very diverse. this study attempts to elucidate religious life of a multicultural society, especially hindus-moslem relationships in bali after denpasar suicide bombing in 2002. using qualitative and phenomenological approach, this research aims at understanding, analyzing, and exploring patterns of hindus-moslem relationship, in the hope of understanding how to cultivate harmony within a multicultural society. the hindus-moslem relationship in denpasar (indonesia) is very distinctive. it has emphasized cooperation in building a social-religious life inseparable from bali aga (balinese life). this study shows that balinese people are performing this ideal of cooperation through the employment of political, social and cultural initiatives. in this way, the government and the people have attempted to conserve balinese culture, using its unique tradition of menyama braya, to foster harmonious religious life among the balinese people. prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 1, january june 2018, 41-58 © 2000 by assumption university press 42 prajñā vihāra introduction the era of modernization and globalization has had a great impact on the social order of life, especially on the diverse forms of religious life. the manner people practice their religion had changed, not only because religion has undergone a process of contextualization, which embeds it in society, but also because the culture that contextualizes religion is a global culture with foreign values. in this context we can say that religious phenomena need to be understood in a way involving the transformation of the knowledge system, the value system, the system of religious action.1 such transformations can have a negative impact on the future life of nation such as indonesia, because for centuries, up until the last decade, religious life was relatively peaceful and there was no serious conflict. but since indonesia entered a new phase of reforming the life of the nation, the emergence of political and economic turmoil has begun to taint the reputation of indonesia as a peaceful and prosperous country. in 1998, the fundamental source of conflict began to involve the two elements of objective culture, namely ethnicity and religion. this phenomenon seems to affirm huntington’s thesis that the main determinants of the world’s political arena are differences in culture and civilization, not the disparities of ideological interests, nation states and economies. one of the most important elements of such difference is religion. he also concluded that the clash of civilizations will primarily involve the east versus the west. furthermore huntington says that a culture is limited by objective elements such as ethnicity, history, language, institutions, customs and religions. in addition to these objective elements, culture is also limited by the subjective element of self-identification of individuals. in turn, these two things make the intercultural distinctions not only real but also a fundamental source of potential conflict.2 communities identify with themselves internally and also distinguish themselves from other communities. therefore, cultural fault lines become the most basic lines of contention. in this tension-filled cultural relation religion is one of the strongest of the differentiating elements. kunawi basyir 43 in many cases of conflictual violence, especially since the collapse of the new order regime, political interest elements are often involved, but the conflict generally grows bigger when ethnic and religious sentiments are played out. religion is not the only factor in these cases of conflict or violence, but religious considerations are always present and decisive. this incident grew more complex when al qaeda attacked the wtc twin towers of new york followed by the bali bombing case on october 12, 2002, the marriot bomb in september 2003 and the bom kuningan in september 2004 by radical groups in indonesia.3 these events suggest that religious plurality is facing a major challenge in indonesia. in this regard, the awareness of religious plurality needs to be understood as a natural reality. only through such awareness can indonesia have a peaceful interfaith life. the paradigms and attitudes that have tended to be exclusive are now being tested and betrayed in a multireligious setting amidst multicultural society, so that the inclusive, tolerant, even moderate religious paradigm becomes a solution to the problems faced by the indonesian nation. this is the situation happening now in denpasar, bali. cultural dialogue towards civil society at the end of the new order period of power, the discourse of civil society became attractive as an issue in academic circles and society at large. this is because the socio-political conditions of indonesia was uncertain resulting in the levels of identity crisis and also the crisis of civilization. the term “civil society” according to naquib al-attas is a society that upholds the values of civilization.4 the discourse is widely leveled by academics like hikam who state that civil society is organized as voluntary, self-generating, and self-supporting. as a political space, civil society is a territory that ensures ongoing behavior, action and self-reflection, not constrained by material conditions of life and not absorbed within official political institutional networks, in which the implicit importance of free public space, free by citizens without any hegemony from any party, including from the government.5 44 prajñā vihāra indonesia post-reformasi, dissolved lantak. power eventually spread in state institutions at the provincial, district, kelurahan and up to the village level. pakraman village (local country) in the city of denpasar bali was impacted by this power. the spirit of regional autonomy as one of the strategies to build civil society in denpasar grew stronger, so that pakraman village seemed to be a symbol of renewal for the people of bali. they considered pakraman village as the last bastion of balinese culture. various movements and programs preserved the traditions from extinction. the government together with the balinese community began to popularize its jargon “ajeg bali”, meaning that bali should be built on balinese culture, and balinese culture built by the hindu breath. bali’s desire to regulate the shari’a-based regulations of hindu shari’a began to apply. although based on the hindu shari’ah, these local regulations still provided opportunities for other religions to coexist, as this culture is a long established culture since the small kingdoms of bali such as the waturenggong kingdom in klungkung, the badung kingdom in denpasar.6 in this royal period the term “brama” was popularized, but because of the modernization and the new order’s political hegemony the tradition gradually did not appeal to the balinese people. thus one of the ajeg bali that must be recovered is “to be like braya” (i am you, and you are me). this shows the affirmation tolerance among religious believers in the city of denpasar bali. the key concepts held by hindus as a guide in establishing interfaith harmony are “tat twam asi” and “yama niyama brata. tat twam asi means i am you. yama niyama brata means you are me. according to the balinese, if we love ourselves, we must say and do to others as we do to ourselves. if these principles can be run, then the peace of life in this world will be realized. the concrete form of applying the concept can be found in everyday life such as ngupoin tradition, mapitulu mejenukkan, ngejot, and others. this is the foundation of interfaith harmony in denpasar. the form and process of intertwining strong religious interfaith as well as the implementation of “ajeg bali” or “ajeg hindu” seems to kunawi basyir 45 continue to emphasize the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and pluralistic balinese social structure. this is reflected in the vision that was proclaimed by the government of denpasar, namely “creative cultured denpasar in balance towards harmonization”. ajeg hindu as an icon of bali in the eyes of national and international, seems to be in line with the multicultural theory initiated by george ritzer, who emphasizes the problem of marginalization of human intellectual tendencies. in essence, this theory holds that minority groups and marginalized groups should be empowered to occupy a more important position and are given equal significance in the social world. ajeg bali as a strategy to unite multicultural society in bali, especially in denpasar, is the most appropriate choice to maintain bali as a peaceful and prosperous region. if we look from the perspective of the history of the so-called fundamentalist jargon in hinduism, it does not mean a closing of religious tolerance in the local area, but instead it provides an opening for harmony in religious life, because the jargon is coupled with a popular concept with the term “brama menyama”. the term (baleg bali) was applied, suggesting that the people of denpasar should be independent through balinese culture. this is a response to the new order period, where the government acted merely as an agency to manage tourism in bali with its sapta pesona jargon which resulted in bali losing its cultural roots. as a result this collapsed with the arrival of the bali bomb 2002.7 as stated by antonio gramsci, there are two main levels of structure in government: civil society and political society. civil society groups cover the entire transmission apparatus often called private, such as educational institutions, mass media, and including religious institutions. while the political community or state group includes all public institutions that hold the power to implement government policies. according to gramsci, hegemony is a political class that succeeds in persuading other classes in society to accept its moral, political and cultural values.8 46 prajñā vihāra the people of bali began to realize that the balinese must rise and stand on their own feet. to borrow the language of a.s hikam, balinese people must build a civil society based on their identity. it seems that hindu buildings in bali are needed to inspire bali maxartham jagadhita ya ca iti dharma (inner welfare) as envisioned by hindu and balinese society in general. the terms”ajeg bali” and even “ajeg hindu” were popularized and reappointed to make bali a brighter, safer, and more enchanting place, reflecting the kingdom of bali in the past.9 one of the ajeg bali that must be revived as a civil society building is the role of history, islam was introduced in 1460 during the gelgel kingdom in klungkung. in tabanan itself the role of islam had existed since the early 19th century. therefore, togetherness and harmony of muslims and hindu society in bali is a part of its cultural tradition and must be maintained. that logic is what the balinese islamists want to rebuild in the context of the muslim-and-bali relationship. however, the contemporary context, especially the sociopolitical and economic context, has distorted this harmony. even the bali bombings eventually exacerbated the problem of tolerance among religious people in denpasar in particular and in bali in general. anak agung ngurah agung,10 for example, carries the need to rebuild “bali harmony” in the bali hindu-muslim fellowship (phmb). according to him, the old era was characterized by a social culture where values were applied consistently by hindus and muslims. from the point of value, bali as a result had a beautiful nature, and this beauty is preserved because bali implemented tri hitakarana and tat twam asi. while from the perspective of social culture. bali has an open culture but still able to preserve the culture of brama, a seguluk, different paksi bina paksa. the two balinese values are in line with the islamic concept, so that local values are applied by different communities but together. as a result the old-time balinese community for example able to create harmony despite the difference akidahnya. that spirit was to be developed by the people of bali as a form of foundation of interfaith harmony in denpasar bali. kunawi basyir 47 the pathways of building civil society there are various pathways that the local community uses to maintain the dialogue of the hindu-islamic cultures in bali: a. political path denpasar city government together with pakraman village are creating policies for enhancing security and environmental order according to brama in the local area. to maintain the stability the governor of bali issued a policy that is the governor of bali regulation dated july 16, 2008, number 32 of 2008 on forum kerukunan umat beragama (fkub). one of the duties of the governor of bali is the maintenance of religious harmony. in one of the articles (article 4) it is mentioned that the duties and obligations of the governor are as follows: first, to maintain the peace and order of the community, including to facilitate the realization of religious harmony in the regions. second, coordinate the activities of vertical institutions in the area in the maintenance of religious harmony. third, cultivate harmony, mutual respect and mutual understanding and mutual trust among religious communities in the region. fourth, foster and coordinate collaboration among the regents and vice regents, mayors and deputy mayors in the administration of local government in the field of peace and public order in religious life.11 the new policy was carried out by the mayor of denpasar in 2009 by issuing decree no. 8 of 2009 on forum of religious harmony (fkub) and denpasar mayor’s decree number 188.45/76/hk/2009 on the establishment and composition of advisory board of forum kerukunan umat religious (fkub) denpasar city. in the event of problems related to religious life prior to the issuance of the decree, the local government would bring the relevant parties together to find a solution. in addition through written policies also through social media as expressed by the governor of bali mangku pastika in his political speech, that through customs, culture, and religion of hinduism, bali will be maintained security and order. he invites all the people to mengajegkan balinese 48 prajñā vihāra customs and culture one of the agenda ajeg bali is menyama braya.12 the local government program of bali province has become the foundation for interfaith dialogue every year in denpasar. on october 28, 2013 denpasar government has held a program of religious life coaching involving the leaders of religious institutions, pakraman village institutions, religious leaders, community leaders, leaders of related institutions. to improve religious social harmony in the city of denpasar, fkub has pursued the following agenda: first, holding regular meetings every month whether there are problems or not. second, holding meetings to solve minor problems and avoid misunderstandings. third, making personal visits to religious institutions, especially attending religious ceremonies. fourth, holding gatherings which brings together braya of religious communities. fifth, holding deliberations and seminars according to the vision of fkub mission.13 according to i made subawa (head of kemenag general affairs office of denpasar), the pattern that was built by the government together with fkub and fkaub to foster interfaith harmony is reflected in dialogue forums between students, religious leaders, community leaders and inter-religious institutions. in 2000 for example, fkaub held the first dialogue theme “avoid the use of symbols and religious attributes”. in 2001, the theme of “applying local wisdom to brama in the perspective of religions”. the results of this dialogue have been agreed to be immediately applied through the implementation of religious teachings of each. the results of these dialogues served as the basis and evaluation of the subsequent dialogues until 2003. in 2004 the implementation of dialogue no longer raised the theme of brama because it is considered this theme has been applied by several religions to the praxis area. the theme of the current dialogue is directed to solving the praxis problem faced, namely the execution of the nyepi holiday that falls on sunday (march 11, 2004) simultaneously with the implementation of the worship service for christians. the dialogue resulted in a mutual agreement in the fraternity (unifying braya) which arranged the implementation of nyepi and the sunday service went smoothly. kunawi basyir 49 in 2005, inter-religious dialogue carried the same theme as in 2004 related to the nyepi holiday which coincided with the friday prayer (11march 2005), it was wisely agreed that the friday prayer will be held as usual but there was a suggestion from the dialogue participants not to use a loudspeaker. in the same year the dialogue was held back to reinforce the first agreement that the implementation of nyepi and the friday prayers continued without any interference in addition, the dialogue of 2006 emphasized the attempt to realize genuine harmony by establishing an understanding of “where the earth is rested in the heavens.” an additional dialogue in 2007 built on the results of the 2006 dialogue with the theme: “build kerahayuan to realize bali jagadhita”. the purpose of this dialogue was concerned with the welfare of the people of bali in general and religious people in denpasar in particular.14 as the condition of religious life in denpasar is more conducive and there are no signs of significant friction, the subsequent dialogues from 2008 to 20013 were directed to building prosperity in the economic field to support the building of religious life in denpasar bali. the dialogue in 2010 had the theme “family welfare from the perspective of religions”. they tried to re-explore the themes related to the building of religious life in the perspective of their respective religions, so religious adherents in denpasar would be able to develop a praxis that bridges religious ideologies. the condition is in line with what i ketut sukanata, said that the tradition of nyama braya is quite high in bali, since the term nyama selam, nyama cina has always been familiar to the ears of the balinese success is not only to achieved the highest levels but also at the bottom levels, such as the tradition of ngayah bareng (mutual cooperation) in banjar-banjar and villages in denpasar. for instance, the practice of cooperation among hindus, buddhists and muslims in religious ceremonies. these various policies and the implementation of the denpasar decree described above have enhanced the growth of religious tolerance. regardless of the shortcomings and the advantages of the policies taken, 50 prajñā vihāra the policy still gives its own color to the interfaith harmony-building in denpasar city in particular and in bali in general. b. cultural path the cultural diversity of the people of denpasar city emerges from various ethnicities, but the original balinese culture has the greatest power. hinduism cannot be separated from the existence of balinese culture itself. balinese hinduism becomes a system of values and norms implemented in a system of actions and social systems, and has contrbuted to harmonious cultural diversity. so fundamentalist bali does not impede the rise of pluralistic awareness in the city of denpasar. precisely the fundamentalistic spirit is the entrance to build awareness of multiculturalism of denpasar society towards building a strong pluralism. this happens, because balinese culture, based on hinduism, s also supported by jargonnnya which is popular in the term “menyama brama”15 always socialized and practiced as a center of plural society. in addition to ethnic and cultural pluralism, religious plurality is also deeply represented (hindu, muslim, buddhist, catholic, christian, and confucian). differences of beliefs do not lead to any negative impacts on the existing social order, it is the difference that brings vibrancy to the city of denpasar.16 the harmony between religious followers in bali in general and in the city of denpasar in particular have so far been relatively harmonious, never having experienced any serious clashs. this is so because balinese society has inherited a tradition that has been developed from generation to generation since the 15th century. the creation of harmony between religious believers, thanks to mutual understanding and mutual respect respect among different ethnic groups and religions. like the nyepi (new year saka 1935/2013 m) celebrated by the hindu community in denpasar, the muslim community is helping the process of implementing nyepi’s success in their respective neighborhoods. in each neighborhood before nyepi they held a meeting to discuss kunawi basyir 51 nyepi preparations ranging from security to technical matters. although it did not follow any ceremonial tradition, it was decided that every alley in their javanese village organized a patrol. this was to avoid the occurrence of things that have interfered with the nyepi in the past. this was done not at the request from the hindu community but at the request of the muslim community both in the village of kepaon, kreneng, and in the village of java denpasar bali. similarly, during nyepi holiday falls to coincide with friday in 2011. based on a joint decision between mui and bali walubi, it was agreed that these two big days can still be conducted in accordance with their respective goals. first, muslims who perform the friday prayers are encouraged to choose the nearest mosque; secondly, it is advisable not to use motorcycles or cars to the mosque but just walk; thirdly, friday sermons are allowed to use the loudspeakers but the sound of the sermon is kept out of the mosque. the condition is in accordance with the original expectations, namely the two big days of islam and hinduism continue to run as before, which does not reduce the meaning and purpose of both ceremonies (nyepi and friday prayers). hindus can run nyepi in accordance with its original meaning, that is, there is no activities of any kind including the making of sounds. they can practice nyepi in their homes without any sounds or lights. such conditions has become part of the life of a multicultural society (islam and hindu) in denpasar. when muslims commemorate isro ‘mi’raj at the darussalam ubung mosque as well as in the holy high mosque, the hindu community provides both food and security assistance. security is conducted by the pecalang who dress in the hindu customs to maintain security and order for the smooth running of the event .. self-control becomes an important foundation in realizing interfaith harmony in denpasar bali. self-control will be able to bring peace to society. various religious activities in denpasar encourage cultural activities and the realization of a balance of outer and inner development. the balance of development is to awaken human beings who always 52 prajñā vihāra have limitations and weaknesses. the interfaith harmony in this tourist destination has escaped the trials and challenges that have tested it, such as the bali bombing in 2002.17 hindus on sunday, march 17, 1991 celebrated the nyepi holiday of the new year of saka 1913 which involves the tapa brata, or avoiding the four taboos: not working, not traveling, not indulging lust, and not kindling fire. in this holiday, muslims make takbiran idul fitri and christians worship in the church. “thanks to the mutual understanding and harmony among the people, each religion can celebrate their holy day. the condition is especially admirable since even though the people of bali are 84% hindu, they can participate in the successful implementation of the national quran tilawatil selection (mtq) in 1998. since the early times, the balinese people have had a love for all people, and still uphold sense of unity among themselves and unity of the nation. the future seems optimistic if there is this continued harmony between islam and hinduism. the art which blendd balinese and islamic elements, was once used to enliven the opening of stq to xiii national level in bali. the culture of brama can be a leading program for multicultural society in denpasar, because brama has a strategic meaning for the development of bali in the future. such language is important for all religions in bali. in the dialogue held by the fkub bali in recent years, all religious representatives expressed their views on the concept of brama and its relevance to the teachings of their respective religions. the views and acknowledgment of some religious figures can be illustrated that the jargon (as braya) is one of the sectors driving the interfaith tolerance of bali, especially in the city of denpasar. the term brama is not only popular among balinese (hindu) people, but it is also popular among immigrants (nyama selam). religious differences are not seen as a challenge, but a natural part of the religious life of a multicultural society (hindu-islam). they have mutual tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect between them, they can distinguish between doctrinal areas and social areas. kunawi basyir 53 to avoid conflict among religious believers in denpasar, scholars and religious leaders have always been active in preventing preachers, ustadz, ngaji teachers and mosque khotibs in denpasar for creating religious intolerance through preaching division, for instance, the use of negative epithets such as “kafir, pig, or idol worshiper”. this needs to be done to avoid the traps of division that many islamic radical groups are promoting. these themes have a severe impact on the disengagement of the various religious communities from one another. acknowledging such practices gives one hope that there is a possiblity to mantain togetherness and use such foundations in realizing harmony among religious people. yet there are still many forces which create suspicion, anxiety, insecurity among religions. therefore, multiculturalism has not yet reached a foundational or root level. c. social path regardless of the pros and cons of “multiculturalism” whether to tolerate a certain degree of disunity or to strive for a unified nation, the thing we must be aware of is the emergence of ethnic, cultural, and ethnic divisions within the bodies of our own nation. the situation of denpasar bali involves a variety of cultures from the archipelago such as java, madura, makasar, bugis, and also the tribe of bali itself. it is a situation which shows distinct cultural possibilities. the condition of multi-ethnicity is is a paradox that on one hand shows the beauty of a mosaic of distinct colors, and on the other hand harbors a potential for conflict. this needs to be managed wisely so that the potential for conflict is not realized. in denpasar bali the existence of interfaith harmony is built through education and social network (ngo). the miftahul ulum education institute in the village of java denpasar developed a vision of mission as beriku: learning to know, learning to do, learning to live together, and learn to face others (four pillars of education). according to djarot soedarman (headmaster of mts miftahul ulum), to achieve the four pillar’s objectives, the 3rd pillar is the most urgent, since the community environment is different from the island of java. 54 prajñā vihāra therefore, to realize a harmonious life between islam and hinduism, then learning to live together should be stressed so that the students can learn to know their environment, learn to do good within their environment, and learn to deal with their environment. conclusion to reaffirm the social harmony of the post-bali bali hindu-muslim community in denpasar, the local government and the community have agreed to strengthen the interaction between islam and hinduism through brama culture. this tradition is developed through the political, cultural and social channels of education in the local area. through such practices, civil society’s power to develop local civil society in bali in particular and in indonesia in general can be strengthened. endnotes 1 irwan abdullah, konstruksi dan reproduksi kebudayaan. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar, 2006, 32. 2 samuel p. huntington, the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: 1993, 68. 3 ibid., 56. 4 naquib al-attas at riswanda imawan, masyarakat madani dan agenda demokratisasi. jakarta: lsaf, 1999, 12. 5 muhammad a.s. hikam, demokrasi dan civil society. jakarta: lp3es, 1999, 45. 6 bali pos, 2 desember 2001. 7 see “ngurah agung memulihkan keretakan hindu-muslim”, tempo, 21 agustus, 2013. 8 antonio gramsci, selection from prison notebooks. new york: international publisher, 1971, 57. 9 i made suastika “jelajah kajian budaya.” denpasar: pusataka larasan bekerjasama dengan program studi magister dan doktor kajian budaya unversitas udhayana, 2012, 59. 10 born from the castle (kingdom), ngurah agung was raised in hindu pesraman. the ancestors of ngurah agung are known to have closeness with islam. one of them kunawi basyir 55 is a.a. manik mas mirah, the daughter of king pemecutan, who is married to the west madura king cakraningrat iv. mas man mas then converted to islam and renamed siti khodijah. however, ngurah agung’s interest to muslim leaders has emerged since he knew about abdurrahman around 1995. since then, ngurah agung often visited pesantrens in east java and established relationships with kiai. from this he is eloquent in reciting dhikr. upon closeness with the muslims, he is often called as ngurah agung muslim see “ngurah agung restoring hindu-muslim rift”, tempo, august 21, 2013 11 setda prop bali, laporan penyelenggaraan musyawarah antarumat beragama (denpasar: proyek pembinaan kerukunan beragama, 2000), 3. 12 i ngurah suryawan, sisi dibalik politik identitas, kekerasan, dan interkoneksi global. denpasar: universitas udayana press, 2012, 55 13 i ketut suda sugira, upaya memantapkan kehidupan dialogis masyarakat beragama di bali. denpasar: upada sastra, 2003, 15. 14 i gusti made ngurah, saling menerima dan menghargai perbedaan melalui dialog antarumat beragama dalam masyarakat multikultural. denpasar: yayasan sari kahyangan indonesia press, 2010, 147. 15 this can also be seen in local regulation no.3 year 1991 where the development of tourism is based on the balinese idea of maintaining the harmony of relations between tourism and society and culture. and also several times bali governor mangku pastika conveyed in some sambutanya that “with the customs, culture, and religion of one is the hindu religion is the basic capital to realize security based on custom, culture, and religion. in addition, also in the vision of the mission of denpasar, namely: “creative culture with a cultural insight in the balance towards harmony”, in one of its mission to grow the identity of the people of denpasar city based on balinese culture. 16 the 2002 bali bombing case as a first step for multicultural society to build inter-ethnic and inter-religious togetherness. this has spawned several institutions such as fkub, fkaen, phmb with the agenda of dialogues in order to build harmony between interethnic and interfaith religion in denpasa. 17 i gusti made ngurah, saling menerima dan menghargai, 23. bibliography ackermann, john robert. agama sebagai kritik: analisis eksistensi agama-agama besar. jakarta: bpk gunung mulia, 1991. adeney, bernard t. etika sosial lintas budaya, terj. loanes rakhmat. yogyakarta: kanisius, 2000. ali, muhammad. teologi pluralis-multikultural: menghargai 56 prajñā vihāra kemajemukan, menjalin kebersamaan. jakarta: penerbit buku kompas, 2003. ali, mukti, “dialog dan kerjasama agama dalam menanggulangi kemiskinan”, dalam wienata saiirin. dialog antarumat beragama: membangun pilar-pilar kendonesiaan yang kokoh, jakarta: bpk gunung mulia, 1994. ali, mursyid. pluralitas sosial dan hubungan antar agama. jakarta: balitbang agama: proyek kerukunan hidup beragama, 1999. alhonse, ali unal and william. advocate of dialogue: fethullah gulen’s. fairfak: the fountain, 2000. ardika, i wayan. sejarah bali dari pra sejarah hingga modern. denpasar: udayana university press, 2012. astra, i gde semadi. guratan budaya dalam prespektif multikultural. denpasar: fakultas sastra dan budaya udayana press, 2003. a.s. hikam, muhammad. demokrasi dan civil society. jakarta: lp3es, 1999. attas (al), naquib, dalam riswanda imawan. masyarakat madani dan agenda demokratisasi. jakarta: lsaf, 1999. burhanuddin, yudhis m. bali yang hilang: pendatang islam dan etnisitas di bali. yogyakarta: kanisius, 2008. castell, manuel. the power of identity. london: blackwell publications, 1997. cowarld, harold. pluralisme: tantangan bagi agama-agama. yogyakarta: kanisius, 1994. covvarubias, miguel. pulau bali: temuan yang menakjubkan. denpasar: udayana university press, 2013. geria, i wayan.transformasi kebudayaan bali memasuki abad xxi. denpasar: percetakan bali, 200. giddens, antony. human societies a reader. cambridge: polity press, 1992. kunawi basyir 57 gramsci, antonio.selection from prison notebook. new york: international publisher, 1971. hick, john. salvations: truth and difference in religion. new york: orbis book, 1995. huntington, samuel p. the clash of civilizations?, foreign affairs. summer, tk, 1993. kymlicka, will. kewargaan multikultural, terj. edlina h. eddin. jakarta: lp3es, 2003. liliweri, allo. prasangka dan konflik: komunikasi lintas budaya masyarakat multikultur. yogyakarta: lkis, 2009. madjid, nurcholish. islam agama kemanusiaan: membangun tradisi dan visi baru islam indonesia. jakarta: paramadina, 1995. masduqi, irwan. berislam secara toleran: teologi kerukunan umat beragama. bandung: mizan media utama, 2011. mashudi, noorsalim. hak minoritas: multikulturalisme dan dilema negara bangsa. jakarta : interseksi foundation, 2007. menocal, maria rosa. the ornament of the world: how muslims, jews, and chistians created a culture of tolerance in medieval spain. boston: little, brown, 2002. ngurah, i gusti made. saling menerima dan menghargai perbedaan melalui dialog antar umat beragama dalam masyarakat multikultural. denpasar: yayasan sari kahyangan indonesia, 2010. pandit, nyoman s. nyepi: kebangkitan toleransi dan kerukunan. jakarta: gramedia pustaka utama, 2001. panggabean, samsu rizal, “islam dan multikulturalisme (ragam manajemen masyarakat plural),” dalam zakiyuddin baidhawi dan m. thoyibi (ed). reinvensi islam multikultural. surakarta: pusat studi budaya dan perubahan sosial universitas muhammadiyah surakarta, 2005. 58 prajñā vihāra panikkar, raimundo. dialog intra religius, terj. j. dwi helly purnomo dan p. puspobinatma. yogyakarta: kanisius, 1994. perwiranegara, alamsyah ratu. pembinaan kehidupan beragama. jakarta: dewan pimpinan pusat guppi, 1982. picard, michel. bali: cultural tourism and touristic. singapore: archipelago press, 1996. putra, i gusti agung. sejarah perkembangan agama hindu di bali. denpasar: pemda tk i bali, 1987. rachman, budy munawar. islam pluralis: wacana kesetaraan kaum beriman. jakarta: paramadina, 2001. reuter, thomas.a. budaya dan masyarakat di pegunungan bali, terj. a. rahman zainuddin. jakarta: obor indonesia, 2005 sugira, i ketut suda. upaya memantapkan kehidupan dialogis masyarakat beragama di bali. denpasar: upada sastra, 2003. suryawan, i ngurah. sisi dibalik bali: politik identitas, kekerasan dan interkoneksi global. denpasar: udayana university press, 2012 suwarsih, warnaen. stereotip etnis dalam masyarakat multietnis. jakarta: mata bangsa, 2002. robinson, geoffrey. sisi gelap pulau dewata: sejarah kekerasan politik. yogyakarta: lkis, 2006. wahid, abdurrahman. kiri islam antara modernitas dan postmodernisme: telaah kritis atas pemikiran hassan hanafi. yogyakarta: lkis, 1993. ________. islamku, islam anda, islam kita. jakarta: the wahid institut, 2006 . widya, i ketut. pecalang benteng terakhir bali. denpasar: udayana press, 2008. 84 prajñā vihāra chantal mouffe and religious pluralism: agonistic experiments in non-western societies lana indralak and john giordano assumption university, thailand abstract this paper examines questions regarding the alleviation and management of religious conflict. it will first examine the philosophical framework of chantal mouffe as a response to carl schmitt’s critique of pluralism. then it will give examples of conflict resolution and the preservation of diversity in such regions as, lebanon, indonesia and thailand. finally, it will examine these examples as exercises in “agonistics” as understood by mouffe. this will be shown to be a valuable framework for conflict resolution and democracy in the asean region. introduction the occurrence of religious conflict around the world is intensifying, from the middle east to south east asia. so an understanding of mechanisms of dialogue and conflict resolution is becoming increasingly important. religion has often been considered as a crucial and integral part of the fabric of the national solidarity. it provides a powerful “comfort zone” and spiritual cohesion for the identity of a culture. but in many regions, such as in lebanon or even asean itself, the strong attachment to religious identity is problematic, since it leads to religious domination or violence. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 2, july december 2017, 84-93 © 2000 by assumption university press lana indralak and john giordano 85 the strong attachment to religion and traditional culture might be natural, but this attachment must also be controlled, so that does not get out of hand and obstruct a basic respect for pluralism, which is important in an interconnected globalized world. it is only through appropriate conflict management strategies and respect for various cultural and religious identities, could the many dangerous hostilities we witness today be defused. but society has always been conflictual, so we need to examine the role of conflict before we try to understand how it can be managed. the philosophy of carl schmitt which condemned pluralism, has long been influential. but as a response to this, chantal mouffe, focuses upon “agonism” rather than antagonism. this takes schmitt a step further. she attempts to use many of schmitt’s insights concerning the inevitability of conflict, while also showing how conflict can be a valuable part of a democracy or a pluralistic society. in order to understand the modern predicament, we must stop romanticizing the power of consensus and recognize how conflict can be accepted and adequately controlled and managed. this essay is an attempt to apply mouffe’s insights to the preservation of religious pluralism and how the relationship between religions can be managed in non-western societies. chantal mouffe is well known for promoting the idea of “the agonistic dimension” and also for her idea of “radical democracy” which is based on conflict. in her argument against conventional political theorists and predecessors, mouffe also promotes the idea of “conflict” as the key driving force in present culturally diversified society. this has been discussed in chayathat supachalasai’s essay “the genealogy of political philosophy: on the anti-consensus”.1 for carl schmitt’s, the idea of “the political” is always distinguished from “politics”. while politics involves conflicting factions within a state, “the political” refers to the identity, unity and sovereignty of the state. for schmitt, the friend/enemy distinction, is key to understanding the unity of a state. but this idea is hostile to the present-day culturally diverse societies. schmitt saw religion as a threat unless it was incorporated 86 prajñā vihāra into the state. so schmitt encouraged the politicalization of christianity, through an embrace of “political theology” as well as his concept of the “state of exemption.” this is the sovereign’s ability to transcend the rule of law in the name of the public good and the nation state. the rise of nationalism around the world which is now threatening pluralism seems to be an outcome of this world-view. but this crude nationalism undermines the diversity of the society which makes a society vibrant. the challenge in an age of globalization becomes how to retain an understanding of the importance of conflict which allows for the preservation of pluralism and democracy. chantal mouffe, recognized that the global community needs a new type of philosophical mechanism in order to help them tackle the rising problems of diversity in an age of globalization. the philosophical framework of agonism is simply based on “struggle.” it is a political theory that emphasizes the potentially positive aspects of conflict. this is done by accepting that there is a permanent place for such conflict, and showing how people might accept conflict and engage in it positively by engaging in debates. but here, the emphasis is not on consensus but on dissensus. this is how mouffe envisions an agonal democracy or radical democracy. but this is nothing new. such agonal mechanisms have been practiced for some time. this paper draws from three non-western examples. lebanon, indonesia and thailand. in these examples we see these agonal mechanisms played out in confessionalism, pancasilla, and asean centrality. all of these are agonistic experiments which might become appropriate conflict management strategies in the non-western societies. lebanon religious sectarianism is the main cause of dispute in lebanon. while religions can promote peace and understanding between people, they could also be instrumentalized as a powerful political device for destruction when violence is done in its name. the ruthless civil war which lasted for more than a decade, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sovereignty https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/rule_of_law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/rule_of_law lana indralak and john giordano 87 also destabilized the whole nation, hindered progress and most of all, the path to envision a possibility of creating national solidarity and civil society. when all religious factions strive to make a political discourse based on the polemical issue of religious identity, national integration and solidarity is nonetheless, obstructed. lebanon’s survival may still lie in “consensual democracy” and “confessionalism”, 2 one of the problems in lebanon is religious domination where one religion had an exclusivist view that could see no spiritual values in other religions. this was initially followed by many powerful maronite christians, and developed into a christian radicalism, which obstructed the path to national solidarity, when many maronite christians avoided justified power sharing with other non-christian factions. to remedy this situation, new political structures were created: “consociationalism” (with reference to politics) and “confessionalism” (with reference to religion). consociationalism is a form of democracy which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that comprises diverse societies (distinct ethnic, religious, political, national or linguistic groups), by allocating these groups collective rights. the executive-power sharing is mainly characterized by proportional representation, veto-rights and segmental autonomy for minority groups. the consociationalist approach consists in accommodating minorities, by granting them collective rights. this comes to the final resolution of how the crucial issue of factional “animosity” and the maronite christian’s religious approach which was based on friend/enemy distinction, was balanced with the recognition of religious pluralism and divergence variations. the heart of this issue is to eventually recognize that conflict in liberal democratic societies cannot and should not be eradicated, since the specificity of pluralist democracy is precisely the recognition and the legitimation of conflict itself! also, according to chantal mouffe, this confrontation between the adversaries is what constitutes “the agonistic struggle” that is the very condition of a vibrant democracy in an age of globalization.3 88 prajñā vihāra indonesia indonesia today consists of more than 17,000 islands with the population of approximately 200 million people, who belong to more than 300 ethic groups and speak more than 500 languages and dialects. according to suseno (1985) in javanese society, there are several ways to prevent conflict, and maintain plural order as well as social harmony.4 one of the fairly unique philosophical and political mechanisms to resolve tension in indonesia is called “pancasilla.” it is what president sukarno describes as a new worldview in an age of bitter “identity politics” and pseudo-claims to “inclusivity.” the tension indonesia had somehow compelled social theorists to go back to foundational premises, to start all over again and rebuild a model of society based on reason, shared values, and individual autonomy.5 according to alexander seran, president sukarno’s concept of pancasilla involved the idea that the struggle for recognition requires communicative action to preserve cultural identities while establishing laws on universally validating principles of morality. as habermas’s theory of communicative action and honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition are concerned, pancasilla manifests the dialectic process in generalizing different cultural worldviews involving economy, culture, and politics and therefore pancasilla is compatible with the search for a moral grammar, through which the dreams of a new world can be built. moreover, the worldview of pancasilla is the recognition that we must meet cultural diversity half-way through the use of a suitable “moral grammar” to construct better arguments for all affected and to increase the capacity for all parties to make decisions which benefit them equally.6 in connection with this unique approach of pancasilla, are the traditional mechanisms of “tawhid” or “unity” which constitutes the very core value of the islamic faith, which in indonesia possess a vibrancy and dynamism.7 also connected are the dual mechanisms of “musyawarah” and “mufakat” for consensus and conflict resolution and management in indonesia. but we saw that mouffe is critical of a simple reliance on consensus. this means that communicative action can also involve an lana indralak and john giordano 89 agnonistic debate which is simple regulated by the idea of tawhid, one of the five elements of pancasilla. unity in diversity also involves a unity in conflict. thailand historically, thai people were adept at defusing political and social tensions within the society. and in the modern era, thailand conducted flexible foreign policies, that successfully established asean. however, over the past decades, thailand is increasingly experiencing more division and hostility within its society than any other neighboring states in the south east asia region. recently, thailand has been experiencing unprecedented escalation of political unrest in its three malay-muslim dominated provinces, namely pattani, yala and narathiwat. the hostility between buddhists and muslims seems to have escalated as the local thai authorities kept on employing draconian measures to suppress this unrest. this created backlashes, which exacerbated the violence.8 in order to defuse the rising tension between the buddhists and the muslims, we can consider the model of “asean centrality” which is the brainchild of dr. surin pitsuwan, who is also the secretary-general of asean. he is the person who really understands the problem and rising sectarian tension, which had been plaguing thailand for decades. a former resident of one of the southernmost provinces himself, dr. surin possessed insight about this troubled region and so his model of “asean centrality” is well crafted for defusing the conflict as well as deep divisions within the kingdom. in a speech, given in the year 2010, dr. surin made it very clear that asean has indeed matured in the last 43 years, and that it is now taking its rightful place on the same platform among major global players for political and economic dialogue and cooperation. in fact, even the us president barack obama also recently described asean as an “organization of global importance” 90 prajñā vihāra “asean centrality” means to use the regional organization as the core of connectivity or hub, and a viable alternative option or crucial mean to an end in order to conduct effective foreign policy, with the european union as the inspiration. although the regional integration of asean is to be considered as loose and not as solid or rigid as in the case of the eu. in addition, the term “asean centrality” is used as a means to help the southeast asian region initiate and coordinate collective action, and to serve as the key hub connecting all major powers in the region, and although nowadays regional conditions may differ and vary from one state to another, regional clashes as well as tensions still run considerably high, with competing territorial as well as historical claims.9 avoiding the clash of civilizations conflict management and transformation in highly disputed regions around the world requires more than a single approach or mechanism, on the contrary, multiple approaches as well as mechanisms must be embraced. only in this way can we diminish religious conflict. the preservation of conflicting differences is what claude levi-strauss recognized as “divergence variations” and consititues the world he understood as a “pluri-verse” rather than a uni-verse. it is only this recognition that can ensure the ultimate survival of humanity.10 the creation of a stabilized plural world order in the upcoming, foreseeable future would require the cultivation of profound religious toleration. yet religious toleration is not sufficient in facing the political wrongdoings and sectarian divisions of various political as well as religious protagonists in the past. therefore, as our complex pluri-verse gradually unravels itself in the unending “agonistic struggle,” it is futile to totally reject it. on the contrary, the multi-faceted society must preserve pluralism by applying various collectively endorsed procedures or mechanisms, to manage conflict and to preserve differences. these differences are both political as well as the spiritual. this is what we see demonstrated in the discussions on “confessionalism”, “pancasilla”, the islamic sufism’s approach of lana indralak and john giordano 91 “tawhid” or “unity” / the approaches of “mufakat” or “consensus” the approach of “musyawarah” or “collective deliberative” to be fulfilled simultaneously with the conventional religious approaches of confucianism, theravada buddhism and finally the regional integration paradigm of “asean centrality” to prevent conflict from getting out of hand, and to ensure that it plays a positive role, these approaches and mechanisms operate as pressure valves. they can also provide a necessary public accountability and ensure fairer economic and social transitions, as well as guaranteeing more transparent allocation of economic resources amongst the several contending religious factions. the sectarian divisions and regional conflicts which arise in lebanon, some parts of indonesia as well as in the southernmost provinces of thailand are the result of misleading public perceptions and the subversive attempt to create what could be labeled as a “monocultural” or “monofaith” climate of fear and distrust, which generally breeds hatred, intolerance and radicalism. chantal mouffe’s agonistic approach can be considered a viable attempt to “rebalance” the deep sectarian divisions in all of the religious factions. therefore, based on mouffe’s philosophical approach, agonism is considered as a useful mechanism for the management of conflict between diverse groups. it does this not by enforcing any sort of superficial makeover, or by compromising the public’s cultural and religious identities, on the contrary, the agonistic approach ensures the cultural and religious coexistence through the recognition of conflict, which involves both the vitality, as well as its “divergent variations.” it does this in an intricate and even creative way, in order to ensure an agonal, yet peaceful society where conflict, and mutual development go hand in hand. it finally provides a model of democracy not threatened by plurality or division. 92 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 supachalasai, chayathat. the genealogy of the political philosophy on the anti-consensus. bangkok: chulalongkorn university book press, 2011. 2 canadians for justice and peace in the middle east, 2007, 19 3 mouffe, chantal. agonistics: thinking the world politically. (new york: verso, 2013), 6-7 4 suseno (1985) 5 seran, alexander. “pancasila and the struggle for a moral grammar.” prajna vihara: vol. 17, no1., 38 6 ibid., p.44). 7 (ramadan, 2004, p.12). 8 nimanong veerachart, “thai buddhists-muslims customs in dialogue for peaceful co-existence in southern thailand”. prajna vihara vol.13 no1-2, 2 9 asean centrality in the regional architecture: singapore institute of international affairs: (policy brief january, 2015) 10 mouffe, chantal. agonistics: thinking the world politically. new york: verso, 2013), 40-41 bibliography antoun, jane. the arab world : focus on diversity. (1st ed). englewood cliffs, nj: prentice-hall, 1977. fisk, robert. pity the nation : the abduction of lebanon. (4thed.): new york: nation books, 2002. fukuyama, francis. the end of history and the last man. new york: the free press,1992. huntington, samuel p. the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon & schuster, 1996. losonczi, peter, mika luoma-aho, aakash singh. (eds.). the future of political theology: religious and theological perspectives. “political theology and its discontents”. surrey: ashgate publishing limited, 2011. http://library.car.chula.ac.th/search?/ahuntington%252c+samuel+p./ahuntington+samuel+p/-3,-1,0,b/browse lana indralak and john giordano 93 gilmour, david. lebanon : the fractured country. london: sphere books ltd, 1984. mouffe, chantal. agonistics: thinking the world politically. new york: verso, 2013. mouffe, chantal. the democratic paradox. new york: verso, 2009. mouffe, chantal. (ed.). dimensions of radical democracy: pluralism, citizenship, community. london: verso, 1992. nimanong veerachart, “thai buddhists-muslims customs in dialogue for peaceful co-existence in southern thailand”. prajna vihara journal of philosophy and religion. (vol.13 no1-2, january-june). bangkok: assumption university, 2012. seran, alexander. “pancasila and the struggle for a moral grammar.” prajna vihara: journal of philosophy and religion. (vol.17 no1, january-june) bangkok: assumption university, 2016. schmitt, carl. the concept of the political. chicago: the university of chicago press, 1996. supachalasai, chayathat. the genealogy of the political philosophy on the anti-consensus. bangkok: chulalongkorn university book press, 2011. tekasuk, preechapak. (2016). บทความปรทัิศนห์นงัสอื: on the political. retrieved from http://www.academia.edu.html retrieved on 19 july 2016. yakinthou, christalla. political settlements in divided societies: consociationalism and cyprus . new york: palgrave macmillan, 2009. http://www.academia.edu.html a93plyuc_1k5atf2_htk.tmp 133 vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 133-132 © 2000 by assumption university press the cyclic wholeness of bing, tao and law in sun tzu’s “the art of war” wang qi, john giordano, and wang shang-wen abstract (pingyin: ) is well-known as one of the oldest writings in chinese history attributed to an individual author. it is the most famous treatise of the military school ( ), of the hundred schools of thought of the pre-qin and han period. however, the text is often misunderstood in the based upon the misunderstanding of its terms. readers and scholars often interpret the text in a pragmatic or utilitarian way, ignoring its philosophical taoist subtexts. in the text, the term translated as war – bing – is related to two complicated philosophical terms and concepts: tao ( ) and law ( ). treatise on bing, this paper will investigate, how changes of tao ( ) and law ( ) in relation to bing occur in a holistic cycle. bing, tao and law must be coordinated, otherwise any operation whether military or political will not be in conformity with the grand tao, and will not be able to achieve its aims. keywords: war ( ), tao ( ), law ( ), yin-yang dialectic, cyclic wholeness 134 introduction: sun tzu ( ; or master sun), is the most famous representative philosopher of the military school ( ), which is one of main schools of thought within the hundred schools of thought ( ) during the pre-qin and han dynasties. his ancient chinese military treatise writing: by sun tzu ( ) emerged from around 2533 years ago (about 512b.c.). through the modern archaeological discovery at yinque mountain, linyi city, shandong province, china in 1972 and after some research, pingti ho, the famous chinese-american historian, believes that “it was the oldest extant private writings in the whole chinese history until now.”1 even for utilitarian purposes such as commerce. outside of china, only some elements of the text are studied and interpreted, and usually from a utilitarian approach. this selective interpretation neglects the philosophical connotations of the text and of military force and sovereign violence during war. although the a deeper appreciation of its cultural context analysis and philosophical basis is still required. the text is quite short, it only has 13 chapters and 6075 chinese characters. while the terms are seemingly simple, there is an ambivalence to explain or translate in a direct and simple way. this is the case not only for this short chinese treatise, but also for most ancient chinese for chinese scholars as well. as 135 does not refer to art in an aesthetic sense, or to art as a kind of practical or utilitarian form of the mobilization of people, raw materials and instruments which can be the law of , would seem to be a more accurate title, since its main aim is to discuss the problem about how to use bing. but as we shall see, the term tao is equally important. in this short text, the terms tao ( ) and law ( ) are used up to 23 and 21 times each. we can situate the text based upon its cultural and historical was b.c. this is earlier than “the analects of confucius” ( ). it 2 ), that is, the earlier teachings of 3 , which were recorded in the text ( )4, and the historical thought of 5 , which were recorded by the text ( )6. furthermore, ping-ti ho revealed that it also “tao te ching”7 ( ), especially on its dialectical thinking.8 in recent years, derek m.c. yuen9 , and concluded that these two classical texts showed a mutual ) and the military school of thought ( ) period. in fact, guan zhong and the text , was also considered by later generations as an early representative of the legalist school of thought / the school of law ( ). moreover, the recent research about the relationship between military ( ) and legalist ( ) school of thoughts by zhao zhichao10, concluded that 136 the military strategists were the direct product of the war environment in the spring and autumn period and the warring states period, while the legalists came into being in order to frame this intense and frequent war main thinking of the legalists, while the legalists extended the scope philosophical connotations of sun tzu and lao tzu as the sources both 11 ( ), which was the theoretical expansion and practice of the generalization and concretization ” and guided the development of the historical trends during the chaos of pre-qin times. is important to understand the conceptual and philosophical meanings of three terms: bing ( ), tao ( ) , and law ( ) . bing ( ) , as the main character both of the state, it has much more wide and broad meaning than the term of chinese character and as an ancient chinese word, its basic meaning was the “implements, instruments weapons or arms” ( ) 12 according to the record of , and later, “those using ” were also called “ ” (soldiers or troops) and this became the second derived meaning of . eventually it became a general term for all people and things relating to the military or war. so that here can be summarized as a 137 general term about armed forces of the states, and their military might, covers anything and anyone related to military and even to war. therefore, just like as producers and users make wood into wooden products, war is made from by their producers (involved and armed people of the states) and users (who are usually kings, military generals or commanders and others within the state). in fact, there is no one word in english can directly describe its ) the transliterated word from its pinyin (chinese phonetic alphabet) of its chinese character. bing was always seen and recognized as a lethal weapon or a tool in chinese ancient culture and philosophy. in the ancient text jiang taigong stated: “the holy kings called bing as lethal weapon of death, when they had no any option for avoiding but to use it, then they had to unwillingly choose to use it.”13 ( ). in chapter 31, of the , lao tzu also said something similar: implements and instruments of evil omen, and it may say that all creatures willing to put bing into use. ”14 ( ). of guan zhong, also pointed out something similar: “there is nothing greater than bing which can create the poverty by harming more rapid than bing which can accelerate the risks, crises and dangers of the state, while increasing the worry and depression of the kings.” 15 ( ). hence, in all periods of chinese history and in all the schools of ancient chinese thought, there has been a negative perception of bing. in a sense, there are some similar ideas in the west concerning this aspect of bing or on the connection of violence and law. if we consider 138 their sovereignty, then bing is similar to the german philosopher walter his essay “the critique of violence.” all mythic lawmaking violence, which we may call preserving, “administrative” violence that serves it. divine violence, which is the sign and seal but never the means of sacred dispatch, may be called “sovereign” violence.16 culture made various attempts to balance its potential destructiveness for protecting the safety and security of the states and ensure the survival of the people. bing was used when it was considered unavoidable by the rulers and generals etc. that was the reason why sun tzu wrote this treatise for revealing the law ( ) of using bing. so again, this sense, tao ( ) was called , and so it would seem that the main topic was to be a discussion about the law ( ) of bing. but in fact it is the tao ( ) of bing which has more emphasis than law ( ) of bing. tao ( ) is a very complex ancient chinese word with subtle meanings. in , its original meaning as a noun refers to a “road, route or path” ( ).17 this basic original )18 in chapter 13 or “paths for marching or carrying army provisions” ( )19 in chapter 10 of . its second meaning as a verb is “to reach / to arrive / to attain” ( )20 139 as in it is also used as a verb by sun tzu, for instance in his chapter 7, he uses it in the sense, “to attain / arrive by marching on through the route with double speed ( )”21. besides these two meanings as noun and verb, it also means “guide, tell or speak out”, for instance, in the passage: “to teach and guide or speak out the orders not clearly and distinctly”22 ( ) in chapter 10 so there are two main layers of cultural derived metaphysical has two levels of meanings. the understanding of these four senses of tao are very important for understanding how they can be combined and harmonized together for the sake of understanding the use of bing. is the “grand tao” ( ) and its changes, its meaning approximates the ancient greek terminology laws of nature or the universe, and has two levels of meaning: unity (oneness or wholeness); and combined with the second level of meaning: the harmonized dialectic changes of yin ( ) and yang ( ) within the united circle or dynamic there are many descriptions about this layer of “tao.” regarding to of the it can be explained as said, “the tao that can be reached or can be spoken, is not the enduring and unchanging tao.” ( );23 and, in chapter 42 of the lao tzu further described the transformations or changes of the tao, “the tao produced one; one produced two; two produced three; three produces all things. all things leave behind them the yin obscurity (out of which they have come), and go forward to embrace the yang brightness (into which they have emerged), while they are harmonized by the breath of vacancy.” ( 140 );24 and in the chapter entitled xing shi, (guan zhong) mentioned that, “what the tao said is just oneness / .);25 and in the chapter xi ci i ( ), there is also similar description that, “the successive movement of the yin (inactive, dark, hard to be known) and yang (active, bright, easy to be known) operations constitutes what is called tao the course (of things). that which ensues as the result (of their movement) is goodness; that which shows it in its completeness is the natures (of men and things). ( )”.26 in general the ancient chinese philosophers tend to explain the term of “tao” in a more abstract and universal through imagery and metaphorical expression, while, the western philosophers tend to explain the term of “laws of nature” by observation and experiences or through logic and mathematics. the second layer of tao grand tao and the harmonized dialectic changes of tao). this is for the oneness / wholeness. its meaning is approximate to western concepts of natural law with its homologous courses for law-making, and it also has two levels of meaning: to harmonize the yin-yang dialectic changes of tao, to coordinate with the grand tao of oneness / wholeness. the second level of meaning involves the ability to speak out or make plans, standards, doctrines, moralities, policies, methods or solutions 141 for guiding real life. there are also many descriptions about this layer of tao. regarding of the although lao negation, positive or negative in terms of yang or yin, the manifestation of dialectics is always the unchanging tao.” ( );27 and in chapter 37 lao tzu writes concerning the exercise of government: “the tao in its regular course does nothing (for the sake of doing it), and so there is nothing which it does not do.” ( );28 and in shu yan, guan zhong said that, “movement of tao in the heaven is at the sun, and in the human being at the heart of people.” ( .);29 and of the jiang taigong said that, “in general, the heart of people hates death and takes pleasure in life, they love and welcome good virtue and also pursue all people under heaven will come over and pay their allegiance to it.” ( );30 and in chapter 40 of lao tzu stated that, “the changes and movements within tao proceed by the dialectic of yin weak.” ( );31 ” of , it borrowed s statement that, “to love people and also to return sage kings use them, the world would have good governance.” ( 142 )32 this layer of tao running through human society, reveals the universal common basic orientation which originated in the heart of the people and should serve people as far as possible. it is similar as the western concept of natural law, while, which is about achieving justice in the west. this can be found in the earlier texts of jiang taigong. in the chapter 12 entitled “the tao of bing”, of the , it recorded: king wu asked tai gong: “what is the tao of bing?” then tai gong replied: “in general, as for the tao of bing, oneness / wholeness can come alone, can depart alone. subtle; its conspicuous manifestation lies in the strategic trends; its completion lies with the ruler. thus the sage kings termed bing as weapons and evil implements, but when they had no any other alternative, they employed them unwillingly.” ( ” ) 33 therefore, there are two main intrinsically connected layers of tao 143 “tao of survival or downfall” ( );34 );35 “tao is to cause the people to be in complete accord with their rulers” ( );36 “which of the sovereigns is imbued with tao?” ( );37 “bing is with tao of (secretiveness / surreptitious / slyness / deceptions)” ( );38 “the tao on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach” ( );39 “this is the tao to keep a country at peace and an army intact.” ( ).40 based upon the discussions above we can see that these two layers with their two levels each constitute four levels of tao constitute a hierarchy and can be considered as operating from the top down, from level of the grand tao, down to level of guiding human action in real life. , they are to be understood according to this hierarchy. this is crucial for understanding the proper use of bing. we can now discuss the relation of each layer and level to the use of bing. (hereafter short as tao1) on using bing is the universal grand tao accords with taoist thought, hereby, it has two “what causes the rulers of the states to use bing?” so sun tzu provides 144 place / basis to decide life and death, and the tao to survival or extinction, hence it has to be thoroughly pondered, observed, and analyzed carefully.” ( )41 : grand tao is oneness / wholeness, and within it, its own movements and changes are naturally of the yinyang dialectic, so that every movement leading to survival or to ruin is a chosen of the movement of tao. because the grand tao is the origin of all things especially for the general population or the weaker multitudes, so that the preservation of the multitude and the social of vulnerable is the fundamental to the grand tao, and it is the basis for the existence of any country. lao tzu also said that: meanness, and what is lofty finds its stability in the lowness (from which it rises). hence princes and kings that in their considering themselves mean they see the foundation of their dignity?” ( 42 because in the grand tao of oneness / wholeness, the tao of survival always exists along with its potential opposite the tao of ruin, therefore it is these considerations of survival that guide the rulers of states to carefully and skillfully use bing. : as guan tzu said, the grand tao of oneness / wholeness in human being is at the heart of people.43 145 on the basis of yin-yang dialectic thoughts within the tao, because all people desire life and avoid death, and the survival of their society. the tao of ruin is always a constant threat. thus, people tend to come together and follow those who can lead them against this potential threat. the ruler should guide the heart of people to come together for the sake of survival, by the correct use of bing within the grand tao. therefore, that 44 and sun tzu further oneness / wholeness and fully in accord with their rulers / leaders, no matter where or when to go alive or dead with their rulers / leaders all together without any fear of any danger.” ( ).45 chapter, to preserve the life and survival of the multitude by unifying the heart of people. the second layer of tao (hereinafter short as tao2) on using bing is about cultivation of the intellect of human beings especially the rulers or generals who are directly and deeply involved in the tao1 of bing. this leads to the two questions: 1) “how could they have tao1 as much as possible or reach ultimate tao1 as far as possible, meanwhile, operation using bing?” : for achieving grand tao1 as far as possible, is to serve the prosperity and survival of the population or the multitudes the socially vulnerable groups (by the smaller group of rulers and authorities). the rule should demonstrate good virtues; to according with ultimate tao1. that was why sun tzu poses the question: “which of the sovereigns is imbued with tao” ( ).46 rulers had more tao1 than the rulers of other states even so-called their 146 at this point, because the soldiers and troops also are recruited from the multitude or the vulnerable groups, sun tzu outlined three main concepts: maintaining “national security” ( ), “intactness of troops” ( ), and the “use of spys” ( ) which was to allow the heart of people come together for achieving grand tao of oneness / wholeness. above three concepts structured the complete usage of this level of tao2 as “tao to keep a country at peace and an army intact” ( ), sun tzu summarized it in the 12th chapter “the attack by fire,” that the ruler must have the ability to maintain the tao of national security and wholeness / intactness of the population because: “a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general is full of caution. this is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.” ( )47 the second level of the second layer: facing up to the changes and movement of tao which is always involves a yin-yang dialectics with contradictory directions along with opposite potentials and trends within its oneness / wholeness, this level of tao2 on using bing means the way for human beings to deal with the changes and to know how to make plans and law ( ). sun tzu proposed the answer to this problem ” ( ; the term of can be interpreted in a much boarder sense which stand for secretiveness, surreptitious, slyness, deceptions, sophistry, the strange, the anomalous, or the paradoxical)48 chapter of . this term of is a concept that covers two movement laws or rules of tao is the foundational yin-yang dialectical principle within oneness / wholeness, which was often with subtle and mysterious situation and unpredictable. therefore, the second meaning is for human being, especially for the rulers or generals, who have to use 147 bing should do so based on the knowledge of the above laws or rules, and to make plans and execute practices in seemingly opposite or contradictory ways to guard against their enemies. actually, this term of had been always misunderstood as merely “deception” by the west. but in fact it is a recognition that the changes of tao are always unfathomable 49 tao ( ), heaven ( , time elements), earth ( , space elements), general ( , capable planners, participators and performers) and law ( ) of the changing situations and conditions which following with the changing laws or rules of tao (oneness / wholeness and yin-yang dialectic and so on). only when these variable are all considered in connection can the practice of bing elements, he could foresee who was likely to wins or lose before the war or combat takes place. in other words, in the above four levels of two layers of meanings, tao1 shows what is the origination, reason, orientation and purpose to use bing, and tao2 shows how to observe the situation, know the conditions, measure the variables, lay the plans, and then execute the law ( ) of using bing. law (fa ) the third chinese term law ( ), is also a key character meaning based upon whether it is used as a noun or a verb. in ancient chinese, e.g. the head of is in 50, is a verb., which means to abide, follow or maintain etc. [hereinafter short as fa(verb.), which meaning is approximate to the western concept about law-preserving], the second fa is a noun., and statutes, disciplines, and ordinances etc. [hereinafter short as fa(noun.), which meaning is approximate to the western concept about law-making of positive law or man-made law]: 148 guang tzu, in the chapter entitled , stated that: if not for fa(verb.) the fa(noun.) managed and always change without any standards or rules, if abiding without methods or laws, then the commands or orders of kings, leaders or generals will not pass to the that means the commands or orders are without the law fa(noun.). if there is law (noun.), but no one executes, then the result is that who make the commands, ordinances or orders cannot check, control, adjust the directions for keeping executing them rightly.” ( )51 according to terms and means of law ( ) in , the is fa(verb.), the second is fa(noun.). if we compare this with western concepts of law, law as a noun refers to law-making, and law as a verb refers to its law-preserving function. therefore, hereby, returning to the term of law ( two main layers of meanings: fa(noun.) as law-making (hereafter referred to as law1): how to follow tao2 positive laws, disciplines, methods, plans, choices, usages, statutes, ordinances, rules, norms, standards and so on what collectively refer to the right usable way or route for the rulers and generals being capable and possible to put bing to predicable good use; and fa(verb.) as law-preserving (hereafter referred to as law2): how to take and keep series of right actions to execute, abide, follow and maintain according to compliance, enforcement and usages of law1 on reach ultimate grand tao1. that is to say, meanwhile, law2 also checks or measures whether it can be rightly achieved and reached to win the 149 survival of all the people and their states after all the actions have been taken by using bing. . in the chapter entitled , of , it states the question, “how to make the people work together for the rulers by themselves?” guan tzu answered, “[the more] the law is established and the law is obeyed, the more people are able to be gathered and able to be led by the rulers.” therefore, law ( 1 is a system of nouns which are created by human rulers in accordance with tao2, and law2 is a series of verbs which are movements / actions taken to rightly maintain the reasonable obeying of law1 tao1. in a sense, tao1 is both the reason and the desired result, or we can call it as the rational end according to laws of nature and the natural law, while, according to law2 to use bing is the means to approach and match the end of ultimate tao1 – oneness / wholeness. is the law ( ): the law ( ) encompass: 1) how to set proper levels and subdivisions of organizations or troops; 2) how to set the matched system of rules and regulations, how to set the ranks, moralities and cultivation modes of organizational information, orders and supplies; above are both law1, and 3) for the rulers and generals, how to let them check, decide, execute and measure the system of the compliance, enforcement and usages of law1 on using bing, which is equal to law2 -how to use bing by the rulers and generals, including what military material and instrumental supplies, and generals to be capable to rightly put bing to good use.” ( ; my own translation and interpretation)52 150 then sun tzu said that one of the ways to predict success involves the last four factors within seven as below: by following and taking the action of law2, to observe, account and compare with the advantages and situations: “1) whose established proper system of law1 and expressed series of commands are more thoroughly implemented through law2 powers of bing and masses are more stronger; 3) whose 4) who have and maintain the greater rightly and clearly unswerving enforcement both in reward and punishment according to the system of law1 and the enforcement requirements of law2.” ( ).53 actually, these factors among rulers of the states, are all contained in the category of the term law ( ) on using bing. therefore, sun tzu provides a very important observation, in chapter 4, the consummated leaders or rulers who excel at employing bing into good use, are those whom both cultivate, construct or whole administration of the states as the regulators to master the key to dealing with relative eventuality of victory (success) and defeat (failure). ( )54 1 and tao2 includes above law1 and law2. then the deep actual meanings of tao ( ) and law ( ) in the use of bing can be understood correctly as a mechanism to maintain dynamic cyclic wholeness. in other words, tao 151 is both the reason and the end. it is the way to understand the great truth and to observe the changes of the situations and preconditions. law is the established system by rulers to deal with conditions and situations, therefore this understanding of law in relationship to tao allows for the prediction of the use of bing and its results in terms of victories or to the grand tao is the protection and survival of the people. conclusion therefore, according to above analysis and deciphering of bing, tao ( ), and law ( ), it can be seen that the intention is to show a mechanism for maintaining the dynamic cyclic wholeness of tao ( ) and law ( ) when using bing. benjamin recognized the perniciousness of law-making or law-preserving violence when taken in isolation. here with sun tzu we have the recognition of a higher coordination which benjamin might recognize as similar to his divine or sovereign violence. here it is the coordination with the grand tao. it is a top-down approach, whereby every series of actions to achieve an aim needs to return back to its initial point in the grand tao. it is a movement from tao to law, and then from law to tao; a holistic cycle between tao and law through the use will constitute a perfect cycle where beginning and end points correspond to the grand tao. however, if during this process, law-preserving bing and law-making bing is not coordinated with their origination in the tao this wholeness can be broken either by the rulers themselves or by their enemies or hostile powers and forces. it is then that their states and their people will face ruin and death. this is the whole systematical ) and law ( ) on using bing, no one state can avoid or escape from this dynamic cyclic wholeness in the history, if it does concern to the survival of its people. in other words, it is also a fundamental law of nature which can that is why sun tzu contends that victory or defeat can be predicted by 152 as a philosophy which relies on observation, measure, counting, weighing and computation, to predict the results of victory or defeat before the and to control the use of bing, when it is unavoidable. endnotes 1 ping-ti ho, , ping-ti ho, trans. and ed. “ oldest extant private writings in china]”, in [three studies on suntzu and laotzu], (taiwan: institute of modern history, academia sinica, lecture series no.2, 2002), pp.35-69. 2 guan zhong, which left an extremely rich military legacy. after duke huan of qi sought diplomatic and military activities and a place. such a social environment provided sun tzu many convenient conditions for military research, making him a knowledgeable military talent in his youth. 3 jiang, taigong century bc), one of earliest representative of military school of thought in chinese shang, and also known as jiang ziya, respectively. following the elevation of qi to a duchy, grand duke jiang was a chinese noble who helped kings wen and wu of zhou overthrow the shang in ancient china. 4 ( ) is a typical book of chinese pre-qin military school of thought which recorded the teachings of jiang taigong to king wen and king wu of zhou dynasty on civil and military strategy at around the eleventh century bc. it is one of the seven military classics in ancient china. 5 guan zhong, , (c.720–645 b.c.) was a chinese philosopher as early legalist with taoist tradition, and also a politician as chancellor and was a reformer of qi-state during the spring and autumn period of chinese history. his teaching was recorded in the treatise of guanzi. 6 is an ancient chinese political and philosophical text that is named for and traditionally attributed to the 7th century bce philosopher and statesman guan zhong. 7 lao, tzu. . tao te ching , is a chinese classic text of taoists school of thought, traditionally credited to the 6th-century bc sage laozi. 153 8 ping-ti ho, , “ [three studies on suntzu and laotzu, a fundamental reversion in the history of chinese thought: an argumentation that the (taiwan: institute of modern history, academia sinica, lecture series no.2, 2002), pp.1-35. 9 derek m.c.yuen, (new york: oxford university press, 2014), p.6. 10 zhao zhichao , [the research of the relationship between pre-qin legalist school and military school]. ( (cnki) cnki china academic journals (cd-rom) electronic journal society co., ltd, 2012), p.120. 11 is a treatise attributed to han fei , who was a typical representative of foundational legalists school of thought. it comprises a selection of essays in the tradition of legalist school on theories of state power, synthesizing the methodologies of his predecessors. 12 xu shen , “ ” in [lit. discussing or explaining graphic writing, and analyzing or explaining characters], volumes 4, entries 1759. ( volumes 66~69. , han dynasty), reprinted in sturgeon (2011); translated by my own). accessed by: https://ctext.org/shuo-wen-jie-zi/bu3/ens#n27983 13 jiang taigong , “chapter 12 ” [tao of bing; tao of military], in [the six secret teaching] volumes 1 [the civil strategy], ed. in [complete library in the four branches of literature], volumes 1-6, chapter 12 1782, pp. 30-31; translated by my own. reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/library. 14 lao tzu , “chapter 39”, in ( ), annotated in , (annotated by wang bi, three kingdoms period; translated by james legge, 1891). reprinted in sturgeon (2011); edited by my own. accessed by: https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing/ens 15 guan zhong , “chapter 16 ” [to execute / preserve the , volumes 344~347; (annotated by fang xuanling, tang dynasty; ed. zhang yuanji, in jing changshu qushi tieqintongjianlou cang song kan ben ben shu er si juan , shangwu yinshuguan , 1919-1936); translated by my own). reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/guanzi/ens 154 16 walter benjamin, “critque of violence”, , edited by marcus bullock and michael w. jennings, p.252. (london: the belknap press of harvard university press, cambridge, massachusetts, 1996). 17 xu shen, “ ” , in . 18 sun tzu, “ [use of spy], in [the art of war]; english translation by lionel giles, 1910. reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/art-of-war/ens 19 sun tzu, “chapter 10 ” [terrain]. in 20 ibid. 21 sun tzu, “chapter 7 ” [maneuvering]. in 22 sun tzu, “chapter 10 ”, in 23 lao tzu , “chapter 1 embodying the dao”. in 24 lao tzu , “chapter 42 the transformations of the dao”. in 25 guan zhong, “chapter 2 xing shi” , in 26 i ching ( ) [the book of changes]. “ ”, in ; ed. wang bi , wei of three kingdom period ; annotated by han kangbo , jin dynasty ; notes and commentaries by kong yingda ; (translated by james legge in , volume 16, 1899; edited by my own). reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/book-of-changes/ens 27 lao tzu , “chapter 1 embodying the dao”. in ; edited and translated by my own. 28 lao tzu , “chapter 37”, in 29 guan zhong, “chapter 12” , in guanzi; translated by my own. 30 , in six secret teaching; translated by my own. 31 lao tzu , “chapter 40”, in ; translated by my own. 32 guan zhong, “chapter 12-shu yan”, in ; translated by my own. 33 jiang taigong, “the tao of the military” in in ; translation and commentary by ralph d. sawyer with mei-chtin sawyer (us,boulder & uk,oxford: westview press, 1993), p51; edited by my own. 34 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ”, in 35 ibid. 36 ibid. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 sun tzu, “chapter 11 ” [the nine situations], in 40 sun tzu, “chapter 12” [the attack by fire],in 155 41 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ” [making the plans / initial estimations], in chapter of “sun-tzu the art of war in translation”, translated with a historical introduction and commentary by ralph d. sawyer, (colorado, us and oxford,uk: westview press, 1994); ed.and translated by my own. 42 lao tzu , “chapter 39”, in tao te ching. 43 guan zhong, “chapter 12” , in guanzi; translated by my own. 44 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ”, in 45 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ”, translated by ralph d. sawyer; ed. and translated by my own. 46 ibid. translated by my own. 47 sun tzu, “chapter 12” [the attack by fire],in 48 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ” [making the plans], in 49 ibid. 50 guan zhong, “chapter 16 ” , in ; translated by my own. 51 ibid. 52 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ” [laying the plans], in , ed.and translated by my own. 53 sun tzu, “chapter 1 ”, translated by ralph d. sawyer; ed. and translated by my own. 54 sun tzu, “chapter 4” [tactical dispositions], in translated by ralph d. sawyer; ed. and translated by my own. 156 references derek m.c.yuen, (new york: oxford university press, 2014) donald sturgeon, chinese text project: a dynamic digital library of premodern chinese, digital scholarship in the humanities 2019. sturgeon, donald (ed.). 2011. chinese text project. accessed by: http://ctext.org guan zhong , “ ” , in , volumes 344~347; (annotated by fang xuanling, tang dynasty; ed. zhang yuanji, in jing changshu qushi tieqintongjianlou cang song kan ben ben shu er si juan , shangwu yinshuguan 1919-1936); translated by my own). reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/guanzi/ens i ching ( ) [the book of changes] “xi ci i”, in wuyingdian shisan jing zhushu ben yijing , ed. by wang bi , wei of three kingdom , annotated by han kangbo , jin dynasty ; noted and commentated by kong yingda , translated by james legge in sacred books of the east, volume 16, 1899. reprinted in sturgeon, 2011. accessed by: https://ctext.org/book-of-changes/ens jiang taigong , [the six secret teaching], ed. in si ku quan shu [complete library in the four branches of literature], 1782; translated by my own. reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/library. in translated and commentated by ralph d. sawyer with mei-chtin sawyer, pp.19-106. us, boulder & uk, oxford: westview press, 1993. 157 lao tzu, “tao te ching” , in , annotated by wang bi, three kingdoms 220-265, translated by james legge, 1891. reprinted in sturgeon 2011. accessed by: https:// ctext.org/dao-de-jing/ens ping-ti ho, , [three studies on suntzu and laotzu], pp.1-70. taiwan: institute of modern history, academia sinica, lecture series no.2, 2002. sun tzu, [the art of war], 6th cent.b.c.; translated by lionel giles, 1910. reprinted in sturgeon (2011); accessed by: https://ctext.org/art-of-war/ens sun tzu, , translated, with a historical introduction and commentary by ralph d. sawyer with collaboration of mei-chün lee sawyer. (boulder and oxford: westview press, 1994). walter benjamin, “critical of violence”, , edited by marcus bullock and michael w. jennings, pp.236-252. london: the belknap press of harvard university press, cambridge, massachusetts, 1996. xu shen , [lit. discussing or explaining graphic writing, and analyzing or explaining characters], in , volumes 66~69. , han dynasty), reprinted in sturgeon (2011); translated by my own). accessed by: https:// ctext.org/shuo-wen-jie-zi/bu3/ens#n27983 zhao zhichao [the research of the relationship between pre-qin legalist school and military school] (cnki) cnki china academic journals (cd-rom) electronic journal society co., ltd, 2012) beng keong, lim 83 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021, 83-93 © 2000 by assumption university press the emancipation from suffering in mahayana buddhism and its implications for contemporary mental health beng keong, lim assumption university, thailand abstract human beings constantly seek meaning and temporary happiness for themselves. nevertheless, they live in a perpetual cycle of universal and subjective suffering, affecting their general and mental wellness. scholars in the humanities continue to pursue questions of meaning and interpretation of suffering, and in science there is still no solution for the emancipation of human suffering. this study will try to show that the concept of bodhisattva in mahayana buddhism can address the issue of emancipation of suffering in a meaningful way. mahayana buddhism suggests that suffering comes from the objectification of the mind, the notion of self, and the discriminatory mind that arises from dualistic views. overcoming suffering is possible by using the type of discipline usually reserved for the bodhisattva. this disciple provides a way even in secular society to emancipate individuals from suffering, and improve their quality of life and mental well-being. in conclusion, the study suggests that bodhisattva practice can be used in public education as a psychological tool for self-help and the emancipation of sufferings. keywords: psychology; mahayana buddhism, suffering, bodhisattva 84 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 introduction the subject of human suffering and its removal is an old philosophical problem. for aristotle, attaining happiness is the goal of character-based virtue ethics. and in the same way, suffering (dukkha) and its removal was the concern of gautama buddha. this paper focuses on the emancipation of suffering using the fundamental practices of the bodhisattva, particularly the universal and subjective truths of sufferings through the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom expounded by the lord buddha.1 it will provide insight into the reasons that the fundamental practice of the bodhisattva is suitable for the secular world. in this paper, the study tries to find how the concept of boddhisatva in mahayana buddhism helps mitigate human suffering. and how such a way could become practical for the public, transcending any religious boundaries. subjective and objective suffering human being have lived in a perpetual cycle of objective and subjective suffering for centuries because of the various unfulfilled human desires in search of happiness. this involves basic survival connected to shelter, food, clothing, birth, living, fears, and anxiety. this suffering can be termed as objective and is inseparable from the environment which affects the emotional, spiritual, physical, and cognitive aspects of human beings. on the other hand, subjective suffering mainly depends on an individual’s perspectives towards their life conditions. studies have found that even human sensory organs have a role in selecting the forms of selective survivorship.2 the complexity of contemporary human society has aggravated the issues of human suffering. society and happiness are in a direct relationship in contemporary economics and external and internal human factors are related to it. given the fast lifestyle, human beings are chasing short-term happiness as a solution to their well-being and adaptation to their circumstances in life. they are constantly searching for meaning for self-actualization. this gives further rise to sufferings beng keong, lim 85 due to increased desires and egocentric behavior. modern science has so far no real solutions to this general emancipation of suffering in human beings.3 these factors to some extent affect the quality of human life, therefore there has recently been attention to this general wellness by the world health organization (who).4 suffering in mahayana buddhism and contemporary society suffering (dukkha) is one of the central concepts in buddhism and its understanding in mahayana buddhism. it is considered to be connected to the objectification of the mind which is the formation of the notion of self that produces a discriminatory mind leading to dualistic views. this is considered the root issues of the suffering of men. buddhist scholars state that men need to end the “becoming,” or in other words they should remove the notion of self 5,6. therefore, the method to end suffering is possible only through the cessation of the passions and the suppression of the discriminatory mind.7 the abovementioned concept can be realized by the fundamental practices of the bodhisattva that comprises of three key characteristics: non-self, non-duality, and emptiness; and they can enable men to achieve the emancipation of sufferings. the three characteristics of non-self, non-duality, and emptiness are taught in all the mahayana buddhism sutras.8 in the lotus sutra the vehicle of the bodhisattva is one of the three vehicles towards the path of enlightenment and is considered the only path to the true path of enlightenment.9 it is due to the bodhisattva’s ability to recognize the world manifested by the objectification of the mind and to free the discriminatory mind from wrong reasoning and imaginations unlike the other two vehicles of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, the six paramitas to gain annattara samyak sambodhi leads to the highest enlightenment.10,11 so what sets this bodhisatva vehicle apart is the practicing of the six paramitas or the six perfections of to assist to gain emancipation from suffering. 86 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 this idea of the overcoming of the suffering can be used to understand the subjective suffering which is common in contemporary society. this is often understood as stress. we can rephrase the four noble truths to suggest that (1) life is stress (duhkha) (2) the source of the rising of stress (samudaya) (3) cessation or extinction of stress (nirodha/nirvana) and (4) the way to the cessation or extinction of stress (marga).12 for the end of suffering is to recognize that life is stress and the rising of stress comes from the aspects of increases in the desires of men for material things,13 leading to the increasing discontentment and dissatisfaction in life.14 secondly, the cessation of stress involves using one of the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom, which is mediation, towards the development of mental, morality, and wisdom, which are said to be the highest quality of the transcended self. 15 it has the purpose of ending the attachments of the discriminatory mind. and it addresses the suffering which arises from unfulfilled worldly passions and complicated emotions which result from sickness, old age and, death.16 an example of the cognitive sufferings of irrational thoughts that habitual thinking can affect the behaviors of the individual that caused problems not limited to depression, anxiety, anger, resentment, rumination, hopelessness, and which compromise the mental wellness of the individuals. this is also recognized by neuroscience. it has been discovered that the brain through instinctual, learned, and thought-related processes could activate emotions, due to a high connection of early life experiences causing ruminations due to memory in the individuals which resulted in painful emotions.17 yet neuroscience still has limitations in its findings regards to the interactive factors of momentary worry, rumination, cognitive and behavior avoidance, and psychological disorders, and the associated negatives impact. academicians do not have solutions for the emancipation of sufferings as they are often engaged in seeking new meanings and interpretations of suffering leading to questions of morality and obligation.18 but the acknowledgment of the four noble truths and the beng keong, lim 87 practicing of the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom are useful for the emancipation from these kind of suffering prevalent in contemporary society. the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom in the book “the tree of enlightenment” buddhist scholar, satina explained that prajnaparamita has the sanskrit language origin of “prajna,” which means wisdom or “insight” and paramita means “perfection”, “transcended” or “the climax of wisdom” the combination of “prajna” & “paramita” means the perfection of wisdom.19 the practicing of the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom is the method to end suffering. in practicing six paramitas is to develop one’s qualities in morality, mental aspects leading to wisdom. mental development prepares the mind to achieve wisdom, which opens the door to freedom and enlightenment. this wisdom is gained is through the attainment of the “non-self” and “emptiness.”20 the practicing of the fundamental practices would help to resolve the issues of discriminating mind producing dualistic views and the notion of self in men through the good works that purify the mind.21 the purpose of the practice of the six perfections or paramitas is to suppress the function of the discriminatory mindset; to be free from attachment of thoughts concerning objects. this leads to emancipation (vimoksa) from these continuous dualistic tendencies leading to desires, pleasures, and anger.22 the fundamental practices of the bodhisattva consist of practice in the aspects of (1) generosity (danaparamita), (2) discipline (shilaparamita), (3) patience (ksantiparamita), (4) energy (virya), (5) meditation (dhyanaparamita) and, (6) wisdom (prajnaparamita). 23,24 there are eight steps of the path in conjunction with the practice of the six perfections of wisdom or the six paramitas. these eight steps consist of the right speech, right action, and right livelihood cultivates good morality; right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration cultivate good mental development; and right understanding and right thoughts cultivate or develop of wisdom.25 through the development of wisdom, 88 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 craving and ignorance ceased through the achievement of nirvana, which is the third noble truth of the cessation of sufferings.26 if it is practiced well, it helps in removing greed, hatred, and delusion and men will be able to be emancipated from the universal and subjective truth of sufferings.27 in the lankavatara sutra, the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom operate to break the habit energy or memory, that is stored up in the storehouse of the memory by the false images of this world (vishaya).28 the memory or habit energy is accumulated over time because of false reasoning and imagination of the individuals through the great variety of objects and actions closely related that produce discriminatory ideas, this habit energy or memory constantly affects and agitates the mind, giving rise to distorted ideas of the external world.29 it is through practicing the six paramitas, that the bodhisattva can cut off from the aggregates or the skandhas that make up the personality and its’ external world.30 it is the cessation or abandoning of the skandhas that are considered as true emancipation in mahayana buddhist tradition.31 emptiness to end the cycle of the causation of suffering, it is important to expand the knowledge to prevent the misunderstandings and malpractice of the fundamental practices of the bodhisattva and the achievement of the three key characteristics of non-self, non-duality, and emptiness. emptiness is one of the difficult concepts that deserves an explanation because it is related to practice and metaphysical understanding of existence. the need for understandings the three marks of existence in the mahayana buddhism tradition is crucial that all existence is “impermanence (anitya), dissatisfaction or suffering (duhkha), and insubstantiality (anatman, “without self”), which can allow men to reduce stress or sufferings from passion and desires causing craving, cling and grasping. as there is no way for men to reduce sufferings, due to the inability to recognized the three marks of existence from craving, cling, and grasping arise from passion and desires.32 as these are defines as beng keong, lim 89 causes of attachment, ignorance, and discriminatory notion.33 if men are not equipped with this essential knowledge, men will perpetually move in the cycle of universal and subjective truths of sufferings as they will still have craving and ignorance,34 due to their desires and passion from the dissatisfaction and discontentment in life. one of the achievements of the three key characteristics of the bodhisattva is emptiness. emptiness is a difficult concept to understand 35 due to the intellectual level of men. there are seven types of emptiness taught by the lord buddha siddhattha gotama36 and the given the example of the “thirty-seven practices of the bodhisattva” written by buddhist scholar, bhikshuni thubten chodron, 2009, which are the practices of the enlightened bodhisattva 37 and such advanced practice is documented in “the lotus sutra.”38 it is not suitable to the practice of the general population due to the different intellectual of men as emptiness is not an easy concept to understand and often being misunderstood and misinterpreted, which could lead to complications toward the achievement of enlightenment.39 men, then, can gain general well-being and mental wellness from the attainment of blissfulness through one of the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom amid their universal and subjective suffering. blissfulness is described as nirvana,40 and nirvana is described as stillness or the state of tranquillity (samapatti).41 the stage of tranquility is attained through the path of meditation to enter the noble wisdom or tathagthahood.42 through this path of perfect tranquilization enable to cast off desires,43 or enabling men to cut off any formation that arises from the faculty of the six organs. men then can be able to experience the seven different types of emptiness consisting of the emptiness of individual marks (lakshana); the emptiness of self-nature is unborn (skt. bhavasvabbava); (3) the emptiness of no-work is explained as skandhas are nirvana itself, and no work is doing in them from the beginning, therefore is called emptiness of no-work (apracarita), (4) the emptiness of work explained as is skandhas are devoid of an ego and its’ belonging and go on functioning, when there is mutual conjunction of cause and action, therefore is the emptiness of work (pracarita), (5) the 90 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 emptiness of all things in the sense they are unpredictable (nirabhilapya) speaks of the nature of false imagination is not expressible, therefore it is the emptiness of unpredictable, (6) the emptiness of the ultimate reality realizable by noble wisdom speaks of inner attainment of realization through noble wisdom without traces of habit-energy generated by all the mistaken conception, (7) the emptiness of mutuality (itaretara) means when things are missing here, one speaks about it being empty. emptiness is not for the practice of the general public for the following reasons. firstly, its misinterpretation can further complicate thought patterns and lead to more complicated psychological issues. secondly, emptiness is not an easy concept to understand because of the different intellectual levels of men. thirdly, bodhisattva is the “enlightened” being able to practice emptiness and the general population is yet to be enlightened and the need to work towards the cessation of becoming and to deconstruct the notion of self. the enlightened bodhisattva can sacrifice the physical parts of their body documented in “the lotus sutra” due to the achievement of the key characteristics of non-self, non-duality and gaining the noble wisdom to recognize the three marks of existence that all things are “impermanence (anitya), dissatisfaction or suffering (duhkha), and insubstantiality (anatman or “without self”) to reduce stress or sufferings from passion and desires causing craving, cling, and grasping. secularizing practises of the bodhisattva the fundamental practices of the bodhisattva are suitable to be used for general public education and as a psychological tool for selfhelp thus improving the quality of life. as the acknowledgment and embracing the four noble truths and practicing the six paramitas or the six perfections of wisdom do need not have the commitments of mahayana buddhism. they do not need to be labelled in terms of religion and spirituality.44 since human beings are found out to be geared by the continuous activities of dualistic poisoning desires (trishna) accompanied by pleasure (nandi) and anger (raga) and ignorance (avidya) in the beng keong, lim 91 mahayana buddhism tradition.45 embracing a religion can be a double-edged sword. they have many benefits such as promoting connections, values, the formation of identities, cultivating a sense of belonging beyond the individual, and for achieving a communal transcended spirituality. but religions often exacerbate differences that often lead to conflicts of the world. whereas, secular forms of meditation can develop spirituality, mindfulness, and self-compassion. mindfulness fosters adaptive, flexible, and receptive awareness and fosters an empathetic attitude towards others, and the six paramitas practiced by the bodhisattva can be used for public education and as a psychological tool for self-help in daily living without the formal adherence to mahayana buddhism. the fundamental practices of the bodhisattva can be incorporated and emphasized as a therapy for dealing with universal and subjective truths of sufferings. men have lived in the perpetual cycle of universal and subjective truth of suffering for centuries. it is through this pragmatic system of training of the mind to work towards the deconstruction of the notion of self that will helps men to gain freedom from the issues of life and death, which are the universal and subjective truths of sufferings. the embracing of the four noble truths helps men to identify and be conscientious with the causes of suffering and the way to end it. it is through understanding the fundamental practice of the bodhisattva to gain insight and transcended wisdom to achieve the three key characteristics of non-self, non-duality, and emptiness. this can serve to eliminate the ignorance that arises from life experiences and wrong reasoning. the expansion of knowledge in the interdependent practices of the bodhisattva in the cultivation of morality, the good mental state without the discriminatory mind towards wisdom to prevent misunderstandings and bad practices. there are two key reasons that it is suitable for general public education and use it as a self-help psychological tool for daily living for men to be emancipated from sufferings of different kinds. firstly, if men still have increasing desires and passions and they do not eradicate the notion of self and discriminatory mind arises from the dualistic views 92 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 that contribute to sufferings. secondly, we have found out through the academic findings in tour research on the pros and cons of religion, spirituality, and secular meditation. this secular meditation yields results or benefits for personal development in terms of morality and a good mental state. this is not just beneficial on the interpersonal level, but it will benefit people across a wider spectrum and can address issues concerning the environment, racism, inter religious issues which are often the result of distortions of identity formation, dualistic views and discriminatory mind in contemporary society. endnotes 1 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 205. 2 mary p. fisher. the living religions (3rd ed.) new jersey: prentice hall, 1991), 27. 3 mathijs peters (2014), schopenhauer and adorno on bodily suffering: a comparative analysis. (hampshire: palgrave macmillan, 2014), 4. 
 4 world health organization, mental health in emergencies (20132019). https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mental-health-inemergencies 5 hsing yun, wisdom and emptiness of the diamond sutra. lam, amy & tsi, jeanne. (trans.) (taiwan: fo guan shan translation center, 2018), 3. 6 bhikkhu thanissara, the paradox of becoming (bangkok: mahamakut rajavidyalaya, 2008), 7. 7 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 73. 8 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 67-68. 9 the lotus sutra. (1993). watson, burton. (trans.). (new york: columbia university press, 1993),35. 10 the lotus sutra, 1993,14. 11 the lotus sutra, 1993, 356. 12 john s. strong, buddhism: an introduction (london: one world, 2015), 446. 
 13 seung sahn the compass of zen, sunim, hyon g.(ed.). (boston: shambhala publications, 1997), 22. 14 traleg kyabgon. (2001). the essence of buddhism: an introduction to its philosophy and practice. (massachusetts: shambhala, 2013), 29. 
eisbn 978-0-83482212-2 beng keong, lim 93 15 peter della santina, the tree of enlightenment: introduction to the major traditions of buddhism. taiwan: chico dharma study foundation, 1997), 20-21. 16 bukkyo dendo kyokai, the teaching of buddha (tokyo: kosaido co., ltd, 2005), 38. 17 sternberg, 2006, 99. 18 sternberg, 2006, p.176. 19 satina, 1997, 169. 20 santina, 1997, p. 400. 21 the diamond sutra, 1986, section xxiii. 22 the lankatavara sutra, 1932, xvii. 23 the lotus sutra, 1993, p. 338 24 the mahayana mapaharinirvana sutra,1973, 191. 25 santina, 1997, 63. 26 santina, 1997, 20-21. 27 the mahayana mapaharinirvana sutra, 1973, 400. 28 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 61. 29 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 238. 30 the lankavatara sutra, 185. 31 the mahayana mahaparinirvana sutra, 1973, p.71 32 kyabgon, 2001, 23. 33 kyokai, 2005, 42 . 34 santina, 1997, 20-21. 35 yun, 2018, 1. 36 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 65-66. 37 thubten chodron, the thirty-seven practices of the bodhisattva. (singapore: fabulous printers pte ltd, 2009), 6. isbn: 978-981-08-2417-4 38 the lotus sutra, 1993, 9. 39 ronald b. epstein, buddhist text translation society’s buddhism a to z. (california: buddhist text translation society, 2003),149-152. 40 the lankavatara sutra, 1932; 1:44, p.9. 41 the lankavatara sutra, 1932, 41. 42 the lankavatara sutra, 1932 p.21 43 the mahayana mahaparinirvana sutra, 1993, p.19 44 sulmasy, d. p., “biopsychosocial-spiritual model for the care of patients at the end of life.” the gerontologist 42, no.3 (2002): 24. https://doi.org/10.1093/ geront/42.suppl_3.24 45 the lankavatara sutra,1932, p. xvii 08_(137-144) an implementation of.pmd an implementation of buddhist environmental ethics for sustainable development in cambodia chim phorst royal universiy of phnom penh, cambodia abstract the subject of this research centers on the solution to environmental crises that cambodia meets today caused by rapid technological developments. various scientific and technological solutions are offered by empirical sciences. yet these solutions are not sustainable, because new problems emerge to replace the existing ones. this paper argues that it is only through a change of consciousness that can affect a lasting solution. buddhism is an important resource for environmental ethics, and buddhist traditional environmental ethics is the most sustainable solution for minimizing our current environmental crises. º·¤ñ́ âèí à¹×éíëò¢í§§ò¹çô¨ñâªôé¹¹õéáõèù¹âì¡åò§íâùè·õè ¡òãá¡é»ñ­ëòêôè§áç´åéíáçô¡äµ ·õè¡ñá¾ùªò¡óåñ§»ãðêºíâùè·ø¡çñ¹¹õé íñ¹à»ç¹¼åê׺à¹×èí§áò¨ò¡¡òã¾ñ²¹òà·¤â¹âåâõ ·õèãç´àãçç ä´éáõ¡òãàê¹íçô¸õá¡é»ñ­ëò·ñ駴éçâçô·âòèòêµãìáåðà·¤â¹âåâõâ´âçô¸õ çô·âòèòêµãìàªô§»ãð ñ̈¡éì áµè·ò§á¡éàëåèò¹õé¡çäáèâñè§â×¹à¾ãòðáõ»ñ­ëòãëáè æ à¡ố ¢öé¹áò á·¹»ñ­ëòà ốá º·¤çòá¹õéµéí§¡ò㶡à¶õâ§çèòáõçô̧ õà ṍâç·õè̈ ðá¡é»ñ­ëò¹õéä é́íâèò§âñè§â×¹ ¹ñ蹡ç¤×í¡òãà»åõè⹨ôµêó¹ö¡¢í§»ãðªòª¹ ¾ø·¸èòê¹òà»ç¹áëåè§êó¤ñ­êóëãñº ¨ãôâèòêµãìêôè§áç´åéíááåð¾ø·¸¨ãôâèòêµãìêôè§áç´åéíáà»ç¹á¹ç·ò§ã¹¡òãá¡é»ñ­ëò àòçðêôè§áç´åéíáçô¡äµôã¹»ñ̈ ø̈ºñ¹·õèâñè§â×¹·õèêǿ prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 137-144 137 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ introduction cambodia is a small country that lies along the delta of mekong river in southeast asia with luscious forests and diverse flora and fauna. cambodia has a rich biodiversity. natural resources are the mainstay of cambodia’s economy, but in recent years, many of cambodia’s natural resources have been heavily exploited. the cultural recognition of cambodia’s natural resources has a long history. it can even be seen in the ancient temples of angkor where it was expressed in the many detailed stone carvings in the bas-reliefs. in khmer tradition, human life is considered as being of the same nature as other forms of life. thus people in cambodia traditionally live among and with all living things and take care of these gifts of nature. nature is the mother that has nourished her children in cambodia from times immemorial. traditionally, we cambodians, being buddhists, regard our relationship to the environment as sacred and having ethical dimensions. but at present we are losing these perspectives due to need and greed. this paper is born out of the concern for this crisis. environmental ethics, treats the problem of how man should relate to the environmental crisis he is faced with today. this crisis is often brought about by human activities. various scientific and technological solutions are offered by science to meet the challenge of these environmental crises. but it is the conviction of this paper that these scientific solutions are not sufficient to address this crisis; indeed they may create new and even greater problems. the thesis of this paper is that traditional buddhist environmental ethics can provide a valuable philosophical solution to our current environmental crises. environmental crisis modern technology is a blessing to people. it has made life more comfortable in many ways. but technology has also caused many environmental problems, global warming, ozone layer depletion, deforestation, and reduction in biodiversity. many scientists consider reduction in 138 prajna vihara __ __ ~ biodiversity as one of the greatest challenges facing humanity today. it affects our ecosystem and ultimately all life including human life. everything humans do has an effect on the environment. deforestation is one of the factors causing global warming __ the increase of average temperature of the atmosphere, oceans, and landmasses of the earth. the main cause of this warming is thought to be the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and natural gas, which releases into the atmosphere carbon dioxide and other substances known as greenhouse gases. as the atmosphere becomes more polluted, the earth retains more heat as a result of the “greenhouse effect”. as peter singer explains: ... the use of chlorofluorocarbons (cfcs) threatens the ozone layer shielding the surface of our planet from the full force of sun’s ultraviolet radiation. damage to that protective shield would cause cancer rates to rise sharply and could have other effects, for example, on the growth of algae. the threat was especially acute to the world’s southernmost cities, since a large hole in the ozone was found to be open up each year over antarctica, but in the long term, the entire ozone shield was imperiled (singer, 2002, pp14). humans require a healthy environment for their own good health. modern technology gives humankind many benefits. it also presents many challenges to our environment. buddhist environmental ethics environmental ethics is concerned with man’s appropriate use of this planet. the word ethics is derived from the greek word “ethos” meaning “custom” and refers to attitudes and values that guide human behavior. ethics in the philosophical sense is the reasoned examination of what “customs tell us about how we ought to live”. thus environmental ethics addresses how man ought to live in harmony with his environment. chim phorst 139 the genesis of buddhist ethics is very close to the natural world. in the buddhist ethical system virtue is contained in all rational beings. sahni mentions that, buddhism’s understanding of nature is innately cosmological and it is only in this sense that nature can be recognized in buddhist thought. (sahni, p., 2008 pp164) the practices of buddhism for solving environmental crises are in direct conformity with the concern of buddhism to alleviate the suffering of all sentient beings. human life and other forms of life are regarded as being of the same matter. this means that developing ethical norms and plans of action based on buddhist practices leads to solving environmental problems. the buddhist perspective on sustainability in the buddhist tradition, a householder should accumulate wealth as a bee collects pollen from a flower. the bee harms neither the beauty nor the fragrance of the flower, but gathers pollen to turn it into sweet honey. similarly, human beings should take resources from nature without damaging the environment. as the dhammapada suggests, as a bee without harming the flower, its color or scent, flies away, collecting only the honey, even so should the sage wander in the village. a natural resource is something that exists in nature and is of value to human life. water, forests, minerals and plants are all examples of natural resources. natural resources are often renewable. fish and trees, for example, will continue to be produced by nature so long as we use these resources in a sustainable way. many of the environmental problems we are experiencing around the world are caused by the destructive human use of the earth’s resources. the resources are placed under increasing pressure to provide for the 140 prajna vihara __ __ ~ industrial and urban needs of the consumer society. resources are judged solely by their economic worth rather than their life-support capacity. the very first teaching for those entering monkhood is the “four habitual practices”. these are: to wander around for alms; to wear simple, used clothes; to live at the bases of trees; and to use natural medicines. they demonstrate the buddha’s intentions for monks to live simply, economically, and in harmony with nature. these four principles serve as a reminder that man must depend on nature for many of his needs including food, clothing and shelter. this contrasts greatly with the concepts of materialism and consumerism, which follow often lead to excess and the notion of satisfying one’s desires with no sense of limits. the buddhist perspective on forest it is well-known that the buddha had a special preference for forest dwellings. his entire life involved around trees and forests. for example, . he was born under a tree, . he attained his enlightenment under a tree . he passed away under a tree. the buddha considered the planting of trees and the preservation of forest groves as important meritorious acts, which provided the additional benefits of the purifying the mind and the eliminating of cravings. buddhist monasteries accept the plant world as edifying and even conducive to the purification of mind. it is no coincidence that many buddhist monasteries are found in forests or in the best maintained plant environments. buddhism, as a rule, adopts a gentle and grateful attitude towards the plant kingdom. the presence of buddhist forest monastery has helped protect these areas of forest over the centuries. more recently in cambodia, monks have begun to ‘ordinate’ trees in order to highlight the sanctity of trees and protect them against logging. this was done around cambodia durchim phorst 141 ing a peak of logging and in response to the development of a large plantation. buddhist monks “ordain” trees by wrapping a saffron robe around the trunks to signify the sacredness of all trees. the abbot of wat samrong in northern cambodia is generally credited with being the first to adopt the ordination ritual to sanctify trees. he developed the ritual as a means of educating people about the environmental importance of the forest and the dangers of logging. rituals such as tree ordination can serve as a focal point to emphasize the urgency of preserving natural resources, and as a way of teaching about the inter-relationships between buddhism, nature, and the environment as a whole. the buddhist perspectives on animal rights animals were an important part in the buddha’s conception of the universe. the buddhist concept of rights extends from the human world to the animal kingdom. thus, the buddha was the first to speak of animal rights. the famous dictum “may all beings be well and happy” in the metta sutta covers not only human beings, but all sentient beings, including animals. “may all those who are inflicted with pain be relieved. may all beings inflicted with fear be relieved”. here too “all beings” includes all sentient beings including animals. findings environmental changes have been taking place in our planet from time immemorial. what is particular to our times is that human activity is destroying the ecosystem at an unprecedented manner and ever accelerating rate. we need address the current environmental crisis in a rational manner so as to protect the health and lives of current and future generations. 142 prajna vihara __ __ ~ cambodians have been living with nature from the beginning of time in ways that are supported by buddhist beliefs. but due to pressures created by growing population and increasing greed, we have begun encroaching on mother nature to such an extent that we are destroying her. this paper should be an eye-opener to all cambodians to return to their traditional buddhist values and respect nature by living in harmony with it. cambodian developmental plans must concern themselves with ways that protect and sustain the environment. we must turn away from development which is destructive to cambodia and ultimately to the planet. hopefully, this paper is just a beginning for the reader to seriously consider what needs to be done to protect and keep the balance of our planet’s ecosystem. this paper also is an effort to encourage the reader to take personal action to help restore the integrity of our planet’s environmental systems and thus secure the humankinds future. i hope to persuade you to dedicate at least 5-10% of your times and resources to the solution of these looming crises. conclusion in this paper the writer has applied some aspects of buddhist ethics to specific environmental problems. in many cases buddhism advocates living at peace with nature. many aspects of this buddhist philosophy are the same to the ethics advocated by the “nonanthropocentrism” of such western philosophers, as peter singer. this paper concludes that the application of traditional buddhist beliefs in cambodia provides valuable guidance for an solving our planet’s current environmental crises. references carl, m. & mak, s. (2006). environmental ethics: course notes. rupp: phnom penh. singer, p. (2002). one world: the ethics of globalization. yale university press: london. chim phorst 143 sahni, p,. (2008) environmental ethics in buddhism: a virtues approach. routlege: london. buddhist institute (1998). toward an environmental ethic in southeast asia: proceedings of a regional seminar. phnom penh, cambodia. encyclopedia encarta student cd rom (2009) ‘buddhism’. henning, d.h. (2002). buddhism and deep ecology. bloomington, usa. henning, d.h. (2002). buddhism and deep ecology for the protection of wild asian elephant s in myanmar: a resource guide. polson, montana, usa. keown, d. (1996). buddhism: a very short introduction. oxford university press, england. deutsch, e.(1987) environmental ethics roger t. ames introduction. journal article; philosophy east & west, vol. 37. available from: http://www.questia.com/googlescholar.qst;jsessionid=j4vl9g9 gr22gvpgcgpk21xhyqn5btlrc2npnxy8bw2njby1jxml6!1137335696!-665261309?docid=95186338 [accessed on 10 january 2012]. becker, c. philosophy educating humanity: from western to asian environmental ethics. kyoto university. available from: http://www. bu.edu/wcp/papers/comp/compbeck.htm [accessed on 10 january 2012]. 144 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 05_(106-112) world complexity.pmd world complexity, value conflicts, human wisdoms kang ouyang huazhong university of science and technology, china abstract global humanity is facing increasingly complex problems. foremost is the complexity of values and value conflicts. how can we effectively face these various challenges and great difficulties coming from our complex global situation? this paper contends that we should learn and borrow from many histories, traditions and cultures. there is no single way or single wisdom that can resolve the complex problems in the world we are facing now. this paper will also appeal to the insights of the chinese tradition. it also calls for a more complex model of thinking. º·¤ñ́ âèí á¹øéâªòµô·ñèçâå¡¡óåñ§à¼ªô­¡ñº»ñ­ëò·õè«ñº«éí¹à¾ôèá¢öé¹ »ñ­ëòíñ¹ ñ́ºáã¡ ¤×í ¤çòá«ñº«éí¹¢í§¤ø³¤èò·ñèçä»áåð¤ø³¤èò·õè¢ñ́ áâ駡ñ¹ ·óíâèò§äã àãò¨ðêòáò㶠༪ô­¡ñº¤çòá·éò·òâáåð¤çòáâøè§âò¡íñ¹áëñ¹µìàëåèò¹õé«öè§à¡ố ¢öé¹áò¨ò¡ê¶ò¹¡òã³ì ¢í§âå¡ãº¹õé·õè«ñº«éí¹ º·¤çòá¹õéµéí§¡òãàê¹í·ò§íí¡çèòàãò¤çãàãõâ¹ãùéáåðëâôºâ×á ¨ò¡»ãðçñµôèòêµãì »ãðླõ áåðçñ²¹¸ããáµèò§ æ äáèáõë¹·ò§à¾õâ§êòâà ṍâçëã×í àùáô»ñ­­òà¾õâ§íâèò§à ṍâç·õè̈ ðêòáòã¶á¡é»ñ­ëò·õè«ñº«éí¹·õèàãò¡óåñ§à¼ªô­íâùèã¹â塹õéä é́ º·¤çòá¹õéµéí§¡òã¹óàê¹íàùáô»ñ­­ò¢í§¢¹º¨õ¹íõ¡´éçâ ¹í¡¨ò¡¹õéâñ§àãõâ¡ãéí§ ãù»áºº¢í§¡òã¤ố ·õè«ñº«éí¹áò¡¡çèòíõ¡ é́çâ how complex is our world today? no matter if seen from the scientific angle or philosophical angle, the world is increasing in complexity. but complexity takes different forms in different parts of the world and its different developing periods. we understand from darwin evolutional theory that the development of the life is a tendency towards complexity. now our world is in the most complex situation in its history. 106 prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 106-112 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __~ the complexity of the world suggests that it cannot be understood very accurately, but there is a need to try to understand its most important elements and their challenges to human life. first, from the elemental level, our world can be considered a complex giant system constructed by virtually unlimited, infinite hierarchies and infinite concrete elements with nearly unlimited types of relations. this can be seen in the way we classify its various forms: natural, social, human; physical, mental, information, economic, political, cultural, scientific, engineering, technological; individual, national, rational, emotional, moral, aesthetic, objective, subjective, practical. these constitute an almost infinitely complex organic stereo network system. each of these aspects, levels and elements are almost infinite properties and form almost unlimited inter-relationships. they each in their own way directly or indirectly affect the overall function of the system. second, human society is composed of numerous conscious persons and their activities. each individual activity has its conscious purpose, has its value orientation, with its own purpose and value orientation. these purposes may be different, contradictory or come into conflict. the social process is an irreversible process, in the presence of the individuals, groups, class differences and conflict situation will produce even more complex situations. third, from the perspective of values, human life is essentially a kind of value choice, it involves cognition, but this cognition is more of an evaluation of advantages and disadvantages between choices. but in today’s world this value differentiation involves many conflicts of interests. between the global and the individual there is a very complex network of values, involving the formation of many knots. these knots involve value contradictions, conflicts, and collisions. the contemporary world can be said to be a huge complex system of problems. the largest are global problems, including the enviroment, climate, resources, and energy issues. they directly affect the whole human existence on the earth. the smaller problems involve individual, including violence, drug use, crime, sex, mental confusion. they not only affect the individual survival condition, but also cause serious social problems. between the global problems and individual problems are race problems and national issues, including various forms of racial conflicts, ethnic conflict, religion conflict and cultural conflict. the above problems range from the macroscopic to microscopic, and to their intertwining, resulting in an extremely complex problem system. for the solving of one particular problem relies on the solving of other problems. we ought to give them the highest attention and concern. kang ouyang 107 the value conflicts in china today there are many value conflicts in china today. these result from different value sources: globalization; modernization; new science and high technology, the western world, nationalism, market economic system, etc. here i just mention some major conflicts. 1) the conflict between traditional chinese values and the modern western values. since the may 4 movement in beijing in 1919, there was a very strong and long time’s debate around the conflict between the chinese values and the western values in china. since 1978, in the practice of open door policy and the chinese modernization, the conflict between the traditional chinese heritages and the new creation of modernization in the western world become obvious and sharp. following from its meaning, modernization is to create new values. since western world had modernized itself much earlier than china, china has much to learn from the west. there are some people who believed that the modernization is westernization, therefore there is a strong desire to westernize china. many chinese people undervalue traditional chinese culture and want to give up their own history and culture. now there is a growing awareness among chinese people that chinese modernization can only successfully build on the historical ground of chinese culture. china should try to combine traditional chinese values with western values. there are many core elements of western values: modernity, freedom, equality, justice, democracy, love, human rights, etc... these are all values that chinese modernization should learn from. and there are also many traditional chinese values that are still meaningful even today, for example, the union of heaven and man, ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (manners), zhi (wisdom), xin (faith), means (zhongyong), searching the harmony of people and society, etc. these are values which have been developed through the long span of chinese history. the chinese socialist modernization should combine all meaningful value elements of human civilization into china no matter they come from the east or the west. 2) the conflict between marxist and non-marxist values. in the past, ccp only respected marxism and refused all kinds of non-marxism. since 1978, chinese leaders and scholars tried very hard to overcome the misunderstanding of marxism. they criticized and corrected chairman mao zedong’s mistakes in his later years and tried to re-understand marxism. in the academic area, there was an academic movement named “return to karl marx” or “re-understand karl marx”. they tried to learn from the former soviet union and develop a more tolerant attitude to 108 prajna vihara __ __ ~ marxism, western marxism and western ideology. they also tried to continue the development of marxism in today’s china. 3) the conflict between individual values and social values. in the past, chinese people believed that collectivism is the main value of chinese culture and individualism is the main value of western value. now chinese people realize that, on the one hand, individual is the foundation of society, all individual’s needs should be protected in a just society, all individual’s efforts are absolutely necessary in the market society, on the another hand, individuals can only effectively live in and act in the group and society, so collective cooperation is also absolutely necessary for all individuals and whole society. in the modernization process, china needs to encourage all chinese people to develop themselves and realize themselves. 4) the conflict between the values of social equality and the efficiency value of economic development. there was a long tradition of egalitarianism in china; it obstructed the economic development. at the beginning of social reform in 1978, to encourage all people to try their best to produce general wealth, china developed the important policy of “allowing some people to become rich earlier than others”. this functioned to stimulate individual’s productive enthusiasm and prompted the efficiency of economic development in a period, but it has led to many new social problems. the greatest problem is the enlarged gap between the rich and the poor. now china is trying very hard to maintain a balance between social equality and productive efficiency. on the one hand, the country need to reform the working and distribution system in order to collect more money from the richer and to distribute them to the poorer by different ways, on the another hand, the country still needs to encourage the able man to produce more and to earn more according to their contribution to society. 5) the conflict between economic values and the moral values. in the past, there was a tradition in china to stress morality and justice, and to despise benefit and utility. since 1978, economic development became the central task of the whole of society, but in the meantime, moral education more or less was ignored. as a result, social morality was reduced or fell to some extent. morality becomes a new social problem in china. many people became concerned about this situation. now, china is trying to keep the balance of these two aspects: to keep the central position of economic development and to enhance the moral and political education. the aim of the country is to construct three kinds of civilizations in the one social progress: material civilization, spirit civilization and political civilization. my university and our colleagues are ackang ouyang 109 tually in charge a national research project to cultivate and enhance the national spirit. we hope to make contributions to raise the moral level and enhance national unity. 6) the conflict between universal values and the particular values. in the rapid process of modernization, people are often attracted to universal values and ignore particular values. there are many kinds of particular values which emerge from different sources, for example, the different districts, different social levels, different estates, different benefit groups and different vocations. for example, the gap between urban area and rural area, peasants and workers is still very large. now the chinese government pays very close attention to the weaker groups and the less developed districts. what can we learn from chinese culture and philosophy? different nations and cultures have their own wisdom to resolve their problem and to improve them. what can chinese culture and philosophy can provide? we list some of the most important. 1) the unity between sky and earth (天人合一 ) the idea of the unity of humanity and heaven (the nature) is one of the key points of chinese culture. now our entire world is facing sharp contradictions between the human being and nature. various challenges, such as environment pollution, weather problems, and different natural disasters and so on, are increasingly threatening the safety of our world and gradually damaging the existence of human beings. superficially, it seems that they are created and induced by nature itself. however, in fact many of them are man-made disasters, or at least the side effects of human behavior. from the guiding idea, this results from absolute rationalism. concerning these emergencies, the basic topic of chinese philosophy is to find out the possible ways to achieve the unity between human beings and nature, to harmonize sky and earth. chinese philosophers always stressed that nature is not the slave of human beings but an equal companion with human life. man should stay with the nature on good terms. human beings should respect and protect nature. to protect nature is to protect the necessary environment of human life. to protect nature is to protect and care about human beings themselves. this is not just for the benefit of a single individual, single country or single nationality, but for the planet and for human civilization as a whole. this is not 110 prajna vihara __ __ ~ just for one generation, but for generation after generation into the future. in this sense, we might say that chinese thought with its thousands of years history, has a special insight into this respect for a sustainable relationship with nature and respect for future generations. 2) the mean or the golden rule (中庸之道 ) the mean (zhong yong, also called as golden rule) is one of the most important perspectives and approaches in chinese philosophy. in the daily life, people always un-consciously tend to be involved in a model of thinking featuring of binary opposition, such as good or bad, good or evil, true or false, friend or enemy, and so on. however, in fact the real world is extremely complex, which requires a more comprehensive worldview and a wiser way of thinking. the mean or the golden rule is one of the wisest principles of thinking embodied in chinese philosophy. the mean, as well as “the impartiality”, “the golden mean” or “the doctrine of the mean”, indicates the need to give up the two extremes, but to hold to the middle. from the epistemological angle, it never means to master an object in a comprehensive and perfect viewpoint, but to avoid any kind of extreme, excessiveness or partiality. in the social life, it insists that people should cultivate their right judgments and maintain balanced positions, no matter what others are saying or doing. the mean is also an important methodology for people to handle complex matters more wisely. 3) collectivist spirit and family values (� � �精神和家庭价 ) no matter in which society, how to deal well with the relationship between individuals and collective is one of the most serious of problems. there is such a long and strange tradition of individualism in the west. it tends to give attention only to the needs, positions and functions of individuals, as well as passionately encouraging individual development and freedom. it has played an important role in the development of western civilization, while also causing so many serious problems and difficulties. now we should learn more from the collectivism in chinese philosophy and culture. in chinese philosophy, an individual is one cell of the whole society. in this sense, every cell can realize its nature and function when becoming an organized part of certain organization. society is composed and organized by individuals but has more functions and common needs than every single individual. in the society, such an organized organism, all individuals inseparably rely on each other. so they should learn to respect each other, understand each other, help each other, cooperate kang ouyang 111 with each other, and even more. the society as a whole should be a united integration featuring of co-laboring, co-living, co-existing and co-sharing. 4) social harmony ( �社会和 ) building and maintaining a harmonious society constitutes the historical aspirations of chinese people. chinese philosophers emphasize that people should stay on friendly terms, as well as avoid irrational conflicts and unjust wars. it insists that people should respect and help each other. the harmonious relationship is based on the common understanding of virtues. the rulers should treat their people kindly and considerately as they would treat their own children. to show the respect to the old and to protect youth have been regarded as the basic virtues for chinese extending back to ancient china. traditional chinese virtues, such as diligence and filial piety, still have meaning for the contemporary era, and should become an intrinsic content of marxist ethics. complexity and complex thinking the complex and serious global problems, which involve diverse value conflicts, suggest that any particular kind of wisdom is not enough to solve the problem; we must learn to cultivate complexity thinking. complexity thinking involves multiple perspectives and ideas, and functions different from simple thinking. first, we should be aware of the complexity factors, in the global world and apply this to our comprehensive system thinking. second, we should be attentive to random variables, dynamic reversible process, and the use of diachronic thinking. third, we should perceive the diverse conflict of values, and the use of selective thinking. fourth, we should try to develop interdisciplinary and multi-level cooperation, and apply this to our subjective and integrated thinking. fifth, we should think of the harmony of society with the help of modern science, technology and networks. sixth, we should be conscious of both original creation and practical application, and integrate them into our thinking. 112 prajna vihara __ __ ~ prajnaviharav20n1.indd chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin 75 service-learning and community: a case study of a university audio-book program for the blind chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand abstract university courses in ethics are designed to help a student develop their moral character. but while classroom work provides students with knowledge, it is often not sufficient for deeper character development. the students also need some sort of practical engagement with people in their surrounding communities. this interaction creates both individual reflection and social awareness. service-learning is a program which encourages the participants to learn and develop their moral characters through working in the community. during this interaction, both participants and community members learn by sharing and exchanging their experiences. but the question remains how effective this program is in creating awareness of communities outside of the orbit of the typical university experience? this paper, uses a case study of an audio-book program developed at assumption university of thailand called: ‘au voice for the blind.’ it will demonstrate on both a theoretical and practical level how the student participant’s values are shaped by such learning experiences. keywords: service-learning, audio books, blind community prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 1 january to june 2019, 75-85 © 2000 by assumption university press 76 prajñā vihāra university courses in ethics are designed to help a student develop their moral character. but while classroom work provides students with knowledge, it is often not sufficient for deeper character development. the students also need some sort of practical engagement with people in their surrounding communities. peter j. parker claims that education often isolates academic life from the community life. because of this, students often lack the ability to put into practice what they have learned.1 there is an increasing interest in creating social awareness through education. herman wasserman and arnold s. de beer proposed a communitarian ethics to deal with hiv/aids problems in africa.2 also, amatai etzioni applied communitarian ethics to appeal for organ donation. his communitarian approach emphasizes how social awareness can lead to responsibility and moral duty.3 the university while often isolated from the wider community still has a central role in the development of social responsibility. this paper proposes the value of communitarian ethics for university servicelearning programs. school and community communitarian ethics focuses on the interrelationship among members in the community/society. this is a recognition of the limits of individualism and its emphasis on merely legal and contractual relations. in his work spheres of justice, michael walzer claims that “human society is a distributive community. in other words people, “come together to share, divide, and exchange…”4 he goes on to write: “a solitary person could hardly understand the meaning of the goods or figure out the reasons for taking them as likable of dislikable. once people like in crowds, it becomes possible for individuals to break away, pointing to latent or subversive meanings, aiming at alternative values – including the values.”5 chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin 77 according to walzer, one needs others to understand one’s own meaning and values. alasdair macintyre also mentioned that the moral identity could not create by one own but through the process of community: “notice also that the fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community. without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists.”6 john dewey noted that the teachers should not only teach morals, but also act as role models. he pointed out that the school should be the place that the students could learn and develop their morals not only in class, but at every moment when they are in the school.7 this is echoed by lawrence kolhberg who considered schools to be ‘just communities’ where students could develop moral character and learn to make moral decisions through a kind of democratic participation.8 this is also asserted by thai scholars like warayuth sriwarakuel who recognize that democracy is not merely individualistic but is also connecte with communitarianism since it requires cooperation and respect for the equality of the other’s positions.9 the community plays the important role as a source of moral education. etzioni mentioned that one of the missions of any social institution is to educate individuals to have mutual respect and civil commitment.10 according to etzioni, the community itself can be an important place for such an education. moral education begins with the smallest community which is the family. later in the school, the teachers are tasked with continuing to cultivate virtues like self-discipline or social responsibility. 78 prajñā vihāra according to communitarian ethics, the social interaction between the members of community is needed. the individuals could learn from others as the role models. they can adjust, develop, and change their moral character by having the dialogue with others and which in turn transforms their knowledge. however, from my view, the most important is the selfreflection which results from the experience. without self-reflection, the individual could not develop their morality. service-learning and it purposes service-learning is a program which promotes learning through serving others. as per t. stanton writes, it is to provide services to others (especially the less advantaged in a community), to undergo community development, individual and community empowerment; and simultaneously “determines the purpose, nature and process of social and educational exchange between learners (students as service providers) and the people they serve”11. in this way, service-learning connects the participant’s individual development with the greater community. for the service-learning projects at assumption university, the student participants are exposed to various communities which they would normally be unaware. for instance, one service-learning project requires students to teach english to younger students at neighborhood schools. at first, the students did not see the point. but after visiting the school and the community, they understood the problems of the lack of teachers and the low salaries. in the service-learning program participants have the opportunity to work in real situations, and they have a chance to apply their knowledge for solving the problems in the community. but to solve these problems, they need to build trust with community members. and this leads to the development of interpersonal skills. charn mayot provides the example of indigenous communities which will only work with those who earn their trust.12 so this is one of the most important aims of the service-learning program: the development of personal and interpersonal skills of the chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin 79 participants. likewise, the students also develop personal skills, gaining self-understanding, management skills, and moral character. for the most part, individuals create their self-identity through their interaction with others. so in this way, interpersonal skills and personal skills support one another in their respective development. for service-learning, the participants need to interact with other participants and the people in the community. they need to apply their knowledge and skills. at the same time, they have the opportunity to learn new things from the project and gain the insight from the opportunity. this helps them to develop a clearer understanding of themselves. the participants not only gain new friends from these projects but they also learn to work with people from diverse backgrounds. from the study of janet eyler and dwight e. giles, this helps the student reduce the problem of considering others in the form of stereotypes as the students have the opportunity to have genuine, informal contact with others.13 the “au voice for the blind” the au voice for blind was the project developed by the researcher because of his previous experience as a volunteer producing audio-books. the main challenge of the national library for the blind and disabled is that there are many books on the waiting list to be converted to audio format, but there are few volunteers to produce such work. furthermore, many of the audio books produced by volunteers are of low quality. but if members of the blind community wish to study in secondary school or pursue higher education, they need the access to audio versions of literature and textbooks. assumption university of thailand is a catholic international university which places an emphasis on ethics and service to the community. it requires all students to study professional ethics. some of the students in the st. martin’s center for professional ethics at assumption university were enlisted for these projects. they provided reflections upon their experiences with the project. 80 prajñā vihāra nattaphol lohsiwanontn related that “this project has shown me the part of society that i have ignored. these children do have some disabilities but it never stops or holds them from having a quality life and being a useful citizen. many of them have self-confidence and courage to do things like a normal person. also, they have proved that the motto ‘practice make perfect’ is really legit. these children study like a normal person, go to the university to study law, and even have better grades than me. this project is very useful in that it makes us acknowledge these quality people in our society. in my opinion, this project should be one of the mandatory project for ethics seminar of our university every semester.” warisara chanprasit, the student in this project of semester 2/2016, reflected her experience that “this project gave me such a good experience and taught me how to be gentle to other people. i am capable of helping people by using my own skill. finally, our group has a kind cooperation among members and receives the useful suggestion from ajarn chavakorn.” charisa singhasakulkai relates that “i learned many things from this activity, such as giving others without any return whether it be an object or a kindness just a little. it can be very valuable for their lives. therefore, it makes me learn about their life as different, but still a good life. it also made me learn how to work with other people, how to solve a problem and make me more aware of society as well.” satarat prachuaparee was another student in this project. he claims “this project changed my mission and attitude so much. because, it made me realize that this world has many people who don’t have the [the same] opportunities for a better life. and we have to help and take care of those people because of our common humanity. [as humans] we can do good or bad, but we should to do whatever we can to make the world better and help each other because we are human.” but it is important to note that the groups who had the opportunity to meet with the blind community before working on the books had a greater empathy than those meeting these communities afterwards. this might be because the group who had the opportunity of meeting the blind chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin 81 community before producing the voice books understood the difficulties faced by this community and developed their sense of empathy through their experience. this again highlight the inter-personal development which is the emphasis of service-learning. there were also exercises which tried to develop this empathy. students were required to block their vision for a day and performing everyday activities.14 this helped many of the participants to more deeply understand the problems of the blind. many students stated in their reports and presentations that through their involvement in this service-learning project, they understood more about the life of the blind. through the project, they developed their interpersonal skills with other au students and the blind community. some reported a deeper appreciation to their own lives and appreciated the opportunity which others might not have. they saw the inequality of the education system for the blind and disabled. some decided to continue as volunteers for producing audio books or the library. also, in the presentations for sharing their experience with other students, the representatives of one group mentioned that all are connected to each other and it is our job and responsibility to promote the justice and opportunities to other communities especially the least advantaged in society. endnotes 1 parker j. palmer, toward a philosophy of integrative education, trans. kannikar promsao (bangkok: suan nguen mee ma, 2010), 25-42. 2 herman wasserman and arnold s. de beer, covering hiv/aids: towards a heuristic comparison between communitarian and utilitarian ethics, https://www. researchgate.net/publication/250894800_covering_hivaids_towards_a_heuristic_ comparison_between_communitarian_and_utilitarian_ethics (accessed february 2019). 3 amitai etzioni, organ donation: a communitarian approach, https://www. researchgate.net/profile/amitai_etzioni/publication/10708117_organ_donation_a_ communitarian_approach/links/563113b408ae13bc6c3553aa.pdf (accessed december 2018). 82 prajñā vihāra 4 michael walzer, “complex equality” in communitarianism: a new public ethics, ed. markate daly (belmont: wadsworth, 1994), 101-110. 5 ibid. 6 alasdair macintyre, after virtue: a study in moral theory, 2nd ed. (notre dame: university of notre dame press, 1997), 221. 7 john dewey, moral principles in education, (carbondale: southern illinois university press, 1975), 3-4. 8 ernest alleva and gareth b. matthews, encyclopedia of ethics (new york: routledge, 2001), s.v. “moral development”. 9 warayuth sriwarakuel, in defense on communitarianism, http://repository. au.edu/handle/6623004553/18299 (accessed november 2017). 10 amitai etzioni, organ donation: a communitarian approach, https://www. researchgate.net/profile/amitai_etzioni/publication/10708117_organ_donation_a_ communitarian_approach/links/563113b408ae13bc6c3553aa.pdf (accessed december 2018). 11 stanton, t. “service-learning: grouping toward a definition.” in barbara jacoby and associates. service-learning in higher education: concepts and practices. san francisco: jossey-bass, 1990, p.9 12 charn mayot, “bridging classrooms to communities in service-learning program” in service-learning in asia: curricular models and practices. ed. jun xing and carol hok ka ma (hong kong: hong kong university press, 2010), 1-13. 13 janet eyler and dwight e. giles, where’s the learning in service-learning?, (san francisco: jossey-bass, 1999), 28. 14 there is the clip in youtube for this demonstration: https://www.youtube. com/snwehs3skvo, the project reports are collected by st. martin’s center for professional ethics and service-learning, assumption university of thailand. the information could be requested by auservicelearning@au.edu or contacting boontham sornsawat. chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin 83 bibliography alleva, ernest and matthews, gareth b. (2001). keyword: “moral development”. in encyclopedia of ethics. lawrence c. becker and charlotte b. becker (eds.). new york: routledge. pp.1118-1125. blackburn, simon. (ed.). (2008). oxford dictionary of philosophy. (2nd ed.). keyword: “communitarianism”. daly, markate. (1994). introduction. in markate daly (ed.). communitarianism: a new public ethics. belmont: wadsworth. pp. xiii-xxvi. dewey, john. (1975). moral principles in education. carbondale: southern illinois university press. d’entreves, maurizio passerin. (2001). keyword: “communitarianism”. in encyclopedia of ethics. lawrence c. becker and charlotte b. becker (eds.). new york: routledge. pp.269-272. etzioni, amatai. (1983). an immodest agenda: rebuilding america before the 21st century. new york: mcgraw-hill. _____________. (2017). retrieved from: https://icps.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1736/f/downloads/ common%20good.etzioni.pdf _____________. (2018). retrieved from: h t t p s : / / w w w. r e s e a r c h g a t e . n e t / p r o f i l e / a m i t a i _ e t z i o n i / publication/10708117_organ_donation_a_communitarian_ approach/links/563113b408ae13bc6c3553aa.pdf eyler, janet and giles, dwight e. (1999). where’s the learning in servicelearning?. san francisco: jossey-bass. fay, brian (1996). contemporary philosophy of social science. cambridge: blackwell. 84 prajñā vihāra haan, norma. (1994). an interactional morality of everyday life. in markate daly (ed.). communitarianism: a new public ethics. belmont: wadsworth. pp. 268-278. macintyre, alasdair. (1997). after virtue: a study in moral theory. (2nd ed.). notre dame: university of notre dame. mansbridge, jane j. (1994). introduction. in markate daly (ed.). communitarianism: a new public ethics. belmont: wadsworth. pp. 203-212. mautner, thomas. (ed.). (2005). penguin’s dictionary of philosophy. (2nd ed.). keyword: “communitarianism”. mayot, charn. (2010). bridging classrooms to communities in servicelearning program. in jun xing and carol hok ka ma (eds.). service-learning in asia: curricular models and practices. hong kong: hong kong university press. pp. 1-13. palmer, parker j. (2010). toward a philosophy of integrative education. in parker j. palmer, arthur zajonc and megan scribner. the heart of higher education: a call to renewal transforming the academy through collegial conversation. kannikar promsao. (trans.). bangkok: suan nguen mee ma. pp. 1-23. payomyam, surapol. (2013). psychology for community works. (2nd ed.). bangkok: s charoen printing. setthamalini, suchat. (2005). the cultural dimension of peacebuilding. in mark tamthai. (ed.). the philosophical and cultural dimension of peacebuilding. bangkok: kobfai. pp. 262-305. sriwarakuel, warayuth. (2017). retrieved from: http://repository.au.edu/handle/6623004553/18299 stanton, t. (1990). service-learning: grouping toward a definition. referred in barbara jacoby and associates. service-learning in higher education: concepts and practices. san francisco: jossey-bass. chavakorn techakesari and kajornpat tangyin 85 walzer, michael. (1994). complex equality. in markate daly (ed.). communitarianism: a new public ethics. belmont: wadsworth. pp. 101-110. wolin, sheldon. (1994). contract and birthright. in markate daly (ed.). communitarianism: a new public ethics. belmont: wadsworth. pp. 181-190. wasserman, herman and de beer, arnold s. (2019). retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250894800_covering_ hivaids _towards_a_heuri stic_comparison_between_ communitarian_and_utilitarian_ethics 94 prajñā vihāra individual enlightenment and social responsiblity: on the sociological interpretations of the holy monk khruba boonchum dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano assumption university, thailand abstract this paper will assess some sociological interpretations of theravada buddhism and holy monks which rely on such concepts as charisma, millenarianism and utopianism. in the past, sociologiests like weber and murti misinterpreted buddhism as focusing upon individual enlightenment rather than the welfare of society. but these interpretations of theravāda buddhism overlook that the buddhist concept of enlightenment has a deep relationship with social development and social responsibilities. buddhism has a highly developed sociological basis and need to be understood in its own terms. the practice of buddhist monks should be understood by means of buddhist sociology. to illustrate this, this paper will discuss the theravāda buddhist concept of the ten perfections (pāramī) in general and perfection of morality (sīla-pāramī) in particular. this will also be illustrated by buddhist tale of bhuridatta-jātaka and the case of spiritual master, the most venerable khruba boonchum, nyanasamvaro. keywords: buddhism, buddhist sociology, holy monks, khruba boonchum prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 93-115 © 2000 by assumption university press dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 95 introduction this paper is an attempt to assess the value of sociological interpretations of theravada buddhism through the concepts of charisma, millenarianism and utopianism. in the past, scholars like max weber and murti misinterpreted buddhism as focusing upon individual enlightenment rather than the welfare of society. for instance, weber stated, “salvation is an absolutely personal performance of the self-reliant individual. no one, and particularly no social community, can help him”. the hindu indian scholar t.r.v murti also stated, “the arahat (arahant) rests satisfied with achieving his own private salvation; he is not necessarily interested in the welfare of others. the ideal of the arahat is made of selfishness; there is even a lurking fear that the world would take hold of him if he stayed here too long”. but these interpretations of theravada buddhism overlook that the buddhist concept of enlightenment has a deep relationship with social development and social responsibilities. likewise, the western sociological interpretations of charismatic monks and their communities as a kind of millenarian cult are misleading. buddhism has a highly developed sociological basis and needs to be understood in its own terms. the practice of buddhist monks could be understood only by means of buddhist sociology. buddhism emphsizes spiritual development rather than sociological power, domination or political revolt. the misinterpretation of buddhist millenarianism was based on the buddhist concept of cakkavatti (universal monarch), the coming of the future buddha-arimetteya, dhammarājā (the righteous ruler) and buddhadesa (the buddha’s land). these concepts should be carefully studied and analyzed from the original buddhist understanding. the arguement here will be based on early buddhist concepts of these terms, including the theravāda buddhist concept of ten perfections (pāramī) in general and perfection of morality (sīla-pāramī) in particular. this will also be illustrated by buddhist tale of bhuridatta-jātaka and the case of spiritual master, the most venerable khruba boonchum, nyanasamvaro. this paper is presented from the shan buddhist perspective of myanmar with reference to theravāda buddhist canons. the charismatic monks and their social functions will be also hightlighted. 96 prajñā vihāra the sociology of religion the term ‘sociology’ was first introduced in 1838 by the french philosopher, auguste comte (1798–1857) who was considered the “father of sociology”. he used the term “sociology” to refer to the scientific study of society. according to him, all societies develop and progress through the following stages: religious, metaphysical, and scientific. he argued that society needs scientific knowledge based on facts and evidence to solve its problems. comte observed the science of sociology as consisting of two branches: dynamics, or the study of the processes by which societies change; and statics, or the study of the processes by which societies endure. he also envisioned sociologists as eventually developing a base of scientific social knowledge that would guide society into positive directions. this social theory was later developed by sociologists such as: karl marx (1818-1883) emile durkheim (1858-1917) and max weber (1864-1920) . the sociology of religion developed soon after the establishment of sociology. the sociology of religion is the study of the relationship or interaction between religions and society, and the study of beliefs, practices and organizational forms of religion using the tools and methods of the discipline of sociology. durkheim, marx and weber were not religious, but they are interested in the role of religions and its influence on society. durkheim’s theory of religion exemplifies how functionalists examine sociological phenomena. according to durkheim, people see religion as contributing to the health and continuation of society in general. thus, religion functions to bind society’s members to sustain their common values and beliefs on a regular basis. social theorist durkheim in his the elementary forms of religious life defines religion, as a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden ... beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them. dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 97 however, early buddhism, does not understand religious belief based upon the sacred and profane as described by durkheim. buddhism is based on the theory of kamma which involves actions and their consequences. the buddhist theory is also based on the four noble truths — the existence of un-satisfactoriness or suffering (dukkha), the cause of suffering (dukkha-samudaya), the end of suffering (nirodha) and the path leading to the end of suffering (magga). the final aim of buddhism (its soteriological aspect) is to attain final liberation, or nibbāna, which is to be free from the cycle of birth, old age, diseases and death. the path leading to the end of suffering is identified as the noble eightfold path which involves: right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. again, this noble eightfold path can be summerised into threefold training as morality, concentration and wisdom. though the main purpose of buddhism is to develop spiritual progress and attain enlightenment, it does not ignore its role in fostering social harmony, peace and development. there are numerous discourses of the buddha that taught about social wellbeing. for example, maṅgala-sutta (sn.2.4, khp. 5) provides teachings on social environment, education, social responsibility, ethics and spiritual progress and sigalovāda-sutta (dn.31) also emphasizes the social relationship between parents and children, teachers and pupils, employers and employee, monks and devotees and also to respect the members of the family, religious leaders, teachers, friends and servants as six directions. moreover, parābhāva-sutta (sn.1.6) focuses on the ethical behaviour as the causes of downfalls. we can also observe buddhist economic concepts in the kūṭadanṭa-sutta, (dn.5) which highlights how to develop the economy of the state and how to maintain peace and order of the nation. furthermore, aggañña-sutta (dn.27) provides us the information of the evaluation of the world, human being and society. it also deals with the buddhist democratic concept of electing righteous ruler, peace, equality and fairness in society without any discrimination. in this discourse, the buddha emphasizes the ethical criteria of superior and inferior, rather than the so called deep rooted 98 prajñā vihāra caste system. cakkavatti-sīhanāda-sutta (dn.26) and mahasudassanasutta (dn.17) deal with the buddhist model of good govenance and righteous kings, while mahāparinibbāna-sutta (dn.16) also explains the seven aparihāniya-dhamma (undeclinable or undefeatable factors) of vajjian as good examples of the buddhist teaching on good governance and politics. in addition, the buddha’s teaching of four sublime states (brahmavihāra): mettā (loving kindness), karunā (compassion), muditā (joy) and uppekkhā (equanimity), are all applicable to social engagement, social cohesion and harmony. the buddhist teaching on the four foundation of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) is also nowadays applied in clinical counselling and psychotherapy. moreover, the commentary of jataka mentioned three missions that the buddha accomplished: striving for one’s enlightenment (buddhatthacariya), striving for the welfare of one’s relatives (ñātatthacariya) and striving for the welfare of the whole world (lokatthacariya). the monks also consider these three missions as their goal and purpose of life. these three practices of buddha have also been inspiring and motivating buddhist monks to engage in social activities. the above suttas and teachings are very relevant for the buddhist standpoints of social function applying to many areas of modern society. buddhism provides numerous guidelines for social and spiritual developments as well. the buddhist concept of the perfection of morality (sīla-pāramī) as practised by the most venerable khruba boonchum goes beyond durkheim’s theory of religious functionalism as it emphasizes spiritual achievement rather than secular social functions. the buddhist principles of five precepts, such as refraining from killing, stealing, adultery, lying and using intoxicants, do not only function for social harmony, mutual respect and trust, but also for higher spiritual attainment. therefore, buddhism is a religion which emphasizes the relationship between individual enlightenment and social developments. charisma in secular sociology charisma has been nowadays widely discussed in the field of sociology. the term ‘charisma’ was originated in the bible and was first dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 99 introduced by max weber as sociological theory to analyse the inner content of a charismatic character. in the bible, charisma means a divine grace or gift or a divine quality. weber used the term charisma to argue for relationship between a great man and his followers. he was also the first to place the charismatic within a social context. according to weber, charisma is to be understood in relation to religions and politics. lindholm observes that weber wrote about two distinct forms of charisma which seemed to oppose one another. the first is the institutional charisma which can be inherited, or achieved with accession to an office, which gives an aura of power to that person irrespective of their actual personal characteristics. it is the institution which bestows charisma and connect that person with the sacred. the other involves the individual charismatic power to command. weber writes: charisma shall be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether his quality is actual, alleged, or presumed. ‘charismatic authority’ hence shall refer to a rule over men, whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person. weber also wrote about three types of leadership authority: traditional, legal and charismatic authority in his essay “the three types of legitimate rule”. traditional authority is the ability and the right to rule, passed down through heredity. legal authority is empowered by a formalistic belief in the content of law (legal) or natural law (rationality). the charismatic authority is found in a leader whose mission and vision inspire others. it is based upon the perceived extraordinary characteristics of an individual. weber saw a charismatic leader as the head of a new social movement and one instilled with divine or supernatural powers, such as a religious prophet. these ideas have gradually been applied to buddhist leaders as well. nasee observes that, 100 prajñā vihāra in social science literature, scholars have applied max weber’s concept of charisma (weber 1988) to explain various social movements led by charismatic figures. similarly, in studies of buddhist movements led by monks or charismatic figures, charisma is often referred to by the term barami (pali: parami), although in fact there is no pali or buddhist term that exactly translates the greek term “charisma” as used by christians or in modern sociology. in buddhism, barami means the perfection or completeness of certain virtues, which cultivates a way of purification while reaching a goal of enlightenment (wisdom library 2014). for weber (1988), the legitimacy of charismatic authority rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him. the buddhist sociology of charisma in buddhism, charisma cannot be understood in the western context. charisma in buddhism cannot be understood as in christianity as a divine gift or grace which sets the charismatic person above his followers. the buddhist theory of charisma does not set apart the charismatic person from his or her society. instead they play an important role in society. the buddhist concept of charisma also has nothing to do with political legitimation of power, domination or authority as defined by weber. the buddhist concept of charisma is purely spiritual virtue developed by individual. the charismatic person in buddhism developed from the practice pāramī, the perfection of virtue, especially the virtue of morality (sīlapāramī). according to cohen, “the relationship between charismatic monks [of lanna buddhism] and thier followers are consistent with weber’s seminal definition but also highlight the distinctive character of thai buddhist cosmology, in particular the concept of barami (pāramī)”. it means his analysis is somehow identical with buddhist concept of charisma derived from perfection (pāramī). he further observed that “the lanna variant of thai buddhist conceptions of charisma presumes dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 101 an integral relationship between the barami of charismatic monks, the identification of the exceptional personal qualities of these individuals at a very early age, and the prolific construction of religious buildings inspired by visions of moral regeneration and utopian moral communities – characteristics exemplified in the lives of khruba siwichai and his successors”. the most venerable khruba boonchum who resides in shan state and has a large of numbers of followers from thailand, myanmar, laos, china, india and bhutan is considered as one of the successors of the lanna holy monk, khruba siwichai (1878-1938) and also believed to be reincarnated by khruba siwichai. the thai term for the person possessing the extraordinary quality is called ton bun (the person of merits). cohen further stated that “these precocious traits are signs of extraordinary charisma based on the accumulation of great merit (bun) and perfections (barami) over past lives. such qualities are perceived as the marks of a bodhisattva, whose compassion is expressed typically in the lanna tradition in the building and renovation of religious monuments and the sharing of merit with the laity”. khruba boonchum also exhibited the charismatic qualities of a ton bun at a very early age. millenarianism, utopianism and buddhism the term ‘buddhist millenarianism’ was first introduced by stanley tambiah to refer to the buddhist concept of the coming of future buddha arimetteyya, the concept of universal monarch (cakkavatti) and the righteous king (dhammarājā). he interpreted the movement of khruba siwichai as political revolt to the central authority of the state and the sangha in thailand as millenarian phenomenon. the term was also applied to all khruba siwichai’s successors such as venerable khruba boonchum, khruba khao pi, khruba theung, a karen monk u thuzana as well as others. the terms millenium, messianism, apocalypticism originate in the bible. millennium means a thousand year span and is associated with period after which jesus christ will return. it is also the expectation of this return. later, the term began to be used for the political struggle for liberation from oppression and injustice. messianic is the coming of the 102 prajñā vihāra savior and the apocalyptic is the final day of judgement; and the utopian is the imagination of a perfect society or kingdom. the term uptopia was coined by thomas more in 1516 in his book ‘utopia’. however, whether these terms are in consistent with the practices of holy monks of lanna buddhism needs closer examination. my first argument is that the true practice of theravāda buddhism are based on the threefold training: sīla-sikkhā (moral training), samādhi-sikkhā (mental training) and paññāsikkhā (intellectual training). the aim of theravāda buddhism is to realize the four noble truths and to attain nibbāna, the ultimate peace or freedom. to be matured enough to become an enlightened person, one has to practice the ten perfections gradually step by step. hence, what the lanna monks were practicing are following the path of the buddha. therefore, it is not necessary to interpret them in western secular sociological terms. secondly, i would like to go back to the definition of the pāli terms which tambiah interprets as the elements of buddhist millenarianism. indeed, the pāli term of bodhisatta, referring to the future buddha, arimetteyya is not in cosistent with millenarian, as the timing of the comming of arimetteyya not only extends far beyond the period of a millenium, but the theravāda buddhists have no expectations for this coming. there is also no messianic movement in theravāda buddhism, as the buddha taught that, “you yourselves should make the effort; the tathagatas (buddhas) only can show the way. those who practise the tranquillity and insight meditation are freed from the bond of mara” (dhp. 276). buddhism teaches to rely on ourselves for our own liberation. this applies to the coming of the future buddha, arimetteyya as well. and, the religious activities of the lanna lineage buddhist monks are just based on their spiritual practice and their pursuit of pāramī (perfections) which include social responsibilities based on compassion. buddhist dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 103 followers consider a great merits to pay respect to holy monks due to their holy practices (brahmacariya) and also as part of helping each other fulfilling the perfections. the opportunity to see and listen to the dhamma talk of monks are a part of the blessings as mentioned in maṅgala-sutta (samaṇānañca dassanaṃ, kālena dhamma-ssavanaṃ). and, the concept of universal monarch (cakkavatti) is not also envisaged to occur at this time and even if it does, the person is not considered to be a monk. therefore, the idea of interpreting the lanna holy monk as being involved in a millenarian movement should not be taken seriously. the next one, the concept of righteous ruler (dhammarājā) is also concerned with the ruler of the state. the monks never consider themselves as the ruler and the qualities of the righteous ruler are also applied only to the king, which the monks in theravāda buddhism never aspire to. moreover, the use of the term utopian movement for the holy monks are also inaccurate as the monks never consider themselves creating the utopian state called ‘the buddha’s kingdom’ or ‘the buddha’s land’ (buddhadesa). in fact, there is no such term in the early theravāda buddhist canon. only the term like majjhimadesa (the middle land), as the land of the dhamma, is found. so, the sociological term of utopianism can not be applied to the practice of holy monks of lanna buddhism. buddhist concept of charisma based on perfections (pāramī) to understand this concept of buddhist sociology more deeply we need to look at the meaning of charisima from a buddhist perspective. in buddhism, the term ‘pāramī (skt. pāramita)’) commonly translated as ‘perfection’ is similar to what we understood in western sociology as charisma or charismatic authority for the extraordinary person who inherited the higher position and who is successful in his endeavour, who possesses high moral and spiritual standards. i will first discuss the buddhist concept of perfection as it appears in the canons and in the commentaries in order to understand the charisma concept in buddhism. the buddha is said to be fully achieve the perfections to become an enlightened being. it takes years of eons (kappas) to fully achieve these 104 prajñā vihāra perfections. likewise, all the great disciples of the buddha and those attain spiritual achievement during the time of the buddha fulfill pāramī in their many past existences to be qualified to realize the noble truths and become liberated beings. there are ten pāramī in buddhavamsa and its commentary (bv. 6, bv.a. 59) in theravada buddhist texts although only eight perfections are listed in the apadāna (ap. 1.5) and seven in the cariyāpiṭaka (cp.103) while there are six paramita discussed in mahayana school of buddhism as the path of bodhisatva the ten perfections recognized by theravada buddhism are: dāna (charity), sīla (morality), nekkhama (renunciation), paññā (wisdom), vīriya (effort or diligence), khanti (endurance), sacca (truth), adhiṭṭhāna (firm determination), metta (loving kindness) and upekkha (equanimity or balanced mind). the fulfilments of all ten perfections are in essence a way to commit oneself to spiritual practices and render service to society based on kindness and compassion. according to theravada buddhist tradition, when one who vows to become a buddha, they must follow the path of a bodhisatta (the buddha-to-be) by pursuing the ten perfections to the fullest extent. these ten perfections are still relevant to be applied in many contemporary issues of modern society as charisma and function for social harmony. sīla (morality) is a virtue and one of the trainings (sikkhā) which every buddhist has to practice to achieve his or her spiritual goal. the three sikkhā are the morality (sīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā) which we can summarize from the noble eightfold path which is also claimed to be the middle path of the buddha. sīla is the foundation of buddhist teaching as it lies in the middle way. the buddhist five precepts for lay disciples appear in many suttas in aṅguttaranikāya of pañcakka-nipāta (an.ii.203-205). the five precepts are: 1) to refrain from taking lives 2) to refrain from stealing 3) to refrain from sexual misconduct 4) to refrain from telling lies and 5) to refrain from drinking alcohol and intoxicating things. these five precepts are prescribed for the lay followers and the eight and ten precepts are for observing on special occasions and vow, and 227 rules or morality for fully ordained monks. dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 105 in order to achieve the spiritual goal of buddhism, purity of morality (sīla-visuddhi) is required. further analysis of sīla will be drawn from the buddhist canonical text, sīlakkhandha-vagga of dn and commentarial literature as well as the first chapter, sīlaniddesa, of visuddhimagga (the path of purification) by venerable buddhaghosa. there are three levels of moral perfection explained in buddhist commentaries, sīlapāramī, sīla-upapāramīand sīla-paramattha-pāramī (bv.a. 59). the first level, sīlapāramī, is the normal observation of the morality when one restrains from committing any immoral acts externally by body and speech. the second level, sīla-upapāramī, is higher as it is involved with bodily organs. though one has to sacrifice any of his organs for the sake of keeping morality, he will do so without hesitation. the third and the highest level of the morality is the sīla-paramattha-pāramī. this involves risking or sacrificing one’s life for the purpose of keeping one’s morality. in this way, each perfection can be multiplied into three levels; and the ten perfections become thirty perfections (tiṁsapāramiyo). the charisma of a buddhist monk does not elevate them above the people, it is the achievement of perfections which come about through service to their community. this can be seen in the buddhist jataka stories. charisma in the bhuridatta-jātaka in theravada buddhism, the jātaka stories recount how the bodhisatta achieved these perfections by sacrificing himself for the welfare of the many. once, the bodhisatta was born as a nāga prince named, bhūridatta (ja.a. 158). the nāga is a magical serpent who can assume human form whenever it wishes. the nāgas live in the realm under water or the earth. they guard rare jewels, jade and precious minerals which are always glittering and bright. they possess supernatural powers and are capable of exhaling fire and spitting out poison. they often emerge out of their realm and wander around on the surface of the earth or the water. the arch enemy of the nāga is the garuda, a magical bird-man which lives in the sunlit and airy skies. once, bhūridatta was meditating and observing sīla (morality) coiling himself at an ant-hill in a forest by 106 prajñā vihāra making a vow “let him who will take my skin or muscles or bones or blood”. one day, he was caught by a brahmin with a magic charm and crushed into a basket and forced to perform various dances in many places to earn the brahmin wealth and fame. however, bhūridatta did not react aggressively though he has the power to do harm. one day, the brahmin took him to perform show in front of the palace in a big crowd including the king. while he was forced to perform various dances and his brother nāga who transformed himself into an ascetic arrived at the scene and competed with the brahmin through magic. the brahmin was defeated and run away, and the kingdom was brought in to peace without violence. due to the nāga bhūridatta’s practice of moral perfection, the violence was avoided and the society returned to peace and harmony. in this jātaka story, bhūridatta, as a bodhisatta, has succeeded in achieving the perfection of morality (sīlapāramī). this is one of the last of the ten jātakas, or previous life stories of the buddha, leading to his becoming the buddha. from this jātaka story we learn how bodhisatta practised moral perfection by giving his life as in his vow. this is the third and highest level (sīla-paramattha-pāramī) undertaken by a bodhisatta. we can learn from this that the virtuous one never gives up his morality for whatever reason even in a situation of the threat to his life. nowadays, many people surrender their morality very easily due to selfishness. as mentioned above, normal or regular observation of sīla is sīlapāramī; giving one’s part of body is sīla-upapāramī and giving one’s life for the purpose of observing morality is paramattha-pāramī. the normal observation of morality is easiest because it only involves constrains of one’s bodily desires and speech. the second level becomes more difficult as it involves giving up one’s bodily organs such as, eyes, ears, nose, tongue, kidney, liver, flesh, blood etc. for the sake of morality. the third level is the most difficult because it involves giving one’s life for the sake of keeping one’s morality. the third kind of morality can only be achieved by bodhisatta. dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 107 khruba boonchum and millenarianism the most venerable khruba boonchum is one of the most prominent theravada buddhist monks among the tai speaking people in shan state, myanmar, northern thailand, southern china and assam, arunachal pradesh of india and beyond. he is known as a forest dwelling monk (āraññavāsī) who started meditation in a cave since he was elevenyears-old and has always been a vegetarian. he has been described as holy monk or charismatic monk of our time by many scholars including paul t. cohen (2017), pisit nasee (2017) and amporn jirattikorn (2017). his main temple, wat dhat don reung, is situated in the golden triangle area of mong phong region of tachilek township, myanmar, bordering lao pdr and thailand. his parents were originally from mong yong of eastern shan state. he was born and raised on thai soil in chiang rai province and has thai citizenship. having been ordained at a young age, he dedicated himself to studying traditional lanna buddhist literature and meditating in the cave, in the forest. as he grew up, his fame and popularity spread far and wide due to his ton bun (the person of merit) character of lanna tradition according to paul cohen. in general buddhist belief, it is called pāramī (perfection) which he accumulated in previous lives. he is also well-known for repairing holy places, pagodas, temples and constructing new pagodas. khruba boonchum also has skills in both languages and design. when he builds or renovates religious buildings, he often creates the designs by himself. mostly, he was inspired by the design of old stupas in lanna style of northern thailand. he has attracted followers from myanmar, thailand, laos and china since his novicehood. at time, his fame and popularity grew, the wealthy and middle class shan people of myanmar and thailand become his main followers and supporters. he travels widely in myanmar and people follow him and welcome him in big crowds wherever he goes. people follow his chanting in lanna style and listen to his talks which is mostly given in shan language. he sometimes travelled to bhutan and meditated in the snowy himalaya forests. he is also well respected and worshiped by the bhutan royal family and the people of bhutan. being suspicious of his 108 prajñā vihāra popularity and activities, the myanmar military government restricted him from travelling out of the area near his temple during 2004 and he was later forced to leave the country. in 2005, he moved to thailand and started a project of building a temple at doi wiang kaew, chiang saen district, chiang rai province. in 2010, he vowed to meditate for three years from his 47 years’ birthday to his 50-year birthday at the rajagriha cave in the remote area of lampang province, thailand. he came out of the cave in 2013 and the thein sein government welcomed him back to myanmar and issued him a national identification card so that he can travel both within myanmar and outside the country easily. he was also conferred the religious title of sadhammajotikadhaja for his missionary works before he was forced to leave to thailand and recently he was again confered another title ‘aggamahā-kammaṭṭhānācariya’ as the highest level of teacher of meditation by the union government of myanmar. he celebrates his birthday every year. without invitation, tens of thousands of people from all walks of life from different regions join his grand birthday celebration. free food stalls are set up by his wealthy and middle class followers for all participants for a week long. his audience is comprised of many ethnic groups: shan, thai, burmese, chinese and minority groups such as palaung, wa, akha, karen and lahu. his teachings cover charity (dāna), morality (sīla) and meditation (bhāvanā). his pali chanting is mainly related to the ten and thirty perfections (pāramī) and the great ten jātaka stories. he is considered as a bodhisatta by his followers and also claims himself to be bodhisatta at some places. some people have claimed to have witnesse miracles and even consider him as an arahant. however, he never claims himself to be an arahant, instead he says he is an ordinary monk who is subject to decay and death. the difference between the arahant and bodhisatta is that the arahant is the one who renounces the world and the bodhisattva is the one who is actively and compassionately involved in the world. nevertheless, the idea that an arahant renounces the world is not always true, as some arahants during the time of the buddha also have shown social responsibility. for example, though the chief disciples of the buddha such as venerable dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 109 sāriputta and moggallāna were the arahants, they also shared social concerns and responsibilities whenever they were needed, for example, the psychological counselling of the sick, and dying person, taking care of monastic community and so forth. khruba boonchum is also well-known for his strict vinaya rules and avoiding close contact with females. he is a trans-border monk with followers from different countries. he is also contributing financial assistance to many projects including education, literature, culture and social works. he is considered as highly endowed with pāramī (perfection). his latest social engagement was involved the twelve children and one coach of a football team who were trapped in the cave in maesai, chiang rai province, northern thailand, in june 2018. the news was widely spread in the social media of the buddhist saint who predicted their rescue within two or three days, and his chanting stopped the rains which made the rescue team easier to access to the children in the trapped area . scholars like cohen (2000, 2001), jirattikorn (2017) identified khruba boonchum as having the character of ton bun (person of merit) in the tradition of khruba siwichai who built and renovated religious buildings and pagodas. at young novice age, khruba boonchum was invited to chiang mai, and he accepted the invitation. people contributed money to help him renovate pagoda at doi wiang kaew. according to cohen, this is the starting point of ton bun character that khruba boonchum has undertaken. the ton bun is again linked to the concept of buddhist charisma of perfection (pāramī). tambiah described millenarian expectations with the coming of a future buddha arimetteyya (maitreya in sanskrit). moreover, keyes described the ton bun tradition with a bodhisattva or a person who vows to become a buddha in the future. khruba boonchum follows the tradition of a ton bun as a form of bodhisatta, as indicated in the letter that he wrote to tham ratchakhrue saying that he vowed to become a future buddha. as venerable khruba boonchum has lived and traveled in shan state, the majority of his followers are usually the shan people. the shan people welcome him wherever he goes in the shan state in a big crowd 110 prajñā vihāra with thier traditional costumes, drums and dances; and the dhamma talk given by the venerable khruba is also usually in shan langauge. the shan see him not only as a holy monk but also as the unity icon of the shan people. this made the myanmar millitary junta suspect his activities and restrict his traveling in shan state and also later forced to leave his monastery in mongphone, tachilek. as a matter of fact, khruba boonchum has never preached politics or staged on a protest against the millitary government to be accused of political involvement. mostly, he preached to live a moral life, to develop social harmony and peaceful co-existence of the diversed communities. after spending time in thailand for about ten year, myanmar political condition changed and the new civillian government invited him to reside in mongphone in myanmar. the effort of bringing khruba boonchum back to myanmar had been partly due to the effort shan mps (the member of parliament) demanding the government to allow khruba boonchum back to shan state. in november 2013 thousands welcomed him at the border of mae sai and tachilek. for the shan, it was the return of the saint or holy monk, but some interpreted it as millenarian event or the creation of the buddha’s kingdom. cohen argues that khruba bunchum’s millenarianism has been expressed in a form of active utopianism. moreover, cohen also stated that khruba boonchum’s movement can be seen as revival of morality and the old lanna tradition. on the other hand, tatsuki kataoka identified khruba boonchum as millenarian for the lahu people of yunan and myanmar as they consider khruba boonchum was a reincarnated of their former g’ui sha who was a glorious lahu ruler in the past. moreover, khruba boonchum has also been interpreted as having a millenarian character as he is seen as defiant and not fully integrated into the established sangha institution of the state in myanmar and thailand. as mentioned above, the most venerable khruba boonchum is a theravāda buddhist monk and practicing theravāda buddhism based on his dhamma knowledge. however, what he emphasizes is the pursuance of the ten perfections, the path of the bodhisatta. all his dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 111 activites are also based on the practice of the ten perfections as appeared in theravāda buddhist texts. therefore, the interpretations of the most venerable khruba boonchum in terms of millenarianism and utopianism are not accurate. conclusion the research shows that the buddhist concept of individual enlightenment has a connection with social responsibilities. the charismatic monks who strive for their spiritual achievement have also committed themselves to many social activities such as building bridges, roads, shelter, helping the people in time of crisis, donating fund for education, fostering peaceful co-existence among different communities and providing dhamma teachings for psychological wellbeing. these are functional aspects of the charismatic monks who have been struggling for their individual enlightenment. the buddhist teaching of the ten perfections of bodhisatta path and the moral teachings (sīla-parami) are a good example of this. the buddhist jātaka story of bhūridatta practicing the moral precept not to kill, even though his bone, flesh and life was threatened, led to the peace and harmony of his realm. similarly, the most venerable khruba boonchum, though he is very strict in his ascetic practice, does not neglect his social responsibilities. his social engagement during his three years’ solitary retreat in the cave of rājagriha, his aid to the earthquake victims in march 2011 in shan state, and involvement in the wild boar football team trapped in the cave in mae sai district in june 2018, proves a relationship between the individual enlightenment and social responsibility. the most venerable khruba boonchum practicing the dhamma and pursuing his spiritual perfection (pāramī) through both individual spiritual quest and social responsibilitys. therefore, his popularity and charisma should not be interpreted as millenarial movement or of a utopian character. 112 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 max weber. “on charisma and institution building,” 213. 2 t.r.v. murti, the central philosophy of buddhism, 263. 3 the word khruba (khuba in northern thai) is commonly translated as ‘venerated teacher’. etymologically it is probably derived from the word khrupacariya, combining the pali guru and pacariya (meaning ‘teaching and teacher of teacher’ or ‘great grand teacher’). according to tambiah, the title of khruba ‘is conferred upon monks, usually of advanced age, who are highly venerated for their holiness and personal charisma’. 4 emile durkheim, elementary forms of the religious life, 44. 5 charles lindholm, charisma, 28. 6 ibid, 28-29. 7 max weber, essays in sociology, 295. 8 max weber, “on charisma and institution building” 1-12. 9 pisith nasee, “globalized world, modern khruba (venerable monk) and the construction of network in thai buddhist society” 204. 10 lanna is the name of the former kingdom in northern thailand established in 14th century a.d., comprised the principalities (muang) of chaing mai, lamphun lampang, chiang rai, phayao, phrae and nan. lanna had a fluctuating political influence over chiang rung, muang yong, muang pu, muang sat and muang nai in the shan states (sarassawadee 2005, 82.) 11 paul t. cohen, charismatic monks of lanna buddhism, 2. 12 ibid, 2. 13 ibid, 9. 14 ibid, 9. 15 stanley tambiah, the buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets, 306 16 https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/utopianism/v-1 1 7   “ d ā n a ṃ s ī l a ñ c a n e k k h a m m a ṃ , p a ñ ñ ā v ī r i y a ñ c a k ī d i s a ṃ ; khantisaccamadhiṭṭhānaṃ, mettupekkhā ca kīdisā’’. 18 a person who takes a vow to carry on the path of the buddhahood. 19 normally buddhist nuns and yogis keep eight precepts, and novices (sāmaṇera) keep ten precepts. 20 bāhirabhaṇḍapariccāgopāramīnāma, aṅgapariccāgoupapāramīnāma, jīvitapariccāgoparamatthapāramīnāmāti. 21 paul t. cohen, “a buddha kingdom in the golden traingle: buddhist revivalism and the charismatic monk khruba bunchum» 22 amporn jirattikorn, “buddhist holy man khruba bunchum: a shift in a millenarian movement at the thai-myanmar border,” 384 dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 113 23 paul t. cohen, “buddhism unshackled: the yuan ‘holy man’ tradition and the nation-state in the tai world,” 244–45. 24 for further details, see: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/monkpredicted-thai-cave-rescue-hailed-intervention.html 25 paul t. cohen “a buddha kingdom in the golden traingle: buddhist revivalism and the charismatic monk khruba bunchum,” 144. 26 stanley tambiah, the buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets, 306. 27 charles keyes, “death of two buddhist saints in thailand,” 149–80. 28 amporn jirattikorn, “buddhist holy man khruba bunchum: a shift in a millenarian movement at the thai-myanmar border,” 401. 29 paul t. cohen, “a buddha kingdom in the golden traingle: buddhist revivalism and the charismatic monk khruba bunchum,» 143. 30 tatsuki kataoka, “millenarianism, ethnicity and the state: kruba bunchum worship among the lahu in myanmar and thailand, in charismatic monks of lanna buddhism,” 242 abbreviations ap apādāna an aṅguttaranikāya bv buddhavaṁsa bv.a buddhavaṁsa-aṭṭhakathā cp cariyapiṭaka cp.a cariyapiṭaka-aṭṭhakathā dhp dhammapada dn dīghanikāya mn majjhimanikāya sn saṁyuttanikāya sn. suttanipāta jā.a jātakaṭṭhakathā 114 prajñā vihāra bibilography buddhadasa, bhikkhu. donald k. swearer trans. & ed., dhammic socialism. bangkok: thai inter-religious commission for development. 1986 cariyapiṭaka aṭṭhakathā: bodhi, bhikkhu. ed. a treatise on the paramis: from the commentary to the cariyapitaka by acariya dhammapala (the wheel, no. 409/411). kandy: bps 1978, 2005 cohen, paul. t. ed. charismatic monks of lanna buddhism. chiang mai university: nias press. 2017 _____. “a buddha kingdom in the golden traingle: buddhist revivalism and the charismatic monk khruba bunchum.” the australian journal of anthropology 2000. 11 (2): 141-54 _____. “buddhism unshackled: the yuan ‘holy man’ tradition and the nation-state in the tai world.” journal of southeast asian studies 2001. 32 (2): 227-47. dhammapada: buddharakkhita, acharya. the dhammapada: the buddha’s path of wisdom. kandy: buddhist publication society. 1985 dīghanikāya: walshe, maurice. long discourses of the buddha, 2nd revised edition. boston: wisdom. 1996 durkheim, emile. elementary forms of the religious life. new york: the free press. 1991 jātakaṭṭhakathā: shaw, sarah trans. the jataka: birth stories of the bodhisatta, new delhi: penguin. 2006. jirattikorn, amporn. ‘buddhist holy man khruba bunchum: a shift in a millenarian movement at the thai-myanmar border’. sojourn: journal of social issues in southest asia 2016. 31 (1): 377412. retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 305616954_buddhist_holy_man_khruba_bunchum_the_shift_ dayweinda yeehsai and john giordano 115 in_a_millenarian_movement_at_the_thailand-myanmar_border on 30/10/2018 kataoka, tatsuki. “millenarianism, ethnicity and the state: kruba bunchum worship among the lahu in myanmar and thailand, in charismatic monks of lanna buddhism,” cohen, ed. chiang mai university: nias press. 2017. keyes, charles f. 1981. ‘death of two buddhist saints in thailand’. journal of the american academy of religion, thematic studies 4, no. 3-4: 149-80. lindholm, charles. charisma. 2002. (pdf version) retrieved from https:// www.bu.edu/anthrop/files/2011/09/charisma.pdf on 1/7/2018 majjhimanikāya: nanamoli, bhikkhu. and bodhi, bhikkhu. the middle length discourses of the buddha. boston: wisdom. 1995 murti, t.r.v. the central philosophy of buddhism. london: routledge. 1955. nasee, pisith. “globalized world, modern khruba (venerable monk) and the construction of network in thai buddhist society,” 2017. retrieved from http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ s e a r c h ? q = c a c h e : b v f d 5 8 a k 7 j w j : w w w . i c t s 1 3 . c h i a n g m a i . c m u . a c . t h / d o w n l o a d _ p u b . p h p % 3 f c t % 3 d c n p 4 x ts i c p r g v n 4 y u f 0 % 3 d % 2 6 + & c d = 3 & h l =en&ct=clnk&gl=th&client=safari on 30/10/2018 nasee, pisith. constructing the charisma of khruba (venerable monks) in contemporary thai society. 2018. retrieved from https:// repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/ 2433/234131/1/ sas_7_2_199.pdf on 30/10/2018 saṁyuttanikāya: bodhi, bhikkhu. trans. the connected discourses of the buddha, boston: wisdom. 2005. suttanipāta: bodhi, bhikkhu. trans. the suttanipata: an ancient collection 116 prajñā vihāra of the buddha’s discourses together with its commentaries. usa: wisdom publication. 2017. tambiah, stanley. the buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets. cambridge: cambridge university press. 1984. weber, max. essays in sociology, eds hans gerth and c. wright mills. new york: oxford university press, 1946. weber, max. “on charisma and institution building”. s. n. eisenstadt, ed., chicago: university of chicago. 1968. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 117 a9gimg5_ayh0lr_4hc.tmp 72 vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 72-108 © 2000 by assumption university press rereading based upon its roots in the tipitaka nath narada and john giordano abstract this paper is a study of thai buddhist cosmology contained in the old manuscript named, ( ). this manuscript had been compiled and entitled and it has been translated into english in 1979 as . the dissemination of this text began since the rise of thai kingdom, thus it is regarded as one of the literary classics of thai culture. the text has often been interpreted as an attempt to make theravada buddhism more accessible to the masses. it subsequently has been appropriated by folk culture as documenting the literal existence of heavens and hells and the accumulation of merits through several lifetimes. this paper aims to move beyond this more upon the concept of impermanence ( ) which is a dominant concept of theravada buddhism. impermanence represents a cosmological view based on the law of three marks of existence ( ). it also determines the features of time, space, and beings as contingent and not independent of other things. therefore, it is used in this study as a key to disclose a new meaning of this text based upon its deeper narrative, the tipitaka. and with the notions 73 the traditional interpretation which overlooks the attainment of nibbana at present lifetime and in modern interpretation which lacks a sociocultural dimension. keywords: tebhumikatha; three worlds according to king ruang; thai buddhist cosmology introduction the three worlds according to king ruang ( )1 is a thai literary work concerning with theravada buddhist cosmology. it was composed in the 14th century, presumably by king lithai of the house of phra ruang. being written in thai makes it distinct from other theravada cosmological texts written in pali in accordance with the buddhist scholastic tradition. this might contribute to its popularity because it made the three worlds more accessible to laypeople who did not understand pali. in brief, the three worlds is a compendious narrative joining a cosmological system with moral system. the author applied several ideas from the tipitaka suttas to construct a comprehensive worldview and used it to guide the people about how to live their lives properly in such a world. the contents of the three worlds range over the metaphysical cosmos at large to the human world. it expounds the theravada contents such as the nature of beings in this cosmos, the origin of mankind, the origin of human society, the fall of mankind, the cosmic destruction, and the rebirth of cosmos, including the salvation or the paths to liberate oneself from this cosmos. nevertheless, due to the change of worldview since the time increasingly skeptical about certain religious beliefs. they considered many religious beliefs as superstition and sought to demystify those beliefs to make them rationally acceptable. in the context of thailand, one can see the emergence of monastic reform led by king mongkut (rama iv) 74 the dhammayuttika nikaya established by him can be seen as a modern order (maha nikaya) such as “seeking for the authentic teachings and practices of the historical buddha, upholding the extra monastic rules more than orthodox monks, supporting the monks to learn the dhamma with modern education, and being skeptical towards the superstitious elements in the traditional teachings.”2 modern perspective on buddhism in thailand in the contemporary time can be seen from the book named the ( ) which is the record of sermons preached by buddhadasa bhikkhu. the contents of this book are mainly about demythologizing the metaphysical terms in buddhist texts. buddhadasa bhikkhu proposed an idea that one should not interpret the buddhist terms in literal sense (the so-called ) which represents “the secular understanding of people who do not understand the dhamma.”3 rather one should interpret the buddhist terms based on the so-called which represents “the intellectual understanding of people who know the truth of dhamma.”4 since the late 20th century, the modern interpretation of buddhist he was not only an expert in the tipitaka, he was also knowledgeable in western science, and philosophy. one of his internationally famous writings is which was compiled from his sermons, then delivered to students of medical science, and was this sermon was an attempt to demythologize traditional religious terms such as those used in the three worlds. he teaches that religious terms that are interpreted in the traditional sense of the should be reinterpreted to be less superstitious, namely as symbols or metaphors of modern psychological states in the sense of the .5 75 table 1. examples of the phasa khon phasa tham interpretation6 no. buddhist terms meaning according to (premodern interpretation as traditional understanding) meaning according to (modern interpretation as ) 1. mara lord of evil obstacle to enlightenment 2. loka space, land, world 3. death the end of life the end of self 4. deva celestial beings laws of nature 5. hell the underworld anger, dissatisfaction 6. heaven pleasant realms of gods attachment to sensory pleasure 7. peta hungry ghosts greed 8. asura demon fear, anxiety 9. tiracchana animal ignorance 10. sunyata emptiness absence of ego, non-self 11. nibbana ideal ultimate state, ideal heavenly realm 12. buddha the historical buddha, siddhattha gotama buddha the teachings of buddha, quote that which implies that the true identity of the buddha is the dhamma, not his personhood.) moreover, buddhadasa bhikkhu also placed an emphasis on the attainment of nibbana in the present lifetime. an example of this is his sermon “ ”7 in which he contrasts his notion of nibbana to the traditional understanding expound in the three worlds, the phra malai sutta, and the jataka tales that the attainment of nibbana relied on the notion of merits accumulated through several lifetimes. 76 in summary, the interpretation of buddhist texts as proposed theravada buddhism in line with modern perspective in the sense that his teachings have become popular among people upholding a modern perspective whether they be thais or those interested in buddhism from other parts of the world. critique of the interpretation based on the although the modern interpretation of buddhist texts in accordance with the among most buddhists, it has been criticized by the traditionalists. they it undermines the sacrality of buddhism. an example of this view can he writes ”8 sathianphong wannapok an acclaimed thai expert on the tipitaka, enlightenment at the present lifetime, sathianphong pointed out that “it is similar to zen buddhism, buddhadasa the mahayana texts into thai which are the sutra of weilang (huineng) and the teaching of huangbo xiyun.”9 this 77 2) concerning the buddhadasa this quote suggests that lord buddha himself accepts both senses of meaning and one should know how to use them appropriately. however, seems 10 religious inclusivism, sathianphong remarked that “although it is by his good will to promote peace and mutual understanding among world religions, using his buddhist point of view may distort the original understanding of christianity and it can cause discord rather than harmony since there are some christians who would refuse such interpretation”11 afterlife, sathianphong gave a remark that “some of another i.e., sometimes he ... does not refuse the belief of rebirth and the afterlife, but sometimes he taught that only the fool would understand rebirth in the afterlife, the wise would understand rebirth as here and now successively.”12 nevertheless, sathianphong supports buddhadasa bhikkhu concerning the idea that both aspects of rebirth and the nature of mind are in accordance with the tipitaka, namely “the mind as instantaneous-self which can be reborn in the afterlife is in line with the sutta pitaka and the commentaries written by buddhaghosa.”13 nature of mind and its implication on rebirth is a major controversial issue in buddhist philosophy. sathianphong explained that “actually buddhaghosa explained both views in his writings, but he had placed little emphasis on the mind as instantaneous-self (maybe because this 78 view was commonly known already), and he explained in detail the mind which led to the charge of distorting buddhism to be brahmanism.”14 nevertheless, despite these controversies, the tipitaka suttas and commentaries used in the orthodox theravada tradition are mostly from the writings by buddhaghosa, the major editor of the tipitaka in the 5th century. king lithai also used the as one of his references in composing the three worlds, probably because he considered that the to people with theistic background. the buddhist scholars who follow the modern perspective classify the suttas into early suttas which represent the early teaching before the various subsects of buddhism came into being and the latter suttas such as those composed during the 1st – 4th centuries which could have been 15 it is likely the case that the authentic teachings had been altered to some extent in order it is not surprising why some buddhist scholars such as buddhadasa bhikkhu are sceptical about some tipitaka suttas, especially those that are dense with supernatural ideas like some suttas of ceylonese tradition that were edited by buddhaghosa and which have become prevalent in southeast asia. buddhadasa bhikkhu once stated that “about 30-60% of the tipitaka suttas should be discarded due to the discrepancy in their dhamma contents.”16 in my opinion, the problems concerning authenticity of buddhist ancient manuscripts found in central asia, northern india, and western china. these manuscripts show that the ancient buddhist texts were not written only in pali, they were also written in other languages such as sanskrit, chinese, and gandhari or prakrit. for example, “the gandharan scrolls found in afghanistan and pakistan dated back to the 1st – 2nd centuries.”17 these gandharan scrolls are as old as the suttas of the pali 79 canon or even older. and in this aspect, the pali suttas which have long been accepted as legitimate source of theravada doctrine in sri lanka and southeast asia can be challenged by the antiquity of the gandharam scrolls. at the time of lord buddha, it might be the case that during in his forty years of teaching the dhamma, lord buddha had taught many groups and the idea that “the older the date of manuscript is, the more original the content of the manuscript, since it is less developed or marred by corruptions caused by transcribal errors.”18 can be problematic since in the texts. in response to the modern critics who diminish the supernatural ideas in the three worlds as not representing the authentic teaching of commonalities among buddhist texts to see whether or not they have common concepts in their teachings. in other words, finding the the authenticity of buddhist teachings. since this concept stands as a main principle of theravada in ceylonese tradition, namely in the principle of the three marks of existence. it is also taught in mahayana doctrine in the teaching about voidness (sunyata) and illusion (maya), and in vajrayana doctrine in the teaching about transient nature. in this regard, the concept of impermanence is a dominant concept which can be used as an indication of whether or not a text in question is in line with authentic buddhist doctrine. maintain the authentic teachings while making buddhism contemporary with the changing world, especially his emphasis on attaining the nibbana of buddhism in providing spiritual bliss in their present lifetime, there are 80 some problems with his theory. to solve those problems, i would like to apply the approach of the german philosopher friedrich schleiermacher to interpret the three worlds because according to his hermeneutical theory, schleiermacher suggests that the interpreter should consider the wider linguistic context of meaning [rather than focusing on the word-level meaning that are restricted to only two senses] and the existential context of author altogether, otherwise the interpretation which is its ideal meaning. it is not necessary for a buddhist term to have only two senses understanding of people in each period of history who inevitably assign the meaning based on their uses. it would be unfair to judge that their interpretations of the text such as their interpretation according to the as the interpretation of the fools. on the other hand, the interpretation according to the as claimed to be derived from the true understanding of the dhamma, can also be questionable i.e., in justify such claim. this does not mean that i condemn interpretations in the sense of the i would rather like to assert that both the which represents the traditional understanding or premodern interpretation and the which represents the demythologized or modern interpretation are neither right nor wrong since the reading of religious text is essentially subjective activity in which faith is heavily involved. in general hermeneutics, we cannot deny the role of reader as the subject who assigns meaning to the text in the process of reading, as david e. klemm put it “although historical prejudices and linguistic not the prison house of understanding, but the universal performance of the dialogical openness of the self to the others.”19 81 understanding which has been criticized as too superstitious and not in line with the authentic teaching and the modern interpretation which can be criticized as lacking sociocultural dimension, two notions from 1) the notion of hermeneutical circle 2) the notion of historical and psychological context of author the gap in the previous interpretation according to the modern perspective of the theory is considered as a kind of modern interpretation, his hermeneutical method can avoid the problem which might occur with the framework since it aims at the holistic meaning of the text by considering the context of meaning beyond the word-level so as to attain the ideal meaning intended by author rather than relying on general grammatical meaning. the interpretation based on the notion of hermeneutical circle this method of interpretation can be applied to represent the three worlds as not deviating from the orthodox doctrine as expound in the tipitaka which is its metanarrative. according to schleiermacher the understand the holistic meaning in relation to its parts. as he explained: just as those texts in which the whole is evident from the parts or in which, given even the faintest outlines of the for determining the relationship between the whole and of the creative spirit, whatever their form and genre, each at the same time is inexhaustible in each of its part. every 82 solution to the task of understanding appears to us as only an approximation. our understanding would be complete only if we could proceed with such works as we do with those we have designated as minimal in this respect, that is, if we could solve the problems of the organization of the whole and the parts at least in a relatively similar way… just as a word relates to a sentence, a sentence to a section, and a section to a work as a particular to a totality or a part to a whole, so, too, every speech and every text is a particular or part that can be completely understood only in relation to a still larger whole.20 the text of the three words is compiled from various tipitaka suttas and commentaries to form a new narrative intended by king lithai. the method of hermeneutical circle can help one to check whether the holistic meaning of the three worlds is still in line with the orthodox doctrine by linking it with the content of the tipitaka suttas which is appreciate the traditional understanding of the three worlds as still in line with the orthodox doctrine in the level of core concepts such as impermanence. the method of hermeneutical circle by using the dominant concept such as impermanence can be helpful in this matter because it can link between the three worlds and the tipitaka in the deeper level of core philosophical concept and theoretically can correspond with the modern remarked: whenever the understanding of a series of sentences and foremost know the whole to which they belong. indeed, since this case, too, can be traced back to the original principle, the principle must hold universally. in fact, every highly coherent set of sentences is governed by a dominant concept, though the way this concept “governs” the text 83 will vary according to the type of work. this concept, just as a word in a given sentence, can be fully determined only when it is read in its context. that is, any set of sentences, large or small, can be understood correctly only in terms of the whole to which it belongs. and just as the shorter sets of sentences are conditioned by larger sets, so, too, these larger sets are conditioned by still larger ones. thus, the obvious conclusion is that any part can be completely understood only through the whole. when we consider the task of interpretation with this principle in mind, we have to say that our increasing understanding of each sentence and of each section, an understanding which we achieved by starting at the beginning and moving forward slowly, is always provisional. it becomes more complete as we are able to see each larger section as a coherent unity. but as soon as we turn to a new part, we encounter new uncertainties and begin again, as it were, in the dim morning light. it is like starting all over, except that as we push ahead the new material illumines everything we have already treated, until suddenly at the end every part is clean and the whole work 21 when one reads the three worlds, one can read each chapter in relation to the dominant concept of impermanence. in this way, one can in the cosmos, in any possible worlds whether the world of phenomena where human beings and animals live in or other supernatural/imaginary realms such as hells and heavens of supernatural beings. the theme of this narrative is to present the presupposition that the intrinsic natures of all beings are under the law of impermanence. rereading the three worlds in this way can link its teaching message as corresponding to the tipitaka and in so doing it can show that the three worlds is still in line with the orthodox teaching regardless of 84 containing a lot of superstitious ideas. this modern perspective of the prefers only the meanings that are empirically reference of each individual word and assumes that the meaning can be understood in isolation. but in rereading the text through the hermeneutic circle, one can see that the text with its imagery of heavens and hells and this aspect of holistic meaning as process of change is gained contexts of objective realms or subjective mental states that they are as animal, demon, human, or god; or be transformed subjectively in the modern interpretation where ones physical body or appearance is human demon, or god. however, the reason behind all these changes whether in the sense of objectivity or subjectivity is to show the impermanence of being ( ), and the truth of non-self ( ) which is in line with the principle of three marks of existence ( ). the three worlds might be composed with this purpose i.e., to communicate this theravada message to people permanent beings. nevertheless, although the three worlds concept seems to refuse the existence of permanent beings, it does not refuse the existence of permanence. in its cosmological system, the permanence is presented as the nibbana which exists beyond the boundary of the three worlds which are the impermanent worlds of beings. in this world, the readers whose spiritual orientation were directed toward permanence, eternity, immortality can derive such implication from the three worlds as well. the 22 which is a kind of spiritual liberation by means of wisdom for realizing the truth of nature such as impermanence. this kind 85 of enlightenment can be seen, for example, in the bahiya sutta in which lord buddha taught a man named bahiya to contemplate the impermanent nature of the world. after bahiya had practiced this according to lord then venerable bahiya went up to the buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and said to him: “sir, may the buddha live alone, withdrawn, diligent, keen, and resolute.” “what do you think, bahiya? is the eye permanent or impermanent?” “impermanent, sir.” “no, sir.” “are sights … eye consciousness … eye contact …the pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by mind contact: is that permanent or impermanent?” “impermanent, sir.” “no, sir.” seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact. and they grow disillusioned with the painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by eye contact. they grow disillusioned with the ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, painful, pleasant, or neutral feeling that arises conditioned by mind contact. 86 being disillusioned, desire fades away. when desire fades journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.23 this sutta represents the possibility of sudden enlightenment in contrast to the notion of being enlightened by merits accumulated from good deeds. the contemplation on impermanence can be one of the means consciousness to interpret the phenomena within that. in fact, king lithai also explained this practice in the three worlds in terms of sequential meditation practices, continuum then reaches the maturity of insight; and the supraworldly absorption consciousness then arises. at that that will obstruct any object of consciousness; the characteristic of impermanence, for example, will arise with the power of the preliminary stage, the access stage, and the stage of conformity…the insight that leads to rising into the supraworldly sphere that discerns the absence of ego or person gives rise to the path that is called the void liberation path. the insight that leads to rising into the supraworldly sphere that discerns impermanence give rise to the path that is called the signless liberation path.24 path, and so proposed the path of faith in the future buddha and making merits as an alternative practice for spiritual liberation. whoever wishes to reach the celestial treasure, which is the deliverance of nibbana, let him listen to this sermon on the three worlds with care and interest, with faith in 87 his heart, and without being heedless in any way. he will then be able to meet the lord sri ariya when he is born in the future, to pay his respect to him, and to listen to the dhamma that he will preach25 if one reads the three worlds hermeneutically according to the concept of impermanence, one can see that it can correspond with the is evidenced by the bahiya sutta. however, based on buddhadasa the contemplation on impermanence in the three worlds, one must contemplate on the changing nature of phenomena which presupposes the consciousness of time from past, present, and future altogether to realize the state of change. an example would be the temporal aspect of listening to a song and gradually making an aesthetic judgment that the song is beautiful. such judgment is not made based on each instant of hearing the melody but rather from the totality of the hearing experience in world as impermanent. this judgement is possible by the consciousness of time not in the basis of instantaneous moment but in the totality of time from past, present, future as projected in the mind. reading the three worlds and its imagery of heavens and hells and afterlives, one gains an way as in the modern psychological perspective which considers such imagery as superstition. the mind that is not touched by the vicissitudes of life, the mind that is free from sorrow, is stainless and secure. conditions for such blessings are victorious everywhere and attain happiness everywhere. to them these are the highest blessings.26 88 based on this notion from the mangala sutta, by contemplating the impermanent nature in every aspect of life experience, one can be aware attachments with the world of impermanence and thus entering the state of nibbana. this approach of attaining the nibbana is heavily involved psychological context of author this interpretation is an attempt to understand the text through the understanding of author by considering his or her historical and psychological context. this method can expose the sociocultural dimension of the three worlds. it is not limited to the spiritual aspect of the three worlds as an instruction on the attainment of nibbana. psychological context of author can show that the three worlds might be composed for sociocultural reasons too. often disagree with this method because it gives too much importance to the role of the author or the reader as an autonomous subject who has of an author who passed away long time ago, it is important to bring a historical context of a text into consideration. as schleiermacher pointed out that “no determination of meaning is correct unless it is supported by an examination of the spirit of the author and the spirit of classical antiquity,”27 aspects of grammatical interpretation and psychological interpretation: 89 give us a certain and complete understanding, then we must employ both methods in both aspects – though naturally in until the result approximates as nearly as possible that of immediate understanding. we surely must accept what i have said about one class of interpreters inclining more to the psychological and another to the grammatical aspect. we know that many a virtuoso in grammatical interpretation give scant attention to the internal process special relationship of a text to its language only minimally and then only in those rare cases when they are forced to consult a dictionary. if we take this into account and apply it equally to the two methods, we must conclude that just as we can regard immediate and instantaneous understanding as having arisen in either way, thus directing our attention language, so we can regard the successful completion of a more artful method in interpretation in these same terms. we can now say that all the points of comparison, for the psychological as well as for the grammatical aspects, have been brought together so perfectly that we no longer need to consider the divinatory method and its results.”28 with this view, the understanding of text can be more complete if one can interpret a text by considering both the grammatical aspect of meaning and the historical context of author as shaped by historical and psychological conditions because in the latter, language can be seen as a tool used by author to express his mode of existence. this type of intepretation goes beyond the word-level meanings whether literal or metaphorical. 90 the three worlds concept creates the image of king lithai as a devout buddhist ruler. his intention of composing the three worlds as stated in the text is to teach the dhamma to his royal mother and his subjects. however, if one considers the historical context of ancient sukhothai society, the reasons behind his composition are more than a thriving trading city where merchants from various civilizations came systems. this could be a reason why although theravada buddhism gained importance in the society as supported by the monarch, but it was not imposed on people by force. being a cosmopolitan society required a free trade policy and freedom of beliefs to guarantee the well-being of people from various cultures living in the city. these aspects of archaeological artifacts found at present time. 29 in terms of the religious beliefs, prior to the restoration of theravada doctrine during the reign of king ramkhamhaeng, there were already three prevalent beliefs practiced in sukhothai society, namely 1) animism the reign of king jayavarman vii who converted to mahayana faith and at that time sukhothai was one of his vassal states. viewing sukhothai as a multicultural society through this historical evidence, it is likely the case that king lithai was aware that to promote social harmony, syncretism would be a good mean to do so. in my opinion, his composition of the three worlds might also represent his political agenda since it is noticeable that the text as presenting his interpretation of buddhist cosmology is selectively made to be compatible 91 trai phum is a royal text, an expression of the orthodox theravada tradition and a sermon that seeks to make the dhamma more accessible to the laity.”30, i am rather skeptical about whether the three worlds view itself is also suspect. however, it seems to be the case that king lithai consciously selected the tipitaka suttas and commentaries to create the syncretic cosmological narrative. the three worlds in a way is his own of his society. most suttas that king lithai used in his composition are from the suttas and commentaries edited by buddhaghosa that are known in general as containing supernatural elements. in advocating buddhism, he had chosen to promote theravada doctrine in a way that it can harmonize with the other beliefs. the evidence to support this view is the stone inscription of kamphaengphet, the major vassal state of sukhothai. this inscription was found at the base of the statue of lord shiva in the ancient city shrine, and the message clearly represents the attitude of sukhothai ruler toward other religions as stated peoples and animals in the city and to elevate the three beliefs including buddhism, animism, and theism together.” this inscription and other statues of hindu deities cast during the reign of king lithai can be the proof to assume that the three worlds idea is not meant for one religion, but it can be a kind of syncretic theravada cosmology as interpreted by king lithai to teach his citizen as a whole. 92 figure 1, the deciphered message of the stone inscription no. 13 of kamphaengphet, 31 figure 2, hindu gods statues, some were cast in the reign of king lithai, at bangkok national museum32 the three worlds as promoting syncretic beliefs theravada concepts such as the concepts of nibbana and the concept of mind, when used in the three worlds, were made more compatible with namely his intention to establish harmony among the religions by making 93 his cosmology to correspond with theistic beliefs. for instance, the concept of nibbana in which there are about 66 occurrences in the text can be i) the nibbana as celestial space or heavenly city e.g., “thus, we have given our brief account of the city of nibbana which is more superb than the three worlds and the limitless cakavala.”33 ii) nibbana as ultimate treasure, worthy of possession e.g., “the treasure of nibbana brings a very high degree of pleasure, happiness, and tranquility; nothing can be found to equal it.”34 iii) nibbana as extinction e.g., “when our lord buddha attained one is called the nibbana of the aggregates, and another is called the nibbana of the relics.”35 iv) nibbana as state of mind occurred in the advanced meditation practice e.g., “the change of lineage then arises for one moment, and nibbana is taken as the object of consciousness; there the lineage of an ordinary person is eliminated.”36 meanings are mostly used throughout the text, whereas the uses of the third and the fourth senses are found only in chapter eleven. the third sense is the pali literal meaning and it corresponds to the orthodox doctrine most, but it occurs in the three worlds only in the context relating to the historical buddha, in other contexts such as cosmological and moral as for the concept of mind which is also controversial in theravada philosophy, there are about 70 occurrences of the pali term (mind) found in the text and most of them are used in relation to the transformation of life, namely the mind as agent of rebirth such as “this kind of rebirth linkage occurs as follows: a mind that takes the rebirth linkage sees and knows with wisdom without being told by anyone, experiences gladness, and takes the rebirth linkage”37 and the mind as being uplifted to attain 94 absorption. it does not proceed into the future at all. at that time, the yogin reaches the attainment of cessation”38 the the not the 39 this implies that the mind, the form, and the nibbana are the beings as subjects in themselves in contrast to the which are the objects of thought to be experienced by the (the mind as subject who does the act of experiencing). in the three worlds, the terms are also used by the author in the same sense of thus the concept of in the three worlds is presented as having an ontological existence in itself such as the as celestial city where the can take refuge in. 40 is not in the same group with because the mind is a kind of conditioned being and it is doomed to be impermanent, unlike the nibbana, which is not a conditioned being and therefore is eternal. according to this sutta, the mind has transient nature characterized by the factors of arising, vanishing, and changing, in contrast to the which is the only unconditioned being in the cosmos known as the “asankhata dathu.”41 based on this notion, when the mind is attaining the nibbana, the two beings, namely the mind and the nibbana should be of same nature which implies that the mind cannot remain itself as a conditioned being; it should be either losing its conditioned nature or transforming into the same nature with the . this aspect of the mind corresponds with the third and the fourth senses of meaning of the and it is also in line with the concept of as an empty mind without ego. however, this notion is not encouraged by the author as one can notice from the numbers of its occurrence in the text. on the contrary, the as subject which does not lose its subjecthood when attaining the is more obvious in the three worlds, and it is the notion compatible with mahayana and other theistic beliefs in the sense that the 95 immortality of subject is still preserved while attaining the spiritual ideal. king lithai composed the three worlds during the time when he was still the viceroy. “phya lithai reigned in srisachanalai for six years, and then he composed this sermon on the three worlds.”42 considering his political condition, it might be the case that the three worlds can serve as an appraisal to his knowledge of buddhism and thus being worthy of the victory by means of dhamma like king ashoka the great in the history. king ashoka had become an idol of siamese rulers since the sukhothai related to the dhamma like emerged in the ). the deed that king lithai composed the three worlds to teach his mother as described in the text not only demonstrated him as a good son, but also made him resemble lord buddha who gave his sermon to his mother in heaven. the notion of cakkavatit king (king of universe) who expands his power by making great merit in all human realms as described in disseminating buddhism all over his kingdom as evidenced by several buddhist monuments created during his reign. moreover, the notion of the bodhisattva king as described in the text also suggests a new concept of ruler unlike before. after they meet and speak to one another like this, they go to pay their respect to the lord bodhisatta, asking him to be their lord and their leaders and to have them as his servants. they then consecrated the lord bodhisatta to be their king by endowing him with three names; one name is great elect, another name is khattiya, and another name is king. the reason that he is called great elect is because it is the people who appoint him to be their superior. the 96 reason that he is called khattiya is because the people agree the rice, and the water among them. the reason that he is called king is because he pleases the sense and the minds of the people – thus he is called king for that reason.43 expansion of power by means of merit and magical power, the new notion of theravada king as proposed in the latter part of the text represents a more modern notion of king i.e., one deserves to be king by three reasons 3) being able to please the people with his appearance and virtues. king lithai had promoted this awareness of thai rulers to the people through to the throne and partly to link theravada virtues with politics to gain acceptance from the people. the three worlds as political tool to organize thai society the three worlds concept was also a political tool to establish from the previous khmer-hindu beliefs. one aspect of this reform can be seen from the beliefs about human nature and the role of the ruler. the emergence of buddhism in the course of indian history can be seen as a reaction against the dominant brahmin beliefs and its oppressive caste system and the authority over spiritual salvation. likewise, the genesis myth as described in the three worlds holds that human beings are equal in terms of their original divine nature. the ruler can claim their right to rule only by his quality of dhamma. here, social hierarchy is still preserved but it is organized based on the belief of meritocracy. according to the three worlds, ancestors of mankind are celestial beings who descended to live on earth. they were primarily from divine backgrounds but living in the earthy conditions gradually changed their nature and caused them to engage in bad deeds. once they have eaten this rice, worldly behavior involving 97 the pleasure of passion coexists with behavior in accordance with dhamma – and the people come to include both men and women…after groups of women and men have emerged like that, they are attracted to one another; and thus sexual relations among people according to the natural way of the world has existed from the kappa long, long ago. to moderate the shame that is associated with their evil doing…together we should appoint one person to be our superior, to be our lord, and to be our leader; whenever we are wrong or right in any way, let him judge and enforce the 44 is set by the beliefs in merit and sin which have political implication in determining the social status of people i.e., people who do bad deeds or have less merit are believed be lower position or inferior to those who have more merits. in this way, the theravada social hierarchy is administrated with belief in the degree of merit or meritocracy. reforming the thai social administration through a cosmological system. he did not impose the belief on his citizens that he is a god-king (devaraja) the authority of king by means of meritocracy such as in the story of the cakkavatit king and encouraged his subjects to help the society altogether by making merit to better their condition in this cosmos. although social hierarchy still exists in theravada cosmology it is thai culture. traditionally thais have the impulse to make merit to better 98 people to do good for their life and for the society which indirectly reduces the works of ruler. one can see this in many thai cultural activities which are usually concerned with merit making and charitable events. meritocracy can function effectively with the beliefs in the lithai depicted in the three worlds. in theravada social hierarchy, it is necessary to presuppose the belief in afterlife. for example, if there are many candidates for kingship and all of them have done good deeds equally, who should have the right to rule? to deal with this problem, the three worlds must assert the notions of former life and afterlife to make room for the belief in merits accumulated before the present lifetime the former lifetime is a matter of faith such as in the jataka tales which basically convey the messages about the great merit that lord buddha had made in his previous lives to demonstrate why he is an exceptional being worthy of praise and respect. this belief in merit accumulated in former lives and after lives has had political implications in thai culture since the time of sukhothai. it functions to sustain the social structure and it is not surprising why king lithai had proposed it in his cosmology. to support this point, one can compare the three worlds of king lithai to another cosmological text written by his teacher, phra medhankara. the background of phra medhankara is probably of mon or burmese origin. he went to study buddhism in sri lanka, and when he returned from his study, king lithai invited him to be the supreme patriarch at sukhothai. 45 the content of is more concerned about cosmological nature and less hierarchical than the three worlds of king lithai. it has three worlds, namely 1) the sensuous planes ( ), 2) the form planes of existence ( ), and 3) the formless planes of existence ( ). according to the contents of 99 loka) which is related to mental formation factors, 2) the world of beings (satta loka) which is related to living creatures, and 3) the spatial world (okasa loka) which is related to physical matters in space.46 the ontological aspects of beings, whereas the three worlds of king lithai degree of pleasure. although some parts of the three worlds show that king lithai was knowledgeable in the theravada contents according to the modern perspective such as the instantaneous nature of mind and the nibbana as subjective mental state, in most parts of the text he explained his cosmology by using the concepts that are compatible with popular theistic beliefs such as the concept of nibbana as heaven, the concept of rebirth in the samsara in a similar fashion to the jataka tales and the concept of attainment of nibbana which takes several lifetimes to accomplish by means of merit making. the interpretation of the three worlds in terms of historical and on the perspective of the ruler whose primary concern would be about how to rule his kingdom properly so that it can last. in this aspect, the interpretation according to the modern perspective of phasa khon – phasa tham which focuses mainly on attaining the nibbana might not be the case if the text was not meant for religious purpose. attaining the nibbana is a religious ideal but if everyone can do so, it would mean the end of society too. in my opinion, if it is only the matter of teaching religious matters, it would not be necessary for king lithai to bother composing the three worlds, as there are the tipitaka and other cosmological texts available already. the composition of the three worlds must be considered should concern about how to maintain the society rather than teaching the citizens to discard society to become monks. as shown in the text, 100 the nibbana are so tough that very few succeed. and as an alternative, he encouraged the people to make merit instead which is an easier path those who meditate in the supra-worldly jhana that provides the basis for the attainment of nibbana; who view intently the wheel of worldly existence; who view nibbana, which brings it to an end; and who view the past time, the future time, and the present time, which is the time behind, the time ahead, and the time of the here and now, do these things with the aid of the ten meditation practices called kasina. they use these meditation devices with strenuousness and attainments, and the six kinds of mental sciences. even if everything is eliminated, if these accomplishments are not reached, nibbana cannot be attained. this nibbana can only be realized by very special people.47 we have given a brief account of the lords who have meditated and attained nibbana. those who have wisdom should really and truly contemplate in this way so that they might come to know the superb nibbana…what kind of beings are able to lead other beings to reach that place? one who has built up an accumulation of perfection and has wished to reach nibbana every day and every night without cessation at all, even for a moment, and has done this for as long as 100,000 great kappa plus one kappa of immense duration in addition will do so. still, despite the fact that he has practiced the perfection for that amount of time, he cannot lead other beings to reach nibbana. he can only take himself alone, to reach nibbana.48 king lithai gave his followers instead the opportunity to make merit for the spiritual goal of seeing the future buddha. this is in contrast to the idea of buddhadasa bhikkhu which encouraged people to attain whoever wishes to reach the celestial treasure, which is 101 the deliverance of nibbana, let him listen to this sermon on the three worlds with care and interest, with faith in his heart, and without being heedless in any way. he will then be able to meet the lord sri ariya when he is born in the future, to pay his respect to him, and to listen to the dhamma that he will preach.49 it is rather obvious that king lithai did not propose the notion that one should attain nibbana at the present lifetime like buddhadasa bhikkhu did. and like other traditionalist views such as in the jataka tales and the phra malai sutta, he presented the nibbana as spiritual goal which takes several lifetimes to achieve by means of merit making. as a result, people who believe in the three worlds are motivated to make of premodern interpretation or traditional understanding lie in its sociocultural function. i do not think that the traditionalist perspective is a foolish interpretation. on the contrary, it can exist alongside the modern perspective, which is rather individualistic and lacks this sociocultural a deeper socio-political implication of the narrative in constructing the beliefs for society and guidance for people. moreover, the three worlds as interpreted in traditional sense has enriched the thai cultural heritages as can be seen from thai literature, art, architecture, way of life, and ceremonies. it is hardly possible to think about what thai culture would be like without the traditional understanding of the three worlds. conclusion religious narrative to thai culture. it was composed based on many theravada texts as a kind of synthetic composition. although the general contents of this text seem to be similar to other theravada writings, each narrative does have its own distinctive features if we bring the historicity of author and subjectivity of readers into consideration. as the nature 102 from time to time depending on the use of people of that language. in this the theory. it found out that the problematic aspect of that theory lies in its concept of meaning which focuses on the word-level of grammatical meaning rather than considering the holistic meaning expressed in the wider context of the narrative. according to schleiermacher, the ideal interpretation is the one that can represent the meaning as intended by author, and to be able to do so, a careful interpreter should not focus only on the grammatical aspect of the text one can learn from dictionary. the deeper interpretation should aim intention. to attain such ideal meaning in the process of interpretation, he suggests the method of bringing historical and psychological aspect into consideration. another method proposed by him is the method of hermeneutical circle which gives importance to the holistic meaning as generated by the relationship between the parts and the whole of narrative. some words play the role of being subordinate ideas, while some words play the dominant role as being controlling idea. in this study, both methods have been applied to reread the three namely the gap in the premodern perspective or traditional understanding the afterlife does not exist) can be solved by the interpretation based three worlds concept is in line with the orthodox doctrine of buddhism despite the fact that it contains several supernatural beliefs which could perspective can be solved by bringing historical and psychological context 103 worlds is bound with the history of thailand. it has crucial sociocultural implications and is not merely existing as text for religious function. finally, i would like to address that our ancestors had left many kinds of legacies. the religious scriptures are valuable heritages. the beliefs kept in the books are silent. only through reading and interpretation can they be brought back to life, to converse with us again. the best preservation of thoughts is not through storing them in paper or digital format, but reviving them in the hearts of people. i believe that the peace which have conditioned the mentality of the people since earlier times, thus rendering the country to be the land of unity within diversity. in this and ideas are constantly replacing old ones. it would be tragic to lose life, how to live with others, and how to deal with change. religion and ethics are arguably the knowledge which matters most to mankind in the long run. to promote the study of religion and philosophy is by turning to hermeneutics to learn how to read, to criticize, to understand them with hermeneutics has the task of allowing the meaning in texts and existence to speak again. sacred scriptures, classic literature, and legal codes are texts that carry an intent to speak into a human situation. because human situations change in unforeseeable ways, these texts call for hermeneutics to assist them in speaking again. the meanings that demand our understanding may be ritual here as well, hidden, and disputed meanings must be brought to light. hermeneutics functions as an aid to understanding meanings in texts and existence. because the interpreted to speak at all, hermeneutics comes into play.50 104 silent writings then can actively converse with us again and it seems that endnotes 1 for the sake of convenience, from now onwards i use the shortened title as 2 nidhi eoseewong, “ ,” (dhammayuttika nikaya), accessed march 29, 2022, https://prachatai.com/journal/2016/10/68495 3 buddhadasa bhikkhu, phasa khon phasa tham (nontaburi: buddhist dissemination center, 1966), 6. 4 ibid, 7. 5 see examples of his sermons about dhamma and science from: https://youtu. be/ylf-ryvk9zs and https://youtu.be/7oiic610n4m 6 buddhadasa, “phasa khon phasa tham,” 9-32. 7 https://youtu.be/mtpyqn6_uqm and https://youtu.be/rykufz2ze30 . 8 sathianphong wannapok, from sathianphong wannapok to phra thepwethi (p. a. payutto) and buddhadasa (bangkok: chormafai press, 1989), 34-35. 9 ibid, 26. 10 ibid, 35. 11 ibid, 36-37. 12 ibid, 43-44. 13 ibid, 69. 14 ibid, 69. 15 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/early_buddhist_texts. 16 buddhadasa bhikkhu, buddhadasa likit, volume. 1(bangkok: sukkhaphabchai press, 1998), 106. 17 stefan baums, “gandharan scrolls: rediscovering an ancient manuscript type” 184, accessed march 26, 2022, https://stefanbaums.com/publications/ baums_2014_3.pdf 18 enomoto fumio, “the discovery of the oldest buddhists manuscripts” 161, accessed march 26, 2022, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/267922585.pdf 19 david e. klemm, hermeneutic inquiry, volume i: the interpretation of texts (atlanta: scholars press, 1986), 177. 105 20 friedrich schleiermacher, “academy addresses” in the hermeneutical inquiry, volume i, ed. david e. klemm (atlanta: scholars press, 1986), 79-80. 21 ibid, 77. 22 sucheeb bunyanuphab, the tipitaka for layperson (bangkok: mahamongkut university press, 1996), 585. 23 “bahiya sutta,” suttacentral.net, accessed february 13, 2022, https:// suttacentral.net/sn35.89/en/sujato . 24 phya lithai, the three worlds according to king ruang, trans. frank e. reynolds and mani b. reynolds (berkeley: university of california, 1982), 343-344. 25 ibid, 350. 26 “mangala sutta,” suttacentral.net, accessed march 16, 2022, https:// suttacentral.net/kp5/en/piyadassi?reference=none&highlight=false 27 schleiermacher, “academic addresses,” in hermeneutic inquiry, volume i: the interpretation of texts, ed. david e. klemm (atlanta: scholars press, 1986), 86. 28 ibid, 73. 29 see example of sukhothai history as city of cultural diversity from: https:// youtu.be/tgzfu__762y 30 phya lithai, the three worlds according to king ruang, trans. frank e. reynolds and mani b. reynolds (berkeley: university of california, 31 thai inscription database, “sukhothai inscription at the base of phra i-suan of kampaengphet,” accessed 29/04/202, https://db.sac.or.th/inscriptions/inscribe/ image_detail/26013 32 b a n g k o k n a t i o n a l m u s e u m . “ s u k h o t h a i r e l i g i o u s s t a t u e s . ” accessed 21/04/2022. https://www.facebook.com/nationalmuseumbangkok/ photos/a.165319730186928/5395124507206398 33 phya lithai, the three worlds according to king ruang, trans. frank e. reynolds and mani b. reynolds (berkeley: university of california, 1982), 347. 34 ibid, 329. 35 ibid, 330. 36 ibid, 344. 37 ibid, 55. 38 ibid, 345-346. 39 sucheeb bunyanuphab, the tipitaka for layperson, 81. 40 ibid, 508. 41 ibid, 672. 42 phya lithai, the three worlds according to king ruang, 45. 43 ibid, 324-325. 44 ibid, 322-324. 45 phra sangharaja medhankara, lokadipakasara (bangkok: the fine arts department of thailand, 2006), iv. 106 references english books bhikkhu, buddhadasa. boston: wisdom publications, 2014. klemm, david e. . atlanta: scholars press, 1986. lithai, phya. . translated by frank e. reynolds and mani b. reynolds. berkeley: university of california, 1982. wittgenstein, ludwig. . translated by g. e. m. anscombe, p. m. s. hacker, and joachim schulte. singapore: blackwell publishing, 2009. thai books , 2541. buddhadasa bhikkhu. , . bangkok: sukkhaphabchai press, 1998. , 2509. buddhadasa bhikkhu. nontaburi: buddhist dissemination center,1966. , 2539. bunyanuphab, sucheeb. . bangkok: mahamongkut university press, 1996. 2549. 46 ibid, 2. 47 phya lithai, the three worlds according to king ruang, 334. 48 ibid, 346 – 347. 49 ibid, 350. 50 klemm, hermeneutical inquiry, 2. 107 medhankara, phra sangharaja. bangkok: the fine arts department of thailand, 2006. 2532. wannapok, sathianphong. . bangkok: chormafai press, 1989. websites baums, stefan. “ .” accessed 26/03/2022. https://stefanbaums.com/publications/ baums_2014_3.pdf eoseewong, nidhi. “ ” (dhammayuttika nikaya). accessed 29/03/2022. https://prachatai.com/ journal/2016/10/68495 fumio, enomoto. “ accessed 26/03/2022. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/267922585. pdf suttacentral. “bahiya sutta.” accessed: 13/02/2022. https://suttacentral.net/sn35.89/en/sujato suttacentral. “mangala sutta.” accessed: 16/03/2022. https://suttacentral.net/kp5/en/ piyadassi?reference=none&highlight=false wikipedia. “early buddhist texts.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/early_ buddhist_texts . 108 figure 1, thai inscription database. “sukhothai inscription at the base of phra i-suan of kampaengphet.” accessed 29/04/202. https://db.sac.or.th/inscriptions/inscribe/ image_detail/26013 figure 2, bangkok national museum. “hindu gods statues of sukhothai.” accessed 21/04/2022. https://www. facebook.com/nationalmuseumbangkok/ photos/a.165319730186928/5395124507206398 meilee shen 73 chinese buddhism in the united states meilee shen national chengchi university, taiwan abstract the connection between a religion and a culture is significant. a religion can have an impact on a surrounding culture while a culture can also transform a religion into a style to suit local needs. buddhism is no exception. its flexibility to fit in different cultures is the key that allowed this religion to progress from an indian religion to a worldwide religion. today, buddhism is the fourth largest religion in the world. according to buddhist studies: buddha dharma education association & buddhanet, there are about 350 million people who claimed they are buddhists. chinese immigrants introduced buddhism to the united states. during the second half of the nineteenth century, buddhism was simply a chinese religion within the immigrant community that enabled immigrants to stay in touch with their native culture and traditions. it eventually grew in california during the first half of the twentieth century. the construction of buddhist temples and the arrival of monk, enabled chinese immigrants to hold onto their original culture and to find a way to fit into the new culture in america. overall, chinese buddhism’s flexibility and willingness to adopt different cultures are major factors contributing to its survival in the diverse cultures of the world. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 73-97 © 2000 by assumption university press 74 prajñā vihāra china: the cradle of mahayana buddhism if india is the birthplace for mahayana buddhism, then china could be seen as the cradle that nurtured this school into a worldwide practice. in china, buddhists helped this school to be reborn into a significant religion that was adopted and practiced by buddhists throughout the world, including western countries.1 today, mahayana buddhism is the most popular buddhist sect around the world. according to buddhist tradition, buddhism was introduced to china from india around the first century c. e. during that time, traders came to china from india through the silk road, and many of them were buddhists. also, buddhist monks came to china to spread buddhism on new soil outside of india.2 in fact, the famous silk road not only symbolized a connection between chinese cultures with the rest of the world but it was also a path for foreign traditions and religions to come to china. as a result, buddhism has adopted chinese culture and been recognized as chinese buddhism.3 when buddhism came to china, it faced chinese traditional beliefs and culture. at first, buddhism combined with taoism and later confucianism.4 for most chinese, there was not a clean-cut division between buddhist teachings and traditional teachings; it was “the wild goose that received different names when it flies to different regions.”5 the way the chinese accepted buddhism into their ancient literate civilization mirrored buddhism spread to other countries; asian buddhism has even been transformed into american buddhism after assimilation into american culture. certainly, its willingness to compromise with every new culture is one of the reasons buddhism spread and has thrived throughout the world. in china, buddhism prospered from dynasty to dynasty, and it reached a high point in the tang dynasty (618 907 c.e.)6 thousands of buddhist temples were established in the capital ch’ang-an, and throughout the kingdom. buddhist practitioners and great masters were attracted to ch’ang-an, including buddhist master hsuan-tsang, the most remarkable scholar and translator. he contributed in translating meilee shen 75 buddhist sanskrit canons into chinese. buddhist literature and studies were at its golden age.7 among hsuan-tsang’ buddhist translations, the heart of prajna paramita sutra, has become the most influential text in chinese buddhism.8 two main buddhist schools emerged in china: the ch’ing-t’u school (“the pure land school” and the ch’an school (“the meditation school”). master hui-yuan (334 – 416 c. e.) was the first buddhist monk in chinese history to build up the foundation for the pure land school in china; he began to teach chinese buddhists to recite the name of amitabha buddha as a way to practice the doctrines of buddhism.9 later, during the fifth century, under the propagation of the first patriarch of the pure land school, tian-luan (476 542 c. e.), helped to popularize it in china. the main concept of pure land buddhism was based on reciting the name of amitabha buddha with a sincere mind with the intention of being reborn into the pure land (“the western paradise” or “the buddha’s land”). in pure land theology, one can live forever and never to be reborn into the “muddy world” (this world) again unless by one’s own wish to come back.10 besides the pure land school, the ch’an school was also popular in china. the well-known buddhist monk bodhidharma was responsible for bringing ch’an to china around the fifth century c.e. the ch’an school, or the so-called meditation school (originated from sanskrit dhyana), teaches that meditation can lead a person to cultivate his or her mind and enable a person to face life challenges and to have a satisfying life.11 the ch’an school has attracted buddhist monks, artists, and intellectuals to its practice. ch’an is widely accepted around the world because meditation is practiced in silence and is not hindered by any language barriers in comparison with other buddhist schools that emphasize chanting in foreign languages, a real challenge and difficulty for most english speakers. there is a famous stanza to express the core principle of the ch’an school: 76 prajñā vihāra a special transmission outside the scriptures; without depending on words and letters; pointing directly to the human mind; seeing the innate nature, one becomes a buddha.12 most americans who have embraced ch’an practice are either the followers of lin-chi ch’an or ts’ao-tung ch’an. both lin-chi and ts’ao-tung schools were founded in the ninth century c.e. the lin-chi school was established by the ch’an master lin-chi, and its main concept is focused on using kuans (mysterious riddles), which are direct questions and answers with a ch’an teacher that could lead to a possible awakening for a practitioner. another ch’an school is ts’ao-tung (soto in japanese), and the founders were the ch’an masters ts’ao-shan and tung-shan. ts’ao-tung ch’an believes in a gradual awakening through meditation and was accepted by the chinese in the north, and lin-chi ch’an emphasizes a sudden awakening and was popular in the southern region of china.13 however, during the ming dynasty (1368-1644), these two schools merged into one ch’an school.14 today, particularly in america, a ch’an teacher would normally guide students to figure out the answers of kung-ans by combining practice with sitting meditation. chinese buddhism spreads to america because most chinese immigrants are buddhists, americans have always labeled buddhism as one of the ethnic religions that was practiced only by the chinese. even though more and more americans became buddhists, there was, and is, still segregation between chinese buddhism and an americanized buddhism in the united states.15 in the nineteenth century, china struggled with domestic and foreign pressures due to its isolation and fell into decline as a world power under qing rule. this caused the chinese to turn to the world beyond their borders.16 chinese was one of the largest groups to appear on mainland united states when james marshall discovered gold at john sutter’s sawmill, north of san francisco in 1848.17 a few years later, in 1852, there were more than twenty thousand chinese who had joined the gold rush meilee shen 77 to california.18 by 1860, chinese made up 10 percent of the population in california.19 china sent an estimated 300,000 immigrants to america before the chinese exclusion act of 1882.20 it was the first federal law to restrict foreigners to enter the united states.21 the chinese immigrants found themselves in a disadvantaged situation in the united states. their inadequate skills, poor education, and inability to communicate resulted in isolation from the american community. struggling between maintaining their old culture and trying to fit into the new environment presented a significant challenge for the immigrants. isolation and loneliness forced chinese immigrants seek spiritual guidance, and their traditional religions became important elements in recreating a social connection within their community.22 as the buddhist population increased within the west coast chinese community, establishing a buddhist temple became an urgent need. when wealthy chinese businessmen came together to form the five (later six) companies, they also shouldered the responsibility of establishing chinese buddhist temples so their countrymen could have places to practice their faith and form a social circle within their community. as a result, the sze yap company built the first chinese temple in chinatown, san francisco in 1852. t’ien-hou (or tien-hau) temple in san francisco has become the first and the oldest buddhist temple in america.23 to remain buddhist in a foreign country was a hard battle for those early chinese immigrants. in the california supreme court case of john eldridge vs. see yup company of 1859, chinese immigrants sought legal assistance in order to maintain their religious freedom. when see yup company purchased a parcel of property at a sheriff’s sale, the land was intended for a chinese buddhist temple. a lawsuit was filed by the city of san francisco against the future use of the property.24 as a result, the california supreme court decided that there was no legal or moral ground for the justice system to determine what type of religious worship to be preserved or prohibited by law.25 this was a great victory for all chinese buddhists in the united states and a turning point for the development of buddhism in the future. 78 prajñā vihāra the early chinese temples in asian immigrant community in california reflected a mixture of taoism, confucianism, and buddhism. these chinese temples were credited for bringing buddha statues to america and for maintaining the tradition of buddhist ceremonies on special occasions, in particular the chinese new year’s celebration.26 during the chinese new year holiday on february 10, 1869, the celebration of the chinese community caught the attention of the press. one of the special reports from the san francisco alta described how the chinese celebrated their new year’s day with religious worship and plays in the theatres. it related how they decorated the temple with candles, flowers, and thousands of oil lamps. the temple mentioned in this newspaper article was the josh temple with a statue that looked similar to othello, the character in one of shakespeare’s plays.27 the second temple was established by the ning yeong company a year later for a total cost of sixteen thousand dollars. not long after, more chinese temples were built around san francisco’s chinatown. in 1875, two decades after the first temple was built, there were eight temples in chinatown alone. by the end of the nineteenth century, there were more than four hundred temples throughout the west coast of the united states, particularly, in the state of california.28 these chinese temples represented “the early seeds of buddhism” that encouraged most chinese immigrants to practice their faith.29 however, for the majority of americans, these temples were seen as “chinatown temples” and had little to do with the development of buddhism in the united states. in fact, buddhism did not attract americans’ attention until the 1890s.30 in the united states, the development of chinese buddhism outside of the immigrant community began at the end of the nineteenth century. buddhist monks from the pure land school were among the early chinese immigrants to america. in chinatown, these monks performed buddhist ceremonies or gave blessings for weddings or funerals. during that period, ch’an monks would have preferred practicing in isolated mountain monasteries rather than to have come to america.31 therefore, zen practice was not as popular as the pure land school during that time. meilee shen 79 in the twentieth century, the increasing population of chinese immigrants in san francisco resulted in the founding of the chinatown there. small shops were opened to provide oriental supplies for chinese immigrants. gradually, chinatown has become a center within the chinese immigrant community to seek both economic opportunity and a cultural connection with their own people. during the 1960s, several chinese groups such as leway (“legitimate way,”) were formed in chinatown that grew rapidly from seventeen members in 1967, to have more than 400 members in the early of 1968. confrontations between police and those chinese groups resulted in the 1969 chinese new year riots. chinatown in san francisco became an unsecure place with bad reputation that led to economic and cultural depression within the chinese immigrant community during the 1970s to the 1980s. religion, in particular buddhism, has become extremely important for uniting chinese immigrants into a community.32 new awakening for buddhist identities chinese buddhists in america increased tremendously after the revision of the immigration act of 1965, which allowed immigrants to have an easier access to come and stay in america than in the previous century. in the second half of the twentieth century, according to the statistical abstract of the united states of washington, d.c. of the u.s. department of commerce, bureau of the census, 1994, the estimated number of chinese immigrants reached 420,000 in 1985 and 921,000 in 1990.33 the increase of asian immigrants resulted in the establishments of buddhist centers and organizations throughout the nation. according to dr. stuart chandler, there were a total of about 150 chinese-related buddhist centers in the united states in the 1990s. chinese buddhist immigrants established most of these centers. during the second half of the twentieth century, in order to avoid being labeled as merely an immigrant religion, chinese buddhist temples such as the hsi lai temple of fo guang shan (fgs) in california and the chuang yen monastery in new york state have begun to offer 80 prajñā vihāra buddhist classes for english-speakers. throughout the united states, fgs’s various branches began to offer programs and services in english in order to gain recognition from more americans. according to professor charles prebish, there were two types of buddhists, “cradle buddhists” and “convert buddhists,” in chinese buddhism in the united states. “cradle buddhists” were those chinese-american buddhists who followed their parents’ footsteps to become buddhists at a very young age while “convert buddhists” were those americans who converted to buddhism.34 dr. thomas tweed interpreted, “cradle buddhists” as adherents who simply followed their family tradition and many stopped practicing altogether. however, “convert buddhists” took a more serious approach to buddhism as they specifically chose the religion. tweed mentioned that there was another type of buddhists called “sympathizers” (or “night-stand buddhists”), to identify those who have a casual attitude towards buddhism; named because they kept buddhist texts on the night-stand to help them to go to sleep.35 a new age of “beat zen” in the united states during the twentieth century, buddhism made an unexpected transformation on american soil. experiencing bitter warfare, in particular ww i and ww ii, and the appearance of the beat movement of the 1950s and the 1960s made americans raise their eyebrows and take a second look at this asian-originated religion. buddhism began to go beyond asian immigrant communities and began making an opening with anglo-americans. technology’s boom by the end of the twentieth century also provided easier access for americans to study buddhism. the beat zen generation the so-called “counter culture created a powerful wave that used zen practice and literature to create an alternative to the conformity of the 1950s and the 1960s. this new generation of beat zen consisted of famous poets, writers, artists, and composers who applied their meditation experiences to their art in order to express a free spirit.36 they believed that the ultimate goal of zen practice was to help them transcend to the highest stage where they could live with happiness meilee shen 81 forevermore. the beats did indeed play a key role in promoting buddhist practices, in particular buddhist meditation, poetry, and literature that impacted and shaped the future of american buddhism. the beat movement can roughly be dated from the end of world war ii to the 1960s. its members lived under the shadow of the postwar society that experienced the frustration of the korean war and the cold war, with economic uncertainty and consumer pressure. that opened a door for americans to search for a new spiritual path. buddhism was at the right place at the right time. buddhist doctrines became an answer and a refuge for americans to deal with their problems in daily life. when jack kerouac’s the dharma bums was published in 1958, the beat movement was at its peak. kerouac’s emphasis on practicing zen and his free lifestyle appealed to many americans.37 searching one’s inner nature and being free from life’s burden were the principal ideal for the beats.38 there were several dominating figures for the beat generation, including jack kerouac, allen ginsberg, and gary snyder. jack kerouac was born in massachusetts, 1922, then, went to new york when he was in his early twenties. in new york, he met and began a friendship with ginsberg and snyder who later became the most prominent figure of the beat generation. kerouac was the most productive writer during the beat generation. he began his most successful literary work, on the road in 1949. other buddhist-oriented books were published later including the dharma bums,39 and some of the dharma.40 henry thoreau’s walden had a significant impact on kerouac’s life, writing, and zen practice. in the 1950s, he had begun to live a lifestyle as a buddhist ascetic in a silent retreat. he went to the desolation peak in jack mountain, washington, to practice sitting meditation, reciting sutras, and observing his consciousness.41he was an admirer of milarepa, a great master in tibetan buddhism. kerouac tried to follow milarepa’s path by practicing as an ascetic. in the end, kerouac decided to come back to society because he realized that extremely painful practice and getting away from reality were not the buddha’s teaching.42 for him, the true meaning of the word “beat” was to “try to love all life, being utterly 82 prajñā vihāra sincere and kind and cultivating ‘joy of heart.’”43 kerouac died in 1969 due to a life of drinking and drug addiction. allen ginsberg (1926-1997) was born in new jersey and went to columbia university in the 1940s. in 1954, ginsberg moved to san francisco where he met kenneth rexroth, a leading figure in the san francisco renaissance. he also befriended with kerouac and snyder.44 together, they promoted zen practice and the free spirit of the beats. during the 1960s and the 1970s, ginsberg studied under several zen masters, including chogyam trungpa rinpoche, a well-known tibetan buddhist teacher.45 besides his zen practice, ginsberg also proactively participated in political and social activities such as protesting the vietnam war and demanding the rights for free speech and homosexuality. he believed that the principal teaching of mahayana buddhism, which he studied from chogyam trungpa rinpoche, was to protect the weak and to save them from unjust social issues. in the 1970s, ginsberg also co-founded and directed the jack kerouac school of disembodied poetics at the naropa institute in colorado, a buddhist university founded by tibetan buddhist teachers. in his later years, ginsberg was a distinguished professor at brooklyn college.46 gary snyder was born in san francisco in 1930. fond of eastern culture and religion, he went to japan and studied under the japanese zen master, oda sesso roshi in kyoto during the 1950s. compared to other beat figures, snyder had more interest in following the traditional buddhist practice.47 snyder’s fluency in chinese enabled him to share his knowledge with friends by reading from the original chinese buddhist texts and poems, including the well-known chinese zen poems the cold mountain.48 in one of his essays, buddhist anarchism (1961), snyder pointed out, “wisdom without compassion feels no pain” and “the mercy of the west has been social revolution; the mercy of the east has been individual insight into the basic self/void. we need both.”49 snyder has published sixteen books of poetry and prose, including mountains and rivers without end (1997) and the practice of the wild (1990). he is an emeritus professor of english at the university of california, davis.50 meilee shen 83 the beats practiced zen and studied buddhist doctrine; however, they still followed their original religion and did not convert to buddhism. the spokesman of the beats, kerouac, was a practicing catholic throughout his life, even though he openly declared his buddhist identity and practice buddhism. ginsberg’s jewish faith was reflected in his writings.51 as snyder points out, “in a way the beat generation [was] a gathering together of all the available models and myths of freedom in america that had existed before, namely: whitman, john muir, thoreau, and the american bum. we put them together and opened them out again.”52 according to the vietnamese zen master, thich nhat hanh, the fundamental teaching of the buddha is to encourage buddhists around the world to care actively and passionately for social, economic, and political justice.53 overall, the beats led americans to a place that they had never imagined before and opened a door for future generations to see the significance of zen practice in american buddhism. chinese buddhism assimilating to american culture chinese buddhism has begun an inner transformation in order to fit into american culture and society. after the korean and the vietnam wars, studying asian culture and religion became more popular in the united states. as a result, more and more leaders from chinese buddhist organizations came to realize that chinese buddhism should become a religion that suits americans’ needs and not remain only a religion for asian immigrants. they began to create programs and activities for english-speakers and provided charities for local communities. among them, california’s ten thousand buddhas temple and hsi lai temple were the most proactive chinese buddhist organizations to try to be a part of american buddhism. the ten thousand buddhas temple was founded by a chinese zen master, hsuan hua. born in china in 1908, master hsuan hua came to america in 1959 and began his buddhist mission in the san francisco buddhist lecture hall a year later. master hsuan hua was the first chinese monk to promote the idea of ordaining american students. he 84 prajñā vihāra believed this approach was the best way to help buddhism’s future in the united states. in 1970, he ordained the first five american monks and began the buddhist order on the west coast. in the same year, the master and the sino-american buddhist association purchased an old mattress factory in the mission district of san francisco. together, they founded the gold mountain monastery. with more and more followers from immigrants and american communities, they purchased a 237-acre parcel of land in ukiah, california, in 1976, which became the site for the ten thousand buddhas temple.54 master hsuan hua’s great contribution was to unite the two most dominating buddhist schools, chan (zen) and pure land, to create chinese buddhism which would be a powerful force in american buddhism.55 he taught his students, both asians and americans, to recite the name of amitabha (the lord buddha of the pure land buddhism) while practicing meditation. besides giving chinese buddhist lectures, the ten thousand buddhas temple also provided sanskrit and european language studies. in 1970, master hsuan hua founded the buddhist text translation society. since then, the society has published a significant number of translated buddhist books in several languages to circulate throughout the world.56 today, there are still more american buddhist monks and nuns in the ten thousand buddhas temple than in other chinese buddhist temples in the united states. the hsi lai temple is another significant chinese temple on the west coast. located in california, hsi lai temple was founded by a chinese master hsing yun. he founded fo guang shan (“buddha’s light mountain”) in taiwan in 1967, which now has more than 100 branch temples, 180 associated centers, and several colleges throughout the world including the university of the west in california. master hsing yun has been a respected exponent of humanistic buddhism worldwide and fo guang shan became a significant international buddhist organization.57 education for monks and nuns is also the priority for master hsing yun. under his encouragement and financial support, many of his disciples have studied and obtained doctoral degrees from top universities around meilee shen 85 the world, including harvard, yale, princeton, and stanford. as a result, those highly educated buddhist monks and nuns have been the major force for master hsing yun to fulfill his dream of spreading buddhism in america. master hsing yun first came to the united state in 1976. he believes that chinese buddhism should adopt local culture and to create an americanized buddhism for americans. right after master hsing yun’s visit to california, fo guang shan purchased a major parcel of property in hacienda heights, california, in 1978 where the hsi lai temple was built. the founding of hsi lai temple was a bittersweet experience for fo guang shan. it took them about ten years to overcome a series of protests from the local american communities. the temple was eventually completed and opened in 1988.58 resistance from american communities has been one of the challenges for chinese buddhist organizations. even today, chinese buddhist temples in the united states have been forced to overcome tax issues and protests over land purchases from townspeople in a nation where the freedom of religion is stated in the constitution. in order to improve relationships with the surrounding communities, hsi lai temple has adopted american cultures and traditions, such as offering food baskets to the needy during thanksgiving and holding a special banquet in the chinese new year for the local neighborhood.59 in 1992, fo guang shan founded the buddha’s light international association (blia), which has become the major power in fulfilling master hsing yun’s dream to bring buddhism into americans’ lives. with a tremendous contribution from chinese communities throughout the united states and direct financial support from fo guang shan in taiwan, hsi lai temple has become the largest chinese temple in the united states. when former vice-president al gore visited hsi lai temple in 1996, he recognized “the placing of palms together is very much in the american spirit, … to bring together, one, two, three, four, so many, is simply wonderful. it is an act of cooperation, union, mutual respect, and harmony.”60 86 prajñā vihāra conclusion the first decade of the twenty-first century was an age for chinese buddhism to be reborn from an ethnic religion for chinese immigrants to become a religion suited to americans’ need. religion became a personal choice rather than just a family tradition. according to todd johnson, a professor at rice university, “religion in america is 3,000 miles wide, but it’s only 3 inches deep” because americans are willing to approach new ideas and faiths.61 if he is right, then, americans’ easiness and free spirit may be a match with buddhism’s flexibility. when asked about how they felt about other religions and practices besides their own faith, about 86 percent of buddhists believed that other practices can lead to an eternal life; this statistic was only second to hindus 89 percent in the survey. buddhists had the highest percentage (90) of followers who believed that there is more than one way to interpret their religious teachings.62 buddhism has become one of the fastest growing religions in the united states in the twenty-first century. in 2001, an interview survey also conducted by barry kosmin, called “american religious identity survey,” (aris) showed that there were about 0.5 percent of adult americans who claimed they were buddhists; this figure is a slight increase compared with his previous survey in 1990, which was 0.4 percent. there were an informal number of 1.5 million buddhists in the united states.63 a recent data survey indicated there are about 20 percent of american converts among the estimated range of 1.5 million to six million buddhists in 2009.64 during an interview with the new york times in 2000, richard hughes seager, a professor of religious studies at hamilton college in clinton, new york, pointed out that there were about two million buddhist practitioners in the united states, and as many as one-third of them were american converts.65 there are more than 2,200 buddhist organizations and centers in the united states, and most of them have lay practitioners in charge. the increasing buddhist population is due to convenient internet access and buddhist scholars and practitioners who have committed themselves to a full-time buddhist practice that have shaped this asian-originated practice meilee shen 87 into an americanized religion.66 there were few “cradle buddhists” and “night-stand buddhists”; instead, many people willingly chose buddhism as their lifetime religion. chinese zen buddhism is still the most developed practice in american buddhism. in 2002, professor davidson of the previous monk experiments project, presented a paper “vision of compassion” which revealed that meditation did indeed transform one’s negative emotions into positive emotions and even caused changes in brain activities and the immune system.67 in september 2003, a symposium was held at massachusetts institute of technology (mit) to discuss the health benefits of buddhist meditation. the attendees included the dalai lama, and a group of well-known neuroscientists and behavioral scientists.68 the research on the power of meditation and is still ongoing in the united states; one should objectively regard the findings of this scientific research. however, the practice of meditation in bringing calmness and peace in daily life has intrigued a significant number of americans, both buddhists and non buddhists. approaching a study of the buddhist practice of meditation with scientific methods is one of the major reasons why more americans are studying buddhism today. applying meditation in the workplace is another new approach in american buddhism in the twenty-first century. since 2007, one of the greatest online searching engines, google, has launched a series of meditation courses for its employees. one of google’s employees, chade-meng tan, was the program’s organizer. tan started the program called search inside yourself (sif), which aims to make the world a better place through high-tech science and to establish a work environment that is enjoyable and stress free.69 the application of meditation in daily life – to put zen in motion – has become a productive avenue for americans to study meditation. a religion serves as not only a spiritual guide but also has a great impact on a country’s culture, tradition, and history. after chinese buddhism had been brought to the united states during the nineteenth century, became a cornerstone for chinese buddhist immigrants. it allowed 88 prajñā vihāra them to maintain their origins while assimilating into american culture. the various cultures and traditions of the east and the west have tested the capability and flexibility of the doctrines of buddhism. traditional asian buddhists still emphasize the need to follow buddha’s original principles and rules as the key to establish and to protect buddhist practice. in the united states, buddhism has evolved into a popular practice for americans. western teachers have taken liberally from different buddhist traditions including gender equality, simple rituals, and focusing on daily life. in other words, american buddhists have utilized and perceived buddhism as a living culture with practical methods that can be applied to solve actual problems in many fields of human life, including psychology, philosophy, morality, science, and art. to adopt local culture in order to transform itself into a model to fit in with a new environment enabled buddhism to become the fourth greatest religion in the world. today, regarding buddhism as solely being something solely for asian immigrants is long gone. instead, continually evolving buddhist practices that contain american culture serve the needs of americans. buddhist centers have been founded by american-convert buddhists. lectures are given in english. buddhist literature blossoms in the academic community. and, more and more americans have sought to develop their buddhist identities. studying buddhism is a part of learning asian culture and traditions. finding a compromise and lessen the differences within buddhist communities in the united states is the key to making buddhism a part of american culture and traditions. during an interview in 1996, a journalist asked the dalai lama, whether it was a possibility for a buddhist to be elected as a president of the united states. the dalai lama answered that he would rather see westerners follow their traditions because buddhism’s priority is not gaining power and popularity.70 the dalai lama’s response reflected a free spirit and open-minded attitude about buddhist practice. today, the most significant contribution of buddhism is its transformation from an ancient ethnic religion into an approachable and practical religion that creates a pathway for people to find a way to live a better meilee shen 89 life. therefore, studying buddhism could be an opportunity for people in the united states to enrich both their spiritual and cultural knowledge. endnotes 1 daisaku ikeda, buddhism, the first millennium, trans. burton watson (new york: kodansha international ltd., 1977), 72. 2 peter harvey, an introduction to buddhism: teachings, history, and practices (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1990; reprint, new york: cambridge university press, 1993), 140. 3 arthur f. wright, buddhism in chinese history (stanford: stanford university press, 1971), 21-41. 4 ibid., 45-54. 5 louise h. hunter, buddhism in hawaii: its impact on a yankee community (honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1971), 11, citing hajime nakamura, the ways of thinking of eastern peoples (tokyo, 1960), 288, 292-93; shao chang lee, popular buddhism in china (shanghai: commercial press ltd, 1939), 11, citing hajime nakamura, the ways of thinking of eastern peoples (tokyo, 1960), 288, 292-93; shao chang lee, popular buddhism in china (shanghai: commercial press ltd, 1939), 8. 6 kenneth baker. “1,000 years in the latter days: asian museum exhibition looks at chinese buddhist art.” the san francisco chronicle, january 21, 1995. http://www.sfgate. com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1995/01/21/dd48194.dtl. all rights reserved. 7 wright, 67-76. 8 buddhist text translation society, trans., the heart of prajna paramita sutra with verses without a stand and prose commentary, by tripitake master hua (san francisco: the sino-american buddhist association, inc., 1975; reprint, san francisco: the sino-american buddhist association, inc., 1982), 13. 9 wright, 46-49. 10 harvey, 152. 11 ibid., 153. 12 harvey, 154. 13 lin-chi is still the most popular ch’an school in chinese buddhism. 14 harvey, 157. 15 james william coleman, the new buddhism: the western transformation of an ancient tradition (ny: oxford university press, 2001), 7. 90 prajñā vihāra 16 iris chang, the chinese in america: a narrative history (new york: viking penguin, 2003), 12. 17 james l. roark et al., the american promose: a history of the united states, 4th ed., 1 vols. (new york: bedford/st. martin’s, 2009), 422. 18 iris chang, the chinese in america: a narrative history (new york: viking penguin, 2003), 19 1. 20 rick fields, how the swans came to the lake: a narrative history of buddhism in america (boston: shambhala publications, inc., 1981; reprint, boston: shambhala publications, inc., 1986), 70-71. 21 yung, 1. 22 chinese exclusion act (1882), http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=47#, excerpting from teaching with documents: using primary sources from the national archives (washington, dc: national archives and records administration, 1989), 82-85. this was the first historical federal law to target a specific ethnic group of immigrants to enter the united states. the act created a ten-year embargo on chinese labors to enter the united states in order to create work opportunities for americans. the law also resticted other chinese who had already presented in the united states and limited them to obtain us citizenship. the act was expired in 1892, extended to 1902, and repealed in 1943. 23 yung, 2-3. 24 garfinkel. 25 david t. bagley, reports of cases determined in the supreme court of the state of california, vol. 17. (sacramento: bancroft-whitney company, 1861), 44-57. all rights reserved. 26 fields, 75. 27 ibid., 74-75. 28 “the chinese new-year: how the occasion was celebrated in san francisco – the josh temple – the theatres,” the new york times, march 14, 1869. the article was first appeared on the san francisco alta on february 11, 1869. the san francisco alta was a local newspaper, which served san francisco area. it was stopped published in 1891. see, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016463/ for the further information regrading the san francisco alta. 29 fields, 73. 30 garfinkel. 31 charles s. prebish, american buddhism (ma: north scituate, duxbury press, 1979), 5. 32 fields, 75. 33 susie lan cassel, ed., the chinese in america: a history from gold mountain to the new millennium (ca: altamira press, 2002), 337-344. http://books.google. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=47# http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=47# http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016463/ http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san fr meilee shen 91 com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+ francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v= onepage&q=bridging%20the%20pacific%3a%20san%20francisco%20chinatown% 20and%20its%20people&f=false. all rights reserved. 34 chandler, “chinese buddhism in america: identity and practice,” the faces of buddhism in america, eds. charles s. prebish and kenneth k. tanaka (berkeley: university of california press, 1998), 17. 35 prebish, charles s. buddhism: the american experience. journal of buddhist ethics online books, 2004, 22. http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/ebooks/bae/ documents/ prebish-bae-preview.pdf. all rights reserved. 36 ibid., 25. 37 prebish, “we’ve come a long way,” buddhadharma: the practitioner’s quarterly, winter 2009, 27. 38 jack kerouac, the dharma bums (new york: the viking press, 1958; reprint, new york: the viking press, 1971; reprint, new york: penguin books, 1976; reprint, new york: penguin books, 2006), 171-179. 39 carole tonkinson, ed., big sky mind: buddhism and the beat generation (new york: riverhead books, 1995), viii-ix. 40 kerouac, 19-45. the book’s exploration of the freedom of sexual relationships between male and female practitioners is shocking to most asian buddhist readers. in traditional buddhist culture of asia, there are many extreme disciplines and rules for both buddhist monks (nuns) and laypeople which prohibits sexual misconduct while practicing buddhism. according to the practice of buddhism, a sexual relationship is not allowed other than one’s own legal partner by marriage. also, traditional asian buddhists would not encourage practitioners to escape from reality by going to the mountains or to isolated areas (as described in the dharma bums) in order to obtain enlightenment. instead, in asian buddhism, the spirit of mahayana buddhism is followed by practicing the great vows of bodhisattva to dedicate oneself proactively to society. the highest wisdom and compassion can only be achieved by helping people in need, which will lead to the ultimate enlightenment according to the teachings of buddha. therefore, the “beat zen” culture can be interpreted as one of the western products in american buddhism that would not be recognized as firmly grounded in buddha’s teaching in asian buddhism. 41 “poets.org: from the academy of american poets”, http://www.poets.org/ poet.php/prmpid/1270. all rights reserved. 42 kerouac, 169-87. 43 tonkinson, 26. 44 ibid., 24-25. 45 tonkinson, 90-91. http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san fr http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san fr http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san fr http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san fr http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san fr http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/ebooks/bae/documents/prebish-bae-preview.pdf http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/ebooks/bae/documents/prebish-bae-preview.pdf http://www.poets.org/poet.php/prmpid/1270 http://www.poets.org/poet.php/prmpid/1270 92 prajñā vihāra 46 ibid., 89. 47 poets.org. 48 tonkinson, 16. 49 “cold mountain” was originally taken from the name of a chinese buddhist monk. according to chinese buddhism, han shan was one of famous zen masters in chinese buddhist history. han shan was a poet of the t’ang dynasty (618 906). after the an lu-shan rebellion in 760, he retreated to the cold mountains of far eastern china and dwelled as a buddhist sage for the rest of his life. 50 tonkinson, 177-78. 51 poets.org. 52 tonkinson, 14. 53 ibid., 13. 54 matthew weiner. “buddhists who stand up.” the new york times, april 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com /2008/04/01/opinion/01iht-edweiner.1.11587836. html. all rights reserved. 55 fields, 339-41. 56 in the history of chinese buddhism, both chan and pure land schools did not really get along because of their variety in practice. chan practitioners always criticized that pure land school was for the lower class and illiterate people, while pure land practitioners argued with chan practitioners for their over-confident pride and unreasonable criticism. today, both schools in the united states have a great connection and relationship. most of chinese buddhist centers and temples introduce both methods and doctrines to followers. 57 fields, 342-43. 58 richard l. kimball, “humanistic buddhism as conceived and interpreted by grand master hsing yun of fo guang shan,” hsi lai journal of humanistic buddhism, vol. 1 (2000): 1, http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw /fulltext/jr-jhb/jhb94214. htm (accessed april 18, 2016). according to professor kimball, humanistic buddhism focuses on promoting “the equality of every human, the interconnectedness of all sentient beings, the sanctity of life and created principles related to developing positive living.” 59 stuart chandler, “placing palms together: religious and cultural dimensions of the hsi lai temple political donations controversy,” american buddhism: methods and findings in recent scholarship, eds. duncan ryuken williams and christopher s. queen (united kingdom: richmond: curzon press, 1999), 37-38. 60 ibid., 38. 61 ibid., 36. 62 kuruvila. 63 ibid. 64 prebish, buddhism: the american experience, 28. 65 prebish, “we’ve come a long way,” http://www.nytimes.com http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw meilee shen 93 66 niebuhr. 67 prebish, “we’ve come a long way.” 68 hall. 69 hall. 70 barry boyce, “google searches,” shambhala sun, saptember 2009, 34-38. 71 claudia dreifus. “peace prevails.” the new york times, september 29, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/peace-prevails.html. all rights reserved. references primary sources newspapers “the chinese new-year: how the occasion was celebrated in san francisco – the josh temple – the theatres.” the new york times, march 14, 1869. first published on the san francisco alta, february 11, 1869. online newspapers baker, kenneth. “1,000 years in the latter days: asian museum exhibition looks at chinese buddhist art.” the san francisco chronicle, january 21, 1995. http://www.sfgate. com/cgi-bin/ article.cgi?f=/c/a/1995/01/21/dd48194.dtl. all rights reserved. dreifus, claudia. “peace prevails.” the new york times, september 29, 1996, http://www. nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/peace prevails.html. all rights reserved. garfinkel, perry. “in buddha’s path on the streets of san francisco.” the new york times, october 10, 2008. http://travel.nytimes. com/2008/10/10/travel/escapes/10buddhism.html. all rights reserved. hall, stephen s. “is buddhism good for your health?” the new york times, september 14, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/ magazine/14 buddhism.html?pagewanted= 1&pagewanted= print. all rights reserved. http://www.nytimes.com/ http://www http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/travel/escapes/ 10buddhism.html http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/travel/escapes/ 10buddhism.html http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/magazine/14buddhism.html?pagewanted http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/magazine/14buddhism.html?pagewanted 94 prajñā vihāra kuruvila, matthai. “study finds most in u.s. reshape religion.” the san francisco chronicle, june 24, 2008, http://articles. sfgate. com/2008-06-24/news/17162220_1_ religion-and-politics-orthodox liturgy-virgin-mary/2. all rights reserved. weiner, matthew. “buddhists who stand up.” the new york times, april 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/opinion/01iht edweiner.1.11587836.html. all rights reserved. secondary sources books buddhist text translation society, trans. the heart of prajna paramita sutra with verses without a stand and prose commentary, by tripitaka master hua. san francisco:the sino-american buddhist association, inc., 1975; reprint, san francisco: the sino-american buddhist association, inc., 1982. chang, iris. the chinese in america: a narrative history. new york: viking penguin, 2003. coleman, james william. the new buddhism: the western transformation of an ancient tradition. ny: oxford university press, 2001. fields, rick. how the swans came to the lake: a narrative history of buddhism in america boston: shambhala publications, inc., 1981. reprint, boston: shambhala publications, inc., 1986. harvey, b. peter. an introduction to buddhism: teachings, history, and practices. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1990. reprint, ny: cambridge university press, 1993. hunter, louise h. buddhism in hawaii: its impact on a yankee community. honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1971. ikeda, daisaku. buddhism, the first millennium. trans. burton watson. tokyo: kodansha international ltd, 1977. kerouac, jack. the dharma bums. new york: the viking press, 1958; http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-06-24/news/17162220_1_ http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-06-24/news/17162220_1_ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/opinion/01iht-edweiner.1.11587836.html http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/opinion/01iht-edweiner.1.11587836.html meilee shen 95 reprint, new york: the viking press, 1971; reprint, new york: penguin books, 1976; reprint, new york: penguin books, 2006. prebish, charles s. american buddhism. ma: north scituate, duxbury press, 1979. prebish, charles s. and kenneth k. tanaka, eds. the faces of buddhism in america. berkeley: university of california press, 1998. roark, james l., michael p. johnson, patricia cline cohen, sarah stage, alan lawson, and susan m. hartmann. the american promose: a history of the united states, 4th ed. 1 vols. new york: bedford/ st. martin’s, 2009. tonkinson, carole, ed. big sky mind: buddhism and the beat generation. new york: riverhead books, 1995. wright, arthur f. buddhism in chinese history. stanford: stanford university press, 1971. yung, judy, gordon h. chang, and him mark lai. chinese american voices. berkeley: university of california, 2006. articles chandler, stuart. “chinese buddhism in america: identity and practice,” the faces of buddhism in america, eds. charles s. prebish and kenneth k. tanaka. berkeley: university of california press, 1998. chandler, stuart. “placing palms together: religious and cultural dmensions of the hsi lai temple political donations controversy,” american buddhism: methods and findings in recent scholarship, eds. duncan ryuken williams and christopher s.queen. united kingdom: richmond: curzon press, 1999. online book bagley, david t. reports of cases determined in the supreme court of the state of california. vol. 17. ca: sacramento: bancroft-whitney company, 1861. all rights reserved. 96 prajñā vihāra cassel, susie lan, ed. the chinese in america: a history from gold mountain to the new millennium. ca: altamira press, 2002. http://books. google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging +the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people &hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_ result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage &q=bridging%20the%20pacific%3a%20san%20francisco% 20chinatown%20and%20its%20people&f=false. all rights reserved. prebish, charles s. buddhism: the american experience. journal of buddhist ethics online books, 2004. http://www.jbeonlinebooks. org/ebooks/bae/ documents/ prebish-bae-preview.pdf. all rights reserved. online journals kimball, richard l. “humanistic buddhism as conceived and interpreted by grand master hsing yun of fo guang shan.” hsi lai journal of humanistic buddhism, vol. 1 (2000): 1. http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw /fulltext/jr-jhb/jhb94214.htm. all rights reserved. magazines boyce, barry. “google searches.” shambhala sun, september 2009, 34-38. prebish charles s. “we’ve come a long way.” buddhadharma: the practitioner’s quarterly, winter 2009, 9. websites “chinese exclusion act (1882)”, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc. php?flash= old&doc=47#. all rights reserved. first published on teaching with documents: using primary sources from the national archives. washington, dc: national archives and records administration, 1989. http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=_zsipkzf0lyc&pg=pa345&dq=bridging+the+pacific:+san+francisco+chinatown+and+its+people&hl=en&ei=omattyk_itt3gafzyvyjda&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0ceqq6aewba#v=onepage&q=bridging the pacific%3a san francisco chinatown and its people&f=false http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/ebooks/bae/documents/prebish-bae-preview.pdf http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/ebooks/bae/documents/prebish-bae-preview.pdf http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=47# http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=47# meilee shen 97 “poets.org: from the academy of american poets”, http://www.poets. org/poet.php/ prmpid/1270. all rights reserved. “statistics on buddhists”, http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/history/ bud_statwrld.htm. all rights reserved. http://www.poets.org/poet.php/ http://www.poets.org/poet.php/ http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/history/bud_statwrld.htm http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/history/bud_statwrld.htm prajnaviharav20n1.indd 18 prajñā vihāra a teleological interpretation of john hick’s threefold typology fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin assumption university of thailand abstract this research critically investigates the soteriological ground of john hick’s religious typology and his understanding of religious pluralism. it begins by considering the criticsims of gavin d’costa who, in his early work, favored hick’s typology in theology and religious pluralism, but later became critical of it in his work, impossibility of a pluralist view of religions. it will also consider paul knitter’s alternative fourfold typology introduced in his work, introducing theologies of religions, and mark heim’s ideas concerning religious pluralism in his work salvation. finally, the paper will investigate zen buddhism’s view of a “positionless position” as a “non-common denominator” from masao abe’s buddhism and interfaith dialogue to see if hick’s idea of ultimate reality is viable basis to defend religious pluralism. after demonstrating these critiques of hick’s main soteriological grounds of this threefold typology, the research defends a new framework of threefold typology, not built on soteriological grounds, but on teleological grounds, in order to fulfill hick’s own wishes for promoting peace both spiritually and socially. this is a new framework which can embrace the beliefs of not only pluralists, but also exclusivists and inclusivists, and those who comprise the majority of christians in the world today. prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 1 january to june 2019, 18-40 © 2000 by assumption university press fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 19 keywords: exclusivism, inclusivism, religious pluralism, ultimate reality. introduction as masao abe points out, europe previously had enjoyed a religious monopoly of christianity.1 however, with globalization there followed by an influx of immigrants from different faiths. with this influx, christian theologians and ministers of both europe and north america needed to reconsider their theology and philosophy of religion to minimize conflicts and to promote peaceful co-existence. this trend has been a continuous process since the beginning of wwii. in 1941, one of the leading writers connected to this change is john hick. with the outbreak of world war ii, hick was very much against violence and he refused to take part in war. instead, he joined the friends’ (i.e. quakers’) ambulance unit and served in several hospitals.2 hick was then considered a christian evangelist; he previously experienced a conversion during the age of eighteen when studying law degree at university college, hull.3 his first published article in scottish journal of theology in 19584 criticized d.m. baillie’s understanding of christology as departing from the chalcedonian orthodoxy in a “paradox of grace.” this demonstrated his earlier conservativism, which is in contrast to the more radical understanding of christology and rejection of chalcedonian orthodoxy in his later works. his conservative and exclusivist views evolved into a more pluralistic view after obtaining the position in the theology department of the university of birmingham in 1967. he witnessed the changes of that industrial city, with the influx of immigrants from the caribbean islands and indian subcontinent. this created larger communities of non-christians: muslims, sikhs, buddhists and hindus along with the long-established jewish community. he also witnessed the emergence of the neo-nazi national front, generating prejudice and hatred and promoting violence against these communities.5 20 prajñā vihāra thus, his fifteen years in birmingham6 and his involvement in community development shaped him as a religious pluralist until his death in 2012. hick was not only involved in various community relations’ organization, but he was also one of the founders and the first chair of the activist affor (all faiths for one race) and encountered opportunities to visit the temples, mosques, synagogues and other places of worship.7 although alan race firstly introduced a tri-polar classification of christian theology of religions in 1983, hick elaborated his idea of religious pluralism by contrasting it to the other categories of exclusivism and inclusivism in an effort to solve the problem of conflicting truthclaims among different religions and to find a common ground among different religions. this classification has come under criticism because of its contradictions and the failure to solve conflicting religious truth claims. the purpose of this paper will show that these problems with hick’s typology can be traced to its soteriological ground. it will further go on to suggest that hick’s typology still has value if it is reconsidered from a teleological ground. tri-polar typology on soteriological grounds when hick explains the tri-polar typology, he usually describes exclusivism and inclusivism before presenting his religious pluralism; thus, previous two serve as thesis and antithesis for hick’s religious pluralism as synthesis. for this reason, d’costa believes the typology functions only for a heuristic purpose and positions religious pluralism as the only true option.8 nevertheless, we should examine if this threefold typology can still be useful heuristic purpose or not. firstly, however, we need to explain hick’s position carefully. d’costa explains the threefold typology in short as follows. although there are, without a doubt, considerable differences between theologians belonging to the same ‘camp’ and many features of overlaps between different approaches, it can be in general briefly summarized. fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 21 exclusivism asserts that only those who hear the gospel proclaimed and explicitly confess christ are saved. inclusivism claims that christ is the normative revelation of god, although salvation is possible outside of the explicit christian church, but this salvation is always from christ. pluralism insists that all religions are equal and valid paths to the one divine reality and christ is one revelation among many equally important revelations.9 alan race originally created the threefold typology, but john hick developed this idea in his books to promote his version of religious pluralism. for hick, exclusivism is out of question since traditional dogma, ‘no salvation outside of church (extra ecclesiam nulla salus10)’ as previously taught in the catholic tradition was already superseded by the second vatican council in 1960’s.11 according to him, exclusivists, who believe the supremacy of christian god and deem other religions and their followers as false is no longer acceptable. nevertheless, it is significant that before the second vatican council, the catholic church had been taking this ‘no salvation outside of church’ stance for more than a millennium. in addition, as of today, many protestant churches are holding this position as well. the pentecostal church is a good example in modern secular countries as the sociologist peter berger pointed out.12 berger initially, predicted that the more secularization progresses, the less the number of religious members will be. however, to his surprise, he found out the fact that the members of religious organizations did not diminished and that the numbers of the pentecostal followers grew much faster pace than that of the conventional protestant churches.13 in fact, the number of church members in traditional churches in western countries drastically decreased while the numbers of unaffiliated people increased as a result. in england, regular church attendance rate diminished from 50 percent in 1851 to nine percent in 1997.14 thus, before debating this issue philosophically, it is worth noticing this trend in mind as a background knowledge. the phenomena in modern secular societies after wwii in many western countries, are the movements toward polarization, either 22 prajñā vihāra an influx toward more exclusivism types of group in christian churches or a departure from conventional churches to become unaffiliated, be it agnostic or atheist. inclusivists hold the view that salvation is possible for nonchristians and is open for those who have not yet encountered christ or have not yet believed in christ. however, salvation always must come from and through christ. as karl rahner describes, other religious followers are ‘anonymous christians.’ paul knitter explains rahner’s view as follows: if grace, or god’s loving presence, is part of our very natures (step1), and if this grace must always be embodied (step2), rahner adds another essential christian belief (step3) to his theology of religions that assures that this is a christian theology; all grace is christ’s grace. with this final step in his case for god’s presence in the broader religious world, rahner provides both further depth but also new limits… from his understanding of jesus as the reason why god pours out divine love over all creation in the first place, rahner drew a further conclusion: therefore, any buddhist or hindu or aboriginal australian who experiences the grace of god’s love in their religion is already connected with and oriented toward jesus, because jesus represents the ultimate goal of god’s gift of love and grace. further since the continuing presence and power of jesus are found in the community that carries on his message through history, those people who are “graced” in and through their own religions are also oriented toward the christian church. they are, in a sense, already christians and experience what christians experience and are directed toward what christians have in jesus. but they don’t realize it yet. they’re christians without the name of christian. they are anonymous christians.15 rahner believed that other religious followers who experience the grace of love are connected to jesus christ. nevertheless, hick fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 23 is dissatisfied with this idea since inclusivism still hold the view of supremacy of one’s own belief and religion over others.16 in other words, the grace of christian religion is only unilateral and not bilateral; hick considers it as a problematic issue since sincere dialogue requires a willingness to understand each other without considering other religions as inferior. most inclusivists do not consider how they would feel if religious scholars from other faiths applied the same inclusivism logic by claiming that all christians are ‘anonymous muslims,’ ‘anonymous buddhists,’ or ‘anonymous hinduists,’ therefore, there is salvation for christians but not through christ. this idea is not easy to accept for christian inclusivists. does not the inclusivist believe that all claims to be the one and only true religions are false except for his own christian claim. inter-religious dialogue, catholic inclusivists believe although they are too polite to say so face to face that they alone have the final and absolute truth, whilst their dialogue partners have only lesser elements of truth.17 hick is aware that the majority of christians remain within the intellectual horizon of either exclusivism or inclusivism.18 against this, hick then explains his religious pluralism. [r]eligious pluralism is a view that there is no one-and-only true and salvific faith. subject to the ‘fruits’ criterion, which rules out violent fanatical sects (including those within the world religions themselves), pluralism regards all the ‘great world faiths’ as equally authentic and salvific. in the poetic words of the persian sufi, rumi, ‘the lamps are different, but the light is the same; it comes from beyond.’19 the sentence, “the lamps and the light” is of course a metaphor; lamps signify different religions while the light reaches everywhere and everyone in the world. light is a kind of ultimate truth. the number of lamps can be plural, however, the light which provides the lamps’ 24 prajñā vihāra purpose is essentially the same. this metaphor also points to an underlying soteriological ground to recognize the light which is the true destination of all the various lamps. it is important to realize that when hick mentions the threefold typology on soteriological grounds, the conflicting problem of truth-claims is always set in motion; hick states that “that in fact the truth-claims and the salvation-claim cohere closely together and should be treated as a single package.”20 hick’s religious pluralism in depth moving beyond the metaphors concerning light, hick’s religious pluralism employs kantian epistemology as a framework to present ultimate reality. this ultimate reality is a noumenal reality, thing as it is in itself or ding an sich21 in german. according to kant, when observing a thing existing as it is in itself, human beings comprehend only through sense perceptions of the object which are limited to capture all the information from the ding an sich. hick thinks this noumenal reality can be applicable to the noumenal deity which is coined as ultimate reality. phenomenal realties are deities to which human beings respond in various forms based on the regional human’s traditions and other factors, however it is also possible to think that we are in fact all responding to the same noumenal reality, which is ineffable. hick exhibits the same concepts from different religious traditions to show that his idea of religious pluralism is not so new and unique concept. the examples are the distinction between nirguna brahman and ishvara from hinduism, parallel distinction between the godhead (deitas) and god (deus) from christian mystic meister eckhart, jewish kabbalist mystic variation between en soph, the absolute divine reality beyond all human description and the god of the bible, and muslim sufis, al haqq’s ‘the real,’ seemingly similar concept to en soph and the self-revealing allah.22 he also points out the modern scholars share the similar views such as that paul tillich’s description of ‘the god above the god of theism’23 and that gordon kaufman’s contrast of ‘real god’ fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 25 and ‘available god.’24 25 although there are many so-called personal god, gods, or nonpersonal gods, or non-theistic divinities, they are all one step before ultimate reality, and all the worships to different god, gods, non-theistic divinities can be thought as responses to the same ultimate reality, “a single divine noumenon and many diverse divine phenomena.”26 thus, it is logically plausible to acknowledge the particularities, such as religious teaching, language, ceremonial clothing, chanting among different religions as different forms to the same noumenal reality, which is beyond human descriptions and comprehensions. this is hick’s religious pluralism hypothesis. hick seems to find the common ground to resolve the issue of conflicting truth-claims for religions. in the last paragraph of chapter nine in philosophy of religion, he ends as follows: “thus it is possible, and indeed an attractive, hypothesis – as an alternative to total skepticism – that the great religious traditions of the world represent different human perceptions of and response to the same infinitive divine reality.”27 for hick, this noumenal reality is a synonym to a common denominator that exists beyond worldly phenomenological religions; thus, it has to be the only one common denominator which is indescribable and unexplainable. a critical analysis of hick’s tri-polar typology d’costa contests hick’s explanation of religious pluralism as another form of exclusivism. he points out that hick holds the view that the ‘solus christus’ assumption held by exclusivists is incompatible with the christian teaching of god who desires to save all people. according to d’costa, hick also insisted that it was god, and not christianity or christ, toward whom all religions move, and from whom they gain their salvific efficacy and he therefore proposed a theocentric revolution away from a christ-centric or ecclesia-centric position that has dominated christian history.28 hick argued that the doctrine of second persona, the son of god, should be understood mythically. he stressed the doctrine of an all-loving god over that of the solus christus principle and more or 26 prajñā vihāra less rejected the second persona of trinity with the references to recent renowned new testament scholars’ conclusions; this dogma that jesus is the son of god was created in 325 at council of nicaea by the roman emperor constantine i, and this dogma created prevalent understanding among christians that jesus possess both human and god elements, solidified in 451 at council of chalcedon convened by emperor marcian and so forth. in simple terms, d’costa criticized hick’s reductionism of christianity.29 d’costa, as a catholic theologian, cannot tolerate hick’s radical shift from christ-centric to a theocentric position. the different religious responses to the same ultimate reality are seen as both theistic and non-theistic. d’costa contests that hick tries to overcome theistic essentialism. this argument allows christians to view the history of religions as a history of ultimate reality’s dynamic movement without making any special claims for christianity. according to d’costa, hick’s christian attitude to other religions need not be characterized by a desire to convert, or claims to superiority, but a will to learn and grow together toward the truth; the mission should be jointly carried out to the secular world by the religions, rather than towards each other. hick suggests that exclusivism and inclusivism cannot provide such fruitful conditions for interreligious dialogues. d’costa certainly has an enormous doubt about the threefold typology. before criticizing the typology, d’costa admits that he had changed his views of it. “my own position has changed over the years. once a convinced rahnerian, i now find myself both troubled by the threefold paradigm and theological construal of the problem.”30 the typology is constantly inadequate. furthermore, typologies easily harden into procrustean31 be, forcing diverse materials into uncomfortably controlled locations. i think it is the case that in using the depictions (pluralism, inclusivism and exclusivism) we disguise the fact that what we are really dealing with are different forms of exclusivism… pluralism often claims the high ground in being more tolerant, more liberal, more affirmative of truth fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 27 in other religions, etc. the threefold typology rhetorically reaffirms this false self-description. pluralism, as i argue elsewhere, has its own intolerant, illiberal, exclusivist logic. it is a form of secular agnosticism, reducing all religion to private confession, controlling the public sphere with its own implicitly ideology. in this sense, hick’s pluralism is an exclusivist secular agnosticism, ruling out of court all truth-claims other than his own, allowing for the truth of only one “religion,” his own mythological modernity. pluralism must operate with criteria to discern “truth,” “god,” and “salvation.” and in so doing, it will naturally exclude all that is not in keeping with these criteria. hence, in this respect, it is no different from exclusivism.32 d’costa revealed his first critical article called “the impossibility of a pluralistic view of religions” in religious studies vol. 32 june 1996 and hick responded the same journal vol. 33 in june 1997 by the name of “the possibility of religious pluralism; a reply to d’costa.” hick rejected d’costa’s claim that his religious pluralism was another form of exclusivism merely because it employed criteria and considered anything that fell out of that criteria was wrong. he admitted that he did employ criteria; but disagreed with d’costa’s claim that all use of criteria constituted a form of exclusivism was misleading33 and stressed that “exclusivism and religious pluralism are of different logical kinds, the one being a self-committing affirmation of faith and the other a philosophical hypothesis.”34 but if as hick admitted there is a difference between religious affirmation and religious hypothesis, then is it also possible to consider that the typology itself be set on different grounds other than soteriological one? this is the challenge of this paper. since the typology is deeply connected to the truth-claims and the condition of life after death, this typology could not separate from salvific grounds, but if exclusivism and religious pluralism are on different grounds, this typology might be justified. d’costa’s recognizes some of the limitations of the soteriological approach. 28 prajñā vihāra hick’s philosophical approach to religious pluralism could be contrasted with the very pragmatic approach taken by those deeply influenced by liberation theology, such as paul knitter or the asian roman catholic theologian aloysius pieris. pieris emphasizes the overcoming of the theocentric, christocentric, and ecclesiocentric problems that bedevil this debate by emphasizing the liberative sociopolitical power of religion as the only criterion for authenticity. for example, he finds that buddhist monasticism and its commitment to the cessation of suffering through gnosis allows “an engagement in a positive and practical program of psychic-social restructuring of human existence here on earth in accordance with the path leading to nirvanic freedom.”35 there are some who claim a fourth option such as paul knitter. knitter explores more neutral categories.36 instead of ‘exclusivism,’ ‘inclusivism,’ ‘religious pluralism,’ he uses ‘the replacement model,’ ‘the fulfillment model,’ and ‘the mutuality model’. this allows him to not categorize the first two as critically as hick. he then proposes a fourth option, ‘the acceptance model,’ which does not require a common denominator uniting the different religions; what hick called ultimate reality. but regardless of his reaction to hick, knitter remains a monistic pluralist. he uses the famous metaphor of finger is pointing to the moon in without buddha, i could not become a christian.37 he believes that buddhism and christianity are pointing to the same ultimate reality. mark heim suggests that each religion should be acknowledged in its difference; unlike the pluralism of hick, the pluralism of heim is that there are many paths leading to diverse equally valid destinations. he writes, “nirvana and communion with god are contradictory only if we assume that one or the other must be the sole fate for all human beings.”38 thus, heim criticizes hick’s pluralism as not diverse enough. in other words, heim’s pluralistic view is not a monistic pluralism, but a kind of pluralistic pluralism. it is for this reason that heim calls himself fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 29 a ‘convinced inclusivist’ who advocates ‘independent validity of other ways.’39 there are two more scholars who are dissatisfied with hick’s approach. they are kenneth surin and john milbank. d’costa thinks both are primarily dissatisfied with threefold typology itself. both see hick as ignoring more important dimensions which underlie religious pluralism. surin’s criticism is essentially political and genealogical (deriving from michel foucault), suggesting that rather than serve up theologies about religious unity in an abstract, ahistorical, and apolitical fashion, real attention should be paid to the social, political, and power relationships between religions in their particular locality. theological talk has usually served to obscure rather than identify the real terrain in which the exercise of power in the materialist order operates. such materialist hermeneutics are the key to understanding the generation of various legitimating theologies – and pluralist theologies legitimate late modernity and capitalism. while surin’s criticisms are powerful and incisive, there is a danger that theology is reductively encoded by surin’s materialism.40 his account of milbank is similar but focused on praxis. milbank, while sharing much in common with surin, proposes quite a different role for theology. milbank is deeply suspicious of the notion of “religion,” as well as the belief that dialogue provides a privileged access to truth. rather, he urges that christianity must simply proclaim its vision through its particular form of practice within the church. the church can do no other than this, nor ought it to try. what both surin and milbank do so clearly is alert us to the fact that all theology is a political and social practice. milbank advances the case, in claiming a heavenly practice for christians, a practice with a difference.41 30 prajñā vihāra departing for a moment from d’costa’s view, it is beneficial to introduce a criticism of this typology from a non-christian scholar, the buddhist scholar masao abe. he argues for his ‘positionless position’ by claiming that there are two types of pluralists; those who admit the commonality of religions and those who deny it (as mentioned in the fourth option). the former includes hick, while the latter suggests heim and john cobb jr. abe first illustrates the exclusivist’s view of rejecting a common denominator such as that of ernst troeltsch and karl barth.42 abe proposed another option; neither rejecting a common denominator nor accepting it. it is neither monistic pluralism nor pluralistic pluralism. he introduces ‘no-common-denominator’ in the absolute sense which becomes a ‘positionless position.’43 in other words, from his perspective, exclusivism, inclusivism and religious pluralism no longer exists, by realizing the religious point referred to as ‘zero,’ the position of having an assumption of both that ‘the commonality exists’ or that ‘the commonality does not exist’ also vanishes; religious belief becomes a ‘positionless position.’ this idea undoubtedly stems from his zen buddhism and its emphasis on ‘non-self.’ however, precisely because of this, abe argues that hick cannot establish the idea of ultimate reality and simply place the non-theistic ‘reality’ of buddhism into this category of ultimate reality. after all, for abe, even if hick made such efforts to reduce the bar of christ-centric theology to more pluralistic theocentric theology, hick still holds a monistic point of view, that human beings are worshipping or responding toward an indescribable ultimate reality, which is still the one and only noumenal reality. threefold typology on soteriological grounds according to d’costa, inclusivism has a similar logic to religious pluralism. for instance, rahner was happy to acknowledge god’s grace operative outside the visible boundaries of the church. however, concerning the final destiny of men and women, rahner could not depart from the necessity of the beatific vision, the trinitarian glory of god.44 thus there is only a twofold typology according to d’costa, or two forms fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 31 of exclusivism, one which is inclusive, and one which is pluralistic. that is to say, either that salvation exists only with christ or that salvation exists without christ. d’costa detested hick’s dismissal of inclusivism and his view as a mere antithesis for a synthetic proposition of his religious pluralism. nevertheless, this is a somewhat unfair criticism of hick and ignores hick’s defense.45 for hick, an exclusivist refers to those who proclaim that salvation is achieved only by believing in christ. hick’s threefold typology has attracted much criticism, and yet the alternative typologies such as twofold and fourfold typology also have their problems. in the field of christology, it is certainly difficult to reach agreement. perry schmidt-leukel presents an insightful reaffirmation of hick’s threefold typology by responding to six different categories of criticism to defend hick’s tri-polar typology; however, schmidt-leukel’s idea still falters on the soteriological grounds.46 and this is a part of the problem, as long as the typology operates upon salvific grounds, defenses and criticisms of exclusivism, inclusivism and religious pluralism lead nowhere since there is little ability to compromise or alter their own religious affirmations. we return to the same impasse as hume. conflicting truth-claims of religions cannot be solved since religion has its roots in particularity of belief. evaluating religious belief through the typology of exclusivism, inclusivism and religious pluralism leads to particularities that cannot be reconciled. this is fundamentally because this typology rests on soteriological grounds; whether salvation occurs only through christ. this is why this typology has been so criticized and rejected. but the question is whether we can rescue hick’s typology by shifting it away from its soteriological basis to a teleological one? considering hick’s typology on teleological grounds we can thus propose the threefold typology with an emphasis on teleological grounds instead of soteriological grounds. in other word, we can give emphasis on what our faith leads us to become. as hick himself argues, the way we evaluate the validity and truth of our religion(s), should 32 prajñā vihāra depend on the fruit of our spirituality which includes our morality.47 thus, the criterion of religious validity should be judged by the behavior of religious believers. what we believe in is less important than how we act, although what we believe and how we act are connected. the authenticity of a religion cannot be measured on soteriological grounds but may be more accurately seen as a teleological problem. we need to reconsider the intentions of hick for proposing his religious pluralism. that is to say that it aimed to overcome hume’s skepticism about religions and to foster peaceful co-existence with people from different faiths. it is based on real living interaction. in this way, we can also see exclusivists not as dangerous fundamentalists or even cults of which he gives many examples. we can see them based on how they act. suppose that there are two exclusivist missionaries sent to the developing countries where the poverty level is severe, from some traditional churches and not from cult groups. both of the missionaries firmly believed that without confessing christ as our one and only savior, there is no salvation. one exclusivist missionary preaches about st. john’s gospel such as “jesus said to him, ‘i am the way, and the truth, and the life. no one comes to the father except through me,’” (john14:6)48 “jesus said to him, ‘have i been with you all this time, philip, and you still do not know me? whoever has seen me has seen the father,’” (john 14:9) and “i and the father are one.” (john 10:30) this missionary’s interest was only to convert the local people, and if they did not accept christianity, the missionary threatens them with damnation. on the other hand, we can consider the exclusivist missionary who truly follows jesus’s words from matthew, “truly i tell you, whatever you do to the least of my brothers and sisters, that you do unto me” (matt. 24:40). this missionary’s interest is to serve others, especially the poorest people on earth. for such a person, hick might probably agree that the fruit of exclusivist missionary work is real or he would call the missionary a ‘saint,’ even though the missionary is essentially an exclusivist. from teleological grounds, we can appreciate how people are transformed and grow spiritually by believing and encountering the divine nature. hick’s fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 33 typology runs into problems when seen from soteriological grounds, but by seeing it from teleological grounds, we can discover many ‘saints’ among ‘exclusivists,’ and ‘inclusivists.’ the departure from salvific grounds makes it possible to create acceptable categories in all categories. exclusivists, inclusivists, and religious pluralists all have bad and good, the inauthentic and the authentic. exclusivists who practice good moral deeds should be accepted and praised, while extreme fundamentalists groups which promote violence against those of different faiths should be condemned. hick quoted the criterion of the authenticity of faiths from bible.49 hick said, “what st. paul called the fruit of the spirit, which he described as ‘love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, selfcontrol’ (gal. 5:22) to which we must, i think, add a commitment to social justice as an expression of love.”50 authentic faith is directly linked to the manifestation of their belief and attitude towards day to day life and neighbors. each believer’s essence becomes actuality. if the essence of faith is ‘real,’ then its manifestation is also ‘real,’ which differs from mere moral grounds. each individual’s action in everyday life through the relationship with the divine should be considered carefully in this typology. if we are to be transformed from self-centric, ego-centric to divinitycentric and act morally and with a compassionate attitude towards others, the faith must be good and true in terms of the criterion of hick, which is applicable to all great world religions, not merely among christians. hick also acknowledged in his article that there are good and evil in all world religions. thus, the declaring position of religious pluralist on soteriological grounds alone is not sufficient even from hick’s point of view, all in which there are no easy dwelling places to affirm oneself as righteous without fruitful actions and attitudes. even more, christians can move amongst those three categories without discriminating others or feeling superiority to others of different faiths. another thought experiment would be that a christian nurse who is an exclusivist encountering patients from different faiths, and treating them with compassion, not just because it is his or her job but because it 34 prajñā vihāra is his or her belief and mission. on soteriological grounds, one can fall into contradiction if one looks only at the beliefs, while on teleological grounds, these salvific elements are not a necessary condition to be an authentic spiritual being. most people can in fact be both pluralist and exclusivist without being self-contradictory just as abe’s ‘positionless position.’ unlike scholars who often adhere firmly to their position and rigorously debate these polemical issues, most people can grow their spirituality out of multiple stances. even among scholars, d’costa has changed his position over the time; hick himself was once exclusivist too; heim, who criticized hick as not pluralistic enough, is a convinced inclusivist. hick disliked the term ‘superiority,’ and detests the attitude among religious believers. he was especially critical about christian scholars who hold ‘superior’ view of their religion when having interfaith dialogues. hick did not make a clear distinction between ‘superiority’ on worship level and practical level. but many ordinary christians may consider their god ‘superiority’ without consciously feeling ‘superior’ to people of different faiths or considering other religions as ‘inferior’ to christianity. a sense of ‘superiority’ in faith is not the same as ‘superiority’ in the way we treat others. the golden rule in all world religions is to treat others as you wish to be treated or do not do things to others that you do not like to receive. as a result, the sense of ‘superiority’ of theocentric or ultimate reality consciousness manifests as a fruitful actuality out of their authentic spirituality. thus, there are two different paradigms; where people can freely proclaim the sense of superiority to divine natures as religious responses and regain their dynamism to transform through and in their faith to the divine, but people should not proclaim themselves as such to others who believe in different divinities. in another paradigm, people can treat others from different faiths equally in multi-cultural communities without falling into self-contradiction and this attitude can be manifested through the response to the divine nature as a source of energy for spiritual growth, this dynamism should always serve for awaking people in order to act the criterion of ‘fruit’ and golden rules. fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 35 conclusion to defend hick’s threefold typology on soteriological grounds is problematic. hick presented his typology in ways which dismissed exclusivism and inclusivism as inferior and saw religious pluralism as the most advanced solution. however, in the real world, most people do not seem to want to abandon traditional religious dogmas so easily. but while we run into problems when we try to defend hick’s typology on soteriological grounds, we can still find value in his work if we see it from teleological grounds. we need not only make distinctions based on belief but see it in terms of action. thus, it makes more sense to look at hick who was interested in seeing human individual’s transformation in a global society as well as within local multi-ethnic communities. however, looking at hick’s threefold typology from its transforming, self-developing and self-evolving angles, the threefold typology could be beneficial to lead christians and those of other faiths to be more egalitarian, ethical, loving and compassionate. as mentioned earlier, this reading from teleological grounds is not lacking in hick’s writing. he often stresses in his writing teleological growth. towards the end of a public talk, hick ended as follows. so the bottom line, i am suggesting, is this: we should live whole heartedly within our own faith, so long as we find it to be sustaining and a sphere of spiritual growth, but we should freely recognize the equal validity of the other great world faiths for their adherents, and we can also be enriched by some of their insights and spiritual practices.51 can these christians, hick encourages to transform, live and act within their own faith, but also be regarded as admirable figures by other religious practitioners or even secular people? if so, then the threefold typology on teleological grounds remains valuable device for understanding religion. 36 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 ibid., 17. 2 hick, john et al. four views on salvation in a pluralistic world. revised ed. edition. michigan: zondervan, 1996, 31. 3 ibid., 29. 4 hick, john. “the christology of b.m. baille,” scottish journal of theology. vol, 11, 1958, 1-12. 5 hick, john et al., 37. 6 from 1967 until 1982. cf. hick, john. john hick: an autobiography. oxford: oneworld publications, 2002. 7 hick, john et al., 38. 8 d’costa, gavin. “the impossibility of a pluralist view of religions.” religious studies vol. 32, no. 2. 1996, 223–32, 226. 9 d’costa, gavin. “theology of religions.” edited by david f. ford. the modern theologians. massachusetts: wiley-blackwell, 2005, 628. 10 citation from catholicism.org. a saint cyprian (died a.d. 258): “he who has turned his back on the church of christ shall not come to the rewards of christ; he is an alien, a worldling, an enemy. you cannot have god for your father if you have not the church for your mother. our lord warns us when he says: ‘he that is not with me is against me, and he that gathereth not with me scattereth.’ whosoever breaks the peace and harmony of christ acts against christ; whoever gathers elsewhere than in the church scatters the church of christ.” (unity of the catholic church) cf. http://catholicism.org/eens-fathers.html 11 hick, john. the new frontier of religion and science religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. new york: palgrave macmillan, 2006, 151. 12 berger, peter. the many altars of modernity: toward a paradigm for religion in a pluralist age. boston: de gruyter, 2014, 24. 13 berger, peter, grace davie, and effie fokas. religious america, secular europe?: a theme and variations. 1st edition. hampshire: routledge, 2008, 10. 14 cf. brierley, peter. the tide is running out: what the english church attendance survey reveals. london: christian research, 2000. 15 knitter, paul. introducing theologies of religions. new york: orbis books, 2002, 72-3. 16 hick, john. 2006, 152. 17 hick, john. dialogues in the philosophy of religion. 2010 edition. new york: palgrave macmillan, 2010, 168. 18 hick, john. 2006, 153. 19 ibid. fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 37 20 hick, john. problem of religious pluralism. london: palgrave macmillan, 1985, 46. 21 das ding is a neutral singular noun, while die dinge is a plural noun. das ding an sich is translated to a thing in itself, while die dinge an sich, things in themselves. 22 hick, john. philosophy of religion. 4th edition. new jersey: prentice-hall, inc, 1990, 117. 23 cf. tillich. p. the courage to be, new haven: yale university press, 1952, 190. 24 cf. kaufman. g. god the problem, massachusetts: harvard university press, 1972, 86. 25 hick, john. 1990, 117. 26 ibid., 118. 27 ibid., 119. 28 d’costa, gavin. 2005, 628. 29 ibid. 30 ibid., 637. 31 greek mythology in which procrustes killed people by cutting or expanding their body which is either too short or tall for the size of bed which was in fact changeable, so anybody could be dead. 32 d’costa, gavin. 2005, 638. 33 hick, john. “the possibility of religious pluralism: a reply to gavin d’costa,” religious studies vol. 33, no. 2. 1997, 162. 34 ibid., 163. 35 d’costa, gavin. 2005, 629. 36 knitter, paul. 2002, 240-2. 37 knitter, paul. 2013, 72. 38 heim, mark. 1995, 149. 39 ibid., 3. 40 d’costa, gavin. 2005, 637. 41 ibid. 42 masao, abe. 1995, 44. 43 ibid., 48. 44 d’costa, gavin. 2005, 638. 45 hick, john. 1997, 162-4. 46 knitter, paul, perry schmidt-leukel, et al. the myth of religious superiority: multi-faith exploration of religious pluralism. new york: orbis books, 2005, 23. 47 hick, john. 2006, 190. 48 all biblical citations are from new revised standard version. 49 hick, john. 2006, 153. 38 prajñā vihāra 50 hick, john. “is christianity the only true religion, or one among others?” nortwich, england, 2001. http://www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite/index.php/articles-by-johnhick/16-is-christianity-the-only-true-religion-or-one-among-others. 51 ibid. bibliography abe, masao. buddhism and interfaith dialogue, part one of a twovolume sequel to zen and western thought. honolulu: university of hawaii press, 1995. berger, peter. the many altars of modernity: toward a paradigm for religion in a pluralist age. boston: de gruyter, 2014. berger, peter, grace davie, and effie fokas. religious america, secular europe?: a theme and variations. 1st edition. hampshire: routledge, 2008. d’costa, gavin. christianity and world religions: disputed questions in the theology of religions. new jersey: john wiley & sons, 2009. ———. “the impossibility of a pluralist view of religions.” religious studies vol. 32, no. 2, 1996, 223–32. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0034412500024240. ———. theology and religious pluralism: the challenge of other religions. oxford: blackwell pub, 1986. ———. “theology of religions.” edited by david f. ford. the modern theologians. massachusetts: wiley-blackwell, 2005. heim, mark. salvations: truth and difference in religion. new york: orbis books, 1995. hick, john. a christian theology of religions: the rainbow of faiths. kentucky: westminster john knox press. 1995. ———. an interpretation of religion: human responses to the transcendent. 2nd edition. connecticut: yale university press, 2005. fumihiko matsumoto and kajornpat tangyin 39 ———. dialogues in the philosophy of religion. 2010 edition. new york: palgrave macmillan, 2010. ———. “is christianity the only true religion, or one among others?” nortwich, england, 2001.http://www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite/ index.php/articles-by-john-hick/16-is-christianity-the-only-truereligion-or-one-among-others. ———. john hick an autobiography. oxford: oneworld publications, 2002. ———. philosophy of religion. 4th edition. new jersey: prentice-hall, inc, 1990. ———. problem of religious pluralism. london: palgrave macmillan, 1985. ———. the new frontier of religion and science religious experience, neuroscience and the transcendent. new york: palgrave macmillan, 2006. 40 prajñā vihāra ———. “the possibility of religious pluralism: a reply to gavin d’costa.” religious studies vol. 33, no. 2, 1997, 161–66. hick, john, clark h. pinnock, alister e. mcgrath, dennis l. okholm, timothy r. phillips, r. douglas geivett, w. gary phillips, and stanley n. gundry. four views on salvation in a pluralistic world. revised edition. michigan: zondervan, 1996. hume, david. an enquiry concerning human understanding, [1748]. edited by l. a. selby-bigge. oxford: clarendon press, 1936. knitter, paul. introducing theologies of religions. new york: orbis books, 2002. ———. without buddha i could not be a christian. london: oneworld publications, 2013. knitter, paul, perry schmidt-leukel, et al. the myth of religious superiority: multi-faith exploration of religious pluralism. new york: orbis books, 2005. spink, kathryn. a universal heart: the life and vision of brother roger of taize. anniversary edition. london: spck publishing, 2015. prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 34 vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 34-54 © 2000 by assumption university press christopher ryan baquero maboloc1 abstract metaphysical abstraction. for this reason his idea of being tends to be morally naïve and oblivious to the reality of which challenges this where the relation between the tendency toward egocentrism of western philosophy in manifestation of the divine. levinas is saying that without this idea of the divine or god, there can be no way out of the violence in human history. the traces of the divine can be found in the unique experiences of transcendence, such as unconditional love. keywords: proximity; substitution; asymmetry; transcendence; ethics of love 35 according to martin heidegger, the human being is always already a being-in-the-world.2 always already understands itself in terms of its being. man is thrown into the world to realize his potentiality for being. unlike other entities, is a being who is concerned with its own existence.3 thrownness is that characteristic of human existence whereby man is attuned to the nature of his existence. by being predisposed into its own existence, the world is disclosed to being arises by means of a state-of-mind which constitutes his openness to the world as such. emmanuel levinas, whose approach to ethics is phenomenological, outlines a departure from heideggerian ontology. ethics, according to 4 this is because epistemology or metaphysics must be dependent on a foundational question.5 while it can be said that metaphysics is fundamental in the history of thought and that epistemology provides the structure underlying cognitive categories, our knowledge of prior to being. for levinas, ethics precedes all intelligibility. response to the violence against the other. beingis morally naïve. even requires the recognition of a primordial situation. levinas says that only belief.”7 the question of ethics points to the meaning of every face-toface encounter. this profound meaning can only be expressed through the concept of transcendence. transcendence, as a manifestation of the divine, is the ability to love unconditionally. beyond ontology: departing from heidegger heidegger positions at the center in the unfolding of being. in such a positioning, it appears obvious that there are concepts that are insofar as being seems to make itself manifest only to those for whom the meaning of being comes into light. “being is the being of beings,” 36 heidegger writes in his . being, in this sense, is a universal concept that applies to the totality of beings. this totality is the world of . however, the meaning of being simply escapes the idea of otherness. while being for heidegger is about presence and withdrawal, when some stranger knocks on the door of a home, the owner of the house would not want the trouble of inviting this person inside. this instance reveals the ethical aspect of human existence. it can be said that truth of being. this transforms the world of into some form of a totality. totality is the way dominates what it means to be in the world. by implication, man is in control of the things around him. being-in-the-world. as such, he proposes a counter-ontology that views being as concrete. the world of for levinas is rooted in lived experience. heidegger, meanwhile, conceives of in terms of the structure of existence as a metaphysical abstraction. modernity teaches us that man is the source of all truth. for “being” and reduces philosophy to an “i”. man as “there-being” is the sole witness to being. levinas thinks that we must move beyond this way of . the face of the other does not encounter being as such. levinas says that the original relation between human beings cannot be limited to complex abstractions. . ethics for levinas is not about rules, happiness, or utility. for him, the ethical is about what makes us human. mortality, in this sense, is the embodiment of sentience and emotions. but the crisis that we face, levinas writes, is “crisis of being, not because the sense of this verb might still need to be understood in its semantic secret and might call on the powers of ontology, of my is not already the usurpation of somebody else’s place.”9 person is to be responsible for someone. if to exist means that has 37 the power-to-be in the world, then existence itself only pushes the other out of the same world. for the western man, the ego-self is at the heart of everything that is. all meanings belong to this ego. the ego then will write the history of, and for all peoples. this ego is the universal truth. all human thought is about what the ego thinks. the world that appears familiar is exclusively under the magical spell of the ego. our modern times, with its emphasis on control and manipulation, reveals that the ego is the god unto this earth. levinas explains in : for in the most general form it has assumed in the history of thought it appears as a movement going forth from a world that is familiar to us, whatever be the yet unknown lands that bound it or that it hides from view, from an ‘at toward a yonder.10 for levinas, the “i” is caught up with the familiar. the ego only knows itself and listens to no one. the outside-of-oneself, the reality of the other, is unknown to it. for levinas, it is the other that addresses its own, is wanting in purpose. the power-over-the-ego of the other, in this way, always comes as an ethical demand. moral power is about the courage to overcome the urge to destroy. yet, an ethical demand never begs, but summons us to act. it is a command: “thou shall not kill!”11 ethical relation between the “i” and the other. the subject has no power over the sovereign other. the reason for this is that the other is the source of all meaning. in addition, leovino ma. garcia says that “the face of 12 the being of being is anonymous. experience is never an abstract thing. stranger among us. authentic subjectivity, which is essentially linked to the ethical, implies the responsibility for the other. 38 according to garcia, the other for levinas is literally the stranger in the biblical sense of the poor, the widow, the orphan and foreigner.13 the face of the other imposes itself to the ego as the emergence of what an object.”14 the very wisdom of love teaches us each human person is unique. man is irreducible to any function. in this way, the other must be addressed more properly in terms of its freedom. by doing the good ethics concerns the relation between the “i” and the “other”. the levinasian concepts of proximity and substitution specify two aspects of such ethical relation. it is not enough that a person places himself in the world of the other. it is important that people are able to rise above their contingent activities in order to recognize the value of the other. it is not enough to “think about” doing the good for other people. the rich man must get out of his car to reach out to the hungry child in the streets. the doctor must not only ask about what a dying patient feels inside. person is associated with various things, with his environment, and with inauthentic. however, the moment the state-of-mind of the same person realizes the needs of people, his contact with the other becomes direct. a father becomes fully aware of his obligation to his children when one of them gets hurt. parental responsibility is beyond any notion of roleplaying. it is about realizing more deeply what it means to be responsible for the welfare of a human being who can only depend on a mature adult for care. 39 beyond our everyday lives, we also carry within ourselves the greater burden of history. speaking about the , elie wiesel says: “what all these victims need above all is to know that they are not we shall lend them ours, that while their freedom depends on ours, the quality of our freedom depend on theirs.”15 past events remind us that the other is not a servant, but our master. we owe our freedom to the people but is superior to us.16 the meaning of our lives depends on how we treat those who have given their lives for our freedom. the second aspect in ethical relations concerns the idea of substitution. the other resists any conceptualization. the other is beyond any categorization. for levinas, it is the self that is subjected to the world of the other. subjectivity in this regard means being held hostage by the world of the other. through substitution, the ego takes the place of the other. the subject, in this sense, becomes that being for the other. the to do otherwise is nothing but hypocrisy. any face-to-face encounter is always personal.17 the person-to-person relationship means that the in the face-to-face encounter, the responsibility for the other is never dependent upon the desires of the self. rather, it is unconditional. to love a person truly is to love without motives. substitution corresponds the more in the less…is produced as desire.” to dwell in the other is to desire the well-being of the stranger. levinas suggests that to be the other must turn into that act of true generosity, one that is “incapable of approaching the other with an empty hand.”19 levinas says that “the responsibility for the other cannot have begun in my commitment, in my decision.”20 rather, it is a responsibility that is prior to every memory.21 responsibility, in this sense, only comes 40 through the other. beyond the illusions of the ego-self, what remains is the imperative that the subject must exist for the other. levinas exclaims that this responsibility is “prior to any dialogue, to the exchange of questions and answers…”22 the moral responsibility for the other supersedes the very freedom of the human subject. the other is prior to everything. for primary duty is to acknowledge its guilt.23 in fact, what is problematic is the inability of the self to rise above by the whims of their egos, with themselves and the systems they organize around them.24 the other. the ego has no meaningful encounter with the face. any encounter is purely conceptual. the other is treated as a useful specimen. this happens when students are sent into immersions only to realize that human subject inside the world of the other. beyond the cold, naïve, and impersonal being, every face-to-face encounter brings into the human 25 it is therefore non-reciprocal. as a natural course of things, people will insist that the value of a relationship should arise from the fact that there is grasp the meaning of the freedom of the other. it naturally mistakes the same as one of its own. for this reason, the ego wants to be recognized around it. the subject must protect its own interest before it can decide to be a friend. such a communion requires a mutual exchange of gifts. but if the subject is too concerned about its own well-being, then how can it truly love? to understand asymmetry, we need to emphasize the vulnerability of the other. the other is helpless. to expect something in return before 41 syria and myanmar bespeak of the reality of death which shows forth the vulnerability of the other. the subject, by thinking only of its freedom, pushes the other into the brink of extinction. a tyrannical state condemns innocent people as its enemy. the other, in this way, becomes vulnerable to violence. this must compel the world, from a moral end, to change that “our lives no longer belong to us alone; they belong to all those who need us desperately.”26 the other is not a property of the subject. the ego has no right to dictate on what is to become of the other. the ego cannot reduce the other into an object.27 love, as such, liberates instead of dictate. love frees the other from the hold of the ego. it perpetuates the freedom of the other. still, the self remains allergic to the reality of the other. this face of a stranger is something that threatens the subject. yet, the face for levinas is actually an epiphany. it is a metaphor for what has become of the stranger. it is the face of the weary orphan, the innocent who are victims of violent extremism, the stateless migrant refugees who deserve humane treatment. the other, garcia says, reveals itself as a form of 29 violence and the ontology of power it is suggested that levinas speaks of violence because he belonged to that dark epoch in human history in which totalitarian regimes persecuted millions. levinas saw violence as a focal point of his critical thought.30 for levinas, “violence is a condition for totality and a negation 31 human possibilities by absolutizing the meaning of history. history forces human beings into submission. the concept of false nationalism, the “us against them” logic, has been employed to justify destruction and the rampant violation of human dignity. violence, in point of fact, is meant 42 to erase the freedoms of decent human beings. levinas witnessed the rise of adolf hitler and nazi germany. the state is all. by consolidating power in his hands, hitler simply put everything at his disposal. to possess total control, he knew that he had to be worshipped like a god. nazi propaganda realized for hitler his ambitions. joseph goebbels was the main architect in misleading the public. his fanatical distortion of reality meant that hitler was the lord realized by means of the state machinery and the countless lies to the german people. history reminds us how ruthless despots demeaned humanity, stripping the moral worth of all those who do not conform to their levinas, “nazi murder was annihilation for the sake of annihilation, murder for the sake of murder, evil for the sake of evil.”32 as a consequence of the atrocities committed by the nazis, a new term had been introduced . the murder of innocent lives was a result of racial bias. nazi ideology dictated what the truth should be at the expense of the lives of six million jews. heidegger had no explanation for nazism. his ontology simply bypassed ethics. violence is manifest in the ontology of power. the ego becomes everything. the weak is excluded from human society as the latter succumbs to the madness and delusion of the powerful. the egohomeless, the sick. the other is conquered in ways that desecrate the humanity of the face. the other is reduced into an entity that is distant, unknown, and alienated from the world. the other wanders nowhere. the its existence only in death. salomon terreblanche, “the question of the possibility of salvation within history becomes a question of how the 43 individual subject comes to meet its own death.”33 jews had reduced him into someone who was morally suspect. heidegger had defended himself by saying that there was no way to overcome his predicament under nazi rule, that he only acted based upon the demands of the situation he was put into as rector at freiburg. levinas regretted and love for humanity instead of hatred. terreblanche expounds, “what humanist and moral philosophy is that in spite of his gloomy account of the 34 power to prevent a moral wrong and yet refuses to act with a sense of on their hapless victims. by not doing enough, human society contributes myanmar. the world is just watching while people are dying. what is to become of the meaning of humanity, for levinas, depends on how the subject values its encounter with the other. the other is utterly have been forced into determines the way the human subject must view its own freedom. levinas explains: abstraction of some anonymous law, some legal entity, but in fear for the other. my being-in-the-world or my ‘place of places belonging to others already oppressed by me or starved, expelled to a third world: rejecting, excluding, exiling, despoiling, killing.35 44 levinas is suspicious of the idea of justice. no amount of human justice, by any form, is enough to repair a totally broken world. for levinas, man must be wary of the impersonal character of justice.36 justice in the world depends on rectifying a moral wrong by improving the future. what is just. the past is something that can be easily forgotten because history is interpreted by hypocrites and bigots. as such, the poor man out there is still voiceless. justice has become nothing but the excuse of a majority that controls every aspect of politics and public life. for levinas, the face of the other is the trace of the divine. the encounter with the other, hence, is a transcendental encounter. the reality for the other.37 levinas thinks that “the invisible must manifest itself if history is to lose the last word.” according to ryan urbano, god for 39 to think of god as an object, for instance, only results to some form of idol worship. levinas is critical of such because it is tantamount to making the believer succumb to a kind of a magical power.40 urbano says that worshipping god as a sacred object undermines the transcendence of the divine.41 the mystical is a passive concept that is not in contact with the reality of man. religion, in this way, alienates man from the meaning of sometimes deceives. the divine is reduced into what is adequate to the ego. the language for such deception is religious hypocrisy. rich people donate money to build churches, but they have nothing to give to hungry children and the homeless. the wealthy seeks salvation for their broken souls through their monetary contributions, but they refuse to give bread to the needy. religion has become the refuge of the morally corrupt who are using god to vindicate themselves. god becomes, in this sense, a tool 45 at the disposal of those who willingly demean and undermine the dignity of the poor and downtrodden. the ontology of power clearly infects religion in various ways. urbano explicates: levinas considers religion that promotes the sacred to be a form of idolatry because god is replaced with a sacred object. moreover, he rejects rational theology because it thematizes god and reduces him to a mere concept. for levinas, rational theology is a manifestation of the philosophy of the same which dissolves transcendence into immanence.42 people worship their idols, all carved out from their insecure egos. control the minds of believers, their attitudes, and convictions. immanence transforms the idea of god into something that is material in expression. but the point is not to think of god as some kind of a sacred object that explains that “for levinas, time itself constitutes the relationship with the 43 the god of history is the same god who accompanies man in his daily struggles. history for levinas, according to terreblanche, belongs to the layer of the “there is”.44 the “there is,” he further explains, refers to a “primordial and fundamental layer of being, which precedes being as light and intelligibility.”45 for levinas, history brings about something fatal to human existence.46 as such, it is only when man realizes the ethical, the face-to-face encounter, that he is emancipated from the impersonal nature of being as such. for levinas, to approach the other is to be “uprooted from history.”47 that ravaged humanity. this interpretation of history helps explain the reality of hegemony and exclusion in the world today. 46 despite the progress of human civilization, there are individuals who still seek to impose their prejudices and dangerous views. religion is used to justify killing people. an ideology is imprinted in the hearts of young men. terror in the name of religion is employed to target and harm innocent civilian lives. today, the random nature of terrorism means that it does not give value to the lives of people. according to michael walzer, terrorists and terror groups “devalue not only the individuals they kill but also the group to which the individuals belong.” hence, violence becomes an evil instrument to subjugate, and at the same time, disrupt the normal way of life of well-meaning people. terrorism has nothing to do with religion. terror is simply evil men using evil against the innocent. religion for levinas, in the substantive sense of the word, points to a higher plane, that of equality and fraternity.49 extremism, in fact, runs counter to the good values that religion tries to bring to human history. the critique on religion of levinas, in this respect, is not a critique against religion , but the way religion is wrongly practiced. in the same manner, the use of the divine by radicals in pursuit of their evil agenda is a distortion and a misappropriation of the name of god. terrorists protest against the hegemony of western values, but they do so at the expense of the lives of many innocent people, including young unsuspecting individuals who their leaders force to wear suicide vests through dogma. 50 just like the for levinas, history is that thing in which being makes itself manifest as war. in war, in the same way as terrorism, human beings are subjugated, reduced as pawns by all the powers who dictate what is to become of our world and the lives of people. historical totality for levinas, like terrorism, is nothing but an attempt to annihilate the other. history, terreblanche into their meaningless deaths.51 47 transcendence as unconditional love the only real salvation in this world is love. for levinas, transcendence defines the lived encounter with the other. beyond ontology, it refers to acts of heroism that emancipate the other from documented nor told in myths. love, indeed, need not be announced to the being there where one is needed. love can only be the proper response to all the wars and violence in this world. love, in the end, makes all hope in this life possible. in the midst of the terror of our mortal existence, the poor can only pray for compassion. compassion is the recognition that the subject too rooted in a negative sentiment. to love is to acknowledge that the other is the ultimate source of meaning in human life. milan kundera is right, “to love someone out of compassion is not love.”52 beyond that feeling of wanting to commiserate with someone, love is the joyful realization moral necessity, irreducible, and complete. only love has the power over everything. love is without end. it is love, in this respect, must be more than the utterance of words. words have the power to move mountains. but it is love that accomplishes the things that make life truly worth living. when a human person loves, he will tear walls down and break all barriers to realize the good for the and incomparable, for which i am answerable, tend of their own accord to make appeal to reason capable of comparing incomparables, a wisdom of love.”53 48 thus, according to terreblanche, “the totality of history shows also, the human dignity of the subject resides, and it threatens to swallow its separateness and place it under erasure.”54 the asymmetrical meaning of ethical responsibility points to the fact that love is unconditional. if the transcendent aspect of ethical relationships is about the divine making its presence manifest in the acts of persons, then by all means, such a trace can the life of a precious human being is to care for this individual tirelessly. nothing can replace the unique opportunity to love in an unquestioning way. love is the greatest expression of our humanity. there is always a peculiar moment that one experiences in loving the other. caring for someone requires more than a mere desire. it is about the movement of the divine within us. each minute that a father spends with a child is a realization that doing something for another human being is most meaningful in life. true love is lasting since one develops an eternal bond that essentially says how one must think and act as a human being. it is the other, in this regard, that helps determine the meaning of thomas tatransky thinks that being responsible for the other is also a way of caring for the self.55 friendship expands human freedom meaning of this presence, levinas thinks, “does not fade away into words, get lost in technical questions, freeze up into institutions or structures. the presence of persons in the full force of their irreplaceable identity, in the full force of their inevitable responsibility.”56 love, in this regard, is that continuous and active expression of the moral good. tatransky is simply mistaken in reinterpreting levinas. since the advent of modernity, called true love if the self will require the other to accept, promote, and 49 recognize the former, which in the actuality of things, has always decided the purpose of every exchange and the value of every relationship under its own terms. life for heidegger is the fact that man is a being-towards-death. accepting the impending impossibility of the human being means that, for heidegger, exposition of the issue of mortality is also incarcerated in his abstractive ontology, one that has been used to justify the senselessness of any war. meaning, life as it is may be absurd, but such judgment is only a result of the inability of the ego to overcome its own excesses. in the end, only love can determine the ultimate meaning of human existence. conclusion this paper is an investigation into levinasian ethics. ethical responsibility bespeaks of the traces of the divine. the face of the other is something that is irreducible to what is objective. for this reason, moral responsibility serves a dual purpose: it summons the self, and at the same imprisonment of man in an ontology and the subjugation of the other in and substitution reveal that the person for levinas must come into contact with and put himself in the place of the other. ethical responsibility is demands nothing from the other whose vulnerability compels the subject to act. but while ethical responsibility always comes through the other, it is transcendence that concretizes every ethical relation. the ultimate meaning of transcendence is love. this essay has tried to correct the impression that levinasian ethics can be reinterpreted so that the responsibility for the other might come to also mean as a creative caring of the self. to commit oneself to the care of the other, the idea of reciprocity connotes, also fashions 50 something good for the human subject. but this is a misunderstanding been subjugated by those who are in positions of power. the ethics of the face, in this regard, is not concerned about mutual exchanges. it is rooted in the urgency of emancipating the destitute, the marginalized, and the the good for the other, despite all, and without condition. endnotes 1 christopher ryan baquero maboloc is an associate professor of philosophy at ateneo de davao university, philippines 2 martin heidegger. . translated by joan stambaugh (new york: suny press), 124. 3 for heidegger, means “there-being.” the “da” means “there” and “sein” means “being.” see ibid, 128 4 emmanuel levinas. “ethics as first philosophy.” in . ed. by sean hand. (oxford: blackwell: 1989), 75. 5 michael dahnke. “book review: ethics as first philosophy.” in . volume 24, volume 2 (2001): 199. 6 dahnke, “ethics as first philosophy, 212 7 martin heidegger. . translated by joan stambaugh (new york: suny press), 7. levinas, “ethics as first philosophy,” 84. 9 emmanuel levinas, . trans. by alphonso lingis. (the 10 see emmanuel levinas, , (baltimore: johns hopkins, 1990), 8. 11 . (davao city: ateneo de davao university research and publication 12 ibid., 11. 13 levinas. , 49. 51 14 elie wiesel. “nobel prize acceptance speech.” in . (new york: hill and wang, 1986), 120. 15 16 levinas, , 51. 17 ibid., 50. ibid. 19 emmanuel levinas, . trans. by alphonso lingis. (dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1991), 10. 20 ibid, 111. 21 ibid., 111. 22 ibid., 112. 23 ibid., 18. 24 reconsidered.” in , volume 15, number 3 (2008): 296. 25 wiesel, “nobel prize acceptance speech,” 120. 26 eduardo calasanz, “ethics with a human face.” in (manila: philippine commission on higher education, 1998), 167. 27 ibid, 167 , 199. 29 phenomenological ethics.” in , volume 1, number 1 (2007): 52. 30 ibid., 53. 31 emmanuel levinas, edited by robert bernasconi and david wood. (london: routledge, 1998), 65. 32 salomon terreblanche, “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch.” in , volume 64, number 2 (2008): 887. 33 ibid., 885. 34 emmanuel levinas, . (london: athlone press, 1999), 23. 35 terreblanche, “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch,” 903. 36 ryan urbano, “approaching the divine: levinas on god, religion, idolatry and atheism.” in . volume 15, number 1 (2012): 50. 37 levinas, , 243; as quoted in terreblanche, “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch,” 903. urbano, “approaching the divine: levinas on god, religion, idolatry and atheism,” 51. 39 ibid. 52 40 ibid. 41 ibid 42 terreblanche, “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch,” 895. 43 ibid., 886. 44 ibid., 895. 45 ibid., 886. 46 levinas, , 52; as cited in terreblanche, on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch,” 886. 47 michael walzer, “terrorism and justice war.” in 34 (2006): p.5. levinas, , 85. 49 terreblanche, “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch,” p.887. 50 ibid. 51 milan kundera, the unbearable lightness of being, (new york: harper and row, 1984), 19-20. 52 emmanuel levinas, “martin heidegger and ontology.” in volume 26, number 1 (1996 186. 53 terreblanche, “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch,” .888. 54 55 levinas, , 87. 56 53 references phenomenological ethics.” in , volume 1, number 1: 52-70. calasanz, eduardo. 1998. “ethics with a human face.” in . manila: philippine commission on higher education. dahnke, michael. 2001. “ethics as first philosophy.” a book review. in . volume 24 (2): 199-218. . davao city: ateneo de davao university: 1-13. heidegger, martin. 1996. . translated by joan stambaugh. new york. suny press. kundera, milan. 1984. . translated by michael henry heim. new york: harper and row. levinas, emmanuel. 1979. . trans. by alphonso levinas, emmanuel. 1989. “ethics as first philosophy.” in . ed. by sean hand. oxford: blackwell: 75-84. levinas, emmanuel. 1990. . baltimore: johns hopkins. levinas, emmanuel. 1991. . trans. by alphonso lingis. dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers. levinas, emmanuel. 1996. “martin heidegger and ontology.” in volume 26 (1 11-32. levinas, emmanuel. 1998. . edited by robert bernasconi and david wood. london: routledge. 54 levinas, emmanuel. 1999. . translated by michael smith. london: athlone. reconsidered.” in , volume 15, number 3: 293-307. terreblanche, salomon. 2008. “on history and salvation in emmanuel levinas and ernst bloch.” in , volume 64, number 2: 885-906. urbano, ryan. 2012. “approaching the divine: levinas on god, religion, idolatry and atheism.” in . volume 15 (1): 50-81. walzer, michael. 2006. “terrorism and just war.” in volume 34: 3-12. wiesel, elie. 1986. “nobel prize acceptance speech.” in . new york: hill and wang. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 1-20 © 2000 by assumption university press karen indigenous knowledge of sustainable resource management manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra mahidol university, thailand abstract contemporary environmental thought is beginning to realize that the relationship between humans and their environments involves a deep intertwining and not a mere co-existence. yet older cultures have understood this for some time. this article analyzes indigenous ecological knowledge of forest conservation for the karen indigenous community at hin lad nai in northern thailand. it explores the values of human-nature relationships, rooted in spiritual beliefs, resulting in holistic approach to biodiversity conservation, and discusses how this indigenous knowledge is preserved across generations in the community. interviews with local scholars, youth, and ‘house ladies’ in the community, show complex practices for the goal of sustainable livelihood. for example, the community does not reclaim forest land for single use, such as tea or coffee plantations, but instead develops a multi-use strategy integrating the production of wild tea, bee hives, bamboo clump plantations into the natural forest. through this strategy, food security is assured in the community, keywords: karen, indigenous knowledge, sustainable resource management 2 prajñā vihāra and promotes sustainable living and fostering integrity between people and natural surroundings at the local community. consequently, the karen ecological knowledge potentially provides implications and contributions to promoting sustainable society which develops from local consciousness and well-integrated livelihoods. introduction thai society is a diverse society with different cultures and ethnic groups. the indigenous knowledge of karen ethnic minorities has been undervalued1 or valued merely as a commodity for mass tourism. karen indigenous knowledge is poorly understood and widely unappreciated by policy-makers and general public in most countries in asia. false assumptions about karen’s ways of life still remain. the community is criticized for deforestation and their illegal settlement in national parks2. meanwhile, in recent years, the human impact on biodiversity have called for a paradigm shift towards sustainable ecology and forest management. this has led to a reevaluation of indigenous wisdom concerning the environment. the environmental wisdom of the karen community of hin lad nai in chiang rai province, thailand, can provide insight into such indigenous knowledge on sustainable resource use and forest conservation. this small rural village makes their knowledge on forest stewardship intrinsically interesting to further explore and promote their indigenous knowledge, beliefs, and practices to wider society. indigenous ecological knowledge (iek), also commonly known as traditional ecological knowledge, demonstrates a long-term sustainable relationship of human beings with their environments3. such knowledge can connect the gap between humans and their natural environment and potentially becomes an exemplar of the co-existing harmony between indigenous people (the karen) and their forest resources. this type of knowledge is locally based, dynamic and unique to a given culture or society and juxtaposed with the international knowledge system derived from academic research. in essence, the practices of indigenous knowledge manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 3 potentially offer appropriate solutions to some of the crucial challenges of the present time, especially climate change and food security4. the community of hin lad nai has gained their wisdom and knowledge from observation and interaction with forest resources. the locals still continue to practice their traditional livelihoods by adopting an integrated system of wet terrace fields, rotation farming, mix farm of beekeeping, native tea and bamboo cultivations along with forest conservation. their sustainable practices in ecosystem management and self-sufficiency5 affirm that they have food security, sustainable income, and social resilience along with ecosystem conservation. such practices have been an important means for managing local ecosystems and landscapes which the larger society can learn a great deal from their successful practices in sustainable management of complex ecological systems. this paper focuses on sustainable resource management systems for hin lad nai community who has adopted self-sufficient traditional livelihoods along with holistic land use and forest conservation. their practices significantly benefit the community members and the surroundings, in terms of sustainable incomes and social resilience. it is in this context that this study aims to explore the indigenous values which are closely intertwined with ways of living and characterized in people and forest relationships. particular attention was given to holistic land use and livelihood systems of the community along with their traditional beliefs and worldview in forest conservation. social and cultural perspectives of the pgaz k’nyau (karen) ethnic group the term “karen” or “kariang” or “yang” is widely used by the people outside the community, the karen call themselves as pgaz k’nyau which literally means “human person”. in this study, karen is referred to as pgaz k’nyau, and sometimes interchangeably used to mean the same group of people. being the largest ethnic minority in thailand, the karen people prefer settling in valleys surrounded with evergreen forest, conifer 4 prajñā vihāra forest, and mixed deciduous forest at 400 meters to 1,200 meters above sea level and riparian areas or water meadows. in other words, they build their settlement in the midst of hill forests, valleys and plains, along the streams, and lowlands in mainly the provinces of tak, mae hong son, and chiang mai. the pgaz k’nyau have long history and unique cultural identity, arts, traditions and rituals. there is also evidence that they have been in thailand over 600-700 years. in the 19th century, the historical evidence was recorded by the british government officers and later american missionaries on the life of pgaz k’nyau and mon. since the 20th century, pgaz k’nyau communities widely dispersed across myanmar and northern and western part of thailand, especially myanmar-thailand border6. there are many subgroups within karen ethnicity. notably, the subgroups are distinguished by the color of their clothing and in thailand the main subgroup are the sgaw and the pwo or white karen who shares the same ancestry as the karen in the karen state in myanmar. nowadays, the sgaw karen are more populated than the pwo in northern thailand. in this study, the main focus is the sgaw karen in northern thailand. karen people are deeply rooted in their own traditions, customs, culture and nature. pgaz k’nyau language is related to sino-tibetan family. they show deep respect for elders and karen tribal rules and customs and the laws of the larger society they live in, and help one another acculturate. furthermore, the pgaz k’nyau believe that all human beings are free and equal and have deep sense of brother-sisterhood. the pgaz k’nyau subscribe to a monogamous marriage, and divorce is considered unacceptable. they spend most of their live engaged with their natural surroundings, thus they traditionally have a deep respect for nature. the source of life energy, which cycles through plants, water, sky and rock, is the life-giving. so a lifestyle of modesty, simplicity, and a deep sense of collective community encourages the karen stubbornly value forest conservation despite the ardent external pressure from the economic development, politics, and modern public policy. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 5 pgaz k’nyau and their religious cosmology traditionally, the pgaz k’nyau believe in animistic cults and the supreme being (ywaz) in nature which nowadays can still be seen in some communities. one of the pgaz k’nyau writings called hta narrates the pgaz k’nyau myths, legends, fables, and folktales. this folklore reflects their customs, morals, worldview, and teachings on life. the beginning of all things comes from ywaz, the creator and keeper (k’caj), and human beings are merely temporary dwellers and caretakers7. it is in this context, people should remember that this world has a greater being who keeps things in order. the notion of the supreme being is taj hti taj tau or hti k’caj kauj k’caj, the powerful creator and keeper of the nature, who gives people water and enables all villagers, regardless of who they are, to live together and brings a new life to the soil, all plants, trees, and animals8. likewise, this supreme being, a lord of the earth and water, will punish those who destroy or take advantage of nature and protect those who do right. whenever someone violates the rules, there is a reconciliation ritual to pacify the supreme being. there is a clear social and cultural legitimacy among the pgaz k’nyau to maintain the cycle and flow of life with their natural surroundings. pgaz k’nyau basic tenet of cosmology is highly related to ecological conservation where human beings are required to maintain the ecological equilibrium. humans cannot claim ownership of nature but only are permitted to use and preserve them. thus every year, when the time comes to prune and plow a land for agriculture, people have to ask permission from the keeper and perform a particular ritual to honor the keeper. there is a consciousness of the fact that while tilling the soil, they may hurt living organism such as frogs, toads, ants, cicadas, and so on, or kill them without knowing it. tilling the soil is akin to piercing the mother earth9. this signifies a nurturing mentality of the pgaz k’nyau that involves caution and respect for living creatures that co-exist in the world with them. human activities sometimes disrupt nature, and so humans need to show a great deal of discretion and due respect. 6 prajñā vihāra they understand their role in this world as an ephemeral one. they are born to live, labor, and raise up the new generation while upholding their relationship with nature. nowadays, a fair number of pgaz k’nyau communities have adopted christianity or theravada buddhism while maintaining their traditional “animist” beliefs. the hin lad nai community hin lad nai, a karen ethnic community settled between the national forest reservation area and the khun chae national park, is situated in ban pong sub-district, wiang pa pao district of chiang rai province. topographically, hin lad nai is classified as hill evergreen forest with an elevation of 800-1,000 meters above sea level and within a mixed-deciduous forest, and the leaf-shedding forest and therefore there are various tree and plant species. biodiversity of the forest is still intact. a large portion of the village’s land is hilly terrain. hin lad is called according to the topological structure of the terrain and stream and near the watershed. there are 14 streams running in the region thus the water supply runs unceasingly in the community. the climate at the location is pleasantly cool all year round and rather cold in winter. still the community is within the tropical climate zone. thus, summer lasts from february to may, the temperature is rather high yet with the ecosystem of this green area and upland watershed, the place experiences a relatively pleasant climate. rainy season usually lasts from may to october. in winter, the temperature can drop lower than 10 degrees celsius. the climate is suitable for cool season plants and flowers all year round as well. the forest area is comprised of 10,954 rai (1,753 ha.) and divided into two main functions. the first is the upland field and residential areas around 1,228 rai (196 ha. or 10% of the total area) meant for basic consumptions such as house-building wood, food growing, and agroforestry gardens. this area is preserved and forbidden to cut any trees or hunt any animals within the 1-km diameter and so a forest for cultural rituals and beliefs. the second area around 9,726 rai (1,556 ha. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 7 or approximately 90%) is called a community forest and preservation area since it is the watershed. the area is used for shifting cultivation (162 rai or 26 ha.), tea cultivation as well as upland rice farming (168 rai or 27 ha.), and being protected and not allowed to invade10. demographically, hin lad nai is part of moo 7 in ban pong sub-district with 120 people and 20 families. the number of the residents is considered relatively small. at hin lad nai according to the karen tradition, when a man gets married, he has to move in to live with the family of his spouse. for the last consecutive decades, the number of the population at hin lad nai, has been almost the same. thus the community is relatively small and has less human impact on forest resources. the criteria of site selection was that in 2010 the community of hin lad nai has been chosen as a “pilot project and special cultural zone”11 of the four chosen karen villages. besides, there has been data collection and research on the ethnic traditional knowledge and so the study will build upon what is known and collected as information. the village is now a community learning center for those who wish to learn and deeply appreciate how human-forest relationship harmoniously and peacefully co-exist. indigenous knowledge for sustainable land use and forest conservation practices the traditional livelihood of karen people depends upon forests by the mere fact that most of them live in and benefit from the forest. this is especially the case of the hin lad nai. the forest becomes an integral part of their lives. the basic attitude that can be gleaned from the research is the idea: we live in and benefit from the forest, we need to take care of the forest. the forest is the source of all lives here and affects all aspects of our lives. several scholars12 claim that the foundation of the traditional ecological knowledge is centered on the forest — the core of indigenous community life — where life begins and ends; and it becomes a strategy for the indigenous community to care for forests. the mutual relations and dependencies of humans on the forest is a distinctive attribute of the 8 prajñā vihāra communities’ consciousness. karen indigenous knowledge emerges from this relation. generally speaking, indigenous knowledge is defined within the construction of the present and the interpretation of the past, and this can never happen if there is no relationship as a ground for socio-cultural and physical context. the community of hin lad nai has successfully restored their forests that were destroyed by logging companies. significantly, they have blended traditional agriculture with evergreen forest and pine forest along the hills13. meanwhile, they have adopted an integrated system of wet terrace fields, shifting cultivation, beekeeping, wild tea and bamboo farming along with forest conservation. the intricate knowledge of the locals in land use and protection illustrates well how they fully understand ecosystems and annual cycles. for instance, upland rice growing in the highland mountain requires water from the watershed through stream. the irrigation is simply taken from the forest and once the process of rice growing was done, water running through the paddy field will be released back into the stream again. indigenous knowledge in land use and forest conservation reflects their holistic approach to sustainable resource management systems14. lands are segregated into settlement, agroforestry/mix farm (of wild tea, bee hive, bamboo clumps), community forest, burial ground, shifting cultivation/rotational farming, and paddy field. within the embrace of rich forest resources, the indigenous karen have their own form of community-based forest management and the community reckons how to manage their living space and producing land with their own traditional knowledge in subsistent uses. this community has blended traditional agriculture — agroforestry as well as shifting cultivation — with evergreen forest and pine forest along the hills. for agroforestry, they reject any single crop plantations since this may pose risk to the natural environment and forest resources as a whole. the imbalance can occur, natural harmony means not only what is suitable for forests, but also what consequences that might happen and disrupt the flow of food supplies. single crops can also alter the manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 9 nature of the soil and disrupt the socio-cultural bonds between humans and forests. as such, no single crops are cultivated at this rural village. monetary gain from the single crops cannot sustain and what has lost is not easy to regain. in a way this is to counter the dependency on the market demands which leads to mass production of single crops and as a result the loss of a sense of self-sufficiency. in the farming areas, there are many other foodstuffs simultaneously grow with rice such as melons, cucumbers, beans and etc. this is the proof that multiple crops are more compatible with mother earth. the emphasis on sustainability of food is a crucial concern for the community, and zoning for living, preserving, and producing areas strengthen the community in self-sufficiency in food and products. the community formulates rules to restore forest resources in the form of government project, and in so doing the karen indigenous knowledge officially perpetuated. for shifting cultivation or rotational farming, the tradition farming has been passed on from their ancestors. in this way the community prioritizes only the needed space through multiple fields for cultivation or “planting crops on the hill,” which rotate between short and long periods (1-10 years) for the land to recover. in effect, the practice of shifting cultivation15 renders the regeneration of flora and fauna and the biodiversity as well as prevents lands from excessive use and degradation. such practice is a natural and organic way which ensures food security and seeds for the next round of farming. furthermore, the traditional rituals and spiritual beliefs characterize how they relate respectfully with nature and acknowledge their place in it without claiming ownership, but instead, stewardship. karen indigenous knowledge helps to preserve biodiversity of the forest and ecological systems in the long-term. in the past, the common belief of forest destruction was partly due to shifting cultivation which was labeled as “forest destroyers” or “illegal occupants” for several decades. however, in the recent years, once the better understanding of the shifting cultivation was acknowledged and so it is now politically called the rotational farming or rai mun wian, and is also underpinned by 10 prajñā vihāra recent research that this process benefits the earth’s biodiversity with an alteration of fallow periods where the land is left to its recovery stage of fertility. this type of farming is considerably reliable and highly preferred by the community for food variety, low carbon emission, and sustainable use and management of resources. the indigenous knowledge of choosing soil and preserving watershed is also paramount to their wellbeing. this can be referred to as the karen philosophical concept of the humans-forest relationship or the livelihood-based forest management of the karen. this has challenged some misunderstandings about the ethnic karen where they have been perceived as agents of deforestation. local consciousness and preservation of karen indigenous knowledge considering themselves as the people of forests, the karen perceive humans and nature as part of the same holistic diversity16. the local way of life has led to self-sufficiency and sustainable livelihood, and resolute socio-cultural identity. this becomes local self-consciousness of their presence of forest conservation. the community tries to instill this in the mindset of the youth. jiao et al. pointed this out through an example of hani indigenous people in yunnan, china, in particular the important role of the youth in the conservation of local biodiversity and their unique cultural landscape of rice terraces: most of the younger generation [who have better education than their parents and grandparents] no longer believe that they are an integral part of the natural landscape or that they are spiritually connected to the flora and fauna that sustained their forebears. as such, the sustainable use of natural resources that was inherent in the traditional practices of the hani people may be unable to survive the onslaught of the consumer culture or of the tourism industry that are rapidly penetrating this region.17 only if the young indigenous people believe that they are an manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 11 integral part of the natural world and are spiritually connected to the local biodiversity that sustained their forebears, can the sustainable use of natural resources continue. the karen co-existence with forests manifests from their cradle to death. the pgaz k’nyau have a ritual practice of deipauz htoof where the newborn child’s navel18 is tied to a tree signifying a deep sense relation and a spiritual bond of dependency that facilitate deep respect for the forest. this is a socio-cultural strategy to instill in the babies at birth of their relation with the tree in a sacred forest. their traditional beliefs and practices contribute to their moral values groundings and conscience in living with the forest. the karen hta has transmitted the ideas, legends, folklores, sayings, wisdom and insights toward the young in the community. such self-awareness of the indigenous people in this community indicates how they significantly appreciate their traditions, and find appropriate means to embody them. interesting self-awareness usually dictates cultural assumption, inner determinants, experience and competence to act and continue to live out the living tradition of the ancestors. the tradition is neither static nor ready-made product of value but invented through time to help the locals adapt themselves to their environment. in this sense, the locals can live out the living tradition of the ancestors. obligation as a result becomes self-imposed duties to face the changing reality within the environments in which they happen to act. the karen community has an oral tradition.19 the oral tradition and other ethnic rituals are a means of socio-cultural transmission of indigenous knowledge from the older generation to the younger generation. as a result, the generation gaps are bridged and cultural values transmitted. the knowledge exchange from one generation to the next comes in two ways: theory and praxis. for the youth, theory is all about stories, legends, folktales, and etc. that teach and inculcate the values of life and living. as for the praxis, it is simply learning by doing. this approach has been characterized through their way of life. besides, the youth can gain practical knowledge and skills through their 12 prajñā vihāra first-hand experiences. for instance, the youth are working with their parents in the fields whenever possible. their local way of life has led to self-sufficiency and sustainable livelihoods, and resolute socio-cultural identity. it is clear that active participation of community members, especially women and youth, and their shared commitment towards common goals are among the strengths of hin lad nai people. such notions and practices are fully rooted in the patrimony associated with local wisdom and beliefs. revival of traditional practices and cultures fully promotes community participation and social cohesion, and respect for local rules and regulations. for decades, the community elders have been promoting good practices based on the interrelation of people and forests,20 because the forestry laws are insufficient to care for the forests21 without true awareness and deep respect for the forest. in return, a good practice of caring for the forests has earned the community the green globe award, the global certification for sustainable tourism in 1999 for a decade (1999-2008). in 2013 the title “forest hero” was given to one of the local scholars by the united nation (un), the awardee as a representative for the entire community to celebrate the fruit of their conscientious effort to care for forests and natural resources. the community of hin lad nai gives priority to the “community rights,” where a sense of belonging and non-alienation provides room for the community to thrive according to traditional beliefs and cultural practices. this creates the possibility of long-term sustainable development of ecological knowledge in the ethnic community. the realization that there is a balance between the taking from forest resources and caring for them, is the key to sustainable living in rural ethnic communities. good practices emerging from indigenous ecological knowledge are grounded in the intimate connection between humans and environments which was expressed in social norms, cultural rituals, and spiritual beliefs for sustainability22. the villagers know that protecting and respecting the place where they live is a must without being told or being reprimanded to do so, since it is part of their way of life. in the consciousness of manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 13 the people, they respect the forest as their world and a home for their community and a raison d’être for their existence. the people and forest relationships are deeply intertwined. if the forest is being destroyed, the life of karen people is at stake. the difference that may occur is that the indigenous people are accustomed to use and exhaust it without replenishing it. the way of the karen at hin lad nai bridges the gap of this among people by teaching the way they live according to their spiritual beliefs and customs that they hold firmly within the community. the awareness is still being transmitted to the younger generation. this becomes the worldview and consciousness of the locals that is important to acknowledge since in our time the focus on development easily overlooks these rich local traditions and local sensitivities. conclusion the practices of ecological knowledge of the karen at hin lad nai not only aim at self-sufficiency as well as self-dependence but demonstrate universal strategies for resource use and sustainability that benefits ecosystems. studying indigenous resource management, teaches us not only the importance of the humans-forest relationship for the sake of sustainable living, but also its role in spiritual wellbeing. the spiritual connection to the land and nature within the human-earth-spirit relationship has been communicated and transmitted across generations at hin lad nai. the karen cosmological belief in forest conservation is what most people have overlooked, and yet it is the most significant dimension that we can learn from the indigenous culture. the focus of humans-nature-spirit relationships23 is a crucial showcase study since it is not merely only a single form of resource management but also a whole intricate relationship between human and their natural surroundings or in today’s terms, sustainable and environmentally friendly relationship. understanding indigenous knowledge of human-forest relationships promotes not only karen identity but the management of natural resources in the mekong region. 14 prajñā vihāra exchange of indigenous knowledge on forest conservation and securing the source of food and self-sufficient traditional livelihoods can lead to better understanding and respect for hill tribes in northern thailand and elsewhere. creating a right understanding with the people outside the community is also important through knowledge exchange and negotiations with the local authorities. the new mutual understanding should foster the strengthening of local wisdom, identity, and the nourishing of diversity in society. forest authorities interested in promoting sustainable resource development and community-based forest management should reconsider policies directed toward the ethnic groups. as far as forest stewardship and natural resources are concerned, indigenous ecological knowledge is more effective since it is directly connected to the community’s way of life and traditional beliefs as they develop from within, and are not merely laws imposed from the outside. the true sustainable development has to come from personal consciousness and community life based in a culture. the common ground is again to place emphasis on community participation and cooperation to manage their surrounding with the relevant regulations by the government agencies. endnotes 1 for constraints on ethnic minority participation in forest management in thailand, see international fund for agricultural development (ifad). managing forest, sustaining lives, improving livelihoods of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups in the mekong region, asia: lessons learned from the learning route, (rome, italy, 2013), p.10; yoko hayami, “negotiating ethnic representative between self and other: the case of karen and eco-tourism in thailand.” southeast asian studies. 44, no.3 (2006), p.398. 2 managing forest, p.47. 3 douglas nakashima, lyndel prott, and peter bridgewater. “tapping into the world’s wisdom.” unesco sources, (july-august, 2000), p.11. 4 for the roles of indigenous ecological knowledge, see fikret berkes, johan colding, and carl folke. “rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management.” ecological applications, 10, no.5 (2000), p.1251. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 15 5 international land coalition (ilc). sustainable forest management ties indigenous group together against eviction threats. case study of the ilc database of good practices, by lakpa nuri sherpa and erin sinogba, (rome, 2016), p.4-5. 6 for the origin of the pagz k’nyau ethnic group, see hayami yoko and susan m. darlington. “the karen of burma and thailand”. in endangered peoples of southeast and east asia: struggles to survive and thrive, ed. leslie e. sponsel (westport, conn.: greenwood press, 2000); pinkaew luangaramsri.“redefining nature: karen ecological knowledge and the challenge to the modern conservation paradigm.” (ph.d. dissertation, university of washington. u.s.a., 2000), p. 47-57. 7 prasert trakansupakorn. “spaces of resistance and place of local knowledge in karen ecological movement of northern thailand: the case of pgaz k’nyau villages in mae lan kham river basin.” southeast asian studies, 45, no.4 (2008), p.587. 8 ibid., p.600. 9 ibid. 10 procasur corporation. sustainable solutions for self-sufficient people”, shifting cultivation as an integrated and self-sufficient system: the experience of huay hin lad nai. report for systematization and sharing of good practices in rural development huay hin lad nai, chiang rai province, kingdom of thailand (2012), p.51. 11 managing forest, p.51. 12 international labour organization (ilo). traditional occupations of indigenous and tribal peoples: emerging trends. project to promote ilo policy on indigenous and tribal peoples, (geneva, 2000), p.33; viveca mellegard. “how hin lad nai’s farming saved a forest and its poetry changed international policy.” re.think, last modified (may 25, 2017): virginia d. nazarea. “a view from a point: ethnoecology as situated knowledge.” in ethnoecology: situated knowledge/located lives, ed. virginia d. nazarea, 3-20. (tucson: university of arizona press, 1999). 13 jintana kawasaki. “assessment of the role of karen’s ecological knowledge to sustain biodiversity, ecosystems and ecosystem services in northern thailand.” in pbes-jbf sub-regional dialogue workshop report on indigenous and local knowledge (ilk) for south-east and north-east asia sub-region, chiang mai, thailand, october 14-17, 2016. institute for global environmental strategies (tokyo, 2017), p.10-11. 14 ibid., p.7. 15 for the benefits of shifting cultivation, see prasert trakansupakorn. “rotational farming, biodiversity, food sovereignty and climate change of karen (pgaz k’nyau) community in northern thailand”. in indigenous valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services compared to other ways of valuation in the context of ipbes, ed. jürgen nauber and alex paulsch (bonn, german federal agency for nature conservation (bfn), 2014), p.28; assessment of the role, p.10-11. 16 redefining nature, p. 120-121. 16 prajñā vihāra 17 yuanmei jiao, xiuzhen li, luohui liang, kazuhiko takeuchi, toshiya okuro, dandan zhang, and lifang sun. “indigenous ecological knowledge and natural resource management in the cultural landscape of china’s hani terraces.” ecological research, 27, no.2 (2012): p.260. 18 assessment of the role, p.7. 19 traditional occupations, p.33. 20 managing forest, p.49. 21 rotational farming, p.29. 22 assessment of the role, p.7-8. 23 yos santasombat. biodiversity: local knowledge and sustainable development. regional center for social science and sustainable development, faculty of social sciences, (chiang mai university, 2003). bibliography berkes, fikret, carl kolke, and madhav gadgil. “traditional ecological knowledge, biodiversity, resilience and sustainability.” in biodiversity conservation: problems and policies, edited by charles a. perrings, karl-göran mäler, carl folke, c.s. holling, beng-owe jansson, 281-299. dordrecht; boston: kluwer academic publishers, 1995. berkes, fikret, johan colding, and 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learning route, by antonella cordone, rome, 2013. international labour organization (ilo). traditional occupations of indigenous and tribal peoples: emerging trends. project to promote ilo policy on indigenous and tribal peoples. geneva, 2000. international land coalition (ilc). sustainable forest management ties indigenous group together against eviction threats. case study of the ilc database of good practices, by lakpa nuri sherpa and erin sinogba, rome, 2016. retrieved december 10, 2017, from http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/ resources/case_study_0049_thailand_en.pdf jiao, yuanmei, xiuzhen li, luohui liang, kazuhiko takeuchi, toshiya okuro, dandan zhang, and lifang sun. “indigenous ecological knowledge and natural resource management in the cultural landscape of china’s hani terraces.” ecological research, 27, no.2 (2012): 247-263. kawasaki, jintana. “assessment of the role of karen’s ecological knowledge to sustain biodiversity, ecosystems and ecosystem services in northern thailand.” in pbes-jbf sub-regional dialogue workshop report on indigenous and local knowledge (ilk) for south-east and north-east asia sub-region, chiang mai, thailand, october 14-17, 2016. institute for global environmental strategies, tokyo, 2017. http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/case_study_0049_thailand_en.pdf http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/case_study_0049_thailand_en.pdf 18 prajñā vihāra luangaramsri, pinkaew. “redefining nature: karen ecological knowledge and the challenge to the modern conservation paradigm.” ph.d. dissertation, university of washington. u.s.a., 2000. mellegard, viveca. “how hin lad nai’s farming saved a forest and its poetry changed international policy.” re.think, last modified may 25, 2017. retrieved december 15, 2017, from https://rethink. earth/how-hin-lad-nais-farming-saved-a-forest-and-its-poetrychanged-international-policy/ nakashima, douglas, lyndel prott, and peter bridgewater. “tapping into the world’s wisdom.” unesco sources, july-august, 2000. retrieved january 7, 2018, from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0012/001202/120200e.pdf nazarea, virginia d. “a view from a point: ethnoecology as situated knowledge.” in ethnoecology: situated knowledge/located lives, edited by virginia d. nazarea, 3-20. tucson: university of arizona press, 1999. parrotta, john a., lim hin fui, liu jinlong, p.s. ramakrishnan, and youn yeo-chang. “traditional forest-related knowledge and sustainable forest management in asia.” forest ecology and management, 257 (2009): 1987-1988. procasur corporation. sustainable solutions for self-sufficient people”, shifting cultivation as an integrated and selfsufficient system: the experience of huay hin lad nai. report for systematization and sharing of good practices in rural development huay hin lad nai, chiang rai province, kingdom of thailand, 2012. retrieved december 10, 2017, from http://asia. procasur.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/huay-hin-lad-nai.pdf sandis, constantine. “culture, heritage, and ethics” in cultural heritage ethics: between theory and practice, edited by constantine sandis, 11-20. cambridge: open book publishers, 2014. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001202/120200e.pdf http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001202/120200e.pdf manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 19 santasombat, yos. biodiversity: local knowledge and sustainable development. regional center for social science and sustainable development, faculty of social sciences, chiang mai university, 2003. ______________. “karen cultural capital and the political economy of symbolic power.” asian ethnicity, 5, no.1 (2004): 105-120. seebacher, frank and craig e. franklin. “determining environmental causes of biological effects: the need for a mechanistic physiological dimension in conservation biology.” philosophical transactions of the royal society, 367 (2012): 1607-1614. suksawad, prasert. 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(in thai) [transfer of belief about water among pga k’nyau]. master’s thesis, chiang mai university, 2006. tangjitman, komkanok, chalobol wongsawad, piyawan winijchaiyanan, treetip sukkho, kaweesin kamwong, wittaya pongamornkul, and chusie trisonthi. “traditional knowledge on medicinal plant of the karen in northern thailand: a comparative study”. journal of ethnopharmacology, 150, no.1 (2013): 232-243. the world bank. using indigenous knowledge in agricultural development, by d. michael warren. world bank discussion paper no.127. washington, d.c.: the world bank, 1991. trakansuphakorn, prasert. “spaces of resistance and place of local knowledge in karen ecological movement of northern thailand: the case of pgaz k’nyau villages in mae lan kham river basin.” southeast asian studies, 45, no.4 (2008): 586-614. __________________. “rotational farming, biodiversity, food sovereignty and climate change of karen (pgaz k’nyau) community in northern thailand”. in indigenous valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services compared to other ways of valuation in the context of ipbes, edited by jürgen nauber and alex paulsch, 28-30. bonn, german federal agency for nature conservation (bfn), 2014. 20 prajñā vihāra yoko, hayami. “negotiating ethnic representative between self and other: the case of karen and eco-tourism in thailand.” southeast asian studies. 44, no.3 (2006): 385-409. yoko, hayami and susan m. darlington. “the karen of burma and thailand”. in endangered peoples of southeast and east asia: struggles to survive and thrive, edited by leslie e. sponsel, 137-156. westport, conn.: greenwood press, 2000. manasan wongvarn and sompong amnuay-ngerntra 21 prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 95 analysis of freedom and thought in descartes’ philosophy and its influence zhiwu zhang and mohammad manzoor malik abstract the search for truth and certainty is a major preoccupation with all western philosophy. this has its most famous attempt in the philosophy of descartes. this paper existence, and thinking is a freedom that i can truly grasp. of the primacy of the freedom of thought in opposition to the freedom of action. this paper will show that descartes does not oppose practical philosophy but intends to seek a metaphilosophy which supports practical philosophy, using the freedom of thinking as the foundation. in short, descartes political, cultural, traditional, moral, or religious factors. philosophers who place the human beings at the center of philosophy. keywords vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 95-101 © 2000 by assumption university press 96 what am i? this was the first question descartes tried to answer. although the question is the primary and central question in by him. as early as socrates, there was the topic of knowing oneself and self-examination. the purpose of socrates raising this theme was to warn people not to blindly worship the false gods created by power and authority, but to recognize the essence of man as soul and spirit. however, he did not fundamentally answer and prove the question of (which he continued from montaigne) allowed him to discover a free seat of thinking which has access to certainty, and can connect with existence. descartes expressed in the that “i am knows little, does not know much, loves, hates, is willing, is unwilling, imagines and feels.”1 existence. descartes concludes from this that i think therefore i am, that is, i think and therefore i exist. thinking that i am thinking, and that i am willing, unwilling, loving, hating, imagining, doubting. the most important of all thinking is doubt, and doubting is the reassessment of all so-called truths. before i accept a socalled truth, i must fully doubt it. only if i meet the standard of excluding all reasonable doubts will i accept this truth, otherwise i will not accept it as the truth. all beings, including me, are the content of my thoughts, and of course, they are also the objects of my doubts. in other words, i have a skeptical attitude toward all beings in the world. when i doubt unquestionable truth. descartes believes that my existence can be proved in two ways. one is that when i think, i discover that through thinking i exist. the second is that when i think about the existence outside of me, when i perceive the existence of this external existence, i also exist at the 97 from this, descartes came up with the proposition, ‘i think, therefore i of philosophy, from which all other truths or propositions of philosophy are derived. therefore, my existence in the form of thinking should be the foundation of philosophy rather than ontological existence. this ground of the certainty of thinking – the clear and distinct idea – is the foundation of all true knowledge. mistakes. many thinkers searched for the root cause of human error in terms of politics, morality or religion, but descartes searched for this reason from the perspective of philosophical thinking. if people manifestation of completeness in the will as of a defect in knowledge.”2 and this attitude is like what kant, hegel, and others call conceit. if i act beyond or range of clear cognition, i will act blindly. therefore, thinking as my existence is not arbitrary, but a basis for access to eternal truths. the purpose a free thinking involving doubt which leads to clarity, is the only way to search for the truth behind things. as hegel said, the biggest misunderstanding of freedom is the will to do whatever you want. pure philosophy thinking is my existence, once i stop thinking, i also cease to exist. but descartes said that “thought means everything in our minds that is directly conscious of us. hence all volitional, intellectual, imaginative and sensory activities are thoughts”.3 i can doubt everything, but i cannot change them. thinking is prior to ethical issues or political issues. descartes is attempting to create a pure philosophical theoretical system. the 98 second meaning or characteristic of cartesian thinking is that thinking only refers to the wisdom about truth and falsehood, but does not include wisdom about good and evil, life, and other aspects. descartes limited his concept of thinking within the scope of true and false, emphasizing that this kind of thinking is an epistemological question about whether and how things exist, or a question about truth and falsehood. this is prior to moral or political thinking which plato developed. from this point of view, descartes tried to separate his thinking from moral thinking and political thinking, and his real intention was to seek purely philosophical pure philosophy would be distinct from cconcrete legal philosophy, moral philosophy, political philosophy, and religious philosophy. the freedom freedoms, and freedom of belief. in this way, pure philosophy transcends concrete philosophy and provides the latter with a foundation. any the relationship between the superstructure and the economic base, and the relationship between the general outline of thought and the divisions descartes wanted to build did not succeed. but the underlying impetus of his philosophical system is still relevant today. it is generally believed that the greatest contribution of descartes is the existence of moral reason. second, modern existentialist theory is a direct result of the cartesian philosophy of thinking. it not only develops the theory of the relationship between existence and thinking, but also 99 into develops from the autonomous individual towards a community. the third is the natural law theory of modern contract theory. no matter whether hobbes, locke, montesquieu, or rousseau, they all assumed a state of nature, and they all believed that natural rights and natural laws existed before laws, governments, and states. only the free human being can realize the natural rights and laws of nature that are unique to human beings. and only when all freely agree to create a covenant and form a government, to implement it, can human civilization come into being. or hegel, all begin with the self, and they all believe that people are truly free beings only when they recognize universal laws and consciously reason into theoretical reason and practical reason. practical reason is based upon freedom, and man is free only when he knows and consciously follows universal laws. therefore, kant believed that human beings are thinking into freedom of conscience and duty. conclusion various philosophies. descartes regards thinking as his core existence, and this thinking is a freedom that i can truly grasp. it is prior to ethics or issues of politics and religious belief. he distinguishes his philosophy of thinking from other classical philosophies, but he does not deny the politics, or belief. he does not deny the ultimate meaning of morality to human beings and believes that conscience is the essence of human lost, then this person is not a real human being. when dealing with the cartesian ideology, a dialectical attitude should be adopted, not only to see the purity of his philosophy of thinking, but also to see the connection 100 who think that descartes only emphasizes the freedom of thought and opposes the freedom of action, it is necessary to understand descartes thought within its wider purpose. therefore, descartes does not oppose ground practical philosophy, taking the freedom of thinking as the mother moral, religious and other humanistic obligations. one which can act to correct the distortions that politics, culture, tradition, morality, religion, thinking in a pure sense, and provides a general guide for how to approach received knowledge. 101 endnotes 1 descartes, r. (translated by pang jingren. beijing, chn: the commercial press, 1986), 33. 2 ibid, 64. 3 descartes, r. (translated by wang taiqing. beijing, chn: the commercial press, 2000), 84. references descartes, r. , 33-64. translated by pang jingren. beijing, chn: the commercial press, 1986. descartes, r, , 84. translated by wang taiqing. 1902. beijing, chn: the commercial press, 2000. zhang, z. w. (2002). . beijing, chn: renmin university of china press. 82 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 82-92 © 2000 by assumption university press understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand abstract a great scholar of the abhidhamma in myanmar, mehm tin mon interpreted alobha as a mental state. he considered non-attachment to sense-objects and greedlessness as the chief characteristics of alobha. to put alobha into practice he recommended generosity, morality called abstinence from sensual objects and non-covetousness, meditation called tranquility meditation and insight meditation. they are generally practices to reduce and remove greed. he explains how to practice these techniques in connection with contemporary social development. yet his interpretations of the stages of buddhist social development are respectively criticized by some buddhists scholars. this paper intends to provide an understanding of his interpretations of alobha and its relevance for the contemporary times. keywords: alobha, non-attachment, generosity, buddhism. mehm tin mon is a famous interpreter of abhidhama in myanmar. his various books and interpretations are an attempt to make abhidama and buddhist doctrine more understandable and more easy to practice for kuvera and kajornpat tangyin 83 people living in contemporary society. in his work the essence of buddha abhidamma, he explains the stages of buddhist social development: he generosity stage, the morality stage and the meditation stage. he gives priority to the practice of generosity to achieve non-attachment or alobha. he interpreted alobha as “non-attachment, greedlessness, generosity”.1 and he claimed that, “non-attachment to sense-objects and greedlessness is the chief characteristic of alobha”.2 alobha is non-attachment or greedlessness. they are different from each other in words, but their main characteristic of not adhering to sensuous objects. both of them lead to the same target according theravada buddhist doctrines. but his main contribution here is the important place which he gives to generosity. he goes on to claims that: “generosity is alobha”. traditionally in theravada buddhism, generosity is considered only a practice. but mehm tin mon teaches us that the practice of generosity is central to the realization of alobha. he writes: “alobha manifests itself in the form of generosity”.3 and furthermore: “non-attachment and greedlessness are the meanings of alobha, and generosity is its practice. this is the meaning and practice of alobha”.4 in his writings he analyses in detail the three stages of buddhist social development: the generosity stage, the morality stage and the meditation stage. but for the purpose of this paper, we can focus on his interpretation of generosity to understand the general tendencies of his interpretation of abhidhama, and his prioritizing of generosity, and to understand some possible criticisms. generosity and its nature regarding generosity and its nature, he writes that: alobha is opposed to lobha. the nature pursuing possessions against generosity, is lobha. the nature being stingy with one’s possessions against it, is macchariya. if eliminating such lobha and macchariya in non-greed (alobha), one can offer successfully. 84 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december lobha is greed and macchariya is stinginess. both of them are obstacles to the realization of alobha. these obstacles can be overcome through generosity. in theravada buddhism generosity is not given a chance to succeed because it is blocked by greed and stinginess. eliminating them, allows the birth of alobha, and one’s generosity can be developed. so, with regard to previously mentioned facts, it can be presumed that his interpretation effectively highlights “no alobha, no dāna. no non-greed, no generosity.” this is the understanding of generosity in traditional theravada buddhism. but we will see how mehm tin mon reverses this to claim that it is the practice of generosity itself with a view to its results can lead to alobha. this reversal is for the purposes of understanding buddhist social development and to understand how alobha can be achieved in contemporary society. the generosity stage in buddhist social development regarding generosity, mehm tin mon taught that generosity is the icon of loving-kindness, it involves loving-kindness in both bodily action and verbal action, and it causes donors and receivers to harmonize with each other.6 loving-kindness brings people together and eradicates hate, producing more love and harmony to society. without it, greed would overpower society. likewise, taedaw sayadaw taught that: “generosity produces not only good results of liberation (nibbāna) and future lives but also good results of present life”.7 it also leads to liberation. so, the practice of generosity in relation to alobha. is understood with reference to its results. this consists in present results and future results. regarding the simplicity of such generosity, aye naing writes: generosity is easier to be observed by buddhists than morality, concentration or wisdom. there is no need to restrict bodily actions or speech like morality. no one kuvera and kajornpat tangyin 85 needs to control one’s mind as in meditation to achieve concentration or wisdom. as long as there is a recipient, a donation and one’s volition, the merit of one’s generosity can be accomplished. generosity is easily practiced in theravada buddhism. it requires little knowledge of doctrine and little discipline. everyone can do it. even an animal can observe it. at the time of gotama buddha, it is said that the elephant pālileyyaka helped the buddha by observing it. so mehm tin mon’s interpretation is accurate concerning his understanding the importance of generosity. knowing the results of generosity generosity involves good deeds directed to the welfare of others. but sometimes it leads to results and sometimes they do not. the buddha taught: even a good person may still meet with suffering so long as his good deeds do not bear fruit: but when they do bear fruit he will enjoy the benefits of his good deeds.10 following this idea, the position of mehm tin mon suggests that we need to know the results of our good deeds. if you do not know the results, you cannot attain its benefits.11 for instance, donors who observe generosity every day and do not know the effects of their generosity cannot attain good results. in the same way, thieves who steal the property of others and do not know the consequences of their crime, cannot reform themselves. this is one weakness of mehm tin mon’s interpretation. the buddha did not teach one should know the result of one’s generosity. it is enough to know that the good deeds will attain their results over time. in the tradition of theravada buddhism, the buddha taught volition (cetanā) is called “action (kamma)”.12 therefore, acting rightly is more important than knowing the results of one’s right actions. ven. sri dhammananda from sri lanka claimed: “great people always regard their body of flesh and blood as useful just for the world’s 86 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december good and welfare”. according to him, in the various jataka stories associated with theravada buddhism, many of the future buddhas (bodhisattā) sacrificed their life for happiness of the beings. the generosity of their self-sacrifice is done as a matter of principle. to a great man, his principles are far more important than his money or life. such people are rare, that is why we regard them as great people. truly great people have one thing in common, that is, they use their resources: wisdom, sympathy, power, energy and knowledge of the good for the benefit of mankind. according to mehm tin mon, this is called ‘the greatest perfection of generosity (dānapamatthapāramī)’ in theravada buddhism. in this regard, albert schweitzer, the nobel prize winner, said: “the only ones among you who will be truly happy are those who have sought and found how to serve”. great minds seek how to serve to create happiness without any expectations or attachments. the more they dedicate themselves to service, the more their actions bring about good results. extreme generosity but why focus on generosity in light of its results? this is because in contemporary times not everyone can aspire to be a great man and give themselves in self-sacrifice. common people often wonder if buddhist teachings can be applied to life in materialist society. this gives importance to generosity and how it can be practiced. mehm tin mon stated that there are ten kinds of generosity (that cause one to be born in woeful states) by referring to milindapañhā pāḷi: what are ten kinds of generosity? venerable nāgasena! there is a drink-generosity. in this world, it should not be called ‘generosity’ because one observes it, one can be born in woeful states. generosity of a theatrical display, woman-generosity, bull-generosity, painting-generosity, weapon generosity, poison, leg-iron-generosity, fowl-piggenerosity, generosity of false weighing and false measure. for instance, in the vessantara jataka, king vesantara practiced kuvera and kajornpat tangyin 87 an extreme form of generosity by offering his own wife and children. yet he did not urge others to observe such generosity. nowadays we would consider his actions criminal. in the jataka stories recounting the previous lives of the buddha, all of the future-buddhas (bodhisatta) had to observe extreme generosity practices. they would offer all their possessions, their children, wife, parts of their body, and finally their life to attain the enlightenment and the buddhahood.16 the principle seems to be: “the more i give, the more merit i will receive. no pain, no gain. i have to observe these acts step by step to attain an enlightenment”. yet king vessantara believed himself absolved for his extreme generosity. he believed his grandfather would recover the children he gave away to brāhmaṇa jūjaka.17 also, before offering his children to him, he himself instructed his son jālī to inform their grandfather in the palace to recover them. for these reasons, it can be presumed that king vessantara cannot be blamed for such extreme generosity. in the jataka stories, the future buddha had to observe such extreme generosities to attain enlightenment. but when he became the lord buddha, he prohibited the practice of such extreme generosities. he laid down training rules for the buddhist monks not to receive bulls, slaves, and woman from donors. this is why mehm tin mon guarded against such extreme generosities did not urge other to observe them. a moral practitioner should not observe such practices in the modern age. one should know the results of one’s generosity because practicing generosity according to mere principle alone can lead to extremes. so, this interpretation is also one of the strengths of his interpretation of generosity. generosity in relation to other practices. mehm tin mon saw generosity in relation to higher buddhist social practices. here again he gives priority to generosity in relation to higher practices since it both contains and anticipates these higher states. 88 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december generosity is a work to suppress greed attaching to the outside properties by offering them. liberation, called nibbāna, is to also give up internal material and immaterial aggregates. if such outside properties are not able to be given away, such internal aggregates to which one attaches deeply, cannot be given up absolutely. due to the help of generosity, insight meditation can be accomplished successfully. if generosity consists of the nature of insight meditation, this meditation also contains the nature of generosity. in the same way, the generosity incorporates the nature of the morality and the morality also involves the nature of the generosity.20 he will even go on to say that, “generosity, morality and meditation should not be distinguished. if they are united, they can produce a power.”21 so generosity goes beyond the mere act of donation and supports morality and meditation. abstaining from killing any living beings is called ‘generosity of life’ due to its own function of offering life and happiness to others. abstaining from stealing, committing sexual misconduct, telling lies and consuming intoxicating drinks and drugs is related to the basic practice of generosity. on account of helping others to be free from dangers, they can be called ‘generosity of non-danger’. this is the power of generosity respecting the functions of morality. generosity also supports meditation, it is found that generosity functions in promoting right speech, right action and right livelihood of the eight-fold noble path that corresponds with the meditation practices to be observed to attain peace. this is the power of generosity respecting functions of meditation. in this way, one’s all of the practices are working their main functions as well as other sub-functions for a successfully united whole. kuvera and kajornpat tangyin 89 conclusion in respect to generosity in theravada buddhism, the gotama buddha did not believe that generosity alone cannot accomplish attaining liberation. in the same way, he did not teach that generosity can accomplish all things within worldly and otherworldly realms. but it is found that there is a concept that a buddhist moral practitioner of a future buddha (buddha-to-be) has to first observe the perfection of generosity (dānapāramī) to attain liberation and save all beings.77 it is first step but it does not directly accomplish attaining liberation. but in his reinterpretation of generosity for the contemporary age, mehm tin mon taught that “generosity can accomplish all results of worldly and otherworldly realms.”78 actually, in theravada buddhism, there are distinctions. generosity has the power to distribute goods, morality is able to foster health, tranquility meditation can create will-power. all of them remain in the worldly realm. but only insight meditation can accomplish wisdom of the otherworldly realm. it is in this realm where real liberation is attained. generosity remains at the lowest level. it has no any power to accomplish all results. while it is understandable that mehm tin mon wishes to interpret alobha through generosity for the common man in contemporary society, his prioritizing of generosity as alobha is inaccurate according to the traditional teachings of theravada buddhism. this is one of shortcomings of his interpretation. in terms of social development, generosity is important. offering food, clothes, and money, helps other persons. also sharing knowledge to others can help them. it produces cheerfulness for oneself and others. promoting cheerfulness also supports social development in the individual and the community. so, it can be agreed that it is an essential stage of the buddhist social development. yet generosity is only one stage in buddhist social development. it need to be followed by morality practices and insight meditation. 90 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december endnotes 1 mehm tin mon. the essence of buddha abhidhamma. (yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 1995), 84. 2 ibid., 88. 3 ibid., 88. 4 ibid., 88. 5 ibid., 145. 6 ibid., 41. 7 taedaw sayadaw. mag huthi (the path). (burmese script). (yangon: dhammabyuhar thuzar myint press, 2005), 57. 8 u aye naing. the buddhist status. (burmese script). (yangon: san la thaw dar, 2010), 90. 9 chaṭṭha-saṅgīti-piṭaka. abhidhammattha-saṅgaha and abhidhammatthavibhāvinī-ṭīkā. (burmese script). (yangon: religious affairs, 2010), 38. 10 daw mya tin. dhammapada, 44. 11 mehm tin mon. myat, 7. 12 r. morris. (ed.). aṅguttaranikāya. vol. ii. (oxford: pāḷi text society, 1995), 416. 13 k. sri dhammananda. how to live without fear and worry. (malaysia: mbs publications, 1989), 173. 14 ibid., 174. 15 chaṭṭha-saṅgīti-piṭaka. milindapañha. (burmese script). (yangon: religious affairs, 2010), 270. 16 chaṭṭha-saṅgīti-piṭaka. jātaka-aṭṭhākathā. vol vii. (burmese script). (yangon: religious affairs, 2010), 553. 17 chaṭṭha-saṅgīti-piṭaka. milindapañha, 273. 18 ibid., 275. 19 h. oldenberg. (ed.). suttavibhaṅga. vol i. (oxford: pāḷi text society. 1993), 150. 20 mehm tin mon. essence, 146. 21 ibid., 147. kuvera and kajornpat tangyin 91 references aye naing, u. the buddhist status. (burmese script). yangon: san la thaw dar, 2010. chaṭṭha-saṅgīti-piṭaka. jātaka-aṭṭhākathā. vol i. (burmese script). yangon: religious affairs, 2010. _________. jātaka-aṭṭhākathā. vol vii. (burmese script). yangon: religious affairs, 2010. _________. milindapañha, (burmese script). yangon: religious affairs, 2010. _________. paṭṭhānapāḷi. vol i. (burmese script). yangon: religious affairs, 2010. chit tin. mahā satipaṭṭhāna vipassanā-insight meditation. yangon: religious affairs, 1979. fausbøll, v. (ed.). jātaka-aṭṭhākathā. vol i. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1990. mehm tin mon. the essence of buddha abhidhamma. yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 1995. _________. amyat sone pan daine aye kan paine (the real achievement of the great goal). vol.i. (burmese script). yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 1999. _________. myat dāna (the great generosity). (burmese script). yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 2000. _________. myat thi la (the great morality). (burmese script). yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 2003. _________. tetkathol abhidhammar (the abhidhamma preached in university). (burmese script). yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 2005. 92 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december _________. wi thot di met alinn bya nate ban lann ma gyi (the way to liberation through the light of visuddhimagga). (burmese script). yangon: myat mon yadanar publication, 2008. morris, r. (ed.). aṅguttaranikāya. vol. ii. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1995. müller, e. (ed.). atthasālinī. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1897. mya tin., daw. (tr.). the dhammapada verses and stories. yangon: myanmar piṭaka association, 1995. ñāṇamoli. (tr.). the path of purification. kandy: buddhist publication society, 2010. oldenberg, h. (ed.). suttavibhaṅga. vol i. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1993. _________. mahāvagga. vol iii. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1993. richard morris. (ed.), aṅguttara-nikāya. vol i. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1989. sri dhammananda, k. how to live without fear and worry. malaysia: mbs publications, 1989. taedaw sayadaw. mag huthi (the path). (burmese script). yangon: dhammabyuhar thuzar myint press, 2000. _________. dāna huthi (generosity). (burmese script). yangon: dhammabyuhar thuzar myint press, 2005. trencker. (ed.). milindapañha & milinda-ṭīkā. vol i. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1986. _________. mijjhima-nikāya. vol i. oxford: pāḷi text society, 1993. walpola sri rahula. what the buddha taught. new york: grove press, 1974. _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand a91nt52rx_ayh0ll_4hc.tmp 37 vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 37-53 © 2000 by assumption university press a layman’s guide to expert opinion chitchanok wanroek demsar 1 abstract in this paper i will contrast two views of expert testimony, an authoritarian view and a libertarian view. i will show that the authoritarian view has some problems that the libertarian view can solve. an authoritarian view leads to skepticism about expert testimony, as, on this view, acceptance of expert testimony is blind. it also seems . having shown that libertarianism can easily address these problems, i conclude by outlining a way of integrating this view with a broader theory of testimony. k e y w o r d s: e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y ; a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m ; libertarianism in this paper i will compare and contrast two epistemic views of expert testimony. one view i will call authoritarianism and the other libertarianism.2 in section one, i will introduce the authoritarian view of expert testimony and raise some challenges to it. in section two, i will lay out the libertarian view and show that it can answer the challenges proposed in section one. in section three, i will consider what each view has to say about the consensus among groups of experts. i consider three problems with the authoritarian view and show how the libertarian view can easily deal with them. in section four i will consider how 38 such a view might be integrated within a broader theory of testimony. the overall upshot of the paper will be to make some progress towards position in spite of expert testimony to the contrary. section 1-the authoritarian view the notion that we must “ the science” and “believe the experts” is all the rage these days. in some quarters it has become something of a political slogan. one doesn’ friends and family echoing the same authoritarian sentiment. “there are people who know these things, people whose job it is to scour the journals and come to reasonable and principled conclusions that are properly apportioned to the data. you should trust their conclusions. anyway, who possibly know if they were wrong?” one must admit the force of the sentiment. but what is the to make of it? what are the general epistemic principles that warrant such a sentiment? what is the in which such principles are situated? what are the consequences of such a view? these are important questions that, to my mind, have not been addressed with any philosophical rigor. what is the essence of the authoritarian view? clearly the core principle of the authoritarian view is that expert testimony ( ) to the provides us with a strong reason to believe that .3 it isn’t . what is clear is that the limit case seems problematic. (osp hereafter). authoritarianism seems to make . it seems to entail that all inception, for presumably all such progress begins with a minority view, often with those lacking the requisite establishment credentials. it is 39 ironic that the authoritarian view, so intimately connected to scientism, a scientism based on the radical success of science, has the potential, if taken to its logical end, to undermine that very success. furthermore, there is what i will call the layman’s dilemma (ld hereafter). how would the layman ever be in a position to know if he has encountered expert testimony? is it reasonable for the layman to assess the has an overwhelming and undefeatable reason to believe questions of expertise can often be as complicated as the technical issue itself. what constitutes expertise? how do we know when one possesses it? and expertise is relevant? this is to say nothing of the frequent disagreement of experts. how can the layman be competent enough to in some situation and yet not layman is reasonable in assessing, on his own, complex issues of who does and who does not possess the relevant expertise, only until such a ’s power and may never have a defeater for e? perhaps the authoritarian will suggest that the layman isn’t competent enough to know when he has encountered expert testimony and that we must have experts about experts? will this lead to authoritarianism seems to open wide the door to skepticism about expert testimony. because the evidence of the experts is beyond our ken, we are unable to challenge it. but then, for the same reason, our trust in the experts will always be blind.4 5 to be frank, history is full of examples of experts talking nonsense. let us take 2 examples. in 1851, the american physician samuel cartwright shed light on what he saw as an important illness in his community. he called it drapetomania. drapetomania was the mental illness responsible for slaves running away from their masters.6 ignaz semmelweis was a 19th century german physician who advocated hand washing. he believed that the high mortality of women after childbirth was due to unsanitary conditions. doctors would perform 40 autopsies and then go directly to deliver babies without washing their hands. although semmelweis’s views seem obvious to us now, at the time they were met with much resistance among his peers. he was widely mocked and his career and reputation were damaged.7 it is easy for us to look back on many of the incorrect and morally abhorrent views of the past, those to do with slavery, hysteria, heliocentrism, phrenology and eugenics (and the accompanying forced sterilizations), and condemn them. but had we been laypeople in that culture, how would we have responded to the authoritarian critics? as laypeople now, how do we know that we are not in a similar situation with respect to some particular topic? of course, no one, or almost no one, actually believes in the limit case of radical authoritarianism. the point isn’t to attack a strawman, but rather to use the view as a foil to introduce the problems and to outline a possible solution to those problems. i doubt that anyone actually believes that it would have been reasonable for a layman to believe in drapedomania and to treat a runaway slave as if he had a medical condition. why? the layman has some epistemic duty, as an individual, to investigate what the experts are telling him. had he done so, he would have seen it for the clear nonsense that it is. while there is something epistemically virtuous in the authoritarian intuition, it must be tempered with the other, more individualistic, more libertarian epistemic virtues. it is to these virtues that i turn in the following section. section 2-the libertarian view let us say that the libertarian view8 is as follows: 9 in believing : (1) (2) ’ (3) ’ (4) 41 . condition (1) is meant to secure our link from the expert to the assertion of proposition . we need to be sure that the expert actually said this, that he intended to say it, and that we have not misunderstood what he said. people can be easily confused or misinformed about what a particular expert has said. something an expert says may be taken out of context or misinterpreted. he may have misspoken or made a mistake at a particular moment that he wouldn’t wish to stand by. condition 2 is meant to address the of the expertise. is e’s expertise the sort of expertise that can support this is not always an easy matter. take, for example, the pandemic, and the various public health policies that have been instituted. when one is considering the various courses of action, clinical doctors, virologists, epidemiologists, biochemical scientists, and even statisticians, they may have something to say about the risks of a certain illness to the public. economists, sociologists, psychologists and public health experts may also have certain policies. goldman’s evidence type c and d apply here. a layman might take into account here, “appraisals by ‘meta-experts’ of the experts’ expertise ( the experts).”10 also the evidence from e’s past track record on a certain topic might provide good evidence that she has a relevant expertise. condition 3 is meant to avoid a situation that might easily undercut an expert’s testimony. of course, this would include cases where an .11 it a group of experts that might give them a particular bias. it might be the case that most bible scholars believe that ‘the bible is the word of god’ (b). it may also be the case that the majority of bible scholars are fervent christians, and one might wonder if this undercuts their testimony. perhaps b isn’t reliably connected to their expert evidence base. itself selects for fervent christians and so there is only an epistemically accidental connection between the expert’s opinion and her membership 42 in the class of biblical scholars.12 . contemporary philosophy of mind tends to attract people who are to reduce the more mysterious qualities of conscious experience to the brain. undoubtedly, these people will be people who think that it’s possible such a reduction can be made. those who are compelled by dualistic arguments are unlikely to spend 20 years engaged in what they view as, quite literally, an impossible project.13 an additional condition (4) is necessary to capture other defeaters because, it is conceivable, that, for whatever reason, an expert could tell me something that is impossible for me to believe. if a scientist of the relevant ilk were to tell me that the sky is red, or that 2 and 2 is 5, i would simply be unable, with my current noetic structure to accept such a view. i doubt that anyone would think it reasonable to believe such a thing based on testimony alone, even having met conditions 1-3. in such cases the expert will have asked us to discard beliefs that are weightier than his erudite pronouncements. these propositions would belong to what goldman refers to as the exoteric aspects of an expert’s claims, those that are relevant to the truth claims of the expert, and yet fall outside of the body of knowledge that constitutes the expertise.14 suppose that a logician shows a layman the following argument: (a) if 2+2=5 then you are a snowman. (b) 2+2=5 (c) you are a snowman perhaps the validity of the argument is esoteric to the logician’s isn’t a snowman are exoteric. they are perfectly within the grasp of the doesn’t have a proper grasp of logical validity. it is also possible, if unlikely, that one could be in a position where he is actually in possession of knowledge that isn’t yet available to the 43 . it is possible that this additional knowledge could provide a defeater for the expert testimony. the epistemic duty of the individual thinker. when confronted with expert opinion, the layman’s duty is to examine (1)-(4) . she will have obtained a defeater just in case she sees that one or more of the conditions above is not met for one reason or other. the libertarian view sees expert testimony as an extension of one’s own cognitive faculties, much like a computer or a telescope. in fact, in trusting the pronouncements of a computer program, an x-ray, or a microscope, one sees almost perfect parallels. the subject matter expert, like the computer or the telescope, allows the layman to see farther and faster than he would ordinarily be able to see, but, unlike the authoritarian, the libertarian insists that he must not abandon his responsibility to ensure that he is using these tools properly. in section 1 we leveled three charges against the authoritarian view, osp, ld and the skeptical challenge. i want to close this section by considering how the libertarian fares by comparison. osp as you will recall, charged that the authoritarian view entails that much, if not . it is known that, many to be a layman, who overturns the consensus view on a certain matter. the libertarian view has a perfectly cogent explanation of how a layman may be the view of an expert. case he sees that the expert testimony has failed to meet conditions (1-4). likewise, the libertarian view avoids the horns of the ld. the epistemic libertarian does not view the layman as being capable of working out the complex and subtle issues that allow him to perceive the and yet unable to resist, . neither . 44 epistemic pursuits in the same manner as he would use a metronome, the pronouncements of these tools in the same way as he is in trusting the pronouncements of the expert. expert testimony, on this view, is not quantifying and summarizing ordinary evidence that is checked and supported in terms of ordinary evidence. neither does the libertarian view fall prey to the problem of skepticism because, on this view, our trust in the experts is not blind. section 3-the consensus view i have dealt with the epistemic role of an individual expert in the heuristic. however, as anyone can tell you, the matter is rarely that simple. when it comes to expert testimony, there are usually various groups of . how do our respective epistemic theories deal with this situation? the authoritarian view here will involve a strong deference to the consensus of the experts. instead of deferring to the individual, in this case, we should defer to the consensus of the relevant group of experts. in the case of a gridlock, we ought to withhold judgment. again, it isn’t clear how much deference is due, but it is clear that the limited case presents serious philosophical problems. again, we must admit that there is some intuitive value to the authoritarian principle. there is something right about it. if a group of medical experts tell us, for example, that a certain antibiotic is the best treatment for bacterial pneumonia, then, prima facie, we are faced with a strong piece of evidence that there is good evidence in favor of the treatment. a group of ostensibly capable people, whose business it is to know what that evidence is, has told us that the evidence for the treatment is overwhelming. the best explanation of the fact that the medical experts are saying this is that they think it is true, and the best explanation for why they think it is true is that it is true. 45 but is it the best explanation? and is the layman really in a position to see that it sometimes isn’t or at least might not be? again, here we must temper authoritarian virtue with more libertarian values. let’s outline the libertarian position as follows: on the basis of the consensus testimony : (1)* the consensus view of the experts (2)* is within the scope of e’s expertise (3)* ’s expert knowledge (4)* s possesses no outside defeater for again, s would acquire a defeater for just in case he became aware that one or more of these conditions was not met. if s were to become aware, for example, that there was a great deal of media censorship on a particular issue this might give him a reason to question condition (1)*, . or if he saw that severe personal and professional penalties were being applied to dissenting experts for no other apparent reason than that they disagreed with the orthodox view, then this might also give s a defeater via questioning (1)*. how can we be sure that we actually know what the consensus view is on a topic if many experts are not allowed to speak? censorship might also call into question condition (3)*. how experts if those who disagree are not allowed to speak? in such a case, dares to disagree with a certain view, or by taking away their right to speak on the topic. how the consensus of the experts ought to inform a reasonable mind. it is . 46 that may arise between them. i think here, the problems raised above, ld and osp, or their analogues, will be even more pressing. ld, the layman’s dilemma, or it’s analogue here, is that either the layman is able to work through the complex issues of determining if there is a consensus, what the consensus view is, what the relevant expertise is, and if the consensus view is reliably connected to the expert knowledge base or not. if he is, then he seems just as competent to assess a group of experts and determine if what they are saying makes sense. it seems absurd that he would be competent as a rational thinker only until he discovered the truth about some expert consensus, at which time he loses all rational ability to dissent from it. authoritarian epistemic view left no room to explain the rationality or . we know that science progresses rapidly, often by overturning old theories. individual, bucks a consensus. all revolutionary theories will, at some point be held by a minority. there was a time, perhaps, when the theory of biological evolution was held only by darwin, or general relativity only by einstein. there were times in history when the heliocentric model would have been a minority view. yet in each case the majority were wrong and the minority were right. authoritarianism provides no answer to the reasonably skeptical question: how do we know, we are not in the same situation now? the libertarian view handles these objections easily. our trust in the consensus need not be blind or undefeatable. the consensus view must runs afoul of conditions (1)*-(4)*.when such defeaters become apparent to the layman, it is reasonable for him to ignore the consensus view. in fact, it may be that the layman has a duty, epistemically or morally, to defy the consensus. i would be remise not to say something of the moral dimension here. 47 oppression that have operated with the full support of the establishment experts. there was a time when the abuses of the eugenics movement, with its forced sterilizations, was said to be supported by the best science of the time. the authoritarian view comes then, not only with an epistemic false beliefs of a particular time, but with a potential hazard-that unquestioning and authoritarian people may follow establishment experts . milgram experiments15 have shown that people are quite susceptible to the blind obedience to authority, and the majority will commit grossly immoral actions if a perceived authority commands them to do so. it is imperative then, not only epistemically, but morally that we endorse a theory that encourages a healthy skepticism of expert testimony.16 section 4-towards integration like goldman, i believe that we can make progress on this issue of expert testimony without resolving some of the more fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony.17 however, it seems clear that the answers we give to it will have to be shaped by the constraints of how . in what view of the epistemology of testimony. expert testimony is within the information transfer view put forward by peter graham (2000). graham considers the view put forth by thomas reid that there is an important analogy between the epistemology of perception and the epistemology of testimony.18 on this view, when someone comes to know something by testimony, what is transferred to the hearer is information. this view contrasts with other transfer views, like those of plantinga or david owens, on which the target of transfer is . 19 20 48 in setting forth the view, graham defends two major propositions: (in) h comes to know that p by accepting that p only if h’s basis for believing that p – h’s internal, cognitive state of taking s as having stated that p – that p. (is) if h’s basis for believing that p – h’s internal, cognitive state of taking s as having stated that p – comes to know that p.21 the view makes sense of the intuition that expert testimony ought to be weighted very heavily in epistemic considerations. expert testimony under certain conditions, this information is more reliable than which comes to us via the layman. i see two main avenues to weld the theory here expressed to graham’s information transfer view. entry point is in the ‘ ’ condition in (is). it might be that something like conditions (1)-(4) or (1)*-(4)* above well describe the (is).22 the second avenue comes by way of graham’s perceptual analogy. perceptual knowledge, says graham, requires that: …one’s belief that is based on adequate grounds. adequate grounds are those that that or that p… one way to understand adequate grounds is in terms of . information carrying is due to a law-like correlation or counterfactual dependence between a signal – an event, condition, of state of – . the rings of a tree, for example, carry the information or the age of the tree. footprints of a certain sort in the snow carry information about wildlife in the vicinity. all of this, 49 however, is to circumstances, to the local conditions that obtain. when a signal carries the information that p it is a guarantee that p. certain tracks or marks in the snow would not be there local wildlife were there...23 it may well be that when one considers those adequate grounds relative to the circumstances of expert testimony, one might well come up with conditions identical to or closely resembling conditions (1)-(4) or (1)*-(4)* above. of information conveyance described in (in), the law like connection between the expert’s testimony and the information that gives rise to the expert’s testimony. it may be that the defeaters one acquires when one runs afoul of (1)-(4) or (1)*-(4)* can best be thought of as a breakdown of information conveyance. there are many questions that remain here about the relationship between the theories. the scope of the present work. the point is that, intuitively, there is general view of testimony within which my views on expert . conclusion i have proposed a general theory here of the proper epistemic role of expert testimony. on this view, expert testimony is a tool that must be used carefully and inspected often by the user. i have described, in rough outline, at least, the conditions under which someone might reasonably disagree with expert opinion. i have contrasted this view with a more extreme authoritarian view whose core tenant is deference to an expert or a group of experts. i have done this not to use the authoritarian view as a straw man, but because this view seems to be fairly commonplace. furthermore, when one considers these more authoritarian viewpoints, it simply isn’t clear when, if ever, someone might have a reasonable disagreement with an expert. if there is a principled place, to the left of 50 libertarianism, but short of the limit cases of extreme authoritarianism that we have been discussing, where one might draw the line of reasonable disagreement with the experts, then i am unable to see it, and invite those of a more authoritarian persuasion to present it. clearly, expert opinion is of great value, and a reasonable person ought to place a great deal of weight on it. clearly deference is due to an expert. what is not clear is how much and under what conditions. this paper attempts to give an answer to these questions, subject of course, to correction by the experts. endnotes 1 chitchanok wanroek demsar teaches at ramkhamhaeng university, thailand. she can be reached at: c.wanroek@gmail.com 2 notion of individual freedom and responsibility based on the concept of natural rights laid out by nozick, locke, etc. or, to take things further still, by ludwig von mises and murray rothbard. see, for example, robert nozick (1974) anarchy, state, and utopia; ludwig von mises (1940) human action; and murray rothbard (1962) man, economy and state. the view emphasizes the rights of the individual and freedom from centralized government control. the parallel, as i see it, involves the discussion over individualism and collectivism. to what extent should authority, political or epistemic, a position on the views themselves or the way in which the terms ought to be used so much as to point out a helpful analogy between questions involving the role and function of political and epistemic authority. 3 my use of the term “authoritarian” is less rigid than others. i mean only views that weigh expert testimony very heavily. lackey describes the authoritarian view as one on which “…the testimony of experts is not one piece of evidence to be weighed with other evidence the hearer might have; rather, experts provide preemptive reasons for belief in the domain of their expertise. moreover, beliefs formed on the discussed above” (lackey 2018, 232). coran stewart (stewart 2019, 2-3) describes that authoritarian view as one in which expert testimony is preemptive. “when a layperson believes on the basis of expert testimony that in the way described here, the layperson 51 as to whether . the layperson gives up deliberating on the matter herself” (stewart 2019, 3). these would be rather extreme forms of what i am calling authoritarianism. lackey argues that one may not be able to obtain a defeater for a belief based on expert testimony. stewart, argues, contra lackey, that one might only acquire a defeater by undercutting the expert testimony that the belief is based on. there are other views, however, that lackey and stewart might consider non-authoritarian, or adviser views, that would be considered authoritarian views in my sense, if they put enough weight on expert testimony, and enough emphasis on deference to expert testimony. 4 john hardwig, “the role of trust in knowledge,” 88, no.12 (1991): 693. 5 alvin goldman, “experts: which ones should you trust?” 63, no.1 (2001): 86. 6 samuel a. cartwright, “report on the diseases and physical peculiarities of the negro race,” , (1852): 707-9. 7 imre zoltán, "ignaz semmelweis," , august 9, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/ignaz-semmelweis. 8 on which expert testimony that does not provide a preemptive reason to believe in , but rather her testimony provides evidence and guidance that should be considered are adviser views that would be considered authoritarian in my sense, if they put enough weight on expert testimony or on the deference to experts. 9 conditions identify an important concept in the epistemology of expert testimony. 10 goldman, ibid, 93. 11 12 absent condition 3, it is easy to use such examples to construct gettier cases, see gettier 1963. 13 or think also of the philosophy of religion, where the majority (perhaps 7080%) are theists (weinberg 2019). it is possible that this majority is explained, not so 14 goldman, ibid, 94. 15 stanley milgram, “behavioral study of obedience,” 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–8. 16 ethics of belief,” in , ed. t. madigan (amherst, ma: prometheus, 1877), 70–96. 17 goldman, ibid, 89. 52 18 peter graham, “conveying information,” 123, no.3 (2000): 366-7. 19 jennifer lackey, “learning from words,” 73, no. 1 (2006): 77. 20 epistemic properties. the information view avoids these counterexamples. for lackey, what matters to testimonial knowledge is the competence of the speaker, which is to be understood in terms of the reliability of her statement. lacky says that the “reliability of framework laid out by graham. 21 graham, ibid, 365. 22 additional epistemic condition will be necessary, in addition to information conveyance, condition in terms of conditions (1)-(4) or (1)*-(4)* above does not address any questions about an awareness condition, or about the presence of reasons or the absence of defeaters that might arise in a proper defense of the view here sketched. see ibid, 368. 23 ibid, 366. 53 references cartwright, samuel a. “report on the diseases and physical peculiarities of the negro race.” , (1852): 691–715. , ed. t. madigan (amherst, ma: prometheus, 1877), 70–96. 23, no. 6 (1963): 121–123. goldman, alvin. “experts: which ones should you trust?” 63, no.1 (2001): 85–110. graham, peter. “conveying information.” 123, no. 3 (2000): 365–392. hardwig, john. “the role of trust in knowledge.” 88, no.12 (1991): 693. lackey, jennifer. “expert and peer disagreement,” in , eds. m. a. benton, j. hawthorne and d. rabinowitz (oxford: oxford university press, 2018), 228-45. l a c k e y, j e n n i f e r. “ l e a r n i n g f r o m wo r d s . ” 73, no. 1 (2006): 77-101. milgram, stanley. “behavioral study of obedience.” . 67, no. 4 (1963): 371–8. stewart, coran. “expertise and authority.” , (2019). https://doi. org/10.1017/epi.2018.43. weinberg, justin. “why are so many philosophers of religion theists?” (2019) https://dailynous.com/2015/01/30/why-areso-many-philosophers-of-religion-theists/ zoltán, imre. “ignaz semmelweis.” , august 9, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/ignaz-semmelweis. 14 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 14-28 © 2000 by assumption university press mass media and propaganda: habermas and the decay of public opinion in contemporary society gerry arambala1 abstract mass media, since its early development has been the sphere where the private individual meets with the political public. it has been the ground for both educating and indoctrinating public opinion. for this reason, interest groups who desire power and control over the masses aspire to take hold of this most powerful tool. in order to better understand the nature of mass media and the extent of control over public knowledge, this paper follows jurgen habermas’ critique of modern-day mass media. and the danger of media control becoming a tool for the elite to dominate the public sphere. such domination leads to the eventual demise of the political public and public opinion, the blood, and the life of a genuinely democratic society. keywords: public sphere; public opinion; democratic society; mass media introduction the rise of the bourgeois society from the 13th to 18th century marked the rationalization of world-historical development with its insistence on the primacy of reason over shared beliefs. civil society was considered to gerry arambala 15 have finally awakened from its deep metaphysical slumber of absolutism and ecclesiastical dogmatism. accordingly, it was in the 13th century that the demise of what jurgen habermas calls “representative publicness,” where the power of the crown took the form of absolute supervision of the people. “civil society came into existence as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority.”2 in the feudal society of the high middle ages, the king, together with his feudal lords, represented themselves publicly as those who held higher power. such expressions as highness, majesty, fame, dignity, and honor are associated with this exercise of power.3 however, this public display of high sophistication and power did not form part of the social lives of ordinary people. habermas writes, “this publicness (or publicity) of representation was not constituted as a social realm, that is, as a public sphere; rather, it was something like a status attribute.”4 anything that does not fit into the determination of a manorial lord, in terms of its value and exalted character, cannot be public. public engagements were limited to the princesses and the knights, while ordinary peasants and town merchants excluded themselves from the crown’s affairs, being passive spectators. interestingly, a new form of representative publicness came into existence during the rise of the early capitalist nobility of northern italy from the 13th to the 15th century, which appeared first in florence and then in france and great britain.5 early forms of trade capitalism of 13th-century europe paved the way for the emergence of bourgeois capitalist societies in the 17th century onwards. within this time frame, the “publicness of representation” of the high middle ages underwent radical transformations from its exclusivist and absolutist representation of high power embodied in the crown to a public representation guaranteed by sound reason and giving priority to the better argument. power in this respect is not a function of status; instead, it is identified with the sovereign character of the people in the public sphere. aside from the genesis of the bourgeois capitalist societies in europe during the 18th century with its highly humanist values, the development of trade and international commerce likewise allowed for 16 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 the eventual realization of the traffic in commodities and news.6 just as the early development of the public sphere was limited to the learned bourgeois and capitalist bourgeoisie, news access were likewise limited to the few elites. the development of the access to news was coterminous with the development of early international trade capitalism. habermas reiterates, “the traffic in news that developed alongside the traffic in commodities showed a similar pattern. with the expansion of trade, merchants’ market-oriented calculations required more frequent and more exact information about distant events.”7 the need for exact and new information from distant lands for trade and security led the merchants to monopolize news distribution. “the great trade cities became at the same time centers for the traffic in the news; the organization of this traffic on a continuous basis became imperative to the degree to which the exchange of commodities and securities became continuous.”8 however, under the monopolistic control of large capital industries aided by the state censorship, the information received by ordinary people (the local town merchants, artisans, and peasants) was fragmented and meticulously scrutinized. it was not in the interest of the state and the elite to allow the dissemination of news information that ultimately served their interest in expanding the market and power entrenchment in politics. to this, habermas asserts, “for the traffic in news developed not only in connection with the needs of commerce; the news itself became a commodity. commercial news reporting was, therefore, subject to the laws of the same market to whose rise it owed its existence in the first place.”9 to be sure, news pamphlets were distributed among the people, nonetheless, only the most insignificant details of an event was permitted to be in public. mass media: a short history the expansion of the scope of human communication was necessary to sustain the organization of early civilizations. habermas recognized the importance of this, “the occurrence of human communication over time and at a distance is much older than the mass media now in use. this gerry arambala 17 process was integral to the organization of each society, which persisted for long periods and extended over large areas.”10 so at the center of every flourishing society stood the importance of human communication. this vitality of human communication in the development and organization of society is best exhibited in how the early state civilizations and church institutions held power over the people. during the high middle ages, the church gained power over the people through the holy scripture and the sermons in the pulpit. however, when the printing press was introduced in the early 15th century, this caused an alarming reaction from authorities, the church, and the state alike. they perceived the emergence of the free press as a threat to their absolute power and domination over the people’s knowledge and beliefs. subsequently, press statements and newsletters that expressed ideas which threated state power were censored by the state’s official censorship boards. “only a trickle of this stream of reports passed through the filter of these “newsletters” into printed journals. the recipients of private correspondence had no interest in their contents becoming public.”11 despite the strict censorship imposed by state authorities on the free press, it nonetheless served its purpose of informing the people. the problem, however, is that since the free press is owned by elite property-owner individuals whose ultimate interest is their profit over producing good information, they “were satisfied with a system that limited information to insiders.”12 this new technologies of printing also replaced the scribes of the early letters with professional authors and editors who produced books, magazines and journals. the application of print technology in the mass production of reading materials revolutionized public relations in its earlier stage. “the successful application of the print technology to the reproduction of texts in place of handwriting, about the mid-fifteenth century, was only the first step in the emergence of what we now call a media institution – an organized set of interrelated activities and roles, directed towards certain goals and governed by a set of rules and procedures.”13 this early introduction of the media institution in the rise 18 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 of modern mass media has led to the liberal formulation of the freedom of the press. the need to ensure freedom of the press – exemplified in the diversity of content in media programming – is grounded in the idea that such diversification of content in mass media offered support to the citizens to maneuver through the murky and muddy waters of democratic engagements. the problem was not whether the public is free to engage with mass media. nonetheless, the commodification of news and information in modern public relations led to the danger where “citizens can find themselves both polarized and paralyzed in a situation of information overload.”14 with the growing number of mass media artifacts and technologies, the world of the press and public relations had grown more potent in commodifying news and entertainment. like its coterminous principle, bourgeois capitalism, the press in the liberal era had entered into the private sphere of commodity exchange. habermas writes, “in comparison with the press of the liberal era, the mass media have … attained an incomparably greater range and effectiveness … on the other hand, they have been moved further out … and reentered the once private sphere of commodity exchange.”15 this integration of modern mass media to commodity exchange would inevitably lead to the manipulation and transfiguration of public opinion to bourgeois false consciousness. mass media and democracy the knot that binds mass media and democracy is similar to the umbilical cord that binds the mother to her children at birth. what sustains democracy in the proper sense is the public; the life and blood of a democratic society runs through the veins of public opinion. hence, a truly functioning democracy presupposes active and critical citizens capable of self-determination through their critical engagements in public discourses that matter to their political lives. over the past decades, people have seen the rapid democratization of the world. nations around the world are beginning to embrace the fundamental principles of liberalism: equality and liberty. it is for this reason that francis fukuyama proclaimed gerry arambala 19 the end of world history. the end of world history is brought about by realizing democracy in the global arena. despite the democratization of the world, democracy remains an abstraction to some, especially in most developing countries. the kind of democracy that has taken form over time is an elite democracy; a democracy that centers upon the few most powerful elites who run the country’s major economic and political systems. they are the transfiguration of the earlier manorial lordships. the only difference is that these new political elites transubstantiate themselves to the role of the divine. their power is no longer limited to a display of grandeur and lordship; these elites can now create a world where everyone lives and thinks according to their design and will. mass media should play the most crucial role in emancipating people from their deep political slumber. but now the control of media under the name democracy denies the press its freedom. indeed, truth has become a costly commodity in our time. furthermore, this control is certainly not by force but by creating in the mind of the public, a false consciousness wrapped in ideas of sovereignty, equality, and liberty. “those at the top understand that the corporate political culture is not a mystically self-sustaining system. they know they must work tirelessly to propagate the ruling orthodoxy, to use democratic appearances to cloak plutocratic policies.”16 from this presupposition, modern media must take the role of the messiah. the messianic role of the media consists in combating the false consciousness that the governing power has inculcated in the minds of the incognizant public. ideally, free media must counter the prevailing consciousness of the current orthodoxy and replace it with what is the truth. such can only be realized when in the process of relaying information, the public is allowed to think for themselves and thereby engage critically in purifying the public sphere. noam chomsky writes, “the role of the media in contemporary politics forces us to ask what kind of a world and what kind of a society we want to live in, and in particular in what sense of democracy do we want this to be a democratic society.”17 20 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 mass media and the democratization process the question of the fundamental role and function of mass media posits a necessity in the transformation and development of modern democracy. the question presupposes a network of problems that are both social and political in structure. moreover, to provide an exhaustive account of the question, one must ponder profoundly and return to the prevailing power structures that generally govern mass media. in the past, mass media communication was regarded as the medium for establishing and promulgating reasonable public opinion. it was primarily conceived as the most potent instrument to combat absolute government rule. mass media communication was regarded as the most powerful tool to liberate the public from the absolutism of the prevailing power structures. however, in recent times, the press may have taken on a different appearance from its intermediary role in forming the public’s political rationality to becoming the worst enemy of public opinion. in the past, a bond existed that necessarily linked the press and public opinion. “the press, the mass communication … had a necessary, conditional relationship to public opinion: without the press, there was no politically effective, reasonable and responsibility-conscious public opinion.”18 indeed, the necessary relationship between the free press and the public in transforming and recreating public opinion is brought about by mass media’s intermediary role as the medium for public critical-rational debate. nonetheless, the idea that mass communication is a medium for public debate and opinion has become a bromide to the majority. mass media today appears to be no longer the medium for reproducing public opinion. it has formed part of the structures that manipulate and manufacture public opinion. indeed, historically mass media was regarded as the most potent medium for liberating the masses from the government’s autarchy. it has become a mechanism for subjugating and pacifying the masses to follow the whims and intentions of the ruling power. “the press was once regarded as the decisive instrument for the liberation of the individual from absolute government, and nowadays we are more inclined to ask ourselves how we can liberate the individual from the gerry arambala 21 spiritual despotism of mass communication media.”19 initially, the role of mass media communication is to question the prevailing orthodoxy and to guarantee the freedom and development of the people through honest and truthful information dissemination. however, what transpired at present is the exact opposite. the free press has become the primary tool of the few elites to manipulate and create a false consciousness to control the citizens. in a functioning democracy, the people are asked to express their thoughts about politics that would serve their purposes. in the same way, they are guaranteed to be listened to by the government. that is, the ruling power accepts and listens to the legitimacy of the people’s appeals. on this note, mass media comes into play as the medium upon which the dialogue between the citizen and the government occurs. indeed, if the citizens are to partake in meaningful political discussions, they need an institutionally guaranteed forum wherein they can critically engage and question the ruling orthodoxy. mass media communication necessarily constitutes the forum where rational-critical debates occur between the citizenry and the established power. “thus the debate about public involvement of citizens in political communication leads to questions about the media as a public sphere where the relations between an established power and the citizenry take place.”20 the process of democratization exemplified in the political communication between the citizenry and the established power takes its full realization through mass media being the public sphere where such relations occur. the role of the press in democratic deliberation is to show that the central democratic values of liberty and equality are respected during the deliberation procedure. moreover, mass communication media must function as the balance that enables the contending voices of the masses to participate in the democratic dialogue. likewise, the free press must articulate quality information and relevant social choices to inform the people properly. finally, the media must participate in democratization by facilitating public deliberation procedures. “failing all these functions, democracy will be undermined. in such a case, the 22 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 media will maintain the status quo by legitimating the power center, marginalizing the contending voices, diluting critical information, precluding genuine options, shortening public debates, and demobilizing collective behaviors.”21 mass media and the demise of public opinion initially, the printing press was regarded as the integral to the public sphere for reproducing public opinion. the free press was tasked to render possible the liberal expression of the people’s sentiments and public opinions over shared political interests. public opinion, in this respect, was identified with the autonomous self-realization of the people engaged in the processes of democratization. it involved the public’s active participation in the critical resistance to political domination through public reason. however, as the ruling power continued to extend its control over the state’s political institutions, they have somehow succeeded in infiltrating the media institutions as well. this absolute control of the polity’s fundamental social and political structures has led to the refeudalization of the public sphere. habermas explains that this refeudalization of society is brought about by linking the private and public realms with their underlying interests in commerce and social labor. they are subsequently being controlled under the monopoly of societal powers.22 it is not the political authorities, but a ruling orthodoxy which now possess the power to manipulate and subjugate the masses and stage the public sphere. chomsky identified them as the specialized class or the business community that manipulates, decides, analyzes, and governs the economic, political, and ideological systems.23 the citizens are made to think that they are free to reform and promulgate their political interests and make political authorities accountable for their decisions. but insofar as they do not form part of the system of control, the public is subtly excluded. habermas writes, “here organizations strive for political compromises with the state and one another, as much as possible to the exclusion of the public; in this process, however, they have to procure gerry arambala 23 plebiscitary agreement from a mediatized public utilizing a display of staged or manipulated publicity.”24 that is because the ruling powers understand they cannot use force to insist on their interests over the masses; they use the most potent instrument for mass inculturation and information. mass media has become the most powerful tool for mass subjugation, inculcating a false consciousness on to the incognizant public. mass media’s “opinion management” has created the false consciousness that the public consumes in the public sphere. the critical stand of habermas’ assertions on the role of mass communication media in the proliferation of public opinion is derived from the presupposition that the public sphere presented in mass media is nothing more than an illusion. public relations in this respect is limited to sheer adoration and conformity to the persona that represent power, similar to the kind of publicity expressed by the kings in the past whose embodiment of divine attributes the people recognize and embrace. publicity is no longer identified with the public’s use of critical reason meant to resist domination in a public debate. “publicity once meant the exposure of political domination before the public use of reason; publicity now adds up the reactions of an uncommitted friendly disposition.”25 this systematic shutting down of publicity, in the sense of the critical exposition of political domination in the public use of reason, has led to the eventual demise of public opinion in the public sphere. “the world fashioned by mass media is a public sphere in appearance only. by the same way token, the integrity of the private sphere, which they promise to their consumers is also an illusion.”26 indeed, with the aid of modern mass media, the ruling orthodoxy has successfully created a pseudo-public sphere where the society of incognizant and mediatized private individuals exist. mass media has successfully disorganized the masses by instigating a false sense of freedom of political engagement to the people, which is limited to a minimum based on the appeal of the ruling elites’ private political interests. furthermore, the media’s transformed the private individual’s public attitude, from the public’s rational and critical dispositions towards the state, to a passive 24 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 consumer consuming public culture. habermas explains, “when the laws of the market governing the sphere of commodity exchange and social labour also pervaded the sphere reserved for private people as a public, rational-critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption, and the web of public communication unravelled into acts of individuated reception, however, uniform in mode.”27 in this manner, private citizens are no longer seen as self-sufficient, self-determining individuals capable of entering into critical rational discourse with the government. instead, they are conceived as the mere consuming individuals. habermas further explains that creating the pseudo-public sphere through the news propaganda proliferated by the ruling orthodoxy is necessary to maintain the illusion of the existence of a critically and rationally attuned citizenry. “public relations fuses both: advertisement must absolutely not be recognizable as the self-presentation of private interest. it bestows on its object the authority of an object of public interest about which – this is the illusion to be created – the public of critically reflecting private people freely forms its opinion.”28 managing opinion inevitably causes the demise of public opinion in the public sphere. it involves ordering political events and the restructuring of the people’s psychological dispositions to fit into the desires and interests of the specialized class is the nature and function of news propaganda. this form of the engineering of consent is masked under the guise of public interest. the idea is that the public is still actively and critically engaged in the democratization process. however, habermas emphatically asserts that a staged public opinion is designed to secure the public interest.29 he writes, “the awakened readiness of the consumers involves the false consciousness that as critically reflecting private people, they contribute responsibly to public opinion.”30 conclusion in the democratization processes, mass media holds a vital role for educating the people by providing truthful information and a proper venue for a rational-critical debate to challenge the the prevailing power. gerry arambala 25 it was always regarded as the most potent instrument for proclaiming truth and questioning the ruling orthodoxy. it was intended to be the public sphere where the critically reflective public can critique and challenge the absolutism of the government. publicity, in this respect, was formerly conceived as the rational resistance of domination by the public use critical rationality. however, things changed when the specialized class of elites emerged on the scene. the business community entrenched itself in power by manipulating everything in the market and politics. with the aid of modern mass media communication, they successfully created the false consciousness needed to keep the masses passive. mass media hid the ruling orthodoxy’s interests under the presupposed liberty of critical engagement and public opinion. the illusion was created is that the public is still capable of contributing to creating public opinion in the public sphere. as noam chomsky writes, “the specialized class, the responsible men, carry out the executive function, which means they do the thinking and planning and understand the common interests. then … the bewildered herd [whose] function in democracy … is to be spectators, not participants in action.”31 in the process of the engineering of consent, the masses are reduced to a “bewildered herd” whose role in the entire democratization process is to sit and watch.32 ultimately, the manufactured public sphere, which mass media and the few elites have created, has led to the disintegration of the public into self-centred private individuals. public opinion, in this respect, bears nothing of its original sense being the product of rational deliberation and contestation against the ruling power. public opinion is a staged opinion created by the specialized class and mediated by mass media propaganda to maintain their control. 26 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 endnotes 1 gerry arambala teaches at mindinao state university, general santos city, philippines. 2 jurgen habrmas, the structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society, trans., thomas burger, (the mit press, cambridge, 1991), 19. 3 ibid., 7. 4 ibid. 5 ibids., 9. 6 ibid.m 15. 7 ibid., 16. 8 ibid. 9 ibid., 21. 10 dennis mcquail, “the rise of mass media,” [article online] available from https://uk.sagepub.com, access in december 15, 2022, p.24. 11 jurgen habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere, 20. 12 ibid., 16. 13 dennis mcquail, “the rise of mass media,” 26. 14 unesco report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development 2017/2018. unesco: paris. 2018. 15 jurgen habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere, 188. 16 micheal parenti, the culture struggle, (seven stories press, new york: 2005), 133. 17 noam chomsky, media control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda, (seven stories press, new york: 1997), 6. 18 elisabeth noelle-neumann, “mass communication media and public opinion,” journalism and mass communication quarterly, vol.36, issue 4, december 1959, p., 402. 19 ibid. 20 livingstone, s., and lunt, p., “the mass media, democracy and the public sphere, talk on television: audience participation and public debate, 1994, p. 10. 21 mohammad sahid ullah, free media, democracy and democratization: experiences from developing countries, journal of global communication, vol. 2., no.2, 2009, p., 345. https://uk.sagepub.com gerry arambala 27 22 jurgen habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere, 231. 23 noam chomsky, media control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda, 13. 24 jurgen habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere, 232. 25 ibid.,195. 26 ibid., 171. 27 ibid.,161 28 ibid., 194. 29 ibid. 30 ibid. 31 noam chomsky, media control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda, 13. 32 ibid. 28 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 references chomsky, noam. media control: the spectacular achievements of propaganda. (seven stories press, new york: 1997). habrmas, jurgen. the structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. trans., thomas burger. (the mit press, cambridge, 1991). livingstone, s., and lunt, p. “the mass media, democracy and the public sphere, talk on television: audience participation and public debate,” 1994. noelle-neumann, elisabeth. “mass communication media and public opinion.” journalism and mass communication quarterly. vol.36, issue 4, december 1959. parenti, micheal. the culture struggle. (seven stories press, new york: 2005). mcquail, dennis. “the rise of mass media.” [article online] available from https://uk.sagepub.com, access in december 15, 2022. sahid ullah, mohammad. “free media, democracy and democratization: experiences from developing countries.” journal of global communication. vol. 2., no.2, 2009. unesco report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development 2017/2018. unesco: paris. 2018. https://uk.sagepub.com 58 prajñā vihāra the morality of criticism and the respect of persons wanpat youngmevittaya university of glasgow, scotland abstract this is a paper in normative moral philosophy, addressing the problem of the respect of persons regarding the activity of criticism. the question is whether the activity of criticism should be considered a moral duty or simply a moral choice? if it is a moral duty, the further question is what, when, and how should we criticize someone if we are required by the moral law to respect persons? i discuss six potential arguments regarding this question, and argue that only one of them is satisfactory and should be set as the standard or the foundation of the morality of criticism. that is, we should criticize someone with the motive of love. i also argue that the criticism virtue would be possible only under the principle of moral particularism, in which this paper means the idea that we all have different roles in fulfilling our moral duties which are the same for everyone, and these different roles are determined by the actual identity of the person. keywords: morality, criticism, love, moral particularism prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 57-70 © 2000 by assumption university press wanpat youngmevittaya 59 introduction: moral philosophy vs. political philosophy how we should criticize one another? are there moral guidelines for personal criticism? according to liberal political philosophy, individuals should be able to criticize someone as they want, given that they do not harm others physically. the respect of persons, according to this view, is simply the protection of persons from any physical violence, or as we all know it as the harm principle. some contemporary liberals may further argue that hate speech should be added to the harm principle, and should be prohibited by law. but this paper will limit itself to moral philosophy rather than political philosophy. the difference is that while the former asks the question of what, when, and how individuals should behave in a particular situation, the latter only asks what individuals should do in their private sphere. we often accept that individuals should be able to criticize someone; given that they do not harm others physically or engage in hate speech. but we may also argue that we should be careful not to criticize someone at all. the respect of persons in political sense is simply that we do not harm others according to law, but the law does not require that we must respect them. under the law, we may hate and criticize others for the sake of our benefits, and exploit them in the sense that we view and treat them as our enemies or competitors. in other words, the respect of persons in the political sense is to abide by the law (the harm principle) imposed on every individual only in the public sphere, not in private sphere. but the respect of persons in moral sense is much more than that. sometimes we may be required by the moral law to view and treat someone not as a means but as an end in themselves. therefore, respect of persons in moral sense is much more demanding and complicated than that of political sense. the main question of this paper is this: what, when, and how should we criticize someone if we are required by the moral law to respect persons? this paper consists of two sections. the first section is morality of criticism. i will argue that there are six main meanings and practices, and only one of them is satisfactory. the second section will argue that 60 prajñā vihāra even though criticism is a virtue and duty of individuals, this virtue should be perceived through moral particularism, that treats individuals not as individuals as such but as particular persons with certain identity, rather than consider them in an abstract sense. section i the foundation of the morality of criticism kantian moral theory teaches us to treat other people as ends in themselves. for instance, kant (1797) argues that we do not respect persons as an ends in themselves if we lie to them even for the sake of the greater good; to lie to them is to use them as a means. to treat one another morally we do not need to take other persons’ ends into account at all; instead we are simply required to respect their capacities of choices or ends; we are required by the moral law to help and assist other people not because doing so would help them fulfill the good life in one way or another, but because doing so would fulfill our own moral duty required by the moral law. even though kant talks about a good will, this does not mean that everyone who has a good will must help others for the sake of helping them achieve the good life but must help others for the sake of the moral law itself. we may be motivated to help others by our sense of sympathy or any other motivations, but the only motive required for the moral law is duty to the moral law itself. kant does not argue that a person with a good will must abandon his or her sense-based motives (e.g. love, sympathy, etc.) at all, but that a person with a good will must always be motivated by the moral duty itself, while other sense-based motives are simply our own moral choices rather than moral duties, as kant writes that “it is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love for them and from compassionate benevolence, or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet our conduct’s genuine moral maxim appropriate to our station among rational beings as human beings, when with proud conceit we presume – as volunteers, as it were – to brush aside the thought of duty and, as independent of command, to want to do merely from our own pleasure what we would need no command to do.” wanpat youngmevittaya 61 in contras t, communitarian moral theory, drawing overwhelmingly from sandel’s thought, teaches us that the respect of persons is to take their choices and ends into account seriously. we should support others to fulfill their ends if it leads them to the good life, and we should discourage them if it does not. according to this view, we are required by the moral law to help others not only with the motive to respect the moral law itself, but also with other motives such as sympathy, love, and commitment; these motivations are not simply our choices but our moral duties in the first place; we must respect other people not only for the sake of the moral law itself, but also for the sake of the good life of those others. another moral theory is what i would call a “utilitarian” moral theory. utilitarianism” usually refers to the philosophy of jeremy bentham and john stuart mill, which argues that the right thing to do is to maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the short term (bentham) and in the long term (mill), my choice of naming a moral theory i will discuss shortly as utilitarian moral theory may be not a good choice because what i mean by “utilitarian” here simply refers to the idea that we should do things for the sake of our own utility rather than the utility of others. according to utilitarian moral theory in my own term, we are required by the moral law to respect persons only to the extent that we do not harm them physically, but we are free to treat them merely as a means for our own ends; we may respect other people simply for the sake of the good life of ourselves. now the question is what we can learn from the three moral theories above? i would propose that what we can learn from them is that there are three motives regarding the respect of persons: (1) to respect persons is to act for the sake of the moral law itself (kantian moral theory), (2) to respect persons is to act for the sake of the good life of those persons themselves (communitarian moral theory), and (3) to respect persons is to act for the sake of the utility of ourselves, given that we do not harm others physically (utilitarian moral theory). and there are two options (actions) regarding criticism: (1) to ignore or not criticize other persons, and (2) to criticize other persons. for the sake of simplicity, i summarize all of these in the following figure: 62 prajñā vihāra actions motives kantian moral theory (1) to ignore persons for the sake of the moral law itself (2) to speak our minds for the sake of the moral law itself communitarian moral theory (3) to ignore persons for the sake of the good life of others (4) to speak our minds for the sake of the good life of others utilitarian moral theory (5) to ignore persons for the sake of the utility of ourselves (6) to speak our minds for the sake of the utility of ourselves now we have six actions regarding the activity of criticism, inspired by three moral theories. i will discuss these six actions in turn, and argue that only action (4) is satisfactory and required by the moral law. however it should be clear that this does not mean that those thinkers (such as kant, sandel, and so on) actually support my arguments, but i simply borrow their ideas to lay out the framework of my arguments. for example, when i argue that kantian moral theory supports action (1) and (2), i do not mean that kant actually thinks so or explicitly says as i would argue; instead i simply want to show how, according to the logic of kant’s argument on the respect of persons, his moral thinking can be applied to the question of the morality of criticism. let’s begin with action (1): we are required by the moral law to ignore other persons choices for the sake of the moral law itself. the reasoning is that a good will requires us to respect any choices other people make, regardless of whether those choices are really good for themselves; if we criticize them about the way they choose or their choices themselves, then we use them as a means for our ends because wanpat youngmevittaya 63 we use our own particular conception of the good as the criterion to judge other people’s ends. for example, if someone asks us if his or her dress is beautiful, then, according to the logic of action (1), we should say neither because giving our opinion is to use our own criterion to judge other people’s choices and to not respect their capacity of choice. we are doing more than what the moral law requires us to do. action (2) argues that we are required by the moral law to speak our minds regarding other persons choices for the sake of the moral law itself. the logic of this argument is this: a good will requires us to respect our own thinking, regardless of whether and how our thinking would affect other people’s sentiments and even our own utility. according to this view, to respect persons is to treat them as an ends in themselves rather than as a means, and to speak our minds is to speak the truth, and to speak the truth is to treat them as an ends rather than as a means for our own ends. for instance, if someone asks us if his or her dress is beautiful, then, according to the logic of action (2), we should say that it is beautiful only if we really think so, and that it is not only if we do not really think so. we speak the truth according to our real thinking not because we want to hurt or please them for our own benefit or even for their own benefit, but because we want to respect the moral law that dictates to us to speak our minds. we show the respect to other persons only if we speak the truth so that other persons would know what we really think of them; they would not feel that they are being used by us for other ends. action (3) argues that we are required by the moral law not to criticize others for their decisions because only they know what will lead to the good life for them. the logic of this argument is this: the respect of persons is not only to respect their capacity of choice but also their choices themselves; we must think that, whatever are their choices, they always choose the good for themselves. for example, if someone asks us if his or her dress is beautiful, then, according to the logic of action (3), we should not give an opinion. this argument differs from action (1) suspends judgement to obey the moral law itself; while action (3) suspends judgement concerning others’ choices. 64 prajñā vihāra action (4) argues that we are required by the moral law to speak our minds regarding other persons for the sake of the good life of those persons. the logic of this argument is this: we should respect other persons by encouraging them to live the good life and preventing them from any choices that would undermine their good lives. in this view, sometimes we should speak our minds along with encouraging them to be confident on their own choices only if their confidence on those choices contribute to the good life. for instance, if someone asks us if his or her dress is beautiful, then, according to the logic of action (4), we should say that it is beautiful or not only if we really think so. we are motivated by our sympathy and desire to see them live the good life. one may question if why we could not do this in action (2)? the answer is that because action (2) argues that we should do things for the sake of the moral law itself, while other motivations are simply our choices rather than our moral duties, so action (2) does not compel us to say that he or she should be confident on his or her choice of dress; we may choose to say it but it is not required by the moral law. in contrast, action (4) compels us to both speak our minds and be sympathetic with other persons; the motivation of sympathy is our moral duty rather than our free choice. action (5) argues that we are not required by the moral law, and we are free to ignore other persons for the sake of the utility of ourselves. the logic of this argument is this: given that we do not harm other people physically, we are free to use others as a means for our own ends, and we should ignore others because this is an efficient way to gain the highest utility for ourselves. action (6) argues that we are not required by the moral law, and we are free to speak our minds regarding other persons for the sake of the utility of ourselves. the logic of this argument is this: given that we do not harm other people physically, we are free to use others as a means for our own ends, and we should criticize others because this is an efficient way to gain the highest utility for ourselves. we feel happy when criticizing others, whether or not our criticism is beneficial to those people, or to society as a whole. as long as we do not harm them physically, we should wanpat youngmevittaya 65 be able to do so. i have discussed all six arguments. now i will show why only action (4) is satisfactory and compatible with the respect of persons and should be set as the standard of the moral law regarding criticism (the morality of criticism). what makes our action moral or immoral depend on the combination of the right action and our motives: doing the right thing for the right reason [morality = (right) action + (right) motive]. a motive is a right reason. our action can be moral only if we convey certain reason to it. in this sense motive is indispensable for our moral actions since we cannot do the right thing for the wrong reason/ motive. the question is what is the right motive to respect persons regarding the activity of criticism? i have discussed three different motives: the motive to respect the moral law itself, the motive to love other people, and the motive to love ourselves. as we can see that the motive to love ourselves is not, indeed, required by the moral law, but it is rather our free choice, this motive is not the right motive/reason that makes criticism moral in the first place. according to this motive, there is no such thing as a morality of criticism because everyone is free to convey any reason to criticism; in other words, there is no foundation of the morality of criticism in the first place. apart from that, this motive also uses people as a means for our own ends, which is clearly incompatible with the respect of persons. according to action (5), we simply do not criticize other people not because we really admire their choice nor even respect their capacity of choice, but because we treat them as a source of our own utility; we do not treat them as a person but as a thing we can use for our own ends. it would be very odd to suggest that this motive should become the moral law or morality of criticism because if this is the case, then the notion that everyone is an end in themself and deserves our respect would be replaced by the notion that everyone is merely a means to be used and underserving of our respect. let’s consider our relationship to someone who has irrational or even destructive beliefs in the supernatural. should we criticize their beliefs and choices? according to the motive of action (1), we would 66 prajñā vihāra keep silent because we do not want to undermine their autonomy, so we would rather leave them alone. according to the motive of action (2), we would be required to criticize them by the moral law to tell them the truth, despite this may make them feel bad. i do not think that these two actions (1 and 2) should become the standard of the morality of criticism because even though they aim to respect persons as an ends in themselves, their understanding and perception of the person is too abstract: they exclude consideration of all ends of the individual person. in other words, they simply respect persons as pure and abstract individuals rather than as emotional and concrete individuals who are motivated by different desires, different conceptions of the good life, and different social positions. the great difference is that while the respect of persons as abstract individuals gives us the feeling that we are respected only because we are simply abstract human beings, the respect of persons as concrete individuals gives us the feeling that we are respected because we are unique and different from others. i would argue that only the second meaning gives true respect to persons. i propose that the right motive of criticism must be the motive of love. at first glance, this proposal seems paradoxical because criticism seems to be the activity that makes someone feel bad, while love seems to be the activity that makes someone feel good. how could we criticize someone with the motive of love? i propose that this is possible only if we embrace the meaning of love in a deeper sense: to love someone is to wish them the good life. this definition of love is not to make someone feel good and stronger in a short term, but to encourage them to pursue the good life. therefore it is necessary to criticize someone when we see that they are deviating from the good life. and we can know whether someone is deviating from the good life only if we know what the good life of a particular person is, and we must take their unique ends and interests into account. we cannot take their interests and ends into account seriously if we do not love them first, as frankfurt (2004, p.37) argues that “loving someone or something essentially means or consists in, among other things, taking its interests as reasons for acting to serve those interests. wanpat youngmevittaya 67 love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons. it creates the reasons by which his acts of loving concern and devotion are inspired.” in this sense, action (3) and (4) come closer to the morality of criticism as they assert that the motive of criticism (or not criticism) is our love and sympathy with other people. their perception of the person is significantly different from action (1) and (2) in that they aim to respect not only the (pure) self but also their ends and goals. however, i would argue that only action (4) is compatible with the morality of criticism. according to action (3), we should not criticize someone even if we want to because if we do so, then we would undermine their good life as we believe that anything they choose and pursue is always good for them. in contrast, according to action (4), we should criticize someone if we see that he or she is doing something harmful to his or her good life; in this view, it is possible that someone else might know better than us about the good life of ourselves. section ii the criticism virtue and moral particularism in the last section i have argued that the morality of criticism must be based on the motive to love other people, and take his or her interests and ends into account seriously before we criticize them. in this sense we not only love individuals as such but also recognize them as emotional and concrete individuals. the problem is that we are required by the moral law to treat equally. but this is impossible in theory and practice. while it is easy to see the practical difficulties, i will focus on the theoretical difficulties of treating everyone equally. the identity of the person is crucial, and the moral theory i would like to introduce for this task is what i call “moral particularism.” moral particularism is often interpreted as the idea that there is no such thing as a universal moral principle; instead different communities have different understandings of what the morality is, so each community has its own standard of morality; a particular action may be a virtue in a particular community but may be a vice in another particular community. however, in this paper, i do not use “moral particularism” that way; instead 68 prajñā vihāra what i mean by “moral particularism” is generally the idea that we all have different roles in fulfilling our moral duties which are the same for everyone, and these different roles are determined by the actual identity of the person, including our community. my argument is that there are two orders of morality: the first-order morality is concerned about the question of “what is the right thing to do?” and the second-order morality is the question of “whom should we do the right thing to in particular?” for instance, the first-order morality may tell us that we have moral duty to help others, and the second-order morality may further tell us that our moral duty to help others is in our own communities. it is important to understand that moral particularism, is a second-order morality, while criticizing someone with a motive of love is a first-order. so i would propose that we should use our more energy to criticize someone who is closer to us in terms of commitment and identity in a particular situation than to someone else who is more distant from us. it is noteworthy that a “particular situation” is a keyword here. without it, we may mistakenly think that we must always do the right thing only to those who are closer to us, which surely causes a conceptual confusion because there is no universal criterion that tells us who else is closer to us. this can be family, neighbors, nationals, etc. eventually this will lead to the failure of the moral duty unless we introduce a standard of judgement: we can know to whom we should have more moral duty with only if we know the situation we are encountering at the moment. for example, if we are in a situation where we are required by the moral law to help two drowning children, one is our own child, another is not, the question is, given that we have time and capacity to help only one child, who should we help first? according to the second-order morality, our moral duty should go first to our own child because of his or her closer commitment and identity to us; in this case we cannot claim either that our moral duty would be equally urgent to both of them or that our moral duty should go first to someone else who is even closer to us than our own child because someone else is out of our particular situation at wanpat youngmevittaya 69 the moment. nevertheless, this does not mean that we should help only our own children; in fact, we are required by the moral law to help them all, but our moral duty to our own child is more urgent and demanding than that to another child. when it comes to the activity of criticism, we also must ask if, given that we cannot criticize everyone with the motive of love equally, who we should offer our criticism? one might question why we must we focus our criticism, rather than criticizing everyone equally? i would say that this is because the activity of criticism with the motive of love is something we need to put our much energy into it; we need to take interests and ends of the person we love into account seriously so that we can know what is good and what is bad for them, in which it is impossible to do for everyone. let’s consider the love between parents and children. parents who really love their children must take their children’s interests and ends into account very seriously so that they can know what is good and what is bad for the life of their children. these parents may love children of their neighbors and also wish them the good life, but their moral duty to their own children must be more urgent and demanding. they are required to criticize their own children even if sometimes they know that doing so would make both them and their children hurt and disturbed, but as a good parent, they must do so with the motive of love. another good example would be the criticism of our own nation. it is mistakenly held by some nationalists and conservatives that we should not criticize our own nation as this always reflects the disrespect of our nation. i would argue that, indeed, just the opposite is true. it is not only possible but also necessary that we have a moral duty to criticize our own nation in several issues such as economics, politics, cultures, traditions, educations, and so on. this is based upon the motive of love. the virtue of criticism is a moral duty; sometimes to fail to criticize someone is to fail to do our moral duty. sometimes we may choose not to criticize our loved one just because we do not want to be criticized in return, but this may be a vice rather than a virtue because it suggests that we 70 prajñā vihāra love ourselves more than our loved one. of course, as frankfurt suggests, it is necessary to love ourselves more than everyone else, but sometimes we have to negotiate between the benefits our loved one would receive from our criticism and the costs we would receive from being criticized. recalling the main question of this paper: what, when, and how should we criticize someone if we are required by the moral law to respect persons in a moral sense? it is difficult to reduce such an argument to a simple statement, since as hegel argues that philosophers need to show how exactly the development of philosophical ideas unfold. however, if i have to try, i would put it this way: we should criticize someone with the motive of love (how). we should criticize when we see others deviating from the good life (when), and we should offer them better alternatives (what). conclusion this is a paper in normative moral philosophy rather than normative political philosophy, whatever suggestions and arguments i would propose in this paper is simply a moral suggestion rather than a political or legal suggestion. i have addressed the problem of the respect of persons regarding the activity of criticism. the question is if the activity of criticism should be a moral duty or simply a moral choice? and if it is a moral duty, the further question is what, when, and how should we criticize someone if we are required by the moral law to respect persons in a moral sense? i have discussed six potential arguments regarding this question, and argue that only one of them is satisfactory and should be set as the standard or the foundation of the morality of criticism. that is, we should criticize someone with the motive of love and wishes the person whom we criticize the good life. i have also argued that the criticism virtue would be possible only if we are governed by the principle of moral particularism, in which this paper means the idea that we all have different roles in fulfilling our moral duties which are the same for everyone, and these different roles are determined by the actual identity of the person. wanpat youngmevittaya 71 endnotes 1 kant, fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals, p.107 2 sandel, liberalism and the limits of justice, p.181 3 sandel, justice: what’s the right thing to do?, p.223 bibliography beiser, f. hegel. new york: routledge, 2005 bentham, j. an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. kitchener: batoche books, 2000. frankfurt, h.g. the reasons of love. princeton: princeton university press, 2004 hegel, g.w.f. phenomenology of spirit, translated by a.v. miller. oxford: oxford university press, 1977. mill, j.s. on liberty. new york: cosimo classics, 2005. ——. utilitarianism. sher. g. (ed.). 2nd edition. indianapolis: hackett publishing, 2001. kant, i. fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals, translated by t.k. abbott. new york: prometheus books, 1988. ——. (1788). critique of practical reason, translated by w.s. pluhar. cambridge: hackett publishing company, 2002. ——. (1797). “on a supposed right to lie because of altruistic motives,” translated by l.w. beck. in beck, l.w. (ed.). critique of practical reason and other writings in moral philosophy. chicago: university of chicago press, 1949. pp.346-350. sandel, m. j. liberalism and the limits of justice. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1982 ——. justice: what’s the right thing to do? new york: farrar, straus and giroux, 2009 prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 53 vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 53-65 © 2000 by assumption university press compassion for the other in levinas and buddhism: the case of the bodhisattva kajornpat tangyin1 abstract the philosophy of levinas, gives a primacy to ethics over ontology, and a primacy of the other over the self. this is something which is also found in the tradition of mahayana buddhism, especially with regard to compassion, and the idea of the role of the bodhisattva. the teaching of mahayana buddhism and and demonstrates how they are connected by their emphasis on the virtue of compassion. both advocate a departure from the ego-self to the compassion for the other. levinas like buddhism other. so reading levinas through buddhism allows us to understand the shift from the western idea of the self to the responsibility towards the other, and it allows us to understand the responsibility the self has towards through buddhism allows us to understand a respect for non-human nature which remains within the framework of keywords: hanh 54 levinas uses the term the “other” ( ) to refer to alterity or otherness in general, and the “other” ( ) to refer to the personal other, and his ethics begins with the encounter with the other in society. the primacy of the other over the “i.” for levinas, the relationship between the self and the other is asymmetrical, similar to the irreversibility of time.2 the traditional philosophy. he says, “the i is the very crisis of the being of a being ( ) in the human… i already ask myself whether my being of my is not already the usurpation 3 so the other is recognized while the self is put the other is beyond any comprehension, or any thematization, or in the other sense the other is beyond any ontological determination. the other is neither initially nor ultimately what we grasp or what we thematize.4 the other to whom we can grasp, thematize, generalize, is not the true other. for levinas, if we could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power.5 the other, for levinas, is not something to be dominated by knowledge and power. he writes that “the relationship with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility.”6 levinas, in his book , continues this discussion when he observes that the other is beyond the graspable, or thematizable, in a manner similar to time. he sees time as beyond any conceptualizing, and prior to any understanding. we experience time but do not possess time, and we have no power over time. likewise, we experience the other but we could not possess the other and have no power over the other. the two things which cannot be understood in the manner of the other things we experience. he says, “the relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy 55 is a relationship with a mystery.”7 this positing of time and the other as mystery leads him consider that our of relationship with the other is similar to our relationship with the future. the future is unknowable, and beyond our grasp. the future is always exceeds our expectations. the future that we speak of of is not the real future. levinas says, “the future is what is in no way grasped…. the other is the future. the very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future”8 when levinas connects the other with time, he accepts the limits of human knowledge to formulate concepts. so he is referring to something prior to our conceptualization. attributes, you are other than i, other otherwise, absolutely other! and indiscernible.”9 alterity of the other must be respected at the moment of the encounter between human beings. otherwise we are tempted to categorize the other as the same, where it becomes only an object of our appropriation. the other cannot be absolutely other if the alterity of the other, levinas says: being, beyond essence, without these formulations taking of goodness are extraordinary possibilities with regard to nature, with regard to the perseverance in being: the possibility of holiness which, beyond the perseverance of a being in its being, would recognize the priority of an irreducible alterity. i think that the true humanity of man 56 begins in this recognition, before any cognition of being, before onto-logy. that is why i said to you that the question of the other seemed to me to be anterior to the problem of ontology.10 for levinas, the irreducibility of the alterity of the other is the moment where the ethical relationship between human beings begins. it is not ontology that remains at the level understanding, or for the sake of knowledge, but it is an ethics, where the alterity of the other is fully respected. any program of reduction of the other to the same, or the return to the self, has to be put into question. in an interview, he claims: “i am to his ontological relation to himself (egology) or to the totality of things which we call the world (cosmology)”11 for levinas, this philosophy of ethics should embrace the whole of humanity. he says, the ethical is not an invention of the white race, of a humanity which has read the greek authors in school and is the human possibility of giving the other priority over exception to that ideal, even if it is declared an ideal of that holiness is incontestable.12 in the above quotation, we can see that he claims that the highest aim of a philosophy of ethics is holiness, and this holiness is the ultimate aim of humanity. this extends even to the examples he uses for the 13 these are real examples of living people that moves levinas beyond abstracts considerations of the other. he is very fond of quoting a jewish proverb: 57 responsibility not through rational principles or the universality of law as in kantian ethics, but through our living relation to the other.14 ethics, for levinas is all about goodness, mercy, and charity. and this ethics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished through service and as hospitality.15 he adds, “i am for the other in a relationship of deaconship: i am in service to the other.”16 re-reading levinas with this in mind connects us to themes in buddhism. for instance, the story in mahayana buddhism of the bodhisattva who delays his attainment of nirvana, because of his compassion for all sentient beings, desires to help every last one of them reach the shore of nirvana before himself. his compassion and responsibility for the other, the privilege he gives to the other, is relevant to the main message of levinas. wing-cheuk chan says, “from the mahayana buddhist that a lives for the sake of others, one can discover that philosophy. indeed, this can be well sustained by the mahayana buddhist doctrine of compassion.”17 more deeply on the nature of true compassion in mahayana buddhism. gadjin m. nagao, in , describes this well: a bodhisattva becomes compassionate toward them he greatly…. his happiness never occurs so long as other independent and special to him.18 58 and never expect anything in return.19 this is the basic characteristic of all bodhisattvas. the ego-self and moves towards a responsibility for the other. levinas limited by itself or within itself. but on the contrary, responsibility extends from beyond self. levinas says, “no one can remain in himself: the humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for the others, an extreme vulnerability. the return to the self becomes an interminable detour.”20 this is similar to the idea of the bodhisattva who carries all his compassion he lives his life for the salvation of the other. this seems compassion, and everyone can become the bodhisattva. thich nhat hanh, the famous vietnamese buddhist monk, says: the essence of love and compassion is understanding, the ability to recognize the physical, material, and the skin” of the other. we “go inside” their body, feelings, and mental formations, and witness of ourselves their 21 the buddhist virtue of compassion, according to thich nhat of compassion of intropathy in general, but makes possible the paradoxical psychological possibilities of putting oneself in the place of another.”22 59 re-reading levinas in this way can also be linked to the animals and the environment. for buddhism, there is no doubt that the five precepts ( ) – (1) not to destroy life, (2) not to steal, (3) not to commit adultery, (4) not to tell lies, (5) not to take intoxicating kill, which means that we have to extend our compassion for all living creatures. thich nhat hanh sees the five precepts as the basic practice in the five mindfulness training: the first mindfulness is about protecting the lives of human beings, animals, vegetables, and minerals. to protect other beings is to protect ourselves. the second is to prevent the exploitation by humans of other living beings and of nature. it is also the practice of generosity. the third is to protect children and adults from sexual abuse, to preserve the happiness of individuals and families…. the fourth mindfulness training is to practice deep listening and loving speech. the fifth mindfulness training is about mindful consumption.23 that includes all living creatures. for levinas, when he echoes the commandment from the mount of sinai “thou shalt not kill” and this commandment means to only human or to all living creatures. john who is my neighbor? the discussion of this question throughout the ages has ranged from asking whether my neighbor is the jew, through whether he is any and every other human being including my enemy, to whether he is to this question would be if we ask not only whether his concept of the neighbor includes god, a question that, in the light of one interpretation of the belief in the death of 60 god, might be deemed by some to purely academic, but the nonhuman animal.24 given to other creatures. when philippe nemo mentioned the biological paradigm that ‘every species lives at the expense of another and one cannot cannot live without killing, or at least without taking the preliminary steps for the death of someone.”25 he elaborates “what is most natural becomes the most problematic.”26 so he seems to acknowledge the biological paradigm but he does not extend his concern to non-human creatures. non-human creatures by using his terms like and . llewelyn remarks: “when asked about our responsibilities toward nonhuman sentient creatures, he is inclined to reply that our thinking about them may have to be only analogical or that the answer turns on whether in the eyes of the animal we can discern a recognition, however obscure, of his has a face.”27 llewelyn, points out that levinas made this very clear, “the face that calls me into question is not the face of the animal.”28 the face that calls me into question is the face of my neighbor, for whom i must be responsible. but there are those like anne primavesi, in the article responsibility to responsibility for other species in the ecosystem.29 this 30 but it must be remembered that levinas lived during the time of war, and he experienced the brutal non-human treatment of human being. the urgency of such a situation is to address the human treatment of the human, or as he writes in the preface of : “everyone 61 will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.”31 the use of buddhism for rereading levinas therefore becomes an interesting task because it has the potential to connect levinas to the idea of a compassion that embraces the whole of nature, human as well as non-human. this task is just beginning and requires deep comparative (pratitya-samutpada). 62 endnotes 1 kajornpat tangyin is a lecturer in philosophy and religious studies at assumption university of thailand and is the director of the center for professional ethics. 2 emmanuel levinas, jill robbins. (ed.). stanford: stanford university press, 2001, 118. 3 emmanuel levinas, michael b. smith. (trans.). new york: columbia university press, 1999, 28. 4 emmanuel levinas, alphonso lingis. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1969. 172. 5 emmanuel levinas, richard a. cohen. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1987, 90. 6 ibid, 76. 7 ibid, 75. 8 ibid, 76-77. 9 emmanuel levinas, 49. 10 ibid, 106. 11 richard kearney, . manchester: manchester university press, 1984, 57. 12 emmanuel levinas, 170. 13 emmanuel levinas, michael b. smith. (trans.). new york: columbia university press, 1999, 97. 14 emmanuel levinas, 114. 15 emmanuel levinas, 300. 16 emmanuel levinas, bettina bergo. (trans.). stanford: stanford university press, 2000, 161. 17 wing-cheuk chan, “the primacy of the other: mahayana buddhism and levinas.” vol.22, october, 1998, 74. 18 19 ibid, 6. 20 emmanuel levinas, alphonso lingis. (trans.). dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1993, 149. 63 21 arnold kotler. (ed.). new york: one spirit, 2004, 81-82. 22 emmanuel levinas, alphonso lingis. (trans.). dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1991, 146. 23 thich nhat hanh, new york: broadway books, 1998, 196-197. 24 john llewelyn, “am i obsessed by bobby? (humanism of the other animal).” in robert bernasconi & simon critchley. (eds.). bloomington: indiana university press, 1991, 234. 25 emmanuel levinas, richard a. cohen. (trans.). quezon city: claretian publications, 1985, 120. 26 ibid, 121. 27 john llewelyn, “am i obsessed by bobby? (humanism of the other animal),” 240. 28 ibid, 242. 29 anne primavesi, “biodiversity and responsibility: a basis for a non-violent environmental ethic.” in ursula king. (ed.). . new york: cassell, 1998, 52. 30 colin davis, colin. indiana: university of notre dame press, 1996, 140. 31 emmanuel levinas, 21. 64 references chan, wing-cheuk. “the primacy of the other: mahayana buddhism and levinas.” . vol.22, october, 1998, pp.71-83. davis, colin. . indiana: university of notre dame press, 1996. hanh, thich nhat. . new york: broadway books, 1998. __________ . arnold kotler. (ed.). new york: one spirit, 2004. levinas, emmanuel. . alphonso lingis. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1969. __________ . richard a. cohen. (trans.). quezon city: claretian publications, 1985. __________ . richard a. cohen. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1987. __________ . alphonso lingis. (trans.). dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1991. __________ . alphonso lingis. (trans.). dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1993. __________ . michael b. smith. (trans.). new york: columbia university press, 1999. __________ . bettina bergo. (trans.). stanford: stanford university press, 2000. __________ . jill robbins. (ed.). stanford: stanford university press, 2001. 65 kearney, richard. . manchester: manchester university press, 1984. llewelyn, john. am i obsessed by bobby? (humanism of the other animal). in robert bernasconi & simon critchley. (eds.). . bloomington: indiana university press, 1991. primavesi, anne. biodiversity and responsibility: a basis for a nonviolent environmental ethic. in ursula king. (ed.). . new york: cassell, 1998, pp. 47-59. eugene victoriano de guzman 51 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 51-58 © 2000 by assumption university press a review of contemporary approaches to anselm’s ontological argument eugene victoriano de guzman1 abstract the ontological argument for the existence of god is an age-old argument. but it still has power and is debated in contemporary times. this article will review the debate concerning maximality in relation to the monk guanilo’s parody of anselm’s argument with his example of the “perfect island.” alvin plantinga attempted to defend anselm and the validity of the ontological argument by showing that maximality does not apply to existing entities but to god alone. brian garrett defends the objection of guanilo by defending the idea of the maximal in relation to an island. finally, edgar danielyan, defended plantinga against garrett. the author shall stand on behalf of anselm’s defenders to reiterate the coherence and validity of the argument. the “something-than-which-nothinggreater-can-be thought,” or god, cannot be replaced or substituted by any worldly existing entities, for example, the perfect island. keywords: maximal properties; ontological argument; proof for the existence of god 52 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 the arguments for the existence of a divine being is a perennial topic of philosophical theology. the topic has echoed from the medieval ages up to contemporary times. the last few years have seen a revival of interest in the subject.2 saint anselm of canterbury’s ontological argument for the existence of god is one of the notable and prominent arguments among others. it has even been one of the central topics of some debates and dialectics particularly on the matter of its logical, metaphysical and epistemological structure and coherence. these concerns paved an avenue for some intellectuals to furnish their reservations and criticisms. so far, the most clangorous and central debates centers around gaunilo’s parody of anselm’s ontological argument. namely, between brian garrett’s defense of gaunilo in his essay on behalf of gaunilo and anselm’s enthusiast defender alvin plantinga. this article will review the debate concerning maximality in relation to the monk guanilo’s parody of anselm’s argument with his example of the “perfect island.” alvin plantinga attempted to defend anselm and the validity of the ontological argument by showing that maximality does not apply to existing entities but to god alone. brian garrett defends the objection of guanilo by defending the idea of the maximal in relation to an island. finally, edgar danielyan, defended plantinga against garrett. the author shall stand on behalf of anselm’s defenders to reiterate the coherence and validity of the argument. the “something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be thought,” or god, cannot be replaced or substituted by any worldly existing entities, for example, the perfect island. the ontological argument for god’s existence is anselm of canterbury’s most famous contribution to the history of western philosophy. the argument begins with the claim is that god is somethingthan-which-nothing-greater-can-be thought. he directs the argument to the “fool” mentioned in the psalms, who in his heart, believes that there is no god above. anselm points out that in order to deny god requires that you understand what you are denying. thus, even the fool can ‘understand’ the definition of god. therefore, god exists as an idea in the understanding. eugene victoriano de guzman 53 the proof goes on to show that the very idea of god also implies god’s existence. so even the fool must accept the existence of god. anselm’s argument may be formulated as follows: (a) i have, within my understanding, an idea of god. (b) this idea of god is the idea of a being that is the greatest that can be conceived or something-than-which-nothinggreater-can-be thought. (c) a being is greater if it exists in reality than if it exists only in the understanding. (d) if god (the greatest conceivable being) exists in the understanding alone, then a greater being can be conceived, namely one that also exists in reality. (e) but premise (d) is a contradiction, for it says i can conceive of a greater being than the greatest conceivable being. (f) so, if i have an idea of the greatest conceivable being such a being must exist both in my understanding and in reality. (g) therefore, god exists in reality. anselm provides another version of the argument in proslogium chapter iii. the argument repeats the first two premises as the preceding argument, but then takes a different direction. instead of talking about existence as such, it focuses on the property of necessary existence. this version of the proof argues that necessary existence must be attributed to a being that is perfect to the maximal degree.3 (a) i have an idea of god (b) this idea of god is the idea of a being, which is the greatest that can be conceived. (c) a being whose nonexistence is impossible is greater than a being whose existence is possible. 54 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 (d) thus, if the greatest possible being’s nonexistence is rationally conceivable, then he is not the greatest possible being. (e) but the premise (d) is a contradiction. (f) so, the nonexistence of the greatest possible being cannot be rationally conceived. (g) therefore, god necessarily exists. both versions of anselm’s argument attempt to deduce god’s existence from his essence. unlike the other traditional account on god’s existence, which begin with empirical facts and proceed to the conclusion that god’s existence alone can satisfactorily explain the empirical world, the ontological argument makes no appeal to the empirical world at all. instead, it attempts to demonstrate that god’s existence is necessary. by his essence, his existence logically follows.4 anselm’s main critic at the time was named gaunilo who had parodied anselm’s argument with the legend of an island that possesses an incomparable abundance.5 his point is that if god’s maximal essence implies his existence, shouldn’t the example of a maximal island imply its existence? “you cannot any more doubt that this island that is more excellent than all other islands truly exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt that it is in your mind; and since it is more excellent to exist not only in the mind alone but also in reality, therefore it must needs be that it exists. for if it did not exist, any other island existing in reality would be more excellent than it, and so this island, already conceived by you to be more excellent than others, will not be more excellent.”6 since such an argument is seemingly unsound, anselm’s argument must be unsound too? anslem himself replies to guanilo by simply stating that it is only for god that existence follows essence. but in contemporary times, alvin plantinga points out that gaunilo’s parody fails because it is not analogous to anselm’s argument because of god’s great-making eugene victoriano de guzman 55 qualities, or omni-properties, are maximal. the maximal is a quality that cannot be possessed to a greater degree. on the other hand, the greatmaking qualities of an ‘ideal island’ are non-maximal, or they can always be possessed to a greater degree. meanwhile, brian garrett in his essay titled on behalf of gaunilo attempts to defend that the qualities of the island can be considered maximal.7 he writes: “but are the great-making qualities of an island nonmaximal? it is good for an island to have coconuts, but not too many. a warm sea can always be hotter, but not consistently with still being warm. there is an upper limit to warmth (similarly for sunnyness). whiteness also seems to be maximal. it is implausible that for every white shade there is a whiter one. properly understood, the greatmaking qualities of an island are maximal. we can make this explicit by defining the perfect island as the island of ideal size, possessing the ideal number of coconuts, ideally white sand, ideal sea and air temperature, etc. since these qualities are intrinsically maximal, plantinga’s riposte to gaunilo’s parody collapses.”8 as this debate continues, edgar danielyan in his essay entitled on behalf of st. anselm tries to refute garrett’s declaration that the ‘ideal qualities that describe that perfect island can be considered maximal. by asserting that: “gaunilo’s island by way of ‘ideal’ attributes does not save it from the peril of incoherence and thus plantinga’s riposte stands. garrett accepts that ‘without the assumption that there is exactly one ideal size for an island [emphasis added], there would, for example, be no absolute ideal number of coconuts, just different numbers for differentsized islands.’ it is therefore enough to refute garrett’s argument by showing that either there is not exactly one ideal size for an island or that the concept of ideal size of an island is incoherent, circular or empty. garrett provides 56 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 no justification for assumption that there is exactly one ideal size for an island despite accepting that the whole argument hinges on such assumption. ergo, there is not exactly one ideal size for an island. ergo, there is not exactly one ideal size for an island. therefore, plantinga’s assertion that the great-making of an island are non-maximal remains justified and that the ‘greatest conceivable island’ is an incoherent concept stands.”9 having laid out the existing debate on anselm’s ontological argument, i would like to defend anselm’s ontological argument and affirm edgar danielyan’s reply through these points (i) gaunilo’s lost ideal island is not maximal in opposition to brian garrett’s claim. (ii) the “something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be thought”; god cannot be replaced or substituted by any worldly existing entity. reflecting on these points, any material or conceptual entities that exist aside from “something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought” [god] possess non-maximal qualities. due to the reason that these qualities are relative and quantitative compared to the maximal qualities of god, which is objective and qualitative in nature as plantinga. another thing is that, non-maximal qualities are a posteriori to human understanding, and maximal qualities of god are a priori to human faculty of mind—he is the very definition of perfection [omni-properties]. the maximal qualities of god necessitate his existence (premises d-e). in order to be “somethingthan-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought” entails actual existence and not only in the mind.10 meanwhile, non-maximal qualities of material entities do not furnish necessary existence but mere contingent existence. god is something than which nothing greater can be thought. if this is so, he must exist both in mind and actual realm. therefore, god exists. whereas, eugene victoriano de guzman 57 let say x island is an ideal island a man can think of. to be an ideal island does not necessary to exist in actual world, it can exist only in mind. thus, x can either exist or not. these formulations above summarized the author’s point and reply to garrett’s defense of gaunilo’s objection to anselm’s ontological argument. this article also argues that defining gaunilo’s island by way of “ideal” attributes given by brian garrett does not save it from incoherence and plantinga’s riposte stands.11 the something-than-which-nothinggreater-canbe-thought cannot be parodically substituted to any human material entities due to gap between non-maximal and maximal qualities. endnotes 1 eugene victoriano de guzman is a ma student at de la salle university and a lecturer at mindoro state university, philippines 2 johnson o. “god and st. anselm.” the journal of religion 45: 362-334, 1965. 3 lawhead w. the voyage of discovery: a historical introduction to philosophy fourth edition. united states of america: stamford, cengage learning, 2015, p. 165-166. 4 johnson “god and st. anselm,”. 5 brian garrett. “on behalf of gaunilo.” analysis 73: 481-482, 2013. 6 gaunilo, 1965, 163–65 7 ibid. 8 garrettt, 482 9 edgar danielyan, “on behalf of st. anselm,” analysis 75: 405-407, 2015. 10 charlesworth mj. st. anselm’s argument. in: sophia studies in crosscultural philosophy of traditions and cultures vol 30. switzerland, springer, 2019, p. 105-114. 11 danielyan, “on behalf of st. anselm,” 58 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 references charlesworth max. j. st. “anselm’s argument.” in: sophia studies in cross-cultural philosophy of traditions and cultures vol 30. switzerland, springer, 2019, p. 105-114. danielyan, edgar. “on behalf of st. anselm.” analysis 75 p. 405-407, 2015. garrett, brian. “on behalf of gaunilo.” analysis 73 p. 48-482, 2013. ____________. “some comments on a modal ontological argument” prajñā vihāra 5:2 p. 1-5, 2004. johnson, oliver. “god and st. anselm.” the journal of religion 45: 362-334, 1965. lawhead, william. the voyage of discovery: a historical introduction to philosophy. fourth edition. united states of america: stamford, cengage learning, 2015, p. 165-166. saiping an 21 prajñā vihāra vol. 17 no 2, july-december 2016, 20-38 © 2000 by assumption university press chin kung: a “potential” humanistic buddhist saiping an mahidol university, thailand abstract the paper aims to demonstrate that chinese buddhist monk chin kung’s theory of “buddhism as education” exemplifies humanistic buddhism, even though he never made that claim himself. humanistic buddhism is a buddhist revival movement in china of the 20th century, which emphasizes this life and this world while playing down concerns about the afterlife and other worlds. it highlighted rationality, with the demotion of buddhist mystic and supernatural elements. humanistic buddhism embodies an inevitable tendency in modern and contemporary development of chinese buddhism, and chin kung lives in the same era. therefore this paper attempts to demonstrate chin kung’s theory and practice of “buddhism as education” can be seen as a contemporary example of humanistic buddhism and chin kung is a “potential” humanistic buddhist, in order to offer a reference to future study on more “potential” humanistic buddhists like chin kung in china. 22 prajñā vihāra chin kung: a buddhist “educator” chin kung, whose lay name is yehong, xu, was born in 1927 in lujiang county, anhui province of china. in his early life he studied buddhist sutras, history and philosophy under the guidance of eminent scholars and buddhist dharma masters in taiwan. he is also well-versed in other buddhist schools, and in the teachings of confucianism, taoism, catholicism, islam and other religions. after he became a monk in 1957, he began lecturing and propagating the buddha’s teachings throughout the world.1 chin kung regards buddhism as education, rather than a religion. it has become the emphasis of his buddhist teaching. facing the decline of modern chinese buddhism, chin kung criticized its spirit worship and devotion to supernatural beings. this led him to develop his approach for propagating the dharma and his theory of “buddhism as education.” he has been invited to australia, the united states and other places for preaching buddhism and founded various international buddhist organizations like pure land learning college, buddha educational foundation, and others. these institutions are not named “temples”, but have a more academic meaning. unlike other buddhist masters, he has never become an abbot of any temple, which follows his wish of being identified as an “educator” rather than a “missionary.” chin kung attaches great importance to role of “buddhist education” in life, society and the world, in particular the role of buddhist moral and ethical education, and hope to use education to resolve conflicts and promote world peace. he has acquired many honorary doctorate degrees and titles of honorary professor from various universities in the world. during the time he lived in united states, he has been awarded the honorary citizen both the state of texas and the city dallas.2 the theory of “buddhism as education,” is the ideological achievement of chin kung’s active promotion of buddhism in a contemporary context, and is also a theoretical attempt to combine buddhist theory with modern society through the mahayana buddhist saiping an 23 spirit of worldly care. as a typical example and prominent representative of the emerging buddhist modernization movement, chin kung’s theory of “buddhism as education” is worth emphasizing and studying. humanistic buddhism as an inevitable outcome in chinese buddhist development in the 20th century, humanistic buddhism came into being and quickly became a powerful buddhist movement in china. it began to exert a much more profound influence in chinese buddhist circles than any individual theories of any influential chinese buddhist masters. it has been generally accepted and vigorously developed by various modern chinese buddhists and has been even regarded as the guideline for the development of the chinese buddhism.3 humanistic buddhism began as a response to the decline and marginalization of chinese buddhism in modern times. the encroachment of western colonial power had resulted in a significant decline of chinese buddhism.4 buddhism was gradually marginalized and reduced to rites involving funeral services and other ceremonies. buddhist monks withdrew from society and went to the mountains to seek personal liberation. in this context, humanistic buddhism rose as a buddhist revival movement in china of the 20th century, which was initiated by master tai xu (1890-1947). tai xu suggests that original intention of buddhism has always been concerned about real life, rather than retreat from the human world. tai xu proposed the theory of “renjian fojiao (humanistic buddhism).” “humanistic buddhism” initiated by tai xu, and promoted by various chinese buddhists in posttai xu period, has two notable features. first, humanistic buddhism emphasizes rationality, with less emphasis on the sacred. for the attainment of ultimate goal, it emphasizes rational ways, with a demotion of mystical religious experience and obscuring of divine power. it shows strong rational characteristics. humanistic buddhism focuses on cultivation of ethics in this life, which is a compulsory approach to ultimate spiritual goal of buddhism. for 24 prajñā vihāra example, tai xu believes that the first step of learning buddhism is to learn how to be a good individual. to be a good person in reality of life, and then gradually “evolving into a buddha.” this is what he frequently mentioned “the perfection of personality is equivalent to attainment of buddhahood.”5 second, humanistic buddhism focuses on this life, the improvement of this imperfect world. it stresses life rather than death. this is reflected in its concept of time and space. in terms of time, it is concerned with this life and ignores the afterlife and buddhist concepts like karma or samsara. in terms of space, humanistic buddhism also is concerned with this world, focusing on the improvement of life and this world, against world-weariness and detachment from this world, or the devotion to the world on the “other side” as one finds in pure land of sukhavati. rather it attempts to adapt to modern society through a variety of secular means and participates in various secular movements, in order to comply with a variety of secular goals. it reduces the criticism and even increases the positive affirmation of this world, though buddhism regarded this world as “saha” which means bearing and enduring suffering. this is reflected in the ultimate goal of humanistic buddhism of seeking a pure land in this world by purification of human mind rather than a pure land in buddhist cosmology.6 as tai xu pointed out, humanistic buddhism embodies a buddhism that accords with both dharma principles and human dispositions,7 humanistic buddhism is a “compromise” for its survival and adaptation to a certain era. modem chinese buddhism was in the edge of social life. in such a situation, if buddhism attached too much emphasis on super-human, otherworldly or mysterious buddhist concepts, with a divorce from rationality and this worldly care, with a loss of function of saving the world and benefiting the people, it is bound to be marginalized and even to be eliminated. in the post-tai xu period, humanistic buddhism is also a buddhist form which caters to chinese socialism, which was originally based on marxism-leninism, an atheistic and materialistic ideology. buddhism saiping an 25 also attempts to adjust to and serve the socialist order in the chinese political context. also, humanistic buddhism is not just a passive adaption to society, it also reflects the buddhists’ positive response and sense of responsibility to a variety of social problems and crises. many urgent problems today have threatened the survival of mankind. older buddhist teachings which emphasize meditation or nirvana are unable to lead to solutions to these problems. humanistic buddhism encourages buddhists to first solve the immediate problems through buddhist teachings and values, before pursuing nirvana and ultimate liberation. as an influential contemporary chinese buddhist master living in the same era with humanistic buddhism, in order to adapt to the times, chin kung’s buddhist theory more or less coincides with the thought of humanistic buddhism. buddhism as education and the de-emphasis of the sacred chin kung’s theory of “buddhism as education” highlights the rationality of humanistic buddhism. chin kung criticized “religious buddhism” or “superstitious” buddhism, as actually weakening the sacred aspects by mixing it with supernatural elements. he believed that “religious buddhism” has been distorted by superstition.8 buddhism was widely regarded by chinese people to be making offering to the buddha statues or praying for blessings and fortune. from the perspective of chin kung, unlike other religions, buddha is not a supreme god, the buddhahood is open for everyone, pure devotion to the buddha does not make any sense. the “parable of the raft” in the buddhist sutras supports chin kung’s argument. the buddha only gave people a “raft (dharma),” but people are supposed to go across the “river (samsara)” by themselves.9 engels said: all religions are nothing but the reflection of illusion in people’s minds from the external forces that dominate the daily life of people, in this reflection, shared power takes the form of super-human strength.10 26 prajñā vihāra according to this definition of religion, buddhism is still a religion with a belief in various super-human strength. the principle of buddhist teachings contain super-human elements, like the karma, samsara, rebirth in pure land, the power of mantra and so forth. in mahayana buddhism, buddha also have various characters of god. visible. but according to chin kung, the buddha “is a compulsory social educator, had never sought compensation, completely for fulfillment of his obligations.”11 buddhism is an education regarding the truth of the universe (our living environment) and the life (ourselves), the education of how to get rid of erroneous thoughts and attaining the complete wisdom to understand life and the universe with the aim of ending suffering and living in harmony with the world.12 and for the approach of attainment of the ultimate goal of buddhist education, chin kung pointed out “five subjects” : namely “three acts of pure karma,” “the six harmonies,” “the three learnings,” “the six paramitas” and “the ten great vows of universal worthy boddhisattva.” it suggests that, to achieve the ultimate goal of buddhism, one must attach more emphasis on the ethical practices of mahayana buddhism, while playing down supernatural elements like mantras or chanting. in fact, all of the five “subjects” are from the buddhist scriptures. chin kung pointed out that each one is a way people deal with their daily lives. for instance, the “three acts of pure karma” teaches people to practice the filial piety loving-kindness in their lives. “the six harmonies” teaches the principle of coexistence with the public in a community. “the six paramitas” teaches the guidelines for dealing with other people in one’s life.13 chin kung also made an “educational translation” of buddhism from various aspects. in terms of appellation, buddha and his disciples is a teacher-student relationship, while in other religion, it is difficult to find such a relation. in terms of organizational structure, chin kung regards temples as combination of buddhist universities and museums, rather than religious places, buddha and bodhisattva statues are symbolisms of the virtues, like guan yin bodhisattva represents infinite compassion. saiping an 27 “guan yin bodhisattva, the most popular bodhisattva in china, represents infinite compassion. when we see this statue, it reminds us to apply compassion when dealing with the world, its people and surroundings. however, people nowadays worship guan yin bodhisattva as a god and pray for the relief of suffering and to eliminate obstacles. this is a superstitious view and misconception.”14 for chin kung, the term “arhat, bodhisattva and buddha” are just different levels of buddhist cultivation, rather than supernatural beings, just like degree system in school education. however, chin kung seems to fail to notice that, there are a great deal of “superstitious” content like the buddha saving sentient beings with supernatural powers as well as practices of reciting the buddha’s name for the relief of suffering in mahayana buddhism. for example, the lotus sutra says: “if any of the countless hundreds of thousands of myriads of kotis of living beings who are undergoing all sorts of suffering hear of gwan shr yin bodhisattva and concentrate on reciting his name, gwan shr yin bodhisattva will immediately hear their voices and deliver them. if a person who upholds the name of gwan shr yin bodhisattva enters a great fire, the fire will not burn him, all owing to this bodhisattva’s awesome spiritual power.”15 similarly, various mahayana scriptures like the sutra of the medicine buddha and the sutra of bodhisattva ksitigarbha’s fundamental vows also mentions contents of “unconditional” salvation through praying for buddhas or bodhisattvas. apparently, chin kung emphasizes the buddha’s virtues, with a demotion of worship of these mysterious powers. it reflects chin kung’s objection to regard buddhas and boddhisattvas as omnipotent supernatural beings, and his effort to rationalize buddhism. it is consistent with the direction of reform of humanistic buddhism. 28 prajñā vihāra sukhavati as a university rather than a paradise: chin kung’s humanistic view on pure land buddhism normally buddhism has been regarded as atheism and a humanistic religion, probably this argument is difficult to be applied to a special mahayana buddhist school, pure land buddhism. this buddhist school believes there is a pure land like the heaven in christianity, in this land there is buddha called amitabha like the god in christianity. believers can be reborn in the pure land by mindfulness of buddha and devotion to amitabha. the approach for salvation is pretty like that in christianity. pure land buddhism, because of its ease of practice, has become a popular contemporary chinese buddhist school, it can be said that contemporary chinese buddhism is pure land buddhism. however, this theistic buddhist school is difficult to reconcile with humanistic buddhism and chin kung’s theory of “buddhism as education.” while as a pure land buddhist master, chin kung actually has transformed pure land buddhism into a humanistic buddhist school. according to pure land buddhism, the traditional mahayana approach of gradual spiritual cultivation is very tough. in other buddhist schools, practitioners are supposed to go through a long period of discipline, in order to purify all kinds of bad karma, and cultivate enough good karma to achieve the ultimate goal of buddhahood. however, in pure land practice, one is able to achieve “rebirth in pure land with karma (ch. daiyewangsheng).” even an individual who had accumulated boundless bad karma, as long as he chants the buddha’s name, and relies on amitabha’s power, will be reborn in the pure land through his faith and vows.16 it can be regarded as an easy salvation through other-worldly powers and other-worldly concerns. in comparison, humanistic buddhism is concerned about this world, it correspondingly proposes a theory of the establishment of “a pure land on earth,” opposing seeking a pure land in the “other world.” chin kung regarded buddhism as education, and did an educational translation of pure land buddhism. here it is considered saiping an 29 through three aspects, namely: his concept of pure land of sukhavati, his view on mindfulness of amitabha and his emphasis on the “three acts of pure karma.” first, he regarded pure land of sukhavati as a university for “continuous education.” (buddhist cultivation), a “transfer station” to buddhahood, rather than a heaven or a paradise for enjoyment. western pure land of sukhavati is a school. buddha’s career is teaching, our career is seeking knowledge. buddha recommended us to be a student and to attend classes every day in pure land........ the aim we reborn in there, not for anything else, is like studying abroad, to enrich our wisdom and virtues, then come back to help those suffering beings......the purpose of the pure land is to train buddhas and bodhisattvas.......pure land is definitely not only our refuge. there are only two careers there: teacher and student......there is no worker, farmer or business man there.17 it suggests that rebirth in pure land does not mean the attainment of nirvana, one who has achieved rebirth in pure land is still required to continue to learn and practice. this world is called “the evil world of five turbidities”18 in which there is no good “learning environment” and no good instructors. in comparison, the pure land is like a “university”. second, in chin kung’s view, mindfulness of buddha is not simply a devotion to buddha, or chanting the name of amitabha as well as mental visualization of amitabha and pure land, but means mindfulness of buddha’s virtues and implementation of them into everyday life.19 for the establishment of the buddha-land, the infinite life sutra described amitabha as one who had accumulated merit and amassed virtues during countless kalpas. chin kung seems to remind believers that even the “teacher” amitabha had not achieved his residence in pure land of sukhavati merely through buddha name chanting, but through the accumulation of countless virtues. in his buddhist education, amitabha is also a teacher and role model. for “students,” only chanting teacher’s name is of no use, one must learn from 30 prajñā vihāra teacher’s virtue accumulated in the past as well as teacher’s great compassion of helping all living beings. last, emphasis on buddhist ethical practice, like “three acts of pure karma” in the sutra on contemplation of amitayus. 1. caring for one’s parents, attending to one’s teachers and elders, compassionately refraining from killing, and doing the ten good deeds; 2. taking the three refuges, keeping the various precepts and refraining from breaking the rules of conduct; 3. awakening aspiration for enlightenment, believing deeply in the law of causality, chanting the mahayana sutras and encouraging people to follow their teachings.20 however, these ethical practices are normally regarded as auxiliary practices by pure land buddhism, and not necessary requirements.21 but for chin kung, these ethical practices are necessary conditions for rebirth in sukhavati, for one who even fails to be a good man, cannot become a buddha. for instance, chin kung regards buddhism as education, education is respect for teachers, but in chin kung’s opinion, respect for teachers is fundamentally based on filial piety, one who does not act filially towards parents will naturally not respect his teachers. without respect to teachers, then the whole buddhist education will be an empty talk.22 chin kung’s educational transformation of pure land buddhism, has changed it from an “easy way” into a “tough way.” it is chin kung’s “compromise” for pure land school to adapt it to seek societal development. a buddhist sect which merely concerns about a world of “other side” or concepts like supernatural power of buddha, with a lower of buddhist ethics, is hard to gain a footing in modern and contemporary china. therefore, chin kung attempts to transform this most influential chinese buddhist sect into a humanistic, ethics-centered and rational sect. in this sense, though chin kung has not yet clearly stated he is a proponent of humanistic buddhism, but it can be said chin kung is a “humanistic pure land buddhist.” saiping an 31 education rescue crises: chin kung’s social engagement humanistic buddhism focuses on this life, the improvement of this mundane world and building a pure land on earth. it adapts to modern society through a variety of secular means. chin kung is also a socially engaged buddhist, who participates in various secular movements, in order to achieve a variety of secular goals through application of his idea of “buddhist education.” it is mainly reflected in his promotion of peace as well as promotion of ethical and moral education. for chin kung, misunderstandings between different religions and cultures is an important factor which leads to all kinds of conflict and wars between nations. so he attached a great importance to peace between various world religions and diverse cultures. he has enhanced mutual understanding and corporation between different religious groups in singapore, indonesia and australia and so on. and his weapon to unite religious groups is his idea of “multicultural education.” in chin kung’s view, all the religions are reflections of a single “true god”, various transformations of god are for the convenience of enlightenment, to adapt to different regions and cultures.23 it is similar to the famous british philosopher and theologian john h. hick who proposed religious pluralism which states that all religions share a common ultimate reality. but this religious approach is slow to be accepted by monotheistic religions like christianity which insists on superiority of their own beliefs. as a response, chin kung states that all the religions concern about sufferings, share a common philosophy of peace, compassion and loving-kindness.24 so they are able to put aside prejudices and develop mutual tolerance, mutual respect and mutual trust, in order to save the current world which is filled with conflicts and disasters. likewise, the universal catholic theologian, paul f. knitter, noted that without integration with global responsibility, religious pluralism will not make any sense.25 only global responsibility can be a common ground for all world religions. in the 1990s, the parliament of the world’s religions proposed a theory of “global ethics,” which attempted to serve as a stable 32 prajñā vihāra though somewhat minimal moral consensus among world’s religious and cultural traditions, in order to arouse the consciousness of responsibility to promote world peace of all religions.26 chin kung’s mode of religious dialogue, is close to paul f. knitter’s “problem-centered” religious dialogue model, and coincides with the essence of “global ethics.” chin kung creates the possibility for interreligious cooperation so religions can go beyond their own limitations and contribute to the lofty ideal of peace and progress of all mankind. chin kung states that the ideal of the establishment of a pure land on earth in humanistic buddhism is possible. it directly relies on purification of human mind. he used the argument of “everything is made from the mind alone” in avatamsaka sutra to explain the root cause of all crises is the “butterfly effect” of the evil mind of individuals. chin kung even pointed out evil thoughts can not only cause man-made disasters, can also influence the external environment. natural disasters like earthquakes and tsunamis are all essentially caused by human mind. he constantly used the water experiment27 of japanese scientist dr. masaru emoto, who claimed human mind is able to directly influence the molecular structure of water, to support his argument. masaru emoto, as a japanese researcher entrepreneur and author, claimed that the human mind is able to directly influence the molecular structure of water.27 in chin kung’s view, the report is able to fully explain that idea can affect the change of matter, the heart can influence and change the external environment, and this discovery informs environmental protection workers that the purification of environment relies on the purification of mind. the purification of human mind is not an easy task. chin kung presents a unique method-education. in modern times, master tai xu was frequently advocating a pure land on earth. in fact, if we are able to implement the three roots of confucianism, buddhism and taoism, a pure land will appear on earth. we call them universal education, the teaching which is widespread around the world. what is this? education of morality, ethics and the saiping an 33 law of causation, if these three universal educations can be promoted worldwide, a pure land on earth will not be impossible.28 in contemporary society, chin noticed that many parents are busy working, while ignoring the children’s family education. while school education focuses on science and technology, social education deals with ethical issues. therefore, chin kung believes only “religious education,” which means common ethical and moral teachings and virtues in all major world religions, can be used to defuse disasters and conflicts.29 here chin kung no longer says “buddhist education,” but uses the term “religious education,” which reflects his hope of promoting education widely but without causing inter-religious conflict. chin kung believed that religious moral education can resolve conflicts, promote social stability and harmony and world peace. he has been invited to the united nations world peace conference for 10 times. his ideas have been praised by national experts and scholars, but realized that to speak of solutions in conferences is always “easier said than done.”30 chin kung thus understood, the importance of establishing an educational base which will successfully lead to building a harmonious society throughout the world. therefore, chin kung conducted an experiment in his hometown lujiang, anhui province of china, set up a non-profit educational institutions, lujiang cultural education center. it trained teachers to promote confucian ethical and moral education. within three months: families became more harmonious, neighborhoods quarreled less. there was a marked reduction of illegal activities. this experiment had attracted the attention of various countries, this mode was even recommended to unesco.31 therefore chin kung believed people can be made good by teaching, and harmonious society can be achieved. however, we can also find, “religious education” promoted by chin kung, is actually humanistic ethical and moral education under the banner of religion. he had reduced religion to a variety of secular ethics education, with the aim of achieving secular goals. the purpose of “religious education” is not to attain nirvana, nor the respective ultimate 34 prajñā vihāra goals in major world religions. rather it aims at the improvement of this world, a temporary liberation, rather than ultimate liberation. it resemblesthe ideal world of a pure land on earth in humanistic buddhism, a utopian society and so forth. conclusion in conclusion, it can be seen that although chin kung has never made the claim that he is an advocate of “humanistic buddhism”, his buddhist theory of “buddhism as education” is consistent with main features of humanistic buddhism. the theory “buddhism as education” itself is a manifestation of one feature of humanistic buddhism, emphasizing rationality, with a de-emphasis on the sacred, mystical religious experiences and divine powers. chin kung’s application of “buddhist education”, namely his educational translation of a most influential chinese buddhist school, pure land buddhism, and his social engagement with the founding of buddhist education, reflects humanistic buddhism’s focuses on this life, the improvement of this mundane world and its ideal of building a pure land on earth rather than seeking a pure land in other world. as discussed at the beginning, since humanistic buddhism has become a tendency in chinese context, a mainstream and guideline of contemporary development of chinese buddhism, even if some chinese buddhists do not identify with the banner of humanistic buddhism, their ideological contents and trends may coincide with the aim of chinese humanistic buddhism. therefore, other than chin kung, it may be possible to find out many more “potential humanistic buddhists” in china. this thesis, as a beginning, hopes to offer a starting point for scholars who are interested in this possiblity. saiping an 35 end notes 1 the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. harmonious universe: the world as one. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. 9. 2 the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. harmonious universe: the world as one. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. 10. 3 zhao, piaochu. “zhongguo fojiao xiehui sanshinian (three decades of chinese buddhist association)”. fa yin. 1983(6). 4 mario, poceski. chinese religions. journal of buddhist ethics online books. 2009. 237. 5 xue yu. renjian fojiao (humanistic buddhism). chung hwa book co. 2011. 16 6 pittman, don a. toward a modern chinese buddhism: taixu’s reforms. hawai’i up. 2001. 238. 7 jing zong, pure land perspectives on “humanist buddhism”. translated by householder jingtu. chinese pure land buddhist association. 2010. 5 8 chin kung. the collected works of venerable master chin kung. translated by silent voice. corporation republic of hwa dzan society, 2010. 11. 9 sallie king b. socially engaged buddhism. university of hawaii press. 2009.57. 10 marx, karl. selected works of marx and engels (volume 3). beijing: people’s publishing house. 1995. 666-667 11 wu you. ming fotuo jiaoyu (understanding buddhist education). taipei: he yu press. 2011. 124. 12 chin kung. fo shuo dacheng wuliang shoujing jiangji (explaining the infinite life sutra), volume 4. amitabha buddhist society of usa, 1996. 356 13 chin kung. to understand buddhism. translated by buddha dharma education association inc. buddha dharma education association inc, 2010. 34. 14 chin kung. buddhism as an education. buddha dharma education association inc., 2010. 10. 15 若有無量百千萬億眾生受諸苦惱，聞是觀世音菩薩，一心稱名，觀世音菩薩即時觀其音聲，皆得解 脫。若有持是觀世音菩薩名者，設入大火，火不能燒，由是菩薩威神力故。(妙法蓮華經 t262 0056c06-10) 16 xuan hua. dafodingshou lengyanjing qianshi (a simple explanation of the surangama sutra). us dharma realm buddhist association china office. 1990. 92-93. 17 chin kung. nianfo chengfo (mindfulness of buddha, being a buddha). the corproration republic of hwa dzan society, 2012. 17. 36 prajñā vihāra 18 it refers to the world on earth. the five turbidities are, 1. the age of people decreases and all kinds of diseases afflict people; 2. people’s views start to degenerate; 3. passions, delusions, desire, anger, stupidity, pride and doubt prevail; 4. human miseries increase and happiness decreases; 5.the human lifespan gradually diminishes to ten years. 19 chin kung. nianfo chengfo (mindfulness of buddha, being a buddha). the corproration republic of hwa dzan society, 2012. 30-31. 20 一者孝養父母。奉事師長。慈心不殺。修十善業。二者受持三歸。具足眾戒。不犯威儀。三者發菩 提心。深信因果。讀誦大乘。勸進行者。(佛說觀無量壽佛經 t365 0341c09-12) 21 lin, kezhi. shiyong jingtuzong cidain (practical dictionary of pure land buddhism). religious culture press. 2007. 176. 22 chin kung. renshi fojiao (understanding buddhism). beijing: thread binding books publishing house 2010. 39-40. 23 the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. message of peace. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. 18. 24 the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. message of peace. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. 17. 25 zhuo, xinping. zongjiao bijiao yu duihua. religious culture press. 2003. 157. 26 sumner, twiss b. and bruce, crelle. explorations in global ethics. westview press. 2000. 2 27 reville, william 2011. “the pseudoscience of creating beautiful (or ugly) water”. highbeam research. https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1p2-27966920.html. 2016.5.8 28 chin kung, jingtu dajing yanyi (interpretation of the great stutra of pure land buddhism),volume 183. corporation republic of hwa dzan society. 2010. 10 29 the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. message of peace. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. 3. 30 pure land learning college association inc. 2012 thailand multi-faith forum review. pure land learning college association inc. 2012. 16. 31 pure land learning college association inc. 2012 thailand multi-faith forum review. pure land learning college association inc. 2012. 18 saiping an 37 references a. books and articles the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. harmonious universe: the world as one. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. zhao, piaochu. “zhongguo fojiao xiehui sanshinian (three decades of chinese buddhist association)”. fa yin. 1983(6). mario, poceski. chinese religions. journal of buddhist ethics online books. 2009. xue yu. renjian fojiao (humanistic buddhism). chung hwa book co. 2011. pittman, don a. toward a modern chinese buddhism: taixu’s reforms. hawai’i up. 2001. wu you. ming fotuo jiaoyu (understanding buddhist education). he yu press. 2011. jing zong, pure land perspectives on “humanist buddhism”. translated by householder jingtu. chinese pure land buddhist association. 2010. chin kung. the collected works of venerable master chin kung. translated by silent voice. corporation republic of hwa dzan society, 2010. sallie, king b. socially engaged buddhism. university of hawaii press. 2009. marx, karl. selected works of marx and engels (volume 3). beijing: people’s publishing house. 1995. chin kung. fo shuo dacheng wuliang shoujing jiangji (explaining the infinite life sutra), volume 4. amitabha buddhist society of usa, 1996. chin kung. to understand buddhism. translated by buddha dharma education association inc. buddha dharma education association inc, 2010. 38 prajñā vihāra chin kung. buddhism as an education. buddha dharma education association inc., 2010. xuan hua. dafodingshou lengyanjing qianshi (a simple explanation of the surangama sutra). us dharma realm buddhist association china office. 1990. chin kung. nianfo chengfo (mindfulness of buddha, being a buddha). the corproration republic of hwa dzan society, 2012. lin, kezhi. shiyong jingtuzong cidain (practical dictionary of pure land buddhism). religious culture press. 2007. chin kung. renshi fojiao (understanding buddhism). beijing: thread-binding books publishing house 2010. zhuo, xinping. zongjiao bijiao yu duihua (religious comparison and dialogue). religious culture press. 2003. sumner, twiss b. and bruce, crelle. explorations in global ethics. westview press. 2000. chin kung, jingtu dajing yanyi (interpretation of the great stutra of pure land buddhism),volume 183. corporation republic of hwa dzan society. 2010. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. message of peace. the amitabha buddhist association of queensland inc. 2005. pure land learning college association inc. 2012 thailand multi-faith forum review. pure land learning college association inc. 2012. reville, william. 2011. “the pseudoscience of creating beautiful (or ugly) water”. highbeam research. https://www.highbeam.com/ doc/1p2-27966920.html. 2016.5.8 b. taisho tripitaka 妙法蓮華經 t262 佛說觀無量壽佛經 t365 maria kellis 157 mysticism: from the eleusinian mysteries to today maria kellis mahidol university, thailand abstract in the hellenistic world, ‘mystical’ referred to “secret” religious rituals, specifically starting with the eleusinian mysteries in ancient greece. the mysteries were taken up in the same form in the roman empire and then morphed, as the dominant religion in the west shifted from the olympians to the way. this paper first focuses on the original meaning of the word, specifically as it refers to the eleusinian mysteries, the most significant pan-hellenic transcendence initiation ceremony aimed at accepting death and opening the consciousness into the superhuman understanding. the origins of the concept of mysteries, exploring in particular the eleusinian mysteries, are briefly described, by investigating accounts from classical texts and archeological evidence. in the beginning of the last century the term mysticism reappeared and evolved in definition in religious studies and an account of the understanding is presented in the second part. the definition of the term “experience” is complex in general and even more complex for a term such as “mystical experience”. the last part of this paper explores the idea of what constitutes a mystical experience and how it relates to the accounts from the eleusinian mysteries. this paper uses literary and scholarly sources, in ancient greek, greek and english. prajñā vihāra vol. 18 no 1, january-june 2017, 157-167 © 2000 by assumption university press 158 prajñā vihāra when referring to the word mysticism it is relevant to start with an attempt at understanding the meaning of the word. the term ‘mysticism’ comes from the greek «μυώ» meaning “to conceal.” from the analysis of the verb «μυώ» itself some insight into its original usage and meaning can be inferred. the verb has a connotation of closing one’s eyes, ears and mouth1. from the same root of the verb comes the word «μύωψ» which refers to someone with short sightedness, who must squint their eyes to see. the implication is that a function of «μύηση» or initiation, allows someone to see beyond what they are able to see with their eyes open. the same can be said for the other senses. in the beginning of the last century the term mysticism appeared and evolved in definition. the first notable attempt was delivered by william james in 1902 in his work: the varieties of religious experiences. in lectures 16 and 17 he proposes four traits of a mystical experience: 1. ineffability 2. noetic quality 3. transiency and 4. passivity. james notes that “although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by preliminary voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going through certain bodily performances, or in other ways which manuals of mysticism prescribe; when the characteristic sort of consciousness once has set in, the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power.” the word mysticism has evolved and has acquired a more limited usage in the last century. in the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, mysticism is defined as “a constellation of distinctive practices, discourses, texts, institutions, traditions, and experiences aimed at human transformation, variously defined in different traditions”. the comparative category of mysticism in religious studies today is a modern construct designed to elicit nuances in the investigation and description of these types of phenomena termed mystical experiences. the first notable instance of a ritual designed to elicit this elusive ineffable experience are the eleusinian mysteries2, in ancient greece. the eleusinian mysteries are rites that were dedicated to the cult of demeter3 and her daughter persephone4. demeter was the goddess maria kellis 159 of fertility of the land, and she valued her kore above all. the myth that describes the kidnapping of her daughter by the ruler of the underworld is pre-hellenic, possibly of sumeric origins, with roots deep in the neolithic age. the myth in greek literature first appears in hesiod5’s theogony, and is also significantly retold in the homeric hymn of demeter6. the eleusinian mysteries, that were practiced from around 1450 bce to 392 ce, were held in eleusis in the third month of the attikon calendar, the month called boedromion7, dedicated to the boedromion8 apollo 9 (as is recounted in euripides10 and pausanias11). the eleusinian mysteries, also referred to as the great mysteries, started on the 15th day of the month and lasted 9 days, and were an initiation ritual open to all men or women, free citizens or slaves, that had undergone the ritual of the small mysteries commemorating the birth of dionysius, and aimed not only at teaching principles of living, but also at conquering the fear of death. through the patronage of pericles in the 5th century bce they gained fame as a purification ritual in the then known world. the initiates12 lined up to receive the great mysteries, that would open up the doors of death and rebirth, from the officiating priest, the hierophant13, the man who would reveal the great mysteries to them. during the ritual the hierophant and the overseers were dressed in very elaborate and flamboyant clothes that were understood to be sacred and were designated specifically for the mysteries14. the ceremony of the mysteries themselves as archeological evidence suggests15 was a very elaborate and glorious affair: there were sacrifices of boars, who lacked respect to the goddess of fertility of the land by ruining the fields; offerings of fish, flowers, fruits (and in particular pomegranates16 that were symbolic of persephone). it is known that participants were fasting and broke their fast by consuming a concoction based on barley called kykeon17. the initiates would be sworn to secrecy, the breach of which was punishable by death in athenian law18, thus most of the knowledge of the secrets of the eleusinian mysteries was lost after the destruction of the temple in eleusis and the slaughtering of all the priests and officiates by the ostrogoths in the christian era19. the interpretation of the archaeological evidence as well as surviving 160 prajñā vihāra traditions, both in terms of symbolism and of ritual meaning, are understood to be only partial descriptions of the less secret parts of the great mysteries and can only point to the basic aspects of this deep spiritual awakening20. the mysteries were rituals aimed at eliciting a mystical experience in the participants and were thus instrumental in their spiritual awakening. the mysteries were favored by socrates and by his students, plato in particular. reference of the practices of the great mysteries can be found in part in many european rituals, for example in england (bober, 1951:33), where roman culture was expanding its reach and influence. an aspect of the mysteries that has taken a great significance in the christian era is involves the concept of the three-parts of the divinity of the god figure. this is reflected in the christian idea of the holy trinity. the eleusinian mysteries highlight the importance of the ineffable character and influence of death, as part of the trinity of the nature of the divine. this notion of the trinity of god is highlighted in hesiod’s theogony. as dias is replacing the trinity of chaos, uranus and kronos, after the fight of the titans he realizes that he cannot rule alone so he enlists his two brothers poseidon and hades, giving dominion of the underworld to hades. this trinity is also a necessary part of honoring the divine in ancient greece21. the rituals themselves as a practice have had more of an influence in the nordic celtic and druid rituals. (charalambides, 2013: 177-179) as time progressed, the symbolism around eleusis was transferred to christian rites and “this is why clement – after speaking of eleusis – called christ the “true hierophant” (eliade, 1978: 297). the term mysticism that originally took its meaning from the eleusinian mysteries evolved over the centuries and reappeared with its current meaning in the scholarship of the 20th century of those known as the philosophers of mysticism, such as william james, evelyn underhill, joseph marechal, william johnson, james pratt, mircea eliade, w.t. stace, steven katz, and robert forman amongst others. the focus of investigation was shifted from what is or elicits a mystical experience to the more intellectual concern of what is the interpretation of the maria kellis 161 understanding. the two main philosophical schools of mysticism referred to as the perennialists and the constructivists offer both points of study and approach as to what could be the definition of mysticism and mystical experience. the scholars of mysticism defend the validity of mystical experiences per se and question whether it is the experience that affects the interpretation or whether the experience itself is the one that gets colored by the interpretative markers of the mystics: namely religion, culture, and experiences. katz opens his article “language, epistemology, and mysticism” (1978) by saying that “though no philosophical argument is capable of proving the veracity of mystical experience, one would be both dogmatic and imprudent to decide a priori that mystical claims are mumbo jumbo, especially given the wide variety of such claims by men (and women) of genius and/or intense religious sensitivity over the centuries as well as across all cultural divisions.” forman goes further in acknowledging the particularity of mystical events, although he chooses to focus on “pure consciousness events” (pce) because “they are relatively common, rudimentary and may therefore indicate certain features of other more complex (perhaps more advanced) mystical phenomena.” it is the general view of both katz and forman and by extension of both branches of the mystical scholars that they influenced, that the mystics do in fact have a supermundane experience, namely the mystical experience. the eleusinian mysteries were aimed at evoking a mystical experience and if anything forbade participants from discussing the experience. today’s scholars, even if they do not deny the existence of the mystical experience, are often mainly concerned with defining, quantifying, and categorizing it. mystical experiences are defined as representing ‘an immediate direct contact with a variously defined absolute principle. after that direct contact the experience is interpreted according to the tradition’s language and beliefs. the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy classifies and contrasts experiences in various ways, such as: extrovertive (sense perceptual, somatosensory, or introspective content) versus introvertive (one’s mystical consciousness of the unity of nature overlaid onto one’s 162 prajñā vihāra sense perception of the world, non-unitive numinous extrovertive experiences, experience of “nothingness” or “emptiness); theistic (experiences purportedly of god, numinous theistic experiences), and non-theistic (ultimate reality other than god or of no reality at all); union with god (a falling away of the separation between a person and god, short of identity); identity with god (consciousness of being fully absorbed into or even identical with god); theurgic (from the greek theourgia, a mystic intends to activate the divine in the mystical experience) versus non-theurgic; apophatic (from the greek, “apophasis,” meaning negation or “saying away”, nothing can be said of objects or states of affairs which the mystic experiences) versus kataphatic (from the greek, “kataphasis,” meaning affirmation or “saying with”, vivid and active experiences); pure consciousness events. in that sense the eleusinian mysteries were aimed at eliciting an introvertive, theistic, theurgic and kataphatic experience. since a mystical experience is generally construed as a direct encounter with the divine or the absolute, some scholars of mysticism claim that the “raw experience” is not affected by linguistics, cultural or historical contingencies” (kripal, 2006: 96). but there is debate whether the experience is colored by the background of the experiencer or whether the description of the experience is colored by the background of the experiencer, or whether the experience even can be accepted as such given the lack of scientific evidence and proof. therefore, scholars of mysticism often miss the most important element, the experience itself. in contrast in ancient greece, the philosophers like plato, the doctors like asclepius, the mathematicians like pythagoras, were concerned with integrating what is ineffable into their own psyche and the psyche of their students, in order to expand their consciousness as well as their abilities. mystics are understood to have a direct, almost privileged access to the supernatural realms. the typical social function of mystics is to access the superhuman, ineffable realm, to provide guidance to the community. they are mediators between the two planes of existence: the visible and the invisible. this is the role of the hierophant and the guidance that he provides to the initiates. mystics express that words are not enough, and maria kellis 163 often they choose to speak in metaphors, in parables, in poetic forms or a combination of the above (james, 1902). experiences can even be shared and yet each person can only describe his or her perception of what has occurred, sometimes only sharing a general sense of characteristics in the experience. mystical experiences are a window to some essential truth. this is reminiscent of the ineffable quality of the experience acquired from the eleusinian mysteries. in conclusion, the topic of mysticism and mystical experience through the ages is complex as it is not only a word that needs to be explored, the whole account of experiences has to be explored, across time and traditions, and somehow summarized in a way that makes sense to the religious studies field. in looking at the origin in the eleusinian mysteries and how this beginning incorporated the elicitation through the ritual of a mystical experience, this paper is an attempt to show the strength of the influence of the eleusinian mysteries to the understanding of mysticism. the parts of the mysteries that are most relevant in this investigation are the characteristics of transcendence, of mystical experience, or deep connection to the divine and to the afterlife, the fasting and use of hallucinogenic substances to expand the mind. the traditional understanding of mysticism, mystics, and mystical instances often focuses on events, experiences, and ideas that are more or less amenable to orthodox framings of what constitutes experiential truth and practice. the mystical experience may in fact be elusive and may not necessarily conduct itself as a scientifically quantifiable event that can be measured, and that points to the limitation of the investigative methodology that is part of religious studies today. it is important to consider that the philosophers in ancient greece, who were simultaneously scientists, doctors, mathematicians, considered the expansion of the psyche that was targeted by the eleusinian mysteries to be a central part towards the perfection of the human soul and of humanity. 164 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 standard definition, etymological analysis in the demetrakos great dictionary (1953) 2 greek «ελευσίνια μυστήρια» 3 greek δήμητρα. also often referred to as rhea or isis. 4 persephone (greek: περσεφόνη) also referred to as kore (greek: κόρη, daughter) especially before her abduction. the root of the word comes from the myth of perseus and killer (phoneuo). she is the daughter or demeter and of dias. 5 hesiod c8th bce was the second most important pre-classical poet after homer. 6 in theogony, an epic poem of 1022 verses, hesiod accounts that persephone was playing in the field with muses and was abducted by hades, ruler of the underworld. he concealed the kidnapping and the rest of the gods did not interfere. demeter was so distraught that she stopped caring for the earth and this resulted in a great famine that almost eradicated the human race. for 9 days demeter was aimlessly wandering until the king and queen of eleusina took her in. they provided so much caring for her, along with the jokes of their servant that the goddess found interest in life again. 7 greek: βοηδρομιών the name of the month is related to the name of the city-state of athens and ion (greek: ίων), the son of creusa (greek: κρέουσα), princess of athens and of the god apollo. 8 the name commemorating apollo’s son ion who came to the aid of athens during the war against eleusis, and brought victory to the city state. 9 the month boedomion starts at the new moon of august until the new moon of september, roughly august 15th to september 15th 10 euripides, in his tragic play relates how creusa, daughter of erechteas, conceived a son through her union with the god apollo, whom she abandoned upon birth in the acropolis. hermes rescued the infant transporting him to delphi where pythia found him and raised him. after this ksouthos became an ally to athens and as a reward received the crown of the city-state and married the princess creusa. the couple was not able to conceive so they went to the oracle in dephi to ask for guidance. ion at the time was serving as an altar boy to the temple, offering his services to apollo, without knowing that apollo was his father. creusa upon meeting him tried to unsuccessfully poison him thinking him to be a child of her husband from his previous marriage. finally, she recognized her own son in him, and was ion through divine interference and reverence was accepted by ksouthos as his son and heir. ,the great mysteries to them. tarot decks as the high priest. during hte he capital city of his kingdom. pausanias places his maria kellis 165 11 pausanias relates that ion arrived in athens at the time of the kingdom of selinountas. he married his daughter eliki, and became his successor. he built the city of eliki that he named after his wife, and that he made the capital city of his kingdom. pausanias places his death during the fight between athens and eleusis. 12 the initiates were called mystes (greek: μύστες), those that had been initiated during the small mysteries that celebrated the birth of dionysus, had spent the previous six months learning the secrets of the first initiation, and then prepared for six months (from march until august) for the great mysteries. 13 the hierphant (greek: ιεροφάντης) was the supreme religious leader in the mysteries and in some accounts in ancient greece. during the eleusinian mysteries he was the leader of the rituals. he always belonged to the lineage of evmolpides (greek: ευμολπιδών). his role was to be the supreme guide to the mysteries. this image of the hierophant can today be seen in the tarot decks as the high priest. 14 ploutarch, in parallel lives describes the dress of aristides the just, during the initiation ceremony, as made of gold and so flamboyant that a persian soldier who saw him in full dress during a battle capitulated to him, thinking he was the king. herodotus in his 8th book describes the impressive dress of the four men who were overseeing the mysteries. overall it is in several sources that the dresses of the officiates during the mysteries are described in all their glory. 15 painting in amphorae (preka-alexandri, 1991) 16 hesiod recounts how upon leaving the underworld, hades offers pomegranate to persephone in order to keep her bound to him. 17 greek κυκεών. references to kykeon date as early as the homeric texts. it is a term that was loosely used in ancient greek accounts to describe a drink as simple as water, milk or wine with barley, or as complicated and secret as the drink used to break the fast of the initiates at the eleusinian mysteries, often described as a mixture of 16 different herbs that today are incompletely known, although it is believed they included fungi, like ergot, and possibly variations of opiates. 18 alchiviades was tried and condemned to death for drunkenly imitating the initiation rituals (he was exiled and later pardoned and performed great offering ceremonies to the temples instead) as narrated by plato. 19 the mysteries were spread to the roman empire and to britain and it is believed that the teachings were adapted and incorporated in nordic mystical initiation rituals. 20 inferences have to be made about most of what was or could possibly have been used or done during the rituals due to the secrecy that enveloped the practices. (fotiadis 1982, preka-alexandri 1991, vlaxos 1984) 166 prajñā vihāra 21 καθάπερ γάρ φασι καὶ οἱ πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὥρισται· τελευτὴ γὰρ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντός, ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος. (as can be seen by the pythagoreans, the whole of universe can be determined in the number three, the trinity.) διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἁγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ. (so to honor that number in nature, so do the rituals for god have to be observed in three) ἀποδίδομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς προσηγορίας τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· τὰ γὰρ δύο ἄμφω μὲν λέγομεν καὶ τοὺς δύο ἀμφοτέρους, πάντας δ› οὐ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν κατάφαμεν πρῶτον. (so when dealing with the divine it is to be realized that there are three parts of god and as such each of these three parts is to be honored. references bober, phyllis fray (1951) “cernunnos: origin and transformation of a celtic divinity”, american journal of archaeology, vol. 55, no. 1 (jan., 1951), pp. 13-51 charalambides, george (2013) pythagoras, the first philosopher. athens, oselotos editions (in greek) demetrakos, demeter (1953) great dictionary of the whole greek language: modern, proper, messianic, common, ancient. greek academy, navarinos editions. (in greek) eliade, mircea (1978) a history of religious ideas. volume i. from the stone ages to the eleusinian mysteries chicago university press. euripides (c. 421 bce) ion, tragic play. (in greek) forman, robert (1990) “mysticism, constructivism and forgetting” in forman, robert editor, the problem of pure consciousness: mysticism and philosophy oxford university press. fotiadis, d. (1982) karaiskakis. athens, melissa editions james, william (1902) the varieties of religious experiences: a study in human nature, being the gifford lectures on natural religion delivered at edinburgh in 1901–1902 longmans green co. maria kellis 167 katz, s. t. (1978). “language, epistemology, and mysticism”. in mysticism and philosophical analysis, 22, 74. oxford university press kripal, jeffrey j. (2006) “mysticism” in the blackwell companion to the study of religion edited by robert a. segal. blackwell publishing pausanias (c 2nd c.), achaica (in greek) papaggeli, k. (2002) eleusis: the archeological site and the museum (in greek) athens, ekdosis editions plato (c. 390 bc) alchibiades i and ii (in greek) plutarch (late 1st c) parallel lives (βίοι παράλληλοι) (in greek) preka-alexandri, k. (1991) eleusis (in greek) athens, yppo-tap editions stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, www.plato.stanford.edu vlaxos, a. (1984) one philhellene for 1821 (1972 first edition) athens, estia editions http://www.plato.stanford.edu lana indralak 55 sufi islam and syncretism in java: and its implications for local secularism lana indralak assumption university, bangkok abstract this paper examines the influence of animism and sufi islam in java. it will show that the accomodating approach of sufism and its tolerance of syncretism was a factor in the spread of islam in java. it will be argued that this syncretism also opens a place for certain local forms of interreligious tolerance and prepares for what is known in indonesia as pancasila. many modern versions of secularism while porporting to be accomodating to religion have become hostile to religious belief. but indonesian forms of secularism and pancasila emerge from these deeper religious roots, which are often overlooked. nowadays, with greater global influence, this syncretism and religious tolerance is under threat. this paper will suggest that an appreciation of the sufi and syncretic origins of indonesian thought can serve to strengthen modern understandings of pancasila and secularism. this can work to mitigate hostility and sectarianism. by maintaining itself as an approach which harmonizes with western concepts of secularism, yet with a deeper religious framework, indonesia can maintain a tradition of toleration, which respects multiculturalism and religious pluralism in resistance to more intolerant relgious movements prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021, 55-67 © 2000 by assumption university press 56 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 keywords: islam; java; sufism; pancasila; syncretism; secularism introduction, “islam nusantara” prior to the advent of islam in java religious life took the form of animistism. this was slowly influenced by the introduction of hindu and buddhist doctrines and practices that once combined and intertwined, offered a fertile “syncretic matrix”1 for both magic and mysticism. this spiritual amalgamation also included animist practices such as, the veneration of powerful souls, spirit cults, and the worship of holy places. islam nusantara or the indonesian islamic model is a distinctive form of islam, essentially developed in “nusantara” or the indonesian archipelago, beginning in the 16th century, as a result of the process of interaction, contextualization, indigenization, interpretation, and veneration of universal islamic values which adapted to the diverse sociocultural entities of indonesia.2 islam nusantara is also defined as an interpretation of islam that takes into account local indonesian customs and is compatible with indonesian cultural values. this lead to the implementation of “pancasila” as a mechanism to establish indonesia’s nationhood and its determination to create post-colonial national solidarity based on the respect of religious diversity and toleration. this rendered indonesia as the most pluralistic and diverse nations in the south east asian region. it also strengthened indonesia’s ability to follow the basic principles of civil society. indonesia / central java: “an empire of the spirit” the establishment of a monotheistic faith like islam in central javanese society was the outcome of long time cultural collisions that occurred as a result of mercantile trade since the medieval era of asia. this was done in a way which didn’t threaten the older forms of local culture, which were based on the aristocratic as well as hierarchical values https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/islam https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/nusantara https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/indonesian_archipelago https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/indonesian_archipelago https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/indonesian_culture https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/indonesian_culture https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/indonesia lana indralak 57 and traditions. this allowed the older religious practices to survive and maintain themselves, while simultaneously embracing and welcoming the advent of a monotheistic faith like islam. the islamic transitory period starts from the foundation of the earliest kingdom of “demak” around 1479 after the conquest over the “hindu majapahit kingdom” and ends with the beginning of dutch colonization of java in 1619, during that time remnants of hindu-buddhist influence were very visible in the javanese mosques.3 with each of the cultural influences that occurred, the javanese notion of “the other” or the foreigner began a slow metamorphosis, an amalgamation which resulted in a complex cultural as well as religious syncretism of local indigenous traditions, hinduism, mysticism, and monotheistic islam. the introduction of monotheistic islam into the region put the final touches on a unique diverse amalgamation and resulted in kejawen islam (javanism).4 the word for “kejawen” or “kejawaan” in indonesian is javaneseness and javanism. the latter word is a descriptive label for those elements of javanese culture that are considered to be essentially javanese, according to this religious context south-central javanese civilization centering in the royal courts of surakarta and yogyakarta, is generally known as kejawen. one needs to understand the advent of islam in southeast asia not as an “imported muslims praxis and metaphysics” 5but as a merging. the result of indonesia’s syncretic merging could also be viewed as subtle process, creating what is known as the “two-tiered microcosm– macrocosm duality” (jagad alit-jagad gedhe)6 where old traditions that are based on animism and social hierarchy and monotheistic islam go hand in hand. this socio-cosmic dualism accommodated the spread of islam nusantara in indonesia over the past centuries. the javanese term, “bhinneka tunggal ika” (unity in diversity)7 was created by the javanese people themselves to emphasize their very own unique identity as well as cultural divergences. java has been a center where mystical animism, hindu-buddhism, and islam co-existed 58 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 peacefully together, moving toward a land of tolerant syncretic religion and a rather peaceful consociational melting pot. the outcome of these powerful political and cultural influences is the perfect and unique syncretism of plural religions. this led to the creation of a society based on the belief in pluralism with provided a strong base for religious tolerance, inclusivity as well as civic morality. pancasila as the national doctrine of post–colonial indonesia this “islam nusantara” or “kejawen islam” (javanism) led to the principle of “bhinneka tunggal ika” (unity in diversity) a principle which eventually transformed indonesia into “an empire of the spirit” and “a pillar of tolerance” that accomodated a plurality of religions. the related doctrine of “pancasila” is composed of five principles that are inseparable and interrelated. in javanese society, there are several ways to prevent conflict, and maintain “plural order” as well as social harmony. according to alexander seran, former president president sukarno’s concept of pancasilla involved the idea that the struggle for recognition requires a kind of habermasian communicative action in order to preserve cultural identities while establishing universally validating principles of morality. it also involves a dialectic process in negotiating different cultural worldviews involving economy, culture, and politics. and it involves the recognition that we must meet cultural diversity halfway through the use of a suitable “moral grammar”8 to construct better arguments for all affected and to increase the capacity for all parties to make decisions which benefit them equally. so “pancasilla” is compatible with the search for a moral grammar, through which the dreams of a new world can be built, and the vision of this so-called new world is the world that is nonetheless “secularized” and based on inclusivity, divergences, variations as well as plural religious toleration. to achieve this goal is not al all an easy task. there is much resistance to the idea that “syncretic religion” is a key towards the process of demystifying divergencess and variations or tolerance in indonesia, and if so what kind of additional social mechanisms are needed? lana indralak 59 kejawen islam (javanism) or nusantara islam is perhaps the preferable answer to unlock any rising social or cultural tension which keeps on arising as a result of extremism or radical poltitical ideologies entering into public discourse by the fundamental groups who adhered their intransigent stance on hannabite / wahabite reform or above all the ever increasing global or neo-salafist revival.9 the rise of all these opposing factions clearly poses such modern threats to the cultivation of pluralism in indonesia and rendered the spread of “zero tolerance” rather than the much more preferred cosmopolitan atmosphere of “consociational divergences” religious pluralism under siege : indonesia’s worrying prospects the nusantara archipelago, which used to enjoy a tolerant atmosphere has unfortunately deteriorated into a breeding ground for some forms of extremism in the post-world war ii period. this has led to the rise of a more “puritanical” form of the islamic faith or “political islam” to develop and gain more acceptance amongst the locals who used to practice religious tolerance in the past. the advent of “political islam” in the shape of “hanbalite” and “wanhabite” reform began to grow and become more intense over the last few decades in this once harmonious region. according to a recent study, the development of a new form of “puritanical islam” in the second half of the twentieth century is currently taking place notably in the central javanese region, a land which used to enjoy peaceful harmony. the multicultural religious coexistence in the region in the past centuries is now under threat due to the rise of extremism. one example of the spread of radicalism is the group jemaah islamiyah or ji. in recent years, the faction has emerged as a fairly powerful group. it originated from the “darul islam” a well-known militant group in indonesia that was highly active in their fight against the dutch forces in the 1940s and also against the indonesia government during 1950-1965 with the aim to establish a islamic caliphate in indonesia.10 60 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 the co-founder of jemaah islamiyah are abdullah sungkar and abu bakar baasyir, two notable muslim scholars whose ultimate goal is the implimentation of islamic law or “shariah”. they established what is also known as pesantren al-mukim or the “pondok nguki”11 in solo, central java which later on metamorphosized into a center of radical ideology in the region. this is the roots of the advent of new islamic movements such as “global salafism” or home-grown “jihadism” in indonesia, which began to subvert and destabilize regional security and ultimately obstructed religious pluralism in the area once known to the rest of the world as a nation of“pancasila” wwhere great cultural resilience and religious toleration went hand in hand. sufi mysticism and cultural assimilation for indonesia to maintain its tradition of civic tolerance and its role as a multicultural nation, secularism must be rethought and appreciation must be given to the long tradition which involved the influence of sufism and syncretism. in order to understand how this is possible, we need to look back at how sufi mysticism was assimilated by the locals into the central javanese region. monotheistic islam came to the indonesian archipelago in the 13th century and was introduced by sufi saints, nomadic teachers who later produced many written treatises, among all of these notable works is the concept of “tasawuf” in sufism, which is also a special term for mysticism in islam. the ultimate goal of “tasawuf” is to have a direct and close relationship with god. the essence of “tasawuf” is the awareness of the existence of communication and dialogue between the human spirit and god.12 this created a kind of individualize worship which was tolerant to other belief systems. the indigeneous people of central java held mystical views before the advent of monotheistic islam, and held on to their tradition very tenaciously, whether it came from the local culture or the teachings of hinduism or buddhism which had arrived centuries earlier. with this similarity of beliefs between islamic mysticism and the local mystic beliefs lana indralak 61 allowed the teachings of sufism and islam to be easily assimilated into the indigenous culture and was gradually accepted by the locals without much resistence. the spread of islam since the 13th century occured rapidly in indonesia ever since, yet mystical ideas have been warmly welcomed in java. it had energized a new mysticism as well as “syncretic dynamics”13, both in terms of cultural, scientific, as well as the social life of religious communities. the sufis also adopted the use of symbols, concepts, and ornaments which clearly derived from a syncretic mixture of hinduism, buddhism, and animism. this led some to comment that what is practiced by the javanese cannot be outrightly labeled as islam, hinduism, or buddhism, since “javanese religion is a javanese religion”,14 it managed to manifest and unravel its syncretic uniqueness over the past few centuries and still continues to do so, even as it is under threat. moreover, there are also many examples of syncretic assimilation or “religious inter-contextualization”15 or intertextuality of sufi mysticism in central java. this tendency towards inter-contextualization is a precuser to modern ideas of secularism with its tolerance of individual belief. the core of sufi mysticism is the belief that humans could overally establish a direct and overarching personal relationship with god and the supernatural through peaceful methods such as performing meditation and harmonizing their unified self with the almigthy. this form of syncretism also has the effect of fostering gender equality.16 despite all of the political turmoil in the region, the process of decolonization as well as the adoption of civic mentality in central java indonesia has proven to be a successful process, since occured in a stabilized realm, that allowed religious pluralism to exist “agonally” and “prudentially”.17 in addition, the public’s strong faith in the national doctrine of “pancasila”, and a secularized ideal, has allowed indonesia to develop into an important regional hub in southeast asia, a diverse region which relies upon religious pluralism and toleration. 62 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 types of secularism secularism is a paradigm which has been developing in the west since the 18th century. the french term laicite´ however stands for modern secularism, derived from a gradual political process of secularization as social transformation. it also demonstrates how religiosity is contrasted to economic globalization. the processes of secularization emphasizes individual choice rather than social conformity, drawing a sharp boundary between religion and secular politics. the term laicite´ has formed constitutional principle of secularism in france, which is manifested under article 1 of the french constitution and is commonly interpreted as discouraging religious involvement in government affairs, especially religious influence in the determination of state policies. it also forbids government involvement in religious affairs, and especially prohibits government influence in the determination of religion, however secularism in france does not preclude a right to the free exercise of religion. it simply reflects a policy based on the 1905 french law proclaiming the separation of church and the state. in such a system, political and religious compromises and reconliations must be put to the test, hence “french-style laicite´”18 or secularism was considered a suitable method for further political reconciliation. the philosopher chantel mouffe introduced the importance of divergences rather than differences, since divergence implies a tension between positions. this philosophical framework of divergences rather than differences enables civil society to achieve a goal where one could easily embrace civic morality within a global order, involving inclusivity and overarching democratization, which has lately become the heart of any tolerant community or society. therefore the ideal of secularism according to “french-style laicite´” and pluralistic democracy is considered a model “conducive” to the understanding of religious divergences and variations, against which indonesia could develop its own tradition. yet we see a weakness in western concepts of secularism which stray from a respect for community and for religious belief. this is why secularism needs to be interpreted according to local models. especially https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/french_constitution https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/french_constitution https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/free_exercise_of_religion lana indralak 63 models which appreciate diversity, tolerance and the peaceful resolution of conflict within religious frameworks. these local models of pluralism and secularism are increasingly important. especially faced with problems arising from the raging pandemics, global warming as well as extremism and radicalized political doctrines which are on the rise. this syncretism fostered by sufi mysticism, created a more relaxed atmosphere which harmonized with local traditions leaving them relatively intact. all of these great syncretic mechanisms could act as positive measures for the nation to achieve religious pluralism, while learning how to sustain the former traditions. indonesia must enable the nation to take a more tolerant civic platform under the pillar of secularism, which could also match their goal of solidarity according to the principle of “pancasila” which had always respected divergences and religious diversity. this paradigm had also proved to reassert itself in the national doctrine of pancasila, where state’s integration under the promotion of national solidariy respected not only religious diversity and toleration, but also enhanced secularism as well as civic mobility, because once achieved indonesia’s polity could become a consummate example of such a matured secularized civil society to rival models of secularism in the west. a synthesis of multi religious variables, which is applied under a state secularized framework possess dual empowerments in deradicalizing extremism, sustaining old traditions, and addressing social problems. concluding remarks : on “prudential tolerance” the growing energy and social dynamism of central java indonesia and its unique syncretic religion is so marvelously captivating, since it responses to the challenge of inclusivity unlike any other cultural tradition. it provides a model of an approach to diversity which harmonizes with secularism based upon local traditions. but unlike western secularism it is not tainted by anti-religious sentiment. although modern political mechanisms are needed to suppliment the wisdom of local culture, they must be used “prudentially” and must adopt certain level of tolerance in order to guarantee proportionate 64 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 macrocosmic transformation, free from the resurgence of extremism. the native javanese culture, with its resilient nature, its tolerance as well as its flexibility has survived through the test of time, despite colonialism and imperialism. the lesson of javanese culture is a living testimony that divergences would not be manipulated by government policies, but become the natural basis of voluntary civic actions, rooted in indigeneous cultural identity. the historical synthesis between monotheistic islam and javanism practices in indonesia represents “a sociology of a pluralistic cosmos” this rendered islam nusantara or javanese islam as a multi-ethnic islam, resistant to radicalized discourses. this is important because indonesia must now take a syncretic approach to curb extremism, since the old platforms has become inadequate. the new platform of interfaith dialogue or syncretic approaches must also be both agonal as well as prudential. the path towards the achievement of civil society, requires that multicultural sectors are systematically renegotiated to “deconstruct” obsolete and oblivious orthodoxies, and are replaced by inclusivity and multilateral civic mobilisation. a secular indonesia, which historically emerged as a more relaxed and harmonious society, should be a model of a post-colonial mature nation who could fully embrace the mantle of civil society, and could become a perfect example to other struggling state entities around the world. such a prudential society which is able to gaze beyond the polemical issues of politicized discourses and sectarianism, has now become a new necessity, “sufi mysticism” in conclusion is not only a possible approach to “deradicalize” extremism, but should also allow us to appreciate the value of syncretism and its ability to underpin the modern practices of secularism. indonesia by absorbing both the local traditions together with the strong belief in the islamic faith, in a syncretic environement, is the model of a global pluralist society. lana indralak 65 endnotes 1 niels mulder, “mysticism in java : ideology in indonesia”, 46. 2 ibid, 46. 3 hee soo lee, “javanese muslims’ tolerance and flexibility through syncretic ornamentation”, 22. 4 niels mulder, “mysticism in java : ideology in indonesia”, 26. 5 ibid, 26. 6 stephen c headley, “durga’s mosque : cosmology, conversion and community in central javanese islam”, 10-11. 7 hee soo lee, “javanese muslims’ tolerance and flexibility through syncretic ornamentation”, 28. 8 alexander seran, “pancasila and the struggle for a moral grammar ”, 35. 9 friedrich ebert stiftung, “salafist transformations significance, implications and prospects”, 22. 10 สุรชาติ บำารุงสุข, “แนวคิด-ยุทธวิธี ขบวนการก่อการร้าย เจไอ (ji : jemaah islamiyah)”, 16. 11 สุรชาติ บำารุงสุข, “แนวคิด-ยุทธวิธี ขบวนการก่อการร้าย เจไอ (ji : jemaah islamiyah)”, 16. 12 wiwi siti sajaroh, sarah hajar mahmudah, “the role of philosophical mysticism in islamic indigenization in java”, 6. 13 stephen c headley, “durga’s mosque : cosmology, conversion and community in central javanese islam” 10-11. 14 niels mulder, “mysticism in java : ideology in indonesia”, 53. 15 niels mulder, “mysticism in java : ideology in indonesia”, 57. 16 see for example the work of george quinn, bandit saints of java. quinn points out that while many mosques in java practice segregation of men and women, the shrines devoted to the sufi saints do not, and are often administered by women. 17 for a discussion of agonal democracy, see chantel mouffe, agonistics: thinking the world politically. new york: verso. 2013.. agonal democracy or radical democracy is based upon conflict. 18 christopher a. lizotte, “the geopolitics of laicite´ in a multicultural age : french secularism, educational policy and the spatial management of difference”, 91. 66 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 references ayman, shihadeh. sufism and theology. edinburgh: edinburgh university press. 2007. calhoun, craig j. juergensmeyer, mark, van antwerpen, jonathan. (eds), rethinking secularism. oxford, ny: oxford university press. 2011. headley, stephen c. durga’s mosque: cosmology, conversion and community in central javanese islam. iseas publications.2004. hee soo lee. javanese muslims’ tolerance and flexibility through syncretic ornamentation. south and southeast asia culture and religion : the sseasr journal. kennedy, emmet. secularism and its opponents from augustine to solzhenitsy. new york: palgrave macmillan. 2006. liss, sheldon b. radical thought in central america. boulder: westview press.1991. lizotte, christopher a. “the geopolitics of laicite´ in a multicultural age: french secularism, educational policy and the spatial management of difference” mouffe, chantel. agonistics: thinking the world politically. london: verso, 2013. mulder, niels. mysticism in java : ideology in indonesia . pepin press. 1998. quinn, george, bandit saints of java. leicestershire uk: monsoon books ltd. 2019. friedrich ebert stiftung. “salafist transformations significance, implications and prospects”, center for strategic studies . university of jordan. sarwar, alam, cultural fusion of sufi islam: alternative paths to mystical faith. abingdon, oxon : routledge. 2020. lana indralak 67 shah, idries. the way of the sufi. london: arkana 1990 313 p. 1990. seran, alexander, pancasila and the struggle for a moral grammar. prajna vihara: journal of philosophy and religion. (vol.17 no1, january-june) bangkok: assumption university. 2016. taylor, charles. a secular age. cambridge, ma: belknap press of harvard university, 2007. wiwi siti sajaroh, sarah hajar mahmudah, “the role of philosophical mysticism in islamic indigenization in java” สุรชาติ , บำารุงสุข, แนวคิด-ยุทธวิธี ขบวนการก่อการร้าย เจไอ (ji : jemaah islamiyah). กรุงเทพ : อนิเมทกรุ๊ป. 2550. a report on emotional education for young children: sacrifice and u.s. war-culture kelly denton-borhaug moravian college, usa abstract what would we say about the losses associated with war if we did not describe them as sacrifices? what would we say about jesus’ life and death if we did not associate the gospel narratives with a cosmic framework of sacrificial self-giving? the “the necessity of sacrifice” operates as an electrical exchange between the institutionalization of “war-culture” in the united states and the understandings and practices of popular christianity. this leads to an important and difficult question: is there any way to rehabilitate understandings of sacrifice for christianity without at the same time aiding and abetting war? introduction anyone who has tried to debate the virtues of war with an eager cadet or loyal marine knows what it must feel like to dispute the resurrection with a priest. warriors are intransigent on the advisability of war, and their resistance springs not from bullheadedness but from a kind of religiosity. theirs is the hymn of the true believer.1 on the eve of the 2008 democratic convention in denver, colorado, more than 1,000 anti-war protesters took to the streets, led by ron kovic, the paralyzed vietnam veteran made famous by the hollywood film, born on the fourth of july, and cindy sheehan, mother of casey sheehan, a soldier killed in the iraq war. carrying signs decrying the use of torture and calling for an end to the war in iraq, along the way of their march they encountered about 50 counter-protesters. among them was nancy hecker of colorado springs, mother of yet another young man 51prajñâ vihâra, volume 10, number 1-2, january-december, 2009, 51-76 © 2000 by assumption university press killed in iraq, major bill hecker. “why are you here for this counterprotest?” she was asked by journalists. mrs. hecker replied, “‘i’m here to honor our son and the sacrifice he made for our country and to support the troops and the families who give so much”.2 what would we say about the losses associated with war if we did not describe them as sacrifices? moreover, in a nation still dominantly shaped by christian religious understandings and practices, how is the same sacrificial language influenced by religious frameworks that emphasize jesus’ sacrificial self-giving life and death? in the united states, language about “the necessity of sacrifice” operates as an electrical conduit between the institutionalization of “war-culture” and the understandings and practices of popular christianity. at the same time, this conduit is entirely naturalized and mostly unquestioned in u.s. culture at large. as a result, the hinge of sacrifice between nationalism and christianity remains largely invisible to many if not most u.s. citizens, and the sacred sheen to war-culture contributed by sacrificial language and understandings goes unchallenged. this article’s first task is to explore and make more visible the facets and inner workings of “war-culture” in the united states. once this reality has become more of a conscious reality in our minds, we can then move on to a second task, analysis of the rhetoric and practices of sacrifice that sacramentalize and mask war-culture, and that silence protest against it. “u.s. war-culture” is the normalized interpenetration of the institutions, ethos and practices of war with ever-increasing facets of daily human life, economy, institutions and imagination in the united states. if “militarism” is a traditional term that refers to the dominance of the military over civilian authority and the prevalence of warlike values in society, contemporary scholars now utilize “militarization” to refer to what i describe as “war-culture”. catherine lutz’ definition is particularly apt: militarization is a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. . . [it is] an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes includ52 prajñâ vihâra ing the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with military goals (italics mine).3 lutz’ insight regarding the way militarization shapes other institutions, perceptions and identities is important here. militarization does not stand apart as an isolated element in u.s. culture. on the contrary, in the post-9/11 world of the united states, militarization is a powerful force that shapes the dynamics of collective power, life, memory and daily experience. “warculture” describes how this force has become a driving influence in u.s. culture at large. as andrew bacevich says, “the global military supremacy that the united states presently enjoys __ and is bent on perpetuating __ has become central to our national identity”. he continues, more than america’s matchless material abundance or even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation’s arsenal of high tech weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and what we stand for. . . americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarization, manifesting in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force.4 while many scholars and activists have explored and criticized the growth of empire in the post-9/11 united states, less attention has been paid to the significance of the rhetoric and cognitive framework of sacrifice that energizes and enables war-culture and that simultaneously is deeply tied to experiences and practices of christianity in the u.s. sacrificial constructions, exactly like the formulation drawn upon by mrs. hecker in this article’s introduction, are the focus of this investigation. specifically, i explore the way sacrificial language and frameworks electrically draw together christianity and war-culture. at the same time, however, not only does the cognitive framework of sacrifice act as an internal engine for war-culture, it also provides a sacred canopy over the institutions, culture and practices of war and thus is one important mechanism through which the reality of war-culture is thrust out of conscious view; in other words, not only does the framework of sacrifice energize kelly denton-borhaug 83 war-culture, it also plays a decisive role in the normalization of war-culture to the extent that it becomes invisible, and simply part of the expected fabric of life in the u.s. facets of u.s. war-culture in his final speech to the american people before returning to private life, president dwight eisenhower in 1961 spoke about a new development in american experience that emerged during his time of military and presidential leadership. he coined the term, “the military-industrial complex”, to describe the new “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry”. the influence of this complex, he warned, had economic, political and even spiritual impact, and while eisenhower allowed that the need for this development was unarguable, nevertheless, he emphasized, it was imperative that americans “not fail to comprehend its grave implications”. among those implications, eisenhower outlined four inherent dangers: 1) the intrusion of unwarranted influence into government by the complex; 2) the potential dangers to civil liberties and democratic processes; 3) the danger to the free university if government contracts “substitute for intellectual curiosity” and the nations’ scholars become dominated by federal employment and allocations and the power of money; 4) the potential for public policy to become captive to a scientific-technological elite. he closed by warning, “we should take nothing for granted. only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together”.5 eisenhower’s initial description of the military-industrial complex and his concerns about it may be compared to the proverbial pebble dropped into a pond. since his time, the depth and breadth of the ripples of war-culture extending out into the water of u.s. culture have grown exponentially and have been analyzed by many scholars. what follows is a brief foray into some of the major facets comprising these connected waves. 54 prajñâ vihâra military buildups and decreasing boundaries according to political scientist chalmers johnson, between 1950 and 2003, the u.s. experienced four periods of “intense military mobilization” and concomitant increases in weapons purchases. these included the korean war, the buildups during the vietnam war and under ronald reagan, and the boon overseen by the second bush administration following the attacks of 9/11.6 at the same time, these military expansions have been accompanied by diminishment of the boundaries between strictly military institutions, actions, purposes and supposed “civilian” institutions, culture and life. if eisenhower was concerned about the influence of the increasingly permeable boundaries between congress, the arms industry and the military, johnson adds a fourth institution playing an influential role in the spread of militarization: think tanks, described by him as “modern patriotic monasteries”.7 a revolving employment door between military and civilian institutions further complicates matters. the “circulation of elites”, with high ranking retiring defense contractors receiving appointments as officials in the pentagon, undercuts attempts by the congress to enforce accountability with respect to military spending. and in addition to expansion of military mobilization and slippage of military/civilian boundaries, warculture’s financial accounting increasingly is shielded from public view. the manhattan project to build the atomic bomb was the beginning of the development of so-called “black budgets” enabling the department of defense to shield itself from public scrutiny. “special access programs”, including weapons research and acquisition, operations and support (including funds for special forces), and intelligence, all are “black budget” programs whose expenses are shared with only a few members of congress. such screening from public view is exacerbated by the increase in the number and influence of private military companies, such as vinnell corporation of fairfax, virginia, a subsidiary of the defense conglomerate northrop grumman, authorized and funded by the u.s. government for ever wider purposes.8 for instance, among a growing host of military contractors, the blackwater “worldwide security firm” is building a 61,000 square foot facility on the san diego border to operationalize a kelly denton-borhaug 55 contract with the navy to train u.s. sailors on tactics to use at sea against insurgents.9 it is estimated that by 2010 the revenue of such companies will exceed $202 billion. additionally, the military increasingly contracts out base construction, maintenance and security. during the five years of dick cheney’s role as ceo of halliburton (1995-2000), the halliburton subsidiary, brown and root, was the beneficiary of $2.3 billion in government contracts, advancing from 73 to 18 on the pentagon’s list of top contractors.10 all this is made worse by what scholars describe as the weakening of constitutional government, especially in the post-9/11 period. johnson writes, “when it comes to the deliberate dismantling of the constitution, the events that followed the supreme court’s intervention in the election of 2000 that named george w. bush the forty-third president have proved unprecedented”. some of this dismantling may be seen in a) the post-9/11 fiat by president bush to veto requests to see presidential records; b) proposals such as the infamous “torture memo” which utilized “commander in chief” power to override us law on torture; c) the weakening and eventually the dismissal of fisa oversight of government wiretapping; and d) “signing statements”, presidential add-ons to approved legislation that in effect, provide a loophole to protect executive power from legislative constraint.11 war-culture has everything to do with the intermingling of all the distinct facets discussed thus far. these include the expanding of the military, slippage of appropriate boundaries of authority, increasing secrecy, and constitutional weakening. yet all this constitutes only part of the inner dynamics of war-culture in the u.s. war-culture and economics according to economists joseph stiglitz and linda bilmes, the afghanistan and iraq wars will cost at least three trillion dollars when all is said and done. in 2008, the u.s. spent approximately $16 billion per month to fund these wars, or what amounts to the annual budget of the united nations. this monthly figure does not include the $500 billion per year that the u.s. already spends on “regular expenses” of the defense department.12 also, because the u.s. government uses “cash account56 prajñâ vihâra ing”, that is, only accounting for what is actually spent today, and ignoring future obligations and costs, the full expenditures for war are hidden from view. to make things worse, faulty accounting practices of the department of defense further shield or muddle war-culture's true costs. the year 2007 was the tenth in a row that the department of defense "flunked its financial audit”.13 in order to obtain a more accurate accounting for the war, these economists track expenses in four discreet categories: 1) the amount of money already spent to conduct the wars; 2) future costs for waging these wars; 3) “hidden costs”, such as increases in the core defense budget and expanding the size of the military; and 4) the interest costs on borrowed money.14 not only the veterans administration, but other health care institutions and the social security administration will be called upon to cover expenses associated with iraq and afghanistan veterans’ health care, social security and disability needs. these costs will run somewhere between $422 billion (in a best case scenario) and $717 billion (in a realistic-moderately conceived scenario).15 yet these figures don’t begin to account for many other grievances incurred, such as the economic value of the loss of a productive young life, difficulties and deficits due to mental health disabilities such as ptds and traumatic brain injury, the costs of “quality of life” impairments to veterans, their family, friends and communities, and more. war-culture and everyday life the tentacles of war-culture into everyday life are far-reaching, and affect every person living in the united states, though relatively little consciousness or concern is registered among u.s. citizens with respect to this reality. through vast arrays of products we rely on in our everyday life, the realities in our workplaces and schools, the production of entertainment, in cultural sites and activities, at many more places and minutes during an average day of every person in the u.s. than we can begin to imagine, we are indelibly connected to what sociologist nick turse outlines as “this new military-industrial technological-entertainment-academicscientific-media-intelligence-homeland security-surveillance-national security-corporate complex”.16 he writes, kelly denton-borhaug 57 the high level of military-civilian interpenetration in a heavily consumer-driven society means that almost every american is, at least passively, supporting the complex every time he or she shops for groceries, sends a package, drives a car, or watches tv. . . the complex is connected to everything you would expect, from the top arms manufacturers to big oil corporations __ as well as numerous government agencies connected to the u.s. department of defense and allied entities such as the central intelligence agency and the department of homeland security. but it is also connected to the entertainment industry and the world’s largest media conglomerates. it is in league with the nation’s largest food suppliers and beverage companies. it supports the most prestigious universities in america and is tied to the leading automakers.17 over 47,000 contractors and over 100,000 subcontractors have business ties with the military. from cheerios to dawn dishwashing liquid, nature valley granola bars to wolfgang puck’s gourmet pizza, household appliances, home computers, video games, car manufacturers, sunglasses, the list of items produced by defense-related mega corporations and manufacturers goes on and on.18 for example, special operations troops and “armchair warriors” alike use oakley high-end footwear, “the elite special forces standard-issue assault boot”. wannabe soldiers purchased their own pairs in 2008 for about $225 a pair. the oakley website features a sophisticated, high-tech commercial video with a series of rapidly flashing images, all featuring extreme athletes snowboarding, doing martial arts, motocross, and more, while utilizing various oakley products in the pursuit of their sports. but if one pays close attention, one might notice that tucked in among the flashing images is a soldier with oakley sunglasses. as turse comments, “behind all the civilian martial and macho hype lies a deepening relationship with the military”.19 war-culture and education for a bird’s eye view into just one of many deeply significant, yet “everyday” facets of interpenetration between the military and u.s. life 58 prajñâ vihâra and culture, consider u.s. practices of education. over 150 militaryeducational institutions operate to inculcate “a youthful corps of tomorrow’s military officers” in the values, militarized sets of knowledge and skills of the warfare state. by 2002, according to a report by the association of american universities, almost 350 colleges and universities conducted pentagon-funded research.20 in addition, congressional earmarks funding college and university research reached an all-time high in 2008, representing a 25% increase from 2003. over 920 institutions of higher education were granted these funds that are dispersed outside of any traditional process of open competition and peer review, with a total of 41% of said earmarks deriving from the department of defense, “a favorite spot for lawmakers to tuck in academic earmarks”.21 at the same time, in the post-9/11 period the united states entered a period of intense recruiting of ever younger actual and would-be citizens for participation in the military-industrial-academic complex. the no child left behind act includes provisions that require all public schools receiving federal funding to allow military recruitment on their campuses. students may be recruited even as young as 14 years old for the “delayed entry program” (dep) that involves them in pre-military training, testing and culture while they finish high school in preparation to enter active duty.22 promises of citizenship by recruiters have proven to be especially powerful in a political climate of growing pressures on undocumented people, and have been criticized by immigrants’ rights activists as a form of “blatant exploitation of a vulnerable population”.23 meanwhile, the pentagon, using a marketing company called benow, compiled one of the largest private databases on young people in the country, 30 million 16 to 25-year-olds, their names, addresses, email addresses, cell phone numbers, ethnicity, social security numbers and areas of study.24 while the dep originally was created after the vietnam draft ended, students who now sign up to become a part of the program are targeted, tested, gifted, video-gamed, recruitment-faired and career-counseled into enlisting before they turn 18. they are also paid $2,000 for every friend they talk into signing up with them and, until recently, were paid $50 for every name they brought in to a recruiter.25 kelly denton-borhaug 59 the deep, naturalized and largely unexamined intertwining of the military with education at all levels is just one example of the interpenetration of war-culture with everyday life in the united states. entertainment, telecommunications, youth culture, the oil industry, food production, car manufacturing, computer technology, the list of facets of interpenetration is seemingly endless. and such intertwining has deeply significant consequences that are questioned far too little in contemporary u.s. culture. if at least some of the results of the “militarized civilian university” include, as listed by henry r. giroux, the production of weapons, increase in the arms race, collusion with forces of secrecy and domination, subversion of or inadequate resources dedicated to scientific knowledge that could be peaceful and/or non-militarized, the imposition of the assumption that using civilian institutions to suit military desires and pursuits is the normal way of doing things __ then key questions must be articulated by those whose commitment is to shape a different ethos in education. “what role do intellectuals play in the conditions that allow theory and knowledge to be appropriated by the military; and what can they do politically to prevent theory, knowledge and information from being militarized in the first place?”26 war-culture is an ever-present yet seemingly invisible reality in the united states. how can this be so? scholars have suggested a variety of answers to the above puzzle. the very pervasiveness of war-culture makes it so ubiquitous as to be almost unrecognizable in everyday life. in addition, military institutions and powers successfully have utilized the latest and most sophisticated of market strategies to portray military institutions, culture and values as hip, savvy, powerful and fun. thus american citizens are diverted from seeing and exploring war-culture’s dangers.27 other scholars have suggested that our very way of life, especially in terms of the dominance of consumerism and insistent dependence on an oil economy despite the resulting dire consequences, presents an inherent crisis in the american republic that citizens are discouraged from acknowledging. instead of looking within the nation and our own culture, government leaders (with citizens’ tacit encouragement) direct our focus to external problems as the real source of any trouble we face. instead of seriously addressing a failed u.s. energy policy, instead of facing the real60 prajñâ vihâra ity of trade deficits at least since the 1960’s combined with a growing and seemingly limitless lust for inexpensive consumer goods as “the american way of life”, citizens are encouraged and themselves willingly believe that our problems all are the result of international issues that can and will be solved by a dominant, omnipotent american military.28 yet there is even more to say. rhetoric and practices of sacrifice run like an electrical current between military institutions, values and culture and religious institutions, traditions, culture and practices. the language of sacrifice thus also plays a deeply important yet almost unrecognized role in the maintenance, pervasiveness and seemingly sacred nature of war-culture in the united states. a segue: the inevitable interplay of war-culture and sacrifice an rotc student requests that the leaders of the small liberal arts college he attends allow an army chinook helicopter to land in the central quad of the campus while classes are in session, in order to ferry him to a military training event about seventy miles away. sound impossible? when this took place at the liberal arts college where i teach in the spring of 2008, i was in the midst of research and writing on this topic. in the immediate aftermath of the helicopter landing, i was fascinated and yet unsurprised to see sacrificial rhetoric emerge almost immediately as controversy regarding the event began to swirl. it all started with a campuswide email sent by a political science professor on our campus, with just one line: “what is the purpose of this little stunt?”29 another professor, this one from the economics and business department, weighed in with another mass email: i can think of three worthy purposes, off hand: those who sacrifice salaries and stable home lives, if nothing else, to the service of their country deserve our support. until the lion lies down peaceably with the lamb, we must encourage young people to consider similar sacrifices (italics mine).30 kelly denton-borhaug 61 in this and further emails from this same professor, sacrificial rhetoric dominated. he wrote about what he viewed as the need to “support those whose sacrifices make our freedoms, including the freedom to wave a peace flag”. . . moreover, it is just these “sacrifices [that] make the freedom of speech”. such “sacrifice . . . makes freedom possible” and is “required” if we, as a “privileged minority” in the world, wish to continue to enjoy freedom of speech and other freedoms. the economics professor thus smoothly aligned the presence of the military helicopter on our liberal arts college campus with a portrayal of war as necessary sacrifice. moreover, his emails argued that the necessity of war as sacrifice is not something to be questioned; in fact, he claimed, its very necessity demands compliance __ we are not to question or protest, for that is akin to belittling the central players (soldiers) in this drama. no one challenged the sacrificial theme in this narrative to my knowledge, and even those who disagreed with the same professor relied upon it, such as one student who suggested in his email that making sacrifices (including, he noted, the “ultimate sacrifice”) only makes sense when one knows it’s going to be “worth it and make a lasting positive impact”. the appearance of sacrificial rhetoric during “chinook-gate” (as it came to be called by certain members of our campus community) was far from an aberration. in fact, it goes with the territory. communication scholars have investigated why this is the case, and how such rhetoric operates. sacrificial rhetoric in the purpose of war-culture has a way of inflating the measurement of real dangers and lifting the specter of peril to a transcendent level. this same over inflation disables critical thinking and pragmatic political critique. the rhetoric of sacrifice is ritualized speech, and channels and legitimates violence by covering the activities of killing with a sacred canopy made up of values such a loyalty and freedom. it “rationalizes war as in the service of the greater glory of god”. robert ivies writes, “[the] secular quest for security [is converted] into a prayer for redemption and a sacrament of atonement through the sacrifice of a scapegoat in whom we have invested all the evil of the world”. safety becomes the equivalent of salvation in the rhetorical universe that is u.s. war-culture. moreover, as also is evident from the same economic professor’s emails, this rhetoric transforms the idea of “safety” into a feminized, risky and fragile undertaking, a reality that always is “. . . vulnerable 62 prajñâ vihâra to the rape of the demonic and demented barbarian if left unprotected”. sacrificial rhetoric in the purpose of war-culture enables dehumanization of those considered the enemy, and depersonalizes those other real fleshand-blood, complicated and multifaceted human beings who all too often are conflated into a one-dimensional portrait, “the troops”. ivie remarks, “in war culture, disembodied abstractions and stone monuments supplant living memories of loved ones sacrificed for country and cause . . . our own soldiers are dehumanized by reducing them to depersonalized heroes.”31 we in the u.s. have become deeply enculturated to the rhetoric and logic of sacrificialism in war-culture. the predisposition toward sacrificial constructs deeply shapes u.s. citizens’ perceptions and equally profoundly impacts our response to the realities of antagonism and conflict. if “the military-industrial-academic (and on and on) complex is a huge systemic behemoth that must be engaged by numerous groups from multiple sites of intervention”,32 it has become all the more important to take on the pedagogical and political challenge to investigate the site of war-culture’s intertwined relationship with the rhetoric and cognitive framework of sacrifice. the same relationship electrifies, masks and sacramentalizes war and war-culture and holds at bay pragmatic critique, ethical discernment and the potential to imagine a different reality. warculture affects everyone who lives in the united states, and many, many more who live in countries outside our borders. once we become conscious of the deadly links between sacrifice and war-culture, there is no going back. more on sacrifice rituals and frameworks of blood sacrifice are central to the “religiosity” of war and war-culture. but investigating this relationship is a complicated undertaking. while cognitive frameworks and practices of sacrifice go back to extremely early human experiences and self definitions, pinning down exactly how sacrifice worked and how it was understood by early human communities is very difficult to do. in large part this has to do with the wide multivalent understandings and practices (still in kelly denton-borhaug 63 evidence today) of sacrifice across context and chronological time. another complexity in understanding sacrifice has to do with the reality that practices and understandings of sacrifice, even ritual sacrifice, not only are specifically religious but also have strong ties to communal, social and political frameworks. this is a reality that has been too little reflected on in theology, but anthropologists have not missed the significance of sacrificial blood rites, values and representations cementing and promoting all kinds of social arrangements.33 from very early times humans have been tempted by the notion that “violence will save”, not only religiously, but socially and politically as well. in modern times, the indelible link between sacrifice and warculture solidified in the rise of the nation-state. “the modern nation at its birth was a nation in arms.”34 one only need look as far as dominant national symbols, such as the flag, anthems, festivals, memorials, etc., to see that waging war and the rise of the nation state in modern times are intimately intertwined, to such a degree that it becomes extremely difficult to envision the modern state without war-culture as an essential ingredient in national self-identity and representation. sacrifice functions as the hinge between war-culture and national self-identity. the wars leading to the birth of the modern state still are explained and justified by making sacred the death of the soldier for the nation, exemplified in national anthems like the “marseillaise”, which proudly proclaims that when its young heroes fall the sacred soil of france will reproduce them all.35 likewise, “my country, ’tis of thee/ sweet land of liberty/ of thee i sing. / land where my fathers died”, are the words of the american anthem learned by every generation of school children. the words of the anthem are paralleled by the famous dictum of thomas jefferson, “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.36 not only a religious artifact, sacrificial self-identity shares an intimate relationship with national identity and representation. the intensity of this relationship between sacrifice and the nation state reaches its apotheosis in the development of what scholars term “total war”.37 the difference between this kind of war and earlier wars largely has to do with the entry of new and more extensively deadly forms of technology, and mass participants and victims in war. total war’s targets expand far beyond the enemy soldier. technological development 64 prajñâ vihâra widens the target focus to include centers of the production of weaponry and also civilian support; as a result, the dead include larger and larger ratios of civilians to each soldier killed (one must also mention in this regard the increasing destruction of the natural world and resulting environmental degradation, accelerating especially in 20th century war). the first total war in modern times identified by scholars is the american civil war, which relied on the mass armies first constructed by napoleon with the added destructive power of new rifled muskets that multiplied target range by five times that of earlier wars.38 the number of american u.s. soldiers killed in the civil war amounted to more than in both world wars, plus the korean and vietnam wars. in the american civil war alone, 622,000 soldiers died. moreover, historians of religion note that it is precisely at the point of america’s first total war that we discover language entering into american political discourse that compares the sacrifice of the soldier for his country to the sacrifice of christ.39 perhaps, scholars muse, it was the search to find some cognitive framework large enough to encompass such devastating loss in the first u.s. modern total war that led to this specific link. by the end of america’s first total war, the civil war, the christian sacrificial archetype became fully merged into american civil religion. both the martyred president and the war dead with whom he was indelibly linked, were understood as those whose sacrificial deaths were “. . . the last full measure of devotion”, making possible “a new birth of freedom”. the mythic symbolism connecting a cosmic interpretation of abraham lincoln’s untimely death with the sacrifice of jesus for salvation entered the nation’s bloodstream, as the words from lincoln’s own law partner, herndon, demonstrated: for fifty years god rolled abraham lincoln through his fiery furnace. he did it to try abraham and to purify him for his purpose. . . making him the noblest and loveliest character since jesus christ.40 christian proclamation and theological doctrines claiming the sacred sacrifice of jesus support, justify and provide a model for the sacrifice of the soldier. both deaths are “necessary” sacrifices in some way, serve a larger social/political or cosmic purpose, provide an ethical bluekelly denton-borhaug 65 print for followers’ imitation, and in both cases, the one(s) dying do so as surrogates for others. in the face of losses of many different types, individuals and communities return again and again to sacrificial cognitive frameworks. at the same time, the sacrificial cognitive framework impedes deeper questioning and analysis about the true nature and causes of the losses being experienced. in light of this connection, we must face the ethical question: how can christians talk about the sacrifice of jesus without it in some way contributing to the problem of war and war-culture, without the sacrifice of jesus adding to a sacred canopy that glorifies and mystifies the realities of war? additionally, once we become more deeply aware of the role that sacrificial language and understandings play vis a vis the glorification and mystification of war and war-culture, what must this same awareness mean for christian theology and practice? people who sit in the pews each week and sing hymns, respond to the liturgy, and hear sermons that focus on sacrifice largely are unaware of the ongoing debate among christian theologians and ethicists regarding how best to respond to this conundrum. moreover, even in the theological world of trained clergy and academics, far too often, when dangerous practices of sacrificialism are acknowledged, such recognition merely precedes a reinscription of the centrality of sacrifice for christian understanding and practice. a recent devotion printed in the popular publication, the lutheran, is a case in point. a pastor writes about the way the “traditional emphasis on atonement” has blocked out the “subversive” element of jesus’ death as a religious leader who was silenced because of the threat he posed to the established order. this pastor seems to be quite aware of the sacrificial scapegoating mechanism in the gospels that more and more mainstream theologians criticize. “we can’t avoid reading that jesus was considered a threat to society by those who felt responsible to maintain peace and security”, he writes. jesus was killed (sacrificed) by the state for just this perceived threat. but such awareness does little to affect this author’s simultaneous emphasis on the necessity of jesus’ sacrifice as part of a cosmic plan. he continues, when i was young, i was taught that god loves me and that jesus died for me. i was reminded to be thankful that god sent jesus to die for my sins. . . during lent and into holy week we lift up the 66 prajñâ vihâra death of jesus as something he didn’t deserve. he was innocent of all charges. . . he died so we might be saved. he paid the ransom. god was pleased with jesus’ sacrifice.41 language such as this is far too captive to manipulation for the purpose of aiding and abetting u.s. war-culture, as we have seen all too well in the speeches of president george w. bush, such as this one from easter, 2008: this morning, families across america are coming together to celebrate easter. . . during this special and holy time each year, millions of americans pause to remember a sacrifice that transcended the grave and redeemed the world. . . on easter we hold in our hearts those who will be spending this holiday far from home __ our troops. . . i deeply appreciate the sacrifices that they and their families are making. . . on easter, we especially remember those who have given their lives for the cause of freedom. these brave individuals have lived out the words of the gospel: “greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. . .”42 u.s. war-culture rests upon a sea bed of cultural assumptions that are reified, naturalized and sacralized by way of religious frameworks. indeed, the “necessity” of war and the “inevitable” suffering that ensues (and in addition the positioning of such suffering as a “necessary sacrifice” that leads to “salvation”), not to mention the assumed “nobility” associated with the ability to wage war and become formed as a warrior, are cultural givens that the majority of the population assume to be natural, “just the way things are.” moreover, these assumptions not only are unquestioned, they have achieved a kind of sacred status in contemporary u.s. culture that prevents citizens from more profound examination of the realities of the war-culture in which we live. what has gone largely unexamined in the u.s. is the dominance of christian sacrificial rhetoric that underlies and undergirds these same “givens”. kelly denton-borhaug 67 theological responses to sacrificialism can sacrificial (re)constructions continued to be relied upon in a christianity that is aware of the destructive links between sacrifice and war-culture? here i briefly outline three different responses from theologians to the problems posed by the link of sacrifice between christianity and contemporary social structures and practices. first, i examine theological analysis that demonstrates awareness and critique of the dangers of sacrificialism, but nevertheless gives way to a reinscription of sacrifice as the central way of christian salvation and formative of christian following. second, i compare and contrast two womanist theologians whose disagreement about the possibility of rehabilitating sacrifice is constructive and illuminating. finally, third, i discuss the analysis of a representative from a school of latin american liberation theologians who have explored the dangers of sacrificialism with respect to christianity and neoliberal economics.43 theologian mark heim, on the one hand, acknowledges and criticizes the social dangers of sacrificialism (and scapegoating), and on the other hand, attempts to redefine jesus’ sacrifice as somehow different. utilizing the theory of social scapegoating from the work of rene girard, heim outlines a central conflict at the heart of the passion story in christianity: the paradox at the center of the narrative of the crucifixion of jesus, “god’s plan and an evil act, a good bad thing”.44 the difficulty with understanding and faithfully embracing the narratives of jesus’ death have to do with multiple story lines (the “stereophonic” quality, according to heim) included in the gospel accounts. on the one hand, these stories are emphatic about jesus’ sacrificial death as unjust and wrong. he is a victim of social sacrificial scapegoating. on the other hand, however, jesus is supposed to die and sets his face to go to jerusalem, the place of his coming torture and death. his death is part of a divine plan for salvation. how can such seemingly contradictory story lines be adjudicated? the “sacrificial crisis” reflected in the gospels and theorized by girard continues well into our own time, according to heim, though in our own age, dominated by the rise of technology and (supposedly) advanced society, many if not most individuals mistakenly believe that sacrifice is a 68 prajñâ vihâra long-passed, “primitive” stage we moderns and post-moderns have abandoned. such thinking actually works well with girard’s insight that scapegoating sacrifice is most effective when it is most invisible and unrecognized. institutions humans have developed to try to deal with social conflict, such as our legal and police systems, (and one might say, though heim does not, the branches of the military as the coercive/defensive arm of the legislative and executive branches of u.s. government), are human communal attempts to deal with mimetic rivalry and its consequence, the escalation of social violence. but heim notes that all too often, such legal, political and military systems are consumed by the very sacrificial crisis they were designed to otherwise control. he mentions the stalinist terror, the national socialist terror in germany, the u.s. red scare after world war i, the practice of racial segregation and more, all as examples of contemporary scapegoating violence. if anything, scapegoating sacrifice is more a danger than ever, given that “mimetic contagion” has only increased with more sophisticated technological developments in human societies in media and advertising. nevertheless, heim argues, even as jesus’ ministry demonstrates unmasking of the violence against innocent victims, jesus’ role is to be sine qua non of scapegoats, in order, heim claims, to repeal scapegoating. this is where heim attempts to clarify distinctions between the “stereophonic” multiple narrative lines of the new testament. according to heim, sacrificial systems demand that something be given up in order for peace to be achieved. you ransom something in order to get something back. in other words, sacrifice is a dynamic of exchange. however, when god steps into the breach, heim claims, the entire process is disrupted: god offers a ransom not only to get the captives out of the place of the scapegoat, but to act from that place, the place of utter abandonment. . . when god, who cannot be silenced and who will not take vengeance, stands in that place, the web of sacrifice collapses.45 heim himself acknowledges the slipperiness of the interpretation of the cross he has claimed. it is exceedingly difficult for the ancient dynamics of scapegoating sacrifice not to be immediately reinscribed into kelly denton-borhaug 69 the system that heim describes as “victory”. he writes, “one could look at representations of christian glory on the cross and see this as a representation not of victory over sacrifice, but of the sacrifice itself. god’s victory is the dying”.46 though heim would have us believe that jesus’ death on the cross is god’s way of disrupting sacrificial scapegoating dynamics, ultimately his analysis in my judgment results in a reinscription of the very process he hoped would be overcome. as christine gudorf has noted, god “stepping into the breach” of sacrifice doesn’t cure sacrifice. if anything, the violence of sacrifice is like a narcotic, anesthetizing and distracting us from examining and growing in awareness regarding the true roots of the conflict. sacrifices should be averted in favor of digging into the realities behind the frustration giving rise to conflict in the first place; the key is not additional sacrifice, but deeper examination and greater awareness.47 the notion that sacrificial scapegoating systems only may be overcome through bearing the pain, loss and destructiveness they create is deeply embedded in sacrificial systems themselves, those in war-culture and in christianity (as well as other religions). to say as much is to glorify and mystify sacrificial dynamics as “necessary”, cosmically approved and effective. this same cognitive framework is centrally entrenched in the u.s. a second trajectory of thinking with respect to the possibility of reclaiming or rehabilitating sacrifice involves the theological tension between womanist theologians dolores s. williams and joanne marie terrell.48 for williams, jesus’ “ministerial vision” captured in his language about the kingdom of god does not point to death; in other words, the kingdom of god does not require one’s death in order to become actualized. the primary significance of the cross for williams is its power to reveal the depth of sin “in its most desecrated form”. in her excavation of the institution of surrogacy in the pre-civil war period, the antebellum period and beyond, williams powerfully highlights the way that social arrangements may be deeply ingrained and reified by way of theological assumptions. whether as the field slave, the mammy or the sexual slave, black women’s social experiences of surrogacy collided with traditional christian soteriological models, especially penal substitution. according to williams, the theological framework of jesus standing in for sinful humanity and receiving in their place the righteous punishment meted out kelly denton-borhaug 7370 prajñâ vihâra by a wrathful god, supports the unjust social situations african american women have endured from the time of slavery in the united states into the present. the argument i make is similar: war-culture rests upon a sea bed of cultural assumptions that are naturalized and sacralized by way of religious assumptions. the “necessity” of war and concomitant “inevitable” suffering are cultural givens that are assumed to be natural, “just the way things are”. i argue that religious assumptions have played a strong role in the process of just such reification, naturalization, sacralization. in contrast to williams, however, for joanne marie terrell the key component to analyze in sacrificial stories and schemes is the possibility of agency. the problem is imposed sacrifice, not sacrifice that is chosen for the sake of a higher good. in fact, the conscious choosing of sacrifice may even be “sacramental”. furthermore, a sacramental notion of sacrifice has saving significance for african american women and helps them to channel pain into service for the community. yet, in a culture such as ours that has such deeply embedded cognitive frameworks as the heroic nature of self sacrifice and the sacred tenor of suffering which follows, not to mention the necessity of sacrifice for the payment of sin, to what degree is such agency truly possible? how will we distinguish between sacrifice that is enacted as a result of capitulation to such schemes and sacrifice that is “freely chosen?” second, the idea of “sacramentalism” associated with sacrifice also is problematic. for such “sacramentalism” is exactly akin to the problem of absolutizing or divinizing the “necessary sacrifices” through which war and war-culture are justified and rationalized. christian theology has not yet fully come to grips with the problematic nature of sacrificialism in christianity and its impact on western life and thought generally speaking. the depth of embedded sacrificial cognitive frameworks and their resulting subconscious existence in our lives makes them exceedingly difficult to unearth and examine, much less criticize. analyses of power, class, race, gender and more are required in order that we shine a light on the way dominating actors utilize sacrificial logic to demand and/or justify the sacrifice of the dominated. a school of latin american liberation theologians has been working on the problem of sacrificial cognitive frameworks with respect to “economic religion” and “its fascination both with its promises and its demands for sacrifices”. i turn to brazilian theologian jung mo sung, who explores neoliberal ecokelly denton-borhaug 71 nomics and the problem of sacrificialism in christianity and society.49 sung describes two sides of one economic coin. on the one side is the “redeeming progress” of the free market coming fully into being, making possible “the american way of life”. commodities go to where there are a greater number of votes or dollars. on the other side of the coin, however, are the suffering and death of millions of people, the “necessary sacrifices” for this same progress. these sacrifices may take the form of employment cuts, higher costs of living, austerity programs and more, all of which supposedly promise a better future, greater competitiveness and freedom for the flow of capital. in the place of a strong collective awareness of social responsibility for the welfare of all, the social owners of capital put forth an argument to justify the lopsided economic reality from which they benefit: sacrifices in the long run are good and healthy for the general public. this is a “shame-blame game that hides a shifting of burdens from the strong to the weak”, “. . . an undeniable sign that rationalizing ideologies are actively at work”.50 the tie between this “economic religion” and war further is undergirded by belief that war brings economic benefits. yet even in the case of world war ii, which many people assume was the economic engine that ended the great depression in the united states, economists warn us against such na?ve thinking. while economic gains did come in the early stages of the war, when the united states was still selling goods but was not yet a combatant, the situation changed significantly once the united states entered the war. as one economist sums it up, while overall economic output was rising, and the military draft lowered unemployment, the war years were generally not prosperous ones. as for today, we shouldn’t think that fighting a war is the way to restore economic health.51 thus, sung concludes, theologians must grapple much more seriously with the sacrificial constructions at the heart of western christianity itself. “sacrificial logic underlies the sacralization of a social system of human works and institutions; this logic has the capacity to reverse the notion of good and evil”.52 not only the u.s., but the world cannot afford lack of awareness kelly denton-borhaug 7572 prajñâ vihâra and examination with respect to the dangerous and destructive links between christianity, sacrifice and u.s. war-culture. if we have learned anything from the post-9/11 history of the u.s., surely it must be regarding the depth and breadth of the human, environmental and cultural damage wreaked in this period through a program of war that has been rationalized, justified and sacralized with the help of sacrificial formulations in a nation still shaped and dominated by christian language, practice and understanding. at the very least, a more incisive set of distinctions needs to be outlined by those who would continue to uphold christian sacrificial frameworks, including a clear demonstration regarding just how and why a christian understanding of sacrifice is different from those sacrificial frameworks that electrify and naturalize war-culture. i remain dubious as to whether such a project is possible, ethically viable, or central to meaningful christian commitment and following. in the meantime, peeling back the layers of sacrificial constructions wherever we find them, and examining honestly just how they function, is of utmost importance if citizens in the u.s. are to confront in any meaningful way the reality of war-culture in which we live and that is so destructive not only to the u.s. but to all people and the natural world at large. we need wise citizens, church members, clergy, theologians and politicians who strive to develop the kind of hearing that can pick up on sacrificialism, and hear it with a new level of suspicion and perception, if we are to challenge the impenetrable, persistent and ever-more-damaging dynamics of war-culture in the united states. endnotes 1susan faludi, “let us prey”, the nation, may 12, 1997, 24. 2judith kohler and colleen slevin, “will war protesters ‘recreate 68’?” associated press, august 25, 2008, http://www.mcall.com/news/local/alla1_cvnprotests.6560317aug25,0,1932893.story, accessed 08/28/08. 3as quoted in henry a. giroux, university in chains: confronting the military-industrial-academic complex, boulder: paradigm publishers, 2007, 31. see catherine lutz, “making war at home in the united states: militarization and the current crisis”, american anthropologist 104: 3 (september 2002), 723. 4quoted in giroux, 36. see andrew bacevich, the new american militarism, new york: oxford university press, 2005, 14. 5“eisenhower’s farewell address to the nation”, jan. 17, 1961, eisenhower kelly denton-borhaug 73 archives, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/speeches/farewell_address.html, accessed 08/16/08. 6chalmers johnson, sorrows of empire, new york: metropolitan books, 2004, 55-56. 7johnson 26. 8johnson 135. 9tony perry, “judge allows blackwater to resume work on san diego facility”, los angeles times, june 5, 2008, http://www.commondreams.org/archive/ 2008/06/05/9432/, accessed, 06/06/08. 10johnson, sorrows of empire, 144. 11chalmers johnson, nemesis: the last days of the american republic, new york: metropolitan books, 2006, 253-255. 12joseph e. stiglitz and linda j. bilmes, the three trillion dollar war: the true cost of the iraq conflict, new york: w. w. norton, 2008. 13stiglitz and bilmes 19. 14stiglitz and bilmes 34. 15stiglitz and bilmes 87. 16nick turse, the complex: how the military invades our everyday lives, new york: metropolitan books, 2008, 16. 17turse 16-18. 18turse 5 ff. 19turse 67-70. see the oakley website, http://oakley.com/innovation, accessed 08/24/08. 20turse 32. 21jeffrey brainard and jj hermes, “colleges’ earmarks grow, amid criticism”, chronicle of higher education, march 28, 2008, http://chronicle.com/free/ v54/i29/29a00101.htm., accessed 06/12/08. 22deborah david, “yo soy el army: if you're an immigrant, at least uncle sam wants you”, metroactive, 09/19/07, http://www.metroactive.com/metro/ 09.19.07/news-0738.html, accessed 06/05/08. 23david, “yo soy el army”. 24giroux 45. 25david, “yo soy el army”. 26giroux 57. 27nick turse writes about both of these rationales in the book cited above. 28see andrew bacevich, the limits of power: the end to american exceptionalism, metropolitan books, 2008. 29gary l olson, “re: fyi-chinook helicopter to land in quad thursday/ transport lv rotc cadets to training”. email to all-college and seminary. moravian college. 4/23/2008. 30george d brower, “re: fyi-chinook helicopter to land i quad thursday/ transport lv rotc cadets to training”. email to all-college and seminary. moravian college. 4/23/2008. 74 prajñâ vihâra 31robert l. ivie, dissent from war, bloomfield, ct: kumarian press, 2007, 56, 61, 79. 32giroux 79. 33see jeffrey carter, ed., understanding religious sacrifice: a reader, new york: continuum, 2003, for a very helpful and expansive anthology of scholarly exploration of sacrifice, spanning thinkers from the early nineteenth century through the twentieth. nancy jay’s work represents one example of exploring the dynamic interplay of sacrifice as a cementing element in forms of religious, political and social power. see throughout your generations forever: sacrifice, religion and paternity, chicago: university of chicago press, 1992. also see barbara ehrenreich, blood rites: origins and history of the passions of war, holt, 1998. 34see george l. mosse, confronting the nation: jewish and western nationalism, hanover, ny: brandeis university press, 1993. 35mosse 16. 36excerpted from thomas jefferson’s letter to william smith, nov. 13, 1787. jefferson writes, “what country before ever existed a century and a half without a rebellion? and what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? let them take arms. the remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify them. what signify a few lives lost in a century or two? the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. it is its natural manure”. the atlantic magazine online, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96oct/obrien/ blood.htm, accessed 08/25/08. 37see chapter 4, “reductio ad absurdum: total war”, in gwynne dyer, war, new york: crown publishers, 1985. 38dyer 77. 39discussion from history of christianity section and north american religions section: war and religion in north america, american academy of religion, san diego, november 2007. 40quoted in robert bellah, “civil religion in america”, american civil religion, russell e. richey and donald g. jones, eds., new york, harper and row, 1974, 32. for an in depth case study that delves into the development of sacrificial constructions during the civil war period, see drew gilpin faust, this republic of suffering: death and the american civil war, vintage, 2009. 41george s. johnson, “was jesus subversive? considering the ‘other’ reason jesus died on the cross”, the lutheran, march, 2008, 28-29. 42“president’s radio address, easter, 2008”, the white house, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080322.html. accessed 04/02/08. 43here i only provide a brief outline and analysis of these theological responses, all of which i explore more thoroughly in a book in progress, the “ultimate sacrifice”: christianity and u.s. war-culture. 44mark heim, saved from sacrifice: a theology of the cross, grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2006, 108. see also brad jersak and michael hardin, eds., kelly denton-borhaug 75 stricken by god? nonviolent identification and the victory of christ, grand rapids, mi: eerdmans , 2007, for an anthology of essays written by thinkers working on questions related to nonviolent soteriological constructions. 45heim 162. 46heim 310. 47see christine gudorf, victimization: examining christian complicity, philadelphia, trinity press international, 1992. 48dolores s. williams, “black women’s surrogacy experience and the christian notion of redemption”, cross examinations, ed. marit trelstad, minneapolis, mn: fortress press, 2006; and also dolores s. williams, sisters in the wilderness, orbis, 1995. joanne marie terrell, “our mothers’ gardens: rethinking sacrifice”, cross examinations. also, joanne marie terrell, power in the blood? the cross in african american experience, wipf and stock, 2005. 49jung mo sung, desire, market and religion, scm press, 2007. other theologians who are working on these issues include franz hinkelammert, ivone gebara, elsa tamez and more. 50“bob goudzwaard with julio de santa ana, “the modern roots of economic globalization”, beyond idealism: a way ahead for ecumenical social ethics, grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2006, 118. 51tyler cowen, “the new deal didn’t always work, either”, new york times, economic view, november 23, 2008. see also robert higgs, depression, war and the cold war, oakland, ca: independent institute, 2006, and ronald l. friesen, “war and peace in economic terms”, teaching peace: nonviolence and the liberal arts, new york: rowman and littlefield, 2003. 52sung 72. 76 prajñâ vihâra 22_(341-342) in tribute to.pmd in tribute to a great king it takes the consummate love of a father to love the people as our king does it takes a giant leap of patience to care as much as a committed king it takes towers of strength to prevail as monarch, even in tribulations of time to be the stability which his subjects avail in changing fortunes or clime it takes forbearance in the fight of life to hold on to wisdom and moderation never to yield, in the floods of misfortunes never to sink, but to survive the waves of destruction it takes the will of life to reach the age of eighty four to stand tall even in the aches and pains of the body it takes the mind of decisive sacrifice to defy history to lead the people with righteousness to the fore it takes a great life, the life of a teacher to hold the hands of the people and leading them forward in teaching to point out in greatness, life’s undying riches it takes the force of morality to sit on the throne of majesty and in the throngs of loyal people look into their hearts which have been touched prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 341-342 341 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ it takes fulfillment in life to look ahead of the fast changing forces of time to be able to look back with smiles, and say i have lived and loved my people as i have promised. long live his majesty the king!!! glen chatelier assumption university of thailand december 5, 2011 (the poem was originally published in the bangkok post, thailand on december 5, 2011. reprinted with permission) 342 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 94 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 the connection between happiness and practice in buddhism and aristotelian philosophy nyartika assumption university, thailand abstract this explores what happiness means according to the buddhist and aristotelian perspectives. both view happiness as kind of practice which can be cultivated, not a gift that good fortune bestows upon humans. people often neglect this insight of the importance of creating their happiness by their own actions. practicing morality, knowledge, and wisdom are important for cultivating a happy and well-lived life. this research investigates how the buddha and aristotle developed special practices which develop the virtues essential for obtaining happiness. keywords: happiness; buddhism; aristotle; practice introduction happiness is understood differently across various communities, religions, and social groups. there is often times a temptation to see happiness as a momentary state bestowed by fortune. but there are approaches to happiness that see it as a kind of virtue which is developed through effort. this is what we find in both buddhism and aristotelian philosophy. while they differ considerably, they share the idea that happiness is something to be cultivated through practice and action. in prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021, 94-104 © 2000 by assumption university press nyartika 95 buddhism, happiness is often understood within the framework of the four noble truths and in terms of the development and practice of mental equanimity.1 happiness for aristotle’s is living in accordance with virtue.2 an action must be self-sufficient and directed towards an absolute end, “that which is good in itself and never for the sake of anything else.” and it must be something attainable by human effort.3 in both buddhism and aristotle we see happiness as involving an end which is approached through a kind of practice or action. comparing buddhism and aristotle on happiness is important because we begin to see happiness, not as a momentary state, but as something developed through discipline or the development of virtue. in its most basic sense buddhism, happiness is called “sukha”, which is considered the opposite of suffering, or “dukkha”. hence, happiness is a state of mind that involves the reduction of suffering. yet buddhism also holds that someone can have their suffering reduced without necessarily becoming happy. there are many kinds of classifications of happiness in buddhism, ranging from the physical level, which is kāmasukha (the happiness arising from sensual pleasures) to the level of wisdom, which is nirodha samāpattisukha (the total extinction of suffering). in buddhism, happiness starts with an understanding of the root causes of suffering.4 happiness is not merely a means to the end of human life, but it is a continual factor in this quest, since when a human is unhappy, they will be affected negatively from their actions. while it is possible to live while being unhappy, it is impossible to develop good habits, and live a better peaceful life for itself and society.5 according to buddhism, happiness denotes the achievement of profound mental equanimity through the active cultivation of knowledge.6 the buddha said that this equanimity could be achieved through belonging to a mental stage of happiness, when man detaches all desires, feelings, wants, and needs of life. one should follow the eightfold paths taught by buddha to pursue “tranquillity” and “insight”, resulting in the achievement of “nirvana.”7 96 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 aristotle’s approach wished to investigate the proper end of the human being and how this end can be achieved. this ultimate goal or end is happiness eudaimonia.8 happiness for aristotle is comprised of different elements of eudaemonic well-being.9 sometimes, aristotle described happiness in terms of “euphoria”, where he stated that if practical activities support the virtue of a person’s wellbeing, then that person could perceive happiness based on these actions.10 aristotle also stated that practical ethics and wisdom walk hand-in-hand in providing perceptions of pleasure, euphoria, and happiness.11 aristotle said that happiness can be achieved by developing virtue and living a good life.12 this involves the practice and cultivation of rational behaviour.13 the focus of this paper then is on this method of cultivation through the noble eightfold path and through the development of virtue. how is happiness connected to activity in buddhism and aristotle, and what this comparison teaches us about the practice and cultivation of happiness in today’s society? virtues and happiness virtue (sīla) in buddhism, is explained in the brahmajala-suttanta categorized in two ways: as caritta sīla and varitta sīla. caritta sīla is the fulfilment of the precepts such as the duties of parents, the obligations of a teacher, the obligations of a student. varitta sīla refers to actions that should not be done and one should avoid the criminal acts.”14 moreover, there are three levels of virtue: minor virtue (cūla sīla) for the layman, the middle-length morality (majjhima sīla) for the novice and the longer (mahā sīla) for monks discussed in the patimokha sutta. some are suitable for everyone to follow such as the five precepts and the eight factors.15 without ethics, one can be selfish; by practicing ethics one can be altruistic. the foundation of moral virtues is intended to bring about the development of the individual, social uplift, harmony, and concord.16 virtue has karmic effects; it can create a good life for a human being and prepare us to undertake certain conventions of life, and identify to us who we are.17 this karmic aspect of virtue is essential to buddhism. it means that the practice of virtue leads to happiness. nyartika 97 ancient greek philosophy developed an idea of virtues in human beings, related to human nature, the good life, and the idea of wellbeing. aristotle asked the question what is a happy life? his answer was that it involved not only virtue, but also the ability to meet needs and wants. aristotle said that the virtues of justice, charity, and generosity are dispositions to act in ways that benefit both the person possessing them and that person’s society. for aristotle, for those people whose principles will enable them to achieve happiness eudaemonia and those people who lack principles would have frustrated in their striving toward a happy life. but the morals are not just functional means to an end. aristotle says that without good judgment, knowledge, and wisdom, one cannot be morally perfect, without practical moral virtues, one cannot have perfect wisdom. the primary purpose of aristotle in his ethics of virtue is to provide guides for the achievement of the happiness to which the performance of virtue gives rise.18 virtue is a kind of practice not merely a kind of knowing.19 this idea is similar buddhism. for buddhism happiness is created by the mind, independent of the forces that oppose it. the cleansed mind is the very origin that creates happiness, not the unclean mind. an origin of happiness is the repetition of performing good actions with a clean mind. if a person does well, let him do it more than once and let him take pleasure in it; happiness is produced by the accumulation of good.20 referring to how unhappiness is causally conditioned, the buddha said that unhappiness is the reliance on our desires, reliance on our pursuits, reliance on our judgments, and reliance on our infatuations. it follows then that happiness is obtained by putting this in the opposite order, for it is from complete elimination, complete eradication, and total absence of desire that happiness is achieved. through no other manner can one achieve true happiness; it is not the following of some external authority, but by fully understanding truth and nature.21 these ideas are the same as aristotle. 98 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 final goals the final goal of the buddha is nirvana, the final goal of aristotle is happiness. so there is a clear difference in the purpose of their ethics. in the teaching of the buddha, there are two transcendental effects, initially, to achieve happiness connected to enlightenment in the present life, and secondly, to aim at the greater manifestation of the better life after death. but, the main focus of the buddha is the enlightened person, their following the four noble truths and the noble eightfold path. the primary purpose of aristotle in his ethics of virtue is to provide guides for the achievement of the happiness eudaimonia to which a good life of the practice of virtue gives rise.22 that is happiness is the end of this life. in buddhism it is easy to consider the possibility that someone meditating in a forest could gain happiness more easily compared to a person working in a city.23 for aristotle, the practice of virtue should be for human beings in general. buddhism’s ideology of happiness indicates that happiness is a significant part of life that aids in ending humanity’s eternal reincarnation cycle. on the contrary, aristotelianism influences aid in describing that every item or being must be accounted for within a limited frame of life.24 both buddha and aristotle see happiness in relation to purpose. however, the end that is achieved is different.25 aristotle believed that education can develop an individual’s virtue so that they can achieve true happiness. he said that if happiness does not come from a higher power, then it must be a consequence of goodness accomplished through the effort of learning. conclusion the similarity between buddha and aristotle is that happiness eudaimonia is the product of a certain kind of practice. for the buddha, this disciple which leads to happiness involves the liberation from suffering, obtained through the practise of the noble eightfold path. the ultimate end is nirvana for aristotle the ultimate end itself is happiness and to live a decent life. this allows him to accept a certain measure of material wealth, good health, and good friendship, as appropriate for nyartika 99 such an aim. for aristotle, the wellbeing of a human depends on their virtuous acts being performed for the sake of other people. in addition, the person acts ethically on behalf other human beings by creating a situation under which they can flourish. moral virtues aim to modify better life and being a good human. thus, it is one of the most essential elements of aristotelian happiness. the purpose of the buddha in his ethics is concerned with what is good for individuals and community and is also described as pragmatic: it is to root out the ‘defilements’ and modify the ego through the understanding of selflessness and the principles of spiritual mindfulness practice such as the four noble truths. the difference is the focus on the particular aim of the monk who is seeking enlightenment and nirvana. the buddha’s main goal is to provide his followers to achieve the peaceful states of nirvana or salvation, the period when someone becomes absolutely enlightened achieves a state of ‘absolute truth,’ and is liberated from the pain of karmic rebirth. while for aristotle, moral virtue is for humans in general. endnotes 1 wallace, a. and shauna, s. mental balance, and well-being: building bridges between buddhism and western psychology. american psychologist journal, maryland, no. 7 (2005): 69061. 2 yacobi, ben. life and the pursuit of happiness. journal of philosophy of life vol.5, no.2 (august 2015):82-90. 3 aristotle, (350 b. c. e.). nichomachean ethics. david ross and lesley brown (ed.) oxford, england: oxford university press, (2009), no. 1097a30-34. 4 kittiprapas, s. buddhist sustainable development through inner happiness. faculty of economics. rangsit university press, bangkok, thailand, 2016. p. 118. 5 keown, d. “keynote one.” presentation at contemporary perspectives on buddhist ethics, columbia university press, new york, (2011), p.124. 6 ricard, m. “a buddhist view of happiness.” journal of law and religion, no. 29.1, (2013) 14-29. 7 muldoon, a. a comparison of aristotelian and buddhism ethics and the implication for a moral way for young people. scotland. glasgow: university of glasgow press, 2008. 100 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 8 aristotle, (350 b. c. e.). nichomachean ethics. david ross and lesley brown (ed.) oxford, england: oxford university press, (2009), no.1094a,18-28. 9 raftari, h. “happiness in view of aristotle and avicenna.” international journal of social science and humanity, (2015). no. 5(8), 714. 10 tabensky, a. happiness: personhood, community, purpose. university of oxford press, oxford, (2017), p.118. 11 aristotle. nichomachean ethics. david ross and lesley brown (ed.) oxford, england: oxford university press, (2009), no. 1107a8-12. i.7 1097b28. 12 ibid, 1097b28. en i.7 1098a16-18 13 ibid, 1097a32-b8). i.7 1098a15-16. 14 nanamoli and bodhi. majjhima nikaya. colombo, sri lanka, sri lanka tripitaka project, 1995, p.18. 15 nanatusita, bhikkhu. the bhikkhu patimokkha. a word-by-word translation buddhist publication society, sri lanka, kandy: (2014), p.15. 16 thouless, robert. social psychology, a textbook for students of economics. the university of oxford press, (1972), p.59. 17 morgan, j. william. ethics in sport. market stress, champaign, united states of america. human kinetics publications, (1996), p. 63. 18 aristotle, (350 b. c. e.). nichomachean ethics. david ross and lesley brown (ed.) oxford, england: oxford university press, (2009), no. vi, 13, 1144b31-32. 19 mann, d. secrets of happy families. web md, (2007), p.139-140. 20 bodhi, bhikkhu. the connected discourses of the buddha, a translation of the samyutta nikaya. wisdom publications, somerville, u.s. wisdom publications, (2012) verse, 2. 21 bodhi, bhikkhu. the connected discourses of the buddha, a translation of the samyutta nikaya. wisdom publications, somerville, wisdom publications, united states of america (2012) p.55-56. 22 muldoon, a. a comparison of aristotelian and buddhism ethics and the implication for a moral way for young people. scotland. glasgow: university of glasgow press, 2008. 23 keown, d. on the good in aristotle and early buddhism: a response to abraham vélez. goldsmiths. journal of buddhist ethics. university of london press, no.24. (1992), p.37. 24 burrell, g., & morgan, g. sociological paradigms, and organisational analysis: elements of the sociology of corporate life. abingdon, oxford, england: oxford university press, (2019), p.24. 25 lowe, s., kainzbauer, a., tapachai, n., and hwang, s. “a bicultural blending between eastern and western paradigms: fresh perspectives for international management research.” culture and organization, no.4. 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cambridge: cambridge university press, uk, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2013.9 104 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 wallace, b. a. and shauna, l. s. “mental balance and well-being: building bridges between buddhism and western psychology.” american psychologist journal, no. 7 (2005): 69061. yacobi, g. ben. life and the pursuit of happiness. journal of philosophy of life vol.5, no.2 (august 2015):82-90 70 prajñā vihāra zhou dunyi’s concept of taiji in the taiji tushuo zenyu qin and shang-wen wangassumption university of thailand abstract as a renowned philosopher of song dynasty, zhou dunyi played a significant role in creating a new approach for chinese philosophy. this involved a reinterpretation of confucianism inspired by the ideas of daoism and buddhism. this was a huge influence in the development of neo-confucian thought. he did not write many works in his life, but he did write a very significant work entitled taiji tushuo, which explains the famous taiji diagram. this paper mainly introduces the historical context and formative influences on zhou dunyi’s taiji tushuo, the content of taiji tushuo and its main concepts. it will also try to assess the modern social value of taiji thought. the purpose of this paper is to give readers a clear picture of taiji and the concept of taiji thought. key words: taiji, taiji diagram, taiji tushuo, zhou dunyi, neo-confucianism prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 2 july to december 2019, 70-93 © 2000 by assumption university press zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 71 introduction zhou dunyi (1017-1073 a.d.), with maoshu (茂叔) as his courtesy name, was born during the northern song dynasty (960-1279 a.d.), and was later known as “lianxi xiansheng” (濂溪先生)1 .he was the founder of neo-confucianism in the song dynasty. from the tang dynasty to the early northern song dynasty, confucian scholars have made efforts to exclude buddhism and daoism and revitalize confucianism. however, it was not until zhou dunyi that the foundations for a new system of confucianism had really been laid. to a certain extent, he inherited laozi’s ontological thought, and combined the “taiji” theory in yi zhuan with chen tuan’s (陈抟, 871-989 a.d.) taiji diagram, put forward a concise theory of cosmology, and established a philosophical theoretical system with confucius and mencius as the orthodoxy of the time. taiji tushuo, one of his main works, showed the theory of cosmogenesis and the ultimate pursuit of life goal of “li ren ji” (立人极)2, which was inherited and developed by later neo-confucianists and became an important symbol of neo-confucianism, which had a wide and profound influence on the scholars in the song and ming dynasties. zhou dunyi did not write many works through his life, only taiji tushuo, tongshu (通书)3 and few poems and essays, among which the most important one is taiji tushuo. zhou dunyi’s taiji tushuo was a work interpreting the meaning of taiji diagram. taiji refers to the law of the world and the origin of the world, while tu the means “diagram”. it is the article explaining taiji diagram. it expresses a way of understanding the world based on the traditional confucian classic the book of changes. with full text of 249 words, the paper holds that “taiji” is the origin of the universe, and that human beings and all things are formed by the interaction of yin and yang and the five elements. five elements are unified in yin and yang, and yin and yang are unified in “taiji”. in taiji tushuo, the value and function of human beings are highlighted, especially the value and function of sages among ordinary people. this paper will develop this topic with three sections. in the first section “zhou dunyi’s concept of ‘taiji’ and his work taiji tushuo” 72 prajñā vihāra zhou’s taiji concept and the book taiji tushuo will be introduced. in the second section “the contents of taiji tushuo” the general contents of the book will be demonstrated. the third section “the main concepts of taiji tushuo” will disscuss the main ideas of this book. history of zhou dunyi’s taiji tushuo some scholars regard the academic grandeur of the song dynasty as the second axis age in chinese philosophy. the first axis age in chinese philosophy was a great change from the spring and autumn period4 to the ideological sphere. by the northern song dynasty, in this new period, china also put forward the urgent need for change in culture. confucianism, as the ideological foundation of the feudal era, encountered the challenge of buddhism and daoism and the changes of the times, leading to its reform. the development of buddhism and daoism had far exceeded traditional confucianism in theoretical depth and even in the way of speculative thinking, which made it difficult for confucianism to establish an authoritative position in the ideological sphere although it had been revived. the direct result was the loss of moral concepts and ethics in feudal society, which threatened the authority of the unified political centralization.5 therefore, ouyang xiu (欧阳修, 1007-1072 a.d.)6 pointed out that, in the chaos of the five dynasties, the monarch did not rule, the minister did not serve, the father was not the father, the son was not the son. there was a decline of ethics.7 consequently, scholars proposed to reorganize the ethical outlines of the ancient prose movement (古文运 动)8, which started the revival of classical ancient literature. however, the traditional doctrine of confucian classics could not satisfy the needs of that time, which required a re-interpretation of confucian classics to make a philosophical demonstration. in order to allow confucianism to confront buddhism and daoism in philosophy, a large number of speculative elements of buddhism and daoism were absorbed into confucianism, constituting a rigorous philosophical and logical structure, and at the same zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 73 time turned the practice of buddhism and daoism to adopt the confucian sage practice. taiji tushuo came into being as the demands of times. taiji tushuo was a very practical philosophy, which not only became recognized by the sovereign, but also developed into the central idea of the late feudal society of official philosophy and ruling philosophy of neo-confucianism. for this reason it had an easy time winning support among the people. ordinary people can easily follow its implementation, having an enormous and far-reaching impact on society. the theoretical basis of taiji tushuo first of all, the fundamental confucian theoretical basis of taiji tushuo is the book of changes9. zhuoudunyi inherited the confucian thought of yi (易)10 before song dynasty, who thought that “taiji” is an undivided qi of chaos, and yin and yang were produced as a result of the movement of qi. taiji in activity generates yang; yet at the limit of activity it is still. in stillness it generates yin; yet at the limit of stillness it is also active. activity and stillness alternate; each is the basis of the other. in distinguishing yin and yang, the two modes are thereby established.11 zhou dunyi’s concept of yin and yang also comes from the confucian classic the book of changes, “yin and yang is the so-called dao.”12 a systematic theory of yin and yang can be found in ten wings,13 which may have been written during the warring states period by confucius. therefore, it can be considered that the concept of yin and yang comes from the book of changes and is based on it. according to taiji tushuo, “the five phases are the unitary yin and yang; yin and yang are the unitary supreme polarity”14, because the early confucianism did not associate yin and yang with the “five phases” or “five elements”15 until the early western han dynasty.16 the confucianism system changed when the confucian scholars represented 74 prajñā vihāra by dong zhongshu (董仲舒)17 began to reconstruct confucianism with a new thought system under the domination of yin-yang and five elements. dong zhongshu’s ideological system takes “heaven”(天)18 as the highest category. he thought, “heaven, earth, yin, yang, wood, fire, earth, metal, and water constitute nine things. together with human beings, they total ten, completing heaven’s numerical categories.”19 dong zhongshu combined the thought of yin and yang and five elements, clarifying the relationship between “heaven” and yin and yang. he reinterpreted the relationship between heaven and all things. only when dong zhongshu began to use yin and yang in the five elements, did it become an interrelated concept. therefore, the theory of five elements and yin-yang in taiji tushuo is based on dong zhongshu’s theory. last but not least, the most important doctrine of taiji tushuo is the theory of “li ren ji” (立人极)20. taiji tushuo puts forward the moral norm of “centrality and correctness, benevolence and righteousness” ( 中正仁义)21. “centrality and correctness”(中正) comes from confucian classics. for example, zhong yong (中庸)22 pointed out “the vigor, strength, firmness, and resolution that fit him to take a firm grip; the focus, seriousness, balance, and uprightness that fit him to be reverent;”23 “benevolence and righteousness”(仁义)24 are the core of confucianism. in the analects of confucius25 and mencius (孟子)26, there are many references to “benevolence and righteousness”. zhou dunyi’s originality lies in the combination of “centrality and correctness and benevolence and righteousness”. he elevated the “centrality and correctness, benevolence and righteousness to the height of being a saint of humanity. making a long story short, it can be seen from the full text that zhou dunyi absorbed the essence of traditional confucianism and base on the thought of the confucian classic the book of changes, created taiji tushuo, and established the cosmic ontology of neo-confucianism. taiji tushuo has a close relationship with confucianism. zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 75 the daoist foundation of taiji tushuo. according to the research results, scholars generally believe that zhou dunyi’s taiji diagram is closely related to daoism. in the southern song dynasty, many scholars made much textual research on the origin of the taiji diagram, believe that it originated from the daoist taiji diagram (先天太极图, figure 1) and chen tuan’s wuji diagram (无极图, figure 2)27, which was eventually transformed by zhou dunyi. chen tuan’s wuji diagram is zhou dunyi’s direct model. huang zongyan (黄宗炎)28 thinks that the difference between the two diagrams is that although they are almost the same in composition, they operate in different directions. taiji diagram mainly describes the problem of cosmic generation, and its logical order is top-down. however, the wuji diagram shows the daoist method of practice, and the logical order is bottom-up. this illustrates that although the style of zhou dunyi’s taiji diagram (周子太极图, figure 3) is influenced by daoism, his approach is fundamentally different, and he ultimately defends confucianism. wuji diagram is the process of daoist immortality cultivation, while zhou dunyi’s taiji diagram reveals the figure 2 chen tuan’s wuji diagram figure 1 daoist taiji diagram 76 prajñā vihāra process of the creation of all things in the universe, which established a theoretical basis for his social and political confucian ideals. therefore, zhou dunyi’s taiji diagram originated from the daoist’s diagram, but it lso transcended the daoist’s diagram. the thought of “wu”29 or “wuji”30 is also obviously influenced by daoism. taiji tushuo is mainly divided into two sections, the first part is about the way of heaven (天道)31. non-polar and yet supreme polarity! the supreme polarity in activity generates yang; yet at the limit of activity, it is still. in stillness it generates yin; yet at the limit of stillness it is also active. activity and stillness alternate; each is the basis of the other. in distinguishing yin and yang, the two modes are thereby established. the alternation and combination of yang and yin generate water, fire, wood, metal, and earth. with these five [phases of] qi harmoniously arranged, the four seasons proceed through them. (adler, 2014, p.168) figure 4 zhou dunyi’s taiji diagramfigure 3 zhou dunyi’s taiji diagram english edition zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 77 from the above, it is not difficult to know that zhou dunyi expressed his arguments on the generation and change of the universe. he considered that the universe was a process of passage from emptiness to the fullness, from nonexistence to into existence. this process is very similar to laozi’s thought: “the dao gives birth to one; one gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to the ten thousand things.”32 the fundamental difference between zhou dunyi’s and laozi’s opinions is that zhou dunyi’s cosmology is more specific, but from the frame and form of taiji tushuo, it is very close to laozi. especially “wuji and yet taiji”33 is the expression of the process from nothing, which is also laozi’s view “the things of the world are born from being, and being is born of nothing.”34 wang bi35 further emphasized the relationship between theory and practice, nonbeing is the origin, which coincides with zhou dunyi’s thought. “nothing” is an invisible infinite existence, which precludes the possibility (common to other scholars) for searching for the origin of the universe. zhou dunyi absorbed the daoist concept of “nothing” and “ultimate of nonbeing” as the ultimate origin of the universe when he established his philosophical supreme category. because there are two inherent characteristics of “nothing” which is infinite and invisible existence, scholars cannot discover an origin is beyond “nothing”. zhou dunyi put forward the theory of “lay emphasis on quiescence”36 about the highest moral standard of human beings. laozi said, “without desire and thus into quiescence, so will the world be settled of itself.”37 just as zhou dunyi absorbed daoism’s idea of “nothing” and “ultimate of nonbeing” in cosmic ontology, he also absorbed daoism’s principle and method of self-cultivation of “quiescence”. certainly, zhou dunyi did not abandon the essential position of confucianism in spite of his absorption and utilization of daoism. “ultimate of nonbeing” is proposed to explore the need of confucianism’s cosmic ontology. meanwhile, the pursuit of “lay emphasis on quiescence” is also to follow the confucian moral principles of benevolence and righteousness. 78 prajñā vihāra the buddhist foundation of taiji tushuo zhou dunyi has a deep relationship with buddhism. the song dynasty rejected buddhism and the neo-confucianism scholars disguised themselves as the faithful followers of confucianism. secretly, they had a very close relationship with buddhism. in my opinion, the abstract logical speculations of buddhism influenced zhou dunyi’s theoretical basis. in the pre-qin philosophy, there is abundant ontological and cosmological thought. however, to some extent, it is not good at speculative arguments, because chinese philosophy in general emphasizes meditation and understanding. for example, in the song dynasty, buddhism, especially in the aspect of heart and nature, reached an unprecedented height. nevertheless, at that time, confucianism focused on mere exegesis and neglected the study of heart and nature. it became far removed from the lives of ordinary people. in the face of these challenges, zhou dunyi put forward the idea of “no desire” in combination with buddhism, and also adopted meditation. buddhism played a crucial role in zhou dunyi’s contributions to philosophy. on the one hand, he discussed philosophical issues. on the other hand, he thought about how to achieve his goals as an ordinary person. it can be said that for confucianism to developed, it must address this question; it must deal with buddhism’s insights on human nature. in this sense, buddhism promotes the development and growth of confucianism. the contents of taiji tushuo taiji tushuo has two sections. the first section indicates the taiji thought of way of heaven and the ontology and cosmology of neo confucianism. the second section focuses on the way of man (人道)38, which is based on the standard of “centrality and correctness, benevolence and righteousness.” cosmology refers to the generation and development of the universe, which now is addressed by science and technology. physics now holds that the universe originated from the big bang ten billion years ago. in ancient china too, although the technological level was zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 79 limited, philosophers had believed that the universe itself is in a process of becoming. in confucius’ theory of cosmogenesis: “therefore there is in the changes the great primal beginning. this generates the two primary forces. the two primary forces generate the four images. the four images generate the eight trigrams.”39 and also in laozi’s theory of cosmic evolution: “the dao gives birth to one; one gives birth to two; two gives birth to three; three gives birth to the ten thousand things.”40 they both express a process view on the formation of the universe. zhou dunyi combined the philosophy of daoism and confucianism to form his own unique cosmology: nonpolar and yet supreme polarity! the supreme polarity in activity generates yang; yet at the limit of activity it is still. in stillness it generates yin; yet at the limit of stillness it is also active. activity and stillness alternate; each is the basis of the other. in distinguishing yin and yang, the two modes are thereby established. the alternation and combination of yang and yin generate water, fire, wood, metal, and earth. with these five [phases of] qi harmoniously arranged, the four seasons proceed through them. the five phases are the unitary yin and yang; yin and yang are the unitary supreme polarity; the supreme polarity is fundamentally nonpolar. [yet] in the generation of the five phases, each one has its nature. the reality of nonpolarity and the essence of the two [modes] and five [phases] mysteriously combine and coalesce together. “the way of qian becomes the male; the way of kun becomes the female”; the two qi stimulate each other, transforming and generating the myriad things. the myriad things generate and regenerate, alternating and transforming without end.41 zhou dunyi’s cosmology can be simply summarized as taiji and wuji —yin and yang — wuxing42 — everything. the state of taiji is silent 80 prajñā vihāra and odorless, which differentiates into yin and yang. after the interaction between yin and yang, five elements are produced. then came men and women and everything else. zhou dunyi’s cosmology is characterized by a clear and complete relationship between various concepts. in the process of cosmic evolution, it is simple and clear. for example, the relationship between the cosmos in huainanzi43 is obscure and unclear. taiji tushuo does not merely discuss the view of the universe, but more importantly, it puts human value into the creation of the universe, and human beings seek an eternal existence in this evolving ever-changing universe, which is also the most remarkable difference between zhou and other predecessors. ontology is the study of being. it is different from cosmology because it is a purely philosophical speculative problem. the most famous concept of ontology in chinese philosophy is dao44. dao is generally derived from the dao de jing45, which states: “there is a thing formed from confusion and born before heaven and earth, silent, solitary, alone and unchanging. it revolves everywhere and is never in danger. it can be the mother of all under heaven. i do not know its name, but i style it ‘dao’.” 46 zhou dunyi inherited this spirit of the dao de jing, and the taiji in his system has the same ontological significance as the dao in dao de jing. zhou dunyi believed that all things evolved from the five elements, which were produced from yin and yang, and yin and yang were produced from the change of taiji. taiji tushuo established a model of taiji-yin and yang-wuxing-everything, and then everything-wuxingyin and yang-taiji. on the one hand, this model talks about the evolution of the universe and forms a complete view of the universe. on the other hand, it explains the root of life. the way of heaven in taiji tushuo is based on cosmology and ontology. the fundamental purpose of explaining the way of heaven in taiji tushuo is to solve the problems of human beings, and the relationship between human beings and nature. in other words, zhou dunyi’s cosmic ontology is only meaningful with respect to the way of man. taiji tushuo: zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 81 only humans receive the finest and most spiritually efficacious [qi]. once formed, they are born; when spirit is manifested, they have intelligence; when their fivefold natures are stimulated into activity, good and evil are distinguished and the myriad affairs ensue.47 this indicates that zhou dunyi believes that human beings should practice excellence in adhering to the principles of nature. the human being has bodily and spiritual characteristics, so they can practice moral norms, thus establishing the goal of renji48, thus forming the way of man. taiji tushuo put forward a new confucian ethical program of centrality and correctness, humanity and rightness, which requires a high degree of moral consciousness in human practice. more importantly, there is no separation between centrality and correctness, humanity and rightness. in order to be the renji, we should consciously observe and practice righteousness and benevolence. because centrality and correctness, humanity and rightness are the moral requirements for ordinary people. yet, not everyone can do it, thus we need guidance. therefore, taiji tushuo put forward the primary way of practice, lay emphasis on quiescence. “taiji” and “wuji” although zhou dunyi’s taiji tushuo contains few concepts they are of vital importance in the field of chinese philosophy. a careful analysis of these concepts is the prerequisite for us to understand and grasp zhou dunyi’s taiji philosophy and thought accurately. the core concepts in taiji tushuo are “taiji” and “wuji”. these two words are mentioned frequently in taiji tushuo, such as “wuji and yet taiji.” so what is exactly taiji? first of all, taiji is qi.49 yi wei50 divides qi into three parts: tai shi51, tai chu52 and tai su53. they represent the beginning of qi, shape and substance respectively, and they are called chaos because of the fact that qi, shape and quality are not formed and mixed together. taiji is chaos. after zheng xuan’s54 interpretation, taiji gradually became the 82 prajñā vihāra highest concept in qi theory. the theory “taiji as qi” was extended from northern learning in wei and jin dynasty to sui and tang dynasty55, and gradually influenced confucianism in song dynasty, which made the founders of neo-confucianism regard this theory as the supreme concept of cosmology. zhou dunyi’s cosmology is based on taiji: nonpolar and yet supreme polarity! the supreme polarity in activity generates yang; yet at the limit of activity it is still. in stillness it generates yin; yet at the limit of stillness it is also active. activity and stillness alternate; each is the basis of the other. in distinguishing yin and yang, the two modes are thereby established.56 two modes57 refers to the heaven and earth of tangible things produced by yin and yang, that as the mainstream thinking, the founders of neo-confucianism in song dynasty will be affected. zhou dunyi thinks: “in distinguishing yin and yang, the liangyi(两仪) are thereby established.”58 liangyi is to inherit the old thought of scholars in the han dynasty, it is the heaven and earth or the tangible yin and yang. “in distinguishing yin and yang”, liangyi must be separated into a complete being, from which it is understood that there exists a chaotic and undivided qi which divides yin and yang. from the above inference, we can learn that zhou dunyi’s taiji is qi. besides, scholars at the same time of zhou dunyi believed that taiji was qi. for example, shao yong(邵雍) interprets taiji with the perspective of qi, a kind of qi is divided into yin and yang. a lot of yang becomes heaven, and much yin becomes earth.59 compared with the “in distinguishing yin and yang” in taiji tushuo, the contents of the two statements are identical. shao yong also made it clear that “ a kind of qi is divided into yin and yang”, which is the detailed explanation of “in distinguishing yin and yang, the liangyi (两仪) are thereby established.” zhou dunyi’s taiji means that. zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 83 moreover, from the early song dynasty to the zhu xi era, taiji is qi---this theory was generally popular. later, zhu xi understood taiji as li. according to the existing records, scholars in the same period of zhou dynasty didn’t consider taiji as li. therefore, in this academic atmosphere the scholars who were earlier, at the same time or later with zhou dunyi thought that taiji was qi, and the taiji in taiji tushuo should not exceed this range. we can also say that taiji is wuji. that is, zhou dunyi’s “ben”( 本)60 character of “ the supreme polarity originally is nonpolar.”61 in taiji tushuo should be interpreted as “benlai” (本来, originally), that is to say, taiji is wuji. second, zhu xi has repeatedly emphasized the relationship between taiji and wuji. he believes that taiji is not generated or inherited from wuji. zhou dunyi uses the word “wuji” to better accommodate the shape and characteristics of taiji, yin and yang, and five elements of “noiseless and odorless”(无声无臭).62 zhu xi believes that taiji is the universe, starting from neo confucianism itself; wuji is a state of taiji. as far as the researchers are concerned, in order to more effectively install the importance of taiji as fundamental, zhou dunyi used the concept of wuji. wuji is another kind of taiji. daoism wanted to go beyond taiji, but zhou dunyi’s idea of wuji, does not surpass taiji.63 as a confucian scholar, zhou dunyi was deeply influenced by daoism, but he could not believe that taiji originated from the wuji. yin-yang and the five elements in zhou dunyi’s taiji philosophy, yin and yang and the five elements are indispensable. taiji tushuo describes: “the alternation and combination of yang and yin generate water, fire, wood, metal, and earth.”64 this sentence expresses the five elements generated after the mutual movement of yin and yang. this shows the complexity of the evolution process of the universe. yin and yang are two kinds of qi. the five elements represent five kinds of special materials that make up different properties of all things, as well as five kinds of qi with different properties. the appearance of the five elements provides the possibility 84 prajñā vihāra for the formation of all things. as the noumenal way of heaven, taiji derives yin and yang, and then five elements appear. then taiji tushuo mentioned: “the five phases are the unitary yin and yang; yin and yang are the unitary taiji;”65 this demonstration that being return to yin and yang and taiji from the five elements, thus forming a system with the changes of yin and yang in taiji to generate all things in the five elements. among them, from taiji to five elements is a downward process, and from five elements to taiji is an upward process. this is to show that taiji is the origin of things. from the above content, taiji, yin-yang and five elements are mutually contained. taiji runs through yin-yang and five elements. yinyang and five elements are the embodiment of taiji in different stages of the generation of all things in the universe. in other words, taiji is the internal essence of yin-yang and five elements. “renji” zhou dunyi proceeds then to talk about humanity and establish the moral standards and ethics of life more directly. according to taiji tushuo: only humans receive the finest and most spiritually efficacious [qi]. once formed, they are born; when spirit is manifested, they have intelligence; when their fivefold natures are stimulated into activity, good and evil are distinguished and the myriad affairs ensue. the sage settles these [affairs] with centrality and correctness, humanity and rightness (the way of the sage is simply humanity and rightness, centrality and correctness) and emphasizes stillness. in so doing, he establishes the peak of humanity.66 this passage talks about human nature and renji. zhou dunyi explained in tongshu: zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 85 he is one whose] nature is simply in equilibrium between firm and yielding good and evil; firmness is good when it is right ，or appropriate, direct, decided, dignified, capable and certain. it is evil when it is violent, narrow, and limited. yielding is good when it is compassionate, docile, and mild. it is evil when it is weak, indecisive, and treacherous, only centrality is harmonious and moderately regulated.67 this means that there are five kinds of human nature: gangshan ( 刚善)68, gange (刚恶)69, roushan (柔善)70, roue (柔恶)71 and zhonghe (中 和)72. the nature of “zhong”73 is the highest standard of the five natures, and it is also the root of human nature and social harmony. the nature of zhonghe is the essential characteristic of “human pole”. the so-called “renji” is the standard of human beings, and its ideal personality is the “sage”. zhou dunyi said: the sage settles these [affairs] with centrality and correctness, humanity and rightness (the way of the sage is simply humanity and rightness, centrality and correctness) and emphasizes stillness. in so doing, he establishes the peak of humanity. thus, the sage’s “virtue equals that of heaven and earth; his clarity equals that of the sun and moon; his timeliness equals that of the four seasons; his good fortune and bad fortune equal those of ghosts and spirits.74 these words demonstrate that people are required to take “centrality and correctness, humanity and rightness” as the criterion in their daily behaviors, to achieve “stillness” and “no desire” in their selfcultivation, and to pursue the spiritual realm of the sage which can be integrated with heaven and earth, sun and moon, four seasons, ghosts and gods. in “establishing the peak of humanity”, zhou dunyi discussed the fundamental value of the real world and connection with the cosmic 86 prajñā vihāra and ontological significance of taiji. in zhou dunyi’s taiji tushuo, the first section focuses on the description of the objective world, while the latter section explains the authenticity of the value of life, and holds that the source of the universe is the source of the value of life; the real value of life. in the end, taiji changed from the theory of cosmic ontology to the philosophy of the value of life, which established a metaphysical theoretical starting point for the theory of mind-cultivation of neoconfucianism in the song and ming dynasties. conclusion in zhou dunyi’s taiji tushuo “wuji and yet taiji” which is the way of heaven and “establishes the peak of humanity” which is the standard philosophical system of human nature and the way of human beings. taiji tushuo is the inheritance and development of ancient chinese philosophy and lays the foundation for the development of neo confucianism in the song and ming dynasty, a framework that continued in chinese philosophy. zhou dunyi’s philosophy of taiji emphasizes the taiji as it operates in the individual, and puts forward the moral cultivation theory of “stillness” and “no desire”, so that we can pursue life value through our own efforts. first, “taiji” concept has the principal value of resolving social conflicts and balancing social relations. in modern society, human beings are confronted with many problems and challenges, namely the contradictions between man and nature, man and society, and man and man. learning from the concept of “no desire” in “taiji” is of considerable significance to coordinate the multiple contradictions among people, society and nature. second, “taiji” has the value of creating and developing multicultural integration. taiji advocates the balance of yin and yang and emphasizes the respect for the multi-cultural coexistence and inclusiveness, and its pursuit is to learn from each other and believe that different cultures should not be the opposed to each other, but can coexist and prosper. in the past, different nations and cultures of the world have different zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 87 understanding for “difference” which have led to disputes, accusations, and conflicts. nowadays, we should learn from the thought of “taiji”, to embrace tolerance for different cultures, respect the existence value of different cultures and absorb all of the outstanding cultural achievements of human beings, so as to form a rich landscape of cultural development. last but not least, the thought of taiji can guide the practice of ordinary people. it not only needs the idea of no desire but also need to be applied in practice. at the same time, taiji thought respects the cultivation methods of buddhism and daoism, and applies this in such a way that confucian theory can be put into practice. endnotes 1. lianxi xiansheng (濂溪先生): this is the esteemed name of zhou dunyi, indicating that zhou dunyi had a clean and honest life. 2. li ren ji (立人极)：it is translated here as “to establish human ethics”. 3. tongshu (通书): also translated into general book, which is another work of zhou dunyi, mainly about confucian ethics and mind. 4. the spring and autumn period (770-476 b.c.): the spring and autumn period is the first half of the eastern zhou dynasty. this historical period is called “spring and autumn period”. the historiographers of the state of lu recorded the major events of various countries at that time by year, season, month and diary, and recorded them in spring, summer, autumn and winter. in short, they called the chronicle spring and autumn. 5. because after the chaos of the five dynasties, china changed from unity to separation. although the song dynasty unified china, he was still afraid of chaos again, so the rulers needed to unify the country through ideological unity. 6. ouyang xiu (1007-1072 a.d.): a writer and historian of the northern song dynasty. 7. original text: “五代之乱,君不君,臣不臣,父不父,子不子,至于兄弟,夫妇人伦之际,无 不大坏,而天理几乎其灭矣”. this sentence directly describes the situation of social unrest and unstable ethics after five dynasties and expresses the necessity of ideological unity from the side. 8. the ancient prose movement: in the middle of tang dynasty and northern song dynasty, the movement of style reform was characterized by advocating ancient prose and opposing parallel prose. because it involves the ideological content of literature at the same time, it has the nature of ideological movement and social movement. 88 prajñā vihāra 9. the book of changes: it refers to the scripture part of zhouyi. it includes two kinds of symbols of hexagram and yaoci (爻辞), and two kinds of explanatory words of hexagram and yaoci, which are used for divination. 10. yi: a term used in the book of changes to refer to the source or the fundamental principle of all things. 11. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi (new york: state university of new york, 2014), p.168 12. the book of changes, xi ci i. original text: “一阴一阳之谓道.” it is believed that everything has two aspects: yin and yang. no matter nature or personnel, they all show this rule. 13. ten wings: another title of the appendices to the book of changes. according to the legend, it was confucius who interpreted the book of changes. in chinese sometimes called yizhuan. 14. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 261. original text: “五行一阴阳，阴阳一太极”. 15. five elements: also translated into five agents and five powers, which explains the source of the objective world and unity of multi-forms of things in it. they are metal, wood, water, fire, and earth 16. western han dynasty (202 b.c-8 a.d.): it is a dynasty in china. 17. dong zhongshu (董仲舒, 179-104 b.c.): a philosopher and great scholar of the modern-script school of confucian classics of the western han dynasty. dong laid an institutional basis for the confucian orthodoxy and for the recruitment of able scholars as government officials through an examination system. 18. heaven (天): also translated into “nature”, this is one of the most important terms in chinese philosophy. according to master meng (孟子), heaven means the concept of fate and a term applied to all those events in human life over which man is unable to control. 19. zhongshu dong, luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn (edited and translated by sarah a. queen and john s. major, new york: columbia university press, 2016), p. 604. original text: “天、地、阴、阳、木、火、土、金、水,九;与人而十者, 天之数毕也”. this sentence expresses dong zhongshu’s opinion that human beings are the most noble as the heaven. it is also a confucian philosopher who directly links yin and yang with the five elements. 20. li ren ji: it means “to establish human pole”. in zhou dunyi’s point of view, it is a rule to set up ordinary people. 21. zhong zheng ren yi: this is the moral standard established by zhou dunyi, in order to achieve the goal of human polarity. 22. zhong yong: it is translated into “golden mean” or “equilibrium and normality”. it is an ethical doctrine of confucianism. (guo, 2002, p.149) 23. doctrine of the mean (translated by fu yunlong. beijing: sinlingua press, zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 89 2006), p. 20. original text: “发强刚毅, 足以有执也;齐庄中正, 足以有敬也.”it comes from the doctrine of the mean, which means a person who works hard and has perseverance is enough to take charge of the political situation; solemn and fair enough to be respected. 24. benevolence and righteousness：this is the core of confucius school and the most important ethical concept. later, it developed into another name of confucian morality. 25. the analects of confucius (论语): one of the confucian classics. records of confucius’ words and deeds compiled by confucius’ disciples. 26. mencius: the book of mencius (孟子, ca. 372-289 b.c.) is a compilation of mencius’ speech, which is composed by mencius and his disciples. it records mencius’ speech and political views. 27. chen tuan (陈抟, 871-989 a.d.): a famous daoist in the northern song dynasty, according to legend, he was lu dongbin’s apprentice. 28. huang zongyan (黄宗炎, 1616-1686 a.d.): one of the philosophers in qing dynasty was huang zongxi’s younger brother, who mainly studied the book of changes. 29. wu: nothingness. the main thought of daoism is a state indicating the origin of the world. 30. wuji: a state in which there is no boundary, not even a central point. there is no center and no boundary. this state is of course endless chaos. 31. way of heaven (天道): an important concept in chinese philosophy. it implies different things in the view of scholars of different schools. it sometimes refers to the law of movement and change of the sky. 32. laozi, dao de jing (translated by robert eno, retrieved from http://www. fang.ece.ufl.edu/daodejing.pdf, 2016), p. 23. original text: “道生一，一生二，二生三，三 生万物”. this sentence expresses laozi’s thought of cosmogenesis. the process is from less to more. 33. original text: “无极而太极”. 34. laozi, dao de jing, p. 22. original text: “天下万物生于有，有生于无”. laozi thought that there is no contradiction between existence and non-existence, just like yin and yang, static and dynamic, which are both opposite and unified, and can be interdependent and transformed. 35. wang bi: a chinese daoist philosopher. 36. this is one of zhou dunyi’s moral principles. 37. laozi, dao de jing, p. 21. original text: “不欲以静 , 天下将自定”. this sentence means that all things have no greed, and the world will naturally achieve long-term stability. 38. way of man (人道):one of the concepts of chinese philosophy, in short, refers to the truth of being a man. 39. the i ching or book of changes (translated by richard wilhelm and cary f. baynes, princeton university press, 1977), p. 616. original text: “易有太极，是生两 90 prajñā vihāra 仪，两仪生四象，四象生八卦”. this sentence shows the confucian’s original view of the formation of the universe. 40. laozi, dao de jing, p. 23. 41. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168. 42. wuxing: this is the chinese pinyin name for the five elements. please refer to the five elements for details. 43. huainanzi: chinese classic philosophical works are philosophical works of han dynasty, mainly recording daoist thoughts. 44. dao: also translated into “the way”, this is the main thought of daoism. the world is produced by daoism, which means ontology. 45. dao de jing: it is one of the important works of daoism, which mainly expresses the philosophy of daoism. 46. laozi, dao de jing, p. 17. original text: “有物混成，先天地生，寂兮寥兮，独 立而不改，周行而不殆，可以为天地母。吾不知其名，字之曰道 ”. it comes from chapter 25 of the dao de jing and talks about the origin of dao. 47. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168. 48. renji: zhou dunyi established the ethical standard of being a man. 49. qi(气): a form of smoke, like water vapor, originally used in chinese philosophy to refer to shapeless matter that fills the universe, which is the fundamental element of physical existence. 50. yi wei (易纬): a book explaining the book of changes. 51. taishi (太始): great origin, a term used to refer to the period in which things began to take form. 52. taichu (太初): great beginning, that is a term used to refer to the period between the great change and the great origin, which is a period of chaos in which material force was beginning to appear and was still intermingled an undifferentiated. it is also similar to the period the great one and the supreme ultimate imply. 53. taisu (太素): great simplicity, a term used to refer to the early state of matter that made up things of the universe. 54. zheng xuan (郑玄): lived around 127-200, one of the greatest confucian philosopher. 55. wei and jin dynasty to sui and tang dynasty: a period of time in china, about 220-618, saw several regime changes, and finally the tang dynasty unified china. 56. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168. 57. two modes: sometimes it’s translated into liangyi. it is means two forms, also translated into “two elementary forms,” it is a term first used to refer to yin and yang, or to heaven and earth. zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 91 58. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168. original text: “分阴分阳,两仪立焉”. 59. original text: “一气分而阴阳判，得阳之多者为天，得阴之多者为地”.this sentence expresses a kind of qi divided into yin and yang, and illustration that taiji is a kind of qi from the side. 60. ben (本): this is a chinese character. it means the original. 61. original text: “太极本无极”. the meaning of this sentence is that taiji is wuji. 62. wu-chou-wu-xiu: the description of the nature and characteristics of taiji is voiceless and tasteless, expressing an abstract concept that cannot be seen or touched. 63. my understanding is that nothing is the highest concept of daoism. if taiji is nothing, it means that nothing can surpass taiji. it shows that taiji is the state of being high. 64. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168. original text: “阳变阴合，而生水火木金土”.it described the relationship between yin and yang and five elements. 65. original text: “五行一阴阳也，阴阳一太极也”. this sentence shows that the five elements are unified in yin and yang, and that yin and yang are the same with taiji. it shows that zhou duny’s taiji can be from more to less, and also from less to more. it expresses the thought of ontology. 66. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168. 67. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 208 68. gangshan (刚善): this chinese word cannot be translated accurately in english. it means it’s absolutely good. 69. gange (刚恶): it meant absolute evil. 70. roushan (柔善): it meant the weak good. 71. roue (柔恶): it means weak evil. 72. zhonghe (中和): harmonious and moderately, it means a very suitable way, that is, middle, similar to the idea of the golden mean. 73. zhong: it means moderately. 74. joseph a. adler, reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi, p. 168-169. 92 prajñā vihāra references 《老子注释及评介》，陈鼓应注释. 北京: 中华书局出版社，1984. (notes and comments on laozi, commented by guying chen, beijing: china book press, 1984.) 《二程集》. 北京: 中华书局出版社，1981. (cheng, hao and cheng, yi, the collection of two chengs, beijing: china book publishing house, 1981.) 《汉英中国哲学词典》河南: 河南大学出版社，2002. (guo，shangxing, a dictionary of chinese philosophy with english annotations. henan: henan university press, 2002.） 《周敦颐集》，北京: 中华书局出版社，1990. (zhou, dunyi, collection of zhou dunyi’s works, beijing: china book publishing house, 1990.) 《朱熹集》，成都: 四川教育出版社，1996. (zhu, xi, collection of zhu xi’s works, chengdu: sichuan education press, 1996.) a chinese reading of the daodejing. wang bi’s commentary on the laozi with critical text and translation, translated by rudolf g. wagner. new york: state university of new york press, 2003. adler, joseph a., reconstructing the confucian dao: zhu xi’s appropriation of zhou dunyi. new york: state university of new york, 2014. doctrine of the mean, translated by fu yunlong, beijing: sinlingua press, 2006. dong, zhongshu, luxuriant gems of the spring and autumn, edited and translated by sarah a. queen and john s. major, new york: columbia university press, 2016. zenyu qin and shang-wen wang 93 feng, youlan, a short history of chinese philosophy, beijing：foreign languages teaching and research press, 2015. the i ching or book of changes, translated by richard wilhelm and cary f. baynes, princeton university press, 1977. laozi, dao de jing, translated by robert eno, 2016, retrieved from http:// www.fang.ece.ufl.edu/daodejing.pdf wu, chung, the wisdom of zhuang zi on daoism, new york: peter lang publishing, 2008. zhang, x., “zhou dunyi’s explanations of tai ji diagram, the image numbers of the changes, and the related doctrines in the west”, modern philosophy, vol. 3, 2005, pp. 85-90. zhuangzi, the complete works of chuang tzu, translated by burton dewitt watson, new york: columbia university press, 2013. http://www.fang.ece.ufl.edu/daodejing.pdf http://www.fang.ece.ufl.edu/daodejing.pdf sarita mahatthanadull 59 on the application of the apaṇṇaka method to living a balanced married life according to the samajīvi sutta sarita mahatthanadull mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university abstract this article aims to analyze apaṇṇaka method by using the idea of a balanced livelihood as a case study. in order to achieve a good married life, a married couple needs to live together following a buddhist principle namely balanced livelihood (samajīvidhamma). when the couple practices faith (saddhā), virtue (sīla), generosity (cāga), and wisdom (pañña), it leads to benefits in this and the next life. even though the existence of the next life cannot be empirically proved, it acts as an important guide and impetus for conduct in this life. in this way, buddhist teachings contribute practically to the harmonious life of the married couple. introduction good family life contributes to a better society. but the strength of married and family life depends on following certain teachings and principles. buddhism provides such principles. one of the most well-known suttas for this purpose is “balanced livelihood” (samajīvidhamma). this deals not only with family life in this life but also in the life to come. this article aims to analyze the buddhist method called apaṇṇaka1 and whether this method is effective for leading to a balanced life. prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 1, january june 2018, 59-68 © 2000 by assumption university press 60 prajñā vihāra the longevity of balanced livelihood balanced livelihood, in this context, means husbands and wives living together in a perfect balance. this is described in the “samajīvī sutta” of the aṅguttaranikāya. in this sutta, the buddha addressed nakula pitā and nakula mātā; herein, householders, if both wife and husband desire to behold each other both in very life and in the life to come, and both are matched in faith, matched in virtue, matched in generosity, matched in wisdom, then do they behold each other in this very life and in the life to come. if both, believers, self-controlled, well-spoken, living as dhamma bids, use loving words one to the other, manifold the blessings that come to wife and husband, and to them the blessing of a pleasant life is born. dejected are their foes, for both are good. so in this world, living as dhamma bids, the pair, in goodness matched, in the deva-world rejoicing win the bliss that they desire.2 so what is expressed here are directions for couples living their marriage life with balanced livelihood. they must be: 1. matched in faith (saddhā), 2. matched in virtue (sīla), 3. matched in generosity (cāga), 4. matched in wisdom (pañña). married couples who practice according to this principle are considered as the best of lay-disciples. they are considered to be males and females, in “intimate conversation”. other texts such as the long knee, the koḷiyan or the dīghajāñu sutta of the aṅguttaranikāya gives an even clearer explanation. sarita mahatthanadull 61 faith means one must believe in the buddha and believe in the awakening of the tathāgata: (arahant), fully awakened (sammāsambuddho), adept in knowledge and conduct (vijjācaranasampañño), well going (sugato), a world-knower (lokavitū), incomparable (anuttaro), a tamer of tamable men (purisadhammasāraṭhi), among devas and men the teacher (satḥādevamanussānaṁ), buddha (buddho), exalted one (bhagavāti). virtue is connected to abstinence related to the five precepts, that is to say the abstaining from taking life, from taking what is not given, from carnal lusts, from lying, abstains from taking sloth-causing liquors, spirits, and wines. generosity means having a mind free of avarice, free of meanness; freely bounteous, open-handed, gladly giving, yoke-mate to asking, he is a cheerful giver. finally, wisdom is connected to the destruction of ill. in addition, the dīghanikāya indicated benefits of sampadā as; “no beings arise in happy, heavenly state after death because of the gain of relatives, wealth or health; but beings are reborn in such states because of gains in morality and right view”3 interestingly, the longevity of a balanced livelihood also leads to two additional benefits. they are diṭṭhadhammikattha; the benefit in this life, and samparāyikattha; the benefit in the life to come, as evidence shown in the mahānidesa scriptures “diṭṭhadhammiko vā attho samparāyiko vā attho. . .”4 the former benefit deals with ordinary present life, while the latter deals with the extra ordinary next life. but a potential question is whether we can prove the existence of a next life? the belief in the existence of a next life even though the existence of next life cannot be empirically proved, buddhism suggests that the belief in a next life as is a worldly right view; and what, bhikkhus, is right view that is affected by the taints, partaking of merit, ripening in the acquisitions? there is what is given and what is offered and what is sacrificed; there is fruit and result of good and bad actions; 62 prajñā vihāra there is this world and the other world; there is mother and father; there are beings who are reborn spontaneously; there are in the world good and virtuous recluses and brahmins who have realized for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world” this is right view affected by taints, partaking of merit, ripening in the acquisitions.5 in this sutta, the buddha explains “if one has right view towards these matters of life, one will live one’s life safely and will have no risk to fall under the unhappy existence (apāya)6. in contrast, the dīgha nikāya stated about the one who does not believe in the next life as a mistaken worldly view; your majesty, there is nothing given, bestowed, offered in sacrifice, there is no fruit or result of good or bad deeds, there is not this world or the next, there is no mother or father, there are no spontaneously arisen beings, there are in the world no ascetics or brahmins who have attained, who have perfectly practiced, who proclaim this world and the next, having realized them by their own super-knowledge.7 the following chart exhibits the worldly right view and worldly wrong view for easy understanding; worldly right view (lokīya sammādiṭṭhi) worldly wrong view (lokīya micchādiṭṭhi) 1 there is what is given there is nothing given 2 there is what is offered there is nothing bestowed 3 there is what is sacrificed there is nothing offered in sacrifice 4 there is fruit and result of good and bad actions there is no fruit or result of good or bad deeds 5 there is this world there is not this world 6 there is the other world there is not the next sarita mahatthanadull 63 worldly right view (lokīya sammādiṭṭhi) worldly wrong view (lokīya micchādiṭṭhi) 7 there is mother there is no mother 8 there is father there is no father 9 there are beings who are reborn spontaneously there are no spontaneously arisen beings 10 there are in the world good and virtuous recluses and brahmins who have realized for themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world there are in the world no ascetics or brahmins who have attained, who have perfectly practiced, who proclaim this world and the next, having realized them by their own super-knowledge this chart, shows the comparison between worldly right view and the mistaken worldly view. the one who does not believe in the next life is following a mistaken worldly view. in fact, the only way to prove the next life is to die and experience it for oneself. so what is the buddhist response to this uncertainty? apaṇṇaka method in buddhism, there is an interesting principle in the above mentioned sutta called the incontrovertible teaching (apaṇṇka). which is also known as the “apaṇṇaka method”. the buddha taught this to the sāleyyaka brāhmins, a brāhmana ascetic, who did not believe in any religions and pointed out how an intelligent person should behave toward the following views: 1. nihilism 2. no-action view 3. non-causation 4. denial of formless existences 5. denial of the extinction of becoming8 64 prajñā vihāra nihilism results from a tenfold wrong view. for instance, the belief that this world does not exist, or the next world does not exist. the no-action view denies of the effects of good and bad actions. non-causation means to believe that purification and defilement of beings occurs for no reason. the denial of formless existences means to deny the existence of the formless worlds. lastly, the denial of the extinction of becoming means to except the existence of the formless world but to deny the existence of nirvana. based on our daily life we are faced with many difficult situations and challenges to our beliefs. therefore, the application of apaṇṇaka method can help us in dealing with those difficulties as veerachart nimanong points out: the apaṇṇaka sutta is an epistemic psychological attitude form of interpretation of all kinds of doubts on the buddha’s teachings. the apaṇṇaka which does not involve logical reasoning cannot be inference; but inference is an aspect of apaṇṇaka.9 thus the apaṇṇaka method is a buddhist practice which is very useful and helpful for us to apply in our daily life. in the same way venerable hegoda khemananda considered the following steps how is it possible for us to make use of it in order to determine any uncertain circumstances. he gives the example of whether the buddha ever visited sri lanka: 1. (according to the folk-lore) it is possible that the buddha visited sri lanka. 2. (in the opinion of those who deny folk-lore) it is also possible that the buddha did not. 3. we pay homage to sripāda with the belief that the buddha visited sri lanka. 4. if the buddha had visited sri lanka in actuality we would gain “merit”. 5. if the opposite was true and the buddha did not visit sri lanka still the religious practice motivated by the belief would result in both generating “merit” and spreading a good name for us. sarita mahatthanadull 65 6. in this manner, we gain irrespective of the factuality of the belief that the buddha visited sri lanka. in this manner, an intelligent person would conclude that it is right to pay homage to the buddha whether he visited sri lanka or not. this method which is truly a buddhist method may be applied to any situation.10 applying the apaṇṇaka method into the mentioned case of balanced livelihood can possibly be as follows: 1. it is possible that a life to come exists? 2. it is possible that a life to come does not exist. 3. husbands and wives should live their life in the belief that they will meet again in a next life. 4. if a life to come does exist, they will be together. 5. if a life to come does not exist, this belief will lead to a good relationship in the present life. 6. in this manner, they gain irrespective of the existence of a next life. in this manner, an intelligent person would conclude that it is right to live their couple life virtuously whether the life to come exist or not. however, different application of apaṇṇaka method can be shown by the following concluding table; analytical issues ven. hegoda khemananda the researcher 1. folk-lore the buddha visited sri lanka the life to come exists 2. deny folk-lore it is possible that the buddha did not visit sri lanka it is possible that a life to come does not exist 3. our belief we pay homage to sripāda with the belief that the buddha visited sri lanka husbands and wives live virtuous relationship with the belief that they will meet again in the next life 66 prajñā vihāra analytical issues ven. hegoda khemananda the researcher 4. if the belief is true if the buddha visited sri lanka we would gain the merit if a life to come does exist, they will be together 5. if the belief is false if the buddha did not visit sri lanka would result in both generating merit and spreading a good name for us if a life to come does not exist it will still result in a quality married relationship. 6. neither true nor false an intelligent person would conclude that it is right to pay homage to the buddha whether he visited sri lanka or not an intelligent person would conclude that it is right to live a virtuous married life whether or not a life to come exists. the apaṇṇaka method is thus an effective means and the apaṇṇaka dhamma is the buddha dhamma in application to our daily life in order to prevent possible mistakes in our life. it is a kind of “buddhist risk management” because it directs us on the path to conduct regardless of our ability to demonstrate the veracity of our beliefs. thus this buddhist method can be applied to any uncertain circumstances and reinforce the power of our faith through the practice of doing good action in all channels: mental, verbal and action based on the law of kamma. 5. conclusion in order to attain the balanced livelihood, husbands and wives need to follow the buddhist principle samajīvidhamma. according to this principle, when a couple practices saddhā, sīla, cāga and pañña, they can live together in harmony not only in this life but also the next. the question is whether the belief in the next life is important? here the apaṇṇaka method plays a crucial role. it is a kind of “buddhist risk management”. that is to say it operates as a buddhist dhamma sarita mahatthanadull 67 which directs our lives regardless of whether we can prove our faith. endnotes 1 m.i.401-414. bhikkhu ñānamoli and bhikkhu bodhi (tr.), the middle length discourses of the buddha, part one, the root fifty discourses (mūlapaṇṇāsapāḷi), (oxford: pts, 2001), p.506-520. 2 f. l. woodward (tr.), the book of the gradual sayings (aṅguttaranikāya), vol.2, (london and boston: routledge & kegan paul ltd., 1982), p.70. 3 maurice walshe (tr), thus have i heard: the long discourses of the buddha (dīgha nikāya), (london: wisdom publications, 1987), pp.495496. 4 nd1. 168-169. 5 m.iii.73; bhikkhu ñānamoli and bhikkhu bodhi (tr.), the middle length discourses of the buddha, part three the final fifty discourses (uparipaṇṇāsapāḷi), (oxford: pts, 2001), p.935. 6 “apāya” means states of loss and woe or low states of existence, namely; hell, the animal kingdom, realm of hungry ghosts and frightened ghosts”, it.93. 7 d.i.55-57; maurice walshe (tr.), thus have i heard the long discourses of the buddha dīgha nikāya, (london: wisdom publications, 1987), pp.95-96. 8 m.i.401. bhikkhu ñānamoli and bhikkhu bodhi (tr.), the middle length discourses of the buddha, part one the root fifty discourses (mūlapaṇṇāsapāḷi), (oxford: pts, 2001), p.506. 9 dr. veerachart nimanong, “theravāda methods of interpretation on buddhist scriptures”, international journal of buddhist thought and culture, vol.6 (february 2006): 77-120. 10 ven. hegoda khemananda, logic and epistemology in theravāda (theravāda nyāya), (sri lanka: karunaratne & son ltd., 1993), p.105. 68 prajñā vihāra bibliography chalmers, robert (ed.). the majjhima-nikāya. vol.iii. london: pts, 1977. davids, t.w. rhys; carpenter, j. estlin (eds.). the dīgha nikāya. vol.i. london: pts, 1975. khemananda, hegoda, ven. logic and epistemology in theravāda (theravāda nyāya). sri lanka: karunaratne & son ltd., 1993. ñānamoli, bhikkhu and bodhi, bhikkhu (tr.). the middle length discourses of the buddha. part one the root fifty discourses (mūlapaṇṇāsapāḷi). oxford: pts, 2001. ______. the middle length discourses of the buddha. part three the final fifty discourses (uparipaṇṇāsapāḷi). oxford: pts, 2001. nimanong, veerachart, dr. “theravāda methods of interpretation on buddhist scriptures”, international journal of buddhist thought and culture. vol.6 (february 2006): 77-120. poussin, l. de. la vallee and thomas, e. j. (eds.). mahāniddesa. parts i and ii. london: routledge & kegan paul ltd., 1978. trenckner, v. (ed.). the majjhima-nikāya. vol.i. london: pts, 1979. walshe, maurice (tr). thus have i heard: the long discourses of the buddha (dīgha nikāya). london: wisdom publications, 1987. woodward, f. l. (tr.). the book of the gradual sayings (aṅguttaranikāya). vol.2. london and boston: routledge & kegan paul ltd., 1982. fumihiko matsumoto 29 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 29-35 © 2000 by assumption university press beyond speech acts: the significance of silence in the shinto marriage ritual fumihiko matsumoto1 abstract rituals and ceremonies in the western tradition, give priority to the spoken word and various kinds of declarations. but in the asian tradition, there is also an appreciation for the unspoken. in this article, the researcher will examine the non-verbal communication which takes place in the shinto marriage ritual. the marriage is accomplished without “words,” “announcements,” or “declarations.” the consummation of the marriage takes place when the couple quietly drinks the sacred liquid, three times in three different cups, for a total of nine times. it is only then the marriage is accomplished. by investigating such a ritual in the japanese culture or eastern culture, the paper also suggests limits to western speech act theory as developed by john searle. keywords: shintoism; marriage ritual; silence; speech act theory; ishin-denshin 30 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 the importance of words in christianity central to the christian tradition is the creation through the word. christians believe that jesus christ is the “son of god,” that the word, or logos, becomes flesh. in the gospel of john, it is written: “in the beginning was the word, and the word was with god, and the word was god. he was in the beginning with god; all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made. in him was life, and the life was the light of men. the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it (john 1:1-5).” in verse 14, it says, “and the word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only son from the father (john 1:14).” the greek word logos had profound meanings in the early christian tradition. when logos was with god, the logos contained god, the logos embraced god, and the children of god who speak logos preach god’s message. ultimately, the son of god, is logos and through logos, leads people to salvation and eternal happiness. therefore, in christianity, words (logos) can at the same time be god, the son of god, and the holy spirit. also, words were used directly through god himself, the son of god, the prophets and the angels. the christian marriage ritual likewise, the western christian marriage ritual relies on words and declarations. the couple is asked to perform their “vows” or pledges to one another. fumihiko matsumoto 31 the bridegroom says: i, (name), take you, (name), for my lawful wife, to have and to hold, from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death do us part. the bride says: i, (name), take you, (name), for my lawful husband, to have and to hold, from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death do us part.2 the pastor asks: (bride’s name), will you have this man to be your husband; to live together with him in the covenant of marriage? will you love him, comfort him, honor and keep him, in sickness and in health; and, forsaking all others, be faithful unto him as long as you both shall live? the bride answers: i will. the pastor asks: (groom’s name), will you have this woman to be your wife; to live together with her in the covenant of marriage? will you love her, comfort her, honor and keep her, in sickness and in health; and, forsaking all others, be faithful unto her as long as you both shall live? the groom answers: i will.3 after the exchanging rings and some more words, the celebrant finally declares: (bride’s name) and (groom’s name), having witnessed your vows of love to one another, it is my joy to present you to all gathered here as husband and wife. (to the groom.) you may kiss the bride.4 32 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 without this final announcement, christian wedding cannot be completed, and the couple is not yet officially married despite the fact they having recited their vows. according to the speech declarations and speech acts in his book expression and meaning,5 john searle classifies his speech acts in illocutionary points into five categories. they are “assertive,” “directive,” “commissive,” “expressive,” and “declarative.” and in the category of “declarative speech acts,” searle places such examples as marriage and baptism. in his understanding, there is no objective marriage. marriage is a social contract, and it is a social reality that human beings have created and institutionalized. searle explains that a pastor or priest’s “declaration” is necessary speech act to create the marriage as a social reality. without this declaration, such rituals as marriage and baptism cannot be real. these speech acts “create new states of affairs by representing them as being the case.”6 searle’s point is that if marriage is a social contract, people in the society must acknowledge these declarations as officially valid. however, the question arises; is there another way for marriage to be official without words or declarations?7 shintoism and the sacredness of nature and act shintoism is a religious movement is deeply attuned to nature. although there was no holy scripture until buddhism was introduced in seventh century8, most rural japanese people believed in the existence of many gods in nature.9 many western scholars see shintoism as a primitive animism. however, shintoism’s respect for the sacredness of nature is more intricate than more primitive forms of animism. the eight million gods or the yaoyorozu no kami (八百万の神) are prevalent everywhere in the nature. gods are nature, and the all the products that the nature yields such as foods and shelters are considered the blessings from gods. yet the gods do not merely give human beings food and shelters like a monotheistic god, but rather gods are within the food and the shelter. fumihiko matsumoto 33 rice is given by a god, but rice too is a god. as a result, famers believe the act of harvesting rice is itself sacred. the sacred expresses itself in phenomena. the shinto priests performed rituals to thank the gods and conducted seasonal festivals to purify the mindset of human beings. thus, in order to thank and worship gods, small wooden houses are constructed, and offerings of food and alcohol are made. these offerings are done not to appease the gods, but to purify people’s mind show that symbolic acts are more powerful than the mere utterance of words. shinto marriage the present form of shinto marriage had been fixed since 1900 when the royal family’s marriage ceremony was held.10 since then, by and large, the procedure has been almost the same. just as in western marriage, there are music, prayers, and utterances of words of blessing. however, the significant difference is that there is no verbal announcement declaring when the couple is married. and no declarations of the couple leading to the recognition of the marriage. the ceremony was usually held with small numbers of people compared with that of western marriage, only with family and extended family. it is a non-verbal event. as mentioned, during the san-san-kudo, miko provides sake with three different cups, and the couple drinks a little sake which is considered as sacred liquid without words three time in three cups. the first cup is the past, the second one the present, the third one he future. although the guuji11 speaks some words and performs rituals to remove evil spirits (the harai ritual), purify them (the kiyome ritual) or to pray for prosperity, these declarations are not the definitive acts through which the marriage is achieved. it is achieved when the couple performs the san-san-kudo ritual (三三九 度) quietly drinking sacred liquid three times in three different cups, for a total of nine times. it is only then the couple as well as their family members and other people who are present in the ceremony recognize the marriage. after this ritual, all acknowledge the completion of the marriage. the social reality of marriage comes into being without words. unlike the western marriage, no official has the authority to announce 34 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 the completion of the marriage. miko is a female god, but it is the bride that plays the role of the female god during the ceremony. the shinto priest, who is always male, conducts the whole ceremony, but he only plays a role within a larger sacred ritual. he does not have the authority to announce the completion of the marriage. the ones who have the authority are the gods who are present during the whole ritual. the eight million gods who had been present everywhere in nature and who had always coexisted among human beings are the authority who protect and bless the newlywed couple without human words. conclusion in judeo-christian monotheistic personal god uttered words to create the world. so for the most part, sacraments and official contracts are conducted through words and declarations. on the other hand, for shintoism’s more panentheistic approach where both act and object are sacred, words are less important. the marriage ceremony is an act of drinking the sanctified liquid, and constitutes a wordless act of togetherness since it is without words that gods are appear to human consciousness. the bride, personifying miko the female god again returns to being an ordinary woman after the ritual, and the couple returns to reality. however, the sacred reality through which they were married now becomes a social reality. ishin-denshin (以心伝心) is still one of the utmost important idioms in japan, which means “thought-transference,” or “non-verbal heart to heart communication.” fumihiko matsumoto 35 endnotes 1 fumihiko matsumoto teaches in the st. martin center for professional ethics at assumption university of thailand. 2 https://www.catholicweddinghelp.com/topics/text-rite-of-marriagemass.htm#consent 3 https://www.theknot.com/content/protestant-wedding-ceremonyscript 4 ibid. 5 john rogers searle. expression and meaning: studies in the theory of speech acts. cambridge: cambridge university press. 1979. 6 ibid. 7 it is interesting to note that the traditional idea of the consummation of a marriage in the catholic church was the sexual act between the couple, which was in some cases even witnessed by the priest. 8 the holy scripture here refers to (古事記) kojiki and (日本書紀) nihonshoki, in which there are many personal gods; however in this article, the researcher focuses on impersonal gods where ancient people before century were believing in and worshipping before 7th century. 9 八百万の神, yoyorozu-no-kami means 8 millions gods in the nature or universe, however there are no 8 million names of gods in any scriptures; it simply means countless gods. 10 joy hendry, marriage in changing in japan: community & society. routledge. 2010. 11 宮司 or guuji is a shinto religion’s priest references hendry, joy. marriage in changing in japan: community & society. routledge. 2010. kojiki. ed. kurano kenji, tokyo, japan: iwanami, 1963. nihonshoki. ed. mitsusada inoue. tokyo, japan: chuo bunko, 2020. searle, john r. expression and meaning. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1979. https://philpapers.org/s/john%20rogers%20searle https://philpapers.org/rec/seaeam-5 https://philpapers.org/rec/seaeam-5 32 prajñā vihāra religion and creative imagination: religious representation in i. b. singer’s in my father’s court and the shadow-theater (wayang) in indonesia andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif indiana university, usa and muhammadiyah university kendari, indonesia abstract even within religion, the creativity of imagination offers an invaluable defense against the tendencies towards dogma and absolutism. it also provides spaces living and experiencing life in diverse ways. this paper discusses the different facets of creative imagination in religious art and literature forms by comparing isaac bashevis singer’s in my father’s court with wayang shadow theater in indonesia. i will show that they possess similar features demonstrating a reflection on religious law, creativity and everyday life. in singer’s work, the synagogue is a theater, and singer’s father functions in the same way the puppet master, or dalang. operates in wayang theater. this allows for the negotiations between religious law and the living community. keywords: isaac bashevis singer, religious creativity, wayang, religious law prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 2 july to december 2019, 32-47 © 2000 by assumption university press andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 33 scholars have often described religion as providing a rigorous set of beliefs, symbols and rituals which have been shaped by the historical dynamics of communities. peter beyer, for example, discusses religion both substantially and functionally. the substantive aspect relates to the supernatural, while the functional aspect of religion focuses on religion’s social or psychological purposes and effects1. he pointed out that to “observe religion as a social phenomenon is to observe it as a communication”2 but this raises the question, if religion is a form of communication, might we ask if it is possible to see religion as a creative form of communication where its effective expression involves creative imagination.3 the distinctiveness of literature and drama stands out in contrast to the conceptual disciplines of theology and philosophy. the creative use of words, movement and sounds create a unique world of ideas, and enables us to express things that the theologian or philosopher might find difficult to express. thus the expressive indeterminacy of the creative imagination can often offer an alternative and defense against the abstract rationalism often encountered in philosophy and theology, and against the tendencies towards dogma and absolutism. the creative imagination opens a space for feeling, emotion, and the mysteries of a particular experience of life. at the same time, literature, like philosophy, shares a determination to question received wisdom and to open up new modes of thought, perception and action. the creative and imaginative qualities of human nature allow people to approach, shape and perceive religious teachings, sources and traditions in very different ways. in addition, creativity naturally spreads the message of religion beyond the limits of merely theological matters, instead touching on many more practical, equally universal aspects of life and experience, and more practical, such as art, literature, dialogue, ethics, etc.4 one form of religious expression that is particularly popular in today’s world is fiction in its many forms, whether poem, novel, film or other kinds of performance. 34 prajñā vihāra this transcending of limits through creative expression allow us to see themes and patterns repeated in various religious expressions which relate to very separate and unique lived experiences. this interpretation of religion through the creative imagination, allows one not only to recognize one’s own life within an exotic culture, but it also allows a creative bridging between cultures. by taking a closer look at the contemporary study on religion, where the qualitative aspects of study of humanities, is able to see very complex situations in social phenomena, this paper discusses the creative imagination represented by religious actors, players, at the same adherents or followers. by taking examples from two different forms of creative art, stories are represented as religious representation in different context of life and people religious life, with different ways of negotiating life, through individual, rational interpretation to mystical interpretation. while both representing different religious tradition within different social-cultural context, they both are similar in a way to show us how to negotiate life within religiousdogmatic prescription that very often are not compatible with people’s real life. isaac b. singer’s book, in my father’s court, is a work of literature that explores a unique life while expressing universal religious ideas. it becomes a question of life and law. from the narrow religious perspective of law what singer goes beyond scripture in order to accommodate the life of his people. the focus on lived experience is important because the narrow perspective of religious law is often removed from living society. in this work, singer powerfully represents and re-creates an eastern european jewish culture that is today unfamiliar to most people. in the book, his father’s synagogue, rather than simply being a place where people sought law and justice, came to represent a space for religious life to break through into the everyday world, creating a unique space for his people to learn, to contemplate, to negotiate life, and to overcome dramatically challenging conditions. singer vividly draws on that world of his childhood to share the deeply humanistic lessons that he himself had begun to learn already in his own childhood. andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 35 in these exotic tales which recount his rabbi father’s life in a polish ghetto, singer is able to lead his readers on their own spiritual journey, to discover deeper human truths that can be valued across religious and cultural divides. his themes center on seeking truth in the face of lust, greed, pride, obsession, misfortune, unreason, communicating all the surprises and challenges of the human condition. such a creative art is not just about a particular life, or a particular story, but also about communicating universal themes creatively through these particular forms. the wayang shadow-puppet drama is a very old javanese tradition going back to the ancient animist traditions and extending through the introduction of the indian dramatic forms of the ramayana and the mahabharata and finally extending to the arrival of islam with the wali songo the “nine sufi saints”, who in the fifteenth century, were able to spread islamic spiritual teachings in indonesia5, in ways in harmony with the older dramatic forms. the imaginative effectiveness of this puppet-theater (and associated local musical forms, such as the gamelan orchestra) meant that the javanese sensed no contradiction between this new vehicle for islamic teachings and the fact that these puppet-theater stories were often hindu in origin, while some of their characters may have stemmed from even earlier local roots. nor do the writers and directors of wayang performances—both old and new—find it odd that the javanese philosophy has deep connections to sufism, the mystical dimension and expressions of islam. the creative characters of wayang are demonstrated, first, through its language. the wayang presents a very rich and creative use of language. aside from the religious-ethical instructions and reflections on the roles of the leader and the people, the stories also communicate more complex themes through allusions, parables, jokes and social criticism6. second, the plot in the shadow theater is not fixed, rather it fluctuates with the emergence of new problems and situations. the complex situations that people face in life – from searching for truth, to the challenges of faith, to the solving of ethical problems – involves doubt, conflict, paradox, 36 prajñā vihāra and unanswered questions. the purpose of the stories is not just to give solutions to the problems of life, but rather, to show new possibilities for contemplation and the negotiation of living situations. human characters portrayed are always individuals and often are not even representations of javanese identity, but are rather more universal. third, wayang is a media of islamic education, and a creative attempt to communicate islamic values.7. some have argued that the highly stylized human forms in the javanese wayang puppets were very effective in accommodating local culture and life with early islamic teaching in indonesia, especially throughout java, bali and lombok. yet this artistic also plays a role in communicating new, contemporary themes and issues arising in areas of religious ideology, religious law, social criticism, ethics and morality, politics. in this way wayang can be a diverse and highly creative contemporary religious representation mirroring the transformation of people’s lives through stories and characters (lakon), like the strange and often exotic figures and stories represented in singer’s book. although the two “religious arts” and representation may not have a close historical connection, i will show that they both involve similar creative features to bring out unsuspected dimensions of religious life, suggesting important insights for the study of religion. so we can ask, what is the role of creative imagination in religious expressions and forms? specifically, how does singer’s creativity represent a unique expression of life, but at the same time allow us to see universal themes that link us with the unique expression of life found in javanese wayang theater? first, it is important to explore the features of singer’s book to see what is shared with the shadow-puppet performance, by looking at the representation of religious life through stories which relate the everyday life in his childhood polish jewish community. those common features in singer’s stories represent areas of life where life cannot be reduced to right or wrong, permitted or forbidden things, as was often understood in the learned religious texts. they do not involve preaching normative andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 37 beliefs and practices, instead those stories evoke the sort of places where individuals must by themselves somehow negotiate life’s mysterious and tricky situations. the plot in his stories does not unfold in a familiar, constant pace, but rather fluctuate through difficult, often inconclusive and unexpected problems and situations. the complex ethical situations that people face in life, from searching for the truth to struggling with the validity of faith, are portrayed in these stories as a process of seeking the truth, since his characters live through dramas of doubt, conflict, paradoxes, and questioning. these often inconclusive stories, echo the famous “teaching stories” of the hasidic mystics. the purpose of such stories, unlike the rabbinic religious authority of singer’s father and his fellows, is not merely about providing a legally or scripturally valid “solution” to the problems of life. instead, they point to a very different form of religiosity requiring a long inner process of contemplation and negotiation. singer suggests, through these stories, that it is the individual’s inner qualities (at once spiritual and ethical) which alone can confront evil in the world; that the human character is drawn to the purity of heart, clarity and courage. it is important to note that these rare, but essential inner qualities arise in characters who are always distinctly individual and not based upon any religious or ethnic identity. moreover, the lessons conveyed by these stories are not just abstract ethical principles, but lively representations of the lives of people. take for example, the story about a man asking whether it is proper to sleep with his dead wife. the reason is his modest crowded home where there is no place to sleep except with his dead wife’s body. instead of providing a religious-law solution, singer’s father helps him with money and neighbors help him with cleaning his house. in this case, he reconstitutes this person’s situation by transforming the “strictly-legal solution” into a more personal-negotiated solution. yet for his rabbi father, it brings up doubts concerning his own beliefs. he felt it odd for a jew to have only one bed in his house. whether someone is a pious jews is not necessarily determined by how many beds he or she might have. 38 prajñā vihāra on another day, an old woman comes to the rabbi to get a divorce from her husband, not because she no longer wants to live with him, but because she loves him so much, she feels he is entitled to a new, younger wife who might bear him a child. she has already chosen her successor for him. the rabbi facilitated their divorce and the man re-married this new wife. not long after the wedding, the new wife did not give birth, the old man fell ill and passed away and the old wife passed away. the rabbi questions himself, why did he facilitate their divorce? the best a man can do is to negotiate and respond creatively to life, even though the outcome is far from what we expect. once again, he recognizes painfully that this is life. this story shows that the uncertainties of life are a lesson for everyone involved, for the old man and women, and for the rabbi himself. another woman comes to him asking why two slaughtered geese “shriek” when they are being carried in her shopping-basket, and whether such possessed geese could possibly be kosher. while singer’s mother hints at the need for logic in encountering this seemingly mysterious and wondrous event. her approach to religious faith requires explanation. that blind faith can be dangerous and needs to be deepened by doubt. singer’s father comments on his mother’s way of “logic tearing down faith, mocking it, holding it up to ridicule and scorn.” this suggests the unavoidable paradoxes in life and the importance of conflict in the development of faith and human decision making. in all those stories singer provides an insight into life far beyond legalistic positions, determined solutions, and flat situations. they are always dynamic, unpredictable, while at the same astonishingly unavoidable. there is something about such literature that gives us space for an imaginative understanding of life in that way, and it seems that the wayang puppet theater does something similar: i.e., creating the inner space for transforming the ways that people encounter religion—not as something outwardly official or authoritative, but as something playful. by “playful” here i mean entering into a different realm of possibility, of different andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 39 interpretations and representations. it allows us to play out situations across the usual limitations of dogma and social determination. it is a way for individuals and communities to express and engage themselves more freely and creatively. the use of language is particularly important in the shadow wayang theater, as it is supposed to be effectively understood by the audience, who are usually mostly javanese. so the language used in the shadow wayang in the past was usually the ancient local kawi language. but even today, contemporary wayang puppeteers still use javanese slang, characterized by a direct, critical and symbolic language that readily lends itself to the elaboration of myth, ritual, social interaction, and other aspects of daily life. while wayang theater represents the beliefs and the philosophy of the javanese which fulfill the need for spiritual inquiry and meaning, it is also like singer’s book in that the characters and the plot are always in a dynamic situation. the richness of the characters in both singer’s book and the shadow wayang genres and plays allows the creative dalang (puppeteer) of the latter to re-create a world that simultaneously questions and brings to deeper life religion’s meaning and teachings that people otherwise very often just take for granted, as something simply “given” in their society. in his role as artist and priest (like that of singer’s father role), a dalang is expected to introduce and reinforce the traditionally accepted social and philosophical concepts. yet the creativity of the dalang allows those who are illiterate to become acquainted with these ideas. that is why no matter how critical the dalang and his performance is, ordinary people may get the lesson immediately. and that lesson itself goes far beyond social and current events, as the shared philosophical foundation of wayang is one of purification and edification. for the representation of the popular shadow-puppet ramayana and mahabharata-inspired figures—like yushistira, durna, sengkuni, and local javanese figures like semar, nala gareng, petruk, and bagong—as a unit actually represent the distinctive characteristics of an ideal muslim personality. the stories they represent, drawn from 40 prajñā vihāra islamic spirituality and javanese philosophical teachings, make these plays vehicles of social criticism, including highlighting the limitations of formal or “official” religion. the humorous or ironic dialogue between these striking characters is necessarily what we can find in the stories in singer’s book which have a similar critical stance in regard to his own father’s relative “orthodoxy”. like the comic characters who live patiently in wayang and javanese legend, the legends and myths that live in society are often latent (not fully conscious or codified) regulatory systems that continue to control the empirical behavior of the members of the community concerned. in the wayang tradition, the clowns’ servants8 often appear as moralistic agents who offer useful suggestions to their kings in times of misery or pressure. for example, semar is not merely a clown-servant (abdi) puppet, but he is also a legendary, semi-divine figure in the world of puppets, as well as a legend and political myth. semar is known as a character who saves the source of leadership, who is charismatic and rational—yet in his physical appearance he looks humble, and outwardly he does not reflect power. semar once advices pandawa that men should not just think about what they will eat every day in seven days, and that as the leader, pandawa should show humility which is represented by “luwe” (hunger) and “a simple life” to his people. thus, in order to protect the kingdom and to have the power to resist, the leader should appoint a good advisor, deputy and or officer (patih), since there is no power of the leader (ratu) without people, and the responsibility of the ratu is to serve the will of people. the javanese mystical-philosophical text, “suluk wujil”, is an old javanese text written by one of javanese saints, sunan bonang. it tells of the spiritual journey of a clown-servant called wujil, the disciple of wahdat, to find his master. after several years performing ritual, wujil complains to his master that he has not yet gained any mystical experiences. one of the main subjects of the dialogue in the play revolves around the importance of “intention” or “purified will”, of true prayer and the importance of self-knowledge. there is always an explanation andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 41 for something (like singer’s mother’s response to the shrieking dead geese). praying by itself will not give anything unless wujil realizes it with self-knowledge and good intentions. wahdat’s long responses to wujil’s inquiry, covers his life story in a very philosophical and symbolic way. for instance, he says: “the turban was used to hit and beat inside the mosque after they were angry with each other, and prayed individually. that is the result of shirk (error), because they assume that each person’s intelligence is the most important. as a result, the person does not understand pure will or sincere intentions”. 9 he continues: “this problem is very difficult. people may not hold fast to the letters (written text), for the existence of text is contingent upon the existence of understanding (ideas, guesses). and there is no single understanding, but they are many, which leads to error, since there are many people who deify their understanding. people already feel happy merely by reciting the qur’an, (and other religious text), yet that is only a whisper of understanding”. 10 here, wahdat presents anti-scripturalism or anti-literalism. blind adherence to the mere letters of scripture is a form of idolatry. now the symbols of wayang become meaningful in terms of the complex hermeneutics of mystical islam. and of course, this ideal can be discovered, and has been communicated, through the encounter of religious texts with the deeper philosophy of life of javanese society. 42 prajñā vihāra the reflection of a message of religious/islamic education appears in the narrative of sengkuni and durna:11 sengkuni who is a royal officer of kurawa, once worried about kurawa’s future, and he is advised by durna that a man should not be discouraged. instead she/he should be resigned and submissive to god, needing his encouragement and relief. although the public knows that durna and sengkuni are antagonistic figures, in puppetry they basically never justify that a person is simply good or bad, but invite the puppet lovers to see a situation from another perspective. the message (either to muslim or non-muslim) is that as a creature, human beings have to continue to fight and not despair, because god always gives a beauty and responds according to the condition of his servant. in addition to the conversation between durna and sengkuni12, another example that describes wayang language as a medium of islamic education is wibisana’s speech to the pandavas. here is a fragment of a wibisana conversation. in this example, wibisana is giving advice to the pandavas to live a good life. “there are seven ways to live a good life: beciking kelakuan, akehinng kepinteran, pakolehing kagunan, sugih, ngudi singgih, buntasing sesurupan, and landheping panggahita”, which means being good, intelligent, useful, rich, respectable, polite, and insightful—all of which are the forms of positive action taught in islam. the language in wayang is very rich with comic expressions of facts and allusion or satire and jokes and humor. along with religious, ethical and political content, there are also stories of love scandals, jokes and social criticism in wayang theatre. it, for example, appears in the dialogue between comic/clown puppets, kenyot and tonglang about their marriage.13 tonglang told kenyot that he has problem with his wife. he says, “when i give her more money, she serves me only rice. less money no food at all, while she selfishly eats out alone. had i known this hardship i would never have sought a wife. she just gives me a blink-of-the-eye orgasm at the expense of yearlong stressfulness.” kentot advises him that if he is no longer pleased with her, he could divorce her. tongleng replies that he is afraid of her mother who may bewitch him, and that he might andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 43 fear that bad things would happen to her after he divorced her. kentot then simply responds, “well, divorce her and i will take her widower?.” what role can strict legal rules play in a story such as this? singer’s awareness of how many-sided people are, and how complex the human condition is, does not undermine an understanding of what it means to be jewish. rather, through his stories, his readers can learn the many sides of religion and what it can mean to be jewish. likewise, with the shadow-puppets, the figures of the dalang (author/ performer) and the lakon (the characters played) are always dynamic, keeping with the changing times and issues in the midst of society, while also encouraging their audience to discover how truly complex life is, beyond just simply being a muslim, and to recognize that we cannot avoid those conflicts that make up the very journey of life itself. thus wayang isnot just a form of expressive creativity, it is also a collection of life stories. here i can quote the dalang ki prabowo who says that the dalang should have immense experience in his life in order to be creative and in order to project the stories to the audiences. because wayang stories are basically a portrait of ourselves as human beings. thus the message of wayang is not just for javanese. or what it means to be a javanese or a muslim, but it has relevance to people all over the world. the messages that the dalang through the wayang wants to share is that the basic values of truth and right living are really the same everywhere. evil in all the world is manifested in the greedy and power-hungry, and that the evil will always be defeated by high ideals and virtue. in its development, wayang has been transformed into a strategic way to negotiate religion and social life and very often serves today as a public medium in addressing social and political issues, moral issues and likely critics of the country, society, government. it is even used to comment on and discuss such governmental programs as natural disaster mitigation. it cannot be denied that wayang shows have an identity or character in their own forms, and that they continue to be transformed as they are used to challenge new dilemmas. in response to the quest for the 44 prajñā vihāra present and in response to each person’s own life situation, that is aspect of its active and highly effective creativity. religion is often considered as a form of law based upon scripture and the enforcement of its rules. but both singer’s book and wayang show religious life is communal, and that it therefore requires voluntary communal consent and conscience. thus it always involves negotiation, and since it is a living reality, it vibrates with life and it has both life’s inconstancy and its persistence, like in the beth-din stories, farther than what just strict, formal rules can offer. it is in light of this realization that singer wishes in his introduction to “in my father’s court” that the “beth-din” can be a universal institution. beyond being a place for small community of jewish faithful, singer intimates, it could become a place all humans can learn from: i.e., learning how god’s mercy and judgment can be manifested in every situation, so that the beth-din might become the place to learn about god’s justice and mercy. what wayang performance can offer back to singer’s stories is that in projecting this complex life situation, beyond being a jew or muslim, and beyond what the religious text says, life always requires a full, deepened understanding of god’s mercy (loving kindness, hesed and rahmat) that most of the time precedes the law and the rule, and judgment. while both judaism and islam very often are seen as religions which emphasize religious law, then through these two forms of religious representation, the “law” might be understood more richly as how human beings come understand god’s mercy. or as the qur’an says: “god’s mercy has precedence over his wrath.” this is the famous understanding of god’s mercy and law that has been long discussed, especially in sufism. finally, what i find most similar between these two creative approaches is that the synagogue can be like the wayang theater or stage, the shadows are like singer’s father (since it is through him that the stories happen), and the director is singer as the (polish jewish) dalang. this theater is the “imagination” of the world, its past, present and future. and beyond this range of times, all the figures are like puppets before the director, just as islamic spirituality through the hadith tells us that andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 45 the hearts of human beings are shifting between two god’s fingers. the human individual, the human heart here is god’s puppet, while the world is the play of god’s imagination. endnotes 1. peter beyer, religions in global society (new york: routledge, 2006) 2. ibid, p.4. 3. for preliminary study on religion and creativity, see kim-lien thi nguyen, “an exploratory study on the relationship between creativity, religion, and religiosity” (2012). master’s theses published by san jose state university. online source: http:// scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/4204. 4. petra kuppinger, (2017), “religion, art and creativity in the global city”, in culture and religion, published by routledge, vol. 18, no. 4, 343–352, p 433. https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2017.1402419 5. nicholas tarling, “religion and popular beliefs”. in the cambridge history of southeast asia, ed. jerome chʻen and nicholas tarling, vol. i. 1970. cambridge: cambridge university press, p. 331; r.m. ismunandar, wayang: asal usul dan jenisnya. 1994. semarang: dahara, p. 96. 6. jan mrázek (1999), “javanese wayang kulit in the times of comedy: clown scenes, innovation, and the performance’s being in the present world”. part one: indonesia, no. 68, pp. 38-128. 7. cf ferdi efendi, “learning islam from the performance of wayang kulit (shadow puppets)”, published by hunafa: jurnal studia islamika, vol. 14, no.1 juni 2017: 99-115. 8. in wayang mythology, the characters of comic clowns are not merely clowns; instead, in the macrocosmos, they are often identified with aspects of the highest being or divine. 9. suluk wujil (101) kepet kinepetaken ing masjis// awekasan padha pepurikan// asembahhyanng dhewek-dhewek// puniku palanipun//sirik gugon uajring tulis//tan wruhjatining niyat//palaning wong bingung//lanang wadon padha ngrarh//angulati niyat kang sejati-sejati//tan wruh ing dedalannya. 10. suluk wujil (102) mapan angeling ujar puniku//nora kena ngukuhi aksara// kang aksara kadadine//dadining nyana iku//nyana nora among sawiji// nyana awarnawarna// dadine kapahung// akeh anyembah ing nyana//paksa hresthi sarira bisa angaji// ujare nyananira. 11. arifin, “learning islam”, p.104. 12. ibid, p.106 46 prajñā vihāra 13. i nyoman sedara, kawi dalang : creativity in dalang theater (2002), a thesis published by university of georgia, p. 105. online sources : https://athenaeum. libs.uga.edu/handle/10724/29419; p. 105. bibliography arifin, ferdi (2017), “learning islam from the performance of wayang kulit (shadow puppets)”, hunafa: jurnal studia islamika, vol. 14 (no. 1). pp. 99-115. chʻen, jerome and nicholas tarling, ed. 1970. the cambridge history of southeast asia, vol. 1.cambridge: cambridge university press. ismunandar, r.m. 1994. wayang: asal usul dan jenisnya. semarang: dahara. peter beyer, peter. 2006. religions in global society. new york: routledge. mrázek, jan., (1999), “javanese wayang kulit in the times of comedy: clown scenes, innovation, and the performance’s being in the present world”. part one: indonesia, no. 68, pp. 38-128. kuppinger, petra (2017), “religion, art and creativity in the global city”, in culture and religion, published by routledge, vol. 18, no. 4, 343–352, p 433. https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2017.1402419 masroer (2015), “spiritualitas islam dalam budaya wayang kulit masyarakat jawa dan sunda, sosiologi agama, vol. 9 (no. 1). pp. 38-61. nguyen, kim-lien thi, an exploratory study on the relationship between creativity, religion, and religiosity” (2012). master’s theses published by san jose state university. online source: http:// scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/4204 singer, isaac bashevis. 2001. in my father’s court, poland: vintage. https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2017.1402419 https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/do/search/?q=author_lname%3a%22nguyen%22%20author_fname%3a%22kim-lien%22&start=0&context=1551039 andi herawati and andi rachmawati syarif 47 sedara, i nyoman, kawi dalang : creativity in dalang theater (2002), a thesis published by university of georgia. online sources : https://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/handle/10724/29419 tarling, nicholas .1970, “religion and popular belie the cambridge history of southeast asia, ed. cambridge: cambridge university press. website: http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/sedana_i_nyoman_200205_phd http://achmad-suchaimi-sememi.blogspot.com/2017/05/naskah-sulukwujil-dan-terjemahnya.html https://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/handle/10724/29419 http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga_etd/sedana_i_nyoman_200205_phd http://achmad-suchaimi-sememi.blogspot.com/2017/05/naskah-suluk-wujil-dan-terjemahnya.html http://achmad-suchaimi-sememi.blogspot.com/2017/05/naskah-suluk-wujil-dan-terjemahnya.html prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 105 vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 105-120 © 2000 by assumption university press nyānavamsa and mohammad manzoor malik abstract this article is an investigation of ideas concerning death and dying in in the context of theravada buddhism. it draws especially from scholarship in manaymar. both physical death and the process of dying can be understoood as products of impermenance. the pali canon while recognizing that death is beyond understanding in ordinary language, understands death from the concept of continuity. myanmar scholars have understood the dying process in buddhism as involving mental processes and conciousness. death is a stage in the process which extends to the next life. they therefore place an emphasis on the importance of consciousness prior to death. the ultimate goal is deathlessness or nibbana which is achieved with the help of meditation. keywords: death, dying, buddhism, nibbana, maynamar in both sanskrit and pali is a term for death. in buddhist thought, this has two senses. (1) physical death as it occurs at the end of life: in this sense, is the twelfth link in the chain of dependent 106 origination ( ). (2) death as the dying process: in this sense, particularly common in the , death occurs continuously as each moment perishes to be replaced by the next. death in both senses is a product of the universal principle of , impermanence.1 in (deathproximate karma) or (a stream of mind as continuity) follow before the death. the death-proximate ( ) is the wholesome or unwholesome volition present immediately before or evil action (kamma), or a sign of it ( ), or of a sign of the future existence ( ) that produces rebirth.2 tells us about death ( ) and explains the word death ( ) as follows: “the cutting 3 moreover, explains the word death ( ) as follows: “herein, death ( ) is the interruption of the life faculty included within (the limits of) a single becoming (existence).”4 hence, describes as well the word death ( ) stating, “and what, bhikkhus, is death ( )? the departing and vanishing, the destruction, the disappearance, the death, the completion of the life span, the dissolution of the aggregates ), the discarding of the body, and the destruction of the physical life-force of beings in this or that class of beings-this, bhikkus, is called death.”5 107 continuity in the doctrine of dependant origination, becoming and passing away is connected not only to dis-continuity, but also to continuity. all change involves a change of matter but it does not destroy matter. for instance in chemistry, solids may change into liquids and liquids into gases, but none of them are ever completely destroyed. the particular energies continue while their forms are changed. viewed in this light, continuity is an unfailing feature of all things. because there is continuity, one never sees an exact line of demarcation between one condition or state and the next. there is also no time gap between the two. even time is continuous.6 death, in ordinary usage, means the disappearance of the vital life process conventionally called man, animal, personality, ego, etc. repeated dissolution and vanishing of each momentary physical-mental combination, and thus it takes place every moment. concerning this momentariness of existence, it is stated in vis.m. viii: “in the absolute sense, beings have only a very short moment to live, life lasting as long as a single moment that consciousness lasts. just as a cartwheel, whether rolling or at a standstill, at all times it only rests on a single point of its periphery, even so the life of a living being lasts only for the duration of a single moment of consciousness. as soon as that moment ceases, the being also ceases. for it is said: the being of the past moment of consciousness has lived, but does not live now, nor will it live in future. the being of the future moment has not yet lived, nor does it live now, but it will live in the future. the being of the present moment has not lived, it does live just now, but it will not live in the future.7 in this approach to birth and death, the duration of life in 108 and according to the analysis of buddhist abhidhamma. it involves arising ( ), presence ( ), and dissolution ( ). the duration of these is called the lesser moment. a thought unit has a duration of life called a thought movement, which has three equal phases. the duration of a physical atom is generally equivalent to seventeen the rising and the ceasing phase of each matter also have a duration of lesser moments. the static period is, therefore, forty-nine lesser moments follows: death is the temporary end of a temporary phenomenon.” (vsm, viii) by death is meant the extinction of psychic life death is not the complete annihilation of a being. death in one place means the birth in another place, just as, in conventional terms, the rising of the sun in one place means the setting of the sun in another place. the existence of atoms of mind and matter is directly or indirectly conditioned as elements. in this connection, mind and matter are merely the functions of energies and nothing else. mind is the thinking element, while matter is devoid of this quality. thus, life is related to the duration and existence of a unit of mind and matter. here, it is noteworthy that in the process of mind, there are three similar kinds of consciousness in life ( and ). the “rebirth-process” ( ), in short, comprises the kamma-resultant ( ) groups of existence. the rebirth process of life takes place in anyone of thirty-one realms along and death abhidhamma pointed out as follows: 109 “the rebirth-liking consciousness, life-continuum consciousness, and the death consciousness in one (particular) birth or life are similar and have an identical 9 in addition, everyone who has to be born will face death. the will be the outcome. travelers have their destinations whether they drive, make our way through life. like everyone else, we will have to disembark 10 hence, it is said: “again and again the slow wits seek re-birth; again and again comes birth and dying comes; again and again men bear us to the grave.” this important law is easier said than understood”.11 death and dying, thus as the concept of continuity, desires a consideration that lies in textual meaning rather than an ordinary understanding of its explanation from traditional buddhist standpoints. canon death, according to as explained by dr. 1) the body and mind are protected by or life. at death, this ceases. 2) tejo element produced by kamma as body heat stops at death. that produced before death may still be present. 3) : any consciousness including , which maintains the continuity of the mind stream, comes to a stop. 12 110 death can be of many types because of the causes, which could be literally understood from pali-canon by scholars. for example, the advent of death is fourfold, namely: 1) through the expiration of the lifespan; 2) through the expiration of the (productive) karmic force; 3) through 4) through (the intervention of) a destructive kamma (untimely death13 is to say: 1) as having the appearance of a murderer, 2) as the ruin of success, 3) by comparison, 4) as to sharing the body with many, 5) as to the frailty of life, 6) as sign-less,7) as to the limitedness of the extent, and 8) as to the shortness of the moment.14 in addition, there is no way to know the moment or place of death. in the pali-cannon this is called the sign of death. the time of death has no sign, such as one has to die only at this time, not at any other. for beings can die at any time. and where the body dies (or drops) has no sign because there is no sign that can tell us when people die, or that their bodies must drop only here, not anywhere else. for those born inside a village are dropped outside the village, and those born outside the village are dropped inside it. likewise, those born in water are dropped on land, and those born on the land are in the water. moreover, this can be multiplied in many ways; destiny has no sign because there a divine world and are reborn in the human world, and some die in the human world and are reborn in a divine world, and so on. in addition, in an ox harnessed to a machine.15 111 perspectives of religious scholars on the dying process in contemporary myanmar pa-auk tawya holds that there are six types of mental processes ( door, and body-door processes, whose respective objects are sights, ). the sixth type of mental process has all phenomena as its object (including ) ). in between these six types of process arises consciousness. in one life, one always consciousness. for the duration of that life, it arises in-between mental last type of consciousness to arise in one life, the death consciousness.16 ( ) arises just before death, taking as an object something seen or heard, for example, a visible object appearing in the mind-door as in a dream. the mind sinks into it, inclining to it with . it becomes agitated with fear. then or death consciousness arises. at existence is concluded.17 in buddhism, typically speaking, dying is a while we are dying. thera anurudha remarks that: out near death. it is as if an aged person is seated near the others seated further away. in the same way, since it happens 112 kamma that at the time of death is recollected very vividly. for example, the habitually virtuous person may vividly recollect an unusual unwholesome action, and a habitually unvirtuous person may vividly recollect an unusual wholesome action.”19 for the next life. another perspective is provided by pa-auk tawya back even further into the previous life. then he will see the mentalitymateriality at the time near death either in his previous life or in the object of the near-death process ( ) of past life. that is the last mental process of his past life, before the rising of the death consciousness. there are three possible objects for the near-death process. since a person has been reborn as a human being, he will be associated with only wholesomeness: 1) kamma: the volitional formations of a wholesome kamma accomplished earlier in the same or previous life. for example, one may recollect the happiness associated happiness and tranquillity associated with meditation. 2) kamma sign ( ): an object associated with a wholesome kamma accomplished earlier in the same or previous life. if one were a doctor in his past life, he might see patients; if he were a devotee of the triple gem, he may see a bhikkhu, a buddha image, or hear chanting of the pali texts; if he were a meditator, he might see the of his past meditation subject. 113 3) destination sign ( destination, where one is about to be reborn. for rebirth like a red carpet. linking consciousness ( ). the object appears because of the kammic potency that was about to mature at the end of his past his present consciousness and will be the object of his death consciousness in this life.20 death, an object manifests itself at one of the six doors or senses through three appearances of objects which can be considered as wholesome or unwholesome or neural. this is unlike ordinary living time as kamma objects now appear. they are as follows: 1) kamma, from the huge amount of kammas accumulated in us, just one, which has ripened, appears. as it belongs to the past, it manifests only in the mind. due to its kammic it overshadows the thought process, even for someone lying unconscious. it is a recollection of whatever had been done in the past. 2) kamma nimitta (condition of the kamma), it is the object experienced when the kamma was performed in the past. it can also belong to present kamma. for a past object, it manifests only in the mind-door. a present object can candles, the person we are quarreling with, the weapon used or the animal hunted: these objects, or the surroundings, such as a meditation hall, related to our kammic action are kamma nimitta. 114 3) gati nimitta (sign of destination), as a present object, it appears at any of the six doors, indicating the place of rebirth. we can see with our own eyes an ugly ogre, calling and approaching us, but not the other people near us. that is why we shout, “save me! save me! he wants to throw a nice mansion. thus, we are being briefed in advance of our destination after death. this gati nimitta usually appears as a visible object.21 these three appearances of objects involve spiritually understanding kamma (stream of consciousness) in ordinary language. in contrast, dr. m. t. mon in his work , describes the three appearances of objects in the dhamma language. therefore, appears at one of six doors, the (adverting consciousness) will pick up the sense object and a stream of consciousness, known as consciousness. hence, according to the that is going to produce the next rebirth, an or normally functioning 5 times as in these . these are known as “ .”22 arising moment ( ) (the moment it is generated). ) (the moment-to-moment arising and perishing of each type of mentality and materiality). moreover, according to vsm.728, by seeing the formed characteristic ( ).23 thus, the dying process is considered a crossing over a bridge into the next life, and also can be 115 objectively attempted with our lightening being as our momentary, lasting consciousness as a rebirth-mind process. mindfulness of death according to buddhist dictionary , mindfulness of death): the seventh of the ten recollections ( ), life and the numerous directions from which death can come, e.g., from snakebite, accident, illness, and assault.24 thus, we are taught that death may come anytime, anywhere, in any circumstances, and by any cause. therefore, we should always be aware of the impermanance of life. in vis. m. viii it is said: “he who wishes to develop this meditation should retreat to solitude, and while living secluded, he should thus the death of a beloved person, just as to a mother while thinking about the death of her beloved child. again, by just as to enemies whilst thinking on the death of their person, however, no emotion will arise, just as to a man whose work consists in cremating the dead at the sight death, fright may arise ... just as at the sight of a murderer whenever seeing here or there slain or other dead beings, attentiveness, emotion, and knowledge and consider thus: 116 this way, will the hindrances q.v.) be repressed; and through the idea of death, attention becomes steadfast, and the exercise reaches neighborhood-concentration 25 according to vis.m. viii, it is said that ways: one may think of it as a murderer with a drawn sword standing in front of oneself that one may bear in mind that all happiness ends in death. even the mightiest beings on this earth are subject to death, we must share this body with all those innumerable worms and other tiny beings residing therein, life is something dependent on in-and-out breathing, bound up with it life continues, and only as long as the elements, food, and breath. these are properly performing their functions; or that nobody knows when, where, and under what circumstances, death will take place, and what kind of fate we have to expect after death; or, that life is very short and limited.” (nyanatiloka. mahathera, 1998, p.188)26 in buddhism, according to the historical , the must begin by focusing the attention on the breathing and then go on to note all other physical and mental phenomena that arise.”27 in addition, ajahn chah states that “the emotion of happiness is a form of birth. the tendency to become sad is a form of death. when there is death, there is birth, and what is born has to die. that which arises and passes away is caught in this unremitting cycle of becoming... if [the buddha] experienced something positive, he did not become positive along with it. he simply observed and remained aware. if he experienced something 117 negative, he did not become negative. in addition, why was that? because his mind had been cut free from such causes and conditions. he had penetrated the truth. the conditions leading to rebirth no longer existed. this is the knowing that is certain and reliable. this mind is truly at peace. this is what is not born, does not age, does not get sick, and does conditioning. the causes then cease with no conditioning remaining. this mind is beyond birth and death, beyond happiness and sorrow, beyond both good and evil.” deathlessness and nibbana according to theravada buddhism, according to popular belief is a name for (s. liberation from the wheel of rebirths, and therefore also from the everrepeated deaths.29 nevertheless, in 6, 7, 8, and 9 it is not misunderstood that a word called amata is similar to 46 synonyms meaning (thera mahamoggalla, 2013, pp.2-3).30 hence, is described precisely as “profound, hard to see and hard to understand, unattainable by mere reasoning” (mn 26.19). the well-known passage from the declares concerning : ““there is an “unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned,” the existence of which makes possible “escape from the majjhima nikaya characterises in similar ways. it is “the unborn, un-ageing, un-ailing, deathless, sorrowbuddha attained to on the night of his enlightenment.”31 in addition, , according to the commentaries, is ‘freedom constitutes the highest and ultimate goal of all buddhist aspirations, i.e., absolute extinction of greed, hate, delusion, and convulsively clinging to existence it is also ultimate and absolute 118 deliverance from all future rebirth, old age, disease and death, from all crucial for nibbàna, but also for a theoretical understanding of it, is to grasp the truth of anattà (q.v.), the egoless-ness and insubstantiality of all forms of existence fully. without such an understanding, one will state of existence into which either an ego or self enters or with which the deed is, but no doer of the deed is there; nibbàna is, but not the man that enters it; the path is, but no traveler on it is seen.” (vis.m. xvi) .32 ongoing process throughout life. deathlessness is not a future state to be attained but is the property of a mind for which every present moment is a 33 hence, as the said, “fully knowing the arising and passing of the khandhas one attains joy and delight. for those who know, this is the deathless.”34 therefore, some scholars explain that mindfulness is the path to the deathless. amatadhamma (deathlessness).35 conclusion with the four elements in every living human being. these systems are constantly in the process of ceasing and recreating, yet we often do not notice this rising or falling, the becomming and passing away of these nevertheless, mindfulness and meditation dying process can lead one perceptions, and to be consciousness of dissolution and vanishing of each momentary physical-mental combination, and thus it takes place every moment until the end of our lives. 119 in theravada buddhism, understanding death and dying is to understand the three characteristics of existence (s. ): and delusions. endnotes 1 damien k, . (new york, oxford university press, 2003), 173-174. 2 nyanatiloka mahathera, , (kandy, sri lanka: buddhist publication society, 1998), 153. 3 arahant upatissa, , trans. n. r. m ehara, soma thera, and kheminda thera (buddhist publication society, 1995).167. 4 , buddhist publication society, (1991), 225. 5 , buddha dharnma education association inc, (1986), 32. 6 gunaratna. v. f, , (buddhist publication society: kandy, sri lanka, 2008), 9-10. 7 ibid, 185-186. ledi sayadaw, . (yangon, burma: union of buddha sasana council, 1965), 110-111. 9 bhikkhu bodhi. . (kandy, sri lanka: buddhist publication society, 1992), 199. 10 , (full colour, mandalay, myanmar, 2016), nine. 11 gunaratna, v. f, . (buddhist publication society, 1966), 14. 12 ibid, 13. 13 bhikkhu bodhi, (tra). (buddhist publication society: kandy, sri lanka, . (mya mon yadanar publication, 1995), 216-217. 120 14 (1991), 226. 15 ibid, 232. 16 sayadaw, pa-auk tawya, “ .” 17 ibid, 12. ibid, 17. 19 sayadaw, pa-auk tawya, , pa-auk meditation centre, 2007, 222-223. 20 ibid, 68. 21 ibid, 20-22. 22 ibid, 218. 23 ibid, 85. 24 ibid, 174. 25 ibid, 187-188. 26 ibid, 188. 27 gunaratana, b. h, “ ,” (digital edition, 2011), 63. chah, ajahn, “ ,” (2004): 464, 338. 29 ibid, 28. 30 thera mahamoggalla, (trans.). burmese scrip. (state pariyatti sasana university,yangon, 2013), 2-3. 31 nanamoli, bhikkhu, and bhikkhu bodhi, “the middle length discourses of the buddha.” (1995), 31-32. 32 ibid, 201-203. 33 sumegi, a, 34 sayadaw m, foundation, 2016), 68. 35 .”(buddhist publication group: totnes, uk, 2010), 282. 13_(227-239) the impact on religious.pmd the impact on religious values on business ethics in the chinese context stephan rothlin university of international business and economics, beijing, china abstract china is showing impressive achievements in economic development, especially in the area of poverty alleviation. yet a major challenge remains to humanize it and make it beneficial for the common good. this would be a role for religion. religions in china are also experiencing an unprecedented growth in believers. and government officials are recognizing their value. however, religion remains a marginal and isolated phenomenon. therefore the paper argues that the first duty of the various religions in china would consist in overcoming a narrow-minded focus on their own affairs and make an ecumenical, combined effort to address pressing social issues along with all people who are rooted in religious traditions. a especially valuable service in the asian context would be if religions can reconnect people to their ethical roots. the religions would be in a unique position to assist the government in order to revive the tradition of confucian secular ethics with a special focus of key values of trustworthiness, honesty, reliability and respect. º·¤ñ́ âèí »ãðà·è¨õ¹ä´éáê´§ãëéàë繶ö§¤çòáêóàãç¨íâèò§ãë­èëåç§ã¹´éò¹¡òã ¾ñ²¹òàèãé°¡ô̈ â´â੾òðíâèò§âô觡òãºããà·ò¤çòáà ×́í´ãéí¹ã¹àã×èí§¤çòáâò¡¨¹ ¤çòá·éò·òâëåñ¡·õèâñ§¤§íâùè¡ç¤×í ·óíâèò§äãà¾×èíãëé¡òã¾ñ²¹ò¹õéà»ç¹áººá¹øéâ¹ôâá áåðà»ç¹ä»à¾×èí¤çòá ṍêèç¹ãçá êô觹õé¤×íº·ºò·¢í§èòê¹ò èòê¹òã¹»ãðà·è ṏ¹ çñ¹¹õé¡óåñ§áõ¼ùéèãñ·¸òà¾ôèá¢öé¹áåðà é̈òë¹éò·õèãñ°¡çµãðë¹ñ¡ã¹¤ø³¤èò¢í§èòê¹ò íâèò§äã ¡çµòáèòê¹ò¡çâñ§¤§à»ç¹»ãò¡®¡òã³ì·õèáâ¡íâùèªòâ¢íº ́ ñ§¹ñ鹺·¤çòá¹õéµéí§¡òã·õè̈ ð prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 227-239 227 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ ¹óàê¹íçèò ë¹éò·õè»ãð¡òãáã¡¢í§èòê¹òµèò§ æ ã¹»ãðà·è ṏ¹¡ç¤×íµéí§¹óáò«ö觡òã àíòª¹ð¡òãê¹ã¨áµè੾òðàã×èí§¢í§µ¹àí§áººáṏ ôµã¨¤ñºá¤º êãéò§¤çòá¾âòâòá ãèçá¡ñ¹¡ñº»ãðªòª¹·õèáõãò¡°ò¹¤çòáàª×èí·ò§èòê¹ò·õèᵡµèò§ 㹡òã ñ́̈ ¡òã»ñ­ëò µèò§ æ ·ò§êñ§¤á ¡òããñºãªé·õè·ã§¤ø³¤èò㹺ãôº·¢í§àíàªõâ¨ðà¡ô´¢öé¹ä´é¡çµèíàá×èí èòê¹òµèò§ æ êòáòã¶àª×èíáâ⧻ãðªòª¹ãëéà¢éò¡ñºãò¡àë§éò·ò§¨ãôâ¸ããá¢í§à¢ò èòê¹ò¨ðµéí§áõê¶ò¹ð·õèà»ç¹àí¡åñ¡é³ì㹡òãªèçâàëå×íãñ°ºòå㹡òã¿×鹿ù¢¹º»ãðླõ ¢í§¨ãôâèòêµã좧¨×êí «öè§à¹é¹ã¹àã×èí§¢í§¤ø³¤èòëåñ¡ æ íñ¹ä´éá¡è ¤çòá¹èòàª×èí¶×í ¤çòá«×èíêñµâì ¤çòáäçéã¨ä é́áåð¤çòáà¤òã¾¹ñº¶×í introduction business ethics can be defined as the responsibility of business enterprises for their impact on society and for the respect of core community standards. business ethics as a subject has been introduced as an academic discipline in china since the 1980s. although it is still a relatively new discipline, it is estimated that 39% of business schools in china, including hong kong and macau, offer courses on business ethics. the present situation in china may sometimes seem far away from any consideration of ethics and religion. the opening of the economy thirty years ago and the access to the world trade organization provoked an explosive economic growth. while acknowledging the impressive achievements of such an economic development, especially in the area of poverty alleviation, the major challenge remains to humanize it and make it beneficial for the common good. it becomes more and more obvious that there is a widening gap between the rich and the poor. in the context of a system of governance which is widely perceived as atheist it may not be appropriate to put too much hope on the impact of religions. it is true that there is an unprecedented growth in believers. the official number of about hundred million adherents to the five officially acknowledged religions has recently been corrected by the research of the east normal university in shanghai to be closer to 300 228 prajna vihara __ __ ~ million. now most government officials recognize the value of religion. however, religion remains a marginal phenomenon. therefore the paper argues that the first duty of religions in china would consist in overcoming the narrow minded focus on their own affairs and make an ecumenical, combined effort to address pressing social issues along with all people who are rooted in religious traditions. the issues which business ethics attempts to address and solve are certainly major challenges. a unique achievement in the asian context would be if religions would use their clout and growing influence to reconnect people to their ethical roots. religion would be in a unique position to assist the government to revive the tradition of confucian secular ethics with a special focus of key values of trustworthiness, honesty, reliability and respect. in reference to important areas of business ethics, a combined ecumenical effort could cause a beneficial impact on society. an example could be the joint efforts of religious groups in taiwan in the area of disaster relief in the aftermath of catastrophes. a significant area which cries for improvement is the protection of the environment. despite state-of-the-art laws, widespread obsession with short term profits has led to tendencies to cut corners and abuse natural resources. also the phenomenon of corruption, which seems to further encroach upon government and society, may ultimately undermine the very groundwork of a society unless there is a strong combined effort to recognize the harm inflicted by a corrupt culture and to eradicate it. the prejudices about china despite a growing awareness about the overall importance of china as a rising nation eager to take a front seat on the economic and political world stage, there seems to be still great ignorance lingering about china, including among academic circles. an indicator about a lack of comprehension of china may be recognized in a number of wide spread prejudices such as: a) there is a complete absence of any morals and ethics in china. only money and the obsession with material stephan rothlin 209 possessions seem to count; b) whoever ventures into china will inevitably be cheated; c) the given political system has provoked a premature death of all religious beliefs; and d) there is no way to bypass widespread corruption. given the long isolation of china from the rest of the world it certainly comes as no surprise that this ignorance and misunderstanding of china still exists. in order to break away from past stereotypes, this paper suggests that both the implementation of the discipline of economic ethics as well as an analysis of the function of religion may not only open a more clear and original understanding of chinese realities but may also have some impact on the continued development of economic ethics and the function of religion. the concept of a state faith and religious faith as we deal with highly complex issues it seems to be necessary to attempt to clarify the concept of religion in the context of china. i would therefore briefly reassume the significant clarification of prof. he guanghu from renmin university. in the paper he delivered on 16 january 2012, prof. he guanghu compared the concept of a “state faith” (国家信仰 , “guojia xinyang”) with the reality in mainland china. the meaning of “religious faith” seems to be straightforward as the “the belief in a mysterious superhuman power”.1 the concept of “state faith” poses more problems even, as he admits, to the point to be dismissed as a false issue. a logical analysis, says he, would provide three meanings: a) the first meaning is the state’s faith, or the faith of state; b) the second meaning is the national faith, or the faith of nationals; c) finally, the third meaning is the faith in the state, or the belief in the state. 230 prajna vihara __ __ ~ in china, ever since the founding of the people’s republic of china, the ninety-year old chinese communist party (ccp) has been the custom to refer to the “faith” or “belief” in marxism or communism. in some limited sense the conclusion would be that marxism or communism with chinese characteristics ( 中国特色社会主义 , “zhongguo tese shehuizhuiyi”) has become the state faith in the last 60 years in the society of mainland china. however, prof. he underlines that the so called “faith in marxism-leninism” or the “belief in communism” has been shaken by the “loss of faith” ( (三心危机 , “sanxin weiji”, i.e. the crisis of faith, trust, and confidence) through different traumatic events of the recent history in china such as the disaster of the “great proletarian cultural revolution” (1966-1976). consequently this state faith has been fading away even if the rhetoric has still not been abandoned by the higher state authorities. actually, such a state faith seems to be approaching its terminal stage. therefore it has to be emphasized that such a state faith is not really a religious faith; however it attempts to regulate and exert strict control over all the religions which are accepted as “state” religions such as islam, buddhism, taoism, protestant and catholic christian faith. along with the imperial system inherited over centuries and dynasties, we are faced with the paradox that the president of the prc is simultaneously iman, lama, and pope for all these religions. a specific reason for this paradox is that any president, who must by state law be an atheist, and a member of an imperial system which promotes the state faith of marxism-leninism, must have control over religion and can never accept the idea that any foreign religious authorities would have a decisive impact on the conscience of chinese citizens. a remote echo of the characteristics of a state religion could be recognized in the other remaining communist countries such as the dprk and cuba including the veneration of the “dear leader”. when it comes to the highly complex picture of religious faith in today’s china he guanghu distinguishes between the religious faith in china such as the five major religions namely buddhism, taoism, islam, protestantism, and catholicism with various folk religions and new religions. besides the above mentioned marxist or communist faith there is another non-religious faith: the confucian faith which is appropriately coined as a “quasi-religious faith” given the fact that any secular set of principles cannot properly be stephan rothlin 231 considered as a religion in the strict sense of the word, no matter how zealous its supporters. theses scholars and supporters who previously denied its status as a relgion, now insist upon its sacred character. more importantly, some of these supporters claim copyright over what confucianism is, when in fact their interpretation is closer to the word “confused”, and bears little resemblance to the ideas of the philosopher. the opportunity for inter-religious dialogue in china it is not the purpose of the paper to explore the richness of the contributions to the education of values of the different religions. however, it attempts to suggest a few elements of a possible next stage of the “state-religion” in china given the fact that the official version of the marxist-leninist version seems to be further fading away. on the other hand, given the feudal past of china within the framework of “statereligions” it may be illusionary to imagine religions completely detached from the reach of the state. however, as the faith in marxism-leninism declines there is a whole new awakening of a sense for truth, values and also religious beliefs. according to the research of rodney stark and byron johnson (who are distinguished professors of the social sciences) as well as carson mencken (who is professor of sociology at baylor university) it seems “entirely credible to estimate that there are about 70 million chinese christians in 2011.”2 it is not the place to further discuss the complexities and reliability of statistical data in china. however, we are on safe ground, based on multiple other research __ most prominently by east china normal university __ that actually all the major religions have experienced dramatic growth since the opening up of the economy in china in 1978 and the total number of believers in religion would not amount to around 100 million, the number usually cited in official statistics, but rather around 300 million. the paper argues that the dialogue between not only religious individuals but between different religions, could be extremely beneficial in some crucial areas of ethics. this is not self evident. the obvious spiritual vacuum in the wake of historic events such as the so called “great proletarian cultural revolution” (1966-1976) and other traumatic col232 prajna vihara __ __ ~ lective experiences may also provoke a mere attitude of competition between various providers of religious insights. it is sometimes striking how underdeveloped an ecumenical spirit of dialogue is even in liberal societies like taiwan which never experienced such restrictions. the various religious groups, are narrowly focused on their own interests and often see other groups and movements as competitors. this is all the more tragic and ironic as the values enshrined in different religious traditions may have an important contribution to pressing social problems such as the deterioration of the environment, corruption, unhealthy working conditions, etc. “state religion” and the closed and open door policies it is important to recognize the historical heritage behind the institutional form of a state religion in china. the political system of a given dynasty was always crucial in the question whether or not a religion was welcome. an example is the gain in popularity of islam and christianity during the yuan dynasty of the mongol rulers (1278-1368). with an expanding of trade with other countries came not only the travels of marco polo visiting kublai khan but also the beginning of a rule of law based on universal principles. the closed door policy in maoist china between 1949 until 1976 gave way, after the turbulent chaos of the gang of four, to the so-called “open door policy” with its focus on economic development. according to the latest recommendations from the world bank, this approach to economic development needs to be significantly revised as it became clear that the price of economic success has been quite often a heavy deterioration of the natural environment. more specifically shortages of water, exacerbated by frequent droughts, have become one of the most pressing problems. in recent history of china i would like to highlight the aftermath of the sichuan earthquake which happened on may 12, 2008. given the fact that the catastrophe provoked an unprecedented outpouring of mutual help involving also many ngos and religious groups, some critical journals such as southern weekend 南方周末 (“nanfang zhoumo”) hailed stephan rothlin 233 this event as the beginning of a civil society in china. in fact, never before have the contributions to charitable institutions so dramatically increased in china. it is, however, also intriguing to note that these philanthropic contributions dropped significantly in 2009. instead of the hope that ngos and religious institutions could supplement the remarkable efforts from the government, it became obvious to the public that most of the contributions ended up in the pockets of the government officials. the aftermath of the sichuan earthquake is however only one event which indicates the emergence of a true civil society in china.3 in the further development of a civil society the religion may play a significant role. it is certainly not without an irony that first missionaries such as matteo ricci (1552-1610) and johann adam schall von bell (1592-1666) revealed a face of religion which is precisely not hostile to human reason but actually complementary to modern science. while missionaries of later centuries did not find such grace in the eyes of chinese historians as they have been portrayed (sometimes unjustly) as puppets of colonial powers, these earlier pioneers of cultural exchange between europe and china are seen in a positive light due to their efforts to enter into dialogue with chinese culture and language. such a view concerning the function of the historical role religion is in line with some contemporary philosophical research which has come to see religion as a partner of the enlightenment.4 prof. hermann l?bbe is arguing that the freedom of liberal societies requires the foundation of a politically and legally free religion. going back to the development and specific situation in china we may indeed argue that it is certainly not appropriate to impose western political models on china. however, given the rise of a civil society in china the thorny question remains: is it time to adjust the role of the religions to a more rational approach? prof. he guanghu reaches an important conclusion: “true religious faith should relativise all the worldly things and affairs, including the state”. (loc.cit., 24). this implies that “state religion” especially when related to distorted ideas concerning patriotism, could stagnate religion and prevent any potential benefit to society. therefore the view adopted during the closed door of the maoist period, in which religion has been perceived as incompatible with the state, needs radically to be changed into a modern understanding where religion within the framework of the state and respecting the laws of the state may become a 234 prajna vihara __ __ ~ trusted partner of the state. therefore in order to regain the trust from a partner who has clearly been an enemy in the past, the cooperation among all the religions needs to focus on a cooperation in those critical areas where the state is most vulnerable such as values, education, integrity, honesty, truthfulness, respect for the dignity of each person, and the fight against corruption. business ethics and the combined response from religions the new academic subject of business ethics, with its 50 plus years of history, has gained growing prominence in business schools in china including hong kong and macau. the focus of this applied field of ethics lies in offering analysis and guidance in dilemmas and ethical problems business people face particularly in situations where the tradition of law is rather weak. virtue ethics as an inspiration for sound and good individual and social behavior seems still largely underdeveloped. given the broad impact of ethics not only on the microand meso-level but also on the macro-level of the economy some languages including the chinese one prefer the term “economic ethics” ( 经济伦理学 “jingji lunlixue” in chinese, “wirtschaftsethik” in german) over “business ethics”. the main areas of this field of applied ethics are the protection of the environment, a commitment to healthy working conditions, accountability and transparency in governance and financial dealings, the fight against corruption, and whistle-blowing as a way to voice legitimate grievances. such a challenge is often answered with considerable cynicism. within the popular cynical world-view corruption seems to be so ingrained, the abuse of natural resources (in contrast to solemn official declarations to the contrary) so rampant, and boundless greed and nonsense so widespread, that any serious attempt to instill a sense of honesty and decency in the business world seems to be a priori doomed to failure. it is still not fully taken into account that ongoing financial crises may well provoke even much more devastating consequences for the whole global system. the chinese government, including one of its main educational institutions, the central party school, seems to pay greater attention to stephan rothlin 235 business ethics. in the wake of the milk and product safety scandals, the need for a more pragmatic approach to sound and ethical business practices has been repeatedly raised by the current prime minister wen jiabao. the term “dignity” actually emerged as chinese equivalent to “human rights”, and involved the commitment of business to make sure that safe working conditions, regular pay, fair competition, and the fight against corruption are safeguarded and regularly policed. in order to enhance a value system that can lead to significant change in business practices, a renewed ecumenical approach of interreligious cooperation is required, one which can overcome the more parochial narrow mindedness. given their strong tradition of shaping universal human values it would be a significant combined effort which would focus on reconnecting the chinese people from different generations wtih their rich but largely unknown ethical treasures of wisdom, especially confucian ethics. business ethics __ not only in the chinese context __ is built upon a secular framework of values such as trustworthiness, honesty, and respect. apparently the dialogue between buddhist and christian traditions has been fruitful by inspiring a genuine social commitment based on the shared value of compassion. for example, in the wake of natural disasters religious groups earned much respect by joining hands together in order to offer concrete help and relief. another connotation of “dignity” in the context of business is the struggle to recognize in each human being the right to be protected from any harm. therefore religious sensitivity for human life (starting from its very beginning) would be likely to pay a continuous attention to main issues of business ethics which tend to be overlooked: the much needed drive to make sure that the brutality of working conditions in sweatshops (the recent string of suicides among factory workers of foxconn may be just the tip of the ice-berg), wide spread child labor, human trafficking etc. will be abolished and give way to a more human approach to an economics and management. actually, even after the latest financial crises, over simplified concepts of “homo oeconomicus”, with its obsession with profit maximization and cost-cutting, seem to prevail in most business education. religious groups are able to link like minded business people to236 prajna vihara __ __ ~ gether in associations, social groups, and networks which continue to inspire and support each other to stick to their commitment to a sound and ethical way to do business. based on the author’s empirical evidence, it appears that business leaders whose values have been shaped by religion are likely to undertake serious steps to implement business ethics principles by developing viable ethical codes in their firms and institutions. religions often inspire their adherents to detach themselves from a culture of lies and struggle to find the truth. this may well lay the groundwork to shift a business focus from an exclusive concern for its excellent public image towards an attitude which would be open to a thorough investigation if there is any evidence that basic ethical principles have been violated. “the truth will set you free”, a key message of the gospel of saint john in the christian tradition certainly strongly resonates in the traditions of islam, buddhism, and taoism. hence, the search for truthfulness and trustworthiness may be a decisive factor to truly implement a requirement of the chinese labor law to install a mechanism for “whistleblowing” in each firm, which means that each employee would have institutional channels to share his or her grievances to an ombudsman who would be entitled to investigate a given case while making sure that the confidentiality of the whistle-blower is safeguarded. given the fact that corruption seems to deteriorate seriously in china (see the findings of the anti-corruption report by the former supreme judge, xiao yang6 as well as the rankings of the german based group transparency international) it appears na?ve to pin all the hopes a change on compliance only, with occasional crackdowns. the threat of harsh punishments certainly has limited merit. however, an ever more decisive source for such a change in human values are the various religious traditions and what they are ready to offer. the dynamic growth of different religious traditions in contemporary china may indicate a longing for a certain purity of life not provided by other sources. the strong ethical tradition in different religions could help shape a new virtue ethics as an inspiring point of reference and guidance for business leaders who would like to create pragmatic ethical cultures which would be a decisive factor for the economic development in china. the christian tradition with its focus on solidarity, subsidiarity, and the attenstephan rothlin 237 tion to the common good may thus not only be a key reference in the dialogue with other religions but also offer key insights for economic and human development. conclusion religion has often been perceived as an enemy of the state. in the particular case of china, within the framework of a “state religion”, a more mature understanding of the character of religion may emerge in the process of the birth of an authentic civil society in china. this will be a necessary complement to the efforts to make the economic open door policy since 1978 more sustainable. the cooperation of different religions as true partners may lay a necessary further foundation for a further growth of the rule of law and civil society. china has achieved great progress in the area of law. this is often not sufficiently acknowledged. however, the tradition of the rule of law still risks being rather weak in some layers of the society. therefore a combined effort of religions may contribute to shape a new value-driven economy, including a firm commitment against corruption. endnotes 1he, g..(2009), “religion”, in ren j. (ed.) a dictionary of religion, shanghai: dictionary press. 2counting china’s christians. there are as many christians in china as there are members of the communist party, article retrieved from www.firstthings.com on may 29, 2011. 3the civil society in china, report submitted by the center for international business ethics for the commission of the european union, 2010. 4lü bbe, h. (1986). religion nach der aufkl ä rung (“religion after the enlightenment”), graz, vienna, cologne: styria. 5xiao, y. (2009). anti-corruption report, beijing: law press china. 238 prajna vihara __ __ ~ references he, g..(2009), “religion”, in ren j. (ed.) a dictionary of religion, shanghai: dictionary press. the civil society in china, report submitted by the center for international business ethics for the commission of the european union, 2010 l?bbe, h. (1986). religion nach der aufkl ä rung (“religion after the enlightenment”), graz, vienna, cologne: styria. xiao, y. (2009). anti-corruption report, beijing: law press china ( 反贪报告 , “fantan baogao”). stephan rothlin 239 dan chițoiu 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 1, january june 2018, 1-12 © 2000 by assumption university press the role of spirituality today: between tradition and novelty dan chițoiu alexandru ioan cuza university of iași, romania abstract spiritual experience today is in some ways, close to the way we consider scientific experiments: both can be understood as a form of trial. the follower of a spiritual path needs to meet requirements of verification of their experience comparable with those of scientific experiments. yet unlike science the results of such spiritual trials is the experience of a reality beyond our common sense perception. to express the contents of this experience is extremely difficult. when we look at history, any description of such experience is always seen as a novelty. this is due to different cultural and social backgrounds, and different “fields of experience”. today, we are in a time when we can better appreciate the requirement for rigour in following a spiritual path as well in connection with the concreteness as we find in the science. contemporary spiritual experiences, conducted as trials within actual contexts, can offer new answers to actual social and cultural challenges. and it can lead to forms of spirituality which are resonant with contemporary scientific understanding. 2 prajñā vihāra globalized culture and the need for spirituality today’s “globalized culture” is made possible by the new ways of communication. there are not only obvious positive effects of this new evolution, but negative effects, especially the challenges threatening traditional cultures. this challenge is the standardization of communication, of rules of communication, but mostly of content of worldwide communication. we can ask if there are consequences on human experience at the anthropological level, as we are faced with changes in the way we experience ourselves, others, and changes in how we experience the world. a recent phenomenon that can be discovered especially on social media, is the increased occurrence of messages or conversations on spiritual/religious topics. this should be connected with the need of identity felt by today’s younger generation, a need related with the development of a personal experience connected with something more than everyday life. yet, this interest in spirituality takes the form of a subjective quest, with little interest in spiritual traditions and practices. i connect this need for personal experience which exceeds the usual, with a quest for radical and authentic novelty, for attaining a something different and personal. today these spiritual quests take on a different shape and content from those made in the past because of the impact of recent science and new technologies. but there is also a kind of danger. if we agree that spirituality is growing today compared with the recent past, this pursuit is different compared to the past, and may not lead to the desired goal since it lacks familiar landmarks, the landmarks that the religious tradition offers. this is confirmed by todays unclear meaning of spirituality: the use of term become now quite rather vague and, on the other hand, the spiritual practices are so diverse that it is difficult to apply the term in every case. that because today this term it is more and more used for designating practices not related with traditional religions. among the young generation there is an explicit tendency for searching a spiritual path that does not follow any traditional religious practice, it is a quest for a private spiritual activity that does not follow the rules and discipline dan chițoiu 3 of traditional religious practices. this tendency is occuring worldwide. this spiritual search is often risky because of inadequate means and goals. it is risky because can affect not only the reasoning but also the health of the practitioner. to support this last statement, i propose in what follows to discuss the value of tradition when speaking about spiritual practices. by “tradition” i understand here that corpus of rules and requirements that where established through the experiences gained through many generations, a corpus understood by the name of a religion. it is not here just the specificity of a religious goal, but at the same time the deployment of an anthropological profile. it is a description of human capabilities and possibilities in conducting spiritual experiences: a horizon of possibilities and limitations. but the limitations where understood as a way to channeling experiences, to empower the human capacities in attaining spiritual goals and to prevent misdirection. so we can speak about a type of rigor implying verifiability (guidance) and precision (prescriptions aiming mind and body). it is very interesting to see how this rigor has been conducted in different cultural areas. we can find many examples of rigor in practice of traditional spirituality, a fact that proves that this kind of precision is not unique to science. so, it is useful to clarify the influence of a certain cultural horizon in shaping a particular spiritual practice and vice versa. cultural horizons and spiritual traditions when discussing the specificity of a spiritual practice in the horizon of tradition, we have to avoid any approach unaware of a certain cultural area`s specificity. a cultural model directly or indirectly influences the shapes taken by the human experience in a certain religious horizon and the way science is conducted. for the western world, what we call “modernity” has as its main mark the privilege given to the rational capacity. this option is visible in the founding of the modern concept of science. the type of science initiated by galileo galilei, dominates scientific perception, replacing the former emphasis on sensitive and living qualities of objects of experience, with a mathematic knowledge 4 prajñā vihāra of their abstract forms and relations. these forms and their relations could be known only through mathematics, meaning that the most authentic sense of reason must be bound to this way of knowledge. galilei’s paradigm was considered for a very long time the only valid ground for the scientific research, as well as for the valid explanation in science. the modern philosophical approach was also influenced by this vision of reality, so that galilei’s doctrine proved to be one of the key sources of modernity. but at the end of the 19th century, wilhelm dilthey insisted on the distinction between two ways of investigation, one proper to the “natural” sciences and one proper to the “spiritual” ones. if explanation is characteristic of the natural sciences, understanding is specific to the spiritual sciences. the object of the spiritual sciences is the “living” and the only way to understand this is through “reliving”. later, martin heidegger writes a study on the modern view on technique, in which he describes the incorrectness of the technical attitude towards nature, as far as it distorts the manner which man addresses nature1. the enlightenment’s rationalism dominated and classified the entire cultural production of mankind. but recent understanding in science has shown that this enlightenment and technological approach suffers from a serious crisis in explanation (especially in quantum physics, also in cosmology or life sciences), as well as the disregard of the significance of nonscientific approaches to value, like religion or philosophy, thus opening a much broader discussion about validity in scientific explanation. one aspect of this major change was a broader understanding of the meaning of “exactness,” and “precision,” which were important classical models and criteria in the validation of scientific research. the need for rigour so, we require a broader meaning of precision and its significance beyond the domain of science. we can see experiment as a form of trial (understood as a fundamental human experiential act). the development of mathematics and physics has modified our understanding of the world, eliminated the sensible, the concrete, in favour of the abstract dan chițoiu 5 characteristics considered essential of an object, describable from a mathematical point of view. the reality described by classical physics is an independent one, that is: our measurements do not interfere with the phenomena (the meaning given to objectivity). this became the central thesis of modern science. but certain research into quantum levels, cannot be subjected to the classical explanation given by the science founded by logical formalism, so there arose the need to resort to alternative explanatory models. in the 1930’s of the last century there was a change in paradigm concerning the physical realism. and nowadays the theory of the quantum field challenges the perspective of the classical physics. this led to a different vision, as well as the necessity to renounce objectivist language. this also led to a new spirituality with elements borrowed from the eastern religions. the movement beyond modernity appropriates certain older cultural constructions. while this horizon offers an unprecedented possibility, it does not necessarily guarantee a productive dialogue between the eastern way of understanding spiritual experience and scientific investigation. it is easy to force a proximity between two dimensions of the human experience. these recent scientific perspectives on the nature of reality made it possible to reconsider the validity of spiritual experience, and of the texts of spiritual tradition as a guide to investigating theese inner levels of reality. if these alternative ways of evaluation can somehow meet the current scientific stadards of rigour, and precision, we can argue that spiritual discourse can also meet standards of rigour in the description of reality. but, are science and spirituality in their separate paths, similar ways for approaching what we call reality? are the mystic’s experience and the scientist’s experiment are both a kind of trial? can the mystic’s experience, be seen as akin to scientific experiment? spiritual experience as experiment? to argue for this possibility we can turn to the work of andré scrima. he provided a number of reasons for that considering spiritual experience is similar to research. first, spiritual experience is 6 prajñā vihāra the manifestation and the sign of a possibility, of a fundamental aspect for human condition. the human being is a being of experience. as scrima indicates, the term “experience” comes from greek, peira, meaning trial (its root seemingly identical to the one of the term pyr, fire), and the latin added prefix ex (starting from)2. experience would be then what comes out of a trial, knowledge by trial. scrima states that the spiritual experience must also represent an object of study because any experience of this kind is creative, founding values, a vision of the world, and a way of founding a cultural tradition. to pursue spiritual experience means to pursue a different actuality than the current one (“actuality” derives from act, from transposing into act, from what is being done: spiritual experience comprises a prophetic dimension as it actualizes what is our nearest into the furthest it allows us to understand the actuality of humanity). in the study on spiritual experience, we must emphasize the term experience. experience, understood as trial, represents the central aspect of any spirituality. but at the same time experience, in the form of experiment, is the essential component of science. one cannot speak about science as long as there is no experimental method. in this double reference to a form of trial, i consider that there exists an area of a real connection between the one who performs a spiritual experience and the scientist. they both put the reality to trial, on one way or another. but in fact, this recognition of this connection is difficult because we encounter difficulties of language. this is why, those thinkers of the who recognized such a common ground, were those who could understand the limitations of language each in thieir own historical period. they were exceptional people who did not fall in the traps of a more or less specialized language that a period or historical moment may impose: being able to understand the authentic ways in which such a complex reality may be experienced and passing over the imaginary and the ideologies of their time. i will provide an example of the overcoming of this language context by an appeal to the spiritual experience of symeon the new theologian, a byzantine author from the turn of the first millennium. here we can find an example of a trial of experience within mystical dan chițoiu 7 writings. symeon was exceptional because he expressed this experiential self-trial poetically. the way symeon spoke about god, and man’s experience of god, is a-typical if we relate his writings to the discursive canons from the beginning of the second millennium. that because symeon wanted to transmit to his contemporaries that they could also reach in their times something that they considered possible only in the time of the church fathers: a sudden transformation of experience that does not come through one’s expectation, and whose result is a deep inner change3. what characterizes symeon’s experience is an exceptional “exposure” to an unexpected experience, a sudden discover of a deep and very powerful reality. it was a double trial for symeon, because it involved the movement beyond daily experience to a different reality, and the movement beyond every inner obstacle in order to expose himself to this experience. as a matter of fact, this understanding of trial was not really new for the eastern tradition, what symeon really succeeds to do in his writings was to warn about the difference between an authentic life and one which was mislead. there are a number of texts describing this path, the most famous for the illustration of true experiential knowledge was isaac of nineveh, from the 7th century a.d. he described the state of rapture as the decisive moment in experiencing a different reality level, beyond space and time. it is hard to understand his affirmations about the state of rapture if we are not aware about his use of words like mind, intelligence, and soul. he often used the expressions like “the movements of mind” or “the movements of intelligence”: these expressions cannot be understood as descriptions of the mind’s functions. they are not descriptions of psychological processes, but of a dynamic access to different levels of reality, and to different levels of being4. the state of rapture cannot be understood as a kind of autosuggestion, but as an effective moment of radical discontinuity with time and space (the discoveries of quantum physics seem to provide scientific support for this possibility). so, all isaac’s affirmations about what precedes and what characterizes the state of rapture are based on an ontological perspective. in this way we can 8 prajñā vihāra explain distinctions between the different states of mind or more precisely, between the movements of mind. here is the ultimate trial, the experience of what is beyond the normal limits of the human capacity of knowledge. isaac’s description of attaining this ultimate experience clearly indicates the stages of an experiment: there are precise requirements in every stage, warnings about the risks of failure and there are criteria provided for verifying the correctness of an experience. the trial is the way of preparing yourself for the state of rapture, when you receive by grace the state of supra-knowledge. this is the fulfillment of the experiential road, and the attaining of this experience changes everything in the subject’s understanding. this is not just an exceptional discovery or an ultimate knowledge, it is more. patristic literature after isaac repeatedly indicates, the consequences are changes in the ontological status of man and world. in isaac’s text we encounter again the difficulties associated with this kind of experimental trial, we can see this also in symeon’s mystical poems, but the byzantine 13th century a.d. was a time when this difficulty was so acute that it was necessary to try to construct a language to provide a proper expression of mystical experience. this happened in constantinople, in a famous debate, opposing balaam, a supporter of intellectualist descriptions of the role of philosophical exercise, and gregory palamas, defender of philosophy as an existential inquiry and as a form of trial. gregory palamas affirmed that the ultimate knowledge (or knowledge of any kind) involves the whole man and not just his intellect, the act of knowledge has the shape of a relationship, expressing an anti-essentialism corresponding to anti-realist position of physics. palamas developed a realistic doctrine of supernatural knowledge, one given to the whole man not only to his mind; on this way offering a justification to the method of prayer. balaam’s criticism was that palamas identified supernatural with the immateriality. this kind of criticism is still assumed by many interpreters. but the “return to self” of the hesychast method was understood not just in the spiritual sense, but also bodily. palamas rehabilitated the status of matter, which the spiritualist tendencies influenced by hellenism tended to despise. he does this not dan chițoiu 9 simply to connect the spiritual to material but to connect the supernatural to created world. palamas opposes a supra-rational knowledge to balaam’s rationalism5. knowing god does not require certain exteriorization between subject of knowledge and the object known, but a union. all these affirmations constitute the ground of the palamite understanding of trial as the privileged form of experiential knowledge. a decisive term in explaining the non-essentialism of the hesychast doctrine was energeia, which gregory palamas takes over from aristotle. the doctrine of the immanent energies implies an intensely dynamic vision of the relationship between god and the world. palamas’ description of light is not the one which make use of rational concepts to express abstract realities, but is, on the contrary, the apophatic expression of an experience culminating in the beholding of god. if energeia or the divine light has this meaning, then what we call a natural (or physical) reality has a much-enlarged spiritual significance. physical reality is not a static, inert one, but matter plus energy: it is something that can be described as an active, living process where we find the presence and the intentionality of a person within this natural dimension. on the other hand, we can state that in this description the reality is constituted by experience in the most radical way: the ultimate reality is the human experience of the uncreated energies. in the hesychast controversy the hypothesis was disputed whether access to the ultimate reality is mediated by the hierarchy of beings or not. that is why there appears the syntagm “uncreated energies.” the experimentalism is important, and truth criteria was provided by the “appeal to experience”. this is for sure, the palamite expression for trial, and this appeal was several times invoked as the decisive criterion in answering to the balaam’s understanding of knowledge’s nature. the hesychasm is different from other spiritual practices, at least from the christian area, by the fact that it emphasizes experience in the shape of the experiment: it relies on a method, of a verifiable criteria, and validation for the pursuit of ultimate reality or, in the hesychast language, for the uncreated energies. we can find here an analogy between science and hesychasm regarding their pursuit 10 prajñā vihāra for the nature of ultimate reality. in these examples of mystical trial (a trial in the face of an unexpectedly revealed reality, as well as a self-trial in the face of a tremendous experience), one of the most difficult tasks was the finding of a proper expression for this radical experience. but the same difficulties appeared once again with the discoveries made in quantum physics at the beginning of the last century6. modern science began to pursue similar questions: how to find a proper language to express reality at the quantum level, or at the universe’s enormous scale? this explanatory crisis meant a conflict of the explanatory models that intended to be complete and truthful. the imposing of an epistemological model led to a pragmatic need to account for the researchers’ experience in investigating the microphysical reality. it imposed the use of a certain language. this became beneficial in communicating among researchers, but at the same time, an obstacle in investigating a reality more complex than a formalist model or an epistemological model. the risk is that an explanatory model will limit the way research can understand and investigate reality. the fact is that the period invoked above meant a new opening to an unanticipated reality, towards a reality evidence that proved a challenge to formalist and the epistemological model. conclusion today, more than ever, there is a need to move beyond the fragmentary knowledge caused by the disciplinary approach, and to integrate information coming from different research perspectives. without including spiritual experience as a radical form of trial between these perspectives, we will not be able to have a full and proper understanding of reality. but achieving such a goal involves a difficult task: to find a language common to the scientific experiment and to the spiritual experience. past history proved how difficult this is, but the study of this history can give us the clues for finding the right approach. spiritual experience can provide new kinds of solutions to the problems and crises of today, which is the reason for an increased interest in it. dan chițoiu 11 the eastern spiritual traditions, chinese, indian or eastern christian offers a very rich and complex inheritance that can be used in developing a more complex understanding of reality. the practice of spirituality, conducted by the rules and criteria provided by a spiritual tradition, can offer a genuine novelty and new perspectives on today’s global challenges. this happens because the spiritual practice is a way of discovering something nonrevealed, and this fact can be explained if we take in account that every human being has its own spiritual path. it is very important to stress that the history of spiritual practices is not a repetitive one, every historical epoch introduced something different and new. if philosophy is today understood as being not only a theoretical and speculative enterprise, but rather connected with practical experience, with a way of life, then spiritual practice is an important part of it. it is now obvious that we need an integrated and integral perspective on research, not only in science, but also concerning the spiritual strivings of the human being. endnotes 1 martin heidegger, “the question concerning technology” martin heidegger: basic writings from “being and time” (1927) to “the task of thinking” (1964), ed. david farrell krell (harper: san francisco, 2008), 315. 2 andré scrima, experiența spirituală și limbajele ei (the spiritual experience and its languages) (bucurești: humanitas, 2008), 198-199. 3 louis bouyer, “byzantine spirituality”, a history of christian spirituality, vol. ii, ed. louis bouyer (ny: the seabury press, 1968), 568. 4 isacco di niniveh, discorsi spirituali, trans. p. bettiolo (bose: qiqajon, 1985), 55. 5 john meyendorff, a study of gregory palamas. trans. george lawrence (ny: st. vladimir’s seminary press, 1998), 204. 6 bernard d’espagnat, on physics and philosophy (princeton: princeton university press), 2006, 14. 12 prajñā vihāra bibliography alfeyev, hilarion. st. symeon the new theologian and orthodox tradition. oxford: oxford university press, 2000. bouyer, louis. “byzantine spirituality”. a history of christian spirituality. vol. ii. ed. louis bouyer. ny: the seabury press, 1968. brooke, john hedley. science and religion. some historical perspectives. cambridge: cambridge up, 1991. cushing, james thomas. philosophical concepts in physics: the historical relation between philosophy and scientific theories. cambridge: press syndicate of the university of cambridge, 1998. d’espagnat, bernard. on physics and philosophy. princeton: princeton university press, 2006. isacco di ninive. discorsi spirituali. trans. p. bettiolo. bose: qiqajon, 1985. heidegger, martin. “the question concerning technology.” martin heidegger: basic writings from “being and time” (1927) to “the task of thinking” (1964). rev. ed. ed. david farrell krell. harper: san francisco, 2008. fanning, steven. mystics of the christian tradition. ny: routledge, 2006. mcguckin, john anthony. “symeon the new theologian’s hymns of divine eros: a neglected masterpiece of the christian mystical tradition”. spiritus: a journal of christian spirituality 5.2, 2005. meyendorff, john. a study of gregory palamas. trans. george lawrence. ny: st. vladimir’s seminary press, 1998. scrima, andré. antropologia apofatică (the apophatic anthropology). bucurești: humanitas, 2005. scrima, andré. experiența spirituală și limbajele ei (the spiritual experience and its languages). bucurești: humanitas, 2008. 03_(21-26) a philosopher defeat.pmd a philosopher’s defeat in world war ii: tanabe hajime’s conversion to shin buddhism in philosophy as metanoetics taro mochizuki osaka university, japan abstract in the last years of world war ii, tanabe hajime, started writing philosophy as metanoetics (the way of zange). he was inspired by shinran, a thirteenth-century japanese shin buddhist thinker and began to understand philosophy as metanoetics. “a philosophy that is not a philosophy”. philosophy that is not a philosophy cannot be undertaken by one’s own power, but must be acquired through other-power. hence, philosophizing implies the continual act of “practice-faith-witness” (gyo-shinsho) of the philosopher’s own metanoia, performed by other-power within himself. this paper argues that tanabe’s conversion became a creative deconstruction of modern philosophy caused by the cultural encounter occasioned by the war, which generated a dialectical effect in his thinking and eventually led to his conversion to shin buddhism. introduction in the last years of world war ii, the thinking of japanese intellectuals and the general public was severely repressed by techniques of thought control, despite the fact that the defeat of the japanese military was already evident in the eyes of the nation. during this time, tanabe hajime (1885-1962)-one of the founding members of the group of philosophers that has become known worldwide as the kyoto school, alongside nishida kitaro (1885-1945) and nishitani keiji (1900-1990)-started writing philosophy as metanoetics (the way of zange), which was finally prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 21-26 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 21 published after the defeat in 1946. to understand the general atmosphere of the defeated country during the period of allied occupation (1945-1947), let us refer to a statement by the former prime minister higashikuni. john w. dower translates higashikuni’s words in chapter 16 of his monumental work embracing defeat as follows: “the military, civilian officials, and the people as a whole must thoroughly self-reflect and repent. i believe that the collective repentance of the hundred million (ichioku sozange) is the first step in the resurrection of our country, the first step in bringing unity to our country”.1 as dower explains, “the concept of ‘repentance’ was placed at the center of public debate”2 back then, and this atmosphere involved both intellectuals and the general public. dower continues, asserting that tanabe’s work “seemed uncannily in tune with the ambiance of the defeated country”, although “tanabe did not develop these thoughts in reaction to the surrender”.3 in fact, tanabe, having been gnawed with guilt for being an incompetent thinker who could not resist militarism, elaborated his philosophy as the way of zange or metanoetics “when he was preparing his valedictory lectures on retiring from the prestigious chair in philosophy at kyoto imperial university”4 in the last few months of 1944. philosophy as metanoetics marked a milestone in the author’s philosophical itinerary, indicating his turn from western to eastern philosophy. this conversion was inspired by shinran, a thirteenth-century japanese shin buddhist thinker. tanabe interpreted shinran’s kyogyoshinsho as metanoetics, and denied philosophy as he had understood it before.5 for tanabe, metanoetics, “a philosophy that is not a philosophy”,6 is the only possible way of philosophizing. of course, as dower elaborates, there is a difference “between tanabe’s densely reasoned disquisition on zange, or repentance, and the government’s bromides on the same issue”.7 however, based on the fact that tanabe passionately reworked shinrans thought, is it correct to conclude-as john dower critically contends-that the position he reached therein was “intensely nationalistic” and that “he did all this in a way that emphasized the unique, even superior, traditional wisdom of japan?”8 that is the research question of this short paper. it should also be noted that tanabe qualifies the way of zange as “metanoetics”, not “the way of repentance”. the 22 prajna vihara-~ concept of metanoetics involves metanoia as well as metanoesis, and the latter goes beyond simple repentance. tanabe’s new philosophical position was not a justification provided for his conversion but a creative deconstruction of modern philosophy. concept of metanoetics so, what is metanoetics? tanabe coined the term for himself. he explains the need for the term: there is another reason for using a word derived from a western language, “metanoetics”, together with the japanese term “zangedo”. ‘metanoetics’ carries the sense of “meta-noetics”, denoting philologically a transcending of noetics, or in other words, a transcending of metaphysical philosophy based on contemplation or intellectual intuition achieved by the use of reason. “meta-noetics” means transcending the contemplative or speculative philosophy of intellectual intuition as it is usually found in the realms of thought based on reason. a very important characteristic by which metanoetics is distinguished from ordinary mysticism or philosophies of intellectual intuition can be observed here: it is not a philosophy founded on the intuitive reason of jiriki (self-power), but rather a philosophy founded on action-faith-witness (gyo-shin-sho) mediated by the transformative power of tariki (other-power).9 thus, the reason tanabe uses the word “metanoetics”: consists in the double-meaning of the word; that is, “metanoetics implies, on the one hand, a self-awakening through a ‘way’ of repentance, a ‘thinking-afterward’ (metanoia), and on the other, suggests a self-conscious transcending of intuition and contemplation (metanoesis). this is why zangedo can be termed a metanoetike or metanoetics”.10 in other words, tanabe’s metanoetics is not only “the way of repentance” but also transcendence of intuition and contemplation. taro mochizuki 23 from philosophy to non-philosophy: absolute transformation through other-power tanabe successively explores western philosophers such as st. augustine, eckhart, pascal, kant, schelling, hegel, kierkegaard, nietzsche and heidegger. finally, he summarizes the western systems of philosophy as thoughts of sages and intellectuals who would never abandon their philosophical viewpoint, and criticizing them as a “philosophy based on self-power”.11 tanabe, who had already realized his “own inability and impotence of any philosophy based on self-power”, had “no philosophy whatsoever on which to rely”.12 in this way, he left western thinkers and their philosophy, and moved toward shinran’s shin buddhism, where he discovered non-philosophy. philosophy that is not a philosophy cannot be undertaken by one’s own power (jiriki), but must be acquired through other-power (tariki). tanabe writes, “this other-power brings about a conversion in me that leads me in a new direction along a path hitherto unknown to me”.13 here, he encounters shinran’s kyogyoshinsho, a work that originates in thirteenth-century medieval japan, the main teaching of which consists in the trinity of action-faith-witness (gyo-shin-sho). actually, tanabe’s encounter with shinran during the wartime was a salvation for this despairing philosopher since it liberated him from his philosophical impasse and made him realize the philosophical importance of the teaching of shin buddhism. hence, for tanabe, philosophizing implies the continual act of “practice-faith-witness” (gyo-shin-sho) of his own metanoia, performed by other-power within himself. dialectic as metanoetics the originality of tanabe’s “philosophy that is not a philosophy” consists in his unique definition of the dialectic as the action of metanoesis. the dialectic that tanabe presents as metanoetics is neither hegelian nor marxist, that is, neither idealistic nor materialistic. it is one’s metanoetic action mediated by the activity of the other-power. in chapter 6 of his philosophy as metanoetics, tanabe describes the difference between the 24 prajna vihara-~ dialectic in western tradition and the one that he understands as metanoetics: our dialectic ..., in contrast [to pascal’s notion of transformation or conversion] is based on the negative mediation of metanoesis which qualifies it as authentic dialectics: absolute negativity functioning through negative mediation as the mediation of absolute nothingness. this is the difference between pascal’s conversion of thought and what we have been speaking of as conversion through the action of metanoesis.14 explaining tanabe’s dialectic in detail is not the purpose of this paper, however. but we can now address dower’s assertion, that tanabe’s position was a regression to nationalism, and whether he utilized shinran’s shin buddhism in order to justify his position and characterize traditional japanese buddhist wisdom as superior to western philosophy. the defeat of his nation in war was simultaneously tanabe’s personal defeat as a philosopher. tanabe’s sincere commitment to his intellectual responsibility brought him to the point of self-denial. it was a conversion, but it was not, as dower asserts, a simple regression to the traditional wisdom of shin buddhism or a form of nationalism. rather, it was a creative, dialectical deconstruction of modern philosophy by way of denying what he had learned from western philosophy. what he achieved was the transformation of philosophy to non-philosophy. he transcended the limits of reason so philosophy could become metanoetics, a process performed by the other-power within himself. endnotes 1john w. dower, embracing defeat: japan in the wake of world war ii, w.w. norton & company, new york and london, 1999, p.496. 2ibid. 3ibid., p.497. 4ibid. 5“as for myself, i no longer share this attitude [i.e. the self-awareness of the autonomy of reason] because i can no longer accept its underlying ideal of philosophy. the experience of my past philosophical life has brought me to realize my own inability and the impotence of any philosophy based on self-power. i have now no philosophy whatsoever on which to rely. i now find that the rational philosophy from taro mochizuki 25 which i had always been able to extract an understanding of the rational forces permeating history, and through which i could deal rigorously with reality without going astray, has left me”. philosophy as metanoetics, trans. takeuchi et al., university of california press, 1986, pp.25-26. all the texts from tanabe’s work are quoted from this translation. 6philosophy as metanoetics, trans. takeuchi, op. cit. preface. 7dower, op. cit., p.497.? 8ibid. 9philosophy as metanoetics, trans. takeuchi, op. cit., pp.2-3. 10ibid., p.3. 11ibid., pp.25-26. 12ibid. 13ibid., preface. 14ibid., p.198. 26 prajna vihara-~ prajnaviharav20n1.indd rainier a. ibana 41 buddhist and kantian enlightenment projects1 rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract the buddha taught in the kalama sutta that one must abide by religious teachings only “when you yourselves know” the consequences of these doctrines in everyday life. this principle is reinforced and corroborated by stories that surround the life of the buddha. not unlike kant’s essay, “what is enlightenment?,” the kalama sutta also aims to liberate humans from distorted perceptions filtered by aristocratic social contexts and naïve world views. kant’s revolutionary project, however, makes a distinction between the public and private uses of reason and applies the enlightenment doctrine to the former while allowing for temporary compromises in the latter. the buddha, on the other hand, is not known to make such a distinction and emphasizes personal emancipation from the illusions of the transitory world. the buddha’s awakening to the experience of suffering, however, goes further than kant’s enlightenment project to include non-human beings within the ambit of its objects of compassion and can therefore more adequately address ecological concerns. prajñā vihāra vol. 20 no. 1 january to june 2019, 41-51 © 2000 by assumption university press 42 prajñā vihāra introduction when the kalamas asked the buddha about preachers that praise their own teachings while reviling the doctrines of others, the buddha replied: “kalamas, when you yourselves know: ‘these things are bad; these things are blameable; these things are censured by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to harm and ill,’ abandon them .... “kalamas, when you yourselves know: ‘these things are good; these things are not blameable; these things are praised by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to benefit and happiness,’ enter on and abide in them.”2 for the buddha, the criterion for both good and bad is not a transcendental principle from above nor a fundamental notion from below nor admonitions made by others from the left or the right; but a reflexive insight from within: “when you yourselves know”. opinions, beliefs and other knowledge claims must be verified or falsified, by the knower himself or herself. it is not enough to hear about or merely restate knowledge claims. one must be able to confirm the truth of such claims. the buddha then asked the kalamas, in a dialogical fashion, whether the absence or presence of greed, hate and delusions appear to benefit or harm humans. his listeners then realized, after being provided with examples, that the former leads to benefit while the latter leads to harm. the buddha’s method of teaching was aimed at the enlightenment of his students by demonstrating the veracity or fallibility of knowledge claims in terms of their practical consequences to everyday life. buddha stories when a woman asked the buddha to resurrect her dead child, the buddha simply asked her to provide him a mustard seed from a household that has never experienced death. the woman then tried in vain to find a house where no one has ever died and realized that she is not the only one rainier a. ibana 43 who has lost a loved one. she then buried her son immediately, returned to the buddha, and attentively listened to his teachings. on another occasion, his followers praised him for being the greatest of all teachers. the buddha merely responded by asking if they have actually met all the great teachers in the world. since they have not done so, the buddha concluded that their flattery has no basis. he then advised them that if they find the teachings of other teachers to be helpful, then they must practice them. he compared his teachings to what appears to be precious gold that must be tested before being bought. his final reminders to his disciples shortly before his death were that “craving and desire are the cause of all unhappiness. everything sooner or later must change, so do not become attached to anything. instead devote yourself to clearing your mind and finding true, lasting happiness.”3 these testimonials summarize the buddhist vision of life. for the buddha, life is imbued with suffering; suffering is due to attachments, the cessation of suffering is attainable, and happiness can be achieved by practicing the right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. awakening and enlightenment the importance of right mindfulness and right concentration are affirmed in the opening lines of the dhammapada: “all that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. if a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage.... if a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him.”4 the task of thinking, as described in the kalama sutta, is to be mindful and not to be easily swayed by: 44 prajñā vihāra “what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; nor upon rumor; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon surmise; nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a bias towards a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another’s seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, ‘the monk is our teacher.’”5 one must think for oneself on this point, the kalama sutta is echoed across four thousand years later in königsburg, prussia, when kant lamented in his essay about enlightenment that, “it is so convenient to be immature! if i have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me, and so on, i need not make any efforts at all. i need not think, so long as i can pay; others will soon enough take the tiresome job over for me.”6 kant, like the buddha, dares us to think on our own: “sapere aude! have courage to use your own understanding!” (we 1)7 such audacity is necessary within social contexts wherein independent and critical thinking threatens the “guardians” of the status quo. kant warned about “the shackles of permanent immaturity” that forbid the public to argue and to merely obey. these shackles are not mere external social sanctions but also internalized individual and social habits, rules and formulas that turn thinking into mechanical forms of reasoning. buddha did encounter such limitations while he lived a sheltered life in his father’s kingdom and when the other monks who were expecting him to live an ascetic life abandoned him when he followed the middle path of moderation between pleasure and pain.8 kant did recognize, like the buddha, that emancipation from non-thinking can be achieved by exceptional individuals who manage to cultivate their own minds. he was more interested, however, in the rainier a. ibana 45 enlightenment of the general public which can be achieved when freedom of thought is allowed to flourish in the public sphere where the best argument can emerge and provide direction for social development. kant himself demonstrated the public character of his philosophical thinking by publishing his essay about the enlightenment as part of a public debate in a monthly magazine in berlin in 1783. the buddha, in a way, had a similar experience of emancipation when he took flight from his father’s kingdom in his search for truth and wisdom. when another king offered him residency as an adviser, siddhartha politely replied that he is not interested in wealth or power, only in the path to truth.9 kant rejoins the buddha on this point when he wrote that “even ceasar must follow the rules of grammar.”10 both of them overcame the ethics of their cultural milieu by aspiring for postconventional principles and by sharing their ideas to the general public. unlike kant’s public use of reason, however, the path towards buddhist awakening is not merely achieved by public debate and discourse but also by private meditative exercises wherein stray thoughts are reinedin by meditators on their way towards the path of emancipation. for the buddha “the greatest of victories is the victory over oneself; and neither the gods in heaven nor the demons down below can turn into defeat the victory of such a man.”11 the buddha offered this approach to salvation for all men, including his own father and family members, and all others in whatever station in life that they may find themselves to be. he offered a more democratic interpretation of the caste system in accordance with the nobility of the experience of treading the path towards nirvana. for the buddha, nobility is defined by the quality of life lived according to the eight-fold path mentioned above. kant, on the other hand, made a temporary exception from the task of enlightenment within the contexts of the private use of reason for those who occupy social functions or offices such as soldiers, tax payers, pastors and priests, who must obey first before they question the duly constituted authorities. such conventional duties, however, cannot 46 prajñā vihāra be held “for all time” because it will preclude the improvement of future generations who might discover better modes of social arrangements for themselves. as kant puts it, a man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is to violate and trample man’s divine rights underfoot.12 for kant, the process of enlightenment is conditioned by the freedom to think and to express oneself in an age of enlightenment. the social conditions of his time, however, were not ripe for the enlightenment of all its citizens. enlightenment is therefore a process that must be achieved historically by creating the necessary conditions for freedom, especially the freedoms of thought and expression. the buddha, moreover, took a step further with regards to the project of emancipation by including all living beings and not only humans, in so far as the former also experience suffering. a tree, for example, could be experienced for itself and for others, as a living organism that serves as dwelling for birds and insects instead of merely cutting it down to build a palace. the buddha once narrated that the spirit of a tree appeared in a dream before a king who wanted to cut it. the tree pleaded that if it must be cut down, it must be cut down piece by piece, in order to avoid harming the smaller trees and animals that are sheltered underneath its shade.13 kant, on the other hand, did not think that humans have reciprocal duties to non-humans because humanity, as the kingdom of ends, is the goal of morality and lower beings are mere means or instruments towards that end. in so far as duties towards humans are concerned, however, they both believe that self-cultivation and education for all is a more lasting contribution towards the human development. as kant puts it, rainier a. ibana 47 ”perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking; instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.”14 the kantian project is both an epistemological and a political revolutionary project because it subsumed and overturned the naïve categories of empirical thinking about objects in the world as categories of the human mind. he announced the advent of modernity with his constructivist epistemology that emboldened humans to control and dominate the natural world. it also paved the way towards a progressive vision history that installs humanity as the end of development. in the field of ethical theory, it introduced the distinction between hypothetical and moral imperatives, or in the language of habermas, the foremost contemporary kantian philosopher, it established the difference between instrumental ways of calculating the world and communicative forms of rationality. this goal is achieved not merely by shifting attitudes towards the world but by means of a structural transformation of the public sphere in terms of human language, action and political power.15 private forms of reasoning is subservient to hypothetical considerations while one is obliged to speak one’s real thoughts in the public sphere. the buddha’s project likewise attempts to achieve enlightenment by becoming aware of prejudices and biases as one tries to experience the unconditioned word of nirvana in this world and beyond. the critical difference between kantian enlightenment and the buddha’s awakening, however, lies in what they claim to be the ultimate ground of reality. on the one hand, the notion of enlightenment for kant is conditioned by freedom from external sanctions such as conventional duties to one’s community. the keystone that tests reality for the buddha, on the other hand, requires a mindful attitude towards experiences that are achieved through meditation and right behaviour. 48 prajñā vihāra nirvana in the modern world for buddhists, the mind must be emancipated from biases and prejudices – that would include kantian categories – in order to enable the knower to come to terms with that which is really real. such an experience need not be devoid of content. thich nhat hanh, a contemporary advocate of buddhist mindfulness, offers an example of how to obtain happiness by awakening to ordinary experiences: “when i am mindful, i enjoy more my tea,” says thay as he pours himself a cup and slowly savours the first sip. “i am fully present in the here and now, not carried away by my sorrow, my fear, my projects, the past and the future. i am here available to life.16 modern human beings are unfortunately over-crowded by many objects around them and are preoccupied with a flurry of activities that do not provide the space nor make time to exercise acts of mindfulness for its own sake. even meditation and taking a nap are being promoted today for the sake of productivity and efficiency in the work place. people live for the sake of projects without appreciating the reality of other people and the beauty of objects that are given to them here and now. in a sense, this is also what kant meant by his enlightenment project – to dare to think in one’s own terms and not be shackled by social and authoritarian figures who think they know better and believe that they should decide for others. for kant the individual person, and no one else, who must know and eventually decide on what must be done. in this sense, both the buddha and kant defended the irreducible dignity of the individual human person as responsible agent whose decisions are made on the basis of their own insights. one of the main differences between them, as mentioned earlier, is that kant confined himself to the duties that humans must have towards fellow humans while the buddha extended human duties to sub-humans, especially those who are suffering. kant was aware of the structural differentiation of the modern world that demands different forms of rainier a. ibana 49 discourses whereas the buddha believes that self-awareness is a necessary precondition to other forms of discourses and that authentic discourses must not be confused with reality’s appearances such as the pleasure or pain that experiences may happen to contain. when mara, the legendary temptress, challenged the buddha to provide a witness to the possible success of his project, the latter pointed to and touched the ground, the earth, as the ultimate testament to his claims.17 the earth as ground of philosophical claims is significant for the modern world not only because of today’s ecological concerns but also because it awakens humans to the broader context of other beings that share their existence. even the seemingly inert rock has been found out to be the source of minerals that feed plants that eventually support life. (ls 1) one of the first inspirations of siddhartha for his search of the path towards emancipation was when he realized the misery of insects, birds and farm animals beneath the beauty and grandeur of nature.18 conclusion both the buddha and kant dare human beings to think not only on their own but also to become aware and critical of the obstructions that block the processes of thinking. for the buddha, the ultimate criterion of awakened thinking is a life lived according to the eight fold path while for kant enlightenment is conditioned by the unshackled freedom to think and to act on one’s own thoughts. both of them require that thinking and acting be emancipated from worldly biases and prejudices. with constant practice, profound thoughts are then carried on in the affairs of everyday life. mindfulness views the end of meditation sessions as mere change of postures from the special moments of contemplation. although this is an arduous project, buddhists believe that it can be achieved. the buddha testified: “the earth is my witness.” kant’s critiques, on the other hand, were made in order to eventually make room for faith. the process may be slow and tedious; but it can be reached, gradually if one just keeps on striving towards enlightenment in the practices of everyday life. 50 prajñā vihāra endnotes 1 the author was inspired to write this paper from his facebook conversations with chanreoun pa, noel valencia, susan tamondong, francisco castro and zosimo lee. the paper was eventually read during the asian association of christian philosophers held at ateneo de manila university in april 2013. 2 kalama sutta: the buddha’s charter of free inquiry translated from the pali by ven. soma thera https://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/kalama1.htm (accessed on may 28, 2019) 3 the life of the buddha (new delhi: hemkunt press, 1978), 115. 4 “the dhammapada,” trans. f. max mueller, the world’s greatest classics: sacred books of the east (new york: the colonial press, 1990) 115-127. reprinted in primaryb texts in moral philosophy: the philippine collection, ed by rainier a. ibana and angelli f. tugado (pasig: philippine commission on higher education, 1998), 2. 5 ibid. 6 immanuel kant, “what is enlightenment?” http://www.columbia.edu/ acis/ets/ccread/etscc/kant.html (accessed on may 28, 2019) 7 ibid. 8 the story of the buddha, 73-76 9 the story of the buddha, ibid., 70. 10 kant, what is enlightenment? 11 dhammapada 8.103-105, ibid, 10-11 12 kant, “what is enlightenment?” 13 ibid., 110-112. 14 “what is enlightenment,” ibid. 15 juergen habermas, knowlege and human interests, (boston: the beacon press), 313. 16 thich nhat hanh, “beyond environment: falling back in love with mother earth” in philosophy manual: a south-south perspective (paris: unesco, 2014), 168. 17 the story of buddha, 81-82 18 ibid., 56-61. rainier a. ibana 51 bibliography habermas, juergen, knowlege and human interests (boston: the beacon press). kant, immanuel, “what is enlightenment?” http://english.ncu.edu. tw/stewart/teaching/library/readingsec/what%20is%20 enlightenment.pdf (accessed on march 28, 2013) the story of the buddha (new delhi: hemkunt press, 1978). thich nhat hanh, “beyond environment: falling back in love with mother earth” in philosophy manual: a south-south perspective (paris: unesco, 2014), 168. prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 1 vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 1-18 © 2000 by assumption university press holbein’s ambassadors: on the technological abstraction and concretization of death anders kølle1 abstract although hans holbein´s painting , 1533, has been the object of much interest and research, the remains largely unexplored, or has played only a peripheral role in the investigations. in this article an attempt is represented in the painting to the artistic practice and strategies of hans holbein, especially in the creation of a highly abstract and intellectual pictorial space. drawing on the writings of martin heidegger and norman bryson, in relation to the impact of the sciences in early modernity and the production of new perspectives on the dimensions of space and time. keywords: 2 much has been written about hans holbein´s famous painting from 1533.2 so much, in fact, that one may doubt whether there could possibly be anything more to say. like velázquez has been the object of intense interest from art historians, art theorists, philosophers and psychoanalysts that now it seems impossible to look at the painting uncolored by these readings. the work is, in fact, so saturated with interpretation that the albertian window seems shut in multiple layers of discourse and speech – unable to free itself from what has already been noticed, described and explained. most famous among these readings is undoubtedly jacques lacan´s analysis of the painting as given in his in which the painting´s notoriously distorted skull, its anamorphosis, serves as a prime example of lacan´s theory of the gaze.3 the skull, which escapes both the two ambassadors looking out on 3 gaze, and subject and desire, just as foucault´s equally famous analysis of served foucault´s greater narrative and philosophical investigations.4 after such forceful and, indeed, brilliant interpretations it seems that the experience of the painting is somewhat exhausted. one is convinced that what one sees cannot be anything but an illustration of an outside theory, eliminating the uncertainties and continued mysteries of of the work has been decoded, the stage, this seemingly exhausted ground, that something still arises from the work and strikes one as odd, that some element, some aspect, some detail of the work continues to be unwilling to cooperate with a singular interpretation. one is then faced with a choice: either to dismiss this detail as peripheral and unimportant, or to follow where this lack of coherence and compliance may lead. let´s be clear: is in several ways an odd painting, occupying an odd and puzzling place within the larger production and artistic oeuvre of hans holbein. this oddity derives not only from the strange and unsettling anamorphic skull, but emanates from the entire composition and the way the two ambassadors are depicted, displaying all their costly and awe-inspiring instruments of culture, science and knowledge. we seem them, facing us, one as proud and colorful as a peacock, the other seemingly less assured and noticeably more reserved. thanks to historical research we are able to name the two men and state their proper identities. on the left, dressed in ermine and silk, we see jean de dinteville, the ambassador to england from the french court french interests in england and the link between the two royal courts. 4 the very word “ambassador” stems from the latin “am´bactus” meaning servant and this is surely how we are supposed to see them, as two noble servants of higher, political and royal aims. yet, looking at the painting, it is hard to escape the impression that something more than the two men´s identities are at stake and that their portrait is not the only, perhaps not even the primary, reason and motivation for the painting – something that hans holbein more than hints at in several ways. compositionally one may wonder why such prominence is given to the costly objects and instruments so that they, rather than the ambassadors, are placed in the center of the painting. leaning on the table between them, resting their giving almost the impression of a group portrait, yet one which has no central human character. why, in a portrait, would one give so much attention to the things instead of the men, the inert instead of the living, if not to make a point, if not to say something that only these objects in their utter muteness can say? what is, in other words, the aim of this still life placed at the heart of the portrait and what is it supposed to represent? surely the question of representation may have more than one layer of meaning 5 in a painting titled . we are from the start led into a and needs. in a strict, utilitarian sense, the ambassadors are themselves, of course, nothing but instruments to the french court and king they would perhaps explain their compositional alignment. but the question of representation may also have another meaning to which the painting itself serves as a representative, an ambassador to hans holbein´s artistic agenda, demonstrating and articulating something uniquely on his behalf. in his book of still life paintings in the following way: still life is in a sense the great anti-albertian genre. what it opposes is the idea of the canvas as a window on the world, leading to a distant view. although its techniques assume a mastery of perspective… the vanishing point is always absent. instead of plunging vistas, arcades, horizons and the sovereign prospect of the eye, it proposes a much closer space, centered on the body. hence one of the technical curiosities of the genre, its disinclination to portray the world beyond the far edge of the table. instead coinciding with a real wall, but no less persuasively it is the outer boundary in medieval maps of the world. that further zone beyond the table´s edge must be suppressed if still life is to create its principal spatial value: nearness.5 is no distant view, no horizons, no vanishing point, no portrayal of a deep and alluring world beyond the objects. any desire or attempt to look beyond is blocked by a green, richly ornamented curtain. with no routes 6 ambassador, to the formal characteristics of still life painting. whether we look at apples and grapes or books and globes the fundamental principles remain unaltered. but despite these common traits, these important shared characteristics, there remains, however, one aspect in which holbein´s gaze prohibits any escape into distant horizons and vistas, it seems questionable whether this curtailment proposes, as bryson says, “a much closer space, centered on the body.”6 the quality of nearness normally achieved by the suppression of depth appears conspicuously absent in holbein´s painting: even if the objects are not distant and remote, they are hardly reachable and graspable either. the orientation towards the body, the hand, the tactile, the grasp so important in still life painting is far from obvious here. it appears instead that we have lost depth without being compensated in any way: the objects remain out of reach, close enough to be seen but not close enough to be touched – neither distant nor truly near. they are, in other words, kept pictorially and compositionally at arm´s length. this impression of distance, of unreachability becomes even more there is a quadrant, a celestial globe, a shepherd´s dial, a torquetum, and a polyhedral sundial. knowledge concerning these objects is reserved only for experts. so the distance between viewer and object is not strictly spatial but cognitive and intellectual as well. if the instruments are usable only by an elite few then these instruments would be precisely what separates the elite from the masses, distinguishes the learned from the unlearned. it is by these instruments that a line is drawn between the ones who know and the ones who don´t, placing the ambassadors themselves on the enlightened side of this divide, endowing them with an aura of wisdom, making them, in a sense, as distant and unreachable as the instruments themselves. of course time is a crucial factor in this distancing as well, 7 making the objects appear ever more mysterious, unfamiliar and remote deliberately creating a room of uncertainty and unfamiliarity, subject not only to spatial but temporal movements and alterations. the homeliness and stability commonly associated with the genre of a still life retreats. whereas vases, plates, glasses and knifes establishes a wholly familiar in the words and analysis of norman bryson: 8 the familiar things shown in still life are all material descendants of what george kubler has called ´prime objects´, the prototypes of the series of artefacts called plates, bowls, jars and the rest. yet even when a series is comparatively recent in western history (forks, tankards, deep plates) such prime objects have long since disappeared without trace into the boundless mass of subsequent replicas. while complicated tools and technologies are subject to rapid change, simple utensils obey a slow, almost geological rhythm. in stratum upon stratum the archaeology of western sites unearth endless variations on the same basic ideas, of storage jar, oil-lamp, beaker, vase. such objects belong to the , time which has a beginning but no end… for as long as such forms are able to do the job, they propose that human life can best be organized by submitting the requirements of the present to the solutions of the past and by subordinating the impulse of invention to the authority of cultural formulae. all such objects are tied to actions repeated by every user in the same way, across more a matter of repetition than of personal originality or invention. as kubler puts it: ́ the cage of routine binds (the individual) so closely that it is almost impossible for him to stumble into an inventive act: he is like a tightrope walker whom vast forces so bind to the cable that he cannot fall, even if he wishes, into the unknown.´7 reading these lines, it is easy to understand why the genre of still life would appeal so strongly to heidegger. the still life connects us with the lifeworld of everyday human existence, and is preeminently suited to show our natural and shared rootedness in the world. we shall return to heidegger and his phenomenology later. for now, let´s see how bryson´s thoughts may bring new aspects of holbein´s painting into play. if it is true the slow, geological rhythm of prime objects, then this faster rhythm, this pacing and unsettling rhythm would be what disturbs and threatens the 9 order and authority of tradition, rendering the forms, ideas and solutions of the past no longer suited to meet the requirements of the present. perhaps we may even give this rhythm a name and call it modernity. it is this fast rhythm, this beating techno-rhythm, that will soon after holbein, soon after was painted, in the 1570s and 80s, bring montaigne to question the foundations of human knowledge and existence with a new and modernly shaped sensibility,8 and, in the century thereafter, lead descartes to his radical and all-encompassing doubt and skepticism about man´s place in the world.9 to a gradual dissolution of everything previously regarded as certain and immune to the questioning of man – a development that, as we know, will ultimately lead to karl marx´s famous dictum: “all that is solid melts into air.” (if ever there was a powerful vanitas image this most surely be it!). the ambassadors are men, inhabitants of a world, with all the pride as well as unease that modernity inevitably brings. surely the bishop, george de selve, the man of religion, the man of the church, is seemingly less assured, less at home in this setting than his friend, the ambassador and landowner, jean de dinteville, and much literature has been devoted to exploring precisely the religious elements of the painting. open hymnbook, here depicted in martin luther´s translation have led to . this is a period of wars and rivalries brought on by the reformation, between the kings of england and france as well as within the french church itself. such an interpretation accords – or rather – perfectly with the broken string of the lute on the lower shelf as a well-known and easily discernable symbol of disharmony. religious instability and upheaval would, in other words, be the underlying theme and hidden motif of the painting, bringing discord and spreading disharmony to the entire reading and perception of the image. but although this interpretation pays much it does not, however, preclude a more modernistic oriented reading. 10 whether hans holbein hints at religious rivalry or not, the fact remains that religion is no longer the unifying and stabilizing force it once was and that its ability to serve as a secure, unquestioned and unquestionable foundation has been irretrievably lost. also the focus on religion leads therefore, albeit by other ways, to a similar result, leaving the ambassadors in a space of uncertainty and unrest, unanchored by the force of beliefs and traditions. a closer look at the compositional space of is needed. as already stated, this space is characterized by its lack of depth in the background. we also claimed that this suppression of depth did not, as is otherwise typical for the still life genre, give rise to a sense and quality of nearness but that both the objects and the ambassadors remain ungraspable, out of reach. so what is this space then, neither close nor far, neither deep nor shallow? what can we actually say about it? it has 11 been suggested that what we see is in fact the interior of a church, perhaps not simply show us the church? why block our access to it? why not present it to us in all its greatness and splendor? surely the curtailment and the uncertainty produced most serve some particular, artistic purpose, theatrical and unreal, describing no recognizable worldly location. perhaps then, all we can say about the space is this: it is an space in the it is a severed space, an unconnected space, untied from the demands unable to settle and rest anywhere. 12 yet, this lack of foundation is not itself entirely unfounded but and intellectual abstraction? do they not lead to a highly abstract view on the space and world that is ours – a space of astronomy, geometry and mathematics, a space of concepts and ideas instead of bodily and sensory dimensions? we are confronted with a world that is no longer truly inhabitable for anything but thought. a space reserved for only the most specialized or sophisticated forms of knowledge. no wonder our bodily and physical presence. and it is precisely from this abstract perspective that the base conditions of life, of space and time in their concrete dimensions, become themselves an abstraction. life as well as death are impossible to see as anything but a blur, an amorphous and unreal stain hovering indecisively before us. in the by montaigne we read the following on the consequences of man´s divorce from nature: we have abandoned nature and want to teach her own lessons to her who used to guide us so happily and surely. and yet such traces of her teachings and whatever little of her image remain by favour of ignorance stamped on the life of that crowd of uncultured country-folk, erudition is compelled to go and beg from them, day in, day out, in order to supply patterns of constancy, simplicity and tranquility for its own pupils… nature, being equal and common to all, cannot fail to be just. but since we have unslaved ourselves from nature´s law and given ourselves over to the vagrant liberty of our mental perceptions, the least we can do is to help ourselves by making them incline towards the most agreeable direction.10 today, almost 500 years later, it is easy to see how man´s divorce from nature has had dire consequences, not only disturbing our tranquility 13 but threatening our very existence. surely, it is exactly “the vagrant liberty of our mental perceptions,” our ability to -stract ourselves from nature´s law that is today leading us into chaos, confronting us with the terrible prospects of nature´s total breakdown. interestingly, our attempts to address this problem, are not sought through reconnection with nature but through further distancing and abstraction. we place all our hope in the sciences, in the continued development of technology to provide the solutions to our ecological problems. our mastery of nature is not to be yet, it would be a mistake to think that all technology and all our tools bryson following kubler noted a distinction must be made between our and material needs.11 what characterizes the instruments displayed in is precisely their disavowal of any earthly connection and of any linkage to the material conditions of human life. what hymn books, globes, and sundials have in common, what both religious objects and between “res cogitans” and “res extensa”, between the “thinking thing” and the “extended thing”, between mind and matter.12 but this split also entails another split which will be of no less philosophical and historical consequence and which not least karl marx will explore.13 the situation when simple things which connect us to our concrete environment and are deemed low and unworthy, and abstract things, the objects of science, religion, and art are valued as the pinnacle of culture, as the very emblems of human capability, intelligence and excellence. this gulf between 14 with access to sophisticated tools and technologies. you are not what you eat, but the tools and instruments you use! it is from this special relation between “higher things” and power that we may fully appreciate the superiority of the ambassadors and the way their instruments both lift and adorn them, placing them within the exclusive sphere of a remote, untouchable elite. and it is also from this insight that we may come to understand why death, in the form of the skull, must appear so strange and distorted. it is marginalized. here in the painting, death has no natural place, no obvious location in the higher space of elitist power and transcendence. it can therefore only appear unfamiliar and estranged, hovering indecisively above the ground, equally unsettled and unsettling. it is what we may call the “unheimlich” in the freudian sense of the word meaning the return of something repressed. in order to see it, to really comprehend it, one must move to the side, away from the frontal gaze and abstract space of higher and pure intellectual power. but this movement, we must stress, is not, at least primarily, an inner movement of thought but a concrete, bodily movement, returning us thus to the concrete and physical dimensions of human existence. only here is death visible, only here does it take on form, and become a concrete image instead of a distant, abstract mirage. 15 it is interesting to contrast this anamorphic image of death with by van gogh in looking at a painting of a pair of shoes, what heidegger calls “an example of a common sort of equipment”14, he presents us with the following picture: from the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the heaviness of the shoes there is accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform lie the dampness and richness of the soil… this equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, and trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.15 for heidegger, death is there, in the painting, even though it is not actually depicted.16 what interests us here is that in describing a “common of death surrounding the shivering woman. death is thus imagined, drawn forth in a painting in which it is actually absent – which would be the very reverse of where death is there, depicted in the scene, yet not visible (to the ambassadors). this contrast echoes the opposition example of the shoes are almost emblematic in their pointing towards the raw and fragile reality of human existence. there is no room for any abstraction here – no digressions, no detours – from the basic conditions in heidegger´s unambiguous analysis. it is a pure scene, undisturbed by disruptive and competing interpretations. death has only one expression, one image and that image comes from the earth, the very foundation of human existence. in fact, heidegger is himself playing the role of an ambassador here, speaking on behalf of the earth, negotiating a peace 16 between man and nature, between subject and object, mind and matter. knowing the role that death plays in his larger philosophical project.17 and for the very possibility of leading an authentic life, it is hardly surprising that death shows up undisguised. what is truly “unheimlich” to heidegger and thoroughly repressed is any indication of modernity, of that quicker and distressing rhythm of modern life with its constant challenging of the traditions and routines of the past. this repression appears all the more conspicuous given that heidegger is in fact looking at a modern painting, van gogh´s unmistakable preference for rural motifs and settings. we may wonder on which side hans holbein should be placed in this strife between immanence and transcendence, between the basic world an often repeated interpretation of announces, “see they too shall end in the grave.” such a straightforward explanation would thus place holbein in opposition to the ambassadors, ridiculing these serious, self-important and self-aggrandizing men. however, if this simple “memento mori,” this straightforward moral, was all holbein wanted to show, one should think that a normally rendered skull or even just a complicate matters further? perhaps we may think of the act of painting itself as playing a double role here, giving us two perspectives at once: to paint obviously means to ab-stract something, to separate and enframe something and thus cut it out from the temporal and spatial continuum of which it is a part. but to paint also means to specify something, to particularize and materialize, to render and express by material means. abstraction and concretization, transcendence and immanence exist side by side, each equally dependent on each other in the artistic practice. let´s be reminded that death seen in the form of a skull is still an abstraction, and that abstraction can only be expressed in a concrete, material form. the artist must constantly negotiate between the two, making him the representative, indeed the ambassador of these dual forces, moving both 17 his body and his mind. if holbein is therefore to be placed on any side, we will suggest, it is on the side of painting itself – this both homely and foreign ground where everything that is rendered is constantly renewing what is both recognizable and estranging in art. endnotes 1 anders kølle teaches at the international college, khon kaen university, thailand. email: anderskolle16@gmail.com. 2 hans holbein: 1533. national gallery, london. . www. https://www.mutualart.com/article/decoding-the-symbolism-in-holbeins--the/84ee3aa0a2fbbb48. accessed 3 dec. 2022. 3 jacques lacan: (new york: w.w. norton & company, 1998). 4 michel foucault: (new york: vintage, 2012). 5 norman bryson: (london: reaktion books ltd, 1990), 71. 6 ibid., 71 7 ibid., 138-139 8 michel de montaigne: (london: penguin classics, 1993). 9 rené descartes: (indianapolis: hackett publishing company, 1993). 10 cited in andrew bowie: (oxford: oxford university press, 2022), 24 11 norman bryson: (london: reaktion books ltd, 1990), 138-139. 12 rené descartes: (indianapolis: hackett publishing company, 1993) 13 karl marx: (london: penguin classics, 2015) 14 martin heidegger: (new york: harpercollins publishers, 2001), 32. 15 ibid., 33. 16 never mind the controversy between heidegger and meyer schapiro as to who these shoes actually belong to. see for example the discussion of jacques derrida: (chicago: university of chicago press, 2017). 17 martin heidegger: (new york: harpercollins publishers, 2008). 18 references alberti, leon battista: . cambridge: cambridge university press, 2013 arasse, daniel. . new jersey: princeton university press, 1996 bowie, andrew. . oxford: oxford university press, 2022 bryson, norman. . london: reaktion books ltd, 1990 bryson, norman. . connecticut: yale university press, 1986 derrida, jacques. . chicago: university of chicago press, 2017 descartes, rené: . indianapolis: hackett publishing company, 1993 foucault, michel. . new york: vintage, 2012 heidegger, martin. . new york: harpercollins publishers, 2001 heidegger, martin. . new york: harpercollins publishers, 2013 heidegger, martin. . new york: harpercollins publishers, 2008 lacan, jacques. . new york: w.w. norton & company, 1998 marx, karl. . london: penguin classics, 2015 montaigne, michel de. . london: penguin classics, 1993 06_(113-124) taoist ecology.pmd taoist ecology in the context of the global climate crisis fan guangchun shaanxi academy of social sciences, china abstract the major principles of taoism are a reverence for life and conforming to the laws of nature. these are also principles of the ecological movement. they come from laozi’s non-human centered theory. this paper contends that taoism has an important contribution to environmental ethics. today taoists actively devote themselves to protecting the environment and are respected by international organizations including the united nations. º·¤ñ́ âèí ëåñ¡¡òã·õèêó¤ñ­¢í§åñ·¸ôàµëò¡ç¤×í¡òããëé¤çòáà¤òã¾µèíªõçôµáåð¡òã ´óà¹ô¹ªõçôµµòá¡®áë觸ããáªòµô ¡®à¡³±ìàëåèò¹õé¡ç¤×íëåñ¡¡òã¢í§¡ãðºç¹¡òã ¹ôàçèçô·âò ¤çòá¤ô´´ñ§¡åèòç¹õéáò¨ò¡·äé®õ¢í§àëåèò¨×êí «öè§äáè¶×íçèòá¹øéâìà»ç¹ èù¹âì¡åò§¢í§âå¡ º·¤çòá¹õé¨ðªõéãëéàëç¹çèòåñ·¸ôàµëò áõêèç¹êó¤ñ­·õèêè§àêãôá ¨ãôâèòêµãìêôè§áç´åéíá ·ø¡çñ¹¹õé¼ùé·õè¹ñº¶×íåñ·¸ôàµëò¨ðíø·ôèµ¹àí§íâèò§á¢ç§¢ñ¹ à¾×èí»¡»éí§êôè§áç´åéíá áåð¾ç¡à¢ò¡çä é́ãñº¡òã¹ñº¶×í¨ò¡í§¤ì¡ããðëçèò§»ãðà·è ãçá·ñé§í§¤ì¡òãêë»ãðªòªòµố éçâ the reverence for life is a fundamental character of religions in general. but there are some differences in approach. for instance, while many religions take human life as fundamental, taoism cherishes life in the whole of the ecological system. this is also the beginning and the end of taoism. its ecological thought and concern for health, makes taoism prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 113-124 113 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ distinctive among the other religions in the world. a green peace 2500 years ago in environmental ethics there are basically two different approaches: one is human centered theory (anthropocentric), another is nonhuman centered theory (non-anthropocentric). it can be argued that the originator of this non-human centered theory was laozi. as early as 2500 years ago, he advanced this theory in the dao de jing. in this work, laozi discussed the relation between dao and life. the dao was the source and identity of the universe, while life comes from the dao and also returns back to the dao. all human behavior must be subordinated to the rule of the dao. in a famous phrase from chapter 25 he writes that man takes his law from the earth, the earth takes its law from heaven, and the heaven takes its law from the dao. the law of the dao is its being what it is. hence human behavior should be in conformity with the law of nature. but how do we conform to nature, laozi also gave some basic guidelines: humans should revere nature, they should not act recklessly, not wage war, and so on. most importantly, human should hold on to sanbao, the first is gentleness, the second is frugality, and the third is avoiding competition with others. the sambao has three aspects, first, there must be love: he advises us to love ourselves, love other people, and love nature. second, there must be frugality: do not abuse human and material resources, make use of resources efficiently; third, do not compete with man for profit, not seek profit by exploiting other organisms. in order to curb human greed and the damage of resources, laozi repeatedly encouraged man to practice abstinence, be satisfied with little, and not to wantonly plunder limited resources for satisfying human appetites. taoism as a religion endeavors to revere and extend these ideas of laozi’s ecology. as the principles of taoism in the tai ping ting indicate, the heavens support human life and the earth supports the human form and warns against destruction, or “cruel harm”. this so-called cruel harm is the damage we commit against the environment. it believes the heaven is man’s father, and the earth is man’s mother, and warns against burning moun114 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tains, breaking stones and destroying trees, if we destroy nature, the mother of the earth will be angry and denounce men to the heavens, and in turn, heaven will punish men and sacrifice human life. since people need to exploit vegetation for fuel, it advises using only dead branches and leaves, and to refrain from cutting down live trees, it also warns against digging roots as this cuts off the vigor of vegetation. in order to emphasize the importance of ecological protection, the tai ping ting develops a measure of biodiversity. it holds that the number of species on earth can be used as a criterion for evaluating richness and poverty. in a so-called rich period, for instance in shanghuang times, there were more than twelve thousand species, nature was self-sufficient leading to long life, species never died out. in zhonghuang times, called slightly impoverished, species reduced significantly, since that time, species have been reduced to less than ten thousand, and our times are now considered extremely impoverished. if heaven and earth are the people’s parents, and the parents are in extreme poverty, it follows that the children of heaven and earth will fall into poverty. another classic called huang di yin fu ting, describes the interdependence of heaven, earth and man. this is the famous theory of san cai xiang dao, that is: a biological web which is both promoting and mutually limiting. in accordance with the great tao, man’s actions must be appropriate and suitable in order to maintain san cai peace, and eliminating the scourge of the world.1 wu neng zi in one tao ting written in the 9th century ad, classified all the fishes, birds, mammals and insects on the planet. he distinguished them by the categories of scales, feathers, fur, carapace, and so on. one category is referred to as worms, and within this there is a special category named “naked worms”, which includes all furless animals. human beings are included in this category. according to his classification, there is no fundamental difference between people and animals. humans consider themselves special because they have thoughts and language, but other animals have this as well. there is an article entitled, quan shi gui zhen, which describes wild animals, birds, crabs and turtles, not competing with humans for drink, not fighting with people for food, not competing with them for home. since the survival of wild animals does not require conflict with humans, why then do humans hurt animals? fan guangchun 115 requirements for maintaining harmony with nature tao of the immortal cherish life, relieving immeasurable men,2 this is the basis of the ethics and religious discipline of taoism. this so-called discipline, which is also the basis of buddhism is to control the matters of conduct. the taoist teachings place great emphasis on the protection of nature. originally, these teachings emphasized harmony with nature, and not the protection of human existence. but it is difficult to do in practice. for human communities to survive, it is not always possible to be in harmony with nature. our utilization of natural resources which supply us with the necessities of life, is bound to influence the original face of nature to a certain extent. yet we must be mindful of this harmony. the taoist classics explicitly require that people love insects, vegetation, birds, animals, and love the mountains and rivers, do not harm any life. they direct us not to kill or damage any life, do not burn wild fields and forests, do not cut trees needlessly, do not pick flowers rashly, do not cast poison into rivers and sea, do not carve and destroy mountains rashly, do not drain rivers, do not raise swine and sheep, do not place one’s feet on domestic animals, do not watch domestic animals copulate, do not fish and hunt living beings needlessly, do not disturb hibernation dens in winter, do not climb up the tree to search for bird’s nests and damage eggs, do not cage birds, do not light fires in the ground, do not take the lives of the domestic animals and other living beings. there are warnings in taoist classic tai shang gan ying pian, about shooting birds, chasing after animals, digging holes for animals disturbing their habitats, filling animal burrows, destroying nests, hurting embryos, breaking eggs, destroying a food supply, wasting grain, killing trees with poisons, hunting animals in the spring moon night, killing turtles and killing snakes, etc., and warning that, these crimes bring retribution, even through bad luck to one’s children and grandchildren.3 not only do humans have a responsibility to protect nature, but also they have a responsibility for the sustainable development of human beings. so the commandments of taoism also state, do not pollute drinking wells, do not seal pools and wells, do not drain lakes unnecessarily, and so on. these are measures for protecting the human environment. in taoist temples, not only do monks follow these principles, but 116 prajna vihara __ __ ~ they also pay particular attention to practicing frugality. in chang chun zhen ren list, man live in the temple, quietly, in solitude, comprehending the nature of the body and of life, weakness is inevitable, humility is a virtue, compassion is a fundamental, convenience is the door. all men should do things in accordance with their abilities, and never in excess. we should make use of clothing and consume food reasonably.4 some legendary taoists and immortals lived in caves and ate pine nuts, grasses and flowers as in lie xian zhuan, xu xian zhuan, li shi zhen xian ti tao tong jian, and other examples of taoist literature. the intention of these records is to lead to the goal of immortality by eating little or nothing, and this had guided the lives of many hermits. the aim is to reduce the impact of the consumption of natural resources. the taoist temples followed strict conservation measures, and the impact on surrounding environment was reduced to a minimum. a living environment in harmony with nature and god one of the emphases in taoism is immortality. the life-long goal of taoist is to become immortal. the taoist should communicate with the immortals, there are places for honoring the immortals, i.e. temples and dong fu. the temple environments are designed for the residence of these immortals and provide a place conducive to the people to accept their teachings, and express their will to these gods. the temples and dong fu are the intermediate places. the setting and architectural style of these temples as well as their functions, are different from secular places and have changed over time. the early mountain ascetics dwelled in the deep mountains, and used slightly modified natural caves, or built a simple hut. later, when the number of the missions was increasing, and the power of economy strengthening, devotees began to build larger temples to accommodate these new communities. they were built according to the taoist practice of harmony with the surrounding environment, in order not to destroy the landscape and surface features. when zhang ling created the twenty-four rules, he also emphasized the natural environment of the temples. the most common places were mountains and springs, caves and stone chambers. fan guangchun 117 the temple grounds also involved accommodations and gardens. worshipers were able to enjoy a quiet and comfortable natural environment, and also gather natural resources conveniently.5 they usually made use of mountains and springs in the surrounding to create natural or artificial gardens, and the use of an official’s executive power, in conjunction with the authority of the gods, to designate these gardens as a nature reserve area. the xi yue hua shan zhi, describes these areas, how they were situated on mountain tops, or within valleys. there were trees of life and death, and god forests where logging was banned. if someone desecrated these forests, they would incur disaster. one account describes a forest on the southwest slopes of a mountain, where there were many tall, old pines and cypresses. it was a holy place where the gods of the mountain visited. but loggers collecting firewood damaged this forest, and as a result the people in the surrounding area were plagued by fires and tigers attacks.6 as a result emperors and governments of every dynasty took the order of protecting taoist mountains, prohibiting logging, hunting and fishing. such as taoist temple garden in mao mountain and wudang mountain, they are strictly protected.7 on zi bo mountain in the liu ba shaanxi province, there is the zhang liang temple where thousands of acres of dense forests existed originally, but in the mid-qing dynasty they were severely damaged by logging. after the president governor of han zhong discovered this, he issued a ban on the logging of trees in zi bo mountain, and created a monument of warning. since then, zi bo mountain and zhang liang temple were strictly protected together. every year they planted a large number of trees, so the dense forests of zi bo mountain have recovered up to the present day. new interpretations of an ancient doctrine confronting the ecological crisis which is brought by global climate change, the taoists of china are actively involved in the global ecological protection action. so we must discuss the modern interpretation of the ancient taoist ecological thought. in 1993, the association of chinese taoism held a national taoist awards ceremony, and commended a number of taoists who had made 118 prajna vihara __ __ ~ outstanding contributions to famous mountains and temple protection, tree planting activities, and reforestation. since then, the taoist community actively participated in international environmental activities and strengthened communication and cooperation with environment protection organizations around the world. in 1995, the association of chinese taoism was invited by the world wildlife fund (wwf) to send a delegation to attend the world religions and environmental protection conference in japan and britain. zhang jiyu, vice president of the association of china taoist in the uk on behalf of the chinese taoists issued the chinese taoism declaration on ecology and environmental protection. (later published in its internal magazine with the title “carrying forward the spirit of taoism, protecting the ecological environment and benefiting humanity: taoist ideas of the world environmental protection”.) in august 1996, the association of chinese taoist and the alliance of world religions and environmental protection (arc) together created a study group, and visited famous taoist mountains including hua mountain of shaanxi and qingcheng mountain in sichuan, and studied the effects of environment protection on these mountains. in 1998, zhang jiyu, vice president of the association of chinese taoism, published the work “tao imitating nature and environment protection”. in august 2000, min zhiting, president of the association of china taoist, as a member of chinese religious delegation, attended the world peace millennium of world leaders of religions at the united nations, gave an address “the love of nature and respect for life” on behalf of chinese taoism. the chinese taoism declaration on ecology and environment protection states as follow: one, we should actively propagate the taoist teachings of ecology environmental protection, to guide people to follow the taoist teachings and not to kill beings for amusement. we should maintain the harmony of nature, and strive to create a paradise on earth, which is the pursuit of our faith. two, we should continue to carry forward the tradition of taoism about reforestation, and maintenance of the ecological environment. the taoists of temples should fan guangchun 119 organize to carry out the work of reforestation and the creation of a beautiful environment, and make temples a model of a real paradise. three, we should develop engineering approaches to maintain the ecological integrity of the famous taoist mountains. in november 2009, the delegation of chinese taoism attended the ceremony of wen sha in london, and issued an eight-year plan (2010 2017) for environmental protection. it involved: first, promoting environmental education to advance environmental consciousness. second, achieving maximum efficiency in the use of ecological resources. third, promoting the ancient taoist wisdom and traditions of ecological preservation. fourth, applying environmental consciousness to daily life. fifth, collaborating with environment protection departments, and making taoist ecological ideas more visible on the internet. sixth, making use of the many way propagating environment protection, and integrating the annual campaign of world environment day with the taoist temple’s work plans. activities and aspects of the new eco-taoist temples since 2002, there has been a developing movement of ecological taoist temples. this began among taoist temples in shaanxi province, and later gradually extended throughout the country. in 2008, the third taoist temples ecological education forum was held in mao shan of jiangsu province. the state bureau of religious affairs attached great importance to this activity, and the activity caught the attention of the 120 prajna vihara __ __ ~ world’s religious and environmental organizations and the united nations development program. dr. keyevin in mao shan forum gave a speech where he highly valued taoist ecological ideas. he argued that 60-year-old united nations must study the two thousand year old ecological wisdom of taoism, and took the chinese taoist temples ecological protection activities into the perspective of the global ecological protection. the key members of initiators and organizers of ecological taoist temples activities were invited to take part in windsor ceremony activities which was held in london. in order to celebrate the united nations climate summit in copenhagen, the ceremony was held by united nations development program and the world religions and the environmental defense fund which were supported by the british prince phillip. the mao shan declaration was adopted in maoshan forum developed a working plan for the next 10 years. we can see the basic contents of eco-taoist temples activities. 1) strengthening the training of the taoists, promoting ecological awareness, establishing environmental protection responsibilities of taoism. 2) advocating a frugal way of life to save energy. 3) participating in activities of social environmental protection, promoting the establishment of healthy global ecosystem. 4) strengthening cooperation with the media to expand the ecotaoist ideas in the whole society. 5) building new eco-taoist temples, taking the activities into the whole social environmental programs, allowing for increased interaction between taoism and society. 6) promoting ecological concepts through the religious activities of the taoism, realizing maximization of the ecological benefits of resource use. 7) establishing an information network between ecological temples, to enhance cooperation and exchanges among temples. the reporters of china environment paper interviewed ren fa rong, director of chinese taoist association, and asked, what is the positive impact of carrying out ecological taoist activities? ren fa rong refan guangchun 121 plied, that there were five aspects. one, it can promote the building of temples to the direction of standardization and modernization. two, it can propagate the excellent ecological thinking in ancient china to all sectors of society through the temples. three, it can promote community and rural environment construction in the local areas. four, it can enhance tourism. five, it can lead to the further protection and better utilization of cultural resources. in recent years, there are basically two main points in eco-taoist temples activities. first are environment-friendly activities. this involves two relationships. one is the relationship between man and nature, (nature including mountains, trees, flowers, water, wildlife, birds, etc.) another relationship is between taoist temples and the surrounding human population, this involves the god-man relationship, more than the man-man relationship. through these considerations the role of the eco-taoist temples is determined. we should respect the tao and cherish the virtues of taoism. we should respect laozi as the god of ecological protection. we should rationally use land, water, vegetation and other resources, maintaining both the internal and external landscape of taoist temples. we should rationally allocate facilities for water conservation and pollution control. we should establish and improve the rules and regulations of the ecological protection and promotion of education. we should greatly enhance the consciousness of the ecological protection. we should maximize the use of energy-saving technologies and materials. we should form harmonious and healthy ecosystem with the surrounding natural environment and community groups. second is the attempt to lead a low-carbon life. in order to achieve the goal of longevity, taoism promotes a variety of health and fitness methods. in accordance with ecological taoist temples activities, we should comply with san bao in lao zi’s tao de ting, which involve three kinds of abstinence applied to modern behavior. one is abstinence in order to maintain a calm state of mind. two involves diet. essentially human survival needs grains, fruits, vegetables and meats. if you eat too much meat or wine, it leads to disease. three is thrift, not only in terms of material consumption, but also in physical exertion, which takes the form of ex122 prajna vihara __ __ ~ cessive entertainment, mental stress, inefficient work, and fatigue, all of which are contrary to the taoist health philosophy. these directives lead to the low carbon life in the society. there is a connection between promoting health in taoist philosophy and technology of carbon conservation in society. first is to reduce the grain, meat, vegetables, oils and other food consumption. we can even learn from the ancient monks practice of eating-air-health. this involves the ancient monks rest system, of not eating after noon. these monk’s consumption of food was less than one-third that of an ordinary person. second is to reduce food production, storage, transportation and carbon emission in processing. the full cycle of food production and storage directly or indirectly releases carbon dioxide. the greenhouse gases are produced in every step of food production, beginning with planting, fertilizing, spraying pesticides and harvesting, but also extending through transporting, power washing, processing and packaging, and finally involving all the steps at the retail end. if consumption can decrease, the carbon emissions will be reduced in all aspects. third is to reduce water, electricity, gas and other energy, in the home food processing, meanwhile reducing exhaust and noise emission, and the reduction waste output. fourth, in addition to all of the above, there is a direct way of energy saving effects, which is compatible with the whole lifestyle of eating-air-health. thus we can have the habit of thrift. it will save a lot of water, electricity and gas, thereby reducing carbon emission to a minimum. endnotes 1reference li yuanguo’s discussion of the ecology ideas in taoism--inspiration of modern. see liu maocai compiled harmony, conflict and communication. sichuanpeople press.1999. p40-72. 2 � � �《太上洞玄灵宝无量度人上品妙 》。 《道藏》洞真部本文 . 3 �《太上感 篇》卷 12, 15, 17, 19, 29. � 《道藏》太清部 . 4 � �《全真清 》。 《道藏》正一部 . 5 �《云笈七 》卷二十八《二十八治•二十四治》。. fan guangchun 123 6 � � �《道藏》洞真部 . 7see yang lizhi’s layout and taoist doctrine of famous mountains and taoist temples. taoist culture study institute of china taoism association, shanghai taoism association, shanghai cheng hung temple, compiled together, modern illustration of taoist doctrine. religion culture press. 2003. p181. 124 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 118 prajñā vihāra prajñā vihāra vol. 19 no 2, july december 2018, 117-129 © 2000 by assumption university press human autonomy and the overcoming of alienation in immaterial labor with reference to zen buddhism teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano assumption university, thailand abstract this paper, will be a reflection on the changes in labor and alienation in the information age. it will focus specifically on the concept of immaterial labor and how this effects human autonomy and the consciousness of alienation. the paper will trace these concepts from the writings of marx, to the approaches of hardt and negri and franco “bifo” berardi. it will then show how the shortcomings of these theories which concern human autonomy in the face of the alienation of material labor can be complemented by the insights into practice developed by zen buddhism. keywords: immaterial labor, semiocapitalism, alienation, zen buddhism introduction we are living in an age where information and communication over electronic networks has a great influence on our perception of reality and even on our perception of ourselves. our activities, our work and our labor increasing rely upon these networks. we are increasingly dependent upon the various kinds of media and social media with which we interact through our smart phones. teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano 119 labor is an important term for understanding economics, history, and production and consumption since hegel and marx. and our present economic system in the information age involves the highest complexities of the flows of labor. in economic philosophy, labor has always been seen as something exploited by capital. when labor becomes commodified, we are alienated form ourselves. and the tradition from marx to lukacs and critical theory developed theories of how alienation can be recognized to lead a way to a revolutionary consciousness which will liberate us from our oppressive system. but with the development of capitalism into the information and media age, our consciousness of reality and ourselves is increasingly shaped and a conscious of our alienation or of any outside alternative is more difficult. this is especially the case with immaterial labor. today our labor is deeply engaged with the creation of information which drives the system onward. we create a kind of artificial reality connected to capitalist production which both controls us and which makes it more and more difficult to recognize our alienation. this paper, will be a reflection on these developments of labor and alienation in this information age. we also discuss on how the system of capital controls communication and the production of information and hence controls human awareness. it discusses possibilities of human autonomy and freedom in the face of this movement. what is alienation of labor? for karl marx, labor is the process in which man and nature are connected. labor is the essence of human species-being. the labor-process begins when the worker extends his living creative activity into material form. the value of the products composed is the value of the material nature and the human labor activity put into it.1 but in capitalism, once labor is detached and separated from the worker, it can be exploited for profit. if the product of labor does not belong to the worker, man no longer expresses his essence in the products he creates. the worker sells his labor to the capitalist to make a living. 120 prajñā vihāra the worker’s freedom and autonomy is diminished.2 labor as a creative living process is replaced by wages given by the factory owner. alienation therefore is the concept that used to explain the separation of the consciousness of the laborer from his or her own essence. marx is influenced by hegel’s concept of alienation in his book “the phenomenology of spirit”. there, in his discussion of the “unhappy consciousness” hegel used the word to refer to the human subject who achieves a sense of individuality and freedom only by alienating himself from the absolute, of which he is a part, but which he projects as detached from himself in the form of god. however, hegel’s consciousness was based upon the spirit or mind while marx’s consciousness is based upon the material. marx’s alienation is the alienation of consciousness in the material world. marx explained this in his work the economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. there he showed that alienation is a result of the freezing of labor as a living process into commodities. the commodities created from labor process in turn confront him as alien objects. marx called it an objectification of labor.3 so what is the impact of alienation? the worker feels a sense of bondage during his working time and feels himself free only in his animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating, and only away from the work-place.4 the alienated worker fails to recognize his labor as his essence. and he begins to see himself and his fellow man as commodities.5 the consequences of alienation lead us to a “false consciousness” where the worker participates in the very system which oppresses him. the hegemony of immaterial labor the term “immaterial labor” is first introduced by maurizio lazzarato. lazzarato defined the immaterial labor as a new kind of labor dominant after the fordist era which is involved in the production of goods which are not visible and material. this lead lazzarato to think about the teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano 121 different definitions of “work” and “workforce” because they combine the results of various types of skill: intellectual skills, which involve cultural-informational content; manual skills which combine creativity, imagination, with technical and manual labor; and entrepreneurial skills in the management of social relations and the structuring of that social cooperation. the size of immaterial labor is also different from the industrial worker. this leads to such notions as precariousness, hyperexploitation, mobility, and hierarchy as key characteristics of immaterial labor. this kind of labor can be sometimes work independently and might not be dependent on a typical work schedule. lazzarato also used the term “self-employed” worker. once this viewpoint comes to dominate within social production, we find that we have an interruption in the continuity of models of production. by this i mean that, unlike the position held by many theoreticians of postfordism, i do not believe that this new labor power is merely functional to a new historical phase of capitalism and its processes of accumulation and reproduction. this labor power is the product of a “silent revolution” taking place within the anthropological realities of work and within the reconfiguration of its meanings. waged labor and direct subjugation (to organization) no longer constitute the principal form of the contractual relationship between capitalist and worker. a polymorphous self-employed autonomous work has emerged as the dominant form, a kind of “intellectual worker” who is himor herself an entrepreneur, inserted within a market that is constantly shifting and within networks that are changeable in time and space.6 hardt and negri were inspired by lazzarato’s concept of immaterial labor and provided a definition not much different from lazzarato, that involves the production of information or other intangible products. they fine-tune the concept further by dividing it into two forms. the first is the 122 prajñā vihāra intellectual or linguistic labor. the second is affective labor. the first form refers to labor that is primarily intellectual or linguistic, such as problem solving, symbolic and analytical tasks, and linguistic expressions. this kind of immaterial labor produces ideas, symbols, codes, texts, linguistic figures, images, and other such products. we call the other principle form of immaterial labor “affective labor. “ unlike emotions, which are mental phenomena, affects refer equally to body and mind. in fact, affects, such as joy and sadness, reveal the present state of life in the entire organism, expressing a certain state of the body along with a certain mode of thinking. affective labor, then, is labor that produces or manipulates affects such as a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion. one can recognize affective labor, for example, in the work of legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast food workers (service with a smile). one indication of the rising importance of affective labor, at least in the dominant countries, is the tendency for employers to highlight education, attitude, character, and “prosocial” behavior as the primary skills employees need. a worker with a good attitude and social skills is another way of saying a worker adept at affective labor 7 even though the material labor is still a major part of production around the world, especially in agriculture, immaterial labor has a more powerful influence. hardt & negri explained that the work of material production is dominated or interconnected to immaterial production. this is why they preferred the term “biopolitical labor” seemingly inspired by foucault. for instance, the immaterial products of information are connected to the material production of agricultural products. teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano 123 the labor involved in immaterial production, we should emphasize, remains material – it involves our bodies and brains as all labor does. what is immaterial is its product. we recognize that immaterial labor is a very ambiguous term in this regard. it might be better to understand the new hegemonic form as “biopolitical labor,” that is, labor that creates not only material goods but also relationships and ultimately social life itself. the term biopolitical thus indicates that the traditional distinctions between the economic, the political, the social, and the cultural become increasingly blurred.8 the hegemony of immaterial labor does not mean that the quantitative production of the world is dominated by immaterial goods. hardt and negri saw the hegemony of immaterial labor is in the terms of the qualitative. and this to a certain extent has always be the case. they give the example of the housewife. the “traditional woman’s work” in terms of reproductive labor and labor in the home demonstrates an open science of knowledges and intelligence closely tied to nature but also shows an affective labor central to immaterial production. the product of housewife is not the production of material goods but is a service to the needs of household. the difference of immaterial labor, however, is that its products are themselves, in many respects, immediately social and common. producing communication, affective relationships, and knowledges, in contrast to cars and typewriters, can directly expand the realm of what we share in common. this is not to say, we repeat, that the conditions of labor and production are becoming the same throughout the world or throughout the different sectors of the economy. the claim rather is that the many singular instances of labor processes, productive conditions, local situations, and lived experiences coexist with a “becoming common,” at a different level of abstraction, of the forms of labor and the general relations of production and exchange 124 prajñā vihāra and that there is no contradiction between this singularity and commonality. this becoming common, which tends to reduce the qualitative divisions within labor, is the biopolitical condition of the multitude.9 notice that the solution for hardt and negri lies in this “commonality” which pervades not only the elite within empire but also the poor, or what they call “the multitude.” this commonality unites and empowers and creates a possibility for change. berardi on mental alienation while immaterial labor is hegemonic it is the starting point for a power that can work outside of the flows of capital. its very hegemony makes it possible to break this hegemony and lead to something new. hardt and negri have a hope that immaterial labor could release us from capital’s control. however, franco “bifo” berardi, an italian workerist, has pointed out that the hegemony of immaterial labor is not perfect. communication and immaterial production might not be sufficient to allow for true autonomy and an escape from capital’s control. in the book the soul at work: from alienation to autonomy, berardi uses the analogy of soul to represent the core value of labor which is connected to the body of a worker. with semiocapitalism which goes beyond fordist capitalism, the worker engaged in immaterial labor cannot separate working time from leisure time. their alienation cannot be seen as being the result of the control of the means of production by the capitalist as in earlier theories. they are not toiling in some factory, for small wages. their work and life is connected, the control of their mind is all encompassing. most of workers engaged in immaterial labor work on his or her laptop whether in their office or at home. there is no sense in which they feel completely forced. berardi called this kind of production semiocapitalism, as the technological stage after the fordist production. it is more reliant on semiotic production rather than the old ideas of producing material objects. teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano 125 the soul i intend to discuss does not have much to do with the spirit. it is rather the vital breath that converts biological matter into an animated body. i want to discuss the soul in a materialistic way. what the body can do, that is its soul, as spinoza said.... the rise of post-fordist modes of production, which i will call semiocapitalism, takes the mind, language and creativity as its primary tools for the production of value. in the sphere of digital production, exploitation is exerted essentially on the semiotic flux produced by human time at work.10 berardi describes how the mind is alienated as the soul is enslaved to others. in the digital era, the content of labor turns to be mental. the wages earned are not based upon the exchange of goods but on the time that immaterial labor spends producing social interactions within semiocapitalism. for instance, in network communication, semiocapitalism stresses the products of immaterial labor available through the networks and smart-phones. in contrast to factory workers, info-workers, instead constantly move all along the length, breath and depth of cyberspace. they move to find signs, to elaborate experience, or simply to follow the paths of their existence. but at every moment and place they are reachable and can be called back to perform a productive function that will be reinserted into the global cycle of production. in a certain sense cellular phones realize the dream of capital; that of absorbing every possible atom of time at the exact moment the productive cycle needs it. in this way, workers offer their entire day to capital and are paid only for the moments when their time is made cellular. info-producers can be seen as neuro-workers. they prepare their nervous system as an active receiving terminal for as much time as possible. the entire lived day becomes subject to a semiotic activation which becomes directly productive only when necessary.11 126 prajñā vihāra one example are the advertisements for the happy life. they produce both illusions of happiness and illusions of inadequacy.12 the individual life dedicated to immaterial labor is also a factor for the increase of depression. depression, in according to berardi, begins with panic. the panic is the action that someone needs to react on the certain situation. the increase in panic results from being faced with uncontrollable events. the excessive panic leads to depression. one loses their motivation and their soul could not follow their will.13 the alienation of soul happens when the soul is alienated in its intangible form, as immaterial production. language, relations, thought and cognitive activities are separated from one’s soul. the soul is put to work and becomes another object or commodity. we could see the difference from earlier forms of alienation. the alienation of physical labor forces the worker to do the same physical activities to contribute to material production according to factory hours. it is possible that the worker can become conscious of their alienation separate from their physical labor. but in the alienation of the soul consciousness is trapped in its immaterial production. consciousness is occupied by its work. there is little chance for the thought of resistance or liberation. the complexity in communication and production of immaterial labor provides an overload. berardi writes concerning the hyper-stimulation of present society: permanent electrocution is the normal condition of a system where network communicative technologies are used in a competitive social situation, projecting the organism in an infinite, hyper-fast flow of economically relevant signs.14 recognizing mental alienation mental alienation, as discussed in the above section, is different from traditional alienation where the worker labors in a factory but his mind can still reflect on their situation leading to resistance or revolution. in the situation of immaterial labor, we are more embedded within the flows of communication and information which alienates us. so how do teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano 127 we, who are involved in material labor, know that we are alienated? hardt and negri did not deal with this. but berardi suggests that consciousness of our alienation can emerge out of the very depression generated by immaterial labor. berardi did not go in detail about the steps for treatment, but he speaks of dealing with stress and panic. the reaction to the alienation of late capitalism must come from within capitalism itself. communism cannot provide a new principle of totalization. so capitalism will not be replaced in the global landscape. however, it will lose its pervasive role in semiotization. berardi believed that the autonomy could still be realized within late capitalism by moving beyond connection of income and work. now we need to allow people to release their knowledge, intelligence, affect. this is today’s wealth, not compulsive useless labor. until the majority of mankind is free from the connection between income and work, misery and war will be the norm of the social relationship.15 autonomy would be in this view a process without the end. mental alienation is the result of our mind’s embeddedness in our systems of communication, and yet, our mind or soul, is not completely controlled by the system itself. there is still a level of freedom or autonomy which can provide a space of resistance, even as we are bound within our immaterial labor. in his famous book, the practice of everyday life, de certeau spoke of the use of “tactics” and its difference from “strategies.” tactics, due to their unproductiveness and unpredictability, provide a kind of resistance to the social order. but how can tactics be used to disguise yourself from the control of capital and achieve a kind of autonomy? a key to this can be found in the tradition of zen buddhism and the concept of ikigai. in buddhist theory in general, the key concept is detachment which frees us from the dependent origination and causality of the world. 128 prajñā vihāra to attain the nirvana, one must achieve this based upon the use of their own thought. for zen buddhism in particular, enlightenment is not a pure achievement that allows for transcendence of the world. zen is not a system, a concept nor a religion. zen is a constant discipline and practice of the mind. detachment is also a process which needs to be constantly exercised. suzuki writes: if zen is to be called a form of naturalism, then it is so with a rigorous discipline at the back of it. it is in that sense, and not as it is understood by libertines, that zen may be designated naturalism. the libertines have no freedom of will, they are bound hands and feet by external agencies before which they are utterly helpless. zen, on the contrary, enjoys perfect freedom; that is, it is master of itself. zen has no “abiding place”, to use a favourite expression in the prajnaparamita sutras. when a thing has its fixed abode, it is fettered, it is no more absolute.16 if we compared this zen practice and berardi’s recommendations for self-autonomy, we would find that they are quite complimentary. first, the process is subjective and dependent on the activity of the self. secondly, we are not eliminating or opposing the surrounding technological world, but we are maintaining the true value of the self. thirdly, autonomy is never purely achieved, it is a continuous process without end. there is always the chance that we can fall under the capital’s control if we are lacking of our determination. this determination is a mindfulness of our actions and should not become a mere habit. once it is the habit, we are in danger of falling back under the spell of the system. once we practice on how we see the truth through our social communication which is animated by capital and for the purposes of capital, our mind still has possibilities for maintaining some forms of autonomy. teerapong jiaranaidilok and john giordano 129 endnotes 1 karl marx, capital: a critique of political economy, 130. 2 ibid, 127. 3 karl marx the economic and philosophical manuscripts, 29. 4 ibid, p.30. 5 ibid, 29. 6 maurizio lazzarato, immaterial labor, 138. 7 hardt, michael & negri, antonio. multitude: war and democracy in the age of empire, 108. 8 ibid, 108. 9 ibid, 114. 10 franco “bifo” berardi, the soul at work from alienation to autonomy, 21. 11 ibid, 90. 12 ibid, 92. 13 ibid, 102. 14 ibid, 115-116. 15 ibid, 214-221. 16 d. t. suzuki, an introduction to zen buddhism, 86. bibliography berardi, franco “bifo”. the soul at work from alienation to autonomy. los angeles: semiotext(e), 2007 hardt, michael & negri, antonio. multitude: war and democracy in the age of empire, new york: penguin press, 2004 lazzarato, maurizio immaterial labor, trans. p. colilli and e. emery, in m. hardt and p. virno (eds.) radical thought in italy: a potential politics. minneapolis and london: university of minnesota press, 1996 marx, karl. capital: a critique of political economy, trans. samuel moore and edward aveling, chicago: charles h. kerr & company,1909 ------. the economic and philosophical manuscripts, in the marx reader, ed. cristopher pierson, cambridge: polity press, 1997 130 prajñā vihāra suzuki, d. t. an introduction to zen buddhism. new york: grove press 1964 prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 66 vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 66-80 © 2000 by assumption university press compassion and attachment: a comparison of lammert holger and john giordano abstract this paper will explore how the concept of compassion is understood by the western phenomenological tradition of max scheler, in contrast to how it is understood morality and ethical theory. max scheler combines his phenomenology with psychological approaches to consider how one individual can relate to the mental states of another other individuals. scheler, distinguishes between empathy buddhism, where emotional contagion is understood as a form of attachment. but scheler unlike buddhism, still emphasizes the autonomous subject of phenomenology with the feelings that arise. the individual sheds their attachments and this leads to a wholesome , as stated not only in the mind of the individual but of humanity in 67 . keywords phenomenology introduction in the western tradition, the feelings of empathy and sympathy are rise to the feeling of compassion. various theories explain their connection and act appropriately or ethically. buddhist tradition. yet in this approach, compassion is separate from the experiences of empathy and sympathy which would be for buddhism a based less on intention and more on practical action, which is also linked to buddhist practices such as meditation and dealing with fellow human beings. this article will show that knowing and understanding of the contrast between the western tradition which emphasizes an ethics of compassion based upon a feeling with another and the buddhist tradition which emphasizes a compassion which does not involve attachment is very and how they understand the ethical. 68 max scheler on compassion kant saw compassion as a duty which was based upon reason. but in the phenomenological tradition, scheler was trying to revive the understood to contribute to ethical actions. max scheler describes the feeling of compassion as a case of sympathy as an ethically relevant basic than sympathy is a way of experiencing others, what scheler calls “nachfühlen” which is equivalent to empathy.1 yet this idea of empathy is one term to describe the same phenomena. for example, ‘understanding likewise, the descriptions of sympathy, empathy and compassion in max whether compassion and the underlying feelings of empathy or sympathy are states that are positive, neutral or negative? compassion, which is based on sympathy, it can be assumed that it involves a perception of pain, foreign is perceived by an inner experience which relates to the “i” in the same way as the i experiences itself. the distinction between inside and outside is dissolved. or as edith stein would say: “in the beginning there what is from outside of it are “gradually crystallized out of it”2 max scheler does not think that the general understanding the emotions of the other person should be based on a strict reproduction of that emotion. for scheler, inner perception is distinguished from outer perception and is directed toward acts. he makes a distinction between the modes of being (wesensgesetzlich).3 it is important to distinguish within and the foreign experiences coming from the outside. 69 in the distinction between joy and pity, the principle is established that presupposes a certain knowledge of the quality of the experience in other people. it is not through pity that i learn about someone who is in pain, apprehending, understanding, and, in general, reproducing (emotionally) the experiences of others, including their states of feeling. these presuppose some sort of knowledge of the fact, nature and quality of experience in other people, just as the possibility of such knowledge presupposes, as its condition, the existence of other conscious beings. to a distressing situation with a feeling of pity (or any other kind of responsive psychological state). in the case of empathy, an “empathic” which provides the stimulus for it. max scheler writes, “knowing and as empathy.4 5 the experience of compassion, is also grounded in empathy, which involves 6 max scheler refers to self-consciousness as an inner perception through which the experiences of the other are made, thereby the inner perception is not focused on sensation, but is involves intention. as matthias schlossberger observes “the experiential ego does not always compassion and sympathy are moral categories that unite people through the recognition that the other is someone equal. compassion is pain.7 really recognized as pain through an act of understanding (through the recognition of both mutuality and otherness), and only then directed as 70 things from a phenomenological point of view and understanding. while this might be considered as a kind of egoism, scheler argues that egoism it does not comprehensively explain the isolation of the perceiver. he focuses instead on the concept of eudemonism, as “the ethical behavior in which feelings of pleasure represent goals and purposes of striving with another person (empathy) does not necessarily say anything about 8 emphasizes compassion as an important, yet one that accepts that ultimately to self-interest.9 compassion is understood as an act of a compassionate person that does not require the feeling of empathy – that they live the experience of the other. the psyche of the other person is not decisive. the only decisive factor is that the compassionate person is able to convey his feeling and is convinced of his action in a moral sense. this will accord with is an action according to moral virtue, and at the same time it stands in a relation to rationality. with others, feelings play a big role which can have a positive or of attachment to things, people, and ideas.10 so the goal of buddhism is to develop a compassionate personality through practice, but not to let 71 of leaving the buddhist path of practice.11 this practice is an active state, where the very idea of the passions is to be passive and to be moved by that which is outside of oneself. so this peculiar attitude of compassion without attachment is something that should be investigated in more detail. which includes the wish 12 compassion ( ) is understood in that one is part of a greater whole and is dependent on and connected to that whole. compassion is part of the four (abodes of brahma, sublime attitudes, limitless states, divine states, and the immeasurable ( ), which is part of a series of buddhist virtue and meditation practices. compassion, however, should not be confused with (loving-kindness), which has as its goal the desire for the happiness of all beings. compassion refers to the empathetic care for all this is an active approach to compassion and not a passive one. so in general, compassion in buddhism has the goal of alleviating from various discussions in the buddhist texts, compassion can also be it extends to all living beings. the visuddhimagga buddhagosa in advises that if a person is so evil that he or she has no apparent good points, compassion should still be felt for him or her of such evil (vism. 340).13 while compassion arises only by knowing compassion cannot be understood as an emotional attachment and this self). attachment involves an attempt to control that which is outside of 72 sense objects, b) opinions and views, c) rites and rituals d) self-hood. in these are, besides the meditative practice, compassion, interdependence, accepting, and expansiveness. the desire for security and personal of changing phenomenal experience. meditation is used as a tool to mental anchors which is in contrast to the false perception of security. ) for buddhism, since it ranges from such states as perceived pain, sorrow, misery, and ), but also from attachment ( ) to emotions as well as to matter. desire essentially refers to the function of not being able to let go, which consequently is leads to liberation. so compassion in the buddhist understanding does not mindset can be countered with meditation. the noble eightfold path, as ( ) of the four noble truths. while compassion is not explicitly mentioned, a general idea of universal love and compassion for all living beings can be derived from the ethical principles of conduct. in this context, the development of wisdom ( ) and compassion are two inseparable qualities, and wisdom refers purely to qualities of mind.14 part of the meditative practice of compassion is the personal attitude toward the ). 15 of tranquility meditation ( ).16,17 in this meditation 73 which is often weak and tends to be restless and wandering. or tranquility serves to purify non-peaceful states of mind, and leads the meditator towards the cultivation of peaceful states (vism., 9.1).18 the term sympathy, if used in buddhism, translates as ‘trembling along 19 true sense and is used because of its proximity to compassion. the pali term or of the other as an inner attitude of the mind.20,21 from the buddhist point of view, through the practice of meditation, metta is cultivated as one of its objects of mediation, creating the basis of a kindness extending to all beings, including oneself, while compassion acts as an activator to brahmaviharas is directed towards self-acceptance and the overcoming of self-doubt and prejudice. compassion is not directed towards the being be understood as compassion in the western sense. it is closer to the attitude of care. from the buddhist understanding, the feeling of empathy is a description of “feeling for the other and not feeling with him.” the sensation of empathy essentially consists of self-esteem, the relationship unit of measurement for perceived empathy. daniel goleman and paul emotional, and compassion. the highest goal in buddhism is to achieve enlightenment, which requires the development of two qualities: wisdom and compassion. wisdom in the buddhist context is understood as consciousness or discrimination and combines the principle of non-self. as it is understood in western philosophy, is not as important in buddhism. 74 conclusion the comparison between the western phenomenological approach certain interesting insights. in the western tradition the connections his phenomenology with psychological approaches to consider how one individual relates to the mental states of the other individuals. in concerning with feeling what the other is feeling (as is the case with not necessarily identical. in other words, it is a matter of whether one of self-interest of the autonomous ethical subject. as a form of attachment and is considered to be counterproductive to the from attachment. so compassion in the buddhist sense is not a feeling the emotions of the other, where it would be an attachment to the other be related to one meaning of the other. it is com-passion which is not passive ( ). it is an activity developed through habit and meditation. so the theravada buddhist the individual but of humanity in general. this approach to compassion . 75 endnotes 1 dan zahavi, “simulation, projection and empathy,” consciousness and cognition 17, no. 2 (2008): pp. 514-522, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.010. 2 edith stein, on the problem of empathy (washington, d.c.: ics publications, 1989), 27-28. 3 jens soentgen, das unscheinbare (bonn: vch in akademie vlg bln., 1997), 43. 4 max scheler and harold j. bershady, (chicago: university of chicago press, 2013), 52. 5 kendra cherry, “kendra cherry, ms,” verywell mind (verywell mind, may 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/kendra-cherry-2794702. 6 for a multidimensional approach.,” journal of personality and social psychology 44, no. 1 (1983): pp. 113-126, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113, 113. 7 rodrigo peñaloza, “max scheler on compassion (rodrigo peñaloza, may 2013),” medium (medium, november 12, 2020), https://milesmithrae.medium.com/ max-scheler-on-compassion-rodrigo-pe%c3%b1aloza-may-2013-444650ef91d2. 8 hans bernhard schmid, “philosophical egoism: its nature and limitations,” economics and philosophy 26, no. 2 (2010): pp. 217-240, https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0266267110000209. 9 rodrigo peñaloza, “max scheler on compassion (rodrigo peñaloza, may 2013),” medium (medium, november 12, 2020), https://milesmithrae.medium.com/ max-scheler-on-compassion-rodrigo-pe%c3%b1aloza-may-2013-444650ef91d2. 10 peter harvey, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2013). 11 pannyavaro, “loving-kindness meditation,” a basic buddhism guide: loving-kindness meditation, by ven. pannyavaro (buddhanet, n.d.), https://www. buddhanet.net/e-learning/loving-kindness.htm. 12 robert e. buswell, donald s. lopez, and juhn ahn, (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2014). 13 (berkeley, ca: shambhala publications, 1976), 340. 14 walpola sri rahula, “the noble eightfold path: meaning and practice,” tricycle, november 23, 2022, https://tricycle.org/magazine/noble-eightfold-path/. 15 ethan mills, “cultivation of moral concern in theravada buddhism: toward a theory of the relation between tranquility and insight,” journal of buddhist ethics mills0301.pdf. 76 16 keown, damien. the nature of buddhist ethics. basingstoke: palgrave, 2002. 17 damien keown, a dictionary of buddhism (oxford: oxford university press, 2004). 18 venerable sujiva, “samatha bhavana – the cultivation of tranquillity ,” samatha bhavana cultivation of tranquillity (buddhanet, n.d.), http://www.buddhanet. net/metta02.htm. 19 damien keown, a dictionary of buddhism (oxford: oxford university press, 2004). 20 wijesekara, oliver hector de alwis. “the concept of peace as the central notion of buddhist social philosophy.” archiv für rechtsund sozialphilosophie v.46 n.4 (1960): 493–501. 21 in early buddhism (sri lanka: educational publications department, 2001), p. 117. references . kandy, sri lanka: buddhist publication society, 2007. batson, c. daniel. “these things called empathy: eight related but distinct phenomena.” the social neuroscience of empathy, 2009, 3–16. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262012973.003.0002. accessed may 17, 2022. betzler, monika. . berlin: walter de gruyter, 2008. bodhi, bhikkhu, and bhikkhu ñanamoli. . boston: wisdom, 2015. . köln, 2010. 77 . berkeley, ca etc.: shambhala publications, 1976. buddhaghosa. . varanasi: bauddha bharati, 1977. burns, timothy. “theodor lipps on the concept of einfühlung (empathy).” theodor lipps (1851-1914): december 16, 2021. https://www.academia.edu/35938838/theodor_lipps_on_the_ concept_of_einf%c3%bchlung_empathy. accessed may 17, 2022. buswell, robert e., donald s. lopez, and juhn ahn. . princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2014. cherry, kendra. “kendra cherry, ms.” , may 2020. https:// www.verywellmind.com/kendra-cherry-2794702. accessed may 17, 2022. for a multidimensional approach.” 44, no. 1 (1983): 113–26. https://doi. org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113. accessed may 17, 2022. ferro, meneses rita wengorovius. . birmingham: university of birmingham, 2011. gaikwad, k d. “home.” educreation publishing, 2018. https:// ebookswhiz.com/pdf/pradnya-evolves-the-buddha-s-way. accessed may 17, 2022. germer, christopher k., ronald d. siegel, and paul r. fulton. . new york: guilford press, 2005. harris, elizabeth j. “detachment 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“the tree of contemplative practices” the center for contemplative mind in society, n.d. https://www.contemplativemind.org/ practices/tree. accessed may 17, 2022. sujiva, venerable. “samatha bhavana – the cultivation of tranquillity.” buddhanet, n.d. http://www.buddhanet.net/metta02.htm. accessed may 17, 2022. wijesekara, oliver hector de alwis. “the concept of peace as the central notion of buddhist social philosophy.” archiv für rechts und sozialphilosophie v.46 n.4 (1960): 493–501. zahavi, dan. “simulation, projection and empathy.” (2008): 514–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. concog.2008.03.010. accessed may 17, 2022. rainier a. ibana 33 confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract confucian philosophy has always considered education as a mechanism to improve the quality of life in society. the confucian classic, ta hsueh and the analects emphasize this pivotal role of education. the ethics of education and life in the family also has a deep impact on government and business enterprises. each one plays assigned roles and lives by the rules that govern his or her station in social life. the ninth chapter of the ta shueh teaches that “correct deportment” can rectify a whole country. projecting the ethics of the family to the social order and extending the ethos of particular cultural practices to the global community, however, poses certain problems. the scope of the latter is much more extensive than the family and broader than the cultural practices of particular nation states. when family relations are preferred over that of others, authoritarian political power will not be too far behind. this paper is an investigation of the nature and limits of confucian educational philosophy and its influence on society against the backdrop of globalization. keywords: confucian ethics, education, filial piety, prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 33-47 © 2000 by assumption university press 34 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december confucian societies are known to put premium on education as a means of improving the quality of life of their citizens. the confucian classic, ta hsueh1, translated as the great learning, “the gate through which the beginning student enters into virtue,”2 emphasized the pivotal role of education in maintaining social order during the pre-modern chinese kingdom of warring states. it offered the following approach to the attainment of virtue: the ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.”3 although confucius had to move from one town to another to teach his students, his lessons on the importance of education are ingrained even today among families and nations that have been influenced by confucian culture. this article will focus on the texts from the analects and the ta shueh because of their tremendous influence on china’s educational philosophy. they were among the most important texts that were required for civil servants to study before joining the chinese government from ancient times until 1905.4 filial piety 孝 education was imbibed through the family. elders served as role models for the duties and obligations that its members eventually played in the larger context of society. propriety (li), the behavior rainier a. ibana 35 that defines proper relationships, was initially learned from the family. one’s humanity (ren) 仁, or lack of it, was traced back to one’s family background. fidelity to family life and traditions was therefore held to be almost sacred. when confucius was asked what filial piety was about, he answered: “it is not being disobedient.” when he was asked a second time, he answered again: “not being disobedient.” when asked to clarify his answer, he said: “that parents, when alive, should be served according to propriety (li); that when dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed according to propriety.” (analects 2:5) the proper way to relate to parents, however, is not only a matter of performing formal duties. confucius said that supporting one’s parents must be done with “reverence.” he laments that “filial piety nowadays means to be able to support one’s parents. but we support dogs and horses. if there is no feeling of reverence, wherein lies the difference?” (analects 2:7) this reverential attitude is practiced not only in relation to those who are alive but especially when they are dead. shrines are devoted to the departed members of the family in confucian homes to honor the ancestors for whom the living members owe their existence and status in life. sunyatsen, revered founder of chinese nationalism, suggested that a national consensus can be achieved if only the four hundred major clans that constitute the chinese nation can be organized to respond to pressing national problems.5citing the analects, sinologist jinli he concurs: “it is believed that if we build up family feeling with the internalization of xiao (filial piety) and di (deference to elders), we will naturally transfer the same feeling to our big family—our nation, literally, a national family (guojia 國家) (analects 1:2) 36 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december the evolution of the chinese notion of education: from xiao 孝 to jiao 教 xiao孝, thechinese character for filial piety, evolved from the character for elder (lao) , depicted by a hunched human being with a walking stick. the walking stick was later replaced by a child to show the support of the next generation to their elders and the authority of the latter over the former. this authoritarian relationship is confirmed in section two of the first book of the analects: “it is a rare thing for someone who has a sense of xiao孝 (family reverence) and di弟 (fraternal deference) to have a taste for defying authority.” this authoritarianism is expressed in the superior location of the character of the elder above the inferior character of the child in the term xiao 孝 (filial piety). jiao 教, the chinese character for education, builds on this metaphor of kinship by illustrating the role of elders in rectification of errors committed by children. it is composed of two characters: that of a father holding a stick on the right side of an image of a child with two x marks above its head . the stick is aimed at the x marks located above the head of the child to emphasize that rectification is an important part of confucian education. ideally, rectification is on the level of ideas, directed against the thinking balloons located above the child’s head. it need not be reduced to corporal punishment as what actually happens during extreme and unfortunate circumstances. the vertical relationship between elders and the younger generations is also practiced within the educational system. this authoritarianism can be also observed in the practices of daily life as in the case of the underlings of government and business bureaucrats who are expected to faithfully follow the commands of their superiors. the latter, in turn, are expected to take care of their wards as parents do to their children. the application of fraternal correction to the realm of governance is evident in confucius recommendation to “rectify names” when given the chance to render advise to the ruler of wei. he explained that: rainier a. ibana 37 “if names are not rectified, then language will not be in accord with truth. if language is not in accord with truth, then things cannot be accomplished. if things cannot be accomplished, then ceremonies and music will not flourish. if ceremonies and music do not flourish, then punishment will not be just. if punishments are not just, then the people will not know how to move hand and foot. therefore, the superior man will give only names that can be described in speech and say only what can be carried out in practice. with regard to his speech, the superior man does not take it lightly. that is all.” (analects 13:3) according to confucius, the key to leadership lies in the rectification of the leader himself or herself. when kang tzu asked confucius about government, he replied: “to govern (cheng) is to rectify (cheng). if you lead the people by being rectified yourself, who will dare not to be rectified?” (analects 12:17) junzi 君子 (moral exemplars) a more optimistic method of teaching within the confucian tradition is by way of moral exemplars. unlike the vertical arrangement of characters that subordinate the ideogram of the child 子 in the characters that constitute xiao and jiao, the image of the child is horizontally along with the ideogram of the gentleman or the junzi 君 . the latter is depicted by the character of a man wearing a hat who appears to be positioned in front of a table before the ideogram of a child who is presumably his follower or student. instruction, just like any other form of teaching, is initially achieved by imitation. the teacher shows how things are said and done and the student tries to follow the cues demonstrated by the former. the teacher leads the way to the learning process and points to the objects to be learned while the student makes the effort to follow and learn the lesson for himself or herself. 38 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december repetition, or following the teacher is a necessary component of learning. at the extreme it becomes a form of rote memorization but it can also be acquired through actual performances of deeds such as role playing, the construction and reconstruction of learning environments that approximate the conditions of experience, or applying the lessons learned to real life situations. the first line of the analects attests to the primacy of practice in the learning process: “is it not a pleasure to learn and to repeat or practice from time to time what has been learned?” one of the disciples of confucius quips in the analects that “one of the three questions that he asks of himself daily is whether he has repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my teacher.” (analects 1.4) sagacity 哲 (zhe) the acquisition of knowledge is not for its own sake but for the sake of practice. knowledge is even measured in accordance with the norms of praxis. as the ideogram for sagacity shows, the image for the mouth is located below the images of a hand and a measuring scale, depicting the primacy of action over mere speeches. in the analects, confucius describes the superior human being as “he acts before he speaks and speaks according to his action” (analects 2:13). he also observed that “the superior man wants to be slow in word but diligent in action.” (analects 4:24) the primacy of action over words is not only illustrated by the ideographic character of the chinese language but also by the normative principle of the “rectification of names” cited above. names must conform to the reality they represent and words must be depicted according to reality. confucian ideals would appear to be tautological if a realistic interpretation of his philosophy is not taken into account. when confucius, for example, was asked about governance, he replied: “let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father and the son be a son.” (analects 12:11). without any reference to the reality of action and the relationships of those who are engaged in the activity of being a father, son, ruler and minister, confucius’ reply would seem rainier a. ibana 39 to be mere repetitions of meaningless syllables. li the virtue of propriety (li) in confucian ethics also becomes more intelligible within the governing principle of the rectification of names. the analects teaches that leaders should “lead them (the followers) with virtue and regulate them by the rules of propriety (li), and they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, set themselves aright.” (analects 2:3) the exemplary behavior of leaders attracts followers especially when such behavior is contextualized within the concrete demands of social reality. to turn away from exemplary leaders puts the followers to shame because they are turning away not only from the leaders themselves but also from their own humanistic aspirations. propriety (li), therefore, is not governed merely by the imposition of laws and their corresponding punishments but by the illustrious life of moral exemplars. in the analects, “confucius said: ‘lead the people with governmental measure and regulate them with law and punishment, and they will avoid wrong doing but will have no sense of honor and shame.” (analects 2:3) acting in accordance with propriety cultivates humanity in a more positive way while the enforcement of law and punishment deters and prevents humans from committing acts of transgression in deference from and fear of external sanctions. following moral exemplars (junzi) and the sanctions imposed by elders (lao) serve as complementary ways of inculcating virtue. the first teaches by example while the second teaches by means of rectification. both methods require social mediation in the cultivation of virtue. for confucians, being human is achieved within the context of fellow human beings. ren ethics (仁) the chinese character for humanity is composed of two ideograms: a picture that depicts a human being (人) along with the number two (二) beside it. being human is always in relation to at least another one. 40 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december being related to fellow human beings is an essential component of what it means to be human. as an ethical project, being humane is achieved by living and dealing with other humans in various ways: children are children in relation to parents and vice-versa. siblings are siblings in relation to brothers or sisters. these relationships require propriety (li) such as filial piety in relation to elders and deference (di) in relation to siblings. the sequence of the child’s birth in the family has corresponding ranks, appellations, and entitlements that entail specific duties and responsibilities. these appellations and entitlements are extended to other relatives such as aunts, uncles, grandparents, great-grandparents, cousins and in-laws. this practice of extending conventional social mores accorded to family members finds their way to the government and business enterprises. each one plays assigned roles and lives by the rules that govern his or her station in social life. the ninth chapter of the ta shueh teaches that “correct deportment” can rectify a whole country: “because he served as a worthy example as a father, son, elder brother, younger brother, therefore the people imitated him. this is what is meant by the saying that the order of the state depends on the regulation of the family.” (ta shueh, chapter 9). projecting the ethics of the family to the social order and extending the ethos of particular cultural practices to the global community, however, pose serious threats to the dignity of the broader human community. the scope of the latter is much more extensive than the family and broader than the cultural practices of particular nation states. when family relations are preferred over that of others, vicious practices such as nepotism and political dynasties that abuse power and authority will not be too far behind. we have also seen how excessive nationalism produced vicious tyrants that vilified and exterminated foreigners and other who do not fit the procrustean beds of native sensibilities. rainier a. ibana 41 self-cultivation 大學 to correct the excessive influence of the family and nationalism at the global level, the ta sueh makes a universal appeal for the inclusion of all human beings within the project of moral education: “from the son of heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation. there is never a case when the root is in disorder and yet the branches are in order.” the ta shueh explicitly states that virtue serves as the root or foundation of the social order (chapter 10). all human endeavors and must therefore prioritize the cultivation of virtue in order to become successful. it concludes that “therefore the ruler will first be watchful over his own virtue. if he has virtue, he will have the people with him. if he has the people with him, he will have the territory. if he has territory, he will have wealth. and if he has wealth, he will have its use.” with respect to wealth, confucius said that “a man of humanity develops his personality by means of wealth, while the inhumane person develops wealth at the sacrifice of his personality” (chapter 10). the cultivation of virtue, moreover, is governed by the “principle of the measuring square,” an all-encompassing negative version of the “golden rule” which states that: what a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not show it in dealing with his inferiors; what he dislikes in those in front of him, let him not show it in preceding those who are behind; what he dislikes in those behind him, let him not show it in following those in front of him; what he dislikes in those on the right, let him not apply it to those on the left; and what he dislikes in those on the left, let him not apply it to those on the right. 7 42 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december the development of such precautionary measures imposes disciplinary measures on the behavior of moral agents. it presumes the possibility of retaliation for untoward acts if one is not careful in his or her dealings. this negative formulation of the golden rule is reiterated in the analects 5:11: “what i do not want others to do to me, i do not want to do to them.” to facilitate the cultivation of virtue, the ta shueh suggests that: those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. the extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. (chapter 1) chu hsi, ta shueh’s commentator explained that “the intelligent mind of man is formed to know and there is not a single thing in which its principles do not inhere.” (chapter 5) the task of education, therefore, is to grasp the principles that govern things and “to proceed from what knowledge he has of their principles, and investigate further until he reaches the limit.” it presupposes a realist theory of knowledge wherein the human mind is believed to be capable of comprehending reality as far as the knower is willing to know. willingness further requires “sincerity”, the virtue that must be cultivated if the mind is to be rectified and directed towards an adequate comprehension of reality. to achieve this end, the ta hsueh recommends that “the superior man will always be watchful over himself when alone” (chapter 6). this watchfulness is directed towards self-deception, such as “when we hate a bad smell or love a beautiful color”. previous experiences and habits could influence perceptions, mislead acts of understanding, and commit erroneous judgments. emotions, must be held in check. chapter seven of the ta hsueh warns that when one is affected by wrath, fear, fondness, worries and anxieties, the mind will not be correct. this is especially the case “when rainier a. ibana 43 the mind is not present, we look but we do not see, listen but do not hear, eat but do not know the taste of food.” one is reminded by the mahayana buddhists’ practice of “mindfulness” wherein attentive exercises are practiced in order to become present to the experiences of the here and now. prejudices, biases and current preoccupations will have to be set aside in order to focus and attend to the subject matter at hand. chu hsi remarks that these exercises are meant to explain the rectification of the mind and the cultivation of the personal life. chu hsi’s commentaries highlight the mutual alliance of intellectual education and the development of moral virtues both as a goal and as a precondition of the act of knowing. he believes that “after exerting himself in this way (of investigating the nature of things) for a long time, he will one day achieve a wide and far ranging penetration. then the qualities of all things, whether internal or external, the refined or the coarse, will be apprehended, and the mind, in its total substance and great functioning, will be perfectly intelligent.” (chapter 5) a rectified heart with sincere thoughts, however, is not enough to obtain knowledge. personal and social sacrifices are made before the altar of learning. other activities and opportunities are given up in favor of quietly sitting down in the pursuit of knowledge. studying under adverse psychological and social conditions might seem impossible. awareness of such distractions through self-reflection, however, can lead to the setting aside of obstacles that block the attainment of true knowledge. the act of knowing therefore cultivates virtues in the same manner that virtues contribute to the attainment of knowledge. virtues and governance confucian societies rely on the family to educate its members. chapter 9 of the ta hsueh admits that “the superior man (ruler) without going beyond the family, can bring education into completion in the whole state. filial piety is that with which one serves his ruler. brotherly respect is that with which one serves his elders, and deep love is that with which one treats the multitude. the ta shueh notes that the “announcement of 44 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december k’ang says: ”when the individual families have become humane, then the whole country will be aroused toward humanity.” (chapter 9) reliance on virtuous individuals to govern entire social systems, however, restricts the privilege of governance to those who are born to the more advantageous positions in society. families who have numerous members and those who have a relatively more advantageous access to resources will dominate weaker families. this consequently will breed social inequalities. the more advantaged can influence public policy in their favor and will breed practices of injustices that will require the intervention by the people or by the state in order to address problems of resentment and jealousy. it is therefore not surprising that modernist values such as equality and freedom erupted later on in revolutionary and reformist movements that rocked chinese history. the “principle of the measuring square,” cited above, warns rulers about the possible vengeance that followers might inflict on them if they fail to abide by the “golden rule.” chapter 10 of the ta hsueh concludes that “therefore, when wealth is gathered in the ruler’s hand, the people will scatter away from him; and when wealth is scattered [among the people], they will gather around him.” equality and social justice, therefore must be kept as virtues of social institutions if the ruler is to maintain himself or herself in power. the ta shueh also warns that “it is not easy to keep the ‘mandate of heaven’” (chapter 10). it warns that by “having the support of the people, they have their countries, and by losing the support of the people, they lose their countries. therefore, the ruler will first be watchful over his own virtue.“ this admonition is consistent with the order of values in the analects. when asked about his preferences in relation to food, armaments and confidence of the people, confucius chose the latter because according to him, “no state can exist without the confidence of the people” (analects 12:7). the will of the people is deemed to prevail even in the despotic regimes of ancient china. rainier a. ibana 45 concluding reflections confucian moral education teaches that virtues are cultivated through the family. the virtues of xiao, li and de are developed from within this social context. in the ancient greek city states or the polis, the virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance were identified as cardinal virtues that guide the flourishing of its members. in the religious communities of the medieval period, the theological virtues of faith, hope and love were preached to promote religious devotions. in the modern world, scientific societies highly valued freedom, equality, and fraternity in the promotion of social progress. in our contemporary virtual communities, communicative competence, sincerity and truthfulness serve as the norm of social relations. the influence of social contexts in the cultivation of virtues and the emergence of distinctive human values from different historical circumstances, however, need not limit the universal aspirations of humanity from within the specific contexts of cultural circles. the validity of these virtues and values can still be recognized, appropriated and applied to other social and historical circumstances since such circumstances are also possible experiences for other human beings. the epistemology of moral beliefs demonstrated by confucian ethics, such as the formation and openness of the mind to know, the investigation of the principles that govern the things that the mind comes into contact with and the act of proceeding to know from that which is already known towards the unknown (ta hsueh, chapter 5) are also familiar to ethicists schooled in the traditions of aristotle, st. thomas, kant, max scheler and habermas. these methodological convergences exemplify the shared experiences of those who have thought deeply about the foundations of moral values and the applicability of moral principles to different social and personal circumstances. human conditions will necessarily be different, but there are convergences among their aspirations that offer hope for the emergence of human solidarity, compassion and shared destiny. 46 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december endnotes 1 translated as the great learning in wing –tsit chan, ed. a sourcebook in chinese philosophy (new jersey: princeton university press, 1963) and the highest order of cultivationin ta hsueh and chung yung: the highest order of cultivation andon the practice of the mean ed. trans. and compiled by andrew planks (new york: penguin books limited, 2003). 2 wing –tsit chan, ibid., 85. 3 ibid. 4 new world encyclopedia (wujing) https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/ entry/wujing 5 sunyatsen, the three principles of the people: san min chu i (taipei: china publishing co, 1927), 33-34. 6 this section is borrowed from jinli he, “confucian ren ethics: the relational person and family feeling” philosophy manual: a south-south perspective (paris: unesco, 2014), 149-151. 7 confucius, “the great learning” cited in http://classics.mit.edu/confucius/ learning.html accessed on november 25, 2020 references andrew planks, trans. and ed. the highest order of cultivation in ta hsueh and chung yung: the highest order of cultivation and on the practice of the mean (new york: penguin books limited, 2003). jinli he, “confucian ren ethics: the relational person and family feeling,” philosophy manual: a south-south perspective (paris, unesco, 2014), pp. 149-151. james legge, “the confucian analects,” the four books, trans. with notes by james legge (oxford, 1892) in primary texts in moral philosophy: a philippine collection edited by rainier ibana and angelli tugado (pasig: commission on higher education, 1998), pp. 33-64. sunyatsen, the three principles of the people: san min chu i (taipei: china publishing co, 1927), pp. 33-34. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/wujing https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/wujing http://classics.mit.edu/confucius/learning.html http://classics.mit.edu/confucius/learning.html rainier a. ibana 47 wing–tsit chan, ed. the great learning: a sourcebook in chinese philosophy (new jersey: princeton university press, 1963). _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 1 vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 1-33 © 2000 by assumption university press kesava rajarajan1 abstract this article is a summary of 60+ hymns on and organizing principle of the structure of the temple, its s (nine holy lands). the , much less known to the outer world. the three authors of the , viz., campantar ( and cuntarar (7) have contributed six s (decades of hymns, totally of 62 hymns) on the budha in unexamined in scholarly works. it is worthwhile to see what the 2 tamil literature clearly recognizes the importance of this venue with reference to its landscape, , , cultic values, mythologies, the visual iconography of the temple that evolved under which is often neglected by scholars. keywords: ; budha; introduction a planet or .2 all the nine in the temple. the 3 4. 3 the navagraha round the sun), and cuntarar have contributed six s (decades of hymns, totaling on. these are often not mentioned in scholarly works. yet it is worthwhile to see what the and [ ] seems rooted in pan-indian lore.5 we may talk of regionalism, but none escape from the shackles of nationalism that we call “emotional integration” or “unity in diversity.” the present article is a summary of the 60+ hymns 4 in the initial stages of growth from the view point of structure and organization of the temple, its location and evolution of regional visual iconography. 5 s (anglicized coromandel) occupies a key place in indian religious geography. from several s are located on the west coast (rajarajan 2020, 2020a, -wild, cf. poongodi 2006) , much less known to the outer world. my doctoral guide, dr. a. veluswamy suthanthiran (1982), did his doctoral work (university of madras 1982) on the temple in this is another nearby s of meant for budha (fig. 7; rajarajan 2015: 192; navagraha(nine holy lands, rajarajan 2011: 131-144). the s (karpagam 2020: 297-321).6 the mystics that composed the , viz., campantar ( s (decades of hymns, totally of 62 hymns) on the veluswamy suthanthiran (1982) remains unpublished, but it is worthwhile to see what the 6 this is as follows: 7 (are 1918: 496) (are 475 of 1918) whose shoulder is bamboo-like smooth) ) and candra) s . found in the temple. other inscriptions are 7 (7th century ce) and cuntarar (8th century). their hymns have been brought under the seven s (books of the sacred order), books one to three by campantar, books four to six by appar, and book seven much dearer to them than their own life. the and (8th ) are regularly recited with the musical accompaniment in if we listen to at least a few among the several thousands of the hymns by the -trio. 8 ), ). the sacred icon is united with a female 9 he is the tempest that nurtures saplings.10 ( ). 2. ghouls do not harass, (ignorance) is unveiled, (devotees) beget good children, and all good s are assured; there the venue of the divinity whose half is occupied by the gracious maiden;11 umai. if thou take a dip in the (trio)12, no evil [ ] (evil deed) haunts anyone. 3. the lord is an abstraction of the s;13 (earth), ( water), (ether), (moon), (sun) and the (breath-spell) that makes 14 4.48.10). he is . his ). he is the this scenario, the pearl shells coming out of the sea are laughing. 15 dwells in a venue in the coastal region. yama had snatched the life of an expert in s16 place. the yamas are afraid of the lord of the scarred-throat to a noose on devotees. seated on trees listen to the names ( ) of the lord recited s17. 9 bones, melodiously as he was afraid of who was seated with the lord.19 the lord is residing in this temple. the handsome peacock is dancing, the ocean 20 obtained grace. those that do not melt their minds in devotion are not devotees. 10. the buddhists and jains21 are preaching philosophies based on false logic. would you mind not listening to them? true wisdom is in the s. full of cold ponds. he is the author of the ten hymns bearing the hymns live happily on this earth. they are masters of the heavens. 4. campantar poison coming out of the churning of the ocean of milk. our patriarch, he is the emasculator of evils that attack the devotees of the lord. bees 2. the lord is the master that redeems us from the evils of , the s. he stamps out errors and showers bliss on devotees. s. 10 3. the venue has three eyes. the lord appears as buds of pearls in the minds of those that partake in heart-melting worship. the ocean waves wash white pearls ashore in 4. the is for the grey-haired people who visit during old age its waves22. smoke) kindled in the 23 24. the lord 25 , that is a rare sight for the celestials. bees are humming among the ponds there. 10. he is the lord that has tamed the dancing cobra. devotees are assembled to shower praises. the sacred could not be understood 11 11. the lord holding the is the governor to give up . if so, you are to rule in the celestial world. 1. he is my god extolled by the vedic aphorisms ( ) by the celestials and indra. the lord is smeared with ( “white-ash”)26 and (end). he has no beginning and no end. 2. his weapon is the (stone-cutters chisel). his garment, 27. 3. the lord is pleased to accept milk, ghee, curd, and other (fruits) the banyan tree for imparting wisdom . 12 laurel ( ), and fragrant screw-pine ( ). white herons ( ) wild where the lord stripped the elephant-demon, , of his skin.29 he is fond of the melody of the lute.30 5. the gifted divinity, the lord, is holy, followed by the s. he absolves our crimes and overcomes all hardships. my god, he is foremost of the s. he is the eternal whose sacred feet services to the lord on all days without fail. his complete presence is felt coming to the sacred land. visited by recluses and holding the in hand. level best to discover the crest and feet of the lord that they could not in 31. none is there to deserve our adorations other than the lord. the experts in the hymns shall be relieved from all ordeals of , 13 leading to nirmala (devoid of s, or psychosis for likes and dislikes). loved by devotees appar 1. my mind, the lord, is a dimple of the eye for devotees that the crest bears the crescent. for the attainment of bliss, one must reach by the s. he is decorated with a white crescent and mounted on the white bull. his throat is black32 (colored by the poison from the white33 14 3. do not pursue the enjoyment of s that melt your tissues. . honey-like, the lord lives on the tongues of those that always cherish 34 elephant of its hide. he is posted on the big white hill.35 his abode is the 36 s and s. 37 with his arrow, he destroyed the enemies of humankind ( ) in the threecities, s. appear as 39 ). civam is the pinnacle of love, extolled by lovers of all countries.40 my locks. he was pleased to burn down the triple-cities of the immoral allies. he has explained the meanings of the four s and six s at forehead, lord by uttering the 41 42 (kalidos 1996). he is the lord of wisdom that appears in 43 (swan) the coveted [ ]my mind reaches him. 15 10. the lord takes pleasure dipping in milk, . he preaches the (carp was caught in his throat. his necklace consists of the bones of corpses. 11. the lord is crested with the moon that glitters during darkness. all hymns in this end with the invocation (see 2.184.11 above) which has a variety of meanings. it can refer to a god, a man of freakish behavior; a person who is obsessed with particular with physical abnormality, an oddity, a rarity, an eccentric, a devotee, a lover, an enthusiast, an addict, a maniac and so on (“manifestations” in kramrisch 1981, cf. meister 1984). commentators often employ for (cf. 3.8.9, rajarajan et al. 2020: 1625) the holy ash ( ). he lifts the in hand and is decorated with the . a good cobra is inserted in the ear-hole ( )44. his golden locks are hanging down. the lord is decorated with a three. he is majestically a divinity of oddities. 2. the lord is well disposed toward his devotees that extol his sacred feet by blessing them through his lotus feet, . this sacred foot stamps out all terrible receive . he plays the during the to tune the s. 16 45 i was standing there. he was pretending to be a visitor, not a beggar. i with soft breasts. his one half. the hooded is tied around his hip. he is mounted on the s. 46 with rainy clouds. wandering all over the cosmos. dwarfed s follow him sounding the (big drum).47 he has captivated my mind. i pretend not to whisper the s. in hand and is decorated with the , and moves not to receive the ; he (sundara) has captivated the viewers. he talks pleasingly to covet my bangles. he is the whose tongue is the , the the [ ]. his job is not to eat and sleep as ordinary mortals; the food is among the s). he is . talking pleasingly, he has caught hold of me. the eternal, he bears the 8. scared s. those that provide services are amply rewarded with desirable boons. the dignitary is mounted on 17 light, and his garland consists of cuntarar 1. thou have decked the hooded cobra on thy crest, . the hide of the prancing tiger is on thy hip. thou demons,49 house in search of alms ( their archaic forms were destroyed and rehabilitated in new bodies.50 thou destroyed manmatha when he dared ruin thy and gave him a new the ocean. 3. lord, thou are loitering along with the s, followed . tell me the truth, why are thou frolicking and moving when the locks of thou hair are pushed down.? why are thou begging seated 4. thou are the melody inherently present in music and poem. thou are the eyes of human beings. thou are the consciousness in devotees who meditate on thee. thou are present on the earth. thou are the bearer surrounded by the ocean. 18 5. lord, thy devotees worship by pouring water pots ( ), ] s. thou are the giver decorated with stringed gems on her breast was grafted to thee. what for the deadly poison perpetually sticks to thy neck? lord, thou are the 6. lord, thou undertook the hazardous venture to strip the skin of is grafted to thy half with whom thou are wandering around begging 7. lord, thou are the justice and the judge. thou are an expert in dance and amusement thy devotees the s are playing instruments and generating music. the s are creating music while standing by thou side. thou are propagating the s, [indian laburnum], and [purple are the ( and ). thou have erased the impurities is surrounded by the ocean. devotees. why are thou dancing in the crematorium where ghouls are that is surrounded by the ocean. 19 the eastern ocean. it is the venue of the experts in the deemed to be celestials. interpretation a sacred center of worship in case of south asian temples. they are , and (soundararajan 1993-95: 9-10), and later s and s were added. there could be no temple without regular services or and periodical festivals, or (kalidos 1989: chap. ix). the is uniformly called 51 20 ( 5.9.10) this is because the sacred venue is holy of the holies on earth ( , ii, 67-68). candra, all the nine are neither grouped nor named. the 3.5 (550 ce, zvelebil 1974: 141) notes 6. 178: that the not clear whether the case there are six plus two, or a total of eight (kalidos 2006: iv, ii, 146, cf. mevissen 2005: 580). it is only in the hymns of the (2.221.1) around the 7th century ce that a clear perspective of the planetary deities is obtained and the hymn itself is called (decad on planets): … … the planets listed are nine and they are sun, moon, mars, mercury, s in a disorderly pattern: a hymn: ( 5.149.4). the s are called 21 another hymn from “the souls that are not dedicated to the lord are born again and again in any one of the caturyonis. he is liberator of the moon from being tortured by the demonic ). the was discharged to admonish the crocodile living in a pond. the liberated beasts (crocodile and elephant) were blessed to attain and (pvp).” 22 th-8th in the east coast that received the attention of the hymnologists. we blunders they committed. at the same time, the lord is the annihilator of cosmic harmony through wanton war or meditated pestilence. in the end, terror or corona shall fall by its weapon; he who takes up the sword will perish by the sword. however, we do not indicate either budha (fig. 7) or the budha,52 which seems to be a later overgrowth of the . the epigraphic sources bearing on the temple are fascinating 23 endnotes 1 r.k.k. rajarajan is currently at gandhigram rural university, gandhigram, dindigul. 2 there is strong belief in india that the planets have a role to play in deciding their fortunes in all walks of life. each family maintains an individual horoscope that is consulted with traditional local experts in astrology in times of need. 3 not the temple that falls within the precincts of the city, examined by rajarajan (2008: 405-14). 4 s into an entity, called s (after the s, e.g., ap “water”, s ( ), s (seven dancing venues, ) and s (performing eight deeds of heroism such , latha 2010, sumathi 2010. 5 sathanarayanan (2022a: 128) write about the 3.311.10). the twins is s” ( ( 7.2.8: literature clearly points the importance of the ; the existing structural monuments add the value of the traditional living rituals connecting to the daily life. 6 similarly, the s and the as follows: 24 rajarajan (2015: 208, fn. 4). 7 with britain dowson 1998: 315). in mythology, the saptas) (salt), (sugarcane), (wine), or (butter), (curd), or (freshwater); for more details see dowson (1998: 102). the romanization of the hymns is avoided due to the constraint of space in this small communication. 9 the rhythm of creation ( ), integration (sustenance ) and destruction ( ), the 10 s. 11 most 12 13 the of tillai was overturned (kalidos 2021, see fig. 5). 14 15 16 expert in the 17 parrots are brought up pets in some temples, e.g., in ii, 193-94). 19 an image conforming to this description is reported from cave xvi, the of cave xiv, ellora. 25 20 hymns in kalidos (2003). 21 “meal or group” ( v, p. 22 full of conchs and pearls on the seashore. 23 the scene radically changed in the 15th century with the coming of malik kapur and his diabolic followers during the khilji and tughlak periods. the s permeating with the sweet-smell of were nauseating with the beef roasted by the s and s (aiyangar 1921, dodamani 2008: 19-20). 24 the finance minister, dr nirmala sitaraman, behind the curtain. 25 this name appears in (rajarajan et al 2020: 540). 26 in (1.202.1-11, kalidos 2006: ii, 68-70). 27 or on his matted locks in the rock-cut hindu cave, aihole (kalidos 2006: ii, pl. li.3). 29 30 (cf. 4.79.3, kalidos 1996: 34-35). 31 1. 32 6.6.3, 9.4.5). 33 5.2.9, rajarajan et al. 2020: 1591). see note 14. 34 s are 35 maybe axis mundi on which any stands. 36 s. it belongs to all s are dramatized here for the entertainment of souls undergoing . 26 37 means “higher wisdom” that includes , and (justice to all and malice to none); religions addicted to war and contagions preach ( the s exist through the ages, e.g., the axis during the second world war; those that propagate terrorism and corona (in several waves) today. 39 an episode in the , elaborated in the (rajarajan 2021). 40 south be extolled; lord of all countries be praised” ( ll. 164-65 of 41 iii, 1407). 42 and 3) and . 43 s (latha 2010) and literature belongs to an early period and so its impact over a later art-form is taken for artist. behind each work of art, a saga of thinking and meditation had gone (rajarajan 2015a: 57). 44 the on tiara, ear-hole, neck and all over the body. 45 46 hymn is a 47 has stolen my mind”. 27 49 cuputti (subuddhi). 50 the and and , are in indian lore. 51 (where are you from); the tamil way is; (what is your place). in tamil tradition, sacred centers of worship are s (gods own country!). 52 is pulled by four lions. he may also be seated on the (rajarajan 2015: 216). 28 references aiyangar, s. krishnasvami. . s. chand, delhi, 1921. anitha, n. ’s views on social reformliberation of women, qjms, 106.3 (2015): 98-107. are: 1896, 1918. ayyar, p.v. jagadisa. . : asian education services, 1993, pp. 262-264. bakker, hans. : helsinki: finnish oriental society, 2001, pp. 43-53. -----. : . leiden: brill, 2019, pp. 489-539. basham, a.l. . rupa, calcutta, 1971. czerniak. nine ponds ( s) : preliminary notes. xxiv.2 (2022): 185-218. czerniak. sathanarayanan. importance of water bodies in the : , edited by malini ambach, jonas buchholz, and ute hüsken, heidelberg: asian studies pub., 2022, pp. 121-157. https://doi.org/10.11588/hasp.906. c13938 dodamani, b.a. ’ . sharada publishing house, delhi, 2008. jeyapriya-rajarajan, : . sharada, delhi 2009. -----. “ : iconography and cult traditions”, qjms: , 109.4 (2018): 41-49. 29 -----. “ : more about [ ]”, qjms, 110.2 (2019): 60-64. kalidos, raju. .2 (1984): 167-73 -----. hymns, , 57 (1996): 13-56. -----. , 46.3-4 (1996a): 371-413. -----. , 64 (2003): 77-136. -----. : , 4 vols*. sharada, delhi, 2006. * . ----tamil literary traditions, their relevance in the study of indian arts. . 2012: 33-75. -----. ‘ (forthcoming), 2021. kansdaswamy, s.n. ( . xiv, 2 pts.) . karpagam, v. navatiruppati: , 31.21 (2020): 297-321. kramrisch, stella, . philadelphia, 1981. latha, k., (ph.d. diss.), the tamil university, thanjavur. 2010. ., . , sapienza university of rome, rome, 2012. meister, m.w. . bombay, 1984 30 mevissen, gerd j.r. chidambaram . archiectur, ikonographie und symbolic, , 9/10 (1996): 345-420. -----. . … rome, 1997. ‘ ’, 4 vols. (tamil ), : . ed. ca. . : . , 24 vols. board of editors. : (not dated 2014). parthiban, rajukalidosss. , 2 vols. (ph.d. diss., iit). hyderabad, 2019. , part of ‘ peterson, indira v. . motilal banarsidass, delhi, 1991. poongodi, g. , xxiv.1 (2005): 39-52. rajarajan, r.k.k. . in p. chenna reddy ed. ( . . ), delhi: sharada publishing house, 2004, pp. 86-91. -----. gender and godhood in medieval tamil bhakti tradition visual imagery, , vol. xxiii.1 (2005): 63-78. -----. art of the vijayanagara: . sharada, delhi, 2006. 31 -----. “ ”, , 27.2 (2011): 131-144. http://dx.doi.org /10.1080/02666030.2011.614413 -----. : a historiographical retrospection, in lorenzetti . 2012: 233-70. -----. s: dancing halls five, , 8.2 (2014): 197-216. doi: 10.1558/rosa.v8i2.197 -----. ‘ in eds. j. soundararajan, , delhi: sharada publishing house, 2015, pp. 189. 147-157. -----. art and literature: inseparable links. 106.4 (2015a): pp. 53-61. -----. : ”, : , 10.2 (2016): 83-104. -----. : exploring of , 40.71 (2020): 3044-66. -----. rejoinder: “disown ”, , 40.76 (2020): 625-630. -----. : the ‘ .” 10 (2021): 355-366. doi: https://doi.org/10.5209/eiko.74158 -----. : . dr. devangana desai endowment senior scholarship, chhatrapati shivaji maharaj vastu sangrahalaya, mumbai (2022: on-going) rajarajan, r.k.k. -rajarajan. : forgotten tillai.k. .k.k. rajarajan eds. : chap. v. sharada, delhi (forthcoming), 2021. rajarajan, r.k.k., r.k. . kalidos. : . sharada, delhi 2017. 32 rajarajan, r.k.k., r.k. . kalidos. (based on ‘ : gandhigram rural university, 2020. -----. ‘ ( ), 4 vols. gandhigram: gandhigram rural university, 2020a. rao, t.a. gopinatha. . vol. ii, part i. madras: the law printing house. santhana-lakshmi-parthiban. : the grahadevatas, qjms, 110.2 (2019): 32-40. shulman, david dean. . . princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1989, pp. 132-134. srinivasan, sharada. cosmic dance. , 34.2 (2007): 126-137 sumathi, k. (ph.d. diss.), the tamil university, thanjavur, 2010. suthantiran, a. veluswamy. (ph.d. diss.), university of madras. madras, 1982. -----. , 42.2-4 (1992): 495-500. . 7 vols. university of madras, madras, 1982 (reprint). , 2 vols. ed. . . transl. g.u. pope, w.h. .w. ellis, /1976. . chennai 1948; transl. g.u. pope (oxford 1900) . , part of ‘ 33 . .ci. . madras, 1905. vairakkodi, c. : a case study of .3 (2016): 31-43. -----. . 107.4 (2016a.): 36-46. -----. 2017. : , (ph.d. diss.), madurai kamaraj university, madurai, 2017. zvelebil, k.v. . chennai, institute of asian studies, 1998. a9eel2k5_ayh0lu_4hc.tmp 109 the important role of the separation of church and state in last generation theology for seventh-day adventists armin kritzinger and mohammad manzoor malik abstract this paper takes a contemporary look at the discussion and analysis of the concept of separation of church and state from a seventh-day adventist perspective. the separation of church and state means that the government should not . the separation of church and state can clearly be seen in the first amendment of the united states constitution. philosophers like locke strongly opposed the combination of church and state, and during the dark ages, where the church largely controlled the state, we can see how many people were killed by the roman catholic church and its subsidiaries for following their consciences. history has shown us that in countries where religion and state has not been kept separate, there is persecution of the masses. the bible, and seventh-day adventist christian authors like alonzo jones and ellen white, completely reject the idea of the state wanting to enforce religious rules on their people. these authors believed in the central idea of last generation theology, which is that the last generation of christians who are alive when christ returns will live lives completely free from sin. in order to be encouraged vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 109-121 © 2000 by assumption university press 110 to be completely obedient to god in all areas that he requires, it is crucial to have the freedom to follow your conscience without the interference of the civil authority. the combination of church and state therefore seems to play a major role in the eschatology of christianity as it relates to last generation theology. keywords: separation of church and state; last generation theology; seventh day adventists introduction . primarily, if not exclusively, governments should protect the rights of people1. james madison made it clear that a government adopting a constitution is what makes it a nation2. this has to do with social contract theories. the church, on the other hand, was created for mission, for the gathering of god’s people to worship freely according to their conscience3. from at least 1122, with the concordat of worms, there has been recorded of a nations people which was triggered from the debate whether religion and state should be united through giving the roman catholic church legislative authority for civil laws, the enforcement of these laws and for enacting punishments for the disobeying of these laws4. church and state ’ . for many centuries, and even more so now, this has been an interesting philosophical debating point. it is important to look at what religious texts say about this issue, what some popular philosophers have to say about it, and what . it is also necessary to understand the important connection between the separation of church and state, and last generation theology.5 111 give to caesar what belongs to caesar and give to god what belongs to god the bible as a whole, unlike many other religious guiding documentations, does not support the idea of combining church and state. jesus himself was the one who said, “render to caesar the things that are ”6. christ did not teach people to give to caesar that which is god’s. “caesar” refers to civil government as caesar constituted the civil government of that day, and thus jesus taught that we owe civil duties to the civil government. the duties that we owe to god are moral duties as it deals with religious views. religious duties pertain to god only, and thus civil government have no businesses with man’s personal faith and religion. the bible scholar alonzo jones thus concluded that civil government can have nothing to do with morality7. this might seem a bit extreme, but with careful thought can be seen to be true. if morality also pertains to our thoughts and intentions, as many religions teach, by nature it is out of the reach of civil government. how can mortal man read the hearts and minds of man? no civil government seeks to punish covetousness, hate or even lusting after an underage child, as long as these things stay in the person’s mind. when a person’s hate leads him to kill someone, then the civil government will punish him. the civil government will punish him not for the hate he had in heart, but for the actions of killing someone else. the government is thus not punishing him for immorality, but rather for not being civil. this is the reason why our nations are called civil governments, and not moral governments. the religious government, or government of god, would be the moral government. political leaders are civil servants and civil governors, not moral servants or moral governors. the civil government should punish uncivility and the moral government should punish immorality. unfortunately, many have made morality and civility to be the same thing. a good example of this is popular, conservative, political commentator michael knowles from the daily wire8. crime and punishes crime, but it doesn’ 112 sin. it is thus the government’s responsibility to encourage and promote and promote morality. this is why christ told the church to spread the gospel, and not the government9. the government’s duty is to preserve order in a nation and guard against uncivility. during the inquisition the church and state united to punish immorality10. it was thus necessary to discover the thoughts and intentions. the papacy carried this principle to its logical consequence. torture was said to bring out confessions of the thoughts and intentions. the idea that civil government should punish morality as it relates to thoughts and intentions will logically lead to the inquisition. some, like michael knowles from the daily wire, argue that the government is in fact enforcing moral law by punishing those who steal and kill and lie, as these are forbidden by religious law, e.g. ten commandments11. but the civil government does not enforce them as the law of god. jesus made it clear that he who hates is guilty of murder and he who lusts is guilty of adultery12, and the government does not punish for hate and lust. regarding moral law, the one who repents can be forgiven and escape the punishment13 14, while this cannot be said of civil law. applying forgiveness in such a sense to civil law would completely destroy the purpose of any civil government. a man who transgressed civil law needs to be punished whether he has been forgiven by god or not since that is a religious matter. peter also said, “we must obey god rather than men”15, simply showing that conscience should be followed as it is informed by god. the levitical priesthood of judaism were not put into the position of king, nor of that of judge during the judges’ period of judaic history, even though over governance was limited to the declaration of those laws which god had made to form their government as a nation and which became enforceable only by conscience after the death of jesus; for when jesus 113 walked on earth during his, about three and a half years, ministry, his goal of saving people from their sins included not establishing an earthly . seventh-day adventist co-founder, ellen white, wrote, “the government under which jesus lived was corrupt and oppressive; on every hand were crying abuses-extortion, intolerance, and grinding cruelty. yet the saviour attempted no civil reforms. he attacked no national abuses, nor condemned the national enemies. he did not interfere with the authority or administration of those in power. he who was our example kept aloof from earthly governments. men, but because the remedy did not lie in merely human and external measures”16. we have three main examples in the bible that deal directly with the idea of church and state. all three of these stories paint a negative picture of church-state unity. 17. king ahab, the civil leader of israel, started a relationship with a prophetess of baal. this prophetess, jezebel, did not like elijah’s religious views and therefore used her husband, as the civil leader, to persecute elijah. the religious power called to the civil power to murder all the prophets and citizens who would not bend their knee to baal, and god’s response to such activity was to change the climate and deny the region water, causing severe shortages of food, so severe that the people were eating each other’s children and paying luxury prices for the privilege of eating donkey heads. this was the punishment god enacted for the state-run religious ordinances of false worship which were in direct opposition to his ten commandments law. the second example is that of john the baptist18. herodias did not like the morality that john was teaching, which was based on his religious views, and therefore she used civil power, through king herod to murder john the baptist by beheading, through manipulating her daughter to manipulate her husband, king herod, via the medium of lewd and provocative entertainment. the bible even tells us that the king did not really want to kill john but did so anyway because of his declaration 114 territory and he didn’t want to look like an oath breaker in front of the delegates present with him at the time of this incident. . there are two beasts depicted: one representing a civil power and one a religious power. the civil power then makes an image of the religious power and enforces rules to force the conscience of individuals to obey every word that proceeds from the mouth of the beast. disobedience is then eventually punished with death, just as it was in our previous example of john the baptist. this exact same scenario is also depicted in revelation 17 where a woman, often seen as a symbol of spiritual power, is riding a dragon, which can . popular philosophers’ the dark ages are so called because there was a very strong link between church and state, and this unity was perverted to such an extent that experimental science, logic, philosophy, art, and culture were retarded by the murderous actions of the roman catholic church and the monarchs who supported them, which culminated in the atrocities of the french revolution from the atheist response to the tyranny of the roman catholic church19. the pope was seen as the direct leader of the church, and the indirect leader of the state. during this time the word was used to describe the combination of church and state20. because of this combination, freedom of expression and beliefs basically became non-existent. thousands were killed during this time for voicing had to profess to believe under pain of torture and execution. there are much less prominent philosophers during this time, than during other times when there were more freedoms concerning the expression of ideas. there was also a massive retardation in the growth and development of great technological advances during this time, due to the laws of physics being declared as heresy by the pope of the roman catholic church for multiple successive generations of popery. creativity was supressed, except for some areas of art and music to a certain extent. 115 during the reformation, martin luther played a vital role in what is today known as the separation of church and state21. his idea on two kingdoms basically laid the foundation for the anabaptists who became by far the most outspoken against the combination of church and state. they did not even allow their baptised members to vote or hold any 22. for about 500 years the monarchs of england have held the position as the head of the church of england, after breaking with the roman catholic church through henry viii. great britain, and is the primary reason why the united states made separation of church and state23. one responsible for this. it is english philosopher, john locke, during the enlightenment period that is often credited with the concept of the separation between church and state in his writings24. his argument was that the government did not have the authority over individual conscience. more and more philosophers after him argued for a separation in faith and reason. there was still no unity amongst all. voltaire defended some separation, but he also wanted the church to be subordinate to the state25, which is still a violation of the right of free-thinking individuals to dictate how they worship god. denis diderot said that the distance between the throne (politics) and the pulpit (religion) can never be too great. in the world as we know it today, many countries with a majority muslim population do not have separation of church and state, and there is more and more pressure to enforce religious rules as the law of the land and we see the very terrible results of such a system crystal clear when we look at persecution in these countries. there are also some buddhist countries, like thailand and cambodia, where there is also not a separation between state and religion, although more freedoms are allowed than in some other countries where the state and religion are not separated. the combination of church and state in the dark ages is largely what made it so dark. new and progressive ideas were rejected, and people 116 could not live according to their conscience. it is also important to mention that philosophers who supported the idea that people should be allowed to follow their conscience did not mean to say that people have unlimited freedom to do whatever they wanted to do. if everyone believed that their god told them to kill other people, or take other people’s possessions, and all were free to follow such ideas, then society would be in great danger and chaos. so where do they place the limit? as soon as the ideas infringe on the life, liberty or possessions of others, then the government has to step in to protect the basic rights of its citizens. truth be told, there are very few religious ideas that actually ask their followers to infringe on the rights of others. it is a vast minority of the cases, and usually extreme interpretations that are even condemned by the mainstream of such religious bodies. alonzo jones’ and ellen white’ alonzo jones is a well-known american christian preacher and revivalist. he believed that the american revolution “was the expression of two distinct ideas: first, that government is of the people; and, second, that government is of right entirely separate from religion”26. he argued that the idea of everyone being free to worship according to their conscience was “a natural, constitutional, and divine right”27. he argued that worship was a duty that man owed to god, or whoever/whatever that man believes in, and not a duty owed to the government. even though jones was a christian, he opposed a government bill that would force everyone to worship on sundays in the late 19th century. he also spoke out against religion was the duty of the parents or a private school. jones especially appealed to the history of what happened when constantine became a christian and many romans were forced into a new belief system. as the roman empire moved the capital to constantinople, and the roman bishop took over in rome, this principle of combining church and state continued in the roman catholic church and eventually led to persecuting those who were declared to be heretics. jones saw this as a recipe for 117 disaster and feared that america would become like what happened to europe under the papal power28. james madison, the fourth president of the united states, proclaimed the same idea when he said “the purpose of separation of church and state is to keep forever from these shores the ceaseless strife that has soaked the soil of europe in blood for centuries”29 ellen white was a female author in the 19th and early 20th century in north america. she is one of the most widely translated authors in the world. she believed that a union of church and state will lead to “national apostasy, which will end only in national ruin”30. she feared that protestants would follow in the footsteps of the roman catholic church and that “protestant churches shall unite with the secular power to sustain a false religion”31. she even mentions that one of the main reasons for the rise of secularism in france where they rejected the seven-day week was because of the abuse of civil power by the church. she predicted that church-state prophecy, “although church and state will unite their power to compel “all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and bond,” to receive “the mark of the beast,” [revelation 13:16.]”32. just like alonzo, she looked for the day when the same things will happen in america that happened in europe, “let the principle once be established in the united states, that the church may employ or control the power of the state; that religious observances may be enforced by secular laws; in short, that the authority of church and state is to dominate the conscience, and the triumph of rome in this country is assured”33. the sour taste of the inquisitions and the depravity of the roman catholic church as the dwelling of every unclean and hateful thing has been overshadowed by a desire for unity, but unity of church and state can only lead to a disaster the likes of which will make the atrocities of, leading up to and including, the french revolution appear to be nothing more than a fun dinner party for children. last generation theology, a doctrine that is unique amongst some seventh-day adventist christians, believes that the last generation 118 of believers who will be alive when christ returns will live lives that are completely free from sin. god will do in the lives of those people what he did in the life of christ – provide the power for total obedience to his commandments. in order to be obedient to god’s commandments, it requires that his followers follow his word in all aspects. they need to do what he asks them to do, and they need to stay away from what he prohibits them to do. when there is no separation of church and state, then it provides the opportunity to the civil authority to legally require people to do things that god says they should not do, or legally require them to stay away from things that god asks them to do. this can prevent total obedience to god and creates an environment where total obedience to god is not encouraged. for this reason, it is an essential part of last generation theology that there must be a separation of church and state so that believers can give to caesar what belongs to caesar while at the same time giving to god what belongs to god. it is also important to note that because obedience and morality is a matter of the heart, it is not possible for someone to force you to be disobedient in the strictest sense of the word. civil power can prevent outward obedience, but they cannot change the condition and allegiance of the heart. the civil power enforcing moral rules therefore does not completely prevent last generation theology from becoming a reality, but it strongly discourages it. conclusion history, especially during the dark ages, has shown us that combining civil power with religious power is dangerous and leads to . it destroys freedom and leads to dry ceremonies and form in the place of true worship and a personal and loving relationship with god. the bible shows us this evil and warns us about it. even philosophers, like john locke, who do not accept the bible as truth, still believe that civil and religious powers should not be united. and civil governments about the dangers of uniting in a global moral 119 enforcement plan by uniting civil and religious powers. the seventh-day adventist church teaches total obedience to all of god’s commandments and therefore teaches the separation of church and state so that people have the freedom to follow their conscience in religious matters. endnotes 1 international service for human rights, “who protects human rights?” 2 3 white, acts of the apostles, 9. 4 white, the great controversy, 153. 5 doctrine of last generation theology for seventh-day adventists: a defense”. this article shows how the separation of church and state is an essential part of last generation theology because those who strive to live lives free from sin must have the freedom to follow their conscience. without the freedom to live out what they believe, they are not encouraged to experience complete obedience to god as is required by last generation theology. 6 mark 12:17 (esv). 7 jones, the rights of the people, 21. 8 newhook, “free speech has gone mad”. 9 matthew 28 (kjv). 10 hamilton, “inquisition”. 11 newhook, “free speech has gone mad”. 12 matthew 5 (kjv). 13 proverbs 28:13 (kjv). 14 acts 8:22 (kjv). 15 acts 5:29. 16 white, the desire of ages, 509. 17 1 king 19 (kjv). 18 matthew 14 (kjv). 19 mark, “the medieval church.” 20 marek, “caesaropapism and the reality of the 4th-5th century roman empire.” 21 loconte, “martin luther and the long march to freedom of conscience.” 22 bender, the anabaptists and religious liberty in the sixteenth century, 83. 23 cornell university law school, “first amendment”. 24 feldman, divided by god, 86. 25 masters, treatise on tolerance, 33. 120 references bender, harold. . unknown, 1955. cornell university law school. . cornell university law school legal information institute, 2013. feldman, noah. : . maryland: john hopkins university press, 2009. feldman, noah. . new york: farrar, straus and giroux, 2005. gilpin, henry. ’ . washington: langtree & o’sullivan, 1840. hamilton, bernard. “inquisition”. britannica. accessed february 2, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/inquisition international service for human rights. “who protects human rights?” about human rights. accessed february 1, 2022. https://ishr.ch/ about-human-rights/who-protects-human-rights/ loconte, joseph. “martin luther and the long march to freedom of conscience.” national geographic. published october 27, 2017. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/martin-lutherfreedomprotestant-reformation-500#:~:text=luther%20argued%20 that%20burning%20heretics,will%20of%20the%20holy%20 spirit.%22&text=%e2%80%9che%20can%20neither%20teach%20 nor,concept%20that%20luther%20ultimately%20rejected. 26 jones, the union of church and state in the united states, 3. 27 jones, the rights of the people, 5. 28 jones, the two republics, rome and the united states of america, 483. 29 cornell university law school, “first amendment”. 30 white, evangelism , 235. 31 ibid. 32 white, the great controversy, 188. 33 ibid., 580. 121 marek, rafal. “caesaropapism and the reality of the 4th-5th century roman empire.” reality. published january 1, 2017. https://www. researchgate.net/publications/318487059_caesaropapism_and_ the_reality_of_the_thth-5th_century roman_empire mark, joshua. “the medieval church.” world history encyclopedia. published june 17, 2019. https://www.worldhistory.org/medieval_ church/ masters, voltaire. . cambridge university press, 2000. newhook, joshua. “free speech has gone mad”. the collegian. published september 23, 2021. https://hillsdalecollegian.com/2021/09/freespeech-has-gone-mad-says-michael-knowles/ jones, alonzo. . id: . jones, alonzo. . id: . jones, alonzo. . id: 1895. white, ellen. . maryland: review and herald publishing association, 1911. white, ellen. . maryland: review and herald publishing association, 1946. white, ellen. . maryland: review and herald publishing association, 1888. white, ellen. . maryland: review and herald publishing association, 1898. 10_(162-182) a naturalist.pmd a naturalist version of confucian morality for human rights haiming wen renmin university of china william keli’i akina1 university of hawaii at manoa abstract this article analyzes the source of confucian universal morality and human dignity from the perspective of the classic saying, “what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature” (jishan chengxing) found in the great commentaries of the book of changes. from a classical confucian perspective, human nature is generated by the natural dao of tian, so human dignity and morality also emerge from the natural dao of tian. this article discusses the relationship between the confucian dao of tian and the moral notion of human rights which ensues from the historical tradition of chinese exegesis on this subject. specifically, the authors reconstruct a naturalist version of confucian morality which inherently motivates the beneficial outcomes generally associated with the modern western conception of human rights. the authors argue that such a framework, which would draw upon confucian “natural goodness within human nature” differs significantly from the more commonly accepted mencian version of human morality dependent upon the premise that “human nature is good”. this intra-mural differentiation within chinese philosophy can be helpful in structuring dialogue with various western theories of human rights. º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéçôà¤ãòðëì¡óà¹ô´èõå¸ããáêò¡å¢í§¢§¨×éíáåðèñ¡´ôìèãõ¢í§ ¤çòáà»ç¹á¹øéâì̈ ò¡á§è¤ố áë觤µô̧ ããá·õèçèò �êô觷õèµòáàµëòâèíá ṍ áåðêô觷õèàµëò¡èíãù» ¡ç¤×í¸ããáªòµô� «ö觻ãò¡¯íâùèã¹íàôíã㶡¶òáë觤ñáàõãì·õèçèò é́çâ¤çòáà»åõèâ¹á»å§ prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 162-181 162 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ µòáá¹ç¤ố ¢í§¢§ ×̈éí ñ́é§à ốá ¶×íçèò¸ããáªòµô¢í§á¹øéâìà¡ố áò¨ò¡¸ããáªòµô¢í§àµëò áëè§êçãã¤ì ´ñ§¹ñé¹ èñ¡´ôìèãõáåðèõå¸ããá¢í§á¹øéâìâèíá¼ø´íí¡áò¨ò¡¸ããáªòµô ¢í§àµëòáëè§êçãã¤ì¹ñé¹´éçâ º·¤çòá¹õéíàô»ãòâ¶ö§¤çòáêñá¾ñ¹¸ìãðëçèò§àµëòáëè§ êçãã¤ì¢í§¢§¨×éíáåðá¹ç¤ô´êô·¸ôá¹øé⪹´éò¹èõå¸ããá «öè§à»ç¹¼åáò¨ò¡¢¹º »ãðçñµôèòêµãì¢í§¡òãµõ¤çòá¤ñáàõãì â´â੾òðíâèò§âôè§ ¼ùéà¢õâ¹ä é́êãéò§êãã¤ìá¹ç¤ố ´éò¹èõå¸ããá¢í§¢§¨×éíãëáèµòáẺ©ºñº¢í§¹ñ¡¸ããáªòµô¹ôâá ·õèàª×èíáâ⧡ñº á¹ç¤ô´¢í§¢§¨×éíà¢éò¡ñºàã× èí§êô·¸ôá¹øé⪹Ẻµðçñ¹µ¡íâèò§íâèò§å§µñç ¼ùéà¢õâ¹ä´éãëéàëµø¼åçèò ¡ãíºá¹ç¤ô´´ñ§¡åèòç¹ñé¹ «öè§ä´éáò¨ò¡á¹ç¤ô´¢§¨×éí·õèçèò �¤çòá ṍµòá¸ããáªòµôàòâ㹸ããáªòµô¢í§á¹øéâì� «öè§áµ¡µèò§¡ñ¹íâèò§áõ¹ñâêó¤ñ­ ¨ò¡¤çòáàª×èí¢í§àá觨×êíà¡õèâç¡ñºèõå¸ããá¢í§á¹øéâ캹¢éííéò§·õèçèò �¸ããáªòµô á¹øéâì¹ñé¹ ṍ� á¹ç¤ố »ãñª­ò ṏ¹·õèáõ¹ñâµèò§¡ñ¹àòâã¹êó¹ñ¡à ṍâç¡ñ¹àªè¹¹õéªèçâãëéà¡ố ¡òãàêç¹ò¡ñ¹ä é́́ õ¡ñºá¹ç¤ố µðçñ¹µ¡·õèëåò¡ëåòâ é́ò¹êô· ô̧á¹øé⪹ introduction the search for a confucian foundation for human rights is a growing enterprise within contemporary scholarship. despite the absence of a well-defined policy of human rights in modern china, many scholars suggest that there are numerous primary and comprehensible ideas related to human rights embedded within classical confucianism. this article reconstructs a naturalist version of confucian human rights based on the hermeneutical tradition built upon the saying within the great commentaries of the book of changes: “what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature” (jishan chengxing 继善成性 ). in much the same way the contemporary western notion of human rights is expressed by the united nations’ universal declaration of human rights, the confucian conception of human rights is seminally expressed in the statement that “the benevolent people tend to love others”. but precisely how these two approaches should interface has eluded scholars within the circle of comparative philosophy. the authors of this article consider the origins of confucian personal rights to be the appropriate entry point for tackling haiming wen and william keli’i akina 163 this question. according to clifford orwin, christian morality continues in secular clothing despite richard rorty’s claims that the god is dead, the latest version of nietzsche’s famous claim that “gott ist todt”, (orwin, 2004: 31-2).2 the concept of morality in human rights emerged as a real global morality in replacement of earlier formulations of theological morality following the second world war. the practical impetus which led to the casting of human rights as a moral issue emanated from the united nations’ recognition of the need for an international court to judge the inhumane atrocities which had scandalized western nations. these included the racial genocide and war crimes of world war ii, and extend to more contemporary massacres such as in yugoslavia in 1993 and rwanda in 1994. the theoretical foundation for the morality of human rights is stated in article 1 of the universal declaration of human rights, which declares that, “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. the dual implication of article 1 is that every human being is born with innate dignity and that every human being must respect the innate dignity of other human beings. this term “innate” strongly suggests that the worth of the individual, far from being dependent upon, actually transcends factors of race, color, sex, language, religion, politics and social status, etc. what elements, then, constitute the essence or foundation of the “innate dignity” of human beings? while the universal declaration of human rights implies that humans are “endowed with”…”innate dignity”, that document stops short of identifying or explaining the source thereof. the pre-modern conception of an almighty creator-god has been an historical referent for human dignity for most of the world, and theism has also provided the foundation for the morality of human rights by virtue of the west’s religious heritage (perry, 2007: 1-6). but with today's global pluralism and the blurring of boundaries between east and west, an appeal to the god of any one tradition falls short of a universal standard. for this reason, it is necessary to explore a non-religious answer for this question. according to michael j. perry, the argument for the traditional western morality of human rights is as follows: john 4:16 states that 164 prajna vihara __ __ ~ “god is love. whoever lives in love lives in god, and god is in him”. we are all sons and daughters of god, and we are brothers and sisters of each other. thus, everyone possesses innate dignity and should not be harmed; humans should respect and love each other. it is necessary to believe that the god creates humans not only to be brothers and sisters of each other, but also to have union with god through love. this is not only union in an ontological sense, but also the practical recognition that human beings are inseparable, such that we share each other’s interests (perry, 2007: 89). in this version, human nature is created by god, and all humans as sons and daughters of god should live as brothers and sisters. the utmost fulfillment for human beings is to attain to unity with god through love. in contrast, the theoretical vision of a confucian morality of human rights is naturalist. confucian human rights emerges from the natural dao of tian, which differs from the foundation of theological morality based upon the law of god. in confucian moral theories, a “dao’s-eyeview” is relativistic, but it is not moral relativism. however, a “god’seye-view” entails an absolute frame of reference. a confucian theory of moral choice needs to examine human ethical behaviors and start with obligation or consciousness. in fact, confucian moral facts can involve both beliefs and desires, so a confucian theory of action can be both “motivational” and “emotivist”. this article focuses on the hermeneutical sources for “what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)” in the great commentary of the book of changes, and argues that universality can be found in a confucian naturalist morality of human rights. additionally, this article attempts to dialogue with western ideas of human rights on both theoretical and practical levels. i. hermeneutical sources on “what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)” in the great commentary of the book of changes discussing some hermeneutical sources on”what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)” in the great commentary of the book of changes will help us to clarify the theoretical haiming wen and william keli’i akina 165 development from mencius’ statement that “human nature is good” through the song-ming neo-confucian statement “from goodness to nature”. this clarification is heuristic in constructing a naturalist version of confucian morality of human rights. according to xiang shiling, when han kangbo commented on the book of changes after wang bi, han did not explain the line about “what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)” in the great commentary. thus, at that time, what was not an important theoretical point for han eventually became a fertile topic of debate in song-ming neo-confucianism. this reflects neoconfucianism’s theoretical effort to construct a “natural goodness-human nature” framework from the dao of tian to the dao of human beings. many neo-confucians have worked on separating goodness from nature (xiang, 2008: 32-42). for example, cheng hao uses the line about in the great commentaries to explain mencius’ idea that human nature is good, and he also claims that it is beyond the expression of “goodness” to describe the ontological a priori nature (cheng, 1981: 10-1). xiang claims that the a priori goodness of nature becomes post-priori in the two cheng brothers (xiang, 2011: 140). cheng yi argues the statement that “human nature is originally good” could be taken as the “goodness of nature” which takes goodness to be a characteristic of human nature; and his elder brother, cheng hao also agrees. this paper argues that both cheng brothers proposed new interpretations on the mencius’ doctrine “human nature is good”. other neo-confucians in the song dyansty, like hu hong and zhang shi, also claimed that goodness is a property attached to nature, so goodness should not be taken as an essential character of nature. su shi also claims that when dao and things meet, goodness emerges, thus, goodness is produced naturally, so it is not viewed in a moral sense any longer. things naturally emerge and yin-yang naturally disappears, so goodness is simply a stage in the creative process of heaven and earth, that is original and ontologically grounded. su argues that it is possible to reason the existence of a father through his son, but one cannot infer the existence of a son from the father. su holds that the goodness comes from the dao, clearly against the mencian doctrine of taking goodness to be nature. for su, goodness is just an effective property of nature, but mencius 166 prajna vihara __ __ ~ confuses these two, which for su, is unacceptable. but later, zhu xi disagrees with su because su takes dao and things to be two separable aspects. chen chun, zhu xi’s student, and xue xuan during the ming dynasty both agreed with zhu that goodness and nature are inseparable (xue, 1990: 1297-8). keeping with the cheng brothers’ separation of goodness and nature, zhu xi claims that the natural pattern (li) is always good, and that things within nature accept this to be the case. he applies the zhongyong’s separation of a priori and a posteriori to argue that, for heaven and earth, it is goodness which precedes nature, but for humans, it is nature which precedes goodness. thus, zhu claims that the “what follows the dao is good” referring to that which is prior to birth, while for mencius “human nature is good” applies following birth (zhu, 1986: 1898). cai qing, during the mid-ming dyansty, also separated these two (cai, 1986: 602). his view was succeeded by wang fuzhi who clearly argues that “what follows (jizhi 继之 )” means the horizon between heavens and humans, and there is no separation between “following” and “not-following”. thus, to render tian as nature places it beyond good and evil, and the source of goodness must come after “what follows” or it will fail to be made manifest. it is the human being which follows the dao of tian that is good. wang also claims that human life comes from the dao of the yin-yang of heaven and earth. he claims that human nature is good because humanity follows tian/nature, and it does not mean that before “what follows” it is already good. he criticizes mencius’ “confusion” of the logical relationship between the goodness which connects to nature with “human nature is already good”, implying that mencius takes particulars to be universals. thus wang rejects the mencius claim that human nature is good (wang, 1988: 959). in sum, we might argue that neo-confucian philosophers transcend the mencius statement that “human nature is good” by reinterpreting the relationship between goodness and human nature. this philosophical breakthrough could be taken as the theoretical foundation for constructing the universal “natural goodness-human nature” of a confucian morality of human rights. haiming wen and william keli’i akina 167 ii. naturalist theoretical reconstruction of “natural goodness-human nature” as we have demonstrated, there emerged a naturalist theoretical transformation when neo-confucian philosophers attempted to develop the mencius “human nature is good” into a “natural goodness-human nature” framework. this theoretical breakthrough may serve as a foundation for our forthcoming reconstruction of a naturalist version of confucian morality of human rights. just as the theoretical transformation of these neo-confucians was motivated by the challenges of contemporary buddhism, a reconstruction of a confucian morality of human rights is motivated by challenges from the modern conception of human rights and meta-ethics. actually, what neo-confucians developed as the mencius “human nature is good” to be “natural goodness-human nature” structure can be seen as a theoretical reconstruction for transforming moralism into naturalism. thus an initial task for us will be to examine what is necessary to provide this transformation with a modern philosophical face to become a naturalist version. from the traditional notion of religious-moral foundationalism, natural goodness is the imitation of the goodness of god. god is the complete good, so human goodness is a property of and reflection of the goodness of god. where religious foundationalism is not accepted, the theologically sympathetic may look to a “god-constructed” naturalist version of goodness. however, in admitting that humans are not “as good as they should be”, how can “natural goodness” be “good?”4 one way of responding is to return to the natural law tradition. for example, michael j. perry avers that the natural law of the morality of human rights is untenable without the support of theology, or the existence of god (perry, 2007: 19). for those who look beyond the tradition of religious foundationalism, the origin of morals is generally sought either within natural science, or within the dynamic of secular life. is it necessary to build moral theories upon objective facts as with scientific theories? are there moral facts? generally, morality and science have been considered separate discourses (shafer-landau, 2003: 67). the classic “is vs. ought” distinction, attributed to enlightenment philosopher david hume, enjoins 168 prajna vihara __ __ ~ scientists and philosophers alike not to confuse fact (that which is) with value (that which ought to be). a similar, although substantively different claim, was made by g. e. moore in his recognition of the naturalistic fallacy which incorrectly identifies what is “good” with whatever may be preferential or bring greatest utility (moore, 1903). ethical naturalism considers moral facts to have causal powers, so ethical behaviors are all natural facts and not non-natural facts. moral realist shafer-landau claims that moral facts possess the same ontological status as scientific facts (ibid., p. 55). his implication is that moral facts operate like scientific and social facts such that they are similarly subject to the rigors of scientific hypothesis testing. peter railton considers that moral properties are objective, yet non-cognitive truths (railton, 2007: 187). shafer-landau also admits the objectivity of moral judgment, which is independent from personal thought, and can transcend the concreteness of time and space (shafer-landau, 2003: 2). according to these forms of moral realism, ethical normativity does not rely upon god (at least within secular versions), nor upon the existence of human beings, so moral facts are objective facts. however, martha nussbaum argues that the “should” in “how humans should act” comes from care and compassion toward others who are less fortunate (nussbaum, 1996: 27). rorty does not accept nussbaum’s mencian way of incorporating an emotional foundation into the determination of human nature as good, and he denies the concept of universal human nature altogether. for rorty, morality is a construct which relies upon “our eurocentric human rights culture”, (rorty, 1993: 126) a position criticized by bernard williams (williams, 1983: 33). while most versions of human rights fundamentalism, religious or not, admit to the innate dignity of every human being, recent theories have questioned the exceptionalism of homo-sapiens, such as peter singer’s work in animal rights or recent advocacy of the rights of nature itself as in the french ecologisme movement. contemporary science fiction has also raised the spectre of robot-rights, when automatons achieve some form of intellectual or moral sentience. yet, while most moral philosophers acknowledge that there are many different kinds of moralities in modern and postmodern times, some, like michael j. perry, assert that there is little impetus to fully banish foundationalism or a place-holder for god, at least for pragmatic reahaiming wen and william keli’i akina 169 sons. as mentioned above, the universal declaration of human rights seems to reflect this tendency in its invoking of the term “endowed” without stating by whom or what humans are “endowed” with rights. perry agrees with philippa foot that most contemporary moral philosophers rarely question the foundation of morals in the scathing way nietzsche did (ibid., p. 23). in this regard, philippa foot claims that ‘natural’ goodness…is attributable only to living individuals and to their parts, characteristics, and operations; and that it is an intrinsic or ‘autonomous’ goodness in that it depends directly on the relationship of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species”. (foot, 2001: 26-7) foot uses the concept of necessity to explain “natural goodness” just as an oak needs a sturdy root since “the good of the oak is its individual and reproductive life cycle”, and this, according to foot, requires the aristotelian notion of necessity (ibid., 46). human goodness is different from the goodness of animals and plants (ibid., 51) because humans have good minds, good natures and do good deeds, animals and plants merely respond to their natural environments. ronald dworkin considers human specialness to be based on two basic facts concerning human beings: 1. everyone is the highest product of our natures; 2. the growth of each person is not just a product of nature, but what humans actively achieve. thus, no one should be offended by others, for humans are unique in two distinct ways: their natures and their human creativity (dworkin, 1993: 82-3). in contrast, most neo-confucians consider “what follows” as nature, and “completing it is nature” as human creativity. for them, the original meaning of this line in the great commentaries is to consider the natural movement of heaven and earth to be good; and individual things come into being because they receive their natures which are formed as dao moves. this theoretical framework from the goodness of the tiandao 天道 to the nature of human beings demonstrates that human nature and rights come from a kind naturalist theory of goodness, and not the assertive claim that human nature itself is originally good. the statement that human nature is good may rest upon the dichotomy of good and evil, such that it becomes a kind of assertive claim in the form of subjectivism with simple judgments. on the contrary, a confucian morality of human rights possesses a naturalist foundation and moral facts like the dao of heaven and earth (tiandi) 天地之道 is good. however, this good is not the 170 prajna vihara __ __ ~ “good vs. evil” good as in dualist metaphysics, but natural goodness. this kind of naturalist goodness differs from the aristotelian claim that “some are goods in their own right” and “others goods because of these” (irwin, 1999: 6, 1096b14-15). naturalist goodness can be traced back to commentaries on this line by many neo-confucians. for example, hu yuan’s commentaries on the book of changes considers the tian to raise the myriad things as natural (hu, 1986: 466-7). just as he kai 何楷 uses the sense of spring to refer to the creativity of nature, and the goodness of nature is exactly like the naturally growing grasses and trees. this is very similar to the cheng brothers’ claim that what sages did was to transform the good deeds of heaven and earth into particular things, and complete the goodness within human affairs (cheng, 1981: 29). zhang zai claims that such goodness is to describe the sustaining effort of humans’ succeeding the natural good accomplishments of heaven and earth (zhang, 1978: 187-8). in this way, it is possible to take natural goodness as good deeds, so it is resonant with natural cosmological sensibility of the zhongyong and the great commentaries. in short, zhang zai takes “goodness” to be the property of the succeeding characteristic of the “good” dao (ibid., 192). cheng hao makes it clearer that dao is to be applied on the achievement and function in succeeding the moving dao (cheng, 1981: 135). hence, “goodness” is a kind of functional characteristic of natural dao. zhu xi’s commentaries on zhou dunyi’s tongshu indicate that goodness starts out as a natural pattern (li), even before it possesses its own name, so it comes into its own being. penetrating (tong) is to name this naturally self-forming process”. (zhu, 2001: 98) this is a kind of naturalist interpretation, and the “goodness” of this creative process is the natural goodness in its ontological sense. when zhu xi answers his students’ questions, he claims that the word succeeding (ji 继 ) refers to the incipient nature of movement, which is both the end to stability and the starting point of motion (zhu, 1994: 2). this is to explain the succeeding (ji) from the perspective of the cosmological beginning and things which are about to come into beings (zhu, 1986: 2388). both cai qing and lai zhide in the ming dynasty clearly define “goodness” as cosmological ontological being which transcends concrete forms and materials. wang fuzhi also comments that succeedhaiming wen and william keli’i akina 171 ing (ji) is the moving horizon between the heavens and human beings (wang, 1988: 825). zhu bokun considers this line to indicate that all things that succeed the pattern of yin-yang are perfect, and all natures are complete with both yin and yang, so all natures are also perfect (zhu, 1998: 79). yang qingzhong points out that zhu’s idea takes “goodness” to be perfect, and not the goodness which is juxtaposed against evil (yang, 2005: 217). thus, the perfect completeness of human being comes from the ontological goodness of complete natural dao of tian. to claim that “human nature is good” is just a kind of judgment concerning the completeness of human nature. along these lines, the good in “human nature is good” as moral judgment should be based on the naturalist moral fact of the dao of tian. accordingly, the confucian morality of human rights should be based upon this version of moral judgment about “human nature is good”. in this way, the goodness of human nature should not rely on any dogmatism, solipsism or subjectivism relating to particular religious foundations, but on the “good” natural facts starting from the natural movement of tiandao. as such, this constitutes a theoretical version of naturalism. iii. confucian natural morality and western morality of human rights regardless of their theoretical differences, both the naturalist version of rights in the confucian “natural goodness-human nature” framework and the western traditional morality of human rights promote the duty of humans to act morally according to their consciences and to respect the human rights of others. thus, the respect for human dignity needs to be demonstrated in moral behaviors by each individual or communally by moral actions. generally, the religious version of western morality of human rights based upon religious foundationalism is experienced by the believer as a form of divine command theory (dct) and incorporates the epistemologies of natural law, known and evolved facts, the revealed scriptures, religious experience, and supernatural experiences. as for dct, human obedience is obligatory, and the commands come from god’s orders, which supersede human authorities. this is often seen as a view of 172 prajna vihara __ __ ~ human freedom. on the other hand, theistic morality is not always portrayed as external to individual will and conscience. the problem of obeying external law as opposed to internal conscience is a theme addressed throughout the judeo-christian scriptures, giving rise to an “internalizing” solution in the words of the prophet jeremiah which allows the individual to obey god autonomously: “i [god] will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts”. (jeremiah 31:33 and hebrews 10:16, new international version). nonetheless, even when the individual is free to choose and endorse personal moral actions, how does the epistemology of hearing or knowing the will of god achieve consensus in a system which fosters personal interpretation of the will of god. in a pluralistic society, individuals and communities, religious or not, must determine what it means to act according to conscience, regardless of one’s religious belief as to what informs the conscience. while there may be ineffability between differing interpretations of god’s will for theistic moral agents, there is no lack of potential conflict within the competing moral visions of non-theists. secular versions of human rights may move society beyond theological foundations, but the question of where to anchor moral values remains. there are several moral sources of human action in the naturalist version of confucian morality for human rights: the conscience one is born with and develops from early life; sympathy based upon conscience which leads to a natural moral sense and desires; community wisdom or social convention, which is different from any transcendental theories; and, particularly important in confucian societies, and the canonical teachings of sages passed down as part of family tradition and cultural values. all these sources rely, to varying extent, on the ancient classics to provide moral wisdom and guidance for life. in what way, then, may we draw upon the classics to inform our contemporary moral notions, especially with respect to human rights morality? one approach is to apply to our contemporary world the basic concepts of virtue explicated in the classic texts, fostering a dialogue with human rights thinking. one of the most prominent virtues is the notion of ai ren or “benevolent love”. irene bloom believes that mencius recognizes the ideas of human equality, responsibility, relationship, and dignity as compatible to virtues held by a consensus of modern civilizahaiming wen and william keli’i akina 173 tions (bloom, 1998: 94-116). henry rosemont opposes the assumption of the autonomous individual in contemporary human rights thinking as incompatible with the role-embedded individual in confucian ethics and political rights. rosemont agrees with roger ames in establishing an alternate vocabulary if westerners want to discuss confucian ethics and politics (rosemont, 1998: 55). wejen chang holds that contemporary human rights thinking and the confucian version of human rights are conceptually compatible, and that they should be theoretically combined even though they were rooted in different histories in practice (chang, 1998: 134). chung-ying cheng has theorized that the language of confucian virtues and duties may be translated into corresponding rights language in that rights and duties are, in some ways, mirror-like corollaries. according to professor cheng, individuals-in-community should become aware of their responsibilities (not just their rights) for the community and for the public. since no one could be separated from her community, this sensibility should motivate individuals to participate in public affairs to the extent of their capacity. extreme forms of public expression which may result in rebellion might occur if individuals are given no recourse to participate in public affairs properly. cheng concludes that people have a right to contend for freedom and for the practice of virtues by their leaders (cheng, 1998: 151). along these lines, an important contribution of the confucian version of human rights, based on “natural goodness-human nature”, is the understanding of moral obligation. confucian moral obligation has no need of transcendent sources or commands, as it is generated from socially defined moral roles, and it becomes morally obligatory based upon non-particularistic, yet situational contexts. consequently, conflict may not always be avoidable between one’s personal selfinterests and social-political interests when the confucian “natural goodness-human nature” framework interacts with contemporary human rights. there are several views on record for resolving this type of conflict: julia ching holds that, as far as the circle of east-asian confucian societies is concerned, the human rights situations in japan, south korea, and taiwan has experienced great improvement in the 20th century. human rights is an effective chinese concept, ching asserts, at least in the following three aspects: 1) there is a confucian version of 174 prajna vihara __ __ ~ human rights; 2) most east asian countries recognize the idea of human rights; and 3) there is no conflict between democratic practice and the confucian tradition in east asian countries. therefore, ching concludes that there is no essential conflict between the western notion of human rights and that of the confucian tradition in theory; but conflict might occur when political rights are interfered with by powerful authorities (ching, 1998, 67-82). d. w. y. kwok points out that to be a confucian person means to learn “rites”, but education in “rights” is often missed. according to kwok, all nations of asia experienced numerous political revolutions and transformations during the 20th century, so no single form of government and society can be said to be purely confucian. the key to developing and practicing confucian human rights today depends upon whether confucianism’s advocates can enlarge the concept of “person”, and provide the common people with legally insured rights (kwok, 1998: 83-91). randall peerenboom is sensitive to the real chinese situations in which communist party leaders like deng xiaoping have emphasized the unity of thought, and confucian “rites”, peerenboom also points out, are not “rights”. at the very least, rights exist to protect individuals and minorities from unjust treatment by majorities (peerenboom, 1998: 249253). toward this end, china’s current leaders have on their plates the need to address both the language and substance of rights as a primary issue in the emerging china of the 21st century. that there may be no single solution for all countries can be seen in the fact that taiwan and singapore are considered states with exemplary human rights practices, yet their citizens do not enjoy the same freedoms of expression guaranteed by the united states constitution’s first amendment. each country will draw a different line in the balance between individual rights and the needs of the majority and state. the confucian naturalist framework of “natural goodness-human nature” offers practical aide to the human rights situations in contemporary chinese society. the recognition of the indigenous place of human rights in chinese thought enables today’s china to embrace human rights as authentically chinese. this is significant as china interacts with western and other nations which appeal to human rights as a universal standard by which to judge the legitimacy of all political regimes. confucianderived human rights theory and practice ensure that the call to human haiming wen and william keli’i akina 175 rights is not a foreign imposition but an embracing of ancient and classical chinese heritage. nationally sponsored research into the cultural roots of human rights in china, via confucian studies, also positions china to become a major contributor to and authority on human rights as a global dialogue. as the course of history and chinese civilization has shown, confucianism may be co-opted by authorities, whether governmental or religious, as a form of social control. many human rights abuses in chinese history have been attributed to confucianism for this reason, including the subjugation of women through practices such as foot-binding or polygamy. conservative political movements have often justified corruption by appeal to confucian rites and values. what is important to keep in mind is that none of this has truly represented the spirit of confucianism which advocates for the individual and the powerless in society. authentic confucianism, derived from the canonical texts, rather than from social customs, has produced the highest levels of intellectual advancement and freedom in china’s history. examples of these ideals include the aesthetic developments of intellects pursuing personal freedom in the wei-jin dynasties, the robust individuality of characters in literature such as the dreams of red chamber, historical novels like three kingdom romance and all men are brothers, where personal characters are distinctive and rise above corrupted social values. the confucian “natural goodness-human nature” framework inspires individuals to fight for human rights as rights to be defended for one’s community and social context. traditionally, the confucian practice of morality of human rights stresses the consistency of personal behavior and social circumstance, negating one’s selfish desires from “conquering oneself” (keji ??), to “extinguish one’s personal desire (mie renyu ???), and disregarding one’s own rights in order to be recognized by authoritarian or ritualized society, and fulfilling the value of “goodness” in social norms. there is an historical embedded-ness to many of the traditional concepts associated with confucianism. yet, change has been a constant factor in china’s long history, and change in customs and practices has occurred with the social expression of confucianism. contemporary chinese society has much room within it for the revisioning of confucian social practice, es176 prajna vihara __ __ ~ pecially with the confucian naturalist version of “natural goodness-human nature” framework as it is disseminated and put into practice. in traditional confucian society, “rites” are demanding requirements for persons, and the ethical standards or norms for individuals who will be engaged in society. it is a confucian view that rites are helpful in sustaining stability and family and community well-being, so there is a temptation for leaders to practice authoritarianism in ensuring that people follow ritual systems. however, “rites” might not always accommodate the moral “goodness” of human nature, so sometimes following rites becomes a social requirement for purposes other than the well-being of the individual.5 in this way, at the individual level, “rites” and “rights” may actually work in two opposite directions. “rites” are limitations upon individual freedoms for the purpose of sustaining the community. “rights” are limitations on the greater community in order to sustain the freedoms of the individual. this is one of the many challenges facing any measure of social change within china. the authors are confident that, on the public level, it is possible for china to develop a naturalist version of confucian morality of “natural goodness-human nature” that is consistent with both tradition and contemporary reality in chinese culture as it dialogues with the western conception human rights.6 the conflict between individual freedoms and social good will require a careful weighing of input from citizens at all levels. some theories have been developed to solve this kind of conflict such as the traditional “dao of rules and rectangles (xieju zhi dao ????)”, yang fu translates john stuart mill’s on liberty to be “a theory of the rights and demarcations between community and individuals (qunji quanjie ????)”. whatever the theoretical foundation, practical tools will be necessary for widespread understanding and equitable practice. while many scholars have realized that the practice of the western notion of human rights in east asian countries should not be indiscriminately transplanted into the chinese mainland, nor should there be a wholesale importing of western ideology and legal mechanisms, the west provides significant historical and philosophical resources. nonetheless, china will have to set its own pace for any political transformation and will need to refine its own ideology, not based upon western foundations for human rights doctrine, but building upon confucian morality of “natural goodness-human haiming wen and william keli’i akina 177 nature”. this may one day lead to a fully developed confucian theory of human rights both based on traditional confucianism and in response to western notions of human rights. conclusion compared with previous religious, scientific or secular versions, the naturalist framework of confucian morality for “natural goodnesshuman nature” appears to provide a more universal and pragmatic approach to human rights for china (zhang, 2009: 483-92.).7 based on the hermeneutical tradition of the line “what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)”, the authors have offered a confucian naturalist version of human rights in this article. we have come to recognize that the freedom of confucian individuals is based upon the “natural goodness-human nature” of the dao of tian/heavens. to put this in terms of the naturalist framework, “natural goodness-human nature” provides the theoretical foundation for “good” confucian moral actions. and it is based on this naturalist “natural goodness-human nature” framework that confucians encourage all people to cultivate their natures to be better persons, and “rest in the utmost good” in the end. the process of cultivating natural goodness starting from human nature is a process of choosing “good” actions based on naturalist “natural goodness-human nature”. from this perspective, humans possess rights when they make “good” choices in order to fulfill their natures (chengxing ??). this follows from the confucian naturalist version of human rights which corresponds to the western idea of god-endowed human rights. these two theories, each of which works in its respective venue, offer a basis for comparison, contrast, and synthesis between china and the west in the area of human rights and social philosophy. endnotes 1haiming wen, associate professor, renmin university of china, specialties: chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. william keli’i akina, adjunct professor of philosophy and humanities, university of hawaii at manoa __ 178 prajna vihara __ __ ~ department of philosophy, and hawaii pacific university __ department of humanities. specialties: ethics, chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. this research is supported by the fundamental research funds for the central universities, and the research funds of renmin university of china, also supported by program for new century excellent talents (ncet), chinese ministry of education. the authors thank chung-ying cheng, tu wei-ming, zhang xuezhi, liang tao, yang xusheng, chen ming, fang xudong, bai tongdong, zhou lian, xie maosong, liu sumin, and ren feng for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 2nietzsche published the gay science in 1882, and proposed “gott ist todt” in its vol. 3, 108 (1988a?s. 467). 3in july 1998, 120 members of the united nations voted to pass the rome statute of the international criminal court (icc), often referred to simply as the rome statute. subsequently, the first international penal court was established at the hague, in holland. the rome statute has been in effect since july 2002, with 119 official parties and 139 signatories. see united nations treary collection, databases, at http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no= xviii-10&chapter=18&lang=en., downloaded 11/1/11. china was initially active in the early development of the rome statute, yet has not signed onto nor approved it. 4this question also emerges within christian theology as an implication of the doctrine of the fallenness of man, which states not that humans are everywhere “as bad as they could be”, but rather, that they are nowhere “as good as they should be”. for st. paul, this condition of humanity has direct bearing upon the moral evaluation of nature. for even with his general acceptance of platonic dualism, st. paul does not isolate humanity and nature into separate compartments, but instead imputes upon nature the fallenness of man: “for the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice…” (romans 8:20a, new international version) 5thus, confucius emphasizes the need for truthful feeling (i.e., being authentic) when practicing ritual propriety, especially because of the human tendency to place social requirements above personal feelings. 6although the western view that all humans are born with equal human rights takes the form of a naturalist claim similar to the one argued in this paper for confucianism, the history of western human rights shows that what is now considered natural or even secular has been strongly influenced by dualist transcendence at its origin. the confucian naturalist view described in this paper differs from the western view as it holds that, to perpetuate what is natural goodness is to succeed the dao of yin __ yang. thus the confucian naturalist perspective does not depend upon a transcendental point of view. 7zhang xianglong regards confucianism to be a typical non-universalism because it considers truths to be intrinsically correlated with the changing processes of our ordinary lives. accordingly, the confucian perspective appears to be lively and active when it contributes to a healthy cultural environment and denies the necessity of universal values derived from the standards that operate on higher than everyday life. his conclusion is drawn from the perspective of the communication of confuhaiming wen and william keli’i akina 179 cianism with other cultures. this being said, it is still possible for confucianism to provide a relatively universal version of the morality of human rights even though confucianism is typically famous for its non-universalism in cultural dialogue. references bloom, irene (1998). “mencius confucianism and human rights”, in chr. cai, 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xue, xuan (1990). notes of reading (dushulu ???), in the complete works of xue xuan (xuexuan quanji ????). vol. 1, taiyuan: shanxi people’s press. yang, qingzhong (2005). studies on the classics and commentaries of the book of changes (zhouyi jingzhuan yanjiu ??????), beijing: commercial press. zhang, xianglong (2009). “the philosophical feature of confucianism and its position in inter-cultural dialogue: universalism or nonuniversalism?” in frontier of chinese philosophy, 2009, 4(4): 48392. zhang, zai (1978). the completed works of zhang zai ???. beijing: zhuanghua books. zhu, bokun (1998) a history of the studies of the book of changes. vol. haiming wen and william keli’i akina 181 1. beijing: huaxia press. zhu, xi (1986). conversations with students (zhuxi yulei????). beijing: zhonghua books. zhu, xi (2001). the complete works of zhu xi ????. vo. 13. shanghai: shanghai ancient books & hefei: anhui education press. 182 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 26 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 things that remain in my heart an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021, 26-54 © 2000 by assumption university press abstracts this is an autobiography of buddhist monk phra siriphong kharuphankit who is an artist and maker of the “teacher's heads,” or the khon masks devoted to the deities of art, music and dance. besides being the recollections of a great thai traditional artist, it also recounts the process of learning a traditional art-form. one of the fascinating aspects of thai traditional art is how it can be strictly anchored in the past and yet incorporate progressive innovations; how it can be both extremely disciplined and transformative. in thai traditional art, much emphasis is given to the wai khru (the ceremony for the honoring of the teachers). here we meet phra siriphong’s teachers and begin to understand how knowledge is passed down in a thai traditional artform. an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 27 editor’s note: we include this autobiography of phra siriphong because besides being the recollections of a great thai artist, it also recounts the process of learning a traditional art-form. one of the fascinating aspects of thai traditional art is how it can be strictly anchored in the past and yet incorporate progressive innovations; how it can be both extremely disciplined and transformative. in thai traditional art, much emphasis is given to the wai khru (the ceremony for the honoring of the teachers). here we meet phra siriphong’s teachers and begin to understand how knowledge is passed down in a thai traditional art-form. my success today is due to the possession of two merits: the merit of a good teacher and the merit of a good student. i was often asked what inspired me to produce khon masks instead of pursuing music and singing, that i had studied in school. every time i have been asked i always tried to dodge the question by giving only oblique answers. i had never revealed the truth in my heart to anyone until the day i was to bring the whole collection of my own works for the inspection of her royal highness princess maha chakri sirindhorn. this was on the occasion of the opening of the centenary of somdejchaophraya borommahasrisuriyavong (chuang bunnag) building. because monks are often prohibited from being artists and musicians, the princess asked: “you are a monk; what do you do when you want to sing or to play a musical instrument? and she recounted “i remember once a music teacher told me about the story of a monk who used to play ranard (a thai xylophone) before he entered monkhood. later, when this monk wished to play music he had to take his instrument and secretly retreat to a cave in order to enjoy his music.” i explained to the princess, that whenever i have free time, i practice chanting sermons on the madree desan episode of the vessantara jataka. and whenever the temple would hold a mahajataka festival, i would chant my sermon on the madree desan episode. i have 28 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 done this since my first year of ordination. the princess smiled, and then she asked me about the process of making khon masks. she enquired why i sometimes used sandalwood powder (my own innovation) in making the khon mask. then she further asked if i had any successors to carry on the craft, and if i had ever thought about writing anything about my work for posterity. since that day i still did not pursue writing about my life until one day my students came to ask for permission to print a book on the collection of my works (both the khon masks and the sculpted items) to be distributed to all my students. this inspired my decision to write my own autobiography. from that day until now, i have tried to construct my life account, from its failures to its successes, from its blind beginnings to selfdiscovery. it is hoped that the following autobiography might be useful to others. i wrote it from the depth of my heart. it is understandable that to write so straightforwardly may cause an uneasiness to both the writer and the reader. but then, why fear the truth? the instincts of the initiate what is unique about my life? i often wonder if anyone has had the same feelings as i have had. no one can remember their earliest life and instincts. yet my first memory is very clear. early in my childhood i woke up one night because of the loud noise of people moving about, even though the place where i slept was partitioned with a curtain. i heard the piphat sound mixed with cheering of a crowd. people were dressed strangely. “what are they doing?” i asked my mother. she answered that they were performing a drama called rachathirat (saming phra ram volunteer episode). together we watched the drama until it ended. they performed their roles very elegantly. i was very much impressed by the character played by arjan pranee samranwong who everyone called the “chinese empress” as she looked very wise, dignified and regal. an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 29 my memories and attraction to such things may be because i was raised by rather old people, and those around me were mostly elderly. my mother got married when she was no longer young and she had me when she was rather old. mother used to tell me about her difficult and hard life. she lived from hand to mouth. she had to sell her wares at the school on weekdays and on weekends at sanam luang (which at that time was a large market). one day our house caught fire, and we had no time to think of anything but our lives. we lost everything except the clothes we were wearing and the towel wrapped around me to carry me out of the fire. there were four members in our family at that time: grandmother, father, mother and myself. we were fortunate enough to move to a house built on land belonging to the crown property. mom mae (khru supalak pataranavik) and mae mun (khru kongoraphat) were kind enough to give us money to buy this house which was behind the bombay market (talad charoen nakorn). as a result, mother kept reminding me never to forget people’s kindness and to always show them gratitude. by the time i was old enough to remember things, mom mae had already passed away. mother used to tell me that mom mae was a very strict person, and very clean too. she would use hot water to clean her dishes and spoons before eating. a scarf was always tied around her neck. she walked with the grace of a drama actress. she always wore a hat according to the policy of that time. i do remember khru mun as a white-haired woman who often gave me money to buy kluay buad chee (banana in coconut milk). when she spoke to me i could feel the kindness in her voice. in contrast to her was khru linchee. you would always hear khru linchee coming before you saw her. she had grave looks, was temperamental, always chewed betel-nut, and her hair smelled strongly of tanee oil. although she was sharp-tongued, she was kind-hearted. every time mother was short of money to buy wares for sale, she always turned to khru linchee for help “here is the money you want to borrow, jaemjan.” the tone of her voice and her kind gestures are still vivid in my memory to this day. 30 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 developing a talent my memories as a very young child also involve my mother taking me along with her to sell her wares. there was a canal in front of the house and mother was afraid that i would fall into the canal if left alone with grandma. so every morning i had to accompany her. when we arrived at the school, mother would be busy preparing food for selling. i would go to play along the temple verandah. there were plenty of broken bricks with which i liked to build a wall. when i became bored, i would go to see students practicing thai dancing at the phra ruang pavilion. sometimes i would pick lanthom flowers, which have sweet and pleasant fragrance, to make a garland. whenever the school had a fair, mother would spend the night at school, and i was always with her. it was great fun. after dinner, i would go to play with the boarding students, and listen to their tales of “the twelve women” (nang sibsong) near the lotus pond. i vividly remember playing hide-and-seek at the chinese pavilion or the teacher’s house in the soft evening breeze, under the light of the full moon. there was no better place for hiding than the issaretrachanusorn hall, behind khao-tok shrine. most seekers could not find the hiders because they were afraid of the spirits of the hall. but i was not afraid for i used to enter the hall to see the khon masks during the daytime. in those days, that is where they kept them. i especially liked the phra rishi masks very much and have ever since. sometimes i would sneak into the chariot hall to take a nap. it was quiet and cool. my other favorite place in the national museum is the phratamnak daeng (the red house). when i entered this place i felt so comfortable and warm, a feeling hard to describe. my most favorite pastime was to mold clay into all sorts of shapes and everyday i would mold a phra rishi head. when i finished with the mold i would put some dust into a bamboo stem and shake it until dust smoke came out of the bamboo stem. this was my way of paying homage to phra rishi. the dust smoke was my own substitute for lighted joss sticks. the “chinese empress” used to scold me “nong noo! you hands and body are so dirty!” alas! she did not understand what i was trying to do. an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 31 primary education when i was 6 years old mother sent me to attend amnuaywongwitthaya school in the orchard near our house, but i had to cross the street where there were passing cars. so mother had to hire someone to take me to school and bring me home. our school holidays were on thursday, saturday and sunday. i attended this school until i finished prathom four but i had to take the final exam at the central school amnuaysil, near tha dindaeng, which has now become khulasiri arts school. during this time, i had less chance to accompany mother. only on thursdays, as i didn’t spend the night at school. some thursdays the “chinese empress” would accompany us home, but she would get off at her home in khlongsarn, which is now the site of a fire station near charoennakorn bridge. i remember once entering her house and paying respect to her grandmother. the turning point after finishing primary education, i joined the first year class at the dramatic arts school and chose to study the piphat according to my mother’s wishes. i myself preferred khon drama, but mother was afraid i would hurt myself while flexing my arms and legs during the rigorous training exercises. mother once illustrated this to me by taking me to the khon drama house to watch them practice. khru aram was flexing the body of students who were crying with pain. mother reasoned that to practice khon drama would be difficult when one becomes old, but one could have music as companion until old age. besides, mother was acquainted with many senior music teachers. so i began the first year of music school with the other male classmates. each morning we would begin with the national anthem, followed by one hour of general subjects, and then two hours of elective art subjects in separate classes according to one’s choice. khru thongyoo was our class teacher. i recall the first time i saw the many musical instruments scattered in the hall, some in cabinets some on the floor. and hanging on the wall were pictures of the departed senior teachers. 32 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 the first day in music class, we were all ordered to sit in rows whereupon teachers led students in chanting the three gems in honor of the past teachers. then teachers led each student by hand and we took turns striking the gong for the first time. i experienced a difficult time learning the music. i was rather slow in catching up with my classmates who could learn quite fast. i felt i was a heavy burden on the teacher. after teaching other classmates, the teacher would have to use the later part of class period to repeat the song for me again and again. everyday the teacher would do the same with great patience. he never showed any sign of boredom. on behalf of mother, some senior students also lent a helping hand to practice with me. still i felt that i did not make any progress. i sympathized with my teachers and senior students who had to tolerate my slowness. yet, the teachers still encouraged me to practice and practice. they would tell me that since i had no background in music, i had to practice very hard. later on i asked my classmates why they were so fast in learning their music lessons. they all answered that they played in a piphat ensemble at home and most of them learned pleng mon in order to play at temple fairs to earn some money! after lessons one day khru bangluang sunthorn said to me, “nong noo, this evening you should come to my house”. so we took the ferry at tha phrachan to cross the river, and continued by a tuk tuk until we arrived at his house at rongkhlueb lane. once we arrived he told me to wait. he then disappeared into the back of the house. he returned after quite a while with a ranard thum (a kind of thai xylophone) but only the body without the tone bars. he had asked my father to carve the tone bars for the instrument so i can practice at home and catch up with my classmates. this instrument was given as a favor to my mother as he explained “i and jaemjan are friends, we both come from petchaburi”. when i returned home i found that my father had already prepared the remaining part of the instrument. thereafter, i had slowly advanced in learning the ranard thum. i finally passed the examination and finished my studies but i have never joined an ensemble. this was because i preferred history and loved to listen to the an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 33 senior teachers recounting past events. i was rather inquisitive and often asked about theory and technique. khru prasit used to say, “this boy wants to be good in theory”. yet my mother still wished for me to study music. she asked khru lamiad to teach me to play a saw-u (thai violin), which i had some slight success in learning. but this was mainly due to the fact that i very much liked the old woman. khru lamiad was not a stern person when she was not teaching. on the contrary, she was very kind. her lips were always red from chewing betel-nut. and best of all, she liked to tell me old stories. it seemed that my life was destined to be around old people all the time. everyday during afternoon break, i would go to learn saw-u with khru lamiad. sometimes auntie tub would come into khru lamiad’s room so i asked her to accept me as her student too. during holidays i would go to sanambinnam by bus to learn music at her home. khru klai (auntie tub) said to me, “siripong, with your loud voice you should concentrate on singing! she once complained to my mother about this. but my mother responded: “he is much like you”. this made her very angry. she would even ask her other students “am i loud like siriphong?” there would be no response, only laughter, which would make her even more angry. however, her remark was apt. auntie tub observed that i was really emotionally charged when i was singing, but khru tuam did not share this opinion. he thought i was just aping my teacher. in any case, i can attribute my success in singing to her. failure between the 3rd year middle class to the 1st year high class i lost my patience with studying music. i couldn’t adapt to my environment in general, and couldn’t adjust myself to the others. i felt it was my fault. from the 1st year high class onward i never attended any class of major subjects. in the morning i attended the general subject for three hours. after lunch break i attended the minor subject (drama) then left the school compound and went to stroll along the tha phrachan, tha phra athit or mahathat temple just to kill time. i would always avoid certain 34 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 places and would wander like a ghost without a shrine. i would often go to see the khon masks and teacher’s heads (srisa khru) in the drama and music division. when i became extremely bored, i would go to talk to the main buddha image, and to see the mural paintings. i was fortunate that i never got involved in bad habits like drugs, night clubs, or other kinds of entertainment. i never thought of going to a second-class cinema house to pass the time. i was obsessed with old places: the temples, the drama and music division, the national museum, and the front palace (wang na). these were the places where i was truly happy, and for which i still have feelings of nostalgia. my obsession about these places gave me inspiration. i was often lost in my thoughts and dreams and i soon felt inclined to write or draw, whatever my mind would dictate. images from past memories flashed in my mind, although i was still very young. one day i saw arjan sawat, the principal of arts school, standing under the shadow of sandalwood tree at the corner of the green house, intensely painting a picture of the temple with oil paint. he was standing facing the temple. so i too found a piece of paper and some watercolor and tried to paint a picture. i have kept this first picture to this day. sometimes i wondered whether or not i was strange because i found learning so boring, yet i loved to go to school. every morning i would hurry to get dressed and went to school despite my strong dislike of learning. other children of my age would have played truant. i myself never strayed and would go direct to school at 5.30 a.m. after getting pocket money from mother. when i was in the 1st year of the middle class, mother stopped selling her wares at school, but she would prepare food for selling at home. it was a good chance for me to go to school in the early morning. before class i would walk among the school buildings. some days i would have breakfast at the kitchen of the boarding section with khru jimlim. i walked to and fro between the arts school and the dance school. one day i was attracted to the room of arjan taem, who was teaching the students to draw a particular pattern called lai rod nam with which i was familiar since very young. so i drew some thai patterns and showed it an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 35 to arjan taem who asked his pupils to examine my drawing. they told me even though i had not trained in this art, my work was not so bad. i could improve my skill if i tried a little harder. i was so encouraged by the words of this kind old man that i decided to become his pupil. some days i would go to sculpture class to watch students working with clay. slowly, these crafts became instilled into my spirit without my realizing it. i would also often go to the drama and music division to admire the khon masks and visit the senior teachers. one day i met arjan akhom, the great teacher of music who asked me “are you free tomorrow?” “yes sir”, i answered quickly. he said, “if you are free tomorrow, then come with me to perform the wai khru ceremony together”. from that time on, i would always accompany him and serve as his assistant when he performed the wai khru ceremony. at the end of the 1st year of high class, i decided to leave school because i never attended any of the major subjects and felt that i could never pass the final exam. how would i be able to face my fellow students and teachers? besides, even if i did pass the final exam, what could i accomplish as a low-quality graduate? it could only harm the school’s reputation. a music major graduate with only mediocre skill! i could not bear the thought of being a music graduate without quality. even though my school years were long ago, i still have nightmares about them. some nights i dream that i am walking in the school building but i could not find my classroom. all my friends are looking at me as if i were a strange animal. i also dream that i cannot catch up with my friends. some times i dream that i am sitting in an examination for the playing of an instrument. i watch my friends play, and when my turn comes, i simply run away. then suddenly i wake up. these nightmares have never gone away. every time i was about to forget them, they kept coming back. it has badly affected my health. i have to be under the doctor’s care all the time. i need medication for heart problems, high-blood pressure and diabetes in order to live a normal life. i also need to follow a strict regimen of food and sugar. i often wondered if i could ever be as happy as my classmates or other people of my age. 36 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 a period of brightening owing to my inquisitive mind and my enjoyment in talking with people, i learned and experienced many new things. after accompanying arjan akhom to perform the wai khru ceremonies, we would often take a rest and i would ask him many things which he would patiently explain to me. i liked to ask questions. normally, mother would have wai khru ceremony on the fifth day of the waxing moon, in the fifth lunar month every year. when the thatched-roof home was taken down and two new two-storey houses were built, the big one was used as a living quarter and the small one for offering food to monks and for the wai khru ceremony. mother’s most venerated teachers were luangphor wat khaotakhrao and thao phromakan. mother told me that these two monks have held an intimate place in our family since the time of our ancestors. an altar covered with white cloth was placed on the floor below the picture of luang phor khaotakhrao. there was no idol on the altar. mother would put on this altar a photo of a “teacher’s head” taken during the wai khru ceremony at sala phra ruang, pictures of mom khru, khru luang vilat, khru luang bamrung. after khru mun passed away, mother would add khru mun’s picture on the altar which she cut from the funeral book. there were various propitiatory offerings including those for the guardian spirits (chao tii). each year there would be six cooked hog heads and one raw one especially for phra phirap (a form of bhairava shiva and lord of the dance). there were also raw internal organs of the whole hog put on a large tray. and another yak servant named rhak sot (who my mother claimed is also a teacher) who is offered a raw sacrifice. after the ceremony, mother would use these offerings to make food for selling. since there were many hog heads, mother would cook them in different ways. she would prepare kaeng buan from those internal organs which i did not like because of its sweet taste. every time mother prepared kaeng buan, i would be assigned to pound the bael leaves, lemongrass leaves, and other types of leaves in order to get juices for kaeng buan. i once asked mother why she never told anybody when she an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 37 had a wai khru ceremony. she would answer that since it was to honor our own teachers, we should hold the ceremony ourselves. she explained that we were fortunate to this day because our teachers protected us. besides, these ritual offerings did not go to waste. mother would use them to make food for selling and the money she received she considered to be the fruit of her merit. mother’s wai khru ceremonies were always simple. in the morning food was offered to the monks, then the offerings were arranged in proper places. mother would wear a white dress with white sash diagonally on her shoulder. she made this outfit by herself. after lighting joss sticks to worship the gods and the gathering angels, she would close her eyes and silently pray for a while. then she would place the joss sticks at the offerings, pour the liquor, peel the skin of fruits, pour sauce on hog’s heads, duck and chicken, then wait until the joss sticks expired. after that she would put some offerings on young banana leaves and place them on both the left and right sides of the land outside the fence. after this ritual the ceremony was considered over. when i was in the 1st year of the middle class, we held the wai khru ceremony at home. mother showed me a funeral souvenir book (the 6th hundred-day rite) of phraya aniruthdeva and asked me to read for her. she told me to read from a specific part used to pay respect to the teachers. from that day on i always performed the reading part for my mother. before we would pay respect to the teachers, mother would ask me to make offerings. she also reminded me not to forget to pay homage to the emerald buddha. she explained to me, “the emerald buddha granted me a child. i was married to your father for many years and all the time we could not have baby. so we decided to petition the emerald buddha in the grand palace to give us a child”. i have been following her instructions for these ceremonies ever since. during the time i was serving arjan akhom, pii (brother) songtham was also helping. songtham is one of the teacher’s first group of students. he was in the military service but came to help the teacher whenever he had free time. pii songtham was an expert in amulets. one day after returning from the wai khru ceremony, before we left the arjan 38 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 akhom’s house, he said to us, “songtham is good in making amulets/ votive tablets, but noo (siriphong) would be good at making khon masks, since you show so much interest in the craft.” a week later, the teacher sent pii mun to fetch me and we went to see the teacher at the drama and music division. the arjan akhom said “no, i have asked khru chit to make a small khon mask for me. if you have time, go to his house and ask him to speed it up”. khru chit’s house was in the ban batr area, in a lane to the left just across the fire-work bridge. initially i went there once a week. but eventually i began walking there everyday after class. at that time, khru chit had many orders on hand and he could not produce them fast enough to meet the demand. whenever someone came to his house to check on the progress of the work they ordered, khru chit would pick up the unfinished work and continue working on it. but when the person was gone, he would set it aside. i was there to watch him so he would finish our piece, but i would also observe him, examining his work, and touching each piece of work carefully. after going back home i would try to do it myself. there were only two techniques i did not know, namely how to carve the soap stone model and the lacquer plate joining formula…. but finally i got the two formulae from pii toy who kindly gave me every detail. since i did not complete my music study course, i had to commission khru chit to make the “teacher’s heads” (srisa khru) for me. the rishi and phra phirap heads cost 5,000 baht for the pair. they were my first pair of teacher’s heads made by khru chit kaewduangyai. khru akhom performed the eye-opening ceremony of the teachers’s heads, and used them to initiate both the host and the guests at the home of khru weera limpraphan (a radio drama 213 producer at that time). this took place on thursday, 25 november 1976. pii mun and i were his assistants. after “initiating” all the others, i was also “initiated” and became the rightful owner of “the teacher’s heads”. it was through his kindness that i could have made it this far. i wondered how many have been as fortunate as i was. these “teacher’s heads” have become my most special models which i return to up until this day. khru akhom not only an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 39 taught me how to make khon masks, but he also molded me into what i am today. he really made a sacrifice for me when he commissioned khru chit to make the khon masks in order that i could learn from him. this teacher taught me both directly and indirectly. he gave me a new life. teacher, you were an artist who was wise and discerning. you could make worthless soil valuable. in deep gratitude for your kindness. you will always be in my memory: phokhru akhom sayakom. after i left school for some time, i decided to enter monkhood. both the ordination and wai khru ceremony were held together on 24 march 1977. the teacher came to perform the wai khru ceremony at my house. the next day i was ordained at wat thongnophakhun. after the end of buddhist lent, i left the monkhood. my father became seriously ill and passed away. the following year i also lost my grandmother. i then lived with my mother who still carried on with her trade. it was a more independent life. after spending some time involved in the family enterprise, i began to feel bored with my life. one day arjan prakhob sent for me through mr. prawit. i went to see arjan at school the following day. “noo, the sueksaphan stationery store sent me a letter saying that they have vacancy in their music section and they want to recruit a music graduate to fill this post. i think you are the most suitable person, and i want you to apply for this job. i have not yet told anybody else about this vacancy”. so i then landed a job in the sueksaphan stationery store. i was trained in the sixth group and was assigned to be at the front of the shop. there i met a lot of people, including my former fellow students both senior and junior who had become teachers in various schools. friends began to send their pupils to me for additional lessons. i accepted many who came for addition music or singing lessons. (since i had become a teacher myself, i felt i could not be complacent. i had to improve and acquire more knowledge). and 40 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 since i was a very slow student myself, and had to work hard to catch up with my other classmates, i could understand the student’s difficulties more than their own teachers at schools. this was very much appreciated by the students who later brought their friends to take lessons at my house. i realized that even as a teacher one cannot stop learning. i had to go to khru prasit to learn music in order to teach my students. i was learning and teaching at the same time. this lasted 2 years. everything was going well. i also found the way to increase my income. khru juree brought us her music theory books to sell in our family shop. mr. sophon, an alumnus of ban somdet college, a flute maker, also brought us his very soft sounding flutes for selling as well. at that time, flute-playing was very popular. each month flute turnover was quite considerable, and students would ask for a flute manual but there were not many books on music available in those days. for this purpose i was the first to write a flute manual and offer it for sale at sueksaphan stationery store (my pen-name was saenkhamnueng). my flute manual was selling well and has been popular ever since. i have been in monkhood for 15 years and this book has been reprinted many times. word had spread that anyone who wanted to learn to play flute, she/he should use the manual written by saenkhamnueng. the serious making of khon masks my income from various sources enabled me to have extra money to commission khru chit to make a pho khru mask. at the same time a phra phrot muni mask of the drama and music division was also sent to me for repairing. the teacher used to wear this mask when he danced at the wai khru ceremony. therefore, i asked pii toy to make a duplicate for me. everyday after the work in sueksaphan stationery store, i walked to banbatr lane to watch and to learn how to make khon masks until i could do it myself. then something happened which made me feel again extremely bored with life, so i decided to quit my job. after my resignation from work i entered the monkhood again. i was ordained at a temple near my house in order to properly take care an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 41 of my mother. one year after ordination i finished the dharma studies. in my free time, i used to walk along the various living cells of monks. i met a novice trying to draw picture. from looking at his work i could tell that he had talent and his skill could be developed if he received proper guidance. so i asked the novice, ”would you like to draw better pictures?” his answer was affirmative. so i asked permission from the abbot to transfer this novice to come to live with me. i relentlessly mentored him for 3 years, teaching him from my own experience. i hired a car to take the novice to petchburi to see with his own eyes how they make the pun pan (molded lime plaster), to ayutthya to see the buddha image at the nah phra meru temple, and to see the mural paintings at the emerald buddha temple. after breakfast, equipped with lots of drawing paper, we would go to the national museum and draw the various khon masks and teacher’s heads (srisa khru), copying every design that we liked. i tried very hard to awaken in him an enthusiasm for fine art workmanship. every evening after 6 p.m., we would begin work. as his teacher, if i felt sleepy i could sleep, but as student he could not do so, he had to carry on with his work. i used to wake up in the middle of the night to inspect and correct the novice’s work. then at around 3 a.m. we both went back to sleep again. this was our daily activity. it is now widely known that whoever comes to wat suttharam to attend the nightly prayer at a funeral there would drop in to see our works at the prachachonneramit 2 living cell. consequently we were commissioned to make many orders, and both the monk teacher and his novice were kept very busy. our first piece of work was a plaster block model, of a bust of crown prince maha vajirunhis. the second was a bust of king phra pinklao and the third was a bust of phra phrot muni. later we ventured to make a full-size body of phra pikhanet, phra trimurti, phra phrot muni, phra phirap and phra uma. each of these five models were 2 metres high. but our first khon mask lacked the proper design. it was a mask of phra phirap, painted with rak tree sap, and made without the use of a mould. after we finished we invited pii toy to have a look at it. she neither criticized nor suggested any modifications, she only said, “it is 42 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 passable, but it looks a bit more like female yak. you and your pupil would have more success in making yaks than making monkeys”. after pii toy left, the novice and myself intensified our efforts. we wanted to make a clay model of a hanuman mask just to prove that our teacher was wrong. after the finishing touch we brought this mask to her. unfortunately, she had already moved out from banbatr to bang gruay area, so we braved the heavy rain and took a tuk tuk belonging to nai daeng to her house. pii toy inspected our work and then said, “i still think it is half-monkey, half-yak”. from then on we stopped attempting to make monkey masks. we concentrated on making yak masks, buddha images and the teacher’s heads. one day we went to visit pii toy when she gave us some soapstone which the chinese used for making ink. she encouraged us to keep practicing for she was confident that we could do it. we were very grateful to her in not giving us the ready sculpted soap-stone because so we could sculpt it ourselves. as we wished to overcome our own self-hindrance, we groped for the right form by trial and error. we had no proper tools and had to make do with a sharp-pointed knife and the sharpened point of a compass to slowly carve the soap-stone, and then use oil-clay to test the mould. we kept trying until we were satisfied with the mould. we made a phra phirap teacher’s head with sandal wood powder, molded with carved designs, with rachawadi to create the color. then we added the fangs and wooden dowels to support the back part of the skull. the finished work was then submitted to pii toy for inspection. when she saw it she smiled saying “is it not true as i told you before? from carving on soap-stone and experimenting with oil-clay models, you certainly have developed your workmanship”. after that we began working on different models: tiny buddha images, tiny khon mask and teacher’s head amulets and many others. we are the first people who made tiny metal teacher’s head models to be used as pendants. they were so popular that many gurus began to make their auspicious objects in the form of rishi, even fakers in the tha phra chan amulet market copied both my tiny rishi, phra phirap, and an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 43 mass-produced them for selling. one day ajarn praphan suhkhonthachat proudly showed me one piece which he bought from a road-side stall. then i showed him the original soap-stone model and told him that it was my own work. our votive tablets have also become very popular among amulet lovers. for example a rishi, a phra phirap on a coconut shell, a rishi on a metal coin, and even a teacher’s head tattoo design. from being an only child playing with soil, to becoming a khon mask craftsman, i can say without reservation that i owe my success to my teachers. my achievement is due to my wonderful teachers and not to myself alone. my novice had been ordained according to the tradition and eventually left the monkhood and has a family of his own. he has used the skill acquired while he was being trained to earn a living to support his family. he did not attend any craft or art school. he has no degree. but what the novice and his teacher have both acquired is much more significant than a mere piece of paper showing accreditation. whatever he and i have today is the result of our dedicating our lives for it through trial and error which earned for both of us a special degree: a “degree of life”. the benevolent teacher is much like the great ganges river, since it eternally flows and never ceases. ten fingers rise in the gesture of prayer, to honor the benevolent teacher with pure heart. honoring the mother on june 13, 1988, at the age of 85, my mother passed away. before she died, she had agreed to sponsor the annual robe-presentation (kathin) ceremony at the temple where i was ordained. since she died before this occasion, my students and myself had to take over. mother’s funeral was simple but with deep devotion. i did not have to search for a piphat ensemble, my students took care of this and they played for her every night. everything was done according to her wishes. red was her 44 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 favorite color, so we decorated everything in red except for the coffin and the decorative items upon it. mother used a red tablecloth when she was selling her wares. even her fingernails were always painted red. she never allowed her grey-hair to be seen, or allow her red nail polish to be chipped, even when she was admitted to hospital. i have not been in touch with the school for quite some time. after mother died, i asked my juniors to inform “the chinese empress” (arjan pranee) about the news. the next day she came to pay respect to the body. she also presided over the cremation ceremony and lighted the fire herself. during the time she attended the nightly prayers, she spoke about her close relationship with mother and father to my students. i brought “the chinese empress” to my living quarters and showed her how i lived. when we entered the gate, she saw so many cats both living and artificial. there were cat pictures on the walls, even in the bathroom. the “chinese empress” was quite happy to find that we have something in common. i also took her to my house and showed her my works. she also liked my works. later my students and i paid her a visit at her home. after we returned, my students commented that i resembled “the chinese empress” in many ways. we share the same interests and even the same favorite color. i told my students that since we both were born on saturday, we even suffer similar kind of illnesses. through her sympathetic understanding, i regained the courage to fight against a dangerous disease. i dared to consult her about everything. whenever i became ill, she kindly phoned often and enquired after my condition. she also remarked that whenever she became ill, it was often the case that i was also admitted to hospital. hence when she was ill, she often thought about me. this kind of warmth has been lacking from my life for so long. “the chinese empress” was a godsend who brought me back to life. she replenished the oil in the lamp, changed its wick, and wound it up again. my morale began to improve and i began to think about showing gratitude to my school, and to the front place land. i consulted “the chinese empress” about this matter and mentioned to her my intention to make a rishi and a phra phirap teacher’s head for the school. i asked an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 45 “the chinese empress” to secure permission from the school director to let me make them for school on the condition that the presentation would be kept simple, unofficial and without any acknowledgement letter. first, i began to work on the rishi and had finished the face painting and eye-opening rite in the wai khru ceremony at the temple on the first anniversary of my mother’s death. the two works were combined to one occasion. “the chinese empress” was kind enough to light the victory candles, participated in wai khru ceremony, and received my rishi teacher’s head as school representative. i consider this my ultimate success. the day “the chinese empress” accepted my rishi teacher’s head was my graduation. it meant that i completed my education, and arrived at the day of my life achievement. “the chinese empress” was my first teacher who saw the potential in me – she was strict and she scolded me, but out of her good wishes. early in my life she saw me taking soil and dust to make a rishi head. and now it is her hands that extend to receive the highest development of that initial piece of soil. it is a kind of education and success that has slowly come to fruition. i would like students to contemplate my kind of life as a lesson. do not expect anyone under your charge to be merely as you wish them to be. be open-minded and give them an opportunity to follow their own heart’s desire. simply watch them grow and be a good mentor to them. guide them on until they reach the star of their dreams. an opportunity arises for honoring a teacher on 14 march 2001 i received an invitation to hold an exhibition of khon masks and teacher’s heads at princess sirindhorn music library (in the national library) on the occasion of the thai heritage conservation day. i met the chief of the music library to discuss the necessary arrangements. i also let him know that i was most willing to accept the invitation provided that i would be allowed to hold a simultaneous exhibition in honor of our teacher: arjan arkom. this was his 84th anniversary birthday. this teacher is no ordinary teacher. he is an expert in khon dance-drama, authorized to perform the initiation rite for khon 46 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 performers, and can bequeath his authority to other teachers. he is an initiating teacher who has directly inherited the ritual of the initiation rite for royal khon performers, which has been handed down from the beginning of ratanakosin era. this teacher also received a sacred thread directly from the hands of h.m. king bhumibol who graciously appointed him to perform the wai khru ceremony for the royal audience. and he has many important works to his credit: including khon dance-drama, music, folk-songs, radio drama scripts and thai modern songs. the national library official readily agreed to my request. the exhibition was scheduled to run from 29 march to 30 april. however the national library had no budget to support my plan; they could only provide space and program printing. so i had to find both money and man power to realize this plan. fortunately, my students took care of the necessary expenditure and temple boys pooled their strength to transport all the exhibition items. one day before the exhibition opened, i arranged for a religious ceremony, inviting monks to chant and and offering them food, the merit gained was offered to teacher and the guardian spirit of the national library. the director general of the fine arts department, mr. arvuth ngoenchuklin, presided over the opening ceremony, accompanied by vice-directors general mr. weera and mr. sirichaichan. the director general was much interested in my works. after the ceremony, we discussed about technical knowledge for quite a while. before he left, he even asked the chief librarian and other staff members to take good care of me because he had heard about my poor health and my hospitalization during the preparation work. during the exhibition, i had to be at the music library and meet visitors. i was allowed to use “than phuying puangroi” room as office. the exhibition was quite successful. both senior and junior student friends came to view the exhibition and gave words of encouragement. there were many requests for extension of the exhibition time since it was also school holidays, so the national library extended the exhibition until 30 june. from the visitors’ book, there were more than 30,000 people who came to view the exhibition. an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 47 october 2001, i had the chance of arranging another exhibition in honour of arjan arkom again at the princess sirindhorn music library. it was the birth month of his 84th anniversary. arjarn rewadee was very kind to bring some of his personal items for the exhibition that he received from the king. these included the sacred thread given by h.m. king bhumibol, a srisa por khru rishi, a phra phirap srisa khru, a headress of the nora chatri (a character from southern thai dance drama), a case containing a deva rup long song, a sacred text used in the initiation rite of khon and lakhon, a staff handed down from phraya natakanurak (thongdee suvanpharot), a srisa por khru rishi and phra phirap srisa khru that were used when initiating princess sirindhorn. i consider this event the greatest success of my life. i could honor my teacher and could help revive the memory of those who used to be his students, his close friends, his acquaintances and the general public, who were mesmerized by his dancing and the tone of his voice. i put a big exhibition poster in front of the national library: “exhibition in honor of phor khru akhom sayakhom, master teacher of the ratanakosin era.” on wednesday, 24 october, i was given the award of a master of the arts (sartrmedhee). also, on 26 october was ajarn akhom’s 84th birthday. i arranged for a merit-making ceremony for both events at king rama ix music library. the director-general mr. arvuth ngoenchuklin was very kind to preside over the ceremonies. causes lead to effects after the exhibition at princess sirindhorn music library ended, i packed up the exhibit items and had another exhibition at the temple for one month since the time coincided with birthdays of the former abbot and myself. according to the visitors’ book, there were altogether 1285 visitors. on 22 august 2001 i received a letter from mom luang pin malakul foundation saying that i have been chosen to receive the master of the arts (sartrmedhee) for the year 2001, in the category of thai art, khon mask making. there were altogether 6 awardees. during the exhibition at the music library, police major-general 48 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 suchart phuerksakon, secretary general and committee member of phra dabot project, asked me to design and to build phra dabot statue to be presented to h.m. the king who would in turn give the statue to the phra dabot foundation. i agreed to do as requested. i molded a figure using sandal wood powder as an ingredient. after i finished the job and the necessary wai khru ceremony done, i exhibited my work temporarily at the princess sirindhorn music library. on 21 may 2002, i had an audience with her royal highness princess chulaphorn walailuk and presented my work to her royal highness who acted as representative of h.m. the king. around the end of 2000, i began to feel weak, my fingertips and my feet were beginning to feel numb. the doctor advised me of sleep at least 10 hours a day. i was also advised to eat more often, but less quantity each meal. but i did not follow the doctor’s instruction. as a result i began to experience increasing numbness in my hands and they began to shake, i eventually lost control of the use of my hands. i could no longer hold a pencil, use brushes or even write. i had to stop working on phra dabot. during some sleepless nights, mr. jack came to help prepare the sandalwood powder. chao kaew came to help with decorations. for these tasks, i required help from my students. i myself could only provide some finishing touches and details. later on i became allergic to glue paste and sandal wood powder. the fine dust that lodged under my fingernails was the cause of my swollen hands which needed medical treatment. i had to stop working temporarily. chao kaew took over to complete the unfinished tasks. my students asked me to stop working completely. they wanted me to rest. but how could i? this is against my character. there were so many plans i had to give up. the spirit is often willing but the body will not cooperate. i could only pray that i would regain my energy and my capability so that i could continue to create. no matter whether the past is right or wrong, it has already been recorded in the memory as mr. chok chomthawat’s poem says: an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 49 one day is one page in our own history, all our past events are recorded in this history, just open the page and read it if you want to reminisce, but don’t ever taint it or tarnish it. (chok chomthawat, 25 june 2002) accepting students for a great task about the beginning of the year 2004, my health had considerably improved, but i still felt a little weak. five boys came to see me and asked me to teach them how to make khon masks. i decided to accept them, but wanted to assess their seriousness and their patience first. i then asked them to stay at the temple while i took care of their living expenses. i began with the basic groundwork just that i underwent myself at the beginning of my own apprenticeship. after a trial period of one month, only one student could pass this acid test. this student was seriously interested in the craft and could follow every instruction of mine. hence, i resumed my khon mask and teacher’s head (srisa khru) making, and assigned this accepted student (jesada saratn) to make a rishi teacher’s head, while i myself would make a black shiva (phra phrairava). after jesada had been with me for three months, we planned to create the world biggest mask of rishi. we followed the ancient customs in every step. we never used modern ingredients or tools, (no casting). we pasted layers of papier maché over a mould, just as in the making of any ordinary-sized khon masks. this work was completed at the end of december 2004. its width from right ear to left ear was 169 cm, its height from his chin to the top of his headdress was 205 cm, and its diameter was 320 cm. we had a celebration on 7 january 2005. this event was telecast on tv channel 7 under the program “sakhet khao” on the night of celebration. the first day of march 2005, i began to make both the world smallest and the world’s largest phra phirap; the largest has 270 cm width and 170 cm height. after completion, i had my work exhibited at king rama ix music library and princess sirindhorn music library, in the compound of the national library, with the title “phra phirap exhibition”. 50 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 this exhibition was to celebrate the 50th birthday anniversary of her royal highness crown princess maha chakri sirindhorn. the exhibition opened on 9 july 2005. phra chao krung jeen (chinese empress) presided over the ceremonies and lighted the candle and joss sticks in homage to phra phirap. mr. arak sunghitkul, director general of the fine arts department, delivered an opening speech. the national library was responsible for publishing the phra phirap song book. i myself wrote a book about phra phirap. this book describes the origin of phra phirap and the process of making phra phirap teacher’s heads. i also made auspicious objects (watthumongkol) in the form of phra phirap srisa khru and phra phirap amulets moulded from powder, to be given to the visitors to the exhibition. the event was quite successful and gained much publicity through its television broadcast. a lot of people came to view the exhibition. the “chinese empress” helped a great deal in making my name better known. students from different institutes came to interview me and asked about the process i used in making khon masks. at the moment there were plenty of work to be done, and little time to rest. i had to go to the hospital every week. the “chinese empress” herself was also not so well. she felt weak. if i had not contacted her for one week, she would phone to enquire after my health. she said she was worried about my infirmity, i also reciprocated her concern. whenever i felt a little stronger, i would pay her a visit at her school. i would cook her favorite dishes and had temple boys take them to her. sometimes i would also prepare my favorite dishes for her. whenever i went to the princess sirindhorn music library i would drop in at school to see the “chinese empress”. after some time she would scold me for taking too much trouble while both of us were not so strong and healthy. i told her it made me happy to do what i did. she did not say a word but continued to accept the food which i had prepared for her. my visit to the school became more frequent and noticeable. one day i happened to bump into arjan praphiphan sriphen when i was leaving the office of the “chinese empress”. she never missed a chance of an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 51 making a joke and said, “pranee (the real name of the chinese empress) seems to be only your relative over here!” i laughed and quickly denied it, although i was deeply fond of the “chinese empress” and felt deep affinity with her (arjan praphitphan and my mother were relatives. they used to have meals together; they consulted and spoke with one other all the time). “the chinese empress” is a friend of arjan praphitphan. after leaving school arjan praphitphan got married to pii tia, but the “chinese empress” remained single. my house and the “chinese empress’s” were close to each other so our relationship was also close. the “chinese empress” was a dignified person with an awe-inspiring personality. she often made this remark to me: “how very odd that a monk should have closer relationship with me than with praphaiphit (who was his relative)”. after that incident of chance meeting, arjan praphaiphit came to visit me more often either at the temple or at the princess sirindhorn music library. hence i felt obliged to fulfill my duty as a younger brother by sending 2 sets of gifts to the administration building and to the school auditorium respectively. gifts are only accessories, but the feelings of affection and good wishes behind the gifts are what is most significant. since october 2005, the “chinese empress” was often admitted to hospital. she often complained about her lack of appetite and body pain. every time she phoned me she would repeatedly remind me to carefully take care of myself. after the new year 2006, she was again hospitalized, but we still kept our contact by phone. we both lied to each other. she would say her condition was not serious, and i would assure her of my own good health. during the time she was hospitalized in the centenary year building, siriraj hospital, i was also admitted to another hospital. arjan rewadee sayakhom phoned me in the morning of 9 february 2006 gasping: “rush to the hospital (siriraj) quickly, somsak told me that the teacher (chinese empress) is waiting for you. she is concerned about you”. this frightened me since it was only 15 days to the “chinese empress’s” birthday anniversary. i mustered up strength and franticly dashed from one hospital to another. i arrived at the centenary year building at about 5 p.m. after getting out of the lift, i saw 52 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 so many of my senior and junior school-fellows were heading towards the “chinese empress’s” room. filled with dread, i came to realize that everyone came to bid their last farewell to the teacher. she was sleeping when i entered the room, her body covered with a mauve blanket – her favorite colour. i could hear the soft sound of the prayer “chinabanchorn khatha” coming from the radio near her bed. i moved closer to the bed. arjan somsak bent over and whispered in her ear, “mother, noo is here”. the “chinese empress” moved her hand and turned towards me. i and arjan nittaya jamornmarn looked at each other across the bed. we both could not hold back our tears. the atmosphere in the room was deadly quiet as if to let the sound from the heart of each student to resound before the last breath of their most beloved and revered teacher. i stood in a trance for almost one hour, until one of my students came to whisper in my ear urging me to return since i myself was also unwell. i did not return to my hospital as earlier intended but went direct to the temple in order to pray for the “chinese empress”. before i left the hospital, i asked arjan somsak to keep me informed. that night i did not go to bed; i just sat and prayed for her. at 8 o’ clock the next day, i received a phone call from arjan somsak saying “mother (teacher) has just passed away peacefully she shuddered a little before breathing her last breath. when i was standing near her hospital bed, i happened to see a garland and a white envelope on a table beside her bed. in the envelope she had put money for her funeral. she had prepared everything because she did not want to burden anyone with her death. she had also donated her body for medical education. at first the hospital refused to accept because it was found that she had cancer. i had to petition the hospital to accept her body because i wanted to see her wish fulfilled.” the “chinese empress” was born on 24 february 1933 and died on 10 february 2006. she was just a few days short of the age of 73. i went to wait for her body at wat tri thosathep. during the preparation for the “water pouring” rite, arjan praphitphan handed me a large garland saying, “reverend, please take this to your sister. the three of us had promised to take care of each other but could not do so. when arjan pranee (the an autobiography of siriphong kharuphankit 53 real name of the “chinese empress”) was hospitalized i also had my eyes operated upon and reverend was also in the hospital”. i was speechless and could only nod. arjan rewadee sayakhom kindly made it known to others that i should be the first person to perform the water pouring rite since i had to hurry back to my hospital. i placed the garland of one sister on the body of another sister with great sadness. in a small mauve booklet in memory of the “chinese empress” funeral, the following message was printed: in dedication to arjan pranee samranwong, a most beloved teacher. a teacher who had devoted her energy, her heart and spirit for the merit of being a good teacher (khru). although the earthly candle-flame begins to flicker out, your light still shines brightly in the sky, this is the light of the great teacher that continually guides me, even through my next life. luk nattasin her body had been donated for educational purposes. even though she may be forever gone, however far away she may be, the thought of her is still alive in our memory and its freshness will not fade way. there was also a short paragraph copied from a book published on the special occasion of the dance and music college giving a short biography and explanation of the work of arjan pranee samranwong when she was director of the school: during my tenure as director, i had a strong desire to develop this dance school which i so love in every way, especially the part of learning and teaching. although i am heavily burdened with school administration and development, i cannot abandon teaching. up to this day, i still repeatedly remind my students of my intention to see students practice the following principles: “practice good 54 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 2 july to december 2021 conduct, be disciplined, have a thirst for knowledge, uphold the arts and crafts, make sacrifices and remain united.” just over one month after the death of the “chinese empress,” arjan bunnag (ngae) thanthranont came to visit me. upon seeing that my health had improved, she said she wanted to tell me some sad news. she told me that arjan praphitphan passed away about a month after arjan pranee. she fell over the temple verandah. she died after a few days in hospital. everybody kept this sad news from me not only because of my poor health but also the traumatic shock i had experienced when arjan pranee passed away. i was stunned and could not utter a word. i suddenly experienced a flashback – an image of the funeral at wat tri thosathep. now the two loving friends who had promised once to care for one another would now be together and live happily in heaven. sooner or later my turn will definitely come. i fully hope to meet again the beings who had played the roles of suvarnahong and the chinese empress here on earth. life is a drama, a play of both happiness and sadness, lovers meet, and at the end of the scene, are separated. nothing remains, everything passes on. siriphong kharuphankit 19_(309-323) peace and justice.pmd peace and justice: reaction of the muslim community in south yunnan to political adversity1 wang jianping shanghai normal university, china abstract the muslims who live in the yunnan province of china strive to follow the principles advocated in the quran, while living as a minority in a non-islamic society. yet the cultural mainstream of contemporary chinese life often clashes with the core beliefs of the islamic tradition. therefore, the yunnanese muslims frequently face political pressures as they try to maintain their distinct islamic way of life. this paper investigates the methods that yunnanese musilims employ to confront an adverse, political environment. particularly their use of the values of peace and justice. º·¤ñ́ âèí ¤ø³¤èò¾×é¹°ò¹¢í§èòê¹òêèç¹áò¡áñ¡áõ �êñ¹µô̧ ããá� áåð �¤çòáâøµô̧ ããá� ãçáíâùè́ éçâàêáí èòê¹òíôêåòá¡çáõàªè¹à ṍâç¡ñ¹ â´â੾òðíâèò§âôè§ã¹¡ã³õ¢í§ªòç áøêåôá«öè§à»ç¹ª¹¡åøèá¹éíâíòèñâíâùèã¹á³±åâù¹¹ò¹ «öè§íâùè·ò§·ôèµðçñ¹µ¡à©õâ§ãµé ¢í§»ãðà·è ṏ¹ ªòçáøêåôáàëåèò¹ñé¹ä é́́ óà¹ô¹ªõçôµ é́çâ¡òã» ô̄ºñµôµòáëåñ¡¡òã ñ́§¡åèòç «ö觻ãò¡¯íâùè㹤ñáàõãì¡øãíèò¹íâèò§à¤ã觤ãñ́ ááé̈ ðà»ç¹ª¹¡åøèá¹éíâã¹á¼è¹ ố¹·õèáôä é́ ¹ñº¶×ííôêåòá ¡òã·õèçô¶õªõçôµ¢í§ªòç ṏ¹ãèçáêáñâä é́¶ù¡¡ãðáêçñ²¹¸ããá¤ãíº§ó àªè¹ ¡òãà¤òã¾ãù»ºùªò ¡òãäáè¹ñº¶×í¾ãðà é̈òáåðëå§ãëåã¹åñ· ô̧çñµ¶ø¹ôâá«öè§áµ¡µèò§¡ñ¹ áò¡¡ñºçô¶õªõçôµ¢í§ªòç ṏ¹áøêåôá ́ éçâàëµø¹õéàí§ ö̈§à¡ố ¤çòá¢ñ́ áâ駢ö鹺èíâ¤ãñé§ à»ç¹¼å ãëéªòçâù¹¹ò¹áøêåôáµéí§à¼ªô­¡ñº¤çòá¡´ ñ́¹·ò§¡òãàá×í§à¾ãòð¾ç¡à¢ò¾âòâòáãñ¡éò çô¶õªõçôµ ñ́é§à ốá¢í§áøêåôáàíòäçé º·¤çòá¹õé̈ ðµãç¨êíºçô̧ õµèò§ æ ·õèªòçâù¹¹ò¹áøêåôá prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 309-323 309 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ ¹óáòãªé㹡òã༪ô­ë¹éò¡ñºêàò¾áç´åéíá·ò§¡òãàá×í§·õèàåçãéòâ â´â੾òðíâèò§âôè§ ¡òã·õè¾ç¡à¢ò¹óàíò¤ø³¤èò·ò§èòê¹ò¤×íêñ¹µô¸ããááåðâøµô¸ããááò»ãðâø¡µìãªéà¾×èí ãñºá×í¡ñº»ñ­ëò·ò§¡òãàá×í§ the fundamental values of most religious traditions certainly contain those of peace and justice. the same is true for islam, especially in the case of the minority muslims who live in yunnan, the most southwest province in china. they exert a great effort, for example, to follow the principles advocated in the quran, while living as a minority in a nonislamic society. since often idolatry, atheism, and materialism have become the norm in contemporary chinese life, this challenges the core beliefs of the islamic tradition, and as a result the yunnanese muslims frequently face political pressure as they try to maintain their distinct islamic way of life. how do these muslims cope in this environment as minorities? how do they deal with the political pressures often facing their community? in essence, they employ peace and justice, the only weapons at the disposal of this group of muslim minorities to confront an often adverse, political environment. a historical review: how to survive strong political adversity to illustrate this point i would like to select two examples from past history demonstrating how the hui muslims dealt with crisis situations. the first one is the event of the mutual protection which took place in nagu township, tonghai county. the year 1858 was the climax of the hui uprising against the qing empire’s ethnic cleansing policy, while the hui force was once very powerful and the muslim upheaval army was surrounding hexi town of tonghai county. the hui in nagu village accepted the proposal raised by the han gentries to urge the muslims to make a peace agreement with the han villages around the area. therefore, the hui accepted the responsibility to protect the lives and properties of their neighboring han people based upon the principle 312 prajna vihara __ __ ~ of the mutual protection. later on as the imperial force got the upper hand and wanted to destroy the hui village of nagu, the han people came out to protect the muslims. hence, the hui in nagu village never did interfere with the han villagers raising pigs, nor did they interfere in the han people’s funeral services. the muslims and non-muslims respected each other, and the mosque, the buddhist temple and the taoist temple stood in the same area, and the different believers peacefully followed their own religions in this chaotic period.2 the second example is the event of the severing of kin relations for the sake of justice. in the 1920s, during the warlord period in the republic, the hui militant organization led by bai qizhou in shadian village raided a french freight train on its way from vietnam to kunming, the capital of yunnan province. the french diplomats lodged a protest over the robbery to the provincial governor who in return ordered the punishment of the raiders. the local authorities in southern yunnan declared that if the hui community did not hand over bai qizhou, the national troops would ransack this muslim enclave. after hearing the news, the hui village autonomous committee held the meetings and carefully considered the consequences if the community would shelter the criminals. so they decided to punish bai qizhou. however, bai qicheng, the elder brother of bai qizhou, was the local commander of a militant group and he strongly resisted the pressure from the hui village autonomous committee on the basis of family ties. under such circumstances the committee had to sacrifice the two brothers in order to protect the interests of the whole muslim village. so they waited for the day that commander bai qicheng came to mosque for prayer, and killed him in the mosque, and carried out the death sentence to bai qizhou by other means. after that the committee also dissolved the hui militant organization and yielded the weapons to the local authorities. they did that because the community led by the moderate hui gentleman bai liangcheng thought that raiding and robbery were unjust actions according to the teaching of the quran, therefore, the community must penalize the wrongdoers even if it meant violating the kin relations among the muslims themselves.3 after the hui village autonomous committee killed the local commander bai qicheng, the corpse was buried. however, a non-muslim official wanted to behead commander bai’s corpse due to his personal wang jianping 311 enmity with bai. according to islamic law, a buried corpse of a muslim could not be disgraced. however, with the support of the local authorities the official insisted upon it. the hui had to bite the bullet and behead bai’s corpse. bai liangcheng, the cousin of commander bai said. with tears in his eyes, that “the commander has done lot of good things for the locality, not only in religion, but also in education. all of these successes are tied to his support. but we have been ordered to execute him, and we do this after considering the overall situation”.4 it can be seen from the above-mentioned two events that the muslims in yunnan knew the arts of how to safeguard their lives in the history when the tide was strongly against them. living in the time of “the great cultural revolution” the cultural revolution is one of the darkest times in the history of china. in such a political turmoil followed the great persecution of many religions and the religious believers, how did the hui muslims suffer from this catastrophe? it was the greatest trial for the muslims since islam came to china. during the fanatical “cultural revolution” led by the gang of four in the period spanning 1966-1976, all religious activities were prohibited by the revolutionary regime. religious people were often treated as counter-revolutionaries and faced the risk of being put into jail. all mosques, about more than 490, in yunnan province were closed down by force, their buildings either being occupied for other purposes or being destroyed.5 the copies of the quran and other islamic books were confiscated or were thrown into fire. almost all the islamic cultural heritage was damaged or destroyed by the red guards or the revolutionaries. all 1300 akhonds in the province had been denounced and even physically tortured, paraded in public as demons, or evil forces. one case occurred in the early days of the cultural revolution, when some revolutionary rebels incited the non-muslim pupils from a chinese primary school to rush into the shuncheng street mosque in kunming and post a portrait of mao zedong (1893-1976), the chairman of communist party of china onto the wall of mihrab (niche, the direction to mecca) in the prayer-hall. 312 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the akhond of the mosque could not do anything in the presence of the revolutionaries. however, after the red guards went home, akhond silently asked a few muslim pupils to take down the portrait of chairman mao, since islam strongly opposing the idolatry worship. later on this action was discovered by the revolutionaries who accused this event as “the counter-revolutionary”. however, mr. wang lianfang, a hui worked in the cultural revolutionary leading team office calmly explained to the people that islam was a monotheistic religion, appealing for understanding from the revolutionary red guards. nevertheless, wang was charged as a reactionary and was deprived of all political rights for ten years, but his peaceful way in dealing with atheists at that time was respected.6 as the hui muslims in shadian faced the people liberation army which had laid siege to the islamic movement, the muslim villagers had to give up the arms and open the village gate to welcome the arrival of the military troops on december 8, 1968.7 due to the insistence of the muslims in shadian of southern yunnan on practicing islam, the communist authorities in the province regarded this muslim community as a “hornet’s nest”, and sent military regiment of a thousand soldiers to surround shadian village and eventually station themselves in this muslim community. after the troops entered the village the soldiers arrested the muslim leaders. the chinese soldiers consumed pork meat in the mosque, and threw pig bones into a well whose water was used for ritual ablution and for drink. the army used the mosque as their cafeteria and dormitory. the soldiers even held a party in the prayer-hall of the mosque. they tortured anyone who practiced islam and insulted them with a pig-head hung around the muslim's neck and enforced them to lick the pig-head. the soldiers also insulted the muslims and requested them to imitate pigs, gnawing on toilet walls and rolling downhill which caused one muslim woman to have a miscarriage. they also pulled off the beard of an old muslim for the punishment of his keeping sunnat tradition of islam. such persecution and humiliation lasted for one year. the muslims in shadian had to suffer this humiliation only finding solace in the teaching of the quran that allah would bless those who have a determination to endure the political stress during the cultural revolution.8 wang jianping 313 in the period of the 1960s and the 1970s when the extreme leftists and politicians were rampant, the muslims were forced to raise pigs and eat pork meat. any religious activities were prohibited by the atheist authorities. the muslims had to endure this religious persecution. some of them turned to the ground to pray, fast and study the arabic quran. they also had to hide their religious and ethnic identities in order to avoid such rude persecution and physical suffering. for them, keeping the faith deep in their heart was also to uphold peace and justice in values and in worldview.9 therefore, since practicing religion was prohibited, the muslims in yunnan maintained such religious practices secretly or quietly underground. forgiveness for the wrongdoings of “the cultural revolution” during the time of the cultural revolution, in 1975, the gang of four cracked down on the struggle of the muslims in southern yunnan for their religious freedom. using artillery they totally destroyed several muslim villages and killing over 1,600 muslims, and injuring at least 5,000 in the so-called shadian incident.10 however, after the cultural revolution, in 1979 the yunnan government changed their view of this “counterrevolutionary rebellion”, and compensation was made to those muslim families which lost lives in the violent crack-down. the muslims in shadian community understood that this terrible slaughter was committed by the gang of four, and that it should not blame the junior officials in the grassroots level of the locality. consequently, the muslims easily forgave those who had committed these grave mistakes during the cultural revolution. they looked forward to future, and with the broad and tolerant mind the muslims did not take any revenge in redressing this horrible event.11 why did the muslims easily forgive all the wrongs done to them? because they understood: “our hui are a geographically scattered ethnic minority, if we do not keep good relation with han chinese and other non-muslim ethnic groups, or if we fall into factional fighting among ourselves, without a solidarity and stable social environment, it is impossible for us to develop or to have wealth. … once the confrontation with others occurs, we should be good at mutually understanding and mutu314 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ally tolerant with the other side, even the confrontation is intense we should uphold the hadith: “it is the imperative obligation to obey the state”, rely upon the government to solve the problem according to the state legal procedures.12 after shadian massacre was redressed and the mistake was corrected by the central government in beijing, the pla commanders went to shadian to apologize to the muslims. shadian muslim villagers touched by this gesture and said: “during the ten years’ turmoil we, the muslims were the victims, so were the pla soldiers, the roots were due to the iblis [shaitan or evil] lin biao (1907-1971) and the gang of four”.13 taking the initiative for making compromises if a dispute takes place the muslims in south yunnan always follow the principle: to obey their country’s constitutional laws must be a duty and compulsory obligation for every muslim. this mentality is entirely in conformity with the hadith: “submitting to the order of the state is the imperative obligation”.14 the hui in guanyi village and the han in xiangmu village, jianshui county, were very hostile to each other because of some historical reasons. however, to reduce the social tension, the hui leaders initiatively went to han’s village to make the gesture of compromise and tried to bury the hatred between the two ethnic groups. the han were pleased by such a gesture and the hostile atmosphere was gradually disappeared. particularly, the hui muslims in shadian community excluded all former complaints, even sent their delegation with gifts going to the front of sino-vietnam border to make condolences with the military pla, which once cracked down on the religious movement of the shadian hui during the cultural revolution.15 another case of muslims preventing violence was ma jiangang, a retired official who had served in the local administrative agency for 21 years. he returned to his hometown in luxi county. because of his fame and virtue and the hui muslims asked him to act as arbitrator to resolve a confrontation. in 1941 there was a severe draught in the area and this wang jianping 315 caused the bloodshed over the dam of the river between the muslim villages at the upper reach of the river and the non-muslim villages at the lower reach. the latter wanted to dig an outlet in the dam to allow water for drinking and to alleviate the great draught. the confrontation escalated and both sides lost many lives. the possibility of an ethnic massacre between the muslims and non-muslims was looming, mr. ma jiangang got news of this danger and immediately came to the site of the confrontation and used his great influence to stop his hui people from engaging in further violence and appealed both sides to make peace over the issue of the water distribution. due to his peaceful efforts the bloody massacre was avoided, and a peace agreement was reached on the matter of dividing the river water fairly.16 sacrificing oneself for the interests of the majority of muslims the hui muslims in yunnan, being an ethnic minority and living in scattered enclaves, have a tradition of sacrificing their leaders to protect the lives of the whole community in times of crisis. this ensured their survival among an overwhelmingly han majority society armed with the very powerful cultural forces of confucianism, buddhism and later communism. the most remarkable example was tu wenxiu (1827-1873), the leader of the hui uprising in yunnan in the period 1855-1874. he surrendered himself to the qing imperial troops as they had surrounded dali, the location of the headquarters of the muslim insurgency. tu used a peacock gallbladder to poison himself after he had made a peace packet deal with the government that promised an amnesty to all the hui followers in the insurgent forces. even in shadian incident of 1975 as thousands of pla military troops with the modern weapons raided shadian hui village, while most of the village had been damaged by gun-fire, the hui leaders appealed for the two thousand civilians to yield to the government to allow them safety from the deadly confrontation. in the 1970s during the cultural revolution when religion was treated as “counter-revolutionary” or “reactionary”, the muslims in najiaying village in tonghai county were suspected by the local revolutionary regime as being religious practitioners, therefore, six regiments of 316 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the people’s liberation army were sent to the village and the heavily armed soldiers surrounded the muslim community and were waiting for the order to suppress the muslims. on march 5, 1975 as the hui muslims faced the suspending catastrophe of the military interference, they had to use their wisdom to deal with such an adversity. the community mobilized women and young people who all held the branches of flowers and sang the song of “love kin-men such as people liberation army” to go out of the village and welcome the armed soldiers entering village as guests. using this friendly approach, the hui muslims in najiaying village averted a military slaughter by the governmental army. so such a strategy of employing non-violence to combat violence or presenting flowers to the gun muzzle is very successful in avoiding the direct confrontation and making peace in relationship with other political groups, particularly with the governmental authorities.17 practicing humility to avoid conflict in pingyuanjie, wenshan county if a dispute takes place between the hui ethnic group and non-muslim zhuang group, the hui consciously show humility, so the quarrel will not develop into inter-ethnic fighting. maolong village has a mixed population, the hui and the han live side by side. the people have used the same well for drinking water for several dozen years, and there never been any conflict over different living habits.18 in the winter of 1989, shuijingwan village suffered from a severe draught, which badly diminished the water supply. the village is composed of a mixed population, muslims and non-muslims used the same well, the only source of drinking water. a han villager once carelessly dropped a piece of pork meat into the well as he drew the water with the bucket. according to the customs of islam, the well water was contaminated by pork, so the hui should not drink it. however, this incident did not lead to the ethnic confrontation, rather, the hui did not seriously regard it as blasphemy, or a deliberate insult or a challenge, rather they went to a remote place to fetch the water even it caused great inconvenience to their daily life. how did they maintain such a friendly approach wang jianping 317 in their co-existence with their non-muslim neighbors? the reason is that they they have long practiced inter-marriage between the two ethnic groups.19 such a strategy of compromise can also be found in the case in maojiawan village in ludian county.20 in taoyuan township, if pig from a han household runs into a hui household, or conversely, if a sheep from a hui household runs into a han household, both sides, the muslims and non-muslims, will make a compromise and pay each other compensation to dissolve the dispute.21 this is also for the case in kedu town, either side will buy a long piece of red cloth as compensation or light a string of fireworks to expel the evil as a ritual for solving a dispute with the other side.22 adapting to han chinese cultural elements without changing the way of the islamic life under the political hardships faced by an ethnic-religious minority the hui in southern yunnan has to strengthen themselves by strictly following islamic law such as abstaining from drinking alcohol, smoking opium, consuming prohibited food, engaging in gambling and committing sexual relations outside of marriage. yet the muslims have assimilated some han chinese cultural customs in their long period of co-existence, particularly with regard to social, economic and cultural exchanges. however, these assimilations have not fundamentally changed their islamic way of life. if the han chinese’s living customs do not directly clash with the teaching of the quran and hadith, the muslims in yunnan will not resist some influences from han culture if it maintains a peaceful life with their non-muslim neighbors.23 on the other hand, the muslims have attempted to make accommodations between shari’a law and the constitutional law. according to islamic law, if a husband says to his wife three times “i divorce you” (talaqa), the mosque will regard such a marriage being spontaneously abolished for this couple. if they co-inhabit again they are considered to commit adultery. however, such a practice does not fit into the constitutional law on marriage. to solve this problem or contradiction the akhond of the mosque in that area assisted by the administrative officials, actively 318 prajna vihara __ __ ~ mediates this issue and decrees that if the couple is willing to make reconciliation or re-union, the mosque is able to recognize their relation as husband and wife if they undergo a witnessed ritual for repenting.24 the muslims in yunnan also bravely teach confucianism textbooks in their community schools. during the republic period (19111949) the muslim community in shadian invited the teachers from the inland to come teaching confucianism classic books such as the analects, mean, the great learning and mencius. the muslim schools even invited non-muslim intellectuals from other places to teach subjects such as french literature, german philosophy, the chinese classic literature as well as inviting famous islamic scholars from outside teaching the arabic quran, hadith, islamic law and persian islamic literature.25 even the school provides modern subjects such as english, science, geography, history, language, philosophy, music, mathematics and physics for muslim students to study.26 enhancing compatibility for the community’s survival to display this point, i cite three cases. first is that the muslims realize the importance of developing education. in order to strengthen the muslim community, particularly after the hui population in yunnan has decreased drastically after the suppression of the hui uprising, the muslim scholars decided to develop islamic education, to improve their capacity to compete with the non-muslim majority. so ma lianyuan (18401903), the preeminent muslim scholar in south yunnan at the end of the 19th century had introduced a thousand muslim students coming from all over china to the arabic quran theological theory after he came back from mecca on hajji.27 the rapid development of the islamic education has greatly contributed to the growing vitality of the muslim community in the region. second is that yunnanese muslims have created a comprehensive network, to overcome the weakness of the loosely scattered “patchwork” community,28 the hui tried hard to establish a communal network in its long historical interaction with the majority non-muslims in the surrounding area. through marriage ties, commercial trade, itinerary clerical mission, wang jianping 319 religious students’ searching islamic knowledge, islamic festival celebrations, fund collection in building mosques, hajji journeys, traveling among muslim enclaves, external connections with the islamic world, the muslims in yunnan although a minority, have formulated a powerful network29 which is able to compete with their strong and majority non-muslim neighbors and would change the political adversity into a political advantage. third is that the muslims stress their solidarity within their community. as the minority living in the majority surroundings the hui muslims in yunnan keep good terms with their different islamic sects such as qadim and ikhwani.30 by this way the muslim minority can often compete well with the non-muslim majority. conclusion through the strategy of upholding peace and justice while living under great political adversity the muslims and islam in south yunnan have gained full development as an ethnic-religious force. although having experienced several massacres and persecutions, the muslim population in yunnan has reached to more than 70000031 from the less than 100000 in the 1880s, and there are almost 900 mosques in the province according to the latest statistics.32 the development of islamic education is one of the most impressive in china, and the province boosts more than 1400 hajjis who have fulfilled the pilgrimage to mecca every year.33 the shadian community has recently built the largest and the most modern mosque in china. the islamic festivals in shadian can attract several dozens thousand muslims from all parts of china to come for celebration. the graduates from madrasahs in shadian and the southern yunnan have gone to various places in china to take the position as akhonds or imams to lead islamic affairs within muslim communities. the muslims in this region live a better life than before since the fast growth of the islamic economy, and shadian community particularly has gained a good reputation as the richest and the most developed economic area in yunnan. in islamic dimension, shadian has a name of “small mecca” which refers to its central position in leading other muslim communities of south yunnan in islam. i think the wisdom of the muslims in dealing with their sur320 prajna vihara __ __ ~ roundings, particularly with regard to religious, political, ethical, cultural, educational and social pressures is important to learn. it teaches us how to maintain harmonious relationships among different ethnic-religious groups. endnotes 1i am so grateful to the invitation from assumption university, thailand to participate this conference on asian culture; i also thank dr. yang xinan from institute of sino christianity theology, hong kong for his recommendation for my participating in this conference. 2yunnan huizu xiangqing diaocha (investigation to the situation of hui villages in yunnan), edited by gao fayuan, kunming: yunnan nationality press, 1992, p. 211. 3ma meizhong: “historical stories of bai liangcheng”, shadian huizu shiliao (historical materials of the hui people in shadian), edited by writing team of a history of shadian hui people, kaiyuan, unofficial publication, 1989, pp. 256259. 4lin zhongshu: “historical achievements by bai liangcheng”, shadian huizu shiliao (historical materials of the hui people in shadian), edited by writing team of a history of shadian hui people, kaiyuan, unofficial publication, 1989, p. 210. 5yunnan huizu 50 nian (50 years for the hui people in yunnan), edited by gao fayuan, kunming: yunnan university press, 2003, p. 131. 6yunnan huizu 50 nian (50 years for the hui people in yunnan), edited by gao fayuan, kunming: yunnan university press, 2003, p. 132. 7shadian huizu shiliao (historical materials of the hui people in shadian), edited by writing team of a history of shadian hui people, kaiyuan, unofficial publication, 1989, pp. 47-48. 8yunnan huizu 50 nian (50 years for the hui people in yunnan), edited by gao fayuan, kunming: yunnan university press, 2003, pp. 136-137. 9na qi: chuantong yu xiandai de zhenghe (integration of tradition and modernity), kunming: yunnan university press, 2001, p. 128. 10for more detail information of this event, please refer to dru gladney’s book muslim chinese, cambridge: harvard university press, 1991. 11wang lianfang: huizu gongzuo de huigu yu qiwang (review and expectation for the work among the hui people), kunming: yunnan nationality press, 1985, p. 54. 12wang lianfang: “preface”, shadian de zuotian jintian (history and present of shadian), edited by shadian district party committee and district government, kunming: yunnan nationality press, 1996, p. 2. wang jianping 321 13zongjiao diaocha yu yanjiu (investigation and research on religion), edited by institute of religions, yunnan academy of social sciences, kunming, 1986, p. 87. 14wang lianfang: huizu gongzuo de huigu yu qiwang (review and expectation for the work among the hui people), ibid, p. 69. 15ibid, p. 46. 16ma hengui & ma shaoqing: “ma jiangang, the old loves people”, honghe zhou huizu shiliao xuanji (a selection of the historical materials of the hui people in honghe prefecture), edited by islamic association of honghe autonomous prefecture of hani nationality and yi nationality, gejiu: unofficial publication, 1993, p. 203. 17“chronology”, tonghai xianzhi (gazetteer of tonghai county), kunming: yunnan people publication house, 1992; i got confirmed through my personal interview with na jiarui, the local teacher in najiaying village, tonghai of yunnan on nov. 14, 1994. 18yunnan huizu xiangqing diaocha (investigation to the situation of hui villages in yunnan), edited by gao fayuan, kunming: yunnan nationality press, 1992, p. 141. 19ibid, p. 237. 20ibid, p. 261. 21ibid. 22ibid, pp. 330-331. 23yunnan yisilan jiao (islam in yunnan), edited by ma kaineng and li rongkun, beijing, religious cultural press, 2004, p. 79. 24zongjao diaocha yu yanjiu (investigation and research on religion), edited by institute of religions, yunnan academy of social sciences, kunming, 1986, p. 106. 25shadian de zuotian jintian (history and present of shadian), editor in chief: wang zihua, ma shaomei, edited by shadian district party committee and district government, kunming: yunnan nationality press, 1996, pp. 268-270. 26yunnan yisilan jiao (islam in yunnan), edited by ma kaineng and li rongkun, ibid, p. 101. 27yunnan yisilanjiao shi (a history of islam in yunnan), edited by yao jide, li rongkun and zhang zuo. kunming: yunnan university press, 2005, p. 228. 28see jonathan lipman: “patchwork society, network society: a study of sino-muslim community”, islam in asia, edited by raphael israel & anthony h. johns. vol. 2, jerusalem: the magnes press, the hebrew university, pp. 246-274. 29for more detail information of the network for the muslim community in yunnan, please see jianping wang’s book: concord and conflict: the hui communities of yunnan society in a historical perspective. stockholm: almqvist & wilsell international, 1996, pp. 127-161. 30yunnan huizu xiangqing diaocha (investigation to the situation of hui villages in yunnan), edited by gao fayuan, kunming: yunnan nationality press, 322 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 1992, p. 259; also see yunnan yisilanjiao shi (a history of islam in yunnan), edited by yao jide, li rongkun and zhang zuo. kunming: yunnan university press, 2005, p. 217. 31gao fayuan: “speech at the celebration of day of break-fast in 2011”, yunnan huizu yanjiu (journal of hui studies in yunnan), no. 3, 2011, p. 3. 32yang zexiong: “speech at the celebration of day of break-fast in 2011”, yunnan huizu yanjiu (journal of hui studies in yunnan), no. 3, 2011, p. 8. 33ibid. wang jianping 323 16_(271-281) the influence of.pmd the influence of the buddhist view of life on universal value in modern society jianfu lv shaanxi normal university, china abstract this paper deals with the buddhist conception of life and its universal value for modern society. it suggests the manner in which asian religions and other culture traditions can solve various social problems. we can no longer afford to solve problems with force of arms, and often our use of political, economic, legal, and other means to solve problems is ineffectual, but we can solve the problems through the old ways, of self control and self adjustment. these techniques are found in the ideas and resources of our religions and other related culture traditions, which can create more fundamental solutions to our problems. º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéíàô»ãòâ¶ö§¤çòá¤ô´àëç¹à¡õèâç¡ñºªõçôµáåð¤ø³¤èòêò¡å¢í§ªõçôµ êóëãñºêñ§¤áêáñâãëáèµòáëåñ¡¾ø·¸èòê¹ò º·¤çòáàê¹íá¹ðçô¸õ·õèèòê¹ò çñ²¹¸ããá »ãðླõ¢í§àíàªõâêòáò㶹óáòá¡é»ñ­ëòêñ§¤á àãòäáèêòáòã¶ãªéíòçø̧ á¡é»ñ­ëòä é́íõ¡áåéç íõ¡·ñ駡òã·õèàãòà¤â¹óá¹ç·ò§·ò§¡òãàá×í§ àèãé°¡ô̈ ¡®ëáòâ ëã×íçô¸õí×è¹ æ áòãªéá¡é»ñ­ëò¡çáñ¡¨ðäáèä´é¼å áµèàãòêòáòã¶á¡é»ñ­ëòä´éâ´âãªé çô¸õ´ñé§à´ôá ¹ñ蹡ç¤×í ¡òã¤çº¤øáµ¹àí§áåð¡òã»ãñºµñç à·¤¹ô¤àëåèò¹õéëòä´é¨ò¡ áëå觤çòá¤ô´ã¹áµèåðèòê¹òáåðçñ²¹¸ããá»ãðླõ·õèà¡õèâç¢éí§ «öè§êòáò㶠êãéò§êãã¤ìá¹ç·ò§á¡é䢻ñ­ëò·õèà»ç¹¾×é¹°ò¹áò¡¡çèò prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 271-281 271 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ we are facing various problems in contemporary society, involving immorality, science, ecological imbalances, environmental pollution, political corruption, violence, war and terror activities, the corruption of rights, hegemonism, egoism, health and safety, hunger and death, etc. while environmental pollution, ecological destruction, resource exhaustion, are new social problems which have emerged with the development of modern science and industrial technology, other older problems are being aggravated. these problems whether old or new, essentially involve the human being. however, the problem of human being is not isolated, but is the problem of the relationship between human being with nonhuman nature. human beings have made great developments connected to civilization, including religion, philosophy, ethics, law, politics, economy, culture, science and so on, but they have been unable to solve the various problems which accompany this development. thus, humanity is faced with an unprecedented predicament. fortunately, we have already found the root of these problems, so we have some hope to solve them. generally speaking, old problems are solved by old ways, yet even new problems we can also draw inspiration from the old ways to find new methods. people have made much effort in this direction, such as global ethics and religious dialogue, theories of harmonious society, ecological balance, controlling pollution and so on. these efforts are still in progress, and such solutions have received a high degree of consensus among the religions and within the academic fields. we can draw some comfort from this. i wish to contend that inspiration for new solutions to problems can also be found in asian religion and other cultural traditions. religions and other traditional thought systems do not use strong political power to intervene, what they do is take inspiration from old theories to propose some new ideas. this approach believes that transforming the world outlook can solve problems. there has been much research on buddhism for more than 2,500 years, a tradition which had spread widely in asia and has shown unique success. i wish to draw upon this tradition to show how it can set a common goal to solve problems in the contemporary global world. the problems involving human beings are ultimately related to the relationship of the human to the crowd. three chinese characters, 271 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ren, compose a chinese character, zhong. it is so-called “three people are all”, that is to say, the problem of human being is the problem of crowd which consist of three ren. they can be summarized as the human nature, human relations and human rights. human nature implies that man has higher pursuit of spirit and life meaning, the human relations means one has a standard of the good and evil, and the human rights says that people in social activities should have human dignity. human nature, human relations and human rights are respectively three levels of the problem, which are religions and philosophical, ethical and cultural, social and political. this is known as the buddhist theory of life. since the human being is a part of nature, it has a natural essence. people are naturally the same as all the natural objects in their birth and a death, their obeying the laws of nature and their being driven by natural instinct. at the same time, people are higher animals with intelligence. as humans, we not only have consciousness and self-control, but we also exceed and control nature. this is the trait that leads to the root of human problems. human nature as being both transcendental and instinctual, human relations being both normal and abnormal, and human rights involving both balance and imbalance, these bring forth most human problems. it looks as if contemporary social problems are very different from those in prior history. it seems that science technology and the development of economy changed the whole world. but these new problems have no essential difference from the natural development of the human. the pace is merely accelerated. while human self-control haven’t been improved and even declined as the development of society. where religions and other culture traditions once provided purpose and the source of such values as self-control, contemporary society is controlled by science technology, and the economy. there is no purpose in its speed or in its goals. buddhism establishes the value of man through buddha-nature theory and mind-nature theory. there is a famous saying in the mahāparinirvāna sūtra , “all living beings have buddha nature”, 1 that is to say, everyone has buddha-nature. moreover buddhism think that man can fulfill value and believes all living beings can become buddha, 2that is to say, everyone even an icchantika (butcher) with a buddha-nature jianfu lv 273 may attain buddha-hood. as for the meaning of buddha nature, different classics give different explanations from different angles. for example, the enlightenment of four noble truths is the goal of life, or liberation from cycle of birth and death is the enlightenment state, or the void of own-nature is shunyata wisdom, or container consciousness ( ālayavijñāna ) is ultimate existence, or nitya-sukha-atma-subha is four virtues of nirvana. in a word, the perfect and consummate of human nature is the supreme goal, which is a positive value system and consistent with value system of other major religions and philosophy and culture, even representing the mainstream value of human being. as for mind-nature theory, it is clean in essence, but defiled by external object ( āgantukatva ). thus, one heart has two aspects in the awakening of mahāyāna faith, one is true thusness aspect of the mind which affirms the positive values of human nature, the other is ignorant thusness aspect of the mind which points out the negative effect of human nature. sentient beings have impure heart, which means the heart is polluted by afflictions (kleś a). so there are various weaknesses in human nature, such as selfishness, mercenary tendencies, intrigue, dishonesty, committing massacres, flattery, bullying the weaker, using violence, cheating each other, fomenting rumor, confusing right and wrong, and so on. the weakest points of human nature is so called “the three poisons”, including desire ( rāga ), anger (dve?a) and ignorance (moha). desire is the first of these three poisons. it is the origin of heart problems, and all human’s fallabilities and error behavior come from this. anger mainly consists of pleasure, anger, sadness, joy and other bad moods. ignorance comprises stubborn and other paranoid tendency. both are important factors leading to problems. the true thusness aspect of the mind is the initial state, the essence of human nature and the highest goal which people have been seeking. ignorant thusness aspect of the mind is natural state and inevitable state of human nature, which people have to overcome and the object people need to cure. therefore, buddhism gives many approaches and methods of practice, from one’s own mind, the arousal of the thought, cultivating the mind, realization of heart to buddhichitta, which constitute the main content of buddhist scriptures. the doctrines of all religions are all to improve mind and perfect human nature. all beings in buddhism also include other life forms and inani274 prajna vihara __ __ ~ mate matter. the one who live are called sentient beings, such as animals, plants and so on. the others are called insentient beings, such as stone, soil, wood, mountain, river, earth, sky and universe. sentient beings have consciousness and feelings, including the six destinies and four forms of birth, 3which is often equated with humanity. insentient beings are the physical environment of sentient beings, the natural world, although they don’t have consciousness and feelings, they are produced and extinguished by origination, and have the internal causes and general rules for their movement and change. so chinese buddhism proposes a theory, insentient beings with nature, and thinks the nature also has its own self-perfect time, which is called the best harmonizer. in this way, buddhism breaks through the hedging-in tradition of anthropocentrism, and extends the scope of the attention to all living things and inanimate nature, and finally creates a value system which is very useful. secondly, as for human relations, buddhism distinguishes right from wrong and good from evil and believes that the improvement of the human nature is gradually perfected by stopping evil and advocating good deeds, from low to high, through ten stages ( daśabhūmi ) to perfection. 4there is a famous verse, seven buddha tong jie, not to do any evil, to cultivate good, to purify one’s mind, this is the way of the buddhas. 5this means that if you stop doing evil, advocate the good and cleanse your impure mind by yourself, you will surpass the good and evil, and achieve the perfect realm, which are the teachings of the buddhas. according to the explanation of increased by one agama, all the commandments and the doctrines of the four agama sutra are all contained in this verse. the first two sentences address the behavior of people, advocating kindness to all living creatures, showing mercy and alleviating the suffering of all living creatures the next sentence is refers to the human’s mind. avoiding the sins of body, mouth and mind means the purification of the individual. among these, not to do any evil is called the commandment door, the most fundamental of the laws, as long as you don’t do evil things, you are living correctly at least with respect to means. but to cultivate good is called the advised method, to do good and accumulate merit to purify the impure mind. to purify one’s mind is considered as the awakened method, the purity of self-nature lies in self-conscious, eliminating inverted understanding as well as all deluded thought, which purifies from jianfu lv 275 itself, and leads from the inevitable kingdom to the free kingdom. the verse of seven buddhas commandment is from precept to self-enlightenment, and accurately expresses the basic spirit of religions ethics, and can be seen as the common program of most religions concerning the human morality, as well as has the values of definition for religion. this definition of religion would be namely: not to do any evil, to cultivate good, to purify one’s mind, this is the teaching of the buddhas. but this can be extended the common principle of the whole human ethics, that is not to do any evil, to cultivate good, to purify one’s mind. edification not only includes religion, but also comprises education and other thought and ethical systems in secular society. as a matter of fact, the commonality of all religions and secular education lies in the ethical principle of resisting evil and advocating virtue. concerning what is good and what is evil, different religions and ideological culture systems give different answers. but buddhism also has its own definition which can be useful for us. what is good and evil? favorableness is called good, harm is called evil, neither favorableness nor harm is unworthy to be discussed says dasheng yizhang, 6which means more and more favorable is called the good, more and more harmful is called evil, without the harmless is called not worthy discussing. favorableness is good, good means benefit, favorableness means the positive benefit. contravening is contrary, harm means the damage, harm is the opposite of benefit. there is a further explanation in dacheng yizhang (essay on the meaning of mahāyāna ). good is divided into three levels from primary to high level, primary good flows with positive for good, and has rising trend. according to the definition, the good deeds of sentient beings, men and gods in the three realms are all called good.7 despite this idea of good as possessing positive benefits, it is still contaminated goodness, and still retains the affliction of habit energies, which deviates us from our complete control of desire and mood. and no-outflow (an ā srava) which can eliminate affliction is the good in middle rank. following the law which is voice-hearer ( śrāvaka ) and pratyekabuddha’s the good law is the standard of this good. the senior good follows nature, and dharma-realm (dharmadh ā tu) is its original nature ( ā tman). the practice of oneself is according to the essence of human nature, 德行圆满 , 276 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 三业清净 ,which is the good deeds of practice of buddhas and bodhisattva. and the good is divided into three levels in mah?vairocan?bhisa?bodhivikurvit?dhi??h?na-vaipulyas?tra and its commentary. the primary good is good act in secular world, the intermediate good is the domestic good, the senior good is the buddhism good. the standard of the good is the degree of the good heart. the good act in secular world is to honor parents and treat relatives well. the domestic good involves friendliness to acquaintances, as well as respect for virtuous friends (kaly?na-mitra) and those possessing expertise and authority. the good in buddhism is great kindness and great compassion as well as benefits for all living creatures. compared with the good, evil has three kinds. one is contrary to the right and harmful to present, this is related to human suffering and animal desire (tiryag-yoni). the second is against the law, which violates the basic principles of buddhism and specific rules. according to this definition, impure good actions in this world can also be evil. the third is against truth and nature, and based on deluded minds (false minds), which are not according with the highest interests, and imperfect. according to this definition, the impure good actions of śrāvaka , pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva belong to evil actions.8 according to the theory of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratāsiddhi śāstra ), both this world and the next are standards of good and evil. the good is not only for the sake of this world, but also for the next world. for instance, if happiness is only experienced in the present, and not in the future, it would not be true happiness. likewise for evil, not only does evil have an influence in the present, but also in the future world. if the three-durgati would be only suffered in the present, but not in the future world?it would not be the completely evil. 9this world and the future world of good and evil can be understood in three levels of relationship, which is: this time and at that time; self and others; and individual and whole. this is related to transmigration?which is a life cycle, and is a time cycle. the past, present, and future form a cycle. so good and evil are all limited by action and related to the present and future. good is gradually accumulated in terms of perfection. and evil is gradually decreased so as to die out. the profit and loss as well as the world and the future world are the standards of good and evil in buddhism. good measure is divided jianfu lv 277 into three levels from low to high and has universal values. the profit and loss is also the basic principle of good and evil in the modern society, and the whole interests of humanity is the standard. the purpose of every religion is to advocate good and stop evil, and only differ with respect to the standards of the good and evil. the idea of good and evil of the world religions goes beyond class, nation, and collective, and is considered as based on the overall interests of all mankind. all of the world’s religions have an ultimate goal, the perfect good, which is the final purpose of the whole of humanity. most religious practitioners try to avoid evil and do good. as as long as the law and other activities in secular society conform to the benefit of the public, they are the primary good. human rights is really the equal rights of human being. in buddhism, equality is reflected not only in social practice, but also in the law. so it claims that the original nature of all dharmas is equal. at the beginning of buddhism, śākyamuni put forward that four castes are all equal and said that as long as everyone belonging to any caste does buddhist practice, they are called ś akya and equal. later, buddhism raises all beings as equal, and further declares all laws are equal. finally, it even thinks buddha dharma is equal. equality is a basic idea of buddhism. buddhism thinks all things and phenomena originated from fate and are equal in nature, which is called the equality of laws, and also is the evidence of dharma equality. for example, the great collection scripture ( mahāsamnipata-sūtra ) thinks three realms and buddha dharma have no differences. three realms are equal and dharma is equality. all method is also equal, as method is dharma, and has no distinction.10 and say, regarding the equality of all dharma by my view of equality and regarding the equal of all the living creature by the equal of all dharma means the equal of buddha, dharma, living creature, the mercy and even the unrealities. the view of equality names the holy right view. 11all beings and i are equal with buddha, because buddha and all beings have buddha nature, which is the inner basis of the equality. all beings and buddha are equal in essence, which is the inner evidence of people’s equal rights, and also the essence of human rights. based on this view of equality, buddhism’s religious practices treat everything equally, especially for every person with equal heart, which is the basic requirement of the bodhisattva. for example, bodhisattva278 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ?bhara?a s ū tra thinks everyone should be treated with equal mind, which is the mind of boddhisattva. vajra ??i-vadana also thinks one who understands all living things has equal rights and this true buddhist nature is called boddhisattva. human rights in modern society are mainly built on political and social considerations. these rights have not been completely and adequately respected. the main reason is the serious inequalities in modern society, not only among individuals, but also among classes, nationalities, countries, and interest groups. these take many forms: economic “law of the jungle” attitudes, to power politics, bureaucratic corruption, plunder of resources, and the trafficking of women and children. this leads to the sorry state of human rights in modern society. the buddhist view of equality gives us some enlightenment about how to solve such problems. firstly, all sentient beings have equal rights, which are not only between man and man, but also between human and other livings, even between humans and nature. secondly, all laws are equal, which not only exist between all things and phenomena, but also observing all things and phenomenon with equal mind. everyone is equal, rights are shared together, and obligations are fulfilled together, which are the basic ideas of life in buddhism, and has a positive significance. the pure human nature, doing good deeds, not evil and the equality of all living things are the basic ideas and attitude of buddhism about human being, which has the universal value in the modern society. but the whole life theory of buddhism is generally considered as pessimistic and negative, and not received by modern society. in fact, the life theory of buddhism is a kind of optimism which includes pessimism, and where the positive includes the negative. its essence is a positive view of life, and also has a universal value. endnotes 1cbeta, t12, no. 374, p. 402, c8-9. 2lilita-vistara,vol.8,cbeta, t03, no. 186, p. 537, c17. 3the six destinies. six kinds of rebirth in sa?s?ra that are undergone by sentient beings in accord with their good or evil actions carried out in their previous lifetime. these are: hell, hungry ghost, animal, asura , human and god. the first jianfu lv 279 three are the result of predominantly good karma while the last three are the result of predominantly evil karma. also written as. four forms of birth. (1) born naturally, born from oneself. (2) that which is born through spontaneous generation. a sentient being suddenly appearing from nowhere, for example, the birth of a ghost. (3) in contrast to other types of birth, (i.e., from an egg, from a womb, from moisture) a species that is born suddenly without a specific origin. this refers especially to the intermediate stage after death, where beings are reborn as spirits, gods, hell-beings, etc. ( upapāduka -yoni). 4( daśabhūmi ) the ‘ten stages’. bhūmi means “stage” and the ten bhūmis are theforty-first through the fiftieth stages in the path of the bodhisattva, which are designated as one through ten. in various mahāyāna texts, each of the stages is associated with the subjugation or elimination of a certain type of obstruction to enlightenment. the ten are: 1. 欢喜地 huanxidi __ the ‘stage of joy’. (pramudiā ) the stage where the wisdom of the middle path is first produced to benefit self and others, and where there is great happiness. 2. 离垢地 __ ligoudi __ ‘freedom from defilement’. (vimalā ) dwelling in the principle of the middle path, to be able to enter the dust of the world of sentient beings, yet remain detached. 3. 发光地 faguangdi __ the ‘stage of emission of light’. (prabh ākarī ) the stage of following the buddha-path and emitting the clear light of wisdom. 4. 焰慧地 yanhuidi __ the ‘stage of glowing wisdom’. (arcismat ī ) the stage of the light of wisdom burning bright according to its clear cognition of the unborn nature of all existence. 5. 难胜地 nanshengdi __ the ‘stage of overcoming the difficult’. (sudurjay ā ) the stage of overcoming the prior stage by emptying all ignorance. 6. 现前地 xianqiandi __ the ‘stage of manifestation of reality’. (abhimukh ī )the stage where the practitioner is facing reality. the stage of manifestation of the aspect that in contemplating the dharma, nirvana and sams āra are not two. 7. 远行地 yuanxingdi __ the ‘stage of far-reaching’. (dūramgamā ) the stage of attaining the middle way and advancing to a higher realm with every thought. 8. 不动地 budongdi __ the ‘immovable stage’. (acal ā ) the stage of abiding peacefully in the wisdom of (no aspects) of the middle path without change. 9. 善慧地 shanhuidi __ the ‘stage of wondrous wisdom’. (sādhumatī ) the stage of using the skill of wisdom contemplation to enter the path of clear cognition regarding the unborn nature of all existence. 10. 法云地 fayundi __ the ‘stage of the dharma-cloud’. (dharma-megha) the stage of attaining the level of buddhahood, and coveringthe dharma-world with wisdom and compassion like a great cloud. in the doctrineof the faxiang 法相 school, the stage of ‘equal enlightenment’ ( 等觉 ) is included here, being considered as within the limits of bodhisattva practice. 5increased by one agama sutras.vol.1, 诸恶莫作,诸善奉行 , 自净其意 , 是诸佛教 , cbeta, t02, no. 125, p. 551, a13-14. 6the seven buddhas of the past. firstvipa ś yi, and ś ikhi, viśabhā , krakucchanda, kanakamuni, k āś yapa, śā kyamuni. 7(sui)huiyuan dacheng yizhang, vol.2, cbeta, t44, no. 1851, p. 503, c3. 8the “form realm”, which is the second of the three realms 三界 (1) exist280 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ence constituted of pure materiality, free from the afflictions of the desire realm 欲界 (yujie). objects of vision 色界 sejie?. the realm of pure mind, in which materiality (one’s body) is transcended. this realm is characterized by the function of four different types of wareness 无 色界 (wusejie). 9the original tex said? “顺义名善，顺有三种 : 一顺益上升名之为善 , 若从是义 , 下极三有 , 人 , 天善法齐名为善 . 二顺理名善 , 谓无漏行 , 若从是义 , 下极二乘所修善法皆名为善 , 同顺理故 . 三体顺名善 , 谓真识中所成 行德相状如何 , 法界真性是己自体 , 体性缘起集成行德 , 行不异性 , 还即本体 , 即如不乖 , 称曰体顺 . 若从是 义 , 唯佛菩萨体证真行 , 是其善也 . 良以所对恶有三故 , 善分此三 . 言三恶者 , 一违损名恶 , 若从是义 , 唯三 涂因及人天中别报苦业是其恶也 . 翻对此故 , 宣说初善 . 二违理名恶 , 取性心中所造诸业皆违法理 , 同名为恶 . 若从是义 , 上极凡夫有漏善业犹名为恶 . 翻对此故 , 说第二善 . 三体违名恶 , 一切妄心所起诸业违背真体 , 同 名为恶 . 若从是义 , 上至三乘缘照无漏 , 齐名为恶 . 妄心起故 , 翻对此故 , 说第三善 . “dacheng yizhang, vol.12, cbeta, t44, no. 1851, p. 697, a3-19. 10the original tex said: 能为此世 , 他世顺益故 , 名为善 . 人天乐果虽于此世能为顺益 , 非于他世故 , 不名善 . 能为此世 , 他世违损故 , 名不善 . 恶趣苦果虽于此世能为违损 , 非于他世故 , 非不善 . 于善 , 不善益损义中不 可记别故 , 名无记 . chengweishilun. vol.5, (cbeta, t31, no. 1585, p. 26, b12-17. 11the original tex said(vol.9): 佛法平等 , 一切诸法亦复平等 . 若无因缘 , 即无种性 . 若无种性 , 即无出灭 . 若 无出灭 , 即名真实 . 真实知者 , 即是实性 , 过去 , 未来 , 现在诸法即是佛法 . 何以故 ? 通达三世无障碍故 . 无 障碍者 , 即是佛智 . 佛智者即是十八不共之法 , 不共之法者摄一切法 , 是故诸法即是佛法 , 诸法佛法无二无别 . cbeta, t13, no. 397, p. 58, a3-9. 12(beiliang)tanwucheng, mahāsamnipata-sūtra . vol.12, 13, cbeta, t13, no. 397, p. 58a, p.89a. jianfu lv 281 u. vinayaparla and john giordano 93 overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand abstract spinoza’s philosophy and buddhism have often been compared based upon their tendencies towards seeing the world as a single order and moving beyond our passions and desires. but the comparison of these philosophies also creates interesting problems. one problem is the way we relate to this order itself. in spinoza we achieve enlightenment when we recognize that we are a part of a single substance which has its own order and necessity. this leads us to transcend the bondage of our passions through reason. and when we reach the highest level of the intellectual love of god, we show kindness on all beings still trapped in this bondage. buddhist enlightenment is the recognition of the dependent origination of all things. it is a larger order of causality which we are a part. we suffer within this order through our attachments so our goal is to eliminate our attachments. when we see the world in this way, we do not judge through the categories of good and evil and we show compassion to all living creatures still in the state of ignorance. so there are obvious similarities. but a major difference in these two approaches is differing ways they regard the order itself. spinoza focuses on the love of this order – intellectual love of god – which leads prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 93-106 © 2000 by assumption university press 94 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december him affirm non-judgment and kindness. and buddhism focuses on the non-attachment to this order which leads to compassion. comparing and contrasting these two philosophies is valuable because it allows a deeper understanding of the buddhist role of compassion as a special kind of (non-passive) passion which breaks the suffering of others. it also clarifies elements of spinoza’s philosophy which are not easily understood, for instance, his claim that pity as a useless emotion. keywords: spinoza, buddhism, dependent origination, compassion, pity substance and god spinoza’s idea of a single substance is the heart of his philosophy. this is in contrast to descartes’ philosophy which posits two substances: thought and extension. this single substance is also the equated with god or nature. god according spinoza is a substance which exists by itself and is the cause of itself. spinoza describes the notion of substance that “by substance i understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed”.1 thought and extension are merely attributes of this single substance. in a way this is reminiscent of the tradition of divine names in philosophical theology. spinoza writes that substance consists of infinite attributes, “each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.”2 and that it “necessarily exists.”3 that is why, spinoza can claim in the famous proposition 15, ethics 1 that “whatever is, is in god, and nothing can either be or be conceived without god”.4 this also means that god is a necessary order. for instance spinoza writes that “god is the immanent and the transient cause of all things”.5 “god acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one”.6 “in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner.”7 u. vinayaparla and john giordano 95 and finally: “things could have been produced by god in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have been produced.”8 dependent origination this order is also present in buddhism. the teaching of dependent origination is one of the fundamental teachings of the buddha. it is known as paticcasamupada in the pali canon or the teaching of cause and effect. in its general understanding, it is used in the context of kamma and rebirth. according to sahdra, this principle is even compatible with empirical psychology which holds that “any given psychological phenomenon exists in the context of a complex nexus of causes and conditions. for empirical psychologists, tightly controlled experiments can help to identify some of the causes of a psychological phenomenon, although they do so by controlling or ignoring many other possible influences.”9 spinoza is aware of this psychological dimension when he writes of the idea of freewill as a kind of ignorance. he writes that we believe we have freewill because we are ignorant of the causes which lead us to do what we do and think what we think, while at the same time we are conscious of doing and thinking. we are a part of a causality but in our ignorance we believe in our own agency. as long as we follow our desires and passions we are moved by this nexus of causation. we are in bondage and we experience suffering because we desire things outside of our control. just as spinoza believes in god as a necessary order, dependent origination is itself an order. it is a kind of law. the teaching of the niyamas or natural laws are a fundamental doctrine in buddhism. they are divided into five types such as caloric order (utu-niyāma), germinal order (bījaniyāma), psychical order (citta-niyāma), moral order (kamma-niyāma), and finally the order of natural phenomena (dhamma-niyāma).10 utuniyāma: physical inorganic order; physical law; the natural law dealing with the events in the natural world or physical environment. bījaniyāma: physical organic order; 96 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december biological law; the natural law dealing with animals and plants, in particular, heredity. cittaniyāma: psychic law; the natural law dealing with the workings of the mind and thinking. kammaniyāma: order of deed and result; the law of kamma; moral law; the natural law dealing with human behaviour, specifically intention and the actions resulting from it. dhammaniyāma; order of the norm; the general law of cause and effect; causality and conditionality; the natural law dealing with the relationship and interdependence of all things, phenomena.11 some buddhist approaches consider that when one achieves enlightenment, the world as dependent origination shows itself as illusion. but the idea of dhamma-nyama suggests that the world exists by itself as a natural order. yet this also depends upon the individual ignorance. the more we develop a concentrated mind, the more we can stop our ignorance and stop the chain of causes. the more we merely possess imagination, the more the imagined world leads us to be bound within this causality. it is interesting that spinoza has a similarly negative view of imagination. overcoming in a work which considers spinoza from an eastern perspective, van reijen defines spinoza’s concept of eternity in term of god’s essence. he focuses upon seeing one’s bodily existence from the perspective of eternity. he writes that “spinoza’s idea that the essence of the special private body is to understand from the perspective of eternity and that only then other things can be understood and god can be seen as the cause”.12 this would be the goal for the human being which is akin to buddhist enlightenment which involves seeing oneself within the order of dependent origination. but as long as we are attached to our finite bodies and our belief in freewill we remain ignorant and see the world in a distorted way based upon its utility for us. according spinoza, this ignorance is a form of human bondage since being influenced by our passions makes us passive in face of the causes external to us. sometimes, spinoza also u. vinayaparla and john giordano 97 describes it as confused knowledge. the french philosopher deleuze observes concerning confused knowledge that it “expresses the natural condition of our experience in so far as we do not have adequate ideas. it is constituted by the linking together of inadequate ideas and of the affects-passions that result from them.”13 this confused knowledge does not understand the body as it is a part of the larger order of the existence of things or substance. in order to move beyond this bondage, more abstract reason should be the foundation of knowledge. as in geometry, adequate knowledge represents the order of things beyond the limits of mere bodily sense perception. he explains in the ethics that “the idea or knowledge of the mind follows god and is related to god in the same way as the idea or knowledge of the body”.14 spinoza’s uses the idea of reason’s power to control the passions as a kind of liberation. in the ethics he states that “i shall treat the power of reason, showing how much reason itself can control the emotions, and then what is freedom of mind or blessedness”.15 passion in seen in relation to its passivity in the face external objects. this leads to suffering. but the use of reason allows us to cease to be passively affected by external objects. in this way, he writes, “in proportion, then, as we know an emotion better is it more within our control, and the less does the mind suffer from it.”16 reason is able to control and cease suffering. buddhism believes that many passions or desires are caused by ignorance which leads to an unwholesome mind and unwholesome actions.17 actions can be distinguish as good and bad actions. according to the principle of dependent origination they are called sankhara. the condition of sankhara produces consciousness. human freedom as god’s freedom the concept of freedom in spinoza is often misunderstood. in book 2, proposition 7, he writes that “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.18 this passage further explains that “the relation between the mind and the body is the same 98 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december as that between an idea and its object, since the mind is nothing but that idea of the body which exists in the infinite intellect of god”.19 this means that to the extent that i can achieve adequate knowledge, my mind can expand beyond the limits of my body and its restricted desires. my knowledge can embrace the order of god. i can become this order and share in its eternal power and freedom. so human freedom is actually the ability to use reason to move beyond the limitations of the body to enjoy god’s freedom. but in the context of the human body, ioan writes that we can understand freedom as “diminishing the determinations from outside and enhancing determination from within.”20 this again is based upon reason. according to kashap, “when one is conscious of one’s freedom to choose whether or not to do a certain thing, one will not do anything other than what follows from adequate ideas in one’s mind.”21 this whole idea can be seen in book 1, definition 7 where spinoza writes: that thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone. that thing, on the other hand, is called necessary or rather compelled which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and prescribed manner. spinoza states the relation of metaphysical notion of “free” and psychological notion of “free” that “god is free from the passions, nor is he affected with any emotion of joy or sorrow”.23 this statement is very similar to buddhist teaching nivana which is known as enlightenment. the word nivana is interesting. the prefix ni means a negation, and the root vana refers to the passions. the idea of enlightenment then is ni-vana, or the overcoming of the passions. in this sense the experience of freedom by the individual is following the principle of god’s freedom as being determined from within and not being influenced by what is external. this is similar to the buddhist idea of non-attachment. u. vinayaparla and john giordano 99 the intellectual love of god versus non-attachment we saw that the lowest form of knowledge is called confused ideas which is related to human bondage. the second level is called adequate ideas and is related to human freedom. the third and highest stage is called intuitive ideas. it is related to what spinoza calls the intellectual love of god. in proposition 25, spinoza writes: “the highest effort of the mind and it’s the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge”24 in book 4 preposition 28 spinoza claims that “knowledge of god is the mind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue to know god”.25 knowledge of god refers to the eternal and infinite essence of god. spinoza states the idea of love of god as follows: the intellectual love of the mind toward god is the very love with which he loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be manifested through the essence of the human mind, considered under the form of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual love of the mind toward god is part of the infinite love with which god loves himself.26 kisner claims that “the means for achieving this ‘intellectual love of god’ is a gradual process of individual and sometimes collective self-improvement, which is guided by an ideal.”27 intuitive knowledge is considered that “the highest effort of the mind and it’s the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge”.28 in other words, it is to see things from an eternal perspective, or from the perspective of the whole. but how can we compare this with buddhism. when the buddhist reaches enlightenment, when they see this order of dependent origination, they are to detach themselves from its causality in order to avoid suffering. but spinoza wants us to identify with and love this order? the answer seems to lie in the way buddhism and spinoza regard compassion. the two approaches are not as dissimilar as they first appear. 100 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december passion and compassion as we discussed earlier spinoza distinguishes between active and passive. in book 3, proposition 3, he writes. “the actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone, but the passive states depend upon those alone which are inadequate”. 29 then, spinoza offers evidence on the passion which is confused idea when he writes: “the force and increase of any passion and its perseverance in existence are not limited by the power by which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own power”.30 this is the way inadequate knowledge or the passive passions are connected to human bondage. buddhism relates this passivity to suffering. spinoza’s doctrines in ethics book 4, which focus on of human bondage or of the strength of emotions are related human ignorance. spinoza tries to show that pity, good and evil, joy and sorrow are based in ignorance. he describes pity as useless emotion and writes: “pity, in a man who lives according to the guidance of reason, is evil of itself and useless”. 31 this idea of pity as useless is not very understood. but if we compare it to buddhist ideas of compassion it makes more sense. compassion has been taught and practiced for millennia in three main buddhist traditions: theravada, mahayana, and vajrayana. for many western researchers, these approaches to the alleviation of suffering are more akin to psychology and philosophy than religion insofar as they do not require belief in a higher power to reap their benefits. makransky and germer observe that “as clinical scientists and psychotherapists begin to systematically explore the concept of compassion, it may be helpful to consider the nuances in understanding that have emerged within these traditions in different parts of the world.”32 this makes the comparison of spinoza’s ideas of overcoming the passions and the buddhist idea of compassion particularly important. the buddhist concept of compassion is found in four sublime attitudes which are the heart of teaching of the buddha. they are metta, karuna, mudita and upekkha. sarkar clarifies these terms as follows: u. vinayaparla and john giordano 101 metta is the pali word and in sanskrit it is maitri (love or loving-kindness). it is the first one of the brahma-viharas or the sublime states. the term “karuna‟ is found in buddhist texts like visuddhimagga, shilakkhandhavagga etc. if anybody is perceived to have suffered and other one shakes or moves with compassion at once, then it is called karuna or or compassion or pity. it is the second brahmavihara. mudita is the third one of the brahma-viharas which is translated as sympathetic joy or sympathy or gladness. when someone feels happy seeing other person’s happiness, then it is called mudita or sympathetic joy. when a person remains mentally in a neutral position between the two extremes of sorrow and happiness then it called upekkha which is translated as equanimity.33 spinoza’s understanding of the passions is rooted in the distinction between passivity and activity. buddhism also sees this idea as mental state in the context of attachment (kilesa) upon which our actions happen. both of schools see this issue as the order of causality. passions are related to our desire in relation to our ignorance. in its original meanings the passions represent a passivity. we are manipulated by things outside of our control and hence we are in a state of bondage. the original meaning of passions is also related to suffering. returning to pity, we see now that it would be the identification with a particular suffering. spinoza’s philosophy instead is an affirmation of joy, the intellectual love of god, or power. this reflects the buddhist distinction between passion and compassion. com-passion is not a mere passion as an attachment. compassion does not attach to the individual who is suffering, it is instead a generalized break [karuna] of suffering in general. it is unselfish according to the meaning of mudita. compassion is not passive, it is active and directed toward the order of dependent origination itself. while spinoza and buddhism differ on their interpretation of order, love and the status of suffering, they end up in a similar destination. that is a freedom beyond individual freedom, a love 102 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december beyond attachment, a generalized compassion and kindness that breaks the suffering of others. spinoza’s ideas and buddhist ideas show many similarities. but the purpose of comparing them means little in itself. what is gained from this comparison is a deeper understanding of principles which are little understood in each tradition. for instance, buddhists often focus upon non-attachment to the extent that they fail to appreciate their connection to the world through compassion. it is a passion which is not merely passive but actively breaks the chain of suffering. spinoza can remind buddhism of its own principles concerning the joy of being actively engaged in the world and the importance of metta as a kind of love that affirms the whole. likewise, buddhism can clarify spinoza philosophy to show that the rejection of such passions as pity is not the rejection of compassion and kindness. it is instead a recognition that to break the suffering of others requires something beyond the passivity of pity. while we cannot bring spinoza’s philosophy into accord with buddhism, we can play them off of one another to gain deeper insights into their respective doctrines and insights. endnotes 1 spinoza, b. ethics: preceded by on the improvement of the understanding. hafner publishing company, (1949), 41. 2 ibid, 41. 3 ibid, 48. 4 ibid, 52. 5 ibid, 59. 6 spinoza, a spinoza reader: the ethics and other works, princeton university press, (1994), p. 97. 7 spinoza, ethics, 65. 8 ibid, 68. 9 sahdra, b. k., & shaver, p. r. “comparing attachment theory and buddhist psychology”, international journal for the psychology of religion, (2013). 23(4), 282293. u. vinayaparla and john giordano 103 10 sanu. m, “buddhist response to environmental degradation under conceptual framework of the five niyāma”, international buddhist studies college, mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, 2015, 65. 11 phaengcharoen, phramaha somphong santacitto, “an analytical study of the concept of dhamma as natural law in theravāda buddhism”, mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university bangkok, thailand, 2006, 62 12 van reijen, m. might “spinoza be considered more as an exponent of the oriental enlightenment, than as an exponent of the western enlightenment? araucaria:”, revista iberoamericana de filosofía, política, humanidades y relaciones internacionales, (2018), 20(39), pp. 297-310. 13 deleuze, gilles. spinoza: practical philosophy. city lights books press, (1988), p.82 14 spinoza, ethics, 101 15 ibid, 252. 16 ibid, 256. 17 bhikkhu, buddhadāsa. paṭiccasamuppāda: practical dependent origination. tr. by steve schmidt. suan mokkhabalaram, suratthani, thailand: vuddhidhamma fund, (1986), 35. 18 spinoza, a spinoza reader, 119. 19 radner, daisie, spinoza’s theory of ideas, duke university press, 1971, 338. 20 ioan, r. “spinoza and nietzsche on freedom empowerment and affirmation”, european journal of philosophy, (2017), 25(4), 1864-1883. doi:10.1111/ejop.12283, 4. 21 kashap, s. p. spinoza and moral freedom. suny press, (2012), 163. 22 spinoza, b. ethics, 41. 23 ibid, 264. 24 ibid, 269. 25 rocca, spinoza, published by routledge, london, (2008), 178. 26 spinoza, ethics, 274. 27 kisner, matthew j youpa, andrew, essays on spinoza’s ethical theory, oxford university press, 87. 28 spinoza, ethics, 269. 29 ibid, 237. 30 ibid, 194. 31 spinoza, a spinoza reader, 226. 32 makransky, j., germer, c. k., & siegel, r. d. “compassion in buddhist psychology. wisdom and compassion in psychotherapy:”, deepening mindfulness in clinical practice, (2012), 61-74. 33 sarkar, bijay kumar, “buddhists concept of brahma-vihar: an analysis of morals”, cooch behar panchanan barma university, (2019), 1. 104 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december references bhikkhu, buddhadāsa. paṭiccasamuppāda: practical dependent origination, tr. by steve schmidt. suan mokkhabalaram, suratthani, thailand: vuddhidhamma fund, 1986. bijay. k. s. buddhists concept of brahma-vihara: an analysis of morals, cooch behar panchanan barma university press, india, 2019. deleuze, gilles. spinoza: practical philosophy, city lights books, 1988. derry, jan. “vygotsky: philosophy and education”, john wiley & sons, 2013. germer, christopher k. and ronald d. siegel. eds. wisdom and compassion in psychotherapy: deepening mindfulness in clinical practice. guilford press, 2012. hampe, michael. “rationality as the therapy of self-liberation in spinoza’s ethics.” royal institute of philosophy supplement, 2010 ioan, razvan. “spinoza and nietzsche on freedom empowerment and affirmation.” european journal of philosophy, 2017. kashap, s. paul. spinoza and moral freedom, suny press, 2012. kisner, matthew j. spinoza on human freedom: reason, autonomy and the good life. cambridge university press, 2011. mccarthy, john c. ed. “modern enlightenment and the rule of reason.” vol. 32. cua press, 2018. melamed, yitzhak y. ed. “spinoza’s ethics: a critical guide.” cambridge university press, 2017. naaman-zauderer, noa. ed. “freedom, action, and motivation in spinoza’s” ethics”. routledge, 2019. radner, daisie. “spinoza’s theory of ideas.” the philosophical review 80, no. 3, 1971. rocca, “spinoza,” published by routledge, london, 2008. u. vinayaparla and john giordano 105 sahdra, baljinder k. and phillip r. shaver. “comparing attachment theory and buddhist psychology.” international journal for the psychology of religion 23, no. 4, 2013. sanu. m. “buddhist response to environmental degradation under conceptual framework of the five niyāma,” international buddhist studies college, mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, 2015. somphong s, “an analytical study of the concept of dhamma as natural law in theravāda buddhism”, mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university bangkok, thailand, 2006. spinoza, baruch. a spinoza reader: the ethics and other works, princeton university press, 1994. spinoza, baruch. ethics: preceded by, on the improvement of the understanding, hafner publishing company, 1949. susan james. “freedom, slavery and the passions”, in olli koistinen ed., the cambridge companion to spinoza’s ethics. cambridge university press, 2009. taylor, alfred edward. “some incoherencies in spinozism.” mind 46, no. 182, 1937. van reijen, miriam. “might spinoza be considered more as an exponent of the oriental enlightenment, than as an exponent of the western enlightenment?” araucaria: revista iberoamericana de filosofía, política, humanidades y relaciones internacionales 20, no. 39, 2018. wright, dale s. what is buddhist enlightenment? oxford university press, 2016. youpa, a. the ethics of joy: spinoza on the empowered life, oxford university press, 2019. _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand 09_(145-161) reflections on the.pmd reflections on the study of christianity in china’s universities: a historical and theological perspective dr. gao xin institute of sino-christian studies, hong kong, china abstract this paper examines the role of education with regard to religious studies within the chinese university. it addresses issues such as the tension between the objective presentation christianity, and its tension with christian education as moral formation. it concludes that education needs to address questions of value and morality, and it needs to address these with students as human beings, and we should not ignore one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional christian education, namely, an emphasis on the moral and spiritual formation of human beings. º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õé¨ðµãç¨êíºº·ºò·¡òãèö¡éòâ´â¤ó¹ö§¶ö§èòê¹èö¡éòã¹ áëòçô·âòåñâ¢í§ ṏ¹ ̈ ð¡åèòç¶ö§»ñ­ëòµèò§ æ àªè¹ ¤çòáµö§à¤ãõâ´ãðëçèò§¡òã¹óàê¹í ¤ãôêµèòê¹òã¹àªô§»ã¹ñâáåð¡òãèö¡éòẺ¤ãôêµìã¹àªô§¡òãíºãáèõå¸ããá º·¤çòá¹õéêãø»çèò¡òãèö¡éò¨ðµéí§µñ駤ó¶òáà¡õèâç¡ñº¤ø³¤èòáåðèõå¸ããá áåð¨ðµéí§ àê¹íàã×èí§àëåèò¹õé¡ñº¹ñ¡èö¡éòã¹°ò¹·õè¾ç¡à¢òà»ç¹á¹øéâì áåðàãòäáè¤çãåðàåâ ¤ø³åñ¡é³ð¾×é¹°ò¹íâèò§ë¹öè§¢í§¡òãèö¡éòẺ¤ãôêµì´ñé§à´ôá ¹ñ蹡ç¤×í¡òããëé ¤çòáêó¤ñ­íâèò§âô觡ñº¡òãíºãá¾ñ²¹òèõå¸ããááåð ô̈µçô­­ò³¢í§á¹øéâì prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 145-161 145 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ greek paideia the greeks, who consider knowledge to be a formative force in education, are the first to recognize that education means deliberately molding human character in accordance with an ideal.1 werner jaeger (1888-1961) chooses paideia as an all-encompassing notion to grasp the essence of ancient greek culture. jaeger’s three-volume work paideia treats paideia, the shaping of the greek character, as a basis for a new study of hellenism as a whole.2 whether or not paideia can be regarded as the fundamental concept underpinning hellenistic culture is still a controversial issue among academics;3 however, a consensus has been reached that paideia embraces the very core ideas of greek education. isocrates, who claims that athens had become the “school” of all greece, highly appreciates the athenian paideia and argues that it should define “hellenic” identity. he says, “the word “hellenes” suggests no longer a race but a way of thought, and the title “hellenes” applies to those who share our culture rather than those who share a common blood”.4 man is at the center of ancient greek education. the greeks believe that education embodies the purpose of all human effort. a unique characteristic of ancient greek education is that every part is regarded as subordinate and relative to an ideal whole. in approaching the problem of education, the greeks rely wholly on the realization that human life is governed by natural principles. the ideal man, according to the greeks, is the universally valid model of humanity which all individuals are supposed to imitate. therefore, the intellectual principle of the greeks is not individualism but ‘humanism’ in its original and classical sense, meaning the process of molding man into the true form, that of genuine human nature, through education. this is the true greek paideia, the molding of man.5 in the fourth century c. e., paideia was connected with the highest arete attainable for human beings and was used to denote the sum total of all perfections of mind and body. this new comprehensive concept was firmly established by the time of isocrates and plato.6 according to plato, true paideia has always been the education of human beings geared toward attaining the whole of arete. no type of training in special activities can lead to the attainment of paideia. plato defines true paideia, as educating minds toward spiritual perfection, as opposed training people 146 prajna vihara __ __ ~ for certain vocations.7 although much attention was paid to the individual human being in paideia, education in ancient greece is not a practice which concerns the individual alone: it is essentially a function of the community. the character of the community is expressed in the individuals who constitute it.8 the greeks think that each individual human being reflects the truth of all human beings and never sees an event or entity as an isolated phenomenon but always as part of a greater whole: “beauty, absolute, simple, and everlasting… the irradiation of the particular by the general”.9 in addition to the relationship between the individual and the community, paideia also concerns the divine dimension. the parthenon, greek mythology, and the greek gods of mount olympus all remind us of the close relationship between the greeks and the divine. the polis is not a matter of walls or ships, but a spiritual community.10 the polis is an independent religious and political unit within which gods are the unseen partners in the city’s welfare.11 in homer, the term arete is used to describe not only human merit but the excellence of the power of the gods.12 hellenistic cultural life can be looked upon as a reflection and foretaste of the happy life enjoyed by the souls blessed with immortality, not only that, but as a means of obtaining it: mental labor and the pursuit of science and art are a sure means of cleansing the soul from the stains of earthly passion and of freeing it from the restricting bonds of matter.13 concerning the sacred elements of paideia, marrou puts it as follows: παιδεία __a thing divine__a heavenly game, a nobility of soul, was invested with a kind of sacred radiance that gave it a special dignity of a genuine religious kind. in the deep confusion caused by the sudden collapse of ancient beliefs, it was the one true unshakable value to which the mind of man could cling; and hellenistic culture, thus erected into an absolute, eventually became for many the equivalent of a religion.14 gao xin 147 platonic paideia one of the most important expansions concerning the meaning of paideia can be attributed to plato. this revision under plato has played a significant role in the appearance of the christian paideia in the first century. the following discussion will concentrate on some parts of plato’s educational ideas which have had a great impact on the formation of the christian paideia. firstly, plato’s primary philosophical interests is the strenuous development of the intellect and will, motivated by a ceaseless desire to reattain the lost union with the eternal. moreover, plato regards education as a process through which truth is not introduced into the mind from without, but is “led out” from within. according to this understanding, the classical paideia assumed the deeper metaphysical and spiritual dimensions of the academy.15 in the republic, plato points out that the capacity for knowledge is present in everyone’s mind and knowledge can only be perceived by inner ability.16 therefore, plato’s “allegory of the cave” not only represents the advancement of the soul through education but also implies the conversion of the soul. “conversion” is a term specific to platonic paideia, denoting the wheeling round of the ‘whole soul’ towards the light of the idea of the good, the divine origin of the universe.17 this is what jaeger calls the “echo-making” development in the meaning of traditional paideia. secondly, assistance from the divine begins to play a more important role in plato’s educational idea of the conversion of the soul. plato is convinced that the ultimate concern of the soul is to strive for goodness. the idea of the good as the origin and the dominator of light and the provider of truth and knowledge, the core of virtue and intellect, is assigned by plato a dominant position at the center of the cosmos.18 more importantly, the idea of the good is proclaimed to be the ultimate cause of everything in the universe. in this regard, plato is thought to have founded a new religion.19 for this reason, the idea of paideia in plato can be considered an educational idea with a religious purpose. unlike sophists, plato’s educational ideas serve the soul and the divine and do not aim at the secular and the human alone.20 although plato emphasizes philosophy as the means of the salvation of the soul, we can see the human 148 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and the divine, so strictly delineated in homer, merging in plato’s paideia. in comparison with earlier greek thinkers who generally view the divine as the original force of the cosmos or the mind that creates everything, plato regards god as the measure of all things and the target for which we must aim.21 in addition, the definition of paideia, according to plato, should depend on the divine.22 in the laws, plato defines the relation between god and the world as god being the teacher of the whole world.23 therefore, different with the polytheism in ancient greek polis, the essence of the divinity of paideia in plato has been changed. while plato’s “allegory of the cave” is interpreted as a religious coloring by the neo-platonists, it does not necessarily follow that plato himself understands the ascent from a religious viewpoint.24 however, paideia reconceived by plato goes through a significant change: a person’s conversion in terms of the pursuit of divinity provides a theoretical foundation for the christian paideia as proclaimed by clement of alexandria. over the centuries, the goal of paideia shifts from the public to the private realm, from equipping people for public and political action to preparing them for inward and religious transformation. moreover, the role of divine power in the molding of human beings emphasizes the function of divine assistance.25 when the greek polis perishes under the roman cavalry, greek paideia survives through the turbulent social environment. it abandons the public for a private sphere and became a religion and an article of faith.26 in this sense, greek paideia becomes a divine extension and is regarded by clement of alexandria as preparation for the truth of and proclaimed by jesus christ. integration of clement of alexandria for the educated greek-speaking people of the first century c.e., paideia simply meant culture in a broader sense. when some of them became christian, whether from pagan families or from jewish families assimilated to hellenistic culture, they came to christianity as persons who had already been schooled according to the greek ideal. it was unavoidable that they interpreted their new christian faith as an alternative paideia.27 the expression “christian education” (christian paideia) was gao xin 149 first used by st. clement of rome (fl. 96) in about c.e. 96.28 at the end of the first century, facing the division of the church at corinth, clement of rome wrote a letter known as clement’s first epistle to the corinthians, expressing his dissatisfaction with events there. at the same time, clement of rome exhorted the corinthian church in the teaching of god, describing the church as a spiritual unity where the teaching of god and the community cannot be separated. at the end of his letter, clement of rome finally referred to the paideia (or teaching) of god. to begin with, clement of alexandria makes a great effort to synthesize greek philosophy with christianity. he demonstrates a positive opinion of greek philosophy by acknowledging that greek philosophy shares the same origin with the truth of christianity. for clement, greek culture is the covenant which the universal god made with the greeks; it is a preparation for christian theology. as a devout christian, clement cannot accept that the partial truth obtained by the greek philosophers is beyond the providence of the god of christianity or merely an accident. therefore, clement considers the greeks as worshipping the god of christianity in a “roundabout way”:29 the greek preparatory culture, therefore, with philosophy itself, is shown to have come down from god to men, not with a definite direction but in the way in which showers fall down on the good land, and on the dunghill, and on the houses. and similarly both the grass and the wheat sprout; and the figs and any other reckless trees grow on sepulchres. and things that grow, appear as a type of truths……and here we are aided by the parable of the sower, which the lord interpreted. for the husbandman of the soil which is among men is one; he who from the beginning, from the foundation of the world, sowed nutritious seeds; he who in each age rained down the lord, the word.30 clement of alexandria conducts a rather radical revision of greek paideia by reshaping it into the christian paideia, based on his understanding that through the interpretation of scripture, philosophy, and greek 150 prajna vihara __ __ ~ paideia, a deeper understanding of the gospel may be achieved. on the one hand, clement affirms the value of greek paideia in the context of christianity. on the other hand, he transforms the transcendent objective of platonic paideia into the god of christianity. clement of alexandria describes the role of christ as tutor (or paedagogue, or instructor), “the instructor being practical, not theoretical, his aim is thus to improve the soul, not to teach, and to train it up to a virtuous, not to an intellectual life”.31 as stated by clement, christ’s teaching is perfect since he comes from god and what is learned from him is the eternal salvation of the eternal saviour. it is necessary to admire the instructor and his injunctions according to which people ought to live a real life.32 clement of alexandria expresses a dynamic idea of salvation. according to clement, salvation is a universal movement and translation through the economy of the saviour. within this movement, faith along with knowledge is the movement towards salvation.33 likewise, the movement of the soul should be upwards from earth to heaven. people who learn everything from jesus christ who comes from above come to understand the dispensation of god’s salvation and “walk in newness of life”.34 it is with this knowledge that people can live in the new life. if we think of salvation as a continuous interaction between divine and human movement, learning the knowledge of god, for clement of alexandria, is a means of salvation. as a result of the teaching (paideia) of christ, human beings experience conversion both intellectually and spiritually. another essential feature of christian education advocated by clement of alexandria is the cultivation of virtue. christian education of the early church meant, on the one hand, learning the dogmas; on the other, it also meant moral training.35 we can see from the arguments given by clement of alexandria that he never separates knowledge from virtue, which includes valor, temperance, wisdom, justice, endurance, patience, decorum, self-restraint, and, in addition to these, piety.36 he states that “being assimilated to the lord as far as is possible for us beings mortal in nature. and this is being just and holy with wisdom”.37 “wisdom” is defined by clement as certain knowledge that comprehends the present, past, and future which the lord has taught.38 being assimilated to god, according to clement, means a participation in moral excellence.39 gao xin 151 the assimilation of god which shapes the final ethical goal of christian teaching (paideia) includes purity, faith, love, benevolence, piety and so on. all the mentioned virtues are a mixture of philosophical and biblical virtues.40 an essential difference between the traditional greek paideia and the christian paideia as developed by clement of alexandria is that greek paideia does not put forward the universal requirements of morality as clement did. in practice, religions in ancient greece did not function successfully in terms of maintaining social morality. besides the definite moral requirements, turning from the worship of polytheism to monotheism is another noticeable change between greek paideia and christian paideia. furthermore, clement of alexandria regards christ as an instructor with a universal nature. unlike the exclusive greek paideia, the teaching which flows from christ is open for all: “the greeks or the barbarians, the wise or the unwise”, in comparison to the traditional greek paideia, from which slaves, manual laborers, and women were generally excluded, clement of alexandria expands the meaning of paideia to one with a universal character and explicates: the union of many in one, issuing in the production of divine harmony out of a medley of sounds and division, becomes one symphony following one choir-leader and teacher, the word, reaching and resting in the same truth, and crying abba, father.41 we can perceive from clement of alexandria’s ideas that his synthesis of greek paideia and christianity follows an approach of “recognition __ integration __ transformation”. firstly, clement of alexandria appraises greek culture in a positive way and claims that its preliminary assets shared its origins with christianity. secondly, clement of alexandria makes an effort to synthesize greek paideia with christian faith. though objections to any collusion with hellenism could be heard among christian theologians even in the early christian church, the fact that christianity is born in hellenistic civilization cannot be denied. accordingly, by following christ, who is the instructor of all, souls can convert to god, the god of christianity. the light in plato’s “allegory of the 152 prajna vihara __ __ ~ cave” now becomes the light of the christian god. as stated by clement of alexandria, people can be led to heaven only under the right guidance of christ, since salvation cannot be separated from learning the truth of god.42 john henry newman’s and paideia in the nineteenth century the important transmitter and modifier of paideia as an educational type in the nineteenth century is john henry newman. according to newman, the university is a place of teaching “universal knowledge”, and its overarching goal is the “enlargement of intellect”.43 newman believes that the “enlargement of the intellect” was accomplished “not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind’s energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas……it is the action of formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements”.44 paideia is considered by newman as the formative power to shape the human intellect through teaching. “philosophy” or “philosophical cast of thought”, which represents a comprehensive mind, is taken by newman to mean the “perfection or virtue of the intellect” and therefore an expanded intellect involves the conversion of a person.45 the training of intellect aims at a quite secular object, “gentlemen”, namely “good members of society”.46 here we can see how newman’s educational philosophy diverges remarkably from clement of alexandria’s moral education. newman breaks the bond of divine morality and knowledge despite his earnest eagerness to integrate the two. according to newman, cultivating capacities of human reason will not in itself lead to the conversion of the soul to christian faith, which constitutes newman’s notable modification of greek paideia and also of the christian notion of paideia developed by clement of alexandria. however, newman lamented this worldly outcome: liberal education makes not the christian, not the catholic, but the gentleman. it is well to be a gentlemen, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a cangao xin 153 did, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life……but still, i repeat, they are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness, they may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless,__pleasant, alas, and attractive as he shows when decked out in them.47 in view of this, newman takes a troubling dual stance concerning the function of theology in the university. firstly, newman argues that theology should have a legitimate place as a branch of knowledge in a university that aims at teaching universal knowledge. conforming to the appellation “liberal”, theology should be cultivated as contemplation instead of being limited to the purposes of the pulpit or being represented by the catechism.48 therefore, the goal of studying theology, defined by newman as “the science of god”, is to cultivate intellect without considering the utility and pastoral purposes embraced by the “berlin type”. secondly, newman examines the study of theology at university on the level of notional assent, which is concerned with abstraction, analysis, and generalization. in this regard, theology as studied at university can obtain notional and exact, while not necessarily virtuous or confessional, knowledge about god.49 paradoxically, newman actually presents a dual nature of theology, which we can perceive from his interpretation of “conscience” as one of the resources of theology. according to newman, we can receive a vivid image of god from our conscience. conscience, too, teaches us, not only that god is, but what he is; it provides for the mind a real image of him, as a medium of worship; it gives us a rule of right and wrong, as being his rule, and a code of moral duties. moreover, it is so constituted that, if obeyed, it becomes clearer in its injunctions, and wider in their range, and corrects and completes the accidental feebleness of its initial teachings.50 all these functions of conscience, according to newman, are independent of books, of educated reasoning, of sensory perception, or of philosophy. furthermore, when conscience functions as “sense of duty” in contrast to “moral sense”, which is the judgment of reason and the only principle of ethics, conscience sheds upon humanity “a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no 15146 prajna vihara__ __~ 4 prajna vihara __ __ ~ earthly object to elicit”.51 therefore, theology as a branch of liberal knowledge has indirect religious or moral effects by means of conscience that completes “the doctrine of a particular providence” in theology, leading people to “reverence and awe, hope and fear”. in addition, newman conceives that a university should be made up of colleges with religious background in order to implement moral education so that a university can teach secular disciplines without straying from christian substance.52 the reason that newman strives to maintain the balance of secular rationality and christian virtue, described as “unity-in-tension”,53 is rooted in his eagerness to justify christianity in the increasingly secularized society of nineteenth century britain and to alert people to the possible invasion of human reason into the realm of christian faith. the contribution of this twofold dimension of the study of christianity, which he calls theology, remains meaningful. on the one hand, newman recognizes the value of the study of christianity in the secular sense, that is, one can understand christianity from a neutral or detached point of view. on the other hand, newman does not restrict it to the narrow definition of a detached and value-free field of study of the sort which has been advocated since the rise of modern religious studies as a discipline in public educational settings in the u.s. his ideas indeed make room for the theological comprehension and virtue construction of christian faith in the public sphere. reflections on the academic study of christianity in china’s universities surveys on christian faith among chinese university students which itself reflects the increasing numbers of christians among university students have drawn a lot of attention in chinese academia in recent years. a survey of students at peking university, published in 2009, shows that 4.7% of the students there identify themselves as christian (either protestant or catholic).54 another survey carried out among six university students in shanghai in 2008 demonstrates that 4.7% of the students of the six universities are protestants.55 compared with ordinary christian believers in china, the main reason to convert for most university christian gao xin 155 students lies in looking for spiritual consolation.56 according to the survey taken at peking university, 61.1% of christian students said they came to christianity because they want to solve the anxiety caused by the social transformation of chinese society.57 in a survey conducted in zhejiang province in 2010, 59.3% of the students there said that the main reason for their conversion was to find meaning in life and a sense of belonging in christianity.58 similar statistics in several other surveys confirm these findings.59 in addition, as many as 76.5% of christian students in a report carried out in 2008 said that they think the deeper significance of being a christian lies in the glory of god.60 as we can see from the statistics that, besides understanding christianity as a knowledge, christian students in chinese universities also have a deep understanding of christianity as a faith. change has also taken place among scholars on the study of christianity in china’s universities in recent years. in a survey conducted in 2008-09, scholars of christian studies between the ages of 35-45 teaching at chinese universities were shown to have different characteristics than other more senior scholars who initiated a similar study of christianity in the 1980s.61 it is noteworthy, firstly, that the proportion of christians shows a considerable increase among the younger generation scholars. approximately 30% of the participants identified themselves as christians in the survey. secondly, many interviewers in the survey show an empathy for the christian community and suggest that christian studies in mainland china should face the faith community in a more gentle and positive way, which may benefit the growth of the faith community. in terms of religious affiliation, this new or third generation of scholars as a whole is relatively more religious and less alienated from the christian churches. in terms of academic orientation, the scholars of the new generation tend to be specialists rather than generalists, to be more open to the spiritual dimension, and to be socially engaged in a more public way. these are the significant differences characterizing the scholars of christian studies who are active in contemporary chinese universities and who will make an important impact on this discipline in the future. in the context of china’s universities, the religious conviction of the teacher should be of no consequence in the classroom. a detached objectivity is regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the study of chris156 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tianity as a branch of religious studies in china’s universities since the very beginning in 1980s. however, students (especially those who are christian believers) may place a rather different demand on the study of christianity concerning detachment and objectivity. as mentioned, among the topics to be discussed at this conference is the idea that, value education starts from existential requirements. here comes the dilemma, how can teaching about christianity satisfy inquiries with regard to theological dimensions which may be raised by christian students in university? furthermore, on a broader level, how is a secular university to make provision for a student community which is not totally secularized? in fact, reflection on the place of christianity as a moral recourse in higher education and reflective ideas on religious studies under the principle detachment and objectivity have drawn attention in academia. at the university level, an inspiring critique on relevant issues is raised by alasdair macintyre, who claims that the liberal university makes itself a place of unconstrained agreements, different from the preliberal modern university by abolishing religious and moral tests. however, this kind of idea presents an endangered state.62 for macintyre, due to the logical incompatibility and incommensurability present in different traditions, criteria used to determine concepts like rationality and justice can differ among different traditions.63 consequently, he advocates that a university should be a place of constrained disagreement and should ensure that rival voices are not illegitimately suppressed. accordingly, the most fundamental type of moral and theological disagreement can be recognized. and the university can also fulfill its mission of inspiring and teaching students in dual context of inquiry and controversy.64 although china’s universities have a distinct historical background in comparison with that of the public university of the u.s., the two overlaps to some extent with regard to the current status concerning the study of christianity. affected by the atheist position of the government and the advocates of rationalism, universal language relates to different religious tradition gets little support in the university. reflecting on religious studies as a discipline in the university, academics also present diverse opinions. extreme objectivism is criticized by david ford who claims that religious studies at its crudest uses an ideology of academic neutrality which presumes a cool, objective apgao xin 157 proach to the phenomenon of religions.65 in this light, procedural virtues such as “noninterference”, “tolerance” and “neutrality” are also considered as encouraging the intolerance of the more conventional religious studies in favor of secularism, pluralism and assimilation.66 differing with ford’s direct approach to giving faith legitimacy in academic studies, gavin flood argues that religious studies and theology should be viewed as critical and non-critical, rather than insider and outsider, thereby avoiding the hegemonic implication of ford’s idea.67 based on the survey i did, some scholars also hold that it’s difficult separating faith entirely from research but that they can keep a neutral stance in teaching. moreover, their changing attitudes towards christianity as a religion are likely to have a positive and healthy impact on the development of the study of christianity in the future. education needs to address questions of value and morality, and it needs to address these with students as human beings. the moral heritage of christianity creates levels of expectation and a sense of accountability. the greeks pass on their wisdom to new generations through the educational process and appreciate the fact that it is wisdom, not just knowledge, which has power. tracing the history of paideia helps us to understand the past and the original idea of harmony and unity with everything that lives. in this regard, we should not ignore one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional christian education, namely, an emphasis on the moral and spiritual formation of human beings (paideia). endnotes 1werner jaeger, paideia: the ideals of greek culture (new york: oxford university press, 1986), vol. i, p. xxii. hereafter abbreviated as paideia. 2werner jaeger, paideia, vol. i, p. ix. 3paideia in the fifth century b. c. simply meant child-rearing and some academics argue that it cannot be regarded as the central subject matter in studying the hellenistic culture. see, borit karlsson, “old ideals for a new world?” h-ideas (february, 2001). http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4956 (date of access 11-03-2011). h. i. marrou also holds the similar opinion that he thinks paideia as an education does not really start before schooling. see h. i. marrou, trans. george lamb, a history of education in antiquity (london: sheed & ward, 1956), p. 142. 4jeffrey walker, rhetoric and poetics in antiquity (oxford; new york: ox158 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ford university press, 2000), p. 178. 5werner jaeger, paideia, vol. i, pp. xvii, xxii, xxiii. 6werner jaeger, paideia, vol. i, p. 286. in homer, arete also began to mean ethics. 7werner jaeger, paideia, vol.iii, pp. 225, 339. 8werner jaeger, paideia, vol. i, p. xiv. 9edith hamilton, the greek way (new york: norton, 1964), p. 201. 10paul cartledge (ed.), the cambridge illustrated history of ancient greece (cambridge; new york: cambridge university press, 1998), p. 139. 11h. d. f. kitto, the greeks (baltimore: penguin books, 1959), p. 76. 12werner jaeger, paideia, vol. i, p. 5. 13h. i. marrou, trans. george lamb, a history of education in antiquity (london: sheed & ward, 1956), p. 101. 14h. i. marrou, trans. george lamb, a history of education in antiquity (london: sheed & ward, 1956), p. 101. 15richard tarnas, the passion of the western mind: understanding the ideas that have shaped our world view (new york: ballantine books, 1991), p. 43. 16plato, the republic, 518 b-d. 17werner jaeger, paideia, vol.2, p. 295. 18plato, the republic, 517c. 19david h. kelsey, between athens and berlin: the theological education debate (grand rapids, mich.: eerdmans, 1993), p. 9. 20richard tarnas, the passion of the western mind: understanding the ideas that have shaped our world view (new york: ballantine books, 1991), p. 43. 21plato, the laws, 897b. 22plato, the laws, 643a. 23plato, the laws, 716c. 24frederick copleston, a history of philosophy (london: search press, 1946), vol. 1, p. 162. for a detailed discussion of plato’s idea on the good and god, please see werner jaeger, paideia, vol. ii, pp. 285-287. 25david kelsey, between athens and berlin: the theological education debate (grand rapids, mich.: eerdmans, 1993), p. 10. 26werner jaeger, early christianity and greek paideia (cambridge: harvard university press, 1961), p. 72. 27david kelsey, between athens and berlin: the theological education debate (grand rapids, mich.: eerdmans, 1993), p. 10. 28h. i. marrou, trans. george lamb, a history of education in antiquity (london: sheed & ward, 1956), p. 314. 29clement of alexandria, stromata, 1:19; cf. alexander roberts & james donaldson (tr. & ed.), the ante-nicene fathers, vol.2: fathers of the second century (grand rapids, michigan: wm. b. eerdmans, 1956), p. 321. hereafter abbreviated as stromata. 30clement of alexandria, stromata, 1:7, p. 308. gao xin 159 31clement of alexandria, the instructor, 1:1, cf. alexander roberts & james donaldson (tr. & ed.), the ante-nicene fathers, vol.2: fathers of the second century (grand rapids, michigan: wm. b. eerdmans, 1956), p. 209. hereafter abbreviated as instructor. 32clement of alexandria, instructor, 1:1, 1:12, pp. 216, 235. 33clement of alexandria, stromata, 6:6; 2:6, pp. 491, 354. 34clement of alexandria, stromata, 4:26, p. 440; exhortation to the heathen, chap. 4, cf. alexander roberts & james donaldson (tr. & ed.), the ante-nicene fathers, vol.2: fathers of the second century (grand rapids, michigan: wm. b. eerdmans, 1956), p. 189. hereafter abbreviated as exhortation to the heathen. 35h. i. marrou, trans. george lamb, a history of education in antiquity (london: sheed & ward, 1956), p. 314. 36clement of alexandria, stromata, 2:18, pp. 365, 366. 37clement of alexandria, stromata, 2:18, p. 366. 38clement of alexandria, stromata, 6:7, p. 492. 39clement of alexandria, instructor, 1:12, p. 235. 40eric osborn, clement of alexandria (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2005), p. 240. 41clement of alexandria, exhortation to the heathen, chapter. 9, p. 197. 42clement of alexandria, instructor, 1:7, cf. alexander roberts & james donaldson (tr. & ed.), the ante-nicene fathers, vol.2: fathers of the second century (grand rapids, michigan: wm. b. eerdmans, 1956), p. 223. 43j. h. newman, the idea of a university (1873), pp. ix, 125. hereafter abbreviated as idea. 44newman, idea, p. 134. 45newman, idea, pp. 52, 122; oxford university sermons (1843), p. 287. 46newman, idea, p. 177. 47newman, idea, pp. 120-21. 48newman, idea, p. 108. 49newman, the philosophical notebook of john henry newman (louvain: nauwelaerts publishing house, 1969), vol. 1, p, 163. 50newman, an essay in aid of a grammar of assent (1870), p. 390. hereafter abbreviated as g.a. 51j. h. newman, g.a., pp. 105-106, 110. 52j. h. newman, g.a., p. 108. in addition, newman conceives that a university should be made up of colleges with religious background where also provide moral education. cf. rise and progress of universities and benedictine essays, with an introduction and notes by mary katherine tillman (herefordshire: gracewing, 2001). 53terrence merrigan, clear heads and holy hearts: the religious and theological ideal of john henry newman (louvain: peeters press, 1991), p. 7. 54sun shangyang, hanqi, ‘the attitude of peking university students towards christianity: an exploratory survey and analysis’, fujen religious studies, 160 prajna vihara __ __ ~ vol. 19, pp. 53-86. 55huahua, ‘a survey on christian faith of university students in shanghai’, youth studies, 2008 (1). 56yang huilin, ‘some characteristics of the understanding of the christian faith among chinese university students’, china study journal, 2002, vol. 17 (3), p. 11. also, zuopeng, ‘christians in the ivory tower: a survey on university christian students in beijing’, youth studies, 2004 (5), p. 12. huahua, ‘a survey on christian faith of university students in shanghai’, youth studies, 2008 (1), p. 28. 57sun shangyang, hanqi, ‘the attitude of peking university students towards christianity: an exploratory survey and analysis’, fujen religious studies, vol. 19, p. 69. 58wang kang, feng qun, ‘a study on christian faith among college students’, the religious cultures in the world, vol. 4, 2010, p. 71. 59huahua, ‘a survey on christian faith of university students in shanghai’, youth studies, 2008 (1); zuopeng, ‘christians in the ivory tower: a survey on university christian students in beijing’, youth studies, 2004 (5); yang huilin, ‘some characteristics of the understanding of the christian faith among chinese university students’, china study journal, 2002, vol. 17 (3); wangkang, fengqun, ‘a study on christian faith among college students’, the religious cultures in the world, 2010 (4). 60huahua, ‘a survey on christian faith of university students in shanghai’, youth studies, 2008 (1). 61cf, gao xin, ‘preliminary survey on the new generation of scholars of christian studies in mainland china’, sino-christian theology: a theological qua cultural movement in contemporary china, edited by lai pan chiu & jason lam (frankfurt am main: peter lang, 2010). 62alasdair macintyre, three rival versions of moral enquiry (notre dame, ind.: university of notre dame press, 1990), p. 230. 63alasdair macintyre, whose justice? which rationality? (london: duckworth, 1988), pp. 349, 351. 64alasdair macintyre, three rival versions of moral enquiry (notre dame, ind.: university of notre dame press, 1990), p. 231. 65david ford, ‘theology and religious studies at the turn of the millenium: reconceiving the field’, teaching theology and religion, vol. 1, 1, 1998, p. 5. 66robert j. nash, answering the “virtuecrats”: a moral conversation on character education (new york, n.y.: teachers college press, 1997), p. 65. 67gavin flood, beyond phenomenology: rethinking the study of religion (london; new york: cassell, 1999), p. 226. gao xin 161 a91po9mlf_ayh0lo_4hc.tmp 54 yoga practice as a complement to samatha meditation sureeporn moeisawat and warayuth sriwarakuel abstract the demands of contemporary life have led to various kinds of practices to promote physical and mental health. in buddhist countries, yoga is increasingly attractive to people as a compeiment to the older theravarda approaches to meditation like samtha. this paper will explore the phenomenon and show that this increasing practice of yoga is not at odds with budhhism. both traditions focus the mind to attain . increasingly, laypersons and religious people have integrated yoga practice with samatha meditation, to promote physical and mental health. this paper will introduce the approach of banyat dhammasaro, the thai monk who has attempted to integrate yoga with samatha meditation. keywords : yoga; samatha meditation, dynamic meditation; banyat dhammasaro introduction ( ) is common, especially for those who live in big cities. the demands of contemporary life . while theravarda buddhism has its own meditation techniques, they often do not involve dynamic movement. as a result, in buddhist countries, yoga is increasingly attractive to people as a compeiment to the older vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 54-71 © 2000 by assumption university press 55 theravarda approaches to meditation such as samtha meditation. this complimentary, as they both attempt to enable the mind to attain . increasingly, laypeple and religious people are integrating yoga practice with samatha meditation, to promote physical and mental health. as people in buddhist countries are increasingly attracted to the more dynamic meditation techniques of yoga, there has been a movement to consider it as a complement to buddhism. this paper will explore the attempts to use yoga as a complement to theravarda meditative practices, especially the work of banyat dhammasaro. . the word yoga comes from the sanskrit root ‘yuj’ which means “ to bind, to join, to attach and yoke, to direct and concentrate the attention to use it for meditation”.1 yoga is the union of the individual of the soul with the absolute. this state is called calm mind, or which is similar to the goal of samatha meditation. in contemporary society, people practice yoga as a way of improved life and health but not as a religious practice.2 it is practice primarily for meditation and to create an “intimate physical-spiritual” bond.3 around the world, the adoption of yoga has emphasized its . currently, the modern medical institute in the west has accepted yoga “as an alternative treatment for many disorders and can complement the conventional medicine system.” 4 so while yoga has its roots as a kind of spiritual practice, its value is not limited by religion. the ultimate goal of yoga is the ability of the mind to reach the highest state of comprehension of nature ( ), “to free from a past impression of any sort, not sought, clear and simply transparent.” 5 yoga in terms of spirituality is to control the senses, the concentrated mind, and also eliminate negative emotions. this is because the outcomes of yoga practice yoga and keep it as a daily habit. the brain and the mind improve 56 in many ways such as becoming relaxed, calm, tranquil, stable, and then develop towards intelligence and consciousness.6 samatha mediation or tranquility mediation samatha is to make the mind concentrate on the object or is meditation. because samatha meditation aims to obtain which has the same meaning as in the pali canon that “samatha is to still, to certain, to concentrate the mind, and to make the mind have a power or samma .” 7 in another words, samatha means “concentration on another form etc., or color and then silently repeating its name as blue, blue, or white, white; it is called .” 8 when the mind has sustained and gained experience of mindfulness, it becomes tranquil and calm. samatha is “peace of mind, calm, comfort, and happiness to obtain .” 9 “it helps develop the quality of mind and capacity of humanity for perfection.” 10 samatha meditation can be practiced in many forms and any place. for example, we concentrate the mind on one object when it is stable and still with the object without getting distracted or lost such as chanting a mantra in any comfortable posture, sitting to pray in a temple, standing with calms, walking with a concentration on something, lying down with control breathing in-out, moving body on an activity with concentration or controlling of breathing, and so on. similarly, we focus on something with breath-in and breath-out while sitting in a car or train or airplane, etc. meditation (insight meditation). the goal is for the mind to be able to maintain stable concentration allowing it to reach a higher stage, where it acheives enlightenment wisdom.11 but newer methods were sought to make samatha meditation more dynamic. luangpor teean jittasubho, the thai buddhist monk, taught a method of dynamic meditation which involved developing awareness ( ) by bodily movements. this was directed to lay people and involved simple and easy to practice movements that 57 people could do on their own such as “turning hands, raising and lowering forearms, walking forward and back, turning and nodding head, blinking eyes, opening mouth, inhaling, exhaling, swallowing saliva, and so on, to be aware of these movements.”12 he taught that when people have in every moment which is seeing themselves as; “ : is the body, is the mind, then they will arise “ , awareness of oneself to know reality as it is, or (knowing) to see dhamma (the truth of nature, of existence). this practice is called (the grounds of awareness). ”13 therefore, samatha mediation or tranquility mediation, or . because these meditations are aimed to make, to train the mind to obtain ‘ ’. the ultimate goal of samatha meditation or tranquility meditation or concentration is to develop inner peace, to calm the mind to attain .”14 as a result, when we practice samatha meditation until the mind performs on a calm level of concentration, tranquil and more focused, the mind can be said to reach the stage of which is . 15 in terms of connection of human life in the present, the objective of samatha meditation is essential “to build up the mental power.” 16 in the buddhist dictionary, concentration or means “one-pointedness of mind: mental discipline.”17 the word of concentration is similar to in the pali term, for which p. a. payutto described the meaning as follows: in simple meaning is the state of a steadfast mind. in academic terms, is anchored on one point, it stays with the object and is not distracted or lost when the mind can stay with the object of its choice.18 also, is the same meaning as in the noble eightfold path, which means right concentration. in other words, is the stability of mind, not distracted from one point, strong power, tranquility, peace, and clarity. 58 the integration of yoga practice and samatha meditation as previously mentioned, yoga practice and samatha meditation or meditative mind are universal forms that everyone can do; they are not limited by religious considerations. besides, both arrive at the same results as . in modern times, yoga practice is well-known and widespread in terms of helping improve physical health and mental health. whenever laypersons and religious people have integrated practice yoga of the physical body and spiritual mind. especially, for thai buddhist monks who presently have increasing health problems, physical inactivity or less physical movement such as sitting for long hours are the causes of physical and mental health problems. thus, applying yoga practice together with the traditional meditation process is seen as a way to help enhance the ability to practice and laymen alike. moreover, this integration is not against the rules of thai monks and buddhist teachings. yoga practice has been adopted by -khandha, to maintain good health. this approach can also be seen elsewhere in theravada buddhism; meditation in thailand was also in conformity with theravarda principles. lunangpor teean writes: we don’t have to sit with eyes closed to get calmness, but we can have calmness in this very society. whenever conceiving thought arises, will see it immediately. doesn’t mean to sit with eyes closed. means setting up the mind to see our own mind, to see our own work. 19 body to do and then use the to be with the movement. you can call it or you can call it . the feeling is called sati; is setting up the mind.20 59 therefore, the compatability of the complimentary nature of yoga and theravarda buddhist samatha meditation can be supported. this can be seen in a more comprehensive way by looking at the approach of banyat dhammasaro, and the meditation approach of luangphor viriyang. the integrative approach of banyat dhammasaro banyat dhammasaro was a thai monk who integrated yoga practice and samatha meditation to increase the power of meditation, to help improve better concentration and establish mindfulness based on the body. in terms of the meditation process, he complied as walking for one hour, sitting for one hour, and doing yoga for one hour each day. for instance, at the beginning of meditation practice, he applied yoga to concentrate on breathing, by taking a deep inhalation of 10 seconds and longer exhalation of 20 seconds. the next step is to practice yoga such as or the sun salutation, a series of yoga poses created for practice in the morning, which consists of 12 postures. he described that while practicing yoga the bodily movement must align with smooth and slow breathing. this concentration on breathing and movement calms and stills the mind. blood circulation. first he applied yoga standing poses, as or palm tree pose is to stand erect, raise the hand above the head, while taking a deep . then continue the stretching of the whole body upward on the heels and hold the pose for a few seconds. and bring the body down on the heels while exhaling. its blood circulation of feet and toes. then he applied yoga sitting poses, such as the or lotus pose, where one sits in a crossed legged yoga pose. this pose aids to sustain and deepen meditation, and calm and relax the mind. it also . concerning the lying down poses, he practiced or . one 60 raises the knees upward, the hands holding the ankles for 5 seconds. after exhaling, one can then return the body down. this is repeated eight times. it helps to increase strengthen muscles of the hip, legs, and spine. it also . the or the reclining buddha pose is lying the head with the right hand. the left hand is in line with the hip and bend slightly the knees. hold the pose 2-3 minutes while breathing in-out softly. . this pose helps to increase the strength of muscles of the legs and spine. additionally, it improves blood circulation and overall bodily balance.21 changing physical movement every hour helps improve strengthen bodily muscles and overall health, which promotes the ability to sustain sitting meditation for long hours. banyat dhammasaro had integrated yoga practice and samatha meditation by practicing breathing control ( ) inhalation, and exhalation in order to establish the mindfulness of breathing which is called in buddha teaching. another meaning is “mindfulness established on an object all time of each breathing in and breathing out.” 22 this method consists of sixteen stages, it is called “ . or mindfulness of breathing with sixteen bases.” 23 it is explained in the . physical body movement ( ) is aligned with breathing in and breathing out to improve overall health . it ( ) which is called ‘ ’ which is “contemplating the body in the body, out of the entire body, physical and mental.” 24 p. a. payutto has described as “mindfulness as regards the body” : contemplation on breathing in and breathing out, 61 contemplation on all the bodily movement or posture, clear comprehension, discrimination, circumspection, clear consciousness, awareness. contemplation on impurity of body. ; contemplation of the four elements; determining of the elements. contemplation of the dead body. 25 this integration of the yogic practice of breathing control ( ) physical body movement ( ) and samatha meditation, is in accord with buddha teaching that is which is a part of or the four foundations of mindfulness. yogic breathing control ( ) accords with the method of and physical body movement ( ) accords with the method of . integration and synthesis refer to combining practice and knowledge from multiple sources in order to create a new approach. in the synthesis of yoga practice and samatha meditation, walking and sitting meditation is combined with yoga, and reciting is combined with breathing control. luangphor viriyang stated that practicing meditation is like “eating easily and comfortably without taking time and place into account.” even if people only meditate a few minutes at a time, they can get great results. he suggested that people “can mediate in any posture, anywhere and at any suitable time”.29 focus on the body. keep the mind focused and awareness on the body such as head, hair, chest, nose, and forehead, etc., during breathing in and breathing out all the time of meditation. focus on the breath. close the eyes and deeply breathe in, hold a few seconds, and then give a long breath out. this practice can be done while sitting on the bus, standing pose, laying down, and any comfortable pose in any place. 62 focus on reciting words. keep the mind focused on reciting words in the mind; ‘inhale, exhale’, or any other suitable words during breathing in and breathing out. focus on reciting the mantra. keep the mind focused on reciting words in the mind; ‘buddho’, ‘buddho dhammo sangho, buddho dhammo sangho, buddho dhammo sangho, or any other suitable mantra during meditation. 30 accordingly, banyat dhammasaro stated that “meditation is a timeless practice. we can mediate on pranayama (breathing control) during the act of breathing.”31 he emphasized that this simple meditation practice can be practiced any place and any time. that is concentration on breathing along with word-counting the breaths leading to the calming of the mind. the outcome of the synthesis of yoga and samatha meditation. not only does yoga improve physical health but it also contributes to mental well-being. as the outcome of yoga is the same as samatha meditation and also similar to . following s. n. goenka’s ’s dhamma, is a universal knowledge which enables everyone to obtain deliverance, by selfobservation of physical and mental and by focusing on inhalation and exhalation. this practice can help the people to establish mindfulness on body and breathing. in addition, it allows practicioners to see and to understand nature’s laws of the interconnection of body and mind in order to “dissolve mental impurity, resulting in a balanced mind full of love and compassion.”41 s. n. goenka claimed that in the popular perception, yoga is only a type of practice and to dispose of diseases or a cure for a particular illness. but he stresses that yoga is a highly spiritual knowledge to obtain peace of mind and the wisdom to emancipate people . as a result, patañjali’s yoga sutra has been described in the context of its spiritual meaning “the universal truth or omnipresent reality” 42 which everyone can understand the real meaning and the truth of natural laws by personal experience. these truths can lead people to 63 reach calm mind, happiness, and wisdom. when people have , the mind develops wisdom (pañña) so they can know the cause of their . . these outcomes are similar to . according to banyat dhammasaro when people regularly practice yoga and meditation, “ jealousy will naturally recede.”59 also, positive thinking, compassion, and loving-kindness for others will be increased. people will realize that when they show compassion, and loving-kindness to other people, especially happiness. relationship of people in societies. if the number of yoga practitioners increase, it will help societies by reducing crime, violence, and homicide. it can contribute to peace and happiness. 60 : as a type of exercise, a part of mental rejuvenation, and a practice to develop a spiritual mind. especially, in terms of the spiritual mind which is the highest value for people to improve peace in mind. in modern life, yoga is an aspect as a type of exercise. it presents itself through the practice of physical exercise ( ) and breathing exercise ( ) help improve hypertension and deducing cholesterol, blood circulation improve balance of the whole of the body system, and so forth. even though yoga practice seems like an alternative medicine, it must work together in conjunction with conventional medicine. in terms of mental health, practicing yoga can emphasize improving the capability of the mind to become more energetic, relaxed, calm, peaceful, still, clear from negative thoughts and reach meditation or . because when people concentrate on one object with breathing in and breathing out, it is the practice of and also focus on the step of feet or body movement or any posture is the practice of . 64 additionally, yoga helps develop a positive attitude and morality of people, because the harmony of physical health and mental health brings sycg positive changes as good attitude and behavior, feeling of sharing and friendliness to another people. —high well-being, and the good relationship in ( ). in the context of spirituality, yoga is a powerful practice. because yoga is dynamic meditation, it enables the development of the type of concentration found in samatha meditation, and becomes a path toward the achievement of . nevertheless, when laypeople and religious people have integrated yoga practice and samatha meditation, it can help to alleviate the physical problems associated with sitting in meditation for long hours and to promote relaxation. this is in addition to improving the quality of mind power to achieve focus and bliss. furthermore, when people continuously practice yoga, it can bring about personal happiness service to other people. these results are similar to the ones gained by samatha meditation. moreover, when people attain it can be . it can be said that yoga is an alternative way for the practitioner to concentrate on body and breathing, in order to make the mind still and stable. this process paves the way for everyone to improve the mind to reach the high stage of samatha meditation, which is . therefore the integration between yoga and samatha mediation involes practicing yoga together with practicing traditional meditation. so one can combine walking meditation, sitting meditation, breathing control, and reciting together with the practice of yoga. it becomes an enhancement of the ability to practice meditation and acts as a complement to samatha meditation for both religious people and laypersons in the age which makes so many demands on physical and mental health. 65 endnotes 1 iyengar, b.k.s. . london: unwin paperbacks, 1981, 4. 2 van ness, h., peter. : . 1999, 15. 3 ferretti, andrea. . 2012. 4 business standard. . 2018. 5 desikachar, t.k.v. . vermont: inner tradition international, 1995, 164. 6 iyengar, b.k.s. b. . . london: dorlin kindersley limited, 2001, 42. 7 the pali tipitaka. . bangkok: the mahachula buddhist university mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya university, 1931. 96. 8 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 13. 9 sirintharo, viriyang. : . bangkok: pra-chachon company, 1998, 10. 10 sirintharo, viriyang. : . bangkok: pra-chachon company, 1998, 13. 11 jeon, hyunsoo. . massachusetts: wisdom publications, 2018, 32. 12 jittasubho, l.t. . bangkok: luangpor teean foundation, bangkok: supa printing, 2005, 16. 13 jittasubho, l.t. . bangkok: luangpor teean foundation, bangkok: supa printing, 2005, 25. 14 p. a. payutto. . nonthaburi: s.r. printing mass product, 1972, 2. 15 sirintharo, viriyang. : . bangkok: pra-chachon company, 1998, 22. 16 sirintharo, viriyang. : . bangkok: pra-chachon company, 1998, 29. 17 p. a. payutto. . nonthaburi: s.r. printing mass product, 1972, 350. 18 p. a. payutto. . bangkok: o.s. printing house, 1998, 3. 19 puntarigviwat, tavivat & bhikkhu nirodho. , 22-23 20 puntarigviwat, tavivat and bhikkhu nirodho. to one that feels, 34. also see for example the article by haifeng fu. : 66 . prajna vihara. vol 22. no. 1. 21 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 51-103. 22 . . bangkok. sublime life mission, 1980, iv. 23 p. a. payutto. . nonthaburi: s.r. printing mass product, 1972, 261. 24 . . bangkok. sublime life mission, 1980, 125. 25 p. a. payutto. . nonthaburi: s.r. printing mass product, 1972, 141. 26 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 109. 27 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 29. 28 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 57-59. 29 sirintharo, viriyang. . bangkok: pra-cha-chon company, 1999, 26. 30 sirintharo, viriyang. . bangkok: pra-cha-chon company, 1999, 26-28. 31 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 25. 32 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 28-31. 33 murugesan, r., govindarajulu, n. & bera, t. k. . indian j physiol pharmacol, 2000. 34 tundwala, v., gupta, r.p., kumar, s., singh, v.b., br, sandeep., dayal, p., & prakash, p. . vol. 2 (1), 2012, 93-98. 35 desikachar, t.k.v. . vermont: inner tradition international, 1995, 154. 36 michalsen, a., grossman, p., acil, a., langhorst, j., lüdtke, r., esch, t., stefano, b. g. & dobos, j. g. . program. med sci monit, vol. 11(12), 2005, 555-561. 37 sahni, s., p., singh, k., sharma, n. & garg, r. : . 2021. 67 38 semwal, k. d., chauhan, a., mishra, p. s., & semwal, b.r. : . 2016. 39 büssing, a., michalsen, a., khalsa, s. s., telles, s., & sherman, j. k. : . digital access to scholarship at harvard. 2012, 1-7. 40 krishnamurti, jiddu. . 1970. 41 s. n. goenka. . 1990. 42 s. n. goenka. . 1990. 43 brennan, dan. . 2021. 44 dalailama.com. . . . 45 dalai, lama. . london: rider, 2001. 46 p. a. payutto. . bangkok: o.s. printing house, 1998, 3-6. 47 transcendental meditation. . 2014. 48 sirintharo, viriyang. : . bangkok: pra-chachon company, 1998, 51-53. 49 alexander, n. c., swanson, c. g., rainforth, v. m., carlisle, w. t., todd, c. c., &oates, m. r. : . 2012. 50 pechsawanga, pawinee., & duchon, dennis. . 2012. 51 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 21. 52 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 17. 53 krishnamurti, jiddu. . 1971. 54 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 25. 55 ross, a., friedmann, e., bevans, m., &thomas, s. : . 2013. 56 kenchannavar, h. h., & perur, d.s. . 2019. 57 kaivalyadhama. . . . 58 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 23. 59 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 17. 60 dhammasaro, banyat. . bangkok: thammasapa, 1999, 16-17. 68 references alexander, n. c., swanson, c. g., rainforth, v. m., carlisle, w. t., todd, c. c., & oates, m. r. 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(1999). : . retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/27944075. accessed 20/10/2021. mikael stamm 85 glimpses of truth in a sea of nescience: reflections on ereignis in art in wölfli, heidegger and advaita vedānta mikael stamm1 figure 1: wölfli 1905. mediziinische fakultäät. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 2021, 85-109 © 2000 by assumption university press 86 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june abstract martin heidegger’s deconstruction of western metaphysics was a project designed to retrieve an appreciation of the question of being through a distancing from the distortions created by the history metaphysics itself. this project takes several forms, but a particularly radical form can be seen by interpreting heidegger’s work contributions to philosophy in the light of the indian philosophical tradition, advaita vedānta. we find in this juxtaposition an accentuation of three concepts: self, concealment and being. the relation of these three elements can be seen within the movement of the work of art, and can be seen especially vividly in outsider art. it is in outsider art that we see the movement towards a disruption which breaks us free from metaphysical thought, throwing us into a pre-metaphysical realm, while still under influence of what advaita philosophy would call nescience [māyā, avidyā]. we intent to show in this article that the works of adolf wölfli can be seen as a manifestation of the rupture of ‘pre-metaphysical occurrence’ disrupting our normal discourse; an occurrence that ultimately can be verified only by its own example, as a unique appearance. keywords: adolf wölfli; martin heidegger; advaita vedānta; nescience; outsider art introduction heidegger’s critique of metaphysics involves the idea that the history of metaphysics conceals the most important question in philosophy, the question of being. so much of heidegger’s early work was a project designed to peel away the distortions of our understanding or truth, in order to retrieve or uncover this question of being. mikael stamm 87 this project is continued in heidegger’s radicalized question concerning being as such, i.e. beyng, as expressed in the beiträge zur philosophie (vom ereignis) (contributions to philosophy) (hereafter shortened to beiträge)2. heidegger designates a pre-ontological condition ‘beyng’ [seyn], spelled with an ‘y’, as opposed to the metaphysical ‘being’ [sein], which is reflected and developed within western philosophy as such. furthermore, when the beiträge is interpreted in the light of an indian philosophical tradition, advaita vedānta, there emerged a significant accentuation of three crucial concepts: self, concealment and beyng. the beiträge expressed a critique of western calculative culture as conditioned by a metaphysical state termed ‘machination’ [machenschaft], which is seen as an ever intensifying metaphysical distortion of a true premetaphysical beyng. this metaphysical distortion is inherently connected to its ‘true source’, as an original pervasive occurrence [ereignis] which conditions any ‘later’ metaphysical object-related concepts of truth. now, if a pervasive distortion is active in this self-propagating way, clouding our sense of what is true and real, then everything we can relate to must be affected by this pervasive deficiency, similar to advaita vedānta’s sanskrit concepts of a cosmic nescience, predominately expressed as avidyā or māyā. the underlying presumption of this study is that art represent a potency, which has the capability to disrupt the dominating (false) objectbeing [sein], and bring forward a glimpse of true beyng [seyn]. the question is now: what kind of art might possess this power? and how is this thought to be operative within our common modes of understanding? we intend to show in this article that the works of adolf wölfli can be seen as a manifestation of a ‘pre-metaphysical occurrence’, as a comprehensive refusal of our normal understanding of self and world. machination and the radical difference the beiträge distinguishes itself from traditional philosophy by its peculiar distancing; a positioning of itself outside conventional western philosophy, which only expresses and propagates a metaphysical distortion 88 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june of the original beyng. this distancing in the beiträge owes its peculiar position to an inexpressible otherness, projected through the concept of an ereignis, which can be defined as an occurrence of beyng beyond the comprehensive distortion of truth, machination, in this study interpreted as a manifestation of nescience. this ‘distortion’ in beiträge, denotes a way of perceiving everything there is, as derived from objects [seiendes] in their character of makeability [machbarkeit], which conceal the real source of their original illumination.3 in machenschaft, the ‘machen-’ (make, do, produce) is to be understood as a reference to the passive wissen (knowledge) in wissenschaft (science), which signifies a calculating cognition corresponding to the active makeability (manipulation) of objects. this understanding of objects, as something that can be acted upon and subsumed in a field of calculative knowledge and planning, is ‘superimposed’ on being as such [seyn], affecting everything (‘beings’) which can be understood or articulated. therefore, the question of true beyng requires a withdrawal [ent-zug] from all representational calculation in a fundamental refusal [verweigerung] of the world of utilization, i.e. of understanding subsumed to makeability.4 how is this refusal possible? does it mean anything else than a pure negation, given that it is deprived of any means of positive articulations? this problem of articulation of an incomparable other truth, in the context of an all-pervasive nescience, is the reason behind the seemingly detour to an indian tradition. the point is that the advaita vedānta tradition regards any form of conceptualization or differentiation as part of a comprehensive illusory potency [māyā, avidyā], and insists that this illusion can only be dispelled through an event of true knowledge of a non-dualistic reality. the advaitic nescience and truth śaṇkarācārya (8th century ce), regarded as the founder of the tradition of advaita vedānta, formulated the concepts of a nescience [māyā or avidyā] and an ultimate reality [brahman] in his commentary on bādarāyaṇa’s brahmasūtras (3rd – 2nd century bce).5 nescience refers mikael stamm 89 to the entire phenomenal world in which humans and things appear, while ultimate reality means an incommensurable true being, the ground of nescience and yet beyond any conceivable difference. ultimate reality, brahman, cannot be thought of as an object or an entity; brahman is beyond categories of beings and the realization that the apparent phenomenal reality is in fact brahman is the achievement of true knowledge, vidyā, which frees the self from the bondage of māyā.6 the interesting point is now: what can be truly said about the prevailing absence of truth? the pluralistic world of objects and appearances are part of the workings of the pervasive indeterminable māyā, which binds the selves to a web of attachments. in this state of bondage is included an illusory self, the antaḥkaraṇa, here designating the intellect, mind and ego; all of which are regarded as instruments of cognition of phenomena, and therefore themselves essentially insentient and object-like. śaṇkara explains the state of nescience by positing a fundamental difference between self [ātman] and non-self [anātman],7 and characterizes this ontological difference as something that creates a fundamental misconception: “the mutual superimposition [adhyāsa] of the self and the non-self, which is termed nescience [avidyā], is the presupposition on which there base all the practical distinctions”.8 the ‘practical distinctions’ accounts for the entire domain of differences within the phenomenal world. the circular logic of this conceptualization is due to the fact that the distinction between self and non-self is considered as both the cause of the ontological confusion, and an effect of the same misconception. vācaspati miśra in his bhāmatī (9th century)9, a commentary on śaṇkara’s brahmasūtrabhasya, pointed out, that if the true self [ātman] was radically different from any objective entity, then it could not be subject to nescience and therefore he raised the question concerning the actual subject (location) of nescience. miśra claimed that the operation of nescience has to be located in the individual self [jīva], because ignorance can never be associated with the pure being, brahman, and in this way he managed to preserve the truth of brahman as an absolute pure other.10 this made 90 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june necessary a differentiation of the concept of the self: an insentient inner cognizing organ [antaḥkaraṇa], a sentient individual self [jīva] and a non-individual essential self [ātman]; these three selves are connected to the mysterious workings of māyā, and to the dualistic tension between the indeterminable nescience and the corresponding radically different truth. in heidegger’s terms, the differentiation between beings and beyng can only be resolved by a transformative event, as a thrust [ruck], which moves the self away from the order of things [seiendes]. this event is closely connected to a similar tripling of the meaning of the self in beiträge, as in the bhāmatī: firstly, an “i” [ich] reflecting the distortion of truth, the machination; secondly, a dubious but necessary self [selbst] part of machination as well as the truth, designating the place of the operation of the machination; and thirdly, an essential principle, the dasein, accessible only through the ambiguous self. ereignis and the unmanageable strife the concepts of beyng and self are further explored in the beiträge in an analysis of the phenomenon of death, which leads to the ultimate possibility of ‘being-away’ [weg-sein], and further to nothingness [nichts/nichthafte]: since beyng implies a refusal [verweigerung] of the unessential apparent being [unseiende], beyng needs the nothingness: “since beyng is permeated with the “not” [nichthaft], for the perseverance of its truth it needs the persistence of the not [nicht] and thus also nonbeings [nichtige]”.11 the path of understanding beyng must go through the refusal of the object-being and the implications of negation, i.e. leaving the common, in order to engage in the strange [fremde]. in this way the sense of the otherness of truth means that everything is transformed in the light of truth, and this is expressed as a sudden movement or displacement [versetzung].12 this concept of nothingness takes us beyond the negation “in the sense of an excess [übermaβ] of pure refusal.”13 an ‘excess of refusal’ is not a return to the original point, rather it is a thinking which points towards a qualitative leap; a choice of a fundamental refusal that nonetheless both cancels and changes itself in retrospect. mikael stamm 91 this movement of negation of the common from which the “i” has defined itself, means that the subject (location) of nescience, the self [selbst] also possesses the power to free [ent-setzen] itself from the siege of things and the ‘false’ self. ‘ent-setzen’ here possesses both the sense of being relocated, and the feeling of ‘horror’ of being torn from the common.14 this ambiguity is exactly what makes possible the occurrence of an ent-setzung; fear of the unknown and in the same movement: being freed through a projection towards beyng. this proximity to beyng is to be understood as a timely transformative event [ereignis], in which the self is appropriated by beyng, which ‘suddenly and properly’ shows everything in their own essences.15 in the “der ursprung des kunstwerkes” (the origin of the work of art)16 this glimpse of an authentic understanding of beyng is directly connected to works of art a connection explicitly stated in beiträge’s §247 as properly belonging to this paragraph as a ‘grounding’ (exposition) of the truth of the self, the dasein.17 the essential characteristic of an artwork is that art evades the ‘being of a utility’, the mark of the machination, because it exhibits a capability of a different order altogether.18 it sets up a world [welt] as a whole, in a form of a new spaciousness [geräumigkeit] in which beings can be met. another aspect is that it discloses the necessary support of the setting forth [herstellung] of the world, i.e. the earth [erde] that moves into the open of the world. the important point here is that earth is a mystical concept which signifies that it essentially withdraws from every meaning.19 this implies an inherent conflict; on one hand, that the world of meanings has to determine that which remains closed to it, and on the other, that the earth has to preserve its self-seclusiveness to support meanings. this original unifying strife [streit] of opposites is not a deficiency, but constitutes the essence of everything that can be. not unlike a heraclitean sense of a pre-ontological éris, which lets everything show in a ‘unity of opposites’.20 heidegger’s claim is that this is what artworks do: they place a rift [riß] which instigates a strife between clearing [lichtung] and concealing [verbergung], between world and earth.21 this is the mark or fundamental 92 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june design of beyng, designating an original timely appearing, a ‘clearing of beings’ [lichtung des seienden].22 the artwork fixates (expresses) this rift/design in a figure [gestalt] as a concrete placing [stellen]. this event in art of evoking the mystical earth and the meaningful world is what heidegger terms a thrust [stoß], a sudden movement to an ‘outside’ of the familiar things: the more essentially this thrust comes into the open, the stranger and more solitary the works becomes […] the more essentially the extraordinary is thrust to the surface and the long-familiar thrust down […]. to submit to this displacement [verrückung] means: to transform all familiar relations to world and to earth.23 this is truth in art: it leaves the realm of the common, and leads to an extraordinary appearing of the complete other. tantric art the pāśupatis were followers of the teaching taught by paśupati (around 200 ce.) which aimed at a complete independence from the world, and which required from the devotees a transcending all material opposites by roaming cremation grounds and participate in ‘impure’ rituals, while continually practicing at least twelve years of yogic meditation.24 one of the most striking examples of this transcendence by submergence is that of kāraikkāl ammaiyār (5th or 6th century ce.), a female poet and devotee of śiva, from the early cult of the tamil śaiva siddhānta.25 her poetry is characterized by a continual overflow of creativeness which obliterates the organized ”i”. in the periya puranam it is said that she prayed to śiva that the earthly flesh she had worn for the sake of her husband would disappear and be replaced by the form of a skeleton, an appearance proper of complete devotion to the terrible form of śiva. her prayers were heard, and from the moment of her transformation, she roamed the cremation grounds of tiruālangkādu. she is described as being smeared in ashes, engaging in erratic behavior and submerged mikael stamm 93 in a continual state of devotion to bhairava śiva: demons with flaming mouths and rolling, fiery eyes / roaming around, doing the tuṇaṅkai-dance / running and dancing in the terrifying forest /draw out a burning corpse from the fire and eat the flesh // the place where our lord raises his leg / with the hero’s kalal jingling / and the anklets tinkling / dancing so that the fire in his hand spreads everywhere / and his hair whips around / is tiruvālaṅkāṭu.26 there is no place for convention or even a community of devotees; there is only the divine vision of the object of her all-consuming devotion. the radical strategy of solitude and social distancing as a condition of insight, brings us to remember the words of beiträge concerning the ‘few and rare’, who essentially do not belong to any community or group, which are excluded from an intimation of the true self.27 this ‘outsider approach’ can be seen in figure 2, the images of the terrible aspect of śiva with his female part, the goddess kālī incorporated, which accentuates a distancing from a conventional godhead by a display of death, sexuality and aggressiveness framed within an ornamented ritualized space. art as excess of refusal: adolf wölfli the term ‘outsider art’ carries specific historical and cultural meanings. according to david maclagan’s discussion of the expression, it refers to both the artworks and their artists.28 he contends that such artists frequently lived on the margins of society and didn’t fit into the conventional establishment, and that they frequently had no opportunities to formally ‘learn the trade.’ they rarely saw their creations as a form of individual artistic expression, and therefore didn’t really think themselves as ‘artists’ at all. maclagan further pointed out that the artworks were originally regarded as therapeutic byproducts of a psychiatric treatment; contributing to this view were several factors: the artworks didn’t exhibit traits of conventional artistic styles, and they were frequently made of 94 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june figure 2: the hindu goddess kali and god bhairava in union. painting; watercolor. los. angeles county museum of art. mikael stamm 95 random materials of whatever was available to the artist, leaving an impression of a crude unreflective work. this impression was strengthened due to apparently purposeless repetitions of the same motifs, and that the works were frequently not approachable through conventional codes of representation, and therefore seemingly impenetrable to conventional artistic interpretations.29 one of the most famous representatives of outsider art is the painter adolf wölfli (1864–1930) who was a resident of the waldau psychiatric institution, located near bern in switzerland.30 wölfli’s early life as an orphan and a child laborer, hired out to different foster families, is described as a harsh existence completely subjected to whatever the families would put him through. later he endured a life of an itinerant laborer, did the military service and two years in prison, due to an attempted sexual assault on a young girl. after a similar incident he was committed to waldau where he stayed till the end of his days. wölfli began to draw, write and compose in 1899, and worked continuously on his artworks until the end of his life. from 1908 onwards he began to systemize his productions by making references to overall narratives, which described adventurous travels around the world or fantastic autobiographical events, all of which were expressed in drawings, musical compositions, poetry, or fictional prose. walter morgenthaler mentions wölfli’s peculiar method of working with his art as an almost mechanistic activity of drawing and writing. he worked continually without emotion with the exception of moments of hostility towards those who would interrupt his endless stream of creation.31 wölfli’s attitude towards his work can be described as almost painful, that is, a continual frustration due to his inability to capture the entire stream of his imaginative visions, over which he seemingly has no control. morgenthaler uses the word maßlosigkeit to designate a hastiness, a ruthlessness, or a lack of moderation: words chasing other words, forms and shades being reduplicated; an excess of flow of creations which relentlessly seek material to be manifested in. 96 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june the whole is less than its parts the fives works selected for this article are drawn from different periods of wölfli’s production: figure 1 and 3 are selected from the period of “early drawings” (1904-1907) before wölfli began attaching titles to series of works, figure 4 is taken from the theme titled from the cradle to the grave (1908-12), figure 5 from geographic and algebraic books (1912-16), and figure 6 from the funeral march (1928-1930).32 we will go through these selected works, which illustrate a certain development in wölfli’s style. in figure 1 (mediziinische fakultäät), reproduced at the beginning of this article, we find all the recurrent basic elements which are characteristic of wölfli’s works throughout his artistic development:33 ornamental ‘strips’ in different patterns are used as frames, either encircling the entire drawing or running through parts of it. in all areas of the drawings are inserted ornamental ‘snails’, individual or in a chain; a half-bow with one or two dots, similar to a stylized eye and ear. similar insertions are visible everywhere in the drawings in the form of an ornamental small female bird (‘vögelii’), not unlike the snail, but with a bird-like form instead. other frequently used elements are stylized black eyes, like an oversize pair of spectacle or pair of shadows hiding the eyes. many variations of icon-like ‘self-portraits’ with or without mustaches, often combined with a black cross and/or black eyes. these recurrent elements are combined in characteristic symmetrical patterns on different levels of the design. furthermore, the particular features of figure 1 reveals a monochrome composition constructed around both a vertical and a horizontal symmetry, but comprising a ‘flow’ of forms, which fill every bit of space. there is no representation of ‘empty space’ or any conventional horizon which would ground a representational orientation. an extreme excess of ornamental elements occupies the drawing, in the form of iconfaces and stylized organic forms (‘snails’/‘birds’) which are swept into an overall movement, which seems to form the shape of a butterfly. words and sentences are inserted inside confined shaded areas, integrated as a mikael stamm 97 in figure 3 (felsenau) there are recognizable components of a city; houses, buildings, trees, and what looks like a large factory chimney, presumably a part the city of bern, protected/separated by a diagonal railing and river. we may assume that the river is aare, which runs adjacent to felsenau and through the center of bern. even if the elements refer to specific geographical places, they are still decorated and formed by the characteristic elements mentioned above. these elements make the geographical location look ‘alien’, since they participate in a pattern that serves a higher purpose than just representation. the symmetry is mirrored figure 3: wölfli 1907. felsenau. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung part of the visual form. tfwo words are present in the upper part of the of the drawing as a kind of title, though not referring to any recognizable theme: “mediziinische fakultäät”. as a peculiar general characteristic, each of the myriad forms are graphically marked as if they contain material inside to be protected from the outside, or maybe to prevent any outside material from contaminating the interior of the form. 98 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june around a diagonal strip, the river, and the entire drawing is framed with stylized self-portraits, ‘snails’ and ‘vögeliis’. the strips direct the flows, making the drawing unmistakably repetitious and uncanny despite its formal references to a geographical location. figure 4: wölfli 1911.london=nord. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung mikael stamm 99 in figure 4 (london=nord), though the capitalized word “london=nord” indicates a geographical location, there are in this work no visible landmarks. names and numbers are inserted in the strips, but the musical compositions are here a dominant element of the design, supported by elements and the strict symmetry. the abstraction here is intensified, compared to the drawings in figure 1 and 3, as well as the christian symbols and the presence of st. adolf in four separate spheres, each connected to the others by musical notes and a symbolic strips of stylized fishes. the symmetry is both vertical and horizontal, centered around the four larger self-portraits combined with crosses. in figure 5 (die kreutzigung des heiligen skt. adolf), the presence of the musical component and the christian theme are intensified. the musical notes, the facial self-portraits and the crosses are arranged around a christian crucifixion of an ornamental adolf wölfli-like image, in which a crown of thorns and marks of spikes in hands and feet are visible. the elements, birds and snails, are inserted in every bit of spaces figure 5: wölfli 1914. die kreutzigung des heiligen skt. adolf. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung 100 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june between the inserted pictures of four saint-like figures resembling wölfli, and higher above, a god-like wölfli, presumably flanked by heavenly hymns. the symmetry is constructed around a vertical line in the center, though two horizontal lines divides the drawing in three realms. the structural division is rigid, and the rhythmic flow is here replaced by a strict rectangular design. though a certain development is visible through the four drawings, certain features are discernable in all of them: an excess of ornamental elements flowing in rhythmically movements, which directed by a structure of graphically marked borders of separation, imposing the impression of each element as an independent or isolated unit. this overflow of autonomous details seems to be in constant conflict with the strict symmetrical overall design. the repetitions of elements seem to be of a ritualistic importance, that is, they seem to be arranged in a necessary structure in each design, to infuse an alternative order associated with places, constructions, occurrences, symbols, names, etc. the divided self now we will return to the concept of the self, and the implication of the peculiar division in advaita vedānta. the advaitic dichotomy of the self made visible the beiträge’s parallel split: on the one hand the “i” that is part of the phenomenal nescience, on the other hand, the true principle of the self, the dasein, concealed by the “i”. this peculiar structure of the self reflects the fundamental division regarding nescience and truth, or in heidegger’s terms, the machination and beyng. we are able to understand from these fundamental differences of meanings, the division that wölfli expressed, i.e. the painful task of fixating the endless interior stream of visions, which are seemingly not controlled by an “i”. in the works of wölfli, this peculiar role of the divided self is expressed in a subversion of the position of the usual or familiar; a distancing that lets the artwork stand ‘solitary’ outside the common frame of relations (e.g. history of art, genres, biographies, sociological explanations, etc.). this signifies a movement away from the order of things into a ‘nothingness’ created by mikael stamm 101 the split within the self. we return to our four drawings for illustrations of this point: figure 1 exhibits an overflow of ornamental elements and rhythmic flows of forms, whose lack of structured space leaves no room for a placing of an organized self. instead we are faced with a dis-orientation through a flood of words, sounds, faces, eyes, mouths, shadows, gods, snakes, borders, patterns, brims; a reflections of a dying self, looking back at the spectator from a foreign world. in figure 3 the reconstructed site of the city shows a diagonal flow between two realms, divided in an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ of the separation. the fragmented city, vaguely recognizable, has been reassembled in a way which shows a new constructed space seen through the memories of a number of distributed selves. figure 4 shows the reduplication of four ascending realms, each centered around a self, each with its own musical composition, but attached to each other by a hieratical rigid scheme. figure 5 displays several distinctly marked insertions of smaller drawings, or ‘windows’, into a larger drawing, surrounded by a ‘loudness’ of musical arrangements, and a replacement of christ with st. adolf, a god-like figure festooned with hymns, words and ornamental figures and patterns. the self is both crucified, resurrected, divinized, and distributed throughout a choirs of saintly and angelic beings, showing a network of reduplicated “i”s with a presiding self as the highest of all. in all four drawings the intrusion of the other [fremde, andere] is visible as a transforming factor [ereignis], causing the overflow and destruction the normal self [ich, ahaṁkāra]. this is present both as a horrifying feeling of losing the self in a fragmented world, and as an orchestral celebration of a different new order. death is felt as the death of an “i”, as its final being-away [weg-sein], bringing in an excess of nothingness [nichts] which reflects that which has no center, and as such is injected into all forms and materials to be seen. 102 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june figure 6: wölfli 1929. ohne titel. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung mikael stamm 103 an excess of refusal we have seen in heidegger’s “der ursprung des kunstwerkes” that the concept of rift [riß] plays an important role, in the sense of an original rupture and design of the strife between earth and world. for wölfli, this strife is expressed in the drawings in various ways. between a centric representation of an “i” and a fragmented self and, and between death and celebration of those selves. furthermore, we have observed in the drawings a conflictual relation between overflowing elements and the controlling power of borders and frames, or put simply: a tension between material flows and restrictive forms. these conflictual settings are raised in wölfli’s artworks in a way which echoes the original strife, beyond the normalized structure of a utility-being. the works of wölfli are these conflictual relationships, and therefore a harmonic ideal can only be represented within a distorted arrangement like figure 6, shown above, taken from the last project, the ‘funeral march’. here we notice pictures taken from magazines and subordinated to a flow of hastily scribbled names and numbers, which undermines the images of idyllic scenes. the discomfort transferred from the drawings and collages are due to the ever present strangeness and conflictual rift, from which we look back on our, now estranged, common world. the distorting ereignis the character of nescience, avidyā, in advaita vedānta, manifests itself due to a beginningless ontological difference between self (being) and non-self (beings), making possible a fundamental confusion/attraction, through which the flow of phenomena is formed. this ontological difference can only be seen in retrospect as a unifying conflict expressed in a mutual superimposition, or as an interdependence of concealment and clearing, since it has already exerted its impact, as reflected in a dualistic tension. if the original rift [riß] can be expressed in art, then it has to manifest as a radical other, an alien intrusion into the familiar scheme, since it can only be seen through the effect of the same 104 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june rift. in heidegger’s analysis and his selection of van gogh to illustrate the rift, there is a symmetrical relationship between earth and world. this tends to undermine the radicality of the rupture and the effects of nescience. both in wölfli’s artworks and tantric art, there is a tendency where the rift is uncontrollable; the work does not disappear back into the world of nescience. thus, in wölfli’s artworks the rift is expressed in the difference between the flow of visions and the fixation of the same. the continual flow is mimicked in each drawing’s strict rhythm and design and between the drawings as their overall narrative, which binds the sheets together in an endless chain. these mimicking fixations are not part of a reconstruction of the ‘true’ inner stream, because they have already changed the flow before the fixation, and therefore the reality of the flow can only exist as that which is inherently absent. the event of truth, the ereignis, is here present as the continual restoration of something irrevocably lost. the truth then becomes the ‘true’ distortion of a distortion (machenschaft or avidyā), and the event of truth becomes the destruction of the “i” and the reconstruction of a different structure, which refrains from controlling the self-secluding material aspect. conclusion why do we speak of truth and not of an aesthetic experience? in our perspective, such radical works of art are designed not to affect the emotional or cognitive faculties of a spectator; rather they trigger a premetaphysical understanding that displaces the delusions of an “i” and the schemes of machination. in our interpretation of heidegger, though, we would choose an approach somewhat different from “der ursprung des kunstwerkes”, where the analysis of a painting of van gogh accentuated an authentic lifeworld, invoking earth and world. rather we would accentuate van gogh’s heightened use of complementary colors, and the connected collapse of the form-aspect into unstable vibrant material. compared with heidegger’s more symmetrical analysis of earth and world, we would accentuate the denial of the appearing world of normality, this pointing mikael stamm 105 to the original conflictual rift of beyng. why the advaitic perspective? the insistence of a radically different concept of truth, a complete other, is nowhere more present than in the concept of a pervasive nescience and its possible obliteration through the inexpressible transformative vidyā. this refusal is in wölfli’s works visible as a violent strife embedded in stylized tableaus, comprising an overflow of ornamental details in a continual conflict with forms and borders. this ever-present threatening loss of control seems to represent an ever present danger which has to be countered by the highest authority: the divine “i”, st. adolf, who overlooks the shattered spectacle of a number of reduplicated selves. in wölfli’s artworks the glimpse of truth is present as the denial of nescience; a negation that points to the source of reality through three conflictual settings: that between a continual stream of visions and a mimicking fixation of the same; that between the mourning of the collapse of the self and the celebration of the new worlds of the distributed selves; and that between an overflowing movement of mystic material and the opposite confinement of borders and frames. there is no ‘new’ truth in wölfli’s artworks, only the turbulence created by the absence truth in the midst of nescience. endnotes 1 mikael stamm is a researcher in western and indian philosophy. he is the author of the book sacred sound and language in classical śaiva siddhānta. email: mikaelstamm@yahoo.co.uk 2 i will in the following refer to both the german and the english editions: heidegger 1989. beiträge zur philosophie (vom ereignis), and the english translation, heidegger. 2012. contribution to philosophy (of the event). translated by richard rojcewicz & daniela vallega-neu. 3 heidegger 1989/2012, 126/100. 4 heidegger 1989/2012, 470/370. 5 thibaut, george. 1962. the vedānta sutras of bādarāyaṇa with the commentary of śaṇkara. vol.1-2. 106 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 6 thibaut 1962, vol.1, p.34. though not systematically in the beginning, there seem to be differences which were gradually developed from the time of śaṇkara through the works of his followers; māyā became connected predominately to the projective function, while avidyā was generally used when referred to the veiling power. 7 thibaut 1962, vol.1, p.3. 8 thibaut 1962, vol.1, p.6. 9 sastri, suryanarayana s.s. and kunhan c. raja. 1933. the bhāmatī of vācaspati on śaṇkara’s brahmasutrabhāṣya (catussūtrī). 10 sastri 1933, 194. 11 heidegger 1989/2012, 101/80. 12 heidegger 1989/2012, 233/184. 13 heidegger 1989/2012, 245/193. 14 heidegger 1989/2012, 482/379. 15 heidegger 1989/2012, 66-67/83-84. 16 heidegger, martin. 1980. “der upsprung des kunstwerkes“. in holzwege, 1-72. english translation: heidegger, martin. 2002. “the origin of the work of art”. in off the beaten track. translated by julian young and kenneth haynes, 1-56. 17 heidegger 1989/2012, 392/310. 18 heidegger 1980/2002, 23/16. 19 heidegger 1980/2002, 31-33/24-25 20 robinson, t.m. 1987. heraclitus. fragments. p.49. 21 heidegger 1980/2002, 49/37. 22 heidegger 1980/2002, 49/38. 23 heidegger 1980/2002, 52/40. 24 stamm, mikael. 2019. sacred sound and language in classical śaiva siddhānta. 40-41. 25 rangachari, r. 2010. saint sekkizhar’s periya puranam. 162-169. the south indian scripture periya puranam describes the lives of the sixty-three nāyanmārs, the canonical poet-saints of the cult of śaiva siddhānta. the poetry of kāraikkāl ammaiyār is included in the eleventh book of the holy thirumurai, a collection of the most revered tamil devotional hymns in praise of śiva. 26 craddock, elaine. 2010. śiva’s demon devotee kāraikkāl ammariyār. 58. 27 heidegger, 1989/2012, 322/254-255. 28 maclagan, david. 2009. outsider art: from the margins to the marketplace. 7-14. 29 an interesting point here is that the gradual acceptance of outsider art or its earlier continental term art brut coined by jean dubuffet, was conditioned by the art critics and art collectors to see outsider art in accordance with the modern concept of a lone artist expressing his talent or genius in artworks. outsider art was considered an example of an unpolished but primordial creative impulse, something authentic mikael stamm 107 and unexploited. the outsider-label may on one hand catch a notion of a radical nonconventionalism, but on the other hand, it fails to capture the significance of a genuine difference, because such a labelling inevitably assimilates any ‘outside’ into an ‘inside’ of the established history of art. 30 morgenthaler, walter. 1985. ein geisteskranker als künstler: adolf wölfli. 1-13. 31 morgenthaler 1985, 13-16. 32 impressum, “adolf wölfli: werk“, adolfwoelfli.ch, adolf wölfli stiftung, 20-05-2021, https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/werk 33 morgenthaler, 1985, p.48, and spoerri, elka. 2012. “wölfli’s vocabulary of forms”. in wölfli: creator of the universe. 268-273. references craddock, elaine. 2010. śiva’s demon devotee kāraikkāl ammariyār. new york: sony press. heidegger, martin. 1980. “der upsprung des kunstwerkes“. in holzwege, 1-72 vittorio klostermann, frankfurt am main. ---. 1989. beiträge zur philosophie (vom ereignis). frankfurt am main: vittorio klostermann. ---. 2002. “the origin of the work of art”. in off the beaten track. translated by julian young and kenneth haynes, 1-56. cambridge: cambridge university press. ---. 2012. contribution to philosophy (of the event). translated by richard rojcewicz & daniela vallega-neu. bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press. impressum. “adolf wölfli: werk“. adolfwoelfli.ch. adolf wölfli stiftung. 20-05-2021. https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/werk. maclagan, david. 2009. outsider art: from the margins to the marketplace. london: reactions books.. morgenthaler, walter. 1985. ein geisteskranker als künstler: adolf wölfli. wien: medusa verlag. 108 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june rangachari, r. 2010. saint sekkizhar’s periya puranam: the stories of 63 saivite saints. tiruvannamalai: sri ramanasramam. robinson, t.m. 1987. heraclitus. fragments. toronto: university of toronto press. sastri, suryanarayana s.s. and kunhan c. raja. 1933. the bhāmatī of vācaspati on śaṇkara’s brahmasutrabhāṣya (catussūtrī). madras: theosophical publishing house. spoerri, elka. 2012. “wölfli’s vocabulary of forms”. in wölfli: creator of the universe. bern: arbor vitae / abcd. stamm, mikael. 2019. sacred sound and language in classical śaiva siddhānta. gilleleje: mikael stamm. thibaut, george. 1962. the vedānta sutras of bādarāyaṇa with the commentary of śaṇkara. vol.1-2. new york: dower publication. “unknown”. . the hindu goddess kali and god bhairava in union. painting; watercolor, opaque watercolor on paper, image: 11 3/4 x 7 5/16 in. (29.85 x 18.57 cm); sheet: 12 3/16 x 7 1/2 in. (30.96 x 19.05 cm) made in: nepal gift of dr. and mrs. robert s. coles to lacma (m.81.206.7). angeles county museum of art. wölfli, adolf. 1905. mediziinische fakultäät. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/0/4/csm_a-1988.09_2__71a4cc9610.jpg bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. ---. 1907. felsenau. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/5/5/csm_ adolfwoelfli_a-8997_8227082b4b.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. ---. 1911. london=nord. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/d/3/csm_adolf_ woelfli_a9243---76_01_2379301622.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. mikael stamm 109 ---. 1911. die kreutzigung des heiligen skt. adolf. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/a/3/csm_adolf_ woelfli_a9253---104_01_99aaa2ae38.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. ---. 1911. ohne titel. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/0/4/csm_adolf_ woelfli_a-9404---s.4017_01_de8393f2dd.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. nick dziadyk 59 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 59-74 © 2000 by assumption university press los t in translation: a film about graham harman’s object-oriented ontology nick dziadyk still from lost in translation dir. sophia coppola abstract this article deals with graham harman’s object-oriented ontology (ooo). it explores the tensions in harman’s quadripartite notion of the object and how aesthetics provides an indirect mode of access to the object. this principally comes by way of metaphor and theatricality, the rift and transposition of the sensual from the real. a good illustration of these concepts can be found in 60 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 sofia coppola’s film lost in translation. reading lost in translation through ooo, we can see the theory enacted, and understand how the of the spectator interacts with the film, the reader with theory. through this aesthetic prism we can approach the both the object of the film and the theory even in the face of their very retreat. all objects, films, theories, and even this article, become lost in translation. everything, in any relation, is condemned to mediation. nevertheless, there are still remain intimations of the real to be had both beyond and through the sensual and literal. this article is an attempt to explore this relationship. keywords: graham harman; object-oriented ontology; aesthetics; film theory, lost in translation, sofia coppola reel one sophia coppola’s lost in translation is about alienation and disjuncture. the protagonists – the young charlotte and the older bob harris – find themselves together in a strange city – tokyo –where the theme of dislocation and near misses is explored. this theme can be found in the line often attributed to charlotte when she allegedly says, “i just feel so alone, even when i’m surrounded by other people.” this line in a film about dislocation also serves as an access point to object-oriented ontology and what it means to be translated. actually, despite the attribution, charlotte didn’t say that line in the movie nor in any version of the script. trey taylor, writing for dazed, traces the misattribution to the tumblr community.1 he goes further and cites a doctoral thesis by nicole dizon witkin which identifies that “extraversion was significantly higher in facebook users than tumblr users. this finding supports the view that facebook connects users to real-life friends, while tumblr connects users with their inner selves.”2 be that as it may, the connection here is that tumblr is seen to be a space of disconnected connectivity where users, blogging and ‘reblogging,’ and near-missing, can be lonely and together in a way just like in the film. it is nick dziadyk 61 the breeding ground which gives birth to the misattributed line. so while the line is not a part of the film, it actually is.3 it is the very object of a film. about loss of contact and meaning. we can read this as an allegory for object-oriented ontology. this is the story of graham harman’s ooo and lost in translation. let’s begin with a translation of the film into painting. lost in translation is like a kinetic rendition of edward hopper’s nighthawks. light and dark contrast through a lurid field of artificial light.4 visually framed behind glass and partitions, there are no clear exits. what is outside the resturant is desolation. the well-lit interior is just a different version of the same. no one makes eye contact or physical contact. they are together, yet alone. all are objects that are only related in a tenuous way. the angular leanings allow it to be a slice into the outside, but this is just redoubled irony. the patrons, the space within, the space without. a cell within a cell of potentially indefinite reticulation.5 relations without relations. a comment on capitalism? on the human condition? lost in translation enacts many of the same themes. nighthawks6 the film frames bob and charlotte often behind windows doubled in reflection. they are cut off within spaces and then lost in the movement 62 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 of open space. the streets of tokyo are a whir and blur of hypercapitalism.7 culture shock is mobilized to the point of caricature. bob is nonplussed by the lower showerhead. he cannot figure out the treadmill. japanese lambdacisms are a point of consternation. bordering on racism, the twisted stereotypes serve to put the unrelated into a system just like his face plastered all over the marketing for suntory whiskey. bob knows who he is. he is a movie star. however, his family, his place in life, his craft have all lost immediacy. he is virtual. for him cultural and technological japan symbolizes his dislocation as everything recedes. his family and agent are always on the other side of a fax or phone. he exists in images and reruns. systematic distortion ironically becomes an organizing principle where what is lost does not become found, but gets thematic expression. charlotte is the opposite. she doesn’t know who she is or should be. “i just don’t know what i’m supposed to be. i thought maybe i wanted to be a writer... but i hate what i write, and i tried taking pictures, but john’s so good at that, and mine are so mediocre ... and every girl goes through a photography phase, like horses, you know dumb pictures of your feet ...”.8 if bob is an image, charlotte is not an entirely different kind of object. from pictures of her feet to the opening scene of a sustained shot of her derrière,9 she is equally as much an object in a sea of other objects. there is no solace here. a newly wed, yet her photographer husband john has become a stranger and is always, so to speak, just out of frame. moving through tokyo, and through kyoto, she drifts without anchorage. japan for her is a landscape without mooring where she just ‘bobs’ along.10 it is an object that cannot be deciphered, just like the indistinguishable options on the shabu-shabu menu.11 of course, this is just symbolic. japan is as real and unreal as anything else.12 it is what allows the film to function as film. on many levels, we have verisimilitude masking withdrawal. like the figures in the nighthawks diner, these ships both do and do not pass in the night. in the painting we can think of an inverted ode on a grecian urn of present but impossible relations.13 but we are now translating a translation of a translation. this is the beginning of our nick dziadyk 63 indirect artistic access to the inaccessible. redoubled impossible relations. this is the way it must be. for, if objects had direct relations they would fully comprehend one another and would thereby be fully deployed in their actuality. there would be no potentia, nothing in reserve.14 this is a argument harman often uses to show that both change and actuality would be impossible. no object is fully present to itself or to others. the lovers of the grecian urn, the isolated of nighthawks, our bobs and our charlottes. the film, involves chance meeting upon chance meeting. bob comes close to sleeping with a red-headed jazz singer, and then experiences the rejection of a blonde woman, before finally meeting the strawberry blonde charlotte. these relations are partial, vicarious. as for charlotte, he is able to touch her feet, to brush her lips. the inaudible whispering into her ear in the final scene is merely an extension of the gaps depicted in their evenings out in the tokyo nightlife. even the seemingly impossible age gap is itself an inflected synecdoche of just that: a gap, a part for a (w) hole. nevertheless, there is contact, but of what kind? this is where we will turn to object-oriented ontology and see how it can be read through the movie and the movie can be read through it. harman finds great facility in heidegger’s tool-analysis. in harman’s reading of heidegger,15 we are always already immersed in the world, and the default position is ready-to-hand (zuhandenheit). it is an attitude of receded relation. this is equipment and it is never singular. equipment interrelates through praxis in a kind of preconsciousness. bob can sit on his bar stool on the upper floor of the park hyatt, suspended above the tokyo streets, cigar and whiskey in hand without needing to be particularly attentive to any of them. the interrelations function. the cigar slowly burns without threat. he does not wonder about the engineering feat placing him in the sky in an earthquake resistant structure. everything is as it should be. for heidegger, it is only when something does not work or is broken that it becomes the object of theory. this is present-at-hand (vorhandenheit). when bob has to do the suntory time commercial, take after take, he becomes more and more frustrated. all 64 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 he wants is a whiskey, but whiskey in his prop glass is fake. the failure of the production comes to the surface as he tries take after take. both whisky and the production of a whiskey commercial become mere objects of theory. for bob, this is comprehensive as the system no longer works as relations fall away. for heidegger, this would give rise to angst, and this fits well with our reading as such, but in harman’s ooo, something else becomes stressed in the tool-analysis. for harman, this does not make present-at-hand meaningfully different from the ready-to-hand. the present-at-hand maintains a relation to me as i observe it. this is what keeps heidegger stuck at the level of surfaces as subjective framing is required. harman sees heidegger as being on the right track, but not pushing the theme far enough. simply put, there is no direct access to objects. when bob looks to the fake whiskey, when he contemplates the oppressive and inscrutable logic of the photoshoot production, these objects are no more present to him then they are to each other. objects withdraw and only make contact indirectly, partially. it is like the director’s longwinded directions that bob’s translator renders into improbably short and terse english. “that’s all he said?”.16 something is lost in translation. in fact, for harman, all objects are lost in translation. his favorite example comes from asharite occassionalism.17 the example given concerns fire and cotton. the argument runs that fire cannot make contact with all of the qualities of the cotton such as its smell, texture, etc., etc. mediation is required. for the asharites, this mediation comes through god. european modernism starts with descartes and finds mature articulation in kant.18 the transition is merely from god as mediator to human subjectivity. whether god or the human subject, philosophy requires comprehending agency. harman’s issue is that objects are not given their proper ontological share. since kant the human subject dominates ontology. harman contends that we are objects just as much as other things are objects. we must move away from the privileging of transcendental thought and correlationalism.19 while fire does not make complete contact with the cotton, i too, witnessing the flame, do not make nick dziadyk 65 complete contact with the cotton or the flame. it is only partial, indirect. objects can only render other objects through translation and this takes us on our first step toward harman’s fourfold structure. harman’s argument runs as follows. objects only make contact with certain qualities of others. this is why there are not just objects, but objects with qualities. conversely, qualities can only interact through objects. let us unpack this. he argues that there must be sensual objects (so) with sensual qualities (sq) as there are real objects (ro) with real qualities (rq). these are all modalities of any given ‘object’. the reasoning here is that for something such as our fire and cotton to be related at all there needs to be translation. both must relate to the other through profiles irreducible to their real qualities as real objects. to do this, there is always a sensual-real bridge which can only be manifest in caricature. this is the phenomenal variation in kind that takes place in experience.20 the fire’s interaction with the cotton is different than a sharecropper’s, a cotton gin, or a boll weevil’s.21 if we take them both to be real objects with real qualities, these remain somewhat like kantian noumena. this is where the rot starts. the kantian inheritance is the contradiction of an unknowable unknown that harman traces as the origin of idealism. idealism sought to resolve the contradiction by discursively situating the noumenal in the fold of subject. harman sees that we have never been able to get out.22 worse, this is seen as human finitude which really just masks hubris. why just humans? all objects are subject to finitude.23 there have been thinkers in this realist tradition that have made headway, but they have never been able to remove themselves from the inextricable circularity. if only, harman would have it, we could return to the days of leibniz, of metaphysics with a capital m, and move forward with what could have been a german realism instead of idealism. since we cannot, what we can do is draw from the tradition at its points of resistance. these moments find configuration in harman’s fourfold structure where he draws from insights of the past. these are indirect points of contact. indirect access can be indirectly in-directed. if we take heidegger’s tool analysis and cobble it with thinkers from yore to shore, we have a 66 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 harmanaic mosaic. there is quite a roster starting from the pre-socratics on up. yet, it really rests on two shoulders. through husserl and heidegger, we get harman.24 harman points to hume’s bundle theory of experience where an object appears to us through its qualities. these qualities are associative and become established through recurrence. there is no object given as such, but it is inferred qualitatively. husserl rejects this and sees the denuded, intended object as prior. this husserl’s object becomes harman’s sensual object. a combination of the humean bundle theory and husserl’s phenomenological reduction to the eidetic inform harman’s sensual qualities. however, within the husserlian enterprise, harman sympathizes with the phenomenological endeavor and would like to credit husserl with intimations of real qualities even if the project lacks the type of transcendence for which harman is looking.25 the immanent tension of object and quality within phenomenology is a starting point. if husserl can find appropriate tensions within his idealist realm, heidegger can take us to the beyond. he needs to be combined with leibniz though for us to properly move away from idealism. leibniz brings the fourfold structure together. his monads are real objects with real qualities. their relations are the qualities that allow for difference and the individuation between monads. without distinction, as we have already seen, the situation would be meaningless. husserl, as noted above, ties the sensual object with the would-be real qualities just as he ties the sensual object with the sensual qualities.26 this leaves heidegger to connect sensual qualities with the real object. there are other permutations of interrelation among these coordinates, and one may rightly wonder why we did not use pride and prejudice and zombies as our movie to illustrate all of this, but this will take us too far afield. the central insight is that all objects are ‘accessible’ to each other through the same prism. humans do not have a special vantage point. the ontological problem is that all objects for other objects are lost in translation. that is their only access. this is done vicariously. for humans, this is done through metaphor (viz. the figurative). nick dziadyk 67 in both talks and writings, harman often uses the same examples to illustrate the mechanics of ooo. when it comes to metaphor, one example he uses in particular is homer’s wine-dark sea. this introduces his idea of theatricality. for harman, metaphors are always asymmetrical. the qualities of wine are conferred on the water to descriptive effect. mystery, danger, drunkenness, etc. the reverse would yield a different object. through this metaphor, the wine and the sea do not come in contact, but they do. through me. i would stand in as the real object for these two sets of sensual qualities. through this, i can approximate those real objects in their retreat. the non-literal suggestiveness of metaphor is what affords the transition. the reason for this is that the object cannot be reduced literally by description. doing so is just a literal construal and leaves us stuck on the level of sensual qualities and no closer to the real object. evoking cleanth brooks, as harman does, paraphrase is heresy.27 this is part of the cheap trick pulled at the beginning of this article with the line of ‘minimal paraphrase’ for lost in translation. the literal reduction is a betrayal of the particularity of the object. perhaps like what this article is doing right now to harman’s thought. but, is it? harman believes real object cannot contact real object. ditto for the sensual. like magnets, negative pole can only connect to positive. this is where aesthetics and theatricality step in and allow a type of bridging to occur in the very separation of objects and qualities. this happens performatively, on a number of levels, in the film and through us via the film. reel two the object of the movie is in retreat. the minimal paraphrase may not satisfy addressing the object. it may be an injustice, but it is a resonance. in the film dialogue, charlotte grew up in new york but moved to los angeles.28 bob is from new york. the bar in which they meet is called new york bar.29 fittingly unheimlich as they are truly dis-oriented in tokyo. tokyo is a sustained metaphor for their own lives where home is a dislocated backdrop that intrudes in its absence through its distorted, withdrawn presence.30 the problem is that we now have a 68 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 series of relations of unrelation. but, do we? bob and charlotte cannot sleep.31 tokyo is like a dream. if new york is the real world, it is because it is real. tokyo is not. if they felt the rift of distance to home, that is because it is real. it takes tokyo for them to, so to speak, realize it. that does not give them direct access to anything though. if they play their part, they will still inevitably fail. but, it is a success in failure like the freudian symptom. tokyo allows the real to link in a sensual assemblage where together they can act like children in the hospital, like adolescence in the streets and arcades. together they play ‘jail-break’ to get out of the hotel and their obligations, they act up at karaoke with friends. codes are played upon and enacted in caricature as when bob is asked at the shoot to be like james bond. director: loger moore. you know loger moore? bob: roger moore? director: yeah bob: okay. i—i—i always think of sean connery. seriously. director: no, no. bob: didn’t you get the sean connery one over here? director: no. loger moore. director: yeah, okay. good. more please. bob: you mean “more” or “roger moore” again? director: yeah, yeah. good. and sexy!32 if tokyo brings them together, it only does so in this metaphorical way. there can only be proximity at a distance. it is the same with the ‘minimal’ paraphrase as we step into the cinema and watch the film. caricatures of people, places, and relations. we become the real object that the film can represent for us and to us. the film as object is lost, and yet there it is. the sensuous and the real dance until the whispered ending. in the script, when they make their final embraces, it reads, bob: why are you crying? charlotte: (sincere) i’ll miss you. nick dziadyk 69 he kisses her, hugs her good-bye bob: i know, i’m going to miss you, too. he holds her close.33 but that’s lost to the cutting room floor.34 the scene was shot with different, almost inaudible, lines. you might be able to hear bob say, “i have to be leaving, but i won’t let that come between us. okay?”.35 even that is pretty much lost. yet, in that very moment of parting, you have indirect points of contact with bob and charlotte, tokyo and new york. their lives there in tokyo, their lives at home in new york. the same applies to the various object positions of theory, movie and article. we have them in a certain way through performance but, at the end of the day, they are all lost in translation. 70 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 endnotes 1 . trey taylor, “how lonely are you: lost in translation vs tumblr,” dazed, last modified september 18, 2015, accessed february 1, 2022, https://www.dazeddigital. com/artsandculture/article/26449/1/how-lonely-are-you-lost-in-translation-vs-tumblr 2 . nicole dizon witkin, the role of personality, attachment, and narcissism in regards to social networking: an examination of social network users (san diego: alliant international university, 2014), quoted in taylor, how lonely are you: lost in translation vs tumblr. 3 . or script for that matter, which is markedly different from the filmed version. taylor identifies eleven occurrences of ‘alone’, but none is uttered dialogue. every instance is in stage directions. coppola, sofia. lost in translation. (2002), quoted in taylor, how lonely are you: lost in translation vs tumblr. ‘alone’ recedes into the visual field, cinematic and indirect. 4 . the chromatic breakdown of lance acord’s cinematography of lost in translation shows a palette of somber grays through to darker and duller tones. for a spectral analysis see roxy radulescu, request week 8: lost in translation, 2003. movies in color, last modified october 29, 2013, accessed february 1, 2022, https:// moviesincolor.com/post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-in-translation 5 one is tempted to think of the film “the matrix” where thomas anderson wakes up and comes out of his pod to see an unbounded series of other pods. to borrow from the intended idiom, physical separation of the res extensa and yet indirect contact of the res cogitans when in the matrix program. 6 hopper, edward, nighthawks, painting, public domain, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/nighthawks_(hopper)#/media/file:nighthawks_by_edward_hopper_1942. jpg 7 here the emphasis is on the mundane rather than the hyperbolic cyberpunk of someone like william gibson. 8 sofia coppola, lost in translation, 2002, 49. 9 “melodramatic music swells over the girl’s butt in pink sheer underwear as she lies on the bed. title cards over image.” coppola, lost in translation, 1. 10 there is a great interlude where charlotte goes by train into kyoto wearing big headphones. they set the tone, so to speak, as it initiates a kind of montage with alone in kyoto overdubbed by air. from the train she goes on to visit shinto temples and the like through the rest of the musically accompanied sequence. now, as harman writes, “alphonso lingis [who was harman’s teacher] argues that even inanimate objects demand that we treat them in some particular appropriate way, so that it is somehow ethically wrong to eat expensive chocolate while drinking cocacola, and just as wrong to listen to popular music on headphones during a beautiful snowfall at a https://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/26449/1/how-lonely-are-you-lost-in-translation-vs-tumblr https://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/26449/1/how-lonely-are-you-lost-in-translation-vs-tumblr https://moviesincolor.com/post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-in-translation https://moviesincolor.com/post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-in-translation nick dziadyk 71 temple in kyoto.” alas, there was no snowfall in the scene. harman, object-oriented ontology, 67. 11 another good example is the swatches sent to bob from the states by his wife in order to determine the colour scheme of his study. same-same, but different. 12 one might think of eliot’s the wasteland where the “unreal city’ is both at the same time the city of london and dantean underworld. a place of living death and shades. 13 bold lover, never, never canst thou kiss,/ though winning near the goal yet, do not grieve;/ she cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,/ fore ever wilt though love, and she be fair! 14 another way to work this is that total presentation, total intelligibility would be meaningless at best and death at worst. nothing is equal to itself without comprehending relations. at a minimum, x = x requires the framework of equality. the particular is always supervened. 15 this is first laid out in harman’s phd dissertation which he in turn published as his first book as tool-being. it is the foundation for his subsequent thought. 16 coppola, lost in translation, 4. 17 passim. 18 “descartes thought that animals were on the dead matter side. so, if you torture a monkey with a knife [making thrusting gestures] and it screams, it doesn’t matter. it’s just a machine that eats grease.” graham harman, “why architecture and beauty need each other,” lecture, tallinn architecture biennale symposium, september, 13, 2019, kultuurikatel, tallinn, mp4, 1:10:10, 0:30:30. he actually said that, but clearly it is lost in translation. perhaps a freudian slip conflating mechanics through machines with monkeys (grease monkeys)? whatever. it’s funny. 19 a term coined by quentin meillassoux, one of the four original speculative realists, to express the postmetaphysical, postcritical philosopheme. after kant, the thing-in-itself is off the table. all epistemology is sustained in subjectivity and we cannot get access to any beyond, to anything outside of our subjectivity. this is a book-length issue. see meillassoux’s after finitude. 20 levi bryant highlights this in harman as there being only a difference of experience in degree, not kind. that means, when we try to think outside of our subjectivity we can, to a degree, posit a phenomenology-for. as thomas nagel argued, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. this would be a phenomenology-of. however, we can make a lot of inferences through observation and measurement. this need not be arrested at the level of the animal kingdom. we can, by way of sympathy, achieve a type of phenomenology-for. or, so the argument goes. levi bryant, “larval subjects,” larval subjects (blog), november 10, 2012, https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/ thoughts-on-posthumanism/. https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/thoughts-on-posthumanism/ https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/thoughts-on-posthumanism/ 72 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 21 the first two clearly are historically suggestive. the problem with harman’s ontology is that it is ahistorical and fails to appreciate ideology which can have profound implications for how an object can relate. as we will see, relation is problematic for harman no matter how you cut it. still, the object can never reveal itself in all of its profiles and we always see it in retreat. 22 harman styles this “philosophy of access”. it is a species of idealism rests on the following founding principle. “[w]hen we think of the noumena we thereby convert them into phenomena, and hence philosophy can deal only with the phenomenal.” graham harman, the quadruple object (winchester, u.k.: zero books, 2011), 82. 23 this is the sin of kant’s copernican revolution. 24 whitehead via latour is actually as important and represents an intersecting axis. 25 real qualities will remain outside of the purview of this paper for economy sake. however, they can be likened to thomas kuhn’s paradigms. this finds elaboration in harman, the quadruple object, 189-90., and elsewhere. 26 this is illustrated by diagram in harman, the quadruple object, 64. 27 graham harman, “the well-wrought broken hammer: object-oriented literary criticism,” new literary history 43, no. 2 (2012): pp. 183-203, https://doi. org/10.1353/nlh.2012.0016, 188-89. 28 in the script it is d.c. and then she was a bit itinerant. coppola, lost in translation, 51. 29 they actually meet in the elevator, but charlotte does not remember. this is appropriate as the first meeting is a non-meeting, a non-relation. 30 a poignant expression of this withdrawn presence, this excess of the object, is when at karaoke bob is singing roxy music, fittingly off-key, and directing it to charlotte: more than this/ you know there’s nothing/ more than this/ tell me one thing/ more than this/ ooh, there’s nothing 31 sleep is mention sixteen times in the script. 32 lost in translation (universal, 2004). 33 sofia coppola, lost in translation, 74-74a. 34 just like the scene in the shooting draft of the frenetic scene where bob is on a gameshow doing an iron chef competition. sofia coppola, lost in translation: shooting draft, 2002., unpaginated. 35 for a forensic take, see vid vidor ’s captioning attempt. lost in translation (bill murray’s whisper revealed), n.d., https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=5mv7sym8biq. https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2012.0016 https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2012.0016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mv7sym8biq https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mv7sym8biq nick dziadyk 73 references bryant, levi. “thoughts on posthumanism.” web log. larval subjects (blog), november 10, 2012. https://larvalsubjects.wordpress. com/2012/11/10/thoughts-on-posthumanism/. coppola, sofia. lost in translation: script, 2002. coppola, sofia. lost in translation: shooting draft, 2002. coppola, sofia, lost in translation, focus features, 2003, 102 min. dennett, daniel c. “quining qualia,” in consciousness in modern science, ed. a. marcel & e. bisiach. oxford: oxford university press, 1988. harman, graham. object-oriented ontology: a new theory of everything. london: pelican books, 2018. harman, graham. the quadruple object. winchester, u.k.: zero books, 2011. harman, graham. “the well-wrought broken hammer: object-oriented literary criticism.” new literary history 43, no. 2 (2012): 183–203. https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2012.0016. harman graham, “why architecture and beauty need each other,” lecture, tallinn architecture biennale symposium, september, 13, 2019, kultuurikatel, tallinn, mp4, 1:10:10. hopper, edward, nighthawks, painting, public domain, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/nighthawks_(hopper)#/media/file:nighthawks_by_ edward_hopper_1942.jpg radulescu, roxy. “request week 8: lost in translation, 2003.” moviesincolor, october 29, 2013. https://moviesincolor.com/ post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-intranslation. https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/thoughts-on-posthumanism/ https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/10/thoughts-on-posthumanism/ https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2012.0016 https://moviesincolor.com/post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-in-translation https://moviesincolor.com/post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-in-translation https://moviesincolor.com/post/65445836763/request-week-8-deletemyself-lost-in-translation 74 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 taylor, trey. “how lonely are you: translation vs tumblr.” dazed. last modified september 18, 2015. accessed february 1, 2022. https://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/ article/26449/1/how-lonely-are-you-lost-in-translation-vs-tumblr. vidor, vid. lost in translation (bill murray’s whisper revealed), n.d. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mv7sym8biq. witkin, nicole dizon. the role of personality, attachment, and narcissism in regards to social networking: an examination of social network users. san diego: alliant international university, 2014. https://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/26449/1/how-lonely-are-you-lost-in-translation-vs-tumblr https://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/26449/1/how-lonely-are-you-lost-in-translation-vs-tumblr https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mv7sym8biq prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 55 stephen evans1 abstract that it behooves anyone referring to the method to explain exactly what she means by it. the present essay characterizes phenomenology as a practice rather than as a theoretical framework. it is a means of gathering what heidegger calls “phenomenological facts.” the in , hopefully allowing us both to better understand that work and to further pursue the hermeneutic of human existence. following a quick review of some phenomenology is reviewed with help from sartre. the phenomenology of is then characterized as a mode of keywords: phenomenology; heidegger; dasein; vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 55-81 © 2000 by assumption university press 56 introduction “the word [phenomenology] merely informs us of the “ ” with which is to be treated... gets exhibited (heidegger, ).”2 it behooves anyone claiming to utilize the method to explain exactly what she means by it. relying on and 3 i characterize the terms of have been doing in an attempt to think him: how can we understand what heidegger was doing in such a way that we can understand not just what he meant but, more, what he understood? my intent is to stake out a mode of phenomenology as a method, rather than as a theoretical framework, that i hope to pursue in subsequent work. it is to be acknowledged that given nearly a century of disagreement understand him or to cover new ground sound rather foolish. accordingly, although the form of the argument is that this is what heidegger was attempting, and although i believe that i am correct, i claim only that is that the very meaning of key concepts is matter of contention. what, precisely, does heidegger mean by “authenticity”, “world”, “ ”, “ ”, “dasein”, for that matter, “ ”? while it is clear that heidegger is using 4 commentators often force these concepts in existing well-understood terms, potentially 57 itself is pursuing the hermeneutic circle of thematizing dasein understanding understanding itself. even those of us who attempt to work out what is genuinely new and who recognize the interrelatedness, often attempt to put these concepts together like pieces of a puzzle, thus arguably falling into the kind of metaphysics that heidegger is trying to transcend (or “destroy”). we ask, for example, “what is dasein?”, “what is world?”, and “what is we ask what kind of thing each is. dasein is an “entity”; world and are “existentialia”, thus in some way constitutive of dasein. but we persist in taking these as items set in front of the philosopher who queries them after their being, as it were looking at them. that is, tacitly taking the subject matter as what heidegger calls present-at-hand, the very approach he seeks to avoid.5 the situation may be illustrated with attempts to understand what heidegger meant by “dasein”: “this entity, which each of us is himself,”6 “we it each of us, we ourselves.”7 “dasein”, in these formulations could refer to the individual person or to something broader. we could, for example substitute “human” for “dasein”: “we are human, each of us,” and it is unclear whether i should say, “i am dasein”, “i am a dasein”, “person”, to “way of living” of which persons are “cases” (haugeland), to enculturated human individuals, or perhaps the culture that is “in them” (dreyfus),9 to an incompleteness10 or “clearing” that allows there to be a world (sheehan).11 is neither a present-at-hand object nor a ready-to-hand item of gear, but rather that for which such entities are what and how they are. based on agent within networks of possibilities giving meaning to the nexus of adequately as these models may make sense of they may remain models of a world objectively in front of us. that is to say, we 58 tend in spite of ourselves to reduce the entities and extentialia of to a holistic yet present-at-hand network. in particular, some reduce essentially to social psychology (e.g. dreyfus, haugeland). such models put the ontic cart before the ontological horse, explaining ontological structures in terms of the ontic phenomena for which they are supposed to be the “foundations”12; as charles guignon has it, “since fundamental ontology is supposed to lay a foundation for such regional sciences as biology and psychology, it cannot begin by taking over their assumptions about the nature of man.”13 such models are examples of what heidegger called “leveling”:14 “the context of assignments or references, which, as formally in the sense of a system of relations. but one must note that in such formalizations the phenomena get may be lost.”15 reading , in the way that i would argue heidegger meant it to be read, requires that beyond trying to make sense of the bewildering maze of strange concepts, we ask, not only what they mean, but also how did he come up with them. the book is neither speculative metaphysics nor logical elaboration of self-evident propositions but is rather built on a certain kind of “data” that heidegger occasionally calls “phenomenal facts”, “phenomenal content” in the just-cited passage. the question in this essay is not: what did heidegger mean by “dasein”? but: how did he, and how can we, get access to it and to those “phenomenal phenomenology? phenomenology as some recent understandings of phenomenology make of it little more than asking “what is it like to be or to do something?”, but that 59 the being of entities—ontology.”16 departure from lived experience,”17 is not wrong, but is of limited help. under “the preliminary conception of phenomenology,” be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” 19 avoids preconceptions,20 and is “rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves,” (heidegger 1962, 21 it is a mode of revealing phenomena rather than a mode of reasoning . that means also that phenomenology goes astray when the assertions it produces, however true, are then used as premises from which further truths may be deduced with apodictic certainty. phenomenology certainly does produce assertions and concepts, but however complex they may become, the concepts must remain bound up with the phenomena of their origins as “exhibited”: phenomenology must be “self-critical”.22 this, again, has to do with the without indicating heidegger proposes investigating, but, as it turns out we must at least touch on the “what” in order to understand the “how”. what heidegger hopes to force into the open, to “show itself”, is the being of entities, or at least the of being. it would be futile to ask at this point what heidegger means by “being” or by the “meaning”, or , of “being”. that is precisely what he does not know beyond a vague “pre-ontological” sense and the principle that being is always the being of some entity. we cannot, that is to say, identify the of the research and directly query it as to its essence; neither can we attempt to locate an already understood object within a haystack of entities. being is not in any sense an entity; it “is” the of entities, and heidegger wants to discover what that “means” rather, we are to engage in this method of allowing phenomena to show themselves, in particular allowing some entity to show itself along with its being, whatever that may turn out to mean. the entity to let show itself is that to which we are closest, to which 60 ordinarily concealed covered over by the “appearances” and “semblances” of everyday life. that is to say, being appears in phenomena that are not themselves being but somehow point back to it, or being appears as semblances that may parade as being, but are not. yet appearances and semblances , that is they manifest, albeit misleadingly, the being that they conceal.23 thus the initial target is everyday existence, letting our own ordinary existing show itself in such a way as to reveal the being “behind” or “of” it. the extent to which heidegger follows this program may be questioned, but in any case, the “how” of the phenomenology of in any of the usual meanings of that term—but rather what [heidegger] become actually manifest in human experience.”24 the “clearing”, in turn, has something intimately to do with, or in some sense dasein.25 that is, dasein holds open and is the clearing in which entities appear in their he maintains, is the subject matter for the phenomenology of represents the search for, rather than an exposition of, the “meaning of being,” which we neither know nor understand in advance, leading to discovery of the “clearing” in which entities may appear in their being. at this point, 26 and others also characterize phenomenology as correlation research, very roughly, concerned with the correlation between human reality (or possibility) and world; better, perhaps, between human activity and the meanings found or constituted in the world, or for husserl, and . this is not wrong, but we must understand that neither the correlations nor even the correlated terms themselves are entities laid out before us like specimens in the 61 laboratory. rather the “correlations” are the engagements (for heidegger: being there, appropriations, accommodations, ) we ourselves have, or are, in the world; we should not think in terms of the “addition of an object to a subject,”27 or assume in advance a correlation of distinct terms. in any case, our question here is not the “question of being,” but more so as to elucidate what occurs “there”: how does heidegger access the phenomena that he so profoundly elucidates? statement of his method on page six of , where he writes, the inquiry and the interrogation, hence we must be made transparent in our very being. husserl and sartre but all this still sounds more like the ideal of a method than the method itself. the “how” of letting phenomena show themselves in themselves is as yet anything but clear. how is interrogation to interrogate itself? what does one , “there” or “opening of the clearing”? heidegger credits husserl with initiating the methodology so we turn and . unlike heidegger, husserl takes consciousness as the entity to be elucidated. that approach greatly facilitates, one might even say makes possible, the explanation of the method. he also takes it that consciousness is intrinsically intentional, consciousness something other than itself: he assumes a subjectivity facing a transcendent objectivity. husserl, however, is not directly interested in the objects of consciousness, not even in whether or not they exist independently. rather he is interested in the structures of consciousness itself, including or especially intentionality. those structures are not to be discovered by introspection, however, which turns “inner” events into the objects of intentionality and thus misses the 62 intentionality and other structures of introspection themselves. thus the empirical ego, the subject, is also not of direct interest, and along with the objects of consciousness is bracketed out of direct consideration in what husserl calls “phenomenological reduction”. it is necessary to the project that consciousness is also aware of itself and that this self-awareness of consciousness-of-something can be made explicit and articulated: “but while i am perceiving i can also regard this perception itself in an act of pure seeing, just as it is, ignoring its relation to the ego, or abstracting from that relation. the perception thus grasped and delimited in “seeing” is then an absolute perception, devoid of every transcendence, given as a pure phenomenon in the phenomenological sense. thus to every psychological experience there corresponds, by way of the phenomenological reduction, a pure phenomenon that exhibits its immanent essence (taken individually) as an absolute givenness. all positing of a “nonimmanent reality,” a reality not contained in the phenomenon and therefore not given in the second sense, is, suspended.”29 i understand the purpose here as not so much to take the object of intentionality out of consideration altogether as it is to bring the intentionality itself into the light. the point is not so much suspending in the reality of transcendent entities, as to avoid being in them and losing sight of the immediate consciousness them. as sartre, eloquent as always, will put it later, consciousness is pre,30 belief, for example is awareness of belief31 and “every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself.”32 thing, without starting from consciousness, ten or so years earlier.33 it is 63 “non-positional” self-awareness of consciousness is not a second, distinct consciousness, but a constitutive feature of every consciousness. it is not that consciousness could or should be self aware, but that without selfawareness there is no consciousness at all. the grounds of those operations by which we achieve certainty about entities and the logic by which we weave certainties into theoretical wholes, particularly in science. as human beings we perform these but the grounds of such operations remain unclear and thus the sciences can be elucidated, he believes, by exploring phenomenologically the ways in which consciousness assigns meaning to entities and relations among focuses on the structures of thinking and verbal expression—not in the form of semantics and grammar, however, but in terms of the “mental acts” which are associated with and give meaning to expression.34 thinking follows certain universal rules in the construction of knowledge. what is the structure of consciousness such that it takes objects in this way and that it follows these rules? what is the ultimate provenance rather than the thinking and the origins of the rules as such.35 we know the rules of logic, for example, that they are right and how to follow them; but what is the status of this “knowing that they are right” and what is consciousness doing when it follows them? when i construct a proof, i do not mechanically follow logical rules—that would require sense (possibly wrong) that the conclusion follows from the premises. 64 then i “see” possible pathways and try them out—discarding those part way through when i “see” that they are futile. similarly, in positing new theorems i do not randomly apply the rules of logic to i “see” possibilities and among all conceivable solutions, i “see” which ones may be real possibilities. in what does this “seeing” consist? what questions, again, “lies in the unnatural direction of intuition and thought which phenomenological analysis requires.”36 we must learn to practice of apprehension”, apprehended in the act of taking objects.37 one of his most important discoveries, at least as far as heidegger is concerned, was of the “categorial intuition”, that is, in intuiting an object we also intuit its being. in perceiving an existing inkpot, e.g. we also intuit “that it is”, its isness, so to speak. again: the phenomenological glance does not intuit “that it is”; rather the phenomenological glance uncovers the intuition. as discovery rather than logical conclusion, identifying and articulating the phenomenal fact of the categorial intuition was possible only by making acts of consciousness themselves explicit. saying that acts of consciousness must be made the objects of apprehension, however, is an unfortunate way of putting it inasmuch as making consciousness-of-x the “object” in the usual sense of the word would displace x as the object of intentionality so that consciousnessof-x evaporates. what is required is to uncover, or “apprehend”, consciousness-of-x, while maintaining x as the object; that is to say awareness explicit. for example, if i now think directly about , i make the object, and miss the desired phenomenological target. what is awareness become explicit. another way of putting self-awareness is to say that consciousness is imminent to itself, and husserl thus writes of “immanent” analysis, content, description etc., again emphasizing 65 perspective.39 nevertheless, phenomenological description and analysis of must refer also to the object, not indeed as a transcendent entity, i.e. not positing it, but as a constitutive element of consciousnessof-something: there is no doing-a-proof without something to be proven. this may be expressed also in reverse order. attending fully and without preconceptions to the subject matter, in this case the proof, reveals also consciousness, the , as constituent of the object, the ; the target of phenomenology is then really the whole: doing-a-proof, that is, the “correlation”. this is essentially the tack heidegger takes in describing his phenomenology as letting entities show themselves in themselves, and in beginning his substantive exploration of dasein by an exploration of the world. attending to the reveals also the entity who a world. that approach allows heidegger to avoid implications of introspection and reifications of consciousness and the subject. in other words, assumptions so as to “let” phenomena simply appear. to give a quick summary, the subject matter of phenomenology, “the thing itself,” is experience rather than what is experienced (husserl 2001, 86), but experience as a whole, thus including what is experienced without being distracted by it, neither the entities encountered in the world.40 the possible equivocation of “object” noted above illustrates another problem. as husserl notes (husserl 2001, 91), our language is suited almost exclusively to the description of transcendent states of such that we simply have no words—and perhaps no grammar and logic—with which to express our phenomenological discoveries and use of language—giving unusual meanings to terms and inventing new 66 perspective.41 what that also means is that the only way to understand heidegger, or for that matter, husserl, among others, is to enter into that perspective ourselves. back to heidegger in what i would call a more radical reduction, heidegger suspends not only direct concern with the transcendent reality of entities and independent existence of the empirical ego, but also with consciousness itself. we cannot then explain his methods in terms of self-aware intentional consciousness. the broad outlines of the method nevertheless remain. he asserts in its own self, is disclosed for itself.”42 more, in he writes that dasein, the “entity which each of us is himself,”43 is an entity such that “in its very being that being is an for it.... dasein, in its being, has a relationship toward that being—a relationship which itself is one of being. and this means further that there is some way in which dasein understands itself.”44 simply put, the “object” of the enquiry has to do with the enquirer, we ourselves,45 yet not through introspection, “the ego bent around backward and staring at itself,” rather, “the self is there .”46 substituting “consciousness” for “dasein”, these self-awareness, that self-awareness is constitutive of consciousness47, and that, “consciousness of being is the being of consciousness”, 49 what of intentionality? since, unlike sartre and husserl, heidegger does not start with consciousness, or deal with it directly at all, he does not address intentionality by name in , though there are analogues, for example, “being-towards”, and, indeed, “being-inthe-world”. he does discuss intentionality explicitly and in detail in 67 ,50 being-directed toward,” and notes, “our inquiry will concentrate precisely on seeing this phenomenon [intentionality] more clearly.”51 later in the book, he virtually equates phenomenology, at least in part, with intuiting and interpreting intentionality.52 similarly, his conception and adoption of phenomenological 53 “being-in-the-world”, and of “being-with” others, shifting the focus from static consciousness of an object, to living out into possibilities of the 54 that is constitutive of dasein: dasein does not exist as an isolated selfcontained entity, but only as involved in a situation or environment. it should by now be evident that what heidegger means by “phenomenal facts”, are those data that are intuited by what husserl called the “pure seeing” of “pure phenomena” in the quotation cited at p. 119 to refer to the way that events are actually experienced as opposed to “theoretically “phenomenal fact” that when one makes an assertion about something not immediately present, she refers to the thing itself, not to a representation, as some psychological theories would “explain” such events. phenomenal facts are data reported from within experience itself, describing neither what is experienced nor the experiencer, but experience, what remains after the “reduction”.55 findingness bracketing out consciousness along with subject and object, what we are left with, not as a merely analytic inference, but as a reduction or redirection of attention, is no longer knowledge, thought, and the like, but just naked being here, or as i shall put it, “ ”.56 that we can of this-here allows us to expand that to “(self-aware) 68 this-here” able to describe itself. i introduce this concept for the sake out all content, without any locational connotations, as just . ”. as with other phenomenological concepts, the self-awareness of is not from which to explore further. if the self-awareness were strictly a logical inference from “this-here”, saying “(self-aware) this-here” would rather, this implicit self-awareness is immediately, imminently, evident, (c.f. sartre 1992, 12). but neither is , or dasein or self-awareness, an object set up for the philosopher as spectator. (self aware) this-here gives us a phenomenological starting place, but we still need something like a concrete procedure. i would , which, with haugeland,57 i the neologism is based on the common german greeting “ as the english, “how are you?” their translation, “state-of-mind” is universally recognized as misleading and as macquarrie and robinson oneself.” thornhauser59 has an excellent elucidation of as 60 heidegger associates the word closely with “mood”, or “attunement”.61 attunements are clues to the actual lived existence of the dasein who has them. what heidegger means by what is translated as “mood” is not simply feeling or emotion and includes, especially, fear and anxiety. fear manifests the existential fact of being threatened; anxiety the groundlessness of my being. “attunement” importantly brings out the 69 being threatened), and that attunement manifests as, or is, mood (fear) as a way of being-in.62 has the advantage of suggesting both the relational and the feeling aspects of dasein in the world63 environment. but for present purposes the emphasis is still too much on which has moods indicating inner states caused by external events. to do so is to indulge in “leveling” and reducing to psychology. but , existence. for heidegger, “dasein… has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in 64 that . “mood” here clearly refers to 65 findingness, in other words is the “(self-aware)” previously noted, and that means that it is constitutive of dasein.66 perhaps67 constitutively, within a surrounding from which things that, as it were, extrude, though the nature of “within”, “surrounding”, and “things” , in relation to entity, that only subsequently encounters other entities: relation-to would seem to be an essential feature of myself: there is no without (in fact we might have begun with the ). this suggests a reinterpretation of intentionality: it is not that i am, or have, self-awareconsciousness of transcendent entities, but that i am (self-aware) entities. it would seem, then, that i only of relations with other entities, though not by them. heidegger 70 insists on something very similar: dasein only as being-in-the-world ) as a unitary phenomenon with “understanding” ( ), where of being-in-the-world with something like competence to navigate those possibilities.69 70 , “within”, “surrounding”, and “things” above, yielding, if heidegger is right, (self-aware) this-here-towards-possibilities among networks-ofis right, of understanding oneself, entities and their being appear—i.e. as the “clearing”, corresponding in fact, what is most interesting phenomenologically is not dasein and world, or and blush will be thought to bind them together but which is revealed to itself as (also) that from which they are elaborated. that will not be the end of as my world alterity. the ambiguity indicates the importance of opening and elucidating it could be cogently argued that while we began with , heidegger began with the things, the , especially ready-to-hand of that for which the things are what and as they are: dasein, overlapping 71 at least, with world, or, if you will, and , appear as inseparable, though as a starting place phenomenology emphasizes one or the other. the sense of realizing that i am in some situation, objective or subjective, as proximally in it does, uses, expects, avoids—in all those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally ,”71: dasein typically thinks of itself in the way that it thinks about things in without the scare quotes: existence that i am, characterization of ; any idea of myself, identity, self image, social role and so on, is as such precisely not but putting it that way remains profoundly misleading on in objective situation is an existentiale, i.e. constitutive of dasein, of myself, and thus part of what is to be uncovered. heidegger, i think, would semblance of the being of dasein. that “self” and especially the naturalphenomenology and take up much of the text of (c.f. “average everydayness”).72 in my terms, if heidegger is right, only so. there is no stripping down to a pure unencumbered self except analytically; such is never found and cannot be the object of a search. that is to say, the naked is always clothed, nevertheless, 72 is (one might say that the clothing may be bracketed out). the external objects found by an internal object, the subject, losing sight of appearances and semblances. what is to be found by phenomenology is itself.73 what i mean by “this-here”, then, would not be encounterable as a found than the delayed, hungry self that is most of phenomenological interest. on another level, i involves alternatively, and less confusingly, we could say that ordinaryof itself as such; phenomenology means allowing that non-positional yet i am aware of myself as writing (or, the writing is aware of itself as writing), as typing on a computer. when hammering, the focus is on the head of the nail, yet i am aware of myself as hammering. otherwise i myself writing, hammering. but the logic is unnecessary, the least bit of 73 74 and “the being of 75 what a problem describing it, not potentially and profoundly alter the being-in-and-towards that is found? to revert to the language of consciousness: does making the non-positional-self-awareness of consciousness-of-something, explicit and indeed thetic, not alter the consciousness itself? this is a serious objection to the characterization given here and it would seem that the answer must be “yes”. while doing a logical proof, for example, i am indeed acutely aware of the movements of doing-a-proof; for example, non-positional self-awareness performs a regulative function maintaining focus on the desired conclusion and managing the shifts among projecting that goal, implementing the prospective next step, and reviewing the prior hopeful steps and suspected missteps. that self-awareness, or overview, binding these together in an intentionality within a sea of logic and proofs, as any logician may verify. similarly, in the midst of a game, the footballer is hyper-aware of the other players, their roles on the teams and their positions and movements on the pitch, the movements of the ball, the plays that they have practiced, and so on, but also of herself within that nexus, her movements, momentum, skills, possibilities etc., as to make explicit and to articulate all that self-awareness while doing the 74 make explicit the operations of her awareness and self-awareness (“now was undeniably there and is to at least some extent recoverable, or better, in a sense remains. i am able, as it were, to doing the proof and at an instant of time bounded by a past that no longer exists and a future to include the whole of being in an environment. what happens is that i task, not in the midst of time, but in the midst of work, for example a proof or game, from inception to projected completion. playing, the footballer is not aware of a series of instants, snapshots, but of whole plays, whole as it were in or as a moment. the task, moreover, discloses itself tasks even when i am not immediately performing them, but performing, logic as a task that includes the previous doing of a proof; as a footballer the previous games are part of the task that i remain engaged in, football, no less on a subsequent day than during half-time: one does not stop playing at halftime—or between games. i mean this as a raw, preliminary being toward death, or levinas , is well beyond the present scope. still, to the extent that phenomenology depends on the “single moment” of extended tasks, it will have to examine that very temporality: the 75 conclusion convinced that understanding requires that phenomenology would be fruitful for further exploration, i have here attempted a characterization. what procedure, gave him the raw material of consciousness reporting on its own activities, to put it simply. those activities are always intentional, of or about something else, thus it is a matter of consciousness reporting on its relations with ---. this is possible in that consciousness is constantly and in every moment non-thetically, non-positionally aware of itself. phenomenology makes that intrinsic self-awareness explicit and describes the acts of consciousness thus made visible. heidegger, however brackets out consciousness as an assumed existent, hoping to burrow down, as it were, to being as such by letting entities show themselves as they are, in and from themselves, thus also in their being. the entity to which we most likely have such access is ourselves, “dasein.” thus it becomes a matter of letting ourselves show themselves to us, as it were ourselves reporting on their own activities, in particular, on their relations with the world, “being-towards.” i understanding his phenomenology. we ourselves constantly and in opposed to the self and world taken as independent entities, explicit. if our characterization is accurate, can it be said that heidegger stays true to the method throughout ? perhaps not, for example, the only others, but more, confronted by and confronting otherness that i understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of being-in-the76 world,”76 may clarify much of what he was trying to do as well as providing tools for further exploration. it is unclear whether the above should read “each letting herself show herself ,” “letting ourselves show ourselves,” or “letting human existence show itself.” i hope in a subsequent essay to explore and clarify what heidegger intends by “dasein” using the procedure articulated here. endnotes 1 stephen evans has spent many years as a scholar and professor in buddhist studies in thailand, teaching at several major universities. 2 martin heidegger, , trans. j. macquarrie and e. robinson (new york: harper and row, 1962), 34. page numbers are from tubingen: niemeyer, given in the margins of the english translation. 3 i take (ga24) as a supplement to . 4 even though in many cases better translations have been suggested. given the plethora of such better translations, it may be less confusing to use those with which readers of heidegger are universally familiar. 5 heidegger, , 42, 43. 6 ibid., 9. 7 ibid., 15. john haugeland, ed. j. rouse (cambridge: harvard university press, 2013), 77, 81-82. 9 hubert l. dreyfus, (cambridge. mit press, 1991), 144, 145. 10 thomas sheehan, 11 thomas sheehan, “ ,” in , ed. b.e. babich (amsterdam: kluwer academic publishers, 1995). 12 heidegger, , 10. 77 13 , eds. hubert dreyfus and mark wrathall (new york: routledge, 2002), 194. 14 cf., e.g. heidegger, , 220. 15 heidegger, , 88. 16 ibid. 38. 17 hubert dreyfus 2002, “volume introduction,” in , eds. hubert dreyfus and mark wrathall (new york: routledge, 2002), xi. heidegger, , 34. 19 ibid., 27, 20 ibid., 28, 34. but note that heidegger later insists that understanding at all is made possible by “fore-having”, “fore-understanding”, and “fore-conception”. in other words, avoiding preconceptions may be an unattainable ideal. 21 ibid., 28. 22 ibid., 36. 23 cf. ibid., 28-31. 24 sheehan, “ ,” 157-8. 25 heidegger, , 133) 26 thomas sheehan, “dasein,” in , eds. hubert dreyfus and mark wrathall (oxford: blackwell, 2005) 192. 27 martin heidegger, , trans. albert hofstadter (bloomington: indiana university press, 1982), 64. as zahavi puts it, “comprehension of the husserlian framework is indispensable if one is to understand and appreciate the aspect of , ed. dermot moran (london: as unnecessary to an understanding of what heidegger was doing. heidegger himself credits . 29 edmund husserl, , trans. le hardy (london: kluwer academic publishers, 2010), 34. 30 john-paul sartre, , trans. hazel barnes (new york: washington square press, 1992), 9-17. 31 ibid., 121. 32 ibid.,13. 33 heidegger, , 159. 34 edmund husserl, , trans. j. j. findlay 35 ibid., 89. 78 36 ibid., 90. 37 ibid., 90. 39 ibid., 90-91. 40 husserl greatly expanded his horizons in later work, much of it not published until recently, long after his death. 41 cf. heidegger, , 15-16: when we express our preontological self-understanding, we revert to ontical description suitable for objects, and thereby miss. even traditional logic fails, but irrationalism speaks with a “squint”, (ibid., 129, 136). 42 heidegger, , 111. 43 heidegger, , 7. 44 ibid., 12. 45 ibid., 7. 46 heidegger, , 159 . 47 sartre, , 12-13. ibid., 68. 49 strikes this writer as largely a cartesian restatement of , though it does make advances in elucidating the relation with others. 50 heidegger, 51 ibid., 58. 52 ibid., 114. 53 ibid., 21. 54 heidegger, , 54. 55 cf. ibid., 37. 56 “this-here”, as the locative sense or as objectively positional in physical, social, temporal or any other kind of space (cf. sheehan, , 136-138). 57 haugeland, , 143. heidegger, , 134, note 2. 59 gerhard thornhauser, “martin heidegger and otto freidrich boll,” in , eds. thomas szanto and hilge landweer (london: routledge, 2019). 60 heidegger, , 134, 135. 61 “die stimmung, das gestimmstein.” “stimmung” typically used for “mood”, originally meant the tuning of a musical instrument (heidegger, , 134, note 3). it is essential to keep the sense of attunment in mind. 62 heidegger, , 136. 63 dreyfus, 79 64 heidegger, , 136. 65 ibid., 136, “ ,” , translated , or, if you will, the of its . in note 2 p. 135 macquarrie and robinson acknowledge that “ ” should more literally be translated simply as “that”. 66 67 the actual phenomenological results presented, this-here, that-there, relation, are preliminary, supporting, hopefully giving additional clarity to, without heidegger, , 145. 69 ibid., 143. 70 at least in the translation “understanding” sometimes refers to the more usual cognitive sense, sometimes to this “pressing forward into possibilities”, an ordinary cognitive sense. 71 heidegger, , 119. 72 heidegger, claim that heidegger starts with the world. starting with the world is his 73 of intentionality is taken wholly out of consideration, but that the intentionality is foregrounded. 74 heidegger, , 135. 75 ibid., 142. 76 ibid., 148. 80 references dreyfus, hubert l. . cambridge: mit press, 1991. dreyfus, hubert. “volume introduction.” in , edited by hubert dreyfus and mark wrathall, xi-xv. new york: routledge, 2002. . edited by hubert dreyfus and mark wrathall, 191-210. new york: routledge, 2002. haugeland, john. . edited by j. rouse. cambridge: harvard university press, 2013. heidegger, martin. . translated by j. macquarrie and e. robinson. new york: harper and row, 1962. heidegger, martin. . translated by albert hofstadter. bloomington: indiana university press, 1982. husserl, edmund. . translated by j. n. findlay. new york: routledge, 2001. husserl, edmund. . translated by lee hardy. london: kluwer academic publishers, 2010. sartre, jean-paul. . translated by hazel e. barnes. new york: washington square press, 1992. sheehan, thomas. “ .” in . edited by b. e. babich, 157-177. amsterdam: kluwer academic publishers, 1995 sheehan, thomas. “dasein.” in . edited by hubert l. dreyfus and mark a. wrathall, 193-213. oxford: blackwell, 2005. sheehan, thomas. . london: 81 thonhauser, gerhard. “martin heidegger and otto friedrich boll.” in . edited by thomas szanto and hilge landweer, london: routledge, 2019. zahavi, dan. “phenomenology.” in the routledge companion to twentieth century philosophy. edited by dermot moran, 661692. london: routledge, 2010. 01_(1-9) self identity and.pmd self-identity and cyberspace challenges: a dialogue between west asian syriac tradition and modernity edward j. alam notre dame university, lebanon abstract this essay draws from the wisdom of the syriac tradition to address problems and trends in contemporary society. particularly the moral and spiritual challenges raised by the all-encompassing category of virtual reality. more specifically, i am interested in showing how a modern appropriation of the wisdom in my own tradition regarding the complementary relation of faith and reason, or religion and science, might help solve what i consider to be core worldwide issues that go to the heart of what it means to be human. i am especially interested in the question of self-identity, sexual identity, the sexual revolution, the relation between sexuality and spirituality, and the apparently growing socalled “addictive” epidemic on internet pornography. beginning1 in the sixth century, and continuing well into the seventh, an explosion of philosophical insight occurred as a result of an extremely dynamic synthesis that can rightly be described as emerging from the religious culture in west asia. syriac speaking christians, heirs to mesopotamian and jewish culture, living primarily in the regions of what are today lebanon, syria and southeast turkey, began to translate, develop, and transmit ancient greek thought and culture into syriac. in the ninth and tenth centuries, the great arab translators, under the patronage of the ‘abassid islamic dynasty, and in conjunction with these syriac speaking christians, who also knew arabic and had begun to assimilate islamic-arabic culture as well, began to translate this great and living heritage from syriac into arabic, thereby not only transmitting the ancient prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 1-9 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 1greek wisdom, but substantially developing it. this latter stage, because of the geographical, political and economic realities at that time, also received the insights and wisdom of persian, indian, and (later during the mongolian period) chinese thought, culture and religion, making this period one of the most dynamic cultural and philosophical interchanges in history. the philosophical and civilizational result was dynamic and long lasting, providing both the solid foundation and building materials for the further construction of what would come to be known as modern science and civilization, once texts were brought to spain via northern africa and translated into latin via castilian in the tenth and eleventh centuries. even a cursory examination of what may rightly be called arabic philosophy, (in which jews, christians, and muslims all participated in developing) reveals that the fundamental impetus at the heart of this philosophical and cultural exchange was a religious one, overwhelming concerned with reconciling scientific insights with the similar versions of revelation contained in the holy texts. these scientific insights were not merely the scientific achievements of greek science transmitted to the west via syriac and arabic, in the precise form they were received, but, as stated above, were substantially developed by oriental syriac speaking christians, and then by arab and persian muslims and jews, aided to some extent, by insights from indian and then later (in the mongolian period) chinese religious cultures. the crucial point here is that in the process of transmitting greek science, those jews, christians, and muslims concerned with reconciling science and revelation, actually moved the scientific and philosophical project forward; their concern to reconcile their religious truths with scientific truths did not hold science or philosophy back, but propelled it forward. with respect to natural science, the new achievements included “a far more advanced number theory and algebra, a new system of trigonometry, a medical corpus much greater than that available in the greek world, and an entirely original theory of optics more powerful than anything known to the greeks and that was not only to form the mathematical basis for the renaissance art but also to inspire new directions in scientific practice”.2 with respect to the philosophical achievements, there were notable advances in ontology and epistemology; questions about whether the world was eternal or created in 2 prajna vihara-~ time pushed the ontological project forward, whereas questions concerning the existence of necessary causes in nature stimulated epistemological discussion. and, again, the west asian, syriac speaking christian culture played a crucial role in these great advancements in philosophy and science, precisely because they were a bridge-building culture open to knowledge and wisdom from wherever it came. i am tempted to spend more time expatiating on the ancient glory of my own west asian syriac heritage, but since we have been advised precisely not to do this and to focus rather on showing how the worldviews, principles, cultural values, and ethical norms that we have inherited from our own traditions can help to handle the problems of modern society and contribute to its future greatness, i shall resist the temptation and enter directly into my subject, which concerns the moral and spiritual challenges raised by the all-encompassing category of virtual reality. more specifically, i am interested in showing how a modern appropriation of the wisdom in my own tradition regarding the complementary relation of faith and reason, or religion and science, which has ramifications for the body/mind or body/soul problem, might help solve what i consider to be core worldwide issues that go to the heart of what it means to be human. i am especially interested in the question of self-identity, sexual identity, the sexual revolution, the relation between sexuality and spirituality, and the apparently growing so-called “addictive”3 epidemic4 of cyberspace pornography. admittedly, this is far too much to address in a twenty minute presentation, but i hope at least to sketch the broad outlines of both the major problem and possible solutions. the question of self-identity is quintessentially a modern one that emerges with the breakdown of agricultural, village-based, community life__a way of living which, we are apt to forget, was the dominant way of life for most of human history.5 the question rarely arises, if ever, in societies wherein one’s own identity is immediately evident in one’s relations to the family, the village, the tribe, the clan, and the land. we do find, of course, the polis in the ancient world, but those who lived in cities still maintained close ties to family, village, tribe, clan, and ancestral land. with the emergence of the modern city, and the radical shift from agriculture to industry, both of which are the result of paradigmatic shifts in epistemology, whereby knowledge came to be defined by the scientific edward j. alam 3 method of the natural sciences, and wherein the telos of knowledge was to master nature, the question of self-identity takes on new and confusing proportions. i do not want to overstate the point, because even a cursory perusal of western and eastern literature in ancient and medieval times shows that human beings have always asked perennial probing questions such as “who am i?” “what is beyond death?” “why do we suffer?” but my point is that with the breakdown of communal, religious, and agricultural life, and with the advent of modern science and society, the traditional answers to these questions have difficulty penetrating, and thus satisfying, the human soul in its quest for meaning. to use the terminology of a great contemporary western philosopher, charles taylor, the modern self has become a buffered self, rather than, as in previous times, a porous self. i cannot defend this bold thesis here, as it is an astoundingly long and tremendously complex story,6 but the idea is that when the natural world (or nature7) is seen as a separate object divorced from the human subject, something to be manipulated and mastered for the material benefit of the human being, then we lose our natural place in the real world. seeking a home, we create a virtual reality that brings with it a plethora of exceedingly complex ontological problems, not the least of which is self-alienation wherein the problem of self-identity, which necessarily includes the problem of sexual identity, since we are sexual beings by nature, comes to the fore. i do not want to suggest that this is an entirely new problem, but because of the unprecedented technological mastery of nature, the problem becomes more pronounced and dangerous, and the degree of self-isolation deeper and deeper. such isolation is the most profound kind of poverty, much worse and more serious than material poverty, of which often times it is the cause. in this state of individualistic isolation, we are prevented from satisfying our natural yearning to have fruitful relations with the earth, with other animals, with mother and father and with an extended community of all ages, young and old. this ultimately affects our ability as adults to have healthy and fruitful relationships with members of the opposite sex, a perennial problem, of course, but one that is compounded by the ability to objectivize the other, as a mere object of pleasure__a special, intimate, and powerful kind of pleasure that is meant to be connected in an intense way to life, children, meaningful relationship, responsibility, and dignity. this ability to imme4 prajna vihara-~ diately objectify another through the medium of a computer screen at the touch of a button in order to know another intimately without knowing them at all, does not satisfy the natural yearning to love and be loved, but frustrates and distorts it, so that one must continually go back for more and more until, as many pornography “addicts” admit, they hit rock bottom, namely, an attraction to what was previously unthinkable: incest, rape, murder, and suicide. listening to the recent testimony of former porn-stars, shelly leubben and trent roe, confirms these claims to some degree.8 i am not claiming that all pornography leads to such radical violence; some research shows that soft pornography can even be related to reduction in sexual violence, as it becomes a relatively harmless and disease free outlet for sexual frustration, and, furthermore, because it is usually private, it brings little risk of public shame or embarrassment. not only that, some sex therapists use various forms of soft pornography to help couples grow into sexually satisfying relationships, although the success rate of such methods is highly disputed. sexual frustration is not a new phenomenon, of course, as the so-called “oldest profession” of prostitution attests. in fact, one could even say it is as necessary to a society as an efficient waste disposal system is, analogy intended. st. augustine said as much. but, again, because of the radically objectifying essence of sexually deviant behavior in the world of virtual reality, the long term effects are more complex and potentially more dangerous, precisely because of the virtual nature of the activity, which allows the creation of worlds that have nothing to do with reality, and therefore, nothing to do with what aristotle called the transcendentals of reality or being, the good, the true, and the beautiful. when one has relations with a real prostitute in person, one is confronted with the fact that he or she is relating to a real person, not an object, even if they are treating that person as an object. this makes the entire experience real, and thus has the potential of revealing the actual moral goodness or evil, truth or falsehood, beauty or ugliness of the activity, but with cybersex the full potential for discovering the reality and truth about the action is blurred and confused.9 at any rate, whether virtual or not, when the special kind of human intimacy associated with sexual pleasure is packaged in such a way as to be consumed as one instant pleasure item among many, one could argue that it is edward j. alam 5 violent by its very nature in that it violates the very dignity and nature of the human person, even if it is entered into freely, not to mention when it is forced upon victims, which is quite often the case, and the fact that these victims are often times women and children reveals even further the violent and distorted nature of such activity. admittedly, there is almost no end to the analyses of such a complex phenomena, but i think i have sketched the broadest outlines of the problem for the purposes of this brief presentation anyhow. and, now, guided by the wisdom of my own west asian syriac tradition, i will try to present a short sketch of possible solutions by focusing on the dynamic and successful synthesis achieved during the christian patristic period between greek philosophy and christian doctrine regarding the role of the human body in the identity of the human being, a synthesis to which the syriac fathers greatly contributed. the clash was between a platonic body/soul, spirit/matter, dualism and the very different jewish/christian approach to the body. the latter sought to overcome the prevalent dualism by emphasizing the importance of the “heart” as the point of unity in human beings, as the “site of our most profound and basic orientation”, that is to say, as the site of “our love”.10 the suggestion was that the body and soul meet, as it were, in the “heart”, and only there do they find their unity, but only if the heart is single-hearted. st. augustine’s achieved anthropological synthesis in this regard with his “two loves”, which was also “crucial to the development of western political thought and the christian theology of history”,11 is well known, what is less well known, but perhaps even more dynamic is the syriac contribution here since this tradition was even more rooted in the jewish tradition, which had already achieved a semitic/greek synthesis in the production of the septuagint. st. ephrem the syrian of the early 4th century, in particular, strongly and effectively resisted the greek body/soul dualism by depicting the body and soul as bride and bridegroom, who came together to consummate their love in the secret bedroom chamber of the heart. eventually, this new jewish/christian anthropology, rooted in ezekiel’s heart stirring prophetic utterances concerning god’s promise to create a new heart for his people in place of their heart of stone, came to rival the body/soul dualism of the pagan world, as more and more people, especially women, 6 prajna vihara-~ came to the “heartfelt” conviction that the body was not alien to the soul, but indeed could be correctly thought of as the “masculine” bridegroom lovingly protecting, caring for, and even serving his bride, the “female” soul. this image totally turned the pagan notion upside down, wherein “the soul had been thought of as ruling the body with the same alert...authority as the well__born male ruled those inferior and alien to himself-his wife, his slaves, the populace of the city”.12 it is no wonder that many women from all walks of life were attracted to this biblical anthropology. not only was st. ephrem’s message fresh and powerful, but the beauty of his method, primarily song and poetry, allowed the new anthropological insights to penetrate the social imaginary of an entire generation. in this regard, comparative studies of classical syriac and confucian thought and method would be interesting, especially in the light of the fact that the syriac christianity, which first entered china by 635 of the common era, during the tang dynasty, was quick to construct a theological linguistic apparatus that borrowed from existing chinese modes and expressions of thought. the confucian emphasis on the “heart” as the very center and unity of the person, the key moral concept of jen, which may be rendered into english as “human heartedness”; moreover, the centrality of the aesthetic element emphasizing music, rites, and songs as necessary for communicating confucian moral and spiritual truths, are all present too in the syriac tradition and the achieved anthropological synthesis which we have been discussing. when the syriac christian brought these views with them to china, they were only strengthened and complemented in chinese culture. it seems a mutual complementary exchange took place. at any rate, this synthesis held strong till the modern period, when it was challenged anew by the cartesian experiment and the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century, a challenge from which the west, where it originated, has never really recovered. one great advantage to most asian thought, whether in its west or east asian variant, is that cartesianism, with its corresponding subject/object, body/soul, universal/singular, faith/reason, and religion/science dualisms, never really took root. in conclusion, the direction we should be facing while searching for solutions to contemporary problems of self-identity, compounded by edward j. alam 7 the “old”, new problem of virtual reality, is back. that is to say, back to our rich religious and cultural traditions, not in order to return to the past by embracing some kind traditionalism, while uncritically rejecting everything that came out of the western enlightenment as flawed, but in order to recover age old truths that can help us go forward together towards, perhaps, a second enlightenment-where the sun of reality, and not virtually reality, shines upon us to bring us joy and to discover our true identity and place in this rapidly changing globalized world. thank you. endnotes 1some of the material appearing in this and the following paragraph has been published previously in prajna vihara: the journal of philosophy and religion, assumption university of thailand, volume 9, no. 2, july-december 2008, pp.10-11, though i have re-worked these 2 paragraphs for the purposes of the present paper. 2see arun bala’s the dialogue of civilizations in the birth of modern science (new york: palgrave macmillian, 2006) 53-54. 3time does not permit to enter into a serious discussion of what constitutes addiction, sex addiction, or otherwise. there are many who argue plausibly that the very category of “addiction” lessons the real need for moral responsibility. when it comes to the complex issue of so-called sex addiction, there are a plethora of social, cultural, moral and religious variables to consider, and not all of these can be considered according to a strict scientific empirical method. whether sex addiction is to be classified as an obsessive-compulsive disorder or hypersexual disorder is a matter of debate because the very category of “disorder” is still debated by serious psychologists. deep philosophical analysis that brings together ontology, ethics, and anthropology is needed to shed more light on these complex issues. at the very least, i would argue that any activity that is cut off from its ultimate “purpose” is to be considered a disorder. with respect to sexual activity, the ultimate purpose, though not the only one, is procreation. 4whether this phenomenon is a worldwide epidemic is unclear since statistics are difficult to come by, but there is evidence that it has reached epidemic proportions in the u.s., but, again, conclusions depend on a precise definition of addiction. a recent article in newsweek (december 5, 2011) reports that “[a]n estimated 40 million people a day in the u.s. log on to some 4.2 million pornographic websites, according to the internet filter software review”. (p.56). also the work of craig gross & steven luff, pure eyes: a man’s guide to sexual integrity (grand rapids: 2010), provides some evidence that cyberspace sex addiction has indeed become an epidemic in the u.s. for an international perspective on the issue, see the work of tami verhelst, vice president of the international institute for trauma and addic8 prajna vihara-~ -~ tion professionals. 5glenn olsen, the turn to transcendence: the role of religion in the twentyfirst century (washington, d.c.: the catholic university of america press, 2010). 6even charles taylor’s one thousand page tome, a secular age (cambridge: the belknap press of harvard university press, 2007), which is the best and most comprehensive work in english when it comes to documenting and explaining the sources of this buffered self, is, as he himself admits, only part of the story. 7see pierre hadot’s the veil of isis: an essay on the history of the idea of nature (london: the belknap press of harvard university press, 2006), for one of the best and most thoroughgoing contemporary accounts of what “nature” has meant in the history of western thought. beginning with the presocratics, hadot traces the meaning of “nature” up till modern times and presents 7 different accou8while very sympathetic to, and supportive of, the action on the part of courageous people like roe and leubben, who as ex-porn stars now speak out strongly against pornography, my impression is that their arguments would have a wider appeal if they were more developed philosophically, rather than theologically. this is not to downplay the power and authenticity of their conversions to “born-again christianity” but simply to point out that their valuable insights into the evil of pornography are often times dismissed in the public sphere because of this association. 9it is interesting to recall here the various “theologies of evil” in many of the world’s great religious, philosophical, and cultural traditions, which identifies evil as just falling “short of full being”__a negation of something rather than something in itself__some kind of half or virtual reality tending towards non-being. 10taylor, a secular age, 276. 11pope benedict xvi’s february 20, 2008, general audience in paul vi’s audience hall on the life and thought of st. augustine; the idea is presented in augustine’s de civitate dei, composed in 22 books between 413 and 426 of the common era. see http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2008/ documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20080220_en.html. 12charles taylor quotes peter brown’s the body and society here. see page 276 of the secular age and footnote 10 on page 805. edward j. alam 9 02_ (39-74) a confucian version.pmd a confucian version of hybrid regime: how does it work and why is it superior?1 tongdong bai fudan university, china abstract there are four problems with democracy, especially the institution of one person one vote. many democratic and liberal thinkers understand them and try to correct them from within. but i will argue that these revisions are fundamentally inadequate to address these problems. a better political arrangement to deal with this fact than today’s democracies is a hybrid regime that contains both democratic and meritocratic elements, which is what a confucian would propose. i will illustrate the basic arrangements of this regime, and show why it can deal with the aforementioned fact and so why it is superior to today’s democratic regimes. º·¤ñ́ âèí áõ»ñ­ëò 4 »ãð¡òã·õèà¡õèâç¡ñº»ãðªò¸ô»äµâ â´â੾òðíâèò§âô觻ñ­ëò·õè à¡õèâç¡ñºë¹ö觤¹ë¹öè§àêõ⧠¹ñ¡¤ố àêãõ¹ôâááåð»ãðªò ô̧»äµâëåò⤹¾âòáâòá·õè̈ ð à¢éò㨻ñ­ëòàëåèò¹õé áåðá¡éä¢àòâãµé¡ãíº»ãðªò ô̧»äµâẺàêãõ¹ôâá áµè¼ùéà¢õ⹨ð âµéáâé§çèòçô¸õ¡òãá¡é»ñ­ëò¹õéâñ§áõ¾×é¹°ò¹·õèäáèà¾õ⧾í·õè¨ðªèçâá¡é»ñ­ëòä´é á¹ç·ò§¡òãàá×í§·õè´õ¡çèò»ãðªò¸ô»äµâã¹»ñ¨¨øºñ¹ ¤×í ã𺺼êáãðëçèò§ëåñ¡ »ãðªò¸ô»äµâáåðã𺺤ø³¸ããá «öè§à»ç¹á¹ç¤çòá¤ô´µòá·õèªò碧¨×êíàê¹í º·¤çòá¹õé¼ùéà¢õ⹨ðä é́¹óàê¹íá¹ç¤ố 㹡òã ñ́̈ ¡òãẺ¾×é¹°ò¹ «ö觨ðáê´§ãëéàëç¹ çèò á¹ç¤ô´·õèçèò¹õé¨ðêòáòã¶á¡é䢻ñ­ëò·õè¡åèòçáòä´éáåðâñ§áõ¤çòáàåôèåéó¡çèò íò³ò ñ̈¡ã»ãðªò ô̧»äµâã¹»ñ̈ ø̈ºñ¹ prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 39-74 39 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ 1. four problems with democracy the majority of people all over the world may still believe that liberal democracy is the best possible regime, the “end of history”, as francis fukuyama’s famous book’s title suggests (1992). when facing with challenges that show problems with democracies, the more informed tend to appeal to the famous retort allegedly made by winston churchill: “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.2 clever as it seems, this claim may be a sign of our intellectual laziness, because it lacks empirical and theoretical support. empirically, in controlling corruption, making sound long-term economic policies, decreasing ethnic violence, and choosing leaders that are competent and represent the true will of the people, democracies, especially in the developing world, don’t always or clearly do better than non-democracies.3 theoretically, democracy, with regard to its institution of one person one vote, also leads to many problems. first, the mainstream ideology beneath one person one vote is the belief in the power of the people, and, by implication, the suspicion of the power of the elite and even the power of the government. for example, the anti-government and antiintellectualist attitude is a reason for many peculiar american phenomena. these phenomena include, first, a critical factor of “electability” of a candidate is whether he or she is likable, is one of us, and is someone that can come to visit us in our living rooms. in the 2004 presidential campaign, a “masterpiece” by the bush team is to label successfully john kerry as a member of the east coast elite. those who support bush believe in this propaganda, while those who are against him are convinced that bush is a redneck, like so many of his supporters. however, the matter of the fact is that the bush family also came from the east coast, and his family is actually far more established than kerry’s. bush and kerry both went to yale and attended the same secret club. moreover, what many americans don’t know is that bush had higher gpa’s than kerry in college. the cover-up of bush’s background and the attack on kerry may have been a result of the campaign culture that is rooted in one person one vote. second, american politicians often claim to be an outsider of the government in order to get elected into the government, 40 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and that their role in the government is to get rid of it. when a ruling branch of a government consists of ‘simple folks’ who despise government (i.e., themselves), it is hard to imagine this branch will turn out to be respected, even by the people who put them there. this is probably why the us congress __ in principle, the most representative of political institutions __ scores at the bottom of most surveys asking americans which institutions they most respect whereas the supreme court, the armed forces, and the federal reserve system (all appointed rather than elected bodies) score highest. (zakaria 2003, 248) daniel bell quotes this passage and uses it to support his confucian model that is partly based upon the rule of the wise and virtuous and demands respect for government (bell 2006, 289, note 34). second, the institution of one person one vote lacks effective mechanisms to take into account the interest of non-voters, including future (and past) generations and foreigners. thus, democracy may have difficulties in dealing with issues of budget deficit (i.e., spending future generations’ money for the present voters), environmental issues that are related to spending the resources of future generations, and foreign aid or other issues involving the interests of foreigners. for example, an interesting phenomenon in the u.s. is that, those interest groups that are concerned with the interests of domestic workers, such as unions and democrats that are supported by these unions, often favor protectionist policies that hurt the interests of poor workers in other countries. third, and related to the second issue, even among the present living adults of a state, the interest of the vocal and powerful tends to trump the interest of the silent (or silenced) and the powerless. this may be a reason for the ethnical problems in democracies, especially the newly democratized ones (that haven’t yet developed fully-functioned rule of law and the protection of liberties). fourth, even with regard to their own interests, it is questionable whether voters alone can be the best judges of them. as many political observers-from both a more popular and anecdotal perspective and a more scholarly perspective-have pointed out, the appalling political ignorance tongdong bai 41 of the (american) general public is a well-established fact over “the six decades of modern public opinion research” (ackerman and fishkin 2004, 34).4 as an example, let me discuss a particular symptom that may have been caused by the above problems, the issue of foreign policy. foreign policy often needs expertise, patient and often painful dialogues, and longterm planning. but in a popular democracy such as the u.s., as henry kissinger argues, foreign policy is often driven by the public mood, and this mood is in turn swayed by what is on tv, but not determined by what is important in international affairs. another influence on foreign policies is domestic politics that has nothing to do with diplomacy. this is because, oftentimes, a congressperson or an official who is in favor of a foreign policy has to promise to support a domestic item to get the support of another congressperson or another official. these factors are obviously in conflict with the needs of good diplomatic policies (kissinger 2001, 77). 2. “internal” solutions to these problems and their fundamental limit many liberal and democratic thinkers also realize the aforementioned problems with democracy, especially the institution of one person one vote, and have offered various answers to these problems. on the first problem, an obvious answer is call for a proper respect for reason and government. the respect for reason (and those with reason) doesn’t necessarily mean the negation of equality. people can still be equal in many ways, because equality is a rather broad concept. government should be understood as a necessary good, and not as a necessary evil or even an unnecessary evil. popular elections can be understood as selecting the most competent and worthy, and not as the punishment of the bad.5 these revisions can be endorsed by some liberal and democratic thinkers, without contradicting their fundamental tenets. a cause of the first three problems is an immoral and radical version of individualism that is taken by some as the sacred ideology of democracy. according to this individualism, we are and should be free and equal individuals who care nothing but our self-interests (“self” under42 prajna vihara __ __ ~ stood as an atomor monad-like individual). we concede part of our freedom to be under a government because we would be better off than we would be in the natural state of affairs, where our interests are in constant jeopardy from other selfish individuals-hence the government is considered a necessary evil, or because we are deceived to think so-hence the government is considered an unnecessary evil. other than the regulations by the government which are considered necessary in this tradeoff, we should assert our self-interests as much as we like. as mentioned, “self” here is understood as an atomor monad-like individual, and thus self-interests are narrowly defined. the interests of our ancestors or descendants (especially those who are present) are not a part of these selfinterests, nor are the interests of foreigners. to say that self-interests are narrowly defined doesn’t mean that they only include immediate material interests. they can also include articles of faith taken sacred by the individual. as a result, for example, there are so-called “issue-voters” in american democracy. they vote based upon their pre-determined articles of faith (on abortion, gun rights, etc.), not allowing it to be open to just and fair discussion with others. democracy then degenerates into a form of peaceful form of battle of might (which side has more issue voters that can push their legislature through). perhaps seeing that this selfish and radical version of individualism as a cause of the first three problems of democracy, the late american political philosopher john rawls, for example, challenges the view one person one vote is nothing but counting heads, and argues that, for voting to be justifiable, the voting entity has to consider the common good or the interests of other entities, rather than merely its own narrowly defined private interests. we can see this from the concept of “reasonable”, as well as the related concepts of public reason and reciprocity, that are crucial to his understanding of liberal democracy in his later philosophy. on the concept of “reasonable”, rawls writes, citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation … and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular tongdong bai 43 situations, provided that others also accept those terms. (rawls 1996, xliv)6 on the contrary, if one votes purely based upon one’s comprehensive doctrine, and accepts the failure of pushing through his or her agenda by the majority of votes only as a convenient truce waiting to be broken by any means possible, for rawls, the stability so achieved is a “modus vivendi” and is not stability for the right reasons.7 in short, according to rawls, liberal democracy requires that each voter vote not merely on private interests, including both material and doctrinal, but on a conception of common good. but how to achieve this? how to make people moral as required by rawls and by our need to address the first three problems of democracy? to achieve this “civil friendship” (rawls 1999a, 137), rawls appeals to education and habituation (“moral learning”) that are conducted through social and political institutions arranged by liberal democracy (ibid., 15 and 44-45), through families (ibid., 157), and through international and domestic political and cultural environments (ibid., 27 (note 23), 102-103, and 112-113). he also pins his hope on the role of statesmen (ibid., 97-103 and 112). the question, then, is whether these corrections will be effective. the qualification of equality among individuals that is necessary to make way for the respect for the competent and the public-minded and for government is not explicitly discussed by rawls, and thus the first problem that is partly caused by the selfish and radical version of individualism is still undressed. as for the second and the third problems, if the “reasonable” people cannot form a majority of a democracy, under the present arrangement of one person one vote, non-voters’ interests can hardly be considered adequately. unfortunately, it seems that we cannot realistically expect the reasonable people to form a majority. in fact, rawls himself offers an argument for this impossibility under the institution of one person one vote, which he contributes to the hegelians and never answers. he writes, whereas, so the [hegelian] view goes, in a liberal society, where each citizen has one vote, citizens’ interests tend to 44 prajna vihara __ __ ~ shrink and center on their private economic concerns to the detriment of the bonds of community, in a consultation hierarchy, when their group is so represented, the voting members of the various groups take into account the broader interests of political life. (rawls 1999a, 73) of course, whether the majority of reasonable people can be formed is open to theoretical and empirical studies. but there is yet another-i consider most fatal-problem with democracy, that is, the fourth problem with democracy previously mentioned. again, liberal and democratic thinkers such as rawls see this problem. he also thinks that, in a realrather than formal-liberal democracy, citizens have to be informed. to achieve this, it is crucial that their basic needs be satisfied and they enjoy education, as well as means necessary to get informed. for example, rawls points out, “hegel, marxist, and socialist writers have been quite correct in making the objection” that “liberties taken alone” are “purely formal”. by themselves they are an impoverished form of liberalism, indeed not liberalism at all but libertarianism (vii:3). the latter does not combine liberty and equality in the way liberalism does; it lacks the criterion of reciprocity and allows excessive social economic inequalities as judged by that criterion. (rawls 1996, lviii; also see rawls 1999a, 49-50) to ensure a plural liberal democracy that is stable for the right reasons, rawls proposes the following institutions: “a. public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability of public information on matters of policy”; “b. a certain fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and training”; “c. a decent distribution of income and wealth meeting the third condition of liberalism: all citizens must be assured the all-purpose means necessary for them to take intelligent and effective advantage of their basic freedoms”; “d. society as employer of last resort…” so that citizens can have a sense of long-term security and the opportunity of meaningful work and occupation that are crucial to their tongdong bai 45 self-respect and their sense of being a member of society; “e. basic health care assured all citizens” (rawls 1996, lviii-lix). according to rawls, failing to establish these institutions will lead to the sorry state of (american?) political reality. he writes, when politicians are beholden to their constituents for essential campaign funds, and a very unequal distribution of income and wealth obtains in the background culture, with the great wealth being in the control of corporate economic power, is it any wonder that congressional legislation is, in effect, written by lobbyists, and congress becomes a bargaining chamber in which laws are bought and sold? (rawls 1999a, 24, f19). it should become clear that, for rawls, the desirable form of liberal democracy is a kind of deliberative democracy. in the law of peoples, he explicitly expresses this idea: “here i am concerned only with a wellordered constitutional democracy … understood also as a deliberative democracy” (rawls 1999a, 138). deliberative democracy recognizes that without wide-spread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic government for all citizens, and without a public informed about pressing problems, crucial political and social decisions simply cannot be made. even should farsighted political leaders wish to make sound changes and reforms, they cannot convince a misinformed and cynical public to accept and follow them. (rawls 1999a, 139-140) in addition the arrangements that eliminate damaging social and economic inequality, clearly, freedom of speech and information and other liberties are also necessary for people to get informed. as rawls points out, measures such as public financing of elections need to be taken to assure that public information on matters of policy is not distorted by the influence of money, and, in general, to assure the availability of public information, in addition to the formal protection of relevant liberties. 46 prajna vihara __ __ ~ moreover, the public has to be given an opportunity to digest information available. otherwise, the availability of information will again become merely formal. for example, political scientists bruce ackerman and james fishkin propose that there should be a new national holiday, the deliberation day, when “registered voters would be called together in neighborhood meeting places … to discuss the central issues raised by the campaign. each deliberator would be paid $150 for the day’s work of citizenship…” (ackerman and fishkin 2004, 34). clearly, the days when voters cast their votes should also be national or state holidays. however, i will argue in the following that these measures-already drastic and radical against the political reality of today’s democracies-are still not adequate. these liberal thinkers have a vision of liberal democracy that is at least in one aspect fundamentally republican. that is, in their ideal form of democracy, citizens need to be well-informed and actively participatory and have a form of civil friendship (rawls 1999a, 137), although the degree of participation in their democracy may not be as extensive as it was in ancient republics such as ancient rome and those of ancient athens. then, a look into the athenian democracy might help us to see why today’s (weaker) republican form of democracy is doomed to fail. first, the success of athenian democracy was built upon slavery. that is, it was the use of slave labors that freed athenian citizens from daily work and made it possible for them to fully participate in political matters. but even by using slaves, the adequacy of the political competence of greek citizens was still challenged by classical writers such as plato and aristophanes. then, how likely is it that the common people in a modern democracy, who need to work hard to maintain their basic living-this is a basic fact of capitalism and perhaps all modern societies that rid themselves of the guilty leisure of slavery, can participate in politics to the extent of acquiring the political competence necessary for a desirable form of liberal and deliberative democracy? it is true that, through mass education, the modern society produces much more educated, white color professionals, such as scientists, engineers, doctors, financiers, teachers, and so on. but what the education gives them is a special craft, and they are consumed by their daily work so as to know little about public affairs or anything outside of their narrow specializations. as jose? ortega y gasset said, they are “learned ignorami” (ortega 1932, 108-112). in tongdong bai 47 short, in today’s world, the majority of people are still consumed by their daily work, and may have limited knowledge about public affairs or anything outside of their narrow specializations. to make the problem even more serious, we need to understand that also crucial to the level of political participation in ancient athens is the fact that athens was all small in size and in population, compared to most of the contemporary democratic countries. according to many political thinkers, on the issue of what kind of regime a state can adopt, “size matters”. montesquieu offers one of the most powerful arguments for this view. according to him, it is necessary that a democracy be small. no medium-sized or large country can really be a democracy. the reasons he offers are the following. in a large republic [which including both democracy and aristocracy], there are large fortunes, and consequently little moderation in spirits: the depositories are too large to put in the hands of a citizen; interests become particularized; at first a man feels he can be happy, great, glorious without his homeland; and soon, that he can be great only on the ruins of his homeland. in a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. in a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive there and consequently less protected. (montesquieu 1989, 124)9 in short, for montesquieu, a large republic leads to large fortunes. this corrupts the virtue necessary to a democracy. in particular, a person’s interest becomes detached from, or even in opposition to, the common good. moreover, the common good becomes too sophisticated for the citizens of this state to grasp. one may argue that, for montesquieu, a large state can be democratic in the form of the federal republic (montesquieu 1989, 131-132). but what montesquieu discusses is something similar to the federation of ancient greek states, a federation still far smaller than most of today’s 48 prajna vihara __ __ ~ democracies. also different from montesquieu’s understanding, the central government of today’s democracies is directly elected, and has far greater power than what montesquieu allows. one may also argue that the kind of democracy montesquieu discusses is not the same as the liberal democracy rawls and others understand. this argument may be true, but this and the previous arguments do not affect the force of montesquieu’s challenge. put in today’s language, we can challenge the likelihood for citizens to be informed in a large state that does not allow the use of slave labors to free its citizens from their daily works by offering the following arguments. first, the overwhelming material wealth in a large state may tempt people away from the civil duty to be reasonable and informed citizens. this requirement of citizens to be reasonable and informed is much more limited than what montesquieu considers the necessary virtue in a democracy (montesquieu 1989, 22-26), but it is still very demanding. second, corporations, especially in the age of globalization, develop interest separate from and even in conflict with the interest of their own states, be it democratic or otherwise. third, the common good in a large state is so complex that it is beyond most people’s willingness or ability to comprehend, and the majority is doomed to be uninformed, however intelligent and well-educated and however willing to participate in political affairs each citizen is. related to this point, in a small state, people might be acquainted with political figures, whereas, in a large state, the majority of the people cannot judge the quality of a politician through a long-term and close contact with him or her, but can only do so by following all kinds of propaganda, which makes their opinion of the politician easily manipulatable. in an article by the journalist robert kaplan, he offers many examples of failed democracies in the modern and contemporary periods. his analysis of the reason for these failures is similar to montesquieu’s argument (kaplan 1997), although he presents this kind of argument in the context of modern and contemporary democracies. the solution kaplan offers is a hybrid regime that combines the democratic elements with paternalistic elements, which, as we will see, is similar to the limited democracy that is suggested by confucians. in a recent article by the political scientist russell hardin (2002), he discusses “three devastating tongdong bai 49 theoretical claims” in postwar public choice theory, made by kenneth arrow, anthony downs, as well as mancur olson, that are “against the coherence of any democratic theory that is conceived as even minimally participatory, collectively consistent, and well-informed” (2002, 212). hardin develops these claims “by relating them and, in particular, by subjecting them to an economic theory of knowledge” (2002, 213). two crucial arguments he makes in this paper are: first, each person’s vote doesn’t really matter; second, to be informed is rather demanding, perhaps much more so than we usually think. if we put these two arguments together, the implication is that, if they are rational, voters have, or they should have, very little interest to vote, let alone getting informed. the first argument is partly a result of the fact that today’s democracies__even on the scale of the state of new hampshire that has about a quarter of a million voters__are too large for one single vote to matter. this is because even if there is one vote difference after we count all the votes in a large state, “merely for practical reasons of the impossibility of counting votes accurately”, we still cannot say for certain which side wins, and other means have to be used for us to make this judgment (hardin 2002, 220).10 to understand this point, we only need to be reminded of the fact that, during the florida recount in the 2000 election, the matter had to be resolved by the supreme court. the second argument also has something to do with the fact of the size of today’s democracies, as their large size makes the price of getting informed unbearably high. thus, we can consider hardin’s thesis as yet another contemporary development of montesquieu’s. if all these thinkers are correct, then it is simply impossible for the majority of voters to even come close to meet the pre-conditions of a meaningful democratic participation. on a more sympathetic note, all the previous problems aside, some citizens may prefer other obligations and interests-such as family obligations or scientific or artistic pursuits__to a time__consuming involvement in politics. these citizens may choose to remain politically indifferent. this choice becomes increasingly sensible when the political matters become too complicated due to the size of the state and the fact that the modern citizens don’t enjoy the guilty luxury of the ancient greeks who forced the slaves to do their daily chores. unlike the ancient republican form of democracy, a contemporary liberal democracy should let these 50 prajna vihara __ __ ~ voluntarily non-participating citizens be. however, there should also be a mechanism that prevents the indifferent citizens from having too much a voice in political matters. in political liberalism, rawls points out five facts of democratic society, which lead to his consideration of the central problem: how a plural yet stable liberal democracy is possible (1996, xxvii, 36-38 and 58; also see 1989, 474-478). we can then add an additional (sixth) fact of modern democracy (or a group of facts). first, human beings have a tendency to fall back to their self-interest, which is encouraged by one person one vote. second, some citizens choose to remain politically indifferent to many political matters. third, modern democratic states are in general so large that it makes it impossible for the majority of the citizenry to be adequately informed, however hard both the government and the individuals try. the causes of this impossibility are, first, due to the size of the modern states and the noble rejection of slavery, to be informed is a burden that most citizens’ intelligence, education, and willingness cannot bear; second, the population of modern states renders a single vote practically meaningless; third, the material wealth and the power of big corporations run free and wild, and they destroy the motive of the elite to devote themselves to the common good and distort information. the sixth fact seems to suggest that the rawlsian liberal and deliberative democracy, or liberal and deliberative democracy in general, in which every citizen participates in an equal manner and in the form of one person one vote, is impossible in the modern world where each state is simply too large. 3. the hybrid regime of confu-china and its superiority next, i will present a confucian form of ideal government-i call it “confu-china”, which, as we will see, can address the four problems of democracy better than the present democratic regimes with all their possible internal revisions. i have argued elsewhere that this government is what a confucian would endorse and promote,11 and, given the focus of this volume, i won’t repeat the arguments here. i will offer a framework of this government in the following. first, the rule of law and human rights are endorsed and firmly tongdong bai 51 established in confu-china. the possibility and necessity of this endorsement have been discussed elsewhere.12 second, in confu-china, the government is considered to be responsible for the material and moral well-being of the people. it is responsible for making it possible that average citizen has their basic material, social or relationship, moral and political, and educational needs met. on the issue of material needs, economic inequality is contained, following rawls’s own “difference principle” (rawls 1971, 60-62 and 78-83). on the issue of education, in addition to theoretical and technical knowledge, the government is also responsible for offering citizens civic education. the goal of civic education is to make citizens understand the following: each citizen should have compassion for others and maintain proper relationships to them; the role of the government is to maintain the material and moral well-being of the people; the politicians in the government should be those who are morally and intellectually superior__morally superior in the sense that they are willing to extend their compassion to all the people who are within his or her power to help; if the politicians are indeed morally and intellectually superior, they should be respected by the common people; the right to participate in a certain political matter is inseparable from one’s willingness to consider the common good and one’s competence at making sound decisions on this matter. to satisfy the moral and political needs of each citizen includes satisfying his or her need to participate in politics. then, in addition to offering the aforementioned education, if a citizen is interested in and has potential of participating in politics, the government should offer all means necessary__for example, the freedom of speech that makes it possible for people to be informed, place and time (for example, “deliberation days”) necessary for political discussions and voting, etc. as argued in the first and second sections of this paper, the government and the competent and virtuous that run the government should be respected. some democratic thinkers may accept this, but this is built into confucianism, making confu-china more firmly equipped with dealing with the first problem with democracy. a fact noticed by many is that, in america, politicians often pretend to know less than they actually do, while in east asia, with its confucian influence, politicians often pretend to know more than they actually do. of course, faking to know is not 52 prajna vihara __ __ ~ what we want, but, at least, faking in the right direction may help the coming into being of the desirable reality. we can reveal his lie if a leader fakes his educational background, thus encouraging other leaders to become truly learned. but if, in a culture, to have knowledge and experience is considered hurting political qualifications, no hope is left for improvements. the treatments with other problems of democracy by democratic thinkers are also endorsed and heartily promoted by confu-china. indeed, the confucian education may be more adequate than the democratic ones because, as i mentioned, the democratic hope lies in a form of civil friendship, which becomes impossible when the population is large, while the confucian education emphasizes on compassion that is targeted at strangers. but as i argued in the previous section, these arrangements, even with the further revisions in confu-china, are not adequate. this leads to the third arrangement of confu-china that departs from the “internal” solutions today’s democratic thinkers would endorse. firmly asserting that the service to the people offers legitimacy to a state, but understanding the limit of the aforementioned arrangements to improve people’s morals and informed-ness, the confucian would be in favor of a hybrid regime that introduce and strengthen the role of the competent and moral “meritocrats”, in addition to the institution of one person one vote. the necessity and the superiority of this regime to today’s democracy come from the aforementioned sixth fact of modern democracy. that is, as we will see below, since the meritocrats are not swayed by votes, they might be on the side of long-term or minority interests when there are conflicts between short-term and long-term, or majority and minority interests, and they might maintain stable, long-term policies. confucians think that the voting right (right of political participation) should be based upon (intellectual, moral, and political) competence, and the sixth fact of modern democratic society means that many citizens are not capable of making sound judgments on many political matters. through civic education, we hope that these citizens should willingly stay away from the decision procedure on these political matters, when they cannot quickly improve his or her competence on these matters. at the same time, we should have more institutional arrangetongdong bai 53 ments that help to prevent the incompetent citizens from having too much a voice in these political matters. based upon this consideration, following arrangements are made in confu-china. first, we should see that a main reason for people not to be informed is that modern states are often way too large. but on communal and local (neighborhood and town) matters__for example, which local policy or which local leader benefits them the most, almost any local resident knows them better than officials in the distant central government. since the matters dealt with here are daily affairs most relevant to residents, it is likely that they are willing to pay attention to them, rather than staying indifferent. it is also likely that the private interests of local residents can be checked by local governments. therefore, the preconditions for the sixth fact to hold don't exist in a small community. this means that all residents should be allowed to participate in local affairs, the ways of participation can be electing local officials through one person one vote, or directly voting on important matters. a difficult problem here is which matters should be considered local. for one thing, although some educational matters should be handled locally, according to mencius’s philosophy, the central government should offer a general and obligatory guideline of education. for another, if certain national policies are closely affecting local affairs, and the populace can make sound judgments on them, people should be allowed to participate, and these matters can be decided by referendum. a general problem is that how large (how many people) a community has to be in order for its complexity not to be beyond the comprehension of its people, and the answer to this problem will determine the size of “local community”. these questions need to be answered empirically, and cannot be answered by armchair philosophers. but a philosopher can offer a general principle: how much democratic participation depends upon how likely the participants are able to make sound decisions that are based upon public interests.13 second, when we are dealing with matters beyond those of a small community, the preconditions for the sixth fact of modern democracy are met, meaning that it is likely that citizens are indifferent to many of these matters, and they lack capacity of making sound judgments. we should then introduce arrangements to limit the influence of popular will on poli54 prajna vihara __ __ ~ cies. there are many ways to achieve this restriction. for example, at each higher level, each voter has to take a class and participate in discussions, or take a test specially designed for this level before he or she can be allowed to vote. different weights may be given to their votes based upon their performances in class or in the test, or based upon their educational levels, social and political roles, and other relevant factors. another, perhaps more practical and manageable arrangement is this. at a higher level, in addition to the elected branch, there can be additional branches of the legislature that are used to check the popular will. let’s call the former branch the lower house or the house of people, and the latter the upper house or the house of the learned and experienced (or “senators” in its original sense, that is, “elders”).14 from the name of the latter branch, we can see that this branch or these branches consist of the learned and the experienced (“elders” or “senators”). let me first discuss how the experienced are selected. since the local officials of the most basic level who are directly elected are freed from specialized jobs and exposed to policy-making on a local level that is often connected with policies on higher levels, they are then likely to be capable of participating in higher-level affairs that are beyond the grasp of the common people. if they have done good jobs in local affairs, but have been retired from decision-makings on these affairs, these experienced officials can then become members of the house of the experienced of a higher level. the house of the experienced can also include those who have done well in areas related to politics and wish to devote themselves to public affairs, such as industry leaders, scientists, organizers of local ngo’s (non-governmental organizations, such as environmental groups, groups for minority affairs, and unions), etc. from this level up, members of the houses of the experienced on higher levels may come from the experienced “elders” who retire from the government on the same level as the one on which the house of the experienced in question is, or from the houses of people and of the experienced of one level lower, and they are selected either through recommendations of some form or internal elections. in other words, houses of the experienced of different levels adopt leveled, internal elections or recommendations. to be clear, this leveled model is different from a representative democracy in that the local officials who enter a higher-level government tongdong bai 55 are not representatives of local interests in the higher-level government, but are those who are capable of participating in the policy-making on a higher level. however, these officials, even if they are free from specialized jobs, may not be free from special interests, especially the immediate material interests of their constituencies, if they are subjected to frequent elections by the local people (as is the case in a representative democracy). this is what often happens in the american congress, and an obvious example is the various infamous earmarks or pork barrel projects in which congressmen or congresswomen have the federal money spent on petty projects in their own districts. oftentimes, these projects force the federal money to be spent not in districts that desperately need it, but in the districts the politicians from which are best at bargaining and manipulating through material interests and threats. but for a confucian, popular participation is not a way to find consensus of people’s short-term interests, and politicians should not be the mere mouthpiece of these interests. to free politicians from the control of special interests is a reason that the house of the experienced consists of those who are not directly subject to local popular elections anymore. the other element of this house or another branch of the legislature is the learned. in his recent works, bell offers the following model. central to this model is “a bicameral legislature, with a democraticallyelected lower house and a ‘confucian’ upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations [later called the xianshiyuan]” (bell 2006, 267). when there is a conflict between these two houses, the “confucian” solution might be to strengthen the xianshiyuan, for example, by means of a constitutional formula providing supermajorities in the upper house with the right to override majorities in the lower house. the head of government and important ministers could be chosen from the xianshiyuan. most significant legislation would emanate from the xianshiyuan, with the lower house serving primarily as a check on its power. (bell 2006, 271) 56 prajna vihara __ __ ~ we can make the following revisions and developments on the basis of this model. governments that are on a level higher than the most basic level (the government of which is directly elected) can have their own house of the learned (and the experienced) of the legislature branch. the learned are those who are first selected by exams to attend “magnet schools”, and are then selected through further exams. this is similar to the situations of keju 科举 in traditional china where the literati obtain titles of different levels which may lead to different positions in the government by passing exams on corresponding levels. some might be suspicious of this attempt that apparently revives keju. but we should see that the keju system is in many ways similar to the western civil servant systems that are widely used today, and the limits of keju often come from the subjects of the exams and the means to conduct them. in the cultivation and selection of the learned, we can take advantage of educational resources of various levels, and require the potential candidates to study humanities (including both chinese and western classics) and sciences. each member of the learned may have a specialty, or we can select the learned from different fields that are needed for policy-making and legislation. moreover, in order to prevent them from being merely booksmart, they also have to go through a series of practical trainings and obtain working experiences, in addition to passing exams. as we have already seen, traces of the selection of the learned can be found in the keju system in traditional china, and traces of selecting the experienced, especially through recommendations, can also be found in traditional china, especially during the two han dynasties (206 b.c.220 a.d.), in the form of “recommending the filial and the uncorrupt” (ju xiao lian 举孝廉 ). in fact, in the han recommendation system, promising students were first selected to the imperial college (tai xue 太学 ), those who did well in studies and exams were then sent to local governments, and those who did good works in their governmental jobs were eventually recommended for higher offices. thus, this recommendation system is actually a mixture of the two selection procedures (by experience and by exams) that were discussed above. the existence of this mixture tells us that perhaps some combinations of the two selection procedures may be more effective. generally speaking, the fact that we can find traces of the selection procedures discussed here in traditional china shows that, tongdong bai 57 in spite of our philosophical approach, our designs here are not baseless contemporary inventions that disregard traditions, but are rooted in the chinese political culture and philosophy, in particular, confucianism (or the kind of confucianism that incorporates into itself the legalist han fei zi's considerations of institutional designs). the resonances between our designs and political mechanisms in china’s past suggest that we may obtain many insights on how to design the selection procedures by studying various selection procedures in traditional china.15 whatever the details of the designs of the upper house may be, it is clear that these arrangements of different branches of the legislature de facto reduce popular will to the role of consultation, and give more power to the relatively knowledgeable, experienced, and compassionate. it is a government for the people, but not purely by the people; rather, it is only partly by the people and partly by the competent people. 4. answers to challenges to the superiority of confu-china in the following, i will consider a few objections to the designs of the upper house. by answering these objections, i hope to elaborate on the designs of the upper house and the reasoning behind them. the first objection is this. the introduction of the upper house in such a manner may breed resentment of the disenfranchised that will threaten the stability of a society.16 in comparison, an important function of democracy is precisely to give people a sense that the legitimacy of the state and the government lies in the approval by the people, so that people will support the state and the government full-heartedly. my answer to this objection is the following. first, as is already shown, it is crucial to the confucian version of democracy that people be instilled, through civic education, with a sense of respect for excellence and acceptance of the rule of the wise and virtuous so as to willingly abdicate their right to participate when they consider themselves incompetent. chinese peasantry in the past and many western__especially american__voters before the age of populism and cynicism had respect for the authority, and they didn’t find it unacceptable that the experienced and knowledgeable have more authority. this fact shows the power of education and culture. second, in 58 prajna vihara __ __ ~ confu-china, the government bears the responsibility of educating everyone, and the exams are open to everyone. this may lessen the feeling of disenfranchisement and resentment. third, legislatures of every level still have a popularly elected branch. an objection related to the first objection is that some might argue that the rule of the wise or paternalism will make the people who are excluded from politics more and more incompetent, thus artificially perpetuating the distinction between the ruler and the ruled. this is perhaps another reason that those who believe in democracy resist hierarchy and paternalism. to understand this objection, let’s take a look at john stuart mill's account on this problem. he warns the danger of paternalism in his criticism of the idea that, “if a good despot could be ensured, despotic monarchy would be the best form of government” (mill 1958, 36).17 according to mill, even if this good despot could take care of everything for the people (which is nearly impossible), his paternalistic actions would chain up the free agency of his subjects and thus perpetuate their incompetence. this is like the situation where the children tend never to grow up when the parents are over-competent and try to take care of everything. in contrast, popular participation offers the best civic education of the people, leading their vision to go beyond their selves (mill 1958, 3655). from the discussion of the sixth fact of modern democracy, however, we should see that mill’s expectation of the educational function of popular elections may have been overly optimistic. on the contrary, only with popular election, the voting public may retreat to their narrow and often misguided private interests. on mill’s critical note, i should first point out that rawls offers a similar argument in his earlier work a theory of justice. he first defends plural voting (i.e., “persons with greater intelligence and education should have extra votes,”), an arrangement different from one person one vote and, interestingly, an idea rawls traces back to mill: the political liberties are indeed subordinate to the other freedoms that, so to say, define the intrinsic good of the passengers [in a metaphor, rawls compares the state with a ship and people with the passengers]. admitting these assumptions, plural voting may be perfectly just. (rawls tongdong bai 59 1971, 233) immediately after making this argument, he criticizes this arrangement, and his criticism is similar to mill’s criticism of paternalism. he states that the participation of all citizens “lays the foundations for civic friendship and shapes the ethos of political culture” and “enhance[s] the self-esteem and the sense of political competence of the average citizen” (rawls 1971, 234). in response, we can see that, in confu-china, popular participation is still preserved. it is just that the check by the elite is added to the decision-making. more importantly, although mencius and other classical confucians didn’t discuss the civilizing role of mass participation, a confucian can nevertheless happily recognize this role. moreover, confucians may even recognize the practical and psychological benefit of making people feel involved as a member of the state through mass participation in the age of democracy.18 as bell points out, even in today’s china, “the symbolic ritual of free and fair competitive elections __ even if the people’s views have minimal impact on actual policies”__has to be recognized (bell 2006, 273). all these considerations give us additional reasons for confu-china to preserve popular elections, although, at the same time, different from rawls, confucians may also be concerned with the possibility that, through this civilizing process, people may grow overconfident, thus losing respect for the wise and the virtuous. moreover, in confu-china, exams and experiences are introduced as the basis for voting rights in the case of certain political matters and for the membership of certain branches of the legislature, but these exams are open to the public and the government has the responsibility to offer any means necessary for citizens to be educated and to participate in politics. even if people fail to pass or choose not to take the exams, the door will be always open when they change their mind or improve their competence. that is, unlike what is criticized by mill, this hierarchy is not fixed. on the contrary, it encourages upward mobility. as a famous line of an ancient chinese poem (exaggeratingly) says, “one can be a farm boy in the morning, but come to the emperor ’s court in the evening” (朝为田舍郎，暮登天子堂 ). this mobility may also dispel possible resentment of the disenfranchised against the powerful elite. when discussing the 60 prajna vihara __ __ ~ keju system that can be considered a forerunner of the selection mechanism we discuss here, the historian and philosopher qian mu (钱穆 ) argues, it “can fundamentally eradicate the social classes…… [and] can cultivate people’s interest in politics and strengthen their patriotism” (qian 1996, 405-406). we can see here that these arrangements by the confucians have an intention similar to the popular participation in a democratic regime. clearly, the rule of law has to be enforced so that there is no perceived unfairness in this mobile hierarchy. another sensible objection is that the learned and the experienced don’t always make good decisions. this may be a sensible one. but we should see that the reason we need the branch of the elite is the recognition of the sixth fact of modern democracy. in other words, the introduction of popular election in history was to prevent few noblemen from controlling political decision-making process and using public resources for their own gains, and mass participation was a good check of pure aristocracy. but a grave problem of today's democracies is that what was meant to be a correction of aristocracy has gone to the other extreme, and it has given too much voice to blind popular will. therefore, we need to reintroduce the good aspect of aristocracy, that is, “aristocracy” in its original sense, the rule by the excellent (at both knowledge and morality), and use it to check the excesses of democracy, hoping to achieve a more desirable middle ground between these two systems, rather than pinning our hope for good governance on the conscience of members from either side. some might agree with me on this point, but might argue that, considering the fact that china (or other not-yet-democratic countries) is not democratic yet, perhaps we should use the promotion of popular elections as a more effective means to achieve the desirable middle ground of limited democracy. but as the path of democratic countries in the recent past has shown us, oftentimes, we often cannot stop at the desirable middle, but slide helplessly and hopelessly to the extreme which we wished to use merely as a corrective. even if we put aside this possibly controversial empirical observation, the democratic promoters should at least be aware of what the ideal state is. besides, even if the branch of the experienced and learned didn’t directly improve the quality of policy-making, its existence can be taken as a civic education, thus indirectly improving the quality of policy-making. that is, the existence of this branch makes tongdong bai 61 people aware of the idea that political participation is not an inborn right, but is based upon competence and has moral requirements. mill and rawls are correct to say that political participation offers opportunity of civic education. but when participating, common people are also helped by looking up to the exemplary people and institutions. they offer role models for people to participate in politics. as confucius says, “governing by virtue is like the north polar star, which remains in its place while all the other stars revolve around it” (2.1 of the analects; for an english translation of the analects, see lau 2002). the role of civic education by the upper house, the house of the experienced and learned in confuchina, enriches the educational role of mass participation discussed by mill and rawls. in short, as long as we don’t hold a radically pessimistic attitude (an attitude some mystical or christian thinkers might have) that denies any positive role of reason and virtues in decision-making, we should see that the upper house might improve government. some might object that, not only do not the elite often make good decisions, but they often make bad decisions. thus they shouldn’t play the role of check and balance. the basis for this argument is that the rule by the elite often falls victim to the interest of the elite class. this worry is a sensible one. to prevent this from happening, we hope that the moral education of the elite may play some role. more importantly, some institutional arrangements should be made. a key is that we must establish a respectable and stable rule of law that regulates the elite branch and use the house of people to check the former branch, so as not to let the elite establish laws at their own will to benefit themselves or their associates. another mechanism to prevent the elite from serving their own interests is that each branch has to have a significant number of members, so that it is hard for the elite to form a unified interest group. another reason to suspect that the elite will make bad decisions is this. the sixth fact of modern democracy presupposes that the populace in a large state can easily be misled by interest groups. but perhaps to mislead a small circle of elite is practically even easier than misleading millions of people.19 this might be the case, and i can only give an imperfect answer. we need empirical evidence for this claim, and, until we have it, we can at least hope that the ruling elite who are wiser, more experienced, more virtuous, and with better conditions (time, assistance, etc.) are less susceptible 62 prajna vihara __ __ ~ to mis-information than the populace. i believe that the regime of confu-china is applicable to all states. the account of it is not only theoretical, but also is meant to be practical. however, whether the ideal can be actualized depends upon the mainstream culture of each state. in the u.s., where most people take one person one vote as something sacred and any challenge to it simply as outrageous,20 the regime of confu-china may only be established through skillful disguises. but in emerging democracies and democratizing countries, the idea of the regime of confu-china might be spread in its original form. besides, the design of confu-china might also help the democratization process of pre-democratic countries. this is because a problem with recently democratized countries is that, among them, there are many populist governments. the chaos these governments create not only make their own citizens suffer, but also make people in pre-democratic states resist democratization. for example, much of political turmoil in taiwan is often taken as a product of a populist government, and the lack of education and other conditions makes many who desire democracy think that it is not feasible to the present situations of today’s china. but the regime design of confu-china, especially its limited or restricted form of democracy, might help us to get around these obstacles. more importantly, the previous discussions might help us to see clearly the truly desirable elements of liberal democracy, thus offering guidance to the democratizing process. these discussions, simply put, show that liberties (rights) and the rule of law might be the gem of liberal democracy, while popular election might be what is problematic. people often believe that liberties and the rule of law on the one hand, and popular election on the other are inseparable from each other, but this view is verified neither theoretically nor empirically. if the two parts are separable, a very simple summary of the above discussions in dealing with democratization is that liberties and the rule of law should come first, and a limited form of democracy should come second. lastly, i will discuss some objections to the arguments in this section that are based upon observations of political reality. first, one could argue that what is truly superior in the american regime is its rule of law and bureaucratic (elite) system, and one person one vote doesn’t really matter. moreover, one person one vote only gives people a sense of tongdong bai 63 imagined equality, and this can be seen from the fact of the disproportionally high number of rich and highly educated people in american congress. in other words, although there are no explicit arrangements like those in confu-china, the u.s. is a de facto regime ruled by the elite. i agree on this evaluation. but i believe that, even if what popular election gives people is an imagined equality, it still gives too much power to the popular will in its influence on politics and the ruling elite. therefore, i insist that elitism or meritocracy should “come out of the closet”, becoming a proud part of liberal democracy and culture. some of the american founding fathers actually had some “elitist” designs, but perhaps because they were not explicitly made, gradually, these elements have disappeared. not to repeat this history, we should make the meritocratic elements explicit. the “elitist” design of confu-china is to give more power to the politically motivated, compassionate, and competent people, and check the influence on politics by those who are politically indifferent, narrowminded, and incompetent. some might ask why we cannot leave it to “natural selections”. those concerned with politics naturally wish to push for their ideas. from american political reality, however, this hope might be overly optimistic, when we see the result of “natural selection” is the rise of the extreme, the issue voters. on surface, they are the opposites to the political indifferent in our discussion of the sixth fact of modern democracy, but, in reality, they adopt the same kind of attitude of political indifference and have the same kind of political ignorance as those apparently politically indifferent and ignorant. for they are concerned with but one issue, refuse to discuss it with others, and indifferent to or ignorant of other issues. they actually offer a supporting example to the sixth fact. another challenge that is based upon observations of reality is about the failure of the iranian model. today’s iran also tries to combine democratic election with the rule by the (religious) elite. of course, an obvious answer to this challenge is that the choice of the elite in iran is based upon the religious expertise that might be politically irrelevant. but this answer needs to be scrutinized further. it should be acknowledged that many observations of democracy in this chapter are based upon american political reality. but whether this reality is peculiarly american or is world-wide can be debated. in par64 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ticular, we need to refer to political scientists for their theoretical and empirical studies of whether western european and japanese democracies suffer from the problems caused by the sixth fact of democracy. 5. confu-china: not a rejection, but an improvement of liberal democracy confu-china is a correction of present liberal democratic regimes, but many who favor democracy may still consider this idea radical. i will show in this section that it is really not. as we see, in practice, a key difference between confu-china and a liberal democracy is that the former indirectly restricts one person one vote and leads to some sort of political inequality. but, as has been discussed, is one person one vote so essential to liberal democracy? of course, according to rawls, reasonable citizens in a liberal democracy should view one another as free and equal. but in his works, there is little mentioning that one person one vote is an expression of equality. only in his discussion of the decent consultation hierarchy does rawls seem to express a belief that one person one vote is an essential element to liberal democracy (rawls 1999a, 71). however, in the law of peoples (lp), he explicitly excludes the “right” to equal political participation from the basic human rights, an exclusion criticized by many.21 this suggests that this right is not as important as what he considers basic rights. in fact, as we see from his discussion of plural voting in a theory of justice (tj), he doesn’t seem to think that the violation of one person one vote is in conflict with liberal democracy, although, as is mentioned earlier, he defends it (or some form of popular and equal involvement in politics__he doesn’t explicitly say that this involvement is in the form of one person one vote) on the ground that it encourages civil friendship, self-respect, and competence (rawls 1971, 233-234). in fact, as discussed in the previous sections of this paper, both confu-china and rawls believe that political participation presupposes proper education and being informed. theoretically, the only crucial difference between them is that the former recognizes the sixth fact of modern democracy, and offers a more realistic treatment of this fact. with regard to the de facto political inequality, if we follow the rationale of tongdong bai 65 rawls’s difference principle in tj that economic inequality can be accepted if the least advantaged are benefited (rawls 1971, 75-83), why can’t we have a difference principle in politics (i will call it the political difference principle): political or electoral inequality (in terms of voting power) can be accepted if the least advantaged are benefited? interestingly, after pointing out problems with contemporary democratic societies and offering the hybrid regime as a solution, the journalist and political commentator kaplan points out, according to aristotle, “whether the few or the many rule is accidental to oligarchy__the rich are few everywhere, the poor many”.22 the real difference, he [aristotle] wrote, is that “oligarchy is to the advantage of the rich, democracy to the advantage of the poor”. (kaplan 1997, 80) from this he argues that perhaps the hybrid regime he discusses is real democracy, while modern democracies have degenerated or will soon degenerate into de facto oligarchies. similarly, we can say that perhaps confu-china is real democracy. one may object to this line of reasoning by arguing that the first principle of justice is the principle of equality, and some of the arrangements in confu-china violate equality.23 however, according to rawls, the first principle reads, “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty of others” (rawls 1971, 60), and the political liberty, one of the basic liberties, means “the right to vote [but not the right for each vote to be counted equally__my note] and to be eligible for public office” (ibid., 61). as we already saw, in confu-china, the democratic branch is still preserved, and the selection for the branch (es) of the experienced and the learned is also open to the public (though not in the form of direct election). indeed, the government is responsible for promoting the upward mobility of common citizens to participate in politics and in the activities of the “non-democratic” branch (es). besides, other aspects of equality are well preserved in confuchina. in short, the political difference principle embodied by some arrangements in confu-china may be in a minor, if any, conflict with rawls’s requirement of equality that is expressed in the first principle of justice. 66 prajna vihara __ __ ~ there is yet another way to see the relation between confu-china and the rawlsian liberal democracy. if we follow rawls’s idea that there is an analogy between what is within a people and what is among different peoples, we see that this analogy actually breaks down in rawls’s own later philosophy.24 that is, in his theory, domestically, a liberal people consists of free and equal citizens and its majority is reasonable. internationally, however, he never asserts that well-ordered peoples__the only peoples that are reasonable__must be the majority. the well-ordered peoples actually possess a higher position than other peoples, and thus rawls introduces a de-facto hierarchy of peoples on the international level. in contract, the regime of confu-china carries out the analogy much more nicely. its domestic hierarchy corresponds to the hierarchy of peoples: the informed and compassionate play a justifiably larger role in domestic politics, just as the well-ordered peoples play a justifiably larger role in international politics. of course, the percentage of incompetent citizens over all the citizens of a state might be higher than the percentage of not well-ordered societies over the totality of all societies. many cosmopolitan liberal thinkers criticize rawls for not being able to carry over his approach in tj that deals with domestic case to the international case, and argue for a consistent approach to both the domestic case and the international case that is based upon his handling of the domestic case.25 i argue for a consistent approach to the opposite direction: to carry his approach to the international case over to the treatment of the domestic case. then, where do we put rawls’s liberal people in my “backward” analogy? the liberal people and its corresponding international society of liberal peoples can be taken as a domestic ideal and an international ideal. in addition to the above formal comparisons, from a more substantial perspective, confu-china actually develops rawls’s ideas, deals with problems rawls doesn’t deal with, and offer more realistic solutions to the problems with which rawls is concerned. as is implied by the third fact of democratic society (rawls 1999a, 38), his version of liberal democracy presupposes that at least a substantial majority of citizens have to be reasonable, and he doesn’t discuss how to deal with the situation in which the unreasonable people may constitute the majority or a substantial minority in a society. he has a good reason to make this presuppositongdong bai 67 tion. that is, we have to solve the problem of the stability first in the ideal situation in which the majority of a society consists of reasonable people who nevertheless hold conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. then and only then can we deal with the problem in a more realistic situation.26 however, if we accept the fact that no real-world liberal democracy has a majority of reasonable and informed citizens, then liberal peoples as rawls understands simply don’t exist. in contrast, confuchina deals with the problem about the relations between reasonable and informed citizens and unreasonable, uninformed, or indifferent people. to be clear, my focus is not about rawls’s failure to offer a proof of the desirability of liberal democracy, as some people might be concerned with. on this alleged failure by rawls, i share burton dreben’s view, expressed in a response he offered to someone who asked a question about the justification for liberal democracy (dreben 2003, 328-329). rather, my concern is that, if, due to the sixth fact, this ideal of liberal democracy is too utopian, can we have a regime that deals with this fact that is nevertheless in line with many of the rawlsian ideals? i argue in this paper that confu-china might fit the bill. moreover, as is pointed out in the previous section, confu-china tries to deal with many practical problems, such as social security, international aid, domestic and international human rights, which rawls is deeply concerned with (rawls 1997, 773), and the difference between confu-china and rawls’s ideal liberal democracy is that the former doesn't believe that these problems can be solved within the regime of the latter, but needs the corrections of regime adopted by confu-china. if what we argue in this chapter stands, we then show the vitality of confucianism in designing an ideal regime. in other words, confucianism as a political philosophy still has a broader function than educating the rulers. facing with the challenges of contemporary dominant political values, confucianism doesn’t have to retreat to the area of ethics or some “confucian reservations”. confucianism-based confu-china doesn’t reject liberal democracy, but is a development of it. it deals with the sixth fact of modern democracy which other liberal democratic thinkers fail to deal with adequately. in his lp, rawls calls the regime he designs a “realistic utopia”. to establish a realistic utopia is the difference between a political philosopher and a politician (the former being 68 prajna vihara __ __ ~ more utopian), and between a political philosopher and a mere dreamer (the former being more realistic). but from the point of view of confuchina, rawls fails to deal with some realistic factors which need to be dealt with even in an ideal design. therefore, using rawls’s terminology, we can say that confu-china is a more realistic utopia than rawls’s design of liberal democracy. endnotes 1this paper is closely based upon chapter 3 of bai 2009, especially the english and revised manuscript of this chapter. the reader doesn’t have to read section 5 if he or she finds this paper too long, for this section is to argue that the form of meritocracy proposed in this paper is not that radically different from rawlsian liberal democracy, a topic not closely associated with this conference. 2from a house of commons speech in 1947, according to http:// en.wikiquote.org/wiki/winston_churchill (accessed on 11/29/2011). 3for some examples, see kaplan 1997 and zakaria 1997. a lot of academic researches have also been conducted on the relations between democracy and growth, democracy and corruption, and democracy and ethnic violence (i thank tianjian shi for calling my attention to some of these researches). for example, the political scientist jonathan krieckhaus has shown that democracy has a negative effect on economic growth in the 1960s and should have a negative effect in latin america (although it has a positive effect on growth in the 1980s and should have a positive effect in africa) (2004 and 2006). daniel treisman (2000) shows that the perceived corruption is influenced by many factors, and whether a country is democratic or not is only one of them. moreover, with regard to the effect of democracy on perceived corruption, a country has to have been democratic for decades in order for democracy to have a significant but relatively small effect on perceived corruption. steven i. wilkinson (2005) shows a complicated picture of the relations between democracy and ethnic violence in india, while daniel bell (2006) shows that, oftentimes, democratization leads to an increase of ethnic violence. 4for a more detailed account, see ackerman and fishkin 2005. there are also numerous popular accounts of the lack of basic political knowledge among americans. for a recent one, see kristof 2008. 5see chan and chapter 2 of bai 2009. 6an almost identical passage can be found in rawls 1999a, 136, and a similar passage can be found in rawls 1996, 49. see also rawls 1999a, 86-88 and 177178. 7see rawls 1996, xxxix-xliii and 146-150 and rawls 1999a, 149-150 and 168-169. tongdong bai 69 8we should consider, based upon this distinction, whether many “liberals” in china are liberals in rawls’s sense or libertarians. 9jean-jacques rousseau agrees with montesquieu on this issue, and offers similar arguments. see his dedication “to the republic of geneva” in his discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men (rousseau 1964, 78-90) and chapters 3 and 4, book 3 of his on the social contract (rousseau 1978, 83-85). 10this impossibility may be a mathematical impossibility: the statistical error of counting a large number of votes is too significant for one vote difference to be considered meaningfully determining the outcome. i thank qian jiang for pointing this out to me. 11bai 2009, sections 1 and 2 of chapter 3. 12bai 2009, chapters 2 and 4 and section 5 of chapter 3. 13the treatment of local affairs in confu-china is different from what is practiced in today’s china in that, first, village (local) elections should be free from interventions of higher officials; second, on this level, popularly elected government should be the only executive branch; third, basic liberties and rights should be effectively protected by law; fourth, there are popularly elected elements in governments and legislatures of higher levels, meaning that elections should not be restricted on the village or town levels; fifth, certain national issues should be open to referendum. none of these is satisfactorily done in today’s china. another challenge to local elections in china is that village elections in some parts of china have led to the monopoly and abuse of powers by powerful village clans or strongmen (i thank zhang qingxiong (张庆熊 ) for pointing this out to me). this fact can challenge the arguments in this paragraph. i suspect that the rule of law, protection of rights and liberties, and more democratic elements on every level of the government might eventually correct these abuses. but this is something that needs to be treated by political scientists as well as political philosophers. 14obviously, in today’s democracies, especially in today’s american context, these names themselves would likely doom the latter branch to failure, because “people” is often taken as a good word by the people, while “learned”, “experienced”, “elders” are words of ridicule. i use these names because they express the intentions of these branches, and i will leave it to the politically savvy to come up with better names for these branches. perhaps, for political purposes, we should use “the lower house” and “the upper house” or simply “the senate” only. 15the late chinese historian and philosopher qian mu 钱穆 offers many detailed, subtle, and insightful analyses of political arrangements in traditional china. see, for example, qian 1996 and 2005. 16i wish to thank daniel bell and qian jiang for pointing out this problem to me. 17mill’s choice of words is rather curious. the “despotic monarchy” he refers to is actually what we usually call “benevolent absolutism” or “enlightened absolutism”, and the despot he talks about is what we usually call a benevolent or enlightened monarch. he uses “despotism” and its variants perhaps in order to lead, 70 prajna vihara __ __ ~ through rhetoric, his readers to feel repelled by this kind of regime. 18based upon some field works in indonesia, benjamin olken arrives at the following conclusion: although direct participation doesn’t lead to policies significantly different from those adopted without mass participation, yet people in the former situation feel far more satisfied with these policies (olken 2008). one might dismiss democratic participation as cynical manipulation. but we shouldn’t ignore the significance of democratic participation, even if it lies chiefly in psychological satisfaction. after all, the goal of a good state is to make people happy, and happiness does not merely come from the satisfaction of material needs. i wish to thank qian jiang for pointing this out to me. 19i wish to thank qian jiang for pointing out this problem to me. 20for example, a most powerful objection to samuel alito’s nomination to the american supreme court is a ruling he made that could be interpreted as an indirect challenge to one person one vote, “a corner stone of american democracy” (cohen 2006; see also the new york times editorial (new york times, 2006)). interestingly, some, if not all, who defend alito don’t defend him by criticizing the idea of one person one vote, but by pointing out that alito didn’t really challenge this idea in his ruling (see, for example, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ 2006/01/what_the_ny_tim.html, accessed on march 15, 2006). 21see nickel 2006 and buchanan 2002. for a defense of this exclusion, see berstein 2006. 22kaplan doesn’t offer the source of this quotation. he may have been paraphrasing a passage in aristotle’s politics (1279b30-1280a5). in the politics, aristotle also gives many arguments that support hybrid regime (c.f. 1281b25-35). 23i wish to thank li shi (李石 ) for pointing this out to me. 24for an argument concerning a different kind of breakdown between the domestic case discussed in political liberalism and the international case discussed in lp and a more liberal solution of it, see tan 2006, 88-91. 25see, for example, pogge 1994 and 2006, buchanan 2002, and tan 1998 and 2006. 26in tj, he offers a similar rationale for dealing with the problem of justice first and postponing the more pressing problem of injustice (rawls 1971, 8-9). references ackerman, bruce and james fishkin (2004), “righting the ship of democracy”, legal affairs, january/february 2004, 34-9. --(2005), deliberation day. new haven, ct: yale university press. bai, tongdong (2009), the new mission of an old state: the contemporary and comparative relevance of classical confucian potongdong bai 71 litical philosophy 旧邦新命 : 古今中西参照下的古典儒家政治哲学 . beijing: peking university press. (a revised english manuscript is available by contacting the author.) bell, daniel (2006), beyond liberal democracy. princeton, nj: princeton university press. berstein, alyssa r. (2006), “a human right to democracy? legitimacy and intervention”, in martin and reidy 2006, 278-98. buchanan, allen (2000), “rawls’s law of peoples: rules for a vanished westphalian world”, ethics, vol. 110, no. 4. (july), 697-721. cohen, adam (2006), “question for judge alito: what about one person one vote?” new york times, january 3, 2006. dreben, burton (2003), “on rawls and political liberalism”, in freeman 2003, 316-46. freeman, samuel (ed.) (2003), the cambridge companion to rawls. cambridge: cambridge university press. fukuyama, francis (1992), the end of history and the last man, new york, avon books. hardin, russell (2002), “street-level epistemology and democratic participation”, the journal of political philosophy, vol. 10, number 2, 212-29. kaplan, robert (1997), “was democracy just a moment?”, the atlantic monthly vol. 280, issue 6, december 1997: 55-80. kissinger, henry (2001), does america need a foreign policy? new york, ny: simon & schuster. krieckhaus, jonathan (2004), “the regime debate revisited: a sensitivity analysis of democracy’s effects”, british journal of political science, 34:4 (october), 635-55. --(2006), “democracy and economic growth: how regional context influences regime effects”, british journal of political science, 36:2 (april), 317-340. kristof, nicholas d. (2008), “‘with a few more brains’”, new york times, march 30, 2008. lau, d. c. (刘殿爵 ) (tr.) (2002) confucius: the analects (paperback bilingual edition). hong kong: the chinese university press. --(2003), mencius, revised and bilingual edition. hong kong: the chinese university press. 72 prajna vihara __ __ ~ martin, rex and david a. reidy (eds.) (2006), rawls’s law of peoples__a realistic utopia? malden, ma: blackwell. mill, john stuart (1958), considerations on representative government. new york, ny: the liberal arts press. montesquieu (1989), the spirit of the laws. anne m. cohler, basia carolyn miller, and harold samuel stone (eds. and trs.). cambridge: cambridge university press. new york times (2006), “judging samuel alito” (editorial, january 8, 2006). nickel, james w. (2006), “are human rights mainly implemented by intervention?”, in martin and reidy 2006, 263-77. olken, benjamin a. (2008), “direct democracy and local public goods: evidence from a field experiment in indonesia”, working paper 14123, nber (national bureau of economic research) working paper series, june 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14123 (accessed on october 26, 2008). pogge, thomas (1994), “an egalitarian law of peoples”, philosophy and public affairs 23, 195-224. --(2006), “do rawls’s two theories of justice fit together?”, in martin and reidy 2006, 206-25. qian, mu (钱穆 ) (1996), 《国史大纲》。北京 : 商务印书馆。. --(2002), 孔子传》。北京 : 三联书店 . rawls, john (1971), a theory of justice. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. --(1989), “the domain of the political and overlapping consensus”, in rawls 1999b, 473-96. ---(1996), political liberalism. new york, ny: columbia university press. ---(1997), “the idea of public reason revisited”, the university of chicago law review, vol. 64, no. 3, 765-807.. ---(1999a), the law of peoples with “the idea of public reason revisited”, cambridge, ma: harvard university press. --(1999b), john rawls: collected papers (edited by samuel freeman). cambridge, ma: harvard university press. rousseau, jean-jacques (1964), the first and second discourses. roger d. and judith r. masters (tr.). new york, ny: st martin’s press. tongdong bai 73 --(1978), on the social contract with geneva manuscript and political economy. roger d. masters (ed.) and judith r. masters (tr.). new york, ny: st. martin’s. tan, kok-chor (1998), “liberal toleration in rawls’s law of peoples”, ethics, vol. 108, no. 2 (jan.), 276-95. --(2006), “the problem of decent people”, in martin and reidy 2006, 76-94. treisman, daniel (2000), “the causes of corruption: a cross-national study”, journal of public economics, 76:3, 399-457. wilkinson, steven i. (2005), votes and violence: electoral competition and ethnic riots in india. cambridge: cambridge university press. zakaria, fareed (2003), the future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad. new york, ny: w. w. norton & company. 74 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 15_(257-264) the bhil culture in central.pmd the bhil culture in central india babu joseph catholic bishops conference of india abstract there is a vast diversity of cultures in asia. this diversity is under threat by the pressures of nationalism and of globalization. this essay discusses the bihil culture of central india as a microcosm of some of these issues facing cultural diversity. it is with much joy that i compliment the organizers of this colloquium at the assumption university on the theme” origins and destinies of cultures”. this being a continuation of last year’s colloquium that focused on asian cultures and the current issues of importance to them, i see a great significance in delving deeper into the origins and destinies of cultures which will in some ways take us closer to each other and forge better brotherhood and sisterhood in the asian context. an intricate area of study: a major hurdle that one comes across while attempting to study asian cultures is their sheer diversity; there are hundreds or even thousands of cultures present in the asian continent that are so different from one another, and it takes a great deal to make sense out of them before one can form an informed opinion on their distinctiveness. moreover, there is overlapping of some aspects of different cultures in asia that it often becomes a daunting task to delineate the fine nuances of one culture from another. as for instance, the east asian cultures are heavily influenced by the chinese culture, although distinctive elements have also been found in the cultures of thailand, laos, vietnam, and japan. in the same manner, the south asian cultures are strongly influenced by the inprajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 257-264 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 257 dian culture although there are elements of these cultures that seem quite unique. it goes without saying, therefore, that any dominant culture in an area will have its influence exerted on smaller cultures, creating in the process a spectrum of cultures in a given area, and in our case in the asian continent. the origin of cultures. the concept of culture of a particular group of people is defined by things ranging from language, religion, cuisine and social habits, to music and the arts. all these aspects manifest the collective ethos of a given social group that has been developed over a period of time and have been accepted and endorsed by it. however, the discourse on the origin of cultures is fraught with several difficulties particularly in the asian context for the simple reason that by and large there is an absence of importance placed on historical accuracy. one can often come across a phrase __ “once upon a time” __ in the common parlance of daily discourse of many asian communities. this common phrase points to a less than serious attitude towards historical accuracy; what passes for historic is often mixed with fables and myths that are integral to popular discourse of a given culture. that said, one can not totally dismiss the historical elements present in the fables and myths for the reason that some of them have been ‘created’ in a historical context of a particular place and over a period of time. what is to be noted in this context is that there is a definite distinction in understanding the significance of historicity in the western and eastern cultural milieu. to that extent searching for historically accurate points of beginnings of a certain asian culture may not be as feasible, as for instance, arriving at a more accurate point in history when a western culture may have originated. where can one find the sources of a particular culture? the historians rely on findings in archeology in order to ascertain the origin and growth of a culture and civilization. and the archeologists in their research also come across many aspects of a culture that aid them to get a clearer view of it. it is also a fact that sources of a specific culture are 258 prajna vihara-~ mostly found in the folklore, songs, dances, paintings, dress patterns and cuisines, art and architecture, profession and life style they adopt. in the absence of recorded historical accounts, most ancient cultures heavily relied on oral traditions for transmitting their cultural ethos to successive generations. and in this transmission process art and artifacts play an important role. an enquiry into the bhil culture of central india. although i belong to a culture other than what i am going to present before you, my credentials to speak on this culture lies in the fact that i have been associated with it for a couple of years through education and other development works. and any serious development works requires a fairly good insight into the community and its culture, and hence i did some work in understanding the bhil culture, which is classified as tribal in the indian demographic classification. tribal or adivasi in hindi language denotes the origin and socio-economic status of this and other similar communities in india which constitutes about 8% of its population.1 and because of socio-economic backwardness of this section of indian population they have been provided with affirmative action by the constitution of india. there are over 500 tribal communities in india and they are considered as the ‘original’ inhabitants of the land while other segments of the population are considered to be migrants at various points in time.2 this sense of ‘rootedness’ to the land is even better denoted by the hindi term __adivasi or mulnivasi as some prefer to say __ which literally speaks of the status of the inhabitants as those who lived here from the ‘beginning’.3 the place of their habitation was and to some extent even today is largely in the forests, place quite removed from the towns and cities, the modern man’s places of habitation. this forest habitation of the tribals helped them to remain isolated to some extent from the vicissitudes of modern life style; they could preserve their unique culture and cultural traits from the invasion of the modern cultures. the bhil tribals have their own social customs and traditions, some of which are unique to babu joseph 259 them while others share some commonalities with other cultures. the word bhil is derived from the bil or vil which mean bow. they are the largest tribe of south asia and constitute 39% of the total population of the state of rajasthan. bhils are known as bow-men of central india. bhil tribe is divided into two groups, the central or pure bhils found in the mountains ranges of madhya pradesh, maharashtra, gujarat, rajasthan and eastern rajput bhils are found in eastern parts of tripura. the bhil tribes are mentioned in epics like mahabharata and ramayana.4 indian mythology says that bhil women offered ber to lord rama, when he was in the jungles of dhandaka, searching for sita. in the history of independent india the bhil tribes of india were regarded as the fighters who were in a battle against the mughals, marathas and the british. bhils furnished the needs of princes of mewar5 with bowmen, supplies or by guarding their families. some famous names of bhils are bhim, bhim singh maharana, bhimisi and bhindar. they were employed by the rajputs as shikaris (hunters) and as warriors in colonial times. the mewar bhil corps today is a much-admired corps of mewar. they are the best archers and possess tremendous knowledge in geography and rank as the third largest tribe in india after the gonds and santhals. bhagat or gurus (teachers) perform the religious rites for bhil tribe. bhils village headsmen (thadavi) deal with their disputes. bhils strictly follow rules and regulations and marry only in their own tribes. the bhils religious practice differs from place to place. they worship local deities like khandoba, kanhoba, bahiroba, and sitalmata. they worship tiger god called ‘vaghdev’. bhils don’t have temples of their own and consult badvas __the hereditary sorcerers on all occasions, as they are highly superstitious people. dance and music are given importance by the bhils due to their rich cultural history. the famous dance among the bhils is ghoomar and gair which are the religious dance drama performed by men in the month of sharavana (july and august). the bhil tribes are talented in sculpture work and make beautiful horses, elephants, tigers, deities out of clay. 260 prajna vihara-~ the unique marriage custom of the bhils. while in most indian cultures, including the tribal cultures, it is generally the bride’s party that pays a dowry, in the bhil tribal culture, it is the bridegroom’s party that has to pay to the bride’s party. in a way, it is as if the girl is purchased by the groom’s family. the bhils marry quite early, usually the boys between the age of 14-16 and girls between the age of 11-13, and it can be arranged by the parents of the couple, or by elopement. polygamy is allowed in bhil culture, but because of the bride price, most bhil men opt for monogamy. if a man has more than one wife, the first one has the authority in the family but each wife has her own rights safeguarded. if there is a problem with the marriage, divorce is easily obtained by repaying the money paid to the girl's family and sending the girl away to her family along with her children. very often it is the woman who decides on the divorce if she is dissatisfied with her husband. the final decision is taken by the village leader (thadavi), whose opinion is final and binding on both parties. is the marriage custom among the bhils a gender level playing field or does it give rise to gender discrimination? going by the social status accorded to women in bhil culture, it may be argued that gender equality is still a far cry as there is a clear patriarchal model still at work in their society. the women in the community are not given any legislative power in their society; they are meant to follow the dictates of the male elders in the village whose decisions in social matters are treated as binding. however, women are given an equal status when it comes to social gatherings; they also share in the locally brewed beverage, and dine with the male members of the community. this is in contrast to most other socially advanced societies of india where usually the women are given separate place in social gatherings, and socializing between men and women is usually to the very minimum. babu joseph 261 the youth dormitory system among bhils another interesting and perhaps quite unique social custom among the bhils is the practice of young men and women living in youth dormitory where they socialize and even initiate courtship between them. it is quite unique in the sense that the youth are provided with an opportunity to socialize in a formal context so that they are able to get to know each other and make proper decision to choose a life partner. the young boys and girls living in youth dormitories are not free to follow their own whims and fancies; they are under the strict vigil of the elders who teach and guide them on the bhils culture and its way of life. it is a formal way of socialization among young members of the society, and also prepares them to enter into marital state of life. influence of modern cultures on the bhils the impact of religions like hinduism, christianity and to some extent islam on bhil communities has long been recognized. the bhils tribe has been influenced by certain traditions of hindus living near them. hindu religious literature like puranas and epics have references to interface between hindus and bhil tribe .for instance there are references to bhil tribe in the epic mahabharata. lord rama lived in chitrakut6 forests in the company of tribes. sabari who offered fruits to lord rama hailed from bhil tribe. the bhil tribe has assimilated at different levels the caste structure of the hindu soceity. in central india sanskritisation7 among certain sections of bhil tribe has been attributed to the bhagat movement. this movement started in 1914 among oraon tribe of chotanagpur meant for purging beliefs in ghosts and spirits and directing their faith to the hindu deity of mahadeo. bhagats today are quite influenced by the brahminical way of life. after india came under british rule, christian missionaries living among the bhil tribe contributed much to their socio-economic development, which resulted in some changes in their culture. the first impact of conversion to christian faith was visible among the bhil tribe about 100 262 prajna vihara-~ years ago when some of them accepted the christian faith. conversions began first at individual and family level. in course of time the pace of conversion increased and some villages came to accept christianity. the major concentration of tribal christians is located in north east states. in central india the highest number of christians is among the kharia tribe. christianity has been responsible in changing the outlook of tribals in the fields of education, festivals, social and economic life. the bhils have become more conscious of the value and need of modern education; they have also integrated christian elements in their festivities, and they began to interact with members of other social groups, and have moved to areas of economic activities other than agriculture. however, there is the view that impact of christianity led to the disintegration of traditional and cultural values and also in the creation of caste-like groups among tribals. at the same time many sections of different tribal groups have come under a single religious leadership of the church among those tribals who have accepted christian faith have changed some of their indigenous tribal festivals, youth dormitories, traditional dances and values. some of the tribals face cultural change due to acculturation, regionalism, assimilation and so forth. acculturation is responsible for the change in ways of life of some tribes like raj gonds and tharus. when some cultural traits of a powerful group are imposed on a weak cultural group, there is the danger of the weak group losing its cultural identity. in such a context the weak group may rise against the stronger group in order to regain its cultural identity. such contra-acculturation process is manifested by the solidarity movements in rajasthan and jharkhand. the bhil tribals are no exception to the process that other tribal groups are faced with today in india. where the christian presence has been strong with large number of tribals opting for christian faith, their life standards have also undergone tremendous change. that was possible because of the multi-faceted development strategies adopted by the missionaries who worked among them. in addition, the federal government’s affirmative action has also enhanced the level of education and health care among the bhils. today, the bhil tribals are found in all segments of the government. besides in the political leadership roles, they are also found among babu joseph 263 administrators, entrepreneurs, service sector and so on, and making their own mark. endnotes 1india has about 8.2% of tribal population according to the 2001 census. this segment of the indian population belongs to a galaxy of various tribal communities with their distinctive culture and ethos. for further information on this, see…indian tribes: r.c.verma isbn81-230-0328-5. 2there are several theories regarding various races of people migrating to india, some of which are also contested today among scholars, but the fact remains that india has multi-racial population. 3the term ‘adivasi’ is comprised of two words __ adi and vasi. adi means beginning and vasi means the dwellers. similar is the meaning of ‘mulnivasi’ which also means __ from the very root of habitation. 4fuchs stephen, the aborginal tribes of india, delhi, madras, bombay, macmillan, 1974. 5mewar kingdom in the present day rajasthan state of india was a wellestablished dynasty, one of the oldest dynasties in the world starting from around 600 ad until year 1947. 6chitrakoot is a town in satna district in the state of madya pradesh. it has a religious significance for hindus and has a historical and archeological importance. 7the term sanscritization denotes the process by which hindus, the majority religious community of india has been trying to assimilate the tribal and other communities into the social structures, religious practices and customs. 264 prajna vihara-~ prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 121 vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 121-135 © 2000 by assumption university press yi jiang and john giordano abstract this paper will examine how the power of filming increasing control of information, images, and events to the individual person. filming loses its elite quality and is brought down to the level of the masses. gradually people is important for human development in a technological world which involves the ability to participate in media technology and not to be overpowered or controlled by it. it will demonstrate this through a reading of walter in the age of mechanical reproduction. it will apply social media such as tiktok which are increasingly shaped by the contributions of individuals. it will also show the negative implications, and will conclude that the human empowerment that accompanies video technologies needs to be accompanied by the cultivation of trust. keywords: walter benjamin; social media; tiktok videos; human empowerment 122 from reader to writer work dealt with distance, but are now brought close to the viewer and possess a ‘use benjamin recognizes this in the move away from the art of story-telling benjamin found that the role of the storyteller was declining. he argues that the traditional storyteller, who brings people together to share personal experiences, has been replaced by the mass media, disseminated to a large, anonymous audience. the value of information is short-lived and constantly overshadowed and replaced by new information. whereas the mystery of storytelling involved the avoidance of explanation, but the presentation of something “understandable in itself.”1 time, but trending news can quickly fade away. this creates both impatience and interaction between the readers and the writers of news. “the fact that nothing binds the reader more tightly to his paper than this all-consuming impatience, his longing for daily nourishment, has long been exploited by publishers, who are constantly inaugurating new columns to address therefore, with the indiscriminate assimilation of facts goes the equally indiscriminate assimilation of readers, who are instantly elevated to collaborators…the reader is at all a prescriber…literary competence is no longer founded on specialized training but is now based on polytechnical education…it is at the scene of the limitless debasement is being prepared.”2 123 with the newspaper, every reader becomes a writer. it is because the newspaper gives readers a chance to express their opinions, such as a and exchange their ideas with other readers through the newspaper. but becoming a writer requires certain writing skills, including the ability express oneself in a certain way. the era of mechanical reproduction become an author. this relates to the quotation from essay. “with the increasing extension of the press, all readers become writers…in western europe the capitalistic interest of the masses through illusion-promoting spectacles and dubious speculations.”3 benjamin wrote this article in 1935 in the early stages of the become a second pair of eyes. whether you see a beautiful landscape or social media and upload and share what they have taken of reality. at the same time people can communicate with each other to evaluate what use for communication. or as benjamin observes, “the illiteracy of the future will be ignorance not of reading or writing, but of photography.”4 again, in the newspaper article benjamin observes that “at the 5 suggest that with smart-phone camera, we are experience the debasement 124 technology and the empowerment of the masses collapsing of the distance between the writer and reader, between high art and low art. in his work entitled “culture industry reconsidered” he writes: “the culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above. to the detriment of both it forces together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years. the seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total. thus, although the culture industry undeniably speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions towards which it is directed, the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation; an appendage of the machinery. the customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us believe, not its subject but its object. the very word mass-media, specially honed for the culture industry, already shifts the accent onto harmless terrain.”6 the mechanical age can also have a redemptive power. it is through the images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden like all shocks, should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind.” ( , 2007, p. 238) 125 distraction or manipulation of the masses, but a tool that can empower the masses. news in the age of media technology easier to read news through a high-resolution cell phone than it used to be through a newspaper. with the advent of youtube, tiktok, and a host of other social media, short-form video journalism began to grow rapidly. short video news has greater information carrying capacity than pictures and text and spreads more rapidly. at the same time, people can post their own comments on the pages of the news, and interaction for professional journalists to gather and disseminate news in real time from anywhere in the world. they can now report from the front lines of events, capture breaking news on the go, and easily interact with a global audience. however, smartphones also give everyone in the audience the opportunity to be the creator of the news. the development of new technologies has changed the traditional monopoly on news generation. this change has made citizen journalism achievable. michael bhaskar in the book writes about this power. bhaskar points out that people recording the news. “7 citizen journalism refers to news content reported by the public, non-professional journalists, social media users, and other non-traditional journalists. with the popularity of social media and smartphones, an increasing number of people can share news events and opinions through online platforms. the rise of citizen journalism has made traditional news media no longer the sole source of information and the holder of discourse, enhancing public participation in news accounts obtained by professional journalists to “weaving the narrative from existing sources.” these existing sources refer to the vast amount 126 a news events and is disseminated through new media technologies. they are quickly being supplanted by non-professional contributors. so footage to create their own coverage of an event. without the materials media present real live coverage. bhaskar suggests, “a random tweet or a bystander with a smartphone encapsulated a situation better than any journalist.”9the ability of professional journalists to compete with private skill of professional journalists can be easily replaced. the internet has real-time interaction online that newspapers or tv news do not have. people can post their opinions in the comments section, where a kind of interaction between viewers is created. this interaction creates more perspectives on the understanding and analysis of the news and provokes people to think about the news events. it even allows for criticism of possible bias and misinformation in the news coverage. in traditional journalism, it was important to conduct a lot of preliminary investigative work. professional journalists went to the site of an event and interviewed the people at the site. now in the media age, the journalist must gather a gather material and information from the internet and piece together an event in the form of a collage. the collecting and transmitting information. now it is about parsing vast amounts of noise for the signal.”10 bhaskar refers to this new brand of the ones who ensure that the news is not just information, but a news way for journalists to edit untold amounts of material. 127 the squares, on the ground of the revolution, not airlifted into it business class. it means wading through published material, much of it brilliant, at least as much awful, irrelevant or misleading, to present us with content that is varied, interesting and informative. and it means selfreaders. this then is the new news: journalism in and information-rich era.”11 capture the attention of users in a time of rapid information change has become a top priority for journalists. the news headline becomes the most important part, which determines whether a user will click on the link or not. but the headline can easily mislead the audience and lead users to misunderstand the content of the news, which can easily damage the objectivity and credibility of the news, and indirectly damage the brand value of a website. and this leads to the problem of political manipulation. the politics of media spectacle benjamin at the end of the essay pointed to the political increasing closeness, their use-value and exhibition value. contemplation for the olympian gods, now is one for itself. its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure fascism is rendering aesthetic. communism responds by politicizing art.”12 in the book , jaeho kang continues he points out that through media technology, leaders can interact and 128 communicate with the public more directly, thus enhancing political communication and interaction. exhibition value can be used in this political messages, and increase the visibility and support of political contenders during political campaigns. in this way, the power of leaders becomes visualized, which kang calls “the visibility of power.” however, he notes that the “increases in the visibility of power per se... do not guarantee more democratization.13 for, through media technology, manipulation becomes easier. “the function of politics now substantially hinges upon the performance of the actor-like ruler”14 political spectacle is controversial because it emphasizes the image and performance of the political leader rather than their policies and ideas. political speeches, political rallies, political marches, etc. have become a kind of political performance. in such performances, politicians usually use various means to portray themselves, including dress, rhetoric, and political communication treats political leaders as commodities and the audience as consumers. second, the masses are not only spectators of political spectacle, but 15 and rallies, the camera recorded the images of the masses. he saw and understood the masses as a collective when he saw individual images appear in the shots of the group. on the other hand, the masses are not only the audience of political activities and performances, but also participate speaking out, participating as citizen journalists, etc. this also means that group; everyone has the right and opportunity to participate and express his or her views. kang calls it a “double media quality.”16 this means that media technology can serve both as a tool for both the presentation of power and as an empowerment of the masses. 129 human empowerment by media technology first, the idea of empowerment by media technology suggests from readers gave ordinary people the right to express their opinions in newspapers. in the internet era, the public can use media technology to express their opinions and present themselves visually. when cell phone cameras did not exist, news broadcasts usually involved a cameraman and gap between the reporter and the audience. but with the cellphone, this distance collapsed. furthermore when the front-facing smart phone camera involved in news production as had their value judgments. also, with the increase in pixels, memory, and even network speed of cell phones, people have started to form the habit of recording their lives rather than experiencing it. individuals sharing their lives, thoughts, and opinions on social networks can also generate discussion and attention and become the subject of communication. media technology allows people to feel a sense of identity and dignity. the ideas or opinions of a lesser-known person can spread rapidly on the internet if they post content that resonates with many people. the internet has made some individuals powerful protagonists of social media communication. individuals also have the ability to choose information. according to kovach and rosenstiel, “we have become “news grazers,” who acquire 17 they use the term “lean forward” rather than “lean back” to describe the modern method of getting news. it is a more proactive approach centered on self-reliance. at the same time, many news websites and social media platforms now allowing audiences to provide instant feedback and interaction on news content and participate in producing information. these features are conducive to democratizing the dissemination of information by allowing audiences to give instant feedback, and interact with news content, and 130 participate in the production and dissemination of information. because the power of technology can easily enslave us if we do not cultivate this empowerment. the dangers of this enslavement are quite obvious. fake news and disinformation is spread more easily. while media technology allows us to access vast amounts of information easily, this does not mean all this information is valuable or accurate. quantity does not mean quality, so what is true from what is false and what is useful from what is not. on the internet, anyone can be the creator and publisher of content. although this model of citizen journalism prevents media organizations from monopolizing information delivery, it also allows some people to spread false information. the traditional media was “primarily engaged in the contemplation of news”19 now there is the experience of information overload where there is no time or room for contemplation. also, privacy is compromised, leading to the possibility of increased control. the development of media technology makes personal information vulnerable to collection and even hacking. governments may freedom of expression and access to information. another problem is the isolation viewers. the development of media technology has made it easier for us to connect with the outside world, but at the same time, it also tends to trap us into an information perspectives and information, deepening the affirmation of their views while increasing their resistance to other views. this way of recommendation by the algorithm can make discussion and compromise 131 it can be empowering or enslaving. that is why his ideas concerning empowerment of the masses in the information age. it also predicts some dealing with the social media platform tiktok is unavoidable when discussing media technology today. tiktok is a very popular social media application, especially among young people. it uses a short video format that allows users to make, share and watch videos of 15 to 60 seconds. tiktok uses an algorithm to direct users to the content that interests them most, which is often light, fun, and easy to digest. the news on tiktok is in the form of a short format. due to the length limit of tiktok videos, news content must be concise to attract “clickbait” headlines are used to attract more clicks and viewers. these as a whole and undermine the relationship between the reader and the media.20 in order for news to stand out on tiktok, much of it is unique and content on tiktok can be from traditional media organizations, small news organizations, or from individuals. the contributions from individuals are often more innovative and diverse. this often makes tiktok news more entertainment-oriented, which can reduce the seriousness and importance people attach to news events. they begin to and them as 132 furthermore, an app like tiktok makes it possible for viewers to switch swipe of the screen. change a video, and the audience will change their and interact with the news, allows users to be more engaged and share their views and opinions. tiktok has also become a very active political platform presidential elections.21 another point is that news on tiktok, except for those published by accredited news organizations, is generally not gated by specialized editors or journalists but uploaded and produced by ordinary users. many then presenting personal opinions or creating provocative stories to gain attention. the researcher proposes that the empowerment of people through cultivation of trust. as kovach and rosenstiel observe that the challenge is to make people active participants in the information age, not “the victims.”22 regardless of whether it is traditional news media or citizen journalism, the accuracy of news and information is of utmost importance. and to avoid false news and information. again, as kovach and rosenstiel state, “it is not enough to be almost certain. to “know” something must be true. you have to be able to show it, to establish it, to defend it, to 23 the news media can try to ensure that the information they publish is accurate. however, we cannot escape the manipulation of news by news sources connected to political or corporate power. yet with the help of media 133 technology, people are now increasingly able to question the accuracy of news reports, and share critical opinions. this improvement in critical thinking supports our engagement with media reports and is an important part of regulating the news in the age of media technology. fun and convenience of an app like tiktok, enabling people to share their lives and emotions through short videos and facilitating communication and connection between individuals. tiktok empowers people to create and share content, allowing them to become content creators. however, due to the commercial nature of tiktok it sometimes prioritizes quantity shifting of priorities is a problem that practitioners must address and resolve by maintaining the pursuit of artistic excellence in balance with promoting standardization and marketization in the industry to protect the rights and incomes of creators. we must balance commercial interests with artistic pursuits, uphold the independence and innovation of creation, and encourage self-expression through creation. 134 endnotes 1 2007), 89. 2 walter benjamin, walter benjamin: selected writings volume 2 (harvard university press, 2005), 741-742. 3 benjamin, illuminations, 232. 4 ibid, 527. 5 ibid, 742. 6 theodor adorno. new german critique, 6, fall 1975, 12-19 translated by anson g. rabinbach. 7 michael bhaskar, curation: the power of selection in a world of excess (hachette: uk. 2016), 216. ibid, 216. 9 ibid, 219. 10 ibid, 217. 11 ibid, 220. 12 benjamin, illuminations, 242. 13 kang, jaeho. walter benjamin and the media: the spectacle of modernity 14 ibid, 138. 15 ibid, 139. 16 ibid, 140. 17 age of information overload (new york: bloomsbury publishing, 2010), 299. ibid, 300. 19 ibid, 50. 20 zhang, a. “tiktok micro-politics: characteristics, functions and 21 “tiktok launches in-app guide to the 2020 us elections.” (2019, august to-the-2020-us-elections. 22 bill kovach, and tom rosenstiel, blur, 12. 23 ibid, 169. 135 references reconsidered. , (6), 12-19. benjamin, walter. (2007). schocken books. smith, g. (2005). . harvard university press. bhaskar, m. (2016). . hachette: uk. kang, jaeho. . kovach, bill., and tom rosenstiel, new york: bloomsbury publishing, 2010 tiktok launches in-app guide to the 2020 us elections. (2019, august 16). retrieved from launches-in-app-guide-to-the-2020-us-elections wang, a. (2011). media technology: empowerment and reempowerment. 7725(2011)03-0070-04 zhang, a. (2021). tiktok micro-politics: characteristics, functions and optimization path. 06_(64-82) the confucian golden.pmd the confucian golden rule, origin and prospect manuel b. dy, jr. ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract the task of the paper is to trace the development of the confucian golden rule from its beginnings in the analects, the book of mencius, the doctrine of the mean, the great learning, to the neo-confucianism of chu hsi, wang yang-ming, and tai chen. with this development, the confucian golden rule can be shown to be in dialogue with buddhism and hinduism in the notion of ahimsa developed by mahatma gandhi. the prospect of the confucian rule lies in its movement from a hierarchical ethics to a cosmopolitan ethics already foreshadowed in the the great learning and proposed by the eco-ethica philosophy of the late tomonobu imamichi. confucius said, “ts’an, there is one thread that runs through my doctrines”. tseng tzu said, “yes”, after confucius had left, the disciples asked him, “what did he mean?” tseng tzu replied, “the way of our master is none other than conscientiousness (chung) and altruism (shu)”.1 tse-kung asked, “is there one word which can serve as the guiding principle for conduct throughout life?” confucius said, “it is the word altruism (shu). do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you”.2 the golden rule or the ethics of reciprocity is found in all world religions, formulated in different ways. the task of this paper is not to compare the confucian golden rule with the golden rule of other world prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 64-82 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ -64 religions, noting their similarities and differences and making judgments on its superiority or inferiority. my task is simply to trace the development of the confucian golden rule from its early scriptures, the four books (analects, book of mencius, doctrine of the mean, the great learning) to the neo-confucianism of chu hsi, wang yang-ming and tai chen. from this development i hope to draw the prospect of the confucian golden rule, notably in the notion of hindu concept of ahimsa or non-violence as developed and lived by mahatma gandhi, and expanding the meaning of “neighbour” as proposed by the eco-ethica of tomonobu imamichi. but first, we must rule out some misinterpretations of the golden rule. one misinterpretation of the golden rule is “do unto others what they did to you”, and what they did to you is often the bad and not the good. clearly this is not a golden rule but an iron rule, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”, and as gandhi would say, the world becomes blind and toothless. likewise, another negative misinterpretation of the golden rule is “do unto others before they do it to you”. this is similar to the position of callicles in plato’s dialogue gorgias that “to suffer injustice is worse than to do injustice”, and therefore before injustice is done to you, you beat the other first to it. another misinterpretation of the confucian golden rule is to compare it with christ’s. jesus says, “do to others whatever you would have them do to you”.3 this is positive whereas confucius’ is negative: “do not do to others what you do not want done to you”, and therefore not a golden rule but a silver one. as we will point out, there are many positive formulations of the golden rule in the analects. the golden rule in the four books the positive formulation of the confucian golden rule, shu in chinese, is found in its reference to the primary virtue of confucius: ren. ren has been translated as benevolence, love, kindness, compassion, magnanimity, perfect virtue, goodness, human heartedness, humanity. but when confucius was asked by a disciple for the meaning of ren, he replied, “love others”.4 the character ren ( ) is a composite of two charmanuel b. dy, jr. 65 acters: ren, meaning man, and erh, meaning two. thus, ren has come to mean the virtue governing inter-human relationships. and the golden rule is one of its two aspects, the other being chung, translated as conscientiousness or fidelity to oneself. tzu-kung said, “if a ruler extensively confers benefit on the people and can bring salvation to all, what do you think of him? would you call him a man of humanity?” confucius said, “why only a man of humanity? he is without doubt a sage. even (sage-emperors) yao and shun fell short of it. a man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent. to be able to judge others by what is near to ourselves may be called the method of realizing humanity”.5 zhong ( ) and shu ( ) are inseparable. they are two aspects of the same virtue, ren. zhong is fidelity to oneself, duty to oneself, and shu, one’s duty to others. ren as love is love for man, both self and others. it is love for the humanity in man, for what he is, not for what he has or does, for “by nature all human beings are alike; through practice they have become far apart”.6 ren is essentially the unity of zhong and shu. both characters are written with the character hsin at the bottom. hsin literally means “heart” and denotes many things: intentions, feelings, cognitive and evaluative activity. it means the very core of man, in phenomenological terms, his subjectivity. shu has the character ru above, meaning “just as”. shu therefore means “do or act just as the heart dictates”, in short the golden rule, in the negative formulation, “do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you”. shu is translated by wing-tsit chan as altruism. chung, translated by wing-tsit chan as “conscientiousness” has the character zhong, meaning “middle, center” above. together with hsin below, zhung literally means “to put one’s heart in the center of whatever you are doing”. zhong means wanting what you really want, being true to oneself. this inseparability of both conscientiousness and the golden rule is what i think kant missed in his refusal to liken his categorical impera66 prajna vihara-~ tive to the confucian golden rule. in a footnote in the groundwork of the metaphysic of morals, he says: let no one think that here the trivial ‘quod tibi non vis fieri, etc.’ can serve as a standard or principle. for it is merely derivative from our principle, although subject to various qualifications: it cannot be a universal law since it contains the ground neither of duties to oneself nor of duties of kindness to others (for many a man would readily agree that others should not help him if only he could be dispense from affording help to them), nor finally of strict duties towards others; for on this basis the criminal would be able to dispute with the judges who punish him, and so on.7 what kant is saying is that the golden rule is too relativistic or subjective. one can justify his not helping others in their problems because he does not want to be helped by others in his problems. or the criminal can contend with the judge that the judge himself would not want to be judged. similarly, a student can tell his teacher not to flunk him because the teacher would not want to be flunked by his own teacher. in all three instances, one is not being true to oneself as human nature, as judge, and as teacher. under the principal virtue of ren, the positive and negative formulations of the golden rule can go together. chung-kung asked about humanity (ren). confucius said, “when you go abroad, behave to everyone as if you were receiving a great guest. employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice. do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you. then there will be no complaint against you in the state or in the family (the ruling clan)”. chung-kung said, “although i am not intelligent, may i put your saying into practice”.8 going abroad and behaving to everyone as if you were receiving a great guest is a positive formulation of golden rule. likewise with employing the people as if you were assisting a great sacrifice. under the principal virtue of ren and its other aspect, conscientiousness, the goal of the golden rule is to establish peace and harmony manuel b. dy, jr. 67 in society. tsu-lu asked about the superior man. confucius said, “the superior man is one who cultivates himself with seriousness (ching)”. tzu-lu said, “is that all?” confucius said, “he cultivates himself so as to give the common people security and peace”.9 and to establish peace and harmony in society is to treat everyone as brothers and sisters. ssu-ma niu, worrying said, “all people have brothers but i have none”. tzu-hsia said, “i have heard (from confucius) this saying: “life and death are the decree of heaven (ming); wealth and honor depend on heaven. if a superior man is reverential (or serious) without fail, and is respectful in dealing with others and follows the rules of propriety, then all within the four seas (the world) are brothers. what does the superior man have to worry about having no brothers?”10 although the humanistic basis of ren makes it universal, in application, however, it admits of gradation. one should start with the family and extend it the community. mencius said. “treat with respect the elders in my family and then extend that respect to include the elders in other families. treat with tenderness the young in my own family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families….”11 ren as graded is further elaborated by mencius, who pairs ren with i ( ), righteousness. mencius said, “ren is man’s mind-heart and righteousness is his path”. a path implies priorities, and priorities involve gradation and distinction. one cannot love everybody equally, although love by nature is all-embracing. by respecting the elders in my family, i can by extension also treat with respect the elders of other families. it is unnatural for man to love all alike and to the same degree. by admitting gradations in ren, the golden rule is applied hierarchically mencius is also known for his doctrine of the innate goodness of man, that man’s nature is originally good. one of his arguments is the intuitive appeal to experience, of the “instinct” in man to save a child 68 prajna vihara-~ about to fall into the well.12 the feeling of commiseration is the beginning of ren and all men have this basic feeling. all also have the innate knowledge of the good and the innate ability to do the good. but what is nature for mencius? for mencius, nature is not only what is inborn but what heaven has endowed,13 such that “he who exerts his mind-heart to the utmost knows his nature. he who knows nature knows heaven”.14 in mencius, we have a close affinity of man and heaven through love and the other virtues. this insight of the affinity of man and heaven is reiterated in the doctrine of the mean, originally a chapter from the book of rites, existing in the early han dynasty (206 b.c.-a.d.220), but which became part of the four books of classical confucianism. the text begins with “what heaven (tien, nature) imparts to man is called human nature. to follow our nature is called the way (tao). cultivating the way is called education. the way cannot be separated from us for a moment. what can be separated from us is not the way….”15 the golden rule appears in chapter 13: confucius said, “the way is not far from man. when a man pursues the way and yet remains away from man, his course cannot be considered the way. the book of odes says, ‘in hewing an axe handle, the pattern is not far off’. if we take an axe handle to hew another axe handle and look askance from one to the other, we may still think the pattern is far away. therefore the superior man governs men as men, in accordance with human nature, and as soon as they change (what is wrong), he stops. conscientiousness (chung) and altruism (shu) are not far from the way. what you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to them”.16 in this passage, the golden rule, shu, together with conscientiousness, chung, aside from their being access to the way, is applied to the ruler in governing his people. the ruler in transforming his people sets himself as a model by the cultivation of his human nature. a similar insight is found in chapter 9 commentary of tzeng tzu on the great learning, which was also originally part of the book of manuel b. dy, jr. 69 rites. yao and shun led the world with humanity and the people followed them. (wicked kings) chieh and chou led the world with violence and the people followed them. the people did not follow their orders which were contrary to what they themselves liked. therefore the superior man must have the good qualities in himself before he may require them in other people. he must not have the bad qualities in himself before he may require others not to have them. there has never been a man who does not cherish altruism (shu) in himself and yet can teach other people. therefore the order of the state depends on the regulation of the family.17 the golden rule plays an important role in the educational, moral, and political program of the great learning: in order to have peace in the world, there must be first order in the states; the order of the states depends on the regulation of the family; the regulation of the family depends on the cultivation of the personal life; the cultivation of the personal life consists in the rectification of the mind-heart, making the will sincere, extending knowledge, and investigation of things. the “world” in the context of the great learning is the whole of china, at that time made of several states ruled by family clans. the golden rule acts as a “measuring square” ensuring order in the states in order to have peace in the world. what is meant by saying that peace of the world depends on the order of the state is this: when the ruler treats the elders with respect, then the people will be aroused toward filial piety. when the ruler treats the aged with respect, then the people will be aroused toward brotherly respect. when the ruler treats compassionately the young and the helpless, then the common people will not follow the opposite course. therefore the ruler has a principle with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct. what a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not show it in 70 prajna vihara-~ dealing with his inferiors; what he dislikes in those in front of him, let him not show it in preceding those who are behind; what he dislikes in those behind him, let him not show it in following those in front of him; what he dislikes in those on the right, let him not apply it to those on the left; and what he dislikes in those on the left, let him not apply it to those on the right. this is the principle of the measuring square.18 it is important to note that while the program of the great learning is addressed to the ruler, it is also applicable to everyone. “from the son of heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation”.19 the golden rule in neo-confucianism after mencius, ren evolved to include the influences of taoism and buddhism, and the great synthesizer of neo-confucianism is chu hsi (1130-1200). in chu hsi we find the metaphysical basis of ren in the dictum “principle (li) is one but its manifestations are many”. chu hsi identifies ren with nature and principle, and love as its function. as principle and nature, it is one, but as function, it is many.20 although love’s manifestations are many, they are all one because they partake of one principle, the principle of heaven and earth.21 now, the principle of heaven and earth is identical with the mind of heaven and earth, and the mind of heaven and earth is to produce things.22 since ren is the mind of heaven and earth, it follows that it is also the process of production and reproduction. “in man, it is the mind to love people gently and to benefit things”.23 the influence of buddhism and taoism is shown in chu hsi’s insistence on making impartiality as the substance of ren. “when one makes impartiality the substance of his person, that is ren”.24 ren is the principle originally inherent in man’s mind. with impartiality, there is ren. with partiality, there is no ren. but impartiality as such should not be equated with ren. it must be made man’s substance manuel b. dy, jr. 71 before it becomes ren. impartiality is antecedent to ren; altruism and love are subsequent. this is because impartiality makes ren possible, and ren makes love and altruism possible.25 ren is the principle of love, and impartiality is the principle of ren. therefore, if there is impartiality, there is ren, and if there is ren, there is love.26 in relation to ren as impartial love, the golden rule or altruism, however, is cultivated. ren is spontaneous, altruism (shu) is cultivated. ren is natural, altruism is by effort. ren is uncalculating and has nothing in view, altruism is calculating and has an object in view.27 wang yang-ming (1472-1529) extends this creative character of ren in his doctrine of “forming one body with the universe”. because of the character of ren to grow and reproduce, the man of ren forms one body with the universe. the great man regards heaven and earth and the myriad things as one body. he regards the world as one family and the country as one person. as to those who make a cleavage between objects and distinguish between the self and others, they are small men. that the great man can regard heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body is not because he deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the human nature of his mind that he do so. forming one body with heaven, earth, and the myriad things is not only true of the great man. even the mind of the small man is no different. only he himself makes it small…28 and loving the people in the great learning for wang yangming means “to put into universal operation the function of the state of forming one body. therefore, only when i love my father, the father of oth72 prajna vihara-~ ers, and the fathers of all men can my humanity form one body with my father, the father of others, and the fathers of all men. when it truly forms one body with them, then the clear character of filial piety will be manifested. only when i love my brother, the brother of others, and the brother of all men can my humanity really form one body with my brother, the brother of others, and the brothers of all men. when it truly forms one body with them, then the clear character of brotherly respect will be manifested. everything from ruler, minister, husband, wife, and friends, to mountains, rivers, spiritual beings, birds, animals, and plants should be truly loved in order to realize my humanity that forms one body with them,…29 we can note from the above that the golden rule as an aspect of love includes not only human beings but all of nature. thus, a person would feel alarmed and commiseration when he sees a child about to fall into a well,30 feel an “inability to bear” when he observes the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of birds and animals about to be slaughtered, feel pity when he sees plants broken and destroyed, and feel regret when he sees tiles and stones shattered and crushed.31 tai chen (1723-1777) rejected the intellectual speculation of chu hsi and the intuitionism of wang yang-ming but perpetuated their understanding of principle as an unceasing process of production and reproduction. however, he considered principle as “nothing but the order of things, and by things he understood ‘daily affairs such as drinking and eating’”.32 as the order of things, principle consists of feelings, not the selfish and excessive ones, but of those that do not err. principle consists of feelings that do not err. principle can never prevail when (correct) feelings are not satisfied. when one does something to others, one should examine oneself and think quietly to see whether he could accept if others did the same thing to him. when one gives some responsibility to others, one should examine himself and think quietly to see whether he could fulfil it if others give the same responsibility to him. when the measure of the manuel b. dy, jr. 73 self is applied to others, principle will become clear. the principle of nature (t’ien-li, principle of heaven) means natural discrimination. with natural discrimination, one measures the feelings of others in terms of one’s own, and there will be no injustice or imbalance….33 measuring the feelings of others in terms of one’s own is none other than the golden rule. by equating principle with feelings that do not err, tai chen follows mencius’ doctrine of the original goodness of human nature and attributes error to selfishness and excess. and the objective standard for feelings that do not err in concrete and ordinary things is the golden rule. confucian golden rule in dialogue with buddhist and hindu golden rule what can we discern in the development of the golden rule from the ancient texts to the neo-confucianism of chu hsi, wang yang-ming, and tai chen? namely, the expansion of the golden rule to include not only fellow human beings but the whole of nature, and consequently a movement of its application from a contextual hierarchical relationship of roles in society to a more universal relationship with the whole of nature. still, what underlies the development is the common goal of establishing peace or order in the world through love or ren, the opposite of which is violence. it is in the notion of non-violence or ahimsa that the confucian golden rule, we can venture to say, has already been in dialogue with buddhist and hindu golden rule. the buddhist golden rule reads, “one who loves himself should not harm another”.34 the equality of the self and the other that is the foundation of the golden rule is none other than the commonality of suffering and happiness: “all equally experience suffering and happiness, i should look after them as i do myself”.35 the love that the buddha preached is an all-embracing love, an unconditional self-giving compassion flowing freely towards all living creatures. 74 prajna vihara-~ may all creatures abound in weal and peace; may all be blessed with peace always; all creatures weak or strong, all creatures, great and small’ creatures unseen or seen, dwelling afar or near, born or awaiting birth, --may all be blessed with peace! let none cajole or flout his fellow anywhere; let none wish others harm in dungeon or in hate. just as with her own life a mother shields from hurt her own, her only, child,-let all-embracing thoughts for all that lives be thine, --an all embracing love for all the universe in all its heights and depths and breadth, unstinted love, unmarred by hate within, not rousing enmity. so, as you stand or walk, or sit, or lie, reflect with all your might on this; ‘__’tis deemed ‘a state divine’.36 likewise, the hindu golden rule is expressed in ahimsa. already in jainism the indic golden rule of reciprocity and nonviolence manuel b. dy, jr. 75 encompasses all creatures: “a man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated”.37 but in hinduism it is a principle within a greater principle of the dharma. dharma is understood as the order both in nature and society. in the social order, it consists of duties proper to one’s position and rank (the caste system). the hindu golden rule is situated in this hierarchical ethical framework of the dharma. thus the formulation of hindu golden rule found in the epic mahabharata is: “one should not behave towards others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself. this is the essence of morality. all other activities are due to selfish desire”.38 that the practice of ahimsa is situated in one’s dharma is illustrated in the hindu classic the bhagavad-gita, which is part of the epic mahabharata. the principal character arjuna hesitates to fight the opposing army because they are his own kinsmen. his charioteer krishna, who is an avatar, an incarnation of the god vishnu, advises him to fight because it is his dharma, his duty as a warrior. besides, the atman, the soul, is immortal and undergoes transmigration or reincarnation. mahatma gandhi reinterprets ahimsa in the gita and made it the central core of his philosophy of satyagraha, the force of truth. for gandhi, it is wrong to interpret the gita as advocating violence. on the contrary, it advocates non-violence. the poet vyasa wrote the epic mahabharata, of which the gita is a part, to depict the futility of war. the gita’s subject is not a description of the battle and the justification of violence. the battle is within us, the battle between good and evil, and the battlefield is our body. that the overall teaching of the gita is not violence but non-violence is evident from the argument which begins in chapter ii and ends in chapter xviii. the intervening chapters propound the same theme. violence is simply not possible unless one is driven by anger, by ignorant love and by hatred. the gita, on the other hand, wants us to be incapable of anger….39 in this world there will always be violence. “the gita shows the way which will lead us out of it, but it also says that we cannot escape it simply by running away from it like cowards. anyone who prepares to 76 prajna vihara-~ run away would do better, instead, to kill and be killed”.40 ahimsa is active nonviolence; it is not meant for the weak but for the strong. “with the weak it might easily be hypocrisy”.41 when there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, gandhi would advise violence,42 but only for self-defense or for the defense of the defenseless.43 prospect of the confucian golden rule: from gandhi to imamichi we can draw out the prospect of the confucian golden rule in the notion of ahimsa as active nonviolence developed by gandhi in his philosophy of satyagraha. for gandhi, “non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute”.44 “that which distinguishes man from all other animals is his capacity to be non-violent. and he fulfills his mission only to that extent that he is non-violent and no more”.45 nonviolence alone is lawful, according to the law made by nature for man.46 as an inseparable part of our very being, it is “not a garment to be put on and off at will. its seat is in the heart”.47 its seat in the heart, ahimsa cannot be proven by argument but is a matter of faith and experience.48 ahimsa is a passion to be pursued, a creed and not a policy. “nonviolence to be a creed has to be all-pervasive. i cannot be non-violent about one activity of mine and violent about others”.49 it is applied privately and publicly.50 nonviolence of the strong cannot be a mere policy. it must be a creed, or a passion if ‘creed’ is objected to. a man with a passion expresses it in every little act of his. therefore he who is possessed by non-violence will express it in the family circle, in his dealings with neighbours, in his business, in congress meetings, in public meetings, and in his dealings with opponents.51 in answer to a query that observing perfect nonviolence is impossible in practical life since the destruction of insects could never be completely avoided, gandhi replied that every action or motion involves viomanuel b. dy, jr. 77 lence because of the very association of the atman (the true self) with the body. perfect non-violence is an ideal to be strived for but some degree of violence is unavoidable. it is a matter of the heart. non-violence is a quality of the heart. whether there is violence or non-violence in our actions can be judged by reference to the spirit behind them….all the gifts and abilities of a good man, that is, a non-violent, compassionate man, are for the service to others. there is violence always in the attachment to one’s ego. when doing anything, one must ask oneself this question: is my action inspired by egoistic attachment? if there is no such attachment, then there is no violence.52 ahimsa is also equated with love. “non-violence, translated ‘love’, is the supreme law for human beings”.53 this love is all-embracing, allpervasive, and unconditional. we must let the law of love rule us through and through or not at all. love among ourselves based on hatred of others breaks down under the slightest pressure….war will only be stopped when the conscience of mankind has become sufficiently elevated to recognize the undisputed supremacy of the law of love in all walks of life.54 ritual observances such as prayers and fasting will mean nothing if “we do not feel a live kinship with all life”, including the enemy.55 “brotherhood requires no consideration or response”.56 for gandhi, “love has no boundary. my nationalism includes the love of all nations of the earth irrespective of creed”.57 faith in ahimsa, however, “is impossible without a living faith in god”.58 ahimsa as truth and love is inseparable from a living faith in god. the god that gandhi believes in is an all-embracing living light, a living force which inheres in every living other force. as a believer in this all-embracing light and living force, gandhi was open to all religions. the practice of ahimsa is the satyagraha, meaning soul-force or truth-force or love-force. satyagraha may be used by individuals or communities. it can be used by women, men and children.59 this attests to 78 prajna vihara-~ the universality of ahimsa. as truth-force or love-force, satyagraha also points to the objectivity of value. truth and love are objective values. “in thousands of our acts, the propelling power is truth or love. the relations between father and son, husband and wife, indeed our family relations are largely guided by truth or love. and we therefore consciously or unconsciously apply satyagraha in regulating these relations”.60 the standard that we apply to domestic relations should also be the standard to regulate the relations between rulers and ruled, between man and man.61 satyagraha should be extended beyond the family to the village, beyond the village to the province, beyond the province to nation, and beyond the nation to the world.62 the last point rings familiar; it is also the program of the great learning. and ahimsa as seated in the heart, the nature of the human being, identified with love, inseparable from a living faith in god as allembracing are also the attributes of the confucian golden rule as rooted in the mind-heart (hsin), an aspect of ren as love, innate in the human being, and inseparable from heaven (t’ien). the prospect of the confucian golden rule lies in its universalization and expansion. this is one of the proposals of tomonobu imamichi (1922-2012) in his eco-ethica philosophy. eco-ethica is a latin term coined by imamichi, to refer to human beings’ habitat, which includes world of technology. eco-ethica “refers to an ethics that encompasses our human habitat” that is mediated by science and technology. “it is an ethics for a borderless society. since the eco in eco-ethica signifies habitat in the broad sense, eco-ethica represents an ethics not for the family or the nation, but for our contemporary world with its scientific and technological environment. eco-ethica is a moral science that addresses issues concerning our entire human habitat”.63 one such issue is our relationship with others, human and nonhuman. more and more our relationships with others are mediated by science and technology, for example by the cellphone and the internet. "with technology-mediated environment people in far-flung corners of the globe become our neighbours via the telephone”.64 in concrete terms, this means we need to rethink the concept of neighbour in ethics. in the past, our neighbours manuel b. dy, jr. 79 consisted of people with whom we had blood ties or territorial connections, but sometimes we also regard as neighbours people who are geographically distant and who would never naturally be regarded in that light. this occurs through legal ties or through work ties or through technological ties where people are linked by technology.65 rethinking the concept of neighbour would mean that the traditional face-to-face ethics would have to be transcended66 and must necessarily include an ethica ad rem, ethics towards things.67 applying the confucian golden rule in eco-ethica would entail expanding our notion of the other to include the strangers or foreigners, what imamichi calls the virtue of philoxenia (love of strangers),68 the marginalized who have nothing to eat, the natural environment (think of the engendered species and pollution), and even things. “we need to acquire the know-how to operate cars and communication devices and other equipment in our technology-mediated society”,69 to provide service to others. conclusion there is so much violence in our world today. as imamichi has noted, “we are exposed to the threat of seven ‘untimely deaths’-i.e. starvation, death from accidents, death in war, death from pollution, death through terrorism, suicide, and murder. these existed in the past, but today atrocious termination of human life, which should be protected through technology and human rights, are far more common than in any previous century”.70 the confucian golden rule in dialogue with buddhism and hinduism, as shown in its development from the time of confucius to the present, may have something to contribute to make our world a more peaceful world to live in. endnotes 1analects, 4:15 wing-tsit chan’s translation, a source book in chinese 80 prajna vihara-~ philosophy. (princeton university press, 1963). unless specified, the translation is by wing-tsit chan. 2analects, 15:23. 3matthew 7:12. 4analects 12:22. translation by roger t. ames and henry rosemont, jr., the analects of confucius, a philosophical translation (new york: ballantine books, 1999). 5analects 6:28. wing tsit-chan translation. 6analects 17:2. 7immanuel kant, groundwork of the metaphysic of morals, translated and analyzed by h.j. paton (harper torchbooks, 1964), p.97. 8analects, 12:2. 9analects, 15:45. 10analects, 12:5. 11mencius, ia: 7. 12mencius, ii a: 6. 13mencius vi a: 15. 14mencius vii a: 1. 15doctrine of the mean, chapter 1. 16doctrine of the mean, chapter 13. 17the great learning, chapter 9. 18the great learning, chapter 10. 19the “text” of the great learning. the “son of heaven” is the emperor. 20chu tzu ch’uan-shu, 47/33. 21ibid., 49:23a. 22chu hsi, “a treatise on ren” in wing-tsit chan, source book, p.593. 23ibid., p. 595. 24quoted from the i ching commentary on hexagram no. 2, k’un. 25chu tzu ch’uan-shu, 47: 19b-20a. 26ibid., 47:6b. 27ibid., 47: 6a-b. 28wang yang-ming, inquiry on the great learning, in wing-tsit chan, sourcebook, p.659. 29ibid., pp.660-661. italics mine. 30book of mencius, 2a:6. 31wang yang-ming, op. cit., p.272. 32wing-tsit chan, op. cit., p.709. 33tai chen, commentary on the meanings of terms in the book of mencius, in wing-tsit chan, sourcebook, p.712. 34john ireland, the udana; inspired utterances of the buddha (kandy, sri lanka: buddhist publication society, 1990), p.68. 35santideva, bodhicaryavatara, translated by kate crosby and andrew skilton (oxford university press, 1998), p.96. manuel b. dy, jr. 81 36sutta-nipata in e. a. burtt, the teachings of the compassionate buddha (mentor book, 1982), pp.46-47. 37suttrakritanga 1.11.33. quoted by richard h. davis, “a hindu golden rule, in context” the golden rule, the ethics of reciprocity in world religions (continuum, 2008), p.146. 38anusasana-parvan 113:8. quoted by richard h. davis, op. cit., p.146. m.k. gandhi, the bhagavadgita (new delhi, orient paperbacks, 2001), pp.12-13. 39m.k. gandhi, the bhagavadgita (new delhi, orient paperbacks, 2001), pp.12-13. 40ibid., p.14. 41raghavan iyer (ed.), the essential writings of mahatma gandhi (new delhi, oxford university press, 2010), p.243. 42ibid., p.237. 43ibid., p.253. 44ibid., p.238. 45ibid., pp.240-241. 46ibid., p.253. 47thomas merton, gandhi on non-violence (new york: new directions paperbook, 1965), p.24. 48raghavan iyer, op. cit., p.248. 49ibid., p.245. 50ibid., p.240. 51ibid., pp.250-251. 52ibid., pp.255-256. 53ibid., p.253. 54ibid., p.242. 55ibid., p.244. 56ibid., p.244. 57ibid., p.245. 58ibid. p.278. 59ibid., p.309. 60ibid.,, p.324-325. 61ibid., p.325. 62ibid., p.325. 63tomonobu imamichi, an introduction to eco-ethica, translated by judy wakabayashi (university press of america, 2009), p.2. 64ibid., p.vii. 65ibid., p.12. 66ibid., p.25. 67ibid., p.15. 68ibid., p.45. 69ibid., p.51. 70ibid., p.3. 82 prajna vihara-~ 12_(193-210) a report on religious.pmd a report on religious pluralism in myanmar hilario plureh assumption university of thailand abstract this essay examines the character of religious pluralism in myanmar and how religious conflict can be solved through interreligious dialogue, particularly as understood by the belgian missionary and theologian, jacques dupuis’, and his “inductive method”. introduction myanmar is famously known as “a perfect ethnological museum or a melting pot” (ling, 2005, p.11). the government officially acknowledges that there are eight major groups among the 135 ethnicities with more than two hundred dialects in the country.1 it is, in terms of ethnicity, one of the richest countries in the world. due to its diverse tribes and cultures, it is a big challenge to unite this diversity under an umbrella of one nation. this is the main reason why the central government has encountered intermittent uprisings of discontented ethnic groups. each ethnic group wants to be independent because they want to keep their ethnic identity. after gaining independence from the british rule, the burmans (the largest tribe in the country, approximately two-thirds of the total population) have been in control of the country and have occupied the majority of seats in the ruling military government. on account of this position, the minority groups (kayin, kachin, mon, kayah, shan, rakhine, and chin) have not been satisfied with the military government. these ethnic groups accused the government of trying to ‘implement a burmanization policy’ in the country. (topich & leitich, 2013, p.3). that is why, for many decades they have been fighting for independence in their own territories. in fact, some of these ethnic groups (for example 193prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 193-210 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ kayah) were even “granted autonomy via the 1947 constitution with the right of succession following a 10-year period” after the agreement (topich & leitich, 2013, pp.2-6). with regard to the aspect of religion, theravada buddhism is the main belief of the people in myanmar. eighty-nine percent of the population embraces this religion in which most of them belong to the burman tribe. this major ethnic group cannot easily convert to other religions because they see buddhism as linked with their social and cultural background. they think that buddhism is the only religion of their tribe and if one of them happens to convert to christianity, that person is considered not only to have committed “an act of disloyalty to buddhist society and to the nation” but the person is also seen to have abandoned his or her ‘socio-cultural identity’ (ling, 2005, p.13). with this deep-rooted mentality of the people, a well-known statement from the burman buddhists emerged “to be a burmese (burman) is to be a buddhist”.2 indeed, this major ethnic group never separates religion from nationality. for them, “religion cannot be forsaken without giving up nationality; in other words, the fact of embracing the religion of another people is equivalent to becoming a member of the same social or political body” (bigandet, 1996, p.4). and for many, “being buddhist is an important part of being burmese, and monks, the most venerable members of society, are beyond reproach”.3 according to samuel ngun ling, even though, in 2005, the military government declared that “there is freedom of worship and no discrimination on religious grounds”, buddhism is still the ‘favored religion’ in the eyes of the government from the very beginning of its arrival. (ling, 2005, pp.12-13). apart from the british colonial period, the burmese government has long seen buddhism as their national religion. their policy is “one dominant ethnic group (burman), one united country (myanmar), and one religion (buddhism)” (berlie, 2008, p.1). as the researcher belongs to an ‘un-favored religion’ (christianity) and a minor ethnic group (kayah), he has been one of the victims under the military government. he has personally witnessed the confiscation of lands and schools that belonged to christianity. the burmese military has constantly fought against ethnic minorities and destroyed schools, hospitals, places of worship, houses, and “the primary targets of these abuses” have been the 194 prajna vihara-~ christian populations (chin, kachin, shan, karen, and karenni or kayah) and the islamic community (rakhine). only in 2009, state peace and development council (spdc) ordered “100 churches and religious meeting places in rangoon to stop holding services and forcing protestant leaders to sign pledges to that effect” (leo, n.d., p.35). the researcher has also heard so many times from his fellow christians that being a christian in myanmar means being an unlucky person. christians are discriminated against in several ways: they seldom hold any high position; they cannot freely build churches as buddhists build temples; and they do not have the same privilege as buddhists. some christians have to abandon their faith in order to get a job. “thousands of young christians are unemployed because of their faith and are pressured to convert to buddhism. several christians churches and homes were burned down during 2003” (claydon, 2005, p.177). many muslims (rohingyns) are not given citizenship. in such circumstances, is it possible to embrace religious pluralism? to answer this question, one needs to look at the problem in a new way. in this paper, the researcher as a catholic christian attempts to apply his practical experience. by doing so, he is using the inductive method4 of doing the study of religious pluralism (myanmar). his personal background is that even though he was born and raised up in a catholic family and surroundings, he has encountered many people of different faiths. while the majority of his relatives on his mother’s side embraces buddhism, his father used to practice local rituals connected to animism. as far as the researcher notices, his parents, on the one hand, are committed to christianity; yet, on the other hand, they never entirely abandon their animistic beliefs. according to western theologians, these practices are against the faith of christianity.5 to confront the local practices (animism) and eastern cultures (buddhism) has been one of the difficulties that christianity (western cultures) has encountered from the very beginning of its arrival. buddhism, however, has been more lenient in dealing with the local practices (such as nat worship, naga worship and fortunetellers).6 in fact, animism is the religion of the land. the other religions (buddhism, christianity, islam, hinduism, etc) are foreign religions. in general, people from myanmar are believers. most follow a religious belief: buddhism, christianity, islam, hinduism, animism, etc. hilario plureh 195 religious belief is familiar to them. but religions in myanmar are not ‘pure’, they are somewhat intermixed. even the main religion (buddhism) still contains elements of folk belief and indigenous spirit cult (animism). according to james roger black who wrote the review of maung htin aung’s book, folk elements in burmese buddhism: burmese buddhism is not purely the outgrowth of the dharma taught by buddha, but contains many indigenous or pre-buddhist concepts that still have powerful attraction for the people of burma, and have dramatically changed the religious practices of the original theravada buddhists of burma (black, 1973, p.10). in this sense, it is hard to find a ‘pure’ religion in myanmar. the plurality of religions has been present in this land back to the arrival of the four major religions: buddhism, christianity, islam, and hinduism. religious diversity therefore is not new to the people but to embrace religious pluralism is another story. the researcher, in this paper, tries to address all existing religions; how they are facing religious pluralism and how they approach or respond to this issue. religious pluralism and buddhism buddhism is known as “the most tolerant religion on earth” (humphreys, 2012, p.50) and a human-based religion. it usually adapts to different cultures easily and emphasizes the liberation of man from worldly sufferings. indeed, it was peace and happiness that gautama buddha searched in his lifetime. in doing so, he tried to avoid all kinds of violence and sought to enter nirvana without depending on others; he rather put his own selfless and strenuous effort into practicing meditation until he attained enlightenment. he identified the contemporary world with sufferings and his mission would be fulfilled only when sufferings ceased. his practical and down-toearth teachings motivate men and women to be able to see the self as humanity and to have compassion for others. this is the authentic teaching of buddha widely known as buddhism. 196 prajna vihara-~ like many southeast asian nations, theravada buddhism is the dominant religion in myanmar. many legends described how buddhism reached this beautiful land. a story even said that gautama buddha had been there and left his eight hairs (bischoff, 1995, pp.18-19). the most famous two accounts, however, are: king asoka sending missionaries to the burmese kingdom to establish orthodox buddhism (buddhism, in this period, was influenced by aris monks, ‘mahayanists’ who adopted the local practices of astrology, alchemy, and spirit-mediumship); another account is of king anawrahta who tried to unify myanmar into one nation and imposed theravada buddhism as an official religion of the country. king anawrahta, however, could not convince burmese (burman) people to stop their traditional practices (nat worship, naga worship, etc).7 not much has been changed even in these modern times; “the burman buddhists embrace primal religions like nat (spirit) worship as part of popular buddhism” (ling, 2005, p.13). according to maung htin aung, “nat worship is part of the buddhist faith and the burmese (burmans) want to worship nat without ceasing to be good buddhists” (aung, 1959, p.73-75). melford e. spiro, the author of burmese supernaturalism, tries to interpret the relationship between animism and buddhism in his beautiful work on nat worship as follows: for most burmese, animism is a concession to human frailty; buddhism is a striving for human nobility. animism represents man’s natural fears and desires; buddhism symbolizes his highest ideals and aspirations. animism presents man as he is; buddhism indicates what he ought to be (and can become). one worships the buddha because he is holy; one propitiates the nats because it is expedient (“out of fear we must”) (spiro, 2011, p.273). animism has been subsumed into buddhism; even comparable aspect of hinduism could also be identified such as worshiping different gods. however, burmese buddhists do not seem to involve themselves with abrahamic religions (christianity, islam, not to mention judaism). they are not so willing, most probably because the general sentiment of the majority of the people is disinterest in “foreign” religions. it is thus hilario plureh 197 difficult to have mutual understanding, which is the second step to religious pluralism after dialogue. without interreligious dialogue, it is almost impossible to reach any mutual understanding, dimming the hope for religious pluralism. even though “to most buddhists the experience of ‘religious pluralism’ has not been the serious shock as it has been to most christians”, buddhists in myanmar are not interested in promoting religious pluralism (abe, 1995, p.18). instead, they are proud of committing to buddhism. they have more privilege in the eyes of the military government. they consider themselves as belonging to the religion of the nation and so regard other faiths as foreign. however, they are, in principle, tolerant towards the other religions if they themselves do not become manipulated by politics. the real cause of conflict between buddhists and muslims is of political nature rather than religious one. of course, the rise of nationalism and ethnicity is the main cause of the conflict. buddhism has taken many times “a leading role in the nationalist movements” and it eventually led into ‘violence’. many non-buddhists feel that buddhism is integral to ‘their national identity’ and so the minorities have no comfortable position. the role of the buddhist monks in myanmar is very honorable. monks wielded their moral authority to challenge the military junta and argue for democracy in the saffron revolution of 2007. peaceful protest was the main weapon of choice this time, and monks paid with their lives. now some monks are using their moral authority to serve a quite different end. they may be a minority, but the 500,000-strong monkhood, which includes many deposited in monasteries as children to escape poverty or as orphans, certainly has its fair share of angry young men (strathern, 2013).8 buddhism in myanmar must strive still towards an appreciation of religious pluralism. it cannot just follow its old way since “buddhism has moved from the old pluralistic situation to a new pluralist one” (abe, 1995, p.19). in myanmar, buddhism can play a big role in order to reach mutual understanding among the different religions which helps to pro198 prajna vihara-~ mote religious pluralism. religious pluralism and christianity for many centuries, doctrinal teaching has been the main emphasis of missionary work. due to this doctrinal highlighting, different religions attempt to separate from one another. instead of trying to learn from each other, people try to indoctrinate others and at the same time strictly entrench their own creed. while this has been common to many religions it is especially characteristic of christianity in the past. while the traditional axiom of the roman catholic church taught, “no salvation outside the church” (extra ecclesiam nulla salus), the protestants said, “there is no salvation outside christianity”. in short, both statements condemned non-christians. it was only in the 20th century that a new way of seeing the world emerged in the christian theology. protestant churches, in 1910, started gathering together to discuss the possibility of overcoming the sectarian antagonism in the propagation of christianity. the consequence of this meeting gave birth to the world council of churches (wcc) in 1948. the roman catholic church, on the other hand, held the second vatican council (1962-65) in order to modernize its teachings. the catholic church has undergone a fundamental change; the catholic attitude towards other religions has taken a positive turn. the researcher therefore may say that, only around this period or in the 20th century, christian theologians began to open up their theological thought. they tried to appreciate the values of other religious traditions and underwent their own copernican shift. this is how the idea of religious pluralism was born within christianity even though religious pluralism has been present for quite some time. of all the world religions, christianity, as mentioned above, appears to be one of the worst in terms of its dealings with other religions. for centuries it has looked disdainfully at other religions. for example, when christian missionaries came to southeast asia, they brought this biased mentality with them. their main mission was to convert the asian people into christianity. they looked down on asian civilizations and the local religious practices. asian people were therefore partly justified to hilario plureh 199 associate christianity with western colonization. in fact, many christians in asia are the fruit of the imposition of western imperialism. myanmar (formerly burma) is just one of them. christianity reached myanmar quite late compared with buddhism. some christians might have passed by this land in the early periods through the commerce and trade. some legends stated that a number of merchants came to this region in the early 17th century but no evidence has been documented. if it is true, the first christians in myanmar would not be natives but foreigners who came from different parts of the world (netherlands, england, portugal, india, etc.). this is the reason why local people in those days used to view christianity as foreign religion. according to the official record, the holy see, in 1720, sent barnabite missionaries to china with the purpose of spreading christianity and some of them eventually ended up in myanmar in 1721 (bigandet, 1996, pp.128). christianity in myanmar was under the care of the catholic church until the arrival of adoniram judson, the first american baptist missionary and his wife, ann judson in 1813. according to samuel ngun ling, christianity in myanmar can be divided into three periods: christianity till the british colonial rule (1947), christianity after independence in 1948, and christianity post-independence under the military rule (1962). christians in the first period enjoyed freedom under the protection of the british rulers but burmese buddhists feared of losing their ‘centuries-old ways of life’ to the alien rule. in the second period, christians were under suspicion of being ‘prowesterners’ by nationalist movements who strongly opposed british colonial rule. when the third period began, christians were indirectly persecuted; “christian missionary schools, hospitals and properties were nationalized under general ne win” (hre & ling, 2012, pp.78-81). christians in myanmar (mainly ethnic groups) do not perceive religious pluralism in the way western christians do. since they (christians in myanmar) are very small in number (4% to 5%) in comparison with the total population of the country, they do not enjoy the same freedom as buddhists. they are still, at the present, in some way in the ‘third period’. they are still followers of un-favored religion in the eyes of the military government. with regard to economic aspect, the majority of the people are still very poor. because of closed-country policy of the mili200 prajna vihara-~ tary government, there are no foreign investments. hence, there are no jobs for the younger generations. hundreds of thousands of them have to sneak out of the country to find work in neighboring countries. most of them could find only menial jobs. back home a large number of people have to struggle hard and most of them live hand to mouth. with this situation, how can christians in myanmar talk about the ultimate truth or god when most of the time they have to worry about their stomach and to feed their children. burmese people (i think also many asian people as well) are not interested in ideology. they would prefer practical or realistic approach rather than idealistic or theoretical one. they want to try something first and then make it as a theory if it succeeds. they prefer practicing first and then write down what they have done. westerners, on the other hand, do the opposite. they would, at first, formulate a theory, and record it in order to have a guideline for practice. if the researcher applies this different approach to religious pluralism, christians in myanmar would rather have interreligious dialogue concerning day-to-day matters (poverty, culture, social life, education, etc.) than discussing about god or ultimate truth. jacques dupuis’9 inductive method to religious pluralism can be applied in this situation. on the academic level, there are more intrareligious dialogue than interreligious one. it seems that christians in myanmar have more problems among themselves (catholics with protestants of different denominations) than with other faiths. catholic bishops, priests, and sisters get along well with buddhist monks and nuns. if the government does not intervene, any interaction among the religious leaders is smooth and friendly. on the grassroots level, christians in myanmar usually meet people of other faiths at work, at school, and at the market without having any problem. they sometimes even invite neighbors of other faiths to help them if there is an emergency, or they participate in animistic festivals. the researcher used to go to his uncle’s village when the villagers celebrated nat worship (the people of this village are christians but still conduct the practice of animism). this festival is celebrated once a year. he also used to go to his mother’s relatives on this special event (it is very interesting that this village, on the other hand, embraces buddhism but still keep on practicing nat worship). all in all, christians in myanmar are quite familiar with religious pluralism even hilario plureh 201 though “christianity itself has moved from a relatively non-pluralistic situation to one radically pluralistic” (abe, 1995, p.19). religious pluralism and islam islam was introduced to myanmar as early as the 8th century. the first muslims who settled in this land were believed to have been arab mariners and traders who landed on the rakhine coast. according to j. a. berlie in 2008, even though muslims make up 7 to 10 % of the total population, like other minority religions, islam is still seen as an un-favored religion. there are various groups of muslims in myanmar. the most famous four are: arakan muslims (rohingyas), muslims of indian ‘origin’, panthays and zerbadees. most of the muslims in myanmar are sunni with a small numbers of shi'ite sects. rohingyas are believed to have been the muslims with the longest history in myanmar. these muslims used to serve in the palaces of both buddhist and muslim kings. “many rohingyas consider themselves to be the natives of the region” and claimed that they are the same like other ethnic groups (berlie, 2008, p.10). for buddhists, who make up the majority of the country, state that they came with the british in the 19th and 20th centuries. rohinyas are the most marginalized ethnic group in myanmar; they are considered stateless. under the british rule, myanmar shared the same province with india. many traders from india came and brought their cultures and religions. many indian muslims were recognized as “the most important minority community under the 1935 government of burma act” (berlie, 2008, p.8). hindus and muslims of indian origin were involved in many kinds of business. myanmar separated from india in 1937 and many indians went back to india in 1964. muslims from yunnan are known as panthays. these chinese muslims, however, prefer to be called burmese muslims. some of these muslims are believed to be the descendants of soldiers who invaded pagan in 1211-79. zerbadees, the mixed-blood muslims, are the nearest culture-wise to burmans. some do not want to be called ‘zerbadee’ but ‘burmese muslims’. zerbadees believe that there is no difference between them and the burman buddhists. they accept 202 prajna vihara-~ some buddhist practices such as fortune-telling and astrology. in general, burmans usually call muslims in burmese language kala, a very derogatory term, but they would, however, prefer to be called ‘burmese muslims’ (berlie, 2008, pp.6-16). like christians, muslims are not only persecuted by the military government, they are also seen as a threat to the buddhist nationalists. many buddhists are afraid of the future possibility of islamic dominance in the country. they are therefore trying to impose the national law, that is, the law of nationalism. according to this law, “burmese buddhist girl should not marry non-buddhists, if they do, the man must convert to buddhism. if a burmese buddhist woman does not obey this law, she will be put to prison at least five years”. this is a law that the leaders of the nationalistic movement such as u warathu and u pinyawara are trying to pass through the parliament.10 if the parliament passes this law, every burmese buddhist girl has to follow it or else she would be put to jail. the reason why recently muslims in myanmar have been continuously in conflict with the burmese buddhists is due to the oppression from the military government. not recognizing them (mainly rohingyas) as one of the ethnic groups and not giving them citizenship is one of the reasons. it has manifested itself as religious clash between buddhists and muslims because buddhists support the government’s position and there are “radical monks who are at the forefront of a bloody campaign against muslims”.11 the researcher, however, believes that not all buddhists hate muslims and also not all muslims dislike buddhists. the fight began only with a very small group of people. this means that there are some antimuslims who are ‘nationalists or fascist’ and there are some muslim extremists who do not like buddhists. the problem of ethnicity is also one of the reasons why these two groups are fighting. to make the matter worse, the government leaders do not know how to handle this problematic issue. they are facing the dilemma of making a definite decision. this controversial case is one of the most challenging the government leaders have to face as they are also trying to open the country and to journey down a democratic road. islam, like other un-favored religions in the country, is also struggling to encounter the favored religion, buddhism. like many christian theologians, in the researcher’s viewpoint, islamic scholars would prefer hilario plureh 203 ' to discuss about the day-to-day problems (basic needs, education, poverty, refugees, etc.) rather than talking about the supernatural things when coming to the dialogue table. the way muslims in myanmar approach religious pluralism might not be the same as the indonesian muslims who make up the majority of the population. historically, just like christians, they have to watch out their daily life in order not to disturb the military government. according to the country’s constitution, “the muslims’ right to worship in myanmar is guaranteed; however, the lack of citizenship of the majority of arakan muslims attests to their strong, albeit unspoken, resistance to state policies in the rakhine state” (berlie, 2008, p.108). religious pluralism and hinduism hinduism, the world’s oldest religious tradition and the world’s largest pluralistic tradition, is considered as “a non-institutionalized religion”. it therefore does not face “the problem of defining itself vis-a-vis ‘the other’” (chatterjee, 1994, p.1). since hinduism is not based on dogma (system of religious laws) but emphasizes one supreme god with different forms or various small gods, its followers believe in the multiplicity of spiritual paths and ways. hinduism, unlike the other world religions, is not based on the teachings of a single master or a single book; rather it follows the teachings of the different sages. hindus therefore can encounter the existence of god everywhere, in everything, and in every being (goel, 2002, pp.1-3). due to their internal pluralism, hinduism is “tolerant of other religions and is capable of subsuming them within its own mythic structures” (knitter, 2005, p.148). it is said that hinduism is the only major religion that does not seek to actively expand and convert others. since it recognizes that “there are many paths to the divine and that each must find the way which suits them best”, hindus are more interested in searching for the truth rather than trying to convert people to their religion (chatterjee, 1994, p.3). the positive aspect of having no creed is that they have not drawn any borders to exclude non-hindus. that is the reason jeffery long said “everybody is a hindu”.12 furthermore, mahatma gandhi who was known as the model of “the adjustment to pluralism under the general umbrella 204 prajna vihara-~ ' of nationalism” in india had believed “in the light of his common-sense realization that people belonging to different communities do not encounter each other in theologically charged contexts but in day-to-day living” (chatterjee, 1994, pp.1&8). here is what gandhi had proposed for all religious people how to pray, “our inmost prayer should be that a hindu should be a better hindu, a muslim a better muslim and a christian a better christian” (gandhi, 1959, p.461). hinduism reached myanmar as early as buddhism. some traders immigrated from india and brought their own culture and religion. according to a mon legend, these hindu merchants fought with the mon who also adopted their beliefs into their own culture. there is no doubt to say that hinduism has greatly influenced buddhism in myanmar. even theravada buddhism was introduced in the 11th century; hinduism still plays a big role in the daily life of the burmese buddhists. hindu god or goddesses have been adopted into the form of nat worship in which burmese buddhists highly venerate. the king of the nats called thagyamin is identified with indra, the king of hindu gods. all three religions are intermingled. as the religion (hinduism) appreciates other religious traditions, hinduism in myanmar, as the researcher observes, seems to get along well with other faiths. religious pluralism with animistic belief and other religions animism, the first stage in the development of religion according to edward burnett tylor, believes that the spirit exists in the natural entities both living and non-living; plants, mountains, animals, etc. animists believe that “the spirits that exist in nature have the power to help or harm; therefore animists offer some form of worship to these spirits” (hopfe & (jr.), 1993, p.36). these people see the spirit or the soul in every being. the practice of animism is everywhere: in africa, in australia, in america, and in asia. myanmar has also been one of the southeast asian countries that greatly embraced this religion in its history. in fact, animism is the religion of the land before the arrival of other world religions. therefore, people in myanmar are very familiar with animistic hilario plureh 205 practices. animism has influenced all other religions in myanmar. it is the religion rooted in the heart of the people there. people might officially convert to the newly-arrived religions but their daily life would not change. they would still believe in the supernatural of the spirit. to give an example of this, the parents of the researcher are officially catholics. they put their effort, at least his mother, to go to church on every sunday. but when there is a problem in the family or when one of the family members gets sick, they will offer something to the spirit so that the person will recover and get well again. it is a kind of superstition. the researcher finds it hard to believe but it is sometimes difficult to deny as well. this practice is very common to the burmese believers either buddhists or christians. buddhism is more flexible adopting the animistic practices into its rituals than christianity. this is the reason why many christian missionaries in the past have failed. they brought western cultures with them and tried to force the local people to practice exactly as they did. many times they could not succeed. they did not realize how strongly indigenous practices have influenced the burmese people. buddhism and hinduism, on the other hand, could easily adapt their teaching to the native cultures. the researcher has to admit that he does not have much knowledge about islam on this issue. animism, however, to a certain extent has a strong impact on all religions coming into southeast asia. buddhism, the religion that officially acknowledges the 37 nats under the reign of king anawrahta, has been influenced the strongest by these animistic practices in myanmar. since chinese immigrants used to come in the past, there might still be some chinese traditional religions in the country but no official record has been given. it is said that before the second world war, there was a jewish community which made up around 2,500 members in rangoon. the document even mentioned that myanmar was “the first asian country to recognize israel in 1949” (planet, allen, smith, & smith, 2012). less than one hundred jews may still be found in the country today. 206 prajna vihara-~ conclusion the religious character of myanmar, like many southeast asian nations, operates along ethnic lines. just as many asians assume that malays are muslims, thais are buddhists, filipinos are catholics, and chinese are taoists/confucians. likewise burmese people (burmans 'the majority’ ethnicity’) should not assume ethnic identity along religious lines. but as many see the religious identity in line with culture and ethnicity, the great need is to first solve the problem of cultural pluralism or ethnic pluralism in order to embrace the religious pluralism. endnotes 1eight major ethnicities are burman, kayin, kachin, kayah, chin, mon, rakhine, and shan. 2the statement is quoted by k. t. tun gottingen, “authority and freedom of action in the (burmese) buddhist tradition”, on p.223 of the book, tradition and modernity in myanmar: culture, social life and languages and by samuel ngun ling, communicating christ in myanmar, p.57. this statement is supposed to apply to the tribe of burman, not all people in myanmar. a burmese in this sense is attributed to the tribe, not to the citizen. 3“punk rockers break myanmar’s silence on religious attacks”, in bangkok post: retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/363116/punk-rockersbreak-myanmar-silence-on-religious-attacks. 4this approach normally starts “from the experience of lived reality and the questions that the context raises, thereafter to search for answers in the light of the revealed message and tradition” jacques dupuis, “my pilgrimage in mission” international bulletin of missionary research, vol. 27, no. 4, october, 2003. 5just a few years ago, after so many years of prohibiting christians to practice their former cult practices, the local priests realize that by imposing them to do so, the culture of the people gradually disappear and so they are now trying to acculturate with the christian faith. it is still noticeable that animistic practices always accompany cultural events. 6when king anawrahta came to power in 11th century, he tried to make theravada buddhism a national religion. at first he tried to ban ‘nat worship’ and destroyed ‘nat shrines’ but he later on realized that his people could not abandon the aged old practices, and worse still, forcing them to do so would take away from buddhism. from then onwards, burmese buddhists can still practice ‘nat worship’ while embracing buddhism. hilario plureh 207 7the word nat in burmese seems to derive from the pali-sanskrit term natha (lord or guardian). nat (also spirit) is “very much alive in the lives of the people in myanmar. the power nat of myanmar has evolved into spirit that may hold dominion over a place, person, or field of experience” (reid & grosberg, 2005, p.59) 8alan strathern, “why are buddhist monks attacking muslims?” retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22356306. on 11. 08. 2013. 9jacques dupuis was a belgian jesuit priest who worked as a missionary in india for 36 years. from there he began to develop his inductive approach to religious pluralism. the inductive approach normally starts “from the experience of lived reality and the questions that the context raises, thereafter to search for answers in the light of the revealed message and tradition” (dupuis, 2003, p.170). 10the deadline for the collection of the votes from the citizens was on july 17, 2013 and according to the information that the researcher referred which was on july 18, 2013, two millions people have singed this potential law. retrieved from thithtoolwin.com july 18, 2013. 11“punk rockers break myanmar’s silence on religious attacks”, in bangkok post: retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/363116/punk-rockersbreak-myanmar-silence-on-religious-attacks. 12this statement is mentioned in his article “anekanta vedanta: towards a deep hindu religious pluralism”. in deep religious pluralism, ed. david ray griffin. louisville, ky: westminster john knox press, 2005 (130-157). references abe, m. (1995). buddhism and interfaith dialogue: part one of a twovolume sequel to zen and western thought. honolulu, hawai’i: university of hawai’i press. aung, m. h. (1959). folk elements in burmese buddhism. rangoon: buddha sasana council press. berlie, j. a. (2008). the burmanization of myanmar’s muslims. bangkok: white lotus press. bigandet, paul. a. (1996). history of the catholic burmese mission. bangkok: white orchid press. black, j. r. (1973). book review: folk elements in burmese buddhism by maung htin aung. bischoff, r. (1995). buddhism in myanmar: a short history. sri lanka: buddha dharma education association inc. chatterjee, m. (1994). reflections on religious pluralism in the indian 208 prajna vihara-~ context. journal of hindu-christian studies: vol 7(5) . retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1093. on 12. 07. 2013. claydon, d. (2005). a new vision, a new heart, a renewed call. pasadena, carlifornia: william carey library. dupuis, j. (2003). my pilgrimage in mission. international bulletin of missionary research. vol. 22, october, pp.168-171. emerick, y. (2002). the complete idiot’s guide to understanding islam. indianapolis: alpha books. esposito, j. l. (2010). the future of islam. oxford & new york: oxford university press, inc. gandhi, m. (1959). the collected works of mahatma gandhi, vol. 35. new delhi: government of india publications. goel, m. l. (2002). religious tolerance and hinduism: florida: florida atlantic university. hre, l. t. & ling, s. n. (2012). select surveys on theological education in emerging asian church myanmar. world council of churches. vol. 64(2), july, pp.74-87. oxford: blackwell publishing ltd. hopfe, l. m., & (jr.), l. m. h. (1994). religions of the world. new york: macmillan college publishing company. humphreys, c. (2012). exploring buddhism. new york: routledge. knitter, p. f. (2005). the myth of religious superiority: a multifaith explorations of religious pluralism. maryknoll, new york: orbis books. leo, l. (2010). international religious freedom: annual report to congress. washington: diane publishing. ling, s. n. (2005). communicating christ in myanmar: issues, interactions and perspectives. yangon, myanmar: association for theological education in myanmar. long, j. (2005). anekanta vedanta: towards a deep hindu religious pluralism. in david r. g. (ed.). deep religious pluralism. louisville, ky: westminster john knox press. spiro, m. e. (2011). burmese supernaturalism. second printing. new jersey: transaction publishers. planet, l., allen, j., smith, a. j., & smith, j. (2012). lonely planet myanmar (burma). lonely planet: the world’s leading travel hilario plureh 209 guide publisher.. reid, r., & grosberg, m. (2005). myanmar (burma). lonely planet: the world’s leading travel guide publisher.. topich, w. j., & leitich, k. a. (2013). the history of myanmar. santa barbara, california: abc-clio, llc. strathern, alan (2013). why are buddhist monks attacking muslims?: retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22356306. on 11. 08. 2013. punk rockers break myanmar’s silence on religious attacks”, in bangkok post: retrieved from: http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/ 363116/punk-rockers-break-myanmar-silence-on-religious-attacks. on 12. 07. 2013. 210 prajna vihara-~ a9te3l5b_ayh0lx_4hc.tmp 122 the ethics of intellectual property law in the area of pharmaceutical drugs and vaccines during times of pandemics peeraput thiendej and john giordano abstract the course of the covid 19 pandemic, has demonstrated the serious obstacles to the availability and access to vaccines for many less-developed countries. one obstacle involves the pharmaceutical patents which limited the ability of the intellectual property laws created by the world trade organization and trips agreement has shown itself to be unfair to less-developed countries. this is also seen as a problem in global justice. there is an increasing belief that pharmaceutical patents should be waived in times of emergency. but the question is how to justify these waivers? one approach might be the idea of the commons which underlies intellectual property in it most basic form. this paper explores ways of reforming intellectual property law in light of the recent problems connected to the covid pandemic. keywords: intellectual property rights; vaccine patents; intellectual commons; pandemics vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 122-132 © 2000 by assumption university press 123 introduction it is the very nature of pandemics that research on cures and vaccines and their distribution needs to be accomplished very quickly. during the covid-19 global pandemic countries around the world had to rush to ensure that their citizens were fully vaccinated. this placed the pharmaceutical companies in a position of great power. it allowed them to to dictate prices of vaccines which created problems in vaccine access. wealthier countries were able to secure large vaccine contracts, this highlighted a serious problem concerning intellectual property in relationship to the distribution of vaccines in times of serious pandemics. there is an increasing belief that pharmaceutical patents should be waived in times of emergency. but the question is how to justify these waivers? one approach might be the idea of the commons which underlies intellectual property in it most basic form. this paper explores ways of reforming intellectual property law in light of the recent problems connected to the covid pandemic. pharmaceutical patents covid-19 patent battle,” explained the necessity of pharmaceutical patents. according to them, pharmaceutical companies have always is the high expense of research and testing to prove the medicines are safe, control once they are on the market in order to gain a good return on their initial investment. but the result of these strict patent laws often leads to monopolies over production and distribution, and makes new drugs and vaccines expensive and less accessible.1 so it is often argued that to solve this problem of accessiblity during times of serious pandemics, there should be a temporary waiver of intellectual property protection. the pharmaceutical companies have argued against such waivers based upon the same arguments they 124 use to defend strict intellectual property laws. they argue that patent waivers would reduces the return for patent holders on their r&d investment in the vaccine; they argue that the research and development of vaccines involves heavy investment in highly specialized equipment, technologies and infrastructure. if vaccines patents are waived in the time there is a similar emergency? in addition, they argue that the waiver of patent rights would create chaos, and even lead to the increase in fake vaccines. that it is a matter of production safety standards, and it is not easy for just any country to have the infrastructure availabile to produce vaccines with reliable medical technology.2 critics of a patent waivers also claim that it would not give an immediate increase in supply, as establishing production of a new type of vaccine would take months. another concern is that waivers would jeopardize existing supply chains. for example, during the covid 19 86 suppliers in 19 countries. competition for access to the raw materials could slow net production and result in an even lower supply. in addition, the waiver would discourage future innovation. most importantly, the were only possible through years of research and development from the public and private sector. jecker and atuire have attempted to investigate ethical arguments for vaccine waivers. they looked at both sides of the argument. at one point they cite the industry argument which contends that if companies investments in the pharmaceutical industry drop. this could lead to a decline in new technologies, leaving us unprepared for the next pandemic.3 yet as jecker and atuire show, there have been good arguments for such waivers. they argue that a pandemic is a global public health problem, and that strict patent laws slow the production of vaccines to meet demand. during the covid-19 crisis there were many manufactures 125 with the capacity to produce vaccines at factories in bangladesh, denmark, canada, israel, and india. unfortunately, these countries were unable to contribute to the production of vaccines because they did not have the right to the patents. in addition, such waivers would give governments the freedom to collaborate on technology transfers and exports. it would enable governments around the world to be prepared for a long-term response to future pandemics. a mechanism for waiving intellectual property rights could help to build diverse regional manufacturing hubs and protect the rest of the world from future pandemics. so this becomes an ethical question; how to balance the rights of investors in research and technology with the needs of the world population involves understanding what lies at the very basis of patent law, that is, intellectual property. and to understand the ethics of intellectual property is to investigate the very essence of property itself and how it is related to the commons. the commons locke has created the way we usually think of private property. that all humans are equal under god, and all have ownership over their extension of their bodies, and so, whenever a person mixes their labour with nature, he thereby makes it their property. the nature available to is called the commons. locke created two limitations on this claim over the commons. we claim only “where there is enough, and as good left in common for others” and “as much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of other words, individuals can have a right to their claims of property as long as there is enough left for others, and if the property can be used 126 these two limitations are to help to create a balance between the interests of individuals who have gained access to properties from commons and for society in general.4 yet , as locke recognized, a complication comes in with the introduction of money that allows unequal control over resources. locke accept this accumulation of property, but be an unlimited commons available for appropriation. locke sometimes it is important in a society for provisions to ensure the access to the commons. this should be the role of the government. a particular government should provide its citizens with public goods. public goods are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. that means that it is wrong to exclude someone from using the good. therefore, this shows that the very idea of the commons implies a certain public good. and certainly in the case of vaccines during the time of pandemics, they can be considered as a public good.5 similarly, in the book , peter drahos shows complications in the meaning of intellectual property. drahos suggests that intellectual property rights are often rights of exploitation of information. information is becoming “the prime resource” in modern economics these days. to drahos, there are two frameworks in intellectual property rights. drahos suggests that intellectual property rights considered within the framework of “proprietarianism” as it is today gives too many advantages to the ownership. the owner of rights the intellectual property rights. intellectual property in the framework of “proprietarianism” is therefore inappropriate and creates a negative 6 so drahos contends that viewing intellectual property rights from the framework of “instrumentalism” is more appropriate. such an approach gives more importance to society. it shows the role of intellectual property in enabling society to operate properly. the instrumental view is supported by the very idea of the commons which makes property 127 idea is that the commons exists to be exploited by whoever can lay claim to it. the positive idea is that the claim to the commons needs to be shared or balanced with the interests of the citizens. our question, then, is whether there are reasons to favour comes to making decisions about the relationship between community and the intellectual commons. one assumption we make without defending it is that communities have an interest in encouraging the creativity of their members. a way to proceed to an answer is to come to some understanding of the role that the intellectual commons has in aiding creativity of all kinds.7 ths idea of the commons and the community which relies upon it, forms the very possibility not only of property, but of the creativity and innovation which issues from it. therefore a strict adherence to intellectual property laws not only limits creativity and innovation, it also leads to exploitation. the dangers of negative community for the intellectual commons come when technology makes new kinds of appropriation possible or when the regulatory conventions protecting it for one reason or another cease to work. the intellectual commons then becomes a hunting ground for the economically strong and the technologically capable.8 this emphasis on creativty and indebtedness is also described by jecker and atuire. they cite the words of a physician, who received the work possible: 128 my gratitude starts with scientists who years before this pandemic, perfected the ability to extract dna from viruses, sequence it and transcribe it to rna… the scientists the spike proteins that the virus uses to invade our cells; those who made the mrna that corresponds to that dna womb to protect that precious mrna payload during its deltoid musculature.9 therefore, both jecker and atuire and drahos, recognize that every innovation is indebted to what has been prepared for by the researchers humanity, intellectual property rights need to be considered in relationship community. the commons and public health the ethics of intellectual property is now becoming increasingly important. but it is especially important with regards to the pharmaceutical industry during pandemics. the discipline of bioethics can help determine ethical choices through four key principles which harmful. justice has to do with being fair.10 how to fairly allocate vaccines is one of the critical ethical issues in the times. it will violate the bioethical principles, if the vaccines are made available fairly to all. for example, elites can receive a vaccine in hospitals sponsored by the government, while many patients in the poor and middle-class were turned away from hospitals without treatment in bangladesh.11 129 in addition, developed counties have taken control over the creation and distribution of vaccines, making the global distribution of such vaccines unequitable.12 yet this exclusion creates dangers. the longer a pandemic spreads among humans, the higher chance that it can lead to new mutations. such mutant viruses lead to the possibility that vaccines will become obsolete. moreover, areas of the world denied access to vaccines will become the breeding ground for new strains. therefore, it is not a question of should wealthy nations help developing and poor during pandemic situations, both developed and developing countries must have provisions to make intellectual property rights more of deaths. intellectual property rights are supposed to be based on the idea of a positive community or commons. therefore, the health of the conclusion the issue of vaccine patents has now become a symbol of a fragmented society. a patent system is a government-supported, guaranteed monopoly on commercial products. the only possible reason for governments to support this is that small groups of investors will all the concerns over covid-19 vaccine patents are far less important than the lives of millions of people. the patent systems may be neither clearly positive nor negative from the perspective of social responsibility. however, what is more relevant is how much more we opening the economy. the patent system should be ethically judged by its impact on humanity as a whole. therefore, vaccines should be considered in relation to the commons as locke would insist we should use only “where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” medical innovation and 130 ethics are related to one another in pharmaceutical industries. the impact of covid-19 pandemic shows the importance of balancing intellectual property rights and service to the community at large during times of crisis. large pharmaceutical companies have the right to protect their investments through patents. however, the question may remain, if the companies deserve such rigid rights during a global crisis. the covid-19 crisis seems to have passed. but what of the next pandemic? an ethical is a positive community which make certain demands upon the use of the commons, both for property in general and for intellectual property. 131 endnotes 1 battle,” (international science council, 2020). 2 siripurapu, a, “the debate over a patent wavier for covid 19 vaccines. what to know.” accessed 7 june 2021. https://www.crf.org. 3 jecker and atuire, “what is yours is ours: waving intellectual property protections for covid-19 vaccines”, accessed 10 may 2021. https://www.jme.bmj.com 4 locke, j, two treatises of government, (cambridge u.p, 1960). 5 boyce, p, “what are public goods.” accessed 8 december 2021. https:// www.boycewire.com 6 drahos, p, a philosophy of intellectual property, hampshire, (ashgate publishing limited, 1996). 7 ibid, 60 8 ibid, 66 9 jecker, n, “what is yours is ours: waving intellectual property protections for covid-19 vaccines,” accessed 10 may 2021. https://www.jme.bmj.com. 10 clark, d. et. al., “biomedical ethics and clinical oversight in multisite observational neuroimaging studies with children and adolescents: the abcd experience,” (developmental cognitive neuroscience, 2018),32,143-154 11 siraj, m. s., et. al., a, “the infectious diseases act and resource allocation during the covid-19 pandemic in bangladesh” (asian bioethics, 2020), review, 12(4), 491-502. 12 mcmahon, a, “global equitable access to vaccines, medicines and diagnostics for covid-19: the role of patents as private governance,” (journal of medical, 2020) ethics, 47, 142. 132 references boyce, p, “what are public goods.” accessed 8 december 2021. https:// www.boycewire.com clark, d. b., et al. “biomedical ethics and clinical oversight in multisite observational neuroimaging studies with children and adolescents: the abcd experience,” (developmental cognitive neuroscience, 2018), 32, 143–154. john locke, , (cambridge u.p, 1960). peter drahos, , hampshire: (ashgate publishing limited, 1996). peter drahos & john braithwaite, , (new york: the new press, 2003). jecker and atuire, “what is yours is ours: waving intellectual property protections for covid-19 vaccines,” accessed 10 may 2021. www.jme.bmj.com. mcmahon, a, “global equitable access to vaccines, medicines and diagnostics for covid-19: the role of patents as private governance,” (journal of medical, 2020), ethics, 47, 142. battle,” (international science council, 2020). siraj, m. s., dewey, r. s., & ul hassan, a, “the infectious diseases act and resource allocation during the covid-19 pandemic in bangladesh,” (asian bioethics, 2020), review, 12(4), 491–502. siripurapu, a, “the debate over a patent waiver for covid 19 vaccines: what to know.” accessed 7 june 2021. https://www.crf.org. 14_(240-250) a global sense.pmd a global sense of solidarity, in the context of narrow nationalism: the case of the hizmet (service) movement from turkey zeki pariti thai turkish business association, bangkok, thailand abstract this paper is an effort to understand/present and outline how the hizmet (service) movement; more popularly known as the gulen movement and named after the prominent turkish scholar fethullah g?len; on which hundreds conferences papers and many books are written, has developed a global sense of solidarity that has a sphere of influence on the global scale: active in more than a hundred countries with schools, aid organizations, intercultural centers and business organizations, the g?len movement is considered to be one of the most significant social movements that arose from the muslim world. º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õé¾âòâòá·õè̈ ðà¢éòã¨áåð¹óàê¹íçèò¢ºç¹¡òã hizmet ä é́¡åòâà»ç¹ ·õè¹ôâáíâèò§¡çéò§¢çò§ä é́íâèò§äã ¢ºç¹¡òã ñ́§¡åèòçáñ¡à»ç¹·õèãùé̈ ñ¡ã¹¹òᢺ繡òã gulen «ö觵ñ駪×èíµòá fethullah g?len ¼ùéà»ç¹¹ñ¡çôªò¡òãªòçµøã¡õ ·õè¹ñ¡çôªò¡òãä é́·ó ¡òãèö¡éòáåðà¢õâ¹à¡õèâç¡ñºá¹ç¤ố ¢í§à¢òäçéáò¡áòâ ¢ºç¹¡òã¹õéä é́á¾ãèëåòâã¹ ¡çèò 100 »ãðà·è ·ñé§ã¹âã§àãõâ¹ í§¤ì¡ããëé¤çòáªèçâàëå×í èù¹âìçñ²¹¸ããááåðí§¤ì¡ã ¸øã¡ô¨ ¢ºç¹¡òã gulen à»ç¹ë¹öè§ã¹¢ºç¹¡òã·ò§êñ§¤á·õèêó¤ñ­·õèêø´·õèà¡ô´¢öé¹ã¹ âå¡áøêåôá 210 prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 240-250 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __~ introduction: solidarity and nationalism the fact that, the changing philosophical and sociological meanings of the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘nationalism’ from a global perspective makes it necessary to clarify that the usually trustworthy academic definitions of these terms are limited by the western understanding version of them. in his book, solidarity: from civic friendship to a global legal community 2005, hauke brunkhorst says that “solidarity is a thoroughly modern concept. it is just as tightly bound up with the juridical concept of equality as with the political concept of democracy. its origin is in the french revolution”.1 later emile durkheim referred to two types of solidarity __ mechanical and organic; a society characterized by mechanical solidarity is unified because all people are engaged in similar activities or responsibilities. in contrast, a society characterized by organic solidarity is held together by the fact that all have different tasks or responsibilities (george ritzer 2004). even though nationalism is unique to the modern world as a political ideology, some of its elements can be traced throughout history. the columbia electronic encyclopedia, 6th ed. records that “the first roots of nationalism are probably to be found in the ancient hebrews, and the ancient greeks also felt superior to all other peoples. these feelings of cultural superiority (ethnocentrism), which are similar to nationalism, gave way to much more universal identifications under the roman empire and with the christian church through its teaching of the oneness of humanity. then it was in the 19th century that nationalism became a widespread and powerful force. during this time nationalism expressed itself in many areas as a drive for national unification or independence. the early 20th century, with the breakup of austria-hungary and of the ottoman empire, saw the establishment of many independent nations, especially through the peace treaties ending world war i. the paris peace conference established the principle of national self-determination, upheld by the league of nations and later by the united nations. while self-determination is a nationalist principle, it also recognizes the basic equality of all nations, large or small, and therefore transcends a narrow nationalism that claims superiority for itself”. zeki pariti 241 the republic of turkey after the breakup of the ottoman empire, a new country, the republic of turkey, which was to witness a radical change in the political system along the lines of the western european nation-states was established. this was an effort to establish and then hold on to, a nationalist, laicist, and westernized republic. (cetin 2010) later, the new republic of turkey went through crises, conflicts and demands for modernization period of time (1923-1950): the republican era: one-party rule, laicist policies, cultural revolution; the history and language reforms to erase the pre-existing culture and education, execution of people, forbidding publications in the old language and kurdish language that was spoken and written by the biggest ethnic minority other than turkish in turkey. in 1950 power passed from a single-party dictatorship to an elected democratic government. but then something happened that would recur in different guises to haunt turkey right up to the present: top army officers offered to stage a coup to suppress the elected government and restore the republicans party which lost the previous election. the following years of turkey saw similar political conflicts that resulted in the illegal deposition of the governments for four times including the one which was called ‘post-modern’ military coup between the years 1960-1997. of course, besides, the problems that were provoked by the pushed social and cultural transformation in a short period of time in the early years of the new republic, education and health, which have been turkey’s two most important issues since the period of the ottoman state, continually grew larger during the republican period and, worse than that, became tools for political goals. especially, ideological and political concerns rather than logic and science ruled almost all the decisions made in the field of education. during this time, turkey never became a noteworthy country in the international arena. on the contrary, universities, which should have made high-level scientific work, became a point of political focus and were in the forefront of military coups in the recent turkish history. 242 prajna vihara __ __ ~ who is fethullah gulen? fethullah g?len is a turkish muslim intellectual, who was born in 1941 into a traditional family in the pasinler district of erzurum, turkey. erzurum lies in the northeast of turkey, and it is socio-culturally very conservative. it is a town that has, for long centuries, reflected the basic religious and national values in its social make-up. as a young man, gulen found himself in a position to deal with two different cultures, islam and the west. beginning three generations before him, people had experienced an identity crisis between these two cultures and civilizations. gulen had a good view of the transforming cultural view of his age. rather than falling into emotional or ethical despair in the face of social and institutional transformations occurring in turkey and the world in general, he did not shy away from drawing on both individual and traditional experience while actively engaging with current social transformations by way of conscious participation. he developed a perspective that fed his personal, ethical, and cultural ideals with new repertoires of knowledge. (ergene 2007) along with other great islamic scholars like maulana jalaluddeen rumi, one of the most important islamic thinkers of late ottoman empire and the republican era from whom fethullah gulen was influenced was said nursi (1873-1960). nursi’s ideas for a modern islamic consciousness emphasized the need for a significant role for religious belief in public life, while rejecting obscurantism and embracing scientific and technological development. keys points in his message inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue: fethullah gulen believes that the thoughts, values and experiences which are shared by the people of not only the same nation but by all the nations of the world, are much more important and more numerous than what divides and antagonises them, encourage tolerance and respect and promote unity, while at the same time preventing the divisions and antagonisms from growing into open hostility and conflict. .. zeki pariti 243 .. education: its role and significance fethullah gulen unequivocally asserts: ‘if you wish to keep the masses under control, simply starve them of knowledge. the only escape route from tyranny is through the attainment of knowledge’. he believes the road to fair opportunity and justice for all is paved with an appropriate and sufficient general education. only then do the resources develop within individuals and within their communities to enable understanding and mutual respect which, in turn. are the basis upon which each others rights can be secured by voluntary compliance. fethullah gulen has over the years encouraged the elite and community leaders, successful industrialists and businessmen, to support quality education for those who cannot otherwise afford it. fethullah gulen maintains: if a civilized nation expects to be ignorant and free, it is expecting what never was and never will be’. in the field of education this principle means making intelligent use of, rather than running away from, the latest knowledge and technologies, notably mass communications technology such as television, to inform the public, especially those unable to attain a formal education, of matters of concern and relevance to them. the usefulness of democracy fethullah gulen is of the opinion that, in spite of its many shortcomings, democracy is the only viable choice in modern times for a system to manage political decision-making and governance generally. he argues therefore that mankind should preserve democracy and try to develop and improve it. people will always demand freedom of choice in the way they run their affairs and especially in their expression of spiritual and religious values. the duty of hope do not despair in the face of adversity and do not yield to anarchists’, he emphasizes time and again. he has warned most particularly 244 prajna vihara __ __ ~ against giving up hope when disappointments and failures come thick and fast. hopelessness is a quicksand that incapacitates the will to struggle and succeed; it is a noose that chokes the powers of reason and imagination so that, in their despair, people refuse to learn from their trials and run to false, short-term solutions which, in time, intensify the very problems they sought to escape. a strong faith in god and loyalty to fundamental principles are the best defence against the decay or loss of hope. visions for the future fethullah gulen senses a positive change in the spiritual climate in the world. he envisions a 21st century in which we shall see the birth of a spiritual dynamism that will shake off the dust that has stifled moral values for so long. he looks forward to an age of tolerance and understanding leading to co-operation between the great human civilizations and ultimately to their unification. the nobility of the human spirit and moral conscience will triumph on the way to inter-civilizational dialogue based on shared values. mankind face anxieties and stresses in modern society, and their labours, even well-intentioned, have undesirable outcomes, psychologically, socio-politically and environmentally. the principal reason, fethullah gulen contends, is that man proceeds only haltingly in search of his creator and the purpose of his creation. to the fundamental questions which we all ask__why was i born? what is the purpose of my living? what is the meaning of death and what does it demand from me?__fethullah gulen gives very practical and convincing answers, but people must choose individually to be guided or not. in his speeches and writings he has often said: 'man has come to a crossroads: one road leads to despair, the other to salvation. may god give us the ‘wisdom to make the right choice. sharing the abundance fethullah gulen does not believe that there exist any material shortages in the world which might conceivably justify the death of millions from famine or drought. the problems arise from unequal distribution of wealth and the resources from which wealth is generated. he argues zeki pariti 245 strongly that wealth should be channeled through private charities to the needy. he has spearheaded the establishment of many charitable organizations to handle the welfare of the underprivileged and to administer and carry out the most direct and effective methods of accomplishing this task. material and spiritual values in his philosophical writings and speeches fethullah gulen has sought to synthesize the positive sciences with divinity, to reconcile the alleged incongruities between them. in the same spirit, he has argued that man must seek, in his everyday life of work and relationships, a subtle and delicate balance between material and spiritual values. individuals and societies must guard against unrestrained avarice and the artificial multiplication of needs. equally, absolute renunciation is not a way that all can follow, nor one that even the few can follow all the time. through steady discipline and intelligent exercise of conscience a moderate path must be sought and held to. only then can individuals and societies enjoy serenity and contentment. use reasoned argument, not violence as for getting others to accept your ways, fethullah gulen tells us, mere force is not appropriate. in a situation where communication across great distances has become easier and easier, and people have access or can demand access to the means of mass communication, the only proper way to get others to accept your ideas is by persuading them through convincing arguments. those who resort to brute force to reach their goals are intellectually bankrupt. current projects though officially retired, fethullah gulen remains active in the organization of meetings and conferences, and as writer and speaker. he is also teaching islamic sciences to a large group of divinity graduates under his private tutelage. his following in his native turkey and abroad 246 prajna vihara __ __ ~ continues to grow. his biography recently reached its fiftieth edition. the fountain magazine (issue 23, 1998). the hizmet (service) movement during the decades of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, he preached to large crowds in mosques and public places throughout turkey and wrote hundreds of newspaper columns, articles and books espousing his ideas. gradually, many turks from all walks of life responded to his ideas of education, modernization, positive relationships with the west and interfaith dialogue by establishing dormitories, university preparatory courses and schools in which quality education, especially in the sciences and technology, were buttressed with commitment to islamic ideals. with the fall of the soviet union, his ideas and service projects spread to the former turkish-soviet countries and ulti-mately to western europe, north america, asia, africa, australia and to middle eastern countries. today, the g?len-inspired movement has over 1,000 schools in 100 countries on 5 continents. it is a civic movement rooted in moderate islam and committed to educating youth, fostering interfaith and intercultural dialogue, assisting the needy in society and contributing to global peace. (helen rose ebaugh 2010) social movements take time to develop; they do not come readymade. in any case, the availability of political opportunities does not automatically and promptly translate into increased action and is insufficient to account for the emergence of a collective action and actor. for an organized collective action as large as the g?len movement, there has to be, already in place, a sufficient number of people with the necessary intellectual and professional skills, and the readiness and will to be employed, before a window of opportunity opens up in history. generally, a collective actor or action (such as a social movement or political party) does not automatically spring from political or social tensions or conditions. numerous factors determine whether or not this will occur. necessary factors include the availability of adequate organizational resources, the ability of movement leaders to represent their ideology attractively to the public or masses, and a political context which zeki pariti 247 makes action possible. field of activities of the hizmet movement in general . education; nonreligious, non-denominational schools. . interfaith-intercultural dialogue organizations . media institutions; an expansion of educational initiative to masses. . relief organizations . business associations; collectively includes thousands of businesses. . healthcare institutions basic dynamics of the movement analyzing the internal dynamics of a movement is important for two reasons. first, it allows others to perceive the structure by which the movement is organized. second, it prevents others from falling into the trap of overlooking the totality of the movement, as they focus on partial analyses. i use dynamics here to mean the key concepts of the movement. intellectual and social attitudes of a movement are shaped by the movement’s dynamics. social science analyses that study a movement proceed on safer grounds if they are aware of that movement’s dynamics, and they do not fall into frequent fallacies. understanding a movement’s dynamics allows us to pinpoint who is making an objective analysis, and who forges a “pirated” analysis without any knowledge (ergene 2007). for instance, a person who strives to comply with the basic dynamics of islamic sufi practice by being humble in his or her relations with others (tawadhu), or regarding himself as inferior to others (mahwiyat), would surely appear as a shy person. an observer, who is unaware of any sufi and ascetic dynamics, might interpret this humble attitude as hypocritical or clandestine. if an analysis does not account for this movement’s muslim sufi dynamics and experiences, can we really call this analysis “scientific”? 248 prajna vihara __ __ ~ sufi, moral, and spiritual profundity in islam invites believers to be humble and tolerant in their family and their social relations. personal virtue and social maturity are pre-requisites. thus, in order to understand this movement, it is first necessary to understand the spiritual dynamics of islam, and the extent to which islam influences its participants. it is almost impossible to analyze even an ordinary muslim’s intellectual and social life without first understanding the profound nature of islam in general. cultural islam gives us a general outlook in regard to the theological, mental, moral, and social relations of muslims. when we look from the window of general dynamics, we can obtain a first glimpse of the individual, spiritual, moral, and social attitudes of muslims in a community. from all these points of view, elaborating on the religious/spiritual, social, and cultural dynamics of the g?len movement would help us formulate a proper rendering of the religious and socio-cultural attitudes of the movement in general. indeed, the titles and concepts that i will highlight are also important in regard to how they are interpreted and how they are transferred to social practice, as well as to their deep meaning in muslim cultural perception. the importance of g?len comes from his success in transforming these dynamics into action in socio-cultural life. in theory, these cultural and religious dynamics existed in books and other sources for almost 1,500 years. 1. magnanimity (generosity of spirit) 2. communicating the word of god (call, conveyance, and guidance) 3. living for others 4. the spirit of devotion 5. sacrifice, fidelity, and loyalty 6. representing and communicating the faith conclusion: is solidarity an aim of the gulen movement? we are all ‘solidary’ through the identity of our behavior. georges jacques danton zeki pariti 249 .. solidarity is not in itself the cause or primary goal of the formation and the collective action of the movement. it is a secondary or a tertiary effect which results from the collective services and action. put simply, the movement and its participants do not pursue solidarity as a goal of their effort; rather solidarity ensues from their collective effort. the solidarity which participants experience comes from their doing together what they collectively have approved as good for themselves and wider society. such solidarity can be considered a ‘natural’ output (as against ‘politically contrived’ or ‘artificial’ input). there are other organizations which pursue solidarity by focusing inward and guarding against outside influences. this contrasts with the g?len movement, which always seeks common grounds with others. finally, as the main question in this paper “how and why”: this is the case. this can be addressed by grouping all the factors in three main categories: 1potential in the turkish social and historical context 2characteristics of gulen’s ideas, and the success of projects 3reaching out to overall population due to combination of all these three factors, some others like public stance against violence, terror and suicide attacks, emphasis on the spiritual dimension of faith, science and faith in harmony, prodemocracy, solutions to social problems working on the ground, other civil society projects, fethullah gulen’s ideas have influenced millions of people both in turkey and abroad. references: all the information that needs to be referenced, and if not stated the source, were taken from the official website of fethullah gulen: http:/ /www.fethullahgulen.org. 250 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 07_(125-136) asian wisdom.pmd asian wisdom in a global age hu yeping the council for research in values and philosophy, washington d.c., usa abstract this paper examines the process in which wisdom is developed in a culture or civilization, not only through the internal development of its tradition, but by its openness to influences outside of itself. special emphasis is paid to china and its assimilation of the influence of buddhism. it shows how buddhism was assimilated but transformed into a particularly chinese character, and chinese culture was influenced by buddhism. this suggests that such a process between tradition and openness allows for hermeneutic reflection upon one’s own culture, and opens the possibilities for dialogue between cultures. º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õé¨ðµãç¨êíº¡ãðºç¹¡òã«öè§àùáô»ñ­­ò¾ñ²¹ò¢öé¹áòã¹ çñ²¹¸ããáëã×ííòãâ¸ããá ·õèáôãªè¡òã¾ñ²¹ò¢ö鹨ò¡àòâã¹»ãðླõ¢í§çñ²¹¸ããáàí§ à·èò¹ñé¹ áµèâñ§ãçá件ö§¡òãà»ố ¡çéò§âíáãñºíô· ô̧¾å¨ò¡àòâ¹í¡íõ¡ é́çâ º·¤çòá¹õé ¨ðà¹é¹ä»·õè»ãðà·è ṏ¹«öè§âíáãñºíô· ô̧¾å¢í§¾ø·¸èòê¹òáåð¨ðáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò ṏ¹ãñº àíò¾ø·¸èòê¹òà¢éòáòáåðá»å§â©áãëéáõåñ¡é³ð੾òðíâèò§äã áåð¾ø·¸èòê¹òáõ íô·¸ô¾åµèíçñ²¹¸ããá¨õ¹íâèò§äã ¹õèáê´§ãëéàëç¹çèò¡ãðºç¹¡òã¾ñ²¹òãðëçèò§ »ãðླõáåð¡òãà»ố ¡çéò§âíáãñºíô· ô̧¾åàòâ¹í¡à»ố ·ò§ãëé¡ñº¡òãäµãèµãí§µõ¤çòá çñ²¹¸ããá¢í§µ¹àí§ áåðâñ§à»ố ·ò§ãëé¡ñº¤çòáà»ç¹ä»ä é́㹡òãêò¹àêç¹òãðëçèò§ µèò§çñ²¹¸ããáíõ¡ é́çâ prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 125-136 125 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ philosophy and wisdom all know that etymologically ‘philosophy’ means “love of wisdom” in the greek language. why do we need to love wisdom; why not something else? and what is wisdom; whence does it come? what insights can it provide and how can we apply these in the real or actual lifeworld? aristotle distinguishes wisdom into two kinds: philosophical wisdom and practical wisdom. the former is “the formal cause of happiness”; the later “ensures taking proper means to the proper ends desired by moral virtue”.1 in other words, wisdom is concerned with something ultimate. it is not just about scientific knowledge or about how to acquire general knowledge in a wise manner; rather it is to know the truth about the general principles of the world and to pursue the truth as such. it studies the ultimate reality, causes, and principles underlying being and thinking in its many aspects and different manifestations. hence, philosophy based on wisdom is an attempt to discover the fundamental principles of the reality in a systematic and scientific way. it derives from reality, upon which it reflects, and to which it returns. without wisdom philosophy would lose its fundamental significance. chinese wisdom in chinese ‘wisdom’ is written in two characters 智慧 , which mean respectively the knowledge of the sun and the harvest of the heart. the knowledge of the sun indicates the search for the ultimate truth. the harvest of the heart symbolizes the realization of goodness. the two dimensions are united in an aesthetic harmony. without either wisdom could not be understood in its full meaning. the mind and the heart must work together in the formation of wisdom and to apply true knowledge and the good will in creative human action in the world. in the chinese tradition the heart is seen as the place where people think and feel. it contains logos and eros, and holds the concepts of consciousness and conscience. it does not feel merely sensual objects at a material level; rather focuses upon the cultivation of the self or the soul 126 prajna vihara __ __ ~ by acting morally both in private and in public in order to achieve the perfection of sagehood. the importance of the heart is its ability to have a special kind of thought that makes sense of purpose in life and the ultimate end for human destiny. hence, the cultivation of the heart has the highest signification for one’s entire life journey. “these three unities of man and heaven, of thought and action, and the unity of subjectivity and objectivity are the questions for ‘truth’, ‘goodness’, and ‘beauty’”.2 however, the emphasis of the chinese understanding of wisdom is upon the harmony of the mind and heart, which express profoundly the interrelationship between heaven, earth and man. knowledge of the sun is always through the grounded human heart, full of life and creativity. wisdom as the cumulative reflexion of life lived by the people expresses the excellent understanding and rich insight of what people face everyday through their thinking and feeling. thus, each wisdom inherently integrates its particular culture or civilization as the foundation of its philosophical reflection. thus, chinese wisdom is characterized by the heritage of chinese culture and civilization evolved through its long history, as is true also of indian, african, islamic, greek, and western philosophy. each mode of thinking and feeling reflects the essence of the cultural tradition __ and this is true notably of chinese philosophy. culture and wisdom philosophy is neither a mere ideology, which groups a set of ideas or beliefs to form a certain political, economic, or other system, nor a sole scientific system, which responds functionally to a related group of components in a systematic way according to a scientific method. beyond these philosophy founded fundamentally on wisdom is a reflection of people’s life and attitude toward the reality; thus it is embedded in culture and civilization. each culture comprises an adequate inner structure and a dynamic formation for its particular people in the particular time and space. culture is not merely an anthropological issue, but is rather about the cultivation of the inner self. any group of people must establish a pattern or style of life through accumulated experience in living together in their hu yeping 127 particular setting. through this experience a people learn what promotes life and what destroys it, how to correct errors and how to respond to catastrophes. more deeply they gradually discover what is of value and worth seeking in life. their concern is with the meaning of life, the exercise of their freedom and creativity, and the future of their children and grand children. as they order their preferences for modes of relationships and give priority, e.g., to harmony over competitiveness or vice versa, they develop a ranking of values. to this corresponds a distinctive set of virtues, strengths or capabilities. together these constitute what is called a “culture”, that is a way of cultivating the soul, of living together and raising the next generations with their rich insight and profound spiritual intuition, namely their own wisdom.3 hence, culture focuses upon the creative spirit of a people and their abili-ty to work together to build all dimensions of life __ material and spiritual, economic and political, scientific and artistic __ into a harmony with beauty and unity, and to share deeply in meaning and values. “culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation. this leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both”.4 for that reason cultures and civilizations “survive political, social, economic even ideological upheavals”.5 they are not stagnant but open-end and on-going, responding to human challenges, adapting to new situations and progressing both horizontally and vertically. in recognizing the external, objective and physical, they takes one still deeper into the internal, subjective and spiritual where the unique identity of persons is in continual evolution. it is precisely in this context that philosophy plays its significant role in reflecting the development of human history and human culture in facing various challenges. today’s global age, philosophy is facing a new challenge, that is, how to understand different peoples, cultures and religious beliefs. are we destined to conflict as samuel huntington warned,6 or is it possible to have mutual understanding, sincere dialogue and even active cooperation among the different peoples and cultures? as philosophers we must think seriously and carefully together in order to draw upon the profound insights of our proper wisdom for the peaceful coexistence of all civilizations. thus, wisdom is no longer an enclosed product of one narrow way 128 prajna vihara __ __ ~ of understanding one’s particular life, rather must become a shared knowledge and insight for the whole humankind. this is our challenge as philosophers in the 21st century. the integration of two civilizations during the process of the formation, selection, transformation and adaptation each culture preserves its wholeness and irreducible identity, while under the influence of other cultures it differentiates itself from them in various forms. each culture as an integrated whole of its own “space” in human history is capable of continuing to expand its inner potentialities by engaging new forms emerging within and without. in particular, i would like now to test and illustrate the possibilities of dialogue and cooperation and integration between different cultures and civilizations by studying how buddhism, which came from india, managed to become an integral part of chinese civilization and how the two were not destroyed but reinforced thereby. buddhism was first introduced to china from india and central asia sometime during the han dynasty (202 b.c.-220 a.d.). the emperor of ming of the eastern han dynasty (58-75 a.d.) sent an envoy to the western land to seek the buddhist teaching and invited two indian monks to establish a buddhist monastery in china.7 during the eastern han dynasty, buddhism was considered a part or companion school of the native chinese huang-lao daoist teachings and practices; it did not have much influence due to the other prevailing traditional chinese philosophy: confucianism. with the downfall of the han dynasty and the chaotic period which followed, china was divided into two regions, both of which were looking for something new to enhance their governing power. interest in buddhist thought spread to different regions of china and was accepted by the ordinary people as well as by governing officials and rulers. borrowing ideas, concepts, rituals, terminology, meditative disciplines, institutional structures and literature from one another and reshaping and adapting itself in a more attractive and friendly manner, buddhism became part of the cultural mainstream together with confucianhu yeping 129 ism and daoism in china. after several centuries of evolution and assimilation it began to develop distinctively chinese forms such as: pure land buddhism began by hui yuan (334-417), chan (zen) buddhism founded by hui-neng in 700, and tien tai buddhism founded by chih-i (538597). professor tang yijie of peking university is the son of the great buddhist scholar, tang yongtong, from whom he learned this history even after such teaching had been officially suppressed. he devoted much of his life to studying how buddhism was introduced and accepted into china and analyzed this in detail in his work entitled confucianism, buddhism, daoism, christianity and chinese culture.8 he illustrates especially how this was done during the wei and jin dynasties and the north and south dynasties; how it became one of the most significant causes for the major philosophical transformation in china; and how it eventually became an integral part of the chinese thought. for this he gives the following three points: (1) adaptation of the tradition, (2) enrichment and intensification of the tradition, and (3) the excellence and value of the contribution. (1) adaptation of the tradition. in han dynasty when buddhism was introduced into china it attached its teachings to the daoshu (daoist teaching) at the time. the main theme of buddhism was about the immortality of the soul and spirit and about cause and effect. very similar themes were being discussed in the traditional chinese thought. similarly the hinayana method of chan meditation (dhyana) was very close to huang-lao school of daoism and immortality (shen xian jia) school. in the wei and jin dynasties the buddhist prajna teaching became popular because of its attachment to daoist xuanxue (daoist metaphysics). particularly, by examining in detail “exalting nothingness (gui wu)” and “taking nothingness as the origin (yi wu wei ben)” of daolists he yan (190-249) and wang bi (226-249) and buddhist mahayan prajna kong zong (emptiness school), professor tang yijie displayed that: at first buddhism was grafted on the body of earlier chinese thought and did not have great influence. only gradually did buddhism gain popularity. it found the chinese cultural tradition to be by nature conservative and thus able to resist the cultural influences from without. in that sense, what was newly imported had to be grafted onto what proceeded and the 130 prajna vihara __ __ ~ elements in the foreign culture which were similar would take hold first. only after would the innovations infiltrate and transform the original culture. a foreign culture must adapt itself to the requirements and demands of the existing culture and be grafted onto its body. those elements of the foreign culture which are relatively close to or resemble the existing culture, will be easier to be propagated; only then, will it be possible for the various parts of the imported culture gradually to penetrate the original culture and exert some of their own influence, until eventually the imported culture begins to transform and modify the original culture.9 (2) enrichment and intensification of the tradition. in wei and jin dynasties the theme of ‘being’ and ‘nonbeing’ was pervasive in daoism. by analyzing in detail the development of xuanxue (daoist metaphysics) on “valuing nothingness or nonbeing (gui wu)” of daoists wang bi and he yan and guo xiang’s idea on “exalting being (cong you)” with the similar teaching in the doctrine of the kong zong (emptiness school) of buddhist prajna teaching on “not real non-existence” professor tang yijie concluded that the potentiality for assimilation was greater as the new culture approximated a potential aspect of the evolution of indigenous culture. this was because the element of continuity in evolution, namely, that the new culture could take root if there was a corresponding potential in the original culture. in time the new culture could become an active and lively element in the indigenous culture and have a strong effect on its development. why was such a development possible? one may ascribe it to the demands or requirements of the heritage or continuity of cultures as they came into contact with one another. as long as the development of a culture is not drastically interrupted, what follows must be the product of a continuous evolution from what preceded it. the development of preceding ideas often would contain several hu yeping 131 possibilities, and the idea(s) which would continue to be developed, representing the subsequent parts of the development, would be bound to take the shape of one or another of these possibilities. if an imported culture can, on the whole, adapt or conform to a certain aspect of a potential or possible development of the original indigenous culture or fit into a trend or tendency of one of the possible developments, not only will it be itself developed and thus exert relatively great influence in itself, but it may even become directly a component part of the original culture and perhaps even to some extent alter the course of the development of that original culture.10 (3) excellence and value of contribution. an analysis of kong zong (emptiness school) of the buddhist prajna teaching on “not being and yet not non-being (fei you fei wu)” clearly demonstrates its higher level of reasoning and analysis in terms of wang bi and guo xiang, and the strong influence of wei shi buddhist teaching (vidjnana, or consciousness only school) introduced by the monk xuan zang in the tang dynasty. professor tang yijie notes that “it was after the baptism of the introduction and assimilation of prajna philosophy introduced from india that the idealist philosophies of chinese tradition became themselves a truly influential and meaningful system of thought”.11 in order for the potential element of the new culture to be realized on a lasting basis it would need to achieve a higher level of development than the indigenous culture in order to serve as a stimulus and have impact on the original culture. despite its superiority in some aspects, however, the new culture must still subject itself to the old and fulfill two prior conditions. for a new culture, even one with a relatively higher level of development in reasoning, to have a great and long-lasting impact on the country [nation or region] to which it is introduced, it not only would have to subject itself, nonetheless, to the limitations of the political and socio-economic conditions of the host country, nation, or region, but it must also be in possession of the first and 132 prajna vihara __ __ ~ second sets of conditions described in the afore-discussed sections. this is particularly true of cultures, especially if the original culture did not experience an abrupt and radical interruption, or if such an interruption was not to be caused by the introduction of the new culture. only in such a way could the new culture affect the original culture in a profound and long-lasting way. without these conditions, no matter how advanced or superior the imported culture may be, it would be difficult for it to strike roots into the soil of the host country and over the long run exert any deep influence.12 from the three points outlined above, professor tang jijie concludes that the introduction of buddhism from india to china in early han dynasty and its subsequent development illustrate that the tendencies in the development of current world cultures manifest the dichotomy of conflict and harmony between and among many different civilizations.13 indeed, after the cold war, culture has replaced political and ideological power in the world order. peoples are knit together by blood lines that connect families genetically and by fundamental beliefs which coordinate their outlook on the world and hence their responses to its challenges. “what ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interest. faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for”.14 especially religion has become increasingly crucial for “shaping the identities of people and aligning the states”,15 and the foundation on which the great civilizations rest. cultures, then, as meaningful entities are the way in which people see, experience and respond to reality. hence, from professor tang yijie’s examination of the introduction and development of buddhism into chinese culture we learn that the increasing frequency and intimacy of the intercultural encounter and exchange in this global age and the propensity for mutual interaction and hu yeping 133 influence, can be harmonious and that mutual assimilation is possible and even promising. conclusion the integration of buddhism with the chinese culture and others such as japanese, korean, vietnamese, etc., makes manifest the possibility of dialogue of asian civilizations. it does not presuppose an homogenization in a universal whole, but rather distinguishes as unique chinese buddhism, japanese buddhism, korean buddhism, vietnamese buddhism, and so on. but relating each together on the basis of its own cultural identity can create a unity that is much richer and broader way than anything known thusfar. however, there is also a tendency for civilizations to clash in hostility, hatred, and chaos. and there is a possibility that cultures could constitute walls dividing us in isolation, alienation and confrontation, like the berlin wall in the past and the wall between israel and palestine at present. if we transform that danger of clash into dialogue or cooperation, and if we break the wall to a greater openness, we will have new and positive possibilities for our families, societies and civilizations. this grounds a hope for the future of our people, our nation and our globe. a common humanity needs a humane approach with unique experiences and the rich resources of its cultural tradition. wisdom in general, asian wisdom in particular, is something “classical” which contains the profound meaning of “a consciousness of something enduring, of significance that cannot be lost and is independent of all the circumstances of time”, or “a kind of timeless present that is contemporaneous with every other age”.16 in order to have a good understanding of the past one needs to create a “fusion of horizons” between now and then, and the different life experiences of the many peoples. one must reflect critically upon the pre-judgments and gain critical distance from the prejudices so as to be ready to open for new encounter or new understanding for the future readings and applications, for understanding cultural tradition is an open-ended and progressive “hermeneutical spiral”. hence, wisdom enables us to read our cultural traditions hermeneu134 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tically, rather than in a closed fundamentalist manner. in sum, asia as a continent has its rich natural resources, as a geopolitical structure it has its strategic importance, and as a civilization it has its long and profound history and cultural tradition. as asians, we share spiritual values, historical heritages and religious sentiment; we have similar concerns for family values, social harmony and sympathetic compassion; and we use our knowledge and wisdom to search for sat (existence), cit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss), to behold the true, the good and the beautiful. no man is an island. asia does not exist alone in this globe; asians do not live alone in this world. we must share our wisdom with other peoples and contribute our competencies to the whole humankind in this global age. the council for research in values and philosophy huy@cua.edu www.crvp.org endnotes 1aristotle, the nicomachean ethics, translated with introduction by david ross, revised by j.l. ackrill and l.o. urmson (oxford: oxford university press, 1998), p. 154. 2tang yijie, confucianism, buddhism, daoism, christianity and chinese culture (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1991), p. 144. 3see g.f. mclean, hermeneutics for a global age: lectures in shanghai and hanoi (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 2003. 4ibid., p. 42. 5f. braudel, history of civilizations (new york: penguin, 1994), p. 35. 6samuel p. huntington, the clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order (new york: simon and schuster, 1996). 7“prince ying of chu state (the brother of emperor ming of the eastern han dynasty) has been reciting the refined teachings of huang and lao (the yellow emperor and laozi are together revered as the founders of the daoism) and has worshiped at the benevolent shrine of buddha. he has undertaken to cleanse himself and has fasted for three months, observing his vows to the gods. he has repented and hu yeping 135 should be considered to have expeated any crime he may have perpetrated or any suspicions he may have provoked. he is now, by way of atonement, submitting his property to add to the grand fete of the upasaka and to the glory of the temples of buddha”. tang yijie, confucianism, buddhism, daoism, christianity and chinese culture (washington, d.c.: the council for research in values and philosophy, 1991), p. 90. 8ibid., chapter ix. 9ibid., p. 115. 10ibid., p. 122. 11ibid., p. 123. 12ibid., p. 123. 13ibid., p. 124. 14huntington, p. 43. 15huntington, p. 47. 16hans-georg gadamer, truth and method (new york: the seabury press, 1975), p. 256. 136 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 20_(324-332) ideas for coexistence.pmd ideas for coexistence: wang zheng’s integration of catholicism and confucianism ding ruizhong shaanxi academy of social sciences, china abstract wang zheng of shaanxi jingyang was an important figure in the history of chinese and western cultural exchange in the late ming dynasty. he chose to be baptized into the catholic faith by missionaries, and he actively introduced and translated western scientific works and wrote many of his own religious works. these works integrated confucianism and catholicism. he also funded the construction of churches, and founded the ren association. there is a deep significance in wang zheng’s attempt at religious integration, particularly for contemporary china catholics. this paper examines the work of zheng and shows how his approach to cultural exchange and mutual learning are important for the promotion of peaceful coexistence. º·¤ñ́ âèí wang zheng of shaanxi jingyang à»ç¹ºø¤¤åêó¤ñ­¤¹ë¹öè§ã¹»ãðçñµôèòêµãì ṏ¹áåð¡òãáå¡à»åõèâ¹·ò§çñ²¹¸ããáã¹êáñâãòªç§èìëáô§µí¹»åòâ à¢òàå×í¡·õè̈ ð à»ç¹¤ò·íåô¡â´âä´é¡òããñºèõååéò§ºò»¨ò¡ºãã´òáôªªñ¹¹òãõ à¢ò¡ãðµ×íã×íãé¹·õè¨ð á¹ð¹óáåðá»å§ò¹·ò§ é́ò¹çô·âòèòêµãìµðçñ¹µ¡ áåðä é́à¢õ⹧ò¹·ò§ é́ò¹èòê¹ò äçéáò¡áòâ §ò¹àëåèò¹õéä é́ºùã³ò¡òãåñ· ô̧¢§ ×̈êíáåð¤ò·íåô¡à¢éòäçé́ éçâ¡ñ¹ à¢òºãô̈ ò¤ à§ô¹êãéò§âºê¶ìëåòâáëè§ áåðà»ç¹¼ùé¡èíµñé§í§¤ì¡ãáë觤çòáãñ¡ ¤çòá¾âòâòá¢í§ wang zheng áõ¤çòáêó¤ñ­íâèò§åö¡«öé§ µèíºùã³ò¡òã·ò§ é́ò¹èòê¹ò â´â੾òðíâèò§âôè§ ¤ò·íåô¡¨õ¹ãèçáêáñâ º·¤çòá¹õéµãç¨êíº¼å§ò¹¢í§ zheng áåðáê´§ãëéàë繶ö §á¹ç·ò§¢í§à¢ò㹡òãà¢éòä»áå¡à»åõèâ¹·ò§çñ²¹¸ããááåð¡òãàãõâ¹ãùéãèçá¡ñ¹ «öè§êó¤ñ­âôè§êóëãñº¡òãêè§àêãôá¡òãíâùèãèçá¡ñ¹íâèò§êñ¹µô 324 prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 324-332 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __~ increasingly, china is recognizing the contributions of catholicsim to its historical development, and recognizing the present role of catholics in supporting national unity and economic development. this paper wishes to introduce an important catholic thinker who is an important part of the history of china, a pioneer in the introduction and translation of western scientific works, and an important part of the history of the cultural exchange between confucianism and catholicism. introduction to wang zheng wang zheng, was born on april 19, in the fifth year of long qing ming mu zong (ad 1571), in shaanxi jingyang luqiao wang jiabu. he was named variously liang fu, kui xin, liao yi dao ren, and zhi li sou, he later took the catholic name philippe, and after his death, the people of his hometown called him duan jie xian shen. in the twentysecond year of wanli shenzong (ad 1594), he passed his provincial examination and received the ju ren. he took nearly three decades to pass the national examination, which he finally earned in the second year of tianqi xizong (ad 1622). wang zheng was familiar with many classic works of literature and became very learned and famous. as the tuiguan of guangping zhi li, he helped overturn the unjust charges against the bai lian religion, he was active in dredging and engineering the qing river, and served as a soldier. as the tuiguan of yangzhou zhili, wang zheng bravely condemned the expense of the king’s boats, built water conservation projects, reduced the salt tax, eliminated private interests, resisted the wei party, and was named “bold man” along with laifu sanyuan. wang zheng was an official for more than two years. in the third anniversary of his father’s death, he was promoted to the position of shandong qianxian jian liaohai army by sun yuanhua with whom he was friends. wang zheng was at this time developed reclamation projects for rivers and mountains, and was involved in the strengthening of military affairs. due to an internal mutiny, he was punished by being ordered to guard a nearby town, but he was eventually absolved and returned home. after wang zheng returned to the countryside, he began to practice the catholic faith, and built a church in luqiao zhen. he and foreign missionding ruizhong 325 aries actively translated and introduced western scientific works. meanwhile he edited and published the works of his own, and founded the ren association in the countryside, served the poor and people struggling with disasters, composed zhong tong which was an army association to keep the peace which was renowned far and wide. wang zheng came into contact with the catholic works of western missionaries, and was baptized a catholic at the age of 46. li zicheng captured the city of xi’an in the sixteenth year of chongzhen (ad 1643), and sent a mission to invite wang zheng into his camp. wang zheng refused to participate, and prepared himself to die for the ming country. the following year, when he learned that the rebel army had occupied beijing, he stopped eating and after seven days died at the age of 74. wang zheng wrote many works during his life. according to records of wang jie __ wang zheng’s seven-generation descendant in jiaqing qing dynasty __ there were dozens of works and millions of words. for various reasons, many of his writings were lost. but many writings were saved and edited by professor li zhiqin, a contemporary scholar. another work to preserve his writings was the chronicle of jingyang master wang zheng, which was edited by professor song boyin. there were 87 articles and 42 works in wang zheng’s writings. in a speech on the three hundredth anniversary of wang zheng’s death, mr. shao lizi said that he __ along with xu guangqi and ma xiangbo __ loved his country, loved the truth, his heart was as pure as snow and as warm as fire. shao regarded wang zheng with high esteem. wang zheng and xu guangqi are alike in that they were both from south xu north wang, and they made valuable contributions which deserve to be learned, their research continued, and their spirit preserved. wang zheng was also known as the first catholic in shaanxi, and some scholars believe he was the first catholic in the northwest of china. wang zheng’s scientific contributions the greatest impact works of wang zheng and the jesuit missionaries translated and published, were xi ru er mu zi, yuan xi qi qi tu shuo lu zui and xin zhi qi tu shuo. wang zheng helped p. nicolaus 326 prajna vihara __ __ ~ trigault to finish xi ru er mu zi and wriote the preface in 1626. at the same time, p. nicolaus trigault taught wang zheng the latin language. wang zheng studied latin from the missionary and helped the missionary to finish xi ru er mu zi. in fact, as a scholar, wang zheng started the road of the chinese people to learn western languages, to better facilitate the exchange between chinese and western cultures. xi ru er mu zi was the work with which european phonology entered into china. mr. du songshou stressed that it was not merely a reference book for westerners to learn chinese characters, but it was an integral contribution to chinese language study. it was, in other ways, a comparative study of chinese and western languages, and was a collaborative work involving both chinese and western scholars.1 on january 10th 1958, premier zhou enlai had a report entitled “the task of the current language reform on the national political consultative conference”. it covered the use of latin as medium of chinese phonetics, which has a 350 year history. in 1605, italian missionary matteo ricci first used the latin alphabet to transliterate the chinese characters. in 1625, another french missionary p.nicolaus trigault also used the latin alphabet to transliterate the chinese characters and wrote the work named xi ru er mu zi in order to serve the needs of foreigners learning chinese language. in 1626, yuan xi qi qi tu shuo lu zui (generally referred to as qi qi tu shuo) was dictated by p. jonannes terrenz, and translated by wang zheng. in 1627, wang zheng wrote the preface. the work was finally published in yangzhou in 1628. this book was one of the more than seven thousand books which were brought into china by trigault, and according to wang zheng’s preface, qi qi tu shuo was one of the early works brought by western missionaries. the book introduced various mechanical devices from the west, and allowed for the possibility of integration and development between chinese and western science and technology. it introduced the water gun and water pump (shui chong), described in qi qi tu shuo, which was useful in fire fighting. its introduction created conditions for the continued exchange and intergration of western and chinese technology. in 1626, according missionary reports, wang zheng independently wrote xin zhi qi tu shuo (generally referred to it as zhu qi tu shuo). in ding ruizhong 327 1628, the work and qi qi tu shuo were published in yangzhou together. wang zheng also learned mechanical engineering by trigault. in his caption to the illustration of windmill he clearly states that it was introduced by mr. trigault. in addition, wang zheng at the behest of his uncle zhang jian and town friend ma liaotan, designed some installations by himself, such as siphon (hong xi), crane drink (he yin), round pots (lun hu), farming (dai geng), spinning mill (zi zhuan mo) and bicycle (zi xing che), and so on. when he worked in guang ping , his practical inventions won much praise. wang zheng studied both practical and theoretical knowledge. he devoted himself to learning for the benefit of the people. he possessed the vision to learn the most advanced mechanical knowledge from the missionaries. wang zheng was a representative intellectual of the late ming dynasty who accepted western scientific knowledge in a pragmatic way. as a confucian, he integrated confucianism and catholicism, then accepted to be baptized into the church. these connections allowed him to continuously adapt western scientific knowledge for chinese use. xi ru er mu zi was a handy tool for learning chinese, this was practical. the appliances he introduced in qi qi tu shuo and zhu qi tu shuo were beneficial to economic production and military defense and other practical activities. xu guangqi, li zhizao, wang zheng were the representatives of progressive ancient intellectuals, they reconsidered china’s past academic weaknesses, pursued modern science, astronomy, geography, mechanics, mathematics, and approached learning with a realistic attitude and vision. the theology of the awe of heaven and the care of human beings the ultimate discussion of the awe of heaven and the care of human beings was the major work of wang zheng’s theological writings. the work enriched the dialogue betwen confucianism, and its propositions concerning heaven and human beings, and catholicism, with its beliefs concerning love. he cleverly joins confucianism with catholicism by appealing to the confucian idea of benevolence. yi (a classic confu328 prajna vihara __ __ ~ cian work) says, yuan is the greatness of goodness. gentlemen experience benevolence, enough to grow. the benevolence is mirrored in christianity through two propositions: to love god (and since god loves mankind) to love others as himself. these two propositions are really one. that is, to love one (god) and love what he loves. this is the source of benevolence and respect that is central to confucianism. benevolence, the great respect for heaven. when one is in awe of god and when one loves ones neighbor as oneself, this is the same as the confucian virtue of benevolence. wang zheng further states that one must move from being in “awe” of god to “loving” god. the consequence of loving god, was loving people. all the instances of love, for example, giving food to the hungry, giving water to the thirsty, giving houses to the homeless, demonstrate the confucian fourteen virtues of body and spirit. wang zheng in the awe of heaven and the care of human beings, believed people who are in awe of heaven and love ones neighbor will go to heaven after their deaths. he also believed that the ancient sages had tried to express these same principles, and that he was merely saying what the sages wanted to say could not. wang zheng made great efforts to integrate confucianism and catholicism in the form of questions and answers in the utimate discussion of the awe of heaven and the care of human beings. he connected these principles with benevolent love. while he attributes these ideas to the ancient chinese sages he believed that all people could put these ideas into practice. wang zheng and chong yitang in 1625 (the fifth year of tianqi), wang zheng invited trigault to open catholic church in shaanxi. wang che, who was the younger brother of wang zheng, donated his mansion in luqiao as a place for prayer, which they named chongyi tang. it can be said that chongyi tang was the first church in shaanxi. later, trigault and johann acquired some money through wang zheng, and they purchased land to build a church also named chongyi tang in north of sanyuan county. also in 16251626, trigault was helped by wang zheng and purchased land to build a ding ruizhong 329 church in tang fang street north of xi’an. when trigault was in xi’an, he had seen the unearthed monument of nestorianism of da qin popular in china. in 1627, trigault was removed from shaanxi, then johann got to xi'an and took over and completed the construction of the church, named chongyi tang. the church building no longer exists today, but we can inferred that the architectural style was an integration of chinese and western styles, this integration of confucianism and catholicism can be even seen in the name chongyi tang. during his visit johann discussed issues with wang zheng in xi’an. wang zheng recorded the conversations and finished the diary essays of chong yitang. later, they also founded the jing feng museum, published other works of literature including wang zheng’s writings and the translated works of western missionaries. wang zheng and the benevolence association on september 8th 1609 (the thirty-seventh year of wanli), matteo ricci founded mother of god association in beijing, it was the first charity, or benevolence association, for china catholics.2 later yang tingyun established the benevolence association in hangzhou. in 1634 (the seventh year of chongzhen), wang zheng founded or benevolence association in luqiao jingyang, called benevolence association. its constitution is considered an important document in the history of catholic charities in china and was created by wang zheng. in this constitution, wang zheng speaks of loving others, the importance of doing one’s best, saving, comfort, dying quietly, the power of love, and other topics. in fact, the benevolence association was the realization of wang zheng’s the awe of heaven and the care of human beings. he further said, if the principles of this association can be carried into practice, poverty can be allieviated. from the small town to the large city, people would truly love one other. society as a result would be more peaceful and harmonious. we still believe this today; if everyone contributed a little love, the world would become better. meanwhile, we should continue to learn from wang zheng’s spirit and practice. 330 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the significance of the integration of confucianism and catholicism the society would be changed in the late ming dynasty. it was the third time that catholicism entered into china for the soil to take root in the late ming dynasty. matteo ricci took on the garb of confucianism in order to proselytize. the integration of confucianism and catholicism begun to take effect gradually through a number of confucian scholarofficials and missionaries. wang zheng was a confucian scholar who accepted the catholic doctrine, but his faith was stability of the country and peace of the world. meanwhile, as a confucian scholar who accepted the catholic, wang zheng’s actions would be worth studying, but more importantly, when we study and communicate between different cultures, misunderstandings and conflicts are avoided. currently, the chinese catholic integrate the local cultural elements, and these features are increasingly evident. but it still seems to many people, that the catholic church is very strange. so misunderstandings caused by unfamiliarity is still a risk. therefore, the understanding and study of the chinese catholic church is an important undertaking. in october 2006, the sixth central committee plenary meeting of the sixteenth congress of cpc passed the resolution of cpc central committee on a number of major issues of building a socialist harmonious society, which clearly emphasized the positive role of religion in promoting social harmony. the report of the seventeenth congress of the party also saw a positive role for religious figures and religious believers in promoting economic and social development. in december 2007, comrade hu jintao in the second study group of the 17th central committee political bureau outlined the fundamental requirements of religion for this new historical period. he encouraged religions to play a role in patriotism, progress, serving the community, making contributions to national unity, economic development, and social harmony. he encouraged interpretations of religious doctrine which were in line with social progress and the requirements based on the profound changes in society. religion should promote ethics, health and civility, and it should strengthen the ideological foundations of socialist society. it should also participate in social service, charity to the poor, assisting victims of a disaster, helping ding ruizhong 331 the disabled, providing for the aged, supporting education and providing medical services. the history of china's catholic church should not be overlooked. in contemporary china, the catholic church should play an active role in building a harmonious society. it is important to understand how the catholic church contributes to socialist construction. for example, to a large extent religious charity is a powerful complement to the social services of government. such groups as the hebei jinde foundation, catholic social service center of xi’an diocese and other catholic charity organizations in china, carry out extensive charity activities in rural areas this is the expression of the functional significance of religion for current social conditions. of course, how to improve this system needs further thinking. for the catholic church, the question of how to enhance the concept of national identity is extremely important. some scholars have pointed out that china always interprets religion relative to government management. confucianism, buddhism and taoism are to assist managing country?chinese, fuzhuwanghua?. when national identity is strong, the church-state relation is more harmonious. for example, it is very significant that the churches cooperate to promote unity and prosperity for the country during major holidays such as national day. they also encourage all believers to love motherland and observe the laws. as a believer who was baptized 300 years ago, wang zheng actively made the effort study western science and culture and demonstrated the spirit of pursuing truth. nowadays, as the openness of the country is increasing, more and more believers, many of whom are priests, are sent to study abroad. these religious people are young and multi-lingual. therefore, they can make use of their knowledge to teach foreign languages, translate and introduce advanced foreign ideas. as a result, the exchange and understanding between chinese and western cultures will continue to strengthen. this is the road, started by the spirit wang zheng, which leads to a peaceful world. endnotes 1song boyin, the chronicle of wang zheng, shaanxi normal university press, 2004, p281. 2gu weimin, chinese catholic chronicle, shanghai bookstore publishing house, 2003, p106. 332 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 17_(282-290) confucian selfcultivation.pmd confucian self-cultivation and cultural dialogue tran tuan phong vietnam academy of social sciences, vietnam abstract this paper deals with the concept of self-cultivation within the confucian tradition. this idea provides a foundation for the understanding of what human nature holds in common. though cultural traditions are different but they are equal because they all share the common root of human nature as the original source for their specific interpretations of human development. it concludes that this commonality of human nature which lies beneath cultural difference can be the foundation for intercultural dialogue. º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéà¡õèâç¢éí§¡ñºáâ¹·ñè¹ìáë觡òã»åù¡½ñ§µ¹àí§µòá»ãðླõ¢§ ×̈êí ¤çòá¤ô´¹õéçò§ãò¡°ò¹·õè·óãëéà¢éòã¨çèò¸ããáªòµô¢í§á¹øéâìáõíðäã·õèàëá×í¹¡ñ¹ ááéçèòçñ²¹¸ããá»ãðླṏ ð �ᵡµèò§� ¡ñ¹ áµèáñ¹¡ç �à·èòà·õâá¡ñ¹� à¾ãòðçèòáµèåð çñ²¹¸ããááò¨ò¡ãò¡àë§éòà ṍâç¡ñ¹ ¤×í ¸ããáªòµô¢í§á¹øéâì«öè§à»ç¹áëå觡óà¹ố ¢í§ ¡òãµõ¤çòáëáòâ¢í§¡òã¾ñ²¹ò¢í§á¹øéâì º·¤çòá¹õéêãø»çèò ¤çòáàëá×í¹¡ñ¹¢í§ ¸ããáªòµô¢í§á¹øéâì·õèãí§ãñº¤çòáᵡµèò§·ò§çñ²¹¸ããá¹ñé¹êòáòã¶à»ç¹¾×é¹°ò¹¢í§ ¡òãêò¹àêç¹òãðëçèò§çñ²¹¸ããáä é́ in the confucian tradition, the idea of self-cultivation could be interpreted as the development or unfolding of human nature. while a particular cultural tradition is the context within which human nature is embedded or embodied (or being concretized and determined), the rich 282 prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 282-290 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __~ variety of cultural tradtions demonstrates the manifestation of human creativity in interpretating and developing human nature. although cultural traditions are different, in another sense they are equal because they all share the common root of human nature as the original (and common) source for their specific (and therefore different) interpretations and developments of human nature. this is the very foundation of inter-cultural dialogue, in which different cultural traditions are to participate equally to contribute to forming the common culture of humanity and to the cause of peace and development of humanity. human nature, human development and cultural tradition before showing that the confucian idea of self-cultivation could be understood as the process of human development, i would like fist to clarify the notion of human nature and how human development could be understood as the development of human nature, within the historical context of a particular cultural tradition. to say that all human beings share a common human nature, i do not mean that human nature as something fixed or a priori given or a potential to be made actual. on the contrary, human nature should be understood ontologically as the original source and the infinite potentiality for human development. it means that human nature should not be understood as an abstract universal existing above and away from the life of human beings. on the contrary, it should be seen as a concrete universal that manifests or unfolds dynamically in the history of humankind as a whole, and as the whole, it exists immanently in the life of human beings. thus, as the original source, human nature offers both the possibility and the commonality for human development. it is the point of reference and shared background for the whole of human existence. as such, human nature offers both a dynamic feature and unity of the whole process of human development. the full development of human nature, or the full realization (or unfolding) of human nature, could serve as the ideal and ultimate meaning for human striving. the idea of human development mentioned in marx’s writing also means the full development of human powers and capacities “the cultivation of all the qualities of the tran tuan phong 283 social human being, production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations-production of this being as the most total and universal social product for, in order to take gratification in a many__sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures, hence cultured to a high degree”.1 as infinite potentiality, human nature is open for human beings to interpret and choose. the variety of interpretations demonstrates the variety of expressions of human creativity in the development of human nature within different cultural contexts or traditions. a cultural tradition is both the manifestation of human creativity and the particularization of human nature in concrete historical contexts. human creativity here has much to do with human self-awareness, the very awareness of the potentiality of human nature and the ability to choose a particular option and act in particular situation to unfold further (the potentiality of) human nature. of course self-awareness is not given to human beings at the moment of birth but the result of education and socialization in the form of social life of a certain community. as such human creativity is the cultivation and manifestation of human nature in a given community but is also the driving force contributing to further developing of human nature and transforming of the cultural tradition in which is was formed. so, it is the openness of human nature as infinite potentiality that contributes to the dynamic character of human development and the diversity of cultural traditions. thus, through the creative process of human development, human nature is made, defined and concretized in the various forms of culture (or cultural tradition). in other words, human nature does not exist apart from cultural traditions but realizes or embodies in them through the creative activity of concrete human agencies. the concrete realization or embodiment of human nature in a specific cultural tradition can be seen in the way people of a community organize their collective life. as such the embodiment of human nature is the emerging quality in the life of a community. it serves as a pattern of organization that gives order, co-ordination and stability to the life of the people of that community and consequently to help the people of the community to develop their talents and abilities to the fullness. as the pattern or form of organization of a given community, the manifestation of human nature offers both oppor284 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tunities and limitations for the people of the community to develop their potentiality. so we can see that human development, as the process of unfolding of human nature, is mediated through different stages and in different historical contexts of cultural traditions. cultural traditions here serve as the historical and social space, within which human individuals are born and they become human persons during the process of socialization, through education and training that initiate and engage them into the social life of the community. thus the formation of human beings as social beings is conditioned by traditional cultures but once they are (more or less) formed, they can continue to develop further the potentiality of human nature and transform the traditional culture in which they are born and being socialized. human beings, therefore, are in a constant dialogue with their own traditions to be formed and educated as well as in a dialogue with human nature to transform their own traditional culture. while being located between a given cultural tradition and human nature, human beings are both the passive receivers of that tradition and the active agencies who can change and transform the given tradition. here we can see the dialectical relation between cultural tradition as a normative system (structure) of values, customs and norms…and cultural tradition as a living social practice for human development. thus system determines the formation of man: in order to become a member of a given cultural community, an individual has to undergo a process of learning and training (cultivation and self-cultivation) to obtain necessary social skills and faculties. but only through the course of the social practice of these very members the system can exist and renewed or changed. as c. taylor writes “social tradition can continue to exert an influence through individuals only to the extent that it is continually renewed by them __ like all structures, it continues to exist by virtue of practice”.2 that practice, as c. taylor rightly points out, “relies on a never exhausted background which can simultaneously be the source of innovative statements and articulations”.3 thus in order to maintain and develop further cultural tradition human beings must be properly cultivated and developed through the process of learning and training, through the practical engagement in real life. the real knowledge or standards of truth based on which one can tran tuan phong 285 strive to cultivate and improve oneself can only be given, accepted and transmitted by cultural tradition in which one lives. through the selfcultivation man can learn to know how to relate meaningfully and properly to other human beings and things to the world around him. it is the cultural tradition that serves the foundation for individuals to cultivate themselves and engage in the world but only through the active engagement of human individuals that cultural tradition is transformed and renewed constantly. the renovation and transformation of cultural tradition is, at the same time, the further unfolding and development of human nature, which serves as the original source and the ultimate purpose for human striving. as j. grondin rightly says, “what distinguishes our humanity, is not a rational capacity that would catapult us into a divine world of pure ideas. rather it is the ability to go beyond our particularity by taking account the heritage that can help us grow above and beyond our limited selves”.4 so we can see how human development as the unfolding of human nature is mediated through different cultural traditions. while being located within that dynamic process of human development, cultural traditions are the concretizations of human nature. so here we can see the dialectical relationship between human development and cultural traditions: without cultural traditions human nature remains potential and formless, only through the formation of cultural traditions that human nature is given shape and form (or being determined), however, human nature serves as the source and condition of possibility for cultural traditions to be developed. the concrete contents of cultural traditions are the manifestations of human nature in different contexts. the human character of cultural traditions is the product of the creative interpretation of human beings about human nature. confucian self-cultivation and cultural dialogue the formation of man as a social being is a process of socialization, in which human individuals engage with the world and participate in living social practice. it is a continuous process of transformation of the self, both ethically and ontologically, and is the very process in which 286 prajna vihara __ __ ~ self-openness (self-discovery) and the disclosure of the things and the world around are taken place simultaneously. for example, foucault notices that for both the greeks and the romans “in order to behave properly, in order to practice freedom properly, it was necessary to care for self, both in order to know one’s self…and to improve one’s self, to surpass one’s self, to master the appetites that risk engulfing you”.5 or according to gadamer, bildung (education or cultivation), is the “properly human way of developing one’s natural talents and capacities”6 and “the rise of the word ‘bildung’ evokes the ancient mystical tradition according to which man carries in his soul the image of god, after whom he fashioned, and which man cultivate in himself”.7 gadamer also agrees with hegel that “the being of geist (spirit) has an essential connection with the idea of bildung’, through which man ‘acquiring a “capacity”, a skill’ and therefore, ‘gains the sense of himself’7 because ‘it is the universal nature of human bildung to constitute itself as a universal intellectual being’.8 thus through the process of human bildung man overcomes his own particularity and rise to the universal. it is the process of gaining both the sense of himself and the sense of the world around him. the similar approach to human development could be seen in the idea of self-cultivation within the classics of confucianism, especially in the chung-yung we can see that the full development of human nature can be achieved through the selfcultivation or the realization of ‘human nature’ endowed by heaven. “what heaven (t'ien, nature) imparts to man is called human nature. to follow our nature is called the way (tao). cultivating the way is called education”.9 education or self-cultivation is the cultivation of the human nature in us. in confucianism, therefore, self-cultivation is very crucial because “when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world”.10 self-cultivation is a kind of life-long dialogue, both with “heaven” (or human nature endowed by heaven) and with a given cultural tradition (in which the way has already been unfolded). as tsai yenzen rightly sums up “self-cultivation as a lifelong moral effort is both a deepening and a broadening process. it involves two dimensions that are simultaneously interrelated. vertically it elevates one toward heaven by delving into the depth of one’s inner nature. horizontally it expands one’s tran tuan phong 287 narrow self to include other human beings whom one may or may not be acquainted with. self-cultivation then is not a solitary or privatized exercise that seeks joy in spiritual ecstasy or finds consolation in inner peace. rather, the highest state of personality achieved by this kind of moral effort, popularly attributed to a sage, culminates in the commonality that is sharable among all human beings. this is the point where our universal human nature lies and the platform upon which we humans mutually communicate”.11 thus upon a proper process of self-cultivation a man will know how to manage his family, bring order to the state and pacify the world. thus self-cultivation should be understood both ethically and ontologically, this is the task for everyone “from the son of heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation”.12 through the process of self-cultivation man gets access to the true knowledge, the very ‘knowledge’ of the tao, the way, or the order, which regulates the life of every thing in the world. in confucian tradition living according to the tao means living harmoniously. here harmony is the way for all creatures to follow. it is clearly stated in the doctrine of means that “equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path. when equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish”.13 here harmony is not a static state but rather a dynamic process. and talking about a dynamic process means talking about its relational aspect: the relationship and interconnection between different elements. harmony or solidarity is the process in which human beings strive for a dynamic balance. thus we can see through the self-cultivation man can learn to know how to relate meaningfully and properly to other human beings and things to the world around him. it is the cultural tradition that serves the foundation for individuals to cultivate themselves and engage in the world but only through the active engagement of human individuals that cultural tradition is transformed and renewed constantly. it is the very process when social solidarity of human beings, peace and human flourishing could be established and maintained. as the concretizations of human nature in concrete historical and social contexts through the process of human creative activities, cultural 288 prajna vihara __ __ ~ traditions are plural and different. cultural traditions are different but they are equal because they are all the manifestations of human nature. the differences between cultural traditions depend not only on the creativity of human agencies but also on concrete historical contexts and the needs of concrete human communities. cultural development should be oriented to solve concrete issues and problems encountered by the people in concrete communities. the differences mean differences in focus, differences in orientations of how to develop human nature in different contexts. it means that the differences between cultural traditions could be complimentary to each other. so though cultural traditions are different but they are equal because they all share the common root of human nature as the original (and common) source for their specific (and therefore different) interpretations and developments of human nature. this is the very foundation of inter-cultural dialogue, in which different cultural traditions are to participate equally to contribute to forming the common culture of humanity. therefore, the sustainability of human development should be founded on cultural traditions, not merely on a specific cultural traditions but also on the very culture of humanity. in this context, human development is also the process of learning from others, the process of dialogue aiming at the sustaining and further unfolding of human potentiality. the good life or the life of peace is the goal and guiding principle for human development understood as a kind of growing beyond one’s limited self. this is a kind of self-transcendence can be archived through the dynamic process of self-cultivation understood both in its moral and ontological senses. we can say that the noble goal of the good life, the life of peace, determines the formation of human beings, but it is only through the active self-cultivation of human beings that the concept of the good life can be realized. as it is said in confucian classic of analects: “a person can make the way great, but the way cannot make a person great”. tran tuan phong 289 endnotes 1k. marx. grundrisse, trans. martin nicolaus, harmondsworth: penguin, 1973. p. 409. 2c. taylor. language and society, in communicative action. edited by axel honneth and hans joas. mit press, cambridge, 1991, p. 25. 3c. taylor. ibid. p. 25. 4j. grondin. sources of hermeneutics. state university of new york press, new york, 1995. 5j. bernauer and d. rasmussen, eds. the final foucault. (mit press, cambridge, 1994), p. 5. 6h. gadamer. truth and method. second revised edition (translated by j.weinsheimer and d.g.marshall, continuum, new york. 2003) p. 10. 7h. gadamer. truth and method. second revised edition (translated by j.weinsheimer and d.g.marshall, continuum , new york. 2003) p. 11. 8h. gadamer. truth and method. second revised edition(translated by j.weinsheimer and d.g.marshall, continuum, new york. 2003) p. 10. 9chan, wing-tsit. 1963. a source book in chinese philosophy. princeton: princeton university press, p. 98. 10chan, wing-tsit. 1963. a source book in chinese philosophy. princeton: princeton university press, p. 86-87. 11tsai yen-zen (2008). selfhood and fiduciary community: a smithian reading of tu weiming’s confucian humanism in dao: a journal of comparative philosophy 7(4), p. 358. 12chan, wing-tsit. (1963). a source book in chinese philosophy. princeton: princeton university press, p. 87. 13chan, wing-tsit. (1963). a source book in chinese philosophy. princeton: princeton university press, p. 98. 290 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 36 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 36-50 © 2000 by assumption university press human cloning and human rights: an ethico-theological discourse peter ottuh1 abstract ethical and theological debates concerning human cloning are getting more intense as cloning technology continues to develop. this has led to debates originating from both secular ethics and christian theological perspectives. this paper aims to coordinate the debate according to these two perspectives. it will draw from the positions of christian theology, the position of the united nations universal declaration of human rights, and the positions of scientific authorities. it will conclude by stressing the importance of regulating new technologies in a manner which recognizes the shared ethico-theological concerns for human dignity, rights, freedoms, and the moral growth of humanity. keywords: human cloning; human dignity; ethics, theology. introduction religions have always recognized the dignity of the human individual as deriving from its relationship to god. this is gradually being challenged by scientific and technological advances. the growth of therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning research and increasing potential to alter or replicate the human being is beginning to lead to peter ottuh 37 deep ethical and religious debates. it is important to note that since the industrial revolution (ir), there have been both optimistic and cautionary expectations of technological for societal transformation. and this is no different with cloning technologies. many recognize that while it is important to support the freedom of inquiry and discovery, scientific adventurism has to be reined in. we find both the united nations (un) declaration concerning the cloning of humans and the social teachings of the catholic church cover the same ground in their dedication towards human salvific welfare and care for the future of humankind. church teachings are intended to provide a methodical approach to human problem-solving which emphasizes collaboration and hope, and fosters human dignity, diversity and plurality. this is an important consideration as we face the major difficulties that are unfolding in the twenty-first century. human cloning can be considered in two ways. therapeutic cloning would involve the creation of a replica of a cell or tissue to be used for medical therapy. reproductive cloning would involve the creation of a replica of a human being as a whole. such cloning has been proposed as a means of enhancing humanity’s genetic potential, but there are many insurmountable challenges and disadvantages. the aim of this paper is to contribute to the research and debate on human cloning from the perspectives of secular ethics and christian theology in order to offer solutions to the issues affecting humanity as a result of the current advancement of the technology. the paper argues that despite its potentials, human cloning needs to be critically examined. this paper intends to aid in this ethical and theological critical examination, by affirming the church’s social teachings. human cloning creating duplicates of a biological entity, ranging from an individual gene, a cell, or a human being, is known as cloning. the concept of human cloning was initially proposed by j.b.s. haldane, who borrowed the words “clone” and “cloning,” from agriculture.2 in 38 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 this paper, the term, “human cloning” will be used interchangeably with such terms as “gene mutation” (a modification of a gene’s dna sequence that results in a different product), “genetic engineering” (a technique that modifies an organism’s dna using technology developed in labs), and “therapeutics” (which entails the creation of a cloned embryo with the sole objective therapeutic treatments.3 in therapeutic cloning, human cells would be reproduced for use in treatments and organ transplants. even though it is a topic of ongoing study, as of 2023, it is not employed in any medical settings worldwide. somatic cell nuclear transfer (scnt) and induced pluripotency are two popular techniques for therapeutic cloning that are currently being studied. reproductive cloning is the replication of an entire human organism. instead of only replicating certain cells or organs, reproductive cloning would include creating a human being from scratch.4 by extracting the genetic material from the egg and inserting the cell nucleus into the oocyte, which would be subsequently induced to begin embryonic development, it is possible to clone an animal via scnt. in animal research, dolly the sheep was the first animal to be cloned from an adult cell.5 but although mammals have sometimes been cloned successfully, the procedure often ends in miscarriages and other forms of failure. ayala points out that animal clones often have serious health problems, like being overweight, dying young, having deformed limbs, and having weak immune systems.6 what is more common is the cloning of stem cells from cloned human embryos to fix damaged nerve cells, to generate organs for transplants and other medical treatments. many scientists contend that it is not yet possible to clone a person because the required advanced medical technology does not yet exist. the history of the human cloning debate to understand how to evaluate genetic research from a theological and philosophical point of view, it is important to look at the history of the debate. this can be divided in four stages. the first stage in the discussion began in the 1960s. this early debate was prompted by new forms of control over reproduction, such as the accessibility of birth peter ottuh 39 control pills and technologically assisted reproduction, such as invitro fertilization (ivf). also important was the potential for cloning preferred genotypes to avoid harmful genes which might endanger the survival of the human species.7 charles curran, bernard haring, richard mccormick, karl rahuer, joseph fletcher, and paul ramsey are just a few of the notable theologians who participated in these early debates regarding genetic engineering and human cloning. given the current state of the debates, the latter two, joseph fletcher and paul ramsey, staked out diametrically opposed stances. compared to the hereditary roulette of sexual reproduction, human cloning, in fletcher’s opinion, is a better method of reproduction.8 laboratory reproduction, according to him, is still radically human since it is intentional, planned, decided upon, and willed. ramsey, on the other hand, viewed cloning as a moral problem that could only be crossed at the risk of jeopardizing the future of reproduction and humankind.9 he speaks of the border-crossings of cloning, first a horizontal one between one person to another, and a vertical border-crossing – between the person to god. the first ivf infant, called “louise brown,” was born in 1978, marking the start of the second period of theological as well as philosophical debates about human cloning.10 although christian theologians focused on the moral questions raised by ivf, jewish intellectuals like seymour siegel and fred rosner focused on human cloning. they were not as critical of human cloning as ramsey or as supportive of it as fletcher was.11 the united church of christ provided the first official protestant response to the cloning debate in 1977. it developed its own broad summary of the science and morality of human cloning. during this time, other religious organizations, including the world council of churches in 1975, 1982, and 1989, as well as the national council of churches of christ in 1980, 1983, and 1986, also released resolutions or position statements cautiously endorsing genetic intervention strategies for certain therapeutic purposes.12 campbell opines that when some religious leaders expressed their opinions on genetic engineering in 1979, the then-united states president jimmy carter asked the president’s commission for the 40 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 study of ethical problems in medicine and biomedical and behavioral research to look into the scientific, moral, and social implications of gene splicing.13 the third period of the theological and philosophical debate began in 1993, after conflicting responses to the blastomeric differentiation of embryonic cells at george washington university. initially, the roman catholic church vehemently objected, branding the study as intrinsically wicked in a vatican editorial.14 moreover, according to the conservative protestants, the study went against their core beliefs in personhood and humanity. some protestants, on the other hand, acknowledged the research’s potential medicinal advantages and preferred regulation over an outright ban.15 with the unprecedented cloning of dolly the sheep, religious disputes entered their fourth and most current phase. the catholic and protestant organizations reiterated their prior stances in this instance. on the other hand, several other protestant theologians have voiced cautious approval for cloning studies and human cloning in light of the notion of human cooperation with continuous divine creative activity. in this renewed discussion of the ethics and morality of cloning research and its applications for human cloning, the testimony given to the usa national bioethics advisory commission (nbac) in the public hearings on march 13 and 14, 1997, offers the most carefully considered statements of theological examination.16 from the historical survey discussed above, some general yet normative generalizations may be made including extended theological and philosophical discussion of the question of human cloning that foreshadows and clarifies much of the current debate; proof that there are several valid religious and philosophical viewpoints on human cloning; proof that both theological and secular philosophical positions reflect societal pluralism; that despite advancements in scientific knowledge and technical prowess, the values that underlie theological and philosophical objections to human cloning have proven resilient and persistent, influencing public debate on the issue; and that the religious debate is no longer restricted to theologians with formal training; it has grown to include other occupations, such peter ottuh 41 as science, other religions, and the education of religious believers. this indicates that theological and religious positions have advanced to become knowledgeable moral discourse groups on concerns relating to reproductive and advanced genetic technology. human cloning prospects although it had been a matter of discussion since the early modern period, scientists and decision-makers have begun to more seriously investigate the technology in terms of its potential benefits. cloning embryonic cells to produce pluripotent or even other stem cells that may be utilized for organ transplantation, regenerative medicine, or to cure or prevent illness is known as stem cell therapy.17 a common type of stem cell therapy is bone marrow transplantation, and stem cells can be utilized to treat sickle cell anemia. growing organs for transplantation using stem cells that include the genome of the organ recipient is one of the most promising uses of therapeutic cloning. the therapeutic development of nerve cells is a regenerative medical application that has been investigated.18 mitochondrial replacement (mr) is a kind of gene therapy that modifies the embryo but so far has had a poor success rate.19 whether these technologies can be developed in an advantageous manner is still uncertain and disputed. one of the benefits of human advanced cloning technology is that it has contributed knowledge about human developmental biology. human pluripotent stem cells (ipscs), provide information and insights into human embryogenesis. prospectively, several developmental illnesses and abnormalities may be resolved by researching signal transmission and genetic modification in the developing human embryo.20 researchers studying the developmental trajectory of humans have found greater support for the idea that these pathways are similar across species. in addition to serving as model systems for the development of new drugs, induced pluripotent stem cells (ipscs) and cells produced via scnt are important for studying the origins of most human and animal illnesses. additionally, research is being carried out to see whether stem cell 42 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 treatment can be used to cure cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and injuries to the spinal cord in the future.21 thus, stem cell treatment can be used, as it involves the application of stem cells to cure or eliminate a disease or condition. while genetic engineering is not yet used in clinical settings, it is actively being studied. the promise of ipscs as a dependable source for producing human neurons currently demonstrates the possibility for regenerative therapy in the brain and for neural ailments. most scholars have argued that human cloning might be a safe and successful means of human and animal reproduction, enabling couples who are resistant to current infertility therapy to have genetically related children. others have argued that human cloning can also be utilized to prevent the transfer of detrimental genetic characteristics to children. according to trounson and dewitt, the human genome project (hgp) has uncovered the genetic underpinnings of many illnesses and is now starting to identify the specific location of genes considered to be responsible for them.22 thus, couples seeking to prevent harmful gene transfer may find human cloning appealing since it does not require the intentional eradication of defective embryos. in addition, it is considered that cloning could help single people and same-sex couples who want to become pregnant without the assistance and possible complications of gamete donors. however, it is postulated that lesbian couples who utilize donor artificial insemination may face concerns about parenthood if they use donor gametes.23 advanced cloning technology may also be utilized to help parents who have lost a child and to remove gamete donors from the reproduction equation. others, however, dispute whether the benefits of conception in this way and under these conditions would extend to the cloned child. as a result of the above, advanced cloning technology would be acceptable to an uncompromising utilitarian in this situation if the benefits were seen to exceed the demerits. one cannot talk about cloning potentials without talking about its potential risks or drawbacks. the most significant concern involves its effectiveness and safety, the danger to the clone’s uniqueness, and the possibility of lessening the diversity of distinctive genomes born into peter ottuh 43 the world. cloning creates life, yet it detaches it from the cell donor’s formative environment.24 human clones would be created in anticipation for future medical treatments, but the problem would involve human clones becoming commodities. while it might be argued that the negative aspects of eugenics is being advanced via the use of cloning technology, history has shown that eugenics may be practiced without the use of cloning, as illustrated by the holocaust, cultural genocide, and laws requiring forced sterilization.25 cloning humans does provide parents with the option of selecting phenotypes and genotypes that would come together to create their children. while this seems unlikely to give any impact on society at large, it is still something to be considered. human dignity cloning ethics refers to a range of ethical perspectives on the use and potential of cloning, particularly human cloning. to treat patients who are ineligible for transplants, prevent immunosuppressive medications, and delay the consequences of ageing, proponents advocate the development of therapeutic cloning. the debate concerning the use of stem cells from embryos, which is related to the debates concerning abortion, is the main point of contention for opponents of cloning technology. however, religious believers are split, with some believing that human cloning as an advanced medical technology usurps the divine’s role in creation while others perceive no conflict between christian beliefs and the possibly life-saving effects of the advanced medical technology. to explore further the relation between ethical and theological debates on cloning, we can focus on the idea of human dignity which is recognized by both secular scholars and the church itself. both recognize that a fair society must respect human dignity; therefore, all technological and scientific advancements must be motivated by an understanding of the balancing of the individual with responsibility to society. the magisterium of the church has praised the universal declaration of human rights for its positive contributions, which pope john paul ii referred to as a significant turning point in humanity’s moral 44 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 development.26 the foundation of human rights is the inherent dignity of every person, which is first and foremost recognized and comprehended by reason. human rights ultimately come from both humans and god rather than from the will of other human beings. these rights can be upheld collectively as well as individually since they are universal, unalienable, and inviolable. they include meeting humans’ basic needs in the material and spiritual domains. the teachings of pope john xxiii, the second vatican council, and pope paul vi have all provided significant indications of the notion of human rights, which is universality and indivisibility.27 these include the right to life, the right to a loving family, the right to a moral environment that fosters the development of the child’s individuality, and the right to one’s own personal progress. from this perspective, human reproductive cloning would conceivable challenge some human rights, including a women’s reproductive rights, the right to life, and the right of a child’s individuality. the bible declares that people are god’s creations and that the thing that makes them unique and distinctive is that they are made in god’s likeness and image. in this sense, human beings have the dignity of being individuals, capable of self-knowledge and self-possession, voluntarily offering themselves, and coming into communion with other human beings. god sets human beings at the center and apex of the created order, and through grace, human beings are required to enter into a relationship with the creator. community and diversity the future of human cloning faces ethical, legal, and technological obstacles. some contemplate that the prospect of recreating humans like great athletes or super-geniuses could be attractive if cloning of a human being were ever to be perfected. yet, even if human cloning were to take place, many assert that nurture is just as significant as nature. while we can understand the development and evolution of human being genetically, including its origins and dispersal from africa, this leads us only so far. humans also live in socially structured groupings, and culture is a defining social characteristic of humans. it encompasses all of the products of the peter ottuh 45 human mind in general, including social and political structures, modes of operation, moral and religious norms, language, common sense, and scientific knowledge. due to cultural inheritance – a uniquely human method of accomplishing environmental adaptation – culture evolution has taken over as the predominant process of human evolution. humans have two different types of heredity: biological and cultural. hence, human sexuality is a divine heritage of humanity. only hereditary qualities may be passed on to the progeny under vertical heredity, which is the case in biology. cultural inheritance, is broader than biological inheritance. it enables methods of environmental adaptability unavailable to nonhuman animals. therefore cultural adaptation has become more significant than biological adaptation throughout the history of humans. the church has emphasized that the human person is an organic, harmonious reciprocal connection. the basis of human oneness is the spiritual and eternal soul, which was formed with the body in perfect harmony. given that god created it, physical life is sacred. so human beings have two distinct qualities: they are metaphysical beings who are capable of transcendence, and they are material creatures that are physically connected to this physical planet. the church argues that the union of soul and body is so fundamental that one needs to regard the soul as the shape of the body. human nature is built on relational subjectivity, and the human person is fundamentally a social creature. a society is a collection of people who are connected by the universal concept of unity. the human being is compelled to live in society from the very beginning and can only develop and fulfill his purpose in relationship with other people. yet humans are also plagued by arrogance and selfishness and other forms of antisocial behavior. a healthy social plurality is necessary for the common benefit of all. so a part of the dignity of the human being from a religious perspective is the recognition of community and diversity which would become challenged by the genetic selection of traits used in human cloning. 46 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 conclusion the philosophical and theological discussions surrounding human cloning began in 1978. since then, with the advances in cloning research the ethical debate is becoming more intense. from a theological perspective, the dignity of the human person is found in their eternal soul, in their community, and in harmonious reciprocal interaction. these are also attributes of human dignity recognized by the united nations universal declaration of human rights. the best approach to dealing with the issue of cloning in the future is with reasonable legislation rather than impenetrable obstacles. we need to recognize theological approaches to the sacredness of the human individual while allowing the benefits of our technologies. humanity’s job in the twenty-first century is to figure out how to use cloning responsibly, because the structures we build now will shape the future. even though it is important to support the freedom of scientific inquiry and discovery, there need to be legal limits which are coordinated with our religions and the principles of the united nations universal declaration of human rights. while human cloning advanced medical technology will continue in the twenty-first century, there is a need for more integrated discussion involving both secular ethics and theological principles to create more awareness about the potential risks and benefits for humanity. peter ottuh 47 endnotes 1 peter ottuh is an associate professor at delta state university, abraka, nigeria 2 i. thomas, should scientists pursue cloning? (london: raintree, 2013), 5. 3 e. l. scheller and p.h. krebsbach, “gene therapy: design and prospects for craniofacial regeneration”. journal of dental research, 88, no. 7(2009): 585-96. 4 a. trounson and n.d. dewitt, “pluripotent stem cells from cloned human embryos: success at long last.” cell stem cell. 12, no.6 (2013): 636–8. 5 j. f. daar, “the prospect of human cloning: improving nature or dooming the species?” seton hall law review, 33(2003): 511. 6 f. j. ayala, “cloning humans? biological, ethical, and social considerations”. pnas, 112, no. 29 (2015): 8879–8886. 7 c. s. campbell, “cloning human beings: religions perspectives on human cloning”. a paper prepared for u.s. national bioethics advisory commission, oregon state university, 2002, d-3. 8 j. fletcher, humanhood: essays in biomedical ethics (buffalo, ny: prometheus books, 1979), 112. 9 p. ramsey, fabricated man: the ethics of genetic control (london: yale university press, 1970), 420; fletcher, 112; p.o.o. ottuh, “assessing human reproductive cloning and creationism from the perspectives of raelianism and african belief”. journal office, 6, no.1 (2020a): 81-96. 10 ramsey, 423; ottuh, 87. 11 d. m. rorvik, in his image: the cloning of a man (philadelphia: j.b. lippimcott company, 1978), 220 12 p. o. o. ottuh, “arguments about human cloning in perspective”. ife journal of religions, 6, nos.1&2(2010d):126-148; b. lynn, genetic manipulation (new york: macmillan pub. co., 1973), 71. 13 campbell, 3. 14 r. a. mccormick, “should we clone humans?” the christian century, 11(1993): 1148-1149. 15 mccormick, 1149. 16 a. d. verhey, “playing god and invoking a perspective”. journal of medical philosophy, 20(1995): 347-364. 17 ayala, 8879; p. o. o. ottuh, “the inhumanity of human cloning: an ethico-theological evaluation”. the humanities journal: an international journal of research and development, 1, no. 1 (2010a): 1-15. 48 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 18 ayala, 8881; p. o. o. ottuh, “clono-theodicy: a biblico-qur’anic defence of god in the ‘cloning’ of adam and eve.” edited by a.k. chepkwony, & p.m.j, hess, human views on god: variety not monotony. nairobi, kenya: moi university, 2010c, pp. 241-249. 19 ayala, 8880. 20 ayala, 8880. 21 n. cartier and p. aubourg, “hematopoietic stem cell transplantation and hematopoietic stem cell gene therapy in x-linked adrenoleukodystrophy”. brain pathology 20, no. 4 (2010): 857–862. 22 trounson and dewitt, 638. 23 ayala, 8881. 24 s. p. lasker, “human cloning: prospects and challenges in the asia-pacific region”. eubios journal of asian and international bioethics, 19, no. 2 (2009): 61-62. 25 k. a. richardson, “human reproduction by cloning in theological perspective”. u.l. rev., 32 (1998):739. 26 pope john paul ii, “compendium of the social doctrine of the church”. pontifical council for justice and peace, 2006. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendiodott-soc_en.html 27 ayala, 8879. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html peter ottuh 49 references ayala, f. j. “cloning humans? biological, ethical, and social considerations”. pnas, 112, no. 29 (2015): 8879–8886. campbell, c. s. “cloning human beings: religions perspectives on human cloning”. a paper prepared for u.s. national bioethics advisory commission, oregon state university, 2002, d-3. cartier, n and p. aubourg. “hematopoietic stem cell transplantation and hematopoietic stem cell gene therapy in x-linked adrenoleukodystrophy.” brain pathology 20, no. 4 (2010): 857–862. daar, j. f. “the prospect of human cloning: improving nature or dooming the species?” seton hall law review, 33(2003): 511. fletcher, j. humanhood: essays in biomedical ethics. buffalo, new york: prometheus books, 1979. foury, c. k. “therapeutic cloning: promises and issues.” mcgill j med. 10, no. 2(2007):112-120. lasker, s. p. “human cloning: prospects and challenges in the asiapacific region”. eubios journal of asian and international bioethics, 19, no. 2 (2009): 61-62. mccormick, r. a. “should we clone humans?” the christian century, 11(1993): 1148-1149. ottuh, p. o. o. “arguments about human cloning in perspective”. ife journal of religions, 6, nos.1&2(2010d):126-148 ottuh, p. o. o. “the inhumanity of human cloning: an ethico-theological evaluation”. the humanities journal: an international journal of research and development, 1, no. 1 (2010a): 1-15. 50 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 ottuh, p. o. o. “clono-theodicy: a biblico-qur’anic defense of god in the ‘cloning’ of adam and eve.” edited by a.k. chepkwony, & p.m.j, hess, human views on god: variety not monotony. nairobi, kenya: moi university, 2010c, pp. 241-249. ottuh, p. o. o. “assessing human reproductive cloning and creationism from the perspectives of raelianism and african belief”. journal office, 6, no.1 (2020a): 81-96. ramsey, p. fabricated man: the ethics of genetic control. london: yale university press, 1970), 420; fletcher, 112. scheller, e. l. and p.h. krebsbach, “gene therapy: design and prospects for craniofacial regeneration”. journal of dental research, 88, no. 7(2009): 585-96. richardson, k. a. “human reproduction by cloning in theological perspective”. u.l. rev., 32 (1998):739. rorvik, d. m. in his image: the cloning of a man. philadelphia: j.b. lippimcott company, 1978. thomas, i. should scientists pursue cloning? london: raintree, 2013. trounson, a. and n. d. dewitt, “pluripotent stem cells from cloned human embryos: success at long last.” cell stem cell. 12, no.6 (2013): 636–8. verhey, a. d. “playing god and invoking a perspective”. journal of medical philosophy, 20(1995): 347-364. 03_(89-104) thedutes.pmd the duties of mercy michael stephen g. aurelio ateneo de manila university, philippines the quality of mercy is not strained, it droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath; it is twice blessed; it blesseth him that gives and him that takes. __ shakespeare, the merchant of venice abstract if goodness for kant as seen above comes solely from one’s duty, what then could be the possible motive for “supererogatory acts” (exemplified by the hero or the saint) which go beyond the call of duty? because “supererogatory acts” involve the transgression of duty, what would be its corresponding motive? this paper will show that it is here in these acts that we may find a place for love, benevolence and kindness, the motives which kant appears to disqualify as motives for moral action. this will be illustrated by appeal to a famous painting by caravaggio, “the seven works of mercy”. the difficulty of locating a place for goodness or love in kantian ethics can be traced back to the very problem with which his ethics begins. the question that kant poses for ethics what ought i do? by its very phrasing, requires in advance a response which is defined by duties and obligations. the ought entails a kind of requirement that an agent must fulfill. in its negative sense, my failure to pass such a requirement is tantamount to a failure of duty, which also amounts to saying that i become blameworthy. in some sense a failure of duty can mean the same in terms of its value and even intention as breaking the law. the difference in gravity between one’s failure and one’s crime matters little here; both disrespect the law, the one negatively and the other positively, and thus both violate it. the law both requires and prohibits; and when i fail to submit prajna vihara, volume 15, number 2, july-deceber, 2014, 89-104 89 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ to the requirement, i am as culpable of any malicious crime one can commit. it is the essence of blame that it is indifferent of failure of one’s duties, and of violations of the law. this is because the law determines in advance our duties of what ought i to do and lays down in writing what i ought not to do. unlawful acts are in themselves defined by reason a priori as the failure or transgression of any agent. a state must possess laws even if there are really no criminals. this is because the law, ethics, and reason look formally into acts themselves, and never at individuals or agents, never at this man or woman of flesh and blood. or again, the law sees clearly only acts themselves, but it is blind when it comes to the one who fails to obey the law __ whoever you may be, as we are wont to say, “no one is above the law”. but the anonymity of agents is at once disregarded when the ought is transgressed or violated. as in a police lineup of suspects, the irresponsible man or the criminal is identified by his negligence and violation. he emerges from the faceless and nameless populace. by virtue of his transgression he acquires an identity that the responsible or law-abiding citizen does not possess in front of the law. as god marked cain after his heinous fratricide, blame marks a man, separates him from the rest, and singles him out in punishment. in predetermining what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, and in which instances they are to be observed, the law only truly manifests itself when it is not obeyed or broken. here is the wrongdoer, the very embodiment of the law. thus paradoxically, the law appears to apply itself to no one else but only the criminal. but if blame marks a man for his failure or crime before the law, what then does he receive when he obeys it? in other words, upon the accomplishment of the ought or compliance to the ought not, how is the agent regarded? obviously he cannot be blamed if he observes the law, if he follows the ought faithfully and avoids the ought not religiously. but is he to be praised then? if blame marks the failure or the criminal, should not praise be given to the faithful and the obedient? apparently, this is not the case. when the taxpayer gives what is due to the state, we do not remark that he is a good citizen for he is only following what should be done by all. when the professional, say, a doctor or a teacher, attends to his duties and keeps office, he is not for the most part admired; it is “just his job” anyway, and he is only committing to either a solemn oath or a binding contract. when the father provides for his family so that his wife 90 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and children are in the best possible situation to be healthy and happy, we only say that that is the duty of a father, and that to fail in that duty would be by definition to be no longer a father. the list of examples may go on, and it will show that there is for the most part nothing praiseworthy in fulfilling one’s duties and obligations. and by keeping to the minimum, by giving what is required, the faithful agent does not gain any clear identity as when he violates the ought and ought not. unlike the criminal, the lawabiding man is unremarkable: that is, nothing is said of him either positively or negatively, nothing is expected more from him, and he thus joins the faceless citizens before the law. we may quickly draw a few consequences from the preceding determination of neglect and obedience of the law. first, we may translate kant’s requirement of universality __ that an action is morally good when it is done out of duty __ as anonymity before the law. when i do what all men ought to do, i become all men, that is, i become everyone and no one. second, in following it the law supersedes everyone, it becomes what is ultimate above all since it is given a higher privilege than any individual agent. the law is what becomes significant, what is correct, and not the unidentified man who merely observes it. third, perhaps the gravest danger in such a view is that when it comes to ethics and the law, even to morality, there may in the end be nothing essentially good in it. paradoxically, it may seem that goodness, kindness, and benevolence may not be accounted for in a kantian and law-based morality; these states of character most persons wish to possess become unnecessary, or to put it bluntly, “optional” instead of required; that is, more dangerously, goodness then becomes inessential to becoming human. and in a world where everyone observes the law anonymously, where everyone does what everyone else does, and where all are tranquilized by sheer obedience to or fear of the law-while there may be peace in such a place, there would be no need for benevolence, kindness, or charity. in his seminal work “saints and heroes” (1958), j. o. urmson pointed out the inability of traditional moral theories to accommodate exceptional phenomenon: the existence of saints and heroes. a saint, according to urmson’s tentative description, is one who “does actions that are far beyond the limits of his duty, whether by control of contrary inclination and disinterest or without effort”, and in the same vein a hero is one who “does actions that are far beyond the limits of his duty, whether by control of natural fear or without effort”.1 he frames this according to kantian ethics. urmson does not have merely the religious saint or a michael stephen g. aurelio 91 medaled soldier in mind; he is referring to living, ordinary men and women, who in everyday circumstances may display beneficence or great courage, “beyond the call of duty”. we call such actions which are not required of all but are praiseworthy supererogatory actions. urmson provides us a few examples of saintliness and heroism. he speaks of a doctor who volunteers to care for ailing patients in a plague-stricken city, a soldier who throws his body on top of a live grenade to save his comrades, and to a more familiar case of an individual who goes out of his way to serve their organization. there are countless other examples of exemplary acts and behavior that can be given. sometimes one only needs to look around to identify those who show extraordinary effort and dedication to their work or vocation, or perform generous acts for those in need. these individuals defy the logic of the everyday man who for the most part attends to his restricted idea of duty. the challenge for urmson was thus precisely how to think of supererogatory actions within the bounds of morality and ethics. can we really identify them and determine their nature using the lexicon of ethics? for, as urmson rightly saw, saints and heroes transgress the limits of what has been traditionally understood as morality because they violate the very boundaries which it establishes, those of duties and obligations. thus in “going beyond the call of duty”, saintly and heroic acts, as it were, seem to leave the horizon of morality. or at best such phenomena grant to ethics problematic limit-cases which have to be understood. because in order to answer the question what ought i to do?, we seek principles, laws, or guidelines which may give shape to the freedom we possess, and give direction to our choices and our dealings with our fellowmen. morality in a word hopes to establish foundations (either rational, practical, etc.) for determining right or moral action, that is, it determines laws or goals which in principle can be enforced for all men. but urmson saw that these kantian guidelines fail to make room for undoubtedly moral actions of saintliness and heroism. “[i]t is surely evident”, urmson concludes, “that kant could not consistently do justice to the facts [of supererogation] before us”.2 the possible inadequacy of kantian thought when faced with the nature of supererogatory acts can be intimated. to go back to urmson's examples, it is unrealistic to ask of all doctors to serve in plague-stricken places, as it is absurd to chastise a soldier for not jumping over a live grenade. doctors and soldiers, and all men for that matter, simply have to fulfill their prescribed duties and obligations, or observe the law. in the 92 prajna vihara __ __ ~ critique of practical reason (1787) kant does in fact give credence to what he called “super-meritorious acts”, such as holding out information from a king who has tyrannical intentions, or saving drowning passengers in a shipwreck;3 but it is important to note that kant considers these examples, however praiseworthy they may be, as having undoubtedly moral worth if they were done “merely as a duty in relation to the solemn law of morality”, and neither tainted by the possibility of seeking merit or praise (self-love), nor partly motivated by the spontaneous inclination to help others where respect for the moral law may be confused with sensibility.4 in so doing, kant seems to put the very notion of supererogation into question __ or at least under suspicion. in his earlier groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (1785), we also find two key texts often referred to where kant in a straightforward manner already cast doubts on the motives of benevolence or kindness. speaking of what is the proper motive of duty for any action to have any moral content, he says the following: to help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them and can take delight in the contentment of others as their own work. yet i maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. it stands on the same footing as other inclinations__for example, the inclination for honor, which if fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and consequently honorable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of such actions, not from inclination, but from duty.5 kant also confronts squarely the commandment of loving one’s neighbor by qualifying when it can be considered to have moral worth. as he continues: it is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the passage from scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor and even our enemy. for love out of michael stephen g. aurelio 93 inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty__although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way__is practical, and not pathological, love, residing in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command.6 kant in sum regards as having improper motives any action based on our natural or pathological inclinations. he places on the same plane, the kindness towards and love for others, with the tending to one’s own happiness and the aspiration for honor. the reduction of what is usually most esteemed, benevolence and love for others, to what is amoral is possible only if we consider altruistic actions as always necessarily going back or referring to the self __ its desires, its passions, its concerns, even if it is concerned for the sake of others. for as long as altruistic actions can be suspected of, whether truthful or otherwise, having any trace of “vanity” or “self-interest”, or leading to “an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them” and “delight in the contentment of others as their own work”,7 or as long as the agent in short gains anything intentionally or accidentally, it seems safer to say that such actions do not count as truly moral or good. only in the name of duty can i be good, divested of all pleasure or interest i may gain. in this peculiar case, because i may gain some happiness from it, goodness out of love or benevolence absurdly does not make me morally good. this leads us back to the dilemma supererogation poses for ethics: if goodness for kant as seen above comes solely from one’s duty, what then could be the possible motives for supererogatory acts which as urmson defined are actions going beyond the call of duty? shall supererogation then be considered as not “good in itself”, as it were, or at least morally neutral, because it is not inspired by what kant considers as the proper motive for our actions __ to do something out of duty __ by the simple fact that it by definition goes beyond it? (it is difficult to understand how a hero or a saint can become so out of sheer duty.) this paradox thus begs the question: because supererogation is the transgression of duty, what would be its corresponding motive? is it in this instance that we may find a place for love or benevolence or kindness, the motives which kant appears to disqualify as motives for moral action? but straightaway saying that love or kindness would be the rea94 prajna vihara __ __ ~ son why saintly and heroic acts are done would obviously be too hasty or careless. one danger in using love as the measure of goodness is that actions become arbitrary: sometimes i do good, sometimes i don’t, because sometimes i love, sometimes i do not love. neither does love or kindness reflect what experience shows us. the doctor who leaves for a plague-stricken town would not say that he does so because he loves those who are sick. i imagine him saying “i just had to do it”. the soldier who uses his body to protect his comrades does not necessarily love them; if he could speak he’d say the same: “given the circumstances before me, i had to do it”. of course, as urmson pointed out, what they did was not required by duty as defined by kant. objectively speaking, supererogatory actions are by definition unnecessary. but it can be imagined that the saint or hero sees otherwise: for them their actions were quasi-duties, that is, they took it upon themselves to make the unnecessary obligatory and the optional categorical. what thus can be gained from the subjective or inner view of the saint or the hero in front of a concrete situation is this: they make what is not strictly a duty, a duty. they “take it upon themselves”, they “volunteer” in the sense that they will (voluntas) themselves to do what need not be done, which means the same as elevating the moral ground to a higher plane that only they can perceive in a particular moment and decide to enter. because of a certain situation which calls on them for possible action, whether it be for a span of a lifetime or for a gripping moment, they require from themselves more than what others have to give, much more than what is required of all __ even surprising themselves at times when they give what they did not know they had. in the same manner that blame marks and singles out the criminal for disobeying the law, the hero and the saint assume singularity and individuation by their actions which go beyond the law, doing what is no longer demanded by the universal ought; they are praised, admired, and distinguished from those who merely observe the law. by raising the bar, as it were, by setting new standards that he alone sees and must meet, the saint or hero accomplishes a transvaluation of values that he does not apply to others. in doing so, by virtue of a kind of moral promotion, he acquires new and many more duties the performance of which others find unnecessary and at times even absurd. perhaps this is why the saint says that what he does is nothing “special” or “good”. for us, we look up to the saint because he does what we need not do; yet for him, he only does what he saw he had to do. it is we who praise saints for their actions, while they usually remain michael stephen g. aurelio 95 silent. they do not regard themselves as saints or heroes because the moment they do so they fall into the temptations of vanity and pleasure, the very inclinations which kant disqualified as motives for moral actions. in his heart he acts not necessarily out of love, or because he is good or kind; it is only we who are not saints or heroes, who need to explain to ourselves why they do what they do. but the saint gives more not because he has more or more is asked from him; he gives more because he asks more from himself. and it is unnecessary to explain why he in fact does, or what motive he can have, as it is unnecessary for kant to ask why a duty must be done or why only a good will can be called good. supererogatory acts, it is here proposed, can therefore be viewed from “the inside”, that is, through the eyes of the saint or hero, as the unnecessary becoming an imperative, as the reception of new duties which must therefore be done and accomplished. they are praiseworthy and unnecessary for us, yet for them it is necessary as an obligation and thus may be nothing special or admirable in their eyes. these new duties are neither imposed on them by the law, nor by other men, nor even by the god one believes in, least of all by rationality and its clear and distinct explanations. they create these duties __ they as it were write their own laws. and one such instance where the saint or hero takes it upon himself to assume new duties is when he performs an act of mercy. it will be claimed in what follows that, much more stable than the emotions, more certain than love, mercy is in itself not required formally by duty, yet it paradoxically has the force of an obligation. it is also praiseworthy or “saintly” outwardly, but subjectively “nothing special”. mercy also resides in the concrete person, not written in some universal tablet of laws. mercy, finally, is for the most part exempted from any possible pleasure or vanity which the agent may enjoy. as we will try to depict in the next section by way of a work of art, indifferent acts done out of mercy may account for the assumption of new duties which can explain supererogatory actions. 96 prajna vihara __ __ caravaggio, the seven works of mercy (sette opere di misericordia), 1607 oil on canvas, 153 1/2 x 102 3/8 in. pio monte della misericordia, naples michael stephen g. aurelio 97 a few years before his death in 1610, and at the height of his powers, michelangelo merisi da caravaggio would be exiled to naples, a dark city much unlike his beloved rome. because of the difficulty to find employment, its people were struck with poverty; they had to live with the everyday dangers of crime and violence on the streets. but such a place nevertheless suited the itinerant and brash painter. welcomed both by its painters and art collectors, caravaggio was something like a celebrity in naples. he would soon be commissioned to paint for those who can afford him. his first major work in naples would be a commission requested by some aristocrats for an altarpiece in the pio monte della misericordia. caravaggio’s dominant seven works of mercy (sette opere di misericordia), considered to be his greatest neapolitan work, remains there today. addressing the dire situation of the people of naples, caravaggio was asked to depict the six corporal acts or works of mercy as can be found in the gospel of st. matthew: feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked, give shelter to the wanderer, visit the sick and the imprisoned. a seventh act will be added to the six, also found in the book of tobit, to address the urgent problem of the city after a recent plague: to bury the dead. finally, in addition to what already promised to be a very complex painting, caravaggio was also asked to portray the madonna della misericordia.8 challenging as it was for caravaggio to place multiple figures with different intentions on one canvas, what he would produce after would be one his most remarkable and most beautiful works in his lifetime. the seven works of mercy easily mirrored the dark and impoverished streets of naples, and most of its figures portrayed its people __ one reason why the aristocrats of naples, unlike the many sponsors that caravaggio earlier offended in rome, praised the work. the scene is set deep into the night when most are asleep. yet caravaggio’s scene is charged with activity and life. caravaggio populates the lower part of the canvas with multiple figures which may confuse the gaze as to what is really happening. the torch a man to the right is supposed to be the only light source, but caravaggio remains faithful to his mature technique of dark backgrounds with multiple sources of radiant light reflecting on the figures. put together the nine figures at the lower part all make for a dramatic scene, a kind of theatrical tableau. but nothing in the painting seems staged. while it is a spectacle there is a calmness to the figures who go about performing their acts of mercy. drawing most of the light in the scene, the woman to the right 98 prajna vihara __ __ ~~ exposes her breast to a prisoner who forcibly extends his head through the grills as far as possible. she lifts her skirt to provide the prisoner a sort of bib as he drinks the milk from her breast. but she is startled by what goes on around her; so she ashamedly covers her right breast to hide what she is doing. behind her and contrasting the nourishment and life that the milk she gives symbolizes, the feet of a dead man can be seen. the corpse is carried by two men, but only one is visible under the fire of the torch that the priest who administered the last rites carries. the priest appears to be praying for the soul of the poor man who will be laid to rest in eternal darkness in the dead of night. here birth and death, light and darkness, the beginning of life and its end, freedom from life and imprisonment in it __ these are conditions characterized by helplessness and require aid or assistance from another human being. i was not “there” in the beginning to feed myself, care for myself, as i will be helpless when my freedom is taken from me or when i am dying. i, too, am then asked to attend to those who can no longer attend to themselves. it is already a matter of decency. on the foreground to the left, the back of a half-naked man is illuminated from a source of light outside the visible field of the painting. he lies on the ground together with a man regarded to be either a sick man or a beggar who is clasping his hands, asking for aid. but they are both received by a man, modeled after st. martin of tours, who cuts with his drawn sword the cloak on his back to share with the half-naked man. this act recalls the vision of christ which saint martin had after he had given half of his cloak to a naked man. also on the left, two men converse with each other. one man directs a wanderer to the direction of his inn so that he and his companion behind him may have shelter for the night. finally, between the innkeeper and the wanderer we find something out of place. it is a weary samson who zealously drinks water from the jawbone of an ass, the weapon he used to kill an army of philistines as was written in the old testament. taken together we see the corporal acts of mercy __ corporal in the sense that man needs drink, clothing, and shelter from the elements for its body to survive. in a certain sense an act of corporal mercy is simply giving a man his due. as a human being who is also faced with these necessities, i have a debt to the famished, the naked, the sick and the homeless to give them what is properly theirs, what all men should have and enjoy. thus if i see a child on the street who has not eaten since the previous night, how can i not give aid? but what ought i to do? if i michael stephen g. aurelio 99 formulate the maxim thou shall give aid to those in dire need, and apply it as moral principle, i will always run into contradictions and problems. by what standard do i measure “need” or “dire need”? and what is the intention or motive behind giving aid? i say that such an act furnishes another human being with what he properly needs. but i can also answer that such a motive, because it is not based solely on the laws of duty, can be subsumed to “natural inclination” of pity and sympathy, which, for kant, cannot qualify as properly moral motive. kant was very clear on this: “to help others when one can is a duty. . . . yet i maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth”.9 but on the other hand, if i were to understand my desire to aid the needy as only a particular case which pertains to this child and not for all children in need (perhaps the child’s face is more pitiful than that of others, or he seems sincere, or i feel unusually generous that time or was in a good mood), i also fall into a dilemma. i shall have to decide in each case who i shall dress, feed, and give drink to, and when i should do so given that there are so many in need. at first glance there seems to be no problem here. not everyone helps another who is in need at all times. we cannot show extraordinary generosity to everyone that we encounter. generosity, too, has practical limits in this sense. but the moral problem at stake here is the relativity of goodness. i shall always have to decide whether i will be good to this particular man or child, or not. and since i am neither required by the moral law to perform all acts of charity, nor am i able accomplish them because of my finitude, i thus end up only helping a few. i help only arbitrarily. in other words, if i act rationally, i will be obeying an impersonal universal law. and if i help this particular child, i may be only arbitrarily good. can such an aporia be transgressed? there is one possibility: if i am to understand an act of corporal mercy as a quasi-duty that i am obliged to accomplish not because it is required by duty, but because each case of suffering demands from me a basic act of mercy. mercy resides in between what is a duty and what is unnecessary for me to do. i can always excuse myself from feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, giving drink to the thirsty, as i can imagine others doing this duty. but that an act of mercy nevertheless has something obligatory in it, as evidenced by the concrete feeling that it is i who am asked to give aid to this naked, hungry, or thirsty man. i cannot completely excuse myself and defer to others this sudden responsibility i receive in the face of suffering. in the face of 100 prajna vihara __ __ ~ suffering i encounter a new duty i did not have before. i cannot “look away”, or be indifferent to the face which asks from me. the other human being imposes upon me a moral injunction which in this one perfect instance acquires the force of a moral law (levinas). upon the arrival of another human being, “the rights of the i collapse beneath the infinite obligations that come down to me” (j. l. marion).10 i do not need compassion to perform an act of mercy, all i need is to see with my eyes without having to feel anything in my heart. i know in my flesh what i ought to do. i do not, in a word, have to become a saint to have mercy. mercy is perfect in itself; it does not need to fear reprimand when it is not administered, nor does it deserve honor when it is shown because nothing is really given or taken, because it only gives back what is due to every human being. and because mercy is apathetic, it is able to stand the kantian test for what qualifies as a valid moral motive for action. having mercy, to answer kant, is not regarded to be a natural inclination: it is not the shadow of self-interest, obviously, and it cannot be reduced to vanity as “nothing special” was really done; it was only fitting that i have mercy, and it required from me neither generosity nor benevolence but only to be human. more importantly, mercy does not give to those who show it “an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them” and “delight in the contentment of others as their own work” (kant).11 for one, happiness can only proceed when the basic needs are already in place to act as its stable base. but acts of mercy attend first and primarily to that physical substratum of human life, they only provide the conditions of the possibility of happiness, and not yet happiness or pleasure itself. caravaggio’s figures show precisely the indifference and apathy of the works of mercy: they all go about their work, as one goes about doing his job. the circus atmosphere of his the seven works of mercy can at first glance be mistaken as what one will usually see in the piazza or marketplace where everyone unmindfully passes each other by on his or her way to do their own labors (opera or work). to borrow the words urmson used to describe the actions of saints and heroes, all of our actors seem to work with “disinterest or without effort”, as if they were all merely performing their duties. and the motive of mercy seen in this way confirms what kant all along had been insisting. we can take the privileged case of mercy as a form of what kant described as “kindness done from duty”, which he had described as “practical, and not pathological, love, residing in the will and not in feeling, in principles in action and not michael stephen g. aurelio 101 in compassion. it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command”.12 kant would later in the doctrine of virtue in the metaphysics of morals (1797) rename such a command of kindness done from duty as a duty of love, as “active benevolence”, which, along with the duty of respect for others, is a duty i owe to “others merely as human beings”.13 and the man who performs duties of love to other men he calls a friend of man or the philanthropist.14 this explains why the aristocrats who commissioned caravaggio were only too happy with the new altarpiece of the pio monte della misericordia. they were part of a confraternity which aimed to address the plight of the poor through the work of charitable deeds, and caravaggio was able to show what they had long felt and known in their hearts: that aiding the weak and the needy of naples was each one’s duty, and as nothing fantastic, praiseworthy, or heavenly.15 perhaps it is in this sense that we too may begin to understand, or remember, why charity can also be a duty, and recognize that saints and heroes walk among us everyday. in caravaggio’s powerful portrait, mercy is seen not from on high, or as something that only god can bestow. mercy here becomes a human and not necessarily a religious or theological virtue. instead of painting the majestic saints on the grand altar of the pio monte della misericordia as in many other churches, what caravaggio depicts here are the real men and women of naples who perform saintly acts. mercy is brought down from the level of the superhuman to the soil where the works of man are performed. the separation of the two realms can be seen in how caravaggio distinguishes between the lower plane where the works of mercy are done, and the upper realm where the virgin and her child, and two powerful angels, observe the actors with compassion. the muscular boy-angel to the left stretches out his right arm to the action below. but the other angel holds him back to keep him from crossing over unto the human realm, and to let the mortals below continue their works of mercy by themselves. i do not need help from above or a command from a hidden god to see and to know what i ought to do in front of poverty and suffering and the death of my brother. i show mercy not because i feel compassion or because i gain happiness or i perceive a future heavenly recompense, but because i already perceive it is as what i ought to do. the duties of mercy are, at bottom, the works of man. the angels, the madonna and the child may see beauty and goodness in these acts, as caravaggio shows in their compassionate faces, but i need not know this nor do i need hope for it. god may praise a good man who makes it his 102 prajna vihara __ __ ~ duty to do acts of mercy, but man does not require such a confirmation. perhaps to learn that, and to earn any reward, would be a revelation that can only occur at the end of mercy’s duties. we recall how upon asked when they saw the christ hungry, thirsty, homeless, naked, sick or in prison, he answered to their amazement: “truly i tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me” (matt. 25:40). endnotes 1j. o. urmson, “saints and heroes”, essays in moral philosophy, ed. a. i. melden (seattle: university of washington press, 1958), p.201. 2ibid., p.207. 3immanuel kant, critique of practical reason, trans. t. k. abbott (amherst: prometheus books, 1996), pp.186-188. 4ibid. 5immanuel kant, groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, trans. h. j. patton (new york: harper & row, 1964), p.66. italics mine. 6ibid., p.67. 7ibid., p.66. 8for this and the preceding, see francine prose, caravaggio: painter of miracles (new york: harpercollins publishers, 2005), pp.116-1120; francesca marini, ed., caravaggio, with a preface by renato guttuso (new york: rizzoli international publications, 2006), pp.154-155. 9kant, groundwork, p.66. 10jean-luc marion, prolegomena to charity, trans. stephen lewis (new york: fordham, 2002), p.86. 11kant, groundwork, p.66. 12ibid., p.67. 13immanuel kant, the metaphysics of morals, trans. and edited by mary gregor and with an introduction by roger j. sullivan (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1996), 198-203. 14ibid., 199. 15prose, caravaggio, p.117. works cited kant, immanuel. critique of practical reason. translated by t. k. abbott. amherst: prometheus books, 1996. _________. groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. translated by h. j. patton. new york: harper & row, 1964. michael stephen g. aurelio 103 _________. the metaphysics of morals. translated by mary gregor and with an introduction by roger j. sullivan. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1996. marini, francesca (ed.). caravaggio. with a preface by renato guttuso. new york: rizzoli international publications, 2006. marion, jean-luc. prolegomena to charity. translated by stephen lewis. new york: fordham, 2002. prose, francine. caravaggio: painter of miracles. new york: harpercollins publishers, 2005. urmson, james opie. “saints and heroes”. in essays in moral philosophy, edited by a. i. melden. seattle: university of washington press, 2001. 104 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 48 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia abstract the relation between religion and human rights has becomes ambiguous. in the past, religion had inspired the idea of human rights. most religions acknowledge that human rights are the rights that a person has due to his status as a human entity created by god. this identity was substantial for his dignity as an individual and his ethical obligations as a member of a community. but after religion was suppressed or replaced by modernity and ideological regimes, the idea of human rights began to be based upon the concept of the good life, the common good, or human flourishing. with this disconnect, human rights needs to be re-evaluated according to different religious traditions. this paper deals with the complexities of the ethical question concerning the ideal of good life under the norms of human rights. it proposes the idea that secular societies should take into account the historical role of religion in shaping the idea of the human to provide a moral foundation. but since religion cannot break away completely from fundamentalism, a new moral foundation inspired by religion but beyond religion is needed. the paper, then, will deal with the problem into three stages: the religious roots of human rights, religion-based-violence, and suggestions for a moral foundation of human rights beyond religion. prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 2020, 48-61 © 2000 by assumption university press mikhael dua 49 keywords: human rights, violence, religion, habermas human rights and its religious roots in his essay on glauben und wissen (faith and knowledge), j. habermas claimed that the tension between secularization and fundamentalism will become one of the main characteristics of postsecularized society.1 the secular world has created one pole in which reason, science and technology are taken as its foundation. meaning, values, morality, and the good life must all relate to the concept of human well-being. by promoting reason, the secular world demands that each religion should be harmonized with modern civilization. religion on the other hand, creates its own gounding. it has its own truth which sometimes rejects reason. habermas reminds us that by rejecting reason, the fundamentalists can use violence and terrorism as ways to defending their truth against the secular world.2 in such cases, the resurgence of religions in the secular world does not always constitute a blessing for humanity. our civil and global relations are often overshadowed by religious conflicts and the violence. this tension between fundamentalism and secularization has its implication to the meaning of human rights. in the past, religion can be regarded as an important factor that brings about human rights. although its formal formula emerged in the 20th century, the basic inspirations of human rights have been found in ancient religious beliefs and practices such as the concept of agreement with god in the jewish tradition, quranic texts on peace and mutual benefit, hindu’s concept of dharma and atma, the catholics’ concept of ius and libertos, and the protestant ideal of freedom and law. all these traditions claim that human beings are given basic rights by the creator. the relationship between religion and human rights has a new emphasis in the post-secularized society. in the first place, under the principle of the freedom of religion,3 each religion claims its own right to exist. in this post-secularized society, religion can play its role in reminding people about the problematic aspects of modern lifestyles. among other 50 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december things, religion shows that the modern world which reduces reality into a rational, scientific, economic, and technological framework will end with failure. spiritual life is something that is intrinsic to being human and cannot be ignored. also religion reminds us that the modern secular state system with its democratic, economic and technological aspects has not really succeeded in providing an authentic sense of national and cultural identity. ernst gellner has pointed out that, in the post-colonial era, developing countries faced a dilemma: whether to imitate western patterns to achieve equality in life, or remain in their own cultural traditions, with the result that material conditions of life did not develop. initially, many developing countries followed the western pattern in building their societies, but after some decades it turned out that the western model was not successful because it led to authoritarianism, corruption, and a return to a primordialism that endangered national integration.4 all these conditions brought forth a need for a more authentic sense of identity. based on human rights every country and culture affirms its own authentic identity. a new understanding of human rights became the philosophical basis for the political recognition of national identity in many countries. this philosophical affirmation of the function of human rights in a society to define the authentic identity, however, goes hand in hand with anti-foreign movement which creates excessive suspicion and hostility towards anything foreign. in such a situation of total disillusion and paranoia, human rights as modern norms for the good life have been heavily criticized. from a philosophical point of view, some philosophers consider human rights as an unsuccessful experiment. they regard it as a fiction and an instrument of neocolonialism used by the western world to control the non-western world. they also claim that human rights become a strategy to give birth to cultural conflicts, social instability, and religious wars so that the world remains dependent on the west. marry ann glendon says: “right talk is the wrong talk for meaningful debate about debate deep questions of justice, peace, and common good.” in this critical condition, religion takes its role as an important mikhael dua 51 factor to balance the secular motive behind the application of human rights. in the theological perspective, without religion, human rights would be controlled by western liberal ideals and political identity. only in religion, we can understand that the concept of human rights is inherent with the concept of duty. pope john xxiii wrote: “every fundamental human right draws its indestructible moral force from natural law, which, in granting it imposes a corresponding obligation. those, therefore, who claim their rights, yet altogether or neglect to carry out their respective duties, are people who build with one hand and destroy with the other.”6 under this theological understanding, human rights can impose moral requirements universally valid in the world of human experience and history since it is rooted in the nature of man and of human society. religion-based-violations the recognition of the religious dimension in human rights or the recognition of human rights by the religious world is one thing, but the application of human rights in the praxis of religions is another matter. when human rights declare equality and teach freedom, the world of religion emphasizes hierarchy and authority; when human rights celebrate diversity, tolerance and pluralism, religion demands purity of orthodoxy, exclusivity and diversity; where human rights teach freedom of speech and expression, some religions suggest total surrender, restraint or silence; when human rights are embraced in such a way as to become universal values, religion as an institution is threatened. so it is hard to deny that behind the religious idealism that emphasizes peace, compassion, honesty, justice and brotherhood, religions actually emphasize a strong tendency towards radicalism, bigotry, group selfishness, megalomania, corruption, chauvinism, and various forms of violence that are diametrically opposed to human rights. based on its some interpretations of religious doctrines, religion can become a motive for doing violence. we call this contradiction as religion-based violence. this phenomenon can be empirically pointed out by some surveys. besides bomb attacks in bali, surabaya, and medan, setara institute 52 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december reported that 3.177 cases of religious radicalism have been conducted in the last 12 years (2007-2018). recently (october 2019), indonesian survey institute’s research shows that religious radicalism is a serious problem in living together among religious communities. the survey discovered that 53% of muslims object to non-muslims building their place of worship near them, but 54% are tolerant if non-muslim people hold religious services near them. in the last four years, the trend of political intolerance towards non-muslims has increased from 48% to 56% in a sense that the majority does not want non-muslims to be their leaders. the survey also points it out that 23.5% of muslim students in indonesia support the movements of the islamic countries of iraq and syria, and are even ready to strive to establish a khilafah.7 this tendency is formulated in another way by the national commission on human rights of the republic of indonesia. in its 2015 report on freedom of religion and beliefs, the commission found out some forms of violence: closing of existing places of worship, demolition of places of worship that had long been used, prohibition of using veil in school, intimidation and prohibition of religious activities. the national human rights commission also notes that all religions have committed violence and potentially violate human rights. a philosophical reflection on this phenomenon may help us to understand the fact. in her writings on the vita activa (the human condition), hannah arendt distinguished three fundamental human activities, namely labor, work, and action. these three activities are closely related to the most common conditions of human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality. labor means that we humans maintain the survival of individuals and species as a whole. work is the way we do every day activities which support life such as eating, drinking and other related activities. it is an activity related to biological processes which are necessary for the continuation of human existence. different from labor, work is a productive activity in achieving certain material goals. with work humans can create the world around them in accordance with their plans and needs. work gives us permanence and durability in gaining meaning mikhael dua 53 in our lives and warding off the futility of mortality. human action is also a productive activity but has no connection to the production of material objects. it includes human communication with each other and which allows them to live together in a society. by such action, humans create history, honor the past, and look forward to the future.9 of these three activities, violence is more visible in labor and work, and less visible at action. it is because violence is related to the needs to maintain human existence in facing environmental challenges. by identifying violence as labor, arendt identifies three hallmarks of violence.10 first, like labor, “violence is essentially instrumental and material.”11 it is governed by the categories of means and end. as an instrument, violence is designed and used to multiply strength. its justification is derived from the end it serves. it can be “justifiable, but never will be legitimate.” 12 religion-based-violence is a kind of violence which uses religion as its propaganda. it is effective because only in religion we can find blind loyalty. second, violence is mute. arendt points out that in essence violence is speechless. there is no speech in violence. it is “incapable of speech.”13 therefore, arendt can say: “where violence rules absolutely … not only the laws … but everything and everybody must fall silent.” this muteness makes violence destroys precisely the solidarity of word and deed that is necessary for action. without speech, action degrades into a merely productive, technological activity. third, violence is characterized by its preference for isolation. tyranny may become its extreme form. without speech, violence places man into the mass in which no body can exist as somebody. as consequence there can be no longer any process of uncovering of the who. because of its instrumentality and muteness, violence creates a solitary man who has no capability to bring relations into existence. by these descriptions of violence, we can say that in arendt’s perspective, all forms of religious violence are the instrumental reaction to the process of alienation, especially alienation from the secularized society. by using religion as its justification, violence destroys human 54 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december communication and togetherness. behind violence grows the most effective command which produces the most instant and perfect obedience. by this way, it overlooks power which is fundamentally based on communication and togetherness. violence, then, will not create human communication, togetherness and power but alienation. the religion-based violence then is a result of religious purification by each religious group to strengthen its stronghold of identity and territory. this isolation process results in paralysis of communication and social dialogue. religion-based-violence has occurred since the crusades in the medieval times. today christians, jews and even hindus also have a record of violence due to deviations of religious values. in this case, religion is used as a propaganda tool for blind loyalty. arendt then concludes that all violence, includes here the religious-based-violence is a actus hominis rather than actus humanus. for her, humans are conditioned beings since everything that is contacted and exposed to humans, immediately becomes a condition of human existence; it becomes a condition of our existence as far as it becomes a part of us. as far as it can humanize labor and work, communication can also become the basis for human rights. and as far as communication becomes the basis for human rights, all practical efforts to promote human rights cannot be pushed by violent actions. moral foundation of human rights the inability of the world’s religions to promote the good life became one of the reasons for secularists to try to replace religion with a new model of good life which can be taken into account by science. sam harris may be one of the scientists who mercilessly and relentlessly attacks religion. for harris, instead of developing ethical sensitivity, religion tends to confuse people’s ethical perceptions of the good and the bad. their people are moral when they conquer or kill; they feel holy precisely when they self-destruct; they feel loyal to their religion precisely by promoting discrimination. according to harris, religion is one of the biggest barriers to sound moral reasoning, although ideally the use of reason is always obligatory. mikhael dua 55 harris proposes that ethics or morality does not require religion as its basis. “research on people’s response to unfamiliar moral dilemmas suggests that religion has no effect on moral judgment.” he reasons that each religion claims to be based on certain revelations, but the contents of the revelations and scriptures are different and can be contradict one another. religious revelations also legitimize inhumane violent practices such as slavery, misogyny, patriarchy, mutilation, self-immolation, and practices such as sati. so it is clear that not all revelations can be regarded as truth. instead of religious revelations, harris contends that human moral intuition is developed in a long evolutionary process. it is not a gift from something we call god. such things as soul or spirit does not exist. our awareness is only a product of brain performance. when the brain is damaged, mental abilities are damaged. for the continuity of the ethical life of the human species what is needed is a picture of the good life that should be taken into account by science alone. this is what he calls the moral landscape. in moral landscape, harris criticizes the modern dualistic way of thinking that separates science and ethics: science talks about the world of facts, ethics talks about values of how we ought to behave. this distinction was developed by david hume and g.e. moore. to harris, the separation of facts and values is an illusion, due to three causes. first, anything that can be known about prosperous life must be related to the facts of the world and the facts of the brain’s performance in its interactions with the world. second, what we called as objective scientific knowledge about facts is in fact always built on certain principles that are considered valuable such as logical consistency, supporting evidence, simplicity of theory, etc. third, it is proved that in the brain’s performance, belief in facts and values derived from one and the same internal neural process, the process of judging about right or wrong.17 harris is of opinion that values are the ideal problem of a prosperous life or well-being which basically is based on facts and can be learned by science, especially neuroscience. the parameters of prosperous life are universal and can be assessed objectively wrong and right. they are 56 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december transcending any cultural or religious tradition. just as the facts about disease are universal cancer is cancer, cholera is cholera – so are ethical norms compassion is compassion. there are no ethical norms which can be verified by religions such as by hinduism, islam, or christianity. just as the concept of health is changed according to the increasingly complex of knowledge and experience, the notion of human rights is indeed dynamic. but it does not mean that the notion of human rights is relative. people’s preferences for food can be diversified, but we can investigate which foods are healthy or poisonous. so is the concept of human rights. each community and institution has its specific concept of human rights, but we can determine its objective measures, at least a minimum condition of practice of human rights, such as: nondiscriminative and equality, religious tolerance, the level of security etc. from the perspective of human rights, we can criticize the darker traditions in certain cultures. from this point of view, people who practice these things are conditioned to want what they should not want. so they can be reformed. harris’s criticism of religion’s claim as the foundation of human morality and human rights is a good step to define that morality is not an emotional and subjective fact but must be rational and universal. but by using science as the tool to describe the moral landscape, harris falls into the trap of scientism which proposes that the truth of morality depends on scientific discovery. harris seems to negate the practical reason of each subject to know the good and the bad of the actions on the one hand and the ability of the cultural community to reach consensus regarding common goals which must be realized in the community on the other side. harris seems to define morality in a mechanistic way of thinking in which good and bad action depends on the mechanism of neural system. there is no freedom in morality and no ability to weigh the maxim of legitimate action as kant pointed it out in his categorical principle: “act only on the maxim where you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”18 but, why we must have an obligation to respect the rights of others? mikhael dua 57 in the kantian perspective, the moral foundations of human rights lie in the categorical, universal and rational obligations to the rights of others. he argues that there is something about a human being that makes him resent and resist being treated as a means instead of an end. the individual human being becomes the basis for the supreme principle of morality: “the foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. all men everywhere want to be considered persons instead of things for the same reason that i do, and this affirmation of the absolute worth of the individual leads to a second formulation of the categorical imperative which says: so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.”19 the categorical imperative, therefore, speaks of the universality of the moral law and affirms the supreme worth of each rational person. kant’s categorical imperative on treating ‘humanity as the end not as the means’ has a similarity to the golden rule: “do to others what you want others to do to you.” in a sense that the concept of human rights is not just a claim about rights but also about duty. “the recognition of the right not to be reduced to slavery implies the responsibility of those who own others to give them their freedom. the right not to be tortured implies the responsibility of the torturer not to torture. the exercise of rights and freedom is subject to duties.”20 the moral foundation of the human rights then rests on a philosophy rooted in the subject. beside the philosophy of subject, the moral foundation of human rights rests on the internal relationship between the practical reason and the intersubjective cultural community. in these intersubjective cultural communities, all citizens, both religious citizens and secular citizens, have the same right to communicate and be heard. for these reasons religion can be accepted as one part of the “oeffentliche gebrauch der vernunft” (public use of reason). and because human reason no longer depends on the religious legitimacy, but on consensus that is built together through discourse, the contribution of religion must be translated into publicly acceptable language. meanwhile, the secular citizens must also learn something about normative truth as religious revelation by re-recognizing 58 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december their own intuitions which are often not examined. thus the arrogance of religious exclusivism which values secular citizens as infidels and the arrogance of secularism which condemns religion as irrational can be avoided. religion and secularity are two components of our civilization and therefore components of our value systems in our communication and intersubjective world.21 conclusion mary ann glendon once said that the declaration of human rights “is the single most important reference point for cross-cultural discussion of human freedom and dignity in the world today.”22 the statement summarizes the historical fact of promulgation of the human rights in the united nations. when human rights were about to be endorsed by the united nations, the question of the foundation of human rights was raised. the background of question was the conflict of value orientation between liberalism which characterized the western world and collectivism which characterized the eastern world, between universalism and cultural difference, between those who are secular and those who are religious. today human rights have been accepted and amended in many countries as practical response to the war crimes and various forms of violence against humanity. but violence is still carried out around the world, as witnessed in genocide in rwanda and former yugoslavia, civil wars in many corners of the world, terrorist attacks, and human trafficking. how can we explain the failure of human rights? one of the most determining factors for the decline of human rights is a selective and pragmatic approach that ignores the ethical foundation of human rights, namely the human person. the human rights discourse is used whenever there is oppression, slavery, conflict, war, human trafficking, and genocide. in facing all these problem, the concept of human rights is used as an instrumental justification of political and social action. the pragmatic approach may be useful in facing the problem. but the act of pragmatic judgment should be morally accepted. without ethical underpinning, human rights will have no legitimation. mikhael dua 59 religion can play its role in overcoming mere pragmatism. through its understanding of human nature as rational and free being, religion can provide moral basis for the necessity and universality of human rights. but in doing this, religion must learn how to develop its own beliefs in a rational way. in dialogue with science, it can play its role more productive. in this new public sphere, both science and religion can develop a rational and democratic commonsense which is accepted by all. by doing this, religion does not only gives moral legitimation to human rights but also creates an emancipatory world. endnotes 1 jurgen habermas, glauben und wissen (frankfurt am main: suhrkamp, 2001) 2 otto gusti madung, “toleransi dan diskursus post-sekularism,” jurnal ledalero, vol. 15, no. 2 desember 2016: 313 3 united nations, universal declaration of human rights, article 18 4 ernst gellner, postmodernism, reason, and religion (london: routledge, 1992). 5 marry ann glendon, rights talk: the impoverishment of political discourse (new york: free press, 1991). 6 pope john xxviii, pacem in terris, n. 6, 1963 7 lembaga survei indonesia, tantangan intoleransi dan kebebasan sipil serta modal kerja pada periode kedua pemerintahan joko widodo, temuan survei nasional 8-17 september 2019, jakarta pusat, 2019 8 komisi hak asasi manusia republik indonesia, laporan akhir tahun pelapor khusus kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan, jakarta: 2015 9 hannah arendt, the human condition (new york: double day anchor books, 1958), 9-18 10 remi peeters, “against violence, but not at any price: hannah arendt’s concept of power” ethical perspectives: journal of the european ethics network 15, no. 2 (2008): 181-183 11 ibid. 12 hannah arendt, crises of the republic (new york: harcourt brace jovanovich, 1972), 151 13 hannah arendt, on revolution (harmondsworth: penguin books, 1973), 19 14 hannah arendt, ibid., 18 60 prajñā vihāra vol. 21 no. 2 july to december 15 sam harris, the moral landscape, how science can determine human values (new york: free press, 2010), chapter 4 16 ibid., 98 17 ibid. chapter 2 18 kant, grundlegung der metaphysik der sitten, 52 19 kant, grundlegung der metaphysik der sitten, 67 20 romuald r. haule, “some reflections on the foundation of human rights – are human rights an alternative to moral values?” in a. van bogdandy and r. wolfrum (eds.), max planck yearbook of united nations law, volume 10 (koninklijke brill n.v.), 391-392 21 juergen habermas, zwischen naturalismus und religion (frankfurt am main: suhrkamp, 2005), 139-143 22 mary ann glendon, “knowing the universal declaration for human rights” notre dame laws review, vol. 73, issue 3., 1154 references arendt, hannah. crises of the republic. new york: harcourt brace jovanovich, 1972. arendt, hannah. on revolution. harmondsworth: penguin books, 1973 arendt, hannah. essays in understanding 1930-1954, edited by jerome kohn. new york: harcourt brace, 1994. arendt, hannah. 1958. the human condition. new york: double day anchor books, 1958. gellner, ernst. postmodernism, reason, and religion. london: routledge, 1992 glendon, marry ann. rights talk: the impoverishment of political discourse. new york: free press, 1991. glendon, mary ann. “knowing the universal declaration for human rights” notre dame laws review, vol. 73, issue 3: p. 1154 habermas, juergen. glauben und wissen. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp, 2001. mikhael dua 61 habermas, juergen. zwischen naturalismus und religion. frankfurt am main: suhrkamp,2005. harris, sam. the moral landscape, how science can determine human values. new york: free press, 2010. haule, r. romuald. “some reflections on the foundation of human rights – are human rights an alternative to moral values?” in a. von bogdandy and r. wolfrum (eds.). max planck yearbook of united nations law, volume 10 (koninklijke brill n.v.), 2006. p. 367-395 kant, immanuel. grundlegung zur metaphysik der sitten in scriften zur ethik und religionsphilosophie band iv. wiesbaden, insel verlag, 1998. lembaga survei. tantangan intoleransi dan kebebasan sipil serta modal kerja pada periode kedua pemerintahan joko widodo, temuan survei nasional 8-17 september 2019, jakarta: lembaga survei indonesia, 2019. madung, otto gusti. desember “toleransi dan diskursus postsekularism,” jurnal ledalero, vol. 15, no. 2, 2016. 305-322 peeters, remi, “against violence, but not at any price: hannah arendt’s concept of power” ethical perspectives: journal of the european ethics network 15, no. 2 (2008): 169-192 pope john xxviii, pacem in terris, n. 6, 1963 _goback _goback 30j0zll 1fob9te 3znysh7 2et92p0 tyjcwt 3dy6vkm 1t3h5sf on budaya and the re-sacralization of indonesian cultural anthropology ferry hidayat pondok modern tazakka, indonesia confucian moral education in the ta hsueh and the analects rainier a. ibana ateneo de manila university, philippines religion-based-violence and the moral foundation of human rights mikhael dua atma jaya catholic university, indonesia the concept of chi in the igbo philosophy of the person emmanuel nweke okafor siam university, thailand understanding mehm tin mon’s interpretation of alobha (non-greed) and the practice of generosity kuvera and kajornpat tangyin assumption university, thailand overcoming the passions in spinoza: a buddhist reading u. vinayaparla and john giordano assumption university of thailand some wittgensteinian reflections on translation practice in a chinese context huang fayang and michael clark assumption university, thailand 04_(27-40) state faith.pmd state faith and religious faith in today’s china he guanghu beijing people’s university abstract this essay analyses the meaning of “state faith” in present day china. this idea of state faith can have three meanings. first, it can mean the state’s faith, or the faith of state. second, it can mean the national faith, or the faith of the nationals. and third, it can mean the faith in the state, or the belief in the state. the essay then attempts to see whether ‘state faith’ in these three senses, does exist in the reality of china. it analyzes what characteristics they possess, and what relationships to ‘religious faith’ they have respectively. forward in november, 2010, shanghai association for philosophy and social sciences held its annual symposium at fudan university. one of the sessions took as its theme ‘chinese faith/chinese experience’, and its coordinator, prof li xiangping, assigned me such a topic----‘the relationship of the state faith to the religious faith’. some time before that symposium, in the presence of prof. li, i once criticized his concept of ‘state faith’ as a ‘pseudo issue’ or false issue. to my surprise, however, he invited me to that symposium with such a theme and topic. having his warmth, tolerance and persistence in mind, i felt i had to rethink this issue seriously. the conclusion of my rethinking is: this is not a ‘pseudo issue’, but really an important and serious reality which is emerging in china and before the world today, therefore, it is absolutely worth considering and discussing. prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 22-40 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 27 concept and reality of “state faith” in fact, the chinese phrase ‘state faith’ (guojia xinyang) is used very rarely, and its meaning is very ambiguous. further more, people may even suppose that what it means does not exist, since they hear or see this phrase very rarely. just for this reason, i once deemed what it refers to is a pseudo-issue or a false issue. however, the rareness of a noun’s usage does not imply the nonexistence of what it refers to. we know that the concept did not yet enter people’s consciousness, but we cannot say that it did absolutely not exist. for example, we cannot say that before the introduction or translation of the western words ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ into chinese language in the beginning of 20th century, chinese people had no feelings or ethos of such kind. however, the appearance, use and clarification of the noun referring to a thing, has enabled people’s knowledge of that thing to emerge. for the same reason, the fact that we rarely use the noun ‘state faith’ does not imply that the historical or social phenomenon it refers to does not exist in reality. however, it is still necessary for us to clarify its meaning. analysis of the concept the concept of ‘religious faith’, seems to have very clear meaning.1 at least, for the common people.2 therefore, we only need to analyse or clarify the concept of ‘state faith’. and only after we have grasped its meaning, can we begin discussing its relationship to ‘religious faith’. what then is the meaning of ‘state faith’? and does the sociohistorical phenomenon which it refers to exist or not? the concept ‘state faith’ can only have the three meanings: the first meaning is the state’s faith, or the faith of state; the second meaning is the national faith, or the faith of nationals; the third meaning is the faith in state, or the belief in state. now, let us see whether the socio-historical phenomena, which ‘state faith’ means in these three senses, do exist or not in the reality of 28 prajna vihara-~ china. then, let us see, if they exist, what characteristics they possess, and what relationships to ‘religious faith’ they have respectively. state faith in the first sense the ‘state faith’ in the first sense, the state’s faith or the faith of state, does exist in today’s china, but exists only in a limited sense. as every observer of china knows, the constitution of people’s republic of china (prc), has continued to declare that the prc is led by the chinese communist party (ccp); and the constitution of the ccp has continued to declare that its ‘guiding thought’ is marxism and its ‘highest goal’ is to realize communism. according to the numerous official documents since prc was founded 60 yeas ago, the ccp’s ‘guiding thought’ or ‘highest goal’ has often been referred to as ‘faith’, that is to say, ccp has ‘faith’ or ‘belief’ in marxism or communism. so we can say that ccp, with its political power, has made its ‘faith’ marxism or communism become the ‘state’s faith’ of prc. this is true that there has been some ‘state faith’ in the last 60 years in the society of mainland china. nevertheless, we can see that this is true only in a limited sense, when we take more facts into account. by ‘limited sense’, i mean that such a state faith is mainly found in the official rhetoric. while referring to the intellectual nature of marxism and communism, the ethos or morality or character of the party members, the education or cultivation of the people, especially of the young people, and the ideals of the people or the future of the society, the ccp and its propaganda organs would often use such rhetoric as ‘our faith is in marxism-leninism’ or ‘we believe in communism’, as their custom of discourse. and such rhetoric has indeed been received or accepted by millions of common people, at least had been seen as official or formal faith, for nearly 30 years since 1949 in mainland china. yet on the other hand, however, since the general disillusion (described as ‘loss of faith’ or ‘sanxin weiji’, meaning crisis of faith, trust and confidence in mass media those years) initiated by the disaster of ‘cultural revolution’ (1966-1976), and continuing through the growing he guanghu 29 cynicism following the tiananmen catastrophe (1989), such rhetoric began to decline, although it has not been formally abandoned by the authorities. everybody living in today’s china know the cause for this: nearly all the people, including party members and government officials, in an age of greed and social corruption, people no longer believe in such discourse, or do no longer consider it to have any real meaning. so, we can say more precisely that the ‘state’s faith’ had once existed in some limited sense, but is now approaching its actual death.3 as for the relationship of ‘state’s faith’ to religious faith, we can argue for the two points: a. first we can consider the ‘state faith’ that is not really a religious faith, although it claims some quasi-religiosity. such a quasi-religious discourse cannot stand the test of theoretical analysis, because the founders and theorists of marxism defined their intellectual movement as a kind of ‘science’ or a ‘social scientific theory’, and named it ‘scientific socialism’. but science is founded upon reason rather than faith. as for communism, in all its three possible meanings: 1. the doctrines that private property should be abandoned and equalitarianism should be realized; 2. a socio-political system in which communist party controls society and its resources; and 3. a kind of future society described and prophesied by some marxist theoreticians, it is really not a ‘faith’ in strict sense, therefore is not a religious faith. yet one can also point out that such rhetoric and expressions do have some features which are close to a religious faith but which violate their principles. for example, supporters of this quasi-religious idea of the state tend to appeal to emotion more than to reason, forgetting that marxism is more of a ‘scientific theory’ appealing to reason, rather than a ‘sacred doctrine’ demanding submission. they are more concerned with moral cultivation than theoretical argument, they put emphasis upon the demand for everybody’s selflessness rather than the promise of ‘distribution according to everybody’s needs’, they refer to the future condition more than to the present situation. unlike the communist party of soviet union, the ccp has not boasted of having entered the communist stage, but only refers to communism as a distant ideal. the above characteristics as well as others, such as the worship to the leader and the demand of common people’s sacrifice for ‘sacred’ 30 prajna vihara-~ ideal or principle, have indeed made this ‘state’s faith’ look like some religious faith. but according to the strict definition of religious faith in the academic study of religion, religious faith should be directed towards an ultimate, or a mystery. for this reason a ‘state faith’ cannot be called a religious faith. b. second, we can consider the ‘state faith’ that took the nature of a ‘quasi-religion’ in order to play a powerful role of expelling other religious faiths. in the 30 years between 1949 and 1978, all kinds of religious faith in mainland china had withered away and disappeared from society. the direct cause for that was the political control from above. but another important and obvious cause was that the ‘state’s faith’ grew more powerful in those years, resulting in an unprecedented scale of propaganda (e.g. all education from kindergarten to graduate school, all propagation from social institution to mass media), and resulted in campaigns of persecution (such as those from ‘anti-rightists’ to the ‘anti-right trend’, from ‘socialist education’ to the ‘cultural revolution’). in 1950s, if you asked people in china what their faith was, a very small minority of them might still answer you that it was a religion. but in 1960s and 1970s, you would receive only one answer from nearly all the people: that it was marxism (or communism, or marxism-leninism, or mao zedong’s thought). this was because the long-term propaganda had inculcated to all the people the ‘unique correctness’ of the marxist answer on the one hand, and the ‘dangerousness’ of other answers. the ‘state’s faith’ of this kind shall expel religious faith, just because it is not religious faith (it even includes atheism) and it tends to monopolize the intellectual discourse. and it can expel religious faith, simply because it is like a religious faith (it had made itself into some emotional, moralistic and sacralized thing), and has the nature of a quasireligion. therefore, when it is approaching its actual death, in other words, when the authority is gradually becoming more ‘de-ideologized’ and the intellectual world is actually becoming more ‘pluralized’, it is becoming more and more unable to displace religious faith. so, it is natural that the ideological resistance to religious faith has greatly decreased in today’s china. he guanghu 31 state faith in the second sense the ‘state faith’ in the second sense, the national faith, or the faith of nationals, does not exist in today’s china, if it refers to a single or unitary faith. for the faith of chinese people or of all the nationals of china today is very complex and diverse. firstly, contemporary chinese people’s faiths can be divided into two types __ religious faith and non-religious faith. secondly, while the religious faith of nationals of prc has become very complex and diversified, their non-religious faith is even more so. a. religious faith besides so-called ‘five major religions’, namely buddhism, taoism, islam, protestantism and catholicism, there are various folk religions and new religions. among buddhists, there still exist traditional sects in some sense, especially the tibetan buddhism in contrast with the chinese buddhism, and the theravada buddhism in yunnan province in southwest china. and there has appeared a very striking trend of secularization of chinese buddhism, including commercialization and politicalization, and relating competition and strife among sects or shan-men. taoism has still influence on chinese intellectuals through its life philosophy, but its believers are a very small minority of religious people. however, there exist two major traditional sects among them----ch’uanchen (or quan-zhen) taoism and cheng-i (or zheng-yi) taoism. traditionally speaking, ten minority ethnic groups in china are muslims. nowadays, however, islam is much more active than before in converting han people who are the overwhelming majority and mostly atheists. it is also worth noting that many members of these ten groups are becoming more and more secularized, and some of their members have been converted to christianity. in protestantism, while so-called ‘three-self church’ has been steadily growing, so-called ‘house churches’ have experienced a very surprising growth. although christian faith has had no place in the official mass media, it has been exerting influence upon scores of million of con32 prajna vihara-~ temporary chinese. in a very striking contrast to the ‘state’s faith’ and its ‘propaganda project’ which consumes billions of state funds, christian faith has been winning more people, especially poor people and young people, even though it has found very little expression in mass media owing to the state’s censorship. on the other hand, we should notice that so-called ‘house churches’, because of their illegal status remain in a relatively closed and isolated situation, are very likely to develop in very diversified forms. in catholicism, while so-called ‘patriotic’ or ‘legal’ church has been slowly growing for the last thirty years, the so-called ‘underground church’ has never disappeared. it remains under pressure from the state. some of the leadership in the official catholic churches, just as that in official protestant churches, are standing in opposition to ‘pious’ believers in the illegal churches. therefore, what we have seen in christian faith in today’s china is also a very complicated and diverse. in the last thirty years, many folk beliefs have been rapidly recovered, and some new religious movements have been seeking to gain ground. the former includes the worships of guandi and of wenchang which are quite popular but remain unorganized, and the worship of mazu and relating temples and rites which are well-organized and powerful at the local level. the latter refers to some variant forms of traditional religions and some new religions coming from abroad, such as mormonism, bahai faith, moonism and some sects or cults originated in christianity and hinduism and other traditions. nearly all the new religious movements are underground or are closely watched by the police, and they are looked down upon by many people and officials as being xie jiao (vicious cults). so, we do not know exactly how they are getting on. but we know that in contrast with them, the chinese traditional folk beliefs are treated with greater tolerance and even support, and are therefore becoming more open and prosperous. b. non-religious faith firstly, we can find some faiths are confused with religious faith, such as ‘state’s faith’ mentioned above (marxist or communist faith) and confucian faith. although we have found that the ‘state’s faith’ is nearing he guanghu 33 its actual death, there are still some individuals (especially some senior party members) who still keep such a faith. likewise while most of confucian scholars deny that confucianism is a religion, some still see it as a religion, and their influence are getting stronger.4 it is very ironic that some famous confucian scholars who once refuted any ideas of confucianism as being a religion, nowadays are petitioning for its religious status under the state and even for its establishment as the sole ‘state religion’! such an appeal violates basic academic or rational principles. however, although some scholars are enthusiastic in promoting it as a religion, the common people have not shared their enthusiasm. on the other hand, because that it is lifting its emotional elements above its rational elements, and it is evoking among some people much more passion rather than reflection, we can classify it as a kind of faith, namely, quasi-religious faith. secondly, besides the above-mentioned two quasi-religious faiths, contemporary chinese have also numerous varieties of beliefs and superstitions, such as fortune-telling, astrology, ba zi, feng shui and so on. for their lack of overt collective activities and institutional organization, they cannot be classified as religions. we’d better call them as some kind of folk faiths or beliefs. furthermore, if we take in account the tendency for many chinese people to become enchanted with the pursuit of wealth, power, rank, fame, eroticism and pleasure, and call these values a form of faith, we would have more reason to say that there exists no ‘state faith’ in the sense of national faith or faith of all nationals. what are appearing before us are indeed countless varieties of individual beliefs. of course, since the ‘state faith’ in the second sense does not really exist at all, we need not consider its characteristics and its relationship to religious faith.5 state faith in the third sense the ‘state faith’ in the third sense, is the faith in the state or the belief in the state, and does really exist in today’ china, even though the phrase or the name is used rarely. statism and similar phenomena has had a long history and has 34 prajna vihara-~ been extremely powerful in china.6 there has been some kind of faith or belief in the state among the chinese people since antiquity. from chin dynasty (221bc-206bc) and western han dynasty (206bc-8ad) up to now, especially during the establishment of the unitary national regime, some form of powerful state machinery has been in place.7 furthermore, as such a power has no limitation upon itself, it is very likely to sacralise itself or to be deified in the mind of common people. in fact, for centuries in china, all the imperial courts were called ‘tianque (heavenly palace)’, all the emperors called themselves ‘tianzi (the son of the heaven)’, and all the subjects called emperors as ‘shengshang (the holy above)’, and this was true to any dynasties and empires ever existed in this country. while in the west, christians refused to worship roman emperors as lords even at the expense of their lives, chinese buddhists accepted the fact that ‘the religious cause cannot stand without reliance on the state lords’, though they once advocated the buddhist principle that ‘monks should not pay reverence to the kings’ when buddhism entered china. in sum, as social organizations were too weak8 and the state became the supreme and sole and overwhelming power in this world, it is natural that there emerged the state worship, or the faith in state, among the chinese who shared the common weakness of human nature __ the tendency to look up to power. this is almost the inevitable in such a historical situation. the ‘faith in state’ was strengthened to an unprecedented degree after 1949. the social, civil, and political organizations, which had been hidden and weak, became utterly open and stronger with the decline of manchurian qing empire and the foundation of republic of china (1912). but these were transformed into the different organs of the ccp and the government under the leadership of the party, and became bureaucratized into the party’s branches (e.g. ‘union of workers’, ‘federation of youth’, ‘federation of women’, and ‘association of writers and artists’, ‘communist league of youth’, etc.). or they became broken or disbanded (e.g. former tribal or patriarchal and grassroots’ religious organizations) from 1949, even non-state enterprises and businesses were taken over by the state since 1956, and people over china had lost all social or horizontal organization or association. as a result they were organized directly, individually and respectively, through a single pyramid-like organization he guanghu 35 unified from the top leadership down through the lowest leadership.9 all the leaders at all the levels of this organization are appointed by the above, except that the few top leaders are appointed by themselves and through distribution of offices. so-called ‘danwei’ (unit) that everybody belonged to, then, was no more than a particle or a cell of this unprecedented, huge and rigid organization. every individual was isolated like individual sand grains with no interconnection, to face up to a cloudless blue sky hoping for rain to fall, but only being scorched by the sun! therefore, at that time, a chinese who came across any difficulties or problems would say that he/she should ‘qu zhao zuzhi’ (go to the organization), or would say ‘zuzhishang hui jiejue de’ (the organization’s leadership can resolve it, ‘shang’ means ‘above’)! then the chinese used to say ‘yao yikao zuzhi’ (they should rely on the organization) or ‘yao xiangxin zuzhi’ (they should believe in the organization)! ‘zuzhi’ did not imply the ‘unit’ to which you belonged and which included your colleagues, but the leadership of the ‘unit’, namely, the party’s organization of it, from above. why does the ‘party’s organization’ have such unimaginably great power? that is because that the party controls all the powers and all the resources of the state __ not only of state’s organs or institutions of legislation, judiciary and administration, but also of the whole country, whole society and whole people. so, ‘the organization’ represents the state (and even the society and the people). of course, when the resolution of an individual’s problem was beyond the jurisdiction of the unit’s party organization, he/she would often say: ‘i believe in the party and the state (to solve the matter)’ or ‘the party and the state will one day make a just conclusion’, as his/her final or ultimate comfort. the phrase ‘the party and the state’ mentioned here seems to have some abstract implications, but it actually refers to the national or top leadership of the party and the state which has the greatest power and authority. a chinese psychological fact that has never been fully explained is the phrase ‘leader(s) of the party and the state’ which all the chinese mass media has been repeating many times a day for sixty years. it imparts to all nationals a basic social reality __ the party’s leaders master the state, and as the state’s power is incomparably great, their own power is incomparably great. analysing in this perspective, so-called ‘personal worship’ of mao zedong in nearly 36 prajna vihara-~ 30 years since 1949 is but a form of worship of state’s power (or, more directly, worship of the state), a distorted form of the ‘faith in state. with the existence of the faith in state (not in name, but in reality), we can explain, to some degree, why many chinese people (especially at the grassroots) still worship mao who brought to china so many terrible disasters.10 because in the eyes of the people who cannot understand rationally the relationships of the personage to the party and state and have no faith in the transcendental (god), mao is considered omnipotent for he masters the power of the state, he is the state. this state is so huge and has so many organs of such enormous strength that it seems to be able to do anything at its will and to be the greatest power which the common chinese can see around them on the earth. if power can become an object of faith through the use of various symbols, then, it is natural that mao would have been made into such a symbol, as he had been the power of the state and deified for nearly 30 years. and to the same degree, this faith in state can be used to explain the continuing nationalism and its connection with the deification of mao many years after his death. for the chinese nationalism has been actually penetrated, dominated and distorted by the statism.11 that is to say, the ‘faith in state’ expressed in the form of ‘personal worship of the leader’ during the former 30 years of prc, found expression in a form of unreasonable nationalism during the latter 30 years. only this veiled faith in state, combined with control of the press, ignorance of the west and institutional hindrance, is able to account for the fact that many chinese, while not being able to afford the expense of their children’s schooling, family medical care or even their own housing, still agree with the government plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on beijing olympic games and shanghai world expo, as they are events which can bestow glory to the state! one of the characteristics of this ‘faith in state’ is that it has taken ‘patriotism’ as most popular and main expression in modern china. during the former 30 years of prc, while the state faith in the first sense or the ‘communist faith’ occupied a higher position in the party’s propaganda than patriotism,12 the phrase ‘ai guo’ (love the state) was often used immediately following the phrase ‘ai dang’ (love the party), and the slogan ‘love of the motherland’ was also found everywhere. furtherhe guanghu 37 more, the principle that ‘state is above the collective, the collective is above individual’ was propagated as basic part of communist morality. from 1980s on, with the decline of ‘communist faith’ in the official propaganda, ‘patriotism’ has been raised to the top. and we should know that the chinese word ‘aiguo zhuyi’ translated from patriotism has literally lost any sense of ‘patria’ or country __ fellows as object of love, leaving instead the sense of ‘guo’ (meaning state) as the only object. in this way, the word ‘patriotism’ has readily become the properly expressive symbol of the faith in state. actually, the ‘faith in state’ is just one of the ‘non-religious faiths or beliefs mentioned above in section 4. judging from the perspective of religious philosophy, these various ‘non-religious faiths’ can be called ‘quasi-religions’ or ‘pseudo-religions’, which mistake for the ultimate those various kinds of the non-ultimate, human doctrines or isms, wealth, power, rankings, fames, etc. as the worldly state itself is not ultimate and is not god, the faith in state is nothing more than a worship of some human power. therefore, the ‘state faith’ in the third sense, the ‘faith in state’, has the same relationship to religious faith with that of any other quasireligion and pseudo-religion to religious faith. that is to say, firstly, it is in opposition to and competition with the religious faith, as it is not religious faith but concerns ideas of value; secondly, it is not in full competition with religious faith (especially in the country where atheists or people with no faith form a majority), as it is some kind of quasi-religious or pseudo-religious faith. just for this reason, we can see that many religious people are also patriots in today’s china, in other words or in terms of this paper, they have also the ‘state faith’ in the third sense. of course, what we are here referring to is just a social appearance, namely, a superficial phenomenon existing among masses who are more occupied with earning their livelihood than considering such concepts or relationships. of the essence, true religious faith should relativise all the worldly things and affairs, including the state. therefore, true religious believers could have different concepts or ideas of the state, but should not absolutize it as an object of faith; instead, they should treat the state with reason. 38 prajna vihara-~ after all, the living memory of humankind tells us that the ‘faith in state’ or statism has brought to the world enormous catastrophes in the last century; and clear reason tells us that the ‘faith in state’ distorts human nature and reverses the order for the state and the people, transforming the state, the tool for the purpose of people’s happiness, into the goal at the expense of people’s happiness. the significance of discussing this topic is to remind us of the existence of this danger. endnotes 1according to the two definitions of religion in ‘a dictionary of religion’, the meaning of ‘religious faith’ is ‘the faith in the ultimate’ or ‘the belief in mysterious superhuman power’. (he guanghu, ‘religion’, in ren jiyu ed. ‘a dictionary of religion’, shanghai dictionary press, 2009.) 2common chinese people understand religion as ‘faith or belief in god or gods’. this understanding is very close to the meaning mentioned above. 3in contemporary china, the authority is still making efforts to maintain the official or dominant status of marxism as its ideology. however, while the central department of propaganda of ccp, the state ministry of education and the united front department of ccp have been spending hundreds of millions cny to implement the ‘project of reconstruction and propagation of marxism’, the term ‘communism’ and related phrases( such as ‘communist faith’) have been used less and less in reality at the same time. 4recently, in confucius’ hometown qufu, shandong province, the reconstruction of a christian church was stopped, owing to the government’s response to the confucian scholars’ petition that the ‘holy place of confucianism’ should be protected from invasion of foreign religion. 5we can even see such a strange belief as ‘li yu-chen belief or worship’ (li is a pop singer who was elected as ‘super-girl’ by millions of fans years ago. 6i have given a particular description and analysis of chinese statism in my essay ‘the dragon and the dove’ (in ‘logos and pneuma’, forthcoming issue, hong kong). 7much stronger is the experience or feeling of the chinese than that of the western people. because in the western civilization emerged after the fall of roman empire, state’s power was limited by church’s power; furthermore, owing to their faith in god who is above all the sovereigns and states, people is less likely to absolutize state and make it an object of faith. 8in the words of w, in the oriental autocracy, no matter how much wealth the property holders have, they ‘are not able to, through organization and activity he guanghu 39 based on their property, exert any influence on the state power, and therefore form a threat to the autocratic regime’. (oriental autocracy, china social sciences press, p.8, 1989) 9the then popular expressions of this are ‘the whole country is a single round of chess match’ and ‘exercising unified leadership of the party’. 10cf. li xiangping, ‘an economical analysis of the faith in mao zedong’, (in wang yan ed., teahouse for sociologists, no. 2, 2011, shandong people’s publishing house). 11see he guanghu, ‘the dragon and the dove: natio-statism and catholicprotestant christianity in china today’, in logos and pneuma, hong kong, forthcoming. 12in fact, marxism should oppose ‘the faith in state’, for it argued that state was only some tool and would disappear in the future; and marxist communism advocated the elimination of state: workers have no motherland! communism aims at ‘free development of every person’ as well as of humankind. (k. marx and f. engels, communist manifesto, chapter 2.) 40 prajna vihara-~ prajnavihara_vol23_no2_p2.pdf 19 the dynamics of religious ideological movements in the city of surabaya indonesia kunawi basyir1 and yulanda trisula sidarta yohanes2 abstract this article will examine the issue of the development of movement in surabaya, which is the second largest city after jakarta. the religious life of such puritanical movements is a special concern for the wider community including based on the results of this study we can suggest that the less able to establish itself compared to other cities. this local religious leaders, to build harmony between diverse religious communities in the local area. with the strength urban community in surabaya is avoided. keywords: surabaya introduction in the islamic tradition, religious ideology must position itself with reference to its religious doctrines and teachings. but often this creates problems concerning the exclusivity and absolutism of the truth that vol. 23 no. 2 july to december 2022, 19-38 © 2000 by assumption university press 20 comes from the interpretation of these islamic doctrines and teachings. and as it is widely acknowledged that some of these attitudes contain an ideological veil. they avoid the dialectical processes and demands of deliberative communication, because they are feared that they will lead to resistance. the phenomenon of exclusivist religious practices among various religious communities in the world becomes a threat to the social integration and cohesion of pluralistic societies like indonesia. this exclusivist attitude holds that only their opinion is correct and the others are wrong and are a threat. the activities of puritanical and militant indonesia. indonesia is heavily impacted by diverse islamic traditions and movements. this is due to its history which involves a dialogue between to a form of a civil war. these more radical groups have various sources: one group follows middle eastern culture (saudi arabia) as legitimate islam (wahabiyah), another follows puritanical groups from syria and from india such as islam ahmadiyah. these islamic groups are increasingly impacting the archipelago, so that indonesia is faced with several competing islamic groups, all of groups such as hizbut-tahrir indonesia (hti) who follow the ideology of “khilafah” wish to establish a trans-national islamic state in indonesia under the sole leadership of an islamic caliphate. similar to hti, majlis mujahidin indonesia (mmi) aims to establish a regional islamic state (southeast asia) under the leadership of an emir.3 the problem of such competing factions can be analysed with reference to their interaction within metropolitan area since it is here that they become concentration and compete with one another most intensely. surabaya provides a instructive laboratory for investigating these frictions and competitions. 21 in academic studies, it has been stated that the religious typology of a santri community is usually pluralist, tolerant, contextual, hereinafter referred to as moderate when addressing contemporary problems. however, since the post-reformation, the religious nuances of urban society in which of course tend to be more radical. from the results of this study, it will be possible to describe the factors that cause the transformation of the religious values of urban communities in the city of surabaya. the reform movement in indonesia in 1998, forced indonesia to enter a new phase in the process of organizing the life of the nation and state. this phase opened to an increased freedom in public spaces. not identities was very strong, especially ethnic and religious identities. the rise of communal violence in the early years of the transition demonstrated gave rise to religious exclusivism and very existence of multicultural society was at stake. the character of exclusivist religious doctrines in the islamic world can be reduced to four characteristics.4 , they tend to approach their scripture literally. the text is strictly treated as an authoritative text, and not discourse, so that it subordinates the historical, sociological, and cultural context of the text. truth is assumed to exist only in the literal reading of the text. the truth of revelation is approached by grammatical analysis and the meaning of words in the text alone. revelation is seen as something that is unchanging, reproduces past knowledge. this way of thinking is soon easy to form an exclusivist social attitude.5 islam is considered as an institutional solution for all the problems of the nation. this idea seems to have found its political momentum following 22 multidimensional crisis which they perceive as a result of the secular and capitalistic system. , followers often tend to believe in conspiracy theories where muslims are victims. in this context, the west is believed to always have and carry out a hidden agenda by conspiring to forge political, economic, military, and cultural alliances to eliminate islam and destroy its people. this belief is based both on a literal-textual understanding of the teachings as well as on the experience of powerlessness in the face of the hegemony of political, military, economic and cultural power of the west which is , they have a tendency to develop an anti-pluralism agenda. one of the reasons is because they consider the idea of pluralism as originating in the west. in addition, it is also based on the conspiratorial belief that pluralism is a western ideological way to dismantle islam as a single truth. to oppose pluralism they believe that allah (swt) has textual interpretation they assume that the jews and christians are a cursed group. the rejection of pluralism which leads to intolerant and pro-violence attitudes is a further consequence of the religious model that embraces this exclusivity. in the historical record of islamic radicalism in indonesia, it was stronger from post-independence to post-reform. since kartosuwiryo led operations in the 1950s under the banner of darul islam (di), a political movement in the name of religion, it was not long before this movement was overthrown by the new order. in 1976, komando jihat (komji) emerged, in 1977 the indonesian muslim liberation front appeared, then followed by the islamic defenders front (fpi), laskar jihad and others.6 the factors for the emergence of radical religious attitudes in they emerge out of socio-political factors. for instance, the political radicalism in 1928 which was pioneered by hasan al-banna for whom the return to 23 true islam is a necessity. they sought islamic solidarity, the islamization of modern science, the application of religious law, and the opposing western culture by the restoration of the caliphate. al-banna and his followers pursued the goal of creating a caliphate to achieve social justice and ensure adequate opportunities for all muslim individuals.7 this symptom of violence in the name of religion is more clear when viewed from a socio-political phenomenon than from a religious phenomenon itself. as stated by azyumardi azra, that the deteriorating driver of the emergence of radicalism. historically, we can see that the and clashing with other groups are actually more rooted in sociopolitical problems. in this case, the muslim community feels that it is not forces that dominate world civilization, namely the west. they appeal to religious emotions and aim to achieve the “noble” goals of their politics (jihad). the orientation of the islamic radical movement is not only in seen in the islamic radical movement initiated by the islamic jamaat in afghanistan and mindanao. they divide religion into two areas, namely the area of teachings and the area of war strategies.8 therefore, military training is always seen as the extension of religious teachings. following this, is is clear that islamic radicalism is not due to religious motives but socio-political motives faced by muslims today. , the religious emotion factor. the hegemony of western powers against islamic countries, whether political, economic, or socioto solidarity. this takes the form of the injustice of america and its allies west and the east, this has resulted in the disillusionment of muslims, eventually giving birth to radicalism and violence.9 religious emotions that are uncontrollable and easily ignited with by issues of injustice. messages of religious wisdom and even the advice of religious advocates 24 10 several possibilities. it can create positive social interactions, where interaction creates an atmosphere of harmonious social relations. or it can lead to negative social interactions arise when social relations are 11 an ideology is a collection of values, ideas, norms, beliefs, and beliefs (walltanschauung) claimed by a person or group of people that forms the basis for determining attitudes towards political events and social problems. in the case of islamic fundamentalism is is seen as the basis of the state. such writers as hassan al-banna and sayyid qutub in egypt, in indonesia. anti-westernization.12 westernization according to him is an ideology that will endanger muslims by preventing the establishment of islamic law. for this reason, western symbols must be destroyed for the sake of upholding islamic law on earth. these characteristics can be seen in the radicalism movement of qutub (1955 m), one of his doctrines is “modern ignorance”. there is a dominant belief in the return of perfect muslim and the elevation islam to its true position as the dominant universal belief.13 strong belief in the truth of the ideological program they carry is also accompanied by an interpretation of the truth of other systems that should be replaced in social movements. beliefs about the correctness of their programs are often combined “populist” ways to achieve them.14 to improve the political, economic, cultural situation, often leads to frustration and anger among the public. as stated by amin rais, one of the emergences of islamic radicalism in indonesia was due to public dissatisfaction with government policies during the new order era which were seen as antagonistic to the existence of muslim communities in indonesia.15 this leads to demands that religion be made the only ideology 25 16 islam is considered as the only foundation for life that is comprehensive, so all political, legal, and social issues cannot be separated from religion. to revive islam, falsehoods, and evils of secular society.17 finally there is a rejection and resistance to western thought. islam is considered distinct from western modernity and all ideologies and thoughts originating from the west must be rejected. they assume that the failure of muslims to build an ideal society is due to the fact that muslims have turned away from the ‘straight 18 to see the religious attitude of the islamic exclusivists in indonesia, wrapped up in the religious fundamentalism movement is a problem of that occurred in the era of the cold war. globalization is characterized by chaos and the absence of a single dominant force in world development. the idea of globalization is closely related to cosmopolitanism.19 globalization uproots the identity of all human beings, creating confusion. one way out, they chose the fundamentalist path to deal with the values of cosmopolitanism. in the same vein, manuel castells stated that religious uncertainty and dissociation of identity.20 some of the characteristics possessed by the exclusivity as mentioned above seem to be a spirit of radicalism and extremism which in turn will threaten the existence of the multi-ethnic, cultural and religious indonesian society. one of them is the religious harmony that has been fostered both by the government and which was a tradition of understanding. in the study of religions, it is clear that the religious attitude for the inclusivist, salvation can be achieved by those in another religion. 26 assumption that more than one religion is true. an inclusivist accepts the doctrines of their own particular religion as true and accepts other religions based upon shared principles. in this way, the inclusive wants to position itself as a middle ground between the exclusivist and the pluralist. in the islamic world, this inclusivist religious attitude is often expressed by such contemporary thinkers as fazlur rahman, who accepst the presence of universal goodness for religions other than islam, as long as they accept the idea of salvation. this approach places muslims on an equal footing with other people in achieving the truth.21 meanwhile, seyyed hossein nasr said that every religion is basically formed by both the formulation of faith and the experience of faith. islam, for example, ) before one can have the experience of faith ( ), in the christian perspective faith.22 perennial philosophy), who mapped the character of religions in terms same.23 nurcholis madjid,24 that islam – or more precisely as a term with a generic meaning – is an attitude of submission and submission to god which covers the entire universe. such teachings were later brought by the prophets, whose core and origin was faith in god almighty, although historically the sociorejection of false gods and false belief systems. it should see the role of islam is as a spreader of mercy and peace for the entire universe. this idea of islam carries a message of love and world peace. unlike the islam narrow idea of “jihad” . for abdurrahman wahid (gus dur), in the creation of a just, democratic, egalitarian, tolerant and civilized society, there should be no 27 demarcation and discrimination of religion, ethnicity, race and between groups. all humans are the same. plurality is a that will agitation, and intrigue. islam for gus dur must be able to realize its slogan as a mercy for all nature.25 as in the context of a plural and multicultural must be directed towards an inclusive religious character. not merely tolerance within the framework of co-existence, but furthermore one must participate in creating pro-existence social relations in pluralism. this religious attitude requires cooperation between religious communities in dealing with actual problems of life such as poverty, violence, and values between religions.26 however, it must be realized that the religious understanding of our society still relies on a normative approach, resulting in fertile ground for radical groups. because the normative approach has put forward an emotional attitude that will lead to dogmatism and fanaticism. it should prioritize an empirical-critical historical and social approach so that religion can provide problem solving tools and not challenge the tradition of pluralism and diversity in indonesia. the historical dimension can provide lessons learned, both a constructive phenomenon and the humanity in the future. the socio-empirical dimension can provide contextual awareness by referring to actual and comprehensive problem solving.27 this is where the historical and social dimensions play a very important role in balancing the normative dimensions so that they can form healthy and inclusive commitments and sentiments demanded by religion to avoid fanaticism. because the exclusivist reason that believes in and monopolizes a single, undivided truth will protect the sacredness of its faith and religious symbols. this is why minority groups when they feel discriminated against, often resort to violence in the name of their religious 28 form of “religious deideology.” deideology is an attempt to distinguish between authentic religion and religion that is ideologically distorted by radical groups. authentic religion is an open and tolerant religion, while ideological religion is a religion that is interpreted reductively, manipulatively, and subjectively into a closed and intolerant religion.28 to address violence, deradicalization requires the desacralization political system which is often manipulated in the direction of theocracy. this desacralization is nothing but a democratization process that gives the people the right to determine their secular political orientation. this process takes a long time because the majority of muslims in general have not been able to move beyond the theocentric political traditions, namely human autonomy and democratic principles are still considered 29 in order for religious life to have a humanistic face, komaruddin principles for religious understanding: the acknowledgment of the logic of “the one” can be understood only from diverse religious perspectives and interpretations. this means that the almighty can be ways, but all of them still refer to one belief that there is only one almighty. this is the essence of the faith of all religions which are developed by , that multiple interpretations and understandings of the one are only tools or paths leading to the absolute essence. this principle is very important because it provides the basis for the necessity of, as well as a preventive measure against absolutist religious traditions and dogma. , a particular religious experience, although limited, must be believed to have absolute value for its adherents, but this these beliefs. religious belief must be accompanied by the recognition that one has a commitment to others outside of ones religious sphere. religious belief and practice are “relatively absolute”.30 29 and diversity of ontological nature. islam treats other religions as they are, and allows them to be themselves, without reduction and manipulation. interreligious tolerance and the role of religious leaders surabaya is the second largest city in indonesia after jakarta. it was the centre of the resistance against the dutch army. surabaya has various ethnic populations, most of which are javanese, madurese, and other ethnic groups. the people of surabaya city have a distinctive javanese dialect known as suroboyoan language. the people of surabaya are known to be quite proud of their language, however, with time there has been an intermingling of suroboyo, javanese ngoko and madurese. there is also a very pluralist character to the various religions embraced by the people of surabaya. relations between religious adherents are close and warm and involve mutual respect. in art, the people of surabaya tend to like art that is dynamic, attractive, and humorous. an example is the remo dance which is used as an opening dance at the surabaya ludruk art stage. the promotion of pluralism also has a history. to foster interreligious harmony for ethnic groups in the city of surabaya, the role of the government, the private sector (social organizations) and the community organize social activities. religious organizations involved in these activities include the east java religious harmony forum (fkub), the surabaya interfaith forum (fla), the east java indonesian christian church (gki), surabaya al-akbar mosque (mas), the maitreya indonesian buddhist pandita council (mapanbumi), muhammadiyah, niciren syosu indonesia, titd (tri dharma place of worship) gresik and a number of non-religious organizations like the indonesia vegetarian society, and the east java branch of the indonesian chinese association (inti). tree planting is a major activity of cooperation. this was initiated by the surabaya branch of the indonesian buddhist representative 30 (walubi) with the support of a number of religious organizations and businessmen with the mayor of surabaya on sunday, march 30, 2008 at kupang indah. this activity inspired by the concern of religious leaders in surabaya to participate in protecting and preserving the environment. no less than 300 trembesi trees with a diameter of 4-5 cm were donated and planted by the forum. the activity coordinator said that the desire to plant trees was based on his concern for the global warming phenomenon. in addition, this activity can at the same time strengthen communication between religious communities in surabaya. the mayor hoped that interreligious communication can be strengthened by cooperation in such activities. through good communication, religious misunderstanding avoided and communicated. the cause of social strife in a city like surabaya can be traced fundamentalist movements biases of religious interpretation. it cannot be denied that the occurrence of changes and even ideological shifts for the islamic community (fundamentalism) in surabaya as a rational thing. whether there is adjustment to modernity, the acceptance of democratic principles or the adaptation to the public sphere. this is complicated by the fact that islamic fundamentalism in both its national and transnational contexts reacts to modernity, and political democracy, because it is perceived as unable to deliver the promises and hopes that it promotes. the criticism of modernity also concerns the domination and hegemony of the west towards islam and the islamic world through the neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism projects. the fundamentalism movement for the islamic community in surabaya can be seen as an as a political ideology. among the followers of this movement, western democracy is considered a product of western modernity and cannot be applied in the islamic world. the resistance to western modernity is considered an oppressive measure, even though it is seen as important in order to return the islamic world to the islamic caliphate system as it was applied at the time of the prophet. 31 departing from the phenomenon that occurred in the religious ideological movement developed by the multicultural society of surabaya (islam), it is more appropriate for us to label them that their movements are a response to the ideology of modernism, both in the state constitution, as well as in the socio-religious realm. fundamentalists furthermore, they want to make radical changes in the name of their “holy agenda.” fundamentalist islamic groups in surabaya emerged through peaceful actions. the orientation and strategy of this fundamentalist group seeks to control society through social action, their movement is far from being revolutionary or violent. although the character of the revolution was lost, islamic symbols permeated society and islamic political discourse. the decline of islamic progressive islamic groups in surabaya as well as progressive islam in indonesia, namely they started from a political movement accompanied by the rise of islam as a social and moral phenomenon. this progressive islamic group strives for what fundamentalists also believe, an islamic society based on the goodness of its members. this group can be found with fundamentalists such as the surabaya branch of hizbut-tahrir indonesia (hti), whose movement orientation is to build a trans-national islamic state in indonesia under the sole leadership of the islamic caliphate. similar to hti, the surabaya branch of the majlis mujahidin indonesia (mmi) also aims to establish a regional islamic state (southeast asia) under the leadership of an emir. radical islamic groups include the islamic defenders front (fpi) and laskar jihad. the orientation of islamic radicalism is more directed at the application of sharia at the community level, not at the state level. shift in the struggle of the fundamentalists from the islamization of the islamized space). therefore, both hti, mmi, fpi, and laskar jihad have similarities in their political orientation and both reject secularization, as 32 well as democracy.31 issues or themes of the caliphate is not a massive movement, but it is a hidden one. this can also have a big impact on the birth of a the various strengths of islamic fundamentalism in surabaya are still fragmentary so that they only rely on the emergence of similar symptoms between various distinct fundamentalist movements. if the pks is the pinnacle of political orientation is that it promotes democracy openness, freedom and political rights for citizens, then it must also be remembered that various fundamentalist movement organizations that form the political basis of pks. orientation with an on the one hand and pragmatic one on the other. as for the academic groups, they choose a style of peaceful actions. the social action, their movement is far from being revolutionary or violent. although the revolutionary character has disappeared, they still put forward the symbols of islam permeating the wider community, starting from students and extending to the wider community. these groups are organized such as hizbut tahrir indonesia (hti) which is based in campus mosques such as its, unair, and some are also at uin sunan ampel surabaya. their religious attitude is fanaticism, where religion is embraced as a basic guide to life. they emphasize obedience and piety, and do not want to consider other teachings. this leads to an exclusivist attitude which in turn can lead to disharmonious relationships among religious people, especially among the people of the city of surabaya. socio-economic conditions in the city of surabaya show a to this research, it was found that the economic level of the immigrant population was greater than that of the local population. this is because the immigrant population has higher work mobility, such as the muslim community in urban areas, where most of the population is ethnic chinese, while ethnic madurese and javanese are quite content to live on the edge 33 of surabaya, with a much lower economic level than the chinese. the existence of economic inequality results in weak social interaction between existing ethnic groups. so that family solidarity will feel threatened by its existence which in the end accumulates a multicultural movement and a ideological religious movements. recognizing this phenomenon, in order weaken movements that threaten national solidarity, the government or fkub together with religious assemblies made all religious communities aware of the importance of inter-religious dialogue to improve the life of its citizens. the factors that promote pluralism in a city like surabaya are as follows: harmonious. in this research we have never found frictions between hindus, muslims, christians, catholics and confucians. , are predominantly muslim and have been very tolerant of accepting is accommodated. this is because the islamic religion embraced by the natives of the city of surabaya uphold the attitude of tolerance as (catholic, hindu christian, islam and confucianism) are not considered a challenge but as a part of the wider community. , there is an awareness of the concept of multiculturalism, as important for creativity and innovation. acceptance of other groups is also based upon the value of non-interference.32 the diversity of ethnicities in the city of surabaya is not much ethnic group and there are also subordinate ethnic groups. the dominant group in a pluralistic society such as in surabaya often functions as a “renewal vehicle” for the other ethnic groups. and the subordinate groups often use the culture of the dominant ethnic group for acculturation orientation in shared life. from the beginning, it was certain that the inhabitants of surabaya (dominant ethnicity), then followed the presence 34 of other ethnic groups from various regions outside surabaya with various and histories. the cultural pluralism in the city of surabaya arises from the various diverse ethnicities, javanese and madurese and the original balinese and have the largest presence compared to other ethnic groups. javanese culture still dominates. in addition to javanese culture having the largest representation, the dialogue of islam, christianity and hinduism cannot be separated from the character of javanese culture itself. there is a reciprocal relationship between religion and culture. in addition to ethnic and cultural pluralism, religious pluralism is also very colourful throughout denpasar city (hinduism, islam, buddhism, catholicism, not have create disharmony in social life, but create a spirit of togetherness and make the city of surabaya more vibrant. , there is local wisdom. local wisdom in surabaya, especially on the outskirts of the city, has contributed to the building of civil society in the local areas, especially in terms of inter-religious tolerance. local wisdom in surabaya emerges from traditional javanese and madurese cultures, as well as the absorption of the teachings of hinduism which has historically shaped javanese culture itself. every local wisdom has an emphasis on a certain values to be guided in the community. there is an emphasis on the value of togetherness, on the value of brotherhood, on the value of sharing the destiny, the value of excellence in the spirit in the struggle for life and the spiritual motivation of religion. all of them are accepted and guide in managing life. among the many local wisdoms that have been promoted by both clergy, government and society in general, local wisdom is considered to have strategic value in fostering and developing life together with religious communities. therefore, the local wisdom of (hinduism) has received serious attention from the local government and the wider community in surabaya. , socio-political conditions. democratic socio-political 35 conditions are certainly one of the ways to build harmony in religious life. without a democratic socio-political life, the building of religious life is threatened. the tense socio-political conditions in all corners of the region in indonesia do not seem to have a great impact on political developments in the city of surabaya. yet there are movements which threaten this pluralistic character: , the attitude of exclusivity and the development of religious sects. globalization marked by differences in life has encouraged social practice. in fact, the ways in which people practice religion also experience changes, not because religion undergoes a contextualization process so that religion is embedded in society, but also because the values. in this context, especially in religious phenomena, it is marked by the transformation of knowledge systems, value systems, and systems of has increased sharply with the emergence of several sects that make “spirituality” as the central theme. starting from local sects such as dharma murti, sandhi murti, cakra naga siwa sampurna, to traditions adopted from outside indonesia, such as falun dafa/falun gong, sai baba, hare krisna, brahma kumaris, ananda marga. in islam, fundamentalist groups in the city of surabaya emerged with the style of peaceful actions. the orientation and strategy of this fundamentalist group seeks to control society through social action, their movement is far from being revolutionary or violent. although the character of the revolution has disappeared, they still put forward the symbols of islam permeating the wider community, starting from students, students to the wider community. these groups are organized like hizbut tahrir indonesia (hti) which is based in campus mosques such as its, unair. their religious attitude is fanaticism, where this attitude is a belief that the religion they embrace is a basic life guide and 36 will give birth to obedience and piety, so they do not want to look at other teachings. this will lead to an exclusivist attitude which in turn can lead to disharmonious relationships among religious people. , there is an economic gap. socio-economic conditions in and immigrants. it was found that the economic level of the immigrant population was greater than that of the local population. this is because the immigrant population has higher work mobility, such as the muslim community in urban areas, where most of the population is ethnic chinese, while ethnic madurese and javanese are quite content to live on the edge of surabaya, at a much lower economic level. conclusion the increase of extremist religious ideology in urban areas in surabaya is inseparable from the development of modernism which has had an impact on changes in culture, social, and economics. culture, and politics. the dynamics of change has an impact on the dynamics of culture and politics, which sometimes creates various islamic revivals in local areas. since the forms of these movements are very diverse, it is leaders and the local government so that these two pillars continue to promote inter-religious unity to foster inter-religious harmony so that this extremist religious ideology does not gain too much power in the midst of a pluralistic society. 37 endnotes 1 kunawi basyir, faculty of ushuluddin and philosophy. sunan ampel state islamic university surabaya. 2 yulanda trisula sidarta yohanes, communication science departement of mataram university 3 kunawi basyir, “ideologi gerakan politik islam di indonesia, , vol. 16, no. 2 november 2016 : 339 – 362. 4 (jakarta: lp3es, 2008), xii. 5 mohammed arkoen, (london: saqi book-the institute of ismaili studies, 2002), 170-184. 6 azyumardi azra, ( jakarta: paramadina, 1996) 43 7 dilip hiro, (new york: tp, tt) 61. david sagiv, terj. yudian w. asmin (yogyakarta: lkis, 1997) 61 8 azyumardi azra, , 18. 9 , disertasi (jakarta: uin syarif hidayatullah, 1996), 178. 10 machasin, ( yogyakarta: lkis grup, 2012), 246 11 (yogyakarta: lesfi, 1992), 95. s. haryo martodirjo, (bandung: sespim polri press, 2000), 12 paul edwards, , vol. iv (new york: macmillan publishing comany&the free press, 1972), 125 13 ali rahmena, terj. ilyas hasan (bandung: mizan, 1988), 158 14 muhammad zaki mubarak, (jakarta: lp3es, 2008) 64. endang turmuzi, (jakarta: lipi press, 2005), 82 15 tim icce uin jakarta, (jakarta: icce uin syarif hidayatullah press, 2000), 240 16 syamsul arifin, (malang: umm press, 2005), 29 38 17 manuel castells, (london: blackwell publications, 1997) 49 jamhari dan jajang jahroni, 18 ., 8. 19 antony giddens, ( cambridge: polity press, 1992) 38 20 manuel castells, (london: blackwell publications, 1997) 49 21 fazlur rahman, (minneapolis: bibliotheca islamica, 1980), 21 22 budy munawar rachman, (jakarta: paramadina, 2001),31. 23 fritjof schuon, (illinois: the theosophical publishing house 1993), 33 24 nurcholis madjid, “dialog agama-agama dalam perspektif universalisme islam,” dalam ed. komaruddin hidayat dan ahmad gaus af. (jakarta: gramedia pustaka utama, 1999), 5. 25 abdurrahman wahid, ( jakarta: the wahid institute, 2006), 43 26 nurcholis madjid, (jakarta: yayasan wakaf paramadina, 1995) 32. budhy munawar rahman, (jakarta: paramadina, 2001), 31 27 amin abdullah, (yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar, 1996), 27. 28 mohammed arkoen, , 29 irwan masduqi, , (bandung: mizan, 2011), 54, 30 (jakarta: pt. gramedia, 1998), 17 31 kunawi basyir, , 339 362 32 robert w. hefner, (yogyakarta: kanisius, 2007), 24. mursyid ali, (jakarta: balitbang agama: proyek kerukunan hidup beragama, 1999), 27 anders kølle 1 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 1-13 © 2000 by assumption university press an aporia of possibility: on technology and the loss of materiality of art anders kølle1 abstract numerous art historians and art critics have announced the death of art. from arthur c. danto´s hegelian analysis to hans belting´s kantian reading, art’s fate seems sealed and its potentials exhausted. these approaches either claim that art has become pure idea and is thus no longer art but philosophy, or that art has so lost itself in the myriad of it’s possibilities that the artistic schools, periods and traditions which once provided it’s stability has vanished . in the following article, the crisis of contemporary art is analyzed from a third and strictly material perspective. drawing on the thinking of andré leroi-gourhan, the article proposes to look at art´s current crisis as a direct result of the changed relations between the human and matter or between the hand and materiality, that modern technologies and processes of automation have produced. where the human hand becomes increasingly superfluous, the ties to the material world that used to steer and guide artists is equally lost. keywords: the end of art; technology and automation; andré leroi-gourhan; the hand; materiality of art 2 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 many obituaries have been written for art to the point where they now form one of the liveliest and most promising genres of art criticism and art history today. it attracts intellectuals from a broad variety of disciplines and schools. although there is little agreement as to the causes of art´s death, there is, however, broad consensus that a revival of art is highly unlikely – at least in the form recognized by art historians and art critics from the time of winckelmann and diderot. in the words of the german art historian, hans belting: “i spoke of the farewell to the guiding model of an art history with an internal logic, which was favored in describing shifts of style from one period to another.”2 the loss described by belting is first and foremost the loss of any successional narrative, of any linear conception of art and its history, where styles continuously succeeded and replaced one another. due to the postmodern dissolution of all grand narratives, due to today´s skepticism about any linear and coherent history, contemporary art finds itself completely disoriented, robbed, it seems, of its future as well as of its past. where there is no history, there can be no progress, and where there is no progress, art loses the very driving force which used to propel it. without history there are no visionaries, without tradition no rule-breakers and no avant-garde. losing the “guiding model” of the past, contemporary art is therefore, according to belting, losing its very foundation, indeed, its life force and very reason for existence: “we can now discern what is stirring people´s minds when art loses the internal mirror of all the particular genres in which it has been created for so long. this is where progress, the life force of the individual arts, ceases to keep the old sense. progress is exchanged for the concept of the ´remake´: let´s repeat what has been done before. any new manifestation is no better, but also no worse… the genres always provided a solid framework, which now begins to dissolve. art history was a framework of a different kind, designed to put art´s course in perspective. that is why the end of art history is also the end of a story: either because anders kølle 3 the story is changing or because there is, in the received sense, nothing more to tell.”3 it is not my intention here to offer yet another epilogue for art. personally i am less convinced than belting that the history of art truly has come to an end. it may very well be that the many reports of art´s death are, to quote mark twain, ‘greatly exaggerated.’ this, however, does not mean that the contemporary art scene is untouched by the significant changes in the conception and foundation of art as described by belting. the enormous profusion of styles we witness today together with the extremely short lifespan of any artistic expression may indeed appear to be the symptom of, if not a deadly illness, then at least a crisis that would challenge of understanding of art. it is this crisis rather than any presumed death of art that i wish to address. there are many difficulties facing contemporary artists. perhaps one of the biggest is the fact that everything today seems possible through the endless range of analogue and digital media techniques generating an unending variety of styles. although this undoubtedly sounds more like a luxury than like a genuine and serious problem, it says something fundamental about the situation of the arts of today: the constant negotiation between possibility and necessity that historically has shaped the arts is today supplanted by pure possibility without any conceivable restraints – neither of a conceptual nor of a concrete, material nature. where everything is possible, as kierkegaard once reminded us, it is also possible to get lost in every possible way. so the contemporary artist is, like kierkegaard´s don juan, faced with unending choices, all of which may appear equally desirable at a distance and equally dull once chosen. today´s absence of any sense of framework or artistic principles and laws may very well prove every bit as challenging as the total lack of artistic possibility and freedom that has been in the darkest chapters of our past. art is in this respect no different than any other activity, enterprise or game: some sort of resistance and opposition is needed for the possibility of any development to occur. 4 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 surely this aporia can be addressed in several different ways. one might, as belting does, analyze it in strictly art historical terms. the lack of resistance is thus translatable into the lack of tradition and the lack of artistic genres and schools. the problem is basically a problem of authority: where art academies and art history are losing their previous privileged positions, a power vacuum is created that leaves art in a seeming state of chaos. professional judgement is supplanted by layman opinion and the contingent fashions and tastes of the art market, offering no directions other than the whims of collectors and gallerists. albeit clearly elitist, this approach does offer important insights into the specific postmodern conditions where art styles are as exchangeable as fashion styles and the only guiding principles are the ever changing prizes of the market. another, less elitist, approach will be to address this aporia from a more technical and concrete, materialist perspective. the problems facing contemporary art can also be formulated in technical terms and with a focus on the specific, artistic means of production. all art forms are techne and as such susceptible to technological developments and changes. as we shall try to extrapolate in the following, the problem of choice, the lack of any guiding principles and laws are closely related to larger changes within the technological field of science and society itself, in a period of human history where the use and handling of all sorts of materials and tools is subject to dramatic changes – both within and outside the art world. the crisis of contemporary art is, as we shall see, as much a crisis of the hand, of the shifting roles of manual labor and work, as a crisis of lofty, artistic ideas. at the end of his seminal work, le geste et la parole (1964-65) the french anthropologist and philosopher andré leroi-gourhan gives a somber account of the direction in which modern humanity is heading. due to the invention of more and more sophisticated and abstract machines and technologies, the gap between humanity and the rest of the living world is constantly increasing, threatening to destroy the last ties between man and his environment. this severance is particularly obvious in the development of robotics and machine automation where the role of human anders kølle 5 labor and agency is quickly diminishing, reducing human engagement and involvement to an absolute minimum. while this may from a certain perspective be regarded as a pure victory and gain, finally freeing the human being from the toil of physical labor, this liberation does have profound and less innocent consequences for the future possibilities of the human being. where automation prevails, the human hand recedes and becomes for the first time in mankind´s history superfluous. what is threatened is not only the human ability to work but our very palpable and physical contact with the world. our relation to matter, to the particularity and very concreteness of things, is thus thrown into a state of uncertainty and crisis. we, as a species, are literally losing touch with the world, receding from our previous proximity and contact with things unto an ungraspable, unreachable distance. in the words of leroi-gourhan: “the loss of manual activity and the reduction of the human physical adventure to a passive one will cause… serious problems… we must therefore expect a completely transposed homo sapiens to come into existence, and what we are witnessing today may well be the last free interchanges between humans and the natural world.”4 as recognized by kierkegaard, the liberation from all restraints is as much a curse as it is a blessing. freed from tools, gestures, and muscle, homo sapiens is losing its very physical and worldly foundations. this divorce from matter, this crisis in the relationship between man and environment, which today, in the age of climate change and climate catastrophe is manifesting itself ever louder and clearer, affects not only man as an empirical, sensuous, biological creature but as an intellectual and cultural being as well. one way of tracking and following this manual regression is therefore through the arts, where the relationship and drama between man and matter for millennia has been played out. if leroi-gourhan is right in his diagnosis then surely the manual retreat, the manual surrender must be inscribed and find expression in the history of art itself. 6 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 looked at from a purely material perspective one can detect two main tendencies in the developments of modern art through the 20th century: one which leads towards an apparent freeing of matter, lessening the artistic grip and control; and one which seeks the complete abolishment of matter, pursuing sur-material and immaterial goals. what both tendencies, despite all differences, share is a common distrust in the traditional relationship between matter and tool, material and hand and a suspicion towards all inherited artistic technics. where the hand is still actively engaged in the artistic practice, it no longer seeks absolute control but allows chance and contingency to play an active, sometimes even determinate role. matter is no longer what is to be mastered but only loosely, often hastily, sculpted and formed. we see the hand tremble as if in the grips of a fever, leaving traces, no longer appearing to circumscribe, delineate or represent a thing. figuration is either completely abandoned or only persists in almost illegible forms, flirting with its own demise and destruction. one might, as roland barthes5 famously does, see this as the signifier´s triumph over the signified, resulting in gestures that now only exist for their own sake. but this aesthetic pleasure derived from the works of cy twombly and other more or less abstract expressionists in no way contradicts or curtails the malaise and awkwardness that has creeped into the artistic production. a certain clumsiness and ineptitude is precisely the sought-after effect which is here evoked with strangely pedantic precision. it is as if the hand and gesture of the artist communicate their very inability to project their own expression: a beautiful and touching surrender for sure, but nevertheless an unmistakable concession. figuration hence becomes a sign of the past, belonging to a bygone era, an echo of a manual and manipulative skill that appears increasingly outdated and foreign. from the last traces of blurred, shaken and contorted figures in the works of jean dubuffet, karel appel or asger jorn to their complete disappearance in the works of jackson pollock, mark rothko, robert motherwell and many others, the story of painting in the 20th century would appear to be one of increased material emancipation and matter´s gradual but certain triumph over the tool and the hand. although figuration has since then anders kølle 7 experienced an important revival, today being at least as common and popular as abstract art, the return to recognizable, legible figures has lost any kind of naturalness and naivety it might have had in the past. all kinds of artistic means are employed to either cover over or make excuses for the reappearance of figuration in art, as if figuration after having been abandoned for so long can only reemerge on the canvas and under the brushstrokes of the artist as an awkward, uncomfortable stranger: georg baselitz hangs his pictures upside down, gerhard richter covers his figurations in so many layers of paint that his figures are either partially or completely buried. it is as if artistic, technical skill must somehow make amends for its own return to the site of production. but surely, where the matter is set free, the hand is equally emancipated – at least in principle untied from any previous bonds and commitments. today, everything indeed seems possible and the range of artistic styles and means of expression appear broader than ever before. photorealistic art, abstract art and graffiti art are exhibited side by side in the galleries and museums of contemporary art, and the hand is free to use spray cans, stencils, knives, hammers and scissors in the constant pursuit of new expressions – not to mention the many other body parts as well as body fluids that have been more or less provocatively applied since the works of yves klein and the rise of feminism and body art in the 60s and 70s. the other main trend of the 20th century would appear to dispense with the hand and the tool altogether. matter and manual labor are here no longer emancipated but rather circumvented or completely eclipsed. what begins with marcel duchamp and his readymades is the realization that art does not have to depend on any physical practice but can consist of pure conceptualizations. the artist is first and foremost an intellectual and the main material of his work is ideas. instead of taking the detour over color and paint, instead of wasting time and energy developing and perfecting a skill, it suffices to choose an already fabricated object and transplant it unto the art scene. hence the signified now outshines the signifier, placing all emphasis on the content and the idea of the work instead of on its empirical, sensuous form. the artist is now a finder 8 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 instead of a creator, a chooser instead of a craftsman. what he seeks to express is expressed no longer thanks to but rather in spite of the material support. the hand now seems either completely superfluous or reducible to the simple function of the index finger, pointing out what is next to be selected and put on display. arthur c. danto6 has in his hegel-inspired writings famously declared this the end of art since art has dissappeared into the spirit, become something else, namely philosophy. whether or not conceptual art truly constitutes a final break with the discipline of art to become pure conceptual thinking, it is clear that art can no longer be thought of in classic, art-historical terms. in this sense, conceptual artists have been far more radical in their rejection of all previous art forms and modes of expression than abstract painters ever were. gone are even the last traces of the artworks´ aura that adorno7 in his aesthetics held on to. mass production and automation is henceforth no longer the enemy and destroyer of art but its new, good playmate and friend – enabling marcel duchamp to collect his mass produced urinals and bottle driers and jasper johns and andy warhol to exhibit their selections of soda cans, bean cans, and soap boxes. immaterial ideas and material support thus enters into a new and significantly cooler relationship, based on the uniform and always predictable products of the assembly line and the machine, leaving the sculpting of matter outside artistic concern. although this may indeed appear to be the only reasonable artistic reply to the significant changes in late capitalist society, there can be no doubt that something essential is lost on the way. in the words of marcel duchamp, describing the thoughts behind his own selections of readymades: “you can choose many objects if you want but the thing was to choose one that you were not attracted to for its shape or anything, you see. it was through a feeling of indifference toward it that i would choose it and that was difficult because anything becomes beautiful if you look at it long enough… indifference, you see, there is a form of indifference in life after all. we are indifferent to many things, aren´t we, and so, especially in painting or art, anders kølle 9 generally, it´s a matter of taste. a painter paints and applies his taste to what he paints and, in the case of the readymade it was to get rid of that intention or feeling and completely eliminate the existence of taste, bad or good or indifferent.”8 together with the cooling of art’s relation to matter, it would appear that an emotional cooling follows as well – the new attitude towards the art work being one of deliberate indifference. and duchamp is far from alone in his search for emotional detachment and indifference. not to arouse feelings or emotions of any kind seems to become a common trait, even artistic strategy, in the works of a broad range of artists following duchamp. since emotions are regarded the enemy of thought, a truly conceptual art must do its best to avoid them – hence the anemic works of joseph kosuth, his naked and cadaverous clocks and chairs; hence the dry and purely analytical and intellectual aims of the art and language movement. as always, andy warhol took this idealized coolness and indifference even further, looking for boredom and emptiness itself: “i´ve been quoted a lot as saying ´i like boring things.´ well, i said it and i meant it… apparently, most people love watching the same basic thing, as long as the details are different. but i´m just the opposite: if i´m going to sit and watch the same thing i saw the night before, i don´t want it to be essentially the same – i want it to be exactly the same. because the more you look at the same exact thing, the more meaning goes away, and the better and emptier you feel.”9 surely, indifference, emptiness and boredom seem to be the natural consequence of consumer society itself where all goods are repetitious, interchangeable and alike. it is the luxurious boredom of the supermarket, the towering indifference of popular entertainment and tv shows. but again, this apathy can also be thought of in more technical terms: where the hand recedes from the artistic practice and site of production itself, 10 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 liberty and boredom, passivity and emptiness become synonymous. it would appear there is only a short distance from the superfluity of the hand to the superfluity of the artist himself. although, matter is precisely what no longer matters, the question is, if the manipulation of matter can be taken out of the artistic equation without also influencing, even damaging and crippling, the generating of artistic concepts and ideas? isn´t the pure intellectual stance towards art threatened with emptiness and boredom from all sides? how far can concepts and ideas truly go on their solo ride? if arthur c. danto is right, that conceptual art is no longer art but philosophy, one should remember what kind of philosophy this is: what danto is describing is german idealism after the opposition between mind and matter, subject and object, reason and nature has been resolved and all historical and dialectical movements have come to a final standstill. as enticing and liberating as this hegelian freeing of spirit may possibly sound, it does leave the crucial question, what mankind is now supposed to do? surely, the sheer sterility of this final stage is enough to make freedom sound a terribly lot like boredom. and even without following danto unto such soaring, philosophical heights, one may still wonder what pure concepts and ideas, left on their own, detached from all material concerns, are truly capable of? in the words of leroi-gourhan: “the loss of manual discovery, of the personal encounter between human and matter… has closed one of the doors to individual aesthetic innovation.”10 where creativity is no longer challenged by anything, where ideas meet no material or worldly resistance, thought may seem to lose the very dialogue partner from which its innovative powers and vitality springs. what we are left with is nothing but a empty conversation: art talking to itself about art – which, and this is no coincidence, is precisely how ad reinhardt has described it: “art is art-as-art and everything else is everything else. art-as-art is nothing but art.”11 whether we approach contemporary art by the way of modernist painting or by the way of conceptual art, the problem now appears to share certain important features: the emancipation of matter no less than its conceptual effacement leads to a crisis in the artistic production anders kølle 11 itself. either art is sealed off in a tiresome, redundant conversation with itself or art is set free to pursue any and every imaginable goal. in both cases freedom seems equally problematic. the manual regression that characterizes our age of increased machine automation leaves the hand strangely jobless, often awkwardly superfluous in many, if not most, day to day operations – a tendency that the coming years of new iot technologies are sure to make even more pronounced. the deliberate expression of manual ineptitude, the stumbling and stuttering of the modern and modernist hand across so many canvases, metals and marble blocks is perhaps the melancholic yet beautiful sign of the human hand´s gradual withering and faltering. let´s recall what the concept of techne used to mean: for centuries art was regarded primarily as a craft, giving form, providing shape to matter. the word techne derives from the protoindo-european root “teks“, meaning “to weave.” this should undoubtedly be taken literally as the production of garments and textiles which has, throughout the history of mankind, played an essential, indispensable role. but the word may also evoke a number of transferred meanings that are no less significant to a traditional understanding of art: to weave, not only garments, but also brushstrokes, colors, impressions – to weave ideas and matter, to weave concepts and form in an ongoing dialogue between opportunity and necessity, freedom and law. 12 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 endnotes 1 anders kølle teaches at the international college, khon kaen university, thailand. 2 hans belting: art history after modernism (chicago: the university of chicago press, 2003), 7. 3 ibid., 14. 4 andré leroi-gourhan: gesture and speech (cambridge: massachusetts institute of technology, 1993), 407. 5 roland barthes: the responsibility of forms (new york: farrar straus & giroux, 1985) 6 arthur c. danto: after the end of art: contemporary art and the pale of history (princeton: princeton university press, 2014) 7 theodor w. adorno: aesthetic theory (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1998) 8 jeanne siegel: artwords – discourse on the 60s and 70s (new york: da capo press, 1992), 17. 9 lars svendsen: a philosophy of boredom (london: reaktion books, 2005), 104. 10 andré leroi-gourhan: gesture and speech (cambridge: massachusetts institute of technology, 1993), 397. 11 jeanne siegel: artwords – discourse on the 60s and 70s (new york: da capo press, 1992), 51. anders kølle 13 references adorno, theodor w. aesthetic theory. minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1998 barthes, roland. the responsibility of forms. new york: farrar straus & giroux, 1985 belting, hans. art history after modernism. chicago: the university of chicago press, 2003 belting, hans. an anthropology of images: picture, medium, body. princeton: princeton university press, 2014 danto, arthur c. after the end of art: contemporary art and the pale of history. princeton: princeton university press, 2014 danto, arthur c. what art is. new haven: yale university press, 2014 leroi-gourhan, andré. gesture and speech. cambridge: massachusetts institute of technology, 1993 leroi-gourhan, andré. treasures of prehistoric art. new york: harry n. abrams, 1967 leroi-gourhan, andré. the hunters of prehistory. new york: atheneum, 1989 lyotard, jean-francois. the postmodern condition: a report on knowledge. minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1984 siegel, jeanne. artwords – discourse on the 60s and 70s. new york: da capo press, 1992 svendsen, lars. a philosophy of boredom. london: reaktion books, 2005 prajnavihara_vol24_no1_final.pdf 82 (qalb) : mohammad manzoor malik1 abstract: there is a broad discussion concerning the importance of the self ( ) in islamic ethics. this discussion is based upon the primary sources of islam, the scripture, and sunnah. however, the idea of the human heart ( ) is not so widely discussed, which is considered integral to the self. this idea needs further exploration concerning its relationship to ethics. ethics is an essential part of the islamic worldview, and the measure of authentic, ethical behavior is intentionality which is an attribute of the heart. the islamic sources assert that the ethical agent must by belief, , provides strength and motivation for good actions. therefore, proper ethical behavior emanates from the heart. the critical point is that intentionality as the property of the heart matters in islamic ethics because ethical accountability is ultimately before god in islam. therefore, a muslim is responsible for safeguarding his heart from temptations and vices. the hearts can experience sickness and hardness through repeatedly sinning. therefore, a muslim should keep his heart clean from vices. in ethical decision-making, the heart’s purity will lead to good actions and better understanding. the heart has intellectual and cognitive powers that can help make ethical decisions. vol. 24 no. 1 january to june 2023, 82-92 © 2000 by assumption university press 83 keywords: heart; qalb; islamic ethics; intentionality; virtue introduction the subject of the self ( ) with which the heart is assumed to be connected is present in the scholarly discourses on islamic ethics. it is evident from the islamic classics on ethics as they are comprehensive, the soul. however, in this article, the researcher aims to look at the place and role of the heart in islamic ethics from an understanding derived from the primary sources of islam: the quran and the sunnah, in other words, (prophetic traditions or narrations). the grounding of the concept of heart in the scripture and sunnah is because of the metaethical necessity to understand islamic ethics as a fundamentally revelation-based discipline, thus providing an intellectual undisputed, uncontroversial foundation to the concept. in terms of the results, this research aims to . furthermore, to answer a few essential questions about the subject. most importantly, how does the concept of heart matter in islamic ethics? importance of ethics in the islamic worldview and how in such worldview, accountability to god makes the heart relevant; secondly, how the human heart is at the center of an ethical agent as the human actions result from it; thirdly, how intentions matter in islamic ethics as they are attributes of heart; fourthly how and why a person should safeguard his heart from how the heart is considered to have a cognitive quality which provides it with the capacity to contribute to ethical decision making. ethics in the islamic worldview ethics includes various concepts such as character, etiquette, morals, intentions, consequences, duties, emotions, ego, contracts, nature, conscience, values, relationships, etc., according to many ethical 84 theories and the scholarship on the subject. ethical thought in philosophy emphasizes three aspects: human character, ethical action, and judging a . however, ethics is ultimately about how a living human acts with both living and non-living beings. human beings are considered ethical agents as they stand morally responsible because of their natural capacities according to all theories, both from the religious point of view and biological perspective, as humans are rational and responsible beings. ethical responsibility creates questions about the origins and sources of ethics and ethical accountability. to determine the source of ethics, human thought is diverse in theories and insights. the question of accountability is left to the authorities and regulators to develop mechanisms that will ensure ethical compliance and take account of those who break ethical codes. ethics is a subject that is rooted in a worldview. the subject of worldview is ontological, epistemological, and ultimately ethical. islamic ethics begins with being; our being with god, our being with creation, and our being with fellow human beings. islam remains clear on the assertion that there is a god who has created the world; there is the revelation that tells us so, and this same revelation provides norms and concepts that guide an ethical co-existence with being. therefore, the ultimate source of ethics in islam is god, which means his word as recorded in revelation or scripture (the quran) and the practice of the prophet (saw), . to : when aishah was asked about the character of the prophet (saw), she said, “his character was the quran.”2 (saw), “and you (stand) on an exalted standard of character.”3 furthermore, god addresses the prophet (saw) by saying, “ye have indeed in the messenger of allah a beautiful pattern (of conduct) for anyone whose hope is in allah and the final day, and who engages much in the praise of allah.”4 the prophet (saw) himself described perfecting good manners as why he was sent as a prophet (saw). “i have only been sent to perfect good character.”5 these are the primary sources of ethics in islam, and scholars can draw many lines of thought from these sources, such as religious virtue ethics 85 or divine command theory, etc. on the other hand, islam demands its followers to live ethically. the prophet (saw) said, “the believers most complete in faith are those who have the best character.”6 finally, the people are responsible and accountable to god for their actions. this premium to aims, motives, and intentions, which are attributes of the heart. various pieces of evidence could be provided from islamic sources to support such a position. however, the prophet (saw) has said it in a precise manner “the reward of deeds depends upon the intentions and every person will get the reward according to what he has intended...”7 this is what an islamic worldview could inform us about ethics. this worldview starts from the beginning of human creation and dedicated to giving the human being respect and making them responsible. it guides them in their life, and ultimately it turns them towards god and stand accountable to him. heart at the center of ethical personality in matters of ethics is the one in which it is reported that the prophet (saw) said, “ sound if it is sound, but the whole body is corrupt if it is corrupt. it is the heart.” this shows the heart as the center of a human personality . that includes how human beings act and behave. the soundness of the heart is, therefore, crucial in islam. the quran states, “but he alone will be saved who brings to allah a sound heart ( ).”9 a sound heart, from the understanding of the quran and sunnah would mean a heart with pure faith in god, and in terms of ethics, it would mean a virtuous heart. ibn abbas states that a .10 on the ethical side, ibn al“ ” 11 86 acting according to the islamic ethical norms needs strength, and the origin of this strength comes from the presence of strong belief in the heart. the belief ( ) quran states, “…and whoever believes in allah he will guide his heart…”12 being a muslim is about acting according to islam, but to be a believer it should start from the heart, the reliability of anyone’s being muslim depends on the iman (belief) of such person, which is fundamentally connected with the heart. the quran states, “the bedouins say, “we have come to believe.” say, “you have not come to believe; instead, you (should) say, ‘we have surrendered and the belief has not entered your hearts so far….”13 therefore, obedience starts from the heart. it was one of the supplications of the prophet (saw) as he used to pray, “o god, who turns the hearts, turn our hearts to your obedience.”14 furthermore, the prophet (saw) used to supplicate, “ o allah! advance me in knowledge: do not cause my heart to deviate (from guidance) after you have guided me.”15 ethical teachings of islam are a matter of belief and obedience. and such belief and obedience should be deep-rooted in a person’s heart. the quality of piety is not limited to physical actions, piety starts from the heart, in this regard, the quran states, “having said that, if one observes the sanctity of the symbols of allah, then such things emanate from the piety of the hearts”16 the heart and its role in intention in islamic ethics, there are two main ways of evaluating an ethical action: a just action, and the other is to evaluate it from the perspective of intentions. this distinction is essential in islam, as actions can be good, wrong, or accidental. and a person, before being accountable to the people and society, is supposed to be responsible before god and accountable to him. here the heart plays a vital role. an ethical agent should be aware that god knows what is in his heart as the quran states, “… allah knows what is in your hearts. and ever is allah knowing and forbearing.”17 87 than anything else, “verily allah does not look to your bodies nor to your faces, but he looks to your hearts.” still, in terms of ethical action the heart and the deeds take prominence as the prophet (saw) says, “verily allah does not look to your faces and your wealth, but he looks to your heart and to your deeds.”19 the all-encompassing narration from the prophet (saw) which sets a guiding ethical principle is the narration of the prophet (saw) that says: “actions are by , and each person will have that which he ...”20 this reference to intentionality is about weighing one’s actions before god; in the end, the good brings reward ( ), and the bad brings punishment ( ) both in this life and hereafter ( ) or in either of them. safeguarding heart from temptations and ethical vices contaminate a person’s heart. according to the quran and sunnah, one should safeguard his heart from temptations and ideas from evil, human, or demonic sources. the quran orders muslims to seek the refuge of allah from “who whispers in the breasts of mankind.”21 and those who whisper in the hearts of people include both demons and human beings. and actions, and ultimately, if it is unretained, the heart may become devilish. as the prophet (saw) says, “…there will be leaders who will not be led by my guidance and who will not adopt my ways? there will be among them men who will have the hearts of devils in the bodies of human beings...”22 in the same way in the end times, there will be some people “…their hearts are the hearts of wolves …”23 the sickness ( ) of the heart is mentioned in the quran many times. however, in terms of ethics, a reference to verse 33:32 in the quran shows the connection of such disease in the ethical sense as the quran states, “wives of the prophet (saw), you are not like other women. if you fear allah, do not be too complaisant in your speech lest those with diseased hearts should covet you; but speak in a straightforward manner.”24 this verse clearly shows that a diseased heart can lead to a wrong action; 88 ’s ethical behavior. a person. “that is how allah stamps a seal on the entire heart of an arrogant tyrant.”25 a person should keep his heart clean from ethical vices as the prophet (saw) says, “… none shall enter paradise who has in his heart the weight of a mustard seed of pride.”26 wrongdoings until they harden and do not yield to piety, the quran states, “no indeed; but that they were earning has rusted upon their hearts.”27 this could be well understood further by the prophetic narration that states, “verily, when the slave (of allah) commits a sin, a black spot appears on his heart. when he refrains from it, seeks forgiveness, and repents, his heart is polished clean. but if he returns, it increases until it covers his entire heart. and that is the ‘ ’ which allah mentioned: “nay, but on their hearts is the rust ( ) which they used to earn.” in other narration, the prophet (saw) says, “the slave continues to lie and a black spot grows in his heart until all his heart becomes black. then ”29 on the other hand, a humble heart is favored in islam, the prophet (saw) used to seek refuge (with allah) from “from a heart that does not feel humble.”30 the hearts should be innocent, and this refers to the prophet (saw) as he says, “a group of people (both men and women) whose hearts will be like the hearts of birds, will enter jannah.”31 in the same manner, “it was said to the messenger of allah (saw): he said: ‘everyone who is pure of heart and sincere in speech.’ they said: ‘sincere in speech, we know what this is, but what is pure of heart?’ he said: ‘it is (the heart) that is pious and pure, with no sin, injustice, rancor or envy in it.’”32 the prophet (saw) used to pray, “o allah, cleanse my heart of ”33 furthermore, the prophet (saw) advised to pray, “say: o allah, indeed i seek refuge in … the evil of my tongue and the evil of my heart….”34 89 ethical decision-making and the heart understanding by heart is essential; eyes become useless if hearts lack their cognitive capacities. one can see, but if the heart is blind, seeing . the quran states, “do they not travel through the land, so that their hearts (and minds) may thus learn wisdom and their ears may thus learn to hear? truly it is not their eyes that are blind, but their hearts which are in their breasts.”35 when a person’s heart is vicious, asleep, and immersed in lust and covered by vices such as hatred, hate, greed, etc. purely. his reasoning and decision-making will be clouded by all those . therefore, the prophet (saw) says, “the intellect is located in the heart...” 36 in the same way, the heart has the quality to judge one’s actions as the prophet (saw) says, “…virtue is a kind disposition and vice is what rankles in your heart and that you disapprove that people should come to know of it.”37 in another narration, it is stated that “consult your heart. righteousness is that about which the soul feels at ease and the heart feels tranquil. and wrongdoing is that which wavers in the soul and causes uneasiness in the breast, even though people have repeatedly given their legal opinion [in its favor].” however, in islam heart becomes morally responsible only when it puts its whispering into action. if a person does not put the thoughts of his heart into action, such whispering would be forgiven, as the prophet (saw) said, “allah has accepted my invocation to forgive what whispers in the hearts of my followers, unless they put it to action or utter it.”39 conclusion the human heart has a very important place and role in islamic ethics. it is the center from which motivation for ethical actions emerges, one makes in understanding and deciding ethical actions. the heart is at the center of an ethical agent, and actions emerge from it. a vicious heart would lead to wrong actions. obedience in islam, generally and 90 particularly in the ethical sense, should start from the heart. being ethical is the call of faith, , which should be present in a person’s heart. therefore, the purity of the heart will lead to better ethical actions. ethical action, according to islam, depends on the intentions, and to judge an action, intentions become essential in terms of being responsible to god. in addition to that, the ethical validity of actions depends on intentions. the heart has cognitive powers and the capacity to judge a human action, understand an ethical problem, and thus take appropriate action. endnotes 1 mohammad manzoor malik is the director of the graduate program in philosophy and religion at assumption university of thailand al-bukhari, , 115. 3 , 68:4. 4 , 33:21. 5 albayhaqi, 10:323. 6 albayhaqi, 10:323. 7 al-bukhari, ,1:6. al-bukhari, 1:56. 9 , 26:90. 10 , 6:134. 11 , 121-122. 12 , 64:11. 13 , 49:14. 14 al-nisaburi, 4:2045. 15 al-sijistani, , 7:399. 16 , 22:32. 17 , 33:51 al-nisaburi, 4:1986. 19 al-nisaburi, 4:1987. 20 al-bukhari, , 1:6. 21 , 114:5. 22 al-nisaburi, , 3:1476. 23 , 4:604. 91 24 33:32. 25 , 40:35. 26 al-nisaburi, 1:93. 27 83:14. , 5:434. 29 , 2:990. 30 an-nasai, , 8:254. 31 al-nisaburi, , 4:2183. 32 , 2:1409. 33 , 5:551. 34 35 , 22:46. 36 al-bukhari, , 192. 37 al-nisaburi, , 4:1980. al-dhuhli, , 29:533. 39 al-bukhari, , 6:377. references al-sijistani, suleiman bin al-ash’ath. . edited by shu’aib al-arnaout and muhammad kamel qarah belli. 1st ed. dar al-risalah al-alamiyah, 2009. al-bukhari, mohammad isma’il. . edited by mohammad fouad abdul baqi. 3rd ed. beirut: dar albashaer al-islamiyyah., 1989. al-bukhari, mohammad isma’il. . edited by mohammad zuhair al-nasser. 1st ed. dar touq al-najat, 2001. al. ( ’ ). edited by ahmad mohammad shakir, mohammad fouad albaki, and ibrahim autwah awaz. 2nd ed. : sharikat maktabatan wamatbaeat mustafaa albabi alhalabii, 1975. albayhaqi, abu bakr. . edited by muhamad abdul qadir aetaa. dar alkutub al-elmiyah, beirut, lilbanat, 2003. 92 an-nasai, ahmad bin ’ali. . edited by abdul fatah abu guddah. 2nd ed. maktab almatbueat al’iislamiat., 1986. . . edited by mohammad fouad baqi. beirut: dar ihya al-turath al-arabi, 1985. dhuhli, ahmad ibn hanbal al-. . edited by shoab arnawot and adel murshid. al-resala foundation, 2001. ’‘ ‘ . . edited by mohammad huyayn. dar-alkutub al-elmiyah., 1372. ibn qayyim al. ’ “ ” . morocco: dar-ul-marifah, 1997. . . edited by mohamed fouad abdel baqi. dar “ihya” alkutub alearabiat faisal issa al-babi al-halabi, n.d. nisaburi, muslim ibn al-hajjaj al-. . edited by mohamed fouad abdel baqi. beirut: dar ihya alturath al-arabi, n.d. . jan anthony garcia and john giordano 75 the unsystematic survival of systems: the parasite, the joker and the bricoleur in michel serres and claude levi-strauss jan anthony garcia and john giordano abstract with our increasing reliance on systems from information theory to economics, it is important to understand how systems are constructed, how they break down and how they preserve themselves. the philosopher michel serres in his work the parasite showed how systems can never preserve their order in a pure manner; they always involve noise and lost signals. he explores this by employing the idea of parasitism from biology. but the problem remains of how systems maintain themselves in the face of parasitism. this paper will explore the concept of bricolage conceived by structural anthropologist claude levi-strauss in his seminal work the savage mind. this concept can be found within a single ambiguous quotation by serres in the parasite, but remains undeveloped. this article will therefore develop these connections between bricolage and parasitism, and show how bricolage is important to the adaptation of any system to change. keywords: michel serres; claude levi-strauss; parasitism; bricolage; systems theory; the joker prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023, 75-86 © 2000 by assumption university press 76 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 introduction when one thinks of a parasite, they will most commonly associate the term with the biological organism that thrives on or within another organism, done for the perpetuation of its own life by taking away resources from a host body that it has invaded without killing it. michel serres in his work the parasite argues that this idea of parasitism, as a concept, can be applied to describe a disturbance within any system or set of relations. he explains how and why the relations between any two entities are never pure, never clear, and the messages that are sent are always disturbed or intercepted by another entity. this phenomenon makes relations possible but disruptions to any stable system will always be present. serres refers to the intruder responsible for this phenomenon as the parasite. however, in the work the parasite, serres also introduces the terms ‘the joker’ and ‘bricolage’: “that joker is a logical object that is both indispensable and fascinating. placed in the middle or at the end of a series, a series that has a law of order, it permits it to bifurcate, to take another appearance, another direction, a new order. the only describable difference between a method and bricolage is the joker. the principle of bricolage is to make something by means of something else, a mast with a matchstick, a chicken wing with tissue meant for the thigh, and so forth. just as the most general model of method is game, the good model for what is deceptively called bricolage is the joker. “1 bricolage is a famous term from the work of levi-strauss entitled the savage mind where he uses it to distinguish the thought processes of archaic societies from modern society. the archaic thinker operates like a bricoleur (one who uses what is at-hand to solve a problem) while the modern thinker operates like an engineer (one who creates special tools to solve a problem). serres’ definition of bricolage is straightforward in the spirit of levi-strauss, that a bricoleur, plays around and creates jan anthony garcia and john giordano 77 something new out of an assembly of available things at his disposal. it can be assumed by this then that serres must have been familiar with the savage mind. yet serres does not cite or give credit to claude levi-strauss or the savage mind for his incorporation of the concept of bricolage. serres’ implementation of bricolage into his own work shall thus be examined in relation to his concept of parasitism. the wordage that was used here, including ‘game’ and ‘method’ will first be studied. morever, in the parasite serres’s introduction of another term called ‘the joker’ places it in clear connection to the idea of bricolage. what is the joker and what exactly is its conceptual affiliation with either bricolage or parasitism? this article will seek to answer this and summarize the findings to best fully understand serres’s quotation in question. on game and method serres uses the terms ‘game’ and ‘method’ in the parasite. he considers these terms as being analogous to bricolage and jokerism, yet he gives no explanation why. to understand this we can turn to the work which first propagated the concept of bricolage, namely the savage mind by claude-levi strauss, as a possible source and starting point of reference to help uncover the mystery. in the savage mind, levi-strauss writes: “in the case of games the symmetry is therefore preordained and it is of a structural kind since it follows from the principle that the rules are the same for both sides. asymmetry is engendered: it follows inevitably from the contingent nature of events, themselves due to intention, chance or talent. the reverse is true of ritual. there is an asymmetry which is postulated in advance between profane and sacred, faithful and officiating, dead and living, initiated and uninitiated, etc., and the ‘game’ consists in making all the participants pass to the winning side by means of events, the nature and ordering of which is genuinely structural.”2 78 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 how levi-strauss uses the idea of ‘game’ reveals that it is indeed an example of a structure, and that structures require the implementation of rules of which opposing participants follow. he juxtaposes this with the notion of ritual in which the participating elements are divided between distinct roles and meanings. levi-strauss goes on to say: “like science (though here again on both the theoretical and the practical plane) the game produces events by means of a structure; and we can therefore understand why competitive games should flourish in our industrial societies. rites and myths, on the other hand, like ‘bricolage’ (which these same societies only tolerate as a hobby or pastime), take to pieces and reconstruct sets of events (on a psychical, socio-historical or technical plane) and use them as so many indestructible pieces for structural patterns in which they serve alternatively as ends or means.”3 he proceeds to liken the game to science, in which it can be shown that whatever observable happenings that take place can be explained because of an established underlying structure that is governed by specific laws. these laws are to be followed by everyone and when enacted produce events. like the competitor of a game following rules, a scientist must follow the laws of science as a means pursuing a perceived goal in a determined ordered process. these laws of science are, much like the rules of a game, “preordained” before the scientist engages in his work. a scientist then is really no different than someone playing to win a game. on the opposite end of this lies ritual, which levi-strauss ties to being like bricolage, the implication here is that rites and myths take fragments and leftovers from an existing set of something in order to build a new meaningful construct, which is prone to dismemberment resulting in revisions in meaning or purpose at any time. truth, therefore, is not its concern. interestingly, serres in the parasite gives his own interpretation of science and the scientist that could be seen as in agreement with levijan anthony garcia and john giordano 79 strauss’s take: “science develops its theory via observation and experimentation. it also changes the material for the logical; that is its technique and its method. no one accomplishes this sublimation with more control and security than the scientist. he has even tried to eliminate lying along the way. science collects as much information on the state of things as it can, and if it can, all information available. experimentation and observation suppose parasitic branchings and balances that are always in favor of those who intercept.”4 serres understands that science requires a sort of reductionism and that the theories it decides on are dependent on a very particular method. it must deduce what it has gathered before it goes down through a process of elimination to ensure that only an objective truth behind the mounds of information remains. the scientist is like a gamer in which the rules he abides to are meant for the reduction of disorganization, a standardized format that enables the observers and participants alike to come to a shared understanding. this creates a level of order for those actively involved, which serres himself attests creates an environment that invites parasitism. the obstacle, however, is the attempt to determine what serres meant with his use of method. he asserts that it serves as the “general model” of game. while serres admitted that scientists do evoke certain method in their practices, how does this differ from others? does a non-scientist who does not follow the laws of science, or simply does not abide to structuralism, not have method at all? the key to making a distinction here is in the relation to games. if we are to follow levistrauss’s thought, that games are in the same stratosphere as science in terms of their preordained rules and structures, then the term ‘method’ in this case applies within this context. we can come to acknowledge the term ‘method’ as an established procedure systematically applied towards 80 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 known possible outcomes. in games, it’s win, lose or draw. in science, it’s proven, disproven or unproven. in other words, there’s no grey area. a non-scientist, the bricoleur in the spirit of rite-based mythmaking, therefore, may have a certain method to their madness but it is not necessarily done with the same preordained rules and results each time. a bricoleur can keep constructing, reconstructing, and deconstructing with a recycled set of materials and resources to no end, every product of his work having differing unpredictable outcomes and changing meanings. it can be implied that game serves as the “general model” for method because any activity that satisfies the aforementioned criteria is equivalent to a player in a game, following rules in a structured setting that is uniform across all constituents, is penalized for not following a standard procedure, and is all enacted towards an outcome that must be objectively true. the bricoleur and the joker we have established that a bricoleur is one who enacts bricolage by playfully creating something from other things that it has at hand and can continue to do so indefinitely through ongoing constructions and deconstructions. while a bricoleur may be “playing around”, this article argues that he is not “playing a game” since a game requires method, specific predetermined rules that govern its structure and events toward an indisputable objective result. given this, why then does serres include the concept of bricolage in his work that is all about parasitism? at this point, it would outright make one assume that serres is trying to imply that bricolage is in fact a form of parasitic activity. but before proving this, however, it must be first brought to attention his connection between bricolage and what serres calls the joker. but what is the joker, and what is its relationship to the parasite? first, let us study the parasite in further depth. harari and bell, writing in their introduction to serres’ work hermes, denote that the parasite “presents itself in a negative guise: it is viewed as a malfunction, an error, or a noise within a given system. its appearance elicits a strategy jan anthony garcia and john giordano 81 of exclusion. epistemologically, the system appears as primary, and the parasite as an unhappy addition that it would be best to expel. such an approach, however, misses the fact that the parasite, like the demon and the third man, is an integral part of the system.” 5 here we can observe the parasite serves a dual function to a system, as an included and excluded third. it is included because the system cannot be possible without it, yet simultaneously it is excluded because the system still sees it as a harmful guest. it is considered a “third man”, meaning it is intercepting the communication between a first and second man. this is how it receives its description as a parasite, thriving off the connection it is intercepting and keeping it in an ever-disruptive state. additionally, in the parasite serres describes the entity he calls the joker as having “at least two values, like the third man: a value of destruction and a value of construction. it must be included and excluded.”6 from this it can be acknowledged that the joker is actually a parasite, for it does fulfill the characteristics of one. it is almost as if the two ideas are mutually interchangeable and are one in the same thing. but if this is true, what differences are there between them, if any? steven d. brown explains: “it can take on all the possible positions... jokers are ‘wild’ in the sense that they are unpredictable – we do not know what will happen when they are put into play. so the joker, as a special kind of parasite, is an engineer of difference, of complexity. it leads relations to go astray. identifying the joker is an important development in serres’ thought, since this figure seems capable of breaking the chain of parasitism.”7 here, we come to understand that while the joker may be a parasite and bears its basic traits, as brown describes, it is a special kind, a different sort of variety. according to brown, this brand of parasite is capable of destroying parasitism altogether because the relations it is parasitizing get out of control. it may be implied then that a “regular parasite” does 82 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 not have the capability of destroying the parasitic process. a parasite cannot allow itself to be destroyed, just as it cannot allow its host to be destroyed, not if it wishes to survive. the joker, on the other hand, with its apparent quality of being volatile and unpredictable, is a parasite that appears to be unconcerned with this. why was the term ‘joker’ used in this context? when one thinks of a joker, they may imagine a deck of 52 playing cards which consists of 13 ranks among four suits: clubs, diamonds, hearts and spades. each suit includes an ace card and three face cards: king, queen and jack. later decks began using “joker cards” and their purpose was for replacing any cards in the deck that may have been lost or damaged. when put into play in card games, the joker card can also be used to take the place of any value of another card, or if instituting rule changes or has exceptions. it is for this reason they are labeled as “wild cards”. they can take on any form and change their identity and purpose. a game’s outcome, when jokers are included, becomes less predictable and more uncertain, hence “wild”. at the same time, a joker also does not have any one single value or identity. what this ends up painting is a unique, very distinguishable type of parasite. serres states, “the joker, in the position of bifurcation, makes it possible by the confluence of values that it insures. it is both what has been said and what will be said. it is bi-, tri-, or poly-valent, according to the complexity of the connection. the ramification of the network depends on the number of jokers. but i suspect that there is a limit for this number. when there are too many, we are lost as if in a labyrinth.”8 serres never says that there can be too many “regular parasites” within a chain that could threaten to disable parasitic activity altogether. this may be due to the fact that “regular parasites” pose no threat to a system or relation other than the basic harmful effects they cause. the joker, due to its unpredictable nature of assuming any or all identities, has the potentiality to cause confusion and death. furthermore, another term used interchangeably with the joker is the ‘white domino’. serres explains, “this white object, like a white domino, has no value so as to have every value. it has no identity, but jan anthony garcia and john giordano 83 its identity, its unique character, its difference, as they say, is to be, indifferently, this or that unit of a given set. the joker is king or jack, ace or seven, or deuce... a is b, c, d, etc. fuzzy.”9 anyone familiar with color theory recognizes that the color white is created by the combination of all colors. supporting this position is brown when he stresses that the joker (or blank domino) is abstract and blank, like a mobile white space which can be deployed in any position.10 similar to the joker card in a card game, the blank or white piece in a game of dominos can be played next to any numbered domino since the values can be whatever one needs them to be. but having the quality of being white does not equate the blank domino to being empty or absent of values. hagemeier explains: “to say that the white is the sum of all colours is basically the same as saying that it encompasses all values belonging to a particular set. we are now able to grasp to notion of the white multiple. being white is not the same as being empty. the white denotes the fact that there is no transcendental essence to such an element. one can write on its surface over and over again; the joker can be played time and time again in combination with any set of cards. its value always depends on a number of specific relations, is always situated. the concept of the white multiple therefore debunks the stream of thought that is commonly referred to by the term ‘structuralism’.”11 here, hagemeier continues by calling the joker the ‘white multiple’, referring to its ability to shapeshift into more than one identity. the joker as a white domino or white multiple possesses a condition of versatility by being able to be deployed in any circumstance, further cementing its reputation for being a harbinger of relations gone awry. hagemeier ends by mentioning how this concept is in direct opposition to the concept of structuralism. it may be argued, then, that the joker is a structuralist’s worst nightmare. 84 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 if we can view a game as a structure, one that requires method, we can now see a more visible connection between bricolage and jokerism, both clearly being anti-structure. because bricolage is about performing acts of construction and deconstruction, it is in the same league with the joker because it possesses these same two values. with each construct the bricoleur builds, he is giving it a different value or meaning, only to deconstruct it and start over again with a new project to work on. this seems incredibly similar to the way the joker operates, in which its meaning and value can also change because its identity and purpose are also never static. it too has the potentiality to deconstruct a system or set of relations, both of which can be considered structures with rules. like the bricoleur, the joker is not bound by any predetermined rules or method; it in fact lives outside of them. both behave unpredictably and the outcomes to their activities are not always clear. ultimately, a bricoleur can be an example of a joker and vice-versa. because a bricoleur is an example of a joker, it also deems it as an example of a parasite, thus bricolage would undoubtedly be a form of parasitism. however, it may affirm that serres must have deliberately conjoined bricolage with the joker specifically for the sole purpose that it has much more in common with jokerism than merely a regular parasite”, which explains why it serves as a “good model”. conclusion when bringing up serres’ claim that the only describable difference between a method and bricolage is the joker, this article can come to the following conclusive statements. recall serres’ suggestion that experimentation and observation, both activities of scientists, still allow parasitism to incur. scientists, with their emphasis on order, may not be entirely free of parasitic disorder because they still require its presence to engage in their work. but as the player of a rule-based game and the user of a method, a scientist must stick to maintaining structure towards an objective truth and not keep changing his identity or purpose. bricolage, on the other hand, through its own experimentations and observations jan anthony garcia and john giordano 85 and apathy towards truth, is completely defined by its nature of constant creating and changing and lack of adherence to structure, inducing parasitism through the taking of resources from existent sources like rites and myths. so, while neither method nor bricolage are free from parasitism, the distinguishing feature between them is jokerism because the bricoleur distinctively resembles the joker through his perpetual acts of constructions and destructions. the conceptual link between serres and levi-strauss regarding these terms becomes apparent. endnotes 1 michel serres, the parasite, (london: the johns hopkins university press, 1982), 160-61 2 claude levi-strauss, the savage mind (letchworth, hertfordshire: the garden city press limited, 1962), 22 3 levi-strauss, the savage mind, 22 4 serres, the parasite, 212 5 michel serres, hermes: literature, science, philosophy. trans. by josue v. harari and david f. bell. (baltimore: the john hopkins university press, 1983), xxvii-xxvii 6 serres, the parasite, 67 7 steven d. brown, “michel serres: science, translation and the logic of the parasite.” theory, culture & society 19 no. 3 (2002), 20 8 serres, the parasite, 162 9 serres, the parasite, 160 10 brown, michel serres: science, translation and the logic of the parasite, 20 11 rouven ernst hagemeijer, the unmasking of the other. erasmus universiteit rotterdam, netherlands. 2005, 55 86 prajñā vihāra vol. 24 no. 2 july to december 2023 references brown, steven d. “michel serres: science, translation and the logic of the parasite.” theory, culture & society 19 no. 3 (2002): 1-27 hagemeijer, rouven ernst. the unmasking of the other. erasmus universiteit rotterdam, netherlands. 2005. levi-strauss, claude. the savage mind. letchworth, hertfordshire: the garden city press limited, 1962. serres, michel. hermes: literature, science, philosophy. trans. by josue v. harari and david f. bell. baltimore: the john hopkins university press, 1983. serres, michel. the parasite. baltimore and london: the johns hopkins university press, 1982. a91ih7arq_ayh0le_4hc.tmp 1 vol. 23 no. 1 january to june 2022, 1-23 © 2000 by assumption university press from identity assertion to a participative political culture: indigenizing philosophy in the bikol region of the philippines victor john malco loquias1 abstract the attempt to develop an indigenizing philosophy in the bikol region of the philippines can be seen as an attempt to aid the creation of a collective identity for the purpose of addressing local socio-political concerns. the task of philosophy is directed to the empowerment of people by allowing them to engage in philosophical thought in their native language and cultural context. philosophy also becomes directed towards social critique and the goals of justice, recognition and emancipation. using axel honneth’s critical theory, indigenous philosophizing is here presented as internal critique of cultureorder to develop a more engaged and participative political culture that can be carried out in academic institutions and operate as a social precondition of democracy. keywords: indigeneity; bikol philosophy; recognition; axel honneth 2 introduction this paper examines the project of indigenizing philosophy in the region of southern luzon, philippines. the impulse to “indigenize philosophy” stems from a desire for a recovery of the indigenous linguistic and cultural resources as a basis for doing philosophy. it also promises avenues and means for their collective identity formation and addresses local socio-political concerns. this aim can be realized by employing axel honneth’s “theory of recognition.” according to this theoretical perspective, the process of indigenization will be presented as a task of reorienting the enterprise of philosophy with local social critique. this entails appropriating into indigenous philosophizing the aims of emancipation and justice. the first part of the paper explains that “indigeneity” is an indeterminate concept but one that allows for its claimants to determine their own identity. indigeneity is a social construct and political project indigenous philosophizing. the second part demonstrates the concept of “recognition” as useful for developing an internal critique of indigenous values. this involves a twofold act of articulating normative orientations of a community and revaluating their legitimacy in relation to the demands of the members of the community. ’ initiative of performing indigenous philosophizing in educational institutions as the strategic avenue for performing of developing an engaged participative political culture. determining identity via indigeneity in the region the introduction of the notion of “indigenous” into the discipline of philosophy started in the early 2000. the term “indigenous” “linguistic turn” to native languages for doing philosophical teaching and research. in a conference held in ateneo de naga university and holy rosary minor seminary, the label “ philosophy” was introduced by scholars. the common feature of their approaches was a shared project of regional identity assertion 3 using language(s) to address the more material social concerns in the region. jose maria carpio for instance suggested that “the rise of a ano social consciousness could provide an approach for poverty alleviation in the region.”2 rainier ibana in the same venue also contended that economic progress is simultaneous with the construction of the of economic globalization. he wrote: identity is our attempt to make the best out of our given situation and to eventually reassert our cultural identities in tandem with the standards of economic progress . . . we begin our quest for philosophy, therefore, by means of a sympathetic interpretation of the ideas and linguistic utterances that emerge in daily life.3 it is wilmer joseph tria however who introduced a full-blown methodology on how to proceed in developing indigenous philosophies. it is imperative, tria claimed to: (1) employ the native language in writing and doing philosophy; (2) tongue where immense wealth of meanings and values are waiting to be unearthed for discussion; (3) traditions, beliefs and practices, and historically accepted narratives values; (4) transcend linguistic constraints by way of thought production or word production; and (5) transcend the culturally-determined meanings by comparing them with their counterparts from other linguistic communities in the hope of accessing the universal human experience.4 indigenous philosophy in tria’s view starts from the local context of experience. values and practices would be referred to as indigenous, or – as that which “grows from a native land.”5 showcasing his methodology, tria wrote his trailblazing textbook in philosophical anthropology in one of the familiar languages in camarines sur province. it should be 4 terms ’s indigenous philosophizing does not , “who have continuously ” as designated by the indigenous people’s law of the philippines6, nor does it refer to a regional ano people bound by one language. tria instead equates “indigenous” with “ ” restricting it to a linguistic identity and preventing it from a more regional relevance. it risks not representing other voices in . importance of indigenous philosophizing in his use of the bikol language in the performance of philosophical discourse. but how is it that tria and the others who follow the thread of the linguistic turn can overlook the indeterminacy of indigeneity itself? in his review of the literature on indigenous rights recognition, benjamin gregg observes that “there is no broadly accepted understanding of the term indigeneity.”7 but “ .”8 he cites further that the “united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues describes as ‘indigenous’ approximately 370 million people in more than seventy countries”9 but does not have a single criterion for identifying them univocally as such. indigeneity rather is a social construct which elevates it in a politically advantageous site for identity construction and determination. “ (politically), in terms of a contestation of competing values. indigenous in a particular way.”10 indigeneity therefore is a project where self-ascription and self-construction fall together as “the foundation on which the group advances its project of gaining recognition and rights.”11 it is neither a return to origins nor an epistemological legitimation of its origination but an assertion of “particular value commitments.”12 the “ ” as indigenous could likewise be perceived more as a political project advocated by its claimants initially propelled by their 5 consciousness of the potency of local linguistic and cultural resources. a radical ascription of indigeneity to the concept of “ ” is performed by kristian cordero “ ” as a separate ethnicity along with the marginalized minority group inhabiting the region, rather than a category of being filipino.13 so on the one hand he claims marginalization, but on the other hand he recognizes that his own ethnicity is not innocent of injustice done to the agta in his own region. this is a bold statement that while the region seeks for justice from above, from the nation-state, reparation should actually start from below, from its own local ground, where acts of disrespect are committed to “others.” cordero’s faith in the capacity of language to articulate philosophy is earlier showcased in his translation of plato’s .14 and recreates indigenous values and practices into literary productions loaded with socio-political significance. his philosophical poetry, for example contains a subversive critique of ( ) society in literary form and a poet’s therapeutic counsel for his ailing society.15 which is literally a folk and indigenous practice of healing, is translated by cordero into a metaphorical therapeutic measure to regain the society’s health through poetry. but his literary production of the “ ”16 brings into consciousness the widely ignored, even normalized, acts of disrespect committed to minority groups . the character is based on juan escandor’s article “the vanishing identity of the ” classmates to show them the same color of blood she shares with them.17 in the following lines the displacement of identity is metaphorically tendered in the attribution of a name by another which the latter does in the same way to a pet, in order to command, tame, and impose oneself as its master: 6 . . tulos akong tinawan nin bagong pangaran . : . here, where i was brought, i am the new pet. they treat me here as their black bird. at once they gave me a new name for me to be accustomed to their label. a nickname, a new clothing: (translation mine).18 the above excerpt represents the indigenous peoples’ struggle for identity intermeshed with concrete experiences of discrimination, social exclusion and denigration, stereotyping, poverty, and lack of social opportunities. in cordero’s equation of with the , or, in his own words — “imagining as an indigene,” a fresh perspective on how to frame the indigenization of philosophy emerges; that is, as a clamor for recognition. this is the same endpoint of cordero’s analysis: ’s act was a gesture of hierarchies and structures that characterize society. we can ask how we ought to see this act of hurting oneself and challenging the other to do the same in order to prove that we have the same genealogy.19 cordero here was not referring to the same blood origin but to the common “search and claim for a collective identity.”20 in the case of the indigenization of philosophy in , social and political concerns were attached to the issue of identity formation which was thematically issued forth as a collective project by its claimants issuing out from the linguistic resources in the region. the impetus for this project is to address social injustices more locally using the intellectual and cultural resources at hand. in other 7 words, this is a showcasing of one’ progress for the local society – an act of asserting and determining one’s identity within the society where one belongs. consequently, framing the indigenization of philosophy by a theoretical matrix of recognition implies certain methodological and teleological requirements on how to do philosophy and a functional orientation for which it is to serve. i contend that doing indigenous philosophy through the theoretical framework of recognition allows one to appreciate the internal critique of values in the society. tria’s methodology on the one hand involves the utilization of the native language in articulating indigenous values as well . on the other hand it relies on a hermeneutic of universal experience which tria hopes to use to legitimize indigenous thought as philosophical instead of a narrow socio-political orientation. internal critique on the topic is attuned to the prospect of social emancipation through philosophical analysis and articulation of socio-political pathologies political will formation. philosophy as internal critique of indigenous values the notion of indigeneity as a project liberates us from the social and historical forces. identity in an indigenous context is a way of articulating the more immediate site for the self-determination of persons within the society and conversely the construction of the society by the persons constituted within it. axel honneth the eminent third generation frankfurt school critical theorist, explains this identity formation of persons as a process of recognition.21 in other words, recognition is an ontological condition for the becoming of personal identity and this becomes especially apparent when it is withheld, as it manifests in various forms of struggle. this struggle characterizes the everyday life of individuals in the society and may be generally schematized in three levels which inseparably contribute together to a healthy personality. 8 loved. the second is the wider recognition from the society granted to an individual when his rights, which he shares equally with his fellowman, are respected, and safeguarded through the legislation and execution of laws. and the third is the recognition accorded to an individual as part of a social group that esteems his capability to partake of its development . indigeneity could be described as the relative site of the experience of social recognition. this is in accord with gottfried schweiger’s reading that “the normative benchmark of the recognition approach is the universal value of undistorted self-realization, which can only be realized in contingent historical, social or otherwise relative forms.”22 while mutual recognition is ontologically required of everyone to become persons, there isn’t a uniform mode of socialization for all as evidenced by the . would be the manifestation of the diversity of struggles for recognition in varying societies. hence love, respect and esteem could have varying the case with its respective deprivations. it is for this reason that there are determinations which must also be addressed in their respective contexts. : philosophy must assume the function of critique of society. according to honneth, the normative foundation of social critique issues from the disrespect which results from withheld recognition and that eventually metastasizes into social pathologies. the use of the clinical term “pathology” that originally “misdevelopments”23 or social aberrations that philosophy as social critique aims to disclose. this be described by the medical term “diagnosis” or the “precise detection and ”24 in order to apply 9 measures for regaining health. hence the articulation of various forms of social contexts to determine where social therapeutic measures are needed. for honneth, “since what counts as a developmental goal or as to a society’s self-understanding that social functions or their disorders can be determined.”25 this self-understanding is encoded or institutionalized in the society’s norms and values which provide practical orientations for the behavior and actions of its members. “social forms of organization are seen as successful, ideal or ‘healthy’ if they allow individuals undistorted self-realization”26 but, pathological on the contrary if individuals are hampered from achieving their utmost potential individually and socially. the articulation of indigenous values is tantamount to an articulation of social normality which “consists in culturally independent conditions that allow a society’s members to experience undistorted self-realization.”27 the imperative of “identifying the existing normative structures that inform and reproduce societal forms of interaction” before critique, as r.t. pada rightly perceives, is important in “avoiding freeof normative values.”28 the social criticism of the indigenous forms of misrecognition would then be based on the “empirical description of what a given culture regards as a disorder.”29 this kind of social critique is what honneth calls an internal critique of the society: it would be necessary to show that certain normative ideas and principles are already institutionalized, which means that they are not only accepted but that they are somewhat already informing our practices. but at the same time, we are not fully explaining the normative content of what we are doing. i would call this internal critique.30 in schweiger’s appraisal of this method, “rather than seeking such universal values and ahistorical truth, it serves as a critical mirror for a society and shows that it fails its own standards and goals.”31 it is for this 10 same reason that the indigenization of philosophy is associated with language, loss of identity, socio-economic issues such as poverty, and unjust distribution of resources by the central government because, recognition is not merely concerned about an individual identity but about all recognitive practices, and the absence thereof, that involve the concrete social, economic and political life of individuals. an internal critique of indigenous values would therefore have greater normative bite when it is directed at the values arising from the institutionalized spheres of recognition. in honneth’s latter work these refer to the institutions of personal relationships, market economy and political will formation.32 the spheres of recognition of love, rights, and solidarity necessary for the development of a healthy personal identity are revised here by honneth into social institutions of freedom. as institutions of freedom, they provide basic avenues for self-realization which therefore make them at the institutions of justice. for “what is just is that which protects, fosters or realizes the autonomy of all members of society.”33 basically, justice consists in the ability to participate in those institutions where one could develop socially as a person. in personal relationships, one secures emotional needs essential for the initial formation and sustenance of individual ego identity. in the market economy, rights are promoted by law to provide equal opportunities for material sustenance and just compensation for one’s labor. and in politics, empowerment is accorded to individuals when they are esteemed as being capable of participating in social building through political deliberation and will-formation. together they form the fabric of social justice which, in honneth’s ideal, is the “democratic ethical life.” the “misdevelopments” of normative values in each sphere however lead to social injustices: those which hamper the formation of personal relationships or wound-up relationships of love like cases of physical or psychological torture and discrimination; unjust compensation to labor in disregard of the principle of achievement and the reduction of work to the pure scale of capital; humiliation, social exclusion and denigration. all these instances necessitate the internal critique and re-evaluation of 11 the respective institutions. philosophizing as analysis of society is then given a normative orientation—it is geared towards the establishment of justice, of emancipation from denigration and various social pathologies. it performs this task by “judging individual questions of legitimacy”34 in the institutions of justice. for justice “consists not in the determination of what is due based on an externally imposed principle detached from the given social reality but rather on the determination of the legitimacy of values in the given institutions of recognition.”35 cordero’s representation of the indigene in the person of the marginalized demonstrates the social function of philosophy that should be carried out indigenously to make philosophy locally relevant. injustices are often locally situated and this is one reason why they keep on thriving at higher levels. they are not uprooted from the ground, but are ignored. one is not cognizant of his own acts of rendering others “invisible” in his own locality. “invisibility” is honneth’s metaphorical tool of describing the intentional act of not ascribing “worth” to others as being able “to lead their lives in rational self-determination.”36 recognition depends on certain public expressions where individuals reciprocally ’s persons but, in invisibility, parties. escandor’s title of his article “the vanishing identity of the ” accurately describes the plight of the marginalized communities located in various parts of the region. while they do not really disappear physically from sight, instead, their “ ” “new clothing” of the dominant rationality of “the same.” an illuminating sample of internal critique of society is performed by adrian remodo in his research on the value of (kindred). he locates the basis of the normativity of this value in the family then shows the problematic character it assumes when it gets entangled with the other social institutions.37 12 the case of politics the term in could either mean “self” or “possession” while refers to a person. when joined, designates . hence, “the family name is the genesis of .”38 within the ambit of the ambivalence of recognition and non-recognition stands as a possibility. while a for immediate concerns, compulsion lies in wait as a string attached in the form of (debt of gratitude). failure to reciprocate such help rendered is ground for expulsion from the blood circle and reduction to being an (literally “other-person”). the usually receives the violence of the ’s tendency to exclude otherness (of kin relation) from its circle. the mentality is also the one behind the perpetuation of the and socioeconomic and political divide. the terms and literally refer to the opposite sizes of big and small. but remodo captures well the political context of these terms in the lexicon, as they are used by anos, to state the opposition between the privileged and the less privileged: “ is the family of the wealthy, the powerful, the landowner, and the educated; the is the voiceless, the property-less, the descendant of the of the landlords”39 and therefore, the “other” ( ). the may have either inherited political power or someone who has gained political momentum in his own right. but in either case, the (kin members) stand behind as the support group that either etches or maintains the in power. has become a culturally ingrained norm for political preference as shown by remodo. true enough, political power in various parts of the region is passed on from generation to generation either to the same big family names in politics or to their . hence, due to its hegemonic sway, “ ”, remodo concludes, “is oligarchic politics.”40 this insightful scrutiny of a familial value that turns exclusivist when it encroaches on the economic and political 13 domains leads to the pathological political culture which has become common in the region. this is evidenced by corruption, poverty, and marginalization of capable persons to engage in politics. and though the scope of remodo’s study is situated in the local experience of anos, it . political dynasties often perpetuate the problem of poverty and extend a rhizomatic presence into the political landscapes of all philippine regions. one can cite this as an empirical evidence of fernando nakpil zialcita’s macro analysis of the philippine society’s inability to develop political structures broader than kin relations41 or, as a local basis for lukas kaelin’s analysis of philippine society’s having a strong family but weak state.42 remodo nonetheless attempts to redeem the positive features of (sympathy) and (empathy) shared among as an ethical ground for a possible reorientation of the towards a more inclusive view of the common good. this entails, according to him, a “decentralization of politics.”43 this involves going beyond the particularism of the familial, personal and kinship towards a wider social perspective which takes the ( ) of persons into consideration. remodo’s however may be asking too much; may just really be limited to smaller institutions of personal relations that on a larger scale, it would not address the problems of equality in the domain of rights and opportunities in the realm of politics. expanding principle does not free it from its normativity within the level of personal relationships. it “misdevelops” and counteracts the demands of equality and solidarity. perhaps the alternative “ ” principle for politics which is not only indigenously familiar in could be explored for the articulation of those values due to the to all human beings.44 indigenous philosophizing as internal critique is a way of localizing the consciousnessthe more immediate society of the people. this localizes the therapeutic measures as well that could be initiated and applied towards emancipation 14 and social change. collective praxis in the local level, the possibility of which is easier to imagine, when a political culture characterized by engagement and participation is visible in a society, something that however is already vanishing from our view. developing a participative political culture the project of indigenous philosophizing in has redirected teaching and research in philosophy towards a more socially engaged undertaking. appropriating honneth’s future prospect for a theory of justice anchored in social analysis, indigenous philosophy aims at developing a “political culture.”45 this means preparing the way for the participation of individual members of the society into “the creation of recognitional relationships based on trust and solidarity, as well as shared attention to all morally sensitive spheres of action that touch on the freedom of individuals.”46 and for this reorientation of indigenous philosophizing, the school persists as the strategic place for its practice. the formative ambiance of the academic setting provides the conducive avenue for awakening critical thinking and enhancing the minds of individuals to be cognizant of pressing social concerns. social justice which is described as the goal of philosophical thinking requires individuals who are capable of self-diagnosis of their society. as renante pilapil articulates succinctly, “one cannot have a normative idea of what a just society is without already having some empirical observation about what is wrong with society. conversely, to be able to make descriptive observations about what is wrong with society presupposes already having an idea of what justice is.”47 this makes the articulation of forms of injustices substantial for philosophical praxis. according to honneth “the that are, in principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact that certain forms of recognition are being withheld from them.”48 what and hindered from being articulated. hence, individual, and collective 15 action for emancipation is basically crippled because subjects are not capable of responding to disrespect and injustices. they become apathetic and docile. an internal critique of indigenous values intends to perform motivational impetus for resistance. one highlight of the linguistic turn which was showcased in tria’s works is the empowerment of language by using it as a medium for . this of the home language. but it has also been shown, as in the work of remodo, how the home language could also embody a culture of injustice ’s social behavior because it has been . what is clear in both cases is the further localization of the articulation of values and social critique using one’s own linguistic resources. this is a fundamental step in facilitating positive social change for, as honneth believes, collective (political) action “shared semantics”49 for articulation. the linguistic turn may be perceived as a further localization of the preparation for the social conditions of justice and emancipation. the notion of justice gleaned from honneth’s theory of recognition appropriated herein as the goal of indigenous philosophizing requires “establishing and maintaining enabling social conditions for the formation of intact personal identity for all members of society.”50 this means that not only should the institutions of justice be made available to individuals but that they should be constantly reviewed and internally criticized. honneth consistently suggests in his essay on education that the critical diagnosis of society is one way of preparing students for democratic participation. “the crucial contribution,” he says, “that school education can make to the regeneration of democracy lies not in teaching individual rules of right action but in a communicative practice that fosters moral initiative and the ability to take up the perspective of others.”51 16 in an earlier essay, honneth showed that the activity of social diagnosis should be democratic and involve the participation of everyone in identifying problems.52 blame but to come up with intelligent solutions for emergent problems. democracy is the “condition for increasing the rationality of solutions to social problems”53 out of the given equal opportunity for articulating one’s concerns and ideas. this implies that democracy does not only refer to the exercise of political rights but to the participation in, and the legitimation of, the institutions of justice. “democracy” does not merely signify free and equal participation in political will-formation; understood as an entire way of life, it means that individuals can participate equally at every central point in the mediation between the individual and society, such that each functionally differentiated sphere reflects the general structure of democratic participation.54 for honneth, “education and the school system are considered to be a social precondition of democracy.”55 in other words, the school persists as the fertile ground for developing an engaged, critical, and participative political culture which indigenous philosophizing aims to do because it is the venue where the skill to critically evaluate the various spheres of freedom and interaction may be continually honed. in the bikol experience it is in the academic institutions where indigenization emerged and could hopefully continue to aspire for the fruition of its aspirations. conclusion what the indigenization of philosophy in has displayed is the confidence in being able to address concrete socio-political situations using one’s linguistic and cultural resources in thinking and to be recognized for this capability. what else does this show but a localization of the philosophical enterprise (as social critique) to where it 17 and emancipation as its end. philosophizing described herein is needed, educational institutions persist as the conducive training ground for its practice, except when it declares exemption from criticism. collective social diagnosis prepares individuals for the practice of democratic participation. the emphasis has always been on the macro level, but the development of democratic political action in the micro level of the indigenous is still wanting. the bikol experience of indigenous philosophizing is an example of how the critical potential of philosophy could be charged and made to function more locally in one’s immediate society. this initiative taken by the scholars in the region can also be realigned to what ferry hidayat has rightly recognized as the emergence of regional and minor traditions of asian philosophy.56 incidentally hidayat also terms such movement as a “struggle for recognition (of southeast asian and regional philosophy).” that even “the tradition of has also ignored the minor traditions.”57 in the philippines, bikol indigenous philosophizing is an even more minor practice of doing philosophy in the country that seeks to materialize philosophy’s critical potential in the region but is largely invisible because of its few practitioners and preference of most scholars for mainstream philosophy. but indeed, local philosophers, as hidayat admonishes, “do not have to wait until western academia’s recognition approves or until their elitist fellow countrymen’s acknowledgement comes.”58 the exigency of emancipation from socio-political pathologies malignant in one’s local society demands only that philosophy practitioners should utilize their analytical acumen in response to the more situated needs arising from their society. may not attain equality with the major traditions in philosophy, but what counts in the present is the service that philosophy should render to the society through its practitioners. 18 endnotes 1 victor john malco loquias teaches at ateneo de naga university, philippines. he can be reached at gbox@adnu.edu.ph 2 jose maria carpio, katanosan and kaibahan: bikolano social consciousness. : 4(2), (2001): 84. 3 ranier ibana, 2001. towards a bikolano philosophical research program. : 4(2), (2001): 61-62. 4 wilmer joseph tria, developing indigenous philosophies. : 6(1), (2006), 10–11. 5 wilmer joseph tria. (naga city: ateneo de naga university, 2009), 18. 6 the government of the philippines. republic act no. 8371: indigenous . metro manila : national commission on indigenous peoples, 1998. 7 benjamin gregg, indigeneity as social construct and political tool. 41 (2019): 824. ibid. 9 ibid. 10 ibid., 825. 11 ibid., 826. 12 ibid., 827. 13 kristian s. cordero, imagining the indigene: a reading on the agta in bikol writings. : 1(1), (2014): 26-47. 14 kristian s. cordero, apologia ni sokrates. : 3 (2003): 59-86. 15 kristain s. cordero. (naga city: goldprint publishing, 2006). 16 kristian s. cordero (manila: university of santo tomas publishing house, 2013), 1. 17 as cited in kristian s. cordero, imagining the indigene: a reading on the agta in bikol writings. : 1(1), (2014): 26-47. 18 cordero, , 23. 19 cordero, imagining the indigene: a reading on the agta in bikol writings, 27. 20 ibid., 29. 21 axel honneth. : (cambridge: polity press, 1995). 19 22 gottfried schweiger, globalizing recognition: global justice and the dialectic of recognition. 4(1-2), (2012): 79. 23 axel honneth. : (cambridge: polity press, 2007), 4. 24 ibid., 52. 25 ibid., 34-35. 26 ibid., 37. 27 ibid., 35. 28 roland theuas ds pada. : (newcastle upon tyne: cambridge scholars publishing, 2017), 49. 29 honneth, : 35. 30 gonçalo marcelo, recognition and critical theory today: an interview with axel honneth. 39(2), (2013): 216. 31 schweiger, globalizing recognition: global justice and the dialectic of recognition, 82. 32 axel honneth. : (cambridge: polity press, 2014). 33 ibid., 18. 34 ibid., 58. 35 socialist-global society. 5(1), (2019): 108. 36 axel honneth, invisibility: on the epistemology of recognition. (2001): 122. 37 adrian remodo, sadiring tawo: from familial to oligarchic politics. : 1(1), (2014): 5-25. 38 ibid., 6. 39 ibid., 12. 40 ibid., 13. 41 fernando nakpil zialcita. (quezon city: ateneo de manila press, 2005). 42 lukas kaelin. : (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 2012). 43 remodo, sadiring tawo: from familial to oligarchic politics, 22. 44 virgilio enriquez. (quezon city: u.p. press, 1992); katrin de guia, indigenous values for sustainable nation building. 14(1-2), (january-december 2013): 175-192; rainier a. ibana, grafting . 12 (2009): 27-60. 20 45 honneth, : . 46 ibid., 333. 47 renante pilapil. : (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 2015), 91. 48 honneth, : 136. 49 ibid., 163. 50 pilapil, : 91. 51 axel honneth. education and the democratic public sphere: a neglected chapter of political philosophy. in : , by odin lysaker & jonas jakobsen (leiden: brill, 2015), 28. 52 : john dewey and the theory of democracy today. 26(6), (1998): 772. 53 ibid., 773. 54 axel honneth. : (cambridge: polity press, 2017), 72. 55 odin lysaker & jonas jakobsen. 2015. “introduction: recognition and .” in : , by odin lysaker and jonas jakobsen (leiden: brill, 2015), 14. 56 ferry hidayat, on the struggle for recognition of southeast asian and regional philosophy. 16(2), (july-december 2015): 35-52. 57 ibid., 43. 58 ibid., 45. 21 references carpio, jose. m. (2001). katanosan and kaibahan: bikolano social consciousness. ( ), 83-106. cordero, kristian s. (2003). apologia ni sokrates. , 59-86. cordero, kristian s. (2006). . naga city: goldprint publishing. cordero, kristian s. (2013). . manila: university of santo tomas publishing house. cordero, kristian s. (2014). imagining the indigene: a reading on the agta in bikol writings. ( ), 26-47. de guia, katrin. (january-december 2013). indigenous values for sustainable nation building. 14(1-2), 175-192. enriquez, virgilio. (1992). . quezon city: u.p. press. gregg, benjamin. (2019). indigeneity as social construct and political tool. , 823-848. hidayat, ferry. (july-december 2015). on the struggle for recognition of southeast asian and regional philosophy. 16(2), 35-52. honneth, axel. (1995). : . cambridge: polity press. honneth, axel. (1998). : john dewey and the theory of democracy today. ( ), 763783. honneth, axel. & margalit, avishai. (2001). invisibility: on the epistemology of recognition. , 111-139. 22 honneth, axel. (2007). : . cambridge: polity press. honneth, axel. (2014). : . cambridge: polity press. honneth, axel. (2015). education and the democratic public sphere: a neglected chapter of political philosophy. in lysaker, o. & jakobsen, j., . (pp. 17-32). leiden: brill. honneth, axel. (2017). : . cambridge: polity press. ibana, rainier a. (2009). . 12, 27-60. ibana, rainier. (2001). towards a bikolano philosophical research program. ( ), 61-66. lysaker, odin. & jakobsen, jonas (2015). introduction: recognition and . in o. l. jakobsen, : (pp. 1-16). leiden: brill. kaelin, lukas. (2012). : . quezon city: ateneo de manila university press. loquias, victor john. (2019). renewed socialist-global society. , 99-140. marcelo, gonçalo. (2013). recognition and critical theory today: an interview with axel honneth. ( ), 209-221. pada, r. t. (2017). : . newcastle upon tyne: cambridge scholars publishing. pilapil, renante. (2015). : . quezon city: ateneo de manila university press. 23 remodo, a. (2014). sadiring tawo: from familial to oligarchic politics. : 1(1), 5-25. schweiger, gottfried. (2012). globalizing recognition: global justice and the dialectic of recognition. 4(1-2), 78-91. the government of the philippines. (1998). “republic act no. 8371: rules and regulations.”. metro manila : national commision on indigenous peoples. tria, wilmer joseph. (2006). developing indigenous philosophies. ( ), 1-14. tria, wilmer joseph. (2009). . naga city: ateneo de naga university. zialcita, fernando n. (2005). . quezon city: ateneo de manila press. 02_(10-20) mahapurush sankaradeva and the.pmd mahapurush sankaradeva and the bhakti renaissance in assam in light of the phenomenology of religious experience archana barua indian institute of technology, guwahati, india abstract the article considers the medieval bhakta saint of assam, mahapurush srimanta sankaradeva in the context of a phenomenological understanding of what it means to undergo a religious experience, and how it transforms not only the life of the saint but the thinking of an entire tradition. a brief introduction of the phenomenological approach to the lived dimension of religious experience in order to understand the prophetic vision of medieval bhakta saint of assam, mahapurush sankaradeva, and his mission to restore his people’s lost sense of belonging to a religious tradition, we need to understand the context of the religious dimension of life and a phenomenology of religious experience in general. if religion can be defined as an integral to what is experienced as a total being, then some formal features that are common to all such experience can be characterized. religious experience is the most intense and practical experience of its kind that compels man to act in a particular way (services, cults, worship, offerings, festivities), to think in a distinctive manner (theology, cosmology, soteriology, ecshatology), or to form an intimate community (brotherhood, church or sect). a phenomenological exploration of religious phenomena includes not only religious experience directly but many other essential dimensions of the overall experienced dimension of religion. the sub sects within sects like the prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 10-20 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ -10 catholic __protestant, shia-sunni, hinayana-mahayana etc. are historical divisions of religion and are also part of religious phenomena that fall under religious experience in a broad sense. looking for a distinctively religious dimension that adds religiosity to all such experiences, phenomenologists remain attentive to the patterns of disclosure of the lived dimension of religious experience. in their attempt at phenomenological exploration of the lived dimension of what it is to be religious, religious phenomenologists like schleiermacher, rudolf otto, mircea eliade and g. van der leeuw have touched upon this sui generis dimension of religious experience as: “…something ‘primitive and primary’ which cannot be derived from something else and cannot be reduced to any other foundation”.1 usually, the essential nature of religion is interpreted as experience of the holy or the sacred, experienced as an encounter with a numinous and a wholly other reality that is beyond the grasp of logical and conceptual scheme. this is a realm of experience that is sacred and undefinable. while for some phenomenologists like rudolf otto, the experience of the “holy” and the encounter with it is something recurrent in all religions, independent of the geographical differences and historical distances separating one culture from another, some others like schleiermacher, mircea eliade and others concentrate more on religious feeling and so on. however, they all agree that all such experiences are characterized by an opening toward the transcendent. when life becomes an offering to god: introducing mahapurush sankaradeva, the bhakta saint of medieval assam sankaradeva (1449-1568), was born in the ahin (september-october) month in 1371 sakabda (1449 ad) at ali pukhuri near bordowa, the present-day nagaon district of assam. this saint (who would one day bar idolatry from his religion), had himself grown up in a tantric shakta environment that demanded the offering of blood to the devi (goddess). since his early childhood sankaradeva had undergone deep religious experiences. he demonstrated his genius since childhood when he archana barua 11 composed a highly philosophical exquisite devotional poem made up of simple consonantal wordings without the addition of any vowel sounds except the first vowel ‘a’. it was a soulful prayer and an offering to his lifelong companion and guide, his beloved lord krishna, the most complete incarnation of the human and the loving god vishnu. the original spark and the decisive moment: the tragic sense of life and beyond the saint lost both his father kusumvara bhuyan and his mother satyasandhya devi at a very tender age and was raised by his grandmother khersuti. he married his first wife suryavati when he was in his early 20s. soon after his daughter was born his wife died and this was his first encounter with the tragic sense of life. sankaradeva’s biographers pen down these shattering experiences of his personal life in a touching manner as follows: “the year was 1472 a.d., a young woman in a forlorn cottage in the remote state of assam was agonizingly ill. frail, weak and with high fever, she drew her last bit of energy,took her month old baby and placed it on her husband’s feet. then tying her own hair around his feet, she said, ‘i have found you as my husband after many good deeds through several births .it is my only prayer that i find you as my husband evey time i am reborn. this little child is part of your life. please take care of her, raise her with love and please find a suitable match for her in time’. as her husband gently lifted her up and placed her on the bed ,the woman breathed her last. her young husband, then hardly 23 years old, was deeply moved by his wife’s devotion, faith in her life and love for her child. life, love, devotion and all the mysteries that human existence could bring mystified him all at once. few years later, after finding a suitable match for his daughter, as requested by his dear departed wife, he set out like bud12 prajna vihara-~ dha to find out the answer. for twelve long years he roamed around india, meeting scholars, holy people, musicians and the like trying to find how the wise and the creative people find meaning in life and try to link with god. the young man’s name was sankaradeva. in those twelve years of sojourn, sankaradeva mastered the best traditions of indian music, art, dance and drama. with those creative art forms, he completely submerged himself in the great vaisnava movement of the time. he became transformed to a devotee of krishna and found a way to cross the ever mysterious ocean of life (bhaba sagara) through cultural, spiritual and literary activities. so transformed, he returned to assam and took upon himself the task of bringing enlightenment to the world. what he did in his long life is now history and is still the backbone of the people of assam and her culture. though sankaradeva is a household name in assam, the genius of this great man (mahapurush) is hardly known in the english speaking world”.2 however, the same decisive moment may be interpreted differently from different perspectives. since no philosophy can replace the original experience of the religious founders, the first hand experience of the believer, no logical structure can replace that initial decisive moment of deeper existential crisis that appears religiously significant. it is this hermeneutic understanding in st paul that the self's reawakening in the kairological time, is more a situatedness of the moment than just a content of belief. in the language of kierkegaard it is the fullness of the moment that gives birth, when time itself is pregnant with new and creative dimensions, those are the moments when time touches or intersects both time and infinity. it was also the influence of ‘thus spake zarathustra’, and of nihilism, when death and nothingness become revelatory of a tragic sense, the double meaning of the event and its mystery, the presence absence, revealed-disclosed, all together instantaneously for “one who listens so that one can speak, that one believes so that one can know (st augustine)”.3 the difficult event in life of a saint or of a religious visionary may be interpreted as tragedy only from our ordinary perspectives. these events may also be seen to have a deeper meaning and can be interpreted symarchana barua 13 bolically. it may be that when god selects someone to shower his bounty, he himself snatches away those things from his devotees which are likely to create attachments with the material world. tukaram, the 17th century maharashtrain saint says: ‘bail meli mukt zali/deve maya sodvili’ (marathi)4 {my wife had died and got liberation and god had made me also free from ‘maya’ (illusion).} so when material possession and the people who create bound with the world had gone we feel increasingly drawn towards god”.5 sankaradeva made himself completely subservient to the divine will and now, accepting life as a gift, he set out on a long pilgrimage visiting important sites spread across the country, searching for a meaningful purpose in life. during his long sojourn at various places of his motherland, he encountered many places, both sacred and profane, and met with a variety of people. he became concerned with both the lowly and the high. he re-discovered the bharatvarsha of his quest and sang her glory and the glory of his present age. although his age __ the iron age __ was considered the most corrupt, he believed it had a saving grace of its own. in this age, in this holy land, anyone who sings the glory of god, is liberated if one has a mind steadfast in god, and sees god in all! what else can one aspire to? why would one want to be a brahmin? so he sang the glory of his wonderful motherland, the land of bharatas, the holy land of the ‘bhaktas’: “dhanya dhanya kalikaal dhanya naratanu bhala dhanya dhanya bharatavarishe” glory to be born as man in bharatvarsha in the kali age. sankaradeva now returned home with all his doubts cleared. he now has to tell his lost countrymen that ‘devotion to god was not a business transaction, where one invested pragmatically with many gods to harvest rich dividends in return. instead, true devotion was total submission to the supreme god with deep and absorbing love’.6 a true devotee is one who takes utmost refuge at god’s feet, kaya-bakya-mane, and leads a dutiful life with a sense of complete dedication to the lord. 14 prajna vihara-~ ek sarana naam dharma: the religion of unvitiated devotion to the one srimanta sankaradeva considered the sravana and kirtana modes of bhakti or devotion, the chanting of the divine name and listening to it, as prescribed by the bhagavata-purana, to be sufficient. these being easily accessible to the highest and lowest, the literate and the illiterate, men and women alike, irrespective of birth, caste or status and no rigid theocratic laws are to be followed by the votary. bhakti is not blind intensity of feeling or an ecstasy divorced from knowledge and duties of practical life, it is dasya, loyal and dutiful at the same time. the word eksarana literally means ‘taking complete shelter or refuge in the one’, deva, in association with fellow devotees, the bhakats, as guided by a guru, and thereby taking refuge in the divine-name because name is inseparable from the bearer of the name. sankaradeva’s religion has many institutional aspects, and these exercise even today a tremendous influence on the cultural, social and community-life of the assamese people. as an institution, it may be considered mainly in two major aspects: the sattras and namghars and these bear distinctive local and regional identities of their own. the namghar became a center for overall development of the community and combined sacred and profane space. all in the performance of the divine name, which is devotion actualized, the above mentioned four parts of devotion are held to be present. the bhakti path is thus associated with a modification of the concept of god to make him accessible to the devotee, but also ‘with a reinterpretation of the final goal’, bhakti, being substituted for mukti. sankaradeva and his assam: re-vitalising the tradition a multi-faceted genius a multi-faceted genius, srimanta sankaradeva is credited with contributing to the bedrock of assamese culture, and creating a religion that gave shape to a set of new values and social synthesis. sankaradeva archana barua 15 found it safe to relate assam with the bhakti-centric medieval india that is liberal in outlook with its emphasis on tolerance. assamese culture and assamese language is in itself a miniature of that miniature bharatvarsha that could accommodate all in a harmonious fold. sankaradeva remains the true representative of this basic assamese spirit. vernacular medium and democratization of bhakti both mahapurush sankaradeva and his ardent follower mahapurush madhavdeva, who guided the movement in the early phase, were not only scholars but also poets. sankaradeva understood the psychological need of his people. he gave to the masses a spiritual nourishment, and did so in the assamese vernacular. the holy books in sanskrit could be now easily accessible to the sudras and women, and came to them in the medium of their own vernacular language that could safeguard the distinctive ethos of this composite society. even though assamese has its roots in sanskrit and pali, it is greatly influenced by the local dialects. various tribal dialects and languages of the state such as bodo, karbi, dimasa, tiwa, tai, mising, rabha, etc. have enriched it. sankaradeva rendered the original bhagavata, which was written in sanskrit, into assamese words and idioms of the time, but it was not a verbatim translation. he intentionally left out some sections and summarized or elaborated others, to fit the situation in assam. he replaced the name of the tribes and flowers by those found in assam, for instance, to specifically target the local populace. more significantly, whereas the original looked down upon the shudra and kaivarta castes (bhagatava 12/3/25), sankaradeva extolled them, envisaging a radically different social order not based on the traditional varna system. some of the more abstruse philosophical parts were summarized and rendered so that the common people in assam could understand them (barman 1999, p.121). hiren gohain observes, “like wycliffe and luther the medieval saints also cultivated the language of the people” and “the parallels are too striking to be thought accidental”.7 -16 prajna vihara-~ reaching out for others: sharing common concerns & inter-religious dialogue tolerance, inter-cultural dialogue and respect for diversity are more essential than ever in a world where peoples are becoming more and more closely interconnected. __kofi annan, former secretary-general of the united nations the sufi religion of the heart could pave the way for ajan fakir (born as shah miran in baghdad 1605-1690) to choose the local vernacular and folk tradition as a medium for instruction. the assamese zikirs along with sankaradeva’s namkirttan and bargits, created a class of muslim devotees who shared cross-cultural commonalities with their hindu counterparts. simplification of rituals and use of the vernacular for translating the religious texts have played a role in popularizing bhakti. both these religious reformers constructed new kind of meaning as the horizon of the text or the tradition, which they sought to creatively re interpret zikirs, such as the following, continue to be sung at social gatherings in assam also helped fostering the spirit of religious tolerance touching upon the phenomenological dimension of lived religiosity. ‘o allah, i have no feeling of difference, i have no feeling of disunity or hate, whether hindu or muslim, all come from the same allah, only, hindus will be placed in the pyre, muslims will rest in the grave, under the same earth’.8 while bhakti-centric sufism and vaishnavism could come closer because of shared commonalities in terms of vernacular assamese as the common medium for both traditions, sankaradeva’s vaishnavite followers could look forward to sharing interreligious dialogue with other forms of non-idolatrous and monotheistic religions including reformist form of brahma religion as advocated by rammohan rai, and with christianity as well. archana barua 17 christianity being the religion of the book, the early missionaries in assam translated the word of god (the new testament more so than the old testament) for the use of the common people. while some american baptist missionaries accomplished the task of compiling the first assamese dictionary in 1867, and brought out the first assamese newspaper named ‘orunodai’ in 1845, missionaries like nathan brown, oliver cutter and miles bronson, came to assam and in 1836 they opened educational institutions in sadya. gradually education was extended to such places as nogaon, sibsagar, guwahati, and golagaht. the printing press was set up in sibsagar as orunodai, the first assamese journal published by the mission in 1846, made its stamp creating a landmark in the history of assamese literature. interestingly, the christian voice in early assam could remain above communal interests to be representative of the liberal and modern trends of the entire assamese community in the true sense of the term as it could give much impetus to the assamese renaissance centering round a handful of assamese educated youths with wide exposure to the humanistic spirit of the time. interestingly enough, arunodai, a journal supposed to be a mouthpiece of christian missionaries, came to be admired across all sections of the society for its secular spirit and its true zeal to spread the benefit of science, education and modernism, to one and all. a scholar observes: “it is evident therefore that the missionaries were reluctant to identify the journal as a mere mouthpiece of the christian mission for religious propaganda .in keeping with the general spirit of the 18th century enlightenment the sibsagar missionaries emphasized the secular aims of the journal to popularize liberal thought in this remote region. in an editorial retrospect the editor of oronodai wrote in 1862: “the editor feels confident none will doubt that the orunodai has been useful for the natives of the scheduled province in the diffusion of general information and more general ideas.9 the activities of early christian missionaries in assam helped in strengthening democratic ideals and they drew the attention of the educated assamese to issues like widow re-marriage, education for women, evils of child labor, care for orphans etc. the american baptist missionaries in assam thus remained representatives of the modern and liberal trends of the entire assamese community. this also provided impetus for 18 prajna vihara-~ a particular section of the sankaradeva’s movement, srimanta sankar sangha, to focus more on social reform along with gandhian and also christian counterparts. concluding remarks: vision for the future while religious conflict in our country is more of colonial origin, one can say it is politicization of religion which is the real problem and not religion per se. with his basic motto of: “never be intolerant of other’s faith, be kind and compassionate to all beings’ (parar dharmaka nihimsiba kadacit, kariba bhutaka daya xakaruna cit’__ sri sri sankaradeva), sankaradeva taught us that living together as brothers and sisters is easy, if and only if we learn how to become religious in the true sense of the term that paves way for meaningful interreligious and inter personal dialogue. it is, rather, in reference to the individuality of each of us living in this world where it is necessary to understand one another as members of an inter-personal community in which each person undertakes within himself or herself to participate and to attain for ourselves all that we are lacking in order to be able to lead an existence based on concord and an active and living comprehension of a goodness that acts to unify all intelligent personal wills. since no form of life is complete in itself and as the buddha so wisely proclaimed: ‘all life is inter dependent’, we can remain fellow travelers with common objectives in mind. matthew muttumana puts it: “according to fr kuriokose, we can draw inspiration from the works of sankaradeva, appreciate his philosophy of life and look at certain specific methodology he employed to reawaken the morbid and dormant religious fervor of the people of his time”.10 but is there any need for such creative and meaningful interaction with the ‘other’? is there any scope for creative dialogue at interpersonal and interreligious level? to quote franco bosio: “we must do so, but only because, and in so far as, we truly wish to understand our duty and our active undertaking to achieve reciprocal understanding and ethical love for our neighbor. the perfect achievement of the ethical life is the living intuition of the divine, both as value and as personality11. -archana barua 19 endnotes 1franco bosio, “the phenomenology of religion” in anna-tymienieeka (ed). phenomenology world-wide (kluwer academic publications, 2002. pp.615-616. 2dr. dilip kumar datta, “preface” to the prasad rajkhowa, sankaradeva: his life preachings & practices, guwahati, b.s. publications, guwahati, 2003. 3st. augustine, conf. 1, 1, 1:pl 32, 659-661. 4vinoba bhave ‘tukaramchi bajane’ (marathi), (‘devotional songs of tukaram’) 5dr. ravi khangai, “neo-viashnavism and social harmony in assam”, http: //ravikhangai.blogspot.in/2012/07/neo-viashnavism-and-social-harmony-in.html. 6ibid. 7h.gohain, “the labyrinth of bhakti: on some questions of medieval indian history” in economic and political weely, nov 1967”. 8saied abdul malik, asamiya zikir aru jari, 1958, guwahati 9the orunodai, july-1861, cited in. birinchi kumar barua, “keikhanman purni asamiya sapa puthi” in assam sahitya sabha patrika, new services, no 2-3, 1952, pp.75-85. 10matthew muttumana, christianity in assam and inter-faith dialogue, http: //openlibrary.org/works/ol5248192w/christianity_in_assam_and_interfaith_dialogue 11franco bosio, “the phenomenology of religion” in in anna-tymienieeka (ed). phenomenology world-wide(kluwer academic publications, 2002. pp.617. 20 prajna vihara-~ 18_(291-308) thai buddhistsmuslims.pmd thai buddhists-muslims customs in dialogue for peaceful co-existence in the southern thailand dr. veerachart nimanong assumption university, thailand abstract the religiously and culturally or traditionally pluralistic harmony and tolerance of buddhists and muslims in the southern part of thailand is the necessary condition for the ever lasting peace, for it is based on the mutual respect for the diversity of pluralistic harmony between two religions. tolerance is the essential condition of harmony in buddhism as well as in islam. tolerance as the essence of sustainable harmony can be conducted through the method of inter-religious dialogue of life. to solve the problem in the deep south of thailand, both thai-buddhists and thai-muslims and thai-malay-muslims, who have been living there in the three provinces of pattani, yala and narathiwat, for many decades, will have to build their trust through the dialogue of life through traditions or customs based on their religious doctrine of tolerance. dialogue of life entails dialogue of action, religious doctrine and religious experiences. º·¤ñ́ âèí à§×èí¹ä¢¨óà»ç¹·õè̈ ð¡èíãëéà¡ố êñ¹µôàò¾¶òçãã¹àò¤ãµé ¤×í¡òã·õèªòç¾ø·¸áåð ªòçáøêåôáµéí§¹óëåñ¡¢ñ¹µô̧ ããá«öè§áõíâùè»ãð¨óã¹èòê¹ò¢í§µ¹àí§áåéçáòãªé ·ñé§ ¾ø·¸èòê¹òáåðèòê¹òíôêåòáµèò§¡çâíáãñºçèòëåñ¡¢ñ¹µô¸ããáà»ç¹à§×èí¹ä¢êó¤ñ­ êóëãñº¤çòáêòáñ¤¤õ ëåñ¡¢ñ¹µô¸ããá¹õé¨ð»¯ôºñµôãëéä´é¼å´õâ´âíòèñâçô¸õ¡òãèòê¹ êñá¾ñ¹ ì̧Ẻ¡òãêò¹àêç¹òàªô§ãªéªõçôµãèçá¡ñ¹©ñ¹à¾×èí¹ëã×í©ñ¹¾õè¹éí§ãðëçèò§èòê¹ô¡¢í§ ·ñé§êí§èòê¹ò ́ ñ§¹ñé¹ à¾×èíãëéà¡ố ¤çòáꧺã¹êòá ñ̈§ëçñ́ ªòâá´¹àò¤ãµé ¤×í »ñµµò¹õ âðåò áåð¹ãò ô̧çòê èòê¹ô¡¢í§·ø¡èòê¹ò ¡åèòç¤×íªèòç¾ø·¸ä·âáåðªòçä·âáøêåôá prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 291-308 291 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ ãçá·ñ駪òçáòàåâìáøêåôáµéí§ãèçáá×í¡ñ¹êãéò§¤çòáàª×èíáñ蹫ö觡ñ¹áåð¡ñ¹ãëéà¡ố ¢öé¹µòá ëåñ¡èòê¹êñá¾ñ¹ ì̧àªô§ãªéªõçôµãèçá¡ñ¹©ñ¹à¾×èí¹ ·õèµñé§íâù躹°ò¹áëè§ëåñ¡¢ñ¹µô̧ ããá ¢í§áµèåðèòê¹ò ¡òãêò¹àêç¹òẺãªéªõçôµãèçá¡ñ¹©ñ¹à¾×èí¹¤ãíº¤åøá¡òãêò¹ àêç¹ò ·õèàëå×ííõ¡êòáíâèò§¤×í¡òãêò¹àêç¹òẺãèçáá×í¡ñ¹·ó¡ô¨¡ããáêñ§¤á ê§à¤ãòðëì ¡òãêò¹àêç¹òẺáå¡à»åõèâ¹àãõâ¹ãùéëåñ¡¤óêí¹¢í§áµèåð £èòê¹ò ãèçá¡ñ¹ áåð¡òãêò¹àêç¹òẺà¢éòãèçá¡òã» ô̄ºñµôèò깸ããáãðëçèò§èòê¹ò i. introduction my attempt in this paper is to explore the role of the dialogue of life in connection with the spirit of buddhism in pacifying conflict and supporting peace throughout the world. my purpose is to show how this dialogue of life can strengthen the relationships between buddhists and muslims in the deep south of thailand in particular. this paper is not intended to be an elaborate discussion of the details of the conflict between the buddhists and muslims in the deep southernmost provinces of thailand, but intends to suggest a religious and philosophical solution to the problem. however, to fulfill the objectives of this paper, some necessary information on the nature and structure of the political conflict and violence must be given so that clear connection of the two aspects of religious doctrine and political conflict can be properly understood. ii. buddhist-muslim conflict in southern thailand 2.1 historical background of the conflict: as we have already known that thailand has been experiencing unprecedented escalation of political unrest in its three malay-muslimdominated provinces, namely pattani, yala and narathiwat, where 80 percent of the total thai muslim population today about 8-10 million (oknation, 2552) are experiencing ethnic, lingual, cultural and political conflict. the incidents of unrest in the deep south were particularly se294 prajna vihara __ __ ~ vere from january 2004 to january 2010. from the database of deep south watch, it was found that over the past 73 months, there were a total of 9,446 incidents of unrest, resulting in approximately 4100 deaths and 6,509 injuries. the total casualties resulting from this unrest over the past six years has been more than 10,609 individuals. if the family of the deceased and the injured are included as those affected by the mentioned loss, then it is estimated that the number of people who were directly affected by loss would be approximately 53,045 persons. it is interesting to note that the victims __ those who lost their lives as well as those who were injured from the violence in the southern border provinces __ consist of various backgrounds. there are muslims as well as buddhists. among the dead, the muslims outnumbered the buddhist, while among the injured, the majority are buddhists. statistics showed that 58.95 percents (2,417 individuals) of the deceased were muslims, while 38.02 percent (1,559 persons) were buddhists. among the injured, 59.82 percent (3,894 persons) were buddhists, while 32.17 percent (2,094 persons) were muslims, (srisompob jitpiromsri, 2011). dr. imtiyaz yusuf is right in saying “the unrest in thailand is rooted in historical grievances and the rise of the ideology of malay ethnoreligious nationalism leading to the rise of mass-based insurgency”, (2006, p. 189). michael k. jerryson, suggests “some southern thai buddhists perceive the violence in their villages as a product of the conflict between radical islam and thai buddhism; conversely, many southern malay muslims perceive the conflict to be between malay islamic separatism and a hegemonic buddhist state” (jerryson, 2011, p. 12). vanchai vatanasapt in his research entitled “citizens dialogue: the way out of the southern thailand violence”, also agrees with imtiyaz yusuf, and summarized the origin and development of the conflict: 1. the issue of conflict in southernmost provinces, thailand is a chronic problem that several governments have attempted to resolve, but day after day acts of violence still occur. 2. from research done by the king pradjadhipok institute, we have summarized the following: the conflict dr. veerachart nimanong 293 in southern thailand stems from the desire of the ethnic malay-pattani people to preserve their unique language, religion and culture. 3. there is evidence of, and an expressed desire for separatism, but it is probably not the view of the vast majority of those in the region. 4. the state must understand that game theory will probably have a part in creating a united front and trust building measures. 5. the life of every citizen whether buddhist or muslim which become the capital cost of the game theory needs to be reduced effectively. 2.2 conflict analysis: my observation drawn from the data received from the deepsouthwatch agency can expressed in the following points. firstly, the number of incidents has decreased due to the new measures rendered by the government. instead of using military action, the government is now using peaceful dialogue of life and action, which was used previously during the time of former prime minister prem tinsulanonda. deepsouthwatch therefore claims that “thailand attributed the success to the “tai rom yen” amnesty programme”. (deepsouth watch, 2011a). and this peaceful dialogue has been maintained by the former prime minister abhisit vejjajiva up continues up to the present period of prime minister yingluck chinavat. (deepsouthwatch, 2011b). secondly, the numbers of ordinary muslims killed, outnumber those of buddhist monks, islamic leaders, teachers, policemen and soldiers, and leads to a conclusion that the separatists are trying to kill those muslims villagers who do not cooperate with them (deepsouthwatch, 2010). this also suggests that the majority of thai muslims do not want separation from thailand. 294 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 03_(75-86) a contemporary reflection.pmd a contemporary reflection on the chinese traditional mode of thinking he xirong shanghai academy of social sciences, china abstract in china’s path to modernization since the 19th century, some intellectual traditions have been disappearing, leading to the awkward situation faced by chinese people of being “neither chinese nor western” or “being chinese and western at the same time”. zhongdao (中道 the middle road or the middle course), the mode of chinese traditional thinking, avoids the western dualism and it considers tian (天 heaven), di (地 earth) and human beings as being a whole. in such an approach, human beings are placed in an important position, because they could change their mode of existence according to their thoughts to make tiandi (heaven, earth including society) creating a sense of harmony. a revival of such thinking can be helpful to solve many of the problems faced by human beings today. º·¤ñ́ âèí ã¹ë¹·ò§êùè¡ãðºç¹¡òãêáñâãëáè¢í§¨õ¹µñé§áµèèµçããé·õè 19 ¨òãõµ·ò§ »ñ­­òºò§íâèò§ä´éëòâêòºêù­ä» «ö觷óãëé»ãðªòª¹ªòç¨õ¹µéí§à¼ªô­ë¹éò¡ñº ê¶ò¹¡òã³ì·õè¡ãðíñ¡¡ãðíè繡ñº¡òã �äáèà»ç¹·ñé§ ṏ¹ëã×íµðçñ¹µ¡� ëã×í �à»ç¹·ñé§ ṏ¹ áåðµðçñ¹µ¡ã¹àçåòà ṍâç¡ñ¹� zhongdao (·ò§êòâ¡åò§ëã×íçô¶õêòâ¡åò§) á¹ççô̧ õ¤ố Ẻ¨òãõµ»ãðླõ ¢í§¨õ¹ëåõ¡àåõè⧷çô¹ôâáẺµðçñ¹µ¡ áåð¾ô¨òã³ò tian (êçãã¤ì) di (âå¡) áåðá¹øéâìã¹°ò¹ð·õèà»ç¹í§¤ìãçá çô̧ õ¡òãáººí§¤ìãçá¹õé̈ ñ́ çò§ á¹øéâìãëéíâùèã¹µóáë¹è§·õèêó¤ñ­ à¾ãòðçèòá¹øéâìêòáòã¶à»åõèâ¹á¹ççô̧ õ¢í§¡òã´ó㧠íâùèµòáá¹ç¤ố ¢í§µ¹·õè̈ ð·óãëé tiandi (êçãã¤ì âå¡ ãçá·ñé§êñ§¤á) êãéò§êãã¤ì »ãðêò¹¡åá¡å×¹ ¡òã¿×鹿ùçô̧ õ¤ố Ẻ¹õéêòáò㶪èçâá¡é»ñ­ëòµèò§ æ ·õèá¹øéâì¡óåñ§ ༪ô­íâùè·ø¡çñ¹¹õé prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 75-86 75 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ raising the question the development of thinking, the ability to observe and mindfulness, are effective means for the development of a society. a specific mode of thinking develops historically. therefore, because of their different living environments, the ways of practicing and cultural conditions, the eastern and western modes of thinking developed differently. in consequence their ways of knowing and practicing that directed by thinking are different. however, any judgment about which mode is better cannot be made, they are just different. since china’s defeat in 1840, western technologies, institutions and thoughts have been gradually assimilated by the chinese. many of the chinese intellectual elite, like gong zizhen, liang qichao, yan fu, hu shi, lin yutang, lu xun, liang shuming, chen duxiu, and li dazhao, compared the west with china, and have concluded that almost in every aspect china had fallen behind the west. as a result, such derogatory terms as ignorance, naivety, backwardness, etc., had become associated with china. the may fourth movement is the first instance of the intellectual elite’s thorough rethinking of chinese traditional culture. they made systemic critique of chinese traditional politics, economics and culture. the new culture movement, following doctrine of “overthrow confucianism and learn from the west”, swept across the country. the new efforts to develop vernacular chinese, simplification of chinese characters, the development of science and the development of democracy, became known by the masses quickly through the intellectual elite’s advocacy. there is no doubt that chinese people were enlightened and chinese society had progressed as a result of the above-mentioned movements, but some extreme ideas, like “there’s no need for young man to read chinese books” (lu xun), “china is backward in everything” (hu shi), “abolish chinese character” (qian xuantong) and “throw chinese traditional books to toilet” (wu zhihui), also emerged. the situation was just as hu shi’s saying in the chinese renaissance,1 “there’s revolt everywhere and tradition is thrown away. the authorities and traditional beliefs are lost and cheap beliefs and new-worship are emerging”. to change the chinese modes of thinking and learn western approaches, yan fu translated j.s. mill’s trea76 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tise of logic in chinese and introduced it to chinese people. because philosophy is the ground of the mode of thinking, so the later scholars also tried their best to learn western philosophies. even until now, the criticism to chinese tradition still concentrates on the criticism to chinese mode of thinking, the representative issues are provided by bo yang and chu yu who think that the major reason for china’s backwardness is the chinese mode of thinking and that the chinese must learn the western scientific mode of thinking in order to progress. bo yang wrote a book called on ugly chinese which claimed that chinese culture is a “sauce urn culture”. and mr. qian hong had a lecture on “there must be innovation in the modes of chinese thinking”, claiming that we should be trained in metaphysics. chu yu published a book in 2010, called the animadvert on chinese thinking mode, he indicated that the reason for china’s falling behind is due to its traditional mode of thinking, and claimed that we should learn from the western mode of thinking especially scientific thinking. however, the mode of thinking of one nation is grounded deeply in its history, and it cannot be uprooted totally by simple advocacy of rejection and revolution. therefore on the way to modernization, we find that chinese traditional mode of thinking is in decline but the western mode of thinking has not yet taken hold. that means chinese people fall into embarrassing situation of being “neither chinese nor western” or “being chinese and western at the same time”. there have been many expositions on the differences between western modes of thinking and chinese. for example, the chinese mode of thinking emphasizes synthesis, entirety, induction, hint, implication, ethics, intention, intuition, imagery and circle models, whereas western mode of thinking emphasizes analysis, individuality, deduction, exactness, clarity, recognition, objectivity, logic, demonstration and linearity. chinese traditional thinking seeks common ground while keeping differences, but western traditional thinking distinguishes from common ground. just as ludwig feuerbach’s assertion, “the easterner sees unity without differences, whereas the westerner sees differences without unity”.2 in fact, these specific modes of thinking have been molded in specific living environments of each nation and function in part to solve existential problems, so each mode of thinking has its own rationality and is he xirong 77 the motivation of formulation of a kind of national character. nevertheless, it is clear that each mode of thinking has its own merits and shortcomings. for instance, chinese traditional thinking is good at shaping an integral, systematic and active grasping of the world and of things, and chinese medicine, qigong and chinese health preserving are rooted in a valuable form of thinking that emphasizes intuition, the blurring of sharp distinctions and dialectics. but these aspects of chinese traditional thinking also created the conditions that made it unable to formulate the objective western scientific forms of knowledge. we can also see the dual character of western thinking in that on one hand it has been the great impetus of modernization but on the other hand it restricts the integrated development of the human being. because thinking is rooted in living activities, the change of existence should lead to the change in the mode of thinking. from this perspective it would not be rational for one mode of thinking to object to another, or to abandon one’s own mode of thinking to cater for an unfamiliar one. an either-or method should be avoided, because it results in the thinking of binary oppositions that has been strongly criticized and abandoned by contemporary philosophies. therefore what we have to do instead is to clarify the different aspects of each mode of thinking in order to grasp the way it occurs and progresses. the ground of this method lies in that, “man is the producer of his own notions, thoughts... consciousness in any time is the awareness of being, and the being of man is his actual living process”.3 this is the basic view of historical materialism of marxism. zhongdao as the chinese traditional mode of thinking thinking of zhongdao (中道 the middle road) involves the traits of integrity, blurring of distinctions and dialectics, that constitute the specific character of chinese thought compared with western thought. western philosophy functions here as “the other” which allows us to determine the traits of chinese thought. binary thinking, making antithesis between subject and object, phenomenon and substance, reason and perception and so on, is the characteristic of mainstream western philoso78 prajna vihara __ __ ~ phy, whereas there is no such pattern in chinese traditional thinking. as mentioned above, chinese thinking takes tian (天 , heaven), di ( 地 , the earth) and human beings as a whole and makes “human beings” an important concept. the function of human beings involves an awareness of existence in an interactive process with their environment including both nature and society. people should be “the heart of tiandi”. that means, th world is taken as a life entity, and human beings, as a smaller life entity, should live properly in it. the proper existentiality is changeable and relatively balanced. because of changing of environments and emerging of new demands of people, balance is regularly broken. therefore the importance of human being lies in the awareness of life, just as lao-tzu’s saying, “he who knows others is wise, he who knows himself is enlightened, he who conquers others has physical strength, he who conquers himself is strong”.4 a real wise and strong man should know himself better and control himself more than others. the attitude of self awareness should not only be taken by a person but also by a nation. the purpose of self-awareness is to enhance the ability to live together and perfect one’s personality. people could change their ways of living to attain the dao ( 道 , the way) and see their worlds much clearly. such mode of thinking implies great vital energies. the long history of chinese surmounting challenges to its survival, the flourishing of “asian four little dragons” (korea, singapore, taiwan, and hong kong) in the 1960’s which held confucian doctrines and the big advance of china in the last thirty years could all be taken as the examples of the merits of such thinking, they are continuing to develop. the meanings of zhong or zhongdao is rooted in its etymology. the first is to be right, proper and impartial. the word “zhong” (middle) emerged early in china and represented the central position of a mast in carapace-bone-script and bronze-script. the ancient connotation is that the mast must be upright to allow distant people to see a flag. so in this sense “zhong” has the meaning of occupying a proper point where one stand in an unconquered state. the philosophical meaning of “zhong”, listening to both sides and choosing the middle course, has originated from this primitive meaning. the mainstream of chinese cultural tradition had formed itself in the process of conflict and fusion of confucianism, taoism and buddhist he xirong 79 beliefs, and the thinking of zhongdao has become the common way. in the book of changes confucius indicates that to position oneself in “zhong” is proper, that means avoiding extremes and at the same time not doing one thing and neglecting another. for instance, when emperor yao abdicated the throne to emperor shun, he told him “yun zhi jue zhong” ( 允执厥中 , keep to the centre), and emperor shun also told emperor yu “yun zhi jue zhong” ( 允执厥中 , keep to the centre) when he was demised. in the orthodox passing, from emperor yu to tang, to wenwang, to wuwang, to zhougong, to confucius and to mencius, the instruction “keep to the centre” was passed on too, so this saying had been taken as the essence of chinese cultural tradition. confucius held the point that all things had their own extent and that in excessive and chaotic situations harmony was the middle course. he said, “since i cannot get men pursuing the due medium, to whom i might communicate my instructions, i must find the ardent and the cautiously-decided. the ardent will advance and lay hold of truth; the cautiously-decided will keep themselves from what is wrong”.5 excessiveness and chaos, the extreme tendencies of things, or wrong tendencies, are objected to by confucius. for instance, one’s conducting oneself is neither reaching for what is beyond one’s grasp nor having no ambition at all. much strict or loose administration should be rejected. in the book confucius’s precepts to his family, he said that “tampering force with mercy is the harmony way of administration”. later mencius inherited confucian saying, he said, “a great artificer does not, for the sake of a stupid workman, alter or do away with the marking line. yi did not, for the sake of a stupid archer, change his rule for drawing the bow. the superior man draws the bow, but does not discharge the arrow. the whole thing seems to leap before the learner. such is his standing exactly in the middle of the right path. those who are able, follow him”.6 zhongdao, right in that, there is a requirement for people’s searching and practicing. people can conform to the middle course, but the middle course can never conform to the actions of people. in taoism, lao-tzu also said, “much talk will of course come to a dead end. it is better to keep the center (zhong)”.7 tao is the central notion in lao-tzu’s thinking, but zhong is the way of grasping tao. the meaning of zhong is grasping unchanging thing in changing things in order to deal with different matters. an important methodological prin80 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ciple of thinking of zhongdao is avoiding extremes and one-sidedness, so in lao-tzu’s thinking there are many discourses on “things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme”. chuang tzu also applied thinking of zhongdao to solve life issues. he said that in the humanness and handling of affairs one should “grasp one to deal with many” and “take the middle course to attain harmony”. then he took the story of dismembering an ox as skillfully as a butcher as an example to explain “pursue a middle course as your principle”. that means zhongdao is the way of preserving one’s life. in the view of buddhism, zhongdao is the highest truth avoiding extremes. at the same time it is the standard of behaviors, the only way of emancipation through cultivating. chinese buddhism also regarded zhongdao, to have avoided the extremes of operating as an ultimate goal on one hand and as a rule of conduct on the other. the middle school (the madhyamika, created by nagarjuna) opposes extremes, which eventually influenced chinese thought. the three schools, confucianism, buddhism and taoism, are the main streams of chinese traditional culture, and all follow the way of zhongdao. this had prepared the philosophic foundations of the chinese mode of thinking. as a consequence of the above, the difference between thinking of zhongdao (the middle road) and thinking of dualistic opposition can be clarified. the former emphasizes harmony of multi-elements and avoiding extremes. zhongdao and the similar thinking of zhongyong (中庸 , the mean) and zhonghe (中和 , neutralization) together constitute the core of chinese traditional thinking. they also have become the rich sources of chinese wisdom and deeply influenced the attitudes of lives of chinese people. this kind of thinking provides a much broader horizon for discoveries. that means proper adjustment and right ways become possible. the second character of zhongdao is yi ( 义 , righteousness). that means proper and reasonable: at a proper time one takes a proper method to attain the best result. when confucius talked about how to become a gentleman, he said, “when the person in authority is beneficent without great expenditure; when he lays tasks on the people without their repining; when he pursues what he desires without being covetous; when he maintains a dignified ease without being proud; when he is majestic withhe xirong 81 out being fierce”,8 “being expressive of enjoyment without being licentious, and of grief without being hurtfully excessive”9 and “the superior man is dignified, but does not wrangle. he is sociable, but not a partisan”.10 these are not only standards for conducting the behaviour of people, but also standards for the administration of a country. to grasp the essence of this proper method one should also pay attention to shizhong ( 时中 , taking a proper time) and quanbian ( 权变 , acting according to circumstances). “shizhong” means taking the way of zhong at the right time. the notion of time was introduced to the concept by confucius. in his opinion, there is no abstract zhong, that presence and historicity are important characters of zhong. that means following the way of zhong should be flexible and one should take actions that suit concrete circumstances. “quanbian” (权变 ) is changing, but not without principle. that means grasping the right way in concrete changing circumstances. “shinzhong” and “quanbian” include judgments of value and the art of administration in the following ways: following comprehensive assessments, advancing with the times, seizing opportunities. and finding something new in what is old. in mencius’ view, zhongdao’s concrete application is solving the problem of what is the relation between principle (jing) and change (quan). changing should come from principle. but persisting in principle and neglecting concrete circumstances, changing becomes impossible and the real zhong cannot be accessible. in his book, mencius relates the story of the “saving the sister-in-law falling into the water” and “shun (an emperor) saves his guilty father” as examples to interpret the problem concerning the relation between principle and changing. also we can take confucius’ ren (humane) as an exemple. there are many statements in analects about ren, but there is no single statement that could be taken as the definition of ren. many people consult confucius concerning ren. their questions have been born in a different context. so confucius’s responding is special and indicative. to generalize the definition of ren cannot be the right way. such intentions could also be found in daoism and buddhism. therefore, the essence of zhongguan is not only practical but also concrete. the third character of zhongdao (the middle road) is the unity of oppositeness and interdependency. the book of changes said, “the yin (阴 ) and the yang (阳 ) make up the dao”. that means all things in 82 prajna vihara __ __ ~ world are pairing, involving a transformation between yin and yang and coexisting in harmony. in the book of changes we read “looking up, he observes the pattern of the tian ( 天 , heaven?; looking down, he examines the order of di. (地 , the earth)”, “changing according tiandi to follow the way of tiandi”. the meaning of zhongdao, as acting according to tiandi, described here. confucius also said, “am i indeed possessed of knowledge? i am not knowing. but if a mean person, who appears quite empty, ask anything of me, i set it forth from one end to the other, and exhaust it”.11 this is the description of confucius’ searching of zhongdao. the saying in the doctrine of the mean: “so raise it to its greatest height and brilliancy, so as to pursue the course of the mean”12, has the same meaning. all things can be motivations including contradictions. these contradictions are unities of oppositeness and are involved in a process of balance. once the balance is disturbed, things would go to extremes. therefore to keep things proper, man has to follow the right way (zhongdao). confucius said that, “where the solid qualities are in excess of accomplishments, we have rust; where the accomplishments are in excess of the solid qualities, we have the manners of a clerk. when the accomplishments and solid qualities are equally blended, we then have the complete man”.13 he also said, “while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom”.14 saying in a modern language is keeping two sides and abounding in one side. therefore, another trait of zhongdao, and chinese traditional mode of thinking, is the notion of du ( 度 , degree) consideration, measure). people who think in this way change their existential modes properly according to the concrete circumstances to maintain situations of peace and harmony. the contemporary significance of thinking mode of zhongdao there have been many controversies on how tradition should be considered, but it is clear that without the ground of tradition innovation cannot be made. it seems to me that the advocacies of revolution in thinking and reform of mode of thinking represent the deep reflections on the he xirong 83 limitations of traditional thinking and the worries that it might hamper integrated development. actually, “the integrated development of people” should be advocated directly. because the mode of thinking is still a kind of abstracting, and the integrated development of people should include all kinds of activities of innovation. according to the thinking of zhongdao, the deviation mentioned above should be adjusted through transformation of thinking of the people, both eastern and western. the reason of this transformation lies in the fact that the deviation of people’s thinking has occurred and the circumstances have changed. the two facts are now actualities. on one hand, the deviation of thinking of chinese people from early modern times has created a situation of “neither chinese nor western”. on the other hand, it is essential that the existence of science is decisive today and the meaning of human lives has been enriched in an unprecedented way. facing this reality the relevant existential conditions of life and thought cannot be ignored. in chinese traditional thinking, the lack of scientific thinking has led to the advocacy of science in may forth period. the tremendous development of science and technology in china, the emergence of many excellent scientists, and the acceptance of science and technology as a primary productive force, has occurred as a result. but because of the inertia of traditional thinking, the scientific thinking must be consciously promoted. therefore, the thinking of zhongdao could play an important role here. but we should also be conscious of the fact that scientific thinking is not the only effective thinking. so the intuitive and organic characters of chinese traditional thinking should also be utilized fully. this is necessary for the requirements of concrete variable lives. the harm of scientism, the consequences of the extreme unbalanced development of scientific thinking, should be rejected. at the same time, the competitive spirit, the spirit of justice, the spirit of legal contract and the spirit of equality, which accompany market economy, are insufficient in chinese traditional thinking. people must establish these ways of thinking through learning and adapting. in fact, the process of china’s opening and reforming is also the process of a changing thinking. for example, the great discussion on truth in 1980s and the disputations concerning universality and generality in recent years are examples of such a process. the chinese people’s predilection for ac84 prajna vihara __ __ ~ commodation also demonstrates this. western notions connected to globalization provide us a contrasting reference system. through these contrasts an awareness of the weaknesses in our thinking becomes possible. michel foucault deems modernity as “an attitude”, which relates to a kind of thinking and a kind of acting. such kind of mode could also be understood as the spirit of an actual historical time. it is very clear that the modernization of thinking could be the most important factor of modernity. therefore we have to adapt our thinking to meeting the requirements of modern society. but this should be on the ground of tradition. this applies only to the chinese, but also for westerners, this is an urgent task. every nation is facing the challenge of transforming their respective modes of thinking within globalization. radical changes in people’s ways of living have taken place in the development of science and technology, especially the development of information technology. at the same time, the transformation in modes of thinking has also occurred, in which the multi-dimensional interaction and the open innovation are the main tendencies. that means people should search for the balance between integrating and analyzing, logic and intuition. therefore in the background of this comparison of chinese and western modes of thinking, is the recognition of the importance of reconsidering of the merits and deficiencies of both chinese and western thought, and the creation of a new active wisdom to solve problems. today our discussions on the value of asian culture could be very significant. the domination of western culture in recent centuries should be overcome. in fact, even in the west, many people of insight have began reflecting their own culture and finding new sources for reflection from the east. in order to remain one nation’s own identity without assimilation of western culture, people should understand their own cultural heritage. if so, the effective communications between different nations and contributions to world harmony could become possible. he xirong 85 endnotes 1hu shi, “the chinese renaissance”, selected writings on hu shi, yuanliu publishing house, taiwan, 1986, volume24, p179. 2ludwig feuerbach,hagel critique of philosophy, selected writings on feuerbach, the commercial press1984, vol.1, p.45. 3karl marx. friedrich engels. the german ideology, people’s publishing house 1961, p.19. 4the lao tzu. chapter 33. cf. wing-tsit chan. a source book in chinese philosophy. 5analects. 13.21. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 6the works of mencius. 13.41. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 7the lao tzu. chapter 5. cf. wing-tsit chan. a source book in chinese philosophy. 8analects. 20.2. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 9analects. 3.20. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 10analects. 15.22. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 11analects. 9.8. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 12the doctrine of the mean. chapter 27. cf. james legge. the chineseenglish four books. 13analects. 6.18. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 14analects. 6.22. cf. james legge. the chinese-english four books. 86 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 09_(124-157) catholic eschatology and evolu.pmd catholic eschatology and evolutionism batairwa k. paulin fu-jen catholic university, taiwan abstract evolutionism” is a scientific theory rooted in darwin’s attempt to explain the origins and diversification of species. “eschatology”, instead refers to a systematic and theological reflection on the meaning of history, “ultimate meaning and end of all things”. are the two related? and precisely can catholic eschatology make sense to a beholder of the evolutionist theory? how does one explain catholic eschatology to an evolutionist? background: two specific occasions the idea of writing this paper developed from two interrelated demands, one general and the other particular. the first evolved from the observation of a learned and pastorally involved senior missionary in hong kong to my endeavor of awareness-building regarding the necessity of promoting interreligious dialogue. he commented on how western scientific mentality affects the knowledge, thinking, behaviors and religious choices of those formed in it. he then added that dialogue should not be restricted to “religions”. it should instead give particular attention to the epistemic background that pops up in the minds of most modern interlocutors, shape their consciousness and validate their convictions. in inquiring further, i gathered that his observation was hinting at the field of natural sciences and the amalgam of explanations that harbor the choices, the arguments and the religious indifferentism of agnostics, atheists, naturalists, scientologists, etc. the second and determinative incentive came as a concrete proposal to present concepts related to catholic eschatology to a mind, to an environment or a community that beholds evolutionism for hermeneutic framework. put in simple words, the question i will at124 prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 124-157 2000 by assumption university press -~ c tempt to answer is “how to explain catholic eschatology to one who holds evolutionary theory as a frame of reference?” i will attempt to address this preoccupation and its appended inquiries through an exploration of the confines of each of the two concepts, highlighting the importance and challenges they bear for each other. this will be done with the expectation of fostering a cross-fertilization of the worldviews evolutionism and catholic eschatology represent. before going any further, an exploration of evolutionism is needed. the evolutionist world view: from darwin to evolutionism the encyclopedia britannica defines evolution in general as “a theory in biology postulating that the various types of plants, animals, and other living things on earth have their origin in other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to modifications in successive generations”.1 detailed exploration of the definition links the origin of the theory to darwin. moreover, those who highlight his contribution don’t hesitate to call it “darwinism”, implying the determinative contribution his explanation brought to the shaping of the theory. but who was darwin and what and why has his contribution been so crucial to evolutionism? charles darwin (1809-1882) was an english naturalist imbued by a quest for knowing. previous to immerging himself in the field of biology and nature, he had been successively a successful student of medicine and theology. during this formative period, darwin familiarized himself with the thoughts of prominent theoreticians such as hume and adam smith, william paley and others. but what held a decisive impact on his inquiring mind was his five year geological field trip in south america (183136) in the company of botanist adam sedgwick which was recounted in his work: “the voyage of the beagle”.2 during that voyage, darwin became aware of the variety of plants and ecosystems. if he had been content with the initial task assigned to botanists, he would have restricted himself to concise descriptions and accurate cataloguing of the plants. but darwin went a step further inquiring the reasons which account for batairwa k. paulin 125 those diversifications. as a naturalist, he intended to offer a scientific explanation for the arrangements he had observed in nature. he proposed that the patterns were variations evolving from some common ancestors. he further hypothesized the existence of a great “tree of life”, from which all species might have evolved, leading to some common ancestry. in this early stage he was unable to explain the mechanisms or ingredients that cause the modifications and how, when and why they occurred. this became a concern of his research until 1859 when he was finally able to present a substantial essay outlining his explanations. noticeably, the formulation included some ideas gleaned from other researchers in the field. previous to darwin’s theories, there were other tentative explications of the origins for instance, james hutton’s theory of the earth (1795) and charles lyell’s principles of geology (183033).3 the authors were attempting to offer an alternative explanation to that provided by the biblical genesis stories (gn1-2). during his preparation as an anglican priest, darwin was fascinated by the natural theology taught by william paley. paley exalted the coherence and coordination found within creation, the “intelligent” manner in which the constitutive parts of a creature are fashioned to perform a certain task. but what became crucial to darwin’s theory was an insight from malthus which he read in 1848. it was after encountering malthus’ essays in the principles of population that darwin sharpened his theory. malthus, a theoretician in politics of economy and demography, had stated that famine and diseases were two crucial natural agents in balancing demography. from this reading, darwin found an insight to justify the incentives for the variations in the patterns noted. he alluded to a “natural selection” that enabled the survival of the strong and the disappearance of the weak. natural selection was the agent shaping the great tree of life. the early intuitions from the voyage of the beagle were finally explained in 1859 in the origins of species. darwin later expanded his theory, relating it to various ramifications or species within the great tree of life.4 the final application of the theory to the human species explained how humans evolved from primates.5 by this time, darwin could claim to have found an interpretative system explaining the origin and variations of species in the biological realm. he showed that natural life unfolds primarily through the process 126 prajna vihara-~ of natural selection ruled by the principle of the survival of the fittest and the disappearance of the weakest. moreover, he specified that natural selection operated blindly, without plan or goal. unlike previous explanations of origins, darwin’s biological evolution theory did not need to be directed by a metaphysical agent. he defined evolution “as a random and mindless process that operates independently of any human or divine agency, and without recourse to inherent, emergent tendencies”.6 meanwhile, the fame of the origin of the species kept expanding. it was highly in demand in 1872 and it was on its sixth and last edition in 1872. its influence on the development of scientific interpretation in the western world was to be lasting. from darwinism to scale of evolutionist theories though biology constituted the backdrop of darwin’s theory of evolution, the reception and application of evolutionism however outgrew that context. in fact, it influenced the disciplines of anthropology, archeology, and paleontology. darwin’s concern for an explanation of the origin and diversification in the biological world has gone through various metamorphoses. traces of darwinism can be delineated in scales of explanation of origin and mutation in the physical, biological and cosmological fields giving rise to new types of investigations.7 for instance, in the field of biology, new discoveries in genetics and molecular biology led to an updating of darwinian explanations. moreover, in the field of astrophysics, evolutionary type approaches are being applied to the bigbang in the form of freeze or fry theories.8 traces of darwinism can be found in many other current scientific projects and philosophies. dr spencer well’s genographic project and the h+, also known as transhumanism are two examples. genography is a scientific approach using advanced dna analysis to retrace the origins, the mutations of human populations on the earth. the analysis of dna samples collected from indigenous communities shows the different migration itinerary and the mutation of humans through millions of years. the findings call in question the socio political importance given to batairwa k. paulin 127 notions such as races and ethnicity. at the end of the day, humans are to discover that they share a common ancestry whose genes diversified in response to the adaptability requested by the surrounding environments in which their ancestors evolved in.9 while genography uses cutting edge technology to explain the origins and mutations of the humans as they spread around the planet, h+ (transhumanism) develops the most efficient technology to enable humanity to hasten its improvement.10 the choice is a practical consequence of the h+ assessment of the human person as “unfinished” but “perfectible”?. max more, anders sandberg, natasha vita-more, james hughes and nick bostrom, kathryn aegis, ralph merkle, and other contributors define transhumanism as “a way of thinking about the future that is based on the premise that the human species in its current form does not represent the end of our development but rather a comparatively early phase”. with this awareness, the current develops “philosophies of life that seek confirmation and acceleration of intelligent life beyond its currently human forms and limitations’. as nick bostrom points out, transhumanists consider human nature as “a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways” and that “current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution”.11 hence, they strive for the most efficient technology capable of enhancing human perfectibility.12 one might be labeled with indiscriminative inclusion by inferring to an inner link between the names and positions here above mentioned. and yet, there is a notable connection featuring the ramification of the theory of evolutionism as it is applied, realized and articulated in different scientific disciplines. evolutionism has been a source of inspiration for thinkers of diverse trends, religious believers and unbelievers alike. the list of sympathizers might include atheistic and agnostic evolutionists, materialist and naturalist evolutionists, humanist and theist evolutionist, etc. in its metamorphosis, evolutionism has generated a wide range of interests, from astronomy to chemistry, biology, religion, theology, etc.13 the ramification of interests early mentioned displays some similarities. first, the explanations offered are not static but continuously evolving in accordance to insights of new findings. there is never a “last word”. second, they are faithful and committed to the inner ruling of scientific methods. in fact, researchers in these fields strive to abide to a realistic 128 prajna vihara-~ epistemology of science. they express things, facts as they believe to have occurred, phenomena as they are taking place and things as they will happen. all these explanations are done not on the basis of fantasy but on the ground of scientific laws and theories. last, the epistemic universe of the theories needs no direct reference to metaphysical intervention or cause. because of this, the implications for religion __ as illustrated in the debates that went along the metamorphosis of evolutionism into a philosophy14 __ can still be delineated. evolutionism was often seen as “the triumph of science over religion, as the dissolution of natural theology by the law of nature […], as a shift from creationist to a positivist episteme […], and as a legitimating variety of political viewpoints, both the ideological right and left”.15 in the following section we will inquire on whether it can also be a basis for eschatology and especially for catholic eschatology. the eschatological worldview while “evolutionism” is a scientific theory rooted in darwin’s attempt to explain the origins and diversification of species, “eschatology”, instead refers to a systematic and theological reflection on the meaning of history. a discourse with eschatological content will naturally ponder questions such as “what occurs after death?” “does death have the last word?” “is there life after this existence” “if there is, then what kind of existence is it?” “as humans, living as individuals and as social groups and being aware of the reality of death, what can we hope for ultimately? is the earth eternal? is “doomsday” a myth, or is there any ground to take it seriously? where is humanity, where is the cosmos heading to? is it towards eternity or towards extinction? these are questions pertaining to the eschatological discourse. as it might be observed, the preoccupations are predominantly addressed by religions (including traditional and even atheistic ones included).16 this might suggest that eschatological preoccupation is inscribed in the philosophical, existential, religious consciousness of the human person. as simon tugwell argues, “the question of what happens after death has, and always will have, a very considerable significance as a way of focusing our fears and our hopes to interpret life batairwa k. paulin 129 and death in this world”.17 it is a debt contracted by our inquiring minds that helps us get a sense of orientation (space and time), and shape the routine of the daily conduct (morality). eschatological curiosity manifests our quest for responsibility, our aspirations for an explanation that transcends the present moment and extends the value of our existence into eternity. by raising eschatological questions, the human mind ponders other meanings and dimensions hidden in and beyond history, resists the thought of surrendering the last word to death, and refuses to live as if death would bring the encounter of what has been collected in the human individual and collective consciousness to a total zero. moreover, the eschatological quest and its related developments vary and contribute to cultural and religious worldviews.18 catholic eschatology the catholic tradition has an important section of theology which addresses issues of life and death for each of us personally and the final consummation of the cosmos of which we are a part. in popular language, these issues are known and dealt with as “last things” __ death, judgment, heaven and hell. they summarize steps that catholics believe unfold after death. yet, “four last things” remain a simplistic way of speaking. it does not, for instance, include purgatory which is still yet part of catholic eschatology. that is why, to be more concise and clear, the doctrine distinguishes between “individual or particular eschatology”19 and “collective or universal eschatology”.20 the former focuses on the unfolding of the process on an individual basis and the latter instead, on an all inclusive and universalistic ground. “universal or cosmic eschatology”, refers to a global, collective or cosmic end. it includes reflections on topics such as the end of the world, the resurrection of the body, general judgment, final consummation of all things, etc.21 individual eschatology the question addressed in individual eschatology is with regard 130 prajna vihara-~ to what happens to the individual at death and onward? the reflection shows how last things apply to individual cases. elements dealt with are death, particular judgment, heaven, purgatory and hell. with regard to death, the first element of individual eschatology which catholic doctrine speaks of is the separation of soul and body. death is a consequence and punishment of original sin.22 it also marks the end of a period of trial on earth, a moment during which through personal choices, one prepares his final destiny.23 the catholic liturgy reiterates this portrayal of death as the conclusion of the pilgrimage on earth in many ways. the prefaces for christian death in the liturgies remind believers that life is only changed, not ended, death opens to a new birth. for karl rahner, death does not end life but only necessitates a change in existence. he writes: “death does not simply withdraw a person from the world and make him a-cosmic; rather it transposes him into a new and more comprehensive relationships to the world, freedom from the limitation of the a single point in space and time, characteristic of his earthly existence”.24 finally, death opens up to a succession of interconnected eschatological elements. based on the interpretation of several new testament passages,25 the church’s doctrine holds that the soul faces judgment at death. the individual or particular judgment of the soul concludes with an assignment to heaven, hell, or purgatory.26 these three categories are not easy to describe. any attempt risks falling into anthropomorphic projections. nonetheless, heaven refers to the beatific vision, the possibility of seeing god face to face, standing in his abode with the company of the saints and angels. thought of in visionary terms, it is a place abounding of joy and happiness, a state of eternal possession of god. hell is the opposite of heaven. it refers to the place or state of those who, because of sin, because of their malfeasance and unrepentant choices are eternally excluded from the beatific vision. it is also referred to as a place or state of eternal punishment. besides heaven and hell as places or states of retribution, the catholic doctrine on individual batairwa k. paulin 131 eschatology has a further specificity. it speaks of a purgatory, not as a third option but as a transitional state of unspecified duration. at this stage, those who die imperfect and yet were willing to repent are offered an extra time with a course of punitive purification so that they might qualify to enter into heaven. the last of the seven points of the 1979 letter from the sacred congregation for the doctrine of the faith with regards to matters pertaining to eschatology explains the church’s understanding of hell and purgatory as follows: the church believes in the beatitude of the righteous and the eternal punishment of sinners, ‘who will be deprived of the vision of god, and this punishment will have repercussions on the whole being of sinners’. there can be a purification, in the case of elect, before they come to the vision of god, which is quite distinct from the punishment of the damned. “this is what the church means when she speaks of hell and purgatory”.27 universal and cosmic eschatology universal, collective and cosmic eschatology looks at the question of the end with the consideration of the fact that human existence is not lived in isolation. we are a community whose existence is enabled other living creatures. our human existence is also enabled by the living environment or cosmos in continuous expansion, exposed and submitted to physical laws. given those predicaments, it is not illusory to imagine an end that consumes all. the subtopics addressed in universal eschatology relate to the subsequent events to the end of the world, the end of the cosmos, general resurrection for a general and final judgment and final consummation. again, as it is the case for individual eschatology, scriptures and tradition constitute the ground for the doctrine.28 the synoptic gospels attest that jesus clearly spoke of the end of the world.29 early christians associated it with the second coming of the lord jesus christ __ parousia, the day of the lord, the day of jesus 132 prajna vihara-~ christ __ when, as an article of the creed says, “he will come to judge the living and the dead”. the misunderstanding regarding the timing of this second coming constituted such a preoccupation among some early christians that it became the main concern st. paul addressed in the first letter ever written to a christian community.30 according to catholic doctrine, at the parousia,31 all the dead (good and bad) will rise. there will be a general and final judgment with the son of god himself sitting as judge.32 besides the final destiny of the human race at final judgment, the finality of the whole creation is described in terms of “final consummation of all things in christ”. the foundational biblical passages for this idea include the physical universe as part of the general consummation.33 moreover, they speak of consummation as a gradual process marked by a series of destructions and reconstructions, but still aimed at a final end, namely, a restoration to a glorious and divine kingdom which will know no end. the hope and openness of this eschatological view gives space for an inclusive dialogue between certain views of evolutionism and christian eschatology. it is a dialogue held with the understanding that despite all, in the end, “the god in whom we live, move and have our being”34 “may be all in all”.35 no more death, no more suffering, but only love and communion in the beatific vision.36 this is the sketchy picture of traditional catholic eschatology. aware of the worldviews shaped by contemporary scientific minds, one might wonder on the meaning it makes to modern scientific people. at the crossroads of catholic eschatology and evolutionism besides these aspects of so called “traditional eschatology, peter phan points to another area of eschatology in need of investigation”. accordingly, further inquiry should be regarding “possible mutual illumination between contemporary scientific theories of the big bang and the big crunch, on the one hand, and the christian imagination of the beginning and end of time, on the other”.37 this is a must if we are to overcome the batairwa k. paulin 133 failures that russell believes has discredited theology. theologians were unable to make eschatology intelligible to believers and non-believers alike. one main reason is the obsolete formulation in which the doctrine is presented without taking into account the generational gaps between doctrine and audience. “the doctrine of eschatology”, is presented in antiquarian form” unable hence to respond to the awareness of the time. he writes: “in an age which takes for granted that our world is a tiny planet lost in the immensity of an unfeeling universe and biological life is the unintended product of blind, evolutionary chance, we as theologians in service of the church have failed”.38 this being the case, how can catholic eschatology make sense to the contemporary quest of meaning? catholic doctrine of last things evolves from a faith sustained reflection on the reality of death. its power relies on faith and claims on the persuasion of a hope in the promises of faith.39 the arguments sustaining the explanation use tools in the reach of the catholic religious framework. hence, while dealing with either individual or cosmic eschatology, the arguments appeal to the authority of the word of god, that of jesus in whom there is no deceit, and to the authoritative explanation of the magisterium of the church. because of this hope, christian eschatology becomes that “kindly light that guides us through a dark world to our eternal destiny”.40 the methodological challenge the initial impression and awareness emanating from the concise exploration above is about the range and complexities of the two concepts under investigation. on a wide scale, the two variables of a talk involving evolutionism and eschatology are science and religion.41 evolutionism and eschatology are concepts with long, detailed and particular interpretations.42 moreover, the complication emanates and is sustained by the fact that there is not only one way of assessing that relation. with evolution theory as a starting point, eschatological issues __that is, reflection pertaining to death and what is expected to occur in the after life __ can be ignored, neglected or denied on the ground of a lack of a scientific proof of their existence or tools to investigate them. on the other hand, christian thinkers have adopted different approaches vis-a-vis the ranges ' 134 prajna vihara-~ of scientific attitudes to themes related to evolutionism. this is understandable mainly for reasons kenneth r. miller offers. he notes that “evolutionism remains a point of concern and controversy because it deals with the greatest of all mysteries, our own origins, and our human place in nature”.43 the task invoked by peter phan and russell’s observation is complex indeed as it could be perceived from the previous schematic descriptions of evolutionism and eschatology. they seem to be developing two opposite dynamics. the first is associated with an investigation and explanation of “origins”, “mutations” and diversifications of species. the second instead is concerned with the “end”. if this is true, then a further exploration of a dialogue between the two fields raises a fundamental question: how and where do the two dynamics meet? from the perspective of evolutionism there is a need to establish whether evolutionism holds any concern for last things. similarly, the investigation of the perspective of the catholic tradition needs to evaluate the importance given to questions on the origin of things. an evolutionist individual eschatology? in the schematic presentation of evolutionism made above, no element of the last things has been stressed directly. death, judgment, heaven and hell did not receive the same treatment and attention in darwin and the ramifications of evolutionism as it did in the catholic eschatology. this might seem to confirm the initial observation. moreover, there are explanations for this apparent lack of interest, all related to methodological constraints. first, it might display an aspiration for consistency with the original quest of darwin and the different ramifications evolutionism has taken. second, the scientific methods and tools of evolutionism do not enable venturing too much into that field. as a methodological rule, the explanation or truth that a scientific approach expects from the world must be phenomenal, in other words, one obtained through observation, test, replications and verification. clearly, the claims of the scientific methods diminish the chance of access to the elements of catholic eschatology. the origin and end of one’s life is beyond the reach of the scientific method. no one can watch the moment of his/her birth batairwa k. paulin 135 and death as an observer. hence the scientific sayings on origin and death can only be a discourse on the “other”. as a talk which involves the speaker, it needs to proceed from a different methodological approach: from the witness of the others, which to be accepted involve calls upon the factor of credibility, trust. because of the methods chosen, the scientific explications of death can only be an objective description of the experience of “the other”. it is an objectification of the experience of the other, including a verification of patterns related to the state of death which can be corroborated by the absence of vital signs. clinically speaking, death can be declared “when life machines monitoring the brain, heart and lungs, all register zero activity”.44 a clinical description of death can concisely describe the process of a decaying body. this would still be short of the explanation motivated by an eschatological inquiry. a similar observation can be made of darwin’s explanation of death as an illustration of the implied price for the survival of the fittest.45 even though these discourses are related to death, they will fall short of answering the serious questions the human mind raises regarding death and which are being addressed in eschatology. this being the case with death __ the first element which yet is still at the margins of observable phenomenon, how hard would it be for the other elements of catholic eschatology? with the awareness of the methodological constraints adopted by evolutionists, the further eschatological inquiries can be answered with varying nuance. evolutionists do not seem to have a direct access to elements pertaining to eschatology. the confines of their scientific approach offer no basis to refute or deny the claims made through unshared methods. however, the lack of direct access does not imply a complete eradication of eschatological concern. in fact, there is an implicit concern for individual eschatology among evolutionists. unfortunately, the development of their research remain in most cases, inconclusive. they rank between agnostics and practical atheists. for the former, death and what follows is too complex, awesome and profound to be fully intelligible to the human mind.46 for the latter, ontological naturalists for instance, the question is of less importance.47 it is also the case for “scientists and philosophers who” as ilia delio notes, “maintain that darwinian ideas 136 prajna vihara-~ can explain in an exhaustively naturalist manner all living phenomena, including human thought, morality, and spirituality”.48 they acknowledge death as a fact and accept it with resignation. as provine says: “when you’re dead, dead, dead, you are gone, gone, gone”.49 such a position is the outcome of the conviction that there is no spirit, no soul; that nothing survives after death. yet this stance of the naturalists provides little comfort to ones yearning to transcend the physical by the hope for something beyond this earthly life. another evolutionist approach to individual eschatological inquiry is practical. moving away from denial and mere skepticism, the approach consists in engaging the scientific method towards inquiring on the possibility of life after death. the move consists of studying and investigating cases of near death experiences to verify the foundation for a hope for immortality.50 the exquisite study of the human brain and the nervous system aims at finding a physiological ground for the sense for eternity and transcendence. although this research remains inconclusive, it nevertheless bears witness to a growing tendency and conviction: an interest of scientific minded people in topics related to eschatology. moreover, the pragmatic solutions of transhumanists can be attested by their resolve to engage and engineer technologies aimed at solving problems supposed to be of eschatological nature. all in all, these enterprises offer an orientation that dialogue between science and religion needs be an engagement of the methodology used by each field. evolutionism and cosmic eschatology after looking at individual eschatology, it is proper to ask what evolutionists understand cosmic or universal eschatology to be. questions raised from a catholic perspective are: the end of the world, resurrection of the bodies, general judgment, final consummation, etc. again as in the previous case, the first noticeable difficulty is with regard to methods and language. the catholic formulations cannot simply be transferred into the evolutionist epistemic world. in the same way, the terminology used in scientific evolutionism, even those speaking of future, is not exactly the same as the last things discourse of catholic eschatology. but there are futurist scenarios of “ends” in cosmology, bibatairwa k. paulin 137 ology and physics with well elaborated theories worthy being called “scientific eschatology”. the “freeze” or “fry” and “physical eschatology” dyson and tipler have introduced is just one example. the picture is depicted as follows: “thus cosmology depicts a universe vastly bigger than we ever imagined before this century, literally billions of lightyear in just the visible universe alone! moreover, the universe as whole is expanding in time […] finally, cosmology tells something amazing about the future: it’s huge! the universe may continue to exist for ever (if the universe is open), or for at least 100billions years (if the universe is closed). in either case, life will surely cease to exist on earth at the solar supernova in the “near” future (5billions years), and if constrained by the speed of light as an upper limit on migration to and communication between the stars, will undergo a diaspora of unthinkable dimensions. moreover, the universe will darken as stars like ours turn into dwarf stars, and in the far future, all complex states of matter decay into elementary particles. the far, far future is, apparently, either “freeze” (open universe expanding and cooling for ever) or “fry” (closed universe collapsing to a final black hole of infinite temperatures)”.51 the universe of ecological evolutionism and astrophysics foster a language with teleological content. this can be captured in the description robert crawford gives of the cosmological answer to the question “what form life after the death of the earth might take if there is one?” crawford’s answer is positive even though it has to be held that the end to appear in billions of years will be bleak. “with the explosion of many stars there will be a vast number of them and soon after this our universe will die. what begun with the big bang will as, t.s. eliot said, end with a whimper”.52 other ideas alluding to the possibility of the death of the cosmic are entropy, black holes, the death of the sun, anti-gravity, etc.52 all these 138 prajna vihara-~ point out that even though it might take billions of years, the system is not eternal. “the universe is going to die by slow freezing rather than heat”.54 unlike the catholic eschatology __ which refuses to give a concise calendar of the eschatological events,55 evolutionists are good with numbers. they calculate in terms of billions of years __ a period hard to imagine for most people. nonetheless, the picture depicted is still disturbing. despite the ray of hope offered by frank tipler and freeman dyson’s physical eschatology __ the end envisaged is still annihilation, a final death that does not allow inquiring questioning on “what may be next?” scientific minds are wrestling with those possibilities in their own ways. those who consider that our planet might be one of the first to face extinction have been looking for possibility of life elsewhere. the space missions of nasa might have an eschatological motive attached to them! the same could be said with regard to cloning which robert crawford looks at as capable of offering benefits similar to those entitled to resurrection. he writes: “cloning has contributed to the discussion of life after death. it might be one way of conferring a kind of serial immortality on those who die and is dependent on the view that genetic identity is equivalent to personal identity. but a clone created with resurrection in mind would be of value for its conformity with his progenitor, that is, identity in personality, behavior, talents and so on.”56 frank tipler and freeman dyson developed “physical eschatology”, a scientific eschatology enjoying a growing consensus regarding the necessity of dialogue between scientists and theologians. their positions are based on the freeze or fry theory of cosmic end and literally hold that life is eternal. dyson, a proponent of the open universe thesis argues that life can continue indefinitely into the far future even though temperature approaches absolute zero and the structures we know of __ as galaxies, stars, planets, even atoms __ eventually decay to fundamental particles. as for tipler, the argument is that “the universe must be such that intelligent life will continue to exist forever”. they compare life to a sophisticated computer capable of processing a big amount of informabatairwa k. paulin 139 tion and keeping traces of it so much that the system can recreate itself.57 tipler is convinced that something important will survive the big crunch: “when atoms disappear human bodies will disappear, but programs capable of passing the turning test need not disappear”. and approaching this from a different angle, dyson states: “whether the details of my calculations turn out to be correct or not, there are good scientific reasons for taking seriously the possibility that life and intelligence can succeed in molding this universe of ours to their own purposes. twentieth-century science, when it looks to the future, provides a solid foundation for a philosophy of hope”.58 on the basis of the examples here cited, similar observations can be made of evolutionism and universal or collective eschatology as those made with individual eschatology. in other words, there is an implied concern of addressing matters of eschatological nature using methods that pertain to the scientific field. the answers offered however fail to notice the immediacy of the eschatological angst. talk of last things are primarily personal concerns. for example, when physical eschatology promises a self remaking of life after the big crunch, the personal eschatological question is how is the explanation important for me and people known to me? the theories are mitigated responses that unveil a gap between the nature of the eschatological angst and the responses that science can offer. is there a way out of this impasse? the possibility of a dialogue rises from the closest allusions to futuristic scenarios and mentions of “ends” in cosmology, biology and physics or again the practical ways of addressing awareness of change and mutation in humans and in the universe in reference for instance to the technologies developed by transhumanists. in the area of cosmology, for instance, the meeting point can be found in a pattern highlighted by russell in terms of “cosmic christ” and “standard bleak scientific picture”,59 a picture with scenarios __ which according to wolfart pannenberg, represent a falsification of christian eschatology.60 here russell attempts a synthesis from two patterns. the 140 prajna vihara-~ cosmic christ carries on the christian tradition, especially the eschatological vision based on the resurrection of jesus and the promises of enacting similar effect to the whole universe. the standard bleak scientific picture instead is a synthesis of cosmological eschatology based on present knowledge and discoveries. evolution theory and catholic eschatology are indeed two wide, complex and intricate topics. the explorations of the two fields have unveiled different pictures, useful not only to emphasize the contrast but also to seek possible convergences between the two worldviews. the way out of the impasse has to be found through a dialogue that seeks the converging point between the methods and the contents fostered by the two worldviews. necessity of a dialogue between investigative methods because of their methodological approaches, the two fields have been seen as developing and moving in two diametrically opposed directions. at first glance, the questions addressed were seen as completely unrelated. a closer look has instead shown ranges of articulations implying that the two discourses are not completely disconnected. there is a relation of mutual indwelling between the quests for “origins” and that of the “ends” trapped by the methods fostered by each side. the task of explaining catholic eschatology to an evolutionist, or engaging evolutionism and eschatology in dialogue necessitates a focus on the methods upheld in each of the two fields. on the one hand, the evolutionist’s insistence on strict scientific methods streamlines the range of investigation to layers or levels of existence with less direct accession to eschatological investigation. logically, with regard to matters that cannot be investigated through scientific methods, evolutionism is compelled to silence and agnosticism. the danger of extrapolation has been denounced through rhetorical questionings and criticisms addressed to scientific naturalists, physicists and other scientific motivated denials of after-life, existence of soul, spirits and other foundational elements for eschatology.61 ruse’s evaluation of evolutionism is one example. he sees evolutionism as a secular religion built around the concepts of progress, improvement, advances in life. furthermore, he attracts attention to the batairwa k. paulin 141 extrapolations evolutionists have made. referring to the leaders of the evolutionary theory, he says that “they did not view evolution as just a dry ‘fact’ of science” but “a confirmation of a life principle”.62 the contention of extrapolation means that there is a boundary to which scientific explanation should be restricted, on the one hand. on the other hand, eschatology runs analogical risks when it ignores the solicitations coming from the scientific insistence on methods, and overstresses instead a dogmatic approach, and reiterates antiquarian forms of eschatology. the dialogic approach to foster must be one harboring a convergence between the two trends. this convergence is capable of attaining the goal russell attributes to theologians, namely the ability to make eschatology intelligible to a contemporary audience, which in our particular case, is made of believers and non believers alike, of people relying on scientific explanations that not always match traditional articulations. henceforth, i will refer to the fruit of that convergence as “scientific eschatology”. scientific eschatology for a scientifically minded audience the awareness of the hermeneutic challenges between the scientific and religious discourse has awaken the need for appropriate answers. russell’s methodological guidelines for new research in scientific cosmology and eschatology stand as the best illustration of a detailed, authoritative and yet sophisticated response.63 scientific eschatology intends to be a simplified methodological response, a cross-breeding of scientific mentality and faith. in a particular way, it is an attempt to creatively foster mutual interaction between christian theology __ eschatology in this particular case __ and science (evolutionist theories). a scientific articulation of faith elements is one reformulated or packaged to correspond or contain answers to the questions of the scientific mind. it is a positive response to haught’s observation: “unfortunately, while modern science has allowed educated people to expand their thoughts and images of the universe, christian theology and spirituality have generally presented the figure of christ in dimensions too di142 prajna vihara-~ minutive to invite worship. a god or savior smaller than the universe will scarcely be noticed except by those who have little interest in the natural world”.64 as a method, scientific eschatology needs to provide space for dialogic concessions. the necessity emanates from the uniqueness of the question under investigation. as mcbrien says, they are the kinds of quests for which our answers will always be inadequate, because “we are at once the questioner and the questioned”.65 moreover, as questioner and questioned the confines of our potentials have not yet been established. pierre teilhard de chardin wrote: “no proof exists that man has come to the end of his potentialities, that he has reached his highest point. on the contrary, everything suggests that at the present time we are entering a peculiarly critical phase of superhumanisation”.66 still as a method, scientific eschatology must also recognize the validity of evolutionism and resist any attempt to restrict it. it must be extended to embrace beyond the reach and confines of human scientific comprehension. from the interpretation of the historical bases of the doctrine, it is clear that there has been a progression in ways christians understood their ends. for instance, in jesus’ time, the jewish people had several views about the after death. some believed in resurrection, others did not. the question of the status and whereabouts of the first dead converts played an important role in developing the christian doctrine of eschatology. the new testament and early church borrowed and reinterpreted jewish eschatological views in the light of the promises of jesus. it is in that sense that new testament speaks of new creation; and reiterates that believers have already eternal life. it depicts jesus as the fulfillment of the jewish eschatology __ “the one who is to come” at the end of times; he is the god among people, a restoration of “original time” __ life in eden __ when god at the beginning was emmanuel with the whole creation. the source of christian hope is rooted in the discovery of the intertwinement of “beginning and end” in the divine plan. it is exactly batairwa k. paulin 143 because “end” is not only understood as “finitude”, but as “finality” “goal”. god has an intention, a plan for human kind, a plan whose realization evolves through space and time. creation and human history are neither aimless development nor a growth in a random laisser-aller doomed to nothingness. it rather evolves towards a goal which is divine. last, still as a methodology, scientific eschatology needs to integrate the recesses of the efforts of predecessors, correcting their shortcomings and expanding on their limitations. the great contribution of the scientific mentality is that learning is a never-ending endeavor. the process invoked implies the capacity to read through tradition, to recognize events and people who have positively effected it so as one can build on what they have established. a catholic scientific eschatology cannot be thought without mentioning forerunners who took scientific explanations seriously and attempted to answer them. bergson’s “creative evolution” and his disciple p. teilhard de chardin’s notion of the “omega point” are two examples of an evolving sprit towards a scientific eschatology. bergson’s explanation of evolutionism mentioned “a vital impulse” within reality, which in his terms, is “either god or of god” and “whose nature can only be grasped by direct intuition”. as to the future, he held it “as an open adventure, an uncertain struggle between the life force and death matter”.69 teilhard de chardin, admittedly recognized the same dynamism within the universe. “using the word ‘evolution’ in its most generally accepted meaning, and in a purely experiential context, i would say that man’s origin by way of evolution is now an indubitable fact for science”.70 he spoke of evolution with optimism, namely as an unfolding towards a cosmic terminus. “since time began, even in inorganic matter, evolution has been an increase of the ‘conscious’. it will always remain an increase of the ‘conscious’. in the human person, the evolution has achieved a higher jump. the ‘conscious’ has raised to “self-consciousness” in man.71 the culmination of evolution must be the highest degree of consciousness, which p.t. chardin calls “the omega point” “where all being will be apocalyptically gathered into a final divine union”.72 their ideas were not only innovative; they further displayed a mastery of evolutionary theory with which they engaged in dialogue, while striving for a faithful and dynamic re-interpretation of the fundamentals of the christian doctrine. the conversation 144 prajna vihara-~ bergson and teilhard de chardin initiated has served as inspiration for many theologians. it is still to be brought ahead in those specific areas; peter c phan’s brief introduction to catholic theology calls for further investigation of catholic eschatology. he speaks of the scientific theories of the big bang, big crunch, biology and physics.73 methodologically speaking, the further investigation mentioned needs to be inscribed creatively in the dynamics of a tradition. first, by tradition we refer to people, to a community endowed with a conviction, with an experience __ in this case, of faith __ that is being grasped, lived and at the same time transmitted through generations. second, a creative and critical reading of tradition unveils the dynamisms and metamorphoses occurring during that transmission. it can also delineate the core from the accidental elements of the tradition, liberating hence the creativity needed to enhance proper adaptation of the tradition to new demands. third, creative insertion in tradition unveils that there is more to catholic eschatology than a discourse on four (five, six) last things.74 karl rahner and benedict xvi instantiate forms of this creative insertion. without negating tradition, for instance, karl rahner views eschatology as kairos, a reality that has been already initiated in the jesus’ event, even though it is still to be fulfilled. as for pope benedict xvi, he speaks of immortality not in terms of time, as living beyond the limits of time. for benedict xvi, immortality is a relation __ being in the loving and nourishing communion with god, with jesus who is life in plenitude.75 this modifies traditional tendencies that unilaterally ascribed eschatological topics to the after death. hope emanating from the resurrection of jesus constitutes the founding element of the eschatological message that christians have been conveying. the emphasis and formulation might differ but it should not obfuscate the centrality of the revolutionary impact of the jesus’ event. this constitutes the novelty that can counterbalance the lack of scientific/ evolutionist eschatologies. last, creative insertion in tradition must identify salient moments and remarkable contributors to the dynamics of conservation and self-renewal of the tradition. this is a particularly needed step in fostering a creative but well rooted dialogue. batairwa k. paulin 145 the content of scientific eschatology besides being a methodological approach, a second important specificity of scientific eschatology is related to its content. it is not a byproduct of the dialogic negotiation of the method but the unveiling of the core element of faith. the method does not create the answer but only helps to locate it and replace it in a much more visible position. scientific eschatology is not a watering down of base foundations but it identifies them in a way which illuminates their potential. the criteria to define the content of scientific eschatology can be established on the basis of the middle way peter phan alludes to this when he writes: “in conversation with cosmologies, christian eschatology will seek to avoid both a naive evolutionary optimism and a paralyzing pessimism and will attempt to formulate a credible theology of hope. furthermore, chaos theory, emphasizing unpredictability and genuine openness and novelty, offers christian eschatology useful insights on the nature of the future not as a mere rearrangement of the past but as a variety of possibilities of true becoming, which god can bring about in god’s kingdom”.76 what are the useful insights of christian eschatology that can enrich the deficiency of scientific eschatology? furthermore, on which scientific ground should they be posited so that their positive contribution can also be asserted by the scientific mentality? if christianity has a useful contribution to this eschatological quest, it is the jesus event. his life, death and resurrection constitute the core content of that insight. here we find a paradigmatic and insightful model for a scientific eschatology. jesus is a historical person whose deeds and words can be ascertained and certified through scientific means. as every human being, he experienced death. his after death however brought a radical change to the common trajectory of human existence. resurrection modified the normal course of human evolution. it marked a discontinuity in the history of human evolution and set a ground to rethink last things questions. furthermore, jesus’ resurrection becomes the background 146 prajna vihara-~ guaranteeing any talk on individual and cosmic eschatology, a talk that is rooted in his unfailing promises. as he promised, so it was and will continue to be. one basic preoccupation is the scientific basis of proposing the jesus event as beholding the solution for scientific eschatology. as an answer, we need to recognize the many efforts addressing resurrection as a scientific fact.77 it can be explained as a discontinuity in the order of human evolution. jesus’ resurrection operated a paradigmatic shift that brings about cosmic implications. dwelling on a method proper of scientific eschatology, one notes that evolutionary theories are familiar with discontinuities. beginnings of the universe, beginnings of life and the rise of consciousness, of free and intelligent hominids are all referred to as evolutionary discontinuities. resurrection is being hence proposed as a discontinuity sui generis and hence capable of enhancing scientific eschatological hypothesis. an invitation to hope once the nature of the quest at the heart of the evolutionist and eschatologist inquirers has been established as a quest for deep meaning, what concerns us ultimately, it becomes easier to orient the investigation towards greener pastures. as lionel tiger says, “science no less than religion is a defense against meaninglessness”.78 and the core of christian eschatology, according to russell is to provide for hope, real hope __ to answer to society’s demand and aspiration for hope.79 once we realize the limitations of scientific explanations to cater fully for such needs, then the time comes to seek higher __ beyond nature, beyond evolutionism __ for a more encompassing solution. at this point, the christian message can stand in a privileged position. it addresses these questions in a larger framework than the one circumscribed by the scientific mentality. the answers can hence touch the depth where they originate. the observation of pope benedict regarding questions related to death80 can be extended to eschatological inquiries. even before we are conscious of it, they are an invitation to hope. responses to those inquiries must be beyond the rational certainties and/or moral duties. they constitute a form of knowlbatairwa k. paulin 147 edge sui generis, for it pertains to a different kind of fundamental question, namely what kant’s epistemological system states as “what may i hope for?”81 hope is the clue. for without it, we have no other ways of penetrating the unfathomable mystery lying beyond death and its realm. without hope, death itself becomes a source of desolation, agony, absurdity; mostly because it negates our deepest aspiration for eternity. moreover, at the end of the day, the basis for the development of a scientific eschatology needs an attitude of openness to scientific methods and rootedness in the contents of the christian eschatology. the development of such a theology will benefit from the dawn of that openness shown in the church’s environment. the nature and depth of that dialogue needs to be posited on hope, faltering point for the scientific mind but anchor for the christian eschatology. scientific eschatology needs to be a theology not limited to the last things but emphasizing the object and foundation of the christian hope, rooted in the promises of christ which according to paul o’collaghan are: “the coming of jesus christ in glory at the end of time, the resurrection of the dead, the renewal of the cosmos and judgment of humanity, followed by eternal life for those who have been faithful to god, or its perpetual loss for those who have not”.83 conclusion in terms of methods and contents, catholic eschatology and evolutionism emerge from two different epistemic frameworks or paradigms. as a precondition for an explanation of catholic eschatology to an evolutionist interlocutor, an acquaintance with the dynamics ruling those paradigms is mandatory. this paper has hopefully shown that despite the difference, there are still some points of convergence, enabling a dialogue between the two fields. evolutionism and eschatology are inhabited by a quest for meaning and understanding, understanding of the origins, the diversifications as well as the ends (finalities) of things, of existence. the earlier tendency was to highlight the discrepancies, leading to the conclu148 prajna vihara-~ sion that there is no meeting point possible between eschatology and evolutionism. but this present reflection has taken a different approach. “beginnings” and “ends”, “origins” and “finalities”, “evolutionism” and “eschatology”, formed two poles interconnected by a deep seated epistemological quest for existential meaning. reflection on death is as important to evolutionary thinkers as the quest for origin is referential for eschatologists. the stress on the confines of each method wanted to highlight ways in which these two fields can complement each other. this has been underscored by the question on whether inquiries regarding “origins” and “ends” are mutual exclusive or do they call for each other? our positive response has been formulated in a call for “a scientific eschatology”, that is, an explanation that merges the scientific concern and is capable of articulating the faith statement in a scientific manner. a scientific eschatology will find it easy to articulate that indeed a reflection on “beginnings” entails __ at least implicitly __ some concerns for the “ends”. it will recognize that preoccupation as partially articulated in the evolutionist explanation and calling for them to be addressed in a larger framework. moreover, scientific eschatology calls each party to humility. questions of origins and ends are profound and complex. they remind us that our efforts of comprehension and mental conquest will always be limited and hence continuously in need of new reformulations. they call us to respect the principle of evolutionism, conceding that despite our endeavor, we will always be short of explanation. they warn us against the danger of dogmatism. no matter whether it is religious or scientific, dogmatism can hinder, falsify the process of understanding and the quest for deep meaning. finally, parting ways from dogmatism, scientific eschatology embraces hope as the pillar of the framework through which to address questions of origin and ends. in this way, it can provide a message not of despair, not of fatalism, not of indifferentism, not of triumphant assertions and/or imperialistic conquests but a message of hope and humility, for what we hope for is only achieved through an act of faith, and surrender to the promises of jesus christ. batairwa k. paulin 149 endnotes 1http://www.britannica.com/ebchecked/topic/197367/evolution (entered on oct. 15, 2012). 2lewen, darwin. london and new york: routledge, 2007, 18. 3“evolutionism” in encyclopedia of religions, p.208-09. 4the structure and distribution of coral reefs published in 1842 related the theory to marine biology. the variation of animals and plants under domestication, published in 1868 reiterates the same theory, emphasizing earlier arguments. 5the descent of man published in 1871 applied the evolution theory to the human species. 6“evolution” encyclopedia of religion, 211. 7david ray griffin, religion and scientific naturalism, new york: state university of new york press, 2000, 11. 8see robert john russell, cosmology from alpha to omega, minneapolis: fortress press, 2008, freeman dyson, infinite in all dimensions, new york? harper &row, 1988; frank j. tipler, the physics of immortality: modern cosmology, god, and the resurrection from the dead, new york: doubleday, 194; john d. barrow and frank j. tipler, the anthropic cosmological principles, new york: oxford university press, 1988. 9“the genographic project” <https://genographic.nationalgeographic.com/ about/ > entered on january 21, 2013. 10“transhumanist faqs” <http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhu manist-faq/> entered on january 22, 2013. 11nick bostrom, “transhuman values” <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.html> entered on january 21, 2013. 12“top ten transhumanist technologies” <http://lifeboat.com/ex/ transhumanist.technologies> entered on january 21, 2013. 13c. leon harris, evolution genesis and revelations, 2. 14“darwinism” in catholic encyclopedia, 670. 15“darwinism” in catholic encyclopedia, 670. 16in buddhism for instance, the notion of reincarnation, layers of hells and even a conception of species as areas of retribution for created karmas constitute part of buddhist eschatology, previous to attaining the realm of bodhisattva and finally that of the buddha. 17simon tugwell, human immortality and the redemption of death, london: darton, longman and todd, 1990. 18an allusion can be made here to the cultural and religious depictions of the afterlife existence, stories and conceptions of retribution in the after death existence, etc. it is in this sense that we might speak of a hindu, a buddhist, an islamic, a christian (catholic and/or protestant), an african or chinese eschatology. the quest for meaning and explanation for ‘what next’ after thislife forms a set of homeomorphisms developed in their contextual eschatological views. for an overview 150 prajna vihara-~ of eschatological religious views, see arnold toynbee and arthur koestler, life after death, london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 1976. 19for more explanations regarding this division see colm mckeating, peace at last: a christian theology of the last things, quezon city, manila: claretian publications, 2004, 159-237. 20mckeating, 91-157. 21these teachings are summarized as article of faith proclaimed from the early church. the apostles creed presents an eschatological view of jesus and stresses its significance for the believers. “i believe in jesus christ, […] he suffered under pontius pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried. he descended into hell. on the third day he rose again. he ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the father. he will come again to judge the living and the dead. i believe in […] the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting”. the nicene creed reiterates the same with some minor alterations. “he (jesus) will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead, and his kingdom will have no end. […] we acknowledge one baptism for the forgiveness of sins. we look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come”. 22genesis 2:17; romans 5:12, etc. 232 corinthians 5:10; john 9:4; luke 12:40; 16:19… 24karl rahner, theological investigations vol. 1. (london: dlt, 1963), 195. 25luke 16:22 sqq.; 23:43; acts 1:25; 26there is a need of a corollary note regarding “purgatory” as a locus or state of eschatological retribution. it has been often portrayed as a still transitory period, one other chance for further purification in between death and final judgment. the doctrine of purgatory has been in evolution since its final formulation which was only during the middle ages. that is why it remains one of the teachings of the church contested by reformists. see jacques le goff, the birth of the purgatory, transl. by arthur goldhammer, (chicago: chicago university press, 1990). 27“the 1979 letter from the sacred congregation for the doctrine of the faith”. in simon tugwell, human immortality and the redemption of death, london: darton, longman and tod, 1990, 175 28dn 7:9-28; mt. 24:3; 1th 2:19; 2th 2: 1; 1cor. 5, 1 th 5:23; jas 5:7-8, 1 jn 2: 28. 29mk 13, mt 24, lk 21. 30in the letter to the thessalonians, paul answers the preoccupation regarding the brothers who have died before the imminent second coming of jesus christ, a coming that was associated with the end of the world. moreover, the timing of the second coming still constitutes a leitmotiv for some christian millenarian movements. for more details see, terence penelhum, “christianity” in life after death in world religions, edited by harold coward, (maryknoll, n.y.: orbis books, 1997), 37-40. 31the term “parousia” is used in reference to the second coming of jesus christ, an event described as glorious and with definitive implications. batairwa k. paulin 151 32mt 25. 332 peter 3:13; romans 8:19; revelation 21:1. 34acts 17:28. 351 corinthians, 15:28. 36revelation 21:4. 37peter c. phan, “roman catholic theology” in the oxford handbook of eschatology, edited by jerry walls (new york: oxford university press, 2008), 229. 38robert john russell, 273. 39this aspect is particularly highlighted by jurgen moltmann as he entitled his book on eschatology a “theology of hope” and paul o’callaghan’s christ our hope. 40colm mckeating, peace at last: a christian theology of the last things, quezon city, manila: claretian publications, 2004, xv. 41a first approach to this topic must realize how it is tributary of the historical debate on the relationship between science and religion, faith and reason. the debate in question has developed very concise and tricky wordings, many acronyms and schools of thoughts borrowing from as many fields as theology, philosophy, and science. in some occasions and places, it has not only been concerned with doctrinal orthodoxy, clarity of mind… it has served as platform to stand for religious convictions, to foster educational policies and even more. in a nutshell, the antagonisms are so complex to summarize. however, in explaining the catholic eschatology to the evolutionist mind, it is possible to highlight salient points of the debate in a more focused way. for a concise presentation of the recent formulation of the problem, see for instance michael ruse, “a darwinian can be a christian, too” http://www. huffingtonpost.com/michael-ruse/can-a-darwinian-be-a-chri_b_618758.html (entered on november 15, 2012). 42see p eter j. bowler, evolution: the history of an idea, revised edition, (berkley and los angeles, california: california university press, 1989), 333-64; kenneth r. miller, finding darwin’s god: a scientist’s search for common ground between god and evolution. new york: harper collins, 1999); mariano artigas, thomas f. glicky rafael, a martinez, negotiating darwin: the vatican confronts evolution (baltimore: the johns hopkins university press, 2006); david ray griffin, religion and science naturalism (new york: state university of new york press, 2000, especially chapter 8 on creationism and darwinism). 43kenneth r. miller, finding darwin’s god: a scientist’s search for common ground between god and evolution. new york: harper collins, 1999), xi. 44kenneth mckeating, peace at last 174. 45karl w. giberson, saving darwin: how to be a christian and believe in evolution, 38-39. 46the implicit and transitional agnosticism as a way of facing eschatological inquiry goes back to darwin. darwin found death simply too profound to be comprehended. additionally, questions related to individual eschatology played a determinative role in his formulation of evolutionism. according to james r. moore, anger 152 prajna vihara-~ and grief connected to the death of his father in 1848, who according to the current doctrine was in hell, followed three years later by that of, annie, his ten year-old daughter constituted the point of no return. see larry a.witham, where darwin meets the bible. ny: oxford university press, 2002, 202; karl w, giberson, how to be a christian and believe in darwin, harper collins e-books, 39-40. charles darwin and francis darwin, the autobiography of charles darwin and selected letters (new york: dover, 1958), p.87 and randall keynes, darwin, his daughter and human evolution (new york: riverhead, 2002). 47naturalists claim that nothing exists beyond the natural universe. they also tend to explain everything, including human behavior, consciousness, as responding to mechanisms of natural laws. the universe and what occurs inside are products of the laws inherent to nature. there is no need to look for causality outside the confines of nature itself. because of this radicalization, the naturalist view is also referred to as “ontological naturalism” or “philosophical naturalism”. 48ilia delio, christ in evolution, maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 2008, ix. 49cited in larry a.witham, where darwin meets the bible. ny: oxford university press, 2002, 23. 50see robert crawford, is god a scientist? a dialogue between science and religion, n.y.: palgrave, macmillan, 2004, 135-36; and raymond moody’s best seller, life after life. san francisco: harperone, 2001. 51robert john russell, cosmology: from alpha to omega, new york: fortress press, 2008, 282. 52robert crawford, is god a scientist, 133. 53gary north in his book, is the world running down? crisis in the christian worldview, speaks pessimisms of the scientists, of entropy and social cataclysms. see gary north, is the world running down? crisis in the christian worldview, (texas: dominion press, 1998); mary midgley, evolution as a religion: strange hopes, stranger fears, london and new york: methuen and co. lt., 1985. 54robert crawford, 134. 55the new testament texts reiterate jesus’ obstinate refusal to give a precise date of his second coming. nobody not even the son, knows the time of parousia. mt. 24:36. 56robert crawford, 135. 57see john robert russell, 283. 58dyson, quoted in john robert russell, 285. 59robert john russell, cosmology: from alpha to omega, new york: fortress press, 2008, 280-282. 60robert john russell, cosmology: from alpha to omega, new york: fortress press, 2008, 282. 61john haught’ is nature enough? is a rhetorical provocation to the mentioned view. see john haught, is nature enough? meaning and truth in the age of science (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006). see also john fidor and batairwa k. paulin 153 messimo piattelli-palmarini, what darwin got wrong. (new york: farrar, straus and giroux, 2010); harun haya, the dark spell of darwinism: how darwinists twist the truth to turn people away from god, (istanbul: global vision, 2006). 62michael ruse, the evolution-creation struggle, cambridge ma: harvard university press, 2005, 31. 63russell, 304-318. 64j. haught, preface to ilia delio, is a god a scientist? a dialogue between science and religion, x. 65richard p. mcbrien, catholicism (new edition, new york: harper san francisco, 1994, 100. 66pierre t. chardin, the future of man, 113. 67rev. 5.17, gal. 6:15. 68jn 3:36. 69evolution, encyclopedia of religions, 212. 70p.t chardin, christianity and evolution, (transl. by r. hague, new york: harvest book, 1969, 139. 71paul emile duraux, histoire naturelle de l’humanite selon teilhard. paris: editions universitaires, 1964, 120-122. (l’hominization est une mutation differente car avec elle est venue la conscience). 72pierre teilhard de chardin, the future of man (tranlslated by norman denny, new york and evanston: harper & row publishers, 1964, 122-23. 73peter c. phan, “roman catholic eschatology” in the oxford handbook of eschatology, edited by jerry l. walls, (new york: oxford university press, 2008), 229. 74traditionally, catholic eschatology has been referred to as a doctrine on the last four things: death, judgment, heaven and hell. the terminology remained unchanged even after the insertion on the discussion on purgatory as one of the elements of the doctrine. the 1992 catechism of the catholic church, in its explanation of the last article of the creed, speaks of the “six last things”, namely, particular judgment, heaven, purgatory, hell, last judgment and finally new heaven __ new earth. 75peter john cameron, “l’immortalit?” in une ann?e avec ben?it xvi, paris: magnificat, 2006, 51. 76peter c. phan, “roman catholic theology” in the oxford handbook of eschatology, new york: oxford university press, 2008, 229. 77is resurrection a metaphor, a miracle or a literally scientific fact? the question has been and will still be attracting the attention of apologetics, theologians and scientists as well. from the 19 century on, the emphases had stressed different points among exegetical interpreters who all aimed at a scientific explanation. one area worthy to notice is the scientific attention given to the shroud of turin. latest conclusions imply that the piece could be a scientific evidence of the resurrection. 78lionel tiger quoted in james carpenter, nature and grace: toward an integral perspective. new york: crossroad. 1988, 165. 154 prajna vihara-~ 79john robert russell, 274. 80benedict xvi, “man needs eternity -and every other hope, for him, is all too brief” <http://www.vietcatholic.net/news/html/93755.htm > entered on november 30, 2012. 81highlighting the peculiarities of methods, kant structured his critique of pure reason (1781) around three questions: “what can i know?”, “what i ought to do” and “what may i hope for”. according to this classification, religious questions, and especially those addressed in eschatology fall under a discussion on hope. 82jpii’s assessment of evolution as a possibility and benedict xvi reiterated call on a dialogue between faith, reason and science can serve as a ground to revisit some theological reflections such as those pertaining to relations between faith and science. for instance, bergson’s “creative evolutionism” and pierre teilhard de chardin’s intuition of the omega point manifest awareness of evolutionist views. hence, the current openness and willingness to take in scientific theories might profit from the methods, insights and endeavor of these catholic thinkers. their efforts displayed the tasks expected from a scientific eschatology. 83paul o’callaghan, christ our hope: an introduction to eschatology. washington dc.: the catholic university of america press, 2011. references artigas, mariano and others. negotiating darwin: the vatican confronts evolution, baltimore: the johns hopkins university press, 2006. benedict xvi, “man needs eternity -and every other hope, for him, is all too brief” <http://www.vietcatholic.net/news/html/93755. htm> entered on november 30, 2012. bowler, peter j. evolution: the history of an idea, revised edition, berkley and los angeles, california: california university press, 1989. cameron, peter john. une annee avec benoit xvi, paris: magnificat, 2006. carpenter, james a. nature and grace: toward an integral perspective. new york: crossroad. 1988. crawford, robert. is god a scientist? a dialogue between science and religion, n.y.: palgrave, macmillan, 2004. coward, harold. ed. life after death in world religions. maryknoll, ny: orbis, 1997. darwin, charles and francis darwin, the autobiography of charles darwin and selected letters new york: dover, 1958. batairwa k. paulin 155 ' ' > darwin, charles. the structure and distribution of coral reef 1842. darwin, charles. the descent of man 1871 darwin, charles. the variation of animals and plants under domestication, 1868. delio, ilia. christ in evolution, maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 2008. duraux, paul emile. histoire naturelle de l’humanite selon teilhard. paris: editions universitaires, encyclopedia of religions, fidor, john and messimo piattelli-palmarini, what darwin got wrong, new york: farrar, straus and giroux, 2010. giberson, karl w, saving darwin: how to be a christian and believe in darwin, harper collins e-books. griffin, david r. religion and science naturalism, new york: state university of new york press, 2000. griffin, david r. religion and scientific naturalism, new york: state university of new new york press, 2000. harris, c. leon evolution: genesis and revelations, new york: state university of new york press albany, 1981. haught, john. is nature enough? meaning and truth in the age of science, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006. haya, harun. the dark spell of darwinism: how darwinists twist the truth to turn people away from god, istanbul: global vision, 2006. http://www.britannica.com/ebchecked/topic/197367/evolution (entered on oct. 15, 2012). keynes, randall. darwin, his daughter and human evolution, new york: riverhead, 2002. le goff, jacques. the birth of the purgatory, transl. by arthur goldhammer, chicago: chicago university press, 1990. lewen, darwin. london and new york: routledge, 2007. mcbrien, richard p. catholicism, new edition, new york: harper san francisco, 1994. mckeating, colm. peace at last: a christian theology of the last things. quezon city, manila: claretian publications, 2004. midgley, mary. evolution as a religion: strange hopes, stranger fears, london and new york: methuen and co. lt., 1985. miller, kenneth r. finding darwin’s god: a scientist’s search for com156 prajna vihara-~ .. mon ground between god and evolution. new york: harper collins, 1999. moltmann, jurgen. theology of hope: on the ground and the implications of a christian eschatology. london: scm press, 1969 moody, raymond. life after life. san francisco: harperone, 2001. north, gary, is the world running down? crisis in the christian worldview, texas: dominion press, 1998. o’callaghan, paul. christ our hope: an introduction to eschatology. washington dc.: the catholic university of america press, 2011. rahner, karl. theological investigations vol. 1. london: dlt, 1963. ruse, michael. the evolution-creation struggle, cambridge ma: harvard university press, 2005. ruse, michael. “a darwinian can be a christian, too” http://www. huffingtonpost.com/michael-ruse/can-a-darwinian-be-a-chri_b_ 618758.html (entered on november 15, 2012). russell, robert john. cosmology: from alpha to omega, fortress press, 2008. teilhard de chardin, pierre, the future of man, translated by norman denny, new york and evanston: harper & row publishers, 1964 teilhard de chardin, pierre. christianity and evolution, transl. by r. hague, new york: harvest book, 1969.. toynbee, arnold and arthur koestler, life after death, london: weidenfeld and nicolson, 1976. tugwell, simon. human immortality and the redemption of death, london: darton, longman and todd, 1990. witham, larry a. where darwin meets the bible, ny: oxford university press, 2002. batairwa k. paulin 157 21_(333-340) christian studies.pmd christian studies in contemporary china jason t. s. lam institute of sino-christian studies, hong kong, china abstract although christian studies is a comparatively new discipline in mainland china, it has a long history in global academia. thus, while promoting this discipline in china, we are also bringing chinese scholars to the international arena and exposing international scholars to the chinese situation. given that we are all living in a globalized (or glocalized) context, this exchange allows people a better understanding of different religious traditions so as to avoid a clash of civilizations, especially for those living in a multi-religious context like asia. in this paper i explain how this special phenomenon has emerged in the rapidly changing chinese situation in the last few decades and to articulate the interesting characteristics of christian studies and related theology in this context, namely extra ecclesiam (outside of the church). º·¤ñ́ âèí ¶ö§ááé¤ãôêµèö¡éòíò¨¨ðà»ç¹êò¢òçôªò·õè¤èí¹¢éò§ãëáèêóëãñº»ãðà·è¨õ¹ á¼è¹ ố¹ãë­è áµè¡òãèö¡éòçôªò¹õé¡çáõ»ãðçñµôíñ¹âòç¹ò¹ã¹âå¡çôªò¡òã ñ́§¹ñé¹ ¡òãêè§ àêãôá¡òãèö¡éòçôªò¹õéã¹»ãðà·è ṏ¹ ö̈§ à»ãõâºàêá×í¹¡ñº¡òã¹ó¾ò¹ñ¡çôªò¡òãªòç ṏ¹ ä»êùèàç·õ¹ò¹òªòµô ã¹¢³ðà´õâç¡ñ¹¡çà»ç¹¡òãà»ô´âí¡òêãëé¹ñ¡çôªò¡òã¹ò¹òªòµô ä é́áõâí¡òêêñá¼ñêáåðàãõâ¹ãùéê¶ò¹¡òã³ì¢í§ ṏ¹áò¡âô觢öé¹ ã¹àá×èíàãò·ø¡¤¹µèò§áõªõçôµ íâùè㹺ãôº·¢í§âå¡òàôçñµ¹ì´éçâ¡ñ¹ ¡òãáå¡à»åõèâ¹¹õé¨ö§à»ô´âí¡òêãëé¼ù餹áõ ¤çòáà¢éò㨵èí¢¹º¢í§èòê¹òµèò§ æ ́ õ¢öé¹ à¾×èíëåõ¡àåõè⧡òã»ð·ð¡ñ¹¢í§íòãâ¸ããá â´â੾òðíâèò§âôè§ êóëãñº¼ùé·õèíâùèã¹êñ§¤áëåò¡ëåòâèòê¹ò àªè¹ àíàªõâ º·¤çòá¹õé ¢éò¾à é̈ò¨ðí ô̧ºòâ¶ö§»ãò¡¯¡òã³ì·õèäáȩ̀ ããá´ò¹õéçèòà¡ố ¢öé¹áòä é́íâèò§äãã¹»ãðà·è ṏ¹·õèáõ prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 333-340 333 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ ¡òãà»åõèâ¹á»å§íâèò§ãç´àãçç㹪èç§êí§êòá·èçããé·õè¼èò¹áò ã¹¢³ðà´õâç¡ñ¹ ¢éò¾à é̈ò¡ç̈ ðªõéãëéàë繤ø³åñ¡é³ð·õè¹èòê¹ã¨¢í§¤ãôêµèö¡éòáåðà·ççô·âò·õèêñá¾ñ¹ ì̧ ¡ñ¹ã¹ºãôº·¹õé ¹ñ蹡ç¤×í extra ecclesiam (¹í¡¾ãðèòê¹ ñ̈¡ã) the study of christianity in universities and research institutes is nothing unusual. it is rather remarkable, however, that christian studies have become established in the cultural and educational system of communist china and have been developing rapidly since the late 1980s. a considerable number of scholars are now pursuing the serious academic study of christianity and publishing their findings, and are doing so not in seminaries or other ecclesiastical settings but in institutions of the social and human sciences run and financed by the state. the institute of sino-christian studies (hereafter abbreviated as iscs), in which the author is presently working, is established in order to promote christian studies (and even develop sino-christian theology) in the above-described situation. our objective is to make christian studies a constituent of the contemporary chinese academic tradition, just like buddhism had done for some centuries ago, so that the chinese culture can be enriched. because of this special mission and the situation described above, our major working partners are not churches and seminaries in mainland china but chinese humanities scholars and their related institutions including universities, research institutes, and so on. although christian studies is a comparatively new discipline in mainland china, it has a long history in global academia. thus at the same time of promoting this discipline in china, we are also bringing chinese scholars to the international arena and international scholars to understand the chinese situation. given that we are all living in a globalized (or better glocalized) context, it should be considered a meaningful activity for letting people have a better understanding of different religious traditions so as to avoid a clash of civilizations, especially for those living in a multi-religious context like asia. in this paper i am going to explain how this special phenomenon has emerged in the rapidly changing chinese situation in the last few decades and to articulate the interesting characteristics of christian studies 334 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and related theology in this context, namely extra ecclesiam (outside of the church). this may be so special that it has never happened in the history of asian and even global christianity, but it may also be an indigenized or contextualized form appropriate to the chinese religiocultural tradition. and we hope that this model may also provide some clues to developing a non-confrontational approach for a public dialogue in the multi-traditional asian and even global context. a historical description of the phenomenon1 after the communist government was established in mainland china in 1949, and especially during the ten years of the cultural revolution, the christian churches were forced to surrender all their educational institutions, including schools, universities and seminaries, to the state. subsequently they had to struggle for their existence and accommodate themselves to the new situation under an atheist socialist government. the general repression of religion ceased over 30 years ago and religious freedom is now enshrined in the constitution. however, since the churches' academic resources were completely abolished for such a long time the seminaries in mainland china have until recently been struggling to produce clergy to meet the needs of the churches. they have therefore had little resources to devote to research and not been able to produce much high quality academic studies. a humanities faculty is not complete without the study of religions. even during the cultural revolution the study of philosophy, history and other subjects in secular universities included the study of religions (although they were presented in a critical manner). once ideological control was relaxed, however, this material began to attract the interest of scholars in its own right.2 despite the atheist stance of the communists and their eagerness to impose their ideology on every area of the cultural and educational system, it was an undeniable fact that communism was a product of the history of western thought. its origin therefore had to be studied in that context; and one of the essential constituents of western thought is christianity. indeed, the writings of marx, engels and even lenin include discussions of creation, original sin, the trinity and jason t. s. lam 335 other elements of the christian faith. as early as 1956, therefore, the communist government was already planning to translate 1630 western philosophical works over a period of 30 years. this was the beginning of the process of introducing a vast amount of western thought into the chinese cultural and educational system. some older-generation chinese scholars learned about christianity in this way. the more important point, however, is that it prepared the human resources and experience needed for studying christianity and even developing theology in recent years.3 because of the above historical development, through the communist cultural and educational system, christian thought has silently participated in the making of modern thought in this ancient country. once the control of an autocratic ideology was relaxed in the academic realm a wide variety of types of thinking had a chance of developing and gaining popularity among intellectuals. this has been the scene since 1978, when deng xiaoping came to the political foreground and began gradually implementing his policy of “reform and openness”. in the last thirty years we have been witnessing the rise of modern china in the international arena. in the eyes of chinese humanities scholars, this country was then and is still pursuing modernization in a dramatically rapid pace. most asian countries are running on a similar track and we are still seeking for an appropriate model suiting our own needs. undeniably, however, from the very beginning all of us are tracing a western type of enlightenment model before we found that some elements might not be most relevant to our traditions. china is no exception. chinese humanities scholars since the 1980s were eager to study this modernization model and from their training they found very quickly that christianity was one key element in the background of western culture. at the same time, the limitation of chinese academic tradition was also reexamined so as to respond to the social challenges. therefore christian studies has been pursued in the public realm of humanities for the sake of searching for a new way of development and a new identity for this ancient country in contemporary era. 336 prajna vihara __ __ ~ characteristics of doing theology extra ecclesiam the first thing to be noticed from this unique phenomenon is that when the church finds it difficult to produce her voice in the public realm, academic christian studies has emerged to let chinese people have a better understanding of this comparatively minor religious tradition. in addition, even christian scholars in the western world find it hard to attract public attention nowadays, christian studies in china is shaping a type of “public theology” in academia through the help of scholars trained in various disciplines. liu xiaofeng, once a prominent figure of this group, pointed out the significance of this phenomenon as evangelization without missionaries.4 i would add that, analogically they in turn become missionaries and preach the christian message to intellectuals without the aids of the institutional churches. that means it is a selfinitiated process by the chinese scholars themselves without the interference or influence of foreign missionaries. their writings are transmitted in the human and social sciences among chinese intellectuals while the churches in mainland china play very little part in this process. undoubtedly it is filled of theological significance. even from the surface, this is a very special phenomenon in the history of christianity, especially in the modern history of christianity in asia, and it directly affects the nature of the “theology” these people have produced. from the above background information, nevertheless, it is quite understandable that from the very outset the proponents of christian studies in mainland china do not aim at constructing a christian “theology” in the (western) traditional sense. they are primarily scholars from different academic disciplines researching into the study of christianity rather than “christian theologians” in the usual sense. in other words, they are scholars of christian culture trained in philosophy, history, literature, sociology and so on rather than believers or practitioners of christianity as a religion. they are interested in the academic study of christianity, rather than believing in christianity, though a few of them do take christianity as their personal faith. the emergence of this group of scholars is already a significant cultural as well as theological phenomenon because before that there had been very rare serious studies of christian theology in chinese academia. jason t. s. lam 337 the second thing to be observed from this cultural qua theological phenomenon is that, as we have mentioned above, is that these scholars are searching for a new way of cultural development and a new identity for a modern china. therefore because of this aim and the platform on which they are standing christian studies has become a constituent in the contemporary chinese academic arena, shaping the modern face of chinese culture in the process of modernization and globalization. it has achieved to some degree what the christian church and missionaries have aimed at for centuries but never succeeded. but it is a self-initiated process by chinese scholars themselves such that it has attracted attentions from academics inside and outside of the churches in china and other areas. nonetheless, since christian studies and the related theology (sinochristian theology)5 emerged in the university context and have made use of the language of humanities and social sciences, some adaptations have to be made. the advantage of this transformation is that even non-believing scholars can in a high degree understand and even appreciate the approaches and contents of different forms of theology. but the tradeoff is that it is not easy to produce traditional or confessional type of theological discourse in this multi-religious context, especially when most humanities scholars involved are not believers and have no such intention. this makes some church leaders, especially those who had received the traditional theological training in theological seminaries, rather skeptical and even critical to the “theological studies” produced. nevertheless, for the sake of becoming a constituent of and contributing to the making of modern chinese culture, many scholars including some with confessional stance welcome this emerging phenomenon.6 lastly, given that this “theological studies” is researched in the universities run by the state, and it is unlikely that a theology department (in the traditional or confessional sense) will be established in the near future, sino-christian theology from the very beginning has been a kind of interdisciplinary studies dispersed in different disciplines. the disadvantage of this is obvious: theology and even christian studies will find difficulties to become a holistic discipline and to develop its own research methodology and approaches like christian theology has been doing in the traditional “western” settings. in most modern chinese societies, how338 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ever, there is a long tradition of the study of confucianism, taoism and buddhism, in university departments of philosophy, history, literature, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, religious studies, etc. in such departments these religions are also studied differently from the way they are studied in institutions run by the respective religious communities. this does not provide a condition convenient for teaching and transmitting the major elements of chinese culture in the modern educational system. nevertheless, they have never lost their identities of being major constituents of this tradition with a history of several thousand years. if christian studies and theology could transform successfully into a kind of encyclopaedic discipline in a similar fashion, then it would have very good opportunities to meet different cultural and religious traditions and get into genuine dialogues in the public platform of academia. this is not merely the hope of the christian church and missionaries, but also fulfill the hope of many modern chinese scholars wanting to absorb elements of other cultures to enrich one’s own tradition in the age of modernization and globalization. ending remarks in the long history of china, her religio-cultural tradition has mostly shown hospitality to foreigners and is thus non-exclusive in nature. in addition, we find that whenever new elements were introduced in the course of development, both the chinese and the foreign cultural traditions were enriched. buddhism is one such example. when it came from india to china and was transformed by the indigenous traditions and gradually became a major constituent of chinese culture. we are now living in an age where the different religio-cultural traditions constantly encounter each other in many ways. so we need to ask: do we want a clash of civilizations or a non-confrontational encounter and even a mutual enrichment? although christian studies and sino-christian theology is still in the infancy stage compared with the long history of chinese and christian cultures, the phenomenon which has appeared during the last three decades may be revealing to us some direction for an age searching for a new cultural identity. jason t. s. lam 339 *jason lam is currently research fellow of the institute of sinochristian studies in hong kong, adjunct professor of tongji university in shanghai, and is teaching in various universities and institutions in hong kong and china. email: jason@iscs.org.hk. endnotes 1a fuller explanation can be seen from my earlier article “the emergence of scholars studying christianity in mainland china”, in pan-chiu lai & jason lam eds., sino-christian theology: a theological qua cultural movement in contemporary china (frankfurt am main: peter lang, 2010), 23-29. 2chen cunfu, “wenhua jidutu xianxiang de zonglan yu fansi” [review of and reflection on the phenomenon of the “cultural christian”], in institute of sinochristian studies ed., wenhua jidutu: xianxiang yu lunzheng [cultural christian: phenomenon and argument] (hong kong: institute of sino-christian studies, 1997), 22-25. 3liu xiaofeng, “academic studies of christianity in the cultural system of the communist party”, in cultural christian, 67-68. 4liu xiaofeng, hanyu shenxue yu lishi zhexue [the sino-christian theology and philosophy of history] (hong kong: institute of sino-christian studies, 2000). 5for a brief introduction of sino-christian theology emerged in this context, please refer to lai & lam, “retrospect and prospect of sino-christian theology: an introduction”, in sino-christian theology, pp.1-17. 6for a brief analysis please my earlier article “the emergence of scholars studying christianity in mainland china”, in sino-christian theology, pp.29-33; deeper discussions can be found in the same volume such as peter k. h. lee, “the ‘cultural christians’ phenomenon in china: a hong kong discussion” and chan shun-hing, “conceptual differences between hong kong and chinese theologians: a study of the 'cultural christians’ controversy”. 340 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 11_(183-209) christian moral.pmd christian moral resources for economic justice and sustainability gerhold k. becker assumption university, bangkok abstract as the recent global economic crisis has shown, we cannot leave the search for solutions exclusively to politicians and the so-called experts in finance and economics. it has become apparent that the usual economic focus on continued growth and short-term profitability is not sustainable and needs to be readjusted. this paper proposes that the moral resources of religions are a precious heritage of humanity in its search for meaning and the good life. this wisdom should not be restricted to the faithful but be made available to secular society as well. for the christian churches, this seems to require firstly taking stock of their social and moral teachings and secondly translating them into a language that is comprehensible to believers and non-believers alike and that can inspire the moral discourse in pluralist society. º·¤ñ́ âèí ¢³ð·õèçô¡äµàèãé°¡ô¨·ñèçâå¡»ãò¡®íâù袳ð¹õé àãòäáèêòáò㶻åèíâãëé ¡òãáêç§ëò·ò§á¡é»ñ­ëò¢öé¹íâùè¡ñº¹ñ¡¡òãàá×í§áåð¼ùéàªõèâçªò­´éò¹¡òãà§ô¹áåð àèãé°èòêµãìà¾õâ§à·èò¹ñé¹ çô¡äµôàãôèáà´è¹ªñ´¢öé¹çèòàèãé°¡ô¨·õèà¹é¹àã×èí§¡òãàµôºâµ íâèò§µèíà¹×èí§áåð¼å¡óäãã¹ãðâðêñé¹¹ñé¹äáèâñè§â×¹áåð¨óà»ç¹µéí§ä é́ãñº¡òã»ãñº»ãø§ º·¤çòá¹õéä é́¹óàê¹íáëå觷õèáò·ò§ é́ò¹èõå¸ããá¢í§èòê¹òµèò§ æ «öè§à»ç¹áã´¡·õèáõ ¤èò¢í§á¹øéâªòµô㹡òãáêç§ëò¤çòáëáòâáåðªõçôµ·õè́ õ àùáô»ñ­­ò¹õéäáè¤çã¨ð¨ó¡ñ́ ੾òð¼ùé·õèáõèãñ·¸ò áµè¤çãà»ố íí¡êùèêñ§¤áâå¡ä é́à»ç¹íâèò§ ṍ êóëãñº¤ãôêµìèòê¹ ñ̈¡ã ¡èí¹í×è¹ ù́àëá×í¹çèò¨ðµéí§¹ó¤åñ§¤óêí¹·ò§ é́ò¹êñ§¤ááåðèõå¸ããáíí¡áò áåðá»å ¤óêí¹àëåèò¹ñé¹à»ç¹àòéò·õèà¢éòã¨ä´é·ñé§êóëãñº¼ùéáõ¤çòáàª×èíáåð¼ùé·õèäáèáõ¤çòáàª×èí prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 183-209 183 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ «ö觨ðà»ç¹á㧺ñ¹´òåã¨ãëéà¡ố çò·¡ããá·ò§ é́ò¹èõå¸ããáã¹êñ§¤á¾ëø¹ôâá let’s imagine two ships of identical structure are going to sail from cape town to shanghai and you must decide on which ship you will travel. you learn that the loading officer of ship “a” will be on board for the full journey and will get his bonus only on the ship’s safe arrival. the loading officer on ship “b”, however, will be paid in proportion to the quantity of the goods carried and he will neither be required to sail on the ship nor will his payments be affected should the cargo (or even the ship itself) be lost. __ on which ship would you like to sail? if you think that this story has something to do with the current economic and financial crisis, you are not mistaken. obviously, the crisis is not only about money or the stability of the banking system but also and more importantly about values and ethics. it is about the erosion of trust in financial institutions, the lack of confidence in the economic system as a whole, and the reassessment of the moral foundations for prosperity in societies across the world. in a crisis that directly affects the whole family of nations we cannot leave the search for solutions exclusively to politicians and the socalled experts in finance and economics, particularly since the latter failed to notice that something was about to go spectacularly wrong and to sound the alarm bells before it was too late. instead, the crisis calls for an overhaul of the finance system and a thorough reform of the world economy that would also include strategies for effectively confronting environmental degradation, global warming, and the rapid depletion of non-renewable resources by accepting responsibility for future generations. it has become apparent that the usual economic focus on continued growth and short-term profitability is not sustainable and needs to be readjusted. as the moral resources of religions are a precious heritage of humanity in its search for meaning and the good life they should not be restricted to the faithful but be made available to secular society as well. for the christian churches, this seems to require firstly taking stock of their social and moral teachings and secondly translating them into a language that is comprehensible to believers and non-believers alike and that 184 prajna vihara __ __ ~ can inspire the moral discourse in pluralist society. a brief analysis of the main causes of the current crisis may serve as the starting point of our deliberations as it helps us to more clearly identify the precarious assumptions of the dominant economic system that need to be reassessed. 1. systemic shortcomings in libertarian economy we may recall that the financial crisis revealed shortcomings on all three levels of operations in the complex economic system that has penetrated all sectors of human life. while some of the shortcomings are of a technical and scientific nature, the more important ones are systemic and directly related to the moral foundations of the modern economy and its assumptions about homo oeconomicus. at the micro-level, the focus is on the individual actors, their moral choices and their moral dispositions. several studies have confirmed that the financial crisis has one of its major causes in instruments of remuneration for top executives that linked salaries to short-term increases in company value and encouraged risky or even irresponsible business operations through attractive incentive payments and share options. it was the carrot-approach without the stick, which fuelled greed, ignored accountability, contributed to a lack of transparency, favoured incompetence and the neglect of due care in the invention of ever more sophisticated financial products whose inherent risks were not fully understood. in the eyes of many observers, the crisis has exposed selfishness, collective greed and the hoarding of goods on a mammoth scale. yet the extent of moral space for responsible decision-making may vary individually as business executives, managers, and investment bankers act within larger environments of market transactions at the interface between business and society. the charge of greed levelled against individuals must therefore be placed within the wider context of established business operations, common industry standards, and the social interaction of people who are moral equals. this leads to the second, the meso-level of business activity, which largely defines the moral space of individual actors in coordination with professional standards, policy regulations, and consumers demanding or gerhold k. becker 185 rejecting products in expectation of profit and the satisfaction of needs. it is at this level that economic transactions and their rules closely correspond to the demands of society at large and are directly influenced by ethical values, policy decisions, and consumer behaviour. this implies a moral responsibility both on the parts of governments and regulators and of consumers for the kind of products they request; it also provides the general public some leverage on the rules and codes of conduct that define good practice in firms, corporations, and business organisations. in this regard, moral shortcomings in business are to some extent prompted by regulatory shortcomings that in turn favour short-sighted consumer behaviour and reflect flaws in the economic system. with regard to the finance industry, banks are supposed to have the twin core functions of providing efficient payment mechanisms and of assessing and managing risks of their products. if __ as joseph stiglitz has argued __ financial markets “created risk, misallocated capital, and encouraged excessive indebtedness while imposing high transaction costs”, this had as much to do with the motivations of individual actors as with deregulation policies (since the 1970s) that gradually revoked the strict separation of commercial and investment banking and resulted in the provision of cheap credit.1 the rapid growth of credit instruments worldwide since the 1990s has long surpassed the accumulation of wealth in the economy and generated enormous debts that in fact have been exported to developing countries and to future generations.2 managers in finance could rightly claim they were merely responding to the consumer spending boom from 2002 to 2007 those policies had initiated; but they could not be blamed for the resulting domestic and international imbalances or for financial innovations that merely executed government policies by making credit cheaper and more widely available. they seem, however, to have traded good merchant-standards that would have required them to ensure clients’ credit payment capacity for shortterm profit and the promise of bonus payments. the attitude of the former chairman of goldman sachs, lloyd blankfein, seems typical of the abysmal failures and moral shortcomings at both the microand the meso-levels. testifying before a sub-committee of the us congress in april 2010 he was reported to have rejected any moral or legal obligations on the part of goldman sachs to inform its 186 prajna vihara __ __ ~ clients about the quality of its products and if they were in their best interest. blankfein argued that since goldman sachs was not acting in a fiduciary role, the firm was not obligated to inform the clients that it was selling products that according to its own assessment, would soon be worthless and on whose depreciation it was betting.3 the main focus at the third, the macro-level of business activity, is on the defining conditions of the economic system as a whole and its moral and social legitimacy. it is also the most significant but certainly not the only entry point for competing religious views on the good society and a life worth living. in the current crisis it is at this macro-level where the leading assumptions of the neo-liberal system of free market economy and capitalism are being assessed together with the system’s ability to properly serve human needs and the common good. the failures and shortcomings at the previous levels are clearly tied to the defining conditions at the macro-level. in particular, we should take note of three presuppositions of the dominant model of capitalist free market economy. firstly, from the neo-liberal perspective markets operate on the anthropological assumptions of human beings as rational, self-interested, and independent agents, who act on utility maximization strategies that exclude emotions as well as goals external to their well-defined self-interest. as amartya sen noted, the “assumption of the completely egoistic human being has come to dominate much of mainstream economic theory”.4 this construct of the homo oeconomicus favours the development of mathematical models for the calculation of consumer behaviour that tend to ignore irrational factors and to disregard social costs as negligible anomalities in an otherwise self-contained system of rational utility maximisation. secondly, the economy is perceived as the totality of processes that follow their own laws and must therefore be kept as free as possible from any interference in their operations. in particular, the role of government is restricted to the absolute minimum and only charged with ensuring fundamental property rights and the highest possible degree of individual liberty. “the implicit view behind standard equilibrium models is that markets and economies are inherently stable and that they only temporarily get off track”.5 according to friedrich august von hayek, gerhold k. becker 187 one of the leading minds of neo-liberal economics, markets operate on principles that __ like the laws of nature __ can be discovered by human ingenuity but cannot be influenced, let alone be changed. it is therefore an “illusion” and simply “nonsense” to expect that markets care about social justice; only the “economically illiterate” may still want to impose social and moral obligations on capital and the market laws of maximizing profit.6 thirdly, within such system ethics will be largely reduced to a supportive role that is charged with interpreting conflicts of interests among market participants merely as coordination problems in devising strategies for the best pursuit of enlightened self-interest with minimal costs. on these premises the characterization of self-interested utility maximization in terms of greed would illicitly introduce external moral expectations into markets and hold economic transactions accountable to ethical standards that are inherently alien to business. economic activity and finance, the argument goes, are defined by the logic of rational markets that alone are sufficient to achieve economic equilibrium. therefore individual actors in the finance industry or elsewhere must not be blamed for simply following the rules of their trade and for doing what they did. except for a few cases of deception and fraud that were brought before the courts, what to outsiders may look like improper behaviour motivated by greed and recklessness was in fact standard practice of their profession and within the legal parameters of the finance industry. it is one of the most remarkable results of the crisis that the dominant model of neo-liberal economics has come under scrutiny and flaws were revealed in its leading assumptions. it is no longer only a weary public whose outrage about the tremendous cost of the crisis economists could continue to ignore as economic “illiteracy”. in the meantime, quite a few economists have expressed doubts about the viability of their favoured model and called for the reassessment of its underlying construct of homo oeconomicus. instead of reducing “economics to the study of optimal decisions in well-specified choice problems”, it would be necessary to acknowledge that human subjects act in ways that bear “no resemblance to the rational expectations paradigm”, since they are strongly influenced by emotional reactions, interactions, and connections between various actors, as well as differences in information, knowledge and capabilities.7 as oscar wilde once remarked, “man is a rational animal who 188 prajna vihara __ __ ~ always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason”.8 since human beings are no rational atoms in a social void, they are not merely functions in the economic system either. instead they are immersed in rich social life-worlds that allow for multiple roles and comprehensive conceptions of the good. recent empirical research has confirmed that market participants act within social frameworks and background institutions that suggest many possible economic models, not just one. “social preference models” point to traders who only care about their own monetary payoff while others “may additionally be concerned with the social impact of their behaviour. reciprocity models conjecture that people tend to be kind in response to kindness and unkind in response to unkindness, while fairness models posit that some individuals may have a preference for equitably sharing the efficiency gains from trade”.9 strong feelings of injustice have been identified as prime motivations in decision-making that includes economic transactions. instead of being an independent system with its own rules, the economy is “rather a subsystem embedded in other systems” on which it relies for its existence.10 as robert solomon has pointed out, “business is not just business. it is not self-contained, with its own rational, its own rules, its own reason for being. it is, essentially, a part of human life and human community”.11 the claim of the amorality of business should therefore be discarded as a myth.12 as the crisis gained momentum, even politicians that were once staunch defenders of unfettered markets could no longer ignore the systemic flaws of neo-liberal economics. in the statement adopted by the g20 leaders at their meeting in pittsburgh in 2009 they agreed that the economic crisis ushers in “a new era of sustainable global economic activity grounded in responsibility”. they called for the reform of “the global architecture” that would “meet the needs of the 21st century” and proposed “to launch a framework that lays out the policies and the way we act together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced global growth” (no. 14). unfortunately, these words have not yet been followed by decisive actions. the longer the crisis lingers on and the more countries in the world are affected, the stronger is the need to unite people in the common task of working out the framework of an economic system gerhold k. becker 189 that is built on the principles of justice and sustainability. in this effort, the world’s religions cannot stand aside but must make their spiritual resources available to secular society in a moral discourse accessible to all. 2. religion and morality in secular society characteristic of secular society in the west are two closely interrelated features: a wide diversity of religious and non-religious views and a set of moral values upon which democratic states are built that is independent of such views and not grounded in their onto-theological premises. these values include liberty, equality, human rights, and the rule of law. ideally, democratic societies are built upon a political ethic that (in rawls’ terminology) is shared by people of different “comprehensive views of the good” in some kind of “overlapping consensus”. it is therefore a fundamental requirement of secular society that the response of the democratic state to value pluralism must not favour any one world-view in particular and at the expense of others. in this regard “the maintenance of neutrality in public institutions” has become “an essential entailment of equality between all basic beliefs”.13 according to charles taylor, the strong normative view attached to secular society enshrines the three basic principles of (1) the rights and liberties of its members, (2) the equality among them, and (3) the principle that rule is based on consent. in other words: human rights, equality and non-discrimination, and democracy are typical features of secular society. the question clearly is whether such an overlapping consensus is possible without a religious underpinning, or to what extent religious worldviews can share their fundamental moral intuitions in a language that is accessible also to non-religious members of society. while the historical connotations of secularism point towards hostility against religion and the cleansing of the political square from any remnants of religious claims on political life, contemporary democratic societies have come to recognize their shaky normative foundations and the need to look for ways of engaging religions in their attempt to secure their basic principles. we may recall that this was the main topic of the memorable de190 prajna vihara __ __ ~ bate between cardinal joseph ratzinger, at the time prefect of the congregation of the doctrine of faith, and j?rgen habermas, one of the leading western political philosophers.14 by exploring possible pre-political moral foundations of the liberal, democratic state, the question quickly shifted to the authority, scope, and possible limits of secular reason that originated in ancient greek philosophy and established itself as the dominant force of modernity in the west. its particular form of rationality, which found its most important expression in modern economics, science, and technology as well as in the liberal, democratic, and constitutional state, was not only credited with the mind’s liberation from church tutelage, but was also thought to have no equal and thus to naturally extend its reign to non-western cultures and, finally, throughout the world. the triumph of science and technology was supposed to be also the triumph of secular reason. yet reason revealed a dialectic that caused doubts about its ability to ground morality exclusively on its own premises. nuclear power equally illustrates reason’s capacity for harnessing nature’s potential for the benefit of mankind and for utterly destructive purposes. the scientific exploration of nature inaugurated extrordinary improvements in the living conditions of humanity but also led to the exploitation of natural resources that turned nature (and increasingly even human nature) into a commodity. apparently, unfettered reason can go astray and be instrumentalized for inhumane purposes. as david hume noted, it is “not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”15 (treatise, 416). modernity, however, has a more complex genealogy than the secularist ideology is ready to accept. for open-minded observers like habermas it is clear that “the normative self-understanding of modernity” cannot be explained without due recognition of its roots in the judaeochristian moral tradition. in this regard, “christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct legacy of the judaic ethic of justice and the christian ethic of love”.16 christian values have penetrated even the moral fabrics of secular society in a process that gerhold k. becker 191 seems foreshadowed in the parable s. matthew (13:33) reports about the leaven that leavens the whole lump of bread without discernible traces (see also 1 cor 5:6). apparently, concepts like “morality and ethical life, person, individuality, or freedom and emancipation” cannot be fully understood “without appropriating the substance of the judeo-christian understanding of history in terms of salvation.17 in the emancipation of secular ethics from these roots, something was lost and its absence is painfully felt even in secular society. this may also explain, at least partially, the re-emergence of religion in many places in the west, e.g. the transformation of sin into guilt cannot substitute for the substantive religious meaning that was once evoked by the term. the recognition of sin implies a longing for forgiveness that is accompanied by the unsentimental wish that suffering caused to others may be made undone. no form of secular remembrance of the victims can substitute for the religious hope that past suffering of the just was not in vain. yet in a post-metaphysical age, even the lost hope in salvation and resurrection leaves a tangible emptiness, when secular modernity is confronted with the irreversibility of past suffering and with the injustice of abusing, denigrating, and murdering the innocent. as the magnitude of such suffering exceeds any secular, humanly possible forms of restitution and compensation, it raises questions about modern morality’s own foundations and about the significance of the spiritual dimension of human existence for the grounding of ethics.18 it is remarkable that pope benedict xvi in his encyclical spe salvi explicitly draws on the dialectic of reason and its implications for establishing a just world on the premises of post-metaphysical secularization. in particular, he credits horkheimer and adorno, “the great thinkers of the frankfurt school”, with working out the “negative” dialectic of reason that exposed the inherent weakness of their own marxist tradition while upholding its vision of salvation in a secular “kingdom of god”. they acknowledged that true justice would imply a world “where not only present suffering would be wiped out, but also that which is irrevocably past would be undone” (no. 42).19 since for adorno this is no longer an option, the cries of the oppressed and the injustice they suffer reveal an empty space in the centre of the secular world that no substitute can fill. in the eyes of the pope, marx’s vision is therefore deeply flawed, 184 prajna vihara __ __ ~ since it ignored the ambiguity of freedom, which “always remains also freedom for evil” (no. 21). similar concerns, albeit on a lesser scale, apply to the moral repugnance about attempts to justify greed as an amoral, dispositional requirement of market participants. the near universal condemnation of such attempts would be misunderstood if it were construed as nothing but resentment and envy of the market losers and not as genuine protest against the persuasive language of economics that has begun to dissolve moral feelings of compassion and sympathy into the terminology of profit maximization. greed, we may recall, stands in the genealogy of moral vices that receive their full profile only from religious connotations. since this context has been lost and is no longer available in secular society, it has become increasingly difficult to define its moral impropriety. consequently its definition oscillates between vice and virtue, or between its characterization as a major cause of the economic crisis and as a genuine motivational force of economic activity. the continued rejection of greed by the general public should therefore be taken as pointing beyond economic theory and reflecting a spiritual loss for which secular morality has no substitute. this leaves us in a precarious position, since we can neither expect to exclusively establish modern ethics on christian foundations nor on the premises of secular reason. it may account for the fact that neither christianity nor secular reason succeeded in their advances towards the cultures outside their perimeters. particularly the cultures of islam, buddhism, and hinduism as well as tribal cultures of africa continue to reject the normative foundations of both christianity and secular rationality. yet they seem to experience within their societies similar tensions between traditional moralities grounded in particular religious traditions and the appeal of universal reason.20 a way forward may be to invite all interested parties to explore a common ethical ground from which principles could be drawn to which all could consent, albeit from different positions. although this will turn out more difficult than it sounds, for a start it could take up rawls’ concept of an “overlapping consensus”21 as well as k?ng’s idea of a global ethic22 and investigate further the ethical commonalities any society will need for peaceful cooperation. such search through interreligious diagerhold k. becker 193 logue has been officially endorsed by the ii. vatican council; pope benedict xvi has recently extended it beyond the realm of religions. in his encyclical caritas in veritate, the pope regards it a “duty of believers to unite their efforts with those of all men and women of good will, with the followers of other religions and with non-believers, so that this world of ours may effectively correspond to the divine plan: living as a family under the creator’s watchful eye” (no. 57). while this requires the translation of fundamental religious concepts into a language that is comprehensible also to non-believers, it would be neither fair nor necessary to demand of politically engaged religious citizens that they suppress their personal religious convictions in favour of exclusively “secular reasons”. such demand would ignore the integral role religion plays in the life of persons of faith. it is therefore a matter of fairness that the liberal, democratic state should not place a greater burden on the shoulders of religious citizens by demanding of them to ignore their religious world views. instead both sides ought to be open-minded and sensitive to each others’ value perceptions. whereas religious citizens may make public contributions in their own religious language provided that these are presented so that secular citizens can grasp their meaning, secular citizens must not close their minds to the possible truth content of such presentations but enter into dialogues from which religious reasons might then be transformed into generally accessible arguments.23 though this is for christians a momentous task, it is not entirely new. over sixty years ago, dietrich bonhoeffer already envisioned it, and in even more extreme circumstances than those we witness today. in his letter from prison, written on 16 july 1944 in the face of execution at the hands of the nazi-regime, he wondered if a “non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts” was possible so that genuine christian concepts could still be understood by people in a secular age.24 this task is certainly worthy of being pursued further. 194 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 3. christian moral resources for an economy in crisis a) human dignity the most prominent candidate for a christian conception that can be a significant resource for the re-assessment of the foundations of contemporary ethics is human dignity. although as a principle of morality it is rooted in the christian theology of creation and in christology, it was also constitutive for the construction of modern moral identity in the west and the conception of human rights.25 theologically, human dignity signifies an ontological quality of human beings that makes them morally considerable. as children of god created in his image all human beings are of intrinsic worth and therefore owe respect to each other. whereas according to the neo-platonic tradition dignity was a general predicate of all being, it was now reserved for the human person as the individual whose specific mode of existence is moral (esse morale) and thus distinct from the natural or rational modes of other beings. its intrinsic worth is christologically grounded in the “infinite dignity” of the humanity of christ that alone can confer infinite value in a finite world.26 the modern origin of the ethics of dignity and respect lies in kant’s moral philosophy. kant was aware not only of the christian genealogy but also of its amalgamation with common morality that was christian in nature as it had integrated fundamental conceptions of the judaic-christian tradition. in this sense, kant’s moral philosophy is both the reconstruction of common morality and the successful translation of a fundamental christian concept into the language of public reason. as alan donagan observed, “morality, as kant presents it, is traditional christian morality demystified and universalized. it does not presuppose the truth of the christian faith, but is presupposed by it”.27 this morality is based on one fundamental principle, the principle that obligates everyone to treat humanity always as an end and never as a means only. its popular precursors are the golden rule of the gospel and the so-called silver rule of confucianism but its philosophical expression is the categorical imperative. in short, the principle of human dignity encapsulates an understanding of human beings as qualitatively different from anything else, gerhold k. becker 195 since their worth is without equivalent and therefore “beyond price”. the dignity of such beings commands unconditional respect (achtung). human dignity draws its moral force from a particular vision of humanity that insists on the priority of reciprocal respect over humiliation, force, and violence. what we owe to each other is grounded in what we fundamentally are: fragile and vulnerable beings with human face. as emmanuel levinas reminds us, by looking at the naked face of the other (autrui) we enter into moral space. in such encounter, the other is exposed to me in the irreducible existence of his or her defenceless eyes. although the other as corporeal reality is an object among objects, the open face looking at me signals a fundamental difference to all objects as it puts up an invisible moral barrier against intrusion. it opens a relation “with something absolutely other: the resistance of what has no resistance __ the ethical resistance”.28 it is this moral barrier that is central to the idea of human dignity and defines a person’s moral standing. human dignity is both empowerment and constraint29 and it would be misconstrued if it were conceptualized exclusively as a principle to safeguard individual rights but not also as the principle of responsibility and respect for all other human beings. b) personhood the christian tradition sees the difference between humans and the rest of creation in humanity’s being created in god’s own image and likeness (gen 1:26-27). christianity thus affirms a holistic understanding of the person that is irreducible to cognitive characteristics that only contingently apply to human embodiment. what makes human beings different and worthy of respect is that they are beings of freedom: they are called to freely choose the good and the just. as genuinely moral beings their freedom is not simply an empirical characteristic among others, but their specific form of existence. as empirical beings, they share their animal nature with all other creatures and are like them subjected to the constraints of nature. yet there is a divine ‘spark’ (meister eckhart) in them (soul) that testifies to their divine nature and resists naturalistic or materialistic reduction. that makes them peculiar beings of two worlds, the world of nature and the world of spirit and mind.30 personhood is 196 prajna vihara __ __ ~ neither something they are accorded by others and that they can subsequently lose, nor can it be dualistically separated from its embodiment. instead it is what designates the specific form in which only humans exist as biological beings. before we blame this view for the environmental destruction we are now experiencing everywhere, we should take note that from a christian perspective the special place humans hold in nature does not entail absolute possession of nature but rather stewardship in responsibility to the creator. as robin attfield has pointed out against lynn white’s charges that “christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects”, the tradition of stewardship runs through the whole bible and christian theology.31 typical is s. augustine’s rejection of the view that everything is made for human pleasure, needs, and satisfaction and his claim that non-human creatures glorify the creator “with respect to their own nature”. although there is an “ineliminable human perspective”32 in our relationship with nature and non-human creatures, the ethics of respect excludes narrow anthropocentrism that would recognize true value only and exclusively in human beings. c) spiritual humanity the prevailing naturalistic worldview in the west leaves space neither for ethics nor for religion or metaphysics, but regards the world as a closed system of which only the hard sciences can offer an adequate description that meets their methodological criteria of empirical objectivity. from this perspective, human beings are essentially biological systems of self-preservation whose differentiation from other such systems can be explained by the laws of evolution. this naturalistic world-view has become the fertile ground for the construction of scientific models of human agency that include homo oeconomicus. it devalues fundamental intuitions of religion and ethics and with them our search for meaning and purpose. historically, this worldview can be traced back to a peculiar ambiguity of the scientific paradigm itself as it first emerged in classical greek philosophy. according to plato's famous statement, philosophical inquiry originated in a sense of wonder. wonderment is simultaneously the acknowledgment of ignorance and the gerhold k. becker 197 awareness of the mystery of being that no explanation can ever exhaust. typologically, the classical attitudes towards the existential experience of wonder are exemplified in plato and aristotle: while the latter takes it as the starting point for scientific curiosity that aims at finally substituting knowledge for ignorance, for the former it marks the ultimate limit of any rational inquiry beyond which one can only speculate in images and myths. the alternative is not between the rational and the irrational, but between respecting the finitude of human nature and the limits of reason or __ with protagoras __ regarding man as the measure of all things. ultimately, it raises the question of how we want to understand ourselves and from where we draw meaning. questions about meaning and purpose arise particularly and most disturbingly when we are confronted with disease, suffering, and death. christianity places theses questions within comprehensive narratives that open a spiritual dimension to human existence that neither science nor economic theory can accommodate. accordingly, the meaning of life transcends bodily existence, but is inseparable from it. for embodied beings of freedom, the drama of human frailty and finitude is as much the drama of the human body as it is the drama of the spirit. while suffering remains, its meaning is transformed, and seemingly senseless death is integrated into the experience of faith that culminates in love of god and other. to god they entrust their lives with all its joy and pain, for the needy and suffering they care through works of charity. d) the principles of catholic social teachings as this brief survey confirms, christianity offers a rich conception of the human person as a being whose fundamental interests exceed the narrow focus of utility maximization. it is the vision of a deeply fragile being that yearns for meaning and purpose of life and is endowed with moral dignity that commands respect. it is also that of a social being whose interest in self-preservation leaves room for the natural feelings of compassion and sympathy from which the reciprocal recognition of responsibilities towards others and the principles of justice and fairness evolve. human dignity, personhood, and embodiment are the basis upon which a christian humanism is built, whose social ethics is comprised of 198 prajna vihara __ __ ~ four interrelated principles that can also guide our response to the economic crisis: human dignity, common good, solidarity, and subsidiarity. as the ii vatican council’s pastoral constitution gaudium et spes (no. 26) points out, “the social order and its development must invariably work to the benefit of the human person, since the order of things is to be subordinate to the order of persons, and not the other way around”. while this social ethics is rooted in scripture and founded on the life and teachings of jesus, its modern conceptualization began with pope leo xiii and his ground-breaking encyclical rerum novarum (1891) and it has been deepened and applied to different aspects of economic life by his successors.33 the principle of human dignity directs all economic activity towards the common good as its ultimate goal. in its broad sense, the common good refers to “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily”.34 it requires of all institutions of society, including business and the economy, to serve all members of the human family, to enable them to meet their basic needs, and to live in dignity. in mater et magistra, john xxiii wrote: if “the whole structure and organisation of an economic system is such as to compromise human dignity, to lessen a man’s sense of responsibility or rob him of opportunity for exercising personal initiative, then such a system, we maintain, is altogether unjust-no matter how much wealth it produces, or how justly and equitably such wealth is distributed” (no. 83). from the dignity of the human person and its intrinsic social nature are derived the two complementary principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. as all human persons are equal in dignity and rights, they are morally obligated to “consider every neighbour without exception as another self” and to accept responsibility for securing the basic conditions for a life in dignity.35 solidarity36 is the normative consequence of human social nature and personal interdependence; it calls everyone to shared responsibility for the wellbeing of every member of the social community. “solidarity helps us to see the ‘other’ __ whether a person, people or nation __ not just as some kind of instrument, with a work capacity and physical strength to be exploited at low cost and then discarded when no longer useful, but as our ‘neighbour’”.37 the principle of solidarity builds gerhold k. becker 199 on the natural sense of compassion and sympathy towards each other but is not merely a “feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people”. instead it is both an authentic moral virtue grounded in “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good” and a structural moral principle that orders social life.38 subsidiarity (subsidium: help) finally flows directly from the rich conception of human personhood grounded in freedom. as an essentially moral being, the human person is called to realize her own potential by fully participating in the life of the community while respecting the dignity and freedom of each member. subsidiarity seeks to secure this social space for genuine development of individual freedom and without undue interference from outside.39 the basic principles of the catholic social doctrine presuppose that humans can transcend self-interest and competition into a true community of people cooperating with each other towards a life of decency and mutual ethical respect. this vision sets out a framework for christian ethics that not only offers resources for confronting the economic and financial crisis, but that can also be attractive to secular society in its search for moral orientation. and __ as the rising interest in christianity in contemporary china suggests __ it may also be a source of inspiration for asian cultures. specifically, it can be the benchmark for the thorough overhaul of the economic system that the crisis apparently demands. 4. towards a human-centred economy with regard to the normative basis of christian ethics, it seems obvious that an adequate response to the economic crisis, with which we began our considerations, would have to be more than applying some technical fixes to a system gone astray. in its most recent statement (2011), the pontifical council for justice and peace refers specifically to taxation measures on financial transactions, the recapitalization of banks, and the separation of commercial from investment banking, but also calls for the education of tomorrow’s leadership in responsibility and commitment to the common good. while plugging loopholes will be necessary too, 200 prajna vihara __ __ ~ they will, however, offer only short-term solutions unless we seriously question some major presuppositions of the underlying economic world view. firstly and above all, we must reject what economist tim jackson has called “the vision of selfinterested hedonism that haunts conventional economics”. in his analysis, “the utilitarian roots of modern economies fail to capture the deeper and broader notions of human well-being. the libertarian focus on individual freedoms misses the broader social nature of human beings. institutional structures of the market, the legal forms of enterprise, the structure of ownership and profit-making have all tended to focus too narrowly on individual self-interest”.40 reforming the economy in accordance with the principles of justice and sustainability will certainly need staunch efforts on the part of governments and business organisations to define new parameters of economic efficiency and the reduction of unsustainable processes of production. yet, the changes must reach deeper and attempt to alter the materialist and consumerist mentality at the basis of the capitalist system of free market economy.41 our focus needs to shift from competition to cooperation, from hoarding money to sharing goods, from materialistic values to spiritual ones. this will require balancing self-interest with the interests of others, particularly those who have no voice, neither on the stock exchange, such as the poor, nor in economic transactions, such as nature with all her creatures. although this may sound like fantasy, the nagging suspicion is spreading that something is inherently wrong with our economic system and that it is unsustainable both with regard to the unjust distribution of goods, benefits, and burdens between rich and poor nations and with regard to its depletion of natural resources and its destructive ecological and climatological consequences. drawing on the definition of sustainability by the world commission on environment and development, numerous indicators suggest that the present economic system compromises with accelerating speed “the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.42 it is here that the religious vision of a life worth living could be expected to join forces with government, economists, and concerned citizens in moving the reform forward. christian ethics reminds us of our responsibility for god’s creation and for each other in a true sense of gerhold k. becker 201 caring brotherhood. in the meantime, a sense of urgency is growing and has even extended to economic theory. questions about the relationship between economy and spirituality or between the prevailing consumerist mentality of utility maximization and alternative comprehensive value orientations are no longer taboo. representative of such new openness towards exploring the fundamental presuppositions of our economic system is the palgrave handbook of spirituality and business edited and published last year (2011) by luk bouckaert and laszlo zsolnai. in response to the growing awareness that managing the vital resources of mankind will not succeed without its spiritual resources, the handbook explores the conditions for a transformation towards a post-capitalist, value-driven global economy. at the practical level and among the various initiatives, the movement that promotes an economy of sharing (eos) or an economy of communion (eoc) merits attention.43 it originated from the shock chiara lubich, the founder of the catholic lay movement focolare, experienced during her visit in 1991 to sao paolo, when she saw all those business skyscrapers flanked by vast areas of slums. she realized that the charitable distribution of goods, as practiced in the focolare movement up to that time, was inadequate in the face of this size of poverty and needed to be complemented by a new form of business enterprise based on the principle of human dignity and with a broad conception of stakeholders at its centre. this type of business would have to be human-centred and all its processes directed toward contributing to the common good. besides bringing work to the unemployed and sharing the profit with the poor by enabling them to help themselves, eos tries to disprove in practice the traditional presupposition that markets can only function through motivations of self-interest. while this experience may not be universaliseable, it certainly is a shining example of a viable alternative to the dominant economic system.44 it holds up the hope that a “decent society” (avishai margalit) is possible where people are no longer humiliated and the principles of dignity and justice are firmly established in the economic system. secondly, as our consumerist and self-serving mentality is deeply enmeshed in a materialistic vision of prosperity that deepens the gulf between the rich and the poor, we need to take a fresh look at economic value and our traditional concepts of profit, prosperity, and wealth. rich200 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ard layard has pointed to the paradox “at the heart of our lives” and investigated it at great length: “most people want more income and strive for it. yet as western societies have got richer, their people have become no happier”.45 apparently, at the root of this paradox lies confusion about the means and the ends of economic activity and business. wealth is more than profit as the libertarian creed and its “acquisitive spirit” would make us believe. while profit can be a means of satisfactory human living, by itself it is not the end of a good life.46 instead, it can be counterproductive and destroy the good life, for oneself and for others. as benedict xvi writes in caritas in veritate, “once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty” (no. 21).47 therefore the narrow focus on the maximization of shareholder value and profit has to be substituted by a “richer” conception of wealth that links it to the satisfaction of basic needs as well as to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and capabilities, and this applies to individuals as well as to whole nations. economically, the wealth of a nation comprises all relevant assets (private and public) including its natural, financial, human, and “social” capital.48 a substantial and traditionally much neglected asset is the natural capital consisting of all non-renewable resources (e.g. oil, natural gas, coal, and mineral resources), infrastructures, machinery, and urban land, as well as the “intangible capital”. the latter encompasses the sum of knowledge, skills, and know-how in the population and in particular its social capital, which includes the level of trust among people in a society and their ability to work together for a common goal.49 in short, the “materialistic vision of prosperity has to be dismantled” and replaced with a conception that generates “capabilities for flourishing within ecological limits”.50 the necessary re-orientation towards a comprehensive conception of human prosperity and flourishing needs to enlist the spiritual resources of mankind. from a christian perspective, it can draw on its holistic conception of the human person whose goals in life extend beyond material well-being and strive towards the spiritual union with god and for human brotherhood. the christian churches can lead the way to prove by their action that true wealth consists in a humane society in which gerhold k. becker 203 everyone’s basic needs are met and human capabilities can freely develop. as pope paul vi pointed out in his encyclical populorum progressio, the vision of authentic “brotherhood of man” rests on the three-fold obligation of mutual solidarity, social justice, and universal charity (no. 44). the christian churches can promote investment in public goods and social infrastructure and thus help build momentum to change the prevailing value perspectives towards a more altruistic and caring society. “when individuals and communities do not see a rigorous respect for the moral, cultural and spiritual requirements, based on the dignity of the person and on the proper identity of each community, beginning with the family and religious societies, then all the rest __ availability of goods, abundance of technical resources applied to daily life, a certain level of material wellbeing __ will prove unsatisfying and in the end contemptible”.51 thirdly, the economic crisis has once again put into sharp focus the question what kind of responsibility, if any, business may have. the inherent tendency of the prevailing economic system to keep ethics at arm’s length, has favoured a mentality that saw the only responsibility of business, be it a small company, a bank, or a large transnational corporation, to stay “within the rules of the game, which is to say”, to engage “in open and free competition without deception or fraud”.52 the responsibility of business was only legal and defined by the legal frameworks within which it has to operate. any moral or social responsibility it may be thought to have was regarded as an exclusively private affair of individual conscientiousness and discretion. while milton friedman could still believe that using “the cloak of social responsibility, and the nonsense spoken in its name”, was subversive and would “clearly harm the foun-dations of a free society”,53 in the midst of the economic crisis we are beginning to realize that it is just the other way round and that an economy that merely “stays within the rules of the game” and lacks in responsibility, both moral and social, is a serious threat to society. business is not only legally but also morally responsible to respect the laws and regulations and thus to contribute on its part to the provision of public goods and to refrain from harming societal well-being. this responsibility is grounded in the principle of human dignity and defined within the framework of basic human rights. in this regard it is crucially important to remember that human rights are above all 204 prajna vihara __ __ ~ not legal stipulations within the jurisdiction of nation states but inalienable moral rights of the family of man. and they are not only claim-rights but carry also complementary duties that apply to individuals, business, and states alike. following henry shue’s seminal classification, every basic right correlates with duties “to avoid depriving”, “to protect from deprivation”, and “to aid the deprived”.54 in the meantime, this classification has been endorsed by the un and integrated into the human rights framework with its three core principles to “protect, respect, and remedy” as moral sign posts for “all social actors __ governments, companies, and civil society”. as the economic crisis has confirmed, the dominant model of capitalist, free market economy has created “a permissive environment” within which blameworthy acts by corporations, especially banks, could occur “without adequate sanctioning or reparation. for the sake of the victims of abuse, and to sustain globalization as a positive force, this must be fixed”.55 instead of exclusively serving individual gratification and shareholder value, the economy and specifically the finance industry must revert to serving the common good as the prime goal of all economic activity, and this will include securing the basic rights of everyone. it seems obvious that for this process of moral re-orientation to succeed, christian ethics could provide valuable support. the catholic church’s initial hostility towards the human rights idea56 that saw in it little more than the attempt to install man as the exclusive measure of all things has long been rectified. it is now recognized as a tragic misunderstanding that in fact had the potential to undermine the fundamental principle of christian ethics, human dignity. in the meantime, the church has become a strong defender of human rights and time and again reminds not only the faithful but also government and business of the christian foundations of the respect for the inviolable dignity of man and of moral responsibility for the common good. thus “the principle of human rights is of profound concern to the area of social justice and is the measure by which it can be tested in the life of political bodies”.57 gerhold k. becker 205 endnotes 1joseph stiglitz, freefall. free markets and the sinking of the global economy, london: allen lane, 2010, 7. 2johan j. graafland and bert w. van de ven, “the credit crisis and the moral responsibility of professionals in finance”, journal of business ethics 103 (2011): 605-619. 3james quinn, “goldman boss lloyd blankfein denies moral obligation towards clients, “the daily telegraph (london) 28 april, 2010. 4amartya sen, the idea of justice, london: allen lane, 2009, 184. 5david colander et al., “the financial crisis and the systemic failure of the economics profession” critical review 21 (2009): 249 267; see also: gebhard kirchg?ssner, “the global crisis and the answer of economics”, schweizerische zeitschrift f?r volkswirtschaft und statistik 145/4 (2009): 381-385. 6friedrich august von hayek, recht, gesetzgebung und freiheit, band 2: die illusion sozialer gerechtigkeit, t?bingen: mohr, siebeck, 2003. 7friedrich schneider, gebhard kirchg?ssner, “financial and world economic crisis: what did economists contribute?” public choice 140 (2009): 319-327. 8quoted in manuel velasquez, philosophy. a text with readings, wardsworth: thompson, 5th.1994, 82. 9gary e. bolton and axel ockenfels, “the limits of trust in economic transactions. investigations of perfect reputation systems”, 2006; http:// ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/uploads/tx_ockmedia/bolton_ockenfels_ limits_of_trust.pdf. 10m. t. brown, corporate integrity: rethinking organizational ethics and leadership, cambridge/new york: cambridge university press, 2005, 32. 11robert c. solomon, a better way to think about business. how personal integrity leads to corporate success, new york/oxford: oxford university press, 1999, 37. 12richard t. de george, competing with integrity in international business, oxford/new york: oxford university press, 1993. 13charles taylor, “the polysemy of the secular”, social research 76,4 (2009): 143-16, see also: charles taylor, a secular age, harvard: harvard university press, 2007. 14gerhold k. becker, “reason, faith, and secularization: j?rgen habermas meets joseph cardinal ratzinger”, prajna vihara, 7/1 (2006): 18-43. 15david hume, a treatise of human nature, ed. by l. a. selby-bigge, oxford: oxford university press, 2nd.ed. 1978, 416. 16j?rgen habermas, time of transitions, cambridge: polity press, 2006,150151. 17j?rgen habermas, postmetaphysical thinking: philosophical essays, tr. william mark hohengarten, cambridge, mass.: mit press, 1992, 15. 18j?rgen habermas, dankesrede des friedenspreistr?gers. glauben und wissen. ver?ffentlichung des b?rsenvereins des deutschen buchhandels, 2001. 206 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 19 quoted from: theodor w. adorno, negative dialektik (1966), in: gesammelte schriften vi, frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1973, p. 395. 20joseph ratzinger, j?rgen habermas, dialektik der s?kularisierung: uber vernunft und religion, freiburg: herder, 2005. 21john rawls, political liberalism, new york: columbia university press,1993. 22hans k?ng, global responsibility. in search of a new world, london: scm, 1991; see also my critical comments on this project in: gerhold k. becker, “‘the good not the traditional’. clearing the path towards global ethics”, in: ariane hentsch cisneros and shanta premawardhana, eds., sharing values, geneva: globethics.net, 2011, 133-159. 23j?rgen habermas, “religion in der ?ffentlichkeit”, in: j?rgen habermas, zwischen naturalismus und religion, frankfurt: suhrkamp, 2005, 119-154. 24eberhard bethge, ed., widerstand und ergebung, m?nchen: siebenstern, 1968, 175. 25gerhold k. becker, “in search of humanity: human dignity as a basic moral attitude”, in: matti h?yry and tuija takala, eds., the future of value inquiry, atlanta/amsterdam: rodopi, 2001, 53-65. 26theo kobusch, die entdeckung der person, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche buchgesellschaft, 1997. 27alan donagan, “common morality and kant’s enlightenment project”, in: gene outka and john p. reeder, jr. eds., prospects for a common morality, princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 1993, 53-72, 54. 28emmanuel levinas, ethics and infinity: conversations with philippe nemo, pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1985. 29deryck beyleveld and roger brownsword, human dignity in bioethics and biolaw, oxford: oxford university press, 2001. 30the “human person, made in the image of god, is a being at once corporeal and spiritual” (catechism of the catholic church, no. 362). 31robin attfield, the ethics of environmental concern, athens and london: university of georgia press, 2nd. ed. 1991; lynn white, “the historical roots of our ecological crisis”, science, vol. 155, 3676 (1967): 1203-1207. 32bernard williams, “must a concern for the environment be centered on human beings?” making sense of humanity, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1995. 33the most important documents apart from those issued by the ii. vatican council are: pius xi, quadragesimo anno (1939); john xxiii, mater et magistra (1961), pacem in terris (1963); paul vi, populorum progressio (1967); john paul ii, laborem exercens (1981), sollicitudo rei socialis (1987), centesiums annus (1991); benedict xvi, spe salvi (2007), caritas in veritate (2009). 34gaudium et spes, no. 26; see also: john xxiii, mater et magistra, no. 65; 78-81; john xxiii, pacem in terris, no.55-56. 35gaudium et spes, no. 27. gerhold k. becker 207 .. 36the principle of solidarity has its roots in roman law and refers to the unlimited liability of each member of a family or community for common debts (obligatio in solidum), as in the motto: “one for all and all for one”. see: kurt bayertz, ed., solidarity, dordrecht: kluwer, 1999. 37john paul ii, sollicitudo rei socialis, no. 39. 38john paul ii, sollicitudo rei socialis, no. 3. 39oswald von nell-breuning notes that the principle of subsidiarity is not exclusive catholic but has already been succinctly expressed in abraham lincoln’s description of the role of government: “the legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever the people need to have done but cannot do at all, or cannot so well do for themselves in their separate and individual capacities. in whatever people can do individually for themselves, government ought not to interfere” (oswald von nell-breuning, “subsidiarit?t”, sacramentum mundi, vol. iii, freiburg: herder, 1969, 755-758, 757). 40tim jackson, “societal transformations for a sustainable economy”, natural resources forum 35 (2011): 155-164, 164; see also his powerful argument in: tim jackson, prosperity without growth: economics for a finite planet, london ; sterling, va: earthscan, 2009. 41in sollicitudo rei socialis, john paul ii refers to “the so-called civilization of ‘consumption’ or consumerism’” (no. 28). 42world commission on environment and development (wced), “our common future”, new york: oxford university press,1987, 8. 43see e. g. tibor h?jj, “the economy of sharing”, in: laszlo zsolnai (ed.), spirituality and ethics in management, dordrecht: kluwer, 2004, 151-161. 44by 2001, nearly 1,000 companies in 30 different countries were established or restructured worldwide according to the eos principles (h?jj, 160). this number decreased to 688 by october 2009 (europe: 413, south america: 209, north america 35, asia: 25); see: http://www.focolare.org/en 45richard layard, happiness: lessons from a new science, london and new york: penguin, 2005, 3. 46amartya sen, loc. cit., 254. 47“for the love of money is the root of all evils” (1 tim 6:10). 48georges enderle, “a rich conception of wealth creation beyond profit maximization and adding value”, journal of business ethics 84 (2009): 281-295, 288. 49world bank, where is the wealth of nations? measuring capital for the 21st century, washington, d. c.: world bank, 2006, 21-25. 49tim jackson, loc.cit., 161-2. 51sollicitudo rei socialis, no. 33. 52milton friedman, “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”, the new york times magazine, 13 september, 1970. 53friedman, ibid. 54henry shue, basic rights, princeton, n. j.: princeton university press, 208 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 2nd. ed.,1996, 52. 55united nations, promotion of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. protect, respect and remedy: a framework for business and human rights. report of the special representative of the secretary-general on the issue of human rights and transnational corporation and other business enterprises, john ruggie. human rights council. eighth session, 2008, a/hrc/8/5. 56particularly during the reigns of gregory xvi [mirari vos, 1832] and pius ix [syllabus errorum, 1864]. 57john paul ii, redemptor hominis (1979), no.17. gerhold k. becker 209 15_(251-270) the prophetic role.pmd the prophetic role of religion in strengthening cultural construction john b. zhang faith institute for cultural studies, china abstract china has made remarkable progress in areas such as the economy, trade, sports, science and technology. however, though rapid economic development has been impressive, examples of charitable services, sharing and sympathy are still rare. the gap between rich and poor in china continues to widen, while instances of corruption and fraud keep surfacing. at the same time, the uncertainty of belief systems and the blind pursuit of money and other material benefits only worsens social morality and dampens the development of religion and culture. therefore chinese society today must not only seek to strengthen the reconstruction of traditional culture, morality, conscience and law, but also enhance prophetic awareness. the term “culture” has again become very popular and is often used in chinese society. this paper investigates how china has shifted its focus from economic development to cultural construction and how cultural legal, spiritual and moral constructions are as important as economic progress. º·¤ñ́ âèí »ãðà·è ṏ¹ä é́·ó¡òã¾ñ²¹òíâèò§à»ç¹·õè¹èòêñ§à¡µã¹ëåòâ é́ò¹ äáèçèò¨ðà»ç¹ ´éò¹àèãé°¡ô¨ ¡òã¤éò ¡òã¡õìò çô·âòèòêµãì áåðà·¤â¹âåâõ íâèò§äã¡ç´õ ááéçèò¨õ¹ ¨ðêòáò㶾ñ²¹ò´éò¹àèãé°¡ô¨ãç´àãççíâèò§¹èò»ãð·ñºã¨ áµèâñ§ëèò§ä¡åã¹àã×èí§ ¡òãºãô̈ ò¤·ò¹ ¡òãáºè§»ñ¹ áåð¡òãàëç¹í¡àëç¹ã¨¡ñ¹ ªèí§çèò§ãðëçèò§¤¹ãçâ¡ñº ¤¹¨¹ã¹¨õ¹¢âòâ¡çéò§¢öé¹äáèëâø´ ·ñé§âñ§áõµñçíâèò§¡òã©éíãòé®ãìºñ§ëåç§áåð¡òã ëåí¡åç§ãëé»ãð ñ̈¡éìíâùèàêáí ã¹àçåòà ṍâç¡ñ¹¤çòáäáèá¹è¹í¹¢í§ã𺺤çòáàª×èí prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 251-270 251 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ áåð¡òãáêç§ëòà§ô¹·í§áåð¼å»ãðâ⪹ìíâèò§ë¹éòá×́ µòáñç·óãëéêñ§¤á ṏ¹áõ¤çòá àê×èíá é́ò¹èõå¸ããá áåðâñ§·óãëé¡òã¾ñ²¹ò é́ò¹èòê¹òáåðçñ²¹¸ããáàê×èíá¶íâ ́ ñ§¹ñé¹ êñ§¤áâø¤»ñ̈ ø̈ºñ¹¨ðµéí§äáèáøè§áµè̈ ðàêãôáêãéò§¤çòáá¢ç§á¡ãè§ é́ò¹çñ²¹¸ããá»ãðླõ èõå¸ããá á⹸ããáêó¹ö¡ áåð¡®ëáòâà·èò¹ñé¹ áµè¨ðµéí§ëñ¹áòêè§àêãôá¨ôµêó¹ö¡ ·ò§ é́ò¹ ô̈µçô­­ò³ é́çâ »ñ̈ ø̈ºñ¹¹õé¤óçèò �çñ²¹¸ããá� ¡åñºáòà»ç¹·õè¹ôâáíõ¡áåð¹óáò ãªéã¹êñ§¤ááò¡¢öé¹ º·¤çòá¹õéµéí§¡òãê׺êòç ù́çèò·óäá ṏ¹ëñ¹áòà¹é¹¡òãêãéò§êãã¤ì ·ò§çñ²¹¸ããááò¡¡çèò¡òã¾ñ²¹ò é́ò¹àèãé°¡ô̈ áåð·óäá ṏ¹ ö̈§¶×íçèò¡òãêãéò§êãã¤ì ·ò§çñ²¹¸ããá¨ôµçô­­ò³ áåðèõå¸ããá«öè§áõ¤çòáêó¤ñ­äáèâôè§ëâèí¹ä»¡çèò¤çòá ¡éòçë¹éò·ò§ é́ò¹àèãé°¡ô̈ forward since the open-door policy was introduced in 1978, china has made steady progress in areas such as the economy, trade, sports, science and technology. economic progress has been especially obvious. after joining the world trade organization in 2001, its economy has been growing quickly and steadily. over the past 30 years, china has gone through a tremendous transformation, which has led to the policy of “let some become rich first” as envisioned by the late national leader deng xiaoping. but although this rapid economic development has made china quite visible on the world stage, the development of charitable services, sharing and sympathy have failed to keep pace. and certain negative instances have tainted the reputation of government-sponsored charitable foundations. the gap between rich and poor in china continues to widen, while instances of corruption and fraud keep surfacing. at the same time, the uncertainty of belief systems and the blind pursuit of money and other material benefits only worsens social morality and dampens the development of religion and culture. the time has now come for china to engage in some deep soulsearching and reflection. what, after all, has happened to china over the years? striving for economic development is necessary, but if it becomes 252 prajna vihara __ __ ~ a one-sided development solely focused on the economy and gdp, if it neglects people’s spiritual and emotional needs and denies the importance of purifying and uplifting belief systems and worldviews inherent in both religion and traditional chinese culture, then social crises and problems are bound to arise. alhough political reform is important for solving the above-mentioned social problems, these political issues are not the main point of this article. the promotion of traditional cultural reconstruction and an emphasis on spiritual and moral systems originating from religion are of equal importance. chinese society today must not only strengthen reconstruction of traditional culture, morality, conscience and law, but also enhance prophetic awareness. this means that intellectuals and religious people as well as other social groups must courageously cry out against injustices and make their protests heard, so as to bring about a human society of justice, harmony and equilibrium. certain parts of this article on the moral role of prophet and of religion were initially presented at an inter-religious seminar in north europe.1 in light of the current social problems in china and the theme of this present seminar, i repeat my contention that china today must pay due attention to the role of prophets and religion. since receiving the invitation to this conference this past june, we have been happy to see that the chinese communist party made “cultural construction” one of the important study topics in its congress in october and made it a new government project. for this reason, the term “culture” has become very popular and is often used in chinese society. people have begun to pay attention to and rediscover the moral power, meaning and usefulness imbedded in traditional and religious culture. at the same time, they have also begun to reflect on why cultural construction lags behind and they look for a way out. in the process of reviewing how china has shifted its focus from economic development to cultural construction and as we highlight some social problems, it is not difficult to appreciate that cultural and legal constructions, as well as spiritual and moral constructions arising from religion, are as important as economic progress. john b. zhangi 253 part i: from economic development to cultural construction, and the cost after the ultra-left period (1950s) and the decade-long calamity called the cultural revolution (1966-1976), china’s economy was almost paralyzed. when china’s economic reform was launched to improve the country’s seriously underdeveloped economy, deng xiaoping, who had just re-obtained political power, proposed the “let some people get rich first” policy and an “economic construction” approach. after years of sparing no effort to advance economic construction, china’s economy gradually did seem to grow more affluent, but it had to pay a heavy price. the good news is that the communist party is not only paying attention to the economy, but it has also started to pay heed to cultural construction and has made the development of culture its target for this year. in the fall of 1978, deng xiaoping visited tianjin, which in 1976 experienced the double catastrophe of the cultural revolution and the severe tangshan earthquake. deng witnessed the difficulties and poor living conditions of urban construction in tianjin. after september 20, deng put forward the policy of “let some people get rich first” for the first time. in december that year, his “get rich first” argument became a more accurately defined statement in the third plenary session: “allow some people to get rich, in order to help the rest become rich as well, so as to achieve common prosperity”.2 on oct 23, 1985, while meeting with a delegation of entrepreneurs in the united states, deng once again stressed: “some areas and some people can get rich first, so as to help other regions and other people, and gradually achieve common prosperity”.3 responding to the painful lessons learned from the extreme leftist ideology and conservative forces wanting to block the reform process and engagement in economic development and opting instead to foster the “political movement”, deng xiaoping repeatedly stressed his ideas of economic reform. for example, he even regarded developing the economy as a political task, stressed that economic development should be the overriding concern, and demanded that all be subjected to economic construction.4 in taking economic construction as the central premise of china’s economic development, china achieved sustainable development for many 254 prajna vihara __ __ ~ years. its total economic output in world rankings keeps rising. in 2005, china overtook italy to become the world’s sixth largest economy. it beat the uk in 2006, becoming the world’s fourth largest economy. in 2007, china surpassed germany to become the world’s third largest economy, and it surpassed japan in 2011 to become the world’s second largest economic entity. “china economic weekly” described its economic growth in this way: “china’s gdp soared from $268.3 billion in 1978 to $5.879 trillion in 2010. during the past 30 years, its economy increased more than 20 times, and its average growth rate was close to 10%. it demonstrated unprecedented speed in the history of china’s economic development”.5 however, the vast majority of chinese people do not agree with such rankings, and do not think their country has surpassed japan and other countries to become the world’s second largest economy. many people understand that china’s per capita gdp is 10 times behind the per capita gdp of japan. the per capita of china not only falls behind developing countries, but also suffers a great gap with developed countries. according to data from the “global times”, the online survey of “china’s gdp overruns japan: how do you see it”, more than 90% of respondents agreed that “china is not the world's second economic power” and more than 74% of chinese people believe their nation will need at least 20 more years to achieve the real per capita gdp of the world’s second highest level.6 obviously, it is pity that most ordinary chinese people still cannot experience, nor enjoy the fruits of the world’s “second largest economy”. data from the world bank in 2009 indicated that china’s per capita gdp ranked no. 124 among 213 countries and regions worldwide. even if one reckons china’s per capita gdp according to the actual sum of us$3,800, it would rank as no. 105 in the world. one could take “medical care” as an example. according to the world health organization’s ranking based on the member states’ integrated assessment scheme, such as the fair distribution and fund collection of health care, china ranked 188 among the 191 member states __ the 4th from the bottom.7 though china’s gdp and fiscal income are in the front ranks of the world, the income level and growth rate lag behind. for instance, as the prices of goods keep rising while the income of ordinary people rejohn b. zhangi 255 mains low. the daily necessities and fruits in supermarkets are indeed abundant, but their prices are almost the same with the developed countries. the reality we have to keep in mind is that the average per capita income in china is only 5,000 usd but 40,000 usd in developed countries. at the same time, the annual income of the lower-middle class in china is dozens of times and even hundreds of times lower than that of the rich class and of the average per capita income in developed countries. from 1978 to 2007, china’s share of total wages in gdp declined from 15.65% to 11.15%, and the nation’s workers compensation share of gdp declined from 62.34% to 42.60%. also the chinese government’s administrative expenses accounted for 26% of total revenue, while it was only 3% in japan, and many european countries did not exceed 4%.8 the unbalanced development of china’s economic growth has created a huge gap between rich and poor, as well as tremendous waste of resources and the escalation of environmental pollution. the unbelievable consequences are as visible as china’s growth. all of these have led to some serious social conflicts and problems. economic growth has become the central measure of development. it has impacted all levels of chinese society and accelerated the process of secularization. the blind pursuit of economic interests is gradually corrupting people’s minds and leading china into a crisis. with the gap between rich and poor constantly expanding, relationships between people have become materialistic and insensitive, leading to instances which have shocked chinese society. the tragedy of yueyue (a 2-year-old girl) last fall was a typical case which demonstrated this lack of compassion and conscience.9 while material conditions are important, the pursuit of spiritual development and belief is also vital. if a society neglects or lacks these, the consequences are often horrific. recently, in the pursuit of money, some people have added melamine to milk powder, selling waste oil discarded from restaurants, etc. from contaminating food (honey, pasta, meat, rice, dried sea cucumber, etc.) to the contamination of ordinary commodities (washing liquid, shampoo, shower gel, gasoline), and the production of fake drugs, fake diplomas and fake invoices, adulteration and fraud have penetrated all walks of life and become a common phenomenon. 256 prajna vihara __ __ ~ in the past, giving red envelops signalled blessings from elders to the young, but today has become associated with acts of bribery. it has lost its traditional value of loving affection and friendship. besides such corruption cases among government officials there are also red envelop bribes of medical workers and teachers. patients often need to give doctors red envelops to get better medical treatment, and students need to give red envelops to teachers. recently, this corruption is also present in sports such as soccer.10 it is not merely secular society that has been polluted by economic growth. the same is happening in cultural, educational, charitable and even religious sectors. for example, temples and churches meant for worship have also been affected by the economy-centred development; most temples in china demand an entrance fee either through the temple administration itself or the cultural relics bureau. some temples even sell the “first burning incense” and “first ringing bell” at a very high price.11 zhu dake, professor of the cultural critique institute at tongji university and a well-known contemporary critic, once candidly asserted: "many believers want to establish an adulterous relationship with gods” and "bring the bribery game in business sectors to religions through making promises and fulfilling them, thinking that by delivering a ‘red envelop’ filled with a lot of money the gods would be pleased and their sins forgiven.12 of course, some enlightened buddhist masters, such as monk jinghui, the former abbot of bolin chansi temple in zhaoxian of hebei province, and his successor, the current abbot monk minghai, insist that bolin chansi be open to visitors, welcoming all believers and people from all walks of life to worship and visit freely. for many years, intellectual and religious circles in china have been constantly appealing for balanced development with due attention given to the traditional culture as well as religious and moral values, instead of just going after economic construction. to solve a series of china’s social problems, not only do the legal system and management as well as transparent supervision mechanism need be strengthened, the spiritual needs, cultural construction and religion's role must be given due attention. in other words, china needs to pay attention to constructing traditional culture and the moral system as much as the economy. john b. zhangi 257 the sixth plenum of the 17th committee of the ccp on october 18, 2011, passed ‘decisions on several key issues regarding furthering the cultural system reform and promoting the great prosperity and development of the socialist culture”. for the first time, cultural and economic constructions, political and socialist, as well as ecological, constructions are being named as the new projects of the ccp.13 this is an historic decision that reflects progress. though a single decision is not enough to solve so many social problems, the great attention given to cultural construction by the ccp can serve as compensation for what has been lost. at the same time, it is bringing new opportunities to construct a harmonious society initiated by the chinese leaders, and it will bring blessings to ordinary people as well. part ii. playing the prophetic role, giving play to the religious function, and safeguarding social justice institutionalized religion has doctrines and regulations, and the state has its constitution, laws and policy. both mutually define their responsibility and duty for each other. the state guarantees the right of its citizens to religious freedom through the constitution, laws and policies, while religion, through its adherents, builds up the nation and contributes to society with its ideals of faith values and multiple identities. take the catholic church as an example. on the one hand, the church thinks it necessary for the state and government to exist for the public welfare, “the political community and public authority… belong to an order established by god”.14 therefore, the church encourages citizens to exercise their rights and fulfil their duty by obeying the authority of the government, respecting the laws of the state,15 and participating in the political life of the state in cooperation with the government, as well as “generously and faithfully loving their country”.16 on the other hand, the church attaches great importance to human dignity and equality, which is the foundation of social justice, believing that social justice is realized only when human dignity is respected.17 therefore, the church emphasizes that, only when inequality is eliminated among the members of the human family and between different nations, and everybody lives a digni258 prajna vihara __ __ ~ fied life, does society have justice and humanity has progress and peace.18 the church’s caring for society and paying due attention to social justice issues have formed the basis for its prophetic role. it requires the joint efforts of the state and all circles of society, including religion, to realize such a goal. contemporary religion contributes to society in two important ways: it enhances human dignity through charitable service, and it promotes social justice by exercising its prophetic role. with regard to the former, the church tries to serve society and the masses by establishing charitable institutions. before ascending into heaven, christ admonished his disciples to love one another by attending to and serving each other (jn 13: 14, 34), and he evidenced this love by giving up his own life, giving shape to the mode of the servanttype church in ecclesiology. in fact, all religions similarly advocate service and devotion to society and the public as the mode of the servanttype church. ever since china has reformed and opened up, the five religions in the country have made some contributions in serving society, but most have chosen social service, which is comparatively easier because it focuses on charitable sacrifice while basically avoiding a prophetic role and mission. this leads to an ambiguous identity, weak voice and limited consciousness of religion’s prophetic role and edifying function __ namely, the prophetic role of religion in safeguarding social justice. ii.1. the prophetic role of religion among world religions, judaism, catholicism, eastern orthodoxy and protestantism all prophetic tradition, and all have a very clear mission in this regard. the old testament prophets were spokesmen and predictors of the lord most high. their prophecies not only conveyed the lord’s messages but also denounced social injustice. the prophet nathan once denounced the famous king david for his serious crime of murder and adultery, and urged him to repent (2 samuel 11-12). and the prophet elijah condemned king ahab for his evil deed of conspiring with his wife to falsely charge naboth and seize his vineyard (1 kings 21:1). in new testament times, christ is not only messiah, the son of john b. zhangi 259 the lord most high, but also prophet, king and high priest. “the spirit of the lord is upon me. he has anointed me, and sent me to bring good tidings to the poor, liberation to prisoners, sight to the blind, and freedom to the oppressed, and to announce a year of favour of the lord” (luke 4: 18). without any reservation, jesus condemned the social injustice of his time and stood with the marginalized to the point of giving up his life. the second vatican council emphasizes that, through baptism, every christian also participates in the priestly, prophetic and kingly functions of christ.19 thus, every christian takes part in his prophetic role and responsibilities. in the history of chinese buddhism and taoism, there were famous monks and priests who courageously stepped forward to ask the emperors to avoid making war and to safeguard peace, playing roles similar to that of the prophets, thereby saving countless common people. for example, “the eminent buddhist monk in the west regions fo tucheng (232-248) converted the ferocious and murderous shi hu and shi le, and prevented countless lives from being destroyed. the shi’s respected fo tucheng as their teacher, and often consulted him on state affairs. master daoan, disciple of fo tucheng, once advised fu jian to stop war”.20 another example was the well-known taoist priest master qiu chuji (丘处机 1148-1227), who, witnessing the miserable scenes brought about by the mongol army’s indiscriminate killings, personally went to the west regions in defiance of all dangers to see genghis khan (1162-1227), founder of the mongol empire, earnestly asking him to stop the atrocities, respect heaven and love the people, and encourage brotherly love and filial piety among the mongols. countless ordinary people were saved thanks to the prophetic role of qiu chuji, the master of eternal spring, who thus won for himself the good reputation of “stopping killings with one word”.21 still another example was liu bingzhong ( 刘秉忠 1216-1274), a former buddhist monk. faced with the mongol rulers, who were interested in nothing but killing and conquering after moving their capital to beijing, he sincerely advised kublai khan, or emperor shizong of the yuan dynasty, to adopt the policy of “minimum force and no killing”, which partly restrained the sanguinary massacres committed by the mongol army in their conquests of dali, yunan and the southern song dynasty.22 260 prajna vihara __ __ ~ in modern china, not only did peace-loving clergy and laity oppose wars and advocate peace, but some even risked their lives to rescue wounded anti-japanese soldiers. in 1937, a group of clergy and laity from anguo county, hebei province, bravely joined the anti-japanese ambulance corps, “especially sister lu, who, in active response to the call to take part in medical aid, went to many places in henan, shanxi, shaanxi, and sichuan during the eight years of the war, trudging in the mountains as taihang and zhongtiao to retrieve the dying soldiers and rescue the wounded ones on the frontlines of the raging battlefields”.23 father zhang qingtong, pastor of erzhancun village, fangshan district, beijing, tried to protect women taking refuge in the church, but he was cruelly shot dead on september 14, 1937, by japanese soldiers, who then hung his body on a cross.24 on october 9 that same year, also for trying to protect women taking refuge in a church, most rev. franciscus hubertus schraven, dutch-born bishop of the former zhengding diocese, and eight other foreign priests and brothers were murdered by japanese soldiers, who thereafter burned their bodies.25 during the nanking massacre in 1937, a group of peace-loving, anti-war and justice-upholding foreign clergy and lay missioners courageously remained in nanking. they not only risked their lives and did their utmost to help chinese refugees, but also bravely recorded in detail the various atrocities which the japanese invaders committed daily in nanking city, thus later providing to the international tribunal irrefutable evidence of the sanguinary massacre the japanese invaders had committed in nanking.26 religious figures have not only stopped violence but also created it as well. this is why religious communities should reject self-destructive religious fanaticism, fundamentalism and chauvinism, especially egocentricity, insanity and irrational compulsion in human nature.27 all religious wars and the mutual oppression and persecution of religions by means of political power in human history, as well as the various forms of religious terrorism today, have been perpetrating horrible violence and terror in the name of the supreme god, and harming the perpetrators themselves as well as others, and causing no end of trouble for future generations. this not only blasphemes god, but more than everything else, it is the tragedy of religion itself. there no longer will be court teacher, emperor’s confidante, or john b. zhangi 261 mafia, nor does modern religion encourage its clergy to enter politics,28 but religious circles can still contribute to society and bear witness to their respective beliefs by serving the masses, safeguarding peace and upholding justice with the multiple identities of their adherents as clergy, citizens, scholars, experts, advisors, or peace mediators. this article is meant to awaken the consciousness of the prophetic role, and advise the religious communities in china to play their prophetic roles and bring into play their unique function in the uplifting of social morality and conscience, the safeguarding of social justice and the relief of the needy. every religion has its prophetic identity and action. this kind of prophetic defence of justice and sincere remonstration, instead of producing effects inferior to those of charitable works, often accomplishes far more. ii.2. effective instruments in defence of social justice: law, religion, and moral conscience the law is the instrument to safeguard the order of the state and social justice, but without the help of moral conscience, the law alone cannot thoroughly resolve the problems in current societal tendencies. the law can only restrain, through punishment and deterrence, external criminal acts that have been discovered, but it cannot restrain the heart, the mind and inner acts of the human being. therefore, despite numerous laws, rules and regulations, various serious problems of social injustice and heartless incidents will inevitably take place if society has no conscience. the media exposure of the three deer (sanlu) contaminated milk powder incident in shijiazhuang, forced state leaders to pay greater attention the problems of corruption. on september 22, 2008, premier wen jiabao pointed out, “what we should do now is prevent such things from happening again. this incident revealed inadequate supervision and management on the part of the local government, and also lack of occupational morality and social morality on the part of some enterprises, in the words of the ordinary people, that they have no conscience. we cannot only affix the responsibility on the officials for the incident, but also resolutely rectify and handle such enterprises, and let none of them off!”29 260 prajna vihara __ __ ~ here, besides severely criticizing law enforcement agencies for their inadequate supervision and management and declaring that criminals will be severely punished by legal means, premier wen also raised a serious social problem that is plaguing contemporary china: no conscience. be it enterprises or individuals, when greed has the upper hand in the competition to make money, they go so far as to make money through fraud, trafficking, cheating and poisoning in total disregard of the health and life of others. this is typical total moral degeneration due to excessive avarice and greed. their conscience has been degraded beyond cure. whether it is society as a whole, or individuals, what effect does the law have on them, and what meaning does it have for them, once they have reached such a level of decadence? in recent years, the chinese government has constantly emphasized the importance of constructing both spiritual and material civilizations equally, yet it has deferred the idea of “governing the country with law”, which is crucial and necessary for the harmonious and healthy development of china. however, not only has rapid economic development not solved moral problems, some severely immoral incidents have been rising. this is because these regulations and policies have no spiritual backup __ no religious or cultural nourishment. actually, the law is not all-powerful, and it is far from sufficient for society to have only the law and administration. since the reform and opening-up, china over the years has drawn up many laws, regulations and rules. “there are rules and regulations covering almost all areas of life, none of which are not strict and severe: in the political area, besides the state constitution and the party constitution, we have various norms and methods; in the economic area, besides various imperatives and stipulations, we have numerous bylaws and directive rules; and in the social area, apart from statutes and stipulations, we have many regulations and pledges. but what is the result? corruption has not been eliminated, and the same is true for fraud, cheating, trafficking, breaching laws and violating disciplines…”30 for example, immediately after the incident of the three deer contaminated milk powder, the law on food safety was drawn up and smoothly approved. there now is a perfect law on food safety, but it is useless if producers of foodstuffs continue to be heartless, supervisory departments of foodstuffs and supervisors remain indifferent to their john b. zhangi 263 duties, and the law fails to expose these criminal acts. therefore, society needs a legal system, and society with a legal system calls out for conscience, and conscience needs religion. what, then, is conscience? where does it come from? as an expression of good-heartedness, conscience is not only a kind of traditional virtue and public morality, but also a reflection of the natural law and justice. conscience originates first and foremost in the innate goodness of human nature. secondly, it is the inner activity of the human person to discern truth from falsehood, good from evil, and justice from injustice. religion is the pivot of conscience, which needs constant nourishment and formation by the former. every religion can strengthen the moral and conscientious responsibility one bears for self, family and society. finally, the feelings of peace or unease, shame or fear deep in the human heart that follow an action are reflected in the conscience as in a mirror, unmistakably signifying how truly ethical the action is. as one saying goes, “the deity is right above your head” and another, “a quiet conscience sleeps in thunder”. everybody fears because the object of fear is the omnipresent and all just supreme deity. conscience cannot penetrate deep into the heart and restrain a person unless the person is conscious of the existence of god and his omniscience. only when conscience is troubled in the face of various unjust temptations can one pull back, wake up and repent. this is the experience of being moved by conscience. obviously, conscience is the just voice of the supreme deity. it can urge one to be on guard and restrain one’s behaviour even if this behaviour falls beyond the reach of the law’s restraining power. beliefs in transmigration, retribution and the nether world in polytheism as well as monotheism’s beliefs in the last judgment, heaven and hell can both contribute to social justice by awing and restraining a person in the heart. of course, to safeguard social justice, besides religion and the restraining power of morality and conscience, the law is also needed because no religion can restrain those who defy the natural law and conscience. religion cannot exert external punishment but only inner restraint and punishment, yet the just and sound law of the state can effectively punish all external unlawful behaviour. therefore, both law and moral conscience are needed to safeguard social justice. only when the building 264 prajna vihara __ __ ~ of the legal system and the rebuilding of morality and conscience are equally emphasized can a civilized, just and harmonious society come into being. therefore, to ensure a healthy development, china needs to build up the edifice of the legal system together with that of morality and conscience. in today’s china, which strengthens the up-building of a society that respects the dignity of law, society calls for a conscience supported by religion. religion can assist society, which in turn should allow the former to play its role of conscience in defence of social justice and give full play to its functions. to supplement the inability of law to get to the root of evil behaviour, equal attention must be paid to both. ii.3. strengthening awareness of identity and walking together with society given the nature of religious identity, every religion should play a prophetic role, and religious individuals must have the courage to pursue social justice, so as to assist those in power in working for the development of the country and welfare of society. nevertheless, it is usually easier to pay the role of a servant than to act according to one’s responsibility as a prophet. of course, it is easy for religion to lose its prophetic role and, as a result, the value of such a role as well, once its identity is brought into question, held in contempt and rejected, so that it can no longer give attention to social justice and contribute to its safeguarding. actually the prophetic role of religion neither resorts to force, nor agitates for political confrontation, but seeks in a timely way to inform the governmental departments concerned and all circles of society of the real situation, denounce unlawful and unjust behaviour, encourage society to be mindful of such issues, and urge the departments concerned to take them seriously, by peaceful means and through the multiple identities of the laity and clergy of different religions and their opportunity to be invited to take part in government and political affairs. in recent years, modern media and the internet seem to have played the supervisory role in speaking up boldly in defence of justice by means of their irreplaceable advantageous position of being the channel of public opinion, in matters such as food safety, workplace accidents, and projohn b. zhangi 265 tecting the rights of the social masses and the marginalized. in most cases, it is usually the media of the national level, of the higher level, or of the local level that respectively exposes the injustices of departments, enterprises and individuals of the local level, and elsewhere in society. nonetheless, most cases exposed and severely criticized by the media have drawn the attention of society and the officials, so that the law could give play to its functions, problems could be resolved, and justice could prevail. this is the real sign of social progress. it is a pity that, in the face of the crisis of moral deterioration and phenomena of social injustice, the five religions in china have never uttered any voice, nor issued any appeal over the years. the fear of touching upon sensitive political and ethnic issues is no excuse not to assist the state in preventing and correcting injustice. religious circles ought to give play to their unique social function connected to social inspiration and edification. of course, while the law is needed to crack down on crimes and various illegal activities, it needs to be supervised by public opinion. as the famous english philosopher bertrand russell said, the law is almost powerless without the support of public opinion. however, like the law, public opinion can only supervise external behaviour and cannot solve the problems in the human heart. public opinion in coordination with the law can indeed expose, check and punish crimes, and reveal the inner and external scars of the human being, but like the law, it is still insufficient to heal the wounds and eradicate the deep-rooted social ills. religion can not only heal the wounds of the heart and change unhealthy social tendencies, but also can function to inspire and edify society. today, as the plurality religions and their social function are becoming understood and recognized, the religions in china must journey together with society and its masses by paying attention to their role as servants, playing the critical role of prophets, protecting the weak, denouncing injustice, awakening conscience, and purifying the human heart, thereby positively contributing to the construction of a civilized, just, stable, and harmonious society. 266 prajna vihara __ __ ~ conclusion in the past thirty some years, a series of social problems have surfaced in the process of rapid economic development in china. this should prompt the whole society to do deep soul-searching and reflection so as to make suitable adjustment and change. it also demands that the government and its citizens pay attention to and strengthen the spiritual, cultural and moral construction. as the guardian and defender of human spiritual life, religious faith will need to play a greater role and exert more influence in china. how to make better use of the religious value systems to support society is a timely challenge for china. in this regard, the religious communities themselves have to take up these prophetic responsibilities, but the government and other social groups have also to pay attention and make good use of this spiritual element and its energy. we are happy to see that, at present, the notion of “religion is culture, and religion is the soul of culture” has been widely accepted by the chinese society at large. in the past 40 years, the religious influence on political affairs has changed from weakness to greater power around the world. religion used to be passive, but has become confident and full of energy. it used to be local but now is universal, and it used to be subjected to power and authorities, but now is prophetic and making its protesting voices heard by politicians.31 although religion still belongs to the government according to the current state-religion practice in china, and without rights to demand any governing power for the political regime,32 the religious people and intellectuals in china are still able and should play the prophetic role in the areas of social justice, morality, and cultural construction, so as to make its prophetic voices for justice heard in building up a harmonious and just society. endnotes 1see, my paper “the function of religion and the development of its role in the chinese society”, religion and society: the challenge of multiple identities john b. zhangi 267 --a workshop for further understanding between europe and china and for our common challenges, the sigtuna foundation, stockholm, october 3-6, 2008. 2艾君編《改革開放三十年流行語錄》 ai-jun, ed. “the popular quotations of the past three decade-long reform”, 2008-12-3, http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2008-12-03/ 154016776075.shtml. 3參考《鄧小平文選》第 2, 卷 3, 1994, 人民出版社 . 《1978中央工作會議 中國命運的轉折》 , 》，《新京報》， , 第 301 期 , 2008 年 12 月 14 日 . see “selected works of deng xiaoping”, volume 2, 3, 1994, people’s publishing house. “1978 china central work conference twist of fate”, “beijing news”, p. 301, december 14, 2008. http://www. thebeijingnews.com/news/reform30/2008/12-15/011@090542.htm. 4 鄧小平 : ：《關於經濟工作的幾點意見》 (1979年10月4日 ) ）《鄧小平文選》第 2 卷第 194 頁 . 鄧小平 : ：《目前的形勢和任務》 (1980年1月16日 ), ，《鄧小平文選》第2卷第250頁 . deng xiaoping: “a few comments on economic work”, (october 4, 1979), “selected works of deng xiaoping”, volume 2, p. 194. deng xiaoping: “the current situation and tasks” (january 16, 1980), “selected works of deng xiaoping”, volume 2, p. 250. 5汪孝宗，《gdp居世界第二被指意義不大，多領域落後》，《中國經濟週刊》，, wang xiaozong, “gdp ranks second in the world accused of meaningful, multi-field backward”, “china economic weekly”, 2011 -03-01, 2011-03-01. see: http://finance.huanqiu.com/roll/ 2011-03/1529791.html. 6中國gdp超日·你怎麼看，全球網 : china’s gdp overruns japan: how do you think: the global network: http://survey.huanqiu.com/result.php?s=sffzd xj2zxlfmzm0mq@`5^1@@`5^1@. 7see: wang xiaozong, “gdp ranks second in the world accused of meaningful, multi-field backward”. 8see: wang xiaozong, “gdp ranks second in the world accused of meaningful, multi-field backward”. 9on the eve of october 13, 2011 evening, on a street in foshan city, guangdong province, 2-year-old girl little yueyue was hit and rolled over by two vehicles. within 7 minutes after the incident, 18 individual went through yueyue’s body, not even one shot to the rescue. finally a garbage-collecting woman came to her rescue. during the following days, the video and photos of this tragedy shocked the whole chinese society, and it has become the center of public news-media and the focus of attention. it caused a nationwide discussion. 10see: http://www.globaltimes.cn, special coverage: former soccer officials on the trial in china? 11“first burning incense” usually refers to the first incensing on the morning of the first day of the lunar new year (or the first day of each month). people consider it as the greatest virtue in gaining the greatest blessings. for this reason, its price is also very high. along with the first burning incense is the ringing of the first bell three times for the health of body and other blessings. 12朱大可《小悅悅和文化夜鷹丸》，2011-11-02博客 : http://zhudake.blog.sohu.com/ 189764911.html. zhu youke’ article in his blog: http://zhudake.blog.sohu.com/189764911.html. 268 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 13中國共產黨第十七屆中央委員會第六次全體會議公報》，北京，人民出版社 , 2011 年10月版 . the communiqu? of the sixth plenum of the 17 the central committee of the ccp, beijing, renmin publishing house, http://baike.baidu.com/view/6730690.html. 14gaudium et spes 74. 15rom 12: 1-2; catechism of the catholic church, nos. 1897-1999, 1904. 16gaudium et spes 75. 17catechism of the catholic church, no. 1928. 18gaudium et spes 29. 19lumen gentium 31. 20 星雲大師編著 : ：《佛教叢書》，見《教用：佛教與政治》篇 , 佛光文化出版社 , 佛教叢書網 . “buddhism and politics”, in master xingyun ed. buddhism series, foguang cultural press, buddhism series network. 21 《“長春子”丘處機：一言止殺……》， , 參考明宗網 . cf. mingzong network, “master qiu chuji stopped killings with one word…”. 余秋陽《長春觀》，《武漢文史資料》 >> 1994年 >> 第04期，第140頁 . 22 《記錄走廊千秋事 __ 探訪前衛古鎮》 , 葫蘆島市檔案資訊網 , 2006-9-6. 原載《葫蘆島日報 ; 《元初名相—劉秉忠（邢臺縣人）》, 參考邢臺新聞網 , 2007-9-17. “visit to the ancient town of qianwei”, 09-06-2007, www.dahld.gov.cn. originally “liu bingzhong (from xingtai county), a famous prime minister at the beginning of the yuan dynasty” in huludao daily. cf. 09-17-2007, www.xtnews.gov.cn. 23 佚名 : ：《中國教徒的靈修》, 載《鼎》 2003 年第23卷 , 總第128期 . anonymous, “spirituality of the chinese christians”, tripod, vol. 23, 2003, total no. 128. 24 《北京教區在房山舉行隆重悼念活動》 , 》、《……為保護婦女而殉道的張慶桐神父永垂不朽》， , 載《信德》，, 1997, 年7月1日 , 第3版 . 參考《北京日報》 , 1997 年5月27日 , 第5版 . “beijing diocese holds solemn memorial ceremonies in fangshan” and “immortal is father zhang qingtong, who died a martyr for protecting women”, faith newspaper, 07-01-1997, p. 3. cf. beijing daily, 05-27-1997, p. 5. 25 《日寇殘殺正定神長教友又一佐證》 , 》、《荷蘭友人來訪》 , 載《信德》， , 1997 年11月1日 , 第13版 . “another proof for the japanese invaders’ murder of the clergy and lay in zhengding” and “visit of dutch friends”, faith newspaper, 11-01-1997, p. 13. 26 章開沅編，加藤実譯 : 《天理難容—美國傳教士眼中的南京大屠殺 : 1937-1938, 南京大學出版社 . zhang kaiyuan ed. heaven will not tolerate it! the massacre at nanking through the eyes of an american missionary: 1937-1938 (transl. by jitsu kato), nanjing university press. 27 謝木水 : 《政教關係的道德思考》 , 載《聯合早報》，, 2002 年11月26日 , 第8版 . xie mushui, “moral considerations of the state-church relationship”, lian he zao bao, 11-262002, p. 8. 28the new canon law stipulates that the clerics “are forbidden to assume public offices which entail a participation in the exercise of civil power” (code 285.3), and “are not to have an active part in political parties and in governing labor unions” (code 287.2), but the church encourages the faithful to enthusiastically participate in the political affairs of the state. 29“wen jiabao: ‘don’t let off any conscienceless enterprises!’” 09-22-2008, john b. zhangi 269 07_(83-104) the ethics of.pmd the ethics of revenge and forgiveness: a comparison of chinese and western cultural values and theology john b. zhang faith institute for cultural studies, china abstract various ways to solve the problems of hatred, and conflict resolution have emerged within cultural traditions, political environments, and religious belief systems. since the emergence of human society, revenge had always been one of the methods to resolve conflicts. we can easily find that this perennial ethical issue affecting and troubling human society, especially families and communities. in the course of history, revenge was once considered as a kind of virtue and the idea of revenge was even honored and respected. however, with the passage of time, it is being gradually abandoned by the civilized world which embraces forgiveness. each culture and religion has advocated forgiveness in different ways. this article examines both the chinese and western attitudes concerning forgiveness and revenge to allow for reflection on cultural dialogue and peace-making. forward thomas aquinas once said, “human beings are social and political animals”. indeed, living in families, communities and societies, conflicts between individuals, families, and races are unavoidable in the protection of one’s own interests. thus, there exists the phenomenon of revenge. the resolution of conflicts is a problem for individuals and families on a smaller scale, and an ethical question for the society at large. in the attempt to control hatred and retribution in society, different methods of conflict resolution have emerged within ethnic and cultural traditions, prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 83-104 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 83 political environments, and religious belief systems. since the emergence of human society, revenge had always been one of the methods to resolve conflicts. whether it was in the eastern cultural tradition represented by the confucianism or in the western one represented by the ancient greco-roman tradition, revenge was once considered as a kind of virtue and the idea of revenge was even honored and respected. however, with the passage of time, it is being abandoned by the civilized world. in many countries, revenge has been outlawed. the nature of the law is to stop crimes, including the acts that can trigger retribution and acts of revenge. nevertheless, when the law cannot provide a timely and just resolution of conflicts, people may still choose the method of revenge. but the result is nothing more than vicious cycle of violence and crime, eventually leading to division and anarchy, causing social instability and unrest. what, then, is the best way to confront hatred? nothing but forgiveness. actually each culture and religion have discussed and advocated forgiveness in different ways. this article takes christianity as an example, through critique, examination, and analysis on the ideas of “revenge” and “forgiveness” in both the chinese and western cultures, so as to provide some meaningful references for cultural dialogue and human peace-making. obviously, this article is merely an introduction. my hope is to awaken wider discussion. i. conceptual analysis on “revenge” and “forgiveness” “revenge” and “forgiveness” are two concepts in social ethics, and within the scope of sociology as well. the definition of “revenge” in ci hai ( chinese encyclopedic dictionary) is “taking action against someone who did evil to you”. however, the ancient chinese philosopher mencius justified revenge action under certain circumstance; “the king tang started a war of revenge for a slaughtered child, not for the wealth and power” (mencius---the legend of duke teng). on the contrary, “forgiveness” is defined as “pardoning someone who did evil to you” in contemporary chinese dictionary. however, chinese culture has 84 prajna vihara,-~ a limited description of the concept of “forgiveness”. speaking from the perspective of psychology, revenge is impulsive behavior that is neither self-serving nor altruistic. vengeance is also a subconscious emotion in human nature; the release of the suppressed feelings of stress, mental pain and other hidden emotions. on the appearance, revenge appears to be righteous expression. however, as a matter of fact, revenge is actually an irrational release of emotions. psychological studies have shown that all human beings can display aggressive “impulse deviations”. revenge is one of the four motivations that cause such “impulse deviation”. the other three are “concern, power and helplessness”.1 “revenge” is an unhealthy condition hidden in human nature. moreover, hatred is a deadly weapon of self-harm. once a person is caught in great resentment, rational thoughts will eventually be clouded anger. additionally, the person will be the first victim of his/her own anger, and the worst part is others will have no knowledge of it. naturally, we would miss ourselves in this logical fallacy “i have been hurt, then i am not willing to forgive, therefore i always will be in the state of angry resentment that eventually leads “i” to get hurt again”. the act of retaliation hurts your “enemy”, but then there will be new tortures for you: “anxiety” from hurting others and “worries” about reprisals. in other words, revenge is a vicious cycle. by contrast, “forgiveness” is a noble act and a form of wisdom. forgiveness is hope for the opposite’s confession of wrongdoings as well, in order to make a progress towards becoming a “complete person”. a person who hurts others always denies the human nature of others; in fact, he or she is destroying their own human nature. but once a person bravely forgives, he or she will be blessed, for the forgiveness could liberate a person’s spirit from the shadow of anger and hatred. the reward of forgiveness for a person, family and community doing the forgiving will be the great relief and peace of heart. thus, forgiveness is wisdom and a virtue that is indispensable to modern civilization and a foundation for constructing social harmony. john b. zhang 85 ii. “revenge” and”forgiveness” in the traditional chinese cultural values in the recent years, some ancient chinese fables, historical fictions and classical literature were made into movies and dramas. besides manifesting as themes patriotism, social morality and romance, “revenge” is the main theme for the majority of action and historical films and television programs. there are many thrilling stories about “revenge” in chinese history. for example, whipping corpse, revenge of duke gou jian, the assassination the king of qin, the orphan of zhao, etc. all these stories are related to the same topic: “revenge”. this leads to the question: “why are these “revenge stories” so frequently remembered by the people?” revenge is still considered a virtue to many people. therefore, i have to seek for the answer from the chinese traditional culture. 1. etymology of “revenge” and “forgiveness” in chinese tradition “revenge” has been highly commended since ancient times. again, just as i mentioned above, much of chinese literature and many idioms are related to “revenge”, and related to three forms of revenge: “retribution for the evildoings” (general revenge), “family hatred” and “desire for revenge”. 1) retribution to evil doings “eyes for eyes, teeth for teeth”, “life for life, blood for blood”. “we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack”. (chairman mao) 2) family hatred “a son should pay his father’s debts”; “a dutiful son shall take revenge for his father’s death”; “when a man kills another’s father, that other will kill his father; when a man kills another’s elder brother, that other will kill his elder brother”. (mencius) 3) desire of revenge “if a man passes by revenge, he shall not be a human being”; “revenge is a just action for a person”; “it is never too late to take revenge for a person”. 86 prajna vihara,-~ 2. revenge for righteousness before the judicial system was set up during the ancient times, revenge was quite common. in traditional chinese society, people used to hold to this creed “if a man passes by revenge, he shall not be a human being”. in confucianism, ‘the gentleman knows what is righteousness (yi); the mean man knows what is profitable”. however, yi (righteousness) implies the act of revenge which had been used as a measure for morality. in short , virtue and hatred of evil are realized through the act of “revenge for righteousness in the view of the public”. it is an act for justice, the reflection of the true quality of a hero, and the real spirit of a man. zhao dagong explained this chinese “complex of revenge” as follows: “the greatest acts of hatred of all are ‘killing someone’s families’, and ‘raping someone’s wife’. all these are implacable hatreds, and if someone passes by these hatreds, he or she has no different to animals”2 regarding revenge, wu song, a character of fiction in “outlaws of the marsh” ( ), took revenge for his brother’s murder. he killed his sister-in-law and xi men qing who colluded in the murder of his brother. wu song even killed all in the family of zhang du jian (a corrupt official who covered up the crimes). finally, wu song proudly declared his success at revenge by identifying himself on the wall with the blood of his victims. however, such a cruel murderer was highly respected and commended as a “hero” by the chinese people in history. this story leads to another question “how does revenge become a just act? why wasn’t the appeal to law accepted by the people?” mr. zhao dagong stated his opinion. since the rule of man has been greater than the rule of law in chinese history, the people do not believe in the fairness of law. “the yamen (residence of a mandarin) gate is wide open, yet with only right on your side but no money, don’t go inside”. (chinese proverb) obviously, justice of the law does not work ahead of the power of wealth, and eventually “revenge” became the only solution. even now, personal revenge is common.3 john b. zhang 87 revenge has become in chinese a tradition connected to the worship of individual heroism; and also a part of the public demand for justice. 3. the virtue of forgiveness in traditional chinese culture, although there are many words for describing revenge, there is very few for forgiveness. nevertheless, there is no lack of famous sayings about forgiveness in confucians, such as: human nature keeps ourselves away from those we hate, and makes us not commend those we dislike. however that is the cause of academic decadence, and the beginning of betrayal of tao (truth) ---minister lu’s annals . some people asked confucius “why do someone people repay hatred with virtue?” confucius answered “how do you repay the one treat that treats you virtuously? i think we shall treat hatred with justice; repaying virtue by virtue”. disciple zi gong asked confucius “is there any doctrine that i hold for the whole life?” confucius said “do not do to others what you would not like to be done to you (golden rule)”--analects . confucius said “he who requires much from himself and little from others will keep himself from being the object of resentment”.--analects the popular sayings in the daily life: “harmony is most precious” “better to get rid of an enmity than keep it alive” “a smile at meeting and enmity is banished”. “repay injury with kindness” “when is the end of revenge?” “take a step back and you'll see the boundless sky and sea”…. all these sayings show that the “social order” that confucianism recommends does not include “revenge” alone, but also highly advocates “benevolence” and “forgiveness”. obviously, to compare with revenge, forgiveness is a noble virtue. 88 prajna vihara,-~ iii. revenge in greco-roman tradition although christianity originally derived from ancient hebrew culture, it is also imprinted with a greco-roman imprint. before the birth of christ until the renaissance period, greco-roman culture was the mainstream culture in european civilization. greco-roman civilization led human beings to a cultural summit.4 however, the idea of revenge was quite common in ancient (pre-christian) greco-roman culture. we can find typical examples in greek literature and drama: erinyes-the goddess of revenge was quite active in the war of troy. obviously, the theme of revenge had been a concern for society in general at that time. for example “orestes” __ the “agamemnon”, “libation person” and “revenge of god” __ are a trilogy and the masterpieces of the great ancient greek playwright aeschylus (525-456bc). they were performed as early as the 5th century bc. the main theme of the orestes story is feuding. “debts of the ancestors must be paid by their heirs with blood”.5 meanwhile, the “revenge genie” ruled the whole of society. another masterpiece, “medea” of euripides tells another bloody revenge story between two families. an angry princess medea killed the mistress of her husband, her father, and two sons, in order to punish her husband through cutting off his blood-line.6 besides ancient greeks and romans, other european tribes, such as the goths, franks, teutons and anglo-saxons had similar revenge traditions. before those tribes were christianized, they were quite hostile. when they conquered a new area, they would kill all the residents there and destroy the weaponry and properties of their enemies. “sacrificing all living creatures to war-god”. in addition, the barbarian law system not only ascribed the punishment for crimes to an individual, but also to his/ her families. prof. brian tierney of cornell university described it as, “once a person was murdered, his/her families had natural right to take revenge on the murderer and his/her families”.7 john b. zhang 89 iv. “revenge” and “forgiveness” in the old-testament during the period of old testament, “revenge” was quite common in jewish values, which had been clearly demonstrated in their “lex talionis”.8 under the influence of the ancient mideastern nations, the law of revenge was once the standard jewish way of revenge. that is “blood for blood!” therefore, what the ancient jews wanted is revenge for shedding blood.9 “lex talionis” can be found in the biblical verses “but if there is harm, then you shall pay life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe” (ex 21:23-25). “lex talionis” can be found in “code of hammurabi”, solon’s law, and roman code. obviously, a “justified revenge” was a “universal law” in these societies. jews eventually took “lex talionis” as a principle in their lives. the ancient hebrews appealed to their laws for solutions, including “lex talionis”. however, in order to avoid the killing of innocents, moses also set up the refuges according to god’s will (num 35:9-15; ex 21:13; deu 4:41-42; 19:2-3). although lex talionis existed in jewish tradition, it could not be carried out personally without a trial by a judge. however, exceptions still existed in the scriptures; joab murders abner; absalom murders amnon (2 samuel 3:26-27; 13;28). we could also find references to “forgiveness” in jewish tradition according the old testament. “you shall not take vengeance, you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (lev 19:18). it would seem that “forgiveness” is a unique characteristic that other mid-east nations did not have at that time. another reason provoking jews to “love their enemies as themselves” is to lift their "hope for justice and revenge” to the lord, and firmly believe god will bring them justice (ps 35, 59, 109). v. theological perspective of revenge in christianity “forgiveness” has an important role in christianity. put simply, it 90 prajna vihara,-~ is one of the foundations of christian faith and value. “forgiveness”, “sympathy” and “love your enemy” are three particular concepts in christian theology. meanwhile, these three “concepts” even became principles in interpersonal relations, and have far-reaching influence for modern civilization. 1. “forgiveness” and “love enemy” in the holy bible according to the new testament, jesus completely rejected the concept of revenge which was a “corrupt custom” handed down from ancient time. he advocated a new value, “love”. (caritas) “you have heard that it was said, ‘you shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy’. but i say love your enemy and do good to those who persecute you.”---(mt 5:43) “so if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go first to be reconciled with your brother, and then come and offer your gift.”--(mt 5:23-24) “so always treat others as you would like them to treat you; that is the law and the prophets.” (mt 7:12) “forgive us for our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors”. “for if you forgive others for their trespasses, your heavenly father will also forgive you”, --(mt 6:12,14) “be merciful, even as your father is merciful.” --(lk 6:36) “you shall forgive your enemies seventy times seven”-(mt 18, 22) “i came not to call the righteous, but sinners” --(mk 2:17) “you shall not go around as a slanderer among your people, and you shall not stand up against the life of your neighbor: i am the lord. you shall not hate your brother in your heart, but you shall reason frankly with your neighbor, lest you incur sin because of him. you shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against the sons of your own people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself: i am the lord.” ----lev 19:16-18 john b. zhang 91 “if you meet your enemy’s ox or his donkey going astray, you shall bring it back to him. if you see the donkey of one who hates you lying down under its burden, you shall refrain from leaving him with it; you shall rescue it with him”. (ex 23:4-5) “show kindness and mercy to one another” ---(zec7:9) “though your sins are like scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they are red like crimson, they shall become like wool” ---(is 1:18) 2. mission of christ: repentance when jesus began his public life, he called people to repent for their sins: “repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (mt 4:17, mk 1:15). here christ had demonstrated his redemptive mission: for the repentance and salvation of all sinners. thus, jesus pointed out that “those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick do. i came not to call the righteous, but sinners”. (mk 2:17, mt 2:17, lk 5;32). speaking from another perspective, the mission of christ also demonstrated his concerns for most vulnerable groups in the society. 3. christ’s forgiveness brings hope and peace christ is life (john 14:6), his forgiveness bring us hope and new lives. according to the gospel of st. john, when the people caught a woman committing adultery, they attempted to stone her to death in order to honor the jewish law. at that time, adultery was an unforgivable crime and death penalty was the consequence. they said to him, “teacher, this woman has been caught in the act of adultery. now in the law, moses commanded us to stone such women. so what do you say?” they said this to test him, so that they might have some charge to bring against him. jesus bent down and wrote with his finger on the ground. and as they continued to ask him, he stood up and said to them, “let he who is without sin 92 prajna vihara,-~ among you be the first to throw a stone at her”. and once more he bent down and wrote on the ground. but when they heard it, they went away one by one, beginning with the older ones, and jesus was left alone with the woman standing before him. jesus stood up and said to her”, “woman, where are they? has no one condemned you?” she said, “no one, lord”. and jesus said, “neither do i condemn you; go, and from now on sin no more. --(jn 8:4-11) jesus not only forgave a sinner, but also gave a person facing death penalty hope and new life. in the gospel, when jesus was in a rich man’s house, he met this woman who hungered for new life again. though jews could not accept her, and even scorned her, jesus forgave her again, and granted her peace. “your sins are forgiven. your faith has saved you; go in peace.” (lk 7:48, 50) 4. christ’s new annotation to the law: forgiveness and sympathy the main line of jewish history is the covenant between god and human beings: “i am the lord, your god, and you are my people”.10 god had been constantly trying to stress his promise. however, the jews did not keep it well. they broke this covenant again and again, and finally their infidelity led to the breakdown of relationship between god and his people. but god always demonstrated his forgiveness to the jews because “they are my people”. therefore, jewish history vacillated between “breaking covenant---setting a new covenant” (the ten commandments, ex 34:10-28). however, the new covenant does not only establish a relation between god and his people, but also has consequences for relations among his people with each other.11 on their long journey of exile and return, the jews strictly followed the law of their forgiving god. they emphasized repentance and law; they solved the problems arising from hatred by following this law john b. zhang 93 and so developed a consciousness of forgiveness. due to the exile and rule of gentiles, the jews followed the law which prevented their assimilation. before christ, the jews considered themselves a selected race, but also for various periods an exiled race. the relation between god and jews was like “father and his son”. even when they were in exile, they strictly followed the law and preserved their characteristics as jews. any violation of the law was a crime. gradually, obedience of the law became a characteristic of the jews, though this came to deviate from its original meaning. during the period of old testament, besides the sins that were defined by the “ten commandments”, jews considered those who disobeyed and belittled the law as sinners. the law became the only standard for judging “sinfulness” or “innocence”, obviously, the poor, shepherds and other marginalized people could not meet the requirements of law, such as keeping sabbath day, cleansing rituals and other rules. they became sinners. they lost all citizenship, and had no qualifications to join in social and religious activities. compared to the marginalized communities, tax collectors, prostitutes and non-jews were considered even more indecent. they would not comply with the covenant and the law. they were classified as gentiles and pagans, and did not belong to god. it is in this historical context, jesus christ came. he taught the jews of god’s love and redemption for all human beings, including sinners and gentiles. jesus emphasized two key words in the law: “justice” and “compassion”. no doubt, obedience to the law was important; it needed to be complemented by compassion. jesus was not against the law, but against its interpretation by the pharisees and scribes and the way they lived it out. for the jews, the key features of the law were holiness and purity. for jesus, the key features of the law were justice and compassion. jesus’ interpretation of the law led to a religious tradition of repentance, and established “forgiveness” at the core of christianity. 5. the irrationality of forgiveness, celebration of repentance the love and forgiveness of christ are irrational. he “recklessly” loved others and ignored the results. in other words, the love of christ 94 prajna vihara,-~ was not based on reasons, but love alone. some of his deeds even violated basic common sense. a typical example is “parable of the lost sheep” “when he has found it, he lays it on his shoulders, rejoicing. and when he comes home, he calls together his friends and his neighbors, saying to them, rejoice with me, for i have found my sheep that was lost. just so, i tell you, there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance”. --lk 15:5-7 here we think the shepherd must have made a mistake, because he should not have abandoned 99 sheep for one. maybe the wolf could attack those 99 sheep anytime. if we judge this parable in accordance with common sense, 99 sheep obviously are more important than one lost sheep. if we think this way, we have totally misunderstood the meaning of jesus’ parable. the theological meaning of “the parable of the lost sheep” is to welcome the so-called incurable sinners home, return them to the community, accept their repentances, for “it is not the will of my father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish” (mt 18:14). 6. unconditional love if forgiveness for christ was not based on reason, it could only be based on love. this kind of love was interpreted as “agape”, which is unconditional. for unconditional love does not require any premise, any acquisition, any pay. from the perspective of secular values, it seems against common sense, a kind of “madness”. however, the lord loves human beings with this agape (unconditional love). it does not matter how bad human beings are, the lord wants to forgive us. he offers human beings a hopeful future that is even beyond what he experienced for himself. for the lord, it is never too late to repent. therefore, the motivation of god’ treatment of human beings is agape. there is another famous parable in the new testament __ “prodigal son” (lk 15:11-32). the lord was like a father or a mother who could not deny love for their own child. owing to their sinfulness, god john b. zhang 95 had sufficient reason to punish human beings with justice. “however, what can i do? you are like lovely infants emerging from wombs; i cannot allow you to perish, for i am the lord and your father”. god is like mother who says to her child who has committed sin “i am angry for your deeds. i could kill you, and you deserved it. however, i could not do it, because i love you”. thus, christianity has forgiveness and agape (unconditional love) at its core. there is abundant love in the lord. forgiveness should not be a question. 7. forgiving one’s enemies when jesus christ was on earth, he publicly forgave those who offended him, betrayed him and killed him. for example, when the samaritans refused to welcome jesus and his disciples, the disciples requested jesus to destroy the enemies by bringing down fire from heaven. however jesus rejected the proposal, and even severely chastised the disciples (lk 9:53-55). another example was when jesus was arrested and his disciples escaped, betraying him one by one. st peter, the leader of disciples even denied jesus three times. (mt 26:69-75). after his resurrection, jesus christ did not complain about their infidelity and “cowardice”. on the contrary, jesus even encouraged his disciples to forget the wrong things they have done and to look for the light in future. moreover, jesus granted peace to them. christ tried to live the doctrine of forgiveness. he had forgiven the people who killed him on the cross. he practiced the most superior love that he taught __ loving his enemies. according to the passion narratives, after he was arrested, jesus also experienced inhuman abuse. he was humiliated and whipped. finally, he was forced to carry a heavy cross to the hill of calvary. however, before he died on the cross, jesus totally forgave his killers, and prayed for them. it was totally beyond common sense. “father, forgive them, for they know not what they do”. ---lk 23:34 since christ set the pattern, “forgiveness” gradually became a religious tradition. deacon st. stephen was the first martyr, but he loved 96 prajna vihara,-~ his enemies. he was stoned to death by the jewish authorities for spreading the gospel. but he prayed to god to forgive the wrongdoers. “lord jesus, receive my spirit. lord, do not hold this sin against them”. (acts:7:59-60) theology and spirituality teach that when we are willing to forgive others, the peace of god will come to our hearts. it will bring liberty and healing to our spirit. the pardoned person could experience the love of christ that will lead to the confession of sin. since the lord has forgiven us with his unlimited love, he would like to see us forgiving others. the ministry to prisoners in jail in western societies is based on this thought. this is a new approach that should be considered by all in society. vi. differences in faith from the perspective of “forgiveness” generally speaking, the discussion of culture is conducted by attention to three factors: values, political institutions, and technology & artifacts. cultural values mainly indicate a nation’s psychological structure, ways of thinking and value systems. it is different form of philosophy and ideology, or something between those two. culture is a deepseated object.12 this paper reflects one of these two concepts “revenge” and “forgiveness” with theological methods based on an historical perspective. obviously, “forgiveness” can be easily found in the culture that is deeply christianized. however, “revenge” is highly stressed in confucianized chinese culture, and only in rare instances is any attention given to “forgiveness”. the ethical differences in these two cultures exist in our daily lives. here i would like to emphasize especially this point. although every national culture is different, that does mean any national culture is high and another is low, one is good and one is bad. certainly each national culture is limited and there are weaknesses in all from an ethical point of view. all need to be constantly purified. john b. zhang 97 1. “forgiveness” and traditional chinese culture the clergy who serve in “grass-roots” churches in parishes in china have experienced a common problem among the faithful in rural areas: “forgiving enemies seems very difficult”. because of the social settings in villages, the conflicts between relations, households and friends are inevitable. if a person is offended, the hatred starts. under this circumstance, the public forgiveness among the people would be very rare. the fact is even that believers do not break away from the “tradition” of revenge because they have been highly affected by this tradition. as a result, their mind-sets are trapped in this traditional practice. the small farmer mentality is alive and effective.. but, in fact, many intellectuals also cannot escape from the spirit of “revenge”. even the famous scholar, mr. zhang zhong xing from peking university, the author of “human characters” (shun sheng lun) admits that he could not forgive some people, because even though they might have confessed their errors, “some issues affect your whole life and lead you not to forgive”.13 forgiveness is indeed far from easy for ordinary people deeply influenced by the confucian culture. since the separation across the taiwan strait for over half a century, full national reconciliation and national reunification have yet to be achieved. apart from the political, economic, diplomatic and geographical reasons of the separation, the absence of the idea of forgiveness in confucian culture becomes a great hindrance for reconciliation and national unity between the two sides. christianity stresses “sin, confession and forgiveness” which is difficult for chinese to understand. in chinese thought the tendency is to think, “i was born to be a good person, i never hurt anyone. whence comes sin? why do i need confession?” however, christianity emphasizes, “human beings were born with sin, we do need the pardon of the lord”. an adult does not necessarily have to do any evil acts, because even any evil thought is still sin. people are not sages, who can be without error? therefore, christianity also stresses that as long as we confess our sins, forgiveness of the lord can still be granted. jesus said, “therefore, i tell you, every sin and blasphemy of the people will be forgiven, but the blasphemy against the spirit will not be forgiven”. (mt 12:31). for this 98 prajna vihara,-~ reason, jesus established the sacrament of reconciliation (john 20:23) and so the church highly stresses the importance of forgiveness. under this circumstance, autonomy has become a core topic in ethics and law. compared to the christianized western societies, chinese prefers heteronomy.14 2. two attitudes towards death western christian faith takes “forgiveness” seriously, but chinese confucian culture emphasizes “value” which can be also interpreted as “fairness”. confucians think “eye for eye” is a kind of fairness. a typical example is when a pious chinese catholic asks a priest for “last rites”. after confessing all sins, he or she would also say “please forgive those who offended me, and all the sins i still remember or have forgotten”. however a chinese confucian who is not baptized, before his or her death, if he or she was hurt seriously by enemies, would say “my child, remember our enemies and who they are and what they did evil to our family”. this is a strong cultural mentality in the east. “eye for eye” simply means “fairness”. 3. “an eye for an eye” for thousands of years, chinese have been considering “an eye for an eye” as reasonable. this thought seems to have become an indivisible part of chinese tradition. to execute a murder will please the people. in ancient times, the revenger would carry the head of his enemy to sacrifice to his dead relatives. in modern society, revengers are happy to see the enemies being executed. they even think the souls of dead families can only be given peace in this way. when an evil murderer was sentenced to death, the news media or judicial officials would often say: “the anger of people can only be calmed by his death”. professor qu xin cai from china university of political science and law once gave an objective analysis of the death penalty. chinese people do not lack sympathy or humanitarianism, but tolerance as practiced by chinese has never conquered the impulse of revenge in the name of justice. people have reason to dislike and to hate the john b. zhang 99 murderer, but the life of a murderer should be respected.15 the so called “anger of people” is just the emotional expression of revenge. even though not every criminal is a murderer, he or she could still stimulate the “anger of people”. thus, under the justice of the law, “anger of people” is another factor that should be considered. finally, it is believed that only the death penalty can deter the whole of society. meanwhile, it also carries forward a vicious cycle of revenge. abusive penalties also stimulate the criminals to revenge this society. in 2001, a man killed his girlfriend. he realized that the death penalty would be his only end. so he chose to take revenge on society by detonating a bomb. hundreds of lives actually became the victims of this abusive penalty. however, we did not learn from this lesson. to comfort the families of victims many people were punished, even those who trafficked in the detonators were sentenced to death.16 the european parliament had always considered death penalty as a form of torture. therefore, those nations wanting to join the eu have to abolish the death penalty in their country. however, chinese people believe the death penalty is a necessary means for maintaining justice, and a deserved punishment to the evildoers. obviously, cultural differences lead to different opinions about the death penalty. in fact, christian ethics have offered the universal principles for many christian nations.17 it does not matter whether people believe in christianity; its values have already become the guide for words and deeds. the spirit of charity has become a value and the guide accepted by all people and whole societies.18 there is no perfect culture in this world. every national culture is like a coin with two sides: the light and beautiful face; the dark color with limitations and even an ugly face.19 we do not need to either commend or blame any particular culture, but we do need to create the future together, to critique our national culture, in order to contribute to human civilization through each culture. the dean of taipei ricci institute, mr. wei ming de once referring to modern times, especially stressed that the value of forgiveness needs to be cultivated, expanded and encouraged as the basis for current culture. to give forgiveness a creative new expression, media presenta100 prajna vihara,-~ tions and other faiths can come into play through novels, movies and comics, in order to contribute to the establishment of a new model. it also depends on the experience of dealing with domestic disputes or solving the conflicts on campus. in fact, forgiveness had been in our hearts, as we walked through the past moments of conflict. the active memory of a society is its culture. in such a culture, the idea should be one of pursuing the future step by step. if a society’s culture is growing under the ideal settings of dialogue, forgiveness, communication, trust, etc. and is based on “sermon on the mount”, then this society, no matter what kind of conflicts it has experienced, would be able to reconcile with itself, so that each molecule of this society will create more trust, tolerance and creative relationships. in short, once a culture understands the importance of expanding the value of forgiveness, it could have an open mind to create new opportunities.20 conclusion if revenge is an instinct hidden in human nature, then the judicial system should be a remedy for resolving hatred. but forgiveness is the best solution of all. “loving your enemy” is the highest value to eliminate hatred. only the selfless agape can create a really peaceful, harmonious, benevolent society. in fact, law scholars have admitted that “law has never been the best way to achieve social regulation; we can only be sure that it is not the worst system. chinese traditional laws were directly related to the ethics and value system of their time. the western law system derived from its religious culture. chinese law in ancient time was not as perfect as ancient jewish law, greco-roman ethics. chinese traditional values and culture need to be more open and so advance the process to civilization. just as in the statement above, the topic about revenge used to be a strong feature of greco-roman culture. fortunately, christianity went beyond the thought of revenge. it even reformed greco-roman culture, and brought the value of “loving your enemy” into the soul of the people. later, this value became a universal value. forgiveness should not only be a practice of christians and the john b. zhang 101 believers of other religions, but also a common mission of global ethics for all human beings. there is a noted chinese saying ‘vengeance has a way of rebounding upon oneself’ it is only when we learn how to forgive, and resolve conflicts with application of a just law that china will become a harmonious society. that is an indispensable factor of a civilized country and a harmonious society. endnotes 1thesis of psychologist rudolph dreikurs, 1964. 2 zhao da gong, “revenge and the chinese people”, september 23, 2000, china weekly internet edition, zhao da gong personal blog. 3zhao dagong, “revenge and the chinese people”. 4 gu feng, “the characteristics of ancient greek civilization”, see also “ancient greek culture” internet, november 27, 2003. 5gu feng, “the great drama writers of greece: aeschylus, sophocles, euripides, aristophanes”, see “ancient greek culture” internet edition, literature in theatre page, november 27, 2003. 6gu feng, “the great drama writers of greece: ??”, see “ancient greek culture” internet edition, literature in theatre page, november 27, 2003. 7 d. james kennedy and jerry newcombe, coauthors, “what if jesus had never been born”, see chapter 11: the influence of christianity on morality. 8 see “retaliation” in the bible dictionary (chinese edition), hong kong: studium biblicum, o.f.m., 1975, pages 1827-1829. 9according to the laws of babylon, whoever murdered a free citizen or a citizen’s wife or children, the same penalty would be imposed on them, the death penalty for murder (see the code of hammurabi, pages 116, 210, 230). if the crime was an offense against the king or a blasphemy against the gods, the punishment was more severe, not only was the criminal put to death but also his entire family, executed equally. ibid., the bible dictionary (chinese edition), hong kong: studium biblicum, o.f.m., 1975, page 1827. 10ex 6:7; lv 11:45, 26:12; dt 4:20; nb 15:41; jos 24:17; is 12:6; 1k 8:21; 2k 17:7; ps 81:10; jr 2:6, 31:33; ezk 37:27. 11“the lord is a god merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, keeping steadfast love for the thousandth generation, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, ...”. “and moses quickly bowed 102 prajna vihara,-~ his head toward the earth, and worshiped. he said, ‘if now i have found favor in your sight, o lord, i pray, let the lord go with us. although this is a stiff-necked people, pardon our iniquity and our sin...’” he said: ‘i hereby make a covenant’. (ex 34:610) “yahweh, yahweh, god of tenderness and compassion, slow to anger, rich in faithful love and constancy, maintaining his faithful love to thousands, forgiving fault, crime and sin…” moses immediately bowed to the ground in worship, then he said, ‘if indeed i do enjoy your favor, please, my lord, come with us, although they are an obstinate people; and forgive our faults and sins…” he then said, “look, i am now making a covenant…” (ex 34:6-10) yahweh then said to moses, “put these words in writing, for they are the terms of the covenant which i have made with you and with israel. “he stayed there with yahweh for forty days and forty nights, eating and drinking nothing, and on the tablets he wrote the words of the covenant -the ten words. (ex 34:27-28) 12gu feng, “ancient greek culture” internet edition, culture survey page, “concepts and classifications of culture”, november 27, 2003. 13 zhang zhe, “zhang zhong hang: never forgive”, “book extracts”, 2005, issue 2, page 41. 14 since the very beginning of civilization, human beings have been dealing with two kinds of disciplines: self-ruled and other-ruled. seeing from the historic-cultural context, the chinese has been living most time in the condition of centralization and therefore easily gets used to othergoverned life, but the west feels more comfortable with self-discipline. therefore, other-ruled governance fits the chinese more while the self-ruled life seems more suitable to the western people. self-ruled style is emphasizes on individual rights; other-ruled governance stresses on the rights of community. this fact can even be recognized from the difference of the education system between chinese and western. (october 1999) “wang rui xian’s impressions of life” feelings consultant page of chong qing net. 15 wang wen, “china death penalty debate: humanitarian or life for a life?” international herald tribune, sina net, november 24, 2003. 16wang wen, “china death penalty debate: humanitarian or life for a life?” 17in history, christians suffered from the religious wars which took place among christian countries. we must learn a lesson from history so that religious wars shall not be allowed to happen again. 18it’s like foreigners that also can celebrate the chinese new year, accepting chinese new year values. most chinese people do not believe in christ, but also will celebrate christmas, going to church to experience christmas eve’s quiet and peaceful atmosphere. 19 bo yang in “the ugly chinese” harshly criticized the chinese people’s “dirty, chaotic, noisy”, “internal fighting”, “failure to unite”, “not admitting john b. zhang 103 any mistakes” and other national evils. bo yang, “the ugly chinese”, taibei, lindbergh press, 1985. takahashi offered in “the ugly japanese” a profound analysis and exposure of various japanese defects. 20 benoit vermander, s.j., “pardon is creation and struggle”, the original set “witness monthly”, issue 285. 104 prajna vihara,-~ 13_(211-235) discourse ethics and.pmd discourse ethics and liberal political culture alexander seran atma jaya catolic university, indonesia abstract discourse ethics and the liberal political culture reciprocally presuppose each other as laws need to be legitimized through discourse in a democracy. habermas’ discourse ethics attempts to provide a practical solution to the problems of the legitimation of normative claims in pluralistc societies. it does this by understanding deliberative democracy as being situated within the life-world of its participants. through which the consensus of validity claims can be carried out. this understanding of the role of discourse ethics will be applied to the situation in indonesia and the philippines. introduction the concept of deliberative democracy involves governmental system bound by the rule of law. discourse ethics will be discussed in this article as an ethics of communicative action. discourse ethics and the liberal political culture presuppose each other as laws are legitimized through discourse. so the combination of discourse ethics and the liberal political culture situate deliberative democracy in the life-world in which a consensus of validity claims can be made to redeem normative claims in pluralistic societies. liberal and republican democracies focus on the individual person as actors but only to lesser extent consider the social person. this is the reason why habermas develops a theory of deliberative democracy to enhance the meaning of the social person and the process of legitimizing universal laws through discourse ethics. what discourse ethics is and how it is employed as a program of philosophical justification of norms will be placed in the first section. 211prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 211-2 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ discourse ethics as a post-conventional morality will be discussed in the next section. the third section will consider the relation deliberative democracy to legal discourse. the fourth section is a discussion on the reciprocal influence between discourse ethics and a political liberal culture through which a phenomenology of political experience will be presented to show the challenge of discourse ethics in promoting deliberative democratic laws. the fifth and last section will consider the limitation of discourse ethics. 1. discourse ethics habermas defines the meaning of discourse ethics as a discourse theory of morality.1 it follows from his accounts of discourse ethics as a program of philosophical justification.2 the relationship between a program of philosophical justification and a discourse theory of morality is that the former places a high premium on discourse ethics as a program of an ethics of communicative action that must be applied by the latter as the principle (d) that redeems normative claims (u) into validity of norms as legitimized laws. my own understanding of habermas’s discourse ethics emphasizes the redemption of various forms of normative claims of a plurality of life-worlds. the definition of discourse ethics as a discourse theory of morality indicates the influence of kant’s and hegel’s philosophies. through hegel’s critique on kant’s morality, habermas places a new emphasis on the relation of a universalistic morality with a concrete ethical life. thus, through discourse ethics we can see morality in the concrete problems of life. this is one of the major tasks of philosophy, namely to use rationality as a safeguard in a pluralistic world called modernity. discourse ethics can be understood in this perspective as a procedure of philosophical justification of valid norms in which various normative claims of individuals, group, communities are granted an equal hearing in periods of conflict. the aim of resolving moral conflicts through discourse ethics is not to indicate which moral claims are better than the other others, but rather to give each the chance to test his/her argument in a practical discourse. this practical discourse is a procedure of testing competing argu212 prajna vihara-~ ments of all affected participants to arrive at a validity claims. the result of discourse ethics is not the determination of rules of behavior but contesting the rationality of valid norms to maintain respect for various spheres of private values. in this sense, positive laws must be redeemed by discourse in such a way to protect various spheres of private values in the life-world under the principle of equality before the law. habermas presents eight theses concerning discourse ethics.3 his aim is to promote discourse ethics as an ethics of communicative action by which validity claims of norms are made central to a discussion of deliberative democracy in contemporary pluralistic societies. this begins with a consideration of moral phenomena in the life-world. 1.1. discourse ethics and the moral phenomena in the life-world habermas’s point of departure is moral phenomena in the lifeworld. he is continuing a project of philosophers beginning with kant of a cognitive ethics where only universal norms can be considered valid. yet he revises this approach. a moral norm can be universal, only if tested by all affected participants in a practical discourse. for habermas, moral norms must be validated through a procedure of argumentation. in other words, it must be a result of practical discourse rather than a result of a subjective consciousness. a subjective consciousness is monological. although an individual may think of a universal norm, it does not necessarily follow that it can be applied universally unless there is a discourse to test its validity claim. for habermas, a norm can be universally applied only if it is universally recognized and approved by all concerned. he seeks a rational testing moral norms in moral phenomena and derives validity claims from the communicative structure of the life-world. habermas develops discourse ethics as a rational theory of morality to respond to the attacks of the con-cognitive ethical theories. this means that moral phenomena are not irrational. these non-cognitive theories rely primarily on two arguments. first, the fact that dispute about basic moral principles ordinarily do not issue in agreement. second, normative propositions are to be true along with intuitionist lines or in terms of either the classical idea of natural law or an ethics of material value as in intuitionism and analysis of semantics.4 first argument refers to alan alexander seran 213 r. white’s subjectivist ethics and g. e. moore’s objectivist ethics. moral statements depend on the subject who is uttering it. although when someone is coming to do something means that he/she has a good reason to do it but his position of so doing is subjective then it is open to criticism whether it is true or false. as a subjectivist claim, moral statement does not result from testing arguments. in contrast, moore refers moral truth to something objective that is an unnatural property. for example, “right or good” or “red or yellow” that can become predicates of something. saying that “it is good” is analogous with “that is yellow” although the former is higher than the latter in terms of morality. second argument refers moral truth to intuitions in such a way that moral truth cannot be verified or falsified. they cannot be tested in the same way with descriptive statements. r. m. hare plays the central role of this kind of argument. by combining imperativist and descriptivist, he places moral statements on the speaker to impose norms to the hearers. the core claim of moral truth lies in the semantic analysis of expressions and sentences. this argument makes his claim of moral truth as a kind of rational decision. the aforementioned non-cognitive ethical accounts are, to some extent, expressions of skepticisms concerning moral truth. they do not treat moral statements as a problem of true and false and therefore ignore rational accountability concerning moral phenomena to which a discourse theory of morality is tasked to take place. habermas makes use of p. f. strawson’s essay on freedom and resentment (1974) although the essay is concerned with a different theme (mcca, 109n.5). habermas notices that strawson’s essay places an emphasis on the rationality of moral phenomenon which is suitable to adopt in developing a discourse theory of morality. based on the phenomenology of moral phenomena, a discourse theory of morality can be developed both as rational and practical attempts in order to solve the pathology of modern consciousness. a theory of morality of this kind must be based on communicative reason rather than on the subjective reason thus both non-cognitive ethics and purposive rationality must be rejected. through a linguistic analysis of phenomenology of the moral, strawson’s essay opens the eyes of the emotivists and empiricists in their role as moral skeptic to their own everyday moral intuitions that are rational at all. strawson sums up that based on, for example, resentment as a moral phenomenon is treated on a rational basis 214 prajna vihara-~ like to forgive or to excuse is based on a good reason not a mere emotion. thus, strawson shows that moral problems must be decided on the following considerations. first, the world of moral phenomena can be grasped only on the performative attitude of participants in interaction. second, resentment and personal emotional responses in general point to suprapersonal standards for judging norms and commands. third, the moral-practical justification of a mode of action aims at an aspect different from the feeling-neutral assessment of means-ends relations even when such assessment is made from the point of view of the general welfare. fourth and last, feeling seems to have a similar function for the moral justification of action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts (mcca, 50). although strawson’s account of moral-practical justification is not all that discourse ethics tries to appeal as a program of philosophical justification, it becomes an indication that moral truth must be developed from communicative structure of the life-world. this affirms that habermas attempts to ground discourse ethics as a rule of argumentation by which validity claims are achieved in communicative action. it means that validity claims appear in the plural context of the life-world. actors make three different claims to validity in their speech acts as they come to an agreement with one another about something. those claims are claims to truth which refer to something in the objective world, claims to rightness refer to something in the shared social world, and claims to truthfulness refer to something in the subjective world. what is of interest to us is the second type, the claim of rightness and validity of norms in which one actor seeks rationally to motivate another to accept what is offered in the speech acts as the better argument. stephen toulmin’s examination of the place of reason in ethics (1950) affirms strawson’s account of the rationality of moral phenomena of which discourse ethics is considered a specific form. toulmin’s theory of reason in ethics comprises both practice and reason. he refers to strawson’s moral phenomenon that there is a parallel between feelings and perceptions in everyday life experience. it is not incidentally that if “x ought to do y” implies that “x has good reasons to do y”. thus, questions and choices between norms admit truth and falsity. it follows that to conceive the objectivity of moral phenomena is to agree that some moral statements are true.6 in toulmin’s examination of reason, he places alexander seran 215 discourse ethics as a specific form of argumentation in making validity claims through practical discourse. his project is to establish a kind of argument or reasoning that is proper for us to accept in support of moral decisions. he abandons the semantic analysis of moral expressions which are speaker-centered, focusing instead of consent-based decision as the method of universalization in which normative propositions are justified. this becomes the criteria that motivate us to recognize demands as moral obligations.7 1.2. principles and presuppositions discourse ethics the main principle of discourse ethics is the universalization principle whereby conflicts of normative claims are understood to be settled in a practical discourse through consensus. the universalization principle is also called a bridging principle because it is used as a method or a procedure that relates conflicting normative claims to be redeemed by a validity claims that are universally acceptable to all concerned. normative claims refer to various spheres of private worldviews in the life-world that in social interactions sometimes lead to conflict. discourse ethics is realized in practical discourse as a procedure of testing arguments by which consensus is settled on the basis of the better argument. as the better argument, consensus is considered the communicative imperative that redeems narrow and one-sided claims of moral truth. the concept of the better argument is obviously influenced by kant’s categorical imperative but not understood and employed in the same way. as a communicative imperative, the better argument is the moral point of view which is universally considered valid to all concerned. based on this bridging principle, habermas distinguishes the principle (u) from the principle (d). habermas enumerates that every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition: (u) all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation.8 216 prajna vihara-~ universal principle (u) is distinguished from discourse principle (d) which stipulates the basic idea of moral theory (theoretical discourse) but does not form part of a logic of argumentation (practical discourse). (d) only those norms can claim to be valid that meet or could meet with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.9 (mcca, 66). the principle (d) is the assertion that the philosopher as a moral theorist ultimately seeks to justify, and already presupposes principle u. from here one can see that habermas’s discourse ethics deals with a rule of argumentation rather than testing normative claims. the aim is to turn normative claims into validity claims through argumentation. discourse ethics does not provide substantive guidelines for generating justified norms but provides a procedure for testing the validity of norms. this is because discourse ethics cannot be applied to test normative claims of the other’s beliefs and cultural values. habermas is correct to consider discourse ethics as a rule of argumentation to allow for impartiality rather than to ensure impartial consideration of all affected interests by placing the moral judge into a fictitious original position where differences of power are eliminated, equal freedoms for all are guaranteed, but the individual is left in a condition of ignorance with regard to the position he might occupy in a future of social order. in kant, the individual justifies the basic norms on his own. in rawls validity claims are not based on the will formation but on a theory of justice. further misunderstanding of the principle of universalization is presented in kurt baier’s, bernard gert’s, and marcus singer’s theories stating that moral norms are valid if the are teachable, publicly defended, and which ensure equality. but it is not the case in fact that something is teachable followed necessarily that it is valid. it is also necessarily not the case that the adoption of a norm by every other individual in comparable situation is sufficient to be conceived as the warrant of impartiality in the processes of judging. habermas is more convinced that the generalizability of valid norms must deserve recognition by all concerned. the universal principles cannot be an achievement of a monological judgment but rather a result of a universal discourse in which every participant must play an ideal role taking in judging so that through alexander seran 217 a universal exchange of roles participants come to a consensus about valid norms. in order to prove that the universalization can work for legitimizing norms, habermas proposes arguments of universal pragmatics and performative contradiction. the term universal pragmatics is generally understood as the general presuppositions of communication, that is, the general presuppositions of communicative action because it refers to the type of action that aims to reach mutual understanding. habermas says, ….anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech-action, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they can be vindicated. insofar as he wants to participate in a process of reaching understanding, he cannot avoid raising the following__and indeed precisely the following__validity claim. he claims to be uttering something understandably; giving the hearer something to understand; making himself thereby understandable; and coming to an understanding with one another.10 anyone enters into discourse must admit that there is a universalization principle. denying that there is no universalization principle is a contradiction because the act of denying is the performing of a universalization process. in saying that no universal claim of truth can be attained through dialogue, one is performing a dialogue to attain a valid claim that there is no universal truth through dialogue. in other words, valid claim must result form discourse cannot be denied. universal pragmatics as the rules of discourse ethics is distinguished from karl-otto apel’s transcendental pragmatics. apel distinguishes two parts of ethics parallel to two forms of communications community. his part a of ethics is referred to universal norms that are “always already” moving the ideal community of communication. without these norms, the universaliztion of situational norms that is his part b of ethics in a concrete community of communication is impossible. as a result, apel’s discourse ethics sketches a regulative ideal to transform an actual communication community. thus, his discourse ethics becomes an ethics of responsibility rather than an ethics of communicative action. the communicative action as “always already” 218 prajna vihara-~ the natural attitude of the life-world is decided as moral norm through a linguistic analysis that makes apel’s method of discourse no longer the cooperative search of truth through arguments in actual community of communication. the “always already” given is the self-consciousness that affirms communicative action as the transcendental concept to which situational norms are required to conform. thus, validity claims are not based on the assertoric meaning of a proposition, but rather a confirmation of what is always already prescribed as universal norm.11 apel’s discourse ethics is an expression of decisionism based on pragmatic analysis of semiotics rather than an expression of testing arguments to motivate the redemption of normative claims concerning various spheres of worldviews in actual life-world. in this way, discourse ethics as an ethics of principles sketches a regulative ideal that does not correspond to a historical utopia but nevertheless projects an asymptotic transformation in history of actual communication community. this shows that apel accounts of a substantial ethics in his part a of discourse ethics while habermas defends a formalist ethics to redeem normative claims through arguments in a concrete-life world. habermas does not attempt to make concrete community of communication through an ideal model. he rather aims to redeem a concrete community of communication from within. he blames apel’s transcendental pragmatics of discourse ethics as an ethnocentric fallacy because the arguments undermine the potentials of emancipation within the concrete-life worlds due to his category of ethics part b. habermas enumerates r. alexy’s rules of discourse in order to reaffirm his concept of universal pragmatics to be raised within the concrete life-worlds as universal presuppositions of discourse ethics. habermas emphasizes that only in the concrete life-world laws are legitimized by argumentation that is free from any compulsion whether internal or external of a practical discourse. this means that laws are legitimized only if the following presuppositions are fulfilled. (3.1) every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in discourse. (3.2) a. everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b. everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion alexander seran 219 whatever into discourse. c. everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. (3.3) no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).12 one may question habermas’s universal pragmatics in that it allows participation only to those who are competent to speak. but what of those who have physical and social handicaps in presenting their agenda in a practical discourse? certainly this is the question that confronts habermas’s model of discourse ethics with the real needs of contemporary societies. by placing a high premium on argumentation, habermas respects participation in a higher level compared to participation in traditional models of democracy. if participation is defined by the principle of the better argument then it is not limited to what is equally good for all members of a community that share a homogenous cultural values.13 discourse ethics indicates that the violations of universal human rights can be settled on the basis of argumentation by which all human beings as rational beings can participate in solidarity to protect the dignity of human persons based on validity claims. 2. discourse ethics as a post-conventional ethics based on the presuppositions as the rules of argumentation, discourse ethics is based on action theory that aims to justify norms. rules for testing principles are the procedures that integrate speaker and world perspectives of validity claims. the idea of the validity claim is an ideal concept of authority that motivates everyone to play an ideal role taking in justifying norms. the concept of authority is understood as the autonomy of social actors in their role as participants in competing validity claims through a practical discourse. the concept of authority as autonomy is an expression of postconventional ethics that grants the ideal validity claim to be decided in a cooperative search of truth by all individuals as members of a society. 220 prajna vihara-~ this is considered the suitable mode of democratic procedure to shift previous contruction of validity claims from the privileged political institutions. previous validity claims are based on practical reason whether they are universal claims of morality or the recognition of various forms of concrete ethical life. discourse ethics as a post-conventional ethics aims to redeem previous claims of validity that separates morality from concrete ethical life. discourse ethics as the post-conventional morality is adapted to deliberative democratic procedure to relate morality with concrete life-worlds through validity claim of norms in which both liberal and republican democratic procedures can be redeemed. i wish to assert that habermas’s attempts to provide a procedure of argumentation to redeem kant’s categorical imperative and hegel’s concept of the ethical life. kant’s concept of categorical imperative is based on the individual freewill to act according to the subject’s mental disposition letting the consequences be what they may. this is certainly the imperative of morality to which laws are subsumed.14 the moral imperative requires an autonomous will for an action to be deemed categorical rather than hypothetical.15 autonomy, therefore, is the supreme principle of morality. without autonomy, justice as the principle of selflegislation cannot prevail in laws as imperatives.16 hegel’s critique on kant’s ethics is that it is too formalist in such a way that ethics addresses moral duty in abstract and thus runs pure convictions as impotence “ought” towards concrete social life.17 since the categorical imperative requires that the moral agent abstracted from the concrete contents of duties and maxims, its application necessarily leads to tautological judgments. the term tautological judgments are expressions of subjective consciousness originated from and backed to the subject. as a result, valid judgment is insensitive to real-life conditions that are in need of solution. the categorical imperative as a moral “ought” faces a problem of how the “ought” that results in subjective consciousness can be realized in concrete life-world. if the categorical imperative is considered pure conviction, how it affects the rest of human beings. hegel does not deny there is moral ought but it must be placed in the recognition of various spheres of ethical worldviews in society in which reason and sanctions are treated from the perspective of serving the higher ends rather than as a pure postulate of practical reason. the term practical alexander seran 221 reason refers to the individual freewill that expresses rational being as autonomous person. hegel admits rationality in the service of the good life of the people in their communities rather than as the self-assurance of a subjective consciousness. although hegel’s critique of kant’s categorical imperative paves the way to include opinions as rules of the universalization process, it still remains obedient to an idea of objective reason that can only exist in the state. hegel fails to redeem kant’s categorical imperative to respond to the issue of the good life because kant deals only with the problem of right or just action on how universal principles can guide actions. universal reason does not serve to justify laws in terms of principles worthy of recognition. kant constructs a deontological ethics rather than a teleological ethics to enable human persons not to achieve the higher ends of his life in society but to merely become autonomous; a self-legislator. the imperative of this autonomous law is “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. discourse ethics is somehow a reconstruction of the relationship between morality and concrete ethical life through which communicative reason is placed as the postulate in justifying universal laws. the imperative of communicative reason is “only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in their role as participants in a practical discourse”. from this perspective, we can see that habermas retains the categorical imperative to some extent while scaling it down to a rational procedure of universalization of validity claims.18 habermas demonstrates in discourse ethics the continuity of rational accounts of justification of laws in society and shows that deliberative democracy can be more reliable to universalize validity of laws through practical discourse rather than the liberal and republican democracies that claim universal laws in terms of practical reason. 3. discourse ethics and legal discourse as a post-conventional ethics, discourse ethics can be applied as legal discourse to enhance modern constitutional systems. legal discourse 222 prajna vihara-~ is the specific application of discourse ethics concerning validity claims of law. in this regard, we have to discuss discourse ethics as both justification and application of justified norms and apply it into legal discourse of justification and application of legitimized laws. 3.1. justification and application of norms moral and ethical discourses separate justification of norms from their applications. both kant and hegel deal with this dichotomy between justification and application of norms. kant emphasizes the justification of norms beyond its application or its relation to the concrete life. kant places justified judgments of moral norms in the realm of intelligible world comprising duty and free will and this intelligible world radically separated from the phenomenal world. the justified moral norms are monological in the sense that they are the results of individual reflections which are prior understanding among a plurality of empirical egos. justified norms are facts of pure reason and thus the “ought” of moral norms is a matter a priori. by contrast, hegel develops an ethics of recognition and thus emphasizes the application of justified norms in the realm of concrete life comprising inclinations, subjective motives, political and social institutions. justified norms become abstract universalism of the “ought” if they are not made in the concrete life recognizing the plurality of ethical life. discourse ethics is distinguished from kant’s formalist ethics and hegel’s substantive ethical life. discourse ethics comprises justification and its application and treat them as reciprocally presupposing each other. the issue is not whether justified norms must have the grammatical form of universal sentences or whether one can will that a contested norm gains binding force under given conditions. the content of discourse ethics is both justification and application of justified norms. this means that moral principles are generated not by philosophers but by actors in a practical discourse. the conflicts of action that come to be morally judged and consensually resolved grow out of everyday life. actors as participants find the conflicts that need resolution through argumentation that actors themselves are considered the testers of justified norms that have to be applied. justified norms are validity claims that are rationally motialexander seran 223 vated and redeemed conflicting normative claims on the basis of the better argument that all actors as participants can agree upon. in discourse ethics, justified norms are not the results of a monological approach which assumes a prior understanding of a subjective consciousness but the results of intersubjectively mounted public discourse. discourse ethics improves kant’s formalist ethics and hegel’s substantive ethics through which the principle (u) is derived from the universal presupposition of argumentation.19 justification and application of justified norms is habermas’s synthesis of kant’s formalist ethics and hegel’s substantive ethics. from this perspective, habermas develops his theory of legal discourse from discourse ethics that is rooted in the life-world. 3.2. justification and application of legal norms legal discourse is strongly related to but distinguished from legal procedure. legal discourse constitutes an argumentative procedure to determine how law should be justified or made to embody the interests of its subjects. although justification of legal norms refers to law, legal discourse is extrajudicial. it means legal discourse takes place in the extended life-world, the public sphere. as the specific expression of communicative action, legal discourse entails deliberation through which validity claims of law are formulated to rationally motivate and redeem normative claims in lawmaking. legal discourse does not aim to produce legal norms but to influence positive lawmaking processes.20 legal discourse is distinguished from moral and ethical discourses. moral discourse aims to formulate justification of moral norms while ethical discourse aims to formulate mutual recognition. legal discourse as the specific application of discourse ethics aims to provide validity claims of law through a procedure of argumentation. moral justification and ethical recognition are normative claims and thus cannot be claimed valid norms to ground positive laws. legal discourse avoids moralistic interpretations of the law from the perspective of moralist and ethical justifications. habermas does not deny moral and ethical claims through which interpersonal relationships can be legitimately ordered and actions coordinated but these are no longer adequate in contemporary societies for 224 prajna vihara-~ seeking universal laws. western traditions of liberal and republican constitutional systems are based on cultural knowledge in which universal laws are legitimized by individual rights and political institutions. in contemporary societies, universal laws must be determined through a deliberative process that provides validity claims to make laws have binding force. in the perspective of deliberative democracy, legal discourse is understood as deliberative democratic procedure through which justification and application are needed in raising validity claims of legal norms. justificatory discourse serves as a theoretic justification of norms to be applied in lawmaking. a theoretic justification of legal norms is understood as a discussion through which validity claims of legal norms lead to rational outcomes in lawmaking. validity claims of legal norms are realized by political legislature in legislation and the judiciary in adjudication can be seen if they take into consideration that the addressees must be treated as free and equal members of a legal community.21 the discourse of application refers to the criteria of validity claim to determine law enforcement. if legal norms represent the reasonable expectations of members of the legal community then laws are respected and as a result the deviant behavior can be avoided.22 in legal discourse, both legal authorities and citizens are involved in the process of defining the criteria for judging whether the justification and application of law by legal authorities is lawful or unlawful. although habermas tries to apply discourse ethics in lawmaking, there is still a gap between legal discourse and legal procedure in terms of the domains and social actors. the theory of legal discourse aims to extend the life-world to include political public sphere in which laws are based on validity claims formulated through public discourses. legal discourse and legal institutionalization presupposes each other in terms of democratic lawmaking. legal discourse provides validity claims through rational procedures to redeem a rationally unmotivated termination of argumentation in legal institutionalization. legal discourse secures both freedom in the choice of topics and inclusion of the best information and reason through universal and equal access to argumentation to exclude every kind of coercion other than that of the better argument, so that all motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are neutralized.23 we can conclude that legal discourse and legal institutionalization alexander seran 225 presuppose pragmatic reasons. these explain that legal institutionalization cannot be understood without legal discourse unless legal institutionalization arises from the real needs of society. if legal institutionalization will effectively respond to the needs of society, it must take universal presuppositions of the pragmatic, the ethical, and the moral into account. if so, then the legislative cannot but includes legal discourse as well as employment of practical reason to provide validity claims that legitimize legal norms. the openness of legal institutionalization to include diverse perspectives also shows that the rightness of legal decisions is ultimately measured by how well the legislative decision process satisfies the communicative conditions of argumentation. this is clear to us that habermas’s model of legal discourse in legislative process is a specific application of discourse ethics.24 this application of discourse ethics in the legislative process is responded by objections in terms of legal theorists. first, the specific constraints in the forensic action of parties in court seemingly prohibit one from using the standards of legal discourse to assess courtroom proceedings in any way. the parties are not committed to the cooperative search for truth, and thus can pursue their interests in the favorable outcome by advancing arguments that are likely to merit consensus. second, the indeterminacy of legal discourse poses a problem because the presuppositions and procedures required in any proper process of argumentation are not selective enough to necessitate a single right decision. third, it is clear that discursively grounded legal decisions cannot be “right” in the same sense as valid moral judgment. the rationality of legal discourse thus is that it is determined by statute and is relative to the rationality of legislation. fourth, and finally, there is a distinction within moral-practical discourse between justification and application and legal discourse as a special case of moral discourses of application. this relieves legal discourse from the problem of justification and makes its presupposed validity of norms passed by political legislature. habermas’s responses to the objections of legal discourse remain as a discourse theory of morality. his aim is to provide validity claims for legislative processes and not to enlist objective rules of conduct. first, he says that each participant participates in a trial, regardless of his or her motives, and contributes to a discourse that, from the judge’s perspective, facilitates the search for an impartial judgment. this perspective alone, 226 prajna vihara-~ however, is constitutive for grounding the decision.25 second, habermas contends that legal discourse is free and open to all so that every participant can freely speak out their concerns and confront others’ perspectives on how to arrive at a common definition of a problem. thus, in contrast to mere imperatives, legal discourse carries an internal force, which is motivating power that is independent from both external threats “brought about by the absence of discourse” and the will of a participant that dominates the discourse. it is not set to justify presupposed norms as mere imperatives. unlike moral discourse, legal discourse is held to test, based on competing arguments, why norms can be accepted as universalized moral principles. thus, it does not simply constitute procedural principles and maxims of interpretation which have been generated from actual practice and systematized in textbooks in order to specify the universal requirements for moral-practical discourses in view of their connection with the existing law. third, habermas notes that the validity claims in legal discourse can be understood as moral principles that are based on better insights achieved through discourse. here, the moral principles are not inferior to the statute but are qualitatively different from it and thus may help in reforming the latter.24 fourth, and finally, he maintains that legal discourse cannot be identical with morally legislative reason because, given the operation of various forms of perspectives, there will be an inevitable difficulty in having validity claims of norms. this is precisely why legislation cannot rely on moral reason but on communicative reason. legal discourse does not intend to ensure the statutes but to justify validity claims whether statutes are generated as binding norms through argumentation among citizens and legal authorities. the universal presuppositions of validity claim are conditioned by a political liberal culture. 4. discourse ethics and the political liberal culture discourse ethics as expressed in legal discourse of justification and application allows for the operation of political liberal culture in a alexander seran 227 modern pluralistic society. and it is founded upon the communicative structure of the life-world. the political liberal culture refers to the communicative action which is always-already operating in the life-world. when the life-world is controlled by the state and the capitalist economy in decision-making processes, discourse ethics can be used to re-establish the communicative action for a political liberal culture to work in modern societies. this re-establishment requires citizens and legal authorities to engage in communicative processes that generate public opinion and will formation, thereby ensuring maximum impact on the policymaking process. the political liberal culture becomes the locus of discourse ethics where solutions to social problems are rationally discussed with due consideration for the plurality of interests. to speak of the political liberal culture is then to recognize the interrelatedness of freedom and law through discourse ethics. law refers to duty__“what should i do?__while freedom refers to validity claims of duty__“why should i obey?” the interrelatedness of law and freedom thus keeps social interactions grounded in the validity norms of action. it makes participative decision-making possible, since everyone is required to take part in validating what one ought to do. the quest for truth starts with the assumption that all are equal, therefore, no one has the monopoly of truth. the force of influence through discourse can generate mutual trust, which is essential in the process of public opinion and will formation. in effect, solid social groups are formed, which if properly mobilized, can wield a strong social influence on parliamentary bodies, administrative agencies, and courts to fulfill their respective responsibilities accordingly. political influence, if supported by public opinion, can turn into social power generated by the communicative exchanges among citizens, the state, and the economy. social power in the public sphere is the expression of a higher-level of intersubjectivity among citizens. it gains its strength from the process of arriving at a mutual understanding of what is equally good for all. according to habermas, we call a culture politically “liberal” the extent that culture operates through relations of reciprocal recognitionincluding among members of different identity-groups. these relations of recognition, reaching beyond subcultural boundaries, are promoted only 228 prajna vihara-~ indirectly, and not directly, by means of politics and law.27 liberalism and republicanism fail to establish a universal concept of law through discourse engaging citizens and legal authorities because they base their validity claims of law merely on moral and ethical principles. given their emphasis on moral and ethical principles of legitimacy, liberalism and republicanism fail to achieve democratic legitimacy where decision-making is validated by mutual agreement held in an actual discourse. a political liberal culture is therefore institutionalized in democratic constitutional states that guarantee a wide range of political rights and that establish a judicial system to mediate claims between various individuals or groups or between individuals and groups and the state. the political liberal culture presupposes basic law and principles of discourse ethics. basic law or the constitution is required to ensure basic rights, first of which is the right to the greatest possible measure of equal individual liberties. this pertains particularly to the right of citizens to become members of voluntary associations of consociates under law, and the right of citizens to individual legal protection. these rights are also referred to as the private autonomy of legal subjects in the sense that they reciprocally recognize each other’s rights before the law. the second involves basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in the process of opinion and will formation, in which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through which they generate legitimate law. these embody the rights of individual liberties and political autonomy which enable citizens to expand their various rights and duties in accordance with constitutional and political development. and the third constitutes basic rights to living conditions that have social, technological, and ecological safeguards. according to habermas, these basic rights are absolutely justified categories that any constitutional liberal political culture should maintain as civic rights.28 (bfn, 122-23). the principle of discourse ethics can assume the shape of the principle of democracy through the medium of law only insofar as the discourse principle and the legal medium interpenetrate and develop into a system of rights that brings private and public autonomy into a relation of mutual presupposition. by securing both private and public autonomy in a balanced manner, the system of rights neutralizes the tension between alexander seran 229 facticity and validity, which are understood as the positivity and the legitimacy of enacted laws.29 the significance of law in a liberal political culture lies in the provision of constitutional guarantees for ordinary citizens to participate in democratic lawmaking processes. this entails equalizing educational opportunities for citizens from all walks of life to respond to the condition of the political public sphere.30 by “law”, habermas means modern enacted law which claims to be legitimate in terms of its possible justification as well as binding in its interpretation and enforcement. unlike liberal and republican laws that are based on post-conventional morality, modern positive law does not just represent a type of cultural knowledge but also constitutes an important core of institutional orders. law embodies two things, a system of knowledge and a system of action. it is a text that contains legal propositions and interpretations and at the same time a complex of normatively regulated actions.31 with this concept of law, habermas supposes a condition of liberal political culture where this type of law can be developed through discourse among legal authorities and ordinary citizens. he believes that only in a liberal political culture discourse can modern positive law be enacted as formal law. when positive law is formulated as formal law, the system of rights explicates the conditions under which people can unite in an association of free and equal citizens. correspondingly, the liberal political culture expresses how people intuitively understand the system of rights in their specific historical life contexts.32 this concept of law is distinguished from the system theory of law, which divides politics and law into different closed systems and analyzes the political process essentially from the perspective of a self-programming administration. it promotes what the system theories lack, and that is the mutual translation of the validity claims of law through discourse between legal authorities and ordinary citizens.33 (bfn, 335). patterns of the liberal political culture consist of resonant and autonomous public spheres anchored in the voluntary associations of citizens. here, citizens are organized, mobilized, and empowered protecting them from being manipulated by political and economic power. as members of voluntary associations, they seek to (1) prevent the formation of 230 prajna vihara-~ indoctrinated masses who are vulnerable to the manipulation of populist leaders, (2) pull together the scattered critical potentials of a public through the mass media that can have a political influence on institutionalized opinion and will formation, and (3) pursue political movements, such as civil disobedience that aims to strengthen constitutionally regulated ways of circulating power in the political system.34 once people develop solidarity, they become the social power vis-a-vis political and economic power in decision-making processes. the concept of deliberative democracy is practiced through organized citizens as they voice their concerns and promote the general interest in lawmaking. they shape the public opinion through public discourse, which functions as the sounding board of people’s complaints to rethink and change irrelevant laws and make them responsive to the realities of the times. the more the people are organized, the more social movements can be formed and strengthened to change the mechanism of oppression in authoritarian regimes. examples of these are the social movements that ended the dictatorships of mr. marcos in the philippines and of mr. soeharto in indonesia. under the authoritarian rule of mr. marcos, the role of parliament was abolished and the essence of public hearing to the lawmaking process was negated.35 in instances where some bills were drafted to be enacted into laws, the said laws only served to mediate the imposition of the authoritarian will of those in power. for instance, mr. marcos declared martial law to justify the enforcement of his presidential decrees. the parliament and the judiciary were structurally and operationally made subservient to the president, making him govern without any accountability or checks and balances. the authoritarian ruler’s imposition of martial law forced people into subservience and involuntary acceptance of the ideology of power that defined the imperatives of national development and national survival. this was perceived as a national crisis that propelled the first people power revolution (called edsa i), leading to the downfall of mr. marcos. in indonesia, the people for several years tolerated restrictive lawmaking practices under the authoritarian rule of soeharto. the judiciary then did not function as an objective and independent judicial body. soetjipto36 emphasized the gap between law and alexander seran 231 .. ' democracy, noting the power abuses of judges. the political regime’s control over the judicial system was apparent in the failure of the supreme court to impose its will on the presidency. soeharto even admitted having interfered in the actions of the courts in order to protect himself and his family from conviction for crimes of monopolizing several large business conglomerates in the country. soetjipto concluded that giving the president the absolute power to rule as the head of the nation-state was a gross violation of the basic law of indonesia. not surprisingly, these practices of power abuse and dictatorship bring out the skeptic in both social scientists and legal scholars. as empiricists, the former teach us about powerless ideas that always look foolish in the face of political interests. as pragmatists, the latter teach us about the hardened conflicts that can be resolved only with the support of a substantial state power. habermas promoted the discourse-theoretic approach involving a procedural rationality that shifts the conditions of lawmaking from a one-sided affair of the state to institutionalized processes of deliberation involving all societal elements as legal co-authors.37 through discourse, he says, rational political opinion and will formation can be achieved. as mediating agents of citizens, voluntary associations form free associations as a counterpart to the state and the economy in seeking laws that are equally beneficial to all. 5. limitations of discourse ethics albrecht wellmer raised a crucial problem of the relationship between justification and application or the relationship between rationality and morality whether there is not a sufficient reason to determine what ought one to do merely based on a single claim of rationality generated in discourse. for wellmer, an ambiguous solution will arise from a decision of moral problems based on the rule of universal presupposition (u) because we are not sure about coercions and side effects of applying the rationality of a generalized behavioral expectations to do justice to all involved in a given situation. habermas admits that discourse ethics as a proceduralist argument may end up with a utopian character concerning question of those 232 prajna vihara-~ who cannot speak and act. to this question habermas still makes sense of discourse ethics that in a complexity of moral problems in which we live. firstly we need to clarify what is the real problem through testing arguments by which we have good reasons for action planning. secondly, there is a misunderstanding of discourse ethics as a formalist ethics parallel with kant’s categorical imperative that separates justification of norms from its application. discourse ethics has learned from this mistake and makes a careful distinction between validity__or justice__of norms and correctness of singular judgments that prescribe some particular action on the basis of valid norm. discourse ethics analytically admits that the right thing to do in the given circumstances cannot be decided by a single act of justification --or within the boundaries of a single kind of argumentation__calls for a two__stage process of argument consisting of justification followed by application of norms.38 this can be of greater help in facing the problem and thereby to refute skepticism. what discourse ethics cannot do is to make any kind of substantive contribution because it is not a substantive ethics. it deals with grounding decision of conflicting moral claims on validity claim raised through argumentation. discourse ethics shows that a consensus can be rationally acceptable to conflicting parties on the basis of validity claims. in terms of legal procedure, discourse ethics cannot be seen as a procedure of establishing the rules of law. legal discourse as a specific application of discourse ethics remains as seeking validity claims to motivate lawmaking processes to embody the general interests of all in positive laws. one can fail to apply legal discourse as legal procedure in the legislative processes. legal discourse is an expression of participating citizens in influencing political institutions in decision-making processes. this is possible if constitutional system provides legal guarantees for people participation through freedom of expression, assembly, petition, and criminal procedure that listens before it condemns. legal discourse presupposes a liberal political culture. endnotes 1jurgen habermas, justification and application: remarks on discourse alexander seran 233 .. ethics. translated by ciaran cronin. cambridge: the mit press, 1993, p.vii. 2jurgen habermas, moral consciousness and communicative action. translated by christian lenhardt and shierry weber nicholsen. cambridge, mass: mit press, 1991, p.43ff. 3ibid., p.45ff. 4ibid., p.56. 5ibid., p.45. 6ibid., p.51. 7ibid., p.57. 8ibid., p.65. 9ibid., p.66. 10jurgen habermas, communication and the evolution of society. translated by thomas mccarthy. boston: beacon press, 1979, p.2. 11moral consciousness and…op.cit., p.88. 12ibid., p.89. 13ibid., p.68. 14immanuel kant, grounding for the metaphysics of morals, trans. by james w. elington (cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1981), p.43. 15ibid., p.vii. 16immanuel kant, critique of pure reason (indianapolis: hackett publishing co. inc, 1996), 436, 436-40, 444-45, 449-50. 17moral consciousness and …op. cit., pp.195-6. 18ibid., p.196. 19ibid., p.204. 20jurgen habermas, between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. translated by william rehg. cambridge: polity press, 1996, pp.178-9. 21ibid., p.414. 22ibid., p.116. 23ibid., p.229. 24ibid., p.230. 25ibid., p.231. 26ibid., p.232. 27critique of pure…op.cit., p.15. 28between facts and…op.cit., pp.122-3. 29ibid., pp.128-9. 30ibid., p.76. 31ibid., p.79. 32ibid., p.184. 33ibid., p.335. 34ibid., p.382. 35jose j. magadia, state-society dynamics policy making in a restored democracy (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 2003), p.26. 234 prajna vihara-~ .. .. .. 36adi andojo soetjipto, “legal reform and challenges in indonesia” in chris manning and peter van diermen, eds. indonesia in transition: social aspects of reformasi and crisis (singapore: institute of southeast asian studies, 2000), p.270. 37between facts and…op.cit., pp.461-2. 38justification and…op.cit., pp.35-6. references habermas, jurgen. communication and the evolution of society. translated by thomas mccarthy. boston: beacon press, 1979. ______________. moral consciousness and communicative action. translated by christian lenhardt and shierry weber nicholsen. cambridge, mass: mit press, 1991. ______________. justification and application: remarks on discourse ethics. translated by ciaran cronin. cambridge: the mit press, 1993. ______________. between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. translated by william rehg. cambridge: polity press, 1996. kant, immanuel. grounding for the metaphysics of morals, trans. by james w. elington (cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1981). ______________. critique of pure reason (indianapolis: hackett publishing co. inc, 1996), magadia, jose j. state-society dynamics policy making in a restored democracy (quezon city: ateneo de manila university press, 2003), p.26. soetjipto, adi andojo “legal reform and challenges in indonesia” in chris manning and peter van diermen, eds. indonesia in transition: social aspects of reformasi and crisis (singapore: institute of southeast asian studies, 2000). alexander seran 235 .. 05_(41-63) economic justice and market.pmd economic justice and market economy: a remark on hayek’s position on social justice andre ata ujan atma jaya catholic university, indonesia abstract is social justice or economic justice a utopia? this would be one of the questions that anyone might immediately raise as he/ she reads friedrich august von hayek’s position on the idea of social or economic justice. as a classic liberal thinker, hayek believed that free market is the ideal economic system for it in nature promotes freedom and equality in free and open societies. is hayek’s defense of free market economy sufficiently convincing to eliminate any room for social or economic justice to take place? in this essay i want to argue that there is actually no free market in a pure sense. market is in fact not entirely free from selfish interests potentially developed by market players themselves in doing business. it is therefore not entirely reasonable to see market as purely spontaneous and independent entity. since it is in fact open for selfish interest, its outcomes can be just or unjust. free competition prompted systematically by free market system, therefore, could risk human life prospect. for this reason, state’s intervention to a certain extent is necessary to prevent market competition from endangering citizens’ basic right to enjoy a decent life. state’s intervention is, therefore, important for it is necessary to secure social or economic justice. social or economic justice is of course an ideal but not necessarily a utopia in a radical sense. taking the unfortunates’ quality of life as the benchmark in designing and enacting economic policies, social or economic justice might be, at least partially, realized. john rawls’ idea of maximin rule or maximin strategy can pave the way for the realization of such ideal that every civilized person or society is essentially ever craving to. prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 41-63 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 41 introduction from an ethical perspective, a central issue in economics is that of economic justice, which is popularly termed social justice. this issue has become important since it is threatened by the pragmatism connected to the promotion of free market economy. there is a shared conviction among its proponents that a free market economy is the most viable economic system for everyone to pursue his/her economic interests. it however, at the same time, tends to enlarge the socio-economic chasm between the rich and the poor. while we must acknowledge that the free market has contributed to our modern societies, it must also be acknowledged that it has brought with it negative externalities. it has often burdened the less fortunate, particularly among developing countries.1 supported by the ideology of neo-liberalism, the inequalities of the free market will increase. this continues until all aspects of human life are under the control of economic hegemony. freedom in free market economy is, therefore, paradoxical in nature. on one hand, it has become a precondition necessary to promote human development, particularly, in terms of economic prosperity. however, on the other hand, it creates a continuous expansion of social disparity. hence, promoting social or economic justice is a task that every civilized society has a moral responsibility to address. friedrich august von hayek (1899-1992), however, stands in opposition to this common concern. hayek believes that the struggle for economic or social justice leads to state intervention, and ultimately to authoritarianism, which in turn would diminish individual freedom. social justice, according to hayek, is an illusion. the market is a spontaneous, independent, and impersonal order. it is therefore unreasonable to take social justice to be the standard to evaluate the market. but this position, regardless of how sound it might seem, must not be taken-for-granted. i would argue in this essay, instead, that the free market is not as spontaneous and independent as hayek has in his mind. the free market is not entirely free from selfish interests and, hence, its results can lead to grave injustice. i would like to show that government’s regulation on markets, which, to a certain extent, functions to confine economic freedom, must not be understood and viewed simply as the reflection of freedom in42 prajna vihara-~ fringement. an intelligent and prudent regulation is necessary to ensure everyone’s right to economic gain, in particular, and human well-being, in general. to such an end, this paper begins with a short elaboration of hayek’s view of social justice and his idea of the nature of free market economy. to be fair to hayek, a careful assessment of his contributions to the theory of the free market and social justice will be necessary. this might help us see both the insights and the blind spots of hayek’s conception about free market and social justice. at the end of this essay, an alternative position will be offered to demonstrate that creating and promoting social or economic justice is still possible and this can be done without necessarily violating individual freedom. social justice in market economy 1. freedom, general welfare, and abstract rules among social philosophers, hayek has been extensively recognized the prominent defendant of the system of laissez faire economics. he has been known for his strong criticisms of the state’s interventions on markets. his observation of political practices leads him to emphasize that the state’s intervention is commonly applied in the form of enforcing models of distribution, which is deliberately designed to create redistribution of wealth and ownership. the state’s intervention according to hayek is likely to generate negative impacts on human civilization since it is by nature a violation of personal freedom; it even promotes and creates authoritarian politics.2 the politics of centralized policy taken to control market, hayek believes, would prompt unfair wealth redistribution for it simply gives advantages to those who avoid assuming real responsibility for the society and, at the same time, disadvantages those who in fact contribute to society. wealth redistribution simply gives a free ride to those who do not deserve it, which is certainly contradictory to the principle of justice as fairness.3 to put it in another way, only those who contribute to society can have the legitimate right to benefit from it. a critical question that follows is: should we neglect those who are objectively unfortunate? is it fair to ignore the life prospect of the unfortunate andre ata ujan 43 ones simply because of their objective inability to contribute? this is a very reasonable question to pose to hayek. it is worth noting that hayek himself actually rejects the idea that individual wealth and income is the end of economic policy, because the so-called general welfare is not the accumulation of individual welfare. general welfare is concerned with the question of how to create conditions that might help facilitate the satisfaction of pluralistic and unknown individual ends. in short, the state’s policy has nothing to do with direct individual income. individual interests are pluralistic in form and they may compete with one another. therefore, the real responsibility that the state is supposed to assume is not to ensure everyone a certain amount of income or wealth, but rather to create conditions that can pave the way for every individual to pursue his/her own interests. there are two factors supporting hayek’s position. first, ensuring individual satisfaction requires full or complete information or knowledge about individual satisfaction. this however, is hard, if not impossible, to meet even by government whose main duty is to make sure that all citizens have equal and fair opportunity to live a decent life. hence, it is unreasonable to consider individual wealth the standard of market evaluation. following adam smith, the market is subject to the invisible hand, i.e., market mechanism in the form of free supply and demand. the power of supply and demand determines market transactions; and nobody can exactly predict and fully know in advance the results. in other word, the market by nature operates within the condition of uncertainty. in such condition, what is necessary to work out is creating the conditions that promote favorable opportunity for everyone to satisfy his/her needs.4 second, and more important, promoting individual or group interests as the target of public policy, instead of promoting social harmony, leads to conflicts resulting from competing interests. such conflicts have become a common phenomenon in pluralistic societies since every party tends to insist upon special treatment. justice and peace as an ultimate end disappears due to the domination of individual or group interests. hence, to avoid potential conflict, what is important to agree on, hayek argues, is not the end but rather the instrument by which everyone is able to pursue his/her own goals or ends. in other words, it is important to strive for creating favorable conditions that provide fair and 44 prajna vihara-~ equal access to reduce and to reconcile various (conflicting) interests. civilized societies, hayek emphasizes, have developed due to the realization that human beings can live peaceful lives and be a benefit to one another without necessarily agreeing on final goals.5 hayek promotes a means-end approach, which has become common in mainstream economics. by stressing the means-end approach as the basic character of mainstream economy, hayek, at the same time, is inclined to see economics, borrowing from amartya sen, as a kind of engineering science or calculative science rather than a normative science. in karl polanyi’s words, mainstream economy prefers to see economy primarily as formal science and, hence, ignores the genuine characteristic of economy as substantive science.6 hayek does realize the impossibility of successfully reconciling various (conflicting) interests. but by giving special emphasis to a meansend approach, hayek eliminates individual ends from the framework of socio-economic concern and encourages openness to develop social cooperation among members of society. in this way, hayek, on the one hand, promotes individual freedom, because freedom is the foundation of human civilization. by anticipating potential conflicts triggered by various and pluralistic self-interests, hayek, however, on the other hand, tries to remind us that self-interest is prone to falling into economic egoism. at this point, self-interest can put free and civilized society in a risky situation.7 we see here that the moral sentiments taken by adam smith to be the moral shield and a product of human self-control, and which prevent human beings from slipping into economic egoism, simply have no place in hayek’s idea of economic rationality. a great society, hayek insists, must not design its rules for the sake of a projected individual end but rather as the instrument that functions to serve various and pluralistic interests.8 to play that role effectively, a rule, according to hayek, must be general and abstract in nature, and only then can a rule or law be adapted to uncertainties. to have adaptive and anticipative rules, it is important to learn from the past. this would be highly important because experience can become viable basis to predict possible future conditions and at the same time help remind us of the importance of observing the rule of law as we deal with uncertainty. a rule therefore serves as general norm in pursuing various and pluralistic andre ata ujan 45 individual interests.9 hayek puts special stress on and even prefers rule utilitarianism to act utilitarianism. a rule in essence functions as the guidance of individual or group behavior. it does not directly determine the type and the form of an action that human being has to do. it provides the agent with insight of how he/she should act as he/she is encountering particular problem in a real situation. act utilitarianism is not as effective because it presumes knowledge of the agent’s concrete situation and the effect of the action for both the agent him/herself and many other people. such an approach neglects the phenomenon of ignorance, which is a condition that always exists in every decision-making process. since a rule is, basically, a normative guidance, it is impossible to have perfect or complete knowledge about the effect it may bring about. it can lead us to a certain action, but it does not necessarily follow that we have sufficient reason to claim with certainty in advance that a rule-based action can lead us to a definitive result. having perfect knowledge would guarantee particular effect of particular action. unfortunately, such situation never exists. under the condition of uncertainty, the results of an action depend not only upon a guiding rule. it is also determined by subject’s ability to adapt him/herself in a way that the prospect of the success he/she is striving for becomes more feasible to achieve. hence, again, an appropriate rule must be in essence general and long term (rule utilitarianism) rather than particular and short term oriented (act utilitarianism).10 2. the mirage of social justice hayek raises these arguments to question the techniques of wealth distribution that governments pursue.11 taking social justice to be the basis for wealth redistribution, hayek asserts, is a primitive way of thinking. hayek argues that whatever the benefits or threats that anybody could acquire through market mechanism are in nature coming out as the unintended result of the market mechanism itself. hence, the so-called social justice is simply the direct consequence of artificial “anthropomorphism” or “personification” taken to rationalize a process and an order, which is in itself self-ordering, that is, market. hence, demand for the satisfaction 46 prajna vihara-~ of social justice is unreasonable. it is even an immature way of thinking because the so-called market is in essence an impersonal entity. in other words, since market is actually under nobody’s control, then its resulting effects cannot be considered fair or unfair. that is also the reason why hayek is likely to question political movements that take social justice to be central. adherents of liberalism and that of socialism commonly take social justice to be the justification for their political struggles. however, since market mechanism and its results are practically uncontrollable, hayek believes, such motive must be open to critical questions. by questioning the motives of such movements, hayek is also likely to unmask political veils, and encourage the public to be aware of the hidden motives. hayek doubts the possiblity of engineering social justice, for our experience teaches us that the more the idea becomes public, the more impossible it is to take place. efforts to create social justice, promoted by both liberalism and socialism, according to hayek, would risk the very human basic values, especially the value of freedom that plays a very central role in supporting human civilization.12 we see here that hayek is likely to confuse social justice as an ideal with its manifestation in political and economic reality. realizing the imperfect manifestation of the idea of social justice, hayek comes to reject it and see it as an illusion. hayek is so intent on defending the free market, he overly diminishes the idea of social justice. taking such position, however, actually leads hayek to fall into a natural fallacy, condemning a particular ideal due to its imperfect manifestation in real life. hayek, however, ignores such an objection since he holds consistently that a discussion about the tension between social justice as an ideal and its manifestation in human real life does not make sense; such discussion, therefore, has no place in free and open societies. many efforts have been made to pursue ideal values, especially social justice, and yet, hayek observes, those efforts always tend to fail. such efforts, according to hayek, even threaten free and open societies. socialism is the most problemtic ideology with regard to its defense of social justice. the adoption of socialism, hayek argues, simply uproots traditional values that everyone needs to develop and maintain moral values, especially personal freedom. hence, the idea of social justice, hayek holds, must be at odds with the culture of free market since andre ata ujan 47 market in essence takes personal freedom to be the foundation upon which it grows and flourishes. but this point, it is necessary to raise the question: is there sufficient reason to hold that market order, in the name of social justice, has the authority to set up remuneration models based on performance evaluation and needs, which are actually different from one person to another?13 hayek’s response is “no”. hayek recognizes people’s shared conviction of the validity of social justice. but he also knows that such a conviction has, supported by government’s intervention, encouraged and motivated people to strive for its realization in their real life. however he emphasizes that the more people are dependent on the government for the realization of social justice, the more the people put themselves under the control of the government. this political environment leads ultimately to totalitarianism. if market and its results, hayek argues, are entirely controllable, then we have sufficient reason to identify certain people to be responsible for the increasingly widening gap between the rich and the poor. this interpretation, however, according to hayek, is entirely wrong. since the market is a spontaneous process, hayek holds, it is absurd to say that there is injustice in market order. blaming market as the source of social injustice, hayek emphasizes, is unreasonable since we actually have no sufficient knowledge that justifies us to assign blame to individuals for social problems. this is only the case in a centrally planned economic system. only in such a system can anyone assume responsibility for market negative externalities. in the system of planned economy, the market operates upon particular planned goals and therefore, the results it carries out can be said to be just or unjust. such a planned system however is at odds with the basic ethos of free society. planned economy potentially negates peoples’ initiatives and creativity, which is the sine qua non condition for economic development. to put it in hayek’s words, command economy, the other label for planned economy, is a real threat to human freedom. 3. market: a game/catallaxy following the above argument, the market cannot be just or un48 prajna vihara-~ just because only human-created situation can be just or unjust.14 justice and injustice are attributes applicable only to human intentionality basedactions and hence cannot be true for unintended actions. justice requires particular game rules. however, since the entire process of the distribution of goods and services is entirely under the control of impersonal market, the existence of such rules is not relevant. although human market behavior can be just or unjust, the consequences of his/her actions that may affect other people’s quality of life cannot be just or unjust because the consequences a market can bring about are unpredictable. hayek viewed the market simply as a game. just like a game that needs the rule of game to take place, so does the market. rules are settled and agreed on the basis that they are needed to increase every party’s opportunity to win the game. it must, however, be noted that the existence of the game rules at the same time indicates that the game itself cannot be entirely controlled by individuals or groups of individuals who participate and involve in the game. the result of the game, therefore, is not exactly predictable even by the players themselves. besides, in any game, the rules are not the only factor of success. players must have good knowledge of how to play, skills to increase opportunities, and even good fortune. since the quality of knowledge and level of skills of players are different, mere knowledge of the game rules provides no guarantee for winning. the competition, at most, is considered to be fair. however, it is unreasonable, hayek argues, to insist that the end result of the competition be equal for every participant of the competition. the same thing, hayek holds, is true in economy. for the above reason hayek prefers to call free market economy a catallaxy,15 that is, the phenomenon of a spontaneous order created by market agents who, on the one hand, are subjected to the same rules of game, but, on other hand, continuously try to create mutual adaptation for the sake of each own interest. a catallaxy become special to adopt for it accommodates various knowledge and interests, which are different from one another. in a catallaxy, everyone has equal opportunity to pursue his/her own interest without negating the same opportunity for others to pursue their own. this argument reveals how hayek is so confident of taking self-interest to be the basic motive of economy. he appears to believe that free market systematically supported by self-interest as its andre ata ujan 49 internal self-regulating power would not turn out to be an arena for economic egoism to flourish. it is worth noting that hayek actually realizes the potency of conflict, which is commonly incorporated in economybased self-interest. hayek, however, seems to believe that there is enlightened self-interest in economic competition that serves to maintain fair economic opportunity for all. this brings him to the conclusion that market, in terms of cattalaxy, is the most efficient system because it opens the door for everyone to benefit from it. in calculative economic language, it is necessary to support free market since it is the only system in which pareto optimality principle could obtain.16 viewing it from the perspective of economic advantage, it must be emphasized that the principle of pareto optimality can be fulfilled only if, and only if, the economic advantage of some people can be increased without at the same time decreasing the equal opportunity for others to benefit. the critical question to be raised is: should we conclusively come to the position to state that the fulfillment of pareto optimality principle inherently brings with it the fulfillment of everyone’s right to benefit from the market? in other words, does justice immediately take place once pareto optimality has been fully satisfied? hayek, however, rejects such question since he holds that the market order is never justified on the basis of its power to create social justice. the market follows its own mechanisms. it is only the market agents’ fair behavior __ that is, market competition, not the market itself, which is free from fraud, monopoly, and violence __ that allows for the principle of justice to flourish. even the liberal conception of justice promoted by john locke, according to hayek, is based on the same conception of free competition, that is, only the way of competition can be fair or unfair; not the result of the competition itself. hence, general rules settled to regulate market procedure can never guarantee that anyone can benefit from the market. critical remarks some elements are worth noting. first, is there sufficient reason to believe that the social free space created by general and abstract rules 50 prajna vihara-~ for everyone to pursue their own interests can never be misused by market agents to selfishly pursue their own interest? should we believe that market is entirely free from economic malpractice, such as dumping, cartels, and monopolies? if there is room for market agents to misuse market opportunities, then why should the market be exempted from measures insuring justice? hayek, it seems, fails to realize that a general rule, no matter how large the scope it may have, cannot effectively anticipate the entire possible problems that can happen in the future. rules are limited by substance and are therefore, not fully anticipative.17 at this point moral considerations come to be forefront. moreover, once a rule is too general in its characteristic, including the ones that regulate market, it opens the door for multi-interpretations. this would in turn give more room for abuse. if that is the case, then there is no sufficient reason for hayek to stubbornly view the market as an independent and spontaneous entity and, therefore, cannot be just or unjust. it is worth noting as well that rule of law is naturally paradox. it is the substance of a rule that, on one hand, it is by character confining, but, on the other hand, opening a space for the things outside the framework of regulation to happen. to such extent, a rule serves to put certain limitation on human actions but at the same time opens opportunities. in a very positivistic legal culture, everything is permitted insofar as it is notillegal. as a result, loophole seeking mentality is very common. it is, therefore, not surprising that on behalf of the rule of law, every market player will try to do whatever they can to win his/her own interest insofar as formal legal norms are observed. things get worse as people come to hold: “what is legally alright must be morally alright too”. in this framework of thinking, we should say that whatever happens in the market must not be spontaneous for it cannot escape from market players’ intentional plan. to put it in another way, whatever the result market can bring about, it is, at least partially, under the intentional control of market players and hence market players must be responsible for market results, especially for the unjust ones. it is not entirely true to see market simply as a social order, which is absolutely spontaneous and independent in such a way that there is no room at all to question its process and results from the perspective of justice or injustice. exempting the market from moral evaluation would pave the way andre ata ujan 51 for illegitimate claims of right. following robert nozick, in his work anarchy, state and utopia, (1974), a claim of an ownership is legitimate if it results from a voluntary transaction; and the person who puts his things under the transaction must be the legitimate owner of the things he is offering. otherwise, the transaction would be illegitimate and so the ownership acquired through the transaction is illegitimate too. voluntary transaction is, of course, possible in a free market system, but since the free market and its general rules are prone to abuse, the claim of ownership can be illegitimate. nozick’s entitlement theory stated that any claim of ownership must not be in force as it is acquired from illegitimate ownership.18 second, it is not entirely true to see the state’s intervention simply as an infringement of freedom. there must be a distinction between the idea of limitation as regulation and limitation as infringement of freedom. hayek is right insofar as he understands freedom to be the foundation of human civilization. the very basic values, such as self-expression, innovation, and creativity are factors that lead to the development of civilization, such values require a free environment. limitation of freedom in terms of regulation is necessary and must be put in the framework of the development of human civilization. thus legal confinement of freedom is necessary for the sake of freedom itself. the glorification of unlimited freedom would ultimately undermine a civilization. it is the above argument that leads prominent thinkers such as thomas hobbes (1588-1679), jean-jacques rousseau (1712-1778), and immanuel kant (1724-1804) to develop the idea of a “social contract”. without being blind to its possible negative externality or its unintended negative effects on the citizens’ basic rights, hobbes’ insistence on the citizens to put their rights entirely under the regulation and control of the king, is initially based on the good will to protect the very citizens’ basic rights. with different way out but under the same logic of thinking, immanuel kant later on came to emphasize the importance of the idea of social contract. instead of giving absolute power to the king, as suggested by hobbes, kant in his work the metaphysical elements of justice underscored the primacy of the rule of law as the political instrument to protect the citizens’ basic rights. to protect everyone’s rights, kant believes, under the guidance of “practical reason”, members of society 52 prajna vihara-~ eventually agree to leave behind the natural state of pre-juridical society and move to juridical society.19 legal protection of the citizens’ basic rights is so important that society is legally justified in forcing every citizen to move from pre-juridical society to juridical society. a claim of a lawful state, therefore, requires true recognition of the state’s essential position to enforce the rule of law as the only political instrument to ensure the citizens’ basic rights. it is, therefore, reasonable, to a certain extent, to confine legally the citizens’ freedom for only in this way can everyone’s basic rights, including the right to social wellbeing, be effectively protected. at this point, the issue of just and unjust law is crucial. third, hayek’s defense on the idea of free market to fullfill the pareto optimality principle, is actually a reflection of his over-optimism concerning the capacity of the market for self-ordering. such optimism, however, is reasonable only if the market itself is perfect. a perfect market is the one that operates under the full support of true and broadly available information. this condition is indeed impossible to fulfill. market information is always asymetric in nature. it is not surprising since competition in itself presumes competitiveness. this requires carefulness in sharing and diseminating information in market. for this reason, every involved party would keep its information in such a way that prevents other parties from having complete or full information they need to increase their own competitive advantage. unfortunately, information about market is always asymmetrical. every concerned party would prefer to maintain such a condition as it serves their self interest. it is, therefore, not entirely true to see market as entirely free from anybody’s control. this further weakens hayek’s insistence on excluding concepts of justice in considerations of the market. besides, the principle of efficiency or pareto optimality principle is acceptable insofar as it promotes the principle of utility. it is, however, worth noting that putting too much stress on the principle of utility is prone to abnegate the principle of fair equality. fair equality of the distribution of goods and services would be at risk once the principle of utility dominates.20 over-emphasizing the principle of utility simply reveals that economy has been taken to be the end in itself. it is not surprising, then, that economy is operating free from any non-economic motive. economy has become the only motive of every economic activity. however, this andre ata ujan 53 way of seeing economy would lead hayek to encounter two serious problems. first, hayek seems to hold that the actual economic behavior is determined solely by economic motive, which is nothing but the selfinterest; and second, hayek falls into neglect of the general formal equilibrium theory in economy. self-interest is important to boost economic development. yet, it is not the sole driving motive of every economic gain. karl polanyi in his masterpiece the great transformation, (2001), shows this clearly. through his careful anthropological and historical study on economic development, he shows that in many cases non-economic motives has played a very central role for economic development. they are a more determining factor in economic development than the economic motives themselves. many economic achievements are generated from an obsession that goes beyond economic interest. in a very micro level, economic prosperity is not the entire motive that encourages a father to be so involved in his work. hard working might be the way for him to maintain and sustain his self-dignity before both his family and the society, at large. his dedication is therefore encouraged ultimately by motives that goes beyond economic motives.21 the same thing is true in a wider perceptive. bill gates, the owner of microsoft, in his speech in global economic forum, taking place in davos, switzerland, (january, 2008), encouraged his audience to take seriously the importance of non-economic incentives in doing business. self-interest, gate asserts, is a very important motive in capitalism. however, realizing the negative externality that the market could bring about, it is the time to look for alternative incentives, which is also based on the market itself. gates comes to believe that this alternative incentive is recognition.22 through the market, every businessman or woman is able to create his/her positive self-image. they should be able to put the value of life beyond mere economic value. positive self-image is an intangible value that may bring a long-term profit (tangible value) to the business; but it is also a very fundamental value for it reflects the very value of human selfquality. at this point self-interest must evolve and grow up to be enlightened self-interest in which economic achievements must be put within the framework of human social responsibility. it is, therefore, not impossible for a human being to take religious 54 prajna vihara-~ values or any other non-economic motives to be the driving motive of his/her economic activity. an economic gain must be treated, then, as an instrumental end for a nobler end once the work and economic achievement a person could harvest is viewed as the form of human responsibility for all the talents the god has endowed him/her. the history of economic practices has confirmed this non-economic central position in economic development. the so-called mercantilism, for example, is an economic system, which has developed and aimed at maintaining and sustaining the state’s sovereignty. its main motive is political, not economic. the economic domination through trade becomes the sine qua non condition for a state to demonstrate its political superiority and sovereignty over other countries in the world. thus, it is nationalism, not economy, that has become the driving force for the growth of mercantilism.23 the overemphasis on economy has led hayek to neglect what is called, following amartya sen, the formal general balance theory.24 to make it simple, the theory in essence emphasizes that to be successful, the economy must be understood within a broadened perspective. according to sen, in order to be able to handle successfully economic problems, economy must open itself and take seriously all non-economic considerations. daily experiences tell us that people can suffer from severe starvation even in a state with the abundance of economic resources or bountiful harvest. if this is the case then it must be clear that the problem to solve is not solely economic in nature. it is the problem of fair distribution of economic resources, which is by nature moral, not economic, problem. in other words, non-economic factors actually have direct or indirect effect on economics performance. amartya sen even believes that economy can become more productive once people take seriously moral considerations in their economic decision-making. fourth, the overemphasis on free market and free competition has disembedded the economy from its original characteristic as an embedded entity. economy, polanyi emphasizes, is but a part of the system of social relationships (embedded economy).25 his anthropological and historical studies on economics reveals that economy can never become the end in itself. originally, economy is always taken to be a part of social relationship and put within a broaden framework of human value system. it even becomes the instrument of social cohesion. that is the reason why andre ata ujan 55 social values such as reciprocity and redistribution, according to polanyi, have played a very central role in economic development. in other words, economic development is determined not primarily by economic growth but rather by its substantial contribution to human social welfare or human common good. hence, fair equality of economic benefit is more important to seek for than the fulfillment of the principle of utility itself. the above critical remarks, however, must not prevent us from giving fair appreciation to hayek’s socio-political and socio-economic contribution in the context of free market economy. hayek has made a very special contribution in reminding us of the potential totalitarianism and authoritarianism that the state might apply in defending social justice. therefore, it is unfair to neglect some of hayek’s critical remarks concerning economic justice. first, hayek’s rejection to the state’s intervention, to a certain extent, is true. while wealth redistribution, is the manifestation of the state’s responsibility for its citizens’ social welfare, hayek’s concerns about free riders in economy is important to note and to be aware of. free riders are morally unjustifiable. justice essentially requires everyone to share benefits and burdens fairly. hence, it is unfair to enjoy any social benefit without, at the same time, being ready to bear certain burden for the society. the rule of exchange requires everyone to produce in order to enjoy particular benefits offered by others in the market. market agents should produce to satisfy what the others need. to put it in rawls’ terms, it is unfair to insist particular right without doing one’s due. different treatment, however, must apply to those who are lacking in the abilities necessary to contribute. yet hayek is not entirely blind to the unfortunate. in his work the road to serfdom26, hayek attracts our attention to totalitarianism that the state could apply in its defense to social justice. he, however, at the same time requires the state to create a safety net for the unfortunate citizens. in a society in which all members of society, to a certain extent, have reached a level of welfare, the most important thing the state has to do is to ensure everyone’s general freedom, that is, a guarantee that every citizen has the real opportunity to satisfy each basic needs necessary to live a decent life. the state, hayek argues, has inherent responsibility to encourage and create a social system that protects its citizens from various threats. in this sense, hayek is exactly right and so deserves real support. 56 prajna vihara-~ second, the state’s intervention must not be taken-for-granted. besides its potential to depress citizens’ creativity, initiatives, and innovations, which are but the preconditions for creating competitive advantage, the common good it adopts to be the legitimate justification of the public policies could become an ideology to support the structural violence it applies to the citizens. it is common in every corrupt government that the so-called common good is adopted simply as the political mask to cover the interest of the dominant parties. this is also the reason for free societies to be aware and critical of the ideology of the general will. lack of criticism would pave the way for totalitarianism, a condition that must be at odds with the basic values of democracy. third, in a very close relation to the second point, it is necessary to emphasize that if we take seriously social justice to be the basic value for every free society, then the initiative for fighting social injustice must come, ultimately, from the oppressed ones. the oppressed parties know better the unfortunate condition to which they have borne. it is likely impossible to expect genuine generosity coming from a corrupt society. hence, there must be initiatives of the oppressed society to fight social injustice. free and civilized societies can learn a lot from social revolutions in the middle east in the last ten years. the social revolution initiated and organized by the oppressed citizens has proven itself the most effective political instrument for citizens to release themselves from political authoritarianism. it has proven itself that even the most authoritarian governments are powerless in sustaining their authority once the enlightened citizens are ready to pay the price for the sustainability of their basic rights. hayek’s stubborn position in rejecting the state’s intervention is therefore, to a certain extent, reasonable enough to support. promoting social justice in the pursuit of a competitive environment, the free market often loses sight of its original purpose. that is, the economy exists to support human welfare. but it has been separated from the social system and its role in strengthening social cohesion. the economy, therefore, must be brought back to its original position in which it serves as a part of a social andre ata ujan 57 infrastructure to support social welfare. to put it in polanyi’s words, economy by nature is but an embedded economy.27 this position, however, requires a communitarian spirit widely shared by society as a whole, for only in this environment, can economy turn out to be the effective means for creating human social welfare. in such environment, every member of society sees him/herself naturally as a part of the society who share fair burden and so fairly contribute to the common good. that is the basic nature of the so-called household for it is in a household that all of its members live together, share meals, and voluntarily take responsibility for the happiness of every member of the household.28 yet, the glorification of individualism and freedom has made polanyi’s and aristotle’s romanticism of mutual self-help and social responsibility seem outdated. it is important to note that hayek rejects social justice to be the standard of a successful market due to the idea that the market is a spontaneous and impersonal ordo that operates under the condition of uncertainty. it operates under its own rules of game and is free from anyone’s ability to control it. the state should intervene only when the market is considered harmful to the society as a whole, particularly, to the disadvantaged ones. so, the question which emerges is: how could social justice be enforced without at the same time infringing individual freedom or without doing harm to, using hayek’s terminology, general freedom? john rawls offers a way out. his idea of maximin rule (latin: maximum mnimorum rule) which is in essence an operational principle generated from his first principles of justice as fairness, that is, (1) the great principle of liberty for all; and (2a) the principle of fair equality of opportunity; and (2b) the difference principle. the first principle of justice as fairness, i.e. the great principle of liberty is political; whereas, the second principle of justice as fairness, i.e. the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle, is economic rather than political.29 hayek and rawls actually have something in common. both of them take uncertainty to be the basis for emphasizing the importance of freedom (in hayek) or liberty (in rawls).30 freedom (and abstract rules) according to hayek, is important because market is full of uncertainty. rawls takes the same way to justify everyone’s option for the first principle of justice. to him, in uncertainty, it is reasonable for rational people 58 prajna vihara-~ to choose the first principles of justice because only within the framework of such principles can everyone guarantee each own rights and freedom to enjoy social benefit provided by and available in society. freedom is even so important that it must not be traded off even for the sake of economic interest. the first principles of justice, therefore, must be treated lexically. it means that the second principle (i.e. the principle of fair equality of opportunity) can come to force only, if and only if, the first principle of justice (the great principle of liberty) has been satisfied. the same way of thinking is true for the difference principle. this principle may come to apply only, if and only if, the principle of fair equality of opportunity has been fully satisfied. that way of regulation is important because every principle in nature incorporates in itself human basic rights; to be more precise, human basic needs. in other words, it is morally unjustified to pursue one’s own interest at the price of others’ interest. that is exactly the essence of the maximin rule or the maximin strategy. the maximin strategy requires the fate of the unfortunate ones be taken seriously to be the benchmark in setting up and enforcing public policies. it means, only if everyone has satisfied his/her basic needs (this is the basic requirement of the principle of fair equality of opportunity), can the better off be allowed to claim the right to enjoy a better life prospect (the basic requirement of the difference principle). it is, therefore, very clear that rawls really takes into account the fate of the disadvantaged to be the benchmark of public policies. only if the disadvantaged has the real opportunity to enjoy a decent life, can the rest has the legitimate claim to enjoy a better life prospect. to put it in a stronger way, the better off must not enjoy a better life at the price of the worse off. this helps ensure everyone’s basic rights, on the one hand, and sustain freedom of the better off to pursue his/her interest, on the other. closing remarks hayek has shown us the importance of freedom in supporting human civilization, particularly, in the system of free market economy. to such extent, we must be very careful of any public policy enforced in the andre ata ujan 59 name of social justice. however, hayek’s conclusive position to eliminate social justice from the system of free market economy for the reason that such ideal would endanger human freedom and civilization, is overly extreme. the spontaneous, independent, and impersonal characteristic of the free market economy, which he takes to support his position, is an exaggeration. there is no sufficient reason to see market as an entity, which is entirely free from any party’s intervention. market is always, potentially, distorted by the market agents’ selfish-interests. hence, free market economy can become a serious threat to social justice. the state’s intervention is, therefore, important to support everyone’s right to enjoy a decent life in terms of human basic needs. it is indeed not easy to reach a situation fully colored by social justice. yet social justice is not a utopia in a radical sense. through restless efforts, social justice could, at least partially, be realized, when the unfortunate become a benchmark in planning and enforcing public policies. a civilized society must not allow any market system to widen the chasm between the rich and the poor. it is highly unreasonable to let an economic system to take precedence that reasonable people recognize as harmful to social justice. at this point, the state has the legal and moral responsibility for creating conditions for the existence and the sustainability of social justice. endnotes 1bill gates, “a new approcah to capitalism”, in michael kinsley, (ed.), creative capitalism (new york: simon & schuster, 2008), pp.7-16. in his speech, bill gates, among others, emphasized the urgency of the developed countries’ openness to help reduce socio-economic chasm that has grown up between developed and developing countries. gates tried to invite and encourage developed countries to create their domestic market for the developing countries’ products. 2friedrich von hayek, law, legislation and liberty: the mirage of social justice (chicago, london: the university of chicago, 1978), pp.67-70. 3see john rawls. a theory of justice, revised edition (harvard: harvard university press, 1999); justice is fairness: a restatement, 2001). taking liberalism to be the political back-ground of his theory of justice, john rawls emphasized the importance of fair distribution of benefit and burden. claim of rights to enjoy any social benefit without doing one’s own part as the reflection of his/her responsibility to society, according to rawls, is a blatant violation of the principle of justice as 60 prajna vihara-~ fairness. 4hayek, op.cit., pp.1-5. see also john rawls, a theory of justice, revised edition (harvard: harvard univerity press, 1999), pp.52-77. 5hayek, op.cit., p.109. 6amartya sen, on ethics and economics (malden, usa: blackwell publishing, 1988), pp.1-9; compare it with karl polanyi, “aristotle discovers the economy”, in karl polanyi et al., (eds)., trade and the market in the early empires, economies in history and theory (new york: the free press; london: colliermacmillan limited, 1957), pp.243-270. polanyi’s main position is that economy must be an embedded economy; and in such position, economy becomes an integral part of a broader human relationship or human value system. unfortunately, economy in fact is disembedded and eradicated from such system. polanyi rejected every notion that considers economic interest the only motive of all economic activities. he defended embedded-economy and rejected disembedded-economy. 7sen, op.cit., pp.10-21. 8hayek, op.cit., pp.4-5. 9hayek, op.cit., pp.11-14; 126. 10hayek, op.cit., pp.20-23. 11hayek, op.cit., pp.62-102. 12hayek, op.cit., pp.65-66. 13hayek, op.cit., pp.67-70. 14hayek, op.cit., p.33. 15hayek. op.cit., p.108. 16sen, op.cit., hlm. 27.s 17r. boatright, ethics and the conduct of business. fourth edition. (new jersey: pearson education, inc., 2003), pp.16-18. according to boatright, good economy requires a balanced consideration on economic, moral, and legal aspects in running economy. an overemphasis on economic aspect would provoke moral problems, which in turn, at least in the long run, inflict negative impact on economy itself. 18robert nozick, anarchy, state, and utopia (oxford: basic book, inc., 1974), pp.150-155. 19immanuel kant, the metaphysical elements of justice. translated with an introduction by john ladd, (indianapolis, new york: the bobs-merrill company inc., 1965), p.80. 20sen, op.cit., pp.31-37. 21karl polanyi, the great transformation. the political and economic origins of our time (boston: beacon press, 2001), pp. 48 etc. see also gregory clark, “the lesson of history”, in michel kinsley, (ed.), op.cit., pp.183-85. 22gates, op.cit., p.10. 23ian bremmer, the end of free market. who wins the war between states and corporation? (new york: penguin group (usa) inc., 2010), pp.32.42. 24sen, op.cit., pp.2-7. sen holds that economy originally has two dimenandre ata ujan 61 sions: (1) ethics; and (2) engineering. each of them in different way has close relationship with politics. quoting aristotle, sen asserts that economy has a close relationship with ethics because economy in essence is dealing not only with the question of “how to live”, but rather “how human beings should live their life”. in raising this moral question sen is going to emphasize the importance of moral motive in economy. due to its close relationship with ethics, economy becomes normative economy. meanwhile, the second dimension primarily emphasizes the calculative character of the economy; this is mainstream economy. 25polanyi, the great transformation, pp.48-58. 26hayek, road to serfdom (chicago: the university of chicago press, 2007). hayek’s explanations, on the one hand, emphasize the importance of releasing market from the state’s authoritarianism (the principle of non-intervention). however, on the other hand, to prevent the fate of the unfortunate ones from getting worse and worse, he emphasizes as well the importance of the state’s intervention to ensure everyone’s basic rights, including right to enjoy a better life in terms of economic prosperity. hence, to a certain extent, hayek is on the side of social justice. 27polanyi, the great transformation, p.48; “aristotle discovers the economy”, pp.243-270. 28aristoteles, politics, translated by c.d.c. reeve (usa: hacket publishing company inc., 1988), p.3. 29rawls, a theory of justice, pp.47-102; 130-138. hayek applies “freedom” in all his analysis of the market economy because his approach to economy is ethical in nature; whereas, rawls takes “liberty” to be the terminology in presenting his idea of justice as fairness because his approach to the issue is by nature political rather than moral. 30“freedom” is a moral terminology, whereas “liberty” is a political terminology. hayek applies “freedom” in all his analysis of the market economy because his approach to economy is ethical in nature; meanwhile, rawls takes “liberty” to be the terminology in presenting his idea of justice as fairness because he claims that his approach to the issue is by nature political rather than moral. references aristotle. (1998). politics. translated by c.d.c. reeve. united states: hacket publishing company, inc. boatright, r. (2003). ethics and the conduct of business. fourth edition. new jersey: pearson education, inc. bremmer, ian. (2010). the end of the free market. who wins the war between states and corporation?. new york: penguin group (usa) inc. 62 prajna vihara-~ gates, bill. a new approach to capitalism. in kinsley, michael, (ed). (2008). creative capitalism. new york: simon & schuster. hayek, friedrich august. (1978). law, legislation and liberty: the mirage of social justice. chicago, london: the university of chicago press. ----------------. (2004; 2007). the road to serfdom. chicago: the university of chicago press. kant, immanuel. (1965). the metaphysical elements of justice. translated with an introduction by john ladd. indianapolis, new york: the bobs-merrill company inc. nozick, robert. (1974). anarchy, state, and utopia. oxford: basic book, inc. polanyi, karl. (2001). the great transformation. the political and economic origins of our time. foreward by joseph e. stiglitz. introduction by fred block. boston: beacon press. ----------------. “aristotle discovers the economy”. in polanyi, karl, et al., eds.. (1957). trade and market in the early empires, economies in history and theory. new york: the free press. ----------------. “the economy as the instituted process”. in polanyi, karl, et al., (eds.). trade and the market in early empires, economies in the history and theory. (1957). new york: the free press. rawls, john. (1999). a theory of justice. revised edition. cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press. ----------------. (2001). justice as fairness: a restatement. edited by erin kelly. cambridge, masscusetts, london: belknap press of harvard university press. sen, amartya. (1988). on ethics and economics. the royal lectures. series editor: john m. letiche, university of california, berkeley. malden, usa: blackwell publishing. andre ata ujan 63 10_(158-174) on the neighbor.pmd on the neighbor: a reading of kierkegaard’s works of love1 kajornpat tangyin assumption university of thailand abstract this essay examines the concept of the neighbor in soren kierkegaard’s “works of love”. it examines kierkegaard’s understanding of the teaching of christ: “you must love your neighbour as yourself”, as a commandment, and how it is connected to the love of god. it then relates this to the writings of levinas on “the other”. i the question “who is the neighbor?” (luke 10:29-37) was asked of jesus christ by a lawyer long ago, and that question has continued to be asked in order to remind those who claim to be a christian. it is not so much to know who the neighbor is but how to be a neighbor. the story of the good samaritan puts the question itself into question. in the words of kierkegaard, “christ does not speak about knowing the neighbor but about becoming a neighbor oneself, about showing oneself to be neighbor just as the samaritan showed it by his mercy” (kierkegaard’s works of love later will be used wl, p.22). the question “who is the neighbor?” is a question that kierkegaard connects to the commandment of love. this is evident in the very title of his book works of love, that talks, “not about love but about works of love”. “there are indeed only some works that human language specifically and narrowly calls works of love, but in heaven no work can be pleasing unless it is a work of love” (wl, p.4) in the teachings of the church, there is nothing more important than love which is ground for all other teachings. jesus christ, in his summary of the whole law, says, you 158 prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 158-174 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ must love the lord your god with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. this is the greatest and the first commandment. the second resembles it: you must love your neighbour as yourself. on these two commandments hangs the whole law, and the prophets also”. (matthew 22:37-40). both the two commandments go together. we could not accept the first without the second, which means “anyone who loves god must also love his brother” (1 john 4:21). this is not a guiding principle that you “ought’ to love your neighbor, it is the commandment: you ‘must’ love your neighbor. for christianity, jesus christ is the clear witness of this sacrificial love for the other person. to give priority to the other without concern for self-salvation is the way that christians can build up their relationship to god through their neighbors. father zossima, in the brothers karamazov, says: “strive to love your neighbor actively and constantly. in so far as you advance in love you will grow surer of the reality of god and of the immortality of your soul” (dostoyevsky, 1999, p.64). our love of god is made practical through our love of our neighbor. christians could not claim the love of god while being indifferent to the other. “anyone who says, ‘i love god’, and hates his brother, is a liar, since a man who does not love the brother that he can see cannot love god, whom he has never seen” (1 john 4:20). for kierkegaard, “love for god and love for neighbor are like two doors that open simultaneously, so that it is impossible to open one without also opening the other, and impossible to shut one without also shutting the other" (kierkegaard, 1978, p.487). this paper explores kierkegaard’s views of the christian teaching of love of neighbor. the first part deals with the views of kierkegaard, while the second connects these ideas concerning the neighbor with levinas’s reflection on “the other”. ii the second commandment in the gospel of matthew 22:39, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself” is the ethical commandment. a commandment implies an obligation to obey. kierkegaard says, “all you have to do is to obey in love” (wl, p.20). he states: to love is a duty kajornpat tangyin 159 (wl, p.24). it is not a matter of choice, but it is “eternity’s shall” (wl, p.37). this commandment implies the duty, the duty to love your neighbor. he says, “only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change” (wl, p.29). a love often changes to hate and jealousy because that love is merely spontaneous love. but when love secures itself in duty, it relates itself with eternity. it never becomes habit. it is guards against all despair. he says, “despair is to lack the eternal; despair is not to have undergone the change of eternity through duty’s shall” (wl, p.40-41). he might want to point out the main characteristic of christian love which is different from other forms of love. the christian love, for him, is a commandment. jesus, in his last teaching, said to his disciples: “the command i give you is this, that you love one another” (john 15:17). when love commands you, it is your duty to love even though it will bring you suffering. suffering will not make you lose your hope, or make you despair, because the duty to love binds you with eternity. philip l. quinn, in his article kierkegaard’s christian ethics, makes the following observation: according to kierkegaard, then, three things threaten to destroy our loves: changes in our inclinations and feelings, changes in the objects we love, and the unhappiness, pain, and suffering that can lead to despair. such things often do destroy erotic loves and friendships. love of neighbor will not be vulnerable to the first two of them only if it is a duty and so compliance is motivated by a sense of duty independent of inclinations, feelings, and mutable characteristics of the neighbor. it will not be vulnerable to the third of them, kierkegaard suggests, only if it is a duty whose source is eternity, a duty imposed by a divine command, so that divine assistance can be relied upon if needed to make compliance a real possibility. in short, only the love that is obedient to the divine command is immutable. (quinn, 2006, p.357) the question “who is the neighbor?” puts ourselves into question. is it possible for me to love everyone even before i know him or her? is it possible for a person __ a sinful person like me __ to perform the 160 prajna vihara-~ duty of love? if i take seriously this commandment to love, i probably will be ready to be deceived, to be a fool in the eyes of the other. i have to be courageous enough to stand firmly on the foundation of christian love. without divine grace, how can it be possible for humans to perform the duty of love? quinn’s remarks on the need of divine assistance for human to do the command of love is quite true. merold westphal, in the book levinas and kierkegaard in dialogue, insists, “ontologically speaking, neighbor love is grounded in the mysterious god relation without which it would be impossible” (westphal, 2008, p.56). he claims that kierkegaard walks the same path as luther, augustine, and paul, in terms of law and grace, commandment and enablement. without god’s grace, we are too weak to overcome our natural inclination. quinn also says, “kierkegaard’s god is the lutheran god from whom salvation comes through faith alone (sola fide). we do not earn righteousness through the merits of our works of love” (quinn, 2006, p.366). as human being, we always need god in order to perform the duty of love. to love the neighbor, according to the commandment, is to love everyone. “since everyone is my neighbor, the commandment to love my neighbors as myself becomes the commandment to love my enemies” (westphal, 2008, p.56). after you shut your door and pray to god, the person you see when you open the door is your neighbor to whom you have to perform the duty of love. we often look for a person who meets and matches our desire, a perfect object of our love, to whom we want to love and be loved. but christian teaching of love does not offer you a choice to perform the duty of love, it commands you to love the ones you see, or even the most terrible and ugly enemy. for kierkegaard: therefore if you want to be perfect in love, strive to fulfill this duty, in loving to love person one sees, to love him just as you see him, with all his imperfections and weaknesses, to love him as you see him when he has changed completely, when he no longer loves you but perhaps turns away indifferent or turns away to love another, to love him as you see him when he betrays and denies you. (wl, p.174) the question “who is the neighbor?” redirects us to the question kajornpat tangyin 161 how to be neighbor, or how to be the good samaritan, or how to perform the duty of love to everyone. for kierkegaard, “the category “neighbor” is like the category “human being”” (wl, p.141). we have to love all human beings. how shall i love my neighbor? “as yourself” is very brief and precise, nothing more or less. you shall love god with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind. “as yourself” is the way you love your neighbor. this commandment presupposes self-love, and this self-love shows the way to love our neighbor. m. jamie ferreira observes that kierkegaard’s account of “as yourself” serves five main purposes __ it is meant (1) to “open the lock of self-love”, (2) to teach a person “proper self-love”, (3) to be a standard for our love of others so that it is not more than love for ourselves, and (5) to remind us that we have been loved by god (ferreira, 2008, p.88). how shall i love my neighbor as myself? kierkegaard says: to love yourself in the right way and to love the neighbor correspond perfectly to one another; fundamentally they are one and the same thing (wl, p.22). for kierkegaard, christian love does not teach us to do away with self-love but to make it in the right way. but how do we love ourselves in the right way? he concludes: you shall love yourself in the same way as you love your neighbor when you love him as yourself (wl, p.23). to love the neighbor is to love yourself, and to love yourself is to love the neighbor. this seeming puzzle is clarified when we understand that the love between self and neighbor is grounded on god’s love. according to his prayer: “how could one speak properly about love if you were forgotten, you god of love, source of love in heaven and on earth" (wl, p.3). human love is originated from god, because god is love. god is ineffable, indescribable. love is also the same. there is no way to take account of love without taking account of god. it is “just as the quiet lake originates deep down in hidden springs no eye has seen, so also does a person’s love originate even more deeply in god’s love” (wl, p.10). we recognize love by its fruit, i.e., by its works, works of love. for kierkegaard, to love neighbor as yourself is not open to love someone and indifferent to some other. the neighbor is someone who is nearer to you than anyone else (wl, p.21). nearer to you than anyone does not refer to your favorite friend or loved one, but to those who are in front of you. then the neighbor, for him, means “all people” (wl, 162 prajna vihara-~ p.21). the neighbor is the one you have to love even before you know her/him. the christian teaching on love of neighbor commands you to “do” even before thinking __ calculating, making distinction, etc. thinking, and calculating lead you to make distinctions among people, and as a result you are tempted to select your preferential ones. you will be trapped into your self-love where there is no place for neighbor in the christian meaning. your preferential person will be your second self. kierkegaard says, “the christian doctrine, on the contrary, is to love the neighbor, to love the whole human race, all people, even the enemy, and not to make exceptions, neither of preference nor of aversion” (wl, p.19) it teaches you to be a neighbor through doing the duty of neighbor. kierkegaard says, “the one to whom i have a duty is my neighbor, and when i fulfill my duty i show that i am a neighbor” (wl, p.22). iii for kierkegaard, christian love of neighbor is very different from erotic love and friendship. he makes the distinction between preferential love (erotic love and friendship) and christian love. this distinction points out the unique characteristic of christian love of neighbor which is the form of “self-denial’s love” (wl, p.55). erotic love and friendship exclusively select only the beloved and friend which is the form of “self-love”. “for this reason the beloved and the friend are called, remarkably and profoundly, to be sure, the other self, the other i __ since the neighbor is the other you, or, quite precisely, the third party of equality. the other self, the other i” (wl, p.53). erotic love selects only the beloved, and friendship selects only friend and group of friends excluding the other person from the circle. then this preferential love of both erotic love and friend, for kierkegaard, is not open for the other you. they are just looking for someone who can represent the other i. for kierkegaard, the preferential love, at the end, reduce the other you to be the other i. he says, “but erotic love and friendship are the very peak of self-esteem, the i intoxicated in the other i. the more securely one i and another i join to become one i, the more this united i selfishly cuts itself off from everyone else. at the peak of erotic love and friendship, the two actually do bekajornpat tangyin 163 come one self, one i (wl, p.56). the finality of the path of preferential love whether erotic love and friendship will lead to self-love. this selflove is exclusive. then he says, “take away the distinction of preferential love so that you can love the neighbor” (wl, p.61). the neighbor is to whom you have duty to love before you make the distinction, you categorize the similarity and dissimilarity, before you reduce him/her to be the other self. by our natural inclination we tend to love only and want to be loved by particular people. to love neighbor is to love everyone, or anyone that you encounter, and it seems to be against our natural tendency. the christian love of neighbor teaches us to extend the love beyond our natural inclination. that is why christian teaching of love has to be founded by the commandment. the commandment corrects our natural inclination. the christian teaching of love is firmly based on selfdenial. it uplifts the standard of worldly love where the reciprocal relation is needed, to love and to be loved at the same time. for christianity, the reciprocal relation is just optional, not compulsory. for kierkegaard, “love is not a being-for-itself quality but a quality by which or in which you are for others” (wl, p.223). without the other, you cannot perform the second commandment. you are not for yourself, but you need the other to whom you can perform the duty of love. the christian has to prove that they are not just preaching love in order to be loved. on the contrary, they love the neighbor, or love the other unconditionally. because “to be loving means: to presuppose love in others” (wl, p.224). to love even the enemy (matthew 5:44-46) has always challenged our natural inclinations. but the lifting of love from the preferential love to the universal love for humankind is the main characteristic of christian love, moving beyond erotic love and friendship. whereas erotic love and friendship is based on preferential love, the christian love is based on the love of neighbor. “insofar as you love the beloved, you are not like god, because for god there is no preference… insofar as you love your friend, you are not like god, because for god there is no distinction. but when you love the neighbor, then you are like god” (wl, p.63). reading kierkegaard’s works of love raises many questions of how to love neighbor and translate neighbor into everyone including our enemy, and how to love without distinction whether our beloved, friends, and neighbors. is erotic love and friendship always trapped in self-love? 164 prajna vihara-~ finally, is it possible to perform the love of neighbor? to perform the duty of love including our enemy is really against our natural tendency. kierkegaard points out the difference between preferential love and christian love by taking account of self-love and self-denial love to be the main theme. whereas preferential love is based on self-love, christian love is based on self-denying love. the self, or the i, is the way to justify your love for neighbor whether your love is finally returning to the i. then the i, for him, has to open for the other you to be loved by the i, and even the i is rejected by the you. for kierkegaard, there are no worldly struggles to regret, “christ’s life is really the only unhappy love… for this reason, his whole life was horrible collision with the merely human conception of what love is. it was the ungodly world that crucified him; but even the disciples did not understand him” (wl, p.110). worldly love is quite different from the christian teaching of love. do we have to sacrifice our preferential love for christian love? kierkegaard does not intend to eliminate the preferential love for the neighbor. on the contrary he says, “just as this commandment will teach everyone how to love oneself, so it also will teach erotic love and friendship genuine love: in loving yourself, preserve love for the neighbor; in erotic love and friendship, preserve love for the neighbor” (wl, p.6162). kierkegaard does not deny preferential love but try to open it for the neighbor. the relationship between the love and beloved, between friend and friend, should not be closed just among the couple and the circle of friends. but it should also be open for neighbor to have a place in that circle. “christianity has not come into the world to teach this or that change in how you are to love your wife and your friend in particular, but to teach how you are to love all human beings universally-humanly” (wl, p.142-143). kierkegaard does not mean to love wife, husband and friend as the way you love you neighbor. to love human beings universally does not mean to love everyone in the same manner. we cannot love everyone because “everyone” is quite abstract. everyone can turn to be no one. we can love each one in particular, and everyone turns to be each one in particular when we see individually. while we are with our loved, “love the beloved faithfully and tenderly, but let your love for the neighbor be the sanctifying element in your union’s covenant with god” (wl, p.62). while we are with friend, “love your friend honestly and devotedly, but kajornpat tangyin 165 let love for the neighbor be what you learn from each other in your friendship’s confidential relationship with god!” (wl, p.62) stephen minister gives a concluding remarks on this point: kierkegaard’s point is not that the god relationship overwhelms or short-circuits the love relationship, but that the god relationship makes possible the genuine love relationship between two particular human beings. without the resources of the god-relation, kierkegaard does not think one can love a particular other as that particular other ought to be loved. the fact that the love relationship originates in god has a very significant implication for kierkegaard. (minister, 2008, p.237) kierkegaard is not against all forms of self-love, or preferential love. he just wants to make it right according to the christian teaching of love. he realizes the phrase “as yourself does presuppose self-love, that there is nothing inherently wrong with our natural inclinations. “for kierkegaard the legitimacy of self-love and the “as yourself” is in part a matter of consistency. if we cannot exclude anyone, we cannot arbitrarily exclude ourselves; similarly, if one has reverence for god’s creation or god’s gifts, one must have reverence for one’s self as well” (ferreira, 2008, p.92). for kierkegaard, to make it right is to do away with all forms of selfish self-love rather than self-love itself. selfish preferential love is always exclusive. he invites us to practice the unselfishlove by testing ourselves how to relate with one who is dead. “the work of love in recollecting one who is dead is thus a work of the most unselfish, the freest, the most faithful love. therefore go out and practice it; recollect the one who is dead and just in this way learn to love the living unselfishly, freely, and faithfully” (wl, p.358). the dead person cannot give you any compliment, he or she is silent to you and there is no gift to return to you. if you keep practicing this love unconditionally for the dead person, you also have to keep doing the same to all persons. then the duty of love according to the second commandment does not end with death but it is the eternal duty. he says, “the duty to love the people we see cannot cease because death separates them from us, because the duty is eternal” (wl, p.358). 166 prajna vihara-~ kierkegaard portrays human nature as a weak condition which is easily trapped in selfish self-love. the human condition in a sinful one, where it is difficult to respond to the presence of the neighbor. to practice the second commandment is not an easy task. on the contrary, “practice in christianity is, of course, hard work” (quinn, 2006, p.367). for kierkegaard, there is nothing easy in being christian. johannes climacus, kierkegaard’s pseudonym in the book concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragment, says: to become a christian then becomes the most terrible of all decisions in a person’s life, since it is a matter of winning faith through despair and offense (kierkegaard, 1992, p.373). it is not a matter what christian you are but how you are truly to become christian. and again he says: “to become a christian is actually the most difficult of all tasks, because the task, although the same, varies in relation to the capabilities of the respective individuals” (kierkegaard, 1992, p.377). if you are christian, you are called not just to admire the teaching of jesus christ but to imitate the life of christ. to be admirer is not the same as to be imitator. if you imitate the life of christ, you have to be ready to suffer, or even to be crucified like christ. it might be true to say that the practice of christianity requires the radical decision to renounce yourself, to move from selfish self-love to self-denying love. you have to follow the divine voice that commands you to love your neighbor as yourself. this question always leads back to the possibility of the practice of love of neighbor. kierkegaard realizes how high a demand this is when he puts god as the middle position in the relation between person and person. he says, “to love god is to love oneself truly; to help another person to love god is to love another person; to be helped by another person to love god is to be loved” (wl, 107). for kierkegaard, god is the beginning and the finality of human love, from truly self-love to love of neighbor. if god is the middle term between person and person, god would be the foundation where human love grows. kierkegaard took the word from i corinthians 8:1, love builds up. human love builds up on this ground, and “it is god, the creator, who must implant love in each human being, he who himself is love” (wl, p.216). and again he adds, “ultimately no human being is capable of laying the ground of love in the other person” (wl, p.219). for kierkegaard, without god… “how could kajornpat tangyin 167 one speak properly about love if you were forgotten, you god of love, source of love in heaven and on earth” (wl, p.3). without god’s grace, we are not able to perform the duty of love in which god is the beginning and the end. kierkegaard leads us to where we cannot continue our journey in christian life without dependent upon god’s grace. quinn insists, “if we are required to imitate christ as fully as possible in our own lives, recourse to grace may be needed twice. perhaps gracious divine assistance will be needed, at least sometimes, to help us bridge the moral gap when imitating christ is especially difficult. certainly gracious divine forgiveness and mercy will be needed in response to our many failures to imitate christ as we should” (quinn, 2006, p.373-374). iv the question “who is the neighbor?” concluded with jesus telling to the lawyer to “go, and do likewise” (matthew 10:37). the over two thousand years story of the good samaritan still plays in the heart of over billion people in the world. we do not know much of this merciful samaritan, and in the story we only know his request of the host to take care of the wounded man and his promise to repay the rest when he returns. there is no conversation between the merciful samaritan and the wounded man. they are two perfect strangers for each other, whereas the one is the unfortunate person, the other one is merciful person. the merciful person helps the unfortunate person without knowing, or questioning about him, or knowing the outcome. kierkegaard retells the story of the merciful samaritan. he asks, “would he not have been equally as merciful, just as merciful as that merciful samaritan, or is there some objection to calling this the story about the merciful samaritan?” (wl, p.317) for kierkegaard, this merciful samaritan still performs the work of love even if it can give nothing and is able to do nothing. because “mercifulness is how it is given” (wl, p.327). this is not the worldly standard but it is god’s standard which measures your deepest inwardness. if you are christian, you will not ask “who is the neighbor?” on the contrary you will “go, and do likewise” obey and perform the duty of love according to the teaching of the commandment. 168 prajna vihara-~ my reading then is not so much on whether kierkegaard interprets the teaching of the commandment correctly, or his view of christian teaching of love destroys human love and friendship. there are many articles taking account of those points which are very useful for enlarging our perspective of kierkegaard’s view of christian teaching of love. my reading skips over those parts. i just want to reflect and test myself __ whether i can “go and do likewise”. for my part, the test of “works of love” is not based on overcoming with argument but practice. let me quote from merold westphal on this point: it will still be the case that the primary scene on which the narrative of my life is played out will not be theory but practice, not speculation (mirroring) but imitation (mimesis), not representation but response and responsibility. the crucial question about me will still not be how much did he know? but how much did he love?, not how much did he understand? but how much did he undergo?, not how much truth did he gather into his transcendental unity of apperception? but how far was he willing to be dispersed and decentered in love for god and neighbor? (westphal, 2008, p.91) i do not think that preferential love is something to be completely uprooted in preference to only christian love of neighbor. erotic love and friendship do not necessarily end in selfish self-love. perhaps proper erotic love and friendship is also the precondition of christian love of neighbor. anyone who says “i love neighbor”, and hate the nearest ones such as a wife/husband or friends, is a liar, since a man who does not love the nearest ones cannot love neighbor whom he does not know. kierkegaard says, “when this is the duty, the task is not to find the lovable object, but the task is to find the once given or chosen object, lovable, and to be able to continue to find him lovable no matter how he is changed” (wl, p.159). if we could not love the nearest chosen one, how could you love the neighbor? for my part, i think that proper preferential love is the way we can test ourselves whether we are still firm on the duty of love. jesus, in the gospel of john, asks peter three times to affirm: “yes, i love you”. if we could not say "yes, i love you” to one”s kajornpat tangyin 169 husband/wife, or friend, how could we say “yes” to the other, neighbor. jesus does not try to uproot the preferential love but tries to make it extend from family love, friendship love to all humankind through the category of “neighbor”. jesus, in the gospel of john, speaks the most meaningful words about friendship: “no one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (john 15:13). jesus called his disciple “no longer servant….i have called you friends” and his friendship with disciples is the best exemplar. v kierkegaard challenges us to think about the neighbor, not in the manner of the one who lives nearby, or those who are familiar to us, but as the unfamilar “the other”. the neighbor is that by which the selfishness in self-love is to be tested. (wl, p.21). by this account i see the opportunity to relate kierkegaard’s “neighbor” to levinas’s “the other”, even though levinas seems to turn kierkegaard’s teleological suspension of the ethical (faith) to back to ethics. whereas kierkegaard focuses on the first voice of the divine command to abraham to sacrifice isaac, levinas focuses on the second voice of the divine “do not raise your hand against the boy, do not harm him” (genesis 22:12). kierkegaard takes account of love of neighbor and levinas emphasizes the priority of the other, i see the way that christian teaching of love of neighbor can be the point where both thinkers can meet and compliment each other. for minister, “despite differences of both the merely apparent and real varieties, kierkegaard and levinas find common ground in arguing that some sense of ethicoreligious subjectivity is the central task and ultimate concern in human life” (minister, 2008, p.229). for levinas, the “other” (autre) refers to alterity, and the “other” (autrui) refers to the personal other, or the other person. he introduces the term “alterity” to challenge western philosophy. he thinks that western philosophy is too highly preoccupied with the self. he is fond of the metaphor of ulysses who is always longing for home and contrasts this with western philosophy is always returning to the self. his most compelling story is that of abraham who leaves his hometown and never re170 prajna vihara-~ turns. he wants to challenge western philosophy to leave the self and never return. the movement from the “i” toward the other and never to return to the “i” is the main theme of his philosophy. for levinas, the priority of the other over the “i” is constantly reinforced. the other here is not only the other reflected in consciousness but he means the existing other person. his ethics begins with the human relation, and he places ethics to be prior to ontology. he sees ontology as an attempt to know, to thematize, and to appropriate the other. the other is reduced into sameness, as an object to be manipulatied. for him, ontology therefore becomes philosophy of power (levinas, 1969, p.46). the other is beyond any thematization. the other to whom we can thematize is not the other. he says, “possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonymous of power” (levinas, 1987, p.90). he is very careful to place the other outside the structure of dialectic. otherwise the other will be absorbed again into the system, and a part of the totality in which he wants to depart. for levinas, the irreducibility of the alterity of the other is the moment where the ethical relationship between human beings begins. levinas’ ethics begins at the moment of the encounter with the other. when the other shows his/her face, i am commanded to respond to his/her needs. the epiphany of the face reveals to me the commandment that i have to be wakeful and ready to response “here i am”. the presence of the face of the other put myself into question and i have to depart from myself to serve the other without expecting something return for the self. for levinas, the departure from the self is the approach to the neighbor” (levinas, 1989, p.246). this approach to the other is to serve the neighbor. “to be in oneself is to express oneself, that is, already to serve the other. the ground of expression is goodness” (levinas, 1969, p.183). to live as a human being is to live for the other, and the other always concerns me. the other is always my business. the other is the person to whom i cannot leave in solitude. ethics, for levinas, is all about goodness, mercy, and charity. and this ethics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished through service and as hospitality (levinas, 1969, p.300). he adds, “i am for the other in a relationship of deaconship: i am in service to the other” (levinas, 2000, p.161). if these sentences reflect levinas’s ethics, we could say his ethics begins with service to the kajornpat tangyin 171 other. his ethics does not begin with theoretical ontology, but with sensible morality. he does not aim at a rational principle as in kantian ethics, but for him ethics arises in relation to the other and not straightaway by a reference to the universality of a law (levinas, 2001, p.114). levinas perhaps wants to echo the words from the mount of sinai when he says: the alterity of the other is the extreme point of the “thou shalt not kill” (levinas, 1998, p.169). the high demand from both kierkegaard’s love of neighbor and levinas’s primacy of the other is quite valuable for the christian understanding of the second commandment of love. both open the self to welcome, to serve, to love the other. westphal says, “the invasion of my innermost identity by this other is the birth of the responsible self” (westphal, 2008, p.106). the responsible self is one who follows the teaching of jesus christ and has to be ready for the invasion of neighbor. despite the differences between kierkegaard and levinas in so many points, i see both of them still sharing the same ideas about the second commandment to love neighbor, the agape love of neighbor. westphal ends his book levinas and kierkegaard in dialogue “we find both levinas and kierkegaard, united in spite of deep differences, in the conviction that it’s not what you know, it’s who you love that makes you truly human” (westphal, 2008, p.151). i agree with this as it leaves the the burden on the reader to become truly human. i think that kierkegaard’s love of neighbor can be summarized by the golden rule in the gospel of matthew 7:12, “so in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the law and the prophets”. levinas seems to be cautious of a reciprocal ethics because he thinks that it always leads to a return to the self. so he emphasizes an asymmetrical relationship which demands more from himself rather than from the other. kierkegaard is also cautious of this same movement back to self-love. he therefore characterizes the love of neighbor as a self-denying love. this allows one to open the self and welcome the other. reading kierkegaard’s works of love leads me to be aware of my natural inclinations, sinful conditions, and human limitations, and realize that i have nothing to rely on myself alone in order to carry out fully this commandment. jesus ends his sermon on the mount invoking the two different houses, and i have to ask myself to which house i belong. westphal 172 prajna vihara-~ ' compares “the difference between building on theocentric rock and building on anthropocentric sand (matt. 7:24-27)” (westphal, 2008a, p.23). i may very well be the one who builds a house upon sand where it is easy to fall when it is attacked by storm. i am just an admirer who simply listens attentively and sentimentally. i have not built my house upon the solid rock. and yet i hope someday to achieve this. i realize that it is still a long distance from admirer to imitator, and also a long-term work to build my house upon the firm foundation of love, when i can someday “go and do likewise”. endnote 1this paper was presented at iasact (institute for advanced study in asian cultures and theologies) seminar, chung chi college, the chinese university of hong kong, 2 june 5 july, 2013. references dostoyevsky, fyodor. (1999). the brothers karamazov. constance garnett. (trans.). new york: a signet classic. ferreira, m. jamie. (2008). kierkegaard and levinas on four elements of the biblical love commandment. in simmons, j. aaron & wood, david. (eds.). kierkegaard and levinas: ethics, politics, and religion. bloomington: indiana university press. kierkegaard, soren. (1995). works of love. howard v. hong and edna h. hong. (trans.) new jersey: princeton university press. __________ (1978). the essential kierkegaard. howard v. hong & edna h. hong. (eds. & trans.). new jersey: princeton university press. __________ (1992). concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments. vol.1. howard v. hong & edna h. hong. (eds. & trans.). new jersey: princeton university press. levinas, emmanuel. (1969). totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority. alphonso lingis. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press, kajornpat tangyin 173 1969. __________ (1987). time and the other. richard a. cohen. (trans.). pittsburgh: duquesne university press. __________ (1989). the levinas reader. sean hand. (ed.). oxford: blackwell. __________ (1998). entre nous: on thinking-of-the-other. michael b. smith & barbara harshav. (trans.). new york: columbia university press. __________ (2000). god, death, and time. bettina bergo. (trans.). stanford: stanford university press. __________ (2001). is it righteous to be? interviews with emmanuel levinas. jill robbins. (ed.). stanford: stanford university press. minister, stephen. (2008). works of justice, works of love: kierkegaard, levinas, and ethics beyond difference. in simmons, j. aaron & wood, david. (eds.). kierkegaard and levinas: ethics, politics, and religion. bloomington: indiana university press. quinn, philip l. (1998). kierkegaard’s christian ethics. in alastair hannay and gordon d. marino. (eds.). the cambridge companion to kierkegaard. cambridge: cambridge university press. westphal, merold. (2008). levinas and kierkegaard in dialogue. bloomington: indiana university press. __________ (2008a). the many faces of levinas as a reader of kierkegaard. in simmons, j. aaron & wood, david. (eds.). kierkegaard and levinas: ethics, politics, and religion. bloomington: indiana university press. 174 prajna vihara-~ 04_(87-105) confucian ethics.pmd confucian ethics in modern society: appropriating confucianism in contemporary discourses manuel b. dy, jr. ateneo de manila university, philippines abstract the task of this paper is to show the relevance of confucian ethics to modern society. we now live in a global society, characterized by the development of technology, market economy, the rise of democratic forms of society, and instant communication overcoming the limitations of space and time. yet the same globalization has brought forth a widening gap of the rich and the poor, the degradation of nature, the migration of peoples away from their families, a consumerist society, and the subjugation of the individual and the state to the world order. while we cannot avoid the globalization process, we can address specific issues arising from the process. this paper will limit itself then to issues pertaining to the family, the state, nature, and to the cosmos (cosmopolitanism). º·¤ñ́ âèí º·¤çòá¹õéµéí§¡òãáê´§ãëéàë繤çòáêñá¾ñ¹¸ì¡ñ¹ãðëçèò§¨ãôâ¸ããá Ẻ ¢§¨×êíáåðêñ§¤áêáñâãëáè »ñ¨¨øºñ¹àãòáõªõçôµã¹êñ§¤áâå¡äãé¾ãáá´¹«ö觢ñºà¤å×èí¹ áåðëáø¹ä» â´â¤çòá¡éòçë¹éò·ò§à·¤â¹âåâõ àèãé°¡ô̈ Ẻµåò´ ¡òãà¡ố ¢öé¹¢í§ »ãðªò¸ô»äµâëåòâãù»áºº áåð¡òãµô´µèíê×èíêòã·õèãç´àãçç©ñº¾åñ¹ «ö觡éòç¢éòá ¢õ´¨ó¡ñ´´éò¹ê¶ò¹·õèáåðàçåò áµèâå¡òàôçñµ¹ìä´é¹óáò«ö觡ñº¡òã¢âòâªèí§çèò§ ãðëçèò§¤¹ãçâ¡ñº¤¹¨¹ ¡òãå´ãð´ñº¤çòáêó¤ñ­¢í§¸ããáªòµô ¡òãí¾â¾âéòâ ¶ôè¹°ò¹¢í§»ãðªòª¹·óãëéµéí§ëèò§ä¡å¨ò¡¤ãíº¤ãñç êñ§¤áºãôâहôâá áåð ¡òã ñ́̈ ãðàºõ⺻ñ̈ ਡª¹áåðãñ°µòáãðàºõ⺢í§âå¡ ã¹¢³ð·õèàãòäáèíò¨ëåõ¡àåõè⧠¢ºç¹¡òã âå¡òàôçñµ¹ìáµèàãò¡çêòáò㶠ñ́̈ ¡òã¡ñº»ñ­ëòµèò§ æ ·õèà¡ố ¨ò¡¢ºç¹¡òã prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 87-105 87 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ âå¡òàôçñµ¹ì¹õéä´é º·¤çòá¹õé¤ãíº¤åøá੾òðà¹×éíëò·õèà¡õèâç¢éí§¡ñº¤ãíº¤ãñç ãñ° ¸ããáªòµô áåð¤çòáà»ç¹¾åàá×í§âå¡ the task of this paper is to show the relevance of confucian ethics to modern society. we now live in a global society, in a borderless world engineered and propelled by advances in technology such as the internet and the cellular phone, resulting in a freer but interdependent market economy, homogenization of cultures aptly called “mcdonaldlization or cocacolalization of cultures”, the rise of democratic forms of society such as civil society, and instant communication overcoming the limitations of space and time. yet the same globalization has brought forth a widening gap of the rich and the poor, the degradation of nature, the migration of peoples away from their families, a consumerist society, and the subjugation of the individual and the state to the world order, to becoming a citizen of the world. while we cannot avoid the globalization process, we can address specific issues arising from the process. this paper will limit itself then to issues pertaining to the family, the state, nature, and to the cosmos (cosmopolitanism). the sources of confucian ethics are basically the four books: the analects of confucius, the book of mencius, the doctrine of the mean, and the great learning. from each of these sources i intend to appropriate a confucian ethics applicable to the family, the state, the environment, and the world at large. analects and filial piety ren ( ) is the primary virtue in analects. without ren, the other virtues of wisdom, righteousness and propriety would make no sense. ren is translated as benevolence, human-heartedness, humanity, and when confucius was asked for the meaning of ren, he said, “it is to love human beings”.1 etymologically, the character is made up of two characters: ren ( ), meaning “human being”, and erh ( ), meaning “two”. thus, ren pertains to interpersonal relationships, to the love that should unite them. 88 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ren, however, has two aspects, chung ( ) translated as conscientiousness, and shu ( ) translated as the golden rule.2 the two cannot be separated; the first is our duty to oneself (being true to oneself) and the latter, our duty to others. chung and shu cannot be separated just as genuine love for oneself cannot be separated from love for others.3 ren, however, begins in the family. “filial piety and brotherly respect are the root of humanity (ren).4 the family plays a pivotal role in confucian ethics such that when the duke of she told confucius, “in my country there is an upright man named kung. when his father stole a sheep, he bore witness against him”. confucius said, “the upright men in my community are different from this. the father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. uprightness is to be found in this”.5 this analect has been misinterpreted to mean that for the sake of the family, one may break law. what confucius simply wanted to emphasize is that the family is the basic unit of society. “few of those who are filial sons and respectful brothers will show disrespect to superiors, and there has never been a man who is not disrespectful to superiors and yet creates disorder”.6 by all means, the love in the family should be extended to the community, to the non-kin members of society. mencius said, “treat with respect the elders in my family, and then extend that respect to include the elders in other families. treat with tenderness the young in my own family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families”.7 thus, with regards to brotherly respect, in most oriental societies, we address the non-kin superior as “elder brother” or “kuya” in filipino. it is in the practice of filial piety that is problematic in our modern society today. filial piety consists in taking care of elderly parents, which for confucius is not just providing material support and comfort to one’s parents, for “we support even dogs and horses. if there is no feeling of reverence, wherein lies the difference?”8 what matters is the attitude of love.9 this is why we asians are reluctant to commit our elderly parents manuel b. dy, jr. 89 to institutions. but how can we do this when both husband and wife have each their own work, and likewise the children are preoccupied with school or their jobs? the solution is to hire domestic workers who may be trusted to care for the elderly parents with reverence and love. this trust, however, necessitates the treatment of the domestic worker as valued members of the family. here the golden rule clearly applies for both the couple and the domestic worker. more than respect and fairness, there is mutual concern and caring between the couple and the domestic worker.10 mencius and governance mencius is known for his theory of the original goodness of human nature. the whole of book six, part i, argues for this innate goodness of human nature. but mencius is also known as the “outer king” in contrast to confucius as the “inner sage”. mencius applied his theory of innate goodness of human nature to the state in the notion of the compassionate government. what counts as the most important element of the state is the people. the mandate of heaven given to the ruler is also the voice of the people. mencius may also be the first philosopher to justify a revolution. when the people overthrows a tyrannical ruler, the people are not committing murder for, following the rectification of names of confucius (the ruler must act as a ruler, the father as a father, etc.), the people are not killing a human being but an animal. by considering the people as the most important element of the state, mencius may be considered as the first democratic philosopher in the history of philosophy. what is important in governing a state is what benefits the people rather than one’s own profit, for the ruler has a compassionate heart-mind that cannot bear to see his people suffer. [mencius replied to king hui of liang], “why must your majesty use the term profit? what i have to offer are nothing but humanity and righteousness. if your majesty ask what is profitable to your country, if the great officers ask what is profitable to their families, and if the inferior officers and the common people ask what is prof90 prajna vihara __ __ ~ itable to themselves, then both the superiors and the subordinates will try to snatch the profit from each other and the country will crumble.11 governance in our modern times does not pertain only to the state but also to business and civil society. what confucian ethics prescribes to us in governing any society is service to the people, not selfinterest. again, the golden rule applies in governing a people. king hsuan of ch’i said, “i have a weakness. i love wealth”. mencius replied, “…if your majesty love wealth, let your people enjoy the same, and what difficulty will there be for you to become the true king of the empire?” the king said, “i have a weakness, i love sex”. mencius replied, “…if your majesty love sex, let your people enjoy the same, and what difficulty will there be for you to become the true king of the empire?”12 this of course is easier said than done. in our complex globalized world today, the leader is beset with problems of corruption and poverty. will it suffice the leader of any society to lead by example? mencius said, “humanity subdues inhumanity as water subdues fire. nowadays those who practice humanity do so as if with one cup of water they could save a whole wagonload of fuel on fire. when the flames were not extinguished, they would say that water cannot subdue fire. this is as bad as those who are inhumane. at the end they will surely lose [what little humanity they have.]”.13 clearly, the way to combat structural injustice is structural reforms. one must harness the efforts of others as well. the leader in today’s globalized world must learn to empower the people to combat poverty and corruption. manuel b. dy, jr. 91 the doctrine of the mean and environmental protection a major cause of the social injustice today is the mindless overexploitation of mother earth’s common resources (minerals, farmlands, petroleum, trees, the air we breathe and the water we drink) to satisfy our wants and not taking into consideration the needs of others too for their survival in the present and future generation. wasteful consumerism has brought problems of pollution, garbage disposal, floods, loss of bio-diversity, the endangering of many species, and climate change. while it is true that it is in the tao te ching that we can find an environmental ethics, the confucian classic chung yung or the doctrine of the mean also prescribes our proper attitude and treatment of mother nature. chung-ni (confucius) said, “the superior man [exemplifies] the mean (chung-yung). the inferior man acts contrary to the mean. the superior man [exemplifies] the mean because, as a superior man, he can maintain the mean at any time. the inferior man [acts contrary to] the mean because, as an inferior man, he has no caution”.14 chung literally means “centrality” and yung literally means “universal and harmonious”. what is central refers to human nature, and what is universal and harmonious refers to human nature’s relation with the universe. together, chung-yung means there is harmony in human nature and this harmony grounds our moral being and is the foundation of the cosmic order, sustaining the regenerative processes of all the myriad creatures in nature. the human being and nature form a unity. to maintain this harmony, the human being must act and live in moderation in his ordinary day-to-day affairs yung, after all, also means “ordinary”. the quality that unites the human being and nature is cheng, translated as sincerity or integral wholeness. it is due to our nature that enlightenment results from sincerity. it is due to education that sincerity results from enlightenment. given sincerity, there will be enlighten92 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ment, and given enlightenment, there will be sincerity.15 only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. if they can fully develop their nature, they can then fully develop the nature of others. if they can fully develop the nature of others, they can then fully develop the nature of things. if they can fully develop the nature of things, they can then assist in the transforming and nourishing process of heaven and earth. if they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of heaven and earth, they can thus form a trinity with heaven and earth.16 in order to live a life of moderation, we need the virtue of sincerity. sincerity involves strenuous learning and practice, tested in ordinary words and deeds. it is the spiritual foundation of our mundane dealings with nature. our dealings with nature for the most part of our ordinary life assume the mediation of technology. it is also through technology that we relate to others. technology in itself is neither good nor evil; its morality depends on how we make use of it. we can use it to dominate and kill others. we can use it excessively such that we become enslaved to it. we can use it as a fa?ade to hide or manipulate the truth. or we can use it to develop our nature, the nature of others, the nature of things, and assist in the transformation and nourishing process of mother nature. the great learning and cosmopolitanism the globalization process in our world today entails forming a world community living in peace amidst diversity of cultures. this is the issue of cosmopolitanism. cosmopolitanism, derived from the greek word ‘kosmopolites’ meaning ‘citizen of the world’, has many different versions, covering the fields of politics, economics and ethics. nonetheless, the core idea remains that all beings belong to a single community, regardless of political affiliations, and that this world community should be cultivated.17 that all beings belong to a single community would make all human beings “global citizens” and this global citizenship carries an ethics of responsibility in order to cultivate this world community. manuel b. dy, jr. 93 the ta hsueh or the great learning or the highest order of cultivation18 contains such a cosmopolitan ethics, uniquely different from the western global ethical theories that present conflicts between duties to the family and compatriots or the state, on one hand, and duties to all human beings, regardless of affections and political identities, on the other. what qualifies it to be a cosmopolitan ethics is that it speaks of values or virtues that are universal and it explicitly advocates peace in the world, although ‘world’ in the historical context of the text refers to the whole of china, at this time, made up of different states. but first a word about the title. ta hsueh ( ). ‘hsueh’ literally means ‘learning’ and ‘ta’ means ‘big’, ‘great’. ‘ta hsueh’ can mean then three things: 1) higher learning, 2) adult education, and 3) education for the great man. although all three are acceptable, it is the third that is preferred in accordance with the content of the text. the way of learning to be great (or adult education) consists in manifesting the clear character, loving the people, and abiding in the highest good. only after knowing what to abide in can one be calm. only after having been calm can one be tranquil. only after having achieved tranquility can one have peaceful repose. only after having peaceful repose can one begin to deliberate. only after deliberation can the end be attained. things have their roots and branches. affairs have their beginnings and their ends. to know what is first and what is last will lead one near the way. the ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. the extension of knowledge consists in the 94 prajna vihara __ __ ~ investigation of things. when things are investigated knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world. from the son of heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation. there is never a case when the root is in disorder and yet the branches are in order. there has never been a case when what is treated with great importance becomes a matter of slight importance or what is treated with slight importance becomes a matter of great importance.19 “the way of self-cultivation, at its highest level, is a three-fold path: it lies in causing the light of one’s inner moral force to shine forth, in bringing the people to a state of renewal, and in coming to rest in the fullest attainment of the good”.20 the three cardinal principles of the ta hsueh are “to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence”.21 “to renovate the people” (hsin min ) is replaced at times by “loving the people” (ch’in min , literally meaning “to be intimate” or to “to treat as kin”), as in the original version of the ta hsueh in the li chi (book of rites) and in the later versions that claimed to be the original. in any case, whether renewing the people or loving the people, the point is to do good to the people. doing good to the people may seem at first glance to be addressed only to rulers, but the way of learning or self-cultivation is for everyone. the three cardinal principles are in reality one, which is to illustrate one’s illustrious virtue or to let one’s inner moral force to shine forth or to manifest the clear character. the way to do this is to love the people or to renovate the people. and to abide in the highest good is none other than to manifest one’s illustrious virtue in the highest perfection. when asked why the learning of the great man should consist in manifesting the clear character, the neo-confucian philosopher wang manuel b. dy, jr. 95 yang-ming said, the great man regards heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body. he regards the world as one family and the country as one person. as to those who make a cleavage between objects and distinguish between the self and others, they are small men. that the great man can regard heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body is not because he deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the human nature of his mind that he do so. forming one body with heaven, earth, and the myriad things is not only true of the great man. even the mind of the small man is no different. only he himself makes it small.22 the cosmopolitan ethics of the ta hsueh is based on the mencian insight of the innate goodness of human nature because it is endowed by heaven, and this includes not only a responsibility to humankind but also to all beings in the world, sentient beings like the animals, living beings like the plants, and non-living things like tiles and stones. thus, a person would feel alarmed and commiseration when he sees a child about to fall into a well,23 feel an “inability to bear” when he observes the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of birds and animals about to be slaughtered, feel pity when he sees plants broken and destroyed, and feel regret when he sees tiles and stones shattered and crushed.24 the way to manifest the clear character is to love or renovate the people. this is because human nature is originally good and clear, our mind-heart (hsin ) being rooted in heaven-endowed nature before it is obscured by selfishness and greed. getting rid of the obscuration of selfish desires is to restore the condition of forming one body with heaven, earth, and the myriad things, and loving the people is “to put into universal operation the function of the state of forming one body”.25 therefore, only when i love my father, the father of others, and the father of all men can my humanity really form one body with my father, the father of others, and 96 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the fathers of all men….only when i love my brother, the brothers of others, and the brothers of all men can my humanity really form one body with my brother, the brothers of others, and the brothers of all men….everything from ruler, minister, husband, wife, and friends to mountains, rivers, spiritual beings, birds, animals, and plants should be truly loved in order to realize my humanity that forms one body with them, and then my clear character will be completely manifested, and i will really form one body with heaven, earth, and the myriad things. this is what is meant by ‘manifesting the clear character throughout the world’. this is what is meant by ‘regulation of the family’, ‘ordering the state’, and ‘bringing peace to the world’.26 loving or renovating the people must be brought to its highest fulfillment, reaching a point of dynamic equilibrium. abiding in the highest good is “to manifesting character and loving people as the carpenter’s square and compass are to the square and the circle, or rule and measure to length, or balances and scales to weight”.27 the highest good is the moral standard that is inherent in our mind-heart, termed by wang yangming as the principle of nature.28 “only when one comes to understand this point of rest can one reach a state of unwavering stability. having reached this unwavering stability, one can then enjoy an unruffled quietude; having attained this state of quietude, one can then achieve an inner calm; once one has achieved this inner calm, one is then in a position to exercise one’s capacity to deliberate clearly. and it is the capacity for deliberation that provides the basis for all moral attainment”.29 this stability, quietude, calmness necessary for moral deliberation is particularly relevant for the cosmopolitan person living in our technological world today. the cosmopolitan person is so constantly within reach by information, messages, calls, twenty four hours a day, through the internet, cellular phones, and the mass media, that he needs this peaceful repose to deliberate on what is in accord with the highest good. quieting down has become a necessity for one to remain sane amidst the fast pace of the virtual world. manuel b. dy, jr. 97 “from the son of heaven down to the simplest commoner, all are guided by a single principle: that the cultivation of one’s individual character constitutes the core of all attainment”.30 for everyone, from the emperor to the common man, the root is the cultivation of the personal life. for the ta hsueh, global citizenship begins with the cultivation of the self. world peace, order of the state, and regulation of the family are the branches. as what the lyrics of the popular song says, “let there be peace on earth, let it begin with me”. but why is the cultivation of the personal life the root of the regulation of the family, the order of the state and world peace? the commentary of tseng tzu offers us an enigmatic explanation: the master has stated: “as a judge hearing litigation, one should put oneself in the place of others. as a matter of categorical principle, however, one should act so as to eliminate litigation altogether”. in this way, men who are bereft of the truth will be in no position to present arguments interminably and one can, accordingly, instill awe for justice in the hearts of the people. this is what is called: ‘understanding the fundamental core of moral cultivation’.31 the original source (analects 12:13) has the master saying, “in hearing litigations, i am as good as anyone. what is necessary is to enable people not to have litigations at all”.32 at first glance what is meant here is something like a preventive medicine, that to prevent any litigation from happening at all, one should cultivate oneself. further reflection, however, requires us to put this statement into a positive general principle of “one should put oneself in the place of others”. again based on the mencian faith of the innate goodness of human nature, cultivating this innate goodness entails a commitment to the various spheres of the other, the family, the state, and the rest of the world. “what the true seeker of cultivation finds within himself is his own inalienable integration into the universal patterns of men and things”.33 the cultivation of the personal life consists in rectifying the mindheart, making the will sincere, extending one’s knowledge and investigat98 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ing things.34 although each has its own function, they are really one affair.35 that the cultivation of the personal life consists first in rectifying the mind-heart means that one’s personal relations must not be governed by animosity and resentment nor must he harbor feelings of fear and trepidation, anxiety and grief. otherwise, “one looks but does not see, listens but does not hear, eats but is not aware of the flavour of his food”.36 for wang yang-ming, the mind-heart is the “clear and intelligent master of the person” and to cultivate the personal life means for the body to do good and get rid of evil, but this, the body by itself cannot do without the mind-heart, the master, desiring to do good and get rid of evil.37 thus, to cultivate one’s personal life one must first rectify one’s mind-heart. to rectify the mind-heart, one must make the will sincere or achieve “a state of integral wholeness within one’s innermost consciousness”.38 this means allowing no self-deception to occur and always be “watchful over oneself when alone”.39 when the inferior man is alone and leisurely, there is no limit to which he does not go in his evil deeds. only when he sees a superior man does he then try to disguise himself, concealing the evil and showing off the good in him. but what is the use? for other people see him as if they see his very heart. this is what is meant by saying that what is true in a man’s heart will be shown in his outward appearance. therefore the superior man will always be watchful over himself when alone.40 for wang yang-ming, the reason the mind-heart, though originally good, needs to be rectified by making the will sincere is because “incorrectness enters when one’s thoughts and will are in operation. now in order to make the will sincere, one must extend his knowledge. this is because “what arises from the will may be good or evil, and unless there is a way to make clear the distinction between good and evil, there will be a confusion of truth and untruth”.41 to extend one’s knowledge is to extend one’s innate knowledge of the good to the utmost. the innate knowledge of the good does not permit any self-deception. and manuel b. dy, jr. 99 so, “the only way to distinguish good and evil in order to make the will sincere is to extend to the utmost the knowledge of the innate faculty”.42 extending one’s innate knowledge of the good to the utmost, however, consists in the investigation of things. extending one’s innate knowledge does not take place in a vacuum but is an event directed to a thing. “to investigate is to rectify. it is to rectify that which is incorrect so it can return to its original correctness”.43 “only once one’s moral character has been cultivated can one’s family be put into proper balance”.44 the commentary briefly explains this by our tendency to be partial towards those we love and partial towards those we despise. thus, “there are few people in the world who know what is bad in those whom they love and what is good in those whom they dislike. hence it is said, ‘people do not know the faults of their sons and do not know (are not satisfied with) the bigness of their seedlings’”.45 “only once one’s family has been put into proper balance can one’s kingdom be brought to a state of orderly rule”.46 the commentary simply but lengthily explains this by referring to the fact that one cannot teach others to be good if one’s own family is in disorder. thus, “the man of noble character accomplishes the moral instruction of his entire country without so much as stepping out of his own house”.47 this is because filial piety is the basis for serving the ruler, brotherly respect the basis for serving one’s superiors, and deep love the basis for treating the multitude.48 referring to the ruler and officials,”one watches over a newborn babe”, like a mother who does not have to learn how to nurture children before getting married.49 to individual families, the teaching also applies. “when the individual families have become humane, then the whole country will be aroused toward humanity. when the individual families have become compliant, then the whole country will be aroused toward compliance”.50 “and, conversely, should the members of a single family be greedy and recalcitrant, this will give rise to a state of anarchy throughout the entire kingdom”.51 clearly, the basic unit of society is the family. the global person must take care of his family first in order to serve better the country. this is because the man of noble character must first possess a quality 100 prajna vihara __ __ ~ within himself before he can demand it of other men, and he must himself be free of certain undesirable trait before he can censure it in others. for it is inconceivable that one can be able to give edifying instructions to others, when within one’s own breast one harbours a glaring lack of mindfulness for the concerns of one’s fellow man52 by being a good father, son, elder or younger brother, one can be a moral exemplar to one’s countrymen.53 “only once one’s own kingdom is in a state or orderly rule is it possible for the entire world to enjoy enduring peace”.54 the long commentary explains the meaning of this statement in four strokes or terms: 1) the measuring square, 2) the mandate of heaven, 3) inner moral force as the root, and 4) sense of honor. 1) the man of noble character “possesses the way of ‘measuring by the carpenter’s square’”.55 he respects the aged and the elders with respect and shows compassion towards the helpless, and thereby the people at large practice filial respect, respect for elders and compliance. the way of “measuring by the carpenter’s square” means that what one does not like in one’s superiors he does not practice it towards his subordinates; what one does not like in one’s subordinates, he does not practice it towards his superiors; what he does not like in front of him, he does not practice it to those behind him; and what he does not like in those behind him, he does not practice it to those in front of him. “behavior that one finds abhorrent when observed in others, on one’s right or on one’s left, ought not be practised in one’s dealings with those on the other side”.56 clearly, this is another way of formulating the golden rule in a negative manner, do not do unto others what you do not want them to do unto you. 2) practising the golden rule is for those who holds sway in a kingdom to keep the mandate of heaven. to keep the mandate of heaven is tantamount to gaining the confidence of the people, acting as ‘father and mother of the people’, loving what they love and despising what they despise.57 3) to gain the confidence of the people is to hold inner moral force as the root, as the only true treasure or wealth. and this holds true manuel b. dy, jr. 101 for the man of noble character, whose first concern is his inner moral force. possessing the requisite moral force, he will have sway over the people, will be in control of the land and the wealth it produces, and will have command of its use.58 this wealth will be dispersed widely instead of being concentrated in the hands of the few, and people will thus be brought together.59 with the inner moral force as the root, qualities of human kindness and tolerance adhere to those in governance. tolerance here means rejoicing in the talent of others and loving it as if it were one’s own, thereby showing his capacity to safeguard the descendants for all their generations and the common people. kindness here means the capability of “both loving men and of hating men”, employing the worthy and removing from office and banishing the wicked.60 such a person possesses a path of single-minded devotion and good faith toward others. in the production of wealth, “a man motivated by human kindness uses his wealth to develop his personal character, whereas a man who lacks human kindness will expend his personal capacities in amassing wealth”.61 4) the person who holds dear the virtue of human kindness will have subordinates having a sense of honor (righteousness). with people having a sense of honor, the affairs of the state will reach its completion. “a proper kingdom does not hold material benefit to be its primary advantage, but rather holds a sense of honour as its true advantage”.62 following the above four strokes does not seem to clarify how the peace throughout the entire world is dependent on the regulation of the state, unless we take into consideration that the entire world at the time of the ta hsueh is the middle kingdom of china. by extrapolation, if the whole of china with its states is the entire world, then world peace is dependent on the states practicing the golden rule, the virtues of caring, kindness, tolerance and sense of honor. what we can gather from the ta hsueh is a cosmopolitan ethics that is developmental in character, starting from the cultivation of the personal life and ending in the promoting enduring peace in the entire world. the writer of the text does not see any conflict arising from one’s commitment to the family, the state, and the entire world. in fact, everything starts from the cultivation of the personal life which involves an engagement with the other, starting from what is near to the farthest in the horizon of one’s relationships. 102 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the writer of the ta hsueh specifically addresses the person in authority in the family, the state and the kingdom but insists that the way to lead is by first cultivating one’s personal character. it is obviously a leadership by example. but what makes the ta hsueh a cosmopolitan ethic is that it is addressed to everyone who belongs or wants to belong to the whole humankind, and even to the whole of nature. such a person must first cultivate the innate goodness of his nature in order to be of service to humankind and to the rest of nature. but for those in authority, it makes sense to remind them that leadership is servant-leadership, that the mandate of heaven is not a divine right but mandate of the people, a responsibility to be of service to the people. the goal of governance, whether familial, national or global, is ultimately to make its subjects happy and good, that those in positions of authority are there to love the people, not to gratify themselves.63 the distinguishing mark of the cosmopolitan ethics of the ta hsueh is the emphasis of the cultivation of the personal life as the foundation. this is based on the mencian doctrine of the innate goodness of the mindheart. but on second thought this is not uniquely asian for it is also the wisdom of solomon, “as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he”. finally, the ta hsueh speaks of universal values of the golden rule, compassion and generosity, tolerance and sense of honor. these are values that make one a citizen of the world. a great man is one who feels that he belongs to a unity which includes the universe and the different kinds of beings. wang yang-ming64 endnotes 1analects, 12:22. 2analects 4:15. 3if they are separated from each other, one is bound to misinterpreting one or the other as in the case of kant. “it (gr) cannot be a universal law since it conmanuel b. dy, jr. 103 tains the ground neither of duties of oneself nor of duties of kindness to others (for many a man would readily agree that others should not help him if only he could be dispensed from affording help to them), nor finally of strict duties towards others; for on this basis the criminal would be able to dispute with the judges who punish him, and so on”. groundwork of a metaphysics of morals. 4analects 1:2. wing-tsit chan translation. 5analects 13:18. wing-tsit chan translation. 6analects 1:2. wing-tsit chan translation. 7mencius, 1a:7. wing-tsit chan translation. 8analects, 2:7. 9analects, 2:8. 10daniel a. bell contrasts the treatment of western employers and ideal chinese employers (english speaking). western employers treat their domestic workers with respect, allow more personal space, treat them on equal terms. chinese employers treat their domestic workers as valued members of the family, daniel a. bell, china’s new confucianism (princeton university press, 2009), p. 78. 11mencius, 1a:1. wing-tsit chan translation. 12mencius, 1b:5. wing-tsit chan translation. 13mencius, 6:18. wing-tsit chan translation. 14the doctrine of the mean, 2. wing-tsit chan translation. 15the doctrine of the mean, 21. wing-tsit chan translation. 16the doctrine of the mean, 22. wing-tsit chan translation. 17http://standford encyclopedia of philosophy. accessed september 21, 2009. 18this is the translation of andrew plaks, ta hsueh and chung yung (the highest order of cultivation and on the practice of the mean) (penguin books, 2003). 19wing-tsit chan, a source book of chinese philosophy (princeton university press, 1963), pp. 86-87. 20translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 5. 21translation by james legge, confucius, confucian analects, the great learning and the doctrine of the mean (new york: dover publications, inc., 1971), p. 22wang yang-ming, “inquiry on the great learning” in instruction for practical living and other neo-confucian writings, translated with notes by wing-tsit chan (new york: columbia university press, 1963), p. 272. 23book of mencius, 2a:6. 24wang yang-ming, op. cit., p. 272. 25ibid., p. 273. 26ibid., pp. 273-274. 27ibid., p. 275. 28ibid., p. 274. 29translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 5. 30translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 6. 104 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 31translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 9. 32translation by wing-tsit chan, op. cit., p. 88. 33andrew plaks, “notes on the ta hsueh” op. cit., p. 61. 34here i follow the sequence of wang yang ming rather than that of chu hsi. 35wang yang-ming, op. cit., p. 277. 36ta hsueh, chapter 7, translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 12. 37wang yang-ming, op. cit., p. 277. 38ta hsueh, chapter 6, translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 11. 39ta hsueh, chapter 6, translation by wing-tsit chan, op. cit., p. 89. 40ibid., p. 89-90. 41ibid., p. 278. 42ibid., pp. 278-279. 43ibid., p. 279. 44ta hsueh translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 6. 45ta hsueh, translation by wing-tsit chan, p. 90. 46ta hsueh, translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 6. 47ibid., p. 13. 48ta hsueh, chapter 9, translation by wing-tsit chan, p. 91. 49ta hsueh, chapter 9, translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 13. 50ta hsueh, chapter 9, translation by wing-tsit chan, op. cit., p. 91. 51ta hsueh, chapter 9, translation by andrew plaks, op. cit., p. 14. 52ibid., p. 14. 53ibid., p. 15. 54ibid., p. 6. 55ibid., p. 15. 56ibid., p. 16. 57ibid., p. 16. 58ibid. p. 17. 59ibid., p. 17. 60ibid., p. 18. 61ibid., p. 19. 62ibid., p. 19. 63james legge, op. cit., p. 33. 64wang yang-ming, answers to questions concerning the book ta-hsueh quoted in carson chang, wang yang-ming (new york: st. john’s university press, 1970), p. 34. manuel b. dy, jr. 105 04_(105-137) onnature a.pmd on nature: a process perspective kajornpat tangyin assumption university of thailand abstract throughout history, mankind has attempted to understand nature in various ways. the way one understands nature has a deep influence upon one’s way of thinking and life. the traditional understanding of nature in the west has been as an object, or understood through the perspective of being. this has resulted in an over-reliance on scientific reductionism. this is in contrast to this is a more dynamic view of nature as becoming, which is more common in the east. in this article i try to reconcile these opposing views of nature; between being and becoming, determinism and indeterminism, mechanism and holism, through the approach of process philosophy. through such a synthesis of these conflicting views, a new perspective of nature can be constructed which can hopefully lead us to a more harmonious interaction with our environment. being / becoming when considering the philosophy of nature, it is best to start with the early greek period, where we can see the beginnings of both philosophy and science and the way they work together. the question concerning the relationship between being and becoming has been asked not only by philosophers but also by scientists. it can be traced back to the controversy in the early greek period between heraclitus and parmenides. annateresa tymieniecka, in her article the ontopoiesis of life as a new philosophical paradigm, insists on the point that philosophers and scientists should return to working together by quoting the words of ren? thom, “even in science, ontology is necessary; metaphysics is not dead” (tymieniecka, 1998, p.17). she also advocates this kind of relationship and calls for an alliance between philosophy and science. she says, prajna vihara, volume 15, number 2, july-deceber, 2014, 105-137 105 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ nothing could be more hasty and erroneous. but also nothing could be more preposterous than a philosopher who believes it possible to reach reality through primary experience and the power of speculation while ignoring scientific inquiry. the striking fact of our present situation is that philosophy needs to consult scientific data, inquiry, methods in order to be able to grapple with reality. the natural and human sciences in turn need a philosophy that is appropriately informed by them for the more profound organization and interpretation of their findings and their own advance. (tymieniecka, 1998, p.25) ilya prigogine, in his book order out of chaos, accepted this as one of the main problems in science and philosophy, “science certainly involves manipulating nature, but it is also an attempt to understand it, to dig deeper into questions that have been asked generation after generation….this is the question of the relationship between being and becoming, between permanence and change” (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.291). prigogine points out that the old science that emphasizes being and denies becoming has found its own limitations. he says, the denial of becoming by physics created deep rifts within science and estranged science from philosophy. what had originally been a daring wager with the dominant aristotelian tradition gradually became a dogmatic assertion directed against all those (chemists, biologists, physicians) for whom a qualitative diversity existed in nature. at the end of the nineteenth century this conflict had shifted from inside science to the relation between ‘science’ and the rest of culture, especially philosophy. (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.299) the denial of becoming is also the denial of natural diversity, complexity and novelty. with the birth of quantum mechanics, we know that nature is full of unpredictable and unexpected surprises. nature does not stand as dead matter, or ‘out there’ to be explored without any interaction. prigogine regarded quantum mechanics as the quest for the bridge from being to becoming (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.219). his attempt to place becoming prior to being challenges traditional philosophy 106 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and science, which give priority to being. “the subsequent development of greek, medieval, and, to a considerable extent, modern philosophy was dominated by the antinomy of being and becoming. in most, though not in all, philosophical systems being was given prominence while becoming was placed in an inferior and subordinate role” (edwards, 1967, p.76). prigogine challenges traditional science by giving priority to becoming, but while he departs from parmenides, he does not totally agree with heraclitus. his approach seems to coincide more closely with whitehead’s philosophy of organism in that he tries to reconcile being with becoming. as he puts it: “initial conditions, as summarized in a state of the system, are associated with being; in contrast, the laws involving temporal changes are associated with becoming. in our view, being and becoming are not to be opposed one to the other: they express two related aspects of reality” (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.310). in quantum theory, we cannot use either wave or particle to understand nature at the subatomic level because it can represent both wave and particle. and in this old tragic choice between being and becoming too, we cannot apply either/or in order to understand nature because nature expresses itself in the form of both being and becoming. at this point we deal with the problem discussed by whitehead as follows: abide with me; fast falls the eventide here the first line expresses the permanence, ‘abide’, ‘me’ and the ‘being’ addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable flux. here at length we find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics. those philosophers who start with the first line have given us the metaphysics of ‘substance’; and those who start with the second line have developed the metaphysics of ‘flux’. but, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. (whitehead, 1978, p.209) through the process view of nature, we may see the possibility how being and becoming can work together. our ambition, at this point, is similar to some great philosophers who attempt to solve the conflict left by heraclitus and parmenides. empedocles explains heraclitus’ change kajornpat tangyin 107 through two opposite cosmic powers __ love and strife __ and replaces parmenides’ being with the four distinct elements: water, earth, fire, and air. plato solves this problem by placing parmenides’ being with the unchanging reality beyond the visible world of heraclitus’ flux. plato, through the allegory of the divided line, links being with mathematical truths, and places becoming on the level of belief or doxa. for plato, becoming can be only the shadow of truth. aristotle, a member of plato’s academy, explains the timeless truth with his concept of ‘substance’ as whitehead mentioned above as ‘the metaphysics of substance’. from parmenidean being to platonic form and aristotelian substance, this can explain the main stream of the history of western metaphysics, which was further developed by thomas aquinas, descartes, spinoza, locke, and others. it seems that most western philosophers have taken this path leading to a timeless truth beyond the realm of becoming. but this placement of being beyond becoming does not only happen in the western philosophy but also in the eastern. masao abe, a zen-buddhist scholar, points out the root of this problem. he says, we human beings are living in a world in which everything is changing. everything including ourselves comes to be, exists, for a time, and finally perishes. we, however, cannot find satisfaction with this changing world because, if everything is changeable and perishable our life is quite unstable, uncertain, and restless, with nothing solid upon which to rely. accordingly, it is quite natural that from ancient times, both in the east and the west, people have searched for something unchangeable, something which truly is, something solid and self-existing. ‘substance’ is a notion that was arrived at through this pressing quest. the unchangeable being was grasped as ‘substance’. (abe, 1997, p.85-86) while ‘being’ as the timeless truth or unchangeable reality is considered as the ultimate goal of our searching, the nature surrounding us seems to be involved in an endless activity of becoming. from scientific discoveries, we realize that nature is as what heraclitus taught two thousand years ago. even though we know much more precisely and accurately than the ancient greek philosophers did, we cannot overlook what our predecessors especially heraclitus have taught. karl popper summa108 prajna vihara __ __ ~ rizes heraclitus ideas as follows: things are not really things, they are processes, they are in flux. they are like fire, like a flame which, though it may have a definite shape, is a process, a stream of matter, a river. all things are flames: fire is the very building material of our world; and the apparent stability of things is merely due to the laws, the measures, which the process in our world are subject to. (miller, 1985, p.235) whitehead also used this idea of heraclitus as a guideline to discuss the chief topic in metaphysics. he writes: “without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, unwrapped by the sophistications of theory, that experience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical system….the elucidation of meaning involved in the phrase ‘all things flow’ is one chief task of metaphysics”. (whitehead, 1978, p.208) from popper’s interpretation and whitehead's metaphysics we can understand how becoming plays the central role in process thought. prigogine accepts both being and becoming as two related aspects. the starting point of our creative insights should begin with our considering nature as ‘process’ rather than ‘thing’. according to the process view of nature, all things do not stand as separated entities but in nature everything is interdependent and participates in process. david bohm also agrees with this starting point, as he puts it: “in order to see the world from the side of its being a unity, we must start from the notion that the basic reality is the totality of actually existing matter in the process of becoming” (bohm, 1957, p.168). and bohm also helped us clarify the root of the term ‘thing’, which alerts us to why we have to replace ‘thing’ with ‘process’. now the word ‘thing’ goes back to various old english words whose significance includes ‘object’, ‘action’, ‘event’, ‘condition’, ‘meeting, and is related to words meaning ‘to determine’, ‘to settle’, and, perhaps, to ‘time’ or ‘season’. the original meaning might thus have been ‘something occurring at a given time’, or under certain conditions. all these meanings indicate that the word ‘thing’ arose as a highly generalized indication of any form of existence, transitory or permanent, that is limited or determined by conditions. (bohm, 1980, p.54) kajornpat tangyin 109 prigogine explains nature in terms of the process of becoming which agrees with the irreversible process of the second law of thermodynamics. even though chance or randomness plays a central role in this process, it does not mean that there is no place for stability, permanence, and order. if we consider his evolutionary process at equilibrium without any fluctuations, nature will have some degree of autonomy and stability in the process of becoming (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.300). in this mode of existence, nature has to be conceptualized in the form of ‘things’. this means that being can be understood ‘within’ the process of becoming. but we have to be careful in taking this as a new perspective of nature. when we conceptualize nature in the form of ‘things’, we have to be aware that the stability of this fixed concept is just temporary and that no given thing can have a complete autonomy in its mode of being because its basic characteristics relate to other things in the process of becoming. we always fail to notice that our concepts of ‘things’ are only images of our past perceptions in our minds. we may be trapped again if we treat some concepts as independently existing reality. we have to be conscious that our knowledge has to be involved in the living process of becoming that is taking place at the present moment. we are entangled in the process, and any fixed concepts we abstract are only approximate and temporary images under some conditions in the world of becoming. on the contrary, if we hold that all things flow without autonomy and any moment of stability, they will lose their essential significance and cannot be understood. however, being, autonomy, stability, things, could not be understood in terms of substance according to traditional meaning which is eternal, unchanging, immutable, and self-existing. but being has to be understood and taken into part of the process of becoming. we have a concept of being as ‘things’ by abstracting from the process of becoming. in this process, bohm explains how being in becoming is possible: we conclude, then, that we must finally reach a stage in every theory where we introduce the notion of something with unvarying and exhaustively specifiable modes of being, if only because we cannot possibly take into account all the inexhaustibly rich properties, qualities, and relationships that exist in the process of becoming. at this point, then, we are making an abstraction from the real process of becoming. whether the abstraction is adequate or not depends on whether or not the specific phenomena 110 prajna vihara __ __ ~ that we are studying depend significantly on what we have left out. with the further progress of science, we are then led through a series of such abstractions, while furnish ever better representations of more and more aspects of matter in the concrete and real process of becoming. (bohm, 1957, p.156-157) when we make abstractions from the real process of becoming, we have to realize that these concepts are to allow us to see the uniqueness of things, but that these concepts must also be understood through the interrelation of all things in the real process of becoming. without being, we will not have any single idea about things. without becoming, all things are merely dead matter in a cosmic machine. in order to understand living nature, we have to be aware of conceptualizing things through our abstractions under some conditions and limitations, and these conditions must be viewed under the process of becoming of the larger system of the universe. with this perspective, beings will interact with becoming in the same process, as prigogine puts it: “today physics has discovered the need to assert both the distinction and interdependence between units and relations. it now recognizes that, for an interaction to be real, the 'nature' of the related things must derive from these relations, while at the same time the relations must derive from the ‘nature’ of things” (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.95). all concepts have to be understood through their limitations. modern science attempted to reach a complete description of nature without realizing the complexity and novelty of nature in the process of becoming. we always situate in the context where we are, and also the same for any concept that we try to abstract. maurice merleauponty proposes the idea of ‘lebenswelt’, the ‘life-world’ in contrast to the objective world of science. in his article what is phenomenology? he writes: “the phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the art of bringing truth into being” (merleau-ponty, 1967, p.373). what he is concerned with is not to conceptualize the essential meaning of phenomenon, but to reflect on what is revealed to our perception in concrete situations. thought is always situated in history and society. the meaning of what we experience should not be based on a conceptual fixation of essence transcending our mundane experience. thus any single concept must be viewed under some conditions, and with this limitation it cannot be applied to all spheres of the universe. bohm reminds us of the limits from our abstraction, and a kajornpat tangyin 111 better understanding about nature should come from our acceptance of the richness of nature. he says, the notion of a thing is thus seen to be an abstraction, in which it is conceptually separated from its infinite background and substructure. actually, however, a thing does not and could not exist apart from the context from which it has thus been conceptually abstracted. and therefore the world is not made by putting together the various ‘things’ in it, but, rather, these things are only approximately what we find on analysis in certain contexts and under suitable conditions. to sum up, then, the notion of the infinity of nature leads us to regard each thing that is found in nature as some kind of abstraction and approximation. it is clear that we must utilize such abstractions and approximations if only because we cannot hope to deal directly with the qualitative and quantitative infinity of the universe. the task of science is, then, to find the right kind of things that should be abstracted from the world for the correct treatment of problems in various contexts and sets of conditions… scientific research thus brings us through an unending series of such revision in which we are led to conceptual abstractions of things that are relatively autonomous in progressively higher degrees of approximation, wider contexts, and broader sets of conditions. (bohm, 1957, p.146) according to bohm’s point of view, we now understand more about the limitations of modern science, which denies becoming and attempts to grasp the essential nature of being. but we are beginning to understand that nature is involved in a process of becoming, and being is only abstracted from this process. being in becoming can represent a new perspective on nature. the mode of being can help us identify things and make the distinction among things by which we abstract from the process of becoming. we create abstractions in the same manner we make a map. if we have no map, we will not know where we are and where we can go. but we have to keep in mind that maps are only maps not the real terrestrial world. reality is not in our maps but in our real existence, a living 112 prajna vihara __ __ ~ stream of dynamic reality. we should allow ourselves be carried along by this current. determinism / indeterminism the problem of determinism and indeterminism can be regarded as one of the main problems in the western philosophy. this problem has remained at the root of the western thought since the early greek philosophy. the problem of determinism has been discussed among philosophers for thousands of years. prigogine, in his book the end of certainty, opens the first chapter by focusing on the problem of determinism and gave us a new light as follows: is the universe ruled by deterministic laws? what is the nature of time? these questions were formulated by the pre-socratics at the very start of western rationality. after more than twenty-five hundred years, they are still with us. however, recent developments in physics and mathematics associates with chaos and instability have opened up different avenues of investigation. we are beginning to see these problems, which deal with the very position of mankind in nature, in a new light, and can now avoid the contradictions of the past. (prigogine, 1997, p.9) to inquire into this problem, we can trace back to the early greek period. in the history of philosophy, many philosophers considered this problem and have given us various answers. prigogine persuades us to rethink the search for the proper answer to this problem in our period. the answer we attempt to find comes from the limitations of a modern worldview influenced by the newtonian theory. in the centuries following newton's discoveries, many descriptions of the universe were more or less dominated by newtonian physics. newton stood as one of the great thinkers in the world and his worldview influenced the people both directly and indirectly for centuries. we will consider the result of newtonian worldview relevant to the problem of deterministic view of nature. paul davies, in his book god and the new physics, described some general characteristics of determinism promoted by the newtonian theory as the following: kajornpat tangyin 113 in the old newtonian theory, every atom moves along a trajectory that is uniquely determined by the forces which act on it. the forces in turn are determined by other atoms, and so on. newtonian mechanics permits, in principle, the accurate prediction of everything that will ever happen on the basis of what can be known at one instant. there is a rigid network of cause and effect, and every phenomenon, from the tiniest jiggle of a molecule to the explosion of a galaxy, is determined in detail long in advance. it was this conception of mechanics that led pierre de laplace (1749-1827) to declare that if a being knew at one instant the positions and notions of every particle in the universe he would have at his disposal all the information necessary to complete the entire past and future history of the universe”. (davies, 1983, p.136) newtonian mechanistic worldview painted the picture of the universe as gigantic clockwork composed of many different parts, which moved in a steady state. all things were seen as nothing more than component parts of the huge cosmic machine. determinism in this sense carries the implication that we can know exactly and accurately about the past and the future if and only if we have enough knowledge at the present state. it means that everything which will happen in the future of the universe is completely determined by its present state, and at the same time we can retrodict what happened in the past by our present position like setting a clock. heinz r. pagels, in his book the cosmic code, could help us understand more about the general characteristics of determinism from his explanation. according to determinism, the universe may be viewed as great clockwork set in motion by a divine hand at the beginning of time and then left undisturbed. from its largest to its smallest motions the entire material creation moves in a way that can be predicted with absolute accuracy by the laws of newton. nothing is left to chance. the future is as precisely determined by the past as is the forward movement of a clock….the wheels of the great world clock turn as indifferent to human life as the silent motion of the stars. in a sense, eternity has already happened. (pagels, 1982, p.16) 114 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the newtonian deterministic description of nature once inspired some thinkers to dream on being omniscient, that is, to know the ‘mind of god’. but such a beautiful dream was terminated by a sudden shock from einstein’s theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. although einstein took the side of determinism throughout his entire life, we still consider him as the great challenger to the newtonian physics. we should also treat quantum theory as the turning point of the great departure from determinism to indeterminism. popper considers the ambition of the old deterministic worldview as a daydream of omniscience, which leads, apparently, to an inescapable nightmare (miller, 1985, p.257). sir james jeans also compared determinism with a prison and quantum theory with a home in which it might, at least, be possible for us to mould events to our desires and live our lives of endeavor and achievement. (jeans, 1981, p.216). thus the newtonian mechanical model, presenting the world as a huge machine, seems not to be a proper worldview in this period. the newtonian worldview may be appropriate for the world of industry, which adopts the perspective of mechanical order. every part of the mechanism has to repeat its own function regularly without any novelty and creativity. chance and randomness were exceptional cases, which have to be controlled and shaped into regular mechanical order. frederick ferr? points out extensively the negative consequences of the newtonian deterministic view. he says: if we venerate the qualities implicit in the image of the perfect machine __ those of regularity, predictability, control __ we lose the values of spontaneity, creativity, responsibility. and those are the values of the personal. if all reality should be seen and felt as perfectly regular clockwork, with each happening being determined by its preceding circumstances, then we are not free to do otherwise than whatever it is we find ourselves actually doing. we are then not responsible agents, capable of initiating chains of events, but we are only necessary links in the causal sequence which looms indefinitely into the future and ties us remorselessly to the conditions of the past….personal responsibility falls victim to the deterministic ideals of regularity and predictability. and with this loss come serious social and psychological consequences for modern civilization. human beings, perceived as withkajornpat tangyin 115 out essential responsibilities or need for personal creativity, will more easily be placed into economic bondage to assembly-line production techniques; overwhelming bureaucracies will show less communication in mechanically administering our lives not only without spontaneity but (worse) without personal assumption of moral accountability, from birth to burial. (ferre, 1988, p.89-90) however, the newtonian deterministic model fails when it extends to the larger scale of the universe and also to the subatomic particle level. it seems to be that quantum theory, according to bohr’s principle of complementarity and heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, removes radically newtonian deterministic worldview and replaces necessity with chance, certainty with probability. john briggs and f. david peat, in the book turbulent mirror, considered quantum mechanics as an indeterminate invasion shaking an old deterministic worldview of some scientists. if the world is strictly deterministic, then all events are locked in a chain of cause and effect. this means that the necessary connection of causeand-effect determinism can be applied for all realms from an insect to a star. in other words, everything in nature is the result of fixed laws. but briggs and peat showed us the failure of such a belief. they say, two pots of soup heated on a stove under exactly the same conditions will behave differently. conditions for dynamical systems are never identical, but for the most part we can ignore differences with impunity because they don't become magnified, turning the familiar into the chaotic. we have traditionally appreciated the simple regularity of order in our familiar world, neglecting the infinitely higher orders (or chaos) woven within it. (briggs & peat, 1989, p.76) quantum mechanics has drastically changed our view of nature from the newtonian deterministic mechanical order to an indeterminate principle. sir james jeans explained metaphorically this radical change of perspective from newtonian determinism to quantum indeterminacy by saying that the ultimate particles of matters would be seen to move, not like railway trains running smoothly on tracks, but like kangaroos hopping about in a field. his comparison of heisenberg’s quantum leaps with 116 prajna vihara __ __ ~ kangaroo hopping signified the end of thinking of particles as being in continuous motion. he also stated the result of the end of continuity, “as discontinuity marched into the world of phenomena through one door, causality walked out through another” (jeans, 1981, p.127). we may have to rethink what we understand about the principle of causality with the rise of the quantum indeterminate principle. to criticize the deterministic worldview does not mean that we hold the idea of an arbitrary universe of pure chance. when we deny the linear causality of determinism, it does not mean that the universe is lawless and irrational. on the contrary, we are looking forward to finding a proper way to understand nature in a new form of rationality. tymieniecka expressed her own point of view about the new form of order relating to our new vision of nature as follows: today’s science is, indeed, offering us a new vision of the universe, nature, society. in fact, the chaotic and turbulent stream, the innumerable streamlets which make up cosmos, nature, life, society and culture, in which from arbitrariness, chaos, chance there emerges segments of ordered world, such that we may acknowledge through our own existence in relatively stable societal, natural, cosmic existential conditions, opens fascinating newly to be formulated issues, views, expectations. the preeminence given to the turbulent, fluid, accidental, irregular, disorderly in the origination and progress of all does not mean, as i have hinted at a few times, a universal ‘disorder’ or a forsaking of order and rationality. on the contrary, it opens vistas in which we have to ask after the kinds, rules, ways of interlinking, of intermingling, molding….there are no sharp divides between matter and life, nature and the cosmos, nature and human culture, but vast intermediary spheres which fascinate our imagination. (tymieniecka, 1998, p.24-25) we have to accept the role of chance proposed by quantum theory playing at the subatomic level, and on the man-sized scale newtonian deterministic still has a narrow place to play. the main point we refuse determinism is its omniscience, and its ambition to accomplish a complete description of nature. paul davies, in his book the mind of god, kajornpat tangyin 117 asserted that both determinism and chance played a role in the different scales of the universe. there is a difference between the role of chance in quantum mechanics and the unrestricted chaos of a lawless universe. although there is generally no certainty about the future states of a quantum system, the relative probabilities of the different possible states are still determined. thus the betting odds can be given that, say, an atom will be in an excited or a non-excited state, even if the outcome in a particular instance is unknown. this statistical lawfulness implies that, on a macroscopic scale where quantum effects are usually not noticeable, nature seems to conform to deterministic laws. (davies, 1992, p.31) davies explanation is related to what we hope to see when determinism and indeterminism have each own place to play in nature. prigogine, in his study of the second law of thermodynamics, at far-fromequilibrium condition with irreversible process, attempted to find an intermediate description that lies somewhere between the two alienating images of a deterministic world and an arbitrary world of pure chance (prigogine, 1997, p.189). his effort was put into an evolutionary process where determinism and indeterminism co-exist in different parts of the same process. in prigogine’s evolutionary process, determinism works appropriately if and only if there is no fluctuation, and systems are in equilibrium. but if systems with some fluctuations move from equilibrium to nonequilibrium and reach a bifurcation point, chance and randomness will play a central role. at the bifurcation point, the roles of dissipative structures will dramatically change the whole system into a new form of order which we cannot predict accurately and know precisely in advance. within the construct of dissipative structure, nature at the bifurcation point is opened for all possibilities. prigogine also says, “let us now look more closely at the critical effect of fluctuations. as we have seen, near-equilibrium fluctuations are harmless, but far from equilibrium, they play a central role. not only do we need irreversibility, but we also have to abandon the deterministic description associated with dynamics” (prigogine, 1997, p.68). for him, determinism cannot play regularly and eternally in the whole process as in the mechanistic worldview. but it can play only in a narrow place between bifurcations at 118 prajna vihara __ __ ~ near equilibrium in dynamical processes. the stability of dynamical systems at equilibrium can help us abstract the deterministic laws of nature, otherwise we will have no concepts of nature. but the fixed laws we use have to be kept in our minds for their limited periods of time. we have no deterministic laws that can apply to all cases in the evolving universe. bohm contested the basic traditional western beliefs in certainty and universality of deterministic laws approaching the complete description of nature. he argues: if we take into account the character of the laws of physics implied by the qualitative infinity of nature, however, we can immediately answer this question in the negative. for, as we have seen, the notion of a law that gives a perfect one-to-one mathematical correspondence between well-defined variables in the past and in the future, is only an abstraction, good enough to described limited domains of phenomena for limited periods of time, but, nevertheless, not valid for all possible domains over an infinite time….thus, we are not justified in making unlimited extrapolations of any specific set of laws to all possible domains and over infinite periods of time. this means that the description of the laws of nature as in principle completely reversible is merely a consequence of an excessively simple representation of reality. when we consider the mechanical laws in their proper contexts of ever-changing basic qualities, it becomes clear that irrevocable qualitative changes do take place, which could not even in principle be reversed. this is because, for systems of appreciable complexity, the fundamental character of the laws that apply cannot be completely separated from the historical processes in which these systems come to obtain their characteristic properties. (bohm, 1957, p.162-163) according to bohm’s description, we probably have to shape our own thoughts about the laws of physics. we once firmly believed that we could reveal the inner secrets of the universe with a single formulation. we have to leave our old dream of the deterministic complete description and be open to seeing chance and randomness playing in our lives and nature surrounding us. popper compares the two different images of dekajornpat tangyin 119 terminism and indeterminism with a clock and a cloud. he keeps indeterminism in his mind, but allows a narrow path for determinism to walk. his proposal is similar to prigogine’s evolutionary process where determinism and indeterminism co-present. “what we need for understanding rational human behavior __ and indeed, animal behavior __ is something intermediate in character between perfect chance and perfect determinism __ something intermediate between perfect clouds and perfect clocks. and we also know that our clouds are not perfectly chancelike, since we can often predict the weather quite successfully, at least for short period”. (miller, 1985, p.263) according to prigogine’s evolutionary process, we cannot choose either determinism or indeterminism in order to take into account nature. we have to use both in order to understand the whole process, as alvin toffler stated in the foreword of ‘order out of chaos’. toffler requests us to put forth new efforts to recognize the co-presence of both chance and necessity, not with one subordinate to the other, but as full partners in a universe (prigogine & stengers, 1984, p.xxiii). according to the newtonian mechanistic worldview, chance and randomness are exceptional cases because deterministic order plays the central role in a mechanical system. but for prigogine, chance and randomness play the central role, and deterministic order is a part of the process, which plays in a short range between bifurcations. karim ahmed, in his article causality, chaos, and consciousness, described the role of dissipative structures causing apparent randomness and chance within all systems. he extends this view by mentioning giorgio careri’s order and disorder in matter, which is correspondent to prigogine’s explanation of bifurcations. he says, chance plays a decisive role in the choice of new structures, by taking the system farther and farther away from equilibrium in an unpredictable direction. thus the forced evolution of the system from one new structure to another must in part have a ‘historical’ character because of the influence of the preceding situation, but it also has a ‘nondeterministic’ character caused by the series of bifurcations it must come across….this gives the system several alternative possibilities of evolution that cannot be predicted because each branch of bifurcation is selected at random at the moment of instability (first emphasis in origi120 prajna vihara __ __ ~ nal). (ahmed, 1998, p.258) according to prigogine’s evolutionary process, deterministic linear causality cannot be applied to the far-from-equilibrium condition at bifurcation. deterministic linear causality can explain only the dynamic at an equilibrium condition where small causes produce small effects. at bifurcation, on the contrary, a small cause can probably amplify an effect to the large system and sometimes can cause extreme changes to the whole. the amplification of small causes strongly effects larger systems. this is supported by the new discovery of edward lorenz, a research meteorologist and mathematician working at the massachusetts institute of technology, who attempts to explain metaphorically nonlinear dynamical system with the butterfly effect. lorenz’s butterfly effect is based on the notion that a butterfly flapping its wings in asia today can transform storm systems next month in the atlantic. a small fluctuation at a bifurcation point can cause a revolution like the stirring air of a butterfly. james gleick, in his book chaos: making a new science, considers the butterfly effect as the starting point of a new revolution causing the unexpected change of systems. “in science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events can have a point of crisis that could magnify small changes. but chaos meant that such points were everywhere. they were pervasive. in systems like the weather, sensitive dependence on initial conditions was an inescapable consequence of the way small scales intertwined with large” (gleick, 1987, p.23). causality, according to the traditional meaning, is a very limited explanation of the connection between cause and effect. the linear causal explanation describes events in a narrow scope and attempts to apply the theory to all realms of phenomena. it may be a correct understanding in one place and a period of time, but it cannot be applied to all places and all periods of time. consequently, the non-linear causal principle can probably open our minds, extend our limited scope and take the various possible causes into our consideration on account of the complexity of nature. thus the non-linear causal explanation seems to be appropriate for a new perspective of nature. briggs and peat attempt to expand the meaning of causality to cover the larger part of the universe when they say, “we ordinarily think of an effect as having only one or a few causes. in fact, the cause for any one thing is everything else. to understand completely the cause of malaria in humans, for example, requires understanding not only the life kajornpat tangyin 121 cycle of the anopheles mosquito, but also evolution, ecology, chemistry, and eventually everything in the universe” (briggs & peat, 1984, p.96). bohm also discusses the problem of causality resulting from the deterministic view of nature, and he explains why we have to rethink the linear explanation of our old scientific beliefs. in order to know the real cause, we might have to enlarge our view to all related parts in the complexity of nature. bohm argues, we see, then, that the behavior of the world is not perfectly determined by any possible purely mechanical or purely quantitative line of causal connection. this does not mean, however, that it is arbitrary. for if we take any given effect, we can always in principle trace it to the causes from which its essential aspects came. only as we go further and further back into the past, we discover three important points: viz. first, that the number of causes which contribute significantly to a given effect increases without limit; secondly that more and more qualitatively different kinds of causal factors are found to be significant; and finally, that these causes depend on new contingencies leading to new kinds of chance… thus, over an infinite period of time, the determination of even the essential features of an effect is evidently not purely mechanical, because it involves not only an infinite number of contingent factors but also an infinity of kinds of qualities, properties, laws of connection, all of which themselves undergo fundamental changes with the passage of time. (bohm, 1957, p.159160) from bohm’s point of view, we obviously cannot reduce the universe into pieces in order to understand, without seeing, the interconnection of all parts in the universe. we have to listen to briggs and peat’s explanation about causality from malaria to ecology. bohm accepts the complexity of nature and argues for the relevance of everything. ahmed suggests that we reconsider causal explanation by expanding broadly to cosmological context. he says, to expand such a causal scheme to its logical conclusion, we should view it from a more cosmological context….for ~122 prajna vihara __ __ ~ example, the preservation of the human beings and the biosphere depends upon a mutual web of causal interconnections between different species on earth __ e.g., the nature of the food chain, material resources, energy fluxes, ecosystem dynamics, etc. in such a biosphere model, the causal interconnections are the vast proliferation of extinct and living species, that continue to be related to each other over time and space. (ahmed, 1998, p.257) with determinism, we once had a beautiful dream of decoding the mystery of the universe. we attempted to attain the complete description of nature, to be omniscient and to be able to control and master nature. but nature is not our slave who always obeys to our commands. prigogine quoted vladimir nobokov’s statement, “what can be controlled is never completely real; what is real can never be completely controlled” (prigogine, 1997, p.154). determinism, in the absolute sense, has no room for chance, novelty and creativity because they are beyond our control. deterministic ideology rises with the desire to achieve a quasi-divine point of view in our description of nature. but, for prigogine, no human measurements, no theoretical predictions, can give us initial conditions with infinite precision in order to retain the idea of determinism (prigogine, 1997, p.38). the deterministic worldview, which many scientists supported, collapses, not because of some new philosophy or ideology, but because of the internal development of science itself. from scientific inquiry, we realize that nature cannot be wholly understood by the deterministic worldview. but we, at the same time, cannot champion the idea of an arbitrary universe of pure chance. even if we know that chance and randomness play the central role in nature, by no means do we have to totally abandon the deterministic view. if nature is expected to be understood in terms of ‘process’ rather than ‘thing’, we will see the possibility that chance and necessity co-exist in the same process. prigogine proposes the way to reconcile determinism with indeterminism in the irreversible process with the arrow of time. determinism can work only between bifurcations in a dynamical system at equilibrium where there is no fluctuation. indeterminism has to be taken into consideration at bifurcation where the dissipative structures play the central role. at bifurcation, the deterministic causal explanation breaks down and fails to give an account of nature. we need some changes from linear to nonlinear causal explanation like lorenz’s butterfly effect. then, we kajornpat tangyin 123 have to keep in mind the limitation of deterministic causal explanation that works in specific places and periods of time. the deterministic worldview with some fixed laws can help us conceptualize and understand only some parts of the whole process of nature. if the nature we understand is not a clock but a cloud full of surprises, novelty and creativity, we need an unending process in making a dialogue, not a monologue, with nature. determinism in indeterminism, therefore, can be taken into consideration as our new vision of nature. with this vision, we will see the interplay between determinism and chance. nature is not dead matter, and we are not cogs in a cosmic machine. we should breathe in and out, participating with all humanity out of sense of freedom and responsibility. we should also extend this perspective to not only living beings, but also all beings participating in the universe. to be is to participate. reductionism / holism whitehead once said, “for the essence of great experience is penetration into the unknown, the unexperienced” (whitehead, 1938, p.62). we used to portray nature with the deterministic worldview and attempted to reach a complete description of nature. but from now on, the modern worldview under the newtonian domination brings us to a limited understanding of nature. nature will not be conformed according to our expectation. the transition from newtonian to a new worldview has been considered in the form of process starting with einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum theory in the beginning of the twentieth century. sallie mcfague, in her article a holistic view of reality, described this transition from the mechanical model to a new organic model which whitehead might accept as the great experience because of its ability to penetrate into the unexperienced. in the early years of the twentieth century there was a movement toward a model more aptly described as organic, even for the constituents with which physics deals, for there occurred a profound realization of the deep relations between space, time, and matter, which relativized them all….it is a considerably more complex picture than the old view, with a hierarchy of levels of organization 124 prajna vihara __ __ ~ from the microworld of the subatomic through the macroworld of the biosphere to the megaworld of intergalactic space. but the characteristics of all levels of reality in this picture are similar: the play of chance and necessity replaces determinism; events appear to be more basic than substances, or to phrase it differently, individuals or entities always exist within structures of relationship; process, change, transformation, and openness replace stasis, changelessness, and completeness as basic descriptive concepts. whereas with the model of the machine, life is patterned on the nonliving, with the organic model the nonliving takes on characteristics of life. the model is most appropriate to life, and hence the quality of life __ openness, relationship, interdependence, change, novelty, and even mystery __ become the basic ones for interpreting all reality. (mcfague, 1993, p.359-360) the model of machine, or gigantic clockwork, used to be a useful model for most of the people for centuries ago. from now we need a more appropriate model that has characteristics like openness, relationship, interdependence, novelty; characteristics not found in the mechanical model. with newtonian paradigm, the scientific method could get along with the reductionistic approach. the word ‘mechanism’ and ‘reductionism’ are interchangeable because with the mechanical worldview, we try to reduce this huge machine into smaller parts. through the reductionistic approach, the whole nature is understood in terms of its parts. briggs and peat described metaphorically reductionism with a watch as follows: essentially reductionism is a watchmaker’s view of nature. a watch can be disassembled into its component cogs, levers, springs, and gears. it can also be assembled from the parts. reductionism imagines nature as equally capable of being assembled and disassembled. reductionists think of the most complex systems as made out of the atomic and subatomic equivalents of springs, cogs, and levers which have been combined by nature in countless ingenious ways. (briggs & peat, 1989, p.21-22) kajornpat tangyin 125 the mechanistic view of nature seems to be very closely related to the reductionistic approach, and thus the whole nature looks like an aggregate of the parts. then, with the mechanistic worldview, the whole is the sum of the parts. through the newtonian mechanical worldview, the historical development of the western science has been founded on the basis of reductionism, in which we can understand the complicated system of the universe by studying the behavior of its component parts. the parts and the whole have no internal relationship as briggs and peat described above. the whole can be disassembled into parts, and the parts can be assembled to be the whole. with this reductionistic approach, most of the scientific works are based on quantification, abstraction, and analysis. the advance of scientific knowledge, then, could be considered mostly by quantitative analysis. paul davies identifies the word ‘science’ with ‘analysis’ which illustrates the scientist’s almost unquestioning habit (davies, 1983, p.61). the etymological meaning of the word ‘analysis’ derived from the greek root ‘lysis’ which means ‘to break up or dissolve’ (bohm, 1980, p.125). with reductionism, science can get along with deterministic causal explanation because the cosmic machine can be seen as being completely causal and determinate. but with the new scientific knowledge, we realize that the mechanistic worldview is not appropriate for our new vision of nature. the traditional reductionistic approach has been challenged by a new holistic approach which is based on some new discoveries in the early period of the twentieth century. the controversy between reductionism and holism has been put into discussion among many intellectuals, and an account of the two different approaches could be seen from a dialogue in douglas r.hofstadter’s godel, escher, bach: an eternal golden braid as follows: achilles: i will be glad to indulge both of you, if you will first oblige me, by telling me the meaning of these strange expressions, “holism” and “reductionism”. crab: holism is the most natural thing in the world to grasp. it’s simply the belief that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”. no one in his right mind could reject holism. anteater: reductionism is the most natural thing in the world to grasp. it’s simply the belief that “a whole can be understood completely if you understand its parts, and the nature of their ‘sum’”. no one in her left brain could re126 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ject reductionism. crab: i reject reductionism. i challenge you to tell me, for instance, how to understand a brain reductionistically. any reductionistic explanation of a brain will inevitably fall far short of explaining where the consciousness experienced by a brain arises from. anteater: i reject holism. i challenge you to tell me, for instance, how a holistic description of an ant colony sheds any more light on it than is shed by a description of the ants inside it, and their roles, and their interrelationships. any holistic explanation of an ant colony will inevitably fall far short of explaining where the consciousness experienced by an ant colony arises from. (hofstadter, 1979, p.312) hofstadter ended the above dialogue with his denial of the question, “should the world be understood via holism, or via reductionism?” he takes some ideas from zen. he rejects the premises of the question and opens the larger context to include both holism and reductionism. hofstadter may be right in his opening the wider context where holistic and reductionistic interplay in the complexity of nature. we ought to leave an old way of ‘either/or’ thinking that leads us to an extreme attitude of ‘all-or-nothing’. frederick ferr?, in his article personalistic organism: paradox or paradigm?, argues as follows: it is not necessary to think either wholes or parts; both are important levels for understanding. the whole, seen as a system, gives context and significance to its parts. the parts, in turn, show the fine structure of the whole. moreover, the parts, looked at closely, are themselves each system with fine structures of their own and therefore become wholes relative to their sub-parts. equally, the larger, context-conferring system, seen in its own context, is itself part of a still more inclusive system. what we should find objectionable about analytical thinking is not that it engages in close examination of parts, or that it conceptually divides its subject matter for rigorous study, but rather that analytical thinkers have too often lost sight of (or interest in) the very contexts that give point to the analytical kajornpat tangyin 127 process itself. they have lost themselves in fascination with the parts. but it is not necessary to choose sides. epistemological holism can (and in ecological science effectively does) embrace analytical thinking, enriching detailed knowledge with wider understanding even as analysis provides rigour in the appreciation of detailed relations. (ferre, 1994, p.64-65) we have seen the limitations of the newtonian mechanistic worldview that reduces everything into smaller parts and separates human beings from nature. science in the newtonian model is often criticized as isolating man from the world and separating the subject and the object. the dichotomy between the subject and object, the observer and the observed has been challenged by quantum theory especially with bohr’s principle of complementarity in which we are both spectators and actors. by this principle, wave and particle are complementary properties of the same object of human knowledge. we cannot, simultaneously, see both waves and particles because as one property is known, it excludes knowledge of the other. then, our knowledge limits itself depending on the choice we choose in measurement. we are not separated from what knowledge we acquire. the objectivity of scientific knowledge through newtonian science treated knowledge as ‘out there’ independently and separately from our involvement. but for quantum physics we are taken into the main part of the process of acquiring knowledge. nature is not ‘out there’ to be explored. according to quantum theory, the separated entities of the mechanistic worldview have to be replaced with the network of the interconnected, dynamic whole whose parts are interdependant. bohm, in his article postmodern science and a postmodern world, argues for the interdependence of all things in the universe as follows: if you bring two particles together, they will gradually modify each other and eventually become one. consequently, this approach contradicted the assumption of separate, elementary, mechanical constituents of the universe. in doing so, it brought in a view which i call unbroken wholeness or flowing wholeness: it has also been called seamless wholeness. the universe is one seamless, unbroken whole, and all the forms we see in it are abstracted 128 prajna vihara __ __ ~ by our way of looking and thinking, which is convenient at times, helping us with our technology, for example. (bohm, 1988, p.62-63) in bohm’s idea of an unbroken wholeness, the individuality of things appears through our abstractions from the whole. at its root, there is no separation between elements, and then the world is one, unbroken wholeness. with quantum mechanics, two subatomic particles can interact locally and then move effectively at the distance, which is called the nonlocality. einstein rejected this nonlocality until he died. but recent experiments in quantum mechanics have begun to affirm this nonlocality. following this idea of nonlocality and bohm’s idea of unbroken wholeness, we have to accept this profound implications for our view of the universe as davies puts it: the mystery is all the deeper for the fact that the separability of nature is actually only approximate. the universe is, in reality, an interconnected whole. the fall of an apple on earth is affected by, and in turn reacts upon, the position of the moon. atomic elements are subject to nuclear influences. in both cases, however, the effects are tiny, and can be ignored for most practical purposes. but not all systems are like this. as i have explained, some systems are chaotic, and are exquisitely sensitive to the most minute external disturbances. it is this property that makes chaotic system unpredictable. yet, even though we live in a universe replete with chaotic systems, we are able to filter out a vast range of physical processes that are predictable and mathematically tractable. (davies, 1992, p.157) davies describes the universe as an interconnected whole where the holistic approach is needed. but he still provides the place for the mechanistic approach to play. however, with this new understanding we need to expand our knowledge about parts to cover the interdependence of all things in the whole. even though we know the technological benefits that scientific reductionism has brought human society, we should be aware of its limitations and also its negative consequences otherwise our concern will be for only human beings, not for the wider context. briggs kajornpat tangyin 129 and peat give a warning as follows: the definition of a tree as a thing or part of nature composed of roots, trunks, limbs, and leaves interchanging with the environment is useful if we want to cut trees down or plant them. in a larger context, however, this idea may be detrimental. the tree is not a part. it is impossible to say at just what point a molecule of carbon dioxide crossing the cell membrane into a leaf stops being air and becomes the tree. the tree threads out into the whole environment and eventually the whole universe. if this fact is ignored and forests are cut down, consequences will arise which affect the whole ecology. human misapprehension about parts and whole can be not only confusing but also dangerous. (briggs & peat, 1984, p.104-105) in order to know a tree, we do not reject scientific reductionism, that is to say, we can analyze tree into separate parts in order to know the details of every part. but we should not end with this, we should expand our understanding to its environment where the tree is, the atmosphere and everything else that relates to that tree. the mere analysis into parts is the narrow view of the old scientific determinism. we need to enlarge our perspective to cover the wider context, the evolutionary ecosystem of our cosmos. eugene p. odum, a leading ecologist as quoted by frederick ferre, says: “when someone is taking too narrow a view, we may remark that ‘he cannot see the forests for the trees’. perhaps a better way to illustrate the point is to say that to understand a tree, it is necessary to study both the forest of which it is a part as well as the cells and tissues that are part of the tree” (ferr?, 1988, p.94). we need to expand our understanding from the cells to the tree, from the tree the forest, from the forest to a larger environment as much as we can. in this ecological perspective, we understand that the world is an endlessly complex network of interdependent organic systems. the mechanical worldview has the presupposition that we could understand the whole by merely abstracting the separated parts without considering their mutual connection with the whole. but we are now seeing its limitations. nature cannot be totally reduced into separated parts, and nature itself expresses in complexity, its unity in diversity. it is an interconnected whole. and this whole is more than the sum of its parts. whitehead comments on the 130 prajna vihara __ __ ~ reductionistic approach of modern science which attempts to discover eternal truths as follows: the universe is not a museum with its specimens in glass cases. nor is the universe a perfectly drilled regiment with its ranks in step, marching forward with undisturbed poise. such notion belongs to the fable of modern science __ a very useful fable when understood for what it is. science deals with large average effects, important within certain modes of observation. but in the history of human thought no scientific conclusion has ever survived unmodified by radical increase in our subtleties of relevant knowledge. (whitehead, 1938, p.90) corresponding with whitehead’s view of the universe, charles birch, in his article processing towards life, confirms the defect of scientific reductionism which overlooks the importance of the whole. he argues: the whiteheadian interpretation of self-organizing entities is in contrast to the parts that make up a machine. he enunciated more clearly than anyone how creative evolution of living organisms cannot be understood if the elements composing them are conceived as individual entities that maintain exactly their identity throughout all the changes and interactions, as is the case with the parts of a machine. that is the newtonian model of the universe. complex living organisms can be broken down into their component parts such as their cells. how is it that the whole has properties the components do not have? it is evident that the properties of the whole are not found in the parts, except as they are organized in the whole. it is for this reason that the reductionist program of science is deficient. one response has been to say that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. there is an element of truth in this statement, but it does not go far enough. it is not just that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. it is that parts become qualitatively different by being parts of a whole. (birch, 1998, p.286) kajornpat tangyin 131 the radical change from reductionism to holism has been expected to develop our new understanding of the world in contrast to the newtonian mechanistic worldview since the beginning of the twentieth century. the removal of our perspective from reductionism to holism has been accepted as the transition from the old to the new worldview in which sanders describes about this movement in her the new planning paradigm as defined by the new science (sanders, 1998, p.147). from to ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ mechanics of parts dynamics of the whole linear nonlinear static, cause-effect view of dynamic, constantly changing individual factors field of interaction microscopic, local wide angle, global separateness relatedness marketplace environment in the old paradigm, it was believe in the new paradigm, the parts of that only by understanding the a system can be understood only parts could one make sense of the in relationship to the dynamics of whole. it also was thought that the the whole. the whole is a worldworked like a machine with constantly changing field of clockwork relationships, precision. connections, and patterns of interaction. component thinking seeing and thinking in wholes time cards, task analysis complex adaptive systems problem solving butterfly effect, system feedback brainstorming self-organization, adaptation polarization environment scanning plus mapping  132 prajna vihara __ __ ~ according to sanders’ description of the new paradigm, we need to revise our perspective of nature. mechanism cannot be taken to be the main part of a new vision of nature. this new vision would need to reestablish the relation of thought to nature. it cannot be based on the mechanical model alone. even though we have criticized the newtonian mechanical model, we do not intend to dispense with it. we just need to show its deficiencies and limitations. it cannot be merely replaced by holism. holism also has its limitations. with a merely holistic approach, we cannot know much about nature because we never find a full set of holistic laws explaining the whole universe. paul davies talks about the limitations of the holistic view, “one of the major unsolved problems of modern physics is whether the holistic features of a physical system require additional holistic laws that cannot be reduced to the fundamental laws of elementary forces and particles. so far we have no evidence for truly holistic laws of physics” (davies, 1983, p.225). bohm also insists that the full set of laws governing the wholeness is unknown and indeed probably unknowable (bohm, 1980, p.178). bohm proposes the idea of “explicate” and “implicate” orders to describe nature in a manner where mechanism and holism can be viewed as co-present in the same process. what distinguishes the explicate order is that what is thus derived is a set of recurrent and relatively stable elements that are outside of each other. this set of elements (e.g., fields and particles) then provides the explanation of that domain of experience in which the mechanistic order yields an adequate treatment. in the prevailing mechanistic approach, however, these elements, assumed to be separately and independently existent, are taken as constituting the basic reality. the task of science is then to start from such parts and to derive all wholes through abstraction, explaining them as the results of interactions of the parts. on the contrary, where one works in terms of the implicate order, one begins with the undivided wholeness of the universe, and the task of science is to derive the parts through abstraction from the whole, explaining them as approximately separable, stable and recurrent, but externally related elements making up relatively autonomous sub-totalities, which are to be described in terms of an explicate order. (bohm, 1980, p.178-179) kajornpat tangyin 133 according to bohm, the implicit and explicit orders seem to be separated, but they actually work in the same process where the explicate order is regarded as a particular case derived from the implicit order. bohm’s explicit order in implicit order can represent mechanism in holism as our new vision of nature. briggs and peat further explain the difference between the parts and the whole by using the analogy of music, “in the sense that parts seem autonomous, they are only ‘relatively autonomous’. they are like a music lover’s favorite passage in a beethoven symphony. take the passage out of the piece and it’s possible to analyze the notes. but in the long run, the passage is meaningless without the symphony as a whole’ (briggs & peat, 1989, p.29). we can analyze things into pieces as many as possible in order to know the details of each piece like we separate each note from symphony, but each piece or each note without symphony as the whole will be meaningless. paul davies, therefore, argues that the reductionistic approach is not adequate for our understanding of the world, and that we also need the holistic approach. in the case of living systems, nobody would deny that an organism is a collection of atoms. the mistake is to suppose that it is nothing but a collection of atoms. such a claim is as ridiculous as asserting that a beethoven symphony is nothing but a collection of notes or that a dicken novel is nothing but a collection of words. the property of life, the theme of a tune or the plot of a novel are what have been called ‘emergent’ qualities. they only emerge at the collective level of structure, and are simply meaningless at the component level. the component description does not contradict the holistic description; the two points of view are complementary, each valid at their own level….to say that an ant colony is nothing but a collection of ants is to overlook the reality of colonial behavior. it is as absurd as saying that computer programs are not real, they are nothing but electrical pulses. similarly, to say that a human being is nothing but a collection of cells, which are themselves nothing but bits of dna and so forth, which in turn are nothing but strings of atoms and therefore conclude that life has no significance, is muddle-headed nonsense. life is a holistic phenomena. (davies, 1983, p.62-63) hofstadter, with this zen answer, rejects the idea that we should use merely reductionism or holism to understand the world. we now 134 prajna vihara __ __ ~ know that both reductionism and holism can help us reach a better understanding of the world. the mechanical worldview is still a useful and fruitful model, and we need not throw it away. but we need to keep in mind its limitations when we engage in scientific reductionism. science cannot deny reductionism. but it should not end with a reductionistic approach. here we may paraphrase kantian thought: reductionism without holism is blind, but holism without reductionism is confused. consequently, science should expand to the interconnected network of relationship of all things in the world as bohm puts it: “everything is internally related to everything through mutual enfoldment. and evidently the whole world, both society and nature, is internally related to our thinking processes through enfoldment in our consciousness” (bohm, 1988, p.67). a new science would need to expand from analysis of the parts to a new understanding of the whole. with this new approach, we may begin to see that reductionism and holism interpenetrates our understanding of nature. references abe, masao. 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(pp.57-68). albany: state university of kajornpat tangyin 135 new york press. davies, paul. (1983). god and the new physics. new york: a touchstone book. __________ (1992). the mind of god: the scientific basis for a rational world. new york: a touchstone book. edwards, paul. (ed.). (1967). the encyclopedia of philosophy. vol.5. new york: macmillan publishing & the free press. ferre, frederick. (1988). “religious world modeling and postmodern science”. in david ray griffin (ed.). the reenchantment of science: postmodern proposals. (pp.87-97). albany: state university of new york press. __________ (1994). personalistic organism: paradox or paradigm? in robin attfield & andrew belsey (eds.). philosophy and the natural environment. (pp.59-73). cambridge: cambridge university press. gleick, james. (1987). chaos: making a new science. new york: viking. hofstadter, douglas r. (1979). godel, escher, bach: an eternal golden braid. london: penguin books. jeans, sir james. (1981). physics and philosophy. new york: dover publications. mcfague, sallie. (1993). a holistic view of reality. in james e. huchingson (ed.). religion and the natural sciences: the range of engagement. (pp.357-363). new york: harcourt brace college publishers. merleau-ponty, maurice. (1967). what is phenomenology? in joseph j. kockelmans. (ed.). the philosophy of edmund husserl and its interpretation. (pp.356-374). new york: anchor books. miller, david. (ed.). popper selections. new jersey: princeton university press. pagels, heinz r. (1982). the cosmic code: quantum physics as the language of nature. london: penguin books. prigogine, ilya, & stengers, isabelle. (1984). order out of chaos: man’s new dialogue with nature. new york: bantam. prigogine, ilya. (1997). the end of certainty: time, chaos, and the new laws of nature. new york: the free press. sanders, t. irene. (1998). strategic thinking and the new science: planning in the midst of chaos, complexity, and change. new york: the free press. 136 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tymieniecka, anna-teresa. (1998). the ontopoiesis of life as a new philosophical paradigm. phenomenological inquiry. vol.22, october, pp.12-59. whitehead, alfred north. (1938). modes of thought. (rev. ed.). new york: the free press. ___________ (1978). process and reality. (rev.ed.). david ray griffin & donald w. sherburne. (eds.). new york: the free press. kajornpat tangyin 137 12_(210-226) confucian ren.pmd confucian “ren” and christian love zhao jianmin beijing institute for the study of christianity and culture, bejing, china abstract “ren” (benevolence, perfect virtue 仁 ) is the core of confucianism, which says “the benevolent man loves others”. but what is the place of ren in today’s society? the heart of christianity is “love” __ “the one who loves others is a kind hearted man”. but is “love” being misused in society? in order to create a new spirit for modern society, people should explore their own tradition, which should be combined with the modern values first. ren and love could work together to achieve this goal. great civilizations can not only coexist but also work hand in hand to found a harmonious society for every one. º·¤ñ́ âèí ¤óçèò �àëãô¹� (àáµµò¸ããá ¤ø³¸ããá·õèêáºùã³ì) ¹ñé¹à»ç¹ëñçã¨¢í§¤óêñè§êí¹ ¢í§åñ·¸ô¢§¨×êí·õè¡åèòççèò �ºø¤¤å·õèáõàáµµò¸ããáâèíáãñ¡¼ùéí×è¹� ã¹·ó¹í§à´õâç¡ñ¹ �¤çòáãñ¡� ¡çà»ç¹¤óêí¹ëåñ¡¢í§¤ãôêµèòê¹ò �¤¹·õèãñ¡¼ùéí×蹡ç¤×í¼ùéáõã¨àáµµò� à¾×èí·õè¨ðêãéò§ê»ôãôµêóëãñºêñ§¤áêáñâãëáè ¤¹àãò¤çã¤é¹ëò¨ò¡¢¹º¸ããáà¹õâá »ãðླõ´ñé§à´ôá¢í§µ¹àí§áåð¹ó仺ùã³ò¡òã¡ñº¤ø³¤èòêáñâãëáè �àëãô¹� áåð �¤çòáãñ¡� êòáòã¶ä» é́çâ¡ñ¹ä é́ 㹡òã·õè̈ ðºããåø¶ö§à»éòëáòâ¹õé ºãã´òíòãâ¸ããá ·õèâôè§ãë­è·ñé§ëåòâ ö̈§äáèà¾õâ§áµèíâùèãèçáâå¡¡ñ¹à·èò¹ñé¹ áµèêá¤çãíâèò§âô觷õè̈ ðãèçáá×í¡ñ¹ êãéò§êñ§¤á·õèãòºã×è¹êáñ¤ãêáò¹êóëãñº·ø¡¤¹ “ren”of confucianism “ren” and “li” ( 礼 ) are the most important concepts in confucian 210 prajna vihara, volume 13, number 1-2, january-december, 2012, 210-226 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __~ thought, but ren is more fundamental. “yan yuan asked about perfect virtue”. the master said, “to subdue one’s self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue”. (the analects: yan yuan) therefore, comparing these two concepts in confucian thought, the latter is the foundation and goal, while the former is the means, which is used by people to transcend the limitation of human nature. ren contains three key elements. the first, ren (human being, 人 ). “mencius said, ‘benevolence is the distinguishing characteristic of man’”. (mengzi” the works of mencius. jin xin ?). mencius also said that “the feeling of commiseration is essential to man” and listed sympathy as the first of the four principles in the book of changes: qian, it said that “the superior man is the one who practices and performs the virtue of ren, therefore he can lead other people”. but liuxi (刘熙 )of east han dynasty turned this meaning upside down; he said that “the nature of human being is ren. ren can give birth to other things” (shi ming/explanation of all the names). zhou boqi ( 周伯琦 ) thought that the roots of yuan (origination, 元 ) are er (two) and ren (human beings); while the roots of ren ( 仁 ) are ren (human beings) and er (two). “when referring to the heaven, we call it yuan, and when referring to the human, we call it ren. because human has the nature of ren, he became the quintessence of all the creatures” the state of equilibrium and harmony (or the doctrine of meaning) said that “humanity comprehends the ?whole?man. the greatest is to have affection for one’s parents”. chenghao ( 程颢 )thought that human heart is just like the seeds of the grain, the seed is growing endlessly, so does the human’s morality. the nature of continued growth is ren. in brief, no matter what metaphors were used to explain what ren is, ren is the fundamental characteristic of the human being. the second element is the affection for parents and relatives (qingqin “ 亲亲 ”). in origin of chinese characters xushen ( 许慎 ) of eastern han dynasty told us that the character of ren was the same as qin (亲 ) and ren was combined by two identified characters which means human (ren, 人 ), therefore ren means the principles which people are following when they deal with each other. it is also said that “filial affection for parents is the working of benevolence”. (mengzi: gaozi ) and “filial piety and fraternal submission!-are they not the root of all benevolent actions?” (the analects: xue er). so ren has the features of zhao jianmin 211 qinqin. in confucianism, qinqin primarily refers to the family ethics, which requires the fathers to treat their children mercifully, for children to have filial piety for their own parents, for elder brothers to show fraternal love, and for younger brothers to show politeness. as for social ethics, ren can leads to another result__to love others, which is the third element of ren. so the third element of ren is to love others (爱人 ). why the character of ren ( 仁 ) is combined by two characters of ren (人 ) chenxuan ( 臣铉 ) provided an answer: due to benevolence or ren, man loves others, so there need more than two people to make ren to be possible. “fan chi asked about benevolence. the master said, ‘it is to love all men’” (the analects: yan yuan). therefore, we said that “the benevolent man loves others” primarily refers to social ethics. in the analects: yong ye ( 雍也 ) it said that “now the man of perfect virtue? wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. to be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves-this may be called the art of virtue”. there are more sayings about this feature of ren, such as in the classics such er ya (尔雅 ), it said that “to confer kindness is to love”. all in all, “to love others” in confucianism means that people thinks that “all within the four seas will be his brothers” and hopes that “treat with the reverence due to age the elders in your own family, so that the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated; treat with the kindness due to youth the young in your own family, so that the young in the families of others shall be similarly treated”. “li” also contains three essential parts. first, is the sacrificial ceremony. the origin of chinese characters (（《说文解字》）) say that “li is to the performance of the ceremony in order to please the gods and brings blessings”. so we know, li was one of the sacrificial ceremonies in ancient religions of china. from there li derived its other two meanings in confucianism. second are the rules of propriety, feudal ethics and rites. “they are the rules of propriety, that furnish the means of determining (the observances towards) relatives, as near and remote; of settling points which may cause suspicion or doubt; of distinguishing where there should be agreement, and where difference; and of making clear what is right and what is wrong” (the classic of rites). in the same book, it is also said that “the function of li is to tell people how to treat their parents 212 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and their relatives properly, and how to respect the sages and use them differently according to their virtues and various abilities”. xunzi (荀子 ) put great emphasis on decorum, advocated courtesy, and looked on courtesy as the function of moderation and observation, he said that “music can promote harmony, and li can maintain the feudal political and social order” (xunzi: on music). the third part involves etiquette and manners. mencius said that “the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man”. xunzi thought that “the spread of the good music can make people’s aspirations and interests pure and bright, while the learning and performances of the rites makes people well behaved”. it was the last two functions of li that confucius was promoting. that is why when yan yuan asked about perfect virtue. confucius gave that answer: “generally speaking, that which makes man is the meaning of his ceremonial usages”. (the classic of rites: the meaning of the ceremony of capping) it is necessary to explain what is yuan (元 ) in relation to ren, before we give a further explanation. the root of the character yuan is er (two, 二 ) and ren (human, 人 ). in the book of the essence of chinese character ( 六书精蕴 ), wei taichang (魏太常 ) of ming dynasty said that: ‘yuan’ is a great virtue between the earth and heaven. it created all things in this world. the roots of yuan is er and ren, while the roots of ren is ren and er. when talking about the heaven, we said this virtue is yuan, and when referring to human, we called it ren, and when it refers to the human body we called it the head of the body. “the character yuan is the other form of ren. the difference between the two is that the orders of their roots are reversed”. in yi-jing: i-ching, discussion of patterns, it said that “origination is the growth of the good”. in er ya (尔雅 ) explanation, it said that yuan is the beginning/origination. “yuan is the beginning of all the things and it is a great virtue in this word, which gave birth to every life and control the emerge of everything. heaven is the greatest being, and human is less great, that is why, the arrangement of the roots of yuan’s is er first and then ren ( 元=二+人 ). the orders of ren ( 仁 ) is reversed ( 仁=人+二 ) because among all the creatures, ren (human) is the best. “in ancient chinese the character ‘er’ ( 二 , two), that is one of the roots of yuan, is the same as the character shang (upper, 上 ); and ‘er’ (son, 儿 ) is a rare word, which is the same as the character ren (human, 人 ) zhao jianmin 213 (origin of chinese characters). “those rooted in heaven are close to high things” (yi-jing:i-ching, discussion of patterns), therefore yuan means that heaven is the origination of everything, including human, and human is the most distinguished among all the creatures. as for the character of ren ( 仁 ) it seems that both ren and yuan has the same root er ( 二 ) but the meanings of this roots are totally different. because, in ancient chinese, the roots of ren ( 仁 ) are actually the combination of qian (a thousand, 千 ) and xin (heart, 心 ). because the character of ren has the combination, it said that ren has the meaning of qin ( 亲 ). that is why chenghao ( 程颢 ) thought that “human heart is just like the seeds of the grain, which has the nature of growing, and this nature is ren”. afterwards, when people say “the roots of ren (仁 ) were ren ( 人 ) and er ( 二 )” or “the benevolent man loves others, that is why the roots has er (two, 二 )”, as a matter of fact, it is only a method of traditional confucian exegesis. in the tang dynasty, han yu regarded that, confucian tradition is handed down from generation to generation. first it handed down from yao to xun, yu, tang ( 尧舜禹汤 ), king wen, king wu, zhou gong (文武周孔 ) then to confucius, but after mencius the tradition is stopped. though xun zi and yang xiong did choose to inherit their learning from this tradition, but their learning is not the best and they did not give a detailed interpretation of their studies (han yu:yan dao/exploration of tao). further more, han yu said that “since the decline of zhou dao (周道 ) and the death of confucius, the world has witnessed many events, like qing shi huang burned ‘the book of songs’ and ‘the classic of history’; the spread of the teachings of huang-lao school in han dynasty; buddhism continued to flourish among the dynasties of jin,wei,liang, sui ( 晋魏梁隋 ). at that time, the people who were talking about moral virtues either belonged to the schools of yang zhu or mozi, or they were either believers of daoism or buddhism”. in this situation, han yu ( 韩愈 ) made up his mind to revive confucianism. maybe he noticed that the original meaning of ren, that is, ‘the most important thing is to love one’s parents’, was too individual-centered to provide for public interests and contribute to world peace, therefore, he emphasized and promoted the concept of “the benevolent man is the one who loves others” and “the universal love is ren, and the righteous behaviors are the ones that follows ren”. han yu 214 prajna vihara __ __ ~ considered his concept of universal love derived purely from the confucian tradition, directly from mencius, and is the essence of confucian teaching. “if a person performs universal love, then he will bring himself good luck; if he applies it to others, then he will be seen as a loving and fair person; if he treats it as the heart of his”. the school of principles of the song and ming dynasties redefined the meaning of ren. the most important scholars of this school were cheng brothers (cheng yi, cheng hao) and zhuxi. they added to han yu’s definition of ren, which is “universal love is ren” and proposed that “though the benevolent man must love others?we can not equate universal love with ren”. (jin si lu 近思录 vol.1). they said that “ren is the true principle of the world, without which there will be only chaos” “xing (性 ) is li (理 ) whose source all are good” (jin si lu? vol.1). this school was against mixing the concepts of ren and love. “mencius once said, ‘to sympathize with other’s misfortunes is ren’. later people treat love as ren. how can we make the mistake of equating love with ren? we should know that love comes from qing (情 ) and ren comes from xing (性 ). for mencius said that to sympathize with other’s misfortunes is the beginning of ren. but if it is only the beginning and is not fulfilled, then we can not call it ren”. this school treats ren as the substance and love as its function. “only when people possess ren, can he show toleratance and love. only if ren is carried out, can people know how to forgive and how to love” (jin si lu, vol.1) wang yang-ming, an idealist neo-confucian also maintained that ren is the inexhaustible source of every creation. (chuan xi lu 传习录 , vol.1). in sum, the schools still put love into the category of practice, but classify ren with the scope of ontology. it is the special contribution of the school to shift the focus of confucian tradition from moral practice to a theory of ontology. later, the representatives of the confucian tradition like kang youwei (康有为 ) and tan sitong (谭嗣同 ) had to face the challenges of the developments of humanities and sciences. tan sitong proposed a new version of ren to connect all subjects of humanities and sciences. he thought that “ren is the origin of the universe” “if we can communicate smoothly with others then it is ren” “if not then it is the opposite of ren”. concerning the humanities, he said that it included three aspects: academics, politics and religion. if the academics are divided, then people zhao jianmin 215 should focus on researches in sciences; if the politics is divided, then the urgent thing is to promote human rights; but religion is the most difficult as it cannot be compromised. regarding the proper order of doing research on these three subjects, the first is to study physics, then politics, and these studies will allow people to understand the essence of religion. “religions is the most important one among the three, if religion does not prosper, politics will degenerate, which will result in decline of academics. that is why, without religions, politics and academics not only will become useless but it also will become a tool for murder”. concerning the various religious traditions, he believed that the three religions: confucianism, buddhism and christianity can work together. “the founders of theses three religions are different, but it does not mean that they are of different ranks. they are just the different faces of the same true master. according to the stele of the propagation of the luminous roman faith in china, it said that the three religions, confucianism, buddhism and christianity, are on”. i think it is a really good interpretation about the relationship of the three. when facing the challenges of contemporary physics, he borrows the concept of ether/aether ( 以太 ) to connect physical things and spirit. he said that only when scholars understand the concept of ether, they then can discuss with him what ren is. ether was the most popular concept among the academics, though it was later cast aside by people when the new discoveries of physics rejected it. tan sitong knew how to use the most popular concept to promote his idea. in his book on ren, he said that “although people give different names to ether, the essence of them is the same. ren is one of the many functions of ether, from which came all the creature, and through which all things fulfill their destiny”. obviously, tan developed his own thought about freedom and equality from the cultures of his time. he said that “though the three religions are different, they all seeking reformation. though the reformations are varied, their aims are the same, that is, to achieve equality”. that is the final goal of his ren. before the may fourth movement, the focus of the confucian scholars was to trace back to the source of the tradition. they appealed to the classics of this tradition, employing all kinds of exegesis, and shifting their focus from practice to theoretical research. during this process, many people absorbed many new and good ideas and discard the out216 prajna vihara __ __ ~ dated ones. the typical one is tang sitong’s ether, which we already mentioned above. he wanted to enrich the concept of ren and abandon the feudal ethical codes of the tradition. the may fourth movement basically rejected all aspects of confucianism. the new culture movement called for the creation of a new chinese culture and a powerful country based on global and western standards, especially democracy and science. because of these movements, the confucian tradition was badly damaged. but at the same time the new ideas of freedom, equality, sciences, democracy and patriotism slowly filtered into people’s minds. confucianism is no more the dominant culture force in china. after the implementation of the reform and opening-up policies, along with the development of the economy, the moral disorder resulting from this quick culture transformation led people to be interested in chinese traditions. all of a sudden, neoconfucianism and masters of sinology appeared and there was a revival of chinese culture. yet people can not understand the true chinese traditional culture without understanding confucian traditional virtues. the first two virtues, according to some scholars, are listed as ren, love, filial piety, and fraternal respectfulness ( 仁爱孝悌 ); modesty and loving of li (谦和好礼 ).1 no doubt, among these virtues ren and li are the most fundamental ones. ren was viewed as the “symbol of chinese spirit. though it was used improperly by some governors, we can not deny that it is the long-lasting and shared virtue of the nation”. what derived from ren are filial piety, fraternal respectfulness; loyalty and forgiveness. li (礼 ) was viewed as “the significant feature of chinese culture…which was the mother virtue of the chinese.2 “the ethics and moral orders which originated from li (礼 ) were called li zhi and li jiao (ritual system and feudal ethical codes; 礼制，礼教 ) while the manners and customs about how to treat people were called li jie and li yi (etiquette and courtesy) ( 礼节，礼仪 )”.3 even the one who considers li as the mother virtue of the nation admits that, li (礼 ) originated from the sacrificial ceremony, then immortalized by confucius, and later reshaped by dong zhong-shu, and finally transferred to the absolute tianli in the song and ming dynasties.4 we can say that confucianism is still limited within the categories of ren ( 仁 ) and li (礼 ). how can we find a way out? zhao jianmin 217 “love” in christianity “love” is the heart of christian faith. john said “god is love” (1 john 4:8). love was regarded as the golden rule by christians. “do to others as you would have them do to you” (luke 6:31). to love god and your neighbor is the greatest commandment. there are four greek words for “love”. the first is στοργή (stergo), which means affection. it is natural affection, like that felt by parents for children. it is mainly used in family. the second is φιλία (philia) which means friendship. this concept was developed by aristotle, into which such elements as loyalty and equality was included. the third έρως ( érōs ). that is passionate love, but does not have to be sexual in nature. it mainly applies to romantic relationships as well as marriage. this is the love plato refers to, and he also used this word to express the seeking and appreciation of beauty itself. the last is αγάπη ( agapē ). it refers to a general love. it can be described as the feeling of holding one in high regard. christianity borrowed the concept of love from greek civilization at the very beginning. the greek translators of the old testament like to use agapē the most, then sometimes used philia. they rarely used érōs and almost never used stergo. “of the three greek words for love, eros, philia, the love of friendship, and agape, new testament writers prefer the last, agapē which occurs rather infrequently in greek usage”.5 they sometimes used the second one, and nearly never used the other two. christianity not only borrowed the agapē from greek, but redefined and enriched it. there are six essential factors in the love of christian faith. first is divinity. “there is a certain relationship between love and the divine: love promises infinity, eternity__a reality far greater and totally other than our everyday existence”.6 the christian love comes from the holy creator, which is transcendental, and has the ultimate value. second is uniqueness. “god is love”. this love is unique. “yet eros and agape__ascending love and descending love__can never be completely separated. the more these two differing aspects find a proper unity in the one reality of love, the more the true nature of love in general is realized”.7 “god loves, and his love may certainly be called eros, yet it is also totally agape”.8 human beings were created according to the image of god, therefore thet also 218 prajna vihara __ __ ~ have love. human’s love originated from god’s love as a model. therefore, human’s love can be called érōs and agápē also. one aspect of human’s love is the “love of one’s neighbor”, which included both the narrow love that is limited to one’s family and universal love. the other aspect is “love of god”. this love requires people to devote their emotions and allow for reason to be guided by faith. the third is life. “love embraces the whole of existence in each of its dimensions, including the dimension of time. it could hardly be otherwise, since its promise looks towards its definitive goal: love looks to the eternal”.9 the relations among the trinity are the relations of love. because of love, god became man. the internal god is love. “starting from the depths of his own sacrifice and of the love that reaches fulfillment therein,he also portrays in these words the essence of love and indeed of human life itself”.10 love is the expression of life. life can reach eternity only when it was combined with love. the fourth is communication. love needs communication. god’s love is the communication of the trinity. st. augustine said that whenever you meet love,you meet the trinity.11 god loves humanity, so he hopes his love is returned by his children’s love. human beings need to love others, but also need to be loved. love has the ability to spread itself. the fifth is justice. god is not only love, but also justice. “here christians can see a dim prefiguring of the mystery of the cross: so great is god’s love for man that by becoming man he follows him even into death, and so reconciles justice and love”.12 love and justice are one in god. this unified justice also became the goal of human. “god’s way of loving becomes the measure of human love”.13 human’s love also contains justice. the sixth is practicality. besides the dimensions that we mentioned above, the christian love also contains the social practical dimension,which containing two levels__love of god and love of neighbor. these two are actually one. you shall love the lord your god with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength and with your entire mind; and your neighbor as yourself. (luke 10:27) “love of god” is the basis with “love of neighbor” as its expression. “those who say i love god and hate his brothers or sisters are liars; for those who do not love a brother or sister whom they have seen, cannot love god whom they have not see (1 john 4:20)”. the fulfillment of christian love is to build a “civilization of love” on earth. christian love is based on the ultimate concern, and it is not zhao jianmin 219 only transcendental but also socially practical. “love of god” makes people pay attention to his ultimate concern and transcend the limits of their narrow love. “love of god” makes people notice that life is infinite, because god himself is infinite and eternal. because human being is both physical and spiritual, without spiritual pursuit, he will become a walking dead body. “love of neighbor” leads people to practice and externalize this transcendental love. we need more love and caring for each other in this fast changing society. people want a world that is full of love. the mission of christianity is nothing but to follow the commandment of god, that is “to love god” and “to love your neighbor”. the ten commandments (exodus 20:2-17; deuteronomy 5:6-21) was a classical interpretation of this love. these commandments got its name from adversus haereses (4, 16, 3-4) by irenaeus (130/48-200). jesus concluded these commandments as “you should love the lord your god …and your neighbor as yourself” (luke 10:27). the object in the sentence can be divided into three categories: god, human beings, things , which actually including all the aspects of human life. now, christianity developed the interpretation according to two principles-tradition and current situation. “to carry out such a task, the church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel. thus, in language intelligible to each generation, she can respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this present life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other”.14 based on this reflection, christianity stated that “drawn from the treasures of church teachings, the proposals of this sacred synod look to the assistance of every man of our time, whether he believes in god or does not explicitly recognize him. if adopted, they will promote among men a sharper insight into their full destiny, and thereby lead them to fashion the world more to man’s surpassing dignity, to search for a brotherhood which is universal and more deeply rooted, and to meet the urgency of our ages with a gallant and unified effort born of love”.15 thus the urgent demand of the age is that all people should cooperate and try hard to build a ‘civilization of love’. 220 prajna vihara __ __ ~ a civilization has a harmonious cooperation between ren and love during the long history of human kind, some civilizations have disappeared, but some old traditions continue to prosper. in the past, most of the great civilizations such as chinese, greek, middle east and india were developed separately, although there were some similarities between them. but in this global age, many civilizations are flourishing simultaneously. what is needed now is communication, even though many conflicts still exist. modern world values are the development of many different civilizational sources. the imposition of values from one civilization to another has often led to ruin. and yet, “the institutions, laws and modes of thinking and feeling as handed down from previous generations do not always seem to be well adapted to the contemporary state of affairs; hence arises an upheaval in the manner and even the norms of behavior”.16 in his book our endangered values: america’s moral crisis, the american former president jimmy carter wrote an elegy for the degradation of american values and appeal america to return to the right path of morality.17 in china, “running the country with morality” is another way of expressing this moral concern. in the east culture transformation is increasingly intensified, and numerous schools are emerging, for instance, “the quintessence school, the westernized school, the western technology application school, the chinese culture application school, the mutual substance school, and the comprehensive innovation school”.18 at the same time, concerning religion, “growing numbers of people are abandoning religion in practice. unlike former days, the denial of god or of religion, or the abandonment of them, are no longer unusual and individual occurrences”.19 at the same time, people observe that “around the world over the past generation, the basic tenets of modern cultures-including equality, personal freedom, and self-fulfillment__have been eroding the domains of traditional cultures that value authority, filial obedience, and self-discipline”.20 some people predicted that “cultural modernization will continue to assault the world’s traditional cultures, provoking widespread political unrest, psychological stress, and social tension. in developed nations, the great majority embrace the tenets of modernization”.21 the situations of religions are the same. the leaders of some zhao jianmin 221 religions also appeal to aggiornamento (keeping up with the times). christianity developed neo-scholasticism and la nouvelle th?ologie (neotheology), while in the east, neo-confucianism and neo-philosophy (led to a mixture of western, chinese, and marxism philosophy). the field of modern thought seems to be very rich, but it is actually in a state of great disorder. meanwhile, globalization is so powerful that it influences all civilizations. nowadays, no civilization can preserve its own purity and integrity. no civilization can develop without paying attention to others. in the east, you can see both the people who want their country to be completely westernized, and who only want their national culture. but we see a similar process happening in the west which is “being strongly influenced by other cultures in which the original religious element is very powerful”.22 globalization has always been equated with westernization; but actually, this is not the case. today’s globalization is based on economics, but its influence extends to politics, science and technology, media, culture, education, environmental protection, sports. but people are not sure who are the masters behind the scene and this leads to anxiety. “today’s spiritual agitation and the changing conditions of life are part of a broader and deeper revolution”.23 facing this, the ancient civilization on which people had once depended upon seemed fragmented and powerless, and can no longer offer human the comforts they need, no matter mentally or spiritually. people can no longer confront the big questions, concerning the meaning of life, which used to be answered by civilizations. providing answers to this kind of questions is central to the dynamic of civilizations’ growth. the fundamental function of civilization is to provide life meaning and “…the increased exchanges between cultures, which should lead to a true and fruitful dialogue between groups and nations…”.24 under globalization, how should civilizations develop is a question. many theories about the relations of civilizations emerged, such as the clash of civilizations by samuel huntington and coexistence of the civilizations by tang yijie. different people hold different opinions towards these theories. but no matter what your personal ideas are, we all have to actively participate in the creation of a new civilization, because all of us benefit from it. 222 prajna vihara __ __ ~ with the help of li, confucian civilization wants people use ren to achieve their transcendence. ren means human, humanity and “ego” who are the subjects of humanity at the same time. human beings are not static, but dynamic. while the metabolic processes of the human body is continuous and our cells are continuously replaced, some parts of “me” are never changed. the stable part is humanity. humanity or ren has a spiritual continuity and a lasting nature. with the accumulation of experiences and knowledge, humanity will become increasingly rich and mature. the real mature humanity must conclude the inborn nature, the narrow love and the universal love, that is ren in confucian culture. in confucianism, ren does not refer to biological man; rather it means the one who has both the stable inborn nature and the possibilities of continuing development, no matter in spiritual or self-cultivated fields. “confucianism and christianity are concerned about the transcendence of humanity. ren and christian love both are the expression and means of this transcendence”.25 in confucianism ren is transcendental, but it is realized through feudal li, which is no longer suitable for today’s world. love is the main means to reach human’s transcendence in christian civilization. “love embraces the whole of existence in each of its dimensions, including the dimension of time. it could hardly be otherwise, since its promise looks towards its definitive goal: love looks to the eternal”.26 this love is both érōs and agápē , which are inseparable. it is unified both in god and human beings. “god loves, and his love may certainly be called eros, yet it is also totally agape”.27 so it is in human beings. according to some physiological research, love can cause subtle chemical changes in the human body and even change one’s metal state. for human beings, love is both the reaction to érōs and the experiences of agápē . love is a seeking beyond the limits of the individual and towards the eternal. “starting from the depths of his own sacrifice and of the love that reaches fulfillment therein, he also portrays in these words the essence of love and indeed of human life itself”.28 love and life are one, and are working together to reach eternity. the fruit of christian love is universal love, which includes fundamental modern spiritual values such as sacrifice, human dignity, equality, peace and justice, responsibility, gratitude, joy. in conclusion, the dialogue between confucianism and christianzhao jianmin 223 ity can contribute to bringing harmony to the world. in fact, when interpreting the ancient writings, confucianism always follows the tradition in order to harmonize the heaven and the human. the original meaning and roots of ren ( 仁 , human nature) is the same as yuan ( 元 , the beginning). afterwards, in the confucian tradition, ren was interpreted as human nature. regarding this human nature, in later confucian tradition such as in the conversations of master chu and of his students, it is maintained that people should “preserve (tianli, the principle) and get rid of the unwanted human desire”. they thought that tianli ( 天理 ) is ren, that is human nature. li (礼 ) was the means of reaching ren. if traced back to the very beginning, we will see, li only derived from ren in a much later period. actually, the core of confucian culture is ren rather than li, which is only a late interpretation of the former. furthermore, according to the researches of modern anthropology, physiology, psychology and neuroscience on human, confucian culture also need to adjust its way of looking at human. it will be really helpful,if confucianism could combine ‘love’ with “ren” to grasp the true essence of humanity. we should use the spirit of universal love to replace the feudal code of ethics, which was seeking to extinguish human desire. both confucianism and christianity will greatly benefit from the new civilization which combined both confucian ren and christian love. first is using this new combination to replace the ren as the heart of confucian culture, because love was only one of the main factors of confucian ren. the confucian love was lacking in life and transcendence, unlike christian love. but life needs love and love is the complete expression of life. love is also the essential part of humanity. the new combination can complement the short-comings of the two cultures, allowing humanity to have both the immanent transcendence which is common in confucian culture and transcendence from the christian background. second, the confucian immanent transcendence needs the christian love to conquer its selfishness. because love should be “not boastful or arrogant. it does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful” (1 corinthians 13:4-5). third, christian love always over emphasizes transcendence but does not pay enough attention to the aspect of immanent transcendence. that is why st.augustine said “god did not need your help when he created you, but needs your help when he saves you”. in order to achieve salvation, people need both the 224 prajna vihara __ __ ~ help from god and their own effort. both are important. fourth, in confucianism innate goodness,l ove of one’s family and love others are the methods of self-cultivation, while in christianity “love of god” and “love of one’s neighbor” are the paths leading to salvation. the combination of these two will become a powerful instrument to rebuild a chinese civilization that abounds with ren and love, and can also offer people the true meaning of life. endnotes 1??? ??? ?????????????????????? 2004? 1??2?? 212-219?. 2ibid. p.212. 3ibid. p.213. 4ibid. p.224. 5benedict ??, encyclical letter, deus caritas est, no.3. 6ibid. no.5. 7ibid. no.7. 8ibid. no.9. 9ibid. no.6. 10ibid. no.6. 11augustine of hippo, on the trinity, ??, 8, 12. 12benedict ??, encyclical letter, no.10. 13ibid. no.11. 14pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world (gaudium et spes). no.4. 15ibid. no.91. 16ibid. no.7. 17reference news (simplified chinese: 参考消息 ) december 20, 2006, p14. 18yu dunkang, confucian ethics and global ethics, editors.he guanghu,xu zhiwei, dialogue 2: confucianism, buddhism, taoism and christianity, social sciences academic press, 2001, p12 余敦康 , 《儒家伦理与全球伦理》， , 见：何光沪，许志伟 主编 , 《对话二：儒释道与基督教》，, 社会科学文献出版社 , 2001年 , 页 12. 19pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world . no.7. 20david pearce snyder; five meta-trends changing the world, the futurist; ju1/aug 2004; pg.23; 戴维.皮尔斯。斯奈德 , ，《改变未来世界的五大趋势》， , 见：《参考消息》，, 2004 年8月 29 第三版 . 21ibid. p. 24. 22the tablet, 19 august 2006, p.8. 23pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world no.5 pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world (gaudium et spes). no.4. zhao jianmin 225 24pstoral constitution on the church in the modern world no.56. 25ji zhen,unbalanced bipolar---on traditional ethical culture, fujian forum, december, 2005. 纪真 , “不均衡的两极——对传统伦理文化的一种分析 ”, ，《福建论坛》，, 2005. 12. 26benedict xvi, encyclical letter, deus caritas est, no.6 27ibid. no.9. 28ibid. no.6. 226 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 08_(105-123) hobbes and.pmd hobbes and the rise of modernity giuseppe mario saccone asian university, thailand abstract this article examines the specific role of hobbes’ dialogue of the common laws in the development of the liberal tradition in the common law. hobbes usually has been regarded as the founder of a theory of absolute sovereignty and as an advocate of state centralization. in some cases he is even considered a forerunner of such neoconservative political philosophers as carl schmitt and leo strauss. however, this reading of hobbes will contend that his philosophical and political enterprise has been misunderstood. opposed to the authoritarian reading i wish to emphasize a strain of pragmatic and free thinking modernity in hobbes’ writings. hobbes supports freedom of expression and enquiry against all types of sectarian claims made by the most powerful legal and religious circles and guilds of that time which he saw as intent on pursuing their own narrow self-interests against the needs of the common people. in other words, he was an early advocate of intellectual freedom and was an agent of change within the conceptual history of common law. the historical influence of these liberal features of hobbes set in motion a shift towards a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism in the understanding of common law. this is the important historical outcome of a dialogue. i argue that the contrast between hobbes’ rational jurisprudence in a dialogue and common law itself is particularly significant to the rise of english and american constitutionalism, modern individualism and utilitarianism. prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 105-124 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ 105 introduction the subject of this article is the historical legacy of hobbes’ dialogue of the common laws, which he wrote in the late 1660s as an attack on the legal ideas of the common lawyers, and in particular on the ideas of the greatest lawyer of the early seventeenth century, sir edward coke.1 in recent years, it has gradually gained wide but not undisputed acceptance among political theorists the view that hobbes provided a rationalist defence for absolutism, but his individualistic methodology and the use he made of social contract theory, prefigured early liberalism.2 the importance of hobbes is firmly rooted in his role as an agent of change in the history of western philosophy. to make a long story short, a basic idea of ‘classical’ political philosophy was developed in greek antiquity and adopted __ but transformed __ in the christian intellectual traditions of late antiquity and the middle ages. this is the idea that the philosophical consideration of political concepts naturally presupposes normative ideas connected with some notion of an objective human good, end, purpose, or function.3 this idea of a human good, as it figures in political theory, was much more radically transformed in european political philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries starting more or less with hobbes as a sort of demon of modernity.4 by the twentieth century, many major political philosophers appeared to believe that it is possible 'to do political philosophy’ without reference to such a normative metaphysical, ethical, or religious ideal. political organization is regarded as a matter of convention or agreement and, in that sense, as something that is the result of human artifice rather than a straightforward consequence of human biology (or of human nature, more broadly). legitimate political authority is the rational endorsement of all citizens (irrespective of whether such endorsement ever explicitly occurs).5 however, the role of hobbes’ restoration writings in this process deserves a closer attention than they have usually received. hobbes in these writings, that is, in his history of the civil war, known as behemoth, and in his extensively revised latin translation of leviathan, as well as in the dialogue of the common laws and a number of other, minor pieces, grappled with the problem that the restored monarchy had allowed itself to be captured by a powerful group of ideologues __ the 106 prajna vihara-~ clergymen of the church of england and their supporters among the common lawyers, whom he accused of being a threat against both civil order and intellectual freedom. a dialogue’s criticism against these ideologues had a remarkable historical significance, and the role and the case for religious toleration in hobbes should be made more forcefully than it has been, with some exceptions, by most modern scholars because it is crucially important for the rise of important features of liberalism.6 the meaning of a political concept such as liberalism is often contested, meaning that no neutral or settled definition of it can ever be developed, but i take the important features of liberalism to which i refer to be that liberal thought is characterized by a commitment to individualism, a belief in the supreme importance of the human individual, implying strong support for individual freedom.7 from the liberal point of view, individuals are rational creatures who are entitled to the greatest possible freedom consistent with the like freedom for fellow citizens.8 the history of conceptions of the common law reflects the gradual and uneasy rise and acceptance of these ideas and in this article i am arguing that hobbes contributed to this process by setting in motion a shift towards a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism in the history of the conceptions of common law.9 in this way, the ideas set in motion by hobbes, i.e., his individualistic methodology and rationalism, the use he made of social contract theory and in particular the role and the case he sets for religious toleration also largely stand at the cross-road of the distinction between classical liberal thought, which believed in natural law, in the inalienability of private property and in a minimal state and modern or contemporary liberal thought, which believes that private property is a social right and that government should be used to improve life through social engineering.10 hobbes’ plea for religious toleration as an avatar of liberalism in his great pre-restoration works, notably of course leviathan itself, hobbes consistently argued that both civil order and intellectual freedom were fundamental political values, and indeed that it was the giuseppe mario saccone 107 destruction of intellectual freedom which had commonly led to civil disorder, through the creation of armies of bigots determined to rule their fellow men for ideological ends, so that: “men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment”.11 against this practice, hobbes asserted that it was wrong “to extend the power of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts, and conscience of men”.12 leviathan, read in its entirety, was a plea for the ruler of england to secure his power over his citizens by allying with the supporters of religious toleration, and thereby to free the citizens from the most formidable threats to their personal and intellectual liberty. to press this point hobbes boldly stated: “faith is a gift of god, which man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture”.13 the ruler hobbes probably had in mind at the time was precisely a restored charles ii, to whom the book seems initially to have been dedicated;14 when charles finally succeeded in restoring the monarchy, however, he immediately allowed the church of england to re-establish a grip upon the religious affairs of the nation, and hobbes found himself treated as a prime target by the refounded church, which threatened him with exile, imprisonment or even death for the theological views he had expressed in leviathan.15 so the reign of charles ii constituted for hobbes a theoretical as well as a personal challenge: a regime which in general he supported turned out still to be involved in a struggle against enemies within, and indeed at certain critical moments to have given way to those enemies. what did hobbes’ theory imply about the correct response to this situation? clearly, the works in which he sought to answer this question by arguing in favour of religious toleration and for the elimination of sectarian strife are going to be among the most interesting of his writings, as in them he was forced to deal with the practical implications of his ideas, and to come to a judgement about the whole of modern english history. the ideas expressed in this judgement constitute an avatar of liberalism and contributed to the development of important features of liberal tradition in the common law. indeed, hobbes always sought freedom of thought and religious toleration as a remedy against the disorder and oppression caused by sectarian strife. that there is more into this than the contention in leviathan in favour of freedom of thought and religious toleration is confirmed 108 prajna vihara-~ by the fact that there is always an implicit or explicit historical theory in hobbes: mostly, it is a theory of the corruption of the christian religion by aristotelian philosophy, especially in the middle ages. this historical theory is clearly expressed in leviathan, but it is possible to read the seeds of it, at least implicit, into the early works, even though hobbes is not giving an historical account of this corruption in the elements of law and de cive because, as pointed out by quentin skinner, in these works hobbes eschews historical arguments in favour of rational reasoning.16 so in de cive, even though no explicit historical account of it is given, it is already implied a theory of the corruption of human life as a whole by philosophical speculation beginning with socrates and which led to the ideological grip on power by the bigots. this theory is implicitly set out in the preface to de cive, as well as in the third section;17 it is referred to in the elements of law natural and political,18 and of course explicitly becomes a full historical account of the corruption of christian religion in leviathan where this account is the central theme of parts three and four,19 and in the historia ecclesiastica.20 this historical account is also one of the central themes of behemoth, as well as the exclusive subject of some of hobbes’ other post-restoration writings, such as the historical narration concerning heresy.21 a dialogue also contains this history of corruption, partly in the history of heresy which is such a striking feature of this work, and partly in the history of the misunderstanding of politics which gave rise to the common lawyers’ sense of their own power over the common people and which together with the ideological power of the bigots undermines civil order and intellectual freedom.22 but in order to understand the importance of the arguments in favour of religious toleration in a dialogue it is also useful to bear in mind that a natural set of questions to ask about hobbesian politics, and one which surely occurred to hobbes himself, is, what would life under a well-founded hobbesian commonwealth actually be like, and has there ever been a genuine example of such a state; and if not, why not? in leviathan he says that we have always lived if not in darkness, then yet in a mist compared with the lucidity of a well-founded hobbesian commonwealth, and that the reason for this is precisely the proliferation of sects, both of christian and of secular philosophers. so, in one sense, by the presence of an historical narrative, hobbes in a dialogue was not providgiuseppe mario saccone 109 ing his readers with an analysis of any form of government whatsoever: he was providing them with an account of a specific kind of government, with a number of special conditions, notably the elimination of sectarian strife, which was not to be found in a pure form anywhere in modern europe. the absence of this specific kind of government required explanation, however, and hobbes argues that it is due to the corruption of the christian religion by aristotelian philosophy. to press this point is one function of the historical discussions in his works. but the historical passages of a dialogue are also intended to make hobbes’ political conclusions palatable to common lawyers and to those with property, the principal users of common law.24 in all his works, hobbes consistently expresses deep hostility to orators who use the power of rhetoric to promote faction and schism, and who lead people to commit themselves to partial or unexamined moral, religious and even scientific opinions.25 freeing genuine personal inquiry from the internal coercion of the persuasive was always one of hobbes' fundamental aims.26 but all his works, to a degree, employ the techniques of the orator themselves to convince their audience __ rhetoric destroys itself, much as reason was to destroy itself in hume.27 nowhere this is more evident than in a dialogue.28 so a plausible explanation for the rhetorical form in which hobbes couched the arguments of the book is that it was a means of slipping into the minds of contemporary readers especially those imbued with the attitudes of the common lawyers, a theory of absolutist government which ran counter to their fundamental assumptions about sovereignty and the law.29 hobbes was all the more compelled to coach his arguments in this rhetorical form because he was doing two things at the same time which, at least on the face of it, it was difficult to render compatible: he was trying to make his conclusions palatable to common lawyers on the one hand and challenging the views put forward by some common lawyers to undermine their authority with the propertied on the other. however, his rhetorical task must be understood in view of the fact that the situation and the attitudes of the common lawyers were not univocal. the idea that hobbes’ theory of absolutist government ran contrary to their fundamental assumptions should not be overestimated: recent work by people like glenn burgess, alan cromartie and johann 110 prajna vihara-~ sommerville has given us a complex sense of what the attitudes of the common lawyers were;30 while in the particular case of a dialogue it should not be forgotten that aubrey says that both hale and vaughan read it, and vaughan, as much of a common lawyer as hale, greatly approved of it __ while hale, as we know, did not.31 so two lawyers as close as hale and vaughan, both friends and executors of the great selden, could read a dialogue in very different ways, which should warn us against attributing too high degree of uniformity to the common lawyers. there were always many different interpretative schools among the lawyers, and the idea expressed by john davies and to an extent by coke, that common law was custom in the sense that it was made informally by the people themselves was only one view.32 equally powerful by hobbes’ time was the view espoused by selden, and by both hale and vaughan, that common law is lost statute __ statutes the records of whose promulgation had been lost, as having been made before the modern sets of parliamentary rolls.33 moreover, on either view it was accepted that any provision of common law could legally be changed by a simple parliamentary act, though coke for one believed that this might be very unwise: this is and has always been the law of england.34 in a sense, it was the non-historical side of common law to which hobbes was chiefly antagonistic: the idea that common law is “reason” and that therefore any case, in the absence of statute, can be decided by the “reason” of the judges. there are two features of this. the first is hobbes’ interesting argument that the best interpreters of the sovereign’s will are not judges with their professional or “artificial” reason, but the common people: and that therefore english juries should be seen as judges of law as well as of fact.35 this was an extremely radical view, and it still is __ it is the principle of “jury nullification”, much debated in the united states, and among hobbes’ contemporaries only the levellers espoused it.36 it might be worth remarking in this context that hobbes’ admirer john vaughan, as justice of the common pleas, later pronounced the definitive ruling on the incorrigibility of a jury’s decision, which still governs anglo-american law.37 a hobbesian view of the jury thus led to what has usually been seen as the antithesis of “absolutist” politics, and to a practical way of limiting state power without handing comparable power to another institution or sect. the second feature is hobbes’ realization giuseppe mario saccone 111 that it was the idea that, in the absence of statute, a judicial case can be decided by the “reason” of the judges which was permitting the reintroduction of laws against heresy into england through the back door.38 parliament, having not renewed the laws in 1640, was unable to reintroduce them after the restoration because there was always a majority against any particular proposal.39 but coke, and his restoration followers, believed that common law incorporated the truths of orthodox christianity and could therefore be used to condemn heretics in the absence of statutory sanction.40 in this respect, a dialogue continues the case for toleration made by hobbes in part four of leviathan. i will analyze next this feature of a dialogue and in particular the fact that hobbes by challenging the belief that common law was the embodiment of universal reason as understood by the common lawyers contributed to the evolution of this belief and to a shift towards a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism. reason in hobbes and in the common law the fact that for hobbes law is the rational will of the sovereign ran against the main claim invariably made about common law, i.e., that it was the embodiment of reason. hobbes in a dialogue points out that to rest law on reason, and to identify this with individual reason is a recipe for anarchy. accordingly, the philosopher states: i find my own reason at a stand; for it frustates all the laws in the world: for upon this ground any man, of any law whatsoever may say it is against reason, and thereupon make a pretence for his disobedience.41 here indeed hobbes was right. in fact, the appeal to reason was continually made by radicals in the civil war on the authority of coke (and later by the french revolutionaries, hence burke’s famous critique of them), and hobbes may have paid attention to the levellers.42 hobbes’ point is that individual rationality is indeterminate, even though not all interpretations are equally valid and true. so he admits the existence of “true” interpretations, but only given the fact that “true and false are 112 prajna vihara-~ attributes of speech, not of things”.43 that is to say, “speech” makes some interpretations less indeterminate than others according to how precise is the meaning of the words which are used, and to the degree to which these words are used consistently and unambiguously in accordance with their meaning. yet to say, as common lawyers claim, that rationality resides in custom is clearly untrue since we debate the rationality of customs. so the philosopher tells the lawyer: now as to the authority you ascribe to custome, i deny that any custome of its own nature, can amount to the authority of a law: for if the custom be unreasonable, you must with all other lawyers confess that it is no law, but ought to be abolished; and if the custom be reasonable, it is not the custom, but the equity that makes it law.44 furthermore, to claim, as the common lawyers themselves do, to have a unique insight into the rationality of custom is, he suspects venal special pleading. their reason is no different from anyone else’s, their knowledge could be gained in a couple of months.45 despite the rationalism of his method, hobbes’ view, expressed in his questions concerning liberty necessity and chance printed in 1656, is that the claim that reason is a criterion of the content of true law “is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives”.46 in a dialogue his answer to the problem of rational indeterminacy is the insistence that “it is not wisdom, but authority that makes a law”.47 in fact, hobbes believes that only the authority of the sovereign, and not the “reason” embodied in any law, can save lives. indeed, what reason reveals is the need to have an authoritative determination, not what the nature of that determination was. this idea was already in the questions concerning liberty necessity and chance, where hobbes stated: i think rather that the reason of him that hath the sovereign authority, and by whose sword we look to be protected both against war from abroad and injuries at home, whether it be right or erroneous in itself, ought to stand for right to us that have submitted ouselves thereunto by receiving the protection.48 giuseppe mario saccone 113 on hobbes’ view all reason is the reason of human individuals, and individual reason is inherently indeterminate whilst law must be determinate. so only the authority of the sovereign, but not “reason” by itself, can prevent the fighting caused by conflicting views and save many lives. reason cannot, therefore, be the basis for law. this point is raised here to establish the position which the next generation of common law thinkers attacked, and in doing so developed a peculiar notion of reason as custom. however, there is a sense in which what common law does with custom, and what hobbes does with his criticism of “the common law mind”, share a role in the way the perception of the relationship between the individual and the state started changing from the seventeenth century, i.e., in the growing recognition of the subjective individuality of the citizens as autonomous social agents within the state, which is one feature “of the rise of individualism and the modern state” and of liberalism itself, and grew out of the struggles between king and parliament. a dialogue by challenging the belief that common law was the embodiment of universal reason as understood by the common lawyers contributed to the evolution of this belief. indeed, hobbes provoked a more self-conscious defence of common law from hale which, however, inexorably left the common law mind open to the critical scrutiny underpinning the difference between being traditional and being consciously traditional. in fact, as pointed out by burke and hegel to whom the distinction between the two is commonly attributed, once it becomes necessary to convince the people that tradition must be regarded in the traditional way, it becomes clear that they no longer view tradition in that way and that men “live and trade each on his own private stock of reason”.49 in regard to this, hegel in the phenomenology of spirit gives an enlightening exemplification of this process by describing what happens when we start enquiring about the origin of customary laws: [i]f i enquire after their origin and confine them to the point whence they arose, then i have transcended them; for now it is i who am the universal and they are the conditioned and limited. if they are supposed to be validated by my insight, then i have already denied their unshakeable, intrinsic being, and regard them as something which, for 114 prajna vihara-~ me, is perhaps true, but also is perhaps not true.50 as exemplified in this passage, the “traditionary” conception of common law requires a certain naive innocence which, once lost, cannot be regained. hale, at least to a certain extent, seems to be aware of this in his critique of a dialogue. for this reason, he advances a pragmatic defence of common law by constructing, against the attack of hobbes’ political absolutism and rationalism, a more sophisticated defence of common law, i.e. the defensive development of custom as adaptation. in a famous image in the history of the common law of england, hale compared the common law to a river which, although it has a source, collects and intermingles with the waters of numerous tributaries so that “it is almost an impossible piece of chymistry to reduce every caput legis to its true original ... danish ... norman ... saxon or british law”.51 then, importantly, he goes on: neither was it, or indeed is it much material, which of these is their original; for ’tis very plain, the strength and obligation, and the formal nature of a law, is not upon account that the danes, or the saxons, or the normans, brought it with them, but they became laws, and binding in this kingdom, by virtue only of their being received and approved here.52 this is a significant shift in emphasis on the basis of legitimacy. no longer are the crucial criteria the objective ones of longevity or provenance, which the “traditionary common law mind” did not put under critical scrutiny, but other criteria whose objectivity requires a more selfconscious effort to be recognized, and, most importantly, a downright subjective criterion: acceptability. indeed, the actual “acceptance” referred to __ these laws were in effect, “they were received here” invokes a more complex “objective” criterion which is open to critical scrutiny, namely empirical evidence that the rule actually existed and was treated as binding. but acceptability __ “they were approved here”, even though does invoke some standard of what may be law, for example, the “natural law” standard that no unjust rule can truly be a law is subjective because it entails that ultimately it was up to an autonomous decision of the english giuseppe mario saccone 115 and not depending on the nature and content of the laws themselves whether or not they were treated as binding. so, from having an objective status as an historical product, common law has become a matter of (pure) subjectivity. in regard to this, the lesson of hobbes’ dialogue to the common lawyers constitutes a turning point in the history of legal and political thought. in sum, because of this, hobbes __ at least posthumously __ has won his long battle against coke: even though his political fight, i.e., the defence of absolute monarchy, was “lost” by hume, common law is not taken as the “objective” embodiment of reason, but as a most valuable historical convention which, nevertheless, like all human practices, can be subject to critical scrutiny.53 in my view, this together with its arguments in favour of religious toleration is the most enduring legacy of hobbes’ dialogue. however, this shift towards a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism in the history of common law must not be seen as leading to a complete rejection of objectivist and natural law influenced conceptions of common law. rather it is the emergence of a new discourse qualifying and complementing the older one. indeed, the evolution of the various conceptions of common law was practically mirrored by their legal and political application in the british and american constitutional systems (and by the many others which were influenced by them), and this application always required the blending of different conceptions of common law and law itself within the evolving constitutional systems: law itself is not static, but a living, growing institution that reflects society’s changing conceptions.54 conclusion this work contends that a dialogue is responsible for the transition from the view that common law is an “objective” embodiment of reason to the historical conventionalist view that it is a generally useful set of arrangements arrived at through adaptive custom that can be subject to critical scrutiny, and suggests that this also influences the rise of important features of western individualism and liberalism. even though it can be argued that the changes that hale, and later locke and hume 116 prajna vihara-~ brought to the justification of common law might have happened without hobbes, what matters most is the fact that they were reacting to and were themselves agents in the vast changes in intellectual perspective which hobbes and his dialogue had brought into being.55 in the same vein, it is true that one may argue that the loss of objectivity of common law and of the concern to formalise natural right, and eventually also the drift away from contract, much less a renewable contract, are only loosely connected and that by no means it is obvious that the outcome of this loss should lead to a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism because logic does not preclude other possibilities.56 nevertheless, this has been the historically dominant outcome. that is to say, what matters most is that a dialogue embodies the rise of important features of liberal individualism which set in motion the historical process leading to a kind of consequentialist and informal utilitarianism. a dialogue is “liberal” because it recommends toleration. indeed, even though toleration has been a policy of absolutist regimes __ in fact james ii had a policy of toleration, it is specifically liberal because it entails freedom of thought, i.e., the principle from which liberalism stems from and which some absolutist regimes may have in fact wittingly or unwittingly encouraged. what is historically and philosophically most significant is that a dialogue’s liberal individualism, conventionalism and modern subjectivism as well as its plea for religious toleration was recalled not only few years later by locke, but also in the following century, and even later, by hume, burke, blackstone and bentham. hobbes directly or indirectly provoked these responses by his own use of history as rhetoric, which undermines traditionary authority based on an “objective” notion of reason, and required the common lawyers to rethink, deepen and ultimately reconstruct on more “conventionalist” basis their arguments in favour of the ancient constitution, even though their approach remains different from hobbes’.57 as my purpose in writing this paper was philosophical, rather than historical as such, i conclude by assessing the historical outcome of the process set in motion by hobbes within common law and beyond. there is a potential problem here: once liberalism has surrendered any belief in objective truths, all personal subjective beliefs become true. the result is that, on the positive side, the only way you can make a decision is by giuseppe mario saccone 117 endnotes 1see, a dialogue between a philosopher and a student of the common law of england, edited with an introduction by joseph cropsey (chicago, the university of chicago press, 1971). 2see, for instance, andrew heywood, political theory: an introduction, second edition (london, mcmillan press, 1999), p.124. 3in terms of the nomos-physis antithesis, the foundation of political organization and of the political virtues or aretai in nature (physis) is the obvious alternative to their foundation in nomos. the appeal to physis often had a normative, rhetorical character: that is, physis should be in control; but nomos conventional mores, customs, human laws frequently constitute an unwarranted and morally deleterious constraint on the operation of nature. we find the appeal to nature conjoined with a particular notion of an unwritten or ‘common’ (koinos) law. in some cases, this concept of law is no more than what eventually came to be called the ius gentium (latin for law of peoples), those parts of written law or of customary and unwritten moral principles that held to be shared by all peoples. the ius gentium was construed by some as the commandments of the god(s) and, as such, would seem to be a matter of nomos. however, by the fourth century b.c.e. aristotle identifies common or universal law, ‘all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere’,’ [aristotle, rhetoric, trans. w. rhys roberts, 1.10.1368b8-9] as ‘law according to nature’: ‘for there really is, he says, ‘a natural justice and injustice appeal to your own conscience. but on the negative side, once all things are equally valid, the only way to attain supremacy is through war and power. and in regard to this it is relevant to mention that the usurpation of the great faiths by secular ideology is not usually recognized. but this process has a historical and a contemporary dimension. for all the major monotheistic faiths, their primary historical distortion lies with their utilization for the purposes of state formation and nationalism and this process has been at work also within common law systems. thus liberalism can make out of us all free and responsible citizens, or bigots and religious fundamentalists justifying extreme political ideologies. when the arrow is primed on the bow sooner or later it must be unleashed, as the chinese proverb says. alas, there is only a fine line between the two outcomes but only the former holds true to the original principles of liberalism itself highlighted by hobbes’ case for religious toleration and freedom of thought in a dialogue. the latter outcome would be tantamount to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. 118 prajna vihara-~ that is common to all, even to those that have no association or covenant with one another’. [rhet. 1.1373b6-9] the explicit opposition to nomos (in the form of ‘association or covenant’) is here obvious. but how, more explicitly, are political organizations, law, justice, and the political aretai grounded in physis? at least part of the answer to this question involves a functionalist conception of aretai, the virtues or excellences of something. an arete of something x is a quality or capacity that enables x to fulfil well x’s proper ergon, its work, business or function. so if x’s function is to g, an arete of x, a virtue or excellence of x, makes x a good g-er. the functionalistic model supplies a framework for grounding the human aretai, including the political aretai, in nature (physis) as opposed to tradition, convention, or agreement, all gathered together under the concept of nomos. see: michael j. white, political philosophy: an historical introduction, (oxford: oneworld publications, 2003), pp.17-18. 4in the classical tradition of political philosophy represented, for example, by aristotle and aquinas, law is first and foremost a dictate of practical reason. the job, so to speak, of positive law __ and of those political structures that determine and implement it is to direct human beings toward the common good, the content of which is determined by the objective human function or end. so, from this perspective, it is essential to positive law that it be a rationally determined means for furthering the (objective) good or end of human persons. although seventeenth-century contractarians such as hobbes and locke do not entirely dispense with the connection between law and practical rationality, they focus on the idea that command and consent (which are functions of the will or volitional faculty) are essential to the legitimacy of law and the political order. in other words, it is either command or consent (or both) that distinguish what has the moral authority of law from what is merely ‘good advice’ or prudential counsel. the shift in emphasis from practical reason to the will seems to be related to a distinctive feature of much modern and contemporary political theory that originates in the contractarian tradition: the privileging in political philosophy of the idea of agreement (in a broad sense that can include promises, contracts, and even tacit consent). in at least some varieties of contractarianism, a corollary is the political employment of a paradigm of commutative justice, rather than the paradigm of distributive justice. commutative justice is a matter of the fairness of private transactions among citizens; distributive justice is a matter of the fairness of the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. the classical assumption was that the fairness of distributive justice is not necessarily a matter of equal distribution, but rather a matter of distribution in proportion to criteria of desert (or merit or worth) of some sort. so achieving distributive justice will certainly involve the exercise of practical rationality. however, in many (although not necessarily all) cases, it seems quite plausible to identify the instantiation of commutative justice with that to which the parties involved freely consent. it may thus seem that issues of commutative justice (determined by that to which persons are willing to assent) are relatively more straightforward and less controversial than issues of distributive justice (determined giuseppe mario saccone 119 by criteria that may well be both difficult to ascertain and controversial). this is essentially the line of thomas hobbes. he is more explicit than later theorists; but the tendency to interpret fairness, in the political sense, essentially in terms of commutative justice remains an important element of much later political thought. see: michael j. white, political philosophy: an historical introduction, pp.120-121. 5eventually, contractualism becomes at best an analytic conceptual device, or disappears all together as elections offer a much more direct and powerful form of legitimization of political authority. see: ibidem, p.120. 6however, a number of distinguished scholars have recently pointed out that hobbes favoured religious toleration. see, for instance: richard f. tuck, “hobbes and locke on toleration”, thomas hobbes and political theory. edited by mary g. dietz. (lawrence ks., university press of kansas, 1990), pp.153-171; mark a. goldie, “the reception of hobbes”, the cambridge history of political thought, 14501700. edited by j.h. burns, with the assistance of mark a. goldie (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1991), pp.589-615; alan ryan, “hobbes, toleration and the inner life”, in david miller and lary siedentrop (eds.), the nature of political theory (oxford, oxford university press, 1983), pp.197-218; johann sommerville, thomas hobbes: political ideas in historical context (new york, 1992), pp.149-156. 7liberal democracy emerged in western europe in tandem with the expansion of capitalism and the rise of a middle class constituency. it developed in opposition to medieval, hierarchical institutions the despotic monarchies whose claim to all-powerful rule rested on the assertion that they enjoyed divine support. liberal democrats attacked the old system on two fronts. first, they fought for the creation of a sphere of civil society where social relations including private business and personal life could evolve without state interference. an important element in this respect was the support of a market economy based on the respect for private property. the second element was the claim that state power was based not on natural or supernatural rights but on the will of the sovereign people. ultimately, this claim would lead to demand for democracy that is for the creation of mechanisms of representation that assured that those who held state power enjoyed popular support. the tradition that became liberal democracy was liberal first (aimed at restricting state power over civil society) and democratic later (aimed at creating structures that would secure a popular mandate for holders of state power). even when the focus was on democracy, liberals had various reservations. they feared that democracy would impede the establishment of a liberal society. the classical explanation of the meaning of liberalism can be found in: isaiah berlin, “two concepts of liberty”, in political philosophy, edited by anthony quinton, (oxford: oxford university press, 1985), pp.141-152, p.146. 8see, ibidem, p.145. 9see, ibidem, p.147. 10see, leon p. baradat, political ideologies: their origins and impact, ninth edition (upper saddle river, nj: pearson prentice hall, 2006), p.39. 11leviathan (harmondsworth, penguin books, 1968), part iv, chap.46, p.700. 120 prajna vihara-~ 12ibidem. 13ibidem, part iii, chap.42, p.527. 14see, richard tuck, “a note on the text”, leviathan, edited with an introduction by richard tuck (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1991), pp.xxviixxxvii, p.xxxiii. 15see, richard tuck, hobbes (oxford, oxford university press, 1989), pp.3334. 16see, quentin skinner, reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of hobbes, (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1996), p.3. but, of course, my reading of hobbes even though is consistent with skinner’s findings it is from a different perspective. i am more concerned with a philosophical understanding of the history of ideas than with establishing a serious method for determining how historical influence or parallel operates between authors. 17see: thomas hobbes, on the citizen, edited and translated by richard tuck (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1998), preface to the readers, p.9; chap.xviii, pp.238-241,247. 18see, for instance: the elements of law (london, frank cass and co., 1969), part i, chap.11, sec.5, p.55. 19see, for instance: leviathan (harmondsworth, penguin books, 1968), part iii, chap.32, pp.410-411; part iv, chap.47, p.711. 20aubrey tells us that the historia ecclesiastica already existed in 1659, but scholars have recently argued that it was probably completed only in 1666. see: historia ecclesiastica carmine elegiaco concinnata, vol.5. thomae hobbes malmesburiensis opera philosophica quae latine scripsit omnia in unum corpus. guilielmi molesworth. 5 vols. (londini, apud joannem bohn, 1839-45), pp.341408; also, patricia springborg, “hobbes on religion”, the cambridge companion to hobbes (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1996), pp.346-380, pp.369-370 note 3. 21see: behemoth or the long parliament by thomas hobbes (london, frank cass and co., 1969), dialogue i, passim, for instance, pp.10-26; an historical narration concerning heresy and the punishment thereof. vol.4. the english works of thomas hobbes of malmesbury now first collected and edited by sir william molesworth. 11 vols. (london, bart, john bohn, 1839-45), pp.387-408, pp.387-388. 22see: a dialogue, pp.122-132; pp.57-68. 23leviathan, part iv, chap.44, pp.628-631. 24see, giuseppe mario saccone, “the ambiguous relation between hobbes’ rhetorical appeal to english history and his deductive method in a dialogue”, history of european ideas, vol.24, no.1, 1998, pp.1-17, pp.2-4. 25see, quentin skinner, reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of hobbes, p.334. 26see, ibidem, for instance, pp.9, 257, 336. 27this remains true even though, as pointed out by quentin skinner, hobbes ostensibly rejected “rhetoric” in favour of “science” in the elements of law and in giuseppe mario saccone 121 de cive 28see, giuseppe mario saccone, hobbes’ dialogue of the common laws and the difference between “natural” and “civil philosophy”, hobbes studies, vol.xii, 1999, pp.3-25, p.6. 29see, giuseppe mario saccone, “the ambiguous relation between hobbes’ rhetorical appeal to english history and his deductive method in a dialogue”, p.3. 30see, for instance: johann p. sommerville, “the norman conquest in early stuart political thought”, political studies, vol.xxxiv (number 2 june 1986), pp.249-261, pp.251-255. 31see, john aubrey, “brief lives”, chiefly of contemporaries, vol.1, 2 vols. edited by andrew clarke (oxford, the clarendon press, 1898), p.341. 32john pocock famously ascribed this version of the immemorial common law of unchanging continuity to the common lawyers as such in his magisterial book: the ancient constitution and the feudal law, published in 1957. but pocock acknowledges that the common lawyers’ views were more complex than what previously thought in the “retrospect” of the 1987 edition of his book. see: j.g.a. pocock, the ancient constitution and the feudal law (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1987), pp.36, 37, 153, 189-190, 234-235; “retrospect”, pp.255-387, p.264. 33see, corinne c. weston, “england: ancient constitution and common law”, the cambridge history of political thought (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1991), pp.374-411, pp.388-389. 34see, charles m. gray, “bonham’s case reviewed”, proceedings of the american philosophical society, 116 (1972) 1 pp.35-58, pp.36,49, and passim. 35see: leviathan, part ii, chap.26, p.328; a dialogue, p.70. 36jury nullification is a sanctioned doctrine of trial proceedings wherein members of a jury disregard either the evidence presented or the instruction of the judge in order to reach a verdict based upon their own consciences. it exposes the concept that jurors should be the judges of both law and fact. jury nullification occurs when a jury substitutes its own interpretation of the law and/or disregards the law entirely in reaching a verdict. the most widely accepted understanding of jury nullification by the courts is one that acknowledges the power but not the right of a juror or jury to nullify the law. 37for a full account of vaughan, see: j. gwyn williams, “sir john vaughan of trawscoed, 1603-1674”, national library of wales journal, viii (1953-1954), pp.33-48, 121-146, 225-243. 38see, richard tuck, philosophy and government, 1572-1651 (cambridge, cambridge university press, 1993), p.343. 39see, richard tuck, “hobbes and locke on toleration”, pp.157-158. 40see, richard tuck, philosophy and government, p.344. 41a dialogue, pp.54-55. 42see: david wootton, “leveller democracy and the puritan revolution”, the cambridge history of political thought, pp.412-442, p.442; also, edmund burke, reflections on the revolution in france (london, printed for j. dodsley, in pall122 prajna vihara-~ mall, 1790. modern edition: harmondsworth, penguin classics, 1986), for example, pp.171, 183. 43leviathan, part i, chap.4, p.105. 44a dialogue, p.96. 45see, ibidem, p.56. 46the english works of thomas hobbes, vol.v, p.176. 47a dialogue, p.55. 48the english works of thomas hobbes, vol.v, p.176. 49edmund burke, reflections on the revolution in france, (london: penguin classics, 1986), p.183; see also: passim, pp.110, 173, 188-189, 198-201. 50george wilhelm friedrich hegel, the phenomenology of spirit, translated by a. v. miller (oxford, oxford university press, 1977), para.437, p.261. 51sir matthew hale, the history of the common law of england (chicago, the university of chicago press, 1971), chap.iv, pp.42-43. 52ibidem, p.43. 53see, david hume, a treatise of human nature, pp.614-615,617. 54see, michael g. roskin, robert l. cord, james a. medeiros, walter s. jones, political science: an introduction, eight edition (upper saddle river, n.j.: prentice hall, 2003), p.321. 55however, with regard to locke we should also bear in mind that he is mostly only an indirect agent in this process via his undeniable influence on english and american politics, because, although like the common lawyers he rejected absolute sovereignty, he hardly speaks about common law itself, emphasizing instead that the “legislative power” is supreme in the commonwealth, which is not too distant from hobbes’ view. 56to take one prominent (counter) example, john rawls implicitly recognizes the loss of objectivity of common law, but he goes on to defend a “contractual” theory of justice that relies on intuitions about moral equality and “natural facts” such as scarcity of material resources and limited benevolence. it is also worth noting that rawls is a harsh critic of utilitarianism. see: john rawls, a theory of justice, (cambridge, mass: harvard university press, 1971), pp.11-12, 60-63, 103-104, 136137, 139-140. 57nevertheless, even though hobbes was a good historian by seventeenth century standards, most of today historians would balk at his approach of selecting examples from history, and ignoring counter-examples, for the purpose of persuading people to adopt a political stance derived from “science”. giuseppe mario saccone 123 14_(236-256) language reality emptiness.pmd language, reality, emptiness and laughter soraj hongladarom department of philosophy, faculty of arts, chulalongkorn university abstract this paper begins by exploring the place of laughter in the characterization of the human being and how it is related to reason. it then examines the attitudes towards laughter in buddhism; from the prohibitions on laughter concerning monks, to the laughing buddha. human beings are the only animals that laugh. other animals are perhaps too serious to laugh, or they are too preoccupied with their living and finding enough to eat to laugh, or perhaps they do not have the physiological capability to laugh. or perhaps the two go together, as the emotional sensitivity that would enable an animal to laugh and its physiological makeup go hand in hand. but that is in fact a matter for biology, of which i do not claim any expertise. that laughing is a uniquely human characteristic has been recognized since ancient times. the medieval west sometimes characterized human beings, as animals that can laugh. the quality of risibility is as unique to our species as does rationality. we human beings are both rational animals and risible animals. that rationality and risibility are equally properties which characterize the human being gives rise to a thought. perhaps it is the case that all rational beings are risible beings, and vice versa. but if this is indeed the case, then rationality and risibility may be closer to each other than previously thought. in any case, philosophical reflections on what uniquely identifies human beings have tended to focus almost exclusively on rationality and not much at all on its counterpart. rationality is the foundation of logic, which underpins systematic communication and thought. it is filled with seriousness and accorded with respectability to such an extent that to claim that one is not rational would be to suggest that one is not a 236 prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 236-256 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ human being. risibility, on the other hand, has been consigned to the realm of the ‘laughable’, that is, the realm of frivolity, playfulness, lightness-in short anything that is opposite to the weighty seriousness that characterizes rationality. what is rather surprising is that when one says of a human being that she does not possess the quality of risibility, one does not appear to be claiming, ceteris paribus, that the person in question is not a human being. on the contrary, to say of someone that she lacks the quality of risibility would even seem to be an act of commending her for her seriousness and its associated qualities, such as dependability, earnestness, punctuality, and so on. as rationality and risibility are equally unique human characteristics, this disparity in the attitude toward the two must be pointing toward something that lies deeper in the collective psyche regarding the attitude toward frivolousness and playfulness. it is therefore not surprising that philosophical reflection on, and academic study of laughter and laughing behavior are much neglected. philosophers tend to be a serious type; one has the image of such personalities as plato, aristotle, thomas aquinas, descartes, kant, or hegel, none of whom is known for their playfulness and frivolity. rationality underlies logic, but exactly what does risibility underlie? is there some counterpart to logic, in the same way as rationality and risibility are counterparts, that serves as the systematic account of risibility in the same way as logic is the account of rationality? one might then talk of the ‘logic’ of risibility, the ‘logic of laughter’. but then this phrase could itself provoke a lot of laughter, for, as the theorists of comedy were wont to say, laughter originate from an incongruous juxtaposition of things that normally do not go together; hence to put logic and laughter together would perform the same function as a successful comedy show. nonetheless, a serious look at laughter and laughing would presumably shed light on our predicaments. i said a serious look because, for one thing, there is the academic constraint of an essay, which precludes my treatment of the topic as a full-scale comedy. and for another, perhaps the objective detachment which is the hallmark of a philosophical essay would ironically be an appropriate venue for treatment of laughing, in the same way the audience laugh at a comedy as they do not identify themselves with the characters in the play, when they feel that they are safely detached from the slapstick pyrotechnics that take place on stage (or in the film, or on soraj hongladarom 237 the television screen). hence there is a reason to treat of laughter as an object of philosophical reflection. the question is to find out why this uniquely human characteristic fares so badly in philosophy and in the wider academic circles. according to one of the few philosophical studies of laughter, john morreall recounts a number of theories on the topic.1 the first and oldest one is the “superiority theory”. according to the theory, laughter occurs as a result on one’s feeling superior to the other, who is the object of laughter. the typical english expression on this kind of laughter is to laugh at someone. for such philosophers as plato, laughter often occurs when one feels superior to those who think themselves to be wise, good looking, or virtuous, while in fact they are not so. it is a kind of feeling of one's knowing better than the one who is laughed at; however, plato maintains that this is actually a kind of vice, a malice toward those who are the object of laughter. furthermore, aristotle, while acknowledges that laughter is part of the good life, nonetheless warns that laughter could get people carried away too far when they say jokes designed to evoke laughter, which for aristotle is always targeted at somebody, and hence those laughing are being inconsiderate toward those who are being laughed at. the other main theory of laughter is the incongruity theory. laughter occurs as a result of a humorous incident in which incongruous things happen together, evoking the feeling of being funny. suppose somebody is walking on the street, and steps on a banana peel and suddenly performs a somersault. we laugh because of the incongruous nature of the situation. this is not necessary a result of our feeling superior to the unfortunate who is doing the somersault, but the situation itself is a humorous one. there is the usual conceptual pattern which we normally associate with the act of walking, but sudden somersault is not part of it, hence the incongruity. however, even though the incongruity theory seems to do more justice to laughter, it does not necessarily entail that philosophers in general will accept laughter. morreall lists three major objects against laughter in western philosophy, which he names the hostility, the irrationality, and the irresponsibility objections. the first objection takes place when one who laughs is usually hostile toward one being laughed at. hence 238 prajna vihara-~ laughter according to the superiority theory is indicative of a hostile situation, one where people feel competitive to one another. when one falls down having stepped on a banana peel, one is being laughed at because other people feel that they are more fortunate in that it is not they who are falling. this feeling is an opposite of envy. one is envious toward another when one senses that the latter is better than oneself; however, when one feels that one is better than the other, one laughs. furthermore, the irrationality objection holds that laughter is objectionable because it is irrational. for plato, laughter is a kind of emotion, and as such it deserves at best a second tier among the hierarchy described in the republic. reason is to reign supreme and laughter has no place there because it is always making fun of reason. the third objection, the irresponsibility objection, holds that laughter is non-serious, and hence does not deserve a place either in plato’s republic or anywhere else for that matter. that is why aristotle said: “serious things are intrinsically better than humorous things or those connected with amusement, and the activity of the better of two things-whether two men or two parts or faculties of a man-is the more serious (quoted in morreall, rejection of humor)”.2 laughter is objectionable because it is an irresponsible act. one who laughs typically looks at things in a playful mode, and it is likely, according to the objection, that one who operates in this mode is not to be trusted with any important tasks. morreall cites a situation where one’s car is stuck in a muddy ditch, if, instead of seriously trying to get the car out of the mud, one laughs at the spinning wheels and the revving engine, then presumably one is not being serious in getting the car out of the undesirable situation. these philosophical attitudes toward laughter, moreover, do not happen only in the west. it is also there in the philosophical traditions of the east, and the attitudes deserve no less attention than its western counterpart. buddhism has a very interesting attitude toward laughter, even though the topic is not treated fully in the canonical text. an image that one in the west recalls to mind when one hears the word ‘buddha’ is that of a fat, kind and laughing monk. so there seems to be at least a connection between the buddha and laughing, even though such a connection may be based on not much more than popular imagination based on certain types of buddha images. nonetheless, something must be there alsoraj hongladarom 239 ready as a source of the popular imagination. perhaps there is a more intimate connection between laughter and the buddha. the core teaching of buddhism, the doctrine of emptiness (sunyata), claims that nothing whatsoever is imbued with inherent existence. so the buddhas and bodhisattvas laugh as part of the playfulness that regards all things as insubstantial and fleeting-the laugh of those who are utterly liberated from the bondage of the samsaric world. i buddhism is not always like this, however, the original canonical text of buddhism, the tipitaka, does not speak much of laughter, and when it does, it treats of laughter as something to be avoided by the monks. the vinaya, the part of the tipitaka that deals with the monastic code, has an injunction against laughing, especially if the laugh occurs in the neighborhood of a household. according to the vinaya, the monk should not open up their robes, laugh loudly, rock himself to and fro near a household, because that would invite disrespect to the monks. another injunction is against monks who tickle fellow monks.3 usually in the vinaya whenever the buddha declared a monastic rule, there was a story behind the declaration that led him to lay down the rule. one day a monk named chabbaggiya played with a fellow monk by tickling the latter with his fingers. the fellow monk laughed so much that he hyperventilated and died. when the buddha learned about the incident, he reproached chabbaggiya and laid down the rule that monks were not to tickle their fellow monks with their fingers. in the sutras, which were the main body of the buddha’s teaching, there are also a few places where laughter in mentioned. in the talaputta sutta,4 the buddha was repeatedly asked by a dancer and a musician named talaputta about the consequences of dancing and music making and making other people laugh. he told the buddha that he had heard his former teacher say to him that those who did something like this would be reborn in the company of the mirthful god pahasa. talaputta would like to know from the buddha whether what he had heard was true. at first the buddha did not want to answer this question, but after 240 prajna vihara-~ -' being asked by talaputta as many as three times, the buddha said that it was wrong that such dancers and musicians who made others laugh through words which were sometimes true and sometimes false would be reborn in heaven with the god pahasa. instead, the buddha said, those dancers and musicians would be reborn either in hell or as animals. when talaputta heard the buddha’s words, he cried. the buddha then said to him that he should not have asked him about the consequences of the action of such dancers and musicians. talaputta then told him that the reason why he was crying was not because he was sad that these dancers would actually have to go to hell or the animal realm, but because he was deceived by his fellow dancers and musicians as well as his former teachers that such dancers and musicians would be reborn in heaven. talaputta appreciated the buddha’s teaching so much that he compared the teaching with “turning over things which have been closed down, opening things that have been closed, telling the way to a blind person with the intention that those who have eyes would see the way”. he then asked the buddha to give him permission to become a monk and eventually become an arhat, or one who is liberated so that he will not be reborn.5 the point of the story is that it is wrong for one to cause another to laugh. chabbaggiya was rebuked by the buddha for his playfulness and mischievousness. many texts in the vinaya were about chabbaggiya laughing out loud so that others could see all his teeth, or causing a commotion in the village with his loud shouts, or rocking himself to and fro.6 as a result of chabbaggiya’s acts, the buddha banned all laughing in the vicinity of the lay householders altogether, except only in the case of illness, being unaware, only smiling not letting others to see the teeth, and losing one’s mind. he also banned shouting out loud and rocking oneself to and fro. for the monks these actions are not conducive to a good behavior of a monk, which should always be focused toward realizing the goal of enligtenment, and as chabbaggiya’s action shows, these actions do not seem to be so conducive. moreover, monks who laugh out loud and shout very loudly in the presence of the lay householders might cause the latter to lose respect for the monks themselves. in the talaputta sutta, the message seems to be that dancers, musicians, actors and the like are quite likely to be reborn in the lower realms as a result of their action. causing others to laugh through “false soraj hongladarom 241 or true words” quite clearly means to provide entertainment to others through imaginative and creative works such as story telling and playacting. these are not encouraging words to the actors, dramatists and poets at all. one is reminded of plato’s banishment of actors and poets out of the republic. the reason given by the buddha why the actors and playwrights will go to the lower realms was that the action of these dancers and actors caused the audience to have defilements that they did not have before. before they watched the play, for example, they were not desirous, angry, or deluded (which are the three main defilements that prevent one from attaining liberation), but only became so after watching it. they were “caused to laugh through true or untrue words”, and when they laughed they presumably lost their control over their minds and became enslaved by the defilements and the passions. hence, the buddha said that the dancers, musicians, and actors who caused others to have these defilements incurred bad karma through their action. the attitude reflected in the sutta toward laughter is quite clear. laughter is just a step away from being born again in hell or the animal realm. monks are not permitted to laugh out loud (smiles that do not expose the teeth were all right). this is because when one laughs, one seems to be mired in the net of the defilements. the pleasure of laughing, then, is part and parcel of sensual delight and desires, none of which is conducive to the realization of liberation, or nirvana. it is thus rather perplexing how this negative attitude toward laughter could fit with the popular image of what is usually thought of as the laughing buddha.7 if laughing is indeed to be avoided, then why is the buddha himself laughing? in a later text in the mahayana tradition,8 the lankavatara sutra (discourse on the descent to lanka), which is about the doctrines of mind only and emptiness, there is the following passage. the buddha was laughing very loudly after learning that ravana, the lord of lanka, understood the profound meaning of the teaching: then the blessed one beholding again this great assembly with his wisdom-eye, which is not the human eye, laughed loudly and most vigorously like the lion-king. emitting rays of light from the tuft of hair between the eyebrows, from the ribs, from the loins, from the srivatsa [svastika] 242 prajna vihara-~ -' . . on the breast, and from every pore of the skin, __emitting rays of light which shone flaming like the fire taking place at the end of a kalpa, like a luminous rainbow, like the rising sun, blazing brilliantly, gloriously-which were observed from the sky by sakra, brahma, and the guardians of the world, the one who sat on the peak [of lanka] vying with mount sumeru laughed the loudest laugh....9 compare this with chabbagiya’s laugh and there is a world of difference. of course chabbagiya is an ordinary monk and the buddha is the enlightened one. but what is important for us here is the attitude toward laughter shown in the two texts. in the pali vinaya and in the talaputta sutta, laughter is seen to be something that should be avoided. it opens the floodgate of emotions which could lead one astray toward surrendering oneself to the defilements. the buddha, however, “laughs the loudest laugh” and “most vigorously like the lion-king”,10 and emits “rays of light which shone flaming like the fire taking place at the end of a kalpa”. the difference could not be greater. the buddha’s laughter, however, is not the kind that could lead him to the door of defilements. the buddha is utterly pure and is utterly free from such lowly possibilities. his laugh is a resplendent, confident one, the laughter of one who has completely destroyed all possibilities of even the slightest and most subtle of the defilements. it is the expression of one who is full of compassion and love, a reflection of pure, transcendent happiness.11 but if this is so, then laughter in itself is not to blame. the emphasis of the early teaching found in the pali tipitaka and the monastic code is on training of newly ordained monks. it makes sense to guard against monks laughing, rocking themselves to and fro and tickling fellow monks, because the purpose of monks is to study and to train oneself on the path laid down by the buddha leading toward eventual liberation. in the talaputta sutta, the buddha told the musician and dancer who asked him repeatedly that the lower realms awaited them because they were leading their audience away from the path. causing others to laugh through true and untrue words was censured because it prevents liberation to them. here laughter is accompanied with allowing oneself to be indulged in the sensual pleasures of the samsaric world, but as we have just seen in the soraj hongladarom 243 buddha’s own case, laughter does not have to be so accompanied, as the buddha himself laughs. back to the lankavatara sutra, when the buddha laughs out loud, the great assembly of bodhisattvas question why: ... at that time the assembly of the bodhisattvas together with sakra and brahma, each thought within himself: “for what reason, i wonder, from what cause does the blessed one who is the master of all the world (sarva-dharma-vasavartin), after smiling first, laugh the loudest laugh? why does he emit rays of light from his own body? why, emitting [rays of light], does he remain silent, with the realisation [of the truth] in his inmost self, and absorbed deeply and showing no surprise in the bliss of samadhi, and reviewing the [ten] quarters, looking around like the lion-king, and thinking only of the discipline, attainment, and performance of ravana?” at that time, mahamati the bodhisattvamahasattva who was previously requested by ravana [to ask the buddha concerning his selfrealisation], feeling pity on him, and knowing the minds and thoughts of the assembly of the bodhisattvas, and observing that beings to be born in the future would be confused in their minds because of their delight in the verbal teaching (desanapanha), because of their clinging to the letter as [fully in accordance with] the spirit (artha), because of their clinging to the disciplinary powers of the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers, __which might lead them to think how it were that the tathagatas, the blessed ones, even in their transcendental state of consciousness should burst out into loudest laughter __mahamati the bodhisattva asked the buddha in order to put a 244 prajna vihara-~ ' ' . -' stop to their inquisitiveness the following question: “for what reason, for what cause did this laughter take place?” said the blessed one: “well done, well done, mahamati! well done, indeed, for once more, mahamati! viewing the world as it is in itself and wishing to enlighten the people in the world who are fallen into a wrong view of things in the past, present, and future, thou undertakest to ask me the question. thus should it be with the wise men who want to ask questions for both themselves and others. ravana, lord of lanka, o mahamati, asked a twofold question of the tathagatas of the past who are arhats and perfect buddhas; and he wishes now to ask me too a twofold question in order to have its distinction, attainment, and scope ascertained-this is what is never tasted by those who practise the meditation of the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers; and the same will be asked by the question-loving ten-headed one of the buddhas to come”.12 the buddha answered mahamati that the reason he was laughing was because ravana asked him questions in order to understand the teaching further, which shows that he was on the correct path. in short the buddha laughed out of his satisfaction and his being pleased that ravana, the king of lanka, understood the heart of the teaching. these questions, said the buddha, will be asked by those who will themselves become buddhas in the eons to come. hence he is immensely pleased, and those who are aware of the basic mahayana doctrine would know that, in order for one to become a buddha, one has to undertake the vow of bodhicitta, which means one commits oneself to practice in order to become a buddha so that one is fully empowered to help sentient beings out of the sufferings of the samsaric world. when one has bodhicitta, any action that one does, every movement, every breath one takes, will be for the sake of other sentient beings. santideva said in the bodhicaryavatara soraj hongladarom 245 ' -' . that all the buddhas in the past have taken the bodhicitta vow, and all future buddhas will also do the same.13 seeing the king of lanka committing himself to learning and understanding the dharma, the buddha is thus very happy because he sees in ravana an awakening of bodhicitta, which will eventually lead him to become himself a buddha. ii what does it mean, then, to be a buddha? it means one who completely sees reality as it is with no distortion whatsoever. here is where the relation between language and reality comes in. in seeing things completely as they are without any distortion or fabrication, a buddha realizes that language itself is a distorting medium, and that there is no way getting around it. the distortion is built into the inner mechanism of language itself. in mulamadhayamakakarika, a seminal text written by nagarjuna, the emphasis is precisely on this point. nagarjuna attempts to lay down in a systematic manner what it means for things to be “empty of their inherent nature”. in other words, nagarjuna in this work presents an exposition and a system of arguments for the doctrine of emptiness. basically what the doctrine says is that things as they normally take them to be, i.e., as things with some kind of inner characteristics that identify them to be what it is, are what they are only by virtue of their being essentially dependent on their environment and on other things. nothing stands alone and derives their being solely through itself. in short, nagarjuna argues that language never adequately represents reality. western philosophers will immediately be familiar with this conclusion. for a typical western mind, this is reminiscent of idealism, the idea that the mind never captures reality fully, and as a result the mind somehow constructs its own “reality”, which only approximates reality as it is in itself. however, nagarjuna presents a series of arguments showing that such is not the case. the buddhist doctrine of emptiness is not guilty of being an idealistic position, if that is taken to be the position that the mind constructs its own reality. the reality for nagarjuna is no more or less than the empirical reality that we interact with everyday.things are empty of their inherent nature when their being depend on others, and 246 prajna vihara-~ --their dependence on other beings also show that they are empty of their inherent nature. perhaps the key passage where nagarjuna discusses this empty nature of things is the following: that which is dependent origination is explained to be emptiness. that, being a dependent designation, is itself the middle way.14 things that are dependently originated are said to be empty. that is to say, they lack their inherent nature as to ascertain that they are the things they are and nothing else. this alone might not sound so surprising for western philosophers. however, nagarjuna is actually saying that whatever we language users designate a certain thing to be what it is, perhaps when we designate this clump of matter as a glass, we are employing our conceptual apparatus which consists of words that serve to distinguish instances of the meaning of the words from everything else. thus, when we say of something that it is a glass, we immediately block out some other things not to be a glass and when we say of another thing it is also a glass we presuppose some common characteristics that enable us to agree that this is also a glass. for nagarjuna, all this is conceptual fabrication. however, nagarjuna’s position is not to be conflated with that of immanuel kant, who distinguishes between the known phenomenon and the unknowable noumenon. for kant, the noumenon is there in objective reality, functioning as a foundation for objectivity. for nagarjuna, on the other hand, what is understood by kant to be the noumenon itself is also “empty”. there is nothing over and above conceptual fabrications; everything that we designate as such and such is in fact what it appears to the conceptualizing mind. there is nothing deeper than the appearances. one becomes liberated from sufferings when one realizes that there is nothing deeper, when one, that is, knows that things are what they are only in virtue of their dependence on others. and an important aspect of the dependence is that of the things as they are on conceptual designation. the difference with kant is that for nagarjuna there is no bedrock reality which one conceptualizes and designates. the act of conceptualization soraj hongladarom 247 and designation itself is part of the empty nature of the total reality. thus, dependent origination is but one way emptiness is characterized. emptiness itself, then, is said to be “a dependent designation”, and is itself the “middle way”. it is a middle way between the two extremes of nihilism and essentialism. the former claims that there is nothing at all, and the other claims that things have their internal essences. the buddha refutes both positions, and thereby releases language from being tied up with reality. this release does not mean that we are now floating in the air of non-substantiality and non-objectivity; on the contrary, things, being designated and understood as they always are, are already there, only that they are understood ultimately to depend on each other, and their being what they are is due only to designation. this is the main difference between the aryas who have attained the understanding, and the non-aryas, who are yet so to understand. and when the buddha laughs, he does so out of the complete understanding that all things are but appearances and insubstantial. the laugh arises out of the mind that pervades all corners of reality and is completely filled with great compassion. it is a laugh that is totally free from any trace of dualistic thinking. however, when he rebuked chabbagiya when he came to the village laughing loudly and rocking himself to and fro, he did so out of his concern for the order of the monastic community. prohibiting laughing out loud so that one bares one’s teeth is part of the training that monks have to undergo in order to rid them of their lay habits and so that they become more focused toward the task at hand, which is to practice the teaching in order to become liberated. thus, there are two kinds of laughs. chabbagiya’s is the kind of laughing that should be restrained, for chabbagiya has not liberated himself yet. it is a mundane laugh that is confined within the samsaric world. and when we come to talaputta’s story, this prohibition against laughing from within the viewpoint of samsara is more pronounced. the buddha told talaputta that those who dance, sing and act so as to cause others to laugh would go to the lower realms, but the story is limited only to the case where the musicians and actors did cause their audience to become desirous when they are not desirous before or to become angry when they are not angry before. it does not say anything of the opposite role of the performing arts in bringing about an eradication of these defilements 248 prajna vihara-~ . and engendering wisdom in the audience. what would the buddha say about that? iii if laughing in itself is not to blame, as the buddha himself also laughs, then acts such as acting in a play, singing, dancing, performing music and so forth are not to blame in themselves either. for their reproachable character is entirely due to the fact that they are used to induce people to turn away from the teaching. however, in themselves it seems at least plausible that these performing arts could be used in the opposite way, that is to bring people to the teaching. nowadays in thailand one finds many cd’s coming out which are artistic expressions of the buddhist teaching. a popular cd in thailand features a rendition of the jinapanjara, a very popular protection chant in pali. in the cd the text of the chant is set as lyric of a piece of modern music made through the modern studio production. the music sounds similar to the soft pop music one usually hears in department stores in bangkok. now, if all musicians who presumably cause their listeners to laugh (or by extension, cause them to have the pleasure of listening) will go straight to hell or preta realms after their demise, then these musicians who produced the jinapanjara cd will also suffer the same fate. however, it is doubtful that they will ever suffer that fate; on the contrary, buddhists believe that they will go to heaven and will collect their merit so that they will become liberated themselves in the future. this is a direct result of their very good karma in producing music that is inducive to people’s turning to the dharma. but if this is indeed so, then laughing is not such a bad thing in buddhism after all. in fact the use of art in buddhism is not a recent phenomenon at all. almost from the time of the buddha himself artists have expressed their reverence to the buddha through their arts. sculptors made likeness images of the buddha only a few centuries after the master’s death, and there were countless paintings depicting aspects of his lives and those of the disciples. poets have written praises of the master’s teachings and activities. in thailand, monks chant the story of vessantara, the present soraj hongladarom 249 buddha’s last human rebirth before becoming the buddha, story which was very beautifully written and contained all kinds of artistic expressions one can find. sometimes the monks also gave teachings in the form of dialogs between two monks, and the content could become rather rowdy and hilarious, much to the delight, and laughter, of the lay audience. phra phayom kalyano, a well known abbot in nonthaburi, thailand, is well known for his comic sermons, which are highly sought after items published in cd’s and cassette tapes known to every thai buddhist. the sermons amply show witticisms and jokes that most people love. if the buddha’s words to talaputta are taken too seriously, then, phra phayom himself risks having his next rebirth in the lower realms. here is an example of phra phayom’s talk: an ungrateful person one morning i went on an alms round to grandma chuen’s house and saw her own dog attacking her. so i asked, “whose dog is this?” grandma chuen said, “he’s my dog”. “then why is he biting you?” “this is the mating season and this dog is being attached to a female dog. perhaps he thinks i am taking away the bitch from him”, grandma said. now let us look at how powerful lust it. it is so powerful that even a dog become disloyal to its owner. we human beings are no different. let’s think about it. when they become teenagers and begin to have girlfriends [or boyfriends]. they take their [boyfriends or] girlfriends home. the mother looks at the friend and thinks that the girlfriend [or boyfriend] might not be a good one and will cause troubles to her child. so she tells her child not to take this one as [boyfriend or] girlfriend. “i don’t like [him or] her”, says the mother. only that, and the children just drive the mother away! “you don’t interfere with my life!” “it is my business!” do you see? when they are in heat they are biting their owners!15 phra phayom is a very popular monk who has the rare ability to mix the buddha’s serious message with humor. one might say that the 250 prajna vihara-~ humor has an auxiliary role in aiding the transmission of the message to an average thai teenager, who is always open to a good joke but not often a dharma teaching. but perhaps the humor and the laughter it evokes is not a mere auxiliary; it seems to be an integral part of the message itself. this does not mean that the message itself, that of the dangers of sexual desire, incorporates humor and laughter into itself, but the buddhist message is how to find ways to bring people to understand it such that they eventually find a way toward ridding themselves of the defilements. here, then, the humor functions more than a mere mask over the message. as humor is designed to get a message across to certain types of audience which would not be receptive otherwise, humor then functions as a “skillful means” (upaya), which is indispensable from the message itself. in short, the upaya itself is the message. as laughter and humor are the upayas that draw the teenage thais’ attention to buddhist teachings, the teachings themselves are also upayas purporting to plant a seed in the minds of phra phayom’s listeners so that one day they would eventually become enlightened. the buddha’s warnings against humor and laughter find analogies with morreall’s taxonomy of objections against laughter in western philosophy. the buddha warned chabbagiya against laughing out loud in the vicity of the lay household because he did not want the lay people to feel disrespectful toward the monks. having established the sangha for only a short time, the buddha felt that he needed the lay householder’s support. here laughing is an act which could bring disrepute to the entire sangha community, which sounds like an instance of the irresponsible objection. the buddha told talaputta that those who sing and dance will go to the lower realms because they cause their audience to laugh, so laughing here means that one loses oneself and opens the mind’s door to the negative influences of the defilements. laughing is in this case a way toward the lower realms and away from liberation. in any case, the attitude toward laughter looks similar. nonetheless, when one comes to the buddha himself in the lankavatara sutra, the attitude toward laughter changes dramatically, as we have seen. phra phayom’s dharma teachings show that it is possible to mix humor with serious teaching, and that humor itself functions as a skillful means. if this is indeed the case, then it is not conceivable that soraj hongladarom 251 . phra phayom himself will be reborn in a lower realm, since he is accomplishing precisely what the buddha himself would like his disciples to do, namely to practice the teaching and to spread it across. however, it seems that phra phayom is performing an act designed to provoke laughter, which according to the talaputta sutta is objectionable. here the solution can be found in the motivation behind the act. when the buddha tells talaputta that singers and dangers will be reborn in a lower realm, the context is that these singers and dancers arouse the feelings of defilements (greed, anger, delusion) in the audience. when the sutta itself is looked at as a skillful means, then one sees that it is only because one’s action leads others to cherish the defilements that it will lead him or her to a lower realm. if it is the intention of those singers and dancers to lead them toward the defilements, then they will certainly face the consequences. and even if they perform their act out of professional duty to cause others to laugh, but with no intention to use the laughter as a ladder toward eventual liberation, then they would quite possible face the same consequences. however, phra phayom’s motivation in his joking teachings is to pave the way toward the goal for his audience; since this lies outside the context of talaputta sutta, then he is not guilty of leading people astray and will not go to a lower realm as a result. if this is indeed the case, then laughter and humor themselves are not to blame. if one laughs and as a result of that one gains enlightenment, then by all means laugh. this is supported by the fact that the buddha himself also laughs. now let us go back to the text from the lankavatara sutra: then the blessed one beholding again this great assembly with his wisdom-eye, which is not the human eye, laughed loudly and most vigorously like the lion-king. emitting rays of light from the tuft of hair between the eyebrows, from the ribs, from the loins, from the srivatsa [svastika] on the breast, and from every pore of the skin, __emitting rays of light which shone flaming like the fire taking place at the end of a kalpa, like a luminous rainbow, like the rising sun, blazing brilliantly, gloriously-which were observed from the sky by sakra, brahma, and the guardians 252 prajna vihara-~ ' ' . of the world, the one who sat on the peak [of lanka] vying with mount sumeru laughed the loudest laugh. the buddha is looking at the assembly of his followers through his wisdom eyes, meaning that what he sees is beyond the normal visual perception, but only through profound understanding of reality. he laughs loudly like the lion-king. lion is the king of the jungle; he has no fear whatsoever and can do anything he pleases, being completely untainted by guilt or limitations. laughing the loudest laugh, the buddha emits light rays from all the pores of his body, causing the cosmos to shine as bright as the all consuming fire that engulfs and burns everything at the end of a cosmic eon. seeing the world through his wisdom-eye, the buddha laughs and emits this blazing rays that outshine everything in the universe. the laugh and the rays go together. the laugh sends out sounds throughout all corners of the universe, and the rays do likewise for light. usually when the buddha sends out rays, it is for the sake of helping sentient beings to realize the truth, as the rays of light dispels the darkness of ignorance. seeing that the ravana is desirous to learn the dharma, the buddha is very pleased and laughs out loud. it is the pleasure of those who are always intent on helping sentient beings get across the ocean of samsara where they have been pointlessly born and died many, many times. laughter, then, is an expression of the pleasure obtained from seeing someone realizing the dharma. the laughter is that of infinite wisdom, which also expresses itself as the rays of light. likewise, those who listen to phra phayom’s talks, laugh, and enter the stream toward liberation are laughing not at a particular being, but their laughter is a pure one of one who is about to get on the shore of liberation. furthermore, it is inconceivable that phra phayom himself would have to go to the lower realms, as seems to be implied in the talaputta sutta. causing others to laugh in this sense is a far cry from the followers of the god pahasa who, causing the audience to laugh and to have a good time, do have to go to the lower realms because they have caused others to neglect the way toward liberation and to increase their defilements as a result. on the contrary, phra phayom is not using humor as an end in itself. he is not a comedian, but he is a monk who is very skillful at telling soraj hongladarom 253 . . jokes in order to get the audience’s attention so that they being to understand the dharma. it is indeed true that some of the audience might not be able to catch the real message, but that is to be expected. listening to phra phayom’s teaching is still better than being engaged in mere play and entertainment simply because the teaching is there, which in his talk it is quite difficult to separate from the upaya of humor and the resultant laughter. motivation is everything in the buddhist thought. iv of course there is a world of difference between the laugh of the buddha, and that of an ordinary sentient being after hearing phra phayom's dharma antic. what they share in common, however, is that attitude toward laughing and humor, which is opposite to that found in plato, aristotle, or hobbes. the buddha’s injunction against laughing in public places and his admonition to talaputta not to ask him the question that eventually saddens himself arises out of his compassionate mind, seeing that for those who are just beginning the practice, some restraint against laughter is sometimes necessary. everything is an upaya. the buddha is not saying that things are thus and so, period. everything he says is aimed at helping his listener realize the path. when he teaches that things are always changing, it is with the intention to bring the audience to renounce the world, which is a necessary first stop toward liberation. when he teaches that things are dependent on one another, it is also with the same intention. the reason why the buddha never states anything categorically is that if he were to do so, that would run counter to his own teaching of impermanence and emptiness. things are empty of their inherent nature. consequently, to say of things as if they had fixed characteristics would run counter to this teaching. if things are empty of their inherent nature, it would not be possible for words and sentences to fix them. after all, words and sentences do not have their inherent nature either. those who object to laughter typically think that laughter is subversive. when one has constructed some point of view meant to be taken seriously and accepted as a doctrine, a good laugh at such a construction destroys its serious intent and its underlying motivation that the point of 254 prajna vihara-~ view should be accepted as a general principle. there is little wonder, then, that in umberto eco’s famous novel, the name of the rose,16 aristotle’s lost treatise on comedy would eventually have to be destroyed. for those who want things to be fixed so that it functions as a fulcrum point for fixed essence and stable meanings would not be able to tolerate laughing and humorous jokes since these will peel away the serious fa?ade of the purportedly stable and fixed essences upon which they would like to build up a cathedral of secure knowledge. but this is precisely those things that the buddha is laughing at. the laugh is not of a kind mentioned by plato, where laughter is always directed at somebody at the latter’s expense. what the buddha is laughing at is the folly of believing and taking seriously those that cannot be taken seriously at all, namely that language could represent reality in a fixed manner. for the laughing buddha, every word is a skillful means. nothing is meant to convey the meaning that things are forever thus and so. things are only ‘thus and so’ if such being ‘thus and so’ succeeds in leading the listener to realize the path. one laughs at the humorous incongruity of language and reality, as an integral part, an expression, of emptiness itself.17 endnotes 1john morreall, “the rejection of humor in western thought”, philosophy east and west 39.3(1989): 243-265. 2quoted in john morreall, “the rejection of humor in western thought”, p.255. the original is from the nicomachean ethics 10.6. 3the vinaya pitaka, vol. 2, mahavibhanga part ii (bangkok: department of religious affairs, b. e. 2530 [1987 c.e.]), pp.509-510 [in thai]. 4the suttanta pitaka, vol. 18, samyutta nikaya, salayatana vagga (bangkok: department of religious affairs, b. e. 2530 [1987 c.e.]), pp.336-338 [in thai]. 5the suttanta pitaka, vol. 18, samyutta nikaya, salayatana vagga, pp.336338. 6bhattaggavatara, in the vinaya pitaka, vol. 7, culla vagga part ii (bangkok: department of religious affairs, b. e. 2530 [1987 c.e.]), pp.185-187 [in thai]. 7in fact the familiar statues of the ‘laughing buddha’ that adorns many chinese temples are those of the bodhisattva maitreya, who is due to become the next buddha in the future. 8it will be apparent in the course of this paper that the buddha in the theravada and mahayana texts are much different. the buddha appears in the soraj hongladarom 255 -theravada tradition as a historical person who organized a group of followers and established the vinaya rules. however, in many mahayana texts he appears as someone who is utterly beyond the human form. this is a skillful means showing that the buddha in the mahayana tradition is not to be understood literally as someone who actually possess these characteristics in concrete reality, but more as an embodiment of certain transcendent qualities. see, e.g., malcolm david eckel, to see the buddha: a philosopher’s quest for the meaning of emptiness (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1992). 9lankavatara sutra, available at http://lirs.ru/do/lanka_eng/lanka-chapter1.htm#chap1, accessed 29 january 2008. somparn promta remarked that the thai translation of ‘laugh’ in the sutra did not use the word in thai for ‘laugh’ but ‘perform the lion’s roar’; hence there is a point whether the buddha’s ‘lion’s roar’ is in fact laughter or not. 10here, as in note 7, somparn promta noted that the buddha’s ‘laugh’ which appears in the text of the lankavatara sutra, is usually translated as ‘a lion’s roar’ in thai. the buddha’s lion’s roar could well indeed be a laugh; this is a point that merits further study. 11one might want to compare the buddha’s laugh here and its implications and presuppositions with morreall’s treatment of zen buddhism as an example of a positive attitude toward humor and laughter in his article (“the rejection of humor in western thought”, p.255 and following). what is similar is that laughter could be used as a means toward liberation. another article dealing with humor in zen is conrad hyers, “humor in zen: comic midwifery”, philosophy east and west 39.3(1989): 267-277. 12lankavatara sutra, available at http://lirs.ru/do/lanka_eng/lanka-chapter1.htm#chap1, accessed 29 january 2008. 13santideva, a guide to the bodhisattva way of life, vesna a. wallace and b. alan wallace transl. (ithaca, ny: snow lion publications, 1997), pp. 35-36. the cited text is from chapter iii, verses 22 and 23. 14rje tsong khapa, ocean of reasoning: a great commentary of nagarjuna’s mulamadhayamakakarika, geshe ngawang samten and jay l. garfield transl. (oxford university press, 2006), p.503. the verse is from chapter xxiv, verse 18 of the root text.) 15available at http://www.saranair.com/article.php?sid=1525, accessed february 4, 2008. 16umberto eco, the name of the rose, william weaver transl. (london: vintage, 1998). 17research for this paper has been partially supported by a grant from the national research university project, project no. as569a and hs1025a, as well as the thailand research fund, grant no. brg5380009. 256 prajna vihara-~ -' . . . -. 05_(138-147) an argument.pmd an argument against the identity theory william demsar silipakorn university, thailand abstract in this paper i outline two kinds of functionalism, role and realizer functionalism, as general accounts of scientific composition. i then argue that realizer functionalism is unable to deliver an appropriate notion of scientific compositional explanation. i argue this point by explaining and diagnosing the distinctive problem with the dormative fallacy and by arguing that realizer functionalism shares this problem. to be more precise, i argue that the kinds of compositional explanations that obtain if realizer functionalism is correct share the same vice as the dormative fallacy. since we ought to reject explanations that commit the dormative fallacy, we ought also to reject realizer functionalist compositional explanations, and by corollary, realizer functionalism itself. i conclude that these considerations give us a powerful reason to favor role functionalism over realizer functionalism. i. introduction in this paper i will be considering an argument against realizer functionalism and in favor of role functionalism as a general theory of reduction in the sciences. i will first describe the two views. i will then argue that realizer functionalism cannot offer the kind of mechanistic explanation that we look for in the sciences. i will illustrate this by showing an important similarity it bears to a fallacy in reasoning. ii. the two views there are two presuppositions that will be useful for us in understanding these two theories. the first is the causal theory of properties and the second is the distinction between higher and lower order proper138 prajna vihara, volume 15, number 2, july-december, 2014, 138-147 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ ties. the causal theory of properties is the view that properties are identical with or individuated by their causal powers.1 the property of being acidic causes corrosion in metal. we distinguish it from other properties by the distinct features of its effects. we call these affects of a property its causal role. second, there are higher and lower order properties.2 some property a is of a higher order than some property b iff the substance exemplifying a is made up by that substance which exemplifies b. the property of acidity, for example, is a higher order property than the property of having a certain charge. the former is a property of chemicals, while the latter is a property of particles. but since chemicals are composed of particles, the property of the chemical is the higher order property. there is some sense in which the property of acidity is made up out of those lower order physical properties. what we want to know is what that sense is. let us consider first role functionalism. a property is that which contributes causal powers to individuals. let’s say that the specific causal patterns the property brings about when it is instantiated is its m-role. the m-role of a property allows certain individuals to interact in certain specific causal processes. an m-role is a particular function, a causal relation between properties.3 lower order properties, the properties of physics, also stand in causal relations. both higher and lower order properties have m-roles. let’s call the relation of a higher order property to a lower order property in a composed entity m-realization. it is a making up relation. the causal roles of the lower order properties m-realize the causal roles of the higher order properties. the causal roles of the physical particles of acids and metals m-realize the causal roles of acidity and corrosion. the m-role of a higher order property is a function; a pattern of inputs and outputs. it is a specific pattern of causal relations. the property of acidity has as part of its m-role the specific pattern of causing corrosion when coming into contact with metal. as we will see, there is controversy between the realizer and role functionalist about whether or not the patterns of these m-roles can be generalized. that is, over whether any characterization of properties must take into account the topic specific aspects of these patterns. if one takes to heart the notion of an mrole as a kind of pattern, it will become apparent that there can be no necessity to the way in which it is realized. consider the pattern of the symbols of english that i now use to write. that pattern could be realized on paper, or in stone, or on a computer screen as it is now. it is generally william demsar 139 held that two things cannot be identical unless they are coextensive. if a is identical with b, then a is coextensive with b. it is not possible to have b without a, and vice versa. it is evident then, that the role functionalist cannot regard higher order properties as being identical with the lower order properties. the higher order properties of the sciences are composed by lower order properties, but they are not identical with them. the higher order properties and the lower order properties in a composed entity could theoretically come apart. the higher order property of being money is realized by lower order properties of paper in some instances, but it can also be realized by the metal in coins and in innumerous other ways. this is called multiple realization. acidity has real ontological status, and so do those properties that realize it. on this view there are many layers of properties in the special sciences, one layer composed by some other layer whose properties are the subject of some yet more fundamental science, yet none of the layers is identical with the others. each of the layers can be explained by the lower layers. the explanation of higher order properties in terms of lower order properties is done in terms of the making up relation, the relation of m-realization that one layer bears to another. to explain a higher order property in terms of a lower order property is to give an account of those lower order properties and of how they compose the higher order property. it is to tell what properties compose that higher order property and to map out their relations.4 the job of the scientist is to give us the details of this composition and this mapping. although the properties of the special sciences can be explained in terms of their kindred sciences, none can be absolutely reduced to the other. the special sciences cannot be dispensed with. now that we have seen the role functionalist’s view of the making up relation in the sciences, we can contrast it with realizer functionalism as developed and defended by david lewis. according to lewis (1972), in order to explain higher order properties we must first topic neutrally characterize the properties of our higher order sciences.5 this involves taking the causal role of some higher order property and characterizing it by means of a ramsey sentence.6 a ramsey sentence describes the causal role of a property; its l-role. to create a ramsey sentence one takes all of the theoretical entities of a scientific theory and turns them into “variables bound by existential quantifiers”. (lewis, 1972, pg.251) take some particular explanation: the ice caused joe to fall. to ramsify the sentence we would take each of our theoretical entities, ‘joe’ and ‘ice’ and turn 140 prajna vihara __ __ ~ them into variables bound by an existential quantifier. our explanation would then begin with, “there is an x, there is a y…” and we would then link each of the variables with a ‘caused by’ connective or predicate.7 in this way we would produce an explanatory sentence devoid of any specific reference to the world. lewis thinks that the resulting sentence, in this case, something like, ‘there is an x, there is a y and x caused y to fall', has just as much explanatory power as did our original sentence.8 what you are left with is a highly abstracted, topic neutral description of the causal role of the higher order properties of that theory. after ramsification, there is nothing but the most general abstract form of the causal relation left in the sentence. the functional role of the higher order property is the causal relationship specified by a particular ramsey sentence. to play that functional role is to be the state of affairs that satisfies that ramsey sentence. a lower order property l-realizes a higher order property just in case that lower order property satisfies the ramsey sentence describing the causal relations of the higher order property. the relation of lower order properties to higher order properties is a semantic relation. we are now in a position to see the implications of this theory. if the causal role of the higher order properties just is this topic neutral characterization and if to play a causal role is to be a state of affairs that satisfies that characterization, then it seems that one will have good grounds for alleging the identity of these higher order properties with lower order ones.9 for if one argues, as does the role functionalist, that higher and lower order properties are not identical, then, given the causal theory of properties, there needs be some way of distinguishing the causal roles of the higher order properties from those of the lower order properties. but if one describes causal roles as does lewis there will be no satisfactory way to do this.10 if one were able to specify such a difference detectable in the ramsey sentence, then the higher order property and the lower order property would no longer have anything in common.11 there would be no similarity that explains why the one composes the other.12 why not then, says lewis, reduce all those so-called higher order properties to the most fundamental properties of our most fundamental science, namely those of the fundamental particles of physics? it would appear that accepting topic neutral characterization and the causal theory of properties gives one good reason to think that higher order properties are identical with physical properties. combining these two ideas, his definition of a function13 and the william demsar 141 identity statement in question gives lewis a powerful argument for absolute and complete reductionism in the sciences. lewis (1972, pg.249) argues as follows: (1) a higher order property p, is identical with the property that plays a particular causal role r that is characterized by some topic neutral ramsey sentence. (definition) (2) the property that plays role r is identical with some lower order physical property q. (3) therefore, the higher order property p is identical with some physical property q.14 on this view, what initially appeared as many layers of properties is really only one. the predicates of the higher order sciences refer to fundamental physical properties. in principle, if we were adept enough at our quantum physics, we could completely do away with all of the special sciences. we keep them around only for the sake of practicality. as we have seen, a main point of contention between these two views is their view of the making up relation. science seeks mechanistic explanations in terms of the making up relation. lewis argues that this relation is one of identity. to identify some property p that makes up some other property q is merely to discover that p is identical with q.15 for the role functionalist, on the other hand, to discover that p makes up q is to discover two ontologically distinct properties and some special relation between them. the main point of dispute is over the following question: is the making up relation in the special sciences one of identity? in the next section i will attempt to answer the question in the negative. iii. the dormative fallacy and identity theory i will first argue that a proper notion of composition in the sciences must allow us to use it as a mechanistic explanation. i will then argue that the identity view of composition does not render a mechanistic explanation. i will argue this point by first explaining the dormative virtue fallacy. second, i will diagnose what i take to be the flaw in this explanation and show that the identity theory shares this flaw. i will conclude by discussing one possible objection to this argument and offering a response. 142 prajna vihara __ __ ~ any adequate notion of scientific ‘making up’ must accord with common scientific practice. the composition relation in the sciences is commonly taken to do a certain kind of explanatory work. it is taken to give us a mechanistic explanation. the fact that diamond atoms are composed of carbon atoms is supposed to mechanistically explain the behavior of diamonds. how those carbon atoms are bonded is supposed to explain mechanistically why the diamond has the properties it has. in his 1673 play “le malade imaginaire”, moliere mocks traditional aristotelian explanations. in the famous passage he asks a doctor why opium puts people to sleep. the doctor responds, “because there is a dormative virtue in it whose nature is to cause the senses to become drowsy”. this example has become a paradigm case of a bad explanation. in what follows i will refer to it as the dormative fallacy. but why is this a bad explanation? the doctor was asked about a particular property of opium. he was asked why opium has this property and not another. the doctor’s answer was to explain the property of causing people to be sleepy in terms of the property of ‘having a dormative virtue’? we explain properties in terms of other properties all the time. as i mentioned above, we take it that the properties of carbon atoms give an appropriate explanation for the hardness of the diamond. why is it that, in this case, we are unwilling to accept the doctor’s explanation? the answer is very simple. the ‘dormative virtue’ is simply another name for the property in question. the dormative virtue is identical with the property of putting people to sleep. the reason why this explanation bothers us is that the names involved are close enough to one another that they reveal this identity. the name ‘dormative virtue’ is close enough to ‘the property of making someone sleepy’ that we cannot help but notice that they have the same referent. the names reveal the structure of the explanation to us; they reveal that the structure of that explanation is one of identity. it seems that mechanistic explanation derives its power from being able to explain one thing in virtue of a different but related thing. we were looking for a mechanistic explanation here and instead we got an explanation of identity. proper mechanistic explanations must proceed by explaining one property in terms of a different but related property. the identity theory tells us that the making up relation is one of identity. it tells us that higher order properties are identical with lower order properties. it tells us that the property of hardness is identical with the property of carbon atoms being bonded in a certain way. it is an explanation of the same form as the dormative fallacy. william demsar 143 clearly the identity theory bears a relevant analogy to the dormative fallacy. if we are to reject one, we should reject the other. since we should reject the dormative fallacy, we should also reject the identity theory of composition. the lewisian might object to this argument by pointing out that there are instances, even within the sciences themselves, where we take identity to be an informative explanation. consider the case of clark kent and superman. one might ask what explains the queer fact that they never appear together in the same place. surely a good answer to that question is that clark kent is identical with superman. we would not feel the need for any further explanation in this case. or consider the case of hesperus and phosphorus. it was a significant scientific discovery that the two are in fact the same planet, venus. the realizer functionalist might ask why we are prepared to accept identity in these cases as an explanation, but not in others. my response is that i have not here claimed that identity statements can never be informative at all or that they can never count as explanations or play some part in a scientific theory. rather, what i have argued is that they cannot render explanations of a certain sort. they cannot offer us appropriate mechanistic explanations. this is what the scientists take themselves to be doing when they discover compositional relations. clearly, the examples given above are not attempts at compositional explanations. identity relations are, many times, adequate answers to the question of how two different phenomena are related. our question about superman, for example, is just such a question. that clark kent is identical with superman is a good answer to the question of how the observation i call clark kent is related to the observation i call superman. it is a good answer to why i never seem to make both of those observations at the same time. the reason is that to observe clark kent is to observe superman. mechanistic explanations, by contrast, seek an answer to the question of why a particular property behaves the way it does rather than some other way, and it is here that identity cannot help us. what we need is an explanation in terms of the properties and dispositions of something different. we consider the dormitave fallacy a fallacy because we are looking for a mechanistic explanation. we do not consider it a good answer because it answers the wrong question. it tells us that clark kent can fly when we really wanted to know how. the identity theory can give us an informative answer to the ques144 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tion of how higher order properties are related to lower order properties. only it cannot give us an appropriate mechanistic explanation, which is what the scientists take themselves to be doing. at the very least, the identity theory is committed to a very strong error theory. it commits us to the view that scientists who take themselves to be offering mechanistic explanations are really offering explanations of a very different sort. to accept the identity theory then is to embrace a very different picture of the scientific enterprise. it is to accept a view of scientific explanation that is both counterintuitive and does not accord with actual scientific practice. these considerations against the identity view of the compositional relation give us a strong reason to prefer role functionalism to realizer functionalism as a general account of making up in the sciences. endnotes 1see shoemaker (1984), where he advances the view that the causal power of a property is what individuates the property, or “what determines its identity”. (pg.212) he says the account is “intended to capture what is correct in the vew that properties just are powers, or that all properties are dispositional, while acknowledging the truth of a standard objection to that view, namely that a thing’s powers or dispositions are distinct from, because ‘grounded in’, it’s intrinsic properties”. (pg.213) 2to completely pacify the realizer functionalist, i should more correctly phrase the distinction linguistically, in terms of the reference and reduction of certain scientific predicates to others. but i think this will involve needless complication. for now, just note that the use of the terms higher and lower order properties in the description of the two theories does not mean that either theory has any ontological commitments in regard to these properties. it will become clear later on what those ontological commitments are, i.e., that the realizer functionalist, strictly speaking, does not really believe in higher order properties. 3or between individuals via their properties. 4the views set out by lewis in his seminal 1972 article are paridigmatic of realizer functionalism. in that paper he sets up his theory in opposition to a theory of reduction by which identifications are made “by positing bridge laws identifying some of the entities discussed in one theory with entities discussed in another theory…identification are made, not found”. but i’m here taking role functionalism as asserting not that bridge principles are created that allow us, for the sake of parsimony, to speak in a certain useful way, but rather that the bridge principles themselves are discovered as a part of a compositional relation between two types of entities. (pg.249). 5that is, the sciences whose subject matter is involves the higher order properties. 6topic neutral characterization is important to the mind body identity theory william demsar 145 in order to respond to the disparate properties argument (levin, 2004). the identity theorist has to locate the differences between mental and physical predicates at the linguistic level; mental and physical predicates don't mean the same thing. the objection here, roughly, and in breif. is that mental and physical predicates couldn’t come to have different meanings unless they picked out some real difference in the world. see also shaffer’s “mental events and the brain” (pg.67) and, in response, james cornman’s “the identity of mind and body” (pg.73), both in materialism and the mind-body problem, david m. rosemthal, ed. (indiana: hackett publishing company, 2000). 7for more on the history and background of ramsey sentences, which were apparently independantly discovered by carnap, see stathis psillos (2006). 8for a more general and more thorough account of this process see lewis (1970). 9see lewis (1966). 10intuitively, it looks as though the lower order properties would have the same general, topic neutral characterizations. the only discernable difference between them will be in their particular details, which will have been scrubbed away by the ramsification process. this is to turn the argument from disparate properties on its head. see footnote 7. 11what the role functionalist needs, i think, is for higher order properties to have some general pattern in common with their lower order properties, a pattern in virtue of which we can explain the composition relation between them and some specific pattern that differs between them by which we can distinguish them as distinct ontological entities. what ramsification really does is preclude the possibility of making this distinction between general and specific causal roles. 12you would no sooner detail a difference in the causal roles of the higher and lower order properties in terms of a ramsey sentence than lewis would insist that you have an entirely different ‘higher order’ property. 13or rather his idea of functional roles and what it is to play one. 14lewis (1966) originally used a more general form of the argument to argue against mind body dualism. 15and thus that p does not really exist. its status is merely semantic, and not ontological as we originally thought. references cornman, james (2000). the identity of mind and body. in david m. rosenthal (ed.), materialism and the mind-body problem (pp.7379). indiana: hackett publishing company. levin, janet (2004). stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ lewis, david (1966). an argument for the identity theory. the journal of philosophy. 63, 17-25. 146 prajna vihara __ __ ~ lewis, david (1970). how to define theoretical terms. the journal of philosophy. 67, 427-446. lewis, david (1972). psychophysical and theoretical identifications. australasian journal of philosophy 50: 249-258. psillos, stathis (2006). ramsey’s ramsey sentences. vienna circle institute yearbook (2004), 12, 67-90. shaffer, jerome (2000). mental events and the brain. in david m. rosenthal (ed.), materialism and the mind-body problem (pp.6772). indiana: hackett publishing company. shoemaker, sydney (1984). identity, cause, and mind. cambridge: cambridge university press. william demsar 147 01_(1-54) liberation.pmd liberation theology: the latin american christian response to transnational capitalism tavivat puntarigvivat mahidol university, thailand abstract latin america is a clear case of how the power structure shapes the destiny of a continent. with the arrival of europeans in the new world in the fifteenth century, the period of modern history began for latin america with a continent plentiful in natural and human resources, and the seemingly less generously endowed northern anglo america. but five centuries later, while anglo america has become the leader of the wealthy first world, latin america has fallen into the desperate poverty of the third world. the cause of this sharp contrast is to be found in the unequal relationships and power structures that have existed from the very beginning of the modern history of the americas. liberation theology emerged in latin america in the 1970s as a response to the structural oppression of the third world by the first world. liberation theology has brought hope to the poor and the oppressed amid the revolutionary atmosphere of the latin american continent. latin america is the only third world continent where the majority of people are christian. because of this, liberation theology is regarded as a third world christian response to the social injustice under transnational capitalism. latin american historical experience and the history of liberation theology in the light of the political-economic realities of latin america will be explored in this work. these include socio-political as well as doctrinal aspects such as the hermeneutics of the poor, the dependency theory, and the belief in salvation within history. i. the latin american experience the divergence of the two basic historical trends in the new world is paradoxical: anglo america and latin america. latin america at the prajna vihara, volume 15, number 2, july-deceber, 2014, 1-54 1 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ beginning enjoyed all the advantages of natural endowment. it was latin america that supplied huge quantities of gold and silver bullion to europe, grew the tropical products needed by the northern european market, and possessed a large native labor force for the mines and farmlands. yet the seemingly less generously endowed and inauspicious anglo america developed steadily from the colonial period onward, while latin america emerged from that period dependent and underdeveloped, and has remained so until today. in this section, i will explore briefly the history and experience of latin american peoples, from the early native americans to the present day latin americans, and the theories behind the contrast in power between latin america and anglo america, and the subsequent underdevelopment of latin america. a. the early native american experience when christopher columbus first landed in the bahamas, he reported that the gentle arawaks showed “as much lovingness as though they would give their hearts...they remained so much our friends that it was a marvel”. “they are well-built people with handsome bodies and very fine faces”. but this same columbus soon was writing back to spain: “from here, in the name of the blessed trinity, we can send all the slaves that can be sold... should your majesties command it, all the inhabitants could be taken away to castile, or made slaves on the island...for these people are totally unskilled in arms”. “they ought to make good and skilled servants, for they repeat very quickly whatever we say to them”. and “with fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever we want”.1 in 1495 columbus shipped five hundred native americans to spain. only three hundred survived the voyage to spain, and most of them died within a few years because of european diseases for which they had no immunity. on the large island of hispaniola (presentday haiti and the dominican republic) columbus ordered each native american of fourteen years or older to bring one of his hawk bells filled with gold dust to his forts once every three months. when a native american brought his or her tribute to the forts, he or she was given a copper token stamped with the month, to be hung around the neck. with that they were safe for another three months while collecting more gold. whoever was caught without a token was killed by having his or her hands cut off. the gold quotas in hispaniola proved impossible of fulfillment. the amounts recovered were quite inadequate, and those who tried 2 prajna vihara __ __ ~ to escape to the mountains were hunted down with dogs and killed. the demoralized arawaks often committed mass suicide, killing themselves with casava poison. within two years about half of the island’s population, estimated originally at 125,000 to 500,000, had died. by 1515 only 10,000 were still alive, and twenty-five years later the entire race had become extinct.2 thousands of years of isolation left the native americans technologically and biologically vulnerable. by 1500 they had reached the technological level that western europeans had in 1500 b.c. and middle easterners in 3500 b.c. although the plants domesticated by the native americans are so numerous and fruitful that today they provide almost half of the world’s total food supply, they themselves never developed their cultivation techniques beyond the bare minimum of day to day necessity. isolation and native beliefs also made them psychologically vulnerable. the aztec ruler, montezuma, mistakenly greeted hernando cortes as a god, paid homage to him and offered his throne and possessions. “our lord...you have to come to your city, mexico... i was in agony...with my eyes fixed on the region of the mystery. and now you have come out of the clouds and mists to sit on your throne again”.3 in reply to such a magnanimous assessment, on march 1519 cortes invaded the great aztec empire in mexico. landing on the mainland coast with an insignificant force of 600 men, 16 horses, 13 muskets, and a few cannon, he was able to conquer a wealthy empire with a population of tens of millions. in 1531 francisco pizarro conquered the highly organized inca empire of peru with a band of only 180 men, 27 horses, and 2 cannon. other native american societies outside the aztec and inca empires lacked the population and organization to offer serious large-scale resistance. hence the rapid white expansion in the new world with periodic armed clashes and scattered colonization wherever the land or mineral resources were sufficiently attractive. by the end of the sixteenth century the spaniards became familiar with the entire coastline of south america from the west indies south to tierra del fuego and north to the gulf of california. likewise in north america, francisco de coronado and hernando de soto led wide-ranging expeditions across what was later to become the southern part of the united states, from florida to the grand canyon. at the same time french explorers like robert la salle, english explorers like david thompson, and american explorers like lewis and clark opened up the northern and western parts of north america, while the portuguese were taking over tavivat puntarigvivat 3 the vast brazilian land in south america.4 the native americans had no immunity against the diseases the european and african newcomers brought with them. this posed as serious a problem as the brutal exploitation by the europeans. the first epidemics which were the most deadly occurred well before the period of massive exploitation. the population catastrophically declined by epidemics as well as by brutal exploitation. this included a fall in the indigenous population in mexico from a possible high of 25 million in 1519 to 6.3 million in 1548, and finally to 1.07 million by 1605. in peru the depopulation was from a possible maximum of 7 million to 1.8 million by 1580.5 after destroying the native ruling establishment, the spaniards were able to force the native americans to provide the heavy labor needed for the mines, where conditions were disastrous for both health and morale, and also labor for the haciendas--two of the three backbones of latin america’s economy. the third, the coastal plantations, had to depend on imported african slaves because of the scarcity of the native american populations in the coastal regions. when the portuguese established the first sugar plantations on the american mainland in brazil, they found the indigenous population quite inadequate as a labor force, so they imported slaves from africa.6 what is clear is that this european conquest led to a deterioration of living condition for the great majority of the native americans in latin america. some may argue that the aztecs and the incas had been subjected to forced labor by their imperial authorities before columbus. but the fact is that they had experienced it within their own social and cultural context, which had continually preserved their own integrity and civilization. after columbus they were exploited to near extinction by the arbitrary european invaders who cared nothing about the continuity of the indigenous races and cultures. the native americans have suffered under these demoralizing circumstances in latin america up to the present time. b. latin america v. anglo america when ask the question of why the initially affluent latin america ended up as a dependent third world continent and the seemingly less generously endowed anglo america became the center of the developed world, there are a number of theories that may explain it. one theory suggests that the answer is to be found in the different levels of economic 4 prajna vihara __ __ ~ development among colonial metropolitan centers. this position contends that during the colonial period, anglo america was subjected to economically highly developed metropolitan centers, namely, britain and france, whereas latin america was controlled by the dependent economic structures of spain and portugal. during that time, both the spanish and portuguese economies were dependent on the northwestern european countries. despite their having an unprecedented lead in exploring the new world, the iberian states could not adequately take advantage of the new opportunities because of their retarded economies. northwestern europe consequently won control over the trade between spain and her colonies, despite the declared monopoly of the spanish imperial trade. the imperial monopoly could not be enforced because spanish industry could not meet the demands of their american colonies. with a similar retarded economy, portugal lacked a home market and an industry to absorb the new wealth accumulated from her colonies in asia and the americas. this theory of the iberian economies’ subordination to northwestern european states explains why latin america was exploited by the northwestern europeans rather than the iberians. but in itself it does not explain why latin america should have become for many generations afterward an exploited third world continent. the theory proposed by l. s. stavrianos is more convincing.7 according to this theory, anglo america’s economic development and latin america’s underdevelopment are to be explained by the nature of the domestic colonial economies, rather than by the transmission of the economic conditions of their european metropolitan centers. the anglo american economic structure, from the very beginning, progressively developed into a diversified and independent economy capable of further development. after their independence, anglo america (the united states and canada) successfully industrialized their countries and emerged as part of the newly developed first world. the latin american economic structure, on the other hand, was from the very beginning confined to a monoculture plantation economy, subordinate to metropolitan centers. as a result, latin america__with its 33 countries and half a billion population__has only been capable of economic growth but without overall economic development. tavivat puntarigvivat 5 __ __ ~ c. roots of latin american underdevelopment the mines, haciendas and plantations of latin america were the envy of northern europe and anglo america. yet, because of the latin american dependent economic structure, the profits from the mines, haciendas and plantations enriched northern europe and anglo america far more than they did indigenous latin america. the mining industry had very few links to the rest of the local economy. the enormous bullion shipments from latin america contributed very little to the overall economic development of the continent. a plantation economy by its very nature as dependent upon overseas demand was incapable of generating overall indigenous economic development. only a few crops were grown, and this was determined by the price in metropolitan markets rather than by the needs of the local economy or population. under the latin american dependent economic structure, the northern europeans and the anglo americans served as the middlemen, transporting varied commodities and services, including manufactured and agricultural goods, fish, shipping, capital and technical expertise. they not only gained most of the profits from the trade but also developed broad-based economies at home with a self-generating development capability. in contrast to the broad-based, self-generating economies of northern europe and north america, the monoculture plantation economy of latin america served as a relatively static resource for the dynamic economic growth of the european states and eventually led the continent to the status of the third world. monoculture meant the inefficient use of natural as well as human resources. it meant unemployment for a good part of each year, as well as inefficient performance during the work seasons. neither slave labor nor tenant labor was highly productive, since there was little reward or incentive to stimulate production. heavy capital investments for the growing and processing of a given crop also made it difficult to shift or to diversify. these various factors explain why plantation societies were capable of economic growth, or increased output of any particular crop, but not of any real economic development. the end result was that the most profitable latin american colonies of the past are now among the most underdeveloped third world countries in the world, while the least profitable colonies, the anglo americas, have become the leader of the first world. 6 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ii. the history of liberation theology under the unequal relationship between the first world and the third world, latin americans have recently sought to understand and explain their own situation of underdevelopment and poverty. social scientists took a leading role in articulating the economic and political structures of latin america and naming their own realities. in so doing, they declared intellectual and cultural independence from those in the advanced industrialized countries. after centuries of resistance, the church or parts of the church followed suit. instead of interpreting christianity in the traditional way, an increasing number of clergymen adopted the methodology of critical social analysis in their interpretation both of christianity and of the latin american situation. these clergymen emerged as liberation theologians. by working with poor people in christian base communities amid the atmosphere of social revolution in the last few decades, they have created a significant theological movement, namely, liberation theology, which contributes to one of the most important developments, as i see it, in the history of christianity. a. early historical development of latin american clergy from its first appearance in the new world, the catholic church was part of the overall colonization of the native american peoples by spain and portugal. some of the early missionaries, however, protested against the cruelty of the conquest. the most well known was bartolome de las casas, who came to hispaniola in 1502. las casas became a dominican priest in 1512. although he himself had indigenous slaves, he struggled on their behalf. in the sixteenth century, some dominican bishops were outstanding in their defense of the native americans. the bishop of nicaragua, antonio de valdivieso, was even killed in 1550 by one of the governor’s henchmen. today’s liberation theologians regard this early generation of bishops as their precursors.8 during the years 1808 to 1824 many countries in latin america declared their independence from spain and portugal. the independence movement was led by the local elites, who were largely motivated by a nationalist ideology. the poor served in the armies that struggled for independence, but they received little benefit. the independence struggle brought a severe crisis to the catholic church. many bishops sided with the spanish, and the popes made pronouncements against the indepentavivat puntarigvivat 7 dence struggle in 1816 and 1823. the vatican only began to recognize the new states in 1831. during the independence struggle, however, some clerics such as hidalgo and morelos supported the independence movements. after independence, the church became tied to conservative parties that battled against liberal parties in almost all countries. as a result of independence and attacks from liberal governments, the catholic church was in a situation of chronic weakness and crisis. one consequence is that most latin american countries have never produced sufficient clergy and have depended on a steady flow from europe. today the catholic clergy in several countries__guatemala, nicaragua, honduras, venezuela, panama, bolivia__is around 80 percent foreign. protestant missionary efforts began late in the nineteenth century. liberal governments often regarded protestants as representing “modernity” and used them for countering catholicism. despite impressive growth rates protestants have remained a minority, and most latin americans continue to see themselves as catholic. during the first half of the twentieth century latin american catholicism emerged with a new strength. the catholic action movements were growing among workers and students. in 1955 bishops from all over the continent met in rio de janeiro for the first plenary meeting of celam (latin american bishops’ conference). they were also beginning to recognize and analyze the deep social problems of the continent. b. the emergence of liberation theology the crisis in latin american societies and the effect there of the vatican council ii and its aftermath had a great impact on the catholic church. beginning in the 1960s, many priests, catechists, and sisters working at the local level began to raise questions about the social and economic order. certain political events, such as the cuban revolution and the repression in brazil in the early 1960s, began to raise questions about the role of the church in latin america. during the cuban revolution christians played no important role in the overthrow of the batista dictatorship. the cuban government and communist party were officially atheist. there was virtually no theological linkage between christianity and the revolution. in the late 1960s, however, cuban bishops began to present a positive theological interpretation of the revolution. inspired by cuba’s example, rural revolutionary 8 prajna vihara __ __ ~ movements arose in venezuela, guatemala, peru, and some other countries in latin america. in response, the kennedy administration launched the alliance for progress, which combined development aid with an upgrading of armies and police to counter the revolutionary movements. under president juscelino kubitschek (1955-1960), the brazilian government sought to solve the problems of economic development. the president himself used christian language such as calling social injustice “a great sin against christ”. the catholic church joined the government in their unsuccessful efforts to solve the economic problems of the rural northeast. at the same time, peasant leagues were becoming militant, and university students were working directly with the poor. paulo freire, an educator in the northeast, developed a new method for teaching literacy through a process of conscientizacao (conscientization, or consciousness-raising). catholic action movements of students, workers and catholic intellectuals became involved. some christians began to utilize marxist social analysis. meanwhile, the army became alarmed by the growing grass-roots militancy and staged a coup in march 1964. many intellectuals, politicians, and popular leaders had to flee the country, and the church was largely silenced for almost a decade. in 1962, with the initiative of pope john xxiii, the second vatican council was held in an open atmosphere. in the council’s plenary sessions and working groups, progressive theological ideas and proposals were legitimized. the council led latin american catholics to take a much more critical look at their own church and their own society, and they began to ask questions that took as their starting point the socio-economic conditions of contemporary latin america. in 1965, camilo torres, a colombian priest, formed an organization called the united front which linked together peasants, workers, slum dwellers, professional people, and others to pressure for basic change in that country. shortly afterward, he joined the revolutionaries of the eln (army of national liberation) and was killed in combat amid the revolutionary atmosphere of the mid-1960s. latin american social scientists were beginning to question the ideology of “developmentism” and proposed a new approach to the root problem of underdevelopment, which was known as the “dependency theory”. it was developed largely by latin americans as a kind of declaration of cultural and intellectual independence. at the same time, a group of eighteen third world bishops issued a statement with a positive view of revolution. this statement of the “bishops of the third world’ became tavivat puntarigvivat 9 a starting point for the movement of priests for the third world in argentina, peru, colombia, mexico, and elsewhere. this radicalized clergy played an important role since they were in more direct contact with the majority of poor people. in august 1968 about 130 catholic bishops met in medellin, colombia, for the task of applying vatican ii to latin america. the medellin meeting was the second plenary meeting of celam (latin american bishops’ conference); the first had been held in rio de janeiro in 1955. they denounced “institutionalized violence” and referred to it as a “situation of sin”. in several places the documents supported the “base community” movement. few such communities existed then, but they would soon become very widespread. one of the advisors at medellin was the peruvian theologian gustavo gutierrez. gutierrez outlined a “theology of liberation” in a talk in chimbote, peru. that may mark the first use of the expression in latin america.9 during 1970 there were many conferences on the topic. in 1971 gutierrez and hugo assmann, a brazilian theologian, published full-length books on liberation theology. the socialist popular unity coalition won national elections in chile in 1970 and president salvador allende sought to carry out significant reforms. many groups of christians joined the socialist parties and movements. when the first sketches of liberation theology appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, several ways to basic structural change in society seemed possible. despite the death of che guevara in bolivia in 1967, revolutionary movements were on the rise in several countries. the 1970 election victory of salvador allende and his coalition held out hope that basic structural change could be obtained through peaceful elections. similar coalitions were organized for elections in venezuela and uruguay. in response to these progressive movements of the 1970s, the united states staged strong counterrevolutionary strategies. military coups led to repressive governments in brazil (1964), bolivia (1971), uruguay (1973), chile (1973), and argentina (1976). moreover, existing military governments shifted rightward in peru (1975) and ecuador (1976). repressive military rule continued in paraguay and most of central america. only in mexico, colombia, venezuela, and costa rica did formal democracy remain, but those governments were ready to utilize harsh repression. after the medellin conference the new progressive theological ideas spread rapidly throughout the continent. each year hundreds of 10 prajna vihara __ __ ~ priests and sisters were taking courses in celam’s own training program. in 1971, however, things changed. the belgian jesuit roger vekemans set up a research center in bogota, colombia, and in collaboration with the ambitious bishop alfonso lopez trujillo began to attack liberation theology and propose an alternative kind of social analysis and theology. at the same time, lopez trujillo cultivated contacts in the vatican and among latin american bishops in an effort to capture the administration of celam. in november 1972 lopez trujillo was elected secretary-general of celam. he then collapsed the several celam training institutes into one, which was located in colombia where he could oversee it. the celam agencies became a platform for attacks on liberation theology. the most important development within the church during this period was the quiet, steady growth of base communities. base communities are a primary embodiment of liberation theology. in brazil alone it is estimated that there are more than seventy thousand such communities with a total membership of two and a half million people. phillip berryman has defined church base communities as small lay-led communities, motivated by christian faith, who see themselves as part of the church and who are committed to working together to improve their communities and to establish a more just society.10 early in this century in europe, the belgian priest joseph cardijn began a new approach to young working people. he began holding small group meetings that emphasized not doctrine but action to solve people’s problems, such as unjust wages, or union struggles. the method was summed up in three words “observe-judge-act”.11 participants would observe by discussing the relevant facts, judge by deciding whether the situation was in accord with the gospel, and agree to act in some way, however, small. this movement thrived in latin america during the 1950s. in 1957 in a community called barra do pirai near rio de janeiro, bishop agnelo rossi began training people to be catechists. the first nationwide pastoral plan (1965-1970) of the brazilian bishops was calling for subdividing parishes into “base communities”. by the end of the 1960s the base-community model had gained wide acceptance. at medellin the bishops stated that the church should become present in small local communities, forming a core community of faith, hope, and charity. celam (latin american bishops’ conference) training institutes in chile, colombia, and ecuador spread the ideas and methodology of “base communities”. two priests, jose marins, a brazilian, and edgard beltran, a tavivat puntarigvivat 11 colombian, traveled full-time giving courses on “base communities” throughout latin america. christian base communities were widespread in the 1970s and 1980s. they have continued their activities in solidarity with the poor until the present time. base communities provided a space in which people could meet in an atmosphere of respect and reaffirm their own faith and hope. they became a space where poor people could “speak their word” and where they heard that god was on their side. such quiet work, however, provoked a violent response, and church representatives came under attack. in brazil repression had been heavy since 1968, especially in the poor northeast. there was an attempt to assassinate archbishop helder camara of recife in 1969, but no serious investigation was conducted by the authorities. other priests in rural areas were arrested, jailed, tortured, or expelled. in chile the brutality of the pinochet coup (1973) provoked a wide-ranging response. in bolivia, uruguay, and paraguay church involvement in human rights activities led to serious conflicts with governments. in argentina bishop enrique angellelli was killed in 1976. in latin america as a whole, between 1964 and 1978, 41 priests were killed and 11 “disappeared”. in addition, some 485 were arrested, 46 were tortured, and 253 were expelled from the countries where they worked.12 the puebla conference in 1979 seemed to provide bishop lopez trujillo and his allies, including some vatican officials, with the occasion for delegitimizing liberation theology. the puebla conference, however, turned out to be a clash between three groups of bishops. the first were those conservatives who stressed hierarchical authority and doctrinal orthodoxy and who attacked liberation theology. the second were those liberation theologians who stressed base communities and the church’s mission for the poor and structural change. the third and the largest group might be called centrist. with the conservatives this group shared a concern for church authority, and with the liberation theologians a conviction to defend human rights, at least in extreme circumstances. the final document that emerged was inconclusive, and each of the three groups could find positive elements in it. in 1979 a broad grass-roots movement led by the sandinista national liberation front (fsln) overthrew the somoza dictatorship in nicaragua. this was the first revolutionary government in latin america in twenty years. in contrast to the cuban revolution, christians played important roles in the anti-dictatorial struggle in nicaragua. similar revolutionary movements were going on in el salvador and guatemala. the 12 prajna vihara __ __ ~ united states, in its attempt to stop revolution, supported the salvadoran regime and created a counterrevolutionary army (contras) to attack nicaragua. during this period, church leaders played an important role in defending human rights, especially archbishop oscar romero of el salvador, who became known as the “voice of the voiceless”. latin american liberation theologians are indeed more conservative in doctrinal expression than many catholic liberals in europe and north america. the challenge comes from a way of doing theology in which the starting point is the situation of the poor. systematic attacks on liberation theology within the church began around 1972. the so-called “ratzinger letter” (“instruction on certain aspects of the theology of liberation”, issued in august 1984) represents the major objections to liberation theology from the vatican. ratzinger’s critique is itself a highly condensed summary of more than a decade of criticism of the latin american church. his position is that “hearts” must be converted before structures are changed, not the opposite way. liberation theologians, however, do not believe that structures must be changed first. rather, they argue that “hearts” are converted as people join together in solidarity to struggle for a more just world. meanwhile, political and economic situations in latin america have changed. by the mid-1980s elected civilian governments replaced most military dictatorship. humiliated by its defeat in war with britain over the malvinas/falkland islands, the argentine army was forced to withdraw from politics. uruguay, peru, bolivia, ecuador, and honduras also returned to civilian rule. el salvador allowed elections, and guatemala returned to civilian rule through an election in late 1985. but these civilian governments were faced with a deepening economic crisis all over latin america created by foreign debt. in august, 1985, the cuban government hosted a meeting at havana of some twelve hundred delegates from all over latin america, among whom were some one hundred catholic priests. during his closing address premier fidel castro read a message to the conference from cardinal paulo evaristo arns of sao paulo which stated that latin american governments’ most basic commitments were to their people, not to their creditors. arns’ message has been well received by most latin american people. during july and august, 1988, many of the world’s leading theologians gathered at maryknoll, new york, to honor gustavo gutierrez, the “father of liberation theology”. the occasion marked the twentieth anniversary of the medellin conference, gutierrez’s sixtieth birthday, and tavivat puntarigvivat 13 publication of the 15th anniversary edition of gutierrez’s classic, a theology of liberation. the original essays from this unprecedented gathering, published as the future of liberation theology, are a unique, multifaceted examination of contemporary liberation theology.13 c. liberation theology as critical reflection and solidarity with the poor in the late 1950s and early 1960s, paulo freire, a brazilian educator, set a model for engagement with the poor through the method called “conscientization” (concientizacion in spanish, or conscientizacao in portuguese). this method dealt with one basic problem in the base communities of teaching peasants to read and write. through the process of conscientization (or consciousness-raising), freire assumed that the peasants were actually intelligent adults, that they only lacked the linguistic tools for reading and writing. hence, they used words and images from the social reality of the peasants’ world such as their crops, tools, customs, land tenure and the problems they were facing. freire argued that conventional pedagogical methods treated people as empty recipients into which knowledge could be deposited. freire and his associates, by contrast, assumed that even poor people are active agents in their own social and political life. using a socratic technique that moved from effects (their own poverty) to cause (the power structure) in society, they brought poor people to a critical consciousness.14 the experiment ended when the military staged a coup in 1964, and freire himself had to leave brazil. however, his ideas and methods spread rapidly as people attended his lectures in chile, where he worked with the agrarian reform agency. he also gave talks in such places as the language and culture training center run by ivan illich in cuernavaca, mexico. freire argues that latin american poor people, like all human beings, are rational and political animals and have the capacity to enjoy or exercise freedom. he believes that through a conscientization process, poor people can decide by themselves what is best for them and how to achieve it. freire himself has worked with socialist and revolutionary governments in tanzania, guinea-bissau, and angola. freire’s pedagogy contributed to the way latin american liberation theologians dealt with their solidarity with the poor. as gustavo gutierrez has pointed out, “theology is reflection, a critical attitude. theology follows; it is the second step”.15 in liberation 14 prajna vihara __ __ ~ theology, critical reflection and solidarity with the poor come first, theology, second. liberation theology is an interpretation of christian faith out of the suffering, struggle, and hope of the poor. poverty is seen as a product of the prevailing social structure. liberation theology is, therefore, a critique of social, political and economic structures and the ideologies sustaining them__including the use of religious symbols. it also includes a critique of the church hierarchy from the angle of the poor.16 the critique of ideology, as gibson winter sees it, involves a hermeneutics of suspicion, an attempt to deconstruct a prevailing ideology in order to trace the interests that sustain it and the societal realities which it conceals.17 as gutierrez has pointed out: it is for all these reasons that the theology of liberation offers us not so much a new theme for reflection as a new way to do theology. theology as critical reflection on historical praxis is a liberation theology... this is a theology which does not stop with reflecting on the world, but rather tries to be part of the process through which the world is transformed.18 or as another peruvian priest put it: as we see it, a perhaps faulty presentation of the christian message may have given the impression that religion is indeed the opiate of the people. and we would be guilty of betraying the cause of peru’s development, if we did not stress the fact that the doctrinal riches of the gospel contain a revolutionary thrust.19 critical reflection always plays the inverse role of an ideology which rationalizes and justifies a given social and ecclesiastical order. for liberation theologians, the whole climate of the gospel is a continual demand for the right of the poor to make themselves heard. iii. hermeneutics of the poor whereas philosophy provided tools for classical theology, social theory provided analytical tools for latin american liberation theology. tavivat puntarigvivat 15 liberation theologians have constructed their interpretations by utilizing the social sciences, particularly marxist social analysis, latin american history, and contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, but they have continually returned to dialogue with the poor concerning their social realities. in the 1979 puebla conference, the latin american bishops (celam) spoke with the language of the “situation of social sinfulness”, “preferential option for the poor”, and “social justice as the kingdom of god”. liberation theology emerged from work by priests, pastors, nuns and lay catechists in the christian base communities and mass organization of the poor in latin america. contrary to the traditional church, which has supported social injustice by its links to the establishment or its silence about the unjust social system, liberation theologians have attempted to assume their responsibility for this structural injustice by working with the poor and the oppressed. reading the bible together has been an essential part of life in the base communities. from a hermeneutical perspective, liberation theology is an attempt to read the bible and key christian doctrines with the eyes of the poor. it is at the same time an attempt to help the poor interpret their own faith in a new way. the poor learn to read the scripture in a way that affirms their dignity and selfworth and their right to struggle together for a more decent life. the disciplined inquiry of a community of those who are committed to the struggle for justice and peace is, according gibson winter, religious social ethics. religious social ethics has the task and privilege of opening the horizon of possibilities in a people’s struggle for justice and peace. these open horizons disclose possibilities of commitment and action. at this threshold, only a people can decide whether to continue in complicity with injustice or to begin resistance.20 as john raines understands it, people in base communities find the meaning of their life and are able to name their own reality. in latin america, the church of the people has discovered that it is crucial to join the people where they are__especially if where they are is deeply enmeshed in despair__and encourage them to name their reality. no one else can do our naming for us. in speaking and in being heard and 16 prajna vihara __ __ ~ responded to, we gain confidence, broaden our perspective, and begin to believe in our right to protest. the listeners support those who have just found voice in their task of liberating themselves from silence, from humiliation, from dependency and feelings of being incapable of self-direction. that is what the biblical command “love thy neighbor” means. real charity is finding out how much the rest of us can learn from the poor and then letting them teach us.21 from this experience came the idea of the hermeneutical privilege of the poor: a true reading of the bible required the participation and perspective of the poor. orthopraxis (right doing) comes before orthodoxy (right knowing). ideas must be reconsidered in light of praxis which is the proving ground of all theory. this approach naturally led to an emphasis on certain themes and interpretations of the bible. as gutierrez has asserted, all the political theologies, the theologies of hope, of revolution, and of liberation, are not worth one act of genuine solidarity with exploited social classes.22 leonardo boff, a brazilian former franciscan theologian, has defined hermeneutics as the science and technique of interpretation by means of which we are enabled to understand the original meaning of any writings (or realities) no longer immediately comprehensible to men and women of today.23 they understand the bible in terms of their experience and reinterpret that experience in terms of biblical symbols. in theological terms, this is called the “hermeneutical circle”__interpretation moves from experience to text to experience.24 the function of theology as critical reflection on praxis has become more clearly defined in recent years. for liberation theologians, it has its roots in the first centuries of the church’s life. they argue that the problem they pose is both traditional and new. between us and the bible, more than two thousand years intervene. people’s conceptual framework has changed, and words have acquired new meanings. some passages are no longer comprehensible to people today. therefore, hermeneutics plays an important role in the interpretation of the messages in the bible. however, there are at least two ways of interpreting the bible: metaphysicalontological hermeneutics and socio-political hermeneutics. the traditional christian church interprets the bible from the metaphysical and ontological point of view. this interpretation has betavivat puntarigvivat 17 come the ideology of the establishment to sustain the existing unjust social system. for example, if jesus’ words about the poor being blessed and captives being liberated were interpreted only “spiritually” to mean inward poverty and the liberation from personal sin, this interpretation would serve an ideological function to maintain an unjust system. liberation theology interprets the bible from a socio-political perspective. it makes use of marxist social analysis in its interpretation of the bible, and this brings a new dimension to the meaning of the bible. the methodology of liberation theology is thus dialectical analysis, as leonardo boff puts it: dialectical analysis examines conflicts and imbalances affecting the impoverished and calls for a reformulation of the social system itself, in order to secure symmetry in the system and justice for all its members... liberation theology holds that this is the analysis that better answers to the objectives of faith and christian practice. and it is here that use is made of the analytical instrument devised by marxist tradition.25 liberation theology owes its methodology and social analysis to marxism in its interpretation of the bible and its understanding of contemporary situations in latin america. but roger lancaster has a somewhat different idea on this point. he claims that marx himself was influenced by pre-marxist socialism. and pre-marxist socialism was influenced by the biblical message. for example, the marxist idea that “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” was derived from the early church in the book of acts (2:44-45, 4:32). so in this sense, marxism owes its worldview in part to the early church. liberation theology is, according to lancaster, closer to pre-marxist socialism than marxism itself. in his prologue, “theses on a philosophy of central american history”, lancaster summarizes the central message of liberation theology: liberation theology knows that the salvation of the poor is the common project of two faiths, marxism and christianity. and the theology of liberation itself emerges at the moment of contact between the old religion and marxism. but the religion of hope is not thus merely some me18 prajna vihara __ __ ~ chanical “new syncretism” of each, blending two old faiths to make a new one, as one might graft two trees together to make one. rather, it only makes explicit what was implicit in the old religion. there is nothing “radical” about it. it sees itself as the most traditional and conservative version of christianity, and takes the communism of the original church as its central message. this is its image of the past: an unbroken chain of oppression, running right up to the present. the bible chronicles that history and future of the poor, on their long march to god and communism. the original message of christ was revolution. if that message was lost, suppressed, or driven underground, it is the sacred charge of the orthodox to revive it.26 lancaster’s claim that liberation theologians took the original message of christ__to do justice to the poor and the oppressed__as their central message, and especially that socialism originally took the form of communalism in the early christian church might be disputed, but it is undeniable that liberation theologians today have utilized the marxist dialectics of class analysis and class struggle. the poor and the oppressed, according to gutierrez, are members of one social class that is being exploited by another social class. an option for the poor means a new awareness of class confrontation. it means taking sides with the dispossessed. it means entering into the world of the exploited social class, with its values and its cultural categories. it means entering into solidarity with its interests and its struggles.27 some liberation theologians have even made a quite obvious use of marxism in their social and economic analysis. for example, in his book the ideological weapons of death, franz hinkelammert, a german economist who has worked for twenty years in latin america, follows closely marx’s analysis of fetishism in capital. human beings at first produced “use-value” for their own subsistence such as a crop to eat. later they began to produce goods for their “exchange-value”. thus fetishism begins: human beings are dominated by the commodities they produce. commodities become “subjects” while human beings become objects. those who produce commodities__workers__are alienated from what they produce, hence their exploitation in their work and wages. matters only become worse, with “money fetishism” and “capital fetishism”.28 tavivat puntarigvivat 19 a. historical consciousness of the defeated liberation theologians see that history has been written by the victors, the dominating classes. historical consciousness has been made up and structured on the ideology of the dominant classes. history’s winners, according to gutierrez, have sought to wipe out their victims’ memory of the struggles, so as to be able to snatch from them one of their sources of energy and will in history: a source of rebellion.29 the winners have killed memory in the losers, so that now everyone’s consciousness of history is that of the victors. but rereading history means remaking history. it means repairing it from the bottom up. the aim of rereading history from the viewpoint of the defeated is a revision of this historical consciousness__especially the historical consciousness from the standpoint of the native americans, slaves, and other marginalized groups. as leonardo boff has pointed out, the purpose of this endeavor is to give latin american peoples a genuine historical consciousness, without which they will remain rootless and deprived of the support needed to nourish their struggle for liberation.30 this approach is uncovering new sources, and permitting new interpretations and outlooks very different from the official interpretation of the major events in the history of latin american peoples. in his book philosophy of liberation, enrique dussel, an argentine philosopher, theologian and historian, has philosophized critically upon the historical consciousness of the metropolitan center. dussel argued that thought that takes refuge in the center ends by thinking it to be the only reality. outside its frontiers is nonbeing, nothing, barbarity, and nonsense. ontology, the thinking that expresses being__the being of the reigning and central system__is the ideology of ideologies, the foundation of the ideologies of the empires, of the center.31 he made explicit his philosophy of domination by referring to contemporary power structures: the empires of the center__england and france as colonial powers, nazi germany, and later the united states with its central intelligence agency (cia)__thus once more possess an ontology that justifies them, a subtle ideology that gives them a “good conscience”.... philosophy again becomes the center of the ideological hegemony of the dominating class.32 20 prajna vihara __ __ ~ dussel sees it as necessary to start historical analysis from the perspective of center/periphery, dominator/dominated dissymmetry, and from this dissymmetry to reinvestigate the history that has been written until now. from a historical, empirical viewpoint, dussel argues, “if this philosophy (of liberation) is critical, if it criticizes the system, then this system must criticize it, must persecute it”. philosophers who practice it have been targeted for bombings; they have been dismissed from their universities, expelled from their homelands; they have been condemned to death by the agents of imperialism, fascism, and the extreme right. b. poverty as oppressed condition the term “poverty” sometimes has ambiguous implications. it has both positive and negative meanings. often people tend to be confused by the implications of what poverty means. some may argue in the positive sense that poverty as material austerity could lead to rich spirituality and that rich people with self-indulgence may be poor in spirituality. this is true if poverty is among the free choices people could choose to live with. for example, if someone who has a middle-class standard of living chooses to live in a self-disciplined life with fewer material goods or takes a “vow of poverty”, this is his or her free choice. on the other hand, if someone who belongs to an underclass, who lacks the basic necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clean water to drink, basic medical treatment when sick, a reasonable place to stay, and basic education was told to be happy with what he or she has for the sake of a “high spirituality”, this would be an ideology that conceals social oppression. liberation theology would argue that the material standard of living of the vast majority of poor and oppressed people needs to be raised to a decent level. then and only then will these people have the ability to choose to live either in their ordinary way or in voluntary poverty in their personal pursuit of high spirituality. the religious meaning of poverty should not be used to confuse this distinction between forced poverty and voluntary poverty. gutierrez has defined the term “poverty” as material poverty, the lack of material goods and services necessary for maintaining life as a human being. many christians, according to gutierrez, often mistake material poverty as a religious ideal-it is taken as austerity or detachment from the material world. for the well-to-do christians, taking voluntarily a step of self-discipline or self-control from material indulgence is probtavivat puntarigvivat 21 ably a good thing to do. but for millions, or even billions, of people who lack the basic material means of living necessary to life due to exploitation and oppression, it is a very different story. to force the majority of the world’s population economically to live in dehumanizing material poverty is certainly not the purpose of christianity. under the circumstances of the world’s poverty today, gutierrez has argued, to talk about spiritual richness and poverty is a misleading conception__it is an ideology intended to maintain the unjust social structure. this misleading conception portrays the cases of the rich who are spiritually poor as well as the poor who are spiritually rich. it is an ideology meant to keep the poor in their social class, without rebelling against it, in the hope for the reward of a life in heaven. to be a complete human being, the basic necessities of this life need to be met. to be a complete human society, a fair distribution of wealth needs to be effected. otherwise, it is only to play with words-and with people. as gutierrez foresees, social classes, nations, and entire continents are becoming aware of their poverty, and when they see its root causes they will rebel against it. in christian terms, poverty is an expression of sin-a negation of love. it is not an interior detachment from the goods of this world. it is therefore incompatible with the teachings of jesus and the coming of the kingdom of god-a kingdom of love and justice. poverty is opposed to pride, to an attitude of self-sufficiency. so poverty needs to be taken as a commitment of solidarity and protest. christian poverty has meaning only as a commitment of solidarity with the poor, with those who suffer misery and injustice. for gutierrez, one cannot really be with the poor unless he or she is struggling against poverty.33 according to gutierrez, if the ultimate cause of man’s exploitation and alienation is selfishness, the deepest reason for voluntary poverty is “love of neighbor”. christian poverty, an expression of love, is solidarity with the poor and is a protest against poverty. christians, therefore, do not choose to become poor out of a love for the ideal of poverty, but rather so that there will be no poor. poor people today are the oppressed and the exploited ones__the ones marginalized in society, the members of the working class and underclass, struggling for their most basic rights, in a country struggling for its liberation. poverty is different from the classic “renunciation of the goods of this world”. 22 prajna vihara __ __ ~ c. kingdom of god as struggle for justice for liberation theologians, christ is the temple of god. the christian community is a temple, and each christian, a member of this community, is a temple of the holy spirit. to cite a few passages from the bible: “surely you know that you are god’s temple, where the spirit of god dwells. anyone who destroys god’s temple will himself be destroyed by god, because the temple of god is holy; and that temple you are” (1 cor. 3:16-17): “do you not know that your body is a shrine of the indwelling holy spirit, and the spirit is god’s gift to you?” (1 cor. 6:19). furthermore, not only each christian is a temple of god, every human being in history is the living temple of god. the “profane”__that which is located outside the temple-no longer exists. according to gutierrez, if humanity__each human being-is the living temple of god, we meet god in our encounter with men and women, and in our commitment to the historical process of mankind.34 according to the bible, to oppress the poor is to offend god, because what is done for others is done for god. to exploit the worker and to delay the payment of wages are to offend god: “you shall not keep back the wages of a man who is poor and needy, whether a fellowcountryman or an alien living in your country in one of your settlements. pay him his wages on the same day before sunset, for he is poor and his heart is set on them: he may appeal to the lord against you, and you will be guilty of sin” (deut. 24:14-15; cf. exod. 22:21-23).35 from these biblical messages, liberation theologians further develop that to love god is to do justice to the poor and the oppressed. christians find god in their encounter with the poor, the marginalized, and the exploited. an act of love towards them is an act of love towards god. as gutierrez has pointed out: to know yahweh, which in biblical language is equivalent to saying to love yahweh, is to establish just relationships among men, it is to recognize the rights of the poor. the god of biblical revelation is known through interhuman justice. when justice does not exist, god is not known; he is absent.36 according to the bible, yahweh “deals out justice to the oppressed. the lord feeds the hungry and sets the prisoner free. the lord restores tavivat puntarigvivat 23 sight to the blind and straightens backs which are bent; the lord loves the righteous and watches over the stranger; the lord gives heart to the orphan and widow but turns the course of the wicked to their ruin”. (ps. 146:7-10). accordingly, love of god is unavoidably expressed through love of one’s neighbor__especially the poor and the oppressed. to struggle for justice for exploited people is to love god. as gutierrez sees it, to sin is to refuse to love, to reject communion and brotherhood, to reject the very meaning of human existence. the bible indicates that where there is social justice and righteousness, there is knowledge of god; when these are lacking, it is absent. “there is no good faith or mutual trust, no knowledge of god in the land”. (hos. 4:1-2; cf. isa. 1). according to gutierrez, the concept of neighbor needs to be reinterpreted within the socio-economic context: as it has been insisted in recent years, the neighbor is not only man viewed individually. the term refers also to man considered in the fabric of social relationships, to man situated in his economic, social, cultural, and racial coordinates. it likewise refers to the exploited social class, the dominated people, and the marginated race.37 this point of view is beyond the individualistic relationship. it is also necessary to avoid the ideology of an individualistic charity. charity today is, according to gutierrez, a “political charity”. often, to offer food or drink in our day is a political action. it benefits socially those who perform this political ritual of individualistic charity. it benefits temporarily only a few poor people without solving the root cause of their poverty. true charity needs to be a radical change in the unjust social structure so that justice is established and all benefit from it. from this new dimension of critical reflection in the interpretation of the bible, liberation theologians place the emphasis on the “kingdom of god”. for them, the central messages of jesus are not god, nor the church, nor jesus christ himself, but the kingdom of god. the kingdom of god is justice for all poor and oppressed people. the struggle for justice is the struggle for the kingdom of god. jesus himself was born poor. he chose to live with poor people for his whole life. and his message is to establish the kingdom of god__to bring justice to the poor and the oppressed in society. as gutierrez has pointed out: 24 prajna vihara __ __ ~ conversion means a radical transformation of ourselves; it means thinking, feeling, and living as christ-present in exploited and alienated man. to be converted is to commit oneself to the process of the liberation of the poor and oppressed, to commit oneself lucidly, realistically, and concretely. it means to commit oneself not only generously, but also with an analysis of the situation and a strategy of action.38 and as leonardo boff puts it: in contact with the poor, who constitute a whole exploited social class, a person experiences a genuine encounter with the lord and makes a commitment to justice, which is the prime characteristic of the kingdom of god.39 the kingdom of god necessarily implies the reestablishment of justice in this world. christ reveals himself to humankind by identifying himself with the poor. to place oneself in the perspective of the kingdom of god means to participate in the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed. equally important, the process of liberation requires the active participation of the oppressed themselves. from socio-political hermeneutics, social injustice is the result of social structures rather than of people’s intentions. in his book marx and the bible, jose miranda, a mexican liberation theologian, calls this social injustice “institutional robbery”. he claims that most of the exploitation today is legal. private ownership under monopoly capitalism is a form of legalized and institutionalized robbery. he also asserts the biblical presupposition that excess wealth is unacquirable without violence and spoliation. therefore, almsgiving is nothing more than the return of what has been stolen, and thus the bible calls it justice. according to miranda, there is a relationship between social analysis and faith in the bible. where social analysis says “structural poverty”, faith will say “structural sin”. where social analysis says “private accumulation of wealth”, faith will say the “sin of selfishness”.40 in liberation theology, another central theme of the messages in the bible is in the relationship between god and the poor. yahweh is the god who breaks into human history to liberate the oppressed. god intervened in human history to free the oppressed and establish justice on earth. this is the purpose of god’s interventions tavivat puntarigvivat 25 in human history. to know god is, therefore, to do justice to the oppressed and the poor. from socio-political hermeneutics of the bible, sin is incarnated in the unjust economico-political structures and in the ideology which sustains them. sin has become structured in the unjust and dehumanized social system whose essential expression is the oppressive law. however, sin and evil, which were later structured into a human social system, are not inherent to humankind and history. they began one day through a human work and can one day be eliminated. so there is hope to change it. as gutierrez sees it: other religions think in terms of cosmos and nature; christianity, rooted in biblical sources, thinks in terms of history. and in this history, injustice and oppression, divisions and confrontations exist. but the hope of liberation is also present.41 the socio-political hermeneutics of the bible demands “praxis” to the point of being identified with the poor and the oppressed in their struggle to establish justice, or the kingdom of god, in society. liberation theologians agree with karl marx that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”.42 the future of history belongs to the poor and the exploited, and true liberation lies in the praxis of solidarity with the oppressed. d. human rights from the third world perspective when the carter administration (1977-81) in the united states made human rights43the center of its foreign policy__particularly with regard to the third world, juan luis segundo, a liberation theologian from uruguay, asserted that the root of human rights violations was to be found in the impossible conditions laid on third world countries by the rich countries__conditions which could only be maintained by repression. hence, it was hypocritical for the first world, especially the u.s. administration, to criticize the third world regimes that carried out the repression.44 latin american theologians insisted that one should not simply speak of “human rights” in general but of the “rights of the majorities” or the “rights of the poor” whose rights were constantly being violated by the oppressive social, economic, and political structures. they pointed to 26 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the need to develop an alternative language, because they saw in liberal western discourse about human rights “idealist” language. instead of simply accepting the western notion of human rights, with its focus on individual rights, which could easily become an ideology masking the daily suffering and death of the poor majority, latin americans should develop a new language about human rights. they insisted that the most basic human right is the right to life and consequently the right to the means of sustaining life, that is, land and employment. liberation theologians insisted on the “rights of peoples” and pointed to the “universal declaration of the rights of peoples” made in algeria in 1976. this declaration stressed the rights of peoples to self-determination, to their natural resources, to the common patrimony of humankind, to a just compensation for their labor, to choose their own economic and social systems, and to speak their own language. the 1948 united nations universal declaration of human rights also include economic and social rights.45 third world representatives regard the western conception of human rights as narrowly individualistic since it ignores or downplays the most basic rightthe right to survival and life, which is essentially connected to the right to work. latin american theologians have sought to move the human rights issue beyond denouncing abuses, like torture, abduction, and murder to question the very development model that provides small elites with luxurious lives while the majority live in dehumanizing conditions. liberation theologians are intellectuals. they produce books and articles and take part in conferences. they differ from traditional theology and academics in having a connection to grass-roots base communities and popular movements. in antonio gramsci’s terms, they are “organic intellectuals”__intellectuals whose work is directly connected with popular struggle. as phillip berryman has pointed out, liberation theology is both theory-for-praxis (it has input to grass-roots movement in the form of theory and methods) and theory-of-praxis (its questions and insights come from involvement with the poor).46 iv. dependency theory liberation theologians have challenged the western idea of “development” by their well-known dependency theory. that theory, though disputed by many economists, is as follows: underdevelopment in the third world is structural and was caused by the development of the first tavivat puntarigvivat 27 world. first world countries, especially the united states of america, japan and western europe, economically dominate and exploit third world countries around the world under transnational capitalist neocolonialism. the rich nations exploit the poor nations by making their whole economy a dependency economy, and also exploit them in terms of their natural resources and particularly their poorly paid labor. this is the unequal relationship between the first world and the third world. in other words, the first world nations develop or progress at the expense of the third world nations. the story of bananas in latin america may serve to illustrate this point. a. the story of bananas: honduras, panama, costa rica and guatemala in march 1974, several banana-producing countries in central america joined together to demand a one-dollar tax on every case of bananas exported. banana prices for producer countries had not increased for the previous twenty years despite high inflation. but the costs for manufactured goods imported from the industrialized countries had constantly increased. as a result the real income of banana-exporting countries had declined by 60 percent. for countries like honduras and panama, at least half of their export income came from bananas. the american banana companies constantly refused to pay the newly demanded export tax. since three large companies (united brands, castle and cooke, and del monte) controlled 90 percent of the marketing and distribution of bananas, they had strong bargaining power. in panama the banana companies suddenly stopped cutting bananas. in honduras the fruit company allowed 145,000 crates of bananas to rot at the docks. finally, costa rica settled the export tax issue with the banana companies for twenty-five cents a case; panama, for thirty-five cents; honduras, with bribes paid to high-ranking officials by companies, eventually agreed to a thirty-cent tax. a u.n. fact-finding commission in 1975 concluded, “the bananaproducing countries with very much less income are subsidizing the consumption of the fruit, and consequently the development of the more industrialized countries”.47 the masses of poor people usually have little power. military dictators, which represent wealthy elites, ruled many latin american countries for much of the last thirty years. in latin america and elsewhere change is difficult because the u.s. and other first world 28 prajna vihara __ __ ~ companies work closely with wealthy local elites to protect their mutual economic interests. the whole country of guatemala was once virtually a dependency of the united fruit company (the former name of united brands). in the 1950s, the company held two-thirds of the usable farmland and monopolized the nation’s railroads in its banana business. in 1954 a democratically elected president, jacobo arbenz, initiated a modest program of agricultural and land reform so that poor farmers could have their own land. feeling threatened by the reform program for their unused land, united fruit lobbied the eisenhower administration to intervene. the cia stepped in and overthrew the guatemala leader, and established a dictatorial regime.48 the u.s. secretary of state in 1954 was john foster dulles. his law firm had written the banana company’s agreements with guatemala in 1930 and 1936. the cia director was allen dulles, brother of the secretary of state and previous president of united fruit. the assistant secretary of state was also a major shareholder in united fruit.49 under the u.s.-backed military dictatorship, the political oppression in guatemala was well-known. on september 1, 1982, cbs news correspondent ed rabel reported: human rights organizations have repeatedly accused guatemalan governments of running deliberate programs of political murder to maintain a grip on power...priests, nuns, labor leaders, teachers, students-anyone who threatened the established order. politicians have always been high on the hit list...a [christian democrat] politician here in this country told me...that more than 120 of his party’s leaders had been assassinated in about an 18-month period.50 latin american theologians suggested that under this unequal relationship between the third and the first world, the proper terms for their relationship were not “advanced” and “backward”, or “developed” and “underdeveloped”, but rather “dominant” and “dependent”. the poor countries have been dominated economically and politically by the rich countries. it is extremely difficult for the dominated countries to develop under these economic and political structures of dependency. their only hope, according to liberation theology, was to break this chain of dependency. tavivat puntarigvivat 29 as gutierrez has pointed out, only a class analysis will enable us to see what is really involved in the opposition between the oppressed and dominant peoples. to understand only the confrontation between countries misrepresents the real phenomena and misleads people because such an approach is rather individualistic than structural. in gutierrez’s terms, the theory of dependency will take the wrong path and lead to deception if the analysis is not put within the framework of the worldwide class struggle. the story of beef in el salvador may provide a clear picture of this global exploitation and class struggle. b. the story of beef: el salvador in the 1950s, almost all beef slaughtered in central america was eaten locally. in 1957 the u.s. department of agriculture (usda) approved building the first beef packing plant in central america, and by the late 1970s three-fourths of central america’s beef was exported. by 1978, central america provided the u.s. with 250 million pounds of beef a year. the u.s.-backed development programs built roads, and provided credit to facilitate the expansion of beef exports. from 1960-1980 over one-half of all the loans made by the world bank and the inter-american development bank for agriculture and rural development in central america went to promote the production of beef for exports. wealthy elites made great profits. but large numbers of poor farmers growing basic foodstuffs were uprooted from their land because agribusiness corporations demanded more and more land to raise beef for export. in el salvador, before the first beef packing plant was opened, 29 percent of rural households were landless. by 1980, one-half of all el salvador’s beef went to the u.s., and 65 percent of the rural households were landless. the poor farmers protested, but the agribusiness corporations succeeded in accusing the peasant activists of being communists. the national security forces trained by the u.s. repressed peasant protesters by using repressive tactics including torture and murder. ronald j. sider has written that: the poor suffered to produce cheap hamburgers for american consumers. since the 1960s, beef consumption within central america has declined 20 percent. the poor cannot compete with us. a study by the pan american health organization showed that between 1969 and 1975 mal30 prajna vihara __ __ ~ nutrition rose by 67 percent among children five years and under. in fact, 50 percent of the children in central america were dying before the age of six-largely because of malnutrition and related diseases. you don’t need communists to tell you that is a bad deal.51 to characterize latin america as a dominated and oppressed continent naturally leads one to speak of liberation and to participate in the process. liberation is, in fact, a term which expresses a new response to the latin american situation. the poor countries in latin america are becoming ever more clearly aware that their underdevelopment is only the by-product of the development of northern american countries__particularly the united states__because of the kind of unequal relationship that exists between rich and poor countries. moreover, they are realizing that their true development will come into existence only with a struggle to break the domination of the rich countries. the story of the border industrialization program in mexico illustrates the domination of the united states over the mexican economy. c. the border industrialization program: mexico from 1942 to 1964 the bracero program attracted the flow of braceros (contracted migrant workers) into the united states. when the program was stopped, 200,000 farm workers were suddenly jobless. the unemployment rate reached 50 percent among the manual laborers in border cities like mexicali and ciudad juarez. u.s. investors proposed the creation of a free trade zone on the u.s.-mexican border. the proposal suggested that u.s. industries would benefit because of their need for cheap labor and mexico would benefit from the transfer of technology and skills and solving its unemployment problem. so the border industrialization program (bip) was established in 1965 with the maquiladora system of twin plants, one on either side of the border. the mexican government granted unprecedented financial incentives to american companies: factories could be 100 percent foreignowned and managed; low taxes on profits and sales were offered, with some mexican states giving full tax exemption; and land could be purchased or leased on favorable terms. american corporations were practically given full discretionary power to conduct business and labor affairs without government interference. the mexican government had considtavivat puntarigvivat 31 ered bip a temporary response to the border unemployment crisis. but in 1972, bip was expanded from the original 12.5 miles south of the border to include all of mexico, opening up the entire country to a new form of colonization of the mexican labor force. rather than solving the massive unemployment problem among male workers in the border area, the program aimed at a new source of cheap factory labor. corporations drew huge numbers of women into the industries. by 1974, there were about 500 maquiladoras operating along the border. they employed some 80,000 people, 85 percent of whom were women, with the majority between 16 and 25 years old. those women came to the border free trade zone from small towns and cities. mexican women were paid less than men because of their sexist disadvantaged position in society and because their wages were considered only supplementary to male sources of family income. maquiladora workers work on average 48 hours a week for the minimum wage of 445 pesos a dayabout 77 u.s. cents an hour. with the recent devaluations of the mexican peso, the real wages of mexican workers have dropped sharply. the national bank of mexico predicted that the maquiladora workforce will reach over half a million in the 1990s. companies frequently require women to sign temporary work contracts to avoid paying increased salaries that go with seniority. they often require a medical certificate indicating that a job applicant is not pregnant, eliminating any expenses for maternity benefits. in their book women in the global factory, annette fuentes and barbara ehrenreich have described the working and health conditions of these mexican workers: workers in electronics plants, which account for 60 percent of the maquiladoras, are regularly exposed to toxic chemicals... in garment factories, which comprise 30 percent of all border industry, chronic back problems, asthma, conjunctivitis, bronchitis and brown-lung are common occupational diseases. with the intense pressure of assembly work, maquila women experience high levels of gastrointestinal disorders, insomnia and menstrual irregularities. bladder problems are common because women cannot use the toilets or drink water freely.52 bip is generally recognized as a failure in terms of the mexican government’s initial expectations. male unemployment along the border 32 prajna vihara __ __ ~ has reached 67 percent; the transfer of skills to the workforce and technology to mexican industry has been minimal; the capital-intensive technology remains in the u.s. what began as a short-term remedy for mexico’s unemployment crisis has only deepened dependency on the u.s. and generated new problems for the mexican people. under the north american free trade agreement (nafta), which includes the united states, canada and mexico, mexican immigration to the united states, according to nafta proponents, will decrease as trade liberalization strengthens mexico’s economy, and consequently, its capacity to create jobs and improve wages. but nafta opponents maintain quite the opposite. they argue that open trade will further uproot poor mexican farmers and put out of business small and medium mexican enterprises unable to compete with u.s. corporations. as a result, millions of mexicans will lose their jobs and many of them will be forced to immigrate to the u.s. according to primitivo rodriguez, who heads the mexico-u.s. border program and american friends service committee, mexico is losing to the united states every year more than 300,000 of her most productive and entrepreneurial women and men, including large numbers of educated, skilled and professional people. they are valuable human resources that mexico has invested in and the country desperately needs them for achieving sound development. behind mexico’s huge immigration is a dramatic capital drain. for the last decade, mexico has sent abroadmostly to the united states-an average of a billion dollars a year in debtrelated payments. it is also estimated that mexican capital flight from 1978-1988 was about $70 billion, while mexico’s trade deficit with the united states for 1991 and 1992 reaches $34.5 billion.53 the income gap between the rich and poor in mexico has grown wider. the 1980 world development report states that: in mexico, where the average per capita income grew in real terms by 2.7 percent a year between 1960 and 1978, the richest 20 percent managed to edge their share of income up from 56.5 percent to 57.7 percent. meanwhile, the poor got a smaller share. in 1968 the bottom 40 percent got 12.2 percent of the income pie; by 1977 it was below 10 percent. the poorest 20 percent saw their share cut from 3.6 percent to below 3 percent. this is not to say that the poor actually had lower incomes. figures show tavivat puntarigvivat 33 that the per capita income of the poorest 20 percent of the people stayed about the same, rising from $183 to about $187 per year. the wealthy 20 percent, on the other hand, saw their incomes rise from $2,867 to $3,722. thus the average poor person saw his or her meager income rise by $4 over a period of eighteen years, while the average rich person added $850 in the same period.54 there was great optimism in latin america in the 1950s regarding the possibility of achieving self-sustained economic development. this would be achieved by means of the substitution of imports, expansion of the internal market, and full industrialization, leading to an independent society. to develop, then, meant to follow the model designed by the advanced countries. in achieving this goal, the social, political, and cultural structures in the “traditional societies” or “transitional societies” of the underdeveloped countries needed to be transformed. a change of attitude, however, occurred in the 1960s. the revealing economic, social, and political realities in latin america have made the ideology of developmentalism obsolete. developmentalism__the concept of economic and modernizing development__among poor nations has been largely promoted by international organizations which are in turn controlled by the first world countries. the rich countries, with their multinational corporations, and their clients of the privileged groups in the poor countries share their mutual economic benefits. hence this global situation is structural. it results in the widening income gap between wealthy nations and poor nations, and between the status quo and the vast majority of poor people in those underdeveloped countries. the story of coffee in brazil illustrates this point. d. the story of coffee: brazil under the unequal terms of trade, rich countries usually threaten new tariff barriers on certain manufactures exported by poor countries. to avoid blame from the international community for imposing tariffs, rich countries ask poor countries to “voluntarily” limit the volume of their exports. “voluntary” quotas can have a devastating impact as was experienced by brazil in her coffee industries. coffee used to provide brazil with approximately one-half its to34 prajna vihara __ __ ~ tal export revenues. brazil’s coffee exports increased 90 percent between 1953 and 1961, but the total revenue earned from coffee dropped by 35 percent. so in 1966 brazil decided to process its own coffee in order to create more jobs and earn more income for its people. but when brazilian coffee captured 14 percent of the u.s. market, the u.s. coffee manufacturers (tenco, general foods, standard brands, and others) charged the brazilians with unfair competition. the u.s. government then threatened to cut off aid to brazil, warning that it might not renew the international coffee agreement (which until recently kept coffee prices somewhat stable). brazil eventually was forced to tax its instant coffee exports, and its coffee industry was seriously damaged.55 from 1968 to 1974, brazil’s economy grew at the rate of 10 percent per year, then dropped to 9 percent per year through 1980. from 1980 through 1987, brazil’s economic growth dropped sharply to only 3.3 percent per year. brazil’s minister of finance admitted in 1972 that only the top 5 percent of the brazilian people had benefited from brazil’s economic growth. by 1970 the richest 1 percent of the population controlled a greater share of the national income (17 percent) than the bottom half (13.7 percent).56 the brazilian government did not challenge a 1974 study that showed that the real income of the poorest two-thirds of the people had declined by more than one-half in the preceding ten years.57 ronald sider has reported that: in 1989, two-thirds of brazilian families tried to survive on less than $500 a month. in 1975, 58 percent of the brazilian children under the age of eighteen were malnourished. in 1980, 40 percent of the total population suffered from malnutrition. today, two-thirds of the total population of 141 million people lack the minimum daily calories. more than 40 percent of the children under five years of age still suffer from malnutrition. during the years 1980-87, 13 percent of all children from 0-4 years old were moderately or severely underweight, and 31 percent of all children between the ages of 2 and 5 suffered from moderate and severe stunting__the result of malnutrition.58 according to gutierrez, there are three concepts of development. in the first, development can be regarded as purely economic. in this sense it would be the same as economic growth. in the second, developtavivat puntarigvivat 35 ment is seen as a total social process, including economic, political, social, and cultural aspects. this view stresses the interdependence of these different factors. in the third, development is seen as liberation from structural domination. it concerns human values: human beings should have control over their own destiny. liberation theology adheres to the third meaning of development, as “liberation”. this approach places the concept of development in a wider context__a history in which humankind takes control of his or her own destiny.59 there are two root causes, according to gutierrez, of the social, economic, political, and cultural problems among the poor nations. first, the dependence of some countries on others: poor countries depend upon rich countries for their “development”. second, the domination of some social classes over others: the privileged or elite class dominate the majority which are the oppressed people in their own countries. the attempts to change the situation within the existing system have proven to be failures. the ruling classes use their legal violence, under the name of “law and order”, against the struggles for justice of poor people. even though most of the struggles of the poor and the oppressed are just for their basic necessities of life-food, shelter, medicine, education-the movements are violently suppressed by the government. gutierrez has pointed out that: development must attack the root causes of the problems and among them the deepest is economic, social, political and cultural dependence of some countries upon othersan expression of the domination of some social classes over others... this analysis of the situation is at the level of scientific rationality. only a radical break from the status quo, that is, a profound transformation of the private property system, access to power of the exploited class, and a social revolution that would break this dependence would allow for the change to a new society.60 the story of the international debt crisis may serve to illustrate the domination of the rich capitalists, through the channels of the international banking system, over the poor countries causing their economic crisis. 36 prajna vihara __ __ ~ e. the international debt crisis: latin america and beyond the debt crisis began with the fourfold increase in the world’s oil prices in 1973-1974 causing a rapid increase in borrowing by underdeveloped countries. western commercial banks overflowing with money deposited by oil-producing nations made huge loans to third world governments. with the leap in oil prices, third world countries needed to borrow huge amount of money to continue their economic growth. in the late 1970s, citicorp chairman walter wriston spoke about the loans taking the optimistic view that “countries never go bankrupt”. many of the loans were, unfortunately, spent on expensive armaments or wasted due to official corruption. faced with budget deficits, most third world governments chose to cut education and health programs rather than their military budgets. the wealthy elites who controlled power transferred their accumulated wealth, amid their country’s poverty, to western commercial banks for reasons of their own financial security and to earn higher interest payments. in 1981 and 1982, while the fifteen largest debtor nations received $81 billion in new loans, the wealthy elites moved $51 billion out of those same countries into swiss bank accounts, u.s. real estate, or other places.61 since the interest rates for the loans were variable rather than fixed, the higher interest rates (partly caused by the u.s.’s huge budget deficit) greatly increased the interest payments on the poor countries. short-term loans that debtor nations received in the mid-1970s at an interest rate of 6.5 percent cost as much as 19 percent when renewed in 1980 and 1981. meanwhile, the prices of their exports, which were basically agricultural products and raw materials, fell approximately 40 percent relative to the prices paid for industrial goods they imported. poor debtor countries now faced widening balance-of-payment deficits as well as trouble paying their debts. to make higher profits during the high-interest-rate years, western commercial banks continued to lend huge sums of money to the third world from 1979 to 1981. in fact, during those two years of high interest rates, commercial banks lent as much to major debtor countries as during the entire period from 1973 to 1979. poor debtor countries now found themselves meeting payments for old debts with newly borrowed money, at much higher interest rates. as a result, their debts piled up even higher, and by the early 1980s they faced severe difficulties in paying even the interest on the debts. tavivat puntarigvivat 37 in august 1982, the mexican government announced that it could no longer pay the interest on its $58 billion foreign debt. shortly afterwards, venezuela, brazil, argentina, and the philippines made the same announcement. the debtor countries were increasingly forced to finance both their old debts and their economic growth out of their export earnings. furthermore, debtor countries were returning $11.3 billion more to western commercial banks than they received in new loans. when paybacks to the imf and world bank were included, the net flow of money (new lending minus payments for debts) for all indebted countries went from a positive $35.2 billion in 1981 to a negative $30.7 billion in 1986.62 this negative transfer of funds, according to the world bank’s annual report, reached $50.1 billion in 1989. the net flow of foreign exchange from the underdeveloped to the developed countries has caused serious problems for domestic investment in poor nations. the result is the stagnation of third world development. but development is crucial to the creation of the new wealth necessary to pay off the debt. so the debt crisis has trapped many poor countries, especially in africa and latin america, in a serious economic crisis, and put off their development prospects. one study estimates that nearly 85 percent of the total increase in the foreign debt of the non-oil-producing countries between 1973 and 1982 resulted from four causes about which they could do nothing: opec oil price increases, the rise in dollar interest rates in 1981-1982, the reduction of third world exports because of worldwide recession, and the abrupt drop in the prices of agricultural products and raw materials exported by third world countries.63 ronald sider reports that: the debt crisis has contributed to the worst economic crisis in latin american histories [sic]. between 1981 and 1988 real per capita income declined in absolute terms in almost every country in south america. in many countries, such as argentina and peru, the drop in national income was greater than 20 percent. living standards in many countries have fallen to levels of the 1950s and 1960s. unprecedented inflation has raged in brazil (934 percent in 1988), argentina, and peru (annual inflation in both reached several thousand percent in 1988). the region is rife with political instability. democratic governments are damaged. in february 1989, venezuelans rioted in caracas 38 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and other cities in protest against austerity measures prompted by venezuela’s debt crisis. three hundred people died.64 faced with the debt crisis, debtor governments drastically cut spending on human services like education, health care, and food subsidies. this resulted in severe increases in malnutrition and illness in poor nations with large foreign debts, as seen in the case of bolivia and other latin american countries which have followed the measurement posed by the international monetary fund (imf). f. the imf measurement and its result: bolivia and others bolivia has been hailed by western banks and governments for its new economic program and fiscal discipline in recent years. the health of the bolivian people has received less attention. a unicef official in bolivia estimated that half of the children born in bolivia die before they reach age one. in 1986, in compliance with an imf stabilization program, bolivia cut its health budget by 67 percent__at a time when 67 percent of bolivia's people suffered from malnutrition.65 third world debt payments have also deprived children of basic education. according to a unicef survey, in twenty-one out of thirtythree poor debtor countries, spending per primary school pupil fell, often sharply, in the first half of the 1980s. bolivia suffered a rise in school desertation from 2.2 to 8.5 percent among primary school-age children between 1980 and 1983. similar drop-out rates are found in barbados and mexico. the director general of unesco, federico mayor, has warned that, “if debt repayment is to take precedence over the necessary investment in the social sectors including education, then [we will suffer] a dangerous erosion of human resources that...might set back the countries of the south by a whole generation or more”.66 a world bank study found that in sao paulo, brazil, real wages of unskilled construction workers fell by over 25 percent between 1980 and 1985. between 1983 and 1985, the minimum wage in brazil fell to only one-fifth to one-seventh the amount necessary to cover a family’s basic needs. from 1976 to 1985, workers in bolivia suffered a 36 percent reduction in purchasing power. in early 1987, the bolivia workers’ union (cob) fought for a monthly minimum wage of $40, which was barely enough for food for a family of four. the government, however, would tavivat puntarigvivat 39 only agree to $25.67 the july 1986 issue of world bank news noted that in chile, the real minimum wage in 1985 had dropped below the 1981 level. the government of mexico between 1982 and 1986 reduced its budget deficit, suggested by the imf, as part of the effort to improve the economy. as a result, unemployment in mexico rose from 4.7 percent in 1982 to 17.6 percent in 1987. real wages in mexico declined about 50 percent between 1980 and 1988. increasing numbers of poor people, particularly poor children, died of starvation or malnutrition-related diseases.68 the international debt problem is not really a banking crisis, ronald sider has pointed out, but rather a development crisis. huge debt payments not only reduce a government’s spending on people's health care and education. they also prevent the capital investment that could provide new jobs and new income in the future. poor debtor economies will continue to decline, essential human services will be cut even more, and millions of people will suffer even greater poverty. under these circumstances, the governments of the rich nations and the oppressive governments of the poor nations create the image of being religious or righteous. traditional religious institutions legitimize oppressive governments by interpreting the religion in a way that sides with the establishment, or simply by being silent or ignoring the social reality and dealing only with metaphysical and ontological aspects of religion. these kinds of religious interpretations serve an ideological function to sustain the status quo and the oppressive structure. hugo assmann had examined the military’s utilization of christian symbols to justify itself. he concluded that it is possible, in concrete praxis with the people, to “repack” religious symbols so that they will aid in dynamizing a “church born of the people”.69 to characterize the situation of poor countries as dominated and oppressed leads one to speak of economic, social, and political liberation. ideas and theories must be reconsidered in the light of praxis or in the real struggle for justice in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. this liberation requires not only better living conditions, but a radical change in the political, economic and social structures for a new way to be a human being. unfortunately, this structural change has oftentimes been faced with the counterrevolutionary effort from the first world metropolitan center, particularly the united states. the case of nicaragua clearly illustrates this point: 40 prajna vihara __ __ ~ g. first world counterrevolutionary effort: nicaragua in 1981 ronald reagan authorized secret cia military support for right-wing guerrillas attacking the new socialist government of nicaragua. the alleged official statement was to stop arms shipments from the soviet union and cuba through nicaragua to the guerrillas in el salvador. later, however, when the contra guerrillas had an army of over ten thousand soldiers and the u.s. could not offer evidence of any substantial arms shipment to el salvador, the reagan administration admitted that it had intended to overthrow the sandinista government. the result has been enormous suffering and massacre in nicaragua. in its brief to the world court, nicaragua claimed that contra violence had killed 2,600 persons; maimed, raped or kidnapped 5,500; and displaced 150,000 civilians.70 nicaragua under the sandinista government had internally retained a market economy, 60 percent of which was in private hands. the sandinista government, according to phillip berryman, had followed the economic strategy of the “structuralist” school of latin american economics, led by economists such as prebisch, rather than a marxist economic program. the sandinista government sought to impose what it called the “logic of the majority” on an economy that operated primarily through market mechanisms.71 however, to end the bloodshed caused by the war with the contra guerrillas, the sandinista government agreed to hold a general election and finally gave way to the government of violeta chamorro which has turned nicaragua back to the capitalist road once again. h. first world critique of liberation theology michael novak, an american theologian, and his associates represent a first world critique of liberation theology. in will it liberate?, novak challenges the marxist conception of history as class struggle. instead he maintains that the chief interpretative key to history is liberty and justice for all. to quote novak: it (marxism) carries within it a self-contradictory principle. on the one hand, it says that history is class struggle. on the other hand, it says that justice ought to prevail. but if the last is true, then the main interpretive key to tavivat puntarigvivat 41 history is not oppression but justice, not struggle but reconciliation.72 he then presents his view of human nature thus: the first step of christian self-identification, therefore, is not solely, “i am oppressed”, but, rather, “i am also essentially (never completely) free and in love with justice”. inherently free and in love with justice, i need bend my knee to no one, may stand erect and proud. i am not merely a victim. i am not merely oppressed. within me i carry the seeds of liberty and justice, and the vision of a world that mirrors these in all its institutions, a world (eventually) of reconciliation in mutual liberty and mutual justice.73 here novak’s argument avoids social reality by entering into the realm of metaphysics. he would tell the oppressed and the poor in latin america that metaphysically they are as free as the oppressors and the elites, so even though their living and working conditions are oppressive, they should still be proud of their own human nature because ultimately all human nature is essentially free regardless of social class. this kind of metaphysical explanation simply conceals social oppression and confuses the poor and the oppressed in order to keep them in their disadvantageous social status. until 1850, latin america and anglo america had comparable per capita incomes. novak argued that the prosperity of the advanced capitalist countries is due to their own innovation and productivity since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century. latin americans, however, have fallen far behind the north because they do not value the same moral qualities north americans do.74 novak’s approach is overly individualistic: failure or success is primarily due to personal “moral quality”. his individualistic view inevitably leads to ethnocentrism. he also fails to see the oppressive forces behind the unjust economic and power structures that constitute the relationship between the first world and the third world, and between the third world’s ruling elites and the vast majority of poor people. one thing novak might be right about in his critique of liberation theology is that most liberation theologians lack a clear idea of what kind of socialism they are seeking. according to novak, one must consult 42 prajna vihara __ __ ~ socialist experiments in north korea, vietnam, tanzania, ethiopia, hungary, romania, and elsewhere. he argues: many who claim to desire socialism actually desire not a particular set of economic institutions, but “a new man”. they want a society characterized by caring, generosity, compassion and unselfishness. to some extent, they naively combine the picture of a society in which citizens are saintly christians with a picture of socialist economic institutions... the trouble with socialism is that it lacks checks and balances. it does not restrain selfishness. it channels selfishness into the quest for military and bureaucratic power.75 novak misunderstands the dynamic and critical properties of liberation theology: liberation theology represents a struggle of the poor and the oppressed out of their misery under the existing oppressive structures; liberation theologians are struggling for a model of society which learns from the mistakes of western capitalism and eastern stalinism and which serves the reality of their own latin america. joseph ramos, an economist and an associate of novak, has calculated that in latin america, the bottom 40 percent could be brought above the “poverty line” (less than $200 a year annual income) by an expenditure of $16 billion a year. that amount would be equivalent to 5 percent of the gnp or 22 percent of government spending (in the late 1970s).76 but ramos has failed to see the skewed power structure between the wealthy elites and the poor, which determines the distribution of income. a serious redistribution of income inevitably supposes a redistribution of power, which is what most third world people have been struggling for. the redistribution of power would bring about a fairer distribution of wealth. cuba may serve as an example for a fairer distribution of income in latin america. cuba has eliminated the dire poverty that existed prior to the revolution. the whole population of cuba has an adequate diet, is able to work, and has access to medical care and schooling. that is true in no other latin american country. on the “physical quality of life” index (a composite of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy) cuba scores 84 as opposed to the latin american average of 71 and the industrialized western countries’ average of over 90. the only latin american country tavivat puntarigvivat 43 to surpass cuba is argentina (85), which has twice cuba’s per capita income. similarly, although brazil’s average per capita income ($702) is higher than cuba’s ($598), the bottom 80 percent of cuban society have a higher income.77 dependency theory tells much about the future of latin american economies. according to phillip berryman, latin america is in its worst economic crisis since the 1930s. the foreign debt ($360 billion in the late 1980s) comprises 40 percent of the continent’s exports. in some countries like peru, living standards have fallen back to the levels of twenty years ago. latin america produces less food per capita than it did forty years ago.78 this situation reinforces the basic ideas of dependency theory that poverty in latin american countries is structural and the only way to cure the situation is basic structural change. and this change, according to gutierrez, is also a process of human emancipation in history: the liberation of our continent means more than overcoming economic, social, and political dependence. it means, in a deeper sense, to see the becoming of mankind as a process of the emancipation of man in history. it is to see man in search of a qualitatively different society in which he will be free from all servitude, in which he will be the artisan of his own destiny. it is to seek the building up of a new man.79 people who engage in this process of human emancipation in history need to be aware of and respond to the global market economic structure as well as to reflect the social and cultural reality of their own countries. since the situation is global and capitalism today is beyond national boundaries, solidarity among people in both the third world and the first world is necessary in the struggle to emancipate people from the domination of monopoly capitalism. the fall of marxist-leninist ideology in eastern europe and the disintegration of the soviet union in 1991 posed a great challenge to the ideas of socialism which liberation theology has been nurturing. the lessons from eastern europe and the former soviet union would help liberation theologians face their own latin american situation with a new sense of reality. and this new awareness would add a new dimension to its dependency theory. above all, liberation theology is not purely marxism. it is rather a form of christianity with marxist social analysis. lib44 prajna vihara __ __ ~ eration theology tends to utilize christianity, marxism, and even some aspects of capitalism (as in the case of socialist market economy of the sandinista government of nicaragua) for the ultimate purpose of the overall well-being of the latin american people and of all human beings at large. v. salvation within history doctrinally the christian church interpreted “salvation” as eternal life after death. this traditional metaphysical view was conjoined with an ethics of charity to alienate social problems. this is a more individualistic approach to salvation. in a more modern interpretation, salvation means “authentic existence” or the self-cultivation of an individual. both traditional and modern views of salvation, then, have less to do with the structure of human community, society, and history. both can be seen as a form of salvation from history. liberation theology has criticized salvation so understood. for liberation theology, salvation primarily includes liberation from political and economic oppression. in other words, salvation is freedom from social sin. it is necessarily socio-political, though not only sociopolitical. this socio-political salvation is virtually equivalent to liberation within history. liberation theologians have wrestled with the tension between the traditional church view of salvation from history and their own concern for liberation within history. yet the tension remains: liberation theologians are not fully satisfied with only social liberation, they seek to include personal salvation as well. for many liberation theologians, salvation means social liberation as well as personal salvation, the combination of which is the fullness of human life within history. in other words, they seek to overcome personal sin as well as social sin. this view could be called salvation within history. i will discuss liberation theology’s concepts of sin and of salvation within history by referring to the works of gustavo gutierrez and leonardo boff. a. social sin and personal sin according to gutierrez, sin is a human, social, and historical reality. on the one hand, sin is regarded as the absence of brotherhood and love in the relationships with other human beings and with god. in this sense, sin is an interior fracture. on the other hand, sin is evident in optavivat puntarigvivat 45 pressive structures, in the exploitation of human beings by human beings, in the domination and slavery of peoples, races, and social classes. sin appears as the fundamental alienation-the root of a situation of injustice and exploitation. unfair wages, exploitation, and starvation are clear indications of sin and evil. sin demands a radical liberation, which in turn necessarily implies a political liberation. gutierrez argues: the prophets announce a kingdom of peace. but peace presupposes the establishment of justice... it presupposes the defense of the rights of the poor, punishment of the oppressors, a life free from the fear of being enslaved by others, the liberation of the oppressed. peace, justice, love, and freedom are not private realities; they are not only internal attitudes. they are social realities, implying a historical liberation.80 sin, according to gutierrez, is both a personal and a social historical reality. it is a part of the daily events of human life, and it is an obstacle to life’s reaching the fullness called salvation. the grace-sin conflict is necessarily and inevitably historical, temporal, earthly, social, and material. the medellin conference refers to the situation in latin america as a “sinful situation”, as a “rejection of the lord”.81 b. social liberation and personal salvation gutierrez argues that salvation is not something otherworldly. salvation is the communion of human beings among themselves and the communion of a human being with god. salvation embraces every aspect of human reality: body and spirit, individual and society, person and cosmos, time and eternity. gutierrez has characterized liberation as having two aspects: exterior and interior. he asserts that: but modern man’s aspirations include not only liberation from exterior pressures which prevent his fulfillment as a member of a certain social class, country, or society. he seeks likewise an interior liberation, in an individual and intimate dimension; he seeks liberation not only on a social plane but also on a psychological.82 46 prajna vihara __ __ ~ again, gutierrez says: the scope of liberation on the collective and historical level does not always and satisfactorily include psychological liberation. psychological liberation includes dimensions which do not exist in or are not sufficiently integrated with collective, historical liberation.83 gutierrez classifies the concept of salvation into three levels of liberation: the first and foremost is the political liberation of the oppressed people. he said, “in the first place, liberation expresses the aspirations of oppressed peoples and social classes, emphasizing the conflictual aspect of the economic, social, and political process which puts them at odds with wealthy nations and oppressive classes”.84 the second is the liberation of people in history by participation in the creative work of god who transforms people and structures. “to conceive of history as a process of the liberation of man is to consider freedom as a historical conquest; it is to understand that the step from an abstract to a real freedom is not taken without a struggle against all the forces that oppress man, a struggle full of pitfalls, detours, and temptations to run away. the goal is not only better living conditions, a radical change of structures, a social revolution; it is much more: the continuous creation, never ending, of a new way to be a man, a permanent cultural revolution”.85 and the third is the ultimate liberation from sin into complete communion with god. “the word liberation allows for another approach leading to the biblical sources which inspire the presence and action of man in history. in the bible, christ is presented as the one who brings us liberation. christ the savior liberates man from sin, which is the ultimate root of all disruption of friendship and of all injustice and oppression”.86 gutierrez has concluded the three levels of liberation as follows: in dealing with the notion of liberation..., we distinguished three levels of meaning: political liberation, the liberation of man throughout history, liberation from sin and admission to communion with god... these three levels mutually affect each other, but they are not the same. one is not present without the others, but they are distinct: they are all part of a single, all-encompassing salvific process, tavivat puntarigvivat 47 but they are to be found at different levels.87 these three levels of liberation are interdependent, and they merge into one history. for gutierrez, there are not two histories, one profane and one sacred; rather there is only one human history. but this history is a conflictual one, a history of conflicts of interest, of struggles for justice, a history of exploitation of human beings, of aspirations for liberation.88 boff agrees with gutierrez in that salvation and liberation are distinct, but they are united. the intimate relationship between love of god and love of neighbor helps us to understand the intimate relationship between salvation and liberation. both are not identical, but each is present in the other. they are always together and cannot be separated. but boff still posits a dualism between salvation and liberation. for boff, liberation is never full and complete, it always carries a quota of oppression, whereas salvation is total liberation. boff makes the parallel of liberation and salvation with the concepts of body and soul. body and soul are two principles, together forming a single human individual. the principles of body and soul enable us to understand a human being in its unity-in-duality. using this model, boff explains that salvation and historical liberation constitute the unity-in-duality of one single history, just as body and spirit constitute the dual unity of a human being. to quote boff: the concrete human being is a unity-in-duality. body and soul should not be understood as two things making up the one human being. body and soul are two concrete principles, together forming a single thing, the human individual. principles are not things. they are what enable us to understand things__in this case, body and soul are the principles that enable us to understand the concrete human being in its unity-in-duality.89 although boff himself is not so clear about the unity of salvation and liberation, his “theory of one history” (or one reality) makes a contribution to the liberation theology of latin america. as such, his theory is a disturbance to the catholic hierarchy in the vatican. he interprets social oppression as social sin, and applies christian terminology to social structures. salvation is experienced through the process of social liberation. solving the problems of political and economic oppression is part of salvific 48 prajna vihara __ __ ~ process. it seems to me that liberation theology, in its attempt to interpret the bible in terms of concrete historical contexts, faces the tension between social liberation and personal salvation. liberation theology has been criticizing the traditional christian churches in their individualistic and otherworldly interpretation of salvation. yet it cannot be satisfied with liberation within history as the total human fulfillment. although the attempts of liberation theologians, ones like gutierrez and boff, to overcome the tension between salvation from history and liberation within history are not complete, their interpretations have shed some light on the perspective of human fulfillment__salvation within history. i would like to conclude this section by saying that liberation within history is the presupposition of salvation within history. in conclusion, liberation theology in latin america represents a third world christian response to the global market economy. under monopoly capitalism, most third world countries have been economically dominated and exploited by first world countries, through the global market economy. liberation theology has borrowed social theoryparticularly the dependency theory__from the latin american school of social sciences to name the economic and political realities of the continent. it has also utilized marxist social analysis, especially class struggle, to unmask oppressive social structures, both at the local and the global levels. although marxism failed to offer a successful alternative economic system, witnessed in its failure in china, the former soviet union, and eastern europe, it still provides an essential tool for the analysis and understanding of the functions of capitalism today. the failure of marxian economic systems in asia and europe has challenged liberation theology and its ideal of socialism. under this new global situation, liberation theology has been forced to reflect upon itself in the context of the new reality. this, over time, may result in a new dimension to liberation theology. liberation theology probably represents the most systematic religious revival in response to social oppression among today’s world religions. and it is probably, as marc ellis and otto maduro point out, the most significant christian theological development in the twentieth century. tavivat puntarigvivat 49 endnotes 1hans koning, columbus: his enterprise, p.53. 2l. s. stavrianos, global rift, p.76. 3m. leon-portilla, ed., the broken spears: the aztec account of the conquest of mexico, p.64. 4e. bradford burns, latin america: a concise interpretative history (englewood cliffs, new jersey, prentice-hall, inc.,1972), p.14-20. 5m. leon-portilla, ed., the broken spears: the aztec account of the conquest of mexico, p.94. 6the arrivals of europeans and africans in the lands of the native americans contributed to the racial mixture of the population in latin america: the mestizo (the cross of indigenous and white race), the sambos (the cross of indigenous and african race), the mulattos (the cross of white and black), and myriad other interracial combination. 7for more details, see l. s. stavrianos, global rift, pp.90-98. 8for more details on the historical development of liberation theology, see phillip berryman, liberation theology (bloomington, indiana: meyer stone books, 1987), pp. 9-107. 9phillip berryman, liberation theology, p.24. 10ibid., p.64. 11ibid., p.65. 12ibid., pp.100-101. 13see marc h. ellis and otto maduro (editors), the future of liberation theology: essays in honor of gustavo gutierrez (maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1989). 14for more details, see paulo freire, pedagogy of the oppressed (new york: continuum, 1990). 15gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p. 11. emphasis in original. 16for a more complete critique of the structure of church hierarchy, see leonardo boff, church: charism and power: liberation theology and the institutional church, translated by john w. diercksmeier (new york: crossroad, 1988). 17gibson winter, liberating creation, p.129. 18gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p. 15. emphasis in original. 19cited by gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p. 116. (see “socioeconomic structures of peru”, in between honesty and hope, p.74.) 20gibson winter, liberating creation, p.134. 21john c. raines, modern work and human meaning, p.83. emphasis in original. 22gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p.308. 23 leonardo & clodovis boff, salvation and liberation, pp 8-9. 24see more details in juan luis segundo, the liberation of theology (maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1988). 25leonardo & clodovis boff, salvation and liberation, p.50. 26roger n. lancaster, thanks to god and the revolution: popular religion and class consciousness in the new nicaragua (new york: columbia university 50 prajna vihara __ __ ~ press, 1988), p.xx. 27gustavo gutierrez, the power of the poor in history, translated from the spanish by robert r. barr (maryknoll, new york, orbis books, 1990), p.45. 28see more details in franz hinkelammert, the ideological weapons of death: a theological critique of capitalism, translated from the spanish by phillip berryman (maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1986). 29gustavo gutierrez, the power of the poor in history, p.20. 30leonardo & clodovis boff, salvation and liberation, p.29. the nova historia da igreja na america latina, in thirteen volumes, is the most complete of this rereading latin american history in the interest of liberation. 31for a more complete perspective on the philosophy of liberation, see enrique dussel, philosophy of liberation, translated from the spanish by aquilina martinez and christine morkovsy (maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1985). 32ibid., pp.8-9. 33gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p.300. 34ibid., pp.193-194. 35ibid., pp.194, 295. 36ibid., p.195. 37ibid., p.202. 38ibid., p.205. 39leonardo & clodovis boff, salvation and liberation, p.25. 40see more details in jose miranda, marx and the bible: a critique of the philosophy of oppression (maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1988). 41gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p.174. 42karl marx, early writings (new york: vintage books, 1975), p.423. emphasis in original. 43for the history of and philosophical basis for human rights, see leonard swidler (editor), human rights: christians, marxists and others in dialogue (new york: paragon house, 1991). 44see more details in juan luis segundo, the liberation of theology. 45see phillip berryman, liberation theology, pp.118, 112. 46ibid., p.86. 47“action”, new internationalist, august 1975, p.32. 48annette fuentes and barbara ehrenreich, women in the global factory, p.42. 49ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, p.144. 50annette fuentes and barbara ehrenreich, women in the global factory, p.43. 51ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, p.137. 52annette fuentes & barbara ehrenreich, women in the global factory, p.31. 53primitivo rodriguez, “we can do more for mexico than a free-trade pact”, in the philadelphia inquirer (january 18, 1993), p.a11. 54ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, pp.6-7. 55ibid., pp.113-114. 56phillip berryman, liberation theology, p.123. tavivat puntarigvivat 51 57world bank, world development report 1989, pp.164-65. 58ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, p.6. 59gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p.25. 60ibid., p.26. 61kenneth jameson and peter henriot, “international debt, austerity and the poor”, lee travis, ed., rekindling development: multinational firms and world debt (notre dame: university of notre dame press, 1988), pp.15-56. 62todaro, economic development (1989), p.419. 63william r. cline, international debt and the stability of the world economy (1983: institute for international economics, washington, d.c.). 64ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, p.117. 65 jameson and henriot, “international debt, austerity and the poor”, lee travis, ed., rekindling development, pp.15-56. 66cited by james p. grant, state of the world’s children 1990 (unesco), pp.45, 47. 67ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, p.119. 68ibid. 69see more details in hugo assmann, “the faith of the poor in their struggle with idols”, in pablo richard et al., the idols of death and the god of life: a theology, translated from the spanish by barbara e. campbell and bonnie shepard (maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1983), pp.194-229. 70ronald j. sider, rich christians in an age of hunger, p.145. 71phillip berryman, liberation theology, p.93. 72michael novak, will it liberate? questions about liberation theology (new york, mahwah: paulist press, 1986), p.109. 73ibid., p.110. 74see michael novak, the spirit of democratic capitalism (new york: simon & schuster, 1982), pp.272-314. 75michael novak, will it liberate?, p.114. 76cited by phillip berryman, liberation theology, p.182. 77phillip berryman, liberation theology, p.184. 78ibid., p.183. 79gustavo gutierrez, a theology of liberation, p. 91. emphasis in original. 80ibid., p.167. 81ibid., pp.167, 175. 82ibid., p.30. emphasis in original. 83ibid., p.31. 84ibid., p.36. 85ibid., p.32. emphasis in original. 86ibid., p.37. 87ibid., p.176. 88gustavo gutierrez, the power of the poor in history, p.52. 89leonardo & clodovis boff, salvation and liberation, p.63. 52 prajna vihara __ __ ~ bibliography assmann, hugo. “the faith of the poor in their struggle with idols”. in pablo richard, the idols of death and the god of life: a theology. translated from the spanish by barbara e. campbell and bonnie shepard. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1983. berryman, phillip. liberation theology. bloomington, indiana: meyer stone books, 1987. boff, leonardo. church: charism and power: liberation theology and the institutional church. translated by john w. diercksmeier. new york: crossroad, 1988. ______ and clodovis boff. salvation and liberation. translated from the portuguese by robert r. barr. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1988. bradford burns, e. latin america: a concise interpretative history. englewood cliffs, new jersey, prentice-hall, inc.,1972. cline, william r. international debt and the stability of the world economy. washington, d.c.: institute for international economics, 1983. dussel, enrique. philosophy of liberation. translated from the spanish by aquilinamartinez and christine morkovsy. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1985. ellis, marc h. and otto maduro (editors). the future of liberation theology: essays in honor of gustavo gutierrez. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1989. freire, paulo. pedagogy of the oppressed. translated by myra bergman ramos. new york: continuum, 1990. fuentes, annette and barbara ehrenreich. women in the global factory. boston: south end press, 1987. grant, james p. state of the world’s children 1990. oxford: oxford university press, 1990. gutierrez, gustavo. a theology of liberation. translated and edited by sister caridad inda and john eagleson. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1986. ______. the power of the poor in history. translated from the spanish by robert r. barr. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1990. hinkelammert, franz. the ideological weapons of death: a theological critique of capitalism. translated from the spanish by phillip berryman. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1986. tavivat puntarigvivat 53 jameson, kenneth, and peter henriot. “international debt, austerity and the poor”. in lee travis (editor), rekindling development: mulinational firms and world debt. notre dame: universit of notre dame press, 1988. koning, hans. columbus: his enterprise, exploding the myth. new york: monthly review press, 1992. lancaster, roger n. thanks to god and the revolution: popular religion and classconsciousness in the new nicaragua. new york: columbia university press, 1988. leon-portilla, m. (editor). the broken spears: the aztec account of the conquest of mexico. boston: beacon press, 1969. marx, karl. early wrintings. introduced by lucio colletti, translated by rodney livingstone and gregor benton. new york: vintage books, 1975. miranda, jose porfirio. marx and the bible: a critique of the philosophy of oppression. translated by john eagleson. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1988. novak, michael. the spirit of democratic capitalism. new york: simon & schuster, 1982. ______. will it liberate?: questions about liberation theology. new york, mahwah: paulist press, 1986. raines, john c. and donna c. day-lower. modern work and human meaning. philadelphia: the westminster press, 1986. rodriguez, primitivo. “we can do more for mexico than a free-trade pact”. in the philadelphia inquirer, january 18, 1993. segundo, juan luis. the liberation of thology. translated by john drury. maryknoll, new york: orbis books, 1988. sider, ronald j. rich christians in an age of hunger. dallas, london, vancouver, melbourne: word publishing, 1990. stavrianos, l.s. global rift: the third world comes of age. new york: william morrow and company, inc., 1981. swidler, leonard. (editor). human rights: christians, marxists and others in dialogue. new york: paragon house, 1991. todaro, michael p. economic development in the third world. fourth edition. new york: longman, 1989. winter, gibson. liberating creation: foundations of religious social ethics. new york: crossroad, 1981. world bank. world development report 1989. washington, the world bank, 1989. 54 prajna vihara __ __ ~ 11_(175-192) indigenous values for.pmd indigenous values for sustainable nation building de guia, katrin de guia author of “kapwa: the self in the other” abstract this paper introduces the philippine indigenous psychology or “sikolohiyang pilipino”, in connection with concepts of the philippine personality model “pagkataong filipino” by dr. virgilio enriquez. sikolohiyang pilipino has become an academic discipline reflecting asian social realities in the field of psychology. it is a psychology of, for, and about the philippine people. it is also a step towards a “world psychology” __ what psychology could become after transcending the limiting constructs of western academic frameworks (which marginalize indigenous psychologies). sikolohiyang pilipino links modern social science to the cultural heritage of the philippine people and their (once) ecology-friendly indigenous knowledge systems and practices. the core concept of this system is “kapwa”__“the including self” (in contrast to the “excluding self” of individualistic cultures). equivalent terms have been identified among other ancestral cultures and indigenous peoples around the world. introduction sikolohiyang filipino is the first indigenous psychology taught at a university. in the early 1980’s, it was established as a university program at the university of the philippines. this was a major advance in the critique of the anglo-american dominance in the international academe. its teaching materials are based on the common experience (history, language, arts, spirituality, etc.) of the peoples of malay-polynesian heritage (and of first nations in the usa). the discipline affirmed the native his175prajna vihara, volume 14, number 1-2, january-december 2013, 175-192 2000 by assumption university pressc -~ tory, values and characteristics of a region, and developed theories, concepts and methods with the local culture as source. the emerging culture-fair models were tried, tested and compared with standard theories/ methods in psychology. psychology, as represented by sikolohiyang filipino, is a multifaceted human science. it accommodates findings from the academicscientific psychologies of industrialized nations and the clerical psychology of academic-philosophical schools. it expands this scope by including ethnic psychology and oral traditions (i.e. the ancestral psycho-medical systems that are rooted in spiritual experience). sikolohiyang filipino proponents consider art (traditional and contemporary) and the findings from the fields of humanities, history, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, etc., as sources for psychological knowledge. in short, they declare both the scientific and the humanistic approaches in psychology, as valid. sikolohiyang filipino aims to balance the present dependence in the philippines on u.s.-centric educational models and establish a truly universal psychology in the service of all mankind. background: colonialization disrupts social and ecological equilibrium in the philippines “the moment we began to view ourselves through western eyes, what we held sacred suddenly became worthless, our virtues turned into vices, our strengths turned into weaknesses, and our triumphs into failures. we could no longer be proud of anything truly our own and began to regard anything native as primitive and undeveloped. anything indigenous became a source of embarrassment and uneasiness”. (felipe de leon jr., president akademiya ng sikolohiyang filipino, 2004) the filipino people, since the 16th century, have been the unwilling recipients of invading cultures, religions, education, and value systems from europe and the americas. until today, western educational models reflecting the us colonial policy of “benevolent assimilation” (pro176 prajna vihara-~ moted through free public schooling) still dominate the horizon of philippine public education, from elementary to university levels. the strong influence of spanish catholicism is also still pervasive in philippine politics and social relations. in contrast, the ecology-friendly indigenous knowledge systems and practices (iksp) of pre-colonial filipinos are marginalized (in schools and media) and even suppressed. where ancestral knowledge system and practices once taught communities that nature was a partner in co-existence, the avaricious western schemes encourage the exploitation of natural resources. the continuing “mis-education” of filipinos with such imported discourse has dire consequences: in the wake of a continued exodus of educated filipinos for job placements abroad, an increasing mass of illiterate, unskilled, and often landless rural folks has turned to ravaging the environment. their desperate efforts to assuage poverty and own a slice of progress spell a road map to an ecological disaster, where the harmony between man and the environment is spiraling out of balance. iksp equal eco-balance: a need for recovery recently, the growing consequences of global warming have pressured soul-searching scientists to point to the shortcomings of western environmental knowledge __ especially concerning global biodiversity. the link between indigenous knowledge and the conservation of biodiversity has been established (regpala, 2010). where academic knowledge (ak) in economics teaches how to maximize profit, indigenous knowledge (ik) invokes a sustainable law of supply and demand: “hunt only what you can eat. harvest only what you can consume. leave some fruits on the tree for others”. lately, lawmakers and international ecology agencies, seek to include the indigenous peoples (ip) sector in drawing up global environmental policies__ to ease the consequences of our extractive/ destructive modern culture. one example for ancestral expertise regarding the ecosystem is the “pinugo” or the ancient watershed systems that sustain the rice terraces of the ifugao people, who inhabit the cordillera mountain ranges in northern philippines. such time-tested eco-wisdom about water cycles, de guia, katrin de guia 177 irrigation, and forest management is said to date back almost 3 millennia and was retained by rice-cycle rituals for many centuries. unesco has cited the ifugao rice terraces as tangible living-culture heritage and a tribute to indigenous knowledge. however, due to the modernization of their lifestyles, ancestral communities in the cordilleras today have ceased to be the stewards of their natural resources. excessive logging in the once sacred communal “pinugo” watersheds__ for woodcarving exports and commercial vegetable gardens __ has caused the springs to dry up. soil erosion alters the ingenious irrigation that originated in the dawn of time. the ifugao rice terraces are endangered. so are the ancestral ways of the ifugao people. the imposition of western values in the philippines__ through missionary schools__ has damaged ancestral communal self-restraint. this is happening around the world. what western economic models fail to factor into their efficiency-oriented models and theories is that the world is a holistic system. man and nature operate interdependently. this systemic view is one of the most important features of the ancestral iksp. the holistic orientation is implicit in the traditional filipino value system of “pagkataong filipino”. here, the core value “kapwa” (the “shared self”) stands for the including of others (people, spirits, even animals, plants, rocks, bodies of water, etc.) in the concept of self. filipino personality, then, is a psychological framework that extends the animistic worldview of the hunter-gatherer societies, among whom respect for the environment is the norm. such a mind-set seeks equilibrium__ i.e. fairness in the social order, pooling resources and strengths in communities, a balanced co-existence of man with nature, and so on. education based on such principles could make a whole lot of difference in modernizing nations like the philippines and other developing countries. and it can address the problems of global warming as well. indigenous filipino psychology as an academic effort in redeeming ik the late filipino psychologist dr. virgilio enriquez pioneered in recognizing the importance of the indigenous social values for contem178 prajna vihara-~ porary society. in the ’70s, he was among a group of social scientists that roused academia in asia to look for a more appropriate social science that was free from western representations. he used findings from anthropology about filipino iksp and other asian cultural traditions as the basis for the values of his novel “person-hood” (pagka-tao) model in psychology. his theory centered on “kapwa”__ the “shared self”. support from the japanese academe helped him to publish his theory in 1989. enriquez and his peers (among them zeus salazar, prospero covar, the late national scientist alfredo lagmay and others) founded “sikolohiyang pilipino” or “filipino indigenous psychology” in the early ’80s, asserting kapwa psychology as an academic discipline. in the ’90s, the group established a graduate program at the psychology department of the university of the philippines. psychological research then included pre-colonial worldviews too, in order to re-discover ways that could strengthen the contemporary filipino society. the philippine personality theory: “pagkataong pilipino” (filipino personhood) the filipino “personhood” model of enriquez is a central paradigm within sikolohiyang pilipino. many, who examined it, are inspired by the insightful foresight of the us-trained filipino psychologist__ to create a personality model from the common, local concepts of his country (mendoza 2008, strobel 1996, 2012, de castro 2012). others criticize the model as an unfounded construct, unsupported by empirical and experimental data (st. maria, 1993). academic efforts to verify enriquez’ theory continue (yacat & clemente 2009, conaco 2012). the author is the first phd graduate in sikolohiyang pilipino from the psychology department of the university of the philippines. although german born, i had lived over three decades in philippines. my research on the worldviews and lifestyles of filipino artist culture-bearers was published and continued to propagate the “pagkataong pilipino” theory of her mentor virgilio enriquez. the book catalyzed several university conferences (in both the philippines and the usa) that examined the importance of values such as “kapwa” for the globalizing society. from my de guia, katrin de guia 179 own precarious positiontrying to make sense of my host country as an outsider, by looking at everything filipino with german cultural filters __ the personhood paradigm helped me to understand my host culture better. for lack of space, my discussion of enriquez’ “value system of the philippine personality” omits some constructs, namely the three colonial / accommodative surface values and the three associated behavioral patterns. in this primer on the philippine personality (pagkataong filipino) the three core-values of the theory are explained, together with two more concepts. 180 prajna vihara-~ confrontative bahala na lakas ng pakikibaka surface values (determination) loob (guts) (resistance) pivotal interpersonal pakiramdam {pakipag-kapwa tao} value (shared identity) kapwa (shared identity) core value kagandahang-loob {pagkamakatao} linking socio personal (shared humanity) value associated karangalan katarungan kalayaan societal values (dignity) (justice) (freedom) the concepts of the philippine personality structure. the three core values of pagkataong filipino: 1) kapwa or pakiki-pag-kapwa (shared identity) the core value of the philippine personality is “kapwa”. this notion of a “shared self” extends the “i” to include the “other”. it bridges the deepest recess of a person with anyone outside him or herself__ even total strangers. “people are just people in spite of their age, clothes, diplomas, color or affiliations”, said one filipino artist (de guia 2006). “kapwa” is the “unity of the one-of-us-and-the-other”, according to enriquez, who introduced his construct as a prime value in filipino social interaction. kapwa implies moral and normative aspects that oblige a person to treat one another as fellow human beings and therefore as coequal, said the scholar. but he also foresaw that this value was threatened by the spreading western influences, when he wrote: “...once ako (the ‘i’) starts thinking of himself as separate from kapwa, the filipino ‘self ’ gets to be individuated as in the western sense and, in effect, denies the status of kapwa to the other”. (enriquez ’89) today, most filipinos hearing the word “kapwa” think of their neighbors or their immediate circle of friends. but standard tagalog dictionaries (vito santos, 1986) pronounce “kapwa” as “fellow being” and “the other person”. older, spanish dictionaries translate “kapuwa” as “both” and “the one and the other”, or “others”. from all these, enriquez concluded that the original filipino idea of “others” was inclusive. he wrote: “the english “others” is actually used in opposition to the “self”, and implies the recognition of the self as a separate entity. in contrast, kapwa is a recognition of a shared identity, an inner self shared with others”. he also said: “a person starts having kapwa not so much because of a recognition of status given him by others but more so because of his awareness of shared identity. the ako (ego) and the iba-sa-akin (others) are one and the same in kapwa psychology”. (enriquez, ’92) this inclusiveness in the philippine language, of the self and others, is unique __ and different from the language of modern, individualistic societies, asserts enriquez. for him, such inclusiveness implies the moral obligation to treat one another as equal fellow human beings. people, who practice kapwa in their lives, display a genuine, people-centered orientation. they share their surplus and go out of their way to lend others a hand. their commitment to their community is palpable. they are good leaders, quick to volunteer, willing to share their resources, skills and knowledge freely (i.e. by teaching children, facilitating municipal workshops, or working with the poor, etc.). usually, their help comes with big smile. community building is second nature to a people of such a bearing. kapwa inspires them to facilitate at meetings and participate in civic affairs. how powerful this filipino core concept is and what it can facilitate on a global scale can be seen in the philippine 1986 people power movement that unseated a corrupt dictator; as well as in the filipinospanish war and the philippine-american wars, which the people won against all odds (like in vietnam). de guia, katrin de guia 181 kapwa-inspired leaders are able to motivate others by living their ideals, rather than imposing their will. in our globalizing age, where it is essential to network, to mobilize masses, build consent and spread ideas, the kapwa orientation might be quite helpful to do that. 2) paki-ramdam (knowing through feeling) as the heart is central to the body, the shared self nurtures the philippine personality (filipino personhood). but “kapwa” does not reside alone at the core. it manifests in “paki-ramdam” __ the pivotal interpersonal value that would translate into the english word “feeling”. but the scope of paki-ramdam embraces so much more than feeling! it matches the ocean-like expanse of kapwa with an equally large field of piercing awareness. in the west this is called emotional intelligence and a lot of coaches build their management training on this platform nowadays. among filipinos, this is but a built-in cultural trait. enriquez named this emotional fineness of filipinos “shared perception” or “shared inner perception” (enriquez ’92). rita mataragnon (in pe-pua ’82) describes paki-ramdam as an emotional a-priori that lies within filipino personhood. enriquez asserts that this all-important value operates behind and drives all other filipino values. a steering emotion, a keen inner sense that initiates all deeds, paki-ramdam seems to trigger the spontaneous actions of helping and volunteering that come with sharing the self. according to mataragnon’s research, most filipinos can boast this heightened sensitivity. they are good in sensing cues, she finds. the empathic “feeling for another”; the talent of “sizing up others”; even “reading signs” (for dangers and weather); or the filipino healer’s skill of sensing the diseases of a patient in his/her body prior to meeting the sick person __ all these call for acute awareness of subtle traces, nuances and gestures. paki-ramdam indicates a tacit cognitive process that assembles information from a multitude of fragments and impressions. it works well within the indigenous filipino social reality, where emotions are participatory, open and constantly shared. where personal privacy is neither existent nor needed. the kapwa disposition must have it this way, initiating constantly new interpersonal encounters through sharing space, food, ideas, beliefs, histories, opinions, gossip, joys, tears, and more. 182 prajna vihara-~ heightened sensitivity makes a good survival tool in a society where not all social interactions are carried out with words. it comes in handy in our globalizing world, where not everybody speaks each other’s language, or, where people speak the same language but interpret words differently. paki-ramdam can help a person navigate the ambiguities of daily living __ knowing the right moment to join a group, when to ask questions or present one’s argument, or how to blend in with other people. this sensitivity is a definite social skill, intrinsic to the filipino personality (and likely to other asian / indigenous peoples, too). 3) kagandahang-loob (shared inner nobility) the third core-value of the filipino personality is “kagandahangloob”__“shared inner nobility”. the dictionary renders this phrase as a very general concept that emphasizes the beauty of something. its meaning is so broad__it stands for “anything good about something”. the term also translates into “nobility” and “generosity”. victor saway is a young and powerful leader from the talaandig tribe, who founded the first and longest existing school of living traditions in the philippines. at a recent conference, he referred to the inner radiance of kagandahang-loob, when he shared that the students at his school could be only motivated with beauty. “show them beauty and they will be naturally following you!” said the charismatic chief. as a core-value, kagandahang-loob acts like an anchor that grounds kapwa and paki-ramdam in the enduring beliefs of filipino indigenous knowledge. these are basic: god is good. life is about learning, creating and sharing. life is good, even if there is hardship. every sunrise brings a new day, a new horizon. there is always hope. kagandahang-loob would guide a person towards authentic acts of goodness and generosity; towards a nurturing that has its origin in genuine empathy. an example is the story of a filipino sailor, as told to a journalist by a tailor in saigon, vietnam. this seamstress, a mother of three orphans, had been widowed during the war. to make ends meet, she worked as an employee at a small tailoring shop near the harbor. she had never met the filipino seaman before and never saw him again afterwards. he had just walked one day into the shop and ordered a suit. during a casual conversation, he learned of the widow’s plight. when he de guia, katrin de guia 183 returned to pick up his suit, he handed the woman an envelope with money to buy her own sewing machine. needing no further thanks, he headed back to the boat and sailed on. the philippine historian reynaldo ileto (pasyon and revolution, 1979) pointed out how important the strife for a noble character (kagandahang loob) was among the historical filipino freedom fighters. he wrote that these “bayanis” (heroes) reminded their followers that nobility had to be re-won every day. they also taught that it was all right to be rich, as long as an equally beautiful character matched the external signs of power. kapwa consciousness in a turbulent world: the relevance of enriquez’ core values in a new world order in summary, the three core-concepts of the value-structure of the philippine personality theory are kapwa, paki-ramdam and kagandahangloob. translated as shared identity (inclusiveness), shared inner perception (a keen sensitivity, enhanced feeling) and shared humanity (nobility, generosity), these values show the humanistic inclination of the filipino. the philippines today__ as the rest of the world__ finds itself at the threshold of a new order. our changes in weather and denuded mountains tell important stories. but these stories are lost in the manipulated “news”, advertisements and other stories we see on tv. for global wholeness and unity, a balance must be found between the ancient organic and the modern mechanical forces of our world. kapwa and the core values of filipino person-hood do advocate wholeness and balance. these values emphasize the function of the whole + its isolated parts. such a worldview seems quite useful for our overcrowding planet, where we have to learn how to tolerate each other in order to survive. the including orientation of the filipino person-hood, with its core values shared identity, shared inner perception, and shared humanity __trains us how to blend and collaborate, to enhance and support one-another. it teaches people to pool their strength and achieve common goals by working together; how to share surplus instead of hoard184 prajna vihara-~ ing and racketeering. on a personal level, these filipino values make sure that the heart is also full, not just the stomach or the bank account. could we call the latter: prophylactic mental health? additional elements of enriquez’ theory: enriquez’ value system of philippine psychology has stimulated a considerable body of research, mostly on the core value kapwa __ the shared self. (pe-pua, santiago, mataragnon, church, odal, de guia, st. maria, strobel, de castro, mendoza, perkinson, de leon, ajejo, obusan, yacat & clemente, conaco, bautista, himeda, lee, and others). for this short introduction to enriquez’ theory, its fifteen values have been narrowed down to nine. the colonial / accommodative surface values and the associated behavioral patterns have been omitted for reasons that they dwell on the re-interpretation of early research by american anthropologists visiting the philippines. readers interested in the entire value system can find it in virgilio enriquez’ book “from colonial to liberation psychology” (1992) or in my book “kapwa __ the self in the other” (2006), both available from anvil publishing house, pasig, philippines. the two additional values discussed in this paper are, respectively, from the categories of the associated societal values and the confrontative surface values. what is a societal value? it is a conviction that is deeply rooted in the ancestral heritage of a people. such a disposition directs the personal values of an individual in profound and unquestioned ways. “kalayaan” a.k.a. “freedom”, “liberty” and “independence” is such a societal value. another, all-important value describes the confrontative character of filipinos. this construct is based on the filipino expression “bahalana!” (“what come may be!”) and refers to a mysterious determination that is linked to spiritual confidencea courage generated from trust in god. de guia, katrin de guia 185 kalayaan (freedom, independence, thinking outside-the-box) and the kapwa culture the philippine value “kalayaan” reflects the untamed need of all living beings to be free. it is dubbed as the sine qua non of filipino personhood. the importance of this societal value becomes clear when one considers the archipelagic habitat of the filipino people, whose ancestors traversed the seas between their 7000 islands on tiny vessels since the dawn of time. flexibility and patience are the virtues of a sailor. no one can dictate on the wind! ileto (1979), in his study of historical freedom fighters, examined this filipino ideal. he noticed that filipino children, traditionally, enjoyed great freedom while growing up. indulged by their parents, they were allowed to learn at their own speed, experiment with life as “saling pusa” (informal group member), and slowly discover and manifest, who they really were as human beings (kapwa tao). the expected result of such liberal rearing was that children who had been indulged by the whole clan would grow up to be tolerant, emancipated and open-minded adults, indulging others. this kind of reasoning worked for countless generations of ancestral filipino kapwa cultures (and may still work for remote indigenous communities). however, the same assumption can also produce the opposite effect: without the proper discipline and training in such things as respect, propriety, compassion and humility, the liberties bestowed on children can mold them into irresponsible and permissive adults, writes ileto. the pampered child spoiled rotten! people ruled by outright selfishness were often the progenies of politicians, royalties, merchants, and other members of the privileged class, he said. can the rigid class systems that are imposed by empires over more egalitarian oriented kapwa cultures be traced as the seedbeds for the rampant global corruption and greed? today’s individualistic city cultures hardly cultivate anymore empathy (paki-ramdam), or genuine kindness (kagandahang-loob), or sharing. many middle-class youngsters in philippine urban settings are reared in an atmosphere of materialistic indulgence paired with the individualistic values of ego-hood. instead of merging with the shared self, we bump into the expanded ego in our malls and streets: people walk beside each 186 prajna vihara-~ other chatting or eyes glued to their mobile phones. freedom now means owning an electronic device with earphones. kalayaan manifested as “filipino time” another aspect of kalayaan refers to the concept of time: a minute more, an hour less, what difference does that make for the now? philippine time, some say, is experiential time (mercado, 1977; de leon, 2008). it is “cosmic time”, not “clock-time”. rather, it is “organic time”__ cyclical, oscillating, approximating, alive! it is a “felt time” filled with memories and contemplations __ not the repetitive staccato of machine time, or the sterile on/off bytes of computer time. a researcher once asked filipino farmers about their concept of time (nicado henson in pe-pua 82). she reported that none of those rural folks measured time by such things as a watch, even though some of them owned one. instead, these natives measured time by the sun; by lunar and by planting cycles; by harvesting seasons; or by the time span it takes to smoke a cigarette. to the despair of some foreign investors and urban administrators, “filipino time” has endured in the philippines. where no cash exists, or where money is not valued enough, the dictum “time is money” does not hold. this attitude rings from the statement of a blacksmith (a character in a film by kidlat tahimik). he owns not much more than his machete, a hammer and a small thatched-roof hut. he is poor, as per imf standards. but he feels “wealthy” when he says, “kaya kong mamundok ng isang buwan, …walang mawawala dito sa bahay ko -yan ang yaman ko!” (i can disappear in the mountains for a month… nothing in my house is worth stealing __ this freedom is my wealth!) bahala-na! __ the tacit trust that can move mountains the closing concept in this discussion of enriquez’ personality theory is the confrontational value “bahala-na!” __ “determination”, “ende guia, katrin de guia 187 durance” and “trust in god” (bathala) and the god-power in man. whenever confronted by the unknown, or challenging / potentially dangerous situations-filipinos take a deep breath and say “bahala na!” before they move. early scholars from america framed this as a negative attitude bordering on fatalism. but the late philippine national scientist alfredo lagmay said that those visiting anthropologists had misinterpreted the way his countrymen use this filipino expression. when those outsiders framed up “bahala-na!” as the apathy of a happy-go-lucky people (stereotyped by colonial masters as “juan tamad”, the “lazy joe”), they were not aware of the whole story. they did not know that “bahala-na!” had sacred undertones: its inscription in alibata (a local version of the ancient syllabic writings of asia) divides the term into “ba” (babae) for “woman” and “la” (lalake) for “man” __ bridged by the syllable “ha” (hanging), which means “breath” and “wind” and, therefore, also “spirit” or “god”. bahala-na!, then, is the expression that pre-christian filipinos invoked when they called on their deity (bathala) in times of dire need. lagmay salvaged bahala-na! from its fatalistic reputation. he transformed “devil-may-care!” into “determination in the face of uncertainty” __ a confrontative filipino value that stimulates resourcefulness and the creativity to survive. in lagmay’s interpretation, bahala-na! inspired action, not inaction. it was not invoked to avoid or forget problems; rather, this expression implied perseverance and hard work. as value, it instilled the courage to see oneself through hard times, said the scholar, who added: “it drives a person on, even beyond his/her own frailties and limitations, to find a creative way out!” in no uncertain terms, lagmay (a psychologist mentored by skinner and roger) attributed the dynamics of filipino courage and determination to bahala-na! __ a value that stands for risk taking in the face of possible failure. the scholar cites this trust in god and the ultimate goodness of life as one of the reason, why so many filipinos grab the chance to make their fortune abroad (leaving on one-way tickets, often without fixed contracts). he also saw the origin of this behavior in a social structure that challenged people to exercise their ability to cope with constant change. the filipino flexibility expressed in bahala-na!, he wrote, developed as a response to living along the earth’s “fire-belt”, an environment 188 prajna vihara-~ that taught its inhabitants to be resourceful, adaptable and creative in order to survive. bahala-na!, then, signifies an improvisatory skill. it is a strength that helps filipinos to access the “deep source in man”, where solutions to anything can be found. but the security offered by bahala-na! would be quite different from the static security of the sigurista __ a person who always makes sure that everything is under control, says the harvard graduate. elaborating on this aspect some more, lagmay traced the dividing line between a people who love to follow rules and others, who prefer to walk out on a limb: “we plan everything to the minutest detail and act according to the blue-print of fixed specifications. this is what the administration wants. it is in contrast to the attitude of someone, who does not know what life will bring, one who will not try to predict the future. for such a person, the needed information will arrive at its own time and only when necessary”, he wrote. kapwa psychology and sustainable nation building the qualities that make up the kapwa orientation are the shoal on which life-enhancing, culture-building attitudes grow __ orientations of the kind that any leader would love to instill among his people. kapwa and the filipino person-hood could mold political advocates to be models of conduct, truly endowed to inspire others. it could mold an effective citizenry that achieved much by working together in harmony and out of free will. there is a need for men and women who practice what they believe; for people, who manage to resist the cultural erosion that swamps the world since the large-scale adoption of wasteful consumerist lifestyles. vital for the survival of mankind (or any culture) today are individuals, who can encourage future generations to adapt a world-view that is nurtured by both: the wisdom of the past and the vision of a global unity in the future. kapwa values could also provide cultural brakes to that runaway international economy that we face with all its social, environmental and humanitarian impacts. de guia, katrin de guia 189 conclusion we have discussed the kapwa orientation of sikolohiyang pilipino (indigenous philippine psychology), as virgilio enriquez has formulated it in his filipino personality model. its values enhance shared humanity; empathy and emotional intelligence; shared perception (where the other is always seen as his or her best!); a social connectedness that is based on respecting the sovereignty of others; independence/freedom with responsibility; creativity/ thinking outside of the box; as well as determination that comes from a tacit belief in ones strength and is guided by a sound intuition. sadly, in today’s philippine society, this kapwa orientation is buriedlike fine gold dust in the riverbanks. it may have to be winnowed again from layers and layers of heavy colonial sand. would it be worth to re-discover the ancestral kapwa ways for policy makers, teachers, managers and other leaders? at a recent symposium for philippine schools of living traditions, the talaandig chieftain migketay victor saway said: “we need to protect, preserve and promote our cultural heritage and identity as a people. we need to develop a sense of identity and cultural values among our children and youth. we need to be culturally accountable to our people and our community”. quipped filmmaker kidlat tahimik: “for those commitments, i would vote this tribal chieftain as our next president!” references ajejo, a. “loob, kapwa at ang paggalang sa tamang salita” unpublished paper read at kapwa-1, u.p. diliman, 2004. aganon, a. & david (eds.) sikolohiyang pilipino. national bookstore publishing, manila 1985. bautista, v. “kapwa: theory and practice of indigenous clinical psychology in the philippines”. unpublished paper read at kapwa3, u.p. baguio, 2012. church, t. a. filipino personality: a review. de la salle university 190 prajna vihara-~ press, manila 1986. conaco, m.c. “recent kapwa research: updates on the kapwa concept in psychological research”. unpublished paper read at kapwa-3, u.p. baguio, 2012. de castro, e. “notes on the origins of indigenous/indigenized psychologies” unpublished paper read at kapwa-2, u.p. iloilo, 2008. --------- “the shared self __ lost and found: a dialogue in reindigenization” unpublished paper read at kapwa-3, u.p. baguio, 2012. de guia, k. kapwa, the self in the other. anvil publication, manila, 2006. de leon, f. jr. “the atman of kalooban: kapwa as an asian concept”. unpublished paper read at kapwa-2, u.p. iloilo, 2010. --------- “the living traditions are the bone marrow of our nation” unpublished paper read at the 1st national symposium for schools of living traditions, baguio, 2010 enriquez, v. from colonial to liberation psychology. u.p. press. quezon city, 1992. himeda, t. “in a time of deep soul searching: report from the japanese archipelago” (mineiken research institute on films on folk culture, tokyo) unpublished paper read at kapwa-2, u.p. iloilo, 2008. ileto, r. c. pasyon and revolution. ateneo de manila university press. quezon city, 1979. kidlat tahimik “the perfumed nightmare”. full-length feature film. 1977. lagmay a. “bahala na”. ulat ng pambansang samahan sa sikolohiyang pilipino, q.c., 1977. lee, seunghwan “education and cultural diversity” (korean national commission for unesco) unpublished paper read at kapwa2, u.p. iloilo, 2008 mataragnon, r.h. “the case for an indigenous psychology” in pe-pua r. (ed.). 1982. ---------“pakiramdam in filipino social interaction”, 1983. mendoza, l. “updating filipino “kapwa” in global dialogue-1: from romance with modernity to the promise of indigeneity”. (oakde guia, katrin de guia 191 land university, michigan, usa) unpublished paper read at kapwa-2, u.p. iloilo, 2008. ---------“falling in love with the indigenous: why healing for (post) modernity requires deep listening to ancestry” (oakland university, michigan, usa) unpublished paper read at kapwa-3, u.p. baguio, 2012 mercado, l. elements of filipino philosophy. divine word univ. publ. tacloban city, 1976. nicdao-henson, l. “pakikipanuluya. tungo sa pag-unawa sa kahulugan ng pahahon” in pe-pua, r. (ed.) 1982 obusan, t.b. “katutubong kaalaman (indigenous knowledge)” in obusan, 1994. obusan, t.b. & enriquez, a. (eds.) pamamaraan. asian center, quezon city, 1994. odal, g. “the mutya approach to research”. unpublished phd thesis, u.p. manila 2012. perkinson, j. “updating filipino “kapwa” in global dialogue-2: from romance with modernity to the promise of indigeneity”. (oakland univ., michigan, usa) unpublished paper read at kapwa2, u.p. iloilo, 2008. pe-pua, r. (ed.) sikolohiyang pilipino. pprth, quezon city, 1982. ---------“indigenization and internationalization of psychology”. unpublished paper read at kapwa-2, u.p. iloilo, 2008. regpala, l. “indigenous knowledge, biodiversity and climate change”. paper read at the 1st national symposium for schools of living traditions, baguio, 2010. strobel, e. “kapwa as postmodern paradigm: how did we become postmodern when we have never really been modern?” (sonoma state university, ca. usa) the virgilio enriquez memorial lecture at kapwa-3, u.p. baguio, 2012. st. maria, m. “die indigenisierungskrise in den sozialen wissenschaften und der versuch einer resolution in sikolohiyang filipino”, unpublished phd dissertation, university of cologne, germany, 1993. yacat j. & clemente, j. a. “direksyon at re-direksyon sa pagsasateorya ng sikolohiya ng kapwa”. unpublished paper read at the annual conference of the p.a.p. dumaguete, philippines, 2009. 192 prajna vihara-~ 02_(55-88) the sig.pmd prajna vihara, volume 15, number 2, july-deceber, 2014, 55-89 55 c 2000 by assumption university press __ __ ~ the significance of the ancient greek political philosophy giuseppe mario saccone asian university, thailand you may not do evil that good may come. st. paul, letter to the romans amicus plato, sed magis amica veritas. aristotle1 abstract the context in which the ancient greek philosophers wrote was characterized by the guiding principle that a position is only as good as the arguments that support it. this principle represents the real and lasting legacy they left to the modern world. what really mattered for the greeks were the criteria used to determine the sort of life one should live. their intended aim was to search how to achieve eudaimonia, or human flourishing, by means of arete, or excellence in human conduct, both at the individual and at the socio-political level. this was to become a major theme in the search for the just society conducted by social and political philosophy up to our time. they asked: (1) are state and society there by nature or convention? (2) what is justice and its import on how to govern? (answering this question involves: whether to give persons what they want or what they need; how burdens and benefits of living in a society should be shared; who should make the decisions; and what are the sources of political obligation.) (3) finally, how to practically implement what the nature of society and justice indicate we should do? (this means providing at least some practical guidance on how to reform politics in order to achieve the common good and construct a just society.) the sophists seem to have already debated some of these fundamental issues. socrates, plato, and aristotle spurred on by the sophists, but at the same time critical of them, took more convincing, even though not entirely uniform, ethical stands. they have constantly been recognized as genuinely seeking the moral truth, thus setting the beginning of the still ongoing philosophical discussion about the role and ends of government. introduction what good fortune for those in power that people do not think (sic). adolf hitler2 “when are you going to stop killing people? said stalin: when it is no longer necessary.”3 i start from four general theoretical premises. the first premise explains how my interest for the ancient greek social and political philosophy falls within the general concerns of what are commonly understood as the humanities; the second premise has to do with what i consider to be the specific role of social and political philosophy within the philosophical discipline and its methods; the third premise explains how i intend to look at the history of ideas; the fourth premise concerns the way i interpret philosophically the evolution of human societies. my first assumption is that human self-expression and understanding is a cumulative historical process in which where we are now and what we now think of ourselves is rooted in the forms of life and expression developed in the past. thus it will always involve some coming to terms with our history and our past. and of course, as it is widely recognized, the role of ancient greek philosophy in this cumulative historical process still looms large. this is confirmed also by the fact that not only current political philosophers but also virtue ethicists, artists, theologians, novelists, and many others still often variously refer to such a legacy, either as a source of inspiration or, sometimes, even to distance themselves from it. a philosophical paper concerned about the history of political ideas is not only supposed to help us understand why certain conditions existed, but it should also help us look outside of the box in which our present cultural milieu inevitably confines and constrains us. however, it is usually pointed out that in the west ever since the ancient greek philosophers, social and political philosophy, in the same fashion as philosophy itself, has evolved and specialized, even though it 56 prajna vihara __ __ ~ still remains for many an open concept. the direction taken by this evolution and specialization constitutes my second premise. to be more specific, social and political philosophy has evolved by promoting second order reflection not only on matters pertaining to society and government in general, but also often with a focus on the processes leading to political change and their annexed tensions. in doing this, social and political philosophy has become not so much concerned with the nuts and bolts of empirical politics (the concern of political science), but with discovering the most fundamental underlying principles of society and politics.4 this is something which socrates, plato and aristotle had already somehow initiated, but that they have progressively inspired western social and political philosophers such as aquinas, hobbes, locke, hume, rousseau, burke, kant, hegel, marx, rawls etc. to mention only a few, to increasingly and more explicitly undertake. deeply intertwined with this second order philosophical reflection is also a specific normative endeavor. in fact, social and political philosophy is supposed to establish some principled justification of social and political organization, a justification that will properly discriminate between better or worse forms of society and polity and that can be used to establish basic norms of social and political justice.5 in other words, social and political philosophy is not merely descriptive, but prescriptive in that it offers views about what we are supposed to do in order to improve society and polities. it follows that the approach i am choosing is, on the one hand, both historical and normative, but accompanied, on the other hand, by the realization that “all history is a contemporary history”. this realization constitutes my third premise.6 in accordance with this, i assume that we are not wrong when we also tend to look at every idea developed in the past from the point of view of our own present concerns, ideally without being too narrowly confined by them.7 in view of the first three general premises, it should be no surprise that i share the view of those who consider the task of social and political philosophy as fundamental in developing the conceptual tools for managing the inevitable political conflicts arising in societies, one of our present concerns. this view constitutes my fourth premise. i will briefly explain the theoretical underpinnings of this view. conflicts are all but inevitable, given that people are meaning-seeking beings defined by their conflicting identities. plato’s dialogues already highlighted that as rational beings, we pursue what we perceive as our own interests, either in a narrow or in giuseppe mario saccone 57 a broad sense. contemporary scholars also highlight that interests and identities reciprocally shape themselves, and also shape both the individuals and the groups they form.8 furthermore, they argue that in turn, pressure groups aspire to shape political institutions that answer to their own interests and identities, which is not that far from what plato and aristotle pointed out. the result is that, according to contemporary scholars, interests, identities, pressure groups and institutions are not static but continuously evolving forces that reciprocally influence each other.9 so it can be argued that aristotle had already highlighted some important features of this process by giving us useful insights on what caused constitutions to change. in particular, he argued that certain interests, experiences, sensitivities, and especially identities (specifically, the greek identity) are to be protected and promoted in order to maintain (or bring about) the good society which will promote the virtuous behaviour of its citizens. in other words, for the greeks, the human flourishing which the political institutions are supposed to promote cannot be achieved so to speak from the outside, through a value-free view, but requires a view from the inside, and requires the proper enculturation in the experiences, values, sensitivities, interests, and identities of his time. whereas the more modern tradition, building upon secularized christian principles, universalizes the thesis of the value of a properly cultivated identity, promoting instead the intrinsic value of all human identities, while at the same time recognizing that these identities are different, that there are divergent and often conflicting legitimate interests which need to be mediated.10 thus any political order, or indeed moral theory, that dictates to us what the good life should be, rather than inspiring and helping us in the search for our own path to it, will be imposing a totalitarian restrictive order impinging on human rights and freedom. before starting to examine these enduring questions of social and political philosophy, i will briefly summarize my premises: (1) where we are now is rooted in the forms of expression developed in the past; (2) social and political philosophy is concerned with discovering the most underlying principles of society and politics and has a normative task to perform; (3) the history of ideas, like all history, is always contemporary history; (4) interests, identities and institutions are always evolving thus generating conflicts, and social and political philosophy ever since the time of the ancient greeks had to grapple with the problems generated by these conflicts. 58 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the enduring questions of social and political philosophy we are discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live. socrates11 claims about origins in philosophy are usually arguable and difficult to accurately evaluate. however, a case can certainly be made that in the west questions about ethics and politics were comprehensively raised for the first time in the fifth and fourth centuries b.c.e. greece by the sophists. these were itinerant professors of higher education; perhaps the most distinguished of whom were protagoras, gorgias, and thrasymachus. but many others were also active and well-known members of this relatively large and widespread group of influential intellectuals. these paid professional teachers had to prepare their students, the offspring of the local well-to-do, to undertake the most sought after career of the time: to become a successful politician. to become a successful politician, at the time, meant becoming a person who excelled in making speeches to convince listeners. in athens, assemblies, consisting of large groups of the city’s populace, frequently met to debate and decide courses of action. every free adult male was expected to participate in these meetings where most matters of government were discussed and decided. this meant that, to a large extent, to be successful in life one had to be successful in one’s interaction with others when political decisions were made. in other words, debating skills were essential to become a successful citizen. to their credit, the sophists addressed this situation by developing a fundamental educational, which we may also call professional strategy. they realized that in order to help their students achieve the rhetorical excellence required to be successful, they had to train them to argue for both sides of any issue.12 in this way, they would be best prepared to argue for or against any motion, according to what they found most expedient as circumstances arose. however, by teaching such skills that could be used for a variety of purposes, they also drew a lot of criticism. it was not surprising that many people, especially those who were not the beneficiaries of their services, would draw the unwarranted conclusion that applying this method meant abandoning altogether the search for the truth. as a result the sophists were accused of teaching their students only how to pursue their personal benefit.13 this accusation may not have been entirely fair, but it was contingiuseppe mario saccone 59 ued by socrates and plato. for them, if philosophy is the search for wisdom and understanding, it means that it seeks the most fundamental truths of any human activity including politics, whereas the sophists were seen as confining themselves to the more superficial realm of political expediency. of course, there is now recognition that this was an over-simplification and that even plato’s attitude towards protagoras and the other sophists was much more complex and nuanced. now it is safe to assume that the sophists were figures of major intellectual stature in the development of western philosophy.14 the enduring questions about social and political organization which were raised by the ancient sophists together with socrates (469399 b.c.e.), plato (429-347 b.c.e.) and aristotle (384-322 b.c.e), and which have arguably achieved an almost universal significance for political theory and philosophy, can be briefly summarized. they are: (1) state and society are there by nature or convention?15 (2) what are justice and its import on how to govern? in other words, what is the ethics of deciding whether the government should give persons what they want or what they need, how to share the burdens and benefits of living in a society, who should make the decisions, and what are the sources of political obligation. (3) how to reform politics in order to achieve the common good? at present, in countries like thailand people seem to be most concerned with the last question: how to reform politics? so much so, that often not enough attention is paid to the other questions. but, in fact, answering the last question in a meaningful way requires careful consideration of the other questions. i will turn next to each of these three enduring questions posed by the ancient greek philosophy, examining how plato and aristotle answered them. i will start from the first one: state and society by nature or by convention? the most famous question about social and political organization, the one that left the most enduring legacy in the history of political thought was: state and society are there by nature (phusis) or convention (nomos)?16 this was because the focus of the debate was the contrast 60 prajna vihara __ __ ~ between two concepts which at the time were thought to be crucial to an adequate understanding of human affairs: nomos and phusis. so this question seems to have provided the catalyst for all subsequent questions. nomos, from which we have such english words as ‘autonomy’ (self-rule) referred to the practices established in a society, whether customs or positive laws (i.e., those laws which depend for their existence entirely on the legislative actions of human beings). since these vary from society to society, and even, within a single society, change over time, what was nomos was changeable. in contrast, phusis from which we get the word ‘physics’, referred to what was unchangeable: nature, or reality. the contrast between the two notions was employed by the sophists in order to distinguish the human world from the unchanging natural order. for the sophists, the human world __ human society and its institutions, including its moral beliefs __ was a world of change, variety, convention: of nomos rather than phusis. plato’s dialogues show the different interpretations placed on this conclusion by different sophists: plato tells us that among the sophists there were partisans of both positions. in a relatively early dialogue by that name, protagoras is a partisan of nomos who advocates an early form of democratic traditionalism stating that although law and morals are human creations which vary from society to society, they are nevertheless binding for human beings.17 in the republic, belonging to his middle period writings, plato presents glaucon as a partisan of phusis.18 however, once fully expressed, glaucon’s position gives rise to an early form of egoistic contractualism, now also called contractarianism, that uneasily accommodates nomos in order to restrain phusis. glaucon states: they say that to do wrong is naturally good and to be wronged is bad, but the suffering of injury so far exceeds in badness the good of inflicting it that when they have done wrong to each other and suffered it, and have had a taste of both, those who are unable to avoid the latter and practise the former decide that it is profitable to come to giuseppe mario saccone 61 an agreement with each other neither to inflict injury nor to suffer it. as a result they begin to make laws and covenants, and the law’s command they call lawful and just.19 there is a combination of phusis and nomos in this passage. in this way, to say that ‘to do wrong is naturally good’ also becomes an assumption concerning how human phusis gives rise to the formation of the state. glaucon identifies the impetus ‘to do wrong’ with the natural inclination of ‘every human nature to pursue its own advantage’. here, there is an underlying picture of the human function understood to be that of unlimitedly acquisitive consumption of satisfactions. these satisfactions may be the result of the consumption of material goods, or simply of the domination of one’s fellow human beings. this is a familiar theme in plato’s dialogues, a description of the ‘fallen aspect’ of human nature and institutions that he thinks needs to be addressed and transcended. so, in the early dialogue entitled gorgias, callicles not so differently from glaucon maintains that human laws are a device of the weak to frustrate the natural order, which shows the strong to be naturally superior to the weak.20 plato’s criticism against the theories of state and society by convention seems to operate more at a normative than at a descriptive level. according to plato, all forms of conventionalism, even in protagoras’ not so skeptical fashion, are inadequate.21 plato holds instead that there is an unchanging moral reality, but one of which human societies, with their great variety of conventional practices, are largely ignorant. like all knowledge, knowledge of goodness depends on being able to penetrate beyond the veil of appearances to the hidden, unchanging reality of the forms. plato thus rejects the idea that morals and law are purely conventional. his theory can be understood as an attempt to show that human behavior is subject not only to established social rules, but first and foremost to an unwritten law __ whether understood to be imposed by the gods, as it is put by sophocles in the tragedy antigone, or better, as a rule to which the gods themselves are subject. the idea of natural law is sometimes described as the view that there is an unchanging normative order that is part of the natural world. according to the theory of natural law, there is an objective moral law either given by god and/or grasped by human reason binding all human beings and providing a standard for evaluating all human practices, including society and government.22 if this is accepted, then plato provided a natural law view in everything but name. this may, however, appear a 62 prajna vihara __ __ ~ bit surprising since it is aristotle who is normally credited with fully developing the view that state and society are by nature. in regard to whether state and society are by nature or convention, it is important to point out that it was not only the specific answers to this question given by protagoras, glaucon, socrates, and plato to be of great consequence, but also the fact that the debate that they reflected, and to which they no doubt contributed, constituted by itself an avatar of democratic discussion, and also a significant contribution to the later theory and practice of democracy.23 this was because discussing the origins of society inevitably involved taking into consideration at least as a hypothesis the idea that people have an equal claim to participation in the governing process, one of the theoretical underpinnings of democracy itself. in other words, the discussion of whether state and society are by nature or convention sets debates in which the first organic formulation of the idea of democracy is expressed. as a result, democracy was understood (and practised by every free adult male citizen) by the ancient athenians, in virtually the same fashion as it is understood at a theory, but less so at a practical level nowadays, as government of the people, for the people, and by the people. i will turn next to the second question posed by greek philosophy: what is the import of justice on governance? plato on the import of justice on governance the history of political thought is the history of the moral evaluation of political power. hans j. morgenthau24 the issue of justice lies at the heart of questions about legitimacy and orderly existence, determining whether citizens are willing to accept the law as binding. once it is taken seriously, at least as the basis for further discussion, and perhaps even as a normative principle, the hypothesis that the people are supposed to be the main beneficiary of government, the next logical step is to probe where all this lead to. justice is by definition about giving each person their due, as it appears from the answers to the following questions posed by socrates to glaucon:25 and are suit decided on any other ground but that a man giuseppe mario saccone 63 may neither take what is another’s, nor be deprived of what is his own? yes; that is their principle. which is a just principle? yes. then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man’s own, and belongs to him? very true.26 if it is assumed that citizens are entitled to good governance, it must still be decided whether good governance requires giving them what they want or what they need. if the former is chosen we have more or less the theoretical underpinning of democracy as it is understood now, if we take the latter we have something similar to what plato and, to some extent, also aristotle theorized. today, largely as the result of the developments of modern western political philosophy especially following rousseau, we tend to assume that what the people want is what they need. however the ancient greeks, those of aristocratic leanings, like socrates and plato, were inclined to think that the people needed a rational direction, and that the political structure could not pander to the whims of the intellectually inferior. to plato democracy meant ochlocracy, i.e. rule by the mob. plato thought that there are few people of high quality in any society and if all the people were allowed to rule, that is to say, if they were allowed to get what they want, those of bad quality, who are much more numerous, would control the state. this would result in a tyranny of the majority, which, in most cases, could not last for long. in the end, plato thought, democracies will be short lived because the mob would soon surrender its power to a tyrant, thus destroying the popular government. in regard to this, aristotle in athens being of foreign origin, and for this reason not belonging to the traditional local aristocracy but to the non-native promacedonian elite, had a more nuanced, even though not entirely different attitude. but what is equally significant and enduring from a philosophical point of view is that trying to answer the question of whether we must give the people what they want or what they need leads to the principle that political structure should not be arbitrary but should have practical moral purposes, that is to say, it must provide justice and fairness for all the members of the community. and of course, to say that the political structure must have moral purposes to be a meaningful proposition must also involve at least some sort of a call for a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of living in 64 prajna vihara __ __ ~ a society. this is what plato supposedly does in his republic, where the members of the three classes he sets, the philosopher-rulers, the warriors, the merchants and laborers share with each other the benefits which each group can contribute to the community.27 underpinning this conception there is a normative anthropology, a view concerning how people are supposed to behave. people are supposed to pursue eudaimonia, that is to say human flourishing. for plato, the purpose of a human being is to know and practise the truth in a wholesome manner. however, this is a personal enterprise and political involvement is but a necessary service that the philosopher will reluctantly undertake to pay back society for having provided him/her with education. concerning the question about the sources of political obligation, an obligation is a requirement or duty to act in a particular way and political obligation refers to the duty of citizens to acknowledge the authority of the state and obey its laws. the earliest theory of obligation is outlined in one of plato’s early dialogues, crito, also considered an anticipation of the social contract theory. after his trial for corrupting the youth of athens, and facing death, socrates explains his refusal to escape from prison to his old friend crito. socrates points out that by choosing to live in athens and by enjoying the privileges of being an athenian citizen, he had in effect, promised to obey athenian law, and intended to keep his promise even at the cost of his own life. but he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implicit contract that he will do as we command him. and he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer, and he does neither.28 from this point of view, political obligation arises out of the benefits derived from living within an organized community. the obligation giuseppe mario saccone 65 to obey the state is based upon an implicit promise made by the simple fact that citizens choose to remain within its borders.29 but there is much that is going on in this passage and here socrates alludes also to the idea that a person is bound to obey the law for moral reasons. to conceive of political obligation in this way is to move away from the idea of voluntary behaviour. thus the debt of gratitude that socrates owed athens did not allow him to challenge or resist its laws, even at the cost of his own life. in other words, here it is also introduced the idea of a natural duty to obey the law. so it is implicitly present also the view that political obligation can be thought of as a natural duty. this points to the fact that according to socrates (and plato), we come by our political obligations for 3 reasons: (1) because we simply inherit them, as a given fact of nature like our parents and parental obligations; (2) because of self-interest __ the state is a necessary means to things we want (physical safety, or security of property) and if we will the end we must will the means; (3) it is because we have certain moral duties (such as maximizing human happiness or securing justice and these cannot be discharged except through the mechanisms of political authority. in sum, the reflection on the sources of political obligation by plato points, once again, to the principle that to be a human person is to be a moral agent and that there is an objective human function which can only be fulfilled by obeying the laws of the state. and it is in accordance with this principle that plato also recognizes a general import of justice on governance. there is in plato, both implicitly and explicitly a call to practically implement this moral justice improving or changing the existing polities in order to make the citizens receive the rational direction they require, so that the common good can be achieved. i will turn next to this topic, which is also the concern of the third question posed by the ancient greek philosophy. in order to reform politics to achieve justice, which he believes to be the common good, plato identifies the sources of the good, stable political system in his utopian republic. and in doing so, formulates the earliest version of the most fundamental argument against democracy. he argues that ordinary members of the people are simply not competent enough to rule wisely in their own interests.30 so instead of democracy, plato advances the idea of rule by the virtuous. he does so by describing an ideal polity in which rational direction is provided to the governed by the philosopher-rulers. plato believed that good governance should reflect the radical form of natural inequality which he postulated. he sup66 prajna vihara __ __ ~ posed that human beings were born with souls containing a prevalence of gold, silver or bronze, and were therefore disposed towards different stations in life. justice and the common good could only be achieved if each group was assigned its proper natural role by the state. according to plato, the state should function, so to speak, like a giant person. in accordance with this principle, there are different classes, each operating like the different parts of an individual’s soul. indeed, plato takes the soul as having three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the passionate one, corresponding to gold, silver and bronze, and he postulated that in each individual, one of the three components would be dominant. (plato’s division between rational, spirited and passionate soul would later find some resonance in sigmund freud’s vision of the psyche’s components as ego, superego and id.) in other words, in order to achieve justice, the state should properly and harmoniously grow out of these components of the individual soul. the state, like the individual, should keep these three aspects of the soul in the proper balance. the required equilibrium is like maintaining at the political level the form of mental health that is required at the individual level, and vice versa. this was plato’s blueprint for political reform. it follows from these premises that his ideal republic is made up of three classes: a class of farmers and artisans, a class of warriors-auxiliaries and a class of philosopher guardians. each class embodies one essential virtue. the workers, who provide for the city physical necessities, are supposed to possess moderation. the warriors should possess courage, which is the perfection of the spirited part of the soul. the philosophers, being in possession of the all-encompassing wisdom, are the only ones who have a completely excellent soul with perfection in every part of their being, as well as in the relationship between the different parts.31 this means that they are also the only ones who understand justice, the most comprehensive virtue according to plato. allegedly, their education and communistic way of life will ensure that they rule on the basis of wisdom without being distracted by any interest for material goods. in regard to this, plato is indeed adamant in his recommending that amongst the guardians entrusted to rule, property, and even family life, should be held in common.32 in sum, because each class in plato’s republic performs its function well (producing food and making things, defending the state, and governing), and in doing so displays a particular cardinal virtue (moderation, courage, and wisdom), this ideal state is also considered the embodiment of justice. thus, and most importantly, because the philosophers are those who know and practice the truth, they can for this very giuseppe mario saccone 67 reason supposedly secure the only just polity which can maintain stability. this is the reason why socrates asserts: until philosophers are kings or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils…33 however, this relies on the philosopher agreeing to perform the role of political rulers without regard for their own self-interest. this is based on the principle of the knowing maker, postulating that whoever “knew” the good (alas, according to plato, most people do not know it) would become good himself/herself, and hence would also be willing to actually perform good deeds. the main reason for this would be, paradoxically, an egoistic one. if the philosophers refused to perform their duty to become rulers, assuming that they had been raised and educated to perform this role with public money by their own city, they would commit an evil act which would damage their own souls. this is something that they would never be willing to do, because it would be tantamount to damaging the soul, the noblest of human components, and the one which had once been in contact with the eternal and unchanging world of forms. in regard to this, he believed that if the proper conditions are met, i.e. if the soul is not further defiled, it was possible that, through the process of metempsychosis, humans could aspire to rejoin the unchanging world of forms. supposedly, this incentive, or we may call it more appropriately spiritual motivation, should have been enough to motivate the philosophers to duly perform their task as rulers. in practice, the process of identifying and educating these philosopher rulers who promote the common good would prove to be a stumbling block, as plato’s failed attempt in syracuse attests. at best, plato’s ideal system looks like an authoritarian theocracy or military dictatorship, and at worst it could very easily be considered a forerunner of modern fascism or communism.34 these proposals for reform look like radical cures that are likely to kill the patients (our societies). platonic idealism, once put into practice, is likely to become a nightmarish dystopia. in other words, the remedy (either totalitarianism or authoritarianism) it is likely to be worse than the disease (political conflict, corruption, etc.) 68 prajna vihara __ __ ~ it is supposed to cure. moreover, plato sets justice as the primary quality of a good political order. indeed, he regards justice as the all-encompassing political virtue, so that the good society and the just society are one and the same. however, perhaps he does so at the exclusion of other desirable qualities that a society should possess. it could reasonably be argued that a society and a country indeed need also to be economically prosperous, artistically fertile, successful in its undertakings, etc. in other words, the aspiration to justice always needs to be placed within a wider context which must practically take into account a multiplicity of factors which are somehow neglected in plato’s utopian reasoning. this points to the fact that, all in all, plato’s proposals for political reform look unworkable and too abstract, even though they were the product of a uniquely genial mind animated by the practical desire for concrete solutions to real problems. this is because plato followed a method that could be defined as both proto-idealistic and proto-rationalistic. he started with a concept (the unchanging form of the ultimate good as the archetype of justice), which he apprehended intuitively or accepted as a result of logical argument, and then used it to observe actual societies. it should then be no surprise that it is plato’s best and greatest student, aristotle, who took on the task of finding more empirically viable approaches to the problem of how to reform politics. indeed, aristotle distanced himself from plato by applying a kind of proto-empiricism which more directly appealed to common sense, and based his position on the observation of actual societies and on the acceptance of traditions that are passed down within them.35 however, before coming to the specifics of aristotle’s proposals for political reform, i will examine next how aristotle answers the questions about the origin of society and the import of justice on governance. with this analysis, i intend to shed some more light on how the enduring questions of social and political philosophy have been pursued, answered and developed after socrates and plato originally set them. scholars have always been divided between those who focus more on the continuity or the difference between plato and aristotle. my interpretation of their ethical and political philosophy (less so of their metaphysics) will tend to see a certain fundamental continuity of concerns between the two, in spite of their different solutions with regard to practical suggestions about how to reform politics. aristotle’s answer to the questions about the origin of society and the import of justice on governance is addressed in his theory giuseppe mario saccone 69 of natural law and justice, which will be the subject of my next section. aristotle on natural law and justice man is by nature a political animal…nature does nothing without purpose or uselessly. aristotle36 aristotle is indeed an early proponent of the natural theory of the origin of the state, even though he did not equate the natural with the unchangeable.37 he believed that people should constantly seek moral perfection, which they will probably never reach. still, he regarded this quest for moral perfection as the noblest of human pursuits, as it appears in the following statement: the good of man is the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue...this activity must occupy a complete lifetime [.]38 humans, according to aristotle, are social beings by nature; that is, they naturally gather together and interact with one another, thus forming a community. this congregation takes place for reasons that go beyond simple biological necessity. indeed, a community is a necessary condition for human fulfilment. the formal organization of the community is the state. the formation of the state is a result of the people’s natural inclination to interact. aristotle believed so firmly that the state was a society’s natural environment that he claimed that people were humans only within the state. an individual outside the state was either “a beast or a god”, the state being the only environment in which one could truly be human. the state was thus the central institution in aristotle’s philosophy; it was not only the manifestation of our natural inclination to interact but also the vehicle through which the individual could achieve moral perfection.39 in accordance with this principle, what the state does to promote the achievement of moral perfection must be considered just and fair. all this points to the fact that aristotle introduces, more clearly than plato, a social component in his notion of human flourishing as it appears from his theory of justice based on merit. so, for aristotle, a 70 prajna vihara __ __ ~ distribution of benefits or burdens is to be made in proportion to the degree of possession of the appropriate sort of merit by those involved.40 rewarding merit was supposed to fulfil what aristotle tells us is the fundamental purpose of the polis. this fundamental purpose is the advancement of the virtue of its citizens, i.e., the polis must provide all that is necessary to make its citizens good and just.41 the same principle of justice based on merit, and the pursuit of the common good of the citizens, provides direction also for deciding who must make decisions. accordingly, aristotle says that “all man agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with arete[virtue]”.42 even today, there is still much discussion about whether or not fairness entails that those who excel in moral virtues should rule.43 but in regard to this, it may be pointed out that, according to aristotle, in any case, the common good is best achieved by rewarding some merit of sorts without necessarily being too specific about what sort of. however, the line that aristotle most resolutely pursues is that, whatever the form of government, the fundamental purpose of the state must consist in the advancement of the virtue of its citizens as the embodiment of the common good. this is also the criterion to discriminate between better and worse forms of polity. but at the same time he argues with equal resolution in favour of the idea that there is a natural law requiring citizens to obey the state.44 in doing so, aristotle implicitly sets some criteria of legitimacy, and making them explicit will become one of the main concerns of western political philosophy from the stoics to cicero, aquinas, and locke and beyond (to mention just a few names). in other words, aristotle introduces the wide ranging idea that human laws are supposed to have a moral basis: there is an objective moral law that transcends human conventions and decisions, governs individuals, and can be known through reason and experience on the basis of the natural order of the universe and the built-in tendencies of human nature.45 accordingly, he tells us: “it has been well said that the good is that at which all things aim”.46 this statement points to his teleological vision of the (proper) aim of human conduct, which is supposed to achieve goodness, excellence, quality, flourishing, etc., and which should consist in the process of actualization (i.e., of reaching “the good”) of certain inherent potentialities, but it also indicates that there is an objective moral order in giuseppe mario saccone 71 reality that is independent of us, just as there is a physical order in nature. it follows from his teleological vision of reality that aristotle believed that human beings are political animals whose very nature dictates that they are made to live in society. aristotle argued that “the polis is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal”. this means that the nature of a human person depends on the social setting supplied by the polis. in other words, against the view of the sophist lycrophron that law is simply a convention to warrant mutual rights, aristotle argued that by fulfilling political obligation the citizens fulfil their human function, i.e., they act as they should. that is to say, they act according to moral virtue, which he calls the practical wisdom (eupraxia) of living in society with one’s fellows with all that doing so entails. in accordance with this principle, all morally aware people have the potential to recognize that it is just and fair for them to obey any civil law which is in conformity with the natural order of things. in this way, aristotle thought that the moral principles underpinning the natural law and political obligation are so basic that they do not require further proof. to sum up, in spite of their differences, the reflection on the sources of political obligation by both plato and aristotle points, once again, to the principle that to be a human person is to be a moral agent, and that there is an objective human function which can only be fulfilled by obeying the laws of the state. and it is in accordance with this principle that aristotle also recognizes a general import of justice on governance. but, obviously, he can do so only in very generic terms by identifying a common or universal law with ‘all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere’.47 in other words, this is ‘law according to nature’. in this way, he can also maintain that there really is ‘a natural justice and injustice that is common to all, even to those that have no association or covenant with one another’.48 of course, the argument is not only descriptive, but also prescriptive. as there was in plato, also in aristotle there is both implicitly and explicitly a call to practically implement this natural justice improving or changing the existing polities in order to make the citizens more virtuous, so to achieve the common good according to natural law. finally, we come to the question of how to reform politics in order to achieve the common good. in regard to this, both plato and aristotle saw athens in political (but not cultural) decline because of internal disunity. in order to stem this decline, they attempted to understand why it was taking place and to suggest how it could be avoided. these were the 72 prajna vihara __ __ ~ parameters of their differing proposals for political reform, which were not intended to radically change the existing social order and class division between slaves (approximately one third of the population) and free adults. plato and aristotle agreed in identifying the cause of the decline was the rulers’ pursuit of their own personal or class interests instead of the common good. this behavior was contrary to virtue (arete), and was the cause of internal instability, and vulnerability to external enemies. they also agreed that the remedy required searching for the sources of a good, stable political system. and the continuity does not even stop there. aristotle’s views on political reform must indeed be understood in view of the fact that he considers virtue as a kind of excellence which is achieved when a rich complexity has been successfully integrated into an organic unity, which is not that far from what plato had already argued for. the moral inadequacy of this position is highlighted by the fact that it is at odds with the contemporary doctrine of human rights, which predicates that the good of each individual being, according to a principle of fairness and equality, has a normative value in itself, regardless of how successful is his integration in the organic unity of the state. for this reason, most contemporary moral and political philosophers, even though expressing admiration for their ideas, ultimately tend to distance themselves, at least to some extend, from both plato and aristotle. be that as it may, whatever our opinion as contemporary readers, we have thus identified the last fundamental objective in common between plato and aristotle: they shared the goal of reforming the greek polis in terms of what they both understood as the moral endeavor of finding ways of achieving excellence in the governance of an organic state of sorts. this is where their similarities end. aristotle takes a more empirical approach than plato to the problem of how to reform politics and does not create a blueprint for an ideal state.49 in this sense, he can be considered more like a modern political scientist. he realized that there could not be a single solution to the most pressing problem affecting the greek city states: the political factionalism and related instability which paved the way for the macedonian conquest.50 however, he held the assumption that in order to improve the situation it was always necessary to determine first what kind of government it is best adapted to particular states, even though the best of these is often unattainable. aristotle realized that, to be able to make any useful proposal, it was imperative to start with information as accurate as posgiuseppe mario saccone 73 sible. for this reason, he sent out his students to gather data from the dozens of greek city-states. with these data, he constructed his great politics, a posthumously edited collection of essays, which is also closely linked to his two ethical treatises eudemian and nicomachean ethics. his general approach and the ethical importance he attributed to (good) politics can be seen from the fact that in the nicomachean ethics he already states that “the good of man must be the end [i.e. the objective] of the science of politics”.51 indeed, aristotle regarded politics as the "master science”, essential for producing the good life, the aim of every practical pursuit or undertaking. in regard to this, aristotle believed that whether a state produces the good life depends upon how its rulers behave. the good rulers seek to achieve the good of all, whereas the perverted rulers seek their own private gain. in accordance with this principle, when a government is functioning rightly, it governs for the common good of all the people, whereas a government is perverted when its rulers govern for their own private gain or interest. so, in his politics, it is this practical pursuit of the common good guiding aristotle’s project for political reform (even though he always self-consciously mixes the theoretical, the descriptive and the normative). more specifically, he commends or condemns certain political institutions according to whether or not they achieve the common good. in his politics, aristotle investigated and classified the political systems of many existing poleis and demonstrated that several different types were conducive to achieving the good life (eudaimonia), the purpose of a properly acculturated (greek) citizen. however, his preference was for a mixed constitution (politeia), and he was not entirely shy about defining what was politically “best”, as in this passage: [t]he best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and those states are likely to be well administered in which the middle class is large….in which the citizens have moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much and others nothing there may arise an extreme democracy or a pure oligarchy, or a tyranny may develop out of either extreme… [d]emocracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has greater share in government, for when there is no middle class and the poor greatly exceed in number, trouble arise, 74 prajna vihara __ __ ~ and the state soon come to an end.52 in other words, aristotle argues that systems that propagate inequality, or that seem unable to stem its rise, contain the seeds of their own destruction. even though the politics was written in the fourth century b.c., aristotle it also sheds light on why democracies succeed or fail today. indeed, it is a point confirmed by modern research that it often depends on the size of the middle class. the measures that he recommends to reduce the risk of disorder and revolution in general involve making the constitution more moderate by sharing power more widely and by reducing the grievances of potential opponents. most importantly, aristotle urged that there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law. and, we are also reminded that, people will always criticize their government unless their conditions of living are such that they can achieve happiness in the form of what they consider the good life. once we universalize the thesis of human moral worth underpinning aristotle’s recommendations for political reform, we discover that the problems he addresses are not at all far from our own 21st century concerns.53 i will highlight some of the differences and similarities that the political philosophy initiated by plato and continued by aristotle share with us in my conclusion. conclusion to neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked. aquinas54 as contemporary readers, we might object to the fact that both plato and aristotle founded their hopes on politicians, instead of the development of a free and vibrant civil society with grassroots forces underpinning the development of democratic institutions. in other words, they were neither principle nor process democrats, nor could they have been, given their elitist cultural milieu.55 but plato thought that philosophers themselves ought to be the politicians who carry out such work; and so he proposed to the philosophers a choice of life and a course of training which would make them simultaneously both contemplatives and men of action __ since knowledge and virtue imply each other. aristotle giuseppe mario saccone 75 believed that the philosopher’s activity within the city should be limited to forming the politicians’ judgement, and that it is the politicians’ task to act personally by their legislation to ensure the citizens’ moral virtue. the philosopher, for his part, should choose a life devoted to disinterested research, study, and contemplation __ a life which will ultimately be independent of political worries. both plato and aristotle saw the pursuit of the socratic method as the solution for political woes. thus, for aristotle, as for plato, philosophy was both a way of life and a way of discourse giving practical advice on how to improve the existing greek poleis. however, what remains as most enduring are not so much their differing detailed proposals for the solution of specific political problems, but the fact that they pursued the search for the solution to the problem of how to improve governance to its intellectual and ethical horizons. they did so by setting a continuous ideal dialogue with their readers, by posing the most meaningful questions (for instance, by asking what are justice, goodness, the just citizens, rulers, etc.) and by searching for the right answers (describing and prescribing the ideal form or forms of government). all this inspired, as perhaps it was supposed to, the search for new questions and new answers by their illustrious successors, both among the ancient and the modern ones. but, and not the least, this is also at the root of a pedagogical, hopefully still ongoing process which goes behind the mere search for political expediency for its own sake, and touches deeper ethical issues which are at the heart of the essence of education in general, and of academic freedom in particular (i.e., the intertwined principles that to pursue good education it is necessary to never stop asking questions, that science is at its best when it acknowledges uncertainty and focuses on defining how much can be known, and john stuart mill’s idea that truth is most quickly discovered when opportunity is given to refute falsehoods, and what i take as the corresponding political principle that all elites without public scrutiny are corrupt or abusive, not only elected politicians, because the formula for corruption or any other abuse is monopoly of power without accountability, and by having an authoritarian regime, there is by definition no accountability). so plato and aristotle spurred by the sophists had the merit not only of identifying the enduring fundamental questions of social and political organization. their attempt to answer these questions resulted in opening the debate about several wide ranging ethical and political concepts that are still relevant to us (and whose identification constituted 76 prajna vihara __ __ ~ milestones in the history of western moral and political thought). they thus set the beginning of the still ongoing philosophical discussion about the role and reciprocal position in terms of priority of the major political values which are the most commonly recognized ends of government: the concepts of justice, security, prosperity, liberty and democracy. in regard to this, both plato and aristotle gave to justice the paramount importance. (but, whereas for plato achieving justice is a matter of remembering the form of the ultimate good of which the individual soul had knowledge before birth, for aristotle it is the exercise of practical wisdom or reason acquired by direct experience, i.e. phronesis sometimes also translated as prudence, which is supposed to guide us on how to achieve justice). nevertheless, both plato and aristotle based justice on notions of merit by birth, gender, status, etc., rather than on a principle of equality or fairness, as 20th century theorists like john rawls did. for all the differences and distance in time, political philosophy as we understand it today owes a lot to the sophists, plato and aristotle (and to the stoics, cicero, aquinas, etc., which followed). it enables us to get involved in systematic and historical reflection on the beliefs that we often absorb in insidiously superficial fashion from our social, cultural and political environments. the mental process set in motion by this systematic historical reflection should contribute to fostering more informed and reflective political commitments. this is a good thing especially in the present historical predicaments. societies are caught between the scylla of a common and widespread political disinterest and the charybdis of turbulent militancy. the former consists in the rejection and disgust for anything explicitly having to do with politics. in regard to this, a strange process takes place. the ‘death of ideologies’ (and annexed political theories and philosophies) paradoxically gives rise to a stillborn but insidiously quasiideological mental process, a phoenix of sorts which egoistically makes the private sphere the primary concern of human beings, whereas the public sphere has shrunk to a bare minimum.56 the latter danger consists in the renewed social and political turmoil when conflicts of interest reemerge between competing groups. this often leads to a resolution through political militancy, which is often based on narrow regional identity politics, and fills the ideological void with political beliefs haphazardly collected from various sources. many societies are caught in this predicament (with various degrees of gravity), of which the recent political conflict in thailand could, arguably, be intergiuseppe mario saccone 77 endnotes 1this is a latin translation of a greek original which the ancient romans attributed to aristotle: “plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth”. 2quoted in: judith boss, analyzing moral issues, p.1, new york: mcgrawhill, 2008. this quote it is in no way intended as giving respectability to hitler’s views or to those of his fanatic followers, nor, as far as the cynicism towards the value of human lives, as most briskly represented in the next quote goes, to many of stalin’s policies. but it is intended, in the spirit of moral and political philosophy as a warning against the unexamined compliance to authority which allows leaders such as hitler to fool the masses, as he himself was admitting to be doing: “the broad mass of a nation…. will more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a small one”. (adolf hitler, mein kamp, vol.1, ch.10). or others like stalin to impose a personality cult to the same effect. on the other hand, this should not also be constructed as a criticism against the lawful obedience due to legitimate authority of which socrates’ behavior after his conviction in a public trial by the citizens of athens is a magisterial example, even though his behavior perhaps looks a bit too extreme and uncompromising in the eyes of ordinary people. for an account of what it is to be understood as legitimate authority, i would recommend john locke’s second treatise on government. 3quoted by hans morgenthau, in “the moral blindness of scientific man”, p.9, (pp.7-15) in robert j. art, robert jervis, international politics: enduring concepts and contemporary issues, new york: 6th edition, longman pearson education, 2003. 4see, for instance, david stewart, h. gene blocker, fundamentals of philosophy, pp.5-9, 379-382, upper saddle river new jersey: prentice hall, fifth edition, 2001. 5see, michael j. white, political philosophy: an historical introduction, p.2, oxford: oneworld publication, 2003. 6of course, there is always inevitably an element of subjectivity in all premises. this one in particular refers to a historical method that i did not follow in my previous writings on hobbes. i previously followed the historical method set by quentin skinner (which i still very much appreciate) of reconstructing intellectual contexts without allowing our present concerns to interfere with our understanding of the history of ideas. however, this is a method that i no longer follow in this writing where i am looking at the past with one eye to contemporary concerns. 7accordingly, the neo-hegelian italian philosopher benedetto croce (18661952) identified philosophy with history: all thought is 'historical judgment’ and all history ‘contemporary history’ because the past is ‘lived’ and reworked in spirit’s, and hence humanity’s present experience. “the practical need, which is at the root of every historical judgment, confers to each history the character of contemporary history, because, however remote or most remote may seem chronologically the facts involved, it is in reality, history always referred to the present need and situation in 78 prajna vihara __ __ ~ preted. which those facts are propagating their vibrations”. see: aphorisms by benedetto croce, htpp://aforismi.meglio.it/aforisma.hml?id=7563 8here the reference to the role of interests and identities it is not necessarily intended as an endorsement of utilitarianism as an ethical theory, setting the standard for private choices in bentham’s, or mill's fashion, or in any of the various subsequent utilitarian or consequentialist theories (such as the ones of j. austin, g.e. moore, h. sidgwich, r.m. hare, g. scarre, etc.) which in fact broadly speaking center their philosophies on the notion of an assumed individual and collective interest in the pursuit of pleasure and/or happiness. however, it is to be seen as recognition that a democratic polity requires that everything be run through people's preferences and interests. two corollaries, always in precarious balance and in tension one with the other follow from the approach i am taking. the first is that it is necessary that public policy maintains at least some degree of benevolent neutrality (although, obviously, not a total disinterest) about official preference between the various competing theories concerning, for example, what the aristotelian concept of human flourishing, or for others one of the competing versions of ‘the good’, ‘the right’, or ‘the true’ (especially concerning religious revelations), etc. is supposed to consist of, and how it could be achieved. the second corollary is the need for a notion of rights, possibly enshrined in a constitution (either written or implicit such as the idea of common law, or of ‘a cultural constitution’ like some academics vaguely refer to in the case of thailand), constraining utilitarian maximizing, to protect vulnerable individuals and weak minorities against excesses. this view can be seen as compatible with some version of rawls’ theory of justice, but also with the tenets of any tolerant philosophy or religious tradition. 9see, jeffrey kopstein and mark lichbach, eds., comparative politics: interests, identities and institutions in a changing global order, pp.10-19, cambridge: cambridge university press, 2000. 10accordingly, the rise of secular liberal democracy as advocated by john rawls is based on the idea that the variety and heterogeneity of human goods is such that their pursuit cannot be reconciled in any single moral order beyond what we would agree in a hypothetical contract based on a principle of equality, and made under a veal of ignorance about the specifics of our interests and identities. 11plato, republic, bk.1 344e. 12aristophanes, the athenian comic dramatist (c.450-385 b.c.e), famously pokes fun on this method of confrontation of rival ideas in his play the clouds. the rival arguments are brought on the stage as virtue and vice, and vice, of course, drives virtue out of the field. this, of course, had only satirical, but no philosophical intent. 13protagoras had said that there are two arguments about everything, two sides to every case, and that the art of effective advocacy which he taught aims at making the weaker case, that which unskillfully presented would have got the worse with the audience, become the stronger. this is consistent with his famous motto that “man is the measure of all things”, reported to as by plato in his dialogue theaetetus, 160d. 14however, in more contemporary times, the criticism once directed against the sophists, it is now often directed, especially at a popular level, against politics giuseppe mario saccone 79 itself. because politics has to do with achieving, maintaining, and managing power over civil society, it is seen by many as being inherently self-serving. people blame politics rightly or wrongly for many of the hardships they suffer. unfortunately, and somehow incongruously, a very common reaction it is the withdrawal from active citizenry, and the limiting of the people's concerns to what pertains to their individual private sphere. but among the many other negative results of this, there is also the fact that, even among many intellectuals, political science itself as an academic discipline looks tainted, and a similar dose of suspicion it is cast towards its practitioners, as it is against politicians. anything and anyone having to do with politics must be having self-serving purposes. however, political philosophy seems, at least in part, to escape the same criticism. political philosophers have a better image than political theorists, even though the difference between the two it is not always so clear cut. this is because as a normative search for wisdom and understanding concerning government, political philosophy looks more morally engaging, and for this reason also more respectable than the colder and more scientifically minded analytical study of ideas and concepts, both normative and descriptive, about politics performed by political theory. political philosophy can be more clearly seen, even though in differing and mostly contrasting ways, as advocating an ethical reform of politics itself; it can be seen as calling for its transformation from the activity of gaining power over societies to the one of achieving the common good of the human community. this call for transformation, even though not unchallenged, has always been and it still is likely to gain the interest and support of many both from within and without the academic community. however, it is also important to remind here that, in fact, political philosophy and political theory can best be seen, for all intents and purposes, as reciprocally complementary disciplines. 15the ancient greeks did not draw a clear distinction between state and society. this is closely tied to the size and characteristics of the greek city-states the poleis. even up to the beginning of modern philosophy (hobbes), political thought is centred on a clear cut dichotomy between a dangerously lurking state of nature and civil society. this paradigm changes with locke, rousseau and kant. a new dichotomy emerges: the one between state and civil society. but, the most organic version of the distinction between state and civil society is the one developed by hegel. (1770-1831) his principal political work, the philosophy of right (1821) advanced an organic theory of the state that portrayed it as the highest expression of human freedom. he identified three moments of social life: the family, civil society, and the state. within the family, a “particular altruism” operates, encouraging people to set aside their own interests for the good of their relatives. he viewed society as a sphere of “universal egoism” in which individuals place their own interests before those of others. however, he held that the state is an ethical community underpinned by mutual sympathy, and is thus characterized by “universal altruism”. this stance was reflected in hegel’s admiration for the prussian state of his day, and helped to convert liberal thinkers to the cause of state intervention. hegel’s philosophy also had considerable impact upon marx and other so-called young hegelians. however, in more recent years especially since the fall of 80 prajna vihara __ __ ~ the soviet union, interest for hegel and marx has somehow decreased, even though not altogether disappeared. the dominant dichotomy now becomes more nuanced: it is the one between the public and private sphere. it is no longer mainly a matter of deciding the relation between private and public property. anyway, in most countries the latter is mostly reduced to a minimum level for both practical and ideological reasons. from a philosophical point of view, it is no less relevant the dichotomy between a public sphere, which at least in liberal democratic societies (challenged by the authoritarian ones) is supposed to be neutral because of competing conceptions about the nature and function of human beings (different religions, ideologies, views, etc. must coexist and the state mostly acts as a referee) and a very rich and diverse private sphere (but with many poor and marginalized people) characterized by all these conceptions. the public sphere which reached its apogee in the ancient city state of athens, more or less at the time of the sophists, with heightened participation of large sections of the populace to assemblies where major issues were discussed and decided (even though attendance was reserved to non slave adult male citizens) it is now inexorably shrinking. what a human being is as a private person it is so much more important than what he is as a citizen. in most countries, people vote only once in a while and they have virtually no other participation in government. furthermore, even that once in a while vote it is often made, in various ways, to become irrelevant by the competing private interests of major lobbies. there is certainly still much that we can learn from the love for wisdom of the ancient greek sophists: their capacity to analyse in a rational way every angle of the issues at stake. this is best highlighted in plato's dialogues. 16although no definitive evidence exists, we are now fairly certain that the state evolved because society had a practical need for it. as farming developed, people ceased their nomadic wanderings and private property became important. the state probably evolved as a way of organizing society to maximize the exploitation and distribution of resources, which had become limited when people stopped moving. further, the instruments of the state (the law and government) were used to define, protect, and transfer property. yet, in previous eras, philosophers and theologians explained the origins of the state in several other, more politically compelling ways to maximize the loyalty of citizens. there are probably some elements of truth in some of these myths; most of them, however, are demonstrably inaccurate, and some are even fanciful. true or not, however, these theories have been believed by people and have motivated their political behavior. the main theories about the origin of the state were: the natural theory, the force theory, the divine theory, the divine right of kings’ theory, the social contract theory. see, for instance, the blackwell encyclopedia of political thought, pp.503-506, oxford: blackwell, 1991. 17this position seems, at least in part, more akin to aristotle’s view of the moral and political virtues as being the common possession of all the properly educated free citizens than to plato’s more elitist views. eventually, this democratic traditionalism also influences the roman republican thinking of cicero, find some resonance in thomist thought, and in common law thinking. 18glaucon who is a character in the republic, a longer dialogue divided into ten books, is plato’s elder brother. 19plato, republic, trans. g.m.a. grube, bk. 2, 358e-359b. giuseppe mario saccone 81 20callicles (c.484 late 5th century b.c.e.) was an ancient athenian political philosopher depicted as a young student of the sophist gorgias in plato’s dialogue gorgias. he argues in favor of an oligarchic amoralism which predicates that it is natural for the strong to dominate the weak and unfair to legislate to limit the power of the strong. his ideas, despite the scant surviving sources, influenced friedrich nietzsche, and also subsequently the elitist extreme right wing political views of fascism and nazism. 21protagoras is considered the first great sophist and is a character in the homonymous 53 pages dialogue protagoras. 22on the legal and political consequences of this on our contemporary societies and global politics, see, for instance: rhoda e. howard and jack donnelly, “human rights in world politics”, p.29 (29-46), in robert j. art, robert jervis, international politics: enduring concepts and contemporary issues, new york: 6th edition, longman pearson education, 2003. 23the relevance of this question it is not confined only to political philosophy, but it is crucial for understanding the very nature of what is a human being. how we answer this question it is crucially important for all social sciences. also the origin of the study of psychology can be traced to this debate about nature or nurture. indeed, another way in which the ancient sophists formulated this question was to ask whether human capabilities are inborn or acquired by experience. this is one of the fundamental problems to solve in order to define mental life, and the ancient preliminary stage from which modern psychology as the scientific study of behaviour and mental processes has developed. even today, one of the current areas of enquiry is how nature and nurture combine to shape our behaviour and mental processes. see, for instance, atkinson and hilgard’s, introduction to psychology, pp. 5-6, wadsworth/thomson learning, belmont, ca, usa, 2003. 24hans j. morgenthau, “the moral blindness of scientific man” p.7. 25however, justice can mean different things to different people depending on the culture and context. it can usually be understood, especially in the west, in a broad and in a narrow sense. in the broad sense, it is a matter of distribution, or about who gets what, when, and how. in a narrow sense, it is about punishment for breaking the law, and about rules of truth and evidence to determine judgments in the law. see, for instance, thomas m. magstadt, understanding politics: ideas, institutions, and issues, p.61, boston: wadsworth, international edition, 2011. 26republic, bk.4, 433-434. interestingly, a definition of justice ostensibly similar, but in fact rooted in conceptually different premises, to the one given by plato in republic bk. 1 332: “justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt”, appears also in hobbes’ leviathan but without directly mentioning plato, where it is stated: “justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own”. leviathan, part i, chap.15, p.202, london: penguin classics, 1985. the difference is that in hobbes and in (much of) the subsequent modern philosophy, the rational foundation of justice does not lie as in plato and aristotle in a normative universal natural order, which in medieval islamic and christian philosophy clearly becomes the work of a creator god increasingly seen as the source of the rational order of things, but in the conventional and more subjective faculty of the will according to a process of deliberation which answers to a formal notion of 82 prajna vihara __ __ ~ reason as opposed to the classical substantive one, and which will ultimately lead to hume’s famous statement: “reason is and ought to be the slave of passions”. according to hobbes, “the will is the last appetite in deliberation”. hobbes is a self-professed admirer of plato and a critic of aristotle blaming his influence, and that of roman followers like cicero, as the cause of subversion and turmoil in seventeenth century england. but, in fact, hobbes is also an accomplished scholar of aristotle having among other things also translated his rhetoric. 27see, plato, republic, bk. vii, 519-520. 28plato, crito or the duty of a citizen, trans. by benjamin jowett, p.16. website: www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/…/plato/crito.p…see, also: http://ebooks.adelaide. edu.au/p/plato/p71cro/ 29political contractarianism based on an implicit promise died out during the nineteenth century. the legitimacy of government becomes determined by the justice of its actions, not by the contractual nature of its historical origins. first there never was such a contract. secondly, a hypothetical promise in a 'hypothetical contract' is no promise at all, for no one has undertaken an obligation. i am obliged to keep my promises, not my hypothetical promises. what contemporary contract theorists such as john rawls draw from earlier traditions it is not the emphasis on promising but the idea that obligations are conventional because they arise from the interactions of individuals who are naturally equal, and the fact that conventional obligations secure important human interests. for a brisk summary of the concerns of contemporary contractualism see, for instance, john rawls, “justice as fairness”, pp.187-202, in robert e. goodin and philip pettit, contemporary political philosophy: an anthology, oxford: blackwell, 1997. 30the idea that democracy is flawed because ordinary people are not competent enough to rule will be shared by the elite theorists of the 19th and 20th century. however, whilst plato believed that democracy leads to bad governance, the later elite theorists argued that it is altogether an impossible foolish dream, because political power it is always exercised by a privileged minority. so gaetano mosca (18571941) argued that in all societies there are two classes of people: a class that governs and a class that it is governed. even in a parliamentary democracy, a small and cohesive minority it is always able to control and manipulate the masses. vilfredo pareto (1848-1923) believed that the qualities needed to govern conformed to one of two psychological characters: the fox, who rules by cunning and it is able to manipulate the people, thus obtaining their consent; and/or the lion who rules by the use of force, that is to say, it manages to obtain the submission of the governed either by violent means, or even by simply inspiring fear. robert michels (1876-1936) described what he called “the iron rule of oligarchy”. he maintained that in all organizations, however democratic they may seem, power will naturally concentrate in a small group of dominant figures rather than in the more apathetic rank and file members. jose ortega y gasset (1883-1955) argued, in similar fashion to plato, that mass democracy has overthrown civilized society and the moral order, paving the way for authoritarian rulers that appeal to the basest instincts of the masses. see, for instance, andrew heywood, political theory: an introduction, pp.231-233, 299, london: `macmillan press, 1999. there have been a number of answers to these criticisms of democracy. on one level, it is possible to argue that the idea that ordinary giuseppe mario saccone 83 people are not competent enough to rule it is, at least to some extent irrelevant, or missing the main point of representative democracy, because in fact people are not supposed to rule by themselves, but only to choose representatives which in turn will have to be able to select personnel competent enough to sort out problems according to the mandate bestowed on the representatives by the electors. also, liberal democracies recognize the need to avoid what alexis de tocqueville described as “the tyranny of the majority”, and afford some inalienable rights to minorities, thus eschewing at least the most obvious forms of authoritarianism. but the main argument against elitism operates at a more fundamental level. it is based on a different normative principle than the one assumed by the elitists. that is to say, it is based on a fundamental axiomatic principle that assumes the moral equality of all human beings against the more conservative notion of natural hierarchy advocated by the elite thinkers from plato on to ortega y gasset. among others, john rawls has examined and clarified the ethical and political implications of this principle of equality. see, john rawls, “justice as fairness”, pp.187-202. 31see, republic, bk. ix, 582-3. 32plato’s abolition of private property among the philosopher-rulers inspired sir thomas more’s philosophical romance utopia written in 1514-1515, and the work of the anti-aristotelian astrologist, heterodox dominican monk, and staunch supporter of galileo’s heliocentric views, tommaso campanella entitled the city of the sun, originally written in italian in 1602, published in latin in frankfurt in 1623, and later paris in 1638. these renaissance works portray an ideal state where private property is altogether abolished. thomas more and tommaso campanella thus, in some respect, pre-figured ideas later developed by karl marx and frederick engels in their communist manifesto of 1848. 33republic, bk. v 473. 34yet, the appeal to so called, usually by (self)definition of interested parties, enlightened elites, supposedly in possession of greater wisdom and capacity than ordinary people, as national saviors against the corruption and self-interest of leaders appointed by the masses is proving against all odds as extraordinarily resilient. of course, this resilience lasts only up until the enlightened elites are themselves put to test. the remedy they provide it is indeed, usually, fatally flawed. 35it may be useful at this point to include some observations on plato’s and aristotle’s methods of enquiry referring to their different metaphysical assumptions and their role for the rise of modern science in general and modern political science in particular. plato’s thought was fixed upon the static realm of timeless being, whereas aristotle oriented his thought towards the dynamic realm of becoming. accordingly, aristotle’s whole metaphysics depends on his substitutions of the notions of the causes and of actuality and potentiality for the work of plato's forms. the simplification of outer reality by the senses is necessary for practical survival and activity; however it is a hard and counterintuitive business to wrestle for a theoretical understanding of what in nature lies beyond the senses, which is the task of science. because of his width of knowledge, intelligence and conformity to common sense observations aristotle came to be the predominant figure in european scientific thought for centuries. by turning away from plato’s transcendentalism (despite his espousal of an unmoved moving god) aristotle also turned away from platonic skepticism about 84 prajna vihara __ __ ~ ordinary language and perception. however, it is also true that such skepticism it is a condition of fresh thinking about the world. if this is the case, it may seem odd that modern science has arisen in the west given that indian thinkers, especially the buddhists, had earlier expressed a much more modern approach to language and perception than the western one. however, in the west scientific aristotelianism and scholasticism never completely wiped out the influence of the anti-dogmatic attitude engendered by plato’s skepticism about ordinary language and perception, and this provided some impetus to scientific researches which challenged conventional wisdom. but, arguably, the most important factor for the rise of modern science is the contradictions which appeared so sharply in western philosophy because of the renaissance and its aftermath. these contradictions were tied with an emergent and highly rationalistic account of god which stemmed from aquinas. this rationalistic account of god paved the way for a questioning of the universe as probably displaying the mind of god and hence conforming to rational patterns. 36aristotle, politics, bk. 1, 1253a 2-3; 1256b 20-21. 37it could be very schematically said that in the ancient and medieval world the dominant answer and associated paradigm was the aristotelian assumption that because “man is a political animal”, state and society are natural institutions, reflecting the natural order of things. modern philosophy, instead, from grotius and hobbes onwards, signalled by developing the social contract theory a paradigm shift: a move from the idea of an objective natural order to the centrality of the conventional role of the political will in the establishment of the institutions of government. eventually, from hume onwards, the idea of a clear cut social contract was abandoned, but the centrality and sovereignty of the political will of the people has remained as a fundamental principle of all democracies. however, the idea of the natural rights of every human being to political freedom and human dignity has remained as equally important in the development of liberal theory. the combination of popular will (by convention) and respect for human (natural) rights and freedoms constitutes the moral and political aim of liberal democracies. it also represents the contemporary ideal synthesis and legacy of the ancient debate about whether state and society are or should be by convention or by nature. of course, the problem now is moving from the realm of the programmatic ideals to the realm of practical application, or put it in hegelian terms moving from the abstract to the concrete. 38aristotle, nicomachean ethics, bk. i, 1098a 16-20. 39although it was made up of interacting individuals, the state to the ancient greeks was actually greater than any single person or any group. it became an entity with a life, rights, and obligations apart from those of the people it served. this organic theory of the state was later supported by diverse people such as thomas aquinas, rousseau, and mussolini. some leftists, today, also still often refer to the organic society. 40however, the thesis of human moral worth, at least in the sense of fullest moral worth, is not applied universally to human beings by plato and aristotle: it is withheld or restricted, for example, in the case of ‘natural’ slaves, of women, and even of common laborers. the tendency of much later western moral and ethical thought, especially following the spread of christianity, has been toward increasgiuseppe mario saccone 85 ingly making universal this thesis of human moral worth. in later thought, human moral worth has not always been so closely tied to enculturation or socialization into a moral community. it is by and large as a result of the development of these ideas that a central issue in the history of western political philosophy is the import of the thesis of human moral worth with respect to two questions concerning political decision-making: who should be making decisions directed toward the common good and how should the content and scope of these decisions respect the thesis of human moral worth? 41see, aristotle, politics, 3.9.1280a31-b12. 42aristotle, nicomachean ethics, 1.3.1131a 25-29. 43but even assuming that this should be the case, how and by who should these qualities be assessed? furthermore, from machiavelli and the theorists of the ‘reason of state’ such as guicciardini, hegel, morgenthau, etc. onwards, the very notion of what is to be virtuous, and of virtue itself has become contentious in the political realm. statecraft has often been frighteningly at odds with morality. the aristotelian practical wisdom, or excellence in all human behaviour, if it ever did, no longer seems to operate in statecraft. but do we still need it? the jury is still out on this, as there no longer seems to be consensus about moral objectivity because, as i have argued in one of my previous papers about hobbes, the rise of modernity is characterized by a dichotomy between the recognition of the moral subjectivism characterizing human behaviour and the supposed objectivity of the natural word as described by science. see also, giuseppe mario saccone, “hobbes and the rise of modernity”: ‘once liberalism has surrendered any belief in objective truths, all personal subjective beliefs become true. the result is that, on the positive side, the only way you can take decisions is according to your own conscience. but on the negative side, once [if] all things are equally valid, the only way to attain supremacy is through war and power’. in other words, as nietzsche said, might is right. this remains a problem. the winners always get the spoils and also write history. but, on the other hand, this is not always strictly true. for instance, spartacus lost his final battle, but became the archetypical symbol of the still enduring struggle against all forms of slavery. the same can be said about socrates and many others, including above all for christians jesus himself. anyway, most importantly, wars are not fought only by sword, or short term success, but also by long term cultural legacies. 44after aristotle, the theory of natural law was developed by the stoics, cicero, and aquinas. eventually, with the rise of modernity, the demands of natural law came to be expressed through the idea of natural rights. natural rights were thought to be invested in humankind either by god or by nature. this is the line of thought followed by grotius, hobbes, locke, and thomas jefferson. see, for instance, richard tuck, natural rights theories: their origin and development, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1979. 45with the rise of modern philosophy, starting from the 17th century, there is a break in the aristotelian unity of knowledge. science becomes the realm of objectivity, whereas ethics and politics start becoming the realm of values and subjectivity. eventually, the aristotelian model will be criticized by hume for falling into the trap of unduly deriving what we ought to do from what it is, and similarly for falling into what later the 20th century ethicist g.e. moore will call the naturalistic fallacy. alleg86 prajna vihara __ __ ~ edly, we fall into the naturalistic fallacy trap, by attempting to make factual information the basis for social and moral imperatives. modern philosophy from galileo, bacon, on to hume considers this as a failure to recognize the essential difference between science and the humanities and, by implication, the essential nature of science as aiming at objective value-free knowledge of the natural world. an approach based on the naturalistic fallacy is likely to subvert both true science and a proper understanding of the source of value in the lived experience of generations of human beings. see, for instance: donald palmer, why it’s hard to be good: an introduction to ethical theory, pp.10-15, new york: mcgraw-hill higher education, 2006. 46aristotle, nicomachean ethics. bk. i, 1094a 2-3. 47aristotle, rhetoric, trans. w. rhys roberts, 1.10.1368b8-9 48ibidem, 1.1373b6-9. 49both plato and aristotle understood the structure of the polis, and indeed moral goodness itself in terms of the fulfillment of the purpose of human nature (as virtue ethicists such as the neo-aristotelian alasdair macintyre, rosalind hursthouse, elizabeth anscombe, nel noddings, and linda zagzebski have done recently). however, on the one hand, plato introduces a form of political rationalism which would later also lead to the development of philosophies centered on the role of rational intuition in our quest for knowledge. and moral rationalism will find its apogee in emmanuel kant. on the other hand, aristotle argues in favor of a form of protopolitical empiricism which could be seen also as inspiring the evolution of moral empiricism which will later culminate in the utilitarianism of jeremy bentham and john stuart mill, which though will ultimately bypass the classical moral and political theories. 50of course, having been for a while the tutor of alexander, aristotle could not have been overtly hostile to the macedonian conquest. in fact, it seemed to have been very supportive of this conquest by advising alexander to handle respectfully the citizens of the greek cities, whilst he recommended ignoring the interests of the foreigners living there. after the death of alexander, a hostile democratic faction came into power in athens, and aristotle, having thus lost political favor and protection, was exiled. he went to live in his family estate in chalcis, where he died one year later, in 322 b.c.e. 51aristotle, nicomachean ethics, book, i, 1094a 1-3, b 6-7. 52aristotle, website: members.tripod.com/batesca/aristotle.html 53of course, the thesis of human moral worth, universal for us, it is severely restricted in aristotle. in its fullest sense, it is the prerogative only of the properly educated greek citizens. a large majority of the population is at least in part excluded from this moral worth and the liberty which it entails. for aristotle, women are (supposed to be) inherently deficient in regard to this, and so are the natural slaves. (plato has a different take on women, but only if they belong to the philosophers’ class.) according to aristotle (and plato concerning slaves), some men are slaves by nature, and it is therefore permissible to make them slaves in fact. it follows that slaves may enjoy a good life only if they have good masters; they are not supposed to have either liberty or rights on their own. 54aquinas, summa theologica, prima secundae partis, q.61. 55here principle democrats are intended as those who following from the giuseppe mario saccone 87 ideas of john locke and jean jacques rousseau believe that the process of making decisions is only part of democracy itself. accordingly, principle democrats argue that what should be considered as most important are the basic goals of democracy, such as ensuring the freedom and independence of individuals, including for later thinkers (from jeremy bentham onwards) promoting social welfare. process democrats are those considering democracy simply as a process by which decisions are made on a popular mandate. their historical inspiration would come from the more conservative edmund burke and james madison who wrote after the first generation of democratic theorists already somehow set the foundational principles of democracy itself. see, leon p. baradat, political ideologies: their origins and impact, p.62, eight edition, prentice hall: upper saddle river, new jersey, 2003. according to process democrats, democracy would thus be more of a path than a destination. i think that aristotle’s position, although not unequivocally advocating any form of democracy, being more a forerunner of mixed constitutionalism, could nevertheless arguably be seen more akin to the one of process democrats. on the other hand, if my interpretation is correct, plato being closer to the elite theorists would more definitely be equally hostile to both principle and process democrats. however, this does not necessarily reflect the way in which the history of political theory has actually developed. the above mentioned principle democrats of classical liberalism variously advocated, or were at least partially inspired by the social contract theory of grotius and hobbes which, in turn, arguably and paradoxically finds some initial inspiration in the contractualist position described in plato’s dialogues in order to be rejected both on moral and rational grounds by socrates and plato himself. process democrats and many of the theorists of the separation between legislative, judicial and executive powers were inspired by charles montesquieu who was a self-avowed admirer of aristotle’s political philosophy. thus the entire history of western political philosophy and indeed of philosophy itself could be seen as a continuous dialogue and /or unfolding dialectics between the influences of plato and aristotle. 56in regard to this, as the leftist neo-marxist theory of noam chomsky (1928) points out, once the public sphere it is made to shrink, alas, it is reinforced the principle that no matter who is in government the small guy gets screwed by the various rich and powerful private individuals, pace socrates, with callicles’ posthumous blessings. it is of little comfort that, of course, different governments allow different levels of exploitation giving more or less leeway to the various local very important persons to directly or indirectly screw their workforce and also more generally civil society by diverting precious collective resources to their own private, often idiosyncratic enterprises. the common good is often the main casualty of this unhindered privatization process. 88 prajna vihara __ __ ~